War and Peace:
Analysis of the Egyptian Presence in the Levant during the 18th Dynasty

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the establishment of the Egyptian "Empire" in the Levant at the beginning of the Late Bronze Age, and aims at reconstructing the reasons that brought Thutmose III and its successors to conquer and control the region. This reconstruction is based upon an analysis of their military actions, namely their campaigns and the development of a network of installations able to logistically support the army in enemy territory. Given the scattered nature of the sources, written and archaeological evidence are used in concert, and the subject at hand is seen through the new and different perspectives of modern military theory. In this way, there emerges a picture of a complex and calculated Egyptian effort, aimed at developing and controlling a buffer state in the region. In particular, it is argued that the Egyptian efforts appear to have been specifically designed to respond to the peculiar characteristics of each area they entered, and to the mutation of the objectives through time. Such an adaptability has been hitherto unrecognized, and opens new avenues in the study of the Levant under the Egyptian occupation.

Ad Alessia, cui non servono parole e ringraziamenti.

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List of Abbreviations

AIT	Tablets from Alalakh. Tablet number in Donald J. Wiseman, 1953, *The Alalakh tablets*, London, United Kingdom: British Institute of Archaeology in Ankara.
CTH	Emmanuel Laroche, 1971, *Catalogue des textes hittites*, Etudes et commentaires 75, Paris, France: Klincksieck.
EA	Amarna Letter; tablet number in Jorgen Alexander Knudtzon et al. 1915, *Die El-Amarna-Tafeln: mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen*, Leipzig, Germany: Hinrichs.
KBo	Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft, 1916–, *Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazköi*, Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichung der Deutschen Orient Gesellschaft, Leipzig, Germany: Hinrichs.
KRI	Kenneth Anderson Kitchen, 1975–1990, *Ramesside Inscriptions: Historical and Biographical*, Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.
KTU	Manfried Dietrich et al., 2013, *Die keilalphabetischen Texte aus Ugarit, Ras Ibn Hani und anderen Orten = The Cuneiform Alphabetic Texts from Ugarit, Ras Ibn Hani and Other Places*, 3rd, Alter Orient und Altes Testament 360/1, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag.
KUB	Vorderasiatische Abteilung, 1921–1990, *Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköi*, Berlin, Germany: Akademie-Verlag.
RS	Ras Shamra - Museum siglum of the Louvre and Damascus.
***Urk*. IV**	Kurt Sethe and Wolfgang Helck, 1906–1958, *Urkunden der 18. Dynastie*, Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums IV, Leipzig, Germany: Hinrichs.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

In the past decades the Egyptian presence in the Levant has been an extremely fashionable topic in Academia. The ever-expanding corpus of research on the subject has included analysis of the concept of Egyptian imperialism in the Levant,[1] on the military campaigns in the region and the texts narrating them,[2] on the economics of the domination,[3] on the archaeological traces of the Egyptian presence,[4] and on the diplomatic system that supported it.[5] This crowded field of scholarship has greatly advanced the understanding of the Egyptian presence in the Levant during the New Kingdom, but the sheer proliferation of these studies also highlights the complexity of the topic at hand, opening new avenues of research and calling for different ways to analyse the related data.[6] A first important development has been the reassessment of the 500-years of New Kingdom imperialism into shorter and more manageable periods of time named after the 18th, 19th, and 20th Dynasties. This rather obvious distinction has helped to clarify the circumstances connected to the historical developments of each period. The second development is a shift in scholarly focus, from the topics of weaponry developments and tactical manoeuvres[7] to the abstract aspects of the Logistics and of the Egyptian "Art of War".[8] Ellen Morris has been an important part of this process, first with her monumental monography on the military bases of the Egyptian Empire (2005), and then with a series of papers which analyse the Egyptian behaviour in the Levant through tools and concepts borrowed from modern social or political studies.[9]

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[1] Helck 1971; Kemp 1979; Redford 1979c; 1990; 1992; Weinstein 1981; Knapp 1989; Galán 1995; Bunimovitz 1995; 2018; Morris 2005; 2018.

[2] Faulkner 1942; 1946; 1953; Schulman 1964a; 1964b; Spalinger 1974; 1979a; 1979b; 1982; 1983; 2005; Der Manuelian 1987; Redford 2003; Heagren 2007; 2010; Wernick 2014.

[3] Aḥituv 1978; Na'aman 1981; Bleiberg 1984; Knapp 1992; Marsio Cole 2004.

[4] Both focusing on the individual sites and on the larger Levantine regions. See for example Oren 1984; 2019; Kokhavi 1990; James et al. 1993a; Mullins 2002; Martin 2004; 2011; Barako 2007; Burke et al. 2010; 2017; Mazar et al. 2006; 2011; Massafra 2016; 2018; Blakely 2018; Damm 2021.

[5] Spalinger 1979a; Liverani 1990b; 2001; Cohen et al. 2002; Sürenhagen 2006; Mynářová 2007; Podany 2010; Breyer 2010b; Kahn 2011b.

[6] As Morris (2005:1) argued almost two decades ago.

[7] Drews 1993; Cotterell 2004; Pollastrini 2013; 2017; Shaw 2019.

[8] Wells 1999; Spalinger 2005; Darnell et al. 2007; Heagren 2010; Wernick 2014; Shaw 2017; P. Emanuel 2020.

[9] Morris 2010; 2015a; 2015b; 2017. In her 2017 article, for example, she compared the Egyptian reliance on the harsh environments of its deserts to

While much attention had been given to the Ramesside period and to how the Egyptians conquered and managed the territory they controlled, less focus has been granted to the Thutmosides and to why they erected their Empire in the first place. This research aims at filling this gap, reconstructing the geopolitical ambitions behind the conquest and management of the Levant by the Pharaohs of the 18th Dynasty, from the conquest of Thutmose III to the death of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. The argument is built upon the premise that political intent is translated into military actions through a series of coordinated efforts, and therefore, by studying the military actions, it is possible to abstract the political ends that motivated them. To put it in a different way, this research is based upon the theoretical premise that it is possible to "Reverse Engineer"[10] said ambitions by dissecting the Egyptian military actions into its main components: the military campaigns themselves, and the Logistical system set up to support them.

1.2. Research questions and outline of the thesis

This thesis aims at answering the following research questions:

- What was the Egyptian military approach to the Levant in the Mid-18th Dynasty?
- How had this approach developed by the time of the Late 18th Dynasty?
- On the base of these approaches and their developments, what can be said were the Egyptian objectives in foreign policy in the two periods?

This thesis is divided into four parts.

The first three chapters set the terms for the discussion, providing a background to both the research question and the theoretical framework through which the answer will be provided. Chapter **I** – the one you are reading – presents the reader with a short review of the relevant literature and a discussion of the aim and structure of the Thesis. Chapter **II** introduces the reader to the geography

control the borders to the current United States policy of Prevention Through Deterrence at the border with Mexico.

[10] Reverse Engineering is the "process of extracting design blueprints from anything man-made," an action usually conducted when such pieces of information are not available, but the end-product is. Traditionally, the process entails the dissection of the product into its constituent parts in order to understand what each piece does (Eilam 2005:3–4).

of the region, to the history of the wars of the 18th Dynasty, and to the social (and possibly political) infrastructure of the Levant before and during the 18th Dynasty. Chapter **III** then presents the modern theoretical frame that will be used to guide the discussion and analyse the data.

The following three chapters are dedicated to the gathering of the data and the discussion of elements which are important in defining the Egyptian military focus: the battles that they fought, the campaigns they set up, and the Logistical System they built to support them. Each chapter focuses on a different set of evidence and on a different subject. Chapter **IV** first introduces the reader to the key written documents of the time, and then discusses the number and scope of the Military Campaigns that they describe. Chapters **V** and **VI** focus on the Nodes and the Edges of the Operational Network, the Egyptian installations in the region and on the roads connecting them.

The last chapters gather the elements previously discussed, analyse them, and conclude this research. Chapter **VII** proposes an interpretative model of the Egyptian presence in the Levant, and then uses it to analyse its military aspects. Chapters **VIII** and **IX** interpret the results in terms of foreign policy, discussing the Egyptian presence in the southern Levant during the 18th Dynasty. Chapter **X** provides a last summary of the argument, and theorizes further developments for this avenue of research.

Table 1: Timeframe[1]	
Period and archaeological periodization[2]	Kings and number of their regnal years
Early 18th Dynasty (c. 1539 -1458 BC) LB IA	Ahmose (25 years)
	Amenhotep I (20)
	Thutmose I (13)
	Thutmose II (2/4)
	Hatshepsut (21)
Mid-18th Dynasty (c. 1457-1390 BC) LB IB	Thutmose III (33)[3]
	Amenhotep II (25) [4]
	Thutmose IV (10)
Late 18th Dynasty (c. 1390-1292 BC) LB IIA	Amenhotep III (38)
	Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten (17)
	Smenkhkare +? + Tutankhamun (13) [5]
	Ay (3)
	Horemheb (27)

CHAPTER II: BACKGROUNDS

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides pieces of contextual information necessary to introduce the research's argument: the first subchapter introduces the reader to the geography of the Levant; the second is a historical introduction to the relationship between Egypt, the Levant, and the kingdom of Mittani during the Late Bronze Age; the third is a presentation of the socio-political system of Mittani.

2.2. Geographical Background[6]

[1] Based on Hornung et al. 2006:197-201, 479-480, 492.

[2] This research follows the common synchronization between the southern Levant and Egypt, used by Morris (2005:20-21) and Martin (2011:19-20) among many others. According to this synchronization, LB IA roughly coincides with the timespan of the early 18th Dynasty, LB IB with that of the Mid-18th Dynasty, and the LB IIA with the Late 18th Dynasty. It is important to note, however, that transitions between each phase at different sites are not necessarily contemporaneous and might have started and ended at different but overlapping times. Moreover, while this scheme provides a quick and functional frame of reference, the synchronisation between the Egyptian historical chronology and the relative chronological phases of the Levant should not be understood as reliably fixed, especially considering that radiocarbon dates from southern Levantine sites sometimes re-date substrata due to the presence of undiagnostic pottery for the early LBA (see for example Webster et al. 2019:94-96).

[3] Thutmose III reigned 54 years, the first 21 of which he shared power with Hatshepsut. Conventionally, the Mid-18th Dynasty starts with his first year of sole reign.

[4] The small impact of the thorny question of the three-years coregency between Thutmose III and Amenhotep II (see Redford 1965; Der Manuelian 1987:19-45; Spalinger 2011; Taterka 2019), is discussed in **§4.3.3.**

[5] As this research ends ends with the death of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, the heavily disputed argument the number of Smenkhkare's successors and the length of their kingdoms (see for example Miller 2007a) has no impact on this research.

[6] Figure §, like other maps in this research, has been realized on a west-to-east axis rather than on a north-to-south one, "horizontally" rather than "vertically." Since the ʿAkkar Plain is more to the east than the Dead Sea, any vertical map showing both must include large and empty portions of Mediterranean and eastern desert at the top left and bottom right corners, with only a narrow strip of populated land at the centre. Albeit off-putting, a




Figure 1: Regions of the Levant

The term "Levant" is commonly used to indicate the Mediterranean portion of Western Asia between the Sinai Peninsula in the south to the Anti-Taurus in the North, the area today occupied by the states of Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.[7] In archaeology, "Levant" is commonly used to indicate two territories: the coastal region of Syria-Palestine, and the vast fertile plain of Northern Syria.[8]

This area is composed of several small independent and highly individual regions, and according to Liverani,[9] this structure did not allow the formation of a single regional polity that could match in dimensions and ambitions the larger and more geographically contiguous kingdoms of northern Syria and Egypt, which could more easily therefore achieve the control of this fragmented region. Together, these regions compose a general geographical unity based on four physical

"horizontal" map minimizes the less-relevant areas and better shows the relevant regions of the "diagonal" Levant. A more conventional north-to-south axis will be used to show smaller regions.

[7] Suriano 2014:9.
[8] Suriano 2014:9.
[9] Liverani 2003:4.

factors:[10] a vast desert in the east, the Mediterranean Sea in the west, with the Syro-African rift[11] and its surrounding mountain ranges between them.

This description starts from the coastal south and proceeds clockwise to end in the Arabah. The deserts of North Sinai and Negev are a single plain covered in sand dunes. Characterized by high ground water, the dune fields are poor in vegetation and cannot be cultivated. Because of the functionally non-existent rainfall, settlements and agriculture were scarce, and the region was mostly inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic populations.[12] Only the regions of the Wadi el-Arish and of the Wadi Gaza, with their concentration of water wells, allowed some sustenance agriculture.[13] North of the Wadi Gaza, the coastal line is characterized by another strip of sand dunes, which forced the commercial roads and the most prominent cities (like Ashdod) to be located away from the waterfront. Only north of the bay of Jaffa and the Yarkon River the coastal plain becomes broader, allows for rain-fed agriculture, and takes the name of Sharon, "the fertile plain".[14] The central highlands, a mountainous range which during the Late Bronze Age was covered in forests, rises east of the coastal plain.[15] Its southern section, the Shephelah (a Hebrew word meaning "foothills") is a small and fertile hilly region that separates the mountains of the central highlands from the coastal area.[16] Its northern section, the Galilee, is comprised of a mountainous region intersected by several valleys, the most important of which is the Jezreel.[17] This vale perpendicularly cuts the central mountain range, and connects the plain of Akko to the Jordan Valley. North of the Akko Plain, the Lebanon Mountains form a barrier that follows the Mediterranean coast, with only a long and narrow strip of land to separate the two. This strip ends in the 'Akkar Plain, a fertile chasms between the Lebanon Mountains and the northern chain of the Jabal en-Nusayriyah,[18] connected to the Orontes River Valley and southern Syria byh the so-called Homs Gap. The Lebanon Mountains' snow cap supplies water to several rivers and streams that allow extensive irrigation in the valleys of the Syro-

[10] Fisher 1971:376.
[11] A long depression running from the gulf of Aqaba in the south to the Beqaa in the north.
[12] Aharoni 1979:26; Suriano 2014:18.
[13] Kolska Horwitz 2005:27-28.
[14] Aharoni 1979:25.
[15] Rowton 1967:262.
[16] Hopkins 1985:68.
[17] Lemche 1988:11-15.
[18] Turri 2015:77-79.

African rift,[19] the most important of which is the Beqaa, where the waters of the Orontes irrigate a large area of arable and fertile land.[20]

From the Anti-Lebanon (the mountain chain on the other side of the Rift) originates the Jordan River. Flowing southward, the river divides the region into Cisjordan (on the west) and Transjordan (on the east), and creates several fertile lowland plains and three lakes: the Huleh, the Kinneret,[21] and the Dead Sea.[22] At times the river flows too deep in a canyon to have been of any use for agriculture in the Bronze Age,[23] and the proximities of the Dead Sea and the Arabah (the southern continuation of the Rift) are semi-desertic lands, where life only manifests near oasis. On the eastern side of the Jordan lies a plateau 300-700 metres high.[24] Bordered on the west by steep slopes that descend toward the rift, the plateau is strongly influenced by its eastern neighbour, the Syro-Arabic desert. With its strong winds, the desert is capable of damaging cultivations and force a pastoral economy on the population of the plateau.[25] The Bashan, the northern plateau east of the Kinneret, is the exception to this general rule because it enjoys large rainfalls and snowfalls thanks to the presence of Mount Haran.[26] South of the Bashan lies the Gilead, a region with difficult terrain, scarce water, and a pastoral economy, which was able to relatively flourish through its control of a major communication route: the King's Highway.[27] South of Gilead, the highlands of Moab and Edom lie alongside the Dead Sea. While the former is mainly a tableland where life was supported by a pastoral mode of production, the latter consists of a chain of high mountains located east of the Arabah. Due to its height, on the western ascent of the plateau it enjoys an adequate amount of rainfall during the winter which grants a long and narrow strip of arable land.[28]

[19] Fisher 1971:383.
[20] Suriano 2014:13.
[21] Also known as the sea of Galilee.
[22] Aharoni 1979:33.
[23] Aharoni 1979:33.
[24] Fisher 1971:385.
[25] Aharoni 1979:37.
[26] Fisher 1971:385.
[27] Aharoni 1979:39. See **§6.2.**
[28] Suriano 2014:20.

2.3. Historical Background

2.3.1. The early-18th Dynasty in the southern Levant and the transition between the Middle and the Late Bronze Age

At the end of the Second Intermediate Period, Egypt was divided into three areas, with the north controlled by the Hyksos, a Nubian state in the south, and Thebes controlling the central Nile Valley.[29] Thebes was a fully independent state in an Egypt divided between the ruled by the Pharaohs of the 17th Dynasty, capable under Seqenenra to control the Nile valley from Abydos to Edfu, and under Kamose to engage wars against Kush and Avaris, the Hyksos capital in the Nile Delta.[30] Avaris (Tell el-Daba) was conquered by Ahmose (Kamose's successor and founder of the 18th Dynasty) who then sieged and conquered a southern Levantine Hyksos city named Sharuhen, usually identified with Tell el-Ajjul.[31]

In the period between Ahmose and Thutmose III several among the rich and well defended cities of the southern Levant appear to have suffered violent destructions, which typically mark the end of the Middle Bronze Age strata and the beginning of the Late Bronze Age ones. Hazor is buried under a thick layer of ashes, several collapsed roofs and charred wooden timbers characterize the end of Gezer, and metres of mudbrick debris cover Shiloh and Shechem.[32] The argument of the causes and actors behind these and other destructions is fascinating, vast, and in dire need of a thorough discussion able to consider the data arisen during the last decades and integrate them into a new understanding of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, such treatment is not the focus of this research, and this discussion must be limited in scope to the elements of consequence to the wider argument.[33]

[29] Redford 1992; Ryholt 1997:141; Bietak 2001; Gotskova 2010:90. For the concept of the so-called Hyksos "invasion" and control, see Bader 2021 and Forstner-Muller 2021 respectively

[30] Polz 2018:230. As it appears in the biographies of Sobekhnakht of El-Kab (Davies 2003) and Emhab of Edfu (Klotz 2010).

[31] *Urk.* IV, 4:10-14. See **§5.4.2.1.**

[32] Watanabe 2002:107-108.

[33] For a discussion, see Ilan 1995; Watanabe 2002:111; Burke 2008:101; Golden 2009:147; Maeir 2010; Ahrens 2015; Höflmayer 2015; Massafra 2016.

Na'aman theorized that the Old Hittite invasion of Syria in the 16th century caused a large number of Hurrians to flee south, leading to the destruction of cities and the disruption of international trade.[34] His hypothesis was based on the fact that a high percentage of Hurrian and Indo-Aryan names – absent in MBA documents from the southern Levant – suddenly appear in the LBA ones: of the 90 individuals whose names were recorded during the MBA, 91.25% bore West Semitic names, and only 2.4% Hurrian ones. Of the 151 individuals whose names were recorded during the 18th Dynasty, only 63% bore West-Semitic names, and 37% bore Hurrian or Indo-Aryan ones.[35] Na'aman's idea however lacked supporting archaeological data and was quickly rejected. According to Dever, no destruction can be dated as early as this theory would demand, the international trade "*actually reached its zenith*" when, according to Na'aman, it should have ended.[36] Moreover, Dever continues, none of the tablets cited by Na'aman appear to come from a stratified context securely dated to the MBA, and thus Na'aman's sole evidence were the personal names of Hurrian origin in the Tanaach and Amarna Letters, which merely attested the "*multi-cultural, polyglot population that has long been known to have characterized Syria Palestine in the Late Bronze Age*."[37] Since also an explanation based on internecine warfare[38] was quickly rejected by Dever and Weinstein due to the absence of any element in its support,[39] the commonly accepted hypothesis became the "*revenge*"[40] against the Hyksos, according to which the destructions should be attributed to a series of undocumented Egyptian campaigns in the southern Levant before the time of Thutmose III.[41]

This theory remains undemonstrated, and is based on the assumption that the Egyptian military presence in the southern Levant started already with Ahmose and the other Pharaohs of the Early 18th Dynasty.[42] However, the early 18th Dynasty scarabs found in MBA tombs in Jericho and

[34] Na'aman 1994:183.
[35] Zadok 1996:118; Hess 1997:153. Similar proportions of Hurrian and Indo-Aryan names have been identified by Glock (1971:30) in the administrative tablets at Tanaach, and by Na'aman (1994:177) and Horowitz et al. (2018:128) in Shechem 2.
[36] Dever 1998:93-94.
[37] Dever 1998:96, 101.
[38] Proposed by Hoffmeier 1989; 1990; 1991. Bunimovitz 1995:322-323.
[39] Dever 1990; 1998; Weinstein 1991.
[40] As per Dever's definition (1998:101).
[41] Weinstein 1981; 1991; Dever 1985; 1990; 1998; Morris 2005:35-38.
[42] As reassessed by Bunimovitz (1995:320-324) and Hoflmayer (2015).

Ashkelon, show commercial efforts at a time when the supposed Egyptian destructions should have been taking place,[43] and there are few written documents to support the idea of Egyptian military actions in the southern Levant at this time.[44] Morris has explained the lack of evidence in support of the revenge hypothesis by saying that comparatively few early 18th Dynasty monuments have survived, and that Pharaohs would have commanded only the "*glamorous*" – and thus commemorated – northern expeditions, leaving to their generals the "*mundane*" – and thus forgotten – southern ones.[45] While it is undeniable that only few early-18th Dynasty monuments have survived, it is equally undeniable that enough of them have been found that contemporary campaigns against Nubia and the northern Levant can be reconstructed through hints and traces, and it would be a rather extreme case of chances of conservation if only documents mentioning southern Levantine campaigns had been entirely lost. Furthermore, Morris herself has mentioned how "*impressive*" the destructions' extent appears to have been,[46] and undoubtedly a large army would have been needed to cause them, and an even greater amount of booty and slaves would have been brought to Egypt in the aftermath. Such major campaigns would have most likely been guided by the king, but even if they had been led by a general, they would still have been the subject of a great propagandistic effort focused on the crown, rather than simply forgotten. Shaw,[47] for example, has noticed that there are examples of recorded Egyptian campaigns which were not guided by the ruler: there is no indication in the Aswan Philae Stela[48] that Thutmose II campaigned personally in Nubia, and Djehutymose refers to a Nubian campaign of Thutmose III indicating that the king only joined the army after the enemy had been defeated.[49] Moreover Hatshepsut did not participate in the commercial expedition to Punt, and yet such effort prominently appears in her propaganda.[50]

[43] See Ben-Tor 2007b:157 and Bietak et al. 2008:57 respectively.

[44] Beside the mention of the conquest of Sharuhen in the autobiography of Ahmose son of Abana (*Urk.* IV, 35:16-17), the biography of Ahmose Pennekhbet mentions two expeditions against Djahy (possibly the coastal Levant, see **§8.3.1.**) and against the nomadic Shasu under Ahmose and Thutmose I (*Urk.* IV, 36:12-14). Morris (2005:29) has convincingly argued that these texts support three different campaigns: since Ahmose Pennekhbet lived to see Hatshepsut on the throne some 50 years later, his first campaign might be different by the one fought by the son of Abana.

[45] Morris 2005:35-36.

[46] Morris 2005:35.

[47] Shaw 2008:116.

[48] *Urk.* IV, 137:1-141:9.

[49] Cairo TN. 21.3.25.14, Selim 2005: 333-337, pl. II.

[50] e.g. *Urk.* IV, 372:14–17.

A single cause for the southern Levantine destructions at the end of the MBA cannot, therefore, be identified with certainty. No monolithic explanations can be supported, either because they have been outright disproven, or because they are unsupported by the evidence. However, if none of the explanations seem to work, neither is acceptable to reject all of them entirely. Although Morris' considerations are not convincing enough if one were to attribute all destructions to series of Egyptian campaigns capable of turning major cities into piles of cinders and rubble without leaving a trace in the available records, they remain valid if one theorizes minor expeditions led by generals. At the same timer, Dever's hastily dismissal of Na'aman's ideas appears undeserved. On the one hand, because recent C14 studies date the destruction of many southern levantine towns to the second and third quarters of the 16th Century BC, comfortably in range of Na'aman's assumption.[51] On the other hand, because the argument that the Hurrian onomastics merely attest to a "*multi-cultural, polyglot population*" is tautologic and has little explanatory value. Since foreign names do not simply "happen" to germinate in a society, their presence requires an explanation that Dever did not offer.[52]

A series of recent studies on the genome of the Bronze Age Levantine population has brought some support to Na'aman's ideas of an influx of foreigners in the MBA Levant by finding the Levantine population of the MBA and the LBA to be related to both earlier local populations, and to populations that were related to the area of the Zagros mountains – in modern-day Iran – during the Chalcolithic.[53] These findings have suggested that the local population had descended from a mixture of people that had settled in the Levant during the 3rd millennium, and of people that had arrived in the southern Levant sometimes during the MBA.[54] Agranat-Tamir et. al in particular focused on individuals coming from 5 archaeological sites dated at a period comprised between the Intermediate Bronze and the Iron Ages: Tel Megiddo (33

[51] Webster 2021:393.
[52] See **§8.3.2.** for a discussion.
[53] Either directly (Lazaridis et al. 2016; Haber et al. 2017; Feldman et al. 2019) or through the Caucasus (Agranat-Tamir et al. 2020:1150-1151). For background on the technique, see Rasmussen et al. 2010; Stoneking et al. 2011.
[54] Analysis of ancient DNA cannot reveal pieces of information regarding the languages and culture of the examined people, but they carry evidence of those movements of people that are invoked by the proponents of migration theories (e.g., Haak et al. 2015 on the origin of the Indo-European languages in Europe).

individuals, plus one from the Intermediate Bronze and one from theIron Age), Baqah in central Jordan (21), and Hazor (3).[55] The obtained data were combined with the already published DNA evidence from other sites in the region, especially Sidon and Ashkelon.[56] While most Bronze and Iron Ages individuals form a tight cluster, meaning that the individuals of the region were more closely related to each-other than they were to outside populations, the data suggest an increase in Zagros-related ancestry across time, likely indicating the settlement of newcomers in the southern Levant during the MBA and the LBA either continuously or with multiple distinct waves.[57] In other words, these studies strongly support Na'aman's suggestion of an influx of Hurrian people in the southern Levant at a time before the Egyptian domination. Three individuals from Megiddo seemingly might offer an extreme example of this process.[58] They are outliers in Zagros-related ancestry, but the strontium-isotope analysis[59] of their remains revealed they had been raised locally, meaning that they were direct descendants of newcomers in the region. Their tomb was radiocarbon-dated to 1578-1421 BC, meaning they were (roughly) contemporaries with the Pharaohs of the early 18th Dynasty, up to the wars of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II. Since their tomb was located within the palace of Megiddo, they were likely associated with the ruling class,[60] and therefore there are reasons to argue that these individuals would have been direct descendants of recent newcomers connected to the ruling class of Megiddo at the time of the early 18th Dynasty.

In recent years Ilan, Maeir, and Massafra,[61] have shared a "call for complexity" in the analysis of this topic, arguing that since the transition was not a uniform and contemporaneous process, the causes of the destructions were likely different from region to region, or even from site to site. According to Maeir, in the Jordan Valley sites were destroyed over an extended period

[55]Agranat-Tamir et al. 2020:1147.
[56] Haber et al. 2017; Feldman et al. 2019.
[57]Agranat-Tamir et al. 2020:1151.
[58] Agranat-Tamir et al. 2020:1150.
[59] A technique commonly used to provide information on the movements of humans and animals. It compares an individual's strontium isotope signature with that of the local biosphere to understand the relations between the two (e.g. Grupe et al. 1997; Bentley et al. 2003; Giblin et al. 2013; Whelton et al. 2018 See Bentley 2006 for a discussion on the uses of the technique in archaeological settings).
[60] As suggested by Agranat-Tamir et al. 2020:1151.
[61] Ilan 1995:314-315; Maeir 2010:165-175; Massafra 2014.

between the Late 17th and the Early 15th century BC.[62] Massafra has underlined how the northern sites suffered destructions only in the advanced stage of the LB I, comfortably in range of the campaigns of Thutmose III, while cities in the central and southern areas of Palestine met their destruction earlier.[63] If the causes of the destructions might have been different, their consequences were just as varied: the northern and larger sites like Hazor were immediately resettled, while smaller one or in less fertile areas such as the Galilee were definitively abandoned.[64] In light of these considerations, Maeir sees "*several overlapping, and at times very different, processes*" to have been simultaneously in action, and among them counts the Egyptian military activities, the immigration from the north, and demographic and economic decline.[65] In his opinion, during the Middle Bronze Age the population in the Jordan Valley had grown to approximately 20,000 people,[66] and the region was able to feed around 21,600 of them.[67] In a situation of such near capacity, any exogenous shock – be it famines, Egyptian military movements, or any influx from northern Hurrian neighbours – might have brought along an agricultural and consequently systemic swift collapse.[68] This collapse would in turn explain the change in settlement patterns and the destruction of the time, and would also fit other larger social and economic changes which have not been directly correlated to the destructions but that happened at the same time.[69] While Maeir's reconstruction remains as theoretical as that of an Egyptian "*revenge*", it also has the merit of accounting for the destructions' differences in timing, the lack of supporting evidence to Egyptian campaigns, and the presence of a large Hurrian population in the southern Levant during the LBA.

[62] Maeir 2010:170.
[63] Massafra 2014:196
[64] Ilan 1995:315; Maeir 2010:169.
[65] Maeir 2010:170-175.
[66] He obtained this number by multiplying Broshi's (1993) coefficient of approximately 200 people per hectare of settlement for the 105 hectares of known settlements.
[67] The region is approximately 45,000 hectares, with 25,000 hectares of irrigated, farming land, and 15,000 hectares of dry-farming zones. According to Maeir (2010:173, with bibliography) a person would have been fed in a year by the produce of 1.5 hectares of irrigated land, or by the produce of 3 hectares of dry-farming land, and therefore the Jordan Valley might have supported circa 21,600 people.
[68] Maeir 2010:173.
[69] Like the passage from the wheel-thrown, mass produced pottery of the MB strata to the hand-made coarse wares of the LB one (Maeir 2010:174).




Figure 2: Geographical Setting of the Mittani Empire (From Homan 2019: Map I)

2.3.2. The kingdom of Mittani: origin and structure

Before moving on with this chapter, it is necessary to open a parenthesis on the kingdom of Mittani (Egypt's great enemy during the 18th Dynasty), its origins, and its socio-political organisation.[70] Little is known about these topics, because the capital city of Waššukkanni is still relatively unexcavated,[71] and there are only a few documents capable of shedding some light over the kingdom's history and organization.[72] What is known is that by the 16th century Mittani controlled the territories between the Zagros Mountains and the Mediterranean Sea, but the way in which this came to be remains debated.[73] It is however often argued that the sudden rise of this kingdom was the consequence of an Indo-Aryan invasion which saw the invaders bringing along the superior

[70] See, among others, Salvini 2000, Von Dassow 2008, Cancik-Kirschbaum et al. 2014, Homan 2019.

[71] The identification with Tell Fekheriye, at the border between Syria and Turkey, is highly likely but excavations in the site are yet to provide certainty on the matter (Bonatz 2014).

[72] Von Dassow 2014:11; Schwartz 2014:265.

[73] Stockfisch 2006:259; De Martino 2014:61; De Martino 2018:38.

military technology of the war chariot, and their charioteers (the "*maryanni*") becoming the ruling elite of the local Hurrian population.[74]

The foundations of this argument rest almost exclusively on the language this ruling elite supposedly spoke, and that for centuries percolated into the Hurrian language through the words connected to their kings,[75] their gods,[76] their chariots, and their horses.[77] Even "*maryanni*" is formed by the addiction of a Hurrian suffix to the Indo-Aryan word "*Marya*", man.[78] Von Dassow noticed some weaknesses in this argument, counteracting it on three elements. To begin with, while the presence of words of Indo-Aryan origin in the Hurrian language of Mittani is undeniable, the words appear as linguistic "fossils", rather than as part of a living language. They therefore likely reflect previous and undocumented contacts with (rather than an undocumented invasion of) Indo-Aryan speakers.[79] Moreover, the idea that the foreign *maryanni* assumed power in the Hurrian state requires the *maryanni* to have been exclusively Indo-Aryan. However, not only are the recorded names of *maryanni* not exclusively Indo-Aryans, but also Indo-Aryan names are recorded in all social strata, rather than solely among *maryanni*.[80] Finally, she continues, the war chariot was not "imported" in the region by the Indo-Aryans, nor was it a Mittanian innovation, but was locally developed and had already been in use during the Middle Bronze Age.[81] On these bases, she argued that there is therefore no reason to assume a foreign inclusion of Indo-Aryan elements to explain the rise of Mittani.[82]

However, Von Dassow's idea needs mending. Lipinski has demonstrated that Indo-Aryan words are completely absent in early Hurrian texts and appear only in documents from the 16th

[74] See for example Liverani 2014:290-300. For a discussion of the importance of the chariot warfare during the LBA, see Drews 1993 and Cotterell 2004.

[75] According to Anthony (2007:49) for example, "Tušratta" is to be identified with the Old Indic Tvesa-ratha, "*having an attacking chariot*" and Šattuara with *"*Satvar*",* "*Warrior*".

[76] The treaty between Šattiwaza of Mittani and Šuppiluliuma of Ḫatti (CTH 51, 52.), for example, names five deities that are also found in the Rigveda, the oldest book of both Sanskrit literature and Hinduism: Mitra, Varuna, Indra, and the Nasatya twins (Fournet 2010).

[77] Many of the words related to horse training in the Kikkuli text (a manual attributed to a "*horse-trainer from Mittani*") are of Indo-Aryan origin (Raulwing 2006).

[78] Von Dassow 2008:77,

[79] Von Dassow 2008:84-87.

[80] Von Dassow 2008:87-90.

[81] Von Dassow 2008:81-84.

[82] Von Dassow 2008:91. As it was previously established by Littauer and Cromwell (Littauer et al. 1979:68; Littauer et al. 1996, *contra* Kuz′mina et al. 2007:135-138).

century onwards. It seems therefore that the Indo-Aryan speakers would have been a relatively recent acquisition among the Hurrian population, and the idea of "fossil" words would not hold.[83] Moreover, even though chariots were not newly introduced to the Hurrian world, nor a prerequisite to be a part of this newly created élite of the *maryanni*, the elite itself was. Its name, and the fact that it appeared at the same time as the arrival of the Indo-Aryan words in the Hurrian language, are elements that point to the arrival of individuals or groups speaking an Indo-Aryan language before or during the 16th century BC.[84] Considering these remarks, one must re-evaluate Anthony's proposition that a pre-existing Hurrian Kingdom had been overruled by a group of Indo-Aryan speaking mercenaries who had usurped the throne sometime during the early 16th century. The thus founded Dynasty later became Hurrian in almost every sense,[85] but institutionalized elements of its Indo-Aryan past were maintained long after the death of its founders.[86] Anthony himself describes this idea as an unprovable guess, but a model on the onomastics of the Levantine elite recently developed by Kilani[87] offers the support of a theoretical frame to Anthony's opinion. According to this model, a king would have chosen a name from one of three traditions: its own native one, the one he ruled, and one possessing a higher cultural or political status than its native one or the one he ruled.[88] In Mittani the first newcomers would have applied their own tradition in choosing their royal names,[89] but with the passing of time each succeeding king – even those bearing Hurrian names like Kili-Teššub – would have in turn adhered to a tradition perceived as politically superior by following the patterns established by their predecessors. The reconstruction thus offered remains unprovable, but this model has the merit of coherently explaining all the data, representing a Mittani where a largely Hurrian population saw an Indo-Aryan element characterizing some elements of power.

[83] Lipiński 2016:126.
[84] Oates et al. 1997:146. The Alalakh texts present at least an example of a chariot-less *maryannu* (Wiseman 1953:11, texts 128 and 131).
[85] If EA 24 was to be considered the private copy of Tadu-Hepa, as hypothesized by Giorgieri (2005:88) it would mean that private conversation at court happened in Hurrian.
[86] Anthony 2007:50.
[87] Kilani 2020a; 2020b.
[88] Kilani 2020b. While the model was developed for the southern Levant, it is directly applicable to the Mittanian reality. See also **§8.3.6.**
[89] Since their names were Indo-Aryan, and the population to be ruled was largely Hurrian, the second option clearly cannot apply. Similarly, the third would require an Indo-Aryan "Superstate" with a higher cultural or political status that Mittani itself, and nothing suggests its existence.

Much like its origins, the socio-political structure of Mittani has been the subject of an intense debate, mostly because without Waššukkanni's archives our knowledge must derive from a patchwork of mentions from Egyptian and Hittite texts, and of documents found throughout the Empire. Mittani appears to have been a coalition where the "actual" land of Mittani, the Khabur Triangle (known as "Ḫanigalbat"), played a hegemonic role over those defined in Hittite documents as the "*lands of the land of Mittani*".[90] This nature can be theorized on the basis of five elements: the several documents establishing the Mittanian "lordship" over its contiguous states; the different system of administration that were maintained across the Kingdom; the tributes requested by Waššukkanni from the territories it controlled; the composite nature of the Mittanian army; and the almost universal presence of Maryanni in the region.

The relationship between the King in Waššukkanni and the local ones seems to have been one of vassalage, since in the treaties between Idrimi of Alalakh and Pilliya of Kizzuwatna, and between Niqmepa of Alalakh and Ir-Tešub of Tunip, the contracting parties are said to be under Mittanian authority.[91] Moreover, the vassalage link might be receded, since a passage of the treaty between the Hittite King Tuthaliya I with Šunaššura of Kizzuwatna explicitly annuls a previous treaty between Kizzuwatna and Mittani.[92] In addition, a vassal king might have had its own underlings, as it is evident by the fact that the great King Šauštatar ruled over a case between Niqmepa and Šunaššura over the control of the town of Alawari.[93]

Each Mittanian state enjoyed considerable independence. The language of the administration was Akkadian throughout the empire,[94] but models of governance apparently differed from city to city, possibly because Mittani proceeded to integrate local forms of political control rather than imposing their own. For example, several contracts found at Terqa attest the local king to be

[90] Giorgieri 2005:78 n.2. See also the recent works from Von Dassow (2014) and De Martino (2014; 2018).
[91] AIT 2 and 3, Von Dassow 2008:34; 52-53. See also Giorgieri 2005:81
[92] CTH 41.I.2 "*Šunaššura non è più [un suddito] dell'uomo di Hurri*" (Translation Devecchi 2015b:87).
[93] AIT 14, Wiseman 1953:39.
[94] Not only in the most external part of the empire such as Nuzi, Qatna, or Alalakh, but also in the Khabur, at Tell Brak (Giorgieri 2004:88).

governing alongside the Mittanian one,[95] while since several document concerning donations directed from the king Mittani to the "people of Basiru", the city of Basiru seems to have had not a ruler, but a form of collective self-government.[96]

Mittani exacted tributes from the states under its control.[97] This is evident in EA 101: 1-5, where Rib-Addi of Byblos states that the king of Amurru does not have wool or lapis lazuli to give as payment to the land of Mittani and therefore might be easily re-conquered by the Egyptians.[98] Furthermore, in EA 75:35-41, Rib-Addi alerts the Pharaoh that the Hittite king had conquered all those land that were paying tributes to Mittani.[99]

It appears that the Mittanian army was composed of people sent by the various parts of the kingdom. In a recent article, von Dassow has published a series of 8 documents that reflect the administration behind the release of men from four different towns in the oriental land of Arraphe, who had gone on a military campaign and – after a tour of duty – were released from service.[100] Moreover, both Thutmose I and Thutmose III seem to have fought against a coalition army summoned by the Mittani overlord,[101] and therefore the cities and territories under Mittanian control might have had to provide military assistance to the king of Waššukkanni.[102]

Finally, while the administration might have been tailored to the *desiderata* of each territory, the presence of the *Maryanni* seems to have been in common all across the kingdom, from the Alalakh and Arraphe of the 15th century, to the Tell Brak and Ugarit of the 14th and 13th.[103] According to von Dassow, the Maryanni class of Alalakh was established under Niqmepa,[104] likely at time of the city's incorporation into the Mittanian Empire.[105] She has shown that the contemporary documents establish how the *Maryanni* were a higher class who held office in the royal

[95] Von Dassow 2014:19.
[96] Von Dassow 2014:19.
[97] De Martino 2018:44.
[98] Translation Rainey 2015:553.
[99] Cordani 2009:20.
[100] Von Dassow 2009.
[101] *Urk*. IV, 9: 8–14; 709:4.
[102] De Martino 2014:45.
[103] See for example RS 16.132 for Ugarit, and TB 8001 for Tell Brak.
[104] A contemporary to Thutmose III (Beal 1986).
[105] Von Dassow 2008:269.

administration, how the king had a role on determining who was a Maryanni,[106] and that although most Maryanni appear to have owned a chariot, that was not a pre-requisite to being one.[107]

In conclusion, when the Egyptian armies arrived to fight in the northern Levant, they faced a "confederation" of protectorates with a tradition of naming their rulers with Indo-Aryan names, controlled by the hegemon state with a capital in Waššukkanni, in the Habur triangle.[108] Within this confederation, a subordinated ruler might have had vassals under himself, and would have sworn an oath to the overlord, provided tributes and army, and received in exchange protection and support.

2.3.3. Mittani and Egypt during the early 18th Dynasty

After unifying Egypt, Ahmose set out to campaign in Nubia and the Levant, the areas that historically had been in the Egyptian purview. The Kushite kingdom in Nubia seems to have been a priority to him and his immediate successors, but enough references to the Northern Levant in the document at our disposal support the notion of Egyptian campaigns north of the Lebanese coast.[109] In a stela dated at his year 22 an oxen is said to have been captured during Ahmose's "*victories [among] the Fenkhu*," [110] and with Thutmose I the attention moved toward regions controlled at the time by the kingdom of Mittani.[111] In a series of campaigns which are more reminiscent of punitive raids than they are to empire-building, Thutmose's armies arrived at the left bank of the Euphrates.[112] Eco of these campaigns can be found in contemporary documents. The biography of a state official named Amenemhet mentions that the aim of this expedition was to requit Mittani's "*evil*",[113] and Northern Levantine toponyms appear in other documents of the same period. In the middle colonnade of Hatshepsut's mortuary temple at Deir el-Bahari there is a reference to an elephant hunt in *Niyʿ*, near the illustration of a great booty,[114] and three northern Levantine toponyms can be discerned in a gate

[106] In AIT 15 and AIT 91, for example, Niqmepa grants the Maryanni status onto two individuals and their descendants, some of which appear to have moved to live in, or near, his palace (Von Dassow 2008: 272).
[107] Von Dassow 2008:269-314.
[108] Kühne 1999:206, but van der Mieroop (2015:160-165) has limited its description to a vague "vassalage".
[109] Redford 1992:153.
[110] The Lebanese coast, see Morris 2005:30, n.12. *Urk.* IV, 25:12.
[111] Von Dassow 2008:21. For an introduction to the kingdom of Mittani, see **§2.3.2.**
[112] *Urk.* IV, 32:82-86; 697:5.
[113] Translation Kazem Baligh 1997:269. Tomb C.2.Porter et al. 1994:457.
[114] *Urk.* IV, 104, 2-5. Possibly to be identified with the region of the Apamea lake (Turri 2015:347-350).

inscription from Karnak[115]: *Ḳdm, ṯwnjp* and *ḏjʒiwny*. *ḏjʒiwny* is otherwise unknown and *ṯwnjp* is most likely the city of Tunip, in the Orontes Valley.[116] The identification of *Ḳdm* is disputed: the abstract toponym *Ḳdm* "the east" is well attested,[117] but Morris[118] has argued it should be identified with a centre "*in the general vicinity of Byblos*," and both Ahrens and Loffet[119] have connected *Ḳdm* with *Ḳdn*, the city of Qatna.

2.3.4. The southern Levant during the Mid-18th Dynasty

Nothing supports the notion of wars or campaigns in the southern Levant between Thutmose I and Thutmose III, but the situation changed after the death of Hatshepsut, with the first campaign of Thutmose III and the Battle of Megiddo. Redford argued that, judging by the sheer amount of space he devoted to the battle of Megiddo in the temples of Egypt, Thutmose III estimated it as the single, most significant military exercise of his lifetime.[120] Judging from the effects of this battle, one can understand Thutmose's opinion: the battle kicked off the "empire", insured a first form of control in the southern Levant, and provided a "platform" for the campaigns to continue further north.[121] Thutmose is said to have decided to act after hearing that the King of Qadesh had gathered in Megiddo "*the chiefs of all the foreign lands who used to be loyal to Egypt*" together with the Hurrians, Naharinans, and Qode,[122] to have attacked them, to have sieged them, and to have defeated them,[123] receiving an oath of loyalty from all of the defeated chiefs.[124] The victory in Megiddo appears to have had lasting effects, as Thutmose only campaigned again in the south more than a decade later, and only against the semi-nomadic Shasu, possibly in the Negev.[125] The campaigns of his successors in the regions were similarly limited in scope and duration. Amenhotep II seems to have defeated small insurrections in the Sharon and the Jezreel,[126] and the sole mention of a southern

[115] Bradbury 1985.
[116] Morris 2005:30.
[117] Ahrens 2015:357.
[118] Morris 2005:30.
[119] Ahrens 2015:357; Loffet 2015.
[120] Redford 2003:207.
[121] Pfoh 2016:18.
[122] Both the association of different enemies and the king hearing of a rebellion, however, are common *topoi* in Egyptian literature and should not be taken at a face value. According to Simon (2011) Qode is to be located somewhere in North Syria, in Mittanian territory. Thus, assuming his identification correct, this inclusion would either be due to an embellishment, or be revealing of the fact that the King of Qadesh had also Mittani's support.
[123] *Urk*. IV, 667:10-15; 662:16.
[124] *Urk*. IV, 1235 16- 1236:5.
[125] *Urk*. IV, 890:14-15. Morris 2005:126.
[126] *Urk*. IV, 1314:14-1315:8.

Levantine campaign of Thutmose IV appears in a small line of his mortuary temple in Thebes. Thutmose is there said to have settled in the temple's grounds the *ḫ3rw* he had caught in Gezer.[127]

2.3.5. Mittani and Egypt during the Mid-18th Dynasty

In the three decades between the expeditions of Thutmose I and Thutmose III Mittani appears to have expanded from the far east of Assyria to the far west of Kizzuwatna.[128] By the time of Thutmose III Alalakh, Mukiš, and Niya were certainly under Mittanian control, as well as Tunip,[129] and probably Qadesh.[130] If we are to take Thutmose's accounts at a face value, the wars started when Tunip and Qadesh had expanded their influence as far east as the Mediterranean, and as far south as Megiddo,[131] either by themselves, or as puppets from Waššukkanni. In year 29, Thutmose attacked north of Byblos, on the Lebanese coast, conquering Ullassa and Ardata on the 'Akkar Plain,[132] and in the following decades he and Amenhotep II campaigned repeatedly between the territory of the Orontes and of the Habur. After his campaign of year 7,[133] however, any such military action disappears from the sources. At the end of the Memphis Stela the "*chiefs of Naharin, Hatti and Sangar*" are said to have carried gifts, to have begged for peace, and to have asked for the "*breath of life*,"[134] but other elements point to a peace process. The tombs of the veterans stop representing Mittanian captives and booty, leaving way to the peaceful scenes of the "presentation by foreigners",[135] and in the Memphis and Karnak stela the enemy is defined not as "Naharina", but with the archaic term for Asiatics, *šttyw*, possibly indicating a different relations between the two states.[136] From this point forward, peace seems to have become the new status quo: Amenhotep II reigned for another 16 years and a treaty at this stage would explain the lack of further campaigning in the region.[137]

[127] *Urk*. IV, 1556:10-11.
[128] Maidman 2016/2017:24.
[129] Ir-Teshub, the king of Tunip, had signed a treaty with Alalakh were he acknowledged the "King of the Hurrian-warriors" as a guarantor (Wiseman 1953, no.3, 73-75). See **§2.3.2.**
[130] **§8.3.3.**
[131] *Urk*. IV, 664-17-665:4.
[132] *Urk*. IV, 686:3.
[133] Der Manuelian 1987:57-62. See **§4.3.4.1.**
[134] *Urk*. IV, 1309. See **§4.3.4.3.**
[135] **§4.3.6.**
[136] As noticed by Bryan (2000:76).
[137] Der Manuelian 1987:78-83.

The argument for peace can only be substantiated for the time of Thutmose IV. After a possible campaign in the northern Levant,[138] the royal families of Egypt and Mittani started to intermarry. In EA 29 king Tušratta says that Thutmose IV sought, obtained, and married a daughter of Artatama, king of Mittani,[139] that Amenhotep III married at least one princess called Gilu-Hepa, and that another marriage seems to have been intended (but it is unlikely to have happened) for Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[140]

2.3.6. The Levant during the Late 18th Dynasty

At the time of the coronation of Amenhotep III, the Egyptian presence in the southern Levant was in its seventh decade. The actions of his predecessors had secured it to such an extent that no king, either by himself or in a federation, could have ever challenged the Theban power and won. Unsurprisingly, nothing supports the idea of Egyptian campaigns in the region until the late kingdom of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[141] From the last decade of Amenhotep III's reign the situation in the Levant can be observed in the Amarna archives.[142] In the territory under their control, the day-to-day administration was left to the local rulers, and Egyptians only kept enclaves in Gaza, Jaffa, Beth Shean, Ullassa, Sumur, and Kumidi.[143] The kings of the local city-states were vassals to the Pharaoh, and their relationship was based on a formal oath (Akkadian "*māmītu*"),[144] through which the local king promised an annual tribute, nourishment for the Egyptian army, and sheltering for the Egyptian merchants in exchange for the right to rule over his own city.[145] The Egyptians were however under no obligation of implementing said right (either because of a lack of interest, or because they were following the principle of *divide et impera*), and were tolerant of the constant turmoil and infighting in the region, only intervening when their interests were at stake. [146]

[138] Bryan 1991:336. See **§4.4.4.3.**
[139] Bryan (1991:118) has connected this wife with the "*špst Nhrn*" "the Noble Lady of Mittani" mentioned in the funerary cone of a woman called Bengai (Davies et al. 1957:N. 527).
[140] Kühne 1999:218.
[141] See **§4.5.2.**
[142] See **§4.4.4.**
[143] See **§4.4.4.4**.
[144] Mynářová 2015:159.
[145] Liverani 2003:17.
[146] Weinstein 1998:228; De Magistris 2020a.

The Amarna corpus also contains information regarding the relationship between Egypt and the Great Powers of Western Asia (Ḫatti, Mittani, Assyria, Babylonia), which are presented as in regular contact and generally at peace with each-other.[147] According to Weinstein, the letters between Tušratta and Amenhotep III do not contain any element of animosity and seemingly confirm an overall peaceful relation between Egypt and Mittani during the Amarna Period, while the few monuments where the king declares to have put Naharina under his feet are stereotypical and "*unabashedly ahistorical*".[148] However, Altman, Cordani, and Kahn have seen in a series of letters[149] clues that hostilities between the two countries flamed once during the 33rd year of the kingdom of Amenhotep III, when Mittani, at the time ruled by either a regent called Uthi or by the usurper and Hittite puppet Artatama II[150] moved against the Egyptian satellite state of Amurru. Uthi appears to have killed King Artaššumara, Tušratta's brother, and to have installed himself on the throne, where he was unable to find Egyptian support.[151] Once Tušratta had secured his throne and defeated the usurper, the war ended and Mittani and Egypt resumed peaceful relations.[152] In any case, the situation appears to have been internally solved and there is no trace for an Egyptian reaction in the written documents.

At the same time, in Anatolia the Kingdom of the Hittites was at the lowest point of its history, after a series of war had left its land in ruins.[153] Suppiluliuma, first as general and then as king, was able to re-establish his kingdom and launch a series of campaigns in the Levant where he conquered Mittani, subdued it, and made it into a puppet state.[154] In year 5 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, Suppiluliuma began the so-called "First Syrian War", which would have lasted 4-5 years.[155] After attacking the Mittanian Vassals of Isuwa, and Kizzuwatna in the first year of war, in

[147] See **§4.4.4.2.**
[148] *Urk.* IV, 1696:9. Weinstein 1998:223; Morris 2005:220.
[149] EA 17; 60; 75; 85-86; 90; 95; 101. Altman 2003; Cordani 2009:10-50; Kahn 2011a.
[150] According to Kahn (2011a:150), possibly one and the same person.
[151] EA 17:16.
[152] *Urk.* IV, 1693, 17-19.
[153] See Bryce 2005:146-170; and Cordani 2009 for a reconstruction of these events.
[154] Bryan 2000:84; Kühne 1999:220-221.
[155] For the context of this period, I will rely on the chronology established by Violetta Cordani (2009; 2011). This is because of her convincing arguments that the First Syrian War developed during 4/5 years, rather than the 1 year usually assumed (e.g. Richter 2008 and Stavi 2015:79). A thorough discussion of this issue cannot be presented here, but a quick recapitulation of the arguments is necessary. The main source on this war is the historical prologue of the treaty between

the second Suppiluliuma seemingly attacked the Mittanian heartland of Ḫanigalbat, up to Waššukkanni. In the third and the fourth the Hittite Army began attacking the Levantine states of Aleppo, Mukiš, Niya, Qatna, and Nuḫašše, arriving near the Egyptian territories controlled by Sumur. In the fifth year of war – the 9th of reign for Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten –, going against the Kurustama Treaty,[156] Suppiluliuma attacks the Egyptian controlled lands of Qadesh and Apina.[157] In the course of this war, Suppiluliuma appears to have campaigned not only against Mittani and its vassal states like Qatna and Nuḫašše, but also against regions controlled by Egypt, like the Damascene.[158] The Egyptian appear to have planned a campaign in response to this event but Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten died immediately after its execution and so the details remain little known.[159] The wars that would follow, from the "Second Syrian War" of Suppiluliuma, to the treaty of Qadesh of Ramses II, will not be part of this research.

2.3.7. Conclusion

In conclusion, Mittani seems to have been the common thread in the wars of the 18th Dynasty in the Levant. During the early 18th Dynasty, the only documented military campaigns were made against territories under Mittanian control, and little proof has been found on Egyptian campaigns in the south. The same trend can be seen during the Mid-18th Dynasty: whereas it is true that the most important military accomplishment of the time was the siege and capture of Megiddo, it is equally true that after this important battle the Egyptian actions south of the Beqaa increasingly dry out, and

Suppiluliuma of Hatti and Šattiwaza of Mittani (CTH 51), where Suppiluliuma states to have campaigned from the region of Išuwa in northern Syria to the region of Nuḫašše in the Orontes Valley, plundering "*all of these lands in one year.*" (CTH 51.I A obv. 45-46, Translation Beckman et al. 1999:40). According to Cordani (2009:51-54; 201), CTH 51 follows closely the canons of Hittite annalistic texts, and in these documents every campaign ends with the mention of the booty that the king either brought to Hattusa, or sent there with a portion of his army. In her view, since the prologue is divided into four paragraphs, and since the end of each paragraph is marked by the mention of the booty that the king said he brought to Ḫatti, the First Syrian War lasted four to five years, and the sentence above should be considered an aggrandizement of the kings' actions. This is particularly convincing considering the distance the army is said to have travelled: the distance between Išuwa and Nuḫašše is 800 km, and although an army of the time might have walked it in a single year, to do so the campaign would have consisted of series of razzias without any attempt at empire building, rather than a carefully structured plan of conquest described in the text.

[156] **§4.4.3.**

[157] Likely the Damascene.

[158] The land of Apina/Upi. See Turri 2015:331.

[159] **§6.4.**

what is known appear to have consisted of "mopping up operations".[160] After Thutmose IV peace appears to have become the status quo in the Levant: the Egyptian control over the southern Levant appears to have been solid, and no Egyptian campaigns in the northern Levant are known until Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.

[160] As Weinstein (1998:223) has colourfully put it.

CHAPTER III: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

Modern military theory recognizes war as a "*complex business requiring coordination from the highest levels of policymaking to the basic levels of executions*":[1] from the desks of kings and politicians to the battlefields of the soldiers. According to this scheme, warfare operates on three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. The tactical level is solely concerned with the movements and the actions of an army during battles.[2] The operational level is mainly involved in the planning and design of campaigns, with the manoeuvring of armies, and with their logistics.[3] The strategic level is instead concerned with the selection of objectives and the deployment of military forces in order to achieve them.[4] A fourth level, operating in times of peace and war alike, is usually added to the three levels of warfare: Grand Strategy. At this level, warfare interacts with domestic and international politics, diplomacy, and economics, affecting them, and at the same time being affected by them.[5] As military strategists select the objectives against which to deploy their forces, grand strategists select the goals to pursue through military actions. The goals, that for the modern states might also be called national interests, can be different in nature from one country to another, and for the same country from time to time. They are an expression of the economic situation of a country, its policies at both the international and domestic levels, and its traditions.[6]

Both the concepts connected to these levels of War and the possibility of studying a Bronze Age state under the lenses of this 20th century theoretical model are the object of this chapter, which is divided into four sections. The first describes the theoretical model of the levels of war and how its constituent concepts were developed according to the evolving necessities of warfare; the second introduces the concept of Logistics, and its connection to Grand Strategy; the third analyses the most prominent example of study of ancient Grand Strategies, and addresses some of the criticisms that

[1] Kane et al. 2012:65.
[2] Luttwak 1980:63.
[3] Kiszely 2005:38.
[4] Heagren 2010a:1.
[5] Luttwak 2001:209.
[6] Luttwak 2001:212.

have been presented against it; the fourth considers the applicability of these theories to the Egyptian actions taken during the New Kingdom in the Levant.

3.2. The Theory of the Levels of War

3.2.1. The Levels of War

The word στρατηγία, "strategy", had several different meanings in Ancient Greek. In most cases it described a way of looking at matters of war that might be defined as "the art of the general",[7] but to Xenophon – the commander of a large mercenary army – στρατηγία means two of the three elements that a general needs to master: "plan"[8] and "logistics."[9] The third element is τὰ τακτικά, "tactics", "*a small part of generalship*", which is necessary to understand because "*there is a wide difference between right and wrong disposition of the troops*".[10] Similarly, an anonymous, 7th century AD Byzantine text[11] defines strategy as "*the means by which a general may defend his own land and defeat his enemies*" and tactics as "*the science which enables one to organize and manoeuvre a body of armed men in an orderly manner."*[12]

These conceptions of Tactics and Strategy remained stable throughout time, arriving intact – at least in their core – to modern times.[13] Broadly speaking, the theoretical discourse on the matters of war evolves when new technologies or larger armies drastically change the conditions in which wars are fought, and although single tactics might have changed in time, war remained roughly similar century after century: the total number of soldiers employed by a single army fluctuated considerably but rarely reached 6 digits until the French revolution, and leaps in technology did not

[7] As in Plato's Laches, where it is said "*In matters of war* (…) *I say that here generalship makes the best forecasts on the whole, and particularly of future results* (…) *because it knows better what is happening or about to happen in the operations of war*." (Translated in Lamb 1990:72).

[8] "*This plan of campaign meant nothing else than effecting an escape, either by stealth or by speed*" (*Anabasis*, Book ii chapter ii, 13. Translation Brownson 1998:192).

[9] "*'Of course,' you said, 'the man to whom you are taking the pay has given you instruction in domestic economy as a part of the duties of a general, has he not? At any rate, the soldiers need provisions no whitless than the servants in your house.' (…) you asked me further whether he had said anything to me about health or strength, inasmuch as it would be requisite for the general to take thought for these matters as well as for the conduct of his campaign*." (*Cyropaedia*, Book I, chapter vi, 12 Translation Lamb 1914:105).

[10] *Memorabilia*, Book III, Chapter i, 7, Translation Marchant 2013:181).

[11] The codex Mediceo-Laurentianus graecus 55.4 (See Shrader 1981a:168)

[12] Translation Dennis 1985:19, 45 respectively.

[13] Dennis 1985:1.

become strikingly relevant to the military world until the Industrial age.[14] With the 19th century the size of the armies experienced an exponential growth: the French "*levée en masse*" of 1793 gave an army of a million men to the revolutionary state, and the Prussian army was able to deploy 1.2 million soldiers in 1870, and 3.4 million at the beginning of WWI.[15] At the same time, the introduction of faster means of movement (railroads and cars), communication (telephones and telegraphs), and weapons (machine guns) expanded the tactical scenario and created analytic problems that the binary distinction "tactics-strategy" could not solve by itself. In a century, armies had become so large that they had to be divided into separate corps able to act at different moments and different points in the same theatre of war, while new technologies had made the concept of a single fundamental battle obsolete.[16] Battles no longer occurred in a single place with the best part of both forces but became distributed into many subordinate clashes scattered along the frontlines.[17]

These advances forced the European understanding of war to catch up, but it was a lengthy process. In 1827 Prussian general and "father" of modern military thought, Carl Von Clausewitz found it necessary to define "Tactics" ("*the theory of the use of military forces in combat*") and "Strategy" ("*the theory of the use of combats for the object of the war*")[18] but not the intermediate layer that would have later become vital. Only some 40 years later, after the Franco-German war of 1870, tactical actions in the field (such as marches, the assumption of favourable positions, and battles) started to be grouped into "Operations", and series of connected operations became a "Campaign".[19] In this development, Strategy would have planned and connected different campaigns (necessary to achieve intermediate objectives) useful to reach the objective of the war.[20] Finally, during the war between the USSR and Poland (1919-21) the generals of the Red Army understood that the development of extended fronts had eliminated the possibility of winning a war with a single important battle, and that armies were forced to achieve victory in a gradual way, by coordinating a series of destructive operations aimed at the physical annihilation of the enemy.[21]

[14] Heuser 2010:41.
[15] Naveh 1997:30.
[16] Olsen et al. 2011:1.
[17] Kelly et al. 2009:18.
[18] Von Clausewitz 2009:54.
[19] Kelly et al. 2009:20.
[20] Kelly and Brennan:20.
[21] Kelly and Brennan:44.

As a consequence of this process, in contemporary western military literature the concept of warfare is now deconstructed in a sequence of levels: Tactical, Operational, and Strategic.[22] The Tactical level maintains von Clausewitz's core definition, and tactical studies are still concerned with the already quoted "*basic levels of executions*": battles, and the moves an army does before, during, and after them.[23] Although advances made in weaponry may have caused single tactics or movements on the battlefield to become obsolete, the ability of an army to outmanoeuvre the enemy, or to achieve the maximum concentration of its forces at the weakest point of the enemies' in order to break its lines, is still considered to be of the highest importance.[24] The Operational level, usually defined as "*the art of campaigning*",[25] is a relatively modern concept in the western world. Developed in the Soviet Union, the already described view of "operations" was translated into a discrete level of warfare intermediate between Tactics and Strategy, and defined as *"the theory of larger unit operations*", which "*involves planning and conducting campaigns*". [26] Campaigns that in turn are defined as "*sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles*".[27] That is, a commander at this level has to determine the course of action that is most likely to achieve the goals stated at the strategical level,[28] which is concerned with the identification of desirable targets in the theatre of war and with the deployment of military forces to attain them. Finally, although the Strategic level has maintained the core idea of "art of the general", since the end of the Second World War it has been defined in a variety of ways, mainly to separate it from the higher level of Grand Strategy. Between these definitions, the most influential are Liddell Hart's 1954 "Pure, or Military, Strategy" and Edward Luttwak's 2001 "Theatre Strategy". According to Luttwak, the logic of theatre strategy "*governs the relationship between military strength and territory*",[29] but because it ignores the "*political, economic, and moral character*" of the latter, exploiting it "*on the same footing as alien deserts*", the logic of theatre strategy is often neglected at the highest level of policy-making.[30] For example, the strategy of

[22] Luttwak 2001:69-73.
[23] Luttwak 1980:63.
[24] Crumley 2006:1256-1258.
[25] English 1996:158.
[26] Fm 100-5 Operations 1982:14.
[27] Fm 100-5 Operations 1982:14.
[28] Jablonsky 1987:65.
[29] Luttwak 2001:113.
[30] Luttwak 2001:133.

destroying drinking water installation that could be used by the enemy makes better sense than the alternatives on a military level because it prevents the enemy from acquiring vital resources. However, since it would damage the economic development of the territory after the war, a decision that would be preferable on a purely strategic level might be ignored in favour of less secure, but politically and economically superior, alternatives. Liddell Hart's definition instead gives a higher importance to the idea and the role of Grand Strategy, which has the capacity to look "*beyond the war to the subsequent peace*".[31] For this reason, while the role of "Grand" Strategy is to "*co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation (…) towards the attainment of the political object of the war*"[32], that of the "Military" Strategy is to distribute and apply the military means in order "*to fulfil the ends of policy*".[33]

Before proceeding towards an explanation and a definition of Grand Strategy there are three further points to be made, and one to be underlined. The first one is that breaking a system – such as warfare – into its constituent parts is only useful insofar as it generates an understanding of the system itself. However, the system must still be conceived as an organic whole, and not as a sum of its parts: what happens at the tactical level is bound to have repercussions at the strategic and operational ones, and vice-versa.[34] The second one is that any distinction between the levels of war is contextual, related to the volume of actions and the variety of means at disposal of the military leadership. For a small group of warriors armed only with shields and spears, the distinction between the three levels is meaningless: a defeat in a single battle might also mean a defeat in the larger scale of the war strategy. On the other hand, for a more complex army where different operational situations might co-exist within the same theatre of war, a defeat at a tactical level need not change the overall war strategy.[35] The third one attains to the nature of Strategy itself (in this case meaning the concept, and not necessarily the level of war). In an influential article, Arthur Lykke defined Strategy as a simultaneous consideration of "Ends", "Ways", and "Means". The Ends are the "*objectives towards which one strives*", the Ways the "*course of action accepted as the result of the*

[31] Liddell Hart 1954:336.
[32] Liddell Hart 1954:336.
[33] Liddell Hart 1954:334.
[34] Kelly et al. 2009:8-10.
[35] Luttwak 2001:113.

estimate of the situation" and the Means the "*instruments by which some end can be achieved*".[36] When it comes to developing a strategy, these elements must be balanced with each other: Ends cannot go further than what the Means allow, and the Ways have to be tailored to both. Lykke uses as an example President Carter's National Policy related to the Persian Gulf, whose control was regarded as a "vital interest" by the USA.[37] The political object of the war remains implicit: the American necessity to access the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf. From this arises the military objectives, the "End" part of the equation: defending oil fields and ways of transportation. The "Means" part is composed of soldiers, airlift and sealift forces, together with resources that can be pulled from different theatres of war and invested in the Gulf. Meantime, a plan is prepared for the "Ways" to use those military resources to protect both the fields and the ways of transport. Finally, the role that the historical circumstances had in developing the theories of warfare must be underlined, especially in the theorization of the Operational Level of War. Without the existence of extensive battlefields, it would not have been necessary to elaborate on the concept of "operations". However, that does not mean that the military actions that would now be called "operations" would not have existed before, or that they cannot be studied under the prisms of modern theory. For example, several military actions that are described in Egyptians documents dated to the New Kingdom would now be categorized as "simultaneous operations" (concurrent movements of multiple armies with different objectives, or their convergence to a particular point in the war theatre) but there are no reasons to believe they were intended as such.[38]




Figure 3: Relations between the Levels of War

[36] Lykke 1989:179.
[37] Lykke 1989:183.
[38] The most famous example is the battle of Qadesh of 1275 BC, where three of the divisions of the

In conclusion, modern military theory recognizes and studies warfare as a succession of three, interconnected levels: Tactical, Operational, and Strategic. Each level coordinates with the other two, and conjugates Ways, and Means to achieve the Ends posed by the higher level. Moreover, while the Tactical and Strategic Levels have been part of the western understanding of war since classical times, the Operational Level has been defined only in the 20th century as an answer to the concurrent evolutions of warfare.

3.2.2. The Development and Definition of the idea of Grand Strategy

At a first glance, defining Grand Strategy is easy. The current official British military doctrine states that "*Grand Strategy is the application of national resources to achieve policy objectives. Such Objectives are determined by the government, consulting where necessary alliance members and military advisors*".[39] However, if one were to consider the relevant literature, the number of definitions would quickly increase, and their coherence decline. Brands, for example, has described Grand Strategy as "*one of the most slippery and widely abused terms in the foreign policy lexicon*", characterized by "*superficial*" discussions that "*muddle or obscure more than they illuminate*".[40]

The previous section discussed how, while premodern warfare only needed the concepts of "Strategy" and "Tactics" to be understood, the developments of warfare in the 19th century made it necessary to define an intermediate level of planning and analysis to synthesize already existing concepts. Much in the same way, it could be argued that the decline of the British Empire, the development of the modern forms of government, and the historical events of the first half of the 20th century made it necessary to define a level intermediate between Warfare and Policy. The beginning of the 20th century saw a period of difficulties for the British Empire, overstretched in its global size, and unbalanced by the events of the Boer War.[41] In an often-quoted speech at the Colonial conference in 1902, Joseph Chamberlain rhetorically asked the public whether the empire was a "*weary Titan*"

Egyptian army – which had been marching through the Orontes Valley – where joined on the battlefield by a fourth one coming from the Akkar Plain (KRI II, 19, 131). See Heagren 2010:446 for a discussion.

[39] Design for Military Operations : The British Military Doctrine 1989:37.
[40] Brands 2012:1.
[41] Reynolds 1991:62-63.

staggering under "*the too vast orb of his fate*" and whether England had "*the strength to sustain the burden of the empire*".[42] According to William Murray,[43] a strategic theory developed during such times could only emphasize the conservation of resources and the limitation of conflicts in an extended, global, scenario. In 1906 Julian Corbett – a British maritime historian – conceived a "Major" Strategy capable of looking at war as a "*continuation of foreign policy*"[44] assigned to deal with it using the "*whole resources of the Nation*": military, economic, diplomatic, and political.[45] After Corbett, two other Britons – J.F. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart – developed this concept in the years between the First and Second World War.[46] Fuller described Grand Strategy as a "*unifier of military action in all its forms*" and the unity of command at a Grand Strategic level as "*the keystone of the military arch, which is supported on the civil abutments of prosperity and national character*".[47] Liddell Hart, as it has been said, defining Strategy as "'*an application on a lower plane of "Grand Strategy*"',[48] polarized the role and the difference between the two concepts. This distinction was important because, in his opinion, the sphere of policy – regarded as the higher conduct of war –, "*must necessarily be the responsibility of the government and not of the military leaders it employs*".[49] The distinction between Strategy and Grand Strategy (or between execution and policy), "*would not matter much if the two functions were normally combined in the same person, as with a Frederick or a Napoleon*" and became needed because "*such autocratic soldier-rulers have always been rare, and became extinct in the 19th century*".[50] In other words, similarly to the level of Operations, until recent times there had been no reason to theorize the concept of Grand Strategy because the same person decided both foreign policies and the military operations. The development of modern democracies, however, separated the two plains and created the need for a theoretical model able to bridge the divide.

