

**Defining the Castle through Twelfth-Century Chronicle  
Perceptions in the Anglo-Norman Regnum**

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# **Defining the Castle through Twelfth-Century Chronicle Perceptions in the Anglo-Norman Regnum**

Kimberly Cowan, Hertford College, D.Phil in History, Hilary 2014

## **Short Abstract**

The medieval castle is one of the most popular topics in medieval historiography and interest in this structure has institutionalized it in modern medieval scholarship.

Unfortunately, this does not mean that modern historians understand it. The problem lies in the narrow and isolationist definition used by many scholars who see it as simply a fortified private residence representing and defending power. This thesis will demonstrate that the castle's contemporaries understood it as an identifiable and distinguishable structure and symbol with a singular yet multi-dimensional characteristics as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource.

The twelfth-century Anglo-Norman realm has been chosen as a focus for this thesis because of the specific differences between the reigns of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II. This period, particularly the nineteen years of Stephen's reign, experienced significant castle warfare, which provides a great deal of material for this study. In chapters 1-3, each of the above characteristics and their corresponding details will be analysed individually. In chapter 4, three case studies will be presented to demonstrate how these independent characteristics were perceived of as acting simultaneously. Chapter 5 will compare perceptions of castles to other medieval buildings. Finally, chapter 6 will test the definition's legitimacy by applying it beyond the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman realm.

This thesis will demonstrate that there was a contemporary understanding of the castle which encompassed its fortified nature, its personal possession, and its multifunctional

resourcefulness. If we are to understand this phenomenon as its contemporaries did, then we need to alter our modern definition and expand our understanding in order to come to a truer and more complete appreciation of this essential resource in the Middle Ages.

# **Defining the Castle through Twelfth-Century Chronicle Perceptions in the Anglo-Norman Regnum**

Kimberly Cowan, Hertford College, D.Phil in History, Hilary 2014

## **Long Abstract**

The medieval castle is one of the most researched and highly published topics in medieval historiography and interest in this structure has institutionalized it in modern medieval scholarship. Throughout different phases of scholarship, historians' primary interest has been in the use of castles either in military strategy or social movement; resulting definitions of the castle which have revolved around these two characteristics in isolation. An initial martial focus, which concentrated on siege tactics and warfare technology, has been countered by a focus on social symbolism. These scholars were intent on proving its military or social nature without realising or acknowledging that the answer could have been that it was a resource for both. Unfortunately, the resulting abundance of scholarship does not mean that modern historians understand it. Modern medieval scholarship has not succeeded in uncovering the contemporary understanding of the castle. The problem lies in the narrow and isolationist definition used by scholars many of whom see it as essentially a fortified private residence which represented and defended power. There is no problem with the basic aspects of this definition but it is too narrow to fully and appropriately define the medieval castle.

The inadequacy of modern definitions stems from one issue: despite decades of warnings against isolationist study, castles continue to be separated from the military, economic, social, and political concerns of the society in which they are located and their archaeological features are ignored. Fortunately, there has been a recent shift in scholarship

to explore fuller and more comprehensive definitions of the castle and break down the barriers of academic isolationism. Multidisciplinary approaches, like those of landscape historians, are needed if the castle is to be appropriately studied within its context. It is within this historical shift that this thesis frames its argument. Unlike the narrow and isolated definitions of modern historians, this research attempts to create one which encompasses all the functions, roles, and natures of the castle using archaeology when possible and appropriate. This study will demonstrate that the castle's contemporaries understood it as an identifiable and distinguishable structure and symbol with a singular yet multi-dimensional characteristics as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource. This definition might, at first, seem no different to those presented earlier since it contains military and social elements; however, it is the emphasis on the resourcefulness of the castle within medieval warfare, politics, society, economy, and culture that distinguishes this definition from its predecessors. The castle's central nature as a multifunctional resource has been missing from modern definitions; it was what distinguished it as a castle in the medieval understanding.

The castle had a central position across medieval Europe; thus demonstrating this contemporary definition for the castle in general would incorporate far too many regions, cultures, and periods for the scope of this project. While this definition could and should be examined across Europe throughout the medieval period, geographical, temporal, and evidential limitations will be applied to this study. The twelfth-century Anglo-Norman realm has been chosen as a focus for this thesis because of the specific differences between the reigns of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II. This period, particularly the nineteen years of Stephen's reign, experienced a great deal of castle warfare. While this may bias the chronicles to focus far more on castles than medieval society typically would, it provides a great deal of material for this study. This overemphasis does not bias the conclusions of this

study because even during this period of castle warfare, the contemporary understanding of the castle accentuates non-military elements. Additionally, the castle, has become stereotyped historiographically particularly in England. While this provides a solid secondary resource framework, it also means that this study's proposed definition will confront several established theories in the hopes of advancing a deeper understanding of how this building operated within the political, social, military, and cultural atmosphere of the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman realm.

'Fortified' included the castle's role in warfare (tactical tool, technology, influence in the rules of warfare, symbol of force) and the physical attributes (fortification elements, garrison). This relatively simple and common description of the castle, was an intricate part of how contemporaries defined the castle. The second component of this definition is the 'personal' nature of the castle which includes aspects of possession and residence specifically the vocabulary used to denote possession and the increase of identity and status through the castle. The final feature of the proposed definition is that the castle was a 'multifunctional resource'. The roles it played affected every aspect of society and the social facets it symbolized (feudalism, lordship, wealth, power, status) divided the castle into an independent and distinct sphere from other medieval buildings. It had the ability to change medieval society, politics, warfare, and administration; it was a multifunctional resource.

This study will use chronicles as the main body of evidence exploiting their narrative to examine the castle within a political and social context. However, using chronicles exposes this study to the various faults and limitations intrinsic in these sources as a form of literature. To act as a balance, non-chronicle evidence, including charters and archaeology reports, will be used. Although charters are a type of formulaic rhetoric and can be as biased or fictional as chronicles, they provide a different type of inventiveness in their foundation and function as legal documents and have a claim on precision that chronicles do not offer.

Their adherence to legalistic contractual norms means they are sometimes very different to the moral stories at the heart of chronicles. The use of historical narrative, legal rhetoric, and archaeological surveys when relevant, will vary and balance this study.

The value of chronicles lies not in their factuality; writing history was essential because it addressed current political and social events with realistic historical accounts. While historians can expect distortion caused by political bias or literary mode, these alterations are just as valuable because of their connection to political and social influences. Within the fiction of possible fabricated narration of events, conversations, and chronology, a social reality is discernible. For this study, what is recorded is not important for its accuracy, but for the perceptions regarding castles. For example, while the *Gesta Stephani* and William of Malmesbury might present a different narrative of events, in conjunction, they offer a more holistic picture including perceptions about castles from both sides of the conflict.

In these sources, these characteristics were consistently understood as what characterised a castle, despite existing in a variety of political, military, and social situations. Amid these circumstances, the emphasis, dominance, and relativity of these characteristics fluctuated; however, the basic concept of what constituted a castle remained constant. The number of chronicles or narrative literature that the twelfth century produced was immense and varied. They ranged from the annalistic to the romantic and many provide excellent insights into the contemporary perception of the castle. This thesis will use the well-known works of Henry of Huntingdon, William of Malmesbury, Orderic Vitalis, and the *Gesta Stephani* alongside Eadmer, Richard of Hexham, Aelred of Rievaulx, Robert of Torigni, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, Simeon of Durham, William of Newburgh, Roger of Howden, Gerald of Wales, Jordan Fantosme, and Geoffrey of Monmouth.

This study uses an open theoretical and methodological approach to examine the castle in its political and social context employing primarily the analysis of the perception of the castle recorded by the chronicles. To do this, a variety of approaches will be used which approaches historical writing from multiple directions and include analysing vocabulary used to describe, explain, discuss, portray, represent, analyse, and even define castles in relation to their social context, dissecting the overt descriptions of the castle for perceptions, and examining the articulated opinions about the castle for implied perceptions. One might ask why, with such a wealth of scholarship concerning castles, would analysis of the perception of castles in text, instead of the real fortifications themselves, be of value. Perception enables us to analyse how contemporaries viewed their reality. Thus, a chronicler could present the location and physicality of a castle and his reader could understand its defensive situation and fortified characteristics, and yet an underlying perception of the castle, which was neither explicitly written nor read, but was understood by both, might have existed.

An additional approach that will be employed is that of a temporal comparative: analysing the perceptions of castles across the reigns of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II. However, the chronicles of Stephen's reign have many castle references because of the violent and near anarchic conditions of the period provided chroniclers with a plethora of moral illustrations. For example, chronicles of Stephen's reign include two from William of Malmesbury, William of Newburgh, Aelred of Rievaulx, the Worcester Chronicle, Richard of Hexham, Orderic Vitalis, Simeon of Durham, and the *Gesta Stephani*. While some of these chronicles do contain narratives of other reigns, their attention on Stephen and the chaotic events of his reign provides numerous and useful moral stories for their audience and a great deal of castle references and detailed context in which this study can operate. Thus, while the evidence lends itself to a focus on the reign of Stephen, the narratives of

Henry I and II can offer comparative insights. If the narrative of castles during Stephen's reign focus on warfare, then the relative peace and stability of the two Henry's provide narratives which focus on political and social development. On the other hand, if the emphasis on the castle is consistent across these three reigns then perhaps the circumstances of the context do not affect the perception of the castle. The comparative framework of this thesis enables these questions to be explored.

Each of the characteristics and their corresponding details will be discussed separately allowing for a thorough analysis of each concept. In Chapter 1, the castle's role as a military resource, its physical appearance, the garrison, and what fortified meant to the chroniclers will be examined. In Chapter 2, the personal element of the castle including aspects of residence, the issue of rentability, and vocabulary of possession will be presented. In Chapter 3, the multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle in issues of power and lordship, patronage and security, in the 'rules' of warfare which include a social dynamic, its expression in architecture, and the destruction of castles will be analysed. In Chapter 4, three case studies from Stephen's reign will be presented to demonstrate that these independent elements are used and perceived as acting simultaneously. Chapter 5 will compare the perception of castles to other medieval buildings to demonstrate the definition as one belonging to the castle. Finally, chapter 6 will explore this definition in Capetian France, Ireland, and England beyond the twelfth century to test its applicability.

This thesis is essentially excavating twelfth-century perceptions by reading twelfth-century historical narratives to demonstrate that there was a contemporary understanding of the castle which encompassed its fortifications, its personal ownership, and its multifunctional and resourceful participation in the medieval world. If we are to understand this phenomenon as its contemporaries did, then we must understand that each characteristic was independent yet simultaneous in what defined the castle in the twelfth-century Anglo-

Norman realm. This provides an excellent setting in which to study this phenomenon in detail, but the wider importance of understanding how the castle was perceived by contemporaries across Europe and across the Middle Ages is imperative. We need to alter our modern definition and expand our understanding in order to come to a truer and more complete appreciation of this essential resource in the Middle Ages.

## Acknowledgements

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- Aelred (eng) *Aelred of Rievaulx: The Historical Works*, ‘Relatio de Standardo’, Cistercian Fathers Series: 56, ed. M.L. Dutton, trans. J. Patricia Freeland (Kalamazoo, 2005).
- ASC *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, ed. D. Whitelock, D. Douglas, and S. Tucker (London, 1961).
- Battle* *The Chronicle of Battle Abbey*, ed. and trans. E. Searle (Oxford, Oxford Medieval Texts, 1980).
- Draco* Etienne de Rouen, ‘Draco Normannicus’, *The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, ed. R. Howlett, vol. 2 (London, Rolls Series: 82, 1884-1889).
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- Gaimar (Rolls) Geffrei Gaimar, *Lestoire des Engles*, ed. T.D. Hardy and C.T. Martin (2 vols., London, Rolls Series: 91, 1888).
- Gerald, *Conquest* Gerald of Wales, *Expugnatio Hibernica: The Conquest of Ireland*, ed. and trans. A.B. Scott and F.X. Martin (Dublin, 1978).

Gerald, <i>History</i>	Gerald of Wales, <i>The History and Topography of Ireland</i> , trans. J.J. O'Meara (Harmondsworth, 1982).
Gerald, <i>Princes</i> (lat)	'De Principis Instructione Liber', <i>Giraldi Cambrensis Opera</i> , vol. 8, ed. G.F. Warner (London, 1891).
Gerald, <i>Princes</i> (eng)	Gerald of Wales, <i>On the Instruction of Princes</i> , trans. J. Stevenson (Felinfach, 1991; facsimile of London, 1858).
GND	<i>The Gesta Normannorum Ducum of William of Jumièges, Orderic Vitalis, and Robert of Torigni</i> , ed. and trans. E.M.C. Van Houts, vol. 2, books 5-8. (Oxford, 1992-1995).
GS	<i>Gesta Stephani</i> , ed. and trans. K.R. Potter (Oxford, Oxford Medieval Texts, 1976).
Hexham (lat)	Richard, Prior of Hexham, 'De Gestis Regis Stephani et de Bello Standardii', <i>Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I</i> , ed. R. Howlett, vol. 3 (London, Rolls Series: 82, 1884-1889).
Hexham (eng)	Richard of Hexham, 'The Act of King Stephen and the Battle of the Standard, 1135 to 1139', <i>Contemporary Chronicles of the Middle Ages</i> , trans. J. Stephenson (Lampeter, 1988).
Howden (lat)	Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, 'Chronica', <i>Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages</i> , ed. W. Stubbs (4 vols., London, Rolls Series, 1868-1871).
Howden (eng)	<i>The Annals of Roger de Hovenden: comprising The History of England and of other countries of Europe</i> , trans. H.T. Rile (Felinfach, 1994; facsimile of London, 1953).
Huntingdon	Henry of Huntingdon, <i>Historia Anglorum</i> , ed. and trans. D. Greenway (Oxford, Oxford Medieval Texts, 1996).
LE (lat)	<i>Liber Eliensis</i> , ed. E.O. Blake (London, Camden third series, 1962).
LE (eng)	<i>Liber Eliensis: a history of the Isle of Ely from seventh to twelfth century</i> , trans. J. Fairweather (Woodbridge, 2005).
LHP	<i>Leges Henrici Primi</i> , ed. and trans. L.J. Downer (Oxford, 1972).
Malmesbury, <i>GRA</i>	William of Malmesbury, <i>Gesta Regum Anglorum</i> , ed. and trans. R.A.B. Mynors, R.M. Thompson, and M. Winterbottom, (2

- vols., Oxford, Oxford Medieval Texts, 1998).
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- Regesta* *Regesta Regum Anglo-Normanorum 1066-1154*, ed. H.W.C. Davis, R.J. Whitwell, C. Johnson, and H.A. Cronne (4 vols., Oxford, 1913-1969).
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- Suger (eng) Suger, *The Deeds of Louis the Fat*, trans. R. Cuismano and J. Moorhead (Washington, D.C., 1992).

Suger (lat)	Suger, <i>Vie de Louis VI le Gros</i> , ed. and trans. Henri Waquet (Paris, 1964).
Torigni	‘The Chronicle of Robert of Torigni’, <i>The Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I</i> , ed. R. Howlett, vol. 4 (London, Rolls Series: 82, 1885-1889).
Wendover (lat)	Roger of Wendover, <i>The Flowers of History</i> , ed. H.G. Hewlett (3 vols., London, Rolls Series: 84, 1886).
Wendover (eng)	Roger of Wendover, <i>Flowers of History</i> , trans. J.A. Giles, vol. 2 (London, 1849).
Worcester	<i>The Chronicle of John of Worcester</i> , ed. and trans. P. McGurk, vol. 3 (Oxford, Oxford Medieval Texts, 1998).

### **Secondary Resources and Archaeological Surveys**

<i>Albion</i>	<i>Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies</i>
<i>AJ</i>	<i>The Archaeological Journal</i>
<i>AHR</i>	<i>The American Historical Review</i>
Amt	E. Amt, <i>The Accession of Henry II in England: Royal Government Restored, 1149-1159</i> (Woodbridge, 1993).
<i>ANS</i>	<i>Anglo-Norman Studies</i>
<i>BAR</i>	<i>British Archaeological Reports</i>
Bartlett	R. Bartlett, <i>England under the Norman and Angevin Kings 1075-1225</i> (Oxford, 2000).
Biddle	M. Biddle, <i>Winchester in the Early Middle Ages: an edition and discussion of the Winton Domesday</i> (Oxford, 1976).
Bradbury, <i>Siege</i>	J. Bradbury, <i>The Medieval Siege</i> (Woodbridge, 1992).
Bradbury, <i>Stephen</i>	J. Bradbury, <i>Stephen and Matilda: The Civil War of 1139-53</i> (Stroud, 2005).
<i>CG</i>	<i>Château Gaillard</i>
Creighton and Higham	O. Creighton and R. Higham, <i>Medieval Town Walls: An Archaeology and Social History of Urban Defence</i> (Stroud, 2005).
<i>CP</i>	<i>The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom</i>

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- EHD* Douglas, D.C. and G.W. Greenaway (eds.), *English Historical Documents* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed, London, 1981).
- EHR* *The English Historical Review*
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- JMH* *Journal of Medieval History*
- JBAA* *Journal of the British Archaeological Association*
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- MA* *Medieval Archaeology*
- NMS* *Nottingham Medieval Studies*
- ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
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- PP* *Past and Present*
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- TRHS* *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*

# Introduction

The castle is one of the most researched and highly published topics in medieval historiography. It was the passion of nineteenth-century antiquarians, a contentious subtopic in the Freeman and Round debates,<sup>1</sup> the subject of a great deal of scholarly publication during the nona-centennial of the Norman Conquest and battle of Hastings,<sup>2</sup> and the focus of a historiographical shift led by Coulson in the 1970s. This interest in the castle has institutionalised it in modern medieval scholarship. Throughout, the primary concentration has been on castles either in military strategy or social movement and, unfortunately, resulting definitions have revolved around these two elements in isolation. Remarkably, while arguing over their role in medieval history, scholars have not recognised that the primary defining characteristic of the castle to its contemporaries was its resourcefulness. Intent on proving its military or social nature, they did not realise or acknowledge that the answer could have been that it was a resource for both.

The castle was an exceptional medieval building and interacted with, and was embedded deeply in, all facets of medieval life from feudal relations to trade, warfare to social status, and was understood and used differently from churches, cathedrals, manor houses, and palaces. Its purposes, functions, nature, architecture, and symbolism have been scrutinised for over a century, but the resulting abundance of scholarship does not mean

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<sup>1</sup> E.A. Freeman, *The History of the Norman Conquest of England: Its causes and its results* (Oxford, 1867-1879); J.R. Round, *Feudal England* (London, 1895).

<sup>2</sup> Some institutionalising publications: E.S. Armitage, *The Early Norman Castles of the British Isles* (London, 1912); C.W. Hollister, 'The Norman Conquest and the Genesis of English Feudalism', *AHR* 66:3 (1961), pp. 641-63 and *The Military Organisation of Norman England* (Oxford, 1965); H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, *The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta* (Edinburgh, 1963); D.F. Renn, 'The First Norman Castles in England', *CG* 1 (1964), pp. 125-32; F. Barlow, *The Feudal Kingdom of England 1042-1216* (London, 1955); J.H. Beeler, *Warfare in England 1066-1189* (Ithaca, 1966) and *Warfare in Feudal Europe 730-1200* (Ithaca, 1971); R.A. Brown, *The Architecture of Castles* (London, 1984) and *Castles, Conquest & Charters: Collected Papers* (Woodbridge, 1989) and 'Royal Castle-Building in England, 1154-1216', *EHR* 70/276 (1955), pp. 353-98 and *English Castles* (London, 1962) and *Origins of English Feudalism* (London, 1973).

that modern historians understand it. Modern medieval scholarship has not succeeded in uncovering the contemporary understanding of the castle. The problem lies in narrow and isolationist definitions, many of which see it as essentially a fortified private residence which represented and defended power.<sup>3</sup> The basic aspects of this definition are acceptable but its premise is too narrow to fully and appropriately define the medieval castle.

In their research, Kenyon and Johnson each employ a definition derived from the Royal Archaeological Institute, but with very different connotations. For Johnson, using the Institute's definition *verbatim*, the castle was 'a fortified residence which might combine administrative and judicial functions but in which military considerations were paramount;' for Kenyon, it was the fortified residence of a lord and a symbol of the feudal society in which it developed.<sup>4</sup> Both accept it was a defensive residence, but Kenyon emphasised social symbolism and Johnson its militarised nature. With varied interpretations of a single institutional definition, it is no surprise that many debates regarding these defining aspects have arisen, that many medieval historians avoid them altogether, and that the consensus definitions are not adequate.

Johnson also raised several concerns about historians' attempt to define the castle, 'with reference to a "need" or "intention" on part of the builders... [it is in] reference to something that is inherently unknowable'.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, scholars need to recognise differences in style and function when defining castles or they risk characterising them as essentially military or essentially social.<sup>6</sup> Johnson's problem with modern definitions is

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<sup>3</sup> D. Crouch, *The Reign of King Stephen 1135-1154* (Harlow, 2000), p. 150; W. Anderson, *Castles of Europe: From Charlemagne to the Renaissance* (London, 1970), p. 17; H. Clarke, *The Archaeology of Medieval England* (Oxford, 1984), p. 105; P.E. Cleator, *Castles and Kings* (London, 1963), p. xiii; D.J.C. King, *Castellarium Anglicanum: An Index and Bibliography of the Castles in England, Wales and the Islands*, vol. 1 (Millwood, NY, 1983), p. xv; Brown, *Architecture*, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> 'Five Castle Excavations: Reports on the Institute's Research Project into the Origins of the Castle in England', *AJ* 134 (1977), p. 2; J.R. Kenyon, *Medieval Fortifications* (Leicester, 1990), p. xvi; M. Johnson, *Behind the Castle Gate: From Medieval to Renaissance* (London, 2002), p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Johnson, *Behind the Castle Gate*, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

that they are derived from documentary sources and historians who employ them, typically do not substantiate them archaeologically.<sup>7</sup> It is impossible to understand a physical building and its remains without crossing disciplines and including other approaches, including delving into the archaeological record. Yet so many modern historians do because they do not consider this research path or they feel the two disciplines should remain separate.

When discussing the castle-phenomenon, Coulson plausibly argued that ‘there is no expression at any time remotely as restrictive as “private fortified residence”’.<sup>8</sup> He was applying Reynolds’ research about ‘fiefs’ and ‘vassals’ to castles; she argued that these two words are ‘post-medieval constructs...neither word is in sources...We cannot understand medieval society and its property relations if we see it through seventeenth- or eighteenth-century spectacles’, or modern ones.<sup>9</sup> Coulson appropriately tied this issue to the castle arguing that this definition ‘should be added to the tyrannical construct of “feudalism”’; rhetorically, it should be disregarded and new terminology and definitions explored using medieval concepts, comprehension, and vocabulary.<sup>10</sup>

The inadequacy of modern definitions stems from one issue: despite decades of warnings against isolationist study, castles continue to be separated from the military, economic, social, and political concerns of the society in which they are located and their archaeological features are ignored. Regional histories include castles as geographical markers without comprehending their individual importance; conversely, castellology has focused specifically on intricate details, sometimes, devoid of context. This creates a

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Coulson’s own definition argues that the castle was exclusively a symbol of social position, almost to the extent of negating any military purpose or intent. *Castles*, pp. 34, 110.

<sup>9</sup> Reynolds, pp. 2-3.

<sup>10</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 34; Coulson’s argument and the concept of ‘feudalism’ as an inappropriate term is derived from and discussed by E.A.R. Brown, ‘The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe’, *AHR* 79:4 (1974), pp. 1063-88.

stereotype of castles as ‘little more than battleships in the landscape’, when in reality they were inseparable from ‘the control of resources, assertions of social and political status, and relationships between and among monarchs and the aristocracy’.<sup>11</sup> Admittedly, this academic segregation has produced and discovered a great deal about castles; however, it hinders our full understanding of the phenomenon and has created a gap in the otherwise well-researched and explored knowledge of the castle and more still needs to be done.

Fortunately, there has been a recent shift to explore fuller and more comprehensive definitions of the castle to break down the barriers of academic isolationism. Multidisciplinary approaches, like those of landscape historians, are needed if the castle is to be appropriately studied within its context. The publications of Creighton, Wheatley, and Goodall are examples of this contextualisation. Creighton aims ‘to re-examine medieval castles by looking at their settings within, and their contribution to, the medieval landscape... using geographers, documentary and architectural historians, and archaeologists’.<sup>12</sup> Wheatley ‘aims to integrate architectural, visual and textual evidence, to explore the idea of the castle in medieval writing and thought, in art and architectural practice’ using ‘their literary and artistic representations’.<sup>13</sup> Finally, Goodall produced ‘an architectural study that aims to set this legion of buildings in historical context, tracing the development of the castle in England through the Middle Ages and beyond’.<sup>14</sup> It is within this historiographical shift that this thesis frames its argument. Unlike the definitions presented above, this research attempts to create one which encompasses all the functions, roles, and natures of the castle as found in chronicle narratives using archaeology when possible and appropriate. This study will also address some of the problems Johnson

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<sup>11</sup> A. Lowerre, ‘Placing Castles in the Conquest: Landscape, Lordship and Local Politics in the South-Eastern Midlands, 1066-1100’, *BAR British Series* 385 (2005), p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> O.H. Creighton, *Castles and Landscapes: Power, Community and Fortification in Medieval England* (London, 2002), p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> A. Wheatley, *The Idea of the Castle in Medieval England* (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 3, 15.

<sup>14</sup> J. Goodall, *The English Castle, 1066-1650* (London, 2011), p. iii.

discussed above by examining the castle through contemporary perceptions. This study will demonstrate that the castle's contemporaries understood it as an identifiable and distinguishable structure and symbol with a singular, yet multi-dimensional, characteristic: as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource.<sup>15</sup> This definition might, at first, seem no different to those of Creighton, 'high-status private residences and seats of local government as well as military strongholds',<sup>16</sup> or Goodall, 'residence of a lord made imposing through the architectural trappings of fortification'.<sup>17</sup> However, it is the emphasis on the resourcefulness of the castle within medieval warfare, politics, society, economy, and culture that distinguishes this definition from its predecessors. This central nature as a multifunctional resource not only distinguished it as a castle in the medieval understanding, but has been missing from modern definitions.

Since castles have been studied across different regions and time periods in isolation, a singular definition for this phenomenon has not been developed. The variations in uses, symbolism, roles, and nature between the castles like the earliest ones in France, those of the Crusades, the Edwardian-Welsh constructions, and the gothic-fantasy structure of early-modern Germany demonstrate the difficulty of undertaking such a challenge. The ultimate test of any definition of the castle is its durability across the various regions of Europe and the medieval period. However, because of its importance and presence across medieval Europe, demonstrating this definition in this manner would incorporate far too many regions, cultures, and periods for the scope of this project. This definition should

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<sup>15</sup> Reynolds (p. 13) argued that when creating definitions, it is vital we distinguish between our words and those of our subjects. Thus, the words fortified, personal, multifunctional resource are my words. Only fortified appears in the sources. Chroniclers do use personal pronouns and denote possession of castles, but they did not have our modern understanding of 'personal possession' that is argued in this dissertation. Finally, contemporaries would not have packaged this usage as 'multifunctional resource', they would not have needed to; this was how a castle operated so there was no reason to create a description other than 'castle'.

<sup>16</sup> Creighton, *Castles and Landscapes*, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Goodall, *English Castle*, p. 6.

eventually be examined across medieval Europe, but in this case, geographical, temporal, and evidential limitations need to be applied. In order to substantiate this contemporary perception *cum* definition, this thesis will use the chronicles of the reigns of Henry I (1100-1135), Stephen (1135-1154), and Henry II (1154-1189) as its primary evidence base. While this eighty-nine year regional focus may seem extremely narrow, the reigns of these kings experienced varying political circumstances providing a continuity focus and appropriate context in which to examine the castle's contemporary characterisation as an exemplar for other parts of Western Europe.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify what the elements of fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource mean in this context. Fortified is certainly the simplest term to understand, define, and demonstrate within the modern historiography. To fortify a place, either a castle or any other building, was to add or strengthen defensible elements like walls, trenches, mounds, and towers, *et cetera*. However, physical strength was not the only aspect that made a castle fortified, its garrison was also important. A difficulty of using chronicles as evidence for fortification is that there are too few detailed descriptions; most just say that the castle was 'fortified', but what did this mean? The second component is the personal characteristic of the castle and encompasses the residential nature prominent in traditional definitions. Additionally, the chronicles include an abundance of vocabulary denoting possession; they refer to castles as belonging to or being the possession of a specific lord or king. This vocabulary becomes very important when the issues of readability and status are raised. The final feature is that the castle was perceived of as a multifunctional resource. Its varied roles meant that it could be used as a tool in warfare, politics, society, economics, and culture. The castle's resourcefulness in warfare centred on its tactical importance and its influence on issues like rules of warfare and the development of military technologies. Socially, the castle was a resource which could determine and

express status and establish relationships with peers and the king extending into royal licensing and rendability. Economically, castles were used as the collection points and storage sites for monies collected from rents, fines, markets, or tolls. Politically, we see the castle was used to form relationships amongst the elite and determined power and lordship. These categories were interconnected and almost inseparable in the Middle Ages, and the castle's military resourcefulness affected its economic value, the political power, and social position of its possessor. Its existence, construction, destruction, improvement, or a change in possession altered military, political, economic, and social developments, sometimes drastically.

To demonstrate this definition, this study will examine each aspect individually discussing historiographical issues with the concept and contemporary support for its inclusion. To demonstrate the simultaneous existence of all of the elements, three case studies – Baldwin of Redvers and Exeter, Miles de Beauchamp and Bedford, and the 'arrest of the bishops' – will be presented. In order to demonstrate that contemporaries distinguished the castle through these characteristics, a brief discussion and comparison of other medieval buildings will be included. Finally, these characteristics will be analysed beyond the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum.

### **Historical Context**

While the establishment of the castellan's power in France was developed over many generations, England experienced a very different birth of castles.<sup>18</sup> While the Anglo-Saxons had communal fortresses called burhs along with remains of Roman civic and military fortifications, castles were constructed in abundance by the conquering Normans

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<sup>18</sup> Fourquin, p. 76.

after Hastings in 1066 to establish their political, social, and military dominance.<sup>19</sup>

Unfortunately the exact extent of this construction cannot be historically substantiated because most of these castles do not have recorded histories; however, based on their remains, it has been estimated that 500 to 550 were built between 1066 and 1087.<sup>20</sup> The castle served as the focal point for the newly established Anglo-Norman administration and power and cemented their presence and dominance across England. The clearest example of Norman power was the construction of castles within Anglo-Saxon burhs, as at Worcester, symbolically and physically assuming the administrative and military power these locations embodied contemporaneously and historically.<sup>21</sup> Additionally, civic and residential buildings were destroyed to make way for castles in several key cities including 113 in Norwich and 166 in Lincoln.<sup>22</sup> In cases of rebellion, castles were used to suppress the region and control urban populations such as at Exeter and York. It was the castle and the Norman use of it which helped ensure their control over England and solidified the Conquest.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Burhs were essential to the national defence system of Alfred of Wessex and his direct descendants against the Viking invaders. Lowerre, 'Placing Castles in the Conquest', p. 54. For more on Anglo-Saxon lordly residences and burhs see: A. Williams, 'A Bell-house and a Burh-geat: Lordly Residences in England before the Norman Conquest', in Coulson, *Castles*. For a chronicled examples and use of *burc* for burh: 'Whoever managed to get into the fortified part of the town found protection and his life was saved, and anyone who failed to get in did not survive unless he fled to somewhere else (...) Had the town not been fortified, the men of Kent would have been in dire straits. While many of them found safety in the town, all of the others perished. (*Mult oscistrent des paisanz, / mes les plusurs furent fuianz; / ki entrer pout en la cité, / si fu guari e bien tensé. / e ki ne pout, pas ne guari/ si aucune part ne s'en fui (...) ne fust le burc ki clos estait, /mult I fussent Kenteis destrait, /mes par le burc plusurs guarirent; /les remanz trestuz perirent.*)' Gaimar, lines 2421-6, 2433-6, pp. 132-5. The few castles in pre-Conquest England included Hereford, Ewyas Harold and Richard's Castle (Herefordshire) and Clavering (Essex), constructed by the Norman and Breton lords who introduced to the island the seigneurial structures 'to which they were accustomed in France'. The lack of castles in England was remarked upon by Orderic and given as a reason why the Norman Conquest succeeded. R.A. Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest* (London, 1969), pp. 98-9, 115-6, 234-6 and *Origins*, p. 75; Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 16, 30-1.

<sup>20</sup> K. DeVries, *Medieval Military Technology* (Peterborough, 1992), p. 207; Stenton, pp. 196-7.

<sup>21</sup> Bradbury, *Siege*, p. 57; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 888-9.

<sup>22</sup> C.G. Harfield, 'A Hand-list of Castles Recorded in the Domesday Book', *EHR* 106:419 (1991), pp. 372-3, 389-90.

<sup>23</sup> Brown, *Normans and the Norman Conquest*, pp. 43-5, 98-9, 234-6, and *Castles, Conquest & Charters*, p. 66; J. Le Patourel, *The Norman Empire* (Oxford, 1976), pp. 303, 307; R.H.C. Davis, *The Normans and their Myth* (London, 1976), pp. 8, 55; M. Chibnall, *The Normans* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 27, 45, 47-8, 51, 67; DeVries, *Medieval Military Technology*, pp. 202-6.

William the Conqueror's sons continued his policy of using castles to assert power and lordship but as the threat from the Anglo-Saxon population deteriorated, the competing ambitions of the Anglo-Norman barons and kings destabilised England. Not all castellans or magnates resisted the increasing centralisation of royal power, but there were occasions when royal control of castles through regulating construction and ownership threatened baronial independence, power, and security sometimes generating instability and conflict. Famous amongst modern historians for his comments on castles, the chronicler Orderic Vitalis touched on the changing political dynamics saying that Henry I 'brought all his enemies low, and demolished the unlicensed castles that...the factious lords had built...He shrewdly kept down illustrious counts and castellans and bold tyrants to prevent seditious uprisings'.<sup>24</sup> Other chronicles of the twelfth century also demonstrate this conflict and their focus on castles provides ample evidence for this study.

Orderic's comment was in reference to the conflicts in Normandy which revolved around Robert, duke of Normandy, and his son William Clito. Henry I began his reign under threat when Robert unsuccessfully invaded England to claim the throne in 1101 and with consequential baronial rebellions the next year.<sup>25</sup> Henry succeeded in conquering Normandy and capturing his brother in 1106 at the battle of Tinchebrai but continued to face pockets of opposition with William Clito as the focal point until his death in 1128. However, the issue of Henry I's successor became a major concern after the loss of his only legitimate son William in the sinking of the White Ship in 1120. He named his

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<sup>24</sup> *'Henricus siquidem rex omnes inimicos suos opitulante Deo miiliauit, ac adulterine castella quae Rodbertus uel seditiosi condiderant prostrauit...Egregios comités et oppidanos et audaces tirannos ne rebellarent callide oppressit, placidos uero et religiosos humilemque populum omni tempore clementer fouit atque protexit'*. Orderic, 11, 23, pp. 98-9.

<sup>25</sup> For Henry I: J. Green, *Henry I: King of England and Duke of Normandy* (Cambridge, 2006), and *Government*. Brothers' peace terms: Orderic, 10, 19, pp. 318-9. Robert of Bellême and William of Mortain's rebellions: ASC, E, pp. 178-9; Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 396, pp. 718-9; Worcester, pp. 100-3, 106-9. More on this 'civil war' see: C.W. Hollister, 'The Anglo-Norman Civil War: 1101', *EHR* 88:347 (1973), pp. 315-34.

daughter Matilda as his heir and the Anglo-Norman barons swore fealty to her on 1 January, 1127 at Westminster.<sup>26</sup> However, her subsequent marriage to Geoffrey of Anjou alienated many Norman barons and conflicts between the couple and the king concerning her dower castles enabled Stephen of Blois to claim the English throne upon Henry's death on 1 December, 1135.<sup>27</sup>

Henry's government ran so effectively that the high number of 'receipts from royal revenue, the degree of judicial activity, and the high calibre of his servant[s]' came to characterise his reign and the prioritisation of peace and order.<sup>28</sup> But while his officials ran the government, it was Henry who set the 'tone'.<sup>29</sup> Henry I was characterised as 'harsh and exploitative' in his pursuit for royal power but was strong, unyielding, and authoritative and remembered nostalgically after his death.<sup>30</sup> While he consolidated royal control of castles, particularly when facing his brother's challenge and the eventual problems of the succession, he typically rewarded loyalty and ability with castles. When he asserted his castle rights in Normandy and began a large-scale castle building in the duchy, he faced some resistance; in England we can assume he did the same, and while there is limited evidence of a castle-building programme, he did make improvements to existing structures.<sup>31</sup> His baronial dealings have been described of as constructing counterbalancing governors, gifting certain barons with power, lordship, estates, and castles which intentionally offset others to protect royal authority.<sup>32</sup> The largest, and subsequently most

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<sup>26</sup> Exact oath unknown. Green, *Henry I*, pp. 190-4, 202-5, 217-8, 220, 320, and *Government*, pp. 11-2; Garnett, pp. 231-3.

<sup>27</sup> J. Green, 'Henry I and the Origins of the Civil War', in Dalton and White, pp. 11, 23-4.

<sup>28</sup> Green, *Government*, pp. ix, 1, 5-7, 18, 50, 95, 106-8, 133.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, pp ix, 1, 5-6, 18, 38.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, pp 6, 95.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, pp 123-4. This included the tower at Corfe and the 'new wall round the bottom of the motte on the south and west sides, roughly concentric, with the curtain wall above;' at Carlisle in 1122, he ordered the construction of 'a castle and towers'. *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 554, 577-81, 588-90, 595-600, 616-24, 629-41, 673-7, 734-8, 806-14, 852, 854-64.

<sup>32</sup> Green, *Government*, pp. 123-4 and *Henry I*, p. 206.

important, of these was between Henry's nephew Stephen of Blois and his illegitimate son Robert, earl of Gloucester. Stephen received lands forfeited by rebellious barons in the southeast of England and married the heiress of Boulogne; only Robert matched him at court with equal lands in the West Country and Normandy. Additionally, the earldom of Chester was balanced by the Beaumont family including the rebellious Waleran of Meulan (who was released in 1129 but never given his castles back until 1135).<sup>33</sup> The division of these barons resulted in the main factions during Stephen's reign.

After Henry I's death, encouraged by his supposed deathbed renunciation of Matilda, Stephen rushed to claim the throne; the swiftness of his reaction meant the majority of the barons, including Robert of Gloucester, had to accept it as *fait accompli*.<sup>34</sup> Stephen's elder brother Theobald of Blois was approached by the Norman barons, but he too accepted, after being paid off, his brother's coronation and ducal control.<sup>35</sup> Even Matilda's appeal to the pope failed with the papacy more willing to support an anointed king. However, that did not stop Matilda's uncle David, king of Scotland and her husband, Geoffrey of Anjou, from invading and taking several border castles in northern England and Normandy.<sup>36</sup>

From Henry I's court, Stephen had strong connections with certain magnates and, solidifying them, granted offices and castles creating almost twenty earldoms between 1138 and 1140.<sup>37</sup> This may have been to balance the uncertain loyalty of barons like

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<sup>33</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 24-5.

<sup>34</sup> *Battle*, pp. 140-1; *GS*, 1, 4, pp. 12-3; 'Robert of Gloucester', *CP*, vol. 2, pp. 683-6; ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23716>, accessed June 9, 2014.

<sup>35</sup> For Stephen's reign: M. Chibnall, *The Empress Matilda: Queen Consort, Queen Mother and Lady of the English* (Oxford, 1991); H.A. Cronne, *The Reign of Stephen, 1135-54: Anarchy in England* (London, 1970); E. King, *The Anarchy of King Stephen's Reign* (Oxford, 1994), and *King Stephen* (London, 2010); D. Matthew, *King Stephen* (London, 2002); K.J. Stringer, *The Reign of Stephen: Kingship, Warfare and Government in Twelfth-century England* (London, 1993).

<sup>36</sup> *ASC*, E, p. 198; Hexham (eng), pp. 57, 60, 62-5, 68-9, 76; Hexham (lat), pp. 145-6, 151, 155-8, 165-6, 177; Worcester, pp. 252-7; Aelred (eng), pp. 249-50, 259-60; Aelred (lat), vol. 3, pp. 183, 191. David was also a direct descendent of Edward Ironside and Atheward II and so had a claim himself to the crown; whether he intended to assert his claim or his niece's is uncertain.

<sup>37</sup> Cronne, *Reign of Stephen*, p. 139; G.H. White, 'King Stephen's Earldoms', *TRHS* 4:13 (1930), pp. 51-82; P. Dalton, *Conquest, Anarchy and Lordship: Yorkshire 1066-1154* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 145-6.

Robert of Gloucester, Brian Fitz Count, or Miles of Gloucester, but it increased local loyalties, family feuds, and decentralised royal authority. Henry I took decisive action against threats like his own brother, Robert of Bellême, and Waleran of Meulan and imprisoned them to ensure his own stability, and while Stephen had gained a reputation as a warrior, his unwillingness to punish barons like Baldwin de Redvers failed to ‘discourage rebellion’.<sup>38</sup> While he may have started his reign as a strong alternative to Matilda, by the end, he was seen as ‘irresolute’ and his ‘indecisiveness was something of a standing joke’.<sup>39</sup>

Stephen was encumbered by a legitimate rival claimant decentralising his royal authority, causing civil war, and enabling a rise in the power of local castellans and barons including Philip Gay,<sup>40</sup> Geoffrey Talbot,<sup>41</sup> William Fitz Alan,<sup>42</sup> John Fitz Harold,<sup>43</sup> Richard Fitz Gilbert,<sup>44</sup> Robert Fitz Harold,<sup>45</sup> William de Mohun,<sup>46</sup> Turgis of Avranches,<sup>47</sup> John Fitz Gilbert,<sup>48</sup> Roger of Bampton,<sup>49</sup> Robert Fitz Hubert,<sup>50</sup> Baldwin de Redvers,<sup>51</sup> Hugh Bigod,<sup>52</sup> Eustace Fitz John,<sup>53</sup> and several adherents of Robert of Gloucester

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<sup>38</sup> King, *King Stephen*, pp. 307, 334. John of Worcester recorded Stephen’s inability to punish rebels. ‘Since King Stephen was, no rather, is, a pious and peaceable man, he did not injure anyone but allowed his enemies to depart freely. (*Et quoniam ipse rex pietatis et pacis erat, immo quia est, non nociture alicui operam dedit, sed hostes liberos abire permisit.*)’ pp. 242-3.

<sup>39</sup> King, *King Stephen*, pp. 307, 334.

<sup>40</sup> Worcester, pp. 248-51, 270-3; *GS*, 1, 26 and 29-30, pp. 56-7, 64-7.

<sup>41</sup> Worcester, pp. 242-5; *GS*, 1, 53, pp. 108-11.

<sup>42</sup> Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 520-3.

<sup>43</sup> Worcester, pp. 274-7; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 37, p. 73.

<sup>44</sup> *GS*, 1, 9, pp. 16-9.

<sup>45</sup> *GS*, 1, 11, pp. 20-1.

<sup>46</sup> *GS*, 1, 37, pp. 80-3.

<sup>47</sup> *GS*, 2, 91, pp. 174-7.

<sup>48</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 39, pp. 74-6; *GS*, 1, 51, pp. 104-7.

<sup>49</sup> *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31; Torigni, p. 129.

<sup>50</sup> Worcester, pp. 284-91; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 31, pp. 63; *GS*, 1, 50-2, pp. 104-9.

<sup>51</sup> Worcester, pp. 218-9; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 229; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 191; Newburgh, 1, 5, pp. 54-5; *ASC*, E, p. 198; *GS*, 1, 15, pp. 30-3; Torigni, p. 129.

<sup>52</sup> Torigni, pp. 149-50; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 229, 248; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 191, 208; Huntingdon, 10, 23, pp. 746-7; *GS*, 2, 90, pp. 174-5.

<sup>53</sup> Worcester, p. 254-5; Hexham (eng), pp. 64-5; Hexham (lat), p. 158; Aelred (eng), pp. 259-260; Aelred (lat), p. 191.

(Walchelin Maminot, Morgan the Welshman, Ralph Lovel, William Fitz John).<sup>54</sup> Their violence was commented upon by the chroniclers with the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* stating that, ‘they said openly that Christ and his saints were asleep’.<sup>55</sup> While this statement might colour the chaos experienced, it was echoed by other chroniclers. What caused modern historians to describe this period as ‘anarchy’ was this localised power of castellans and the proliferation of private warfare within specific areas as compared to the stronger royal control pre-1135 and post-1154.<sup>56</sup>

However, the kingdom was separated into relatively well controlled and peaceful regional commands attempting to continue royal administration under Matilda, Stephen or even powerful magnates like the earls of Chester and York.<sup>57</sup> The baronial *conventiones* of the 1140s demonstrate the willingness of the magnates to protect their own interests at the king’s expense. Writing after Stephen’s reign, William of Newburgh recorded the violence:

Numerous castles had been raised in individual areas through the eager action of factions, and in England there were in a sense as many kings, or rather tyrants, as there were lords of castles. Each minted his own coinage, and each like a king had the power to lay down the law for his subjects. As each of them sought predominance in this way, so that some could not stomach a higher authority and some not even an equal, they disputed with each other in deadly hatreds, they despoiled the most famous regions with plunderings and

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<sup>54</sup> Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 518-9; Huntingdon, 10, 7, pp. 712-3; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 231; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 193; *GS*, 1, 31, pp. 66-6; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 37, p. 73.

<sup>55</sup> *ASC*, E, p. 200.

<sup>56</sup> N.J.G. Pounds, *The Medieval Castle in England and Wales: A Social and a Political History* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 30.

<sup>57</sup> The charters collected in the *Regesta*, vol. 3 demonstrate an attempt at, and strong belief in, royal administration on both sides. G.J. White, ‘The Myth of the Anarchy’, *ANS* 22 (2000), pp. 323, 332-3; S. Speight, ‘Castle Warfare in the *Gesta Stephani*’, *CG* 19 (2000), pp. 269, 273; S. Marritt, ‘King Stephen and the Bishops’, *ANS* 24 (2002), p. 131; E. King, ‘King Stephen and the Anglo-Norman Aristocracy’, pp. 180, 184, and *King Stephen*, p. 88, and ‘The Anarchy of King Stephen’s Reign’, *TRHS* 5:34 (1984), pp. 134-5, 137, 152; ‘Ranulph of Chester’, *CP*, vol. 1, pp. 166-7; ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23128>, accessed June 9, 2014; P. Dalton, ‘*In Neutro Latere*: The Armed Neutrality of Ranulf II Earl of Chester in King Stephen’s Reign’, *ANS* 14 (1992), pp. 39-60; Davis, ‘The Anarchy of Stephen’s Reign’, pp. 631-2; Amt, pp. 1-2; Bartlett, p. 287.

burnings, and in a country once most fertile they virtually wiped out the bread which is the staff of life.<sup>58</sup>

The continual and violent warfare along a reasonably well-defined line of demarcation (see Appendix A), meant that the period should really be classed as a civil war, ‘a war of borders’, or, according to some, ‘localized gangsterism’.<sup>59</sup> Under Henry I, loyalty was greatly rewarded with prestige, position, or power, but under Stephen, lords took what they wanted. The two sides’ inability to control castle-building manifested in the proliferation of an estimated 1,115 unlicensed castles by 1153.<sup>60</sup>

Furthermore, Stephen’s main threat was not from Matilda’s smaller forces, but his mistreatment of magnates including Miles of Gloucester, Brian Fitz Count, and Robert of Gloucester. However, Stephen’s reign was most affected by his capture at the battle of Lincoln in 1141, Geoffrey of Anjou’s conquest of Normandy by 1145, and the future Henry II’s English campaigns. Henry Fitz Empress first visited England at the age of nine in 1142 and again in 1149 in order to rally Angevin support before, prompted to action by Stephen’s renewed siege of the resolutely-Angevin Wallingford, succeeding in 1153. Henry’s appeal as a strong, proven, and legitimate leader caused the defection of many barons including Robert of Leicester, a long-time devotee of Stephen’s, putting thirty English castles under Angevin control.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> ‘*erantque in Anglia quodammodo tot reges vel potius tyranni quot domini castellorum, habentes singuli percussuram proprii numismatis, et potestatem subditis regio more dicendi juris, cumque ita singuli excellere quaerent, ut quidam superiorem, quidam vel parem sustinere non possent, feralibus inter se odiis disceptantes rapinis atque incendiis regiones clarissimas corruperunt, et in fertilissima olim patria fere omne robur panis absumpserunt*’, Newburgh, 1, 22, pp. 98-9.

<sup>59</sup> Angevins held Somerset, Gloucestershire, modern Monmouthshire, Herefordshire, and, sometimes, Worcestershire; Stephen had ‘Hampshire, Avon, and the Cotswolds, on the north and north-east by the Welland, the fens in the lower valley of the Ouse, and the river Waveney... [and] Wilts[hire] and Dorset’. H.W.C. Davis, ‘The Anarchy of Stephen’s Reign’, *EHR* 18:72 (1908), pp. 631-2.

<sup>60</sup> W.L. Warren, *Henry II* (London, 1973), pp. 39-40. Regardless of number constructed, the proliferation of castles in this period as recorded by the chroniclers was seen as a manifestation of disorder. Garnett, pp. 250-1.

<sup>61</sup> Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 124-5.

The treaty of Westminster, signed on 6 November, 1153, confirmed Henry as Stephen's heir; Henry did homage but was to be consulted on certain matters, agreed to destroy 'adulterine' castles (acknowledging these as the greatest threat to royal authority), and placed specific castles in the control of men they both trusted.<sup>62</sup> Stephen ended his reign, only one year after the treaty, secure on the throne as a legitimate ruler and with the power to deal with any final pockets of resistance; he spent his remaining time reasserting royal authority primarily through regaining royal control of castles, but the Anglo-Norman regnum was already looking to the future.<sup>63</sup>

When Henry Fitz Empress heard of Stephen's death on 25 October, 1154 he was besieging the castle of Torigni and did not rush back to England, setting sail on 7 December.<sup>64</sup> Instead of the country dissolving into independent factions as in 1135, Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury succeeded in keeping the peace: 'many chroniclers remarked of the wonder that after Stephen's death such a troubled kingdom waited quietly for Henry's arrival'.<sup>65</sup> Garnett argued that this was because the barons had already been bound by 'liege homage' to Henry and that the

...peace which had been inaugurated by the settlement of 1153 was unaffected by Stephen's death... [the] interregnum was, and was widely acknowledged to be, unlike any other. It was so because so much care had been taken over the preparations.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> *GS*, 2, 120, pp. 240-1; King, *King Stephen*, pp. 283, 288-90, 292; Stephen's eldest son Eustace died shortly before Henry relieved Wallingford in 1153, and his youngest son William was not considered. For a discussion on this see: Amt, pp. 15-1, 43-4. The charter does not mention the destruction of castles. For more on this and why the dissemination versions differed see: E. King, 'The Accession of Henry II', in C. Harper-Bill and N. Vincent (eds.), *Henry II: New Interpretations* (Woodbridge, 2007), pp. 33-6, 40; Garnett, pp. 277-8. See also Garnett, pp. 262-94 for analysis of the diplomatic, chronicle, and practical evidence of the peace.

<sup>63</sup> Amt, p. 19.

<sup>64</sup> For Henry II see: G.J. White, *Restoration and Reform 1153-1165: Recovery from Civil War in England* (Cambridge, 2000); J.D. Hosler, *Henry II: A Medieval Soldier at War, 1147-1189*, *History of Warfare* vol. 44 (Boston, 2007); Harper-Bill and Vincent, *Henry II*.

<sup>65</sup> Amt, p. 21; Examples include Torigni, pp. 180-1; Huntingdon, 10, 39-40, p. 775-7; *Battle*, pp. 152-3.

<sup>66</sup> Garnett, p. 296.

Henry had no legitimate rival which meant that, in contrast to the successions of 1066, 1087, 1100, and 1135, he was universally acknowledged as the rightful heir. Crowned on 19 December, 1154, his coronation charter confirmed everything his grandfather had and, according to King, it was as if he wanted everyone to recognise that ‘Stephen’s reign was a mistake, and should be forgotten... [and to] help men forget, no claim to land based on tenure during this period was accepted’.<sup>67</sup>

From the outset, Henry treated his barons and castles completely differently. Modern historians have argued that his equal treatment of both sides of the civil war further secured the beginning of his reign:

...whosoever’s lordship they [the barons] had accepted up to this time, and whether or not they had changed their allegiance over time, their homage would be accepted, by the other party... There would be no disinheritance built into the peace... the personal integrity of those who fought on either side was respected.<sup>68</sup>

Henry attempted to return to a *status quo ante bellum*, as conditions had been under Henry I.<sup>69</sup> The new king’s castle policy was simple: all castles were at the king’s disposal and castellans would no longer be identified with the castles they held; titles and land could be hereditary but not offices or castellan possession of castles.<sup>70</sup> Henry’s primary concern was

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<sup>67</sup> King, ‘King Stephen and the Anglo-Norman Aristocracy’, p. 181; Amt, p. 21. Among the charters in N. Vincent, ‘Acta of Henry II and Richard I: Part 2’, *List and Index Society: Special Series 27* (1996), only one refers and upholds a charter of Stephen’s: p. 47. The majority confirm holdings currently possessed, but some specifically state that lands, offices, services, *et cetera*, are to be returned or held as they were ‘in the time of Henry I’. Ibid, 17 and 27 (p. 52), 31-2 (p. 55); J.C. Holt and R. Mortimer, ‘Acta of Henry II and Richard I’, *List and Index Society: Special Series 21* (1986), 16 (p. 33), 78 (p. 60), 87 (p. 65), 96 (p. 69), 111 (p. 76), 135-6 (p. 87-8), 170 (p. 108), 184-6 (p. 111), 237 (p. 136), 277 (p. 154), 284 (p. 157), 286 (p. 158), 292 (p. 160), 299 (p. 164), 302 (p. 165), 314 (p. 171). See Garnett on confirming status quo as under Henry I (pp. 255, 304, 306); confirming Stephen’s grants (pp. 290-1, 305-6). Garnett argued that Henry would ‘silently reverse any of Stephen’s augmentations, and reiterate his grandfather’s charters’ (p. 306) but also that ‘even [with] the reverence for the *status quo* of his grandfather’s day, ostentatiously proclaimed... remained, for all the brouhaha, subject to the king’s discretion’ (p. 308); Henry was ‘perfectly willing to be flexible’. (p. 309).

<sup>68</sup> King, *King Stephen*, p. 287; White, *Restoration*, pp. 74-7, 115.

<sup>69</sup> Torigni, p. 183; King, ‘King Stephen and the Anglo-Norman Aristocracy’, p. 181, and *King Stephen*, p. 287; White, *Restoration*, pp. 78, 216-7.

<sup>70</sup> White, *Restoration*, pp. 78, 81, 86, 91-3, 95-6, 216-7; C. Coulson, ‘Fortress-Policy in Capetian Tradition and Angevin Practice: Aspects of the Conquest of Normandy by Phillip II’, in Liddiard, p. 329.

maintaining strong control over his territories of England, Normandy, Aquitaine, Anjou, and Maine, and his 'government embarked upon a systematic programme to neutralise castles' potential for opposition by effecting the destruction of some and the imposition of royal garrisons upon others', including royal allies.<sup>71</sup> He did face a few initial challenges to these consolidation policies. Count William of Aumale and York, who had been 'one of the most flagrant profiteers of Stephen's reign at the king's expense', surrendered his earldom and Scarborough castle but Henry allowed him to keep 'important gains from the royal demesne in Yorkshire'.<sup>72</sup> In the case of Earl Roger of Hereford, Henry acquiesced and allowed him to maintain his possession over 'former royal towns and castles in Gloucestershire and Herefordshire' after realising he was not strong enough to confront this powerful magnate.<sup>73</sup> However, Hugh de Mortimer 'served as a frightful example to all' when his possession of Bridgnorth was quickly ended.<sup>74</sup>

Most of Henry's baronial opposition was spurred on by his sons, particularly during the Great War of 1173-4. This conflict involved many English and Norman barons including the earls of Chester, Leicester, Norfolk, and Derby.<sup>75</sup> After dealing with the uprisings in Normandy, Henry's forces moved against the earl of Leicester at Huntingdon, Hugh Bigod at Bungay and Framlingham, and Roger de Mowbray.<sup>76</sup> The earls of Chester and Leicester were captured and not released until 1177.<sup>77</sup> Prior to the conflict, Earl

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<sup>71</sup> Patterson, pp. 3-4.

<sup>72</sup> D. Crouch, *The English Aristocracy, 1070-1272: A Social Transformation* (London, 2011), pp. 74-5.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 673-7.

<sup>74</sup> 'Nobilis castri Brugensis supra Sabrinum fluvium obsidio, et militis egregii Hugonis de Mortuomari terribili cunctis exemplo ad dedicionem compulsio', Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 31, pp. 216-7; *Battle*, pp. 158-61; Torigni, pp. 184-5, 193, 212, 223, 228, 232, 235-7, 241-2; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 255; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 215; Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 74-5.

<sup>75</sup> Fantosme, lines 193-5 and 1445-78, pp. 220-1, 324-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 366-7, 372; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 45-6, 51-2; Torigni, pp. 257-60; Gerald, *Princes* (eng), 2, 4, p. 16; Gerald, *Princes* (lat), 2, 4, p. 165.

<sup>76</sup> Several of Roger de Mowbray's castles were destroyed including Kinnard (upon surrender), Kirkby Malzeard ('partially dismantled in 1174' and razed in 1176), and Thirsk (1176). Greenway, pp. xxx-i.

<sup>77</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 380-1, 383-4; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 60-1, 64-5; Torigni, p. 265; Gerald, *Princes* (eng), 2, 4, p. 16; Gerald, *Princes* (lat), 2, 4, p. 165.

William of Gloucester had lost possession of Bristol castle, and during the war ousted the royal garrison, but lost it again in 1175.<sup>78</sup> Henry was not spiteful and re-established his relationship with his barons by making peace based on *status quo ante bellum* saying that ‘castles which had been built or fortified during the time of the war, should be reduced to the same state in which they were fifteen days before the war began’.<sup>79</sup> In 1176, royal justices were ordered ‘take precaution that the castles already dismantled are quite dismantled, and that those which are to be dismantled are utterly razed to the ground’.<sup>80</sup> This compulsory demolition confirmed the king’s power and demonstrated the insignificance of barons who rose against him. He removed castles from rebels and loyal supporters alike, including Ongar which belonged to his loyal justiciar Richard de Lucy, in order to demonstrate that all castles, not just rebellious ones, belonged to the king. His actions had ‘put the principle [of rendability] beyond doubt – though not beyond resentment’ as he acquired castles from families that had held them for generations.<sup>81</sup> This was Henry’s way of dealing with his rebellious barons; as the object and tool of their rebellion and their power, castles were targeted and repossessed to reduce the likelihood of future clashes and limiting the number of baronial castles in general.<sup>82</sup>

Henry II faced King Louis VII of France several times and their relationship was a dominating factor in his kingship because of Henry’s marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine

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<sup>78</sup> It is uncertain exactly when Henry took Bristol but, according to Patterson, possibly when, ‘claims of royal jurisdiction over Bristol’s burgesses which appear in the Pipe Rolls almost continuously from 1164/5 onwards mean royal authority over the castle had been established by then’. pp. 3-4; *King’s Works*, vol. 2, pp. 577-81.

<sup>79</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 390; ‘*praecipiens quod castella, quae firmata vel infortiata fuerant tempore guerra, redigerentur in eum statum quo fuerunt quindecim diebus ante guerram*’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 72; White, *Restoration*, pp. 101-2, 216-7; Greenway, pp. xxx-xxxi; Patterson, pp. 3-4.

<sup>80</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 410; ‘*provideant quod castella diruta prorsus diruantur, et diruenda bene prosternuntur*’. Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 91. Kirkby Malzeard and Thirsk as examples. Greenway, pp. xxx-i.

<sup>81</sup> For example, William d’Aumale surrendered Scarborough, King Malcolm surrendered Carlisle, Bamburgh and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and William of Blois surrendered Norwich and Pevensey. Amt, pp. 24-7; White, *Restoration*, pp. 101-2, 216-7; *King’s Works*, vol. 2, p. 554.

<sup>82</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 257-8, 412; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 217-8, and vol. 2, pp. 93-4; Torigni, pp. 206, 209-10; Amt, p. 26; White, *Restoration*, pp. 101-2, 216-7.

(Louis' former queen<sup>83</sup>) and Henry owed homage for his continental territories. The two kings would attack border castles regularly in attempts to gain a little more off their rival with those along the Vexin at the forefront.<sup>84</sup> But Louis also sided with English barons against Henry supplying his enemies with men and money. Henry also faced an invasion from King William of Scotland who attempted to take several Northumbrian castles in 1173/4.<sup>85</sup> He was captured by Henry's men and was forced to sign the treaty of Falaise; in return for his release, he acknowledged Henry as his lord, performed homage, and surrendered several castles his family had received from Henry I, Stephen, and Matilda.

Henry II's sons Henry the Young King and Richard joined forces with the French kings Louis VII and Philip II against their father for the same reasons as many barons in the twelfth century: to gain the power and lordship they thought they deserved.<sup>86</sup> Up until his death in 1183, Young Henry continuously troubled his father spurred on by disgruntled barons (many of whom had lost their castles to the king and wanted their power back) and by the French king. Once Richard became Henry's heir, he felt that he had demonstrated his abilities in his dealings with the turbulent barons in Aquitaine and now deserved to control a greater part of his inheritance, and worried that his father would reduce his authority by giving more power to the youngest brother John. In 1189, he and Phillip II

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<sup>83</sup> *ASC*, E, 202; *GS*, 2, 116, pp. 226-7.

<sup>84</sup> *Draco*, 2, 8 and 10 and 12-15, lines 415-32, 549-614, 675-830, pp. 675, 680-2, 684-90; Torigni, pp. 227, 231-32, 238-39; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 324-5, 383-4; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 282, and vol. 2, pp. 64-5.

<sup>85</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 377-80, 382-4; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 57-60, 63-5; Torigni, p. 264; Fantosme, lines 478-506 and 538-87 and 1344-5 and 1420-37 and 2042-6, pp. 244-7, 250-5, 316-7, 320-3, 372-3; Gerald, *Princes* (eng), 2, 1 and 4 and 30, pp. 12, 16-7, 51; Gerald, *Princes* (lat), 2, 1 and 4 and 30, pp. 156-7, 165, 215.

<sup>86</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 367-8, 370-2, 383-4; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 46-7, 49-51, 64-5; Torigni, p. 259; Gerald, *Princes* (eng), 2, 4, p. 16, and 3, 24-5, pp. 88-9; Gerald, *Princes* (lat), 2, 4, p. 163, and 3, 24-5, pp. 282-3, 286.

attacked Henry's castles in Normandy forcing the issue.<sup>87</sup> It was one of the rare occasions that Henry II surrendered; he retired to Chinon dying on 6 July, 1189.<sup>88</sup>

Henry I and II's power in England came from strong royal government stabilised by sheriffs, justices, and the central administration of the Exchequer; however, it was control of castles which strengthened their royal authority and they present a clear and solid comparison with the turbulent reign of Stephen.<sup>89</sup> The amount of contrasting castle involvement in warfare, politics, and social developments makes these three reigns a useful focus for an effective comparative study. Did the resourcefulness and understanding of the castle change as the strength of royal government fluctuated? Were castles in the Anglo-Norman regnum described or understood differently across these reigns and various stages of conflict? Was any one aspect of the castle considered more dominant in particular situations? Above all, this study will ask how contemporaries described, used, and perceived the castle as a multifunctional resource within warfare, society, politics, economics, and culture to determine if, or how, the contemporary perception of the castle changed with circumstances.

## **Evidence**

This study will use chronicles as the main body of evidence exploiting their narrative to examine the castle within a variety of contexts. However, using chronicles exposes this study to the various faults and limitations intrinsic in these forms of literature. To act as a balance, charters and archaeological reports will be used. Although charters are a type of

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<sup>87</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 2, pp. 86-7; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 343-4; Gerald, *Princes* (eng), 3, 24-5, pp. 88-9; Gerald, *Princes* (lat), 3, 24-5, pp. 282-3, 286.

<sup>88</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 2, pp. 110-1; Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 367.

<sup>89</sup> Amt, p. 113; Green, *Government*, pp. 5, 18, 122-3, 133, 139-40; Brown, *Castles, Conquest & Charters*, pp. 68-9, and *Normans and the Norman Conquest*, pp. 43-5; Chibnall, *Normans*, p. 51.

formulaic rhetoric and can be as biased or fictional as chronicles, they provide a different type of inventiveness in their foundation and function as legal documents and have a claim on precision that chronicles do not offer.<sup>90</sup> Their adherence to legalistic contractual norms meant their purpose was very different to the moral stories at the heart of chronicles. Thus the use of historical narrative, legal rhetoric, and archaeological surveys, will add a multidisciplinary approach and balance this study.

A primary concern of the chronicler was moral ‘edification’ which meant that they were typically more engrossed in ‘the propagation of moral idealism than with a concrete analysis of reality’.<sup>91</sup> Thus, they were not focused on castles as they wrote. The ‘arrest of the bishops’ in June 1139 provides an excellent example because its commentators were interested because of its moral implications.<sup>92</sup> For many chroniclers, the bishops’ castles were a physical manifestation of pride, and we see the dramatic, and even didactic, use of the castle as an image and metaphor for vanity. Like their castles, these bishops believed themselves unassailable, but the chroniclers were quick to show that God would always triumph over sinners and the futility of material power. Bishop Roger of Salisbury was ‘supported by the vast power of his friends and his own magnificent lordship’, expressed through his ‘elaborately’ built castles.<sup>93</sup> According to William of Malmesbury, he wished ‘to seem magnificent in the buildings he erected’.<sup>94</sup> William of Newburgh wrote that he

...built two imposing castles of the costliest workmanship, striving with the utmost vanity that they should have no rival in the kingdom... Alexander [of Lincoln] too being swollen-headed aped his uncle and built two quite notable

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<sup>90</sup> Brown, *Norman Conquest of England*, p. 122.

<sup>91</sup> G.M. Spiegel, *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography* (London, 1997), p. 89.

<sup>92</sup> Background on this event found in chapter 4.

<sup>93</sup> ‘*immensa etiam amicorum et splendidissimi dominatus suffultus potentia... munificentissime*’, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>94</sup> ‘*Rogerus qui aedificiorum constructione magnanimum se uideri uellet, plura*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

castles at prodigious expense.<sup>95</sup>

However, both Roger and Alexander tried to counterbalance their castle construction and erected wondrous ecclesiastical buildings. William of Newburgh continued that,

...since buildings of this type [the castle] seemed inappropriate to the good name of the episcopate, in order to remove the odium attached to such construction and to expunge this blot, he [Alexander] set up the same number of monasteries and filled them with religious communities.<sup>96</sup>

Roger rebuilt ‘the church of Salisbury, and beautified it in such a manner that it yields to none in England, but surpasses many’.<sup>97</sup> Alexander tried to argue that the castles were ‘for the protection...and glorification of his diocese’, but not all believed that.<sup>98</sup> William of Malmesbury wrote that Devizes ‘was erected at great and almost incalculable expense, not, as the prelate himself used to say, for the ornament, but as the real fact is, to the detriment of the church’.<sup>99</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* provided caricatures of Alexander and Nigel of Ely saying that they,

...loved display and were rash in their reckless presumption... disregarding the holy and simple manner of life that befits a Christian priest they devoted themselves so utterly to warfare and the vanities of this world that whenever they attended court by appointment they too aroused general astonishment.<sup>100</sup>

The *Gesta Stephani* blamed their downfall on their pride and recorded that they were

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<sup>95</sup> *duo enim nobilia sumptuosissimo opere castella, scilicet Divisas et Scireburnam, construxit, vanissime satagens ne reciperent comparationem in regno. Qui, cum esset cordis latissimi, avunculum aemulans duo et ipse non ignobilia expensis profusissimis castella exstruxit*, Newburgh (1988), 6, 3, pp. 56-9.

<sup>96</sup> *et quoniam hujusmodi exstructio epsicopalem honestatem minus decere videbatur, ad tollendam illius exstrucitionis invidiam et quasi expiandam maculam, totidem monasteria construens collegiis religiosis implevit*, Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> *Domine, dilexi decorum domus tuae*, Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 408, pp. 736-9.

<sup>98</sup> *ut dicebat, et dignitatem episcopii* Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>99</sup> *si uel castellum recipere posset multis et uix numerabilibus sumptibus, non, ut ipse praesul dictitabat, ad ornamentum, sed, ut se rei ueritas habet, ad ecclesie detrimentum, edificatum*, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9.

<sup>100</sup> *uiri pompatici temeritatisque non audendae praesumptores...puramque et simplicem Christianae religionis conuersationem neglectui habentes, militiae prorsus et pompae seculari studium adeo accommodabant, ut quotiens ex conductu curiae interessent, propter miram, qua undique stipabantur*, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

‘sinners against the pacific office of a bishop and suspected enemies of his [Stephen’s] peace and public order;’ the use of sinner here clearly demonstrated the moral point the author was trying to make.<sup>101</sup> The chroniclers’ description of the bishops after the surrender of their castles further compounds this example. They are ‘humble and downcast and stripped of all their empty and ostentatious splendour, to hold their church property in the simple fashion that befits a churchman’.<sup>102</sup> Nearly all the chroniclers believed that they had received their just dues for their sins of pride and vanity and that this tale should serve as a lesson to all.

The chroniclers’ deeper concern with morality and following rhetorical principles than with establishing a perfect record of historical events, paired with their literary style, produced what modern historians call ‘verbal fictions’. The chroniclers’ attempt to create a realistic style was, in modern eyes, hampered by their desire to include all ‘morally serious’ material including miracles, resurrections, myths, and visions which have been ‘systematically excluded from the precincts of modern historical realism’.<sup>103</sup> Thus, literary accounts of battles or sieges have two main problems with their accuracy. The first is the desire to ‘stir’ their audience and the latter’s expectation to be moved, which sometimes led to ‘exaggeration or distortion’.<sup>104</sup> Secondly, battles and sieges were typically confusing affairs and in order to establish a clear and ‘consecutive story... [chroniclers would] rationalize the irrational... [which meant they] deviate[d] from the exact and too complicated truth’.<sup>105</sup> Consequently, siege and battle accounts were typically ‘dramatized and rationalized’.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> ‘*mansuetudinis transgressores suspectosque pacis suae et regni tranquillandi peruersores*’, Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> ‘*episcopi humiles postmodum et depressi omnemque inanis gloriae pompositatem exuti, ad res ecclesiasticas simpliciter et ecclesiastice possidendas regrediebantur*’, *GS* 1, 36, pp. 78-81.

<sup>103</sup> Gransden, p. xii.

<sup>104</sup> Smail, pp. 165-6.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

But the chronicler did understand the concept of accuracy and repeatedly expressed an aspiration to rely on personal knowledge or first-hand accounts of events to ensure their reliability. However, comments like ‘Woe to Fantosme, if ever you hear me lie!’ were rhetorical literary tropes to establish credibility; the goal of edification was still paramount and expected by their audience.<sup>107</sup> Nevertheless, there was ‘a rudimentary concern for evidence’ which sometimes led to lifting whole sections from the works of preceding and well respected authors; plagiarism was an accepted form of rhetoric to ensure and maintain consistency and accuracy.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, proximity to events did not always guarantee the inclusion of factual elements but they were predisposed to provide more information in their narratives. The dissemination of moral points was crucial regardless of the temporal distance between the event and the writing of the chronicle.

Therefore, the value of chronicles lies not in their factuality; writing history was essential because it addressed ‘contemporary political life’ and established ‘an apparently “factual,” because realistic’ historical account.<sup>109</sup> While chroniclers were aware of their duty to translate and clarify the truth, they remained completely connected to the ‘power structures of their societies’, sometimes omitting, changing, or glossing over events and actions of individuals to fit their ideology and narrative revealing ‘cultural context most vividly at the sites of conflict between ideologies’.<sup>110</sup> Therefore, while historians can expect distortion caused by political bias or literary mode, these alterations are just as valuable because of their connection to and reflections of political and social influences.<sup>111</sup> Within the fiction of a possibly fabricated narration of events, conversations, and chronology, a social reality is discernible. For example, the *Gesta Stephani* was a royalist

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<sup>107</sup> ‘*Dehé ait Fantosme, si jà m’orrez mentir!*’ Fantosme, line 1154, p. 300.

<sup>108</sup> Spiegel, *Past as Text*, pp. 88-9. The similarities in the passages from Henry of Huntingdon and Roger of Howden are a clear example with the latter copying the former.

<sup>109</sup> Gransden, pp. xii-iii.

<sup>110</sup> L. Ashe, *Fiction and History in England, 1066-1200* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 19; Gransden, p. xi.

<sup>111</sup> Gransden, p. xi.

chronicle focused on the acts of Stephen and William of Malmesbury dedicated his work to Robert of Gloucester. While their narrative of events might differ, in conjunction, they offer a more holistic picture including perceptions about castles from both sides of the conflict. For this study, what is recorded is not important for its accuracy, but for perceptions regarding castles.

Spiegel's theory, 'social logic of the text', creates a framework within which the text's ability to reflect and create social realities, as 'both as products of the social world of authors and as textual agents at work in that world', can be accessed.<sup>112</sup> Since

...all texts occupy determinate social spaces... [they] both mirror and generate social realities... [thus] the power of any given set of representations derives in large part from its social context and its relation to the social and political networks in which it is elaborated.<sup>113</sup>

It is unprofitable to draw a distinct line between the supposedly factual and the imaginative. Therefore, while the events recorded in chronicles may be fictitious, the usage of the castle within the narrative, and the inherent perception therein, can be used to help understand the social and political reality of the castle's role. The perception may be formed by the social constructs familiar to the author, who would then, probably unconsciously, express social truths about castles within the narrative. Additionally, the chronicler saw his work as a transparency through which he created 'as direct and vivid an impression of past and present reality as possible' for his audience.<sup>114</sup> If chroniclers wanted to present a realistic past, then castles could be used to create an understandable connection to reality while simultaneously acting as a tool of narration. Chronicles can be used as a medium 'for the expression of fundamental ideas concerning the nature of medieval political reality' enabling this study to exploit these characteristics to analyse such a

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<sup>112</sup> Spiegel, *Past as Text*, pp. xviii, 24-5.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, pp. 24-5.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 101; Smalley, *Historians*, pp. 12-3.

foundational symbol of the medieval world as the castle.<sup>115</sup>

A brief example of this reality can be demonstrated by the *Gesta Stephani* whose anonymous author is well-known for vivid descriptions of warfare, especially sieges. The details in his accounts are remarkable ‘for their factual, realistic elements’ and it has been argued that the author ‘had first-hand information about contemporary campaigns’.<sup>116</sup> His description of the siege at Exeter in 1136 relates that Stephen hired men who had ‘skill in mining underground and ordered them to search into the bowels of the earth with a view to demolishing the wall’, and used ‘engines of different sorts, some rising high in the air, others low on the ground, the former to spy out what was going on in the castle, the latter to shake or undermine the wall’.<sup>117</sup> While this passage does not detail every specific action taken during the course of this long siege, his record of the tactics and engines used is impressive and establishes a clear and recognisable reality of warfare for his audience. This descriptive value of chronicles and their connection to a social and political context, regardless of a fictitious or biased narrative, makes this type of evidence a key element in this research’s pursuit to demonstrate the castle’s multi-dimensional definition during a period of radical and turbulent change.

The number of chronicles or narrative literature produced in the twelfth century was immense and varied. This literature ranged from annals to romances and many provide excellent insights into the contemporary perception of the castle. The majority are monastic authors and tended to focus on their house or order whose involvement in secular issues led to histories which included a wider scope of narrative. Eadmer’s *Historia*

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<sup>115</sup> Spiegel, *Past as Text*, p. 98.

<sup>116</sup> Gransden, p. 191; *GS*, pp. xi-xxxviii.

<sup>117</sup> ‘*aliquando autem ascitis eis, qui massae subterraneae cautius norunt uenas incidere, ad murum diruendum uiscera terrae scrutari praecipere; nonnumquam etiam machinas diuersi generis, alias in altum sublatas, alias humotenus depressas, istas ad inspiciendum quidnam rerum in castello gereretur, illas ad murum quassandum uel subruendum aptare*’, *GS*, 1, 16, pp. 34-5.

*Novorum in Anglia*, written between 1095 and 1123, is primarily a biography of Archbishop Anselm but contains a great deal of national history because of the archbishop's involvement and is essentially a 'history of the church/state relations in England'.<sup>118</sup> The title even 'suggests that Eadmer was more concerned with policies and principles than with the personality of one man'.<sup>119</sup> The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* was continued at the Benedictine abbey of Peterborough during this period and maintained its focus as a 'national history...into which local history is fitted'.<sup>120</sup> John of Worcester's *Chronicon ex Chronicis* translated and then borrowed much from a now lost version of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* and from early in the twelfth century became a first-hand account.<sup>121</sup> Simeon of Durham's *Historia Regum* was a 'collection of historical miscellanea rather than a unitary history' recording up to 1129.<sup>122</sup> Augustinian canon Richard of Hexham's<sup>123</sup> chronicle covered the years 1135-1139 and Cistercian Aelred of Rievaulx<sup>124</sup> wrote his account of the battle of the Standard (1138) between 1155 and 1157 based on Richard of Hexham's account. Robert of Torigni wrote a diplomatic history between 1154 and 1186 of Henry II's continental campaigns and politics.<sup>125</sup> But some monastic chronicles have such a narrow focus that their value is limited, such as the *Chronicle of Battle Abbey*<sup>126</sup> or the *Liber Eliensis*.<sup>127</sup> The latter chronicle, for example, is concerned only with what affects Ely and its greater English context is limited. Even when Bishop Nigel of Ely is involved in direct confrontations with the king, like his

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<sup>118</sup> Eadmer (eng), pp. vii-xiii; Gransden, pp. 136-42.

