Although the Catalan Question dominated Spanish politics between 1901 and 1923, and the Lliga, considered the first modern political party in Spain, played a prominent role in those debates, little literature exists on this movement's overall political complexities. The Lliga has often been considered simplistically: as the party of the Catalan bourgeoisie that failed to protect its class interest by democratic means, as a conservative party which failed to achieve a nationalist aim, or as a nationalist party that failed to impose itself on Spanish politics.

But the Lliga was none of these. It was a movement with a coherent ideology: regionalism. The Lliga sought to restore Catalonia by winning the region autonomy from the central state, and then to use Catalonia as a springboard to regenerate all of Spain. What distinguished this political party was precisely this double goal. This thesis presents the Lliga in the way it saw itself and its contemporaries saw it, within the context of Catalan and Spanish politics, and probes the causes of its failure.

This thesis examines perceptions of the movement - both from within and without - to determine the reasons for its failure to achieve concord in Spain, despite (or because of) the enormous success it had in pressing forward its agenda in Catalonia and influencing the course of Spanish politics. The very success of the movement opened the way for its ultimate downfall. The thesis investigates the vocabulary, logistics, and motivations of the Lliga’s program and the political mobilization in favor of and opposed to the Regionalists. The Lliga’s program grew from nineteenth-century political theory, but it was the work of a particular group of young men who provided the transition to a substantial political movement. Their own motivations are considered.
Spain at the turn of the twentieth century was a country in political crisis. Much of the previous century was spent fighting civil wars at home and colonial ones in the Americas. The Liberal Restoration installed a new constitutional regime in 1875, and this provided stability at home but did not arrest the decay of the Empire. By 1898, war with the United States caused Spain to lose its last important overseas colonies. This defeat made many Spaniards look to within their own country to find the source of presumed decadence. There, they found a political system beset by corruption and under the domination of the agricultural oligarchy of the center. Relative to other Western powers, against which Spain had once compared favorably, Spain had declined in stature. Politicians of many shades had called for regenerative movements to pull Spain out of its doldrums throughout the nineteenth century, but 1898 Disaster provided added urgency.

Not all of these movements, however, sprang from the center. Catalonia, on the eastern coast, had its own home-grown regenerative movements. These based themselves on Catalonia's distinct cultural, linguistic, and regional identity, something which had also declined in the previous centuries under the influence of a Castile-dominated Spain. But this identity resurfaced in the nineteenth century. Added to it came the industrial revolution, which affected Catalonia more than the rest of the country, making Catalan economic interests at variance with those of Spain's agricultural oligarchy. Furthermore, just as other Spaniards saw faults with the Liberal Restoration, Catalans, too, questioned the system and considered ways in which they might have their own autonomy to carry out their own programs and see to their own needs.

These two tendencies - Spanish and Catalan - did not need to conflict. The *Lliga Regionalista*, formed in Barcelona in 1901, was the culmination of several nineteenth-century tendencies. While rooted in Catalonia and staunchly catalanist, the *Lliga* also saw itself as a Spanish political party, one which had a project for the regeneration of the
entire State based upon Catalonia's vitality as a region and upon the Lliga's proposed reforms. The Lliga's program was two-fold: to regenerate Catalonia - culturally, economically, and politically - by winning the region autonomy from the central state, and then to use Catalonia's new-found vitality as a springboard to regenerate all of Spain in a similar way. The Lliga was Catalan and even catalanist, but it was not nationalist - it wished to govern not just an autonomous Catalonia from Barcelona, but a reorganized Spain from Madrid.

Catalonia underwent a cultural revival in the nineteenth century, the *Renaixença*, which helped to distinguish it from the center. Politically, the ideas of Federal Republicanism, strong in Catalonia, and of its subsequent evolution on the part of some thinkers into political catalanism created another context. Meanwhile, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie, primarily represented by the economic pressure group known as the *Fomento de Trabajo Nacional*, had also become disillusioned that the political system in Madrid might not best represent its economic interests. These three tendencies converged under the guidance of a fourth group of Catalans unimpressed by the Restoration system, the traditional conservatives. These saw their interests as distinct from those of the Liberal ruling class in Madrid, and they were often deeply connected with Catalan cultural and language movements. Foremost among these Catalan conservatives was Manuel Duran y Bas, a prominent legal scholar who led the defense of Catalan law when the Madrid government moved to create a unitary legal code for Spain in the 1880s. He also had great influence over the University of Barcelona, where many of his disciples would become leaders of the nascent regionalist movement. Chief among these were Francesc Cambó i Batlle, Enric Prat de la Riba i Sarrà, and Lluís Duran i Ventosa, all in their twenties in 1900. These men viewed Catalonia as a vital part of Spain, and as such an ideal point of departure to regenerate the entire State.

The Disaster of 1898 provoked debate on how to regenerate Spain. For the first time, the ideas of Catalan regionalists spawned an important political movement. The Lliga sought to preserve Spain but to reorganize it in a manner more consistent with its diversity. Perhaps its greatest achievement was the creation of the *Mancomunitat* in 1914. This, Catalonia's first regional government in centuries, had very little new power on paper, but the frenetic activity of the Lliga made it an effective and ambitious organization with which to carry out the Party's political program. The Lliga hoped to
use the vitality of Catalonia to spur the regeneration of all of Spain. Its politics remained consistent throughout the period - indeed the positions of its young leaders Cambó, Prat de la Riba, and Duran in 1898 virtually foretold its actions, which led to failure, in 1923.

This thesis examines perceptions of the movement - both from within and without - to determine the reasons for its failure to achieve concord in Spain, despite (or because of) the enormous success it had in pressing forward its agenda in Catalonia and influencing the course of Spanish politics. The very success of the movement opened the way for its ultimate downfall. The thesis investigates the vocabulary, logistics, and motivations of the Lliga's program and the political mobilization in favor and opposed to the Regionalists. The Lliga's program grew from nineteenth-century catalanism and the 1898 Disaster, but it was the work of a particular group of young men who provided the transition to a substantial political movement. Their own motivations are considered.

The policy of the Lliga evolved over its history as situations changed, but it never strayed from its basic premise as put forward by the crucial triumvirate of Cambó, Prat, and Duran. Cambó was the thinker who led the strategy and dealt with the world outside the Lliga proselytizing for regionalism throughout Catalonia and Spain, the political leader of the party. Prat knew how to carry out actions to make the most out of even the most restrictive legal circumstances, and so gained the respect and cooperation of all parties. Duran, the scholar, devoured their thoughts and the politico-legal debate elsewhere, and codified it in writing, laying out the definitions and bases from which the party could then operate. These three essentially ran the show from even before the existence of the Lliga, and they provided the energy needed to bring the party together. They also all collaborated on the Veu de Catalunya, the Regionalist newspaper Prat founded as a daily in 1899 and for which Duran served as political advisor. Prat in many ways saw himself as indeed what his newspaper was called - the "Voice of Catalonia" - as he put the Lliga's plans into action from his posts first as President of the Barcelona Provincial govern from 1907 and later as President of Catalonia (with the constitution of the Mancomunitat in 1914). In carrying out his actions, Prat often pretended to perform an apolitical, extra-party function. Cambó, meanwhile, became the parliamentary leader of the party, crafted its Spanish policy, and dealt with the political circles in Madrid.
The *Lliga*'s strategy proved remarkably successful. The *Lliga*'s first parliamentary representatives took their seats in 1901, one month after the Party had formed. The following Fall, the dynastic parties were defeated in Barcelona, and a new political system had taken hold in the Catalan capital. A broad electoral coalition led by the Regionalists swept the dynastic parties from their control of the Catalan political system in 1907, making the *Lliga* an influential voice in the *Cortes* and a collaborator in governmental reform projects. These projects included one which would lead to the *Mancomunitat* in 1914, an organization the Regionalists would come to dominate as their own political fiefdom and in which they could put into practice many of the reforms and modernizations they had long professed. From this base in Catalonia, the Regionalists could launch an attack on the Liberal Restoration system and help cause the collapse of the *turno* in 1917, which led to the Restoration's first coalition government which included the *Lliga*. The Regionalists took part in subsequent coalitions as well, and had the chance to spread their programs, so that instead of concentrating on reform for Catalonia they now could work to regenerate all of Spain. For several years, they were one of the most dominant political forces in Spain.

Although the *Lliga* continued to improve its results at the polls until 1923, its years of offensive actually ended early in 1919 when it failed to see to the concession by the central government of integral autonomy to Catalonia. The political and social situation in Catalonia had by this point escaped the control of the *Lliga*: the youth movements the party had spawned had become so wrapped up in catalanism that they joined forces with a newly assertive Catalan left to break away from the *Lliga* and its ideal of reforming Spanish politics; the revolutionary left had augmented its attacks on order and had provoked the industrialist classes who had nominally supported the *Lliga* to their own form of lawless violence, disrupting the party's base; the Catalan left wisely used the *Lliga*'s support for the restoration of social order to take the lead in presenting itself as the true force of catalanism; and the leadership of the dynastic parties tried to use the decayed situation in Catalonia as a means to block the *Lliga*'s effectiveness in Madrid. The premature death of Prat in 1917 had deprived the party of its linchpin and virtually apolitical conciliator in Barcelona, and the insecure Josep Puig proved to have a difficult task filling Prat's shoes as President of Catalonia. The *Lliga* eventually tasted defeat in the 1923 provincial elections, leading Cambó to resign from his seat in
Congress and to go into a self-imposed exile and Duran to resign his role as the party's theorist. The removal of Cambó, Duran, and Prat meant the recognition that the program of the *Lliga*, as these three had founded and controlled it, was untenable.

The thesis follows a generally chronological approach:

- Chapter One discusses the origins of the movement, discussing the various nineteenth-century influences that culminated in the founding of the *Lliga*. Duran y Bas, as the main theoretical influence behind the *Lliga*, merits special attention, but the cultural reawakening, economic pressure groups, and federal republicanism are also discussed. The 1898 Disaster gives greater urgency to regenerative movements across Spain.

- Chapter Two begins with the preparations of the 1901 general elections, when the *Lliga* was founded and in which it won its first parliamentary representation. The dynastic parties were broken in Barcelona in subsequent elections by the Regionalists and the resurgent Republican movement. The *Lliga* was still a broad coalition at this time without coherence of direction. Reactions to a visit by the King in 1904 split the party and allowed the Regionalist wing of Cambó, Prat, and Duran to reorganize the *Lliga* to give it a definitive structure more to their liking.

- The thesis diverges in Chapter Three to discuss political theory. The reorganization of the party after 1904 provided the context in which the *Lliga* needed to clarify its program. This program is compared and contrasted with nationalism, with the radical brand of republicanism then growing in Barcelona, and with the politics of the arch-conservative Madrid politician Antoni Maura. Maura became the Regionalists' biggest ally in Madrid. This chapter also contains a discussion of the Czech question in the Austrian Empire as a useful comparison with which to place the Regionalists' politics within their European context.

- The chronology resumes in Chapter Four with a discussion of the Catalan Solidarity movement, a broad coalition of Catalan parties under the organizational leadership of the *Lliga*. The Solidarity ended the domination of the dynastic parties throughout Catalonia, and enabled the *Lliga* to spread its power base. The *Lliga* proved its ability to work with diverse groups of right and left, and to get those groups to follow the
Regionalists' lead even if they numerically outnumbered the *Lliga*. Parliamentary debate in this period was dominated by Maura's administrative reform bill.

- Chapter Five deals with the aftermath of the collapse of the Solidarity. Opposition to Maura's reforms and the brutal suppression of a revolutionary strike in Barcelona discredited the right across Spain after 1909. Maura wanted to attract the Regionalists into Spain-wide politics in collaboration with his party. The Regionalists considered their future in Spanish politics, and decided from their current point of weakness to launch an offensive to win autonomy for Catalonia and to plant themselves firmly in Madrid. Both main dynastic parties continued to fragment and the republican groups in Catalonia failed to coalesce, as the *Lliga* got stronger.

- Chapter Six deals with the Regionalist offensive as it continued after the granting of the *Mancomunitat* in 1914. This was made most clear by its 1916 manifesto "*Per Catalunya i l'Espanya Gran,*" in which the *Lliga* advocated what it always had: the use of Catalonia's vitality as a catalyst for the reorganization and regeneration of Spain. The Great War presented economic difficulties which the central government proved incapable of dealing with. The *Lliga* stepped up its opposition to the Liberal Restoration system until the Summer of 1917, when it once again led a broad coalition, the Assembly of Parliamentarians. The Assembly movement, which originated with the *Lliga* in Barcelona, had designs on turning itself into a constitutional assembly for the establishment of a new political order. The year ended with the suspension of the dynastic parties' alternation in power. The *Lliga* entered the first coalition government of the Restoration.

- The entrance into government in Madrid gave the Regionalists their great opportunity to advance their program across Spain. Their failure to do this over the next year-and-a-half is the subject of Chapter Seven. After 1917, the political and economic crisis grew even worse. But the *Lliga*, which had taken over the city government of Barcelona, dominated the government of the *Mancomunitat*, and now provided cabinet ministers for the central government, was unable to replace the old system with a new one in its image. It also failed to win integral autonomy for Catalonia, thus alienating its own constituency.
• The final Chapter Eight shows the Lliga back on the defensive after 1919. His great opportunity passed, Cambó became more and more pessimistic that the Regionalist program could be salvaged. Nevertheless, he made several attempts to reimpose his criteria on Madrid, and his friendship with Maura coalesced into one final government in 1921-1922. When this failed, both politicians realized that their careers had effectively ended. The chapter concludes with the Lliga’s defeat in the 1923 provincial elections.

This thesis relies heavily on archival and other primary resources. These include the personal archives of leading political protagonists, both in Barcelona and in Madrid; other administrative archives in both cities; and the major press of the day, especially the Veu. In using these sources, this thesis sets out to give a complete picture of the overall political complexity of the Regionalist movement, in contrast with the more simplistic approach most scholars have taken. Indeed, other approaches have resulted in the Lliga often being considered too simplistically: as the party of the Catalan bourgeoisie that failed to protect its class interest by democratic means, as a conservative party which failed to achieve a nationalist aim, or as a nationalist party that failed to impose itself on Spanish politics. But the Lliga was none of these. It was a movement with a coherent ideology: regionalism. The Lliga sought to restore Catalonia by winning the region autonomy from the central state, and then to use Catalonia as a springboard to regenerate all of Spain. What distinguished this political party was precisely this double goal. This thesis presents the Lliga in the way it saw itself and its contemporaries saw it, within the context of Catalan and Spanish politics, and probes the causes of its failure.
The Lliga Regionalista: failure of a Spanish political movement, 1901-1923

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abbreviations:

AC Catalan Action
BRA Autonomist Republican Bloc
CADCI Autonomist Center of Industrial and Commercial Clerks
CNT National Labor Confederation
Esquerra Catalan Left
FMA Monarchic Autonomist Federation
Fomento National Work Initiative
Joventut Nationalist Youth
Lliga Regionalist League
PRC Catalan Republican Party
PRR Radical Republican Party
PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers Party
UFNR Federal Nationalist Republican Union
UMN National Monarchist Union

proper names:

• When a place name has a suitable English form, this form is used.
• Parties and organizations have also normally been rendered into English, when not referred to by initials. The notable exceptions are those organizations whose English equivalent would be confusing or disconcerting, such as the name of the party which is the subject of this thesis: the Lliga (“League”).
• Personal names have been left in the spelling used by the person concerned when writing in his own native language at the end of his life. Therefore, older Catalans retain the old Catalan spelling conventions, where those who lived until after the spelling was modernized get the newer form. Two names merit comment: Francisco Pi y Margall and Antoni Maura y Montaner. Pi, though a Catalan born “Francesc,” preferred his castilianized name even when his writings were translated into Catalan (a language he forgot). Maura, although normally referred to by his castilianized name “Antonio,” was a Catalan-speaking Mallorcan who preferred to use Spanish for most of his adult life but never insisted that his name be castilianized in Catalan.
• Unless clear by the context, “Maura” refers to Antoni Maura, while his sons are referred to by first and last names. “Duran” is Lluís Duran, while his father is normally referred to as “Duran y Bas.” “Rovira” is always the Catalan nationalist Rovira i Virgili, even in the footnotes - Maura’s private secretary, of no relation to Rovira i Virgili, is always “Rovira y Pita.” The identities of others with the same surname, relatives or not, should all be clear from the context or additional names will be supplied.

archival material:

• Archives are referred to using the abbreviations noted in the bibliography.
• With the exception of most correspondence, archival material has been referenced using the classification system specific to each archive.
• When correspondence comes from a folder or envelope in an archive clearly catalogued as containing the correspondence of only that individual with the person in whose archive the letter is preserved, then no classification is specified. When correspondence comes from another part of the archive, then the classification reference is supplied.
THE HISTORIC REGIONS OF THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

--- provincial boundaries

--- regional boundaries

--- linguistic boundaries

CATALONIA

ARAGON

VALENCIA

TARRAGONA

FRANCE

ANDORRA
Introduction

The *Lliga Regionalista*, formed in Barcelona in 1901, intended to advance a particular form of regeneration for Catalonia in the face of the unitarist tendencies of the central government and to reform the Spanish state. The loss of Spain's last colonies in 1898 provided the urgency for its regeneration. The Party's program was two-fold: to restore Catalonia by winning the region autonomy from the central state, and then to use Catalonia as a springboard to regenerate all of Spain. What distinguished this political party from others in Spain and elsewhere was precisely this double goal. The *Lliga* did indeed seek autonomy for Catalonia, in which it promoted Catalan language and culture; however, the *Lliga* truly saw itself as a Spanish political party, one which had a project for the regeneration of the entire State based upon Catalonia's vitality as a region and upon the *Lliga*'s proposed reforms. The *Lliga* was Catalan and even catalanist, but it was not nationalist - it wished to govern not just an autonomous Catalonia from Barcelona, but a reorganized Spain from Madrid. It made a great impact - despite what others saw as its fundamental internal contradictions - because of its superior organization and the great talent of its leaders. Other political groups had to react to the Regionalist agenda, and new formations appeared on the Spanish and Catalan political scenes. These forces, which were in some cases the result of the *Lliga*'s success, contributed to the party's ultimate failure. The *Lliga* changed Spain, but could not control the results of the change.

Although the Catalan Question dominated Spanish politics between 1898 and 1923, and the *Lliga*, considered by many the first modern political party in Spain, played a prominent role in those debates, very little literature exists on this subject. The most widely known book, Jesús Pabón's three-volume *Cambó* (Barcelona 1952-1969) is an excellent historical biography of the *Lliga*'s leading figure, but as such takes a different emphasis; it is not the history of the *Lliga* as a political party, and it does not seek to uncover the reasons for the *Lliga*'s failure.

What material does exist on the *Lliga* itself is written primarily by Catalans and for a Catalan readership, and also fails to consider the *Lliga* on its own merits. Of the studies, Isidre Molas' *Lliga Catalana, un estudi d'estasiologia* (Barcelona 1972),
is a work of political science concentrating on the data of elections and demography rather than on the words and actions of the players and the response they produced. It also views the Restoration *Lliga* as a mere forerunner to its 1930s incarnation. Although the party-structure and people were the same in the 1930s as before the Dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja, the political circumstances had changed and the *Lliga* was forced to adapt to new realities; the Regionalists no longer played a leading role in Spanish or Catalan politics - their time had passed. Borja de Riquer's *Lliga Regionalista, la burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme* (Barcelona 1977), which looks only at 1898-1904, concludes that the Regionalists proposed a "nacionalisme impossible:" their very conservatism precluded their nationalism and they had to side with the central government against the Catalans they claimed to represent. I consider the movement of regionalism to be distinct from nationalism: this could not be an impossible nationalism because it did not pretend to be nationalism in the first place. The *Lliga* found its regionalism misunderstood, while its fundamental conservatism made it the target of all sides. Riquer also presents the *Lliga* in the way it is generally perceived: as the party of the Catalan *bourgeoisie* directed by Catalan industrialists. However, although much of the *bourgeoisie* supported the *Lliga* and its desires often coincided with those of the Regionalists, Catalan industrialists neither founded nor directed the party. I will present the *Lliga* in the way it saw itself and its contemporaries saw it, within the context of Spanish politics and European regionalism, and will probe the causes of its failure.

*El Catalanisme i l'Estat* (Montserrat 1993), by Agustí Colomines, breaks off in 1917, just before the *Lliga* entered the cabinet of the central government, and from this position of power got its first chance to carry out its program from all levels of government: state, regional, and local. Colomines also fails to discuss the complex role played by the *Lliga* in Spanish politics after 1909, even ignoring the concession of limited autonomy in 1913. I will specifically pay attention to the complex developments of 1917 to 1923, looking at the years of the Party's greatest power, which were also the years of its demise. I will also concentrate on the implications of the Regionalists' program on the general Spanish politics they considered as important as the specifically Catalan politics.
This thesis will also rely heavily on archival and other primary resources, which Colomines virtually ignored. These include the personal archives of leading political protagonists, both in Barcelona and in Madrid; other administrative archives in both cities; and the major press of the day, especially the Regionalist daily *Veu de Catalunya*, since the leading political figures often directed, wrote for, influenced, and paid close attention to this press. To amplify my study of the *Lliga*, I will examine perceptions of the movement - both from within and without - in order to determine the reasons for its failure to achieve concord in Spain, despite (or because of) the compromises that led to the *Mancomunitat*, limited autonomy won in 1913. I will investigate the logistics, the motivation, and the economics of the Party’s program, and the political mobilization of the masses in that period in favor of and opposed to the Regionalists. I will also explore the vocabularies of regionalism, understanding that the very words used proved critical in the way the Regionalists presented themselves and others reacted to them. The Party’s program grew from nineteenth-century catalanism and Spanish regenerationism, but it was a particular group of men who provided the transition to a substantial political movement. Their own motivations must also be considered. The chapters in this thesis follow a generally chronological approach, with a short digression in Chapter Three to discuss political theory in the context of the *Lliga*’s reorganization and ideological reaffirmation in 1904. The thesis opens with an examination of the origins of the *Lliga*.

The *Lliga*’s foundation was the culmination of various influences, one of which was federal republicanism. The Revolutionary Sexenium of 1868-1874 included an ill-fated and unstable republic. This republic had professed to reorganize Spain on a federal model, but not all of the republican groupings were fully in agreement with this administrative structure. Bickering between the various groups led to the formation and collapse of four governments in under a year (two of them headed by ethnic Catalans), none of which could implement the new model.

After these experiments, Spain had a constitutional monarchy installed in 1875 under the guidance of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo. Cánovas hoped to bring about a parliamentary democracy modeled on the British version, in which two
main parties, both of which supported the dynasty, alternated in power. The military was removed from active politics, as long as active politics failed to meddle in military affairs and was able to maintain order. Despite the Constitution, Spain hardly became a true democracy, as a liberal oligarchy dominated politics and rigged elections. The government was centralist and based on the interests of the agricultural elites of the center. The two main parties, the Liberal-Conservatives and the Liberal Fusionists, were really flip sides of the same coin and differed little in substance. Both were rife with internal factions based not on political ideals but on personal conflicts that further reduced their abilities to accomplish anything. These parties based their power on caciques, local party bosses who rigged elections to return majorities for whichever party currently formed the government, while the parties alternated in power in the turno pacífico. Meanwhile, the Republicans were also hopelessly divided, and provided little opposition to the regime. On the far right, the Carlist opposition, based on traditionalist, Catholic values and loyal to a Pretender from an alternate Borbón line, was a spent force and had very little ideological coherence. Nevertheless, the structure of the regime did allow for peaceful transitions from one government to another, brought an end, for the time being, to the civil wars and political instability that had torn nineteenth-century Spain, and succeeded in bringing peace to Spain. The Constitution remained in force for half a century.

Catalonia, the most industrial region in Spain, had different concerns from the rest of the country, though it had for the most part remained peripheral to Spanish politics. During the first years of the Restoration, Catalans mostly preferred to stay out of politics. This did not mean that the Parliament in Madrid contained no Catalans nor that Catalans did not occupy the majority of local posts within Catalonia. However, those Catalans who did serve in various offices did so as representatives of the Spanish Restoration system and did not represent any particular Catalan interest or point of view. So while Catalans participated directly in politics, they did not occupy positions of great importance. For example, no Catalan held a cabinet post between 1874 (the end of the First Republic) and 1899. As a result, Catalan leaders developed a distinctive form of lobbying in the hopes of influencing policy from outside the party system.
Catalonia underwent a cultural revival in the nineteenth century, the Renaixença, which helped to distinguish it from the center. Politically, the ideas of Federal Republicanism, strong in Catalonia, and of its subsequent evolution on the part of some thinkers into political catalanism created another context. Meanwhile, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie, primarily represented by the economic pressure group known as the Fomento de Trabajo Nacional, had also become disillusioned that the political system in Madrid might not best represent its economic interests. These three tendencies converged under the guidance of a fourth group of Catalans unimpressed by the Restoration system, the traditional conservatives. These saw their interests as distinct from those of the Liberal ruling class in Madrid, and they were often deeply connected with Catalan cultural and language movements. Foremost among these Catalan conservatives was Manuel Duran y Bas, a prominent legal scholar who led the defense of Catalan law when the Madrid government moved to create a unitary legal code for Spain in the 1880s. He also had great influence over the University of Barcelona, where many of his disciples would become leaders of the nascent regionalist movement. Chief among these were Francesc Cambó i Batlle, Enric Prat de la Riba i Sarrà, and Lluís Duran i Ventosa (a son of Duran y Bas), all in their twenties in 1900. These men viewed Catalonia as a vital part of Spain, and as such an ideal point of departure to regenerate the entire State.

The Disaster of 1898 provoked debate on how to regenerate Spain. For the first time, the ideas of Catalan regionalists spawned an important political movement. The Lliga sought to preserve Spain but to reorganize it in a manner more consistent with its diversity. Perhaps its greatest achievement was the creation of the Mancomunitat in 1914. This, Catalonia’s first regional government in centuries, had very little new power on paper, but the frenetic activity of the Lliga made it an effective and ambitious organization with which to carry out the Party’s political program. The Lliga hoped to use the vitality of Catalonia to spur the regeneration of all of Spain. Its politics remained consistent throughout the period - indeed the positions of its young leaders Cambó, Prat de la Riba, and Duran in 1898 virtually foretold its actions, which led to failure, in 1923.
To make sense of this study requires laying out the definitions employed. This will mean building a basic vocabulary, most of which will be that used by Duran, the *Lliga*’s theorist. The term “regionalism,” in common usage in Spain, replaces what, in Northern Europe, is often referred to as “nationalism.” Duran supplied the term “regionalism” in order to distinguish clearly between types of “nationalist” objectives. The only drawback, Duran admitted, was that its root implied geography, not ethnicity, which he correctly feared would allow micro-nationalists a means to question regionalism as a movement of ethnic identity.\(^1\)

Acknowledging the power of ethnicity, historians have given nationalism much attention, yet have usually overlooked regionalism, a movement based in an ethnic region but which, through compromise, tried to propose the reorganization and renovation of the entire state. Regionalists based their project on the possibility of dual loyalty: to ethnic group and to central state, each forming a part of the identity of the individual. The “nation-state,” crucial for nationalists, no longer became necessary in a system which allowed for, and even encouraged, diversity, while stressing the mutual dependence of each group on the others. But this mindset had trouble taking hold, and often groups, macro- and micro-, concluded that maintaining multi-ethnic states compromised their own identities. Once mistrust poisoned the debate and polarized the groups, the regionalists themselves often became the object for scorn from both sides.

“Macro-nationalism” has often represented the chauvinism of the majority *Volk* towards its minorities, while “micro-nationalism” has usually sought a quest for “self-determination.” Because of their implied relationships to persecution, the different nationalisms have gained favorable and unfavorable reputations, yet both have represented the same underlying outlook: namely, placing ethnic identity foremost. Many nationalist groups held in common that the word “nation” should correspond to the state: either the minorities should take on equally the identity of the majority - thus making the state into a “nation” - or they should seek self-determination and independence - making their “nation” into a state. Either way, nationalism became a destructive force, one that excluded one group from living

\(^1\) Lluís Duran i Ventosa, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, 10f.
with another under the same political framework, and which made the identity of one people the enemy of that of another.

Regionalist arguments owed their conception to the conservative anti-enlightenment which placed greater emphasis on individual liberties than on equality. Yet as generally conservative movements, they left themselves open to attack. The micro-nationalist left, which from the beginning questioned the ethnic basis of regionalists who profess loyalty to the greater state, criticized regionalism as merely a conservative movement, not at all ethnic. The macro-nationalist left, fearing the loyalty of regionalism to ethnic groups, doubted its commitment to the greater state and saw it as a conservative movement aimed to divide the solidarity of the working-class. Both feared conservatism and doubted that anyone could maintain two loyalties; the regionalists, they felt, needed to choose between central state and ethnic region: they needed a "nation."

This choice was not one regionalists were prepared to make. While the nationalists regarded them as idealists who thought they could maintain a dual-identity and preserve conservative values, regionalists thought of themselves as realists in that they recognized and accepted the actual status of their states, and sought to build a solution based on that situation and not on any fictitious history. Through all the confusion, everyone could agree on at least one concept: that of the Volk. Duran i Ventosa defined this ethnic demarcation using the German term as "the hereditary community of spirit, sentiment, and race between a group of men of different professions and status... (that) feels united by culture and origin, especially by language and customs."2

Respecting the historical accidents that established modern states, regionalists stressed cooperation between the groups for the benefit of all. When ethnic affiliation alone becomes the determining factor of a state or region, then citizens of different groups are, by definition, excluded. Dividing states into their respective historical regions could better promote the cultures of groups that formed the majorities within the regions, but still not at the expense of the regions' minorities

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2 Duran, Regionalisme, 30. Because of its many definitions, "nation" has become an effectively meaningless term. "State" more descriptively expresses a governmental unit actually in existence. "Nationality" (not to be confused with "nation") would represent the Volk of Duran's definition. This group might lend its character to a "region," or several regions, within one or more states, the boundaries determined by historical accident, rarely corresponding exactly to the settlements of the Völker.
since, in Duran's terms, the importance of the greater state served as a "guarantee and union based on the mutual respect of the rights of every (group)." These regions, according to this concept, must remain federated within the state. Duran's federalism was "the regionalism of convenience of political organisms bound in permanent union without the loss of their respective personalities." Once the groups within a federation trusted each other and ceased thinking of others by ethnic classification, then a firm federation could acquire unity and loyalty to a greater state without abandoning particularism. Hence, the Regionalists' struggle was to maintain their identity and their dual-loyalty, despite the skepticism of the more radical groups. Through their compromises they sought to produce equal rights and liberty for all, regardless of nationality.

The _Lliga_, then, marked a new tendency in Catalan politics: political intervention in the Spanish state. With this intervention, it hoped to win autonomy for Catalonia with which to promote Catalan cultural, political, and economic interests; but this very intervention also looked to do the same for Spain as a whole. Thus, the Regionalists offered a program that was fiercely catalanist at the same time as they strove to dominate Spanish politics for the greater good of Spain.

The new strategy proved remarkably successful. The _Lliga_’s first parliamentary representatives took their seats in 1901, one month after the Party had formed. The following Fall, the dynastic parties were defeated in Barcelona, and a new political system had taken hold in the Catalan capital. A broad electoral coalition led by the Regionalists swept the dynastic parties from their control of the Catalan political system in 1907, making the _Lliga_ an influential voice in the Cortes and a collaborator in governmental reform projects. These projects included one which would lead to the _Mancomunitat_ in 1914, an organization the Regionalists would come to dominate as their own political fiefdom and in which they could put into practice many of the reforms and modernizations they had long professed. From this base in Catalonia, the Regionalists could launch an attack on the Liberal Restoration system and help cause the collapse of the _turno_ in 1917, which led to the

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3 Duran, _Regionalisme_, 102.
4 ibid., 13.
Restoration's first coalition government which included the Lliga. The Regionalists took part in subsequent coalitions as well, and had the chance to spread their programs, so that instead of concentrating on reform for Catalonia they now could work to regenerate all of Spain. For several years, they were one of the most dominant political forces in Spain.

Success, however, bred failure. The very existence of the Lliga caused other groups to form, fracture, and reposition. The political scene created by the Lliga’s politics - one which was more open, democratic, and respondent to public opinion - also allowed for voices to speak out from all sides against the Lliga with increasing vigor. In a democratizing and changing society, the Lliga’s fundamental conservatism also clashed with sensibilities of the modern and reformed society which it itself was helping to create. The party helped transform Spanish politics, but the new Spain hardly accepted the Regionalist vision. Transformed, Spanish politics were also in a stronger position to rebuff the Lliga. By 1919, the Regionalists had to cease their offensive. They regrouped to protect what they had already won and attempted to preserve their power until a more favorable moment came along. They were under attack from Catalan and Spanish forces; and while they lost their footing in Barcelona, they had yet to secure power in Madrid. Although they continued to win increasing shares of the vote and to serve in Spanish coalition governments, this was illusory. While it enabled them to continue elaborating their program for Catalonia and for Spain, it was this program which allowed opposition to them to strengthen. The Regionalists found that most Spaniards could not accept them in the end for the reasons much of Spain had objected in the beginning: because the Lliga was a Catalan party, and, what was more, was catalanist; but once a viable nationalist alternative presented itself in Catalonia, the Catalans rejected the Regionalists because they simply were not nationalists but were instead a Spanish political party with its base in Catalonia. Either the Regionalists had to abandon their catalanism and focus solely on Spain from Madrid, or they had to give up their pretense of governing Spain, and concentrate instead on Catalonia. Unprepared to make this choice, the Lliga suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1923 provincial elections, and its leaders retreated. The party continued, but could never again achieve the role of dominance in Catalonia and in Spain that it had achieved in the
previous quarter century. Thanks - to a large extent - to the Lliga, the political map of Spain in 1923 had changed remarkably from that of the late-nineteenth century. Although the Regionalists helped create this new Spain, they could not prevail in it.
I. The origins of the Lliga Regionalista

The most traumatic event to shake Spain's psyche at the end of the nineteenth century was its defeat by the United States in the War of 1898, which stripped proud Spain of its last important overseas colonies. Regenerative ideas had floated around Spain for many years, but in the climate after the Disaster of 1898 they began to inspire popular imagination, and it appeared that some of the ideas might actually get applied. In this atmosphere, the Lliga Regionalista would emerge in 1901. The Lliga would be an altogether new type of political party for Spain, one with a modern party structure that contrasted with the factions, personal rivalries, and often ill-defined ideologies of the extant political groupings. The ideology the Lliga would present would also provide an organizational structure for the state: regionalism. This regionalist ideology marked the development and convergence of several strands of Catalan political thought.

The political ideas of Federal Republicanism, strong in Catalonia, and of its subsequent evolution on the part of some thinkers into political catalanism created one context for the birth of Catalan regionalism. One of the Presidents of the First Republic, the castilianized Catalan Francisco Pi y Margall, had advanced Federal Republicanism but had failed to implement it when he had the chance in 1874 because of rifts in the republican movement. Discouraged by Pi's failure and also perceiving Pi to have turned his back on specifically Catalan interests, Valentí Almirall y Llozer launched political catalanism, hoping to get catalanists to participate actively in the affairs of state. This trend led to the founding of the Catalanist Union, which met in Manresa in 1892 to write out the "Bases for the Catalan Regional Constitution."

Many of the influences that would give rise to the Lliga were not specifically political, rather stemmed from a unique system of pressure groups which gradually politicized as they came into conflict with the Spanish state. Catalan conservatives showed increasing distaste for the legal structure of Liberal Spain, and this manifested itself in the defense of traditional Catalan law spearheaded by the University professor and legal scholar Manuel Duran y Bas; Catalonia underwent a cultural reawakening, the Renaixença; and various economic pressure groups
formed to influence state policy found their influence waning. Most important among these was the industrialists’ National Work Initiative (*Fomento de Trabajo Nacional*).  

Most Catalans found themselves willing to cooperate with - or, at least, refrain from hampering - Restoration politics, so long as they could protect their own economic interests. Spain had a mostly agricultural economy, although poor infrastructure and political meddling stunted development. Catalonia’s main industry was textile production, while the port of Barcelona served as a major commercial link with Europe. The result was to give Catalonia a different set of economic criteria than the rest of Spain. Many Catalan industrialists banded together to form lobbying groups which demanded - and often got - high tariff protection, the virtual bribe they exacted from Madrid politicians who wanted to secure their acquiescence in the system. These lobbying groups may have had Catalan directors and an overwhelming Catalan membership, but they saw themselves as representing the economic interests of Spain as a whole and had members from all over Spain who shared the desire for protectionism to support new industries or certain products. By 1889, these groups had coalesced into one pressure group, the *Fomento*, which brought together economic forces from all over Spain into an influential Barcelona-based organization with a Spanish profile. At the end of the nineteenth century, the *Fomento* had more than two thousand members across Spain; half of these were industrialists, including seventy per cent of the cotton textile producers of Catalonia. In 1899, fourteen of Catalonia’s forty-four members of parliament were themselves members. Its Service of Economic Studies, headed by Guillem Graell i Moles and Frederic Rahola i Trémols, was

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1 Jesús Pabón y Suárez de Urbina also attributed the rise of regionalism to the coming together of four influences, which he classified as “economic protectionism,” “political federalism,” “traditionalism,” and “cultural reawakening.” Pabón, *Cambó*, vol. I, 98-163. In making these categories, he overemphasized protectionism at the expense of examining the general organization of the pressure groups. By qualifying one strand as “traditionalism,” he gave the Church disproportionate credit for the legalist movement Duran y Bas epitomized. Also, by making “traditionalism” a simple one of four influences, he ultimately failed to acknowledge the role the conservatives had in bringing the other three forces together.


6 ibid., 106.
considered the best informed think-tank on economic affairs in Spain, and the *Trabajo Nacional*, the periodic magazine it put out, regularly distributed three thousand copies.\(^7\)

Other Barcelona-based pressure groups which proved less strongly linked to Spanish politics and more to Catalonia included the Industrial and Commercial Defense League, which represented the shop-keepers and petty *bourgeoisie*, and the Catalan Agricultural Institute of Saint Isidore, which represented the landed gentry. The former had its finger on the pulse of a less powerful group of the Catalan middle class which had little influence on Madrid but which would spearhead the Barcelona taxpayers’ revolt of 1899; the latter, in contrast with its Castilian equivalents, sought to introduce new farming techniques learned from Europe, which implied an accompanying reformism, and found itself close to the land and thus deeply moved by the renascent Catalan patriotic spirit.\(^8\) It tried to integrate Catalan agriculture with the industrial movement, and in this way to influence the ideology of Catalan farmers.\(^9\) This deeply conservative group became heavily involved early-on in the cultural *Renaixença*, although this catalanist movement hardly became political until the century’s end.

The *Renaixença* touched other conservatives as well, but they, too, worked most often within the system as long as they thought they could continue to promote their own ideas. Duran y Bas characterized the Catalan conservative movement, and his teachings at the University of Barcelona had an impact on men of all political hues. His profound love for Catalonia influenced republicans and conservatives alike, and highlighted the distinction between Catalonia’s needs and Spain’s politics. His ideological successors broke with the Spanish conservatives to form the core of the regionalist movement. Indeed, the fundamentally conservative Duran y Bas ultimately rejected Cánovas’ Liberal-Conservative Party because of the “Liberal” background which its title acknowledged. He had always maintained his membership of the Party, but he was not a man of that party: “I am an English-style conservative,” he explained, understanding in that definition a


\(^8\) Vicens Vives, *Industrials*, 113.

certain legal constitutionalism and openness to modernity and free thought. He had long recognized individuality and diversity as a God-given fundamental of human nature, and felt that men should accept each other and work together in forging a society that could accommodate this diversity. "Society is solely for security," he had said in 1876. "It is the guarantee of the existence and the liberty of the individual." He added that "to deny liberty is to deny human personality, and to deny this personality leads to the negation of moral order and the whole reason for law." By 1891, a frustrated Duran broke from the Liberal-Conservative circle of Cánovas, and started his cooperation with the Conservative dissident Francisco Silvela y de le Viellueze. He represented many Catalan conservatives who had become disillusioned by Castilians who called themselves, Duran felt incorrectly, "Conservatives," especially Cánovas. "As a man of doctrine," Duran wrote Silvela, "I profess conservative principles, conservative in the genuine spirit of the word."

Duran based his legal philosophy on the individual, which provided him with the subject of his doctoral dissertation as early as 1852: *El Individualismo y el Derecho* ("Individualism and Law"). To Duran, the centuries had passed with the struggle between liberty, representing the individual, and order, hallmark of society, and he wondered how these two conflicting interests could resolve themselves. In the nineteenth century, Duran y Bas wrote later, one principle predominated: "the principle of the value of man as man. The great struggles at the present time are the struggles for the rights [fueros] of human personality." France and many continental states had, according to Duran y Bas, considered the individual a "molecular element," a mere part subsumed in the whole of society, while the British and Americans, whom he admired, had come to oppose the centralization of power, producing modernizing societies which still conserved their historic elements. "Public Powers," he thought,

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10 Manuel Duran y Bas, quoted by Joaquim de Camps i Arboix, *Duran i Bas*, 5.
12 same speech in ibid., 191.
13 same speech in ibid., 200.
15 Duran y Bas, letter to Francisco Silvela y de le Viellueze, 22. Mar. 95, quoted in ibid., 135.
18 Duran y Bas, *La Actitud del Estado según la Ciencia Contemporánea*, 18.
do not have legitimacy, then, if they have not been constructed by common consent; the law should not order, prohibit, urge, nor penalize unless to promote the harmony of the liberties of everyone else; the natural order of human societies consists only in guaranteeing liberty in all its manifestations, leaving to it all its responsibilities. 19

Law existed, then, to ease the coexistence of extant Society and legal State. 20 And here, as early as his 1852 dissertation, the prescient Duran acknowledged the principle of nationality as a natural condition of the individual:

an invisible force for each people, but a constant fact which mankind and science must recognize yet which neither man nor science knows how to explain, a fact that we do not understand except that it includes elements of community of origin, of feeling, of habits, of traditions, and of language; a force about which is raised an extremely powerful influence, destined to give to every people their own moral physiognomies and to seal with an individual character every one of the manifestations of its life. 21

Nationality would become not merely a fact but a force of individuality. 22

Duran y Bas would come to caution Restoration governments not to equate the unity they sought for Spain with the uniformity they practiced. Unity, he wrote, was the realization of an end which left ample space for individual liberty; uniformity affected identity and the application of an end onto people, converting social order into a mechanism for controlling individuals. 23 The State should be satisfied when these social needs filled a common good; in turn, the State should encourage the development of the individual, intervening only when individual liberty compromised the conditions essential for the functioning of the State. 24

When the central government determined in the 1880s to codify all Spanish law on a Castilian model, Duran y Bas led the defense of the Catalan legal system. While distinct nationalities existed, he argued, there could be no unified civil law. While dismissing this forced attempt at the social unity of Spain, he emphasized that he in no way sought to attack the political unity of the State. 25 "The organization of a people," he explained,

can be found reflected in its civil laws. These are the means of expression of the organism of the state; but those which serve as models for the large organisms of family and property delineate the characteristic traits of the life of a people in which the human personality manifests itself in those two orders of relations in all its intensity and all its expression of power: the moral and physical communication with other beings of our species for the conservation and perfection of the individual, and the intellectual and material communication with the natural surroundings around us. 26

19 Duran y Bas, La Actitud del Estado, 114.
20 ibid., 105.
21 Duran y Bas, Individualismo, 3-4
22 Duran y Bas, Actitud del Estado, 66.
23 Duran y Bas, Codificacion, 177.
24 Duran y Bas, Actitud del Estado, 121.
25 Duran y Bas, Memoria acerca de las Instituciones del Derecho Civil de Cataluña, xxii.
26 ibid., i.
In trying to avoid the political revolution of constitutional change, the Restoration governments were actually bringing about a social revolution implied by changes to civil law. Duran y Bas considered this a needless reform which threatened to undermine the natural structure of Society by creating laws that would conflict with the practices and traditions of the people. Reform, unification, compilation, and codification of laws were all distinct terms which people should not confuse - each had its own time, but one did not require any of the others. Codification should occur only to affirm juridical reality, to accommodate the law to the needs of Society, or to identify the new law with changed social conscience.

Although he had pressed for a new modern code for all of Spain, Duran meant that Spain should look for influences elsewhere in Europe and overseas while recognizing the individual traditions of Spain and its peoples, especially those parts of the country that were relatively well-off and less in need of reform. "In this sense," he pleaded to the Senate,

I belong to the historic school, and I ask for Catalonia, for Aragon, for Navarre, for the Balearics, for Bizcay, the conservation of those institutions that, of age-old duration, have deep roots in the customs and in the sentiments of those peoples;... let those peoples live with their laws and customs which have created the state of prosperity in which they respectively find themselves.

Nevertheless, Duran realized the need to codify general Spanish law for the interregional level. Duran's proposals found backing by many of the politically active in Catalonia, who protested the codification attempted by Madrid in the 1880s. Duran organized meetings of the leaders of judicial and legal groups of all political leanings, which would set an example for future Catalan politicians: a Catalonia-wide pressure group that would embrace general concern for Catalonia in the face of Madrid's centralization, without necessarily agreeing on the specific politics. At this time, however, Duran had not yet branched into politics, trying to mediate the situation through purely juridical means. Duran felt that Spanish law had come to lack legitimacy because it had not adapted to the times; it had to look abroad. During the previous century, thinkers in many countries had talked of reunification and greater centralization, while in others, notably Austria and the United Kingdom,

27 Duran y Bas, Memoria acerca de las Instituciones, iii.
28 ibid., v.
29 ibid., xliii.
30 Duran y Bas, speech to the Senate, 26. Feb. 1889, quoted in Camps, Duran, 114.
31 ibid., 123f.
they had considered regionalism. Spain, Duran felt, could not ignore these trends and had to decide if it would complete its centralization or - the better option in his view - if it preferred a diverse administrative regime.32

Duran defended traditional Catalan law, and himself compiled volumes of it to serve as a basis for its practice. When Madrid proceeded to codify Spanish law in 1889, it left untouched much of Catalan law. However, it made Catalan law applicable only to Catalans within Catalonia, and it reclassified those it considered Catalan for these purposes, applying Castilian law to everyone else. Reclassified as not Catalan were children of mixed marriages (Catalan and any other group), Catalans born outside Catalonia, women who had ever lived outside Catalonia, children of such women, and several other minor categories. These people usually considered themselves Catalan, but here the central government gave them no choice.33 In this case, Duran and his students forced the central government to reconsider, reforming the offending article so that men still had some choice as to their nationality, although the central government hardly budged for women's rights to choose.34

Inspired by Duran, many of his students formed catalanist organizations within the University, and these young lawyers became the leaders of the future regionalist movement: Narcís Verdaguer i Callís, who had come from an agrarian Carlist background, Enric Prat de la Riba, from a humble upbringing in a small rural town, and the elder Duran's son Lluís Duran i Ventosa, who mingled with artists schooled in the Renaixença such as the architectural student Josep Puig i Cadafalch. In 1889, Puig was president of the Scholastic Catalanist Center, which Verdaguer had founded, which Prat had also presided over, and in which Lluís Duran had headed the law section. From that position, Puig denounced Madrid’s artificiality: in Europe, governments should not attempt to do what the founders of the United States of America had done in order to forge a common civil society, because in Europe distinct communities already existed with their own histories and cultures.35 He defended regionalism as "no more than the naturalist school in the constitution

33 Narcís Verdaguer i Callís, La Primera Victòria del Catalanisme, 23-32.
34 ibid., 99-104
35 Josep Puig i Cadafalch, Discurs del President del Centre Escolar Catalanista, 5-6.
of nations,” and promoted the rebirth of Catalan identity through the sciences, through the arts, including architecture, music, and literature, and through the politics of regionalism.\(^\text{36}\) The youth movements prevalent in Catalan intellectual circles had become decidedly conservative in their individualist way.\(^\text{37}\) They marked the discontent that many Catalans felt towards all political groups which had seemingly caved into the center.\(^\text{38}\)

Even the various republican groups co-opted themselves into the caciquist system, collaborating in order to secure seats for themselves. These republicans would include Pi y Margall, the head of the Catalan Federal Republicans Josep Maria Vallès i Ribot, Emili Junoy i Gelabert, the followers of the possibilist Emilio Castelar (who forsook his allies from the First Republic by supporting the Liberals in return for the granting of universal male suffrage, even though the caciquist system still made voting a fiction), and the independent-minded eccentric Joan Sol i Ortega.\(^\text{39}\) A majority of the Republicans’ seats in the Cortes came from Catalonia; yet although this showed a predisposition by many voters in Catalonia to a different political inclination than that of Spain on the whole, the Republican voters - let alone the working classes - demonstrated very little opposition to the regime and had very little effect on Madrid politics during the Liberal Restoration.

But the libertarian streak did not just extend to young Catalan conservatives; the Catalan left also upheld this tradition, and this trait characterized a tendency towards anarchism and support for the Catalan Federal Republicans, rather than for socialist and other radical groups more typical in many other parts of Spain. Pi y Margall had opened the floodgates with his seminal 1854 book *La Reaction y la Revolución* (“Reaction and Revolution”). He asserted that individuality was the only true way to harmonize Society. Filling his writings with revolutionism, he inspired many Catalans, even those later inclined towards anarchism. Pi’s proposed federalism would come about as a result of local revolutions.\(^\text{40}\)

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36 Puig, *Discurs del President*, 7.
37 Vicens Vives, *Industrials*, 296-297. Their break with the main thrust of the political catalanist movement of that period, the Catalan Center of Valentí Almirall, caused them little anguish, since Almirall’s movement had emerged from a rather left-wing Federal Republican background.
40 Francisco Pi y Margall, *La Reacción y la Revolución*, 31-33.
The fundamentals of Pi’s philosophy rested on socialism, federalism, and morality. Like anarchism, which also gained currency at the same time, federalism hoped to base its appeal on spontaneous revolution, a confidence in the masses, and a higher moral ground against corrupt misgovernment. Pi’s plan to create a federal Spain did not involve strict devolution, but rather hoped for diverse republican revolutions across the country to establish juntas - as had happened before in Spanish history - and, once they had established control and laws for their provinces, for those juntas to federate themselves. To Pi, the “pact” formed the crux of federation, a voluntary pact between equal men. Federation would then mean a pact between independent and sovereign people; for that reason the Spanish Cortes must take a federal and republican form in order to bring about federalism. Any other system of government would limit the sovereignty of the people and would make federalism unworkable. The “provinces” (regions) had distinct identities, and the struggle of the Spanish “nation” (state) in the nineteenth century was to save their identities without losing the unity of Spain: “This ‘nation’ [state] seems, as they say, cut out to be a republic like those in Switzerland and the United States.”

Castelar, a more moderate Republican, initialled Pi as a socialist, preferring to defend absolute economic and political liberty: Pi, he felt, wanted to prove that democracy and socialism are brothers. So were Cain and Abel.... He calls the liberty that we support a fantasy, that which is entirely, wholly, and spiritually liberty; and if tomorrow we tell him that those qualifiers he has placed on liberty he has lifted from the old arsenal of the absolutists and doctrinaire, he will accuse us of bad faith. When we're lucky, to have a debate with the Disquisición [Pi’s newspaper] is to battle with chaos.... What does socialism consist of? In cutting this movement off from liberty, at least in the sphere of credit, in the sphere of labor, in the sphere of change; to return, then, to the ancient ideal, to consecrate the monopoly of the state on a single class. Democracy is the enemy of socialism.

For lack of liberty, the colonies had revolted; the same fate could await Spain itself. Pi replied that federation does not break up the unity of nations [states], it does no more than give them other bases, turning the organization of political power upside down. We for federation seek the true unity, the unity in variety, that is the unity in nature; our

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41 López Cordón, 79-91.
42 Pi y Margall, Reacción y la Revolución, 317f.
43 Antonio Jutglar Bernaus, Federalismo y Revolución, 110f.
44 ibid., 139.
46 Emilio Castelar, in his newspaper La Democracia, written in 1864, cited in Pi y Margall & Pi y Arsuaga, vol. IV, 313f.
Pi hoped to bring about his revolution as President of the First Republic and made the greatest attempt of the nineteenth century to establish federalism. In turn, Pi became inextricably associated with federalism, and the two rose and fell together. But after the disgrace of Pi and his system, the ideas remained, if not the names of the terms and the actors. Pi failed because of the natural suspicion many Republicans had towards federalism; because of the diversity of its objectives; because of the geographic, mental, and structural distance between the politicized cities of Barcelona and Madrid; and because the interests of many Catalans were really too bourgeois to work within Pi's vision.

But Pi's attempts at federalism during the short-lived First Republic changed the emphasis of intellectual catalanism and the way in which the arguments of regeneration considered the regions. Between the Constitution of the First Spanish Republic and Pi's project for a federal constitution in 1883, the word "region" had already substituted for the previous "canton" or "province." The emerging regionalist movement may have evolved with influence from the federalists, but it presented itself as an alternative which recognized the vitality of regions within a single state, and for that reason had pushed for the use of the term "region." Regionalism recognized the sovereignty of the center, which it sought to reform, while federalism (or federal republicanism) had shifted the sovereignty away from the state in a revolutionary manner in which the state would exist only as the center of contractual pacts.

Perhaps because the First Republic did not come about in this way, it failed to become the federal republic it proposed to be. After its failure, Catalan workers began to break with the Federal Republicans of the countryside, and the first anarcho-syndicalist organizations sprang up in Barcelona by 1881. They used

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48 Jutglar, 2.
49 ibid., 171. Cf. Leandre Colomer i Calsina, Catalunya i el Federalisme, 57-73: The Federal Republicans entered into power in order to bring about the revolution; but the revolution either did not come or formed against the government.
Catalan as their language, seeing the use of Spanish as conformist, and collaborated with Almirall, a disaffected Federal who had broken with Pi to promote catalanism. Almirall hoped to use this movement to catalanize and then to politicize the working class. However, when the Catalanist Union assembled to write the Bases of Manresa in 1892, the political catalanist movement had begun to blend with the vision promoted by the more conservative youth, often bourgeois and accidentalist. This caused another split in the Catalan left, with some left-catalanists like Pere Coromines i Montanya choosing to back the Catalanist Union, while others looked for a new form of workers movement.

In the nineteenth century, Catalan trade unions did not have a tradition of supporting any particular political party. Rather, they generally stayed out of politics in much the same way their industrialist bosses chose to. During the boom years known as the Febre d’Or (“Gold Fever”), roughly from 1876 to 1886, Barcelona entered a period of prosperity from which workers benefited along with their bosses and so very few strikes occurred in the city. However, hopes were dashed in the 1890s and still more by the beginning of the twentieth century as employment opportunities and conditions deteriorated. Strikes and terrorist bombings increased dramatically, giving Barcelona a somewhat dangerous reputation and further isolating Catalan politics from those of an unconcerned rest of Spain. Workers kept to the spirit of Catalan individualism, culminating in the foundation of the anarcho-syndicalist union, the National Work Confederation (CNT), in 1910.

The Catalan Federal Republicans had also come into contact with one other component of left-wing organization in the region, the Agricultural Workers’ Federation. This farming union had formed in 1891 after a plague of phylloxera destroyed most of Catalonia’s grapes, the region’s largest cash crop - in 1888, vineyards covered 385,000 hectares of Catalonia; by 1899, phylloxera had reduced this to 41,325 hectares, of which 21,946 were still infected and only 12,268 had been replanted with phylloxera-resistant vines from America. This devastated the rabassaires, farmers who cultivated the land on behalf of the large landholders in

54 Ullman, 18.
return for what they, over the centuries, had come to consider permanent leases to
the land. However, during the late nineteenth century, the landowners had become
increasingly reluctant to renew the leases, and had begun to claim back their land.
Phylloxera wiped out the *rabassaires*' means of subsistence, and clinched their
inclination towards organizing a union and preaching social disorder that
approximated the revolutionary doctrines of Pi and the Federals.\(^{56}\)

The mid-1890s saw a surge in bombings, including attacks on prominent men
such as the Restoration strong-man General Arsenio Martínez de Campos y Antón
and on innocent civilians such as those killed when an anarchist threw a bomb off
the upper balcony of Barcelona's opera house during a performance. Such terrorism
led to a government crackdown on workers' movements, which it distrusted, and
the internationally infamous trials of Montjuic in 1897. One of the men the
government implicated, railroaded, and imprisoned for terrorism was Coromines,
who owed his life to the intervention of Durán y Bas on his behalf.\(^{57}\) While the
Catalan conservatives hardly supported violent workers' movements, they also
hardly considered Madrid's centralist intervention, suspensions of individual
liberty, and simple repression the proper way to handle Barcelona's complex
circumstances.

The different Catalan groups of right and left cooperated, then, however
uneasily, because fundamentally they recognized the main source of conflict
stemmed from their living in an entirely different world than that of their Madrid
governors. But the Catalan left and right chose, by and large, to remain aloof from
politics and only to press peripherally for their perceived economic interests.
Almirall was the first to actively promote the concept of a permanent catalanist
political group that could act in Madrid systematically with a coherent political
platform rather than merely to gain periodic concessions on single issues. He broke
with his mentor Pi y Margall, who, though a Catalan acting in Madrid, had spent so
much of his life outside Catalonia that he had become castilianized, using a Castilian
name and forgetting his Catalan. Rather than effecting a policy to use Catalonia as
the basis for a new type of Spanish politics, Pi, in Almirall's opinion, had attempted

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merely another Spanish-based policy which failed to consider the specific needs of
the Catalans. Pi’s federalism failed because such a plan could not originate from the
center, Almirall concluded from the failed Republic. By 1879, Almirall established
the Diari Català, the first daily newspaper edited solely in Catalan, with an eye to
engendering in the periphery the movement towards entering the politics of the
center in order to care for its own needs.58

To Almirall, too many of the republicans had adopted federalism half­
heartedly, their plan anyway would employ the same internal constitutional and
organizational model for all regions regardless of their historic characters, and the
doctrinaireism that Pi employed proved as rigid as that of any absolutist.59 Almirall’s
“positivism” offered something concrete to distantly oppose Pi’s “rational idealism.”
Almirall had discovered an Anglo-Saxon influence distinct from Pi’s Franco­
German background, an influence which stressed individualism and individual
differences. He also realized the importance of making regionalism less radical if he
hoped to attract the Catalan businessmen to the catalanist cause, and so win it the
support it needed to get off the ground politically.60

To Pi, the identity of Catalonia mattered less than the organization of Spain,
and this annoyed Almirall who preferred to reform the specific region before
turning to the state.61 Almirall’s federalism, then, had a regional historic base,
whereas Pi’s based itself on the pact between equalized provinces and the central
state, denying the rights of nationality.62 Almirall, who also did most of his writing
in Spanish, based his theory on the regeneration of Spain, particularism, and a
federal system. To implement it, he hoped to arrive at the nucleus of power in
Madrid and thereby to save Catalonia from centralist oppression.63 He was accused
by other Catalans of being too hostile towards Castilians, and they felt that such an
approach could hardly serve to win Catalonia the concessions its pressure groups
could achieve by cooperating with the system.64

58 Josep M. Figueres i Artigas, Valenti Almirall, 57.
59 Trias, 142.
60 ibid., 161f.
61 Horst Hina, Castilla y Cataluña en el Debate Cultural, 157.
62 Figueres, Almirall, 169.
63 ibid., 172.
64 Juan Tutau, presidential discourse to the Barcelona Athaeneum, 22. Nov. 1886, in Ateneu Barcelonès,
Acta de la Sesión Pública, 22-23.
Almirall’s catalanism also contrasted with the clerical catalanism that had come into existence in the later nineteenth century, in part influenced by Carlism. The Carlist movement emerged from mass rural protest against modernization, anti-clericalism, the centralization of administration, and liberalism. The Carlists were traditionalist and very Catholic, and based their movement on a rival line of dynastic claimants. They had caused three civil wars - in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1870s - as well as other sporadic clashes. The Carlists sought to restore a quasi-mediaeval monarchy based on the Cortes, the Royal Council, regional fueros, and the Church.  

The movement’s strongholds were in the north, from the Basque Country through Navarre, Aragon and non-industrialized zones of northern and inland Catalonia. As industry spread, first in Catalonia and then throughout Spain, Carlism remained as a residual force, a protest movement of fervent Catholics. In Catalonia it proved more open to cooperation with other groups than in other regions. Many of the leaders of the Catalan regionalist movement came from Carlist backgrounds or from areas where Carlism remained active. Although this did not mean that they necessarily shared Carlist beliefs, it did mean that they could often develop a good working relationship with Carlists and the clerical right.

This right was deeply skeptical of Almirall. Where the catalanist bishop Joseph Torras y Bages, a close friend of many influential Catalans including Duran y Bas, had looked to the rural and religious traditions of Catalonia for inspiration, Almirall instead defined the traditions of the region in terms of its urban, burgher, democratic, and commercial history that traced back to the middle ages, set alongside modernity and progress for the future. To neutralize the program presented by Almiral, Torras published a series of articles in the late 1880s which he later reworked into his 1892 book La Tradició Catalana, which affirmed Catalonia’s Catholic identity. However, the book went virtually unnoticed by most of the Catalan public - including intellectual circles - and only acquired a readership among those who were already inclined to follow Torras. Catalanism - unlike nationalisms elsewhere in the peninsula - did not require the Church as a pillar for

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65 Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 3-7.
66 ibid., 12-17.
67 Trias, 255.
68 Casassas, Intellectuals, Professionals i Politics, 107n.
support since Catalonia had a distinct cultural identity and mythology apart from the Church. The Catalan Church, however, did seek to open up to Catalan concerns and even - as Torras exemplified - catalanism. To Torras, ethnicity or gens was God-given, and thus the Catalan Church needed to be catalanist. Torras professed a form of "Christian socialism," clerical activity to promote workers' rights, and hoped to provide an impulse for the more intransigent Spanish Church from Catalonia. For all the attention historians have payed Torras, his work received little comment in his day. He was recognized as a catalanist, but his specific theories had very little influence on the main catalanist groups.

On the proposition of Verdaguer and Prat, the Catalanist Union formed in 1891 in order to link the right and left wings of catalanism, respectively headed by the League of Catalonia (the adult version of the Scholastic Center founded by Verdaguer in 1887) and the Catalan Center (founded by Almirall in 1882), in one umbrella political group, presided over by the established architect Lluís Domènech i Montaner. At the Union's second conference held in Manresa in 1892, the group drew up the famous "Bases for the Catalan Regional Constitution," and at its third meeting a year later it discussed how best to implement the bases it had agreed on in Manresa and their implication for various areas of Catalan society.

The Bases of Manresa, the political program of catalanism, clearly divided power between the central state and the regions, recognizing Spain's sovereignty but asserting Catalonia's right to manage its internal affairs. To the central government would go all international and interregional matters, with a separation of powers to provide a true democratic framework. To the regions would go all the rest. Pi recognized the differences between the new regionalism and federalism and criticized them. Power over common affairs rested clearly in the center, rather than in terms of pacts with the regions concerned. The regionalists did not insist on a republic; if they had their internal structure they did not concern themselves with the greater one so long as it was democratic and allowed them to function within their region. They did not specifically define the rights of individuals; they did not

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69 Frances Lannon, "Catholic and Nationalist: Castilians, Basques, and Catalans in 20th century Spain" in Michael Hurst, States, Countries, Provinces, 237.  
70 Josep Massot i Muntaner, L'Església Catalana al Segle XX, 25.  
define the divisions to be made between the regions, counties, and towns; they did not agree with each other in every matter (while republicanism had an absolute creed); and they allowed for the Church to continue to function. To Pi, the regionalists were “not democrats but traditionalists.”

These Bases, however, marked the end of the relative calm caused by the economic boom that had accompanied the first years of the Restoration, rather than the origin of political catalanism. Despite their name, the Bases did not represent a political constitution entirely but served as an act of defiance towards Madrid. This combative, negativistic mood drew its last breaths within Spain-ward-looking political catalanists when Prat published the fiery, anti-Castilian *Compendi de la Doctrina Catalanista* in 1894. After this point, political catalanism clearly evolved to consider the regeneration of the Spanish state as a parallel question to the implementation of the catalanist program. By 1898, on the dawn of catalanism’s active involvement in Spanish politics, the junta of the Catalanist Union was primarily composed of young lawyers, students of Duran y Bas but of two backgrounds - conservatives (Prat, Duran i Ventosa, Puig - the lone non-lawyer, and Francesc Cambó i Batlle) and Possibilist Republicans (Jaume Carner i Romeu, Ildefons Suñol i Casanovas, and Joaquim Lluhi Rissech).

Duran y Bas in his old age continued to play a crucial role in influencing Catalonia’s youth from his post as Rector of the University of Barcelona from 1896 until 1899, when he resigned to enter the cabinet of the reformist conservative Silvela. Citing his friend Torras y Bages, he talked about the importance of catalanizing the University, citing the cleric’s phrases that “the University of Catalonia has to be the complement of the regional resurrection” and that “the day the University becomes truly Catalan, then will the rebirth of Catalonia begin.” As rector, the elder Duran reorganized the curriculum, instituting courses ranging from Catalan civil law to Catalan literature, so that even those students who did not come across him directly could not avoid his influence.

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72 Pi y Margall & Pi y Arsuaga, vol. VI, 845.
74 Alfred Perez Bastardas, preface to Jaume Carner i Romeu, *La Democràcia Nacionalista de Catalunya*, vi.
Catalan conservatives slowly, if unknowingly, approximated Almirall, seeking Catalonia’s mainstreaming into a renovated Spain which would allow for the defense of Catalan interests from Madrid. The meeting of the new political movement with the old elite forces culminated in the formation of the *Lliga Regionalista* at the 1901 elections. The fundamental basis for catalanism which would make it politically attractive to these conservatives, then, came in its embrace of modernity. While the *Renaixença* had gone into the past to romantically resurrect Catalan culture as a vital force, its leaders, in stark contrast to Carlism, did not seek to return to something that had already existed. Rather, the *Renaixença* sought to create a modern culture comparable and compatible with the rest of industrialized Europe. Catalonia, as the most industrialized region of Spain, looked to the future, as did its conservative elites.

The Catalans, then, had a much different perception of romantic Spain than did the hegemonic Castilians: the country was not the product of the Reconquest by Castile, but rather the sum of its many local and regional histories. Seen from this angle, the Catalans naturally had a fundamentally distinct picture of their country, and the clash of interests would necessarily create tension. As Catalonia industrialized, the distance increased. Nevertheless, the Catalan elites still hoped to use their pressure groups to influence Madrid governments. The liberal Madrid press, however, used the simple fact that these groups were based in Barcelona to show that they did not really represent the interests of Spain, even if they did speak of “Spanish” industry and the “Spanish” market. Whether Madrid liberals interpreted the rise of Catalan industrialist pressure groups as Catalan “egoism” or Catalan separatism did not matter; what they demonstrated was a growing Spanish anti-catalanism. Industrialist groups grew in Barcelona because Spanish industry was centered there. Madrid was an artificial capital - the geographical center of the peninsula but by no means the commercial or industrial center as London or Paris were. Thus the focus of policy or policy-makers did not have to remain in Madrid but should instead spring from the regions, of which Catalonia, the logic followed,

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76 Camps, Duran, 177f.
77 Horst Hina, *Castilla y Cataluña en el Debate Cultural*, 25f.
78 ibid., 113.
79 Manuel Pugés, *Como Triunfó el Proteccionismo en España*, 204.
had become the most vital.80 "It is impossible," the architect Domènech later announced,

for central Spain, under these circumstances, to inspire Catalonia in order to organize it as a modern poblet. On the contrary, Catalonia, a wealthy, industrious, and commercial country, must serve as the point of departure, if possible, for the reorganization of the other Spanish regions. And, in addition, Catalonia, full of life, has the right to assure itself of its future, which it sees threatened with death due to the collapse of Spain.81

“To accomplish this (the regeneration of Catalonia) we need, in my judgement, to put aside useless reminders of sad pasts which with little prudence some people want to convert into today’s complaints;” the conservative director of the Diario of Barcelona, Joan Mañé i Flaquer, clarified:

It is important not to lose time in gloom and doom which would result in sterile generalities; it is crucial to attract to our cause the sympathies of all the Spanish regions, victims, as we are, of egoistic, corrupt and corrupting politics; to make common cause with those who, by insulting we make into our enemies; and, above all, to content ourselves with a little in order to achieve a lot. The remedy for the evils we suffer lies in the peoples more than in the governments: let us reestablish Catalan customs, sentiments, and traditions in the individuals, in the families, and in the municipalities, and we will have recovered that Catalonia for which we strive.82

Mañé underlined the trends that had brought Catalan conservatives increasingly closer to the catalanist movement in the last decade of the century. The product, regionalism, sought to transform Spain, not to destroy it, and to do so by accepting even small changes rather than trying drastically to maximize results.83

The Catalan conservatives also now hoped to gain a direct influence in Madrid. They wanted to use that influence to allow Catalonia to play the pivotal role that Castile had long had, hoping that a new point of view could regenerate Spain. Already the fallout from the legal reforms of 1889 had given momentum to the catalanist political movement which led to the Catalanist Union and the Bases of Manresa.84 The bases for regional government agreed on there would come to form the fundamentals for regionalist demands as the catalanist and conservative movements gradually united. The concurrent rise in Catalonia of anarchism in the working classes gave impulse to the intellectual burgher class to become actively

80 Hina, 89.
82 Joan Mañé i Flaquer, Un Ensayo de Regionalismo, 7-8.
83 ibid., 30. The tactics approached those of Almirall himself, who wrote that “a change so radical as that which intends to transform a simple state into a composite one cannot come about quickly, but can only come controlled step by step.... It is not necessary to remember that in Spain there is not, nor can there be for now, any government that does not feel weak.... The day in which particularist aspirations make themselves known and those who profess them decide to take part in active (political) life, the concessions will begin.” Almirall, Regionalismo y Particularismo, fifth letter, quoted in Trías, 382.
84 cf. José Antonio González Casanova, Federalisme i Autonomia a Catalunya, 166.
involved in politics in order to maintain order. By 1895, catalanists had taken over the leadership of the two most important conservative think-tanks, the Barcelona Athenaeum and the Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation. In 1897, Prat became the secretary of the Athenaeum, and used his post to reform the organization’s statutes, to encourage the official use of Catalan, and to initiate a series of conferences on the history of Catalonia entitled “the Fact of the Catalan Nationality.”

With the Disaster of 1898, this new political alignment had its impetus and chance to break into Spanish government. Almirall, when he broke with the Federal Republicans, had realized the importance of winning over Catalonia’s conservative elites, since they had the money, the prominence, and the connections that catalanism would need to attempt to gain power. Now, finally, the opportunity had emerged. Even so, some critics felt this represented merely a marriage of convenience: catalanism needed the conservatives to enter the political scene sooner rather than later, and the conservatives were perfectly willing to hijack catalanism to serve their own personal ends - a force more powerful than their own which they could use to gain personal power.

Yet the aging Pi y Margall, though Catalan neither a catalanist nor a conservative, found himself coming quite often to the defense of the regionalists in his last years. “It is important not to forget,” he wrote in a republican Madrid newspaper, “that in this case what is being done with the administration of the provinces is little less than what was done with that of the colonies, and the same causes produce the same effects. Have we learned absolutely nothing from this anguishing experience?” Spain’s political system was perceived as a badly governing one, and was losing its legitimacy. In 1898, the main political parties suffered deep divisions, the Cortes filled with dissidences, personal attacks, factions, and scandals.

85 Jardi, Ciutat de les Bombes, 30.
86 Ainaud & Jardi, 29.
87 Trias, 8.
88 The nationalist political scientist Isidre Molas i Batllori has written that “they were in no way catalanists, but quite simply industrialists discontented by the abandonment in which they considered themselves due to the action - or the inaction - of the government.” Molas, Lliga Catalana, vol. I, 41.
90 Camps, El Tancament de Caixes, 12.
Across Spain, various groups began to question the legitimacy of the regime. Although the Restoration had provided a quarter-century of stability to a country that had recently experienced a century of regime changes, contested successions, and civil wars, and did so within a nineteenth-century liberal framework which produced a functioning democracy with a multi-party parliament which had produced some modernizing achievements such as the introduction of universal male suffrage and the recognition of trade unionism, it seemed to many a farce run by a select oligarchy, whose virtually authoritarian rule, maintained by caciques, produced corruption, the failure to adapt to the reality of changing socio-economic conditions, and the inability to implement reforms. Nevertheless, though the system may have had difficulties satisfying the needs of many groups, the stability of the regime had permitted Spain to make several important economically modernizing transformations towards the end of the century: in agricultural techniques; in industrial power, especially through the beginnings of a hydro-electric infra-structure; and in the foundations of a modern banking system. 1898 changed nothing physically in Spain - even the loss of the last major colonies did not seriously hurt the Catalan export market, due to the ties that had developed with the people of the colonies and the favorable trade terms of the peace treaty with the United States. Mentally, however, the Disaster awakened Spain into a political frenzy.

The radical reformist Joaquin Costa, who himself developed a Spain-wide regenerationist movement which paralleled the concerns of the catalanists, complained that the Parliament and parties existed only in name and thus did not function as in other countries; Spain had instead been run by an oligarchy. He felt potential regenerators needed to recognize this if they were to fix it. Spain did not necessarily require a new governmental system, but rather new players who could give the current system legitimacy by making it work properly. The Catalan lawyers, the most connected to the system, could make the first Catalan contact with Spanish reformists, representing themselves as carrying on the tradition of

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91 González Casanova, 137.
92 Vicens Vives, Manual de Historia Económica de España, 668.
94 Joaquin Costa, Oligarquía y Caciquismo, 20f.
constitutional civil law of the nineteenth century while opposing the centralist and absolutist tendency Spain had adopted. Silvela backed them, telling a skeptical Congress that "what the regions feel is not separatism: it is a profound contempt for the central power."95

A corrupt, mistrusted, delegitimized government, Costa warned, was potentially more dangerous than revolution.96 "Without any doubt," he announced,

the risks of carrying out a revolution from below are great; but the risks are greater if we hold back a revolution from above. Every hour that we delay putting ourselves in motion on the road towards Europe has been one step further in the direction of Africa. The continuation of the current regime, which would make our current decadence incurable by consolidating our condition as defeated in war, will result in civil war and foreign intervention in our affairs at one blow.97

The system needed complete reorganization, in Costa’s view, and he was willing to take into account the desires of various groups.

Industrialists, based in Barcelona, still had not entirely entered the political fray. Yet even they came up with new ideas to present to Madrid. Indeed, the Catalan industrialists, seeing their potentially fragile situation in relying on the former colonies, were forced to consider the deficiencies of Spain’s home market. This market was based on an agrarian society which depended on unreliable harvests. When crops failed across Spain, the purchasing power of the interior decreased. With peace in the colonies, trade did increase somewhat, and the fall in the value of the peseta did resecure the home market for Catalan products.98 Catalan conservatives proved that they were after all only reluctantly protectionist, when faced with foreign trade barriers. In the aftermath of the Disaster, the Fomento put a different proposal before the government:

The object of the Fomento is to take the country out of the current stagnations, because it cannot go on like this. Europe and the United States march on at such a dizzying velocity that we cannot do less than change our tune and follow their example.... Quick tariffs will be insufficient to shelter us within the internal market. It is essential that we increase the volume of trade, just as the entire world is doing.99

To attempt this, they suggested opening Barcelona up as a free port, which would serve especially as a link to Spain’s former American colonies. While this would result in the loss of many duties, it would greatly benefit the trade in Spanish wines,

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95 Silvela, speech to the Congress, 23. Feb. 1899, quoted in Camps, Tancament, 52.
96 Costa, 38.
97 ibid., 187.
98 Harrison, Economic History, 76-80.
99 the Fomento’s 1900 proposal to the government, quoted in Guillem Graell i Moles, Historia del Fomento de Trabajo Nacional, 381.
textiles, and other products, and increase the traffic of Latin American tobacco, which Spain re-exported to Europe. A free port would also attract trade that was now going to other countries, which in turn would mean an increase in employment and industry relating to warehouses and factories. What Spain, or at least Catalan industrialists, could not afford was to take no action after the War of 1898, as that would leave Spain vulnerable to foreign competition without compensation within its home market.

To some extent, though, the industrialists felt relieved by the loss of the colonies. These developments, on purely economic (as opposed to political) grounds, did not especially weaken or impoverish Spain. The home market itself now had the potential to develop, since money did not need to be diverted overseas: indeed, the colonies themselves had become a financial drag, which financially benefited only corrupt officials. The hated and feared military service in Cuba, to which Catalonia lost a disproportionate amount of its labor and finance, also came to an end.

An 1898 by-election in Vilafranca de Penedès gave the catalanists a chance to push a regionalist candidate forward against a particularly weak dynastic candidate. The Catalanist Union decided to propose as a test case Joan Josep Permanyer, an uncontroversial candidate who would not offend Madrid but who could also attract the votes of the Federal Republicans who still carried influence in the area. Despite Permanyer’s defeat through blatant electoral tampering, the candidature showed the industrialists who may still have been hesitant that catalanism could be an effective means of entering politics.

General Camilo García, Marqués de Polavieja y del Castillo, had returned from his commission in the Philippines to symbolize the disillusion that the military had in the Spanish political system, blaming politicians for the Disaster. Polavieja also proved sympathetic to the complaints of the conservative catalanists, and they in turn looked hopefully to him as someone capable of imposing their program in Madrid. Both expressed dismay at administrative inefficiency which

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100 Graell, Historia del Fomento, 390f.
101 ibid., 377f.
102 Clarke, Modern Spain, 469.
103 Francesc Cambó i Batlle, Memorias, 53.
104 Riquer, “Catalunya 1898-1931” in Miquel Izard & Riquer, Conèixer la Història de Catalunya, 125.
would place Spain in economic peril if left unaddressed.\textsuperscript{105} On September first, 1898, Polavieja wrote an open letter to the press laying out his program. Sagasta, the Liberal president, ordered that its publication be suppressed.\textsuperscript{106} The program began to leak, however, and commentaries on it surfaced in the press. The radical catalanists did not perceive Polavieja's calls for decentralization as an approximation to their ideas, but merely as a stop-gap effort to prolong the regime for a few more years.\textsuperscript{107} The leadership of the \textit{Fomento,} however, embraced Polavieja's program because it called for decentralization and for conceeding to the Barcelona economic community greater control over commerce passing through the city.\textsuperscript{108} A gap still existed, though, between the catalanists and the Catalan industrialists. The industrialists continued to show suspicion of catalanism as seditious, and professed that they merely wanted to find a new form of economic and political influence within the Spanish state, something they were not yet convinced the catalanists could achieve.\textsuperscript{109}

Domènech wrote a letter to Polavieja on September fifteenth, 1898, laying out the Catalanist Union's proposals, to see if the General would accept them in the government most people anticipated he would form. The letter, clearly influenced by the Constitution of the United States, called for greater responsibility to be placed in the Chief of State and his cabinet, and for the powers of the executive to be clearly separated from the legislature; the upper house of the legislature should become a regional assembly; the judicial system should be made independent and decentralized; and division of powers between central and regional governments needed to become more clearly defined.\textsuperscript{110} Domènech stressed that the catalanists truly wanted more concessions, but that if Polavieja proved willing to implement these compromises, they would collaborate whole-heartedly. Polavieja wrote back at the end of September confirming his agreement, and the catalanist leaders fell in to

\textsuperscript{105} Colomines, \textit{El Catalanisme i l'Estat}, 90.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Renaixensa}, 11. Sept. 1898, 5329-5332.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Renaixensa}, 12. Sept. 1898, 5352.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Renaixensa}, 15. Sept. 1898, 5413.
\textsuperscript{110} Joaquín Romero Maura, \textit{La Rosa de Fuego}, 544f.
support him. Prat aided in getting Polavieja and Domènech to collaborate, to incorporate catalanist ideals in any new reforms.

Duran y Bas also wrote to Polavieja to iron out a few principles. Duran hoped to see a new movement begun which would regenerate Spain, and he himself wanted a voice in that movement. He explained to Silvela that the movement adhering to Polavieja has made declarations and promises favorable to regionalism, which has produced in this latter movement a predisposition to align itself with Polavieja himself, not because it thinks he will give it ultimate satisfaction, but as a step forwards towards the realization of what it calls the catalanist ideal. This has engendered a division in the catalanists, the most intransigent represented by the Renaixensa oppose Polavieja as just another Spanish politico. But different are the opportunists, who have just founded the Veu de Catalunya as a daily and who already count on thousands of subscribers.

The Veu had become a daily on January first, 1899, under the direction of Prat and with the financial backing of Verdaguer. Its editorial staff included most of the under-thirty crowd which had recently been involved in political catalanism through participating in catalanist student groups and by taking over the corporations, and included Duran's own sons.

Yet Polavieja, who found politics distasteful, did not form a government himself, but looked to collaborate with existing political groups without entering one nor even forming his own party. He had little choice, in his own opinion. "The Liberal Party has no reason for existing," he told an interviewer for the main party mouthpiece, the Madrid newspaper El Liberal, arguing that ever since it won universal male suffrage that party had neither accomplished nor stood for anything: "Neither Sagasta nor his party can (do) anything. That party is the first thing that needs a blood transfusion. And exactly the same thing should happen to the Conservative Party."