The concept of Grand Strategy at the beginning of the Second World War revolved thus around three cornerstones: it was deputed at dealing and defining the foreign policy of the State; it

[42] Crosby 2011:122.
[43] Murray 2011a:151.
[44] Milevski 2014b:80.
[45] Layton 2012:56.
[46] Murray 2011b:7.
[47] Fuller 1923:220.
[48] Liddell Hart 1929:150.
[49] Liddell Hart 1929:147.
[50] Liddell Hart 1929:147-148.

had to consider military elements as well as those akin to the economic, political, and diplomatic sphere; and it was to rest at the level of policy making, and not at the military one. Most of the definitions that would have emerged after WWII stem from Liddell Hart's idea that Grand Strategy synchronises Means and Ends at the highest level of national policy.[51] Discussing them all has required a doctoral research by itself,[52] and thus only those who discussed elements of consequence to this research will be considered: Paul Kennedy's and Edward Luttwak's.


Paul Kennedy, a diplomatic historian with a keen interest in strategic history, developed an understanding of Grand Strategy that concerns "'*great' rather than 'small' or 'medium-size powers*'",[53] considered social and economic terms to be in a position of prominence over the military ones, and that could only be understood over long periods of time.[54] In his opinion, a "true" Grand Strategy balances Ends and Means at its disposal, because "*it was not enough for a statesmen to consider how to win a war, but how the costs would be*", and concerns itself about "*the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for decades, or even for centuries*" and that "*did not cease at a war's end, nor commence at its beginning*". [55]

Edward Luttwak is the first person to have applied Grand Strategy to the distant past, with his study of the Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. While his work on the Roman Grand Strategy will be discussed in a following section, what needs to be said now is that his interpretation of Grand Strategy differs by all others on two reasons. On the one hand, the weight and importance the military has in his examination is unparalleled: Luttwak's concept of Grand Strategy was strongly related to the security concerns of the Roman Empire, and with the systems that in his opinion had been put in place by the emperors with the purpose of protecting the state.[56] On the other hand, this relevance of warfare in his idea of Grand Strategy is mirrored in the importance given to the political use of force, to the extent that his approach has been defined as "*the political utility of the operational level of war*".[57] Luttwak suggested that the "*misuse of force in pursuit of purely tactical goals (…) was*

[51] Brands 2012:3.
[52] Milevski 2014b.
[53] Kennedy 1991:6.
[54] Milevski 2014b:255.
[55] Kennedy 1991:4.
[56] Milevski 2014b:247.
[57] Milevski 2014b:250.

avoided by those who controlled the destinies of Rome", and that it occured because the "*military force was clearly recognized for what it is, an essentially limited instrument of power, costly and brittle*".[58]

Figure 4: Relation between Grand Strategy and the Levels of War



In conclusion, Grand Strategy was first theorized at the beginning of the 20th century as an answer to the need for a declining British Empire to conjugate a scarcity of military resources with a plurality of possible conflicts in a global scenario. It has since grown into a complex concept with several different definitions, many of which rely on Liddell Hart's idea that Grand Strategy must synchronize Ends and Means at the level of policy making. This section has looked at two of those ideas, the ones that best fit the object of this dissertation. The first one is Paul Kennedy's approach that Grand Strategy must concern the great powers in the "*decades, if not the centuries*". As will be argued in the following paragraphs, the Egyptians do not seem to have developed a concept of Grand Strategy similar to what has been discussed here, and thus we must analyse the integration and developments of policies over an extended period. Moreover, since we lack day-by-day documents only a similar approach can be fruitful. The second point is the consideration – implicit in Luttwak and explicit in Lykke – of the limitation of the use of the army in the war theatre: Ends, Ways and Means must agree to each other.

[58] Luttwak 1999:2.

Therefore, considerations of the Egyptian Operational Logistic in the Levant will have to be an important part of the equation.[59]

3.3. "Grand" Strategies of the Ancient World

3.3.1. Luttwak and the Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire

The applications of the concepts of the Levels of War and of Grand Strategy to the ancient world is a relatively new field of academic enquiry. The first example – Luttwak's "*Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*" – was published in 1976, and while classical civilizations have been studied under these lights, earlier ones have not. Hittites, Assyrians, Babylonians have all been neglected, and only a few works have used Grand Strategy to analyse the Egyptian New Kingdom.[60]

This scarcity of studies on an otherwise interesting argument is probably connected to the cold reception of Luttwak's work by the academic community.[61] Luttwak identifies three "systems" the Romans had developed between battle of Actium (31 BC) to the crisis of 3rd third century AD, and holds that they were intended to satisfy three distinct sets of priorities in the changing conception of the empire: hegemonic expansionism for the Julio-Claudians, territorial security for the Flavians, and the survival of the empire during the crisis of the 3rd century.[62] Luttwak states that these "systems" – each integrating diplomacy, military forces, road networks, and fortifications – had the goal of organizing the security of both the empire and its frontiers.[63] He assumes that the Romans expanded their Empire in order to achieve defensible, fixed, and identifiable frontiers.[64] He claims that such systems were coherently respondent to the same internal logics, one that is identifiable

[59] See **§3.4.** and chapter V.
[60] Manassa 2003:94-107; Grandet 2008; Muller 2011:236-251. Grandet in particular has argued that the entirety of the Egyptian foreign policy and military actions in the Levant during the New Kingdom were aimed at guaranteeing the supply of tin to Egypt "*par tout les moyens possibles*" (pp.47-51). Already Spalinger (2008), Liverani (2009), and Vandersleyen (2009) have debated the many issues with his work, and noted how he largely overplayed the importance of tin. Grandet's idea that access to the commercial routes would have been an important factor in the Egyptian will of controlling the Levant must however be taken into consideration.
[61] Kagan 2006:334, Loreto 2006:81.
[62] Luttwak 1999:4.
[63] Luttwak 1999:4.
[64] Kagan 2006:338.

through the study of the archaeological remains and the historical records, and argues that in said frontiers they implemented relatively uniform systems of defence.

Although his work seems to have been almost universally considered a "*lucid analysis*",[65] if not straightforwardly "*brilliant*",[66] classical historians have strongly opposed it, presenting numerous arguments against it and denying the sheer idea of a Roman strategic thought.[67] Therefore, it is important to assess some of the most discussed elements to avoid walking through the same paths, while at the same time recovering what it can be saved from such a fruitful approach. However, since issues over the examination of the sources go beyond the scope of this research, only discussion of its theoretical framework will be considered.

The first and most important point has been the discussion of the existence of a Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. Many historians deny that there ever was one and instead advocate for 400 years of case-by-case policies.[68] This argument seems to endure mainly because of Luttwak's controversial approach: he admits that the Romans had not been able to theorize something similar to a modern definition of Grand Strategy, but at the same time insists that they were nevertheless able to design a series of complex security systems coherent with each other in every corner of the empire.[69] However, this debate focuses on a moot point. What the two sides of this argument do not seem to consider is that there is a difference between the idea of studying a theorized Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, and to study the Roman Empire in light of the theory of Grand Strategy. A theory, an idea, can be used to shape the events that come after its formulation, but can only be used as an interpretative tool for events that happened before. In other words, one could study, for example, the Grand Strategy of the United States during the Cold War because they had formulated one, but studying a Roman Grand Strategy means to assume that the Romans had formulated a Grand Strategy to begin with, and that would be unlikely, and at best impossible to prove.

[65] Isaac 1990:377.
[66] Wheeler 1993a:7.
[67] Lacey 2014:43.
[68] Campbell 2005:114.
[69] Luttwak 1999:4.

The second line of reasoning means using Grand Strategy to relate the contemporary conditions to the actions taken to confront them in the long period. Let us recall once again Arthur Likke's definition of strategy as a simultaneous consideration of "Ends", "Ways", and "Means:" Ends cannot go further than what the Means allow, and the Ways must be tailored to both. However, in the medium and long period, both the Ends and the Means tend to change. And while the political and economic scenario could only be imagined and planned to a certain level, the presence of garrisons, citadels, military bases, and roads built because of the will of a sovereign was destined to influence the political and military map for his successors. For example, the construction of the Hadrian wall and of its forts in 122 AD would not only have changed Hadrian's own approach to Britannia, but also the set of conditions Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius would have had to face in the following years. At the same time unpredictable or aleatory forces – such as pressure from foreign enemies on a plurality of borders, economic necessities, social changes, or even cultic requirements – are bound to have been related to the means available to face them in the short period of time, and to have shaped Ends, Ways, and Means in the medium and long period. Therefore, the idea of 400 years of case-by-case policies can be easily integrated with Kennedy's position that a study of Grand Strategy should focus on the evolution and integration of policies, because the two positions are not mutually exclusive. Although the Romans may not have developed an idea of Grand Strategy, they had to manage their resources in the medium and long periods, and these actions can be studied in light of the theory of Grand Strategy.

The third element to be mentioned starts from the consideration that, for how extreme Luttwak's idea of the Roman Grand Strategy could be, it would not be rational to suppose that the Romans built an empire and managed an army without administrative oversight and advanced planning.[70] Many arguments have been presented in favour of this idea, but those relevant to this research have ultimately been expressed by Benjamin Isaac and Brian Campbell. Isaac holds that no Roman source formulates any clear-cut objective that a hypothetical Grand Strategy would have been supposed to achieve, and therefore states that there was no Grand Strategy in the Roman Empire. His claim that

[70] Lacey 2014:41.

the absence of evidence equals evidence of absence cannot be accepted. As Loreto has observed, even setting aside the most basic point – it is most likely that discussions of strategy would have been kept secret, rather than made widely known to the population –[71] such claim remains inconsistent: very few ancient authors discuss and were interested in strategical themes and decisions, and therefore it is understandable that they would not have written in depth of such peculiar arguments. If we did not have the *Corpus Iuris Civili*, Loreto continues,[72] it could also be held on the same grounds that the Romans did not know the Rule of Law, since there is no historiographical account of the public and private Law of the Empire. Campbell has argued that the Romans did not possess "*the kind of intelligence information necessary to make far-reaching, empire-wide decisions*"[73] and said that they also "*lacked a high command or government office capable of giving a coherent direction to overall strategy, which was therefore frequently left to the decision of individual emperors and their advisers*", especially during the 3rd century, when many emperors were rapidly overthrown.[74] However, As Dyson has put it, while it would be "*anachronistic to speak of think tanks and formal strategic studies*", we should at least "*credit the romans with sufficient sophistication to develop a long-range strategy and the institutions to execute it.*"[75]Moreover, Roman documents support the idea that the emperors kept records of strength and dislocation of their troops in the empire,[76] and similar recordings are believed to have happened for diplomacy and administration as well.[77] Furthermore, there are also reasons to counter the idea of a lack of a high command able to direct the overall strategy: Lacey notes that the ability of the Roman empire to sustain its military apparatus does not coalesce with its alleged lack of administrative oversight and planning.[78] Furthermore, Kagan argued that operations of redistribution of troops to meet changing conditions of the empire – from the conquest of new provinces to the presence of new

[71] Loreto 2006:81.
[72] A collection of fundamental works in Jurisprudence issued by the emperor Justinian in the 6th century (Loreto 2006:80).
[73] Campbell 2005:114.
[74] Campbell 2005:114.
[75] Dyson 1985:277.
[76] An example can be the "*Notitia Dignitatum*", a widely discussed document that presents the order of battle of the Late empire (see McAndrew 2015)
[77] The existence of a correspondences from the provincial administrations to Rome – such as the one between Pliny the Younger (proconsul in Pontus-Bithynia) and Trajan – support this idea (Millar 1988:362).
[78] Lacey 2014:41.

threats – show the "synergistic relationship" among Roman frontiers and the understanding of the necessity of balancing risk and opportunity across the entirety of the empire.[79] On a similar note, Wheeler observed that even though the mechanisms of higher command "*remain one of the arcana of Roman Government*", the ability to transfer units and legions from one region to another after an imperial decision clearly indicates the existence of a coordinating office able to connect the imperial seat and the military branches.[80] While it should not be assumed that the existence of archives and of a high command equals to the development of a long-lasting Strategy, it can be said that, without them, a state could not have developed one.

In conclusion, three main elements that will be useful in the development of this research can be learned from Luttwak's critics. The first point is that while there is no reason to theorize the existence of a Roman Grand Strategy, it should not be assumed that ancient populations were unable to identify policy objectives, think in long terms, and organize accordingly. Therefore, instead of studying the development of a theorized (and likely non-existent) Egyptian "Grand Strategy" it would be better to study the Egyptian actions as a reaction to and a cause of the contemporary conditions, as Coleen Manassa did with Merneptah's actions against the Libu.[81] The second element is the identification of the said conditions, such as the development of on-the-ground infrastructure, or of a network of diplomatic alliances in the Levant. In this light Luttwak's idea of using the archaeological remains of the military infrastructure to study actions, positions and necessities of the army must be taken into consideration and re-adapted. The third element – the existence of archives of diplomatic and military documents able to provide information to fuel the state-wide decisions of the time, and of a chain of command capable of transferring the Pharaonic orders to the areas under Egyptian control, to sustain and support their implementation, and to give a coherent direction to the areas in the absence of such orders, is easily represented by the sheer existence of the Amarna corpus, which demonstrates the existence of all of these elements.[82] Finally, it is now possible to define what

[79] Kagan 2006:361.
[80] Wheeler 1993b:234.
[81] Although without a theoretical background and only for a short period of time (Manassa 2003).
[82] **§4.4.4.**

meaning the words "Grand Strategy" will have in the course of this thesis: the study of "policies in execution", the military elements in lights of the political, and diplomatic, situations of the time.

3.3.2 An Egyptian Strategic Thought

The applicability of the theory of the modern understanding of War to the Egypt of the 18th Dynasty is a complicated quest. While the Romans had produced a compendium of strategic thinking – the 4th-century AD "*De Rei Militari*"[83] – nothing similar is known in Egyptian literature. For the argument to be sustained, therefore, two things must be proven: that the Egyptians and their contemporaries thought in terms that are compatible with modern military theory, and that the variety of their actions underline an Egyptian use of military power in pursuit of Political Objectives.

Already Brett Heagren has argued that the Egyptian military capabilities during the New Kingdom would have allowed the development and utilisation of a rudimentary form of Operational Art.[84] A consistent part of his discussion was devoted to demonstrate how Tactical, Operational, and even Strategic objectives were often mentioned in the New Kingdom's royal and private inscriptions.[85] It would be redundant to fully rediscuss each document in here, and thus, since the Annals and the Memphis and Karnak Stelae are discussed elsewhere, I will mainly consider here two "case studies": the General's letter from Ugarit and Kamose's First Stela,

3.3.2.1. The General's Letter from Ugarit

The so-called "General's Letter" from Ugarit is the most important example of a LBA military dispatch.[86] Found in the house of Rap'anu, a scribe with a prominent position within the city's administration, the letter was sent to his king by a field commander named Šumi[-…][87] who had

[83] Shrader 1981.
[84] Heagren 2010:401-478. Heagren adheres to the official U.S. military definition of Operations Art: "*The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and execution of battles and engagements into campaigns and major operations. In war, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight over time.*" (Fm 100-5 Operations 1995:6.2.
[85] Heagren 2010:402-419.
[86] R.S. 20.33, published several times, including Nougayrol et al. 1968:69-79 and Izre'el et al. 1990. It was not considered by Heagren in his discussion.
[87] Only the first half of his name is preserved.

Figure 5: The Akkar and Koura Plain (Detail from Izre'el and Singer 1990:120, Map I)



been stationed somewhere on the coast of northern Lebanon in preparation of an Egyptian attack sometimes at the end of the Amarna Period.[88] Šumi[- describes the events that have occurred in the preceding months, the skirmishes that have been fought in the city of Ardata, and his estimation for the future of the war, based on the information obtained from a captured Egyptian. Šumi[-…] 's role and rank appears to have been closer to those of a captain than a general, as he is executing orders received from a higher authority. Thus the letter solely discusses details at the tactical and operational levels, merely implying the Strategic intent.

In lines 6-9 of the recto, Šumi[-…] describes Egyptian actions at the Tactical Level: *"my men [were]indeed [atta]cked [over and over again] in the middle of the night, [and] a battle was [w]aged betweenthem, and my men drove them out, and heaped up their equipment and their property".*[89] In lines 15-20 of the verso, Šumi[-…] writes: *"[It is for] [mo]nths n[o]w that I have been settled in Amurru, and I guard them day and night. I guard them thus: their roads and their entrances I guard; half of my chariots are stationed at the coast, and half of my c[hariots]are stationed in front of the Lebanon Mountain, and I, personally, am settled there, on the plain. (…) But if, now, one day the pond overflows, then the guardsmen will leave, and we shall not know whether supplies and auxiliary troops will have been introduced."*[90] .

[88] Izre'el et al. 1990:13-14. The letter was dated on philological and linguistics grounds (Izre'el et al. 1990:16, later accepted by Spalinger 1992 and Röllig 1993 among others).

[89] Translation Izre'el et al.:25.

[90] Translation Izre'el et al.:23

According to Jablonsky, a commander at the Operational Level must determine the course of action most likely to attain the goals stated at the strategical level,[91] and this passage contains both the Strategic objective and Operational considerations. The Strategic objective is implicit: Šumi[-…] must protect a pass between the mountain range and the sea, working as a sentinel in the region, ready to send word to Ugarit if the Egyptians were to arrive. The Operational handling of the situation is expressed with extreme clarity: Šumi[-…] is dividing his forces through the entire extent of the pass, all the while a fort[92] is located in the centre. The fact that there has been some fighting in Ardata,[93] near the Egyptian centre of Ullassa[94] makes it likely that Šumi[-…] had placed his men on the two sides of the Jebel Terbul (see fig.5), effectively controlling both sides of the plain.

3.3.2.2. Kamose's First Stela

Kamose's First Stela,[95] which recounts the king's confrontation with the Hyksos ruler Apophis, and is a good "case study" for the treatment of military matters in Egyptian inscription because it covers all levels of war. The narrative part of the stela opens is an "*extremely detailed description of the Grand Strategic situation of the time*,"[96] because Kamose laments the situation of his kingdom and considers economical ("*No one can be at ease when they are milked by the taxes of the Asiatics*"),[97] political, and military ("*To what end do I know my (own) strength? One chief is in Avaris, another in Kush, and I sit (here) associated with an Asiatic and a Nubian*")[98] matters. Once the choice to go to war is taken, the Strategic objective is formulaically described: "*to repel the Asiatics*".[99] Unfortunately, a more definite strategic objective is not given, likely – as Heagren argues –[100] due to a mismatch between an ideal and unreached end (the expulsion of the Hyksos) and the reality of what was obtained in the campaign. The means the Egyptian employed to travel north, and the ability of sending the Medjay battalion to attack the city of Nefrusi while Kamose remained protecting an

[91] Jablonsky 1987:65.
[92] Mentioned in line 9 of the verso.
[93] Probably Ardé, near Tripoli (Izre'el et al.1990:120).
[94] See **§5.4.7.**
[95] For a treatment of the Kamose military texts, see Habachi 1972, Smith H et al. 1976, Redford 1997:13-15.
[96] Heagren 2010:406.
[97] Helck 1975:82, no.119, 4. Translation Redford 1997:13.
[98] Helck 1975:82,no.119, 3. Translation Redford 1997:13.
[99] Helck 1975:82,no.119, 3. Translation Redford 1997:14.
[100] Heagren 2010:406.

unspecified settlement (his camp?) are actions that would now be considered part of the Operational level of War. The discussion of the modality of the conquest of the city of Nefrusi rests at the Tactical Level**.**

3.3.2.3. Other examples of Egyptian strategic thinking

Heagren has argued that many other Egyptian military inscriptions of the 18th Dynasty mention Tactical, Operational, and Strategic objectives. In the Biography of Ahmose son of Abana, the low-rank soldier (and thus likely excluded from Strategic conversations) only mentions the Tactical and Operational objectives of which he would have been aware, such as the need to "*repel the intruders from the desert region*" of Khent-hen-nefer in the south.[101] Thutmose I recounts the same campaign in the Tangur graffito and in an inscription from Sehel. In both occasions, the Strategic objective is defined as the desire of overthrowing the prince of Kush. [102] The Annals of Thutmose III seem to have stated the Strategic Objective quite clearly at the beginning of the account. Although the passage is too damaged to be fully comprehended,[103] it clearly contained a somewhat formulaic assessment of the strategic situation which cited years of unrest, the expulsion of at least one Egyptian garrison, and a general "revolt" in the region.[104] From an Operational and Tactical point of view, the first segment also mentions how the prince of Qadesh has instigated the revolt, has gathered his allies near Megiddo, and how the battle near Megiddo has been fought.[105] Finally, the Memphis and Karnak Stelae of Amenhotep II (**§ 4.3.4**).detail a Strategic objective of broadening borders and giving properties to those loyal to the pharaoh in the campaign of Year 7, and that of conquering the town of Aphek in year 9.

[101] *Urk.* IV, 8.5-8.6. Heagren 2010:409
[102] *Urk.* IV, 1.15-11.14; Hintze et al. 1989:172 and *Urk.* IV, 89.6-89.8 respectively.
[103] *Urk.* IV, 647.3-648.1. For a deeper glance of the debate on the reconstruction of the damaged lines, see Sethe 1911:73; Gunn et al. 1918:54 n. 2; Redford 1979a; Murnane 1989b; Goedicke 2000:12-22.
[104] The ideas of "unrest" and perceived "rebellions" is supported by a (also damaged) passage in the autobiographical test of Yamu-Nedjeh, mentioning "rebellions" in Retjenu (*Urk.* IV,946:10-12).
[105] **§ 4.3.1.**

3.3.3. Force and the Different Courses of Action in the Pursuit of Foreign Policy Objectives

It has been established that while the populations of the Late Bronze Age Levant were able to discuss war matters in a way that is compatible with the modern understanding of war, the Egyptians saw violence as a possible course of action in pursuit of policy objectives, but not as the only possible course of action.

On the one hand, in his book on contemporary strategy Thomas Kane lists, without any assertion of completeness, four common uses of an army in the pursuit of precise policy objectives: "Defence", "Offence", "Deterrence" and "Coercion".[106] All of them can be easily ascribed to the Egyptian New Kingdom. Defence – the act of providing security to the population – is the most basic and important function of an army, because only through security can a society prosper. Merneptah's actions in the war against the Libu, and its protection of the Delta,[107] or the sheer existence of the forts in Tjaru[108] are an example of this. Offence – the act of pursuing an object using force – is another basic function: military actions are often the easiest, if not the only, mean of achieving gains considered to be fundamental to the development of a state. Under this definition, Thutmose III's necessity of controlling the Lebanon[109] can be considered as an offensive action. Deterrence and Coercion have been classified under the idea of "armed suasion":[110] Deterrence relies on the threat of using the army to force the enemy not to take a certain course of action, while Coercion is "the power to hurt", the art of forcing the enemy into submission by demonstrating the force that may be used against him. The presence of an Egyptian garrison in Jerusalem after a rebellion (likely meant to discourage new rebellions in the area)[111], and the slaying of seven Asiatic chieftains by Amenhotep II[112] are likely to be examples of such policies of "armed suasion". Although it could be argued that Defence and Offence are an effect of the most basic function of a state – to guarantee its own survival – and thus not necessarily politically influenced, Deterrence and Coercion cannot face the same

[106] Kane et al. 2012:11.
[107] KRI IV, 2:12-12:6; 12:13-19:11; 19:15-22:16; 23:4-7.
[108] See **§5.3.2.1.**
[109] See **§5.4.6.3.**
[110] Luttwak 2001:190.
[111] Discussed in the Jerusalem letters from Amarna, mainly EA 285, 286, and 289.
[112] See **§4.3.3.**

accusation. Both are indirect in their approach, both are based on the psychological effect of the military power over an enemy, and both require an understanding of variables to be used in the pursuit of an agenda.[113] In other words, they are part of a more complex scheme than the dyad of Defence and Offence, and their use presupposes the existence of a planned strategy, able to consider the consequences of an action not only in their immediate developments, but also on a wider scheme and a longer term. On these grounds, one could conclude that the Egyptians used their military force to pursue objectives considered to be of importance to the state.

On the other hand, as Marcus Müller has recently argued, in the New Kingdom the Egyptians did not limit themselves to the use of violence to pursue their state's objectives, but instead considered seven different courses of action in their relationship with the Levantine states:[114] diplomatic contacts (**§4.5.3.**), investiture of loyal princes (**§4.4.4.2.**), the Egyptian upbringing of the sons of royal princes (**§5.4.8.2.**), the wars of conquests (**§4.5.2.**), the already recalled severe punishments, the establishments of garrisons in the territory, and the restricted demonstration of military strength. According to Müller, both the variety of these actions and their diverse nature show the flexibility of the Egyptian approach and imply the existence of a strategic thought that can be studied under the light of the theory of Grand Strategy.

3.4. The Level of Logistics

3.4.2. Introduction

In military theory, "Logistics" is a broad term used to describe "*all activities in war that are pre-conditional to the use of the fighting forces.*"[115] More specifically, Logistic studies those aspects of warfare related to the movement, organization and equipment of the troops, and the systems used to transport an army and its provisions on a campaign.[116] Logistics is usually studied at the corresponding level of war, each with its distinct but correlated functions. At the tactical level, it focuses on the effective allocation of materials to the soldiers in the battlefield, planning,

[113] Kane et al. 2012:12.
[114] Müller 2011:245.
[115] Proença et al. 2005:646.
[116] Heagren 2010:160.

coordinating, and executing the "*six functional areas of logistics of a deployed army: supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, general engineering, and services*".[117] On the other side of the spectrum, Logistics at the strategic level studies "*the capacity of the industrial base of the state to sustain the military power"* by providing *"organization, training and equipment*".[118] In this sense, Logistics at the strategic level of war is a cardinal component of the overall military strategy, and the military leadership is in charge of making decisions with a long-lasting impacts in both economic and operational extent, insensitive to local and random changes in terms of logistic demands.[119] Finally, Operational Logistics analyses "*the art of applying the military resources to achieve military objectives in a war theatre*",[120] and has the function of connecting the economic and industrial production of the state to the combat units in the field. In other words, it executes the tasks necessary to sustain a campaign in a war theatre, from force accumulation (the mobilization and gathering of combat forces at the beginning of the campaign), to the sustainment and the transportation of said forces to the war theatre. [121]

3.4.3. Operational Network and its Connection with Grand Strategy

Moshe Kress has divided the mobilization of Operational Logistics into three composite parts: the creation of a "Logistic Network" capable of connecting the state to the War Theatre; the deployment, where the resources are placed in the theatre of operations; and the employment, the sustainment of the army during a campaign.[122] The concept of Logistic Network is of particular importance to this research, because by carrying and supporting the troops from accumulation to deployment the Network represents the physical embodiment of logistics in the theatre of operations. Composed by "Nodes" (key points in the theatre of operations, such as bases in ports or cities) and "Edges" (routes connecting the nodes), it can be considered to be the skeleton of a military campaign, which guides the army, node after node, towards its final deployment.[123] In this, Kress notes that a Logistic


[117] Mcwp 4-12 Operational-Level Logistics 2016:1-1. See also Kress 2016:23-24.
[118] Mcwp4-12 Operational Level Logistics 2016 :1-1.
[119] Kress 2016:22.
[120] Mcwp 4-12 Operational-Level Logistics 2016:1-1.
[121] Kress 2002:36.
[122] Kress 2016:42.
[123] Kress 2016:29.

Network tends to have the form of a tree divided into the three levels of Logistics, with roots at the Strategic, trunk at the Operational, and the leaves at the Tactical one.[124]

In the course of this chapter, both Arthur Lykke's definition of strategy as a simultaneous consideration of "Ends", "Ways", and "Means", and Liddell Hart's interpretation of Grand Strategy as a way to synchronise "Means" and "Ends" at the policy-making level were recalled. Since a commander's mission at the Operational Level is to determine the sequence of actions most likely to achieve the objectives set at the Strategic and Grand Strategic Levels, one of its roles is to account for the role of the Ways, "missing" in Liddell Hart's definition of Grand Strategy.[125] Grand Strategy and Operational Logistics therefore live a symbiotic relationship in which Grand Strategy establishes the Ends of a state according to what the Means allow, while Operational Logistics informs and executes the Ways through the Network.[126] Since it is necessary for a strategic objective to be achieved through the Operational means of the army, one of the theoretical premises of this research can thus be delineated: that by studying the development of a Network through time it is possible to reconstruct how an army moved in a determinate period, and therefore reconstruct the Ends said army was built to achieve at that time.

3.4.4. Establishing the Form of an "Operational Network"

Figure 6: Flowchart for the relations between Grand Strategy and Operational Logistics



By defining what influenced the construction and the shape of the Egyptian Network in the Levant, it is therefore theoretically possible to

[124] Kress 2016:148.
[125] Jablonsky 1987; Milevski 2014a. It must be noted, however, that Milevski speaks about Operational Art, rather than Operational Level, using them as synonyms. Although there is a debate over the existence of a difference between the two concepts (see Eikmer 2015), that difference is subtle, complex, and mostly irrelevant for the purpose of this research.
[126] Kress 2002:36.

establish the Ways the Egyptian army moved, and with it, the Ends that moved it. Heagren was the first to approach this theme through the application of Kress' "Operational Network" model but,[127] recognizing that his short work had only achieved "*a somewhat basic representation*" of the Network, called for a more detailed assessment of the argument and a restructured model.[128] While most of Kress' Model can be applied directly, several of the concepts he presents are connected to modern warfare, and must be adapted to the challenges and issues of a pre-modern society.

According to Kress, Nodes and Edges should possess three attributes each. Nodes should have "*Capacity*", meaning storage space sufficient for the intended use (for example, a strategically located and highly frequented base should have larger granaries, and be able to feed more people than a secondary one), they should be possible to defend and maintain in place (*Survivability*), and they should be movable, meaning that a network should be able to evolve and adapt to the changes of conditions in the military or political environment of the state that has established it (*Dynamics*).[129] Similarly, Edges are defined by "*Capacity*,", and "*Survivability*" meaning in this case that they should be able to absorb the flow of material needed by the army and deliver it safely and in time ("*Duration*").[130] Nodes and Edges will be discussed in chapters **V** and **VI** respectively.

Between the elements that need to be challenged stands the role of the "Strategic Bases". In his model, Kress did not need to discuss in detail the concept of "Strategic Logistics" (which studies the production, development, and maintenance of military technologies and the stockage of supplies in a base),[131] but the origin of the supplies used by the Egyptian army in the Levant demands consideration. Facing the same issue for his work on the logistics of the Roman Empire, Roth has introduced, along with the concept of "Operational Base" (what here is called a "Node"),[132] that of "Strategic Base", the "*source of provision <u>outside</u> the area of operations*" (emphasis added) which represents "*all the regions which contribute provisions to a distant army*".[133] Roth mainly referred to the Italian Peninsula, and Heagren followed his example and considered the Nile Valley as the

[127] Kress 2002:145-160; Heagren 2010:261-273.
[128] Heagren 2010:267.
[129] Kress 2016:149-150.
[130] Kress 2016:150-153.
[131] Kress 2002:18.
[132] Roth 1999:169.
[133] Roth 1999:223.

sole "Strategic Base" of the Egyptian army.[134] However, two of the most fertile areas in the southern Levant (the Jezreel and the Yarkon River Valley)[135] appear to have been co-opted by the Egyptians during the 18th Dynasty, and the Egyptian administration either acquired the supplies produced there to distribute them along the Network. Therefore, they too may be considered "Strategic Bases". The concept of "Strategic Bases" might be reflected by the *bḫn*, a term which, according to Morris' definition, usually refers to a villa, or a farming estate.[136] Unfortunately, the only Levantine *bḫn* mentioned in the documents at our disposal is the Ramesside "*bḫn* of Merneptah Hotephirmaat", near *ḏ-r-r-m*, an otherwise unknown locality.[137] Therefore, even if Kress' model might have been sufficient for the smaller extent of Heagren's examination, the closer focus of this research, and a wider look at the data show that another element needs to be added to better tailor the model to the Egyptian dynamics: the concept of "Internal Strategic Base", a region inside the "Theatre of Operations", which is a source of provisions for the army.

3.4.5. Theorizing an Operational Logistic in the Egyptian Levant

It is a basic truism that no army can march on an empty stomach, nor can fight empty-handed, and according to Kress a marching army can be supplied in one of three ways: by carrying all necessary goods, by obtaining the needed resources from the traversed areas, and by shipping them in advance to a number of secure points across an Operational Network.[138] As it will be argued in the course of this research, the Egyptian army during the 18th Dynasty appears to have supplied itself by behaving differently in different areas of the Levant.

The first option means that the army can carry supplies to and from the battlefield. It also has different repercussions at various levels. On the positive side, an army carrying its own supplies has the possibility to traverse regions with limited or no local populations and resources, and to remain longer in areas that would not otherwise be able to sustain its presence. Furthermore, the fact

[134] Heagren 2011:253.
[135] See **§5.4.4.5**, **§5.4.5.2**, and De Magistris 2020b.
[136] Morris 2005:821-823.
[137] P. Anastasi III, vs. 5:1-2 (Gardiner 1937:20-22. Unless it is to be identified with the *ḏ-r-r* of the topographical list of Thutmose III (see the **Appendix**), possibly Khirbat Sitt Leila, in the Sharon.
[138] Kress 2016:9-13.

that this system is less detrimental to the lands the army traverses, makes it more suitable to long-term, "imperialistic" goals, because it antagonizes less the local inhabitants.[139] On the negative side, this option slows the army down, both because each soldier must carry the greatest part of his own food,[140] and because every army must walk at the pace of its slowest element like donkeys and wagons.[141] The presence of chariots and wagons of goods, in addition, reduces the number of possible routes the army is able to take, and forces the commander to detach portions of his fighting force in order to protect his supply train.

With the second option, campaigns would have had to be timed to coincide with the harvest season, requisitioning supplies from subdued centres. Thutmose III in his Annals repeatedly states, for example, to have sacked the fields of Megiddo and Qadesh.[142] Supporting an entire military force by living off invaded or controlled land has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, troop provisioning consumes fewer resources to the invading force, limiting a supply train allows an enormous amount of freedom on the operational side,[143] and the invading troops subtract resources otherwise consumed by the enemy.[144] On the other hand, pillaging and plundering present hindrances both in the short and in the long term for an invading force. In the short term, because the necessity of pillaging for food ties the army to routes with the highest availability of resources,[145] and in the long term these actions incite an increasing hostility in the local populations.[146]

The third possibility - the shipment of goods to protected facilities in the war theatre – requires a higher level of Logistical commitment than the others, but it is also the most suitable for long-term, "imperialistic" goals of an army because it diminishes the amount of friction between the

[139] It seems that, at least during the Old Kingdom, the Egyptians had regulation to deter the troops from stealing the food from each other and the local populations (Goedicke 1988:20-21)

[140] Wernick 2014a:274. This is an assumption based mainly on later documents, because only papyrus Lansing has a fleeing mention of the baggage of a soldier in the New Kingdom: "*The foreign woman faints on the march, she hangs herself (on) the soldier's neck. His knapsack drops. Another grabs it while he is burdened with the woman*." (Lichtheim 2006:172).

[141] According to Heagren (2007:143) the average speed of a donkey is 4.0 km per hour, bringing the average speed for the entire army at 24 km per day.

[142] **§4.3.2.**

[143] Without donkeys and wagons to slow them down, soldiers proceed at a faster pace than the one they would have had while carrying the necessary supplies.

[144] Heagren 2007:143.

[145] Wernick 2014:272.

[146] Heagren 2010:193.

invading army and the newly conquered territories. Shipping the troops, or the goods, brings many advantages, because the army is able to move faster toward the war theatre, and lands in a relatively rested state.[147] At the same time, a similar system has hindrances, as it requires the presence of ports and bridgeheads (fortified areas which serve as foothold in enemy territories) to embark and disembark soldiers, and that of a large fleet capable of transporting the army, the weaponry, the supplies, and other necessary equipment.[148] A recent study on the argument of the Egyptian navy has underlined how the seaborn aspect of the Egyptian campaigns during the New Kingdom appears to have been limited to satisfy these needs, by providing transportation for the supplies and the terrestrial expeditions.[149] In other words, an Egyptian army shipped to the Levant would have needed a series of supporting bases across the traversed regions. Such bases could have been occupied or allied cities, as well as Egyptian fortresses. Relying on them would have become more important every time the border had moved north.[150] Several elements point to the development of chains of fortresses in the northern Sinai (**§5.3.**) and along the Lebanese coast (**§5.5.6.3**),[151] but that this system was extensively used is also clear from the written sources. Šumi[-…] in the General's letter (**§3.3.2.1.**) mentions Egyptian supplies sent in advance, like in the event of the interrogation of a captured Egyptians, who said that "*The king of Egypt is going forth, but he is going unaccompanied. In the coming Eššešu-day his equipment will be moving, and the king will come after the equipment.*"[152] The best example of this kind of campaign preparation however lies in a group of some seventy texts from the Amarna corpus, all responding to an order by Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten to be "*prepared before the arrival of the king's regular troops, the bread being abundant, the wine (and) every supply being abundant*."[153]

[147] Heagren 2010:379.
[148] Heagren 2010:380.
[149] P. Emanuel 2020:54-63. The Papyri Baldwin and Amiens record a fleet of 21 ships during the 20th dynasty. Its average cargo is of 596 sacks (one sack being circa 6 Kilos) per ship, but some ships are able to carry 1,000 sacks, or 60 tonnes (Janssen 2004:28).
[150] Heagren 2010:209.
[151] *Contra* Heagren 2010:207.
[152] Recto, Lines 13-15. Translation Izre'el et al. 1990:22-27.
[153] EA 367, translation Rainey et al. 2015:1249. See **§6.4.** for a discussion.

3.5. Conclusions

The main purpose of this chapter has been to present the theoretical arguments behind this research: the possibility of studying the Egyptian approach to the Levant through the lenses of the modern understanding of War. The first portion has presented the theory of the Levels of War, according to which it is possible to study a conflict through a series of connected levels: Tactical, Operational, Strategic, and Grand Strategic. The second element has discussed the applicability of this concept to the ancient world. The third section has discussed the possibility that the Egyptians during the New Kingdom used their military force to pursue policy objectives, and the variety of courses of action at their disposal. Finally, the connection between Grand Strategy and Operational Logistic has been introduced and applied – to a simplified level –, to the southern Levant during the Egyptian control. There has been no attempt to say that an Egyptian Grand Strategy will be either established or understood in a way similar to what Luttwak has attempted to do in his "*Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*".[154] That would be an implicit assumption that the Egyptians had developed a Grand Strategy of their own, something which is both unlikely, and impossible to establish. As Spalinger has put it, if the Egyptians had a "*Grand Strategy*", then it was based on "*historical contingencies*",[155] it would not have been constructed by bureaucrats or experts, or handed down from king to king. Rather, Spalinger continues, it would have been developed by each Pharaoh as a response to contemporary external pressures.[156] This work will investigate the relevant Egyptian actions and relate them to the external pressures that caused them.

The theoretical frame behind this research is that political intent is translated into military actions through a series of coordinated efforts. Hence, by considering the limited confines of the Egyptian military and diplomatic actions, it is possible to abstract the political ends that motivated them. The main object of the next few chapters will therefore be the definition of these actions. Chapter **IV** will discuss the actions developed in the short term, with the campaigns of the Mid and

[154] Luttwak 2016.
[155] Spalinger 2016:74. On the subject, see also Spalinger 2008, *contra* Grandet 2008.
[156] Spalinger 2016:74.

the Late 18th Dynasty, whereas chapters **V** and **VI** will analyse those in the long term, with the development of the Operational Network.

CHAPTER IV: WRITTEN SOURCES ON EGYPTIAN ACTIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the written documents that provide pieces of information on both the wars and the foreign policy of the 18th Dynasty, with the threefold aim of introducing the written documents that will be at the base of other discussions of this research, of identifying the areas where the Egyptian army campaigned during the 18th Dynasty, and of reconstructing the Diplomatic system of the time.

4.2 Evaluating sources: Reliability of Textual Records as an Information Source in the Description of Military Actions

Following the battle of Qadesh, Ramesside propaganda transformed a ruinous defeat into a victorious manifestation of the power of Ramesses II, showcasing the battle in several reliefs across the country and telling the story of a brave king who – alone – had defeated the enemy. Years later, when diplomatic relationships had resumed, the Hittite envoys must have seen and reported the Pharaonic propaganda to their king,[1] because in one of his letters Hattušili ironically asks Ramses II if "*was there really no-one in battle (with you)?*".[2] While it is now known that the king who alone defeats the enemy is a common theme in New Kingdom military accounts,[3] this anecdote is a graphic remainder of the caution one should have in using temple reliefs and propagandistic documents as historical sources.

If we are to define "History Writing" a document that aims at describing past events without artifice, metaphor, or secondary aims, then few among the texts at our disposal could be defined as such.[4] These documents were never meant to form a historical narrative, nor to present an objective and methodological analysis of the events they treat. Quite the opposite, the Egyptian documents

[1] As theorized by Liverani (1990).
[2] KBo I 15+19, see Edel 1950. "*Davvero non c'era nessuno lì* (*con te*)?". Translation Liverani 1990a.
[3] A similar rendition appears both in the Memphis and Karnak Stelae of Amenhotep II and in the Konosso Stela of Thutmose IV (*Urk*. IV, 1302:7-15; 1311:1-12; 1547:6-11 respectively). See Shaw 2008:119-120.
[4] As Redford (1986:xiv) has argued.

discussed in this chapter were written to celebrate the King's success over chaos, or to present an apologetic description of the life of a deceased in his tomb. At the same time, the corpora of cuneiform documents (like that found in Amarna)[5] discuss the short-term necessities and circumstances of a handful of regional empires and dozens of small and belligerent Levantine cities. To extract usable data from these texts it is therefore necessary to make a distinction between potentially historically accurate elements and their formulaic context, through a process of source criticism able to treat these texts, as Hallo proposed, "*critically but without condescension*".[6]

A common approach is to consider the so-called "*decorum*" of the texts. As Baines has described it, decorum is "*a set of rules and practices defining what may be represented pictorially with captions, displayed, and possibly written down, in which context and in what form.*"[7] In other words, decorum is the principle that indicated, given a certain context, what could be depicted, how it could be depicted, and what text could accompany the depiction. The Decorum of these representations fundamentally shaped the images and texts scholars rely on for their discussions and must therefore be taken into consideration when looking through these sources for historical information. For example, Shaw has convincingly demonstrated how only the Pharaoh could be shown in a templar context offering to the gods, killing enemies, and leading the army.[8] Their propagandistic and formulaic character, however, does not mean that these texts do not contain potentially historically accurate elements. The fact that Ramses II did not fight the Hittite army by himself does not mean that there never was a battle in Qadesh, or a war against the Hittites. The fact that the story was told inside the temple, however, means that the decorum of its context shaped (to a point) the message that he was.

Another common approach is that of analysing texts considering questions of authorship, commission, public consumption, and source. In other words, asking "who wrote this text?", "for

[5] See **§4.4.4.**
[6] Hallo 1990:189. For a discussion of the issue of historicity in the documents of Egypt and the Levant, see, among others, Bjorkman 1964; Redford 1979d; Spalinger 1982; Hallo 1990; Eyre 1990; 1996; Hoffmeier 1992; Manley 1996; Lundh 2002; Shaw 2008.
[7] Baines 1990:20. See also Baines 2007:3-30.
[8] Shaw 2008:116-121

whom?", "for what public?", and "from what sources?".[9] According to Eyre, texts can be classified as "historical", only insofar as they describe the present for the posterity, or the past for the present. When they urge actions or attitudes on the present for the present, or have deliberate artistic form appreciated as such by the audience, they are to be classified as "political" and "literal" respectively.[10] While many of the texts under examination might be considered therefore non historical, that does not mean that we should not believe any piece of information that they present: these sources contain data that are of consequence for this research – like the locations of the battles, or the passing mention of the Egyptian presence at a site – and are so peculiar that there is no reason to doubt their accuracy. For example, Shaw doubts that the War Council in Yehem discussed in the Annals of Thutmose III happened as the text indicates:[11] since the letter of the text had to conform to the decorum of the medium in which it was depicted, the content is unreliable. However, the reference to the insignificant centre of Yehem in the Sharon is so minor that there is no reason to deny that the army stopped there on its way to Megiddo.

Another problem that this chapter faces is the scarcity of the material at our disposal. The ephemeral life of papyrus paper means that the administrative documents that would ideally have been the base of the following discussion disappeared together with their writing support. Only one relevant administrative document survives (Papyrus Hermitage 1116A, **§4.3.7**) and the internal communication inside the Egyptian administration and the Levant are merely testified by the bulla sealing a papyrus found in the Egyptian 19th Dynasty centre of Deir el-Balah.[12] The texts that will be presented in this chapter are what was written in less-perishable materials, like the clay tablets of Amarna and the walls of the Egyptian temples and tombs, but besides durability they have little in common. To account for their different natures, origins, issues, and peculiarities, the written

[9] As posited by Redford (1979d:15).
[10] Eyre 1992:432.
[11] Shaw 2008:118, contra Redford 2003:18.
[12] Brandl 2010c:207, no. 2087. The seal is likely to be dated to the Late 18th Dynasty, but the bulla was found in a centre only found later (see Killebrew et al. 2006).

documents will be discussed separately first, and the information drawn from them will be discussed unitarily at the end of the chapter.

In conclusion, the depiction of the Egyptian actions in the Levant appears to be somewhat distorted by the rules of a "mythohistorical" world:[13] the royal and the private inscription present a complex historical phenomenon in a highly selective manner, where military episodes are highlighted as significant because they fit the narrative of royal and personal greatness. However, several elements presented in the documents at our disposal can still shed light over the Egyptian military actions in the Levant and some aspects of the diplomacy of the Late Bronze Age.

4.3 Egyptian documents

4.3.1. The Annals of Thutmose III

Location and Findspot: Karnak, monumental gate of the temple of Amun.

Publications: Birch 1853; *Urk*. IV, 625-756; Hoffmeier 1997; Sternberg-el Hotabi 2005; Delange and Rondot 2015: 157-183.

Selected Bibliography: Spalinger 1974; Spalinger 1977; Redford 1979c; Spalinger 1982:134-181; Murnane 1989a; Goedicke 2000; Lundh 2002:73-106, 215-219; Redford 2003:1-98;

4.3.1.1. Introduction

Annals represent both a distinct typology of documents and the main source of information for the wars of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II. As a typology of documents, annals did not usually focus on or narrate specific episodes, but assembled events and achievements in a way more akin to a list than to a narrative.[14] Noth, Grapow, and Spalinger have demonstrated how they derive from entries in a daybook (*Tagebuch*),[15] which consisted in a series of descriptive statements, likely mere notes taken during a campaign.[16] That of Thutmose III in particular appears to have been the *hrwyt*, the

[13] As Panagiotopoulos has defined it (2000:139).
[14] Baines 2008:27.
[15] Noth 1943; Grapow 1949; Spalinger 1982.
[16] Spalinger 1982:122.

day-book, documents which recorded "*an event or series of events by dates*", typically written by the temples, the king's houses, the archives and the treasury.[17] The *ḥrwyt* is mentioned in the texts itself,[18] together with two other sources: an unspecified account regarding the harvest in Syria and the amounts of goods gathered by the army kept in the treasury,[19] and a leather role containing a detailed list of military operations and soldiers during the first campaign.[20] According to Spalinger, the fact that they were based on such a "*reliable* (…) *mundane and pedestrian*" source did not discount the value of the religious contexts they were immersed in: Amun had given Pharaoh his might, and Pharaoh was coming back "*to render victorious praises to his deity*".[21] In other words, the very nature of the military writing was not objectively historical, but the texts must be understood in the context of the temples in which they were presented.

Carved on raised reliefs in the temple of Amun in Karnak, the Annals of Thutmose III are the most important surviving document to discuss the beginning of the Egyptian presence in the Levant.[22] The text is divided into two piece which appear on the walls of ambulatory around the bark shrine and in the Rooms VI-VII.[23] According to Redford,[24] only high level priests would have had access to these texts, meaning that the intended audience would have been composed only by Amun and the senior priests.[25] The first text focuses on the first campaign of Thutmose III (that of the battle of Megiddo), which is presented with a long and embellished account which tells the events of several days in the campaign. The second text presents, in a schematic and laconic way, several

[17] Redford 1986:101.
[18] *Urk.* IV, 693:11.
[19] *Urk.* IV, 694:7-8, possibly because the treasury was responsible for foodstuff in foreign regions, as hypothesized by Redford (2003:4, n.9).
[20] "*Everything his majesty did to this town* (Megiddo) *together with that vile doomed one and his vile army, are set down by specific day and specific foray* (*nʿy*) *And the name[s] of the com[manders ….] are published on a leather roll in the temple of Amun unto this day*." *Urk.* IV, 661-662:5. Translation Redford 2003:33.
[21] Spalinger 1982:239-240.
[22] Lundh 2002:73.
[23] Redford 2003:3, 57.
[24] Redford 2003:6-7.
[25] Interestingly, according to Tacitus (*Annales* II, 60) one of the elder priests in Thebes showed and translated for the Roman general Germanicus some Theban inscriptions related to the wars of a "King Ramses". It is possible that this Ramses should be identified with Thutmose III, since (like in the Annals) "*the lists of the tribute imposed on the various nations could also be read—the weight of silver and gold, the quantity of weapons and horses, the gifts of ivory and perfumes for the temples, and the amounts of grain and all other provisions that each people had to contribute. These were all no less impressive than the duties now levied by the might of Parthia or the power of Rome*" (Translation Yardley 2008:71).

campaigns said to have been fought between the years 29 and 42. The campaigns are not described on a day-to-day basis, but follow a regular scheme: a statement of the king's whereabouts in the year, the numbering of the campaign (*wḏyt*), short statements describing the military operations, and lists of the benevolences received by the conquered lands.

4.3.1.2. Information on the military campaigns - Megiddo

The first section of the Annals consists in a series of daily entries based on the King's presence. The first entry is dated to the 25th day of the fourth month of *Prt*, when the army leaves the border-fortress of Tjaru "*[to extend] the frontiers of Egypt*".[26] The following lines seem to describe the *casus belli* of the campaign in a standardized passage referring to years of unrest in the Levant, but a large lacuna in the middle makes any interpretation uncertain.[27] Only to the presence of an Egyptian garrison in Sharuhen at the beginning of the campaign can be read with certainty.[28] The second and third entries are dated to the first month of *šmw*, days 4 and 5:[29] the king and his army arrive at Gaza[30] and leave the day after. This entry expresses – in vague terms – the Grand Strategical end of the campaign: the overthrowing of the king of Qadesh and extension of the frontiers of Egypt. The fourth entry,[31] dated to the 16th day of the same month, sees the king in Yehem, for the already mentioned council of war.[32] During the council, the king of Qadesh is said to be hiding inside Megiddo with its allies from Mittani, and the plan of attack is drawn. The following entries are dated to I *šmw* 19th, 20th, and 21st,[33] and consist mainly of extensive descriptions of the passage of the Aruna pass, of the tactical dispositions of the two armies, of the ensuing battle, and of the construction of a wooden wall to siege the city. The battle and the victory are presented in a literary way, and the failure to take the city after the battle is attributed to the army, which has been distracted by the sight of the enemy's booty.

[26] *Urk.* IV, 648: 2. Translation Redford 2003:8.
[27] *Urk.* IV, 648: 2-7.
[28] **§5.4.2.1.**
[29] *Urk.* IV, 648:9-11.
[30] Meaning that it has taken 10 days for the Army to arrive to Gaza from Tjaru, see **§6.3.**
[31] *Urk.* IV, 652:13-655:15.
[32] See Spalinger 1974 for a discussion.
[33] *Urk.* IV, 650:8-661:6.

4.3.1.3. Information on the military campaigns – the northern Levant

The section of the Annals containing the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th campaign (years 24 -29) is heavily damaged, and unreadable. However, Redford has suggested that a section of the Festival Hall decree and one of the Seventh Pylon,[34] should be connected to them, and if he was right these campaigns (like the following ones) would have been directed at "Retjenu" and the Lebanon.[35] In the 5th campaign (year 29), the king is said to be in "Djahy"[36] and to have conquered the towns of Ardata and Ullassa.[37] In the 6th campaign (year 30)[38] the king is said to be in Retjenu, conquering and plundering the city of Qadesh, located on the decisive point at the northern entrance of the Beqaa valley, before moving to the coast to attack the cities of Sumur and Ardata. The record of the 7th campaign (year 31) is anomalous,[39] since it only mentions a second conquest of Ullassa, that Retjenu's harvest was delivered to the Egyptians,[40] and that every harbour in the Lebanon had been supplied with food for the Egyptian army.[41]

The 8th campaign (year 33) against Retjenu and Mittani can be discussed in detail, both because of its longer (but embellished) account in the Annals,[42] and because episodes of this campaign appear also in other documents, mainly the Gebel Barkal and Armant stelae,[43] and the biography of Amenemheb.[44] According to the Gebel Barkal Stela, ships had been built in the vicinity of Byblos to be carried to the Euphrates,[45] and although no document alludes to the itinerary of this campaign, Mizrachy has hypothesized[46] that the recently occupied Ullassa served as a point of departure. If so, the Eleuthero Valley would have been the most likely progression route, supporting Sethe's restoration of the name "Qatna" as the city conquered at the beginning of the campaign.[47]

[34] *Urk.* IV, 1257:14-1259:9 and 184:4-186:9 respectively.
[35] Redford 2003:210-216. For a discussion on the identification of Djahy and Retjenu, see **§8.3.1.**
[36] *Urk.* IV, 685:5-688:16.
[37] Likely the modern Amioun and Tripoli (Kilani 2017:179). See **§5.4.7.2.**, Helck 1971:137, Redford 2003:64-5, and Morris 2005:122, n.30.
[38] *Urk.* IV, 689:1-690:10.
[39] *Urk.* IV, 690:14-696:11.
[40] *Urk.* IV, 694:3-8.
[41] *Urk.* IV, 693:6-15.
[42] *Urk.* IV, 696:15-703:13. See Spalinger 1977:44.
[43] *Urk.* IV, 1227:7-1243:8 and 1243:1-1247.14 respectively. See **§4.3.2.**
[44] *Urk.* IV, 890-897. See **§4.3.6.2.**
[45] *Urk.* IV, 1232:1-6. Or possibly the Orontes, as Kilani (2020a:106) has suggested.
[46] Mizrachy 2012:29.
[47] *Urk.* IV, 697:3-4.

Redford finds "*no justification*" in such restoration,[48] but it can be argued that it is a logical necessity. Mizrachy convincingly argued that Qatna would have been an important city on the way to the Euphrates,[49] and thus it would have been extremely risky to leave it in enemy hands while proceeding into Mittani. Moreover, since an archery contest in Qatna is associated with the 8th campaign in the Seventh Pylon in Karnak,[50] and since such leisure might only have taken place the end of the campaign,[51] it is likely Qatna was already in Egyptian hands by the end of the campaign. Since however there are no mentions of the city in previous campaigns, Sethe's restoration is likely correct. From Qatna, the Egyptian army appears to have moved towards Aleppo first, and Carchemish later, where two battles (or at least two skirmishes) are implied in Amenemheb's auto-biography.[52] After crossing the Euphrates near Carchemish,[53] the army is said to have plundered the towns and villages of Naharina,[54] and to have clashed against the Mitannian army. The battle, however, is only alluded to in the Gebel Barkal stela and the Annals,[55] and while (as Mizrachy has pointed out) the first citation comes from a laudatory section of the stela, and is therefore too "*ideologically infected*" to be considered as historically reliable, the second describes the fleeing enemy "*like herds of wild game*", in too vivid a manner to be drawing from an actual occurrence of the war diary.[56] After this battle, the famous stela is set up, and the army marches back, stopping in Niya[57] for the elephant hunt, and in Qatna for the archery context.

In the 9th campaign (year 34) the king is said to be in Djahy, where he plunders 2 towns, before moving to Nuḫašše to conquer a third one.[58] The region of Nuḫašše in the Amarna letters appears to be both the name of a single state, and of a region containing, among others, Qatna, Niya, and Tunip.[59] In the 10th campaign, (year 35) Thutmose III is again in Djahy.[60] He arrives at the town

[48] Redford 2003:77.
[49] Mizrachy 2012:28.
[50] *Urk.* IV, 188:15.
[51] As Redford has argued (2003:222).
[52] *Urk.* IV, 891:2-3,9. **§4.3.6.2.**
[53] Helck 1971:139; Redford 2003:170, 225; Mizrachy 2012:29.
[54] *Urk.* IV, 697:5-6
[55] *Urk.* IV, 698:3-9 and 1230:5-9 respectively.
[56] Mizrachy 2012:30.
[57] Classical Apamea. See Turri 2015:259-262.
[58] *Urk.* IV, 703:16-709:11.
[59] In EA 53:40-43 appears the king (singular) of Nuḫašše, whereas in EA 160:24-25 and EA 161:36-37 the kings (plural) are mentioned. See Turri 2015:263-267.
[60] *Urk.* IV, 709:15-714:8.

of Aranu, where he battles the Mittanian army. Aranu is unidentified, but Helck located it north-west of Aleppo,[61] and Turri identifies it with the village of Aryante mentioned in a text from Alalakh.[62] If that was the case, the Egyptian army would likely have either met the Mittanian army on the same route run in the 8th campaign, or passed from the port of Ugarit.[63]

The records of the 11th and 12th campaigns (years 36 and 37) are mostly lost, as are those of the 15th and 16th (years 40 and 41).[64] In the 13th campaign (year 38),[65] Thutmose III is again in Nuḫašše, where he attacks two unnamed cities. In the 14th campaign (year 39),[66] Thutmose III is said to be in Retjenu, having defeated the Shasu. No city is said to have been conquered (as one might expect for a campaign against a nomadic population) but the "land of the Shasu" is usually located in the hill countries around the Jordan River.[67] This would well connect to Redford's idea that a portion of Thutmose III's topographical list is to be identified with an itinerary that, from the Bashan, moves south to Moab, east of the Jordan River.[68] In the 17th and last campaign (year 42)[69] Thutmose III is in Djahy, where he sets out to destroy the towns upon the coastal road, sacking Irkata,[70] -kana,[71] Tunip, and three villages around Qadesh. In Qadesh, he reportedly captures a garrison of Mittanian troops, an element that suggests how the region was still under Mittanian control after 20 years of war. According to Spalinger, the Annals end with the campaign of year 42 because Thutmose III decided to retire from actively campaigning abroad at that time. [72] If he was right in his assumption, that might mean that the wars continued uninterrupted under one of his generals, simply unregistered in the surviving documents.

Finally, the Annals also record a series of "diplomatic gifts" said to have arrived several after of the several Egyptian campaigns from the great kingdoms of Ḫatti, Ashur, Babylonia, and

[61] Helck 1971:153.
[62] AIT 195. See Turri 2015:228.
[63] See **§4.3.4.2.**
[64] Redford 2003:87-94.
[65] *Urk.* IV, 716:12-721:6.
[66] *Urk.* IV, 721:9-723:10.
[67] Romeo 2000, Vassiliev 2007.
[68] Redford 1982. See **§4.3.5.** and Kitchen 1992.
[69] *Urk.* IV, 729:3-734:10.
[70] Tel 'Arqa in the 'Akkar Plain (Goren et al. 2004:122-125).
[71] The first part of the name is unreadable.
[72] Spalinger 1977:42.

Isuwa.[73] Ḫatti in particular appears 4 times,[74] mostly after campaigns where the Egyptian Army had penetrated far into Mittani itself. All of these kingdoms surrounded Mittani, and this gift-giving might be interpreted in one of two ways, as Podany has noticed:[75] they either appreciated the Egyptian attempt of weakening their neighbour, or this gifts-giving was a request for an alliance, and might signal the beginning of the diplomatic relations that would have culminate with the Kurustama treaty.[76]

4.3.2. Gebel Barkal Stela

Location and Findspot: Now at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (MFA 23.733), the stela was found in secondary location in room B 501, III-V, VI of the temple of Amun at Gebel Barkal.[77] Primary location is unknown, probably a chapel of the fortress *sm3 ḫ3stw,* in Napata.[78]

Publications: *Urk.* IV, 1227-1243; Reisner 1931; Reisner G and Reisner M 1933; Leprohon 1991; Cumming, Davies and Helck 1982 Vol I; 1-7; Gestoso, Bargues Criado and Feldman 1996.

General Bibliography: Lundh 2002:190-204; Spalinger 1982:203-211; Redford 2003:103-119; Shaw 2008:98-101; Winkler 2013; Kilani 2019:104-116.

The Gebel Barkal Stela, dated to year 47 of Thutmose III, is five years older than the last entry of the Annals.[79] It has the form of a *ḥmst-nsw,* a "sitting of the king," a text which usually reflects an announcement made by the king to the court, and where the king alludes to his foreign campaigns in order to enhance the role Amun has had in granting him his victories.[80] This form does not presuppose reality, but according to Redford a case can be made "*that an historical "séance" may in fact underly such text.*"[81]

[73] Redford 2003:250-254.
[74] Years 33; 35; 41; 42 (*Urk.* IV,701:11-14; 713:13-16; 727:13-14; 732-733)
[75] Podany 2010:149.
[76] **§4.4.3.**
[77] Leprohon 1991:23.
[78] Manley 1996:21.
[79] O'Connor 2006:29.
[80] Redford 2003:101.
[81] Redford 2003:101. See also the discussion from Spalinger 1982:202-206.

The last lines of this stela seemingly indicate that the speech was pronounced in Thebes.[82] However, the people who would have read and seen the stela – its "audience" – where the Egyptian settlers in the region of Upper Nubia, and therefore it is possible that the purpose of telling Thutmose III's accomplishment in the Levant was to underline his abilities on the two sides of his dominion. The stela contains references to several episodes of the first[83] and eight[84] campaigns that are useful for the current discussion, together with details of its administration in the newly-acquired lands, like the oath of allegiance of the rulers of Retjenu and the production of wood in Ullassa.[85]

In the passage on the capitulation of Megiddo the Canaanite chiefs implore Thutmose III for mercy, covering him in gifts and asking for the "breath of life". Thutmose III then "*had them take the oath (sḏꜣ tryt) as follows: 'We will not again act evilly against Menkheperre, Living for ever! Our lord, in our lifetime, since we have witnessed his power, and he has given us breath as he pleased.'*"[86] In his study on the *sḏꜣ tryt*, Morschauser has argued that the passage not only conveys the oath of allegiance to the Egyptians, but Thutmose III appears here to be granting a royal pardon to the Canaanite chiefs, "absolving" them of the sin of having fought against the Egyptians, and establishing a relationship between suzerain and vassals on the condition that they pledge to never rebel against him again.[87]

An important passage regards Thutmose III's 8th campaign in the Levant. Thutmose III arrives in the mounts of Lebanon near Byblos to harvest cedars and build small boats. These boats are then placed on wheeled carts, and taken to the Euphrates, allowing his army to cross the river and enter in Naharin.[88] Kilani noted that the fact that the ships were built in this region "*suggests that the city controlled considerable forest resources*"[89] and that the choice of Byblos might have

[82] Redford 2003:118.
[83] *Urk.* IV, 1229:6-13; 1234:6-8.
[84] *Urk.* IV, 1232:11-19.
[85] *Urk.* IV, 1237:15-16. Spalinger 1982:204-206; Lundh 2002:190.
[86] *Urk.* IV, 1234:7-1235:15. Translation Redford 2003:110
[87] Morschauser 1988. According to Mynářová (2013), however, this procedure might not have been standard, since it is only recorded twice in the 18th Dynasty written record (the other being the king of Qadesh in the Memphis stela, *Urk.* IV 1303: 19–1304: 2, see **§4.3.4.1**.).
[88] *Urk.* IV, 1232:1-6.
[89] Kilani 2019:106.

been influenced by the fact that the city might have been felt safer or more loyal to Egypt, especially given the religious connection between the "Lady of Byblos" and Hathor.[90]

A third relevant passage regards the 8th campaign and the raid against Mittani. It is not a "proper" battle sequence, but only a description of a series of destructions and looting of the king against his enemies.[91] Lundh considers it as an indication that the crossing of the Euphrates did not result in a major battle, and in a mere razzia of towns of so little importance as to go unnamed.[92]

The last relevant passage is that of the taxes paid to Egypt by the newly conquered territories of Nubia and the Levant.[93] Lumber is collected from Negau, a wooden territory near Byblos,[94] confiscated by the garrison in Ullassa[95] and sent to Egypt "*without missing a single season each and every year*."[96] This passage underlines the importance that coastal Lebanon had to the Egyptians, as its control allowed for a continuous access to much needed wood.

4.3.3. The Amada and Elephantine Stelae

Location and Findspot: The Amada stela is *in situ* in the local temple; The Elephantine stela is broken into two pieces: Wien ÄS 5909, Cairo CG 34019=JE 28585. The Cairo Fragment came from Armant, but the origin of the Wien one is unknown.

Publications: *Urk.* IV, 1287-1299, Kuentz 1925; Gruen 1973; Cumming, Davies and Helck 1982:24-28; Dessoudeix and Gros de Beler 2012:367-382.

General Bibliography: Yeivin 1967; Rainey 1973; Spalinger 1983; Der Manuelian 1987:47-56; Goedicke 1992; Morris 2005:127-132; Fazekas 2006; Zangani 2017; Taterka 2019:49-52.

These twin stelae were erected in the temple of Amada in Nubia and in the temple of Khnum at Elephantine, and their inscription is mainly focused on the constructions performed by Amenhotep

[90] **§5.4.6.3.** For the religious connections between the two goddesses, and the religious significance of Byblos to 18th Dynasty Egypt, see Kilani 2016a; 2019:219-229.
[91] *Urk.* IV, 1231:7-19.
[92] Lundh 2002:193. See **§4.3.1.3.**
[93] *Urk.* IV, 1237:9-1238:2.
[94] Kilani 2019:129.
[95] See **§5.4.7.**
[96] *Urk.* IV, 1237:10. Translation Redford 2003:111-112.

II in favour of the gods. A summary at the end provides a short account of Amenhotep's return to Egypt after his "first campaign of victory" in year 3. In a short paragraph, the two stelae say that Amenhotep had journeyed to the Upper Retjenu to overthrow his opponents, and brought back to Egypt seven chiefs from the region of Takhsy (likely the region between Qadesh and Damascus).[97] He hung these men off the prow of his bark on the way back to Egypt, and once back in Thebes he re-hung them (at this point, likely their corpses) to the walls of Thebes, and sent one to Napata, possibly to discourage rebellions in Nubia.[98]

The texts mention no conquered cities, and give no elements to support the route that the Egyptian army would have followed. However, other texts indicate that Egyptian campaigns against Takhsy took place under Thutmose III and Amenhotep II, indicating some level of interest in the region. In the biographical inscriptions of Amenemheb-Mahu Thutmose III is said to have plundered thirty towns in the district, and that of Minmose mentions the conquest in the town of Meriu.[99] As these events do not appear in the Annals, it is likely that they happened at the end of Thutmose III's reign, after his year 42.[100] For the times of Amenhotep II, beside these stelae the crushing of Takhsy appears also in the name of a regiment,[101] and in the famous letter from Amenhotep II to his viceroy in Nubia, Usertatet.[102]

The real extent of their military interest, however, eludes us, and the data are few and unclear. On the one hand, both rulers appear to have been involved in the region, but the campaign might have been just one, because that against Takhsy is not Amenhotep's sole "first" campaign of victory, as also his campaign in year 7 is mentioned in the Memphis and Karnak Stelae as being his first (and his year 9 campaign is said to be his second).[103] While this oddity has not yet been resolved,[104] it is often assumed that Amenhotep would have re-numbered his campaign to distinguish

[97] *Urk.* IV, 1296:13-1298:8. For the identification, see Turri 2015:280.
[98] As argued by Morris (2005:127).
[99] *Urk.* IV, 893:6 and 1442:17 respectively. For Amenemheb see also **§4.3.6.2.**
[100] As already argued by Redford 2003:171.
[101] Der Manuelian 1987:54-55.
[102] *Urk.* IV, 1344:8-9.
[103] *Urk.* IV, 1301:15–17 and 1305:13–15 respectively.
[104] And not for lack for attempts (see for example Redford 1965:119-122; 2003:241-244; Yeivin 1967; Helck 1971:156, n.106; Rainey 1973; Der Manuelian 1987:32-39, 57-58; Spalinger 2011; Taterka 2019).

between those conducted as general or as a junior co-regent to the aging Thutmose III and those conducted as sole ruler.[105] In this scenario, it is possible that the campaigns of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II would have been one and the same, but also that there had been multiple campaigns in the region. It is also possible, however, that the "year 3" in the stela would have reflected to the beginning of the temple's construction, and not the campaign, and thus the Takhsy episode would have happened at the end of the year 7 campaign.[106] In any case, the reasons for the re-numbering elude us, but do not largely impact on the purpose of this discussion. I follow both Der Manuelian and Morris in taking the texts as they stand and assume that three separate campaigns of Amenhotep II occurred, in years 3, 7, and 9.[107]

4.3.4. The Memphis and Karnak Stelae

Location and Findspot: The Karnak stela is still *in situ* in the southern entrance of the 8th Pylon of the temple of Amun in Karnak. The Memphis Stela (now at Cairo Museum, JE 86763) served as the ceiling for the burial chamber of Sheshonq I.

Publications: *Urk.* IV, 1301-1309 and 1310-1306; Badawi 1943; Edel 1953.

General Bibliography: Aharoni 1960; Yeivin 1967; Helck 1971:160-172; Rainey 1973; Spalinger 1982:142-152, 176-182; 1983; Der Manuelian 1987:56-90; 221-229; Singer 1988; Goedicke 1992; Morris 2005:127-132; Shaw 2008:106-109

The Memphis and Karnak stelae record the events of the second and third campaigns of Amenhotep II. They are likely based on the same daybook, and present the events in an extremely similar (but not always correspondent) way.[108] This is particularly helpful because the Karnak Stela was censored during the Amarna religious revolution, and by combining the two sources one can generally follow the campaigns fought by Amenhotep II in his 7th and 9th regnal years.