<sup>119</sup> Eadmer (eng), p. x.

<sup>120</sup> Gransden, pp. 142-3; Brown, *Norman Conquest of England*, p. 51; Smalley, *Historians*, p. 86.

<sup>121</sup> Gransden, pp. 143-8; Brown, *Norman Conquest of England*, pp. 51-2; Worcester, pp. xv-l.

<sup>122</sup> Simeon (lat), pp ix-xlii; Gransden, pp. 148-51.

<sup>123</sup> Hexham (lat), pp. lvi-lviii; Gransden, p. 186; *Chronicles of the North: The Hexham Historians and the Chronicle of Jordan Fantosme*, trans. J. Stevenson (Felinfach, 2000; facsimile of London, 1856), pp. vii-viii; *Contemporary Chronicles of the Middle Ages*, trans. J. Stevenson (Felinfach, 1988), p. 9.

<sup>124</sup> Aelred (lat), pp. lvii-lx; Gransden, pp. 212-8.

<sup>125</sup> Torigni, pp. vii-lxiv; Gransden, pp. 261-3.

<sup>126</sup> Gransden, p. 121.

<sup>127</sup> Brown, *Norman Conquest of England*, p. 118.

relinquishment of the castles of Devizes or Ely, the chronicle only mentions that the king and the bishop were at odds.

There are several authors who have contributed greatly to the writing of history and to the evidential base of this study. These include Henry of Huntingdon (non-monastic), William of Malmesbury, Orderic Vitalis, and William of Newburgh. Henry of Huntingdon began writing his *Historia Anglorum* in 1133 and it covered from 1129 to 1154.<sup>128</sup> Orderic Vitalis wrote the thirteen books of the *Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy* between 1114/5 and 1141 and his Anglo-Norman heritage and Norman monastery influenced his writing and bias providing a view into the evolving cross-channel world.<sup>129</sup> William of Malmesbury contributed two works to this study: the *Gesta Regum Anglorum* (covering from the coming of Saxons to 1120) and the *Historia Novella* (covering 1128-1142).<sup>130</sup> Malmesbury's connection to men like Roger of Salisbury (his abbey was in Roger's diocese and in the shadow of his castle) and Robert of Gloucester (to whom his works were dedicated) connected his work directly with the politics of the age. His closeness with the events is important: the *Historia Novella* from 1140 onwards was written within one or two years of the events, he attended the council of Winchester, gives a fair and detailed account of Stephen's virtues and failures, and he offers a balanced view of Roger of Salisbury 'expressing sorrow at his complete disgrace and miserable end, [while] pointing him out as an example of the mutability of fortune'.<sup>131</sup> Both Orderic and Malmesbury travelled understanding 'that what a historian sees may be as significant as what he reads'.<sup>132</sup> Additionally, and unlike some authors of this period, neither knew how

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<sup>128</sup> Huntingdon, pp. xxiii-cvii; Gransden, pp. 193-200; Kealey, p. 24.

<sup>129</sup> Introductory volume of Chibnall's translation (Orderic, vol. 1) contains an analysis of the entire source and the author. M. Chibnall, 'Orderic Vitalis on Castles', in Liddiard, pp. 121-32; Gransden, pp. 151-63; Smalley, *Historians*, pp. 86-90.

<sup>130</sup> Malmesbury (Rolls), pp. ix-cxlvii; Malmesbury, *HN*, pp. xi-v, xxxviii-xliii; Smalley, *Historians*, pp. 86, 90-2; *Contemporary Chronicles*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>131</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, pp. xii-xiii; Gransden, pp. 166-85.

<sup>132</sup> Gransden, pp. 166-85.

the events they describe ended. Their bias and perceptions were immediately contemporary without the benefit of hindsight.

During Henry II's lifetime, William of Newburgh wrote *Historia Rerum Anglicarum* which covered from the Conquest to 1197 and provided a thoroughly researched piece with including critical thoughts on Thomas Becket and Henry II.<sup>133</sup> However, we also begin to see a different type of writer at this period focused on administrative and secular histories. One such author was Roger of Howden who wrote two pieces: one covering from Bede to 1201 and the other, sometimes attributed to a Benedict of Peterborough, covering 1169-1192. While he used and copied a great deal from Henry of Huntingdon, he was a royal administrator and was interested in king and government and his works included royal letters, text from the Assizes of Northampton, and the Assizes of Arms and the Forest.<sup>134</sup> This pattern manifested in Richard Fitz Neal's *Dialogue of the Exchequer* written between 1174 and 1183,<sup>135</sup> and the account of common law known as *Glanville* written between 1187 and 1189.<sup>136</sup> These authors demonstrate a 'greater concern for and knowledge of legal and constitutional affairs' and a strong interest in the country's administration though not necessarily the politics.<sup>137</sup> Additionally, authors like Gerald of Wales<sup>138</sup> used history to provide evidence for arguments and denote a new historiographical development: 'a heightened perception of reality'.<sup>139</sup>

In stark contrast to these administrative and political histories, romance literature was growing in popularity and a number of writers were patronised by kings and magnates. The romance author's 'object was to entertain, not to record or edify... He loved to describe

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<sup>133</sup> Newburgh, pp. ix-lvii, and 1, pp. 1-19, and 2, pp. 1-13; Gransden, pp. 186, 263-8.

<sup>134</sup> Howden (eng), pp. iii-xii; Gransden, pp. 220-31; Smalley, *Historians*, pp. 113-4.

<sup>135</sup> Richard, son of Nigel, *The Course of the Exchequer* (London, 1950).

<sup>136</sup> Smalley, *Historians*, pp. 113-4; Kealey, p. 42.

<sup>137</sup> Gransden, pp. 219-21.

<sup>138</sup> Gerald, *Princes* (eng), pp. 5-6; Gerald, *Conquest*, pp. xii-xxxiii, 267-84; Gerald, *History*, pp. 11-8.

<sup>139</sup> Gransden, p. 186.

battles and heroism... [and was the] product of the courts and kings and nobles, and often showed the strong influence of courtly culture'.<sup>140</sup> Gaimar (*L'Estoire des Engleis*), Wace (*Roman de Rou*), and Jordan Fantosme wrote during the reign of Henry II with some of their work being commissioned by the king.<sup>141</sup> Fantosme's *Chronique de la Guerre entre les Anglois et les Ecossis* was written in 1174/5 about the Scottish campaign of the Great War and used 'real information about contemporary events, some from personal observation... [and] merely adapted their material to conform to some conventions of romance literature'.<sup>142</sup> The best known romance author from this period was Geoffrey of Monmouth and his *Historia Regum Britanniae* which covered from Creation to the late seventh century. Instead of following standard literary tropes of the period, he fed the appetite of the court and became a 'romance writer masquerading as a historian' and some of his contemporaries condemned him.<sup>143</sup> His biggest critic was William of Newburgh who wrote that Monmouth's history was fiction not fact; Henry of Huntingdon, on the other hand, found him amusing.<sup>144</sup> These types of authors provide courtly perceptions of castles which can balance the work of the more religiously orientated chronicles. However, it is important to note that all of these genres fed and reflected each other and the perceptions that existed within their society.

We have already demonstrated the importance of the *Gesta Stephani* for this study because of its detailed recording of sieges. While the author's identity is not known, modern historians are confident he was not a monk from his lack of preoccupation with a

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Gaimar, pp. ix-lxiii; Gaimar (Rolls), pp. ix-lxiii; Gransden, pp. 209-12; Wace, pp. xi-xlvi; Wrote at Henry II's command: Gransden, p. 219; for more on writers under Henry II see R. Kennedy and S. Meecham-Jones (eds.), *Writers of the Reign of Henry II: Twelve Essays* (New York, 2006).

<sup>142</sup> Gransden, pp. 236-8; Fantosme, pp. lx-lxvi; *Chronicles of the North*, pp. xvii-xviii; *Contemporary Chronicles*, p. 10.

<sup>143</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, trans. L. Thorpe (London, 1966), pp. 9-37; Gransden, pp. 187, 201-8; Kealey, p. 24.

<sup>144</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *History of the Kings of Britain*, p. 17.

religious house or order. Robert, bishop of Bath (1136-66), has been posed as a possibility because of his travels with Stephen throughout the 1140s. The author certainly had first-hand knowledge of many of the events in and around Bath and Bristol and was familiar with Exeter, Plympton, Bampton, Oxford, Winchester, London, and Bedford; based on Bishop Robert's recorded movements, he would have this knowledge. However, this argument does not convince many modern historians because the bishop's exposure to military issues does not seem to match the author's.<sup>145</sup> This work was written in two stages: first in 1148 writing up to 1147 and the rest after 1153. Unlike Malmesbury and Orderic, this author lived to see the outcome of the conflict and, in this second section, had to temper his anti-Angevin comments. While the author demonstrated an interest in and knowledge of warfare, military architecture, and urban sites, his piece also touched on the important ecclesiastical figures of the day suggesting he was familiar with the royal court. With the exception of Orderic, this single source contains more contextualised references to castles than the other chronicles combined. Thus, regardless of its authorship, the extensive narrative of castles, sieges, and the military engagements makes this chronicle invaluable.

## **Theory and Method**

This study requires an open theoretical and methodological approach to examine the castle in its multidimensional context. One methodology that this thesis will employ is the analysis of the perception of the castle. To do this, a variety of methods will be used including the 'mediating force of language' which, 'believing that there is no direct access

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<sup>145</sup> For a far more detailed analysis of the possible authorship of the work and arguments for Bishop Robert's case see *GS*, note on pp. 8-9; Speight, 'Castle Warfare', p. 269; Gransden, p. 189.

to historical events or persons’, considers historical writing from multiple directions; thus, in order to analyse twelfth-century castles, this study will discuss the text of chronicles, archaeological studies, and charters.<sup>146</sup> Also, influential to the method of this study is Spiegel’s argument that ‘a relational reading of the text and context, of overt and suppressed meanings, of implied and articulated purposes... [of] occupying a theoretical “middle ground” and practicing a “mixed” kind of reading’.<sup>147</sup> This includes analysing vocabulary used to describe, explain, discuss, portray, represent, analyse, and even define castles in relation to their social context and dissecting the overt descriptions and articulated opinions of the castle for implied perceptions.

Since chronicles were products of a social environment they reflect a social reality; they are attached to history and separate from it, and this dual nature provides an entwined record of the past.<sup>148</sup> The use of mediation as a reading technique divides this dual nature while simultaneously connecting its features acting as a mediator ‘between two disparate yet analytically relatable domains of inquiry’.<sup>149</sup> It is a perfect method for the literary nature of the chronicles because it requires a ‘relationship’ to be created between the narrative and its social context. This relationship enables a greater understanding of the ‘historical experience’, or perception of the castle, via the ‘linguistic evidence’ concerning it. This is achieved by mediating between the literary perception of the castle in the chronicle and its foundation in social realities. Through these methods, this research will try to connect the castle, and perceptions of it, to its social context in a far more concrete way than previous scholarship.<sup>150</sup>

One might ask why, with such a wealth of scholarship concerning these structures,

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<sup>146</sup> Spiegel, *Past as Text*, pp. xvi-xvii.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, pp. 54-5.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, p. xviii; Ashe, *Fiction and History*, p. 2.

<sup>149</sup> Spiegel, *Past as Text*, p. 49.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid, pp. xviii, 18-9, 49, 54; Ashe, *Fiction and History*, p. 2.

would an analysis of the perception of castles in text, instead of the real fortifications themselves, be of value. The answer is simple: ‘perception and representations of reality are often very different from, and sometimes just as historically important as, reality itself’.<sup>151</sup> Perception may not express a reality but it enables us to analyse how contemporaries viewed their reality. Examining perceptions is a viable route of analysis since they are ‘built into the source material’, and while perception was included in the writing of history, it was not identical to it.<sup>152</sup> Thus, a chronicler could present the location and physicality of a castle and his reader could understand its defensive situation and fortified characteristics, and yet an underlying perception of the castle, which was neither explicitly written nor read, but was understood by both, might have existed. We will see this in more detail in the next chapter when discussing the meaning of ‘fortified’ in the text. Additionally, ‘it is necessary for historians to look at the particular and the individual in order to establish how feasible or valid generalisation might be’.<sup>153</sup> While this creates the possibility of an inestimable number of accounts ‘told about/constructed from/or imposed upon the same past from infinite variety of perspectives’, it also provides an additional layer of analysis: perspective pluralism.<sup>154</sup> However, since a castle had many functions, purposes, and was used differently throughout the twelfth century, multiple perceptions, possibly differing ones, are to be expected and test the validity of the proposed definition.

An additional approach that will be employed is temporal comparison: analysing the perceptions of castles across the reigns of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II. The chronicles

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<sup>151</sup> L. Stone and G.M. Spiegel, ‘History and Post Modernism’, *PP* 135 (1992), p. 190.

<sup>152</sup> P. Magdalino (ed.), *The Perception of the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe* (London, 1992), p. xi; R. McKitterick, *Perceptions of the Past in the Early Middle Ages* (Notre Dame, IN, 2006), p. 2. These publications are important in developing this method, but this research will explore perceptions *in* the past, not perceptions held *of* their past.

<sup>153</sup> McKitterick, *Perceptions*, p. 2.

<sup>154</sup> M. Fulbrook, *Historical Theory* (London, 2002), p. 23.

of Stephen's reign include two from William of Malmesbury, William of Newburgh, Aelred of Rievaulx, the Worcester Chronicle, Richard of Hexham, Orderic Vitalis, Simeon of Durham, and the *Gesta Stephani*. While some of these chronicles contain narratives of other reigns, their attention on Stephen and the violent, and near anarchic, conditions of his reign provide chroniclers with a plethora of moral illustrations for their audience. As a result, these chronicles contain a great number of castle references and detailed context in which this study can operate. While the evidence lends itself to a focus on the reign of Stephen, the narratives of Henry I and II can offer comparative insights. If the narratives of castles during Stephen's reign focus on warfare, then the relative peace and stability of the two Henry's provide narratives which focus on political and social development. On the other hand, if the emphasis on the castle is consistent across these three reigns, then perhaps the circumstances of the context do not affect the perception of the castle. The comparative framework of this thesis enables these issues to be explored.

### **Latin Vocabulary**

One of the difficulties facing castellology is the inconsistency of the chroniclers' Latin vocabulary. Roman legionary camps (*castra*) developed into towns in both Britain and in Gaul; *castrum* came to mean 'very generally a (fortified) settlement' which was 'civilianized'.<sup>155</sup> However, the clarity of classical Latin terms does not apply to much of the medieval period. The medieval Latin for 'castle' could have been several words like *castrum*, *castellum*, *munitio*, and *oppidum* – all of which had different classical meanings –

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<sup>155</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 18, 43. Occasionally, a burh could be called a *castrum* in early medieval documents, so distinguishing between Roman *castra*, burhs, or castles is difficult based on vocabulary. *Castellum* has been described as a fortification with a small 'defensive value' (Stenton, p. 202) or a 'fortified dwelling-house' which came to include the community or village (P.S. Fry, *British Medieval Castles* (Newton Abbot, VT, 1974), p. 11).

and historians are further hindered by the ‘absence of a scholarly consensus on a technical vocabulary’.<sup>156</sup> While historians use these words and translate them as ‘castle’ or ‘fortification’, Bachrach argued that ‘we still lack an understanding of the criteria employed by medieval writers in choosing the terms they used to denote fortifications’.<sup>157</sup> Without a full understanding of the reasoning behind word choice, can we still attempt to discern how contemporaries perceived and defined this structure?

Ademar of Chabannes’ *Chronicon* was analysed by Bachrach with this aim in mind.<sup>158</sup> Ademar was ‘considered... a good and conscientious stylist’ and did not use *castrum* and *castellum* synonymously, nor did he use *burgus*, *munitio*, or *firmitas*; once he ‘described that a particular stronghold was a *castrum*, Ademar use[d] only that term to denote it and no other’.<sup>159</sup> Bachrach was even able to develop an idea of the physical sense of what Ademar meant by *castra*: ‘a hill surrounded by a stone wall and surmounted by a stone tower’.<sup>160</sup> On the other hand, Verbruggen argued that

...early medieval writers were careless or disinterested in technical problems of this kind and used words like *castrum*, *castellum*, and *munitio* interchangeably. Verbruggen found that Ademar was part of this group which lacked a systematic vocabulary for describing military architecture.<sup>161</sup>

However, Bachrach asserts that because Ademar corrected mistakes, ‘he did have some definite idea of what constituted a *castrum* and what constituted a *castellum*, that the two words mean quite different things to him’.<sup>162</sup> If Ademar had a specific distinction in mind concerning *castrum* and *castellum*, as Bachrach suggests, the ‘great diversity of institutions that flourished or dominated at the many fortifications Ademar mentions makes it unlikely

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<sup>156</sup> B.S. Bachrach, *Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusading Europe* (Aldershot, 2002), p. 536.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 531-3, 536.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 539-40.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 549-50.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid*, p. 560.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid*, p. 561.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid*, p. 562.

that his definitions were in their inspiration social, political, economic or a combination of these;’ his perception of differences between these two structures appears to have been physical.<sup>163</sup> However, not all medieval writers were as aware, or considered their vocabulary as carefully, as Ademar. Verbruggen’s choice of ‘careless’ is perhaps too strong, but ‘inconsistent’ is certainly the case for many authors including several in this study.

One chronicler who certainly fits Verbruggen’s argument of synonymous usage was Orderic Vitalis.<sup>164</sup> Orderic used *municipium*<sup>165</sup> which meant ‘town’; *arx* which meant ‘stronghold’<sup>166</sup> or ‘citadel’<sup>167</sup> and from context he used this for both of these structures distinguishing between a tower or keep and the larger fortification or castle; *oppidum* was used for ‘town’<sup>168</sup> or a ‘fortified town’<sup>169</sup> but was also used for non-civic fortifications like ‘fortress’,<sup>170</sup> ‘castle’,<sup>171</sup> ‘stronghold’.<sup>172</sup> He also used the two words most commonly associated castle, *castrum*<sup>173</sup> and *castellum*,<sup>174</sup> which classically meant fortified post, fortified settlement, stronghold, or fortification<sup>175</sup> and fortress.<sup>176</sup> These words are also

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid, p. 566.

<sup>164</sup> Chibnall in Liddiard, pp. 129-30; All English translation options from the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, 2005).

<sup>165</sup> Orderic, 11, 6 and 19-20, pp. 44-5, 80-3, 92-3.

<sup>166</sup> Orderic, 10, 15 and 18, pp. 290-1, 302-7, and 13, 26 and 37 and 43, pp. 466-73, 518-9, 538-45.

<sup>167</sup> Orderic, 10, 18, pp. 302-7, and 11, 45, pp. 182-3, and 12, 1 and 7-8, pp. 188-9, 204-9, and 13, 26 and 32, pp. 466-73, 490-5.

<sup>168</sup> Orderic, 12, 8, pp. 206-9, and 13, 18 and 32 and 41, pp. 444-7, 490-5, 548-51; Similar from Monmouth, 1, 8, lines 466-8, pp. 184-5.

<sup>169</sup> Orderic, 13, 21 and 37, pp. 454-7, 518-9.

<sup>170</sup> Orderic, 11, 10 and 45, pp. 56-7, 182-3, and 13, 18 and 30 and 37 and 40, pp. 444-7, 482-7, 516-9, 530-5.

<sup>171</sup> Orderic, 11, 3 and 12 and 16 and 20, pp. 20-9, 68-9, 76-7, 84-5, and 12, 3 and 13, pp. 190-5, 218-21, and 13, 26 and 36-7 and 40-1, pp. 466-73, 510-21, 530-7; Similar from Monmouth, 1, lines 79-90 and 107-13 and 127-52 and 213-8, pp. 8-17, and 8, lines 513-20, pp. 186-9, and 9, lines 232-4, pp. 204-5.

<sup>172</sup> Orderic, 11, 45, pp. 182-3, and 13, 26 and 30 and 40-1, pp. 466-73, 482-3, 530-5. Also used in reference to Bayeux and Caen: Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 514-7.

<sup>173</sup> Orderic, 11, 2-3 and 19 and 44, pp. 14-5, 20-9, 32-5, 80-3, 176-9, and 12, 1 and 3-4, pp. 184-7, 190-7, and 13, 26-7 and 36, pp. 466-75, 510-5.

<sup>174</sup> Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9, and 12, 1 and 4-5, pp. 188-9, 198-201, and 13, 18, pp. 444-7.

<sup>175</sup> Orderic, 10, 19, pp. 308-9, and 11, 3, pp. 20-9, and 12, 4 and 34, pp. 198-201, 334-7, and 13, 36, pp. 510-5.

<sup>176</sup> Orderic, 12, 13, pp. 218-221.

used to refer to counter- or siege-castles also.<sup>177</sup> The most common word from Orderic was *munitio* which means ‘fortification’<sup>178</sup> but used most often as ‘castle’.<sup>179</sup> In one of his passages, Orderic records that Richard de Lucy was ‘the captain of the knights inside the fortress, defended the castle manfully with the aid of the garrison (*princeps militum in oppido fuit, et cum oppidanis munitionem uiriliter defensauit*).<sup>180</sup> In this passage we have ‘*oppido*’ and ‘*munitionem*’ being defended by the garrison; why the change in vocabulary for the same building? He does not always do this: when describing the rebellion of Shrewsbury against Stephen he says ‘the king captured the castle in a determined assault (*et rex forti assultu munitionem subegit*)... When at last the castle was taken he was captured with a great many others (*Denique capta munitione cum multis aliis ipse comprehensus est*)’.<sup>181</sup> He uses *munitio* every time. In neither case is the vocabulary choice an issue of referring to different castles in one sentence; so why the inconsistency?

Orderic’s contemporaries were also varied in their vocabulary.<sup>182</sup> Henry of Huntingdon predominantly used *castella*<sup>183</sup> and *castra*<sup>184</sup> with *turris* being used to refer to

<sup>177</sup> Orderic, 11, 3 and 20, pp. 20-9, 84-5.

<sup>178</sup> Orderic, 11, 45, pp. 182-3, and 12, 4 and 34, pp. 194-7, 334-7.

<sup>179</sup> Orderic, 10, 19, pp. 308-9, and 11, 3 and 13 and 17 and 22 and 44-5, pp. 20-35, 72-3, 78-81, 94-5, 176-9, 182-3, and 12, 2-4 and 13 and 34, pp. 190-7, 218-221, 334-7, and 13, 18 and 22 and 26 and 30 and 32 and 36-7 and 40-1 and 43, pp. 444-7, 458-9, 466-473, 482-3, 490-5, 510-523, 530-5, 546-551, 538-545.

<sup>180</sup> Orderic, 13, 38, pp. 526-9.

<sup>181</sup> Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 520-3.

<sup>182</sup> In Monmouth, *castrum* is found only two passages. First, during his narration of Brutus; the second during Julius Caesar’s invasion of Britain. In these two passages, *castrum* is used in its classical sense as ‘camp’ and since Geoffrey was dealing with Roman characters and events this was perhaps warranted. Monmouth, ‘they selected the bolder soldiers to guard against any stealthy attack which the enemy might launch on their camp and tents, while the other soldiers were resting, tired by their exertions (*eliebant qui dum ceteri labore fessi quietem caperent soporis castra et tentoria ab hostium furtiua incursion tuerentur*)... Finally he opted for a cunning stratagem, planning to approach the enemy camp at night, slip past the guards and slaughter them as they slept (*Callido deinde usus consilio, proponit castra hostium noctu adire ipsosque soporatos, deceptis eonmdem uigilibus, interficere*)’, 1, lines 107-13 and 127-52, pp. 10-3; ‘Everybody agreed and made for the coast where Caesar had erected his camp and tents (*Assensum igitur praebentes cuncti petierunt littoral quibus Julius castra et tentoria sua erexerat*)’, 4, lines 47-8, pp. 70-1. Gerald of Wales also used *castra* for a military camp: Gerald, *Conquest*, 1, 3 and 13, pp. 32-3, 56-7.

<sup>183</sup> Huntingdon, 7, 24 and 35, pp. 450-1, 470-3, and 10, 4-5 and 7 and 10-1 and 21-3 and 30-2 and 36, pp. 706-13, 718-23, 742-9, 754-61, 768-9.

<sup>184</sup> Huntingdon, 7, 25, pp. 452-5, and 10, 11 and 21 and 23 and 32, pp. 720-3, 742-3, 746-7, 758-61.

the keep at Bristol castle,<sup>185</sup> the keep at the bishop of Winchester's castle,<sup>186</sup> and the Tower of London.<sup>187</sup> William of Newburgh used *castella*,<sup>188</sup> *munitio*,<sup>189</sup> and *castrum*.<sup>190</sup> Gerald of Wales, occasionally used *municipium*<sup>191</sup> but favoured *castrum*.<sup>192</sup> The *Gesta Stephani*, on the other hand, was very consistent in its vocabulary and is almost alone in this trend. His most regular choice was *castella*.<sup>193</sup> His use of *turris* was always in reference to a 'tower'<sup>194</sup> and *munitio* was for 'fortifications' in the general sense of fortified elements of a structure.<sup>195</sup>

Why is there such a difference between, specifically, Orderic and the *Gesta Stephani*? When examining sources at the disposal of these authors, the Bible specifically, a similar linguistic pattern emerges. The medieval castle was not part of the understanding of biblical authors but fortified towns, towers, and other fortifications were. There are fortresses (*arx*) as residences<sup>196</sup> and fortified sites,<sup>197</sup> refuges (also naming God or Jesus

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<sup>185</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 19, pp. 738-41.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 21, pp. 742-3.

<sup>188</sup> Newburgh, 1, 6 and 10-1 and 22, pp. 56-9, 64-5, 68-71, 98-9, and 2, 1 and 3 and 7 and 24 and 28 and 30 and 32-3 and 36-7, pp. 14-5, 18-9, 30-3, 98-101, 116-21, 126-35, 144-5, 150-1.

<sup>189</sup> Newburgh, 1, 6 and 29 and 32, pp. 58-61, 122-5, 130-1. Also used for general fortifications: Newburgh, 1, 10-1 and 13, pp. 64-5, 66-7, 72-3, and 2, 24 and 27-8 and 32 and 37-8, pp. 98-101, 116-25, 132-5, 150-7; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 24 and 27-8 and 32 and 37-8, p. 159, 169-75, 181-3, 194-8.

<sup>190</sup> Newburgh, 1, 8 and 13 and 32, pp. 60-3, 72-5, 32-3, and 2, 2-4 and 18, pp. 16-21, 78-81; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 2-4 and 18, pp. 103-5, 146-7.

<sup>191</sup> Gerald, *Conquest*, 1, 11 and 22-3, pp. 52-3, 80-1, and 2, 15, pp. 168-9.

<sup>192</sup> Gerald, *Conquest*, 1, 22, pp. 78-9, and 2, 17 and 21-22 and 31 and 34 and 36 and 38, pp. 178-9, 190-1, 194-5, 216-7, 232-3, 238-9, 248-9.

<sup>193</sup> *GS*, 1, 4, and 7-12, and 14-27 and 30-2 and 34-9 and 41-5 and 47-54 and 57-8 and 63-4 and 69-73 and 75-8 and 81-91 and 93-7, pp. 8-9, 14-23, 28-59, 64-9, 72-5, 78-119, 126-33, 138-45, 148-57, 160-91, and 2, 103-6, 109-20, pp. 196-205, 208-39.

<sup>194</sup> *GS*, 1, 16 and 23 and 27 and 34 and 37-8 and 50 and 53 and 56, pp. 32-5, 46-51, 56-9, 72-5, 80-3, 104-5, 108-11, 114-5, and 2, 69-70 and 81-2, pp. 138-41, 160-3.

<sup>195</sup> *GS*, 1, 47, pp. 98-101, and 2, 71 and 106, pp. 140-3, 202-5.

<sup>196</sup> 1 Chronicles 11:7 'David then took up residence in the fortress, and so it was called the City of David (*habitavit autem David in arce et idcirco appellata est civitas David*)', All biblical passages taken from the Latin Vulgate from <http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/www/Vulgate/> and English translation options from Bible Gateway accessed from <http://www.biblegateway.com/>.

<sup>197</sup> Samuel 5:7, 9, and 24:7; 1 Chronicles 11:5; Isaiah 23:11, 13-4, and 32:14; Daniel 11:10, 19, 24, 39; Hosea 8:14; Amos 3:11.

as a fortress or refuge),<sup>198</sup> fortifications,<sup>199</sup> strongholds,<sup>200</sup> and towers (as either part of fortification,<sup>201</sup> a citadel,<sup>202</sup> or watchtower<sup>203</sup>) and even as a siege tower.<sup>204</sup> The vocabulary is most often *munitio* meaning these were certainly fortified sites that performed a defensive purpose. If twelfth-century chroniclers were drawing on these biblical authors, then their vocabulary choices for a fortified site like a castle could have been affected by them. However, this only accounts for their use of *munitio*, *turris*, and *arx*, not *castrum*, *castellum*, *oppidum*, *et cetera*. It does not help clarify why there was such a variation.

Most probably, Orderic employed synonyms to enhance rhetoric without a concern for linguistic precision. Chibnall argued that ‘unlike some secular clerks, Orderic was not a domestic chaplain whose life lay inside the castles and fortified dwellings of the nobility’.<sup>205</sup> She continued saying that ‘his vocabulary is not precise enough to be a reliable guide to the nature of the buildings he describes. And frequently he wrote about castles that he himself had never seen or, at best, had viewed only from the outside’.<sup>206</sup> Conversely, the *Gesta Stephani* does appear concerned with linguistic precision and his interest in Stephen’s actions, and the castles besieged during his reign, goes a long way to

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<sup>198</sup> Most often using *munitio*: Psalm 9:9, and 18:2, and 27:1, and 28:7-9, and 31:2-3, and 43:2, and 46:7, and 52:7, and 59:1, 9, and 61: 3, and 62:2, 6, and 71:3, and 91:2, and 144:2; Proverbs 14:26, and 18:10; Isaiah 17:10, and 23:4, and 29:7, and 33:16; Jeremiah 6:5, and 9:21, and 16:19, and 17:27, and 49:27; Daniel 11:7, 31; Hosea 10:14; Amos 6:8; Micah 5:5; Nahum 3:12; Zechariah 9:12; 2 Samuel 22:1, 3; Joel 3:16.

<sup>199</sup> 2 Samuel 20:15.

<sup>200</sup> As *munitio*, *arcem*, and *turris*: Judges 6:2, and 9:46, 49; 1 Samuel 22:4, 5, and 23:14, 19, and 24:22; 2 Samuel 5:17, and 23:14; 1 Chronicles 11:16, and 12:8, 16; Psalm 8:2; Proverbs 21:22; Isaiah 25:2, and 31:9, and 34:13; Jeremiah 48:1, 41, and 51:30, 53; Lamentations 2:2, 5; Ezekiel 19:7, and 24:21, 25, and 33:27; Amos 5:9; Micah 4:8, and 5:11; Zephaniah 3:6; 2 Corinthians 10:4.

<sup>201</sup> As *turris*: 2 Chronicles 14:7, and 26:9-10, 15, and 27:4, and 32:5; Nehemiah 3:25-7; Psalm 48:12; Isaiah 2:15, and 33:18; Ezekiel 26:4, 9; Zephaniah 1:16

<sup>202</sup> As *munitio* and *turris*: Judges 8:9, 17, and 9:46, 49, 51-2; Nehemiah 3:1, 11, and 12:38-9; Jeremiah 31:38; Zechariah 14:10

<sup>203</sup> 2 Kings 9:17; Lamentations 4:17

<sup>204</sup> Isaiah 23:13, and 29:3.

<sup>205</sup> Chibnall in Liddiard, p. 121.

<sup>206</sup> However, what Orderic has in his favour is his contact with those ‘who manned them’ and is therefore, ‘on such topics he is almost unrivalled among his contemporaries’. Ibid, p. 122.

explain this exactness. His attention on sieges and castles probably forced a linguistic precision that was not relevant for other chroniclers. Similarly, charter scribes needed to be more precise and formulaic in the legal jargon of their texts and this is reflected in the precise and consistent use of *castella* and *castra* in the charters of Stephen, Matilda, and Henry Fitz Empress.<sup>207</sup>

Additionally, one needs to examine what ‘castle’ the chronicler is discussing. If we parallel it with the word ‘*ecclesia*’, ambiguity arises. *Ecclesia* could mean a church building, those who serve the church building, the Church hierarchy, or all the faithful. In the same vein, *castella* or *castrum* could mean the castle complex (domestic and storage buildings, keep, walls, and towers), the keep alone (citadel), the garrison (typically referred to as the men of the castle), or the city and castle. This final combination is usually used for general descriptions like ‘the king went to Bristol’ or ‘to Carlisle’. On occasions when the city acted independently or is treated separately to the castle, it is distinguished from it. For example, when Exeter was besieged in 1136, the *civitas* surrenders but the *castellum* held out.<sup>208</sup> This could explain the various terminology employed by the chroniclers as they attempted to differentiate between the various elements like the castle complex or the keep.

In his work on Geoffrey de Mandeville, Round presented another reason for the variations.<sup>209</sup> He argued that there were two possible explanations for the similarities and synonymous usage: that the

...relative importance of the two factors in the fortress may have determined the ultimate function of its style... [or] the older of the two factors may have

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<sup>207</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 3, *castra*: 494 (pp. 184-5), 795 (p. 292), 796 (pp. 292-3); *castella*: 68 (pp. 26-7), 178 (pp. 64-5), 180 (pp. 65-6), 272 (pp. 97-9), 274-6 (pp. 99-103), 282 (p. 105), 309 (p. 111), 314 (p. 119), 387-8 (pp. 149-50), 391 (p. 150), 393-4 (pp. 150-1), 430 (p. 162), 437 (p. 165), 465 (p. 174), 482 (p. 180), 582 (pp. 212-3), 634 (pp. 233-4), 757 (p. 279). Richard Fitz Neal used ‘*castris*’, *Course of the Exchequer*, pp. 20, 89.

<sup>208</sup> *GS*, 1, 15, pp. 30-3.

<sup>209</sup> J.H. Round, *Geoffrey de Mandeville* (London, 1892), pp. 328-46.

given its name to the whole. For sometimes the keep was added to the ‘castle’ and sometimes the ‘castle’ was added to the keep.<sup>210</sup>

He further argued that ‘tower’ and ‘castle’ were considered two distinct concepts but that they ‘coalesced so early that the original distinction between them was already being rapidly forgotten’.<sup>211</sup> From his evidence, he argued that *castrum* and *castellum* meant a ‘fortified enclosure’ and *motte* or *tour* as the central keep; he also admitted that ‘*castellum* continued to be regularly used as descriptive of a fortified enclosure, whether surrounded by walls or earthwork’.<sup>212</sup> The conclusions drawn by this study are similar with any distinction between tower and castle (regardless of the Latin) based on physical description with the tower being inside the castle or incorporated into it. Therefore, a tower could be the keep of a castle or stand for the castle itself.

Unfortunately, this brief analysis poses more questions than answers. One could analyse all the terminology choices of the various twelfth-century chroniclers but that is not the purpose of this study and an explanation for the varied medieval vocabulary for ‘castle’, is not attempted here. What should be noted is that the majority of featured authors vary their vocabulary with what appears to be synonymous usage. However, when attempting to analyse a perception of the castle, this synonymous usage adds further complication. Obviously, context is crucial to determining whether the author meant ‘castle’ by his terminology; thus, the arguments posed by this thesis focus on the context instead on the specific word employed by the chronicler in question.

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid, p. 353.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid, p. 331.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

## Conclusion

The overwhelming trend this thesis has thus far encountered is the ubiquity of castles in medieval life. The traditional definitions which divide the varied functions of castles into isolated niches and create a mentality amongst historians that an individual castle is either strictly social or strictly military is dangerous for scholarship in ignoring the reality of the castle's role in society.<sup>213</sup> The new definition introduced by this thesis aims to combine the castle's functions by asserting that it was at all times a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource. By analysing contemporary chronicled perceptions of the castle from the reigns of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II like the *Gesta Stephani*, Henry of Huntingdon, and William of Malmesbury, this thesis will demonstrate that this tripartite definition not only encompasses and builds on modern and traditional definitions presented above, but also finally realises the multifaceted nature and omnipresence of medieval castles while maintaining a singular collective identity as a signifier of that society.

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<sup>213</sup> Johnson, *Behind the Castle Gate*, p. 10.

# Chapter 1: Fortified

Fortification is one of the oldest and most common phenomena in history; the protection of people, goods, and land was central to the survival of every civilization.<sup>1</sup> In medieval Europe, a new form of fortification evolved distinguished by its architecture, functions, and symbolism. Since their first construction, castles have differed in shape, size, and design but central to each were fortified elements such as walls, ditches, palisades, or towers. These fortification elements, the garrison, and its military resourcefulness separated it from other buildings and were fundamental to its contemporary understanding. This chapter will examine the castle's physical appearance, importance of the garrison, what twelfth-century Anglo-Norman chroniclers meant by the word 'fortified (*munio, firmo*)', and its function as a military resource. Crucially, these elements are inseparable: the military resourcefulness of the castle was the reason why it was fortified and *vice versa*.

One might ask why this chapter is necessary; fortification is an obvious and very visible aspect of the medieval castle. Modern historians like R.A. Brown<sup>2</sup> have published extensively on the subject and its role in warfare has been central to its modern definition for decades and longer.<sup>3</sup> So it surprising that some modern historians, specifically Coulson,

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<sup>1</sup> From Bronze Age forts, Roman walls and legionary forts, Anglo-Saxon burghs, Japanese castles, and communal walls from the grand imperial centres of Babylon and Chinese cities to the small village palisades of European peoples.

<sup>2</sup> Brown, *Architecture*, and *Castles, Conquest & Charters*, and *English Castles*, and *Normans and the Norman Conquest*, and *Origins*, and 'Royal Castle-Building', and 'An Historian's Approach to the Origins of the Castle in England', *AJ* 126 (1969), pp. 131-48, and 'A List of Castles, 1154-1216', *EHR* 74:291 (1959), pp. 249-80, and *The Norman Conquest of England: Sources and Documents* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1995), and 'The Norman Conquest and the Genesis of English Castles', *CG* 3 (1969), pp. 1-14.

<sup>3</sup> Some examples not cited previously include: G.T. Clark, *Mediaeval Military Architecture in England* (2 vols., London, 1884); P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. M. Jones (Oxford, 1984); J. France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300* (London, 1999); C. Gravett, *Medieval Siege Warfare* (Oxford, 1990); M. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965) and (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History* (Oxford, 1999); S. Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings 1066-1135* (Woodbridge, 1994); C. Oman, *Castles* (London, 1926), and *The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515*, ed. J.H. Beeler (Ithica, 1953); M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (London, 1996); R. Rogers, *Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford, 1992); A. Taylor, *Studies in Castles and Castle-Building* (London, 1985); M.W. Thompson, *The Decline of*

disagree or exclude this element in their definition.<sup>4</sup> His work on the castle's social symbolism reacted to Brown's military focus and he was right to emphasise this aspect; however, he has almost completely dismissed its fortified nature. He argues that 'by whatever reckoning, the castle of repute bristling with soldierly virility, was an exception not an institution even in the twelfth century' and that the castle was 'powerful only to the impressionable'.<sup>5</sup> This chapter will argue against such assertions by demonstrating that the fortified nature of the castle was essential to its understanding in the twelfth century and that it was an inescapable reality in what made it a multifunctional resource.

### **The Fortified Elements**

In this section, several factors that made a castle 'fortified (*munio, firmo*)' will be examined including its physical appearance, the garrison, and the process of fortifying a castle. Unfortunately, there are few descriptions of the physical appearance of castles in twelfth-century Anglo-Norman chronicles; therefore, archaeological studies and photographic analysis of the current state of castles will be used when possible or relevant. Additionally, the garrison was rarely described in detail so questions regarding their

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*the Castle* (Cambridge, 1987), and 'The Military Interpretation of Castles', *AJ* 151 (1994), pp. 439-45, and *The Rise of the Castle* (Cambridge, 1991); J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages: from the Eighth Century to 1340*, trans. S. Willard and R.W. Southern (Woodbridge, 1997); P. Warner, *The Medieval Castle: Life in a Fortress in Peace and War* (London, 1971), and *Sieges of the Middle Ages* (London, 1968).

<sup>4</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, and 'Cultural Realities and Reappraisals in English Castle-study', and 'Peaceable Power in English Castles', *ANS* 23 (2001), pp. 69-96, and 'Structural Symbolism in Medieval Castle Architecture', *JBAA* 132 (1979), pp. 73-90, and 'Community and Fortress-Politics in France in the Lull before the Hundred Years War in English Perspective', *NMS* 40 (1996), pp. 80-108, and 'Freedom to Crenellate by Licence – An Historiographical Revision', *NMS* 38 (1994), pp. 86-137, and 'The French Matrix of the Castle-Provisions of the Chester-Leicester *Conventio*', *ANS* 17 (1995), pp. 65-86, and 'Hierarchism in Conventual Crenellation: An Essay in the Sociology and Metaphysics of Medieval Fortification', *MA* 26 (1982), pp. 69-100, and 'Licences to Crenellate', *MA* 26 (1982), p. 162, and 'The Sanctioning of Fortresses in France: "Feudal Anarchy" or Seigneurial Amity?' *NMS* 42 (1998), pp. 38-104.

<sup>5</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 76-7.

composition and number will be hard to answer as well. In this case, evidence from other sources like charters will be employed.

### Architecture

Physical appearance as a fortification concept is straightforward and included the density of the walls, number and location of towers, the makeup and size of the complex, the fabric of construction, and type of perimeter fortification whether man-made or natural. The castle sometimes included a keep, but also the ‘complex’ incorporating walls, gatehouse, towers, and enclosed buildings.<sup>6</sup> The castle’s fortifications, location, construction, and design were influenced by the possessor’s or builder’s requirements, preferences, situation, and geographical considerations across several generations.<sup>7</sup> This produced a variety of styles in terms of strength, location, material, and architectural features. It is important to note that ‘castles’ can include a varied range of scale and design; minor baronial castles and royal castles differ dramatically but, as this thesis will demonstrate, appearance was not central to contemporary understanding what a castle was. Therefore, this study does not discriminate between royal or baronial castles in terms of appearance and engages with a broad range of structures.

To understand the appearance of the typical twelfth-century castle, it is necessary to go back to their introduction in England since many retained their eleventh-century motte-and-bailey design which was commonly employed after the battle of Hastings.<sup>8</sup> This type of castle included a large flat-topped mound of earth (the motte) topped with a, typically

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<sup>6</sup> The identification of a castle complex separates it physically from urban defences although it may incorporate or be incorporated into these as well. The separation between urban defences and castles will be discussed later.

<sup>7</sup> D.J.C. King, *The Castle in England and Wales: An Interpretive History* (London, 1988), p. 42; Bradbury, Stephen, pp. 72-73; Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 17, 81; T.A. Heslop, ‘Orford Castle, Nostalgia and Sophisticated Living’, in Liddiard, pp. 275-6; Brown, ‘Royal Castle-Building’, p. 363. This has even been demonstrated in the construction of Crusader castles. R.C. Smail, ‘Crusaders’ Castles of the Twelfth Century,’ *Cambridge Historical Journal* 10:2 (1951), p. 137; R. Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories* (Cambridge, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> Beeler, *Military Organisation*, p. 136; Bradbury, *Siege*, p. 50; Brown, *Origins*, p. 79.

wooden, tower-keep surrounded by a larger enclosed area (the bailey) which contained structures like domestic buildings and storerooms (Appendix B, figure 1).<sup>9</sup> The motte was usually surrounded by a fosse or moat (dry or wet ditch, Appendix B, figures 2-3) and palisades making it the final refuge during an assault.<sup>10</sup> While only the earthworks remain at Pleshey, it is a good example of the shape of a motte-and-bailey with key elements still distinguishable (Appendix B, figure 4).<sup>11</sup> While there are architectural sub-groups and multiple varieties of design in Conquest castles, including ringworks, the motte-and-bailey was the most common (Appendix B, figure 5).<sup>12</sup> Wood dominated the fabric of the towers and palisades in early construction phases and could be easily replaced or repaired, dependent only on carpentry skills and a ready supply of materials.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, any stone towers constructed on a motte required the earth to settle in order to support the weight, or needed to be built first with the earth then formed around it, both with lengthy build times.<sup>14</sup> The decreasing, though not absent, threat of invasion and rebellion in England during the reigns of William Rufus and Henry I reduced the need for urgent castle-building and the traditional motte-and-bailey was replaced by a stone castle typically through reconstruction.<sup>15</sup> Many castles were only used for a short period of time and were allowed to

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<sup>9</sup> Motte-and-bailey castles were also accompanied by ringwork alternatives which could be filled in to create a motte if needed. The ratio was typically 1 ringwork to around 3.6 mottes. It is unclear why a lord favoured one form over another but 'it seems to have been a matter of mere personal preference'. King, *Castle in England and Wales*, p. 42; Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 72-3; Heslop in Liddiard, pp. 275-6; Brown, *Origins*, p. 79.

<sup>10</sup> Heslop in Liddiard, pp. 275-6; Brown, *Origins*, p. 79; Bradbury, *Stephen*, p. 72.

<sup>11</sup> King's Works, vol. 2, p. 781.

<sup>12</sup> D.J.C. King and L. Alcock, 'Ringworks of England and Wales', *CG* 3 (1969), p. 91; R. Higham, 'Timber Castles – A reassessment', *Fortress* 1 (1989), p. 60; Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 72-3; Brown, *Origins*, p. 79.

<sup>13</sup> King, *Castle in England and Wales*, pp. 42, 62; Higham, 'Timber Castles', p. 60; Brown, *Origins*, p. 79; Bradbury, *Siege*, p. 50; Heslop in Liddiard, pp. 275-6; Bartlett, p. 270. Appendix B, figures 4 and 5 demonstrate how easy and quick this design was to construct.

<sup>14</sup> Clifford Tower at York is an example of a settled motte (Appendix B, figure 6).

<sup>15</sup> DeVries, *Medieval Military Technology*, p. 208; King, *Castle in England and Wales*, p. 62. Brown has argued that the expenditure on the majority of royal castles in this period was to update them from motte-and-bailey designs to stone some with the addition of the stone keep like at Dover. 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 363-4.

fall into ruin. The 500-550 believed to have existed in 1087 and the 250 in 1154 demonstrate the short life-span of some of these castles.<sup>16</sup>

The motte-and-bailey design was less expensive and simpler to build than a stone structure and ‘suited a situation of conquest and emergency;’ the structure could be completed quickly while using the newly conquered populace as a workforce.<sup>17</sup> Eales argued that this design did not come from Normandy, but was developed and ‘in the course of the conquest process’.<sup>18</sup> While this style of fortification was not typically found in Normandy, this might be explained by the geographical differences between the two regions. To increase the fortification of a castle one could elevate its position in the landscape by employing a motte; if a naturally elevated site was available and useful to the intentions of the builder, a motte might not be necessary such as at Corfe and Dover (Appendix B, figures 7 and 8).<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, even the availability of an elevated site might not deter the construction of a motte as at Cambridge where the motte-and-bailey castle was located on the highest hill in the area. However, ‘the physical locations that motte-builders chose were also incredibly varied’, across England, as the above examples demonstrate, and across Europe.<sup>20</sup>

While the motte-and-bailey was common, castles also varied with fashion. As symbols of their possessor’s power and status, castles had to be ‘up to date and impressive: they might improve the motte, add another bailey, or especially change the wooden palisades and keeps for stone ones’ when wealth and circumstance allowed.<sup>21</sup> With the

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<sup>16</sup> Fourquin, p. 90. The short life-span would be further illustrated if Warren’s calculation of the 1,115 constructed during Stephen’s reign was accurate. *Henry II*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>17</sup> J.P. Poly and E. Bournazel, *The Feudal Transformation 900-1200*, trans. C. Higgitt (London, 1991), p. 27; Bradbury, *Stephen*, p. 73; Bartlett, p. 270; King, *Castle in England and Wales*, p. 62; Heslop in Liddiard, pp. 275-6.

<sup>18</sup> R. Eales, ‘Royal Power and Castles in Norman England’, in *The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood III* (Woodbridge, 1986), p. 57. For further argumentation which influenced Eales, see B.K. Davidson, ‘Origins of the Castle in England’, *AJ* 124 (1967), pp. 202-11, and ‘Early Earthworks Castles: A New Model’, *CG* 3 (1969), pp. 37-47.

<sup>19</sup> *King’s Works*, vol. 2, pp. 616-24, 629-41.

<sup>20</sup> Oliver Creighton, *Early European Castles: Aristocracy and Authority AD 800-1200* (Bristol, 2012), pp. 93-4.

<sup>21</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 72-3.

motte-and-bailey and the stone-keep situated side-by-side in the diagram in Appendix B, figure 1, the evolution of one to the other can clearly be seen. Sometimes the motte was topped with the stone keep and the bailey palisades changed to stone walls as at Clifford's Tower (Appendix B, figure 6); other evolutions moved the keep to a new area and ran the walls over the top of the motte as with the twelfth-century alterations at Warwick (Appendix B, figures 9a and 9b). Archaeology has determined that 'the great bulk of castles of the earlier type received their stone defences in the twelfth century;' by 1139, it was rare to construct a new castle that was not predominantly stone.<sup>22</sup> Some, like Tower of London and Rochester (Appendix B, figures 10 and 11), started with a stone keep skipping the wood and earthwork step.<sup>23</sup> These castles were unlike their contemporaries in that they were intended to be permanent from their beginning; their material and style expressed power, status, and control early in the Conquest. The evolution to concentric castles occurred late in the twelfth and throughout the thirteenth century. They were typically new constructions but a second encircling wall could be added to the stone-keep style castle to make it concentric like at Wallingford (Appendix B, figure 12). Beaumaris (Appendix B, figure 13) was one of Edward I's last constructions in 1307 and is a model of concentric castles.

It has been plausibly argued that a return to the quick and simple motte-and-bailey, or similar ringwork constructions, occurred during the turbulence of Stephen's reign when, like during the Conquest, insecurity and violence meant castles were needed immediately.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid; King and Alcock, 'Ringworks of England and Wales', pp. 99-100; King, *Castle in England and Wales*, p. 62. Variations include Richmond which was stone from its beginning, Middleham and Cotherstone which became stone in 1180/90 and 1200 respectively, and the castles at Pickhill and Topcliffe which remained earthworks (without stone) far into the thirteenth century. L. Butler, 'The Origins of the Honour of Richmond and its Castles', in Liddiard, p. 102.

<sup>23</sup> *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 806-14. These castles and the later construction at Orford will be revisited later. For further reading on the design conception of the Tower see Edward Impey, 'The Ancestry of the White Tower', *The White Tower*, ed. Edward Impey (London, 2008).

<sup>24</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, p. 73; C. Coulson, 'The Castles of the Anarchy', in Liddiard, p. 180.

While the number of these constructions is unclear, Warren argued for 1,115.<sup>25</sup> This was later countered by Beeler:

...so far as can now be determined, a large proportion of the 'castles' known to have been erected during this period were hasty improvisations or religious structures diverted to military use. Some...were the hastily repaired strongholds of an earlier day. Other and more regular military works were established as well, and for some of them we have literary evidence. But on the whole, castles attributable to the period 1135-1154 are not numerous.<sup>26</sup>

However, the chroniclers note that new castles were constructed during this period.<sup>27</sup> These include Stephen's own constructions at Wilton,<sup>28</sup> Crowmarsh,<sup>29</sup> and others to control the adherents of Matilda<sup>30</sup> or independent rebellious barons like Hugh Bigod.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, Miles of Gloucester's construction at Cerney,<sup>32</sup> several un-named<sup>33</sup> ones constructed by the earl of Gloucester and his men or those named like Cricklade specifically built by William de Dover<sup>34</sup> and Farringdon built by Robert's son Philip,<sup>35</sup> the Earl of Hereford's construction at Winchcomb,<sup>36</sup> and, finally, those of Earl Ranulf of Chester were specifically noted to have been 'built in haste (*raptim...erigere*)'.<sup>37</sup> While we are not told what materials these castles were made of, their rapid appearance in the landscape suggests they were similar to the wooden motte-and-bailey designs. Stone castles (either refurbished or new constructions) denoted permanency; these lords were perceived of as unable to spend time on long construction projects, demonstrated by their haste, and the motte-and-bailey design

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<sup>25</sup> Warren, *Henry II*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>26</sup> Beeler, 'Castles and Strategy', p. 584.

<sup>27</sup> Further examples include the two castles constructed by Alan, earl of Richmond, against the bishopric of Durham: a motte-and-bailey at Howe Hill to pressure North Allerton, and a ringwork at Hutton Conyers to manipulate Ripon and to 'overawe the archbishop's tenants east of the Urse'. Butler in Liddiard, p. 102.

<sup>28</sup> *GS*, 1, 64, pp. 130-3.

<sup>29</sup> *GS*, 2, 94, pp. 184-5.

<sup>30</sup> *GS*, 2, 84, pp. 164-7.

<sup>31</sup> *GS*, 2, 90, pp. 174-5.

<sup>32</sup> *GS*, 1, 43, pp. 92-5.

<sup>33</sup> Mentioned on several occasions: *GS*, 2, 75 and 85 and 88, pp. 148-51, 166-9, 172-3.

<sup>34</sup> *GS*, 2, 87, pp. 170-1.

<sup>35</sup> *GS*, 2, 93, pp. 180-1.

<sup>36</sup> *GS*, 2, 89, pp. 172-5.

<sup>37</sup> *GS*, 2, 104, pp. 198-201.

suiting their situation. The relative peace and security in Henry II's reign enabled him to construct stone-keeps on pre-existing sites at Scarborough, Newcastle, Bamburgh, Bridgnorth, and Dover, and a completely new castle at Orford. His construction patterns demonstrate the change to stone that began to characterise the twelfth-century castle, but also that the motte-and-bailey design was no longer standard.

Design elements were intended to withstand a siege and these were typically simple and straightforward with little variations based on the personality or circumstances of the owner.<sup>38</sup> The construction of walls, towers, mounds, fosses, moats, palisades, battlements, and gates were used to enhance the defensive ability of a castle.<sup>39</sup> Chroniclers sometimes comment on the advantageous situation of certain castles.<sup>40</sup> Their location also played a decisive role in these fortification considerations: castles like Corfe and Dover benefitted from their elevated location which complicated the employment of engines and mining. However, an elevated position was not the only geographical factor that was important. William of Newburgh recorded that Drax was 'virtually impregnable with its barriers of rivers, forests and marshes'.<sup>41</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* described Bristol as located between two

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<sup>38</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 48.

<sup>39</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, p. 73-74; Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, p. 44.

<sup>40</sup> 'strategically placed (*locis opportunis sita*)' Newburgh, 2, 2, pp. 14-5; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 1, p. 102. 'In the gorge itself, to which one cannot mount without exertion, is situated the royal tower. Below the gorge the town begins, its two flanks fanning out to south and north, and its front facing west. The town is defended at the front by its own wall, and on the east by the castle-rock; moreover. Both its flanks are washed by the sea. The count William earlier mentioned was certainly the most powerful man in Yorkshire, and regarded this site as suitable for the construction of a castle (*In ipsis autem faucibus, ad quas sine labore non ascenditur, turris regia sita est; et sub eisdem faucibus urbis .initium est in austrum et aquilonem utrumque latus spargentis, frontem vero ad occidentem habentis: et a fronte quidem proprio muro, ab oriente vero rupe castelli munitur; porro utrumque ejus latus mari alluitur. Sane hunc locum memoratus comes Wilelmus, cum in Eboracensi provincia plurimum posset, castro construendo idoneum contemplatus, sumptuoso opere naturam juvans, totam rupis planitiem muro amplexus est*)', Newburgh, 2, 3, pp. 18-9; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 3, p. 104. 'either because it was near his own castle and conveniently situated (*uel quia castello suo uicinum erat et commodum*)', *GS*, 1, 51, pp. 104-7. 'which is situated in a delightful spot abounding in resources of every kind, and with the greatest zeal built a castle which was inaccessible because of the barrier of water and marsh on every side (*in loco delizioso totiusque opulentiae abundant sitam, deuenit; castellumque, aquis se et paludibus undique obicientibus, inaccessum feruentissime erexit*)', *GS*, 2, 87, pp. 170-1; 'It was situated beyond Ui Drona in a naturally well protected position (*Inter que super nobilem Berue fluvium a latere Ossirie trans Odranam in loco natura munito Lechlinie castrum erexit*)', Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 21, pp. 190-1.

<sup>41</sup> 'munitionem objectu amnium, silvarum atque paludum fere inaccessibilem', Newburgh, 1, 32, pp. 130-1.

rivers which are affected by a tidal flow (Appendix B, figure 14).<sup>42</sup> While the location of the castle near a forest could provide the besieger with necessary supplies to build engines or mining supports, surrounding fortifications with water like a moat, marshland, or siting it on a river prevented siege towers from reaching the walls and increased the difficulty of mining, if not making it impossible. Water access was crucial for a continuous supply of provisions or even water itself to a castle during a siege and uninterrupted access enabled it to hold out longer. Without water or access to supplies that a river could provide, starvation or thirst forced surrender and there are many examples of this.<sup>43</sup>

But if an excellent location was not enough or the castle was exposed on one side, further fortification elements were needed. We typically see descriptions like that of Winchcomb which ‘rose steeply on a very high mound and was surrounded by impregnable fortifications on every side’, and at Farringdon was ‘a castle strongly fortified by a rampart and stockade’.<sup>44</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* continued its description of Bristol saying that the castle, ‘rising on a vast mound [the motte], strengthened by wall and battlements, towers and divers engines, prevents an enemy’s approach’ on the land or exposed side of the city.<sup>45</sup> Here we are told the fortification elements of the castle include walls, battlements, towers, and ‘divers engines’ or catapults. The author’s detail of these elements of the castle, whose position and fortifications protect the city, substantiates calling Bristol ‘the most strongly fortified’ city in England.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> *GS*, 1, 27, pp. 56-9.

<sup>43</sup> Orderic, 13, 41, pp. 534-7; Fantosme, lines 1570-1601, pp. 334-7; *GS*, 1, 18-9 and 39, pp. 38-43, 84-5.

<sup>44</sup> *GS*, 2, Winchcomb, ‘*reperiensque castellum uallo eminentissimo in praeceps deuexum, insuperabili munitione undique circumcinctum*’, 89, pp. 172-5; Farringdon ‘*castellum in eo uallo et propugnaculis munitissimum erexit*’, 93, pp. 180-1.

<sup>45</sup> ‘*castellum plurimo aggere exaltatum, muro et propugnaculis, turribus et diuersis machinis firmatum, impugnantium coerces accessus*’, *GS*, 1, 27, pp. 56-9.

<sup>46</sup> ‘*omnium ciuitatum Angliae munitissima*’, *Ibid.* Bristol’s value was also based on generated revenue which ‘constituted the largest item in the earls’ income’ and was the ‘caput of the Honour of Gloucester’. Patterson, pp. 3-4.

Excavations at Bristol recorded the keep as 25 feet thick, 60 x 45 feet long with four corner towers the largest of which was ‘five fathoms higher than the other three’ and 6 feet thick; the castle complex’s length was recorded at 180 x 100 yards (Appendix B, figure 14).<sup>47</sup> What now remains is the entrance to the hall and remnants of curtain wall. Excavations in the 1970s gave rise to several conclusions about the development of the castle: it was first a ‘ring-ditch and bank, succeeded by a motte using the ring-work as a bailey’, later the ‘motte was possibly surmounted by a stone tower’, the ‘east gate was partially constructed with the ring-work, becoming more complicated during the [twelfth century] but beginning as a simple gap with postern’.<sup>48</sup> The twelfth-century alterations included the ‘destruction of the motte and its tower’ to make way for the keep and filling in part of the surrounding ditch, a barbican wall, the expansion of the south-west gate, and the construction of the west and north-east walls all possibly completed by Robert of Gloucester.<sup>49</sup> It is difficult if not impossible to know if this was the most highly fortified city in England but the castle’s fortifications were impressive.

Another common expression favoured by almost all the chroniclers was ‘impregnable fortified (typically *inexpugnabili munitione* or *inexpugnabili firmaviti*)’. Unfortunately, it is meaningless because it provides no clarification of a castle’s fortifications; only a few examples are needed to demonstrate its vagueness.<sup>50</sup> Simeon of Durham wrote that Henry I allowed some castles to remain ‘impregnable (*inexpugnabiles*)’ after Waleran’s rebellion, but in this case, all that is discernable is that he allowed them to remain instead of destroying them.<sup>51</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that Richard Fitz

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<sup>47</sup> M.W. Ponsford, *Bristol Castle: A Short Summary of the Recent Excavations* (Bristol, 1972), pp. 1-2.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Additional occurrences: Orderic, vol. 5, 10, 18, pp. 302-7; Malmesbury, *HN*, 520, pp. 73-4; Newburgh, 1, 29 and 32, pp. 124-5, pp. 130-1; *GS*, 1, 21 and 30 and 33 and 37 and 42-3 and 47 and 63, pp. 44-5, 64-7, 70-1, 80-3, 90-5, 98-101, 126-7, and 2, 70-1 and 81 and 89 and 106, pp. 140-3, 160-1, 172-5, 202-5; Huntingdon, 10, 11 and 24 and 31, pp. 720-3, 748-9, 756-9.

<sup>51</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; Simeon (lat), 209, pp. 273-4.

Gilbert's wife took refuge in one of his most 'impregably fortified (*inexpugnabili munitione uallatum*)' castles; apart from recording that the castle was closely besieged 'by the enemy in great force (*ambientibus eam cum plurimo suo collegio inimicis*)' and did not fall, no other clarification or description of the fortification is given.<sup>52</sup> Since the castle held out against a great force long enough to enable a rescue, 'impregably fortified' seems an accurate description if not a very clear one. However, castles that survived sieges may not have been 'impregnable', but simply assaulted by a weak or under-prepared force without adequate siege engines or contained by an ineffective blockade.<sup>53</sup> On the other hand, several 'impregnable' castles were captured. Robert Fitz Harold's castle was 'impregably fortified (*inexpugnabiliter firmauit*)' and 'garrisoned...with men prepared for any fate (*hominibusque in eo ad omnem sortem paratis diligenter expositis*);' however, his Welsh enemies were either too well-prepared, or his castle too ill-prepared, and it was forced to surrender. There is no description of the Welsh army or the castle to help form an impression of the fortifications but this 'impregably fortified' castle, clearly was not.<sup>54</sup> This begs the question: how literal was this phrase? It could be nothing more than an archetypal description without any qualitative measure; it is used so often without context or detail that it provides no additional information.

The chroniclers also made qualitative judgements on the fortifications: John of Marlborough's castles were described as 'designed with wondrous skill'.<sup>55</sup> However, it is impossible to infer what type, to what extent, and, specifically, how castles were fortified based on this type of narrative; we lack descriptions like the number of towers or gatehouses or the extent and depth of the walls. But why is there a lack of detail? The most plausible

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<sup>52</sup> *GS*, 1, 9, pp. 16-9.

<sup>53</sup> R. Liddiard, *Castles in Context: Power, Symbolism and Landscape, 1066-1500* (Macclesfield, 2005), pp. 84-9.

<sup>54</sup> *GS*, 1, 11, pp. 20-1.

<sup>55</sup> '*castella miri artificii*', *GS*, 2, 85, pp. 166-9; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 734-8.

reason is that the chroniclers' audience did not need to know the depth of the walls, the number of portcullises, the height and shape of the towers, or possibly even the situation of the castle itself. Regardless of whether they were familiar with the specific castle being discussed, they were familiar with the silhouette of a castle and the provided descriptions enabled them to alter their archetype to imagine the castle in question. If the audience was told that Pevensey had a 'very lofty mound, fortified on every side by a most beautiful wall, fenced impregnably by the washing waves of the sea, almost inaccessible owing to the difficulty of the ground', they could imagine a castle with a mound, surrounded by a wall, near the sea.<sup>56</sup> They did not need any additional detail about the towers, gatehouses, or the wall, assuming they matched the standard design. These descriptions set the scene for the chronicler's narrative and he relied on the audience's imagination and knowledge of castles to fill in the gaps.

Unfortunately, we do not have this luxury; unlike the chroniclers' audience, castles, specifically in their twelfth-century form, are no longer part of our world. We have their physical remains or modified forms from later centuries but we are not as familiar with a twelfth-century castle as a medieval audience. Even more difficult for this study, some castles have no remaining physical presence, even modified ones, and we lack archaeological evidence for many making establishing exactly what a twelfth-century castle looked like very difficult.<sup>57</sup> Archaeological excavations can provide some information as to

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<sup>56</sup> *'castellum editissimo aggere sublatum, muro uenustissimo undique praemunitum, gurgite marino abludente inexpugnabiliter uallatum, loci difficultate paene inaccessum'*, *GS*, 2, 106, pp. 202-5.

<sup>57</sup> For archaeological surveys on specific castles see: 'Five Castle Excavations', p. 2; N.W. Alcock, and R.J. Buckley, 'Leicester Castle: The Great Hall', *MA* 31 (1957), pp. 73-9; T. Darvill, 'Excavations on the Site of the Early Norman Castle at Gloucester, 1983-84', *MA* 32 (1988), pp. 1-49; P.L. Drewett and D.J. Freke, 'The Great Hall at Bolingbroke Castle, Lincolnshire', *MA* 18 (1974), pp. 163-5; K.W.B. Lightfoot, 'Romney Castle, a Ringwork and Manorial Centre in South Glamorgan', *MA* 36 (1964), pp. 96-163, and 'Three Urban Castles and their Communities in the East Midlands: Lincoln, Nottingham and Newark', *CG* 22 (2006), pp. 259-65; D.F. Renn, 'The Keep of Wareham Castle', *MA* 4 (1960), pp. 56-68; N. Riall, 'The New Castles of Henry de Blois as Bishop of Winchester: The Case against Farnham, Surrey', *MA* 47 (2003), pp. 115-29; Royal Commission on Historical Monuments (England), 'Excavations in the West Bailey at Corfe Castle', *MA* 4 (1960), pp. 29-55; A. Saunders, 'Lydford Castle, Devon', *MA* 24 (1980), pp. 123-86; D. Stocker and A. Vince, 'The Early Norman Castle at Lincoln and a Re-evaluation of the Original

the layout and construction of these castles. Fortunately, several castles still have much of their twelfth-century form and can be studied alongside chronicled descriptions to come to grips with their perceived physical appearance. To demonstrate, Winchester and Lincoln will be examined.

All that remains of the once important royal castle at Winchester is the hall; the rest of the castle complex has been covered over by modern constructions. Fortunately, archaeological excavations, published by Biddle in 1976, provide some information on its medieval state. It was begun in the winter of 1066/7 and incorporated much of the Roman defences including the town wall which formed its perimeter to the north, west, and south while a new earthwork covered the east side (Appendix B, figures 15a and b).<sup>58</sup> While there is little written documentation, streets and buildings found underneath the Norman fortifications mean that Anglo-Saxon homes and structures were destroyed to make way.<sup>59</sup> It is still unclear whether the motte situated at the southern end of the castle was part of the original design but there was a 'apsidal stone chapel' in the northern section built directly after 1067 and can be identified through 'the quality of the masonry, the presence of internal wall-paintings, and the use of coloured glass in the windows', with the *capella regia* mentioned in 1072, and the location of a council to discuss the archiepiscopal primacy.<sup>60</sup> The open plan of the northern section was 'strengthened by the construction of an earthen platform revetted by timber to the west and south' which was eventually replaced, most

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West Tower of Lincoln Cathedral', *MA* 41 (1997), pp. 223-33; A. Taylor, 'White Castle in the Thirteenth Century: A Reconsideration', *MA* 5 (1961), pp. 169-75; C.P.E. Taylor, and R. Wilson-North, 'Bodiam Castle, Sussex', *MA* 34 (1990), pp. 155-7; P.S. Wood, 'Geophysical Survey at Bamburgh Castle, Northumberland', *MA* 49 (2005), pp. 305-10; M.W. Thompson, 'Recent Excavations in the Keep of Farnham Castle, Surrey', *MA* 4 (1960), pp. 81-99 and 'The Origins of Bolingbroke Castle, Lincolnshire', *MA* 10 (1966), pp. 152-8 and 'Further Work at Bolingbroke Castle, Lincolnshire', *MA* 13 (1969), pp. 216-7 and 'Further Work at Conisbrough Castle, Yorkshire', *MA* 13 (1969), pp. 215-6 and 'Kenilworth Castle Since 1962', *MA* 13 (1969), pp. 218-220.

<sup>58</sup> Biddle, p. 302-3.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 303, 470.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*.

possibly by Henry I, by ‘an immense stone keep, [and] the chapel suppressed’.<sup>61</sup> From this, the twelfth-century Winchester Castle included a stone-keep encircled mostly by the town wall and earthworks.

Winchester Castle was the location of the most important and largest royal treasury during this period making it a major resource in the interregnum power struggles particularly between Stephen and Matilda.<sup>62</sup> When the *Gesta Stephani* recorded Stephen’s success in gaining possession in 1135, there is no mention of the castle’s fortifications.<sup>63</sup> Additionally, no other chronicler takes the time to describe the physicality of this castle when it is attacked by Matilda in 1141; it is simply mentioned as the location of important events or the target of one party or another.<sup>64</sup>

At Lincoln (Appendix B, figure 16), excavations and archaeological surveys have determined that the first castle on the site was started in the early twelfth century.<sup>65</sup> The east and west gates (bottom and top of picture respectively) were Norman with the west gate ‘sufficiently well-preserved to allow it to be dated to c. 1100’.<sup>66</sup> Additionally, the ‘herringbone work in the western face of the curtain wall’ and in some places of at the western ends of the north and south faces of the wall could indicate that both the wall, and the bank it was built on, are of a similar date.<sup>67</sup> The bank formed a continuous embankment and ditch which enclosed a polygonal bailey on the northeast side of the motte.<sup>68</sup> This

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 304.

<sup>62</sup> *King’s Works*, vol. 2, pp. 854-5; Biddle, pp. 290-1. When Henry I raced to Winchester in 1100 to take possession of the treasury, no fortification is mentioned. Orderic, 10, 15, pp. 290-1.

<sup>63</sup> *GS*, 1, 4, pp. 8-9.

<sup>64</sup> Some examples mentioning Winchester Castle when Matilda is in possession but with no fortification descriptions : Torigni, pp. 141-2 ; Worcester, pp. 298-303; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 245; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 204-5; Orderic, 10, 15, pp. 290-1; *GS*, 1, 3 and 63-4, pp. 8-9, 126-33; *ASC*, E, p. 201; Malmesbury, *HN*, 499, p. 58. Even in the eleventh century and up to 1155, there is ‘virtually no documentary evidence relating either to the topography of the castle’, and the Pipe Rolls demonstrate construction on parts of the castle nearly every year. Biddle, pp. 302-3.

<sup>65</sup> Stocker and Vince, ‘The Early Norman Castle at Lincoln’, p. 224.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

evidence suggests that the majority of the castle was constructed by the de la Haye family who were hereditary constables during the reign of Henry I.<sup>69</sup> From 1129 to 1136, one of the towers, which one is still unknown but it was either in the southeast on a new motte (square tower with turret in bottom-left) or in the southwest on a pre-existing motte (rounded tower in middle-left), was raised by Countess Lucy whose son Ranulf, earl of Chester, is probably responsible for the second one.<sup>70</sup> From this survey we can describe the twelfth-century castle at Lincoln as containing two mottes both with towers in the southeast and southwest corners; as having an encompassing ditch and wall with east and west facing gates. For its day, it was strongly fortified.

Lincoln was the focal point for a great siege and subsequent battle in 1141 so there are several passages which mention this castle. Ranulf of Chester claimed the castle for himself and King Stephen responded with a siege, resulting in the battle of Lincoln.<sup>71</sup> Later in 1143/4, Stephen tried again to remove it from Ranulf's possession.<sup>72</sup> Unfortunately, we are not provided with a single description of this castle at any point in these passages. It is reasonable that the importance of the castle in the resulting events of the period meant that a description was not needed for the chroniclers' audience. However, if we examine the tactics used by Ranulf and Stephen to gain the castle, we can see how their actions and the chroniclers' descriptions fit with its fortification. We are told that Ranulf gained Lincoln 'with the greatest secrecy',<sup>73</sup> 'guile',<sup>74</sup> and 'deceit'.<sup>75</sup> With encompassing stone walls, possibly two motted-towers, and two gatehouses, stealth was potentially the easiest method

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<sup>69</sup> *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 704-5.

<sup>70</sup> Dalton, 'In Neutro Latere', pp. 39-60, and 'Allegiance and Intelligence in King Stephen's Reign', in Dalton and White, pp. 88-90; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 704-5.

<sup>71</sup> LE (eng), 3, 72, p. 395; LE (lat), 3, 72, p. 320; Worcester, pp. 292-3; Orderic, 13, 43, pp. 538-45; Torigni, pp. 139-40; Huntingdon, 10, 13, p. 724-5; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 224-41; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 199; ASC, E, p. 201; Malmesbury, *HN*, 487, pp. 46-7; Newburgh, 1, 8, pp. 60-3; *GS*, 1, 54, pp. 110-5.

<sup>72</sup> Torigni, p. 146; Huntingdon, 10, 22, p. 744-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 246-7; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 207; Newburgh, 1, 13, pp. 72-3.

<sup>73</sup> 'occultissime', Malmesbury, *HN*, 487, pp. 46-7.

<sup>74</sup> 'dolo', Newburgh, 1, 8, pp. 60-3.

<sup>75</sup> 'fraudulenter', Huntingdon, 10, 13, p. 724-5.

of gaining possession. Unable to repeat the feat, Stephen arrived with ‘catapults and other siege engines of different sorts’.<sup>76</sup> In 1143, he began to construct a siege-castle which was abandoned because of attacks from the garrison.<sup>77</sup> While the chroniclers do not describe Lincoln’s physical appearance, the actions of the characters and the mention of siege-engines was enough to establish the level of fortification for an audience. Without any description or remains, we are still able to form a basic understanding of a castle’s physical appearance as well as its strength and importance from the chroniclers’ narrative.

### Garrison

All descriptions of the castle thus far have been of walls, natural defences, or earthworks but they all have one thing in common: they are static. Even among his arguments against the military role of the castle, Coulson plausibly argued that “‘garrisoning’ and castle-guard bear the burden of vindicating the military image’.<sup>78</sup> While maintaining that the castle’s ‘primary purpose was military’, Pounds said that in order to fulfil this function a ‘castle, garrisoned with mounted soldiers, was a prerequisite’.<sup>79</sup> Bartlett contended that because of the garrison, ‘a campaign in an encastellated landscape was fundamentally different from one in an uncastellated terrain;’ the active and mobile force of the garrison, the threat it posed, and the activities it could perform meant it could not be ignored.<sup>80</sup> The effectiveness of the castle as a resource was dependent on the garrison; it was the only way of exerting the military strength symbolised by the castle.

It has been plausibly argued that before the twelfth century, and possibly even by the tenth on the continent, all castles were garrisoned in some form; however, this process,

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<sup>76</sup> ‘*quique includebantur balistis et aliis diuersi studii machinis grauissime infestante*’, *GS*, 1, 54, pp. 110-5.

<sup>77</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 22, p. 744-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 246-7; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 207; Newburgh, 1, 13, pp. 72-3.

<sup>78</sup> Coulson, ‘Peaceable Power’, pp. 76-7.

<sup>79</sup> Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, p. 44.

<sup>80</sup> Bartlett, pp. 281-2.

where the men came from, how long they remained, duties performed, payment, and what the garrison composed of are all still unclear to historians because of a lack of detailed and wide-ranging evidence.<sup>81</sup> Smail argued that any form of levy would have been ‘unsuitable for normal requirements since it produced troops who were possibly to be inexperienced and ill-equipped’.<sup>82</sup> While these men were possibly useful in an emergency, they were more effective in ‘raiding and private warfare’ not ‘protracted campaigns’.<sup>83</sup> Painter argued that ‘except in the case of castles supported by very large baronies these services [levies], even if exacted every year, could furnish only an insignificant permanent garrison’.<sup>84</sup> The existence of a levy for castle guard is now doubted by historians, but there was an expectation of service from all who held land, including religious establishments. Evidence of castle-guard is most commonly found in charters when they are transferred or when monasteries, abbeys, or churches are exempted. For example, in 1103, ‘Osbert the monk and the abbey of Tavistock be quit of castle-ward of Exeter for one knight’;<sup>85</sup> in 1130 Henry I ‘quitclaimed [Bishop] Hervey of Ely and his successors the castle-ward that they used to do at Norwich, and all other services, &c., that they used to do in respect of the said castle’ and moved the service to Ely;<sup>86</sup> the abbot of St. Edmund’s Abbey ‘to perform his castle-guard [of forty knights] at Bury St. Edmunds instead of at Norwich’;<sup>87</sup> and granted Bishop Alexander of Lincoln ‘the entire third part of the service of his knights belonging to the bishopric of Lincoln so that he may assign it to his castle of Newark and that thenceforward they may

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<sup>81</sup> Poly and Bournazel, *Feudal Transformation*, p. 28; Reynolds, pp. 170, 469-70; Prestwich, pp. 92-5.