However, both parties had large dissident factions, and he tried approaching first the Liberal Democratic one of José Canalejas Méndez and then the Conservative one of Silvela. After the assassination of Canovas in 1897, Silvela was in a good position to take over the leadership of his party, and had already constructed a nucleus around himself on the Spanish dynastic right. Where

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111 Romero Maura, Rosa de Fuego, 20f.; Camilo García, Marqués de Polavieja y del Castillo, letter to Domènech, 30. Sept. 1898, copy in ArxPrat.
112 discussions of projects, ArxPrat, Prest I, C7/11-12.
113 Duran y Bas, letter to Polavieja, 22. Sept. 1898, ArxDyB.
114 Duran y Bas, letter to Silvela, 5. Jan. 1899, ArxDyB.
115 Polavieja, interview in El Liberal, 17. Sep. 1898, quoted in Romero Maura, Rosa del Fuego, 544.
Canalejas objected to Polavieja's prior understanding with the Catalans, Silvela and his Conservative Union did not. Polavieja recognized Silvela's conformity on many issues, and offered to pool his adherents with Silvela's to bring about a regenerationist government. The Queen Regent called on Silvela to form this government in March 1899, with Polavieja as the Secretary of War. Silvela also invited Duran y Bas to take up a cabinet post as the Secretary of Justice, hoping that the presence of these two traditional conservative reformists with ties to Catalonia would win over the sentiment of the economic elites, although the rest of the cabinet consisted of less committed party hacks of the Canovan mold. When Duran left in the train for Madrid, a large crowd showed up at the station to see him off. The *Diario* reported that "the seeing-off was important for the number and the quality of the people that went along. It was very affectionate and eloquent testimony to the sympathies on which the new minister can count in Barcelona and of the hopes which rest on him."

Yet the cooperation with Polavieja and the Conservatives did not sit well with all catalanists. Some catalanists, notably the young hot-headed Prat de la Riba mellowed their rhetoric, seeing the chance to confirm catalanism's alliance with conservative industrialists and to gain power in Madrid at one stroke, and had swayed Domènech in their favor. The more radical catalanists with further left-tendencies, concentrated in the League of Catalonia and its newspaper *La Renaixensa*, saw compromise and cooperation as selling out to Madrid. "I have to give you terrible news," a shocked militant Pere Aldavert told the young law graduate Cambó at the end of the summer of 1898, "Domènech and Prat intend to sell out catalanism!" Cambó asked his mentor and Prat's patron at the *Veu*, Verdaguer, about their support for Polavieja. Verdaguer explained that some government had to go about reforming Spain, and that it was better to have a

118 Gabriel Maura y Gamazo & Melchor Fernández Almagro, *Por Qué Cayó Alfonso XIII*, 30. Duran, though no stranger to Madrid politics, still felt uncomfortable in his ministerial uniform. To avoid wearing it, he pretended to be ill whenever he was called to official events. This habit, however, alarmed his constituents, who wanted him to be visible, so he finally had to relent and wear it. Camps, *Duran*, 156.
120 Izard & Riquer, 129.
121 Cambó, *Memorias*, 55.
government sympathetic to Catalonia and for which in turn catalanists would also show sympathy for as long as it continued to honor its promises to Catalonia. Yet certain radical catalanists like Aldavert and Permanyer could not trust any such government.122

In the meantime, cooperation with Madrid produced some tangible compromises. The government needed to appoint a new mayor for Barcelona, and decided to pass over candidates more usual to the Restoration system’s patronage, picking instead the notable Doctor Bartomeu Robert i Yarzábal from within the conservative Catalan intellectual elite. Robert made an acceptable compromise because, though internationally renowned as a physician, his political personality remained virtually unknown. As a youth he had sympathized with the Republicans, and had later held offices for both the Liberal-Fusionist and the Liberal-Conservative Parties. While he had often expressed anti-centralist opinions, he had no direct links with the political catalanists.123 As mayor, Robert’s most lasting contribution to the Barcelona, and ultimately Spanish, political scene, was to stand up to the caciques by pressing for cleaner democratic elections - easier for him since his was a direct appointment by Silvela and not the product of any local party boss. In fact, the old Liberal-Conservative party machine began to crumble in Barcelona in this period because Silvela, who had himself been a dissident, showed no inclination to favor the old party elements and instead backed his own supporters in Catalonia who were those most inclined to support nascent regionalism. Robert, from the City Hall, further reduced the power of the party machine.124 By going over the electoral rolls, he removed 27,000 false entries from the city of Barcelona alone, names belonging to people who had died, moved away, or been invented by the caciques.125 He also restored names to the list which had been removed by the liberal caciques: Robert himself had not figured on the lists.126 Robert carried out his charge publicly in order to win popular sympathy, with most of his catalanist rhetoric being written by the twenty-two-year-old Cambó.127 Thus weakened, the dynastic parties

122 Cambó, Memorias, 56.
123 Jardi, El Doctor Robert i el seu Temps, 72.
124 Salvador Canals i Vilaró, La Cuestión Catalana, 157-158.
125 Camps, Solidaritat, 254.
126 “L’escándol de les llistes,” Veu, 1. Apr. 1899, 2.
127 Rafael Olivar Bertrand, Prat de la Riba, 143.
were set to lose their control of Barcelona by the 1901 general elections. In the meantime, however, they withstood his attempts to rectify electoral fraud. The conservative Diario of Barcelona lamented that what failed to defeat the dynastic candidates at the general elections of 1899 was not so much Robert’s inability to go further, but rather public apathy. Yet the gates had opened, and the breakdown allowed catalanist candidates Leonci Soler i March and Raimon d’Abadal i Calderó, running as independents, to win in Manresa and Vic respectively.

With Robert in place, Silvela’s government could also engineer over Liberal protests the appointment of catalanist mayors in several other cities and towns, as well as the promotion of the Bishop of Vic, Josep Morgades, a man of deep Catalan sentiment, to the bishopric of Barcelona, and the replacement of Morgades in Vic by Torras i Bages. Duran also set up a commission to discuss the restoration of Catalan law which had suffered under the legal codifications of 1889, thus returning to an issue he had felt strongly about for many years. He also set up commissions to study the restoration of legal traditions in other Spanish regions. Duran decided to cut back the size of his department to reduce spending and interference in public life. He also negotiated with the Vatican to reduce the influence of the clergy in public law. Duran presented many other proposals for reforms of public order, administration, and even economics, of which the most commented on were his calls for decentralizing all areas of government and reducing the competencies of all the cabinet’s departments. He thus ran up against the fierce opposition of the Secretary of the Interior, Eduardo Dato Iradier. Also, the mood in Madrid proved hostile to any attempts to press what was seen as a Catalan agenda, with opposition arising from both the Liberal and the Conservative benches. Duran urged Silvela

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128 Romero Maura, *Rosa de Fuego*, 82. Cambó, as a reviewer for the Veu, attended the first City Council meeting presided over by Robert, describing it later: “Bartomeu Robert’s presence was greeted with an immense ovation: the councilors who won their seats due to the caciques, who had never been in contact with public opinion nor had ever seen a crowd, sat overwhelmed and, due to its sheer numeric force, did not dare to face down the philippic the new mayor dedicated to them.” Cambó, *Memorias*, 61.

129 Jardi, *Doctor Robert*, 78.


133 Duran i Ventosa, letter from his father’s Madrid office to Enric Prat de la Riba i Sarrà, 1. July 1899, ArxPrat. Alfons Sala i Argemí, a leading industrialist and liberal cacique from Terrassa, accused the catalanists of lacking tact by pressing their demands at a time when the Spanish state was undergoing a profound crisis. He concluded that they were merely inviting hostility. Aureli Joaniquet i Extremó, *Alfonso Sala y Argemí*, 142.
to avoid the traditional elements of his party and instead to listen to Polavieja and to the Liberal dissident German Gamazo, whose faction in the Liberal Party had long maintained similarities with Silvela's own in the Conservative Party. 134

Despite these promising beginnings the facts would prove the catalanist skeptics right. While the Silvela/Polavieja government showed that it talked seriously about regeneration, it nevertheless failed to live up to its word in the opinions of the conservative catalanists. These felt that it would be necessary to make more than cosmetic changes to the system in order to effect Spain's regeneration. Under the new government, the same oligarchs remained in place, the same leaders of the same political parties, continuing electoral and administrative corruption. 135 Conservative catalanists became disillusioned with Silvela's government, as did Polavieja and Duran, the two pro-Catalan ministers. Although backed by Silvela and Antoni Maura y Montaner, the spokesman for the gamacistas, Polavieja's proposed reforms both in military and administrative matters met strident opposition from both parties, especially in the personages of the Liberal Canalejas and Silvela's own Secretary of the Treasury Raimundo Fernández Villaverde. 136

Fernández Villaverde had decided to carry out a much needed overhaul of Spain's finances, but he did so without taking into account his government's other policies. The proposed reorganization of the Treasury intended to reaffirm the fiscal sovereignty of the central state over these matters. 137 Taxes increased sharply to pay off the foreign debts Spain had incurred during the War of 1898, and the Catalans found themselves paying the brunt, without ever having a say on the policy through direct democratic representation. Not only the catalanists, but other regenerationist movements across the country, notably those led by Costa and by the

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134 Duran y Bas, letter to Silvela, 30. July 1899, ArxDyB. For the gradual approximation of Silvela and Gamazo, see Silvela, letter to Alejandro Pidal, 2. Apr. 1893, in Silvela, vol. II, 77, in which Silvela expresses admiration for Gamazo's proposed reforms as Secretary of the Treasury, which were ignored by the Liberal President Sagasta. By the mid-1890s, Silvela was already invoking these similarities in public, backing up the regenerationist beliefs of Gamazo's deputy, Antoni Maura y Montaner, on the floor of the Cortes. Silvela, speech in the Cortes, 7. Mar. 1896, in Silvela, vol. II, 217.

135 Camps, Tancament, 11.

136 Cambó, Memorias, 66.

137 Camps, Tancament, 27. The great contradiction of this government was that it included Fernández Villaverde, who was charged with balancing the budget and restoring Spain's financial integrity, at the same time that it included Durán y Bas and Polavieja, who sought the immediate regeneration of Spain, a potentially costly enterprise. G. Maura & Fernández Almagro, 30.
left-wingers Basilio Paraíso and Santiago Alba Bonifaz reacted sharply.\textsuperscript{138} Some even expressed an analogy to the American Colonies who in the previous century had reacted against “taxation without representation,” which started a chain of events that ended up in the birth of the United States.\textsuperscript{139} Prat de la Riba denounced the new taxes: “It is necessary to pay taxes in order to sustain education, communications, defense, public order, an army and a navy; but never to maintain squads of civil employees who do not administer, nor teach, nor defend our territory, nor govern.”\textsuperscript{140} Duran i Ventosa, hoping to encourage dissident factions to take over the political initiative in Madrid, had denounced the dynastic parties in Madrid as “organized bands for the legal squandering of the budget.”\textsuperscript{141}

Tension here began to build. At a meeting of trade groups convened by the League for the Defense of Industry and Commerce, a petty-bourgeois pressure group, the League’s President, Sebastià Torres, introduced the proceedings in Spanish. Someone in attendance interrupted him, shouting that “it’s enough already that we pay taxes in Castilian, at least we could protest in Catalan!” Torres continued in Catalan, to great applause.\textsuperscript{142} The following proceedings determined that Catalan businesses would rather close their doors than pay the new taxes, ushering in a wave of passive resistance known as the \textit{Tancament de Caixes}. Even Madrid’s left-wing press sympathized. The liberal-democratic \textit{Heraldo} of Canalejas a bit quizzically remarked that “the passive resistance of the Barcelona industrialists could be debatable for those who love order; but it undoubtedly represents a movement that should force our government to stop and think, given that only through economic order can we arrive at economic regeneration.” The republican \textit{Pais} added that “the only strange thing is that it is only the Catalan taxpayers who are refusing to pay.”\textsuperscript{143} It took this passive stance to mark the arrival of active catalanism and its introduction as an influence, for better or for worse, in all of Spain.

\textsuperscript{138} Camps, \textit{Tancament}, 15f.
\textsuperscript{139} ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{140} Prat, cited in Termes, \textit{Història de Catalunya}, 165.
\textsuperscript{142} Camps, \textit{Tancament}, 20.
\textsuperscript{143} The \textit{Heraldo} and the \textit{Pais}, quoted in ibid., 21f.
Fernández Villaverde’s agents in Catalonia attempted to prosecute the catalanist leaders and the lawyers who defended them and their role in the *Tancament de Caixes*. To do this, however, required Robert’s signature as mayor, which he refused to give. Finally, Fernández Villaverde, with the support of Dato, resorted to dictating a royal order which would force Robert to sign and then to subject Barcelona to rule by the central government’s bureaucracy, entailing press censorship, the closure of the University, and martial law. Robert, unwilling to go along, resigned his office; Duran y Bas, convinced that the whole affair smelled of illegality, also resigned. As Polavieja had previously left the government over Fernández Villaverde’s cutbacks of promised spending on rebuilding the military when Polavieja already felt generally deceived by professional politicians, the catalanist presence in Madrid had unraveled. Duran had wanted to stay on to see his reforms through, but even Silvela preferred not to support him while trouble persisted in Catalonia. To no avail, he had continued to urge Silvela to rein in Fernández Villaverde, and to make concessions to Polavieja so that the general could in turn put pressure on his allies at the *Fomento* to desist from their activities, as well as to allow Duran to go ahead with his own reform plans. The *Diario* commented that Duran had been “the Catalan cabinet minister of the Spanish state,” and concluded that Madrid did not want Catalans in the cabinet. Duran returned to Barcelona, where an old Catalan friend asked him what impressions he had brought with him from Madrid. “They will never understand us ever,” came Duran’s response.

However, despite the perceived short-term failure of the *Tancament de Caixes*, it produced good long-term results for political catalanism. It proved that the forces which organized it - mostly *bourgeois* - were able to produce a popular mobilization in Catalonia. It also formed a common front in Catalonia against the central government, which now accused the Catalans of separatism when before there had hardly been any popular political manifestation of catalanism. The

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144 Camps, *Tancament*, 34f.
146 Duran y Bas, letter to Silvela, 30. Jul. 1899, ArxDyB.
148 Maurici Serrahima i Pelà quoting Duran y Bas in Camps, *Duran*, 176. It is also interesting to note that the language in which Duran y Bas wrote his private correspondence - including to his family - switched at about this point from Castilian to Catalan. See correspondence, ArxDyB.
Tancament also created the base for an inter-class movement, a crucial element if catalanism hoped to launch itself into active politics.\textsuperscript{149} When Dato came on a tour of Catalonia in April 1900, he was greeted in every town by large crowds who came out to jeer him. Most of this agitation was organized by the young Cambó.\textsuperscript{150} The sensitive Dato was hurt by these personal attacks, since he felt he had only been doing his job in difficult times.\textsuperscript{151}

The Disaster of 1898 followed by the complete failure of Silvela and Polavieja to implement their original reformist plan shocked the conservative catalanists enough to realize that they needed their own forceful political grouping: they could not count on Madrid to understand and attend to their wants and needs.\textsuperscript{152} Even the Tancament de Caixes which had won them sympathy across Spain quickly lost its Spanish dimension, as the catalanists did not unite with other grassroots movements such as the National Union of Paraíso and Alba, because these represented an entirely different class of people than the shop owners and industrialists from Barcelona. Yet despite this more conservative front that the Catalans tried to show, they succeeded in presenting an example of disobedience to the population at large, even though they themselves were of the class least apt for disorder.\textsuperscript{153} If the population had shown apathy for years, then the events of 1899-1900 attempted to instill a sense of political catalanism into the public in a passive, seemingly orderly way. Nevertheless, the sheer act of conservatives not paying taxes played into the hands of demagogues and of those centralists who suspected all catalanists of separatist or anti-Spanish tendencies. These major flaws in their strategy would haunt them in later years.\textsuperscript{154} Meanwhile, without the cooperation of the catalanists, the National Union began to dissolve within the existing parties, while Costa, who sought to galvanize the popular classes, failed to gain large enough forces for his struggle. The catalanists, convinced that no one but they could carry out their own program, had to go on alone.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{149} Colomines, Catalanisme i l’Estat, 98-99.
\textsuperscript{150} Oliver, 154.
\textsuperscript{151} Eduardo Dato Iradier, letter to Duran y Bas, 14. May 1900, ArxDyB.
\textsuperscript{152} Riquer, \textit{Lliga Regionalista}, 305.
\textsuperscript{153} Camps, \textit{Tancament}, 53.
\textsuperscript{154} ibid., 25.
These circumstances galvanized the industrialists, previously content merely to remain aloof from politics and to use pressure groups to present their views in Madrid. They proposed creating a new type of "larger Spain," modernizing Spain itself while increasing trade in a larger world-market, especially in South America, to, in turn, provide the financial resources Spain needed. Thus the industrialists did not put forward their ideas as Catalan interests, but rather Spanish ones, in the same way as many considered these plans as good for the workers and not just for the capitalist bosses. The industrial development of Catalonia depended on the (re)construction of Spain, and would produce what observers saw as the "emancipation" of the common people in the rest of Spain which in turn depended on the wealth of Catalonia. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Disaster, many workers increasingly believed the assertion by the industrialists that, as bosses, they really did concern themselves with the plight of the workers but thought that if they improved pay and benefits they would not be able to keep their costs competitive and this would in turn force them to close the factories completely, terminating the employment of the workers.

When General Polavieja came out with a program that took into account many of the concerns of the Catalan industrialists, a large number of members of the Fomento rushed to form a support group for the reformist general in Catalonia, the Regional Junta, which became the Regionalist Union after Polavieja resigned his cabinet post. Yet Polavieja's failure showed them the deficiency of their actions: some realized they could only achieve the reforms they needed if they entered the system themselves, decentralized it in order to gain their own political power, and achieved their own representation in Madrid. They now approximated the thinking of the political catalanists. Before 1898, political catalanism had failed to attract the burgher classes because it had not spoken directly to their concerns but rather had produced, as Prat's Compendi demonstrated, a radicalized utopic intellectual idea, while at least the Restoration system with which the burghers dealt concerned itself more with actual problems of reality. But the taxes of Fernández

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156 Edouard Escarra, El Desarrollo Industrial de Cataluña, 167.
157 ibid., 186-187.
158 Vicens Vives, Industrials, 145-146.
159 Riquer, "La Lliga Regionalista i la Vaga General de 1902," 3-4.
160 Figueres, Almirall, 149-150.
Villaverde and his failure to protect Catalan industry clinched the industrialists' disillusion with Madrid, and brought them into alliance with the motley catalanists, even though the catalanists - neither in the conservative nor possibilist republican wings - did not specifically espouse a protectionist project. Duran i Ventosa fudged the issue several years later, saying that regionalism could admit protectionism, even though it did not necessarily keep with their ideals of economic liberty, because the state had the duty to promote wealth in order to facilitate paying for improved communications, and as such had the duty to adopt whatever trade system necessary at a given moment to develop the country's production.

Pi mused at how the various peripheral groups could form a regenerative party to bring about the needed revolution in popular thought and to reclaim power for the people from a corrupt and discredited government. Duran y Bas reminded the Cortes that the unity of the state was not incompatible with a variety of juridical institutions, and such extreme thinking would be necessary to cure Spain. But Canalejas warned against such approaches, classifying them with other discredited attempts at organizing government as "a threat to public peace." Pi announced that he could not agree with Catalan regionalism because it did not feel for individual rights, republicanism, or democracy, but even he defended it against the charges of separatism:

They have accused the regionalists of supporting separatism. I have read their many declarations; in none have I seen not even attempts at separatism. They have classified them egoists; I have also not seen any of the catalanists demonstrate that they want only autonomy for Catalonia. They speak of autonomy for all the regions of the Peninsula, and they want them bound by a central power which would govern their common interests.

Pi, at the end of his long life, accepted the presidency of the Jochs Florals, and admitted the distinction between Catalonia and the other regions in regards to its history, economic needs, laws, although at the same time these clearly tied Catalonia to the rest of Spain:

For all these reasons, the only thing lacking is autonomy. We will get nothing more from independence if some day we acquire it.... Thus, we would have now and always to live united by a freely elected central power with the other regions of the Peninsula.

161 Michele Olivari, Regionalismo Catalano, 24.
162 Duran i Ventosa, Regionalisme i Federalisme (2nd ed.), 258-260.
164 Duran y Bas, in the Cortes, Jun. 1899, quoted in ibid., vol. VIII, 1816.
165 Jose Canalejas Mendez, speech in the Cortes, Jun. 1899, quoted in ibid., vol. VIII, 1816.
166 Pi y Margall in the Cortes, Jun. 1899, quoted in ibid., vol. VIII, 1817.
Because if there is no central power to unite, the nations are all exposed to unfortunate wars and will have to contrive through treaties today signed and tomorrow broken. But opponents to the catalanist vision of regeneration continued to tag those who wished to diminish centralized rule as separatists and ethno-centrist egoists who reacted against the Spanish and Spain. These catalanists, then, appeared to many in the center as reactionary extremists: Carlists of the countryside or groups reacting against an influx of immigrants from elsewhere in Spain to Barcelona and other industrial areas of Catalonia.

Even so, these attacks on Catalan egoism at least recognized the need for Catalonia to remain part of Spain, if only in an exploitative role. The conservative industrialists were not, nor could they be, separatists because of their interests in Spain. The industrialists saw that the economic backwardness of Castile paralyzed the development of Catalonia, in a way that bore no relation to the intellectual and literary connection between the two regions - the focus of the Renaixença. Castile had to advance for political catalanism to succeed, and with the added dynamism of Catalan industry, regionalism gained strength. Cynically, then, those who recognized that the catalanism of that period did not represent separatism still felt that it was a manifestation of Catalan disdain for Spain, a superiority complex.

Robert, as mayor of Barcelona, had announced in the Cortes, that "I am not unaware that Madrid finds itself in a morbid state, that could be called catalanophobia. I am not a separatist, nor am I a Catalan regionalist; I am a Spanish regionalist." His words described the tone that regionalism, a movement which grew out of Catalonia, would take for the next quarter century in which it became one of the dominant political forces of Spain's attempted regeneration. When the independent regionalist MP Abadal discussed his political beliefs at the Madrid Athenaeum in 1900, it was an opportunity to show intellectuals in the capital that the Catalan regionalists really provided a doctrine for all of Spain.

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167 Pi y Margall, "Discurs del President del Consistori," Jochs Florals de Barcelona (1901), 41.
168 Ramiro de Maeztu, Hacia Otra España, 290.
169 ibid., 202f.
171 Bartomeu Robert i Yarzabal, speech to the Cortes, 27. July 1899, quoted in ibid., vol. VIII, 1829.
172 Leonci Soler i March, letter to Prat, 8, Mar. 1900, in Prat & Soler, Correspondència Inèdita, 79.
Polavieja, who sought to start regeneration immediately in 1898, thought he found in catalanism a force with which he could bring about his plans.\textsuperscript{173} Conservatives, Polavieja's natural allies, had come to dominate the movement, and here he saw Spain's future.\textsuperscript{174} Yet Polavieja soon failed. Pi, who never gave support to the old General, saw this as natural because Polavieja did not seek to organize his own political party but rather hoped to gain support from all parties; only Catalonia took his proposals consistently seriously; and he did not, in Pi's opinion, offer a convincing plan to regenerate the entire state.\textsuperscript{175} With the failure of a leader from the center to bring about the changes that regionalists saw as necessary for the regeneration of Spain, they had to come up with their own organization to attempt to bring those changes about with a spur from the periphery. Spaniards referred to the "Catalan question" which dominated politics until the Civil War; to the Lliga, the question revolved around Spain and what type of state that country would have.

\textsuperscript{173} Pi y Margall & Pi y Arsuaga, vol. VIII, 1489.
\textsuperscript{174} Polavieja, open letter, 1. Sept. 1898, reprinted in ibid., vol. VIII, 1498.
\textsuperscript{175} ibid., vol. VIII, 1500.
II. The organization of the *Lliga* in a new political climate, 1901-1905

The 1901 General Elections in Barcelona marked the point after which Spanish politics could never return to what had become normal in the Restoration period. Although the Conservative government of Francisco Silvela had ridden in on the crest of calls for regeneration after the 1898 Disaster, it had failed to manage any substantial reform. The trauma of its failure sparked a political reaction in Barcelona, where two already existent groups - catalanists and republicans - launched attacks from the right and the left on politics-as-usual. But although catalanism had existed previously, this election marked the entrance of the catalanists as an important organized political force on the Spanish scene for the first time. The catalanists initiated, in 1901, what many have considered Spain’s first modern political party, using prominent citizens as figureheads for a dynamic younger generation of conservative regionalists, who had succeeded in bringing together the forces necessary to break the dynastic *caciques* and launch their own political careers.

Catalonia had lived under increasing martial law since 1897, when the Liberal government reacted sharply to a letter, drafted by the young Enric Prat for the Catalanist Union, to the King of Greece congratulating him on the liberation of Crete from the Turks. The Silvela government in its last year, with its reformist element removed, also chose to continue to arrest prominent Catalans and to impose heavy press censorship, a policy followed by the Liberal-Conservative old guard which pushed Silvela out in the Fall of 1900, and lasted under the presidency of General Marcelo de Azcárraga until early 1901, when Sagasta’s Liberals returned. The occupation, however, actually worked against the centralists, as it prepared a strong incentive for Catalans to air their opinions in the 1901 elections.1 The Liberals lifted the state of emergency on March eleventh, just two months before the elections scheduled for May nineteenth, and Prat wasted no time in reestablishing the *Veu de Catalunya*, which encouraged Catalonia to lead the way in Spanish

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1 Riquer, *Lliga*, 183f.
politics by a strong turnout.² A victory in 1901, the catalanists argued, would signify
the beginning of the end of caciquismo in an orderly, non-anarchic, manner.³

Various catalanist factions began to meet to form a common strategy. While
the conservative catalanists had become convinced that the extremists had been
right to mistrust working within the Madrid establishment, the extremists had also
learned the use for the industrialists’ clout and wealth. In the end, their immediate
political goals diverged very little in 1901, and a merger was imminent. The result
was a new political party, the Lliga Regionalista.⁴ The Catalan industrialists were
willing to fight elections under the banner of catalanism as a means of achieving
their economic interests in a way they had been unable to through extra-political
pressure groups.⁵ With the birth of the new party on April twenty-fifth, the thrust
of the new movement was evident, especially after the announcement four days
before the elections of the joint candidature in Barcelona of the ex-presidents of four
important bourgeois societies: Bartomeu Robert (the Economic Society), Lluís
Domènech (the Athenaeum), Sebastià Torres (the Industrial and Commercial
Defense League), and Albert Rusiñol i Prats (the Fomento).⁶ The president of
another pressure group, Carles de Camps i Olzinelles (the Agricultural Institute of
Saint Isidore), decided not to run in Barcelona, but rather in his home town of Olot.
Leonci Soler also stood for re-election in Manresa to complete the Lliga’s slate.

The Renaixença had restored to Catalonia a sense of its own identity, but it
hardly made the Catalan people ready to enact various plans to use Catalonia to
regenerate all of Spain, let alone make catalanists ready to govern Catalonia or
Spain. The leaders of the Lliga tirelessly, therefore, organized conferences and
events all over Catalonia in order to empower themselves by activating and gaining
the support of the population. The twenty-four-year-old lawyer Francesc Cambó,
more than anyone else, put himself out to promote an organization that he

² Riquer, Lliga, 191; see the Veu throughout Apr. 1901, which contained many articles about the need to
defeat the caciques and about the various candidatures. It also explained how the electoral process
worked, and advised that the Catalan National Center (Verdaguer’s group) was in the process of
registering electors and verifying the electoral rolls.
³ Jardi, Doctor Robert, 118.
⁴ see Izard & Riquer, 134-137. Prat facilitated the merger of the catalanist and industrialist groups.
⁵ Reunió important,” Veu, 23. Mar. 1901, 1.
⁶ Balcells, Culla, & Conxita Mir Curcó, Les Eleccions Generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 1923, 33.
    cf. ibid., 36.
effectively ran with Prat de la Riba and Lluís Duran, a pair of thirty-year-old lawyers influenced by Duran’s father Manuel. Cambó had proposed the need for the new party publicly on March twentieth, when he wrote in the Veu that Catalonia, if it does not resign itself to follow the road to decadence and death down which the governments of the Spanish State take it, does not have any more than two routes to follow: electoral struggle or revolution. Since we do not believe the latter to be possible today - and nor do we believe it to be convenient even if it were possible, these two routes reduce themselves into a single one.

Cambó proposed that Catalans take the political situation into their own hands, to take over the governing of their own municipalities and region, and to send representatives to Madrid who could revitalize the Spanish State. To get started, he felt that this “movement of opinion” required “honorable citizens” as its figureheads. Duran backed Cambó up, arguing that “It is not only the interest of a party that enters into play here, but that of all Catalonia. With a sufficiently strong and independent Catalan parliamentary representation, the condition of Catalonia in general relative to the Madrid government will have to change much from the way it is now.” Duran suggested that such a political formation would require only eight-to-ten representatives to be a player in Madrid - if not in the coming election then in subsequent ones.

First this meant establishing political catalanism in Barcelona, as the necessary centerpiece of any movement in Catalonia. The catalanists sought to restore Barcelona’s prominence within its own region, and then its region within the entire state. To defeat the caciques and accomplish their program, they needed to capture Barcelona and then Catalonia. This required cleaning the electoral rolls and then giving the populus political hope and a sense of civic responsibility. This latter duty became the purpose of the Veu, the newspaper Prat directed.

To form the Lliga, Prat had won over the support of many important industrialists at the Fomento, whose prominence and wealth the early political catalanist Valenti Almirall had two decades before declared crucial to successfully launch political catalanism as an important movement. These industrialists had their own gripes about rule from Madrid. Catalonia, they noted, paid more in taxes.

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10 Juan Barco Cosme, Problemes Catalanes, 12-13.
11 Modest Sabaté i Puig, Història de la Lliga, 18.
of all types than the rest of Spain. Catalonia covered only seven per cent of the landmass of Spain and contained only eleven per cent of the population, they pointed out, yet paid twenty-one per cent of the state's taxes. They ignored, of course, that these payments were based on the fact that Catalonia was also the wealthiest region of Spain and thus could more afford to pay its share. Nevertheless, when post-1898 Spain found itself saddled with huge debts, Catalonia, more than anywhere else, felt the crunch.

For Spain, the trade which passed through Barcelona was even more important than developing the city's industries, yet here, too, no Madrid politician had come up with a plan to improve the port nor to attempt to increase trade through Barcelona in order to raise revenue for the country and for the region. Even more, the system of communications fell far short of European standards (although it was still better than in the rest of Spain), thus affecting both the transport of produce and the newly developing tourist industry. By the end of the last century, the Fomento's influence on Spain's economic policy began to wane, losing out in a political system more oriented towards representing the agrarian Spain of aristocratic large landowners who distrusted capitalism and industry. Since the political system directly affected the economy, the time had come for the Barcelona industrialists to flex their political muscles. They had called for free elections, an end to periodic military occupations, true constitutional guarantees, a free press in order to open the eyes of the public to the problems confronting Spain, decentralization - including decentralization of taxation, and state-wide infrastructural improvement programs. Thus they approximated the Lliga's leaders in many respects, and the new party found itself tagged as bourgeois. After 1898, Spain had fallen into a depression that reached its nadir in 1902. The cotton textile industry, for example, suffered one of the harsher fates, with exports in 1902 making up only one third of the 1897 total. Over this period, the Fomento decided that the time had come to make the stricken industries more competitive, and asked

13 Barco, 31.
14 ibid., 43.
Madrid for compensation for these losses by tax exemptions and aid for importing new machinery. These requests fell on deaf ears, and this encouraged the industrialists to seek a new political force outside one of the two main parties. At first, they supported the reformist program of the popular General de Polavieja, but when the old general failed to see it through the industrialists turned to the young dynamos who forged the *Lliga* - not a political party, *per se*, compared with the parties of that period in Spain, but rather, as its name suggested, a league of groups banded together to support a political program called regionalism.

The *Lliga* formed out of the convergence of the possibilist elements of the Catalanist Union, the more conservative Catalan National Center which Narcís Verdaguer had recently founded to promote his brand of possibilist catalanism, and the Regionalist Union of the industrialists. The negotiations which created the *Lliga* before the 1901 general elections necessarily gave the impression that the new party existed in large part to further the needs of this last group, as important burgher elements became most visible within the new political formation. However, much of the Catalan burgher class remained loyal to the dynastic parties, and those who joined the *Lliga* actually mixed in with elements from all sectors of society, which shared a program to win political power. Importantly, the *Lliga* saw itself as representing all political and social groups within the region, and thus not as a *bourgeois* party. Likewise, although a good number of devout Catholics voted for the *Lliga*, the party did not see itself as confessional, especially considering its broad range of members which included some republicans and considering that it hoped to attract large numbers of anti-clerical republicans who lived in Catalonia as well.

Yet this very diversity underlay the organizational problems that the *Lliga* suffered in its first years, especially after the death of the unifying figure of Robert, the party's titular president. His successor, Rusiñol, an old Liberal from the *Fomento*, tried to restore contact with his old friends elsewhere in Spain, while a whole swath of the *Lliga* felt more intransigent towards Spain, the monarchy, and

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18 Riquer, "La Lliga Regionalista o els límits del catalanisme conservador" in Termes et al., *Catalanisme*, 119.  
19 Massot, 110. Ties, though, existed to Torras y Bages, who had once declared that Catalonia would be Catholic or nothing. Even the religious Prat, however, did not care if Catalonia had or did not have a Catholic character so long as it was Catalan.
the political regime. Meanwhile, a small clique of young men controlled the overall direction of the party. But critics noted that these groups lacked coordination and a party structure, and some electoral setbacks and a large split led to reorganization in 1904.20

The first paragraph in the Lliga's founding statute stated that it is the objective of the Lliga Regionalista to defend the interests and the restoration of the rights of Catalonia employing all legal means to achieve the autonomy of the Catalan people within the Spanish State.... the Lliga Regionalista will assist all autonomy movements in the other Spanish regions, achieving the extension to all of the doctrine of autonomy.21

Robert announced in the campaign that he wanted to see the new movement extend from "Ferrol to Cadiz," because the time had come to act.22 Indeed, historians have often described the Lliga as Spain’s first modern political party not only because it tried to break the monopoly on power by the dynastic establishment, but more because it understood the importance of effective party organization to contest elections and adopt tactics and reforms.23

The far-left of the catalanist movement criticized the new party, however. One such nationalist, Pere Aldavert, said that the very name the Regionalists chose for themselves showed their lack of commitment to Catalonia by not calling themselves “catalanists;” if they truly were, it would be better, he thought, to say so. As Regionalists, they represented merely another wing of the old Conservative Party, and thus nothing new. Only the Republicans represented the truly anti-dynastic option, he felt.24 Of the four Regionalist candidates in Barcelona, Aldavert mocked in La Renaixensa that the Lliga had selected one who spoke but did not think (Robert), one who thought but did not speak (Domènech), and two who neither thought nor spoke (Rusiñol and Torres).25 Indeed, Torres never would open his mouth during his entire term in the Cortes.26 But the selection of the candidates was crucial if the Lliga was to succeed in 1901, since it needed men respected broadly

20 Josep Pella y Forgas, La Crisis del Catalanisme, 85-87.
21 Lliga Regionalista, Estatuto de la Lliga Regionalista, 5.
22 Robert, campaign speech, 7. May 1901, in Jardi, Dr. Robert, 120.
23 Riquer in Izard & Riquer, 139; Stanley Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal, 605f.
24 Pere Aldavert, cited in Jardi, Dr. Robert, 121. The Renaixensa noted that no candidate was running as a “Catalanist,” and that those running as “Regionalists” knew nothing of political theory and thus were unqualified to do what they purported to stand for. “Nos ab nos,” Renaixensa, 17. May 1901, 2848 and 19. May 1901, 2894.
25 Aldavert, cited by Cambó, Memorias, 75.
26 Jardi, Dr. Robert, 124.
enough by all of its factions, by the electorate, and even by the Madrid establishment and its caciques. The name of Robert on the ballot virtually assured victory, as most of Barcelona remembered his role as mayor during the Silvela government.27 These were shrewd tactics; while the Presidents existed as figureheads for the party, the real leaders of the Lliga came from the younger generation.28 Prat wrote much of the literature from his position as director of the Veu, and Cambó and Duran made most of the technical arrangements which brought and held the various catalanist groups together. These men provided the intellectual formation for regionalism as well as the hard work in the political trenches, although they presented themselves as merely serving their superiors in the Barcelona elites.29 The representatives in the Cortes achieved very little more than a visible presence. Joan Garriga i Massó, a Catalan Liberal Democrat who several years later joined the Lliga, commented that effectively, Dr. Robert had provided the singing voice. Domènech remained mute and there was no way to get him to make statements of any sort. Rusiñol had made some interruptions of great inconsequence, talking about breaking the chains that tied the vessel of Catalonia to the immobile wharf of Spain. And Sebastià Torres was an enigma who never said anything, nor did anyone know anything about him other than that he was very rich.30

Rusiñol had spent most of his political life previously as a liberal cacique, and for this the more radical catalanist press could never forgive or trust him: “if he is a convinced catalanist,” the Renaixensa printed, “if he is a repentant politician, let him renounce his seat and enter into militant catalanism, so that he will never lack occasions to serve Catalonia more, much more than he can serve her at this moment in the Congress of the Spanish state.”31 These radical catalanists could not accept the industrialists, nor the Regionalists’ willingness to accommodate them. But on the whole, the radical catalanists also stayed out of politics in this period, and posed no threat to the Lliga’s rapidly advancing political structure. The Renaixensa had very few readers, and gradually faded out of circulation entirely by 1904.32

29 Sabaté, 16.
30 Joan Garriga i Massó, Memòries d’un Liberal Catalanista, 140.
31 Renaixensa, 17. July 1901, 4143. In the Cortes, Rusiñol was asked what he had been when a was a Liberal. Rusiñol replied: “I was a sinner.” Veu, 20. July 1901, 3.
32 Barco, 82.
Yet the Lliga was not the only party pulling itself together on a platform opposed to caciquismo. The Republicans were trying to reconstitute themselves as well as a political force, and had despatched Alejandro Lerroux García, a young Madrid-based journalist, to Barcelona to reorganize the party there. Fortunately for the Lliga, though, the working class supporters of the Republicans still did not tend to exercise their vote, although Lerroux sought to rectify that as well. Nevertheless, the two parties agreed to support each other on the issue of electoral fraud, to stand united against the Liberal party bosses.33

When Lerroux arrived in Barcelona, Catalonia, once a Republican haven and still home to many prominent men of Republican sentiment, had only two sitting Republican deputies: the aged Federal Francisco Pi y Margall and the eccentric Joan Sol i Ortega. The party on the whole was not organized, and had few operating newspapers.34 Lerroux looked around, and saw people exploited, their votes bought or cast under orders; the census falsified; the governing parties lacking ideas, while many republicans abounded without an active Republican Party to vote for, and the other parties were either just putting themselves together (the Lliga) or gradually falling apart (the Carlists). Lerroux felt that class struggle loomed and what he considered separatist sentiment increasing, fueled by the Church and its catalanist bishops, and he viewed those who had supported Polavieja as, ironically, “enemies of the State’s integrity.”35 Indeed he attacked the Regionalists, calling them “señoritos of the University,” the children of the Catalan bourgeoisie who, for lack of anything better to do, “dedicated themselves to balkanization... resuscitating nationalisms that history and time, slowly, patiently, and with constant work, had come to clean out.”36 But like the Lliga’s leaders, Lerroux felt that he could solve Spain’s ills by generating a new party in Barcelona.

Thanks to Robert’s complete overhaul of the electoral rolls when he was mayor, as well as some heavy research done by the anti-dynastic groups, the Lliga could easily establish the actual results of the elections, showing that the four Regionalist candidates had taken the top four spots, with one Liberal and the

34 Alejandro Lerroux y García, Memorias, 415.
35 ibid., 422.
36 ibid., 558.
Republicans Pi y Margall and Lerroux winning the remaining seats (although the fact that the turnout, despite all the hype, was still a low 20% also made counting easier). The caciques, not surprisingly rigged the results, giving their favored candidates all seven seats. The Veu protested, publishing the results it had calculated, and Prat demanded a recount. Lerroux made another trip through all of the districts of Barcelona to calculate that he indeed had won a seat, and then descended with his masses of workers into the Plaça de Sant Jaume in front of the City Hall. Meanwhile, the caciques were frantically consulting each other and the government in Madrid for guidance as to how to respond. They kept releasing new results over a period of days, which gradually began to approximate the Lliga’s own figures. Jaume Carner, a young Regionalist of republican sentiment, went as the Lliga’s representative to the recount, pressuring the caciques alongside Lerroux. Once the vote-count had been finalized, Lerroux, now with parliamentary immunity from prosecution, pulled a pistol on the magistrate in charge of supervising the count, and told him that had he not been granted his seat, he would have used its two bullets: “one for you and the other for me.” Ironically, it had been Lerroux’s very demagogic behavior - which would so often trouble the Lliga in the future - that had secured the Lliga’s candidates such an overwhelming success in the party’s first elections. “If it had not been for the help of the Lerrouxist Republicans,” Garriga reported, “I truly believe that all would have been lost.”

Outside Barcelona, the two other Regionalist candidates, Camps and Soler, also won their seats, sending six Regionalists in total to the Cortes. Spain had to respect the Lliga, Pi wrote in a series of articles in a Republican Madrid newspaper, because it had proven well-organized and popular, its sundry groups having quickly

37 This was only an average turnout for Restoration Barcelona, although the figures of previous years can validly be challenged as the caciques used to generously pad the results with votes cast as many as ten times or by allowing the dead to vote in favor of the official candidates. Constitutional guarantees were suspended for a week leading up to the elections, and the press was censored so as not to discuss catalanism, regionalism, obrerismo, or Carlism. Veu, 8. and 9. May 1901. Nevertheless, the Veu insisted that the elections would be just as fair because the Veu would scrutinize the results. It was merely important for people to vote. “Als electors,” Veu, 12. May 1901.
39 Culla, El Republicanisme Lerrouxista a Catalunya, 43.
40 Garriga, Memòries, 138. The Diario, supporting the Regionalists, warned that they should carry out their protests in an orderly fashion because disorder would only provoke further repression from Madrid. Diario, 23. May 01, 6417. See the day-to-day reports in the Veu, 19-24. May 1901, and the fullest account of the recounting process by Romero Maura, Rosa de Fuego, 121f.
assembled themselves into a common party; having the support of, by his count, 46 newspapers (including four dailies), intellectual centers, an enthusiastic youth; and spreading quickly even after its electoral triumph.\(^{41}\)

Yet most politicians in Madrid looked upon the new Regionalist deputies with mistrust, considering them either separatists or successors to the old Catalan Carlists. Robert affirmed to the Cortes however that the Regionalists were not nationalists who wanted to recreate the mediaeval Catalan nation.\(^{42}\) If Republican and Liberal opponents accused the Lliga of ignoring the workers to favor the elites of Barcelona society, Robert countered that he did understand the importance of the working classes and that they should have direct representation. With decentralization, he added, it would become easier for them to get involved in the politics that affected their lives. Referring to the Liberals’ custom of buying votes from poorer electors, he asked: “is this truly democratic and liberal, or is what we propose more democratic and liberal?”\(^{43}\) The Lliga, Robert argued, was not a class party: “We catalanists, in this matter, do not keep a closed mind. We did not seek precisely to attract only people who accept our doctrines, but rather we tried to seek an agreement between all people of good will, whatever their class, who were inspired by the same patriotic sentiments.”\(^{44}\) If the Castilian regenerationist “Generation of 1898” was pessimistic in its outlook on decadent Spain, then, some thought, the Catalan “Generation of 1901” showed constructive optimism, carrying with it the force of the Renaixença combined with the might of Barcelona industry, feeling that Catalonia had done something positive, not decadent, and that the same could happen throughout Spain.\(^{45}\)

Yet Lerroux sought to mobilize the Barcelona workers against the Lliga on its own territory. He cooperated with the Regionalists to break the caciques in the general elections of 1901, but then he went onto the attack. The Disaster, he felt, had broken Spain’s national unity and had allowed political catalanism, representing Barcelona’s bourgeoisie, a foothold. His proposed revolution, then, would fall more

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\(^{42}\) Robert, speech in the Cortes, 26. Nov. 1901, in Robert, Legislatura de 1901, 52.

\(^{43}\) same speech, ibid., 68. The Carlists shouted out their approval.

\(^{44}\) speech in the Cortes, 14. Nov. 1901, in ibid., 7.

\(^{45}\) Josep Benet i Morell, Maragall i la Setmana Tràgica, 11f.

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on the conservative catalanists than against the Liberal central government. After the 1901 election cleared out the dynastic machinery from Barcelona, the city's politics reverted to a predominantly two-party structure, although now those parties were the *Lliga* on the right and Lerroux's Republicans on the left. Indeed, now that the Liberals could no longer control Barcelona, Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, the Liberal Secretary of the Interior and at various times later in the decade President of the Government, actually supported Lerroux, while the *Lliga* aligned with the Conservatives when Antoni Maura took over the leadership of that party. While the aged Pi had become predisposed to working with the Regionalists for common interests against the central state, the belligerent Lerroux now dominated the local Republicans, and he had no time for the *Lliga*'s industrialist interests.

Pi died at the end of 1901.

The fledgeling parties now looked ahead to the electoral calendar. Parliamentary elections were not regular, but were called after a new party took over the government, followed shortly thereafter by the Senatorial elections. Provincial and municipal elections, however, were regular and held every odd year in March and November, respectively. Provincial constituencies would elect their deputies to four-year terms, with a portion of the provincial chamber coming up for election every two years. City councilmen also served for four years, with half the chamber coming up for election every two years - however each constituency had the opportunity to vote for a new councilman in every election. Although parliamentary by-elections could be held whenever the government chose to call one, vacant seats at the provincial and municipal levels had to wait until the next regular election to be filled. Still to come in 1901 were the municipal elections in November; the year's provincial elections having occurred before the general elections, the next ones would not be until March 1903; general elections would not be held again until 1903, shortly after the Conservatives returned to government (election results between 1901 and 1923 are included in Appendix A).

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46 Octavio Ruiz Monjón, *El Partido Republicano Radical*, 29f. Prat recognized later that only a veritable political force could combat another veritable political force. Since the Liberal Party was hardly one based on popular opinion, Moret needed to turn to Lerroux for opposition to the *Lliga*. Thus, the existence of the *Lliga* helped in the resurrection of a real Republican Party. Prat, "La crisi constitucional: plantejament del problema," *Veu*, 20. May 1913.

47 Romero Maura, *La Rosa de Fuego*, 178f.
The 1901 municipal elections gave a taste of what was to come. The *Lliga*, to show Spain its true multi-dimensional nature, put together a slate composed of men from all of its diverse components, including a number of candidates of republican sentiment such as Carner.48 The candidates for the City Council came mostly from the younger membership which had brought about the party’s formation, run its general election campaign, and shown skill in dealing with real issues and people. Some of the more radical left-wingers resisted the offer for a time; although they had helped propel the *Lliga*’s figureheads to victory in the general elections earlier in the year, they themselves did not want to get involved in politics. Ildefons Suñol i Casanovas advised Prat: “I am resolutely determined not to accept any public office at all, and much less that of a city councilman, because I feel inherent and profound repugnance (for the political system).... I will not change my resolve in any way.”49 But Suñol, along with Carner and others, did accept the *Lliga*’s nomination after all.

The Liberals wanted revenge on these upstarts, however, and decided that it would be better to have the Republicans win than the Regionalists, beginning what the *Veu* would call the “Repugnant Alliance” of “authority with anarchy.”50 The *lerrouxistas* began to stir, and in turn the Regionalists denounced the Republicans (both those of 1901 and of 1868) as “the Rabble.” Lerroux disagreed: “You are the Rabble, wretches all, foreigners in our country, insiders in politics, Pharisees in religion, fakers in science, exploiters of society, implacable towards the poor, and when confronted by the active - cowards.” He then went on to slander the *Lliga*’s leaders, beginning with Robert, whom he accused of everything from corruption to adultery to failing to naturalize properly (Robert had been born in Mexico).51

If the Republicans attacked the Regionalists more fiercely than anyone, labeling them separatists and clericalists, in reality, the *Veu* campaigned, it was the Republicans who deceived the public. The Republican leaders were not themselves workers, but rather men with their own caciquist ambitions, who wanted to become

50 quoted in Jardi, *Doctor Robert*, 140f.
51 Lerroux, quoted in ibid., 145.
councilmen and control politics just as the Liberals had long done. The regionalist circle of the *Veu* contained men who were making names for themselves outside politics in their various professions. Lerroux, the Federal Republican Emili Junoy, the Liberal Democrat José Canalejas were all men who attacked the system from the left yet who were all themselves political insiders. As leftists, they fomented disorder in order to win personal power over the workers they purported to represent. The Regionalists had a program for the workers, the *Veu* asserted: the abolition of military service, progressive taxation, and direct representation for men of all classes through the corporations. Furthermore, a catalanist program had more to offer, because, after all, the Catalan worker was fundamentally still a Catalan.

Not known for its cartoons, the *Veu* did print one prominently on its front page in late 1901, which depicted the police arresting several catalanists shouting “Long live Catalonia!” while thieves walked by carrying a large safe, thumbing their noses at the officers. The average Barcelona citizen had only one statement to make, the Regionalists concluded, by voting for order and against centralist oppression.

The *Lliga* won the most seats in the City Council, although not a majority, taking eleven to the Republicans’ ten and the Liberals’ four. Among the *Lliga’s* new councilors were the left-wing Carner and Suñol, the historian Josep Pella i Forgas, the architect and industrialist Josep Puig, and Cambó, who became the *Lliga’s* spokesman. Thanks to the campaigning of several Regionalists around Catalonia, regionalist groups put forward candidatures in cities outside Barcelona, notably in Girona, with heavy backing by traders, factory owners, and land owners. They in turn met opposition from the *caciques*, who sought to block the spread of the new movement. In Barcelona, although the mayor decided against putting forward a dynastic Liberal ticket, he offered to collaborate with the republicans. In response to this pressure, the *Lliga* and the *Veu* (both controlled by the same people) offered to help anyone verify the electoral roles, opening their offices to the public to come in and check that their names were properly included. The *Lliga* compiled an

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"electoral dictionary" for the city of Barcelona which filled 320 volumes.57 Beside their success in Barcelona, catalanists won seats in several other city councils: in Girona, they won seven and the Republicans also won seven; in Vilanova, where no regionalists ran but where the Veu had supported the Federal Republican candidates, the Federals captured all the contested seats to the exclusion of the Liberals. Outside Barcelona and Girona provinces, the caciques still retained much of their power, although catalanists made their first breakthroughs: in Lleida, Liberals captured ten of fourteen seats, while regionalists and conservatives each won two; in Tarragona, where early returns gave victories to catalanists, Conservatives, Federals, and radical Republicans, the Liberal caciques rigged the results to give their candidates all of the seats.58

In Barcelona, at least, the caciques had lost their hold, and the battle between Regionalists and Republicans in that city’s politics heated up. The economic crisis grew worse in 1902, and since the industrialists had thrown their support behind the Lliga, the Republicans found an easy opening for an attack. Because of the recession, and also the failure to gain economic concessions from Madrid, the large employers in the textile industry implemented, during the Winter, a series of cutbacks in worker rights and benefits, including lock-outs, longer workdays, and the replacement of many workers by underpaid women’s labor. Protests by workers translated into a Republican offensive which implicated the Lliga, the party supported by the employers.59 But the industrialists did not direct the Lliga’s policy, and it became important for the party to try to distance itself from its wealthy supporters. Domènech advised Prat of the importance of making common cause with the workers living in Catalonia. The central government, Domènech argued, would like nothing more than to see Catalonia divided against itself; a better strategy for the Regionalists would be to profit from the disillusion the workers now had in the system. These social questions should be defused and taken outside the realm of Catalan internal politics. The Lliga did not condemn the workers when they went

57 Veu, 10. Oct. 1901, 1. Cambó and Ferran Agulló i Vidal, the Lliga’s General Secretary, did most of the compilation themselves. Olivar, Prat, 156.
58 See the results as they became released in the Veu on 11. Nov. 1901 and subsequent days.
on a massive general strike, but nor did the party condemn the subsequent repression.  

Lerroux decided to use the circumstances in his favor. His sheer dynamism, like that of his Lliga counterparts, served to attract many supporters, even if they did not always agree with him. He based his platform on españolismo, obrerismo, and republicanism, although he did not require his followers to embrace all three. Fundamentally, he gained much personal prestige, and his radical caesarism delayed for several years the formation of a major syndical movement in Barcelona. He offered the unhappy workers of Barcelona a new, dynamic, and fiery brand of republicanism, and they rewarded him for it with their adulation. The Liberal government did not last long in Madrid, but it had survived long enough for Lerroux to reestablish the republican base in Barcelona. When the Conservative Silvela formed a new government with promises of electoral reform, the Republicans saw their opportunity to capitalize.

Silvela had resigned in his first term as president of the Council of Ministers, unable to carry through his regenerative plans and flustered by discord within his cabinet. He had resolved to fare better when he next got an opportunity. “We cannot come to power,” he had told a Conservative gathering, “considered as a mere expedient in order to solve a momentary difficulty...; we need to come to power in order to carry out a great work, complement of what we began not long ago.” A Conservative Unionist government would attend to four issues above all: the resolution of Spain’s economic situation; the reform of local administration; the reorganization of the military; and the planning of public works. While Silvela promoted his program, the Liberal dissident Maura campaigned on the same themes. When the Liberal government came to an end, Silvela formed the new government with Maura as Secretary of the Interior.

The appointment surprised some Conservative elements. Silvela had given the most important cabinet position in a time of reform, the Interior with its control of administration, to someone still not in the Party, but rather considered an

61 Manuel Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, Catalanisme i Moviment Obrer, 13.
“auxiliary force” in the coalition.\textsuperscript{63} Eduardo Dato and others on the Party’s left had wanted the position, sowing the seeds of future conflict between those who still carried some of the tradition of Cánovas and Maura, who would forever remain an outsider. Maura’s first tradition-breaking decrees as Interior Secretary went to the provincial governors he appointed: they had to actually govern; they had to act on local interests; they had to stress justice, not favoritism; they had to consider authority not as a point of honor, but of the law of the land; they had to recognize that the needs of workers required special understanding to reduce class tension; and they had to oversee free and fair elections.\textsuperscript{64} In 1903, Maura set about running the elections, and again broke with the Restoration system’s traditions. He started by refusing to replace the local town governments, even though these had been appointed by and owed their loyalty to the previous Liberal government. He then refused to designate official candidates, and warned that he would intervene to annul any election that was not clean and that he would prosecute those responsible for any rigging. None of the customary practice was constitutional, but in enforcing the law, Maura set a new precedent that would, when enshrined by his proposed reform laws, wreck the turno. The Liberals were naturally aghast. Moret argued that the lack of control over the system would actually allow corruption to get worse; Canalejas said that the reform would impede the general interests of the state.\textsuperscript{65}

Both the left and the right in Catalonia saluted the new government. To the Regionalists, Maura brought hope for effective reform. Prat wrote Duran at the end of 1902 after hearing Maura speak: “I have found myself quite satisfied with Maura; if he does everything the way he has said, I believe we have to be quite happy.”\textsuperscript{66} The Republicans were more skeptical, but were also hopeful that Maura could carry out his promises to make fair elections. Maura always stated his policy clearly, criticizing faked census data and election results, which he argued produced only

\textsuperscript{63} Javier de Bedoya, \textit{Don Antonio Maura, Ministro de la Gobernación}, 82f.
\textsuperscript{64} Bedoya, 97f. Maura selected his governors not on party loyalty but on competence. One solution he used to break up local power-struggles was to remove the most competent from their local communities and put them in charge of even greater posts so that they would learn the importance and the considerations of power. Ibid., 121.
\textsuperscript{65} Maura, \textit{Treinta y Cinco Años}, 454f.
\textsuperscript{66} Prat, letter to Duran, 13. Dec. 1902, ArxDiV.
“difficulties and discords;” Spain needed a truly representative government elected by all, which in turn would have the confidence to lead. The Republicans, ironically, benefited most from Maura’s actions, nearly doubling their representation in the Cortes. They also captured many important cities in the local elections later in 1903, winning a total of 739 local council seats across Spain. Noting that the reforms had allowed the Republicans to grow in power, the Queen Mother called Maura an “uncomfortable and dangerous” man.

Regeneration, then, became the main theme brought to the general elections by the new government. In Catalonia, it was the Lliga and its predecessor organizations that had long carried the banner of regeneration for Spain - a positive motive which had even formed broader republican extra-parliamentary contacts with Joaquín Costa and Basilio Paraiso. Republicanism in Catalonia had become another affair, a matter of obrerismo; no one could consider Lerroux a regenerationist. Nevertheless, the election in Catalonia was fought on different issues than elsewhere in Spain. The Lliga had hoped to capitalize on its record in the City Hall, where, led by Campó, the Regionalists had made the cleaning up of corruption their main issue. Campó himself exposed an enormous public works scandal that involved not only Liberal caciquist councilmen, but Republicans as well. With the Conservatives loyal to Silvela, the Regionalists worked to defeat the corrupt officials. For his effort on this issue, the Council elected Campó deputy mayor in December 1902. In March 1903, Campó used his new post to call an emergency meeting of Council. Although the proceeding remained secret, the caciquist councilmen left very reserved, leading to speculation that Campó had brought up several cases of irregularities on the year’s electoral rolls.

68 Diego Sevilla Andrés, Antonio Maura, 224.
69 García Venero, Antonio Maura 1907-1909, 45.
70 In October 1902, the Lliga and Paraíso’s National Union signed the Pact of Lleida as part of a series of alliances the Lliga was to make with other groups seeking decentralization and the reform of the State. Romà Sol i Clot & Maria del Carme Torres i Graell, Lleida i el Fet Nacional Català, 206-207. However, Paraíso’s group was to be short-lived, and the Lliga’s project never took root elsewhere in Spain. The Veu had long before complained that the National Union would never succeed because it lacked a public base throughout Spain, and dispute its rhetoric never acted on its specific agenda. “Els errors de la ‘Unión Nacional,’” Veu, 18 Apr. 1901.
71 Romero Maura, La Rosa de Fuego, 292.
72 Pla, Francesc Campó, 175-181.
73 Ignacio Buqueras y Bach, Campó, 58.
74 Veu, 7 Mar. 1903, 2.
The *Lliga*, seeking to bolster its ranks against the onslaught by Lerroux, turned to the right, aligning with the Carlists and the Catholics. While the Catholics had no organized political party and tended to side with whoever best represented social order (even if that party included, as did the *Lliga*, anti-clericals such as Carner and Suñol), the Carlists did have a long-standing tradition of political aloofness. Yet by 1903, a large number of Carlists had already stopped reading the Carlist newspaper *Correo Catalán*, taking up subscriptions to the *Veu* instead. Rather than find their power base eroded in Catalonia, the Carlist leaders, encouraged by the pragmatic Juan Vázquez de Mella y Fanjul, decided they could survive better in an electoral alliance with the Regionalists. After all, they reasoned, Carlism had long supported regionalism as an organizational structure for the traditionalist monarchy they intended to establish.75 Despite the fact that the Carlists still had the greatest support outside Navarre in Catalonia, they could count on only one parliamentary seat from the region. This called for a new tactic, which meant to many Carlists alliance with the Regionalists.76 As for the Catholics, some remained intransigent, but the Catholics who voted for the *Lliga* merely showed that religion was not the foremost cleavage. The *Lliga* could attract the Catholic vote without itself becoming a Catholic party.77 With the dynastic conservatives also turned out in Barcelona, they, too, often joined in supporting the *Lliga*.

The *Lliga* was already portrayed as the party of the Catalan industrialists, and its new supporters cemented its reputation on the right. The Republicans now represented themselves as the only sane choice for elections at any level. Even Almirall, long ago retired from politics, returned to speak at rallies on behalf of the Republicans, saying that he had been let down by the path chosen by the *Lliga*.78 These Catalans joined the Republicans and their Liberal patrons to form the left bloc at the various elections held in 1903.79 At the provincial elections, the Republicans won the majority in the city of Barcelona, while both non-dynastic groups made inroads across the province; the Republicans scored an overwhelming victory at the

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75 Anon. ("R.J."), *Catalanistas y Carlistas*, 2-6.
76 ibid., 9.
77 ibid., 5.
78 Albertí, 184f.
general elections; the non-dynastic parties offered no candidates for the Senate in Barcelona, but the Regionalists did make their first breakthrough at the senatorial elections in Girona; and the Republicans won a majority in the Barcelona City Hall with a crushing victory in the municipal elections there.\textsuperscript{80}

Throughout 1903, then, the \textit{Lliga} leaders sought to experiment with electoral strategy. They had already won over the right, but they still had two lingering fears: the latent left which was already showing distaste for the allies the Regionalists had already acquired; and the dynastic \textit{caciques}, whom they had still not vanquished outside Barcelona. The \textit{Veu} presented the March provincial elections as having only two true parties: the Regionalists and the Republicans. Because the \textit{caciques} still operated, falsifications would produce a third party. While the Regionalists had serious ideological differences with the Republicans, they acknowledged the Republicans as a better choice than the \textit{caciques}, because although the Republicans were their competition, the \textit{caciques} were their enemy.\textsuperscript{81}

The \textit{Veu} encouraged Catalans to express their preferences in a large turnout, something not normal at provincial elections.\textsuperscript{82} Cambó pressed for the need to clean out the \textit{caciques} from the provincial and local levels as a necessary first step to empowering Catalans at these levels.\textsuperscript{83} Duran pressed for the need to hold elections \textit{"a la europea,"} and that, for catalanists and their allies, more important than victory would be to see to it that Catalonia had fair and democratic elections. "In this sense, catalanism," he mocked, "the reactionary, mediaeval, backwards catalanism has done more to bring Catalonia closer to Europe than any of the parties which speak always of progress and of modern trends."\textsuperscript{84} When the results favored the Republicans, the \textit{Veu} still celebrated, especially since all three candidatures - the Regionalist, the Republican (the majority of Republicans who won seats were of the Federal variety), and even the dynastic - had to talk of decentralization and local power in order to win their share of the vote.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{80} Cambs, \textit{Història de la Solidaritat Catalana}, 12f.
\textsuperscript{81} "Sempre'ls mateixos," \textit{Veu}, 1. Mar. 1903, 1.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Veu}, 2. Mar. 1903, 1.
\textsuperscript{84} Duran, "Eleccions a la europea," \textit{Veu}, 7. Mar. 1903, 2
After the provincial elections, the *Veu* proposed the union of all those who cherished Catalonia without making political distinctions. It feared that political divisions would only serve to profit the enemies of Catalonia. Naturally, coming from the pens of the *Lliga*'s leaders, the direction of this policy was clear, and clearly stated: to resolve social issues in an orderly manner, protecting Catalonia from anarchy and revolution as much as from overbearing Madrid-based oppression. The *Veu* called for respect of the law and religious issues, looking for concord between the social classes.\(^6\) The *Lliga*' leaders had to win over the people who voted for the Republicans. Joan Ventosa i Calvell cautioned that republicanism "represents death; it wants (to bring in) the partisans of red despotism, even more repugnant than black despotism."\(^7\) The *Lliga*'s executive discussed putting forward a balanced slate for the general elections in Barcelona that would encompass candidates from every wing of the *Lliga*'s supporters. But, backed by Domènech (already on the ballot as an incumbent), Carner and Suñol, who both came from the same leftist nationalist republican group, insisted that neither would run without the other also on the ballot, thus excluding the most dynamic and disciplined group of supporters, by keeping the Regionalists Cambó, Duran, and Puig from putting one of themselves on the ballot for Barcelona. If this alienated the Regionalists from their own party, it at least provided the hope that the *Lliga* could appeal to the city's left-of-center voters.\(^8\)

The plan did not work particularly well. When the Republicans fared well at the general elections in late April, the *Lliga* had to look on the brighter side: for once, there had been relatively low abstention (with participation up to forty-five per cent in Barcelona from twenty per cent in 1901, and high elsewhere although the electoral rolls were not as clean and statistics less accurate), and although the Republicans had crushed the Regionalist slate in Barcelona, the *Lliga* had actually increased by several thousand the size of its vote.\(^9\) Duran concluded that the results had showed the way of the future: the Republicans had fought the elections under


what were for them favorable conditions (given the social tension), and they went to the elections with a united slate. Therefore, the duty of the Regionalists in the future would be to increase their vote still more, looking for other political elements which approximated their program given the individual circumstance of every election. 90 Cambó wrote Prat that

in Barcelona, when the republican storm passes - and it will pass soon - we will have as much or more force as before. Outside (Barcelona), our influence has spread greatly, and the last legislative elections have prepared us admirably a stack of districts that will be ours in the next elections. Outside, the republican wave could be strong enough to erase the remaining caciques, but the union of the conservative elements and those of order will assure us victory. 91

The next elections of the year, those for the Senate, proved more problematic. Suffrage here was extremely limited, essentially encompassing the city councilmen, the provincial representatives, and those who bought their votes through contributions to various district leaders. With the caciques still on the whole in control of enough of the relevant posts, the best chance non-caciquist candidates had at gaining any seat in the Senate was to win one of the seats elected corporately (through, for example, the Economic Society or the University). Catalanists had gradually been taking over several such organizations, and felt they had the best chance in concentrating their efforts at the Economic Society. 92 They could assure themselves of nothing though: the voting membership rolls of the Economic Society included many names associated with sundry groups: besides Prat, Duran, Duran’s two older brothers, and Puig, were the Regionalist MP for Olot de Camps, the industrialist and current President of the Lliga Rusiñol, the historian and Regionalist city councilman Pella, the left-wing radical catalanist Joaquim Cases Carbó, the Federal Republican leader Josep Vallès i Ribot, the independent Republican cult-figure Sol i Ortega, the cacique leader José Comas y Masferrer, and the other main cacique Manuel Planas y Casals (whose name appeared listed twice). 93 Nevertheless, the Lliga scored a breakthrough: de Camps triumphed in both the Economic Society and in his home province of Girona. 94

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91 Cambó, letter to Prat, May 1903, ArxPrat.
92 "Eleccions de Senadors," Veu, 8 May 1903, 2.
94 Veu, 10. May 1903, 2.
No new elections came around until the municipal ones at the end of the year, and the Regionalist leaders spent the middle part of the year fiddling with their strategy. It had become clear to them that they needed to address the workers in the city of Barcelona in order to cut back the margin the Republicans had gained over them there; outside Barcelona, however, the *caciques* still remained a more important enemy than the Republicans, who in many cases came from the Federal side of the Republican Union rather that of the lerrouxists more prevalent in the city. Cambó researched information that could lump Lerroux with the *caciques*, thus allowing the *Lliga* to focus its attacks on caciquism which would encompass Lerroux. The *Veu* published information showing that Moret had funded Lerroux, the Regionalist newspaper concluding that Moret had done so to establish a mass opposition to catalanism which he himself could in reality control thus limiting the direct damage the Republicans could do to the Monarchy. Republican groups in Madrid and Valencia, the other two strongholds of the movement, agreed with this interpretation that Lerroux had deflected the force of republicanism away from the Monarchy towards regionalism.95 Leading up to the elections, the *Veu* proceeded to publish a series of articles from republican publications and of letters it had acquired demonstrating connections between the Liberal Party and Lerroux dating back to before Lerroux came to Barcelona in 1901. The *Veu* presented Lerroux as a *cacique*, and his party as secretly caciquist.96

The Regionalists, who were officially accidentalist - that is, ambivalent - on the question of the type of regime, sought to downplay the importance of latent republican sentiments. Cambó told a rally that the regime did not matter, only the system and the people: France was a republic, yet it found itself politically no better off than Spain; Britain was a monarchy, yet it had perfected the concepts of liberty and human rights. The individuals of Spain, Cambó felt, had to determine their own future in a free system. “We do not give the worker the formula for the solution,” he told a campaign rally in the Barcelona working-class district of Igualada.

What we do is tell him: you have to win it yourself, and you have to win it by instructing yourself and not letting yourself be deceived by those who want to ruin

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96 see a series of articles published in the *Veu*, Oct.-Nov. 1903.
you.... The agitators are not Catalans, they stir up the general strikes in order that they themselves can live off the strikes. And what do they achieve? That the Catalan workers established here who have families and, of course, needs to attend to, flee Barcelona and head for the country in order to do whatever it takes to earn a piece of bread; when the strike is over, when they return to their homes in order to take up their work once again, they find their jobs taken by scabs who have come in from the homeland of the agitators who offer their services at a lower price.... But as for the agitators who have arranged this: they come out with their own (livelihood) intact. 97

The Regionalists had increased their portrayal of themselves as the defenders of all that was Catalan against every other party, which had by association to be influenced or sent in by Madrid. Recognizing that the economic difficulties in Barcelona were having a greater influence on the polls than issues of catalanism, the Regionalists had to assert that these social problems, too, had come in from Madrid. Ventosa wrote in the Veu: “That the state of profound agitation in which our city finds itself is the work of the centralist government is not a secret for anyone.... They have not destroyed catalanism, because it is the living expression of our personality and this is not the way to destroy the personality of a people. On the contrary.” Due to the rift between Madrid and Barcelona, that personality was growing every day. Only autonomy, Ventosa concluded, could fully produce social order. 98

In City Hall, the Regionalists had held an effective majority due to support they received from the Conservatives and rifts in the republican ranks. During those two years, they had pushed forward a program promoting the use of Catalan in official business; decentralizing services to reduce corruption; rebuilding the infrastructure of the old city; urbanizing the new parts of town; and improving communication with the suburbs and neighborhoods. 99 In 1902, the Regionalist Josep Bertran i Musitu became the first person to speak Catalan in City Hall, beginning a trend that still took until 1916 to complete. 100 Encouraged, the Bishop of Barcelona Josep Morgades began to conduct catechism classes in Catalan, leading the Liberal Justice Minister, Álvaro Figueroa y Torres, the Count of Romanones, to ban such action, declaring that all primary instruction, including Christian doctrine, must be given in Spanish. The Regionalists launched from Barcelona a stark

100 Alexandre Gali i Coll, Història de les Institucions i del Moviment Cultural a Catalunya, 19.
campaign against this new law, pressuring the government to soften it. Church leaders insisted on the importance of teaching the catechism in the language of the people, and when the Conservative government returned to power it refused to apply Romanones' law. By 1904, the Conservative government would authorize the use of "all Hispanic languages and dialects" for communications. The Regionalist program in place in the Barcelona City Council had begun to pay dividends, although whether this would translate into electoral success remained to be seen given the complexity and variety of the cleavages in place in Barcelona.

By the time of the municipal elections of 1903, the Lliga had begun to look externally like the model of a modern major political party. The Lliga had set up its own campaign office in every electoral district in Barcelona in October. It had also spread out, running candidates in over forty municipalities across Catalonia, mostly in the provinces of Barcelona and Girona, but also offering some candidates in the provinces of Lleida and Tarragona, including those two capitals. Duran encouraged Regionalists in every town to form the alliances necessary to best serve the interests of each town. In Barcelona, the Regionalists again increased their total number of votes, although once again they lost out relatively to the Republicans, who won an overwhelming sixty-six percent of the vote. In many cities where Regionalists stood, they won several seats: most notably in Manresa, where the Regionalists captured eight of the nine contested seats; in Sant Pere de Ribas, where they won all the contested seats; in Sitges, where they won six of eleven (the other five going to socialists and republicans), and in Girona, where they won the largest share of the vote (good for three seats, to the republicans' two, the "Workers"' two, the Conservatives' one, the Liberals' one, and the Liberal Democrats' one); in normally cacique-filled Lleida, where the Regionalists failed to win a seat, the Republicans surprisingly trounced the dynastic parties, taking eight seats against two each for the Liberals and Conservatives.

101 Gali, Història de les Institucions, 99-100.
102 Termes, Història de Catalunya, 189.
103 Buqueras, 66.
104 see announcements in the Veu, Oct. 1903.
105 Veu, 4. Nov. 1903, 2.
Much of the republican success across Spain in the 1903 elections can be directly attributed to Maura’s insistence on clean elections. Yet Maura continued to press on, outlining his proposed new project for local administrative reform. The centralizing liberal nineteenth century, he felt, forced municipalities to reduce themselves into a supposedly efficient symmetry; better, he felt to return to natural divisions and traditional customs. He did not rule out wider administrative associations, indeed he favored them when the local people required and wanted them. At this time, he first dreamt up the idea of the “mancomunidad” as an association of like local governments - municipalities or provinces - which voluntarily pooled their resources to govern an area with mutual customs and concerns, a system that would play an important role in the development of the Catalan question. The problem he sought to rectify was that local government was not an agent of the people, but rather of the central government, directed through the cacique, even when the central government had talked of passing administrative power from itself to the provincial and municipal governments. Maura sought free elections of the mayor (the voice of the government in the town) and representatives (the voice of the town in the government). This would free the local councils from the whims of the Government; it would also free the Government from the obligations of the local councils, saving it administrative costs: if the local councils could not administer themselves well, they could annex themselves to another town, or they could form a mancomunidad; their mismanagement would be something for them to solve, not for the state. The most crucial difference between Maura’s reforms and previous attempts was the underlying motive of attacking caciquismo, the system on which the Government relied for its very power.

The presence of Maura in a Conservative cabinet had ruffled a few feathers, and the Secretary of the Treasury Raimundo Fernández Villaverde particularly set out to block Maura’s programs. In fact, the main opposition to the Silvela/Maura

108 Maura, Discurso... 27 de Mayo de 1903, 6f.
109 ibid., 9.
110 ibid., 10f. To a large degree, Maura washed his hands of many problems, refusing to take responsibility for the future survival or efficacy of his reforms if they passed and then went wrong.
111 Maura, Ideario de Don Antonio Maura sobre la Vida Local, 292 f.
administration came not from the Liberals, who had themselves split into factions in the struggle to succeed Sagasta, but from the continuing strife within the Conservative Party still looking for a leader as dominant as Cánovas. When Fernández Villaverde lost out to Silvela but remained within the party, he expected to retain influence, but found himself obscured by Maura. After the 1903 elections, he led a rebellion against Maura, pacting with Liberal-Conservatives and Liberals who still acknowledged their interest in the old system and now had reason to fear for their seats. When Silvela refused to abandon Maura, his Government fell. Fernández Villaverde's budget-constraining reforms, which hampered many of the plans Silvela's government had hoped to implement, forced Silvela from power as they had done in 1900. Fernández Villaverde led an ineffective government through the Summer, which was unable to accomplish anything. Maura officially joined the Conservatives, and Silvela, who had, eclipsed, left vacant his position as head of the party, nominated Maura as the new party leader.\textsuperscript{112} This set up Maura's first government. When Maura appeared at the head of the government, the Republicans respectfully ceased their obstruction of debates, showing that they would work within a system led by such a committed reformer.\textsuperscript{113} Maura may have remained enigmatic to the Republicans, but he brought about what one Barcelona radical would call "perhaps the first time that the head of a party forms a cabinet by virtue of his parliamentary force and his own personal valor."\textsuperscript{114}

The conservative Catalans also anticipated great advances from Maura's presidency. The aged guru of Catalan conservatism Duran y Bas wrote to Maura of his hope that the new government could follow through on the reforms that the elder Duran had failed to complete during his short ministry in 1899.\textsuperscript{115} The mentor of the \textit{Lliga} leaders and owner of the \textit{Veu}, Verdaguer wrote in the newspaper in early 1904 that

\begin{quote}
In the short time he has been in power he has demonstrated that he possesses the master quality of a true and useful man of government, in knowing the consequence that the first and most essential duty of the exercise of power is the loyal and energetic maintenance of the Law. The rule of Law is order, and order is the condition most
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item Maura, \textit{Treinta y Cinco Años}, 244f.; García Venero, \textit{Antonio Maura}, 44; and Silió, \textit{Vida y Empresas de un Gran Español}, 81f.
\item Gabriel Maura & Fernández Almagro, \textit{Porqué Cayó Alfonso XIII}, 57.
\item Duran y Bas, letter to Maura, 27 Apr. 1904, ArxDyB.
\end{footnotes}
necessary in the planting and developing of those elements of subsistence and of progress for a country.\textsuperscript{116}

To Cambó, Maura displayed energy, interest, and character, and his project of Local Administration was the hope of Catalonia because it proposed municipal autonomy and allowed the reconstruction of the regions; Maura also accepted some of the demands the Catalan industrialists had put forward in 1898: economic agreements, a modern industrial school, and an export bank. Cambó hoped for good luck, since Maura, like Catalonia, had many enemies in Madrid.\textsuperscript{117}

Perhaps one of Maura’s greatest feats in his first term came in 1904, when he brought the young King Alfonso XIII on his first visit to Barcelona. Due to the unstable political situation in the city, most politicians from inside and outside Madrid political circles advised against such a trip. Yet Maura pressed ahead, ignoring the cautions, and brought about one of the defining triumphs of his first government. The idea of bringing the King to Barcelona was not new - it first surfaced in 1902 shortly after his coronation, but this had been averted several times as too politically contentious or too dangerous to his personal safety. By 1904, however, the King, encouraged by Maura, was definitely coming to Catalonia. Riots threatened to disrupt Alfonso’s visit, and the Cortes protested for his safety, but Maura remained steadfast: “If this policy costs me my life, let it! Public Power does not have to seek permission from delinquents.”\textsuperscript{118} The King survived the trip, encountering less unrest than expected thanks to support from the Lliga and Maura’s ability to address the crowds in his native Catalan.\textsuperscript{119} The President himself barely survived it, however: an anarchist terrorist stabbed him in the chest.\textsuperscript{120} The assassination attempt only served to increase Maura’s popularity.

The royal visit caused a heated debate within the Lliga which ultimately split the party. The liberal-leaning Domènech objected to the visit because he found its


\textsuperscript{118} Maura, quoted in Silió, \textit{Vida y Empresas}, 94.

\textsuperscript{119} Silvela smirked: “Only Maura is capable of such a pleasant adventure.” Silvela, quoted in ibid., 95.

\textsuperscript{120} The blade just missed his heart. With characteristic lack of expression, he had the driver continue home as though nothing had happened. There he phoned Manuel Sánchez Guerra, the Interior Secretary, to make sure that when the news reports came in the government would continue to function: “They’ve wounded me with a blow to the chest,” he reported matter-of-factly, making Sánchez Guerra think he had heard Maura wrong. “(Dr.) Alabera is going to check me out now. Warn Constancia (Gamazo, Maura’s wife) so she doesn’t get worried.” Three days later, Maura had returned to his full daily schedule. Reported in ibid., 95f.
supporters over-hopeful that it would establish a dialogue between Catalonia and the King. But the Regionalist representatives at the Cortes had decided to accompany the King on his visit. In Catalonia as well, the Lliga leadership saw the visit as a potential way to play the Spanish political game and earn some advances for its policies. Cambó had thought for some time that a royal visit would enable Catalans to present their concerns directly to the King. Maura, too, had said that after the visit he would take up many of the economic issues affecting Catalonia. Yet the official policy hashed out by agreement in the Lliga's Junta Directiva differed from that of Cambó - the Junta decided to abstain from all proceedings - and so Cambó found himself espousing this old hard-line stance in the Veu: Catalans should keep protesting until Madrid agreed to discuss the issues, and should show no sympathy to the King nor to his visit, because he embodied the Spanish State that had never concerned itself with the Catalans. In a document signed by the President and Secretary of the Lliga, Rusiñol and Ventosa, the Lliga clarified that it had no personal or dynastic hostility towards the King and remained ambivalent on the type of regime; but a protest against the King would show Catalonia's unhappiness at the poor treatment it had received throughout the history of the Spanish State. The Lliga would not join in the celebrations of the King's arrival, unless Madrid immediately conceded full constitutional liberties; municipal, commercial, and regional autonomy; official recognition of the Catalan language; the corporate organization of universal (male) suffrage; voluntary military service; and autonomy for the University and for social and economic institutions.

The hard-line wing of the Lliga had clearly influenced this approach. The Junta Directiva of the party which made these decisions was actually much different than the people who really ran the party, and was composed instead of many of the more prominent figureheads and of representatives from the sundry catalanist groups Prat had roped together in order to first found the party. In this case, Domènech and Carner and the rest of their clique backed the policy of abstention the

122 Cambó, “El viatge del Rey” on behalf of the Junta Directiva, Veu, 2. Apr. 1904, 1-2. He later referred to this article in his Memòries as a “disgrace.” Cambó, Memòrias, 98.
Lliga ultimately adopted. Prat discounted these reasons as not strong enough, writing of the importance of seizing each moment, judging the climate of the people, and not letting the enemies of catalanism take any advantages of the situation. Duran seconded Prat, calling for positive action that would put the ball in Maura’s court. If prior attempts had failed, then the situations were not right; this had become the best opportunity yet to seize the momentum.

The true Regionalists (as opposed to the nationalists, industrialists, and other such groups that made up the Lliga membership) decided to forge ahead outside the party structure with their original plans, while the Veu printed quite favorable accounts of the King’s journey. People swarmed into the streets to get a glimpse of the young monarch. The Veu mutedly described the greeting as “courteous, deferential, respectful” but not “enthusiastic.” Although people filled the streets, the Veu described them as hardly the intellectuals or movers of the city, even though the Fomento prepared a great reception for the King as one of his first stops. The Regionalist newspaper was hedging its bets. It had to account for the crowds in the street despite the Lliga’s official calls for people to stay away. Maura, having carried out the visit against advice from all Madrid circles, recognized his triumph. When his carriage passed down the Passeig de Gràcia, the crowds erupted into spontaneous applause. “This is Cuba,” he whispered in the ear of his adjudant, Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, referring to his failure in a Liberal cabinet a decade before to have anyone take his ambitious reformist ideas seriously. If failing to grasp Maura’s program once before had cost Spain the end of its Empire, this time, he thought, judging by the success of his trip, Spain would have to allow the new President to carry out his plans.