4.3.4.1. Campaign of year 7

[105] As posited, among others, by Redford (1965:119-122; 2003:241-244) and Yeivin (1967).
[106] Taterka 2019:50.
[107] Der Manuelian 1987:55-56; Morris 2005:127, n.46.
[108] See Spalinger 1982:142-152 for a discussion.

The Memphis stela begins the description of the campaign of year 7 by stating that Amenhotep II proceeded to Retjenu to "*extend his boundaries*" and to "*give properties to those who were loyal to him*".[109] In the first and second entries Amenhotep II is claimed to have sacked Shamash-Edom and to have crossed the Orontes. In the latter, the Egyptian army is reportedly attacked by enemies coming from the city of Qatna, who are defeated and killed.[110] The topographical list of Thutmose III locates Shamash-Edom somewhere near the Galilee (possibly at Qarne Hattin),[111] but the data from the Memphis and Karnak Stela do not seem to support this idea: according to the Memphis Stela, the city is reached and conquered on *šmw* 25, and according to the Karnak Stela the following entry – the crossing of the Orontes in the region of Qatna – happened I *šmw* 26. As Edel and Malamat have argued, since the Egyptian army would have not been able to march the more than 300 km between the two in one day, this Shamash-Edom (which may not be the same as the one in the Topographical List) must have been located near Qatna.[112]

The third entry is dated to II *šmw* 10, two weeks later than the crossing of the Orontes: the army is said to be going south, reaching the gate of the town of Niya, the classical Apamea.[113] The texts do not report a conquest of the city, and its inhabitant are said to have been at peace with Amenhotep II. While in Niya, the Pharaoh is informed that the Asiatics living in the town of *i-kꜣ-ṯy* – usually identified with Ugarit – want to overthrow their ruler (who is loyal to Egypt), and to expel the Egyptian garrison in the town. As a reaction, Amenhotep is said to have headed to the city, slain the rebels, and pacified the town.[114] In the fourth entry, ten days later (II *šmw* 20), Amenhotep II is camped in the town of *ṯꜣ-r-ḫ* which is said to be east of *š-š-r-m*.[115] From there, Amenhotep II reportedly plunders the village of *m-n-ḏ-t*, reaches *h-ṯ-r-ʿ*, where he's offered peace by *i-n-ḳ*, and then Qadesh, to receive its ruler's oath of allegiance (*sḏfꜣ tryt)*, before going forward to hunt in the

[109] *Urk.* IV, 1301-1302. Translation Cummings 1982:30.
[110] Karnak: *Urk.* IV, 1312:2.
[111] No.51, Simons 1937: 109-122; **§4.3.5.** For context, No.52, Ananarath, is usually identified with Tel Rekesh (Paz et al. 2010). For this identification, see Aharoni 1960:177-181; Turri 2015:272.
[112] Edel 1953:147; Malamat 1961:224 n.19, later followed by Der Manuelian (1987:59), Spalinger (2005:140) and Morris (2005:128).
[113] Megiddo: *Urk.* IV,1303:5; Karnak *Urk.* IV, 1312:3. For a discussion, see Turri 2015:259-262.
[114] Karnak: *Urk.* IV,1312:7-16.
[115] Memphis: *Urk.* IV,1303:13; Karnak *Urk.* IV, 1312:17.

forests of Lebo.[116] After this hunt, in the sixth entry (II *šmw* 20+X[117]) Amenhotep II attacks (apparently alone and without a companion), the town of Hashabu, at the northern entrance of the Beqaa,[118] and comes back with a sizeable plunder and the submission of the entire town.[119] Finally, the seventh entry (III *šmw* 6) is the southernmost point of the campaign: *ꜥ-m-ḳ-w sw-rí-nꜣ*, the Plain of Sharon.[120] The Army and Amenhotep II are travelling south and encounters a messenger from Mittani, carring a letter around his neck. The content of the letter is unknown, but the messenger is captured and brought to Egypt.

4.3.4.2. The identification of *i-kꜣ-ṯy* with Ugarit

The name of Ugarit (an important port in north Syria, identified with modern Ras Sharma) is usually written *i-kꜣ-rí-ṯy* in the Egyptian documents dated to the new Kingdom, and its identification with the *i-kꜣ-ṯy*[121] of the Memphis and Karnak Stelae needs to be discussed. The difference in spelling does not constitute an insurmountable issue, and can been explained with either a scribal error,[122] or with a Middle Kingdom spelling of the name.[123] Moreover, many of the toponyms in Egyptian texts are reasonably similar to other toponyms found in the documents from Alalakh, and it seems likely they might have therefore been located near one-another. *ṯꜣ-r-ḫ* is usually identified with Zalhi, a town in the mountains between Ugarit and Alalakh[124] which appears together with Ugarit in the Amarna Letters,[125] but that at the time of Amenhotep II was likely part of the kingdom of Alalakh.[126] *š-š-r-m* might be the same as the *š-w-s-r-n* which in the toponym list of Thutmose III appears after *ṯ-r-ḫ*. The toponym has been identified with the Sussulla (^{uru}*Sù-sù-la*) which appears to have been under Alalakh at the time of Thutmose III.[127] *m-n-ḏ-t*, and *h-ṯ-r-ꜥ* have not been identified with any

[116] Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1303:14-1304:5.
[117] The number is unreadable.
[118] Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1304:10-14.
[119] Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1304:12.
[120] Der Manuelian 1987:67-68.
[121] Edel 1953:150; Der Manuelian 1987:63-64; Morris 2005:167-169; Giveon 1981:55-56; Zangani 2017:154-155; Cooper et al. 2019, *contra* Albright et al. 1957:118; Yeivin 1967:122-123; Astour 1981:14.
[122] Morris 2005:168; Edel 1953:150.
[123] Giveon 1981:55-56; Zangani 2017:154-155; Cooper et al. 2019
[124] See Turri 2015:295-296, 302 for a discussion, *contra* Albright 1934:64-65.
[125] EA 126:5-6.
[126] Since it appears in many documents, including AIT 395, where it pays a large amount of silver to Mittani.
[127] The identification was suggested by Astour 1963:264. See Turri (2015:279) for a discussion on Sussulla.

certainty, but if Turri is right in his suggestion that *i-n-ḳ* is to be identified with the Amuq Valley, near Alalakh,[128] then it is possible they also would have been located in the same area.

Astour,[129] however, opposed this identification on an issue of time and geography. As it has been said, the Karnak stela provides two dates: on II *šmw* 10 the army is in Niya and receives news of the situation in Ugarit, and on II *šmw* 20 the army is camped in *ṯ3-r-ḫ* (probably nearby Zhali, see below). Therefore, if one takes the texts at a face value, Amenhotep II and his army must have covered the distance between Niya, *i-k3-ṯy,* and *ṯ3-r-ḫ* in 10 days. Astour concluded that the city should not be identified with Ugarit because the detour would have required more time to the Egyptian army than the ten days that the stela allows, especially because – he argued – there was no direct communication between the two cities, and it would have taken 260 km for a return travel. However, not only a return to Niya is nowhere specified in the texts (and therefore, even assuming all other arguments to be correct, only 130 km would have to be accounted for),[130] but also the 20-km-a-day figure – which Astour shares – is an estimation for a full army carrying supplies, but a detachment of troops making a quick march would have been much faster, especially if it sustained itself by plundering the territories it traversed.[131] Moreover, In fact, in the famous letter to the viceroy Usertatet, Amenhotep II enumerates the gift he has given to his overseer of the southern Lands, and in particular he mentions a maiden from Alalakh.[132] Helck suggested[133] that they might have been captured during an unregistered raid in Syria in the two weeks between the crossing of the Orontes and the Egyptian army in Niya. However, if one considers the identifications of *i-k3-ṯy* and *ṯ3-r-ḫ* with Ugarit and Zalhi, then there would be no reason to theorize the unregistered raid in Syria, considering that they passed near Alalakh, before marching down to Qadesh, Lebo, and eventually Egypt.

[128] Turri 2015:224:49.
[129] Astour 1981:14.
[130] As Morris (2015:338) has argued.
[131] Morris (2015:338) offers the figure of 55 kilometers per day.
[132] *Urk.* IV, 1344:6.
[133] Helck 1971:158.

A different issue is connected to the presence of an Egyptian garrison in (and to the loyalty of the ruler of) *i-kꜣ-ṯy* at the time of Amenhotep II. Assuming, as it seems likely to me, that the city is to be identified with Ugarit, there is no evidence to indicate a prolonged Egyptian involvement in the city,[134] and there are therefore no information regarding when and how it started, nor when and how it ended.[135] It might be hypothesized that Ugarit was among the coastal cities that entered an alliance with Egypt under Thutmose III,[136] but the city is located too far north from the theatre of Egyptian Operations of the time (the 'Akkar Plain and the Orontes Valley) to have been involved in military actions. Only in his 10th campaign Thutmose III might have needed supports from Ugarit, and even in that case Turri's suggestion that the town of Aranu is to be identified with the village of Aryante near Alalakh is tempting, but unproven.[137] In conclusion, there is no certainty that *i-kꜣ-ṯy* should be identified with Ugarit, and if it was, there is little to be said regarding its relationship with Egypt. We only know it was allied to Amenhotep II, that it might have been allied already to Thutmose III, and that by the time of the Amarna Letters, it was independent. The Egyptian presence in the town seems to have been ephemeral, if not circumstantial, and the city does not seem to have been part of an Operational Network.

4.3.4.3. Campaign of year 9

According to the Memphis and Karnak Stelae, Amenhotep II conducted a third campaign in the Levant in his year 9. In the first entry, Amenhotep II is said to be arriving in Aphek, which surrenders peacefully.[138] The army moves north to Yehem, which is reportedly captured without resistance, and on its way sacks two otherwise unknown places:[139] *m-p-s-n* and *ḫ-t-ṯ-n*, said to be located west of Socho. After a "dream sequence," where Amun visits the king to show him its divine support and give him strength,[140] the king attacks the city of *Mktr-ynt*[141] and *ỉ-t-r-n*. The following day, likely in

[134] Singer 1999:623.
[135] In the Amarna Letters Ugarit does not appear to have been under Egyptian control (see Mynářová 2006).
[136] **§5.4.6.3.**
[137] According to Turri (2015:228) the city is mentioned as a tributary in AIT 195.
[138] Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1305:13.
[139] Aḥituv 1984:135-136.
[140] Oddly enough, the sequence is only present in the Memphis stela, and absent in the Karnak stela, even though one would expect the opposite, given that the Karnak Stela had been erected at the seat of the god's power (Der Manuelian 1987:71).
[141] Likely to be identified with Migdal in the Sharon Plain (Aḥituv 1984:142).

IV *ꜣḫt* 1[142] Amenhotep II continues north and arrives at Ananarath.[143] The city is said to have been plundered, and a considerable booty to have been taken.[144] Amenhotep II continues then to the vicinity of Megiddo, where he punishes Qaqa, the prince of Gebath-Shehem, a city in the Akko Plain,[145] by removing him from the throne and installing a different (and likely more loyal) ruler.[146] This is the last entry in the campaign, after which Amenhotep II returns to Memphis.

This campaign is unusual in its duration, territory, and scope. It appears to only have lasted 6 days, from III *ꜣḫt* 25, to IV *ꜣḫt* 1.[147] It is the southernmost Egyptian campaign since the battle of Megiddo, because the Egyptians move solely between Aphek and Ananarath.[148] In most cases the Egyptian army does not seem to fight against numerically consistent armies, since from the battle of Ananarath the captures are meagre, totalling 17 maryanni and 74 other Asiatics,[149] no captures are made against *m-p-s-n* and *ḫ-t-ṯ-n*, and in the battle against *Mktr-ynt* and *ꜥ-t-r-n* only bring a total of 332 captures. As Spalinger has noticed, all these cities and towns appear to lay off the main route of the Via Maris, and it seems likely they had either caused troubles on the road, causing the Egyptian swift response to maintain the control of the territories, or the Egyptian might have just considered it to be necessary to re-establish and sthrenghten their control of this territory.[150]

4.3.4.4. The problem of the peace offers

The campaign of year 9 is the last "large" military campaign to have been recorded in the documents at our disposal. This is often considered to be connected to the last episode registered in the Memphis Stela: the arrival of the "*chiefs of Naharin, Hatti and Sangar* (Babylon)" at the Egyptian camp,

[142] See Der Manuelian 1987:73 for the identification of the date.
[143] Probably the same as No. 52 in the Topographical List.
[144] Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1308.5-10.
[145] No. 41 in the topographical List, see the **Appendix**.
[146] Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1308:12.
[147] See Der Manuelian 1987:73 for a breakdown.
[148] Goren et al. 2004:240-243.
[149] Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1308:6-9.
[150] Spalinger 1983:95. For the via Maris, see **§6.2.**

carrying gifts, begging for peace, and asking for the "breath of life."[151] Other elements suggest the beginning of a peace process between Egypt and Mittani at this time. The tombs of the veterans stop representing Mittanian captives and booty, leaving way to the scenes of the "presentation by foreigners", and in the Memphis and Karnak stela the enemy is defined not as "Naharina", but using an archaic term for Asiatics, *šttyw*, possibly to distance the concepts of war and of a newly minted ally.[152] According to Bryan, the language of the Memphis stelae was composed after the conflicts with Mittani had ended, and it might have been reflecting that peace with Mittani had either been achieved, or at hand.[153] From this point forward, peace seems to have become the new status quo: Amenhotep II reigned for another 16 years and a treaty at this stage would explain the lack of further campaigning in the region.[154] Unfortunately, there are no written treaties with Mittani in the document at our disposal, but according to Podany and Warburton,[155] Mittani might have sought peace at this stage because at the same time it was fighting against the territorial ambition of Ḫatti for Kizzuwatna, and an aggressive Egypt at this stage would have been an issue worth resolving with peace.

4.3.5. The Great Topographical List of Thutmose III

Location and Findspot: *in situ*, Great Temple of Amun, Karnak.

Publications: *Urk*. IV, 779-786 (the so-called "Megiddo" list), 786-794 (the so-called "Naharina" list); Simons 1937.

General Bibliography: Astour 1963; Helck 1971; Giveon 1977; Aḥituv 1984:12; Redford 1982; 2003: 43-48; Kitchen 2006; Stockfisch 2004; 2008; Turri 2015:162-173. See also the **Appendix.**

The so-called "Topographical lists" are long series of names of places and peoples inscribed into cartouche-like ovals, a conventional representation of a fortified wall. They are normally displayed upon the pylons of a temple or carved on its external walls.[156] Topographical lists were written from

[151] *Urk*. IV, 1309. See § for a discussion.
[152] As noticed by Bryan (2000:76).
[153] Bryan 2000:76.
[154] Der Manuelian 1987:78-83.
[155] Podany 2010:170-186; Warburton 2016:258.
[156] O'Connor et al. 2003:62

the time of Thutmose I to the times of the Roman Emperors, but only 15 survive from the 18th Dynasty.[157] Since the lists are essentially a long parade of toponyms which often proceed in regional groups, it is tempting to used them to support and describe the political geography of Nubia and the Levant, or to identify in them the conquests made of each Pharaoh. However, while these lists were originally and most likely compiled by combining administrative, military, or literary documents,[158] with the passage of time they became standardized items, almost a "literary" kind of document, heavily relying on – if not directly copied from– older ones.[159] Generally, an entry in these lists merely proves the existence of a toponym at the moment in which the inscription was composed, without giving, *per se*, any other information, not even for the existence of the connected settlement at the time of the carving of its name. Therefore, as Kitchen has said, names from these lists should not be cherry-picked indiscriminately, to be used as "*instant history-pegs for the study of any given place in the Near East*."[160]

It is common opinion, however, that this general statement does not apply to the list of the great temple of Amun in Karnak of Thutmose III, both because it is considered to be the "original source" for later lists,[161] and because many connections can be drawn between its toponyms and those in his other inscriptions.[162] The list mentions a total of 360 different toponyms divided in two regional portions, the first dedicated to the southern Levant (the so-called "*Megiddo List*"), and the second dedicated to the northern Levant and Syria (the so-called "*Naharina list"*). The "Megiddo" list is copied three times across the sixth and seventh pylon of the temple of Amun, with little difference in the names recorded from one copy to another. Following Simon's terminology and translations,[163] List "a", engraved on the northern tower of the Sixth Pylon, is said to be a *"List of the countries of Upper-Retenu shut up by His Majesty in the city of the wretched Megiddo. His*

[157] 2 from the Early 18th, 9 from the Mid-18th, 4 from the Late 18th (Stockfisch 2004:95-96).
[158] Kitchen 2006:133.
[159] Kitchen 2006:130.
[160] Kitchen 2006:129.
[161] Astour 1963:220; Giveon 1977:173; Stockfisch 2004:96; 2008:169-170.
[162] The same connections cannot, for example, be noticed in the Karnak list of Amenhotep II (Simons 1937:129). As Giveon (1977:173) has noticed, only 4 out of 11 readable toponyms in the list are mentioned in the Memphis and Karnak stelae.
[163] Simons 1937:28-34.

majesty brought their children as living prisoners to the city of śwhn m ỉpt-š.wt (Castle in Thebes) on his first victorious campaign, according to the command of his father Amon, who led him to fortunate paths". List "b", located on southern face of the western tower of the Seventh Pylon, indicates *"All the inaccessible lands of the marshes of śt.t (Asia) whom His Majesty brought as living captives. He made great slaughter among them. They had never been trodden before by any of the kings of lower Egypt apart from his majesty. The renown of his Might in [his doing so[shall not be destroyed in this land [for ever].* Finally, list "c" on the northern face of the same tower as "b" is the sole one to add the adding 270 names of the "Naharina" to the 117 of the "Megiddo" list,[164] and it is said to be a *"List of …. to the city of Thebes (wȝś.t) in order to fill the storehouse of his Father Amun in ỉpt-š.wt* .

There are 118 Toponyms in the Megiddo List a, and they are discussed in the **Appendix**. 24 among these toponyms cannot be identified, and 6 are geographical features.[165] A first group of toponyms accounts for the first 56 names. After the first two toponyms – Qadesh, the head of the coalition fought by Thutmose III, and Megiddo, where the battle was fought – the names in the list are all located in the Levantine interior, from the Jezreel to the Orontes Valley. From no.3 to no.10,[166] from Hashabu to Labana, the names pertain to the Beqaa. It seems likely these names are presented in a north-to-south directions, but since only one has been identified with certainty (Kumidi, with Kamid el-Loz)[167] this remains a mere supposition. The toponyms from no. 11[164] to no.30 pertain to cities located in the regions of southern Syria and the Bashan. Numbers 31 to 52 are all in the Galilee, the northern valleys around the Jordan river, the Jezreel, and the plain of Akko, but there does not seem to be a consistent pattern, aside from a vague north-to-south direction. After two unidentified sites, numbers 55 and 56 belong again to the Beqaa.[168]

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[164] Simons 1937:28-30.

[165] Redford 1982:59. No.77 is a "*ḥr*", a "mountain"; No. 95 is "*ʿyn*", "springs"; and No. 15, 90, 92, and 99 are "*i-b-r*" "wadis".

[166] The locations of Number 11 (*ḳ-r-t n-ḏ-n*) and number 12 (*m-r-m*) are discussed. It seems likely they are to be placed in Southern Syria, and therefore I have placed them in the second group, but there is no certainty.

[167] **§5.4.9.**

[168] Aharoni (1979:156) observed that they might have been originally been "misplaced" by the fact that Qadesh and Megiddo were posed as the first sites.

A second group of toponyms starts with number 57, and it does not seem to follow a consistent pattern. The sites' location moves from the Negev in the south to southern Syria in the North, touching the Sharon and the Akko, Jezreel, Jordan, and Orontes Valleys. There are no sites that can be placed on the coast, aside from Jaffa and those in the plain of Akko. There does not seem to be a general pattern linking the sites, but some sections can be best described as a collection of itineraries, of segments of routes used by travellers and armies.[169] Three examples of such routes can be identified:

- Sequence I: (Numbers 57-71)

Number 57 is "Negeb", which Rainey[170] has suggested might be a "regional" indicator. If he is right, numbers 58 and 59 are somewhere in the North Sinai or in the Negev, and connect to the road that can be "read" in numbers 60-71. This road appears to move along the Via Maris, from Yursa/Tel Jemme passing by Ashdod and Jaffa on the coast, turning east with the Yarkon River, and then, once passed Aphek and its springs, continues north through Yehem and to Tel Zeror.

- Sequence II: (Numbers 112-116)

As Aharoni has noticed,[171] this is likely the road mentioned in the Annals as going north of Megiddo,[172] since it passes by Djefty (likely Tel Esur, some 15 Km west of the Aruna Pass),[173] and continues north to Jokneam. Read from north to south, it continues, to a certain extent, the previous sequence. passing from Northern Sharon to the Jezreel Valley. No 112 has been identified as Tel Qasis, in the Akko Plain, while Number 116 is Djefty.

- Sequence III (Numbers 89-101)

[169] See Helck 1971:127; Redford 1982:56-59 and Kitchen 2006:135.
[170] Rainey 1987:535.
[171] Aharoni 1959:110-111.
[172] *Urk*. IV, 654:12.
[173] Shalvi et al. 2019.

According to Redford,[174] this sequence represents an itinerary that, from the Bashan, moves south to Moab, east of the Jordan River. While Redford's argument are convincing,[175] caution must be used, since only three among these names[176] have parallels in other lists, and other three[177] of the names are instances of the use of the word "*i-b-r*". Nonetheless, the proposed candidates for sites 93-97 were occupied during the LBA, and the 3 streams fit nicely with the sequence, possibly mirroring the King's Highway, as implicitly suggested by Redford. [178]

In conclusion, there is not a recognizable coherent pattern in the distribution of the Toponyms in the topographical list of Thutmose III. The first 56 names are all located to the valleys of the interior, and considering the fact that the inscriptions upon lists *a* and *c* state it represents the "*countries of upper Retjenu*" conquered by Thutmose III, a likely interpretation is that the description should be taken (at least for what matters the first 56 names) at a face value, and that these names represent the countries of Upper Retjenu which were allied to Qadesh and submit to Thutmose III in the wake of the battle of Megiddo. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that cities which according to the Annals were already in Egyptian hands by the time of the battle of Megiddo (like Gaza and Sharuhen)[179] do not appear in the toponym list. Similarly, neither the cities of the Lebanese coast which were seemingly allied to the Egyptians,[180] nor those which would have only been conquered in successive campaigns (like those in the 'Akkar Plain) appear in the "Megiddo list". The nature of the second part remains difficult to fully comprehend, as it does not follow a recognizable and unitary shape. As the list continues with a series of sequences of cities located along roads, it is possible that it might had been made longer by adding toponyms registered in other documents to the primary list of conquests but with the data at our disposal it is difficult to establish for certain.

[174] Redford 1982:
[175] For a discussion, see Kitchen 1992.
[176] No. 89,91,93. See Rainey et al. 2006:73.
[177] No. 90,92,99.
[178] See the **Appendix**, and Redford 1982:74
[179] **§5.4.2.** and **§5.4.3.**
[180] **§5.4.6.3.**

4.3.6. The tombs of the Veterans of the wars of the 18th Dynasty

4.3.6.1. Introduction and General discussion

The simple design of the rock-cut, tomb-chapels of the 18th Dynasty in Thebes was often enriched by elements representing names, titles, and familial affiliations of the deceased. Sometimes, these elements appeared together with a lengthier biography, where texts and images narrated the owner's social position and episodes of his life.[181] Similar biographical texts already appear in tombs dated to the early Old Kingdom,[182] but it was with the early 18th Dynasty that autobiographies start to focus also on the profession of the individual, often including phraseological elements of the royal annalistic in the text to describe the historical setting of the events.[183] The tombs of at least 40 veterans of the wars of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II, and of the dignitaries in the courts of Amenhotep III,[184] contain the descriptions of military campaigns, records of Egyptian centres in the Levant, and the so-called "presentation by foreigners" scenes.

According to Frood,[185] the elite context in which and for which the tombs were constructed and decorated calls for caution in their utilization as historical sources. Biographies were not written to relate facts but to glorify the tomb owner and perpetuate his memory, and as such they are not immune to the influences of "*aesthetic referentiality*", the fictionalization in the representation of potentially real events.[186] At the same time, Shaheen has noticed several elements that support the idea of a certain level of historicity at the base of these texts.[187] To begin with, biographies, titles, and reliefs of each tombs are internally coherent. Depictions of horses, for example, appear mainly in the tombs of people bearing the titles of "overseer of the horses" and "stable master", and are usually absent in the tombs of those who do not share the title.[188] Moreover, the biographical texts tend to be specific in their descriptions of the events, and to include historical circumstances and

[181] Dodson et al. 2008:115-116.
[182] Frood et al.2007:8.
[183] Gnirs 1996a:228-232; Guksch 1994.
[184] TT (Theban Tomb) 17; 18; 24; 39; 40; 42; 53; 55; 58; 63; 74; 78; 80; 81; 82; 84; 85; 86; 89; 90; 91; 93; 99; 100; 106; 119; 120; 121; 127; 131; 143; 145; 154; 155; 162; 226; 239; 241; 256; 261; 274. Polanski 2000:194.
[185] Frood et al. 2007:4-6.
[186] Guksch 1994:2-4; Frood et al. 2007:4-6.
[187] Shaheen 1988:306-307.
[188] Shaheen 1988:300.

geographical sites that are known from the royal sources. For example, a stela from TT 84 contains two descriptions of the crossing of the Euphrates in year 33,[189] and another (possibly) one of the erections of the rampart during the siege of Megiddo which, according to Shirley, is similar to that of the text of the 7th pylon Reveal at Karnak.[190] Moreover, in the tomb of Menkheperrasonb[191], who took part to the expeditions of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II, the chief of Tunip is represented holding his son in his hands and presenting him to the Pharaoh.[192] Such representation well supports the passage in the Annals of Thutmose III where it is said that the sons of the rulers of Retjenu would have been taken to Egypt to ensure loyalty on their fathers and on their cities.[193] It seems therefore likely that at least a certain flair of historical elements can be gained from these documents.

The military narrative of the 18th dynasty seems to dry out at the end of the reign of Thutmose IV, leaving space to the stereotypical[194] and almost omnipresent "presentation by the foreigners" scenes. This typology of scenes, where Egyptian administrators are shown receiving valuable or rare commodities from people of Syrian and Nubian descent, can be found in tombs dated at the entire 18th dynasty, from Ineni's TT81 – the owner of which seems to have died under Hatshepsut, and therefore predates the campaigns of Thutmose III[195]–, to Huy's TT40, dated at the Amarna Period.[196] Between these two chronologically distant examples, many others present similar scenes, such as the tomb of the Great Herald Antef, TT 155.[197] The owners of these tombs seems to have held positions in the executive branches of the Egyptian Government, and are shown to receive items catalogued as *inw*, *bꜣkw*, and *ḥꜣḳ*.[198] The nature of these offerings has been discussed at length, and the distinction between them is not clear. *inw* are usually interpreted as "*tributes*",[199] likely paid on a

[189] *Urk.* IV, 946.6-7.
[190] The line was not noticed by Sethe for his Urkunden, but by Shirley in her later collation. Shirley 2005:355; 2011:306-307.
[191] TT86.
[192] Davies et al. 1933:pl. IV.
[193] *Urk.* IV, 689:13. Translation Redford 2003:69. See **§5.4.8.2.**
[194] To the extent that one of them – TT 86 – in presenting several chiefs of foreign countries, represents the king of Ḫatti as a Syrian Chief, "*as if a Hittite could not be distinguished from any one else north of the Egyptian boundary*" (Davies et al. 1933: 4). While it is at the very least doubtful that the King of Ḫatti went to Egypt to pay a tribute, it has been argued in the past that since theologically all the foreign lands were under Pharaonic control, a foreign ruler might have been portrayed bowing to the Egyptian King even though it might not have happened in reality (Gordon 1984:334).
[195] Shaheen 1988:158.
[196] Davies et al. 1926.
[197] Säve-Söderbergh et al. 1957.
[198] Gordon 1984:332, Shaheen 1988:157.
[199] Warburton 1997:221.

yearly basis to the private purse of the King.[200] However, it has also been argued that because of the Egyptian world view, goods coming from foreign lands would have been considered tribute regardless of their nature as forced contribution, trade goods, or gifts.[201] *bꜣkw* is usually interpreted as "*tax*" or "*rent*",[202] but it also seems to have been paid – as opposed to the king's *inw* – to the temple.[203] Finally, *ḥꜣḳ* literally means "*what was plundered,*"[204] the booty from the campaign, often used to identify war-prisoners[205] The foreigners are represented as subject people, at the mercy of the Pharaoh,[206] arranging a variety of goods in front of him, and sometimes, items, people, and regions of provenience in the presentation scenes can be tied to the items, people, and regions mentioned in contemporary royal records, acts and policies, "*and are consistent with the reigns from which different items*" are said to be coming.[207] Copper and Tin are only shown in presentations involving Asiatics and Keftiu people;[208] Giraffes and ostrich appear only in presentations involving Nubians and other African populations.[209] Horses nearly always come from Asia.[210]

4.3.6.2. The inscription of the soldier and Lieutenant General Amenemheb, called Mahu

Tomb number: TT85

Publications: *Urk.* IV, 890-897; Virey 1891; Breasted 1906: vol II:227-234; Porter 1970:V.1:170-175.

General Bibliography: Davies 1934; Gardiner 1947: 153-158, Gnirs, Grothe and Guksch 1997:174-181, Redford 2003:167-173, Shirley 2005:381-401, Di Biase-Dyson 2015.

[200] Bleiberg 1984:157.
[201] Gordon 1984:333.
[202] Warburton 1997:256.
[203] Bleiberg 1988:68.
[204] Warburton 1997:263.
[205] Shaheen 1988:157.
[206] Hartwig 2004:74.
[207] As discussed by Shaheen 1988:292-307 and Hallmann 2006:10-207. The tomb numbers refer to the catalogue of Porter et al. 2004.
[208] TT 17; 39; 40; 42; 100; 119; 131; 155; 256; 276.
[209] TT 39; 98.
[210] TT 40. Shaheen 1988:292-293.

Table 2: Catalogue of Amenemheb-Mahu's deeds during the wars of Thutmose III following Redford's nomenclature (2003:167-170).			
Letter	Events	Letter	Events
A	Capture of three Aamu in the Negeb, carried them to Naharina.	F	Oversees the mounting of fortifications (probably a provisional camp) in a place the name of which is unreadable.
B	Capture of other 13 Aamu and several goods at the "Juniper-Ridge", west of Aleppo	G	Witnesses the victories over the land of Takhsy and the town of Mariu, and receives the Gold of Valor.
C	Crosses the Euphrates and captures other prisoners of war during an expedition in the land of Carchemish.	H	Witnesses the hunt in Niya, saves Thutmose III from a charging elephant, and is awarded another Gold.
D	Witnesses Thutmose III plunder Sendjar[211] and receives the Gold of Valor	I	Amenemheb battles in Qadesh, where he kills a mare set free in order to distract the Egyptian horses
E	Witnesses Thutmose III plunder Qadesh and receives a second Gold of Valor	J	Amenemheb is part of the elite troops sent to breach the walls of Qadesh.

Amenemheb Mahu spent most of his career under Thutmose III and Amenhotep II,[212] and his nearly-intact tomb and long autobiography detail his military deeds. The most debated portion of his biography (and also the one of most relevance to this discussion) is composed of the ten passages presented in table 2 above, whose chronological distribution (meaning, in what campaign they supposedly happened) is not a settled argument.[213] Breasted thought that an old Amenemheb had told a scribe the most important events in his career without an attempt at order.[214] Gardiner and Di

[211] Probably to be identified with a region in the Orontes, between Niya and Tunip (Redford 2003:168, but see also Turri 2015:273).
[212] Shirley 2005:381.
[213] See for example Breasted 1906 vol II:228; Gardiner 1947:157; Faulkner 1946:39; Redford 2003:170-172; Di Biase-Dyson 2015:139-142.
[214] Breasted 1906 vol II:228.

Biase-Dyson saw them as all belonging to the same campaign of year 33.[215] Redford has convincingly argued that since soldiers were decorated only once every campaign, then "*this might be a reliable rule of thumb in trying to ascertain the number of expeditions the old soldier is recalling,*"[216] and therefore A, B, C, D and H should be assigned to the 8th campaign (but D it might have been part of the campaign of the Year 13), F to the 10th, G between years 42 and 49, E, I, and J remain undated. There is an overall agreement that at least A, B, and C pertain to a single campaign, likely to be identified with the 8th, the only known instance in which Thutmose III crossed the Euphrates and fought in Carchemish. However, the Gebel Barkal Stela says that in year 33 Thutmose III sailed[217] to Byblos to build the boats necessary to cross the Euphrates, and only then he moved inland toward Mittani. This description does not correspond to the itinerary described by Amenemheb in his autobiography, where he passes by the Negeb before reaching Aleppo and Carchemish. Di Biase-Dyson noticed how from line 12 of the text the predominant character stops being Amenemheb and becomes Thutmose III. [218] In other words, Amenemheb stops acting and becomes a witness to his Pharaoh's accomplishments. According to her, this element that seemingly indicates the physical presence of the Pharaoh,[219] and, as a logical consequence, Amenemheb went north without the King, meet with him in Naharina, and together they went back south.[220] Under the assumptions that the texts are both consistent with reality, and that the points made before are correct, an explanation for this apparent discrepancy might be that Thutmose III organized a complex expedition, where he went north via boat toward Byblos with a limited portion of his army, while the bulk of it travelled by foot.

[215] Gardiner 1947:157.

[216] Redford 2003:170. This "rule of thumb" seems to be supported by the rewarding sequences found in the tombs of the late 18th dynasty (TT75, dated to the reign of Thutmose IV). According to Susanne Binder (2008:81-84), a sequence of scenes dated to the Amarna Period showed the moment in which the king rewarded the worthy soldier, starting with the return of the soldier home, and the actual celebration being carried on the inside of the palace, rather than on the battlefield.

[217] The sentence in the stela recites "*jst ḏ3-n hm-jr phww mw sti*", "*Now my Majesty crossed to the end of Asia*" (Translation Kilani 2017a:125) but the verb *ḏ3i*, here with the boat determinative, is usually considered as "*to ferry someone across water*" (Faulkner 1962:318) and therefore the sentence is usually considered as to mean that Thutmose sailed to Byblos, rather than travelled by other mean.

[218] Di Biase-Dyson 2015:141-142.

[219] Di Biase-Dyson 2015:139.

[220] Di-Biase-Dyson 2015:142.

The second half in Amenemheb's career is interesting for a different reason: after the death of Thutmose III and with the accession of Amenhotep II, Mahu became *idnw n mš3*,[221] a title which, according to Gnirs, was a originally a military office, but during the New Kingdom became more of an administrative label given to those with Logistical responsibilities within the military.[222] A few scenes in the tomb appear to confirm this impression: his tomb shows Mahu as being involved in the troops provisioning, the inspection of the records of a storehouse named after Amenhotep II, and giving instruction to a "*overseer of the granary of the lord of the two lands, one who reckons the preparation of bread and beer*."[223] This second half of his career, therefore, testifies the extensive Logistical preparations for the army, similar to what can be understood from the archaeological excavations at the Infrastructure of North Sinai.[224]

4.3.7. Papyrus Hermitage 1116 A

Location: Museum Hermitage, St. Petersburg.

Publications: Müller 1914; Golenishchev 1993.

General Bibliography: O'Callaghan 1951:10-11; Helck 1971 :620-630;8 90-892. Epstein 1963a; Redford 1965; Vernus 1978; Na'aman 1997; Pasquali 2007; Turri 2015:233-236.

Papyrus Hermitage 1116A is a small papyrus which contains two lists of payments to envoys from eleven towns (lines 68-78 and 183-190, see **Table 3**), rations of food distributed by the Egyptian palace officials. These envoys are defined in the papyrus both as *maryanni*, and as *wpwty*, messengers. According O'Callaghan the combination of the two terms (together with the particularly high quantity of beer and grain reserved for them), makes it likely that these were people of high rank, tasked to present petitions to the king on behalf of their cities.[225] Not only all of the location beside Ashkelon are located in the areas of the interior, but also nearly all of these names are mentioned in the Megiddo list of Thutmose III, and are therefore likely to have been considered as "allies" of the king of Qadesh.[226] As it can be seen, Ashkelon is the "odd one" of the list, the only

[221] *Urk*. IV, 897, 11-17.
[222] Gnirs 1996b:25, n.202.
[223] Scenes 2, 3, 8, 30 in Porter et al. 1994:171-175.
[224] **§5.3.**
[225] O'Callaghan 1951:311.
[226] See **§4.3.5.**

town not to be situated in the "Upper Retjenu".[227] Muller is probably right in his hypothesis that the list is to be intended as a caravan of the envoys of the northern kingdoms which had been joined by the one from Ashkelon.[228]

Table 3: the Toponyms of Papyrus Hermitage 1116A (based on Epstein 1963:50).			
Toponyms' Identification	Toponym's Translitteration	Position in the Toponym List of Thutmose III	Location (A)Goren,Finkelstein and Na'aman (2004) (B) Aḥituv (1984)
Megiddo	*M-k-t*	2	Tel Megiddo, Jezreel (A)
Kinnereth	*k-n-n-r-t*	34	Khirbet el-'Oreimeh, Jordan Valley (B)
Achshaph	*ʿ-k-s-p*	40	Tel Keisan, Akko Plain (A)
Shimron	[*š*]-*m-r-n*	35	Tel Shimron, Jezreel (A)
Ta'anach	[*t*]-*n-n-k*	42	Tel Tanaach, Jezreel (B)
Mishal	[*m*]-*š-i-r*	39	Tel el-Nahl, Akko Plain (B)
Bit-Tenne (?)	*t-n-n*	-	Unidentified, Jezreel Plain[229]
Sharon	[*š*]-*r-n*	21	Unidentified, Bashan (A)
Ashkelon	*ʿ*-[*s*]-*k-r-n*	-	Tel Ashkelon, Southern Coastal Plain (A)
Hazor	*ḥ-ḏ-r*	32	Tel el-Qedah, Huleh Valley (A)
Ham	*h-t-m*	118	Unknown. Possibly Tell Ham, in the Bashan[230]

4.4. Cuneiform documents

4.4.1. Introduction

In the Late Bronze Age the Akkadian cuneiform writing became an integral part of the organization of the society, and was used for legal, administrative, and political purposes.[231] While the Amarna corpus demonstrates the wide use of cuneiform writing in the region, less than a hundred documents

[227] Another city from the same area, Lachish, is mentioned in the papyrus, but separate from the main list of towns, and his envoy is not defined as a maryannu (for a discussion, see Webster et al. 2019:90).
[228] Müller 1914:105.
[229] See Turri 2015:234-236.
[230] For a discussion, see Turri 2015:234, n.139.
[231] According to Cohen (2018:247-254) the existence of local schools has been shown by the existence of teaching aids in many of the cities where writing was attested for political and administrative reasons (see for example Hazor 6 and 9, Ashkelon 1, Aphek 1 and 3).

have been retrieved in the course of a century of excavations of sites located south of the Orontes.[232] The documents that follow date from the late 15th to the 13th century, are presented in the most-likely chronological order, and are mostly presented with the nomenclature proposed by Horowitz, Oshima, and Sanders (2006; 2018).

4.4.2. Tanaach 6 and 5: Letters of "Amanhatpa" to Talwašur

Location and Findspost: Arkeoloji Muzeleri, Istanbul, Fi 6 and 5, ES 2798 and ES 2799. In situ, in a chest which served as a repository for the collection.[233]

Publications: Hrozny 1904:36-37; Albright 1944; Rainey 1999; Horowitz, Oshima, and Kreuzer 2006:127-151; Horowitz, Oshima, and Sanders 2018:132-155.

General Bibliography: Glock 1971; 1983; Der Manuelian 1987:83-90; Zadok 1996:106-111; Pruzsinszky 2006.

Translation: Horowitz, Oshima, and Sanders 2018:144-147.

Tanaach 6: *[To Ta]lwašur [message of A]manhatpa: [May the Storm God gu]ard your life.[For]merly, Baz'unnu son of Narsi is whom you were sending to me. Furthermore, your retainers are not on guard and you yourse[lf] do not come before me nor do you send your brothers here. Furthermore, in Gaza I was, but you did not come to me. Now I [am going fort]h to war[…] you are [… of yo]urs. [F]urthermore [your] brothers [and your y]oung men _ you do [no]t [s]end [them t]o me. […] of yours s[end them to] me. [No]w , in regard to the captive[es] [w]hom I have redeemed [se]nd them. As for [your] brother[s] and […] their […F]urthermore […send] to m[e][tomo]rrow and […]*

Tanaach 5: *To Talwašur message of Amanhatpa: May the Storm God guard your life. Send me your brothers, together with the[ir] chariots, and send me the horses, your tribute,*

[232] Horowitz, Oshima, and Sanders 2018:5.

[233] Glock 1983:58.

and an audience gift; and all the captives who are presently with you. Send them tomorrow to Megiddo.

Of the 17 LBA documents discovered in Tanaach, 8 are letters sent to its ruler Talwašur, dated on palaeographic grounds to the end of the 15th century BC.[234] Tanaach 6 and 5 were written by a man called *A-ma-an-ha-at-pa* (a rendition of the Egyptian name "Amenhotep")[235] who orders Talwašur to send him his troops and tributes.[236] According to Glock,[237] Tanaach 3 and 4 (two list of names found near 5 and 6) are records of this military mobilization, and Horowitz et al. (2018:140) have argued that the verb *deku* (Tanaach 3 obv.6) has various meanings, including "to mobilize soldiers" and "to summon officials". Moreover, the Amanhatpa author of these letters has evidently a high profile in the Egyptian military administration, but no title is given. Malamat suggested an identification with Amenhotep II in his campaign of year 3,[238] but Spalinger and Der Manuelian, noticing a conspicuous absence of royal titulary, have argued for an Egyptian official of the same name.[239] Considering that in EA 162 (3-4) Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten uses his titulary in a letter to the unruly king of Amurru Aziru, their rebuttal appears convincing, and it is unlikely that Amanhatpa should be identified with Amenhotep II as Pharaoh. It remains possible that the letter was written by Amenhotep II as a young general, but a similar idea cannot be demonstrated on the base of the information at our disposal.[240] In any case these letters testify the existence of a system in which the small Levantine Kingdoms had to provide soldiers and supplies for the Egyptian army. As a similar request for food and military aid is well documented in the Amarna Letters,[241] it is possible that the

[234] Glock 1983:57; Rainey 1999:154.
[235] Among others, see Albright 1924:140; Hess 1993:29, and Pruzsinszky 2006:107.
[236] The letters are given in an inverted order following Malamat (1961:219), who argued that since an army directed to war would have gone north from Gaza to Megiddo, the two letters should be read in an inversed order from the one Hrozny put them in.
[237] Glock 1983:62-63.
[238] Malamat 1961.
[239] Spalinger 1983:97-98; Der Manuelian 1987:87.
[240] As proposed by both Rainey (1973:73) and Glock (1983:61). A similar discussion – which is chronologically outside of the purview of this research – relates to the identification of the "man of Egypt" *Ar-ma-a-as* mentioned in Hittite letters of the time of Šuppiluliuma and Mursili II with the pharaoh (or future pharaoh) Horemheb (see Stefanini 1962; 1965; Miller 2007a; 2007b for a discussion).
[241] **§6.4.**

structure suggested by these letters might have been similar to that which is well documented for the time of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.

4.4.3. Kurustama Treaty

Manuscripts: CTH 134.A: KBo 8.37; CTH 134.B: KBo 53.250+KBo 22.15+KUB 23.7+Bo 6943+Bo 3508; CTH 134.C: KUB40.28.

Publications: Davis 1990; Breyer 2010a:142-145; Singer 2012:474-479.

General Bibliography: Sürenhagen 1985; 2006; De Martino 2010; Simon 2007; Breyer 2010b; Mynářová 2014; Devecchi 2015a:168-170; 2015b:164-165.

The so-called Kurustama Treaty is the first treaty signed between Egypt and Ḫatti, and the only one to be related to the time of the 18th Dynasty. Retrieved in Hattusa in extremely fragmentary conditions, it is preserved in five fragments originating from three different duplicates, which have only recently been collated.[242] Since however the treaty is mentioned in documents dated to the end of the 18th Dynasty,[243] its content is at least partially known. The deeds of Suppiluliuma in fact mention how the king of Ḫatti, having been reached by the Egyptian queen's request to marry one of his sons,[244] asked for the documents related to relations with the Egyptians, and a treaty concerning the deportation of the population of the city of Kurustama into Egyptian territory was read to him, demonstrating how "*The Storm-god concluded a treaty between the lands of Egypt and Hatti, and how they were continuously friendly with each other*".[245]

A full treatment of CTH 134 is yet to be written and beyond the scope of this research, but a passage recently restored by Singer testifies the existence of treaties stipulated and written by Egyptian rulers of the 18th Dynasty:

[242] Singer 2012:474; Devecchi 2015a:168.

[243] The Deeds of Šuppiluliuma, the "Second Plague Prayer" of Mursili II, and a different and fragmentary plague prayer (KBo 14.12, IV 26-39; CTH 378.II Obv. 13-24; CTH 379 II 6-24 respectively).

[244] For the famous episode of Queen Dahamunzu, see Miller 2007b and Del Monte 2009:113.

[245] Translation Singer 2012:472. See also Devecchi 2015b:264.

The men of H[atti], you should not go into the land of E[gypt]with [ev]il intentions [and the men of Egypt should not go (?)] [t]o the land of Hatti [with(?)] evil. [The land of H]attusa [should] be allies to the land of Egypt and you should defend Egypt! Egypt should be allies [to Hattusa and you should defend Hattusa][246]

The exact date of the Kurustama treaty is unknown. According to Breyer, the treaty should be dated on palaeographic grounds to the 15th century,[247] but it remains impossible to identify the signing parties with any certainty. The possible names are Thutmose III, Amenhotep II, and Amenhotep III for the Egyptians, and Tuthaliya I, Arnuwanda I, and Suppiluliuma I for the Hittites.[248] Both Thutmose III and Amenhotep II appear to have been in contact with the Hittites, and as Amenhotep II mentions how the ruler of Ḫatti sent embassies to obtain the "breath of life" from him he is the most likely signator from the Egyptian side.[249] On the Hittite side, as Simon[250] has noticed, only a king who controlled the territory of Kurustama would have been able to sign a treaty concerning the deportation of its people, and as such only Arnuwanda I might be identified as the signatory. As Podany has noticed, moreover, at this time the kingdoms of Egypt and Ḫatti had every reason to be friendly, since they shared a common enemy, and since they had no land in dispute.[251]

Further evidence of the relationship between Egypt and Ḫatti at the time is found in the existence of the fragmentary KBo 31.40. The tablet is likely a copy of a letter sent from Ḫatti to Egypt, but its state does not allow for extensive discussions:[252] neither the name of the sender nor that of the addressee are mentioned, and so the letter has been dated to the 15th-14th centuries on two arguments: the salutation formula different and likely earlier from that of the 13th centuries letters with Ramesses II,[253] and the peculiar spelling "*Mi-iz-za-ri*", "Egypt", found only in Middle Hittite documents.[254] Moreover the use of the brotherhood metaphor (similar to that used in the Amarna

[246] KBo 8.37, rev.5-10. Translation Singer 2012:478. A similar reconstruction and translation has been presented in Breyer 2010a:144.
[247]Breyer 2010a:142.
[248] Devecchi 2015b:265.
[249] *Urk*. IV, 1309:16-18.
[250] Simon 2007.
[251] Podany 2010:150.
[252] Edel 1996; De Martino 2005:292; Cordani 2017:10.
[253] Cordani 2017:10.
[254] Edel 1996:116.

Letters) likely indicates the existence of equal and cordial relations between the two countries,[255] possibly after a period of strained relations.[256] This letter, therefore, further supports the existence of a diplomatic connections with Egypt in the pre-Amarna period.

4.4.4. The Amarna Letters

4.4.4.1. Introduction

A corpus of 18th Dynasty letters was discovered in 1887 at Tell el-Amarna (the site of the capital of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten). To these days this corpus represents the most detailed and important window of observation over the Egyptian administration in the Levant and over the diplomatic contacts with the rulers of the Near East.[257] Petrie, who guided the first modern archaeological excavation in Amarna, reports that all but a few letters were found in the same building, one whose bricks were inscribed with the sentence "*the place of the letters of the Pharaoh, lph*".[258]

First published by Winkler, the corpus was later re-edited, collated, and translated by Knudtzon (1915).[259] Knudtzon's numbering system was kept by Rainey (who added 21 further texts),[260] and then by all editions that have been published since, by Moran (1987 in French, 1992 in English, translations only), Liverani (1998, in Italian, translations only),[261] and again Rainey (2015, both transliterations and translations).[262] The corpus of research on the Amarna Letters is functionally endless, as the letters have been approached from a variety of perspectives both as a

[255] As argued by Cordani 2017:10.
[256] Since Edel interprets a passage in lines 7-8 of the obvers to mean *"Du hast dich zu m[ir], deinem Bruder, wieder um[gewendet].. [..] ich werde [dein guter Freund o. ä.] sein."*
[257] Rainey et al. 2015:1.
[258] Petrie et al. 1894:pl. XLII.
[259] Winckler 1896; Knudtzon et al. 1915.
[260] Rainey 1970.
[261] Liverani (1998:62) developed his own numbering system alongside the "canonical" one. In Liverani's system the letters are divided into "dossiers" which are related to the same areas, and organized along chronological lines.
[262] Rainey's 2015 translation is also the one used throughout this research.

general corpus,[263] and as particular "dossiers" of letters coming from a single region or city.[264] In light of this ever-growing corpus of publications, an integral discussion of each individual letter would have been difficult (and quite superfluous) in the context of this research. The letters are therefore introduced as a corpus, identifying some of the main elements and methodologies that will be mentioned and used throughout the discussion.

4.4.4.2. The Political and Diplomatic Systems

The Amarna letters reflect a hierarchical (and in a certain sense binary) political system, where "Great" Kings rule over "Small" (often also called "Petty") ones. The Great Kings are the independent ones, who rule over the regional states of Egypt, Mittani, Ḫatti, Babylonia, Alashiya and, for limited periods, Assyria and Arzawa.[265] The Little Kings are the rulers of the city-states in Syria and the Levant, who owe their allegiance and their power to their Egyptian, Mittanian, and Hittite overlords. The relationship between Pharaoh and the kings of the city-states in the Egyptian Levant was based on a formal oath (Akkadian "*māmītu*"),[266] a unilateral promise of allegiance where the local king owed an annual tribute, nourishment for the Egyptian army, and sheltering for the Egyptian merchants, while the Pharaoh provided "*balātu"*, "life", the right to rule over his own city.[267] However, providing "*balātu"* and implementing said right were not the same thing, the Levantine rulers often lament the actions made againt them by their neighbours and the impression one might gain from the letters is one of turmoil and small scale conflicts between towns, or between

[263] Among others, Campbell (1964) Cordani (2009), Stavi (2015) discussed the chronology of the letters. Na'aman (1985), Hess (1985, 1993a), and Kilani (2020b,c) approached the subject of sociolinguistics and etnic composition in the contemporary Levant (see **§8.3.**). Goren et al. (2004) have studied the origins of the letter's clay to establish their provenance. Schulman (1964), Pintore (1973), Spalinger (1979), Galán (1994), and Warburton (1994) have treated some of the military aspects of the period. Liverani (2000), Cohen et al. (2002), and Mynářová (2007) have approached the diplomatic subjects.

[264] Among others, Youngblood (1971), Liverani (1974, 1979), Pryke (2010), and Kilani (2020a) have focused on Byblos, Goren et al. (2003) and Barreyra (2006) on Amurru, Galil (1998), Vita (2004), Finkelstein et al. (2005), and Na'aman (2011) on other cities across the Levant.

[265] Arzawa, a large territory in the Anatolian south, is only represented by two letters (EA 31-32), written to Amenhotep III in a moment in which Ḫatti was unable to exert its power (Stavi 2015:56-60). On the other hand, the two letters from Assyria (EA 15-16) are instead likely originated by the destruction of Mittani, which freed Assyria and allowed it to enter the circle of the great powers (Liverani 1998:361-363).

[266] See Mynářová 2015:159.

[267] Liverani 2003:17.

a town and the nomadic population.[268] As Liverani has observed,[269] however, such turmoil are only tied to the infighting between the petty rulers, and have no impact on the Egyptian control on the region.

International relations appear to have been shaped on the model of interpersonal relations that was common in the kingdoms of Mesopotamia already in the Early and Middle Bronze Age:[270] the rulers call each other "brother" or "father" (depending on the age-difference) and repeatedly intermarry, to the extent that the correspondence between the Great Kings appears to have been largely reserved for marriage negotiations and the exchange of goods in dowry.[271] For example the "dossier" of letters from Mittani (a collection of 9 letters)[272] contains information on the political and commercial connection between Egypt and Mittani that evolves around the weeding of a daughter of Tušratta to Amenhotep III first, and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten after.[273] According to Artzi, it seems that the Mittanian court "played" a lot on this hand: their letters always add greeting to the daughter sent to marry the king of Egypt, called "son-in-law."[274] According to Schulman the weddings were a way to tie rulers to each-other,[275] and were important elements in shaping the relations between two countries.[276] EA 24 for example, the only letter written in Hurrian in the corpus, seems to be focusing on a wedding between one of Tušratta's daughters and Amenhotep III.[277] The fact that it was written in a language different from Akkadian has led to speculations over its nature,[278] but since the land of Ḫatti is identified as an enemy of Egypt[279] right after the ritual salutations to the Pharaoh, and since it contains language closely resembling that of a treaty, Artzi

[268] De Magistris 2020a.
[269] Liverani 1988:30-32.
[270] The so-called "Ebla Age" in the 24th century, and the "Mari age" in the 18th century.
[271] Cohen et al. 2000:11.
[272] EA 17;19;20;21;23;24;26;27;28;29.
[273] Liverani 1998b:365.
[274] EA 19:1-8. Artzi 2000:205.
[275] And for this reason, both Amenhotep III, and Ramesses II asked for spouses from their allies in case of a succession in government
[276] Schulman 1979:179.
[277] Wilhelm 1995:135.
[278] Liverani has for example argued it was a private copy for the princess (1998:375), while Artzi (2000:209) saw it as an instruction for the Mittanian delegation on the occasion of the wedding festivities.
[279] For the reading of the passages, see Wilhelm 1995.

has argued that this letter might have been meant as a "draft" of a defensive treaty between the two countries.[280]

The diplomatic system of the time of Amenhotep III seems to have crumbled under his successor. The invasion of Mittani by the hands of Suppiluliuma of Ḫatti during the First Syrian War destroyed the equilibrium of the region by first annexing Mittani and then attacking the regions of the Levant which were under Egyptian control, like the city of Qadesh, whose ruler was then deported to Ḫatti.[281] Some of the former Mittani vassals tried to solicit an Egyptian intervention, and the regions of the Beqaa and of the Damascene report of attacks in their territories operated by the Hittites and the new ruler of Qadesh Aitakkama. These actions ushered in a new order and a new set of wars which go beyond the subject of this research, but the Egyptians reactions will be a part of the discussions of chapters **V**, **VI**, **IX**.

4.4.4.3. Mentions of Egyptian Campaigns

There are several mentions of Egyptian military activities in the Amarna Letters. Often, they appear as short and contained missions to protect precise Egyptian interests rather than vast military campaigns, like in the cases of the ephemeral presence of Nubian forces in Jerusalem and the expedition aimed at capturing (and probably kill) Abdi-Aširta of Amurru.[282] However, the preparations for a large military campaign, probably aimed at re-establishing the Egyptian control over the 'Akkar Plain and Orontes Valley are seemingly reflected in a series of letters ordering the Levantine vassals to prepare food for the passing army.[283]

Past campaigns are sometimes mentioned in the letters. EA 51, for example, from the ruler of Nuḫašše Addu-Nirari, mentions that "*Manaḫpiya, king of the land of Egypt, the father of your father, would appoint [T]a[ku, the fath]er [of] my [fath]er to kingship in the land of Nuġasse*".[284] Similarly, EA 59, from the inhabitants of Tunip, discusses how "*As for the city of Tunip, in the past*

[280] Or proposes one, according to Artzi (2000:209).
[281] See **§2.3.6.**
[282] **§5.4.8.3.1.**
[283] **§6.3.**
[284] EA 51:4-9. Translation Rainey 2015:385.

who occupied it? Did not Manaḫpirya occupy it, namely your ancestor?"[285] A long discussion has been had regarding the identity of *Ma-na-aḫ-pi-ja* and *Ma-na-aḫ-pi-ir-ja*, and whether they are to be considered Thutmose III (*mn-ḫpr-rˁ*) or Thutmose IV (*mn-ḫpr.w-rˁ*). The linguistic side of the argument has not found a satisfactory conclusion in either direction,[286] but Vergote has presented the convincing argument that, since both letters are to be dated to the time of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten,[287] and since *Manaḫpiya* is defined as the "father of your father", Thutmose IV is to be identified with the ruler of these letters. This seems especially likely considering, as Bryan has done, that personal communications between rulers are more likely to refer to events which happened in living memory, rather than a century before.[288] While caution is needed when handling these letters, it is also true that in the tomb of Nebamun, Thutmose's standard-bearer, the rulers of Northern countries are shown before his king, bringing "*the great plunder [from your] very valiant [armies] and the children of the chiefs of Nahrin*.[289] Also TT78 and TT63, show children presented to Thutmose IV by the rulers of the Levant, raising the possibility of a *ḥꜣk* plunder.[290] Although such depictions might be ceremonial and a-historical, it is also possible that they might have reflected the effect of a campaign of Thutmose IV possibly mentioned in EA 51 and 59. However, with the elements at our disposal a definitive answer cannot be given.

4.4.4.4. The Egyptian control over the Levant in the Amarna Letters

The Levantine Egyptian presence in the Amarna Letters is limited to a series of towns and regions that are said to be owned and controlled by the Egyptians: Gaza, Jaffa, Beth-Shean, Kumidi, Ullassa, and Sumur.[291] With the exceptions of Jaffa and Ullassa, in the corpus they all house one or more "*rabisu*", an Akkadian word that does not seem to correspond to a specific Egyptian title and that is usually translated as "commissioner".[292] Each commissioner resided in one of the centres, and looked

[285] EA 59:5-8. Translation Rainey 2015:413.
[286] See Vergote (1961:15-16) and Bryan (1991:339-343), *contra* Krauss (2012).
[287] Since both mentions the actions of Aziru of Amurru and Šuppiluliuma of Ḫatti in the region, who were contemporaries of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten's (**§5.4.8.3.1.**).
[288] Vergote 1961:15-16 and Bryan 1991:339-343.
[289] Translation Davies et al. 1923:33.
[290] Shaheen 1988:189-193
[291] See Chapter **V**.
[292] Moran 1992:xxvi n.70.

after the Egyptian interests in the cities and areas under their responsibility. There was a connection between the Egyptian commissioner at a centre and the cities under his responsibility, and this connection is evident in the numerous letters where rulers accepts a new commissioner,[293] and in two documents that seemingly describe this connection from a commissioner's perspective: EA 230, and Ostracon Michaelides 85.

EA 230 is a letter sent to Egypt from a man called Yama. According to Na'aman, ^{I}*Ia-ma* is *Ma-ia*, a commissioner stationed in Gaza whose name is metathesized.[294] Although this would be the only cuneiform exchange between the Egyptian court and one of its commissioners, such a metathesis is not unparalleled.[295] Furthermore, Yama's actions are not dissimilar from Maya's own, as he writes:

> "*Behold, I am your servant in the place where I am. Look, the places where I am are all your cities; I am your [lo]yal servant; I indeed protect your city rulers. If a soldier of yours comes to me, then I will guard him. And the towns where I am are all verily protected for you. And as for the city rulers, ask them whether they are verily protected. So may you be apprised that it is well with all your cities.*"[296]

Assuming Na'aman to be right in his identification, EA 230 certifies the relation between a commissioner and the rulers of the city in the territory under his command, similarly to how the 19th Dynasty Ostracon Michaelides 85 does. The ostracon is a letter written by a scribe stationed in Gaza to his superior Bakenamun, likely the centre's commissioner.[297] In the letter Bakenamun is informed that "*the towns of Pharaoh, l.p.h., which are in the district of (my) lord are prosperous […] of Pharaoh, l.p.h., who are in them are prosperous and healthy*".[298] The Ostracon depicts a situation similar to that described by EA 230, and it also provides the information that the commissioner of

[293] e.g. EA 315.
[294] Na'aman 1990:401.
[295] As Liverani (1998c:110 n.170) has noticed, the same metathesis is also found in the Egyptian name of Irimayasha, which is spelled ^{I}*i-ri-ma-ia-aš-ša* in EA 130:11 and ^{I}*i-ri-ia-ma[-aš-ša]* in EA 370:8 (See also Hess 1993:88).
[296] EA 230:4-22, Translation Rainey 2015:971.
[297] Michaelides et al. 1962:pl.XCIII; Wente et al. 1990:127, letter 150; Thorpe 2021:54.
[298] Translation Morris 2005:489.

the Egyptian centre of Gaza held jurisdiction over a district composed by several towns. This will be relevant in the definition of the Proximity Principle (**§5.3.2.**).

4.4.4.5. The chemical and petrographical analysis on the corpus

The geographical classification of the clay tablets found in Amarna begun with Knudtzon, who organized the letters according to the colour and the fabric of their clays, and believed that by establishing the source of each tablet's clay one might clarify the provenance of the letter.[299] The idea was reprised by Goren, Finkelstein, and Na'aman, who were able to petrographically and chemically analyse 300 among the corpus' tablets, confront it with both the Levantine ceramic material and the geological environments of the Levant, and in this way indicate the origin of the letter's clay by confronting it with the supposed geological environments of the tablet.[300] With their analysis, Goren, Finkelstein, and Na'aman were able to establish the provenance of most letters, sometimes pointing out a region at large, but often identifying the particular site of origin. They also proved that the clay of 46 letters (15% of the examined tablets) matched not the geological environments of the senders' cities, but that of the Egyptian centres of Gaza, Beth-Shean, Sumur, and (in all likelihood) Kumidi.[301]

- 22 letters were written with a clay compatible with that of the southern coastal Plain, probably in the Egyptian centre of Gaza. The kings in these letters ruled the cities of Gezer,[302] Lachish,[303] Gath,[304] and Beirut,[305] but there are also several examples of letters from rulers the cities of which cannot be read,[306] but that are usually considered to be located somewhere in northern Canaan.[307]

- 7 letters were written with a clay compatible with the sediments of the central Jordan Valley, probably in the Egyptian centre of Beth-Shean. The kings in these letters ruled the cities of

[299] Goren et al.2004:2.
[300] For a discussion on the methodology, see Goren et al. 2004:4-22. For applications of their work, see Goren et al. 2003a; 2003b; and De Magistris 2020.
[301] Goren et al. 2004:323.
[302] EA 298; 299; 300; 378.
[303] EA 329.
[304] EA 281.
[305] EA 97.
[306] EA 66; 211; 212; 213; 217; 218; 307; 308; 309; 310; 312; 317; 318.
[307] Goren et al. 2004: 323.

Akko,[308] Shamhuna,[309] and Jerusalem.[310] Two more letters were written with the same clay, but neither the name of the king, nor the name of his city has survived.[311]

- 7 letters were written with a clay compatible with the 'Akkar plain, probably in the Egyptian centre of Sumur. The kings in these letters ruled Amurru[312] and Byblos,[313] with also a letter written to the King of Byblos by an unnamed Egyptian commissioner.[314]

- 10 letters appear to have been written in the Beqaa, and a case can be made they were written in the Egyptian centre of Kumidi. According to Goren et al., the Beqaa valley is "*characterized by varied lithologies*", and therefore one would expect a considerable variety in the clay of the letters from the valley's city states. However, the 10 Beqaa letters were all written using the same clay, thus indicating a single writing location. Moreover, as Liverani has argued, four of these letters[315] are virtually identical, and thus were likely written by the same scribe at the same moment.[316] In light of these considerations one has to agree with Goren et al. that the best candidate for this location is the Egyptian centre of Kumidi, but since none of the tablets from Kumidi could be petrographically studied, there cannot be the same level of certainty that there is for the other sites.[317] The represented cities are Hashabu,[318] Hasi,[319] Guddashuna,[320] Enishasi,[321] and Tobihi,[322] but there are also letters that cannot be traced to a particular city because the name of their king or the name of the city have not been preserved.[323]

[308] EA 232; 234; 235.
[309] EA 224.
[310] EA 285.
[311] EA 251; 263.
[312] EA 165; 166; 167.
[313] EA 78; 103; 126.
[314] EA 96.
[315] EA 174; 175; 176; 363.
[316] Liverani 1998c:259.
[317] Goren et al. 2004: 325.
[318] EA 174, Hashabu is usually identified with tel Hasbe (see Turri 2015:242).
[319] EA 175; 185;186. Identification is disputed, but a candidate might be Tell Hizzin (See Turri 2015:243).
[320] EA 177. Usually identified with Tell Jdita, on the western end of the Beqaa, nothing really supports the location (See Turri 2015:239-240 for a discussion).
[321] EA 363. Unidentified. Proposed locations are Tell Ayn es-Sauda and Tell Nab Litani, near the Litani river springs, and Ayn esh-Sharif, on the western side of the same river (see Turri 2015: 238-239 for a discussion).
[322] EA 179. Unidentified. Proposed locations are Tell Deir Zenun and Tell Sirhan (see Turri 2015: 282-283 for a discussion).
[323] EA 176; 178; 187.

To explain these data, Goren, Finkelstein and Na'aman theorized that the Canaanite mayors would have often arrived at the Egyptian administrative centres, to have their letter written and sent from there.[324]

4.4.4.6. The timeframe of the corpus and its internal chronology

The timeframe and the internal chronology of the corpus have been discussed at lengths.[325] A few letters were dated by the Egyptian administration upon receipt with hieratic dockets of red or black ink,[326] and it is likely that at least some of the letters were catalogued and organized in chronological fashion. Unfortunately, that order is now lost, these dockets are more exception than norm, and therefore modern researchers have had to find different ways to date and organize the corpus.

The timeframe can be defined somewhat easily on two grounds. To begin with, the lowest dates in the corpus are provided by the dockets of EA 23 and 254. In the case of the first letter, the date is easily readable as "*ḥ3t-zp* 36, 4 *pr.t, sw* 1", "[Regn]al year 36, 4th month of *prt*, day 1", firmly dating EA 23 to the late kingdom of Amenhotep III.[327] According to Moran from internal evidence it is possible to infer that EA 17, 19-21 and 24-25 date at the previous five to six years.[328] The ink on EA 254 has now faded away, and its date raises more doubts. According to Mynářová, and on the base of early copies, the inscription reads year "12" (which would date the letter to the time of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten), or year "32" (which would place it under his father). Since EA 254 was written by Lab'ayu of Shechem (who likely died under Amenhotep III),[329] it seems the former option is the most likely. In addition, it is well known that Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten moved the Egyptian capital from Thebes to Amarna, and that Tutankhamun reversed the decision. It is generally assumed[330] that each time the scribes in charge of the diplomatic archive brought to the new city only the documents that were related to affairs in current development, leaving in the abandoned capital

[324] Goren et al. 2004:325.
[325] See, among others, Kitchen 1962; Campbell 1964; Kühne 1973; Moran 1992:xxxiv-xxxix; Stavi 2015.
[326] Only those of EA 11, 23, 27, and 254 are still readable (see Mynářová 2011).
[327] Mynářová 2011:124.
[328] Moran 1992:xxxix.
[329] Moran 1992:xxxvii-xxxviii.
[330] See for example Liverani 1998c:13-14; Rainey 2015:5; Stavi 2015:22.

all documents considered to be obsolete and of no use to the current diplomacy of the kingdom. Under these assumptions, the abandonment of the city of Akhetaten at the beginning of the kingdom of Tutankhamun functions as *terminus ante-quem*: any letter written after this moment would have been written in Thebes, and hardly included in the archive at Akhetaten. Moreover, since no letter can be placed unequivocally under the kingdom of Smenkhkare and Tutankhamun, it is more likely that the latest letter of the archive would have been several years old when Amarna was abandoned. It can be therefore said that the archive covers 25 to 30 years between the last decade of Amenhotep III and the end of the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[331]

Establishing the internal chronology of the corpus is a more complex affair. The letters discuss the short-term necessities and circumstances of dozens of belligerent rulers spread through a wide region. They were never meant to convey a single narrative, and consequently there are differences of opinion over the diachronical succession of the events they mention, over the contemporaneity between sets of letters, and over the placement of the events in the wider Near Eastern chronology.[332] The approach used in this research to discuss the diachronical placement of letters and events is built upon four concepts commonly used in the field.

The first is Campbell's idea of the "*Focal Points*,"[333] which gives indications in terms of contemporaneity. According to Campbell, it is possible to consider two or more letters as contemporary based on the presence of a "Focal Point," a common character or event. Let us take for example EA 86 and 116, written by the ruler of Byblos Rib-Addi. As Abdi-Aširta of Amurru is mentioned in both letters, he is a Focal Point.

The second is the idea that the larger corpora (meaning, sets of letters from the same city) inside the Amarna archive make it possible to reconstruct a somewhat clear succession of the chronicled events. The seventy letters written by Rib-Addi are especially useful in this sense, as they

[331] Moran 1992:xxxiv.

[332] For a reconstruction of the events, see Moran (1992:xxxv-xxxvii), Miller (2007), Cordani (2009), Pryke (2010), and Stavi (2015).

[333] Campbell 1964:116-133.

mention and at times describe events regarding northern Lebanon over a period of more than a decade.[334] In the example above, Abdi-Aširta is said to be alive in EA 86, and to be dead and to have been succeeded by his son Aziru in EA 116. Thus, EA 116 was written after EA 86.

The third is the idea that Focal Points between letters written in Byblos and letters written elsewhere offer clues about the diachronical succession for events taking place elsewhere in the Levant. Continuing with the same example, let us consider EA 59, written by the people of the city of Tunip. The letter mentions the actions of Aziru of Amurru, which acts as a Focal Point. EA 59 – and the events it describes – must have therefore been written after EA 86 and roughly at the same time as EA 116.

The fourth is the idea that external sources such as the historical prologues in Hittite treaties[335] provide a wider context for the wars that were fought in the Levant between Egypt, Mittani, and Ḫatti in the Amarna Period. Focal Points between these sources and the Amarna Letters fix the events mentioned in the letters against the known chronology of the Near East. The invasion of Nuḫašše, for example, is mentioned both in EA 165, written by Aziru, and CTH 51, the treaty between the Šuppiluliuma of Ḫatti and Šattiwaza of Mittani,[336] and thus acts as a Focal Point. The events mentioned in CTH 51, therefore, likely happened later than the events described in EA 86.