<sup>82</sup> Smail, p. 97.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Painter, pp. 145-6.

<sup>85</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 2, 649, p. 33.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 1656, p. 241.

<sup>87</sup> ‘*quietem clamavi in sempiternum deo et Sancto AEdmundo et ecclesie sue et abbati et monachis ibidem deo servientibus wardam xl militum quam facere solebant [ad] castellum meum de Norwico per iiii terminus in anno per decenos milites singulis terminos residentes et preterea quicquam ecclesia prefata vigilibus predicti castelli dare solebat per annum pro warda ejusdem castelli. Et ita quod hanc eandem wardam facient apud Sanctum AEdmundum ad eosdem terminus sicut faciebant apud Norwic(um)*’, *Regesta*, vol. 3, 757, p. 279. According to Prestwich, there was no castle at Bury and it is conceivable that Stephen ‘was making a grant – or sale – of rents than that the abbot was seriously expected to require such of his tenants as Hugh Bigod to produce a guard outside the abbey’s gates’. p. 94.

keep guard there and do the other services which they owe to the [bishop] as he has disposed'.<sup>88</sup>

It is crucial to note that our knowledge of baronial practices is limited or obscured by the lack of documentation, and because of the variety of castles and circumstances, garrison provisions were typically local concerns without a universal pattern of operation.<sup>89</sup> A possible reason for this was presented by Stenton: '[t]he Norman kings insisted that no castle should be built without their license, but they were not concerned with the arrangements which their barons might make for the garrisoning of their lawful castles'.<sup>90</sup> For baronial castles, the best evidence comes from Richmond in Yorkshire. In the twelfth century, the knights of this lordship, comprised of 199 manors, were,

...organised into six groups, who each provided guard for two months. Each group answered for between twenty-two and thirty knights' service, which would be the nominal strength of the castle garrison. The lands that contributed this knight service were by no means all in Yorkshire, but were drawn widely from the North and East Midlands, and even Herefordshire.<sup>91</sup>

According to Crouch it is difficult to know if Richmond was exemplary but there were some variations to other known castle-guard arrangements. Richmond's period of service was two months, while forty days were served at Briouze in Brecon and the castles of the earl of Gloucester during the reign of Henry II.<sup>92</sup> Additionally, Crouch argued that large honours might have 'subtenanted knights' on castle-guard as at Weston Turville (Bucks) or Brandon (Warks).<sup>93</sup> In the 1130 Pipe Roll, there is evidence of the garrisoning at Roger de Mowbray's castle at Burton in Lonsdale: 'consisting of a knight, paid 8d. a day, and ten

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<sup>88</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 2, 1791, p. 268.

<sup>89</sup> Reynolds, pp. 170, 362-3; Prestwich, pp. 92-5, 123.

<sup>90</sup> Stenton, p. 207.

<sup>91</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, p. 24.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

sergeants, a porter, and a watchman, each paid 1/2d. a day'.<sup>94</sup> At Richmond, by the end of the twelfth century, £21 1s. 2d. per annum was paid to the earl instead of physical service, and presumably being 'spent on hiring soldiers with few outside commitments to interfere with their willingness to do service'.<sup>95</sup>

Prestwich argued that if royal garrisons consisted of 'tenants-in-chief and their knights performing their due service, then indeed the monarchy must have depended on the loyalty of these men'.<sup>96</sup> However, the extent to which castle-guard was personally fulfilled is unknown, and there may be little documentation to answer this question.<sup>97</sup> Additionally, how long these arrangements for physical service lasted depended on the frequency of military activity and many began to commute the service for payments.<sup>98</sup> Reynolds has argued that there is no 'hard evidence about the period of service required by custom in the twelfth century', and it is also unclear 'how soon the king's tenants in chief were regularly allowed to pay rather than serve'.<sup>99</sup> She argued that by the thirteenth century, 'personal service was... more an obligation of social and political status than anything else'.<sup>100</sup> In article twenty-nine of the Magna Carta, we see that by the thirteenth century, castle-service was viewed by the barons as an 'alternative rather than an addition to regular service in the host'.<sup>101</sup> According to Crouch, the barons 'reminded the king that it was still possible that a

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<sup>94</sup> Greenway, pp. lix-lxii; *Magnus Rotulus Scaccarii, 31 Henry I*, ed. J. Hunter (London: Records Commission, 1833), pp. 137-8.

<sup>95</sup> Painter, p. 146. Crouch argued that 'Most knights, especially the landless ones deriving from landholding families, served for other rewards: bed, board, equipment and cash. This sort would have been more useful to lords than those knights holding land by military tenure. Retained knights (*mercenarii, stipendarii* or *soldeiers*) were flexible in their service and had no outside demands on their time. The limiting factor in their recruitment was their not inconsiderable expense to their employers'. *English Aristocracy*, p. 4.

<sup>96</sup> Prestwich, p. 93 and 'War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State', *TRHS* 5:4 (1954), pp. 22-3.

<sup>97</sup> Smail, p. 97; Prestwich, 'War and Finance', p. 43; Reynolds, p. 170, 362-3.

<sup>98</sup> Reynolds, pp. 362-3.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Painter in Liddiard, p. 206. Article 29: 'No constable is to compel any knight to give money for castle guard, if he is willing to perform that guard in his own person or by another reliable man, if for some good reason he is unable to do it himself; and if we take or send him on military service, he shall be excused the guard in proportion to the period of his service. (*Nullus constabularius distringat aliquem militem ad dandum denarios pro custodia castris, si facere voluerit custodiam illam in propria persona sua, vel per alium probum hominem, si ipse eam facere non possit propter rationabilem causam; et si nos duxerimus*

man might exercise the option to perform his period of guard, or delegate it to a capable substitute of his own choice, in which case no one ought to be automatically assumed to want to pay to be rid of the duty'.<sup>102</sup> Holt argued that the article meant that those who owed service could not be forced to pay it in cash if they were willing to perform it personally; on the other hand, this 'scarcely halted the general process towards commutation'.<sup>103</sup>

Royal records demonstrate a preference for mercenary or non-tenured soldiers specifically in wartime and royal castles could be strengthened by 'combining the service due from a number of baronies'.<sup>104</sup> These troops were typically veterans, well-armed, and remained as long as they received or had the prospect of payment.<sup>105</sup> The popularity of these troops, in general or as garrisons, is demonstrated by the influx of Flemings in Stephen's reign and the 'brabanters' of Henry II's.<sup>106</sup> During the rebellion in Normandy in 1118, Green argued that,

...the scale and duration of Henry [I]'s difficulties...were such as to require a substantial military commitment. Henry relied heavily on mercenaries and household troops, perhaps in part because it would have been difficult to be too exacting in demands for military service from Normandy.<sup>107</sup>

If Henry I was unable to rely on tenured troops from his barons to garrison his castles, then mercenaries were a more reliable choice. While we have only one complete Pipe Roll for Henry I and none for Stephen, those of Henry II, particularly during the revolt of 1173-4, demonstrate that war was expensive.<sup>108</sup> In an entry in the 1155 Pipe Roll, there are

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*vel miserimus eum in exercitum, erit quietus de custodia, secundum quantitatem temporis quo per nos fuerit in exercitu.*' J.C. Holt, *Magna Carta* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 324-5.

<sup>102</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, p. 24; Prestwich, p. 95.

<sup>103</sup> Holt, *Magna Carta*, p. 217.

<sup>104</sup> Painter, p. 146.

<sup>105</sup> Painter in Liddiard, p. 206.

<sup>106</sup> Chibnall, *Empress Matilda*, p. 88; 'brabancons' Strickland, pp. 244-5; Prestwich, p. 25. 'brabancons or routiers' J. Gillingham, *The Angevin Empire* (London, 2001), p. 34.

<sup>107</sup> Green, *Government*, p. 17; The severity of Henry I's finances: Prestwich, p. 119, and 'War and Finance', p. 23.

<sup>108</sup> H. Thomas, 'Violent Disorder in King Stephen's England', in Dalton and White, p. 147; Prestwich, 'War and Finance', p. 19.

‘payments of over £150 for knights left in the castle of Worcester after Stephen’s death’ which illustrates the cost of one castle garrison.<sup>109</sup> But troop payment could be problematic; Smail argued that to maintain a strong force for an extended period of time was ‘too severe a strain on the rudimentary financial organisation of the medieval state’.<sup>110</sup> Yet, from this required payment of £150, Thomas has argued that it must have been the ‘major preoccupation for every military commander...to find the resources to keep his forces going’.<sup>111</sup> Stephen’s treasury, which had been left well-stocked by Henry I, had been drained by 1139 and that he was forced to maintain wartime garrisons across dozens of castles might explain its depletion.<sup>112</sup>

While we have limited financial documentation for Stephen’s reign, White has argued against continuity: ‘in economic as well as administrative terms, the reign of Stephen was essentially an interlude’.<sup>113</sup> He had financial control from Yorkshire to Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Huntingdonshire, Cambridgeshire, East Anglia, and in the southeast as far west as the ‘frontier zone’ of Hampshire, Berkshire, Oxfordshire, and Buckinghamshire.<sup>114</sup> While this includes ‘the more lucrative shires’, he did have problems with some major barons in these areas so he was perhaps not receiving all he was owed; thus, he lacked comprehensive fiscal control of England and Normandy.<sup>115</sup> Regardless, Thomas argues that he needed to sustain ‘a healthy financial situation throughout the reign...or he would have lost the war’.<sup>116</sup> He must have maintained an adequate income to sustain garrisons and field forces strong enough to threaten Angevin strongholds.

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<sup>109</sup> Thomas in Dalton and White, p. 147; *Magnus Rotulus Scaccarii, 2-3-4 Henry II*, ed. J. Hunter (London: Records Commission, 1844), pp. 62-4.

<sup>110</sup> Smail, p. 97; Prestwich argues differently: ‘War and Finance’, pp. 19-43.

<sup>111</sup> Thomas in Dalton and White, p. 147.

<sup>112</sup> Prestwich, ‘War and Finance’, pp. 40-2.

<sup>113</sup> G.J. White, ‘Royal Income and Regional Trends’, in Dalton and White, p. 43.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>116</sup> Thomas in Dalton and White, p. 147.

Despite the lack of detail records describing their terms of service, garrisons are common elements within the chronicles. Thirteenth-century evidence at the castle of Clun demonstrates that the castle-guard would be summoned when needed to minimise maintenance costs.<sup>117</sup> This practice is supported by twelfth-century chroniclers who most commonly mention garrison formation as part of a castle's siege preparations.<sup>118</sup> The *Gesta Stephani*'s use of *milites*<sup>119</sup> to refer to garrisons, instead of the more common *castrenses*,<sup>120</sup> *oppidani*,<sup>121</sup> or *municipes*<sup>122</sup> certainly denotes the military role these men performed.<sup>123</sup> Additionally, descriptions of garrisons are commonly used to denote the loyalty of a castle to one person in particular<sup>124</sup> or as simply royal.<sup>125</sup> For example, Henry I suspected William Talvas and Roger of Tosny of rebellion, and in order to prevent their advancement, 'sent his

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<sup>117</sup> F. Suppe, 'Castle guard and the castelery at Clun', in Liddiard, pp. 211-2, 219-20. Suppe analysed the castelery of Clun in detail and his work is a more recent treatment of this subject and corrects or offers a specific difference to Painter's work in 1935 which was reprinted in Liddiard. From their sources, it appears that Painter extrapolated the conditions in the thirteenth century regarding Clun to presume service standards across England in the twelfth century ignoring earlier materials; Suppe attempts to redirect these conclusions back to the specific example at Clun using earlier sources.

<sup>118</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 196-8; Simeon (lat), 209-10, pp. 273-5; Worcester, pp. 166-7, 216-9, 242-5, 250-1, 256-7, 266-7, 282-91; Hexham (eng), p. 64; Hexham (lat), pp. 157-8; LE (eng), 3, 82, pp. 403-4; LE (lat), 3, 82, p. 328; ASC, E, p. 177-8; GND, 8, 15 and 22, pp. 226-31, 236-7; Malmesbury, *HN*, 479 and 483 and 506 and 520, pp. 36, 42, 66, 73-4; Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 122-5; Fantosme, lines 1202-4 and 1344-5 and 1635-63, pp. 304-5, 316-7, 340-3; GS, 1, 14-9 and 21 and 23 and 30-1 and 37-8 and 42-5 and 53-4 and 58 and 64, pp. 28-51, 64-9, 82-3, 90-7, 108-15, 118-9, 130-3, and 2, 69-73 and 83-4 and 87-9 and 93 and 104-6 and 109 and 112 and 114 and 117 and 119, pp. 138-45, 164-7, 170-5, 180-1, 198-205, 208-11, 214-5, 220-1, 228-9, 234-5; Orderic, 10, 18, pp. 302-7, and 11, 3 and 16 and 19-20 and 45, pp. 20-9, 76-7, 80-5, 182-3, and 12, 3-4 and 8 and 11-2 and 14 and 17 and 19 and 34 and 36 and 39, pp. 190-201, 204-9, 216-9, 222-5, 228-31, 244-5, 334-7, 340-3, 346-51, and 13, 18 and 22 and 26 and 30 and 32 and 36-8 and 41 and 43, pp. 444-7, 458-9, 466-73, 482-3, 490-5, 510-29, 538-45, 548-51.

<sup>119</sup> GS, 1, 19 and 31 and 73, pp. 40-3, 66-9, 144-5, and 2, 83-4 and 89 and 93 and 114, pp. 164-7, 172-5, 180-1, 220-1.

<sup>120</sup> Orderic, 11, 19-20, pp. 80-5, and 12, 4 and 8 and 17 and 34 and 36, pp. 194-201, 204-5, 230-1, 334-7, 340-3 and 13, 37, pp. 514-21; *Draco*, 2, 16, lines 831-940, pp. 690-5.

<sup>121</sup> Orderic, 11, 20 and 45, pp. 84-5, 182-3, and 12, 11 and 17, pp. 214-7, 228-9, and 13, 26 and 30 and 32 and 36-8 and 41, pp. 466-73, 482-3, 490-5, 510-29, 548-51.

<sup>122</sup> Orderic, 12, 12 and 19, pp. 216-9, 244-5, and 13, 41, pp. 534-7; GS, 1, 14 and 44, pp. 28-31, 94-6.

<sup>123</sup> The GS also relates the garrison to castle inhabitants, *castellum inhabitantis*: 2, 72, pp. 142-5, and *castellani*: 1, 15 and 31 and 64, pp. 30-3, 66-9, 130-3, and 2, 106, pp. 202-5.

<sup>124</sup> ASC, E, p. 177-8; GND, 8, 15 and 22, pp. 226-31, 236-7; Simeon (eng), pp. 196-8; Simeon (lat), 209-10, pp. 273-5; Orderic, 11, 19-20 and 45, pp. 80-5, 182-3, and 12, 3 and 17, pp. 190-5, 230-1; Malmesbury, *HN*, 483, p. 42; Worcester, pp. 242-5, 248-51; GS, 1, 73, pp. 144-5, and 2, 69 and 109, pp. 138-9 and 208-11; Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 122-5; Fantosme, lines 1635-63, pp. 340-3; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 412; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 93-4.

<sup>125</sup> Orderic, 11, 20, pp. 84-5, and 6, 12, 14 and 17, pp. 222-5, 230-1; GS, 2, 119, pp. 234-5; Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 122-5; Worcester, pp. 242-5, 280-1.

own knights to garrison the castle of Conches'.<sup>126</sup> This role as the guards or guardians of castles explains why *custodes*<sup>127</sup> was also used to refer to garrisons.

The importance of the garrison revolved around its defensive and offensive capabilities. They would man the fortifications of the castle and could venture out to confront a besieging force, scour the land for provisions, or strike passing hostile forces. Sorties were a common counter siege tactic and are mentioned in nearly all the chronicles.<sup>128</sup> However, if a garrison was not well maintained or provisioned, their defensive tactics under siege were limited. As mentioned above, it was a primary concern for commanders to maintain their garrisons and many castellans pillaged the surrounding land to support the necessary man-power. The best examples of this are the passages recording castellans and garrisons gathering supplies for a siege typically at a great cost to the surrounding populace.<sup>129</sup> The ravaging and plundering expeditions of a garrison were rarely, if ever, portrayed positively. Roger de Mowbray's men from Kirkby Malzeard stole grain from the abbey of Fountains at Ripon, eighty-three marks were 'forced' out of the monks, and the tenants of St. Mary's at Myton on Swale were forced to pay *tensarie* or 'protection money'.<sup>130</sup> Once Robert Fitz Hurbert gained possession of Malmesbury in 1140, he

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<sup>126</sup> *'propriosque milites ad custodiendam munitionem Conchas direxit'*, Orderic, 13, 18, pp. 444-7; Green, *Henry I*, p. 219.

<sup>127</sup> Orderic, 10, 18, pp. 302-7, and 12, 14 and 39, pp. 222-5, 346-51, and 13, 18, pp. 444-7; *LE* (eng), 3, 82, pp. 403-4; *LE* (lat), 3, 82, p. 328; *GS*, 1, 30, pp. 64-7, and 2, 70, pp. 140-1.

<sup>128</sup> Some examples include: *GS*, 1, 42, pp. 90-3, and 2, 104, pp. 198-201; Newburgh, 1, 13, pp. 72-3; Orderic, 11, 3 and 22, pp. 20-9, 94-5, and 12, 8, pp. 206-9, and 13, 22 and 26 and 37, pp. 458-9, 466-73, 514-7.

<sup>129</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 196-8; Simeon (lat), 209 and 210, pp. 273-5; Orderic, 11, 45, pp. 182-3, and 12, 3 and 14, pp. 190-5, 222-5; Worcester, pp. 216-9; *LE* (eng), 3, 82, pp. 403-4; *LE* (lat), 3, 82, p. 328; *GS*, 1, 11 and 14 and 16 and 37 and 42 and 48, pp. 20-1, 28-35, 80-3, 90-3, 100-3; and 2, 106 and 209 and 112, pp. 202-5, 208-11, 214-5; Gerald, *Conquest*, 1, 11, pp. 52-3.

<sup>130</sup> Greenway, Fountains at Ripon exaction in charters 102-3, pp. 75-7 (102. ...*Sciatis me dedisse et concessisse Deo et monachis Sancte Marie de Fontibus plenarie necessaria sua in foresta mea de Niderdala in pasture et pastione in ferro et plumbo et material et in omnibus necessariis suis... 103. ...Hanc donationem feci eis in recompensationem bladi sui quod homines mei ceperunt ab eis apud Ripon(am) et octoginta trium marcarum quas michi in mea magna necessitate dederunt...)*, St. Mary's at Myton on Swale in charter 318, pp. 206-7 (...*Quoniam tam per me quam per meos multa dampna multociens abbatie Ebor(aci) illata sunt, in recompensationem et satisfactionem eorum firmam et perpetuam pacem futuris temporibus a me et heredibus meis et omnibus qui ad me pertinent, predictae ecclesie concessi et presenti cartula confirmavit, videlicet ut ipsa ecclesia deinceps libera et quieta sit ab omni exactione mei et meorum tam de operibus castrorum quam de tensariis que violenter et injuste a castrensibus exigi solent. Concessi etiam prefate ecclesie ut habeant apud Mitonam villam suam molendinum et stagnum et piscariam suam sicut unquam*

‘devastated the surrounding countryside (*iam uastatis omnibus in circumitu*)’, and, again, after gaining Devizes he ‘ravaged everywhere day and night, and did not stop doing all the harm he could (*et singulis diebus ac noctibus, in extollentia cordis ubi omnia deuastat, et mala que poterat agere non cessat*)’.<sup>131</sup> The violence of the garrison’s excursions was the primary reason castles received a negative reputation.<sup>132</sup> The standard description was that a garrison attacked ‘neighbours with fire and pillage (*affines omnes igne et depraedatione uehementer uexabat*)’<sup>133</sup> and that they ‘reduced all the surrounding country everywhere to a lamentable desert (*totam circumiacentem prouinciam in miseram solitudinem ubique redegerunt*)’.<sup>134</sup> Provisioning and the exertion of power were not customarily peaceful actions, leading Bisson to argue the castle was ‘attended characteristically by coercive violence’.<sup>135</sup>

However, these pillaging tactics were crucial. It was the garrison’s responsibility to ensure their castle was prepared to withstand a siege, and chroniclers commented on whether or not they succeeded.<sup>136</sup> During the rebellion in Normandy in 1118, the garrison at Bellême ‘prepared themselves to put up a stalwart resistance to any attacks’<sup>137</sup> and Henry I ordered his men to advance on Brionne to ‘attack the garrison while it was unprepared’ making sure they could not withstand his eventual siege.<sup>138</sup> Garrisons not only stripped surrounding land to gain provisions and deny the same to their besiegers and *vice versa*. A poorly prepared garrison could not hope hold a castle for long and was practically useless; subsequently, the chronicles note when a castle was ‘nearly empty (*uacuumque paene*

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*melius preteritis temporibus habuerunt...*)’, Both examples are charters restoring rights or payment in compensation for injuries done. pp. lx-lxi.

<sup>131</sup> Worcester, pp. 284-91.

<sup>132</sup> Worcester, pp. 216-19; *GS*, 1, 38, pp. 82-3, 94-6, and 2, 69 and 87, pp. 138-19, 170-1.

<sup>133</sup> *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31.

<sup>134</sup> *GS*, 1, 45, pp. 96-7.

<sup>135</sup> T.N. Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century* (Princeton, 2009), pp. 46, 48.

<sup>136</sup> *GS*, 1, 45, pp. 96-7, and 2, 84 and 106, pp. 164-7, 202-5.

<sup>137</sup> ‘*resistendum impugnanti cuilibet acriter parauerunt*’, Orderic, 11, 45, pp. 182-3.

<sup>138</sup> ‘*aggredi castrenses imparatos*’, Orderic, 12, 34, pp. 334-7; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 183-4, 187.

reperiens)',<sup>139</sup> 'empty (*euacuatum paene inuenit* and *euacuatum reperiens*)',<sup>140</sup> or insufficient (*non bene munitum*).<sup>141</sup> When Stephen was captured at the battle of Lincoln, he left his followers in a 'quandary;' the *Gesta Stephani* wrote that it 'was most difficult to support the king's cause and restore it to its former flourishing condition, above all because he had not provisioned or garrisoned his castles well enough'.<sup>142</sup> The author criticised inadequate and ill-prepared garrisons because their preparation, size, and strength were crucial to holding castles.<sup>143</sup> It is conceivable that Stephen decided to increase his field army for Lincoln by reducing the garrisons of many of his castles leaving them undermanned and without any prospect of relief when Matilda won the battle.<sup>144</sup> Later, when Stephen arrived at Winchcomb in 1144, he found 'there was only a small garrison for resistance (*sed paucis ad resistendum impositis*)' which was 'unable to withstand the furious onslaught of so large a force, and at last they surrendered the castle by agreement (*effrenem tantorum impetum qui se interius reculserant minime sufferentes, datis tandem dextris castellum reddiderunt*)'.<sup>145</sup> Regardless of the impressiveness and strength of a castle's fortifications, the garrison was crucial to its resistance.

A successful garrison, which had properly prepared, was typically described as adequate<sup>146</sup> or strong<sup>147</sup> but there are passages which provide composition detail.<sup>148</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* recorded knights and footmen in the castles built in front of the bishop of

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<sup>139</sup> *GS*, 1, 31, pp. 66-9.

<sup>140</sup> *GS*, 1, 54, pp. 110-5, and 2, 70, pp. 140-1.

<sup>141</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 520, pp. 73-4.

<sup>142</sup> '*quia partes regis tueri et ad priorem punctum reducere difficillimum erat, maxime quia castella sua nec escis nec hominibus sufficienter firmarat*', *GS*, 1, 58, pp. 118-9.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> Smail has argued that commanders needed to maintain a balance between field forces and garrisons because an army was vulnerable without the fortification, and garrisons, as seen in this example, could be exposed without the support of a field army. p. 25.

<sup>145</sup> *GS*, 2, 89, pp. 172-5.

<sup>146</sup> '*sufficiens/sufficientis*', *GS*, 1, 31, pp. 66-9, and 2, 84 and 114, pp. 164-7, 220-1.

<sup>147</sup> '*uirtus*', Orderic, 10, 18, pp. 302-7; Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; '*pugnatorum*', Simeon (lat), 209, pp. 273-4; '*fort*', Fantosme, lines 1344-45, pp. 316-7.

<sup>148</sup> Personality: *GS*, 1, 38 and 42, pp. 82-3, 90-3, and 2, 114, pp. 220-1; Fantosme, vol. 3, lines 1635-63, pp. 340-3. Composition: *GS*, 1, 14 and 23 and 64, pp. 28-31, 46-51, 130-3, and 2, 87 and 109, pp. 170-1, 208-11.

Winchester's castle of Lidelea,<sup>149</sup> Roger of Bampton 'gathered knights and archers in his castle';<sup>150</sup> Roger of Howden recorded that Henry II's son Richard took a castle called Aesse in 1176 from the 'forty knights who formed its garrison' and in the same year, at Châtillon, he took the castle and its 'thirty knights';<sup>151</sup> When Roger de Mowbray's castle at Kirkby Malzeard was taken, 'thirty knights and sixty archers were captured'.<sup>152</sup> These accounts of the number and profession can help clarify some of the typically vague accounts from chroniclers where they describe a castle-garrison as 'the flower of his whole army'.<sup>153</sup>

But, what if a castle was not garrisoned? The *Gesta Stephani* described one captured by Robert Fitz Harold along the Welsh border as 'almost unoccupied (*paene fuerat inhabitatum*)'.<sup>154</sup> This may mean that a garrison was not present, possibly having left on a sortie, and that Robert faced 'almost' no opposition. 'Almost' indicates that there were people within the castle, perhaps even a skeleton garrison or staff, to resist Robert's attack; it does not mean the castle was empty. Liddiard noted that the 'estate staff' of a castle – civilian support which included 'clerks of the works, porters, watchmen, and the artisans, smiths, masons, carpenters, and such-like as were required to keep the fabric in repair'<sup>155</sup> – was almost permanently in residence, while a 'mobile household' followed the movements of the lord and remained at the castle as long as he did.<sup>156</sup> While this small castle on the Welsh border encountered by Fitz Harold was possibly unable to support such a workforce, castles were commonly accompanied by support settlements, like towns and villages, and

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<sup>149</sup> '*militumque et peditum turmis sufficienter timpositis*', *GS*, 2, 109, pp. 208-11. For the location of this obscure castle see Appendix A, figure 1, item 11.

<sup>150</sup> '*militibus et sagittariis secum in castello agglutinatis*', *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31.

<sup>151</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 402, 412; '*in eo quadraginta milites... triginta milites*', Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 83, 93-4.

<sup>152</sup> Greenway, p. lxi; figures recorded by *Giraldi Cambrensis Opera*, ed. G.F. Warner (London, 1891), 4, p. 366.

<sup>153</sup> '*militibusque, totius uidelicet uirtutis suae flore*', *GS*, 2, 93, pp. 180-1.

<sup>154</sup> *GS*, 1, 11, pp. 20-1.

<sup>155</sup> G. Lapsley, 'Some Castle Officers in the Twelfth Century', *EHR* 33:131 (1918), pp. 348-9.

<sup>156</sup> Liddiard, p. 3; other modern historians have argued that knights or soldiers of the royal household were used to garrison castles. Green, *Henry I*, pp. 98, 183; Painter, pp. 129-130; Moore, 'Anglo-Norman Garrisons', p. 210; Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 201-2; Poly and Bournazel, *Feudal Transformation*, p. 28.

therefore the lack of a military garrison did not mean a lack of people within the castle complex.

As we will discuss in far greater detail later, the garrison's role in siege warfare was very important because it was directly in control of the castle and was responsible for its resistance or surrender. While garrisons were the active arm of the castle, sometimes, we have little or no mention of them beyond their surrendering; this is the most commonly mentioned action of a garrison in the chronicles, sometimes with little more description than that the event occurred.<sup>157</sup> The garrison was merely a feature of the fortified element and the castle had a much larger 'military image' derived from many elements; therefore, it cannot be separated from its physical appearance in what made the castle fortified or its military resourcefulness.

### *The Meaning of Fortification*

Since this thesis argues for a fortified element to be included in the definition of the castle, it would be important to demonstrate that this was a significant characteristic perceived by the twelfth-century chroniclers. As with 'garrison' and 'castle', the chroniclers are not always consistent in their terminology but *munio* and *firmitas* were very common and could mean 'fortify' or 'strengthen'.<sup>158</sup> However, even this raises several questions: what did

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<sup>157</sup> Orderic, 10, 18, pp. 302-7, and 6, 11, 3 and 16, pp. 20-9, 76-7, and 12, 4 and 8 and 11 and 17 and 36, pp. 194-7, 206-9, 230-1, 340-3 and 13, 32 and 35 and 37 and 41 and 43, pp. 490-5, 510-5, 520-1, 534-45, 548-51; *GND*, 8, 15 and 22, pp. 226-31, 236-7; Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; Simeon (lat), 209, pp. 273-4; Worcester, pp. 261-9, 242-5, 250-1, 256-7, 284-91; Hexham (eng), p. 64; Hexham (lat), pp. 157-8; Malmesbury, *HN*, 520, pp. 73-4; Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 124-5; *GS*, 1, 14 and 19 and 23 and 30-1 and 42-5 and 64 and 73, pp. 28-31, 40-3, 46-51, 64-9, 90-7, 130-3, 144-5, and 2, 70 and 72 and 84 and 89 and 106 and 109, pp. 140-5, 164-7, 172-5, 202-5, 208-11; Wendover, p. 533; Fantosme, lines 1635-63, pp. 340-3.

<sup>158</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 22, pp. 744-7; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 4, 333, pp. 572-7; Malmesbury, *HN*, 467 and 479-80 and 483 and 520, pp. 22-4, 36, 42, 73-4; *GND*, 8, 8 and 15, pp. 214-5, 226-31; Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70, 172; Simeon (lat), 183 and 185, pp. 234, 237; *LE* (eng), 3, 72, p. 395; *LE* (lat), 3, 72, p. 320; Newburgh, 1, 11 and 13, pp. 66-7, 72-3; *Battle*, pp. 158-61; Fantosme, lines 1990-7, pp. 368-9; Orderic, 11, 44-5, pp. 176-83; and 12, 1-4 and 10 and 12 and 14 and 17 and 19 and 22 and 34 and 39, pp. 184-201, 212-5, 218-9, 222-5, 230-1, 244-5, 276-81, 334-7, 354-7; and 13, 21 and 26 and 32 and 37, pp. 454-7, 466-73, 490-5, 518-9; Worcester, pp. 220-1, 242-51, 268-9; Torigni, pp. 105-7, 226; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4, 197, 231, 235-6, 243, 251, 324-5, 377-8, 380-1, 383-4, 390, 402, 418-9, and vol. 2, pp. 20-1, 86-7; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60, 162, 193, 196-7, 199, 210-1, 282, and vol. 2, pp. 57-8, 60-1, 64-5, 72, 83, 101, 273-4, 343-4; *GS*, 1, 8-9 and 11 and 14 and 16-7 and 21-3 and 27-8 and 35 and 37 and 42 and 44-5 and 47 and 63, pp. 14-

the chroniclers mean when they used these words in their narrative? What elements were perceived of as necessary for a castle to be ‘fortified’? Did the chroniclers include its physical appearance and garrison?

The simplest usage of fortified was to describe the physical fortifications of a castle.<sup>159</sup> This was combined on occasion, and with some authors consistently, with the description ‘impreguably fortified (*inexpugnabiliter firmauit, inexpugnabiliter fuit firmatum*)’.<sup>160</sup> As discussed, there is no clear indication of what this meant. Fortunately, the majority of passages discussing the ‘fortified’ state of the castle include more than physical fortifications giving us a better idea of what this word indicated. In many cases, it is clear that provisions – men, sustenance, or both – were crucial, and the addition of or collecting of these provisions were perceived of as a required part of the process.<sup>161</sup> Chroniclers wanted their audience to understand that the castles in their narrative were prepared for a siege and achieved this by describing them as fortified.

To demonstrate the importance of the garrison and supplies to this description we can begin with Coulson’s argument that without them, castles were ‘empty husks’.<sup>162</sup> During the 1118 rebellion in Normandy, Orderic recorded that Henry I ‘fortified’ Le Plessis and included a ‘distinguished band of knights to protect the region’.<sup>163</sup> In a later passage, Orderic specifically links resources and the garrison to fortifying a castle: ‘So young Stephen took possession of Séez and Alençon and Le Mêle-sur-Sarthe and Almenèches with La Roche-

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21, 28-39, 44-51, 56-9, 78-83, 90-101, 126-7, and 2, 69-71 and 73 and 89 and 93 and 104 and 106 and 110 and 112 and 114-5 and 117 and 119, pp. 138-45, 172-5, 180-1, 198-205, 210-5, 220-3, 226-31, 234-7.

<sup>159</sup> *GS*, 2, 70 and 106, pp. 140-1, 202-5.

<sup>160</sup> *GS*, 1, 11, pp. 20-1 and 2, 119, pp. 234-7.

<sup>161</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 467, pp. 22-4; *GS*, 1, 11 and 45, pp. 20-1, 96-7, and 2, 93, pp. 180-1; Green, *Henry I*, p. 35.

<sup>162</sup> Coulson, ‘Peaceable Power’, pp. 76-7.

<sup>163</sup> ‘*insigni militum caterua pro tuitione regionis constituit*’, Orderic, 12, 3, pp. 190-5.

Mabille, fortified the castles by filling them with arms and his own troops'.<sup>164</sup> When Stephen later took the throne, John of Worcester recorded that the nobles of England 'store[d] castles and towns with necessary provisions. They garrison[ed] them with armed followers'.<sup>165</sup> The English castles Robert of Bellême used against Henry I in 1102 further demonstrate this point. He is recorded by John of Worcester as 'supplying them with provisions, siege engines, arms, knights, and foot soldiers' and, at Bridgnorth and Carrocove, 'rushed, by all possible means and by carrying out the work day and night, to complete the walls and towers'.<sup>166</sup> Additionally, he is recorded to have 'laid waste part of Staffordshire, and took away to Wales many oxen and beasts, and some men'.<sup>167</sup> William of Malmesbury recorded that he 'fortified' his castles, and 'collecting in Bridgnorth corn from the whole of Shropshire and everything required for a war of some duration'.<sup>168</sup> Simeon of Durham mentioned men 'labouring and working day and night' to reconstruct a wall at Bridgnorth and that his castles were 'strongly fortified' and supplied with 'provisions, munitions of war, horsemen, and infantry'.<sup>169</sup> While these accounts are similar, it is clear that Robert's castles had several aspects in common: fortified elements, provisions, and men; they were the archetypal 'fortified' castle.

But provisions and the garrison were not always included in the description of a castle as 'fortified' and they are usually perceived of as secondary to a deeper concern. The

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<sup>164</sup> 'Stephanus itaque iuuenis Sagium et Alencionem Merulamque super Sartam Almaniscas cum rupe de lalgeio possedit, munitiones armis Topriisque satellitibus muniuit', Orderic, 12, 4, pp. 194-7; Green, *Henry I*, p. 143.

<sup>165</sup> 'Sibi suisque dumtaxat consulunt. Vite necessariis castella et oppida muniunt; manu militari cum armis instruunt', Worcester, pp. 216-7.

<sup>166</sup> 'alimentis, machinis, armis, militibus, ac peditibus... Muros quoque ac turres castellorum, uidelicet Brycge et Carocloue, die noctuque laborando et operando, perficere modis omnibus festinauit', Worcester, pp. 100-3; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 68-70.

<sup>167</sup> 'partem Steaffordensis page uastauerunt, ac inde iumenta et animalia multa, hominesque nonnullos in Waloniam abduxerunt', Worcester, pp. 100-3.

<sup>168</sup> 'Comportatum eo frumentum ex omni regione Scobbesberiae, et quicquid necessarium bellum efflagitat diuturnum', Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 396, pp. 718-9.

<sup>169</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; 'die noctuque laborando et operando perficere... alimentis, machinis, armis, militibus ac peditibus contra regem Henricum firmiter munivit', Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234.

fortification elements, garrison, and supplies were necessary for a castle to be strengthened; but, crucially for its role as a military resource, a castle had to oppose someone in order for preparation to be considered fortification of the castle. Each castle ‘fortified (*munio* or *firmitas*)’ throughout the twelfth century was militarily prepared to face opposition. Since the number of sieges and military campaigns in these three reigns was high, the description of castles which were held against either Henry I or II,<sup>170</sup> or as royal castles as ‘fortified’ against enemies like the kings of France and Scotland and, more specifically, barons, was very common.<sup>171</sup> For example, Henry I, ‘in opposition to Gervase of Châteauneuf... fortified two castles, one called Nonancourt and the other Uiers-l’Évêque’.<sup>172</sup> He also ‘fortified Bures and, because he regarded many of the Normans with suspicion, placed there Breton and English mercenaries with ample supplies’.<sup>173</sup> In these two examples we see that the castles were fortified in opposition to someone (Gervase of Châteauneuf and the Norman barons respectively). The second example also included the garrison and supplies in the process of fortification, but as secondary concerns to the castle’s opposition to the Norman barons. Hugh, bishop of Durham, surrendered his castles of Norham and Alverton to Henry II which were ‘fortified’ against the king during the wars of 1173/4.<sup>174</sup> In 1175, Henry’s son Richard moved against Arnold de Boiville who had ‘fortified against him’ the castle of Châtillon.<sup>175</sup> In these last descriptions we do not see any mention of supplies or garrison; the concept of the castle prepared in opposition to someone was expressed as a primary concern.

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<sup>170</sup> Henry I: Orderic, 11, 45, pp. 182-3, and 12, 1 and 10 and 39, pp. 188-9, 212-5, 354-7; Henry II: Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 377, 380-1; Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 57, 60-1; *Battle*, pp. 158-61.

<sup>171</sup> Orderic, 12, 14 and 19, pp. 222-3, 244-5; *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31, 96-7; Malmesbury, *HN*, 467, pp. 22-4; Worcester, pp. 218-21, 242-51; *LE* (eng), 3, 72, p. 395; *LE* (lat), 3, 72, p. 320; Fantosme, lines 1990-7, pp. 368-9; *Battle*, pp. 158-61.

<sup>172</sup> ‘*Contra Geruasium de Nouo Castello...duo firmavit nunicipia unum quod Nonencort aliud quod Uias dicitur*’, Orderic, 11, 44, pp. 176-9.

<sup>173</sup> ‘*Moderatus igitur rex Buras muniuit, ibique quia plerosque Normannorum suspectos habuit stipendiaries Britones Anglos cum apparatu copioso constituit*’, Orderic, 12, 2, pp. 190-1.

<sup>174</sup> ‘*firmaverat*’, Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 383-4; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 64-5.

<sup>175</sup> ‘*contra eum munierat*’, Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 402; Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 83.

When the *Gesta Stephani* recorded at the beginning of Stephen's reign that Brian Fitz Count 'after strengthening an impregnable castle that he had at Wallingford rebelled against the king with spirit and great resolution, assisted by a very large body of soldiers', he stresses that the garrison and castle are prepared to resist the king.<sup>176</sup> When the castle is described to Stephen as 'most securely fortified by impregnable walls, that supplies had been put into it in very great abundance, enough to last for a great number of years, that the garrison consisted of a very strong force of invincible warriors', we see the emphasis on the physical attributes, supplies, and garrison that are prepared to face him.<sup>177</sup> What was important to the narration of this event was not the secondary detail of the garrison, the supplies, or the walls of this castle; the *Gesta Stephani's* audience will have understood their strength in his first description of Wallingford as '*firmato inexpugnabili*'. What was important, particularly to the rest of Stephen's reign and his tactical concerns, was that this castle was now prepared to oppose him, to face any royal force, and prepared to fulfil its role as a military resource on Matilda's behalf. Fortification was an act and not a passive phenomenon, and when castles are described as such, they move from latent to active resources.

### **Military Resource**

The castle was intrinsically connected to the traditional aims of war – conquest, survival, expansion, defence, punishment, booty, exercising power, and maintaining order – both offensively and defensively.<sup>178</sup> However, without a garrison or physical fortifications, a

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<sup>176</sup> '*firmato inexpugnabili, quod penes Walengefordiam habuerat, castello, cum militum ingentissima copia aduersus regem uiue et constantissime rebellauit*', *GS*, 1, 42, pp. 90-3.

<sup>177</sup> '*munimine insuperabili tutissime firmatum, escas ad plurimorum annorum suffragia copiosissime ingestas, pubem ualidissimam inuictissimumque militiae robur intus susceptum*', *Ibid.*

<sup>178</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 71-2.

castle was no different from any other medieval structure and the perception of it as a fortified structure was dependent on these elements. However, this is a circular issue. The fortification elements discussed above were necessary because it was a military resource, and their presence meant it could be used as one. Its effectiveness as a military resource meant that the capturing, protecting, constructing, and demolishing of castles became the predominant actions of medieval warfare.

The great pitched battle was rare in the Middle Ages with siege warfare preferred. Coulson accurately characterised this preference as ‘medieval risk-management;’ battles were hazardous for important individuals and a favourable outcome was uncertain.<sup>179</sup> For example, the capture of Stephen at Lincoln in 1141 placed England in the hands of his rival, and Robert of Gloucester’s subsequent detention by royalist forces shifted the balance again. Once battle commenced, communication and tactical logistics became complicated and increased uncertainty, effectively leaving victory to chance or ‘divine judgment’.<sup>180</sup> This is not to say that battle was not sought in order to end conflict quickly – William the Conqueror planned to face Harold at Hastings and Henry I probably provoked his brother into battle at Tinchebrai – but most commanders preferred to avoid them. Normandy faced near constant warfare from 1135 until Geoffrey of Anjou was proclaimed duke in 1145; however, no pitched battles were fought and all military engagements revolved around sieges.<sup>181</sup> Henry II attended no battles during his reign; he preferred, or was forced, to operate defensive campaigns relieving castles across his territory.<sup>182</sup> His one offensive operation into Toulouse ended with his withdrawal for several reasons: Henry’s liege-lord, the king of France, had entered Toulouse to support the count and Henry was reluctant to

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<sup>179</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 77; Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 71-2; Smail, pp. 12-3.

<sup>180</sup> Strickland, p. 59; Prestwich, p. 22. Other examples include Hastings in 1066 and Tinchebrai in 1106.

<sup>181</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 71-2; C.H. Haskins, ‘Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet’, *EHR* 27:107 (1912), p. 423.

<sup>182</sup> Smail, p. 35.

continue; additionally, he did not have the men to provoke a battle with a favourable outcome.<sup>183</sup>

The conquest of territory was the most common offensive objective and, while land armies did control the area they inhabited, their control was terminated once they vacated the region. As Smail has argued, 'effective and durable lordship over a district depended on possession of the walled towns and castles'.<sup>184</sup> Siege warfare (gaining ground in a gradual progression by attacking fortified sites) was a more consistent method of achieving territorial or political gain because it offered a method of defending conquered territory through a physical resource.<sup>185</sup> To ensure their protection, a ruler 'might put all his trust in fortifications and garrisons' but they could not endure a protracted siege on their own nor could they exert an active military presence; as both Smail and Coulson argue: 'fortresses without an army were almost powerless'.<sup>186</sup> Crucial to Smail's argument was the combination of field army and castle: without a field army, a castle on its own could defend a border 'only a limited sense'.<sup>187</sup>

During a siege, the garrison would resist and defend the structure as long as possible. However, and as we will see in a later chapter, they could send for aid from a relieving force. This reprieve was not meant to eliminate the invading force, but to disrupt supply lines and hinder siege operations reducing the threat to the castle and aid the garrison. However, the importance of the castle meant that sometimes the meeting of a relieving and a besieging force could result in battle. Examples include Brémule in 1119, Lincoln in 1141, and Wilton in 1143.<sup>188</sup> On the other hand, attempts were made to avoid battles at sieges: Henry Fitz Empress attacked Stephen's castle at Malmesbury early in 1153 forcing the king

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<sup>183</sup> Prestwich, p. 22.

<sup>184</sup> Smail, pp. 22-4.

<sup>185</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 94-5; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 192-257.

<sup>186</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 253; Smail, p. 25; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 110-2.

<sup>187</sup> Smail, p. 204.

<sup>188</sup> Prestwich, p. 22.

to bring a relieving force; later that year the reverse occurred at Wallingford.<sup>189</sup> Both times, battle was prevented by the physical division of the armies by a river and, at the latter, the eagerness of magnates and bishops for negotiations after the devastating warfare of the previous two decades.<sup>190</sup> That the risks of battle were considered acceptable in order to defend or take a castle is a clear demonstration of their value in medieval warfare.<sup>191</sup>

Before the introduction of castles, even into ancient history, the besieging of cities was crucial to strategic advancement. Conquering a city would alter the possession of the land, could destroy or give control of the economy of the area, and devastate its population. However, the castle, as a resource for war, posed a different obstacle. Cities were typically described as sacked in warfare because they provided plunder but could not be used to consolidate individual power; a castle could be gained or taken to be used again. In England, before the Conquest, Edward the Confessor was able to survive and put down Earl Godwin's rebellion because the earl could not form a physical dynastic power base like the one created fifty years later by Robert of Gloucester around Bristol and its surrounding castle network.<sup>192</sup> One has but to compare the domestic rebellions in England and in Normandy before the Conquest to realise the tactical importance of castles in warfare and in claiming territory. After 1066, English baronial rebellions become more endemic because the castle provided Anglo-Norman barons with a valuable resource.

In order to control land, one had to control castles and, because of their role as resources, this translated into military strength. When Henry I took Anceins from Richard of Fresnel in 1118, he 'receive[d] the whole county of Évreux to hold undisturbed;'<sup>193</sup> by

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<sup>189</sup> Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 122-5; *GS*, 2, 118, pp. 230-1; Huntingdon, 10, 37-8, p. 770-3; Cronne, *Reign of Stephen*, p. 64.

<sup>190</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, p. 127; Cronne, *Reign of Stephen*, p. 64.

<sup>191</sup> Smail, p. 25.

<sup>192</sup> J. Campbell, 'Observations on English Government from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century', *TRHS* 5:25 (1975), pp. 39-45.

<sup>193</sup> 'et arce sibi reddita omnem comitatum Ebroicensem quiete reciperet', Orderic, 12, 13, pp. 218-21.

taking the castles of Glos and Lire in the region of Ouche in the same year, Henry I ‘pacified’ the area;<sup>194</sup> after taking Fougères in 1166, Henry II brought Brittany under his control.<sup>195</sup> Robert of Gloucester’s capture of Wareham in 1143 gave him ‘absolute authority over a very wide tract of country in that region;’ the same author calls this castle ‘the master-key of the whole kingdom’ re-emphasising the castle’s importance to Robert’s control of the area.<sup>196</sup> Additionally, every time Henry II took a castle, the chroniclers perceived it as a military victory and it increased his control over the region.<sup>197</sup> These stories demonstrate that holding a castle meant control of a territory and, as we have already seen, taking the castle meant a physical conquest of the land.

Through this resource, a lord could increase his military presence and influence by possessing more than one. In 1102-3, Robert of Bellême had ‘authority over a wide area’ because of his castles in England and Normandy;<sup>198</sup> Orderic recorded that he held ‘thirty-four very strong castles, from which... [he would] be able to launch very harmful attacks on the invader’.<sup>199</sup> Henry I moved quickly to take his castles of Arundel, Shewsbury, Bridgnorth, and Carrocove, claiming these resources for himself and ending Bellême’s military power and threat in England; by 1118 he had succeeded in doing the same with his Norman castles. After her father’s death, Empress Matilda and her husband Geoffrey were able to take the castles of Argentan, Exmes, Domfront, Ambreras, Gorram, and Colmiaie Montem gaining control of a large portion of the border between Normandy and Anjou; they

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<sup>194</sup> ‘*pacificata*’, Orderic, 12, 20, pp. 250-1; Green, *Henry I*, p. 148.

<sup>195</sup> ‘*Quia vero optimates Cenomannici comitatus et Britannicae regionis, antequam rex transfretaret, minus obtemperaverant praeceptis reginae...comes Conanus concessit regi, quasi ad opus filii sui, totum ducatum Britanniae*’, Torigni, p. 228.

<sup>196</sup> ‘*suisque impositis latissimae prouinciae dominium illis in partibus potenter exercuit...quod una erat totius regni clavis*’, *GS*, 1, 73, pp. 144-5, and 2, 75, pp. 148-51.

<sup>197</sup> Torigni, pp. 208-11, 227, 319-20; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 375, 379-81, 383-4, 402, 412, and vol. 2, p. 64; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 55, 60-1, 64-5, 83, 93-4, 318. The same can be said for other military commanders like Geoffrey of Anjou (Torigni, p. 136) and the kings of Scotland (Hexham (eng), p. 57; Hexham (lat), pp. 145-6).

<sup>198</sup> *ASC*, E, p. 178.

<sup>199</sup> ‘*Adhuc xxxiiii firmissimas munitiones habeo, unde molestissimas infestationes inuasori profecto inferre potero*’, Orderic, 11, 22, pp. 94-5; Green, *Henry I*, p. 29.

used these castles to move deeper into Normandy.<sup>200</sup> Geoffrey de Mandeville secured permission to build several castles from Stephen and Matilda, providing him with enough resources to ultimately develop military control over western Essex reducing ‘a very wide extent of country round about [and this] he subdued under the yoke of his power’.<sup>201</sup> The use of these castles enabled him to protect his lands from the violence gripping the rest of England; however, he also held enough military resources to pose a threat to Stephen which the king could not tolerate and he eventually confiscated his castles.<sup>202</sup>

Castles, and the military presence they represented, gave the possessor control over the ‘material basis of government:’ land.<sup>203</sup> In order to ‘annex territory’ and establish a ‘permanent conquest’, a conquering force needed to possess castles.<sup>204</sup> One way of gaining possession was to weaken the land through pillaging and ravaging so it could be more easily claimed at a later time, or provoking the lord of the area into battle.<sup>205</sup> Prior to the confiscation of Anceins by Henry I, Richard of Fresnel’s garrison ‘systematically ravaged his neighbours’ fields’.<sup>206</sup> Henry besieged William of Mortain’s castles in England<sup>207</sup> and Count Waleran’s castles, particularly Pontaudomar, in Normandy; Simeon of Durham recorded that the castles were targeted so ‘that the enemy might not be able to do any

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<sup>200</sup> Orderic, 13, 21, pp. 454-7; Torigni, p. 128; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 217-8; Haskins, ‘Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet’, pp. 420-2.

<sup>201</sup> *‘latissimas circumquaque prouincias sub tyrannidis suae iugo flectere’*, *GS*, 2, 86, pp. 168-71; ‘and was craftily and cleverly building up huge resources (*et subtili astutia ingentia moliens*)’, Newburgh, 1, 11, pp. 66-7. For more on information on these charters and Geoffrey de Mandeville’s relationship with Stephen and Matilda see Round, *Geoffrey de Mandeville*, pp. 37-54, 81-113, 136-200, and the *EHR* debate between R.H.C. Davis and J.O. Prestwich: Davis, ‘Geoffrey de Mandeville Reconsidered’, 79:311 (1964), pp. 299-307 and ‘Geoffrey de Mandeville: A Final Comment’, 103:409 (1988), pp. 967-8; Davis and Prestwich, ‘The Treason of Geoffrey de Mandeville’, 103:407 (1988), pp. 283-317; Prestwich and Davies, ‘Last Words on Geoffrey de Mandeville’, 105:416 (1990), pp. 670-2; Prestwich, ‘Geoffrey de Mandeville: A Further Comment’, 103:409 (1988), pp. 960-6.

<sup>202</sup> Newburgh, 1, 11, pp. 66-9; *GS*, 2, 81, pp. 160-1; Huntingdon, 10, 21-2, p. 742-7.

<sup>203</sup> Smail, pp. 22-4.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid*; Coulson, *Castles*, p. 224; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 110-2.

<sup>205</sup> These tactics were used by the Muslim armies and in particular Saladin but were usually not effective because of the Crusaders’ determination not to risk their army in battle and trust in their ‘passive strength’ of their fortifications. Smail, p. 24, 142-3; Amt, pp. 133-4; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 110-2.

<sup>206</sup> *‘sectatus uicinatorum agros depopulari’*, Orderic, 12, 13, pp. 218-21.

<sup>207</sup> Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 398, pp. 720-5; Green, *Henry I*, p. 78, 88-9.

mischief'.<sup>208</sup> After Stephen's coronation, Roger of Bampton 'grievously afflicted all his neighbours with fire and pillage' from his castle;<sup>209</sup> Reginald of Cornwall used his many castles to 'most grievously to oppress all supporters of the king that were in his neighbourhood';<sup>210</sup> Stephen targeted Robert of Gloucester's allies at Cary and Harptree in an attempt to temper their 'hostile acts'.<sup>211</sup> In the Great War of 1173-4, Henry II took Anceins and 'then laid waste the adjoining parts of the province with fire and sword; he also rooted up the vines and fruit-bearing trees'.<sup>212</sup> This pillaging tactic was damaging but it was considered 'a temporary disadvantage of minor importance so long as the castles and walled towns remained intact;' while these were still in his possession he retained his land regardless of its devastated state.<sup>213</sup>

As previously discussed, the location of castles influenced their design, but it was also a key factor in their use as a military resource.<sup>214</sup> Many were constructed on pre-existing fortifications, either Anglo-Saxon or Roman, utilising the predetermined and accepted defensive benefits of the location. The best example was Winchester where the Anglo-Saxons had used the Roman centre for their Wessex capital and the Norman conquerors settled their royal administration and treasury in the same place.<sup>215</sup> Additionally, Robert of Bellême repaired 'the fortress which Aetheflaed, the lady of the Mercians, had

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<sup>208</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; '*ut hostes quid mali facerent non invenirent*', Simeon (lat), 209, pp. 273-4; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 183-4, 186-7, 316-6.

<sup>209</sup> '*affines omnes igne et depraedatione uehementer uexabat*', *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31.

<sup>210</sup> '*regis quotquot e proximo fuerant, fautores grauissime coepit opprimere*', *GS*, 1, 48, pp. 100-3.

<sup>211</sup> '*quicquid durius et infestius possent in regem et suos, tanquam in comitis aduersarios*', *GS*, 1, 31, pp. 66-9; Worcester, pp. 248-51.

<sup>212</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 380-1; '*provinciamque circumjacentem igne et gladio devastavit, vineas et arbores fructiferas eradicavit*', Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 60-1.

<sup>213</sup> Smail, p. 25; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 110-2.

<sup>214</sup> Fry, *British Medieval Castles*, p. 14; Hollister, *Military Organisation*, p. 162.

<sup>215</sup> Evidence that the royal treasury was held at Winchester since Cnut and not moved until the 1180s. Biddle, pp. 290-1, 449-69. The best evidence of this re-use of sites for fortifications is the presence of pottery from Roman and Anglo-Saxon habitation. Archaeological reports detailing these finds at a variety of castles include: Darvill, 'Excavations on the Site of the Early Norman Castle at Gloucester', pp. 1-49; Lightfoot, 'Romney Castle', pp. 96-163; Renn, 'Keep of Wareham Castle', pp. 56-68; Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, 'Excavations in the West Bailey at Corfe Castle', pp. 29-55; Saunders, 'Lydford Castle', pp. 123-86; Thompson, 'The Origins of Bolingbroke Castle', pp. 152-8.

formerly built on the south side of the river Severn, at the place called, in the Saxon tongue, Briege [Bridgnorth], in the reign of her brother king Edward'.<sup>216</sup>

The personal element in determining the location for many castles has spurred some debate on whether castles were intentionally constructed along rivers and roads or in towns as a method of control.<sup>217</sup> Additionally, while a conscious decision to construct castles for national protection could be debated, the images in Appendix B illustrate that, regardless of intent, the castle's location along rivers like Rochester and Chepstow (figures 11 and 17 respectively), at ports like Dover, and in towns like Exeter (figure 18) could and did have a tactical benefit if only in a local sense.<sup>218</sup> Castles inserted into cities like Norwich or Lincoln expressed their control over the citizenry by destroying civic and residential buildings, and castles like Chepstow could regulate river traffic posing a threat to military advancement in the area. Royal castles in Cheshire and Shropshire helped control the Welsh marches; Devon and Cornwall were controlled by Launceston, Trematon, Okehampton and Totnes; Skipsea 'protected the exposed Yorkshire coast and Humber estuary, where Scandinavian invasion forces had landed in 1066 and 1069;' and Richmond could confront any Scottish invasion towards York.<sup>219</sup> However, not every castle had a 'military imperative'.<sup>220</sup> Liddiard has plausibly argued that the siting of a castle was not exclusively a military concern; 'the overwhelming majority of castles occupied lowland situations which provided ease of access to estates and efficient communications', and that the 'castle site represented some level of

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<sup>216</sup> Simeon (eng), p. 169; '*Arcem, quam in occidentali Sabrinae fluminis plaga, in loco qui Bricge dicitur lingua Saxonica, Agelfleda Merciorum domina quondam construxerat, fratre suo Eadwardo seniore regnante*', Simeon (lat), 183, p. 234; Worcester, pp. 98-101; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 193; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 159.

<sup>217</sup> Bowes castle was constructed 'to control the Roman road over Stainmoor against Scottish raiding instigated by William the Lion;' Richmond secured 'the Swale crossing and an entry to Gillingshire', Catterick controlled the 'Roman road crossing the Swale', Pickhill protected 'the hundred of Hallikeld' Aldborough secured 'the Ure crossing' and Hunsingore 'the Nidd crossing' and Tadcaster 'the crossing of the Wharfe'. On the other hand, he also points out that in certain locations where one would expect a castle, 'near Milby on the north bank of the Ure', there is no visible evidence one was ever built. Butler in Liddiard, pp. 101-2.

<sup>218</sup> Lowerre, 'Placing Castles in the Conquest', p. 180; Fry, *British Medieval Castles*, p. 14.

<sup>219</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 136-7.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid*; *King's Works*, vol. 2, p. 554.

compromise between the needs to protect property, administer estates and generate revenue. It is for this reason that so many castles lie adjacent to major roads or river crossings'.<sup>221</sup> Arundel, Bramber, Lewes, Pevensey and Hastings did not, according to Crouch, defend ports since Dover, Wareham and Southampton were the most used crossings.<sup>222</sup> On the other hand, these castles were given to the Conqueror's closest supporters and despite their lack of national military intent, 'every castle dominated its neighbourhood and, whatever its location, was essential to the maintenance of...overlordship' and this could increase their resourcefulness particularly in the Conquest.<sup>223</sup>

A lord could also rely on the number of castles for military strength with more resources at his disposal; the king of England could, theoretically, requisition all the castles in the realm as royal resources.<sup>224</sup> Thus, it can be argued that the number of castles, instead of their location, was a more decisive tactical consideration. A well-sited castle could be an invaluable resource in warfare; however, more castles, regardless of location, placed more resources at the disposal of the military commander, lord or king, and could influence military considerations on a larger scale. There are several examples in the chronicles of a number of castles in an area used to slow the advancement of conquest or solidify control and security, sometimes simultaneously. For example, despite losing Exmes and Château-Gontier to Henry I after Tinchebrai, Robert of Bellême remained confident in his remaining thirty-four castles in Normandy to continue his rebellion.<sup>225</sup> In 1123, at the beginning of Waleran of Meulan's rebellion, Henry I consolidated his power and increased his protection by fortifying his castles at Rouen, Caen, Arches, Gisors, Falaise, Argentan, Domfront,

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<sup>221</sup> Liddiard, *Castles in Context*, p. 123, and pp. 24-5.

<sup>222</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 136-7; *King's Works*, vol. 2, p. 554.

<sup>223</sup> Smail, p. 208; Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 136-7.

<sup>224</sup> Rendability will be discussed in a later chapter. Hollister, *Military Organisation*, p. 162.

<sup>225</sup> 'Adhuc xxxiiii firmissimas munitiones habeo, unde molestissimas infestationes inuasori profecto inferre potero', Orderic, 11, 22, pp. 94-5.

Oxismes, Ambret, Vavaire, Vir, and Vernon.<sup>226</sup> Waleran himself used a number of castles as defensive resources forcing Henry to capture Vatteville, Brionne, Beaumont, and Pontaudomar in order to break his lordship and power.<sup>227</sup> After Henry I's death, Geoffrey of Anjou needed to capture Aunay, Mortaigne, Tinchebrai, and Cerences before gaining control over large parts of Normandy. He was successful by 1141 but in order to reinforce his control over the duchy, he also needed to take St. Hilaire, Brichessart, Bastonbourg, Trévières, Castel de Vire, Plaiseiz, and Villers and did so by 1145.<sup>228</sup> Robert of Gloucester's supporters and their numerous castles presented a strong resistance to Stephen essentially dividing the country in half. Henry of Huntingdon listed some enabling one to imagine a block of local and regional resistance to the crown:

For a certain traitor, Talbot by name, held the castle of Hereford in Wales... Earl Robert, the bastard son of King Henry, held against him the very strong castle which is called Bristol, and another which is called Leeds. William {*recte* Ralph} Lovel held the castle at Cary. Paynel the castle at Ludlow. William de Mohun the castle at Dunster. Robert of Lincoln the castle at Wareham. Eustace Fitz John the castle at Malton. William Fitz Alan the castle at Shrewsbury... [and] Walkelin, who was holding the castle at Dover.<sup>229</sup>

When Oxford submitted to the Empress in 1141, she received 'homage of the whole city and of the surrounding region' demonstrating this one castle's local and regional position.<sup>230</sup>

However, to increase her military strength in the region, the Empress fortified castles around Oxford at Woodstock, Radcot, Cirencester, and Bampton; one was clearly not enough.<sup>231</sup> In

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<sup>226</sup> Torigni, vol. 4, pp. 105-7, 169-71; Green, *Henry I*, p. 183. For the reasons of Waleran's rebellion see Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 4, 15-8, and Robert's loyalty pp. 24, 27; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 83-4, 183-4.

<sup>227</sup> ASC, E, p. 190; GND, 8, 22, pp. 236-7; Huntingdon, 7, 35, p. 470-3; Discussion of siege and importance of these castles in detail: Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 4, 17-23; Green, *Henry I*, p. 187.

<sup>228</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 3, 74, pp. 124-7; Haskins, 'Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet', pp. 420-2.

<sup>229</sup> '*proditor nomine Talebot tenuit contra regem castellum Herefordie in Wales... Robertus consul, filius Henrici regis nothus, tenuit contra eum fortissimum castellum, quod uocatur Bristoue, et aliud, quod uocatur Slede. Willelmus Luuel tenuit castellum de Cari. Paganellus castellum de Ludelaue. Willelmus de Moium castellum de Dunestor. Robertus de Nicole castellum de Wariiam. Eustacius filius lohannis castellum de Mealtune. Willelmus filius Alani castellum de Salopesbiri... Walchelinus, qui tenebat castellum de Doure*', Huntingdon, 10, 7, p. 712-3.

<sup>230</sup> '*totiusque ciuitatis et circumiacentis regionis suscepit dominium atque hominum*', Worcester, pp. 294-5; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 771-5.

<sup>231</sup> *GS*, 2, 69, pp. 138-9.

1189, Richard and King Philip of France attacked Henry II's castles at Mont-Double, Trou, de Rocher, Montoire, Carciere, Chateau-du-Loir, Chaumont, Amboise, Roche-corbon, and Beaumont.<sup>232</sup> These castles were crucial in controlling the area around Tours and Le Mans and their fall left Henry with little choice but surrender. This use of the castle was repeated by many lords across the century. Even the ill-fated Robert Fitz Hurbert attempted to gain multiple castles in 1140 with the aim of controlling a larger region and protecting his power.<sup>233</sup> . According to Gerald of Wales in his work on the conquest of Ireland, it was,

...far, far better to begin by gradually connecting up a system of castles built in suitable places and by proceeding cautiously with their construction, than to build large numbers of castles at great distances from each other, sited haphazardly in various locations, without their forming any coherent system if mutual support or being able to relieve each other in times of crisis.<sup>234</sup>

This passage demonstrates that location and style were crucial for each castle but also for a defensive network on the whole. While each castle was individually and locally situated, and were strategically important in terms of their location, their number and position in relation to others was important in relation to the success of conquest and crucial to their use as resources to protect and control vulnerable areas.

Another similar issue was their role along borders or divisions between lands. This could mean between kingdoms like Scotland and England or between the territory of lords and magnates. But there has been some debate concerning the purpose of border castles and whether castles along such a line of demarcation was meant to deter enemy forces. While examining the tactics of the crusades, Smail argued that the ease with which Muslim forces bypassed several castles at the end of the twelfth century illustrated the 'inability of

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<sup>232</sup> Wendover, p. 73.

<sup>233</sup> *GS*, 1, 43, pp. 92-5, 104-5; Worcester, pp. 284-91; Malmesbury, *HN*, 485, pp. 43.

<sup>234</sup> '*Satius enim est, et longe satius, paulatim primo locis idoneis castra conserere, et quasi pedetemptim in eorundem constructione procedere, quam intervallis distancia magnis, variis passim locis, multa construere nec invicem sibi vel coherencia vel necessitatis articulis opitulancia*', Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 38, pp. 248-9.

fortresses to check the advance of an enemy force'.<sup>235</sup> His argument suggests that these castles and their garrisons were not constructed to protect the passes or even to stop the movement of troops, but to control territory, be economic bases, and exert lordship.<sup>236</sup> For him, this explains the lack of castles along passes and the border between the kingdom of Jerusalem and its Saracen enemies. He does acknowledge that some castles like those in Galilee were constructed with a concern for the frontier but that their purpose was in controlling the frequent raids and not in 'preventing any permanent reduction' of the region and enabling the Crusaders to meet the enemy before they penetrated too far.<sup>237</sup> Ellenblum concluded that Crusader castles were constructed in three phases and the 'cost of castle building increased in a direct ratio to their potential of being besieged and the potential length of the siege warfare'.<sup>238</sup> Together, these historians propose that castles in the Holy Land were not constructed along borders necessarily but that their construction, size, and design were influenced by expected foreign invasion. What do their conclusions mean for castles along England's borders with Wales and Scotland?

Before answering this question, 'border' as a concept needs to be addressed. It was not a solid construct in this period but the possession of territory was.<sup>239</sup> When Stephen granted to Henry, son of the king of Scotland, the earldom of Northumberland after the battle of the Standard in 1138, it extended Henry's, not Scotland's, control.<sup>240</sup> After the Scottish invasion in 1173/4 and with the treaty of Falaise, Henry II regained possession of

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<sup>235</sup> Smail, p. 140; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 110-2.

<sup>236</sup> Smail, pp. 204-8, and 'Crusaders' Castles of the Twelfth Century,' pp. 136-8, 140; Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 110-2, 118-9.

<sup>237</sup> Smail, p. 208.

<sup>238</sup> Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, p. 192, further discussion of these three phases (pp. 170-92), and arguments against Smail (pp. 165-70).

<sup>239</sup> Long discussion on medieval and modern ideas of 'border' and how without the modern concept of the 'state' it is hard to discuss 'borders'. Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 123-5, 145. Smail even admits, despite his arguments quoted above, that the authority of the Crusaders was 'represented on the map not as an area bounded by frontier line, but as a series of points which were their fortified places'. 'Crusaders' Castles of the Twelfth Century,' p. 143.

<sup>240</sup> Hexham (eng), p. 76; Hexham (lat), p. 177.

these castles removing the Scottish king's influence and increasing his own.<sup>241</sup> This individual control of territory by barons and kings created hundreds of borders – divisions between jurisdictions be they royal, baronial, or ecclesiastical – between areas of power and lordship. A magnate's 'self-defined patch of lordship gave borders to his own little political world'.<sup>242</sup>

Using the map in Appendix B, figure 5, a discernable difference in the quantity of castles along the Welsh and Scottish borders is apparent, with the latter parallel to the kingdom of Jerusalem (Appendix B, figure 19). The Scots invaded at least three times in the twelfth century, jeopardising the security of the castles and lands along the border; so why were there more castles in the Welsh Marches? If the castle was intended to stop invading armies, then surely the situation should be reversed. If we apply Smail's thesis, the densely encastellated Marches existed because of a greater need to control the locality; the frequent threat of uprising or raids meant that Marcher lords needed several defensible positions for personal and territorial security. The eleventh- and twelfth-century circumstances in this region assumed a localised concern for protection and not a national one defending England from Welsh invasions. Therefore, while these castles were located on the 'border' they were intended for primarily local concerns.

There are several chronicle passages discussing the construction of and attacks on Norman castles in Wales demonstrating their local and regional resourcefulness. Welsh attacks on these castles were intended to counter Anglo-Norman power and lordship and attempt to replace it. This is particularly evident in 1116 when Gruffyth ap Rhys rebelled after Henry I denied him the inheritance of his father's honours.<sup>243</sup> Every twelfth-century

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<sup>241</sup> These castles include Roxburgh, Berwick, Jedburgh, Edinburgh, and Stirling. Warren, *Henry II*, pp. 135-9, 185-6; Strickland, pp. 204, 219-20; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 595-600.

<sup>242</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 133-4.

<sup>243</sup> Worcester, pp. 138-9; Simeon (eng), p. 181; Simeon (lat), 194, p. 249.

royal incursion into Wales concluded with the construction or repair of castles to increase English power and security.<sup>244</sup> Welsh invasions into England after 1066 were rare; arguably, until the thirteenth century, they lacked the military unity and strength to pose a universal threat to the Marcher lords. Typically, Welsh raiding tactics targeted livestock and other supplies and castles were capable of managing this type of local disturbance. On the other hand, and applying Smail's concept, if the Welsh decided to invade and did not reduce (capture in siege) every castle along the way, they would have been confronted with far too many castles locally whose garrisons would immediately confront any army raised.<sup>245</sup> That is not to say that the Marcher castles were intended to defend the Welsh border; they could, but their primary function was as the military resource to protect the land, power, and lordship of their possessors on a local level.

Conversely, the kings of Scotland had far fewer castles to deal with, more similar to the conditions in the Holy Land, but these did include several powerful royal castles including Carlisle, Wark, Alnwick, Bamburgh, and Newcastle. When the Scots invaded, the northern barons, would 'retire' to their castles taking in supplies like livestock and crops; the invaders could either reduce every castle or ignore them and move on. When David invaded England in 1138 and William during the Great War of 1173-4, they chose to confront almost every castle. In both situations, their siege operations slowed their progression and enabled Stephen and Henry II's magnates to gather a force and move against them. On the other hand, if they had pressed through without taking castles, the garrisons could block any retreat when they finally did face an English army.<sup>246</sup> David and William conceivably chose the first strategy because southern advancement was not the primary concern; their aim was

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<sup>244</sup> Henry I: Simeon (eng), pp. 181, 190; Simeon (lat), 194 and 202, pp. 249, 263-4; Worcester, pp. 220-1, 228-9; ASC, E, p. 183. Henry II: Torigni, pp. 195, 222, 226. Lack of evidence from Stephen's reign because he did not lead a royal incursion into Wales.

<sup>245</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 71-2.

<sup>246</sup> Painter, pp. 129-30.

to gain control of northern territory through castle possession. So long as they remained in opposition, these castles could prevent a permanent Scottish conquest and, as at the battle of the Standard in 1138, their garrison could help confront the enemy before they penetrated too far south. Unlike the Welsh Marcher castles, these northern ones did not have a constantly rebellious population to restrain but they still controlled and defended territory, even against an invading force.

The castle provided a strong and safe location for their possessors from each other, a higher authority, or a subjugated majority. We see this vulnerability and refuge in several chronicles. According to Orderic, Walter Tirel fled after killing William Rufus to ‘his castles in France, where he laughed in safety at the threats and curses of those who wished to harm him’.<sup>247</sup> After being chastised in Henry I’s court in 1102, Robert of Bellême realised he could not appease the king or clear his name and Orderic recorded that he ‘fled, panic-stricken and breathless, to his castles;’ Robert refused the king’s subsequent order to return to court and ‘strengthened the ramparts and walls of his castles everywhere’.<sup>248</sup> He fortified his castles for war but they were his refuge and illustrate his vulnerability against the king. After the battle of the Standard in 1138, Eustace Fitz John is recorded to have ‘barely escaped alive to this castle [Malton];’ similarly, ‘the [Scottish] king’s son [Henry] with only one knight reached Carlisle on foot, and the father barely escaped through woods and defiles to Roxburgh’.<sup>249</sup> When Stephen came to the throne, John of Worcester recorded that:

The rich nobles of the kingdom, in their affluence and wealth, are not in the least bothered by the way the poor are unjustly treated. They care only for themselves

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<sup>247</sup> ‘*pelagoque transito munitiones quas in Gallia possidebat expetiit, ibique minas et maledictiones maliuolentium tutus irrisit*’, Orderic, 10, 15, pp. 292-3.

<sup>248</sup> ‘*Cumque Rodbertus licentiam ut moris est eundi ad consilium cum suis postulasset, eademque accepta egressus purgari se de obiectis criminibus non possee agnouisset equis celeriter ascensis ad castella sua pavidus et anhelus confugit...sed ille uenire prorsus refutauit immo castella sua uallis et mûris undique muniuit*’, Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9.

<sup>249</sup> ‘*qui uix cum uita ad castellum suum uulneratus aufugit*’, and ‘*Filius autem regis cum uno tantum milite ad Carlor pedes uenit, patre ad Rokesburh per siluas et saltus uix euadente*’, Worcester, pp. 254-5.

and theirs. They store castles and towns with necessary provisions. They garrison them with armed followers. They fear any change in the kingdom.<sup>250</sup>

This chronicle is recognising the nobles' use of castles to protect themselves against the populace and the possible chaos of the interregnum. In each of these examples the castle was the tool with which the nobles attempted to reverse their vulnerability. Because of their uncertainty on how Stephen's intentions and legitimacy, or Matilda's actions, would affect their positions and safety, some nobles 'hung back around their castles'.<sup>251</sup> Secure in these fortifications, these nobles safeguarded their positions until they decided which side to support or until the king acted against them. By remaining in their castles, they demonstrate that the fortification was a refuge but also a symbol of strength. The undecided barons could present a strong front to the king who both needed and feared their castles. By fortifying and hesitating, these barons made their castles symbols of their possible resistance or support.

### Military Technology

This chapter has demonstrated that castles were military resources; consequently, they were influential in the development of military technology through their capacity as a target. In a circular evolution of technological advancement, siege tactics and fortifications (particularly castles in this period) attempted to overcome the other. While the extent to which medieval siege engines and tactics were influenced by Roman ones has been debated for decades, the specific requirements of taking the castle meant that new tactics and engines, like the counter-weight trebuchet, were developed in the twelfth century.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> *'Opulenti regni optimates diuitiis affluentes minime procurant quam impie tractentur miseri. Sibi suisque dumtaxat consulunt. Vite necessariis castella et oppida muniunt; manu militari cum armis instruunt. Timent regni mutationem'*, Worcester, pp. 216-7.

<sup>251</sup> *'diu se circa castella sua reprimentes'*, *GS*, 1, 12, pp. 22-3.

<sup>252</sup> For information on the use of Vegetius in the Middle Ages see: B.S. Bachrach, 'The Practical Use of Vegetius' *De Re Militari* During the Early Middle Ages', *Historian* 47:2 (1985), pp. 239-55; M.L.D. Reynolds, *Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics* (Oxford, 1983); C.T. Allmand, *The De Re Militari of Vegetius: The Reception, Transmission and Legacy of Roman Text in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2011).

Consequently, the tactics of besieging a fortified site remained constant, and the Middle Ages witnessed an evolution of both fortification technology and siege equipment which culminated in the development of gunpowder and the cannon, rendering the castle militarily redundant.

A castle could fall through negotiation prior to conflict, treachery, blockade, and direct attack, and almost all sieges involved a combination.<sup>253</sup> The first two do not require much explanation; a castle could negotiate surrender before a siege began or it could be betrayed from the inside at any stage. Examples of the latter are rare in this period but a significant one occurred in 1153 at Malmesbury. When Stephen confronted Henry Fitz Empress during his siege of this castle, they agreed to avoid battle and destroy the castle. However, the royal castellan defied this agreement and, instead of destroying it as ordered, presented it to Henry.<sup>254</sup> The fall of a castle through negotiations prior to conflict occurred far more frequently. Two such examples include the surrender of the city and citadel of Caen to Henry I in 1105 in the hopes of avoiding the same fate as the devastated Bayeux and the surrender of Baldwin de Redvers' castle of Plympton to Stephen while he was besieging Exeter in 1136.<sup>255</sup>

The other two methods of taking a castle (blockade and direct attack, or storm) were the standard actions of siege warfare, yet the duration of the former depended on the intensity of the latter. All castles, even the basic motte-and-bailey and especially any constructed in stone, had a great short-term advantage over besiegers. The design and material typically complicated a direct attack strategy and their advantage centred on their pre-siege preparations and an adequate supply of water and food. The use of a blockade was common at all sieges since denying the garrison reinforcements or resupply was consistently

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<sup>253</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, p. 132; Keen, *Laws of War*, p. 119.

<sup>254</sup> *GS*, 2, 119, pp. 232-3; Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 122-5.