Cambó, too, decided to seize the moment, and in a personal capacity contrary to the official policy of his party, he led a group of Regionalist city councilmen to greet the King at the City Hall. “Sir,” he addressed the King, you have seen this city of Barcelona, which upon receiving you courteously and ceremoniously has shown you how badly founded are the suspicions that this noble and

124 Cambó, Memorias, 97.
128 Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, Orígenes Próximas de la España Actual, 158.
A loyal city could work in a different way from that which your dignity and never-counterfeited courtesy demanded....
This city, Sir, does not feel happy. Your Majesty would be fooling yourself if you believed that the contentness that manifests itself towards you in its heart, indicates that its aspirations are satisfied....
We, as councilmen of Barcelona, only desire that this city be, not the foremost in Spain, but one of the foremost in the world, and as Catalans we desire the greatest prosperity for Catalonia as Your Majesty surely desires as well.129

Cambó had been encouraged by Prat and Duran, in order to deliver a “cop d’estat” within the Lliga, so that its young conservative members could reassert their domination of the agenda. Cambó’s speech succeeded in splitting Carner, Suñol, and their dynamic allies from the Lliga and thus allowed Cambó, Prat, and Duran to reorganize the party entirely in their image and under their control.130

The Madrid press gloated over this break in discipline within the Regionalist ranks, especially as they saw it as emerging from the fact that the King had received a great welcome. The Veu answered back that the people in Madrid were deceiving themselves if they thought this signified the end of the catalanist movement. On the contrary, the Regionalists argued that the enthusiasm for regionalism and curiosity in the new King had nothing to do with each other. Besides, these newspapers in Madrid had been the same ones that had publicly hoped that Maura’s expedition would fail. The Veu printed numerous letters that it had received from diverse places congratulating Cambó on his address to the King, affirming that Cambó, still only twenty-seven, held the key to the future success of catalanism within Spanish politics.131 Cambó had set the example for personal initiatives to present the regionalist cause to Alfonso. When the King reached Girona, Camps addressed him there, asking the monarch for autonomy for Catalonia, inviting him to travel through the small towns of Catalonia to learn personally of the country’s aspirations.132

Domènech did not see much good in the whole affair. Writing in the Heraldo of Madrid, he concluded that the good result of the trip will not have beneficial political effects for the monarchy. In the next elections, the republicans will achieve a greater triumph than in the last ones. The events of today are exterior, superficial.

129 Cambó, address to the King, Barcelona City Hall, 6. April 1904, printed in the Veu, 7. Apr. 1904, 2-3.
130 Rovira, Els Politics, 75-79.
131 “Posemho en clar,” Veu, 8. Apr. 1904, 1. The letters congratulating Cambó were printed over several days following.
This trip will not benefit the Regionalists either. It is true that the regionalist forces are divided. The only profitable thing that can result from the trip is that Maura resecures himself in government. 133

Almost disastrously for this hope, though, was the assassination attempt against Maura, who had become the focus of the hopes and aspirations of many people of all political hues. Verdaguer emphasized that the visit had allowed Catalonia and Spain to establish a dialogue, and that now Alfonso and Maura had begun to talk about the impulse Catalonia could provide for the benefit of Spain. 134 The attempt also served to harden the Regionalists' calls for order in the streets. 135

But the lack of discipline in party ranks meant that the Junta Directiva of the Lliga had to call an emergency meeting on April twentieth. Cambó and those who went to address the King insisted that they had done so as individuals, not in the name of the Lliga, even though there had been disagreement, expressed by Carner more than any other, over whether they should have given the Junta prior notice. Rusiñol announced his resignation as President in protest, making the possibilist Vice President Abadal the acting President. Abadal, however, refused to accept Rusiñol's resignation, and called for another emergency session. 136 The Veu also denounced this attempted breakaway movement, arguing that Catalonia had always been divided over left-right political questions, which had only produced misery for Catalonia and for Spain. The Veu called for mutual understanding (or, considering the side of the debate on which the Veu staff fell, at least called for the left-catalanists to rejoin the right): "Everyone who works for the good of Catalonia is a catalanist, unattached to catalanist political parties.... Catalanism is not another party, it is something even greater than such a languid thing; it is the union of all the Catalans." The left, it felt, only created difficulties by treating the Lliga as a mere party. 137 The leaders then tried a different tack: Abadal and Ventosa wrote to the membership of the Lliga that although Cambó's address to the King went against the agreement of the Junta, it had worked out for the general good of Catalonia, and

therefore the act should be considered a huge success. Rusiñol, however, confirmed his resignation, but agreed to form part of a commission along with Abadal, Carner, and Prat, to discuss the reorganization of the Lliga. These discussions dragged on for several months, since Prat and Carner disagreed on virtually everything, leaving Abadal to make peace in the center. Rusiñol appears to have been included only for decoration, as Cambó, in his documented Memòries, did not mention Rusiñol’s involvement in these deliberations.

In June, the Junta Directiva of the Lliga reconvened and decided to take up one major reform in its organization: the formation of a Political Action Commission. To the Commission it entrusted “anything referring to the objective of the Lliga, or the claims of the rights of Catalonia and the defense of its interests.” The Commission would also deal with relations between the Lliga in toto and its adherent societies and organizations. To try to please all constituent elements of the Lliga, the Junta proposed as permanent members of this Commission Rusiñol, Abadal, Carner, Prat, and Cambó, yet when offered membership, Carner resigned completely from the Lliga. Carner, under pressure from his clique, had refused to work with Cambó. By the end of the year, a group had coalesced around a new newspaper, the Poble Català. The editors and collaborators listed in its first issue on November twelfth included such notable left-wing catalanists as Gabriel Alomar i Vilallonga, Jaume Carner, Joaquim Cases Carbó, Pere Coromines, Lluís Domènech, Joaquim Lluhi Rissech, and Ildefons Suñol, as well as the philologist Pompeu Fabra, the poet Joan Maragall i Gorina, and most surprisingly as editor-in-chief Joan Ventosa.

Ventosa, although in complete agreement with Cambó’s act, had ultimately decided to split away due to his concern over the breakdown in discipline. By 1905, however, he had fully reintegrated himself into the Lliga, whose ideology matched his far better than that of the radicals of the Poble Català. At the time, however,

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140 Cambó, Memòrias, 100.
143 Cambó, Memòrias, 100.
144 Poble Català, 12. Nov. 1904, 1.
Ventosa had decided that catalanism organized for political struggle had reached a period of crisis. Political catalanism needed to include everyone, including those with conservative solutions, but, in the end, the movement had been controlled entirely by a conservative grouping most concerned with preserving social order. Political catalanism needed a new evolution, capturing the sentiment of an entire people, based on - he used Almirall's old words - "variety in unity," respecting all opinions and organizations.145 "Nationalists of Catalonia," the Poble Català announced in its very first article, "we come to struggle legally for the autonomy of our people with all the amplitude possible and useful at the present time and in coming circumstances.... We do not try to represent, within the catalanist press, a social group," but rather since "the hour for immediate political action has arrived" the time had come that "our ideals present themselves before the political powers of the Spanish State."146

Although a group had broken away, the Lliga actually gained strength by retaining a tighter organization while the breakaways failed to form an important political grouping. Cambó surmised later that though the apparent cause of the Lliga's split had been his address to the King, the real cause had been a fundamental lack of agreement between the old catalanists [by which Cambó meant his own clique] and the group of ex-possibilists [political descendants of Emilio Castelar's Possibilist Republicans].... All the old catalanists remained in the Lliga. The left did not act as (a left-wing party) and had no influence over the working class. The Lliga gained a great impetus after those of the Left left.147

Of Carner, Cambó later said that “he is a great intellect, an unsurpassable writer, but an absolutely horrible person.”148 With Carner, his personal differences, and most of his left-wing republican-sentimented nationalist colleagues out of the way, the Lliga's reorganization was complete in time for the series of elections in 1905.

Cambó, Prat, and Duran had long run the Lliga from behind the scenes, but this reorganization made it official. These three, plus Puig, Abadal and later Ventosa, formed the Political Action Commission from 1904 until the party’s demise. This energetic younger generation of catalanists openly dominated the party's activities after the initial electoral success of 1901. As they grew more

147 Cambó, letter to Duran commenting on Josep Pla i Casadevall's book Francesc Cambó, 2. Oct. 1932, ArxDiV.
148 Cambó, letter to Duran, 17. Apr. 1946, Arx. DiV.
vociferous, their divergence in opinion on many issues with many of their contemporaries in the Lliga showed. When Robert died suddenly in 1902, the parliamentary leader whose honesty and legality could serve as a figurehead for both main political tendencies of the party vanished.\footnote{Rovira, Resum d'Història del Catalanisme, 97.} A split was imminent. Like any young party, the Lliga could not expect always to continue building momentum, but rather needed to learn and adapt in order to increase its political potential.

Indeed, part of the lack of direction the Lliga had suffered for two years resulted from Prat's absence: in 1902 the Liberal government imprisoned him for several months because it objected to the contents of several articles he had published in the Veu. In jail, his already precarious health decayed further, and he spent a further year in a sanitorium in France, removed from Catalan politics. With Prat removed from the scene shortly before Robert's sudden death, Cambó and Duran could not call on him to step in to stem what they already saw at that time could clearly develop into a crisis. He missed the social unrest of 1902 and the electoral struggles of 1903, and did not return to action until just before the Lliga's internal crisis erupted in 1904. The triumvirate was restored, and with it the effectiveness of the party organization. "Mysteries of the human heart!" an observer exclaimed shortly after Prat returned. "See here a man of clear intelligence and right in his heart, who loves Catalonia as though he were the first to do so; I am sure that he would gladly sacrifice everything if it were for the good of the Pàtria: health, interests, future, family, everything."\footnote{Joan Balanzó y Pons, letter to Rusiñol, May 1904, third letter in Balanzó, Cartas Catalanistas al Meu Bon Amic Don Albert Rusiñol, 10.} Indeed he would: Prat was never wealthy, spent several terms as a political prisoner, worked hard through chronic illness, and died in 1917 in his family home, as President of an autonomous Catalonia, at the age of forty-seven.

Maura also gained politically from the split of the Lliga. Those who left the party were mostly republican and had opposed the visit of the King on ideological grounds. By leaving the Lliga they opened up the possibility for future collaboration between Maura and the Lliga. But these developments only made the Lliga's swing rightward more pronounced - although the political opinions of leaders had not
changed, the party had lost its left wing while continuing to attract more right-wing supporters. The Lliga had recognized as early as 1903 that the majority of the citizens of Barcelona had at least a latent republican sentiment, and were also from the working classes. There were people, then, who could vote for Lerroux if they were not made to feel sufficiently Catalan to put the regional issue first. Also, after 1903, the Republicans of Barcelona had the possibility of forming part of a parliamentary group much larger than that of the Regionalists.\footnote{Octavio Ruiz Monjón, \textit{El Partido Republicano Radical}, 45.}

"Whatever the result," cautioned Pella in 1905, "if regionalism does not deal with the mass of workers, it will never be a great force. If it has to be truly nationalistic, not even its name will suffice, while it does not enter fully into the great and tempestuous social problem of Catalonia."\footnote{Pella, 72-73.} Carner sought out this new mix of nationalism and republicanism, stressing that the two movements need not contradict each other: "When Catalan nationalism entered into the political struggle, the people in Madrid took notice that they had before them a people that, as Catalans, could demolish through unity of action the ruling system, empty and gnawed away."\footnote{Carner, "Crida Patriotica," \textit{Poble}, 31. Dec. 1904.} Carner mocked the Regionalists. He felt that, due to their bourgeois nature, they did not understand the gravity of the situation and therefore failed to embrace the working class which was necessary to ensure them success.\footnote{Carner, same article, \textit{Poble}, 31. Dec. 1904.}

For Carner, then, it became important to attract to the Catalan nationalist movement all those who "today live apart from the nationalist movement, who even feel uneasy or antipathetic towards it, despite the fact that deep in their hearts they are just as Catalan as we are and they love our homeland and the distinctive characteristics of our social personality passionately."\footnote{Carner, same article, \textit{Poble}, 31. Dec. 1904.}

The challenge for the left-catalanists came in confronting the Radical Republicans, who already controlled much of the working-class vote and had become hungry for power. Lerroux declared by 1905 that "I throw down my gauntlets and I want to govern." He had already developed a large personal following, and had become the great leader of the Barcelona working class, ready to

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item Octavio Ruiz Monjón, \textit{El Partido Republicano Radical}, 45.
  \item Pella, 72-73.
\end{itemize}}

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take that raw power and transfer it to political power. His dictatorial tendencies produced several republican dissidencies, splitting the vote, but did not quite allow room for the catalanist left to field its own slate in any of the 1905 elections, since the catalanist vote stayed with the Lliga.\textsuperscript{156} The Lliga continued its numerical gains in all of the elections of 1905, although it still had much to make up for in the relative vote as turnout remained high. Unlike 1903, however, it did not choose to align with Catholic groups, but allowed its affiliates to form whatever electoral coalition seemed most beneficial in each district, resulting in some alliances outside the city of Barcelona with Conservatives or Carlists, though on most slates the Regionalists stood alone.\textsuperscript{157} Despite its animosity, the group of the Poble Català continued to vote for the Lliga in order to oppose centralism, since it lacked a party of its own. But it realized that to remain viable as a voice in Catalan politics it needed to form soon a new political organization, in order to speak for all of Catalonia. “We do not doubt,” the Poble Català wrote, “that for lack of others... the catalanist bloc will turn out to vote” to elect representatives of the Lliga.\textsuperscript{158}

The Lliga did not fare badly in 1905. After gaining several seats in provincial elections (including electing Prat to the Barcelona provincial government), and recapturing two Senate seats (Camps was reelected in Girona, and Rusiñol took Camps’ vacant seat representing the Economic Society), the Lliga turned its focus to the Barcelona candidature for the general election. The Lliga decided to stress its catalanist credentials putting forward a broad, if consistently conservative, candidature. For the 1905 general elections, the Lliga put forward five candidates for Barcelona: Ignasi Girona, President of the Agricultural Institute of Saint Isidore; Frederic Rahola, Vice President of the Fomento; the historian Pella, now President of the Economic Society; Puig; and Cambó. The Political Action Commission determined that Rusiñol should not stand for reelection in Barcelona, but rather gave him the less glamorous position as the candidate for Vic. Ventosa, his dissidence officially over, stood on the Lliga’s ticket for Torroela de Montnegri.\textsuperscript{159}

While only Girona and Rahola won seats for the Regionalists in Barcelona (out of

\textsuperscript{156} Rovira, \textit{Resum d'Història}, 103.
\textsuperscript{157} Camps, \textit{Història de la Solidaritat}, 16f.
seven victories across Catalonia), the Republican vote in the city dropped substantially, as turnout fell to twenty-nine per cent.

But during the vote counting for the September general elections, it emerged the Pella had been involved in vote-fixing. The Lliga, which had spent so many years decrying corruption, immediately expelled him from the party. He became an embittered critic of his former friends, but after 1905 made very little impact. In 1905, however, he accused the Lliga of losing touch with the people, especially the workers, in its outlook. He criticized the Regionalists for aligning with the Carlists in Girona to block the spread of republicanism, for aligning with Republicans in Vic and Granollers in order to defeat the caciques, and for aligning with other candidatures in other areas. This opportunism suggested to him a lack of ideals. At different times they called themselves catalanists, regionalists, or even nationalists, depending on their audience, and they neglected the one solution Pella considered democratic: the unification of the forces of nationalism and republicanism. In many ways he echoed the complaints of the Poble Català dissidents.

The Lliga hoped to improve on its 1903 showing in the November 1905 Barcelona municipal elections. The municipal elections produced triumphs across Catalonia, especially in the provinces of Barcelona and Girona. In the city of Barcelona, the Regionalists won twelve seats to the Republicans' fourteen, an immense improvement over 1903 without a substantial drop in voter turnout. The Poble, though, called these triumphs a negative vote: people, it surmised, had voted against radicalism rather than for the Lliga.

In reality, the Poble Català had offered no alternative. Luis de Zulueta, a prominent Lerrouxist Republican, offered this critique:

A catalanist left does not exist, not even a shadow of one. Politically, all Catalan nationalism is reactionary....
The youths of the Poble Català keep themselves... off the field of battle, away from the conditions where two worlds, face to face, are engaged in the battle for our times.

It took the Catalan left several more years to become a major player on the Catalan political scene. Yet the Regionalists had shown their durability. The split of

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160 Cambó, Memorias, 104-105; cf. Buqueras, 68.
161 Pella, 89-95.
163 see results in the Veu, Nov. 1905.
165 Albertí, 206-207.
the *Lliga* reconcentrated power more strongly than ever in the hands of Cambó, Prat, and Duran, and gave the *Lliga* a structure more prepared than any other party in Spain to deal with rapidly changing situations. When electoral coalitions formed, they did so under the formidable electoral apparatus of the *Lliga*. After a military disturbance in Catalonia led Moret to suspend constitutional guarantees and impose stricter censorship on the press at the end of 1905, the *Lliga* rose to head a broad coalition that made it, with Cambó at its head, one of the foremost political movements in the country, with a program that would assume state-wide importance, and dominate political discussion across Spain until its collapse in 1923. Cambó would become the linchpin in Spanish politics, as he had desired since the early days of his party.
III. Regionalist political theory and the Spanish State

With the reorganization of the *Lliga* in 1904, the Party set out to define clearly the theory behind its action. Lluís Duran published in 1905 his most important work, *Regionalisme i Federalisme*, which provided the public with the necessary definitions of regionalism and state structure, specifically in contrast with federalism. Enric Prat de la Riba was elected to the Barcelona Provincial Government in 1905 and from that position saw himself as the director of catalanism within Catalonia. He wrote the prologue to Duran’s work, and then expanded that into a complete book in 1906, *La Nacionalitat Catalana*, in which he promoted his definition of a Catalan nationality and in which he proposed the “nationalization” of Catalonia - the restoration of ethnic cultural consciousness to the Catalan people, a great task that would concern him until his death. The publication of *La Nacionalitat Catalana* was timed to correspond with a May 1906 Barcelona celebration honoring the parliamentary representatives of the nascent Catalan Solidarity, a movement organized by Francesc Cambó which combined politicians from most Catalan parties into one great movement directed by the *Lliga*.¹

The clear elucidation of a program was made all the more critical at this point not just because of the *Lliga*’s own reorganization and the attacks it was beginning to sustain from the catalanists who had split away in 1904, but also because the Conservative politician Antoni Maura had nudged his way to the top of the party structure in Madrid and was now in a position whereby his proposed administrative reforms might come to fruition. As Maura’s stance on the issues corresponded to some extent with many of the Regionalists’ desires, it was important for the Regionalists to have a complete theory before them in order to maximize the potential of collaboration with Maura.²

Although the left wing of the *Lliga* had broken away in 1904, the Regionalists hardly lost their dominance within political catalanism. The Catalan left was slow to organize - the republican groups that had existed before remained

¹ Casassas, “Prat de la Riba i ‘la Nacionalitat Catalana,’” 2-10.
² ibid., 9-10.
inconsequential, and those who broke away in the wake of the King's visit failed to create a coherent political grouping of their own. By defining itself, the Lliga could effectively define the entire debate on its own terms, and help minimize potential challenges by roping other groups into its plans - either they had to fall in line behind the Lliga, or they would get tagged as anti-catalanists or worse. Those who broke away from the Lliga in 1904 were well aware of this predicament, as Ildefons Suñol explained to Jaume Carner in 1908: "This is the result of the action that the Lliga has developed over the last few years - an action quite tactful for promoting the interests of that party, but underneath hardly patriotic." With the Regionalists' organization and domination of the political debate, the formation of an effective nationalist republican party was "in this day, absolutely impossible." On one side, the Regionalists Cambó, Prat, and Duran were busy defining themselves as the only legitimate voice of political catalanism; while, in opposition to them, Alejandro Lerroux was promoting a fiery anti-catalanist brand of republicanism. For those who hoped to create a group that was left-wing in character but also catalanist, the going was rough.

Indeed, the Veu de Catalunya had always sought to be what its name claimed: the "Voice of Catalonia." It had declared as much on the front page of its first issue as a daily on January first, 1899, under the guidance of Prat. Even then, over two years before the foundation of the Lliga, it was calling for some form of political catalanism to take over the structures of government, from the municipalities to the state itself, as well as cultural and economic institutions. "The ideal of catalanism," Duran wrote in the same issue, "is in the reality that Catalonia be completely Catalan." This meant fomenting both the cultural and political spheres.

The founders of the Veu, fresh out of the University, provided the impulse that would become the Regionalist movement - they saw that the quickest way to gain influence was to print their own newspaper to propagate their ideas, and only then, when they had produced a large enough popular base, to develop a political

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party which could carry out those ideas. By April 1901, the *Veu* had to purchase a new printing press which could print 12,000 copies an hour. The machine ran for two hours per edition, two editions a day, producing a very large total of 48,000 copies daily. By June 1901, even this was insufficient, and it had to buy an even bigger press which could print 26,000 copies an hour of a longer, 8-page, format. Prat directed the newspaper himself until 1902, when the Liberal government imprisoned him because it objected to the newspaper's content. After that time, the *Veu* maintained a series of straw men who nominally served as editors-in-chief, so that if the government were to prosecute and imprison anyone it would hold these men responsible and not the newspaper's true ideologues. Prat remained the newspaper's true editor until his death in 1917, and Duran served as its political adviser - the theoretician of regionalism - until he resigned that post in 1923.

The actual political direction of the *Lliga* rested with a very small core of men and their close friends. The *Lliga*'s Political Action Commission, formed in 1904, included only five lifetime members (Cambó, Prat, Duran, Josep Puig, and Raimon d'Abadal) later joined by Joan Ventosa. This Commission made all of the *Lliga*'s strategic and policy decisions, often in consultation with others who specialized in the areas under discussion. However, the Commission did not take minutes - preferring to show a united front and to avoid repeating the public squabbles of 1904. The content of the *Veu*, including what was to be said, by whom, and how, was regularly discussed by Duran, Prat, and Cambó. Electoral decisions were made by those three in consultation with Ferran Agulló i Vidal, the *Lliga*'s Secretary General and campaign strategist. This group also consulted their mentor, the man who had introduced them all, Narcís Verdaguer, for general advice. Puig was involved when matters of culture cropped up. Almost every evening for over twenty years, at the Café Continental in the Plaça de Catalunya, Cambó and Duran had a *tertulia* with a small clique of lawyer friends which included Duran's brothers and Ventosa, as well as three more of their closest friends: Rafel Llusà, Rafel Pomès,

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8 notice in the *Veu*, 1. Apr. 01.
9 notice in the *Veu*, 17. June 1901, 3.
11 Sabaté, 41-43.
12 see the stacks of correspondence kept in the ArxPrat.
and Pere Rahola i Molinas. Oddly, Prat did not figure in this circle. All his personal correspondence was addressed to him using the formal or semi-formal forms of the second person. Only one non-relative addressed him in the familiar: his oldest friend, the republican Albert Bastardas. From this distance, Prat maintained amicable relations with most in Catalonia, and this later allowed him to be the effective and respected operator within the Catalan government. Meanwhile, Duran was in charge of theory, while Cambó did the legwork - in the early years of regionalism, whenever a catalanist demonstration took place in Catalonia, the newspapers nearly always reported that Cambó had been there to address it. Later on - but even before he was elected to parliament, Cambó would take on the role of heading the Lliga’s political action in Madrid.

Although the movement these men headed incorporated diverse elements which had converged under their direction at the end of the nineteenth century, the primary influence that had formed these men was the legalist conservative tradition of Manuel Duran y Bas at the University of Barcelona and Verdaguer at the Catalan Scholastic Center. It was precisely by coming from this tradition that the Regionalists could attract so many diverse groups. The Catalan industrialists respected Duran y Bas and hardly saw in him a threat to social order, while the youths of the left had also felt an immense influence from Duran y Bas by being educated in the same University of Barcelona. It was only natural, then, that Catalan conservatism would dominate political catalanism when it first came to act on a grand scale. Prat himself had not only militated with the groups established by Verdaguer, but had also collaborated with more radical catalanist elements within

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13 It was customary for Cambó to write postcards to the group at the Café when he was traveling abroad, and some of these were saved in the ArxDIV. Cambó also refers to the tertulia periodically in his Memorias, esp. 385-386.
14 see the correspondence in the ArxPrat.
15 “I have gone from town to town,” Cambó reported as early as 1899, “and everywhere I have been able to enthuse everyone with catalanism.” Cambó, reported in “Meeting catalanista a l’Barcelona,” Veu, 1. July 1899, 1. While Prat was recovering from ill-health in a sanatorium in France, Cambó wrote to him that between Duran and Cambó the work of the Lliga was being carried out: “we agreed that I would do it and he would document it.” Cambó, letter to Prat, May 1903, ArxPrat.
16 Cambó first ran for a seat in the Cortes in November 1905, although he was defeated. Nevertheless, he still went to Madrid to observe the sessions, and the Regionalist contingent consulted him on how to proceed. In the campaign literature that year, Prat had noted Cambó’s enormous activity, both canvassing Catalonia and within the Barcelona City Hall, and had pointed out the importance of applying Cambó’s energy against the machinery of Spanish politics in Madrid. Prat, “En Cambó,” Veu, 8. Nov. 1905, 3.
the Catalanist Union. His connections were broad and he had amicable relations with most elements. And his legal background, both in Barcelona with Duran y Bas and in Madrid, assured that whatever theory he espoused, it would comprehend the complexities of theories of the state. His vision of nationality foresaw three crucial elements: language, which Catalonia certainly had and which had been recovered in the cultural *Renaixença*; structure of laws, which Duran y Bas had defended in the 1880s and for which a long tradition had existed; and popular will, something Prat himself hoped to generate. Francisco Pi y Margall’s Federalism and even Valenti Almirall’s particularist theories did not appeal to Prat, because while they dealt with reforming the structure of the state and with devolving some powers through pacts with the center, Prat felt that these theories put too much stress merely on the affairs of the greater state and ignored the structure and life of the regions therein. Prat put foremost the “fact of Catalan nationality,” and for this he was forever credited by nationalists as the creator of that nationality in popular sentiment. Nevertheless, this Catalan nationality was to act firmly within the Spanish state, and its role was not just to regenerate itself but also to reform that state. The influence of Duran y Bas remained clear.

Duran y Bas had often looked abroad. His beliefs were conservative and modernist, seeking to blend tradition with progress. As he considered himself a conservative in opposition to what in Spain passed as conservatism, he was quite aware of politicians and legal theory in other countries. Likewise, his disciples - both those who continued the logic of his politico-legal thought and became the leaders of the Regionalist movement and those who represented other, more nationalist, tendencies - looked abroad. Pi y Margall had also been heavily influenced by foreign political theory, and this outlook turned up in his political descendants, especially

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18 Jardi, *El Pensament de Prat de la Riba*, 87-93.
19 ibid., 107-109.
21 The direct influence of Verdaguer was also evident. Often ill, Verdaguer did not himself serve on the front lines of the *Lliga*, whose foundation and whose leaders he encouraged. But he stated the role they had to pursue after 1904: “All Catalans must come to work for Catalonia, whether they be republicans or monarchists, reds or whites; all are our brothers; all should come together in a community of effort... Outside this country, outside Catalonia, there are many Spaniards with the same aspirations as us; they too want their rights recognized; they too pursue the reindication of the personality of the non-Catalan regions. With them we will have a just *españolismo*, redeemed and uplifted; with them we will achieve the well-being and the prosperity of the different homelands which make up the Spanish State.” Verdaguer, speech at the Nou Retir Theater (Barcelona), quoted in “Festa de Germanor Catalanista,” *Veu*, 11 July 1904, 4.
Antoni Rovira i Virgili. The catalanist ethnic movement did not occur in a vacuum: it looked to earlier ones serving as examples for inspiration.

As one of the earlier experiments with launching an ethnic reawakening into a political movement designed to reshape and reform the entire greater state in which it took place, the role of the Czechs within the Austrian Empire provided perhaps the most complex situation, full of practical examples for others to examine. Many political catalanists of all hues saw their position as similar to the Czechs several years before, and as a result considered Austria a prime case to study. Catalan newspapers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, unusually for that time especially in Spain, provided rather extensive coverage of foreign affairs, especially when these concerned minority ethnic groups and systems of government. As the training grounds for and the mouthpieces of the foremost politicians of their day, these Catalan newspapers with their wider-world view demonstrated alertness for the world across the Pyrenees: neither Catalonia nor Spain could simply supply the theory needed for regeneration, but rather both needed to look beyond to foreigners who had previously attempted to put their theories into practice. The Catalan Regionalists, seeking a model to enable their ethnic-based movement to take on Spanish political overtones, looked to the Austro-Bohemian movement, wondering if they could adapt the Czech project in Austria for their own use in Spain; if the Catalan Regionalists saw similarities in their situation, they hardly fared any better, failing as the Czech regionalists had, and for similar reasons. This model is also the most apt for consideration because it was the most widely adopted by different groups within Catalonia - other models, such as that of Ireland, were used more predominantly by some groups and rejected by others. 22

Historical accidents had crafted Europe’s most diverse state in mid-nineteenth-century Austria and, ever since Europe’s ethnic reawakening, this polyglot state of polyglot states has served as a model for virtually everyone who has

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22 Ireland and its Home Rule were a favorite case study for Rovira i Virgili - see Rovira, *Nacionalisme i Federalisme*, 163-188. The Regionalists, however, rejected this analogy. Catalonia could not be compared to Ireland, in their view, because Ireland was divided from England by sea, religion, race, language (albeit disused), customs, and “an abyss of blood.” Catalonia was not so far from Castile, and was geographically and historically part of Spain. Catalonia’s mission, therefore, was to reform the state. Martín Dedeu, *El Catalanismo en Acción*, 62-63.
wanted to explore how ethnic groups can (or cannot) cooperate within a single governmental structure. The search for freedom and equal rights for the various groups led to the rise of micro-nationalism as an escape from conceived oppression. Yet, in asserting his Czech identity during the Revolution of 1848, František Palacký maintained his loyalty to the Donaumonarchie, making the famous declaration that "indeed, if the Austrian Imperial State had not existed for so long, then in the interest of Europe and in the interest of Humanity itself, we would be obliged to hurry ourselves up and create it."\(^{23}\)

Under increasing diplomatic pressure after 1866 from Prussian Germany which forced it to cede powers in the east to Hungary, Austria looked for a new way to preserve itself intact. German-speaking Liberals sought to apply uniformity to the state, and through social, political, and ethnic intolerance actually set in motion the sequence that would shatter the Empire. Conservatives and regionalists desperately tried to create a federation that would acknowledge the equal rights of the assorted groups and preserve the state on which all groups depended. The growth of the German left drove many ethnic groups into the more radical micro-nationalist parties, which paralleled the Germans in intolerance and social platform, and came also to share their anti-Austrian sentiment. The threat both pan-Germans and "lesser" nationalists brought to this Empire prompted Palacký’s declaration, as he and his successors, particularly Franz Ladislaus Rieger, leader of the Bohemian regionalist Old Czechs, worked towards a reconciliation between the Czechs and Germans, leading to the ill-fated Ausgleich of 1890, which had tried to grant limited autonomy to Bohemia.

By 1879, a series of ineffectual Austrian Liberal governments had formed and fallen. The electorate had grown tired of Liberal experiments, while Kaiser Franz Josef had become upset over the continued absence of the Bohemian delegates who were boycotting parliament. He called upon the conservative Eduard Taaffe to form a government. The Czechs quickly joined Taaffe when he professed an interest in a federated state and language rights.\(^{24}\) Taaffe pushed forward industrialization towards a capitalist society; he sought order, but not governmental dictation, and

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\(^{23}\) František Palacký, Gedenkblätter, 152. This most famous of tracts written to assert Czech identity was, of course, written in German.

\(^{24}\) William A. Jenks, Austria under the Iron Ring 1879-1893, 40.
only after he restored that order did he bring in limited social reform. The *Eisener Ring* ("Iron Ring") Conservative/Slavic coalition managed to run the Empire for the next decade. Not surprisingly, the Iron Ring met sharp reaction from the German left, which was most offended by the smaller role played by Germans. The infamous Georg Schönerer agitated the left in Vienna, basing his platform on socialism; racism, especially anti-Semitism; and pan-germanism stemming from Otto von Bismarck's Germany. He wished to purify the German *Herrenvolk* ("Master Race") under one state, and to germanize minorities.

German animosity caused the other ethnic groups to react. The Young Czechs, who represented the Czech left in opposition to the conservative parties, grew even more radical and hot-headed in opposing the Germans, with whom they actually shared some ideological principles. Like the German left, the Young Czech Party under Julius Grégr did not seek equality of races in Bohemia, but rather wanted its own ethnic group's dominance. While the Germans fought to keep Austria under their control by seeking to exclude other ethnic groups, the Young Czechs moved to isolate the Germans within Bohemia with the goal of removing them altogether. Like the Germans, the Young Czechs rejected the idea of races living side-by-side within Bohemia, and this precluded compromise. The more concessions the Germans made, the more the Young Czechs felt they deserved; they demanded the most in the decade in which they had received the most, starting a spiral.

The violent stance of Grégr and the Young Czechs contrasted with the more restrained opposition of Rieger and the Czech regionalists and conservatives and set the former clearly apart from the latter. This left the Old Czech Party hinging its future on negotiations with the Germans. These began in 1889, and concluded in a compromise, the *Ausgleich* of 1890, which protected a German minority within an autonomous Bohemia.

The *Ausgleich* of 1890 provided the ammunition for Grégr to denounce the Old Czechs as "traitors" and, with the emerging proletariat and the peasant classes

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26 Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, 40f.
29 Jenks, 90f.
30 ibid., 242f.
swelling their numbers, the Young Czechs roared to victory in the 1891 Reichsrath elections.\(^{31}\) Facing the pressure, the Old Czechs agreed to suspend the Ausgleich agreements, but even this could not save their party, as the Young Czechs continued to accuse them of not being able to identify with the Czech Volk.\(^ {32}\) The disintegration of the Bohemian compromise and the diminished Old Czech representation after 1891 spelled the end of the Iron Ring. Taaffe remained Minister-President until he, too, was forced into retirement in 1893. By then, the Old Czech Party had ceased to exist, and stirrings by German Nationalists, Anti-Semites, and Young Czechs kept a sturdy government from forming.\(^ {33}\)

The more the radical parties grew, the more they alienated voters who might have compromised, but who instead joined other radical parties themselves. In response to increasing germanism, the Czechs flocked almost entirely to the Young Czech Party.\(^ {34}\) By the 1897 elections, the Young Czechs had won all Czech seats but one, and could declare that “the only road for the Czechs is leading out of the Habsburg Empire.”\(^ {35}\) Czech political identity had effectively shifted from merely seeking recognition of the political rights of Bohemia to an aggressive, ethnic, and pan-Slavic solidarity looking outside the Empire.\(^ {36}\) The press in Catalonia followed the debates in Austria eagerly, the conservative press even tracking down the defeated Rieger to learn his opinions. “The situation in Austria is truly hopeless,” Rieger commented in St. Petersburg in 1898. “In as much as there is any probability of a solution between Czechs and Germans, all compromise seems to me impossible the longer it takes to reconstruct sincerely the equal rights of the nationalities.... The Czech Question will become an international question.”\(^ {37}\)

The *Veu* denounced the politics of the post-Taaffe governments, which sought merely to “gain time" rather than actually try to solve the *Nationalitätenfrage*.\(^ {38}\) Meanwhile, the rapid radicalization of the electorate forced the Young Czechs to obstruct parliament, and ground all politics to a halt at a time

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\(^{31}\) Cohen, 265; Jenks, 277f.
\(^{32}\) Jenks, 284.
\(^{33}\) ibid., 292.
\(^{34}\) Wiskemann, 42f.
\(^{35}\) quoted in William Wallace, *Czechoslovakia*, 45.
\(^{36}\) Robert Kann, *The Habsburg Empire*, 121f. and 132.
when Austria required an active regenerative government.\textsuperscript{39} The \textit{Veu} lamented that the situation had been allowed to deteriorate too far, and that Austria had to introduce a system of comprehensive autonomy in order to reforge the ties between the various \textit{Völker}: “Anything that is short of this will result in nothing else but the aggravation of evil, up until the day arrives when not even federalism would be a remedy to save Austria.”\textsuperscript{40}

Cambó, who began his journalistic career as the foreign editor of the \textit{Veu}, saw a conflict in economic concerns between Czechs and Germans, just as the Catalans and Castilians had differing economies. The rise of Czech industry produced anxiety in the Germans, but Taaffe had tried to harmonize the interests of the two groups for Austria’s maximum benefit. With his failure in the economic sphere, all solutions had to take into account the aspirations of nationalists in order to calm their intransigence, and here Austria was bound to come to grief.\textsuperscript{41} Likewise, industrial concerns in Catalonia conflicted needlessly with the economy of the rest of Spain, when Cambó and other regionalists and conservatives thought they could be made to complement each other. The Catalan regionalist solution of the early twentieth century would attempt to use the Catalan economy as the catalyst to modernize Spain, just as it hoped it could use Catalan politics to reshape the Spanish state. Making Spain prosperous might allow it to avoid the political squabbles that had troubled Austria. Cambó’s own attempts at solving the problems not by force but by compromise would later fail as the pertinent groups polarized. After struggling for the \textit{Mancomunitat}, he felt that the Catalans themselves undermined his efforts, by protesting louder against Spain. People should only raise their voices, he thought, when they are not heard, not when they are gaining concessions, otherwise they might scare their opponents. The Catalans had made the most progress when they were willing to compromise.\textsuperscript{42}

The micro-nationalist opponents of the regionalists, quarreling over the various interpretations of the “nation,” accused them of not actually defending ethnic interests, but rather conservative or capitalist ones, given that their goals

\textsuperscript{39} “La quèstió nacionalista à l’Austria,” \textit{Veu}, 15. May 1900.

\textsuperscript{40} “Al parlament austríach entre Austria y Russia,” \textit{Veu} (published under censorship as “El Diari de Catalunya”), 2. Mar. 1901, 2.


\textsuperscript{42} Cambó, \textit{Por la Concordia}, 27.
often corresponded. Micro-nationalists felt that Völker must have freedom of self-determination, while macro-nationalists, defining freedom as equality within the central state, tried to stamp out differences: true nationalists would hold their Volk identity above all else; obviously, in their thinking, other concerns must motivate regionalists. "Regionalism is not catalanism when it with such a great conscience uses that name," wrote one micro-nationalist Catalan, pointing to "regionalist" as a forced alternative to "nationalist" or "catalanist."43 The Lliga had purposefully called itself "Regionalista" so as to stress its non-ethno-specific (as opposed to Catalan) character, promoting regionalism throughout Spain to solve its crisis. But this did not enamor it to the Catalan left, which used the term to question the Lliga's commitment. For conservatives, liberty has been the central concept of the modern democratic era: if regionalism as a movement was not ethnic by nature, as its opponents claimed, then it certainly carried the torch of conservative liberty.

Both the Lliga and the Old Czechs before them appeared to themselves and their opponents as conservative parties, and this flavored their desire for compromise. As conservatives, they sought stability, and honored the language of the central government as a means of preserving the state: the introduction of other languages by the political center would only have resulted in mass confusion. In the case of Austria, Palacký also rejected the notion of redrawing regional boundaries to reflect language boundaries, because of the mix of different ethnic groups within the regions. Already extant, historically-determined regions could allow for government in the predominant language of the region, but must also recognize the Staatssprache. German he accepted as this Staatssprache, but in doing so he in no way implied a "German character" rather an Austrian one, with German as the language of convenience.44

The German-Austrian conservatives agreed, as the Austro-Marxist theorist Otto Bauer unhappily admitted: they stressed the economic unity of Mitteleuropa, Habsburg leadership, and a foil against the socialist tendencies of Germany. The Austrian bourgeoisie "wanted to develop the German language and a good piece of singularly German culture away from itself: its feeling was rather Austrian, not

43 Aldavert, quoted in Riquer, Lliga, 199.
44 Palacký, Österreichs Staatsidee, 31f.
German; not the depraved Germany, but the people-rich (volkerreiche) Austria was its fatherland."\(^{45}\) These people saw ethnic origin as only a part of an individual's identity. More important was the unity of the state, which itself should have no specific ethnicity, only freedom of identity for all groups and individuals. Regionalists then saw themselves as regionalists of the state (e.g. "Austro-slavs") not separate "nations" entitled to self-government either inside or outside their state.\(^{46}\)

Micro-nationalist critics, however, have found problems with the ability of such polyglot states to function. One such, Jaume Bofill i Mates could clearly see the difference between the state and the traditional hegemonic Volk, but used that difference merely to doubt the viability of the state as a federal one, because loyalty should go first to the Volk.\(^{47}\) The problem with the Old Czechs, Bofill’s comrade Rovira i Virgili pointed out, was that they participated in the central government - even worse, that they formed part of the governing coalition. This signified a "moderate character that disgusted a great part of the (Czech) patriots."\(^{48}\) Here Rovira defined patriots merely as those who would settle for no less than complete local independence. In making this reference in 1913, he could by comparison attack the Lliga’s collaboration in Madrid, and anticipate what would to him seem the unspeakable: that Catalan Regionalists themselves would soon become important ministers in the Spanish cabinet.

Bauer, a socialist who argued for micro-nationalism when it suited his convenience, also felt that the Danube-area had too great a mix of peoples to form a successful polyglot state. For historical-political reasons, though, the “ruling class” (Herrenklasse) had adopted German, thus reinforcing the oppression of the geschichtlose peoples, who now needed to rise up against linguistic as well as economic hardship.\(^{49}\) Since German was a “sign of distinction,” Rovira interpreted its use by the Czech aristocracy and bourgeoisie to show that they were not merely not nationalists - in the sense that anyone showing concern for his Volk was, for Rovira, a “nationalist” - but that they were actively anti-nationalist.\(^{50}\)

\(^{45}\) Bauer, Die Österreichische Revolution, 49.
\(^{46}\) Heinrich Hanau, Absolutismus und Föderalismus, 58f.; Dennis Thompson & Dov Ronen, Ethnicity, Politics, and Development, 35.
\(^{48}\) Rovira, Història dels Moviments Nacionalistes, vol. II, 32.
\(^{49}\) Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, 190f.
\(^{50}\) Rovira, Història dels Moviments Nacionalistes, vol. II, 23.
Austrian regionalists did not always equate this “assimilation” with loss of identity. It was, rather, crucial for the state to function, and for the assorted groups of the Empire to maintain mutual respect. If they could not work together for their common “Austrian” culture, one which accepted and included the individual cultures, then, thought the Austrian federalists cynically, the Empire might as well employ forced segregation and confine the Völker to their own areas apart from one another.51 A non-nationality-specific state could preserve everyone’s identity; independent, these micro-nationalities could never survive, as Catalan regionalists often warned.52

Rovira argued against using Austria as a model solution. The Habsburg Monarchy was, to him, still semi-feudal in its structure: it could not overcome the Nationalitätenfrage because it had formed in a pre-nationalist age with archaic institutions not useful in the modern era. To modernize Austria meant to destroy it.53 Duran later countered that the post-Habsburg model adopted by the Czechs was itself inherently flawed, not least of all because Czechoslovakia gave the Czechs the same hegemony over Slovaks, Germans, Poles, Hungarians, and Ukrainians that they had argued the Germans should not have had in Austria. Czechoslovakia he termed an “absolutely imperfect political formation, incomprehensible within good nationalist doctrine and without historic viability.”54 But Rovira did indeed support the clear demarcation of frontiers, with states based on “national” ethnic identities and emigration by new minorities encouraged.55 The German Empire, he noted, could function as a federal state only because virtually all its inhabitants were German - polyglot federations like Austria did not function as well, as the diverse groups could not get along.56

51 Viktor Russ, Der Sprachenstreit in Österreich, 9.
52 “Studying the conditions of each of the peoples that compose the “Spanish Nationality,”... (we should admire) the harmony that results in the counterposition of diverse qualities, that complement one another and would make for a complete harmony the day that none predominates over the others. To separate them... or give preponderance to one would be to produce... an illness of the entire organism.” Mañé, El Regionalismo, reprinted in Cucurull, vol. III, 189.
53 Rovira, Nacionalisme i Federalisme, 83-85.
54 Duran, La Esencia de los Nacionalismos, 42.
55 Rovira, Nacionalisme, 37.
56 ibid., 88-89.
Bauer, arguing that the ties between the proletariat should make ethnic origin secondary, admitted "national" socialism, but only because he attributed the reawakening of many of Europe's peoples to their awareness of ruling class oppression. Once they had used nationalism to free themselves, they should realign with their proletarian comrades. Strict micro-nationalists disagreed, arguing against cooperation with other groups. Rovira criticized those who restricted themselves to merely their own region, when many of the same nationality lived outside: thus the Old Czechs should not have been a Bohemian party, but should have also concerned themselves with predominantly Czech Moravia as well as with Silesia with its large Czech minority. This was also his critique for the Lliga: true catalanists included the Valencian Country, the Balearic Islands, and even Roussillon and Andorra in their "Catalunya."

These men had picked up some of the regionalist language and carried it to an extreme. To argue their cases for regional autonomy from a centralized faceless government, regionalists had stressed their individuality as purely natural. The state itself had formed as a contract between different men for their mutual benefit, not the subjugation of one by another - Prat made the distinction. Yet, Prat's micro-nationalist followers credited him with taking the biggest step by speaking of "nations" and "nationalism," even though he himself used the terms strictly to support regionalism. Prat cautioned, however, that too many people used "nation" to signify independence. He saw this micro-nationalism as regression, breaking the state down into smaller "clan" components that civilization had spent centuries of social progress eliminating.

Duran's vision called for creating an ethnic consciousness along the Pratian model, because he felt it necessary to have a personality before that personality could be expressed. But this applied to individuals as well as to whole ethnic groups - at issue here was liberty and individualism within the law. Duran admired countries

57 The term "national" socialism (used long before the Nazis) served to contrast the socialism of one nationality with standard "international" socialism.
58 Bauer, Nationalitätenfrage, 325.
61 Rovira, Els Politics Catalans, 34.
62 Prat, Nacionalitat Catalana, 56 & 118.
63 Duran, Esencia, 77-80. The influence of his father remained apparent.
like Switzerland, which had institutionalized its diversity, because there Swiss patriotism not only admitted these differences but took pride in them, even down to the recognition of Romansch.\textsuperscript{64} Prat was of the same mindset, writing in the prologue to Duran's \textit{Regionalisme i Federalisme} that

\begin{quote}
Liberty represents the principle of the individual, equality the social or collective. The former is variety, the latter unity. For one we have to approach 'anarchy' in the sense of minimum government, while for the other we head towards authoritarianism. Freedom for the French is equality, which absorbs and destroys variety, levels it off and undermines it. English freedom is true liberty, it is 'self-government,' government by oneself, the recognition of men, of corporations, of municipalities, of all social entities: it is the principal of autonomy. In self-government we can find the maximum of liberty with the minimum of limitations. The political organism which systematically realizes this ideal is the composite state, formed from smaller states, associated and federated but with their own sovereignty for their individual internal lives, and with sovereignty delegated (to the greater state) for foreign affairs, the military, trade, individual human rights, communications, currency, weights and measures. The composite state which promotes variety... will have all the advantages small states have, with the force and advantages of a large one.\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

Crucial here were the right type of politicians to carry out such a drastic overhaul of the system. Politicians, Duran believed, needed to display patriotism, a sense of history, and a knowledge of the diversity of their country. Blind patriotism was not enough - they needed to truly understand the variety of cultures, the character of the land and of the people, the structure and requirements of the economy, and the traditions and origins of the whole state.\textsuperscript{66} A politician needed to do for his country what an architect did when restoring a monument: he needed to think about how to "augment its wealth and along with that its economic independence, its culture, its rule of law, its justice, the physical well-being of its people, and the consideration and respect of foreigners."\textsuperscript{67} Not everyone could carry this out: "A man can be an illustrious poet or a universally renowned musician and be a miserable politician."\textsuperscript{68} Spain, for one, was full of bad politicians, from the viewpoint of Duran and many others. In turn, many of the men who tried to dabble in politics at the head of various reformist and regenerationist movements were also, in Duran's opinion, ill-suited for the profession despite being educated and erudite. Only a very few men understood the country's ills and had the right temperament to carry out the required action effectively. Ángel Ossorio, the founder of the Maurist movement, commented that Duran,

\textsuperscript{64} Duran, \textit{Esencia}, 25.
\textsuperscript{65} Prat, Prologue to Duran, \textit{Regionalisme}, 2nd ed., 18.
\textsuperscript{66} Duran, \textit{Els Politics}, 100.
\textsuperscript{67} ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{68} ibid., 100.
in whom a glorious heredity and his own personal merits come together to a high valor, is, fundamentally, a politician. That said, he is passionate, arduous, a capable server of his prejudices, insinuative, and subtle. His book *Regionalisme i Federalisme* brought to the catalanist movement a doctrine - which I do not share - which has nourished a generation, the seed for many other venerables. Prat de la Riba was the dogma, Cambó the impulse and the action, Duran the dialectic.69

Others took their lead from these cues as well. Rovira always maintained that he was merely carrying out the work Prat had started, the nationalization of Catalonia. Rovira’s admiration for Prat and his insistence that he was the political descendent of the Regionalist leader was all the more remarkable because Rovira had always opposed Prat and the *Lliga*, unlike some of Rovira’s nationalist associates who had emerged from the *Lliga*.70 The adapting of Prat’s “nationalism” by true nationalists not only meant the diversion of the regionalist program, but also underscored a fear in Madrid: that regionalism and nationalism were indistinguishable, or that in the very least the former led to the latter. This produced even more fear of regionalism in Madrid than might normally have arisen.71

“Every nation,” Rovira wrote, “has the right to constitute itself into an independent or autonomous state.” But the good nationalist needed to achieve this in a variety of ways, and needed to function within the vigent political structures with good political sense. Nationalism may have been a contemporary problem which called for the fulfillment of history, but it was “not an ancestral call; it is a new word,” created within modern political circumstances.72 Rovira’s nationalist republican ally Gabriel Alomar announced that “the national quality of Catalonia cannot be in doubt. This is not a matter of a right, but of a fact.... Our precise affirmation of Catalan personality is a defense against patriotic and nationalist coercion imposed by the Spanish State as a weapon against the uneasiness and dynamism of Catalonia.”73

Cambó later responded to Rovira’s separatist tendencies: Spain’s regions were distinct, but had grown together through history, and now had a linked

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71 Fernández Almagro, *Catalanismo y República Española*, 47.
73 Alomar, Prologue to Rafael Campalans i Puig, *El Socialisme i el Problema de Catalunya*, 8. In the body of the book, Campalans argued that only the example of an emancipated Catalonia could liberate the other regions of Spain - it would be the duty of the Socialist Republic of Catalonia to redeem the entire peninsula from the oppressor state. Campalans, 47.
interdependence; Catalonia had formed a separate entity with a Mediterraneanean outlook, but history had intervened, and now Catalonia should use its vitality to further Spain. 74 Despite apparent internal contradictions, it could better preserve itself. The Lliga declared in an official document of March 1916 that:

the maximum of cohesion coincides with the maximum of federalism. (Austria, for example, has) more parliaments, more legislative assemblies than all the other states of Europe combined; as many legal, civil, and administrative regimes as provinces; almost as many official languages as languages spoken within its borders.

This, the regionalists said, marked a well-run state. 75

Conservatives agreed. Maura, when he tried to break corruption and the caciques that ran Spanish politics always insisted that a government can only exist with the consent of the governed, and this included recognizing the desires of individuals for their identities. 76 Maura, one of the most controversial politicians of his day, had developed theories that often approximated those of the Regionalists. He thus provided the Regionalists with a formidable ally in Madrid.

Maura had come to Madrid from Palma de Mallorca in the late 1860s to study law. The law department fascinated him, because its faculty considered all of the problems which faced the country at that time in order to analyze them, theoretically independent of bias. The big city and the greater state mystified Maura, but also made him feel ill at ease. He spoke Spanish only with great difficulty - although he read it well - and this caused him problems and public ridicule in front of his classes. One day, after one such embarrassing incident, two classmates introduced themselves and consoled him. They invited him to their home, where a great friendship would develop between Maura and their older brother, the already established lawyer German Gamazo, who would soon enter Parliament as a Liberal representative from his home city of Valladolid. 77

This friendship launched Maura's political career, and gave him the confidence to set himself up in the heart of the Castilian establishment. Although his language started off awkward, studied, and catalanized, Maura quickly grew to become one of the greatest orators of his era. From obscurity, he rose rapidly through the political ranks.

74 Cambó, Per la Concordia, 40. Cf. Almirall, Lo Catalanisme, 77.
75 Lliga Regionalista, “Per Catalunya i l'Espanya Gran,” reprinted in Cucurull, vol. IV, 103.
76 Brenan, 31; Joaquim Maria de Nadal i Ferrer, El Maurismo ante el Problema Catalán, 4.
77 On Maura's youth, by far the best source - and the source on which most other books draw their information - is by Maura's personal secretary, Prudencio Rovira y Pita, Maura, Infancia y juventud. Chapter III describes Maura's university career. Maura later married Gamazo's sister.
He won a seat representing his hometown of Palma in 1881, as an enthusiastic supporter of the Liberal Party’s professed desire for the democratic development of the Constitution. Quickly, though, he concluded that the Party’s leadership, under Práxades Mateo Sagasta, had little interest in furthering democracy, but rather considered the retention of power as most important. Gamazo led a group of Liberal dissidents away from Sagasta, claiming that government had moved away from the people who, through the events of the 1860s and ’70s, had given it its legitimacy. The gamacistas also doubted the viability of its economic policies, which they felt would lead Spain to ruin. Gamazo argued that the Liberals must abide by the Constitution, guaranteeing rights to the people, reforming public administration, promoting culture, and reorganizing the military. To neutralize the dissidence, Sagasta offered Maura a cabinet position in 1888, but Maura would not abandon his friend and ally without good reason. He asked the Liberal President to clarify the economic goals of the Liberal government, but Sagasta would not and could not. Deciding that the existing party had no program to implement, that it was governing for the sake of governing, Maura declined the invitation, causing the government to fall.

Yet for the gamacistas, the Liberal-Conservatives under Antonio Cánovas hardly behaved any better. The system of government in Spain was a system of politicians, not of people, as Maura’s eldest son, Gabriel Maura y Gamazo, described his father’s critique: what mattered was the ideology of preserving that system, the ascent through the party hierarchies, and the “art of conquering power and retaining it, by vote or by fix.” This had irked Francisco Silvela, a Conservative dissident, who resigned his cabinet post in 1891 to protest corruption scandals that had rocked the party. Yet Cánovas was the embodiment of the Restoration system, and no one, not even Silvela, had the audacity to attack him in the Cortes. Maura, in a fit of blistering oratory, caused Cánovas to fall. Yet in doing so, he exposed a glimmer of his future self; in his attack, he used the same ideas, doctrines, and even vocabulary that Silvela had previously pronounced. “He is a very distinguished closet conservative,” the Liberal-Conservative orator Francisco Romero Robledo quipped.

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78 Maura, Treinta y Cinco Años, 222.
79 Silió, Vida y Empresas, 55f.; and Rovira y Pita, Maura, 143.
80 Gabriel Maura, prologue to Maura, Treinta y Cinco Años, 15f.
81 cited in Sevilla Andrés, Antonio Maura, 84
Sagasta now had to accept the gamacistas into his next government in 1891, making Maura the Secretary for Overseas Territories and Gamazo himself the Secretary of the Treasury. Yet this was a show; Sagasta could not commit himself to reforms, and ignored Maura’s proposals for the colonies. Maura already had decided that reforming the treatment of the Cubans was a matter of justice, and that not reforming would result in the loss of what remained of Spain’s empire. Yet many of the island’s representatives in Madrid were actually peninsular Spaniards who had never been to Cuba but who were hangers-on in the Liberal system and had every interest in retaining control but no interest in the actual conditions on the island. Maura proposed granting Cuba limited autonomy and that only representative elections should determine public administration of the islands; all Spaniards would benefit from the territories’ well-being.82

Nothing came of the proposals. The Liberal Party’s elites refused to support Maura, so Maura and Gamazo stormed out of the government in protest. By the time these elites were ready to consider Maura’s reforms, it was too late: the Cuban Revolution led to the Disaster of 1898. Maura could never forgive his party this failure to act. The dissidence of the gamacistas resumed, paralleled in the Conservatives by the silvelistas.83 Both groups wanted much needed reform before Spain’s government collapsed, and Maura vocalized the ideas of both dissident groups. Maura hoped to mobilize the masses to turn this into a positive force: “In Spain there is public opinion to criticize and judge politicians; there is opinion to censure the parties.... But to assist the government, to assist the oppositions, to help these necessary and useful reforms that the country needs, for that there is no public opinion.”84 Only the proper reform of the government, he felt, would allow Spaniards to feel comfortable about exercising their rights of citizenship. “Nothing is so subversive as Spain’s public administration,” he cautioned.85 Reform needed

82 James Durnerin, Maura et Cuba, 199f.
83 Silvela broke permanently with Cánovas and his corrupt system in 1893, with seventeen representatives of his faction in the Cortes. Cánovas tried to limit the damage when the Liberal-Conservatives ran the elections of 1896, keeping the Silvelistas to only ten seats. But this dissedency allowed the opening towards Maura and the disaffected liberals. After Cánovas’ assassination, with his party in dissarray and with the Liberals fixing the elections, Silvela could reorganize the conservatives to form the Conservative Union, while Romero Robledo and others attempted to continue in the Canovan tradition of the Liberal-Conservative Party. Martínez Cuadrado, Elecciones y Partidos Políticos de España, vol. II, 581f.
84 Maura, speech in the Cortes, 8. Jun. 1891, in Maura, Ideario Político, 81.
to take place, and that required a government willing to act, since most merely passed on any new laws unfinished for subsequent governments to delay still further. "The works of the administration," he explained, "are not the works of anybody, because for every project it takes the intervention of seven generations of civil servants and seven party hierarchies before they get accomplished."86 After the Disaster of 1898, the refusal of eighty-eight Liberal dissidents loyal to Gamazo to support the Liberal government caused it to fall, thus making way for the formation of the Silvela-Polavieja government of 1899.

Maura noted how the nineteenth century had seen the resurgence and formation of nationalities - especially in Germany and Italy, the reaffirmation of Switzerland, the domination of the British Empire, and the rise of the United States. He learned from these cases that the economic life and the internal solidarity of the various component elements of society depended on each other. The Spanish State, however, suffered from colonial disasters and a complete lack of internal legitimacy. Regeneration in Spain required not just diverse men with sundry ideas, but mutual cooperation, in which everyone was needed to work together to achieve the changes required in the state. If people did not actively participate, the state could not forge ahead; if people pushed their own ideas without consideration for others, the state would fraction to no one's benefit.87

Spain had at once too much and too little government; while the ministers avoided enacting policies, the country still strangled in bureaucracy, unresponsive and with little popular input. "It is absolutely clear," noted Maura, that the nation's budget is not geared for public services. It is based on the middle-class civil service; it is an interminable series of assignments in order to keep busy those who did not want to, did not know how to, or could not find in industry, in agriculture, in the arts, or in the sciences a better use for their time.88

Administrative reform came foremost on Maura's platform, and to achieve the reform required a responsible government. After 1898, Maura became convinced that if the government could not bring about the necessary changes, that the people of Spain would themselves rise up - a far more destructive scenario, one which he feared would tear the country apart by pitting interest group - social, ethnic, or any other - against interest group, rather than allowing them to all work

87 Maura, speech in the Cortes, 29. Nov. 1901, in ibid., 115-117.
88 Maura, speech in the Cortes, 8. Jul. 1899, in Maura, Treinta y Cinco Años, 436.
together for managed reform: "For this reason I have said and I repeat that the whole of Spain needs a revolution from within the Government, and that if the revolution is not made from within the Government there will be a formidable upheaval." 89

With the death of Gamazo in 1901, Maura became the head of the gamacista dissidents. He broke with tradition in 1902 by announcing that he would consider an alliance with the Conservative Silvela if that would enable the gamacistas, long excluded from power, to have a say in the policies of government. 90 In November, Maura proclaimed in the Cortes his alliance with Silvela; one month later, Silvela appointed him Secretary of the Interior in the new Conservative-led government. It was in that government that he worked to clean up electoral fraud and first launched his Local Administration Reform bill, which included a provision for the formation of mancomunidades as associations of provinces with their own autonomy to develop the economy, preserve culture, and control local administration more efficiently. 91 He first presented the idea to the Cortes after he became the leader of the Conservative Party and himself headed the Spanish government; later, he would succeed in implementing and augmenting the program. The conditions of the system of mancomunidades had grown out of the work of nineteenth century theorists, culminating with Almirall and Prat, and looked to the Catalan Regionalists like a sensible starting point to reunite the four provinces of Catalonia into a single autonomous entity. 92 These projects produced in the period before, during, and immediately after the Crisis of 1898, formed the bases that conservatives and regionalist catalanists would attempt to use to regenerate Spain. When Maura assumed the leadership of the Conservative Party in 1903, the Regionalists figured they at last had someone in Madrid they could collaborate with.

Maura wanted to keep the regions within the Spanish State, and to do so meant to recognize their needs, but to recognize as well the tendency of some to seek secession. These forces criticized him for not offering enough, while centralist forces

89 Maura, speech in the Cortes, 1901, cited in Silió, Vida y Empresas, 73.
90 see Maura's proclamation at the "Valladolid Meeting" of the Gamacista dissidents, 18. Jan., 1902, in Maura, Treinta y Cinco Años, 230.
91 Lliga Regionalista, Les Mancomunitats, viii.
92 see Salvador de Madariaga, España, 251.
thought he was giving away too much. To quiet both groups down, he extended his hand to the catalanists while attacking them:

It is natural that you attend principally to the aspirations of Catalonia, although at times you agree that the accusation of egoism does your intentions an injustice, and just as you do not want to be egoists, it is also natural that you may - and do - say that you ask for Catalonia what you ask for all of Spain and that you announce intentions to launch a crusade through the other regions. Aiding you in this, I tell you that the conviction does not have to come by accident but that it must eventually arrive in your spirit, that you can do nothing and you will soon fail if you do not join us in the national task with the entire Spanish nation.93

Maura had gone on record when the first Regionalists took their seats in the 1901 Cortes against the catalanist nature of the Lliga. This made the Regionalists a local party, one which would never be understood at the Spanish level because it concentrated too much attention on Catalonia. Despite its intentions to regenerate the Spanish state, Maura did not see how the Lliga could succeed. Besides, "a local party which says that within it fit republicans and Carlists, liberals and conservatives, orthodoxies and heterodoxies: what does that mean?"94

Nevertheless, as Ossorio advised, it was necessary for the Maurists to recognize that catalanism existed, and that it could be harnessed as a Spanish force if Catalonia were treated with due respect.95 Maura had wanted to give the people its liberty, and this required promoting good citizenship and an active awareness of politics.96 This was a revolutionary conservatism, based on constitutionalism and prepared to abandon any forces - even, in his last days, the Monarchy - if they failed to support order. The primacy of human liberty demonstrated the inspiration of Anglo-American influences, notably Edmund Burke.97 That the same Anglo-American conservatism influenced Duran y Bas and his disciples certainly helped Maura and the Regionalists see eye to eye on many issues, even if they disagreed on the finer points.

But while the Regionalists were predisposed to work with Maura, the statist Liberals collaborated with the demagogic Lerroux. Lerroux and his Radicals formed the main opposition to the Regionalists from within Catalonia. To these españolistas, all catalanism represented separatism, and they considered the

95 Ossorio, Conversación sobre el Catalanismo, 36.
96 Ossorio, Orígenes Próximas de la España Actual, 187.
97 Manuel Fraga Iribarne, El Pensamiento Conservador Español, 174-178.
Regionalists to be reactionaries. This played well with the Liberals in Madrid, who helped finance Lerroux. Most serious politicians considered the republican cause moribund after the failure of the First Republic. Several republicans, most representing Catalonia, still sat in the Cortes by the grace of Cánovas and Sagasta, the dynastic party leaders, but from there they showed little inclination to attack the monarchy. To begin the revitalization of Spanish republicanism, the thirty-seven-year-old opportunist Lerroux moved to Barcelona in 1901. He set about changing these circumstances in the 1901 general elections, insisting that it was more important for him to organize a republican party based on latent sentiment than even to secure himself a seat. He placed himself before the public, appealing directly to the voters in order to by-pass the official channels which served only to protect the caciquist candidates. In Barcelona, he made the working class voter feel important, and turn-outs in elections began to rise.

In the 1901 general elections he worked for all republicans under the guise of the Republican Union, the core party of Spanish republicanism under the nominal leadership of Nicolás Salmerón Alonso, one of the four presidents of the First Republic. After his successful campaign, though, Lerroux personally began to pursue a much more combative line, which Ossorio would later admire for its candidness, describing "the only serious republican movement that took place during the regency and the rule of Alfonso XIII was the one provoked in Barcelona by Alejandro Lerroux."

Lerroux found that much of his personal support grew only in the non-Catalan working-class neighborhoods of Barcelona and some other small industrialized pockets. While his presence certainly did its part to reawaken republicanism across Catalonia, this support still found itself fragmented into camps: the Possibilists had evolved mostly towards catalanism and had joined the founders of the Lliga, the Federals continued to wander in the countryside, and only the hodge-podge Republican Unionists of Salmerón offered Lerroux his most organized base. But Lerroux found himself on a different footing from most

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98 Ossorio, Mis Memorias, 70.
100 ibid., 41.
101 Ossorio, Memorias, 71.
Republican leaders: most of them were Catalans, even if not catalanists. For the catalanists, then, this created a challenge - the left-wing catalanists tried to press their own views without blending with the centralist sentiment which most republicanism had acquired, while the right-wing of the Lliga found itself a new and potentially dangerous opponent. To stem the tide towards Lerroux, Cambó even suggested “making” a left, in order to impede the growth of a strong left in Catalonia and to give the Lliga an effective ally to attract the masses.\textsuperscript{102} The Possibilist Republicans within the Lliga broke with the party in 1904 over Cambó’s activities, and they indeed did fail to combat either Lerroux’s Radicals or the Regionalists.

Lerroux, in finding a niche in the Catalan political structure being created by the Lliga, had only one obvious path to follow, one entirely hostile to the Regionalists, since the dynastic parties and the remnants of the Republicans offered very little in defining the parameters of the political scene. If the Lliga adopted a degree of hard-core catalanism, had connections with the Fomento, and many of its theorists had traditionalist and clerical roots in their very recent pasts, Lerroux had to oppose stridently all of these tendencies.\textsuperscript{103} Lerroux successfully equated catalanism with bourgeois reaction, and this underscored his españolista republicanism.\textsuperscript{104} But, because of this position opposed to the Regionalists, even Lerroux himself fell under the wing of Liberal Party leader Segismundo Moret, who used money from the coffers of the Interior Ministry to help fund Lerroux’s activities. These ties, along with the corruption that set in as his followers gained elected offices, tainted Lerroux and helped alienate him from many Catalan voters within the Republican Union.\textsuperscript{105} The final break came when Salmerón proposed the Catalan Solidarity movement in 1905 and joined the Republican Union in an electoral coalition with Regionalists and Carlists, as well as other Republicans. A disgruntled Lerroux, who had spent several years resuscitating the Republican Party in Catalonia only to see its nominal leaders desert to what he considered the enemy, would then set up his own Radical Republican Party.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{102} Ossorio, \textit{Memorias}, 122-123.
\textsuperscript{104} Culla, \textit{Republicanisme Lerrouxista}, 31.
\textsuperscript{105} Ossorio, \textit{Memorias}, 71.
\textsuperscript{106} Culla, \textit{Republicanisme Lerrouxista}, 145-146.
Meanwhile, many Catalan republican elements, having seen the failure of the First Republic, especially to bring about Federalism, and disillusioned by central government in general, carried Pi y Margall’s revolutionary doctrines one step further, turning their back on governmental solutions and embracing anarchism in a way that did not usually occur elsewhere in Spain.\textsuperscript{107} This paralleled the response of the capitalist classes, who also had individualist ideas and spurned direct participation in the Spanish governmental system. At the turn of the century, the Catalan anarchist movement found itself aiding any and all anti-state movements, including the *Tancament de Caixes* tax strike of 1899 and later the Catalan Solidarity, though the former had been organized by lesser burgher elements and the latter dominated by the Regionalists. The growing popularity of regionalism and harsh governmental repression kept revolutionary political anarchism calmed for many years, affirming the development of the movement towards syndicalism. These anarchists accepted calls for autonomy, seeing decentralization as a first step towards what they considered democratization. Meanwhile, they pressed the politicians from outside politics for workers’ demands.\textsuperscript{108} However, they did not connect with the agricultural workers, who did not favor the anarchists’ conceptions of collectivism which they considered more appropriate for the large *latifundias* in the south of Spain than for the smaller, mostly leased, holdings in Catalonia which required no more than cooperatism.\textsuperscript{109}

The general strike of 1902 marked the culmination of the social conflicts of nineteenth-century Barcelona, and ushered in a new period of anarcho-syndicalist activity.\textsuperscript{110} Meant to be non-violent, an attempt to change the system, the 1902 strikes fizzled out by the end of February, without the employers having granted any concessions to the workers. Indeed, many employers had actually organized their own counter-unions to work during the strikes, often with a Catholic-syndicalist base. The anarchists determined that they needed to hold more revolutionary strikes, and thus began to become more confrontational throughout the next decade.

\textsuperscript{107} Ricard de Vargas i Golarons, “Moviment llibertari i qüestió nacional a Catalunya (de finals de s. XIX a l’any 1919)” in Joves Historiadors Catalans, *La Història i els Joves Historiadors Catalans*, 366.

\textsuperscript{108} Balcells, “Los anarquistas y la cuestión nacional catalana hasta 1939” in Balcells, Culla et al., *España 1898-1936*, 385.

\textsuperscript{109} Balcells, *Problema Agrari*, 55.

\textsuperscript{110} Vicens Vives, *Industrials*, 189.
The Catalan unions of the nineteenth century fell apart, and were ultimately replaced by the new anarcho-syndicalist groups. The number of bombings, down since the Montjuic trials of 1897, also began to increase again, now more often placed in public spaces and markets, especially along the Ramblas, Barcelona's central promenade, in order to produce more innocent victims than the terrorist bombings of the previous decade which had been aimed primarily at dignitaries or on factory sites. Terrorist incidents increased to a 1907 peak of twenty-eight attacks, which produced at least twenty-six victims.

Yet although the left predominated in Barcelona in this period, it found itself divided. After the 1903 municipal elections, the Republicans held a majority, but due to the way in which the Republicans had been patched together from several splintered groups, rivalry negated much of their power. Initially, the Regionalists saw no other alternative than to obstruct the Republican majority's ability to effect its policies. But upon seeing the conflicts within the Republican grouping, they concluded that the Republicans could achieve little constructive anyway. The Lliga switched its policy and actively cooperated with anyone ready to put into practice the urban reforms Barcelona required. This led to the loose formation after 1904 of what the Republican leader Bastardas called "Municipal Solidarity," which came under the leadership of left-wing republicans with catalanist sentiments such as Bastardas. This allowed for cooperation both with the Lliga and less-radical elements of Lerroux's Republicans. Some of the projects begun by this Municipal Solidarity in 1905 included the ordination of the newly developed district the Eixample, paving and street-lighting, municipal services, refinancing of the city's debt, sanitation reform, and new public schools (especially for deaf, mute, and blind children).

Such movements as these marked the coming of age for Catalan politics, and paved the way for the Catalan Solidarity soon to form. For decades, Catalonia did not have a developed political party-system, because its needs and concerns differed so strikingly from those of the Spanish state in its entirety, and thus the Catalans

111 Ullman, 71-73.
112 Rafael Nuñez Florencio, El Terrorismo Anarquista, 75-76.
113 ibid., 191-193.
114 Culla, Republicanisme Lerrouxista, 77-78.
115 Pérez Bastardas, L'Ajuntament de Barcelona a Primers de Segle, 102-103.
could not adjust to the Spanish party system thrust on them. This meant that Catalans remained apolitical to a degree, expressing themselves mostly through pressure groups which negotiated directly with the government. Once a Catalan party system did develop and inspire enough interest to lure voters to the polls, it produced results startlingly at variance with the overall Spanish results. The same discontent that had long kept Catalans from voicing their political views through traditional parties now began to galvanize these very Catalans to supporting their own parties in a new-styled political system.

But this Catalan party system had to function within the Spanish one if it was to have any effect. It could do this by taking the interventionist approach favored by the Regionalists in which Catalonia could provide the solutions for Spain's problems, or by taking a more nationalist approach which stressed Catalonia's distinctiveness from Spain. Politicians in the center then had to choose whether to accept intervention by Catalans in Spain - which would fundamentally change the political structure of the state - or to fight catalanism through further centralization.

Writing about the Austrian Socialist Party, Rovira had remarked on the example they had set for merging nationalism and socialism. Regionalists, supposed spokesmen for the Austrian Völker, had adopted a stance intended to coincide with their federalist conservative allies in Vienna, in order to preserve, in Rovira's words, "the general solidarity of the bourgeois interests." Thus, in this case, socialism began to address the nationalist as well as the social aspirations of the underclasses. As for the apparent conflict with international socialism, the Brün Conference of the Austrian Socialist Parties 117 in 1899 clarified its goals as "national autonomy and international union." 118 The workers needed to achieve the breakup of these states first before joining the international workers movement. But while Bauer could, in part, reconcile himself with the aspirations of micro-nationalist socialists - in his model, the Czechs - he still asserted his own culture's superiority. 119

117 at this conference, the unified Socialist Party formally split into constituent parties representing the Völker.
119 Czech nationalism had arisen from a once-strong regionalism that had opposed the Revolutions of 1848 and had underscored the "natural inequality of men" (natürliche Ungleichheit der Menschen). But worst of all, Bauer mocked, the Czechs most important in the so-called "reawakening," Palacký
The coincidence of nationalism and socialism would lead to Bauer's ideal unity of interests, and in such a way the two had to be compatible; thus Bauer stressed macro-nationalism when it served the workers' benefit. Bauer's "nation" resulted from the process of integration that had formed the modern state. Formerly, the state had been embodied purely by identification with the feudal and then proto-capitalist ruling classes. In fact, Bauer, in one of his more macro-nationalistic moods, blamed the rise of ethnic identity on a conservative plot: conservatives wanted many differences between individuals to keep them separate and powerless. A "language of national unity" (Nationaleinheitssprache, as opposed to Staatssprache) was crucial for solidarity and progress. These had then dictated culture and identity to the people, and so created the Nationalitätenfrage. Breaking down what these classes had wrought - removing differences between the common men - became the goal of social democracy in light of the problem that Bauer, as an Austrian, faced, and needed to address even more than most of his political comrades elsewhere in Europe. Occasionally he expressed his views in a manner favorable to micro-national assertions of autonomy, and at other times he appeared completely macro-nationalist and unitarist. But many of his ilk had tried to explain these apparent contradictions through the language of whatever happened to coincide best with the interests of the proletariat.

With either interpretation of socialism, however, regionalists represented the greatest enemy. The left saw in them the agents of conservatism, not of ethnicism. Characterizing Cambó as "not a realist spirit," Rovira accused the Catalan regionalist leader of lacking two essential traits necessary for politics: a fixed orientation and the ability to grasp human realities. Rovira's realities essentially stated that the common man had two loyalties: to his nationality and to his economic class, while the conservatism of Cambó denied both. From the other side, centralizing macro-nationalism also felt threatened by regionalism. Miguel Primo de Rivera, the dictator who ruled Spain from 1923 to 1930, claimed that he could not distinguish regionalists, micro-nationalists, and separatist extremists - while they might speak in included, had all written primarily in German. Bauer, in such passages, clearly had no tolerance for minorities. Bauer, Nationalitätenfrage, 233f.
120 ibid., 164.
121 ibid., xxvi f.
122 Rovira, Politics, 156.
different terms, he felt they all sought the same ends: "Those, who upon achieving the 'nation' do not seek to achieve the state, would not be good nationalists."\textsuperscript{123}

Duran had argued that the only way for regionalism to function would be for all ethnic groups to pass their loyalty to a non-ethnic state. But this would never work, he argued, when the component groups feared each other.\textsuperscript{124} Indeed, once antagonism began, it proved difficult to hold back polarization. The regionalist Old Czechs and their allies tried to reconcile the different ethnic groups, but this engendered sharp agitation from the German-speaking Left, which in turn shifted the balance of Czechs into the Young Czech camp. By 1891, the compromise had failed. A similar situation would undermine compromise in Spain. Although the \textit{Mancomunitat} was enacted and had begun to fill many of its goals, tensions nevertheless increased. After 1918, when anti-Catalan demonstrations in Madrid forced the Catalan delegates to leave Parliament, Catalan separatism suddenly began to increase its credibility.\textsuperscript{125}

Regionalism's characteristic dynamics, then, opened it up to its own failure. These arose in two aspects of its project: its emphasis on dual loyalty to ethnic \textit{Volk} and greater state, and its alliance with the conservative parties of the central government. In that nationalism asserts the identity of one group apart from others, any attempt at compromise with other ethnicities placed in doubt the commitment of the regionalists to their own ethnic identities. Often, the compromise had conservative overtones, seeking the preservation of law and order while decentralizing power into the hands of the regionalists themselves, who usually also supported a capitalist economic structure. But these forces did not represent the masses, and as such could not legitimately survive once the proletariat gained class consciousness. Once the masses also underwent a revival of ethnic consciousness, nationalism, too, would eliminate the conservative forces of regionalism.

\textsuperscript{123} quoted in the \textit{Dossier}, 41. By "nation," Primo meant "consciousness of nationality."
\textsuperscript{124} Duran, \textit{Regionalisme}, 39f.
\textsuperscript{125} Cucurull, vol. IV, 170.
IV. The Catalan Solidarity movement, 1905-1908

It has long been recognized that the Catalan Solidarity movement broke the domination of the caciques on Catalonia and allowed the Lliga to spread its influence across the region. What has received less attention is the way in which the Lliga leaders conceived this movement as a means of reorganizing the party system to make it one in which they could operate and bring about their goals. At precisely the time when the Lliga's reorganization forced them to make their goals more specific and defined, they could use the Solidarity to broaden their base both in terms of popular support and ability to shake the system parties. New parties began to form and old parties to reorganize or redefine themselves in response to the Regionalists and the Catalan Question.

The split of the left wing from the Lliga in 1904 had left a core of its leaders - Francesc Cambó, Enric Prat, Lluís Duran, Josep Puig, Raimon d'Abadal, and Narcís Verdaguer, as well as many of its financial backers from among Catalan industrialists and other sectors of the bourgeoisie - convinced that the best way to achieve their aims would be through opportunistic cooperation from within the political structures of the Spanish state. Antoni Maura, head of the Conservative Party, had shown himself eager to undertake what they considered necessary reforms, respected their concerns, and appeared a man with whom they could reason. With Maura their friend in Madrid, the Regionalists found they could launch a major offensive as the best defense of their own goals, continuing to promote catalanism in Barcelona while advancing their conception of regenerationism in Madrid.1 Cambó would later explain that the whole notion had emerged from the lessons learned from the failure of the Catalan movement which had supported the regenerative plans of General Polavieja in 1899: "a profitable action for our land cannot be the work of a single group, nor can it be the work of a sole part of Catalan opinion."2 The Regionalists needed to broaden their movement by politicizing Catalans and channeling their intensity towards cooperation with each other and with sympathetic elements in Madrid.3

1 Claudi Ametlla i Coll, Memòries Polítiques, 223.
2 Cambó, Catalunya y la Solidaritat, 10.
3 ibid., 11-12.
After internal tensions in the Conservative Party had caused the government to fall in early 1905, a Liberal government dominated by the ideological successors of Práxedes Mateo Sagasta came in with little plan for how to tackle Spain’s politico-economic troubles. By failing to act much, they effectively energized their own opposition, and set the foundations for Maura’s return to power in 1907. No sooner had the last election of 1905 passed than trouble emerged in Barcelona that would dominate political debate for the duration of the Liberal government and create in Catalonia momentum for the movement which Cambó and the Regionalists had sought. To celebrate their unexpected success in the Barcelona municipal elections of November, the Lliga held a Victory Banquet, which itself became the backdrop for a political cartoon in Cu-cut, a satirical magazine - in this case poking fun at the Spanish military. The weekly thought little of this cartoon, placing it in reduced form in a corner of an interior page. The army focused on it, however, took offense, and sacked the offices of Cu-cut and of the Veu, causing several disturbances in the Barcelona streets. The Liberal government imposed martial law on the city, before ultimately passing the Law of Jurisdictions, which gave the military the power to court-martial civilians it accused of insulting the “patria,” in early 1906. The policy of the Liberals directly provoked Nicolás Salmerón, the leader of the Republican Union, to propose, and Cambó to organize, the Catalan Solidarity movement.

To be fair, regionalist publications, particularly Cu-cut, had baited the military for years, and this final cartoon proved one provocation too many, especially for a garrison that was gradually finding itself less and less comfortable in an area of Spain increasingly promoting its non-Castilian identity. In part to gain popular support and to make satire from the extremes, Cu-cut had often blurred the distinction between regionalism and strident Catalan nationalism, heightening the cleavage the army felt existed over the definition of “patria.” As tensions between catalanists and the military mounted, the cartoons became more frequent, without the military having legal recourse to defend itself until after the passage of the Law of Jurisdictions.

4 Romero Maura, Rosa de Fuego, 392.
5 Pla, Obra Completa, vol. XXV, 263.
6 Romero Maura, The Spanish Army and Catalonia, 13f.
After the incident, Cambó accompanied the Regionalist Senator Carles de Camps on the train to Madrid. During the night, they drafted a speech de Camps would read when the debate on the suspension of constitutional guarantees opened in the Senate. With his old ties to the silvelista dissidency within the Conservative Party, de Camps had long before befriended Maura, and on arriving in Madrid he went with Cambó to visit the leader of the opposition, who wished them luck. While de Camps proceeded to the Senate, Cambó initiated negotiations with Segismundo Moret, who had a claim to the leadership of the Liberal party and a personal rivalry with the then President of the Council of Ministers, Eugenio Montero Ríos. Moret surprised Cambó by blaming the Government - which his own party formed - for not controlling the army and thus causing the current crisis. Cambó, hopefully and diplomatically, appealed to Moret’s classic liberalism to oppose such reactionary measures as Montero had taken. Moret did not commit himself. He had struggled with Montero after Sagasta’s death to succeed the Liberal leader, and here saw his chance to win the upper hand. By taking a firm stance on the issue of Catalonia, Moret saw the possibility of winning the support of the uninspired party ranks and displacing Montero from power. In the Cortes, Moret took a harder line than Montero, and his strategy for personal gain paid off.