4.4.4.7. Conclusions

The Amarna letters will be the most important document for the discussion of the Egyptian military actions during the Late 18th Dynasty. They offer information regarding the administration of the Levant, the presence and role of each Egyptian centre, the political and diplomatic system of the time, the development of military campaigns, and the chronology of the time of Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.

[334] For a discussion, see Pryke 2010 and Kilani 2019:146-175.

[335] For a discussion, see Devecchi 2015b.

[336] See note **122** of Chapter **II**.

4.4.5. Beth Shean 2: The cylinder letter of Tagi to Lab'aya

Location and Findspot: Israel Museum 1997-3310. Found in the excavations of Beth-Shean.[337]

Publications: Horowitz 1996; Horowitz, Oshima and Sanders 2006:48-49; Horowitz, Oshima and Sanders 2018:47-48.

General Bibliography: Rainey 1998:239-242; Goren, Finkelstein, Na'aman and Artzy 2004:259.

The object, retrieved during the excavations at the Egyptian centre of Beth-Shean, is the only documented case of a letter on a clay cylinder, and it is particularly short. The readable lines read: *To Lab'aya, my lord, speak. Message of Tagi: To the King (Pharaoh) my lord: I have listened carefully to your dispatch to me […].*[338] According to Horowitz and Liverani,[339] the sender and the addressee of the letter should be identified with the Tagi and the Lab'ayu of the Amarna Letters, respectively rulers of Gath Carmel and Shechem. The importance of the letter resides on the fact that the garrison of Beth-Shean is identified as being composed by men of Tagi in EA 289 (18-24). The petrographic analysis of Goren, Finkelstein and Na'aman have questioned the cylinder's origin, by showing that its clay is radically different from that of the Tagi letters, and similar to the Lab'ayu ones.[340] The logic consequence of this argument, Na'aman has argued, is that the Lab'ayu of the letter is most likely the Lab'ayu of the cylinder seal, but also that the Tagi of the seal is most likely not the Tagi of the letters,[341] but a messenger sent from Shechem to the Egyptian centre of Beth Shean (something that would explain the fact that Tagi calls Lab'ayu "my lord", which would have been unlikely for a king).[342] In any case, the existence of this cylinder in Beth Shean is an element in support of the idea that Beth-Shean hosted an Egyptian garrison during the Amarna period.

[337] **§5.4.5.**
[338] Horowitz et al. 2006:213.
[339] Horowitz 1996a:208; Liverani 1998:119.
[340] Goren et al. 2004:259.
[341] Tagi is a common Hurrian name, found across documents from Marri, Nuzi, Ugarit, Alalakh, Tanaach, e Amarna (Hess 1993:154).
[342] Goren, Finkelstein and Na'aman 2004:259.

4.4.6. The Kumidi Letters

Table 4: The Kumidi Letters		
Letter Number	First Publication	Excavation number
KMD 1	Edzard 1970	KL 69: 277
KMD 2	Edzard (1970)	KL 69: 279
KMD 3	Edzard (1970)	KL 69: 100
KMD 4	Edzard (1970)	KL 69: 278
KMD 5	Wilhelm 1982	KL 72: 600
KMD 6	Edzard 1976	KL 74: 300
KMD 7	Edzard 1980	KL 78: 200
KMD 8	Arnaud 1991	
KMD 9	Huehnergard 1996	

The cuneiform tablets found in the Egyptian centre of Kumidi[343] are an important item when discussing the Bronze Age Levant and the Egyptian administration. This "corpus" consists of one incantation tablet and of 8 letters and fragments dated to the very end of the period covered by the Amarna letters (if not slightly later).[344] Seven between these documents were found during the 1970s by the German excavations of Kamid el-Loz. When the civil war started, the excavations were halted, and the site of Kamid el-Loz began to be looted by locals.[345] Objects of "unknown" provenance began to appear in the international black market.[346] Among these objects, two written tablets are usually considered to come from Kamid el-Loz,[347] and are included in this list.

The tablets found in the excavations have received a dedicated number, the others have not, and although Hachmann (2012) has gathered all articles in one publication, a single and coherent study of all of these documents is yet to be made. Some, like Turri and Pruzsinszky[348] have started indicating the letters as KMD (Kumidi), numbering them in order of publication, as in table 4.

These letters are perfectly integrated in the Amarna System, and most present characters already known from the larger corpus, and the fact that they were found in the city of Kumidi make it likely they belonged to a small archive of the local correspondence. Moreover, KMD 6 from Ili-

[343] Modern-day Kamid el-Loz, in the southern Beka'a Valley. See **§5.4.10.**
[344] Na'aman 2005:312. See **§5.4.10.3.5.** for a discussion of the dates.
[345] Seeden 1987:7.
[346] Lilyquist 1994:207.
[347] Huehnergard 1996.
[348] Pruzsinszky 2008; Turri 2015:215-216.

Rapi of Byblos, who complains that his men are forced to go with the troop of the King,[349] reflects the same Logistical and military system that already appears in the Tanaach and Amarna Letters.

4.4.7. Aphek 7: The Governor's letter

Location: Israel Museum.

Publications: Owen 1987; Singer 1987a; Horowitz, Oshima and Sanders 2006:35-38; Horowitz, Oshima and Sanders 2018:32-35.

General Bibliography: Rainey 1998:239-242; Singer 1999:698, 716; Goren, Na'aman, Mommsen and Finkelstein 2006:164-165; De Magistris 2020.

The so-called "Governor's Letter" was found in Aphek's Ramesside "Governor's Residence".[350] It was written by the prefect of Ugarit Tagulhin to Haya, probably the resident Egyptian Governor in Aphek,[351] and it is conformed to a format – that of a letter from an envoy – well known in the archives of the city of Ugarit.[352] However, Goren et al. (2006) have proven that the tablet was never fired, and since the petrographic analysis show that the clay was local, the letter might have been a scribal exercise, or a copy for the local administration of an original destined to a different centre.[353] Despite the letter having been written at a later time than the one covered by this research (around 1230 BC), this tablet is important to the purpose of this dissertation because it clarifies the nature of the Egyptian presence along the Yarkon River.[354] This exchange between two individuals of a certain relevance describes a commercial transaction regarding wheat that has been sent to Jaffa, which acted as a port of shipment for the produce of the territories, and may spread light to the role of Jaffa in the Mid and the Late 18th Dynasty.[355]

[349] Na'aman 1988a
[350] Owen 1987:1.
[351] According to Morris (2005:576) Haya should be identified with Huy, troop commander of Tjaru, and later viceroy of Kush under Ramesse II.
[352] As Owen (1987:3) has argued.
[353] Goren et al. 2006:165.
[354] See De Magistris 2020.
[355] Singer 1987b:25; 1999b:716. See **§5.4.4.**

4.5. Analysis and conclusions

4.5.1. The areas of Egyptian campaigning during the 18th Dynasty

The number of Egyptian campaigns in the Levant during the Mid-18th is uncertain. Thutmose III in his Annals mentions a total of 17 campaigns,[356] and Amenhotep II mentions 3 campaigns,[357] while that (or those to Takhsy under Thutmose III, and the campaign of Thutmose IV against Nuḫašše and Tunip[358] are examples of possible expeditions of which little records have survived to modern times. It is also possible more happened at the end of the reign of Thutmose III, after year 9 of Amenhotep II, or at the time of Thutmose IV, and their records might have just been lost. Some trends can however be established from the documents at our disposal.

The battle of Megiddo seems to have had for Thutmose the same value that the battle of Qadesh had for Ramses II: one of the greatest – if not the greatest – achievements of his career. Surely it was the most publicized, [359] and several centuries later poems (the battle of Joppa and the poem of Thutmose in Asia)[360] were still being written about it. The importance that was given to the battle, rather than with the battle itself, seems to have related to the territorial acquisitions that followed. The rulers of the interior, previously allied to Qadesh, left Megiddo as Egyptian subjects,[361] and there are no recorded campaigns in the region until the time of Amenhotep II.

After the battle of Megiddo the focus of the Egyptian campaigns moved north. While the section of the Annals containing the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th campaign is now unreadable, from the 5th campaign onwards Thutmose III appears to have attacked time and again in the regions between the plain of ʻAkkar and the Orontes valley, with occasional expeditions in Mittanian territories as north as Alalakh. Ardata and Ullassa were reportedly conquered in the 5th campaign. Qadesh, Sumur, and again Ardata and Ullassa were attacked in the 6th and 7th. The region of Nuḫašše was invaded in the 8th, 9th , and 13th campaigns. Irqata, Tunip, and the region of Qadesh in the 17th. Also Amenhotep II,

[356] **§4.3.1.**
[357] **§4.3.3.**; **§4.3.4.**
[358] **§4.3.3.**; **§4.4.4.3.**
[359] Redford 2003:206-209.
[360] See Botti 1955; Spalinger 1986:154-164; Wente 2003; Manassa 2013:66-101; 102-117.
[361] *Urk.* IV, 1235:16-1236:5.

in his campaign of year 7, appear to have fought in the same region, near Qatna. The action of repeating the attacks on a relatively limited area time and again for three decades contrast sharply with the extension of their actions in the events of the three campaigns which extended into Mittanian territory. Rather than a series of small steps to consolidate Egyptian control over a limited strategic region, the campaigns of year 8 and 10 of Thutmose III, and that of year 7 of Amenhotep II appear to have been razzias and actions of intimidations toward Mittanian territories.

The only documented campaign of the Late 18th Dynasty is the one that appears to have been prepared at the time of the First Syrian War of Suppiluliuma of Ḫatti, which was likely aimed at attacking the city of Qadesh, and is discussed in detail in chapter **VI**.

4.5.2. Elements of Egyptian diplomacy during the 18th Dynasty.

According to the Memphis stela, at the end of the campaign of year 9 the chiefs of Mittani, Ḫatti, and Babylonia came to Amenhotep II carrying gifts, and begging for peace.[362] Although the rendering of the event appears to be excessively stereotypical to be taken at a face value, there is a general agreement that the event might have indeed happened.[363] The Kurustama Treaty demonstrates how the kings of the Mid-18th Dynasty were opened to the possibility of signing "paritary" treaties with the powers of the time,[364] and peace became a normal state in the region sometimes under Amenhotep II or Thutmose IV: Amenhotep II ruled another 17 years, and a treaty at this stage would explain the absence of evidence for any other campaign. Thutmose IV seems to have chosen to maintained the peace in the region, since the houses of Thebes and Waššukkanni started to intermarry and several inscriptions from the time of Thutmose IV mention at least one visit of the "princes of Naharin" to Egypt.[365]The silence of the written sources of the times of Amenhotep III may describe a situation of peace between the Egyptians and the Great Kingdoms of the north

[362] *Urk.* IV, 1307.
[363] **§4.3.4.4.**
[364] **§4.4.3.**
[365] Shorter 1931. *Urk.* IV, 1597:14-1598:2; 1620:9.

that is reflected in the letters of the Amarna Archive. Amenhotep III, like Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, kept cementing the ties of their alliance with the court of the Near East by negotiating marriages.

4.5.3. Conclusion

This chapter had the threefold aim of introducing the reader to the written documents that are at the base of this research, of identifying the areas where the Egyptian army campaigned during the 18th Dynasty, and of reconstructing, to some extent, the Diplomatic system of the 18th Dynasty.

The written sources dated to the Mid-18th Dynasty describe an almost uninterrupted series of Egyptian campaigns in the Levant, aimed at the territories that are said to have been under the control of the ruler of Qadesh, first in the Jezreel and the valleys of the interior (the territories that are defined as "the lands of Retjenu" in the topographical list), and then in the northern Lebanon and southern Syria, where Thutmose III and Amenhotep II appear to have repeatedly campaigned against the subjects of Qadesh and the Mittanian Empire. After the second campaign of Amenhotep II, peace became the norm in the region, and Egypt entered a system of direct contacts between the great kingdoms of the Ancient Near East that would have ended the need of great military expeditions. These great military expeditions started again when this order fell through, during the Amarna Period, with the First Syrian war of Suppiluliuma II.

CHAPTER V: THE EGYPTIAN PRESENCE IN THE LEVANT

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter had the purpose of presenting the written documents on the Egyptian activities in the Levant during the 18th Dynasty and examining the campaigns in the region. Similarly, this chapter will present the archaeological evidence of the Egyptian presence in the Levant during the 18th Dynasty, examine their settlements in the region, and understand the long-term military objectives that caused them.

It is first necessary to understand whether the Egyptian presence in the region can be understood as an "Operational Network," a series of stations or encampments (or "Nodes") located in a War Theatre, built to support and lead an army to battle in the most rapid, secure, and economically efficient way.[1] "Node" is a general term that indicates that a structure is (or could have been) part of an Operational Network, and says nothing of the structure itself beside the possession of both "Capacity" and "Survivability". "Capacity" is the ability to store resources for the army. "Survivability" is the possession of the means to be defended and maintained against an attack from enemy forces.[2] In the context of the pre-modern warfare of the Egyptian army in the Levant the requirements of Capacity and Survivability would translate into the presence of storerooms, granaries, and fortifications[3] in military bases. Elements that cannot be noticed in the archaeological records would also have been taken into consideration, such as the allegiance or the tolerance of the local population for the Egyptian presence, and the distance of a node from the War theatre. Furthermore, the Network needs "Dynamism", meaning that Nodes must be easily moved (or new Nodes created) as soon as the situation requires it.

5.2. Methodology: establishing the Egyptian presence in a site

The identification of the Egyptian presence in the Levant is no easy task, since the inadequacies of the archaeological data are particularly daunting.[4] To begin with, there is a general dearth of archaeological

[1] Kress 2002:145-160; Heagren 2010:261-273. See **§3.4.4.**
[2] Kress 2002:149-150.
[3] Although fortifications would not have been the sole measure of
[4] As already noticed by Weinstein (1981) and Morris (2005; 2018:192-202).

information, which depends on both the nature of the findings, and on the quantity and quality of the excavations and relative publications. The important centres of Gaza (**§5.4.3.**) and Ullassa (**§5.4.7.**) have never been excavated, and in Aphek (**§5.4.4.5.**) and Sumur (**§5.4.8.**) the 18th Dynasty strata have not yet been reached. The execution of some of the older and better published excavations – Byblos (**§5.4.6.**) and Tell el-Ajjul (**§5.4.2.**) – is now considered substandard,[5] and many of the most recent ones are still awaiting full publication.[6] This often combines with scarcity in documentation, as 18th Dynasty Egyptian buildings and pottery have only been found at sites located along the so-called "Ways of Horus" (**§5.3.**), Tell el-Ajjul, and Jaffa (**§5.4.4.**). The case of Beth-Shean (**§5.4.5.**) is in this sense particularly disconcerting. In the 19th and 20th Dynasties the site hosted an instantly recognizable example of Egyptian garrison, where several stelae describe important military actions and where Egyptian buildings abund. In the 18th Dynasty, however, the Egyptian presence is mostly documented through pottery.[7]

According to Schwartz, the lack of documentation for the early stages of an empire is not uncommon in the study of the Ancient Near East. In working towards a reconstruction, historians of the ancient civilizations may base themselves on written sources and on archaeological findings, like the construction of monumental or military infrastructure. Unfortunately, the bureaucracy of newly conquered territories is often still in its infancy, and there is usually little interest in constructing monumental architecture. Facing a similar issue with the early stages of the kingdom of Mittani, Schwartz observed that more documents are written and more buildings are built "*in periods of state florescence, when central institutions are in full operations, than in the period when a new polity forms,*" and the early stages of an empire are usually less documented than their golden times. [8] Faced with the difficult task of obtaining something from (almost) nothing, historians must analyse what is available in a variety of ways, in order to combine the various results and produce a "*frustratingly incomplete*" picture, which is still able to further our knowledge of the subject.[9] In the following pages, the available

[5] See Sparks 2005, 2013a and Kilani 2019:6-16.
[6] For example, the sites along the so-called "Ways of Horus" remain underpublished decades after their excavation. Only short articles and encyclopaedic entries testify the importance of those findings.
[7] Martin 2011 and Mazar 2011, but also James et al. 1993a for the 19th and 20th Dynasties, and Mazar 2007 for the 18th.
[8] Schwartz 2014:265.
[9] Schwartz 2014:265.

data will be approached in a variety of ways, with the aim of obtaining a picture as clear as possible of the Egyptian presence in the Levantine centres during the 18th Dynasty.

5.2.1. Parameters for the identification of Egyptian constructions

The classification of Levantine buildings as Egyptian is a task usually accomplished by considering several elements at once, like the construction material, the planimetry, and the presence of "peculiar" construction elements.[10] Since the foundations of contemporary Levantine buildings were made of stones,[11] the presence of mudbrick architecture is often considered to be an indication of Egyptian presence at a site.[12] Mudbricks are rectangular blocks of straw-tempered, compacted soil left in the sun to dry and harden. [13] They are cheap, easy to manufacture, and generally well-suited for the rainless climate of Egypt. When the bricks' measures at a site (or at a series of sites, such as the so-called Ways of Horus) are uniform, this is usually taken to indicate that there was a systematic and industrial production beside the constructing effort.[14] A second element that is usually considered is the plan of the buildings, since certain layouts are recognized as "Egyptian". The most cited example among them is the "Governor Residence", a design that Oren identified in eight Ramesside buildings scattered in sites recognized as Egyptian across the Levant,[15] and that was later recognized elsewhere.[16] The common structure is square in plan, with two or more floors, and occupies an area between 225 and 500 m^2. The rooms are symmetrical, with thick perimetric walls (1.5-2 m) and an interior arrangement where a central space is surrounded by a series of rooms, for both occupation and storage.[17] Finally, among the "peculiar" construction elements is the layer of clean sand usually placed under the wall foundations, a characteristically Egyptian feature[18] which is found – for example – at Tel Mor and Deir el-Balah.[19]

5.2.2. Parameters for the identification of Egyptian Pottery

[10] This methodology has been employed, among others, by Brandl (2010a) for Deir el-Balah and Barako (2007:20) for Tel Mor.
[11] Kemp 2000:82.
[12] See Higginbotham 2000:263-264 and Barako 2007:20.
[13] Although in areas poor of vegetal matter, such as the North Sinai, straws were often replaced by sea shells (Abd el-Maksoud 1998:48).
[14] Davis et al. 2014:198.
[15] Like Aphek and Beth-Shean (Oren 1984).
[16] Like Tel Gerisa and Deir el-Balah (Patrón de Smith et al. 2017 and Brandl 2010a).
[17] Oren 1984:50; Streit 2019.
[18] According to Weinstein (1973:5-6, 13) part of a foundation ritual was the "pouring of the sand" onto the ground of a construction site, especially in temple foundations.
[19] Barako 2007:20; Brandl 2010b:254.

The question on how to determine the presence of foreign individuals (in this case, Egyptians) from the material culture of a given region is particularly thorny. As "pots" do not necessarily equal "people", the presence in a site of clay vessels presenting features commonly found in Egyptian pottery does not necessarily mean that Egyptians lived there, especially considering how the vast majority of the Egyptian ceramic corpus in the Levant comprises of locally-produced "imitations" of Egyptian vessels.[20] In his recent monograph on the Egyptian pottery in LBA southern Levant, Mario Martin has established three parameters to evaluate a site's Egyptian presence on the base of the excavated pottery: local production, numerical consistency, and variety of types.[21] According to Martin, only locally produced objects are indicative of an Egyptian presence, because imported ones could be found also in non-Egyptian sites. Moreover, "Egyptian" vessels must represent a consistent share (<25%) of the total amount of sherds retrieved in a stratum, while the type-range of the assemblage must contain both closed (like the beer jars) and open forms (like the simple bowls). Closed types are usually considered to be a more reliable indicator of an




Figure 7: Examples of Flowerpots from excavations in Tell el Ajjul and Beth-Shean (From Oren 2019: 306, Pl. 4.1.12)

[20] See the discussion over the Egyptianization and Elite Emulation made by Higginbotham (2000).

[21] Martin 2011:263-266.

Egyptian presence at a site: they are only found in large numbers at sites where an Egyptian presence is supported also by other sources, their shapes are distinctive enough to be linked to the Egyptian pottery tradition, and their evolution across Egypt and the Levant is both parallel and synchronous, meaning that they evolved to respond to needs that were changing at around the same time in both regions.[22] Open forms are less distinctive: they are commonly distributed and easily found also at sites where the Egyptian presence is unsupported by other sources.[23] In other words, the local production of a consistent and differentiated number of Egyptian-style pottery, a common typological developments between Egypt and the Levant, and the use of the produced vessels are usually considered to be indicators of the presence of Egyptian communities at a site.[24]

Although these parameters are well suited to discuss ceramic corpora dated to the 19th Dynasty, they do not always work when discussing the 18th Dynasty material, as neither share nor type range appear to be pertinent. The share of Egyptian pottery in the 18th Dynasty contexts is usually small (only in Jaffa it represents a majority of the retrieved vessels), and steeply grows in the 19th Dynasty ones.[25] At the same time, among the 18th Dynasty sites only those in the so-called Ways of Horus, Tell el-'Ajjul, and Jaffa have provided a variety of open and closed forms, whereas in other sites the only forms to be locally produced are the slender ovoid jars with concave neck and everted rim (JR2a) among the close forms and the so-called "Flowerpots" among the open ones. Flowerpots are coarsely made vessels, carelessly manufactured and roughly finished, with ribbed sidewalls and a hole at the bottom.[26] Aston and Martin have proposed that, due to their use, the contexts of their appearances, and their locality of production, they should be considered as "diagnostic" vessels for Egyptian contexts dated to the Mid-18th Dynasty.[27] Their use was already clarified by Petrie, who found a flowerpot containing a "*cake of barley mash and grains*" that had been pressed on the central hole to "*squeeze out the fermented beer from the grain*,"[28] in a process similar to that used in the production of Bouza, a cereal beer commonly

[22] Oren 2019:264.
[23] Oren 2019:267.
[24] Koch 2021:7.
[25] Martin 2011:266. For example, in Beth-Shean the share of Egyptian pottery is 4% of the vessels retrieved from the 18th Dynasty stratum IX, and 56% across all areas of excavations in the 19th Dynasty stratum VII (*Ibid.*:152, fig.85).
[26] Holthoer 1977:78.
[27] Aston 2002:56-57; Martin 2011:47-49, 245. This concept is now widely accepted, see for example Mullins 2006:25 and Burke et al. 2010.
[28] Petrie et al. 1907:23.

drunk in Egypt at least since the Middle Ages.[29] In Egypt and Nubia Flowerpots are usually found in contexts dated between the reigns of Hatshepsut and Thutmose IV, become increasingly rare during the Late 18th Dynasty, and virtually disappear by the 19th Dynasty, substituted by another poorly manufactured vessel with ribbed sidewalls, the "Beer Jar".[30] In the Levant, Flowerpots' rugged execution and utilitarian nature points to an everyday use. They are found in sites that in the written documents are intensively related to Egyptian activities, like Jaffa and Beth-Shean. They are common in LB IB strata, their number decreases in LB IIA ones,[31] and in the LB IIB strata of the 19th Dynasty they virtually disappear, substituted by the Beer Jar.[32] This is not particularly surprising, as beer was a staple of the Egyptian diet, and in the garrison kitchen in Jaffa most of the retrieved ceramic was connected to the production of beer in Egyptian fashion.[33] Their clay is always locally sourced, and in both Harouba and Jaffa several Flowerpots have been found in the kiln in which they had been fired.[34] In other words, since Flowerpots were used for the production of beer since they are found in independently identified Egyptian sites, since their developments across Egypt and the Levant are both parallel and synchronous, and since they were locally produced, it is reasonable to use them to indicate Egyptian presence at a site.

5.2.3. Egyptian centres and the "Proximity Principle"

Another tool to identify the Egyptian centres in the Levant and obtain pieces of information over their administrative role is the "Proximity Principle," a concept that I have developed and introduced in a recent article.[35] As it was said in **§4.4.4.5.**, Goren, Finkelstein, and Na'aman have petrographically and chemically analysed 300 among the Amarna corpus' tablets, localizing the origin of a majority of documents' clay by confronting it with their supposed geological environments.[36] They also proved that

[29] Geller 1992:124-127. Other proposed functions, like Holthoer's idea (1977:78) that they were bread molds, should therefore be discarded. See Lords Pierce 2013:514-517.
[30] Martin 2011:49, Table 32-33.
[31] Burke et al. 2017; Mazar et al. 2009.
[32] Martin 2011:47; Oren 2019:280.
[33] See **§5.4.4.3** and **5.4.4.4.**. Interestingly enough, beer-related pottery represents most of the locally-produced Egyptian pottery in the Levant. According to Lord Pierce and Damm, this is mainly due to the fact that Levantine bread would have been an acceptable substitute for Egyptian bread, but no alternatives existed in the local ceramic tradition for the production of beer comparable to the Egyptian one (Lord Pierce 2013:519-531; Damm 2021:357-358).
[34] **§5.3.3.3.**; **§5.4.4.4.**; Mullins 2002:292; Burke et al. 2010; Oren 2019:271.
[35] De Magistris 2020b.
[36] For a discussion on the methodology, see Goren et al. 2004:4-22.




Figure 8: Cities of rulers writing from Egyptian centres

the clay of 15% of the examined tablets (46 letters) matched the geological environments of the Egyptian centres and not that of the senders' cities. More specifically, the rulers of Gezer, Lachish, and Gath,[37] wrote from Gaza, those of Akko, Shamhuna, and Jerusalem[38] from Beth-Shean, those of Hashabu, Hasi, Guddashuna, Enishasi, and Tobihi likely from Kumidi,[39] those of Byblos and Amurru from Sumur.[40] To explain this pattern, Goren, Finkelstein and Na'aman theorized that the Canaanite mayors (or their scribes) would have often arrived at the Egyptian administrative centres and sent their letters from there.[41] However, if one puts these cities on a map (as in fig.8 below), an interesting pattern arises, backing a concept that I call "Proximity Principle":[42] barring exceptional circumstances, a local king would have related with the closest Egyptian centre rather than a farther one. It was argued in **§4.4.4.5.** that each Egyptian commissioner of the Amarna Letters held jurisdiction over several towns located in the districts under his control. Since it is reasonable to assume that the Proximity Principle would work

[37] Tel Gezer (EA 298; 299; 300; 378), Tel Lachish. (EA 329), and Tell es-Safi (EA 281) respectively.
[38] Tel Akko (EA 232; 234; 235), Tel Shimron (EA 224) and Jerusalem (EA 285) respectively.
[39] Hashabu is usually identified with Tel Hasbe (EA 174; Turri 2015:242), Hasi with Tell Hizzin (EA 175; 185; 186; Turri 2015:243), Guddashuna with Tell Jdita (EA 177; Turri 2015:239-240). The other cities are unidentified but proposed locations are Tell Ayn es-Sauda and Tell Nab Litani for Enishasi (EA 363; Turri 2015:238-239), and Tell Deir Zenun and Tell Sirhan (EA 179; Turri 2015:282-283) for Tobihi.
[40] Goren et al. 2004:323.
[41] Goren et al. 2004:325. Although evidently this cannot apply to Aziru's letters, written in a newly conquered Sumur.
[42] De Magistris 2020b.

both ways, it can be argued that, barring exceptional circumstances, a commissioner would have related with the closest cities rather than the farther ones. This assumption has two repercussions:

1. That by tracing the letters that mention each Egyptian commissioner, one might recognize the commissioners' "Proximity Factor" (their areas of influence), and thus attribute them a specific working location. In some cases also trace the career of a commissioner from a seat to another.[43]

2. That by compiling the cities that interacted with all commissioners located in a site, one might also map the "total" Proximity Factors of each Egyptian centre.

Overall, the Proximity Principle provides a new and valuable tool to analyse the Egyptian presence in the Levant, indicating not only which centres were involved in the administration of the region, but also (to a point) the extent of the territories under their influence.

5.2.4. The Egyptian Temples

As Bleiberg and Morris have argued,[44] temples were an important part in the administration of the areas under Egyptian control since they received *bꜣkw*(*t*) – commodities and taxes – and used this income both for internal expenses and to support the king in his campaigns. However, of the several suggestions that have been made of the presence of Egyptian temples in the Levant, only some seem reliable:[45] those of Byblos (**§5.4.6.2.**), Ullassa (**§5.4.7.2.**), Jaffa (**§5.4.4.3.**) and Lachish (**§5.4.1.**). Although their existencce does not appear to have been directly relevant on a military level, their presence is an important element in arguing for an Egyptian presence at a site.[46]

5.2.5. The "invisible" 18th Dynasty, the "visible" 19th, and the co-existence with the locals

According to Schwartz, a final approach is to examine a state's periods of florescence and use its abundant data to try and shed some light over less documented ones.[47] Given the widely different nature of the evidence for the Egyptian presence of the Thutmoside and Ramesside times, this approach can be

[43] For the example of Yanhamu, see De Magistris 2020b:304.
[44] Bleiberg 1988; Morris 2015b.
[45] For a discussion of each proposal, see Wimmer 1990; 1998.
[46] For the so-called "ideological money laundering", the practice of recognizing local deities as Egyptian ones to render the payment for goods "acceptable", see Liverani 1990b:240-254 and Morris 2015b.
[47] Schwartz 2014:265.

fruitful, if carefully handled. The 18th Dynasty Egyptian presence at several sites is well attested in the written sources, but few traces remain in the archaeological record. The opposite is true for the 19th and the 20th Dynasties, when to a general scarcity of written documents corresponds a flourishing of Egyptian – or Egyptianized – material across the Levant: new installations are founded on virgin soil,[48] Canaanite sites are taken over,[49] and those sites which had been already in Egyptian hands during the 18th Dynasty are radically transformed into Egyptian fortresses or garrisoned towns.[50]

According to Morris, this change in archaeological visibility is a consequence of the Edict of Horemheb, when a tradition of co-opting existing infrastructures was abandoned in favour of one of constructing installations *ex novo*.[51] Her interpretation finds roots and support in the Amarna Letters, because Egyptian soldiers appear to have commandeered local buildings and supplies when stationed in a city for short periods of time.[52] However, it still does not explain the scanty Egyptian remains at sites said to have been controlled by the Egyptians in the written sources, like Beth-Shean. Recent works on the Egyptian presence in the Levant[53] have underlined how the relationship between the Egyptians and the locals was one of cooperation and coexistence. The written sources support the idea of a complex collaboration between the locals and the Egyptians, as the rulers stress their affinity with – and their loyalty to – the Theban court. Although such loyalty might have been coerced, their collaborations is evident, and the garrisons at the various Egyptian centres appear to have been composed not by Egyptian soldiers but by local ones: Jaffa and Gaza are said to have been garrisoned by men from Ashdod,[54] Beth-Shean by men from Gath Carmel,[55] Sumur by men from Byblos,[56] and Kumidi by men from Damascus.[57] Moreover, of the four men that Abdi-Aširta of Amurru says he saved in the Egyptian palace of Sumur, and that were supposedly part of the local garrison,[58] only one – Maya – bears an Egyptian name, whereas the other bear names of either West Semitic or Hurrian origin.[59] Therefore, rather than a somewhat manichean relationship between a subject and his overlord, between local cities and Egyptian

[48] Like Deir el-Balah (Killebrew et al. 2006; Dothan et al. 2010.
[49] Like as Tel Mor (Barako 2007).
[50] As the sites of the so-called Ways of Horus, Aphek, Jaffa, and Beth-Shean.
[51] Morris 2005:269-276; 2018:151-152, 159-160.
[52] As referred by the rulers of Gezer (EA 292:36-40) and Jerusalem (EA 289:18-24).
[53] Massafra 2018; Koch 2021.
[54] EA 296:30-35.
[55] EA 285:20-25.
[56] EA 103:5-22.
[57] EA 160:20-40.
[58] EA 62:24-28.
[59] Hess 1993:41 (Arsayu); 63 (Bishitanu); 106 (Maya); 138 (Sabi-ilu).

centres, one should expect to find somewhat "mixed" signals. If the Egyptian garrisons were not usually composed of Egyptian people, there should be no expectation to find a consistent share of Egyptian pottery in a locality known in the sources to be Egyptian. And if the Egyptian army was in the habit of commandeering local buildings, there should be no expectation to regularly find edifices built according to the Egyptian taste and necessities. In light of these considerations, the near-undetectability of the 18th Dynasty presence from an archaeological point of view cannot be read as a proof of absence, and should be understood as an expected datum, one inherent to the nature of the subject. It is therefore reasonable to follow Schwartz and consider the archaeological evidence of the 18th Dynasty not only by themselves, but also in connection with the more abundant 19th Dynasty material.

5.2.6. The "Jerusalem Paradox", the Glass half full, and the Egyptian terminology.

Another approach is to use the data coming from the written documents to integrate the archaeological evidence. This idea – dubbed "*the Glass half full*" by Mazar –[60] was developed to discuss the "Paradox" of Jerusalem in the Late Bronze and Early Iron Ages, where the written accounts do not match the archaeological evidence.[61] Written documents like the Amarna Letters decribe the city as an important centre with some sort of political gravitas in the area, while the archaeological evidence in the so-called "City of David" do not support such a description.[62] It is particularly telling in this regard that the inches-small fragments of two LBA tablets (Jerusalem 1 and 2 in Horowitz, Oshima and Sanders 2018) found near the Ophel spring, at the foot of the City of David, are among the most important evidence for a LBA presence in Jerusalem. The size of the fragments and the nature of the damages preclude any sort of study on the tablets, aside from petrographical ones. Jerusalem 1, locally produced with terra rossa clay, was dubbed by its publishers as a copy of a letter from Jerusalem.[63] Jerusalem 2 is "*what might be expected from a tiny fragment from a very well-written tablet*",[64] one that petrographic analysis

[60] Mazar 2006.
[61] Na'aman 1996; Steiner 2001:39-45; 2003; Mazar 2006; Finkelstein et al. 2011; Reich 2011; Uziel et al. 2019.
[62] Ussishkin 2016; Reich 2018. The most important remains are some pots in the Mount of Olive's graves (Steiner 2001:39) and the meagre remains of what has been interpreted as a 19th Dynasty Egyptian temple at the Damascus Gate, 1 km north of the "City of David" (Barkay 1996 *contra* Wimmer 1990:1073).
[63] Mazar et al. 2010:11-12. Sanders (2016) has also shown that the dialect of Jerusalem 1 is different by those of the Amarna Letters from Jerusalem, and that the scribes must have been different.
[64] Mazar et al. 2014:138.

demonstrated came from Egypt, testifying an exchange similar in nature to those of the Amarna Letters.[65]

These conflicting evidence have been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some have used the negative evidence to indicate that it is necessary to search for the LBA Jerusalem elsewhere, likely on the Temple Mount.[66] Others have argued that the Jerusalem of the Amarna Letters should be interpreted as a territory, more than a city, and therefore the search for archaeological evidence might be futile.[67] However, the existence of scribal activity at the site – testified by both the Ophel fragments and the Amarna letters – weaken these proposals[68] and suggests a third possibility: that this dissonance is due to the state of preservation of the archaeological material. As Na'aman has argued, given the high bedrock of Jerusalem, there was little accumulation of strata, and each new phase would have invariably damaged the lower ones. Thus, well-built structures erected at times of prosperity such as the MB III are preserved, whereas skimpy and fragile buildings of poorer times such as the LBA rarely survived.[69] In this optic, it might be best to consider the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age Jerusalem as Uziel et al. and Mazar have done: by looking at the "Glass Half Full" of the written evidence, rather than at the Glass Half Empty of the archaeological ones.[70] To put it in Uziel et al. words

> *"There is no doubt that if not for the mention of Jerusalem in the el Amarna archive, we would certainly conclude that based on the archaeological remains, Jerusalem was at best a small dispersed settlement in the LB. However, this leads to the core of the problem in relying solely on archaeological evidence, as advocated by Steiner. The textual mention of el Amarna Jerusalem should lead us to conclude that even minimal evidence – such as small remains of structures (Steiner 2001:24), scattered ceramic remains in the various areas of excavation (Cahill 2003:27–28), and most importantly – what should be viewed as the smoking gun – the remains of written documents recently found in the Ophel (Mazar et al.2010; 2014) are in*

[65] The publishers prefer a Ramesside date but admit that "*we have no direct internal or physical evidence of any kind to connect our tablet fragment (…) with any particular king*" (Mazar et al. 2014:138).
[66] Finkelstein et al. 2011.
[67] Steiner 2003:351.
[68] Rollston 2010:20.
[69] Na'aman 2011b:286.
[70] Mazar 2006, Uziel et al. 2019.

essence a test case for indicating that archaeology has its limits, and at times, even meager evidence should be used as evidence of presence as opposed to evidence of absence."[71]

A similar situation concerns the centres that, mentioned as "Egyptian" in written documents, have not been excavated or have yelded little Egyptian material. Meager evidence is not absence of evidence (nor evidence of absence), and it is thus necessary to try and integrate the pieces of information coming from the archaological excavations with those gained by the written sources. Among these sources of information stands the name used in Egyptian documents to define each settlement. Ellen Morris, tracing the mentions of every New Kingdom Egyptian centre between Nubia, Libya, and the Levant, has defined the meaning of the terms used to identify them during the 18th Dynasty: *ḫtm, mnnw,* and *dmi*.[72] *ḫtm* defined the border-fortress of Tjaru (**§5.3.2.1.1.**),[73] and usually designates a military base which functioned as a gateway monitoring and preventing access to a restricted area. *mnnw* designates fortress-towns, usually established to protect Egyptian interest in populated areas, like the fortress erected by Thutmose III in Lebanon,[74] and identified with Ullassa (**§5.4.7.2.**). *dmi* is employed as a synonym for "fortress-town", but also as a designation of individual administrative headquarters in the region, and the word was apparently used to identify bases where a significant population resided, like Gaza and Sharuhen,[75] but in later times also Beth-Shean and Sumur.[76] Other terms like *mktr*, *nḫtw*, and *bḥn* only appear in 19th Dynasty documents, but have some relevance for this discussion. The first two were used in reference to stations of the so-called Ways of Horus, identifying fortified structures of modest proportions. *bḥn* seem to have referred to farming estates producing food for the Egyptian administration abroad. Unfortunately, the only *bḥn* found outside North Sinai is the "*bḥn* of Merneptah Hotephirmaat" near *ḏ-r-r-m*, an otherwise unknown locality.[77]

5.2.7. Conclusion: evaluating the Egyptian Presence at a site

It is now possible to discuss on what elements can the Egyptian presence at a site be argued, elements that will be used in the context of this chapter. These elements can be divided into three classes:

[71] Uziel et al. 2019:178-179.
[72] Morris 2005:803-827.
[73] *Urk.* IV, 1635:11.
[74] *Urk.* IV, 739:115-740:1; 1241:13-1242:4.
[75] *Urk.* IV, 648:10-11, KRI I, 8:16; *Urk.* IV, 648:5 respectively.
[76] KRI I, 12:9; P. Anastasi I, 18:8-19:1 respectively.
[77] P. Anastasi III, vs. 5:1-2.

"Strong", "Likely", and "Possible" indicators. Strong indicators mean that a site is to be recognized as being in Egyptian hands in a continuously during the 18th Dynasty. Likely indicators mean that a site might have been in Egyptian hands or might have seen an Egyptian presence without a direct control of the area. Possible indicators are reserved for sites where either the archaeological record or the written documents seem to suggest an Egyptian presence and control, but where, because of the quality of the excavations or the lack of publications, an Egyptian presence must be considered uncertain until more elements become available. It is also important to discuss what sites that appear to not have been part of the Egyptian administrative system, especially those which would have become Egyptian during the Ramesside period, or that were important during the Amarna Period.

Strong indicators are:

- An explicit mention in a written document – such as the Amarna letters – of a centre as an administrative hub.
- A centre's Proximity Factors.
- The presence of one or more buildings showing "Egyptian" characteristics.
- The presence of either diagnostic Flowerpots, or of a "representative corpus" of Egyptian pottery in terms of quantity and variety of types.

Likely indicators are:

- The presence of a temple where Egyptian gods were worshipped.
- Evidence of activities of Egyptian officials.

Possible indicators are:

- Presence of buildings unrelated to the Canaanite styles of construction.
- Presence of a small but indicative amount of Egyptian pottery.
- Egyptian presence during the 19th Dynasty

On the opposite side, elements to support Egyptian absence are, together with the absence of evidence to the contrary:

- Explicit mention of an Egyptian conquest (since before conquest a site would not have been Egyptian).
- Independence in the Amarna Letters

5.3. The Infrastructure in North Sinai (the so-called Ways of Horus)

5.3.1. Introduction and written sources

In modern academic discussions the name of the "Ways of Horus" identifies both the road between the fortress of Tjaru in the eastern Delta and Gaza in Palestine, and the series of fortresses that were erected alongside it during the New Kingdom. Dominque Valbelle has however repeatedly demonstrated that this usage of the term is incorrect.[78] Until the end of the 18th Dynasty, the toponym *w3twt-ḥr* indicated the then-swampy region of north Sinai close to the eastern Delta, and in Ramesside times the fortress of Tjaru. Despite the academic usage of the term,[79] at no point in time, it seems, the toponym *w3twt-ḥr* was meant to indicate the road across the desert, nor the chain of fortresses. I will therefore call "the Infrastructure of North Sinai", or simply "the Infrastructure" what it is elsewhere called "The Ways of Horus".

The idea of a military infrastructure in North Sinai comes from the written documents of the 19th Dynasty. Both the satirical letter of Papyrus Anastasi I,[80] and the reliefs representing the Levantine campaigns of Seti I in the temple of Amun in Karnak[81] detail the North Sinai as hosting a series of fortresses and wells running between the *ḫtm*-fortress of Tjaru to the *dmi* of Gaza. Unfortunately, there are no similar descriptions in 18th Dynasty documents, but there might be an indirect mention in the Annals of Thuthmose III: since the ruler boasts to have travelled from Tjaru to Gaza in 9 to 10 days, he appears to have travelled an average of 25 km per day. Absent a chain of fortresses guarding the route,

[78] Valbelle 1994:36; 2020.
[79] See Hoffmeier et al. 2014:37.
[80] Papyrus Anastasi I 27.1-28.1 (Gardiner 1911:28-29).
[81] Survey 1986:3-21.

protecting the water sources, and provisioning the army, it would be difficult to explain such speed.[82] As the barren desert of North Sinai is the main land-bridge between Egypt and the Levant, and the obligatory passage for armies and trade moving in and out of Egypt, the study of the infrastructure of North Sinai has a peculiar role in the argument of this research. Passing through such landscape, which today sees scarce annual precipitation (50-150 mm), and mean summer temperature of 31-39°C,[83] would have required access to a relevant number of water sources. As it can be seen by comparing fig. 9 and 10, the map of the LBA settlements and that of available water through the Northern Sinai are almost superimposable, identifying a probable and rather obvious relation between the two factors. Since any major military endeavour would have had to cross this desert, to Egyptian eyes control of this natural bottleneck – and its water sources – would have been a Logistical imperative. Archaeological excavations have shown that although the land route across Sinai was in use between the first half of the 12th Dynasty to the middle of the 13th, with the Second Intermediate Period began a gap in occupation that would only end at the beginning of the 18th Dynasty.[84] Lacking local settlers there was nothing to commandeer, and the military administration was forced to erect its own buildings and fortresses.[85] Moreover, the same absence of local settlers to reuse them and build upon them, caused these fortresses to be found relatively undisturbed when archaeological excavations in the region begun in the 1970s. In other words, since the region was (and is) largely unsettled, the relative absence of disturbances on the infrastructure of the North Sinai provides an ideal archaeological case study for the Egyptian military and logistic infrastructure during the New Kingdom. This sub-chapter will shortly describe the archaeological remains of the 4 known sites of the Infrastructure during the 18th Dynasty, to then propose a unitary analysis of their role inside a Logistical Network.

5.3.2. The sites in the area of the Paleolagon

In 1991, representatives for Egypt's Supreme Council for Antiquities (SCA) announced to the International Congress of Egyptology the development of the As-Salam Irrigation Project. The project would have brought water to the region east of the Suez Canal, and therefore they invited the academic

[82] See **§6.3.**
[83] Kolska Horwitz 2005:26.
[84] Bietak et al. 2012.
[85] As already Morris (2005:222) has argued.

community to focus on the area before damages could occur on the archaeological sites laying under the sands.[86] The resulting excavations have uncovered 18th Dynasty forts at Tell Hebwa and Tell el-Borg,[87] and the remains of a shell-paved road connecting these sites.[88] They have also lead to a reconstruction of the LBA environmental conditions of area,[89] discovering that the fortresses (now 45 km inland) controlled the access to Egypt by overseeing a stretch of land between the Mediterranean (Tell Hebwa I), a 35-40 km^2 lake (now interred, called "the Paleolagon") and a series of ponds, wetlands and canals that constituted the main land access to the Delta.[90]

5.3.2.1. Tjaru

5.3.2.1.1. Tjaru in the written sources of the 18th Dynasty[91]

Tjaru – Egypt's eastern frontier – frequently appears in written sources already during the Old Kingdom. Mentions of soldiers connected to the regions are already present in documents and stories of the 6th and 12th Dynasties.[92] The military character of the town emerges in the written sources with the 18th Dynasty: Papyrus Rhind records its conquest by Ahmose;[93] a man called Djehuty-hay bears the title of "*Overseer of the storehouse at the Ways of Horus*" at the time of Thutmose II;[94] the Annals of Thutmose III mention Tjaru as the starting point of his first campaign;[95] and several soldiers under Thutmose IV had a career connected with Tjaru. Neby, for example, worked as Mayor (*ḥ3ty-ʿ*), overseer of the canal (*imy-r ḥn*), chief of the Medjay (*wr n Mḏ3yw*), overseer of the fortress (*imy-r ḫtm*), and troop captain (*ḥry pḏt*) of the city.[96] During the Late 18th Dynasty the known mentions of the city are mostly connected with Tjaru's importance as an agricultural and religious centre. The region produced wine destined to the court,[97] while the city housed temples of Amun-Ra, Nut, and (expectedly) Horus.[98] Finally, the Amarna

[86] Hoffmeier 2014:4.
[87] Abd el-Maksoud 1998; Abd el-Maksoud et al. 2005; 2011 for Tell Hebwa. Hoffmeier et al. 2014a; 2019 for Tell el-Borg. Another 19th Dynasty fort was identified in nearby Tell Abyad (Minault-Gout et al. 2012).
[88] Hussein 2019.
[89] See Marcolongo 1992; Stanley 2002; Hoffmeier et al. 2014a; Moshier 2014.
[90] Moshier 2014:71-83.
[91] For an account of all sources mentioning Tjaru, see Wernick 2014:102-108.
[92] In the 6th Dynasty the Governor of Upper Egypt Weni fought marauding Bedouins in north Sinai (*Urk.* I, 123:5). In the 12th Dynasty's story of Sinuhe, the runaway official meets a "*Commander in charge of the Garrison*" on the Ways of Horus (Gardiner 1916: 147, l. 242).
[93] Robins 1987:11.
[94] *Urk.* IV, 547:4.
[95] *Urk.* IV, 645-647.
[96] *Urk.* IV, 1643:6-7; 1635:2-11. See Bjorkman 1974.
[97] Al-Ayedi 2006:32-35.
[98] Murnane et al. 1995:270; Hoffmeier et al. 2005:81.

letters fleetingly mention Tjaru as the gateway to Egypt.[99] The written sources, therefore, present Tjaru as both a city and as an important military centre during the 18th Dynasty.

[99] EA 288:34-47.




Figure 9 (above) Map of the NK sites in North Sinai according to the North Sinai Survey (From Goldwasser and Oren 2015:26 fig.1)

Figure 10 (below) Available water in the region, as demonstrate by the excavations of wells by the Desert Research Centre in Mataryia, Egypt in 2008 (readapted from El Kashouty et al. 2012:61, fig.16)







Figure 11 Map of North Sinai with the mentioned sites (zoomed on the left for the initial sites). Satellite images from the 1970s are used to show the profile of the so-called "Paleolagon", the dark terrain.

5.3.2.1.2. Archaeological excavations and relative publications

Tjaru is now securely identified with the complex of Tell Hebwa,[100] which is composed of four different sites at different stages of publication. The main sites of Hebwa I and II are characterized by two brick size, probably as a consequence of two distinct construction phases: a 18th Dynasty one with mudbrick measuring 35 x 17.5 x 8.5 cm, and a 19th Dynasty one, with mudbrick measuring 40 x 19 x 10 cm.[101]

Tell Hebwa I is a double-walled city of impressive size (1 km^2), where no difference has been recorded between the mid and the Late 18th Dynasty material.[102] Only selected parts of the tell have been published: a section of the walls of the fortress and its granaries (Area A); two industrial complex with magazines, granaries, ovens and administrative buildings (B and C); and a residential area (D).[103] The religious complex in the southern portion of the tell was excavated since the year 2004 and only briefly commented upon in 2005.[104] To date, everything else in the tell is yet to be published. The stratigraphy of areas A and B revealed 6 main levels, dated at the Graeco-Roman Period (Level I), the 19th Dynasty (II), the Mid and Late 18th (III), the transition between the SIP and the early 18th (IVa) and the late Middle Kingdom (IVb and V).[105]

Figure 12 The excavated areas in Tell Hebwa I (readapted from Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2005:1)



Tell Hebwa II is 1 km south-east of Hebwa I, on the other side of a deep depression that once received water from the Pelusiac branch of the Nile.[106] Only two articles have been published on the

[100] Abd el-Maksoud et al. 2005:19, 7-9.
[101] Wernick 2014:111.
[102] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:23.
[103] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:48-89.
[104] Abd el-Maksoud et al. 2005.
[105] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:35-39.
[106] Bietak et al. 2011:24, fig.I.

tell, one after the 1999-2005 excavations of al-Ayedi,[107] and one after the 2006-2010 excavations of Abd el-Maksoud.[108]


The two articles would appear to discuss different sites: Al-Ayedi describes a 100 m^2 fort dated at the New Kingdom, with walls 4 m wide, an administrative building, and a small settlement.[109] Abd el-Maksoud describes instead an enormous, 1.25 km^2 fortress with walls 14 m wide, and defensive towers 20 m wide, containing magazines, a tripartite temple, and buildings.[110] However, by comparing the plan Al-Ayedi produced of his "fort" (fig. 14) with the aerial picture of the site published by Abd el-Maksoud (fig. 13) and satellite images of the tell (fig. 15), it seems likely that Al-Ayedi described a "little" fort inside the walls of Abd el-Maksoud's "Great" Fort, what the latter defined as a "tripartite temple".[111]

Very little can be said about Tell Hebwa III and IV. Tell Hebwa III is a small 18th Dynasty fortress, which has been excavated since 2010 and never published.[112] Tell Hebwa IV is a largely unpublished cemetery, dated to the early-to-Mid-18th Dynasty.[113]

5.3.2.1.3. The architectural remains and the pottery from the site

Tell Hebwa was likely inhabited already during the Second Intermediate Period,[114] but under the Thutmosides the complex was expanded and developed the characters of an important military complex, with massive fortifications and large buildings laid out on orthogonal plan.[115] Since the early 18th Dynasty Tell Hebwa I was defended by two fortification walls:[116] an external one 1.2 m thick, and a main one which – with a 7 m thick base – might have been as high as 15 m.[117] Between conquest and fortification, the city grew significantly, possibly by action of the government, who might have decided that a settled frontier was a safer option.[118]

[107] Al-Ayedi 2006:35.
[108] Abd el-Maksoud et al. 2011:1.
[109] Al-Ayedi 2006:35.
[110] Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2011:2.
[111] A similar line of reasoning is proposed by Wernick (2014:120).
[112] Hussein 2019:354.
[113] Dorner 1996; Aston 1996.
[114] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:37; Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2011:2.
[115] Wernick 2014:112.
[116] Tjaru's presence in the Annals of Thutmose III, and the fact that stratum III ceramic could hardly be attributed to the Mid-18th Dynasty Pharaohs support this idea (Abd el-Maksoud 1998:36).
[117] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:46; Wernick 2014:117.
[118] As argued by Morris (2005:171).






Figure 13 (above) Aerial picture of the Central Area in tel Hebwa II. Readapted from Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2011:18, Pl. I)

Figure 14 (left) Plan of the fort according to Al-Ayedi 2006:202, Fig.2.

Figure 15 (below) Satellite Images of Tell Hebwa II. It Is possible to follow the perimeter of the massive fortification wall described by Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2011 (From Google Earth, Accessed 24/02/2018).



Several houses dated to the Hyksos period were expanded and reused,[119]while a large religious complex was built in the city's south-west corner.[120] Several granaries and silos were built across areas A and B of the excavations,[121] together with administrative buildings.[122]

Tell Hebwa II underwent a similar process of establishment of fortress, fortification lines, magazines and temple.[123] An "administration complex" contained administrative offices, storage units and an industrial area (a group of furnaces) of unknown use, and a rich collection of 18th and 19th Dynasty pottery and weapons (spearheads and daggers) was found inside the "tripartite temple".[124] The building is also likely the point of origin of the fragment of door frames found decorating later tombs in the area. Since those fragments sport the names of Thutmose II, the temple – and Hebwa II with it – is likely dated to the early 18th Dynasty.[125]

In the 19th Dynasty Tell Hebwa I became the epitome of an Egyptian fortress-town, tightly packed with administrative buildings, storage facilities, a temple, a residency,[126] and a reconstructed fortification wall.[127] Also Tell Hebwa II saw a reparation and enhancement of the fortifications,[128] and the construction of a temple over 18th Dynasty buildings.[129]

The pottery from Hebwa I and II remains largely unpublished. For Hebwa I, Abd el-Maksoud published almost 500 objects, dated between the SIP and the 20th Dynasty. Both open and closed forms[130] were published, but since the total proportion is unknown, a statistical analysis is impossible. Since the silts from the Paleolagon and the Nile are identical, also petrographic analysis able to distinguish between them are nearly impossible.[131] Of the assemblage of Hebwa II it is only known that it contained a group of decorated 18th Dynasty jars, beer-jars of the 19th Dynasty and examples of Cypriot ceramics.[132] However, the pottery from the cemetery of Tell Hebwa IV was, at least partially, published by Aston.[133]

[119] Morris 2005:117.
[120] Abd el-Maksoud et al. 2005:3.
[121] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:48-50.
[122] BAT. I and BAT. IV in Abd el-Maksoud 1998:121 and Wernick 2014:122.
[123] Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2011:2.
[124] Al-Ayedi 2006:36-38.
[125] Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2011:2-11.
[126] Morris 2005:384.
[127] Morris 2005:509.
[128] Al-Ayedi 2006:35.
[129] Abd el-Maksoud and Valbelle 2011:11.
[130] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:167-245.
[131] Goren, Oren and Feinstein 1995:113.
[132] Al-Ayedi 2006:36.
[133] Aston 1996.

The assemblage was limited to the Mid-to-Late 18th Dynasty, between the reigns of Thutmose IV and that of Amenhotep III, further supporting an early date of establishment of the complex.

5.3.2.1.4. Analysis and Conclusions

Although the complex is still awaiting its final publication, what is known offers important elements for this discussion. To begin with, it can be argued that the site possessed both "Survivability" and "Capacity". Its 14 meters wide wall would have made it an almost impassable obstacle for an enemy army, and although the storage units of both tells are yet to be published, the granaries in Hebwa I's Zone B (a small portion of the site) alone show Tjaru as the "breadbasket" for both the region and the army.[134] According to Wernick, these granaries contained 116 tonnes for Level III, and 136 tonnes for Level II.[135] Wernick estimates that Thutmose III army (counting 10,800 men) would have needed between 8 and 16 metric tonnes of food every day, and the larger (20.000 men) army of Ramses II between 15 and 30.[136] Assuming Wernick to be correct in his calculations, the army of Thutmose III could have been fed by the granaries of Zone B for one or two weeks, and since more granaries might have not survived, it is possible the army might have been fed for longer . Such storage capacity questions the origin of the food that the stores contained, and whether the supply would have been of local production or this grain was imported from somewhere else. The traces of a supply delivery system at the other sites of the Infrastructure (see below), together with seals found in the granary sector, point to the idea that the site received material from the Delta to feed the army located on site.[137] Such an importation would have required a strong administration able to control and manage the operation, a wide variety of grain transporter, distribution workers, and personnel to do the day-to-day work running the granaries. In conclusion, the complex of Tell Hebwa was both the main access to Egypt from the Levant, the starting point of the military road of North Sinai, and the first Node of a Logistical Network.

[134] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:114.
[135] Wernick 2014:126.
[136] Wernick 2014:297.
[137] Abd el-Maksoud 1998:115.

5.3.2.2. Tell el-Borg

5.3.2.2.1. Introduction

Tell el-Borg is identified with the "Dwelling of the Lion", the second station of the Infrastructure of North Sinai in the Karnak Reliefs.[138] Excavated in the 2000's by James Hoffmeier and the East Frontier Archaeological Project, Tell el-Borg is the only fully published site in the Infrastructure.[139] Hoffmeier found a heavily damaged tell divided in two mounds. The southern mound revealed the remains of two New Kingdom forts. The first fort, dated to the 18th Dynasty, was dismantled to build the second, dated at the 19th Dynasty, which was in turn destroyed in the 20th Dynasty and cut by a canal dug by the As-Salam Project. The northern mound revealed two cemeteries, a public space, and a domestic area.[140]

5.3.2.2.2. The forts and other architectural remains




Figure 16 The disposition of the two forts in Tell El-Borg, from Hoffmeier 2014: 238, Fig.2

Due to their history of destructions, the fort's architectural remains are mainly represented by moats and buildings' foundations, and most of the objects that will be discussed were found in secondary placement in the canal or in the moats themselves. [141]

Like in Tell Hebwa, two brick sizes have been identified: those of the 18th Dynasty phase have an average size of 35 x 15 x 6 cm,[142] while those of the 19th Dynasty have an average size of 37 x 18.5 x 8.5 cm.[143] The first fort was likely built under Thutmose III or Amenhotep II and dismantled after the Amarna period.[144] On the base of the fosses' length, Hoffmeier estimated it covered an area of 9600 m^2. Since the fosse's walls were built in mudbricks, which were fired to withstand both the heavy weight of the fort and the presence of fluctuating water, the fosses are believed to have been a moat. [145] It is also likely that the 18th Dynasty

[138] *t3 ʿt n ssy*, "the Dwelling of Sese" of papyrus Anastasi I (Gardiner 1920:103).
[139] Hoffmeier et al. 2014a; 2019.
[140] Hoffmeier 2014.
[141] Hoffmeier et al. 2014:184.
[142] Hoffmeier et al. 2014:126.
[143] Hoffmeier et al. 2014:220.
[144] Hoffmeier et al. 2010:192.
[145] Hoffmeier et al. 2014:194-195.

fort housed a stable, since the funerary stela of a "overseer of the horses" (*imy-r ssmt*) called Betu was found in fosse N (see below). The second fort is also poorly preserved, mainly because half of it was obliterated by the canal, which destroyed everything between the north and south corners. It is however known that it was defended by a 4 m wide mudbrick fortification wall, that it had a monumental gate, and that its moats (fosses A and N, east and west of the fortress) were left unfinished.[146] Fosse N provides a rich collection of epigraphic material, because to avoid groundwater infiltration its bed was lined with stone material – like Betu's Stela – that had previously been standing in the 18th Dynasty fort.[147]

The first inhabitants of Tell el-Borg appear to have settled in the "domestic area" of the excavations between the SIP and the early 18th Dynasty. They might have been Shasu Bedouins, as hypothesized by Davis,[148] but it is also possible they were somehow connected to the local garrison. The public space appears to have been in use only after the transition between the 18th and the 19th Dynasty, when it housed a religious shrine built to service the garrison.[149] A domestic space of the Mid-18th Dynasty became a cemetery in the Late 18th.[150] Due to the damages that the site incurred, no clear housing could be traced at the site, but since large burials in the cemetery house remains of men, women, and children, entire families appear to have lived in the fort's proximity.[151]

5.3.2.2.3. The findings from the site and their meaning

Because of the poor conditions in which the site was found, and because of the complex history of its occupation, almost no object related to the forts was found in its primary context. Several relevant pieces of information can however be gathered from what was found in secondary contexts. It is possible, for example, to offer some framework for the date of construction of the two forts. The first fort was already in place during the kingdom of Amenhotep II, because 6 doorjambs found in fosse N carried his throne name,[152] as well as two sherds found in the cemetery.[153] Moreover, a heavily damaged limestone block from the canal was inscribed with the cartouche of a "Thutmose."[154] It's impossible to determine which

[146] Hoffmeier 2011:208-209; Hoffmeier et al 2014:230-231.
[147] Hoffmeier et al 2014:226.
[148] Davis 2019:313.
[149] Mumford 2019:124.
[150] Haddow et al. 2019:229-231; Hummel 2019:245.
[151] Hoffmeier 2019:437.
[152] TBO 0703; 0704; 0715; 0706; 0705; 0714; 0726; 0727.
[153] TBO 0071; 0364.
[154] TBO I 2A, Hoffmeier et al. 2014b:92.



Figure 17: Seal TBO II 0061 (from Van Dijk and Hoffmeier 2010:203: fig.15).

"Thutmose" is represented, but the presence of early 18th Dynasty clay coffins in the cemetery,[155] and of several findings testifying occupation of the public space by the early-to-Mid-18th Dynasty,[156] point to Thutmose II or III as the most likely candidates to be the ruler under which the fort was established.

The dismantling of the first fort and the construction of the second can be dated on two elements: the aforementioned doorjambs, and the material from the fosse of the first fort. The doorjambs were likely part of a building in the first fort, and since the name of Amun – and only the name of Amun – was carved out of them, they were still standing in the first fort during the Atenist revolution. They are therefore a *terminus post quem* for its destruction.[157] The second element is the material collected from the moat: as Hoffmeier has noticed, to serve its purpose it must have been regularly cleared from any wind-blown sand,[158] and therefore, the material recovered in the fosse must pertain to the moment in which they were abandoned and filled.[159] The pottery material from the fosse dates from Amenhotep III to Ramesse II,[160] like the assemblage of Cypriot pottery,[161] and the Mycenean vessels,[162] while two stamped jars (one with the cartouche of Akhenaten,[163] one with that of Smenkhkare)[164] set this date at the end of the 18th Dynasty.

Finally, an important document is represented by TBO II 0061, a stamped seal impression on an amphora handle found in the public space's well (fig. 17). The inscription was initially read as *pr nb-ḫprw-rˁ*, "the estate of Neb-Kheperu-ra", the throne name of Tutankhamun,[165] but the badly eroded sign at the bottom was later convincingly interpreted as a boat determinative by Goldwasser and Oren, who argued that this sign was likely the name of the boat that imported the amphora to Tell el-Borg.[166] As it

[155] Janzen 2019.
[156] Hummel 2014:376.
[157] Hoffmeier et al 2014:244-246.
[158] Hoffmeier et al. 2014:195.
[159] Hoffmeier and Van Dijk 2010:192.
[160] Hummel 2014b:379.
[161] Swiny 2014:493-494.
[162] Hummel 2014a:497.
[163] TBO 0309.
[164] TBO 0077.
[165] Hoffmeier et al. 2010:202.
[166] Goldwasser et al. 2015:33. Their reading was later accepted by Hoffmeier (2019a).

will be discussed below, it is likely that this amphora was part of a large system aimed at importing food from Egypt to the Infrastructure of North Sinai.

5.3.2.2.4. Conclusions

In conclusion, Tell el-Borg was a site with obvious military relevance, inhabited without interruption between the second intermediate period and the end of the 19th Dynasty. The first fort seems to have been constructed either under Thutmose III or his immediate successor Amenhotep II, and then manned continuously until its replacement at the end of the Amarna Period. The excavations could not clarify the presence of magazines or granaries at the site, but the existence of the stamped Jar testifies how supplies found their way to Tell el-Borg, and it is possible to hypothesize the existence of a magazine that would have stored them.

5.3.3. The sites in the Northern Sinai

5.3.3.1. Introduction

The only campaign of archaeological surveys and excavations in the rest of the Infrastructure was the North Sinai Survey conducted during the 1970s by Elezier Oren and the Ben Gurion University. Across a decade, the Survey recorded 231 New Kingdom "sites" (mostly concentrations of pottery sherds and lithic tools)[167] between the Paleolagon and Raphia.[168] Oren noticed a pattern in their distribution, with groups of secondary sites clustering around a central one, like temporary encampments erected around a fortress. He recorded eight New Kingdom clusters (in Rumani, Nagila, Bir el-Abd, Madba'a, el-Mazar, el-'Arish, and Haruba), but only excavated and partially published those in Bir el-'Abd and Harouba.[169] Those in Nagila (S-57 in Oren's nomenclature) and Mabda'a (C-69) were surveyed and probed, but never excavated. They were central sites in their clusters, and (somewhat similarly to Harouba and Bir

[167] Wernick 2014: 153.
[168] Oren 1973b.
[169] Oren 1973; 1987; 1993; 2006; Goren et al. 1995. See figure 19.

el-'Abd) revealed remains of mudbrick buildings scattered on acres, together with large amount of pottery.[170]

5.3.3.2. The cluster at Bir el-'Abd

Bir el-'Abd consists of a central site (BEA-10) surrounded by 30 small encampments dispersed in a radius of 3/4 km.[171] According to Al-Ayedi, two phases were recognized in its stratigraphy:[172] an earlier one dated to the 18th Dynasty – represented by the fortification of the centre, and by the construction of the granaries –, and a second one – represented by the magazine complex – dated to the beginning of the 19th Dynasty.[173] There are no destruction levels at the site, which was abandoned peacefully at the end of the New Kingdom.[174]

All structures at BEA-10 are composed of bricks of size 44 x 22 x 12 cm, almost identical to those found in Harouba. The largest building is a 1600 m^2 square fortress protected by a mudbrick wall 3m thick, which contained several structures and installation for cooking, storage and bronzeworking.[175] The Logistical relevance of the site is represented by the granary found 40 m south of the fort. It consisted of 4 large silos preserved to a height of 180 cm, with a capacity estimated to have been between 40,[176] and 70 tonnes.[177] As it was said, since Wernick estimates that the army of Thutmose III would have needed between 8 and 16 metric tonnes of food every day,[178] the content of these granaries might have fed them for several days. The granaries, replaced by large magazines, went out of use with the 19th Dynasty, became a refuse pit for the fort, and were found to contain a large quantity of pottery and animal bones.[179] 200 metres from the magazines stood an artificial depression of 15x10 metres. Waterproofing layers of clay lined its sides and bottom, and it contained sherds of NK pottery.[180] Oren thought of it as a water reservoir for the fortress, but the low rainfall and high rate of evaporation in the

[170] The North Sinai Survey, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, from Elezier Oren, personal communication, May 2018.
[171] Oren 1987:78.
[172] Al-Ayedi 2002:Volume II, 75.
[173] Al-Ayedi 2002:Volume II, 75.
[174] Wernick 2014.
[175] Oren 1987:78; 1993:1389; Morris 2005:296.
[176] Oren 1993:1389.
[177] Wernick 2014:165-166.
[178] Wernick 2014:297.
[179] Oren 1993:1389.
[180] Oren 1987:83.

region[181] make it more likely that the "reservoir" would have been filled (likely to water the animals) only when needed, rather than continuously maintained.[182]

Most of the material from Bir el-'Abd is characteristic of the period between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th Dynasty.[183] Although no kiln was found in BEA-10, petrographical analysis proved that pottery was locally produced at the site.[184] At the same time, since three pottery vessels from BEA-10 carry the cartouche of Thutmose III,[185] and since Oren has recorded the presence of "*hundreds of examples of open vessels shaped like Flowerpots with very thick, thumb-indented bases*",[186] the site was likely already in use during the Mid-18th Dynasty. Late 18th Dynasty objects include scarabs and seals impressions, a large collection of Egyptian pottery, spearheads, and arrowheads.

An object of particular importance for this discussion is a beer-jug stamped with a cartouche that reads "*Mn-M3ʿt-Rʿ ḏsr-ḫprw-Rʿ*", the throne names of Seti I and Horemheb (fig. 20).[187] The association of two throne names inside the same cartouche is unparalleled. However, papyrus Rollin mentions a royal ship named *ḏsr-ḫprw-Rʿ* from the days of Seti I,[188] and in the cartouche *ḏsr-ḫprw-Rʿ* is followed by a boat determinative. Since most of the jars in Bir el-'Abd were imported (either from Egypt or from the southern Levant) Goldwasser and Oren have suggested that the cartouche is the name of a ship that carried the beer jar to the coast north of BEA-10.[189]

[181] Oren 1993:1389. In El-Arish (halfway between Harouba and Bir el-'Abd) the average annual rainfall is of 83.6 mm, with rainy days concentrated in the winter, while the average daily evaporation in June (when the reservoir would have been needed) is of 17.4 mm (El-Kashouty et al. 2012:42). Without the addition of water from an external source, a year worth of rain would have evaporated in a week.

[182] Wernick 2014:167.
[183] Oren 1993:1989.
[184] See below and Goren et al. 1995.
[185] Oren 2006:287 (Fig.6, No 12-14).
[186] Oren 1987:83-84.
[187] Goldwasser et al. 2015:32.
[188] KRI I, 263, 15. Jones 1988:239.
[189] Goren et al. 1995:115; Goldwasser et al. 2015:32.




Figure 18 (above) Site A-345 (from Al-Ayedi 2002:98, fig. 23).





Figure 20 (above left)
A reconstruction of the Cartouche on Jar 330 from BEA-10.

Figure 21 (above right)
A reconstruction of the stamps from the beer Jars of A-343

(Both from Golwasser and Oren 2015:32)

Figure 19 (below) Cluster of Harouba. New Kingdom sites are in Red, built sites are underlined (from Goldwasser and Oren 2015:26, fig.2).