<sup>255</sup> Caen: Worcester, pp. 106-9; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 87, 159. Plympton: *GS*, 1, 17 and 21, pp. 34-9, 44-5.

effective and extreme measures were sometimes taken. In 1113, to take the castle at Alençon, Fulk of Anjou achieved his objective by cutting ‘off the water supply of the besieged by tunnelling underground and secretly cutting the pipes’, and the ‘men besieged in the citadel, seeing that their food was failing and that no help came from any quarter, made peace’.<sup>256</sup> The effectiveness and relatively low effort needed to blockade a castle meant it was a popular method.

But so long as the castle’s provisions and particularly water lasted, blockades could drag on for months, or in the case of Wallingford over a decade, allowing a relieving force time to arrive. In order to gather supplies, or to prevent a garrison from doing so, ravaging tactics were employed prior to and during a siege. Strickland has plausibly argued that ‘ravaging...was the most common manifestation of medieval warfare, and arguably the most fundamental of all its forms’.<sup>257</sup> Some chronicled examples have already been presented but the sources are rife with both sides executing this tactic.<sup>258</sup> One of Henry I’s rebellious Norman barons, Hugh de Gournay, fortified his castles at Gournay, La Ferté-en-Bray, and Gaillefontaine and ‘laid waste the whole region between the Seine and the sea with fire and plunder’.<sup>259</sup> Geoffrey of Anjou, in his attempt to gain Caen, ‘laid waste the region all around, and tried to tempt the garrison out of the castle’.<sup>260</sup> He continued this tactic throughout Normandy and ‘devastated and laid waste many districts’.<sup>261</sup> In the Great War,

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<sup>256</sup> *‘eisque aquam per subterranea machinamenta occultis abscisionibus abstulit...Illi uero qui clauderantur in arce uidentes sibi cibaria deesse, nullumque auxilium ex aliqua parte prouenire pacem fecerunt’*, Orderic, 12, 8, pp. 206-9.

<sup>257</sup> Strickland, pp. 259-90.

<sup>258</sup> For example: Worcester, pp. 261-7, 250-1; *ASC*, E, p. 179; *GS*, 1, 14 and 31 and 45 and 113, pp. 28-31, 66-9, 96-7, 218-9, and 2, 69, pp. 138-9. Similarly to their use of ‘impregnable fortified’, reference to pillaging, burning, and laying-waste occur so often without variation that they could be literary tropes. That they are included when a castle is fortified is significant to the process of fortification but not necessarily to the reality of the accompanying violence.

<sup>259</sup> *‘et castella sua Gornacum et Firmitatem atque Goisleni Pontem militibus et armis muniuit, et incendiis ac rapinis inter Sequanam et pelagus totam regionem oppido deuastauit’*, Orderic, 12, 3, pp. 190-5.

<sup>260</sup> *‘prouinciam undique depopulati sunt: et castrenses extrahere de munitione conati sunt’*, Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 514-7.

<sup>261</sup> *‘plurimas regiones depraedavit ac destruxit’*, Hexham (eng), p. 57; Hexham (lat), pp. 145-6.

William of Scotland left part of his army to besiege Carlisle while the rest ‘passed through Northumberland, ravaging the lands’ leaving Robert de Vaus, castellan of Carlisle, with dwindling supplies.<sup>262</sup> Denying one’s enemy supplies was violent but it was clearly a necessary military tactic for either side respectively.

The standard siege strategy was a blockade in conjunction with direct assaults. The highly developed Roman fortifications and city walls required the use of machines like the traction trebuchet and mangonel. Subsequent political authorities could not maintain such structures and they were typically replaced by wood and earthwork defences like the Anglo-Saxon burhs. This less advanced fortification was paralleled by less advanced tactics with manpower and fire adequate to take such a fortification. By the twelfth century, the strength of the castle had increased from the motte-and-bailey, to the inclusion of barbicans, mural towers, and concentric walls making the complex stronger and far more resistant to conventional methods of attack. The development of the castle and its material and design enhancements meant that siege tactics and techniques had to evolve. Twelfth-century sieges utilised ancient engines like the mangonel, trebuchet, battering rams, and siege towers and combined them with sapping, or undermining a tower, gate, or wall forcing it to collapse on itself.<sup>263</sup>

In 1123, when besieging Pontaudomar, Henry I,

...perceiving that he was not succeeding as he expected, erected a wooden tower, which they call Berfreit. This being brought to the castle by mechanical skill, the besiegers showered down from it, from above, arrows and great masses of stone. This fabric from which the archers and slingers fought, towered twenty-four feet in height above the wall of the fortress.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>262</sup> ‘*perambulavit Northimbriam, terram...devastans*’, Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 379-80; Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 60.

<sup>263</sup> Bradbury, *Stephen*, pp. 73-4; Coulson, *Castles*, p. 121. See Appendix B, figures 20-5 for illustrations of these siege engines and tactics.

<sup>264</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; ‘*Videns autem rex se non ut disposuerat proficere, ligneam turrin quam Berfreit vocant erexit. Qua ad castellum arte deducta, desuper praeliatores sagittas et ingentes lapidum moles super inclusos jaciebant. Altitudine xxiv. pedum super murum praesidii eminebat machina, unde sagittarii et alabastarii praeliabantur*’, Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 209, pp. 273-4.

This is a very detailed description of what we would recognise as a siege tower and it was employed to speed up the progress of the siege. Henry also built ‘machines’ against Bridgnorth in 1102<sup>265</sup> and at Alençon ‘battered the castle with heavy showers of stones’.<sup>266</sup> We have a description stating that Robert Fitz Hubert used ‘scaling-ladders strongly and skilfully made of leather’ against Devizes in 1138.<sup>267</sup> In 1173, the king of France used ‘engines of war’ against Verneuil<sup>268</sup> and Henry II used ‘stone engines, and other engines of war’ against Dol.<sup>269</sup> Henry II’s son Richard is recorded to have used ‘engines of war’ against Châtillon in 1175.<sup>270</sup> Typically, engines and tactics were combined to increase the pressure on the castle and garrison. At Malmesbury in 1153, Duke Henry ordered his men to ‘assail the defenders with arrows and missiles, [and] others to devote all their efforts to demolishing the wall’<sup>271</sup> and, Wallingford was ‘battered perpetually by the heaviest assaults from the king’s party’.<sup>272</sup>

From these passages we can see the varied tactics and engines used to besiege castles, but they also demonstrate a linguistic issue. Modern historians struggle when identifying siege engines because of a lack of consistent or descriptive terminology by chroniclers. When describing Stephen’s siege of Castle Cary in 1138, the author of the *Gesta Stephani*, who is one of the more descriptive, says that the king gained the garrison’s

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<sup>265</sup> ‘machinas’, Worcester, pp. 100-3; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4; ‘machinas’, Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60.

<sup>266</sup> ‘saxorum ictibus munimentum contriuerunt’, Orderic, 12, 4, pp. 194-7.

<sup>267</sup> ‘ornanter et inexpugnabiliter muratum, tensis a muri propugnaculo scalis usque ad imum ex corio firme et ingeniose contextis’, *GS*, 1, 49, pp. 104-5.

<sup>268</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2; ‘machinae suas bellicae’, and ‘machinae illius bellicae’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51.

<sup>269</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 372; ‘parari perarias suas et alias machinas bellicas’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 51-2.

<sup>270</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 402; ‘machinis suis bellicis’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 83.

<sup>271</sup> ‘quantius alii sagittis et missilibus obsistentes impeterent, alii ad murum diruendum attentius desudarent’, *GS*, 2, 118, pp. 230-1. No further description of how the soldiers attacked the wall is given; engines are not mentioned here but sapping is possible.

<sup>272</sup> ‘quam graui regalium incursione continuatim oppressam’, *GS*, 2, 117, pp. 228-31. Again, no clear description of how they were battered and what sort of heavy assaults were used.

surrender ‘since his engine scattered fire and showers of stones among the besieged and the pressure went on until their rations ran short (*balistisque ignem et lapidum imbres inter inclusos, adempta cessatione, discutientibus, usque ad escarum indigentiam uexatos*)’.<sup>273</sup> This is an example of a blockade and an assault being used together; but, we are not told what the engine was, simply that it could hurl fire and stones. The word used was ‘*balistis*’ but this is a general term for a large military engine which throws missiles: was this a trebuchet or a mangonel? At Lincoln in 1141 the *Gesta Stephani* described the use of ‘catapults and other siege engines of different sorts (*includebantur balistis et aliis diuersi studii machinis*)’<sup>274</sup> and William of Newburgh said Stephen used siege-works (*munitionem*),<sup>275</sup> he also used *machinis* at Trowbridge in 1139,<sup>276</sup> against Robert of Gloucester’s siege-castles blockading Malmesbury in 1144,<sup>277</sup> and at Faringdon in 1145.<sup>278</sup> No other chronicle provides a further description of these siege engines and the word used to describe them, *machinis*, simply means ‘machine’ or ‘engine’ and is too vague to be helpful.

There are many possibilities for siege engines in Latin including *catapulta*, *fundibulum*, *fundibalum*, and *scorpio* for catapult, *machinamentum*, *machina* for siege engine, and *ballista*; yet authors tend to use *machina* or machines and simply mention siege engines, which could have any of the above including siege towers, without any further description of what they were capable of or how they were specifically employed. When describing the siege of Shrewsbury in 1138, John of Worcester said that a ‘large structure of wood was put together and brought forward (*ut ferunt qui nouerant, talis paratur machina*)’.<sup>279</sup> It is clear that the engine was a wooden structure which could be moved; there

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<sup>273</sup> *GS*, 1, 31, pp. 66-9.

<sup>274</sup> *GS*, 1, 54, pp. 110-5.

<sup>275</sup> ‘*munitionem*’ can also mean fortifications so this was plausibly earthworks, palisades, or even a siege-castle. Newburgh, 1, 13, pp. 72-3.

<sup>276</sup> *GS*, 1, 45, pp. 96-7.

<sup>277</sup> *GS*, 2, 88, pp. 172-3.

<sup>278</sup> *GS*, 2, 94, pp. 182-5.

<sup>279</sup> Worcester, pp. 248-51.

is no information about how the machine was used or its effectiveness. Was this a siege tower, catapult, or ram? Additionally, the ‘gate was forced open by the royal onslaught (*Regia ui porta aperitur*)’ but no more details are provided; was a battering ram employed or simple manpower?<sup>280</sup> At Stephen’s siege of Corfe in 1139, he ‘lingered for a very long time, thinking to reduce the enemy by siege-engines or starve them out (*ibique tempore diutissimo commorans, dum hostes aut machinis affligere aut fama afficere putabat*);’ while he did neither, no further information about these engines was provided.<sup>281</sup> What this linguistic ambiguity means is that determining what engines or tactics were used is very difficult. However, it is still possible to understand from their use that they were necessary demonstrating the level of fortification of the castle and its importance.

But why were all these different techniques needed in order to capture a castle? Once stone became the material of choice in the twelfth century, more advanced techniques were needed. Stone-throwing machines could damage or destroy stone walls, sapping could undermine the foundations of a tower or wall causing them to collapse, ramming machines could attack the gates which were still wooden and vulnerable, and finally, siege-castles could protect the army and provide a base of operations for the blockade. Additionally, castles were not passive in their defence: to protect themselves, castle owners and designers introduced murder holes (located above a gate passage to attack besiegers from above), multiple-portcullis gatehouses, rounded towers to avoid blind spots, rubble-filled walls to absorb impact from missiles, hoardings to protect the garrison defending the wall, and concentric walls forcing the enemy to break through more than one set of defences. At Argentan, knowing he would have to face Henry I at some point, William Talvas ‘enlarged the moats of Argentan and... greatly strengthened the defences of that fortress’.<sup>282</sup> Tactics

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<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> *GS*, 1, 39, pp. 84-5.

<sup>282</sup> ‘*fossa Argentomi augmentauit, et oppidum illud futurorum nescius summopere, muniuit*’, Orderic, 13, 18, pp. 444-7.

such as countermining were also employed and some castles even had siege engines of their own located on towers or in the bailey.<sup>283</sup> Siege engines are reported within Arundel and Tickhill during Robert of Bellême's rebellion in 1102,<sup>284</sup> and Geoffrey Talbot placed 'catapults' in the tower of the church near Hereford in 1140.<sup>285</sup> The physical attributes like rounded towers, concentric walls, or murder holes advanced the castle as a fortified site enabling it to better deal with the conventions of siege warfare and the possibility of attack.<sup>286</sup> One has but to compare the early motte-and-baileys of the Conquest with Orford and the concentric Edwardian castles in Wales to see this active technological development.<sup>287</sup> This advancement increased the defensibility of the site forcing besiegers to develop their tactics and employ engines for which there had been no use before.

The interplay between defensive and offensive siege technologies and tactics is well illustrated by the 1180 siege of Geoffrey de Rancon at Tailleburg by Richard, duke of Aquitaine. Tailleburg was

...defended by three moats and walls, besides arms of all kinds, bolts, and bars; it was crowned with turrets placed at intervals, and had a large quantity of stones on its battlements, besides stores of provisions, and number of knights and experienced soldiers...it entertained no fear from duke Richard's approach.<sup>288</sup>

These defensive tactics had to be countered by Richard if he was going to be successful in punishing this rebellious baron. He 'invaded its territory with more than a lion's fury, carried off the produce, cut down the vines, burned the villages, and demolished everything', eliminating the possibilities of resupply to the garrison. He then 'erected machines against

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<sup>283</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 48.

<sup>284</sup> Worcester, pp. 100-3; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 844-5.

<sup>285</sup> 'balistas', *GS*, 1, 53, pp. 110-1.

<sup>286</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 77.

<sup>287</sup> Fry, *British Medieval Castles*, p. 12.

<sup>288</sup> Wendover (eng), pp. 48-9; '*triplici fossato totidemque moeniis vestitum, seris, armis et repagulis sufficienter instructum, turribus per intervalla dispositis insignitum, comportato lapide in propugnaculis munitum, abundans in victualibus, refertum militibus et hominum millibus ad pugnam idoneis, ducis Richardi non expavit adventum*', Wendover (lat), pp. 124-6.

the walls'.<sup>289</sup> Despite the garrison's sally attempt, which was repulsed, Richard was successful in taking this castle and 'the fair walls were levelled with the ground'.<sup>290</sup>

One exemplar of technological development was the counterweight trebuchet (Appendix B, figure 25); the only siege engine originating from the Middle Ages.<sup>291</sup> The earliest use of the word 'trebuchet' was '*trabuchis*' found in the account of the siege of Castelnuovo Bocca d'Adda in 1199 and this has been used as evidence for the first appearance and invention of the counterweight trebuchet in Europe.<sup>292</sup> There are even remarks made by chroniclers describing certain siege engines as 'new' inventions or machines which have been thought to mean counterweight trebuchets.<sup>293</sup> The demonstrated inconsistent terminology for siege engines has caused dating problems for this engine and 'conclusive proof' is only available in the thirteenth century when the word 'trebuchet' – like *trebus*, *triboke*, *trabuchetum*, *trabocco* which were more common after 1220 – and pictorial evidence increased confidence in identification.<sup>294</sup> It is universally agreed by modern historians that it was used on a regular basis at the beginning of the thirteenth century. If that is the case, then its development must have occurred in the twelfth. Whether this was in response to the castle may not ever be possible to prove; however, its invention does demonstrate the influence the castle had on the period and the development of siege techniques and engines.

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<sup>289</sup> '*postquam dux ipse leonibus audacior regionem hostiliter introivit, fructus praediorum abduxit, vites succidit, villas succendit, omnia demoliendo contrivit...machinas prope murum erexit*', Ibid both.

<sup>290</sup> '*facies murorum pulcherrima complanatur*', Ibid both.

<sup>291</sup> Warner, *Sieges of the Middle Ages*, p. 206; Gravett, *Medieval Siege Warfare*, p. 49; Bradbury, *Siege*, pp. 254, 261-2.

<sup>292</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, p. 122; D.R. Hill, 'Trebuchets', *Viator* 4 (1973), pp. 103-4; Introduction date ranges from 1180-1220: J. and F. Gies, *Life in a Medieval Castle* (New York, 1974), pp. 145-6.

<sup>293</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, pp. 115, 123.

<sup>294</sup> Bradbury, *Siege*, pp. 260-3; 'English sources do not use the term 'trebuchet' much in the thirteenth century...The great engine which Edward I was so anxious to use against Stirling in 1304 is described by a chronicler as *immensis tormentis* and by neutral terms in the records'. France, *Western Warfare*, p. 123.

Another tactic developed in response to the castle was the counter- or siege-castle. A common tactic used throughout medieval Europe, it was essentially a fortification used to contain and assault a targeted castle and to protect the besieging army.<sup>295</sup> Siege-castles were most commonly used in long-term sieges and blockades, when the destruction of the target was not the objective and the continuous presence of a large army was not maintainable. Some siege-castles were built extremely close to their target to conduct a blockade, while others were built much farther away to protect the lands previously ravaged by the castle.<sup>296</sup>

Siege-castles were common in the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum and particularly favoured during Stephen's reign. So many castles rebelled against him concurrently that he needed a tactic to restrict the influence of those he could not continuously besiege directly. The most siege-castles are found at Wallingford where Stephen constructed at least two castles (some records say five) early in his reign and left them for the duration intent on gaining and reducing this important Angevin castle.<sup>297</sup> Matilda and Robert of Gloucester constructed several against Stephen's castles with one 'unifying function; to challenge the lordship...embodied in the royalist castle'.<sup>298</sup> However, since Matilda wanted to claim the royal castles and the power and lordship they represented, she was not interested in destroying them but 'rather to obtain their peaceful surrender with the minimum of damage so that such castles could then become symbols of her rightful authority'.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> Examples of this tactic used during the Crusades include Malregard built by Bohemund and La Mahomerie built by Raymond of Toulouse during the siege of Antioch. Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, pp. 196-7; T. Asbridge, 'The Principality of Antioch and the Jabal as-Summaq', in J. Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact* (Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 144; H. Kennedy, *Crusader Castles* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 21.

<sup>296</sup> Speight, 'Castle Warfare', pp. 270-1.

<sup>297</sup> *GS*, 1, 42, pp. 90-3, 228-31, 236-9; Malmesbury, *HN*, 483, pp. 42; Worcester, pp. 270-3.

<sup>298</sup> Speight, 'Castle Warfare', pp. 270-1.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*

In order for the target castle to re-establish its power and lordship, the siege-castle needed to be destroyed.<sup>300</sup> A castle is always described as surrendering, or passing to another's possession, whereas siege-castles are simply destroyed, or abandoned, when their objective is complete. Some castles have left no remains and could have been built for a temporary purpose but they were still multifunctional resources; conversely, the entire purpose of a siege-castle was to threaten a castle as a temporary tactic and it was never intended to remain beyond the siege as a permanent solution. Like trebuchets, siege-towers, mangonels, battering rams, or sapping, the siege-castle was constructed on site and then dismantled once it served its purpose. The materials might be transported elsewhere and reassembled into another siege-castle, but this only clearly designates it as a temporary military tactic.

While siege-castles were fortifications and threatened the target castle's lordship, a castle was typically described as fortified against someone; a siege-castle is always described as fortified against a castle. At Arundel in 1102, the chronicles record that Henry I 'set up castles in front of it (*castellis ante illud firmatis, recessit*)',<sup>301</sup> 'planted fortresses before it (*et castellis ante illud firmatis recessit*)',<sup>302</sup> and 'built castles in front of it (*castellis ante illud constructis*)'.<sup>303</sup> Realising that Wallingford was well fortified and prepared for a very long siege, Stephen planned 'to build two castles there and place in them a sufficient number of his men to maintain the siege (*ut duobus ibi constructis castellis suisque ad obsistendum sufficienter impositis*)'.<sup>304</sup> Other chroniclers corroborate this<sup>305</sup> When Duke Henry relieved Wallingford in 1153 he faced these siege-castles: 'Wallingford, which was being very closely besieged with two castles built in its neighbourhood (*ad Walengefordiam,*

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid, p. 273.

<sup>301</sup> Worcester, pp. 100-3.

<sup>302</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234.

<sup>303</sup> Huntingdon, 7, 24, p. 450-1.

<sup>304</sup> GS, 1, 42, pp. 90-3.

<sup>305</sup> Worcester, pp. 270-3; Torigni, vol. 4, 151-2; GS, 2, 117, pp. 228-31.

*quae erectis circa duobus castellis strictissime obsidebatur)*.<sup>306</sup> In all of these examples, *castellum* refers not to a castle, but to a siege-castle.<sup>307</sup> Additionally, Henry of Huntingdon referred to ‘besieging castles’, castles used to besiege castles.<sup>308</sup> This denoted their tactical value and directly relates a siege-castle to a castle; the first cannot exist without the latter. It was a technology that was dependent on the castle. The importance of the castle proper as a military resource is excellently demonstrated by this technological interplay.

## Conclusion

The consistent, yet vague, use of ‘impregnable fortified’ and lack of detailed description of the physical appearance of castles, leads one to wonder if a castle could be considered fortified regardless of its physical fortifications. As we have seen, the chroniclers focus more on the presence of a garrison and the castle prepared in opposition but they do not seem concerned with its appearance. Since the castles of this period were not consistent in their design or use of material, it is possible that their physical appearance was irrelevant in the chroniclers’ perception of them as fortified, or even as castles. When the chroniclers refer to other buildings, typically churches, used as castles, it is the emphasis on the garrison and its readiness to be used as military resource that is the most obvious alteration.<sup>309</sup> The most famous of these conversions was of the abbey of Ramsey by Geoffrey de Mandeville in 1143.<sup>310</sup> When Henry of Huntingdon recorded that ‘the earl invaded the abbey of Ramsey,

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<sup>306</sup> *GS*, 2, 120, pp. 236-9.

<sup>307</sup> Other examples: Worcester, pp. 100-3; Orderic, 12, 17 and 39, pp. 230-1, 354-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60.

<sup>308</sup> Huntingdon, ‘*castella obsidentia*’, 10, 31, pp. 756-7; ‘*castellum obsessorium*’, 10, 32, pp. 758-61; other examples: 7, 24, pp. 450-1, and 10, 24 and 31, pp. 748-9, 756-7.

<sup>309</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 42, pp. 82-3. More on this distinction in chapter 5.

<sup>310</sup> ‘*Qui carens possessionibus, invasit abbatiam Ramesiensem, et monachis expulsis raptos immisit... Porro Gaufridus in ecclesia Ramesensi, ut diximus, scelus idem paraverat... Dum autem ecclesia illa pro castello teneretur, ebullivit sanguis a parietibus ecclesiae et claustris, indignationem divinam manifestans, sceleratorum vero exterminationem denuntians. Arnulfus vero filius consulis, qui post mortem patris ecclesiam in castella [incastellatam] retinebat, captus est et exsulatus*’, Torigni, pp. 146-7.

expelling the monks, he sent in plunderers, and turned the church of God into a den of thieves', his emphasis is on the presence of armed men in the church.<sup>311</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* stresses this issue also: 'and he not only pillaged the monastery of St. Benedict of Ramsey, taking the monks' valuables, but actually drove the monks out of the monastery without pity, put in a garrison and turned it into a castle for himself'.<sup>312</sup> Narrating the event much later, William of Newburgh reiterates their concern: 'He drove out the monks, and did not hesitate to make so famous and holy a place a den of thieves, nor to turn God's sanctuary into a home of the devil'.<sup>313</sup> These three authors emphasised the insertion of a garrison in the church and, contextually, its opposition to Stephen. Newburgh even provided a record of the actions of the garrison which, as discussed above, were performed at any castle but were now coming from an encastellated church. These passages do not describe any alterations to the structure to make it more defensive so either they did not exist or the chroniclers did not feel they were important to their narrative or their audience's understanding of the encastellated church. They focused on the garrison and its use as a military resource; these were perceived of as the crucial features of the fortified nature of the castle.

Finally, William of Malmesbury recorded that the earl of Gloucester 'subdued the Isle of Portland, which they [adherents of Stephen] had turned into a castle'.<sup>314</sup> Here, an island is turned into a castle; what did this mean and how was it done? From the arguments presented above, we can assume that turning the Isle of Portland into a castle would have involved physical fortifications of some sort, a garrison to defend them, and its intention to be used in opposition to Matilda. The vocabulary used in this passage does not differ from

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<sup>311</sup> '*Possessionibus igitur carens consul predictus inuasit abbatiam Ramesiensem, et monachis expulsis, raptos inmisit, et ecclesiam Dei speluncam fecit latronum*', Huntingdon, 10, 21, p. 743.

<sup>312</sup> '*coenobiumque sancti Benedicti de Ramesia, non solum captis monachorum spoliis, altaribus quoque et sanctorum reliquiis nudatis, expilauit, sed etiam expulsis incompassiue monachis de monasterio, militibusque impositis, castellum sibi adaptauit*', *GS*, 2, 83, pp. 164-5.

<sup>313</sup> '*nec veritas expulsis monachis locum tam celebrem et sanctum facere speluncam latronum, et sanctuarium Dei convertere in domicilium diaboli*', Newburgh, 1, 11, pp. 68-9.

<sup>314</sup> '*eodemque impetu insulam Portland, quam incastellauerant, subegit*', Malmesbury, *HN*, 3, 78, pp. 130-3.

those descriptions of castles; thus in order to ‘subdue’ this ‘castle’, Robert would have needed to besiege it, possibly reduce some of its physical defences and receive the surrender of the garrison. It appears that he did not maintain this ‘castle’ for himself against Stephen and, therefore, would have had to remove all ‘castle’ elements like its garrison, but, crucially, he would have also had to end its use as a military resource.

By examining the physical appearance of the castle, the importance of the garrison, what twelfth-century Anglo-Norman chroniclers meant by the word ‘fortified (*firmata*)’, and the castle’s function as a military resource and technology, this chapter has demonstrated the inaccuracy of Coulson’s comment that the castle was ‘powerful only to the impressionable’, which if true, included twelfth-century chroniclers.<sup>315</sup> The fortified nature of the castle and its use as a military resource was powerful and it was understood as such. Coulson continued saying that ‘the castle of repute bristling with soldierly virility, was an exception not an institution’.<sup>316</sup> What we have seen in this chapter is his underestimation of the perception of the fortified nature of the castle. It is true that many castles were never attacked, but in the twelfth century, particularly the middle years during Stephen’s reign, a fortified and militarily prepared castle was a necessity. During the wars in Normandy of Henry I and II, castles needed to defend their territory from many sides; the northern and Marcher castles faced the same threat from the Scots and Welsh. If a calculation was ever made of all the sieges that occurred during the twelfth century, Coulson’s comment would be proven unsound. The elements which made the castle fortified were inseparable from its role as a military resource. This chapter has demonstrated that ‘fortified’ was central to the contemporary perception of the castle during the twelfth century; it was an institutional understanding appreciated by all, not just the impressionable.

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<sup>315</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 76-7.

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*

## Chapter 2: Personal

Mocking the ‘well-known adage “the Englishman’s home is his castle”’, Holdsworth argued that ‘to hold a castle was to hold something which was in theory a privilege, held on license from the king and rendable to him when he required’.<sup>1</sup> If this was how the castle was used and viewed by its contemporaries, then how can ‘personal’ be used to describe the castle? Since the early debates on the origin of the English castle, ‘communal’ has been disregarded in reference to the castle, and the perceptions of the twelfth-century chroniclers substantiate this. The idea of ‘private’, and its modern connotation of belonging to, restricted to, or intended for an individual person, such as the ‘home’, does not fit the situation or the period since the concept of ‘private’ ownership or status was not an understood concept.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, modern ideas of ‘ownership’ were not part of the medieval understanding and, as will be demonstrated later, their concern was with possession of or holding property and castles. ‘Personal’ and ‘possession’ more accurately reflect the reality perceived by the chroniclers without restricting use or control to one person. These terms provide room to manoeuvre amid complicated issues like rendability and hereditability. More importantly, they account best for the chroniclers’ vocabulary and the phenomenon of the castle.

On the surface, these two words appear to fit the situation nicely; however, there was a great deal of friction and tension in this period because of the complications involved in personal possession. One primary issue that will need to be examined is the issue of rendability and its possible existence in the narrative of the chronicles. Rendability is a complex and complicated issue to explore particularly in the twelfth century because of a

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<sup>1</sup> C. Holdsworth, ‘War and Peace in the Twelfth Century: The Reign of Stephen Reconsidered’, in B.P. McGuire (ed.), *War and Peace in the Middle Ages* (Copenhagen, 1987), p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Discussions on public and private which influenced the use of ‘personal’ in this dissertation, Reynolds, pp. 25, 35, 51.

lack of direct evidence to either account for or disprove it. While the matter of its existence in the twelfth century will not be determined in this chapter, there is chronicled evidence which demonstrates this issue in terms of possession and the personal characteristics of the castle. This chapter will also examine the use of the castle as a residence and the vocabulary used by the chroniclers to determine the nature of possession in this period.

## **Residence**

One of the central aspects of the personal nature of the castle is its use as a residence: the location of family, household, and where people lived. This is not a commonly discussed aspect of the castle despite it being a central factor of many of the modern definitions presented earlier. Many modern historians mention that the castle acted as a residence but not all lords made their ‘chief residence in a castle’ because there were more comfortable lodgings elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> Regardless of its popularity in modern comprehension, Coulson believes the castle’s denotation as a ‘private fortified residence’ needs to ‘be added to the tyrannical construct of “feudalism”’ as argued by E.A.R. Brown.<sup>4</sup> But is this really the case? Perhaps those three words used in conjunction do need to be re-examined, but can we disregard the residential nature of the castle because of the difficulty of locating it in the sources? If the castle was only occasionally a residence and evidence is problematic, why does this element feature so prominently in its modern definition? The answer is twofold: first, the publications of the nona-centennial of the Norman Conquest focused on distinguishing the castle from the Anglo-Saxon burhs and it was the castle’s position as a lordly residence which separated it as a new phenomenon. Secondly, ‘residence’ has become a prominent and defining feature of the castle because it was one, even when lords had

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<sup>3</sup> Le Patourel, *Norman Empire*, p. 315; Fry, *British Medieval Castles*, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 34.

several residences to choose from, and the castle was ‘a slightly (but significantly) differentiated type’.<sup>5</sup>

Residence is not an easy topic to discuss with chronicle evidence because it was a common factor of life and thus was not worthy of mention. Characters are located within castles, active with a variety of tasks, but their living in them is rarely discussed directly. References of other residences do occur, but just as infrequently.<sup>6</sup> We are told that Stephen attacked a ‘magnificent house’ belonging to Robert of Gloucester near Tewkesbury;<sup>7</sup> Robert of Bampton and the king’s knights stopped for ‘lodging in a residence;’<sup>8</sup> John of Worcester’s description of Roger of Salisbury recorded that he was ‘an eminent builder of castles, defences, and residences;’<sup>9</sup> Orderic recorded that Hugh de Gournay, during his rebellion against Henry I, had ‘many adherents thereabouts, in whose houses they could refresh themselves and if necessary lie low for long time’.<sup>10</sup> However, the existence of other types of residences, like palaces or manors, does not preclude the castle from that distinction. Additionally, it was unlikely that the castle was the sole, or even primary, residence of its lord but this still does not mean that they did not serve this purpose.

References to castles as residences are typically presented when families are mentioned. Since castles were refuges, lords protected their families by sheltering them there and typically families were already in residence (already living at the castle) when danger threatened. At the siege of Exeter in 1136, the *Gesta Stephani* recorded that Baldwin de Redvers installed a very strong garrison who ‘were shut up with his wife and children’.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 383.

<sup>6</sup> This is most likely because residence or domestic situations are not of interest to the chronicler or their objective.

<sup>7</sup> ‘*magnificam domum*’, Worcester, pp. 282-3.

<sup>8</sup> ‘*ad quandam ipsius Robertii uillam hospitandi gratia diuertissent*’, *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31.

<sup>9</sup> ‘*castellorum, murorum, domorum fundator precipuus*’, Worcester, pp. 258-9.

<sup>10</sup> ‘*Consentientes ibidem plurimos habebant quorum hospitio refoti*’, Orderic, 12, 3, pp. 190-5; Green, *Henry I*, p. 143.

<sup>11</sup> ‘*sum uxore illius et filiis ad omnia parati recludebantur*’, *GS*, 1, 16, pp. 32-5.

This could mean two things: that Baldwin placed his family in the strongest and most securely guarded of his castles, and/or that they were already residing there when Baldwin installed this garrison. Richard Fitz Gilbert's wife 'shut herself up for refuge' in one of his castles after his death in 1136 and she is portrayed as heading to the castle.<sup>12</sup> John of Worcester recorded that when Stephen moved on Shrewsbury Castle in 1138, the possessor, William Fitz Alan 'secretly escaped, with his wife and children'.<sup>13</sup> In this case we are indirectly told that William and his family were in residence at Shrewsbury. Stephen's queen was recorded as 'residing' at Winchester when Robert of Gloucester was brought to her after his capture.<sup>14</sup> As queen, she had access to many manor houses, hunting lodges, and castles in the area, but the use of this term certifies that, at this point in time, Winchester was her location or residence. Jordan Fantosme, while describing the preparations of the northern barons and the fortification of their castles against the Scottish invasion of 1173/4, wrote that 'Roger d'Estuteville has garrisoned his house' at Wark.<sup>15</sup> In this metrical chronicle, it is possible that 'house (*maisun*)' fits his style better than 'castle', but it does demonstrate that a castle was perceived of as a residential building and could therefore be described as a 'house'. During Stephen's campaign in Normandy he 'destroyed the castle of Guitry in the Vexin, where there was a den of thieves, with the result that William of Chaumont and his son Otmund rose against the king and resolved to make war to avenge the destruction of their house'.<sup>16</sup> The direct association with the castle (*munitioem*) and house (*domus*) is clear; Guitry was a home of William of Chaumont and his family.

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<sup>12</sup> '*clausa delitebat*', *GS*, 1, 9, pp. 16-9.

<sup>13</sup> '*cum uxori et filiis et quibusdam aliis latenter fugam iniit*', Worcester, pp. 248-51.

<sup>14</sup> '*residenti*', Worcester, pp. 300-3.

<sup>15</sup> '*Rogier d'Estuteville ad sa maisun guarnie*', Fantosme, lines 1202-4, pp. 304-5.

<sup>16</sup> '*Tunc in Vilcassino rex munitioem Chitreei ubi spelunca latronum erat deiecit, unde Guillelmus de Caluimonte cum Odmundo filio suo in regem surrexit, et pro domus suae precipitio guerram facere decreuit*', Orderic, 13, 32, pp. 490-5.

A more contextual, yet perhaps more illustrating, example involves Lincoln castle in 1141: the wives of the earl of Chester and his brother visited the castellan's wife demonstrating that Lincoln was the castellan's residence and where his wife received visitors.<sup>17</sup> William of Malmesbury wrote that 'that the two brothers had settled unsuspectingly in the city's castle' after they had taken possession of it through their ruse.<sup>18</sup> The term 'settled (*resedissee*)' was used to mean that they were resolved to remain in the castle, but one could also interpret it as reside; it was not just Ranulf or his brother settling in the castle, but their wives and sons were 'staying (*commorans*)' as well.<sup>19</sup> *Commoro* could also mean 'abide, linger, dwell' and, in our context, reside, and his family continued to remain throughout the siege and battle of Lincoln. These rare glimpses into the residential side of castles demonstrate personal habitation of the castle.

All of these examples are from passages where the mention of residence and the families was not the primary focus. Many are simply details that the author decided to include for his own reasons but are typically omitted. On the other hand, the most common reference which can be interpreted as a castle being used as a residence is when the king progresses through England or Normandy. He could stay at a hunting lodge, like Woodstock,<sup>20</sup> but many times he is recorded as at, and issued charters from, a castle.<sup>21</sup> Biddle's publication of the excavations of Winchester demonstrate the use of the castle as a

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<sup>17</sup> Orderic, 13, 43, pp. 538-45.

<sup>18</sup> 'in castello eiusdem urbis secures resedissee', Malmesbury, *HN*, 3, 41, pp. 80-3.

<sup>19</sup> 'cumque in Lincolnensi cum uxore et filiis commorans castello', *GS*, 1, 54, pp. 110-5.

<sup>20</sup> The Abbot of Battle Abbey is recorded as staying at his manor of Hutton which was not far from the castle to await Henry II's arrival. If he did not have a manor so close, he could have stayed at his brother's castle Ongar where the king was expected. *Battle*, pp. 174-5, at Woodstock: Huntingdon, 7, 41, p. 487; Brown, 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 358-9.

<sup>21</sup> Orderic, 11, 10, pp. 56-7, and 12, 38, pp. 346-7, and 13, 30, pp. 484-7; *ASC*, E, p. 179; Eadmer (eng), 4, p. 175; Eadmer (lat), 4, p. 164; Huntingdon, 7, 34 and 41, pp. 469 and 487, and 10, 6 and 24, p. 711 and 749; Worcester, pp. 164-6, 292-5, 298-9; Malmesbury, *HN*, 478 and 499, pp. 35, 58; *GS*, 1, 41, pp. 86-9; Torigni, pp. 151-2; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 219, 223, 249, 324-5, 383-4, and vol. 2, pp. 110-1; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 182, 185, 208, 282, and vol. 2, pp. 64-5, 367. Biddle lists when the Anglo-Norman kings celebrated Easter courts in Winchester distinguishing between those at the palace and at the castle. pp. 295-6. Royal itineraries were based on castles as much as 'civil lodgings'. Brown, 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 358-9; *Regesta*, vol. 2, pp. xxix-xxxi, and vol. 3, pp. 375-7; R.W. Eyton, *Court, Household, and Itinerary of King Henry II* (London, 1878).

residence in three ways: first, that the presence of a *capella regia* at the castle in 1072 demonstrates the likelihood of ‘a royal hall and chambers;’ secondly, the enhancements to the Anglo-Saxon royal palace by the Conqueror meant that the royal accommodations moved to the castle; finally, the transition of the Norman royal palace to an episcopal one under Henry I illustrates a change of location of the royal residence to the castle.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, Henry I’s frequent alterations early in his reign demonstrate that the castle ‘was to be the sole royal house in Winchester’.<sup>23</sup>

One strong argument for the residential nature of the castle was the inclusion of personal chapels. Gilbert de Lacy constructed the Church of St. Clement ‘in his castle’ at Pontefract.<sup>24</sup> At the Tower of London and Colchester, the ‘protruding apse of the castle chapel’ has led to Bonde’s argument that this ‘prominence... [of] the ecclesiastical portion... indicates that the function of the castles was not solely that of defence’.<sup>25</sup> Additionally, a comparison of the accommodations between castles and other residences like palaces or manor houses would demonstrate the use of castles as residences even further. However, it is difficult to know for certain just what accommodation provisions would have been available at either.

Fortunately, the archaeological features of the residential segments of castles, palaces, and manors have been studied and hypothesised. At Dover Castle, English Heritage have recreated the twelfth-century interiors of the keep.<sup>26</sup> They include wall coverings to

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<sup>22</sup> Biddle, pp. 302-5, 472-3.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, pp. 472-3.

<sup>24</sup> W. Dugdale, *Monasticon Anglicanum* (London, 1718), p. 83.

<sup>25</sup> S. Bonde, ‘Castle and Church Building at the Time of the Norman Conquest’, in Reyerson and Powe, p. 87.

<sup>26</sup> ‘The aim of the Great Tower project is to evoke the atmospheric interiors of King Henry II’s medieval royal court, creating an immersive world in which the visitor stands at the centre of the experience. Backed by meticulous research, compelling evidence and an army of skilled craftsmen who have re-created the lavish interiors, from wall hangings, stunning furnishings and over 500 intricate objects, the project is considered the most ambitious attempt to re-create a medieval palace in more than a century’. <http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/daysout/properties/dover-castle/great-tower/about-great-tower/> (accessed 10 February, 2014). For more see ‘The Great Tower’, *Heritage Today* (2009) <http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/content/imported-docs/f-j/heritage-today-article.pdf>. ‘In terms of historical research, re-creating Henry’s great Dover palace has been a tough challenge because there is no historical or

retain heat, storage furniture like trunks, tables and chairs, bedding and space for servants or squires, and illustrative and colourful decorations (Appendix C, figures 1-6 illustrate the chamber furnishings). These accommodations are depicted within the keep and one, called the royal chamber, is adjacent to the stylised throne room.<sup>27</sup> While it was possible for accommodations to be located in towers or keeps, archaeology had demonstrated that it was also common for residential buildings to be constructed along the wall within the walls. Separate from the lord's accommodations, there would have been sleeping quarters for the garrison and some of the castle staff. While these chambers at Dover are quite large and it is very plausible many manor houses did not have this space available, the furnishings would not have varied between residences. As lords and their households travelled between residences and court, many of the trunks or even bedding would have accompanied them in the baggage trains. While these accommodations are within castle walls they could be transported to chambers with a manor or palace. The distinction of the castle as a 'lordly residence' is deserved and a strong indicator of the personal nature of the castle.

### **Rendability**

The most complicated issue of this chapter is the practice of rendability: the vassal's recognition that the king's right to castles superseded all others and entailed relinquishment of fortifications when requested for war or other reasons. This included the royal right to license the construction of castles and install royal garrisons in them when required. This

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archaeological record of how the building was decorated and equipped in medieval times. Therefore, researchers had to comb hundreds of British and continental sources to work out how a typical royal palace of the period would have been decorated'. D. Keys, 'Dover Castle: Back to the Twelfth Century', *The Independent* (31 July 2009) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/dover-castle-back-to-the-12th-century-1765349.html> (accessed 10 February, 2014).

<sup>27</sup> Brown has argued that not all royal expenditure on castles was military but on residential and administrative elements of castles. However, he admits that 'So far as we are able to compute it, expenditure upon specifically residential or administrative buildings within the castle seldom amounts to more than a fraction of the whole'. 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 358-9.

practice possibly started under the Carolingians with the earliest known account in 864 when Charles the Bald ordered all castles built without his permission (*castella, firmitates et haias, sine nostro [sic] verbo*) to be destroyed.<sup>28</sup> One issue with this statement, which runs throughout the twelfth century as well, was whether the nobility of the region acknowledged that his permission was even required and, therefore, submitted their castles to his possession or destruction. Thus, while the theory of rendability might have existed for kings, it does not follow that it was a realistic baronial practice.

By William the Conqueror's death in 1086, 'no castle could be built in Normandy without the duke's permission'.<sup>29</sup> However, the first documentation of this tradition relevant to the Anglo-Norman regnum was clauses four and five of the *Consuetudines et Iusticie*, ordered in 1091 by William II of England and Duke Robert of Normandy to record Norman custom on specific points that existed during their father's reign.<sup>30</sup> The *Consuetudines*, perhaps in an aspirational confirmation of the powers the brothers hoped they had over their barons, 'not only forbade the building of castles and strongholds, but placed careful restrictions on the making of fosses and palisades... With this went the right, so freely used by the Conqueror, of placing garrisons in the castles of his barons'.<sup>31</sup> Painter argued that the duke's permission was possibly required for castle construction, but it would be difficult to assert that castles could be seized on a whim, because 'it is highly improbable that in practice the duke possessed any such power, and it is perfectly certain that the king of

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<sup>28</sup> Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 332-3 and 'Community and Fortress-Politics in France', pp. 81-2.

<sup>29</sup> Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 182-3, 332-3; Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, p. 27.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid both; Painter, pp. 139-40. '4. *Nulli licuit in Normannia fossatum facere in planam terram nisi tale quod de fundo potuisset terram iactare superius sine scabello, et ibi non licuit facere palicium nisi in una regula et illud sine propugnaculis et alatoriis. Et in rupe vel in insula nulli licuit facere fortitudinem, et nulli licuit in Normannia castellum facere, et nulli licuit in Normannia fortitudinem castelli sui vetare domino Normannie si ipse eam in manu sua voluit habere. 5. Et si dominus Normannie filium vel fratrem vel nepotem baronis sui qui non esset miles voluit habere obsidem de portanda fide, nullus sibi contradicere potuit.*' C.H. Haskins, 'The Norman "Consuetudines et Iusticie" of William the Conqueror', *EHR* 23:91 (1908), pp. 502-8.

<sup>31</sup> Haskins, 'The Norman "Consuetudines et Iusticie"', p. 503; Painter, pp. 139-40.

England did not'.<sup>32</sup> Theoretically, it was more conceivable that the duke could order a castle rendered for the safety of the state; practically, 'he could demand the surrender of castles held by men whose loyalty he suspected'.<sup>33</sup> Reynolds argued that in eleventh-century France, it was 'generally accepted that no one – irrespective, apparently, of the nature of his or her property – ought to build a castle without the consent of the count in whose county it stood;' this permission was 'customarily' included in fealty negotiations which would include the castle possessor's agreement 'to open his castle to his lord when the lord might need it'.<sup>34</sup> This was exactly what the Anglo-Norman and Angevin kings did, or tried to do, with some resistance from their barons. For example, for Henry I with Robert of Bellême, Stephen with Ranulf of Chester and Geoffrey de Mandeville, and Henry II with Hugh de Mortimer, Hugh Bigod, and Robert of Leicester, force was needed because these lords did not acknowledge the king's right to take their castles.

There is some support to their argument which stemmed from the application, or lack thereof, for the Conquest castles. Since William the Conqueror needed to quickly establish firm control over the country, it has been argued that he allowed his barons to construct what castles they saw necessary and granted them the authority to control the territory and exert their lordship and power without the formality of royal licenses.<sup>35</sup> Afterwards, it was the construction of new castles and not the enhancement of pre-existing ones that would affect the status quo and therefore required the king's permission.<sup>36</sup> The first documented manifestation of rendability in England was two short passages in the *Leges Henrici Primi* (c. 1115) which stated that royal consent was needed before constructing a castle and that all

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<sup>32</sup> Painter, pp. 139-40.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Reynolds, pp. 469-70.

<sup>35</sup> Brown, *Normans and the Norman Conquest*, pp. 43-5.

<sup>36</sup> Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 186-7.

castles were under the king's jurisdiction.<sup>37</sup> What is clear from this document is that castles without licences (*castellatio sine licencia*) were a matter for the king's justice; a lord who built a castle without the king's permission put himself, and the castle, at the king's judicial discretion.<sup>38</sup>

But there are other examples of barons constructing castles without mention of any permission or licence to do so. The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that John of Marlborough 'built castles, designed with wondrous skill, in the places that best suited him'.<sup>39</sup> William de Dover 'with the greatest zeal built a castle' near Crickland.<sup>40</sup> Robert of Gloucester's sons are described similarly: 'they built castles in some places which they saw to be suitable, in others stole them from their neighbour'.<sup>41</sup> The chronicler does not mention that these men built their castles against the king's permission, and since they were in rebellion against Stephen, they would not have sought it anyway. However, the lack of permission recorded as requested or given in these cases does not mean it did not exist in theory. Stephen and Henry Fitz Empress' agreement in 1153 that all castles built during Stephen's reign were to be destroyed or were to return to the *status quo ante bellum*, to what existed in Henry I's time, demonstrates that since neither side recognised the royal authority of the other, no castle constructed in this period had proper permission and therefore should be destroyed.<sup>42</sup>

There is limited evidence of William I and his successors giving their formal permission for baronial castles to be constructed and it is difficult to substantiate this

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<sup>37</sup> This statement appears to define a castle as a 'fortification with three earthen banks', but its mean in this regard is not clear or completely understood by modern scholars. Did this mean three stone walls? There continue to be questions regarding its meaning. *LHP*, pp. 108-9, 116-7, 325; Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, p. 29; Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 180-1, 332-3; Beeler, 'Castles and Strategy', p. 598.

<sup>38</sup> *LHP*, pp. 116-7; Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, p. 29.

<sup>39</sup> '*castella miri artificii in locis sibi competentioribus construere*', *GS*, 2, 85, pp. 166-9.

<sup>40</sup> '*ad uillam quae Crichelada dicitur... castellumque, aquis se et paludibus undique obicientibus*', *GS*, 2, 87, pp. 170-1.

<sup>41</sup> '*ubi competentius praeuiderant, castella erigere, illic a uicinis furtiue surripere*', *GS*, 2, 85, pp. 166-9.

<sup>42</sup> Torigni, p. 177; Huntingdon, 10, 37-8, pp. 771-3; *GS*, 2, 120, pp. 240-1.

tradition in theory or practice with hard evidence.<sup>43</sup> It was not explicitly stated in the *Leges Henrici Primi* that the king had a superseding right to restrain castle construction and ownership of their barons by placing any castle under the command of royal officers and installing royal garrisons, but it has been argued that it was ‘generally accepted’ by barons, particularly in Normandy.<sup>44</sup> However, the ‘general’ acceptance of this concept is difficult to assert amidst the resentment and regular challenge to rendering orders by barons in the twelfth century. The chronicles include numerous instances of Anglo-Norman kings attempting to claim castles from barons when they felt it was beneficial, typically when royal security and lordship was threatened.<sup>45</sup> Henry I confiscated castles from Robert of Bellême,<sup>46</sup> William of Mortain,<sup>47</sup> Waleran of Meulan,<sup>48</sup> and other rebels;<sup>49</sup> Stephen ordered the rendering of the castles of Bedford,<sup>50</sup> Exeter,<sup>51</sup> of the Bishops of Lincoln, Ely, and Salisbury,<sup>52</sup> of Earl Ranulf of Chester,<sup>53</sup> and of Geoffrey de Mandeville;<sup>54</sup> Henry II

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<sup>43</sup> Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, p. 27. Liddiard has provided a useful designation between baronial and royal castles arguing that the baronial castle was the scene of seigneurial power and the aristocratic residence; royal castles were the setting for royal administrative activities and events for either the county or territory or during the king’s travels. Liddiard, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, pp. 27-9.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>46</sup> Torigni, pp. 88-93; *ASC*, E, pp. 178-9; Orderic, 11, 1-3, pp. 12-31; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60; Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; Simeon (lat), 183, p. 234; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 393 and 395, pp. 714-9; Worcester, pp. 100-3; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 63, 66, 69-10, 72, 78, 99, 233.

<sup>47</sup> *ASC*, E p. 179; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 196; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 161-2; Torigni, p. 84; Green, *Henry I*, p. 63, 233.

<sup>48</sup> Simeon (eng), p. 202; Simeon (lat), 214, p. 283; *ASC*, E, pp. 190, 195, *GND*, 8, 21-2, pp. 234-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 217; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 180-1; Torigni, p. 107. More on Waleran’s rebellion: Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 4, 15-23; Green, *Henry I*, p. 63, 187, 206.

<sup>49</sup> Including Hugh of Gournay, Eustace of Breteuil, Amaury of Montfort, and Richard of Fresnel. Orderic, 12, 2-3 and 10 and 13, pp. 190-5, 212-5, 218-21; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 148, 233.

<sup>50</sup> Worcester, pp. 234-7; *GS*, 1, 23 and note 3, pp. 46-51; Orderic, 13, 36, pp. 510-5; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 230; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 192; Torigni, p. 134.

<sup>51</sup> *ASC*, E, p. 198; Torigni, p. 129; Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7; Newburgh, 1, 5, pp. 54-5; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 229; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 191; Worcester, pp. 216-9.

<sup>52</sup> Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5; Torigni, pp. 136-7; *ASC*, E, pp. 198-9; *GS*, 1, 34-6, pp. 72-81; Worcester, pp. 244-9, 258-9, 266-9; Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-61; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 21-6 and 32, pp. 40-51, 64-5; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 235-6; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 196-7.

<sup>53</sup> *GS*, 1, 9, pp. 16-9, and 2, 104-6, pp. 198-205; *ASC*, E, p. 201; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 246-9; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 207-8; Orderic, 13, 43, pp. 538-45; *LE* (eng), 3, 72, p. 395; *LE* (lat), 3, 72, p. 320, Newburgh, 1, 8, pp. 60-3; Torigni, pp. 151-2; Dalton, ‘*In Neutro Latere*’, pp. 39-60.

<sup>54</sup> Torigni, pp. 146-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 246-8; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 207; *GS*, 2, 81-4, pp. 160-7; Newburgh, 1, 11 and 22, pp. 66-71, 98-9; *LE* (eng), 3, 83, p. 405; *LE* (lat), 3, 83, p. 329.

confiscated and destroyed many castles at the beginning of his reign<sup>55</sup> and after the Great War<sup>56</sup> particularly from Hugh de Mortimer,<sup>57</sup> Hugh Bigod,<sup>58</sup> Robert of Leicester the younger,<sup>59</sup> and William of Gloucester,<sup>60</sup> his sons did the same in their territories with his permission.<sup>61</sup>

Unfortunately, rendability complicates the personal aspect of the castle: if the castle was personally held by someone as their possession, then how could the king claim it as his own or have jurisdiction over it? This is one of the reasons why 'private' is not used in this definition. 'Private' property belongs solely to the owner, there is no 'shared' possession; however, a castle can be 'personally' held by a baron but still belong to the king. 'Private' cannot be used as a descriptor of the castle because each time a castle was 'held against the king' it was in violation of royal rendability and was a clear indication of treason and rebellion.<sup>62</sup> Additionally, medieval barons held their lands, castles, and offices from the king, as a theoretical, if not actual, universal landlord, through some sort of tenure;<sup>63</sup> thus they were 'personal' and not 'private' holdings.<sup>64</sup> The king's ability to enforce rendability and license castle construction affected the security of his throne and his relationships with his baronage. Rendability was essentially about the balance of resources, royal attempts to secure more castles sometimes conflicting with the intentions of nobles. In theory,

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<sup>55</sup> Torigni, pp. 183, 209-10, 212; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 255; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 215.

<sup>56</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2, 390; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51, 72.

<sup>57</sup> *Battle*, pp. 158-61; Torigni, pp. 184-5; Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 31, pp. 216-7.

<sup>58</sup> Torigni, pp. 193, 195.

<sup>59</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 418-9; Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 101.

<sup>60</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 397; Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 78; Patterson, pp. 3-4.

<sup>61</sup> Torigni, pp. 281-2.

<sup>62</sup> There is a debate over the legitimacy of rebellion amongst modern historians but contemporaries believed holding a castle against the king was treason. Strickland, pp. 231-5 and 'Against the Lord's anointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in England and Normandy, 1075-1265', in G. Garnett and J. Hudson (ed.), *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 56; Dalton in Dalton and White, pp. 80-1, 86-7; S. Reynolds, 'Secular Power and Authority in the Middle Ages', in H. Pryce and J. Watts, *Power and Identity in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 11-22.

<sup>63</sup> Reynolds has argued that from the eleventh century, 'people who held land with what were thought of as full rights but were under the power or authority of some kind of lord were sometimes said to hold their land from him'. pp. 288-9. Garnett, pp. 70, 81-5.

<sup>64</sup> Painter, p. 135. Distinction between private and public: Reynolds, p. 51.

rendability ensured that castles remained royal resources and if rendability was refused, then the castle was considered held against the king constituting rebellion and threatened the security of the realm as an attack on royal power.

However, none of the coronation charters of these kings mention castles in any capacity; while they do grant the same rights and privileges as the kings before and promise to uphold the laws, there is no direct association with castles.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, it was not until Henry II's legal reforms, which created proprietary rights that the 'essential elements of true property or "ownership" began to develop.<sup>66</sup> While his reforms may have made the royal office or custody of a royal castle separate from inheritances, this 'did not affect the principle of the heritability of most free property'.<sup>67</sup> Does this mean that these kings were assured of their rendability rights and so had no need to state them in their coronation charters, or that they did not exist? While the answers to these questions may never be known, the chroniclers' perceptions appear to present a situation where, as feudal suzerain of England and universal landlord, the king had jurisdiction over all castles but his barons and castellans personally held them.<sup>68</sup>

One reason why there is limited evidence and modern arguments for its theoretical existence is that rendability (or the mention of the practice) appears only when conflict over the castle arises; its existence in the chronicles could be considered symptomatic of failed relationships. The complications experienced by kings when attempting to assert rendability could be taken as a barometer of the state of their kingship since the royal ability to enforce rendability fluctuated in the twelfth century. Once Henry I had eliminated the threat of Robert of Normandy and William Clito, he experienced only minor infringements on his

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<sup>65</sup> W. Stubbs (ed.), *Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History*, revised by H.W.C. Davis (Oxford, 1921), pp. 117-9, 142-4, 158.

<sup>66</sup> Reynolds, pp. 374-5.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Painter, p. 135.

royal castle-authority because he was secure enough to assert his jurisdiction. According to Coulson, his authority was so stable that he could use ‘the fortresses of many of his barons as though they were his own’, which, within the theoretical confines of the *Consuetudines*, denoted ‘normal rendability’ practice.<sup>69</sup> Upon his undisputed accession, Henry II began consolidating royal control over castles intent on securing these resources for himself and the security of the realm; he faced little challenge from barons who were as eager to bring order as he was, as evidenced by the *conventiones* of Stephen’s reign. Stephen, on the other hand, was forced by conflict to order many castles rendered to him at the beginning of his reign, but was not strong enough receive their submission without a fight. The existence of a valid rival in England and Stephen’s unwillingness to deal with rebels as Henry I had, created a situation in which he was unable to enforce rendability, causing a widespread break-down of his political and social relationships and widespread insecurity.

There must have been some acceptance of rendability as a practice, despite its symptomatic status, because there are several examples in the chronicles. Orderic recorded that around 1118, suspicion of Waleran of Meulan’s disloyalty prompted Henry to summon Hugh of Montfort to court where he ‘commanded him to hand over the keep of his stronghold of Montfort-sur-Risle... The king sent loyal friends in advance with him to receive the keys of the fortifications’.<sup>70</sup> During this rebellion, Henry requested that Amaury ‘hand over the citadel, and receive the whole county of Évreux to hold undisturbed’, but was refused.<sup>71</sup> Shortly thereafter, Theobald of Blois, having captured Amaury, brought him before the king where he ‘quickly became reconciled, [and] voluntarily surrendered the citadel to the king’ rendering the castle.<sup>72</sup> Hoping to join William Clito, Reginald of

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<sup>69</sup> Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 332-3.

<sup>70</sup> ‘*sibi que mox assistenti ut munitionem castris Montis-fortis sibi redderet imperavit... Rex autem amicos cum illo premisit fideles qui reciperent munitionum claves*’, Orderic, 12, 34, pp. 334-7; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 183-4.

<sup>71</sup> ‘*arce sibi reddita omnem comitatum Ebroicensis quiete reciperet*’, Orderic, 12, 13, pp. 218-21.

<sup>72</sup> ‘*qui protinus reconciliatus regi arcem ultro reddidit*’, Orderic, 12, 22, pp. 276-81.

Brailleul ‘went to Falaise, renounced his fealty to the king, and, when the king required him to hand over his castle of Le Renouard, haughtily refused’.<sup>73</sup> In 1136, Roger of Bampton was ordered to ‘put his castle at the king’s disposal’ and this was considered to be a ‘just provision and a very fitting sentence, that he...by a just decision of equity lose what was his own’.<sup>74</sup> When, after Henry’s death and Stephen’s capture, new relationships need to be formed, rendability is again evident. Upon hearing of the king’s death, Guigan Algason ‘received her [Matilda] as his liege lady and put under her rule Argentan and Exmes and Domfront and other fortified towns’.<sup>75</sup> After news of Stephen’s capture at Lincoln reached him, Geoffrey of Anjou ‘came at once into Normandy, sent out envoys to the magnates and commanded them as of right to hand over their castles to him and keep the peace’.<sup>76</sup> This passage stressed his right to the castles now that his wife was *de facto* queen and duchess after Stephen’s downfall; he certainly perceived that the castles should now belong to him. In the 1150s, Stephen was able to present a powerful enough figure that some barons ‘brought the keys of their castles and begged the king to receive their homage’.<sup>77</sup> Each of these examples demonstrate that requests to render castles did happen and that barons did, many times, willingly submit their castles to their lord or king.

Unfortunately for the security of Stephen’s throne and the strength of his authority, he could not always implement rendering successfully. In 1138, he besieged Bridgnorth,

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<sup>73</sup> ‘*Falesiam abiit, fidelitatem regi reliquit, eique poscenti ut domum suam de Mansione Renuardi redderet superbe denegavit*’, Orderic, 12, 11, pp. 214-7.

<sup>74</sup> ‘*castellum regis deliberationi committere... Et hoc profecto iuste prouisum satisque idoneum iudicatum fuit, ut qui aliorum cupidus quae sua non erant iniuste inuaserat, iusto aequitatis iudicio et sua amitteret*’, *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31. As we saw in the *LHP*, the castle was under royal jurisdiction thus it was the king’s right to order the rendering of a castle as a judicial punishment.

<sup>75</sup> ‘*quam Guigan Algaso uir infimi quidem generis sed magnae potestatis ut naturalem dominam suscepit, eique Argentomum et Oximos et Damfrontem aliaque quibus ut uicecomes iubente rege praeerat oppida subegit*’, Orderic, 13, 21, pp. 454-7; Garnett, pp. 223-4.

<sup>76</sup> ‘*Iosfredus autem Andegauensis comes ut uxorem suam uicisse audivit protinus in Normanniam uenit, legatos ad procures direxit, ac ut munitiones suas sibi dederent et pacifici essent iure requisiiuit*’, Orderic, 13, 41, pp. 546-7; Haskins, ‘Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet’, pp. 420-2.

<sup>77</sup> ‘*Quidam etiam munitionum suarum claves detulerunt seruitiumque suum regi supplices optulerunt*’, Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 520-3.

Cary, Harptree, Sudley, Cerney, Wallingford, Cardiff, Dudley, Shrewsbury, Wareham, Hereford, Leeds, Ludlow, Dunster, Melton, and Dover after their castellans refused to render them.<sup>78</sup> Additionally, William of Newburgh recorded that ‘there were in a sense as many kings, or rather tyrants, as there were lords of castles’.<sup>79</sup> His remark may not have been a commentary on Stephen’s ability to enforce castle-construction or rendability, but it was an observation on the strength of his kingship. Chroniclers complained that neither

...king [n]or empress exercised powerful enough control over his or her faction...Neither of them could wield authority or maintain strict discipline over their followers; instead each pandered to them, denying them nothing so that they would not desert them.<sup>80</sup>

This included issuing licenses to construct castles which were considered illegal by the opposing side and threatened the peace of the realm. Since neither Stephen nor Matilda could enforce this royal prerogative, Newburgh described castellans as local ‘kings’, subject to no one. After the strong reign of Henry I, where ‘the peaceful condition of England never left anything to be desired’, the contention between Stephen and Matilda resulted in a lack of power to prevent castle construction or successfully request the rendering of castles.<sup>81</sup> While this was not exactly ‘anarchy’ it was perceived as a breakdown of royal authority on this particular issue.

Even if weakened royal authority was characterised by the construction of adulterine or unlicensed castles and the refusal of rendability, there is evidence that Stephen and Matilda attempted to enforce this tradition as a manifestation of their power.<sup>82</sup> The licensing

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<sup>78</sup> *GS*, 1, 27 and 30-2, pp. 56-7 and 64-71; Worcester, pp. 248-51.

<sup>79</sup> ‘*erantque in Anglia quodammodo tot reges vel potius tyranni quot domini castellorum*’, Newburgh, 1, 22, pp. 98-9.

<sup>80</sup> ‘*non quod vel rex vel imperatrix suae parti potenter imperaret... neuter enim in suos imperiose agere et disciplinae vigorem exercere poterat, sed uterque suos, ne a se deficerent, nihil negando mulcebat*’, Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> ‘*ut nichil pacis in Anglia desiderares*’, Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 410, pp. 740-3; Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, p. 29; Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 179-81.

<sup>82</sup> *GS*, 1, 49, pp. 104-5; The 1217 reissue of Magna Carta explains that *castella adulterina* were to be ‘razed in principle’, were contrary to established lordship, and were intrusive ‘upstarts’ built without the king’s consent; Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 179-86.

tradition is difficult to determine from the chronicles, but, from charters, we do know that Geoffrey de Mandeville sought licences from Stephen and Matilda in order to construct and possess his many castles.<sup>83</sup> To buy his support, both sides issued charters which ‘preserved the fiction that royal permission was required’ to hold castles even in a time of strife and theoretical anarchy.<sup>84</sup> ‘Fiction’ is probably not the word contemporaries would have used since both parties insisted on this prerogative as their royal right and the nobility sought their confirmation of their holdings.

### **Distinction in Personal Possession**

Whether rendering a castle was theoretical or practical, there is evidence of lords granting personal possession to vassals in the chronicles. In order to gather support against his brother, Robert of Normandy ‘gave Robert of Bellême...the stronghold of Argentan... and granted the castle of Gisors to Theobald Pain’.<sup>85</sup> Henry I ‘committed the castle of Ivry’ to Ralph of Gael ‘to guarantee his loyalty’;<sup>86</sup> gave William Talvas ‘Alençon and Almenèches and Vignats and other strongholds’;<sup>87</sup> pardoned Robert of Saint-Céneri and ‘restored Montreuil and Echauffour to him’;<sup>88</sup> gave the burgesses of Pacy the castle of Breteuil and ‘restored to Ralph of Gael... the whole honour of his ancestors apart from Pacy’.<sup>89</sup> In return for loyalty, Henry

...gave Sééz and Alençon and all the land of Robert of Bellême in that region to Count Theobald, and he with the king’s permission granted that honour to his brother Stephen as his share of the ancestral inheritance in France. So young

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<sup>83</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 3, 273-6, p. 99-103; Round, *Geoffrey de Mandeville*, pp. 37-54, 81-113, 136-200.

<sup>84</sup> Beeler, ‘Castles and Strategy’, p. 598; Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 180-1, 196; King, *King Stephen*, pp. 55-6.

<sup>85</sup> ‘*Tunc Rodberto de Belismo... Argentomum castrum... donauit, et munitionem de Gisortis Tedbaldo Pagano*’, Orderic, 10, 19, pp. 308-9.

<sup>86</sup> ‘*arcem de Ibreio pro fide seruanda illi commiserate*’, Orderic, 12, 17, pp. 228-9.

<sup>87</sup> ‘*Alencionem et Almaniscas atque Vinacium aliaque castra*’, Orderic, 12, 15, pp. 224-5.

<sup>88</sup> ‘*et Monasteriolum et Excalfurnum reddidit*’, Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Burgesses’ possession of Breteuil in the same passage ‘*Radulfo de Guader... reddidit totum honorem antecessorum eius preter Paceium*’, Orderic, 12, 10, pp. 212-5.

Stephen took possession of Séez and Alençon and Le Mêle-sur-Sarthe and Almenèches with La Roche-Mabille.<sup>90</sup>

Robert of Gloucester was given ‘immense power in England through the grants of his father...and had at his command wealth, castles...He had charge of Gloucester castle and Canterbury, and held the very powerful fortresses of Bristol, Leeds, and Dover’.<sup>91</sup> Finally, in order to gain support in Normandy, Stephen ‘granted the stronghold of Moulins to the count [Rotrou of Mortagne] and Bonmoulins to Richer [of Laigic]’.<sup>92</sup>

From charters we have less descriptive but similar statements. Henry I informed John, bishop of Bath, and Arulph the sheriff that ‘he has confirmed to the monks of Montacute the church of St. Peter with the castle;’<sup>93</sup> in a marriage grant, he gave Miles of Gloucester the castle of Hay;<sup>94</sup> gave to Canterbury and Archbishop William, ‘and all his successors, the custody and constabulary of Rochester Castle for ever...that they may make a fort or tower as they please’.<sup>95</sup> Stephen’s grants included Grosmont castle in Monmouthshire to Walter Fitz Miles;<sup>96</sup> confirmation of Miles of Gloucester in the

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<sup>90</sup> ‘*Tunc rex Henricus Sagium et Alencionem et totam in illa regione terram Rodberti Belesmensis Tedbaldo comiti dedit, ipse uero eundem honorem permittente rege Stephano fratri suo pro portione paterna hereditatis quae in Gallia est donauit. Stephanus itaque iuuenis Sagium et Alencionem Merulamque super Sartam Almaniscas cum rupe de lalgeio possedit*’, Orderic, 12, 4, pp. 194-7.

<sup>91</sup> ‘*dono Henrici regis patris sui potentiam in Anglia possidebat, diuitiis et oppidis uirisque ferocibus pollebat. Nam munitionem Gloucestrae et Cantuariæ seruabat, oppida quoque munitissima Brihstou et Ludas atque Doueram habebat*’, Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 516-9.

<sup>92</sup> ‘*Nam comiti oppidum de Molinis et Richerio Boumolinum concessit*’, Orderic, 13, 30, pp. 484-5.

<sup>93</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 2, 735, p. 50.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 1280, p. 162.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 1475, p. 203. Also in John of Worcester: ‘Henry also, on his nobles’ advice, entrusted to the church of Canterbury, to William, the archbishop, and to all his successors the custody and constabulary of Rochester castle in perpetuity: that he should be free to erect fortification or tower in the same castle, that he should hold and guard it for ever; and that the garrison chosen to guard the castle should be free to go in and come out whenever it pleased, and that it should defend the castle on his behalf. (*Ipse etiam rex, consilio baronum suorum, concessit Cantuariensi ecclesie et Willelmo archiepiscopo et omnibus successoribus eius custodiam et constabulationem castelli Hrofi semper in posterum possidendam: et in eodem castello munitionem uel turrim quam uoluerint sibi faciant, et in perpetuum habeant et custodiam; et milites qui custodi eiusdem castelli deputati fuerant, intrent et exeant per uices suas sicut intrare et exire debuerint, et de eodem castello ei securitatem faciant.*)’ pp. 166-7.

<sup>96</sup> ‘*Carta regis Stephani in qua dat Waltero filio Milonis Glocestrie castellum de Grossomonte cum tota terra et tenure quod ad illam pertinent*’, *Regesta*, vol. 3, 314, p. 119.

constablership of Gloucester;<sup>97</sup> his treaty with the earl of Chester in 1146 in which he confirmed him in his possessions in England and Normandy including his castles like Lincoln and Tickhill;<sup>98</sup> the castles of Almondbury and Barwick-in-Elmet in Yorkshire to Henry de Lacy;<sup>99</sup> the borough, castle, and county of Hereford to the earl of Leicester;<sup>100</sup> a grant to the bishop of Lincoln of Alice de Condet's castle of Thorngate and the wardship of her son;<sup>101</sup> and the castle of Gainsborough to Earl William of Lincoln.<sup>102</sup> Matilda's grants included the 'shrievalty of Worcester in return for liege-homage' to William de Beauchamp which included the castle of Worcester;<sup>103</sup> Tamworth to Robert 'Dispensator';<sup>104</sup> St. Briavel's castle,<sup>105</sup> Abergavenny,<sup>106</sup> and Hereford to Miles of Gloucester along with his earldom;<sup>107</sup> the earldom of Oxford to Aubrey de Vere including Colchester;<sup>108</sup> and Windsor to William Fitz Robert.<sup>109</sup> Henry Fitz Empress confirmed the earl of Chester's holdings in

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<sup>97</sup> *'Sciatis me reddidisse et concessisse Miloni Gloec(estrie) et heredibus suis post eum, in feodum et hereditatem, totum honorem patris sui et custodiam turre et castelli Gloecestrie ad tenendum tali forma (sic) qualem reddebat tempore regis Henrici sicut patrimonium suum'*, Ibid, 387, p. 149. A second one also recorded but only a fragment remains, 388, p. 149.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, 178, pp. 64-5; Dalton, *'In Neutro Latere'*, pp. 39-60.

<sup>99</sup> *'Carta regis Stephani per quam concessit Henrico de Lascy et heredibus suis castellum de Almanberia, et per quam confirmavit emptionem quam idem Henr(icus) fecit de terra Dalton cum pertinentiis, et eadem confirmavit eidem Henr(ico) castellum Berewicam'*, Regesta, vol. 3, 430, p. 162.

<sup>100</sup> *'Sciatis me reddidisse et concessisse hereditary Rob(erto) com(iti) Legre(cestrie) et heredibus suis Burgum Hereford(ie) et castellum et totum comitatum de Herefordisc(ira)'*, Ibid, 437, p. 165.

<sup>101</sup> *'Sciatis quia concedo Alexandro episcopo Linc(olnensi) vadium quod Adelid(is) de Condet fecit ei de castello suo de Tornegat et de terris suis...et custodiam filii sui'*, Ibid, 482, p. 180.

<sup>102</sup> *'Et preter hoc concede ei castrum suum de Geinesburg(o)'*, Ibid, 494, pp. 184-5.

<sup>103</sup> *'Sciatis me dedisse et reddidisse Willelmo de Bellocampo hereditario jure castellum de Wigornia cum mota sibi et heredibus suis ad tenendum de me in capite et heredibus meis. Dedi ei et reddidi vicecomitatum Wigorn(ie) et forestas cum omnibus appendiciis suis in feodo et hereditary per eandem firmam quam pater suus Walterus de Bellocampo inde reddebat'*, Ibid, 68, pp. 26-7.

<sup>104</sup> *'Et preter hoc dedi ei et reddidi castellum et honorem de Tamword ad tenendum ita bene et in pace et quiete et plenarie et honorifice et habere sicut unquam melius et quietius et plenarius et honorificentius et liberius Rob(ertus) Dispensator frater Ursonis de Abetot ipsum castellum et honorem tenuit'*, Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> *'Et volo vos scire quod tunc quando homagium suum ad Gloecestriam recepi, dedi ei pro servitio suo in feodo et hereditate sibi et heredibus suis castellum Sancti Briavelli'*, Ibid, 391, p. 150.

<sup>106</sup> *'concessisse Milon(i) com(iti) Heref(ordie) et heredibus suis castellum de Abergeveinea et totum honorem qui ad illud pertinent'*, Ibid, 394, p. 151.

<sup>107</sup> *'Sciatis me fecisse Milonem de Gloc(estria) comitem de Hereford, et dedisse ei motam Hereford cum toto castello in feodo et hereditate sibi et heredibus suis ad tenendum de me et heredibus meis'*, Ibid, 393, pp. 150-1.

<sup>108</sup> *'Et turrim et castellum de Colecestr(ia) sine placito finaliter et sine escampa quam citius [ei] deliberare potero'*, Ibid, 634, pp. 233-4. Duke Henry confirmed this in 635, p. 235.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, 959, p. 355.

1153 in Normandy;<sup>110</sup> restored William Maudit to Portchester castle;<sup>111</sup> and an agreement with Salisbury Cathedral and See in 1153 to return Devizes after three years.<sup>112</sup> Finally, the 1153 treaty between Stephen and Henry gave possession of several castles to ensure security for both parties and also confirmed Stephen's son William in his Warenne holdings and castles.<sup>113</sup>

The above passages demonstrate personal possession of the castle but the terminology of 'baron' and 'castellan' begs the question, was there a distinction in how castles were held by these men? How does this affect the personal possession element of the castle? While many of the charters include *in feudo et hereditate*, the chroniclers are not specific as to how castles were held. Sometimes there are examples of some sort of tenure. During the Great War and the siege of the northern castles, Fantosme wrote that William de Vesci 'held his father's castle as a vassal' and Roger Fitz Richard 'had [Warkworth] in keeping' and was 'master and lord of Newcastle-on-Tyne'.<sup>114</sup> Unfortunately these passages are vague when it comes to determining whether these men were barons or castellans. In the first case, William de Vesci held his father's castle in fief either as its castellan or a lesser

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<sup>110</sup> *'Sciatis me dedisse et concessisse Ranulfo comiti Cestrie omnem hereditatem suam Normannie et Anglie sicut unquam aliquis antecessorum suorum eam melius et liberius tenuit, et nominatim castellum de Vira et Barbifluvium cum tali libertate quod per totam banleugam possit capere forisfactum suum, et Brullium de fossis et Alebec et hoc unde erat vicecomes [de] Abrincis, et in Sancto Jacobo de hoc feci eum comitem, et quicquid habui in Albrinchein ei dedi preter episcopatum et abbatiam de Monte [Sancti Mich]aelis et quod eis pertinet'*, Ibid, 180, pp. 65-6.

<sup>111</sup> *'et nominatim castellum de Porcest(r)a cum toto honore... Insuper etiam reddidi eidem camerariam mei thesauri cum liberatione et cum omnibus pertin(entiis), castellum scilicet de Porcest(r)a ut supradiximus, et omnes terras ad predictam camerariam et ad predictum castellum pertinentes sive sint in Anglia sive Normannia sicut pater suus illam camerariam cum pertinentiis melius habuit'*, Ibid, 582, pp. 212-3.

<sup>112</sup> Retained possession in 1149: *'excepto castro de Devys(is) quod in predicto Sar(esberiensis) ecclesie manerio est situm'*, Ibid, 795, p. 292. Agreement to return in 1153: *'Idem comes (sic) teneat castrum de Devys(is) usque ad triennium ab hoc Pascha. Ita tamen quod si infra terminum jus suum recuperaverit, tunc per consilium domini Cant(uariensis) archiepiscopi, H(enrici) Wynton(iensis), R(oberti) Bathon(iensis), H(ilarii) Cicestr(ensis) episcoporum reddet idem castrum. Q(uod) si jus suum infra predictum terminum non recuperaverit, tunc per consilium eorum in fine ipsius termini castrum idem restituet Sar(esberiensis) ecclesie et episcopo'*, Ibid, 796, pp. 292-3; King, 'Accession of Henry II', p. 25, and King Stephen, p. 253; Garnett, p. 277.

<sup>113</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 3, 272, pp. 97-9.

<sup>114</sup> *'Ki le chastelsun pere tint par vasselage...L'aveit ëu en garde'*, Fantosme, lines 538-87, pp. 250-5.

lord, and the same could be said of Roger Fitz Richard. These are suppositions and the sources are not exactly clear; however, the variety of descriptions does suggest a difference.