Salmerón, himself an immigrant who had never shown any particular sympathy for the catalanist cause, stood up in the Cortes against the suspension of constitutional guarantees in Barcelona, and his words shook the parliament:

> In Catalonia there is the representation of a patria which remains hidden because Spanish repression does not know how to tie together the sentiments of Spaniards.... Catalans: do you agree with me that we need to bring peace to Catalonia? Do you wish that catalanists and republicans should go arm-in-arm through Barcelona in order to say: Our ideas may differ, our opinions may diverge; but we are going to set them forward and express them in the holy and harmonious bosom of our common Spanish mother?

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7 Pla, 266.
8 Cambó, Memorias, 111.
9 ibid., 114.
10 Carlos Seco Serrano, Alfonso XIII y la Crisis de la Restauración, 69.
11 Indeed, Salmerón found it difficult to begin an anti-military campaign when he himself had broad ties to the military, he lacked the juridical power to bring those individuals responsible for the events of November twenty-fifth to trial, and he had always shown a degree of repugnance towards catalanism. Nevertheless, he had learned from the Regionalists of the possibility for electoral combat against the system and for the use of Catalonia as the basis for a campaign for Spanish regeneration. Canals, Cuestión Catalana, 257-258.
Salmerón had proposed the Catalan Solidarity and had taken the Regionalist representatives aback. Francesc Albó i Martí, the Lliga’s parliamentary spokesman, sent the Regionalist representative Josep Bertran to consult Cambó, present in the gallery. With Cambó’s nod of approval, Albó accepted Salmerón’s offer “for the social peace of Catalonia.” 13 Maura stood up, and addressed the Liberals sarcastically: “Now you have done it!” 14 Of the Madrid politicians, Cambó later remarked, only Maura grasped immediately the consequences of this moment. 15 Cambó believed that Moret, succeeding Montero as President of the Government, must have had some inclination, and Cambó feared that Moret might have given orders to the police to have Cambó secretly arrested and killed. The Regionalist leader fled to Toulouse, where he met up with Puig and Joan Ventosa, who had also fled, and remained there for several days until the danger passed. 16 On the train back to Barcelona, Cambó drew up an electoral map of Catalonia, assigning candidatures to each district to capture the largest possible vote in favor of the newly formed alliance in any future elections. Arriving in Barcelona, he gave his plans to the poet Ferran Agulló, the Lliga’s master campaign secretary, who began organizing the necessary grassroots support across Catalonia. When the general elections were held sixteen months later, the candidature showed few changes from Cambó’s original master-plan. 17

The birth of the Catalan Solidarity, loosely grouping Regionalists, Carlists, and some republicans from the Catalan representation in the Cortes to oppose the Law of Jurisdictions, ultimately produced some major political results: it caused the elimination of the Republican Union as a party, extended the electoral appeal of the Lliga to the rest of Catalonia via this party’s dominant role within the Solidarity, and ended the control of the caciques in Catalonia. 18 Yet it failed in its one initial reason for existing: the Liberal majority in the Cortes succeeded in passing the Law of Jurisdictions; adherents of the Catalan Solidarity had lost the specific project on which they had cooperated. Cambó proposed that these groups form a permanent

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13 quoted in Camps, Història de la Solidaritat Catalana, 33.
14 Pla, 268.
15 Cambó, Memorias, 115.
16 ibid., 116. Cambó claimed that his suspicions about this incident were confirmed to him several years later by Canalejas.
17 Pla, 270.
18 Romero Maura, Spanish Army, 29.
electoral coalition seeking autonomy for Catalonia and the transformation of Spain. An anonymous article in the *Veu* crowed that

After a series of memorable campaigns to disperse the good news throughout Catalonia, to strengthen the political action of catalanism, and to increase the integral strength of the Catalan reawakening, that manner of thinking, which like a platonic ideal we have scattered in our articles and discourses and like a future stage of our evolution we have foretold, has converted itself into an ideal with immediate possibilities for realization. In a memorable meeting held at the headquarters of the *Lliga Regionalista*, the stirring words of Cambó proposed (this action), and the enthusiasm of good Catalans sanctioned (it).20

The streamlined, post-1904, *Lliga* was far more effective at influencing a greater number of people than it had previously been. The Regionalist leaders could do what they had wanted since before the founding of the *Lliga*: invigorate Catalan politics and use Catalonia as the catalyst for the political regeneration of Spain.

The Regionalists came to direct the Solidarity because of the inhibitions of the Federal Republicans, the submission of the historic Republicans to the *Lliga*’s lead, and the difficulties the nationalist republicans were experiencing in trying to establish their own electoral base.21 An executive committee met at the house of the industrialist Albert Rusiñol, titular president of the *Lliga*, although he himself did not participate: present were Cambó (representing the *Lliga*), Jaume Carner (the nationalist republicans), Amadeu Hurtado (the independent republicans), Miquel Junyent (the Carlists), Domèneç Martí i Julià (the Catalanist Union), Josep Roca i Roca (the Republican Union), and Josep Maria Vallès i Ribot (the Federal Republicans).22

Despite the supposed coordination of the new electoral coalition, the Catalan Solidarity never produced a concrete program until the 1907 general election campaign. At that time, all groups still only agreed unanimously on the need to repeal the Law of Jurisdictions - every other matter caused some degree of controversy and reflected the varied composition of the group.23 The former caciquist representative Josep Elias de Molins wrote at the time that “the Solidarity, as long as it brings together political parties of such opposed ideals, will only be a transitory amalgam of elements, and cannot survive intact for long.” It lacked, Elías argued, fundamental principles, and stood only as a protest movement without a

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19 Sabaté, 49-50.
21 Ametlla, 259.
definitive plan. Indeed, the Catalan Solidarity only ever seriously existed as a parliamentary compromise - other than at the 1907 provincial elections in Barcelona, its components never fielded a joint slate at anything except parliamentary elections. Those provincial elections served as an experimental case - to test the viability of a complete joint candidacy at parliamentary elections. Indeed, the Catalan Solidarity did rope together diverse groups that felt uncomfortable in each others' company. But uniting such a broad segment of the Catalan political spectrum produced general euphoria.

Cambó put himself in charge of running the 1907 election campaign with no objections from his Solidarity allies. The Carlists, the smallest element of the movement, needed the patronage of the Lliga to boost their influence, while the Republicans were divided: the Federals weak, the Unionists undergoing a crisis with a large component unwilling to support Salmerón's entrance into such an alliance, and the nationalists still under-organized despite their natural position to lead this movement with both republican and catalanist identities. The executive committee met regularly through the spring of 1907 to work out possibilities for assuring a majority to Solidarity candidates and to divide the seats fairly amongst the component parties. In Barcelona, the Solidarity hoped to win not only the five majority seats but also, through tactical voting, to capture the two seats reserved for the minority. Even when his hectic schedule caused Cambó to fall ill, he continued to direct these meetings from his bed. In the end, the agreed official candidature named fifteen Regionalists, six Carlists, six Republican Unionists, six Federals, five nationalists, and four independents. Cambó conceded that all the parties had to make sacrifices for the Solidarity to work, especially in dividing up the candidatures. The Lliga had to give up its hard-won seat in Vic, for example,

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24 Josep Elias de Molins, Catalunya, la Solidaridad, la Monarquía, el Regionalismo, 13-14.
25 Albertí, 268.
26 ibid., 235f.
27 ibid., 237.
28 Most parliamentary constituencies were single-member. Several large cities, however, were organized as “circumscriptions” - multiple-member constituencies. Barcelona sent seven representatives to the Cortes, but each voter could only vote for five names, thus allowing minority parties to win two seats. The Lliga calculated, though, that with the amount of support the Solidarity could muster in Barcelona, tactical voting would allow voters in each electoral district to vote for five of the seven Solidarity candidates while still providing each with enough overall votes to capture all seven seats ahead of the opposition candidates.
30 Albertí, 238-239.
handing it over to those it had spent the last several years quashing. But, Cambó told members of the *Lliga*, such a policy would be beneficial for the party, since it served to benefit Catalonia as a whole and thus extended the *Lliga*'s power.\(^{31}\) A victory for the Solidarity, Ventosa explained, would not be the victory of a party but rather of a pre-constitutional movement, a "spirit of tolerance," and a "Spain enlivened, informed by Catalan spirit, a learned, new, and civilized Spain."\(^{32}\) The Carlist chief Juan Vázquez de Mella telegraphed Cambó, congratulating him on the selection: the Catalan Solidarity was "not only the work for the restoration of Catalonia but an example for the other regions and a true enterprise (of) public vitality. It will come out from the frontiers of Catalonia and will extend itself across the peninsula, forming a strong and free Spain. Forward without hesitation: Long live Catalonia!"\(^{33}\)

The mass followers of the Republican Union were not so impressed, however. Inspired by Alejandro Lerroux, who had done so much to revive the party’s fortunes in Barcelona, they could not understand how Salmerón could suggest and enter into an alliance headed by the Regionalists, and share a stage - as he indeed physically did - with industrialist leaders like Rusiñol and Carlist leaders like Manuel de Llanza i Pignatelli, the Duke of Solferino, whom Salmerón publicly embraced.\(^{34}\) This smelled of betrayal, and Lerroux cried foul. Only a few days before the 1907 general elections, one of Lerroux’s followers attempted to assassinate the old Republican president, firing into his carriage as he left a campaign rally in the working-class Barcelona neighborhood of Hostafranchs. The bullet instead struck Cambó, riding in Salmerón’s coach. Severely wounded, Cambó fought for his life in the hospital, and remained out of the political scene for half a year. The public outpouring of sympathy helped seal the Solidarity’s success. Lerroux, however, doubted the seriousness of Cambó’s injuries, and even years later was convinced that the Solidarity merely wanted to exploit the incident for political gain.\(^{35}\)


\(^{33}\) Vázquez de Mella, telegram to Cambó, cited in Camps, *Història de la Solidaritat*, 87.

\(^{34}\) Salmerón’s famous embraces of Solferino and Rusiñol took place on May twentieth, 1906 during the Great Feast of the Solidarity, a ceremony staged by Cambó to honor those parliamentarians who had voted against the Law of Jurisdictions. It was widely reported in all of the next day’s press.

\(^{35}\) Lerroux, *Memorias*, 432.
Lerroux’s actions over the preceding year-and-a-half had placed his personal followers in direct and open conflict with the Republicans who had followed Salmerón into the Catalan Solidarity, and the assassination attempt at Hostafrancs was merely the extreme culmination to the tension that had ruptured the Republican Party in Catalonia. If the party leaders had joined in this new movement, a good part of the working class - syndicalists, socialists, anarchists, and Lerroux’s own personal following - remained outside the Catalan Solidarity. Only days after Salmerón suggested the idea in the Cortes, Lerroux stood on record in support of exactly the opposite of what the movement stood for:

- Castilians, who form one third of this population (of Barcelona), did not dare to speak aloud on the Rambles, because the separatist beast cynically mocked their language.
- Some army officer was chased down and beaten on the public streets.... I say that if I had been a soldier, I would have gone to burn (the offices of) the Veu, Cu-cut, the Lliga, and the bishop’s residence at the very least.

In the preceding decades, Barcelona had suffered from repression, tragedies, and disasters, yet no Solidarity movement had formed, Lerroux fumed. But when an army, come home after an unfortunate war, defended itself and was granted by law the power to judge insults and remarks made against the patria, only then did the Solidarity form. In its first year of existence, the Catalan Solidarity - Republican component and all - was already helping the Conservative Maura even though, in Lerroux’s opinion, the movement had yet to make up its mind as to what all its sundry components could agree on. If it indeed fought caciquism, it appeared to do so in order to establish its own electoral hegemony, expecting Carlists to vote Republican and Republicans to vote Carlist. Lerroux thought the whole notion absurd. If catalanism had emerged as a movement of the conservative and bourgeois classes, then the worker had to be, by definition, anti-catalanist. One commentator noted that Lerroux’s proposal was “to alienate the working masses from catalanism, as if autonomy and workers’ rights were incompatible; a false supposition, considering that workers make up the greater part of the membership of our Athenae and Orfeo (catalanist cultural societies).”

If the Solidarity presented itself as the embodiment of Catalonia, Lerroux had to look for an alternative ideal for forces opposed to the Solidarity: the concept of

38 Lerroux, “Yo y la Solidaridad,” reprinted in Marcel Riu, La Rematada, 2-4.
39 Riu, Clar y Català, 5.
Spain linked his radical republican followers, the followers of the eccentric independent republican Joan Sol i Ortega, the Liberals, and the soldiers stationed in Catalonia. Now, he did not need to attack so much the conservatism of the Lliga, but could rather question the “separatist” tendencies of the entire movement.  

When the Solidarity showed an interest in other regions of Spain, lerrouxists asserted, it was only to aid anti-Spanish groups such as the Basque nationalists.

“There goes Puig i Cadafalch,” one lerrouxist cried, the most vile injurer of the Spanish soul, distilling his venom in the Veu; Cambó, the most cynically ambitious subject Catalonia has ever seen; Prat de la Riba, who writes little letters of anti-Spanish propaganda, filled with the most miserable lies; the evil Rusiñol, applying all the emptiness of his head to think up and repeat the foolish and discredited spurs of incitement; and, finally, the wackos of the Initiative for National Idleness [Fomento de la Holganza Nacional], making an anti-Spanish face no sooner than they try to win themselves a ‘second column.’

This was the new company Salmerón kept, and this the lerrouxists did not understand: the Solidarity movement would inherently be unstable and unscrupulous for want of common ground.

Salmerón, faced with Lerroux’s violent stance, expelled the young rabble-rouser from the Republican Union. This act undermined the last vestiges of the old republican presence that had had its roots in the First Republic, and opened up the possibilities for the formation of new republican parties. Since the various republican groups that won seats representing Catalonia sat in Parliament with the Catalan Solidarity, the Republican bench was left greatly reduced in 1907. In this vacuum, a moderate republican from Asturias, Melquíades Álvarez González, layed the foundations of what would become in the next decade the Reformist Party, while Lerroux formed his own Radical Republican Party. The actions of the Lliga were having major ramifications on the Spanish party system, something the Regionalists desired because the new parties would represent true opinions rather than the traditional personal rivalries and factions.

Outside the umbrella of the Republican Union, Lerroux could expand his base, tapping the anarcho-revolutionaries in Barcelona and the Republican Unionist

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41 B. “Becefe” Calderón Fonte, La Mentira Solidaria, 16. This view was held by many Liberals, as well. Cf. Baron de la Torre (Civil Governor of Guipuzcoa), letter to Moret, printed in the Pueblo Vasco, 22. Apr. 1906, ArchRom 18/2.
42 Emilio Navarro, Separatismo Solidario, 15.
43 Calderón, 16.
remnants in the rest of Spain which disapproved of the Solidarity alliance. Lerroux's forces were badly routed in the 1907 general elections, and Lerroux himself lost his seat and with it his parliamentary immunity from prosecution. Fleeing to France, he felt let down by the whole affair.

To a degree, however, the Lliga exaggerated the lerrouxist peril. While Lerroux may have drawn from a base of non-Catalan workers and functionaries who lived in and around the city of Barcelona and in other very small and contained industrial areas, he found little support throughout most of Catalonia. His electoral struggle, then, was to capture the five majority seats for Barcelona - which, out of Catalonia's forty-four, amounted to a small percentage - and to win control of the Barcelona city government. Many workers chose to remain aloof from such political squabbles, looking out for their economic interests in the manner that Catalan pressure groups had done for decades. The Autonomous Center of Commercial and Industrial Clerks (CADCI, founded in 1903), for example, took neither side. Although it often agreed with Lerroux's stances on class issues, it found itself usually left-catalanist in cultural contacts and had the financial support of the Regionalists, especially championed by Abadal, to fund its scholastic and excursionist groups which stressed many of the ideals held in esteem by the romanticists of the Renaixença. Lerroux himself did not even control the bulk of the workers' movements. The Worker Solidarity movement formed in 1908 from the collaboration of syndicalist elements among socialists and anarchists, while many anarchists, preferring to hold out for a revolutionary general strike or armed insurrection, remained aloof from even this early union. Worker Solidarity was internationalist, and its leaders, notably Antonio Fabra Ribas, thus approximated españolista positions when faced with catalanism. But, in order to distinguish themselves within the social and cultural climate of Catalonia, these leaders had to adopt pragmatic tactics and distance themselves from the Madrid based socialists of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the General Union of Workers

44 García Venero, Melquidades Álvarez, 181.
45 Lerroux, Memorias, 292.
46 Alberti, 286-287.
47 Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, Catalanisme i Moviment Obrer, 10f.
48 Xavier Cuadrat Ciurana, Socialismo y Anarquismo en Cataluña, 318-322.
(UGT) by showing a much more strident and uncooperative vehemence.\textsuperscript{49} Terrorist bombings began once again to increase, and Lerroux found that by adopting a much more extreme vocabulary he could attract much anarchist support to the Radicals.\textsuperscript{50}

Meanwhile, many republican intellectuals found themselves within the Catalan Solidarity, trying to attract their own segments of the population towards catalanism. Carner, Joaquim Lluhi Rissech, and Ildefons Suñol (then President of the Barcelona Athenaeum), with journalistic support from the \textit{Poble Català}, founded the Nationalist Republican Center (CNR) in 1906.\textsuperscript{51} Carner announced at the inaugural session that the new group intended to "republicanize catalanism and catalanize republicanism."\textsuperscript{52}

Although becoming the first political organization of Catalan republican nationalism, the CNR still had trouble establishing for itself an identity apart from the \textit{Lliga} which its members had abandoned in 1904. Nationalist Republicans continued to sit with the Regionalists in the municipal government, and the \textit{Poble Català} endorsed the \textit{Lliga}'s candidates for office for lack of a separate nationalist electoral organization, which the CNR was slow to adopt.\textsuperscript{53} But Carner dismissed the contention by members of the \textit{Lliga} that the CNR could have little impact within the framework of the Solidarity.\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, the new CNR appeared inside the Solidarity, but the Solidarity itself was not a political party proper. "No," Carner explained, "within the Solidarity we guard our own convictions and we respect the particular convictions of others."\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{49} Xavier Cuadrat Ciurana, \textit{Socialismo y Anarquismo en Cataluña}, 331-334.
\textsuperscript{50} Connelly Ullman, \textit{Tragic Week}, 105. Perhaps the most famous declaration Lerroux made during this confrontation was his article "Rebels, rebels!" - a plea to his "Young Barbarians" for violent action. "Young Barbarians of today, enter with glee into the pillaging of the decadent and miserable civilization of this country, destroy its temples, finish off its gods, lift up the veil of its novices and elevate them to the category of mothers to virify the species, break into the property registers and make bonfires out of their papers so that the fire might purify the despicable social organization, enter into humble dwellings and lift up legions of proletarians, in order that the world trembles before their awakened judges. It is necessary to make everything anew.... Go on, go on.... Do not hesitate not even before the tombs, not even before the altars." Lerroux, "¡Rebeldes, rebeldes!" \textit{Rebeldia} (Barcelona), 6. July 1907, reprinted in Ucelay (ed.), vol. II, 51.
\textsuperscript{51} ibid., 232; Ruiz Monjón, \textit{El Partido Republicano Radical}, 60f.
\textsuperscript{52} ibid., 232; Ruiz Monjón, \textit{El Partido Republicano Radical}, 60f.
\textsuperscript{53} Silvia Tusell Gómez, "Los Nacionalistas Republicanos de 1904 a 1914," in Joves Historiadors Catalans, \textit{La Història i els Joves Historiadors Catalans}, 284.
The *Lliga*, in its guise of cooperating with conservative central forces, could not appear to sanction its republican and nationalist allies. Agulló warned Prat early of the need to keep the Catalan left under control. Prat later admitted the terms of "nationality" and "nationalism" employed by the CNR, but stressed that the *Lliga* had never intended to choke dissenting opinions and wished to cooperate with other groups for the betterment of Catalonia and of Spain. He wrote in the *Veu* that we have never wished to link the salvation of Spain to forms of government or predetermined institutions, believing that citizens worthy to be called such have to contribute their thinking and their force of direction to the society in which, by choice or by chance, they live. We have believed and still believe that it is a duty to fight within the established regime, within constitutional legality.

Prat still harbored mistrust towards those who had broken away from the *Lliga* in 1904 and who now tried to form a nationalist republican party within the Solidarity. He felt that the *Lliga*'s leaders had been clearly consistent throughout their political lives, and this had led them to take stances in agreement or at variance with almost every other group:

Those who (broke away) legitimized their actions with more or less specific accusations that the *Lliga* was conservative, monarchic, and maurist. Time has passed and... the *Lliga* has followed, without deviation, without hesitation, and without doubt, the same road as ever, with the same means as ever, with the same attitude and with the same criteria as ever.

The members of the CNR, now that they had come back under the Regionalists' umbrella, might be inclined to make trouble once again by criticizing the *Lliga*'s policies and its willingness to cooperate with Maura, just as they had in 1904, in an attempt to wreck the *Lliga*, although without bringing in their own positive contribution to the political debate. This would hamper the Regionalists' goal of reorganizing Spanish party politics, and had to be opposed.

Those Nationalist Republicans who had had personal differences with Cambó in 1904 continued to feel strongly about him, and even tried to have him removed from the candidature for Barcelona in 1907, suggesting that the "more respectable" Abadal might be more appropriate. Abadal himself objected to this. Barcelona was the flagship candidature for the Solidarity, and Cambó needed to appear on that city's ballots since he was the spokesman of the movement. "It is a question of dignity for the *Lliga* and for our entire program," Abadal insisted. Anyway, Abadal considered himself too unhealthy to guarantee his effective participation in the

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parliamentary debates, and thus preferred to take a seat in the Senate. Indeed, not all the Republican members of the Solidarity felt strongly opposed to Cambó's presence. The Catalan Republican Unionist Junoy, upon arriving in Madrid, woefully lamented Cambó's absence at the head of the Solidarity representation because of his convalescence after the assassination attempt. In a broken and unsure Catalan, Junoy wrote to Prat: "Cambó is without substitute. Without wanting to offend everyone else, his disposition, culture, talent, and good will leave me without a doubt that our illustrious friend has a clear mission and vision of our task." Indeed, Cambó forever remained upset at the scheming the Nationalist Republicans did in Madrid while he was convalescing, and he credited such old republican foes as Junoy and Valles for not joining the Nationalist Republicans in their personal attacks against the Regionalist leader.

The young Antoni Rovira i Virgili, who had come to Barcelona from Tarragona and to political catalanism from an extreme left Federal Republican background, took over the editing of the *Poble Català* during the Solidarity period. He encouraged a more radical tack, galvanizing the younger generation to take a more active part in reorganizing the Catalan left along politico-electoral lines. "We nationalists," he wrote in early 1908, are the most interested in giving a positive and modern orientation to our movement.... If the extant forces of the left in Catalonia do not satisfy this critical need of the times, our splendid democracy - yes, indeed, splendid - will find itself eternally condemned to be a decorative mob, and to serve as the brilliant masquerade of the forces of the right.

Cambó asserted in the Cortes, nevertheless, that "the Solidarity is a great force precisely because we who compose it are distinct. The parliamentary grouping of the Solidarity represents all Catalonia, because it represents it in all its variety of guises." Ventosa, propagandizing for the Solidarity in Extremadura, concurred:

I have to tell you, gentlemen, that the Catalan Solidarity movement has been neither a movement of political conjunction nor much less an electoral coalition.... The Solidarity movement that unites the priest and the atheist, the poor and the rich, the wise and the ignorant... has a strong idealistic component, a broad sentimental community, which is none other than love for Catalonia, the proclamation of regional autonomy.

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60 Emili Junoy i Gelabert, letter to Prat, 2. May 1907, ArxPrat.
61 Cambó, *Memorias*, 140.
64 Ventosa, speech in Badajoz, quoted by J. Alsina Bover, *España Regionalista y el Movimiento Catalán*, 44n.
These Regionalists had succeeded in uniting quite diverse groups which they then directed, diffusing much opposition to themselves within Catalonia but leaving their new supporters in conflicting circumstances, in effect seconding the Lliga's Madrid policy while disagreeing with the Regionalist worldview.

For this, Lerroux criticized the Solidarity. While it succeeded in uprooting caciquism in Catalonia, it had replaced the old system with a new electoral hegemony, which had allowed the right big gains: the Lliga expanded its power base and protected and advanced the position of the Carlists. The Lliga's supporters argued, in turn, that if the Carlists had won influence, more numerous republican components had won proportionately more, showing that the Solidarity was not a closed shop. Lerroux objected to the Lliga's support of Maura, but again this policy was defended because of Maura's talk of the Solidarity's gains as "decentralization well understood."65 To Conservative forces in Madrid, the Catalan Solidarity was clearly the movement to deal with, since it had emerged in favor of public order in response to a Liberal government that had lost control of that order.66 Cambó agreed with this maurist view that Catalan politics were the same as Spanish politics because Catalonia suffered for the same reasons Spain did. Spain needed to restore and maintain public order, and for that reason Catalonia could not win its autonomy suddenly. Rather the Regionalists had to cooperate within the system to gradually win Catalonia the status they desired for the region and with this status create the benefits they desired for Spain.67 Cambó tried to lead the Solidarity movement in this direction, but not all of his allies agreed with this moderated stance.

For a while, though, the Solidarity achieved huge success in setting the tone of debate in Madrid. By mid-1906, Moret, the Liberal President of the Council of Ministers, already saw the difficulties the system he cherished and upheld would suffer, writing his personal secretary that "from Catalonia I have bad news. There they are preparing all sorts of catastrophes for our country."68 José Canalejas, leader of the dissident Liberal Democrats, addressed Salmerón and the Solidarity

65 Riu, Rematada, 11-12.
68 Moret, letter to his private secretary, 31. Aug. 1906, quoted in Romero Maura, Rosa de Fuego, 380n.
representation in the Conservative Cortes of 1907: "I, a Spanish legislator, representative of Spain, have to know what is a nation; I have to know what Spain is.... I am Spanish; I am the son of my Patria. Spain? I refuse to define it; Spain is Spain in all its national intangibility, in its geographic frontiers." Not even such dissident Liberals were prepared to work with the Catalan Solidarity. Nor were such republicans as Álvarez who had voted with the Solidarity against the suspension of constitutional guarantees in 1905 and again against the Law of Jurisdiction in 1906. Spain was to him, although an Asturian, the creation over time of Castile, and Catalonia could not be allowed to dominate the Spanish political scene: "With these ideas come separatism or national dissolution." Count Romanones, Secretary of the Interior in two of the six Liberal cabinets between 1905 and 1907, and a member of two other cabinets in that period, defended the government's treatment of the situation in his personal notes: "The Liberal Party has done nothing in Barcelona other than to defend its program, the intangibility of the patria, and the inviolability of the institutions. If the solidarios fight us over this, then all the worse for them."

With such hostility in Madrid, and the lag between the formation of the Solidarity in 1905 and the next general elections which brought its immense representation to Madrid in 1907, the components of the Solidarity had to first begin work at more local levels. An opportunity presented itself in 1906 when the mayor of Barcelona fell ill, and the radical Hermenigildo Giner de los Ríos became acting mayor. Duran began the assault on Giner, arguing that it would be better for Barcelona to have its royally appointed mayor than to have a radical tainted by corruption and anti-catalanism. Even though the Solidarity technically only encompassed parliamentary cooperation, the Lliga began to attempt to attract all prestigious councilmen towards the Solidarity and thus bring them under its influence. The pressure on Giner mounted until he resigned and was replaced by Albert Bastardas, a notable Republican Unionist and longtime friend of Prat. Bastardas served as acting mayor for most of 1906, and he and Duran led the drive to make the post of mayor a democratically elected office. This effort failed, but when

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69 Canalejas, quoted by García Venero, Melquiades Álvarez, 184-185.
70 Álvarez, quoted in ibid., 188f.
71 Romanones, notes s.d. [1906?], ArchRom 12/14.
72 Pérez Bastardas, L'Ajuntament de Barcelona a Primers de Segle, 78-80.
the government appointed a new mayor, Domèneç Joan Sanllehy i Alrich, the council agreed to cooperate with him only in as long as he recognized the overall authority of the council. When Sanllehy attended his first council meeting, Bastardas and Duran read him a proposal advocating once again the free election of the mayor, that this case be taken up by the Cortes, and that other city councils throughout Spain second their motion.73

Nothing came of the motion, and Sanllehy continued on as Mayor. But when he had to travel to Madrid at the beginning of 1908, Bastardas once again became Acting Mayor. This created a difficult situation on the King's Saint Day, January twenty-third, when tradition dictated that the City Hall and Provincial Government had to fly the Spanish flag and decorate their façades with floral wreaths and artificial lights. Bastardas, a stickler for the law, noted that the law merely required the flying of the Spanish flag and said nothing about the other traditions. As a Republican, Bastardas also had no desire to celebrate the King's holiday. He insisted that not displaying flowers or lights was not a matter of discourtesy towards the King, but rather a perfectly legal and democratic interpretation of the law.74 Although Prat, then President of the Barcelona Provincial Government, decorated that building across the Plaça Sant Jaume, Bastardas' failure to follow tradition on his side of the square created discussion in Madrid and hastened Sanllehy's return to Barcelona. But the Barcelona City Council had won its administrative autonomy.75

The next local controversy to surface came with the debate over the so-called "Cultural Budget of 1908." The main issue of contention was the inclusion of funding for the city government to establish new public schools. The expansion of the public school system fitted both the Regionalist and the Republican agendas: good schools made good citizens who could be good voters and good contributors to society. Yet while both groups agreed on this issue's importance, they disagreed on the specifics. The issue of public schools in Barcelona highlighted one of the main difficulties the Regionalists had, both during the Solidarity and afterwards: while the Lliga often collaborated with political groups of all hues to achieve its general goals,

73 Pérez Bastardas, L'Ajuntament de Barcelona, 295-299.
74 ibid., 141-142.
75 ibid., 143-149.
its sensibilities on the specifics of issues put it at variance with the groups it needed to collaborate with. Therefore, although its organization facilitated its success in collaborating with broad groups, the Lliga would often have difficulties bridging the ideological gaps between its diverse allies.

In this case, three problems developed: whether instruction should be primarily in Catalan or Spanish, whether or how religion should appear in the curriculum, and whether the schools should be co-educational. The final proposal determined that classes should be taught in Catalan, although all students would be expected to completely master Spanish and Spanish-speaking children could receive exemptions from studying in Catalan provided they learned the language; the schools would be religiously neutral, with one afternoon a week of optional religious instruction by the Church; and some schools would be co-educational and others single-sex, allowing parents a choice. The budget also payed teachers and administrative staff; provided facilities for classes in music, drawing, gymnastics, and manual work; and funded libraries in each school. Catholics protested against co-education and the down-grading of religious studies; monarchists fretted about the implications such a system had in confirming municipal autonomy from Madrid; and Carlists, hardly a dominant force in Barcelona, complained that the Solidarity movement ignored their opinions in that city. But as the City Council was composed of only Regionalists and Republicans (of both sorts - Radicals and Nationalists), the councilmen soon came to their consensus on all but the religious issue, which held the project up. The Lliga leaders, not wanting to upset the Solidarity movement in a Republican stronghold, advised passage of the project, although it did not dictate to its members how to vote. Duran and five other Regionalist councilmen voted in favor, while five Regionalists voted against. These latter were joined by one Catholic sitting in the Regionalist ranks and one Radical Republican who called the project too separatist and not anti-clerical enough.

76 Camps, El Pressupost de Cultura 1908, 13-20.
77 ibid., 25-28.
78 ibid., 30-35.
79 ibid., 41.
The project established a precedent for the autonomous action of the Barcelona City Council in policy areas at variance with the government of the central State, and showed that various groups of widely different hues could collaborate on a single project and be respectful of each others' opinions. Sanllehy, however, became a casualty of the debate, when he decided that the debate created too much fractious tension and he cut it short, refusing to approve the final project. With this decision, the Council passed a startling motion of censure - carrying out the threat it had made when Sanllehy arrived in 1906 - and refused to work with the Mayor, forcing him to resign. In his place it elected Bastardas, who became the first democratically elected Mayor of Barcelona, drawing on the support of the "Municipal Solidarity" he had long worked for between Republicans and Regionalists on the Council. Maura, noting the popularity of Bastardas and the efficacy he had shown in producing compromises and results in his years on the Council, approved of the new choice of Mayor and the democratic manner in which it was made. In turn, Bastardas was willing to cooperate with Maura, even receiving members of the royal family on their trips to Barcelona in return for Maura's recognition of de facto municipal autonomy. Only the Radical Republicans protested. The Barcelona City Council had imposed itself on the central government, an astonishing feat.

In another development of 1908, a Royal order in January granted the Barcelona City and Provincial Governments the right to form a joint commission to study ways of limiting terrorist activity in the city. Puig had spent some time in London and Paris during the previous year on a fact-finding trip observing how other cities dealt politically and governmentally with anarchist terrorism. In part on Puig's recommendation, the joint commission hired Charles Arrow, an English detective from Scotland Yard, and his presence in Barcelona inspired a wave of protest from working class groups. However, after the apprehension and

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80 Camps, El Pressupost de Cultura 1908, 56.
82 Pérez Bastardas, Republicans Nacionalistes, vol. I, 181-185. However, some of this enthusiasm cooled when the King himself returned to Barcelona and proved unable to speak any Catalan as he had promised he would when he last visited in 1904. Pere Vilanova, "Exèrcit, crisi colonial, i catalanism en la Setmana Tràgica," Avenc, May 1977.
84 Jardi, Ciutat de les Bombes, 47.
execution - amid protests - of Joan Rull, a police informant, anarchist terrorism decreased sharply, and the ploy proved temporarily successful.85

While the Republicans controlled the City Government, the Lliga had greater direct say in the Barcelona provincial government, especially after Prat became its President in 1907 thanks to the cooperation of the Solidarity parties.86 No sooner was he elected, than Prat unfurled his grandiose plans for the province, for Catalonia, and for Spain. “We cannot forget,” he announced in his acceptance speech,

that the Province of Barcelona is not a natural organism and is a fragment of a living body called Catalonia, and we have the duty to create the solidarity of this province with the sibling provinces of Catalonia, putting at their service all our forces. What is more, there is another solidarity to create: that of our provinces with the others in Spain.87

Within Barcelona-Province, Prat established commissions to look into the possibilities for building secondary railways, for reforming the schools system, and for promoting Catalan cultural, linguistic, and literary institutions.88 This would be no passive provincial administration.

A year before, in 1906, Prat had already initiated a project assembling in Barcelona provincial representatives from all over Spain to discuss common administrative problems. This was part of the Lliga’s ongoing efforts to use the politics they promoted in Catalonia as a catalyst for the regeneration of all of Spain. To Prat, discussing provincial governments themselves was not worth the effort, since he considered the provinces artificial creations which broke down the ancient regions of Spain. Instead, the assemblies of November 1906 dealt with reform of the entire administrative system.89 Prat hoped to regenerate another regional layer of government, open closer relations between these governments in different regions of Spain, and spread the regionalist ideology to other parts of Spain.90

85 Jardí, Ciutat de les Bombes, 48-52.
86 After the 1907 elections, where the Solidarity picked up thirteen of the sixteen contested seats (six for the Lliga, three for the CNR, three for the Republican Union, and one for the Carlists, the non-Solidarity seats going two for the Radicals and one for the Liberals), Solidarity forces controlled the Provincial Government (eleven republicans within the Solidarity, nine Regionalists, and four Carlists, against an opposition of three Liberals and two Radicals, while seven Conservatives split between cooperation and opposition). As one of the leaders of the Regionalists, Prat became the natural choice to become President, a post he would be reelected to until his death in 1917. The Vice Presidency and First Secretary of the Provincial Government went to the CNR, while a Conservative took up the post of Second Secretary. Camps, Història de la Solidaritat, 72f.
87 Prat, cited in ibid., 76.
88 Ainaud & Jardí, 61.
89 ibid., 49.
90 Olivar Bartrand, Prat de la Riba, 200-201.
These actions underlined the Regionalists' Spanish policies. They had tried to dominate the debate within Catalonia, and then to export their ideas to the rest of Spain. At the beginning of 1906, in a pamphlet ghost-written by Prat, the Regionalist senators and representatives in Madrid announced that regionalism was growing throughout Spain and that all the political parties were beginning to deal with the issue.91 "In Catalonia," Prat wrote, "there is no longer anybody who is not a regionalist. They disagree only in the extent, but the regionalist ideal is common to all Catalans." The Regionalists, then, had the duty to convey this to the rest of Spain.92 With regionalism, each region could solve its own particular problems in its own fashion. These could best be accomplished individually, rather than communally by a standardized central government.93 Duran, observing the debates in the Conservative Cortes of 1907, concluded that "only strong regions and living municipalities can create and maintain a vigorous State."94

Duran had previously written of the need to make Barcelona into the de facto political capital of Spain, using its vitality to reshape the whole country:

Here will be concentrated - and not for a moment but for a long duration of time - the total political life of Spain, that will drag it out of the miseries and drowsiness of the impoverished Madrid political scene, in order to take on real politics, arrayed in vigorous manifestations and sincere feelings of all the people.95

Duran clearly wanted the Catalans to hijack Spanish political life under the leadership of his party.

Most of the rest of Spain, however, did not find itself inspired by this strategy. When Solidarity members went to promote their ideas, the crowds found them too

91 The document was published in Spanish with the signatures of all the senators and representatives, with Rusiñol's name first: Rusiñol et al., La Cuestión Catalana. The Regionalist Senator Carles de Camps wrote to Maura that the document was crucial in order to remind other Spaniards that catalanism was not necessarily separatist. "It is my feeling," Camps wrote, "that this is a step so that our movement may lose the character of exclusivism that it indeed had until now. If this document only half-succeeds, perhaps it can become the point of departure for other developments" including the future collaboration of the Regionalists with the monarchic parties. Camps, letter to Maura, 11. Jan. 1906, ArchMaura. Maura's eldest son, Gabriel, was, incidentally, in charge of overseeing the political organization of the remnants of the Conservative Party in Catalonia at the time, where he sought to assuage the concerns of conservative elements, many of whom were now supporting the Lliga. Emili Riu, letter to Gabriel Maura, 20. Dec. 1905, ArchGMG 103/3.

92 Rusiñol et al., Cuestión Catalana, 6-7.

93 Andalucia needed to address the agrarian question and transform its latifundios; Catalonia had to consider industrial reorganization, the social question, and anarchism; Galicia had to deal with the excessive division of property and mass emigration; Castile had to look into usury and depopulation of the countryside. All regions required public works projects, institutions, education, economic development, and cultural activities, "to elevate themselves in such a way to become intensely living members of a great State." Rusiñol et al., Cuestión Catalana, 20-21.

94 Duran, A les Cortes Espanyoles, 15.

intent on considering purely Catalan issues. In Valencia, republicans, notably Rodrigo Soriano y Barroeta, formed a "Levantine Solidarity" expressly anti-Catalan, insisting that that region's agricultural and marine export bases precluded any common ground with Catalan industry and interest in internal Spanish markets.96 When Pompeu Fabra visited the Basque Country, he also found the Basques uninterested in the Catalan Solidarity - he thought the Basque nationalists too obsessed with their racial theories to consider the Catalans worthy equals, while they needed to use racial characteristics to distinguish a people which for the most part no longer spoke Basque.97 A Solidarity trip to Galicia in September 1907 perked up spirits, as Ventosa, Vallès i Ribot, and the Republican Unionist Odón de Buen y del Cos, later joined by Vázquez de Mella and the Nationalist Republican Felip Rodés i Baldrich, were well received. Carner, the Nationalist Republican Pere Coromines, Junoy, Cambó, Frederic Rahola of the Fomento, and Vallès i Ribot also made a successful visit to Menorca several days later.98

Yet Madrid politicians doubted that Catalans could act out their own politics in Madrid. Either Cambó had to lead the Regionalists back to Barcelona to work at lower levels of government, or the Lliga would have to desist as a catalanist party. Even at home the Lliga had not solidified substantial direct (non-Solidarity) support outside the provinces of Barcelona and Girona. Would the other two provinces, these centralists wondered, even want to join in a Catalonia recreated through Maura's proposed administrative reform?99

Yet outside their specific power-base, the Regionalists were winning important allies. Joan Garriga, a follower of Canalejas from Lleida, became the only dynastic candidate to stand for the Solidarity in the 1907 general election. He found the movement "neither retrograde nor anti-Spanish" and felt that it sought solutions positively by taking into account a wide range of views.100 For Garriga, the Solidarity was an instrument to change the political orientation of Spain without changing the country itself.101

97 Pompeu Fabra, letter to Duran, 15. Apr. 1906, ArxDIV.
99 Royo, Problema Catalán, 214-216.
100 Garriga, La Cuestión Catalana, 5.
101 ibid., 37.
But fissures began to appear as soon as a mostly-recovered Cambó first arrived to take his seat in the Cortes in the Fall of 1907. Maura, understanding the importance of the Solidarity movement, determined to launch his Project for Local Administrative Reform immediately when the new Cortes opened. Since this project covered the fundamental issues that concerned the Solidarity, this would force the Catalan movement to debate its issues on its ground. This project dominated the three years of the Maura government, especially as it considered the very problems the Solidarity wished to address. Nevertheless, the project carried conservative elements which substantial parts of the Solidarity considered distasteful, and herein grew the ultimate rift in the movement on whether or, if so, how much to cooperate with Maura. Thus, when Cambó arrived in the Fall, debate had already begun. Suñol had already begun the Solidarity’s opposition in the fall session, when Cambó spoke. Although his catalanist rhetoric created a splash, he showed himself predisposed to collaborate with Maura. His lurch towards Maura opened a crack for the Liberals to begin to deal directly with the Catalan left.

The leaders of the Solidarity met to discuss Maura’s proposals, and decided that Cambó was best placed to serve as the intermediary between the Conservative President and the Solidarity movement. Maura accepted many of their suggestions, and in turn, Cambó argued, the Solidarity owed him help to get them passed or, at the very least, the more radical members of the Solidarity should keep quiet until the parts they did approve of - notably the law of mancomunidades - were safely passed. This would prove the Solidarity capable of affirmative politics. Yet the Liberals began to agitate across Spain, encouraging complete opposition to all parts of the project. Cambó’s collaborationism was written off as another example of the Lliga’s maurism, and mocked for desiring Catalan autonomy without giving up ambitions on the Spanish political scene.

Indeed, the Lliga did offer to broad segments of Catalan society the possibility of participating directly in and actually determining Spanish politics without having

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102 Pla, 291.
103 Ametlla, 258.
104 Cambó, Catalunya i la Solidaritat, 48-50.
105 Camps, Història de la Solidaritat, 210-212.
to pass through the traditional pressure groups.\textsuperscript{106} Even the \textit{Fomento} published a document in which

forgetting its traditional distance from all political questions, today (the \textit{Fomento}) assists in the Cortes, showing its criterion in respect to the project of law concerning local administration, a project that even when it has come out of the blows of political struggles, affects in a most important fashion the normal and secure course of economic life in Spain.\textsuperscript{107}

Nevertheless, the \textit{Fomento} objected to Maura’s purely legalist criteria for determining provinces and other local boundaries which did not consider natural economic needs.\textsuperscript{108} Here the \textit{Fomento} even refused to consider historic, cultural, and linguistic criteria that were so important to the Solidarity, but rather placed perceived economic interests foremost, arguing that for Maura to ignore economic foundations for administrative reform doomed the full growth of Spain’s wealth.\textsuperscript{109}

But even Maura, the maurist Civil Governor of Barcelona Ángel Ossorio asserted, considered the project of \textit{mancomunidades} as merely a partial solution, in which the administration of Spain would be invigorated from its lowest levels to improve the government of the entire state: starting at the municipalities, moving to the provinces, through the \textit{mancomunidades} to the central state.\textsuperscript{110}

Maura felt that the Spanish masses were fundamentally conservative, provided that they were given the opportunity to express that conservatism through responsive and responsible government. This meant doing away with the elitist Canovan party structure and creating a new Conservative Party based on instilling the duties of citizenship.\textsuperscript{111} To dispel fears, Maura clarified that his law of \textit{mancomunidades} was nothing new, that it merely affirmed in the provinces powers they already latently had. The new law would simply underline their abilities and duties to carry out better government.\textsuperscript{112} Between 1907 and 1909, the project dominated the Cortes. The Congress heard 2,950 speeches on the subject and considered 1,387 amendments; the Senate heard 707 speeches, and considered 551 amendments.\textsuperscript{113} The opposition from the center was immense, but Maura and his

\textsuperscript{106} Riquer, “La Lliga Regionalista o els límits del catalanisme conservador,” in Termes et al., Catalanisme, 118.

\textsuperscript{107} Fomento de Trabajo Nacional, \textit{Informe sobre el Proyecto de Ley de Administración Local}, 3-4.

\textsuperscript{108} ibid., 6-7.

\textsuperscript{109} ibid., 8-9.

\textsuperscript{110} Ossorio, \textit{Conversación sobre el Catalanismo}, 35.

\textsuperscript{111} Ricardo de la Cierva, \textit{La Derecha sin Remedio}, 154.

\textsuperscript{112} José Gascón y Marín, \textit{Las Mancomunidades Provinciales}, 97.

\textsuperscript{113} Colomines, \textit{Catalanisme i l’Estat}, 190-191n.
supporters agreed on the need to bring about this law not only to improve administration in general, but also to settle the Catalan question, thereby reincorporating the Catalans into active Spanish political life so that a developed Catalonia could help regenerate Spain just as the Catalan Regionalists themselves had insisted. 114 Although the other regions may not have manifested their identities to the extent that Catalonia had, they still, in this view, suffered just as much as Catalonia from the same injustice of bad government from Madrid. 115

Yet Duran expressed concern that Maura’s project did not properly consider Catalonia’s personality. But, at least, he credited Maura with trying to find a solution to the Catalan problem. Many nineteenth-century governments had discussed administrative reforms, but had never accomplished any. At last, Duran thought, a government had come to power in Madrid at the same time as a concerted regional movement had arisen in Catalonia. 116 “Never,” Duran wrote from his observation of parliament in Madrid, “has any government found itself in such a favorable point for a truly national work. And the Liga Regionalista can certainly not explain itself if it loses such a beautiful occasion to realize such a similar work of good government.” Importantly, though, the Liga needed, while cooperating with Maura, to convince the President of the fundamental importance of Catalonia’s regional identity. Simply, Maura’s mancomunidades were merely temporary pacts, easily broken, which did not take into account the permanency of the historic regions. 117

From the Catalan left, Lluhi Rissech echoed that Maura’s project merely redistributed bureaucracy without allowing the regions any personality of their own. This made Maura, in Lluhi’s opinion, just as much an absolutist and centralist as those before him. 118 If the provincial mancomunidades did not inherently recognize the regions, then regional identity would come at the unpredictable whim of the Council of Ministers. 119 Suñol attacked Maura: “In the first place, we ought to

114 Silió, El Regionalismo en Castilla, 7.
115 ibid., 27-31.
116 Duran, A les Corts, 4.
117 ibid., 5.
object to your project for law in which you have absolutely ignored the existence of one of the most intense national realities: the existence of the region.”

The Catalan left tried to figure out Maura’s game. “Is it,” Sunol asked, “that once the regions are recognized by law they will modify the essence of your centralist and assimilating State? Ahah! Then if you fear this, I will tell you with all clarity that we do indeed seek to do this, to transform profoundly and radically the manner of being and the manner of functioning of the centralist State.” While the project looked useful in parliamentary theory, Sunol did not see how it would work in reality. He especially mocked Maura’s plans to put debt-ridden municipalities under the tutelage of others. While this aimed to produce fiscal responsibility and spread out the benefits of good government, Sunol did not find that it took into account the varying circumstances of different towns. Barcelona, for example, had run a budget deficit because of the events of the last few years, mostly out of the control of the Barcelona city government. Nevertheless, if Maura carried out his plan letter for letter, he would have to annex Barcelona to its small suburb Sarrià, a town which had no deficit. Such a suggestion produced harsh laughter throughout the Cortes.

Even Maura’s Civil Governor Ossorio recognized the differing circumstances Barcelona experienced from other cities in Spain. When Juan de la Cierva y Peñafiel, the Secretary of the Interior, drew up guidelines for reforming municipal services and social problems, Ossorio wrote directly to Maura to explain that la Cierva should not be able to impose such reforms on Barcelona. Maura passed the letter to la Cierva, who reported that Ossorio had explained the reasons that they advised not to impose such reforms on Barcelona, a cosmopolitan city, but also one with peculiar traditions - the ‘hecho diferencial’ about which so much has been spoken and God knows where it will take us. But... I authorized him to go about applying the reforms and instructions gradually, in the manner he thought convenient to do so, taking into account his own determinations.

La Cierva had recognized the differing political development in Catalonia when he had run the 1907 general elections; he needed to ensure a conservative parliamentary majority while writing off any influence in Catalonia where he

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122 Sunol, same speech, in ibid., 102-103.
123 Sunol, same speech, in ibid., 111-115.
124 la Cierva, Notas de mi Vida, 132.
realized the Solidarity would pick up virtually all of the seats.\textsuperscript{125} Maura approved that la Cierva not interfere in Catalonia, even if the Conservatives could win some seats there, because he hoped to "domesticate" the catalanists, bringing them into the fold of the Restoration parties; the best way of accomplishing this, Maura proposed, would be to let them extend their power base throughout Catalonia and in this way imbue them with political responsibility.\textsuperscript{126} Ossorio had written Maura after several months in Barcelona that the remnants of the Conservative Party, especially the younger generations, felt alienated by Madrid politics. He thought it was necessary to use this force to aid Maura's new program, thereby renewing the Conservative Party in Catalonia and attracting to it the Regionalists.\textsuperscript{127} Ever the legalist, Maura hoped to lure the catalanists into the constitutional framework - the Regionalists into the Conservative Party itself.\textsuperscript{128}

With the Liberal party divided between the groups loyal to Moret and Montero Ríos - successors to Sagasta, and the Liberal Democratic dissidents loyal to Canalejas, the Conservative majority and the Solidarity became potentially the only effective forces in the 1907 government.\textsuperscript{129} This gave Maura the platform to seek a broad compromise between the various political elements, which policy the Catalan Solidarity agreed with, to recreate a Spain using natural forces without sacrificing the actual state. Maura also hoped to eliminate the personal assaults on power that had destroyed his previous presidency in 1904.\textsuperscript{130} Yet had Maura's administrative reform bill been a party measure, Gabriel Maura opined, it would have passed easily due to the Conservatives' overwhelming majority. It was not a party measure; indeed, the bulk of the Conservative Party was not maurist, and the livelihood of the party elites still depended on caciquism and central control. Hence the need for Maura to look outside the party, especially to a third party such as the Lliga at the head of the Solidarity.\textsuperscript{131} "What was the attitude of the (Maura) Government when faced with this tempest (the Solidarity)?" Ossorio asked.

That which corresponded to the clairvoyance and the nobility of Maura: refrain from all intervention and allow the people to go about its work. To put itself in opposition to

\textsuperscript{125} la Cierva, Notas, 80.
\textsuperscript{126} Royo, Problema Catalán, 237-240.
\textsuperscript{127} María Jesús González Hernández, Ciudadanía y Acción, 13.
\textsuperscript{128} G. Maura & Fernández Almagro, Por Qué, 120; García Venero, Antonio Maura, 126.
\textsuperscript{129} la Cierva, Notas, 80; Hurtado, vol. I, 128.
\textsuperscript{130} Hurtado, vol. I, 128.
\textsuperscript{131} Ullman, 50-51.
a positive, certain, and respectable social current would have been notable for its
crassness, and trying to mediate this civic action would have produced a revolutionary
explosion. To open the vents and allow all of that torrential downpour to channel itself
towards Madrid was to situate the case in the heart of Spain. The results are visible.
The aspirations of the Catalan autonomists were made compatible with their
intervention in national politics.\textsuperscript{132}

However, as the philosopher Miguel de Unamuno Jugo pointed out, Catalonia was
the most politicized region in Spain. Reforming administration did not figure
foremost in the minds of most other regions, the populations of which remained for
the most part separated from real political decision-making.\textsuperscript{133}

Under these circumstances, the debate in Madrid produced many speeches,
but did not actually produce any agreement. Cambó later concluded that Maura
owed his failure in part to his legalism which had required him to break the project
for law into many little and specific articles which, by parliamentary rules, allowed
the \textit{Cortes} to debate each detail rather than consider the plan as a whole.\textsuperscript{134} As time
passed slowly and Cambó worked more and more closely with Maura, rifts began to
open ever wider within the Solidarity. Ossorio predicted for Maura that with the
Solidarity divided on many issues, the Catalan left would begin to radicalize. This
would drive the Regionalists definitively into the Conservative camp, which was, of
course, one of Maura's objectives.\textsuperscript{135} The Solidarity had come about to combat Moret
and the Liberals. Now, with Maura and the Conservatives in power, the movement
was less necessary, and Maura knew this. He looked to bring about its end without
destroying its vital elements.\textsuperscript{136} Maura, Abadal insisted in the \textit{Cortes}, did not
understand the Solidarity. It was not a sudden, recently created movement, Abadal
demonstrated, but one which had gradually been forming in Catalonia for many
years. Maura should have realized in his 1904 visit to Catalonia that the Catalans
were intent on manifesting their identity. If Maura proposed to have the Catalans
join the system parties, then perhaps he did not understand the Catalan situation.\textsuperscript{137}
Or perhaps he understood it too well, since the members of the Solidarity began to
behave as he and Ossorio had predicted.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[132] Ossorio, \textit{La España de mi Vida}, 46.
\item[134] Cambó, \textit{Memorias}, 145.
\item[135] González Hernández, 13.
\item[136] ibid., 162.
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This conflicted with Cambó's wishes for the future of the Solidarity. Cambó sought to make the Solidarity into a single political party, even while he acknowledged the differences between the Regionalists, the Nationalists, and the republicans in the movement who were not nationalists. But Cambó realized that he needed to capture the working-class vote in order to stave off Lerroux, and thought that absorbing the Catalan Left would assure the hegemony of the Regionalists in Barcelona and thus throughout Catalonia, from which secure power base they could launch their campaign throughout Spain. Meanwhile, Moret made overtures to the Catalan nationalist Left within the Solidarity, even offering up a ministry in a future Liberal government if it would break away from the Solidarity. This ploy did not work, since the Catalan nationalists still viewed cooperation with Moret's Liberals as treason to the catalanist cause. But the very existence of the Solidarity was having the effect Cambó desired: influence over the governing parties even if the Solidarity itself could not rule Spain.

Cambó viewed the Solidarity as something more than a simple movement. While it had come about as a protest (and therefore a negative) movement, Cambó hoped that under his direction it would become the affirmation of Catalonia. Cambó, Duran later summarized, "was never a negative person." Centralists worried about this trend, believing that the Lliga wanted to create fanatics more than a political party in itself, because those fanatics could then be more politically powerful. Despite the moderate words of the Lliga, the movement was bound to radicalize. The Lliga already dominated politics in Barcelona, and the Solidarity was rightly seen by these Madrid insiders as the stepping stone for the Regionalists to capture Catalonia and then to export itself to the rest of Spain in order to govern from Madrid in its own way. The Regionalists and their allies were taking over Catalonia, and driving the dynastic parties to extinction there. Elements in both dynastic parties now had to come to grips with this scenario, and work with any kindred elements they could find within the Catalan party system.

139 ibid., vol. I, 144.
140 ibid., vol. I, 145.
If the *Lliga* achieved this reaffirmation of Catalan distinctiveness through the Solidarity movement, it also let that movement escape it. Once Catalonia had achieved a vibrant political identity, it entered into the realities of politics-at-large.

The Regionalists, Suñol wrote Carner, carried out without saying it, and even denying it, decidedly conservative politics. They affirm that whoever disagrees with them - that is to say whoever wishes to be catalanists and at the same time liberals and republicans, whoever wishes to concern himself with other political and social problems - is a dissident. Remember that this is the word that the *Veu* always uses when it speaks about us.

Suñol continued that the *Lliga* had needed to create a catalanist left in order for the name “Solidarity” to make sense. But within the Solidarity, that left was not free to actually take up any socio-political concerns actually on the left. As long as the Catalan Left failed to act on these feelings, it lost support among the working classes, who were beginning to show some support for those republican groups which did address their class interests, although these groups were also anti-catalanist. Therefore, Suñol felt the time had come to act:

> If democratic catalanists continue the way they are now, a powerful anti-catalanist bloc will form. The *Lliga* will capture, once again, a great part of the middle class. The great electoral struggles will repeat themselves between conservatives (catalanists) and democrats (anti-catalanists), and the (Catalan) left will be cornered and useless. The only hope that remains is for the *Lliga* to suffer a terrible defeat and sacrifice its love for itself and the interests of its party (you'll see how difficult this is) and convince itself that the most convenient thing is to favor the creation of a powerful and truly catalanist left.144

The inclusion of corporate suffrage in Maura's project provided the Catalan Left with its opportunity, and ultimately undid the whole Solidarity movement. Even Duran criticized this plan, which he saw as impractical. Maura had formed his corporations horizontally, based on the intellectual community, the industrialists, the workers, and the property-owners. All votes, then, had to pass through a government-controlled medium, and this could produce, Duran feared, a new type of caciquism. Duran did not think it an entirely bad idea; he simply did not see how it would work in practice to produce the type of representative and active government Maura proposed.145 At first, only Junoy spoke out against it from the left. But when it became clear that Cambó had accepted corporate suffrage, his personal rival Carner joined in opposition, bringing with him the CNR. The groups worked out a momentary compromise with Maura, calling for universal male suffrage at elections up to the provincial level without renouncing the system of

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electoral colleges Maura had devised. But soon after, the campaign against corporate suffrage took off in Catalonia nevertheless. At its head was Salmerón himself, in the last year of his life, whom Cambó discounted “at this time now that he is half-cadaver,” backed up in the pages of the Poble Català. Soon the lerrouxists joined the fray, while the Liberals began to agitate across Spain, obliterating the entire project over this issue.146 By including corporate suffrage in the Law of Local Administration even though the two had nothing to do with each other, the leftist Joaquim Cases Carbó wrote in the Poble as early as December 1907, Maura would effectively produce a great dilemma for the Catalan left over whether to cooperate with Maura on this issue or to risk destroying the Solidarity movement.147 Cambó later commented that the Catalan Left was indeed looking for such a pretext: it needed to establish itself as a proper party in Catalonia but could not appear to have destroyed the Catalan Solidarity for risk of losing its electoral support. By opposing Maura’s project over the inclusion of corporate suffrage, it could distance itself from Cambó, undermine the Solidarity movement, and still retain its supposed base. It forgot, however, that Carner and Suñol, too, had actively proposed corporate suffrage as recently as when they defected from the Lliga in 1904.148

The motion to repeal the Law of Jurisdictions also caused controversy within the Solidarity. Maura could not accept that the term “immediately” figured in the motion, arguing that no government, even one disposed to take an action, should be dictated to by a minority group. He would accept the motion without the offending word, but none of the components of the Solidarity other than the Lliga agreed. Cambó acted as intermediary, but failed to get the left wing of the Solidarity to agree to remove the word. In an effort to hold the group together, Cambó, as the Solidarity’s parliamentary spokesman, actually found himself arguing the Catalan left’s case in the Cortes.149 Garriga, the former Liberal Democrat in the Solidarity, commented later that “this occasion was when I most admired Cambó. He argued in defense of a proposition he believed was in error with the most formidable discourse.” Cambó’s remarkable speech won him personal accolades and held the

146 Cambó, Catalunya i la Solidaritat, 51-59.
148 Cambó, Memòries, 148.
149 Garriga, Memòries, 170.
Solidarity together for a little longer, but, by keeping the word “immediately” in the
text of the repeal motion, the catalanists ensured that the Conservatives would
defeat the motion and keep the Law of Jurisdictions intact. As Cambó continued to
cooperate with Maura, the fissures in the Solidarity grew. 150

Maura had wanted to establish himself as a statesman - to reinvigorate
parliament, reorganize local administration, implant reforms - but many on the
Catalan left saw these as mere words, doubting he could fulfill his promises: a man
of order, of tradition, and of the system could not succeed in the reforms he had
brought up. 151 “Either Maura’s reform will adapt itself to the needs of nature and of
life,” Lluhi concluded early on, “or it will fall defeated in the Parliamentary
debate.” 152

Maura got credit from the Catalan left for trying, but still it feared the man
and the movement that followed him. In the opinion of Gabriel Alomar, Maura
was better than those who had come before him, especially than the Liberals who
had abandoned him over his plans for Cuba. But even though he had better
motives, Alomar cautioned, “maurism is not something sympathetic; but, even less
sympathetic is mauristisme [sic].” 153 The threat of this new force on the Spanish
right galvanized the Catalan left to seek greater organization for itself, with Alomar,
Carner, Cases Carbó, Hurtado, Junoy, Lluhi, Roca i Roca, and Rovira writing a series
of articles in the Poble Català in late 1907 on the need to form a new party. 154 Lluhi
wrote that

the left has to be fundamentally nationalist, intensely democratic, and progressive, all
at the same time.

The immediate action will have to consist of the contact and cooperation of all the
forces of the left, in the affirmation, every day more accented and tidy, of republican
solutions, in the defense of an intangible national autonomy, and in the heated and
formidable struggle against the work of Maura. 155

150 Garriga, Memòries, 171.
appears to be an early acknowledgement that a difference had opened up between the arch-
conservatism of Maura and the even more extreme positions of many of his followers. The Maurist
movement as an overarching political force in its own right did not come into being officially until its
foundation by Ossorio in Saragossa in 1913, and even then most political opponents rarely distinguished
between the man and the movement he inspired but of which he himself was not a part. A statement
such as this, made in mid-1907 when Maura was still active within the political mainstream, implies a
nuanced understanding of his and of his followers’ worldviews.
154 vid. the Poble throughout Dec. 1907.
"We have to constitute the Catalan Left," Rovira trumpeted. "If we - the radicals of the Solidarity - do not constitute it, someone else outside the Solidarity will constitute it." But this Catalan Left found itself trapped between, on one side, the Regionalist-led Solidarity with its direct connections to Maura who promoted very conservative policies and who failed to recognize Catalan nationhood in his administrative reforms, and, on the other, the "Bloc of the Lefts" front promoted by Moret which included the Radicals of Lerroux, who opposed Maura's reforms for their decentralization which would give too much power to Catalonia.157

The Catalan left also lacked a leader of the same prestige and tirelessness as Cambó. One Madrid observer noted that "Cambó is more of a politician than all of his other comrades. He is in Congress like a fish is in water. In contrast, Suñol does not leave Barcelona." Suñol, pessimistic about the possibilities for Catalan republicanism and his health failing, resigned his seat in the Cortes and withdrew from politics. A master orator, he nevertheless had little patience for Madrid politics. "I would want to be a cabinet minister for one day," he used to comment, "in order to sign a decree granting autonomy to Catalonia: I would resign the next day and would return to Barcelona." Of this attitude, Cambó commented that "of a man who would think and speak in such a way, his family and friends could expect much, but his country could expect very little."

Meanwhile, Carner, although President of the CNR, gave few speeches or conferences. Rovira concluded that "the case is that Jaume Carner spent months and months without appearing in public. Is it conceivable that the leader of a political party has something to say to the public no more than one time per year?"

In 1908, Salmerón having died and Macià having renounced his parliamentary seat for Barcelona, by-elections were due to take place in the city. The Lliga strategists determined that the Solidarity could once again win both majority and minority seats, as it had done in 1907, but in the convoluted electoral system of circumscriptions, it required four vacant seats in the city, not just two, to exclude the

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157 Albertí, 265.
159 Albertí, 258.
160 Cambó, Memorias, 143.
161 Rovira, Els Política Catalans, 121.
Radicals. Suñol’s resignation provided one more seat, and they convinced Junoy to accept the Solidarity’s nomination at the next Senatorial elections in turn for giving up his seat. The effort fell just short, however, as the left-wing Solidarity candidates lost out to the Radical ticket headed by Lerroux, with only the Lliga’s Carlist ally Ramón Albó i Martí capturing the fourth, minority, seat. Although it still captured a far larger share of the vote, the Solidarity suffered a humiliating electoral loss, and had facilitated the return of Lerroux. Electoral failures added up through the beginning of 1909. The Lliga had spent years encouraging people to vote, and electoral turn-out remained high. But people had started voting in protest against what had come before, and the Radicals certainly represented a change. Nevertheless, the Regionalists felt vindicated in one respect: they had had an effect on politics in Barcelona, in Catalonia, and in Spain. The entire political process acted, they believed, in some degree in response to their efforts to produce a certain brand of politics. If they could weather the storm, collaborating with larger parties where necessary, they thought they could effectively hold the balance of power at all three levels of government.

The Solidarity had died, however. “The entire question is a party struggle,” Prat scribbled to himself in 1909, of one bunch of groupies - not the left wing of the Solidarity but that little nationalist republican group… seconded by a newspaper [identified in accompanying sheets as the Poble Catala] from which it arises to obstruct, combat, and disturb the men of the Lliga Regionalista. It is in this way that these terrible members of the Solidarity serve the movement; it is in this way that these generous nationalists serve Catalonia.

Indeed, within the Catalan Solidarity, the Nationalist Republicans were kept too weak to attract the large potential of republican forces in Catalonia, and had to remain forever in the shadow of the Lliga. The Regionalists could also not allow the nationalists a prominent voice while they cooperated within the political system. As a result, the nationalists began to see one route for their future: the creation of a new political party outside the Solidarity. The Catalan Left, as it had already been known for several years, began to coalesce, joining the CNR with the Federals and the remnants of the Republican Union.

162 Ruiz Monjón, 73f.
163 Olivar, 218.
But the Solidarity movement launched Cambó's Madrid career and redefined Spanish politics. Political groups readjusted their positions to take into account the stance of the *Lliga*. The republican movement itself found new life in these years, and the three main movements of Spanish republicanism of the end of the Restoration formed as a direct consequence of the Solidarity: Lerroux formed the Radical Republican Party to organize anti-Solidarity opposition from those who felt betrayed by Salmerón's leading the Republican Union into the Solidarity; Catalan republicans regrouped to form the CNR, which later merged with the remnants of the Catalan Federals and some Unionists to form a sequence of parties which made up the Catalan Left; and Álvarez, on one hand not a Catalan but on another put off by Lerroux's demagogic antics, laid the groundwork that would soon create the Reformist Party as a major player on the Spanish political scene. The dynastic parties - Liberals and Conservatives - were undergoing their own internal disputes, and these crystallized on the issues of administrative reform, especially as it applied to the Catalan Problem. While the Maurist Conservatives proved in this short period to have the only other comprehensive plan for Spain, Maura himself saw the Catalan Solidarity movement as important enough to require special political power-play. Indeed, that the Solidarity had a program for Spain was due entirely to its Regionalist leadership, and it was this very leadership that found itself working alongside Maura in Madrid. While Cambó's collaboration with the arch-conservative and *españolista* Maura gave the Catalan Left an excuse to undermine the Solidarity, it also confirmed the *Lliga* for what it was: a Spanish political party with a basis in catalanism, which hoped to have its positions dominate the entire political debate in Barcelona, in Catalonia, and in Spain.
Finally a force in Spanish politics, the Lliga by 1908 needed to determine how it could best bring about its objectives within a rapidly changing party system. The decay of the Solidarity movement, the Lliga’s parliamentary leader Francesc Cambó’s close relations with the conservative President Antoni Maura, and, ultimately, the social unrest that produced the Tragic Week revolution in Barcelona during the summer of 1909 combined to force the Lliga to look in on itself, reaffirm its ambitions, and relaunch its program. This required taking an active role at a time when many political pundits, including the Lliga’s leaders themselves, questioned the future existence of the very party.

In these years, the Regionalists themselves became confused as to the nature of their party. While they remained convinced catalanists, they now had a taste of having a political impact in Madrid and wished to keep up their influence. In fundamental disagreement with the Esquerra, the Catalan Left, the Lliga found itself attracted by the politics of Maura and his Conservative Party. The Regionalists flirted with joining the Conservatives or setting up a parallel party which would cooperate with Maura. But at the same time Maura’s behavior and his attitude towards specifically Catalan demands made the Regionalists wary. Certainly they did not want to lose the upper hand they had won in Catalonia to the Esquerra, and this ultimately convinced them to start an offensive on their own to win over the bulk of Catalan politics into the Lliga’s sphere of influence and then to reform the entire State. In this, they had the uneasy encouragement of Maura, who did not openly support these efforts but who at the same time was reconsidering his own role in the changing Spanish political structure.

The sheer scope of Maura’s proposed Law for the Reform of Local Administration left it open to attack on many fronts. The assault by the Solidarity’s left wing on the corporate suffrage which the project entailed proved most upsetting for Maura’s plans.1 The Esquerra had become alarmed at the close collaboration

1 For a brief outline of this bill, including its plans for corporate suffrage, see previous chapter. The Lliga leaders felt disappointed that after several years of discussion this bill was not passed. They faulted Maura’s decision to achieve the complete agreement of all parties. Yet, while most of the politicians in the Cortes agreed to substantial parts of the bill at one point or another, they often had
between Cambó and the arch-conservative Maura, and saw its own influence at home diminishing, and so needed an excuse to begin an offensive aimed as much at Cambó as at Maura. "I suppose," Cambó wrote Maura,

the campaign by some members of the Solidarity had caused you some surprise.... This campaign has also surprised me, and much more seeing that elements take part in it who have always defended corporate representation and who took an active part in the elaboration of the amendments which, in order to reform the organization which they gave the program we presented and which you accepted.2

The Lliga leader Enric Prat noted in the Veu that catalanism, especially in its most nationalist wing, had always backed some form of corporate suffrage - so long as this had a universal base - in order to protect regional, corporate, and local identities. Now, the Esquerra’s campaign against corporate suffrage risked destroying both the sought-after reform of local administration and the Solidarity movement.3

Because of the respect which Maura’s Civil Governor of Barcelona, Ángel Ossorio, showed for the political realities in Barcelona during his term, the catalanists returned the favor, making him a remarkably sympathetic figure in a city at odds, on the whole, with a President as controversial as Maura. Ossorio noted that even the most fervent catalanists eulogized him in Castilian, and played the Spanish Royal March and flew the Spanish flag at events he attended.4 This also allowed him to see more clearly what was happening within the movement. "The Solidarity has, virtually, broken down," Ossorio reported to his boss at the very beginning of 1908. He further inferred that Maura’s politics themselves had produced this very rupture on purpose in order to carry out Maura’s plans to neutralize the movement and bring its elements into the political mainstream.5

Maura decided to step up his campaign of gradual attraction of the Regionalists to the Conservative cause, focusing his efforts on his now close associate Cambó. “What has happened with the appearance of Cambó is delightful,” Maura confided in the old Conservative Eduardo Dato. “...Quickly he has completed his doctorate in comparative political psychology. One afternoon it occurred to him

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4 Ossorio, “Política,” political notes from 1908, Arch M 305/10.
5 Ossorio, letter to Maura, 11. Jan. 1908, ArchM.
to spring on the Liberal minority the idea that it should present the part of the law which dealt with (economic) agreements of future *mancomunidades* and the Central Administration.” Maura could not believe that such a plan would work, and thought that an embarrassed Cambó would have to retreat into his safe ranks. “But, quite the opposite, it succeeded!” Maura continued amazed. “Among the Liberals we could see something similar to the dissolution of greasy stains treated with a spray of detergent; all (resistance) decayed... it was one of the funniest episodes I have ever witnessed.” Cambó had, in less than a year, completely mastered the parliamentary stage; he would make a formidable ally of Maura within the system, but would be equally difficult now to coopt as a subordinate.  

Cambó’s self-positioning in the *Cortes* as head of the Regionalist representation had an overwhelming effect on all parties. Since he also led the Solidarity grouping, his erstwhile allies had to rethink their association with him as he began to deal in the political mainstream. If the Nationalist Republicans had personal differences with Cambó the man, they also found his politics distasteful. Importantly, the Solidarity had formed during a Liberal government; under a Conservative government, it was bound to dissolve, precisely because of the success of the mutually approximating programs of Maura and Cambó, which meant the imminent implementation of catalanism’s minimum demands.  

Only a year after Maura had taken over as President of the government, the Solidarity had already run aground. The failure to win the Barcelona by-elections in December of 1908 brought increased disillusion, and by 1909 the Solidarity existed in very little more than name.

José Collaso Gil, the political informant in Barcelona for the Liberal Party leader Segismundo Moret, had meanwhile come to the same conclusions as Ossorio had reported to Maura:

The division between the different Solidarity groups accentuates itself more each day, and already the split between the right and left marks itself out for the future. Within the latter a nucleus exists, perhaps the more important group, which patronizes the more radical tendencies that have characterized catalanism. The *Lliga*, without doubt, is taking all types of measures to avoid confrontations with the nationalists.

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6 Maura, letter to Dato, 30. July 1908, ArchDato.
Two months later, Collaso reported that the Esquerra was actually benefiting the most from keeping the Solidarity extant, since it could thereby take advantage of the superior political organization of the Lliga, which had influence in all major branches of Catalan society. Only when the Esquerra felt that it could stand on its own would it allow the Solidarity to decay, although that time would soon come.9

"Barcelona must be practically a people’s republic," Carner proclaimed when faced with the municipal elections of May 1909.10 The Esquerra put great emphasis on the results in the city of Barcelona and the need to control the Catalan capital. "Two formidable enemies have this new spirit that would sap the life from our city," Carner warned of "the army of the loud-mouthed Radicals, foreign enemies of everything that is ours," on one hand, and of the "band of spirits imprisoned by prejudicial traditions incompatible with modern public life" on the other.11

Indeed, the Lliga had combined with the Carlists to fight these elections and had shed all its remaining liberal pretenses. "It is an easily explained cause," Collaso reported to Moret that every time that the men of the Lliga have to take a resolution on definite character, they show themselves more inclined towards conservative rather than liberal tendencies, all the while that the components that form the party and some of its principal thinkers have a marked ultra-conservative and reactionary origin.12

Although the Radicals won the majority of the contested seats - sixteen, the moral victory went to the Esquerra, which outgunned the Lliga eight to five. This signaled to the Lliga that the time had possibly come to change its tactics in dealing with its erstwhile allies.13

Events intervened, though. Protest against the war in Morocco grew in the Summer of 1909 when the government showed poor judgement by calling up its Barcelona-based regiment at a time when the socio-political conditions in that city were already under strain. This served as the ostensible excuse for the revolutionary confrontation of the Tragic Week. In reality, however, some leaders of the revolutionary left saw these events as an means of discrediting Maura and the

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10 Carner, "La lluita pel govern de la ciutat," Poble, 1. May 1909. These elections, originally scheduled for 1907, had been postponed pending the debate on local administrative reform in the Cortes. As left-wing groups had increasingly delayed the passage of Maura's program, the election could realistically be delayed no further.
11 Carner, same article, Poble, 1. May 1909.
13 Albertí, 270-271.
Solidarity and to wreck once and for all the Law of Local Administration and especially its articles pertaining to the establishment of regional *mancomunidades*.14

Antonio Fabra Ribas and the other leaders of the Barcelona syndicalist Worker Solidarity movement pressed for a general strike across the city in response to the Moroccan war. The time had come to take on Maura, and Fabra, internationalist and thus nominally anti-catalanist, proved willing to join forces with anyone on the left prepared to work with him against the Spanish Conservative leader. Maura, Fabra proclaimed,

belonged to a very Spanish school that has brought about great evils on the country.... Spanish lock stock and barrel - despite or because of (it is quite hard to tell which) his Jewish ancestry - and a genuine exponent of a social class which... has monopolized power... with the determined goal of governing at all costs for its own profit.15

The situation spiraled out of their control, however, turning into a full-blown revolution. Through two of his English-language students, the Catalan nationalists Antoni Rovira and Claudi Ametlla, Fabra arranged a meeting with Carner, offering the nationalist republican chief the leadership of the revolution. He hoped that Carner’s political organization could bring control over the working-class masses and bring about a republic with a new revolutionary order. Carner, however, found himself even less prepared to carry out these dreams, and declined the offer.16 Instead, Alejandro Lerroux’s Radical Republicans benefited from the power vacuum and rushed to the forefront of the revolution, the week for them becoming not “Tragic” but “Glorious.” The Radicals egged on the workers until they provoked harsh governmental repression, hoping to profit politically from the aftermath. Meanwhile, they played up the participation of anarchist rabble-rousers such as Francesc Ferrer i Guardia, in order to deflect much of the government’s repression away from their own party.17

The repression ordered by the Secretary of the Interior Juan de la Cierva would taint the Spanish right for several years. Although Ossorio resigned his post in protest and Maura, failing to restrain la Cierva, remained aloof, it was only a matter of time before the Conservatives fell from power. Most Spaniards were surprised: it had been years since a Spanish politician had done anything so extreme

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as to cause an international scene. The reaction against Spain had a chilling effect on the country, and Maura’s enemies benefited from the publicity surrounding the protests around the world.18

Cambó, in London at the time, cautioned la Cierva in a letter: “you are not at all familiar with the city of Barcelona, with the multiple problems that are rooted in it and the various factors of these very complex circumstances.” Prat called on all Catalans - including immigrants, of all classes, parties, and ideas, to restore the “rule of law and normality.” He concluded that “only in this way can Catalonia achieve its greatness and realize its mission as the base and foundation for the prosperity of a new Spain.”19 The Regionalists, themselves conservative, hoped to appeal to Maura and la Cierva on the terms they had professed for their entire term in office, yet these appeals fell on deaf ears. Although the Lliga protested privately to la Cierva and ostensibly criticized the government’s action publicly, it, too, failed to distance itself from public discontent. The Veu remained in circulation while much of the Barcelona press was silent, and in the months following the Tragic Week, the regionalist daily dedicated much copy to exposing the damage the revolutionaries had caused to Catalonia’s artistic heritage by burning Church buildings.20 The Lliga thus presented itself as a party of order. From this disarray, the republicans - both the Radicals who had actively stoked the fires and the Esquerra which hoped to appeal to nationalist republican sentiment in the Catalan masses against both Radicals and Regionalists - stood to gain.

The Murcian party-boss la Cierva was the rogue appointee of Maura, who had previously established a name for himself as a proponent of fair elections and clean government. La Cierva resorted to the old party-political tricks as Secretary of the Interior, but he also proved himself hard-working and an effective conservative reformer, partially justifying Maura’s confidence in him.21 Even Ossorio, who never had good relations with la Cierva, admitted some respect for the man:

18 García Venero, Antonio Maura, 187f.
19 Cambó and Prat, quoted in ibid., 182f.
20 The falangist historian García Venero later noted that the targets of arson were almost exclusively religious buildings and not factories or commercial buildings. To him, this implied that the Tragic Week had the support of the bourgeoisie and possibly of the Lliga as well, which wanted to provoke extreme disorder in order to see complete law-and-order forcibly restored. García Venero, Historia del Nacionalismo Catalán, vol. II, 107.
21 Romero Maura, Rosa de Fuego, 425.
I believe that in politics (la Cierva) represented caciquism in its oldest sense. But I have always recognized that as a man of administration he was a phenom. He had a firm resistance, an incomparable capacity for work, and an indomitable will. During that period of government [1907-1909], he put his hand into everything and with assuredness. He reorganized the police, reformed and improved the Mail and Telegraph services, imposed order and morality in the Beneficence, zealously cultivated sanitation, and carried an exquisite beauty in managing covert funding.... In all, he was a great minister. 22

Nevertheless, an inherent tension always existed between Ossorio, a close friend of Maura’s eldest son Gabriel and through this connection a direct political appointment of the President rather than of the Secretary of the Interior, and la Cierva, such that Ossorio continued reporting directly to Maura, by-passing the normal route of communication, especially considering la Cierva’s animosity towards the political (as opposed to social) reforms that Maura and Ossorio professed to support. 23

For example, when the new Captain General Santiago, connected to la Cierva, arrived in Barcelona in the late spring of 1909, Ossorio protested about his behavior directly to the top: nothing illegal or without precedent had occurred, but Ossorio felt that the general’s ostentatious displays actively, ignorantly, and unnecessarily provoked the Barcelona population, and this could lead to future confrontation. 24 Ossorio’s assessment proved correct. When he could not control the military authorities in the first days of the Tragic Week, and therefore could not maintain public order through civil methods, he felt he could no longer uphold his post as the Civil Governor, and resigned. 25 “Barcelona will thank Ossorio quite a lot for the most worthy work he has carried out during the exercise of his charge,” Cambó summed up for Maura. Ossorio, Cambó continued, understood Catalonia and the Catalans, in a way la Cierva and his deputies did not even attempt. 26 The Regionalist Josep Puig lamented that “there has been no incident more saddening than the change of governor at such a critical moment in such a complicated city, where only time (permits one) to get to know people and things, which here are different than those which the rest of Spain comes across in its politics.” 27

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22 Ossorio, La España de mi Vida, 52.
23 Ullman, 103-104.
24 Ossorio, letter to Maura, 30. May 1909, ArchM.
26 Cambó, letter to Maura, Aug. 1909, ArchM.
27 Puig, letter to Maura, 25. Aug. 1909, ArchM.
The week did not win Barcelona any sympathy elsewhere in Spain, however. The Madrid press construed anything which took place in Catalonia as catalanist, and thus mistook the Tragic Week as at least partly separatist, a repetition in Catalonia of what had happened fifteen years before in Cuba. The misunderstanding also arose because the social tensions which had created the situation in industrial Barcelona did not exist anywhere else in Spain; here a large proletariat with a high proportion of immigrants found life further complicated by a catalanist bourgeoisie interested in radically transforming all of Spain from above on the one hand, and a local tradition of revolutionary anarchism on the other. Ironically, the Madrid press provided better coverage of the situation than the local papers, because censorship kept Barcelona dailies silent on the developments. When the local press did publish, it instead had to content itself with mostly literary, scientific, or other non-controversial topics.