5.3.3.3. The cluster at Harouba

The cluster at Harouba consists of circa 20 sites scattered through an area of 5 km^2, and includes encampments, settlements, and a shallow coastal anchorage for maritime connnections.[190] Oren focused on the well-preserved 18th Dynasty administrative building (A-345), on the 19th Dynasty fortress (A-289), and on the largely unpublished A-343. The brick size across all sites is homogeneous: 45 x 22 x 12 cm, almost identical to those of BEA-10.[191] According to Al-Ayedi, 4 strata can be reconstructed in the cluster: a first level dated at the reign of Thutmose III, represented by A-345 and a group of rooms and a series of burials in A-289; a second level dated at the kingdom of Seti I, represented mainly by A-289. A third, 12th century phase, when the original fortress was repaired and destructed again, and an Iron Age I phase of occupation. [192]

The 18th Dynasty complex of A-345 comprises a well-planned area consisting of an industrial quarter and a magazine complex.[193] Since also Tell el-Borg, during the 18th Dynasty, had a "domestic" area outside the fortress, and since the storage units of Bir el-'Abd were located outside the fort, it is possible that the limited area of excavation might have hindered a fortification wall.[194] The industrial complex on the eastern edge was a pottery workshop, complete of installations for the preparation and the storing of the product, and two kilns, which were able to fire dozens of items at once.[195] The complex was covered with kiln refuses, and fired and unfired specimens.[196] Among the locally produced vessels, bowls, kraters, and drops-shaped containers are the most common, together with Flowerpots.[197] As one of them was impressed with the cartouche of Thutmose III, the site might be dated to his reign.[198] The magazine complex included a series of long, (10 x 3 m) plastered halls with brick floors, similar to those found in Bir el-'Abd and Tell Hebwa.[199] No fortifications dated to the 18th Dynasty were found, but Oren (who was only able to excavate 1 out of the estimated 6 to 15 acres of A-345) records the presence of buildings protruding from the sand 150m over the excavated area.[200]

[190] Morris 2005:513.
[191] Oren 1987:87.
[192] Al-Ayedi 2002, Volume II:91-92.
[193] Oren 1993:1390.
[194] Oren 2006:283.
[195] Al-Ayedi 2002 Volume II:99.
[196] Goren et al. 1995:108-109.
[197] Oren 1993:1391.
[198] Oren 2006: fig. 6 no.15.
[199] Oren 2006:282.
[200] Oren 2006:282.

Only two of the four occupational phases of A-289 are relevant for this discussion. Phase IV of the building was likely contemporary with A-345, probably precedes the construction of the fortress, and contained a seal with the name of Thutmose III. Phase III is dated at the 19th Dynasty, and saw the fortification of the centre.[201]

Located halfway between A-289 and A-345, A-343 was likely a transit station, with stone installations and mudbrick constructions that could not be excavated, but that yielded animal bones, stone artefacts, and a large assemblage of NK pottery largely produced in A-345.[202] According to Oren, the site was used from the time of Thutmose III to the end of the 19th Dynasty, with a brief hiatus during the Amarna Period.[203] Among the objects found there, two Beer Jars[204] are of particular interest: they were stamped with the same object, which left a symbol with an upper section constituted by a cartouche of *Mn-M3ʿt-Rʿ* – Throne name of Seti I –, a middle section which can be read *ir pt t3*, "creator of Heaven and Earth", and an element of unclear reading in the lowest section. The base of the sign reveals it as a ship, possibly the determinative in *skdwt*, "sailing".[205] Considering the parallels from Tell el-Borg and BEA-10, it is possible that also these jars were imported to Harouba.

5.3.3.4. The pottery from Bir el-'Abd and Harouba during the 18th Dynasty

A full account of the pottery from Bir el-'Abd and Harouba has never been published, but some accounts and graphics have appeared in two short articles. In the first one, Oren focused on the typology and chronology of the Egyptian presence in north Sinai,[206] showing that the evolution of the Egyptian pottery in the region follows closely that in Egypt. Having this considered, the presence in A-345 of numerous locally manufactured vessels presenting the diagnostic red-lipped and splashed decoration (an important chronological marker for the Mid-18th Dynasty), together with Flowerpots,[207] indicates an Egyptian

[201] Oren 1987:92.
[202] Goldwasser et al. 2015.
[203] Goldwasser and Oren 2015:30.
[204] #10553 and #11896.
[205] Goldwasser and Oren 2015:32.
[206] Oren 2006.
[207] Aston 2006.

presence in the north Sinai already under Thutmose III.[208] Combining this with the fact that several imported Egyptian amphorae bore the stamped cartouches of Thutmose III, it becomes possible to argue that the Logistical organization testified for the Late 18th-Early 19th Dynasty by the jar handles of Tell el-Borg, Bir el-'Abd, and Harouba might predate to the time of Thutmose III.[209]

In the second article, Goren, Oren, and Feinstein petrographically analysed the clay of 400 vessels found during the North Sinai Survey.[210] In doing so, they discovered that vessels could be divided into three main groups: locally produced (with distinct clays for Harouba and Bir el-Abd), Canaanite imports, and Egyptian imports. The changes in proportion between these groups reveal much about the Egyptian Logistics behind the military crossing of the desert. A first element of interest is the fact that the proportion between the three main groups changes gradually as one moves across north Sinai (fig. 22). The Egyptian wares are the large majority in the T sites of the Paleolagon (undoubtedly also because the clay of the Paleolagon and that of the Nile Valley are almost indistinguishable), but the percentage of locally produced pottery grows as the road moves east. The growth is slow but noticeable in the clusters of Nagila (S-57) and Mabda'a (C-69), it doubles in Bir el-'Abd (BEA) and becomes dominant in Harouba (A-345). A second element of interest (fig. 23) is that in Harouba and Bir el-'Abd the




Figure 22 Ware distribution in New Kingdom Sites from northern Sinai (From Goren et al. 1995:113, Chart 1)




Figure 23 Provenance of Bowls (left) and Jars (right) in Bir el-'Abd and Harouba(from Goren, Oren and Feinstin 1995:114, chart.3)

[208] Oren 2006:284-286.
[209] Oren 2006:286.
[210] Goren et al. 1995. Unfortunately, raw data are not published, so I must rely exclusively on their graphs for this analysis.

proportions between the three main groups changes drastically if one considers specific vessel types separately. A comparison is made between "table ware", like bowls, and "storage ware", like jars. Table wares are largely locally produced, whereas storage vessels are largely imported, either from Egypt or the Levant.[211] If one combines these pieces of information with the already mentioned jars with "naval" cartouches found in Tell el-Borg, BEA-10 and A-343, an interesting picture starts to emerge. On the one hand, assuming these storage jars were imported full, the supplies for the marching army during the 18th Dynasty originated in Egypt, were transported by boat to the Infrastructure of North Sinai, and disposed to feed the marching army. On the other hand, as Goren et al. have argued, pottery production at the sites was restricted to household items that were in high demand because they were involved in the distribution of rations.[212] When combined, these two aspects strongly suggests the existence of a complex Logistical organization, probably capable of nourishing the army marching through the desert.

5.3.3.5. Analysis and conclusions

Although it is likely that BEA-10 was garrisoned continuously, its small size suggests that the site was not built as a defensive measure, but as a "Node" to the Logistic Network. Since granaries, magazines, and the cistern lay outside of the fortress, Wernick has convincingly argued that they were not stored year-round but would have been filled before a campaign.[213] Moreover, since there was a natural mooring point 20 km north of Bir el-'Abd,[214] and since the beer-jug point towards a maritime connection, it is likely that this station received its material via a combination of boat and some form of overland transportation system. A similar role can be argued for Harouba: the presence of a mooring site and the beer-jar stamp from A-343 make it apparent that Harouba was an integral part of the Logistic Network, one where granaries and magazines would have been filled before a campaign. It can therefore be argued

[211] Goren et al. 1995:114-115.
[212] Goren et al. 1995:115. In this sense, it is interesting to recall the role of Amenemheb Mahu in the later part of his career, when he was involved in the troops provisioning and had under himself a "overseer of the granary of the lord of the two lands, one who reckons the preparation of bread and beer" (see **§4.3.6.2.**).
[213] Wernick 2014:170.
[214] Stanley 2002.

that, from the time of Thutmose III to the end of the 19th Dynasty, Harouba received and redistributed food to the army.[215]

5.3.4. The Infrastructure of North Sinai: analysis and conclusions

In conclusion, the sites in North Sinai can be defined as Nodes in an Operational Network. Their "Survivability" is proven by the extensive fortifications found in Tell Hebwa, Tell el-Borg, Bir el-'Abd, and the 19th Dynasty Harouba. It is likely that, at Harouba, also the 18th Dynasty complex was fortified, but since the excavations only revealed a fraction of the site, there can be no certainty. Their "Capacity" is well established: Tell Hebwa, Bir el-'Abd and Harouba possessed magazines and granaries of significant dimensions, able to feed a passing army. Although the excavations at Tell el-Borg could not prove the presence of magazines or granaries at the site, the existence of the stamped Jar testifies how supplies found their way to Tell el-Borg as well, and it is possible to hypothesize the existence of a magazine that would have stored them. Therefore, these sites can be considered as "Nodes" in an Operational Network.

It has also been argued that the sites of the Infrastructure were at the centre of a complex system of maritime refurbishment of rations. Both Bir-el'Abd, and Harouba had some anchorage in their vicinity, and the three stamped jars from Tell el-Borg, BEA-10, and A-343 are seemingly connected to a shipping service which likely delivered food for the passing army. While the large majority of pottery coming from the outside were jars coming from Egypt, the vessels found in Bir el-'Abd and Harouba show that the kilns at the sites mainly produced bowls and cookware. This notion of the importation of food to the sites of north Sinai has important repercussions, as it clearly demonstrates the involvement of the Egyptian administration in the creation and the maintenance of their army in the crossing of the desert of north Sinai. The local production of the important quantity of pottery that has been found in Harouba and Bir el-'Abd is particularly telling in this sense, since it must have been an expensive Logistical nightmare. According to Oren, neither site has clay sources nearby, nor sources of fuel to fire the pottery, and therefore the Egyptian administration must have transported all of these elements to the

[215] Wernick 2014:182

two centres in order for their kilns to work.[216] The elevated costs that such an operation would have imposed on the Egyptian administration could only be explained by the absolute military need to manage the north Sinai and feed the passing army.

Finally, it is possible to give a timeline for the construction works on all excavated forts. Tell Hebwa I and II, Tell el-Borg, Bir el-'Abd and Harouba were all built either before or at the time of Thutmose III. The two eastern sites in particular seem to have been part of a common construction scheme, since they share size, building methods, bonding patterns and bricks' shapes.[217] All these sites underwent major works of fortification and reconstruction between the end of the Amarna Period and the beginning of the 19th Dynasty, when also Tell-Abyad was built anew.[218] The fact that the phases of construction appear to have happened simultaneously across all sites indicates two stages of investments on the site, and a period of relative "stasis" at the time of the Late 18th Dynasty.

5.4. The Levant

5.4.1. Introduction

After the battle of Megiddo the Egyptians established themselves at several sites around the Levant, all capable of controlling areas that were strategically and Logistically important: the Wadi Gaza, the Yarkon River Valley, the Jezreel and Beqaa Valleys, and the 'Akkar Plain.

The Wadi Gaza is an obligatory passage for armies, messengers and caravans coming in and out of Egypt through North Sinai. The long-standing Egyptian interest in the region[219] during the 18th Dynasty was manifested with the direct control on the sites of Tell el-Ajjul and Gaza, and developed further during the 19th and 20th Dynasties, when Egyptians appear to have occupied several other sites.[220]

[216] Goren et al. 1995:116.
[217] Oren 1987:80.
[218] Minault-Gout et al. 2012.
[219] The site of Tell es-Sakan testifies an Egyptian presence during the pre-dynastic period (de Miroschedji et al. 2001).
[220] Such as Deir el-Balah (Killebrew et al. 2006) Tel Sera' (Oren 1993); Tell el-Hesi (Blakely 2018); Qubur al-Walaydah (Lehmann et al. 2010); Tell el-Farah South (Yisraely 1993).

The Valley of the Yarkon River is a fertile region confined between the Mediterranean Sea, the Shephelah, and the Sharon.[221] The Egyptian established a presence at the harbour of Jaffa during the 18th Dynasty, and in nearby Tel Gerisa and Tel Aphek during the 19th Dynasty, if not before. The other important sites of the Sharon and the Shephelah do not seem to have been controlled directly: Ashdod and Tel Mor likely entered Egyptian direct control under the Ramessides, but the excavations of the LB IB and LB IIA strata have not offered material capable of pre-dating this control.[222] Similarly, in Ramesside times Ashkelon and Lachish became two highly Egyptianized centres,[223] but nothing supports an Egyptian military presence in earlier strata, and they are clearly independent in both the papyrus Hermitage 1116A and the Amarna letters.[224] Ido Koch has however recently argued that the LBIIA Fosse Temple at Lachish shows Egyptian elements in its construction, and that the goddess to which the temple was dedicated (likely Elat) was identified with Hathor first and – through Hathor – with the deified wife of Amenhotep III, Tiye.[225] Finally, Gezer and Gath appear to have been small and unfortified during the Mid-18th Dynasty, and independent during the Amarna Period. [226]

The Beth-Shean and the Beqaa Valleys are part of the Rift that goes from the Red Sea in the south to the Orontes Valley in the north.[227] The first is a section of the Jordan Valley, the second runs for 110 km between the Lebanon and Antilebanon mountains. Both areas were strategically important, as they controlled both the roads going south-to-north (the so-called King's Highway) and east-to-west:[228] Beth-Shean controlled the roads going through the Jezreel Valley for the Egyptians since the Mid-18th Dynasty, while Kumidi did the same on the roads from the Damascene towards the Mediterranean during its short-lived Egyptian occupation in the Amarna Period. Nothing suggests an Egyptian presence at other sites in the region during the 18th Dynasty. In Tel Dan, the few Egyptian vessels that have been found appear to have arrived by trade and are therefore not indicative of an Egyptian presence,[229] while the other important centres of the region – Hazor, Akko, Pehel, Rehob,

[221] Avnimelech 1950:178; Gadot 2008:57; Allen Pierce 2015:117.
[222] See Dothan et al. 2005 and Barako 2007.
[223] Martin 2008; 2011:195-201, 215-220; Koch 2014.
[224] Ussishkin 2004; Stager et al. 2008.
[225]Koch 2014; 2017; 2021:46-53.
[226] e.g. EA 268 and 279 respectively. Dever 1993; Finkelstein 2002:264-265; Maeir 2012:16-17; Rainey 2012; Dever et al. 2014:12-13.
[227] See **§2.2.**
[228] See **§6.2.**
[229] Martin et al. 2007:200.

Jerusalem – are independent in the Amarna Letters,[230] and have offered nothing to support the notion of an Egyptian presence.[231] Megiddo in particular has been seen as controlled by the Egyptians following its conquest by Thutmose III, but the city is independent in the Papyrus Hermitage 116A and in the Amarna Letters, and the few early Egyptian-type vessels found in the city need not be explained with a direct Egyptian control.[232]

In the Phoenician coast and the ʻAkkar Plain the only sites that appear to have been relevant for the Egyptians during the 18th Dynasty are Ullassa, Sumur, and Byblos. The first two are known only from the written documents, as Ullassa is yet to be discovered and the LB IIA and LBIB strata at Tell Kazel/Sumur have not been reached so far. It is instead usually identified with Tell Kazel. The city of Byblos is unlike any other: although famously independent during the Amarna Period, according to Kilani the city had important ideological and economic ties with Egypt, that are especially evident in the local Obelisk temple and its architectural fragments with the name of Thutmose III, and it is likely it was an important ally to the Egyptians during Thutmose's wars.[233] This coastal region is not well known archaeologically, but excavations at the city of Tel ʻArqa/Irqata,[234] in the ʻAkkar Plain, and Sidon[235] and Tyre[236] in the Phoenician coast have insofar supported the idea that they were independent, as they appear in the Amarna Letters.

5.4.2. Tell El-Ajjul/Sharuhen

5.4.2.1. Introduction and Historical sources

Located at the crossing between the Via Maris and the wadi Gaza Tell el-Ajjul was a major port town during the Bronze Age.[237] The site's excavator Petrie believed he had discovered ancient Gaza, but this identification appears unlikely: LBA strata have been found under the modern-day city of the same

[230] e.g. EA 227; 234; 256; 249; 286 respectively. Hazor is also independent in Papyrus Hermitage 1116A (see **§4.3.7.**).
[231] Smith et al. 1992; Knapp 1993; Artzy 2006; Ben-Tor 2016:78-117; Mazar et al. 2019.
[232] e.g. EA 242. Morris 2005:158-160, Finkelstein et al. 2008, and Martin 2011:161 *contra* Gonen 1987:83 and Fritz 1995:41.
[233] **§5.4.7.**
[234] Thalmann et al. 2006; Thalmann 2010. The city is mentioned as independent, for example, in EA 62.
[235] Saidah 2004: 109-114; EA 144.
[236] Bikai 1978. EA 295.
[237] Tufnell et al. 1993:49; Massafra 2018:102.

name,[238] and Tell el-Ajjul is generally equated today with the city of Sharuhen of the written sources, where it appears four times.[239]

- In the biography of Ahmose son of Abana Sharuhen is fleetingly mentioned in the context of the wars against the Hyksos. The man from el-Kab only says that, after the conquest of Avaris: "*Sharuhen was besieged for three years. His majesty despoiled it and I brought spoil from it: two women and a hand. Then the gold of valor was given me, and my captives were given to me as slaves*."[240]
- In the Toponym Lists of Amenhotep III (in Soleb) and Ramesse II (in Amara West),[241] Sharuhen appears in the wadi Gaza.
- In the Annals of Thutmose III, it is said that: *"Then it transpired, in later times, that the garrison (Ỉwśyt) which was there was (now) in the town (dmi) of Sharuhen, while the territory from Yarusa as far as the distant marshlands had broken out in rebellion against His Majesty"*[242]

From these texts three elements can be argued: that Sharuhen was located in the wadi Gaza, south of Yurza/Tel Jemme;[243] that after the expulsion of the Hyksos, the Egyptian army besieged and conquered Sharuhen, and that by the time of Thutmose III the city *(dmi)* hosted an Egyptian garrison. One would expect, therefore, to recognize a LB IA Egyptian presence at the site of Sharuhen, and since Tell el-Ajjul is the only site where early-18th Dynasty material is found in the Levant, the site is the best candidate for Sharuhen.

Phases	*Palestine*	*Cyprus*	*Egypt*
H1A	Iron and later	n.d.m.[17]	n.d.m.
H1B	LB IIA/B	LC IIB/C	18th Dyn, late (?)
H2A-B	LB IB/IIA	LC IIA	18th Dyn, middle
H3-4	LB IA-IA/B	LC IB	18th Dyn, first half
H5A-B	MB/LB	LC IA2/B	SIP, late/18th Dyn, early
H6 and 7	MB IIC	LC IA1	SIP, late
H8	MB II, 2nd half	n.d.m.	n.d.m.

Figure 24 Chronology of Tell el Ajjul (from Fischer et al. 2002:139 Table2).

[238] Ovadiah 1993:465.

[239] As proposed by Kempinski 1974:149-52 (followed by Weinstein 1981:6, and Morris 2005:28 among others). Other candidates for Sharuhen are far less convincing: Albright (1929:7, followed by Aḥituv 1984:179 and Hoffmeier 1989:184) placed Sharuhen in Tell el-Farah South. Rainey (1993, followed by Redford 2003:11-12) identified it with Tel Haror.

[240] *Urk.* IV, 4:14-17. Translation Lichtheim 2019:321.

[241] The first mentions it alongside Canaan (Gaza), Raphia, and Beth Shemesh (Giveon 1964:247-248). The second after Canaan and Raphia, and before Muhazzi, Socoh, and Jaffa (KRI II:216,9).

[242] *Urk.* IV, 648:5. Translation Redford 2003:9.

[243] For Yurza as Tell Jemme, see Goren et al. 2004:299-301 and Ben-Shlomo 2012).

5.4.2.2. The archaeological excavations at the site, and the stratigraphy of Fischer and Sadeq

The archaeological record of Tell el-Ajjul is still highly disputed. The site was first excavated by Flinders Petrie in the 1930s, and then by Fischer and Sadeq at the beginning of the 2000s.[244] Petrie's disastrous publications and excavations method came under severe scrutiny already in the 1930s,[245] and the work of Fischer and Sadeq, aimed at clarifying Petrie's record, was abruptly interrupted by the second intifada.[246] It is easy to understand, therefore, how the comprehension of the site remains limited, and the discussion over the chronological frame of the site unsettled.[247] The small trenches opened by Fischer and Sadeq provide the only reliable stratigraphy of Tell el-Ajjul, one that is possibly connected to the nearby Palace area. They identified 8 levels, or "Horizons" in their trenches, and dated all Horizons between 5 and 1B to different moments in the 18th Dynasty.[248] Horizon 5 A-B sees the construction of a mudbrick building that remains in use in the following strata. The Egyptian pottery found within it – four piriform jars – is common in tombs dated at the Late SIP/ early 18th Dynasty, up until the time of Thutmose I. Horizon 3-4 contained several levels of destruction, several Egyptian vessels (including a flowerpot) and a closed context dating the stratum to the LB IA-LB IB. Horizon 2 is the most recent phase with architectural remains, after which the area remains deserted for a considerable time. It has been dated at the Mid-18th




Figure 25: Excavation Areas in Tell El-Ajjul, after Winter 2018:8, fig.2.

[244] Petrie 1931; 1932; 1933; 1934; Petrie et al. 1954; Fischer et al. 2000; 2002.

[245] Albright 1938; for a recent discussion see Sparks 2005; 2013a:148. In short, Petrie never published a comprehensive architectural plan of the site, left undiscussed entire areas of the site he had apparently excavated, registered only a few findspots, published only a small portion of his findings, and what was published was presented in isolation from its context.


[246] Fischer et al. 2002.


[247] Among others, Albright (1938), Stewart (1974), Bergoffen (1989), Morris (2005:62), Massafra (2018:102-146), and Winter (2018) have struggled with the dating of the site and its material.

[248] Fischer et al. 2002:119-139.

Dynasty, mainly on the base of the abundant Cypriot ware. The Egyptian pottery is present in all strata but never predominant, always between 1 and 2 % of the non-Canaanite vessels.

5.4.2.2.1. The architecture of the site





Figures 26 and 27: Plans of Palace I (above) and II (below). After Tufnell and Kempiski 1993:50.

The excavations at the site found an administrative quarter (the so-called "Palace"), a residential area (the "City"), a series of cemeteries,[249] and an impressive amount of artifacts, such as a high number of Hyksos royal scarabs,[250] an important collection of goldwork,[251] and a large assemblage of Egyptian pottery dated to the early-18th Dynasty.[252] Finally, during the MBA, Tell el-Ajjul had been well fortified, but it is unclear for how long these fortifications were still standing during the LBA.[253] Petrie identified a sequence of five superimposed palaces in the northern corner of the tell, the chronology of which has been long debated. Albright refused Petrie's vision of an Old and Middle Kingdom Egyptian palace and proposed one where palace II and III were dated at the 18th Dynasty, and palace IV at the 19th, and most later analyisi have advocated for similar dates.[254] The earliest building in the sequence is the only one that might be interpreted as a "Palace", and that does not seem to have been built in Egyptian fashion.[255] Its planimetry (a large courtyard surrounded by small rooms on the north and east side) is common in the MBA Levant, and foundations made of sandstone

[249] Gonen 1992:70-79.
[250] Giveon 1974:230; Porter 2016.
[251] Stewart and Kassis 1974:27-49.
[252] Kopetzky 2011.
[253] Massafra 2018:110.
[254] Albright 1938:359; Bergoffen 1989:157-210; Winter 2018; Massafra 2018.
[255] Winter 2018:13.

slabs are rarely met in Egypt.[256] Palace I was found covered by strata of ash and washed earth, so it likely met a violent end, and on its ruins was buillt a considerably smaller and unfortified building: Palace II. According to Winter, its plan (nine rooms built around a central main hall and a side entrance) is reminiscent of the earliest examples of Egyptian Governor Residences,[257] and also its building methods (a mudbrick walls and a lack of stone foundations) are common in Egypt.[258] In room MV of Palace I and II was found the limestone head of a canopic Jar carved with what seems to be a New Kingdom funerary formula.[259]




Figure 28: Administrative headquarters in Palace III (from Morris 2005:67, fig.10)

Palace III is the first in a series of buildings which are difficult to discuss: its plan was only partially published by Petrie, whose plans appeared without a scale, a north arrow, or written explanations.[260] According to Morris' reconstruction, the building was a square residence of 27m per side, reminiscent of the centre hall-residence, lacking stone foundations and with a side entrance.[261] The fact that it reused several among Palace II walls,[262] moreover, also suggests a continuity of occupation by the Egyptian forces. With outer walls in some cases 2.6 m thick,[263] this building is commonly considered to be a "fortress",[264] an idea supported by the presence of 14 arrowheads around the building.[265] Remains of several thin-walled structures, possibly housing quarters, were uncovered south the building, and it is possible they were built at the same time as the "fortress". The objects found in and around palace III date to the LB IIA[266] and support the idea that its inhabitants were either Egyptians or highly Egyptianized. Four scarabs, a plaque, and one scarab impression bearing the cartouche of Thutmose III were found in and around

[256] Bergoffen 1989:83.
[257] Like those of Tell el Far'ah (South), Tell Jemmeh, and Tel Aphek (Winter 2018:19).
[258] Winter 2018:18.
[259] Sparks 2013b:88.
[260] The arrow and scale in figure 28 were added by Morris.
[261] Morris 2005:63.
[262] Bergoffen 1989:159.
[263] Morris 2005:64.
[264] Among others, Albright 1938:353-354 and Kempinski 1974:148.
[265] Morris 2005:64; Massafra 2018:126.
[266] Massafra 2018:126.

Palace III, while 13 of 21 reconstructed vessels found in association with Palace III have close Egyptian parallels.[267] These objects, together with the fragment of a storage jar stamped with the cartouches of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III (fig.29), all suggest that resident troops were at least occasionally directly provided with supplies from the imperial government, possibly on the same level as the sites of the Infrastructure of North Sinai.

The Egyptian outpost of Palace IV stood alone on top of the tell.[268] The structure seems to have been a redevelopment of Palace III, consisting of a main building of a square or rectangular shape and a row of storerooms. Some of the walls were thickened during the construction, likely to fortify it.[269] Palace V was, at the time of Petrie's excavation, non-existent: only a couple courses of bricks delineated its structure, partly resembling those of Palaces II and III.[270] The dating of these two palaces ranges between the Middle of the 18th Dynasty (Palace IV) and the Late 18th (Palace V) given by Massafra, and the Late 18th and the beginning of the 19th given by Morris.[271]

The palace area is not the only one to have produced Egyptian material, but both the area south of the Palace and the "City" area were poorly defined by Petrie,[272] so a detailed discussion is unfeasible. According to Massafra, however, the former was inhabited between the LB IA and the LB IIA, presented mainly examples of Egyptian vessels, with several Cypriot imports, and few examples of local pottery.[273] Similarly, area A inside the LB IA City II presented several elements that would suggest an Egyptian influence (if not an Egyptian presence): the Egyptian pottery from the city mainly originated there,[274] and two buildings sported planimetries and characteristics usually found in Egyptian context, such as the "Courtyard Patrician House" with mudbrick foundations (Building AN), [275] and the "Egyptian Mortuary chapels", a tripartite sanctuary with raised floors and an offering court (Building AF).[276]

Traces of an Egyptian presence were also identified at Al-Moghraga, circa 700 metres north of Tell el-Ajjul.[277] Aside from reports of mudbrick construction visible on the ground, the site yielded

[267] Morris 2005:65.
[268] Morris 2005:307
[269] Tufnell et al. 1993:51.
[270] Morris 2005:527-529
[271] Morris 2005:307; Massafra 2018:128.
[272] Massafra 2018:107-114.
[273] Massafra 2018:132.
[274] Massafra 2018:135.
[275] Petrie 1932:pl. LIV. See Oren 1992a:115-117.
[276] See Massafra 2018:111.
[277] Steel et al. 2015:940.



Figure 29 Amphora shard with impressed cartouches of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut (from Massafra 2018:130, fig. 5.14)

considerable MBA and LBA pottery, and significant quantities of small finds that relate to the Egyptian presence in the area, such as a series of pieces of fired terracotta cones, stamped before firing with the cartouches of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut.[278] Since similar cones in Egypt were inserted in batches around the doorway of a tomb, the excavators argued that they could have been connected to the tomb of an Egyptian personality of Tell el-Ajjul.[279]

5.4.2.2.2. The Egyptian pottery from Tell el-Ajjul.

Tell el-Ajjul produced one of the largest assemblages of 18th Dynasty Egyptian pottery in the Levant,[280] comprising open and closed shapes, imported and locally produced vessels.[281] The discussion over this corpus is limited by the fact that Petrie only kept either decorated sherds or complete or nearly complete shapes. As Massafra has noticed,[282] since Canaanite, Egyptian, and Egyptianized wares are generally characterized by plain pottery, they were likely discarded. Therefore, not only the available assemblage is unlikely to reflect the real amount of pottery retrieved at the site, but it also makes any large-scale petrographic or statistical analysis pointless. The discussion can therefore only be based upon the qualitative analyses made by Kopetzky and Massafra.[283] Kopetzky argued that a large part of Tell el-Ajjul's Egyptian assemblage has parallels in the 17th Dynasty Upper Egypt, and that similar vessels only reached the Nile Delta and the Levant in the early 18th Dynasty.[284] Massafra noticed how the locally produced Egyptian-style pottery was meant to cover a whole range of utilitarian functions closely connected to the food preparation and consumption, whereas the imported vessels of Egyptian origin were constituted almost exclusively by storage wares.[285] Although the Egyptian garrison at the site doubtlessly drew resources also from the surrounding areas the dynamic that is implicit in these findings – one where the Egyptian troops are supported also by the central

[278] Steel et al. 2004:37, 52-62, 62-64 respectively.
[279] Steel et al. 2004:64.
[280] Martin 2011:240.
[281] Kopetzky 2011:203.
[282] Massafra 2018:133.
[283] Kopetzky 2011; Massafra 2018.
[284] Kopetzky 2011:207.
[285] Massafra 2018:135-136.

Egyptian administration – is supported by both the amphora stamped with the joined cartouche of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut, and by the parallel of the findings from the Infrastructure of North Sinai.

5.4.2.3. Analysis and Conclusion

Given its history of excavations and publications, it is difficult to discuss and interpret Tell el-Ajjul. The city was inhabited (and likely controlled) by the Egyptians since the early 18th Dynasty, and they appear to have established a presence in the city, by erecting several buildings both in the "palace" and in the "city" area. If one relies in the association of Tell el-Ajjul with Sharuhen, as it seems likely, these Egyptians residing in the site were members of a garrison, one that likely received its supplies – or at least a portion of them – from Egypt. Judging from the storage jar with the joint cartouches of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut, the system of provisioning closely recalls that discussed for the Infrastructure of North Sinai during the reign of Thutmose III, and it might be argued that the system extended to Sharuhen as well. The presence of the Egyptian garrison appears to have caused the population of the city to gradually abandon the city, possibly moving to nearby Gaza, while the Egyptians appear to have held the Palace area well into the 19th Dynasty.

Finally, although it cannot be said for certain that the centre of Tell el-Ajjul was a "Node" of an Operational Network, it seems to be likely. On the one hand, during the MBA the centre appears to have been fortified, as testified by the fact that Ahmose son of Abana says that the Egyptian army sieged the centre for three years, and by the presence of fortifications similar to those found elsewhere in the MBA Levant.[286] It is unclear if the fortifications were still in use during the LBA, but it seems likely that the Egyptians would have kept them in use when settling in the city. In any case, the external wall of Palace III appears to have been fortified. It can be therefore suggested that the centre possessed the characteristic of "Survivability". On the other hand, the excavations do not appear to have found traces of magazines or garrisons, neither of Egyptian, nor of local manufacture. However, considering the state of the excavation in the city, and considering the amount of imported pottery in the city itself, the existence of granaries or magazines appears to be more than likely.

[286] Burke 2008:101.

5.4.3. Gaza

5.4.3.1. Introduction and archaeological record

Although Gaza – 6 km north of Tell el-Ajjul – appears in the written documents as the most important Egyptian centre in the Levant, there is little in the archaeological record to document both the city's existence, and its Egyptian presence. Ancient Gaza's is thought to correspond with Tell Harouba, where a series of limited sounding has found traces of a 14th century BC settlement with an estimated extension of about 0.2 km^2.[287] Unfortunately, however, the Tell is at the centre of the modern city of Gaza, has never been excavated, and thus Gaza can only be discussed on the basis of the written documents.

5.4.3.2. Gaza in the written documents of the Mid-18th Dynasty

During the Mid-18th Dynasty Gaza appears only twice in the written sources, offering glimpses of the early days of the Egyptian presence in the Levant. These documents but they can be used to understand – or at least theorize – its role in the administration during the Mid-18th Dynasty.

The first mention appears in the Annals of Thutmose III, at the beginning of the campaign of year 23. After ten days marching across North Sinai, the army enters in Gaza, referred to as "*dmi n mḥ.n pꜣ ḥḳꜣ gḏt* [*rn.f ḫꜣrw*]", "*the town of 'the ruler' Seizure", called Gaza [of Kharu]*".[288] As many have argued, since the Egyptians had a custom of renaming conquered towns, and in particular those that had entered direct rule,[289] it is likely that, by the time of Thutmose III, the Egyptians already controlled the city directly, and that Gaza was the centre where the Egyptian army would have gathered at the end of the Infrastructure of North Sinai.

The second mention is in Tanaach 6 (6-17). As it was discussed[290] in the letter an Egyptian named Amenhotep (who may or may not be identified with Amenhotep II) reproaches the ruler of

[287] Phythian-Adams 1923b; 1923a; Clarke et al. 2004; de Miroschedji 2007:71.
[288] *Urk.* IV, 645:67. Translation Redford 2003:13.
[289] Redford 1967:60-61; Katzenstein 1982; Morris 2005:54. Examples are Ullassa, Sumur, and Kumidi. Ullassa (if the identification proposed in **§5.4.8.2.** is correct) was renamed by Thutmose III as "Menkheperre is the one who subdues the wanderers" (*Urk.* IV, 740:1), and in the 19th Dynasty Sumur became the "Sumur of Sese" (P. Anastasi I, 18:9-19-1), and Kumidi "Ramesses-Meryamun, the town which is in the Valley of the Cedars" (KRI II, 14:6-10).
[290] **§4.4.2.**

Tanaach Talwasur by saying: "*Furthermore, your retainers are not on guard, and you yourself do not come before me nor do you send you brothers* (his soldiers)[291] *here. Furthermore, in Gaza I was, but you did not come to me. Now I [am going fort]h to war […].*"[292] In Tanaach 5 (4-10) the same Amenhotep writes to Talwasur and orders him to send both his army and his tribute to Megiddo, so that he may receive them.[293] As the ruler of Tanaach should have sent his army to Gaza to join Amenhotep in his war, Gaza appears to have been the centre where the Egyptian army would have been joined by soldiers provided by the locals.

To sum up, according to the written sources, by the time of Thutmose III it is likely that Gaza had already been conquered and was directly controlled by the Egyptians. Moreover, since both the military forces coming to Egypt and those coming from the Levant appear to have gathered in Gaza, the city was the centre deputed to the "force accumulation" phase of an Egyptian military campaign, the one where the military forces are gathered for deployment. To play this part Gaza must have housed sizeable granaries and magazines to feed the army for several days, and the fact that Talwasur's tribute was also supposed to be sent to Gaza support this idea.

5.4.3.3. Gaza in the written documents of the Late 18th Dynasty and its Proximity Factor

Gaza appears in the Amarna Letters as a well defended and well garrisoned centre. It is directly mentioned in only four letters: EA 129, 287, 289, and 296. The first three letters underline the military role of the city. In EA 129 (81-92) the ruler of Byblos Rib-Addi mentions it as a centre from where a commissioner can send a military force against the sons of Abdi-Aširta of Amurru. In EA 287 (32-52) and 289 (30-40) the ruler of Jerusalem Abdi-Hepa writes to Pharaoh to lament the actions of some Cushite soldiers that had first been sent to Jerusalem, and then moved back to Gaza. In EA 288 (16-17) Abdi-Hepa also states to have given to the commissioner of Gaza Addaya ten slaves, possibly as a tribute.[294] In EA 296 (30-35), the ruler of Ashdod Yaʿṭiri writes "*So may the king, my lord, ask his*

[291] The fact that Amenhotep means "your soldiers", or "your *maryanni*" when he says "your brothers" is evident in Tanaach 5:4-5, where it is specified that the "brothers" should be sent "*together with their chariots*" (Translation Horowitz et al. 2006:141).

[292] Translation Horowitz, et al 2006:141-142.
[293] Horowitz, et al 2006:140
[294] EA 288:16-17.

*commissioner whether I am guarding the gate of the city of Gaza and the gate of the city of Yapô (*Jaffa*).*"[295] The presence of a gate to be guarded at the site of Gaza means that the city was fortified, especially considering that an Egyptian gate dated at the Late 18th Dynasty was excavated at the other Egyptian centre mentioned by Yaʿṭiri, Jaffa.[296]

As it was said in **§5.2.3.**, by considering together the Proximity Factors of all commissioners related to an Egyptian centre, it is possible to "map" the extent of the control of the centre of Gaza according to the Amarna Letters. Five commissioners can be connected to Gaza:[297] Addaya, Yanhamu, Maya, Rianappa, and Tahmashi. Addaya related with Jerusalem and Shechem. Maya with Gezer and Lachish. Rianappa with Ashkelon, Gezer, and Yurza. Tahmashi with Ashkelon, Gath, and Yurza. Yanhamu with Ashdod, Gezer, Gath, Gath Padalla, Jerusalem, and Lachish. In total, Gaza's Proximity Factor appears to have covered the entirety of the coastal Plain, from the Carmel Ridge to the Negev, including the Sharon and Shephelah plains.

5.4.3.4. Analysis and Conclusions

The written sources mentioning Gaza are few and scattered between several decades. For how important the pieces of information they provide might be, it is also cardinal to consider that the idea of the Egyptian centre of Gaza that can be described on these bases remains tentative. And yet, it is also coherent across all mentions in its description of Gaza as an important military and administrative centre, with a role resembling that of a "capital" of the Egyptian Levant, controlling an area spanning from the Negev to the Carmel Ridge.

Judging from the limited information that can be gathered from the Tanaach and the Amarna Letters, Gaza might have been an important military centre in both the Mid and the Late 18th Dynasty. The fact that the site was the stopping place for the army of Thutmose III, and the fact that it appears to also have received soldiers sent from the local rulers such as that of Tanaach likely means that it played a role of "force accumulation". Under Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten., the sources

[295] Translation Rainey 2015:1145.
[296] **§5.4.4.2.**
[297] See Table 5.

mention several times Gaza's connection with the military, as it apparently housed a garrison to police the region when needed.

Finally, definite proof in favour of this hypothesis cannot be offered on the base of the data at our disposal, it can be argued that the centre of Gaza was a Node in the Operational Network of the Mid and the Late 18th Dynasty. The centre appears to have possessed both Survivability and – arguably – Capacity. Although it is likely that the centre was already fortified during the Mid-18th Dynasty, the survivability of Gaza can be supported solely for the Late 18th Dynasty, when the gate of Gaza is mentioned in EA 296, testifying the centre's fortification. In a similar way, the Capacity of the city is never directly mentioned in the texts. It is suggested by the existence of tributes that were supposed to be delivered to Gaza from the ruler of Tanaach, and it is a logical necessity behind the idea of a role of "force accumulation" at the site.

Figure 26: Gaza's Proximity Factor.




Table 5: Letters connected to the centre of Gaza, or to its commissioners.			
City and/or commissioner	**Number of letters directly connected to city or the commissioner**	**Known cities represented in letters**	**Rulers of unknown cities**
Gaza	22	Beirut (EA 97) Gath (EA 281) Gezer, (EA 298; 299; 300; 378) Lachish (EA 329)	Dagan-Takala (EA 317-318) Zitriyara (EA 211-213) Bayawa (EA 215) Shiptu-risa (EA 226)
Addaya	4	Jerusalem (EA 285; 287; 289) Schechem (EA 254)	
Maya	7	Gezer (EA 292, 300) Lachish (EA 328)	Bayawa (EA 216) Unnamed A (EA 217) Unnamed B (EA 218) Hizziri (EA 337)
Rianappa	3	Ashkelon (EA 321) Gezer (EA 292 Yurza (EA 315)	
Tahmashi	3	Ashkelon (EA 303) Gath (EA 284) Yurza (EA 316)	
Yanhamu	17	Ashdod (EA 296) Byblos (EA 83; 85; 86; 98; 102), Gezer (EA 270; 271) Gath (EA 283; 284; 366) Gath Padalla (EA 249) Jerusalem (EA 285; 286; 289) Lachish (EA 330) Pella (EA 256)	
Total	54	Ashdod Ashkelon Beirut Gath Gath-Padalla Gezer Jerusalem Lachish Pella Shechem Yurza	Bayawa Dagan-Takala Hizziri Shiptu-risa Unnamed A (EA 217) Unnamed B (EA 218) Zitriyara

5.4.4. Jaffa

5.4.4.1. Introduction

Identified with the mound of Tel Yafo, on the southern side of today's Tel Aviv, Jaffa was a centre of great importance during the Late Bronze Age. From a coastal ridge 40 meters high, towering over the outlets of the Ayalon and the Yarkon Rivers, Jaffa was both the southernmost port along the via Maris not to be surrounded by sand dunes, and the main harbour for centres like Gezer and Jerusalem.[298] Because of these reasons, it held capital importance in Egyptian eyes, and functioned as garrison, supply port, and possibly as centre for the distribution of food produced in the Yarkon River Valley.

5.4.4.2. Jaffa in the written sources and its Proximity Factor

The many mentions of Jaffa dated at the New Kingdom testify the important role it enjoyed. During the Mid-18th Dynasty, Jaffa only appears in the topographical list of Thutmose III.[299] Considering that the heavily romanced story of "The Capture of Jaffa" is said to be happening at the time of Thutmose III,[300] and the archaeological material retrieved at the site, it is possible that the city was conquered during the king's first campaign. During the Late 18th Dynasty, the many mentions of Jaffa inside the Amarna Letters give a consistent description of an Egyptian stronghold:

- In EA 138 the ruler of Byblos Rib-Addi mentions Jaffa both as a safe place where he might have found refuge from his enemies (5-22), and as the place where his son is being detained (71-93).
- In EA 294 (18-24) the ruler of Lachish Zimredda states: "*As for my men, whom I sent to serve in Yapo and to guard the storehouse* (Akk. Šu-nu-ti) *of the king, my lord, then, behold, Piya son of Gulati took them*".[301] Not only is Jaffa guarded by soldiers from Lachish, but it also houses

[298] Burke et al. 2013:100. Recent research have located Jaffa's harbour north of the Tell, in what might have been the estuary of the Ayalon River inside Tel Aviv (Burke et al. 2017:107).
[299] No.62, Simons 1937:109-122. See **§4.3.5.** and the **Appendix**.
[300] The story is only documented in a Ramesside document, but might have originated before, possibly from a literal embellishment of a real event (Zwickel 2011:81).
[301] Translation Rainey 2015:1135.

some Egyptian storehouses, identified with the phonetic spelling of the Egyptian word *šnwti*, "granary".[302]

- In EA 296 (22-35), the ruler of Ashdod Yaʿṭiri writes "*So may the king, my lord, ask his commissioner whether I am guarding the gate of the city of Gaza and the gate of the city of Yapô.*"[303] Jaffa, garrisoned also by Ashdod's soldiers, is apparently fortified during the Amarna Period (something which well combines with the archaeological record discussed below).

It is impossible to describe a Proximity Factor for Jaffa, as there are no letters in the Amarna corpus written with a clay originating from the area,[304] and there are no commissioners that can be safely connected to the site. The only exception appears to have been Yanhamu, who in EA 296 is said to be informed of Gaza's and Jaffa's defences. Since Yanhamu's Proximity Factor, at the time of EA 296, locates him in Gaza,[305] and since Gaza's Proximity Factor appears to have also encompassed the Sharon, it seems more than likely that Jaffa was not directly involved in the administration of the Egyptian Levant.

To sum up, the written sources describe Jaffa as an important, fortified, and well garrisoned Egyptian centre, likely controlled by the Egyptians since the times of Thutmose III, but not part of the administrative network of the region. Located in a fertile valley, the city was the principal harbour for the shipping of agricultural product of the surrounding region and housed the (almost certainly related) Egyptian granaries. This image is like the one that can be obtained from the 19th Dynasty sources. In the "Governor's Letter"[306] Jaffa is mentioned as the port from where a great shipment of wheat produced in the Yarkon River Valley would have been sent to Ugarit. In Papyrus Anastasi I, the city is described as an Egyptian centre, one where a broken military chariot can be fixed, where a soldier can get married to a local woman, and as a fertile area, where the fields are "verdant with grain".[307]

[302] Moran 1992:337.
[303] Translation Rainey 2015:1143-1145.
[304] EA 294 and 296 come from the central coastal plain, likely from Ashdod or Jaffa (Oren et al 2004:293-294). From internal references in the two letters, it appears to be more likely the letters were sent from Ashdod.
[305] De Magistris 2020:303-305.
[306] See **§4.4.7.**
[307] Gardiner 1932:5, and Allen 2002:14.

5.4.4.3. The excavations in Tel Yafo and the settlement during the LB IB and the LB IIA

Tel Yafo has been excavated for almost three decades, but both Kaplan's (1956-1974) and Herzog's (1997-1999) excavations remained relatively underpublished[308] until the Jaffa Cultural Heritage Project (JCHP) retrieved their documentation, continued their work (2007-2016), and started a stream of detailed publications on the Egyptian presence at the site during the LBA.[309] Since Kaplan the excavations have mainly focused on area A (see fig.31), where two complexes have been identified: the "Ramesside Gate" (RG), and the "Lion Temple" (LT).[310] In Ramesside times they respectively hosted a fortified gate to the city, and a monumental administrative building built in Egyptian fashion,[311] but less is known about the site during the 18th Dynasty.

In the Ramesside Gate area, Burke also identified some constructions dated to this early presence, built with mudbrick walls and stone foundations.[312] Although there are no evidence to support the idea that the settlement was fortified,[313] it might not be a coincidence that the walls of one of the buildings align with the later Ramesside Gate. This building appears to have had a roofed area and an open-air pit for producing and firing pottery,[314] and contained a rich array of Egyptian-style vessels, a collection of 20 intact Flowerpots (some found directly in their kiln), and an Egyptian potter's wheel.[315] The in-site production of Egyptian pottery is an important mark for an Egyptian presence at the site, and the area has been interpreted as a LB IB garrison Kitchen.[316] In the Lion Temple area the LB IB strata have only been exposed in a series of probes. While these probes have produced a large amount of pottery, little can be said in terms of constructions.[317] LT 10 is the first level to present Egyptian pottery, and since Kaplan found Egyptian-style ceramics also beneath its floors it is likely that the few known structures from this stratum (two small rooms) were built after the installation of the garrison.[318] LT 9,

[308] Kaplan 1956; 1960; 1961; 1962; 1964; 1966; 1970; 1971; 1972; 1974; Kaplan et al. 1975; 1993; Herzog 2008:1791-1792.
[309] Burke 2011; Burke et al. 2010; 2011; 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Peilstöcker 2011; Peilstöcker et al. 2011; Lords Pierce 2013; Allen Pierce 2015; Williams et al. 2016; Damm 2021.
[310] A full stratigraphy of the Lion Temple area has never been published, but a summary was discussed in Damm's (2021:262-337) doctoral dissertation.
[311] See Burke et al. 2017a and Damm 2021:310-316.
[312] Kaplan and Kaplan 1993:657.
[313] Burke et al. 2017.93.
[314] Kopetzky 2011:239.
[315] Kaplan 1960:121. According to Damm (2021:218) the discoloration on the wheel's working face is due to the use of a lubricant that is found in Egyptian examples (as BM 32621) but not in Levantine ones.
[316] Burke et al. 2017:93; Damm 2021:219.
[317] Damm 2021:264.
[318] Damm 2021:282.

also dated to the LB IB, appears to have been coeval with the garrison kitchen, as the ceramic assemblages and the walls are perfectly aligned, and both contexts appear to have been sealed by destruction debris at the end of the LB IB.[319]

If the LB IB ceramic represents the first attestation of Egyptians in Jaffa, the remains of the Egyptian gate in Stratum V represent the earliest evidence for Egyptian architecture at the site.[320] This gate was in use for several centuries during the New Kingdom, was repaired and reconstructed in the same place and with the same materials several times, and its portal façade was ultimately decorated at the time of Ramesse II. For all of these reasons, it is considered an example of Egyptian architecture in the Levant.[321] Built over stone foundations, the gate in V already had a mud-brick superstructure of two rectangular towers of identical colour and composition,[322] with walls 6.2 metres wide and 22.35 metres long,[323] a cobbled road running outside it,[324] and a 4 meters wide passageway. Kaplan recognized that in Level V the Gate sported two different kinds of brickworks – the orange, lower ones, and the red upper ones, separated by a layer of plaster –, but according to Burke and the JCHP, he did not understand that he was examining two phases of the same gate: RG-4a and RG-4b. The fact that the orange brick presented also evidence of erosion meant that there likely had been a gap in time between the two phases, the earliest one of which should be considered to be contemporaneous with Kaplan's level V, and the latest with his level IVB.[325] Unfortunately however, probably because the passageway remained in use during the RG-4a phase, no floors could be connected to the RG-4b one, and no *in situ* findings can therefore date it.[326] Burke and the JCHP could only date the construction of RG-4b gate by its relative stratigraphic position: the gate was built after the destruction of the LB IB Level VI *late*, and before the LB IIB RG-4a gate. Since however, a small firing installation dated by its ceramics to the LB IIA was found south of the gate, and since its walls run perpendicular to the gate, it seems likely that the two are contemporaneous. According to Burke, therefore, the RG-4b gate should be dated to the transition between the LBI B and the LB IIA. [327] On the other side of area A, the Lion Temple of LT 8 was fully

[319] Burke et al. 2017:93; Damm 2021:298.
[320] Burke et al. 2017:125.
[321] See Burke et al. 2017, and Streit 2019:73-75.
[322] Burke et al. 2017:106.
[323] Burke et al.2007:105.
[324] Kaplan 1956:260.
[325] Burke et al. 2017:105.
[326] Burke et al. 2017:106.
[327] Burke et al. 2017:107.

excavated, and according to Damm it reveals an architectural plan – with a side entrance, and a row of row of pillars – reminiscent of the contemporary phase II of the Fosse Temple in Lachish (which was, in turn, tentatively associated by Ido Koch to the cult of Hathor or that of Tiye, the deified wife of Amenhotep III).[328] What is remarkable in the structure, however, is the preponderance of Egyptian-style ceramics this stratum, which surpasses the 70% of the retrieved material.

5.4.4.4. Egyptian pottery in Jaffa[329]

The Egyptian ceramic corpus excavated in Jaffa is one of the earliest, largest, and possibly longest-lived assemblages found in the Levant. The range of the represented forms includes nearly all of the open and closed forms attested elsewhere in the region, and although the majority of the Egyptian vessels are linked to the LB IB and the LB IIA, the local production of Egyptian pottery continued until the end of the Late Bronze Age, closely following the homeland's typological development.[330] Particularly interesting in this sense are the Flowerpots that Kaplan retrieved in an open firing kiln of the LB IB stratum, together with ceramic wasters of Egyptian style bowls. Not only they testify the early Egyptian presence at the site, but their discovery provided the JCHP with a clear example of the local fabric used to produce the Egyptian-style ceramic. According to Jacob Damm, that specific fabric group is extremely stable over the course of the whole Late Bronze Age, being homogenous, and readily distinguishable from local Levantine ceramics.[331] Locally-Produced Egyptian pottery composes a large portion (when not a majority) of the retrieved sherds in all LB IB and LB IIA strata and substrata: 62 of 84 retrieved sherds at the Level VI *late* kitchen (73.7%); 41 of 75 in the combined substrata of LT 10 (54.7%); 274 of the 419 in the combined substrata of LT 9 (65.4%); and 307 of 446 in the combined substrata of LT 8 (68.6%).[332] Such data are unique, as no other centre in the Levant has presented such large percentages of Egyptian pottery for the 18th Dynasty, and – perfectly adhering to Martin's three parameters –[333] strongly suggest an Egyptian presence at the site already during the Mid-18th Dynasty.

[328] Damm 2021:305; Koch 2017; 2021:46-53.
[329] I must thank Dr. Jacob Damm, Dr. Mary Ownby, and the JCHP for sharing with me, ahead of their publication, many of the elements here discussed.
[330] Burke et al. 2010:14; Damm 2021:348.
[331] Jacob Damm, personal communication (08/06/2021).
[332] Damm 2021:451-458; 473-503.
[333] **§5.2.2.**

Figure 31 Excavation areas in Tel Yafo. From Burke et al. 2017, Fig.2




Table 6: Stratigraphic Levels for the Late Bronze Age strata in Jaffa (on the base of Burke et al. 2017 and Damm 2021)				
Level for Kaplan	Phase for JCHP		Period	Date
	Lion Temple	Ramesside Gate		
VII (?)	LT 11	RG-5	MB II	Pre-16th century
VI		VI	LB IA	1550-1400 B.C.
	LT 10	VI *late*	LB IB	
	LT 9			
V	LT 8	RG-4b	LB IIA	1400-1300 B.C.
IVB	LT 7	RG-4a	LB IIB- LB III	1300 – 1135 B.C.
IVA	LT 6	RG-3	LB III	1135 – 1125 B.C.




Figure 32 (above) Plan showing the shared alignment between the architectures of LT 9 and RG-VI Late. (From Damm 2021:291, fig.45

Figure 33 (below) Phase RG-4b gate complex, showing probable contemporaneous structures of level V to the south (from Burke et al. 2017: 106 fig.16

Moreover, it was said before (**§5.3.3.4**) that in the Infrastructure of North Sinai closed forms – usually believed to be storage containers – were imported from Egypt and open forms locally produced, testifying the Logistical support provided to the army in crossing the desert. In Jaffa, however, the situation appears to be different, as both open and closed forms were produced with the same fabric group.[334] This notion strongly points towards the idea that the garrison in Jaffa did not rely on the importation of foodstuff from Egypt, but locally produced most of what it needed. An interesting and relevant exception is represented by the zir jars found at the site. Zirs (JR10 in Martin's 2011 classification) are very large storage jars, with a capacity of circa 45 litres, that did not outlive the 18th Dynasty.[335] In the Levant, they are found solely in Tel Mor, Tell el Ajjul, and Jaffa. The examples found in Jaffa appear to have been made with a different fabric than the other Egyptian vessels, and this fabric did not originate in Egypt. After petrographic analysis, Mary Ownby[336] has suggested the clay originated in the Levant, and that outcrops of the same clay appear to come from the area of the Ayyalon river, near the city. It is therefore likely that both the zir and its content came from the vicinity of the city, possibly from Egyptian-controlled lands in the region.

5.4.4.5. The Yarkon River Valley as the Yarimuta of the Amarna Letters

I have argued elsewhere that the Yarkon river Valley should be considered the land of Yarimuta mentioned in the Amarna Letters.[337] The argument cannot be repeated here for lack of space, but a short introduction needs to be given. In the letters written by Rib-Addi of Byblos,[338] Yarimuta is described as a grain-producing region located south of Beirut, which had been in Egyptian hands for some time and was governed by Yanhamu, the then commissioner in Gaza. This territory is said to have housed a port from which supplies were shipped to whomever could pay their price, or – most importantly – to the Egyptian army stationed elsewhere in the Levant.[339] All these elements certainly match the situation of the Yarkon river Valley at the beginning of the 19th Dynasty: at the time, Jaffa was still in Egyptian

[334] Jacob Damm, personal communication (08/06/2021).
[335] Martin 2011:70.
[336] Mary Ownby, personal communication (10/06/2021).
[337] De Magistris 2020.
[338] EA 68:27; 74:16; 75:13; 81:40; 82:29; 85:14; 86:33; 90:38; 105:48; 112:29; 114:55; 116:74; 125:17.
[339] In EA 86 (31-50) Rib-Addi states that the Egyptian centre of Sumur received Yarimuta's produce.

hands, while the nearby centres of Tel Gerisa and Aphek housed Egyptian Governor Residencies which – due to the presence of sizable granaries for local produces and the written account of local production – have been interpreted as farming estates.[340] The excavations in Aphek have also found the document that support best the argument for Yarimuta as the Yarkon River Valley: the "Governor's Letter."[341] This document identifies Jaffa as the port from where a great shipment of wheat produced in the region would have been sent to Ugarit, in a manner similar to that of the shipment to Rib-Addi a century earlier.

The argument of the identification between Yarimuta and the Yarkon River Valley of the 18th Dynasty is somewhat hampered by the fact that, while the excavations in Jaffa offer strong arguments for an early Egyptian presence, those of Tel Gerisa were never published, and in Aphek no object can be related to the LB IIA stratum due to the excavator's decision to preserve the Governor's Residence.[342] However, at least for what relates to Aphek, a case can be made (and has been made)[343] that the Egyptian presence should be pre-dated to the LB IIA. The structure of the main LB IIA building (Palace V) not only encases the later Governor's residence, and shares its foundations with it, but also presents elements – such as the use of a colonnade and a rectangular, tripartite structure – which conform to the Egyptian tradition and are at odds with both that of the MBII strata of the same site, and the contemporary palaces of the Levant.[344] Because of these reasons, and because of the fact that Aphek disappears from the written sources after its surrender to Amenhotep II,[345] it seems reasonable to argue that Aphek – and the Yarkon River Valley with it – had been in Egyptian hands since the middle of the 18th Dynasty.

5.4.4.6. Analysis and Conclusions

To sum up, Jaffa appears to have been in Egyptian hands and Egyptian control since the time of Thutmose III, as it is likely it was conquered during his campaign of year 23. As Damm has argued, the first decades of Egyptian presence were less than stable, and witnessed the destructions of both LT 10

[340] For Tel Gerisa, which has only partially been published, see Herzog 1993 and Patrón de Smith et al. 2017. For Aphek see Gadot et al. 2009 and Gadot 2010. The written account is Aphek 2 in Horowitz et al. 2018.
[341] See **§4.4.7.**.
[342] Gadot 2009:58.
[343] See Morris 2005:574 and Gadot 2010:53.
[344] Kokhavi 1990:X. See for example the palaces of Strata VIII and VIIIB at Megiddo (Oren 1992b:105-115).
[345] See **§4.3.4.3.**

and LT9/Level VI *late*.[346] The argument for Jaffa as a Node of the Operational Network is easily made, as both the written and archaeological sources indicate it was a fortified centre in Egyptian hands, and in the Amarna letters it is said to have housed Egyptian granaries.

Despite all the evidence that clearly point to the Egyptian presence in (and control of) Jaffa, it remains difficult to fully comprehend this centre's role in Egyptian eyes, since nothing suggests it was involved in the administration of the Egyptian Levant. I believe that the most likely answer relies on the land of Yarimuta. If, as it seems, it is to be identified with the Yarkon River Valley, then it is likely that the importance of Jaffa in the Egyptian eyes would have relied on its harbour: produce of the valley would have been stored in the Egyptian granaries in the city, and would have been shipped to Sumur and other Egyptian centres along the coast. The fact that little to no examples of Egyptian imports could be found in the city also strongly indicates that the Egyptians would have resupplied from their vicinity, as it seems to be the case for the zirs examined by Mary Ownby. Jaffa would therefore not have been a simple Node in the Operational Network, one that received sources from the mainland and distributed to the passing soldiers, but would have operated at the Strategic level,[347] distributing to the other sites the resources produced in the fertile Valleys it likely controlled.

5.4.5. Beth-Shean

5.4.5.1. Introduction

Tel Beth-Shean is one of the most extensively excavated and better published tells in the entire Levant, and the centre it housed was of capital importance to the Egyptian presence in the region. Located on top of a steep hill at the crossroads between the Jordan and the Jezreel Valley, Beth-Shean controlled their abundant water, their fertile lands, and their major land routes: the King's Highway and the road connecting Damascus to Akko and the sea.[348] Although it is likely the Egyptian presence at the site started already at the time of Thutmose III, this is especially true for the Ramesside Period, when it became the epitome of the Egyptian garrison towns in the Levant. At the end of the Amarna Period, in

[346] Damm 2021:343.
[347] See **§5.5.3.3.**
[348] Mazar 2011:155; Martin 2011:122. See **§6.2.**

fact, Beth-Shean saw a radical transformation, manifested by a modification of the town's plan, the construction of several new mudbrick buildings with close Egyptian parallels (like several governor Houses and a fortress, the so-called "Migdol"),[349] the erection of several stelae, and the production of one of the richest collections of Egyptian-type pottery in the southern Levant.[350]

5.4.5.2. Beth-Shean, its Proximity Factor, and the lands of the Jezreel in the written sources

There are only two certain mentions of Beth-Shean in documents dated to the 18th Dynasty. The toponym list of Thutmose III,[351] and EA 289 (18-24), where Abdi-Hepa, king of Jerusalem, says "*Look, the territory of the city of Gath-carmel belongs to Tagi and the men of Gath are the garrison in Beth-shean."*[352] As it was noticed, it was not exceptional for Levantine men to be part of an Egyptian garrison,[353] and this letter is the sole written element to clearly indicate the presence of an Egyptian garrison town in Beth-Shean during the 18th Dynasty.

The lack of certain mentions is somewhat balanced by other elements. In EA 234, for example, Akko's ruler Satatna states;[354]

> *"May the king, [m]y lord, hear the word of his servant: [Zir]damyashda deserted from Biriawaza. He w[as] with Shuta, the servant of the king, in the garrison town; he said nothing to him. The army of the king, my lord, came forth, he was with it in the city of Megiddo; nothing was said to him. He deserted to me. And now Shuta has written to me, "Hand over Zirdamyashda to Biryawaza" but I refused to hand him over."*[355]

The term for "garrison town" used in this letter is the logogram URU ˹UN˺. This logogram has been equated by Moran[356] to the *maṣṣartu* that in EA 76:36 and 190:5 defines the centres of Sumur and Kumidi. Considering that Zirdamyashda was in this garrison town after leaving Biriawaza, ruler of Damascus, and before being in Megiddo, it would follow that EA 234 is mentioning an Egyptian

[349] James and McGovern 1993:4-6; Mazar 2011:155; Martin 2011:122.
[350] Mazar 2011:155; Martin 2011:122.
[351] *b-t š-I-r*, no. 110 (Simons 1937:27-44, see **§4.3.5.** and the **Appendix**).
[352] EA 289:18-24. Translation Rainey 2015:1121. The excavations of Beth-Shean found a cylinder seal letter mentioning Tagi, possibly supporting the content of EA 289. See **§4.4.5.**
[353] See **§5.2.5.**
[354] Written in Beth-Shean (Goren et al. 2004:239).
[355] Translation Rainey 2015:979.
[356] Moran 1992:293 n.1. Followed by both Liverani (1998:136 n.38) and Rainey (2015:1556).

garrison town located between Damascus and Megiddo. While to my knowledge this has not been argued before, unless one assumes the existence of a different garrison town in this area, this is likely a second mention of a Beth-Shean as a garrison town, and since Šuta is elsewhere defined as "the commissioner of the king,"[357] EA 234 associates Beth-Shean with an Egyptian commissioner.

The presence of a commissioner in Beth-Shean well combines with the existence of seven Amarna Letters written with a clay compatible with the Beth-Shean area.[358] The rulers who wrote from Beth-Shean in these letters ruled the cities of Akko, Shamnuna, and Jerusalem.[359] Two more letters were written with the same clay, but neither the name of the king, nor the name of his city has survived.[360] To these letters one can add those connected to the commissioners likely to be located in Beth-Shean: Pawura, Tahmashi, and the already mentioned Šuta. Pawura relates with the unnamed author of EA 263, and with Abdi-Hepa of Jerusalem.[361] Tahmashi relates with the rulers of Gath Carmel (EA 265) and Ashtaroth (EA 364). Šuta, as said, with Akko and Jerusalem. Overall, Beth-Shean's Proximity Factor appear to cover the Jezreel and Jordan Valleys.[362] Finally, large sections of the Jezreel and Jordan Valleys appear to have belonged to the Egyptians and farmed by conscripted workers on their behalf.[363] To begin with, the Annals of Thutmose III say that after the battle of Megiddo

> *"the arable land (ȝḫwt) was made into fields (ꜥḥwt) and entrusted to controllers (rwḏw) of the king's house L.P.H., to reap their harvest. Tally of the harvest which H.M. took from the fields (ꜥḥwt) of Megiddo: wheat ḫȝr 207,300 (+ x), not to mention what was cut in foraging by His Majesty's army."*[364]

[357] EA 288:16-22.
[358] EA 224; 232; 234; 235; 251; 263; 285. Goren et al. 2004:323.
[359] Tel Akko (EA 232; 234; 235), Tel Shimron (EA 224) and Jerusalem (EA 285) respectively.
[360] EA 251; 263.
[361] EA 287; 289.
[362] The boundaries of its Proximity Factor cannot however be precisely defined due to the paucity of letters from the territory it controlled. It is well known that relatively few letters come from the regions of the interior. Only two letters exist from Hazor, the largest city of the region (EA 227; 228). This irregular distribution of the data skews the results: Beth-Shean is overall less represented than Gaza or Sumur, and so the boundaries of its control cannot be precisely defined.
[363] In recent times this idea was first presented by Na'aman 1988b, and then followed by Morris 2018:146 among others.
[364] *Urk*. IV, 667:10–15. Translation Redford 2003:42.

There is a general consensus that this passage indicates a change in legal status of these lands, that were now considered to be owned by Pharaoh, likely to produce food for the army.[365] According to Aḥituv's calculations, the plot size necessary to produce 207.300 sacks of wheat (approximately 11.2250 tons) must have neared 50 km^2, an eight of the area of the Valley.[366] A different set of farms is mentioned in the inscription of the Seventh Pylon of the temple of Karnak, where Thutmose says he had

> "*authorized [.. three towns to my father Amon, 'viz.' Nugas the name of one, Yeno'am the name of another, and Harenkar] the name of the remaining one. Their labour was assigned to the temple of my father Amon, as a tax quota of each year. So My Majesty took these wives of the doomed one of Qadesh as plunder[.. for] my father Amon, with a tax quota on labour in the course of 'every' year."*[367]

None of these toponyms is certainly identified, but since they are always mentioned together it is likely that they were near one another in the Transjordan. Yeno'am is often clustered together with Hamath, Beth-Shean, and Pella in 19th Dynasty Topographical lists, which suggest they pertained to the same geographical area.[368] Moreover, the city also appears in the Beth-Shean stela of Seti I, as a city which had rebelled and conquered the Egyptian centre.[369] Since its insurrection is said to have been quelled in a single day, it is likely it was located near Beth-Shean, and it has been suggested it should be identified with Tel esh-Shihab, in the Bashan.[370] Harenkarw (*ḥw-rn-k3-rw*) has been identified by Redford with the *ḥ-r-k-r* of the toponym list of Thutmose III, something which would place it in the Transjordan, possibly in Kerak, but there is no certainty

[365] Na'aman 1988b; Redford 2003:42; Morris 2005:228.
[366] Aḥituv 1978:98.
[367] *Urk*. IV, 185:14-19. Translation Redford 2003:122. The same episode is also described in the Annals (*Urk*. IV, 665:1-4) and in the sixth Pilon (*Urk*. IV, 744:5-8).
[368] KRI I, 29, no. 54-57; 32: no.49-57 and no. 1-2; 33: no. 15-17; 34: no. 15-17. See Morris 2005:350 n.28.
[369] KRI I, 11:8-12.
[370] Spalinger 1983:99.

Table 7: Letters connected to the centre of Beth-Shean, or to its commissioners.			
City and/or commissioner	**Number of letters directly connected to city or the commissioner**	**Known cities represented in letters**	**Rulers of unknown cities**
Beth-Shean	7	Akko (EA 232; 234-235) Shamnuna (EA 224) Jerusalem (EA 285)	Unknown, possibly the ruler of Rehov (EA 263) Unknown (EA 251)
Šuta	2	Akko (EA 234) Jerusalem (EA 288)	
Tahmashi	2	Gath Carmel (EA 265) Ashtaroth (EA 364)	
Pawura	3	Jerusalem (EA 287; 289)	Unknown, possibly the ruler of Rehov (263)
Total	12	Akko (EA 232; 234-235) Shamnuna (EA 224) Jerusalem (EA 285, 287-289) Gath Carmel (EA 265) Ashtaroth (EA 364)	Unknown, possibly the ruler of Rehov (EA 263) Unknown (EA 251)




Figure 34: Beth-Shean's Proximity Factor

behind this suggestion.[371] Nugas has no direct connection, but according to Redford there is a *"relative frequence of NHS in the onomasticon of Transjordan"*.[372]

That these lands in the Jezreel and Jordan Valleys remained in Egyptian hands throughout the 18th Dynasty is evident from EA 250, where Lab'ayu is said to have to have attacked the town of Shunem, Burquna and 'Arabu, to have "*seized the town of Gath-Rimmon*" and to have "*developed the agricultural lands of the king.*"[373] Traces of the corvee labour farming these lands can be found in several letters written by rulers of the Jezreel during the 18th Dynasty. In Tanaach 2, for example, the ruler of Rehov says to the ruler of Tanaach: *"Command your towns that they should do their work. On my head is everything which took place in regard to the city."*[374] A similar context is presented by EA 365, where the ruler of Megiddo writes to the Egyptian court:

> *Now, it is I who am cultivating in the town of Shunem and it is I who is bringing corvée men. Look, the city rulers that are with me are not doing as I am doing; they are not cultivating in the town of Shunem and they are not bringing corvée workers. But I, by myself, am bringing corvée workers. From Yapo (Joppa) they are coming, from [those under my] authority here,*[375] *and fro[m the to]wn of Nuribda."*[376]

Reading both letters, it becomes necessary to consider under whose authority were the rulers of Rehov and Megiddo responsible for agricultural work in the fields of Tanaach and Shunem, and the only authority that comes to mind is the Egyptian administration. As the land of Shunem is one of the lands conquered by Lab'ayu in his anti-Egyptian efforts, and in the book of Joshua[377] a Gath-Rimmon is mentioned near Tanaach, it seems to be possible that the Egyptian lands of Gath-Rimmon in EA 250

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[371] No. 101, Simons 1937:27-44, see **§4.3.5.** Redford 1982:63-64; Spalinger 1983:99.

[372] Redford 2003:38-40. The suggestions that Nugas should be identified with the land of Nuḫašše is not convincing, since Nugas is clearly identified with a town, and not a land.

[373] EA 250:40-47. Translation Rainey 2015:1019.

[374] Tanaach 2:13-16. Translation Horowitz et al. 2006:133.