What was this distinction? In an ideal situation, the king would issue a licence for the construction of a castle to a baron; the king or baron could hand over direct possession of a castle to a castellan and we do have evidence for this. Henry Fitz Empress granted the ‘manor of Bitton (Glos.) and £100 of land in Berkeley (Glos.) with permission to build a castle there’.<sup>115</sup> Painter argued that a ‘baron should have several castles and the lesser landowners in a more or less compact area should be his vassals;’ additionally, ‘a baron could have effective control of a castle by owning or being in command of one already in existence or by building a new one’.<sup>116</sup> So by this definition, Rabel was a baron because he held Lillebonne, Villers Chambellan, and Méridon,<sup>117</sup> Ralph of Conches possessed ‘powerful castles [at] Conches and Tosny, Portes and Acquigny’,<sup>118</sup> Guigan Algason possessed ‘Argentan, Exmes, Domfront, and others which he governed as vicomte by the king’s command’,<sup>119</sup> and Robert of Bellême held ‘thirty-four very strong castles’.<sup>120</sup> But Painter’s definition, is very schematic and, among other things, does not address the barons, including great magnates, who were castellans of royal castles.

In many cases there is ambiguity. Brian Fitz Count was described as ‘strengthening an impregnable castle that he had at Wallingford...rebelled against the king with spirit and great resolution’.<sup>121</sup> Orderic describes Stephen taking ‘possession of his [Roger le Bègue’s] castle of Grossoeuvre in the Évrecin’ and that ‘Richard Silvanus fortified a very strong

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<sup>115</sup> ‘*Et pepigi ei firmare ibi castellum secundum voluntatem ipsius Rodb(er)ti*’, Ibid, 309, p. 11.

<sup>116</sup> Painter, pp. 39-40.

<sup>117</sup> ‘*oppida eius luliam Bonam Vileriasque et Mansionem Odonis obsedit*’, Orderic, 13, 30, pp. 482-3.

<sup>118</sup> ‘*Ipse fortia possidet eastras, Coneas et Toeneium, Portas et Achinneium*’, Orderic, 12, 19, pp. 244-5.

<sup>119</sup> ‘*eique Argentomum et Oximos et Damfrontem aliaque quibus ut uicomes iubente rege praeerat oppida subegit*’, Orderic, 13, 21, pp. 454-7; Garnett, pp. 223-4.

<sup>120</sup> ‘*xxxiiii firmissimas munitiones habeo*’, Orderic, 11, 22, pp. 94-5.

<sup>121</sup> ‘*firmato inexpugnabili, quod penes Walengefordiam habuerat, castello...aduersus regem uiue et constantissime rebellauit*’, GS, 1, 42, pp. 90-3.

castle at Saint-Pois'.<sup>122</sup> In 1188, Philip of France gave Chateau Raoul 'into the charge of William des Barres' and the Bishop of Beauvais took 'Aumarle, a castle of William, earl of Mandeville'.<sup>123</sup> Humphrey de Bohun 'by the advice and at the instigation of Miles, had strengthened [Trowbridge] with impregnable defences for resistance to the king;' in this case whether Miles told his castellan Humphrey to do this or one lord advised another to is unclear.<sup>124</sup> Are these men magnates, barons, castellans, or possibly all of the above?

Twelfth-century royal charters linguistically distinguish between magnates and barons denoting that there was a separation.<sup>125</sup> The common words to describe the magnate, or 'landowners whose interests embraced a realm and who were consequently close to its prince (*principes, primores, proceres, maiores, nobiliores, illustres, primates* and *optimates*, to name but the most common)', and included those with titles 'hereditary or otherwise' who 'were being generally referred to as "barons" (*barones*)'.<sup>126</sup> According to Crouch,

Lay magnates had castles and military followings which made them highly visible and formidable in their own right. A monarch needed them for the support they offered. It was the magnates and their military households who made up the core of any medieval army. Because they were dangerous, a prudent king or queen would always attempt to have the majority of magnates on his or her side in any potential conflict. They were therefore conceded a voice in the affairs of the realm, by which they became the royal 'council'.<sup>127</sup>

Crouch's distinction argued that magnates with titles (typically earls) were just as powerful as those without titles (barons). For example, Brian Fitz Count held no titles but was just as

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<sup>122</sup> '*municipium eius quod in Ebroicensi pago Grandis Silua nuncupatur optinuit...In Abrincatensi pago Ricardus cognomento Siluanus apud Sanctum Paternum fortissimam munitionem firmavit*', Orderic, 13, 32, pp. 490-5.

<sup>123</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 2, pp. 86-7; '*Albemarliam castellum comitis Willelmi de Mandeville*', Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 343-4.

<sup>124</sup> '*consilio et incitatu Milonis, ad regi aduersandum defensione inexpugnabili firmarat*', *GS*, 1, 43, pp. 92-5.

<sup>125</sup> For example, the treaty between Stephen and Duke Henry was addressed to '*archiepiscopis episcopis abbatibus comitibus iusticiis vicecomitibus baronibus et omnibus fidelibus*', distinguishing between magnates (*comitibus*) and barons (*baronibus*). *Regesta*, vol. 3, 272, pp. 97-9.

<sup>126</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 39-41.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

powerful and influential under Henry I and Stephen (but for Matilda) as Earl Robert of Leicester. So what was the distinction? According to Crouch,

[t]he most obvious – and perhaps inconvenient – was the entry fine into an estate which was said to be held per *baroniam*... [which] established that a man was a direct tenant of the king, and those who had to pay it who were not earls, were barons.<sup>128</sup>

Earls were titled, barons paid this fee to be barons, and both could be magnates. Furthermore all ‘aristocrats may have been knights, but it did not follow that all knights were perceived as aristocrats. Most were employees’, serving in the armies or garrisons of their lords.<sup>129</sup> Knights might have held the military distinction but they were not titled nor paid to be amongst the baronial ranking.

So what does this mean for the role of castellan? The status of a castellan (also seen as constable or custodian) was not consistent throughout the twelfth century even from castle to castle.<sup>130</sup> The importance of a magnate or king to political or military endeavours meant it was unlikely he would be in residence during a siege; thus, the castellan ‘to whom the lord [or king] gave custody’, would hold and defend the castle in his absence supported by, and in charge of, the garrison.<sup>131</sup> The words consistently used to refer to castellans support this with phrases like ‘captain of the knights’,<sup>132</sup> ‘was holding’,<sup>133</sup> ‘guarded by’,<sup>134</sup> and the words used for castellan (*oppidanus*,<sup>135</sup> *municeps*,<sup>136</sup> *castellanus*<sup>137</sup>) reference the castle – or the various terms for it – connecting this office/position with the structure. Even

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid, pp. 48-51.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>130</sup> Reynolds, pp. 170, 261.

<sup>131</sup> W. Van Emden, ‘The Castle in Some Works of Medieval French Literature’, in Reyerson and Powe, p. 3; ‘The custodian of a castle would—or should—have regarded himself as responsible to his lord for its safety’. Reynolds, p. 170.

<sup>132</sup> ‘*magister militum*’, Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 34-5.

<sup>133</sup> ‘*Tunc nimirum Rogerius Guillelmi filii Barnonis filius pretorium Gloz seruabat*’, Orderic, 12, 20, pp. 250-1.

<sup>134</sup> ‘*conseruabat*’, Orderic, 11, 17, pp. 78-81.

<sup>135</sup> Orderic, 12, 1 and 17, pp. 188-9, 232-3.

<sup>136</sup> Orderic, 11, 17, pp. 78-81, and 12, 17, pp. 232-3; *GS*, 2, 115, pp. 222-3.

<sup>137</sup> Orderic, 13, 21, pp. 454-7; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 32, pp. 64-5; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 374-5, 410; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 54-5, 91.

in peace, kings and barons could not devote their full attention to all their castles at once; thus, the custodian/constable/castellan was a necessity.<sup>138</sup> Stephen gave Saffron Walden to Turgis of Avranches ‘to guard rather than to possess’, and in 1145, Stephen arrived and ‘wished to have entry into the castle as usual, because it belonged to him legally and had, he thought, been won by his efforts;’ however, ‘Turgis, fearing that what he held might be entrusted to another, flatly refused’.<sup>139</sup> The chronicler makes it clear that this was held from the king and the use of ‘guard’, and that it might be ‘entrusted’ to someone else, suggests Turgis was the castellan.

Referring to a ‘castellan’ was a common identifier in chronicles: ‘Gilbert, the castellan of Tillières’,<sup>140</sup> ‘Robert the castellan’,<sup>141</sup> ‘Roger d’Estuteville was castellan’ of Wark,<sup>142</sup> ‘Ingelram, castellan of Trie’,<sup>143</sup> John of Marlborough named as ‘castellan of Marlborough’,<sup>144</sup> William Trussebut called ‘the castellan of Bonneville’,<sup>145</sup> Ralph of Bayeux described as ‘castellan of the citadel of Évreux’,<sup>146</sup> Arnold of Bois-Arnaud ‘was castellan of Lire’,<sup>147</sup> William Fitz Alan was ‘the castellan and sheriff of Shrewsbury’,<sup>148</sup> the castle of Carrouges was besieged and the citadel ‘which the castellan—a knight named Walter—was holding’ fell,<sup>149</sup> and Painel is described as castellan of Les Moutiers-Hubert.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Roger de Mowbray sent his castellan of Axholme notification to ‘pay directly to the canons of Hirst his gift of 30s. and 8 sesters of malt p.a., instead of through the agency of his reeves as formerly, because the reeves frequently failed to make the payments’. Greenway, 219, pp. 154-5. And another to a different castellan of Axholme Robert de Daiville in 221, pp. 156-7. The following examples may contain men who could fall under the category of baron; however, their relationship with the castles in these passages is one of the castellan, they hold it for someone else, and are therefore referred to by that position.

<sup>139</sup> *‘quam rex ei ad conseruandum magis quam ad possidendum commiserat: cumque rex in castello, utpote in sui iuris suique, ut putabat, laboris possessione, solitos uellet frequentare ingressus...uerens ille ne quod possidebat alteri committeret, omnino inhibuit’*, *GS*, 2, 91, pp. 174-7; Cronne, *Reign of Stephen*, pp. 55-6.

<sup>140</sup> ‘Gislebertus Tegulensis castellanus’, Orderic, 12, 19, pp. 248-9.

<sup>141</sup> ‘Rodbertum municipem’, Orderic, 12, 17, pp. 232-3.

<sup>142</sup> ‘Rogier d’Estuteville en fud le cunestable’, Fantosme, lines 478-506, pp. 244-7.

<sup>143</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 374-5; ‘Ingerannus, castellanus de Trie’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 54-5.

<sup>144</sup> ‘qui Merlebergensi praeerat castello’, *GS*, 2, 85, pp. 166-9; ‘qui apud Merleberge castellum habebat’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 39, pp. 74-6.

<sup>145</sup> ‘subito Guillelmus cognomento Trossebot Bonae Villae munio’, Orderic, 13, 38, pp. 526-9.

<sup>146</sup> ‘Interea Rannulfus Baiocensis qui Ebroieae turris munio erat’, Orderic, 12, 39, pp. 346-51.

<sup>147</sup> ‘Ernardus de Bosco Lirae municeps erat’, Orderic, 12, 20, pp. 250-1.

<sup>148</sup> ‘municeps et uicecomes Scrobesburiae’, Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 520-3.

<sup>149</sup> ‘arcem quam Gualterius miles teenebat in triduo expugnauit’, Orderic, 13, 26, pp. 466-73.

<sup>150</sup> ‘uictoque Paganello municipe’, *Ibid.*

However, there is some uncertainty and ambiguity in other passages.<sup>151</sup> Additionally, and as we saw in the previous chapter when discussing the garrison, there was not always a need to mention a castellan at all.<sup>152</sup>

The castellan's basic role as the commander of the garrison was understood by its contemporaries and some passages do not refer to them as castellans but describe them in this manner. When Ranulf of Chester sent his wife and sister-in-law to visit Lincoln castle, they are described of as 'laughing and talking with the wife of the knight who ought to have been defending the castle',<sup>153</sup> Richard of Lucy was described as the 'captain of the knights inside the fortress' when Geoffrey of Anjou besieged Falaise;<sup>154</sup> William of Valiquerville was described as the one 'whom the king had put in charge of the garrison' of Vatteville;<sup>155</sup> Henry I 'placed his household troops under chosen leaders in the castles... He stationed Ralph of Bayetix in the citadel of Évreux, Henry the son of Joscelin of La Pommeraye at Pont-Autou, Odo Borleng in charge of the castle of Bemay,'<sup>156</sup> similarly, Rotrou, count of

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<sup>151</sup> Other examples not included in text: *'einde rex cum mille militibus contra Hugonem in Braium expeditionem fecit, et castellum Hugonis quod Firmitas uocatur expugnare cepit, sed pluuiæ mira mox inundatione erupit. Denique prouincia funditus deuastata recessit, et inde contra Rodbertum I qui rebellauerat Nouum Burgum expetiit, impugnauit, penitusque concremauit'*, Orderic, 12, 5, pp. 200-1; *'Disposita itaque prodicione Rodbertus Cadomum perrexit, et inuento regi familiariter dixit, "Municipium quod supra Diuam habeo si mecum uenire placet tibi reddo."*, Ibid, 11, 19, pp. 80-3; *'uersus duo castella, Carith uidelicet et Harpetreu illud a [Radulfo] cognomina Luuel, istud at Willelmo filio Ioannis possessum, expeditionem promouit. Erant autem amicitiae nexibus cum comite copulati, fide et iureiurando firmanter unificati, pactionibus et hominio adeo confoederati, ut cum celerius percepissent illum aduersus regiam postestatem uelle insurgere, et ipsi in eum praesto et conspiranter secum insurgerent'*, GS, 1, 31, pp. 66-9; *'Philippus quoque, filius Roberti comitis Glaorniae...Habuit uero idem robur militiae inuictissimum, castella quoque plurima, alia ex regis sibi permissione mandata, alia probitatis suae industria ex aduersariis conquista. Cepti namque Robertum, cognomento Musard, uirum simpliciter, immo ut uerum fatear, imprudenter de castello suo egressum: cumque Philippus in insidiis delitesceret, progressum eum fortuito inuenit, suspenditumque, collo loro innexo, minitans castellum illius uiolenter obtinuit'*, GS, 2, 95, pp. 186-7; *'si castellum Wigorniae uellet secum obsidere et sibi contradere, quod eo tempore milites comitis Mellonensis dolose occuparant, capto et in carcerali angustia ludibriis exposito Willelmo de Bellocampo, qui illud prius possederat et se comiti Herefordiae ex toto inclinarat'*, Ibid, 117, pp. 228-9.

<sup>152</sup> No castellan mentioned. Orderic, 11, 3 and 13, pp. 20-9, 72-3, and 12, 14 and 17, pp. 222-5, 228-9; GS, 1, 30 and 53, pp. 64-7, 108-11, and 2, 69, pp. 138-9.

<sup>153</sup> *'cum uxore militis qui turrin tueri debebat luderent et confabularentur'*, Orderic, 13, 43, pp. 538-45.

<sup>154</sup> *'Ricardus de Luceio princeps militum in oppido fuit'*, Orderic, 13, 38, pp. 526-9.

<sup>155</sup> *'Guillelmi de Gualicheriuilla quem rex principem custodum constituerat'*, Orderic, 12, 39, pp. 346-51.

<sup>156</sup> *'Familias uero suas cum precipuis ducibus per castella disposuit...Nam Rannulfum Baioensem constituit in Ebroarum turri, Henricum uero Goisleni de Pomereto filium ad Pontem Altouci, et Odonem cognomento Borleugum ad presidium Bernaici'*, Orderic, 12, 38, pp. 346-7.

Mortagne ‘entrusted’ Pont-Echanfray to Roger de Platanis;<sup>157</sup> Henry I ‘fortified a very strong castle at Noyon-sur-Andelle...under the command of William, son of Thierry’,<sup>158</sup> William Talvas ‘committed the stronghold’ of Bellême to Aymer of Villeray,<sup>159</sup> and Robert Giroie ‘was defending the castle of Saint-Céneri against the king’ and ‘Roger of St. John and John his brother had been hand-picked by the king’ to defend La Motte-Gautier-de-Clinchamp.<sup>160</sup> What is common in all of these descriptions regardless of whether an office like *municeps* was mentioned, there is the perception that these men were the military commanders of the garrison and responsible for the castle’s defence. However, the above passages demonstrate an assumption and need for someone to be in control of the castle and garrison on behalf of the lord of the castle.

At some castles, this position evolved into a hereditary office attached to familial possession of the castle which complicated the issue of possession. Theoretically, a castle held in fief could be confiscated only if the baron was, or was suspected of being, disloyal; however, ‘the tenure of a hereditary constable was much less secure’ as demonstrated by Henry II’s replacement of nearly all of them in 1176, in an arguably simple application of rendability.<sup>161</sup> For the eleventh and twelfth centuries, twelve royal castles with hereditary castellans have been identified by modern historians and four continued into the thirteenth century.<sup>162</sup> Their families may have possessed these castles for many generations, they were the king’s castellans. While these men were royal castellans, they were also magnates and barons who possessed several of their own; in many cases, their wealth and power

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<sup>157</sup> ‘*oppidum Rogerio de Platanis commisit*’, Orderic, 13, 41, pp. 534-7.

<sup>158</sup> ‘*Henricus rex contra Francos apud Nogionems castrum firmissimum muniuit, ibique centum milites quibus princeps militia Guillelmus Teoderici filius preerat constituit*’, Orderic, 12, 12, pp. 218-9.

<sup>159</sup> ‘*Porro Haimericus de Vilereio aliique Belesmensium proceres quibus Guillelmus Talauacius Rodberti filius oppidum commiserat*’, Orderic, 11, 45, pp. 182-3.

<sup>160</sup> ‘*qui castrum sancti Serenici contra regem defensabat inuitatus uenit...quorum principes Rogerius le Sancto lohanne et lohannes frater eius a rege electi fuerunt*’, Orderic, 12, 4, pp. 194-7.

<sup>161</sup> Painter, p. 135.

<sup>162</sup> These were the Tower of London, Windsor, Nottingham, Leicester, Gloucester, Dover, Exeter, Salisbury, Bedford, Lincoln, Rockingham, and Worcester with the latter four still held as hereditary constablerships early in the thirteenth century. Ibid, p. 137.

challenged the king's which made the reality of reclaiming castles very difficult. Stephen retained the loyalty of the Tower of London (Geoffrey de Mandeville), Windsor and Nottingham (Richard de Lucy), Leicester (Robert of Leicester), Rockingham (William Maudit II<sup>163</sup>), and Worcester (Waleran of Meulan). Others chose to join Matilda and Stephen could not muster enough resistance to stop them. Robert of Gloucester's defection in 1138 removed Gloucester from Stephen's authority; he besieged Dover when its castellan (Walchelin, son-in-law to the new earl of Derby, Robert of Ferrers) turned to the Angevins in 1138, and the king ordered the rendering of Bedford, Exeter, Salisbury, and Lincoln in order to replace their castellans.<sup>164</sup> So if a baron could also be a castellan, then does this distinction matter to the personal nature of the castle? Could this element be better expressed by the vocabulary discussing possession and not in titles? And, regardless of whether a castellan or baron possessed a castle, does that make it any less 'theirs'?

### **Vocabulary of Personal Possession**

We have already seen that when a castellan is mentioned, the perception of distinction is typically achieved by naming their office or function: so is their possession distinguishable from that of a baron? Charter vocabulary may be helpful. First, there are hereditary grants and confirmations. Stephen granted the castles of Almondbury and Barwick-in-Elmet to Henry de Lacy and his heirs<sup>165</sup> and the castle of Hereford to the earl of Leicester and his heirs.<sup>166</sup> When Duke Henry issued a charter to Ranulf of Chester, he

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<sup>163</sup> *King's Works*, vol. 2, p. 815.

<sup>164</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 231; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 193; Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 520-1. Worcester too was attacked following the defection of Waleran of Meulan after the loss of Normandy to the Angevins in 1141.

<sup>165</sup> '*Carta regis Stephani per quam concessit Henrico de Lascy et heredibus suis castellum de Almanberia, et per quam confirmavit emptionem quam idem Henr(icus) fecit de terra Dalton cum pertinentiis, et eadem confirmavit eidem Henr(ico) castellum Berewicam*', *Regesta*, vol. 3, 430, p. 162.

<sup>166</sup> '*Sciatis me reddidisse et concessisse hereditari Rob(erto) com(iti) Legre(cestrie) et heredibus suis Burgum Hereford(ie) et castellum et totum comitatum de Herefordisc(ira)*', *Ibid*, 437, p. 165.

confirmed him in everything he held hereditarily and that he would hold it freely.<sup>167</sup> When the empress granted William de Beauchamp the shrievalty of Worcester, the charter recorded that he and his heirs would hold the castle at Worcester from the empress and her heirs;<sup>168</sup> she gave Miles of Gloucester St. Briavel's castle for his service, and he and his heirs will hold the castle *in feudo et hereditate*,<sup>169</sup> he and his heirs received the castle of Abergavenny,<sup>170</sup> and when she made him earl of Hereford, she gave him, and his heirs, Hereford to hold *in feudo et hereditate* from her and her heirs.<sup>171</sup> The inclusion of *in feudo* and *liberius tenuit* seems to imply a status as a 'permanent or inherited property as distinct from what was held *ut de vadio* or *ut de warda*'.<sup>172</sup> The hereditary nature of these confirmations and grants appears to imply baronial possession conferred freely by the king or empress. The second distinction was holding a castle in custody. Early in his reign, Stephen gave Miles of Gloucester custody (*custodiam*) of Gloucester castle.<sup>173</sup> The treaty between Stephen and Duke Henry stated that those who would hold specific castles would hold them in custody (*custodiet, custodiam, custodient, custodiunt, custodiendum*).<sup>174</sup> These

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<sup>167</sup> 'Sciatis me dedisse et concessisse Ranulfo comiti Cestrie omnem hereditatem suam Normannie et Anglie sicut unquam aliquis antecessorum suorum eam melius et liberius tenuit', Ibid, 180, pp. 65-6.

<sup>168</sup> 'Sciatis me dedisse et reddidisse Willelmo de Bellocampo hereditario jure castellum de Wigornia cum mota sibi et heredibus suis ad tenendum de me in capite et heredibus meis', Ibid, 68, pp. 26-7.

<sup>169</sup> 'dedi ei pro servitio suo in feudo et hereditate sibi et heredibus suis castellum Sancti Briaveli', Ibid, 391, p. 150.

<sup>170</sup> 'concessisse Milon(i) com(iti) Herefordie et heredibus suis castellum de Abergeveneia et totum honorem qui ad illud pertinent', Ibid, 394, p. 151.

<sup>171</sup> 'Sciatis me fecisse Milonem de Gloc(estria) comitem de Hereford, et dedisse ei motam Hereford cum toto castello in feudo et hereditate sibi et heredibus suis ad tenendum de me et heredibus meis', Ibid, 393, pp. 150-1.

<sup>172</sup> Reynolds, p. 354.

<sup>173</sup> 'Sciatis me reddidisse et concessisse Miloni Gloec(estrie) et heredibus suis post eum, in feodum et hereditatem, totum honorem patris sui et custodiam turris et castelli Gloecestrie ad tenendum tali forma (sic) qualem reddebat tempore regis Henrici sicut patrimonium suum', Ibid, 387, p. 149.

<sup>174</sup> 'Ita scilicet quod Reginaldus de Warenn(ie) castrum Belencumbre et castrum Mortui-maris custodiet, si voluerit, et dabit inde duci obsides. Si vero noluerit, alii de ligiis hominibus comitis Warenn(ie) quos dux voluerit similiter per salvos obsides et salvam custodiam eadem castra custodient. Alia vero castra que pertinent ad comitatum Moretonie dux ei reddet ad voluntatem meam cum poterit, per salvam custodiam et per salvos obsides... dedit ei dux et concessit quicquid Richerus de Aquila habebat de honore Peveneselli, et preter hec castra et villas Peveneselli, et servitium Faramusi, preter castra et villas de Dovre, et quod ad honorem Dovre pertinet... Illi autem qui castra Warengesford custodiunt homagium mihi fecerunt, et dederunt mihi obsides de fidelitate mihi servanda... Etiam turris Lundoniensis Ricardo de Luceio, et mota Windlesores consilio sancte ecclesie ad custodiendum tradite sunt... Similiter consilio sancte ecclesie Rogger[us] de Busseio motam Oxeneford, et Jordan[us] de Buseso firmitatem Lincolie custodiunt...

terms imply that the grant was out of the king's direct control but was held from him.<sup>175</sup> The use of *custodio* certainly implies that this possession was conditional and not hereditary; these are not lords of the castle but castellans.<sup>176</sup>

In chronicles, the most basic, and prolific, answer is through personal pronouns or verb declensions. Brian Fitz Count was 'strengthening an impregnable castle that he had at Wallingford (*firmato inexpugnabili, quod penes Walengefordiam habuerat, castello*)',<sup>177</sup> Stephen took 'possession of his [Roger le Bègue's] castle of Grossoeuvre in the Évrecin (*municipium eius quod in Ebroicensi pago Grandis Silua nuncupatur optinuit*)',<sup>178</sup> and Aumarle is 'a castle of William, earl of Mandeville'.<sup>179</sup> Additionally, after Stephen's coronation, English nobles prepared 'their castles'<sup>180</sup> and he had to deal with the former favourites of Henry I who 'hung back around their castles (*diu se circa castella sua reprimentes*)'.<sup>181</sup> As consequence for his rebellion against Stephen, Eustace 'was compelled to give back the castles that King Henry had given him (*castra, quae ei rex Henricus commiserat*)'<sup>182</sup> which included Malton and this castle was referred to as being held by Eustace Fitz John and called 'his' several times.<sup>183</sup> Bristol was 'the earl's [of Gloucester] own headquarters (*specialem comitis sedem Bristoam tendentes*)'<sup>184</sup> and only John of Worcester named its castellan, Philip Gay, who is not described as possessing the castle but

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*Episcopus Wintonie in manu archiepiscopi Cantuar(iensis) coram episcopis affidavit, quod si ego decederem castra Wintonie et munitionem Hamtone duci redderet*, Ibid, 272, pp. 97-9.

<sup>175</sup> Reynolds, pp. 174-5, 233, 266-7, 353, 359-60.

<sup>176</sup> Inheritability was a natural concept for all holdings but the issue of inheriting castles was complicated and followed no pattern as discussed by Reynolds and later in this chapter. Ibid, p. 48-9.

<sup>177</sup> *GS*, 1, 42, pp. 90-3.

<sup>178</sup> Orderic, 13, 32, pp. 490-5.

<sup>179</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 2, pp. 86-7; '*Albemarliam castellum comitis Willelmi de Mandeville*', Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 343-4.

<sup>180</sup> This was a common personal attribution for castles and some examples include: Worcester, pp. 216-9; *GS*, 2, 96 and 117, pp. 188-91 and 226-31; *ASC*, E, p. 202; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22-3 and 29, pp. 44-9, 56-9.

<sup>181</sup> *GS*, 1, 12, pp. 22-3.

<sup>182</sup> Aelred (eng), pp. 259-60; Aelred (lat), p. 191.

<sup>183</sup> Hexham (eng), pp. 64-5, 68-9; '*suum alterum castellum nomine Maltun munitissimum*', and '*oppidum Eustachii quod Maltun vocatur*', Hexham (lat), pp. 158, 165. This was also used by Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 17, pp. 178-9.

<sup>184</sup> *GS*, 1, 26, pp. 56-7; Worcester, p. 249.

as responsible for the garrison's depredations and the violence coming from it.<sup>185</sup> The bishop of Winchester is recorded as having a castle in that city which 'he had built in very elegant style in the middle of the town' and when the empress came to confront him in 1141, she targeted 'the bishop's castle'.<sup>186</sup> Wareham was one of the earl of Gloucester's castles which he had 'long since entrusted to his eldest son William'.<sup>187</sup> In this case, the castle is clearly the earl's but in possession of his son. Geoffrey de Mandeville was described of as having 'in his hands the Tower of London, likewise castles of impregnable strength built round the city', and the king succeeded in 1143 of depriving him of 'the castles he possessed'.<sup>188</sup> Castle Cary was denoted as belonging to the earl of Gloucester when Henry de Tracy was 'fortifying another castle in front of' it.<sup>189</sup> In 1149, when Stephen went on the offensive against the earl of Chester, the *Gesta Stephani* recorded that the king 'destroyed some of his castles and very closely besieged others'.<sup>190</sup> We are not told which castles are included in this comment but the crucial information is that they belonged to the earl. When Henry Fitz Empress arrived in England, he succeeded in capturing several castles including Earl Ferrers' castle at Tutbury and the king's castle at Bedford.<sup>191</sup> Lidelea was recorded as having 'belonged to the bishop of Winchester';<sup>192</sup> Downtown was seized by Earl Patrick but was

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<sup>185</sup> 'A little later the king moved his army to Bristol, where at that time there had emerged, as though from Hell, cruelties worthy of the times of Nero or Decius, and practised by the earl's kinsman, Philip Gay. By him various pitiless cruelties were there first introduced which were to spread far and wide throughout England, and nearly reduce the island to nothing. (*non multo post uersus Brycestowam rex mouit exercitum, ubi hisdem diebus per quendam comitis cognatum, Philippum Gai nuncupatum, uelut ex inferno emergerunt Neroniana seu Deciana tempora et tormenta. Illo enim agente, coeperunt inibi primitus adinueniri diuersorum acerbitates tormentorum, quem per totam longe lateque disseminate, Angliam uniuersam prope iam ad nichilum redegerunt insulam.*)' Worcester, pp. 248-51.

<sup>186</sup> '*castellumque episcopi, quod uenustissimo constructum cemate in ciuitatis medio locarat*' *GS*, 1, 63, pp. 126-7; '*turrim Wintoniensis episcopi*', Newburgh, 1, 9, pp. 62-3.

<sup>187</sup> '*quem uicum cum castello iamdudum commiserat filio suo promogenito Willelmo*', Malmesbury, *HN*, 3, 74, pp. 124-5.

<sup>188</sup> '*possederat castellis*' *GS*, 2, 81-82, pp. 160-3; 'He held the famous Tower of London and two other quite notable fortifications (*praeclaram illam arcem Londoniensem cum duabus aliis munitionibus non ignobilibus possidens*)', Newburgh, 1, 11, pp. 66-7.

<sup>189</sup> '*ante castellum, quod Cari dicitur, et aliud firmabat, quo et comitem Glaorniae per hoc facilius arceret*', *GS*, 2, 110, pp. 210-3.

<sup>190</sup> '*nunc illius municipia alia subuertere, alia strictissima obsidione cingere*', *GS*, 2, 114, pp. 220-1.

<sup>191</sup> *GS*, 2, 119-20, pp. 234-9.

<sup>192</sup> '*Fuit namque idem castellum ex episcopi Wintoniensis iure*', *GS*, 2, 109, pp. 208-11.

recorded as belonging ‘by right to Winchester Cathedral’.<sup>193</sup> The vocabulary used by these chroniclers demonstrates a perception that these castles belonged to their possessor.

These last two passages raise another issue: the use of *ex iure*. This can be translated as ‘justly,<sup>194</sup> rightly,<sup>195</sup> deservedly’<sup>196</sup> so in the context of castles can be used for holding them ‘by right’.<sup>197</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* used this phrase several times: Miles de Beauchamp claimed that Bedford was ‘the hereditary possession of himself and his family (*possessione, ex paterno iure sibi et suis debita*);’<sup>198</sup> John Fitz Gilbert was

...in forcible possession of a very strong castle belonging of right to the king, named Marlborough. Robert [Fitz Hubert] was anxious to gain possession of it, either because it was near his own castle and conveniently situated, or because if that too were brought under his power he could more freely cause discord in the whole of England. (*castellum tutissimum ex regione iure uiolenter possidens, Merlebergam nominatum. Quod Robertus affectans, uel quia castello suo uicinum erat et commodum, uel quia et illo sub iure suo redacto, toti posset Angliae licentius inferre dissensum*).<sup>199</sup>

Oxford ‘castle and all the country round about were brought under her [Matilda’s] authority (*tum quia castellum cum omni circumiacente prouincia sub sui imperii redigebatur iure*)’.<sup>200</sup>

Other chroniclers used the same language. In order to solidify his control over Normandy, Geoffrey of Anjou ‘sent out envoys to the magnates and commanded them as of right to hand over their castles to him and keep the peace. (*legatos ad procures direxit, ac ut munitiones suas sibi dederent et pacifici essent iure requisiiuit*.)’<sup>201</sup> When Stephen created his earls, he gave them ‘endowments of landed estates and revenues that had belonged directly to the king (*applicitis possessionibus et redditibus que proprio iure regi*

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<sup>193</sup> ‘*ex iure et possessione Wintoniensis ecclesiae furto surripuerent*’, *GS*, 2, 112, pp. 214-5.

<sup>194</sup> Malmesbury, *Novella*, 2, 24, pp. 48-51.

<sup>195</sup> Huntingdon, 7, 24, pp. 450-1.

<sup>196</sup> *Oxford Latin Dictionary*.

<sup>197</sup> More detailed discussion of this phrase as pertains to the fief. Reynolds, p. 266.

<sup>198</sup> *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51.

<sup>199</sup> *GS*, 1, 51, pp. 104-7.

<sup>200</sup> *GS*, 2, 71, pp. 140-3.

<sup>201</sup> Orderic, 13, 41, pp. 546-7; Haskins, ‘Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet’, pp. 420-2.

*competebant*)'.<sup>202</sup> Alexander of Lincoln allowed 'his castle to pass out of his authority and into the custody of strangers (*ut castrum suum a iure suo in extraneorum custodiam deponerent*)'.<sup>203</sup>

But there were other ways *ex iure* was used. The *Gesta Stephani* used it to describe Matilda's claim to the English throne: 'and it was not only Baldwin, but all others she could, that she had induced to obey her, inasmuch as she laid what she considered a just claim to the sovereignty of the kingdom by right of her father (*Nec solum Balduinum, sed et alios, quotquot poterat, ad sibi obsequendum inclinarat; utpote quae regni dominium, ex paterno sibi iure, iuste, ut sibi uidebatur, uendicabat*)'.<sup>204</sup> Orderic also used *iure* to describe a 'royal decree' by which Henry I assembled Normans and English followers.<sup>205</sup> He also used it for 'inherited': Richard Bassett 'made a show of superiority to all his peers and fellow countrymen by the magnificence of his building in the little fief he had inherited from his parents in Normandy (*potentia utpote capitalis iusticiarii magna fuerat, in paruo feudo quod parentum successiuo iure in Normannia optinuerat*)'.<sup>206</sup> Henry I also took away his own daughter Juliana's 'complete inheritance, which was hers not by hereditary right but by seizure and which until then the king in his benevolence had tolerated (*omnem illam hereditatem, quam non hereditatio iure, sed sua peruatione, immo regis clementia hactenus ille possederat, non immerito illi abstulit*)'.<sup>207</sup> Henry I 'pulled down many great men from positions of eminence for their presumption, and sentenced them to be disinherited for ever (*Vnde plerosque illustres pro temeritate sua de sullimi [sic] potestatis culmine precipitauit, et haereditario iure irrecuperabiliter spoliatos condempnauit*)'.<sup>208</sup> Henry I's son William

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<sup>202</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 1, 21, pp. 40-3.

<sup>203</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 11, pp. 720-3.

<sup>204</sup> *GS*, 1, 22, pp. 46-7.

<sup>205</sup> '*Normannos et Anglos aliosque multos regali iure asciiuit*', Orderic, 12, 8, pp. 206-9.

<sup>206</sup> Orderic, 13, 26, pp. 466-73.

<sup>207</sup> *GND*, 8, 15, pp. 226-31; Green, *Henry I*, p. 147.

<sup>208</sup> Orderic, 11, 2, pp. 16-7.

‘did homage to the king of the French for Normandy, acknowledging that he would hold the province from him by legal right (*hominium regi Francorum de Normannia fecit, iure legitimo de eo prouintiam cogniturus*)’.<sup>209</sup> Stephen received ‘the duchy of Normandy from him [King Louis] as his right (*Normanniae ducatum ab ipso iure recepit*);<sup>210</sup> In each of these cases, the castle, or land, is perceived as belonging to the person with what appears to be some sort of legal basis grounded in familial possession.

Apart from using personal pronouns or verb conjugations, authors also described the loyalty of the garrison to denote the possession of castles. Stephen garrisoned Weobley and Hereford ‘with his troops’ regaining possession from rebellious barons.<sup>211</sup> After breaking the bishops in 1139, ‘the king took over Ely castle and manned it with his men’, and completely destroyed the bishop of Ely’s power in the area.<sup>212</sup> Malmesbury and Devizes, are never referred to as Robert Fitz Hubert’s; however, the presence of his men garrisoning the castle does mean he is perceived as possessing them.<sup>213</sup> When Robert of Gloucester arrived at Devizes to take possession from Fitz Hubert, the latter threatened him ‘saying he had captured the castle to occupy it, not to hand it over to one stronger than himself’ with his intent to claim power for himself ‘not to keep on the earl’s side, nor to proclaim himself a supporter of the king’.<sup>214</sup> In both castles, Fitz Hubert took the castle from royal garrisons (i.e. the king) and this was one of the most common descriptions of how the king possessed castles.<sup>215</sup> For example, Henry Fitz Empress ‘tricking the royal garrison to which it had been

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<sup>209</sup> Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 405, pp. 732-5

<sup>210</sup> Orderic, 13, 30, pp. 482-3.

<sup>211</sup> ‘*rex cepit, et illud et predictum Herefordense castellum instructis militibus muniuit*’, Worcester, pp. 242-5.

<sup>212</sup> ‘*Rex autem Eliense castellum optinuit, et in eo milites suos posuit*’, Worcester, pp. 280-1.

<sup>213</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 31, pp. 63; *GS*, 1, 52, pp. 108-9.

<sup>214</sup> ‘*affirmans, ut castellum possideret, non fortiori se committeret, castellum se conquisisse... quatenus nec ex parte comitis se continens, nec ex consortio regis se profitens*’, *GS*, 1, 51, pp. 104-7.

<sup>215</sup> Worcester, pp. 284-91; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 31, pp. 63

entrusted', gained control of Warwick<sup>216</sup> and a royal garrison was also described at Malmesbury and at Stamford when Henry arrived to besiege these castles.<sup>217</sup>

What about the possession of castellans? It is important to note that in none of the passages above relating to castellans are the castles referred to as theirs; they hold and defend castles as military officers, but they are not the possessor.<sup>218</sup> In a passage describing Amaury of Montfort's 'very well-fortified castles and powerful castellans', these are his castles held by his castellans;<sup>219</sup> while Roger de Platanis was 'entrusted' with Pont-Echanfray its lord was Rotrou, count of Mortagne, who possessed it;<sup>220</sup> Henry I only put William of Valiquerville 'in charge of the garrison' of Vatteville<sup>221</sup> and the castles of Évreux, Pont-Autou, and Bemay are the king's as well despite Ralph of Bayetix, Henry of La Pommeraye, and Odo Borleng being named as castellans respectively;<sup>222</sup> Noyon-sur-Andelle<sup>223</sup> and La Motte-Gautier-de-Clinchamp were in the same position;<sup>224</sup> William Talvas possessed Bellême and entrusted its defence to Aymer of Villeray.<sup>225</sup>

There were some castellans who had 'rights to alienate their fortresses and pass them on to their heirs'.<sup>226</sup> However, the status of castellans and the conditions under which they held the castles differed across the Anglo-Norman regnum, Europe, and the Middle Ages: in 'some charters the immediate heirs were more narrowly defined than in others; some

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<sup>216</sup> 'deceptis regalibus quibus commissum fuerat', *GS*, 2, 119, pp. 234-5.

<sup>217</sup> Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 122-5.

<sup>218</sup> Citations from examples not used: Orderic, 12, 17 and 19-20 and 39, pp. 232-3, 248-51, 346-51, and 13, 21 and 26 and 37-8 and 43, pp. 454-7, 466-73, 520-3, 526-9, 538-45; Fantosme, lines 478-506, pp. 244-7; *GS*, 2, 85, pp. 166-9.

<sup>219</sup> 'castella munitissima et potentes oppidanos habebat', Orderic, 12, 1, pp. 188-9.

<sup>220</sup> 'oppidum Rogerio de Platanis commisit', Orderic, 13, 41, pp. 534-7.

<sup>221</sup> 'Guillelmi de Gualicheriulla quem rex principem custodum constituerat', Orderic, 12, 39, pp. 346-51.

<sup>222</sup> 'Familias uero suas cum precipuis ducibus per castella disposuit... Nam Rannulfum Baioensem constituit in Ebroarum turri, Henricum uero Goisleni de Pomereto filium ad Pontem Altouci, et Odonem cognomento Borleugum ad presidium Bernaici', Orderic, 12, 38, pp. 346-7.

<sup>223</sup> 'Henricus rex contra Francos apud Nogionems castrum firmissimum muniuit, ibique centum milites quibus princeps militia Guillelmus Teoderici filius preerat constituit', Orderic, 12, 12, pp. 218-9.

<sup>224</sup> 'quorum principes Rogerius le Sancto Iohanne et Iohannes frater eius a rege electi fuerunt', Orderic, 12, 4, pp. 194-7.

<sup>225</sup> Orderic, 11, 45, pp. 182-3.

<sup>226</sup> Reynolds, p. 130.

fortresses were to be surrendered to the lord on demand while others were not'.<sup>227</sup> The 'difference between castles held as what historians call fiefs and those held by custodians with fewer property rights was, it seems, unclear enough to be open to different interpretations later on'.<sup>228</sup> Reynolds argues that the difficulty,

...may arise less from the loss of records than from the anachronism of the categories. Military commanders may not always have had the time or facilities to record the arrangements that they made as well as great churches did... [and] if full and explicit conditions were imposed, they are unlikely to have fitted into the mutually exclusive categories of fief and custody.<sup>229</sup>

Thus, while it is difficult to determine from some examples exactly how the castle was possessed, and despite the position of castellan becoming hereditary in certain cases, it was still held on the lord's behalf and it was he who was referred to as the possessor of the castle.

## **Conclusion**

While there was an element of royal jurisdiction, the castle was certainly perceived as personally possessed by someone. This was typically a baron or king who was the possessor of the castle, because, as we have seen, castellans 'held' the castle but it was not referred to as 'theirs'. However, the residential aspect did apply to the castellan who would have been in constant residency in the castle under their protection. From the evidence provided in this chapter, the personal nature of the castle is perceived and strongly understood by its contemporaries. In summing up the rebellion against Stephen, Henry of Huntingdon's passage from the previous chapter listing the men who held castles against

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid, p. 261.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, p. 170.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

Stephen demonstrates this concept perfectly.<sup>230</sup> While Holdsworth is right, that ‘to hold a castle was to hold something which was in theory a privilege, held on license from the king’, Huntingdon was not concerned with the specifics of how each man held their castle (i.e. their station, office, or responsibilities). The chroniclers’ use of personal pronouns, verb conjugations, comments of possession, and the issue of residency demonstrate that regardless of how castles were held from the king, they were understood as personal possessions.<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 7, pp. 712-3; chapter 1, p. 88, note 227.

<sup>231</sup> Holdsworth, ‘War and Peace’, p. 71.

## Chapter 3: Multifunctional Resource

The definition argued by this thesis – the castle as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource – may seem obvious. Modern historians now understand that the castle was a fortified residence and this study has demonstrated in the previous two chapters that these elements were perceived by twelfth-century chroniclers. In recent scholarship, the castle's multifunctional role has become accepted and its involvement in local and national issues in politics, administration, justice, economics, warfare, social interaction, and cultural development are now themes of research. We understand more how it operated as an outpost, refuge, and a base of military operations for national and local defensive networks; how it controlled lines of communication, the movement of goods and revenue, and land. The castle was a gaol,<sup>1</sup> repository for documents and treasure, and the centre of local lordship and power and other 'ruling elements of medieval society' like the shire and honorial courts.<sup>2</sup> Its space could be political, social, military, judicial, communal, domestic, exclusive, commercial, or theatrical.<sup>3</sup> Recent scholarship has opened up to the idea that the castle consisted of far more than the one-dimensional and exclusive classifications of traditional definitions.

Unfortunately, the most obvious, constant, and universal aspect of the medieval castle is still missing from modern scholarship: its use as a resource. The varied roles of the

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<sup>1</sup> Waleran of Meulan was held at Bridgnorth then Wallingford, Hugh Fitz Gervase at Windsor, Duke Robert was moved from Devizes to Bristol. Green, *Henry I*, p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> A. Harvey, *The Castles and Walled Towns of England* (London, 1911), pp. xv-I; D.R. Cook, 'The Norman Military Revolution in England', *ANS* 1 (1978), p. 97; King, *Castellarium Anglicanum*, vol. 1, p. xvi; Brown, *Architecture*, p. 12; Morillo, *Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings*; Eales, 'Royal Power and Castles in Norman England', pp. 60-1; Beeler, 'Castles and Strategy in Norman and Early Angevin England', pp. 581-601.

<sup>3</sup> Theatrical and imaginative: Dixon, 'The donjon of Knaresborough', pp. 121-40. Varied uses of the castle substantiated by archaeological finds like 'smithing, bronze working, gambling in the form of dice, cooking, archery...importing foreign pottery and probably wine, bronze buckle making... iron working, [and] coal-mining' as excavated at Bristol. Ponsford, *Bristol Castle*, p. 10

castle meant that it could be used as a tool politically, socially, militarily, and economically; it possessed a range of potentialities. The castle affected political and social relationships, was used to determine power and lordship, to indicate the social status of their possessors, and influenced the development of warfare; it was a constantly evolving military technology, a symbol of force, and a latent resource. This chapter will address this inadequacy by demonstrating that the twelfth-century chronicler understood the multi-faceted, multi-functional, and all-encompassing nature of the castle with its role as a resource as the most important characteristic.

While it is possible to isolate political (administrative) and military functions, it is crucial to note that the resourcefulness of a castle across politics, warfare, economics, and in society is difficult to separate. These categories, which modern historians use to thematically distinguish issues, are not always relevant to the twelfth century when they affected, influenced, determined, and linked each other. Increased military power increased political influence which increased social status and economic security, and *vice versa* interchangeably. Its ability to be used to for personal benefit caused it to be targeted in war; its interconnectedness made it a valuable resource.

### **Power and Lordship**

According to Speight, 'twelfth-century castles function in an elaborate power-play game, in war and peace alike...The castle is first and foremost the symbol of lordship'.<sup>4</sup> The castle's resourcefulness is rooted in its role in determining the extent of and symbolising power and lordship. In the context of the twelfth century, lordship was the control exercised

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<sup>4</sup> Speight, 'Castle Warfare', p. 273. 'The true castle was not simply the basis of a military system. It had become the centre of actual power'. Fourquin, pp. 91-2.

over the governance of a region, the status and position that accompanied landowning, and the inherent power. As described by Smail, possession of a castle,

...gave to its overlord power to control the district which surrounded it. He could derive from the land and its inhabitants an income in goods, money, and services which at once supported his personal needs and enabled him to discharge his feudal obligations in government and warfare.<sup>5</sup>

The castle was both the symbol and tool of medieval lordship representing the owner's influence; the more castles owned, the larger the area controlled and political, social, economic, and military strength gained. By constructing a castle, a statement of possession, protection, and jurisdiction was issued declaring the area under the castle and garrison's control. If anyone wanted to control that region, they had to go through the castle first.<sup>6</sup> This strength and influence, the ability to make others do one's bidding was the core of medieval power.

Yet, power was not simply physical force, protection of the territory, or 'coercive violence';<sup>7</sup> it had multiple dimensions. Power also meant the financial control to induce payment of tax and to control markets, the control of labour to compel castle-service and construction, and administrative authority including the ability to assert the practical elements of lordship like justice.<sup>8</sup> Gerald of Wales demonstrated this in his discussion of Hugh of Lacy's success in Ireland.

So when he had won their support, he enticed them to his side still further by his mild rule and by making agreements on which they could rely, and finally, when they had been hemmed in by castles and gradually subdued, he compelled them to obey the laws. Thus he succeeded in reducing to an ordered condition all that his predecessors had either destroyed or thrown into confusion, and was the first to succeed in deriving any profit from that which had brought others nothing but trouble.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Smail, p. 214; Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, p. 102, 133-4.

<sup>6</sup> Fourquin, pp. 91-2; Bradbury, *Stephen*, p. 132; Brown, *Castles, Conquest & Charters*, p. 83.

<sup>7</sup> Bisson, *Crisis*, pp. 46, 48.

<sup>8</sup> J. Hudson, *Land, Law and Lordship in Anglo-Norman England* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 21-3.

<sup>9</sup> *'Allectos igitur tam mansuetudine quam stabili convencione deliniens, demum municipiis inclusos et paulatim edomitos, legibus obtemperare et servire coegit. Sic autem effectum est ut destructa a prioribus et*

Hugh's use of castles to assert his power and lordship enabled him to stabilise the region and govern better, and more lucratively, than his predecessors.

The administrative functions attached to lordship are demonstrated by the issuing of baronial and royal charters from castles.<sup>10</sup> Within these, the power to extort fees and labour from the surrounding area is expressed most often by relief of the required work, usually for religious communities. For example, Henry I's queen Matilda 'pardoned the canons of Waltham the money which William [bishop] of Durham had from them yearly for the work of Durham Castle'.<sup>11</sup> That exemption charters were needed assumes a requirement of the supporting lands enforceable by the castle possessor. Thus, power was the ability to control the surrounding area and expel those who threatened your security; kings, magnates, and local lords exercise this authority regularly in the chronicles.<sup>12</sup> The castle's role in defending, controlling, and governing the surrounding area bestowed upon its holder the authority to act in those capacities on a local scale regardless of their larger political status.

While this thesis has disagreed on several occasions with Coulson, his summation of the relationship between kings and barons demonstrates the twelfth-century perception of the castle's role. He has plausibly argued that the English castle was 'monarchical in ultimate origin but tenurial in implementation' meaning that economic, judicial, and military power was local and that castellans and barons were 'the associates, and "companions"

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*deformata in formam reduxit, et unde alii laborem, hic primo fructum efficaciter elicuerit*, Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 21, pp. 190-1.

<sup>10</sup> While royal administration also took place within palaces and charters were signed at hunting lodges and palaces, castles make up the most numerous location for the issuance of charters for both royal and baronial administration. *Regesta*, vol. 2, pp. xxix-xxxi, and vol. 3, pp. 375-7; Eyton, *Court, Household, and Itinerary of King Henry II*; W. Farrer, 'An Outline Itinerary of King Henry the First', *EHR* 34:135 (1919), pp. 303-82, and 34:136 (1919), pp. 505-79; Patterson, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 2, 526, p. 9. Other examples: vol. 3, 100 (pp. 36-7), 675 (pp. 249-50), 904 (p. 329), 928 (pp. 337-8), 941 (pp. 345-6), 981 (p. 363); Greenway, pp. 206-7.

<sup>12</sup> Orderic, 11, 6, pp. 44-5; Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70, 196-7; Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183 and 209, p. 234, 273-4; Hudson, *Land, Law and Lordship*, pp. 21-3.

(*comites* or “counts”) of the king...his (junior) partners in the business of ruling’.<sup>13</sup> He continued saying that the castle’s ‘normal existence was administrative, [with] the office and home of the skeleton residential staff’, with daily ‘manorial routine (common to all estate centres, at all periods)’ consisting of ‘court sessions, festivals with the lord in residence with his “riding household”, rent-receiving, and mundane housekeeping’.<sup>14</sup> A castle was the centre of the estate ‘receiving renders of food and cash, accommodating judicial sessions and quite often prisoners awaiting trial, acting as *dépôt* and office of the sheriff or the lord’s steward, assembly-room of tenantry and local notables’.<sup>15</sup> The variety of roles meant that it was never inactive; it might not have been a siege target but it was the centre of local administration and economics. Locals came to the castle to pay taxes and tolls, request justice and plead their cases, and trade at markets held within the walls and under protection.<sup>16</sup> Thus the standard, or peace-time activities, express a partnership between local lords and the king concerning administration and economics.

Lords (barons or castellans) were expected to maintain the king’s peace, so that administration could continue and economic responsibilities be fulfilled. This not only benefitted the king but the lord as well. Maintaining these regular activities was so important to the operation of government on all levels that any disruption of ‘peace’ was noted by the chroniclers and the reestablishment of peace meant a reestablishment of regular activities.<sup>17</sup> The perception of a lord’s power through the castle is best expressed by the chroniclers

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<sup>13</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 24.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 48-9.

<sup>15</sup> Coulson, ‘Peaceable Power’, p. 77.

<sup>16</sup> Tithes from castle mills: Greenway, pp. 184, 192. Castle markets: *Ibid*, xxiv; *Regesta*, vol. 2, 735 (p. 50), 1773 (p. 265) and vol. 3, 282 (p. 105); Castle rents: *Ibid*, 1023 (p. 109), 1088a (p. 124).

<sup>17</sup> Orderic, 12, 2 and 39, pp. 190-1, 354-7, and 13, 37 and 41, pp. 518-9, 546-7; Worcester, pp. 242-5; *ASC*, E, p. 179; Newburgh, 2, 7, pp. 30-3; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 7, pp. 112-4; *GND*, 8, 13 and 15, pp. 220-3, 226-31; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 399, pp. 724-5; *GS*, 1, 7, pp. 14-5, and 2, 75 and 81 and 113 and 117, pp. 148-51, 162-3, 218-9, 228-31; T.N. Bisson, ‘The “Feudal Revolution”’, *PP* 142 (1994), p. 29. Garnett acknowledges that the ‘importance in the logistics of royal accession had long been recognized’. p. 277.

when a lord is exerting or gaining his power or re-establishing peace; he has regained control of the castles and thus the resources to enforce his lordship.

As crucial resources in the maintenance of power and lordship, castles were typically the first target for attacks against a lord.<sup>18</sup> Sieges were challenges to the power and lordship of a specific castle and its lord and castles was targeted to suppress or eliminate this power.<sup>19</sup> Orderic's summation of Henry's reign demonstrates this association:

So King Henry with God's aid brought all his enemies low, and demolished the unlicensed castles that Robert and the factious lords had built... During this time he himself governed the duchy of Normandy firmly together with the kingdom of England; up to the end of his life he always devoted himself to preserving peace, and after he had secured the lasting prosperity he desired he never declined from his early power and strict justice. He shrewdly kept down illustrious counts and castellans and bold tyrants to prevent seditious uprisings, but always cared for and protected men of peace and monks and the humble people. After becoming firmly established in his government on both sides of the Channel in the eighth year of his reign, he always attempted to give peace to his subject peoples, and strictly punished law-breakers according to severe laws.<sup>20</sup>

While this passage briefly mentions castles, the political, social, economic, and military power associated with these structures is described and their capture or destruction is associated with it from the beginning. It was his control over castles, as demonstrated by the many passages which record the rebellion in Normandy in favour of William Clito,<sup>21</sup> and those in possession of them, that enabled Henry to govern well and establish and maintain peace in his territories. Similarly, after the Great War, Henry II re-established his authority

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<sup>18</sup> Fourquin, pp. 91-2.

<sup>19</sup> Bradbury, *Siege*, p. 79.

<sup>20</sup> *'Henricus siquidem rex omnes inimicos suos opitulante Deo militavit, ac adulterina castella quae Rodbertus uel seditiosi condiderant prostravit... Ipse interea ducatum Normanniae cum regno Angliae fortiter gubernavit et usque ad uitae suae finem semper paci studuit, atque iugi felicitate potitus ut uoluit, nunquam a pristino robore iusticiaeque seueritate decidit. Egregios comites et oppidanos et audaces tyrannos ne rebellarent callide oppressit, placidos uero et religiosos humilemque populum omni tempore clementer fouit atque protexit. Confirmatus in fastigio citra mare et ultra viii anno ex quo regnare cepit pacem subiectis plebibus semper quesiiuit, et austeris legibus legum transgressores rigide multauit'*, Orderic, 11, 23, pp. 98-9; Green, *Henry I*, p. 98.

<sup>21</sup> Some examples include: Orderic, 12, 22 and 39-40, pp. 276-81, 346-51, 354-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4, 197; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60, 162; *GND*, 8, 13, pp. 220-3; Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 410, pp. 740-3; *Battle*, pp. 106-9; Or the construction of many castles. *GND*, 8, 31, pp. 250-1.

by confiscating castles from his rebellious barons.<sup>22</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that

Robert of Gloucester and his supporters were able to make,

...the kingdom subject to them far and wide, demolished with spirit and valour castles belonging to the king's men, in unchecked triumph built others for their more effectual subjugation, and without any resistance from anyone put almost half of England, from sea to sea, under their own laws and ordinances. This lordship of the earl [was] very greatly adorned by restoring peace and quietness everywhere, except that in building his castles he exacted forced labour from all and, whenever he had to fight the enemy, demanded everyone's help either by sending knights or by paying scutage. And there was indeed in those regions a shadow of peace but not yet peace complete, because nothing more grievously vexed the people of the country than working not for themselves but for others and in some sort increasing by their own efforts the causes of strife and war.<sup>23</sup>

Possession and destruction of castles in this passage are clearly associated with the establishment of the earl's power, his ability to govern, and his tactical strength. However, it also demonstrates that castles could also be used to destroy power as well. Through the assertion of his own authority and using castles to do this, Robert damaged Stephen's power and removed resources from his possession. The final lines of this passage mention the lack of complete control over the violence perpetrated by the forces of these factions. In order to maintain some power in certain areas, both Matilda and Stephen gave castles, and permission to build them, via charters to those who agreed to be loyal, decentralising their control over them directly.<sup>24</sup> But, as previously discussed, neither Stephen nor Matilda could

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<sup>22</sup> Newburgh, 2, 27 and 30, pp. 116-21, 126-31; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 27 and 30, pp. 169-72, 177-9; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2, 380-1; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51, 60-61; Fantosme, lines 206-12, pp. 220-1.

<sup>23</sup> *'Et comes quidem suique consentanei uictoriose se postmodum hilariterque continere, regnum latissime in suae potestatis iura redigere, castella ista a regalibus possessa ardentem et uirtuose destruere, illa ad eos enixius edomandos triumphatissime surrigere, dimidiamque fere Angliam a mari in latus usque ad mare legibus suis et praeceptis, sine omni omnino resistente, addicere. Hoc autem illius dominium, pace et tranquillitate ubique reformata, plurimum decorabat, excepto quod in castellis suis aedificandis operariorum exactiones ab omnibus exigebat; et quotiens cum aduersariis esset congregiendum, omnium sibi auxilia ascisebat, uel in militibus mittendis, uel in aeris descriptione reddenda. Et erat quidem illis in partibus umbra quaedam pacis, sed pax necdum perfecta quia nihil compatriotas anxius angebat quam non sibi sed aliis laborare, materiamque discordiae et belli suis quoquomodo nisibus adaugere'*, GS, 2, 75, pp. 148-51.

<sup>24</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 3, 69 (pp. 26-7), 111 (p. 40), 178 (pp. 64-5), 180 (pp. 65-6), 309 (p. 111), 314 (p. 119), 387-8 (pp. 149-50), 391 (p. 150), 393-4 (pp. 150-1), 430 (p. 162) 437 (p. 165), 494 (pp. 184-5), 582 (pp. 212-3), 634-5 (pp. 233-5), 959 (p. 355)

control their followers' castle construction.<sup>25</sup> This meant that these lords could use the power associated with these resources to become the supreme authority in their region and assume the lordship associated with the political, social, economic, and military resourcefulness of the castle. This decentralisation, and William of Newburgh's passage discussed in the introduction, demonstrate the multifunctional nature of the castle: it could be used to support, maintain, and create the power of a lord, and destroy it.<sup>26</sup>

### **Patronage, Relationships, and Security**

In order to ensure peace, kings gave castles to trusted vassals, solidifying their authority in the area (indirectly) and the power of the local lord, creating the business relationship described by Coulson.<sup>27</sup> The king divided his resources to reward or attract loyal barons and protected himself by distributing these castles strategically to prevent baronial possessions becoming strong enough to challenge royal authority. This patronage was an accepted method of retaining loyalty and, while mentioned by chroniclers, is perhaps best recorded in charters.<sup>28</sup> Henry I's method of patronage created 'a royalist baronage' and has been described as building counterbalancing regional governors providing protection for royal authority.<sup>29</sup> For example, when Waleran of Meulan rebelled, Henry was able to counter his power and castles with those he had entrusted to Theobald and Stephen of Blois, as well as Waleran's own brother Robert.<sup>30</sup> When Henry I 'made peace with Robert Goel...

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<sup>25</sup> Newburgh, 1, 22, pp. 98-9; chapter 2, p. 123, note 78.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, Introduction, p. 22, note 56.

<sup>27</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 24.

<sup>28</sup> S.L. Mooers, 'Patronage in the Pipe Roll of 1130', *Speculum* 59:2 (1984), p. 285. For examples of patronage in charters see chapter 2, pp. 125-7, notes 88-108.

<sup>29</sup> Mooers, 'Patronage in the Pipe Roll of 1130', p. 285.

<sup>30</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 24-5.

[and] committed the castle of Ivry to him to guarantee his loyalty',<sup>31</sup> and Argentan and Exmes and Domfront were given to Guigan Algason to hold as vicomte,<sup>32</sup> peace and security of the region were the objectives.

When Robert, duke of Normandy, returned from the First Crusade, he discovered that Henry had claimed the English throne in his absence. Robert was 'joyfully received by all the people, apart from the castles that were garrisoned with King Henry's men, against which he had many struggles and battles'.<sup>33</sup> These castles had changed allegiance and destabilised Robert's authority in the duchy. To take the English crown and eliminate his brother's threat, Robert sailed to England with an army in 1101. A battle was avoided and the peace required Henry to relinquish control of the Cotentin but he could retain possession of Domfront, 'a castle he had sworn to the citizens to protect and to retain in his possession at all times'.<sup>34</sup> While Henry was determined to maintain his relationship with this castle, it remained an undermining resource in Robert's territory.

When Henry invaded Normandy in 1105/6, he succeeded in taking Caen and Bayeux and many barons 'handed castles over to him'.<sup>35</sup> The possession of these castles increased Henry's power, established a secure footing for his invasion, and provided him with valuable resources to threaten Robert's position. These barons and castellans were described as having 'abandoned their duke and lord, and the fealty owed to him, and rushed over to the gold and silver the king had brought with him',<sup>36</sup> and in 'betrayal of their liege lord the count, [they] introduced them [Henry's men] into their castles, from which they did many

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<sup>31</sup> 'Prouidus rex cum Rodberto Goello ut predictum est pacem fecerat, et arcem de Ibreio pro fide seruanda illi commiserat', Orderic, 12, 17, pp. 228-9.

<sup>32</sup> Orderic, 13, 21, pp. 454-7; Garnett, pp. 223-4.

<sup>33</sup> ASC, E, p. 177.

<sup>34</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 192-3; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 158-9; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 32-3, 64-5.

<sup>35</sup> 'Omnes autem pene Normannorum maiores, ad eius aduentum, spreto comite, domno suo, et fide quam ei debebant, in aurum et argentum regis, quod ipse de Anglia illuc portauerat, cucurrerunt, eique castra munitasque ciuitates et urbes tradiderunt', Worcester, pp. 106-9; ASC, E, p. 179; Simeon (eng), p. 172; Simeon (lat), 185, p. 237; GND, 8, 13, pp. 220-3.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid Worcester.

injuries to the count, in ravaging and burning'.<sup>37</sup> These barons broke their bond of loyalty with their castles and threatened the security of Robert's domains. But Robert did have many powerful supporters including Count William of Mortain, who like Robert of Bellême, had challenged Henry and had been banished with his English castles confiscated; he now used his Norman ones to support the duke.<sup>38</sup>

In 1106, Henry besieged the count of Mortain's castle at Tinchebrai.<sup>39</sup> This castle was not in itself special but its capture would have aided Henry's progression in gaining control of Normandy and weakening his enemies. Duke Robert and Count William 'thinking they could avenge themselves...and blot him out from the land, with very many soldiers attacked him with a powerful charge'.<sup>40</sup> In spite of their determination, Henry was victorious, not only in battle, but in ending current resistance to his control of Normandy. Henry had gained complete control over the duchy with the capture of his brother and the subsequent supplication of all the Norman castles. Symptomatic of his victory, he now confiscated the castles of so many barons who had sided with Robert and he now had offices and castellanships with which to patronise loyal subjects; he used these castles as patronage and to secure his royal and ducal authority.

But there were further baronial rebellions. In 1123, in favour of William Clito, Waleran of Meulan, Amaury and Hugh of Montfort, and William of Roumare 'deserted from him [Henry] and held their castles against him'.<sup>41</sup> During his rebellion, Waleran of Meulan 'handed over the tower [of Vatteville] to two brothers whom he trusted completely,

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<sup>37</sup> ASC, E, pp. 177, 179.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 179; Worcester, pp. 106-9; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 196; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 162.

<sup>39</sup> Eadmer (eng), 4, pp. 196-7; Eadmer (lat), 4, p. 184; Worcester, pp. 108-11; ASC, E, p. 180; Simeon (eng), pp. 172-3; Simeon (lat), 186, p. 238; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 198; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 163.

<sup>40</sup> 'putantes se de rege Henrico uindicare, eumque omnino de terra delere, cum magno impetu irruerunt in eum', GND, 8, 13, pp. 220-3.

<sup>41</sup> ASC, E, p. 190; Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; Simeon (lat), 209, pp. 273-4; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 4, 15-23.

Herbert of Lisieux and Roger' in order to increase his security in the area.<sup>42</sup> Simeon of Durham recorded that Henry took these castles from his rebellious barons and called them 'the enemy' implying that by holding their castles against him they broke their social, political, and military relationship and challenged his power and lordship; but by claiming their castles, he ended their opposition and stabilised his position.<sup>43</sup> If a castle was held against the king, it was a threat to royal authority and, as the symbol of resistance, was targeted. Without castles, rebellious barons did not have a base of operations from which to launch their resistance; thus, the symbol and tool of defiance had to be dealt with in order for the problem to end.<sup>44</sup> A castle in the hands of a baron could quickly turn from a symbol of loyal support to a military, social, and political hazard to the king.<sup>45</sup> Henry succeeded in capturing Waleran and imprisoned him; several years later, he pardoned him and 'keeping only the strongholds for himself, allowed him the revenues of his land'.<sup>46</sup> It is telling that Henry released a former rebel but kept his castles. While their general relationship was re-established after Waleran's release, he never received the same level of trust again and did not regain his castles; their relationship had clearly been affected by his use of castles in rebellion. This clearly demonstrates that while Waleran was a threat to Henry, his castles were the tools of his rebellion; they enabled him to pose an acute threat to the king. In possession of these tools, Henry was able to secure his power and ensure peace: 'his enemies on every side were either conquered or reconciled; prosperity everywhere smiled on him'.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> 'Gualerannus comes duobus fratribus in quibus confidebat. Herberto scilicet de Luxouio et Rogerio cum viii clientibus arcem commiserat', Orderic, 12, 39, pp. 346-51; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>43</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; 'hostes', Simeon (lat), 209, pp. 273-4.

<sup>44</sup> Speight, 'Castle Warfare', pp. 269-70.

<sup>45</sup> Bradbury, *Siege*, p. 79.

<sup>46</sup> 'redditus sue terre habere permisit, munitiones tantum ipsius in sua manu retinens', *GND*, 8, 22, pp. 236-7; *ASC*, E, p. 195; Simeon (eng), p. 202; Simeon (lat), 214, p. 283.

<sup>47</sup> Simeon (eng), p. 202; 'omnibusque quaquaversum hostibus vel victis, vel repacificatis, arridente sibi undique prosperitate', Simeon (lat), 214, p. 283.

However, patronage with castles could backfire. The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that after having gained the crown, Stephen ‘armed himself like a man to establish peace in the kingdom’.<sup>48</sup> This simple phrase prefaces the rest of the author’s story, which is anything but peaceful, and demonstrates that like Henry I and II, Stephen’s first concern was security and he ‘granted no small bounties to restore harmony among his subjects’ to secure himself through castle patronage.<sup>49</sup> William of Malmesbury supports these acts of patronage recording that he ‘established many as earls who had not been earls before, with endowments of landed estates [including castles] and revenues that had belonged directly to the king’.<sup>50</sup> But unlike Henry I and II, Stephen’s patronage hindered as much as it helped. William of Newburgh recorded that,

Numerous castles had been raised in individual areas through the eager action of factions, and in England there were in a sense as many kings, or rather tyrants, as there were lords of castles... they disputed with each other in deadly hatreds, they despoiled the most famous regions with plunderings and burnings, and in a country once most fertile they virtually wiped out the bread which is the staff of life.<sup>51</sup>

This direct link between the castle and insecurity raises a concern: was castle patronage worth the risk of rebellion?

While at Henry I’s court, Stephen formed a strong bond with the powerful Beaumont family, who through their familial network of castles controlled a great deal of the Midlands and important sections of Normandy.<sup>52</sup> By 1138, Stephen had confirmed or granted the

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<sup>48</sup> ‘*ad pacem in regno conciliandam sese uiriliter armauit*’, *GS*, 1, 3, pp. 6-7.

<sup>49</sup> The author was writing, or correcting, his work late in Stephen’s reign or at the very end and so had knowledge of the extreme measures Stephen had to take in order to secure his realm; he knew about the sieges undertaken, the extent of Stephen’s efforts, and probably, the cost. He also knew the outcome and so was able to record under the year 1135, that Stephen went to these great lengths to establish peace and uses the past tense (spent, granted, made) to describe his efforts. *GS*, 1, 7, pp. 14-5.

<sup>50</sup> ‘*Denique multos etiam comites, qui ante non fuerant, instituit, applicitis possessionibus et redditibus que proprio iure regi competebant*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 1, 21, pp. 40-3.

<sup>51</sup> ‘*illis quippe per singulas provincias studia partium crebra surrexerant; erantque in Anglia quodammodo tot reges vel potius tyranni quot domini castellorum...feralibus inter se odiis disceptantes rapinis atque incendiis regiones clarissimas corruerunt, et in fertilissima olim patria fere omne robur panis absumpserunt*’, Newburgh, 1, 22, pp. 98-9.

<sup>52</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 29-31.

family the earldoms of Leicester, Worcester, Warwick, and Bedford; those of Pembroke, Warenne, and Northampton ‘were held by men with links with the family’ resulting in half of the existing earldoms being under the influence of one family.<sup>53</sup> After Robert of Gloucester’s defection, and the rebellion of barons like Miles of Gloucester and Brian Fitz Count, ‘whether he wanted to or not, Stephen had to rely on the major aristocratic faction that still adhered to his *curia*:’ the Beaumonts.<sup>54</sup> Their loyalty was crucial for Stephen’s power and created ‘a “Mercia” to set against the hostile “Wessex” that was being built up against him’.<sup>55</sup> Crouch argued that there was a sound ‘military justification for his partiality’ but described Stephen’s support of this family as ‘politically absurd’.<sup>56</sup> It increased local loyalties and family feuds, and put royal authority in the hands of powerful magnates increasing their control over resources to the point that they were probably among the ‘kings, or rather tyrants’ Newburgh discussed.<sup>57</sup> Stephen’s favouritism goaded many to join Matilda or attempt to protect and advance their interests independently. It has been observed that the ‘underhand[ed]’ treatment of lords like Bishop Roger of Salisbury, Ranulf of Chester, Geoffrey de Mandeville, Miles of Gloucester, Baldwin de Redvers, and Earl Robert of Gloucester cost him the loyalty of many in England and Normandy.<sup>58</sup>

That does not mean that Stephen did not try to maintain the loyalty of his lords and his attempts to spread his patronage and balance security were recorded by William of Malmesbury. In 1138, many barons ‘did not shrink from asking the king for estates or castles;’ Stephen rejected these demands ‘with excuses that the domains of the Crown would be impaired or that others laid claim to the same things or were in actual possession of

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 41.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> ‘*reges vel potius tyranni*’, Newburgh, 1, 22, pp. 98-9.

<sup>58</sup> King, *King Stephen*, pp. 334-5

them'.<sup>59</sup> While these were practical reasons to maintain his security, they were not accepted. The responsibility of causing strife must be attributed to the rebellious barons who demanded castles, but the castle itself was perceived as the resource they used to cause this disruption to the political, military, social, and economic stability of Stephen's reign. Their requests also left the king in a quandary: to patronise one baron through a castle, he endangered his relationship with whoever held it; on the other hand, by preserving this latter relationship he would destroy the former. Those who physically held castles were in a stronger position to retain them because of the castle's resourcefulness; any mandate to relinquish control could cause destabilising conflict particularly if the castle had become a hereditary possession. Stephen's other argument, that the Crown would be impaired by the loss of direct royal control of castles to the barons, further demonstrates the castle's resourcefulness. Since Stephen was unsure of the loyalty of some of his barons, and with the theoretical status of rendability, he hesitated to relinquish control of castles. In a contested succession, the Crown could not afford to lose the multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle regardless of the possible, but uncertain, value of patronage.

The denied barons 'were at once moved to wrath, fortified castles against him and carried off immense plunder from his lands'.<sup>60</sup> William of Malmesbury recorded that by 'expending many great efforts', Stephen was able to 'win a pretence of peace' but it was all in vain.<sup>61</sup> Once the rebellious castles were reclaimed, Stephen achieved this 'peace' through 'the gift of honours or castles;' his new earls were given 'landed estates and revenues that had belonged directly to the king', and while this patronage was an attempt to retain their loyalty, it weakened the Crown's ability to maintain law and order by relinquishing direct

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<sup>59</sup> *'multi siquidem... a rege hi praedia, hi castella, postremo quaecunque semel collibisset...excusata mutilatione regni, uel quod eadem alii calumpnniarentur aut etiam possiderent'*, Malmesbury, *HN*, 1, 21, pp. 40-3.

<sup>60</sup> *'illi continuo ira commoti castella contra eum obfirmabant, predas ingentes ex eius terris agebant'*, *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> *'multis enim et magnis laboribus suis in cassum effusis...simulatam ad tempus pacem ab illis promerebat'*, *Ibid.*

control on the crucial resources he had just reclaimed.<sup>62</sup> Consequently, he nullified his military, political, social, and economic power by creating magnates powerful enough to defy him, like Geoffrey de Mandeville, and made enemies of many other lords, like Miles of Gloucester. Malmesbury's words demonstrate how crucial the castle was in Stephen's patronage, but also the fragile nature of those ties as a symptom of the castle's resourcefulness in the atmosphere of this civil war and contested succession.

In the early years of Stephen's reign, 'there was much discord throughout England and Normandy, and the bonds of peace were torn apart'.<sup>63</sup> While this chaotic and violent upheaval might be expected from a contested succession, the extent of the discord was deplorable to contemporaries and this chronicle continued saying:

Each man rose against his fellow. Conflict arose, infiltrating the tall, massive, and diverse fortifications of both greater and lesser alike, and devastating everything. Each man plunder[s] the goods of others. The strong violently [oppress] the weak. They deter with threats any criticism of their actions. They kill those who resist. The rich nobles of the kingdom, in their affluence and wealth, are not in the least bothered by the way the poor are unjustly treated. They care only for themselves and theirs. They store castles and towns with necessary provisions. They garrison them with armed followers. They fear any change in the kingdom, not considering the divine dispensation: whose ways are past finding out.<sup>64</sup>

While this record of violence on the lower classes is not new to historical research, it does demonstrate that the castle affected all levels of society. To the lower classes, castles were symbols of the lord's ability to seize and detain without reason and 'represented terror and violence'.<sup>65</sup> The passage above and others previously discussed recorded garrisons riding

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<sup>62</sup> See p. 159, n. 59, Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> '*nec non multo ubique locorum per Angliam et Normanniam dirupto pacis foedere plurima fit disturbatio*', Worcester, pp. 216-7.

<sup>64</sup> '*Quisque in alterum caput eleuat. Que oritur Discordia in uastando omnia nobilium et ignobilium, alta, magna, ac diuersa subintrat moenia. Quisque alium rebus spoliat. Potens impotentem ui opprimit. Questum super hoc agentem minis territat. Neci traditur qui resistit, Opulenti regni optimates diuitiis affluentes minime procurant quam impie tractentur miseri. Sibi suisque dumtaxat consulunt. Vite necessariis castella et oppida muniunt; manu militari cum armis instruunt. Timent regni mutationem, non animo supernam perpendentes dispositionem; inuestigabiles enim sunt uie eius*', Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Fry, *British Medieval Castles*, p. 15; P. Marshall, 'The Ceremonial Function of the Donjon in the Twelfth Century', *CG* 20 (2002), p. 142; Fourquin, pp. 91-2; Brown, *Castles, Conquest & Charters*, p. 83.

into the surrounding countryside to burn and pillage villages and the castle was a symbol of this potentiality to all who lived in its vicinity. Additionally, the local populace was, certainly during the Conquest, forced to construct castles and they became the physical manifestation of suppression and control.