The Lliga, with its connections to the Maura government, suffered the most politically from the fallout: a social crisis had struck, and the party proved that, although within the Solidarity it had tried to win over a popular base, it indeed emerged from the movement as decisively conservative. The Regionalists, while desiring order, did not, however, endorse the total repression of the city. Ossorio received Cambó’s letters with sympathy, although he now had little effect; la Cierva, who did exercise power, responded coolly. Publicly, however, the Veu stood for order, even refusing to publish several articles by its longtime contributor, the literary figure Joan Maragall - a man with excellent Catholic credentials who criticized the government over the repression. When the case against Ferrer became celebrated across Europe, Maragall tried to win the anarchist schoolmaster an amnesty on the grounds that he was being scapegoated for the sins of the entire

28 Augusto Riera, La Semana Trágica, 85.
29 In 1910, only 66.5% of the population of Barcelona came from Catalonia, with 31.5% immigrants from elsewhere in Spain. Romero Maura, Rosa de Fuego, 554. Of the 990 detainees in Barcelona on August twenty-fourth, 1909, 40% were not Catalan (18% were Valencian and 9% Aragonese), and only 20% of these had lived in Catalonia for many years or had had a wife or child who considered themselves Catalan. Riera, 281-282.
30 Antoni Calvet i Pasqual, Tots els Camins duen a Roma, 329.
32 Benet, Maragall, 118.
33 ibid., 112.
week. Ossorio and Cambó showed sympathy for Maragall and even discussed the issue with Maura, but neither agreed with Maragall. Prat explained that the aftermath of the Tragic Week was no time to speak out on behalf of anarchists, especially since terrorist bombing had never really abated before the Summer; cracking down on anarchists, even if not entirely just in these circumstances, might clear up these other crimes. Maura agreed, and responded to Cambó that after what happened in the last days of July, the most urgent and advantageous job is to achieve that, in the general and healthy test of consciousness, they learn the lesson for their future actions the hard way, so that they will not even inadvertently take after the bandits who act out the role of revolutionaries.

Cambó, however, was actually out of the country during the critical month, thus depriving the Lliga of its main link to Madrid’s inner political circle, and perhaps damaging both the Regionalists and the Conservatives. In Prat’s public writing, however, the Radicals were the villains of 1909, and their defeat would ensure that these events could not take place again: “Now we have seen the color of blood in the flowers of radicalism, we have heard its stench [sic] of death. The greatest enemy of Catalonia - its prosperity, its future, and of its growth - is radicalism. We will never forget the lessons of the red week.” Prat declared, through the mouths of the Lliga’s president Raimon d’Abadal and the other Regionalist senators and representatives that he spoke not in the name of any party, but rather, as he was accustomed to, for all parties that wanted to carry Catalonia peacefully, legally, and patriotically into the future.

Soon after, the Carlists approached Abadal with the suggestion of entering upcoming elections with a new electoral coalition of Regionalists, Carlists, Catholics, and Conservatives. Although Abadal agreed, Prat thought it would be more sensible for the Lliga to remain on its own at this time to consolidate its base, although he agreed to cooperate with the other right-wing groups. In the provincial elections in October, the Lliga did hold on to most of its ground outside Barcelona, the countryside little affected by the events of the summer. In Barcelona, however, the Esquerra carried the day. The Radicals failed to present candidates in

34 Miquel Ferrer, De la Fundació de la Lliga Regionalista a la Primera Guerra Mundial, 27-28
35 Maura, letter to Cambó, 21. Aug. 1909, ArchM.
38 Prat, notes from 1909, ArxPrat 1-7/9.
protest against the government’s closure of their offices.\(^\text{39}\) As the fall wore on, Maura doggedly tried to hold onto his position in Madrid as well, but this too proved futile. The right was in retreat across Spain, although it was not going to depart without making a noise and clinging to the remnants of what it had held.

To Lerroux, Spain in 1909 faced the same disaster as it had in 1898, its government so discredited that only a complete change of regime could save the country.\(^\text{40}\) After the relatively long period of thirty-three months that Maura had remained in power, these republicans could embarrassingly taunt the Liberal Party as to how long the “joke” of the \textit{turno} system could keep the Liberals from alternating in power. Pressured by the Republicans, the Liberals entered into outright hostility to the Maura government.\(^\text{41}\) By mid-October, Moret raised the question whether Maura should step down because he had lost contact with popular opinion. Maura, in response, suggested that general elections be called immediately, believing that these would show that the Conservatives still had the support of the majority of the population. This confirmed Maura’s ambition to destroy the \textit{turno}, since here he refused to alternate directly, but rather wished to place the elections before the change in government.\(^\text{42}\) Alfonso, however, considered Maura divisive, and wished to avoid a civil war he thought might break out if he failed to replace Maura with a new man.\(^\text{43}\) According to Ossorio, everyone from these demagogues to the King himself took part in the massive “Maura, No!” campaign to exclude the Conservative leader from power.\(^\text{44}\) Lerroux began what came to be known as the “Radical Veto” to keep Maura from regaining power by threatening further unrest. Working with groups in the Liberal Party, particularly Moret, became a top priority in order to achieve this.\(^\text{45}\)

\(^\text{39}\) Albertí, 276-278; Ainaud & Jardi, 68.
\(^\text{40}\) Lerroux, \textit{Al Servicio de la República}, 66.
\(^\text{41}\) Miguel Maura y Gamazo, \textit{Así Cayó Alfonso XIII}, 14.
\(^\text{42}\) Luis Antón del Olmet & Arturo García Carraffa, \textit{Moret}, 176.
\(^\text{43}\) Alfonso XIII, related to Gabriel Maura, in G. Maura & Fernández Almagro, \textit{Por Qué}, 156f.
\(^\text{44}\) Ossorio, \textit{Orígenes}, 188.
\(^\text{45}\) Culla, \textit{Republicanisme Lerrouxista}, 253. From 1909 until the collapse of the \textit{turno} in 1917, Lerroux carried on his watch chain a medallion engraved with the words “Maura, no!” M. Maura, \textit{Así Cayó}, 86. Pablo Iglesias named his dog “Maura.” The dog was later befriended by an amused Miguel Maura, one of the Conservative leader’s sons, who owned a summer house across the street from the Socialist chief in San Lorenzo del Escorial. Iglesias never forgave Miguel Maura for this, and refused to speak to him even when the two both collaborated in the Second Republic of the 1930s. M. Maura, 313.
Maura’s term as President ended abruptly on October twenty-first, when the King dismissed him, reducing the Conservative leader to tears in the Palace. He returned home to Palma de Mallorca after the 1910 elections (in which his constituents had reelected him), passing through Barcelona, despite warnings that he should take another route. Days before, Pablo Iglesias Posse, the leader of the Socialist Worker Party, had lamented that the 1904 assassination attempt had failed, while Lerroux told him that “your kingdom is not of this earth.” Sure enough, another would-be assassin seriously wounded him. Yet for all the controversy, Maura remained the most respected and dominant politician in Spain. The career of any other politician would have ended at that point in disgrace, yet Maura stayed on as the Conservative Party’s leader.

Duran’s brother Raimon, long out of politics, wrote to Maura to express his support: “Catalonia will be the first victim of the indifferent politics that the Liberal Cabinet will undoubtedly begin now. It is not necessary to be a prophet - merely to have common sense is enough - in order to predict the great evils to come to our sad country.” Maura had had a plan; Moret desired only to replace Maura without presenting any alternative program. While some factions of the Liberal Party did have new ideas, Moret’s dominant faction did not, and the government he would form did not seek to include men from other factions, thus weakening his support from within his own party ranks. Meanwhile, the conservatives could not cooperate with such a man interested, Maura thought, only in his personal power. So began Maura’s policy of “implacable hostility” towards Moret’s Liberals.

Even after his fall, however, Maura remained at the center of Madrid politics, receiving visits, invitations, telegrams, and letters from members of all parties seeking opinions and advice. Again, the political situation of Catalonia had created the most friction, but even there Maura discounted the more vocal opposition,

46 Silió, *Vida y Empresas*, 166.
47 Sevilla Andrés, 362.
48 Raimon Duran i Ventosa, letter to Maura, 22. Oct. 1909, ArchM.
49 Antón & García Carraffa, 193. Indeed, before Ferrer’s execution, Maura, who had always sought consensus on important issues, had even approached Moret to give the Liberal leader a chance to argue for Maura to approach the King about granting Ferrer a royal pardon. Moret did not support a pardon, allowed the execution to go ahead, and then sought to take personal advantage of Maura’s resulting unpopularity. “Información política: la implacable hostilidad,” *Mañana* (Madrid), 25. Jan. 1910, in ArchNRivas 11-8897.
encouraging the Catalans to enter into the parties of the central government, to cooperate with him within the system. "The politics of this government," Maura told the Congress,

have found their inspiration in a sincere respect for the popular will of Catalonia.... More than once I declared, and now I repeat, that while the political forces there are organized in local parties, the situation will persist. I confess that I have encouraged those forces so that they might direct their thrust within the mainstream of the national parties; I do not say that I have achieved this, but yes that I have attempted it.\textsuperscript{51}

Indeed, the first person he received upon stepping down as president was Cambó. "I have seen Maura immediately after he stepped down," Cambó reported to Prat.

To defend himself against my censures, he said that if he had remained in government one day longer, then the Liberal Party would have made republican declarations and would leave to the condemned monarchy (no alternative other than) a dictatorial regime since there would be no manner to substitute the actual government and this government could not govern with the Cortes open. He told me that he would never pardon the Liberals for what they have done to him and that he is predisposed to make the Liberals' life in government impossible and leave them without seats when he returns to carry out elections. He told me that the elimination of the Liberal Party depended on me, since, if I raised up the banner of a Spanish reformist party, a good part of Liberal party members would join with us and he would have the immense satisfaction to form in this way the two alternating main parties... within a monarchy with a frankly autonomist banner.... I believe that we cannot lose anything by playing around in respect to the advisability in the creation of a Spanish regionalist party, based on ours.\textsuperscript{52}

By the first week in November, then, Cambó gave a series of talks at the Lliga's Barcelona headquarters, at which he argued that the party, without renouncing its catalanist ideals, should intervene directly in the politics of the Spanish state, indeed that the Lliga should consider governing Spain itself from Madrid.\textsuperscript{53} "Cambó wants us to carry the Catalan question to the other regions of Spain," the nationalists responded in the pages of their newspaper the Poble Català, accusing him of relying too much on a vague concept of "regionalism" to generate a basis for his movement.

...So it is that Cambó gropes, now more than ever, for the slightly mistaken word 'regionalism,' and grasps it like a Christmas log in order to carry to Spain a moderate light that does not hurt the eyes. It is clear that he condemns separatism. Even nationalism makes him afraid. This word ['regionalism'] will cost us dearly.... Outside Catalonia it is probable that that which, for us, is a question of language, of sentiment, of that which penetrates deeply into life may continue being an administrative problem. If he uses no more weapons than this merely comfortable word, Cambó will fail, and he will produce no more than a new cliché, a new project of local administration, that will recognize the regions without nourishing them.

\textsuperscript{51} Maura, speech in Congress, 18. Oct. 1909, quoted in Antón & García Carraffa, 175.
\textsuperscript{53} Sabaté, 58-59.
What new movement could Cambó and the Lliga offer Spain, the Poble wondered, if "regionalism" was too vague and if, when the situation became difficult as it had in 1909, they proved themselves to be fundamentally conservative. Cambó, the conclusion went, had nothing to offer Spain.\textsuperscript{54}

The Regionalists did indeed hope to recoup at home the support of the broad coalition that had formed the Solidarity, but the Esquerra knew this was impossible; after the Tragic Week, the left had to cooperate against any force on the right. Meanwhile, most people doubted whether the regeneration of Spain could originate in Catalonia.\textsuperscript{55} "I have never known how serious it is to find myself in a right-wing party," Cambó told Amadeu Hurtado. "To be right or left is like a gap which cannot be ignored or filled; but if I now can pass into a left-wing formation, I would change the course of Catalan politics. It seems that the lefts are the force, but that they do not know how to profit from their great possibilities."\textsuperscript{56}

Moret decided to reentrench himself in Catalonia, and keep open his close ties to Lerroux. Collaso became mayor of Barcelona, with Lerroux's blessing, in order to combat the catalanists Lerroux called "your enemies and mine." Lerroux also offered to give the Liberals a new electoral toe-hold in Catalonia, supporting Liberal candidates in some seats if Moret would provide him with certain other seats.\textsuperscript{57} Yet the Radicals, the most potent force of the political left in Barcelona, leaders of the opposition to the now defunct Solidarity, failed to convert their supposed triumph into promoting the alleged aims of the anti-Solidarity movement. Recognizing the limitation on the further growth of the party in Catalonia, Lerroux began to accommodate Catalan sentiment in parts of the population he had before not chosen to acknowledge; the Radicals began to use Catalan as well as Castilian in their dealings, and tried to present themselves as more pro-Spanish than anti-Catalan. By 1910, they felt they needed to respond to and root out the catalanist left which had begun to compete with the Radicals for republican votes. The Radicals saw the Esquerra as a mere satellite of the Lliga, uncommitted to republicanism, and shamelessly separatist. The open combat between the two main branches of Catalan

\textsuperscript{54} "La tèctica dels regionalistes: notes disperses," Poble, 10. Nov. 1909, 1
\textsuperscript{55} Ruiz Monjón, 80.
\textsuperscript{56} Cambó, to Hurtado, 1910, quoted in Hurtado, vol I., 179.
\textsuperscript{57} Lerroux, letter to Moret, 17. Dec. 1909, Arch NRivas 11-8895.
republicanism, compounded by the growth of anarcho-syndicalism which encouraged abstention from the polls, succeeded in reducing the left's share of the vote. Thus, just when the Regionalists found themselves foundering for new ideas, their opposition at home proved unable to deliver the Lliga its death stroke.58

The Republican Nationalist Center (CNR) decided to take advantage of the disarray caused by repositioning within both the PRR and the Lliga, hoping also to attract dissidents from both groups.59 But the CNR represented only a portion of the Esquerra, which in turn represented only one channel for the left in Catalonia, which now found itself divided among catalanists still loyal to the Lliga, nationalists and federalists approximating each other, the PRR with its caesarist and militarist tendencies, the anarcho-syndicalists who founded the National Labor Confederation (CNT) and advised political abstention, and a few miscellaneous socialists.60 By March, 1910, the Esquerra determined the need to form for itself an official political party, the Federal Nationalist Republican Union (UFNR), a blend of the CNR, the Federals, and the Solidarity-affiliated wing of the Republican Union. At the opening meetings, the UFNR determined to take its cue from many of the theories of the late Francisco Pi y Margall regarding the regional powers of a federal Spain, which would evolve into a federal Iberia with local autonomy and a republican and secular government. With the CNR leaders Carner and Ildefons Sunol withdrawn from active politics, the UFNR needed a new leader; Carner backed Coromines' successful bid.61 Coromines responded to Cambó's quasi-assimilationist ideal for integrating catalanism into the Spanish state by proposing that Catalonia differentiate itself from the rest of Spain.62 The Mallorca-born Gabriel Alomar denounced Madrid, arguing for the vitality of Barcelona. For Alomar, Madrid "places us on top of a base of insincerity, of pretense, of hypocrisy, of Jewish conniving, of pharasaism or jesuitism, which has savaged all our attempts and doctrines."63 The Catalan Left,

60 Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, Catalanisme i Moviment Obrer, 19.
61 Albertí, 288-295.
63 Alomar, Nagacions y Afirmacions del Catalanisme, 4.
then, needed to seek out the proletariat, “so that the workers may say: we are the catalanists.”

Prat did not see much hope for the UFNR’s future, telling Hurtado that the leaders of the UFNR “had the defect of not being men of the left as they believed, because, if they were, they would have understood that their job was to attract with a certain social radicalism, in this case with a Catalan fashion, our popular masses, instead of thinking and wanting to act as governmental figures.” The Lliga had already shown its predisposition towards government, and maintained much popular support based on this credibility. For the UFNR to succeed, then, Prat figured that it had to galvanize the left in a way it could not do on the Lliga’s terrain.

Meanwhile, the left in Madrid also needed to rethink its plan after the right’s electoral collapse. Unlike the crisis within the Conservative Party which owed its origins to the popular backlash against its leader, the crisis within the Liberal Party emerged internally. The party leadership, failing to develop a program for a country that was itself in crisis, exposed rifts in its ranks once again that had opened up a decade before and had never properly healed. “In order to live,” the Madrid paper El Liberal critiqued, the Conservatives need the nourishment given them by the neos, the Jesuits, the traditionalists, and those of the Social Defense Committee. The same with the Liberals, whose only program expired in 1890 [the granting of universal suffrage], if democracy had not come to their rescue, they would not even have food or clothing.

Even Alfonso XIII joined the chorus of criticism, telling a Madrid daily that the Liberal Party had to decide to govern in Spain, not just to occupy power. Moret, without a program, lasted only a short while as head of the government. Shortly after the King’s remarks, Alfonso called on the Liberal Democrat José Canalejas to form a new government predominantly from his wing of the party.

Two years later, Canalejas explained to the Liberal-Conservative Joaquín Sánchez de Toca the difficulty in defining the Liberal Party, which had become spread out over three generations and four or five diverse factions. As President of the government, then, Canalejas chose to consider each situation as it arose,

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64 Alomar, Nagacions y Afirmacions, 9.
determining policy based in real circumstances. Sánchez de Toca surmised that the crisis of the two main parties derived from constant conflict. With the entry of Canalejas, reconciliation entered into Madrid politics, allowing the Cortes to breathe deeply and consider the socio-political trauma of Spain in a more relaxed setting. This did not mean that Canalejas faced an easy ride, however. The Conservatives opposed him for his presumed anti-clericalism, his support of workers against factory-owners, his opposition to consumer-choice, and his law making military service obligatory; groups within the Liberals opposed his 1911 campaigns in Morocco, his anti-revolutionary attempts to quell social conflicts, and his ultimate support for the project of mancomunidades brought forward as a solution to the Catalan question. Despite the opposition, Canalejas imposed himself forcefully on the parliament. To do this, however, required him to follow the traditional example of keeping the Cortes closed for prolonged periods, especially in contrast with the previous Conservative government, in which Maura maintained his constitutionalism by leaving the Cortes open for the majority of his term.

The right looked to Maura to counter Canalejas' social reform measures. Instead, Maura announced that unanimity did not exist across Spain, and therefore tolerance and coexistence with other parties was essential. Fundamentally, Canalejas was entitled to his opinions and actions, and was helping Spain mature into a proper democracy. The new role of the Conservative Party, then, was to attract elements of the left through democratic means, even if this meant making big concessions. Indeed, with Moret no longer the head of the government and Moret's wing of the Liberal Party in eclipse, Maura showed himself more prepared to accept the Liberal government under Canalejas, and toned down his scathing public attacks. When Moret's government collapsed under the pressure of Maura's implacable hostility, Canalejas entered with the virtual support of the Conservatives, who then felt reluctant to fight him in the next elections lest they

69 Canalejas to Joaquín Sánchez de Toca, Nov. 1912, quoted in Sánchez de Toca, La Crisis de Nuestro Parlamentarismo, 335.
70 Sánchez de Toca, ibid., 318-319.
71 Seco, Alfonso XIII y la Crisis de la Restauración, 101-102; G. Maura & Fernández Almagro, 165.
72 Anon. ("Un Espectador Imparcial"), Exposición Sintética y Documentada del Pensamiento y de la Obra del Sr. Maura y de su Papel en la Política de España, 13.
74 Maura, speech in the Congress, 29. May 1910, cited in ibid., 8-10.

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destroy his fragile new hold on the leadership of the Liberal Party. "Maura's attitude," proclaimed Cambó, "was an enormous disappointment for the Catalan Regionalists." 75

The run-up to the general elections in May 1910 also caused a reshuffle in Catalonia. The Lliga had not fared well at the polls in late 1909, and hoped for a turn-around that was not forthcoming. The Regionalists decided to remain on their own, despite overtures from the Conservatives to fall into the ranks of that central party in order to strengthen both groups by restoring the Conservative Party to Catalonia and by bringing the Regionalists into the mainstream of Spanish politics. That the Regionalists declined irked Gabriel Maura, now controlling his reclusive and aging father's political life more and more each day. "In 1909," he wrote later, centralism prevailed, strengthening itself through tricks it is shameful to recall; the Solidarity could not keep up, and instead fell apart; and what resolution did the catalanist right adapt? To join the ranks of the national Conservative Party in order to renovate it, to purify it, transform it, or complete it? No. To procure a concentration of all the Spanish right-wing groups? Also no. To propagate citizenship outside Catalonia with the object of infusing in the political factions the social spirit of a true party? Even less so. What the catalanist right did was to reinforce its regionalism, greedy and useless for future enterprises, and to constitute itself as well into yet another parliamentary faction, to open a booth in the Madrid barter fair, and to measure up governments not for what they did but for what they ought to have done. 76

The younger Maura, though, was perhaps too harsh. Cambó, very interested in the suggestions made by the elder Maura as to the Regionalists' future in Madrid, did indeed try to arrange some collaboration between the two parties within Catalonia, but found Maura unforthcoming. Already in January, in a letter to Ossorio, Cambó wrote that "in my work to prepare for the general elections I do not know to whom I should direct myself to deal with the Conservative Party. Do you know if there is anyone who can legitimately speak in the name of the Conservative Party in Catalonia?" Ossorio passed Cambó's message on to his chief, noting that "you can well understand that I have not dared to give him an answer while you do not tell me." 77 As Gabriel Maura was his father's political secretary, any such facilitation would have needed to come through him, and thus he could not fairly criticize Cambó on this issue. Nevertheless, Cambó persisted. The merger of the two parties not yet a reality, Cambó at least offered to support Conservative

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75 Cambó, Cambó contra Maura y Gamazo, 22-24.
76 G. Maura, "El error del catalanismo" in Cambó, contra Maura y Gamazo, 6.
77 Ossorio, letter to Maura, 17. Jan. 10, ArchM.
candidatures in Catalonia, provided the Conservatives would help the Regionalists to win other districts.\textsuperscript{78} Conservative help was not forthcoming, however.

Within Catalonia, the \textit{Lliga} suffered a humiliating defeat, beaten into third place in Barcelona with twenty per cent of the vote to the PRR's thirty-nine per cent and the UFN R's thirty per cent, despite a ticket on which it had placed some of its most prominent names: Cambó, Abadal, Puig, Narcís Verdaguer, and Carles de Camps, none of whom won seats. "My defeat has not surprised me," Cambó wrote Maura stoically: "Although I did not have any blame for it, the obvious fact is that my governmental politics failed in the last Cortes, and failures are paid back with a moment of unpopularity."\textsuperscript{79}

Prat did not wish to worry overly about election results in such circumstances, because he felt that this distracted too much from tackling the Catalan question.\textsuperscript{80} Collaso reported to Moret that some elements of the \textit{Lliga} tried to reopen a dialogue with the UFN R in order to push these concerns forward, but Sunol opposed contacts with the Regionalists.\textsuperscript{81} Prat decided to swing round again and try to gain support for his catalanist program from the far right. In 1910, then, he took on Jaume Bofill, a young man from the \textit{Joventut Nacionalista}, a youth movement set up in 1907 by Puig, with long-standing familial connections to the traditionalist and Catholic groups, as his deputy for dealing with these groups.\textsuperscript{82}

Bofill, who had only recently joined the \textit{Lliga} after entering the Solidarity movement and then the \textit{Joventut} with the Carlists, hoped to revitalize the party. He jotted down his plan:

The \textit{Lliga} has done enough - it has infused a spiritual ideal (nationalism which also supposes culture and solidarity) into a \textit{bourgeois} nucleus that had sought nothing more than economic ideals, order, and the defense of its class spirit. The Catholics have not known how to profit from this (above all through solidarity and traditionalism) in order to accomplish social action. Political action against the \textit{Lliga} is attempted in order to fight over the \textit{bourgeois} vote. We have to conserve and conquer: first - the intellectuals and culture; second - the children and the schools (teachers, etc.); third - afterwards, the political invasion of the state will come.

\textsuperscript{78} Cambó, letters to Maura 22. & 30. Mar. 1910, ArchM.  
\textsuperscript{79} Cambó, letter to Maura, 14. May 1910, ArchM.  
\textsuperscript{80} Sabaté, 63.  
\textsuperscript{81} Collaso, letter to Moret, 12. June 1910, ArchNRivas 11-8888.  
\textsuperscript{82} Casassas, prologue to Bofill, \textit{Prat de la Riba i la Cultura Catalana}, 19.
We have to bring about a Christian Democracy or a Social Catholicism in order to conquer the workers and put the people in contact with the clergy. We have to be confessional - and even a bit apostolizing.\(^{83}\)

Within the *Joventut*, Bofill sought to capture the wellspring of Catalonia, in order to neutralize the right-wing and Catholic groups which were trying to attract certain elements of society away from regionalism. He hoped to politicize the youth along the ideals of Pratian doctrine, to make regionalism consider the religious question, to channel Catholicism towards what he saw as nationalism, and to adopt a modernist philosophical outlook.\(^{84}\) Bofill also picked up some of Cambó's visions for direct intervention in general Spanish politics.\(^{85}\)

Nationalist Republican leaders doubted Bofill's assessment of the Catalan youth. The bulk of the Catalan youth, Carles Rahola argued, had - like much of the Spanish youth in general - become disillusioned with the state. But, like Bofill, Rahola saw the *Joventut* as an organization well poised to reinvent the Spanish state.\(^{86}\) Joaquim Lluhi, another Nationalist leader, mocked the *Lliga*'s search for itself: I do sincerely believe that these men have the gift of the error of spinning round and round like butterflies in the midst of several lights, of making and unmaking different things without care, of devouring - like Saturn - their own children. I do not deny their qualities as men of energy and of action, but this action and energy is disorganized, incongruent, diffuse - in short, unfruitful... …I am not a dissident of the *Lliga*, as they are dissidents of the Catalanist Union. My ideas today are far older than the *Lliga* and its politics. Fifteen years ago I had republican and catalanist ideals... A man of liberal ideas, I cannot act in a conservative way; a catalanist, I must not accept the deficient and precarious catalanism of the *Lliga* today, compatible with the Project of Local Administration [of Maura], an ally of the caciques of the Barcelona provincial government. Republican nationalism does not represent a dissidence, but rather a division of the *Lliga*.... The Solidarity has never been an instrument in our hands.\(^{87}\)

Thus, when the *Lliga* once again offered in 1911 to form an electoral alliance with the UFNR against the PRR at the provincial elections, the Nationalists turned the Regionalists down. It was important, they felt to see just how much electoral force they could muster on their own, especially against the Radicals, the other force on the left.\(^{88}\) Coromines also feared that the Regionalists would try to attract the

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83 Bofill, "El catalanisme," notes [1910], ArxJBM, VI-2 #1.
88 Pérez Bastardas, *Els Republicans Nacionalistes i el Catalanisme Politic*, vol. 1, 155.
more moderate members of the UFNR for incorporation in the Lliga, leaving the rest of the Nationalists at the mercy of the PRR. The UFNR overestimated its resources, and had seriously underestimated the staying power of the Lliga. The Regionalists and their Carlist allies held their seats at these provincial elections, while the Nationalists lost out to the Radical voters of Barcelona. The Spanish right still wandered in the wilderness, but the Lliga proved remarkably resilient.

Although it appeared in a position of great weakness after 1909, the Lliga actually decided to go onto the offensive. From the Barcelona provincial government, Duran began a fierce campaign to attract provincial representatives of all parties and from all four provinces of Catalonia to Barcelona to draft a plan to form a mancomunidad, which could then be presented complete to Madrid. If Canalejas chose to follow popular opinion as closely as he professed, he would have to accept such a move despite his long-standing opposition. Duran’s job was facilitated by the fact that the Regionalists dominated not just the government of the province of Barcelona, but also that of Girona, where the government had succeeded in making the Catalan language co-official, and had in February 1910 already called for the reunification of the four provinces into a single autonomous Catalonia. In Lleida, meanwhile, the problem of the Solidarity’s rupture had not been so profound, since this inland province was far from the socio-political trouble spots; here the Solidarity forces continued to cooperate greatly, and exert some influence on the dynastic politicians.

By May, 1911, the Barcelona Provincial Government had reiterated its affirmation of Catalan personality and had invited the other provincial governments to join it in discussing the project. By July, the delegates had convened and drawn out a plan to create a mancomunidad based on the relevant portions of Maura’s defunct administrative reform bill. The project was finalized by October and presented to Canalejas. The future Mancomunitat de Catalunya would have charge of highways, railroads, hydraulic works, ports, telephones and telegraphs, land surveyance, the repopulation of the forests, the exploitation of

89 Pérez Bastardas, Els Republicans Nacionalistes i el Catalanisme Politic, vol I., 161.
90 Sabaté, 67.
92 Conxita Mir Curcó, Lleida, 152.
natural resources, social welfare, education, conservation and restoration of monuments, cultural institutions, and whatever else the state wished to concede it, particularly what interested Catalonia but did not pertain to any other public organism. In reality, this was no more than creating a single large province out of four smaller ones, and involved no real sacrifice on the part of the central state, other than the mental one of recognizing Catalonia’s differential status. With the minimum amount of competencies needed to govern Catalonia, Prat hoped to simply use his base in the province of Barcelona to restore the Catalan feeling in the other three provinces. To remain aloof from politics, Prat, as President of Barcelona province, did not himself begin the motion, but rather left that work to Duran with their old mentor Verdaguer. These two then sought out allies in the other parties to make this a truly cross-party issue. When Prat presented the finished product to Canalejas in December, he could honestly say that “these bases, Mr. President, are not the work of a party.”

The debate dragged on the Cortes for another year, although this time the Regionalists were determined to see it through. To accomplish this, though, Cambó needed to have a seat in the Cortes. Lluís Ferrer-Vidal i Soler resigned his seat representing Castellterçol, and Canalejas, rather than leaving the seat vacant for a prolonged period as would normally happen, hastily called a by-election. Only the Radicals presented a candidate against Cambó, and the Regionalist leader won handily with ninety-one per cent of the vote. The climate in Madrid had drastically changed, and Cambó had impressed upon Canalejas the will of the majority of Catalans for the Mancomunitat.

In mid-1912, Cambó wrote to Duran of his imminent triumph. Canalejas spoke of Catalonia and of our aspirations with a fondness and an understanding that [Nicolas] Salmerón [the late head of the Republican Union who had swiftly gone from opposing catalanist aspirations to propose in 1905 the formation of the Solidarity] would never have matched. And alongside this triumph for Catalonia and for the regionalist solutions - now proclaimed by everyone - our triumph as a group was absolute.

Maura was very preoccupied yesterday. He did not know what to do, nor what to say. It seems to me that he now understands that he cannot go forward without us and that he cannot govern against us. Canalejas is with us unconditionally. He has our loyalty.

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93 Mancomunitat de Catalunya, Bases que Fueron Aprobados... 1911, 10.
94 Ainaud & Jardí, 87-89.
95 ibid., 93.
96 Cambó, letter to Duran, s.d. [1912], ArxDiV.
Canalejas had tried to redefine the Liberal Party in similar terms as Maura had the Conservative Party - to make a modern political party based on popular opinion. If the majority of Catalans supported the Mancomunitat, this alone was enough to win over Canalejas' support for a project he had so long opposed. For his part, though, Canalejas saw a double political advantage: he could rectify the politics of Moret, who had opposed the Lliga, by restoring his party's contact with a greater sphere of Catalan opinion, and he could neutralize the advantage the Conservative Party had because of Maura's general understanding with Cambó.

Ten years before, when Canalejas was still intractably opposed to concessions to catalanists, he nevertheless hinted that his opinion could change if Catalonia did show profound popular support for concessions. He had written a letter to Joan Garriga, a personal adherent and family friend, in which he expressed this view. Sure enough, by 1912 Canalejas was explaining that to deny Catalonia the reform that it sought would be insensitive and would produce the stimulus for the disintegration of the Spanish State. Granting the Mancomunitat, Canalejas expected, would assimilate Catalan politics into general Spanish life. He appointed the Liberal cacique Alfons Sala, a wealthy industrialist from the Fomento and a formidable opponent of the Lliga, to head the parliamentary committee which was drafting the Madrid version of the new law. Here Canalejas could count on the support of Fomento on one hand, while also assuaging potential opponents that the author of the proposal would not himself be under the thrall of the Lliga.

The Lliga had indeed won over the support of Canalejas for its project, but had found that Maura no longer offered his backing. Even though the idea for the Mancomunitat had come directly from Maura's own proposed administrative reform bill, the Conservative leader did not agree with the way that this project implemented only a part of his plans: it dealt only with Catalonia, and would reorganize the provinces without reforming local administration. "Autonomy

97 Cambó, “La Lliga Regionalista y la política general española,” speech at the Tivoli Theater, 6. Apr. 1913, ArchNRivas 11-8893.
99 Canalejas, letter to Garriga, 1902, in Garriga, Memòries, 142-143. The original letter was destroyed when anarchists torched Garriga's law office in 1936; Garriga cited it from memory.
100 Colomines, Catalanisme i l'Estat, 166n.
101 Joaniquet, 198-200.
102 Ainaud & Jardi, 99.
for Catalonia," Maura scribbled to himself in the Cortes, "should not be discussed except in an environment of cordialities and concord. For that reason, it seems necessary to put forward, in all fairness, all local aspirations for autonomy - for the municipalities and regions of all Spain, Catalonia being a specialized case of a common matter." Catalonia should not be at odds with the rest of Spain, as it would be if given a special status; while Catalonia had a more pronounced regional political identity than most of Spain, and while most people did not necessarily oppose recognizing Catalonia's aspirations, giving the Catalans a special status might risk upsetting some elements, and so Maura wished to proceed with greater caution. Maura contributed to the feeling of concord in the Cortes by trying not to disturb the government of Canalejas. When a preliminary vote arose, the Conservatives would not vote against the government, because this would have had them joining the Liberals who were still loyal to Moret. "If we had voted with Moret," Maura told a Madrid newspaper, in a clipping saved by Moret, "I would have seemed obliged to accept power immediately, and I am not disposed to take it out of the hands of Canalejas."

When the final vote in the lower house on the law of mancomunidades occurred in October, however, Maura did not want to take responsibility for voting in what he considered only a partial reform, but he also did not want the project to fail. With a large number of representatives abstaining, Maura had to ensure that there would be enough votes cast to provide the quorum necessary for the law to pass, so he instructed many conservatives to vote against it. Liberal Democrats, Regionalists, Nationalists, Carlists, Catholic fundamentalists, many independent republicans, and Catalan Conservatives all voted in favor, and the law had cleared its main hurdle. Cambo sent Duran a wire immediately: "Canalejas declares that on being passed the mancomunidades are the initiation of a new era of politics. Everyone including Maura considers their [final] approval a sure thing."

Then tragedy struck. An anarchist terrorist shot Canalejas in Madrid, killing perhaps the most effective and popular modern politician within the main system

103 Maura, personal notes [1912], Arch M 401/3.
105 Colomines, "Catalunya 1900-1917: una visión parlamentària," Acacia, #3 [1992], 121n.
106 Cambó, telephone message to Duran, 1912, Arch DiV
parties. Canalejas died before he could cement the changes that he had begun within the Liberal Party to make it a true party of popular opinion. Even the recalcitrant Maura had shown his respect for the leader of the Democrats by choosing to stand back and allow Canalejas to remold the Liberal Party only months after Maura had designs to destroy that party forever for its backhanded role in removing him from power. Canalejas gone, the Liberals once again foundered into their multiple factions. Count Romanones, from a rival wing of the party and a protégé of Eugenio Montero Ríos - a personal rival of Moret - formed the new government in mid-November, 1912. La Cierva, in an interview with Alfonso XIII, told the King that "Canalejas' succession would give rise to questions and disputes that would not allow for stable government, and which would constitute a serious difficulty for the Conservative Party." 107 Maura had shown respect for Canalejas, but not for any other Liberal leader; he would thus resume his implacable hostility to the Liberal Party, and refuse to alternate with it in government. Yet the Liberals had redivided, and might not last much longer in power without Canalejas at the helm. Neither main party, then, had determined exactly how - or even with what program - to carry on.

Meanwhile, amidst the confusion, the fate of the new law of mancomunidades was still undetermined, since it had yet to pass the Senate. Prat wrote sadly to a cousin that "unfortunately it is certain. We have to start all over again." 108 Romanones had gone on record against the project, but had also announced months before that once it had begun, the Liberal Party should see it through. In September in Santander he had said that

Precisely the greatest victory obtained by Catalan politics in these last years has been in having achieved the complete disappearance of the atmosphere of prejudice and of antipathy with which its first complaints were heard in the Spanish parliament. Today, not only are the complaints heard with the utmost attention and with the greatest desire to be able to satisfy them, but also the illustrious representatives and orators of the Catalans inspire everyone for their great culture and for their eloquence.... Today everyone recognizes that we are faced with a very severe problem of the greatest and most decisive importance, a problem that, what is more, does not just affect Catalonia: it has to do with the transformation of that which until now has constituted the basis of our entire administrative regime. 109

107 la Cierva, Notas, 177.
The Barcelona provincial government began to debate new tactics to force the issue upon Romanones. Prat secured a promise from Romanones that, as soon as the parliament sorted out the year's budget and a trade treaty with France, the law of mancomunidades would be the first project on the agenda. Arguing that they had no reason to think that Romanones would go back on his word, Prat felt that the Catalan provincial governments and representatives in the Cortes should wait until these other issues passed before resuming their agitation. An underlying fear did exist in the ranks of the Regionalists that the new government would renege, but nevertheless they decided to wait until the new year before pressing the issue.110 Although Cambó, too, thought it necessary to keep pushing on Madrid, Prat's view that the Regionalists should "not make a noise," prevailed. With only a passive impulse from Cambó, Romanones failed to advance the law to the Senate.111 When he did raise the issue in June, the Liberal party ruptured again and his government foundered until he found himself forced to close the Cortes with the bill once more left unapproved.112

The governing Liberal Party had too large an anti-autonomist substratum. Many Liberals feared that any reform of local administration would only serve to benefit Maura and the Conservatives; they feared as well that if any manner of autonomy were granted to Catalonia, the other regions might also want some while Catalonia itself would seek more.113 The debate had caused ever greater rifts within the Liberal Party. Many of its industrialist members - often men of the Fomento - favored the creation of the Mancomunitat as an administrative improvement rather than as a nationalist one. The bulk of the Party, with agricultural interests, failed to understand this issue, arguing that it made no sense to duplicate

11 Olivar, 231-233. "Is it," Cambó asked, "that I understand the catalanist movement to have renounced forever all forms of protest, so that we cannot and ought not to protest any more, that we should proscribe all possibility of externism, that we should never sing "Els Segadors" [the Catalan anthem] again? This question produces in me the same effect as if someone asked me if I am in favor of taking morphine or if I am resolved never to take it. If at some moment I succumb to a bout of acute rheumatism, I reserve for myself the right to use morphine; but I have the desire, the ardent desire, that I never have this need and that I never have to resort to morphine." Cambó, "La Lliga RegionalISTA y la politica general espanola: necesidad de crear gobiernos de opinion - politica de afirmaciones y realidades," speech at the Tivoli Theater (Barcelona), 6. Apr. 1913, ArchNRivas 11-8893.
113 Colomines, Catalanisme i l'Estat, 70-71.
responsibilities and that the central state itself was better positioned to handle coordinating policy for all of Spain. Many Liberals of both industrial and agricultural wings found themselves ideologically less concerned with the issue, and considered it instead as a merely a salient issue to use for personal conflicts within the Party.\textsuperscript{114} The dominance of Liberal agricultural interests in Castile did indeed lead to polarization between the Catalans and the Castilians, even if this issue had little to do with nationalism. These entrenched interests also helped stifle attempts by the Regionalists to generate enthusiasm for decentralization and the formation of mancomunidades throughout the rest of Spain.\textsuperscript{115} Spain had entered recession, although this had affected the rural areas more than the developed ones. Therefore, many of the agricultural elites viewed with suspicion any attempt at decentralization, since this would imply that the better-off provinces would be able to divert resources from the rest of Spain, making "national life impossible." More than administrative reform, these elites thought Spain needed economic reform to share the wealth.\textsuperscript{116}

Romanones remained skeptical about his ability to pass the legislation; Alba and his followers vacillated; many Liberal senators, encouraged by the closed-door intrigues of Montero Ríos, declared their inhibitions for voting in favor of the law of mancomunidades; and Canalejas' successor as head of the Liberal Democratic faction Manuel García Prieto, hoping that he could assume the party leadership with Romanones' demise, withdrew the support of his faction. When a motion of confidence in the Romanones government arose in the Senate, Romanones lost narrowly, and his government resigned.\textsuperscript{117} Prat felt deceived by the inability of the Parliament to pass a law so widely approved in Barcelona and agreed to by the leader of the governing party, and concluded at the end of 1913 that Catalonia could and should no longer wait for the Parliament for the satisfaction it wanted for its demands.\textsuperscript{118} This encouraged Prat to make the Mancomunitat a more active

\textsuperscript{114} Josep Puy i Joanico, Alfonso Sala i Argemi, 69-70.
\textsuperscript{115} Ricardo Robledo Hernández, "L'actitud castella enfront del catalanisme," Recerques #5 [1975], 248-256.
\textsuperscript{116} Sociedad Económica Numantina de Amigos del País, Las Mancomunidades Provinciales y los Intereses Generales, 6-12.
\textsuperscript{117} Colomines, Catalanisme i l'Estat, 189.
organization when it finally did come into existence, and to wholeheartedly back Cambó's desire to enter government in Madrid.

Cambó's brief spell out of office left him time to put together his contacts and plans for the Regionalists in Madrid. He traveled to Saragossa in October 1911 to meet with Ossorio, who headed the Conservative Party there. These meetings prompted the long-winded Ossorio to write an especially detailed letter to Maura, in which he explained Cambó's wish to influence Spanish politics from the periphery but wavered on the edge of joining Maura's forces.

He is every day more and more yours and at times he advances an identification with everything that you stand for, represent, and guarantee in politics. It is difficult for me to find in Spain a twin any more identical to you than Cambó. But the Conservative Party fears him.... It thinks - it seems to me with reason - that as soon as the Regionalists come into the party they would introduce a revolution within its ranks. If they did, what responsibility! If they did not, what uselessness!

The other alternative, that the Regionalists stay on their own, attracting kindred elements from around Spain to their cause, was not, Ossorio felt, viable. Cambó, Ossorio continued,

spoke to me for a while of constituting a group of normal people who would fight for the good of Spain, without aspirations of ruling, against the extremists of the right and of the left. To that group they [the Regionalists] would affiliate, and some Conservatives and Liberals. I think he is out of his mind, given the absurdity of the plan. Among the Liberals there is no one normal. Of the Conservatives, the most normal, disinterested friends of the regionalists are precisely those most loyal to you and who find satisfaction in your ideals. From there, the famous normal group would be reduced to just the Liga.

Against the extremes, Cambó and Ossorio agreed on the need to combat the next municipal elections by forging a Regionalist-Conservative alliance, in order to put a limit on any growth of the disaffected right.119

Maura, too, thought highly of Cambó and sought to highlight the closeness of his program to Cambó's, maintaining the hope of attracting the Regionalists into the Conservative Party, in order to transfer their energy into Spain by involving them in a state-wide party.120 "When you left power in 1909," Cambó responded,

I hid the fear that all your work aimed at disarming - with effect and justice - the protest of Catalonia, would perish in that shipwreck of Spanish political normality, and I believed that Catalan opinion, which had not been able to appreciate the magnitude of your effort, would look upon only the very little result achieved and that the pessimism of negation and protest would be reborn, aggravated.

I believe that we Catalans have to be those who have contributed to... normalizing Spanish politics and not to unsettle it any more than it already is.121

119 Ossorio, letter to Maura, 20. Oct. 1911, ArchM.
120 Maura, letter to Cambó, 30. Jan. 1912, ArchM.
121 Cambó, letter to Maura, 3. Feb. 1912, ArchM.
Cambó worked directly with Maura during their years of isolation from the political mainstream. Even though Maura personally opposed the passage of the law of *mancomunidades* without the rest of his local administrative reforms, and indeed worked harder to stifle the Liberal Party than to produce effective politics of his own in the years after the fall of his long government, he nevertheless aided and advised Cambó on how to proceed and backed the Regionalists behind the scenes.122

Nevertheless, passing the new law of *mancomunidades* was still a struggle, and one the *Lliga* itself needed to carry out by impressing on the bulk of the parliamentary representatives the urgency of the project. "If we achieve the *Mancomunitat* this time," the *Veu* stressed in the Summer of 1913, we will have Maura and Canalejas to thank, for their noble and determined attitude in creating not an ideal but a favorable atmosphere. But for the success of the moment, for the final victory, for the definitive approval of the *mancomunidades*, we do not have to thank anyone. Our effort, the heroic perseverance of our Catalan politicians - of all affiliations - will have achieved it.123

The bulk of the dynastic politicians still did not operate under the sway of Maura and Canalejas. Both men were on their ways to creating parties based on popular opinion, but both had their power violently cut short at the point of their maximum influence: Maura by the Tragic Week, Canalejas by an assassin. This left, in Cambó’s opinion, the only movements of popular opinion in the hands of protest groups, as had long been customary in Spain. Only the *Lliga*, Cambó asserted, was a positive political party, born of protest and popular opinion but working to build a new Spain through governmental politics.124 Prat de la Riba wrote in the *Veu* that the only definitive solution to this formidable constitutional crisis is to connect the extant parliamentary institutions with veritable citizens who have opinions and vote - that is to say, to put at the disposition of the parliamentary machinery that the constitution has set up the driving force of two or more parties of opinion which involve the majority of the electorate.125

With Canalejas dead and the Liberal Party mostly hostile, the Regionalists had to continue to turn to Maura and the Conservatives. But in following his convictions, the intransigent Mallorcan alienated many of his former allies and even much popular opinion, and appeared to be heading back into dissidence.126

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123 article in the *Veu*, 30. May 1913, 1.
Dealing with the Conservatives did not always mean dealing with Maura. The majority of the party came from other factions, while even Maura himself did not run the Maurist faction. Often, Gabriel Maura handled his father’s affairs, and he proved much less understanding of Cambó’s operations. If the elder Maura remained in charge, the Regionalists were considering joining the Conservative Party if they could be sure the elder Maura would continue to direct it. Party leaders claimed he did. Nevertheless, there was still some ambiguity, and the Lliga remained independent of the Conservative Party. After the death of Canalejas, it seemed still more important for the Lliga to expand its own power base and to compete directly on the Spanish political stage in Madrid.

Maura himself created a stir by announcing his retirement from politics at the very start of 1913, although he quickly withdrew the resignation. The stunt served to reaffirm his position at the head of the Conservative Party, at a time when many Conservatives had begun to doubt their possibilities of returning to power while he officially led the party. “My impression is,” Cambó wrote Prat soon thereafter, “that had Maura not returned to politics, the elements of the Conservative Party closest to him would have come with us. Now they do not know what to do: a large number of them have come to see me, but they wait to learn what Maura will say and do.”

Cambó was opposed to Maura’s theatrics, angry that the abstentionism that the Conservative leader and his party played had nullified their influence for three years and had thus meant that they could not properly represent the popular opinion Maura had always claimed to value. Now that the Liberal Party had entered a profound crisis while in power, the Conservatives paid for their recent strategy: a party could not now rise to power which had not made any proper opposition.

Cambó became even more convinced that the time had come to have his Regionalists consider a broader spectrum of Spain’s problems. “I have the conviction,” he announced in a major speech in early 1913, “that if Catalan opinion had become interested in all the problems of Spanish political life, if it had

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130 Cambó, “La Lliga Regionalista y la politica general española,” speech at the Tivoli Theater, 6. Apr. 1913, ArchNRivas 11-8893.
intervened in that life in order to enliven it, the vessel of our aspirations would have advanced much more on its journey than it has by concentrating all of our efforts on a single problem (the Catalan Problem)." The Regionalists could become the dominant party in Spain, Cambó felt, and from that position be even better placed to bring about their wishes for Catalonia. The immediate future of the Lliga, though, depended on the passage of the law of mancomunidades. The failure in the previous year to get it approved had cost the Regionalists and had strengthened the Liberals for the time being. But the matter remained unresolved. The way the parties in Madrid went about finding a solution to this one problem would determine their effectiveness and relative positions of strength for the long run.

Garriga, who defected from the Liberal Democratic faction to the Lliga definitively at this point after having first joined the Solidarity six years before, did so for his sheer desire to join the forces of catalanism while working within the governmental structure of Madrid. "The Lliga," he explained, was a veritable Catalan party of the right, understanding this word not in the purely traditional sense of the political lexicon, but rather that the party had all the conditions of being, in the style of the English Conservative Party, a regulator of the political course pushed along by a progressivist and reformist party. But in Catalonia, this advanced reformist party did not exist. The catalanist left was always a catch-all of disoriented men, incapable of defining any specific progressive policies. From this state, the Lliga appeared to the outside world as the only genuine representative of catalanism. Outside Catalonia, no one was known as a catalanist other than the men of the Lliga.

Indeed, the astute Ossorio had long noticed the collapse of the left in Catalonia. The Catalan Left, he wrote Maura in 1911, is in complete disaster. The nationalists, made daring by Coromines, Carner, and Lluhi, and animated by a blind hatred of Cambó, have stuck out the violent and aggressive daggers for regionalism. The political descendants of Salmerón, [Emili] Junoy, [Joan] Miró, [Joan] Moles, and [Albert] Bastardas, under the influence of Cambó, want to maintain at all cost cordiality with him. The Poble and the Publicidad have broken fire against each other.... Miró told me last night that as soon as the Cortes open, seven of them will declare the fusion broken and will adhere exclusively to the Republican-Socialist Conjunction.

The Radicals had fared little better. Controlling the Barcelona City Hall, their main base, after 1909 they had become beset with corruption scandals. Rather than expelling the guilty elements from their party, they actually honored them as if to

131 Cambó, same speech, Arch NRivas 11-8893.
132 Rivas, journal entry, 6. June 1913, ArchNRivas 11-8893.
133 Garriga, Memòries, 203.
134 Ossorio, letter to Maura, 20. Oct. 1911, ArchM.
further mock the population. For this behavior, the Republican-Socialist Conjunction expelled the PRR in 1911, yet Lerroux wore even this as a badge of honor for his personality cult. More than simply collect the personal spoils of power, the Radicals in the City Hall tried to put all city life into the hands of their friends through influence, protection rackets, and favors. With city funds, they paid municipal guards, consumer watchdogs, porters in the markets, neighborhood “mayors,” and even “public lighting inspectors;” they controlled everything down to kiosk concessions; and they distributed “charitable goods” to “needy” families whom they determined. While in exile between 1907 and 1909, Lerroux had made numerous international financial and business contacts, and had amassed a small personal fortune. Back in Spain, he now wished to extend his network.

This activity did not endear Lerroux to the syndicalist movement. His reluctance to represent his constituents also alienated many voters and contributed to the rise of anarcho-syndicalism in this period. Lerroux had won his seat in the Cortes at the December 1908 by-election - and with it his parliamentary immunity allowing him to return from exile; nevertheless, Lerroux did not bother to return to Spain until November 1909. On the other hand, the anarcho-syndicalists who coalesced into the CNT in 1910 also saw Lerroux’s close contacts with the Liberal Party and his adoption within the caciquist system as making the PRR a governmental party, and one which the workers should therefore not support. Lerroux, the commentator Antoni Calvet (“Gaziel”) quipped, “lived and wanted to live the ghost of the revolution, but never actually make it.” He struggled against catalanism as a bourgeois manifestation, he sought personal power, and he offered leadership to those workers who had no direction, but after the Tragic Week, his influence in Barcelona waned as he redirected himself towards Madrid. Meanwhile, the combined events of the summer of 1909, Lerroux’s deceit, and the

135 Alberti, 319-322.
137 Culla, Republicanisme Lerrouxista, 241-245. “I am not yet rich,” Lerroux disclosed at the Gran Via Theater on June fifth, 1912, “but I propose to become so.”
138 ibid., 198-199.
139 Cuadrat Ciurana, 457-462.
140 Calvet, 331.
decline of the short-lived socialist movement in Catalonia aided by the Socialist Party's decision to concentrate more on Madrid-based concerns added up to the rise of the CNT and the decline of the working-class vote at elections. By 1911, the Lliga had begun to reverse the setbacks it had suffered in the provincial and municipal elections of two years before.

By 1912, the growth of the alliance between the right-wing parties in Catalonia caused the PRR and UFNR to look to each other to stem the decline of the left. This created unease among many members of the UFNR due to the anti-catalanist origin of the PRR. Nevertheless, an alliance was seen as inevitable to combat any future return of Maura and to stem the loss of votes to anarchist-inspired abstention.

When Álvarez, in founding the Reformist Party in 1912, made a concession to certain autonomist sentiments, an entire wing of the UFNR, already at odds with the party leadership, defected from the UFNR and joined the ranks of the new republican configuration. Nevertheless, the Republican vote continued to decline in the polls of 1913 - and Álvarez's Reformists pulled very little of the vote in Catalonia, not boding well for the future of his party there. With the UFNR representation cut across Catalonia either through poor showings at the polls or through defections, the Nationalists chose to join the PRR in a Republican Defense Junta. Such activity allowed the Lliga to question seriously the ethical and patriotic credentials of the UFNR, and spelled the end for this configuration. Several of its leaders, including Lluhi, retired from politics in frustration, as so many left-wing catalanist leaders had in previous crises before - notably Lluis Domènech, Suñol, and Carner. The Radicals, though, benefited from any alliance, since they recognized a need to change their image. The PRR, with its base in a Catalonia evolving steadily towards some form of autonomy, could no longer afford to be seen as anti-Catalan; trying to attract a different base not necessarily rooted in

142 Albertí, 323-324.
143 ibid., 324.
144 ibid., 343.
145 ibid. 653.
146 ibid., 362-363.
the masses who had forsaken it anyway for syndicalist movements, the PRR also needed to appear respectable in order to have an impact in Madrid. 147

With the two main parties in crisis in 1913, all the smaller ones were beginning to reposition themselves in the hope that they could gain the influence over the system that an organized party could have, and from there play the pivotal role in controlling the direction of politics for the coming years. Here the Regionalists had the head start due to their superior organization and flexibility. In the early Fall of 1913, Prat de la Riba stepped back and jotted down some notes about what the _Lliga_ should do in the approaching months. Romanones' government had long ago entered a fatal crisis, but fierce objection by the republican groups would prevent Maura's return. The King, Prat figured, would first try to find another suitable Liberal to head the government, but could not approach Moret or even García Prieto because of the objections of the _Lliga_. One solution would be for the King to choose a Liberal who had reached an understanding with the Regionalists, but Prat felt he would not do this because it would have the effect of a "double coup" - first for destroying the Conservative Party by not allowing it its turn, and second for giving effective power to the Regionalists which would produce a sharp reaction across Spain. Still more, Cambó, competent to win over much public opinion on various issues, had instead spent the previous years concerned with a specifically Catalan issue - the _Mancomunitat_ - and thus had not been able to show his talent at tackling Spanish issues. The King, Prat concluded, had no other choice but to call on the Conservatives.

Prat's foresight then extended into what the _Lliga_ should do to take on the critical position within the government. Once the Conservatives took power, Prat surmised, they would begin to suffer the same factioning as now beset the Liberal Party. "To profit from this party," Prat concluded, it is advisable for us to pursue various things: first, Cambó must in the very least move his home to Madrid; second, we must create in Madrid our own newspaper; third, in the next _Cortes_ we must take part in all general matters, making a criterion of integral and complete government dealing with all manner of problems. 148

Surely enough, the _Lliga_ became the critical party within the Spanish system. The political world having written them off after the events of 1909, the Regionalists

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147 Culla, _Republicanisme Lerrouxista_, 277-279.
148 Prat, notes [Fall 1913], ArxPrat 1-7/27.
emerged stronger than ever after several years in the wilderness, their ambitions refocused, their means determined, and their short-term goal of a quasi-autonomous Catalan *Mancomunitat* on the verge of becoming a reality.
VI. From the Mancomunitat to the Assembly of Parliamentarians, 1913-1917

In the next three years, the Lliga went from triumph to triumph. The Mancomunitat, founded in 1914, allowed the Lliga to begin its economic and cultural regenerative programs for Catalonia. It also allowed the Lliga to reaffirm its home base, from which it could launch its campaign throughout Spain. The Regionalists stayed on the attack, pressing for the economic and political modernization of the state. By 1917, with Spain in crisis, the Lliga was placed to unite disparate forces in both destroying the old system and in creating a new one.

Enric Prat’s analysis of the Spanish political system in late 1913 proved correct. The two dynastic parties had suffered traumatic internal crises. The internal disputes within the Liberal Party had left it incapable of succeeding itself in government. Yet the King could not turn to the Conservative Party while Antoni Maura remained its leader. Prat had guessed that Alfonso would turn to another man within the Liberal-Conservative Party, and that this would give the Lliga the opportunity to affirm its dominance within Catalonia. Indeed, their success in ultimately bringing about the Mancomunitat assured the Regionalists steady electoral gains within Catalonia at the expense of all opposition parties - particularly the fractured Nationalists. And with the fracture of the two dynastic parties in Madrid, the way became clear for the Regionalists to increase their influence in the Spanish capital and prepare the final destruction of the party system as it had existed since the Restoration.

When the government of Count Romanones fell after much of his own party failed to support him in a confidence vote in the Senate, the King appointed a Conservative replacement. Maura left town quietly, making room for Eduardo Dato to become the new President. Dato was a member of the more traditional left-wing of the Liberal-Conservative Party, and with his long history of social concerns and contacts with Republicans was acceptable even to the Radicals.¹ Also, unlike Maura,  

¹ Culla, Republicanisme Lerrouxista, 311. It had been widely noted that the greatest social reforms in recent years had come under Conservative governments, and were particularly the work of the recent Interior Secretaries Dato and la Cierva. Bofill, “Sobre questions d’estatisme,” notes from 1910, ArxJBM VI-3-#2; Miguel Sastre, Los Partidos Turnantes. Since the deaths of Fernández Villaverde and Romero Robledo, Dato represented the only non-maurist vision within the Liberal-Conservative Party. Nevertheless, as a party man, Dato loyally followed Maura until this point. Yet Maura had evolved ever right-ward. Recognized as a “left-wing Conservative,” Dato was well positioned ideologically to
Dato could accept the Liberals as suitable partners in the *turno* system. Only Maura and his followers considered Dato’s acceptance of power treachery, and Maura’s aide, the former Civil Governor of Barcelona Ángel Ossorio, with the tacit approval of Maura’s sons, pronounced a speech in Saragossa in which he called on Maura’s most faithful followers to leave the party. Many of Maura’s most loyal adherents came from Catalonia, where the youth groups which formed the only important remnants of the old Catalan Conservative Party declared their allegiance to the discredited leader. After a decade in the mainstream of a major party, Maura found himself back where he had been long before when he had refused to compromise his principles for party discipline and cohesion. More importantly, he became the figurehead of a political movement, more visible on the streets than in the corridors of power.

In one of his first actions, Dato passed the *Mancomunitat* by Royal Decree. The long-awaited passage of the bill was a curiosity: it had been necessary to obtain a Royal Decree rather than get a parliamentary vote of approval, even though the issue had been before the *Cortes* in one form or another for a decade, much of it had been partly approved at one point or other, and it had received the backing of virtually all parties and factions. Rafael Andrade, the new Civil Governor of Barcelona, explained that the Regionalists had entrenched themselves in Catalan politics and that it was they who not only pushed for the *Mancomunitat* but had convinced all the other Catalans that theirs was the only course to follow; they brought variance in opinion by other political groupings under suspicion. Nevertheless, the *Lliga* had obviously proven very effective in this action, and therefore the Royal Decree served to diffuse agitation before it began. Andrade also hoped it might serve to deflate the Regionalists and allow the government to question the directions the *Lliga* wished to pursue with the new organization, particularly in the way the Regionalists’ plans for autonomy would actually limit municipal autonomy and at the same time allow Barcelona to dominate the other

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three Catalan provinces. Thus, many centralists argued, the Lliga had blackmailed Spain into granting this concession by threatening to provoke general agitation in Catalonia which the fragile political apparatus might not be able to control.

Many right-wingers in Catalonia did indeed fear that the Lliga might play with revolutionary fire if it did not get its way. Right-wing groups decided to join forces to combat the Regionalists in upcoming elections. Most vociferous among these groups was the Committee of Social Defense, a Catholic integrist organization. However, these ultra-Catholics had very little influence in Catalonia, inspired very few constituents, and were hardly organized as a political party, especially when compared to the organizational structure of the Lliga. The Lliga wore as a badge of honor that it was combatted from the right and from the left yet cooperated with all - this demonstrated its true “Catalan” nature, as opposed to any left-right political bias. With the very Catholic Jaume Bofill helping to organize the Lliga, the Regionalists discounted the fundamentalists almost entirely. Indeed, the far right did not do well in the municipal elections of 1913; the Catalan left’s results were mixed; and the Lliga and its allies once again made gains across Catalonia. In Barcelona, the Regionalists and the Radicals each won eleven seats, while the UFNR, the far right, and the Liberals only captured one apiece; in Girona, the Regionalists and the Conservatives won three seats each to the Catalan Republicans’ and Liberals’ two each; the candidates supported by the Lliga also won half the fourteen contested seats in Tarragona, while the UFNR was the biggest winner in Lleida, taking five of fourteen contested seats. The 1913 municipal elections showed that the Regionalists had returned to dominate Catalan politics, and that the UFNR had not been able to coalesce into the strong political formation on the Catalan left that many had predicted it could. At the end of 1913 and the beginning of 1914, the Veu began running frequent advertisements for Prat’s Nacionalitat Catalana and Lluís Duran’s Regionalisme i Federalisme, even though neither book

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5 García Venero, Historia del Nacionalismo Catalán, vol. II, 139.


8 see the Veu, 10. Nov. 1913, 2.

was currently in print, as if to remind everyone of the theoretical basis for regionalism, to assert the Lliga's predominance in Catalan - and catalanist - politics, and to show the way forward into general Spanish politics that these books had preached.10

After the approval of the law of mancomunidades in Madrid, an Assembly of all the Catalan provincial deputies met to finalize the Catalan Mancomunitat. Andrade, the Civil Governor, created a stir by insisting, possibly at the suggestion of the Secretary of the Interior José Sánchez Guerra, that the discussion must only occur in Spanish. This threatened to undo the prevailing calm. Prat, Duran, Josep Puig, and Narcís Verdaguer, the leading movers of the Lliga in the Barcelona Provincial Government, met to determine a response. For the lawyer Duran, the answer was clear: "If I defend my clients in Spanish, why not defend Catalonia in the same way? I accept the sacrifice with much relish." Puig, however, remained intransigent, and refused to take part in the discussions which created the Mancomunitat.11 The differences which would lead to Puig's conflict with the other leaders of the Party several years down the road had already begun to surface.

The law of mancomunidades had allowed for the formation of three types of regional structures, which manifested themselves in immediate proposals from Catalonia, Castile, and the Ebro area (Aragon, Navarre, and the Rioja region).12 Catalonia's Mancomunitat promoted its regional character as official and natural, but also set up a regional governmental structure with its own powers, something not specifically written into the law of mancomunidades.13 The Castilian proposal followed the law more strictly, pooling the resources of the provincial governments but, at the same time, leaving power in the hands of those governments. The proposal for the Ebro area did not even seek to associate the provincial governments, but merely allowed for the collaboration of groups across provincial lines to favor agriculture and commercial interests.14

Thus, the passage of the law of mancomunidades, designed to diffuse the situation in Catalonia, also inspired elements in the other regions to consider their

10 see the Veu in many 1913 and 1914 editions.
11 Olivar, 235.
12 José Gascón y Marín, Mancomunidades Provinciales, 78.
13 ibid., 126-127.
14 ibid., 86-88.
own mancomunidades, so verifying Maura's theory that the Catalan Problem was merely a problem of bad central government that afflicted all of Spain, and that the application of Maura's project throughout Spain would serve to revitalize the country as a whole. In January of 1914, the Madrid Provincial Government called on other Castilian provinces to participate in a discussion of a Castilian Mancomunidad, the first discussion of such a project on a provincial level outside Catalonia. When the preliminary ideas were approved for further study, the Madrileños consulted Prat on how to proceed.\footnote{“La Mancomunitat Castellana,” Veu, 2. Jan. 1914, 3; “Síntoma encoratjador: la Mancomunitat Castellana,” Veu, 3. & 4. Jan. 1914.} Even the Catholic Madrid newspaper ABC, never a friend to any project remotely tinged with catalanism, supported the formation of a Castilian Mancomunidad.\footnote{“La Mancomunidad Castellana,” ABC, 3. Jan. 1914.} The proposal for the Ebro-area mancomunidad was initiated in the Rioja region by the Provincial Government of Logroño. The idea was received by the Provincial Government of Saragossa, which passed it on to the other provinces involved. But the law of mancomunidades only ever came to be applied in Catalonia, because only there did a political party exist that was determined to see the project through. Although public opinion in many other regions remained to varying degrees in favor of forming mancomunidades, the oligarchic party bosses still held sway and could effectively block any progress towards the creation of the new administrative units that were, after all, designed to shatter the grip the old system held on Spanish politics.\footnote{Canals, Cuestión Catalana, 344-345. The next several years saw many more attempts to create mancomunidades outside Catalonia. Many regions noted that through the Mancomunitat, Catalonia had succeeded in planting its problems before the entire Spanish state. These other regions felt inspired, as the Regionalists had predicted, and sought to do the same for their regions and their regions’ problems. The trouble came in overcoming the opposition of the entrenched system bosses. Those in Valladolid were a prime example, and they effectively opposed any formation of a mancomunidad in Old Castile. Luis Carretero y Nieva, La Cuestión Regional de Castilla, 2-5 and 246-252. They also could represent their opposition to the formation of the new administrative unit as opposition to Catalonia, presenting the whole law as merely the tool of the catalanists designed to cause the break-up of Spain. In this sense, many supporters of the project lamented that the Catalans had pushed so hard to get the law passed so that they could apply it to Catalonia, instead of first making sure that the law would be applied to all of Spain. The entire project had created enormous misunderstanding between Catalonia and the other regions, fueled by the anti-Catalans of the center. Carretero, 169-218.}

The Catalan Mancomunitat combined the duties of the four provinces into a single administration. While its supporters did not wish to admit it, it was no more than a large province, with no proper autonomy. The provincial deputies sat on the
General Assembly and elected a President and a Council of eight who oversaw different portfolios dealing with public works, services, culture, and other similar areas over which the provinces already had jurisdiction. The Mancomunitat had even less actual power until 1919, when the provinces finally agreed to cede their entire budgets to the greater structure. When the General Assembly of the Mancomunitat held its first official meeting on April sixth, 1914, it unanimously elected Prat - still President of the Barcelona Provincial Government - as its first president. Under his leadership, many of the Mancomunitat’s limitations became effectively moot, since his sheer determination made the project an ambitious one beyond what anyone had imagined.

Prat continued to view himself as the spokesman for all Catalans and not just for the Regionalists, and his new post made this image that much more important. The author Claudi Ametlla remarked that after a short period, Prat de la Riba has established truces with all parties and has the support of all the provincial deputies - now deputies of the Mancomunitat. And those who talk about ‘en’ [a prefix of respect] Lerroux and ‘en’ Cambó, refer to him as ‘el senyor’ [even greater respect] Prat.... Everyone respects him even more than they respect their own party chiefs, and when the relationship grows, they adore him as this cold and distant man has never been and never could have been adored before.

Catalans of all parties sought to work with Prat on the Mancomunitat, such was the excitement he generated for the possibilities of the new administration. Dynastic politicians turned into autonomists, while even Radical Republicans began to participate in cultural and educational activities. One catalanist later remembered Prat for being “above all the political parties.... He did not only look towards politics, he looked towards the aggrandizement of Catalonia.” However, anyone who did not agree with Prat’s vision found himself classified as somehow anti-Catalan, which made any opposition to the Lliga difficult.

Prat extended many of the projects he had planned from the Barcelona Provincial Government to encompass all of Catalonia. The Institute of Catalan Studies, the project to normalize the Catalan language, and the Library of Catalonia all passed from the Barcelona Provincial Government to the Mancomunitat. But

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18 Ainaud & Jardí, 128.
19 Minutes of this meeting can be found in the Fundació Jaume Bofill’s Dossier de Documentació sobre la Mancomunitat Catalana, 3.
21 Ainaud & Jardí, 145-147.
23 Alberto Blasco Ochoa, letter to Maura, 23. Mar. 1915, ArchM.
now his new projects included large public schools, colleges, vocational institutes, libraries, museums, and cultural institutions; he launched international exchange programs; he began programs to conserve monuments and promote Catalan identity; and he supported scientific studies.\(^{24}\) He wanted the Mancomunitat to facilitate any project for development in Catalonia, to give the sense that anything was possible. The main activity of the new Catalan government, then, was to direct funds to deal with projects proposed by local governments and individuals. The Assembly met regularly only twice a year to pass the budget, so most of the work was supervised by committees of provincial deputies.\(^{25}\) Given the limited competence the Mancomunitat had, Prat had to start with what he had, before spreading out into the economic modernization programs he had in mind and which would take several years to plan and undertake anyway. But the programs he was able to start up produced an immediate impact. However, this activity did lead to a criticism by some in Catalonia and many outside that the Mancomunitat had merely allowed Prat to begin his own system of caciquism, which would favor those areas loyal to him and which he chose to develop, would force the cooperation of the other political parties, would exercise a complete intellectual control over the Catalans, and would therefore broaden the Lliga’s hegemony within Catalonia and its bargaining power with Spain.\(^{26}\)

Shortly before he died in 1917, Prat sent a message to the Catalan Assembly when illness forced him to be absent from their first full session of that year. He urged them to continue his work:

> We have not created the Mancomunitat in order to have a single large province or to give the Catalan spirit a tiny morsel of subservient and secondary administration. We all want for Catalonia a sovereign body, we all feel that the dignity of the popular Catalan will imperiously demands, in a way more or less attenuated, the trappings of a State.... Therefore we aspire to see that the functions today granted to the central power, which need to be transferred to the Mancomunitat, are functions totally and fully handed over; that the limit of autonomy imposes itself on the extension of the number

\(^{24}\) Ainaud & Jardi, 161-228; cf. Bofill, Prat.

\(^{25}\) The Archive of the Mancomunitat mostly contains documentation relating to the broad range of projects proposed at the local level and reviewed by the committees. A fair amount of this was still written in Spanish, with no discernable discrimination. Some of the legislation brought up in the Mancomunitat, however, was more controversial. One of the first motions raised was by the republican Albert Bastardas demanding that the central government repeal the Law of Jurisdictions once and for all. ArxManc 2778-1914-25. Later in 1914, the Mancomunitat raised a project to reform local administration in order to clean up municipal and provincial treasuries and to give them more autonomy in determining their funding, to create local treasuries which were “powerful and absolutely independent from the state.” ArxManc 2779-1914-91.

of functions but not on the intensity, not on the fullness of each one of the functions devolved.27

The republicans looked to be the only serious potential opposition to the Regionalists within Catalonia. The coalition between the UFNR and the PRR continued. But the nationalists could hardly fail to support Prat’s plans to catalanize Catalonia, while the Radicals sought respectability and had moderated their anti-catalanist stance. The UFNR had proven that it could not defeat the Lliga on its own as it had hoped when the Lliga seemed on the point of demise in 1909-1910. But the alliance served to discredit the Catalan Left for its dealings with the traditionally anti-catalanist Radicals, and the republican share of the vote continued to decline. Nevertheless, the retired left-nationalist Jaume Carner backed the policy, and in a letter to Pere Coromines, the President of the UFNR, wrote:

> An alliance or coalition with the Radicals must recognize that a considerable part of our party is sentimentally hostile.
> A coalition with the Lliga would have very grave political consequences.
> It would be a formidable blow to our influence in the republican strongholds outside Barcelona, and outside and inside the city it would debilitate republican significance.
> I believe that it would be an important step to bring Lerroux into an understanding with Catalan republicanism.28

The policy failed miserably in the 1914 general elections: the Lliga picked up four new seats to bring its total to twelve, while the UFNR won six seats - three fewer than the Esquerra had in 1910, and the PRR lost four of its five Catalan seats (see results in Appendix A). The Lliga had established its own power base, leaving the republicans to mobilize the working classes; the UFNR had never had much influence in those sectors, while the PRR was losing its influence to the anarcho-syndicalist groups.29 The alliance with the PRR generated neither votes nor enthusiasm for the UFNR, and actually served to do just the opposite by calling into question the UFNR’s professed stance on issues relating to Catalonia.30 The success of the Lliga in achieving the Mancomunitat and the outlet that the newly founded Reformist Party of Melquiades Álvarez created for some disaffected republican groups meant that the UFNR slowly began to disintegrate.31

28 Carner, letter to Corromines, cited in Pérez Bastardas, Republicans Nacionalistes, vol. I, 225-226. Even after the UFNR continued its slide at the polls, Carner insisted that “I believe that one of the advantages of the coalition is this: it will accustom us to thinking that being radical does not signify being anti-Catalan.” Carner, speech at the Third Assembly of the UFNR, 2. June 1914, in Culla, Republicanisme Lerrouxista, 280.
29 Olivar, 237.
By 1915, a group of nationalist republicans - headed by Francesc Layret i Foix and Prat's oldest friend, the former Mayor of Barcelona Albert Bastardas, and aided by Marcel.li Domingo and the Mallorcan Gabriel Alomar - broke definitively from the UFNR to form the Autonomist Republican Bloc (BRA). This became the latest in a series of left-wing Catalan nationalist parties trying to define its own electoral space. Its founding manifesto declared:

The Lliga Regionalista constitutes a danger for the liberal ideal.... It has gathered all the diverse forces of Catalonia, the remnants of a caciquism that just barely extant has helped sustain it .... It has united with Carlism and the Social Defense (Committee), so very much opposed to the values the Lliga once upon a time stood for.

Like the other groups before it, it expressed dismay at the right-wing character of the Lliga, and sought to find its constituency in the bulk of Catalonia, a country it viewed as naturally progressive, republican, and catalanist. The UFNR may have failed in its attempt to escape the hegemony of the Lliga by pacting with the lerrouxists, but it did succeed in keeping the momentum going on the Catalan Left, attracting the working classes to catalanism. When enough of the working class finally did feel its Catalan identity, it would undermine the Lliga and help cause that party's downfall. By the following year, the Republican Youth of Lleida, affiliated with the BRA, had grown tired of this organization and started its own, the even further-left Catalan Republican Party (PRC), which would be the first party to attract an important segment of the non-catalanist - but Catalan - left to catalanism.

Meanwhile, the replacement of the Liberal government in 1913 by one formed by the main wing of the Liberal-Conservative Party failed to stabilize the political situation in Madrid. Dato's ineffective government failed to deal with the international and domestic crises caused by the First World War, and kept the Cortes closed most of the time in order not to have to face down parliamentary debate. Just because he had approved the Mancomunitat did not mean that the Regionalists let Dato off the hook. They pressed loudest to have the Cortes left open to discuss reforms geared to allow Spain to deal with the international crisis. The most important of these reforms were the Lliga's proposals for the economic

32 Albert, Republicanisme Català, 382.
33 Manifesto of the BRA, quoted in Michele Olivari, Regionalismo Catalano, 213.
34 Silvia Tusell Gómez, "Los nacionalistas republicanos de 1904 a 1914," in Joves Historiadors Catalans, 388.
modernization of Spain, using Catalan industry and the structures of the Mancomunitat as a springboard.\(^\text{36}\)

The Restoration regime rested on an agricultural oligarchy. However, the First World War forced rapid economic pressures on the unprepared country and served to benefit Spanish industry, the bulk of which was based in Catalonia. Catalan textile manufacturers received a huge increase in orders from the belligerent countries. Meanwhile, the disappearance of competition from European firms acted as a sudden stimulus on other industries such as electrical goods, engineering, metallurgy, and vehicle construction. Such a changed economic environment created new possibilities and even greater urgencies for the Madrid government, and pushed the Lliga to act.\(^\text{37}\)

Spain remained neutral in the War, despite the sympathies of many of its politicians for one side or the other. The ever-influential Maura best argued for maintaining this neutrality: Spain should not enter the war because it would serve no specific Spanish interest; besides, Spain’s military was not up to the job - it could not even effectively defend Spanish interests in Morocco - and the country had not yet found a solution for its post-1898 internal political crisis.\(^\text{38}\)

The Regionalists also split privately in sympathizing with sides in the War. But publicly, the Regionalists agreed with Maura that the best course for Spain to maintain was neutrality. Since Spain’s trade with belligerent countries had suddenly increased, however, this neutrality needed to take geo-political concerns into account - neutrality did not, for the Regionalists, mean turning away from the conflict.\(^\text{39}\) The crisis, however, apparently continued not to concern the Dato government even as the increased demand created rampant inflation within Spain

\(^{36}\) Lliga Regionalista, *Història d'una Política*, 166-167 & 172-175.

\(^{37}\) Paco Romero Salvadó, “Spain and the First World War,” 90-92. Cotton exports from Catalonia increased from a value of 53.3 million pesetas in 1913 to 138.4 million in 1915; in the same period, wool exports made an even more spectacular climb from 3.7 to 162.5 million pesetas. Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above*, 2.

\(^{38}\) Maura, *Sitüacion Política*, 28f.

\(^{39}\) Ucelay, “Wilson i no Lenin: l’esquerra catalana i l’any 1917,” *Avènc*, Jan. 1978; Carles de Camps, response to questionnaire “Catalunya davant la Guerra Europea,” *Revista*, 15. May 1915, 8; Muriel Casals, “La burgesia industrial i la guerra,” *Avènc*, Mar. 1984, 42. The Catalan nationalists were, for the most part, sympathetic to the Allied cause, and made no secret of it. The Allies, in their minds, stood for republicanism and the right of self-determination. As some people - not least of whom were germanophilic Catalan nationalists - pointed out, however, not all the Allied countries were republics, and France, the front-line Allied nation, was also one of the most centralized, especially when compared to Austria and Germany. See the selections in David Martinez Fiol (ed.), *El Catalanisme i la Gran Guerra*. 190
and worsened the economic crisis there. Now, not only did the state not have an economic policy that would allow industry to expand and increase the country’s overall wealth, but it furthermore left the bulk of the population struggling for economic survival.\textsuperscript{40} The agricultural oligarchy, remained uninterested in the structural reform of the country; it, too, benefited from an increase in exports, but it did not wish to see its power diminished by the growing urban classes. The Dato government failed to put forward a budget that would even acknowledge the crisis.\textsuperscript{41} Dato behaved as though maintaining neutrality in and of itself would be enough to bring prosperity and to resolve any economic problems. He thus felt he could ignore the \textit{Lliga}'s calls for an active neutrality.\textsuperscript{42} While debates continued in the \textit{Mancomunitat}, Catalonia could not proceed with economic modernization in relation to the wider world without the collaboration of the rest of the state. This was not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{43}

In 1914, Prat de la Riba initiated from the Presidency of the \textit{Mancomunitat} a commission to develop proposals for economic policy which took into account the business interests of Catalonia - industrial, agricultural, petty \textit{bourgeois}, and mercantile. Cambó then presented the commission’s conclusions to the Parliament in Madrid as the policy of the \textit{Lliga}. The most crucial portion of these proposals called for the concession of a free port to Barcelona as a stimulus to trade and local employment in what was already Spain’s busiest port. This would help create wealth and jobs in Barcelona, Spain’s industrialized hub.\textsuperscript{44} To achieve this critical economic concession, Cambó was even willing to postpone any pressure for further political devolution to Catalonia.\textsuperscript{45} Dato refused to consider these proposals until after a budget had been passed in 1915. The \textit{Lliga} acquiesced in allowing Dato’s insignificant budget to pass, but then found that Dato closed the \textit{Cortes} so as to avoid taking up the Regionalists’ proposals.\textsuperscript{46} Rebuffed, the \textit{Lliga} decided to step up its

\textsuperscript{40} Boyd, 48.  
\textsuperscript{41} Martínez Cuadrado, \textit{Burguesía Conservadora}, 415; Romero Salvadó, “Spain and the First World War,” 53-54.  
\textsuperscript{42} Rovira, \textit{La Crisi del Règim}, 7-10.  
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Lliga Regionalista}, premise of conference series which lead to publication of \textit{El Pensament Català davant del Conflicte Europeu}.  
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Lliga Regionalista}, \textit{Història d'una Política}, 166.  
\textsuperscript{46} Colomines, \textit{Catalanism}, 259-263. Dato had insulted the Catalans still further by granting the status of free port to non-industrial Cadiz, implying that he was willing to consider such a proposal but
opposition to Dato specifically and the central government in general through assemblies, demonstrations, publications, and parliamentary and extraparlimentary contacts throughout Spain.47

The incredulous Dato fell at the end of 1915.48 Cambó had demonstrated that Spain had entered a situation of the first order of interest which Dato did not wish to consider. The Liberal-Conservative leader had thereby lost the confidence of the country.49 The Lliga's secretary general, Ferran Agulló, made quite clear in his column in the Veu that the Regionalists did not care who governed so long as the Cortes remained open and free debate flowed.50 "The ideal solution," Cambó believed,

the solution that Regionalism has preached since 1909, is really the formation of governments which represent states of opinion, the adoption of regionalist doctrine as the basis for the organization of Spain. This would save everyone, Catalonia could rejoice in liberty, and we would have the satisfaction of having saved Spain.51

The Lliga was poised to launch its offensive for a "Great Spain," an agenda it did indeed press during the ensuing government.

Romanones returned with a new cabinet which included the Liberal Party's rising star Santiago Alba as Secretary of the Interior. Alba was a bit of a renegade in his own right. He had been active in the regenerationist movement of Basilio Paraiso at the beginning of the century and had gradually been attracted into the Liberal Party from the left. He had become the Liberals' party boss for Valladolid, and had most of that province under his sway.52 Alba showed disdain, however, for the centrists who dominated the two main parties without providing any ideological direction, even to the point of recognizing the value of the arch-conservative Maura to the system. To have a functioning dynastic left, he told not from Catalonia which could most benefit from it. Romero Salvado, "Spain and the First World War," 92.