[375] The reconstruction of this passage regarding Joppa is unclear: Na'aman reads it "*from the city of Joppa they come here, from your hand, and from the city of Nuribta*", but Moran (1992:363 n.1), followed by Rainey (2015:1636). contests a similar value for the reconstruction of *ii-tu* ŠU-*[ti-ia]*. Liverani (1998:130) translates it as "*a mio carico"*, meaning "*at my expenses*", thus substantially agreeing with Na'aman on a matter of meaning and with Moran over the linguistical one.

[376] EA 365:10-29. Translation Rainey 2015:10-29.

[377] Joshua 21:24.

might be the lands discussed in Tanaach 2,[378] and that both might be connected to the lands donated to Amun by Thutmose III.

Finally, there is no evidence of the fact that the administration of these lands was connected to the garrison in Beth-Shean, but such an arrangement appears to be more than likely. Beth-Shean is located halfway between the Egyptian lands in the Jezreel and the supposed ones in the Jordan Valley, and its Proximity Factor appears to have covered both areas. Moreover, recent salvage excavations in tel Shadud, near Megiddo and Shimron, have found a 19th Dynasty Egyptian clay coffin manufactured in Beth-Shean.[379] The coffin likely testifies a connection between the later administration of the garrison town and the lands of the Jezreel, even though no further excavations have been conducted to substantiate this point further.

In conclusion, the written documents and the Proximity Factor describe Beth-Shean as an Egyptian centre with its own commissioner, garrisoned by the men from the city of Gath Carmel, and a Proximity Factor covering the Jezreel and Jordan Valley. The centre was also likely involved in the administration of the Egyptian agricultural lands in its vicinity, with a connection similar to that of the centre of Jaffa with the lands of the Yarkon River Valley.

Table 8: Stratigraphy at Beth-Shean between the 18th and the 20th Dynasty.

Period	Date	UME Level	HU Area
LB1A	First half of the 15th century		R2
LB IB	Second half of the 15th century	IXb	R1-b
LB IIA	14th century	IXa	R1-a
LBIIB (?)	Late 14th\Early 13th century (?)	VIII	Q3 (?)
LBIIB	13th - early 12th Century	VII	N4- Q2- S5
TBI	Early 12th – Circa 1130 BC	VI	N3- Q1- S4-S3

[378] However, "Gath" is an extremely common element in Levantine topography: there are four *Knt* in the toponym list of Thutmose III, four Gath in the Amarna Letters, and another Gath Rimmon near Jaffa in the same book of Joshua (19:45-46, probably to be identified with Tel Gerisa). This argument is therefore suggestive, but inconclusive.

[379] van den Brink et al. 2017.




Figure 27: Topographic map of Tel Beth-Shean with HU excavations areas from Mazar 2011, Fig.2.

5.4.5.3. The site's excavations and structures

Tel Beth-Shean has been excavated by the University Museum Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania (UME, 1921-1933),[380] and by the Institute of Archaeology of the Hebrew University (HU, 1989-1996).[381] UME excavated the tell and established a first, provisional stratigraphy, and HU redefined the stratigraphy by opening new areas. Although the 19th and 20th Dynasty material was retrieved across the tell, the 18th Dynasty strata have only been reached in Area R of UME Level IX,[382] something which hampers the discussion considerably.

Beth-Shean was a small centre during the MBA and appears to have been abandoned during the MB IIB (stratum R3). It was re-occupied in the LB IA (R2), when a short-lived temple (the first of a long line at the centre of the settlement) was erected, damaged by an earthquake, levelled, and back-filled.[383] The back-fill (and the end of the stratum) is dated to the LB IA and the reign of Thutmose III by the presence of a handful of locally-made Egyptian vessels, which include a red-splashed and red-rimmed bowl (BL1A), six Flowerpot fragments, and two fragments of JR2 Jar.[384] No fortifications have been found in Beth-Shean, but according to Panitz-Cohen[385] it is possible that the lack of fortification might be due to chances of conservation, because the site was mined for construction material in roman times. The 18th Dynasty strata in Beth-Shean correspond to Level IX (UME) in the HU substrata R1-b (LB IB), and R1-a (LB IIA).[386] Their plan of construction follows that of the Middle Bronze Age: a central courtyard surrounded by a series of buildings, none of which – not even the large administrative

[380] Preliminary publication in Rowe 1930. See also James 1966; Oren 1973a; James et al. 1993b.
[381] Mazar et al. 2006; Mazar 2007; Mazar et al. 2009.
[382] Mazar et al. 2006:13.
[383] Mazar et al. 2007:16-17; Mullins 2007:112; Panitz-Cohen 2013:113.
[384] Martin 2011:135.
[385] Panitz-Cohen 2013:113-114.
[386] Kopetzky 2011:124.

building 1240 – presented any recognizable Egyptian tracts.[387] A great conflagration marked the end of R1a, since a layer of ashes and one of burnt bricks were found between the floors of R1a and stratum VIII.[388]

5.4.5.4. The site's material

If the structures from R-1 do not seem to support an Egyptian presence in Beth-Shean, the material retrieved at the site, however, does it.[389] As it is common for contexts dated to the 18th Dynasty, the percentage of Egyptian-style vessels is extremely small: Mullins considers it to be 1% of the total ceramic assemblage, and 3 to 4% including "questionable vessels" like the undecorated Egypto-Canaanite bowls.[390] Yet, it is varied and significant enough to represents a first period of Egyptian occupation. Egyptian-type pottery appears in Stratum R1-b,[391] in a variety of open and closed Egytian-style vessels. Flowerpots (JR2), Tall necked-ovoid jar (JR4) and the Slender Ovoid Jar (JR5) are all found at the site. The 23 Flowerpots in particular are the second largest collection of these vessels after Jaffa's.[392] The vessels were all locally produced (with the sole exception of a fragment of a storage jar made of Nile clay),[393] with the same clay used for other ware found at the site,[394] and thus Egyptians likely resided there and had most of their necessities met from local sources, with little importation of material from Egypt.[395]

There are other elements pointing to an early Egyptian presence at the site. The scarabs found in Level IX are peculiar and may indicate Egyptian administrative activity because, rather than being Egyptian imports (as it is common in LBA context in the Levant), they are locally produced and made as replicas of individual Egyptian scarabs.[396] A narrow chamber, possibly meant for storage, produced a store jar with a hieroglyphic inscription depicting a man with hand to mouth.[397] Moreover, a faience bowl was found in the temple of Level IX by Rowe, and described by him as depicting a few hieroglyphs

[387] Mullins 2002:44; Mazar 2007:139.
[388] Mullins 2002:69.
[389] Among these is not to be counted the so-called Mekal Stela, which was believe to date to the Late 18th Dynasty (see for example by Morris 2005:251) but that has convincingly been re-dated to the 19th Dynasty in a recent article from Levy (2018).
[390] Mullins 2007:442.
[391] Martin 2011:151.
[392] Mullins 2007:450.
[393] Mullins 2007;441.
[394] Mullins 2006:252.
[395] Mullins 2002:292.
[396] Ben Tor et al. 2012:87-88, 99.
[397] Mullins 2002: 322, pl.40.2.

which form "*part of the name of some god, and perhaps part of the name "Beth-Shean*" (fig.38).[398] The sherd, published but not commented upon in 1975 by James,[399] represents an Egyptian man with his arms raised in adoration. In the same stratum was also found a *psš kf* blade used in the ceremony of the opening of the mouth, and the head of an Egyptian basalt statue (fig.37).[400]

In conclusion, although the archaeological material of Stratum IX does not offer any definitive evidence of an Egyptian presence in the 18th Dynasty Beth-Shean, the existence of a large and locally produced Egyptian pottery assemblage and of several Egyptiaca strongly suggest it already had some role in the Egyptian control of the region already at the time of Thutmose III.

5.4.5.5. Analysis and conclusion

The written and archaeological evidence paint a complex picture for the Egyptian presence in Beth-Shean during the 18th Dynasty. Beth-Shean is virtually absent in the written sources of the Mid-18th Dynasty, but several elements in the archaeological record of R1-b and R1-a (the pottery, the *psš kf* blade, the scarabs, and the inscribed faience bowl) point toward an Egyptian presence at the site. For the Late 18th Dynasty, the Amarna letters offer enough pieces of information to argue that Beth-Shean was an Egyptian centre garrisoned by soldiers from Gath Carmel, and that it had a commissioner and a Proximity Factor that covered both the Jezreel and the Jordan Valley, the same territories where a significant portion of agricultural land was controlled by the Egyptians and farmed by the locals.

There is no direct proof for the existence of fortifications or of storage buildings in Beth-Shean. However, both appear to be likely. The idea that the Egyptian would not have fortified one of their garrison towns would be difficult to defend, and since the site appear to have been mined in roman times for construction materials, the absence of fortification might be due to the chances of preservations. [401] Moreover, if Beth-Shean was involved in the administration of the Egyptian lands in the Jezreel and Jordan Valley, then storage would have been a logical necessity. The parallel with Jaffa's *šnwti* (**§5.4.4.2.**) strongly implies that also Beth-Shean would have likely contained a storehouse.

[398] Rowe 1930:11.
[399] James 1975:117.
[400] Mullins 2002:326.
[401] Panitz-Cohen 2013:113-114.




Figure 28 Schematic Plan of Stratum R1b. From Mullens 2002, fig.18

Figure 29 Head of an Egyptian basalt statue (from Mullins 2002:pl. 69.8)



Figure 38 Inscribed fayence bowl from Beth-Shean (from James 1975:117)



5.4.6. Byblos

5.4.6.1. Introduction

Built on a rocky promontory on the northern Phoenician coast, Byblos (modern Jubayl, 42 km north of Beirut) was the capital of an important Bronze Age kingdom.[402] Byblos is unlike any other site discussed in this research, as it is both one of the better documented Levantine cities during the LBA, and not an Egyptian site at all. On the one hand, it is clear from the Amarna Letters that Byblos was an independent city-state: his ruler Rib-Addi, the most loquacious of the corpus' rulers, sent circa 70 letters to the Egyptian court and his missives provide information on the 18th Dynasty history of Byblos and the northern Levant.[403] On the other hand, excavations in the city found temples with Egyptian features, Egyptian influence over the city is documented since the Old Kingdom,[404] and during the Middle Kingdom and the Second Intermediate Period Byblos' rulers adopted the Egyptian language, the Egyptian writing system, and even the Egyptian title of *ḥ3tj-ʿ* (high official).[405] By the beginning of the New Kingdom, therefore Egypt and Byblos had had a relationship several centuries long, one that appears to have revolved around two interconnected concepts: the role of the "Lady of Byblos," associated with Hathor,[406] and the importation of cedar wood.[407]

5.4.6.2. The archaeological record

Discussing the 18th Dynasty Egyptian presence in Byblos from an archaeological perspective is no easy task. The city's difficult terrain and long settlement history means that the archaeological strata and the architectural structures were not uniformly preserved,[408] and have been understudied. After a long history of archaeological explorations by Montet and Dunand (1921-1924 and 1924-1975),[409] the

[402] Kilani 2017b:227.
[403] For a discussion of the letters from Rib-Addi, see Youngblood 1961; Liverani 1974; 1998:166-244; Moran 1992:xxx-xxxiii; Pryke 2010; Kilani 2019:146-175.
[404] See Espinel 2002.
[405] As evidenced by their tombs (Montet 1928:85). The exact character of this relation at the time has insofar been impossible to define. Ryholt (1997:87-88) describes a *de facto* autonomous state that saw itself as an Egyptian Domain. Ben-Tor (2007a:179) argued that a direct political connection is "unthinkable" because the names of the city's rulers, in their scarabs, are enclosed in cartouches. Flammini (2010) and Kopetzky (2015) saw the relationship through the prisms of the "elite emulation"
[406] Zernecke 2013.
[407] See Allen 2008 for the Middle Kingdom, and Kilani 2019 for the New kingdom
[408] According to Kilani (2020:20-21) in the hills the strata predating the classical period have entirely disappeared.
[409] Montet 1928; Dunand 1939; 1954; 1973; Dunand et al. 1968; 2008.

relatively scarce LBA material has only recently been gathered and examined by Kilani, whose work is the base for this discussion.[410] The city was defended by a series of ramparts from the Early Bronze Age to the Persian Period, which survive in the northern and western sectors of the site.[411] Dunand dated one of their phases of construction to the Late Bronze Age,[412] but since he offered no evidence in support of this argument, the idea must be taken with caution.[413]




Figure 39 Map of the archaeological area of Ancient Byblos. Readapted from Kilani 2020:18, fig. 2.4.

The temple of the "Lady of Byblos" was the most important sanctuary in the city, according to the written documents of the LBA, but they have not survived to this day: under a stratum dated to the 3rd century AD only the MBA strata remain. The connection of the Lady with Egypt is testified by the several Old and Middle Kingdom Egyptiaca discovered in the foundations deposit of the Middle Bronze Age building.[414] The so-called "Obelisk temple," located nearby, is however well preserved: built in the MBA in honour of the Egyptian god Herishef,[415] the temple owes its modern name to the series of obelisks and standing stones that were erected in a court around its cella. According to Kilani, an Egyptian influence in the construction of this building is likely, especially if one considers the presence of a dedicatory inscription to Herishef, written in Egyptian during the Middle Kingdom by the king of Byblos Ibishemu.[416]

[410] Kilani 2019.
[411] Kilani 2019:17.
[412] Dunand 1954:pl. ccxii.
[413] As Kilani (2020:17) points out.
[414] Kilani 2019:54-56.
[415] Bietak 2019:179.
[416] Kilani 2019:58-87. A similar opinion has also been advanced by Bietak 2019.

A discussion of Byblos' ceramic finds has yet to be undertaken. Dunand reportedly found tens of thousands of vessels and potsherds during the excavations in Byblos, but only published a sample of the complete, decorated, or inscribed vessels, and according to Kilani it is unclear what was preserved of the unpublished material.[417] Several objects however indicate the presence of close ideological ties between Byblos and Egypt during the Late Bronze Age: 2 architectural fragments with the name of Thutmose III likely come from a chapel or a shrine sponsored by the king;[418] and the inscription of a third badly ruined block reads "*m ḥwt-nṯr ḥwt-ḥr nbt* [*kꜣp-n-y*]" "*in the temple of Hathor Lady [of Byblos]*."[419] This supports the idea, as Kilani has pointed out, that the Lady of Byblos was associated with Hathor not only in Egypt, but also in her city. Moreover, it is likely their origin is to be identified with the shrine erected by Minmose under Thutmose III (see below).

5.4.6.3. Byblos in the Mid-18th Dynasty according to the written sources

While the archaeological evidence from Jubayl offer limited information on the role of the city in the Egyptian eyes during the Mid-18th Dynasty, the written documents offer more pieces of information on this topic. There are two sets of documents to discuss: the contemporary Egyptian sources, and the depiction given *a posteriori* by Rib-Addi during the Amarna period.

Byblos is mentioned several times in Egyptian sources of the Mid-18th Dynasty:

- In the Gebel Barkal Stela in a passage narrating events of his year 33 campaign.[420] Thutmose recounts how he "*caused many ships to be built of ʿš-wood, from the hills of god's land in the neighbourhood of the Lady of Byblos*,"[421] to cross either the Euphrates or the Orontes and attack Mittani.[422] In commenting this passage, Kilani raises two interesting points.[423] The first one is that Bylos is mentioned not on its own, but in connection with the goddess. The second is that considering the campaigns in the northern Levant were still in their infancy, the choice of Byblos

[417] Dunand 1939:9; Kilani 2019:15.
[418] No. Montet 947 (Montet 1928:pl. Clii); No. Dunand II 13439 (Dunand 1954:Pl. clv); Kilani 2019:37-40.
[419] Translation Kilani 2019:43.
[420] *Urk*. IV, 1232:1-6; Reisner and Reisner 1933:28-29. See **§4.3.2.**
[421] "*jw rdj-n=j mḏḥ=twʿ ḥʿw ʿšꜣw nw ʿš ḥr ḏww nw tꜣ-nṯr m-ḫꜣw tꜣ nbt kpny*", transliteration and translation by Kilani 2019:105.
[422] As suggested by Redford (2003:106-107) and Kilani (2019:106) respectively.
[423] Kilani 2019:106.

for the construction and delivery of these goods might have been due to the pre-existing ties of the city. In other words, Byblos might have been felt – due to its long-lasting connections to Egypt – like a safe choice.

- In the biographical inscription of the statue of Minmose, [424] "*overseer of the temples of [all] the gods*" and "*royal scribe*" of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II, the decesead claims to have supervised the construction of several temples, including one dedicated to "*Hathor, Lady of Byblos*", possibly to be identified with the point of origins of the blocks discussed above.[425]
- In the tomb of Senneferi[426] the city is mentioned in the context of a royal expedition to gather wood for flagpoles for the temple of Amun in Karnak. According to Kilani, it is possible that this is the same expedition that appears in the Gebel Barkal Stela,[427] and – as in the stela – the precedence in Byblos is given to the temple of the Lady, since Senneferi is said to have made offering to the goddess before obtaining the wood.[428]

In addition, it can also be argued that Byblos is the subject of several passages that in the Annals of Thutmose III discuss the annual delivery of the Lebanese taxes to local harbours. They are all similar to the one from Year 33:

> *"And so the harbors were stocked with everything in accordance with their tax quota and in accordance with their yearly custom (nt-ꜥ) and the labor (bꜣk) of Lebanon in accordance with their yearly custom(nt-ꜥ), and the chiefs of Lebanon…"*[429]

There are no mentions of an Egyptian capture of Byblos – or of any other southern Lebanese harbour – in the sources of the Mid-18th Dynasty, and they do not appear in the Topographical Lists of Thutmose III.[430] Considering Byblos' prominence in contemporary Egyptian sources, a military conquest of this city would have undoubtedly been registered. Since it does not, either the related documents have been lost, or one should look for an alternative explanation, as Kilani has argued.[431] Routledge has

[424] Drioton 1927:50-56; Kilani 2019:113-116.
[425] Kilani 2019:115.
[426] TT 99. *Urk.* IV, 536:2-4; Strudwick et al. 2016:100-105; Kilani 2019:116-123.
[427] *Urk.* IV, 1241:13.
[428] Kilani 2019:121.
[429] *Urk.* IV, 700:6-9. Translation Redford 2003:75. See also *Urk.* IV, 707:10-14; 713:46; 719:7-10; 723:4-7; 727:11; 732:6-7.
[430] Simons 1937:109-22.
[431] Kilani 2019:125-126.

demonstrated that the word *nt-ꜥ* indicated administrative documents with legal force, such as legal agreements involving the movement of goods, and written international treaties.[432] According to Kilani, it is possible that the cities of the Lebanese coast were peacefully incorporated in the Egyptian administration, each bound to Egypt by a *nt-ꜥ*, a treaty. From the Annals it appears that one of the conditions of these treaties would have been the payment of a *bꜣk*.[433] Although it can be translated as "work produce", *bꜣk* in this context identifies a type of taxation to be annually delivered to the Egyptian State.[434] It seems therefore likely that this passage means that Thutmose designated a fixed proportion of the Lebanese harvest to be delivered each year to the Egyptian state and stored in the Lebanese harbours.[435] Considering that ships during the LBA would sail close enough to the shore to dock in safe harbours come nightfall or bad weather,[436] the system delineated in these passages would have been similar (*mutatis mutandis*) to that of the Infrastructure of North Sinai: a series of Nodes on the coast of Lebanon where Egyptian ships would have been able to dock and feed their passenger on the way to their deployment in the north. In this light, the inscription of the "*Superintendent of fortresses in the northern Foreign Lands*" Si-Amun appears as particularly important:[437] Si-Amun mentions how he, being "*familiar with the conditions of the lands of the Fenkhu*", would receive the benevolences of those subjected to the Egyptians,[438] and it seems likely that his involvement with both the benevolences and the fortresses might have been connected. It must be noticed how nothing in the Annals suggests a precise identification or a precise role of these harbours, and thus any (and all) Lebanese ports might have been part of this group, either as a port of call or as a destination and part of a "force accumulation"[439] phase in the military campaigns. Considering however that in the period between the first and the last mention of these harbours (years 33 and 42) the Egyptian army appears to have mainly fought in the ʻAkkar Plain and the Orontes Valley, it seems likely that the northern ones – like Byblos and Ullassa – would have been used as bridgeheads, while those too far south to directly support an

[432] Routledge 2001:306-331. In the bilingual peace treaty between Ramses II and Hattushili III, for example, *nt-ꜥ* is translated in Akkadian as *rikiltu*, treaty (*CAD* R, 345-346, *s.v. rikiltu, rikistu*.; Edel 1997:22-23, 88-89; Murnane 1990:72-74).

[433] See **§4.3.6.1.**

[434] For a discussion, see Liverani 1990b:255-266; Spalinger 1996.

[435] Redford 2003:219; Morris 2005:124; Kilani 2019:108.

[436] Drower 1973:507.

[437] Speleers 1923:no.117.

[438] Redford 2003:257 n.12.

[439] The mobilization and gathering of combat forces at the beginning of the campaign.

Egyptian army fighting in the ‘Akkar Plain and the Orontes Valley – like Sidon and Tyre – would have functioned like port of calls.

A second set of information comes from the Amarna Letters. Several times Rib-Addi, the ruler of Byblos, alludes to events that happened in the past, and while it is true, as Kilani has argued,[440] that many among these declarations might have been rhetorical devices, some might have been rooted in reality. On the one hand Rib-Addi repeatedly stresses that "*w[e are] loyal [servants]of the king from olde[n day]s*,"[441] and on this line he several times argues that *"Look, as for my fa[ther]s, garrison troops were with them and royal [provisions] were in their charge. [Look,] as for me, I have no [pro]visions, no garr[ision] troops from the king.*"[442] The fact that Byblos had been loyal to Egypt "in the past" finds some levels of support in the written documents of the Mid-18th Dynasty, but also on the wording of the passage. Jana Mynářová has argued that *arad* (ÌR) *kitti* (the phrase employed here for "loyal servant") is a "*distribution of the substantive kittu* "*truth, justice, correct procedures, fidelity, correctness, normal state, treaty*", and that although *kittu* is not attested as a direct translation of *nt-ʿ*, it might be intended as some kind of legal provision.[443]

It is therefore likely that Rib-Addi is recounting veritable events, and that troops and supplies were sent to Byblos at the beginning of the wars of Thutmose III. A second element mentioned by Rib-Addi is that "*Formerly, the [ki]ng of the land of Mittani was hostile to your fathers but your fathers did not desert [my] fath[ers*]."[444] As noticed by Kilani,[445] since the mentioned hostile force is not a generic "enemy" but a more real and consistent "King of Mittani", Rib-Addi might have had a specific instance in mind, indirectly confirming the city's involvement in the wars of the Mid-18th Dynasty.

In conclusion, the image that the contemporary written documents give of Byblos is that of a city with strong historical relations with Egypt. Byblos was likely considered a loyal subject – if not an ally – at the beginning of the wars against Mittani. It was in Byblos that the Egyptian army was able to

[440] Kilani 2019:150-151.
[441] EA 116:55-56. Translation Rainey 2015:617. See also EA 74:5-8; 118:39-44.
[442] EA 121:11-17, Translation Rainey 2015:637. See also EA 76:30-34; 112:50-51; 117:11-17; 121:11-17; 122:11-19; 125:14-18; 126:18-23; 130:21-25.
[443] Mynářová 2013.
[444] EA 109:5-8. Translation Rainey 2015:591.
[445] Kilani 2019:150.

gather wood and build the ships necessary for the war effort. Moreover, if – as it seems likely – the Annals of Thutmose III refer also to Byblos, and the later mentions of Egyptian garrisons and provisions by Rib-Addi are to be believed, it seems likely that, at the beginning of the campaigns of Thutmose III, Byblos was part of a system of local bases comparable to the Infrastructure of North Sinai, one that would have fed the army on its way to battle in the northern Lebanon.

5.4.6.4. Byblos in the written sources of the Late 18th Dynasty

Byblos is largely ignored by Egyptian sources of the Late 18th Dynasty, where it only appears in the Soleb list of Amenhotep III. At the same time, the city is well documented in the Amarna and Kumidi corpora, where it appears like a normal – and clearly independent – Canaanite city-state, the importance of which had diminished in Egyptian eyes compared to the times of Thutmose III. This is clearly manifested by how Rib-Addi appears to have tried (and failed) to leverage the religious connection between Egypt and the Lady of Byblos. As noticed by Kilani,[446] in 27[447] of the letters from Byblos the blessings from the goddess and the blessings from Amun are added to both the introductory greetings and the body of the text, something that no other Levantine ruler appears to have done. This might be interpreted as an attempt to distinguish Byblos from the "average" vassal. Three letters[448] also carry mention of messages sent to the Pharaoh by "the maidservant of the Lady of Byblos" thus indicating that not only the palace of Byblos, but also the temple of the city had some ties to Egypt. Nonetheless, the Egyptians do not seem to have cared for Byblos in particular, and Byblos appears to have remained relatively unimportant in their eyes.

5.4.6.5. Analysis and conclusions

Byblos has a unique position in this discussion: with a strong and historical relationship with Egypt, Byblos was likely an ally at the beginning of the wars of Thutmose III, and the fortifications of the city and the storage points in the harbours would have made Byblos an important Node in the Operational

[446] Kilani 2019:147-150.

[447] EA 68:4-6; 74:2-4; 75:3-4; 76:3-5; 78:3-5; 79:3-5; 81:3-4; 83:3-4; 85:4-5; 89:3-4; 92:5-6; 105:3-4; 107:4-6; 108:4-5; 109:2-3; 114:3-4; 116:3-4; 117:3-4; 118:6-8; 119:3-5; 121:3-5; 122:4-6; 123:4-7; 124:3-4; 125:5-7.

[448] EA 83:52-57; 84:42-44; 85:84-86.The fact that the letters appear to have been written by three different scribes (Vita 2015:47) makes it also likely that there was an intent which went beyond the habits of a single scribe.

Network. It was in Byblos that the Egyptian army was able to gather wood and build ships, and in its harbour that it was able to gather and collect supplies. In Byblos the Egyptians found a loyal ally, likely bound by treaty, and the city appears to have been part of a system of bases comparable to the Infrastructure of North Sinai, one that would have fed the army on its way to battle in the northern Lebanon.

Quite a different scenario can be offered for the Late 18th Dynasty, when the Egyptians appear to have focused on their own centres of Sumur and Ullassa, and ignored the ally, now considered to be on the same level as any other city in the region,

5.4.7. Ullassa

5.4.7.1. Introduction

Ullassa is usually looked for in the Koura Plain, a fertile and strategically important portion of the 'Akkar Plain. Located between the seaside and the Lebanon mountains, the Koura connects the coastal Lebanon to the Orontes Valley and southern Syria through the so-called Gate of Homs. During the Late Bronze Age, the Koura appears to have been relatively densely populated, as the recent archaeological survey of the Northern Lebanon Project (NoLeP) has found a total of 15 potential sites likely to be dated at the first and second millennium B.C.[449] Inside this region, the identification of Ullassa with any city or tell is disputed. Tripoli is the most common identification,[450] especially considering that the discovery of a LBA tomb near the Castle of Raymond de Saint-Gilles offers evidence to the fact that the city was inhabited at the time.[451] A second identification is with the classical town of Orthosia, located north of the Koura Plain, on the Nahr al-Bared river.[452] Unfortunately, however, both are archaeologically unknown: Tripoli was not included in the NoLeP and it has not yet been systematically excavated,[453] and the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared now lays over the ruins of Orthosia.[454] Therefore, only the contemporary written sources allow a discussion on the Egyptian presence in Ullassa.

[449] For the NoLeP survey, see Iamoni et al. Forthcoming. See also Kilani 2019:152-176.
[450] Drower 1973:454; Goren et al. 2004:123; Morris 2005:155; Kilani 2019:130-131.
[451] Salamé-Sarkis 1973:94.
[452] Dussaud 1927:78-80; Helck 1968:29.
[453] Iamoni, personal communication 19/12/2020.
[454] The ruins were still visible at the beginning of the 20th century (Dussaud 1927:78-80), but the refugee camp covered them in 1949. Briefly unearthed after a long battle destroyed the camp in 2007, the ruins

5.4.7.2. Ullassa in the Mid-18th Dynasty

The importance of Ullassa to the Egyptians as a wood-gathering locations is evident already in the Middle Kingdom,[455] and this connection with wood permeated the relations during the Mid-18th Dynasty as well. Three relatively certain mentions of Ullassa appear in the Annals of Thutmose III and in the Gebel Barkal stela.[456] In the Annals, Ullassa is mentioned in the context of the campaigns of Year 29 and 31. In year 29 the city, which had apparently been garrisoned by troops from the Mittanian city of Tunip, is said to have been plundered, and some cargo boats (*Ỉmw*) seized, loaded with booty, and sent to Egypt. An hecatomb is offered in the city to Amun-re-Horakhty, in a place defined as a "storehouse of offering"(*šnᶜ n wdnw*).[457] In the campaign of year 31, Ullassa is apparently sacked again after having fallen in the hands of Tunip a second time, and is then given to the army.[458] Finally, the Gebel Barkal Stela contains the largest and most important discussion on the role of Ullassa, in the passage that describes the taxes paid to Egypt by the Levant and Nubia.

> *"Each and every year true cedar of Lebanon (R-mn-n) is hewed for me in Dj]ahy, and brought to the Palace L.P.H. Lumber comes to me, to Egypt, brought south […] true [cedar] of Negau, the best of God's-land, sent off with its balast in good order to make the journey to the Residence, without missing a single season each and every year.*
>
> *My army, which constitutes the standing force (iwᶜyt) in Ullassa, comes [to My Majesty(?) yearly with..] which is the cedar of My Majesty's forcible confiscation, through the counsels of my father [Amon-re] who consigned all the foreigners to me. I left none of it for the barbarians,*

were shortly excavated and then covered by concrete in an effort to maintain peace in the camp in 2009 (Bajjaly 2011). To my knowledge, these excavations have never been published.

[455] Khnumhotep, responsible of the Levantine trade under Senwosret II, described in his biographical inscription a military expedition to fight Byblos and gather cedar from Ullassa (Allen 2008).

[456] Some questions have been raised on the different spellings associated to this toponym. In the Annals it is written *w3-r3-*[*t*] (as per Sethe's restoration) in the year 29 (*Urk*. IV, 685:8-686:10) and *jwn-r3-ṯ-w* in the year 31 (*Urk*. IV, 690:16), whereas in the Gebel Barkal Stela it appears as *w3-n-r3-*[*t*]-[*3*] (*Urk.* IV, 1237:15). This has led Redford (2003:64-65) to wonder whether the different spellings represent different cities, but Kilani (2020:131, n.26) has convincingly rejected this hypothesis, arguing that "*unless we were to assume a multiplication of cities with very similar names, it is simplest to interpret these as orthographic variants referring to the same city, Ullassa*".

[457] *Urk.* IV, 685:8-686:10. Translation Redford 2003:63-64.

[458] *Urk.* IV, 690:16. Translation Redford 2003:71-72.

(for) it is the wood he loves; he has enforced (it) so that they operate regularly for 'The Lord,' (even though) they be irked being in a state of peace(?) [..]."[459]

Some elements regarding Ullassa can be gathered from these mentions: that its control was important to the Egyptians, as the city had been conquered twice before being given to the army; that it housed an Egyptian garrison, as *iwʿyt* is usually interpreted as a term employed to identify the regular army called to garrison duty (as opposed to part-time militias called in emergencies, or for expeditions in enemy territory);[460] that the garrison was in charge of gathering wood to send to Egypt; that the area had a relation with Amun, as not only Thutmose III offered an hecatomb to the god in the wake of the city's conquest, but also the god had some relation to the gathering of the local wood.

Four other mentions might be reasonably ascribed to Ullassa: in the sixth pylon in Karnak a *mnnw*-fortress named "Menkheperre-is-conqueror-of-the-vagabonds" is said to have been built "amidst the chiefs of Lebanon";[461] in the Gebel Barkal Stela, a *mnnw*-fortress, the name of which is unfortunately lost, is mentioned in a passage describing how the Egyptian army gatered ʿš-wood in the mountains of the Lebanon for the flagpoles of the temple of Amun ;[462] in the biography of Senneferi[463] the deceased says he guided an expedition to retrieve wood from the mountains of Byblos for the flagpoles of the temple of Amun , and the decoration depicts a fortress or a fortified building; a similar (if not the same) building is shown also in the decoration of the tomb of Amenmose,[464] where it is said to be located in Negau.[465] As both Morris and Kilani have observed[466] although none of these mention a known toponym, all show a fortress in the mountains of Lebanon, one whose location and connected activities are similar to those attributed to Ullassa in the Gebel Barkal stela, and it is therefore likely all refer to Ullassa. As with Gaza, it was not unusual for conquered cities to be named after the Pharaoh who conquered them.[467] Furthermore, the two made separate observations that go on to support this identification. Morris noticed that the safety of Ullassa during the Amarna period was threatened by the seminomadic 'Apiru of

[459] *Urk.* IV, 1237:15. Translation Redford 2003:111-112.
[460] Faulkner 1953:44; Goedicke 1968:221; Redford 2003:11.
[461] *Urk.* IV, 739:15-740:1. Translation Redford 2003:137.
[462] *Urk.* IV, 1241:11-1242:13.
[463] TT 99.
[464] TT 42.
[465] A term usually taken to indicate the mountains of Lebanon, usually associated with Byblos and Ullassa.
[466] Morris 2005:137, 157; Kilani 2019:129.
[467] See note 287 of this chapter.

Amurru, "*and it was perhaps this population that is broadly described as "vagabonds.*"[468] Kilani observed that although the word ꜥš-wood appears to have indicated a generic "conifer wood" such as cedar, juniper, and fir, the Cilician fir appears to have been the sole wood with the necessary characteristic for the flagpoles of the temple of Amun , and this particular kind of tree now only grows in the area around Tripoli.[469]

Another mention might be connected to Ullassa: the biographical account on the statue of Minmose, the "overseer of the works in the temples of [all?] the Gods" (*jmy-rꜣ m rꜣw-prW nw nṯrw* [*nbw?*]).[470] In his early career, Minmose followed Thutmose III in Syria,[471] and in his biographical text he lists all the temples he worked on in the course of his career. As Wimmer has noticed,[472] the list is organized in a south-to-north direction, from Asyut to Memphis to Byblos. After Byblos, the statue names a temple of Amun built in another city, the name of which is unreadable.[473] Wimmer saw in it a Mid-18th Dynasty mention of the Amun temple in Gaza known from papyrus Harris I (8,13),[474] but such an identification seems unlikely: given the direction of the preceding toponyms, one would expect a site north of Byblos, rather than south of it. On this rationale, Kilani suggested Sumur, Qadesh or Qatna as possible options,[475] but Ullassa is a more fitting candidate.[476] On the one hand, it would not be surprising to find a temple of Amun there, considering that most of the sources at our disposal point to a relationship of the God with the city: it is to Amun that Thutmose offers his hecatomb at the storehouse of offerings (*šnꜥ n wdnw*), and it is to Amun that the cedar wood gathered in the region is said to have been offered.[477] On the other hand, it was argued that Ullassa is to be identified with the *mnnw*-fortress of "Menkheperre-is-conqueror-of-the-vagabonds", and in the *mnnw*-fortresses of Nubia – such as Sai and Sesebi – both storehouses and cultic institutions appear to have been important elements. According to Morris, the Nubian *mnnw* were fortress-towns erected in a vulnerable region to settle an area worth defending, whose inhabitants were civilians rather than soldiers, and whose settlement's core where temples and

[468] Morris 2005:138.
[469] Kilani 2019:130, following Bardinet 2008:330. For a discussion on the different kinds of wood, see Kilani 2016b.
[470] *Urk*. IV, 1442:16-1443:25. For a discussion and a translation of the passage, see Kilani 2019:113-116.
[471] Drioton 1927:52-56.
[472] Wimmer 1990:1090.
[473] *Urk*. IV, 1443:24.
[474] Wimmer 1990:1088.
[475] Kilani 2017:134.
[476] This identification has already been proposed, on similar grounds, by Morris (2015b:177-179).
[477] This last argument is however less cogent. Since the Annals were written in the temple of Amun in Karnak, a connection with Amun would have been made explicit in any case.

storehouses.[478] All of these elements appear to closely reflect the Ullassa that can be pictured from the written sources mentioned above.

Finally, because of all of the reasons outlined above, it seems to be likely that Ullassa is to be counted among the Lebanese harbours that in the Annals of Thutmose III are said to be receiving the annual deliveries of the Lebanese taxes.[479] As it was said, the system that these passages delineate is reminiscent of the Infrastructure of North Sinai: a series of Nodes on the coast of Lebanon where Egyptian ships would have been able to dock and feed their passengers on the way to their deployment in the north. Such a system would have required for a "bridgehead" at the end of the route, part of a "force accumulation" phase in the military campaigns. A bridgehead is a small, fortified area serving as a foothold in enemy territory, built to aid the crossing of a body of water and to grant safe arrival on the landing side. Considering that in the period between the first and the last mention of these harbours (years 33 and 42) the Egyptian army appears to have mainly fought in the 'Akkar Plain and the Orontes Valley, it seems likely that the northern ones – like Byblos and Ullassa – would have been used as bridgeheads. If Ullassa is to be identified with a centre in the Koura Plain, then at the time of Thutmose's first campaigns in the Northern Levant, the city would have been naturally defended by the Mediterranean sea on the east, by the mountains of the Lebanon on the west, and by the presence of a loyal ally – Byblos – on the south.[480] Together with this defensively advantageous position, considering that the Koura Plain has easy passage to the Orontes Valley through the so-called "gate of Homs", the erection of a fortress in the area in the campaign of year 31 would have granted a solid bridgehead for the following thirty years of campaigns.

In conclusion, the profile of Ullassa that emerges from the Egyptian sources of the middle of the 18th Dynasty is that of a fortress in northern Lebanon, conquered and manned by the Egyptian army to gather wood and send it to Egypt. It is also likely that the city had seen the erection of a temple dedicated to Amun , to serve the local Egyptian population and help fulfilling the economic role of the

[478] Morris 2005:155, 809-814. See also Kemp (1979:23-25) for a discussion on the temples of the *mnnw*-fortresses of Nubia, and **§5.2.6.** for a discussion on the different types of fort in Egyptian documents.

[479] *Urk*. IV, 700:6-9; 707:10-14; 713:46; 719:7-10; 723:4-7; 727:11; 732:6-7. See **§5.4.6.3.**

[480] This point, on similar grounds, was already argued by Kilani (2019:165).

settlement. But the most important role for Ullassa was likely strategic, rather than economic, as Ullassa appears as it might have been a perfect "bridgehead" for Thutmose's plans, a fortified position in a easily defendable point from where to start his campaigns.

5.4.7.3. Ullassa in the Late 18th Dynasty

The only sources on Ullassa during the Late 18th Dynasty are contained in the Amarna corpus, where the city is mentioned in 6 letters written by Abdi-Aširta of Amurru and Rib-Addi and Ili-Rapi of Byblos.[481] Four elements can be gathered from them:

- In EA 60 Abdi-Aširta asks to be recognized as protector of Sumur and Ullassa,[482] certifying thusly the former as an Egyptian centre.
- Most of the mentions of Ullassa repeat solely that the centre has been conquered by the sons of Abdi-Aširta, and are thus all to be dated at the time of the Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[483] If an argument from silence can be made, since Rib-Addi repeats four times in later letters of the conquest of Ullassa, the absence of any mentions of the city at the time of Abdi-Aširta might mean that Ullassa had remained in Egyptian control until Aziru's times.
- At the time of the second conquest of Sumur,[484] Ullassa is said to have been taken by Abdi-Aširta's son Pu-Baʿla, brother of Aziru. Following the capture of the city, Rib-Addi writes in EA 105 (83-84) that:

  "*The men of the land of Egypt (*ʿLÚʾ.MEŠ KUR *Mi-iṣ-ʿriʾ) who came forth from the city of Ullassa [n]ow are with me but there is no [grai]n for them to eat. Yapaʿ-Hadda does not let my ships (go) to the land of Yarimuta and to send them to Sumur I am not able [bec]ause of the ships of the city of Arvad"* [485]

  This passage testifies that, at the time of the Amarna Letters, Egyptians inhabited Ullassa. Unfortunately, the letter does not indicate an exact number for these "men of the land of Egypt"

[481] EA 60:19-29; 61:1-9; 104:6-13, 27-30, 40-42; 105:23-25, 83-88; 109:13-15; 117:35-52; 140:18-19.
[482] *"[Look, Paḫ]a(m)nate is w[ith you]; may the king, my sun god, ask him if I am not guarding the city of Sumur and the city of Ullassa while my commissioner is on a mission of the king, my lord*." EA 61:19-25, Translation Rainey 2015:419.
[483] See **§5.4.8.3.1.**
[484] See **§5.4.8.3.1.**
[485] Translation Rainey 2015:575.

that had fled Ullassa and they are never mentioned again. It might be argued that, had they been a handful, Rib-Addi would have housed them and use his munificence in his dealings with the Egyptian court. As Rib-Addi presents this issue with the refugees, therefore, it is possible they were a considerable number, large enough to be difficult to handle.

From the point of view of the city's Proximity Factor, Ullassa appears to not have acted on the same footing as Gaza and Sumur: there are no mentions of garrisons or commissioners connected to the city, and there is no unequivocal evidence that letters from local vassals were sent from the centre. The sole exception might be EA 58, whose provenance is puzzling: the letter's clay appears to come from the area of Tripoli,[486] but the name of the writer, Tehu-Teššup, is Hurrian,[487] and the city over which he ruled unnamed. Since a ruler with a Hurrian name would be unparalleled in the Phoenician coast,[488] according to Goren, Finkelstein and Na'aman the most likely explanation is that it the letter had been sent from Ullassa by a ruler of a city in the 'Akkar Plain or the Orontes Valley. Assuming them to be correct, as the content of the letter dates it at the time of the Mittanian foray in Amurru against Abdi-Aširta,[489] it might be theorized that, having Sumur been lost, either the letter had been written in Ullassa by chance, or Ullassa had taken over some of Sumur's administrative roles after its first capture. Without further information, however, such an idea cannot be proven.

The profile of Ullassa that emerges from the Amarna Letters appears to be consistent with that of the *mnnw*-fortress of the earlier period. As the *mnnw*-fortresses of Nubia, Ullassa appears to have been an Egyptian centre with an Egyptian population, and not to have normally had an administrative role. However, as the reasons behind the Egyptian presence in Ullassa during the Amarna Period are not given, one can only theorize that the role of such an Egyptian enclave in Lebanon had not changed in a century, and that the Egyptians still controlled Ullassa to maintain the flow of wood to the mainland. Unfortunately, the only supporting argument for such an idea is one from silence, and therefore inherently weak: Bardinet noticed that before and during the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten there are no Egyptian evidence of royal missions to fetch wood comparable to those of the time of Thutmose

[486] Goren et al. 2004:123.
[487] Hess 1993:183.
[488] See **§8.3.2.**; Kilani 2020a; 2020b.
[489] See **§2.3.6.**

III, while Kilani has made the same point regarding the Amarna Letters.[490] As Rib-Addi appears not to have been shy in discussing trade with the Egyptians (as in the case of Yarimuta)[491] the fact that wood is never mentioned might be due to the fact that it was not passing through Byblos, but through Ullassa.

5.4.7.4. Conclusion

In the absence of archaeological excavations able to identify and discuss this city, only the written documents share some light over the Egyptian presence in Ullassa during the 18th Dynasty. At the time of the wars of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II, the centre appears to have been a *mnnw*-fortress built in Lebanese soil to house an Egyptian population employed in gathering wood for the motherland and possibly to act as a bridgehead in the region for the Egyptian army. A century later, Ullassa appears to have still been considered an Egyptian town, and to still have had a somewhat consistent Egyptian population. It can be argued – unfortunately, again, only from silence – that it still had the same role as a century before, and that it was still gathering and sending wood to Egypt. Finally, Ullasa can be considered a Node in an Operational Network. The numerous mentions of the city during the time of Thutmose III present it as a fortress, therefore granting it the characteristics of "Survivability", while the existence of a "storehouse of offerings" and of the granaries in the Annals supports its "Capacity".

5.4.8. Sumur

5.4.8.1. Introduction and archaeological excavations

Located near the mouth of the Eleuthero river, the city of Sumur controlled the main access point to Syria, and its possession was (as noticed by Morris)[492] cardinal to access and control a large part of commerce between coastal Lebanon, the Beqaa, and the Orontes Valley. The city is commonly identified with Tell Kazel, a site with an occupation sequence that spans between Neolithic and Roman times, an imponent size (350x325 m at the base), and impressive fortifications dated at the MBA that were likely still in use during the LBA.[493] The tell has had a somewhat tortuous history of excavations and publications[494] and its Middle and Late Bronze Age strata have never been thoroughly discussed. The

[490] Bardinet 2008:228-248; Kilani 2019:152.
[491] De Magistris 2020.
[492] As noticed by Morris (2005:224).
[493] Badre et al. 1990:19; Badre 2013:739.
[494] The site was first excavated by Dunand in the early 1960s, and by the American University in Beirut between 1985 and 2008 (Chiti et al. 2014:67).

available studies are limited to preliminary reports, short articles, and a book on the site's LBII ceramic.[495] These contributions add little to the purpose of this research, as the LBI strata are still largely unknown. They have been touched in the residential complex of area II, and excavated and published only in area IV of the excavations, where a temple that appear to fit "*perfectly within the types of the Syrian temples*" was found.[496] According to the excavators, the sole element that might be connected to the Egyptian presence is a very large and likely fortified building in the southern portion of the Tell (Area IV-south).[497] However, its excavations begun only recently, and no elements have been offered in support of this idea.[498] No pottery found in these areas has been classified as either Egyptian or Egyptianizing, and what has been published so far mainly reflects the important commercial ties of the city with Cyprus, the Aegean, Mittani, and Ḫatti.[499]



Figure 40 Plan of Tell Kazel (From Badre et al. 2018:163 Plan 2.

5.4.8.2. Sumur in the Mid-18th Dynasty written documents

Since there are no reliable archaeological elements to illustrate the Egyptian presence in Sumur, any discussion must be based on the written documents alone. However, there is nothing in the written documents of the Mid-18th Dynasty to argue for an Egyptian presence in Sumur. The sole mention of the city is in the Annals of Thutmose III, where notice of its conquest is given in the description of the campaign of year

[495] Badre et al. 1990; 1994; 1999-2000; 2018; Capet 2003; Badre 2006; 2009; 2013; Chiti et al. 2014.
[496] Badre 2009:260.
[497] Badre et al. 2013:241.
[498] Badre et al. 2018:14.
[499] Badre et al. 2018.

30:*"Arrival at the town of Qadesh; sacking it, cutting down its fruit-trees and pulling up its grain. Proceeding via the 'Arid-region'(?), arrival at the town of Sumur and arrival at the town of Ardata. Doing the same to them."*[500] Absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence, and the fact that Sumur is mentioned only once in the documents at our disposal might easily be explained with the chances of discovery and conservation. However, a bipartite argument can be made that this lack of documentation is in fact to be connected to the unremarkable role that Sumur enjoyed in Egyptian eyes at the time of Thutmose III.

The first consideration is based on the lines that in the Annals immediately follow the mention of the capture of Sumur: a tally of the "benevolences" brought to Thutmose, which includes 36 children of the chiefs of Retjenu, which are said to have been brought to Egypt. The Annals then explain that "*whenever any of these chiefs died, his Majesty would have his [son] go to assume his position.*"[501] The abduction of the children of the elite of a subdued population is a behaviour that has been practiced, throughout history, by many conquering forces. It often goes together with the children's "civilization", their absorption into the culture and the elites of the invaders. Romans for example often took the young elite of a subdued population as hostages, to ensure loyalty from their fathers in the short term, and in the long term to "Romanize" these children into loyal rulers for their populations, eventually exerting roman influence in their territories with little need for further military investments.[502] As noticed also by Cowie and Morris,[503] the Egyptians during the 18th Dynasty seem to have been of the same opinion, as there are several examples of young Nubians[504] and young Levantines[505] that were taken, "Egyptianized", and put on their fathers' thrones. As nothing in the document suggests that the children of the ruler of Sumur where spared such destiny, one is left to wonder why the Egyptians would have taken the ruler's children hostages if they were planning to transform Sumur in an administrative centre.

[500] *Urk.* IV, 689:13. Translation Redford 2003:68.
[501] *Urk.* IV, 689:13. Translation Redford 2003:69.
[502] Moscovich 1972:2; Wells 1999.
[503] Cowie 2008; Morris 2018:104-109.
[504] Török (2008:270) indicates the example of a man called Menkheperre-sonb, son of the prince of the Medjay Neferkhat. He appears to have been educated at the court of Thutmose III, to have been appointed to several high offices in Egypt, only to become prince of the Medjay himself after his father's death.
[505] Ya'tiri of Ashdod (EA 296:22-29) mentions how he, as a child, had been brought to Egypt and had served in the palace before ruling over his city. Moreover, in EA 59 (13-20) the inhabitants of Tunip ask pharaoh that the son of the deceased ruler Aki-Teššup is sent back to Tunip.




Figure 41: 3D rendering of the Northern Lebanese coast in the Amarna Age. From Kilani 2020:157, fig. 5.4

A likely answer to this question would be that Sumur was not, at the time of Thutmose III, intended to become an Egyptian centre.

The second consideration is connected to the military necessity of a "bridgehead" in the northern Levant. Given what is known of the northern Lebanon under the Egyptian domination, only two candidates come to mind for this role: Sumur and Ullassa. As the two cities were conquered at around the same time (in year 30 and 31 respectively) it is likely the Egyptians would have been able to choose which city would have best served as a foothold in this enemy territory. Ullassa, protected on three sides by the allies of Byblos, the Mediterranean sea, and the mountains of the Lebanon, could easily serve the purpose.[506] Sumur, located in the large 'Akkar plain, far from allies or natural defences, could not.[507] In the geopolitical scenario that the Egyptians were facing at the beginning of the campaigns of Thutmose III, therefore, there would have been little reasons to choose Sumur as a military bridgehead in the region, at a time when Ullassa was about to be conquered again and established as an Egyptian centre. It is particularly relevant to notice, in this light, that Thutmose III appears to have fought in Irqata in the campaign of his year 42.[508] This battle, late in his reign, makes it unlikely that the 'Akkar plain north of Ullassa – and thus Sumur – was in Egyptian hands.

In conclusion, although absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence, it seems unlikely that Sumur would have already been an Egyptian centre at the time of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II.

[506] A contributing factor would have also been the fact that Ullassa controlled sources of specific wood coveted by the Egyptians. See **§5.4.7.2.**

[507] As already argued, on similar grounds, by Kilani 2019:165.

[508] *Urk*. IV, 729:7–730:10. I must thank Marwan Kilani for pointing this out to me.

5.4.8.3. Sumur in the written documents of the late-18th Dynasty

Due to the silence of the sources, it is impossible to say when such transformation happened,[509] but at the beginning of the time covered by the Amarna Letters Sumur appears as the most important centre in Northern Lebanon. Thanks mainly to the letters of Rib-Addi of Byblos and Abdi-Aširta of Amurru, it is possible to understand the succession of the events that happened to Sumur during the Amarna period, several aspects of the Egyptian presence in the city, and its Proximity Principle.

5.4.8.3.1. The history and chronology of Sumur in the Amarna Letters

It is usually held that at the time of Amenhotep III Amurru was not an organized and unitary kingdom, but probably just a little mountainous region inhabited by semi-nomadic people, lacking a capital and a recognized ruler.[510] At the end of the time period covered by the Amarna Letters, however, the successors of a chieftain named Abdi-Aširta had developed Amurru into a large regional power. Rib-Addi chronicled these events for the Egyptian court,[511] and he relates that the process started with the conquest of the large coastal cities of Ardata and Irqata,[512] continued with the subjugation of a series of small centres in Byblos' political sphere, and ended with an attack on Sumur itself. It is only after his conquest of Sumur that Abdi-Aširta wrote his letters,[513] introducing himself as a loyal subject, justifying his intervention by saying that Sumur was under attack from the troops of the city of Shehlal,[514] and requesting to be recognized as the guardian of the Egyptian interests in the area.[515] Despite their gravity, Abdi-Aširta's actions did not meet immediate response, and he appears to have used that time to continue eroding Byblos' control in the area.[516] Singer[517] has theorized that the Egyptians might have tacitly accepted the situation. After all, the presence of local garrisons in Egyptian centres was common practice, and in Egyptian eyes Sumur might have been just another centre garrisoned by a local ruler.[518]

[509] It might be suggested that the city passed under the Egyptian direct control following (or in the context of) the campaigns against Nuḫašše and Tunip of Thutmose IV (**§4.4.4.3.**). However, beside the sheer existence of this campaign, nothing can be offered to substantiate this hypothesis.
[510] For a short history of Amurru, see Singer 1991.
[511] For a discussion of the succession of these events, see Singer (1991:135-155) and Kilani (2020:152-175).
[512] Likely to be identified with modern Arde and Tell Arqa (Kilani 2019:156).
[513] EA 60; 61; 62; 371.
[514] EA 62:16-24. According to Turri (2015:275), today's Shahli, 15 km east of Hama.
[515]EA 60:6-29. Rib-Addi, writing an account of the same episode, describes the conquest of Sumur as due to Abdi-Aširta's own volition. *(*EA 84:6-18).
[516] Kilani 2019:157-175.
[517] Singer 1991:145.
[518] See **§5.2.5.**

It came a time, however, when the Egyptians decided to put an end to Abdi-Aširta's activities, sending two contingents to capture and likely kill him.[519] The reasons behind this change of mind are not clear: it might have been because Amurru had grown to such an extent that the Egyptian felt they could no longer control it, because Abdi-Aširta had been accused of seeking an alliance with Mittani, or a combination of the two factors.[520] Whatever the reasons, the death of Abdi-Aširta only managed to buy the Egyptians some time (maybe even years), as they were ultimately unable to bring Amurru's political activities to an end. After his death, the sons of Abdi-Aširta started expanding Amurru, again conquering Irqata first and Ardata later. Once again, Amurru was able to siege and conquer Sumur. It is unclear how long this siege took, but since Rib-Addi had time to write at least 5 letters in which the siege is said to be happening (and probably 8, according to Cordani)[521], it would not be surprising if it took between one and two years. After the conquest one of Abdi-Aširta's sons, called Aziru, seems to have achieved prominence among the others, since he writes to the Pharaoh and asks to be recognized as the official ruler of Amurru and protector of Sumur. At the same time, Sumur does not seem to have held the same status in the Egyptian administration, as no commissioner appear in later letters. This might be because, after Rib-Addi's exile, the new ruler Ili-rapi was nowhere near as verbose as his predecessor (we only have 4 of his letters),[522] but it seems more likely that the Egyptians did not attempt to re-establish their direct control over the city, that would have remained in Amorite hands until Aziru's alliance with the Hittites.[523]

If the diachronic succession of the events is well trodden ground, and therefore its discussion is relatively straightforward, the connection with the wider chronology of the period hinges on two "Focal Points,"[524] which will be used also for the discussion of Kumidi: the succession on the throne of Amurru, and the second capture of Sumur by the sons of Abdi-Aširta. It is widely recognized that Abdi-Aširta was contemporary with Amenhotep III, that Aziru acted under Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, and that there

[519] EA 117:21-31.
[520] For a discussion, see Singer 1991:144, Liverani 1998a, Gubel 2000, and Altmann 2003. This accusation in contained in a series of letters from Rib-Addi (EA 85; 95; 101), who even mentions a visit of Tušratta to Amurru.
[521] EA 105; 106; 107; 114; 116; 117. Possibly also EA 113; 118; 119. Cordani 2009:58-60.
[522] EA 139; 140; KMD 6; 9.
[523] Singer 1991:148-152.
[524] See **§4.4.4.6.**

was an "interregnum" between the two under the "sons of Abdi-Aširta", before Aziru took power.[525] This is due to the fact that in many letters to Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten Rib-Addi says that it was his father who killed Abdi-Aširta, and that he should do the same to Aziru.[526] The death of Abdi-Aširta appears to have happened at the end of the kingdom of Amenhotep III, possibly – according to both Cordani and Stavi[527] – between years 34 and 36. The second focal point is the second capture of Sumur by the "sons" of Abdi-Aširta, an event that directly ties the succession of events of Rib-Addi's archive with the Syrian War of Suppiluliuma. Petrographic analysis have shown that Aziru wrote EA 165 in Sumur,[528] and in the letter he mentions the presence of the Hittite army in Nuḫašše, the region of the middle Orontes.[529] Since, according to Cordani,[530] the war arrived in Nuḫašše in its third year, and since the third year of the Syrian war corresponds with year 7 of the kingdom of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, it can be argued that Sumur had been conquered by the sons of Abdi-Aširta during, or before, the seventh regnal year of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.

In conclusion, sometimes at the end of the kingdom of Amenhotep III – years 34/36 – Sumur was captured by the ruler of Amurru. Reconquered, it was again lost in year 7 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, when it fell in the hands of Aziru.

5.4.8.3.2. Characters of the Egyptian presence in Sumur in the Amarna Letters

From the various mentions in the letters, it is possible to discuss several aspects of the Egyptian presence in Sumur.

- There was a palace, in Sumur, recognized as belonging to the Pharaoh. This palace must have had some administrative nature, as it appears to have house a bedchamber for the Pharaoh, and a treasury.[531]

[525] For a reconstruction of the events, see Moran 1992: xxxv-xxxvi, n.126; Miller 2007:285-287; Pryke 2010:35-38; Cordani 2011:29-35; and Stavi 2015:9-11, esp. n.30.
[526] As for example the already mentioned EA 117:21-31, but also EA 108:28-33, 117:21-28, 132:10-17.
[527] Cordani 2009:29-35; Stavi 2015:9-11, esp. n.30.
[528] Goren et al. 2003:7-10.
[529] "*The king of the land of Ḫatti is situated [in the land of Nuġasse,] and [I am] af[raid of him], lest [he come to the land of Amurru, t]o the land [of the king, my lord].*" EA 165:18-21. Translation Rainey 2015:815. For the land of Nuḫašše, see Turri 2015:263-267.
[530] Cordani 2009:62-65.
[531] "*And even now the city of Sumur, the court of my lord and his bedchamber, has joined him! And he*

- There was a commissioner inhabiting the centre (see below).
- Egyptians inhabited the centre, since a ruler of an unnamed city writes that, after Aziru's conquest, he has welcomed "*men of the land of Egypt*" (LÚ.MEŠ KUR *M*[*i-iṣ-ri*]) as refugees.[532]
- The centre hosted a garrison which is mentioned several times, but its dimensions are unknown.[533] If one accepts Abdi-Aširta words to Pahamate in EA 62, however, it is likely it was somewhat large. Abdi-Aširta states first that Sumur had been left without men to protect it, [534] and then that he was able to save four men who were "*dwelling in the palace*", while other 25 have died.[535] Assuming both elements to be true, it would either mean that Sumur had two garrisons (one of at least 30 men in charge of the palace, one with an imprecise but somewhat large number in charge of the city) or that there was a garrison of such an extension that 30 men equalled to having left the city unattended.
- Egyptians owned and cultivated lands in and around Sumur.[536]
- Sumur also received from the Egyptian administration grain produced in the land of Yarimuta.[537]

The profile of Sumur that emerges from the Amarna Letters is that of an important centre. The presence of a well-documented series of commissioners and of a well-defended palace, with a treasure and a royal chamber indicate that the centre had a cardinal administrative role, and also the Egyptian refugees of EA 67 might have been connected to the administration. Moreover, the city appears to have been protected by a somewhat large garrison, one likely fed by the produce of the land of Yarimuta.

has slept in the bed[chamber of] my [lord] and he has opened the treas[ury of] my [lord], but he (Pharaoh) keeps silent." EA 84:11-16. Translation Rainey 2015:495. The palace is also mentioned in EA 59:34-38 and 62:16-28.

[532] *"[And] may [the su]n god be apprised:all the men of the land of E[gypt that we]re located in [the city of] Ṣumur, the city of the sun [god, my lord,] are all right; they [ca]me forth and are located in my territory, my [lo]rd*". EA 67:8-13, Translation Rainey 215:435. The city is likely to be identified with the formerly Mittanian Niya (Goren et al. 2004:92-93).

[533] EA 81:48-51; 103:32-51-104:31-39; 106:24-27; EA 114:26-33.

[534] EA 62:8-14.

[535] EA 62:20-25.

[536] "*And I am guarding the barley harvest of the city of Ṣumur and all the territories of the king, my sun god, my lord*". EA 60:25-29. Translation Rainey 2015:419

[537] "*Furthermore, may it please the king that grain, the produce of the land of Yarimuta be given. What was given formerly to the city of Ṣumur, may it be given now to the city of Byblos.*" EA 85:33-39, Translation Rainey 2015:501. The same concept is also expressed in EA 86:35-50; 98:12-20.




Figure 42: Sumur's Proximity Factor

Sumur's Proximity Factor can be calculated by adding the 6 letters from Byblos and Amurru cited at the beginning to the letters mentioning the 5 Egyptian persons that either certainly or likely held the office of commissioner in Sumur:

- Pahamata is mentioned as the commissioner of Sumur at the time of its first conquest in 5 letters,[538] which come from Amurru, Byblos, and Sidon.
- Amanappa appears in 10 letters,[539] all written by Rib-Addi, and all connected to the period of the first conquest of the city.
- Yanhamu, as I have argued elsewhere,[540] appears to have worked in Sumur only for a limited period of his career, between the first and the second conquest of Sumur. In this vest, he is mentioned in 9 letters, from Amurru, Byblos and Beirut.[541]
- Pawura is mentioned as a commissioner of Sumur in 6 letters from Rib-Addi,[542] all written after his death by the hands of the sons of Abdi-Aširta during the second conquest of Sumur.[543]
- Hapi – Pahamata's son, repeatedly accused of having handed Sumur to Aziru – appears in 7 letters[544], 6 from Byblos and 1 from Tyre.

In conclusion, Amurru and Byblos represent 36 out of the 39 letters directly connected to the city, with Sidon, Beirut, and Tyre to complete the image. The centre of Sumur, therefore, appears to have covered at least coastal Lebanon, from as south as Sidon to the 'Akkar Plain.

[538] EA 60; 62; 68; 131; 145.
[539] EA 73; 74; 77; 79; 82; 86; 87; 93; 109; 117.
[540] De Magistris 2020b:304.
[541] EA 98; 102; 105; 109; 116; 117; 118; 132; 171.
[542] EA 117; 124; 129; 131; 132; 362.
[543] EA 362:66-69.
[544] EA 107; 117; 127; 132; 133; 138; 149.

5.4.8.4. Conclusion

Absent archaeological excavations of the relevant strata in tell Kazel, Sumur's role in the Egyptian administration during the 18th Dynasty can only be reconstructed through an analysis of the written documents at our disposal. In the past few pages it has been argued that it is unlikely that Sumur had been made an Egyptian centre already at the time of Thutmose III. However, a century later, at the time covered by the Amarna letters, Sumur had become the most important centre in the northern Lebanon, with a relevant administrative role, a Proximity Factor covering the 'Akkar plain and the coastal Lebanon, and a numerically consistent garrison. This reorganization of the Egyptian control of the region likely followed commercial considerations: located near the borders of the region, the city controlled the access to the Mediterranean to the Orontes Valley and the inner Syria, and through it, much of the commerce between the two regions. Finally, Sumur also clearly possessed both Capacity and Survivability. The presence of granaries is implied by the fact that the city appears to have received resources from the land of Yarimuta, and to have farmed its own lands. The formidable MBA fortifications were likely in use during the LBA as well, especially given the fact that the city was able to withstand a two-years siege.

5.4.9. Kumidi

5.4.9.1. Introduction

Kamid el-Loz, usually identified with the Kumidi of the Amarna and Kumidi Letters, is one of the largest, highest, and better excavated tells in the fertile Beqaa Valley.[545] The site occupies an easily defendable position at the foothills of the Anti-Lebanon mountains, near the southern border of the Beqaa Valley, where it controlled both the portion of the King's Highway inside the Beqaa, and the roads going from the Damascene to the Mediterranean harbours of Beirut and Sidon.[546] Given this prominent location, control of Kumidi would have become a cardinal element for any power interested in controlling the region. The Egyptians of the New Kingdom do not seem to have been an exception,

[545] Marfoe 1995:99.

[546] Heinz et al. 2010:27. See **§6.2.**

and in the written documents of the Late 18th Dynasty Kumidi appears as an Egyptian centre with both an administrative and a military role.

5.4.9.2. The excavations at the site

Kamid el-Loz was excavated by the universities of Mainz and Saarbrücken under Rolf Hachmann between 1963 and 1981, and from 1997 onwards by the University of Freiburg under Marlies Heinz.[547] These excavations found a rich city, built and destroyed several times between the Middle and the Late Bronze Age, with a palace, a temple, and several residential areas.[548]

Kumidi's history of destructions is particularly evident in both the Palace and the Temple areas, where a series of buildings were erected and destroyed in close succession. The early LBI Palace 5, for example, was built on top of a similar MBA palace and – soon destroyed – was replaced by Palace 4 which, several times re-arranged and modified, lasted until the LBII.[549] In its earlier stages (4d and 4c) this structure housed a peculiar building that was initially thought of as the palace's "treasury" (in German, "*Schatzhaus*") because of the richness of the findings. Although the name stuck, the *Schatzhaus* is now understood to be the burial place for members of the local elite: two children and one adult were buried there with hundreds of luxurious objects, like a ring with the cartouche of Thutmose III, and a stone vessel with the name and the title of the Egyptian dignitary Rawoser (*ḥ3tj-ʿ Rʿ-wsr*).[550] In its later stages (4b and 4a), the Palace underwent important changes: not only a massive defensive wall (similar to the city's fortification) was built to defend the palace and isolate it from the city, but since the new constructions were partly built on top of the abandoned *Schatzhaus* it is likely the newcomers had no relation with those buried there.[551] The palace also housed a collection of letters dated to the late Amarna Period (the Kumidi Letters, **§4.4.6.**) which by themselves strongly suggest an Egyptian presence in the

[547] The first set of excavations was published in the 20 volumes of the Saarbrucker Beitrage zur Altertumskunde. The most relevant for the discussion of the Late Bronze Age strata are Frisch et al. 1985; Miron 1990; Marfoe 1995; 1998; Hachmann 1996; Marfoe Penner 2001; and Hachmann et al. 2012. The second set of excavations has been published in a series of preliminary articles and books: Heinz et al. 2010a; 2010b; 2011; Heinz 2016.

[548] Heinz et al. 2010:24-28; Linke et al. 2021.

[549] Heinz 2016:130-135.

[550] This vessel was once considered as the proof of an Egyptian presence in Kumidi during the LB I (Hachmann et al. 2012:207-225), but is now commonly believed to be a result of trade (See, among others, Ahrens 2016 and Heinz 2018).

[551] Heinz 2016:148-150.

palace before its destruction sometimes during the LBII.[552] Similarly to the Palace, also the Temple appears to have been destroyed and rebuilt several times during the Late Bronze Age, growing in size (and possibly social and economic importance) at every reconstruction.[553] Nothing however points toward an Egyptian origin of these changes, especially considering that the only identified Egyptian ware were a few imported vessels found in secondary location.[554]

The excavations located three residential areas. The first two, west and north of the temple, were in use continuously between the Middle and the Late Bronze Age.[555] The third one, on the eastern portion of the tell, was likely established at the beginning of the LB II and although its architecture resemble those of the other areas in building material, wall structures, and the planimetries of the buildings, its standards of construction are much higher, more akin to those of the palace than to those of the other residential areas.[556] To this area also belong the two sole fragments of Egyptianized ware identified in Kumidi to this date.[557]

Finally, it appears to be likely for the Kumidi of the LB II to have been a fortified centre. A monumental fortification wall has been identified at three points along the settlement's perimeter, and although the walls at two of the points are yet to be published, the third one has been described to some detail by the excavators of the Freiburg University. It is similar to those surrounding the palace, with a wall with stone foundations 3 meters wide, a mudbrick-built top, and (adjacent to the wall) pottery dated to the LBII.[558]

In conclusion, the sole traces of an Egyptian presence in Kamid el-Loz are the Kumidi letters and the two small fragments of LBII "Egyptianized" vessels found in the eastern portion of the tell. Both the presence of the letters and their contents testify an Egyptian involvement in the site at the end of the Amarna Period, but little in the archaeological context supports this conclusion. While excavations at other settlements defined as Egyptians in the written documents – such as Jaffa and Beth-Shean–[559] have revealed either Egyptian buildings or locally-produced Egyptian pottery, nothing that might be

[552] Heinz 2016:148.
[553] Heinz 2016:160-168.
[554] KL 74:793, 738, see the catalogue from Penner 2001.
[555] Heinz 2016:176.
[556] Heinz et al. 2010:25-35; Heinz 2016:174-176.
[557] Heinz et al. 2010:34.
[558] Heinz 2016:177.
[559] **§5.4.4** and **§5.4.5.**

characterized as "Egyptian" has been found in Kumidi that could not be explained with trade, and there is thus virtually no evidence to support a long Egyptian presence in the city. This state of being might be explained with the fact that the site has only partially been uncovered, or with the fact that a full study of the site's LBA ceramic is yet to be done.[560] However, an argument can be made (one that agrees with the written evidence discussed below) that since the settlement in the eastern portion of the tell where the Egyptian vessels were found, the fortifications of Palace 4b, and the Kumidi Letters are all to be dated to the LBII,[561] it might be suggested for the Egyptian presence in Kamid el-Loz to have been both rather ephemeral, and dated to the late Amarna Period.

5.4.9.3. Kumidi in the written documents of the 18th Dynasty

5.4.9.3.1. Characters of the Egyptian presence in Kumidi

Kumidi is virtually unknown in the written documents of the Mid-18th Dynasty, as it is only mentioned in the Topographical List of Thutmose III.[562] The situation changes with the Amarna Period, when the abundant documents mentioning Kumidi describe a complex and contradictory picture. Kumidi appears in EA 198 as a regular Levantine city, with a ruler – Arašša – who first asks for support from the Egyptian dignitary Ḫamašše in proving his loyalty to the Pharaoh, and then requires to be granted "life", the right to rule over his own city. However, Kumidi also appears as a regular Egyptian centre, with a commissioner – Pahuru –, a garrison, and a Proximity Factor that covers the Beqaa, the Bashan, and coastal Lebanon.