A common assumption of Stephen's reign was that hundreds of lords, in violation of the royal control stated in the *Leges Henrici Primi*, constructed many castles without his permission amid the near anarchic conditions. The *Gesta Stephani* alluded to the numerous rebellious, if not illegally constructed, castles when it said that Stephen incessantly,

...hastened, always accompanied by a host, to deal with various anxieties and tasks of many kings which continually dragged him hither and thither all over England. It was like what we read of the fabled hydra of Hercules; when one head was cut off two or more grew in its place.<sup>66</sup>

This passage with its metaphor of a hydra-like crisis of rebellious castles was very true, though not entirely concerned with illegal castle construction. The primary protagonist was Robert of Gloucester, who endangered royal power throughout England through his many castles including his base at Bristol and those of his supporters including Bridgnorth, Cary, Harptree, Sudley, Cerney, Wallingford, Cardiff, Dudley, Shrewsbury, Wareham, Hereford, Leeds, Ludlow, Dunster, Melton, and Dover.<sup>67</sup> The lords of these castles,

...were bound to the earl by ties of friendship, firmly united with him by pledge and oath, and so much his allies by compact and homage that as soon as they learnt he wished to rebel against the king's power, they joined in his rebellion promptly and by agreement. Finally, hearing that the king had advanced against Bristol and thinking he would long continue the siege there, with one mind they fulfilled their promise to the earl and by grievously ravaging all the districts round them they committed everywhere all the hostile acts they could.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> 'quae per omnes eum Angliae partes sine intermissione huc illucque in diuersa trahebant, armatus semper et cum exercitu properauit. Sicut enim de fabulosa illa Herculis legimus hydra, cuius uno resecto capite duo uel ampliora suboriebantur', *GS*, 1, 31-2, pp. 66-9.

<sup>67</sup> *GS*, 1, 27 and 30-2, pp. 56-7, 64-71; Worcester, pp. 248-51.

<sup>68</sup> 'Erant autem amicitiae nexibus cum comite copulati, fide et iureiurando firmanter unificati, pationibus et hominio adeo confoederati, ut cum celerius percepissent illum aduersus regiam postestatem uelle insurgere, et ipsi in eum praesto et conspiranter secum insurgerent. Audientes denique regem in Bristoam castra promouisse, diutinamque obsidionem ibi protelaturum arbitantes, pollicitam comiti fidem

Their use of their castles in this passage illustrates that castles were crucial to their relationship with Robert. While using their castles against Stephen constituted rebellion and made their castles targets, they solidified their bond with Robert.

In order to re-establish and maintain royal lordship and security, Stephen had to reclaim the castles and punish the rebels quickly before more barons decided there were no consequences for treason and decided to enlarge their own power.<sup>69</sup> The repossession of these castles was of such importance to re-establishing and maintaining royal security and power that Stephen commonly besieged them *en masse*. He would move quickly from castle to castle leaving a siege-castle to protect his besieging force and devastate the surrounding area, collecting resources for his army and leaving a well-supplied force to maintain a siege. It is evident from his actions and the chronicles that recovering castles was paramount to royal security. By 1140, the *Gesta Stephani* recorded that the king had great success in re-establishing peace, law, and order in England because he had ‘demolished a great many unlicensed castles’ which ‘had been oppressing with unendurable inroads’ various regions.<sup>70</sup> These castles could have been new constructions built without the king’s permission, but they could also have been those in the hands of his enemies. Regardless, in capturing and demolishing these castles, he ‘completely cleared and restored [England] to absolute tranquillity;’ by reclaiming possession of these resources he reasserted his power, security, and peace.<sup>71</sup>

Subsequently, the relationships Stephen formed with his barons were hollow with many barons flocking to Matilda after Lincoln and Stephen’s defeat and imprisonment.

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*unanimiter reddiderunt, omnesque circa se prouincias graui infestatione permouentes, quicquid aduersi poterant ubique gentium inferebant*, *GS*, 1, 31, pp. 66-9.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*; Malmesbury, *HN*, 3, 75, pp. 126-9; *King’s Works*, vol. 2, p. 852.

<sup>70</sup> ‘*plurima adulterina castella...subuertit ...intolerabili infestatione degrauabant*’, *GS*, 1, 49, pp. 104-5.

<sup>71</sup> ‘*purgauit tunc omnino, et quietissimas reddidit*’, *Ibid*.

Among these was the castellan of Oxford, Robert d'Oilli, who surrendered to Matilda in early May 1141.<sup>72</sup> The submission of this castle later played a large part in the events of 1142, but at this moment, it signified a strong and important royal castle paying homage to the newly designated 'Lady of the English' and abandoning its former master. By receiving the 'submission and homage of the whole city and of the surrounding region', Matilda increased her own authority and security in the area, increasing the stability of her cause.<sup>73</sup> The empress received offers of homage, hostages, and castles from 'chief men and the highest nobles of England' if she were to release the king.<sup>74</sup> She ignored these petitions and while this was perhaps the more secure decision, it angered many barons and did not solve any problems.

Having lost a great deal of support since his capture, Stephen changed his approach to his relationships with his barons upon his release in 1141 and began to rely less on his magnates and more on lesser lords. His relationship with the Beaumonts had changed because of the situation in Normandy. Stephen's control of the duchy was threatened by the successes of Geoffrey of Anjou after Lincoln, and by 1145 Geoffrey was duke forcing many Anglo-Norman barons to decide between their English and Norman holdings.<sup>75</sup> In 1141, the 'Beaumont unity collapsed';<sup>76</sup> many of Waleran's castles and estates on the Lower Risle had fallen to Geoffrey and Robert of Leicester, trapped at Breteuil, 'was left with no alternative but to negotiate a truce with the Angevins for himself and his brother'.<sup>77</sup> In order to retain his 'great Norman patrimony, Count Waleran swallowed the pill and by September 1141 had submitted to the empress in England'.<sup>78</sup> Robert returned to England and Waleran to

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<sup>72</sup> Worcester, pp. 292-5.

<sup>73</sup> '*uenit illa, totiusque ciuitatis et circumiacentis regionis suscepit dominium atque hominum*', Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> '*a maioribus seu primoribus Anglie*', Worcester, pp. 296-7.

<sup>75</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 50-1; Haskins, 'Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet', pp. 420-2.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid Crouch, pp. 51-2.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, pp. 50-1.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, pp. 50-1, 54-5, 58; Haskins, 'Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet', pp. 420-2.

Normandy and their support was now divided, nullifying powerful familial connections for Stephen. Regardless of his patronage, the loss of the loyalty of their castles threatened his security in Normandy and England.

Stephen's insecurity changed drastically after the death of Miles of Gloucester in 1143 and Robert of Gloucester on 31 October 1147, and with the Empress' retirement in 1148 to Normandy never to return; only Brian Fitz Count remained from the core Angevin party.<sup>79</sup> Additionally, Henry Fitz Empress' first two forays into England in 1142 and 1149 had not achieved their goal of establishing him as the rightful heir to his grandfather's throne; he was probably too young to become the standard bearer for his family. In the mid- and late-1140s, Stephen began to target barons he had allowed to grow powerful enough to defy him, including Ranulf, earl of Chester, and Geoffrey de Mandeville, earl of Essex. He succeeded in reclaiming valuable castles and gained relative security with no rival strong enough to challenge him present in England. He might have lost Normandy by 1145, but he was much stronger as king of England.<sup>80</sup>

Ranulf had been responsible for drawing Stephen to Lincoln in 1141 and in 1144, had 'seized the king's castles by stratagem or broke into them by assault'.<sup>81</sup> At the time, the king was not strong enough to confront Ranulf and entered into a concord confirming, through charter, his possessions in England and Normandy.<sup>82</sup> However, in 1146, Stephen,

...was successful and most resolute on several occasions in dealing with others of the earl's castles: sometimes he afflicted the garrison by a close and unendurable siege, sometimes he destroyed and consumed the surrounding country by frightful ravages or burning all with fire; always he was grievous and hostile to the earl and his adherents.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Amt, pp. 1-2.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 8.

<sup>81</sup> '*regis castella uel furto interciperere, uel uiolentiam ingerendo perfringere*', GS, 2, 104, pp. 198-201; King, *King Stephen*, p. 228.

<sup>82</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 3, 178, pp. 64-5.

<sup>83</sup> '*Sed et circa alia nonnumquam comitis castella uictoriose rex et constantissime egit; nunc graui et intolerabili obsidione qui se interius recluserant affligens, nunc mira depopulatione, uel ignis conflagratione, quae circa erant destruens et depascens; semper autem comiti sibiue consentientibus*

Stephen attacked Lincoln but was again unsuccessful in capturing it.<sup>84</sup> He arrested Ranulf when the two met at Northampton for negotiations and the earl was released on the condition that all his castles be surrendered to the king including Lincoln. Finally triumphant over the castle which had caused him so much grief, the king held court and wore his crown, symbolising his strengthened power and authority.<sup>85</sup>

Geoffrey de Mandeville had a different relationship with the king that resulted in the same outcome.<sup>86</sup> Geoffrey had been a loyal supporter receiving an earldom and control of the London castles from Stephen.<sup>87</sup> However, after Lincoln, he turned to Matilda to confirm his holdings in charters, pledging his loyalty to her and protecting his possession of them.<sup>88</sup> Geoffrey's power threatened the king upon his release:

...in the splendour of his position he surpassed all the chief men of the kingdom. He also had in his hands the Tower of London, likewise castles of impregnable strength built round the city, and all that part of the kingdom which had submitted to the king he had so firmly brought under his control that everywhere in the kingdom he took the king's place and in all transactions was listened to more eagerly than the king and received more obedience when he gave orders.<sup>89</sup>

His power had grown to such an extent that Stephen feared 'he would have been deprived of his kingdom'.<sup>90</sup> His barons argued 'that with the restoration of the castles he [Geoffrey] possessed the king might thereafter be free from fear of him and his kingdom in a more

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*molestus extitit et peruersus*', *GS*, 2, 104, pp. 198-201.

<sup>84</sup> Torigni, p. 146; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 246-7; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 207; Newburgh, 1, 13, pp. 72-3.

<sup>85</sup> *ASC*, E, p. 201; Newburgh, 1, 13, pp. 72-5.

<sup>86</sup> See the Davis and Prestwich debate on Geoffrey de Mandeville in the articles cited in chapter 1, p. 83, note 199.

<sup>87</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 246; '*quem de barone consulem fecerat*', Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 206; Garnett, pp. 250-2.

<sup>88</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 3, 273-276, p. 99-103. For more on these charters see Round, *Geoffrey de Mandeville*, pp. 37-54, 81-113, 136-200; Garnett, pp. 250-2.

<sup>89</sup> '*qui omnes regni primates et diuitiarum potentia et dignitatis excedebat opulentia; turrim quoque Londoniarum in manu, sed et castella inexpugnabilis fortitudinis circa ciuitatem constructa habebat, omnemque regni partem, quae se regi subdiderat, adeo sub dispositionis suae clauae redegerat, ut ubique per regnum regis uices adimplens et in rebus agendis rege auidius exaudiretur, et in praeceptis iniungendis plus ei quam regi obtemperaretur*', *GS*, 2, 81, pp. 160-1.

<sup>90</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 246; '*regno privatus fuisset*', Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 206.

peaceful condition'.<sup>91</sup> Stephen followed their advice, arrested Geoffrey, and ordered him to turn over his castles of Walden, Plessis, and the Tower of London.<sup>92</sup> Having been stripped of his status, position, and castles, he rebelled and attacked royal castles in East Anglia in an attempt to regain his power and authority, dying in the process.<sup>93</sup>

By 1153, Henry Fitz Empress was duke of Normandy, count of Anjou, had married a great heiress in Eleanor of Aquitaine, and had proven himself against the king of France. Now, he presented an appealing alternative to Stephen and many barons quickly joined him including the powerful Earl Robert of Leicester, the younger of the Beaumont twins.<sup>94</sup> Robert's defection deprived the king of his castles while Henry gained them as resources to threaten Stephen's throne. Encouraged by the actions of such a powerful magnate, other barons joined Henry and his authority grew with the growing possession of more castles, like Warwick and Stamford, enabling him to relieve Angevin strongholds, like Wallingford, which had been besieged for years.<sup>95</sup> By targeting castles, Henry endangered Stephen's power and forced the king to make peace in 1153.<sup>96</sup>

Peace made between two parties, like Henry I and his brother Duke Robert or Waleran of Meulan, was similar but meant that both sides agreed upon the castles and regions under the other's control (and who was superior) and, therefore, the territory under their power and lordship with the agreement not to interfere or oppose it politically, socially,

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<sup>91</sup> '*redditis quaecumque possederat castellis, et rex post hinc securus, et regnum ipsius haberetur pacatius*', *GS*, 2, 81, pp. 162-3.

<sup>92</sup> Torigni, p. 146; Huntingdon, 10, 21, pp. 742-3; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 246; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 206; *GS*, 2, 82, pp. 162-3; Newburgh, 1, 11, pp. 66-7.

<sup>93</sup> Newburgh, 1, 11, pp. 68-71; *GS*, 2, 83-4, pp. 164-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 246; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 206; Torigni, pp. 146-7; Round, *Geoffrey de Mandeville*, pp. 201-26.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, p. 7.

<sup>95</sup> *GS*, 2, 117-9, pp. 228-237; Huntingdon, 10, 32 and 36, pp. 758-61, 768-9; Torigni, pp. 171-174. Prior to the treaty Henry granted and confirmed the holdings of the earl of Chester. *Regesta*, vol. 3, 180, pp. 65-6; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 850-2.

<sup>96</sup> *GS*, 2, 120, pp. 236-41; Huntingdon, 10, 37-8, p. 771-3; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 252-3; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 212; Torigni, p. 177; *Regesta*, vol. 3, 272, pp. 97-9; King, *King Stephen*, pp. 283, 288-90, 292; Amt, pp. 15-6.

or, more importantly, militarily.<sup>97</sup> The ‘peace’ agreed between Stephen and Henry Fitz Empress illustrates this concept with both agreeing to terms which protected the other’s current and future power and ensured the stability of this agreement by the destruction of illegal castles and placing royal ones in the hands of specific men trusted by both sides.<sup>98</sup> This, according to Garnett, was not about Henry ‘securing the castles at the very beginning of an interregnum, but of ensuring that they were not used against him during the critical period before he had become king’.<sup>99</sup> A crucial element to the re-establishment of peace was the destruction of the ‘adulterine’ castles which had been constructed. Demonstrating the resourcefulness and importance of castles, this *caveat* caused strains in the peace when the duke complained that the king had not destroyed some of his loyal supporters’ castles as agreed.<sup>100</sup> Despite this hiccup, the agreement to destroy castles for the security of the realm created the atmosphere needed for an undisputed succession and provided Henry with the precedence for his royal castle-policy after Stephen’s death in 1154.

The most important relationship that Henry II struggled to maintain was that with his sons and most rebellions were initiated by filial discontent, especially the Great War of

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<sup>97</sup> Orderic, 11, 10 and 17 and 20 and 23 and 45, pp. 56-9, 78-81, 84-5, 98-9, 180-3, and 12, 15 and 17-8 and 34 and 36, pp. 224-5, 228-9, 240-3, 334-7, 340-3, and 13, 30, pp. 484-7; Torigni, p. 181; Simeon (eng), pp. 190, 202; Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 202 and 214, pp. 263-4, 283; *GND*, 8, 22 and 31, pp. 236-7, 250-1; Worcester, pp. 276-7, 280-1, 284-91, 302-5; Newburgh, 2, 18 and 24 and 37-8, pp. 78-81, 98-101, 150-1; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 18 and 24 and 37-8, pp. 146-7, 159, 194-8; Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 395 and 398 and 410, pp. 716-25, 740-3; Malmesbury, *HN*, 1, 21, pp. 40-3, and 2, 31, pp. 63; *Battle*, pp. 106-9, 158-61; Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 192-3, 228-9, 251, 255, 367-8, 373-5, 383-8, 412; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 158-9, 190-1, 210-1, 215, and vol. 2, pp. 46-7, 53-5, 64-5, 67-9, 93-4; Fantosme, lines 538-87, 1388-1413, pp. 250-5, 318-21; Huntingdon, 7, 23, pp. 448-51, 10, 4 and 10 and 24, pp. 706-9, 718-21, 748-9; *GS*, 1, 3 and 9 and 12 and 14-5 and 17 and 31 and 37 and 51 and 58, pp. 6-7, 16-9, 22-3, 28-9, 66-9, 80-3, 104-7, 118-9, and 2, 94-6 and 105 and 109 and 111 and 117 and 120, pp. 182-91, 200-3, 208-15, 228-31, 238-41.

<sup>98</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 252-3; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 212; *ASC*, E, p. 202. Also charter evidence: ‘*Etiam turris Lundoniensis Ricardo de Luceio, et mota Windlesores consilio sancte ecclesie ad custodiendum tradite sunt... Rogger[us] de Busseio motam Oxeneford, et Jordan [us] de Buseso firmitatem Lincolie custodiunt... Episcopus Wintonie in manu archiepiscopi Cantuar(iensis) coram episcopis affidavit, quod si ego decederem castra Wintonie et munitionem Hamtone duci redderet*’, *Regesta*, vol. 3, 272, pp. 97-9; Richard de Lucy at London and Windsor, Roger de Bussy at Oxford, Jordan de Bussy at Lincoln and Henry of Blois at Winchester and Southampton. *Amt*, p. 17; Garnett, pp. 277-8.

<sup>99</sup> Garnett, pp. 277-8.

<sup>100</sup> White, *Restoration*, p. 70; King, *King Stephen*, p. 289; *Amt*, pp. 19-20; Garnett, pp. 277, 283.

1173-4.<sup>101</sup> As the duke of Normandy, Brittany, and Aquitaine and count of Anjou and Maine, Henry's relationship with the king of France was a constant threat to his security. It was compounded when his eldest son, the Young King Henry, joined with Louis against his father, hoping to gain control of more power. The Great War began in 1173 when Henry's castles at Pacy, Gournay, Aumale, Driencourt, and Verneuil were targeted.<sup>102</sup> Unsure of which English lords remained loyal<sup>103</sup>, Henry operated under the assumption that all were a threat and over forty royal castles were fortified, increasing his security. Robert, earl of Leicester (son of the Beaumont twin Robert of Leicester who had served Henry II as justiciar until his death in 1168) decided to end his relationship with the father in favour of his son and used his castles in the Midlands to destabilise Henry's military, political, social, and economic power in England. Henry spent the next several months moving from one castle to the next relieving or capturing them to re-establish and maintain his security in Normandy and Brittany<sup>104</sup> while loyal supporters like Richard de Lucy<sup>105</sup> did the same in England.<sup>106</sup>

The narrative of the Great War from the chroniclers emphasised the resourcefulness of the castle; not only were they a target for both sides, but the peace centred on them. These were the tools to destabilise and secure power politically, socially, economically, and militarily; but these were not just resources for war, but also peace. Henry was not vindictive in his victory and re-established his relationships with his barons by making peace based on *status quo ante bellum*, as he had after Stephen's reign; castles were to return to the state they were in before the war.<sup>107</sup> In 1176, the Assizes of Northampton ordered that 'justices

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<sup>101</sup> Gillingham, *Angevin Empire*, pp. 34-5.

<sup>102</sup> Torigni, pp. 257-8; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51.

<sup>103</sup> Torigni lists the numerous barons who deserted Henry II, p. 257.

<sup>104</sup> Torigni, pp. 259, 265; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2, 375, 380-1; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51, 55, 60-1.

<sup>105</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 374-5, 379-80; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 54-5, 60.

<sup>106</sup> ; King, *King Stephen*, p. 219.

<sup>107</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 390; Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 72.

are to take precaution that the castles already dismantled are quite dismantled, and that those which are to be dismantled are utterly razed to the ground'.<sup>108</sup> Henry repaired his relationships with his barons by removing the tool of rebellion, but he did not discriminate and confiscated castles from loyal barons including Richard de Lucy. By reducing the number of castles in England and taking many others into his own hands, Henry diminished the threat to his security. This indiscriminate targeting of castles mirrored the process after Stephen's reign and it ensured that his relationships with his baronage could be maintained equally.

Repairing his relationship with his sons, however, was more difficult. Their rebellions, similar to those of many twelfth-century barons, were intended to gain the power and lordship they thought they deserved. But Henry treated his sons as he did his barons. While Young Henry had to give his youngest brother John castles and revenues in England, Normandy, and Anjou, King Henry did acknowledge their complaints and gave the Young King two more castles in Normandy and fifteen thousand pounds, Richard received half the income from Poitou, and Geoffrey was given half the revenues of Brittany.<sup>109</sup> He relinquished only two castles to Young Henry but also acquired, through John, some of the Young King's more powerful ones. While Henry gave his sons money, he did not give them the resources they desired to establish their own power and lordship. Up until his death, Young Henry continuously troubled his father over this issue of castle possession and power, spurred on by disgruntled barons (many of whom had lost their castles after the Great War) and by the French king. Richard, after the death of his brothers Henry (1183) and Geoffrey (1186), continued to trouble his father. He felt that he had demonstrated his abilities to be king in his dealings with the turbulent barons in Aquitaine and deserved to

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<sup>108</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 410; '*Item, justitiae provideant quod castella diruta prorsus diruantur, et diruenda bene prosternuntur*', Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 91.

<sup>109</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2, 385-8; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51, 67-9; Gillingham, *Angevin Empire*, p. 34.

retain the duchy and gain control over a greater part of his inheritance. In 1189, he and Philip II of France attacked Henry's castles and succeeded in capturing Ferte-Bernard, Montford, Baalverque, Mont-Double, Trou, de Rocher, Montoire, Carciere, Chateau-du-Loir, Chaumont, Amboise, Roche-corbon, and Beaumont, before pressuring Henry at Tours and forcing him to make peace.<sup>110</sup> Again, castles were targeted to destabilise Henry and to gain resources for their advancement. He was forced to surrender several castles and retired to Chinon where he died, leaving Richard as his heir.

One of the most common methods of creating relationships and security with castles was their use as bargaining tools; this was most often seen in their use as dowry in marriage arrangements. Because of their resourcefulness, inclusion of a castle in a marriage contract could be crucial to relations. It was agreed that Fulk of Anjou's daughter and Henry I's son William would marry. But when William and his wife died in the sinking of the White Ship, Fulk demanded his daughter's dowry back which included several castles along their border.<sup>111</sup> Henry refused since returning the castles would have destabilised his position as he fought his nephew William Clito for Normandy. Fulk then made a pact with William Clito and married his other daughter to him; the castles were to be her dowry if William could gain possession of them from Henry.<sup>112</sup> The importance of these castles to the two parties cannot be denied. Henry did succeed in making a firm alliance with Anjou when he married his widowed daughter Matilda to Fulk's son and heir Geoffrey in 1127; however, even his relationship with this couple was rocky because Henry refused to release her dower castles.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 2, pp. 86-7; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 343-4.

<sup>111</sup> Simeon (eng), p. 193; Simeon (lat), 205, p. 267; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 216; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 179; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 126, 149, 180-1.

<sup>112</sup> Simeon (eng), p. 193; Simeon (lat), 205, p. 267; Green, *Henry I*, pp. 126, 180-1, 187.

<sup>113</sup> Green, *Henry I*, pp. 188, 190, 192; Garnett, p. 277.

Their role as bargaining tools can also be seen in their use in treaties. The relations between the kings of Scotland and England demonstrate this best. After the battle of the Standard, in return for homage, Stephen gave Henry, son of the king of Scotland, ‘Carlisle and Doncaster, with all their appurtenances’ while King David returned four of the castles he had seized during the campaign.<sup>114</sup> Before the Great War, the Young King

swore that he would give to Philip, earl of Flanders, for his homage, a thousand pounds of yearly revenues in England, and the whole of Kent, together with Dover castle, and Rochester castle; to Matthew, earl of Boulogne, for his homage, the Soke of Kirketon in Lindsey, and the earldom of Mortagne, with the honor of Hay; and to Theobald, earl of Blois, for his homage, two hundred pounds of yearly revenues in Anjou, and the castle of Amboise, with all the jurisdiction which he had claimed to hold in Touraine; and he also quitted claim to him of all right that the king his father and himself had claimed in Chateau Regnaud. All these gifts, and many besides that he made to other persons, he confirmed under his new seal, which the king of France had ordered to be made for him. Besides these, he made other gifts, which, under the same seal, he confirmed; namely, to William, king of Scotland, for his assistance, the whole of Northumberland as far as the river Tyne. To the brother of the same king he gave for his services the earldom of Huntingdon and of Cambridgeshire, and to earl Hugh Bigot, for his services, the castle of Norwich.<sup>115</sup>

Later, in 1188-9, William paid Henry II 5,000 marks for the Saladin tithe and for the restoration of his castles which Henry had confiscated from him as part of the peace settlement after the Great War.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Hexham (eng), p. 57; ‘*Deditque rex illi cum consulatu patris sui de Huntadun, Carlel, et Donacastrum, cum omnibus quae ad ea pertinent*’, Hexham (lat), pp. 145-6; also recorded later in Hexham (eng), p. 76; Hexham (lat), p. 177; *King’s Works*, vol. 2, pp. 595-600.

<sup>115</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 367-8; ‘*Deinde juravit se daturum Philippo comiti Flandriae pro homagio suo mille libratas reddituum in Anglia, et totam Cantiam cum castello de Dovere et castello Rofense: et Mathaeo comiti Bononiae pro homagio suo socam de Kirketona in Lindisia, et comitatum Moretonii cum honore de Heya: et comiti Theobaldo Blesensi pro homagio suo quingentas libratas reddituum in Andegavia, et castellum de Ambasio cum toto jure quod ille calumniatus fuit in Turonica, et clamavit ei quietum totum jus quod rex pater suus et ipse calumniati sunt in Castello Reginaldi. Et omnes istas donationes, et alias multas, quas caeteris fecit, confirmavit sigillo suo novo, quod rex Franciae ei fieri fecit. Praeterea alias fee fecit donationes, quas ipse eodem sigillo confirmavit; scilicet Willelmo regi Scotiae pro auxilio suo totam Northimbriam usque fluvium Tine. Et David fratri Scotiae regis pro servitio suo comitatum de Huntendona et de Cantebregesire; et comiti Hugoni Bigot castellum de Norewiz pro servitio suo*’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 46-7.

<sup>116</sup> ‘*ad Willelmum regem Scottorum, pro decimis colligendis in terra sua: quo audito, rex Scotiae occurrit eis inter Were et Brigebam in Loenais; et non permittens eos terram suam pro decimis colligendis intrare, obtulit se daturum domino suo regi Angliae quinque millia marcarum argenti pro supradictis decimis et pro castellis suis re habendis sed rex Angliae facere noluit*’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 338-9.

As discussed in chapter 1, the relations with Welsh princes were important for any English king. The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that in the Conquest, the Normans added Wales, ‘to their dominion and fortified [it] with numberless castles; they perseveringly civilised it after they had vigorously subdued its inhabitants’.<sup>117</sup> This statement clearly illustrates the use of the castle as a tool to create a relationship between Wales and England, even if this relationship had a conqueror/conquered dynamic. In 1114, the Welsh kings swore allegiance to Henry I and he ‘had castles built among them’.<sup>118</sup> These new resources were intended to enforce this relationship and the political, social, economic, and military superiority over the Welsh. In retaliation for attacks on his castles by Griffyth ap Rhys, in 1121, Henry returned and ‘reduced the whole of Wales under his dominion’<sup>119</sup> constructing and, in particular, rebuilding castles.<sup>120</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that shortly after Henry I’s death, the Welsh ‘invaded in force, violently destroyed churches, townships, crops, and beasts far and wide, burnt down castles and other fortifications’.<sup>121</sup> Stephen responded by sending Baldwin Fitz Gilbert and Robert Fitz Harold to regain the lost territory and ‘impregably fortified among them a castle’ and to ensure their dominance in the political relationship, ‘subdue the Welsh’.<sup>122</sup> But they were unsuccessful and the Welsh captured and destroyed several more castles, symbolically ending that castle’s ability to assert English lordship over them.<sup>123</sup> Stephen did not respond; his occupation with rebellions in England meant that the relationships with the Welsh princes were not enforced or their violence punished; he was forced to abandon his Marcher lords to fend for themselves. Henry II, on the other hand, did

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<sup>117</sup> ‘*adicientes castellis innumeris munire; propriis incolis uiriliter edomitis, constanter excoluere; ad pacem confouendam*’, *GS*, 1, 8, pp. 14-5.

<sup>118</sup> *ASC*, E, p. 183.

<sup>119</sup> ‘*totam Waliam sue dicioni subegit*’, Worcester, pp. 150-1.

<sup>120</sup> Worcester, pp. 138-9; Simeon (eng), pp. 181, 190; Simeon (lat), 194 and 202, pp. 249, 263-4; Orderic, 13, 18, pp. 444-7.

<sup>121</sup> ‘*magna...irruptione. Ecclesiarum, uillarum, segetum animalium grauissima per eosdem Walenses longe lateque destructione, castellorum seu aliarum munitio exustio*’, Worcester, pp. 218-21.

<sup>122</sup> ‘*fuit ad Walenses subiugandos... castellum inter eos... inexpugnabiliter firmavit*’, *GS*, 1, 11, pp. 20-1.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

not waste time remedying this situation and in 1157, marched into Wales, intent on re-establishing his relationships with his Marcher lords by protecting them and offering support (*'subjectis ad libitum Walensibus, et restitutis terris et munitionibus baronibus suis'*), but also with the Welsh princes and reminding them that they had sworn allegiance to the English throne.<sup>124</sup> Henry, and the chroniclers, clearly perceived castles as the resources vital to English dominance in Wales.

Throughout all three reigns there were common overriding patterns of the castle used through patronage to create, or destroy, political and social relationships to ensure peace. Additionally, peace was not always forthcoming and castles needed to be repossessed in order to regain security. The threat posed by the earls of Chester and Essex centred on the number of castles they possessed, mostly through the king's patronage, and the correlating power and lordship; they had acquired so many resources and power that they rivalled the king. These cases demonstrate that, despite the value of patronage, security was best ensured by direct control over castles.

### **Status**

Alongside patronage and security as a resource for power and lordship, the castle was associated with the social status and prestige of its possessor. Military, political, and social status was created and influenced by the castle's connection to the 'militant noble milieu' and possession of the castle was considered 'one attribute of a lawfully armed aristocracy'.<sup>125</sup> Because of its personal nature, the castle's resourcefulness for power was directly associated with its possessor; therefore, the castle's strength or influence affected

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<sup>124</sup> Torigni, p. 195.

<sup>125</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 96, 110.

his. The right of administration that accompanied possession of a castle meant that it bestowed power, lordship, and wealth on whoever held it. Despite a difference in perception of their personal possession, castellans could and did benefit from their custody of a castle.

For example, a charter from Henry I

...to the barons and vavasours owing ward to Rockingham Castle: To dwell in Rockingham Castle at the summons of Michael de Hameslap, who has the keeping of it. Michael or the sheriffs of the counties where they hold land are to enforce obedience.<sup>126</sup>

Because Michael de Hameslap had ‘the keeping of the castle’, potentially as the castellan, he embodied royal authority in the area. When a baron or castellan was dispossessed of or was given a castle(s), his status was correspondingly altered. The associated authority to govern for oneself and for the king and the ability to enforce this authority that came with possession of a castle elevated lords throughout the period.

In the class of ‘castle-holder’, kings, barons, bishops, lords, and castellans existed together.<sup>127</sup> While the scale of their castle-holdings would obviously differ, their position as castle possessors raised their status with the fortification and power to influence local issues. On the lowest scale, castellans were responsible for the protection of the local area and the castle, the lord’s interests involving his specific castle, and the day-to-day administrative necessities.<sup>128</sup> His status and power came from the direct control over the castle and from liberties given to him by his lord. On the baronial level, one castle could be singled out as the seat of the barony and was the centre of their feudal honour and was thus the most important, strategically or historically, and typically the strongest or most luxurious castle held.<sup>129</sup> When Henry I attacked Pontaudomar during Waleran’s rebellion, he attacked

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<sup>126</sup> *Regesta*, vol. 2, 563, p. 17.

<sup>127</sup> Bartlett, p. 130; Reynolds, p. 170.

<sup>128</sup> For examples of the day to day administration passed from the lord of the castle to his castellan see charters 219 and 221 of Roger de Mowbray. Greenway, pp. 154-7; Reynolds, p. 170.

<sup>129</sup> Stenton, p. 197; Bartlett, p. 280; Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 136-7.

‘Waleran’s prestige, for it was the oldest and wealthiest of possessions of count’s family;’<sup>130</sup> additionally, Bristol was described as Robert, earl of Gloucester’s, ‘headquarters’.<sup>131</sup> Robert of Torigni employed the more recognised word *caput* in his narrative to express this perception.<sup>132</sup> Since barons used their castles to symbolise their position and strength and to defend their demesne lands, many even bore the names of their families and the honour and vice versa engraining the castle in the family heritage and identity.<sup>133</sup> But because barons sometimes held more than one castle, their network of these resources was ‘both convenient and prestigious’.<sup>134</sup> The king also possessed several castles each held directly by castellans, which placed him on the same level as the baronage; however, rendability theoretically laid all castles at his disposal and under his jurisdiction giving him unparalleled power.

This power and status is reflected in the chroniclers’ descriptions of castle holders. When Helias besieged Le Mans in 1100, the castellans proclaimed him count of Maine after surrendering the castle;<sup>135</sup> Walter Tirel was noted to be ‘a wealthy châtelain of Poix and Pontoise, one of the more powerful magnates;’<sup>136</sup> Richard Fitz Gilbert was described as ‘a man distinguished for his truly noble birth... endowed with countless lands and castles;’<sup>137</sup> Ralph of Conches’ power is demonstrated in the description of him as ‘possesses powerful castles. Conches and Tosny, Portes and Acquigny; loyal barons accept his lordship, and they

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<sup>130</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, p. 17.

<sup>131</sup> See p. 138, *GS*, 1, 26, pp. 56-7.

<sup>132</sup> Torigni, ‘*Dux Normannorum cepit castrum munitissimum et, divitiis opulentum et cujusdam comitatus caput, scilicet Stanfort*’, p. 174; ‘*Comitatum etiam de Broerech abstulit ei, cujus caput est civitas Venetensium*’, pp. 236-7; ‘*Inde venit Redonis, et per civitatem illam, quae caput est Britanniae, totum illum ducatum saisivit*’, p. 228; ‘*Rex vero Henricus, quia illud castrum erat de casamento Hugonis filii Supplicii de Ambazia, quod tenebat de comite Teobaldo (caput autem sui honoris scilicet Ambaziam, tenebat de rege Henrico)*’, pp. 208-9.

<sup>133</sup> Stenton, p. 197. Examples include Amaury and Hugh of Montfort, Hugh of Chateaufort-en-Thimerais, Hugh of Le Plessis, Hugh of Gournay, Ivo of Grandmesnil, Robert of Pontefract, Robert of Bellême, Haimo of Falaise, and Hugh le Puiset.

<sup>134</sup> Bartlett, p. 280.

<sup>135</sup> ‘*arce reddita te principem Cenomannorum hodie constituimus*’, Orderic, 10, 18, pp. 302-7.

<sup>136</sup> ‘*Picis et Pontisariae diues oppidanus, potens inter optimates*’, Orderic, 10, 15, pp. 288-9.

<sup>137</sup> ‘*uir sincera generositate insignis...terrīs et castellis heredatus innumeris*’, *GS*, 1, 9, pp. 16-9.

will greatly increase our numbers if he alone comes over to us;'<sup>138</sup> Hugh de Mortimer was described as 'a powerful man, but more than that, exceedingly able, rich and vigorous in warfare, estimating the king to be a mere boy and indignant at his activity, he fortified his castles and refused to submit himself to the king'.<sup>139</sup> Robert de Vaus was described as holding Carlisle 'nobly like a noble baron', and deserved honour and respect for doing so.<sup>140</sup> From these few examples, it is clear that the common description of chroniclers to note that someone was a 'lord of a castle'<sup>141</sup> not only told the audience that he held this castle but that he was a member of the noble class; this description was not only for military information but also communicated his position, power, and status.<sup>142</sup>

The chronicles also demonstrated the castle's resourcefulness in altering power, wealth, and status through possession or confiscation. Henry I was recorded by Orderic as altering the position and power of several barons. In order to establish himself as king against his brother's claim, Henry 'brought all his enemies to heel by his wisdom and courage, and: rewarded his loyal supporters with riches and honours'.<sup>143</sup> He first

...pulled down many great men from positions of eminence for their presumption, and sentenced them to be disinherited for ever. On the other hand, he ennobled others of base stock who had served him well, raised them, so to say, from the dust, and heaping all kinds of favours on them, stationed them above earls and famous castellans.<sup>144</sup>

<sup>138</sup> '*Ipsa fortia possidet castra, Coneas et Toeneium, Portas et Achinneium, probatique barones gestant eius dominium, qui per ipsum solum multipliciter nostrum augebunt numerum*', Orderic, 12, 19, pp. 244-5.

<sup>139</sup> '*uir pollens uiribus, sed multo maxime ingenio ualidus, prediues opibus, militari negotio strenuus, regem utpote adolescentem eiusque industriam indignationi habens, castris suis munitis eiusdem imperii se suaque summitti refutabat*', Battle, pp. 158-61. 'that excellent knight, Hugh de Mortimer, (*militis egregii Hugonis de Mortuomari*)', Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 31, pp. 216-7.

<sup>140</sup> '*noblement cume gentil barun*', Fantosme, line 1574, p. 334.

<sup>141</sup> '*Rodbertus enim de Nouoburgo prefati castra dominus Iosfredo comiti notus fuerat*', Orderic, 13, 26, pp. 466-73.

<sup>142</sup> Orderic, 11, 1 and 3 and 13, pp. 12-3, 32-5, 72-3, and 12, 3-4 and 10 and 12-3 and 19-20 and 38-9, pp. 190-7, 212-5, 218-23, 248-51, 346-7, 354-7; Huntingdon, 7, 24, p. 450-1; Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; Simeon (lat), 183, p. 234; *GND*, 8, 15, pp. 226-31; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51; Torigni, pp. 212, 223.

<sup>143</sup> '*Omnes inimicos suos sapientia uel fortitudine sibi subiugauit sibiqûe seruientes diuitiis et honoribus remunerauit*', Orderic, 11, 2, pp. 16-7.

<sup>144</sup> '*Vnde plerosque illustres pro temeritate sua de sullimi potestatis culmine precipitauit, et haereditario iure irrecuperabiliter spoliatos condempnauit. Alios e contra fauorabiliter illi obsequentes de ignobili stirpe*

Orderic then gives the names of several of these men and says they ‘heaped up riches and built lavishly, on a scale far beyond the means of their fathers’ and those that Henry is said to have wronged were done so by ‘trumped-up and unjust pretexts’.<sup>145</sup> Henry

...raised to high rank all these and many others of low birth whom it would be tedious to name individually, lifted them out of insignificance by his royal authority, set them on the summit of power, and made them formidable even to the greatest magnates of the kingdom.<sup>146</sup>

Orderic’s description and Henry’s actions demonstrate the social and political resourcefulness of the castle; this passage, and those preceding, may not directly mention castles as either what was taken from the disinherited barons or the ‘riches and honours’ given out by Henry, but the rest of his narrative, supported by contemporaries, makes this connection.<sup>147</sup>

Orderic named the disinherited men as ‘the traitors who had infamously deserted him in his hour of need... Robert Malet, Ivo of Grandmesnil, Robert of Pontefract the son of Gilbert of Lacy, Robert of Bellême;’ this passage notes that some of these men were only fined, and others were ‘disinherited and [driven] into perpetual exile’.<sup>148</sup> The fate of Robert

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*illustravit, de puluere ut ita dicam extulit dataque multiplici facultate super consules et illustres oppidanos exaltauit’, Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> ‘*opibus aggregatis et aedibus constructis super omnia quae patres eorum habuerunt, ipsi quoque qui ab eisdem sepe falsis uel iniustis occasionibus oppressi sunt*’, Ibid. Examples of these disinherited lords, Orderic, 11, 1, pp. 12-3, and 12, 4, pp. 194-7; Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; Simeon (lat), 183, p. 234; Huntingdon, 7, 24, pp. 450-1, 453; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 196; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 162; ASC, E, p. 179; Torigni, p. 84.

<sup>146</sup> ‘*Illos nimirum aliosque plures quos singillatim nominate tedio esi rex cum de infimo genere essent nobilitauit, regali auctoritate de imo erexit, in fastigio potestatum constituit, ipsis etiam spectabilibus regni principibus formidabiles effecit*’, Orderic, 11, 2, pp. 16-7. Another example: ‘afterwards he bound them to him by so remarkable an affection that he enriched them with the most beautiful grants, endowed them with very extensive estates, made them his chief officials in all the business of the palace, and appointed them as advocates in every case that had to be pleaded at court (*in tantum postea singulari sibi dilectione astrinxit, ut eos honoribus ditatos largissimis, praediisque honoratos amplissimis, et omnium palatinorum archiministros efficeret, et omnium curialium causarum susceptores praescriberet*)’, GS, 1, 12, pp. 22-3.

<sup>147</sup> For more on the monetary exemptions, royal gifts, and other fiscally recorded favours see: Mooers, ‘Patronage in the Pipe Roll of 1130’, pp. 282-307.

<sup>148</sup> ‘*et super proditores qui tempore necessitates suae nequiter ab illo descuerant paulatim ulcisci conatus est. Nam Rodbertum cognomento Maletum et Iuonem de Grentemaisnilio, Rodbertum de Pontefracto filium Ilberti de Laceio, et potentiores omnibus illis Rodbertum de Bellismo... Quosdam eorum qui se de obiecto*

of Bellême<sup>149</sup> and William of Mortain<sup>150</sup> demonstrate that castles were resources of disinheritance and social reduction. Orderic even recorded that Henry gave Robert of Bellême's former castles of Séez and Alençon to Count Theobald, who then passed it to his brother Stephen).<sup>151</sup> Later in his narrative, some of the men named above, including William Trussebut (castellan of Bonneville<sup>152</sup>) and Guigan Algason (described as 'a man of low birth but great power' and in possession of 'Argentan and Exmes and Domfront and other fortified towns, which he governed as vicomte by the king's command'<sup>153</sup>), are in possession of castles. By taking castles from his traitorous barons and gifting them to other men, Henry was responsible for destroying the status and power of some and creating 'new men' by raising their status and altering their identity.<sup>154</sup>

Henry's new men administered royal justice and collected royal revenues and having 'men of this kind presiding over courts must have affronted noble sensibilities...to be brought before men of a lower social origin was insulting to men of high birth'.<sup>155</sup> However, not all of Henry's new men were lowly born: Miles of Gloucester's father had been a court constable and constable of Gloucester, and had held Carmarthen for the king;<sup>156</sup> Payn Fitz John's father was listed as a 'tenant-in-chief in Domesday Book'.<sup>157</sup> On the other side, men like Geoffrey de Clinton might have acquired wealth and position under Henry but they 'did

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*crimine purgare non poterant ingenti pecunia condemnauit, alios uero quos magis suspectos habebat irrecuperabiliter exheredatos exulare compulit*', Orderic, 11, 1, pp. 12-3.

<sup>149</sup> Orderic, 11, 3 and 20 and 22 and 44, pp. 20-9, 84-5, 94-5, 178-9; Torigni, pp. 88-93; Worcester, pp. 98-103, 108-11, 132-5.

<sup>150</sup> Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 397-8, pp. 720-5; *ASC*, E, pp. 179-80; Eadmer (eng), 4, pp. 196-7; Eadmer (lat), 4, p. 184; Torigni, pp. 85-6; Huntingdon, 7, 24-6, pp. 452-5; Orderic, 11, 20-1, pp. 84-5, 94-5; Worcester, pp. 108-11; *GND*, 8, 13, pp. 220-3.

<sup>151</sup> *Tunc rex Henricus Sagium et Alencionem et totam in illa regione terram Rodberti Belesmensis Tedbaldo comiti dedit*', Orderic, 12, 4, pp. 194-7.

<sup>152</sup> *Guillelmus cognomento Trossebot Bonae Villae munio temeritatem hostium callide preuenit*', Orderic, 13, 38, pp. 526-9.

<sup>153</sup> *Guigan Algaso uir infimi quidem generis sed magnae potestatis ut naturalem dominam suscepit, eique Argentomum et Oximos et Damfrontem aliaque quibus ut uicecomes iubente rege praeerat oppida subegit*', Orderic, 13, 21, pp. 454-7; Garnett, pp. 223-4.

<sup>154</sup> For more on these new men see: Kealey, p. 3; Green, *Government*, p. 144.

<sup>155</sup> Green, *Henry I*, pp. 242-4.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid*; ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10820?docPos=1>, accessed June 9, 2013.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid* Green.

not rise to the heights of the great nobles' with inheritable titles or estates and could be expendable, as de Clinton discovered.<sup>158</sup>

A closer look at Robert of Bellême's situation further demonstrates this idea by demonstrating his status before he crossed Henry I. Orderic refers to him as 'the mighty earl' who fled to his castles after a confrontation at the royal court; Robert could not have gone to all of them but the chronicler possibly used the plural to demonstrate that he had more than one, illustrating his power.<sup>159</sup> Simeon of Durham and Roger of Howden called him the 'earl of Shropshire' and lists the castles he possessed in England.<sup>160</sup> Robert 'strengthened the ramparts and walls of his castles everywhere'<sup>161</sup> and many chroniclers document that Robert was in 'the process of building a very strong castle at Bridgnorth on the river Severn'<sup>162</sup> to increase his resources; the mention of these constructions stressed that this baron possessed many resources with which to support his power and rebellion and exemplified his power. He relied on Bridgnorth to such an extent that when it surrendered to Henry, Robert 'was in despair; almost insane with grief he did not know what course to take'.<sup>163</sup> Henry, intent on breaking Robert and confiscate all his English castles, moved on to Shrewsbury where he succeeded and 'vanquished his enemy Robert, and ignominiously

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid, pp. 245-6.

<sup>159</sup> '*potentissimum comitem...celeriter ascensis ad castella sua pauidus et anhelus confugit*', Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9.

<sup>160</sup> Simeon (eng), p. 169; '*Scrobbersberiensis comes*', Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234; 'earl of Shrewsbury', Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 193; '*comes Scrobessbiriensis*', Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 159.

<sup>161</sup> See p. 95, n 248, Ibid. Other recordings of his English castles: Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234; Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 396, pp. 718-9; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60.

<sup>162</sup> '*Ibi nempe Brugiam munitissimum castrum super Sabrinam fluium construebat*', Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9. Other recordings of the construction of Bridgnorth: Torigni, pp. 88-93; Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234; Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 396, pp. 718-9; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60. The cost of constructing and maintaining castles symbolised wealth and status of the possessor. Royal records illustrate that Henry II spent £6400 on Dover's reinvigoration which included a square keep and his total castle-costs reached £21,500 across thirty years. Other examples include Scarborough (£682), Wark (£382), Newcastle-upon-Tyne (£1144), Bowes (£616), Richmond (£138), Chilham (£428), Arundel (£339), Rochester (£150), and Canterbury (£100). Brown, 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 355-7; *King's Works*, vol. 1, 2, pp. 554, 588-90, 745-8, 852-3.

<sup>163</sup> '*anxius ingemit et pene in amentiam uersus quid ageret ignorauit*', Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9.

expelled him from England'.<sup>164</sup> But Robert was not defeated completely; he still had control over plenty of resources including 'thirty-four very strong castles'.<sup>165</sup> While he had lost his English castles and thus his influence in that region, he was still exceptionally powerful in Normandy as the earl of Ponthieu and had the resources to maintain this political and social status.<sup>166</sup>

Additionally, the example of Henry of Blois, bishop of Winchester, and his possession and construction of castles can be used to support the resourcefulness of castles in status, power, and lordship on several dimensions. According to Biddle,

The association of the custody of the castle [of Winchester] and of the treasury is also of interest in view of the connection which the constable of the castle enjoyed in later times with parts of the site of the former palace. Although this connection may simply reflect the assignment to the constable of rents from the site, it may imply an older arrangement in which he was responsible for the security of the treasury while it was still located within the ancient palace<sup>167</sup>

Therefore, in 1135, the constable of Winchester castle and sheriff of Hampshire and Wiltshire was William Pont de L'Arche and he was responsible for collecting the rents of the area and protecting the royal treasure.<sup>168</sup> When William surrendered the castle to Stephen in 1136 and the king gave possession to his brother Bishop Henry, the power of this

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<sup>164</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; '*inimicum suum Rodbertum superavit, et ignominiose de Anglia expulit*', Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234. Similar from Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4; '*inimicum suum Robertum superavit, et ignominiose de Anglia expulit*', Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60.

<sup>165</sup> '*Adhuc xxxiiii firmissimas munitiones habeo*', Orderic, 11, 22, pp. 94-5. Orderic gave this number in an earlier passage: 11, 3, pp. 32-5.

<sup>166</sup> Simeon (eng), pp. 169-70; '*qui comitatum etiam Pontivensis pagi rexit eo tempore, ac in Normannia castella possedit quamplurima*', Simeon (lat), vol. 2, 183, p. 234; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 193-4; '*qui comitatum etiam Pontivensis pagi rexit eo tempore, ac in Normannia castella possedit quamplurima*', Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 159-60.

<sup>167</sup> Biddle, pp. 302-5.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid: treasury at Winchester since Cnut pp. 290-1; movement of the treasury from palace to castle pp. 295-6, 302-5, 472-3; administrative move from Winchester to Westminster or Tower of London in 1180s, p. 291. Clark, *Mediaeval Military Architecture*, pp. 48, 52; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 854-64; King, *King Stephen*, p. 45.

position, and the wealth associated with it, were transferred to the bishop.<sup>169</sup> Winchester was still the financial seat of the kingdom during Henry's possession and Biddle argued that,

...the departure of the king from Winchester was to some extent balanced by the authority, wealth, and patronage of the bishop. In addition to the power which he wielded by virtue of his ecclesiastical offices and personal wealth, Bishop Henry exercised during his brother's reign a major political and administrative authority over the counties within his diocese, and in Winchester occupied an almost regal position.<sup>170</sup>

His power became nearly equivalent to his brother's because of the authority that possession of Winchester and its financial and administrative apparatus gave him: 'his influence had now entirely supplanted that of the king'.<sup>171</sup> Henry not only benefitted through his physical possession of the castles but also from the trade revenue, 'landgable rents' that he collected as the royal official in the city, and 'substantial revenue from properties in Winchester which do not seem rightly to have belonged to the bishopric, and may have been held by a delegation of royal authority or even actually belonged to the king'; he was in possession of a very valuable multifunctional resource.<sup>172</sup> Having constructed Wolvesey castle in the city, Henry now possessed two castles and the former royal palace. Matilda's attack on Wolvesey and the episcopal palace in 1141 demonstrated her intent to reduce Henry's power and authority.<sup>173</sup> His position and control over these resources, described by Biddle as 'undisputed lord of the city', was challenged by Henry II upon his accession; the bishop's flight from England, the destruction of some of his castles, and the royal repossession of Winchester demonstrated his change in fortunes as Henry tried to re-consolidate royal power.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid, p. 305; King, *King Stephen*, p. 45. Similar argument about William le Gros, count of Aumale and earl of York, during Stephen's reign. Dalton, *Conquest, Anarchy and Lordship*, p. 147.

<sup>170</sup> Also contains a further discussion on the royal departure from Winchester. Biddle, pp. 302-5, 489-91.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid, p. 490.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid, and evidence of commercial profit and international trade through pilgrims pp. 496-7.

<sup>173</sup> Biddle, p. 490; King, *King Stephen*, p. 45, 167-9.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid, pp. 489-91.

Stephen was determined to retain and regain as many castles as possible, especially from Robert of Gloucester, because possession of these resources even increased the status and power of kings. Robert's power was such that 'a considerable number of bishops and castellans on learning that the earl... had joined the Angevins, revealed the evil designs they had cherished in secret and rebelled against the king' and offer a stout resistance to the king splitting the country.<sup>175</sup> Henry I was recorded by Orderic as 'stoutly [upholding] his royal dignity' by having his royal garrisons stationed in many castles across Normandy like Rouen, Bayeux, Coutances, Avranches, Sées, Arques, Nonancourt, Caen, Falaise, Exmes, Fecamp, Lillebonne, Vernon, and Argentan, 'which were directly subject to the royal control alone'.<sup>176</sup> Henry II's power after his coronation is perhaps best demonstrated when William, earl of Albemarle

... who, in the times of Stephen, had been more truly a king there than his master... submitted to his power, and very reluctantly resigned whatever of the royal domains he had possessed for many years, more especially that celebrated and noble castle of Scarborough.<sup>177</sup>

The capitulation of such a magnate rendering his castles to a new king was a clear demonstration of that king's power and authority and, since many magnates did the same, the restoration of traditional practices.

Not only were castles responsible for giving status but they could be closely related to identity. For example, Eustace of Breteuil, Henry I's son-in-law, rebelled against him because he refused to 'restore to him the castle of Ivry, which had belonged to his ancestors;' Henry then promised Eustace possession of this castle at a later date because he

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<sup>175</sup> *'In Anglia uero presules et oppidani quamplures ut prefatum comitem cuius potestas magna erat in utrisque regnis Andegauensibus adminiculari audierunt, nequitiam quam penes se occultabant protulerunt, et contra regem rebellauerunt'*, Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> *'quae regiae ditioni dumtaxat subdabantur'*, Orderic, 12, 14, pp. 222-5.

<sup>177</sup> *'qui ibidem sub Stephano rex verier fuerat, de re consimili eodem quo ceteras pondere auctoritatis convenit. Ille diu haesitans, multumque aestuans, tandem corde saucius potestati succubuit, et quaecunque ex regio dominico pluribus jam annis possederat, cum ingenti anxietate resignavit, maximae famosum illud et nobile castrum, quod dicitur Scartheburth'*, Newburgh, 2, 2, pp. 16-9; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 2, pp. 103-4.

did not want to be in conflict with one of the ‘most powerful nobles of Normandy, who had strong castles and was well supported by friends and vassals’.<sup>178</sup> Not only were Eustace’s castles part of his noble identity and power, but he felt that Ivry should also be his since it once belonged to his family. The description of Amaury of Montfort also listed his lineage and noted that he ‘had very well-fortified castles and powerful castellans under him, and his kinsfolk abounded in wealth and resources so that he was one of the greatest among the great nobles of France’.<sup>179</sup> His connections certainly increased his status but his castles and loyal castellans were crucial to his identity as well. Additionally, his rebellion against Henry I was perceived of as acceptable because of his deprivation of his ancestral lands and castles in the county of Évreux.

Significantly, the castle’s resourcefulness in status and power could affect the possessors regardless of whether they were born to the castle-owning class. This situation is best demonstrated by the case of Robert Fitz Hubert, a Flemish soldier who decided to take advantage of the chaos of the early 1140s and whose exploits earned him notoriety on both sides of the conflict. While no chronicler portrayed him in a positive light, all illustrated his use of the castle to gain power and status.<sup>180</sup> In 1140, Robert captured the royal castle of Malmesbury ‘by treacherous cunning’ and through possessing this castle, raised his status and gained the power and resources to threaten Stephen who besieged him and forced surrender several days later.<sup>181</sup> Robert then joined the earl of Gloucester’s retinue ‘staying

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<sup>178</sup> ‘*Et quia discordiam eius habere nolebat, qui de potentioribus Neustrige proceribus erat, et amicis hominibusque stipatus firmissimas munitiones habebat, ut securiorem sibi et fidelioem faceret*’, Orderic, 12, 10, pp. 212-5.

<sup>179</sup> ‘*utpote qui castella munitissima et potentes oppidanos habebat parentibus quoque diuitiis et potentia uigentibus inter summos Francorum procores sullimis florebat*’, Orderic, 12, 1, pp. 188-9.

<sup>180</sup> The GS described him as ‘a man of great cruelty and unequalled in wickedness and crime’ and ‘deceitful in mind and deed, who, as is said of the judge in the Gospel, regarded neither God nor men, (*uiro crudelissimo nullique in malitia et scelere aequando... animo et actu fraudulentus, qui, ut de euangelico iudice dicitur, nec Deum nec homines reuerbatur*)’, 1, 43, pp. 92-5. John of Worcester said that he ‘feared neither God nor man (*nec Deum nec homines ueritus*)’, pp. 284-91. To Malmesbury he was ‘a cruel and savage man (*immanis ac barbarous*)’ and ‘savage...excellently suited to stratagems (*barbarous...ad furta belli peridoneus*)’, HN, 2, 31 and 39, pp. 63, 74-6.

<sup>181</sup> ‘*Dolo malignitatis*’, Worcester, pp. 284-91; Malmesbury, HN, 2, 31, pp. 63.

with him for some time, brooding treacherous thoughts'.<sup>182</sup> John of Worcester recorded that, he 'went to Devizes with his men, without the earl's knowledge' and succeeded in gaining possession through scaling ladders and trapped the royal garrison in the tower until they surrendered.<sup>183</sup> Earl Robert sent men to claim the castle as Robert's overlord but he drove them away,

...saying he had captured the castle to occupy it, not to hand it over to one stronger than himself. Such indeed was the fact, such the cunning intention of that turncoat, not to keep on the earl's side, nor to proclaim himself a supporter of the king, but to bring into the castle a large body of his own people and either ensnare by craft or seize by force all the surrounding country.<sup>184</sup>

Declaring that Devizes was under his personal control and lordship gave Robert the position and power to threaten Stephen and Matilda. Wishing to further his advancement and gain more resources, he contacted John of Marlborough to make peace and asked him for access to his castle with designs on taking it as well. John, who was an Angevin adherent, was not deceived, allowed Robert to enter the castle, and 'placed him under guard... [and] caused every torture which Robert had formerly inflicted on others to be inflicted on him'.<sup>185</sup> John then brought this traitorous man to Devizes, and hung him in front of his garrison who quickly surrendered the castle.<sup>186</sup>

In this episode, Robert's power grows each time he gains a castle; without one, he was not a threat and essentially ignored. While Robert was never a baron, Crouch's research on the social influence of upper class appurtenances (including castles) argues that the lower

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<sup>182</sup> *'diuertit, penes illum ad tempus in doli ueneno moraturus'*, Worcester, pp. 284-291; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 39, pp. 74-6.

<sup>183</sup> *'ignorante comite, cum suis ad Diuisas se contulit'*, Worcester, pp. 284-91; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 31, pp. 63; *GS*, 1, 51, pp. 104-7.

<sup>184</sup> *'affirmans, ut castellum possideret, non fortiori se committeret, castellum se conquisisse. Et quidem ita se res habebat, ita et uersipellis ille uersute cogitabat, quatinus nec ex parte comitis se continens, nec ex consortio regis se profitens, suae gentis uiribus abundanter intro receptis, omnem circumquaque prouinciam aut dolo deciperet, aut uiribus obtineret'*, *GS*, 1, 51, pp. 104-7.

<sup>185</sup> *'illum captum in custodiam posuit uicemque pro uice reddens, omnia tormentorum genera que is in crudelitate sua prius aliis intulerat, in illum expendi fecit'*, Worcester, pp. 284-91; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 39, pp. 74-6; *GS*, 1, 51, pp. 104-7.

<sup>186</sup> Worcester, pp. 284-91; *GS*, 1, 52, pp. 108-9; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 39, pp. 74-6.

classes attempted to increase their social position by gaining possession of upper class symbols. By connecting themselves with or possessing a castle, one could take on some noble characteristics if not be wholly accepted by them.<sup>187</sup> Thus, once Robert takes Malmesbury for himself, he is quickly confronted by the king; at Devizes, the earl of Gloucester quickly tries to assert his over-lordship. Robert was an interloper in the existing tenurial-political situation and needed to be dealt with by gaining his loyalty or destroying him. John's steps to capture and execute Robert demonstrate the danger this independent castellan posed to the region with sufficient resources in his possession. His pursuit of power and lordship centred on castles, as did his demise.

### **Resourcefulness expressed in Architecture**

We have demonstrated that a castle was perceived as fortified, and symbolised military strength; regardless of actual military intent (and many never faced any form of military confrontation) they needed to visually express this ability. The resourcefulness of the castle, to military confrontations in particular, was typically expressed architecturally. The motte-and-bailey Conquest castles represented Norman military superiority to their Anglo-Saxon subjects; they 'were a visible expression of Norman power, and later generations were even to take them as symbols of Norman tyranny'.<sup>188</sup> But a castle geared 'towards full attack-deterrence was highly expensive' and sometimes there was more emphasis on the symbolism of strength than the reality of it.<sup>189</sup> According to Speight, 'the preferred aesthetic, that which symbolised power, was the one which highlighted the defensible quality of architecture, whether the particular building was defensible or not'.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. xvi, 3-4, 48-51.

<sup>188</sup> Chibnall, *Normans*, pp. 143, 146.

<sup>189</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 81.

<sup>190</sup> S. Speight, 'An Englishman's Castle is his Home', *Castle Studies Group Newsletter* 12 (1998-9), p. 45.

Thus, the construction of a castle with heightened fortification elements increased its military resourcefulness but also demonstrated the political, social, and economic position of the possessor; alternatively, an increased economic, political, and social position could lead to the construction or enhancement of a larger castle with heightened fortification elements. According to Coulson, '[t]he medieval peculiarity was to associate the architectural panoply of fortification so closely with governmental power that jurisdiction and castellation were almost inseparable'.<sup>191</sup> But architecturally, castles dominated the landscape and whether it symbolised oppressive or supportive power, its impressiveness in the countryside or towering above a medieval city is beyond question.<sup>192</sup>

As previously discussed, there was a variety of styles for a twelfth-century castle. But did this alter its resourcefulness? The answer is two-fold: while it demonstrated the personal taste of the builder, it also expressed their political, social, economic, and military power. The builder of Plympton had a different position, level of power, and intention than William the Conqueror when he ordered the Tower of London and Rochester built by Bishop Gundulf. Plympton was primarily for local control and while it could have resisted a siege, it capitulated quickly in 1138. The Tower and Rochester, on the other hand, were originally stone constructions demonstrating the king's security and wealth. Most Conquest castles were constructed initially to secure possession of the land and the initial instability and insecurity of conquest meant that these resources were needed quickly; thus motte-and-bailey castles were predominant. Once the military threat subsided in the area, a lord could afford to express his status and wealth through stone while increasing his security at the same time. Thus, the initial stone construction of the Tower and Rochester demonstrated William's confidence in his position after Hastings; they also demonstrated to the Anglo-Saxons that the Normans were not going away.

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<sup>191</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, p. 205.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid*, p. 187.

The episcopal castles constructed by Bishop Henry of Winchester and Bishop Roger of Salisbury demonstrate the potential for castle architecture to express political, military, social, and economic status. Wolvesey was described by the *Gesta Stephani* as ‘built in very elegant style’.<sup>193</sup> Bishop Roger built ‘castles of great renown, raised up towers and buildings of great strength’<sup>194</sup> and built ‘buildings large in scale, expensive, and very beautiful to look at’.<sup>195</sup> Archaeological surveys of these castles have determined that they were constructed in similar ‘rectilinear layouts focused around a courtyard’.<sup>196</sup> Riall argued that ‘the guiding principle to these designs appears to be the provision of country-house grandeur and luxury combined with defensive arrangements’.<sup>197</sup> He discusses the variation in castle design further:

None of these chamber-blocks or tower-keeps [at Sherborne, Bishop's Waltham, and Wolvesey] are comparable to the contemporary castle-keeps at Guildford, Portchester or Oxford, quite apart from the more massive constructions like that at Corfe. This further emphasises the differences between these ecclesiastical palaces and the more military-style castles of the same period.<sup>198</sup>

But what this thesis, and Riall, assert is that these luxurious castles were not ‘any the less defensible’ as the sieges of Wolvesey, Devizes, and Malmesbury throughout Stephen’s reign demonstrate.<sup>199</sup> The designs of these castles ‘matched their [possessor’s] high position and social status in the governance of both the realm and their episcopates’.<sup>200</sup> They were not only defensible military resources but were political, social, and economic resources which expressed the status, power, wealth, and position of these men. To have a military tool constructed in such an extravagant and decorative way undeniably expressed power.

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<sup>193</sup> ‘*uenustissimo constructum cenate*’, *GS*, 1, 63, pp. 126-7.

<sup>194</sup> ‘*castella nominatissima construxisse, turres et aedificia munitissima subuexisse*’, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>195</sup> ‘*Fecit enim ibi edifitia spatio diffusa, numero pecuniarum sumptosa, spetie formosissima*’, Malmesbury, *GRA*, vol. 1, 5, 408, pp. 736-9.

<sup>196</sup> Riall, ‘New Castles of Henry de Blois’, p. 126. Similar analysis from J. Blair, ‘Hall and Chamber: English Domestic Planning 1000-1250’, in Liddiard, pp. 318-9; Biddle, p. 491.

<sup>197</sup> Riall, ‘New Castles of Henry de Blois’, p. 126; Biddle, p. 491.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid* Riall, p. 126.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid*; *GS*, 1, 63-4, pp. 126-9; Biddle, p. 491.

<sup>200</sup> Riall, ‘New Castles of Henry de Blois’, p. 126.

Henry II's castle at Orford equalled the Tower of London and Rochester as another statement of royal security, wealth, and power.<sup>201</sup> Orford was constructed in response to 'a local political situation' in order 'to check the dangerous power of Hugh Bigod in Suffolk in general and to contain his castle at Framlingham' and protect the local port.<sup>202</sup> Its strategic value is evident from this political and military situation and over £1000 was spent on its construction indicating its importance.<sup>203</sup> Hugh had three castles in the area (Bungay, Framlingham, and Walton) but there were no royal castles in the county until Henry II 'obtained Eye and Haganet (Haughley) by escheat;' he also succeeded in confiscating Walton in 1157.<sup>204</sup> Construction of Orford commenced in 1166, and was finished by the start of the rebellion of 1173-4; simultaneously, Hugh added a stone-keep to Bungay.<sup>205</sup> After the Great War, Bungay and Framlingham were surrendered to Henry with the latter, possibly both, destroyed.<sup>206</sup> Subsequently, the royal castle of Orford became the supreme castle in the region. The keep was 'an unusual polygonal design',<sup>207</sup> and, according to Heslop, its style was an attempt to find 'an image which expresses an ideal but which also provides appropriate accommodation', and the result was an elegant, palatial, extravagant castle which symbolised the king's power, authority, and security.<sup>208</sup> Arguably, Orford was the perfect example of the fortified, personal, and multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle expressed through architecture: it was strongly fortified, a symbol of the king's power, and was a political, social, military, and economic resource for him in peace and war.

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<sup>201</sup> *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 706-29.

<sup>202</sup> Brown, 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 360-1; Fry, *British Medieval Castles*, p. 14.

<sup>203</sup> Heslop in Liddiard, p. 296; Brown, 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 355-6.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid* Brown; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 769-71.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid* Brown, pp. 360-2.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid*; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 769-71.

<sup>207</sup> Brown, 'Royal Castle-Building', p. 362.

<sup>208</sup> Heslop in Liddiard, p. 296; Brown, 'Royal Castle-Building', pp. 355-6.

## Inverse Resource: Destruction of Castles

When a castle was taken, the victor had two options: maintain the resource by installing his own men, or eliminate it. The destruction of castles was a common tactic for kings and barons across the twelfth century. When Stephen took Plympton in 1138, he had it ‘levelled to the ground’ which possibly only entailed destroying the contemporary tower since the mound still exists today.<sup>209</sup> No explanation is provided but from the garrison’s surrender ‘on the pretext that they were too weak to stand a siege’, the castle was probably too weak; since the cost of fortifying the castle was too great for its subsequent value to Stephen’s campaign, it was destroyed.<sup>210</sup> Stephen was also more concerned with the rebellion of royal castellans and Robert of Gloucester’s castles to be interested in a relatively small local castle. It was not worth his effort to enhance and so he destroyed it. For its lord, on the other hand, it was an important loss; despite its size, it was still valuable to his rebellion against the king as another point of resistance.

Stephen’s elimination of Plympton denied its lord access to it as a resource but there are cases in which the garrison destroyed their own castle to do the same. Robert, the castellan of Dangu, was besieged by French forces during the reign of Henry I; he ‘set fire to the fortress, burned it, and rode out leaving nothing but embers to the enemy’.<sup>211</sup> This denied the French use of this castle; but it denied it to Henry as well. Robert was advised by friends to destroy this castle because it would have been better for Henry’s cause to destroy the castle than leave it to his enemy. However, Robert’s plan seems to have backfired; the chronicle recorded that King Louis ‘was highly delighted by the burning of Dangu and

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<sup>209</sup> *‘regisque ex iussione solotenus diruto’*, GS, 1, 17, pp. 34-9.

<sup>210</sup> *‘quasi pro impotentia obsidioni resistere non ualentibus’*, Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> *‘Tandem oppidanus amicorum consilio qui extrinsecus obsidebant castrum immisso igne combussit, et egressus nichil hostibus nisi fauillas reliquit’*, Orderic, 12, 17, pp. 232-3.

besieged Châteauneuf-sur-Epte' instead; he did not have to expend resources on this castle and could progress through Henry's territory.<sup>212</sup>

Castles were also demolished to demonstrate the victor's power over the loser. Henry I ordered Reginald of Bailleul to render his castle of Le Renouard but was refused and vowed that Reginald 'will regret having defied' him; when Henry besieged the castle, Reginald realised that he 'had not the resources to resist such a force, came out in the morning and surrendered the strong place, begging for the king's mercy', and true to his word Henry retaliated and 'had the stone building with all its provisions and everything inside it put to the flames'.<sup>213</sup> Not only did he punish Reginald permanently removing this castle from his possession, but this convinced other rebellious castles like Courcy, Grandmesnil, and Montpinçon to surrender.<sup>214</sup> When Waleran of Meulan 'attacked Acquigny with a strong force and burnt the fortress to the ground',<sup>215</sup> in retaliation, Henry 'razed the tower of Vatteville right to the ground' during Waleran's imprisonment in 1123.<sup>216</sup> Additionally, furious with his father-in-law, Geoffrey of Anjou besieged and 'burnt Beaumont to the ground'.<sup>217</sup>

Although the treaty of Westminster in 1153 ordered the destruction of adulterine castles, Amt has argued that there appears to be little evidence of this. It is difficult to be certain which, if any, Gloucestershire castles were destroyed because 'evidence for the actual destruction or survival... in this period is scarce'.<sup>218</sup> Oxfordshire, also, does not seem to have been affected.<sup>219</sup> The reason was probably because these castles posed no threat to

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<sup>212</sup> 'Rex autem Franciae concremato Dangu elatus tripudiauit, et Nouum Castrum...obsedit', Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> 'sed poenitebit te nefas cepisse contra me... Porro Rainaldus uidens quod ad tantum onus sustentandum impos esset mane exiuit, et clementiam regis postulans munimentum reddidit. Protinus rex lapideam domum cum apparatu ciborum et omnibus quae intus erant incendio tradidit', Orderic, 12, 11, pp. 214-7.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid; Simeon (eng), pp. 196-7; Simeon (lat), 209, pp. 273-4.

<sup>215</sup> 'Achinneium cum ualida manu inuasit, totumque municipium combussit', Orderic, 13, 22, pp. 458-9.

<sup>216</sup> 'rex Henricus turrem Wateuille funditus fecit euerti', GND, 8, 22, pp. 236-7.

<sup>217</sup> 'obsedit et Bellum Montem penitus concremauit', Orderic, 13, 18, pp. 444-7.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid, pp. 43-4.

<sup>219</sup> Amt, pp. 55, 63.

Henry and were in loyal hands.<sup>220</sup> Essex, on the other hand, presented an ‘unknown’ problem for Henry and his 1153 complaint regarding Stephen’s reluctance to destroy his followers’ castles stemmed from this area; but again, after his coronation it appears he did not demolish many castles.<sup>221</sup> According to Amt, only Saffron Walden and Pleshey (Mandeville castles) and Mount Bures (a Sackville castle) appear to have been destroyed which ‘emphasized the distrust [in] which the king must have held him [de Mandeville in particular], for demolition was, apparently, an unusual punishment, despite the assertion of the chroniclers;’ the majority of baronial castles in this region survived.<sup>222</sup> Furthermore, in

...none of these three counties is there real evidence for the widespread demolition or confiscation of baronial castles under Henry II...But while a few castles suddenly disappeared (and the fate of many cannot be known) in these three regions in the first two years of the reign, far more of them survived and remain[ed] in baronial hands than one would expect from the general statements in the chronicles. Perhaps for Henry II, confiscation of castles was more difficult than he had expected, or perhaps he decided that it simply was not necessary -- or worth the trouble... As the kingdom fell into line under the new king and the royal government gathered the reins of power to its hands, castles were no longer the immediate threat they had been during the civil war.<sup>223</sup>

Garnett has argued that the ‘supposed agreement on the demolition of castles constructed after the death of Henry I was exploited by the chroniclers [like Howden and Torigni] to make a polemical point about Stephen’s status;’ thus it appears that Henry addressed this issue carefully, and by other means, upon gaining the throne.<sup>224</sup>

However, rebellious barons during his reign were treated differently. After besieging Limoges, ‘all the castles of his enemies in that neighbourhood [surrendered]; some of which he retained in his own hands, and some he levelled with the ground, not leaving one stone upon another’.<sup>225</sup> After the Great War, he ‘caused the castle and fortifications of Leicester to

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<sup>220</sup> This includes Berkeley, Cerney, Cirencester, Dursley, Dymock, Hailes, Miserden, St. Briavel’s, Slaughter, Sudley, Tutbury, and Winchcomb. Ibid, pp. 43-4.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid, p. 64, 78-9; King in Harper-Bill and Vincent, *Henry II*, p. 38.

<sup>222</sup> Amt, pp. 78-9.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid, pp. 79-81.

<sup>224</sup> Garnett, p. 284; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 324-5; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 282; Torigni, pp. 183, 238-9.

<sup>225</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 2, p. 28; ‘*et omnia inimicorum suorum castella in illis partibus; quorum quaedam in manu sua retinuit, et quaedam prostravit, non relinquens lapidem supra lapidem*’, Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp.

be destroyed' along with Groby, Thirsk, Malzeart, North Allerton, Framlingham, Bungay, and 'nearly all the castles of England and Normandy which had taken part against him in the time of the war'.<sup>226</sup> The destruction of such castles meant that Henry was intent on punishing rebels. Their destruction was so important that a few years later in 1176 at the Assizes of Northampton, Henry ordered that,

... justices are to take precaution that the castles already dismantled are quite dismantled, and that those which are to be dismantled are utterly razed to the ground. And, if they do not, our lord the king will desire to have the judgment of his court on them as condemners of his commands.<sup>227</sup>

These castles were to be destroyed, or their possessor would suffer the consequences.

The destruction of the castle denied possession and employment of its resourcefulness and was a common tactic of kings and lords; if there was no resource then there was no threat.<sup>228</sup> The value of this tactic is demonstrated by the difficulties that Stephen experienced: if he had destroyed some of the castles held against him as Henry I and, especially, Henry II had done, then they could not be reused against him. Wareham, Devizes, Malmesbury, and even Bedford were all retaken from Stephen and eventually ended up in Angevin hands; if they had been destroyed, they would have not posed a threat to his security. However, Stephen's problem of a contested succession meant that he needed

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<sup>226</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 418-9; '*fecit demoliri castellum et moenia Leicestriae, et castellum de Grobi, et castellum de Tresk, et castellum de Malesart, et castellum novum de Alvertun, et castellum de Fremigham, et castellum de Bungeie, et fere omnia castella Angliae et Normanniae, quae fuerunt contra eum tempore guerrae. Sed castellum de Pasci retinuit in manu sua et castellum de Muntsorel sicut suum proprium*', Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 101. In earlier passages, Howden records that Henry took these castles but there is no mention of their subsequent destruction (Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 383-4; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 64-5). He even points out that 'the city of Leicester was burned 'together with its churches and buildings, with the exception of the castle (*combusserunt villam de Leicestre totam cum ecclesiis et aedificiis, excepto castello*)', Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 377-8; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 57-8. In this same passage Geoffrey, bishop of Lincoln 'took the castle of Kinardeferie, and levelled it with the ground (*Gaufridus Lincolnienis eiectus, regis Henrici filius, cepit castellum de Kinardeferie et subvertit*)'.

<sup>227</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 410; '*justitiae provideant quod castella diruta prorsus diruantur, et diruenda bene prosternuntur. Et nisi hoc fecerunt, dominus rex iudicium curiae suae de eis habere voluerit sicut de contemptoribus pracepti sui*', Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 91. That this order was issued demonstrates that the castles were not destroyed in 1174. However, the effectiveness of this order is unclear since Leicester continued to exist after it as a royal castle. Additionally, as discussed above, Amt's research calls into question Henry's use of destruction and the likelihood of chronicler exaggeration.

<sup>228</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 216; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 179; Worcester, p. 253; Hexham (eng), pp. 68-89; Hexham (lat), p. 165; *Draco*, 2, 14, lines 781-8, pp. 688-9; Torigni, pp. 231-2, 238-40.

as many resources/castles as possible under his control; it was conceivable that he decided that despite their possible threat, these castles were too valuable to him to be destroyed. It was a gamble that did not always pay off.

### *Conventiones*

One final example of the multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle in term of power and lordship was the existence of baronial *conventiones*. These were, at their most basic, political treaties or ‘a written settlement of a dispute between two parties;’<sup>229</sup> in this case an agreement between two magnates in order to protect their power and lordship in the face of political and social upheaval. Maintaining the balance of power through castles was crucial to the peace of a region, kingdom, or honour as well as ensuring the ‘status and structure of the lord’s seat, and the integrity of the castellary’.<sup>230</sup> This was not just about military strength but political and social control. As we saw in the previous chapter, some sort of ‘tenurial relationship (however brief or tenuous) with the lord needing rights over them or exercising *de jure* or imposing *de facto* suzerainty by guarantee...up to complete takeover under rendability, kept them amenable to higher authority’ like the king.<sup>231</sup> While constructing castles, magnates needed to ‘abstain from provocative intrusion themselves’ and safeguard against the castle-building of ‘lesser barons’.<sup>232</sup> This meant creating areas where unauthorised castle-building ‘would be as much a breach of a non-aggression pact as overt armed invasion’.<sup>233</sup> During Stephen’s reign, a breakdown of this structure and the lack of royal enforcement created the atmosphere for a proliferation of ‘adulterine’ castles; the

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<sup>229</sup> Crouch in Garnett and Hudson, *Law and Governance*, pp. 300, 307.