47 Lliga Regionalista, Història, 172-175.
48 In the opinion of Alba, this was caused by the Lliga's opposition. "La caiguda del Govern - el naufragi," Veu, 8. Dec. 1915, 1.
49 "¿Per què ha caigut En Dato?" Veu, 12. Dec. 1915, 1. The article further noted that this was not a usual reason for a government to fall. Normally, Restoration governments fell only when they lost the confidence of the King, when the governing party's internal factions could not cooperate, or when there arose great opposition to a particular law. Never before, the Veu smirked, had popular opinion caused a government to fall.
52 Remarkably, Valladolid was also a Maurist stronghold. Maura's brother-in-law, German Gamazo, who had led a Liberal dissidency until his death in 1902, hailed from Valladolid. Maura, who had become the leader of the gamacista movement after Gamazo's death, had led that group into the Conservative Party, but still maintained influence in Valladolid.
Ossorio, required Maura's return to his legitimate position as head of the dynastic right. Alba hoped to be the counterweight to Maura, the strongman of the Liberal Party, and ultimately that party's chief. His pass through the government in 1916 allowed him to strengthen his core of personal affiliates, and to lay the groundwork for what he hoped would be his future leadership.

But Alba was a man of the system. Therefore, the biggest obstacle to his rise was not other party factions within that system but the one strong political organization which sought the system's destruction: the Lliga. On making new elections, Alba tried to restore cohesion to the Cortes. Principally, this meant eliminating the influence of the Lliga in Catalonia, and there, by promising favors, he organized all the other parties in a bloc to defeat the Regionalists. The "Castellana Pact," named after the street in Madrid where it was finalized at the house of Romanones, marked what the Regionalists considered the return of caciquism to Catalonia. This encroached on the Lliga's home territory, and helped galvanize the Regionalists into further action. Cambó himself did not worry too much about Alba's attempts to pact with all other parties against the Lliga, since the Regionalists, in his opinion, would prevail in Catalonia due to their overwhelming base of support. Although he succeeded in forming a large Liberal majority throughout Spain, Alba's attempt failed in Catalonia, where the Lliga actually

53 Alba, letter to Ossorio, 9. May 1915, ArchM. Cambó remained curious about Maura, however. "If we consider the Maura of 1907-1909," he mused, "the Maura of the Local Administration Bill, the Maura who defended Catalonia against Moret and other politicians, he represents a hope. If we consider the Maura of 1910 to 1914, the hope is more feeble. We have to see if it is the real Maura, full of good faith and energy, capable of going to battle against the evil crafts that certain politicians employ against Catalonia, or rather if he is the indecisive and colorless Maura, who has not made up his mind in the last few years. Actions will tell." Cambó, "L'actual moment politic," talk at the CADCI, 20. Dec. 1915, printed in the Veu, 21. Dec. 1915, 3.
54 Cambó, Memorias, 223-224.
56 It was the Lliga's domination of Catalan politics however - the "new caciquism" - which led members of all the other parties including the nationalist republicans of the BRA to agree to pact with Alba's Liberals. Canals, Cuestión Catalana, 356-357. Gustau Peyra i Anglada, a leading Maurist who opposed the Regionalists, wrote to his chief that "the deadly concession of the Mancomunitat made by the Dato Cabinet to the Regionalists - not to Catalonia which neither felt for it nor wanted it - is beginning to give fruit.... The use that the Regionalists have made of that concession, converting the Mancomunitat into an association of their cronies and badly administering the ordinary and extraordinary budgets which they have available to them, has contributed powerfully to determine the disquiet which is today their greatest preoccupation." Peyra, letter to Maura, 12. June 1916, ArchMaura.
57 see the various articles under the header "Dignitat i la vida de Catalunya," in the Veu, 3. Apr. 1916, 1.
58 Cambó, letter to Prat, 28. Feb 1916, ArxPrat. The letter opens: "Finally, I have found the explanations for the strange conduct of the Carlists!"
increased its representation. The *Lliga* won thirteen seats, a gain of one, while the UFNR, reduced to a single seat, fared worst; the Liberals' fourteen Catalan seats came mostly at the expense of Liberal-Conservative and Maurist candidates (see Appendix A for full results).

Prat determined to launch the campaign "*Per Catalunya i l'Espanya Gran*" just before the General Elections of 1916. With the *Mancomunitat* well in place and the Regionalists feeling secure in Catalonia, this campaign was designed not to fend off Alba's attempts to roll back the *Lliga*'s influence, but rather to extend that influence in Catalonia and throughout Spain. Published both in Catalan and in Castilian, the program outlined a history of Spain which stressed the diversity of its origins. Spain, it argued, had once been great because of the vitality achieved through this diversity of language, culture, and legal-administrative structure. As the government centralized in Madrid, however, Spain had declined. The document stressed the importance of the current moment: not only had the empire totally collapsed thus marking the urgency of immediate action, but also the international climate of political instability in the early part of the twentieth century afforded Spain a chance to reorganize as a major player on the world stage. The great colonial powers had carved up new parts of the globe, while Spain and Portugal had both not enjoyed great influence since Portugal won its independence in the wars of 1640. To Prat, this proved that the two countries needed to reunite in order to re-complete the totality of Iberia. United, but full of vital diversity, an Iberian Spain could reestablish itself. But Portugal, Prat recognized, would never willingly rejoin Spain as long as it saw how other Iberian peoples such as the Catalans suffered under Castilian centralization. Therefore, the Regionalists advocated the reform of administration for the entire peninsula, through the adoption of a new federal constitution. Rather than fragmenting the country, this new federalism would devolve powers to lower levels of government in order to foster the vitality necessary to strengthen Spain and to attract Portugal back into the fold. In conclusion, this movement had to originate in Catalonia, the most modern region of Spain; Catalonia had to work for Spain. The program laid out by the Catalan

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leader was nothing new; it represented virtually the same Regionalist program as conceived by the Lliga’s leaders from the first days of the party. However, the time had now come to show that the Lliga meant business and intended to regenerate all of Spain through Catalonia.61

Romanones shuffled the cabinet, moving Alba to the Treasury.62 There, Alba began to offer an alternative to Cambó’s plans for regenerating Spain, and the two men became fearsome political enemies.63 Alba had an ambitious plan which included reforms of public works, as well as military and cultural reforms. But the cornerstone of Alba’s plans was a tax on war-profits. Most of the enormous profits made off Spain’s neutrality in the War went to Catalonia’s textile industry, and so this tax hit Catalonia disproportionately. Noticeably, the agricultural bulk of Spain did not fare badly in the new taxation scheme despite the fact that it, too, had benefited from increased international demand and prices from the War.64 Alba had first tried to crush the Lliga at the polls, and had failed. Now Alba threatened the Regionalists’ economic base. Cambó realized that Alba, the one competent and intelligent representative of the Liberal Restoration system capable of opposing the Lliga, needed to fail here, too.

Cambó hoped to regenerate Spain through capitalism. He wanted the government to institute massive public works in order to facilitate the development of a modern economy. Spain should take advantage of the international situation to create industries that it had yet to develop but which it could support without protection, to shore up the internal market as a base for already existent industry, and to look for new export markets for those industries which over-produced.65 Alba, on the other hand, wanted to regenerate Spain through its agricultural base. The Liberal leader also believed in public works, but saw big business as the source of

62 The Veu commented that Alba had become the third Secretary of the Treasury in the five-month-old Romanones government; Romanones had also had three Secretaries of State in that time. This demonstrated “that Spain is not today arriving at even a bad approximation of European-ness.” Despite the scope of the European crisis, no other country had shuffled its crucial cabinet posts so much. This proved that Romanones had no direction. And worse, the Veu thought, this government fought against the best interests of Spain. “La crisi darrera,” Veu, 1. May 1916, 1.
65 Cambó, L’Acció de l’Estat i l’Acció Privada en les Indústries que Tenen Sobreproducció, 5
funding through massive taxation.\textsuperscript{66} Alba considered himself the successor to Raimundo Fernández Villaverde, the Liberal-Conservative Secretary of the Treasury who had wrecked two Silvela governments in 1899 and 1903 by demanding fiscal responsibility at a time of economic difficulty, and whose taxation policy in 1899 had provoked the \textit{Tancament de Caixes}. Fernández Villaverde’s plan, Alba commented, was first to balance the budget, then to rebuild the interior economy, and finally to stimulate growth in selected areas through tax breaks. But Fernández had only ever had the chance to accomplish the first phase. By not following through with this plan, Spain had run its deficit back up and had seen its tax base drop. Alba intended to start this plan all over.\textsuperscript{67} This involved undertaking austerity measures, increasing taxes, and rebuilding Spain’s credit base.\textsuperscript{68} Although the Catalan \textit{bourgeoisie} had reacted sharply against Fernández Villaverde, Alba hoped this time to win over important industrialist elements. He even offered to approve the free port status many industrialists had long been seeking in return for their support of his economic proposals. He was willing to make this concession to help separate many of these elements from the \textit{Lliga}, the party which had been advancing many of their economic preferences in Madrid. Cambó realized the necessity of combatting Alba, and argued that despite Alba’s sweet-talking and contacts with the \textit{Fomento}, if the industrialists agreed to go along with Alba they would be committing economic suicide. Most importantly, they would subsume themselves to Alba and would lose the influence in Madrid that the \textit{Lliga} could offer them. For the \textit{Lliga}, a victory by Alba would destroy the Regionalists and all they sought. “The battle which we are fighting with Alba,” Cambó wrote to Prat, will be decisive for us. If we win, we will obtain delegations, official status for our language, and everything that we want. If we lose, we will have a period of persecution which will begin as political and continue as economic…. It is necessary for the \textit{Veu} to make a campaign with the sense that the battle we are fighting will determine the prestige and the force of Catalonia in the governments of Spain.\textsuperscript{69}

Alba also came into continued conflict with the Regionalists because he opposed any form of local control over budgets - all taxing and spending needed to

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\textsuperscript{66} Harrison, \textit{An Economic History of Modern Spain}, 98.
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\textsuperscript{67} Alba, \textit{Un Programa Económico y Financiero}, x-xi; the Regionalist economist Frederic Rahola concluded as well that Alba was indeed following in Fernández Villaverde’s footsteps. F. Rahola, \textit{Comentarios sobre los Proyectos Tributarios del Sr. Alba}.
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\textsuperscript{68} Alba, \textit{Un Programa Económico}, xix-xxvi.
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be based in Madrid to oversee the functioning of the entire system.\textsuperscript{70} The Alba/Cambo debates turned into some of the fiercest in the \textit{Cortes}, where Cambó scrupulously analyzed every element in all of Alba's proposals looking for the most minute faults, contradictions, or lack of clarity.\textsuperscript{71} Combatted by Cambó, who successfully rallied the support of opposition groups from elements of the Liberal-Conservative Party, the Maurists, and various industrialists from around Spain—notably from the Basque Country, Alba failed even to pass the year's budget. Even parts of the left did not support Alba; much of the far-left did not trust the man because he still remained a system politician looking for influence within the existing structure, while many Liberals viewed his demise with quiet favor for the same reason, that he sought power for his faction within the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{72} The Regionalists found they had greater leverage over diverse factions, particularly those breaking away from the main parties.\textsuperscript{73} "I do not believe," Cambó admitted to Duran, "that any party chief would want to cross us."\textsuperscript{74}

Besides the push for "l'Espanya Gran," the Lliga also strove for "Catalunya." Cambó thought it necessary for the Regionalists to push both halves of their program simultaneously while they had the momentum.\textsuperscript{75} Cambó brought up the subject of greater political autonomy for Catalonia, and this issue dominated the \textit{Cortes} in the Summer of 1916, as many opposed such concessions, either out of plain opposition to catalanism in general or to the Regionalists and their increasing influence in particular. Cambó's strategy was to disrupt the \textit{Cortes} and the effective grip that the oligarchy continued to hold on Spanish politics. By launching such a divisive campaign, he could be assured of stirring discord.\textsuperscript{76}

Like Dato before him, Romanones found he had to keep the \textit{Cortes} closed to avoid confrontation with the Regionalists. In his fourteen months of power, Romanones left the \textit{Cortes} open for only six. They then remained closed until

\textsuperscript{70} Alba, \textit{Un Programa Económico}, xc-xci; Cambó, letter to Duran, 10. Feb. 1917, ArxDiV.
\textsuperscript{72} ibid., 104-105; Cambó, \textit{Memorias}, 240.
\textsuperscript{74} Cambo, letter to Prat, 10. June 1916, ArxDiV.
\textsuperscript{75} Cambó, letter to Duran, 10. June 1916, ArxDiV.
\textsuperscript{76} Romero Salvadó, "Spain and the First World War," 94-98. The Lliga had not only emerged strengthened from the 1916 elections, but also had another card to play: Alba had included the Catalan Nationalists in his "Castellana Pact," and these Nationalists had stronger catalanist ambitions than the \textit{Lliga}. Pabón, vol. I, 451-457.
March 1918. This meant that during the greater part of the world-wide crisis, Spain effectively had no parliament. 77 The ferocious opposition the Regionalists played to the Liberal government meant that the Liberal-Conservatives decided to attempt to attract Cambó into their camp. However Cambó and the Lliga's Political Action Commission determined not to enter into an alliance with either of the main turno parties, but only with dissenting groups or with the Reformists, in the hope that the Lliga could put an end to the ineffective governments produced by the Restoration system. Cambó began talks with all parties and all factions therein, but particularly with the Basque Nationalists, the Maurists, and the two main Republican groups - the Reformists of Álvarez and the Radicals of Alejandro Lerroux. 78

Failure to restore its own brand of order destroyed the last vestiges of a united Liberal Party. “Just as republicanism is now agonizing, liberalism is gravely ill,” a position paper on Romanones’ desk warned.

We find ourselves at the beginning of a political retrocess. The people, put off, will end up following these rightists who are fortified with the wealth of the plutocratic bourgeoisie, with the money to buy votes. Already in Asturias they are screaming ‘long live Catalonia!’ in the name of Regionalism.

The document advised taking on regionalist symbols in order to woo support in the rest of Spain away from the Lliga. Such a policy might also win over the majority of Catalans as well, making them more supportive of the Liberal government and less catalanist. 79 Romanones also attempted to revive the Liberal Party in Catalonia, but found that many of the dynastic politicians there had come under the influence of the Lliga. Advised that his best chance lay in forming a “Monarchic Union,” he then approached Dato about combining the efforts of the two main parties to create

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77 García Venero, Santiago Alba, 120-121.
79 “El Problema de Cataluña,” notes, 18. June 1916, APG-AMC/25. “The day this happens,” the document concluded about the revindication of reformism by the Liberals, “when the Liberal Party headed by a Grandee of Spain who wears the Cross of Saint James, who represents the purest national traditions, then Catalonia will be the most Spanish region of Spain and catalanism, broken into factions or simply disequilibrated, will have been mortally wounded and will have fallen never to rise again.”
an anti-Regionalist bloc. 80 This squared well with the Liberal-Conservatives, who had seen much of their residual support in Catalonia pass into the ranks of the Lliga or the Maurists. 81

Such politicking, besides failing to stem the Regionalist tide, also undermined the very party system it theoretically sought to preserve. Events in 1917 shook the whole system yet again. Low-ranking officers stationed in Catalonia mutinied against the army; social unrest flared up inspired by events in Russia; and debates on trade and industry pushed by the Catalan Regionalists met fierce opposition from the traditional elites of Madrid. After several cabinet shake-ups, the Liberals fell from power in June of 1917, and Dato formed a government with the Cortes closed. The fiction of the Liberal Party had died. 82

Back in Barcelona, the Veu also saw no good in the replacement of the Liberals with a Dato government similar to the one which had failed spectacularly to come to grips with the economic and political crisis in 1915. Under the banner headline “The crisis of the Regime and the shipwreck of common sense - Dato is charged with forming a cabinet - the shameful decision,” the Veu asked “what has happened up there in the (Madrid) heights? What has happened that they have responded to a cabinet crisis with a crisis of idiocy?” 83

The Regionalists hoped to fill the vacuum. Abadal, Cambó, and Ventosa, sensing public disillusion with first the decay of the Liberals and then the anti-democratic tendencies of Dato’s new government, announced to the country their desire to see the Cortes reopened and politics resumed in order to write a new constitution:

In Spain, the regime of alternating parties has ruled for many years - a regime of fiction and artifice, thanks to which we have no organized army, no treasury, no justice, no public education, no means of economic development; there does not even exist among the social forces and political organisms the coordination necessary for normality and for progress.

...The whole world is convinced that it is absolutely impossible for the artifact of Spanish politics to last a moment longer; and there is not a single conscious Spaniard who, seeing the spectacular decomposition of the Liberal Party and the impotence of the Conservative Party; believes that one or the other could govern Spain any longer.

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80 Ossorio, letter to Maura, 25. Aug. 1916, ArchM.
81 J. Canovas, letter to Dato, 11. Aug. 1916, Arch D.
They called on all Catalan parliamentarians from all parties to demand the opening of the Cortes, and failing that to organize the parliamentarians from the rest of Spain to join them in defying Dato's governmental dictation.\textsuperscript{84} The first Assembly, on July fifth, included the bulk of Catalonia's congressmen and senators. This marked an even stronger movement than the Solidarity movement which had confronted Madrid a decade before. Back then, one Catalan party (the PRR) opposed the movement, as did the bulk of Spanish popular opinion. In 1917, however, all the Catalan parties - including the bulk of the dynasties - supported the movement, and they counted on the sympathy of Spanish popular opinion.\textsuperscript{85} As scheduled, this meeting served to invite representatives from all over Spain to assemble in Barcelona on July nineteenth if Dato failed to open the Cortes before then.

Once again, Cambó found himself at the head of a broad movement containing more left-wing than right-wing groups, as the July nineteenth Assembly of Parliamentarians grouped him notably with Álvarez, Lerroux, and Pablo Iglesias, the head of the Socialist Worker Party.\textsuperscript{86} The Lliga was the only party with broad enough contacts to bring together diverse groups of the right and of the left, through its dominance in Catalonia and its activity in Madrid.\textsuperscript{87} Indeed, when the Regionalists launched their economic program in 1915, they had already started working in Madrid with most left-wing elements who represented Catalonia in Madrid - Lerroux, the Liberal Josep Roig i Bergadà, the head of the Reformists in Catalonia Luis de Zulueta y Escolano, the head of the now defunct UFNR Coromines, and the old Catalan Federal chief Josep Vallès i Ribot. All of these men sought the votes of the Catalan industrial and middle classes, and despite their differences had converged to back Cambó.\textsuperscript{88} These elements now continued to collaborate.

Cambó tried to balance the movement by attracting to it Maura and the Maurists. Ossorio and one of Maura's sons, Miguel, both close to the Regionalists, considered going, but Maura judged that the presence of the Lliga as the only major right-wing force did not serve to guarantee enough control over the more radical

\textsuperscript{84} Abadal, Cambó, & Ventosa, \textit{A la Opinión Española}.
\textsuperscript{85} Rovira, \textit{Crisi}, 73; Josep Maria Poblet i Guarro, \textit{Aquell Any} 1917, 42-46.
\textsuperscript{86} García Venero, \textit{Melquiades Álvarez}, 302f.
\textsuperscript{87} García Venero, \textit{Historia del Nacionalismo Catalán}, vol. II, 205.
\textsuperscript{88} ibid., vol. II, 79-80.
elements participating. Gabriel Maura explained to Abadal that he sympathized with the movement, but he considered the whole event illegal and order-threatening. As Dato tried to limit the proceedings of the Assembly, the movement attracted more and more left-wing affiliates, which began to alarm Cambó, who continued to pressure the Maurists. For the sake of the Regionalists, Ossorio continued to argue to Maura that his group should join the Assembly - if not, he feared, the abandoned Regionalists might begin to direct their attacks against the Spanish state. Miguel Maura also kept up his pleas, and he wrote his brother that after the Maurists had spent the last few years opposing the turno parties, “we are the ones who are making its substitution and elimination impossible by our abstention. It is beyond doubt that while in this moment the right wing is not properly represented, the assault on the turno will not bear fruit - at least not in an orderly fashion.”

To compensate for Maura’s absence, the Regionalists also hoped to gain the support of the military Juntas, another force clearly not separatist nor a threat to the unity of Spain. These low-ranking officers were a sort of military middle class. They saw the effectiveness of unions for the workers, and formed Juntas to serve as virtual unions - not for political power, per se, but to vocalize their grievances. They employed much regenerationist rhetoric, but this was not their true aim. When they rebelled in June, 1917, they merely wanted their basic demands for personal gains - mostly pay and rank - satisfied. The government could not crack down on the mutiny, because it required the military to protect the system in the face of growing discontent and unrest. The Liberal Democrat Manuel García Prieto, then President of the government, was too weak to face down the Juntas, especially without the legitimate backing of the Cortes, which remained closed.

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91 J. M. de Nadal, Memòries, 268.
92 Ossorio, letter to Maura, 1. Aug. 1917, ArchM.
94 Boyd, 79. The renegade conservative la Cierva, a civilian close to the Juntas, suspected that Cambó was up to something as the Regionalist leader and Ventosa, despite their personal animosity towards la Cierva, invited the Murcian to dinner several times during the first days of the Dato government to discuss vague political criteria. La Cierva, Notas, 182-183.
95 Ramos Oliveira, 167.
96 Boyd, 64-65. Rovira commented on “the politicians who have made a fiction of Spanish public life and have ridiculed the Constitution and the laws: what moral force do they have to oppose the
Socialists feared what might happen if the mutiny succeeded because it implied a breach of civil supremacy. However, even the Socialists hoped that the Juntas would hold true to their regenerationist rhetoric and prove democratic and anti-oligarchical. Lerroux himself prepared an armed force of workers in the Rambles to come to the aid of the Juntas if the government did indeed try to crack down.

The Regionalists and the republicans tried to get the military in Barcelona to aid the Assembly itself. "Catalonia has a very deep mission to fulfill in Spain," Cambó wrote of the leading junteros:

that of the freedom from political factions who govern without any other object than to serve their own personal interests. Catalonia has achieved the imposition of the will of its citizens and the end of the electoral farce, the basis of that which sustains all of the corruption of Spanish political life.

The destruction of caciquism in Catalonia would not have been worth the effort without spreading this throughout Spain. Like the Regionalists, Cambó continued, the junteros could not act alone, ignoring the rest of the country. Both wanted to liberate Spain from its political system, and should cooperate. Cambó actually reached an agreement with leading junteros that if the Juntas at least did not suppress the Assembly when the government gave it orders to, then Cambó would personally see to its peaceful dissolution after one day. By merely holding a truncated Assembly, the Lliga would thus have a moral victory without bringing about the social revolution its left-wing allies sought. The Regionalists, so backed by the Juntas, could secure a new federal constitution for Spain with autonomy for Catalonia, and would in turn support the monarchy against the left. As the armed force behind the operation, the Juntas could then have the respect they desired in a new system. The bulk of the junteros, however, did not support this plan and determined to stand against the Assembly when so ordered. But the military was not truly interested in regeneration, only in military reform. Hence, it could gain influence with the government and with the King merely by threatening inaction,
to show throughout the turbulent Summer of 1917 that neither the government nor
the monarchy could survive if the military were not to defend it. 102

But the Assembly also marked the confrontation of industrial and mercantile
Spain against its agricultural interior. The bulk of the non-Catalans to attend the
Assembly came from the northern and eastern periphery, where most of the new
industry and wealth had begun to bud. This economic might now sought a political
voice. Also, with industrialization came new social concerns which did not affect -
or interest - traditional Spain, and hence came the left-wing affiliates. 103 Alfonso
also began to worry, and sent word to Cambó that if he called off the Assembly, “he
could precipitate a crisis out of which a coalition government would form in which
the Lliga could count on two or three portfolios.” 104 Cambó decided to hold out
until the regime had completely folded. 105 The Dato government and the Liberal
Party leaders tried to determine which of their party members were considering
attending the Assembly, and then threatened them with the loss of their seats in the
next elections. 106 The diminutive size of Republican representation in the Cortes,
combined with the abstention of the non-Catalan followers of Maura and Alba and
the pressure on other sympathetic dynastic politicians by Dato and the Liberal Party
leaders, meant that the Assembly was not as well attended as it might have been,
garnering only a fifth of the Cortes. However, this was enough to show the force of
popular opinion, and make Dato’s government try to suppress the whole
movement.

Dato, calling the Assembly seditious and separatist, declared martial law in
Barcelona, including press censorship. The Veu began to publish under the names
of kindred newspapers in other towns, and concluded that it was actually Dato who
was behaving seditiously: “the President of the Council of Ministers is the one who

102 Boyd, 86.
103 Lacomba, 209-211.
104 Alfonso XIII, quoted by the man who served as the intermediary, the Catalan Maurist J. M. de
Nadal, Memòries, 270.
106 Rovira, Crisi, 84. Indeed, the Liberal Party leaders saw the threat to the system, and had offered
their support to Dato through the crisis. Romanones had written to Dato when the Liberal-
Conservative leader took power on June eleventh: “Although I might not choose to remember your
conduct (of opposition) while the Liberal Party has been in power, and this forgetfulness would be
criminal, the circumstances in which you come to power require all the cooperation that the Liberal
Party can lend you and that you need, and I do not have to say up to what point you have me personally
at your disposition.” Romanones, letter to Dato, 11. June 1917, ArchDato.
has profaned and violated the laws, the one who has created a revolution with arbitrary detentions and violations of private correspondence, the one who has sworn with inadmissible conspiracies the dignity of power.” In the same vain, Dato was promoting separatism: “In the moment in which a loyal, effusive, affirmative Catalonia invites to a legal and most noble act all the hispanic regions, Dato has had no greater obsession than to isolate it.” The Mayor of Barcelona, the Dato appointee Antoni Martínez Domingo, resigned to protest Dato’s opposition, reminding some observers of Bartomeu Robert, who in 1899 had resigned as Mayor rather than support the government’s crackdown on the Tancament de Caixes tax strike. Martínez Domingo affiliated with the Lliga, while the Dato government looked for a replacement. No member of the Catalan Conservative Party would accept the nomination, and the City Council made it quite clear that it would refuse to accept any mayor whom it itself had not elected. As in the case of Bastardas during the Solidarity years, the Council selected one of its own as Acting Mayor: this time, the Lliga’s theorist Duran, who would serve through the conclusion of the Assembly movement.

The Assembly had three items on its agenda: the problems of autonomy, of the economy, and of the military. Because Dato was intent on preventing the Assembly from taking place, the organizers had to assure that Barcelona would stay calm and not provoke any governmental reaction. There could be no manifestations of support in the street – whether in the form of strikes, closures, or even banners. The shuttering of shop windows was to be the only sign of public support, while the parliamentarians would secretly go about their business. The parliamentarians took round-about routes to get to the secret meeting place while losing their police tail. The Assembly took place, and it discussed the constitutional reforms it had set before it. The police finally located the Assembly and broke it

109 Ametlla, 382. Martínez Domingo would later be rewarded by being democratically elected as a Regionalist candidate for mayor in 1919.
110 Poblet, Aquell Any, 105-106.
111 “Hores històriques: la finalitat de l’Assemblea,” Veu, publishing as the Baluart (Sitges), 17. July 1917, 4.
112 Exhortation in large boldface print, in a box in the Veu, publishing as the Costa del Ponent (Vilanova i Geltrú), 18. July 1917, 2.
113 Poblet, Aquell Any, 120.
up, but not before it had already reached its agreements and had decided to reconvene in mid-August. Thanks to strict controls on the press, news leaked out of Catalonia only slowly that the Assembly had indeed taken place - the official government propaganda had said that it had not. The Dato government had only discredited itself further and shown its paranoia. Even the junteros respected the way the Assembly had been carried out, and declared their willingness to work with other, non-military, reform groups. "The day in which Catalonia can talk with the rest of Spain without intermediaries," Cambó told a Cantabrian newspaper, "we will always understand each other and in five minutes flat.... While we have to communicate through governments like the present one, we will never understand each other." Cambó urged the government to call new elections, which should be run fairly. This would force the King, if he wanted to show that the monarchy was not incompatible with reform, to turn to a new government based on popular opinion.

However the far-left sponsored a paralyzing general strike in August, which Cambó and Abadal found they had to disown. The strike gave the government a legitimate reason to repress the entire movement. Indeed, evidence later suggested that it was the Dato government which had provoked the strike. The military lined up to save the monarchy, and this placed the monarchy in debt to the military, which demanded an end to the Dato government and the traditional oligarchy. Alba feared the consequences - immediate general elections would produce an enormous bloc of representatives under the influence of the Lliga, against whom the traditional parties could never hold sway. Alba believed that Cambó was making any government impossible - Dato's could not continue much longer, and Cambó's ongoing personal opposition to Alba made a Liberal return unlikely.

114 vid. articles in the Veu, from 26. July 1917 to the end of the month; also Rovira, Crisi, 147-150.
117 Poblet, Aquell Any, 113.
118 Balcells, Sindicalismo, 29-31; Buxadé, 215-218. Dato himself was the President of the legal counsel to the railroad firm where the strike initiated. Buxadé, 235. When the leaders of various factions within the Assembly movement appealed for order, the government censor forbade the publication of this appeal. Rovira, Crisi, 163-165.
119 Ramos Oliveira, 172-178.
120 Alba, notes, 29. Sept. 1917, 11-12, ArchNRivas 11-8912.
121 Rivas, journal entry, 13. Oct. 1917, ArchNRivas 11-8904. Talk of an Alba/Cambó government had circulated since the Summer, but the personal rivalry between the two made this unlikely as well, even
Cambó had been busy touring Spain to find support for his political movement, while also meeting with the leaders of all political factions. He specifically kept up his pressure on Maura, who continued to refuse to come to Cambó’s aid because the old Conservative leader feared doing anything remotely unconstitutional that might undermine the monarchy.122

Meanwhile, the *Juntas* were upset that they had been used by the government to suppress a revolution that the government itself had helped bring about. The repression also cost the *Juntas* the public sympathy that they had won before; the repression had been severe since these were soldiers and not civil guards - thus the August strike was put down with massacres, widespread arrests, and violations of constitutional rights including the arrest and military trial of Marcel.lí Domingo, a left-wing catalanist MP whose seat in the *Cortes* should have made him immune to any such action. Even Dato was shocked by the military’s behavior, and had spies investigate, an action which, when discovered, did not endear him any further to the military.123 It was only now a matter of time before Dato would be forced from office.

With Dato weakened by his ineptitude and the Liberals by their party divisions, the Assembly movement reappeared in October. It had canceled its proposed meetings in August due to the general strike, but now began meeting openly in Madrid. The Assembly clearly courted the *Juntas* by agreeing to consider their proposed military reform in a new government. The Liberals, who still formed the majority in the *Cortes* because Dato had never been able to call elections to install his own majority, showed a predisposition for access to power in the new order because, through their presidency in the *Cortes* they allowed the Assembly to meet in the *Cortes* building itself.124 Even the Catalan conservatives were demanding that Dato give in to the demands of the Assembly.125 Dato needed to open the *Cortes*, but he also needed to dissolve them in order to create new ones that would give him the majority he needed to press ahead. He asked the King for


123 ibid., 271-277.

124 Boyd, 89-90.

the dissolution of the Cortes. If Alfonso agreed, however, Cambó declared that he
would not hesitate to abandon the monarchy.126 The military juntas also lined up
against Dato, and demanded that the King force his resignation. When Dato
resigned in late October, Cambó declared to a Maurist daily, “I believe that in today’s
crisis not Dato, not the Conservative Party, but the damned system of alternating
parties has fallen.”127

According to Cambó, the crisis would not have been so serious had Maura
and Alba taken part in the Assembly movement. If they had, Dato would have
fallen much earlier, and it would have been easier to start over with a new
system.128 Instead, several months were wasted trying to save Spain from Dato and
the turno on one hand and from revolution on the other. Much debate ensued,
however, on who would replace Dato. There were several suggestions, and it took
four attempts over eight days to form a new government. Maura, with his
enormous stature, had surfaced since the Summer as one favored suggestion,
heading a coalition which would include Cambó.129 La Cierva appeared a likely
choice for the War Department, since he still commanded the respect of all branches
of the military - yet, importantly for this crisis, was not himself a military man.130

Cambó remained on the front line - while he did not himself become a
minister, he was now consulted about appointing ministers, “like a veritable chief of
a national party,” Hurtado commented, “with a position of the first order within
Spanish politics.”131 Maura, without a role he found attractive, remained at home,
while Cambó made the rounds of dinner invitations - eating on successive days at
the homes of Dato, la Cierva, Alba, and Romanones.132 Cambó in October 1917 could
control the entire political spectrum - inside and outside the parliament - and forge
the necessary agreements. He steered Spain through the crisis resulting from the
general strike, rescuing the country from the revolutionaries. In turn, he was
charged with finding a combination of neutral dignitaries able to form a governing

126 Cambó, to the Diario de Navarra, quoted in Seco, Perfil, 90-91.
129 anon. notes, 11. Aug. 1917, ArchDato. According to Pabón, Cambó’s papers of September and October
reflected that Maura, tired of party-politics, was considering forming a government with Cambó and a
130 Cierva, Notas, 187-189.
132 Josep Maria de Sagarrera i de Castellarnau, Memòries, 737.
coalition, behind which he would in reality control the reins of power. The Regionalists would never agree to any government dominated by a single party. The King offered the Liberal-Conservative Joaquín Sánchez de Toca the first chance to form a government, and he tried to put together a coalition of all dynastic groups plus the Regionalists and the Reformists, to whom he would make some concessions. Without a promise to reform the constitution, however, these last two groups refused to sign up. Then the King turned to García Prieto, who proposed a coalition of Liberal Democrats, Regionalists, and Reformists. But he offered the Assembly groups similar terms as Sánchez de Toca had, and thus was also rebuffed.
The King approached Maura third to see if he could put together a coalition, but no one was willing to cooperate with a man who had vilified other politicians for so long. Maura wanted to form a Conservative government, reserving a ministry for Cambó - though not wanting to deal with the Catalan problem. Cambó held out, and found himself speaking to the Assembly when Alfonso called him in for a consultation. Cambó refused to go immediately, preferring to remain in the Assembly until he had finished his business there. Only then did he proceed to the Palace. The King had sent a message to Cambó, and the messenger was intercepted by Cambó's aide Rafel Marquina i Angulo, who passed it along. Looking at the message, Cambó explained to Ventosa that "the King has scheduled me for six o'clock. Because I cannot go at six, since I am speaking here, I will reply to the Palace to let the King know that I would appreciate it if he schedule me for some other time." As he left his meeting with the King, Cambó told Marquina: "I have told him everything that has come to mind. I have even gotten around to telling him that he should proceed with caution when dealing with Catalonia, because in Spain all anti-dynastic movements have always originated in Catalonia."

At the Palace, Cambó had finalized a coalition government under García Prieto which included two Regionalists in the cabinet: Ventosa in the Treasury and

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133 Sagarra, Memòries, 744f.
134 Cambó, letter to Duran, 29. Oct. 1917, Arx DiV.
135 Romero Salvadó, "Spain and the First World War," 288-291. Maura also did not want to form a government without the Juntas having been dissolved first. The military was not keen to agree to this. "L'actitud d'En Maura," Veu, 28. Oct. 1917.
136 Cambó, letter to Duran, 30. Oct. 1917, ArxDiV.
138 Cambó, quoted by Rafel Marquina i Angulo, La Nostra Gent, 52-53.
Felip Rodés in Public Instruction.\textsuperscript{139} The advent of a coalition meant the suspension of the turno, highlighted the divisions within the major parties, and now solidified the Lliga as a Spanish party which had originated in Catalonia but which had an influence far beyond its regional base. Cambó celebrated the agreements which led García Prieto to form a government, noting in a letter to Duran that with García’s willingness to head a coalition government with non-Liberal elements, “the Liberal Party is left undone and can never be put back together again.”

Cambó continued that “if I had wanted, they would have offered me the Presidency of the Council... (since) I would be the President with the greatest number of supporters.”\textsuperscript{140} The Lliga now had its first direct say into the affairs of central government. But the intricacies of Madrid politics were not new to Cambó and his deputies. The party had become a critical player in Spanish politics since decade before, when it learned to work alongside diverse partners from far-left to far-right in an electoral coalition and parliamentary grouping, at the same time as Cambó himself worked closely with Maura to reform the administration of all Spain. The Regionalists continued to show their aptitude at coopting forces from the entire political spectrum to achieve their goals. And they had once again used a threat from the left to give themselves a clear advantage on the Madrid establishment.

The joke was up. Cambó expected that the new elections would return the extremes, leaving the traditional mainstream dynastic groups with heavily reduced representations. Even with an unfavorable result, the mere existence of a coalition government traumatized the party system. Riding on top of the fray was a man, just turned forty, leader of a party which represented only part of a single corner of the country. Yet Cambó found himself the most powerful politician in Spain: his little party had succeeded in becoming the dominant force within Catalonia, and could use this base to give it the confidence to launch its project across Spain. Forcing the issues it chose to push, the Lliga forced the other parties to react, and their reactions helped cause their demise. The Regionalist program was not simple - if it had been, the Lliga could not have created the big splash it did. Instead, the party entered

\textsuperscript{139} Cambó, conversation with Alba, 11. Nov. 1917, recorded by Rivas, ArchNRivas 11-8904.

\textsuperscript{140} Cambó, letter to Duran, 3. Nov. 1917, ArxDiV.
discussions of broad issues and dealt with all other groups - left and right - which could aid it in its program.
The collapse of the *turno* after the crisis of 1917 gave the Regionalists the opportunity they had long hoped for. The *Lliga* was the most organized party in Spain and well poised to take advantage of the situation. Furthermore, the Regionalists had used the year's crisis to broaden their ties to other political groups of the left and right, all of which wanted to see the Restoration system reformed or overturned. Yet, despite the problems the regime faced, reforming it would prove difficult. The system was entrenched beyond what the Regionalists had anticipated. Since they did not have a replacement political system ready, they could not install their own alternative. As the dynastic politicians continued to struggle to preserve their personal power within the convulsing Restoration regime, the crisis released new groups on the left which offered their own, more extreme, alternatives. The Regionalist solution to the Spanish political problem - and to the Catalan one - looked increasingly untenable when caught between these distinct programs. By 1919, the Regionalists realized they had lost their last great chance to implement their own program.

The decision by Francesc Cambó, as leader of the *Lliga*, to abandon the Assembly and support the formation of Manuel García Prieto's coalition government in November 1917 turned a few heads. Aside from two Regionalist members and an apolitical independent magistrate in the Department of the Interior, the new cabinet contained men drawn from the old dynastic oligarchy. Although the formation of a coalition had suspended the *turno*, some observers still wondered if Cambó's eager acceptance of the new situation did not show him abandoning his campaign of the Summer. Whereas he had previously demanded a constitutional assembly, he now contented himself with a government which merely promised to keep Parliament in session and to hold fair elections.

Cambó defended his behavior. He noted that when García Prieto had first tried to form a cabinet, he had intervened against the new President because the Liberal Democratic leader had selected too many from his own faction. A new government, Cambó argued, had to contain a broader representation of the Spanish political community. Cambó did not see any way to form a government out of the
Assembly movement, and thus acquiesced in García Prieto’s solution. He justified this by declaring that a new government at this stage had to include everyone who could admit reform - even those who had not attended the Assembly (here he probably had the arch-conservative Antoni Maura and possibly Cambó’s bitter rival the left-Liberal Santiago Alba, along with their followers, in mind, since he had previously lamented their absence); that ideas could not be imposed but rather had to be negotiated while winning over public opinion; that an Assembly government led by the Lliga’s president Raimon d’Abadal with the Socialist leader Pablo Iglesias would not be able to pass any legislation while it faced the opposition of the entrenched old-party politicians; and that although the Assembly was agreed on the need for reform in general, the events of the Summer had shown how much the social views of its components diverged.\(^1\) Now it was important to make sure that the turno could never recur. The Lliga’s opposition to Alba had ended his possibilities of taking over the leadership of the mainstream Liberal Party, so he broke away to form the Left-Liberals. Two more factions, in addition to the main ones led by García Prieto and Romanones, also appeared. Thanks to the Regionalist offensive, neither dynastic party could now count on forming a government by itself.\(^2\) Results from the municipal elections held shortly after the formation of the new government confirmed public support for the Regionalists and their allies across Catalonia and brought some non-dynastic breakthroughs in the North of Spain and in Madrid, in what the Regionalist organ the Veu de Catalunya called a “plebiscite.”\(^3\)

But now Cambó had to deliver. He had accomplished the mission Enric Prat de la Riba had crafted for him by going to Madrid and establishing himself as the power-broker of Spanish politics. But Cambó would find that one unexpected event of 1917 would leave him exposed from behind: the forty-seven-year-old Prat had


\(^3\) Veu, 12. Nov. 1917, 10. In Barcelona, the Lliga won thirteen seats, its most in any single municipal election to date. In Girona, the Regionalists captured five seats, the Republicans two, the Carlists two, and the Maurists one, to the Liberals’ one. Even in Tarragona, the Lliga captured seven of the eight contested seats. The Lliga and its allies won similarly across Catalonia and northern Spain, particularly in the Basque Country and Navarre. In Madrid, the Republican-Socialist electoral coalition won fourteen of thirty contested seats, with the Maurists winning eight more and leaving the traditional parties only eight.
died in the middle of the Assembly movement that Summer. Prat supported Cambó's action in Madrid as long as Prat was there to carry out the Lliga's program on its home territory. But now, with Prat out of the picture, Cambó could not guarantee that the situation in Barcelona would stay calm. Without Prat, the center of the program pushed by the Regionalist leadership - now, in truth, reduced to Cambó as the player in Madrid and Lluís Duran as the general theorist, and without an effective player in Barcelona - had shifted away from Catalonia. Prat's presence in the Presidency of the Catalan government had assured that the Party would maintain its balance between specifically Catalan and generally Spanish issues. 4 Cambó, under Prat's suggestion, had come to specialize in Spanish politics; without Prat, he could lead the Lliga into the fray in Madrid, submerging the Catalan Problem into the general problem of the entire peninsula, in a course somewhere between that followed by Prat and that urged by Cambó's frequent Madrid ally Maura. 5 If the Lliga now failed to come through with its promises to bring about its proposed reforms - including those for Catalonia - it might find itself a victim of its own over-rapid success. Prat, the Catalan literary figure Antoni Calvet ("Gaziel") concluded, had been the deus ex machina of everything he had touched in Catalonia: "however, at the premature death of the only man who had known how to carry out and conciliate so many impossible things, the cultural machine and the mechanic died together. The inevitable explosions would come...." 6

For a few months, the Mancomunitat remained without a permanent president until the Assembly elected the architect Josep Puig to the post in November. Puig had long been the main person Prat consulted on Catalan cultural affairs. With his cultural bias, Puig did not come from the same legalist tradition, and in many ways was more tightly tied to the latent nationalist wing within the Lliga. Primarily, it was Puig who had founded the Joventut Nacionalista in 1907 as a youth movement to inspire in the Catalan youth a fierce catalanism. Although Puig had spent three years in the Cortes, he lacked the sense of statecraft which Prat had maintained. He could never replace Prat as the third member of the Lliga's triumvirate with Cambó and Duran. Prat had overseen the Lliga's offensives in

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4 Miquel Ferrer i Sanchis, Enric Prat de la Riba i l'Assemblea de Parlamentaris de 1917, 19.
5 Eduard Aunos Pérez, España en Crisis, 166-67.
6 Calvet, 428.
Barcelona and in Madrid, while Puig remained virtually unconcerned with Madrid. Cambó had acted in Madrid within Prat’s grand strategy “Per Catalunya i l’Espanya Gran,” all the while firmly tied to Prat in Barcelona. Without this link, Cambó would often come to practice Madrid politics without a sense for his roots in Catalonia, and this would soon place him in direct conflict with the more nationalist Puig.

Cambo now faced a Spanish socio-political crisis which had come to a head in his own back yard. No longer able to rely on Prat to conciliate the diverse forces at work in Barcelona, he now tried to avert the growing unrest by democratizing the whole system from Madrid, to give the disaffected a voice. He found instead that this voice often clamored for greater social unrest, especially in Barcelona which was the most economically developed center, which had been the first place in Spain to break the strangle-hold of the system politicians on election results and thus had a much more free and complex political structure than the rest of Spain, and from which he was now often physically distant. But for the time being, Cambó had triumphed: he had brought Catalans - Joan Ventosa and Felip Rodés - into the central government for the first time since Manuel Duran y Bas in 1899 by exploiting the chaos of 1917. He had also persuaded the military Juntas of his good faith in order to blunt the threat they posed to the civilian regime and in order partly to override their still-latent distrust for regionalism. He could therefore help avoid, for the time being, a military rising which had seemed plausible, and which probably would have treated Catalan aspirations unfavorably.

But as for these aspirations, they would have to wait even though Cambó had secured an apparent triumph. Rather than press the issue of integral autonomy which the Assembly had made a cornerstone of its reform program, Cambó now advocated waiting to hold a proper parliamentary debate. He wished to avoid the granting of autonomy by decree, which he viewed skeptically as an indignity: all of Spain had to come to understand the Catalan problem and would have no qualms about granting autonomy. This would not happen: not during García Prieto’s coalition government, nor even during the following government of Maura which

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7 cf. Ben-Ami, 5.
8 Boyd, 92-93.
included Cambó in the cabinet. García Prieto’s government, with the Regionalists Ventosa and Rodés on board, failed to accomplish anything - even the elections it held produced very little change in the composition of the Cortes - except for the reforms of the maverick Secretary of War Juan de la Cierva, whose military reform bill succeeded in bringing the military back into the Restoration fold but which was so contentious as to cause the government to collapse in March 1918. The next coalition - led by Maura - which, thanks to its composition of all the largest factions except the republicans and that of la Cierva but including two Regionalists in Cambó and Ventosa, had an overwhelming majority, failed even more spectacularly to carry out any reforms to the system. Cambó, dealt a great personal blow by the failure of these two governments, returned to his barricade in Catalonia, but by then the situation had begun to escape him. 10 When the bill granting Catalonia integral autonomy failed to clear the Cortes at the beginning of 1919, the Lliga’s years of offensive had come to an end.

Cambó had started out on the right foot, however. He finished 1917 having won himself much sympathy from many reformist sectors. Even the Catalan republican leader Marcel.li Domingo, critical of Ventosa and Rodés for entering the cabinet, concluded that Cambó had merely stuck to his own plan, since the Assembly, although mostly attended by the left, had really been a right-wing construct. The left, Domingo declared, had forgotten what it had set out to do - the leaders of the left, he revealed, had formally agreed on June fifth to “convert into a revolutionary situation whatever workers movement might arise” - and had nevertheless allowed itself to support a conservative movement. While Domingo believed Ventosa and Rodés to be abandoning the Assembly in order to prop up a discredited regime, he argued that Cambó himself continued to apply pressure in favor of the goals set out by the Assembly which he himself had created and into which he had attracted the left. 11 While Cambó himself did not figure in any position within the new administration, his support for any new administration was critical, allowing him to place some prominent Regionalists in high positions: Ventosa became Secretary of the Treasury, Rodés Secretary of Public Instruction, the

10 Canals, Cuestión Catalana, 393-396.
11 Marcel.li Domingo i Sanjuán, quoted by Poblet, Aquell Any, 148-149.
large landowner Carles de Camps Director General for Agriculture, and the
industrialist Lluis Ferrer Vidal Director General for Customs. This merely replaced
the Spanish oligarchy with token members of the Catalan conservative classes.
Judging the results, Domingo concluded that “the Assembly was conceived,
organized, determined, and carried forward by forces partial to the regime, by men of
order, by elements of the right.” The presence of Ventosa and Rodés in the Cabinet
was meant to ensure that García Prieto stuck to the agreement and produced a
government that would make way for constitutional change. But both Catalans
were inexperienced in government, and García could take advantage of their
inexperience to stall their reformist desires. Cambó noted that, within the Cabinet,
García Prieto consulted la Cierva more than anyone else. Cambó lamented that he
had not personally entered the Cabinet at that time, because he had experience in
dealing directly with the party leaders. But he had thought that he could exercise
greater influence on the country as a whole at such a crucial moment from outside
the Cabinet.

The feeling on the Left was that Spain needed, first and foremost, a
representative and responsive government. The advances made by the left across
Spain in the municipal elections of November 1917 were a start, but the general
elections which the new government would hold would be the real test of whether
anything had changed. Since the Assembly had disbanded without achieving the
constitutional assembly it had sought, the next best result would be for the new
elections to herald in a more fairly representative parliament. Cambó himself
promised this when he announced his support for the new coalition government,
and swore that he would launch a campaign for public opinion across Spain in order
to assist the new government in its renovative action. Pere Coromines, the

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12 Domingo, speech in Congress, 31. May 1918, in Poblet, Aquell Any, 166.
14 Cambó, Memorias, 264-265.
15 cf. Adolfo González Posada, España en Crisis, 50.
16 Cambó, at a press conference, quoted in “Crisis resuelta,” ABC, 4. Nov. 1917: “In order that the next
Cortes, functioning as a Constitutional Assembly, consecrate the accords of the Assembly, it is necessary
to make a very intense campaign for (popular) opinion in all of Spain, gaining the adhesion of the
people with these conclusions. And it is necessary to have a complete guarantee that no opposition or
obstruction will come from the government against the authentic expression of popular will.” Cambó
explained to doubters that the Lliga had already shown within Catalonia that the possibility existed
to defeat the caciques and bring about a true democratic regime. This could now happen throughout
Spain.
Catalan republican, wrote that Spain could be salvaged merely by getting itself a legitimate government: the old regime had not collapsed by definition, but merely because it lacked action.\textsuperscript{17} Catalonia, the base for this reform movement, he added, had to follow its own route to reform, whether or not the rest of Spain wished to proceed as well.\textsuperscript{18}

As the date for the elections approached in February of 1918, Cambó's plan had gone into full swing. Outside Catalonia, the \textit{Lliga} campaigned on the "\textit{Espanya Gran}" half of its Pratian doctrine. Cambó assigned other prominent Regionalists to oversee the campaign in each region.\textsuperscript{19} Cambó and Duran exchanged correspondence about the campaign and how the \textit{Lliga} should go about fielding candidates outside Catalonia. Cambó hoped that the elections would sweep in an entirely new parliament, which would make García Prieto's presidency of the government merely interim until the new parliament could force a change in the administration. However, Cambó could not attack the current government directly as long as it contained two Regionalists in the cabinet; yet if Ventosa and Rodés were to resign in order to clear the way for a Regionalist assault, it would create too large a governmental crisis to resolve with any stability.\textsuperscript{20} Cambó also wished to cooperate with the Maurists, and did not put candidates forward to oppose his Maurist allies. However, the Maurists were often less faithful to this friendship than the Regionalists, and after the Regionalists withdrew some potential candidates at the request of the Maurists, the Maurists did not always put forward their own candidates.\textsuperscript{21}

The elections did not go Cambó's way, however. In the interests of holding fair elections, virtually all parties had agreed on the need to make an independent figure with no political background or party connections Secretary of the Interior. Yet the man picked, Juan Bahamonde, had no experience at all in running elections, and thought that as long as he did not interfere, the elections would be clean. But his department was full of the same system veterans who did indeed know how to

\textsuperscript{19} Marquina, 55-56. Agulló, the \textit{Lliga}'s Secretary General and election strategist, had already laid the groundwork for this campaign in 1915, when he set up contacts in thirty-nine provinces outside the four Catalan ones, as well as tours by leading Regionalist politicians. Molas, \textit{Lliga}, vol. I, 120.
\textsuperscript{20} letters between Cambó and Duran, Jan. & Feb. 1918, ArxDiV.
\textsuperscript{21} Cambó, letter to Maura, 17. Feb. 1918, ArchMaura.
manipulate elections, and these men favored the two dynastic parties. Despite the events of 1917 and the heavy campaigning of 1918, the elections proved how deeply rooted caciquism and apathy were in most rural areas. The Liberal-Conservatives of Dato won the largest share, but with only 98 seats, followed closely by García Prieto’s Liberal Democrats with 92. Seven distinct factions won substantial representation, including the Regionalists, who won 32. But these captured only six seats of their own outside Catalonia. Ventosa and Rodés resigned from the cabinet to protest the way the elections had been carried out. Although García Prieto filled their seats with two of his own followers, including a Catalan Liberal - the Count of Caralt, then President of the Fomento - as Secretary of the Treasury to replace Ventosa, the government collapsed within a few days.

But the flawed elections only provided part of the reason for the Lliga’s withdrawal from the coalition. The projects of the renegade Conservative and maximum cacique la Cierva, the civilian who held the War portfolio, once again clashed with the Regionalists’ sensibilities. He hoped to domesticate the Juntas, and thought that producing a military reform bill which granted their demands would get their movement to dissolve. At the same time, he realized that the military leaders had not necessarily wanted to get so involved in civilian politics. He overlooked the fact that giving the Juntas a success at this point would only encourage them to act similarly the next time they wanted reforms in their favor, and that these military men were too volatile to be the type of power base that la Cierva had hoped to tap for support in civilian politics. Nevertheless, he persevered, and pushed forward his Army Reform Bill in February of 1918. Since the Cortes had remained closed since February of 1917, there had been no previous debate even over the legality of the Juntas themselves, and this made passing their demands even more difficult. Yet, given the restlessness of the junteros, La Cierva

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22 Lacomba, 336; Boyd, 100; Molas, Lliga, vol. I, 121; García Venero, Eduardo Dato, 305. Six more of the “Regionalist” seats were won by other - mostly Basque - parties who chose to sit with the Regionalist representation in the Cortes. See full results in Appendix A.

23 García Venero, Dato, 306.

24 Boyd, 96-97. La Cierva knew he had the backing of the King, so he could force his way in García Prieto’s coalition with virtually dictatorial behavior. His military reform bill did not reform: it increased the defense budget, the number of officers, salaries (especially for senior officers), and basically acceded to the demands of the Juntas. Despite the economic crisis and widespread starvation, the Spanish state now devoted even more of its budget to the military. Romero Salvadó, “Spain and the First World War,” 313-316.
insisted on passing the bill by decree. García Prieto had formed the government on the concept of democratic reform, which required parliamentary debate and not royal decree. Ventosa and Rodés opposed the decree, and Cambó thought about pulling them out of the cabinet, but refrained from doing so because he did not want to become unpopular with the military, which backed la Cierva - who made veiled threats to continue governing with military backing if necessary. Cambó felt the Regionalists could combat la Cierva more effectively from within the government. The election issue gave the Regionalists a safe way out. La Cierva’s bill passed by decree, and the Murcian cacique found himself strengthened. Then he tried to dissolve the Juntas himself, and his failure to do so, combined with copy-cat industrial action by state employees imitating the military Juntas, led to his resignation in mid-March, the last straw for the struggling Cabinet, which now dissolved.

La Cierva had drawn up a plan with members of the military to set himself up as President of the government with a cabinet of eight colonels. Such authoritarian tendencies necessitated his exclusion from the next government, although the new government itself would have to be stable enough to reassure the military that it could still trust in the viability of the constitutional monarchy. Maura was perhaps the only man with enough personal prestige to lead such a government, and the King called on him to form one on March twentieth. Maura first consulted la Cierva, who obstinately refused to budge on his decision either to remain as Secretary of War or to preside over a military government. Maura next turned to Cambó, to ask him to join a Maurist government. Cambó refused, but suggested instead a Maurist-Regionalist coalition. Finally, Maura approached the conservative Augusto González Besada, who turned down a coalition. Maura declined to form a government, but no one else would take up the offer either. Finally, the King called together the leaders of each of the dynastic factions - excluding la Cierva but including Cambó - and asked them to join together into a new Cabinet or face his abdication. The new coalition formed under the presidency

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26 Boyd, 106-107; Balcells, El Sindicalismo en Barcelona, 43-44.
28 Javier Tusell Gómez & Juan Avilés, La Derecha Española Contemporanea, 143-144.
of Maura, with Cambó as Secretary of Development later joined by Ventosa who got
the newly created portfolio of Provisions. The workers duly noted that Cambó -
officially accidentalist in respect to the regime - had stepped in to save the monarchy
at precisely the moment when it could have least violently passed on.29

The Liberal-Conservative Manuel de Burgos y Mazo concluded that this
government had been an error which could benefit only three of its members:
Cambó, Maura, and the Count of Romanones. Cambó's presence within the Cabinet
reaffirmed his prestige within Catalonia and his ability to carry through with his
promise to have a direct say in the government of Spain while also facilitating his
intention to preach his message throughout Spain; Maura returned to power for the
first time since the events of 1909 had driven him out of government, and now
received recognition as the man with the most personal prestige in Spain; and
Romanones had the chance to recapture some of the public sympathy he had lost
during his last term in government. As for the other members of the cabinet, they
benefited little from taking part, and some, such as Dato, had to make personal
sacrifices in order to participate.30 Dato had personal differences with everyone else
in the Cabinet, and especially with the Regionalists, who were the only faction with
two portfolios.31 Cambó wrote optimistically to Duran, although he doubted the real
viability of the new government which had such an overwhelming but
heterogeneous parliamentary majority:
The current government will last a very short time, but it can do great things because the
parliament will approve everything it wants....
I believe that this government will either do great things - and I hope to make myself
the motor and we will hoist our flag - or the monarchy will collapse and we will be put
in the position, in this case, of working alone to save Catalonia.32

The Progressive Liberal Natalio Rivas Santiago did not see how Cambó could
handle his new position. He started at a disadvantage because he was Catalan, and
would never be trusted by many in Madrid. He would have to shelve his Catalan
identity in order to accomplish anything, but if he did, the nationalist masses in

29 Alberti, 434. Initially, the King appointed Alba as Secretary of Development, giving Cambó the
portfolio of Public Instruction. Alba opined that this would only cause problems because Cambó, as the
representative of catalanism, would try to make linguistic concessions to Catalonia. This would put
Cambó in conflict with others in the Cabinet - and in the Cortes - who opposed such concessions, making
this government's life difficult. Alba suggested exchanging their two portfolios, and Cambó and the
King agreed. García Venero, Santiago Alba, 148.
30 Manuel de Burgos y Mazo, El Verano de 1919 en Gobernación, 37-40.
31 García Venero, Dato, 315.
32 Cambó, letter to Duran, 23. Mar. 1918, Arx DiV.
Catalonia would never understand. Yet if he failed to suppress his catalanism, the planting of the Catalan question from within the cabinet would be enough to bring the government down.33

Yet Cambó in the Department of Development finally had the chance he had long awaited to carry out his programs to modernize the economy of Spain, especially to bring about the infrastructural changes that the Lliga's policies had already begun in Catalonia. In his new post, he oversaw public works, agriculture, industry and commerce, and communications.34 Considering that the Great War would soon end, he sought to come up with a project that would prepare Spain economically for the post-War period. This meant fostering agricultural production, since this formed the base of Spain's exports; crafting a Forestry Defense Bill; exploiting mineral resources to give Spain capital reserves; stimulating the construction of reservoirs and artificial waterfalls for hydro-electric power, which Cambó saw as the energy source of the future; developing roads, ports, and irrigation, especially those private initiatives which needed political backing; improving transport, especially by rail, since this was essential for ensuring production and providing adequate resources for industry and access to the coast; and stimulating private initiative with aid from the Department of Development, through reforming the Law of Securities and Appropriations Bills and by establishing an Institute for Industry and Commerce.35 Cambó invested much effort in studying the railway system, because, he explained,

the railway does not only serve to transport riches and to transport products, but the railway creates riches and creates products. In Spain, because of deficiencies in our railway policy, because of fundamental errors in our railway policy, our railways not only do not anticipate the product, but they do not even follow the product.

He further noted that the railway system in Spain had grown only five per cent between 1900 and 1917 despite increased demand, and this had stunted the economic growth and well-being of all regions of Spain.36 Meanwhile, the railroad companies were in financial trouble. Cambó believed in their nationalization as a public service because he noted the expense of building a suitable system - an expense that was one-off, but far too high for private firms to afford.37

33 Rivas, journal entry, 23. Mar. 1918, ArchNRivas, 11-8893.
34 Buqueras, 117.
35 Buquer, 118; Pla, Francesc Cambó, 516; vid: ministerial documentation in ArchMaura 210.
36 Cambó, La Política Económica de España, 16-17.
In projects like these, Cambó showed his enthusiasm for direct participation in the government of the entire state. "I tell you, gentlemen," he affirmed after his tenure in government, "that I have never known any Spaniard who feels for Spain more than I do, who thinks of its grandeur more than I do, and who - respecting the integrity and effectiveness of the sovereignty of the central state’s power - has a more rigorous and more ambitious concept than I do." But for all his time in the Cabinet, Cambó effectively ignored the Catalan problem. The Catalan Republican Francesc Layret concluded from this that Catalonia could not be properly represented by the right, nor in the Madrid cabinet. Indeed, the *Lliga* had to step carefully in order not to upset a government that by its very heterogeneous nature was extremely fragile. When the Autonomist Center of Commercial and Industrial Clerks (CADCI) - a politically liberal organization but one which had long-standing ties with the *Lliga* - decided to bring its petitions to the Regionalists because it thought that this would allow it direct access to the government, the Regionalists refused to act so as not to shake the government. This left the CADCI, and other mainstream groups with catalanist and working-class sympathies to turn to the left for attention. And this left was now increasingly a Catalan one. The Radicals, long the main opposition to the *Lliga* at home, had finally lost much of their support at the polls: at the 1918 general elections, Alejandro Lerroux and Hermenigildo Giner de los Ríos failed to win their seats for the minority in Barcelona. The Catalan left had begun to organize itself once again, although this time it looked to have more staying power.

As 1918 progressed, Cambó faced an increasing dilemma: how to survive politically in a situation highly charged by the influence of events in the rest of Europe - specifically the revolutionary republican and self-determination movements. He had to preserve the system as much as possible to be able to work

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40 Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, 490.
41 Fité, *Política Republicana*, 180. The Radicals, deprived of much of the working-class immigrant support over the previous ten years by the anarcho-syndicalists, had toned down their fiery rhetoric. No longer did Lerroux stress class struggle, but had come to emphasize order. "The workers are doing well to organize themselves," he said of the syndicalist activity of early 1919, "because organization is discipline, order, responsibility. Through that route they will begin to governmentalize themselves." Fité, 208.
his programmed reforms, without thereby losing his base of support in Catalonia.\(^{42}\) Yet Catalonia was still a divisive topic in Madrid, especially for a fragile government. Cambó and Ventosa needed to control the nationalists in Catalonia if they were to be able to continue to function in Madrid.\(^{43}\) If the government fell, it would also create enormous instability since there was no obvious replacement. Early in the government, Cambó admitted to Duran the government's fragility: "As to how long the government will last, we cannot put a date on it. It is a fact that there are many political people who are conspiring to make it fall, but it is evident that its substitution would be an immense problem. I do not see anything else that would serve us."\(^{44}\)

Sure enough, the cabinet's heterogeneous nature provoked great tension, and its members regularly quarreled over both policy and personal differences. The ambitious Alba, still smarting from his inability to take over the leadership of the Liberal Party in order to forge ahead with his agenda, engaged most of the other cabinet members in petty clashes, and they objected to his obstinence. But the critical rift in the Cabinet came between Alba and Cambó, still bitter rivals with divergent plans for the modernization of Spain.\(^{45}\) They finally began to clash towards the end of the summer. Cambó also began to feel pressure from Catalonia to bring up the Catalan question, and explained to the cabinet his need to do so in a way that would produce as little friction as possible so as not to break the unity of the government. Alba, however, used this as an excuse to criticize Cambó without having to meddle in the affairs of Cambó's Department.\(^{46}\) To reaffirm his Spanish credentials, Cambó - on Maura's suggestion - accompanied the King to Covadonga, to pronounce a speech at the site where the Reconquest began with the first defeat of the Moors exactly 1200 years before. Many dynastic leaders expressed outrage at what Rivas called the "remarkable fact that a separatist is representing public authority in a solemn act of commemoration of the beginning of the crafting of national unity."\(^{47}\) Such an event dishonored Spain, Rivas thought, even though the Asturians gave Cambó an

\(^{42}\) González Casanova, *Federalisme i Autonomia*, 223.
\(^{43}\) Hurtado, vol. I, 344f.
\(^{44}\) Cambó, letter to Duran, 23. Apr. 1918, ArxDiV.
\(^{46}\) Rivas, journal, 9. Aug. 1918, ArchNRivas, 11-8893.
\(^{47}\) Rivas, journal, 7. Sept. 1918, ArchNRivas, 11-8906.
immense ovation. The reception Cambo received did not dissuade his Liberal opponents of their concern over his presence in the cabinet.

Alba finally provoked a crisis - ostensibly over teachers' salaries - and resigned from the cabinet. The real disagreement was over Alba's worldview. Alba saw the future need of the regime to incorporate the left. Cambo, with Maura, had hoped to reform the dynastic parties so that they could then reform the system from above. This, of course, required the cooperation of these dynastic politicians, which proved not to be forthcoming. When Maura could not carry out his Fall program, he declared the government effectively dead in all but name, and let the cabinet members struggle to define what would come next. Growing social unrest created even greater urgency for the cabinet to find a workable solution. "The perilous situation of struggle between right and left has influenced us more than anything else, so that we have put our (Catalan) case on the back seat," Cambo reported to Duran the day after Alba resigned. "It is crucial that, in a very intense action, we plant the urgency of a solution to the Catalan case. Now it is convenient that the government that comes after this one be led by us, under the banner of constitutional reform and autonomy." Cambo then presented these views to Maura, and commented that García Prieto and Romanones had also showed themselves disposed to constitutional reform. The moment to press for autonomy under the aegis of general constitutional reform had arrived.

The government continued to limp on day-by-day. Cambo considered bringing the government down with his resignation in mid-October over the inability of the parliament to approve some urban reforms for Barcelona, but decided to hold out for the optimal moment. "When the crisis comes," Cambo wrote Duran,

we have to be absolutely resolved, whatever happens, not to enter into any government which does not have for its mission the submission to the current Cortes of the project for constitutional reform of the Assembly of Parliamentarians and which does not count on the promise of a decree of dissolution to then go on to elect a Constitutional Assembly. If this is not accepted in its entirety, I am convinced that shortly after the new government forms, it will have to capitulate.

49 Boyd, 114-115.
50 Burgos, 52.
51 Cambo, letter to Duran, 11. Oct. 1918, ArxDiV.
52 Cambo, letter to Duran, 12. Oct. 1918, ArxDiV.
53 Cambo, letter to Duran, 17. Oct. 1918, ArxDiV. There are also several letters between Duran and Cambo about the urban reforms in Barcelona.
By the end of the month, Ventosa wrote further to Duran that: "now that our hegemony in Spanish politics is accentuated, I believe it possible that they [most other political groups] will accept political autonomy in order to keep us in the government." 54 In some ways, though, the Regionalist leaders deluded themselves about the weakness of the other parties, and overestimated their own force. As the general elections in February had shown, the caciques still maintained great power throughout most of Spain, and this ensured that despite party divisions, nondynastic groups would still encounter great difficulty in pressing their agenda in the Cortes. Cambó did indeed exercise great influence in Madrid, but he mistook the fact that politicos from virtually all groups were coming to him for support as evidence that Cambó and the Lliga were indispensable if anything was to get accomplished in Madrid. "Really," Ventosa concluded, "I am convinced that the year 1919 will be the year for the autonomy of Catalonia," if only the Regionalists could avert social unrest that might arise in Barcelona. 55

This hubris cost the Regionalists. Although the Government could weather the resignation of one member - in this case, Alba - it could not withstand a second resignation. Dato, the Secretary of State, finally came forward with his resignation, complaining that he could not carry out the affairs of State with the constant interference of Maura, who himself had determined policy through consultation with Cambó and with Ventosa. Ever paranoid after his last term as President in 1917, he also found the intrigues of Cambó and of Romanones - both plotting for future power - too much to tolerate. 56 Sure enough, when Maura resigned, the King turned first to Romanones to form the next government. Romanones sought to include the Regionalists and the Reformists in another broad coalition. The leader of the Reformist Party, Melquíades Álvarez, refused categorically, and the Regionalists could not accept the Liberal economic and budgetary proposals. Romanones himself, wanting to avoid the always-contentious budgetary debates, also felt that he would rather allow a short-lived government to form to deal with the immediate economic crisis and then himself form a government as soon as a budget had passed. So the opportunity to form a government passed on to García

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54 Ventosa, letter to Duran, 27. Oct. 1918, ArxDiV.
55 Ventosa, letter to Duran, 27. Oct. 1918, ArxDiV.
Prieto, who ignored the Regionalists altogether, and formed a government out of
the three main Liberal factions: those led by García Prieto, by Romanones, and by
Alba, and including the prominent Catalan Liberal Josep Roig, a former Democrat
who had aligned with Cambó in the past and who now found himself in the Albist
camp. Cambó found himself suddenly excluded from power. Meanwhile, as
complicated as the factions were becoming in Madrid, the dynastic parties
themselves were realigning in Catalonia.

Maura and Cambó had begun to collaborate again. But Maura’s opinions
wavered at times and remained undisclosed at others, and so the movement that
bore his name lacked coherent direction. As to the Catalan problem, Maura
continued to want to treat it within the context of Spanish politics, something
amenable to Cambó as long as Spanish politics did indeed deal with the question.
But the Maurists differed over whether to treat the reform of the entire
administration first, before tackling Catalonia’s demands, or whether to collaborate
with their Regionalist allies, even if it meant that Catalonia had to win autonomy
before the system changed to allow other Maurist goals. Maura did not ignore this
dilemma, and carefully studied the proposals of Cambó, which he preserved in his
files. Maurists, unlike many Madrid politicians, did distinguish between
regionalism and nationalism, and thought it wise to use the former to check the
later. But, while recognizing Catalonia’s aspirations, Maura had usually tended to
keep to his prior objections that regionalist policy had to affect all regions
(something Cambó agreed with, but as long as many regions - or regional party
bosses - opposed regionalism, Cambó did not see why Catalonia should not advance,
leading the way for the rest of Spain). The 1917 Assembly had irked some Catalan
Maurists because it did have a heavy Catalan bias, as well as for the fact that it had
played with revolution. Cambó’s pass through the Cabinet revealed his credentials
in government and as a strong ally of Maura, and now pushed the Maurists to
reconsider him.

57 Romanones, personal notes, 9. Nov. 1918, ArchRom, 5/37; “El Marqués de Alhucemas forma Gobierno”
58 ArchMaura 265/1.
Some Catalan Maurists, appalled by Cambó’s intention to relaunch the autonomy issue and fearing the *Lliga*’s dominance as the hegemonic party of the Catalan right, since it had incorporated most of the old dynastic nuclei either directly into the Party or at least into factions heavily under Regionalist influence, formed the National Monarchist Union (UMN) with the core of the Catalan Liberal Party. The UMN would come to replace the now tamed PRR as the black beast of the *Lliga* in Catalonia, but would represent a more complex problem for the Regionalists, in that the more worldly Monarchists, having experience in power and needing less to impress the masses by combativeness, could behave more subtly. The majority of other Catalan Maurists, however, reacted to the formation of the UMN by creating their own group, the Monarchic Autonomist Federation (FMA). They felt patriotic towards Catalonia, and collaborated with the *Lliga* and in the *Mancomunitat*, but also wanted to stress their pro-Spanish and specifically dynastic feelings.

Indeed, the majority of Catalan politicians now supported bringing about some form of integral autonomy as proposed by the 1917 Assembly. The Regionalists found that they had won the sympathy of the hard right through their conduct in 1918, and sought to use this support while they still could command the disparate Catalan forces that were increasingly moving to the left. Even the Madrid military establishment began to make noises that it could tolerate Catalan autonomy so long as the new Catalan government was dominated by the same men who had shown their administrative ability and loyalty to Spain within Maura’s government. Meanwhile, at Cambó’s suggestion, the Civil Service School of the *Mancomunitat* had conducted a poll of every town council in Catalonia. On November eleventh, the Catalan government revealed that ninety-eight per cent of them had supported autonomy, with the other two per cent abstaining; not one opposed autonomy. Armed with this result and with the actual situation in Madrid, the Regionalists decided to act: “If Catalonia does not obtain autonomy at this moment,” Cambó announced to a meeting of Catalan parliamentarians, “those who

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60 Tusell & Avilés, 166-169.
64 Cambó made the suggestion in a letter to Durán, 19. Oct. 1918, ArxDiV.
come after us will never forgive us." 65 Time, they thought, could be short, not just because this convergence of criteria by such diverse groups would probably not last, but also because events across Europe - both in terms of revolutionary workers movements and independentist nationalisms - could only influence the situation to the Lliga's disadvantage. If the Regionalists waited any longer, they could lose the initiative to more radical groups less interested in economic and social stability. The failure of Maura's government in 1918 also left men like Cambó, who had so far delayed raising the issue of integral autonomy, disillusioned with Madrid politics. Isolating Cambó merely made him more interested in making the life of future governments difficult. 66 Once again, Cambó tried to use the threat of imminent disturbances in Barcelona to force Madrid to follow his lead; he had again overestimated the amount of attention Madrid would pay him. 67

The Assembly of the Mancomunitat began to debate bases to present to the central government. Differences naturally appeared between the desires of such diverse groups as nationalist republicans and Carlists as to how to set up the government of an autonomous Catalonia, particularly in regard to suffrage, voting patterns, and executive power. When these debates threatened to delay the presentation of the bases to Madrid, Cambó essentially smoothed over the trouble by getting all parties to agree to leave many final decisions until later, allowing the current arrangements to stand but leaving all agreements open to change by the first autonomous government. 68 Puig presented the proposal on behalf of his government directly to the Cortes, in which he put forward the bases for debate over what powers an autonomous Catalonia should have. Puig's bases conceded much to the state, but whatever he wanted the state to devolve he wanted it to devolve in its entirety, giving the Catalan government full competence in whatever those areas ended up being - hence, the term "integral" autonomy. 69 The Parliament found much to debate. García Prieto was willing to allow Catalonia full jurisdiction over matters of education and public works, projects which the Mancomunitat had

65 Cambó, quoted in Mancomunitat de Catalunya, Per l'Autonomia (1918 ed.), 58.
66 Joaniquet, 212-213.
67 Burgos, 55-56.
68 Mancomunitat, Per l'Autonomia (1918 ed.), 75-78.
69 Puig, Missatge Adreçat a l'Excm. Senyor President del Consell de Ministres per l'Autonomia de Catalunya, 6-9.
virtually taken over anyway; Romanones wanted to form an extra-parliamentary group to discuss the issue, since he felt the Parliament under its current conditions could not handle such an issue properly; Alba, personally opposed to any concessions to the Catalans, agreed to such an extra-parliamentary committee, considering that such a committee could also kill any proposal; and Roig, although now in Alba’s camp, stuck to the position in favor of autonomy that he had agreed to at the Assembly. Unable to hold the Liberal factions together in his cabinet, García Prieto dissolved his government less than a month after he had formed it. Romanones took over, promising to consider the Catalan proposal, which he then opened for debate in Congress.

One after another, the Madrid politicians attacked the Catalan demands. The Catalans weathered all of these verbal assaults, until Maura had his chance to speak. Maura shocked all present by refusing to back his ally Cambó and by summarily dismissing the Regionalists’ program. In his notes, Maura jotted down that he was not actually opposed to the concepts put forward by Cambó, he merely objected to details. He feared what would happen if a region were constructed before the entire state could be reconstituted; he questioned the motives of the bases for autonomy which defined the role of the state when in reality they should have defined the powers of the autonomous region; and he pondered many omissions - if the proposal defined the Spanish state, then why did it not mention several of that state’s competencies, which Maura listed from the monarchy to the African colonies, which in no way concerned any specific region. Maura sought global solutions, and opposed Catalan autonomy for this reason, emphasizing that the same laws needed to govern all citizens. “Decentralization?” Maura asked. “All you want. Administrative autonomy? As much as may belong to the region and as you are capable of handling. Encroachment on national sovereignty? This, never! Not at all, not even in the very least!” If Maura’s outburst on top of everyone else’s had not stunned the Regionalists, then Romanones’s congratulatory handshake which immediately followed did. Cambó gave up on his presumed allies, marched the

72 Colomines, Catalanisme, 118-119.
73 Maura, speech in the Congress, 11 Dec. 1918, quoted in Poblet, Moviment Autonomista, 37-38.
Regionalists out of Parliament, returned to Barcelona, and now welcomed the Catalan left to work with him to force integral autonomy through.74

Romanones crafted the extra-parliamentary committee he had considered, and put on it important representatives of all political groups in Spain and in Catalonia under the chairmanship of Maura. The Regionalists were disposed to participate; the nationalists were not. Believing that only a united Catalan front could achieve a reasonable amount of autonomy in the face of such strong Madrid opposition, catalanist leaders of all hues gathered in Barcelona at the end of December. When the Catalan nationalists, proposing to form their own Catalan constitutional assembly, still refused to take part in the extra-parliamentary committee, the Regionalists had to accept this decision and withdraw themselves. Madrid politicians certainly noted that this marked the first time that the Catalan left had imposed itself on the Lliga.75

Given the social tension in Barcelona, the non-nationalist (but still Catalan) left had begun to regard autonomy as a useful way of promoting revolution in Barcelona, and gradually approximated the nationalist left which had long advocated Catalan self-determination alongside social reform.76 But now the new nationalist formations produced revolutionary overtones.77 With these developments, even the anarcho-syndicalist National Confederation of Labor (CNT) - which had long opposed catalanist aspirations because they had often been voiced by the right and because they promoted one ethnic group when the CNT professed not to believe in human differences - came out in support of the radical nationalist line. The anarchists approved of the disruption the issue had begun to cause at a time when the regime itself looked unstable, and could stomach the new arrangement so long as these nationalists did not replace one government that would undermine their revolutionary agenda with another such government.78

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74 Rovira, Resum d'Història, 148; Burgos, 87-89. Burgos added that Maura did not mean to sound so harsh towards the Catalan demands, since he considered them reasonable if put into the context of general Spanish administrative reform, and met with Cambó before the Regionalists' departure to clarify his comments.

75 Burgos, 96-99; Jardí, Puig, 129; Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, 256.

76 Poblet, Moviment Autonomonista, 43 & 21-22.


78 Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, 261. The tremendous growth of the CNT in this period underscores its influence and the social difficulties of the period: in 1915, only 15,000 workers belonged to the union in Catalonia; by July 1918, the CNT had over 73,000 members; and by February 1919, it had grown to have a membership of 427,000. Termes, Història de Catalunya, 294-295.
Inspired by the independentist Colonel Francesc Macià i Llussà, youth groups began to cause daily disturbances in the streets of Barcelona, in order to provoke the police and the military garrison. This led to dead and wounded on both sides. Cambó, who needed order to push forward his campaign for autonomy, found it difficult to dominate the situation and block these events. For Macià and other radical nationalists, this marked an effective policy to neutralize Cambó, since they believed that if he failed to achieve autonomy there would be more public demand for outright independence.\(^79\) Cambó, on the other hand, hoped to channel these disruptions, along with the climate of strikes and work stoppages, into pressuring the government for the concession of autonomy. But playing with the workers in this way began to alienate some of the industrial and commercial elements that traditionally supported the Lliga, without actually bringing these working-class forces under the control of the Regionalists.\(^80\)

Gustau Peyra i Anglada, a fervent Maurist who had led the break from the bulk of Catalan Maurists to now militate in the UMN, referred to this tactic as "provoking fear in Madrid" in order to get concessions on the Regionalists' own terms. Peyra considered that such tactics actually left Cambó open to great weakness, continuing that

> the circumstances are so favorable that if there were a real government here or if we were in any other country, the occasion could not be better to engage these people in battle.... They say, and they have their motives, that after everything they cook up in Madrid they will once again behave like spoiled brats as though we have to be grateful to them for not breaking Spain to pieces.\(^81\)

Not only Peyra noted this tactic. At a syndicalist meeting in the Bosque Theater, union leaders urged their members to stay calm for a while, because a violent strike at that point would only play into Cambó's hands rather than truly achieving any of the syndicalist goals.\(^82\) Cambó also appeared - to government officials, at any rate - to want any social disturbances to come across as tactics by the government to destabilize Catalonia, and thus wanted the government not to intervene so that forces of the Mancomunitat could resolve the situation, so justifying Catalonia's claims for autonomy.\(^83\)

\(^82\) Civil Governor of Barcelona, telegram to Amalio Gimeno, 12. Jan. 1919, ArchRom 12/31.
\(^83\) Civil Governor of Barcelona, telegram to Amalio Gimeno, 15. Jan. 1919, ArchRom 12/31.
Towards the end of January, the *Mancomunitat* held its own Assembly of elected officials, at which it deliberated the details of a statute of autonomy. This was meant as a show of solidarity between Catalans of all hues, and was well attended by most party factions and corporatist groups. The debate concerned mostly not whether Catalonia should have autonomy, but rather how much it should have. The speeches ranged from Cambó decrying separatism as a state of mind and asking for no more nor less autonomy than was necessary to recognize Catalan identity and freedom within a great Spain, to Macià declaring that only armed struggle could free Catalonia since no government in Madrid would ever consent to any form of the statute of autonomy under debate. This discussion finished, the Catalan parliamentarians returned to Madrid to present their proposals to the government, whose own extra-parliamentary committee had continued to meet despite the absence of the Catalan delegates. Romanones hoped that the return of the Catalans to Madrid would mark a cooling down period in which, having blown off steam and shown their mettle in Barcelona, they could now be ready to compromise.