Before debating the meaning and circumstances of this unparalleled arrangement, it is worth mentioning that not many details can be gained by the written documents, as most letters merely acknowledge the Egyptian presence in the city.[563] Three points regarding its organization can however be made:

[560] The study of the ceramic made by Penner (2001) only covers the temple area.
[561] For the date of the Kumidi letter, see below.
[562] *k-m-t*. Number 8 Simons 1937:118. See **§4.3.5.** and the **Appendix**.
[563] EA 57; 116; 117; 122; 123; 129; 131; 132; 139; 189; 190; 197; 207; 208.

- That Kumidi is an Egyptian centre is clear in EA 190, where the city is defined as "*the [king's] garris[on] city*" in a letter written by the Egyptian court.[564]
- That the city was garrisoned by Levantine soldiers from Damascus.[565]
- That Pahuru had a military division under his command is implied several times. For example, in EA 116 the ruler of Byblos Rib-Addi, asking for military support against Abdi-Aširta of Amurru, says: *"May the king send regular troops, Yanḥamu, with [the overseer]er of the land of Yarimuta [and] the commissioner of the city of Kômidi [with]him".*[566]

5.4.9.3.2. Kumidi in the Amarna Letters: succession or diarchy?

A situation in which both a local ruler and an Egyptian commissioner are present in the same city is unparalleled in the Amarna Letters, and raises the question of Kumidi's form of government: did Pahuru and Arašša share control of the city, or was the local king removed by the Egyptians?

Hachmann and Na'aman have answered this question in opposing manners.[567] Hachmann said that Kumidi became an Egyptian garrison town only late in the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. Na'aman argued in favour of a diarchy, suggesting that Kumidi had been jointly controlled by the Egyptians and the locals from long before the beginning of the Amarna Period. Hachmann identified the Ḫamašše mentioned in EA 198 with the ambassador to Babylon and Mittani of the same name mentioned in EA 11, 27, and 29. Na'aman saw these two persons as mere homonyms, because in the Amarna corpus commissioners are often called to witness a local rulers's loyalty, and naming an ambassador is unparallelled. Hachmann proposed a change in foreign policy in the Late 18th Dynasty. Na'aman advanced the notion that the passive approach to foreign policy of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten makes any change to the pre-existing Egyptian structure in the Levant unlikely.

[564] Goren et al. 2004:27. "*The land of the king, [your] lord, [and guard] Puḫuru, [your] com[missioner; may] you [be on[guard] and gua[rd the city of Qede]sh and guard [the city of Kômi]di, the [king's] garris[on] city."* EA 190:1-5. Translation Rainey 2015:887. The reconstruction of the name of Kumidi is accepted also by Liverani (1998:290), and – to a point – Moran (1992:270 n.2).

[565] "*While my associates (brothers) are hostile to me, I am guarding the city of Kômidi, the city of the king, my lord.*" EA 197:36-43. Translation Rainey 2015:905.

[566] EA 116:72-80. Translation Rainey 2015:617. See also EA 117:53-64.

[567] Hachmann 1982b; 1982a; Na'aman 1985:21, n.4.

I believe there are many reasons to discount Na'aman's ideas. First and foremost importantly, there is nothing in the documents at our disposal to suggest that Ḫamašše was a commissioner. Even assuming that he was one, there is nothing to suggest he was Kumidi's commissioner, or that Kumidi had been Egyptian for some times. On the basis of the (lack of) information provided by EA 198, Ḫamašše might just as easily have been a commissioner in the close Egyptian centres of Beth-Shean and Sumur. Furthermore, Na'aman's idea does not fit easily with the information at our disposal. On the one hand, because it requires that either Arašša or one of his successors remained in power throughout the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, but there is no trace of rulers in Kumidi in later letters. It has already been said, for example, that it was common for local rulers to send troops to guard an Egyptian centre, and the troops guarding Kumidi were sent by Biryawaza of Damascus. If Na'aman were right, there would have already been a ruler in Kumidi before Biryawaza, one who would have contributed with its own army to the security of his own city. The fact that both the ruler and the army go completely unnoticed in Biryawaza's letter would need an explanation that is not offered. On the other hand, even though Ḫamašše and Pahuru supposedly governed the same region, there is a considerable difference in the volume of mentions between the two, one that appears to be difficult to argue solely on the basis of the chances of discovery: the latter is only mentioned in EA 198, while the former is mentioned in 10 different letters written across northern Lebanon and southern Syria. Furthermore, the notion of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten's passive approach to foreign policy, commonly held in the 1980s, is now seriously questioned.[568] Finally, if "unparalled in the sources" is ground to dismiss Hachmann's theory, it should dismiss Na'aman's as well: since there are no rulers of Gaza, Beth-Shean, or Sumur in the documents at our disposal, a diarchy between a commissioner and a local ruler would be just as unique as an ambassador called to witness a ruler's loyalty. In other words, not only Na'aman's "diarchy" theory finds no support in the data at our disposal, but it would require convoluted explanations for the lack of documentation in the late Amarna period, for the absence of the king of Kumidi in the dealings with Damascus, and for the lack of letters regarding the commissioner called Ḫamašše.

[568] Liverani 1998c; Galán 1994:30-32.

Hachmann's idea appears therefore to be preferable. To begin with, it fits nicely with the available evidence. Let us consider the passage in which Arašša declares his loyalty to his overlord: "*May the king, my lord, ask his commissioners whether I am a loyal servant of the king, my lord. May the king, my lord, ask Ḫamašše[e] whether I am a loyal servant of the king, my lord.*"[569] By calling first "the commissioners" and then Ḫamašše, Arašša appears to voluntarily single the former out of the "commissioners" group. Having this considered, since Kumidi lies on the main inland road from Egypt to Waššukkanni and Babylon (see **§6.2.**), it is reasonable to assume that an Egyptian ambassador would have been known to the local ruler. It would therefore be unsurprising if Arašša had called on a known ambassador to support his plea of loyalty, and it would have been just as normal if he had separated him from the "commissioners" group. Moreover, Hachmann's interpretation does not require additional explanations to fit with the available evidence. If the two Ḫamašše(s) were one and the same person there would be no reason to assume a displacement of a number of the commissioner's letters, nor to explain Arašša (and his army's) absence in Biryawaza's letter.

The written evidence, therefore, points decisively to the idea that the Egyptian presence was most likely rather short, both because Arašša's removal from power would explain his absence in any later letter and because it fits nicely with the available evidence.

5.4.9.3.3. Kumidi in the Amarna Letters: establishing a *post quem*

Given the fact that a diarchy appears to be unlikely, the question becomes one of timeframe: when did Arašša's rule over Kumidi end, and when was the city turned into an Egyptian administrative centre? Unfortunately, providing a precise answer to these questions seems hardly possible on the basis of the current evidence. Kumidi lacks a chronicler such as Rib-Addi, and there are no letters to document when and in what circumstances the city was taken over by the Egyptian administration. What can be done, however, is finding *termini post* and *ante quem* for the end of Arašša rule and the establishment of the Egyptian presence.

[569] EA 198:10-17. Translation Rainey 2015:907.

Since Arašša was clearly still ruling over Kumidi when he wrote EA 198, and since he does not appear anywhere else, this letter must be considered the *terminus post quem*. Beside its historical implications, EA 198 is a standard letter, with a normal opening passage,[570] and the usual request to be granted "life". The only Focal Point[571] in the letter is the character of Ḫamašše. As mentioned above, this is because an ambassador of the same name is mentioned in the letters written by the Great Kings of Mittani Tušratta (EA 27:37-40, 52-54; 29:25-29) and Babylon Burna-Buriaš (EA 11:9-22). Dating these letters might therefore also suggest a date for EA 198. EA 27 and 29 can be dated with relative certainty, as the latter had a hieratic docket registering date and place of arrival in Egypt, and the former is directly connected to the latter. According to the docket, EA 27 was delivered to Thebes by two Hurrian emissaries named Pirissi and Tulubri in the first month of Peret of the second regnal year of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[572] From an internal reference, it appears that EA 29 should be dated to some years later. Since in line 113 Tušratta says that two of his emissaries have been kept in Egypt for the preceding 4 years, the letter should be dated at Year 6 if the emissaries in question are Pirissi and Tulubri, and at Year 4 (at least) if they are not.[573] EA 11 is more difficult to date, as its registration docket is unreadable,[574] and the letter does not contain Focal Points. However, if an argument from silence can be made, what the letter does not mention might be revealing. In EA 9 (19-35), Burna-Buriaš desperately tried to "veto" any contact between Egypt and the nascent kingdom of Aššur (testified by EA 15), claiming the territory as his own vassal. Since the contacts continued unimpeded (as testified by EA 16),

[570] Although this is the only letter where the addressee is identified as "my personal gods" (DINGIR.MEŠ *sa* SA[G-*ia*]), with an uncommon plural marker (Mynářová 2007:135).

[571] See **§4.4.4.6.**

[572] *ḥꜣt sp* 2 *ꜣbd 1 prt,* [*sw* 9]*(?) twꜣ.tw m nwt rsyt m pꜣ bḫn n ḥꜥ-m-ꜣḫwt mitꜣ t n šꜥt nᶜ-hᶜ-*[*r*]*i-n*[ᶜ] *inꜣ.n wpwty Pi-ri-si wp*[*wty ṯrbr*] [Ye]ar 2, first month of winter, day [9?], when one (pharaoh) was in the southern city, in the castle of *Ḫꜥ-m-ꜣḫt* ("Rejoicing in the Horizon"); copy of the Naharina letter that the envoy Pirissi and the envoy [Tulubri] brought. (Translation Rainey 2015:295). Much ink has been invested in arguing that the docket reads "year 12" rather than "year 2" (see Miller 2007a:270, n.130 for a discussion, and 266-267 n.65 for further bibliography). However, such idea is now outdated and should be rejected for several reasons: because a "year 12" reading would require a long coregency which finds little support in the available documentation; because it would not explain why the letter had been received in Thebes if the capital had been Akhetaten for the preceding 6 years (according to Liverani (1998:374, n.25), the castle of *Ḫꜥ-m-ꜣḫt* should be identified with the palace of Malqata, in Thebes); because, as noticed by Cordani (2009:37) it would overspread the 10 letters of the Mittani corpus over 16 years; Finally and most importantly because, as it was argued by Mynářová after collating the document, EA 27 presents two strokes representing the numeral "2", and "there is no reason to reconstruct any tens preceding the numeral" (2011:125).

[573] The idea is first proposed by Cordani (2009:37), who however somewhat confusingly argues both that the letter is to be dated at year 4, and that the ambassadors are Pirissi and Tulubri.

[574] Mynářová 2011:124.

either it is to be believed that Burna-Buriaš found his peace on the subject, or that EA 11 was written before EA 9. Considering that Aššur could only develop his foreign relations after the Hittite conquest of Mittani[575] in the first decade of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten,[576] it would appear that EA 11 is to be dated roughly at the same period as EA 27 and 29.

As there can be no certainty over the identity of Ḫamašše, in light of the discussions above it is worth considering that there are 3 different scenarios:

A. that the Ḫamašše of EA 27 and 198 are two different people, as Na'aman sustained.
B. that the two Ḫamašše are the same person, and that he is to be considered a commissioner.
C. that the two Ḫamašše are the same person, and that he is to be considered the ambassador.

Under the unlikely scenario A, EA 198 would have no Focal Points and there would be no way to date it. The only possible indication would therefore be the *terminus ante quem* discussed below. Under scenario B (also unlikely) EA 198 should be dated at the end of the reign of Amenhotep III, because by Year 2 of his successor Ḫamašše was already an ambassador. Year 2 would therefore be the *terminus ante quem* of EA 198. In light of the discussion above, scenario C appears to be the most likely, and in that case, since it can be established that Ḫamašše worked as an ambassador at least between Year 2 and 6 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, it would follow that also EA 198 is to be dated at the same period, if not somewhat earlier.[577]

5.4.9.3.4. Kumidi in the Amarna Letters: establishing an *ante quem*

The establishment of the *terminus ante quem* is a more complex affair, since the diachronic discussion needs to be connected to both the conquests of Sumur, and to the First Syrian War of the king of Ḫatti Suppiluliuma.[578] The earliest letters related to this discussion are EA 116, 122, and 123, all written by Rib-Addi of Byblos. Their mention of a commissioner of Kumidi predate (with different degrees of

[575] Liverani 1998:361.
[576] For a discussion on the date of EA 9, the thorny debate on the name of the recipient of the letter, and the date of the Hittite campaign in Syria, see Miller 2007 and Cordani 2009.
[577] Although Egyptian bureaucracy in the Levant can somewhat elude us, and although it might have eluded also the Levantine scribes (which might have been confused by the Egyptian titles) in this case Ḫamašše is defined as an envoy in EA 9:9, 27:37, 29:25, and his title is not given in EA 198.
[578] See **§5.4.8.3.** and **§2.3.6.** respectively.

certainty) the second conquest of Sumur, and therefore they offer a first *terminus ante quem* for Kumidi in Year 7 of the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, and might be dated as early as Year 3 of the same king.

The one that can be dated with the highest degree of certainty is the already mentioned EA 116, in which Rib-Addi mentions a "commissioner of Kumidi" in a list of Egyptian forces he would like were used to impede Aziru's conquest of Sumur. Clearly, therefore, there already was a commissioner in Kumidi before Sumur fell for the second time. Since it was argued before that Aziru conquered Sumur in Year 7 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, EA 116 must have been written before or during Year 7. A somewhat earlier date for this letter can be suggested on other – less cogent – arguments. The first is the mention of the crowning of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten[579] which means – according to both Miller and Cordani –[580] that the letter was written in the first few years of his reign. The second is the ironic comparison of the sons of Abdi-Aširta to the Kings of Mittani, Cush, and Ḫatti.[581] According to Cordani[582] the inclusion of Ḫatti in the list is indicative for two reasons: first, since in similar earlier lists Rib-Addi does not mention Ḫatti,[583] its inclusion likely means that the First Syrian war had already started, and that Ḫatti was again an important player in the international stage; second, since Rib-Addi can be arrogant about Ḫatti's presence, and not as nervous as how he appears to have been when he wrote EA 126 (51-66, written at around the same time as EA 165) the First Syrian War had not yet arrived near Byblos. For all of these reasons, EA 116 should be dated to the first few years of both Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten (likely Year 5 or Year 6), and of the First Syrian War (likely the first or second year).

EA 122 and 123 might be the earliest mention of the activities of Pahuru, but are almost self-contained and of difficult chronological collocation. In them, Pahuru is said to have sent Suteans to Byblos to kidnap 3 men, killing a Shardana mercenary in the process.[584] The only Focal Point is a short mention of the sons of Abdi-Aširta at the end of EA 123 (38-43). This would date the letters to before

[579] EA 116:60-67.
[580] Miller 2007:286, and n.147, Cordani 2009:32.
[581] EA 116:67-71.
[582] Cordani 2009:67.
[583] EA 75:14-16; EA 104:17-24.
[584] *"Piḫura [s]ent Suteans; they sm[ote] a Sherdani [man and] they [t]ook three m‹en› and delivered [my] ser[vants to] the land of Egypt.*" EA 123:9-21. Translation Rainey 2015:645.

the siege of Sumur, sometimes at the beginning of the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. A date between Year 3 and Year 5 would appear to be likely, but impossible to prove. It is possible that Pahuru would have already been a commissioner in Kumidi, and this might indicate that Kumidi had – at this early stage – an influence over Byblos, possibly because Sumur had yet to be re-built after having been re-conquered.

In conclusion, a "hard" *terminus ante quem* for the establishment of Kumidi can be set in Year 7 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, the latest possible date for EA 116, which mentions the commissioner of Kumidi. However, EA 116 might be dated as early as Year 5, and EA 122 and 123 as early as Year 3. A "soft" *terminus ante quem* for the transformation of Kumidi would therefore be Year 3 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.

5.4.9.3.5. Kumidi in the Amarna and Kumidi corpora: Chronology of the later letters

If EA 116, 122, and 123 represent the earliest attestations of the commissioner in Kumidi, a higher number of disconnected letters has to be considered in this analysis, because they testify the activities of the Egyptian centre of Kumidi in the northern Levant and offer some level of diachronical placement to the Egyptian activities. A total of 29 letters will be discussed in the following pages: 8 mention either Pahuru or a "commissioner of Kumidi", [585] 10 were likely written in Kumidi,[586] and 7 were found – or are thought to have been illegally dug – in Kamid el-Loz.

Setting aside the already discussed EA 116, 122, and 123, Pahuru and the Egyptian centre in Kumidi appear in other 8 letters, five from Byblos,[587] two from the Bashan,[588] and three related to the Orontes Valley.[589]

- EA 117 was apparently written right after EA 116, as Aziru is emerging among the sons of Abdi-Aširta, Sumur is under siege, and Rib-Addi again requests that the commissioners of Sumur and Pahuru are sent against Amurru.

[585] EA 57; 116; 117; 122; 123; 132; 139; 189; 190; 207; 208.
[586] EA 174; 175; 176; 178; 177; 179; 185; 186; 187; 363.
[587] EA 117; 129; 131; 132; 139.
[588] EA 207 and 208, written in Ashtaroth, and Damascus respectively (Goren, Finkelstein, and Na'aman 2004:223-225).
[589] EA 57 from Qatna, EA 189 from Qadesh, and EA 190, a copy of an Egyptian letter sent to Qadesh.

- EA 129 pertains to the same period, but it is clearly written after Sumur has been conquered.
- EA 131 mentions Pahuru as being a "loyal servant" to the king, and asks again that troops are sent to Byblos to wage war against Amurru.
- EA 132 is likely the last to have been written by Rib-Addi: Sumur has been taken, and Aziru is said to be planning an attack on Kumidi.
- EA 139 was written by Rib-Addi's successor Ili-rapi, and it is thus particularly late. In it, Pahuru is said to be inciting Byblos' men against Aziru, and to want to wage war against him.
- EA 207 and 208 are too short and too fragmentary to be dated: in both cases Pahuru is mentioned in relation to local squabbles, and his role is comparable to that of any other commissioner. Neither sender could be identified.
- EA 57, written by the ruler of Qatna Akizzi, is exceedingly deteriorated, and thus any chronological indication would be at best an informed guess.
- EA 189 and EA 197 describe from opposite sides the war between Aitakkama of Qadesh and Biryawaza of Damascus in the Beqaa and the Bashan. According to Cordani, since in EA 162 the Pharaoh orders Aziru to interrupt any relation with Aitakkama, "a man with whom the king is angry,"[590] after this letter the relation must have deteriorated, and therefore EA 189 and 197 should be considered to be later than EA 162, that Cordani dates to Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten's 14th Year.[591]
- EA 190, sent to a ruler whose name cannot be read, orders him to guard and defend both Pahuru and Kumidi, defined as "the king's garrison city". There is little to be said regarding the date, but since there is mention of the travel of the Egyptian army, it might be dated at the later years of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, those when also the Egyptian campaign of the Amarna Letters should be dated.[592]

[590] "*And now the king has heard, saying:"You are on good terms with the ruler of Qidšu." Food and strong drink have you been taking in fellowship with him? So is it true? Why are you doing thus? Why are you on good terms with the man at whom the king is angry? Also, if you have behaved trustworthily, then you will see that your relationship (with me) and his relationship (with me) are incompatible*" EA 162:22-27. Translation Rainey 2015:803-805.

[591] Cordani 2009:102, 119.

[592] See **§6.4.** and Rainey 2015:28-31.

Based on the letters mentioning Pahuru, it seems possible to argue that he acted as commissioner in Kumidi for several years, as the first mention of his activities (EA 116) can be dated at Year 7 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, (but EA 122 might be dated to Year 3), and he is mentioned in letters written until Year 14 of the same king.

The second group of letters was likely written in Kumidi,[593] and might be dated to the same period of time:

- EA 174, 175, 176, 363 were written respectively by Bi'iri of Hashabu, Ilu-Dayyani of Hasi, an unnamed king, and Andi-Resa, ruler of Enishasi. They are all similar in content, and they were all written by the same scribe, likely at the same moment. Since they all mention the expedition of Aitakkama of Qadesh in the Beqaa also discussed in EA 189, they are likely to be dated at after EA 162, in Year 14 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.
- EA 177, written by the ruler of Guddashuna Yami'uta, is too fragmentary and thus does not offer a Focal Point.
- EA 178, written by Hibiya, ruler of an unnamed city, offers no Focal Points, and it is therefore impossible to date.
- EA 179 was written by a deposed ruler of the city of Tobihi. There are no explicit Focal Points in the letter, so a date cannot be specified with confidence. However, since in the letter the author says that Tobihi has become *"like a city of the lands of Amurru"*,[594] it could be suggested it is to be dated at a later stage of the letters, when Aziru was expanding its influence.
- EA 185 and 186 were written by a ruler of Hasi whose name is not Ilu-Dayyani, but Mayarzana, meaning that these two letters cannot be dated at the same time as EA 175. According to Campbell these letters are "*an extreme example*" of undatable documents, as they are lengthy and in good state but contain no Focal Points.[595] The two letters discuss the same issue (a series of conquests of Aman-hatpi, ruler of Tushulti) and are intimately connected, but no character nor event can be reconducted with any certainty to any character or event in other letters.

[593] See note 37 of this chapter.
[594] EA 179:18-20. Translation Rainey 2015:855.
[595] Campbell 1964:130.

- EA 187 was written by a ruler of Enishasi who is not Andi-Resa of EA 363, but an individual named Sadeya. This likely means that the two letters cannot be dated at the same time. Unfortunately, there are no Focal Points to date this letter.

Few of the letters likely written in Kumidi can be dated with any certainty: EA 174, 175, 176, and 363 can be dated at after the 14th Year of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. Unfortunately, however, EA 177, 178, 179, 185, 186, and 187 cannot be dated.

Finally, an even later (but unquantifiable) temporal horizon is offered by the letters that have been found in Kumidi.[596] A general argument to date these letters resides in EA 198: since a commissioner was responsible for the transmission of orders to the local rulers, and since the king of Kumidi would have had no reasons to intercept and store letters from the Pharaoh to another king, it is most likely that they are to be dated to a post-Arašša period.[597] Setting aside KMD 3, 4, and 7 – which are too extensively damaged to offer any data – the other letters all offer a reason to be dated at the end of the Amarna Period.

KMD 1 and 2 are nearly identical letters, sent by an unnamed Pharaoh to Zalaia of Damascus, and Abdi-Milki of Sazaena.[598] Although the two toponyms are spelled differently, Turri has identified the Abdi-Milki that in EA 203 is ruler of ^{uru}*ša-az-hi-mi* with the Abdi-Milki that in KMD 2 is ruler of ^{uru}*ša-sà-i$_{15}$-na*, explaining the difference in spelling with an alternance between nunation and mimation.[599] Zalaia of Damascus is instead otherwise unknown, since in the Amarna corpus the king of Damascus is called Biryawaza.[600] However, in EA 194 Biryawaza mentions both his father Šuttarna and his grandfather Hastar, who presumably ruled before him. As Na'aman has argued,[601] this would make Zalaia either a successor of Biryawaza – and therefore date these letters at the end of the period covered by the Amarna Letters – or a predecessor of Hastar – and therefore date these letters at long before the Amarna Period. However, in the Amarna corpus both Biryawaza and Abdi-Milki reply to the same

[596] See **§4.4.6.**
[597] Wilhelm 1983:42, Pruzsinszky 2008:81.
[598] According to Turri (2015:274-275) this centre should be identified with Tell Barr Elias or Tell Deir Zenum, on the road to Damascus.
[599] Turri 2015:274 n.472.
[600] The identification of Biryawaza as the ruler of Damascus is discussed (see Vita 2004), but the petrographic analysis of Goren et al. (2004:170-171) have confirmed the idea with reasonable certainty.
[601] Na'aman 1988a:287.

Egyptian letter, and therefore are likely contemporary.[602] At the same time, also KMD 1 and 2 are identical, and therefore also likely contemporary. Consequently, if Turri is right in his identification, Abdi-Milki was contemporary with both Biryawaza and Zalaia. To account for the lifespan of Abdi-Milki, KMD 1 and 2 must either be dated at the Amarna period, shortly precede it, or shortly follow it. However, since it is unlikely that Abdi-Milki might have reigned for enough time to know four generations of Damascus' rulers, KMD 1 and 2 should both be dated at after the period covered by the Amarna Letters. The unsigned KMD 5 discusses the weapons of a "*bi-ri-di-ya*" that are in Kumidi. It is generally held[603] that this man might be identified with the ruler of Megiddo of the same name that appears in 5 letters of the Amarna corpus.[604] If this idea was to be wrong, then there would no Focal Point to date KMD 5. If it was correct, however, among the 5 letters stands EA 247, where he replies in affirmative to the request for food for the Egyptian campaign likely connected to EA 190.[605] Unfortunately, KMD 5 does not provide any clear-cut evidence that the two persons are one and the same.[606] However, a plausible and unprovable possibility is that the ruler of Megiddo had departed with the Egyptian army, had died somewhere in the Beqaa, or in the attack against Qadesh, and left his weapons at the Egyptian centre of Kumidi.[607] This would however date KMD 5 in the late Amarna Period. KMD 6, 8 and 9 are sent by Aziru, and by Rib-Addi's successor Ili-rapi. The presence of Ili-rapi dates them to the second decade of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, but their date cannot be established with any more certainty.

Of the 9 Kumidi letters, therefore, 6 can be dated to the last decade of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, whereas 3 could not be dated at all because they were exceedingly fragmentary.

In conclusion, all of the letters that are to be related to the Egyptian centre in Kumidi, either because they mention the commissioner Pahuru, or because they were written or found in Kamid-el-Loz, are to be dated in the last decade of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.

[602] EA 195 and 203 respectively.
[603] Pruzsinszky 2008:82; Hess 1993:62; Wilhelm 1982:138; Rainey 1976:341.
[604] EA 242; 243; 244; 246; 247; 248; 365.
[605] And discussed in **§6.4.**
[606] Hess 1993:62.
[607] Rainey 1976:341.




Figure 43: Graphic representation of the chronological distribution of the letters discussed. The outlines indicate the possible dating ranges

5.4.9.3.6. Chronology of Kumidi

The findings of this discussion can now be summarized. A *terminus post quem* could not be precisely identified. EA 198 – the only point of reference – has a single Focal Point in the Egyptian ambassador Ḫamašše, and although he was certainly active between Year 2 and Year 6 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, his ambassadorial capacity likely started before and might have continued after these two dates. Thanks to the many connections with the lengthy and detailed archive of Rib-Addi, however, the *terminus ante quem* is more easily and reliably fixed to Year 7 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten (the year of the second fall of Sumur)[608] and possibly as early as Year 2 or 3 of the same king. Before this date, there are no letters to support the notion of an Egyptian presence in Kumidi. Moreover, of the 39 documents that pertain to the Amarna and Kumidi corpora and that are related to the Egyptian presence in Kumidi, none can be dated at earlier than Year 2 or 3 of the same Pharaoh: 28 can be dated, with varying degrees of certainty, to the first and second decade of the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, while 11[609] could not be dated at all.

[608] See **§5.4.8.3.1.**

[609] EA 177; 178; 185; 186; 187; 207; 208. KMD 3; 4; 7.




Figure 44: Kumidi's Proximity Factor

Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that Kumidi was established as an Egyptian centre at the beginning of the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, after the first loss of Sumur.

5.4.9.3.7. Kumidi's Proximity Factor

Kumidi's Proximity Factor can be reconstructed by considering who interacted with the centre – either by writing from the centre itself,[610] or by being the addressee of a letter found there –,[611] and who interacted with its commissioner Pahuru.[612] Much of the data has already been exposed in the chronological discussions of its letters: Pahuru related with Qatna, Ashtaroth, Qadesh and Damascus; the kings that wrote from Kumidi were the rulers of Hashabu, Guddashuna, Tobihi, Hasi, Enishasi, and two unnamed ones, all located in the Beqaa; the letters found in Kumidi connect the city with Amurru, Byblos, Damascus, Sashimi, and (possibly) Megiddo. However, the letter supposedly from Megiddo (KMD 5) is not relevant to the discussion. The unsigned letter asks for the restitution of objects belonging to a man called Biridya, like the ruler of Megiddo in the Amarna Letters. If the two Biridya are the same person, then retrieving his objects would count as an exceptional circumstance. If the two Byridia were different people, there would be nothing to tie the unsigned letter to a specific city. In either case, KMD 5 would have little value for the Proximity Factor of Kumidi.

Considering these elements, Kumidi's Proximity Factor appears to have covered not only the Bashan and Beqaa Valley, but to have also reached areas that one would either assume for reasons of regional proximity to be related to Sumur (such as the Orontes Valley and the cities of Qatna and Qadesh), or that are known to have been connected to Sumur (such as Byblos and Amurru). In this regard, it is important to consider the dates of the letters that connect Byblos and Amurru with Kumidi.

[610] EA 174; 175; 176; 178; 177; 179; 185; 186; 187; 363.
[611] KMD 1-9.
[612] EA 57; 116; 117; 122; 123; 132; 139; 189; 190; 207; 208.

Setting aside the letters in which the commissioners of the two centres appear together (EA 116-117), they are all to be dated at periods in which Sumur is not an Egyptian centre, either before its reconstruction (EA 122-123) or after its destruction (KMD 6,8, 9). In other words, in the periods where Sumur was not an Egyptian centre the rulers of Byblos and Amurru had to interact with the nearest Egyptian centre, the one that held the reins of the Egyptian administration in the north: Kumidi.

5.4.9.4. Analysis and conclusions

Considering the elements discussed in the previous pages, five conclusions can be reached on the basis of the letters from Tell el-Amarna and Kamid el-Loz:

1. Sumur was conquered by Amurru twice, the first time by Abdi-Aširta sometime at the end of the reign of Amenhotep III, and the second time by Aziru in Year 7 of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.
2. There are no letters connected to the commissioner of Sumur that can be dated to the second decade of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.
3. It is extremely unlikely that Kumidi had been an Egyptian centre before the period covered by the Amarna letters, as the city in EA 198 appears to be governed by Arašša and a "diarchy" between the Egyptian commissioner and a local ruler cannot easily fit with the pieces of information provided by the documents at our disposal;
4. Kumidi was established as an Egyptian centre at the beginning of the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, before Year 7 and possibly before Year 3.
5. The commissioner in Kumidi had, in the second decade of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, influence on the kingdoms of Amurru and Byblos, replacing Sumur as the Egyptian administrative centre in the northern Levant.

The five elements above coherently support the idea that Kumidi was established as an Egyptian centre only after Abdi-Aširta's conquest of Sumur. It is also likely that Kumidi was a Node in the Operational Network, as it was a well defended city, and the palace was further fortified, possibly at the time of the regime change in the city. Nothing in the archaeological record, however, and nothing in the

documents at our disposal describe the existence of granaries or storages in the city, which is however likely considering the large and pre-existing population of the centre. The fact that Kumidi eventually replaced the coastal city as the main Egyptian centre in the Levant, extending its influence also on areas formerly controlled by Sumur, proves "Dynamism" in the Network. This is because, to face a change of conditions in the War Theatre (namely the loss of Sumur, the emergence of Amurru, and the Syrian wars of Suppiluliuma of Ḫatti) the Egyptians created a new Node for their Operational Network.

5.5. Conclusions

5.5.1. The Egyptian sites in the Levant during the 18th Dynasty

According to the parameters discussed in **§5.2.**, only a few Levantine sites can be said to have been in Egyptian hands during the Mid and the Late 18th Dynasty. The sites of the Infrastructure of North Sinai are markedly Egyptian in character. The fortresses of Tell Hebwa I and II (**§5.3.2.1.**), located at the Nile Delta's eastern border and identified with the *ḫtm*-fortress of Tjaru, are mentioned in several 18th Dynasty documents. Recent excavations in the area have found that by the time of Thutmose III the two sites had already been established, housed several important temples and granaries, and were defended by monumental fortifications. The nearby, heavily damaged fortress of Tel el-Borg (**§5.3.2.2.**) was likely founded under Thutmose III. Although unknown in the written sources, the sites of Bir el' Abd and Harouba (**§5.3.3.**), in the coastal desert have both produced a considerable corpus of Egyptian pottery and examples of Egyptian architecture.

The southernmost Egyptian site in the Levant is Tell el-Ajjul, the most likely candidate for the *dmi*-base of Sharuhen (**§5.4.2.**). In the Annals, Sharuhen appears to be the only Egyptian garrison in the Levant at the beginning of the wars of Thutmose III, and Tell el-Ajjul is one of the few sites where buildings with Egyptian features are found together with a corpus of pottery which is to be considered "representative" in terms of both quantity of vessels and variety of shapes. Nearby Gaza (**§5.4.3.**) is archaeologically unknown, but is mentioned in several different sources. Presented as a *dmi*-base, Gaza is said to have been conquered by Thutmose III, and in the letters from Amarna and Tanaach is defined as an Egyptian administrative site, with a Proximity Factor that covered the Shephelah. The harbour site

of Jaffa (**§5.4.4.**) in the Amarna letters is said to be housing Egyptian granaries, and is said to be have been conquered by a general of Thutmose III in a famous Ramesside tale. Excavation on the tell found the largest and most complete assemblage of Egyptian vessels dated to the Mid-18th Dynasty, and an example of fortified Egyptian gate of the Late 18th Dynasty. In the vicinity of Jaffa stand two sites that would have become Egyptian farming sites during the 19th Dynasty, but where the 18th Dynasty presence is likely, but uncertain because of the state of the publications: Tel Gerisa and Aphek (**§5.4.4.5.**).

In the Jordan and Beqaa Valleys the sole 18th Dynasty Egyptian sites seems to have been Beth-Shean and Kumidi (**§5.4.5.** and **§5.4.9.**). Beth-Shean (which during the 19th Dynasty will become an Egyptian *dmi*-base)[613] in the Amarna letter hosts an Egyptian garrison, and has a "Proximity Factor" that extends across the Jezreel. Its LB IIA and LB IB strata have produced a complete corpus of locally-made Egyptian vessels, and the second largest number of Flowerpots in the Levant. Kumidi is the only other site in which an Egyptian presence can be established during the 18th Dynasty, but only during and after the Amarna period, and only in the written sources since the archaeological excavations have not yielded certain evidence for earlier Egyptian occupation.

In the Lebanon, the only sites that appear to have been relevant for the Egyptians during the 18th Dynasty are Byblos, Ullassa, and Sumur. Byblos (**§5.4.6.**) does not appear to have ever been fully in Egyptian hands, but based on the written evidence and on the historical connection between the two polities, it seems likely it acted as a temporary node during the wars of Thutmose III. Ullassa (**§5.4.7.**) is yet to be discovered, but the petrographic analysis place it in the Koura Plain. In the Annals, the city is said to have been conquered by Thutmose III and to have been given to the army, and it is likely Ullassa should be identified with the *mnnw*- fortress mentioned in several other sources as having been in the vicinity of Byblos, and to possibly have housed a temple. Sumur (**§5.4.8.**) is usually identified with Tell Kazel, a town with direct control of the commercial routes between Syria and the Mediterranean. First said to have been conquered by Thutmose III, in the Amarna Letters it appears to have been a fortified Egyptian centre, with a governor, a garrison, a palace, and a Proximity Factor that extended through the 'Akkar plain. However, the excavations to date have reported no Egyptian

[613] KRI I, 12.9.

architecture, no Egyptian pottery, and nothing points to an Egyptian presence during the Mid-18th Dynasty. Finally, as it was discussed in **§4.3.4.2.**, it is possible a garrison might have been housed in Ugarit, since it is mentioned by Amenhotep II in the context of his 7th year campaign. However, since there is nothing in the written and archaeological evidence published to this moment to suggest that a garrison might have stationed in the city for a long time, it seems most likely that its presence might have been short-lived, and possibly contingent to the campaign.

5.5.2. The Egyptian presence in the Levant as an Operational Network

5.5.2.1. Capacity and Survivability: viewing Egyptian installations as Nodes

According to Kress, to be considered a Node a military installation needs both "Capacity" (i.e. the presence of storage facilities) and "Survivability" (i.e. the presence of fortification, or the location in a secure area).[614] Tjaru appears to have been defended by monumental fortifications, and to have housed important granaries. Excavations in Bir el-'Abd have shown that during the 18th Dynasty a square fortress (defended by a 3m wide mudbrick wall) was built near a granary consisting of 4 silos with an estimated capacity of 40 to 70 tonnes. Excavations in Harouba have found an intact magazine complex, but the presence of 18th Dynasty fortification could not be proven. It has been argued in **§5.3.4.** that the sites in North Sinai were at the centre of a complex system of maritime refurbishment of rations. This new notion of the importation of food to the sites of north Sinai has important repercussions, as it clearly demonstrates the involvement of the Egyptian administration in the creation and the maintenance of their army in the crossing of the desert of north Sinai. In the Amarna letters Jaffa is said to have been fortified and to be housing important Egyptian granaries, and the archaeological excavations found that the city was surrounded by a fortification wall 6.2 metres wide. Gaza is yet to be excavated, but since in EA 296 (30-35) a local king said to have been guarding its gates, it was likely fortified. Moreover, in TT5 it is implied that a tribute should have been sent there, and therefore the city was likely provided with granaries to receive them.

[614] Kress 2002:154-155.

An argument for the presence of storage facilities can also be made for those Lebanese ports (likely Byblos and Ullassa) which in the Annals are repeatedly said to have been provided with the taxes from Lebanon and Retjenu, and therefore likely had storage depots to contain them. It has also been proposed in **§5.4.6.3.** that some passages of the Annals and the Amarna Letters point to the existence of a system of Nodes for the ships in the Northern Lebanon similar to that of the Infrastructure of North Sinai. The absence of evidence for granaries in the other sites can be explained with the accidents of conservation, or the circumstances surrounding the excavations. For example, considering that in Beth-Shean the LB IB and LB IIA have only been reached in area R, it is possible that the granaries of the 18th Dynasty might have been found in other parts of the city. Moreover, it is possible to theorize their presence because of the likely connection of Beth-Shean with the administration of the Pharaonic lands in the Jezreel. It appears therefore that most of the 18th Dynasty sites fit the two elements to be classified as "Nodes" of an Operational Network.

5.5.2.2. The Nodes of Ullassa and Kumidi as an example of Dynamics

According to Kress, to be considered a Network a series of Nodes needs "Dynamics," the ability to evolve and adapt to changes in the War Theatre through the construction a new Node or the abandonment of an old one.[615] Since Sharuhen appears to have been the only Egyptian site in the Levant at the time of Thutmose III, it might be argued that any Node established later is an example of Dynamicity of the Network, but Ullassa and Kumidi better embody the ability of the Network to evolve and adapt to the changes in the War Theatre.

As it has been argued in **§4.3.1.3.**, after the battle of Megiddo the War Theatre of Thutmose III shifted to the Northern Levant, and in the 5th, 6th, and 7th campaigns the Egyptians fought Tunip for the control of the coastal Lebanon and the 'Akkar Plain. Redford has rightly observed that the establishment of Tunip's garrison in Ullassa would have threatened the Egyptian access to its main source of timber,[616] but since with the 8th campaign the focus appears to shift again toward Qadesh and Mittani, it might be argued that the previous ones were aimed at opening the road for the consequent forays against Retjenu.

[615] Kress 2002:154-155.

[616] Redford 2003:71.

Kilani and Morris concur that the several sources mentioning the existence of an Egyptian fortress in the Lebanon should be related to Ullassa,[617] meaning that in year 31 the Egyptians had established a *mnnw* fortress at the southern limit of the ‘Akkar Plain, deputed at the gathering of resources (wood) for the state. In Morris’ definition, a *mnnw* is a fortress-town, strategically located in a vulnerable and valuable region to settle an Egyptian population.[618] Considering that Ullassa appears to have been an harbour town in Egyptian hands, that it was likely furnished with granaries replenished yearly, and that it was thus likely able to support and launch Egyptian expeditions against Retjenu and Mittani, it appears evident the city should be considered a Node of the Network. Moreover, the establishment of a new Node in a different War Theatre, after the beginning of the War, and in a “decisive point” such as the entrance of the ‘AkkarPlain, shows the “Dynamics” of the Operational Network at the time of Thutmose III.

The city of Kumidi – located at a “decisive point” at the southern border of the Beqaa – is a second example for the establishment of a new Node following changes in the Theatre of Operations. Specifically, it has been argued in **§5.4.9.3.** that Kumidi became an Egyptian centre only after Sumur had been lost to Abdi-Aširta of Amurru. While it is true that *post hoc* does not necessarily mean *propter hoc*, it also true that after the loss of the Egyptian centres of the ‘Akkar Plain, no control could have been exercised either in coastal Lebanon, or at the northern entrance of the Beqaa Valley. The establishment of a new Node at the decisive point of the southern entrance of the Beqaa would have been needed, if not for administrative purposes, for defensive ones.

In conclusion, it can be said that at least twice during the 18th Dynasty the Egyptian Network was adapted to the changes of the War Theatre through the establishment of new Nodes at decisive points of the ‘Akkar Plain and Beqaa Valley. Such adaptations clearly show the Dynamics of the Operational Network at the times of Thutmose III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.

5.5.2.3. The classification of the Nodes

[617] See **§5.4.7.2.**, Kilani 2017:146, and Morris 2005:809.

[618] Morris 2005:814.

Nodes can be classified according to the corresponding Level of Logistic. Strategic Nodes produce and gather resources to distribute it to the Nodes at the lower levels. Operational Nodes receive supplies from the Nodes at the Strategic Level and distribute it to the Army inside the theatre of Operations. Tactical Nodes are essentially combat service support, where the army is housed and protected in enemy territory in the short term.[619]

Tactical Nodes elude most investigations. Although movable and temporary camps appear in the written documents of the time as tents surrounded by wooden fences,[620] it is unlikely they would have survived in the archaeological record, and to this day they have not been retrieved. Operational Level Nodes would have been smaller and relatively underdefended sites in the Network. Given their role, they would not necessarily have important Administrative roles. Given their positions, they would have received most of their supplies from external sources, and fed the army with it. They could be identified by the presence of Magazines or Granaries, and by the large presence of locally produced bowls – to distribute food to the army – and contemporary small presence of locally produced storage ware. As it was discussed, before, the sites of the Ways of Horus, and the ports of the Lebanon appear to have possessed both storage units and to have been protected by fortified walls.

Roth, in his analysis of the logistics of the Roman Empire, introduced, the role of "Strategic Bases" along with the concept of "Operational Base" (what here is called a "Node").[621] A "Strategic Base" is the "*source of provision <u>outside</u> the area of operations*" (emphasis added) which represents "*all the regions which contribute provisions to a distant army*".[622] Roth mainly referred to the Italian Peninsula, and Heagren followed his example and considered Egypt to have been the sole "Strategic Base".[623] However, it has been discussed how lands in both the Jezreel and the Yarkon River Valley – two of the most fertile areas in the southern Levant – were co-opted by the Egyptians at the time of Thutmose III, and the Theban administration either sold the supplies produced or acquired and

[619] Kress 2016: 45-47.
[620] e.g. Amenhotep II is said to have camped near the city of *śi-i-ḫ3* in his second campaign (Memphis: *Urk.* IV, 1303:13, Karnak *Urk.* IV, 1312:17) a Levantine camp appears in the Memphite tomb of Horemheb (Martin et al. 1989:36-38, Plate VIII), and the "*śḥ nb*", "*the king's rest houses*" in the tomb of Antef might have simply defined a military camp (*Urk*. IV, 975:2-11).
[621] Roth 1999:169.
[622] Roth 1999:223.
[623] Heagren 2011:253.

distributed them along the Network. In other words, Thutmose III and his successors appear to have underwritten part (if not most) of the costs of their campaigns on to the most fertile areas of the southern Levant, by requisitioning enough land within it that the profits could feed their armies (or be sold for a profit).[624] As Morris has put it,[625] by his 7th campaign Thutmose III appears to have developed a system where supplies where either cultivated on Egyptian-owned lands or requisitioned as taxation. Egypt itself does not seem to have needed Levantine grain, nor for the husbandry that was likely collected, but these resources could have been transported to the harbours of Lebanon and of the southern coastal plain to supply soldiers and resident imperial functionaries, undercutting the costs of maintenance of the Egyptian Administration in the Levant. As it was discussed in **§3.4.5.**, the production and delivery of supplies to the army is an advanced statement regarding the intention of an army toward the territory it traverses, since it limits the amounts of attrition with the local population. It is particularly interesting in this sense, to note how the three Transjordanian cities that Thutmose III captured and donated to Amun are said to have been previously owned by the ruler of Qadesh.[626] It would not be farfetched to theorize that the absorption of these lands would have limited the burden of the Egyptian taxation on the conquered territories, since they were already owned and controlled by a foreign power. Because of their role, they should therefore be considered "Internal Strategic Bases". Given their importance, sites at the Strategic Level would have required a large defensive wall to guard the complex, and the vicinity of fertile lands (also likely settled by Egyptians) to produce supplies.

5.5.3. Conclusion

According to Kress' Model each Node of an Operational Network must possess Survivability and Capacity. In the context of pre-modern warfare that translates into the presence of defensive fortifications and storerooms or granaries to feed the passing army at the site. In **§5.5.1.** it was proved that the presence of both fortifications and granaries can be argued for most Egyptian sites in Sinai and the Levant, either because they are mentioned in the written documents at our disposal, or because archaeological excavations have found their remains. Thus, most sites that can be recognized as

[624] As it is evident in EA 74:15-19, 75:10-17, and 85:23-50.

[625] Morris 2018:146.

[626] Urk. IV, 665:1-4. See **§5.4.5.2.**

Egyptian satisfy the requirements for Capacity and Survivability, and can be considered Nodes of an Operational Network. In addition, Kress' Model requires for the Network to possess Dynamics, meaning that it must be able to move its Nodes or create new ones across the War Theatre when the need to so arises. In **§5.5.2.2.** it has been argued that in two recorded periods of deep changes in the military and political scenario of the Near East, the centres of Ullassa and Kumidi were established to help prompt the Egyptian control of the northern Levant. Ullassa was needed as a bridgehead for the Mid-18th Dynasty wars, and Kumidi was established when the important Node of Sumur had been lost to the rulers of Amurru during the Late 18th Dynasty. Both establishments satisfy the requirement of Dynamics. Therefore, it can be argued that the Egyptian presence in the Levant during the 18th Dynasty can be defined as an Operational Network. While it is important to clarify that not all Nodes in the Operational Network need to have been directly controlled and managed by the Egyptians: the Egyptians took centres that they had an interest in controlling directly, but ample evidence exists to indicate that the cities of the Levant were an integral part of the system that the Egyptians erected, as it will be discussed in the next chapter.




Figure 45 The Egyptian military centres of the 18th Dynasty

Table 8: Egyptian Sites of the 18th Dynasty																	
Indicators		Strong						Possible						Likely			
Name	Main 18th Dynasty Written Documents	Egyptian Buildings		Pottery		Petrographic data		Temple presence		Officials		"Unusual" Buildings		Pottery		19th Dynasty presence	
M= Mid-18th, L= Late 18th		M		M	L	L		M	L	M	L	M	L	M	L		
Tell Hebwa I	*Urk.* IV, 647:12 (Annals); 1643:6-7; 1635:2-11 (Stelae of Neby).	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X			X		X	
Tell Hebwa II		X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X					X	
Tell el-Borg		X	X	X	X					X	X					X	
Bir el- 'Abd		X	X	X	X											X	
Harouba		X	X	X	X											X	
Tell el-Ajjul	*Urk.* IV, 648:5 (Annals).	X	X	X	X											X	
Gaza	*Urk.* IV, 648:9-11 (Annals); Tanaach 5; 6; EA 296.					X					X					X	
Jaffa	*Urk.* IV, 783:13 (No.62 Topographical List); EA 294; 296.	X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X				X	
Tel Gerisa	*Urk.* IV, 783:14 (No.63 Topographical List).													X	X	X	
Aphek	*Urk.* IV, 784:2 (No.65 Topographical List); *1305*:13 (Memphis Stela).												X			X	
Beth-Shean	*Urk.* IV, 786:10 (No. 110 Topographical List); EA 289; Beth-Shean 2.			X	X		X				X					X	
Sumur/Tel Kazel	*Urk.* IV, 689:13 (Annals); EA 59-62; 67-68; 96; 103-109; 112; 114; 116-117; 124; 129; 131-132; 159-160; 162; 371.						X				X						
Ullassa	*Urk.* IV, 1241:19 (Gebel Barkal Stela); 739:15-740:1 (Annals); TT 99; TT 42; EA 60; 84; 89; 95; 104-105; 109.							(?)			X						
Kamid el-Loz/ Kumidi	*Urk.* IV, 784:2 (No. 8 Topographical List); EA 57; 117; 122-123; 132; 189-190; 207-208; KMD 1-2; 5-9.						X				X						

CHAPTER VI: ROADS AND THEIR MILITARY USE

6.1. Introduction

Chapters **IV** and **V** had the purpose of presenting the evidence and discussing two complementary elements in the conquest of a territory: the military campaigns, and the Nodes of the Operational Network built to support them. The role of this chapter is to present a third set of evidence – the Levantine road system, the "Edges" of an Operational Network –[1] and to show how the Egyptian army would have traversed while going to battle. This will be achieved by first presenting the roads and highways of the Levant as they have been described in previous literature, by then considering the characters of the Levantine roads, and finally by discussing how an Egyptian campaign in the Levant seemingly unfolded along the lines of the identifiable roads at the end of the Amarna Period.

6.2. The Levantine road system[2]

As Aharoni and Dorsey have argued,[3] since there is no comprehensive contemporary written record of the Levantine road system during the Late Bronze and the Early Iron Ages, and since only a few paved tracts have survived in the archaeological record, any discussion can only be based upon four resources. The first two are the course followed by later routes and the topographical configuration of the territory: since every landscape fixes through times the routes across it, most roads would have followed the same path from a century to another, and therefore it is likely that a road attested in the Iron Age would have been walked already during the Late Bronze Age. For example, the lower points across a mountain chain become passes, shallow places on a river's bed become fords, and both become elements to take into consideration when planning a journey or preparing a road.[4] The Levant, with its narrow valleys and high mountain chains is no exception. To follow the north-to-south direction of the Syro-African Rift and of the mountains of Lebanon and Carmel, the main roads developed on the two sides of the central

[1] The communication lines which make it possible for an army to go to battle in the most rapid, secure, and economically efficient way (Kress 2016:29. See **§3.4.4.**).

[2] The terms "road" and "route" are used in this discussion almost as synonym. However, there is a substantive difference between them, as routes are the direction of travel between two points, while roads are the prepared paths that manifest the routes. To put it in a different way, it can be said that all roads manifest routes, while not all routes are manifested by roads.

[3] Aharoni 1979:45; Dorsey 1991:52-57.

[4] As Dorsey (1991: 208) has argued.

highlands.[5] Meanwhile, regional roads open in correspondence of valleys and mountain passes connecting the two highways on a longitudinal axis.[6]The third resource is the names and segments of roads mentioned in the contemporary written documents, like those in the Annals and the topographical list of Thutmose III.[7] The fourth are the archaeological investigation revealing the chain of settlements located along the various historical routes, similarly to what has been done for the Infrastructure of North Sinai, the so-called Ways of Horus.[8]

The coastal Highway, usually called "*Via Maris*"[9] was a military and commercial route that, passing through the Levant, connected Egypt with Syria, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia. After passing through the desert of north Sinai and its Infrastructure,[10] after Gaza the highway pointed north, passed through a "corridor" between the dunes and the hill country[11] and reached the cities of Ashkelon,[12] Ashdod, and the Egyptian centre of Jaffa.[13] The road would have then turned inland, following the unfordable Yarkon river until its springs, where the strategically important city of Aphek (which might have been an Egyptian centre already during the Amarna Period)[14] controlled the narrow passage between said springs and the hills of Ephraim.[15] From Aphek, the highway split into different roads leading toward the interior, but the highway pointed directly north, across the Sharon Plain, to Socoh, Yehem and Gath-Padalla.[16] Amenhotep II seems to have followed this route in his third campaign[17] likely because controlling these three cities meant to control an important junction within the *Via Maris* (especially Socoh, located on a crossroad leading east toward Shechem and the river Jordan).[18] The Carmel range just north of Gath-Padalla creates a barrier which can only be crossed in three points, which constitute the three roads mentioned in the Annals of Thutmose III:[19] a northern road passing by Djefty[20] and terminating in the western end of the Jezreel, an eastern route which ended south of Tanaach, and a mountain pass that would have led to Arunah and then directly south of Megiddo.[21]

[5] Aharoni 1979:45.
[6] Dorsey 1991:208.
[7] See **§4.3.1.** and **§4.3.5.**
[8] **§5.3.**
[9] Dorsey 1991:57.
[10] See **§5.3.3.**
[11] Aharoni 1979:48.
[12] Which, as the sole major centre built directly on the Mediterranean shore was connected to the main highway by access roads (Aḥituv 1984:70; Dorsey 1991:60).
[13] Aḥituv 1984:69; Dorsey 1991:60.
[14] **§5.4.4.5.**
[15] Aharoni 1979:48; Aḥituv 1984:60.
[16] Dorsey 1991:70.
[17] **§4.3.4.3.**
[18] Aḥituv 1984:179.
[19] *Urk*. IV, 650.8-12. See **§4.3.1.2.**
[20] Likely Tel Esur (Shalvi et al. 2019). According to Aharoni (1959) this road is reflected in the toponyms 112-116 in Thutmose III list (§4.3.5).
[21] Dorsey 1991:72.

While the first two seem to have been in regular use since the Late Bronze Age, Recent investigation from Zertal have supported the idea the Arunah pass was not in regular use until Roman times.[22]

The Jezreel Valley, and Megiddo in particular, was extremely important in controlling the *Via Maris*. Whomever controlled the Jezreel controlled the east-to-west movements between the Akko Plains and the Jordan Valley, the Bashan, and the Damascene.[23] The main coastal route would have led from Megiddo toward Jokneam, which guarded the pass between Mount Carmel and the hills of southwestern Galilee, and finally point toward Akko.[24] From Akko the route continued north, passing in the continuous and narrow strip of land between the sea and the Lebanon mountains, and through Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Byblos, and finally the Egyptian centres of Ullassa and Sumur in the Koura and 'Akkar Plains.[25] On the opposite side, the routes to Mesopotamia had a formidable obstacle in the high mountains of Galilee and Lebanon, and thus turned inland toward the Jordan Valley, passed the Egyptian centre of Beth-Shean, and resumed a northward direction toward Hazor. This city was located near a ford of the Jordan river, on the direct roads to Damascus and the Beqaa valley. From Hazor, the road would have gone north, entering the Beqaa near Kumidi and toward Qadesh on the Orontes, and turned toward the area of modern Homs.[26] The King's Highway, the second most important route of the region, run the length of the Transjordan, from the Arabah to Damascus, passing through Ashtaroth and across the Moabite Plateau.[27] This road served mainly as a trail for nomadic caravans, but Redford has convincingly argued that its northern portion is part of the topographical list of Thutmose III.[28]

Most "local" roads in the region connected "perpendicularly" the coastal highway with the interior and the King's Highway.[29] From north to south, a road opens in the Homs Gap connecting Sumur on the coast to Tunip and Qadesh in the interior, [30] and others connected Damascus to Sidon and Hazor and Tyre from at least the Middle Bronze Age.[31] Three routes run through the Galilee connected Hazor with the seaports of the Akko Plain.[32] Another road passed between the Carmel and the Jezreel Valley going

[22] Zertal 2011.
[23] Dorsey 1991:78; Hesse 2008b:39.
[24] Aḥituv 1984:123; Dorsey 1991:80.
[25] Dorsey 1991:82.
[26] Astour 1995:1415.
[27] Aharoni 1979:54-57; Mattingly 1996.
[28] Redford 1982. See **§4.3.5.**
[29] Aharoni 1979:57.
[30] Likely the route taken by Thutmose III in his Fifth Campaigns. *Urk*. IV, 685-688.
[31] Hesse 2008a:172.
[32] Dorsey 1991:156.

from Megiddo to Akko, and likely appears in the Amarna Letters as an international caravan route.[33] Finally, another important one run from Yurza (modern Jemma) to Aphek in the south, passing through Gath,[34] and then branching out further east towards Lachish and Beth-Shemesh.[35]

6.3. The Capacity and Security of the Levantine Roads

Kress has argued that Edges should be considered using two elements:[36] "*Capacity*", the rate at which the army can move through an edge, as it can be determined by the type and width of the road, the topography of the route, and the means of transportation used to travel through it; and "*Survivability*", the possibility of protecting a route in a way that the destination can be reached within the necessary duration.

The armies of antiquity and late antiquity are generally argued to have marched with an average speed of 4 km per hour, roughly 24 km per day assuming a 6-hours day march.[37] However, this speed does not seem to have been consistently reached, and to have drastically changed depending on the security of the traversed areas. In the Annals of Thutmose III, for example, it is possible to reconstruct the velocity of the army which moved seemingly undisturbed between Tjaru and Yehem. In the first entry of the first campaign the army leaves Tjaru on the 25th day of the fourth month of *Prt*.[38] The second and third entries are dated to the first month of *šmw*, days 4 and 5:[39] the king and his army arrive at Gaza and leave the day after. The fourth entry,[40] dated to the 16th day of the same month, sees the king in Yehem.

[33] Aharoni 1979:61.
[34] Dorsey 1991:58.
[35] Dorsey 1991:69.
[36] Kress 2002: 374-377. A third element, "Duration", indicates the time it takes for a single unit of an army (like a single soldier) to travel from a Node to another. As he observes, however, the distinction between Duration and Capacity is uncommon, since a standard model assumes the flow to be homogeneous and continuous over time, making the flow of the single unit similar to that of the army itself. Such a minute distinction is however unachievable on the base of the available data, and in any case beyond the point of this research.
[37] Murnane 1990:95-98; Redford 2003:202-205; Spalinger 2005:32-34; Heagren 2010:205-207; Wernick 2014:280-286. The same speed has been theorized, for example, by Engels (1978:58 n.135) for the army of Alexander the Great.
[38] *Urk*. IV, 648: 2. Translation Redford 2003:8.
[39] *Urk*. IV, 648:9-11.
[40] *Urk*. IV, 652:13-655:15.




Figure 46: Map of the main Levantine roads. While the stops are those identified by Dorsey (1991), the connection between each stop has been re-drawn on the base of a QGIS algorithm which is currently being developed by Kilani, capable of identifying the shortest walkable distance between two points.

According to Thutmose, therefore, the Egyptian army was able to cover the 220 kilometres of North Sinai in 10 days, matching the expected velocity of an army of the time. However, the 115 Km between Gaza and Yehem are covered in 11 days, meaning that the same army has averaged a meagre 10.5 km per day. In the first portion of its march the army was doubtlessly protected and fed by the Infrastructure in place in the area, but in the second the army was seemingly entering in enemy territory, and it is likely that they would have had to slow their march for it to be secure.

6.4. The use of the Edges: the Campaign at the end of the Amarna Period

That the Egyptian army would have found supplies at regular stations along the road is an idea that can be observed archaeologically in the Infrastructure of North Sinai,[41] and found in several sources written during the Mid and Late 18th Dynasty. At the time of Thutmose III the stela of the Great Herald Antef describes how he was sent ahead of the army to set up and organize the supply of goods to the military camps *(śḥ nb)*,[42] while the port of calls on the Lebanese coast are said in the Annals to have been supplied with every manner of goods.[43] A similar system can be understood to have been in place at least since the time of Amenhotep II, as it appears in Tanaach 5 and 6.[44] However, the system can be better seen and studied in the Amarna Corpus, as 26 letters appear to have been written to answer a pharaonic order to feed his passing army.[45] This order is preserved in EA 367, a copy of a letter sent to the ruler of Achshaph Intaruta by an unnamed Pharaoh:

> *"Speak to Intaruta, the ruler of Achshaph; thus (spoke) the king: This tablet have I sent to you ‹to› say to you, "Guard! May you be on guard in the place of the king that is in your charge." Now, the king has sent to you Ḫanni, the stable master of the king in the land of Canaan and as*

[41] See **§5.3.**

[42] *"Every śḥ nb situated in a foreign land was assessed for [supplies] and I travelled before the elite corps at the head of the army, and (by the time) my lord came safely to me I had provisioned it. I supplied it with all good and desirable things available abroad, better than an Egyptian palace, purified, cleased, with privacy and security for their apartments, and the pantry staffed by its attendants." Urk*. IV, 975:2-11. Translation Redford 2003:180-181.

[43] *Urk*. IV, 692:15-693:14. Translation Redford 2003:72. See **§5.4.7.3.**

[44] **§4.4.2.**

[45] EA 55; 65; 144-142; 144; 147; 153; 191; 193; 195; 201-206; 216-218; 223; 227; 233; 247; 291, 324; 325; 337. On the subject see Schulman 1964b; Pintore 1972; 1973; Liverani 1979; Na'aman 1990; Giles 1997; Rainey 2015:28-31. Both Pintore (1972; 1973) and Liverani (1979) have understood these letters as reflecting routine activities of control of the region, rather than a single campaign. As noticed by Na'aman (1990) and Rainey (2015:29) however, the fact that the chronological indication point to the same period for all letters makes their idea unlikely (see below).

for what he says to you, heed it most diligently, lest the king find in you a fault. Every word that he says to you, heed it most diligently and carry out most diligently. And guard! Guard! Do not be slack and may you verily be prepared before the arrival of the king's regular troops, the bread being abundant, the wine (and) every supply being abundant. Now he is coming to you very quickly and he will cut off the head(s) of the enemies of the king. And may you be apprised that the king is well like the sun god in heaven; his vast troops and his chariotry are exceedingly well"[46]

EA 370 presents Intaruta with 3 orders: to "*guard his city*", to "*obey his stable master*", and to prepare food for the arrival of the Egyptian Army. Assuming all rulers received the same orders, then – as Na'aman has argued – all letters mentioning these points would have been written to answer to EA 367 and its copies. The 26 letters (from 24 cities) which corresponds to these indication are all similar to EA 325 below.[47]

Now, I am guarding the place (temple?) of the king, my lord, and the city of the king, my lord, which are in my charge. Who is the dog that he would not obey the words of the king, the son of the sun god? Now I have prepared every commodity: [br]ead, beer, cattle, small cattle, [gr]ain, straw, all the commodities which the king, my lord, said, [and] now I have prepared. And now I am [preparing(?)] the tribute of the sun god according to the command of the king, my lord, the sun god from [heaven].[48]

Having this considered, it is evident that a military campaign was under preparation during the Amarna Period, and since the army would have had to pass through these cities (or, in a sense, these Nodes) to be fed, then by tracing each city that appears to have contributed to the expedition it might be possible to identify the roads that the Egyptian army took – or would have taken – in this campaign.

[46] EA 367, Translation Rainey 2015:1249. The same missive might have been also contained in EA 370, sent to the ruler of Ashkelon Yidia. However, the letter is unfortunately damaged in the central area, where the message would have been written.

[47] I follow Na'aman (1990:398) in considering solely letters that answer 2 or more of the points touched by EA 367, and I add EA 247 from Megiddo, to the group, which Na'aman did not consider (perhaps because of its fragmentary state).

[48] EA 325:10-22. Translation Rainey 2015:1205.

Twelve among the cities represented by these letters can be easily identified, either because the ruler and/or the city are well known, or through the petrographic analysis of Goren, Finkelstein and Na'aman.[49] These cities are: Akko (EA 233), Achshaph (EA 223), Ashkelon (EA 324, 325), Beirut (EA 141), Damascus (EA 195), Gath (EA 65), Gezer (EA 292), Hazor (EA 227), Megiddo (EA 247), Qatna (EA 55), Sidon (EA 165), and Tyre (EA 147, 153).

Other twelve cities are more difficult to identify. Sometimes the centre is scarcely known or unknown in contemporaneous documents, sometimes Goren, Finkelstein, and Na'aman could not examine the letters, sometimes the letters were written on a clay for which no parallel could be found, and sometimes the letters were written in an Egyptian centre.

A first group is composed by EA 191 and EA 193, sent by Arzawuya and Tiwati, the rulers of Rogisi and Labana. Both towns appear to be near and connected to Qatna and Qadesh on the Orontes: in EA 197 Arzawuya is said to have gathered troops in Qadesh, and in EA 53 and EA 54 Akizzi of Qatna writes to the Pharaoh that the rulers of Qadesh, Labana, and Rogisi have attacked together the Egyptian land of Upi.[50] The petrographic analysis could only point to the area between the northern Beqaa and the Lake Homs as an origin for the tablets.[51] On these basis, Turri has recently proposed an identification with the poorly excavated Tell et Tin and Tell el-Wawiya respectively, both located on the shores of Lake Homs and both inhabited in the LBA.[52]

A second group is composed by letters that Goren et al. could not analyse: Shiribashani (EA 201), an unnamed city (EA 202), Sashimi (EA 203), Qanu (EA 204), Tobu (EA 205), and Nasiba (EA 206). All letters appear to have been written by the same scribe and with the same clay, so it is likely they were composed at the same time and in the same place.[53] Since the same scribe wrote also EA 195 from Damascus, and the clay used to prepare the tablets appears to come from the southern Bashan, it is likely that the six cities were located near one-another in that region.[54] Shiribashani is likely to have been in the Naveh region of the Bashan.[55] The unnamed city of EA 202 remains of course unknown. For

[49] Goren et al. 2004. See **§4.4.4.5.**
[50] The Damascene (Turri 2015:331).
[51] Goren et al. 2004:99.
[52] Turri 2015:249, 270.See also Mousli 1981-1982.
[53] Goren et al. 2004:224.
[54] Goren et al 2004:215.
[55] Aḥituv 1984:181.

what matters Sashimi, Turri suggested one between Tell Barr Elias or Tell Deir Zenun,[56] but the sites are both in the Beqaa and although it is not impossible that the scribe from Damascus might have travelled in regions that were different by the Bashan, it seems unlikely he would have pushed so far north. Qanu and Tobu appear in the Topographical list of Thutmose III.[57] Although that only supports the placement in the Bashan, Qanu is usually identified with Qanawat, Tubu with et-Tayibet, and Nassiba with modern-day Nasib. [58]

A third group is composed by EA 216, 217, 218 and 337. The first three letters were written in the Egyptian centre of Gaza, but provide no indication on the related city, and while EA 337 cannot be placed with any certainty, a location can be suggested. Hizziri – the ruler who sent EA 337 – sent another letter, EA 336. Since EA 336 was written with the same clay as EA 364 from Ashtaroth. it is likely Hizziru's city is located in the vicinity of Ashtaroth. Moreover, since EA 336 is nearly identical in both style and petrographic composition to EA 334 – written from a city called Zuhra – it is possible that Hizziru ruled over Zuhra. The petrographic analysis of EA 334 and 336 point toward a calcareous area, east of the Jordan River, and on this base Goren, Finkelstein and Na'aman have suggested the area of Tell el-Husn, in today's Jordan.[59]

Before moving on with the analysis, it is necessary to consider this campaign's chronological frame. Even though the Pharaoh who sent EA 370 is never named, several elements concur in pointing to Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten as the most likely sender, and the second decade of his kingdom as the most likely period in which the campaign took (or would have taken) place. To begin with, the concluding declaration of EA 367 does not mention the god Amun (which prominently appeared at the times of Amenhotep III)[60] but features a "*sun god in heaven*" reminiscent of the Aten, suggesting that the religious revolution had already started. Moreover, in EA 55 Akizzi of Qatna addresses his letter to Namḫuria, which is usually identified with Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[61] In addition, in one of his answers to the order Ammunira – ruler of the city of

[56] Turri 2015: 274.
[57] No. 26 and 22 respectively, see **§4.3.5.** and the **Appendix.**
[58] Goren et al 2004:215.
[59] Goren et al. 2004:224.
[60] As Rainey (2015:28) has noticed before me by comparing EA 370:22-25 with EA 369:228-32.
[61]Hess 1993:116-117.

Table 9: the disposition of the cities for the Egyptian campaign during the Amarna period							
EA	**Location**	**King**	**City**	**EA**	**Location**	**King**	**City**
55	Tell Mishrife	Akizzi	Qatna	204	(?)	(?)	Qanu
65	Tell es-Safi	Abdi-Ashtarti	Gath	205	(?)	(?)	Tobu
141	Beirut	Ammunira	Beirut	206	(?)	Amayashe	Nasiba
142	Beirut	Ammunira	Beirut	216	Sharon (?)	Bayawa	Unknown
144	Saida	Zimredda	Sidon	217	Sharon (?)	(?)	Unknown
147	Tyre	Abdi-Milki	Tyre	218	Sharon (?)	(?)	Unknown
153	Tyre	Abdi-Milki	Tyre	223	Tell Keisan	Intaruta	Achshaph
191	Tell el-Wawiya (?)	Arzawuya,	Rogisi	227	Tel Hazor	Abdi-Shullim	Hazor
193	Tell et Tin (?)	Tiwati	Labana	233	Tel Akko	Satatna	Akko
195	Damascus	Biriawaza	Damascus	247	Tel Megiddo	Biridiya	Megiddo
201	(?)	Artamaya	Siri-Bashani	292	Tel Gezer	Balu-Dani	Gezer
202	(?)	Amayashe	Unknown	324	Ashkelon	Yidia	Ashkelon
203	(?)	Abdi-Milki	Sashimi	325	Ashkelon	Yidia	Ashkelon
				337	(?)	Hizziri	Zuhra

Beirut – mentions the presence in his city of Rib-Addi, the exiled ruler of Byblos.[62] Since, according to Cordani's chronology, Rib-Addi was exiled to Beirut sometimes around Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten's 12th year of reign, this event functions both as a Focal Point and as a *terminus post quem*, dating the preparation for this campaign to the second decade of the kingdom of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[63]

A second issue is connected to the execution of this planned campaign. Only a few letters in the archive date to the last decade of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, and thus it is likely that any tablet related to the campaign itself might have been deemed "current affairs" when Tutankhamun moved the capital to Memphis.[64] However, there are three documents that support the idea that an Egyptian campaign took place at the end of the Amarna Period. One (if Izre'el and Singer are correct in dating it to the Amarna Period) is the General's Letter, where an Ugaritic soldier discusses its skirmish with (and the wait for) the Egyptian army in the Koura Plain, something which well combines with the argument of an Egyptian division marching through coastal Lebanon.[65] The second is the Deeds of Suppiluliuma, as presented by

[62] EA 142:15-17.
[63] Cordani 2009:100.
[64] Like Na'aman (1990:404) has argued. See **§4.4.4.6.**
[65] Izre'el et al. 1990:16, later accepted by Spalinger 1992 and Röllig 1993 among others.

his son Mursili II. In a passage which relates to beginning of the Second Syrian war (also known as the "Hurrian War") Mursili writes *"To the country of Kinza, which my father had conquered, troops and chariots of Egypt came and attacked the country of Kinza."*[66] According to the chronology of the wars of Suppiluliuma developed by Cordani, this event happened during Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten 16th and last year,[67] and thus it is conceivable that a preparation for a similar campaign could have started already on year 12 of his reign.