<sup>230</sup> Coulson, ‘French Matrix’, pp. 65-6.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*

*conventiones* demonstrate a magnate attempt to restrain this in their territories and maintain order under their authority.<sup>234</sup>

Several magnates entered into these agreements throughout Stephen's reign: Earl Robert of Leicester had treaties with Simon of Senlis before 1141 and with Earl Roger of Hereford and Earl William of Gloucester between 1148-9; Earl Robert of Gloucester and Earl Miles of Hereford had one from around 1142.<sup>235</sup> This profusion of treaties between the great men of period led to a 'magnates' peace' between 1150-4.<sup>236</sup> The most documented *conventio* of this period was between Robert of Leicester and Ranulf of Chester dated between 1148 and Ranulf's death in 1153.<sup>237</sup> These magnates were in competition in north-west Leicestershire since the creation of the earldom of Leicester in 1107 and controlled most of the north and Midlands, making them powerful players in Anglo-Norman politics.<sup>238</sup> The Chester-Leicester *conventio* intended to preserve the power of both parties through castle control. The agreement centred on the cessation of castle fortification or construction in the Leicestershire marches and 'bilaterally agreed zones' by themselves, their men, or other parties. The acceptance and preservation of certain castles like Whitwick and Mountsorrel, or reduction of others like Ravenstone, was crucial to this peace.<sup>239</sup> Control

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<sup>234</sup> While this section will focus on the *conventio* of Stephen's reign, Coulson suggests that these provisions were preceded on the continent from an established French tradition. 'French Matrix', pp. 65-6.

<sup>235</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 84-5; Hudson, *Land, Law and Lordship*, p. 36; Patterson, pp. 95-6; Round, *Geoffrey de Mandeville*, pp. 379-83.

<sup>236</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, p. 82. King argued that there is no great difference between the end and the beginning of Stephen's reign in terms of magnates coming to agreement with each other and cites Robert of Gloucester and Miles of Gloucester as an example. 'Dispute Settlement in Anglo-Norman England', p. 119.

<sup>237</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 82, 85; *EHD*, pp. 1151-3.

<sup>238</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 82, 86-7.

<sup>239</sup> Coulson in Liddiard, p. 183. 'that Earl Rannulf has given and granted to Robert, earl of Leicester, the castle of Mountsorrel to hold to him and his heirs of him and his heirs, hereditarily...so that the earl of Leicester ought to receive Earl Rannulf and his following in the borough and baileys of Mountsorrel, as in his fee... if it shall be necessary for Earl Rannulf, the earl of Leicester will receive him personally in the demesne castle of Mountsorrel...In this agreement the castle of Whitwick remains to the earl of Leicester fortified with his other castles...And the earl of Leicester has promised Earl Rannulf that he will destroy the castle of Ravenstone unless Earl Rannulf shall allow that it may remain, and so that if anyone wishes to hold that castle against the earl of Leicester, Earl Rannulf will help him to destroy that castle without guile. Neither the earl of Chester nor the earl of Leicester ought to build any new castle between Hinckley and Coventry, nor between Hinckley and Hartshill, nor between Coventry and Donington, nor between Donington and Leicester, nor at Gotham nor at Kinoulton, nor nearer [to Leicester], nor between Kinoulton and Belvoir, nor between Belvoir and Oakham, nor between Oakham and Rockingham, nor nearer [to Leicester], except

over ‘lesser men’ was also crucial: William of Aunay was singled out for turning Ravenstone ‘into the lair of a robber-baron’, resulting in the destruction of this castle at the earl of Chester’s command.<sup>240</sup> This particular treaty also ‘seems to regard the king as little more than a troublesome irrelevance;’ the word ‘king’ never appeared in the document with ‘liege lord’ used instead implying ‘that the earls’ superior was liable to change: today’s king might be tomorrow’s enemy (and the alternative, Matilda, could never be a king)’.<sup>241</sup> But the *conventiones* did not ignore or countermand tenurial obligations; instead they limited them ‘in accordance with accepted and legitimate practices concerning conditional allegiance’ which enabled both to ‘avoid committing themselves to the ultimate objectives of either side in the succession dispute and (in their own minds) were on neither side and effectively neutral so far as the issue of the resolution of that dispute was concerned’.<sup>242</sup>

In another treaty, between Earls Robert of Gloucester and Miles of Hereford between 1141-3, Robert agreed to defend Miles’ ‘rights and his inheritances and his tenements and his acquisitions...and his customs and dues and his liberties’ including his possession of castles.<sup>243</sup> This agreement, and the Chester-Leicester *conventio*, enabled the power and lordship of one party to be acknowledged, respected, and protected by the other centring on

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with the common consent of both. And if anyone shall build a castle in the aforesaid places, or with in the aforesaid limits, each shall aid the other without any ill will until the castle shall be destroyed.’ *EHD*, pp. 1151-3.

<sup>240</sup> King, *King Stephen*, p. 260; Hudson, *Land, Law and Lordship*, pp. 48-9. ‘And if Earl Rannulf makes a claim upon William of Aunay, the earl of Leicester will have him to right in his court so long as William shall remain the earl of Leicester’s man and hold of him, so that if William or his men shall have withdrawn from the earl of Leicester’s fealty on account of the destruction of his castle or because he refuses to do right in the earl of Leicester’s court, neither William nor his men shall be received into the power of the earl of Chester to work ill against the earl of Leicester.’ *EHD*, pp. 1151-3

<sup>241</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 83-4; For example, ‘On the other hand, Earl Rannulf will keep faith with the earl of Leicester saving the faith of his liege lord, and if it shall be necessary for the earl of Chester to attack the earl of Leicester with his liege lord he may not bring with him more than twenty knights.’ *EHD*, pp. 1151-3

<sup>242</sup> Dalton, ‘*In Neutro Latere*’, p. 55.

<sup>243</sup> Hudson, *Land, Law and Lordship*, p. 36. ‘*Rob(ertus) comes Gloec(estrie) assecuravit Milone(m) comitem Herefordie fide et sacramento quod custodiet illi pro toto posse suo et sine ingenio suam vitam et suum membrum et terrenum suum honorem et auxiliabitur illi ad custodiendum sua castella et sua recta et sua hereditaria et sua tenementa et sua conquisita q(ue) modo habet et q(ue) faciet et suas consuetudines et rectitudines et suas libertates in bosco et in piano et aquis et quod sua hereditaria q(ue) modo non habet ei auxiliabitur ad conquirendum*’, Patterson, pp. 95-6.

castles.<sup>244</sup> Stephen's reign saw a proliferation of adulterine castles and these treaties reflected the 'consequences, intensified by civil war and by the abeyance of royal authority, of the (partial and often exaggerated) dependence on territorial control upon castles'.<sup>245</sup> As a multifunctional resource, the castle was 'the most eloquent symbol and potential guarantee of landed dominance', and these *conventiones* were intended to control possession of these important resources to ensure peace and stability in regions under the authority of these magnates.<sup>246</sup>

### **Influencing the 'Rules' of Warfare**

As demonstrated in chapter 1, the castle's resourcefulness in warfare was demonstrated by its influence on military technology; while this is a good example of the importance of the castle as a military resource, its impact on the developing 'rules' of warfare is more demonstrable across social, economic, and political issues. This thesis has demonstrated the importance of taking or retaining a castle to one's political, social, and economic stability and this meant that 'rules' were needed to protect the interests of both sides during a siege. These rules were not simply military considerations but extended into the social and political relations of the period.

According to Strickland, it is

...difficult for the eleventh and twelfth centuries to speak of a "law of arms" governing the nature of conduct between protagonists in the sense of an enunciated, written corpus resting on an amalgam of canon, civil and customary laws... Yet this is not to deny the existence of a powerful body of customs relating to behaviour in war.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> Coulson in Liddiard, p. 183.

<sup>245</sup> Coulson, 'French Matrix', p. 65.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

<sup>247</sup> Strickland, pp. 39-41.

William the Conqueror compensated the garrison of Dover in 1066 and protected the citizens of Exeter in 1068; did he do that because he understood a form of a *ius belli*, a law of war, ‘or were his actions simply dictated by a series of customs, a loose collection of gradually accumulated *mores* concerning correct conduct in war’?<sup>248</sup> In the twelfth century, rules of warfare were un-codified, but they were understood ‘in the everyday practices and customs’.<sup>249</sup> Strickland states that in this period, *lex* and *ius* (law) are less common when discussing warfare, but that *mos* (custom) appeared more frequently.<sup>250</sup> Thus, this section uses ‘rule’ loosely because it incorporates a meaning that may not always apply to twelfth-century warfare. Additionally, Strickland has already examined the existence of ‘rules’ for warfare; thus this section will be analysing their appearance in the narrative of twelfth-century chronicles in relation to castles. The ‘rules’ discussed primarily dealt with the garrison’s actions under siege and protection of the lord’s interests while enabling an honourable surrender, and were not solely concerned with military issues.

The first of these ‘rules’ required the garrison to hold their lord’s castle against his enemies until aid or orders arrived and affected not only the military value of the castle but the social relationship between lord and vassal. Bishop Fulbert of Chartres claimed in 1020, that ‘anyone who swore fidelity to his lord was obliged not to injure the lord, betray his secrets or fortresses, impede his justice or any business pertaining to the lord’s honour, or cause him to lose his possessions’.<sup>251</sup> Maintaining the lord’s possession of such a valuable resource as the castle was clearly a military, political, and social matter. The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that in 1136, the garrison of Exeter was ‘bound by fealty and an oath never to yield to the king at all’.<sup>252</sup> This type of oath ‘might sometimes be demanded by lords from their

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid, p. 31.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid, pp. 39-41.

<sup>251</sup> Reynolds, p. 20.

<sup>252</sup> ‘*et isti quidem fide et iureiurando, ne regi cederent omnino*’, *GS*, 1, 16, pp. 32-5. Robert Fitz Hubert’s garrison refused to ‘break their oath (*ne uiderentur periuri*)’ and surrender Devizes. Worcester, pp. 284-91.

garrisons' to ensure the lord's continued access to the resourcefulness of the castle.<sup>253</sup> This garrison's loyalty was crucial for the military tactics of Baldwin de Redvers' rebellion and was a central feature of their social and political relationship; they were expected to remain loyal to their lord regardless of the legality of his possession of this castle. The author records that Stephen's barons advised mercy since the garrison 'had not sworn allegiance to the king's majesty, and had taken up arms only in fealty to their lord;' they should not be punished for their loyalty since it was Baldwin who was at fault.<sup>254</sup> There are examples of lords releasing their garrisons from this oath giving them permission to surrender. During his rebellion against Henry I, Waleran of Meulan, 'sent trustworthy envoys to command Morin, the steward of his property, to surrender the castle of Beaumont without delay to the victorious monarch of the English people'.<sup>255</sup> Additionally, after Tinchebrai, Duke Robert's 'castellans too all over Normandy were released by the duke from their fealty and, by surrendering all their castles with his consent, were reconciled to the conqueror'.<sup>256</sup>

Due to the importance and value of the castle as a multifunctional resource, to surrender your lord's castle without his permission was a violation of the social, political, and military responsibilities of the garrison and had its own consequences. However, withstanding a siege was not an easy task and garrisons typically ran low on supplies and men weakening their resistance. Thus, the 'conditional respite', where garrisons would request from the besieger a determined period of time to seek assistance from their lord on the condition that the castle would be surrendered peacefully if it was not forthcoming,

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<sup>253</sup> Strickland, p. 214.

<sup>254</sup> 'Addebant et illos non in regiam maiestatem iurasse, nec nisi in fidelitatem domini sui arma mouisse', *GS*, 1, 20, pp. 42-3.

<sup>255</sup> 'Missis fidelibus legatis obnixe iussit Morino procuratori rerum suarum, ut sine mora sepe memoratum castellum triumphatori subigeret sceptrigero Angligenarum', Orderic, 12, 39, pp. 354-7.

<sup>256</sup> 'Alii quoque municipes per totam Normanniam a duce absoluti sunt. eoque annuente omnia tendentes municipia triumphatori reconciliati sunt', Orderic, 11, 20, pp. 92-3.

became an acknowledged rule and tactic.<sup>257</sup> Direct assaults could be costly and ineffective, while long-term sieges had financial, logistical, and sanitary issues; ‘it was often in the best interests of the attackers, therefore, to minimise the length of the siege’.<sup>258</sup> Thus, a conditional respite could ‘facilitate the capture of castles’.<sup>259</sup> According to Strickland, ‘the relative paucity of effective reliefs is largely explained by the fact that in many situations the besieging forces clearly granted conditional respite only because they adjudged it impossible for a garrison to be relieved’.<sup>260</sup> One example of this is Robert of Gloucester’s siege of Wareham: the royal garrison,

...asked for a truce that, as is customary with those people, they might beg aid from the king; they would surrender the castle on a fixed day supposing he refused to come. This proposal was most agreeable to the earl, though he was filled with an impatient longing to possess the castle... what must we think of his resolution, seeing that, as yet supported by no aid from England, he fearlessly awaited with only a few more than three hundred knights the arrival of the king.<sup>261</sup>

The risk that a relieving force could aid the garrison was typically minimal because if such a force was close enough to help the castle quickly, then respite was usually not necessary or attempted.

The garrison even benefitted from this ‘rule’. If a castle surrendered after a respite, the garrison was conventionally allowed to leave peacefully.<sup>262</sup> Furthermore, surrender attributable to a lack of requested aid was perceived to be an honourable course of action

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<sup>257</sup> Strickland, pp. 208-12. For example, Huntingdon, 10, 32, pp. 758-61; *GS*, 2, 119, pp. 234-7; Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9, and 12, 20, pp. 250-1; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2, 385-8; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51, 67-9.

<sup>258</sup> Strickland, pp. 209-10.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>261</sup> ‘*petiuerunt indutias ut, sicut moris est illorum hominum, efflagitarent a rege suppetias; die dicta, si forte uenire negaret, castellum reddituri. Id, spe regem ab obsidione sororis abducendi, acceptissimum comiti fuit, quamuis impatienti desiderio castelli habendi teneretur; qua putamus animi confidentia...cum trecentis et paulo plus militibus...*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 3, 77, pp. 128-31.

<sup>262</sup> Generosity varied; revolting garrison were potentially treated more harshly, and if they were not set free then ‘immunity from execution or mutilation’ might be expected. Additionally, ransom might be sought and their relinquishment of horses and military equipment would be used as booty for the victors. Strickland, pp. 218-9; Keen, *Laws of War*, p. 128.

even though it still resulted in the loss of the castle. If the lord was unable to up-hold his side of the social, political, and military relationship because of his inability or willingness to send aid, the garrison was not blamed for their acquiescence; they fulfilled their duty and now are cleared of any guilt. When Henry I

...grew angry at the surrender [of Alençon, the garrison] blushed with shame, but defended their failure on the reasonable grounds that though they had waited long and had repeatedly sent urgent messages he had delayed too long in bringing the help they needed.<sup>263</sup>

It was not their fault he lost this valuable castle. When Robert of Bellême heard that his garrison at Arundel had ‘humbly petitioned the king for a truce so that they might apply to their lord either for reinforcements or for permission to surrender’, he knew he could not relieve them.<sup>264</sup> Orderic recorded that,

His heart sank when he heard of the collapse of his men; he absolved them from their allegiance since he was powerless to help them, and in bitter grief authorized them to make peace with the king. When the envoys returned the castellans thankfully surrendered the castle to the king, who received them kindly and loaded them with gifts.<sup>265</sup>

Here we see the acceptance of a respite, the granting of permission and absolution for surrender, and the peaceful acceptance of that surrender, all according to the ‘rules’. It appears that a common tactic of besiegers was to threaten to hang garrisons if they failed to surrender by a certain deadline; after which, if the castle fell by storm, they would not be protected by any ‘rules’ and, these examples, the besieger predetermines their fate.<sup>266</sup> When Henry I was besieging Robert de Bellême’s castle at Shrewsbury, he used William Pantulf to

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<sup>263</sup> *‘defectum tamen suum rationabiliter excusauerunt dum crebro per nuncios quaesitus diuque expectatus cum necessariis uiribus auxiliator nimis tardasset’*, Orderic, 12, 4, pp. 194-7.

<sup>264</sup> *‘ut a domino suo exigent uel auxilium defensionis uel permissum reconciliationis’*, Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9.

<sup>265</sup> *‘Audiens itaque defectionem suorum ingemuit, eosque a promissa fide quia impos erat adiutorii absoluti, multumque merens licentiam concordandi cum rege concessit. Redeuntibus legatis leti muniones castrum regi reddiderunt, et benigniter ab eo suscepti multis muneribus honorati sunt’*, Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> Further examples include: *GS*, 1, 35 and 52, pp. 78-9, 108-9, and 2, 82 and 91 and 95-7, pp. 162-3, 174-7, 186-91; Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 39, pp. 74-6; Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 235-6; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 196-7; Worcester, pp. 244-9, 284-91.

inform the garrison that ‘he would have all whom he could capture put to death by hanging.’<sup>267</sup> This appears to have persuaded the garrison who ‘with the king’s consent, they sent an envoy to their lord Robert, to inform him that it was impossible for them to put up further resistance to the might of the unconquered king’, and they would have to surrender.<sup>268</sup> Henry, having received the surrender allowed them to leave unharmed. Roger of Bampton was captured and hung by Stephen in front of his garrison who were threatened with the same fate if they did not surrender.<sup>269</sup> In 1138, Stephen carried out this threat and hung the garrison of Shrewsbury and the commander Arnulf of Hesdin after capturing the castle because he had ‘proudly rejected repeated offers of peace made by the king, and besides this presumed to speak contemptuously of the king and stubbornly forced others who wished to surrender to persist in their rebellion.’<sup>270</sup> Orderic further records that the king,

...because unruly men regarded his gentleness with contempt and many great lords scorned to come to his court when summoned, commanded in his anger that Arnulf and about ninety-three of the men who had defied him should be hanged on gibbets or put to death in some other fashion without delay. Arnulf, penitent too late, and many others begged the king to spare their lives and promised great sums of money for their redemption; but the king preferred revenge for the crimes they had committed to any weight of gold, and they were executed immediately.<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> *‘Très quoque precipuos municipes mandauit, et coram cunctis iurauit, quod nisi oppidum in triduo sibi redderent’*, Orderic, 11, 3, pp. 20-9.

<sup>268</sup> *‘Denique permissu regis domino suo legatum Rodberto destinauerunt, per quem se non posse ulterius tolerare uiolentiam inuicti principis mandauerunt.’* Ibid.

<sup>269</sup> GS, 1, 14, pp. 28-31.

<sup>270</sup> *‘multoties a rege oblatam pacem superbe respuit, insuper et iniuriosa regi uerba iaculari presumpsit, et alios qui sese dedere uolebant in rebellione pertinaciter perstare coegit’*, Orderic, 13, 37, pp. 520-3.

<sup>271</sup> *‘Rex autem quia pro mansuetudine sua contemptibilis contumacibus uidebatur, ideoque multi nobelium ad curiam eius asciti uenire dedignabantur, iratus Arnulfum aliosque fere xciii de his qui ei obstiterant iussit patibulo suspendi, aliisque generibus mortis festinanter puniri. Arnulfus quipped sero poenitens aliique plures regi pro se supplicauerunt, multamque pecuniam pro redemption sui promiserunt sed rege ultionem scelerum multis auri ponderibus preponente protinus trucidati sunt.’* Ibid.

This garrison did not ask for a respite and was taken by storm and therefore does not fall under the ‘rule’ granting safety to surrendering garrisons. This punishment encouraged Arnulf’s allies at other castles to surrender quickly to avoid such a fate.<sup>272</sup>

There are several examples of these ‘rules’ in the chronicles. The castle at Le Mans belonged to William Rufus, but on his death in 1100, it was unclear if it transferred to Duke Robert of Normandy or King Henry I of England. When Helias of La Flèche besieged Le Mans, the castellans Walter and Aymer informed him that they were prepared to withstand a siege, but they said, ‘we do not know for whom we are fighting to hold this tower’.<sup>273</sup> The castellans were willing to retain this resource for their lord, but did not know who that was. They requested and were granted a respite, which Helias allowed because he understood the castellans’ responsibility to determine who possessed the castle and what their orders were regarding it. Depending on the response, Helias could face a strongly resisted siege or gain the castle without expending any effort and was willing to take the risk. His assessment paid off: when the messenger returned from Robert and Henry, the castellans were told by both to surrender the castle. Having been given permission to surrender they offered the castle to Helias having ‘magnificently vindicated their loyalty’.<sup>274</sup>

In 1173, King William of Scotland invaded northern England; the northern barons stood strong and held their castles ‘preferring honourable death to suffering shame’.<sup>275</sup> They understood their social, political, and military responsibility to retain their castle and held out against William; by following this ‘rule’, they protected Henry II’s castles, his power and lordship in the area, and retained these valuable resources during this Great War. After granting respites to Wark, Alnwick, and Newcastle, William marched to Carlisle and

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<sup>272</sup> Event also discussed by Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 231; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 193; Huntingdon, 10, 7, pp. 712-3.

<sup>273</sup> ‘*presertim cum ignoremus cui militantes hanc turrin seruemus*’, Orderic, 10, 18, pp. 302-7.

<sup>274</sup> ‘*laudabili iam fide probati*’, Orderic, 5, 10, 18, pp. 302-7.

<sup>275</sup> ‘*Mielz vuelent murir à honur que suffrir huntage*’, Fantosme, line 578, p. 250.

demanded surrender. The castellan, Robert de Vaus, responded with a clear statement of his loyalty:

I hold the castle and the tower of Carlisle/ By force against him, as against one who is making war; / And if my lord the king be displeased with me for it, / Let him send me his messenger, but no traitor/ Who may say on his behalf: 'Surrender this fief... [otherwise] The castle of my lord, I will not surrender it to him.'<sup>276</sup>

Robert had the same determination as the other northern barons and upheld his military and feudal responsibility; but Robert knew his strength and he requested, and received, a respite to determine Henry's wishes. William conceivably granted these respites as 'chivalric gestures' but also because he believed that there was no hope of relief for these castles with Henry dealing with incursions of the Young King and the king of France in Normandy.<sup>277</sup>

Fantosme also narrated Henry's views in his response to the actions of his castellans. The king questioned the messenger if Robert de Vaus was 'guilty of treason?'<sup>278</sup> This connection between treason and the surrendering a castle was common since it was a matter of loyalty. The messenger described Robert as holding the castle 'nobly like a noble baron', upholding his social and military responsibilities for which he deserved honour and respect.<sup>279</sup> This appeal for help was taken very seriously by Henry and the messenger returned to Roger with news that 'He will have the succour of the good king his lord/ As a loyal knight who has kept his honour'.<sup>280</sup> Henry understood that if he did not send help, he would lose his resources to defend the rest of the country. When William returned to demand the castle, Robert asked once more for time saying that 'If assistance does not come

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<sup>276</sup> "'De fieus ne heritez, ne frai à nul jor; / Mès voist au rei Henri, si face sa clamur/ Que jo tieng de Carduil le chastel e la tur/ Par force cuntre lui cume vers guerreieur; / E si mi sire li reis en ait vers mei irrir,/ Enveit-mei sun message, mès nul traïtur,/ Ki me die de sue part: 'Rendez sus cest honour.../ Le chastel mun seignur ne li serrai rendant.'" Fantosme, lines 1420-37, pp. 320-3.

<sup>277</sup> Strickland, pp. 209-11, 221.

<sup>278</sup> 'faite traïsun', Fantosme, line 1573, p. 334.

<sup>279</sup> 'noblement cume gentil barun', Fantosme, line 1574, p. 334.

<sup>280</sup> 'Il aurad le succurs del bon rei sun seignur/ Cume leal chevalier ki ad tenu s'onur', Fantosme, lines 1636-7, pp. 340-3.

from the king my lord, / I will surrender to you the castle, you shall be commander'.<sup>281</sup>

Robert already knew that aid was coming, so he dutifully stalled for more time but prepared to surrender should the aid not arrive. From his attitude, it appears that Robert had no qualms about surrendering at this point; he had been successful in holding his lord's castle, he had appealed for aid, but if this never came, then he had done his duty and could surrender with no regrets.

Despite granting several respites, which possibly stalled his military efforts, William did succeed in gaining some castles including Brough-under-Stanemore.<sup>282</sup> Fantosme's description of this castle's capitulation verified that surrender was an acceptable course of action for a garrison after requesting respite: 'That is a right act which they now do./ To the king they have surrendered, great sorrow have they in their hearts'.<sup>283</sup> These men had no other choice and the author presented it as the honourable course of action. Nevertheless, the garrison regretted their surrender and felt no relief; they were still responsible for losing their lord's castle to his enemy and this was clearly important to them. They understood that by surrendering, they gave the enemy another resource with which to attack their lord; they had failed in their responsibilities regardless of how acceptable the chronicler, or society,

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<sup>281</sup> 'Si succurs ne me vient del rei mun seignur, / Rendrai-vus le chastel, si serraz cumandur', Fantosme, lines 1644-6, p. 340; 'But when the fearful citizens guaranteed to surrender their city to him by a fixed day if adequate protection were not in the meantime dispatched to them by the king of England (*Sed cautione a trepidis civibus praestita, quod ad diem certum civitatem illi traderent, nisi interim a rege Anglorum sufficiens sibi praesidium mitteretur*)', Newburgh, 2, 32, pp. 132-5; Newburgh (Rolls), 2, 32, pp. 181-3; 'Here he continued the siege, until Robert de [Vaus], in consequence of provisions failing him and the other persons there, made a treaty with him on the following terms, namely, that, at the feast of Saint Michael next ensuing, he would surrender to him the castle and town of Carlisle, unless, in the meantime, he should obtain succour from his master the king of England', Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 379-80; 'Et tam diu ibi moram fecit, donec Robertus de Vals, victu sibi et caeteris inclusis deficiente, cum eo pacem fecit in hunc modum; quod ad festum Sancti Michaelis proximo sequens, redderet ei castellum et villam Carleoli, nisi interim haberet succursum a domino suo rege Angliae', Howden (lat), vol. 2, p. 60.

<sup>282</sup> Strickland, pp. 219-20.

<sup>283</sup> 'Ne poënt plus souffrir: au rei rendu se sunt. / Co est faite fesance iço qu'il ore funt. Au rei se sunt renduz, granz dolurs ès cuers unt', Fantosme, lines 1496-8, p. 328. There are other examples of garrisons surrendering when there is no hope of relief. The garrison of Alençon 'seeing that their food was failing and that no help came from any quarter, made peace and, surrendering the tower, came out unharmed with all their men. (*Illi uero qui claudebantur in arce uidentes sibi cibaria deesse, nullumque auxilium ex aliqua parte prouenire pacem fecerunt, turrimque reddentes cum omnibus suis salui exierunt.*)' Orderic, 12, 8, pp. 206-9.

considered it to be. What we see in these two events is the implication, perception, and demonstration of this rule of the garrison's loyalty under siege. They held out against their lord's enemy and appealed for his aid; in doing so they are praised, specifically by the chronicler, for their loyalty, regardless of the differing outcomes.

But not all garrisons adhered to this rule. There was a clear distinction between a garrison who appealed for aid before surrendering, like Brough-under-Stanmore, and a garrison who did the opposite. During the siege of Exeter in 1136, Baldwin de Redvers' garrison at Plympton,

...despairing of their lord on account of the invincible army which they had heard was with the king, and fearing more than they should have, being utter cowards and irresolute, to run danger to their lives, sent secretly to the king about the surrendering of the castle and coming to a peaceful agreement.<sup>284</sup>

There are several aspects to this surrender which endorse the author's use of 'cowards'. While it was not uncommon for a castle to surrender based on the size of an approaching army, this situation was very different. The royal army never approached this castle, never initiated a siege; the garrison heard of the force at Exeter, doubted their lord's support, and capitulated. The garrison never appealed to Baldwin for help, never asked for his advice; they simply sent to the king and surrendered 'on the pretext that they were too weak to stand a siege'.<sup>285</sup> They failed to protect their lord's castle and handed it over without a fight; they weakened Baldwin's position by losing such a resource during his rebellion. It could be argued that since they were facing the king, they should surrender; however, Plympton's garrison never encountered Stephen and he never ordered their surrender so they could not refuse a royal command.<sup>286</sup> The garrison is described as 'cowards and irresolute' and were

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<sup>284</sup> *'propter insuperabilem, quam adesse cum rege audierant, uirtutem, de domino suo desperantes, et ne uitae suae periculum incurrerent, ut inertissimi et inconstantis animi, plus iusto formidantes, de reddendo castello pacisque concordia inter eos statuenda regi occulte miserunt'*, *GS*, 1, 17, pp. 34-9.

<sup>285</sup> *'quasi pro impotentia obsidioni resistere non ualentibus'*, *Ibid.*

<sup>286</sup> Strickland, p. 229.

criticised even by the royalist author of the *Gesta Stephani* who was appalled at their actions; this was, as Speight observed, ‘breaking the rules of correct behaviour’.<sup>287</sup> It could be argued that this was an example of failed lordship, that Baldwin did not prepare this castle well-enough to withstand a royal siege or act as a strong resource for his rebellion. The garrison’s despair could also reflect their knowledge that their lord was unable, or unwilling, to send aid and they would have to resist on their own without his support. However, if any of these were the case, why was their resistance still perceived as inadequate by the author of the *Gesta Stephani*?

One example which might answer this question come from Richard of Hexham who wrote of nine knights who held Norham during Stephen’s reign:

...despairing also of aid from their lord Geoffrey, bishop of Durham, and being besides inexperienced in such struggles, they in dismay surrendered to the king, while as yet the wall was in good condition, the tower very strong, and their provisions abundant. The soldiers, consequently, and those who were in the town, incurred great obloquy, because they had made a feeble resistance, and had too readily given up the castle; and not only were they censured, but their lord also, because he had not garrisoned his fortress according to his means, and as the necessities of the period required.<sup>288</sup>

In this passage, we see that the fortifications were adequate but that the lord, Bishop Geoffrey, had not garrisoned or supplied the castle well-enough (a failure on his part), but also that the garrison had not resisted sufficiently and were castigated. Thus, for Plympton, Baldwin could be blamed for poorly preparing the castle; however, the case at Norham

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<sup>287</sup> Speight, ‘Castle Warfare’, pp. 269-70; Surrendering without permission was ‘a fundamental violation of the feudal bond, and in the *customals* of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was explicitly cited as treason [in the thirteenth century]...the surrender of a lord’s castle without adequate reason might also be viewed and punished as treason within the Anglo-Norman realm’. Strickland, pp. 225-6.

<sup>288</sup> Hexham (eng), p. 64; ‘*tum quia a domino suo Gaufrido Dunelmensi episcopo nullum auxilium sperabant, tum quia in talibus conflictibus parum exercitati erant, attoniti deditioem regi fecerunt, cum et vallum optimum esset, et turris fortissima, et eis victualia habundarent. Igitur milites et alii qui erant in oppido magnum vituperium incurrerunt, quia castrum male custodientes nimis cito defecerunt: nec solum illi sed et dominus illorum, quia non pro sua opportunitate et temporis necessitate castrum suum munierat*’, Hexham (lat), pp. 157-8.

demonstrates that the garrison was still required to defend the castle and resist for as long as possible, which Plympton did not.

From these events, we can see these ‘rules’ in action and being followed almost as a matter of course. The castellans of Le Mans needed to know for whom they were holding the castle and what was required of them before engaging in a siege and the northern castellans held out against William while repeatedly appealing for aid, giving Henry plenty of time to send it. However, it is when the rules are not followed, or are not even considered, that their place and importance is clear. Plympton’s garrison’s actions damaged Baldwin’s efforts and broke their faith with their lord, a violation that the author of the *Gesta Stephani* despised and, according to Fantosme, Henry II feared. The castle’s importance meant that if the lord could send help, he would. This is demonstrated by Robert of Bellême and Arundel but also the siege and battle of Verneuil in 1119. The king of France besieged this castle and its town and the citizens appealed for a respite of three days.<sup>289</sup> When news reached Henry I, he collected an army and ‘for the purpose of engaging with the king of France...drew up his troops in order of battle’.<sup>290</sup> This castle was of such value to the king that he was prepared to do battle in order to relieve the garrison. The development and value of these rules, and their implications for the garrison and resulting possession of the castle, demonstrates its importance and the consequences of its role as a social, political, and military resource.

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<sup>289</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 370-2; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 49-51.

<sup>290</sup> ‘et in crastino praeliaturus cum rege Franciae...disposuit acies suas ad bellum’, Ibid.

## Chapter 4: Independent Elements in Simultaneous Usage:

### Three Case Studies

The previous three chapters have analysed each element of the argued definition and contemporary perception of the castle (fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource) in isolation to critically examine the specific aspects of each. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that these elements were understood as acting both independently and simultaneously in the chroniclers' comprehension. In order to do this, three case studies from Stephen's reign will be presented chronologically starting with the rebellion of Baldwin de Redvers at Exeter in 1136, then Miles de Beauchamp at Bedford in 1138, and finally the arrest and confiscation of the castles of Bishops Roger of Salisbury, Nigel of Ely, and Alexander of Lincoln in June 1139. The consequences of each critically affected Stephen's reign: after their confrontations with the king, both Baldwin and Miles became loyal supporters of Matilda, and Stephen's treatment of the bishops damaged his relationship with the Anglo-Norman Church's most powerful members. With the exception of the arrest of the bishops, which greatly concerned all the chroniclers of the age, many of whom were closely connected with those involved, these events were primarily recorded in detail by the *Gesta Stephani*. While this author had a royal bias, his narrative, in conjunction with the other contemporary reports, provides us with a detailed contextual narrative in which to examine the three elements in the contemporary perception of the castle.

#### **Baldwin de Redvers**

During Rogation 1136, Stephen ordered Baldwin de Redvers to render Exeter castle after the citizens appealed that he was violently asserting his authority on the surrounding

area circumventing the king's. Baldwin refused and Stephen sent a preliminary force to blockade the castle until he arrived. The siege dragged on for months reportedly costing Stephen a large amount of money and ended only when the castle wells dried up and forced the garrison's surrender.<sup>1</sup> Stephen's chronic inability to impose readability and his lack of resolve to punish rebels was exposed first by Baldwin; Stephen pardoned him and the baron fled to his castle on the Isle of Wight (Carisbrooke) planning to use it to continue his rebellion.<sup>2</sup> The king quickly, and unexpectedly, followed and Baldwin again surrendered despite having fortified this castle to withstand another protracted siege.<sup>3</sup> While this issue should have ended with Baldwin's expulsion from England, he immediately joined Matilda who gave him possession of more castles enabling him to continue his struggle against Stephen in Normandy and creating a new relationship with the Angevin party.<sup>4</sup> Baldwin later returned to England and took Wareham as part of Angevin plans to distract Stephen from Matilda's landing in 1139.<sup>5</sup> In 1141, Baldwin was made earl of Devon by the empress; he died on 4 June, 1155.<sup>6</sup>

Most chronicles mention these events as one rebellion amongst many during the first years of Stephen's reign and provide no additional detail. The shortest narrative comes from William of Newburgh who simply said: 'Baldwin de Redvers, who had begun a rebellion against Stephen, was overcome and driven into exile'.<sup>7</sup> The other chronicles scarcely provide more detail recording only that Baldwin held Exeter against the king and that a siege

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<sup>1</sup> 'fifteen thousand marks (*usque ad xv. milia marcas*)', *GS*, 1, 18, pp. 38-9; 'used up much of his treasure (*multum thesauri sui absumpsit*)', Huntingdon, 10, 4, pp. 706-9.

<sup>2</sup> Newburgh, 1, 5, pp. 54-5; *ASC*, E, p. 198; Torigni, p. 129; Howden, p. 229.

<sup>3</sup> *GS*, 1, 21, pp. 44-5.

<sup>4</sup> *GS*, 1, 22, pp. 46-7.

<sup>5</sup> *GS*, 1, 39, pp. 84-5; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 45-6.

<sup>6</sup> 'Baldwin de Reviars', *CP*, vol. 2, pp. 311-2; ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1163>, accessed June 9, 2014; Garnett, pp. 196-9.

<sup>7</sup> '*Baldewino de Redveriis, qui contra eum rebellare coeperat, expugnato atque in exilium acto*', Newburgh, 1, 5, pp. 54-5.

was undertaken.<sup>8</sup> The method of Exeter's capture is consistent throughout the chronicles save one; they concur that Stephen's attempts to take the castle by force were unsuccessful, surrender was eventually agreed, and the castle was handed over to the king. However, Richard of Hexham wrote that 'and after a lengthened siege [Stephen] took the town by storm'.<sup>9</sup> As we saw previously, taking a castle by storm was very different from negotiating surrender. Some even recorded that Stephen abandoned the siege after three months, leaving troops behind to continue the blockade.<sup>10</sup> Richard of Hexham was either mistaken or misinformed, but his account of the siege does not match the other evidence; the consensus was that Exeter surrendered after a lengthy and protracted siege. While many of these chronicles provide little detail of the event, what is clear is Baldwin's use of the castle as a multifunctional resource to retain personal possession and increase his power and lordship; Stephen responded with force to maintain control of this resource and retain his authority.

Aside from Exeter, which the Redvers family had held as hereditary castellans since the Conquest, there are two other castles involved in this event, Plympton and the castle on the Isle of Wight, which is never named but can be identified as Carisbrooke, constructed by the de Redvers family in 1100 when they were given the island by Henry I.<sup>11</sup> The castle's role as a social resource and affecting identity and status is illustrated by the description of Baldwin himself as a 'man of eminent rank and birth';<sup>12</sup> he held 'three distinct honours, of Plympton in Devon, Christchurch in Hampshire, and the Isle of Wight, which were granted by Henry I, he was the greatest landowner in the south-west'.<sup>13</sup> Baldwin's lands were

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<sup>8</sup> Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7; Worcester, pp. 216-9, 234-7; Newburgh, 1, 5, pp. 54-5; ASC, E, p. 198.

<sup>9</sup> Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; '*post diutinam obsidionem oppidum per vim cepit*', Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7.

<sup>10</sup> GS, 1, 15-20, pp. 30-43.

<sup>11</sup> 'Baldwin de Reviers', CP, vol. 2, pp. 311-2; ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1163>, accessed June 9, 2014. Huntingdon does not even mention a castle stating that 'king then advanced to Isle of Wight and took it away from Baldwin de Redvers (*Inde igitur rex perrexit in insulam Vectam et abstulit eam Baldewino de Reduers*)', 10, 4, p. 706-9.

<sup>12</sup> '*uirum et dignitate et genere magnificum*', GS, 1, 15, pp. 30-3.

<sup>13</sup> King, *King Stephen*, p. 65.

plentiful with the area around Plympton described of as ‘extensive and pleasant and rich in all good things’ and, after taking this castle, Stephen was able to seize ‘many thousands of sheep and cattle’.<sup>14</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that almost all of the Isle of Wight had gone to Baldwin ‘by inheritance (*patrimonio*)’ and called it ‘his land (*terram suam*)’.<sup>15</sup> With these three resources, Baldwin and his family were amongst the elite of England and he would have been anxious to ensure this continued under Stephen.

However, Richard of Hexham recorded that Baldwin fortified Exeter against Stephen because he was ‘disappointed at not obtaining a barony which the king had promised him’,<sup>16</sup> possibly the continued castellanship of Exeter.<sup>17</sup> Hexham is the only chronicler to provide this detail, but if true, Stephen’s patronage would have strengthened their relationship; refusing to grant what had been a hereditary position cast doubt on his lordship. King also argues that Baldwin possibly knew of the grants made to Miles of Gloucester regarding the offices of castellan and sheriff of Gloucester. To force the issue, Baldwin held Exeter against Stephen and attempted to gain direct personal benefit from this royal resource. Baldwin’s actions constituted rebellion, but it could be argued that he was driven to it by Stephen’s inability or unwillingness to uphold his promises. Regardless, Stephen had every right to confront a baron who resisted royal authority, threatened his peace, and refused to render his castles when ordered.<sup>18</sup>

It is important to note that Exeter was never referred to as belonging to Baldwin by any chronicler. They were very clear that Exeter was a royal castle and that Baldwin’s

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<sup>14</sup> ‘*partibus ampla est et delectabilis omnibusque affluens bonis...multis gregum et armentorum milibus*’, *GS*, 1, 17, pp. 34-9.

<sup>15</sup> *GS*, 1, 21, pp. 44-5.

<sup>16</sup> Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; ‘*quia non potuit quendam honorem habere, quem a rege postulaverat*’, Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7.

<sup>17</sup> King, *King Stephen*, p. 65. Baldwin’s ancestor, Baldwin de Meules had been given possession of Exeter by the Conqueror. Pounds, *Medieval Castle*, p. 27. Baldwin ‘delayed in paying homage to Stephen, so the new king had refused to confirm his holdings. Consequently, Baldwin raised the flag of revolt’. Kealey, p. 163.

<sup>18</sup> Garnett argues that Baldwin never did homage to Stephen and thus uniquely ‘ensuring that for him and his men there was no king...chose artificially to prolong the interregnum’. p. 201.

actions were rebellious. For example, Stephen ‘for some time besieged the castle of Exeter which Baldwin de Redvers was defending against royal authority (*longi temporis spatio Exancestreense castellum obsessurus quod Baldwinus de Reduers cognomine contra regiam maiestatem munierat*);<sup>19</sup> Additionally, the *Gesta Stephani* referred to Exeter as ‘a royal possession...the king had a reasonable claim to the custody of the castle of Exeter, which had always been a royal possession...what was his by right (*quod ex regio sibi usurparat honore...quod regalis semper extiterat iuris, rex sibi custodiam rationabiliter requirebat...quod sui erat iuris and sui erat proprii iuris*)’.<sup>20</sup> Only Hexham refers to Exeter as Baldwin’s: ‘Baldwin de Redvers...fortified against him his town of Exeter (*Baldewinus de Redwers...quem a rege postulaverat, Excestram oppidum suum contra illum firmavit*)’.<sup>21</sup> Plympton, on the other hand, was denoted as belonging to Baldwin and was recorded as his castle (*‘quibus obseruandi castelli sui de Plintona curam indulserat’*) as was Carisbrooke.<sup>22</sup> Possession of Exeter was clearly understood as royal and Plympton and Carisbrooke were Baldwin’s. Whether Exeter was perceived as a royal castle or a baronial one, by those involved in the situation or by the chroniclers, would not have theoretically mattered; we have seen that renderability applied to all castles and Baldwin’s refusal to render Exeter gave Stephen no other option but to reclaim it by force.<sup>23</sup>

Painter argued that ‘the ambition of the castellans...was, of course, to acquire full lordship over their strongholds’, and this is what Baldwin was trying to do.<sup>24</sup> However, in

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<sup>19</sup> Worcester, pp. 218-9.

<sup>20</sup> *GS*, 1, 15-6 and 20, pp. 30-5, 42-3.

<sup>21</sup> Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7. Hexham’s account differs from his contemporaries in other ways casting doubt on his reliability.

<sup>22</sup> *GS*, 1, 17 and 21, pp. 34-9, 44-5.

<sup>23</sup> Bartlett, p. 279; Coulson, ‘Peaceable Power’, pp. 75-76; Stenton, p. 206; King, *Castle in England and Wales*, p. 20.

<sup>24</sup> Painter, pp. 38-9; Stenton has argued that ‘situations like this must have arisen in other towns when the keepers of their castles declared against the king, but they are nowhere else described so clearly. No other writer shows the rebellious custodian of a royal castle in the act of making himself master of the city which lies beneath it. Above all, no other writer of the time brings out so plainly the repugnance of the king’s burgesses to a baronial lord’. pp. 239-40. Barons wanted to hold their land freely ‘so that they could

his attempt to use the castle to assert his lordship over the king's, he violated their patronal relationship. According to the *Gesta Stephani*, Baldwin was of the proper rank to act as a castellan of a royal castle but in 'asking not only the dwellers in the city but also all villagers round about to bow to his lordship alone', he was 'acting in an unusual way and, as was in fact the case, contrary to the king's peace'.<sup>25</sup> At Baldwin's other castles, he would expect his lordship to be recognised since he was their lord; however, at Exeter, his role was as a castellan not a baron. As castellan he had possession and influence in the area but it was not solely to his benefit; he was the king's man and, therefore, had to ensure that the castle remained a resource for the king. Baldwin's attempt to take sole control of this resource was what angered Stephen and what the *Gesta Stephani* deemed 'unusual'.

To contextualise this perception, Roger of Bampton's rebellion in 1135/6 was not perceived in the same manner. Roger was described as knight 'not of the lowest birth or of small landed estate', who in 'a spirit of rebellion, gathered knights and archers in his castle' and after having 'paid homage to King Stephen... [and] should most have refrained from disorder and disturbance, he showed himself more cruel and more aggressive than all'.<sup>26</sup> This passage focuses on the inappropriateness of the level violence, but his possession of the castle and exertion of his lordship are not seen as 'unusual'. Though both Baldwin's and Roger's rebellions were violent, Roger's use of the castle as a military, political, and social resource to enhance his power and lordship was not perceived as improper. The distinction is rooted in the way each man possessed the castles: Roger held his castle in-fief while Baldwin was the castellan. Roger held his own castle and from it, attempted to claim others

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become lords of a particular place, have an ancestral castle or seat'. R.H.C. Davis, 'What Really Happened in Stephen's Reign 1135-54', *History* 49:165 (1994), pp. 11-2.

<sup>25</sup> '*nec solum in urbe commanentes, sed et conuicaneos omnes, ut ad sui solius dominium inflecterentur rogare... insolita quaedam et, ut res se habebat, aduersus regiam pacem agere*', *GS*, 1, 15, pp. 30-3.

<sup>26</sup> '*miles reuera nec sanguinis infimi, nec honoris terrarum exigui... discordiae commutans discidium, militibus et sagittariis secum in castello agglutinatis, affines omnes igne et depraedatione uehementer uexabat: hominioque tandem regi Stephano exhibito, cum discordiae maxime et inquietudinis deberet immunis existere, crudelior cunctis et infestior apparebat*', *GS*, 1, 14, pp. 28-31.

in the area, Baldwin seized Exeter as his own and used it to exert his lordship. Roger's punishment was the confiscation of his castles which the *Gesta Stephani* described as just because who 'had laid hands on what was not his should by a just decision of equity lose what was his own'.<sup>27</sup> Practically, castles held in-fief were the resources of their possessor, but castles held by castellans served their lord and not the castellans; any attempt to alter the status quo was cause for concern, even military action.

After losing Exeter, Baldwin 'did not despair, nor was he broken in spirit' knowing he had other castles, other resources, with which to continue his fight.<sup>28</sup> However, Stephen took Plympton, forced his surrender at Carisbrooke, stripped him of his remaining possessions, and exiled him. Without resources in England, Baldwin sailed to Normandy where he,

...complained bitterly to his friends and relations of the king's persecution, saying that he had been driven from his country and disinherited, had unjustly suffered banishment and exile, and therefore had fled to the only harbour of refuge open to him, that with strength of arms united they might try if they could in any way to improve his fortune.<sup>29</sup>

While Baldwin's position as a baron was not affected by his loss of the castles, he no longer possessed any resources in England with which to ensure his political position. The only way to regain possession of these resources was to join Matilda.

The *Gesta Stephani*'s description of the siege tactics used by both Baldwin and the king demonstrates the castle's role as a multifunctional resource. With his three castles, Baldwin could extend his lordship and authority and that is what he attempted to do. We are told that Baldwin was 'hastily collecting all sorts of provisions in the castle' while

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<sup>27</sup> 'ut qui aliorum cupidus quae sua non erant iniuste inuaserat, iusto aequitatis iudicio et sua amitteret', Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> 'non est desperatus nec animo fractus', GS, 1, 21, pp. 44-5.

<sup>29</sup> 'amicis et cognatis pro regis infestatione plurimum conqueri, se patria pulsum, a patrimonio alienatum, fugam et exilium iniuste perpassum, ideoque ad solius sui refugii portum recurrisset, quatinus uiribus et armis secum utentibus, si quo modo fortunam in melius immutare possent, experirentur', GS, 1, 22, pp. 46-7.

threatening violence to the citizens of Exeter; he was clearly preparing the castle for some sort of engagement, preparing to use it as a military resource.<sup>30</sup> The chronicler recorded that Stephen ‘gave the enemy no time for making forays over the countries, but sent two hundred cavalry to Exeter as an advance guard, with orders to ride all night and cut the enemy off if possible’.<sup>31</sup> He wanted to limit the castle’s supplies, limit the strength of this resource, and succeeded catching Baldwin off guard. By the time the king arrived with his ‘glorious, or I should rather say a terrifying retinue in squadrons and companies’, the castle was successfully blockaded.<sup>32</sup> Stephen and his men built ‘many siege-engines’<sup>33</sup> and the *Gesta Stephani* recorded that soldiers,

...took an outwork raised on a very high mound to defend the castle, and...manfully broke the inner bridge... and with wondrous art built great erections of timber as a hindrance to those trying to fight from the battlements...[they] vigorously and energetically pressed on with the siege of the garrison.<sup>34</sup>

The king did not stand idle during this siege and ‘sometimes he joined battle’.<sup>35</sup> He also employed ‘slingers (*funditoribus*)’ to bombard the garrison and,

...summoned those who have skill in mining underground and ordered them to search into the bowels of the earth with a view to demolishing the wall; frequently too he devised engines of different sorts, some rising high in the air, others low on the ground, the former to spy out what was going on in the castle, the latter to shake or undermine the wall.<sup>36</sup>

The garrison fought back ‘sallying unexpectedly from secret posterns... [and] frequently they shot arrows or flung javelins from the battlements and showed an aggressive spirit in

<sup>30</sup> ‘*omne etiam genus edulii in castello*’, *GS*, 1, 15, pp. 30-3

<sup>31</sup> ‘*nullum hostibus discursandi per prouincias tempus indulisit, sed ducentis equitibus, qui illum praecederent, ad Esoniam destinatis, praecepit ut tota nocte itinerantes aduersarios secluderent si possent*’, *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> ‘*turmis et centenariis cum glorioso, immo ut uerius dicam, cum horrendo comitatu aduenit*’, *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> ‘*machinas multas*’, *Huntingdon*, 10, 4, p. 706-9.

<sup>34</sup> ‘*quod ad castellum muniendum aggere cumulatissimo in altum sustollebatur, expulsis constanter hostibus suscepit, pontemque interiorem, quo ad urbem de castello incessus protendebatur, uiriliter infregit, lignorumque ingentia aedificia, quibus de muro pugnare nitentibus resisteretur, mire et artificiose exaltauit. Die etiam et nocte grauiter et intente obsidionem clausis inferre*’, *GS*, 1, 16, pp. 32-5.

<sup>35</sup> ‘*pugnacem secum committere*’, *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> ‘*aliquando autem ascitis eis, qui massae subterraneae cautius norunt uenas incidere, ad murum diruendum uiscera terrae scrutari praecipere; nonnumquam etiam machinas diuersi generis, alias in altum sublatas, alias humotenus depressas, istas ad inspiciendum quidnam rerum in castello gereretur, illas ad murum quassandum uel subruendum aptare*’, *Ibid.*

many other ways as occasion required;’ they offered a ‘resolute and ready defence, cared nothing for all this engine [mentioned in the extended quote], on which the cunning of the craftsmen had spent vast labour’.<sup>37</sup> Possession of this resource was so critical for both sides that ‘both parties putting vigour and resource into the struggle it was a great trial of their shrewdness and quickness to act’ and it ‘was doubtful whether besiegers or defenders would prevail’.<sup>38</sup>

While we lack a detailed physical description of Exeter from many chroniclers, these details of the siege tactics suggest the physical strength of the castle. However, the *Gesta Stephani* does provide a rare depiction of the castle’s physical appearance and perhaps even a measure of what ‘impregnable fortified’ meant beyond being a formulaic description. The author recorded that the castle was ‘raised on a very high mound surrounded by an impregnable wall and fortified with towers hewn of limestone constructed by the emperors’.<sup>39</sup> We get the basic, and reasonably common, inclusion of walls, towers, and a mound in this description but the author provides much more by his mention of Roman imperial construction. This reference supports assumptions of a resilient fortification since remaining Roman buildings across England were incorporated into the foundations of Anglo-Saxon and Norman structures when possible because of their acknowledged advanced construction and strength.<sup>40</sup> However, whether the castle’s towers or walls were Roman constructions is irrelevant; the description was intended to create an image in the mind of his audience of an impregnable fortress with the awe and trepidation of the historic

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<sup>37</sup> ‘*Aliquando etiam ex occultis aditibus ex insperato prosilientes...nonnunquam uero aut sagittas emittere, aut iacula ex alto uibrare, multisque aliis modis cum tempus exigebat, infesti existere... Illi e contra fortiter et promptissime refragantes, omnia eius machinamenta, in quibus plurimum artificum desudarat ingenium, nihili pendebant*’, Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> ‘*ita ut strenue et ingeniose utrisque decertantibus, magnum eorum fieret prudentiae et uelocitatis certamen*’, Ibid; ‘*exterius impugnantium et interius obnitentium anceps esset uictoria*’, *GS*, 1, 18, pp. 38-39.

<sup>39</sup> ‘*Castellum in ea stum, editissimo aggere sublatum, muro inexpugnabili obseptum, turribus Caesarianis incisili calce confectis firmatum*’, *GS*, 1, 16, pp. 32-5. See Appendix D, figure 1.

<sup>40</sup> Chibnall, *Normans*, pp. 44-5; Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 15, 43; Fourquin, pp. 87-90.

might of Rome.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, the author may not have been exaggerating; Stephen felt the need to bring a large force, construct siege engines, utilise various siege tactics, and spend an outrageous sum of money so he probably perceived Exeter as being well-fortified if not impregnable. This embellishment serves as a perfect example of the perceived fortified nature required by the definition of a castle and it could be an example of what ‘impregnablely fortified’ meant to this author. Exeter was one of the first castles he described and the first in so much detail; therefore, its ‘imperial’ grade defences that are ‘impregnable’ might have been used as a perceivable measure for his audience when he later described other castles in a similar fashion.

Baldwin’s garrison at Exeter was also very impressive. They are described as ‘a very strong force, no less than the flower of all England, chosen to resist the king [and] bound by fealty and an oath never to yield to the king at all...ready for anything’.<sup>42</sup> The garrison participated ‘aggressively’ during the siege, and in Baldwin’s attempts to assert his lordship prior to the king’s arrival. They accompanied him on his excursions into the city and collected the needed provisions and, while the chronicler does not explicitly say so, was responsible for the citizens sending ‘to the king for their own hurt’ because of their ‘raging with pillage and fire;’ Baldwin’s men became ‘incensed’ when they heard of this appeal and exited the castle ‘in close column to plunder the city and throw torches into the houses’.<sup>43</sup> As we have seen chroniclers do not typically record who was responsible for the pillaging of land or the enforcing of a lord’s power, but in this case, we have a direct answer.

The *Gesta Stephani* also described Carisbrooke as ‘very finely built of stone and very

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<sup>41</sup> Exeter was initially begun by Baldwin de Meules under direction from William the Conqueror. How much of the castle was built at this time is unknown but it certainly had an outer wall and bridge to the inner ward by 1136. *King’s Works*, vol. 2, pp. 647-9.

<sup>42</sup> ‘*in quo Balduinus ualidissimam pubem, totius dumtaxat Angliae florem, ad obsistendum regi delectam imposuit... ad omnia parati repledebantur*’, *GS*, 1, 16, pp. 32-5.

<sup>43</sup> ‘*iracundia...eo quod in malum suum ad regem misissent... ad ciuitatem spoliandam, ad faces domibus iniciendas, agmine conferto e castello prodibant... pro castellanis depraedatione et igne furentibus*’, *Ibid.*

strongly fortified... firmly and impregnably against the king'.<sup>44</sup> Since Baldwin did not want to repeat any mistakes from Exeter, he ensured this castle was adequately supplied with water.<sup>45</sup> He used this castle as his base of operations 'assembling a huge pirate fleet... [and] labouring to intercept traders sailing between England and Normandy and annoy each country as much as he could'.<sup>46</sup> Recognising the danger posed by Baldwin from this castle, Stephen 'rapidly followed' and moved so quickly that Baldwin was 'utterly astonished at his sudden and unexpected arrival' and forced to surrender despite his thorough preparations.<sup>47</sup>

As previously discussed, the crucial element of a 'fortified' castle was its position to confront an enemy. Thus when Exeter and Carisbrooke are 'fortified' they were strengthened and prepared to withstand a siege from the king.<sup>48</sup> Richard of Hexham directly expressed this idea when he recorded that Baldwin 'fortified against him [Stephen] his town of Exeter'.<sup>49</sup> Other chroniclers do not use 'fortified (*firmavit*)' but instead record that it was 'held (*teneo*)' against the king.<sup>50</sup> They express the same concept as the other chroniclers, but is there any significance in the lack of 'fortified' in these passages? In Howden's case, the passage was copied almost verbatim from Huntingdon. As for the lack of 'fortified' in Huntingdon and the *ASC*, the concept of 'fortified' is expressed; we could easily insert 'fortified' for 'held' in these cases and in doing so, these passages would read like those from John of Worcester and the *Gesta Stephani*.

Baldwin's castle at Plympton provides a stark contrast to Exeter and Carisbrooke. The chronicle perceptions of Plympton's garrison have already been discussed but their consequences are relevant here. Contextually, Baldwin was in possession of Carisbrooke

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<sup>44</sup> '*ornatissimo lapidum aedificio constructum, ualidissimo munimine firmatum... firme et inexpugnabiliter aduersus regem munito*', *GS*, 1, 21, pp. 44-5.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> '*collectis in immensum nauigium piratis... mercatores inter Angliam et Normanniam uelificantes intercipere, et utrisque terris, quocumque nisu posset, molestiam inferre desudabat*', *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> '*celeriter fuit subsecutus... de illius aduentu tam subito tamque insperato nimium obstupescens*', *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *GS*, 1, 16-7 and 21-2, pp. 32-9, 44-7; Worcester, pp. 218-9.

<sup>49</sup> Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; '*Excestram oppidum suum contra illum firmavit*', Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7.

<sup>50</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 4, p. 706-9; *ASC*, E, p. 198.

and Exeter and was in a strong position to oppose Stephen; by surrendering Plympton to the king, the garrison weakened Baldwin, giving his enemies a military resource in wartime. The garrison perceived the castle's fortifications as unable to withstand a siege, the *Gesta Stephani* offered no description of Plympton, and no other chronicler mentions this event. The modern state of Plympton presents a simple motte-and-bailey with remains of a stone tower which was built after Stephen's reign (Appendix B, figure 9). The description of the king's force as 'invincible' might be a literary trope, but the garrison's actions still substantiate that they did not like their chances against the royal host besieging Exeter. It is important to note that Plympton was never described as 'fortified' or 'held' against the king; it was never prepared or strengthened for a siege. If Plympton was a strongly fortified castle, the garrison might not have surrendered so quickly, thus, it is more conceivable that it was physically weak; after taking possession, the king ordered it 'levelled to the ground' which possibly only entailed destroying the contemporary tower since the mound still exists today.<sup>51</sup> Stephen could have turned Plympton into a resource for himself, but his actions demonstrate that it was too weak or ineffective and not worth the cost to maintain.

The contrast between the garrisons' at Exeter and Carisbrooke resistance and Plympton's quick capitulation demonstrates a clear variation in the degree of fortification and strength of the garrison. Fortification (architecture and garrison) was central to the castle's 'fortified' nature, but not all castles were fortified to the same degree; regardless of whether Plympton was physically able to withstand a siege, its garrison was not. The chronicler's perceptions of this situation are also important: by degrading the garrison he is demonstrating what the castle should have been, how they should have acted, which illustrates that, even though the garrison was cowardly, the castle was meant to be fortified in order to operate as a multifunctional resource.

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<sup>51</sup> '*regisque ex iussione solotenus diruto*', Huntingdon, 10, 4, p. 706-9.

## Miles de Beauchamp

The second case study involves Miles de Beauchamp and Stephen's siege of Bedford Castle in 1138.<sup>52</sup> This dispute was not viewed as a 'major event' by the chroniclers with many only mentioning it briefly. Bedford was acknowledged as a hereditary castellanship and Miles was confirmed in his possession by 'the king's permission' after Simon's death.<sup>53</sup> One of the earldoms created by Stephen was given to Hugh le Poer whose older twin brothers, Waleran of Meulan and Robert of Leicester also benefitted from Stephen's largesse and were made earls of Worcester and Hereford respectively.<sup>54</sup> Hugh was made earl of Bedford in 1138 and, through his marriage to the late-castellan Simon de Beauchamp's daughter, was granted 'Simon's whole "honour", including the hereditary custody of Bedford Castle'.<sup>55</sup>

In 1138, Stephen sent messengers to Bedford with orders that Miles render to

Hugh the castle of Bedford and the service due to the king himself. He promised that if Miles willingly acceded to his order he would grant him honours and many gifts, but that if he showed any kind of opposition, he would very soon have to bear the weight of complete disaster.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51; Dalton in Dalton and White, pp. 88-90; King, *King Stephen*, p. 83.

<sup>53</sup> '*regia permissione custos praesidebat*', *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51; However, very little was spent on the castle's construction and upkeep by the crown, so regardless of whether it was officially royal, the family treated it as their possession and expended their income. *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 558-9, 651-6; King, *King Stephen*, pp. 60, 83, 137; Stenton viewed it differently calling it 'an act of feudal aggression on the part of Miles de Beauchamp'. p. 238; ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/54497/61193>, accessed June 9, 2014.

<sup>54</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 9, 41, 49-50; White, 'King Stephen's Earldoms', p. 55.

<sup>55</sup> *GS*, note 3, pp. 46-7; 'Hugh de Beaumont', *CP*, vol. 2, pp. 68-9; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 558-9; King, *King Stephen*, p. 83; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 9, 41, 49-50; White, 'King Stephen's Earldoms', p. 55. Waleran and Robert Beaumont respectively, ODNB, <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1887/?back=,1882>, and <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1882?docPos=3>, accessed June 9, 2014. No record for Hugh.

<sup>56</sup> '*ut et castellum Bedefordiae et quam sibi debebat seruicii Hugoni exhiberet. Si uero praecepto suo libens adquiesceret, honorandum eum multisque donandum eximiis; si uero quoquo modo contrarius haberetur, totius eum infortunii aduersitat iem perlaturum citissime pollicebatur*', *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51.

This order demonstrated that the king was eager to maintain peace in the region and continue the connection between Miles and himself but only so long as his authority was recognised and his orders followed; he was willing to patronise this baron but was also prepared to enforce his authority. If Miles agreed, Bedford would have been given to Hugh and he would lose the castellanship and the castle. Miles understood this and responded that he would serve the king so long as he did not

...try to remove him from what was the hereditary possession of himself and his family, but that if the king was in earnest and really determined to do him this wrong he would endure his anger with what patience he could, but the king would never get the castle until Miles was reduced to the last extremity.<sup>57</sup>

Miles was also wanted to preserve their relationship, but his family's control of Bedford was more important.

The conflict between the perceptions of Bedford's royal or baronial possession is apparent. The comment in the *Gesta Stephani*, that Miles, 'by the king's permission was castellan of the castle of Bedford (*regia permissione custos praesidebat*)' established this as a royal castle in which Miles served as a royal castellan; therefore the transfer of possession from Miles to Hugh by royal decree would be perceived as a normal process.<sup>58</sup> Stephen's Anglo-Norman predecessors conferred on the Beauchamp family the office of castellan of Bedford and allowed the position to become hereditary, establishing the precedent and rights of a Beauchamp castellan at Bedford. Kings like William II and Henry I could count on the loyalty of the Beauchamps since the family benefited from their patronage and royal permission of castle possession, or perhaps more accurately, lack of disturbance of their familial possession of Bedford. But for Stephen, their hereditary possession caused

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<sup>57</sup> 'ni se a possessione, ex paterno iure sibi et suis debita, amouere temptaret, quod si id ex animo faceret, si fixe aduersum se insurgere pararet, se quidem iram eius quanto posset patientius tolerare, sed castellum, nisi illo ad extrema deducto, numquam habiturum', Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

difficulties when new relationships required the castle to change hands. By allowing the Beauchamps to become hereditary castellans of Bedford, Stephen's predecessors forced him into conflict. But Stephen was not guiltless; he valued support from the Beaumonts over the Beauchamps and appeared to have had no qualms about replacing them. By removing Miles from the castellanship in favour of Hugh, Stephen himself damaged their relationship and forced Miles into rebellion to defend his hereditary right to Bedford. Hereditary castellanships were a contentious issue and this example, and the chronicler's avoidance of choosing sides, only further demonstrate this.

The chroniclers still referred to Miles as the ex- or former constable (*exconstabularius*) of Bedford several times during and after the siege, demonstrating just how important the castle was as a social and political resource and that his identity was still related to the castle even after it left his possession.<sup>59</sup> But in the case of Bedford, the castle's resourcefulness is best demonstrated not by Miles, but by Hugh. Possession of a castle signified and bestowed power, lordship, wealth, and position; while Hugh was from a very important family, he never possessed Bedford long enough to be associated with its military, political, and social resourcefulness, as Miles was, and he lost the seat of his power along with the wealth and status inherent in holding it. The author of the *Gesta Stephani* supports this: the loss of Bedford 'by a strange reversal of fortune, according to the judgement of God, made Roger [Hugh (sic)] himself a knight instead of an earl and a poor man instead of a knight'.<sup>60</sup> A later passage echoes this when describing Hugh's eventual downfall:

Hugh, surnamed the Poor, who by the king's permission had obtained the earldom of Bedford when Miles de Beauchamp was dislodged, behaving carelessly and slackly (for he was a dissolute and effeminate man) willy-nilly handed over the castle to Miles, and by a just judgment of God became in short time a knight instead of an earl and instead of a knight, a very poor man.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Worcester, pp. 282-3.

<sup>60</sup> 'uerum ipsum Rogerium [Hugonium] de comite militem, de milite pauperem, Deo iudice, ordine mirabiliter transuerso, effecerunt', *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51.

<sup>61</sup> 'Sed et Hugo cognomine Pauper, qui comitatum Bedefordiae, detruso Milone de Bellocampo, ex regia

Hugh slipped into poverty and was degraded from his title between three and four years after this event.<sup>62</sup> His fall might not be directly related to losing the castle, but the *Gesta Stephani* certainly connects the two in its narrative. Both passages clearly illustrate that Hugh's military (knight), social (dissolute and effeminate man), and political (earl) status was linked to the castle in the eyes of this chronicler and his wider contemporaries.

As with all castles, Bedford's role as a military resource was related to its physical appearance. The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that because Bedford was 'surrounded by a very lofty mound, encircled by a strong and high wall, fortified with a strong and unshakeable keep, and filled with tough and unconquerable men, [the king] had removed all hope of taking it so quickly' (Appendix D, figure 2).<sup>63</sup> The castle's fortifications and Miles' quick preparation forced an extended siege. When Stephen departed, he ordered his men that 'if they could not overcome the garrison by means of engines, [they were to remain] until famine caused by lack of supplies forced submission'.<sup>64</sup> This order demonstrated the level of fortification with protracted siege aimed at starvation as the only feasible option.

For any reference to the garrison, we are again dependent on the *Gesta Stephani*. The author stated that Bedford was, 'filled with tough and unconquerable men' and Stephen's army 'could not overcome the garrison by means of engines'.<sup>65</sup> His men forced the garrison's surrender through starvation and they 'left the castle on terms in accordance with

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*permissione possederat, negligenter et remisse, ut uir laxus et effeminatus, se continens, castellum Miloni, uellet nollet, commisit, iustoque Dei iudicio de comite miles, de milite in breui pauperrimus fuit*, *GS*, 1, 57, pp. 116-7.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*; 'Hugh de Beaumont', *CP*, vol. 2, pp. 68-9; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 49-50; King, *King Stephen*, p. 83.

<sup>63</sup> '*Sed quia castellum editissimo aggere uallatum, muro forti et arduo in circuitu cinctum, inquassabili turri et forti firmatum, hominibus duris et inuictis oppletum, spem tam cito capiendi prorsus ademerat*', *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51.

<sup>64</sup> '*ut si machinis eos subiugare non posset, quousque fame et inedia defecti supplices redderentur, obsidionem protelarent*', *Ibid*.

<sup>65</sup> '*hominibus duris et inuictis oppletum... ut si machinis eos subiugare non posset*', *Ibid*.

the laws of war'.<sup>66</sup> They returned after an unknown period 'as triumphant and fierce as they had once been humble and downcast' and retook it from the royal garrison.<sup>67</sup> However, this event also provides passages which do not mention the garrison but the roles they fulfilled.

When preparing for Stephen's siege in 1138, it is recorded that Miles

...forcibly took from everyone and carried away with him any food on which he could lay hand, and shamelessly robbed the townsmen and their neighbours, whom hitherto he had humanely spared as his own dependents, [and] he gathered into the castle everything that met his eyes; then carefully barring the gates, he shut out the king's men for the time without loss to his own.<sup>68</sup>

Miles did not do this alone and the involvement of a garrison can be assumed.

Bedford's tactical value is not demonstrated as thoroughly in the chronicles as the other castles in this chapter because the chroniclers' primary focus was Miles' refusal to render the castle. It was strategically located on the frontier between the Midlands and the Fens at the head of the river Ouse and along the Great North Road. However, the military resourcefulness of the castle cannot be doubted. In order to retain possession, Miles prepared to face the forthcoming siege and 'forcibly took from everyone and carried away' any supplies he could and 'gathered into the castle everything that met his eyes; then carefully barring the gates, he shut out the king's men for the time without loss to his own'.<sup>69</sup> Stephen responded to Miles' rebellion by gathering an army 'collected from the whole of England'.<sup>70</sup> Both passages demonstrate how important possession of the castle was. Upon his arrival, Stephen 'exerted himself with skill and ingenuity, expense and labour, at the construction of

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<sup>66</sup> 'Sub militari igitur conditione castellum deserentes...tradiderunt', Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> 'Sed quanto tunc humiliores et depressiores... elatiores et acerbiores', Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> 'quicquid escarum subminibus reppererat, ab omnibus cum uiolentia distractum, secum asportauit; ciuibusque et confinibus, quibus prius, ut suis, humane, pepercerat, irreuerendam inferens rapinam, quicquid oculis occurrebat in castellum congeffit, portisque diligenter obseratis, hac uice regales sine suorum detrimento exclusit', Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> 'ex omni Anglia in unum exercitu conflente', Ibid; other chroniclers record the speed at which Stephen responds to Miles' rejection of his order: Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 230; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 192; Worcester, pp. 234-7.

different sorts of engines to break up the palisade or shatter the wall’ and contemplated ‘the most effective means of reducing them to submission’.<sup>71</sup> He ordered a ‘skilful reconnaissance’ and ordered archers to harass the garrison and ‘judiciously posted the barons on guard to watch every entrance of the castle, lest the besieged should make a sally to throw his own men into confusion’.<sup>72</sup> Stephen’s determination illustrated his anger at Miles and the importance of Bedford to his cause. Orderic Vitalis even recorded that Stephen ‘unseasonably took up arms’ and spent the winter at the siege hindered by heavy rain, but ‘after a great struggle, accomplished nothing’.<sup>73</sup> From these passages, and the earlier discussion of the castle’s physical appearance, we can formulate an idea of this castle as a technology which forced Stephen to use sapping, siege engines, and blockades. But even with his advanced siege tactics, Stephen was unable to take it by storm, insinuating that these were advanced fortifications. Despite his determination, the siege was interrupted by news of a Scottish invasion and he left to deal with this incursion. In the meantime, his men captured Bedford and it was given to Hugh as an important military, political, and social resource to establish his new earldom. Miles was motivated to retain this resource; shortly after his garrison surrendered to Stephen’s men, they returned and retook the castle.<sup>74</sup> Consequently, almost a year after issuing his rendering order, Stephen was forced to re-take the castle, but this time he kept it for himself. Clearly the resourcefulness of this castle in Miles’ hands destabilised Stephen’s royal authority and he decided to assert direct control instead of leaving it with this earl regardless of his familial connections.

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<sup>71</sup> ‘*diuersi generis machinas construendas, quae uel ad uallum dispergendum uel ad murum dissipandum aptarentur, arte et ingenio, sumptu et opere insudare...quibus modis competentius posset inflectere, studiosius prouidere*’, *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51.

<sup>72</sup> ‘*Verum rex castelli ambitum prudenter pergirans, illis et illis in locis, quae ad insidiandum opportuniore habebantur, sagittantium phalanges apposuit, praecepitque ut in altum dirigentes, uel propugnaculis inhaerentes, crebra sagittarum impeterent emissione, liberumque prospectum habere non permittentes, ad eos perturbandos studiose contenderent*’, *Ibid*.

<sup>73</sup> ‘*importune arma sustulit...laboriose peregit, et nichil profecit*’, Orderic, 13, 36, pp. 510-5.

<sup>74</sup> *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51.

However, the apparent ease with which Miles, and then Stephen, re-captured this castle raises questions about the castle's fortified state. If the king was forced into an extended siege, then how could Miles retake it with such apparent ease? Were the fortifications damaged? Were they not so 'unshakeable' to begin with? Was the garrison not strong enough? Unfortunately, other chronicles do not help with these questions because most gloss over the event and the *Gesta Stephani* does not elaborate; when it later records Duke Henry's siege in 1153, it was described as 'a very strong castle (*castello munitissimo*)' and another protracted siege was required.<sup>75</sup> However, we have no physical descriptions and no mention of any repairs or alterations which would have improved its strength. There are pages missing from the *Gesta Stephani* which might have included a more detailed account of the re-taking of Bedford or an account of the damage caused by Stephen's siege which would better describe the level of fortification of this castle and answer the questions posed.

In the case of Bedford, the phrase 'held against' was used by almost all the chroniclers and based on their context, we could insert 'fortified' into the passages as suggested with Exeter.<sup>76</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that he provisioned the castle but did not describe it as 'fortified' until describing the physical attributes and garrison saying that the castle was 'fortified with a strong and unshakeable keep, and filled with tough and unconquerable men'.<sup>77</sup> Does the location of 'fortified' in passage only refer to the physical attributes and garrison? Not necessarily; the idea that Bedford was prepared to face any opposition is still included in this passage even though the direct connotation of 'fortified' is to do with the keep and the chronicler emphasised the advanced fortifications. Miles strengthened and prepared his castle to meet a confrontation by the king; perhaps the use of 'fortified' was implied in this detailed narrative but from the context, its use could have seemed repetitive

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<sup>75</sup> *GS*, 2, 119, pp. 234-7.

<sup>76</sup> Worcester, pp. 234-7; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 230; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 192.

<sup>77</sup> '*inquassabili turri et forti firmatum, hominibus duris et inuictis oppletum*', *GS*, 1, 23, pp. 46-51.

or redundant to the author. His story did not need it.

### **Arrest of the Bishops**

The third event began on 24 June, 1139, during a session of the royal court at Oxford, when an altercation over lodgings erupted between the men of the Bishop Roger of Salisbury and his nephews Bishops Alexander of Lincoln and Nigel of Ely and those of Counts Alan of Brittany and Waleran of Meulan.<sup>78</sup> Alexander and Roger were brought before the king to answer for the disruption and as surety for their behaviour were ordered to render their castles.<sup>79</sup> Roger and Alexander offered other compensations for their infraction but refused to surrender their castles; Henry of Huntingdon wrote that ‘far from refusing to stand trial [the bishops] earnestly begged a fair hearing’.<sup>80</sup> The king was not appeased and they were arrested along with Roger le Poer, Bishop Roger’s illegitimate son and Stephen’s chancellor.<sup>81</sup> Nigel, who had lodged outside the city, fled to Devizes and held it against the king who followed bringing Bishop Roger (unfettered), Roger le Poer (in chains) with him while Alexander was left at Oxford.<sup>82</sup> To gain the castle, Stephen threatened to hang Roger le Poer; Bishop Roger fasted in hopes of persuading his forces to surrender.<sup>83</sup> Although Nigel was in residence, the castle was held by Roger’s mistress Matilda of Ramsbury and, knowing that the king would not harm a bishop but would harm her son, she surrendered the

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<sup>78</sup> *GS*, 1, 34-5, pp. 72-9; Worcester, pp. 244-9; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9; Kealey, pp. 181, 183; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 44-5.

<sup>79</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9; Worcester, pp. 248-51.

<sup>80</sup> ‘*nichil iusticie recusantes et iudicii equitatem deuotissime poscentes*’, Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21.

<sup>81</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9; Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-61; Worcester, p. 248-51, 266-7; *ASC*, E, pp. 198-9; Howden, vol. 1, pp. 235-6; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 196-7.

<sup>82</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9; Worcester, pp. 244-51, 266-7; *ASC*, E, pp. 198-9; Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-7; Howden, vol. 1, pp. 235-6; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 196-7.

<sup>83</sup> Hanging threat: *GS*, 1, 35, pp. 78-9; Worcester, pp. 248-51; Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 58-9; Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21. Some chroniclers recorded that Roger voluntarily fasted: Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9; Worcester, pp. 244-51. Others say he was starved: *GS*, 1, 35, pp. 78-9; Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 58-9; Huntingdon, 10, 10, p. 718-21.

castle.<sup>84</sup> The capitulation of the bishops' other castles soon followed.<sup>85</sup>

This was a well-recorded event and many of the chroniclers knew Roger of Salisbury or had contact with him and his family: William of Malmesbury's abbey was located within Roger's jurisdiction and he was almost certainly a witness to the resulting council of Winchester, Henry of Huntingdon was the archdeacon in Alexander's diocese at Lincoln, and, although the author of the *Gesta Stephani* is unknown, he was clearly very close to the royal court.<sup>86</sup> These authors described the arrest of the bishops as an 'extraordinarily scandalous and quite unprecedented affair',<sup>87</sup> and it both threatened and strengthened the security of Stephen's throne.