The Regionalist-led delegation, however, still hoped to use its momentum to fundamentally change all of Spain. Inserted in the preliminary statement of the Catalan draft of the autonomy statute came a discussion of the importance of the right for regional assemblies to initiate reforms: "This facility can be a powerful stimulus to cure the chronic illness of the central Parliament, and can serve so that all of Spain may profit from by fruitful initiatives of the Catalan Regional Parliament." Cambó reminded the dynastic parties of the reason they opposed his aspirations so forcefully: "If Catalonia broke away from Spain, nothing would happen in Spain and everything would stay the same; but with the autonomy of Catalonia, Spain would transform itself. For this reason autonomy stirs up more resistance here than does separation." Indeed, Catalonia was not the only region that was then considering autonomy, it was merely the only region which had

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84 for the complete proceedings, see the "Catalunya Autònoma" issue of the *Novela la Nova*, Feb. 1919.
87 Cambó, speech in the Congress, 7. Feb. 1919, quoted in ibid., 251n.
broken sufficiently free from the constraints of the Restoration political system to carry through this debate to such an extent.\(^{88}\)

But the extra-parliamentary committee, with no Catalan representation, had come to its own proposal for a statute of autonomy which did not match the Catalan proposal, although even Cambó noted that under Maura's guidance, it had improved markedly on the powers of the *Mancomunitat*.\(^{89}\) Where the Catalans based their autonomy on the region, the extra-parliamentary committee built the regional structure on autonomous municipalities. Also, the extra-parliamentary committee merely sought to answer some of the immediate demands of 1919, viewing their proposal as a temporary solution much in the way that the *Mancomunitat* had been in 1913. The Catalans had been looking for a more permanent form for their autonomy. Francesc Maspons i Anglasell, a Catalan legal scholar, concluded that the extra-parliamentary proposal merely represented a mild administrative reform of the state rather than a fundamental and permanent reworking of the system. Reconciling the two plans would be difficult.\(^{90}\) Ventosa then visited Romanones and went against the *Lliga’s* stated policy of late 1918: he requested that Romanones grant the Catalan statute by decree, since he thought any

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\(^{88}\) *Heraldo* (Madrid), 27. Jan. 1919, cited in Josep Conangla Fontanilles, *Cataluña y su Voluntad*, 35-36. When the *Mancomunitat* presented its project to the Cortes at the end of 1918, members of various provincial governments throughout Spain gathered in their regional groups to discuss how they would respond. Most, dominated by the system oligarchy, opposed Catalonia's bid for autonomy just as they had opposed the creation of the *Mancomunitat* and efforts by some regional politicians to form mancomunidades in these other regions. The biggest opposition came from agrarian strongholds in Castile and in Andalucía. The main concern in these regions was economic: they feared Catalonia would try to keep its own economic policy and control the flow of goods in Spain, thus weakening agricultural regions. Also, they felt that the social climate in Catalonia was too volatile, and that an autonomous Catalonia would soon need the Spanish army to come in to restore the order it could not preserve itself. Vid: Ricardo Robledo Hernández, “L'actitud castellana enfrente del catalanismo,” *Recerques*, #5 [1975], 244-247 & 267-268.

In Aragon, where the assembly was called by the municipal governments, the gathering showed more sympathy with Catalonia but still feared the break-up of Spain. The Aragonese decided to appeal to Maura to continue to press with his old plan to empower the municipalities with the autonomy necessary to deal with their own local concerns. Once this was accomplished, the Aragonese urged the supression of the provinces in favor of the traditional regions. Vid: “Bases de la Asamblea General de Municipios de Aragón,” 16. Dec. 1918 & J. Alberto Cerezuela (Mayor of Zaragoza), letter to Maura, 20. Dec. 1918, in the ArchMaura, 395/13.

The Navarrese met to discuss the revindication of that region’s foral rights, for the “aggrandizement of Navarre, a valid desire, compatible with the supreme ideal of the aggrandizement of Spain, beloved fatherland of everyone.” Asamblea de la Diputación Foral de Navarra, *La Reintegración Foral de Navarra*, 10.

The *Lliga* had especially been exerting pressure on nascent regionalism in Valencia and the Balearic Islands for years, with some, mostly cultural, success. Vid: Alfons Cucó i Giner, *El Valencianismo Político*.

\(^{89}\) Cambó, *Memorias*, 300-301

\(^{90}\) Francesc Maspons i Anglasell, cited by Ucelay, “La Diputación i la Mancomunitat,” in Riquer (ed.), vol. II, 123.
debate in such a hostile parliament would be futile. But Romanones led a minority government; even if he could convince his own followers - many of whom opposed Catalan autonomy - he still relied on the support of Maura to govern. So Ventosa called for passive resistance throughout Catalonia, so that the local and regional governments would simply not cooperate with Madrid. This action, Maura feared, would lead to even greater social unrest, and Maura, therefore, said he would demand full prosecution of any form of resistance. Cambó then intervened passionately in the Cortes, but found the wind there blowing hostile, especially from the Liberal benches. Chief among the Liberal opposition was Alfons Sala, the wealthy industrialist, Liberal cacique and perennial representative from Terrassa, and leader of the UMN. Sala refused to let the debate continue as long as the whole process had begun with the Mancomunitat's own referendum, and he demanded a new one on his terms. With Sala filibustering - and being allowed to by the other Liberals, the Catalan left began to conclude that achieving autonomy would be impossible in the current Cortes, and that it could only happen within the context of a constitutional assembly.91

Cambo, however, hoped to appease Sala by accepting his terms. Sala saw the opportunity to stall further, saying that any new referendum would take time to prepare. Meanwhile, the social crisis in Barcelona needed a more immediate solution. Romanones then announced that he did not think a new referendum was necessary, so splitting the Liberal ranks still further. Alba made one last effort to win over the support of the disgruntled Liberal party by pointing out that, by the agreements with other party leaders in December, Romanones' minority government only had a mandate to approve the new budget and to open debate on pressing issues, but not to actually act on those issues. Over the protests of Cambó, Romanones suspended the Cortes.92 Cambó pressed Romanones to solve the Catalan question at once to alleviate that pressure, since the crisis threatening Spain would affect industrialized Catalonia first and foremost, and then Catalans needed to have the ability to deal with the problem themselves. He thought - incorrectly -

that he could take the problem directly to the King if he had to. Cambó had threatened to sabotage parliamentary politics if the Cortes failed to settle the Catalan problem. This he did, but in doing so, he lost control of his own situation as well. A general strike took hold in Barcelona, and it was clear to all that the Catalans did not even have their own house in order. Cambó had derived his power from two sources: the Cortes where he led the Regionalist minority and Catalonia where his party ran the show and provided the home-base support. With both in collapse and out of his control, Cambó would no longer be able to function, and he would never again have the chance to bring about the Regionalist agenda for Spain. He sensed this, and looked to his future in Spanish politics:

I can say that without any vacillation: I will not be in any government in which I cannot develop my program in its entirety. Without a total agreement as to what it is going to do and how it is going to do it, I will not enter into any government. Failure to complete its program killed the National Government [of Maura in 1918], as well as a lack of audacity and effort. The memory of that is for me a definitive lesson that I will never forget.

If in these conditions I cannot act in general politics, I will limit my action to Catalan politics, and if I fail in this, I will concentrate all my efforts into preparing the Barcelona Exposition [1929]. I absolutely feel the need for efficacy. I will always prefer an effective action in a reduced sphere to a pompous and sterile action on a grand scale. When I go to sleep, I need to know that I have not wasted the day and that my efforts have served for something. Only in that way can I feel anxious to start a new day.

For a man so committed to his political program, Cambó was demonstrating very little staying power. The pessimistic outlook he often accused Spain of taking had begun to pervade him as well.

With Parliament suspended, the autonomy bill was effectively dead in any form. Romanones now had to deal with the escalating general strike in Barcelona. The "Canadiense" strike had at its root the inability of the industrialists to keep salaries in line with the huge inflation caused by increased European demand for Spanish products - especially Catalan textiles - during the War, and now with the unemployment that had come at war's end when these industries had not modernized sufficiently in the boom years to become competitive on the world market in peacetime. The anarcho-syndicalist leaders, controlling one third of the Barcelona workforce, also realized that they could count on the moral support of

93 Cambó, letter to Duran, 27. Feb. 1919, ArxDiV. Cambó had warned Alfonso that the failure to solve the pressing issues in Catalonia could produce the revolution that would overthrow the monarchy. Pabón, vol. II, 17-18.


what was now an important Catalan left. This seemed an opportunity to split the Regionalists from the allies on the left once and for all, and undermine the legitimacy of the autonomy movement at the moment when it had reached its height in Madrid.96

The strike took its name from the nickname of the Canadian-owned electric company where it began. Barcelona first found its power-supply under threat, which required military intervention. Then, from the “Canadiense,” the strike spread to all sectors of the workforce. The Regionalists offered mediation but, as a party with broad connections with the employers, they were not seen to be neutral.97 Ventosa returned to Barcelona to organize protection for transport bringing foodstuffs into the city so as to avoid a complete catastrophe. Josep Bertran set about organizing the Somatent, a para-military police force in theory responsible to the Mancomunitat but in reality a tool of the Employers’ Federation.98 Failing to control the strike, the Romanones government entered into negotiations with both employers and workers. As this began to produce some dialogue, the strike subsided, and the government gave the order to relax martial law and release the strike leaders from prison. The military, however, did not feel satisfied with the civil government’s efforts, and obstructed the workers’ movement. Tensions increased between the civil and military governments in Barcelona, until the military government - in mid-March - unceremoniously forced the civil governor onto a Madrid-bound train. Dealt such an insult, Romanones submitted his resignation to the King. Under military repression, the syndicalist leaders felt betrayed and returned to the barricades.99

In this climate, all Cambó had worked for came unglued. He could no longer speak in the name of Catalonia in Madrid when his party could not control Barcelona. He had lost his contacts with the Catalan left which had shown revolutionary tendencies in supporting the strike. And he alienated many of the employers because, in his effort to threaten Madrid in order to win autonomy, he had played with fire. Although the Lliga had had access to government for a year-

96 Boyd, 120.
97 Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, 271.
99 Aunós, 252-253.
and-a-half and had built a veritable army of Regionalists at all levels of government, it had failed to achieve autonomy. Disorder had been unleashed which it did not want and could not control. This meant it had to retreat for good from the offensive. Cambó admitted to the Regionalist Senator Joan Garriga that he had lost confidence in himself to be able to do anything effectively, and that now all that remained was to save the Mancomunitat from revolution.

Despite their political differences, Coromines wrote to cheer up Cambó, while encouraging him to transfer his enormous energies into leading Catalonia peacefully into a new form of sovereignty: “Go back to your strong disposition, if you can. Not only for personal egoism but for Catalonia. Because separatism implies war and destruction... from which we can expect nothing good to come.”

Cambó sent back his telling reply, that he was continuing to do all he could to resolve the situation. But if he could not, Catalonia could not count on him any more.

Like you, I believe that if autonomy does not come soon, it will cease to be a solution for the Catalan case and my hour will have passed definitively. Believe you me that, if this happens, I will not try to resist the inevitable. Recognizing my failure, I will be a determined follower of whoever then raises up the banner of our fatherland.

Cambó’s success proved his downfall. He had helped topple the old political system without having prepared its replacement. Unable to control the forces released in this upheaval, he saw he could not fulfill his aspirations. To Madrid, he would remain a Catalan and therefore inherently suspect. Yet he had shown his Catalan constituents that the moment he was in a position of power in Madrid he failed to advance a catalanist agenda. Cambó’s politics became Spanish politics, and the Catalan question became only a part of the greater question of the reorganization and modernization of Spain, even though Cambó had himself long argued that the Catalan question should not get treated in this way. Prat’s death had virtually severed the connection between Cambó and popular opinion in Catalonia, and had also weakened the Lliga’s control by attraction within Catalonia, where it could no longer conciliate all sides and reduce unrest. Although the Regionalists continued to gain in the polls, their opportunity to implement their program had passed.

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101 Garriga, Memòries, 237-239.
After having seized the initiative from a point of weakness in 1911 and gradually working up its strength to dominate the agenda of Spanish politics, the *Lliga* found itself on the defensive after 1919. While it continued to maintain its prestige, it could not use this to its advantage. It had helped undermined the old order, as it had wanted, but had failed to install a new one which conformed to its needs. In post-1919 Spain, the *Lliga* had to fight both the vestiges of the old and the risings of the new. In such a situation, all the Regionalists could do was to hang on to what they had already achieved, but they could get no closer to fulfilling the goals they had set out for themselves when they made their first offensives in politics. At times, they found themselves driven into the arms of the establishment forces they had long fought in order to restore the social order they craved; at times they continued to act as a thorn in the side of this Madrid oligarchy in order to show their power to shake the regime in the hope that they could replace it with one set in their image. But the Regionalists continued to provoke ire in Catalonia and throughout Spain, and now realized that their program was no longer tenable, if it ever had been. By 1923, defeated at the polls, rejected in Madrid and Barcelona, there was nothing left to do but retreat.

In Catalonia, the Regionalists dominated all layers of official politics. The Catalan left remained unorganized in any viable party; most of the Catalan Carlists had broken with the new Carlist pretender (Jaime) as part of the Traditionalist Party set up by Juan Vázquez de Mella, and had - in Catalonia - joined as junior partners with the Regionalists in a seemingly perpetual electoral coalition; and the dynastic groups remained either under the *Lliga*'s sway or marginalized. Only the Radicals represented any important opposition, and these no longer presented a grave threat. Opposition by the Radicals in Catalonia was especially tempered since the party leader, Alejandro Lerroux, had moved towards the political center in Madrid and now often seconded the Regionalists' reformist attempts, hoping to shed his

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1 Ametlla, 323.
revolutionary background and now serve as a class mediator. In his memories, the writer Claudi Ametlla described the "Golden Age of the Lliga:"

during these years, the Lliga, in all of Catalonia, is the only party that counts, the only one that governs. And, in Madrid, the only party worth fearing, like no one else. Except for it, no party can muster a true opposition. The non-Lerrouxist Republicans... keep little solidarity between them, and cannot form a real force. Not able to control Barcelona - and they don't - they are no one.3

Yet much of the social crisis in Catalonia existed outside the structure of the party system. The sources of tension were so broad and cut across so many strata, that most politicians realized why the Lliga, despite its official political power, failed to neutralize the situation. "Only with great difficulty" the Secretary of the Interior for much of 1919, Manuel de Burgos, concluded, "could we find any other city in the world in which so many causes of unrest had accumulated, so many elements of disquiet as in Barcelona."4 A high percentage of workers, under the influence of the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, failed to vote, while other Catalans, seeing no options other than the Lliga, also abstained. The Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), growing throughout Spain but most notably in Madrid, did not have a toe-hold in Catalonia, in part due to the strength of the CNT but also because it ignored the Catalan question. The Socialist pamphleteer Luis Araquistain Quevedo, distressed at the decomposition of the Spanish party system because it afforded the PSOE no viable opponent to its right, chose to disregard the Lliga almost entirely in his analysis of Spanish politics.5 In the end, he considered the Lliga a reactionary party, and for this reason incapable of following through with its promised reforms of the previous couple of years.6

Labor disputes, workers' strikes, and employers' lock-outs prolonged unrest throughout 1919, allowing the Regionalists to make no further progress with their reforms either at home or in Madrid. To counter rising anarchist terrorism, the Employers' Federation (Patronal) hired its own paramilitary band, led first by Manuel Bravo Portillo, a former police agent and one-time spy for the Germans, and then - after his assassination - by a German character named Fritz Stallmann who worked under the name "Baron de König." Stallmann ostensibly worked for the

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2 Culla, Republicanisme Lerrouxista, 333.
3 Ametlla, 325.
4 Burgos, 449.
5 Luis Araquistain Quevedo, España en el Crisol, 28-29.
6 ibid., 78.
Patronal, but would carry out any assassination he was paid for, or even make attempts on the lives of employers who failed to pay him protection money. His shooting of the President of the Patronal in January 1920 for failing to make such a payment led to his expulsion from Spain.7

The Patronal, formed of some of the most intractable members of the industrialist class, not only stepped up its campaign against the CNT through terror, but also increased the pressure with lock-outs, culminating in the largest coordinated one of October 1919. This was their response to the chain of events which had begun with the general strike at the beginning of the year. The employers had hoped that by locking the workers out of their jobs, they could undermine the prestige the syndicalist leaders had accumulated by making them seem unreasonable. But as hunger and misery grew, so did the workers' support for their leaders, especially those who increasingly called for more social violence and anarchy. General unrest in Barcelona continued.8 The Lliga and its government in the Mancomunitat refused to mediate, ostensibly because the lock-out affected only Barcelona and not all four provincial components of the Mancomunitat. But in reality the Lliga hoped to distance itself from intervention in the social question, while also seeking not to tarnish the institution of the Catalan government with any unfavorable result.9

The Madrid government, in the second half of 1919 under the control of the Liberal-Conservatives and under the presidency of Joaquín Sánchez de Toca, created a Labor Commission to oversee ethical and juridical issues of social conflicts in Catalonia, so that the workers and employers could deal directly with the civil government.10 Sánchez de Toca then nominated Alfons Sala, the fierce anti-Regionalist leader of the UMN, Liberal cacique and perpetual representative from Terrassa, and one of the most important industrialist leaders, to represent all Catalan employers at the International Labor Conference in Washington simultaneous with the lock-outs.11 This nomination demonstrated the dynastic

7 Francesc de Madrid i Alier, Ocho Meses en el Gobierno Civil de Barcelona, 46-47; Pere Foix, Los Archivos del Terrorismo Blanco, 107-110.
9 Madrid, Ocho Meses, 48-49.
11 Puy, 113-114.
party’s opposition to the Regionalists, as well as the reassertion of anti-Regionalists as the dominant element within the industrialist corporation. The traditional industrialist pressure group, the *Fomento*, began to bypass the parliamentary influence it had long tried to wield through the *Lliga*, and now returned to dealing directly with the cabinet, using the prestige of Sala as a route in. Sala himself supported the lock-out, believed in the suppression of all syndicalism, sought the reinforcement of police including the Catalan military force the *Somatent*, and - most of all - wanted the reimposition of order by the central government.

Indeed, the leaders of the *Patronal* had begun to show their lack of confidence in all of the political parties - party politics, they felt, had created the subversive situation. Many employers even abandoned what support they had previously shown for the *Lliga*, including for the autonomy movement they had so recently backed when they thought that such a political power play might serve their interests. And meanwhile, the employers continued to enlarge their contacts with the military government, which since early on in 1919 had itself disregarded the civil government’s attempts to reach a peaceful solution to the labor unrest. Cambó himself deplored this state of affairs. He demanded throughout the year an end to martial law in Barcelona, to allow proper negotiations to begin. While he agreed that tough measures had been necessary for a time after the violence of the beginning of the year, he also insisted that only liberty and justice could solve the strife. Furthermore, he noted, that as the military repression continued, the violence had begun to escalate once more. Francesc Layret, a leader of the Republican Party of Catalonia (PRC), a Catalan nationalist group of far-left - and once not particularly catalanist - origin, supported Cambó’s claims: “violence spawns violence and an act of violence on the part of the Power-that-be is always answered by those below with other acts of violence.” The military censorship and

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12 cf. the *Trabajo Nacional*, July 1919.
13 Puy, 114. The failure of the central government to provide this order was ultimately one of the main causes for the demise of the UMN. Puy, 115-116.

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repression was lightened in 1919 only briefly during the short-lived right-wing government of Antoni Maura, when Cambó and his deputy Joan Ventosa complained that martial law was interfering with the run up to the general elections held on June first. Cambó also pointed out the absurdities of press censorship, which applied only to newspapers published in Barcelona even though the Madrid press continued to be available at Barcelona’s newsstands. Nothing, Cambó thought, excused the free rein the military had been granted in Catalonia: “What is happening, Don Antonio, is that in Barcelona not even the Captain General is in command, but a mix of officials who have no concept of justice and want to impose an intolerable dictatorship.” The forced reduction of the actions of the political parties meant that the structure of the social problem became even further removed from the party-system within Catalonia, thus weakening possible action by the Regionalists still further. Meanwhile, the industrialists who maintained their contacts with the military benefited by increasing their power relative to the civil politicians. “Those who from within and without Catalonia gave preference at that time to resentment or prevented the definitive resolution of the situation in Catalonia in the supreme interest of Spain, have given Spain an all-around unhealable wound,” Cambó would later comment of the year’s events.

For what they were worth, election results in 1919 and 1920 saw the consolidation of the Lliga’s control over Catalan politics. The provincial elections of 1919 passed control of all four provincial governments to the Lliga and its allies, which guaranteed that the residual division of the Mancomunitat into provinces would no longer harm the body’s ability to function as a single unit: all the provinces could now dissolve themselves from within. In the municipal elections pushed back by the troubles of 1919 to February 1920, the Regionalists increased their hold at the municipal level as well even capturing staunch republican districts in

18 Cambó & Ventosa, series of telegrams to Maura, 21-23. May 1919, ArchMaura.
19 Cambó, letter to Maura, s.d.(May] 1919, ArchMaura.
20 Cambó, El que Pensa En Francesc Cambó davant dels Actuals Problemes, 3.
21 Ucelay, “La Diputació i la Mancomunitat: 1914-1923,” in Riquer (ed.), vol. II, 152. The Lliga actually only had thirty-five of the ninety-six seats in the Assembly of the Mancomunitat; Barcelona was the only province where the Regionalists had an outright majority (nineteen of thirty-six) - in the other provinces, with twenty seats each, the Lliga only had eight seats in Girona, six in Lleida, and two in Tarragona. Yet the Regionalists exercised a considerable influence over and generally had their way with many of the other provincial representatives. In this way, in 1919, all four provincicial assemblies elected Regionalists as their presidents.
Barcelona, where the *Lliga* captured thirteen seats and its coalition partners three more to increase their majority to thirty of the fifty seats in the Council. Voter turnout throughout the period remained constant from the years before the disturbances, roughly at 30-40 per cent within Barcelona and substantially higher outside the city (generally at 60-80 per cent). By the general elections of 1920 when the *Lliga* once again sent the largest representation from Catalonia, Cambó could declare that "the *Lliga Regionalista* is today the only active political force organized. All the expressions of Catalan sentiment, all the manifestations of collective Catalan life, have to be channeled and ordered and arranged by the men of the *Lliga Regionalista*."  

He continued that "the *Lliga Regionalista* cannot act with the liberty of a political party, because it is something more than a political party." The *Lliga*, in Cambó's view, had to assume the direction of the masses, and not become a victim of the impulses of the masses. Cambó pushed to reassert his party's former role, to divert the destructive energies of all sides of the social nightmare into a peaceful resolution that would allow the Regionalists to carry on with their political agenda. He emphasized that he saw no way to resolve the social conflicts without simultaneously addressing the underlying political crisis. To do this required peaceful order and the restoration of constitutional liberties. He felt that the catalanist mission had not directly suffered from the social crisis, and that the Regionalist push could pick up where it had left off before 1919. Catalonia, he stressed, could never see peace restored while it was being governed by an inimical central government. To guarantee that the central government would become sympathetic to the needs of Catalonia required that Catalans solve the general political crisis of Spain. Cambó's general thinking had changed little.

Meanwhile, the *Lliga* busied itself within the government of the *Mancomunitat*. In control (through its influence if not numerically) of all four provincial governments, the *Lliga* secured the transferal of their entire budgets automatically to the *Mancomunitat* beginning in 1920, drastically increasing the

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22 Albertí, 466-467.
24 ibid., 2.
25 ibid., 2.
budget of the Catalan government and securing it the ability to augment its involvement in the full complement of projects it involved itself in. Nevertheless, the entire budget of the Mancomunitat still only equaled what the central government spent in three days of its ongoing war in Morocco, and was less than half of the budget allotted to the city of Barcelona. Therefore, it began to amass large debts, although most of these went into investments within Catalonia. Seventy per cent of the Mancomunitat's budget went into building an extensive communications network, including roads, railways, and telephone lines; twenty-two per cent went to funding welfare programs, including hospitals and academic institutions; and the remaining nine per cent went into cultural projects. Projects such as these, once affordable only in the wealthier province of Barcelona, could now expand to include all of Catalonia. For example, by the end of 1922, the Mancomunitat had connected 405 new towns to the telephone network; by mid-1923, it had completed over a quarter of a million kilometers of new roads, not including bridges, and had nearly half that many more kilometers under construction. But the Lliga could also channel funds to those areas where the Regionalists or their allies were in the majority or required favors. Thus, some towns received preferential treatment, while other municipalities still under the sway of the caciques found themselves bypassed by the Mancomunitat's communications networks. In the province of Lleida, where the Lliga had few direct supporters, the Regionalists knew how best to fund their Autonomist Liberal and Carlist Traditionalist allies, and hoped to win over the support of that province. As a result, many important Liberal Autonomists switched over to the Lliga in 1919, including the president of the provincial government, Romà Sol i Mestre. By the time the Mancomunitat was liquidated by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1925, Lleida had received more financial investment than even the Regionalist-dominated province of Girona. Tarragona received the least

27 Comisión Liquidadora, 94-96; and Balcells, El Nacionalismo Catalán, 71.
28 Mancomunitat de Catalunya, Acuerdos de Traspaso de Servicios de la Diputaciones Catalanas a la Mancomunidad, 10-11.
30 Josep Lladanosa i Pujol, Història de Lleida, vol. IV, 191-204; Balcells, Nacionalismo, 69.
investment, no doubt because it remained, more than the other provinces, under the influence of non-Regionalist or allied forces, and offered the Lliga less strategic value.\textsuperscript{31}

At this point, the action of the Mancomunitat was directed by its President, Josep Puig, who had taken over soon after the death of Enric Prat de la Riba in 1917. Cambó continued to lead the Regionalist contingent in Madrid, but with the collapse of the attempt to gain integral autonomy in 1919, Puig saw his chance to take over the direction of the Party. As president of Catalonia, he saw himself as ideally positioned to push forward the catalanist mission of the Lliga, to the detriment of Cambó's focus in general Spanish politics. Puig proposed a great increase in Catalan cultural and educational initiatives, including propaganda campaigns abroad to take advantage of the international climate favoring self-determination.\textsuperscript{32} Prat's life achievement was to draw up the plans for what the Mancomunitat could accomplish, and to initiate the extension of the programs he had begun as President of the Barcelona provincial government to all four Catalan provinces. Now it fell to Puig to carry out Prat's visions. But Puig encountered several blocks to his plans: the republican revolt in 1919; the opposition of the entrenched Liberals of the UMN to the transfer of services from the provincial governments to the Mancomunitat; feuds within the Mancomunitat's own intellectual circle at the Institute of Catalan Studies which led to the expulsion of several of Prat's associates who had been working in the cultural sphere but whose ideals differed from Puig's vision; and finally increasing tension with many of the civil servants of the Mancomunitat, who identified the organization with Prat and could not accept his successor.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, Puig had a personality opposite to that of Prat which made his job as Prat's successor all the more difficult. Prat had always sought conciliation and had maintained broad contacts in many political, cultural, and intellectual spheres. Puig remained more self-contained, and preferred to surround himself with men of like-mind, thus producing bitter conflicts with those who disagreed. While Prat preferred to delegate powers to attract the broadest possible base, Puig chose a more

\textsuperscript{31} Comisión Liquidadora, 88.
\textsuperscript{32} Puig, "Parla el President de Catalunya," speech to the Assembly of the Mancomunitat, 12. Sept. 1919, in the Novell la Nova, #120 [1919].
authoritarian approach and wanted to do as much as he could himself to ensure that his specific ideals were realized. While Prat knew how to be diplomatic, and also relied on his close political relationship with Cambó and Lluis Duran, Puig had a more abrasive personality, and one which Cambó and Duran found themselves unable to control.34

On the one hand, Puig hoped to use the projects of the Mancomunitat to divert the attention of the masses from the social crisis and to continue the Regionalist project championed by Prat of “recatalanizing” Catalonia. But on the other hand, Puig’s efforts in this direction, without the concern that Prat had had (not to mention that Cambó still maintained despite his eclipse) for Spanish politics, showed a nationalistic tendency. The Catalan left, long in disarray, certainly noted the policy emphases within the Mancomunitat. While it wanted to block the Lliga’s self-preservation through and monopoly on political power, it also wanted to have a role in the nationalization of the country. Indeed, as Catalan elements in the labor movements began to evolve towards Catalan nationalism, they could begin to team up with the Catalan left that had after 1917 shown an increasing concern with the working classes. The anarcho-syndicalist Salvador Seguí i Rubinat was a clear example of the former element, as he denounced the Regionalists in 1919 as those reactionaries who call themselves catalanists. What they most fear is the straightening out of the Catalan nation, in case Catalonia no longer remains subdued. They know perfectly well that Catalonia is not theirs; they do not even try to disconnect the Catalan politics from the Spanish.... The Catalan-ness of those who direct the Lliga Regionalista is false. And it is that these people place their interest in capitalism before all interests or ideologies.”35

If Seguí thought that the Lliga had monopolized Catalan politics in order to further its class interests in the name of, rather than for the benefit of, Catalonia, he at the same time established direct contacts with Puig and with the independentist Francesc Macià to begin to open his movement up to the prevailing nationalist trends within Catalonia.36

At the same time, Seguí tightened his relationship with other local leftists who had been evolving towards Catalan nationalism as well. At one point Seguí

35 Salvador Seguí i Rubinat, quoted in Ricard de Vargas i Golarons, “Moviment llibertari i qüestió nacional a Catalunya (de finals de segle XIX a l’any 1919),” in Joves Historiadors Catalans, La Història, 371.
had shown himself disposed, despite his anarchist sentiments, to join up with a wing of the PRC, which under the guidance of Layret had affiliated itself with the Third International in December 1919. Layret hoped to form a bloc of the left in Catalonia, lumping together the PRC, the PSOE, intellectuals from the defunct Nationalist Republican Center, and any Radicals who felt inclined to desert Lerroux. They hoped to take advantage of the rift between the Lliga and the UMN to make electoral gains. This plan died, however, with Layret’s assassination in late 1920. 37 It also fell foul of the leadership of the PSOE in Madrid which could not support Catalan autonomy as envisioned by the nationalists because the Socialists felt it would have negative repercussions on the rest of Spain and would provoke reactions elsewhere in favor of centralization. 38 Araquistain could admit some degree of local - not regional - autonomy “in order to avoid in the autonomous regions the dominance of plutocratic oligarchs... [like those] of the Lliga Regionalista of Catalonia.” 39 The PSOE treated its Barcelona outpost as a mere part of its centralized, Madrid-based structure, and this inhibited, in part, its growth in Catalonia. The Spanish Socialists also lacked an understanding of the complex socio-political make-up of Catalonia and failed to understand the mentality of the Catalan worker. 40

The lack of a Spanish socialist option in Catalonia left the door open for native-grown Catalans to fill the void. Chief among these was the recurring figure of Jaume Bofill. Bofill had come from Carlist roots, and had joined the Lliga towards the end of the Solidarity movement in 1909. He had been brought under Prat’s wing, in part to rehabilitate Prat’s image in 1910 but also to reaffirm the politics of the Lliga on the right. He had taken over running the Lliga’s youth group, the Nationalist Youth (Joventut), established by Puig in 1907 and thereafter under Puig’s personal patronage - to instill catalanism in the next generation, and thus exercised a great influence. But his views had gradually evolved leftwards, until he himself opened up the possibility of adopting socialism in Catalonia and within a nationalist movement. “In Catalonia we need socialism,” he jotted in notes to himself,

37 Albertí, 468.
38 Araquistain, 130-131.
39 ibid., 134.
as an educative element, as a remedy - first among those below, afterwards among those above - for our age-old individualist excesses. But we need urgently a great socialist party for our national politic. Great zones of our land, principally the great cities and among them the capital, Barcelona, can never be well governed and administered if they cannot rely on a strong and worthy socialist party.\textsuperscript{41}

He blamed the "age-old individualist excesses" which had produced a strong "negative" anarchist tendency in Catalonia, on the centralized state, which had never allowed Catalans to administer themselves and had thus stunted their political modernization.\textsuperscript{42} He began to see the future of Catalonia in its working classes and encouraged the formation of the Socialist Union of Catalonia by Rafael Campalans i Puig, a socialist party meant to counterbalance the anti-catalanist PSOE in Madrid and the "negative" and destructive CNT in Barcelona. As a result of this, Campalans organized an act of homage to Bofill, which was well attended by members of the \textit{Joventut} and by Puig. There, Bofill announced that no party in which the bourgeoisie predominated could bring about the reforms necessary for justice in Catalonia. Cambó not only did not attend this meeting, but refused after this point to attend any public ceremony by Bofill.\textsuperscript{43}

As 1919 drew to a close, the Catalan left grew bolder, and decided to agitate: it would lay its cards on the table, either to produce the social and cultural results it sought or to bring about an even greater governmental crackdown.\textsuperscript{44} Cambó and Maura, called before the King in March 1920, offered to bring about the transformation of the Spanish state if he would entrust them with a new government and guarantee that government enough time to accomplish reforms. But the Liberal-Conservative chief Eduardo Dato and the Liberal Democrat Manuel García Prieto, the two strongest of the dynastic politicians, threatened to abandon the King if he handed power to Maura and Cambó. Instead, they offered to reestablish discipline within the various factions that had once made up the two main parties, and thus reestablish the \textit{turno}. Dato had considered retiring from politics in 1919, but was convinced by his advisors that his party would not survive without him, and that only he could restore the fortunes of the Liberal-Conservative Party in the

\textsuperscript{41} Bofill, "Ens cal socialisme," notes from 1919, ArxJBM VI-2-#7.
\textsuperscript{42} Bofill, "El socialisme a Catalunya," notes from 1919, ArxJBM VI-2-#5.
\textsuperscript{43} Casassas, \textit{Jaume Bofill i Mates}, 222-228.
\textsuperscript{44} Garriga, \textit{Memòries}, 247-249.
tradition of its founder Antonio Cánovas.\(^{45}\) He had the chance in May 1920, when Alfonso called on him to form a new government. The formation of this government would further undermine the efficacy of the \textit{Lliga}. Dato prepared for the holding of new general elections in December in which he would strengthen the hand of the old party-bosses. In Catalonia, this meant an advantage for the UMN, and in areas where the Monarchic Unionists could not muster support, for groups on the Catalan left. At all costs, the \textit{Lliga}, as the party which had destroyed the \textit{turno} during Dato's last presidency in 1917 could not return at full strength. Although Dato failed to reduce the number of Regionalist representatives in the \textit{Cortes}, he did succeed in weakening the party further, by pushing it more into the hands of rich industrial elements who might otherwise have supported the UMN. Needing funds and votes, the Regionalists turned to some of their more marginal past supporters, and allowed these to dictate some of the candidatures and to hold a debt over the \textit{Lliga} in the ensuing years.\(^{46}\)

The Presidency under Dato began a series of social reforms aimed at appeasing the left in Barcelona. He created a Department of Labor with a cabinet position, set rent control, established obligatory social security, and adopted other similar concessions. He had a long personal history of showing social concern in his previous passes through assorted cabinets, and could count on the sympathy of some leftist elements. But he also wished to restore order, and this led him to pass a "Law of Flight," which allowed the police or military to fire on supposed terrorists trying to flee, giving broad scope for error and abuse. The anarchists would never forgive him this one act, and the law would later cost Dato his life at the hands of an anarchist assassin.\(^{47}\) But in the meantime, he hoped to calm the situation in Barcelona, and so appointed Frederic Carles Bas i Vasallo as the civil governor there. The workers considered Bas an honorable man - "his only fault," pamphleteer Pere Foix assessed, "was to be at the service of the monarchy."\(^{48}\) Although syndicalism remained officially illegal, Bas did not care if it operated as long as it did not cause him trouble. "The employers," Bas told journalists, "will have to learn this truth. If

\(^{47}\) Seco, \textit{Alfonso XIII}, 145-148.  
\(^{48}\) Foix, \textit{Apòstols}, 39.
they do not understand, then all the worse for them, because no one other than the employer class will lose out.” Sure enough, the Patronal ignored Bas, and stepped up its paramilitary attacks on the workers. In their turn, the workers struck back by turning once again to the syndicates, their own gangs, and terrorism.49 In 1920, a record number of people were killed and injured in terrorist attacks, with an over four-fold increase on 1919. In Barcelona alone, 22 employers were shot or blown up, 12 plant bosses, 40 policemen, 127 workers, and 23 by-standers in 1920. The numbers went up again in 1921.50 Meanwhile, the number of strikes also increased in 1920, and almost twice as many working days were lost in those strikes as in the strikes of 1919, to set a new record of almost seven-and-a-half million working days lost.51 Meanwhile, the industrialists were doubly hurt economically in 1920, as they not only lost productivity to labor unrest, but were hit by a drastic reduction in export demand now that the boom years of the war had ended, which cut their export profits in half.52 Beset by poor returns, the Bank of Barcelona collapsed, inspiring runs on several smaller banks which subsequently had to close as well.

Bas had little success in Barcelona politics. The intransigent Patronal was in no mood to listen to calls for lenience or concessions. The Regionalists themselves had given up hope on the civil government being able to handle the crisis in Barcelona without destroying or mis-interpreting the Catalan identity the Regionalists had so long promoted. The Mancomunitat broke off its relations with the civil government in May of 1920 - albeit before Bas’ arrival - after the police fired on a group of revelers leaving the celebration of the annual Floral Games Catalan language festival.53 Although the Regionalists had previously preferred the civil administration to the military one, the former had proven its incompetence and so now it did not matter who came to represent Madrid in Barcelona: the functionaries remained relatively constant and the civil government out of touch with a regional and a local government capable of handling civil affairs; a military government existed to handle state order. “In Spain... either the employers place all the blame on the workers or the workers place all the blame on the employers,” a frustrated

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49 Foix, Apòstols, 39-40.
50 Balcells, Sindicalismo, 161n.
51 ibid., 181.
52 ibid., 183.
53 ibid., 139.
Cambó declared. "The two groups look at each other as enemies, without seeing that they are nothing but associates." He faulted government incompetence for either favoring the employers or the workers in the dispute, without helping the situation by pressing them to work together to aid the savaged economy.  

But Cambó was himself outgunned by his allies in 1920. Many industrialists were abandoning the Lliga as a means to express their political voice, and they had openly supported the gangs which Cambó could not stomach and which had helped produce the violent climate on Barcelona’s streets. The reactionary Josep Bertran, a long-time and now senior member of the Lliga, himself organized a network of informants among the workers in order to aid the terrorist efforts of the employers - of which he was one. He was described by Foix as a “collaborator... for his personal dishonor and the dishonor of his party.” Under pressure from the Fomento, Dato replaced Bas with General Severiano Martínez Anido, already the Military Governor of Barcelona, in the post of Civil Governor shortly before the 1920 general elections. Bertran worked to generate enthusiasm for this appointment within the ranks of the Lliga itself. The Fomento looked to Martínez Anido as a forceful presence who could quell unrest with harsh measures against the workers. Cambó felt that if the government had to use repressive measures at all, it should do a thorough job of the repression in order to quell the problem once and for all. Martínez Anido cracked down on the CNT, outlawing the organization to deprive its terrorists of funds. He deported those he considered instigators, and did not fear to make full use of the Law of Flight. Under difficult circumstances, he proved successful in reestablishing a semblance of order, because he had the stomach for repression that others before him did not and because he would make no concessions which would anger the employers. However, he did little to solve the problem in the long term, because he favored the CNT’s opponent in terrorism, the Free Syndicates, which he did not ban but rather encouraged, and because in jailing

54 Cambó, El Problema Català i els Problemes Espanyols, 4.
56 Foix, Archivos, 47-49.
57 Garcia Venero, Dato, 341.

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those CNT leaders he could catch, he actually removed the more moderate wing of the anarcho-syndicalist organization from action.\(^{60}\)

Cambó himself kept a low profile during much of this period. He decided to wait out the crisis until the time would come when order could be restored and he could resume his political campaigns.\(^{61}\) In these years, he set out to make his personal fortune in international finance, principally through the Hispano-American Electric Company (CHADE) which he founded. Ventosa, long his deputy in parliament, became his deputy in business as well. During this time, his actions in Spanish politics were limited to financial matters - the bailing out of the Bank of Barcelona with a new Catalan Central Bank was one pet project which received little support elsewhere, not even from Barcelona financial circles.\(^{62}\) Barcelona industrialists merely wanted Dato, through the treasury, to shore up the Spanish Central Bank - if that bank could not defend the peseta, as it failed to, it was not working properly.\(^{63}\) Cambó argued against many social reforms - such as the introduction of an eight-hour workday - as bad for the economy and thus bad for the workers: Spanish industries would not be able to compete, he feared, production would drop, and, in turn, prices would rise while workers earned less; the profit of the plutocrats, however, would not suffer proportionately. The essential remedy for the economic downturn, he concluded, was to “produce more or consume less.”\(^{64}\) Dato’s government, Cambó noted to Maura, entirely failed to understand simple economic policy.\(^{65}\) Count Romanones also noted the complexity of the problems in Barcelona. If the social crisis were merely one of law-and-order, it

\(^{60}\) Colin M. Winston, *Workers and the Right in Spain*, 138-141. The Free Syndicates had begun as a Carlist union, but by necessity had spread across certain sectors of the working class, and thus now had very few even remotely Carlist members. While they had little previous success displacing the the CNT, they grew under the protection of Martínez Anido as the only legitimate form of representation to stand up to the employers. Winston 94-97, 105-107, 115-116.


\(^{62}\) The Catalan bourgeoisie found it could just as happily find credit with Spanish and European banks, and many European banks proved even more willing to take capital risks than their Spanish - and previously Catalan - counterparts. Therefore, the bourgeoisie saw no requirement for a specifically Catalan Bank, let alone a Catalan Central Bank. Cambó merely came as the next in a series of conservative Catalan politicians, which had included Duran y Bas, who supported a Catalan Bank for sentimental rather than economic interests. Joan Ramos Rosés, “La Banca Catalana de la Febre d'Or a la crisi, 1866-1914” *Avenc*, May 1991, 16; Francesc Cabana, *Història del Banc de Barcelona*.

\(^{63}\) Jaime Cussó (President of the Fomento) & Graell (General Secretary), “La cuestión de los cambios,” letter to Dato, *Trabajo Nacional*, Nov. 1920, 118-120.

\(^{64}\) Cambó, “L'actitut social i politica,” talk at the Centro Theater (Madrid), 10. Apr. 1920, in *Novel.la Nova*, #135 [1920], 4-6.

would have been solved long ago. Instead, the complexities of the issues had prolonged the crisis, as they had also glossed over the Catalan question. Romanones added, however that this did not mean that the Catalan question had been resolved.\footnote{"Discurso del Conde de Romanones," \textit{ABC}, 1. May 1921.}

In March 1921, an anarchist terrorist shot Dato in Madrid - the third serving President of the Government to be killed in twenty-five years. To salvage the regime, the King turned to Maura, who called a meeting at his house with Cambó, Romanones, Manuel González Hontoria y Fernández Ladreda - a respected Liberal from Romanones' faction personally loyal to Maura, Vázquez de Mella, the leftward-sliding Maurist Ángel Ossorio, the Independent Conservative boss Juan de la Cierva, and the Naval Commander-in-Chief Admiral José Ribera. Maura asked these men to form a cabinet which would exclude the left and the two main dynastic factions along with their sub-factions. If his "Cabinet of Concentration" lacked any of these participants, he would turn down the opportunity to govern. Cambó and Romanones agreed forthwith: Cambó because he welcomed the opportunity to participate in a government relatively untainted by Restoration system politics, Romanones because he held Maura in high regard and felt that this was his duty. But when those assembled could not reach a complete agreement, Maura declined to form a government.\footnote{José Gutiérrez Ravé Montero, \textit{Yo Fui un Joven Maurista}, 235-236; notes [1921], Arch M 407/22.} Cambó wrote to Maura about this failed attempt, saying that if Maura were to form a government, with or without the Regionalists, he could "count on unconditional support from me and my friends."\footnote{Cambó, letter to Maura, 12. Mar. 1921, ArchMaura 407/22.}

The Maurist Manuel Allendesalazar succeeded in forming a government with a coalition of Conservative factions as a stop-gap measure with no particular program. The assassination of Dato had proven that the social crisis in Barcelona could directly spill over all the way to Madrid, so one main concern of the new government was to maintain martial law in Barcelona in order to contain the situation there.\footnote{Rivas, journal, 29. Apr. 1921, ArchNRivas 11-8907.} On this action, Allendesalazar was in agreement with the other conservative remnants and even with the Left-Liberals of Santiago Alba and the Regionalists of Cambó. All felt that the situation would pass quickly once it was
Cambó even anticipated that after a few months the Allendesalazar government would cease to be of value, and a new government under Cambó’s own leadership would be formed to deal with Spain’s pressing issues. A Liberal commentator and former cabinet minister, Natalio Rivas, had reason to believe that Maura would support Cambó in the future, and that the main block to a Maura-Cambó alliance was the personal envy la Cierva carried towards Cambó. Maura, Rivas believed, thought that la Cierva had wrecked the attempt to form a government after Dato’s death because he did not want to see Cambó restored to the cabinet in Madrid.

In the Allendesalazar government, la Cierva held the portfolio of Development, and this put him directly in the way of many of the economic ideas Cambó had for Spain. Principally, la Cierva was rethinking plans for the development of the railway system that Cambó had elaborately drawn up when he had been Secretary of Development in 1918. Now Cambó and Maura joined forces in the parliament to combat la Cierva’s new proposals, demanding a parliamentary commission to study railway policy. Cierva wanted to raise taxes on the railway lines without allowing those companies to raise prices. Cambó had argued that the companies should be allowed to set new prices in order to fund improved service and that it was worth it for Spain to invest in its railway system. Cambó, who had already written the most exhaustive study of railways and who had the most complete knowledge of railway systems in other countries, was convinced that any new study would back his plans and not la Cierva’s. Indeed, most Liberals as well as most Conservatives of diverse stripes agreed with Cambó; believing that José Sánchez Guerra, now the most important figure within the remnants of the Conservative Party, had reached an understanding with Cambó, the UMN withdrew its loyalty to the old Conservatives it had previously given to Dato, and switched to support la Cierva out of sheer opposition to Cambó.

71 Rivas, journal, 30. Apr. 1921, ArchNRivas 11-8907.
72 Rivas, journal, 18. May 1921, ArchNRivas 11-8907.
73 la Cierva, Notas, 229-230.
75 vid.: Luis Olariaga, La Cuestión de Tarifas y el Problema Ferroviario Español.
The Allendesalazar government did not last long. But its downfall was not because it had quieted the situation in Barcelona and had thus outlived its usefulness as Cambó had predicted, but rather because, on June twenty-third, the Spanish Army in Morocco was routed in the battle of Annual. The assassination of Dato and the disaster of Annual came so close together that once again the King was forced to call upon the "fireman of the monarchy," the figure so highly viewed above all others that he would be the only one able to form a government which could keep the monarchy from collapsing: Maura. This time, Maura had to accept the charge to put together a coalition. Although broad in its membership, it really consisted of three forces: Maura himself (President), with his personal allies inside and outside his own party, including some "on loan" to Maura from other parties such as the Liberal González Hontoria (State); Cambó, the only Regionalist in the cabinet (Treasury) but backed up by the most organized political party structure in Spain; and la Cierva (War), joined in the cabinet by another Ciervista, José Maestre (Development). Although Maura found collaborating with la Cierva distasteful, he felt he had no choice since he always had to rely on factions not loyal to him or to his program in order to push ahead. "If I were fifteen years younger and Spain could be badly governed for fifteen years more," Maura confessed to the Catalan Maurist Joaquim Nadal, "I would set up my own political party and would hope, upon governing, to be able to count on elements unconditionally affiliated to me. But, since neither one nor the other is possible, I will govern with those who want to govern with me." These forces did not have anywhere near a majority in the Cortes, but the Liberal-Conservatives and the various Liberal factions were willing to lend support (and even a couple of ministers) in order to preserve the monarchy. The main axis of the government was between Maura and Cambó, who offered complementary programs of conservative reformism but realized that with the parliament and most lower level government under the control of the entrenched oligarchy and with la Cierva in the Cabinet (mostly to appease military interests), they could never hope to revolutionize government in the way they

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77 Maura to J. M. de Nadal, quoted in J. M. de Nadal, Memòries, 280.
wanted. The two men believed that together they could bring about the reforms necessary to regenerate Spain.

But the participation of Cambó in a government designed to save the monarchy did not play well with the left in Barcelona. Many who had welcomed the Lliga's detachment from the incorrigibles of the Patronal as a positive sign of the Lliga's reformist character, now gave up hope on that party. And since Cambó in the Treasury hardly considered Catalan issues but busied himself once again with Spanish reforms, the Catalan nationalists also reaffirmed their view that Catalonia would not benefit from his latest pass through government. Amadeu Hurtado, an influential Catalan Republican lawyer, blamed Cambó personally: he should have realized that his catalanist past ensured that he would not be entirely trusted in Madrid and therefore would not get away with enacting the reforms he sought for Spain. Meanwhile, his personal ambition both in terms of regaining political power in Madrid and in terms of accumulating wealth abroad during the previous few years meant that he had lost the sympathy of a good number of Catalans, especially the youth. Cambó justified his actions:

I do not want to tell you that my entrance in government means any guarantee for the realization of our ideals [of integral autonomy]. It is quite possible that it will not be this way. And, despite this consideration, I had to convince myself of my duty to accept the position because if a collapse comes along, the failure will affect me exclusively and I exclusively will suffer the consequences. Meanwhile, there is some hope that my pass through government will be for the good of Catalonia and an impulse for the normal realization of our ideals.

Cambó argued that if he gained prestige as a Spanish politician it would indeed benefit Catalonia. Indeed, in this statement he was trying to calm a fervent nationalist residing abroad. What Cambó knew, and what the people in Catalonia soon learned, was that this pass through the cabinet, just like his last, would result with Cambó advancing very little in the way of a catalanist agenda, and that Cambó's failure to press this issue when he had the chance affected more than just Cambó. Catalonia would not gain integral autonomy with Cambó in the cabinet, and the Regionalists would suffer through this omission.

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79 Gómez Ochoa, "Reformismo dinástico y crisis de la Restauración: el gobierno de concentración, agosto de 1921," in Congreso de Jóvenes Historiadores y Geógrafos, Actas, 566-570.
80 J. M. de Nadal, Memòries, 275.
81 Albertí, 474.
82 Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, 420-421.
In the years that had passed since Cambó was last in government, he had increased his travels in, studies of, and familiarity through his financial dealings with other countries so that he could become more expert on Spanish general politics. He felt that Spain had failed to come to grips with the post-War economic situation. This had resulted in a collapse of exports, a resulting fall in domestic prices, a reduction in the volume of domestic commerce, a crisis of sea-trade, a monetary collapse, and socio-political conflicts. As Secretary of the Treasury, Cambó felt he had to take drastic action. Unlike the Liberals, particularly those loyal to Alba, he believed in promoting foreign investment in Spain as well as Spanish enterprise abroad to increase the capital flow, and this was one of his main foci in the Treasury Department. Spain still maintained an enormous public deficit, so Cambó realized the need for sacrifices, but against the trends of the times he advocated to Maura taxes rather than nationalizations and confiscations of private holdings. The latter course, he feared, would lead to further devaluation of the Peseta, bankruptcies, and more rampant inflation. Cambó held that the state was not bringing in enough to make the modernizations he felt urgent. Therefore, he recommended reorganizing local treasuries to take care of much of their own taxation and funding without the need for intervention from the central government; he proposed new taxes on capital, income, and sales; and he urged precautions against fraud, which was widespread and which cost the government dearly. Thanks to Cambó's international prestige, his presence in the Treasury reversed the collapse of the Peseta, which recovered from 7.73 to the Dollar in August 1921 to 6.37 to the Dollar in March 1922. The Central Bank cut down on printing money, and new tariffs were raised to aid the development of Catalan industry which had been hard-hit in the recent crises. He also encouraged Spanish bankers to look abroad for ideas: in Spain, Cambó felt, the banks looked only at the

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85 Andreu Bausili i Sanromà, Cambó y el Desarrollo, 55.
87 Cambó, "Nota de Francisco Cambó sobre la situación de la Hacienda" [1922], in ArchM 276/11.
88 Cambó, Proyecto de Ley de Modificaciones de Tributos y Reforma de las Haciendas Locales, vi-vii. Cambó also took advantage of laws already in the statute books but as yet unapplied, to allow cities to take over the administration and earn the tax base of their suburbs in order to improve city services. The decree which aggregated Sarrià to Barcelona created a small stir within catalanist circles which decried the implied loss of identity for a traditional suburban municipality. Bofill, notes [Nov. 1922], ArxIBM VI-1-#68.
89 Bausili, 56-57.
bottom line and how much interest they currently earned, rather than following the example set by more developed countries whose banks, after a stimulus and backing from the Central Bank, used their capital to make credit investments which produced economic growth. 90 Here Cambó showed his Catalan identity. Industrial Catalonia had to lead the way for Spain if Spain’s economy were to modernize. The region could not fulfill this goal as long as it was itself engulfed in social conflict. 91

Needless to say, Cambó’s proposals proved controversial, especially among the old dynastic oligarchy which began to oppose the Maura-Cambó government. 92 La Cierva, unsurprisingly, produced the cabinet’s demise from within. He posed a threat not just because of his personal animosity towards and disagreements with Cambó, but also because he was the civilian front for much of the paranoid military and sat in the War Department. When Maura and Cambó showed themselves partial to pulling Spanish troops out of Morocco, many elements in the military and oligarchy whom la Cierva represented in the cabinet could not accept such an admission of defeat. 93 La Cierva advocated increasing the military force occupying Morocco in part to improve Spain’s international standing. 94 Maura objected because he considered that the whole occupation had dubious constitutionality, Cambó considered the program too expensive, and González Hontoria - the Secretary of State - considered the plan too militarist. While all three agreed that there was an international strategic need for Spain to remain in Morocco, their primary concern was, rather, modernizing the economy and politics of the peninsula, and la Cierva’s Moroccan policy prevented that. La Cierva did not take these rejections kindly, and adopted a belligerent tone in dealing with Parliament and with the other members of the cabinet. 95 Through his ally Maestre in the Department of Development, he also continued his conflict with Cambó over railway reform, and both of them teamed up to attack Cambó in the Treasury. Unable to tolerate la Cierva, first Cambó and then González Hontoria submitted their resignations to Maura. Cambó further snubbed the King, who had supported

90 Cambó, La Política Económica de España, 9.
91 Cambó, Problema Català, 3.
92 Gómez Ochoa, “Por una nueva interpretación de la crisis final de la Restauración: el Gobierno Maura de 1921 y la reforma económica de Cambó,” Investigaciones Históricas [1991], 270-271.
93 Tusell & Áviles, 245-252.
94 Boyd, 195-197.
95 ibid., 205-206.
some of la Cierva’s militarist tendencies, by refusing an invitation to walk with him in the park just before his resignation.96 Maura had to explain these actions to the King, and in the process submitted his own resignation.97

The King responded that he would put his faith in a new government headed by Maura and Cambó, which proposal Maura took to Cambó. Cambó noted the resistance they faced in the Cortes and saw that with the oligarchy entrenched they had little hope of getting a parliament elected that would be favorable to them. “There is no other remedy,” Cambó concluded, “than to take the responsibility of governing by decree all the time that it is necessary, in order to create a state of [public] opinion that will allow us to call elections. Do you consider yourself prepared for this?” Neither politician was prepared to go through with such a move that would contradict every political philosophy they had ever stood for. Cambó knew the answer as well as Maura himself. “It is already too late for me,” was Maura’s ultimate reply.98 The price of seeing their programs through was too high. Both men, feeling impotent to enact real political change constitutionally, saw their political careers in the Spanish Liberal Restoration effectively end that very day. Maura’s revolutionary conservative ideology had elevated the level of Spanish politics, but Maura himself was unable to see his solutions through.99 Spain lacked the executive power necessary for a visionary such as Maura - or José Canalejas and others - to push their reforms through a parliament dominated by an oligarchy which resisted any changes that would necessarily lead to a reduction in its own power. Maura’s “Revolution from Above” was about as appealing to the oligarchy as a revolution from below, and would have had much the same result. Spain was not ready for this type of modernization.100 Cambó, offering a similar ideal, tried desperately in 1917 to engender a new political movement across Spain, but his vision could only take secure root in Catalonia, which had a distinct socio-political structure and a real way of manifesting public opinion in the Maurist sense.101

98 Maura and Cambó, quoted in Cambó, Memorias, 340.
99 Matilda de la Torre, El Agora, 116.
100 Ramos Oliveira, 141; Torre, 83f.
101 Ramos Oliveira, 179-180; Colomines, Catalanisme, 31-32.
Cambó himself was incapable of becoming the leader of a Spanish movement, and returned home to Catalonia to face growing nationalism and revolutionary extremism. He was undone at both ends.\textsuperscript{102} He might have teamed up with other movements, such as the Left-Liberals or the Reformists, to combat the oligarchy, but he failed to see eye-to-eye with their leaders: Alba, towards whom he maintained his inplacable hatred, and Melquíades Álvarez, whom he continued to distrust. Meanwhile, he found he needed to rely on Madrid to maintain order in Catalonia, where he himself had fought for liberty and now found the situation out of his control.\textsuperscript{103}

Unable to set up a government with Maura, the Left-Liberals, or the Reformists - let alone on its own - the \textit{Lliga} tried to work within the next Liberal-Conservative government of Sánchez Guerra, with Bertran as Secretary of Justice. Sánchez Guerra, who had moved with Maura from the Liberal Party into the Conservative Party nineteen years before but then who was never forgiven by Maura for abandoning him in favor of Dato in 1913, felt uncomfortable with the presence of Maurist holdovers in his cabinet, and looked to provoke a small crisis. He announced in the \textit{Cortes} that he would lift martial law in Barcelona in order to soothe the left. If this were not already a controversial enough move, he declared that he had made this decision in agreement with his cabinet. No agreement existed, and so Bertran and the Maurist César Silió Cortés resigned less than a month into the government, to be replaced by Liberal-Conservatives.\textsuperscript{104}

The \textit{Lliga} became openly hostile to the new government, and had only one possibility left for retaining power in Madrid. It entered into negotiations with the opposition Liberal factions to see if it could replace Sánchez Guerra’s government with a Progressive Liberal/Regionalist government under Romanones. As a precondition, though, it demanded autonomy for Catalonia, at least along the lines proposed by the extra-parliamentary commission of 1919. These attempts failed because too many Liberals remained fundamentally opposed to any further concessions to Catalonia.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} Aunos, 166.
\textsuperscript{103} Ramos Oliveira, 183-184.
\textsuperscript{104} Silió, \textit{En Torno a una Revolución}, 106-107.
Without martial law in Barcelona, the circumstances that allowed Martínez Anido to act had changed. The Regionalists had also begun to have differences with the general over the previous months as he began to restrict their ability to carry out their projects in Catalonia. In the Summer of 1922, the Lliga made an attempt to control the civil governance of the province of Barcelona directly from the provincial government - an elected body which the Lliga controlled. This put the provincial government in direct conflict with Martínez Anido. The general submitted his resignation, but Sánchez Guerra refused to accept it, arguing that “it is not the provincial government which has nominated you governor.” The Patronal supported Martínez Anido, and was seconded by the Fomento and the UMN. The general remained, and the oligarchy had struck yet another deadly blow against the Lliga.

But the main issue for debate in the Cortes throughout 1922 was the placing of blame for the Annual disaster. Fault was placed, variously, at the feet of the commander of the African army, General Dámaso Berenguer (by his personal rivals); the field general who over-impulsively ignored Berenguer’s plans, Manuel Fernández Silvestre (by the government); the government of the time, the stop-gap one under Allendesalazar set up after Dato’s assassination (by the Liberals); the entire African Army and military hierarchy (by the military Juntas); the Juntas, for undermining that command structure (by the African army); and the entire Restoration political system (by the republican left which was the only clump of parties completely untainted by the whole dynastic system whose squabbles had indeed led to the disaster). By the end of 1922, the far-left was demanding heads, military and civilian. The Liberals, who by definition could not undermine the entire Liberal system, called merely for the censure without trial of the Allendesalazar government, and were joined in these calls by the Reformists and the Regionalists. Maura, with his usual brilliant oratory, argued that such a move was unconstitutional, and that, besides, the responsibility rested with several governments. The Liberal-Conservatives saw Maura’s argument as a way to save

108 Boyd, 185-186.
face, by backing down without risk though admitting some responsibility. The Reformists and the Regionalists also swung over to Maura’s corner, thus crippling the Liberals.

As a result of all the instability, the King offered Cambó the opportunity to form his own government to sort out the fallout. But the King also placed one fatal condition on his offer: that Cambó take it up as a Madrid-based Spanish politician and drop all catalanist demands. Insulted, Cambó turned down the offer, and decided to sabotage the entire effort to save the regime. On December first, he formally accused the whole Allendesalazar government of complicity in the Annual disaster. Those members of that government’s cabinet who also served in Sánchez Guerra’s resigned on the spot. Sánchez attempted to hold his government together, but now he had to deal with la Cierva, whose brother he quickly brought on as Secretary of Public Instruction. It was the actions of la Cierva on the floor of the Cortes that would topple the government and whatever remained of the Liberal-Conservative Party on December fifth.109

La Cierva himself had been in the Allendesalazar cabinet at the time of the Annual disaster. This debate provided the perfect opportunity for several parliamentarians to vent their aggressions on the ciervistas, and, on that last day of the Sánchez Guerra government, Lorenzo Domínguez Pascual, Romanones, the Socialist Indalecio Prieto, and Cambó successively lambasted the Murcian cacique’s clan. The last proved too much, and la Cierva, in his turn, personally attacked Maura and Cambó. Sánchez Guerra refused to allow Cambó to defend himself, provoking anxiety on the Regionalist benches. The house divided into chaos over whether Sánchez Guerra had a right not to allow Cambó a word, and Sánchez Guerra closed the session so he could make his way to the Palace to resign. Cambó and Maura went off to discuss the affair privately, while the ciervistas physically assaulted the Regionalists and Maurists in the chamber. Unidentified cries in favor of a Republic and against the King were heard over the ruckus.110

109 Boyd, 232-235; Cambó, Memorias, 351-352. Although Cambó refused to abandon his catalanist agenda now, he had, in fact, effectively done just that in order to take up cabinet positions two times previously. However, in neither of those cases was renouncing his Catalan identity a precondition to taking up the office.
During this whole affair, Cambó had finally achieved one of his long standing ambitions: to be asked to form his own government. But when it happened, it came with too high a price. Cambó, as head of the Regionalists, was rejected in Madrid. But the Catalonia he refused to abandon had also rejected him, although not yet at the ballot box. The Lliga had continued to increase its share of the vote over the entire period after it last lost a meaningful election in 1910. This had not changed despite the trying times after 1919 when it looked as though the Lliga was finally losing its luster. The attempt by the UMN to sweep aside the Regionalist by hook or by crook had failed, despite some rigged elections under the last Dato government. Meanwhile, under the guidance of Puig, the Lliga had continued its domination of politics within Catalonia, and thus the loss of some industrialist voters to the UMN did not trouble it when it could count on the support of so many Catalans who considered the Regionalists the only political manifestation of Catalonia.

Mostly, the Catalan left now began to challenge the Regionalists for the right to speak with the voice of Catalonia. Macià, through his political party the Nationalist Democratic Federation, began to gather other catalanist elements together to take advantage of what he saw as a growing internal crisis within the Lliga. This move culminated with the foundation in late 1922 of the Catalan State, an extremist organization that would advocate revolutionary and para-militarist tactics to achieve an independent Catalonia. Macià banked on his great personal popularity, even if his message seemed overdone to many Catalans. Not all radical catalanism was so violent. Antoni Rovira, the prolific Catalan nationalist theorist, also spoke of liberating Catalonia from the Spanish yoke, breaking with the iberist, federalist, and especially the regionalist traditions while intensifying the rebuilding of Catalonia from within. Rovira gave Cambó only one excuse for becoming a cabinet minister: to gain concessions for Catalonia; yet, Rovira noted, Cambó had preferred to use his positions to concentrate on Spain in general, the country which oppressed Catalonia. He mocked the Regionalist hope to build a federal Spain, calling such a state a “federation of ghosts.” Rovira saw no one Catalonia could

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113 Rovira, Els Camins de la Llibertat de Catalunya, 3-4.
114 ibid., 14.
federate with - certainly not the other fourteen regions: “these regions, gentlemen, have not had the courage to form a *mancomunidad* which they could form. How can we hope to one day form a federal State?”

Rovira was reaching these conclusions simultaneously with a good portion of the Catalan youth disillusioned after the failure of the *Lliga* to bring in a new political system in Madrid and to gain autonomy for Catalonia in the period between 1917 and 1919. The *Joventut*, built up by Puig and by Bofill, had, thanks to the influence of Prat, expanded its membership far beyond the natural political constituencies of the *Lliga*. If Prat had wanted to nationalize the youth of Catalonia, Puig and Bofill had successfully done so. While the *Lliga* spoke for the country, this group remained docile. But once new ideas critical of regionalism and of Cambó in particular filtered in from its broad base, this group, more nationalist than Prat had envisioned, formed the cornerstone for the movement that would replace the *Lliga*. The group had hitherto not seen itself so much political as cultural, and thought that one of the Regionalists’ problems was that they had attempted to engage both in Spanish politics and catalanism, with the accompanying inconsistencies. If the Regionalists could not perform the role of nationalists, which they could not by definition, then a new group must form to take the task of performing catalanism away from Cambó and company.

“What does it mean to be a regionalist?” Bofill would later ask. “it is a monstrosity to call oneself a regionalist of Spain.” Bofill had defined nationalism as “subconscious separatism: we are what we are.” For this very reason, the *Lliga*, a Spanish party, could never be “nationalist,” but the *Joventut*, though founded by the *Lliga* could be: first it was necessary to attend to the nation before attending to the state. Bofill and his collaborators saw themselves as continuing the work of Prat

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115 Rovira, *Camins*, 23-24. “Those who are very young, in terms of age or in terms of catalanism,” Cambó responded, “could believe that this is some new type of program. Those who, like me, are no longer so young in age and who are quite old in catalanism, can appreciate that this is not a program. This is an immense retrocess; it is a return to the place from where we left years ago.” The belief that the Catalan Problem was not a problem for the Spanish state to resolve had been the policy of the Catalanist Union in the last century. Cambó, *L’Actuació Catalanista de la Lliga*, 3.

116 Montserrat Baras i Gómez, Acció Catalana, 11-12.


119 Bofill, notes taken at the Third County Meeting of Catalan Action, 3. Dec. 1922, ArxJBM VI-1-#69.

120 Bofill, “La Joventut Nacionalista i nacionalisme avui,” notes, s.d. [betw. 1913-19], ArxJBM VI-2-#3.
de la Riba within Catalonia, while the Lliga - or at least its directors in Bofill’s distinction - was guilty of collaborationism. “To be a member of the Lliga,” Bofill jotted down, “is compatible with being of the Autonomist Monarchic Federation (FMA, the mostly-Maurist group of dynastic politicians who had formed their own dynastic movement in Catalonia to aid the Regionalists).”\(^\text{121}\)

Though himself a member of the Lliga’s policy-setting Political Action Commission, Puig had certainly inspired such behavior. To the Assembly of the Mancomunitat, he had announced in 1921, at the very time that Cambó served in Maura’s cabinet, that Catalonia needed to run even more of its own affairs independently of the central government. He noted how so many countries that had been devastated in the Great War were well on the way to recovery, while Catalonia, which had benefited from the War years, could not forge ahead while Madrid held it back. It was up to the efforts of the Mancomunitat to take control of the situation and force the issue.\(^\text{122}\) This sentiment echoed Prat, but Catalonia’s first president had always been more conciliatory in making his demands. “Thanks to the Spanish State," went Bofill’s interpretation, our ideal and our ambition grow more every day. If Maura’s reform of Local Administration had been granted to us [during the 1907-1909 government], perhaps we still would have gone about our business resigned. In denying it, we rise. If the Statute [of integral autonomy] had been given to us [in 1919], now we would not want much more.\(^\text{123}\)

Cambó and others were deceiving themselves, Bofill thought, when they thought they could win concessions by working in Madrid: Madrid obviously had no interest in Catalonia.\(^\text{124}\)

To plot out future activity and show its disconformity with the politics of the Lliga in Madrid, the Joventut called for a Catalan National Conference in June 1922. The Political Action Commission of the Lliga, in its turn, announced it would expel any members who attended the proceedings.\(^\text{125}\) Puig, however, told the press that he personally saw no problems with the Conference. Everyone, he said, needed critics, and Catalans had a tradition of being self-critical and showing inconformity. Also, he sympathized with many of the people who planned to attend the Conference,

\(^{121}\) Bofill, “Notes referents a l’escissió de la Lliga,” 1922, ArxJBM VI-3-#10.


\(^{123}\) Bofill, notes, 1922, Arx JBM, VI-3-#11.


\(^{125}\) Jardi, Puig, 153.
people who had wearied of the long period of Regionalist interventionism in Madrid and who now wanted action in Catalonia. Furthermore, Puig declared,

I would hope that [at the Conference] they create a force ready to inherit our legacy, to substitute for us the day - perhaps near - in which the cycle of intervention, of transigence, comes to an end. The [Madrid] governments will learn then that they have allowed the opportunity to pass, just like the sad history of modern Spain rolls on with a terrible and overwhelming fatalism.\(^{126}\)

But the \textit{Lliga} could never accept the Conference, because the whole reason the \textit{Lliga} had come into existence in the first place in 1901 was specifically to intervene in Spanish politics. The Conference marked a clear break in tactics.\(^{127}\)

The Catalan National Conference got underway as planned on June fourth, with 978 individuals in attendance and 101 organizations expressing support. The Conference considered four subjects: nationalist doctrine, organization and propaganda, action in Catalan public corporations, and action towards and within the state, the discussions chaired respectively by Bofill, Carles Pi Sunyer, Lluís Nicolau d'Olwer, and Rovira.\(^{128}\) Nicolau explained the impetus of the conference: between 1917 and 1919, it had seemed to many that Catalonia was on the verge of winning integral autonomy, yet it failed to do so and its attempt was finally interrupted by the class war. Now that the social crisis had calmed, Catalans were no longer clamoring for autonomy. As a result, the conference organizers hoped to push harder for the renationalization of Catalonia without collaborating with the Spanish central government.\(^{129}\) Bofill put forth the thesis that “the day in which the nationalist density in Catalonia is sufficient, that very day Catalonia will completely deserve, live, and obtain its freedom - that is to say, its autonomy.”\(^{130}\) All interventionism produced, Rovira added, was the obstruction of debate in Madrid, not concessions for Catalonia. “I have the conviction,” Rovira asserted, salting wounds, “that la Cierva alone in the entire Spanish Parliament has more efficacy than the work carried out and being carried out by the entire [Regionalist] minority.”\(^{131}\) The Conference called for the creation of a new group - though not a political party, \textit{per se} - to continue with the cultural work at hand in Catalonia that

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\(^{128}\) Baras, 18-20.


\(^{130}\) Bofill, “Doctrinas nacionalistas,” 5. June 1922, ArxJBM VI-1-#63.

the Regionalists in Madrid had forgotten. "Catalan Action" (AC) was born. Action in Madrid, after this point, need come second.

This new generation of catalanists acknowledged the role that Prat, Cambó, and others had played in instilling a "positive and realistic concept, rigorous and structured, rational if you will, of the cultural necessities of the country. A 'program,' to describe it in one word." The time had come to take it one step further. Indeed, the members of the AC, even those who had not been Regionalists, recognized the importance of having grown up educated in the "Lliga School" in the Pratian tradition. Since the AC did not see itself as a political party, it did not think it would compete directly with the Lliga. It merely wished to divide labor with the Regionalists, to do the chores the Regionalists did not do. It would support a Regionalist government in Spain, so long as the AC administered Catalonia. In many ways, it saw itself as the successor to Prat, who had remained in Barcelona while sending Cambó on to Madrid. Indeed, many elements in the AC preferred to see the Regionalists remain powerful in Madrid, since they represented a far better form of government than the centuries of rule Catalonia had experienced under the Castilians, and men like Cambó, Ventosa, and Duran showed real political talent most Madrid politicians lacked.

The founding statutes of the AC gave as their object to "obtain the triumph of the Catalan nationalist ideal, based on the right of self-determination." The listed goals were the catalanization of the population, the concentration of all labor and production energies leading to self-sufficiency, the harmonization of the social unrest in conformity with national fraternity, the reunification of Catalan territories outside Catalonia with Catalonia proper, the internationalization of the Catalan question, and the development of catalanism in other Catalan lands. The program of the AC was to make "Catalonia from within." This meant a propaganda campaign of cultural awareness similar to the one which had touched the now-

132 Baras, 26.
133 ibid., 35-36.
134 Joan Estelrich i Artigues, Catalunya Endins, 52-53.
136 Francesc Pujols i Morgades, La Solució Cambó, 12.
137 ibid., 30-31.
grown youths of the Joventut. Catalonia also had to broaden its horizons through Europe and the world, through international public relations campaigns and cultural exchanges even greater than the ones the Mancomunitat already organized.

The split of the AC from the Lliga deprived the Regionalist party of its next generation, the intellectual leaders of the Joventut. But, in general, the AC - its name notwithstanding - did not attract activists, most of whom remained within the Lliga. The AC did not seek wholesale affiliations of broader groups abandoning the Lliga, but preferred instead to attract only individuals fully committed to its goals. Macià's band, for example, was a notable absence, since Macià had much more revolutionary objectives in organizing armed struggle to free Catalonia from Spain. The AC did excel in the intellectual sphere, and its leaders participated in many publications and periodicals. Principally, the AC, based on a decision made at the Catalan National Conference, bought the Republican daily Publicidad in August 1922, and began to catalanize parts of the newspaper gradually so that by October first it appeared only in Catalan under the name "Publicitat."

Cambo defended himself against the bad press the AC gave him, and he determined to carry on in Madrid. To the AC, he defended the legacy of the Lliga: twenty-five years of political action had cleared away four centuries of castilianization. Most notable was the growth of the public usage of the Catalan language. Although Catalan never achieved co-official status in the government of the Mancomunitat, it was still in actual practice the language used in most public and administrative documents. Cambó deflated one of the nationalists' prized examples of a people achieving independence: the case of newly free Ireland, which still spoke English for the most part. "I would treasure more a dependent Catalonia speaking in Catalan than an independent Catalonia which did not speak Catalan."

141 Pujols, Història de l'Hegemonia Catalana en la Política Espanyola, 217.
143 Baras, 22-23.
144 ibid., 23.
146 Balcells, Nacionalismo, 70; vid. the official documentation of the ArxManc.
147 Cambó, Actuació Catalanista, 4.
Cambó also placed blame at the feet of both sides in the class wars, calling Catalonia’s problems worse than anything being encountered in Britain, France, or Germany at that time. Catalonia was at the mercy of terrorists, squeezed between anarchist workers and reactionary employers. This was, to Cambó, “a sign of backwardness, a sign of weakness of one side and of the other, a considerable disgrace for Catalonia, that is the victim of this horrific radicalism of workers and owners.” Both groups performed negative roles in Catalonia, even more so because they delayed the solution to the Catalan question.148 As a result, Cambó argued for activity in total politics, not just in that which dealt with catalanism within Catalonia as the radicals of the AC proposed.149 The theorist Duran, too, stood by Cambó, and personally opposed the AC, which he refused to acknowledge by name, often calling it “Nicolau’s crowd.” Duran also sparred often with Puig over the official direction the Lliga should take.150

Tensions between Puig and the other Regionalist leaders only grew worse in the aftermath of the Catalan National Conference and the breakaway of the AC, with Puig arguing for an end to interventionism in the Spanish state and insisting on projects within Catalonia.151 This put Puig in line with the proposals of the AC. Puig had even raised some eyebrows in Madrid and abroad by increasing the international profile of Catalonia, seeking to take advantage of the post-War climate. Most notably, he invited the French Marshall Joffre, a hero of the Great War and a Catalan from Roussillon, to come on an official visit to take up the honorary post of President of the Floral Games of 1920, which included addressing the Assembly in Catalan. Puig also played up his contacts with radical Catalans on the French side of the border, most noticeably with Emmanuel Brousse, a French cabinet minister from Perpignan.152 Puig could never fill Prat’s shoes as the third member of the Lliga’s triumvirate with Cambó and Duran, and he could also never live up to the idealized and idolized Prat’s legacy as President of Catalonia. But Bofill lamented Puig’s place within the leadership of Prat’s party: “It pains us to see Puig i Cadafalch

148 Cambó, Actuació Catalanista, 4.
149 ibid., 5.
152 Archival documentation suggests that Puig was himself masterminding a nationalist insurgent movement, although the sources might very well have been demonstrating over-active imaginations. See especially the document provided as an addendum to this thesis.
(for his own sake and because he is the President of Catalonia) inside the Political Action Commission of the *Lliga.*”

In November of 1922, Puig addressed an official letter to Julio de Ardanez, the newly appointed successor to Martínez Anido as governor of the province of Barcelona. Ardanez returned the letter because it was written in Catalan, and advised that all future correspondence from the *Mancomunitat* to his office be written in Spanish. Puig and the nationalists took this as an unprecedented insult to Catalonia, which demonstrated that the government of Sánchez Guerra had purposefully sent a governor to Barcelona who was entirely ignorant of the Catalan situation. But even more insulting for the nationalists was the way that most Regionalists already did address officials of the central government in Catalonia using Spanish instead of Catalan. Bertran publicly affirmed that it only seemed natural, since most of the appointees of the central State were indeed Spanish-speakers; a Regionalist city councilman defended such action as “a question of manners.” This, the *Publicitat* announced, showed “authentic” Regionalism: the *Lliga* treated Catalonia as a Region of Spain.

The Regionalists had always maintained that only when all efforts had failed would it be time for radicalism. But, it seemed to the AC that, after twenty-five years, all efforts had failed, including the minimal Statute of Autonomy drawn up by the extra-parliamentary committee in 1919 and even the *Mancomunitat* itself, which had atrophied without full sovereign powers. “We do not believe,” the *Publicitat* chimed when Cambó brought down the Sánchez Guerra government in December 1922, that Cambó could be quite proud of himself at the moment nor quite satisfied with the fall of the Government. We view with the same indifference the fall of Sánchez Guerra as the rise of García Prieto. But we do not see the gain that the ministerial crisis has for the Regionalists. It is always nice to have the skill of ‘tombeur de ministeres’ as was the parliamentary specialty of Clemenceau. If Cambó had made the Government fall by attacking it on the ground of the Catalan Question, it could have been more-or-less advantageous for Catalonia. But Cambó has achieved the goals of a party that is not one of ours. For us Catalans, everything remains the same.

In many ways, the climate in Madrid got worse, as the anti-Catalan press took Cambó’s actions badly in a different way. The Catholic newspaper *ABC* proposed the

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153 Bofill, notes, 1923, Arx JBM VI-3-#21.
formation of a front against Catalonia. In a series of articles, the *ABC* demanded that the Catalans had to choose between being brothers within Spain or being foreigners, but neither way should they interfere with the functioning of the State. Even the *ABC* concluded from this that if the Catalans had to make this choice between unitarism and independence, the majority of Catalans should choose independence. The Barcelona press remarked on the *ABC*’s campaign in favor of Catalan separatism.\(^{158}\)

So, at a meeting at the beginning of 1923, the AC decided to enter the electoral fray after all. For the time being, it would limit its candidature in the next general election to Barcelona only, to send a representative (later selected as Rovira) to Madrid not to get involved in Spanish politics but simply to expose the Cortes to the now politically organized voice of Catalan nationalism.\(^{159}\) The *Lliga* had offered the only audible voice of catalanism in Madrid, and this had produced no benefits for Catalonia that the nationalists of the AC or of Macià’s Catalan State would admit to.\(^{160}\) The *Publicitat* noted that the *Lliga*’s mouthpiece the *Veu* was slow to publish its customary platform for the general elections, but that the Carlist *Correo Catalán*, allied with the Regionalists, and the Radical Republican *Progreso* had both printed manifestos which startlingly coincided. Both spoke of the need to combat Rovira and the AC in order to conserve the “*patria,*” by which both meant “Spain.”\(^{161}\)

When the *Veu* did publish a platform, it ignored this charge, instead basing its campaign on the defense of citizens against disorder, on opposition against crippling tax-increases, in favor of liberty in Catalonia, and in favor of ending the debacle in Morocco - especially since this last debate had stalled all other matters in the Cortes.\(^{162}\) “If you have lost hope in the governments of Spain,” ads in the *Publicitat* countered, “vote Rovira i Virgili. If you believe in Catalonia and in your very selves, vote Rovira i Virgili.”\(^{163}\)

In the preliminary tabulations, Rovira captured one of the seats reserved for the minority in Barcelona. Doing so, he had taken part of the vote away from the

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\(^{158}\) see the series of articles in the *ABC*, the *Veu*, and the *Publicitat*, Dec. 1922.

\(^{159}\) “Els acords d’Acció Catalana,” *Publicitat*, 7 Jan. 1923, 1.

\(^{160}\) The *Vanguardia*, 10 Jan. 1923, 14.

\(^{161}\) “Els que tenen plataforma,” *Publicitat*, 25 Apr. 1923, 1.


\(^{163}\) advertisements, *Publicitat*, 27 Apr. 1923, 5.
Carlist candidate who had run on the Lliga’s slate, but he had also attracted a substantial base of his own. However, when the official results came out, Rovira had narrowly failed to get in. An examination of the tallies showed some rather dubious results had been returned in some districts. Investigations suggested that a rogue Regionalist in cahoots with Radicals had adjusted figures to Rovira’s detriment. The Lliga immediately expelled him from the party and backed Rovira’s claim of fraud. However, despite much protest, the government in Madrid seemed determined to let the official results stand. To Bofill and others of the AC, it appeared that the Lliga, having co-opted the Carlists, neutralized the Lerrouxists, and vanquished the UMN, had now decided to turn everyone against the AC out of spite. The AC had backed the Lliga’s candidature on some shared grounds, and now wanted no less than for the Regionalists to help Rovira hold his seat. Bofill gave no credit to Cambó for having come out in favor of Rovira, believing him to be insincere.¹⁶⁴

The AC did not accept the Lliga’s support or even acknowledge the disciplinary and criminal proceedings the Regionalists had taken up against the councilman accused of the fraud. A band marched into the headquarters of the Lliga and the offices of the Veu and sacked both locales. The police were called, and a melee ensued. This was no uncontrollable band of youths which had slipped out of the grip of the AC: Nicolau himself had led the charge and was one of the people wounded scuffling with the police. The Regionalists had expected more from the AC, most of whom had received their upbringing in the Lliga, where they had learned the difficult tasks of governing and the need to refrain from violence. “The happenings of last night,” the Veu sadly remarked,

if not serious in and of themselves, were symptomatic and did much more harm to Catalonia than to the Lliga Regionalista. The intrusion with full force into a political locale and the destruction caused, is an event that we have not seen the likes of since the twenty-fifth of November, 1905 [the sacking of the offices of the Veu and of the satirical magazine Cu-Cut by the military, which led to the formation of the Catalan Solidarity movement]. It does not appear very favorable to the triumph of the cause of Catalonia to make such a comparison.¹⁶⁵

But the Publicitat did not stop its attacks on the Lliga. It accused the Lliga’s General Secretary Ferran Agulló of secretly organizing the fraud against Rovira and

declared that this pact with the Lerrouxists “will bring about the death of the Lliga Regionalista.”  