It seems clear that at the end of the period covered by the Amarna Letters the Egyptian prepared a campaign that would have taken their army from Gaza to the gate of Homs and the Orontes Valley, passing through both coastal Lebanon and the Beqaa valley. On this track or its close proximity lie all the contemporary Egyptian centres (Gaza, Jaffa, Beth-Shean, and Kumidi) and most of the cities that prepared to support the marching army: Ashkelon, Gath, Gezer, Megiddo, Hazor, Akko, Qatna, Rogisi, Labana, Tyre, Beirut, Sidon. Some other cities (those in the Bashan and Damascus) do not appear to have been directly involved but are still close enough to the main route that they could have easily joined the expedition on the road at Hazor and Kumidi. The same path and the same division of the Army would have later been chosen by Ramses II in the famous battle of Qadesh of 1275 BC, where 3 divisions of the Egyptian army marched through the Orontes Valley and are said to have been joined on the battlefield by a fourth one coming from the 'Akkar Plain.[68] As Darnell and Manassa have noticed, the decision of dividing the Army in this way might have been due to Logistical concerns since, by dividing the army in the two contingents, the Army would have been better able to supply from the territories they would have been passing through.[69] Since the Egyptian army would have arrived in Sidon, Rogisi, and Qatna, it is reasonable to consider that the object of a similar campaign might have been located either north of the Orontes Valley and the gate of Homs, or in the region itself. All of these elements together seem to the capture of Qadesh as the most likely strategic objective of this campaign, and such an idea well agrees with the notion of an Egyptian attack to the city at the end of the kingdom of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. Considering that, at this point in time, Egypt had already lost control of

[66] KBo V 6:21-23. Translation Güterbock 1956b:93.
[67] Cordani 2009:127-130.
[68] KRI II, 16, 102; 19, 131. For a discussion, see Spalinger 2005:209-226.
[69] Darnell et al. 2007:173.

Sumur and Ullassa, it seems likely that the objective of this campaign would have been the capture of the lost territories, and the re-establishment of the Egyptian control.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the second element that compose an Operational Network: the Edges, the roads prepared to take an army to war in the most rapid, secure, and economically efficient way.[70] This chapter has first discussed the roads of the Levant as they can be reconstructed according to the contemporary and later sources, and according to the topography of the Levant, and has then shown how an Egyptian campaign in the Levant would have unfolded along the lines of the identifiable roads to bring the army to battle against an identifiable source in the region of Qadesh on the Orontes. The existence of written sources mentioning an Egyptian attack on Qadesh makes the above discussion of the sources even more compelling.

[70] Kress 2016:29. See **§3.4.4.**

CHAPTER VII: THE MODEL

7.1. Introduction

It was said in Chapter **I** that this research aims at understading the Egyptian foreign policy objectives in the Levant during the Mid and Late 18th Dynasty through an operation of "Reverse Engineer" of the contemporary military behaviour. According to Eilam, Reverse Engineering is the "*process of extracting design blueprints from anything man-made*,"[1] an action that is usually carried out when such pieces of information are not available, but the end-product is. Traditionally, the process involves the dissection of the product into its constituent parts to understand the function of each piece.[2] The theoretical premise of this research is that it is possible to "Reverse-Engineer" the Egyptian political Ends by dissecting the military actions into its constituent parts: the objective established at the Strategic Level of War and the role played by the Operational Network in supporting said objective.[3] The role of this chapter is to develop a model capable of accomplishing these aims by briefly reviewing the main theoretical concepts discussed in chapter **III** and employed throughout the previous discussion, and by touching upon some important ideas presented by Liverani and Heagren.[4]

7.2. The Theory behind the Model

The Model and its discussion are based on four core ideas that need to be briefly recalled here: the "Levels of War", "Grand Strategy", "Operational Logistics", and "Operational Network".

- According to the theory of the levels of War, War is a complex business that requires constant coordination between the establishment and pursuit of objectives across several levels of analysis. Each level has its own area of interest: the Strategic Level identifies what targets to

[1] Eilam 2005:3-4.
[2] Eilam 2005:3-4.
[3] This theoretical premise is not, however, unincumbered by issues: military actions rarely happen in the way they were planned, nor they are always based upon a reasoning that would be considered "rational", or upon misinformation, miscalculation, and arrogance. For example, if we were to fully accept the story of the War Council in Yehem in the way it is described in the Annals (**§4.3.1.2.**), the decision taken by Thutmose against his generals' will – to walk through the risky 'Aruna path rather than through safer routes – would have to be considered as irrational, and lucky. However, Such theoretical considerations cannot be relevant for the purpose of this discussion. Although battles must have been lost by the Egyptians over irrational decisions, because of the propagandistic nature of our sources, we are not aware of their existence and cannot comment upon them.
[4] Liverani 1988, Heagren 2010.

acquire in the War Theatre; the Operational Level establishes a series of coordinated battles (what is usually called a "campaign") to acquire the targets sets at the Strategic Level; the Tactical Level is concerned with the way said battles are fought. These levels are conceived as an organic whole, where abstract objectives are established at a higher level and passed down at a lower level, where they are translated into concrete actions. The success or failure of such actions affects the decisions taken in the higher levels.[5]

- Grand Strategy is the highest area of analysis and decision of a state, where diplomatic and military elements are considered together, and used to elaborate the state's objectives in foreign policy. Although part of the theory of the "Levels of War" (where it is located above the Strategic Level), Grand Strategy is not a purely military concept, but it informs and connects the military actions of wartime to the diplomatic actions of peacetime. As U.S. General James Mattis wrote to Congress, "*If you don't fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy more ammunition*".[6]

- Operational Logistics is the art of mobilizing resources "*to achieve military objectives in a War Theatre*".[7] In other words, it studies the execution of the tasks necessary to support a military campaign, such as the transportation of supplies to the combat units in the War Theatre, or the maintenance of the marching army.

- The Operational Network is a series of stations or encampments located in a War Theatre, built to support and lead an army to battle in the most rapid, secure, and economically efficient way. It enables the sustainment of an army during a campaign and therefore is, in a certain sense, the "embodiment" of the theoretical principle of Operational Logistics.[8]

These elements are all connected to one another: "Grand" strategists select the political objectives to be pursued through military actions, and military strategists identify the corresponding military

[5] See **§3.2**.
[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/27/retired-generals-cite-past-comments-from-mattis-while-opposing-trumps-proposed-foreign-aid-cuts/?utm_term=.8547dca5008f, last accessed 25/01/2019. See **§3.2.2.**
[7] Mcwp 4-12 Operational-Level Logistics 2016:1-1. See **§3.4.4.**
[8] See **§3.4.3.**

objectives against which to deploy the armed forces. The Operational Logistics supports the deployed forces in their endeavour by mobilizing the necessary resources through the Operational Network. The relationship between Grand Strategy and Operational Logistics is one of interdependency: Grand Strategy establishes the Ends of a state in accordance with what the Means allow, while Operational Logistics informs and (through the Network) executes the Ways.[9]

7.3. Factors in the Development of the Model

In a 1988 article Mario Liverani disputed the "*old paradigm*" that had been used to discuss the development of the Assyrian Empire in the Habur.[10] In his opinion, this paradigm was based on the concept of territorial empire, on the idea that the Assyrians would have expanded their control over the surrounding regions in a systematic and uniform manner, comparable to how an oil stain expands on a piece of paper.[11] According to this paradigm, since it is assumed that there was a sharp distinction between areas that were and were not under Assyrian control, when two succeeding kings claim to have campaigned in the same region it must also be assumed that Assyrians had lost control of it in between the two campaigns.[12] Liverani proposed a new and different paradigm, based on the concept of the "network-empire", according to which a network of palaces, cities, and strongholds are built along borders and lines of communication to support the Assyrian presence in the Habur. Military campaigns are run through this network, each strengthening and enhancing the Assyrian control over the region, each helping to thicken the network's meshes. In the long run all lead to the emergence of a territorial domination comparable to (and at the same time different by) that described by the "*Oil Stain*" paradigm.[13]

Already Liverani has suggested that his idea of the Network-empire Model might be fruitfully applied to the Egyptian Levant,[14] and his model has the advantage of considering together both the military campaigns and the construction of an Operational Network, able to enhance and develop an

[9] Kress 2002:36; Milevski 2014a.
[10] Liverani 1988.
[11] Liverani 1988:84.
[12] Liverani 1988:84.
[13] Liverani 1988:91.
[14] Liverani 1988:92. Benz (2013) has taken this idea and applied it, but only focusing on the "Negative Spaces", the regions outside the "Meshes" and inhabited by the nomadic population subject of his study.

invading presence in the conquered regions. Since it is necessary for objectives defined at a Grand Strategic level to be achieved through Strategic avenues, and for a Strategic objective to be achieved through the Operational means of the army, the theoretical premise of the Model can be delineated as follows: that by reconstructing where and how an army moved in a determinate period, what it attacked, and if it was supported or not by an Operational Network, it is possible reconstruct – to a certain extent – the political Ends behind said war.

There are several factors that would have impacted on the development of an Operational Network:

- The international situation at the time of its establishment and development. Since the military action of wartime would have required a supply delivery system, it is likely a Network would have been developed in times of War, but in times of peace its construction would have been deemed less essential and therefore halted or slowed.

- The actors at play. It is important to establish what was the political situation of the Levant before the beginning of the wars of Thutmose III, and during the Amarna Period.

- The existence of older structures on the territory, and the impact they would have had on the development of the Network. Since the construction of new bases, camps and fortresses would have consumed resources and taken time, it is reasonable to assume that the Egyptians would have first co-opted pre-existing facilities, and then expanded the network around them, decommissioning them only when new strategic situations or Logistical advantages would have forced them to.

- The existence of "decisive points": geographical features dominating important areas in the War Theatre (i.e. important communication routes, or fertile valleys) that were bound to assume significant importance during and after a campaign. Control of decisive points by either military or diplomatic means would therefore have been essential to campaign in this region.

7.4. Definition of the Model

This Model will have to answer a series of questions, each building upon the other, each more abstract than the other.

- What were the strategic objectives of the campaigns of the Mid and Late 18th Dynasty?
- What factors and what actors influenced the construction and shape of the Operational Network?
- What were the Egyptian political objectives in the Levant during the Mid and Late 18th Dynasty?

If Reverse-engineering traditionally entails the dissection of a product into its constituent parts,[15] the next chapters aim at dissecting the Egyptian military actions to identify their military Ends. These constituent parts are the military campaigns and the Network of strongholds along which said campaigns ran. The military campaigns will be studied to identify the objective at the Strategic level of War, and the Network will be studied to identify the characteristics of the Operational level of Logistics.[16] Once the military Ends (that is, the objectives at the Strategic Level) will have been established, they will be related to the socio-political milieu of the region at the time, in order to understand – or at least theorize – the foreign policy Ends (that is, the objectives at the Grand Strategic Level) that the Egyptians were achieving through their military actions.

7.5. Conclusion

In the course of this chapter, it was explained how, according to the theory of "Grand Strategy", political intent is translated in military actions, and a model has been offered to analyse the military actions and reverse-engineer the political intent behind them. Two elements will have to be considered: the areas where Thutmose III and Amenhotep II campaigned – to identify the strategic objectives – and the areas where the "Operational Network" was built, together with the characteristics of the "Nodes" – to identify the "Operational Logistics".

[15] Eilam 2005:3-4.

[16] That is due to the facts that Operational Logistics – being an abstract idea, cannot be studied *per se.*

CHAPTER VIII: THE WARS' ENDS

8.1. Introduction

We are now at a point where it is possible to sew up the many threads that have been discussed until now, analyse the Egyptian military behaviour in the Levant, and define the objectives that Thutmose III and his immediate successors of the Mid-18th Dynasty appear to have wanted to achieve in the region. In the following pages, I will first establish the strategic objectives of the campaign, and I will then consider them in light of the socio-political milieu of the contemporary Levant.

8.2. The strategic objectives of the Mid-18th Dynasty

8.2.1. Location of the Nodes during the Mid-18th Dynasty

Most of the Nodes controlled directly by the Egyptians during the New Kingdom appear to have first been installed and developed under Thutmose III and Amenhotep II. The Infrastructure of North Sinai is the best chronological indicator in support of this notion, because most of its forts appear to have been established on virgin soil either before or at the time of Thutmose III, likely as part of a common construction scheme.[1] The Egyptian presence in Tell el-Ajjul and Gaza[2] likely precedes the sole reign of Thutmose III, and judging from the written documents the latter was likely an important centre in the Egyptian administration already under Amenhotep II. In Jaffa the Egyptian presence can be assessed by the amount of locally produced Egyptian pottery dated to the LB IB.[3] A similar argument can be made also for the presence in Beth-Shean and the Egyptian territories around it. If one assumes Beth-Shean to have been an Egyptian centre already at the time of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II – as it appears to be more than likely –[4] then the centre would have been the easternmost Egyptian outpost at the time, and the only one to have been erected far from the sea. The earliest northern Levantine Node appears to have been Byblos,[5] which had a strong and historical relationship with Egypt, and was bound by treaty to Thutmose III. Byblos, together with other unnamed Lebanese ports, appears to have been part of the Egyptian military effort during the following years, likely creating a network of safe harbours where the

[1] **§4.3.**
[2] **§5.4.2.** and **§5.4.3.**
[3] **§5.4.4.**
[4] **§5.4.5.**
[5] **§5.4.6.**

Egyptian army would have been able to dock and be fed on its way to the battlefield. Ullassa[6] is the northernmost centre to prominently appear in the written documents of this time. Twice conquered by Thutmose III, the town seemingly became the Egyptian bridgehead in northern Lebanon. Sumur does not seem to have been directly controlled by the Egyptians during this time,[7] and a different case is to be connected to Ugarit. The sole mention of an Egyptian garrison in the city is in the Memphis and Karnak stela, it appears in no other document, and it is linguistically disputed. Even if the identification was to be accepted, an Egyptian presence would have been short-lived and seemingly uninfluential beyond the scopes of that particular campaign.[8]

Overall, the Egyptian presence in the Levant during the Mid-18th Dynasty appears to have been focused on the coast, with the sole strategic and easily defendable centre of Beth-Shean in the interior.

8.2.2. The campaigns of the Mid-18th Dynasty

After the campaign of year 23, the battle of Megiddo, and the acts of fealty from the rulers of Retjenu, other twenty campaigns are known to have been conducted in the Levant by Thutmose III (17) and Amenhotep II (3) in the span of three decades.[9] According to Liverani's "thickening meshes" Model,[10] military campaigns run repeatedly along a network of strongpoints built along borders and lines of communication, strengthening, and enhancing an already existing control. The act of repeating a campaign in the same area is therefore important in the identification of the strategic objectives, as the installation of a network of strongpoints is for the identification of the Operational support. Thutmose appears to have conquered Ullassa twice on the coast to establish a bridgehead, and from there to have extended his reach to the rest of the 'Akkar Plain and of the Orontes Valley. Ardata, Sumur, and Qadesh are taken twice in the first three years, and the Egyptian army keeps coming back to attack and submit different towns in the same areas before seeing the interest switch towards the Orontes, repeatedly sacking in the span of a decade Qatna, Niya, Tunip, and the region of Qadesh, together with several cities the names of which were not preserved.

[6] **§5.4.7.2**.
[7] **§5.4.8.2.**
[8] **§4.3.4.2.**
[9] **§4.5.2.**
[10] **§7.3.**

The Egyptian army appears to have extended the reach of its actions north against Mittani only two or possibly three times, in the 8th and 10th campaigns of Thutmose III (year 33 and 35 respectively), and in the second campaign (year 7) of Amenhotep II, when the region of Alalakh might have been sacked. In these occasions the army appears to have covered more distance than usual and to have ventured far from the safe territories, in a manner more akin to the razzias of the early 18th Dynasty than to the empire-building made in the Orontes. The only campaign apparently conducted in the southern Levant is the short and peculiar campaign of year 9, said to have lasted a mere 6 days[11] mainly spent in the Sharon. Finally, another campaign against Nuḫašše has been hypothesized for the time of Thutmose IV, but even admitting they happened, there is not enough evidence to discuss them in detail.[12] In general, after one between Amenhotep II and Thutmose IV signed a treaty with Mittani and the houses of Waššukkanni and Thebes started to intermarry, there seem to not have been any campaign in the region.

Overall, the Egyptian campaigns in the Levant during the Mid-18th Dynasty appears to have been focused on the interior, with the few battles fought in the coast, mainly against strategic areas and cities which, like Ullassa, would later become part of the Operational Network.

8.2.3. Analysis

The episode of the War Council in Yehem before the battle of Megiddo seem now to be particularly relevant.[13] Although clearly embellished, there is no reason to deny that a council took place in the city: Redford's argument that a decision of some comparable sort had to be taken is compelling, and the detail that it was taken in Yehem is insignificant enough to be plausible.[14] The fact that, in the War Council, the King of Qadesh is said to have gathered in Megiddo the chiefs of all the foreign lands who used to be loyal to Egypt defines a scenario in which the enemy lies ahead of the army, suggesting – as Kilani has noticed –[15] that although Megiddo was clearly in a hostile territory, Yehem was not. While fortification walls and the presence of garrisons would have clearly played an important role in

[11] See Der Manuelian 1987:73 for a discussion of the campaign's length.
[12] Bryan 1991:339-344. See **§4.4.4.3.**
[13] *Urk*. IV, 649:3-651:17.
[14] Redford 2003:18-21. **§4.3.1.2.**
[15] Kilani 2020b:52.

guaranteeing the "Survivability" of a Node, also the allegiance (or at least the tolerance) of the local population would have been a cardinal element in the development of a Network. Therefore, one would expect that both Strategic Bases and Operational Nodes would have been erected in areas deemed secure by the Egyptians. Having this in mind, the facts that there is no recorded conquest of the Lebanese coast, that the cities of the region (and especially Byblos) appear to have been bound by treaty to Thutmose III, and that they were an active part in the contemporary Operational Network acquire important connotations. By looking at figure 44 it is possible to observe that all the sites that have been recognized as having been in Egyptian hands are located either in the Lebanese or in the southern Levantine coast. Beth Shean is the sole Egyptian installation in the interior. Placed at a decisive point at the entrance of the Jezreel, the site protected (and likely also administered) the pharaonic lands of the valley. Similarly and complementarily, the geographic distribution of the Egyptian campaigns and of the battles fought during the Mid-18th Dynasty (table 10) present a similar but opposite pattern, with most military actions directed to the lands of the interior and against Mittani, while those on the coast appear to have few and mostly focused on areas later controlled by the Egyptians themselves.

Table 10: Cities and Areas where the Egyptian army fought during the Mid-18th Dynasty			
Ruling King	Year	Macro-Region	Locality/ City
Thutmose III	22	Retjenu	Megiddo
	29	Djahy	Ullassa
		Djahy	Ardata
	30	Retjenu	Qadesh
		Djahy	Sumur
		Djahy	Ardata
	31	Djahy	Ullassa
	33	Retjenu	Qatna
		Mittani	Aleppo
		Mittani	Carchemish
		Mittani	Various towns and villages
		Mittani	Unknown, battle against the Mittanian Army
	34	Djahy	Unnamed city, likely in the ‘AkkarPlain
		Djahy	Unnamed city likely in the ‘AkkarPlain
		Retjenu	Unnamed city in Nuḫašše
	35	Mittani	Battle in Aranu,
	38	Retjenu	Unnamed city in Nuḫašše
	39	Retjenu	Shasu lands (Transjordan?)
	42	Djahy	Irkata
		Retjenu	-kana
		Retjenu	Tunip
		Retjenu	Three towns around Qadesh
Amenhotep II	3	Retjenu	Takhsy
	7	Retjenu	Shamash Edom
		Retjenu	Qatna
		Djahy	Ugarit
		Mittani (?)	*m-n-ḏ-t*
		Retjenu	Hashabu
	9	Djahy	Aphek
		Djahy	Yehem
		Djahy	*Mpsn*
		Djahy	*ḫttn*
		Djahy	*Mktr-ynt*
		Djahy	*Ỉtwrn*
		Retjenu	Ananarath
Thutmose IV	Unknown	Djahy	Gezer
		Retjenu	Nuḫašše
		Retjenu	Tunip

8.3. The Political Situation in the Levant before Thutmose III

How can these data and this marked division be interpreted? Why were the Egyptians concentrating their campaigns in the lands of the interior? As Kilani has argued,[16] there is a tendency in the scholarly discussion about the Egyptian war to analyse the Egyptian activities in the Levants as if they had been fought on an empty and virgin plain, as if the enemies and their actions where more a nuisance than an army competing for the same spaces as the Egyptians. However, the Egyptians themselves do not seem to have seen the Levant in this fashion since before the time of Thutmose III: the presence of a garrison in Tell el-Ajjul already in the early 18th Dynasty, together with the conquest of Gaza under the co-regency between Hatshepsut and Thutmose III seem to point to a long-held Egyptian interest in the region. Moreover, the chain of destructions in the region preceding Thutmose III, together with the notions of a mobilization of the Levantine forces against the Egyptians, also point to the existence of an organized enemy in the region. This subchapter will argue that the political situation in the Levant before the campaigns of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II is the most likely trigger for their military actions. This idea is based upon a series of considerations. First, that the Egyptian sources of the Mid-18th Dynasty – and the Annals of Thutmose III in particular – appear to divide the Levant in two distinct areas: the coastal Djahy, and Retjenu in the interior. Second, that recent studies have suggested a similar division of a territory on the base of linguistic markers (such as the royal onomastics in the Amarna Letter) between the West-semitic[17] coast, and the Hurrian and Indo-Aryan interior.

8.3.1. Egyptian perception of the Levant in the texts of the Mid-18th Dynasty

The first element in support of the presence of this socio-political division can be identified in the terms used in the Annals of Thutmose III to describe the Levantine regions and the people inhabiting the: *ḏ3hy* and *rtnw*. Even though they are usually interpreted as unspecific, vague, and general terms,[18] and even though these geographical terminologies were subject to changes in meaning through

[16] Kilani 2020b:53.

[17] A family of languages that includes Amorite, Hebrew, Phoenician and Ugaritic names (Hess 1993:4).

[18] See for example Spalinger 2005:131.

time,[19] in the Annals they are used consistently and associated with cities in determinate areas. As Gardiner has first argued,such systemic distinction must mean that each term, at least during the Mid-18th Dynasty, had a precise meaning, not shared with the other,[20] and it is therefore likely that the Egyptians perceived the two areas as different from one-another. The lists of booties from the Annals of Thutmose III, for example,uses different heading for the campaigns of years 29, 30, 33 and 35.

- In year 29, the king is said to be in *ḏ3hy*,[21] and to have been plundering the garrisons of Ullassa and Ardata, in the Lebanese coast.
- In year 30, he is campaigning in *rtnw*,[22] fighting in Qadesh, and Sumur.
- In Year 33, he is campaigning again in *rtnw*,[23] from where he proceeds north to plunder the town and the villages of Naharina.
- In year 35, he is in *ḏ3hy*,[24] fighting first north-west of Aleppo, against the town of Aaranu, and then against the forces of Mittani.

The geography of each term in the annals, therefore, appears to be coherently exrpessed: *rtnw* is in the valleys of the interior, from the Beqaa to the Orontes Basin, and *ḏ3hy* is in the coast, from northern Syria and the ‘Akkar Plain and Eleuthero Valley. The picture remains consistent if one also considers other documents written at the time of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II:

- the Topographical list, said to be recording “*the countries of Upper-Retenu shut up by his majesty in the city of the wretched Megiddo*”,[25] refers almost exclusively to the valleys of the interiors, and mentions very few coastal centres, none of which are located north of the Akko Plain.[26] Especially the first 56 names represent a continuous “block” of identifiable cities located in the Beqaa, the Jordan Valley, and the Jezreel.
- In the Gebel Barkal Stela, Thutmose declares that Lebanese *ʿš*-wood was gathered for him

[19] See below.
[20] Gardiner 1947:143-149. The argument has been further developed by Kilani (2020b).
[21] *Urk.* IV, 685:4-5.
[22] *Urk.* IV, 685:4-5.
[23] *Urk.* IV, 696:16.
[24] *Urk.* IV, 709:16.
[25] *Urk.* IV, 780:4-9. Translation Simons 1937:34.
[26] **§4.3.5.** and the **Appendix**.




Figure 47: The distinction between Djahy and Retjenu as it appears in Mid-18th dynasty sources.

in Djahy, likely in Byblos or Ullassa.[27]

- The so-called Festival Hall Decree[28] refers to the "*mountains of Djahy*" south of Megiddo (possibly, as Redford has argued, the Aruna Pass).[29]
- The Sixth Pylon in Karnak, refers to the "*three towns in Upper Retjenu*" of *Nu-g-s-ʿ, Yʿnqʿm, ʿnd ḥ-r-n-kȝ-rw*.[30] Yeno'am is consistently placed by the sources of the 19th Dynasty near Beth-Shean, and while Harenkarw and Nugas are unidentified, since they are always mentioned together it is likely that they were near one another in the Transjordan.[31]
- In the Memphis and Karnak Stela Amenhotep II is said to be in Retjenu and to have reached Shamash-Edom. This town is to be located either near the Orontes, or near the Kinnereth, and both would be consistent with the identification outlined above.[32]
-

Overall, while the borders of the two areas are not defined as precisely as we would like, based on the information at our disposal, "Retjenu" seems to have indicated the valleys of the interior, from Qatna and Qadesh to Megiddo, and "Djahy" the region south of the Jezreel and the coastal Levant, from Syria to the Sharon.

[27] *Urk.* IV, 1237:9.
[28] Gardiner 1952.
[29] Redford 2003:129 n.115.
[30] *Urk.* IV, 738-56.
[31] **§5.4.5.2.**
[32] Memphis: *Urk.* IV,1303.5; Karnak *Urk.* IV, 1312.3. **§4.3.4.1.**

Another term *ḏ3hy* appears to have been coupled with is *ḫ3rw*, the Egyptian rendition of the word "Hurrian." Already Gardiner noticed how during the 19th Dynasty *ḫ3rw* replaced *rtnw* in identifying the same area,[33] but in the 18th Dynasty the term is an ethnonym.[34] This is evident from the booty of the 7th and 9th year of Amenhotep II – where he says to have captured 36.300 *ḫ3rw* –[35] and from the *ḫ3rw* captured by Thutmose IV in Gezer.[36] Finally, that the two areas of *ḏ3hy* and *ḫ3rw* were understood as different, if not complementary, is evident from the booty lists of the Annals: many,[37] have already set in contrast the *ḥnw m b3k n ḏ3hy* the "*vessels of Djahy workmanship*" that are part of the booty of the year 39 with the *3kwn3 3ʿ m b3k n ḫ3rw* "*great Akuna vessel of Hurrian workmanship*" that are part of the booty gathered in the battle of Megiddo.[38]

It is therefore possible to suggest that, in Egyptian eyes, the Levant was divided into two macro-regions: Retjenu in the interior and Djahy on the coast, with each region apparently possessing definite geographical and ethnolinguistic characters, with the people of the interior being usually intended as "Hurrians".

8.3.2. Geographic distribution of Hurrian and West-Semitic Royal Onomastics in the Amarna Letters

As it has been said in **§2.3.1.**, Na'aman hypothesis of a Hurrian invasion in the southern Levant at the end of the MBA was briskly rejected by Dever, who considered the personal names of Hurrian and Indo-Aryan origin in the Tanaach and Amarna Letters as a mere expression of the "*multiculturalism*" of the LBA Levant.[39] However, of the 125 linguistically identifiable names in the Tanaach and Amarna Letters (where elites are overrepresented) the West Semitic ones account for respectively 56 and 58% of the total, whereas theindividuals bearing Hurrian and Indo-Aryan names account for 44 and 42%. It is not sufficient to claim that these names were merely a testament to the Levantine "*multi-cultural, polyglot population*" as Dever has done,[40] because foreign names do

[33] Gardiner 1947:181-186.
[34] Helck 1971:269-270; Vernus 1978; Wilhelm 1996:18; Zadok 1996:118.
[35] *Urk.* IV, 1315:20.
[36] *Urk.* IV, 1556:10-11.
[37] Gardiner 1947:147; Vernus 1978:44; Kilani 2020b:53-55.
[38] *Urk.* IV, 699:8 and 665.16 respectively. Translation Kilani 2020b:54.
[39] Dever 1998:101.
[40] Dever 1998:101.

not germinate naturally in a society, and their presence needs to be explained.




Figure 48 Geographic distribution of the names of the Amarna Rulers according to Kilani 2020a:fig.1.

That the names of the southern Levantine Kings do not reflect a linguistically uniform society is a debate that was closed decades ago.[41] In a recent article, Kilani has systematized this idea[42] by selecting those among the kings who could both be geographically located from the petrographic analysis of their letters,[43] and whose name could reliably be identified as either West Semitic or Hurrian and Indo-Aryan according to both Moran and Hess.[44] A selection according to these parameters has resulted in a list of 44 kings ruling over 30 different cities, and a map similar to that presented above and related to *ḏ3hy* and *rtnw*. In figure 48, kings with West Semitic names (blue areas) occupy the coast from the Negev to northern Syria, and kings with Hurrian and Indo- Aryans names (yellow) occupy the northern portion of the interior.[45] Some areas (green), like the ‘Akkar plain, the Jezreel, and the northern portion of the Shephelah, present an intermixing of the two traditions, with cities ruled by bearers of Hurrian and Indo-Aryan names surrounded by cities ruled by bearers of West Semitic names.

8.3.3. Retjenu and Mittani

Given the previous discussion, the case of a Hurrian presence in the southern Levant before the

[41] Hess 1989; Hess 1993.
[42] Kilani 2020a.
[43] Goren et al. 2004; **§4.4.4.5.**
[44] Moran 1992; Hess 1993.
[45] It is interesting to note that also the “wretched foe” of Qadesh, against whom Thutmose III fought at Megiddo might have had an indo-Aryan name. According to Epstein (1963b) his name might have been registered in a list of donations of a temple in Qatna. According to him, “Durusa” is a “*clearly*” non-semitic name, and likely Indo-Aryan because also his successors names (Sutatarra and Aitakkama) are easily identifiable as such

battle of Megiddo is clear. However, "Hurrian" and"Mittanian" are not necessarily synonyms,[46] and it is now necessary to discuss whether this Hurrian population might be understood as subject to the Kingdom of Mittani. The few and scarce information on the political system of the Levant before the time of Thutmose III are not enough to certify such political connection. However, several elements concur in making this idea more than likely.

It was said in **§2.3.2.** that the Mittanian Empire appears to have been a "confederation" of Hurrian protectorates under the rule of a hegemonic kingdom whose kings carried Indo-Aryan names, and the same can be said of Retjenu. According to the model proposed by Kilani, names are an individual's "*true social statement*," and are strongly connected to feelings of pride and prestige. In choosing a name for oneself or a child, therefore, a person selects one related to either a tradition he or she is proud of (i.e. his or herown) or to a tradition perceived as more "prestigious" (socially, religiously, or politically) and therefore worth being associated with.[232] Kilani builds up on his model by adding that a king might adopt a name from one of three potential sources: his own, one perceived to be superior on a political, cultural, or religious sense, or – if he is foreign to his own kingdom – the local tradition he aspires to rule upon.[233] Since the Indo-Aryan tradition is not "indigenous" to the area, and since during the Amarna Period the Levant had been controlled by the Egyptians for a century, neither the second nor the third option would explain the presence of these Indo-Aryan names in the region. Therefore, the rulers with Hurrian or Indo-Aryan names were likely connecting to their own tradition, stemming from a socio-cultural phenomenon that must have pre-dated the wars of Thutmose III, since nothing would appear to support, in the document at our disposal, a Mittanian influence over the region following his campaigns.[47] Therefore, the presence of Indo-Aryan names among the region's kings during the Amarna period could be easily explained with a political tradition that had rooted itself in the region before the Egyptian arrival, one that had developed at the same time with the Indo-Aryan house in Waššukkanni, and, if it did not shared the Indo-Aryan ethnic presence, was at least part of the word that attributed Indo-Aryan names in those who rose to power.

It was also said in **§2.3.2.** that the sudden rise of Mittani was connected to the development of

[46] As discussed by Giorgieri (2005:79)

[47] As Kilani (2020b:53-55) has argued.

a new political class, a nobility who held office in the royal administration: the *Maryanni.* As it was discussed in **§4.3.7.**, Papyrus Hermitage 1116A is an administrative document dated to the kingdom of Amenhotep II. The document registers the supplies that have been given to *Maryannu* sent to Thebes from several cities, most of which are located in the territory identified as Retjenu, like Megiddo, Hazor, and Tanaach. Both O'Callaghan and Vernus[48] before me have argued that because these men are also classified as *wpwty*, ambassadors, and because they are allocated large amounts of beer and grain, these Levantine Maryanni sent to Egypt held great status at home. It appears likely, therefore, that at the time of Amenhotep II these cities had a social stratification akin to that found in the kingdom of Mittani and observable in the documents from Alalakh.[49]

Finally, it was also said in the same subchapter that subordinate rulers within the Mittanian Empire might have had vassals under themselves, and in the Egyptian documents the king of Qadesh seem to both have had vassals and to have been a vassal himself. He is first said to have gathered in Megiddo all cities that used to have been vassals of Egypt (implying an hegemony over them)[50] and then to have controlled the towns of Yeno'am, Harenkarw, and Nugas, likely located in the Transjordan, far from his own city.[51] Moreover, in the Annals of Thutmose III Mittanian troops are present at the battle of Megiddo, and in year 42 troops from Mittani are said to be garrisoning three towns in the Qadesh's territory.[52] Therefore, at least on the base of the Egyptian documents, an allegiance of the ruler of Qadesh to Mittani does not appear to be far-fetched. This is especially true if one considers that since the neighbour kingdoms of Tunip[53] and Qatna[54] appear to have been subject of Mittani, Waššukkanni seems to have had some power over the region.

All considered, the naming pattern strongly point to a similar composition of the elites of Retjenu and Mittani, and the presence of a composite army of the king of Qadesh in Megiddo suggests an internal organization compatible with what is known from the organization of Mittani

[48] O'Callaghan 1951:311; Vernus 1978:202.
[49] See Von Dassow 2008:268-315.
[50] *Urk.* IV, 655:15-657:2.
[51] *Urk.* IV, 185:14-19; 665:1-4; 744:5-8. **§5.4.4.2.**
[52] *Urk.* IV, 667:10-15 and 729:3-734:10 respectively.
[53] As it is evident in AIT 2, a treaty between Niqmepa of Alalakh and Ir-Addu of Tunip ends with a statement of Allegiance to the ruler of Mittani (Dietrich et al. 1997).
[54] Klengel 2000.

itself. It seems therefore likely that Qadesh and Megiddo were somewhat connected to Mittani.

8.4. Analysis and interpretation of the data

According to Liverani's "thickening meshes" Model,[55] the act of repeating a campaign in the same area is therefore as important to the identification of the Strategic objectives, as the installation of a Network of strongpoints is for the identification of the Operational support. The analysis of the data regarding the wars of the 18th Dynasty has shown a radical difference in approaches between the macro-regions of the coast and of the interior. The Operational Network, built to support military actions, was mainly located in the coast, in a region where the locals (as evidence by the treaties of Thutmose III with the Lebanese cities) appear to have been somewhat accepting of the Egyptian arrival. At the same time, the Strategic objectives of the military campaigns appear to have been the centres of the interior and the Empire of Mittani. The exceptions to this frame of reference appear to confirm this general approach: most of the military actions said to have happened in the coast anticipate the setting up of the Operational Network in the same areas (as in the cases of Ullassa and – likely – Aphek), and the sole example of a Node in the interior – Beth Shean – is located on an important decisive point that would have protected the fertile lands of the newly-acquired Jezreel, producing supplies vital to the development of the Egyptian military actions in the north.

A series of elements can be used to understand the political ends that commanded these actions. To begin with, the two macro-regions of the coast and of the interior roughly correspond with how the Egyptians seemingly saw the Levant, In the texts of Thutmose III the coast and the interior appear to have consistently been called "Djahy" and "Retjenu," and a similar pattern can be observed in the divide between lands inhabited by speakers of West-semitic and Hurrian languages. It can therefore be said that the Pharaohs of the Mid-18th Dynasty were using the coastal region of west-semitic Djahy as bases and points of departure in their attack to the Hurrian regions of Retjenu. The importance of this division appears to have been political rather than ethno-linguistical, as it is likely that the lands of "Retjenu" were connected to Mittani, either through kinship or through alliance, and this seems to have influenced

[55] **§7.3.**

the Egyptian decisions. As Kilani has argued,[56] Thutmose had no need to approach Qadesh from the Lebanese coast, as he might have passed through the Beqaa like his successors. However, the Hurrian Beqaa might have appeared to Thutmose a less secure alternative than the West-Semitic coast *because* it belonged to the same social and ethnic milieu as Qadesh and Mittani. It was not a case that the first recorded Egyptian campaign in the Beqaa was conducted by Amenhotep II a full 3 decades after the battle of Megiddo. Neither it was a case that Kumidi became an Egyptian centre only late in the Amarna Period, and only after the kingdom of Mittani had fallen in Hittite hands.[57] These choices are likely to have been calculated to maximize the safety of the Egyptian army going to war.

So, what were the Egyptian foreign policy objectives in the Levant at the time of the Mid-18th Dynasty? To answer this question, it is worth remembering how Strategic and Operational Nodes of an Operational Network are usually erected in areas considered to be "safe" by an army, and how the shipment of supplies to a marching army is the most advantageous Logistical choice for an army with long-term, "imperialistic" goals, because it reduces the friction between the army and the local population.[58] The southern Levant remained relatively untouched by the Egyptian campaigns after the battle of Megiddo, and at the same time the Operational Network in the region started to be developed almost immediately: the centres of Jaffa and (likely) Beth-Shean, together with the Egyptian lands of the Jezreel, of the Transjordan, and (possibly) of Yarimuta, can all be dated to this early period through their mentions in the written documents, or via the indications coming from the archaeological excavations. The absence of further campaigns and the development of the Operational Network in the south are therefore strong indicators that the Egyptian political objective in the southern Levant had already been reached with the pledge of allegiance of the rulers of Retjenu, with the detachment of the Hurrian states from the control of the ruler of Qadesh, and with their concurrent entrance in the Egyptian sphere of influence. In other words, it seems likely that an extension to the Jezreel of the Mittanian power could not be accepted by Thutmose III and his successors, who aimed at developing a "buffer state" between the Nile Delta and Mittani.

[56] Kilani 2020b:55.
[57] **§5.4.9.**
[58] **§3.4.5.** and **§3.4.6.**

After Megiddo, the focus of the military actions rapidly moved towards the northern Levant, where again they appear to indicate an attempt at "empire building". On the one hand, the northern node of the Operational Network was able to transport the Egyptian army to the 'Akkar Plain and the Orontes Valley, and to supply it in its battles. On the other hand, the campaigns in these areas appear to have been part of a scheme of repeated attacks against the same region year after year in a way that closely reminisces Liverani's "thickening meshes" model. The same cannot be said for the long-ranged and Logistically unsupported expeditions against Mittani, which appear to have been closer to acts of intimidation and razzias rather than attempts at empire-building. As it was discussed in **§3.4.6.**, an army can limit its own supply train in order to march faster and go farther that it could have if it had been burdened by it. While the move allows an enormous amount of freedom on the operational side, the invading troops need to pillage the needed resources from the local population. These actions incite an increasing hostility in the local population and make the long-term control of an area increasingly difficult. For these reasons, since most of the battles and the expeditions of Thutmose III appear to have been focused on the region of the Gate of Homs, and of the access to the Beqaa. and these continuous attacks to the southernmost territories of the Mittanian empire seems to have supported by an Operational Network capable of supply and sustain the Egyptian Army, they appear to have been made with the idea of creating their own lands in the region. At the same time, the few expeditions in Mittanian territory might have been attempt of terrorizing the state in Waššukkanni into compliance of the Egyptian expansion, because the absence of an Operational Network capable of sustain a prolonged effort indicate that it is unlikely the intention was to conquer territories this far north.

8.5. Conclusion

This chapter has identified the presence in the lands of the interior of the southern Levant of kingdoms likely connected to the great Kingdom of Mittani as the most likely cause behind the wars of the Mid-18th Dynasty.

It was argued that the Egyptian appear to have considered these lands – consistently defined as "Retjenu" in the contemporary documents – as "Hurrian", that the political system between Mittani and Retjenu were likely similar, and that is possible, if not likely, that Mittani, through the

possessions of the King of Qadesh, extended as far south as Megiddo and the Jezreel. It is unlikely that a similar state of being would have been easily accepted by the Egyptians, and the actions of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II seemingly aimed at developing some sort of buffer zone between the lands controlled by Waššukkanni and the Nile Delta. It was also argued that the Egyptian military behaviour in the region appears to have been aimed at replacing Mittani as the great power in the southern Levant and coastal Lebanon, by both creating an Operational Network that would have financed and enabled the Egyptian military actions in the region, and launching a series of campaigns against the kingdoms of the ʻAkkar Plain and Orontes Valley, aimed at submitting and controlling the area,

CHAPTER IX: THE PEACE'S ENDS

9.1. Introduction

This chapter provides a complement and a conclusion to the arguments of chapter **VIII**. By sewing up the many threads that have been discussed in this research, I will analyze the Egyptian military behaviour in the Levant during the Late 18th Dynasty, and defines the objectives that Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten appear to have wanted to achieve in the region.

9.2. The military actions of the Late 18th Dynasty

9.2.1. Location of the Nodes during the Late-18th Dynasty

The Operational Network in the southern Levant and north Sinai appears to have entered a period of relative "stasis" with the end of the wars of the Mid-18th Dynasty, meaning that no further cities passed under Egyptian control, and the administration that is reflected in the Amarna letters developed in already-controlled areas. There is no evidence for any development of the infrastructure in North Sinai between the kingdom of Amenhotep II and that of Horemheb.[1] Tell el-Ajjul and Gaza likely remained under Egyptian control, with the former becoming the most important centre in the administration of the Levant.[2]At the same time, in Jaffa and Beth Shean the Egyptian presence was likely connected to the production of supplies for the Egyptian territories in Yarimuta, the Jezreel, and the Transjordan.[3]

In the northern Levant, however, the shape of the Operational Network appears to have different considerably from that of the previous period. While under Thutmose III Byblos and Ullassa had a cardinal role in the Egyptian campaigns, neither seem to hold such an important position under Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. Formerly an important ally and Node in the Operational Network, Byblos seemingly lost most of its strategic value in the eyes of the Egyptian administration, and probably enjoyed more or less the same status as most other cities in the region.[4] Ullassa had likely remained an Egyptian enclave in Lebanon, and it seems likely its existence as an Egyptian centre was related to the gathering and shipment of wood: nothing in the Amarna letters suggests it had an

[1] **§5.3.**
[2] **§5.4.2.**and **§5.4.3.3**.
[3] **§5.4.4.**, **§5.4.5.**, and De Magistris 2020b.
[4] **§5.4.6.4.**

administrative role, nor it suggests the presence of a garrison in the town.[5] In any case, Ullassa seems to have become less important than the newly-created centre of Sumur. This city had become the main administrative (and likely military) Egyptian centre in the region sometimes before the beginning of the period covered by the Amarna Letters.[6] Located in a poorly defendable but rich position at the centre of the Akkar Plain, it controlled the flow of goods accessing the Mediterranean through the gate of Homs, and both the position and the role of the city seem to respond to the necessity of administering the area, rather than that of conquering it. The shape of the Egyptian administration and of the Operational Network seems to have changed again during the first decade of the kingdom of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. Having lost Ullassa and Sumur to Aziru of Amurru, the Egyptians established a new centre in the city of Kumidi.[7] This city does not seem to have been the largest in the region, nor – as far as we can tell – to have held particular importance over its neighbours. It seems, however, to have enjoyed a strategic position on the southern edge of the Beqaa Valley, where it controlled the main communication routes. By holding Kumidi, protected from the mountains on three sides, the Egyptians were able to defend on of the main access to the southern Levant more easily.

Overall, the Operational Network appears to not have changed between the Mid and the Late 18th Dynasty in the south, but to have been subject to at least two variations in the north: first with the establishment of a centre in Sumur, and then – after the loss of Sumur – with the establishment of another centre in Kumidi.

9.2.2. The Campaign of the Late 18th Dynasty

There are no documents to indicate that the Egyptian conducted any large-scale campaign in the Levant between the reigns of Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten.[8] The sole exception is a campaign that was probably organized in year 12 and executed late in the kingdom of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, possibly in year 16.[9] During this campaign, the Egyptian Army, fed by the petty rulers of the Levant, would have marched along the Via Maris, headed north through both the coast and the interior, and

[5] **§5.4.7.3.**
[6] **§5.4.8.3.**
[7] **§5.4.9.3.**
[8] The expedition to capture – and likely kill – Abdi-Ashirta of Amurru does not appear to have been a large enterprise (**§5.4.8.2.**).
[9] **§6.4.**

terminated its march in the Orontes valley. The fact that the trail of supplies for the marching army stops in the near vicinity of the city is a strong indication that Qadesh would have been the object of this campaign, and indeed the Amarna Letters suggest some level of Egyptian animosity against the city, while Hittite sources mention an Egyptian attack on Qadesh and on the ‘Akkar Plain sometimes at the end of the period covered by the Amarna Letters. It seems therefore more than likely that the end objectives of this campaign would have been – and likely were – the conquest of Sumur and Qadesh, and the re-establishment of the Egyptian control on the northern Lebanon.

9.2.3. Analysis

After the wars of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II many among the sites that appear to have been important to the Egyptians during the wars – like Gaza – became administrative centres. The Egyptian administration that can be understood from the Amarna Letters appears to have been focused on the security of the territory (relatively to the Egyptian affairs and commerce), and the production and delivery of the goods to the Egyptian centres in the coast rather than on operations of military conquest. At the same time, in fact, there are also no known large campaigns in the region, likely because no southern Levantine ruler would have been able to seriously threaten the Egyptian interests and the Egyptian control withoutexternal support.

This sense of “stasis” is absent in the northern Levant, where the Egyptian administration mutated twice between Thutmose III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. Sumur is unlikely to have been directly administered by the Egyptians under Thutmose III and Amenhotep II, but by the time of the Amarna Letters the city had become the most important Egyptian centre in Lebanon. The city was therefore likely established as an Egyptian centre after the end of the wars, and this move seemingly points to a new set of priorities: the city was less defendable than Ullassa, but its possession granted control of the commercial routes between inner Syria and the Mediterranean. Thus, its importance might point to the fact that security and defendability were now considered less important than the control of the flow of goods through the Gate of Homs. By the time of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten, however, Sumur had been lost to Amurru, and Kumidi took its military and administrative role. With the loss of Sumur, the

establishment of Kumidi and the beginning of the wars against the Hittites, defendability had again become a vital element in the development of the Operational Network.

9.3. The Political Situation in the Levant at the time of Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten

If the wars of Thutmose III were seemingly directed to cities that were likely vassals to Waššukkanni,[10] following the peace between Egypt and Mittani the situation appears to have changed. In the southern Levant, no archaeological or written documents argue for large military campaigns, or an expansion of the Operational Network. No southern Levantine ruler would have been able to threaten the Egyptian control by himself, and the peace between the two great kingdoms excluded the possibly that any such ruler would have found outside help. In other words, the Egyptian control of the southern Levant seems to have been considered as unchallenged and secure, and so the Egyptians appear to not have taken any action to further fortify their position.

A different situation can be described for the northern Levant. The relative peace between Egypt and Mittani seems to have allowed the Egyptians to move their administrative centre to a city – Sumur – located in a less secure but more economically advantageous point than Ullassa. However, the Egyptian control appears to have been heavily influenced by the presence of the border and the vicinity of the great kingdoms of Ḫatti and Mittani. While a southern Levantine ruler could not have hoped to change his situation, near the border, a ruler could have aspired of abandon Egypt and subject himself to the rulers of Ḫatti or Mittani. Moreover, the local rulers of the Egyptian territories might have been involved in the infighting of the two northern Great Kingdoms. The events connected to the expansionist will of the rulers of Amurru and the First Syrian War of Suppiluliuma of Ḫatti changed the Egyptian approach to the northern Levant and reverted it to a paradigm of defence of their territories as their first and most important concern. The establishment of an Egyptian centre in Kumidi – on a decisive point at the southern end of the Beqaa – seems to reflect this sort of preoccupation: the Egyptians needed to protect their territories in the southern Levant during a trying time of international insecurity, and

[10] As it was argued in **§8.3.**

therefore erected the new centre in a previously independent city, which is doubtful it could have been able to offer the same economical possibilities as Sumur, but could have likely offered some level of protection against new enemy forays in Egyptian-controlled territories.

So, what were the Egyptian foreign policy objectives in the Levant at the time of the Late 18th Dynasty? The southern Levant appears to have remained untouched by the Egyptian military actions, and it might therefore be argued that the main political object in the region had already been reached since the time of the Megiddo campaign of Thutmose III: a buffer zone between Mittani and the Delta. The northern Levant, however, saw several changes in the administration and the military of the area, first on an economic and commercial sense and then again on a military sense. It might therefore be argued that the Egyptian political object in the northern Levant was twofold: a primary focus would have been the maintenance of the control of the region and guarantee the existence of the "buffer state". While a secondary one (to be pursued only after the first had been secured and attained) would have been the control of coastal northern Lebanon and the main access in the region to Inner Syria (*i.e.* to Mittani) from the Mediterranean sea. Since the first one had been secured and attained through diplomatic meanings – that is, through peace with Mittani – the second was pursued. But once the first was lost through a combination of the actions of Aziru of Amurru and Suppiluliuma of Ḫatti, the second became once again unimportant.

9.4. Conclusion

This chapter has identified as the most likely objective in the foreign policy of Egypt in the Levant during the Late 18th the security of the Egyptian state and of the Egyptian control, through the creation and the maintenance of a "buffer zone" under Egyptian control in the territories of the Levant.

CHAPTER X: THE SHORT 18TH DYNASTY

10.1. Introduction: The Egyptian "Empire" during the 18th Dynasty

In the course of this research, I have tried – as much as it has been possible – to avoid referring to the Egyptian presence in the Levant during the 18th Dynasty as an "Empire". This is because "Empire" might not be the right word to accurately describe this phenomenon, since it now encompasses (at least in the perception of the term most widespread in the anglo-american world) ideas of colonisation, of directly controlled regions, and of external powers inhabiting conquered areas,[1] and all seem unapplicable to this phase in the Egyptian control of this region. The closest expression to the idea of "imperialism" in the documents at our disposal is *ir*/*swsḏ t3šw* ,"to extend the borders".[2] *t3š*, "border", referred to the territorial extension of the authority of a person, which included the right to collect revenues from a controlled area.[3] With the 18th dynasty the term started to be used to indicate the foreign lands subject to the Egyptian authority, who were imposed tributes and restrictions of their relations with the outside world, but were largely able to govern themselves and their territory.[4] These *t3šw* and the actions of extending them bring to mind another border zone that historians are at pain in defining clearly: that of the "*Marches*" of the Carolingian empire. According to Reimitz and Pohl, marches were areas of "*ill-defined or undefined domination*", perceived like "*deep zones of forward control*", the inhabitants of which were defined as "*Those who were prepared to attack the enemies and extend the borders*."[5] In this light, it seems likely that we should think of the Egyptian Levant during the 18th Dynasty as a *Marca*, a "*t3š*" and accept that a single and coherent term able to encompassing the entirety of the Levant simply did not exist. In other words, the Egyptians seems not to have colonized the Levant the way – for example – Europeans did with the Americas in the 17th century, nor to have managed or controlled the region directly like they did in Nubia, or like the Romans did in the Mediterranean.[6] And

[1] Agnew 2004:2.
[2] Galán 1995:156
[3] Galan 1995:156.
[4] Galán 1995:134.
[5] "*Illos qui parati sunt inimicis insidia facere et marcam nostram ampliare*" From a document first published in Azzara et al. 1998:70, n.8. See Reimitz 2001:192-195; Pohl 2001:126-127.
[6] Redford 1992:193).

yet, short of defining the Egyptian presence in the Levant as a *t3š*, the term "Empire" might still be the better suited word to roughly indicate the concept of the Egyptian domination in these territories.

10.2. The new arguments of this research

This research has analysed a subject which in the past few decades has been under much (and yet insufficient) scrutiny.[7] The ideas that moved this research can be summarized in four concepts:

- the 18th Dynasty presence in the Levant had rarely been studied as an integrated matter, considering at once both the archaeological excavations and the written sources. The only (excellent) example of such study – Ellen Morris' 2005 monography – is now almost two decades old;
- recent studies have been able to show the complexities and the efficacy of the Egyptian Art of War and of its Logistics,[8] but these studies have not been used to analyse the purpose of such advanced abilities.
- consequently, the subject of the Egyptian military actions has never been studied by considering at once the short-term subject of the campaigns, the long-term subject of their Logistical organization, and the socio-political contexts the Egyptians were moving against;
- without the discovery of more texts, or the excavations of more archaeological sites, the only way to advance the understanding of this subject is the reorganization of the available data and their re-analysis through new and different interpretative frameworks.

One of the ways that the available data have been re-organized has been the concept of the Operational Network, which Heagren had briefly used to achieve what he defined as a "*somewhat basic representation*" of the Egyptian system in the Levant.[9] Once fully developed, the Operational Network has been the most useful analytic tool, since it has helped both with the evaluations of the roles of centres (like Jaffa, Ullassa, and Sumur) which had been previously been considered to a lesser extent, and has

[7] **§1.1.**
[8] Heagren 2007; 2010; Wernick 2014.
[9] Heagren 2010:267. See **§3.4.3.**

been a cardinal element in the re-evaluation of the campaign against Qadesh contained in the Amarna Letters.[10]

A second concept I have defined and used here is the Proximity Principle, namely the idea that it is possible to "map" the extent of the control of each Egyptian centre by considering their areas of interactions in the Amarna Letters.[11] This idea has a value both *per se* and in the context of the larger examination of the Egyptian Levant. It offers new information on long debated issues like the location of the land of Yarimuta, the role of Jaffa, Beth-Shean, and Ullassa in the Egyptian administration of the Late 18th Dynasty,[12] and the number and geographical extension of the Egyptian provinces.[13] However, the most important element is that it helped to argue the role and the succession of the event of Sumur and Kumidi, a subject which had never been argued, and with important repercussions in the discussion of the history and the chronology of the Egyptian Levant, and on the consequent military actions.

10.3. The results of this research

At the end of this research, the Egyptian political objectives in the Levant can be defined in three words: "Security against Mittani". It seems to have been the need for security against the expansion of Mittani in the southern Levant that moved the actions of Thutmose III against Megiddo first, and Qadesh later. It seems to have been the need for security against any future enemy expansion that made the Egyptian organize the long-term control and possession of key points in region, and it can be argued that the peace with Mittani fulfilled through marriage the same need for security that had been obtained through war, causing the "stasis" in the development of the Network, and the suspension of the military campaigns. This is not to say that other objectives would not have been taken into consideration. The importation of cedar wood from the Lebanon, the large booties taken during each military campaign, and the control of the main commercial avenues of the Levant were clearly important for the Egyptians. However, it is only through security that any secondary objective might have been (and seems to have been) reached.

[10] **§6.3.**
[11] **§4.4.4.4.** and **§4.2.3.**
[12] De Magistris 2020b. **§5.4.4.**, **§5.4.5.**, and **§5.4.7.**
[13] Helck (1971:248-252) saw three districts: Canaan in the south, Amurru in the north, Upi in the Damascene. Na'aman (1981:183-184.) argued for two areas: one in southern Palestine and the Phoenician coast, the other in southern Syria, the Bashan, and Hazor. Hachmann (1982c) added a region controlled by Beth Shean to the three proposed by Helck.

10.4. Conclusion: the Short 18th Dynasty

A massively influential definition in recent Historiography has been Eric Hobsbawm's "*Short 20th Century*". At the base of this definition stands the argument that History forms "*coherent historical periods,*"[14] shaped by identifiable forces and ideologies, and that centuries – while a useful instrument – are a limited tool in defining such periods. Hobsbawm opined that "*the world that went to pieces at the end of the 1980s was the world shaped by the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1917,*" that the following world – shaped by new ideologies and new forces – would have been inherently different, and for this reason he defined the period between the Russian Revolution and the fall of the USSR "*the Short 20th century*".[15] At the end of this analysis, I believe it is congruent to borrow his concept of coherent historical periods, and speak of a "Short 18th Dynasty" to define the Levantine world shaped by the impact of the wars of Thutmose III against Mittani, which would have eventually gone to pieces at the end of the reign of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten. In the previous chapters, I have connected the development of the Egyptian foreign policies in the Levant during the Mid and the Late 18th Dynasty to the role of the kingdom of Mittani. I have argued that the Egyptians developed their "Empire" as a tool against Mittani and his vassals, and that this system became one of management of the conquered territory following the peace and alliance with the royal house of Waššukkanni. However, if the Egyptian foreign policy had been shaped in no small amount by the presence and relationship with Mittani, when the Hittite armies captured Waššukkanni they not only started decades of wars, but also ushered in a different world, shaped by other forces and other approaches of the Egyptians over the same territories. The actions of the successors of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten in this new world would have been greatly influenced by the existence of the remains of the Operational network south of Kumidi, but the enemy against which they fought and the actions they undertook will be the subject of a different research.

[14] Hobsbawm 1995:5.

[15] Hobsbawm 1995 :3.

APPENDIX: THE MEGIDDO LIST

The following table presents the Megiddo List of Thutmose III, suggesting an identification for most of the sites it mentions. The table is structured in 5 sections:

- The first and the second sections present the number and the name of each toponym, as presented in Simons' catalogue;[1]
- The third section contains the common name of each site according to Ahituv's 1984 work on the Canaanite Toponyms in Egyptian documents (unless otherwise specified);
- The fourth section contains the Amarna letter connected to each site according to Rainey and Notley;[2]
- The fifth contains the estimated localization of the site.

Regarding the localization, when the petrographic analysis of Goren et al.[3] have indicated that a letter had been written *in loco,* I follow their results. When the letter was not written in loco, or the toponym was only mentioned in a letter from a different centre, or the toponym is not present in the Amana corpus, I follow the evaluations from Ahituv (1984), Redford (1982), and, most of all, Turri (2015).

[1] Simons 1937:115-121.
[2] Rainey et al. 2006:72-74.
[3] Goren et al. 2004, see **§4.4.4.5.**

Translitteration: Simons 1937:115-121; Name according to Ahituv (1984), unless otherwise specified; Location (A) Goren, Finkelstein Na'Aman (2004), (B) Ahituv (1984), (C) Redford 1982, (D) Turri 2015.									
#	Translitteration	Name	EA	Location	#	Translitteration	EA	Identification	Location
1	*ḳdš*	Qadesh	189	Tel Nebi Mend, Beqaa (A)	60	*yrḏ*	314-315	Yursa	Tel Jemmeh (B)
2	*mkt*	Megiddo	242-246; 365	Tel Megiddo, Jezreel (A)	61	*m<i>ḫś*	298	Muhazzu	Tel Ashdod
3	*ḫty*	Hasi	175; 185-186	Possibly Tell Hizzin, Beqaa (A; D)	62	*yp<w>*	294;296	Jaffa	Tel Yafo
4	*ktšn*	Guddashuna	177	Unidentified, Beqaa (A)	63	*knt*		Gath Rimmon	Tel Gerisa
5	*ʿnšw*	Enishasi	187; 363	Unidentified, Beqaa (A)	64	*r<w>tn*		Lod	Lod (B)
6	*dbḫ*	Tubihi	179	Unidentified, Beqaa (A)	65	*inw*		Ono	Kafr'Ana (B)
7	*bmy*	Corruption of No. 8 (?)[4]			66	*ipḳn*		Aphek	Tel Aphek
8	*kmt*	Kumidi	199	Kamid el-Loz, Beqaa (**§5.4.9.**)	67	*šʿ<w>k*		Socho	Tel er Ras, Sharon (B)
9	*ttyn*	Dutin		Unidentified, Beqaa (B)	68	*yḫm*		Yehem	Tell Yemma, Sharon (B)
10	*rbn*	Labana	193	Possibly Tell et-Tin, near the Orontes Valley (**§6.4.**)	69	*ḫbḏn*		Habisina	Unidentified
11	*ḳrt nḏn*	Kiriath Nisan		Qaryatein, Southern Syria[5]	70	*knṯ.*	250	Gath Padalla	Jett, Sharon (B)
12	*mrm*	Marom		Unidentified, Southern Syria (B)	71	*mktr*	185	Migdal	Tel Zeror, Sharon (B)
13	*tmśk*	Damascus	194;196-97	Damascus, Southern Syria (A)	72	*iptn*		Aptan	Unidentified
14	*itr*	Abila		Unidentified	73	*šbtn*		Shabtuna	Unidentified, Possibly near Qadesh on the Orontes (D)
15	*ibr*	Wadi		Unidentified	74	*tyi*		Taya	Unidentified
16	*ḥmt*	Hamath		El-Hammah, Bashan (B)	75	*nwn*		Naun	Unidentified
17	*iḳd<w>*	ʻAqidu		Unidentified, Bashan (B)	76	*ḥd<i>t*		Hadit	Unidentified
18	*šmn*	Samnu		Tel Ashari, Bashan (B)	77	*hr*		Har	Mountain. Possibly the AntiLebanon (B)

19	*birt*	Be'Eroth		Unidentified, Bashan (B)	78	*yšpr*		Yasupil	Unidentified, likely in Northern Damascene (B)
20	*mḏn*	Musunu		Mentioned in the Mari Texts, it is likely in the Bashan (B)	79	*rgd*	192	Rogisi	Possibly Tell el-Wawiya, near the Orontes Valley (**§6.4.**)
21	*śrn*	Sharon	241	Unidentified, Bashan (A)	80	*Krr*		Galilee (?)[6]	Galilee (?)
22	*tby*	Tubu	205	Unidentified, Bashan (A)	81	*ḥrir*		Harmil	South of Qadesh on the Oronte (B)
23	*bḏn*	Busruna		Busra esh-Sham, Bashan (B)	82	*rbi*		Lebo	Tell Labwe, Oronte Valley (B)
24	*imšn*	Amsuna		Imtan, Bashan (B)	83	*nmn*		Numan	Unidentified
25	*śḫ*	Mushihihuna	182-184	Unidentified, Bashan	84	*nʿmn*		Na'aman	Tell en-Name, Huleh Valley (B)
26	*ḳnw*	Qanu	204	Unidentified, Bashan (A)	85	*mrmim*		Maromim	Tell el-Khirbe (B)
27	*ʿrn*	Allonu		Unidentified, Bashan (D)	86	*ʿny*		'Ain	Unidentified
28	*ʿstrt*	Ashtaroth	364	Unidentified, Bashan (A)	87	*rḫb*		Rehob	Tel es-Sarem, Beth-Shean Valley[7]
29	*Nwrpi*	Nurpa'		El-Rafe, Bashan [8]	88	*iḳr*		Aqar	Possibly Iqrit, Upper Galilee[9]
30	*mḳt*	Maqed		Tel Miqdad, Bashan (B)	89	*hykrym*		Hykrym[10]	Unidentified, Bashan (C)
31	*rwś*	Laish		Tel Dan, Galilee (B)	90	*ibr*		Stream	Yarmuk River (C)
32	*ḥḏr*	Hazor	227-228	Tell el-Qedah, Huleh Valley (A)	91	*itrʿ*		Utra'	Der'a (C)

[4] Rainey et al. 2006:72.
[5] According to Rainey (1987:536537) this location might be connected to the Naṣiba of EA 206:4 – which, however, has not been petrographically analysed, nor contains any indication on the location of the centre – and with the *Naṣala* of the Mari Archives, which Dossin 1952 has connected to Qaryatein
[6] Kitchen 1992:23.
[7] Rainey and Notley 2006:73.
[8] Schaaf 2012:198
[9] Rainey 1987:535
[10] Redford 1982:60.

33	*pḥr*	Pella		Tabaqat Fahl, Jordan Valley (A)	92	*ibr*		Stream	Wadi Zerka (C)
34	*knnrt*	Kinnereth		Khirbet el'Oreimeh, Jordan Valley (B)	93	*knṯit*		Gittoth	Unidentified, Beqaa(C)
35	*šmn*	Shamuna	224-225	Tel Shimron, Jezreel (A)	94	*mḳrpt*		Magraptu	Unidentified, Beqaa(C)
36	*itmm*	Adumim		Unidentified	95	*ʿyn*		Spring	Umeiri (C)
37	*ḳśn*	Qisun		Khirbet Qasyun, Jezreel (B)	96	*krmn*		Keramin	
38	*šnm*	Shunem		Possibly Sulem, Galilee (B)	97	*bt*<*y*>[*ʒ*][*ʔ*]		BethAnath	Jalul(C)
39	*mšir*	Mishal		Tell elNahl, Akko Plain (B)	98	*tpn*		Dhiban	(C)
40	*iksp*	Achshaph	223	Tel Keisan, Akko Plain (A)	99	*ibr*		Stream	Wadi Mujib (C)
41	*kbʿ śmn*	Geba' Shehem		Tell el'Amr, Akko Plain (B)	100	*yrt*		Yarutu	Khirbet Yarut (C)
42	*tʿnk*	Tanaach		Tell Tanaach, Jezreel (B)	101	*ḥrkr*		Ulkur	Kerak (C)
43	*ybrʿm*	Ibleam		Khirbet Bel'ameh Manasseh (B)	102	*yʿḳbir*		Yaqubilu	unidentified
44	*knt iśn*	Gath Ashna	319	Unidentified	103	*ḳpt*		Gebath	Shephelah, near Gezer (B)
45	*rtmrk*	Alamelek		Unidentified, Akko Plain (B)	104	*ḳḏr*	268-71; 292; 297-300	Gezer	Tel Gezer (A)
46	*ʿyn*	Ayuna		Unidentified, Akko Plain	105	*rbt*		Rubuta	Shephelah (?)[11]
47	*ʿkʒ*	Akko	232; 234; 235	Tel Akko, Akko Plain (B)	106	*mḳrt*		Magarath	Unidentified
48	*rš ḳdš*	Rasi Qodsu		Mount Carmel(?), Akko Plain (B)	107	*ʿmḳ*		Amqa	Valley of the Litani River[12]
49	*krymn*	Karmim		Akko Plain (B)	108	*śrt*		Sirut	Unidentified. Possibly near Beth Shean.(B)

[11] According to Rainey and Notley, (2006:74), it should be identified with the Rubbutu of EA 289:13 and 290:11, an unidentified town under the control of Jerusalem, and therefore likely somewhere in the Shephelah.

[12] Aharoni 1953

50	*br*	Be'er		Unidentified	109	*birt*			Unidentified
51	*šmš itm*	Shamash Edom		Qarne Hattin, Jordan Valley[13]	110	*bt šir*	289	Beth Shean	Tel Beth Shean
52	*inḫrt*	Ananarath		Tel Rekhesh, Lower Galilee (A)	111	*bt bnt*		Beth Bint	Unidentified
53	*ʿpr wr*	Great Opher		Unidentified	112	*ḫrḳt*		Helkath of Asher	Tel Qasis (?)[14]
54	*ʿpr šr*	Small Opher		Unidentified	113	*ʿnḳnʿm*		Jokneam	Tell Yoqne'am, Jezreel[15]
55	*ḫšb*	Hasabu	174	Beqaa (A). Possibly Tell Hashbe (D)	114	*ḳbʿ*		Geba	Tell Abu Shusha (B)
56	*tšrt*	Tusulti		Beqaa (A). Unidentified.	115	*ḏrr*		Seror	Possibly Khirbat Sitt Leila[16]
57	*ngb*	Negeb		Negev desert (?)[17]	116	*ḏft*		Djefty	Tel Esur
58	*iššḫn*	Asoshin		Unidentified , North Sinai	117	*brḳn*	250	Burquna	Possibly Burqin, north of the Jezreel[18]
59	*rnm*	Ranam		Tell Abu Salima, North Sinai (See n.17).	118	*h<w>m*		Ham[19]	Possibly Tell Ham, in the Bashan (B)
					119	*iktmś*		Aktamas	Unidentified

[13] Schaaf 2012:198.

[14] A Helkath is mentioned in the Bible as on a road north of Jokneam, and Aharoni (1959) sees an identification with Tell alQasis,that is however rejected by the excavators, that identifiy it with the Byblical Dabbesheth (Ben-Tor 1993b:1200).

[15] Ben-Tor 1993a:805

[16] Aharoni (1959:112116), followed by Ahituv (1984:204205), considered this site to be Djefty because excavations on the site revealed an uninterrupted occupation of the site from the Chalcolithic to Roman time, and the size of the tell indicate it was an important centre during the LBA. Since he was unable to offer an identification for *ḏrr*, and Tel Esur appears a better fit for Djefty, an identification of *ḏrr* with Khirbat Sitt Leila can be proposed.

[17] If Ahituv is right in his identification of Asoshin with the Sashimi of EA 203, then from the Petrographic Analisis of Goren, Oren and Finkelstein this centre should also be in the Bashan, which would also place north Negeb and possibly Ranam. Considering the portion of Via Maris clearly expressed in the numbers 60-71, however, Helck (1971:121) and Rainey (1987:535) have proposed that Negeb was a regional indicator, then it is likely that Negeb, Asoshin, and Ranam should be placed in the south, and the portion of via Maris start at 57 rather than at 60. He further argues that Asoshin should be Khirbet Sihan, 3 km southeast Gaza, and Ranam to be the Laban of Sheshonq's lists, Tell Abu Salima in North Sinai, which was inhabited in the early 18th dynasty and destroyed at the end of it (See Petrie et al. 1937, and Mumford 1998:14431603). Since, however, the portion of the via Maris from 60 to 71 clearly proceeds northward, and Khirbet Sihan is located north in respect to Tell Abu Salima, only two of the three proposals from Rainey can be accepted at any time: either Negeb, Asoshin, and Ranam are part of the Via Maris, or at least one of the identifications must be rejected. Since the identification of Ranam seems more likely, Asoshin should be located east of Tell Abu Salima, possibly somewhere along the Ways of Horus.

[18] Rainey 1987:535.

[19] According to Epstein (1963:54) this toponym should be connected to the *htm* of Papyrus Hermitage 1116A.

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