The AC had expressed its intent to field a full slate for the provincial elections in early June, and the Veu surmised that it had decided to use this controversy to give it a platform to run on. If the AC hoped to replace the Lliga as the internal voice of Catalonia, it needed a stronger platform. The Veu lamented that the AC could offer a constructive candidacy, and be a positive force, but that it had decided on the contrary. The Lliga could withstand this personalized challenge, as it had withstood every other personalized left-nationalist challenge in the past.  

Indeed, the AC did intend to make hay out of the scandal to fuel its next campaign. “To Rovira,” an AC leader wrote Bofill, “whom I congratulated on learning of his triumph: double congratulations now that he has been robbed of the post.” But the Lliga underestimated the challenge. The Lliga attacked García Prieto’s government in the Cortes for widespread vote fraud across the country, especially against Regionalists. The vote in Parliament to overturn contested results also went against the Lliga. This demonstrated that the Lliga no longer commanded the same fear in Madrid, and it certainly did not command the same respect at home. 

Cambó put his personal prestige on the line campaigning for the provincial elections. It was important that the Lliga, which had brought about the creation of the Mancomunitat, and which had governed it to the acclaim of most Catalans ever since, win the elections. A Regionalist victory would assure future good administration in Catalonia, and would send a message to Madrid that Catalans still had faith in the Lliga and its work. He tried to downplay the importance of the struggle with the AC, accepting the AC as a valid - if immature - catalanist party. But the AC was also the principal opponent, as the other parties reduced their candidatures. The Lliga did want to stress this because it had always believed (or professed to believe) in representing all Catalans, and to sway opinion its way. In

166 Publicitat, 4. May 1923, 4.
168 Ramon d’Abadal i Vinyals, letter to Bofill, 5. May 1923, ArxJBM.
contrast, the belligerent AC showed another tactic: divisiveness.171 “Catalan:” the
AC’s campaign poster read,

if you want to protest the perverse proceedings of the Spanish governments in
Catalonia, it is not logical to vote for the party of the ex-cabinet ministers.
If you want to show your disconformity with the war in Morocco, you cannot vote for the
candidature put together by those who have had the responsibility in the Government
of Spain in a critical period of this belligerent adventure.
If you think outrageous what the State sterily carries out, it is not right to vote for the
candidates of one of the last secretaries of the Treasury.
If you think that by being a nationalist you do not need to place limitations on your
ideal, you should not for that reason vote for those who talk of autonomy always
within the Spanish State.
If you want the immediate efficacy from your vote, you cannot give it to the party
which, governing in Catalonia and in Spain, has not known how to achieve even
devotion to the Mancomunitat.172

In the end, the AC made huge breakthroughs wherever it stood. In Barcelona
itself, the Lliga was routed. The Regionalists, though still the largest single party,
were reduced to barely over a quarter of the seats in the Assembly of the
Mancomunitat, most of those seats having been won in the previous election of
1921 and were not contested in 1923.173 Cambó, still only forty-six, resigned his seat
in the Cortes and announced his intention to go abroad. Duran, now fifty-three, left
his post as the political advisor to the Veu, the post in which he had controlled the
theory behind the Regionalist movement. Even Madrid commentators lamented
the talented Cambó’s departure from political life, arguing that no other politician
then active could save the regime.174

The Veu tried stoically to argue that the Lliga was not undone without Cambó
and Duran, noting how it had survived the deaths of Bartomeu Robert in 1902 and
Prat in 1917: “Now, the same thing will happen. Neither has the Lliga failed nor can
it be even now substituted for. The place that it gives up will either remain empty
or be filled by the enemies of Catalonia.”175 But this implied in its overtones a
resignation to fate.

A Valencian newspaper wrote the party’s obituary, by noting that Cambó had
never been understood in Madrid, except by Maura and a few republican
intellectuals. Spain had rejected the Regionalists, and this had set them up for
rejection at home. “The politics of concord,” the newspaper wrote,

173 Albertí, 505.
have failed, at least for now, but it is not necessary to place the blame on Cambó, but rather on the centralist politicians, for whom Cuba and the Philippines were not even a lesson, just as this tragic craziness in the Moroccan Protectorate is not either. Cambó, if he had any individual defects, was on too high a ground.... Spain now loses with his retirement from politics the politician most qualified and prepared for government, at the same time as a channel for the Catalan Problem. 176

Within three months, with politics in Barcelona and in Madrid deteriorating further, the Captain General of Catalonia, Primo de Rivera, had staged a golpe de estado and seized power. The Liberal Restoration system came to an end, and so, soon after, did the Mancomunitat. Cambó and his party had succeeded in irreparably weakening the old system, but had not proven strong enough to replace it. His identity as a Catalan further made him a target for suspicion in Madrid. Yet his presence in Madrid made him suspect in Barcelona as well. There the Regionalists had also unleashed new forces, but there too they could not control the situation which they had brought about. They had struggled for a quarter century, and achieved what they had set out to do. However, this very success proved their failure.

Although the Regionalists thought of themselves as a popular movement, they were really a movement run by a small circle of people. The political program these leaders expounded was not fully comprehended by many. Therefore, while the Regionalists had successfully coopted other groups for many years, they never really captured the full imagination of the public at large, as evidenced by the fact that even though their party exercised a dominant control over the direction of Catalan politics, election results never gave them complete hegemony. Once other groups also developed coherent political philosophies and the impetus to back them up, the Lliga lost its influence and with that influence its source of power. Meanwhile, although the Lliga became a force in Madrid, it never could install a new system in its own image throughout Spain even though it tried to behave as a Spanish political party. And by behaving as a Spanish political party when it had a chance to win specific concessions for Catalonia from within the cabinet, it alienated vast sectors of the Catalan population on whom it depended for its political support. Much of Spain, still under the thrall of the old oligarchy, never accepted the Lliga; now Catalonia abandoned it as well.

Conclusion

The Captain General of Catalonia, Miguel Primo de Rivera, staged his *golpe de estado* in September 1923. He had become alarmed at the increasing anarchy he had witnessed in the streets of Barcelona and by the pacts that the AC, emboldened by its electoral success, made with Basque and Gallego nationalist groups. Meanwhile, in Madrid, the Cortes continued to debate who had been responsible for the army's fiascos in Morocco, and the position which the Left-Liberal Santiago Alba argued with some success, inculpating the privilege structure of the Spanish officer corps, angered senior generals such as Primo. Primo stepped in to avert what he saw as the intentional undermining of the Spanish State by anarchists and separatists, and to fend off attacks on the officer class.¹ In Barcelona, where he staged his *pronunciamiento*, he gained the backing of a sizable amount of the Catalan bourgeoisie, as well as of Josep Puig, the President of the Mancomunitat. By early 1924, the new military directory had restored order to Barcelona's streets; had displaced the Regionalists from their positions in the Mancomunitat by substituting in their place industrialists from the anti-catalanist UMN headed by the hard-nosed liberal cacique Alfons Sala who became the new President of the Mancomunitat; and had chased Alba into exile. But Primo did not so much end an era as mark the failure of the Lliga to usher in a new one. The Lliga had helped to destroy the old system, but had failed to implement a replacement. It then watched as the forces it had helped unleash in the failing years of the Liberal Restoration combined to make any regionalist solution unworkable. The Regionalists were finished before Primo came along, and they left behind them the wreckage of the Canovan system with nothing constructive to put in its place. Although they did not support Primo, the

¹ On the reasons for Primo's *golpe*, see Bofill, "Valoració inicial de Primo," notes [Winter 1924], ArxJBM VI-3-#29; Fernández Almagro, Catalanismo, 101; Rivas, journal, 13. Sept. 1923, ArchNRivas 11-8909; & R. Martínez Sol, *De Canalejas al Tribunal de Responsabilidades*, 39. Ben-Ami argued that Primo had struck precisely when the parliamentary system was beginning to behave like one by tackling its responsibility and dealing with the issues. Ben-Ami, 19f. The Liberals, beginning to sort themselves out as a party, were trying to bring the military under civilian control. The various factions of the military cooperated under this threat. Boyd 236-237. The Liberals and the Catalan Left could have collaborated in 1923 for greater dynamism, common social interests, leverage with the military, and even a common antagonism towards the Lliga and Cambó, but the Summer of 1923 showed a marked leftward swing in both political camps. Alba began to predominate within the Liberal circles in Madrid and the AC rose as the champion of the left in Catalonia - the two were mutually opposed and polarized. Boyd, 250-251.
Regionalist leaders, especially Francesc Cambó and Lluís Duran, also could not remain satisfied with the turmoil facing Spain in 1923. Their failure was total.

The regionalist project had grown from the culmination of several nineteenth century influences: the cultural Renaixença, Federal Republicanism and its offspring political catalanism, economic pressure groups, and traditional Catalan conservatism. Most important of these was the legalist and individualist conservatism most clearly expoused by Manuel Duran y Bas, who exerted a great influence on Catalan intellectual society. The three main leaders of the regionalist movement, Cambó, Duran, and Enric Prat, all emerged from this school, and successfully integrated the other tendencies into their movement. They did this within the context of a Spanish state in need of regeneration and reform, and they decided to act not just on the Catalan front, but also on the Spanish. The political and economic reorganization of the Spanish state was as important to them as the reassertion of catalanism. Not only would the reform of Spain allow for a freer and more productive Catalonia, but the Regionalists saw the reform of Catalonia as a vital first step in and a catalyst for the regeneration of Spain. The Disaster of 1898 did not alter political realities in Spain, but it did serve to shake the system and to introduce regenerationist movements into mainstream Spanish politics. With the failure of the reformist conservative government of Francisco Silvela, which had included General Polavieja and Duran y Bas in the cabinet, which failed due in great part to reactions in Catalonia against the policies of the Secretary of the Treasury Raimundo Fernández Villaverde and the Secretary of the Interior of Eduardo Dato, the potential for an organized political party with catalanist and interventionist goals became plausible. The Lliga was founded to fight the 1901 general elections.

As the first modern political party on the Spanish scene, the Lliga forced itself into the fray, and was instrumental in influencing the splits and realignments of many of the other parties, which had also been shaken by events of the late-nineteenth century. The political landscape of Spain was changing. The Republicans, who were stronger in Catalonia than in other regions, were rebuilding, and found the climate in Catalonia - where the caciques were now being openly challenged - conducive to the relaunch of their movement. But as the Regionalists made their presence felt in general Spanish politics, republicans diverged in how to
deal with the Regionalists. Most Catalan republicans joined the *Lliga* in the Catalan Solidarity movement, the left wing of which would spawn a series of nationalist republican parties. However, the more *españolista* and radical republicans refused to enter an electoral coalition with conservatives and catalanists, and these broke away to form the Radical Republican Party. Many non-Catalan republicans sympathized with the foundation of the Solidarity, but could stomach neither its catalanism nor the rabble-rousing nature of the PRR; this group also saw value in working within the existing constitutional structure, and soon formed the Reformist Party. The two main dynastic parties were also not immune from divisions - especially after the deaths of their respective founders. Mostly, these divisions continued to represent personal rivalries, but one strand in each party sought reforms that would turn them into representations of public opinion: José Canalejas and Antoni Maura. Both men became responsive to the Catalan Question, but both had their terms as party leaders cut short. Nevertheless, the two dynastic parties continued evolving, and the increasing strength of the *Lliga* gave them a serious contender to deal with.

From its earliest days, the *Lliga* had wanted to launch itself as a Spanish political party with a base in Catalonia. While it drove the *caciques* from Barcelona in 1901, established its dominance across Catalonia first by leading the Solidarity to victory in 1907 and then by running the government of the *Mancomunitat* after 1914, and even showed its strength in determining governmental policy in Madrid, it never succeeded in spreading as a party outside Catalonia. The events of 1917 offered it a chance, when it headed the Assembly movement and then entered into the Restoration's first coalition government. But the rest of Spain, still greatly dominated by the fractioned dynastic groupings, never embraced the Regionalists, who often appeared to many Spaniards as primarily Catalans concerned with Catalonia. However, the Regionalists continued to maintain that this concern for Catalonia was a necessary part of and even subsumed by a concern for the greater Spanish state. While they had enough strength to help destroy the workings of the Liberal Restoration system, the Regionalists could not impose their own. Meanwhile, the *Lliga* found itself in trouble from its rear flank: many Catalans saw it as too Spanish, and thus not concerned enough with the welfare of Catalonia. Its
additional conservatism also meant it would eventually fall victim to societal turbulence and social trauma. The fact that it had been instrumental in creating the popular catalanist atmosphere in Catalonia and that its insistence on democratization and modernization coincided with and facilitated the growth of the left did not save it from these nationalist and left-wing forces when they grew in strength - and especially not when these forces came themselves to correspond.

The Regionalist offensive was finished by 1919. The Lliga had become the prevailing party within Catalonia. It had won for Catalonia the Mancomunitat, and on the strength of that organization had begun economic and cultural programs for the entire region. With this Catalan base established, the Lliga could launch its campaign for the regeneration of Spain. The Regionalists' offensive made them the most influential party in Madrid, and helped undermine the turno system of government. However, despite all this, the Regionalists failed to replace the old political system with a new one based on a fresh democratic constitution; they failed to spread their own party throughout Spain; they failed to see the implementation of mancomunidades and similar administrative reforms in other regions that might have formed the bases for the new federalist structure they sought for the state; they failed to win integral autonomy for Catalonia; and they failed even to convince many Catalan industrialists that they could keep order in Barcelona and that they could best represent Catalan economic interests in Spain.

By early-1919, Catalonia was convulsing in class warfare, general strikes, lockouts, terrorism, and assassinations. Both the forces of the central government and the Regionalists proved unable to contain the polarizing society. The class conflicts, combined with the increasing catalanization of Catalonia run by the Mancomunitat under the direction of Puig, afforded the Catalan Left the chance to reorganize. Catalan labor leaders who had previously been ambivalent about their ethnicity now began to collaborate with Catalan nationalists, including some younger Regionalists. Meanwhile, the industrialists began to see alternatives to the Lliga for representation of their interests. The UMN formed, combining dynastic groups to combat the Regionalists. The employers organized in the Patronal to combat workers, both through dealing directly with the agents of the central government and through their own paramilitary and terrorist bands. These actions undermined
the *Lliga*’s attempts to restore order. Although it continued to increase its share of the vote in Catalonia and did participate in coalition governments in Madrid, the activity of the *Lliga* proved defensive until the Party’s ultimate collapse in the Summer of 1923.

The success of the *Lliga* doomed it to failure. It helped destroy the old system, but failed to replace it with anything viable. It helped release the forces of revolution with which to threaten Madrid, but then it could not control these forces. It succeeded in its goal to “nationalize” Catalonia through educating the youth, but then found that the youth had become far more radical than the Regionalists themselves. The Catalan *bourgeoisie* had supported it in 1901 as a useful way of presenting certain economic interests in Madrid at a time when Madrid seemed content to ignore those interests. But the *bourgeoisie* increasingly found political and theoretical discrepancies with the Regionalist leadership, and abandoned the *Lliga*. The *Lliga* continued its electoral domination until 1923 because it controlled the *Mancomunitat* and portrayed itself as the only voice of Catalonia. After the death of Prat in 1917, such a position became difficult to maintain, and political and economic crises showed the Regionalists actually spoke for few in Catalonia. By democratizing the principality, the *Lliga* unleashed the forces of unrest that disrupted the order it cherished and which it felt it needed to bring about peaceful reforms. All of this was inherent in the theory, and Cambó, Prat, Duran, and others had recognized the difficulties they would face from the outset.

The Regionalist leaders presented a complex political program, as demonstrated not just in their public speeches, articles, and books, but also in their private notes and correspondence. This material demonstrates that behind their stoic public faces lay private concern and a realization that they had to press onwards. They had no doubts about the dual nature of their ideology: although catalanist in soul, theirs was a Spanish political movement, as their private dealings with Madrid politicians and with each other clearly show. In public, they behaved accordingly, but the general public was not tuned in to the nuances of the Regionalist ideology. As a result, the *Lliga* has often since been considered in a simplistic way: as the party of the Catalan *bourgeoisie* that failed to protect its class interest by democratic means, as a conservative party which failed to achieve a
nationalist aim, or as a nationalist party that failed to impose itself on Spanish politics. But the *Lliga* was none of these. It was a movement with a coherent ideology, Spain's first modern political party in organization and political action. It applied itself to most areas of Catalan and Spanish political life with great impact, but in the end it could not impose itself on the oligarchy it failed to completely dislodge, or on the masses it helped to empower, on the Spaniards it failed to convince that the granting of integral autonomy to Catalonia would serve as the first step in the renewal of the entire State, or on the Catalans whose ethnic awareness and political voice it had encouraged who now clamored for more from the State than what the *Lliga* wanted to offer. In the actual circumstances of Catalonia and Spain in the period between 1901 and 1923, the Regionalist program was untenable.
Epilogue

The end of the Mancomunitat

A few days after the event, the Veu de Catalunya applauded the golpe of Miguel Primo de Rivera for having put an end to the regime, and it spoke of the unanimity of opinion in Primo's favor. But it cautioned that the Directory must be short and perform a "positive and solid work, which will pave the way for the definitive regime that must substitute the artificial one which has fallen.... What is essential is that the fallen regime not return, that Spain and the Spanish peoples never again be victims of the oligarchic caciquism of the Madrid political parties."¹ Industrialists and even the Regionalist President of the Mancomunitat, Josep Puig, offered their services to Primo, hoping that the general could bring order to Catalonia and thereby facilitate a complete autonomy that would not have to deal with social questions, and bitterly remembering the failure of the more timid General Polavieja to carry out reforms after 1898.² Puig worried about the total chaos in the streets and the inability of the civil government to control the situation, about the corrupt political system which impeded proper government and which now - after the retirement of men like Francesc Cambó, Lluís Duran, and Antoni Maura - looked like it would not simply roll over. Puig despaired of ever having the control he wanted in Catalonia, and hoped that a directory under Primo would afford him the chance to clear Catalonia of its turmoil and Spain of its sham democracy.³

Puig's calculation failed miserably. Primo, of course, had no time for Catalonia, catalanism, or autonomy. He did know how to restore order, however, and this he did, in the process limiting the actions of the Mancomunitat and restricting the use of Catalan language, to great protest within the ranks of the government of the very Mancomunitat Puig professed to represent.⁴ The Catalan bourgeoisie, however, was, on the whole, delighted. Primo's Directory overthrew the Liberal government which was about to lower the protectionist tariffs of 1922

² Ben-Ami, 45f.; Bofill, “Notes sobre Primo,” notes [Winter 1924], ArxJBM VI-3-#29.
⁴ see the immediate and frequent protests raised in the permanent council of the Mancomunitat, ArxManc 2805-1923-19.
which the *Fomento* had long fought for, and planned to do away with the pesty National Confederation of Labor (CNT).\(^5\) When Primo called together the most notable Catalan political and industrial leaders for consultation in January 1924, the National Monarchist Union (UMN) and the *Fomento* gave their loyal endorsement to the new regime - but the Monarchic Autonomist Federation (FMA) and the remnants of the *Lliga* did not. Carles de Camps, the Catalan aristocrat and one of the most senior Regionalists assembled, told Primo of his unease about the suspension of democracy, and asked that the *Mancomunitat* be allowed to continue to function with its current structure, government, and linguistic and cultural arrangements. If Primo respected this wish, then the Regionalists would not oppose his regime. Primo responded that he would dissolve all provincial governments, but that he would retain the structure of a castilianized *Mancomunitat* while eliminating all opposition. “Then,” Camps responded, “my friends and I can do nothing else but retire, because we consider any understanding with you to be impossible.”\(^6\)

Primo made Alfons Sala, the leader of the UMN, the new President of the *Mancomunitat*, with an Assembly formed only of members of his party.\(^7\) As President, Sala embarked on an austerity plan, cutting heavily in the public spending the *Mancomunitat* had financed in its first years through debt and investment in Catalan public works. He put an end to all cultural projects, mocking them as “administrative debauchery” which had turned Catalonia into the *Lliga*’s “laboratory for experimental psychology.”\(^8\) Sala called himself a good Catalan, who wanted to look out for the best interests of Catalonia, a country which had been hijacked by the policies and propaganda of the *Lliga*. However, without public works or cultural projects, functioning only as an administrative body, Sala’s *Mancomunitat* lacked any reason for existing. In April 1925, Sala resigned his post and the UMN leaders who ran the Province of Girona decided to pull their province out of the *Mancomunitat*. Primo dissolved the whole operation shortly thereafter.\(^9\)

\(^5\) García Venero, *Catalunya*, 212-213.

\(^6\) Minutes of the meetings between Primo and the leaders of the UMN, the FMA, and the *Fomento*, 8-9. Jan. 1924, ArchMaura 401/3. See also the commentary in Maluquer, 134-140.

\(^7\) For Sala’s installation, see the commentary in the *Noticiero Universal* (Madrid), 30. Jan. 1924.

\(^8\) Jardí, Puig, 174-177.

\(^9\) ibid., 184.
The Lliga and its leaders after 1923

The years of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship were rough on the Regionalists and their friends. Cambó spent much of the time traveling around the Mediterranean in his yacht. Having recognized his own political failure, he decided to observe the fates of other countries, and wrote several books of observations and political commentary. He admired the experiments of Benito Mussolini in Italy and Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, but he lamented the restrictions both imposed on functional democracy and personal liberties. He also studied international economic policies. He wrote books in Spanish knowing that Primo and his advisors would read them and with the hope that they would learn something from Cambó’s writings that would salvage Spain from its economic and political misery. In political theory, he continued his collaboration with Duran, who also published. Meanwhile, Cambó used his travels to extend his international business and finance contacts, and he and Joan Ventosa continued to expand their personal fortunes. Back in Barcelona, Cambó invested much of his wealth into Catalan cultural projects, including the Barcelona World Exposition of 1929 and Cambó’s own publishing houses which were producing translations of the Bible and of Classical Greek and Latin literature into Catalan. Others were not so lucky: Raimon d’Abadal, Ángel Ossorio and others served time as political prisoners during the Primo dictatorship; the aged Maura, disillusioned with political life and having retreated to the countryside to study German philosophy, died in December of 1925.

Although Primo suppressed politics within Spain, the Catalan Left gained the upper hand over the Lliga for the first time in protests from exile. Primo’s suppression only made already extant catalanism more radical. Francesc Macià militated in exile, and his Catalan State organization continued to arm, expanded its international contacts through Macià’s trips across Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Americas, and even set up a Catalan government-in-exile in Paris in 1928. Other left-wing catalanist groups also based themselves in Paris, and there they began to cooperate, not only with each other, but also with exiled republican groups.

Within Spain, many groups became disillusioned with the monarchy and Alfonso XIII for having accepted and supported Primo, further sealing his fate once Primo stepped aside. Among the notable politicians who swung into the Republican
camp were Miguel Maura, one of the arch-conservative leader's sons, and Ossorio; Cambó, still upset by the King's treatment of him in 1922, remained lukewarm. The Regionalist and Maurist movements, unhappy before 1923 but which could be counted on not to overthrow the Monarchy, had faded, and other political parties, such as Melquíades Álvarez's Reformists and Ossorio's fledgling Popular Social Party had ceased to exist. Primo himself outstayed his welcome even among his supporters. When his technocratic Dictatorship could not handle the international economic crisis of the late 1920s, the industrialists helped nudge him aside. The year 1930 was then spent attempting to salvage the regime by paving the way for an orderly transition to democracy. At the head of this movement were Cambó and Maura's eldest son and political heir Gabriel, who hoped to create a Constitutional Center party which would carry on from the programs Cambó and Gabriel's father had wanted to implement when their last government together failed in 1922. In the political vacuum of 1930, many commentators viewed such a party as the only viable reformist conservative force able to inspire the country and preserve a smooth democratic transition. But the political climate of 1930 had changed too much. Also, Cambó was suffering from throat cancer, and was being treated in London. Unable to do any public speaking and sensing doom, Cambó never fully endorsed this attempt - when asked by the King to return to Madrid for consultation, Cambó refused but went anyway, stopping instead at Ventosa's house. Ventosa came to serve as Secretary of the Treasury in the last cabinet of the monarchy, a cabinet which included Count Romanones, Manuel García Prieto, Juan de la Cierva, and Gabriel Maura.

After the rout of the monarchists in the 1931 municipal elections, Alfonso abdicated and the Republic arrived. The assorted republican groups had agreed on a federal structure for the new regime in order to gain the support of the Catalan left. Nevertheless, before the Second Republic could be declared in Madrid, Macià declared the independent Republic of Catalonia in Barcelona. This act forced the Spanish republicans - mostly españolista and unitarist - to work their new constitution around the de facto existence of Catalonia for Macià to accept the sovereignty of the Spanish state. Macià joined his political organization, the Catalan State (founded in 1922), in coalition with other left-nationalist groups to form the
Esquerra Republicana (Catalan Republican Left), which quickly became the dominant party within Catalonia. Madrid soon granted Catalonia widespread autonomy and Macià became the President of its new government, the Generalitat. Several Catalans served in Republican cabinets in Madrid, including Lluís Nicolau, Marcel.lí Domingo, and Jaume Carner.

Political and social conflict dominated the Second Republic. The Lliga reorganized itself, but now took on the name “Lliga Catalana” so that its catalanist intentions would not be questioned. However, it existed more as a throwback, a wishful party of order. It exerted very little influence in Catalan or even Spanish politics except that its leaders were remembered for having once been capable politicians and thus were still well-respected and taken seriously. In Madrid, the Regionalists dutifully defended Catalan autonomy; in Catalonia, they called for law and order. They received few votes.

Disagreements over agricultural policy between a Catholic-centrist coalition government in Madrid and an Esquerra government in Catalonia resulted in Catalonia declaring independence again in October 1934. This lasted one day, and led to the imprisonment of the Esquerra’s leaders and the suspension of the Generalitat. This was all reversed when the Popular Front formed the government in 1936. Spain’s Republic soon collapsed under another golpe, an anarchist revolution in Barcelona, and a bloody civil war.

Caught in Barcelona during the anarchist revolution, the Lliga’s leaders were forced to flee into exile. Their houses and offices were sacked. Faced with a choice between supporting such revolutionaries and supporting General Francisco Franco Bahamonde, the Regionalists picked the latter. From Cambó down, they offered the Right enormous financial support throughout the Civil War, and Ventosa even set himself up as Franco’s chief international fundraiser. On the other side of the divide, Ossorio became the Republic’s greatest international apologist - even Miguel Maura had long since lost hope. After Franco’s victory, most of the Regionalists returned to active lives in Spain. But despite their support for his forces, Franco did not permit them to lead public lives. The new regime was authoritarian and not responsive to Catalan concerns. Unlike in the case of Primo’s dictatorship, however,
the Regionalists saw no alternative when given the choice between only black order and red revolution.

Puig, whose political career had been ruined in 1923, remained in the background. Under the Franco regime, he was never permitted to practice his profession as an architect because his modernist buildings were deemed to be too Catalan in their inspiration. Like his former Regionalist colleagues, he died unhappy.

Alejandro Lerroux finally saw the Republic he had long wanted come about. His politics had completely moderated, however. He was the head of the Catholic-centrist government which suppressed Catalonia's independence in 1934, but he soon had to resign due to corruption scandals - some things never changed. *Persona non grata* for many years, he was allowed to return to Spain to die in 1949.

Macià had died in office in 1933. Bofill, disillusioned by the left, had returned to the *Lliga* when it reorganized as the *Lliga Catalana* in 1933, and then died shortly thereafter. Most of the other important left-catalanists went into exile after Franco captured Catalonia in 1938, and never returned.

Gabriel Maura accompanied the King into exile in 1931. He was allowed to return to Spain in the 1940s, where he resumed his position at the Royal Academy of History. However, Franco forbade him to publish much of his work. Rejected by the dictator in this way, he refused to take up some of the general's own commissions. Meanwhile, his brother Miguel lived in exile in Argentina. Another brother, the apolitical Honorio, had been executed behind the Republican lines during the Civil War, as had other notables such as the Reformist Álvarez. La Cierva would have suffered the same fate, but he took asylum in the Norwegian Embassy, where he spent the last two years before his death.

Cambó never returned to Catalonia after he fled in 1936. He made one trip to Madrid in 1940 to tidy up his financial dealings and make sure that his associates there could manage their end. But the presence in Franco's Madrid of a man for so long associated with catalanism meant that his life was in danger and he required the personal bodyguards of the Foreign Secretary, who was also Franco's brother-in-law. Cambó quickly joined his family in New York, and later moved to Buenos
Aires. There, he found a large ex-patriot Spanish community. Of this he wrote to Gabriel Maura:

I run into your brother here all the time. He and his wife have found a generally sympathetic ambient here.
I see very few Spaniards because they are all militant Reds, repentant Reds, or people completely clueless when it comes to understanding Spanish affairs.
Just as I won't see Ossorio, I hope I don't see (the anti-catalanist Liberal-turned-Republican Niceto) Alcalá Zamora. Every now and then I see (several other figures)... who are all victims of their own guilt.¹⁰

Cambó mostly busied himself writing and associating with artists and other cultural figures, while he longed to return to Catalonia. By 1947, Franco had given approval for Cambó to return to Spain, but as he was about to sail he fell ill and died.

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¹⁰ Cambó, letter to G. Maura, 5. Feb. 1942, ArchGMG 120/16. This archive and especially Duran’s archive contain letters written by Cambó from Argentina which describe his views of world politics, his reflections on his life and political career (Cambó wrote his Memòries at this time), and his hope that affairs in Spain and Catalonia would improve.
Appendix A. Election results and composition of governments

Spanish electoral results from the Restoration are patchy at best. Normally, when official results were released, they were released without specifying the candidate’s political affiliation. This was also true in most roll-calls in the Assembly of the Mancomunitat. Thus, many compilations done then and since do not agree on the exact results by party. Where information exists, I have tried to select the most referenced and exhaustive work on the given set of figures. I have cross-checked and made small corrections to the cited references where I have felt one of the other sources described the results more accurately.

While figures for the province of Barcelona and for all general elections have been well reconstructed, similar information for the other Catalan provinces is still lacking. This is especially true for the province of Tarragona, where little information has been compiled.

Also of note, the results of the Spanish general elections compiled by Miguel Martínez Cuadrado reflect seating patterns in the Cortes. There, for example, nationalist republicans sat with the other Republicans even when they represented separate tendencies within Catalonia. The only exception was during the Catalan Solidarity movement, when they sat with the Regionalists.

The final table shows the percentage of the vote won by the major parties in Barcelona at all city-wide elections. These were municipal and general, but not provincial, as not all districts in Barcelona voted in the same year for provincial deputies. Barcelona is the only municipality for which I could find complete and reliable tabulations of these percentages for the entire period, since other places either had incomplete results or remained at least partly under the control of caciques who would have made exact outcomes questionable to some degree.
### Composition of Cabinets in Spanish Central Government, 1898-1923

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a - Gamacistas (in Liberal Party)
b - Romeristas
c - Canalejistas
d - Mauristas
e - Villaverdistas
f - Ciervistas
g - Albistas
h - misc. Liberals

Compiled from: Martínez Cuadrado, Elecciones y Partidos Políticos de España (1868-1931)
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1920</td>
<td>12S</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2r</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>12S</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2r</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- a - Gamacistas
- b - Romeristas
- n - UFNR
- o - BRA
- p - PRC
- r - misc. Regionalists
- s - Catalan Solidarity
- t - Tarragonese Liberals
- u - UMN

Compiled from: Balcells et al., *Les Eleccions Generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 1923*
Seats held in the Assembly of the *Mancomunitat*, 1919-1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1919-2021</th>
<th>1921-1923</th>
<th>1923</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1921-1923</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56 seats contested at 1921 elections)</td>
<td>(40 seats contested at 1923 elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regionalists</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regionalists</strong></td>
<td>Regionalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA:</td>
<td>FMA:</td>
<td>FMA:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carlists</strong></td>
<td><strong>Far Right:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Far Right:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>followers of D. Jaime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>followers of Vázquez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>other Traditionalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UMN:</strong></td>
<td><strong>UMN:</strong></td>
<td><strong>UMN:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalist Republicans:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nationalist Republicans:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nationalist Republicans:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRR</strong></td>
<td><strong>PRR</strong></td>
<td><strong>PRR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformists</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Results from earlier years are too patchy, particularly in Tarragona, to provide any meaningful information; these results primarily compiled from: the *Veu* and the Archive of the *Mancomunitat*
# Seats Won in Barcelona Provincial Elections, 1901-1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seats Won in Barcelona Provincial Elections, 1901-1923</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalist League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchic Autonomists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Unionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformist Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Unionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Nationalist Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan Independents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n - UFNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o - BRA</td>
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Compiled from: Rosa Toran, “Les eleccions provincials a Barcelona: 1876-1923,” in Riquer (ed.), *Història de la Diputació de Barcelona*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Conservatives</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Regionalists</th>
<th>Carlists</th>
<th>Independent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903-1905</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1907-1909</td>
<td>Regionalists (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regionalists</td>
<td>Republican Unionists (6)</td>
<td>Carlists (4)</td>
<td>Nationalist Republicans (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1913</td>
<td>Regionalists (12)</td>
<td>Carlists (5)</td>
<td>Nationalist Republicans</td>
<td>Radicals</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-1917</td>
<td>Regionalists</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Radical Republicans (3)</td>
<td>Nationalist Republicans (2)</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>Carlists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1921</td>
<td>Regionalists</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Reformist Republicans</td>
<td>Carlists</td>
<td>Radical Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Regionalists</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>Reformist Republicans</td>
<td>Carlists</td>
<td>Radical Republicans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

compiled from: Rosa Toran, “Les eleccions provincials a Barcelona: 1876-1923,” in Riquer (ed.), *Història de la Diputació de Barcelona*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reg’lists + allies</th>
<th>Dynastic parties *</th>
<th>Radicals + allies</th>
<th>Other Republicans *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909b</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>1915</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - when not allied with the Regionalists

+ - when not allied with the Radicals

### Seats Held in the Barcelona City Council, 1903-1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seat Holders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1904-1905  | Republicans: 28  
Liberals: 4  |
| 1906-1908  | Republicans: 32  
Regionalists: 19  |
| 1909       | Radical Republicans: 25  
Regionalists: 14  
Nationalist Republicans: 11  |
| 1910-1911  | Radical Republicans: 30  
Catalan Left: 15  
Regionalists: 10  |
| 1912-1913  | Radical Republicans: 25  
Regionalists (12)  
Carlists (2)  
Social Catholics (1)  
Maurists (1)  
Nationalist Republicans: 16  |
| 1914-1915  | Radical Republicans: 22  
Regionalists: 18  
Nationalist Republicans: 6  
Carlists: 3  
Reformist Republicans: 2  
Social Catholics: 1  
Maurists: 1  
Liberals: 1  |
| 1916-1917  | Regionalists (19)  
Carlists/Maurists/Catholics (5)  
Liberals (1)  
Radical Republicans (20)  
Nationalist Republicans (3)  
Independent Republicans: 1  
Liberals: 1  |
| 1918-1919  | Regionalists (21)  
Carlists/Maurists/Catholics (4)  
Liberals (1)  
Radical Republicans (20)  
Nationalist Republicans (2)  
Catalan Republicans (1)  
Independent Republicans (1)  |
| 1920-1921  | Regionalists (26)  
Carlists (3)  
Monarchic Autonomists (1)  
Radical Republicans (16)  
Independent Republicans (1)  
Monarchists: 2  
Catalan Republicans: 1  |
| 1922-1923  | Regionalists (22)  
Monarchic Autonomists (8)  
Carlists (4)  
Radical Republicans (13)  
Independent Republicans (1)  
Monarchists: 2  |

Compiled from: Salvador (ed.), *Les Eleccions Legislatives i Municipals a Barcelona (1810-1986)*

---

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Election (% turnout)</th>
<th>Regionalists</th>
<th>Nationalists</th>
<th>Radicals</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>general (20)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>22 (Rep. Union)</td>
<td>25 (Libs + Cons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>municipal (32)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>36 (Rep. Union)</td>
<td>24 (Libs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>general (46)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>68 (Rep. Union)</td>
<td>8 (Carlists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>municipal (34)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>66 (Rep. Union)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>general (29)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>63 (Rep. Union)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>municipal (30)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>44 (Rep. Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>general (60)</td>
<td>71 (Solidarity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>parl. by-election (53)</td>
<td>56 (Solidarity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>municipal (60)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27 (Esquerra)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>municipal (55)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31 (Esquerra)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>general (58)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30 (UFNR)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12 (Right Coalition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>municipal (51)</td>
<td>37 (Lliga + Rightists)</td>
<td>30 (UFNR)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>municipal (44)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19 (UFNR)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>general (43)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13 (BRA)</td>
<td>37 (PRR + UFNR)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>municipal (38)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>38 (PRR + UFNR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>general (37)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19 (BRA)</td>
<td>35 (PRR + UFNR)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>municipal (36)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>general (43)</td>
<td>57 (Lliga + Carlists)</td>
<td></td>
<td>42 (Left Coalition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>general (49)</td>
<td>45 (Lliga + Carlists)</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>16 (UMN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>municipal (43)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>general (29)</td>
<td>53 (Lliga + Carlists)</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>17 (UMN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Feb.</td>
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<td>36 (Lliga + FMA)</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>general (34)</td>
<td>30 (Lliga + Carlists)</td>
<td>25 (AC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table includes only parties or electoral coalitions which received more than eight per cent of the vote city-wide. In municipal elections, not every party put forward candidates in all districts, and this may have reduced that party's overall share of the vote. Also, in general elections, not all parties fielded complete lists.

compiled from: Balcells et al., Les Eleccions Generals a Catalunya and Salvador (ed.), Les Eleccions Legislatives i Municipals a Barcelona
Appendix B. Glossary of personal names

Abadal i Calderó, Raimon d’ (Vich 1862 - Rupià 1945): lawyer. Pres. of the Barcelona Athenaeum (1902-1903); of the Barcelona Academy of Jurisprudence (1903, 1911); Regionalist MP (1899-1907, 1931-1933); Senator (1907-1918); Member of the Lliga’s Political Action Comm.; Pres. of the Lliga (1917-1936); Pres. of the Assembly of Parliamentarians (1917); Dean of the Barcelona Coll. of Lawyers (1924-1926); political prisoner (1926); exiled in France and Italy (1936-1939).


Alba Bonifaz, Santiago (Zamora 1872 - San Sebastián 1949): left-reformist politician. Sec. General of the National Union; Liberal MP (1905-1923); Sec. of the Navy (1906); Sec. of Education (1912, 1918); Sec. of the Interior (1915-1916); Sec. of the Treasury (1916-1917, 1918); Sec. of State (1922-1923); Leader of the Left-Liberals (1918-1923), later joined PRR (1931-1936); Pres. of the Congress (1933-1934); exiled in France (1923-1930, 1936-1945).

Allendesalazar, Manuel (Guernica 1856 - Madrid 1923): Conservative politician. Loyal first to Silvela, then to Maura; MP (1884-1898); Senator (1898-1923); Mayor of Madrid (1900); Sec. of the Treasury (1901); Sec. of Education (1902-1903); Sec. of Agriculture (1903-1904); Sec. of State (1907-1909); Pres. (1920, 1921).

Almirall i Llozer, Valenti (Barcelona 1841 - 1904): journalist. Disciple of Pi y Margall who broke away to advance political catalanism, especially through his book Lo Catalanisme (1886). Ed.-in-chief, the Estado Català (1869-1873), the Diari Català (1879-1881); Pres. of the Catalan Center (1887) and of the Barcelona Athenaeum (1896-1897).

Álvarez González, Melquíades (Gijón 1864 - Madrid 1936): industrialist and republican politician. MP; Pres., Reformed Party (1912-1923) and Liberal-Democratic Party (1931-1936); Pres. of the Congress (1922-1923); political prisoner (1936); executed by Republican prison guards (1936).

Bastardas i Sampere, Albert (Barcelona 1871 - 1944): lawyer. Prat de la Riba’s closest personal friend. Republican; Barcelona City Councilman, instrumental in assembling the “municipal solidarity” within the Council; Acting Mayor of Barcelona (1907-1909); Sec. of the UFNR (1910-1914); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1913-1917); exiled (1926-1930).

Bertran i Musitu, Josep (Montpellier 1875 - Barcelona 1957): industrialist. Married into the Güell family, one of the richest in Spain; Regionalist MP (1905-1923); SubSec. of the Treasury (1918); Sec. of Justice (1922); exiled in France (1936-1939).

Bofill i Mates, Jaume (Olot 1878 - Barcelona 1933): poet. Of Carlist background, joined Lliga (1910); Barcelona City Councilman (1910-1919); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1919-1923), split from Lliga (1922) to become Pres. of the AC (1922-1933); MP (1931-1933); rejoined Lliga (1933).

Cantó i Sampere, Albert (Barcelona 1871 - 1944): lawyer. Prat de la Riba’s closest personal friend. Republican; Barcelona City Councilman, instrumental in assembling the “municipal solidarity” within the Council; Acting Mayor of Barcelona (1907-1909); Sec. of the UFNR (1910-1914); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1913-1917); exiled (1926-1930).

Camps i d’Olzinelles, Carles, Marqués de (Girona 1860 - San Sebastián 1939): landholder and forestry engineer. Catalan Conservative tied to Silvela dissidency; Pres. of the Girona Prov. Govt. (1891-1892); Pres. of the Catalan-Balearic Agricultural Fed. (1899), of the Vintners Union (1897-1901), and of the Catalan Agricultural Inst. of Saint Isidore (1897-1901); Regionalist MP (1900-1903, 1916-1919); Senator (1903-1905, 1919-1923); Dir. General of Agriculture (1917-1918).

Canalejas Méndez, José (O Ferrol 1854 - Madrid 1912): doctor in law and journalist. Republican politician, joined Liberal Party (1881); leader of the Liberal Democratic faction; Ed.-in-Chief, the Heraldo (Madrid); MP (1881-1912); Sec. of Agriculture and Public Works (1902); also of Justice, of the Treasury, and of Development; Pres. of the Congress (1905-1906); Pres. (1910-1912); assassinated by anarchist (1912).
Carner i Romeu, Jaume (Vendrell 1867 - Barcelona 1934): lawyer. Republican intellectual. Helped found Lliga; Vice Pres., Catalan National Center (1899-1901); Barcelona City Councilman (1902-1905); split from Lliga (1904) and became Pres. of the CNR (1906-1910); MP (1907-1916, 1931-1933); Sec. of the Treasury (1931-1933).

Coromines i Montanya, Pere (Barcelona 1870 - Buenos Aires 1939): author and doctor in law. Political prisoner sentenced to death for anarchist activities (1896-1897), defended by Duran y Bas, who secured release; exiled in France (1897); Pres. of the UFNR (1910-1914); Barcelona City Councilman (1899-1910); MP (1910-1916, 1936); exiled in Argentina (1939).

Dato Iradier, Eduardo (A Coruña 1856 - Madrid 1921): lawyer. Member of the Royal Academy; MP (1883-1921); Leader of Liberal-Conservative Party (1913-1921); Sec. of the Interior (1899-1900), Sec. of Justice (1902-1903); Sec. of State (1918); Pres. of Congress (1907-1909); Pres. (1913-1915, 1917, 1920-1921); assinated by anarchists (1921).

Domènech i Montaner, Lluís (Barcelona 1850 - 1923): architect. Dir., Barcelona School of Architecture (1901-1923); Pres. of the Jochs Florals (1895), the Barcelona Athenaeum (1898-1900, 1904-1906, 1911-1914), the League of Catalonia (1888), and of the Catalanist Union (1892) overseeing Bases of Manresa; Regionalist MP (1901-1905); split from Lliga (1904).

Duran i Ventosa, Lluís (Barcelona 1870 - 1954): doctor in law and political theorist. Son of Duran y Bas. Sec. of the Lliga (1901-1923) and was a member of the Lliga's Political Action Comm.; Pres., Barcelona Acad. of Jurisprudence (1916-1917); Barcelona City Councilman (1906-1910, 1916-1920, 1933); Acting Mayor of Barcelona (1917); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1910-1916, 1932-1936); Senator (1919-1923); exiled in France (1936-1939).

Duran y Bas, Manuel (Barcelona 1823 - 1907): doctor in and professor of law. Chair in Roman Law (1850-1899), in Mercantile Law (1862-1899), and Rector (1896-1899). Univ. of Barcelona; Pres. of the Barcelona Athenaeum (1867-1868, 1872-1873, 1876-1877), of the Barcelona Acad. of Jurisprudence (1868-1974), and of the Barcelona Acad. of Fine Letters (1901-1904); Catalan Conservative; MP; Senator; Sec. of Justice (1899).

Fernández Villaverde, Raimundo (Madrid 1848 - 1905): politician. Liberal-Conservative; MP (1872-1905); Sec. of the Interior (1885); Sec. of Justice (1890); Sec. of the Treasury (1899-1900, 1902-1903); Pres. (1903, 1905). His tax plans scuppered two reformist governments of Silvela and produced a great backlash in Catalonia, notably the Tancament de Caixes (1899).

García Prieto, Manuel, Duque de Alhucemas (Astorga 1859 - San Sebastián 1938): liberal politician. MP; Leader of Liberal Democratic faction (1912-1923); Sec. of the Interior (1905, 1918); Sec. of Justice (1905-1906, 1931); Sec. of State (1910-1912); Pres. (1917, 1917-1918, 1918, 1922-1923).

Garriga i Massó, Joan (Barcelona 1871 - 1956): lawyer. Of Liberal Democratic origin, joined Solidarity movement (1907) and gradually integrated into the Lliga; MP (1907-1916); Senator (1916-1923).

la Cierva y Peñafiel, Juan de (Murcia 1864 - Madrid 1938): Liberal-Conservative party-boss. Civil Gov. of Madrid (1903); Sec. of Education (1904-1905); Sec. of the Interior (1907-1909); Sec. of War (1917-1918, 1921-1922); Sec. of the Treasury (1919); Sec. of Development (1921, 1931); assylum in Norwegian Embassy in Madrid (1936-1938).

Lerroux García, Alejandro (La Rambla (Cordoba) 1864 - Madrid 1949): journalist. Helped restore republicanism as a force in Spanish politics. Ed.-in-Chief, the País (Madrid), the Progreso (Madrid and Barcelona); Pres., PRR (1908-1936); MP (1901-1907, 1908-1923, 1931-1936); Sec. of State (1931, 1935); Prime Minister (1933-1935); exiled in Argentina and France (1907-1909) and in Portugal (1936-1947).

Macià i Llussà, Francesc (Vilanova i la Geltrú 1859 - Barcelona 1933): army colonel, engineer, and independentist. Resigned commission to protest Spanish military’s presence in Catalonia; MP (1907-1923); Pres. of the FDN (1919-1922) and the Estat Català (1922-1933); exiled in France, Soviet Union, Argentina, Cuba, and Belgium (1923-1931); Pres. of Catalonia (1931-1933).

Maluquer i Viladot, Joan (Barcelona 1856 - 1940): lawyer. Catalan Conservative; MP (1886-1891, 1896-1899); Senator (1903-1905); Dean of the Barcelona Coll. of Lawyers; Pres. of the Barcelona Acad. of Jurisprudence (1921); loyal to Maura, founded and Presided over FMA (1919-1923); Pres. of the Barcelona Prov. Govt. (1930-1931).
Martínez Anido, Severiano (O Ferrol 1862 - Valladolid 1938): army general. Military Gov. of Barcelona (1917-1922); Civil Gov. of Barcelona (1920-1922); Sec. of the Interior (1925-1930); exiled in France (1931-1936); Sec. of Public Order, Nationalist Spain, (1938).

Maura y Gamazo, Gabriel, Conde de la Mortera y Duque de (Madrid 1879 - 1963): conservative politician and historian. Political Sec. for his father, Antoni Maura; MP (1904-1923); Sec. of Labor (1931); exiled in Portugal (1931-1940).

Maura y Montaner, Antoni (Palma de Mallorca 1853 - Torrelodones (Madrid) 1925): lawyer. Preached “revolution from above.” Member of the Royal Acad.; MP (1881-1923); Liberal dissident tied to brother-in-law German Gamazo; Sec. for the Colonies (1892-1894); Sec. of Justice (1894-1895); Sec. of the Interior in Conservative government (1902-1903); leader of Conservative Party (1903-1913); Pres. (1903-1904, 1907-1909, 1918, 1919, 1921-1922).

Montero Rios, Eugenio (Santiago de Compostela 1832 - Madrid 1914): lawyer and jurist. Liberal; joined Republicans (1973) but returned to Liberals (1884); Sec. of Justice (1870, 1873, 1892); Sec. of Development (1892); negotiated Treaty of Paris ending War of 1898; Pres. of the Supreme Court, and of the Senate (1898, 1911-1913); Pres. (1905).

Moret y Prendergast, Segismundo (Cadiz 1838 - Madrid 1913): liberal politician. MP (1869-1913); Sec. of the Interior (1883, 1902); Sec. of State (1894); Sec. for the Colonies (1898-1899); Pres. (1905, 1906, 1906, 1909-1910).

Nadal i Ferrer, Joaquim Maria de (Barcelona 1883 - 1972): author. Pres. of the Catalan Monarchist Youth (1907), which he turned into the Catalan Maurists (1913), and then led into the FMA; Barcelona City Councilman (1921-1923); Political Sec. to Cambó (1930-1936); MP (1933-1936).

Nicolau d’Olwer, Lluis (Barcelona 1888 - Mexico City 1961): hellenist and doctor in history. Barcelona City Councilman (1918-1922); helped found AC (1922); Ed.-in-Chief of the Publicitat (1922-1923); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1923); exiled in Switzerland and France (1923-1931); MP (1931-1936); Sec. of the Economy (1931); Pres., Catalan Republican Action (1933-1936); Sec., Barcelona Athenaeum (1932-1934); Governor, Bank of Spain (1936); exiled in Switzerland, France, and Mexico (1939-1961).

Ossorio y Gallardo, Ángel (Madrid 1873 - Buenos Aires 1946): lawyer. Conservative; Mayor of Madrid (1902-1904); Civil Governor of Barcelona (1907-1909); split with Liberal-Conservative Party to form the Maurist movement (1913); Sec. of Development (1919); split from bulk of Maurists to found and become Pres. of the Popular Social Party (1922-1923); Pres. of the Royal Acad. of Jurisprudence (1923-1930); MP (1931-1936); Ambassador for the Republic to Belgium, France, and Argentina (1936-1939); exiled in Argentina (1939-1946).

Pi y Margall, Francisco (Barcelona 1824 - Madrid 1901): historian. Exiled in France (1866-1869); Pres. of the Federal Democratic Republican Party (1870-1901); MP (1869-1873, 1891-1901); Sec. of the Interior (1873); Pres. of Spain (1873).

Prat de la Riba i Sarrà, Enric (Castelltercol 1870 - 1917): doctor in law. Pres., Catalanist Scholastic Center (1890-1891); Sec., Catalanist Union (1891-1899); helped found the Lliga and was a member of the Lliga’s Political Action Comm.; Ed.-in-Chief, the Veu (1899-1902); political prisoner (1902); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1905-1917); Pres., Barcelona Prov. Govt. (1907-1917); Pres. of Catalonia (1914-1917).

Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja, Miguel, Marqués de Estella (Cádiz 1870 - Paris 1930): army general. Capt. General of Morocco (1919); Capt. General of Catalonia (1920-1923); Dictator (1923-1930); exiled in France (1930).

Puig i Cadafalch, Josep (Mataró 1867 - Barcelona 1956): doctor in architecture and professor of the history of art. Pres., Catalanist Scholastic Center (1887-1888); helped found the Lliga and was a member of the Lliga’s Political Action Comm.; Barcelona City Councilman (1902-1905); founded Joventut (1907); MP (1907-1910); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1911-1923); Pres. of Catalonia (1917-1923); exiled in France (1936-1939).

Robert y Yarzábal, Bartomeu (Tampico (Mexico) 1842 - Barcelona 1902): doctor and professor of medicine. Chair in Internal Pathology, University of Barcelona (1875-1902); Pres. of the Barcelona Acad. of Medical Sciences, of the Barcelona Athenaeum (1881-1882, 1900-1901), of
the Barcelona Economic Soc. (1898-1899), and of the Lliga (1901-1902); Mayor of Barcelona (1899); MP (1901-1902).

Rodés i Baldrich, Felip (L'Hospitalet de Llobregat 1878 - Barcelona 1957): lawyer. Sec. of the CNR (1906-1910); joined Lliga (1917); MP (1907-1923, 1936); Sec. of Education (1917-1918).

Romanones, Álvaro Figueroa y Torres, Conde de (Madrid 1863 - 1950): large landholder. Liberal Party leader; MP (1888-1923); Mayor of Madrid (1901); Sec. of Education (1902, 1910); Sec. of Agriculture (1905); Sec. of the Interior (1905-1906, 1906-1907); Sec. of Justice (1906, 1918, 1922-1923); Sec. of State (1918-1919, 1931); Pres. (1912-1913, 1915-1917, 1918-1919).

Rovira i Virgili, Antoni (Tarragona 1882 - Perpignan 1949): historian and journalist. Of Federalist background; Ed.-in-Chief of the Nació (1914-1922), of the Nau (1927-1931), and of the Revista de Catalunya (1924-1929); deprived of seat in parliament by fraud (1923); exiled in France (1939-1949).

Rusiñol i Prats, Albert (Barcelona 1862 - 1928): industrialist. Vice Pres. of Assembly of Chambers of Commerce of Spain (1898); Pres. of the Assoc. of Factory Owners of the Ter, of the Fomento (1899), and of the Lliga (1902-1906); MP (1893-1896 as a Liberal and 1901-1907 and 1914-1923 as a Regionalist); Senator (1907-1910).

Sala Argemí, Alfons, Conde de Egara (Terrassa 1863 - Barcelona 1945): industrialist and Liberal cacique. MP (1888-1907, 1910-1923); Pres., UMN (1919-1926); Senator (1923); Pres. of Catalonia (1924-1925).

Salmerón y Alonso, Nicolás (Alhama la Seca (Almería) 1830 - Pau (Gascony) 1908): republican politician. Pres. of the Democratic Republican Party (1871-1874), of the Progressive Republican Party (1884-1887), of the Centralist Republican Party (1887-1893), and of the Republican Union (1893-1907); Sec. of Justice (1873); Pres. of the Congress (1873); Pres. of Spain (1873). Proposed the Catalan Solidarity (1905).

Sánchez de Toca, Joaquín (Madrid 1852 - Pizuelo de Alarcón (New Castile) 1942): banker and lawyer. Liberal-Conservative; MP (1884-1899); Senator (1889-1923); Sec. of the Navy (1902-1903); Sec. of Justice (1903-1904); Pres. of the Senate (1913, 1920); Pres. (1919).

Sánchez Guerra, José (Cabra (Cordoba) 1859 - Madrid 1935): lawyer. Liberal tied to Gamazo, joined Conservatives with Maura, and later deserted Maura to remain in Liberal-Conservative Party under Dato (1913); MP (1886-1923); Sec. of the Interior (1903-1904, 1913-1915, 1917); Sec. of Development (1907-1909); Pres. (1922).

Sunol i Casanovas, Ildefons (Barcelona 1866 - 1913): lawyer. Pres., Barcelona Athenaeum (1906-1907); helped found Lliga; Barcelona City Councilman (1902-1905); split from Lliga (1904) to join CNR; MP (1907-1908).

Vázquez de Mella y Fanjul, Juan (Cangues d’Onis (Asturias) 1861 - Madrid 1928): politician. Parliamentary leader of the Carlists; MP (1893-1923); broke with Carlist Pretender Don Jaime to form Traditionalist Party (1919).

Ventosa i Calvell, Joan (Barcelona 1879 - Lausanne 1959): lawyer and financier. Sec. of the Lliga (1903-1904); member of the Lliga’s Political Action Comm.; Barcelona City Councilman (1906-1907); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1932); MP (1907-1923, 1933-36); Sec. of the Treasury (1917-1918, 1931); Sec. of Provisions (1918); Pres. of the Barcelona Acad. of Jurisprudence; chief international fundraiser for Franco (1936-1939); Private Counsel to Don Juan de Borbón (1947-1959). Was Cambó’s right-hand man in Madrid political circles and, later, international financial ones.

Verdaguer i Callis, Narcís (Vich 1863 - Barcelona 1918): lawyer. Pres., Catalanist Scholastic Center (1887-1888); Ed.-in-Chief, the Veu (weekly) (1891-1899); Vice Pres., Catalanist Union (1897); Sec., Fomento (1898); Pres., Catalan National Center (1900); Vice Pres. of the Lliga (1901); Barcelona City Councilman (1909-1910); Pres., Barcelona Economic Soc. (1910-1911); Barcelona Prov. Deputy (1911-1913); MP (1914-1916); Pres., Barcelona Acad. of Jurisprudence (1917-1918). Introduced Prat, Duran, and Cambó, and served as their ideological mentor.
Addendum. The secret activities of Puig i Cadafalch

The following report appeared in the archive of Count Romanones.\(^1\) Nothing with it gave any clue as to its precedence, nor was it clear exactly for whom it had been prepared or who collected the information. It appears to be a police record which claims that Josep Puig was actually masterminding an insurrection while he was President of Catalonia. I found no other trace of this document, and Puig's personal papers remain the property of his heirs, who did not allow access. Archivists in Madrid suggested that the original documents as well as much of the supporting evidence may have perished when Spain's administrative archive was destroyed during the Civil War. However, information culled from other archives suggests that at least some of this document is true. The document in Francesc Macià's archive referred to in footnote 8 is the most detailed corroborating report, but Macià was careful not to use proper names. Yet if this document is true, and if certain men like Romanones had access to this information, there is no sign that they actually acted on it. There is no particular reason that Romanones should have had a copy of this report. This material has never been commented on before. The original report was sixty-three pages. I here reproduce the parts relevant to Puig's activities:

ABOUT SEPARATISM

Copy of the distinct information presented to the Superiority, at its respective times. PUIG Y CADAFALECH, VALLES Y PUJALS, and VIDAL DE LLOBATERA have formed themselves into a Directorate of Rebellious Catalanism in order to organize a true resistance against the Government in case it does not relent in its attitude against the Mancomunitat and keeps pushing Catalonia around.

They have decided to form a committee to study and propose more efficient methods to oppose centralist dispositions. Another section dedicated to quietly disseminating the agreements, in order to convert them into orders that will put these into practice at the first warning, against a password to be determined.

This section's job, for now, is to prepare the passive resistance of the city halls and provincial governments in fulfilling their duties in regards to the general governance of the State.

In this section will be the provincial deputies from Girona-Province QUINTANA and GELI, in charge of setting it up. A working Cabinet will be set up in France, probably in Perpignan where they can count on BROUSSE (currently they are not sure about him since he is the Sub-secretary of the Treasury)\(^2\) and two or three Catalans who are very good at this sort of work. Two of them, a certain PORIA and a certain FONTBERNAT, I know perfectly. They have decided to install this cabinet in a foreign country so as not to run the risk of a search resulting from someone denouncing them, in which case the conspiracy would be discovered with all of its supporting documentation.

I will keep reporting details.
- Barcelona, June twelfth, 1920.

\(^1\) "Del separatismo: copia de las distintas informaciones presentadas a la Superioridad a su debido tiempo," anonymous report, ArchRom 69/35.

\(^2\) Spanish intelligence had been tracking Brousse since at least 1917, when the archive of the Department of the Interior has its first records of his trips to Catalonia and of which political leaders he had met there. See various telegrams from 1917 to 1922, AHN-Gob-FC 52/16. For its part, the Department of State kept tabs on Brousse when he met with Catalans or discussed catalanist issues in France. See telegrams from 1917 to 1919, AGA-AE #95, C.5960, C. 5977, and C.6056 (the last of these is an entire dossier on Brousse, detailing his activities from 1916 to 1923). Brousse often met with Cambó and Ventosa, as well as with Puig and Macià.
The Directorate of Rebellious Catalanism, to which I referred in the first note, has been augmented by the provincial deputy BOFILL Y MATES and the member of the Mancomunitat's cabinet RIERA, the President of the Girona Provincial Government. The provincial deputy for Figueres MONEGAL, political secretary to the Senator and banker D. CARLOS CUSI DE MIQUELET, has joined the section destined to quietly disseminating agreements. Cusi is a member of the Monarchist-Autonomist fraction (it plays the double role in order to get on with the Regionalists). In the same way, the section for quiet dissemination in Girona-Province includes the deputies QUINTANA, GELI, and MONEGAL, under the direction of the Mancomunitat's cabinet member RIERA.

QUINTANA and MONEGAL are the ones in charge of directing the work of the working Cabinet that they have already organized in Perpignan, so they can disguise their trips to France in with their business and professional duties. There they have the cooperation of the son of the Representative for the Eastern Pyrenees, BROUSSE, since the father cannot compromise himself because of his official duties in the Treasury.3

-Barcelona, August eleventh, 1920.

The Directorate of Rebellious Catalanism has decided to begin its campaign of separatist propaganda - very quietly for now.

They have decided:
1. To name a delegate or representative, at least, in every town, who must be a person of total confidence and know how to keep a secret. The said delegate will have the mission of obeying blindly the orders of the Directorate.
2. On the fifteenth of the current month, the delegates who have been named already will go to Perpignan to exchange impressions and receive orders. This date and town have been chosen because on the sixteenth a great fest will be thrown there to celebrate the opening of the Catalan Library that has been set up in the CASTILLET, at which (will attend) all the important men of Catalanism (politicians and literary figures) and many others who will go only out of curiosity to enjoy the fest. In this way the trip to Perpignan will be disguised, in such a way that it will not call attention to the fact that many Catalans are going and that many of these are from the Province of Girona, since they are neighbors of the French department. It will also not arouse any suspicion in the French, and the Catalans can thus take advantage of the occasion to meet in whatever place to discuss the wherewithal of their desires and plans.
3. One of the matters to be discussed in Perpignan is: to agree to put into practice some stridency so that electoral assets emerge, since in the next electoral campaign they want to make a great amount of propaganda with the goal of bringing the Spanish Government into ill repute.
4. They will also deal with the preparation of a rising in Catalonia, if the Government does not quickly reestablish the peace disturbed by syndicalism, since they say that the this has not happened because the Government has not wanted to do it. Afterwards, they will solve the problem themselves in their own way and with their own authority.

PUIG Y CADAFAULCH has told his most loyal followers that he is disposed to separate from the Lliga with a great fuss if it keeps obeying Cambó, whom Puig describes as the Central Power’s pastry chef.4

The man in charge of carrying messages and correspondence between the working Cabinet in Perpignan and the Directorate will be a certain FABREGA, who figures as a commercial importer in Perpignan. Through the means of the AMIGO I got to see him,

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3 Broussé himself admitted that he used his sons to transport political letters across the border. Broussé, letter to Quiñones, the Spanish Ambassador to Paris, 21. Mar. 1918, forwarded in a telegram to Dato, then Secretary of State, 28. Mar. 1918, AGA-AE #95, C.6056.

and it turns out that he is an old acquaintance of mine whom I could not place.  
- Barcelona, October 1920.

In Girona, the presence of the most significant catalanists from the nearby towns who went to visit RIERA, President of the Provincial Government, and QUINTANA is notable. It was to discuss elections, as an excuse, and later to talk about the matter of being a delegate.

The AMIGO tells me: although they went about investigating all those who are to be delegates with complete discretion and guaranteeing the highest secrecy, very few have accepted, due to the mystery surrounding the proposition which makes them wary enough to oppose all sorts of secrets. Nevertheless, there are some who have accepted with great enthusiasm, such as: JOSÉ MACIÁ, the organist from the town of Lladó; RAMON MARGINEDA, a property-owner from Vilajuiga; JOSÉ CABRE, secretary of the Vilajuiga town hall; IGNACIO DE BUDALLES, a pharmacist in Port Bou - it is assumed that he pull out when he learns what the mission is, since he is a close friend and loyal supporter of CAMBÓ; a certain TABERNER, a SARGEANT from the town of VILAFONT; JAVIER ROGER, a property-owner in the town of Navata; and some others that the AMIGO still does not know the identities of, but we will know them in great detail when they meet to exchange impressions and receive their orders, as the previous note explained.

RIERA, member of the Cabinet of the Mancomunitat and President of the Girona Provincial Government, works incessantly on this matter.  

(October) twelfth: I have learned that the MP for Figueres Dr. D. AUGUSTO PI-SUNER has called a meeting for all the nationalist republicans, his colleagues and voters. Taking into account the significance of PI-SUNER, who each day gets more and more separatist, and the nationalist character of those he invited, I went there to learn what they were talking about publicly and privately.

The official meeting was to agree to vote against the proposition of MARCELINO DOMINGO, LAYRET, and ALOMAR in the Assembly of the Catalan Republican Party - those from Figueres did not want to adhere to the Third International. They also agreed - in a very reserved way, for now - to present PI-SUNER as a candidate in the next elections, counting on the cooperation of the Regionalists and of the Monarchist Autonomist D. CARLOS CUSI, the ex-Senator from Girona.

In the private conversations, many of those attending spoke about the celebrations in Perpignan, where some of them are expected. They did not speak publicly about this matter since some lerrouxist republicans were also there who had voted for PI-SUNER in the last elections and will do again in the next ones.

- Barcelona, October twelfth, 1920.

... [Pages 12-15: a discussion of cultural and (disguised) separatist activities of the Catalan celebration in Perpignan, giving the names of delegates.]  

In Perpignan

There is in this town a group, fortunately reduced, of totally separatist Catalans, almost all of them fugitive from Spain where they have debts with Justice. These, along with some French citizens from Roussillon, shamefully separatist (there they don't even hide it) make up the working cabinet under the direction of PUIG Y CADAFALCH. They have a cultural center called the "CASAL CATALÀ" where they conspire constantly, and on various occasions they have shouted out "down with the Spanish State - long live a free Catalonia," and, have sung the "Segadors" menacingly.

They have also flown the Catalan flag that has the single star, on the fourteenth of July this year. The Spanish Consul D. Juan Bel came and took it down, as was his duty.

... [pages 16-17: a discussion of anti-Spanish nature of some of the fugitives and Frenchmen, journalists in Roussillon and members of the Casal Català.]  

The Spanish Consul has orders to not grant visas to anyone who is a member of the CASAL CATALÀ and to watch the motions of those evil Spanish citizens.

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5 The existence of Fabrega as an associate of Brousse is confirmed by Juan de Bel, the Spanish Consul in Perpignan, coded telegram to Quinones, 31. August 1917, AGA-AE #95, C.5960.

6 The "Segadors" is the Catalan national anthem, and describes the "Reapers' War" of 1640 when the Catalans rebelled against the Spanish state. The Catalan flag with the single star represents an independent Republic of Catalonia.
The doctor CARBONEIL keeps in constant contact with PUIG Y CADAFALCH and also with SOLÉ Y PLA, the latter with the motive of the Catalan festivities: He receives funds from the MANCOMUNITAT with some frequency. FONTBERNAT receives 200 pesetas monthly from the MANCOMUNITAT.

PUIG Y CADAFALCH goes to Perpignan sometimes to meet with those from the CASAL CATALÀ. He goes in a car on the highway from Figueres to LA JUNQUERA and PERTHUS, which is also the one from Madrid to Paris. (In Junquera there are border guards).

On Sunday the tenth of this month, Dr. J. ROCA, President of the Barcelona Athenaeum, and FRANCISCO MATEU, President of the Floral Games, were eating with the BISHOP DOCTOR CARSELADE in his palace. They went to discuss the celebrations of the bell, arranged for the eleventh of November.

To conclude the information of the principal part of my trip and investigations I should point out: that on the eighteenth at noon I went to Figueres to meet with the AMIGO. It was an important local festival, and for that reason the people were very dressed up. We talked about elections: orders were given advising an efficient campaign to see to the triumph of the candidates protected by the Lliga, and, above all, war without remorse on the Government’s candidates, appealing to convictions, bribery, or intimidation as necessary. The main argument to be used is the complacency of the Government in dealing with the syndicalists in order to neutralize Catalonia.

The delegates have been charged with forming a list of men of confidence to quietly make up a legion destined to defend the interests, lives, and property of the men in the area when syndicalism extends to the towns and tries to establish Bolshevism, which they say will happen soon. They say that they will create this army because they cannot count on the SOMATENT since this is subject to the Government with the intervention of the military, and so they need to go behind the back of this organization. These men will be the soldiers of Catalonia, who, after the social problems have been resolved, will win independence for the land.

Based on the results of the electoral campaign, the catalanist propaganda will intensify with more or less impudence.

Barcelona, October twentieth, 1920.

The AMIGO says: The Directorate has charged the representatives from each province to quietly and subtly hinder as much as possible the attempts by the Government to solve the class conflicts, in order to stir up the Catalans against the Central Power for its ineptitude in governing Catalonia.

In respect to the wheat shortage, there must be a strong campaign of hatred towards the Spanish Government, to make it believed that the Government does not want to relieve the shortage in order to punish the catalanism of the province of Girona.

An intense campaign must be made against the mayors appointed by royal order, and that those municipalities begin passive resistance or a strike at the first notice.

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7 Solé had organized a catalanist banquet in Paris in 1919 to honor various public figures from Perpignan. The Mancomunitat provided a medal of honor for Brousse at that event. Bel, telegram to Quiñones, 20. Mar. 1919, AGA-AE #95, C.6056.

8 A manuscript in Macià’s own archive confirms this strategy. He discussed the need to form a new Catalan army, because the Somatent had government agents infiltrated in it. Although a rising needed to come, it was not yet time to rise because of a lack of arms. Macià also considered the aid of the syndicalists and revolutionary republicans necessary in order to see to the foundation of an independent Republic of Catalonia. Macià mentioned a Directorate in the third person, and referred to it as though he was not on it - suggesting that perhaps he was not leading the movement. Yet the entire document was written carefully to avoid mentioning the names of anyone involved. The Directorate charged Macià with forming the army, organizing safe-houses in every town, buying arms, and drawing up the military plans. Notes s.d. [datable from information therein as between 1920 and 1922], ArxMacià 03.07.02.01.
I did not return immediately because on Saturday VIDAL DE LLOBATERA had to go to the Empordà on electoral business and the AMIGO told me I should wait for him. The aforementioned VIDAL did not go until Sunday, to take advantage of the excuse that he was taking part in an electoral rally that was taking place in the town of RUPIA with the motive of blessing the banner of the _Joventut Nacionalista_, after which he would meet secretly with the AMIGO and others, to whom he gave the following instructions:

Stir up hatred towards the official candidates making use of all methods.

Create a hit gang to intimidate election campaigners in order to make them afraid to do their jobs. If they did not have the right sort of men for this, men would be sent from Barcelona.

Do whatever is possible to stir up the Government so that it makes reprisals against the catalanists, in order to make people indignant and put them in the mindset for rebellion.

To wait for further instructions that will come in due time.

* * *

The campaign here described has two objects. These are to make the Central Power hated, and to make Cambó look ridiculous so that he loses his prestige in Spain and in the _Lliga_, with the goal of making the plan laid out by PUIG Y CADAFALCH more achievable.

The AMIGO believes that the Directorate will fail, since it will not find the right atmosphere for such radicalism.

-Barcelona, December 1920.

From the AMIGO: I arrived in Figueres on St. Joseph’s Day. Immediately I went to meet with the AMIGO, who told me that VIDAL DE LLOBATERA and BOFILL Y MATES were to arrive the next night to pass on instructions, after which I would understand everything. These men did not come, and on Monday he received word that this trip had not been possible and that they would reschedule the meeting for the day they were honoring the defeated candidate PUIG DE LA BELLACASA, which will be over the Easter holidays in Girona. At that event will be the electors of Torroella de Montegrí and the catalanists from the province, and this would be a good way to disguise the trip and for all of PUIG Y CADAFALCH’s men to gather together and exchange impressions.

The AMIGO says: the separatist Directorate has quietly organized an active propaganda campaign to take advantage of the intensification of the nationalist campaign of the _Lliga_. In these occasions PUIG Y CADAFALCH’s men can mix up their work with men of confidence with the goal of preparing themselves for a day to be determined, which will be when MARTINEZ ANIDO and ARGLEGUZ leave their respective commands.

Since the _Lliga_ remains offended by la Cierva (they say he is responsible for having eliminated the Regionalists from power), they will work against the current Government until it falls. With this in mind, the separatist Directorate has decided to look for a way, among its unconditional followers, to find any excuse to close down factories and force lock-outs under the current circumstances. It has also decided to stir up the tax-payers against the projects of the Secretary of Development.

In review: the _Lliga_ will block the Government’s plans so that the government projected by Maura comes to power.

The separatists will take advantage of this campaign to prepare their ground and in their turn to undermine the projects of the _Lliga_ by acting in a hostile manner to its Government.

-Barcelona, March twenty-fifth, 1921.

...[pages 31-34: a discussion of French consular contacts with the CADCI and with PUIG; and a discussion of the influence of BROUSSE through the presence of his eldest son (Carles). Barcelona, 10 February tenth, 1922.]

...[pages 35-36: news from Perpignan, including the death of CARBONEIL, President of the CASAL CATALÀ; the move of the working cabinet’s headquarters to Toulouse; and the move of the CASAL CATALÀ to PLATANE, buying a building for 16,000FF of the 30,000FF PUIG had given them.]
The MP for the Eastern Pyrenees EMMANUEL BROUSSE continues his campaign against Spain in his newspaper L'INDEPENDENT. It has now been verified that all of the articles are by PUIG Y CADAFAŁCH. The correspondence that goes back and forth between the two does so in the hands of a private carrier whose identity I do not know but will find out. (This information comes from reliable sources.)

PUIG Y CADAFAŁCH has not been in Perpignan since last October, when they intended to hold the celebration - suspended from last year - of the gift of the library of Catalan books. This ceremony was suspended once again because Mayor Denis did not want the inconvenience of a foreign political display.

...[pages 36bis-37: the existence of a Spanish Center in Perpignan made it difficult for the Working Cabinet to remain in that city.]

- Barcelona, February twenty-first, 1922.

MORE ABOUT SEPARATISM

Separatism is now working with an amazing activity. The secret campaign has gradually intensified in all the towns of Catalonia which have sent men of confidence. It is certain that PUIG Y CADAFAŁCH, although he figures in the Lliga, is personally directing the campaign, and that the representative MACIÀ is only a straw-man.9

What is still not quite clear is whether VALLES Y PUJALS, President of the Barcelona Provincial Government, and RIERA, President of the Girona Provincial Government, still form part of the separatist Directorate, or if they decidedly remain with the Lliga.

The bond of union between the propagandists of Catalonia and the delegates from the towns is Don JOSÉ MARIA FOLCH Y TORRES, with the excuse of creating and maintaining the POMELLS - associations which appear cultural but which have as an objective the poisoning of the youth especially with separatism by using choral and religious festivals. This is the modus vivendi of this character.

...[pages 39-41: a discussion of work carried out abroad; the cabinet has moved to Toulouse; SOLÈ Y PLA makes frequent trips to centers in southern France; and PI SUÑER has been nominated to become an honorary member of the Medical Faculty at the University of Toulouse, which serves as an excuse for several trips.]

EMMANUEL BROUSSE FOR THE EASTERN PYRENNES

This man, now, would appear to have left off his catalanist campaign. This is not true because he continues to have an understanding with PUIG Y CADAFAŁCH and SOLÈ Y PLA. What is certain is that the French Government has called on him once again and that this has changed his behavior. His son remains in Barcelona with the same activity, frequenting the Center of Commercial Clerks on the Rambla of Santa Mónica and other separatist locales as I detailed in my earlier note.

...[pages 42-43: the French consulate is protecting Carles Brousse; the Catalan Center in Paris has broad contact with elements in Havana, Cuba.]

...[pages 44-48: in Toulouse, the Working Cabinet is sponsoring “cultural” activities, keeping contacts with Basques from both France and Spain, and promoting the use of Occitan in order to influence Occitan nationalism. There is activity in other French towns as well.]

9 The Maurist Peyra once referred to Puig in the same league with Macià and other left-wing groups and as distinct from the Lliga as run by Cambó. Peyra, letter to Maura, 23. Dec. 1918, ArchMaura. But Peyra was also one to complain about Cambó and Ventosa making threats to seize autonomy by force and with help from France should the Spanish government not grant it. Peyra, same letter, and letter to Rovira y Pita, 28. Dec. 1918, ArchMaura. That Macià was armed and planning a rising was well-known in Madrid. Rivas, journal, 2. Jan. 1923, ArchNRivas 11-8909; and also the telegrams between the civil governors of all four Catalan provinces and the Department of the Interior, 21-23. Feb. 1923, AHN-Gob-FC 52/16.
THE VISIT OF VARIOUS CATALANS TO TOULOUSE

On the seventeenth of June last, the following arrived in Toulouse: RIERA; DURAN REINALS; NICOLAU D’OLVER, a member of the cabinet of the Mancomunitat; Dr. TURRO, a French doctor in Barcelona; Dr. GIRONA, a member of the Catalan School of Doctors; BARTRINA, representing the Mancomunitat; Dr. SOLE Y PLA, President of the Catalan Volunteer Force (in the Great War);10 FARROLS; PIJOAN; and MORAGAS; with Doctor PI SUNER who was about to receive an honorary doctorate.

...[pages 48-51: a discussion of both latent and apparent catalanism.]

...[pages 52-58: the Aran Valley wants to annex itself to France; a discussion of Spanish citizens acting in the catalanist movement in Toulouse and of French catalanists in Toulouse; a list of anarchist contacts the catalanists have in Toulouse and in Cette; and a discussion of the renewed activity in Perpignan of the CASAL CATALÀ.]

* * *

Doctor SOLE Y PLA continues going to Perpignan with great frequency, as does RIERA from Girona, and their visits are always to the CASAL CATALÀ and to the MP EMMANUEL BROUSSE, although he has stopped his catalanist campaign in the newspaper L’INDEPENDENT. Secretly, he continues as before.

According to what they assure me, the reason the INDEPENDENT has changed its policy is due to the fact that PAMS, formerly Secretary of the Interior, who is also from this Department, has bought the largest stake in the newspaper and he does not want to print anything against Spain. BROUSSE and PAMS are now political enemies.11

BROUSSE, for his contacts with the Spanish catalanists, uses his son, resident here (Barcelona), about whom I have already informed in previous notes....

-Barcelona, August twenty-seventh, 1922.

...[pages 61-63: contacts and visits between P. COROMINES and the CASAL CATALÀ; and a survey of the roads that need to be guarded along the border in order to see who drives across.12 Barcelona, September sixth, 1922.]

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10 After the war, Solé had presented to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson a demand for Catalan self-determination. Although this embarrassed the Spanish and American governments, the Spaniards found him harmless since despite his extremist views he associated with Regionalists in Barcelona. Quiñones, telegram to Romanones, 27. Dec. 1918 and Romanones, letter to Quiñones, 30. Dec. 1918, AGA-AE #95, C.5977.


12 Many groups, notably the CADCI, often organized trips to France to take part in separatist demonstrations. If a group passport was denied, they found other ways to get individual passports from other offices around Catalonia and to go to France on “tourism.” See the series of telegrams between the offices of the Barcelona Civil Government, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of State, Mar. 1923, AHN-Gob-FC 52/16. Spanish border guards and Spanish consulates in the south of France tried to keep a record of border crossings. There is ample reason to believe that the crossings mentioned in this document took place on the days specified, and indeed that Puig and others met with the people identified. Whether or not this document is correct in its speculation about actual events, however, cannot be confirmed with the materials available.
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(Throughout this bibliography, B refers to Barcelona and M to Madrid.)

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- APG-AMC Ministerio de la Presidencia, Fondos Autonomía y Mancomunidad Catalana

**B. Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de Henares, M):**

- AGA-AE Ministerio de Estado, Sección de Asuntos Exteriores.
- AGA-Int Ministerio de Gobernación, Sección de Interior.

**C. Archivo Histórico Nacional (M):**

- AHN-Gob-FC Ministerio de Gobernación, Fondos Contemporáneos.

**D. Arxiu de la Diputació de Barcelona (B):**

- ArxManc Arxiu de la Mancomunitat de Catalunya.

**E. Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya (B):**

- ArxDiV Arxiu Particular de Lluís Duran i Ventosa.
- ArxDyB Arxiu Particular de Manuel Duran y Bas.
- ArxPrat Arxiu Particular de Enric Prat de la Riba i Sarrà.
- ArxMacià Fons del President Francesc Macià i Llussà.

**F. Biblioteca de Catalunya (B):**

- BC-AHM Arxiu Històric de Manuscrits de la Biblioteca de Catalunya.
- ArxJBM Arxiu Particular de Jaume Bofill i Mates.

**G. Fundación Antonio Maura (M):**

- ArchMaura Archivo Histórico, Fondo de Antoni Maura y Montaner.
- ArchGMG Archivo Personal de Gabriel Maura y Gamazo.

**H. Real Academia de la Historia (M):**

- ArchRom Archivo del Conde de Romanones.
- ArchDato Archivo de Eduardo Dato Iradier.
- ArchNRivas Archivo de Natalio Rivas Santiago (G: Reinado de Alfonso XIII - gobiernos constitucionales, 1902-1923).
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