Roger of Salisbury, also called Roger of Caen, was an influential political figure. Before Henry I's coronation, Roger was a member of his household and proved a loyal and capable administrator. Henry made him chancellor on his accession and then bishop of Salisbury in 1102.<sup>88</sup> He became a powerful lord, counselled the king, gained supervision over the financial and judicial operations of England, was known as justiciar of England, and held the position of viceroy from 1123-6 while Henry was in Normandy.<sup>89</sup> Roger used his power and position to advance his family: Alexander was made bishop of Lincoln in 1123 and Nigel was first royal treasurer, then bishop of Ely by 1133; his son Roger was chancellor and another possible son, Adelelm, was royal treasurer until 1139.<sup>90</sup> After the battle of Tinchebrai, Bishop Roger held Duke Robert of Normandy at Devizes in 1106-

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<sup>84</sup> Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5; Worcester, pp. 248-51; on their children and relationship see Kealey, pp. 22-4, 186.

<sup>85</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9; Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21; Worcester, pp. 280-1.

<sup>86</sup> Kealey, pp. 6-7.

<sup>87</sup> '*infamia notabilis et ab omni consuetudine remota comparuit*', Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21.

<sup>88</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 194; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 160; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 408, pp. 736-9; *Regesta*, vol. 2, pp. xvii-xix.

<sup>89</sup> Huntingdon, 7, 35, pp. 471, 473; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 217; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 180-1; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 408, pp. 736-9. Green, *Government*, pp. 5-6, 38, 44-5; Kealey, pp. 26, 29-30, 33, 45.

<sup>90</sup> Adelelm later became Salisbury's archdeacon and dean of Lincoln cathedral. Huntingdon, 7, 35, pp. 471-3; Kealey, pp. 22-4.

1126.<sup>91</sup> He was given control over Salisbury by Henry I around 1130, made several alterations to Devizes, and constructed Sherborne and Malmesbury castles with the king's permission.<sup>92</sup> If Henry had wanted to consolidate Roger's administrative position, he might have given him control of Winchester, the location of the main royal treasury, the Exchequer, and the centre of his government. Instead, Roger's prestige, and not his office, was reflected in the gifting of different castles not connected with his administrative position. Roger gained enough influence to assume he had the right to be consulted on the second marriage of Henry's daughter Matilda, and was insulted when he was not.<sup>93</sup>

After Henry I's death, Henry of Huntingdon recorded that 'Roger did all he could to raise Stephen to the throne and helped him more than anyone else at the beginning of the reign' primarily because he was at Winchester when Stephen arrived to claim the royal treasury in December 1135.<sup>94</sup> As the head of the administration, Roger's cooperation was vital; if he decided to remain loyal to Matilda, civil war was certain.<sup>95</sup> But Roger supported Stephen; Malmesbury wrote that he had heard Roger explain that he was released from the oath since he was to have been consulted on her marriage; only Robert of Gloucester and Brian Fitz Count are known to have been aware of the marriage arrangements since they escorted her to Anjou.<sup>96</sup> However, a better excuse might have been to argue for the Church's interest. While many lords were not excited about Matilda as their ruler but did not rush to support Stephen, it was the support of the Church, led by the archbishop of Canterbury, and

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<sup>91</sup> ASC, E, p. 192; Green, *Henry I*, p. 192; Kealey, pp. 90, 147-8.

<sup>92</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 194; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 160; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 408, pp. 736-9; *King's Works*, vol. 2, Devizes: pp. 626-8, Malmesbury: p. 734, Sherborne: pp. 832-3, Salisbury: pp. 824-8. We do not have royal licences for these castles but, since Roger was a close advisor and loyal supporter, it is safe assumption Henry I granted him permission to build new castles and enhance royal ones.

<sup>93</sup> Kealey, p. 157; Green, *Henry I*, p. 194.

<sup>94</sup> Kealey, pp. 154-6; Huntingdon, 10, 1, p. 701.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, Kealey. The chroniclers' biases (Henry of Huntingdon as friend and colleague of Alexander and William of Malmesbury whose abbey had several confrontations with Roger) are possible reasons for this difference in opinions.

<sup>96</sup> This passage also demonstrates William's closeness to this event. Malmesbury, *HN*, 468, pp. 25-6; Kealey, p. 157; Green, *Henry I*, p. 194.

the bishops of Salisbury and of Winchester, that placed Stephen on the throne.<sup>97</sup> Roger remained a powerful ecclesiastical lord and retained his administrative positions under Stephen which meant he was deeply connected to ‘a party of mandarins’ and now became embroiled in court divisions, and exposed himself to political attacks.<sup>98</sup> William of Malmesbury wrote that Roger ‘conducted himself with such integrity and energy that no ill-feeling was aroused against him’.<sup>99</sup> But perhaps this was not exactly accurate; the events of 1139 attest to a modern observation that while ‘the viceroy’s accomplishments delighted the ruler, they did not make Roger popular with others’.<sup>100</sup> Roger, ‘worn out by grief and distress’,<sup>101</sup> ‘wasted away, worn out by sorrow as well as old age’,<sup>102</sup> and died of a fever on 11 December, 1139. Malmesbury recorded that he ‘escaped from a quartan fever, by which he had long been afflicted, by the favour of death. They say he contracted the illness from mental suffering, having been assailed by King Stephen with injuries so many and so great’.<sup>103</sup>

It appears that Roger’s, and his family’s, downfall was set up by the Beaumont family in order to eliminate a rival, repeating their successful elimination of Geoffrey de Clinton under Henry I.<sup>104</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* described the resentment of Waleran of Meulan towards Roger as ‘a furious blaze of envy’; William of Malmesbury wrote that some lords

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<sup>97</sup> Hugh Bigod’s testimony that Henry I denounced Matilda as his heir and chose Stephen encouraged the barons to follow Stephen since they believed their oaths were voided by the king’s deathbed renunciation. Kealey, p. 158.

<sup>98</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 44-5, 29-30, 89. Attesting to Roger’s position at Stephen’s and Henry I’s courts: *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5; Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 58-9; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 194, 217; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 160, 180-1; Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 408, pp. 736-9; Kealey, pp. 22-4, 26, 29-30, 33-4, 42, 45, 77, 159; Green, *Henry I*, p. 114, and *Government*, pp. 5-6, 38, 44-5, 50.

<sup>99</sup> ‘*tanta se agebat industria ut nulla contra eum conflaretur invidia*’, Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 408, pp. 736-9.

<sup>100</sup> Kealey, p. 79.

<sup>101</sup> ‘*per dolore et tristia infirmatus*’, Worcester, pp. 258-9

<sup>102</sup> ‘*tam merore quam senio confectus, demarcuit*’, Huntingdon, 10, 11, pp. 720-3. More on Roger’s death see: King, *King Stephen*, p. 108; Kealey, p. 205; R.A. Stalley, ‘A Twelfth-Century Patron of Architecture: A Study of the Buildings Erected by Roger, Bishops of Salisbury 1102-1139’, *JBAA* 3:34 (1971), p. 63.

<sup>103</sup> ‘*febrem quartanam, qua iam dudum quassabatur, beneficio mortis euasit. Dolore animi aiunt eum contraxisse ualitudinem, utpote tantis et tam crebris a rege Stephano pulsatum incommodes*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 33, pp. 64-5.

<sup>104</sup> Huntingdon, 7, 41, p. 486-7; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 44-5; Kealey, p. 176.

‘nourished within their hearts an unseen grudge of envy’.<sup>105</sup> The primary difference between these two political attacks was that Clinton was ‘nobody, a useful but expendable servant,’ whereas Roger was bishop of Salisbury, immensely wealthy, deeply engrained in the administration of England, and held several powerful castles.<sup>106</sup> In sacrificing Clinton to the Beaumonts, Henry I was ‘simply adjusting the balance of his court with care, economy and no danger to himself;’ Stephen, on the other hand, ‘was gambling everything recklessly on the support of one aristocratic faction’.<sup>107</sup> But, perhaps Stephen felt that his bond with the bishops had already been broken or, at least, jeopardised with rumours circulating of Roger and his nephew’s probable defection to Matilda. John of Worcester recorded that Stephen called Roger to Oxford to confer with him, and that the bishop, ‘set out on this journey with much reluctance, thinking that he would never return’.<sup>108</sup> While this could be hindsight being used with dramatic licence, some questions remain: did Roger know of the rumours of his disloyalty? Did he fear this journey?

If the contemporary chroniclers close to Roger had heard the rumours, it is possible he knew of them as well. While the events of 1139 acted as a forerunner to the arrests of the earl of Chester and Geoffrey de Mandeville, Roger had no evidence that Stephen would turn against him at his own court. Earlier in his reign, Stephen called a few lesser barons to court to answer for their violent actions but none were ever arrested; there was no dangerous precedent for Roger to fear. If the narrative of Henry of Huntingdon is any guide to proper court conduct, his shock and disgust was aimed at Stephen’s actions: arresting the bishops after having received them ‘peacefully’ was an ‘extraordinarily scandalous and quite

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<sup>105</sup> *‘inuidiae facibus hostiliter in eos efferuebant’*, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5; *‘cecum intra pectora uulnus alebant inuidie’*, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 44-5.

<sup>106</sup> Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 44-5.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> *‘Quam ille profectionem, ut aiunt, nimis inuitus, utpote iam amplius non reuersurus, aggressus, duos secum nepotes’*, Worcester, pp. 244-9. This chronicle’s accounting of events is slightly different from others: here Devizes was apparently fortified against the king, so Roger was called to court to account for this. Then the violence between the households occurred, the bishops were arrested, and Nigel fled to Devizes which, as all chroniclers agree, was fortified against the king.

unprecedented affair'.<sup>109</sup> Arresting anyone, including suspicious bishops, during the peace of a royal court was a violation of the protection and immunity guaranteed to his vassals. However, if Stephen believed Roger and his family were ready to submit their castles to Matilda, then the truth behind the rumours would be academic. If Stephen felt threatened, or believed the rumours, then he would have felt justified in confirming the destruction of their relationship by arresting them and taking their castles. If his bishops had already broken faith with Stephen, why should he remain loyal to them?

The suspicion of the bishops' loyalty was one of the many reasons that precipitated their arrest but it has been argued that the events were planned in order to claim their wealth and castles for the Crown.<sup>110</sup> Henry I had amassed a great treasure but Stephen's expenditure in his early years included several large payments to Rome to confirm his kingship, Geoffrey of Anjou for a truce in Normandy, his brother Theobald of Blois to relinquish his claim to Normandy, and many of his barons to secure support; additionally, the siege of Exeter was reported to have cost £10,000 (15,000 marks<sup>111</sup>) which has been calculated at 1/10 of his treasure.<sup>112</sup> Roger of Salisbury was a very wealthy man; his construction projects alone attest to his fortune. While Stephen gained important castles from this episode, his main target may have been the bishop's treasure estimated at £40,000 which was quickly used to facilitate Stephen's son Eustace's marriage to King Louis VII of France's sister Constance.<sup>113</sup> The chroniclers even noted this financial element of the bishops' arrest.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> See p. 227, n 87, Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21.

<sup>110</sup> Kealey, pp. 178-9; Prestwich, 'War and Finance', pp. 39-40.

<sup>111</sup> *GS*, 1, 18, pp. 38-9; King, *King Stephen*, p. 66.

<sup>112</sup> Regardless of whether the siege of Exeter actually cost £10,000, it was regarded a massive drain on Stephen's finances. The actual number is not relevant but the state of his treasury afterwards is. Kealey, pp. 173-4; K. Yoshitake, 'The Exchequer in the Reign of Stephen', *EHR* 103:409 (1988), pp. 950, 958-9. Other expenses included campaigns in the Welsh marches, Scottish invasions, and in Normandy, 2,000 marks to Theobald to buy his claim to Normandy, truce with Geoffrey of Anjou for 2,000 marks annually. Prestwich, 'War and Finance', pp. 39-42, 76; Haskins, 'Normandy under Geoffrey Plantagenet', p. 418; King, *King Stephen*, p. 66.

<sup>113</sup> Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 719, 721; Kealey, pp. 178-9, 187-8.

<sup>114</sup> 'Taking possession of the bishop's treasure, he used it to acquire Constance, sister of Louis, the French king, for the benefit of his son Eustace (*Accipiensque thesauros episcopi comparavit inde Constantiam*

While the previous examples of Baldwin de Redvers and Miles de Beauchamp demonstrate that his barons were not always obedient, this episode was the first manifestation of Stephen's 'nervous anticipation of the danger of over-powerful subjects' and while he gained control over several key castles, it cost him dearly.<sup>115</sup> Additionally, Henry of Winchester had supported his brother because he believed he would 'be upright in ecclesiastical affairs but his trust, it now seemed, was misplaced'.<sup>116</sup> Stephen had jeopardised ecclesiastical confidence in his coronation promises and, subsequently, the Church's most powerful members remained passive for the duration of the civil war.<sup>117</sup> However, the devastation to his government was more significant; while it continued to function, the 'secret of its efficient operation was lost... [with] the experience of the men whom Stephen dismissed'.<sup>118</sup> Roger had been the 'linchpin' of the English government, and his passing was a great loss to its workings and, with one decision, Stephen had discarded the 'personalities, the policies and the political interests on which the strength of the monarchy had so long rested'.<sup>119</sup> Some modern historians argue that Roger's fall led to, or

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*sororem Lodouici, regis Francorum, ad opus Eustacachii filii sui*)', Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 718-21; 'He [Stephen] imprisoned them in close confinement, and stripped them of their money and their castles (*captos inclusit, arctabit, pecuniis et castellis nudavit*)', Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-7; 'As a result Roger relinquished those two splendid castles in which his treasures were stored (*ita coarctavit ut duo illa praeclara castella, in quibus thesauri ejus erant repositi, resignaret*)', Ibid, 1, 6, pp. 58-9; 'when they had yielded to the king, though reluctantly and unwillingly, all the stocks of weapons and money they had laid up in the castles. So when these things had in this manner been fulfilled, we wonder at the surprising good fortune that was the king's lot, inasmuch as after he had drained his own treasures almost to exhaustion to protect the kingdom, he so suddenly came to enjoy the fruit of others' toils, and what had been stored up in the castles for his own injury and damage, as was reported, was given up for his honour and profit alone without any toil at all on his part (*concessis regi, licet aegere et inuite, quascumque in castellis recondiderant armorum et pecuniarum copiis. His itaque tali modo completis, inopinabilem regi fortunae contigisse miramur euentum, cum suis ad regni tuitionem impensis paene et exhaustis thesauris, in aliorum labores tam repente impegerit, quaeque ad suum, ut fama erat, damnum et detrementum in castellis congesta fuere, ad suum modo honorem et proficuum sine omni omnino labore indulta cessere*)', GS, 1, 36, pp. 80-1; 'Accipiensque thesauros episcopi, comparavit ide Constantiam, sororem Ludovici regis Francorum, filio suo Eustachio', Torigni, pp. 136-7; he left 'immense sums of money, which he bequeathed, not for the benefit of God, but for King Stephen (*infinitam in castellis suis relinquens pecuniam, que non in Dei, sed regis Stephani tota cessit in usum*)', Worcester, pp. 258-9.

<sup>115</sup> Davis, 'Geoffrey de Mandeville Reconsidered', p. 304.

<sup>116</sup> Kealey, pp. 154-6.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 199.

<sup>118</sup> Yoshitake, 'Exchequer in the Reign of Stephen', p. 950; Kealey, p. 200.

<sup>119</sup> Prestwich, 'War and Finance', pp. 39-40; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, pp. 44-5.

explained, Stephen's creation of so many earldoms, or that his creation of earls was to counter the old administration under Roger; regardless, royal government now became localised and lost its efficient and strong central control.<sup>120</sup> The new earls acted as local governors managing the sheriffs, justices, and local administration of their counties.<sup>121</sup> Roger of Howden, with the benefit of hindsight, noted that 'in consequence of this conduct, the house of King Stephen was consigned to impending destruction'.<sup>122</sup>

All the chroniclers assert how the political and social bonds between these bishops and the king were broken, but they differ on who was to blame. Malmesbury described the confiscation of Roger's castles, and the events of their arrest, as causing 'illness from mental suffering, having been assailed by King Stephen with injuries so many and so great'.<sup>123</sup> While he was aware of the court factions and their envy receives blame for planting suspicion in the king's mind, he believed that '[i]t belonged to pagan times to imprison bishops and deprive them of their property' placing the blame back squarely on Stephen's shoulders.<sup>124</sup> Henry of Huntingdon said that the event was an 'extraordinarily scandalous and quite unprecedented affair' and that Stephen had received the bishops at court 'peacefully' before 'violently' arresting them and refusing them the chance to plead their case; he was among those who claimed that Stephen starved Roger of Salisbury casting the king as the villain.<sup>125</sup> William of Newburgh blamed Stephen's 'personal hatred for them or a

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid; Crouch, *Beaumont Twins*, p. 39; Yoshitake, 'Exchequer in the Reign of Stephen', p. 950.

<sup>121</sup> Cronne, *Reign of Stephen*, p. 139.

<sup>122</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 235-6; 'Ob quod patefacta est domus regis Stephani finitimae condemnatione', Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 196-7.

<sup>123</sup> 'Dolore animi aiunt eum contraxisse ualitudinem, utpote tantis et tam crebris a rege Stephano pulsatum incommodis', Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 33, pp. 64-5.

<sup>124</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 'Gentilium quippe seculorum opus esset episcopos incarcerare et possessionibus suis exuere', 2, 26, pp. 52-3; 'In consequence some powerful laymen, vexed that they would be surpassed by clerks in the amassing of wealth and the size of their castles, nourished within their hearts an unseen grudge of envy. And so they poured forth to the king the grievances that had formed in their minds (*His moti quidam potentes laici, qui se a clericis et opum congerie et municipiorum magnitudine superatum iri dolerent, cecum intra pectora uulnus alebant inuidie. Itaque conceptas querimonias regi effundunt: episcopos, oblitos ordinis, in castellis edificandis insanire*)', 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>125</sup> 'Vbi res infamia notabilis et ab omni consuetudine remota compamit Rex namque Rogerum episcopum Salesbiriensem et Alexandrum Lincolniensem ipsius nepotem cum pacifice suscepisset, uiolenter in curia sua cepit, nichil iusticie recusantes et iudicii equitatem deuotissime poscentes', Huntingdon, 10, 10, pp. 720-1.

desire for money' for the events in which 'he laid wicked hands on them;' he argued that Stephen was responsible for destroying (and ignoring) the political and social relationship between himself and his bishop.<sup>126</sup> The perceptions of these authors was that Stephen disregarded the bond with his bishops and was disgraced by his actions.

Other chroniclers blame the bishops' disloyalty. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* puts them in the same group as other lords who had broken their oaths to Stephen and held their castles against him.<sup>127</sup> While it was true that many barons across England did exactly what the author says, he locates the bishops in this group without offering any other considerations or information on the matter. The royalist *Gesta Stephani* recorded that Roger had,

...promised, but in secret, to avoid offending the king, that he would most loyally keep faith with them [the Angevins] and grant them zealous aid, and his castles, which...he was filling on a very lavish scale with weapons...shrewdly combining service to the king with waiting till the time should duly come when those others arrived in England and he could help them with the utmost vigour and speed.<sup>128</sup>

However, he also understood and expressed the count of Meulan's role in provoking the violence at court, persuading the king, and inflaming the envy of the barons by saying that their castles existed,

...not to put the king in possession of his kingdom, but to steal his royal majesty from him and plot against the majesty of his crown; wherefore it would be judicious and was most expedient for the king's peace to lay hands on them, that they might give up to the king for his honour the castles and whatever else could give rise to strife and wars, but that they should be yielded to their disposal.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> 'eis manus injiceret...odio personarum vel ambitu pecuniarum... (unmindful of the service which he, before all others, had rendered him on his entry into his kingdom) male recordans bonorum que in introitu regni sui, pre omnibus aliis, ei congesserat', Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-61.

<sup>127</sup> ASC, E, pp. 198-9.

<sup>128</sup> 'eisque fidem firmissime seruatorum subsidiumque seditate impensurum, occulte tamen ne regem offenderet, pollicitans castella sua, quae ornatissime construxerat, tam armis quam escarum copiis munificentissime farciebat, prudenter et regi deseruiens et temporis oportunitatem expectans, quo illis in Angliam aduentatis uirilius et expeditius subueniret', GS, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>129</sup> 'nec hoc ut regi regnum conferrent, set ut regiam ab eo dignitatem subriperent, et ut coronae suae dignitati insidiarentur; quamobrem consultum fore, regiaequae paci potissimum expedire, manus in illos inicere, quantinus castella et quaecumque alia erant discordiae et bellorum materiam, ad honorem regis regi

Here we are told it was the bishops who used their castles to break their bond with the king; they are the tools of their treason. Orderic wrote that Roger was ‘suspected of betraying his king and lord’, but provides little evidence or furthers this comment; he recorded that ‘goaded by savage provocations’ that many received from the bishops, ‘a number of men formed a league against them and, seizing an opportune moment, rose simultaneously and attempted to repay them in their own coin for the injuries inflicted’.<sup>130</sup> He named the Beaumont twins in this plot. Stephen does not appear culpable in Orderic’s eyes and that the king was convinced of ‘the truth of the disingenuous and spiteful statements that had been made to him before’ when Nigel held Devizes against him.<sup>131</sup> Fortifying the castle and taking up arms against the king was a sure sign that the bishops had ruptured the relationship between them. While John of Worcester does say that the bishops were arrested ‘for plotting against the crown’, he provides one of the most balanced accounts placing blame equally on both parties.<sup>132</sup>

While Nigel’s flight to Devizes was for his own protection it was also construed as treasonous and the fortification of the castle cemented Stephen’s fears and destroyed the bishops’ position altogether. Roger’s arrival at Oxford with a well-armed group of men, possibly his household or personal guard, further confirmed the king’s suspicions; when Stephen then armed his own men it created an atmosphere of mistrust and the confrontation seemed inevitable. The machinations and animosity of Waleran of Meulan were responsible for the rumours of treason and instilling suspicion, but the details of the situation revolved around the castles. The confiscation of these castles was certainly the symptom of the arrest

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*dimitterent*, Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> ‘*derogabatur quod regi dominoque suo Stephano esset infidus...Vnde furiosis punccionibus exerciti plures contra eos conspirauerunt, et occasione concepta pariter insurrexerunt, eisque talionem agitationum illatarum rependere conati sunt*’, Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5.

<sup>131</sup> ‘*quae sibi prius dolose et aemulanter suggesta fuerant, uera credebat*’, GS, 1, 35, pp. 78-9. The king was ‘*iratus*’ and ‘*furenti*’ as he marched to Devizes. Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5.

<sup>132</sup> ‘*quasi regie corone insidiatores*’, Worcester, pp. 266-7.

of the bishops, but it could be argued that Stephen's mistrust resulted from their resourcefulness. Their potential surrender to Matilda caused political and military uncertainty that he was forced to act on. These narratives demonstrate that regardless of whose fault the event was, as multifunctional resources, the castles were too important to be left in the suspect bishops' hands.

There were several castles involved in this event: Roger relinquished Devizes, Malmesbury, Salisbury, and Sherborne, while Nigel lost Ely, and Alexander surrendered Newark and Sleaford. Unfortunately, analysis of their military resourcefulness is limited because the primary concern of the chroniclers was not the castles, but the fate of the bishops. Much of our evidence for the castles' military resourcefulness must be derived from the motives of the protagonists. With the empress' pending arrival, the military security of the realm was in jeopardy. Tactically, Stephen could not afford to lose or be suspicious of any castle and episodes like Exeter and Bedford made him wary. The *ASC* also recorded this threat:

...for every powerful man built his castles and held them against him and they filled the country full of castles. They oppressed the wretched people of the country severely with castle-building. When the castles were built, they filled them with devils and wicked men.<sup>133</sup>

Because Stephen was uncertain of baronial loyalty on the whole, he could not allow these castles to fall into Matilda's hands and took the initiative when the opportunity presented itself. Thus, whether or not Roger and his nephews were contemplating treason made little difference. Stephen had to ensure direct possession over as many resources as possible and this was probably a strong motivating factor behind the rendering request and eventual confiscation of these castles. The *Gesta Stephani* named castles as tools of 'strife and wars'

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<sup>133</sup> *ASC*, E, pp. 198-9.

perceiving their potential threat as political and military resources.<sup>134</sup> Stephen's barons recognised that the bishops' castles were a threat to royal stability arguing that they could be used 'not to put the king in possession of his kingdom, but to steal his royal majesty from him and plot against the majesty of his crown'.<sup>135</sup> Their resourcefulness is well-defined here: they were a threat and not safe in the hands of those with questionable loyalty. Roger filled these castles 'on a very lavish scale with weapons and supplies of food...waiting till the time should duly come when those others [the Angevins] arrived in England and he could help them with the utmost vigour and speed'.<sup>136</sup> Regardless of whether he planned on delivering them to the Empress, he was perceived as preparing them as resources for conflict.

Henry I permitted Roger of Salisbury to possess and enhance his magnificent castles partially because their possession by a loyal subject meant they could be used to stabilise royal authority. For Henry, Roger's castles balanced out powerful magnates like the Beaumonts and even Robert of Gloucester; however, under Stephen, they threatened to upset the balance of power if, as the magnates claimed, they were to be used against the king. Their possession by someone who was not strictly loyal to the king was a serious threat, and while the tradition of rendability and licensing existed for situations like this, as discussed previously, Stephen did not have the power to enforce those traditions. Stephen's desperate acts demonstrated just how worried he was; he demanded the castles as punishment so as to eliminate their political and military threat. The bishops too understood their resourcefulness and 'they were ready to give satisfaction but hesitated about the surrender of the castles' knowing both they and Matilda would lose possession of valuable resources.<sup>137</sup> By relinquishing possession of these resources they limited their ability to

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<sup>134</sup> See p. 235, n. 139, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> See p. 235, n. 128, *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> '*Illos ad satisfaciendum paratos, sed de deditioe castellorum cunctantes, ne abirent artius asseruari precepit*', Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9.

influence politics and warfare; by losing them, they had nothing to aid Matilda in her quest if that was their intention. When Nigel fortified Devizes, he demonstrated how quickly this resource could become a realistic and immediate threat; this was exactly what Stephen feared and he moved quickly to eliminate it.

The construction and existence of the bishops' castles caused a great deal of unbalance, concern, and fear in Stephen's reign; so why did he not destroy them and end this threat? The answer was simple; they were of far greater value standing. The *Gesta Stephani* echoes this: 'we wonder at the surprising good fortune that was the king's lot'.<sup>138</sup> True, they could fall into the hands of his enemies as happened to Devizes in 1140 (Robert Fitz Hubert then to Robert of Gloucester) and Malmesbury in 1153 (to Henry Fitz Empress); however, their value to him as resources, particularly militarily, in the face of an Angevin invasion was worth this risk. Thus, regardless of the possibility of the castle being taken from him, Stephen gained a great deal of stability, security, and power from maintaining these castles as multifunctional resources.

Unlike the episodes surrounding Exeter and Bedford, no chronicler described the siege of Devizes in 1139, or even if any siege tactics were employed. This is certainly because the chroniclers were far more interested in these events for their moral application. However, we do have descriptions of some of the castles and archaeological evidence with which to gauge the chroniclers' descriptions (Appendix D, figures 3-9). Henry of Huntingdon wrote that Devizes had 'none more splendid in the whole of Europe;' Sherborne 'which was almost equal to Devizes in splendour;' Newark was built near the river Trent and a 'most beautiful castle in a florid style' and Sleaford was 'not inferior in style or position' to Newark.<sup>139</sup> The

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<sup>138</sup> See p. 233, n. 114, *GS*, 1, 36, pp. 80-1.

<sup>139</sup> 'quo non erat aliud splendidus intra fines Europe...quod parum Diuisis decore cedebat...uenantissimum florida compositione castellum...neque forma neque situ a predicto secundum', Huntingdon, 10, 10-1, pp. 718-23.

*Gesta Stephani* tells us that Roger's castles were elaborate, renowned, with 'towers and buildings of great strength', and that they were 'built with so much care;' Devizes was 'constructed with wonderful skill and impregnable fortification'.<sup>140</sup> William of Newburgh described Devizes and Sherborne as 'two imposing castles of the costliest workmanship, striving with the utmost vanity that they should have no rival in the kingdom', and that they were 'splendid;' Alexander also had built 'two quite notable castles at prodigious expense'.<sup>141</sup> William of Malmesbury tells us that at Sherborne and Devizes 'he had raised masses of masonry, surmounted by towers, building over a great extent of ground' and Salisbury was surrounded with a wall by Roger after Henry I gave it to him.<sup>142</sup> At Salisbury and Malmesbury were 'buildings large in scale, expensive, and very beautiful to look at, the courses of stone being laid so exactly that the joints defy inspection and give the whole wall the appearance of a single rock-face'.<sup>143</sup> Orderic Vitalis says only that Devizes was a 'very powerful fortress'.<sup>144</sup>

To put these cliché-sounding comments into context, we should look again at the descriptions of Exeter and Bedford. These two castles are described in relatively good physical detail, contrasting with the absence of similar information about the bishops' castles. However, what we lack from these contextual examples is the awe-inspired descriptions that the chroniclers provide for the bishops' castles which demonstrate that they were perceived as impressive, magnificent, and costly. Additionally, we can see a variance in fortification and expressions of different levels of the technology. It appears that many of

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<sup>140</sup> *'turres et aedificia munitissima subuexisse...summo et amore complectebantur...mirando artificio sed et munimine inexpugnabili firmatum'*, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>141</sup> *'duo enim nobilia sumptuosissimo opere castella, scilicet Divisas et Scireburnam, construxit, vanissime satagens ne reciperent comparationem in regno...praeclara...expensis profusissimis castella exstruxit'*, Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-9.

<sup>142</sup> *'multum terrarum edificiiis amplexus, turritas moles erexerat'*, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>143</sup> *'Fecit enim ibi edicitia spatio diffusa, numero pecuniarum sumptosa, e specie formosissima, ita iuste composito ordine lapidum ut iunctura perstringat intuitum et totam maceriam unum mentiatur esse saxum'*, Malmesbury, *GRA*, 5, 408, pp. 736-9.

<sup>144</sup> *'fortissimum oppidum'*, Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5.

the bishops' castles, particularly Roger's, were at the forefront of development across Europe, were magnificent examples of the advancing technology of fortification, and are clearly understood as pinnacles of their kind.

Roger and Alexander (at Newark) did not make a keep the centre of their castles 'preferring the more flexible arrangement of domestic buildings that a strong curtain wall allowed'.<sup>145</sup> Salisbury and Sherborne each had large residential blocks constructed round a courtyard and their similarities have been attributed to Roger.<sup>146</sup> His castles were consistently ornate: Sherborne still has evidence of the skilled carvings common to his castles (Appendix D, figure 5b and 5c) and fits the descriptions from the chroniclers.<sup>147</sup> It had a thirty-foot deep moat, a twenty-six foot wall that was seven feet thick and formed an octagon; a large gate was in the south-western corner (Appendix D, figure 5a and 5d) with another entrance in the north wall; the curtain wall encompassed three and a half acres with small towers located in each corner and a primary tower of seventy feet.<sup>148</sup> Thus, while it could be said that Sherborne 'was intended to be a luxurious place in which to live', it was a well-fortified castle.<sup>149</sup> At Devizes, a previous motte-and-bailey castle burned in 1113 and was rebuilt in stone.<sup>150</sup> The site has not been systematically excavated but it appears to have had a traditional plan with a thirty-foot deep moat that surrounded a mound of the same height topped by a thick, square keep about 'seventy by eighty by ninety feet high'.<sup>151</sup> The known physical appearance of these castles certainly fits in with the magnificence, expansiveness, and expense described by the chroniclers as well as demonstrating their

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<sup>145</sup> Stalley, 'Twelfth-Century Patron of Architecture', pp. 67-8.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid, pp. 65, 70; Kealey, pp. 86-90. Kealey also argues that Roger constructed the castle at Kidwelly with similar attributes, pp. 20-1, 106-7; and that while Duke Robert was imprisoned in Devizes from 1106-26, he may have 'recalled his military experience in Normandy and the Holy Land and used it to assist Roger in planning his castles'. p. 90.

<sup>147</sup> Stalley, 'Twelfth-Century Patron of Architecture', p. 62; Kealey, pp. 86-90.

<sup>148</sup> Kealey, pp. 86-90; *Historical Monuments Report for Dorset 1* (1952), pp. 64-5; J. Fowler, *Mediaeval Sherborne* (London, 1951), pp. 103-29.

<sup>149</sup> Stalley, 'Twelfth-Century Patron of Architecture', pp. 67-8.

<sup>150</sup> Kealey, pp. 86-90.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

fortification elements like walls, mounds, moats, gates, and towers. Perhaps the awe the chroniclers were relaying derived not only from their ornate style but their advanced and grand fortifications.

For the events surrounding the arrest of the bishops, we have almost no references to garrisons because, as seen earlier, garrisons were crucial to the military resourcefulness of castles and were mentioned alongside siege preparations which only Devizes experienced.<sup>152</sup> However, not even the garrison of Devizes is mentioned; with the chroniclers so intent on the actions of the bishops and the political and social repercussions of the event, they conceivably did not feel a garrison worthy of mention. One reference across the wider context of this event that may denote a garrison comes from Howden: he described Newark as ‘extremely well-fortified and most amply supplied’.<sup>153</sup> We have seen in a previous chapter that this could mean either supplied with men or provisions, and since it is well-fortified, a garrison and provisions could be implied. Additionally, Howden, demonstrating his understanding of the garrison’s control over the castle and its responsibility in defending it, recorded that Alexander had to request ‘his own people to transfer his castle from his own authority into the hands of strangers’.<sup>154</sup>

We find Devizes described as ‘fortified’ on several occasions: Stephen heard ‘that the castle of Devizes was fortified against him’<sup>155</sup> and a castle ‘named Devizes, made ready with determination to resist the king’.<sup>156</sup> Earlier in the passage, we are told that Roger ‘was filling [his castles] on a very lavish scale with weapons and supplies of food’, but he is not

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<sup>152</sup> In other passages in the chronicles, we have garrisons at these castles when they are under siege. When Robert Fitz Hubert takes Malmesbury and Devizes in 1140, garrisons mentioned at both castles: Newburgh, 1, 29, pp. 122-5; Worcester, pp. 284-91; *GS*, 1, 43 and 45, pp. 92-7, and 2, 87 and 119, pp. 170-1, 234-5.

<sup>153</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 235-6; ‘*fortissimum et florentissimum*’, Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 196-7.

<sup>154</sup> ‘*ut castrum suum a jure suo in extraneorum custodiam deponerent*’, *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> ‘*audito quod castellum Diuisas nuncupatum contra illum obfirmaretur*’, Worcester, pp. 244-9.

<sup>156</sup> ‘*quod Diuisa dicebatur, itinere sub festinatione protenso, ad obsistendum regi uiriliter se accinxit*’, *GS*, 1, 35, pp. 78-9.

described as fortifying them.<sup>157</sup> This was probably because he was provisioning his castles, as many barons were at this time, but not preparing them for a confrontation against anyone in particular. Only Devizes, which was prepared by Nigel for a siege, was described as fortified; the others were not prepared (or preparing) for a military confrontation. Because Roger did not expect his castles to face any military confrontations, he is not fortifying his castles but simply supplying them; they have not yet become military resources but they have the potential.

The most demonstrative example of a castle as a residence in this episode is only found in Orderic. When Stephen arrived at Devizes, it was held by Matilda of Ramsbury, Roger of Salisbury's mistress, and it was her primary residence.<sup>158</sup> She was credited with its surrender to save her son's life. Additionally, one can gauge the residential intention of these castles based on how they were constructed and the corresponding descriptions within the chronicles. Almost all the bishops' castles were constructed (or improved) in magnificent and ornamental ways and the money spent on them was an expression of the bishops' power, wealth, and position, but it could also be an attempt to make them comfortable residences. With perhaps hyperbolic descriptions that these castles had no rivals in Europe, they were elaborate, lavish, and renowned, and thus their function as a residence expressed the power and influence of the owner far more than a manor house could. Their impressiveness increased their use as a social resource but their military and political importance made them splendid and wondrous.

The multifunctional resourcefulness of the bishops' castles succeeded in raising their possessors' status and position to the extent that some barons of England became maliciously envious and targeted them. The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that the count of

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<sup>157</sup> See p. 235, n. 128.

<sup>158</sup> Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5; Kealey, p. 186.

Meulan and other barons were ‘indignant at this splendid pomp of the bishops’ referring to their personality and the use of their castles as social resources and ‘were inflamed against them with a furious blaze of envy’.<sup>159</sup> Malmesbury recorded that ‘[i]n consequence some powerful laymen, vexed that they would be surpassed by clerks in the amassing of wealth and the size of their castles, nourished within their hearts an unseen grudge of envy’.<sup>160</sup> Orderic recorded that the bishops used their wealth and castles to ‘oppress the magnates round them in various ways’.<sup>161</sup> These comments are strong evidence that castles were seen as resources in the social and political status of their possessors, even to their detriment. Bishop Alexander argued that his magnificent castles were constructed as resources for the ‘glorification of his diocese’.<sup>162</sup> Regardless, Roger of Salisbury was known as ‘a great builder of castles, defences, and residences’<sup>163</sup> who ‘wish[ed] to seem magnificent in the buildings he erected’.<sup>164</sup> Orderic Vitalis also added that Roger had ‘strong castles as befitted one who had enjoyed authority over all England’.<sup>165</sup> Orderic clearly understood castles to be social and political resources influencing or resulting from the bishops’ position. Finally, the importance of castles as social and political resources is clearly demonstrated by the consequences of the loss of possession:

So the bishops, handing over to the king this castle and others they had held, were going back soon afterwards, humble and downcast and stripped of all their empty and ostentatious splendour, to hold their church property in the simple fashion that befits a churchman.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> ‘*Hanc autem magnificam episcoporum gloriam comes Mellonensis, ceterique, qui regi artius et priuatius adhaerebant...inuidiae facibus hostiliter in eos efferuebant*’, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>160</sup> See p. 231, n. 105, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>161</sup> ‘*temereque uicinos optimates uariis infestationibus inquietare presumebat*’, Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5.

<sup>162</sup> ‘*dignitatem episcopii*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7; King, *King Stephen*, p. 110.

<sup>163</sup> ‘*castellorum, murorum, domorum fundator precipuus*’, Worcester, pp. 258-9.

<sup>164</sup> ‘*qui aedificiorum constructione magnanimum se uideri uellet*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>165</sup> ‘*Rogerus enim Salesburiensis presul diuitiis ac potentibus amicis ac munitionibus admodum fretus, utpote qui toti Angliae omni uita Henrici regis pre fuerat*’, Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5.

<sup>166</sup> ‘*Hoc igitur castello sed et allis, quae possederant, in manus regis contraditis, episcopi humiles postmodum et depressi omnemque inanis gloriae pompositatem exuti, ad res ecclesiasticas simpliciter et ecclesiastice possidendas regrediebantur*’, *GS*, 1, 36, pp. 80-1.

By losing these castles, the bishops became ‘simple’ without any status beyond their office, losing influence at court, social status, and their powerful identity as castle owners.

Most of the passages concerning the arrest of the bishops denote ownership of the castle by a particular person, but there are occasions when no reference was given. For example, John of Worcester says that Nigel of Ely ‘fled with a body of soldiers to Devizes, that he might find protection there’<sup>167</sup> and later does not recognise or communicate that Ely belonged to Nigel when Stephen took it in 1140.<sup>168</sup> This could simply be because the castles and the event was so renowned that the audience would not have needed to be told directly who owned these castles. However, the extensive use of personal pronouns and possessives in these passages clearly demonstrate that the castle was a personal resource. We see Devizes constantly referred to as the bishop of Salisbury’s.<sup>169</sup> Even when Nigel holds the castle it is still designated as ‘his uncle’s castle (*castellum auunculi sui*)’.<sup>170</sup> Henry of Huntingdon recorded Stephen taking Devizes, Sherborne, Newark, and Sleaford, each time making their ownership clear to his readers.<sup>171</sup> John of Worcester does acknowledge Roger’s possession of these castles stating that on his death, ‘his castles’ went to Stephen, and called Roger the ‘founder (*castelli fundatorem*)’ of Devizes.<sup>172</sup> The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* recorded that the bishops were imprisoned ‘till they surrendered their castles’.<sup>173</sup> William of Newburgh also affiliated the bishops with the castles they built and wrote that the king ‘stripped them of their money and their castles (*captos inclusit, arctabit, pecuniis et castellis nudavit*)’ and Roger ‘relinquished those two splendid castles (*ita coarctavit ut duo illa*

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<sup>167</sup> ‘*manu militari ad Diuisas fugit, ut ibi protegeretur*’, Worcester, pp. 266-7.

<sup>168</sup> Worcester, pp. 280-1.

<sup>169</sup> Torigni, pp. 136-7; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>170</sup> *GS*, 1, 35, pp. 78-9.

<sup>171</sup> ‘he took the bishop of Salisbury with him to a castle of his called Devizes (*episcopum Salesbiriensem secum duxit ad castellum eiusdem, quod uocatur Diuise*);’ ‘taking with him Bishop Alexander... At Newark... the bishop had built a most beautiful castle (*Ibi quidem construxerat episcopus super flumen Trente in loco amenissimo uenantissimum florida compositione castellum*)’, Huntingdon 10, 10, pp. 718-23.

<sup>172</sup> Worcester, pp. 244-9, 258-9.

<sup>173</sup> *ASC*, E, pp. 198-9.

*praeclara castella... resignaret*).<sup>174</sup> William of Malmesbury recorded personal possession in detail:

Alexander had built the castle of Newark... Roger, wishing to seem magnificent in the buildings he erected, had built several. At Sherborne and at Devizes he had raised masses of masonry, surmounted by towers, building over a great extent of ground. At Malmesbury he had begun a castle... The castle at Salisbury, which belonged immediately to the king, he had obtained from King Henry, surrounded with a wall and brought under his own guardianship.<sup>175</sup>

This last sentence even provides an example of a castle changing possession between Henry I and Roger. Finally, Malmesbury recorded that Alexander bought ‘his freedom with the surrender of his castle[s of Newark of Sleaford] (*redditione castellorum Niwerh et Eslefford liberationem mercatus*)’.<sup>176</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* described Devizes as ‘a castle of the Bishop of Salisbury (*quod erat Salesbiriensis episcopi castellum*);’ Stephen ‘bent all his efforts to gaining possession of their castles (*tantoque in episcopos uehementiori indignatione succensus, ad eorum possidenda municipia totus intendit*)’ so that ‘until by the restoration to Caesar of their castles and those things that belonged to Caesar (*donec municipiis suis et quae Caesaris essent Caesari redditis*)’ they should remain in prison; so the bishops ‘put at the king’s disposal the castles they had built with so much care and regarded with so much affection (*ni municipia sua, quae summo studio construxerant, summo et amore complectebantur, in regis deliberationem committerent*); they handed ‘over to the king this castle and others they had held (*hoc igitur castello sed et alliis, quae possederant, in manus regis contraditis*)’.<sup>177</sup> It is evident from the direct association of the castle with their possessors that this author clearly understood a personal element of the castle’s existence.

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<sup>174</sup> Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-61.

<sup>175</sup> ‘*Alexander ad tutamen... castellum de Niwewerche construxerat; Rogerius qui aedificiorum constructione magnanimum se uideri uellet, plura, Apud Scireburnam et apud Diuisas multum terrarum edificiiis amplexus, turritas moles erexerat. Apud Malmesberiam in ipso cimiterio... castellum inchoauerat. Castellum Salesberie, quod cum regii iuris proprium esset, ab Henrico rege impetratum, muro cinctum custodiae sue attraxerat*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>176</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9.

<sup>177</sup> *GS*, 1, 34-36, pp. 72-81. This author is stressing the grandeur to prove his point on morality.

While it could be argued that the bishops held these castles with the king's permission, they were still referred to as in the bishop's possession; they are clearly understood as their possessions and their resources.

Royal jurisdiction over castles was rarely commented on unless a castle was not rendered but as we have seen, castles were typically referred to as belonging to those who possessed them. As discussed in a previous chapter, there were two different types of castles: those held by barons with the king's permission or built by barons with a royal licence (baronial), and those held by lords as constables, custodians, or castellans as a royal officer (royal). Miles and Baldwin held both baronial and royal castles and we have seen the difference in how the chroniclers referred to them in this context. Baldwin attempted to make Exeter his castle, add it to his direct holdings like Carisbrooke or Plympton, and remove the castellan aspect of his possession; Miles wanted to continue to hold Bedford as its castellan and not relinquish possession to Hugh. The difference in their goals was reflected in the vocabulary used to describe their possession. In the episode regarding the bishops, royal castles were typically expressed in terms common to the following sentence: Roger had 'the castle at Salisbury, which belonged immediately to the king, and he had obtained from King Henry'.<sup>178</sup> Henry had given Salisbury to Roger to hold as a castellan but, as we have seen in the chronicles, the castle was still referred to as Roger's.<sup>179</sup> Baronial castles can be characterised by Roger's castles at Malmesbury and Sherborne, but more particularly Devizes, where he constructed or was given the castle as a tenurial possession.<sup>180</sup> When the chroniclers discussed Roger's castles, they rarely include Salisbury

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<sup>178</sup> See p. 246, n. 175, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>179</sup> Green, *Government*, pp. 123-4; Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', p. 332; Kealey, pp. 3, 20-21; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 825-6; King, *King Stephen*, p. 110.

<sup>180</sup> Described of as the 'castle's founder (*castelli fundatorem*)' for Devizes: Worcester, pp. 244-9. Given credit for building Devizes, Sherborne, and Malmesbury: Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7. Alexander is always described as having built Newark and Sleaford: Newburgh, 1, 6, pp. 56-61; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 23, pp. 46-9. The bishops built their castles: Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7; *King's Works*, vol. 2, pp. 626-8, 734, 824-8, 832-3.

but focus on Malmesbury, Sherborne, and Devizes. This was not an oversight. Salisbury might have been improved and held by Roger, but it was a royal castle. Additionally, as Henry of Winchester attempted to argue during the council of Winchester, the others belonged to his diocese and successor after Roger's death in the same way a baronial castle would pass to a lord's heir. The king's confiscation, or practical application of rendability, caused an issue amongst the bishops because they perceived him as taking Church property.

While the castles are understood to be the bishops', when Stephen orders them rendered at Oxford, whatever his reason, the bishops are perceived as obligated to indulge him. By refusing, they provide Stephen with the right to take them by force and give credence to the claims of treason. Had they willingly rendered the castles, they might have received them back once their loyalty was assured. Instead, they became royal enemies and permanently lost their castles demonstrating the consequences of refusing to render a castle to the king. The example of the bishops presented a different and more detailed perspective on rendability and consequences than Exeter and Bedford.<sup>181</sup> The consequent council of Winchester concluded by confirming the tradition of rendability and demonstrated that it was the most influential way that the castle was used as a multifunctional resource in the twelfth century. Henry of Blois, as papal legate, called an ecclesiastical council at Winchester for 29 August, 1139 in response to the bishops' appeal to regain their property and to argue against the secular confiscation of ecclesiastical property.<sup>182</sup> By calling this council, Henry was essentially taking his brother, the king, to task for his affront to episcopal inviolability and violation of Church rights. He argued that:

...if the bishops had in anything stepped aside from the path of justice, then it was not for the king to judge them, but for the canon law; without a general council of churchmen they should not have been deprived of any property: the king had not acted thus through zeal for righteousness but to serve his own advantage, seeing that he had not restored the castles to the churches at whose

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<sup>181</sup> Coulson in Liddiard, pp. 184-5.

<sup>182</sup> For more about the council see: Kealey, p. 189-200.

expense and on whose land they had been built but handed them over to laymen and likewise men of little religion.<sup>183</sup>

He was trying to make these castles church property based on their possessors' position and the source of the money used to build and improve them.<sup>184</sup> Thus, by arresting bishops, Stephen offended his ecclesiastical lords. The issue affected more than the insulted bishops; according to Henry of Huntingdon, 'Theobald, archbishop of Canterbury, and all the bishops present, fell at the royal feet, begging in most eager supplication, that to gain their free forgiveness of all his offences against the said bishops, he should restore their possessions to them'.<sup>185</sup>

This council, though ecclesiastical, was recognised by Stephen. It is possible that his predecessors would not have acknowledged a council of this sort, and in doing so, Stephen demonstrated his weakness and instability. But his position was tenuous and he needed Church support, so while he was perceived to have violated the episcopal rights, he needed to demonstrate the righteousness of his cause. William of Malmesbury, who witnessed this council, provided a detailed account of Stephen's case:

...the Bishop of Salisbury secretly favoured the king's enemies, though meanwhile he disguised his craft for the time: the king had learnt that beyond doubt by many proofs, and this especially, that the bishop had not allowed Roger de Mortimer, with the king's troops whom he was leading to stay even one night at Malmesbury, when he was in the greatest dread of the people of Bristol. Everyone was saying that as soon as the Empress came he would take her side together with his nephews and his castles.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> *'si episcopi tramite iustitie in aliquot transgredierentur, non esse regis, set canonum iudicium; sine publico et ecclesiastico concilio illos nulla possessione priuari debuisset: regem id non rectitudinis zelo, sed commode sui compendio fecisset; qui castella non ecclesiis, ex quarum sumptibus et in quarum terris constructa erant, reddiderit, sed laicis eisdemque parum religiosi contradiderit'*, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 24, pp. 48-51.

<sup>184</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, pp. 58-9; King, *King Stephen*, p. 113.

<sup>185</sup> *'Tedbaldus Cantuariensis archiepiscopus, et omnes episcopi qui aderant, ad pedes regis deuoluti sunt, deuotissima supplicatione poscentes, ut episcopis predictis possessiones suas redderet, ut omnia in eo commissa regi benigne condonarent'*, Huntingdon, 10, 11, pp. 720-3.

<sup>186</sup> *'Episcopum Salesberiensem inimicis regis clam fauere, dissimulata interim pro tempore uersutia: id regem ex multis indubitanter comperisse; eoque potissimum, quod Rogerium de Mortemer, cum militibus regis quos ducebat, in summo de Bristowiensibus metu, nec una nocte idem episcopus Malmesberie manere dimisisset. Omnibus esse in ore, quod, statim ut imperatrix uenisset, ille ad eam cum nepotibus et castellis se conferret'*, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 27, pp. 54-7.

This refusal to house royal troops was a refusal to render a castle to the king; Stephen clearly took this as a sign that Roger intended to betray him. This is the only narrative which mentions this event but it does not mean it should be ignored. The chronicler was local and plausibly more accurate and detailed about events that happened in his vicinity; therefore, it is plausible that Roger de Mortimer was refused entry to Malmesbury, possibly explaining why Bishop Roger was summoned to the court at Oxford.

Stephen's case, as argued by Aubrey de Vere, stated that Roger was

...arrested not as a bishop but as a servant of the king, who both managed his affairs and received his pay. The king had not seized the castles by force, but both the bishops had surrendered them gladly to avoid facing a charge for the brawl they had stirred up at court.<sup>187</sup>

This issue also emerged when the money that Stephen acquired with the confiscations was discussed:

The king had found some money in the castles, but it was money that lawfully belonged to him, because Bishop Roger had amassed it from the revenues of the royal treasury in the time of King Henry, his uncle and predecessor. However, that same bishop, in the fear induced by his misdeeds, had willingly yielded up the money to the king.<sup>188</sup>

His argument had strong precedents: in 1088 William of St. Calais, and in 1100 Ranulf Flambard, both bishops of Durham, were arrested for treason as tenant-in-chiefs and not as bishops.<sup>189</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* supported this argument by stating that the bishops were arrested 'as sinners against the pacific office of a bishop and suspected enemies of his peace and public order'.<sup>190</sup> This secular possession of castles ties in with Orderic's comment that

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<sup>187</sup> *Rogerus itaque captus sit non ut episcopus, set ut regis seruiens, qui et procuraciones eius administraret et solidatas acciperet. Castella non per uiolentiam rex eripuerit, sed episcopi ambo gratanter reddiderint, ut calumpniam de tumulto quem in curia concitauerant euaderent*, Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> *Aliquantum pecuniarum rex in castellis inuenerit, que ipsius legitime essent; quia eas tempore regis Henrici, auunculi et antecessoris sui, ex fisci regii redditibus Rogerus episcopus collegisset. Eis tamen, sicut et castellis, idem presul pro timore commissorum in regem libens cesserit*, Ibid; *GS* argues nearly the same, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>189</sup> Kealey, pp. 189-200.

<sup>190</sup> *sed ut episcopalis mansuetudinis transgressores suspectosque pacis suae et regni tranquillandi*

Roger's castles befitted his station of secular authority.<sup>191</sup> In this sense, their identity as castle owners gave Stephen an excuse to arrest them and confiscate their castles.

Henry I did not distinguish whom he gave castles to on their secular or ecclesiastical positions, only on their loyalty: Colchester was given to Eudo the steward, Rochester to the archbishop of Canterbury, Dover and Canterbury to Robert of Gloucester, Salisbury to Bishop Roger, and Wallingford to Brian Fitz Count.<sup>192</sup> Bishop Gundulf has been called the 'master of works' on the White Tower and was later ordered by Henry I to re-build Rochester which acted as the precursor to other castle-possessing bishops like Roger of Salisbury and Henry of Blois (Taunton, Farnham, Downton, Merdon, Bishop's Waltham, and Wolvesey).<sup>193</sup> Clearly, castle ownership and construction in England was never solely a secular activity.<sup>194</sup> While it could be argued that the contention over the possession of castles by bishops was brought up because of the politics of the situation, there does seem to be 'something anomalous, if not improper, about a bishop constructing his see palace in the form of a castle'.<sup>195</sup> However, on their manor property, the 'inhibitions that existed in the precinct of the cathedral' were no longer relevant and the situation was no different from a secular lord's.<sup>196</sup> It has been suggested that since Roger did not have a monastic background, maybe his possession of a castle could be examined in a different light; however, his contemporaries made no such distinction.<sup>197</sup> Waleran of Meulan argued that once safety was

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*peruersores, priuatim captos custodiae manciparet*, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5.

<sup>191</sup> Orderic, 13, 40, pp. 530-5.

<sup>192</sup> Green, *Government*, pp. 123-4; Hollister, 'Anglo-Norman Civil War', p. 332; Kealey, pp. 3, 20-1; *King's Work*, vol. 2, pp. 825-6; S. Marritt, 'Reeds Shaken by the Wind? Bishops in Local and Regional Politics in King Stephen's Reign', in Dalton and White, p. 117.

<sup>193</sup> Archbishop William of Corbeil was responsible for the '*egregia turris*' at Rochester. Liddiard, pp. 3-4. While Farnham has been included by several chronicles as a castle of the Bishop of Winchester, its construction by Henry of Blois has been doubted and it might have been built by William Giffard. However, Henry of Blois did possess this castle regardless of whether he constructed it. Riall, 'New Castles of Henry de Blois', pp. 115-29.

<sup>194</sup> Chibnall, *Empress Matilda*, p. 79; Clark, *Medieval Military Architecture*, p. 48. Additionally, modern scholars argue that 'crenellation was equally resonant in ecclesiastical as well as secular circles'. Liddiard, pp. 3-4. Creighton and Higham, p. 21.

<sup>195</sup> Kealey, p. 84.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>197</sup> M. Thompson, *Medieval Bishops' Houses in England and Wales* (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 89-90.

secure ‘there should be yielded to their disposal, in pious and Catholic fashion, what pertained to the Church and to the sacred character and rights of a bishop’ and he did not mean castles.<sup>198</sup> Waleran might have been used as a mouthpiece for the author’s perception, but the *Gesta Stephani* was the only chronicler who mentioned the appropriateness of the bishops possessing castles. His contemporaries ascribed this similarly to all lords regardless of religious position. William of Malmesbury did note that the bishops ‘were mad with a rage for castle-building’ but this comments on their preoccupation and is not a criticism on their right to possess them.<sup>199</sup>

Unfortunately for the bishops, the archbishop of Rouen buttressed Stephen’s case on secular and ecclesiastical levels. He argued that the bishops could have their castles if they proved it was permitted by canon law; but it was not, and since ‘it was the height of impudence to contend against the canons’ they could not hold their castles.<sup>200</sup> Then, the archbishop’s argument turned to the theory of rendability: ‘as the times are eventful, all chiefs, after the custom of other nations, ought to deliver up the keys of their fortifications to the will of the king, who is bound to wage war for the common security’.<sup>201</sup> This left the bishops in a quandary ‘for, either according to the decrees of the canons, it was unjust for them to have castles; or, if that were allowed by the king’s indulgence, they ought to yield to the emergency of the times, and give up the keys’.<sup>202</sup> The council resulted in the ecclesiastical acknowledgement that ‘all towns, castles, and fortified places throughout England where secular business was conducted should submit to the jurisdiction of the

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<sup>198</sup> ‘*quae uero ecclesiastica propositi essent, religionis et iuris episcopalis, in eorum deliberatione sancte et catholice cederent*’, *GS*, 1, 34, pp. 72-5; Kealey, p. 176.

<sup>199</sup> ‘*in castellis edificandis insanire*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 22, pp. 44-7.

<sup>200</sup> ‘*extreme improbitatis esse contra canones niti uelle*’, Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 29, pp. 56-9.

<sup>201</sup> ‘*certe, quia suspectum est tempus, secundum morem aliarum gentium, optimates omnes claues munitio-  
num suarum debent uoluntati regis contradere, qui pro omnium pace debet militare*’, *Ibid*.

<sup>202</sup> ‘*aut enim secundum canonum scita iniustum est ut habeant castella; aut, si hoc ex indulgentia principali toleratur, ut tradant claues necessitati temporis debent cedere*’, *Ibid*.

king;’ this was an acknowledgement of the theory of rendability.<sup>203</sup> The *Gesta Stephani*’s comments that the ‘restoration to Caesar of their castles and those things that belonged to Caesar’ and that ‘any receptacles of war and disturbance in the hands of any of the bishops should be handed over to the king as his own property’ demonstrate that this author also understood that castles were under royal jurisdiction.<sup>204</sup> Additionally, Roger of Howden, writing later, was explicitly negative about Stephen’s actions and only objected to the treatment of the bishops and not to the confiscation of their castles.<sup>205</sup> This is possibly because his judgement was coloured by a generational interpretation of the event and the reign of Henry II, during which the confiscation of castles became standard practice and improper treatment of clergy, like the murder of an archbishop, was relevant and significant.

We can see that it was the castle’s role as a multifunctional resource that concerned the chroniclers and their characters the most. The physical descriptions of these castles, while being complementary and praising, are vague; the vocabulary attributing these castles to their appropriate owners is simple and understated. However, the issues of rendability, the threat these castles posed if they fell into the wrong hands, and the reluctance of the bishops to surrender them to the king all emphasise the multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle. If Roger and his nephews intended to aid Matilda, then of course they would refuse to relinquish powerful castles to her enemy. Stephen could not allow her to possess these resources and so was forced to act regardless of the truth behind the whispers of treason. This feature of castles was so important that if the bishops had not been in possession of these castles, then they might not have been targeted by certain magnates and, subsequently,

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<sup>203</sup> ‘*oppida, castella, munitiones queque in quibus secularia solent exerceri negotia, regis... iuri cedant*’, Worcester, pp. 268-9; King, *King Stephen*, p. 114.

<sup>204</sup> ‘*donec municipiis suis et quae Caesaris essent Caesari redditis... firme statuntur quaecumque in quorumlibet episcoporum manu belli essent ac tumultus receptacula, tanquam propria regis regi permitterentur*’; separate passage that expresses the bishops’ understanding that ‘especially as what belongs to Caesar must be rendered unto Caesar (*maxime cum ea, quae Caesaris sunt, Caesari sint reddenda*)’, *GS*, 1, 34-36, pp. 72-81.

<sup>205</sup> Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 235-6; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 196-7.

suspected of treason. The strategic importance of these castles, as demonstrated later by Devizes and Malmesbury, threatened Stephen, and their possessors were suspect.

Henry of Huntingdon sums up the castle's role as a vehicle in the bishops' fall in his epitaph of Roger of Salisbury:

May all who read this pause to marvel at so great and sudden a reversal of fortune. For so many blessings had come to that man from his earliest youth, and had accumulated without interruption, that we all might have said that with regard to him fortune's changeableness had been forgotten. During the whole of his life he was unaffected by any adversity, until at the last he was smothered by a great landslide of troubles simultaneously heaped upon him. Therefore let no one trust in the continuance of happiness, nor take fortune's constancy for granted nor strive to remain for long set in place on the revolving wheel.<sup>206</sup>

While Huntingdon's comments are meant to strike a moral tone with his audience, they can be contextualised to include the possession of castles as multifunctional resources. Roger's great fortune to become a trusted advisor of Henry I put him in a position to possess many castles which confirmed and aided his rise in status and power. But one event cost him everything. The value of his castles raised suspicions and envy and their confiscation in order to protect royal authority left him with nothing. His castles solidified and maintained his position as the king's man; by losing them, he lost this validation, became nothing, and wasted away. The bishops' pride, and their social and political collapse, was manifested in castles. Through the alterations in the balance of power, by gaining or losing castles, the story of Roger of Salisbury and his nephews as well as Baldwin de Redvers and Miles de Beauchamp clearly demonstrate the contemporary perception of the castle as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource.

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<sup>206</sup> *'Stupeant igitur omnes lecturi tantam tam subitam rerum permutationem. Viro namque prefato tot a iuventutis exordio bona contigerant, et sine interpolatione in cumulum creuerant, ut diceremus omnes in eo fortunam sue uolubilitatis oblitam. Nec aliquibus aduersis in tota uita sua potuit affici, donec tante miserie cumulus simul confluens in extremis eum prefocauit. Nullus igitur de felicitatis assiduitate confidat, nullus de fortune stabilitate presumat, nullus in rota uolubili sedem confixam diu superesse contendat'*, Huntingdon, 10, 11, pp. 720-3.

## Chapter 5: Other Medieval Buildings

Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated that contemporaries of twelfth-century castles perceived a castle to be a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource; they were social, political, economic, and military resources and this spectrum distinguished them from other medieval buildings. Liddiard has supported this argument stating that, while castles were only ‘one particular form of noble castellated architecture’, it was ‘the particular combination of residence, administrative centre and fortification that set the castle apart (albeit not exclusively) from other dwellings of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy’.<sup>1</sup> Based on this thesis’ conclusions, this parenthetical comment alludes to the multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle. But Liddard’s comment also begs the questions: what about other medieval buildings? How were they perceived as different? What distinguished them?

Fortification, the strengthening of a structure for defence, was not solely a castle trait and occurred in different forms across a variety of medieval buildings.<sup>2</sup> However, this was typically for reasons, ‘beyond the simple need for security and defence, and included to different extents, the desire to display prestige, wealth and social status’, lordship and power.<sup>3</sup> As with castles, the inclusion of fortified elements on any building demonstrated and symbolised ‘status, wealth, power and defensive needs’ since the expense of including these elements into a design increased the cost of the construction.<sup>4</sup> Thus this ‘military’ architecture and design found in castles, churches, manors, and palaces may have simply been the style of the period without connection to any one structure in particular;

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<sup>1</sup> Liddiard, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> King, *Castle in England and Wales*, 20; Jean Le Patourel, ‘Fortified and Semi-fortified Manor Houses’, *CG* 9-10 (1982), p. 190; Higham and Saunders, p. 120; Creighton and Higham, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Creighton and Higham, pp. 165-6; Liddiard, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> As discussed in chapter one, fortification in the twelfth century included using stone as the primary building material. The development of siege tactics throughout the century required the addition of intermural towers, gatehouses, *et cetera*, but stone continued to be a strong and durable material. Liddiard, p. 2.

crenellation was as familiar in ecclesiastical circles as secular ones.<sup>5</sup> However, as discussed in chapter one, castle-contemporaries perceived ‘fortified (*firmauit*)’ to include several factors like a garrison and opposition to an enemy. Buildings like churches could be fortified against the devil with the clergy as their garrison but their fight was for the souls of men. To hold a castle was to be a member of the fighting class, the *pugnatores*, to have a military resource at your disposal; holding a palace or manor house did not have the same military repercussions. Other buildings, with the exception of cities, did not have the same influence on technology or rules of warfare and certainly did not hold the same military resourcefulness as the castle and fortification elements on manor houses or palaces must be analysed for defensive intent. Additionally, castles were also not the only personal structures, residences, or political and social resources. The owners of palaces and manor houses and the relevant religious orders and chapters personally held the property separate from the communal and shared interests and regardless of any responsibilities (like prayers, church services, and estate management) performed on behalf of or in the interest of public welfare. Palaces, manors, and churches also housed political and social activities meaning they, too, could be used as resources. However, none encompassed social, political, economic, and military roles simultaneously. Thus, while other buildings performed some of these same roles acting as centres of administration, politics, power, and lordship, were personal structures, and had fortified elements, their contemporaries do not perceive them as castles. In order to further demonstrate that these were defining elements of the castle, this chapter will compare each element to perceptions of other medieval buildings and structures, including manor houses, palaces, churches, and cities. Unfortunately, the differentiation of

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, pp. 3-4, 7-8; Heslop in Liddiard, pp. 273-4; Higham and Saunders, p. 120. The Hundred Years War saw a ‘move to defensibility of lay settlements and buildings, both castles and gentry residences, all along the [southern] coast’. J.C. Jenkins, ‘Monasteries and the Defence of the South Coast in the Hundred Years War’, *Southern History* 34 (2012), pp. 16-7; A. Emery, *Greater Medieval Houses of England and Wales, 1300–1500: Southern England* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 269, 283-7, 454-7.

many of these structures, particularly manor houses and monasteries, is relevant primarily after the twelfth century; however, they are addressed here because they provide comparisons of perception which clarifies this thesis' arguments.

## **Manor Houses**

While manor houses were private residences, sometimes fortified, and expressed the wealth, status, and power of their owners, they were not political and military resources. Since the earliest known license to crenellate (permission to add crenellations) for a house was not until the very late twelfth century, the relevance of discussing the medieval manor house is limited for the scope of this thesis.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the fortified house is 'thought to have begun its ascendancy at the same time that English castle building and castle design were reaching their apogee in the late thirteenth century'.<sup>7</sup> However, it still needs to be addressed in order for this proposed definition to be applied outside the years focused on by this research because it is the fortified manor house which causes the most complications and confusion with the castle outside the twelfth century. Coulson has undertaken a study of these licenses during the fourteenth century and has argued that they were status symbols, indicated royal favour, and did not signal defensive intent.<sup>8</sup> Jenkins has argued against this summation, stating that 'for those residences facing the threat of violence defensive reinforcement was also, if not primarily, a practical response to local circumstances'.<sup>9</sup>

Le Patourel identified three separate categories of the medieval manor house: open

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<sup>6</sup> Le Patourel, 'Fortified and Semi-fortified Manor Houses', p. 190; Coulson, 'Freedom to Crenellate by Licence', pp. 91-7, and 'Hierarchism in Conventual Crenellation', pp. 93-5. Crenellations were and are the fortification elements visualised most often with castles. For physical examples see Appendix E.

<sup>7</sup> Dean in Reyerson and Powe, p. 147.

<sup>8</sup> Coulson, 'Structural Symbolism', pp. 73-90, and 'Freedom to Crenellate by Licence', pp. 91-7. For a list of 'conventual licences to crenellate from 1200-1536' see 'Hierarchism in Conventual Crenellation', pp. 93-5.

<sup>9</sup> Jenkins, 'Monasteries', p. 17.

manors, semi-fortified manors, and fortified manors; above these she placed the castle as the pinnacle of personal fortification.<sup>10</sup> In order to evaluate fortified manors, which began to increase in numbers in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, she needed to establish a definition of a castle. Her definition stated that a castle, at this point, must include a stone curtain wall, projecting towers with provision for flanking fire able to cover the wall as well as a gatehouse. She argued that anything less, ‘the building with a single tower or even with a towered facade, was grouped with the fortified manors’ irrespective of any existence of a moat.<sup>11</sup> What le Patourel’s research means is twofold: first, that with the emergence of licences to fortify and crenellate houses, ‘fortified’, as a characteristic of a castle, becomes constrained to physical appearance and includes specific requirements for application to manor houses. Secondly, that even with different fortified buildings being constructed, the castle is acknowledged and defined as the supreme technological example of fortification. However, her research creates another question: if the castle and the late-medieval fortified manor house were fortified private residences, how did their contemporaries distinguish them?

Roger of Salisbury was described as ‘an eminent builder of castles, defences, and residences’.<sup>12</sup> Here, John of Worcester distinguished between the castle and personal residences (possibly manors). The *Gesta Stephani* also understood a castle and a fortified manor to be different when discussing the castle (*castellum*) and residence (*domus*) of Roger of Bampton.<sup>13</sup> These examples use *domus* for the residence and *castella* for the castle; only from the context can further distinctions be identified. These *domus* never feature in the narrative of events political, social, or military as central to developments or as their possessors’ tools; the multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle was not applicable to the

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<sup>10</sup> Le Patourel, ‘Fortified and Semi-fortified Manor Houses’, p. 191.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 190.

<sup>12</sup> ‘*castellorum, murorum, domorum fundator precipuus*’, Worcester, p. 259.

<sup>13</sup> GS, 1, 14, pp 28-31.

manor house. These differences, even with a lack of direct evidence, demonstrate that there was a distinction in the contemporary understanding of a castle and a manor house. Apart from their possibly limited fortification attributes, manor houses were simply residences, particularly in the twelfth century.<sup>14</sup>

As military technology advanced, the resourcefulness of the castle declined; they no longer were strategic tools. Thus the need to construct a castle declined. However, magnates, barons, and kings still wanted to express their wealth, status, and power. Instead of constructing a castle for which there was no military necessity, they built fortified manors. These still provided a level of security but expressed the power and status of their owners in a more comfortable and relevant manner. But the image of the castle did not disappear. By including crenellations and naming these manors ‘castles’, the owner could invoke its symbolism and multifunctional resourcefulness and apply it to their grand house. With the decline in the military – and thus the political, social, and economic – value of the castle, fortified manors overtook castles as the principal fortified private residence.<sup>15</sup>

## Palaces

Keevill defined a medieval palace by starting with its personal residential functions and their role in public ceremonies. He argued that the ‘site should be intended for reasonably regular visits of one or several nights over a prolonged period’.<sup>16</sup> This concept

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<sup>14</sup> For a case study evaluating whether a site was a castle or manor house see: R. Swallow, ‘What law says that there has to be a castle?: The castle landscape of Frodsham, Cheshire’, in B. Hausmair, B. Jervis, R. Nugent, and E. Williams (eds.), *Archaeologies of Rules and Regulations: Between Text and Practice* (Manchester, Forthcoming, 2014).

<sup>15</sup> It is important to note that there is a grey area in interpretation. This is both a medieval and modern issue. The interpretation of the Latin and subsequent perceptions could affect how a structure is classified as a castle or fortified manor. Additionally, medieval chroniclers use different vocabulary, as discussed, and have different levels of exposure to castles and fortified manors so their distinguishing characteristics could vary.

<sup>16</sup> Keevill, *Medieval Palaces*, pp. 13-8.

implies a degree of comfort and quality acknowledged in the ‘scale and type of materials used in the ranges and chambers lived in by the monarchy and bishops;’ these were not simple homes.<sup>17</sup> The concept of lordship, both ceremonial and functional, was also a central aspect and Keevill argues that ‘palaces could provide the stage for public displays of regal or mitred style and justice’.<sup>18</sup> According to James, a palace ‘was the manor writ large, with a great hall, or halls, chambers, chapels, kitchens and other offices;’ this difference in scale of style, size, and grandeur enabled the ‘elite to display their wealth in sumptuous architecture...to most lavish specifications’.<sup>19</sup> However, these aspects of residence and political display are not adequately distinctive and both Keevill and James acknowledged that any royal or episcopal residence, including hunting lodges and castles, could be ‘defined as palatial’.<sup>20</sup> Both are correct in emphasising the palace’s administrative (political) and social functions and the issue of ownership (i.e. the palace being a personally possessed building) which are crucial to its contemporary understanding. But, what distinguished it from a castle?

The major difference was fortification and military resourcefulness. Palaces could operate as a political resource housing administrative functions and as social and economic resources by symbolising the power and wealth of their owners through architectural style and expense of their personal residences. Higham and Saunders have argued that, as at Durham, the episcopal palace and the royal castle could be one and the same and simultaneously symbolised royal and episcopal power and lordship.<sup>21</sup> However, this was not the norm; typically a separate episcopal palace, which might include fortification elements like gatehouses and towers, signified the bishop’s status but ‘was not indicative of

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> James, *Palaces of Medieval England*, p. 9.

<sup>20</sup> Keevill, *Medieval Palaces*, pp. 13-8.

<sup>21</sup> Higham and Saunders, p. 120.

independent political ambition nor of actual military threat'.<sup>22</sup> These fortification elements might be the 'result of specific royal permission (a "license to crenellate"), which further underlines its fundamentally social character', symptomatic of having the status and power to receive such a licence, and not of a fortification requirement to be considered a palace.<sup>23</sup>

It was not the basic purpose of a palace to act as a defensible site, to withstand or launch a military operation, or to act as a strategic tool. Most modern historians acknowledge this separation of warfare from the definition of a palace but disagree on where the line between a fortified palace and a palatial castle can be drawn. For example, Heslop has proposed that the castle complex be divided from 'palatial' castles like the Tower of London, or *arx palatium* (fortress palace), and argued that the 'keep is the palace and the fortress [or castle] element is almost entirely concentrated in the enclosing wall, its banks and ditches'.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, James wrote that 'some castles such as the Tower of London and Windsor were furnished with palatial accommodations', clearly naming these as castles.<sup>25</sup> Keevill further argued that '[w]e need to allow some overlap here between palaces and castles: some, such as Windsor, were clearly intended as much for palace accommodation as defence'.<sup>26</sup> So if modern historians have divided castles and palaces based on military intention, and acknowledge that some can have both castle and palatial attributes, how were they viewed by contemporaries? Were the Tower of London and similar constructions like Orford considered castles or palaces (or both) by their contemporaries?

Some excellent examples are the 'castles' at Winchester which included the royal castle, and the Bishop of Winchester's possessions of Wolvesey and a castle/palace. The

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Heslop in Liddiard, p. 277.

<sup>25</sup> James, *Palaces of Medieval England*, p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> Keevill, *Medieval Palaces*, pp. 13-8.

vagueness of these distinctions is intentional since modern historians have not decided which description belongs with which structure. Blair called Wolvesey, along with Sherborne and Salisbury, ‘palaces’ and ‘fortified houses’.<sup>27</sup> Blair’s argument is that ‘the palaces of twelfth-century bishops form a distinct group: they are distinguished by a predilection for courtyard rather than axial layouts, they are more tightly integrated, and they are more exotic in some of their details’.<sup>28</sup> With these episcopal structures, Blair argues that they are ‘unique in their regularity and their integration...the hall and chamber being linked by lesser ranges to form a completely enclosed courtyard’.<sup>29</sup> He argues that ‘these palaces of c. 1100-40 are a highly distinctive group, drawing on traditions of ecclesiastical as well as of domestic planning’.<sup>30</sup> Faulkner argues that the ‘near royal independence of an archbishop’s state allowed [him] to build private palaces in which domestic demands could be paramount and it is this aspect which gives these buildings their peculiar significance’.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, Biddle’s analysis of the city of Winchester proposes that in the *Gesta Stephani* passage discussing Henry of Blois’ residences in the city – ‘the bishop’s castle, which he had built in very elegant style in the middle of the town and of his palace, which he had fortified strongly and impregably just like a castle’ – the *castellum* ‘should be identified with the royal palace, and that the *domus* should therefore be equated with Wolvesey’.<sup>32</sup> Biddle’s assessment and Blair’s vocabulary argue that Wolvesey, and thus Salisbury and Sherborne, are palaces; however, as we saw in the previous chapter, contemporaries certainly perceived these latter two as castles. Why do Biddle and Blair view these structures differently from castle contemporaries?

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<sup>27</sup> Blair in Liddiard, pp. 318-9.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Faulkner, ‘Some Medieval Archeipiscopal Palaces’, p. 130.

<sup>32</sup> ‘*castellumque episcopi, quod uenustissimo constructum cernate in ciuitatis medio locarat, sed et domum illius, quam ad instar castelli fortiter et inexpugnabiliter firmarat, ualidissima obsidione claudere praecepit*’, *GS*, 1, 63, pp. 126-7. Regularly referred to as: ‘*episcopi castellum*’, *GS*, 1, 64, pp. 130-3; Biddle, pp. 295-8.

If we frame this discussion in the context of the siege of Winchester in 1141 by Empress Matilda there are several key perceptions to examine to determine the status of Wolvesey. Before the Conquest, the royal Anglo-Saxon palace at Winchester was the location of the royal treasury; after, the Conqueror constructed a royal castle and by 1070 was extending and rebuilding the palace. According to Biddle, this ‘must imply that the Conqueror intended to make that complex, rather than the new castle, his principal residence in the city, and may also mean that the treasury was still in its former location’.<sup>33</sup> This was also exhibited in the movement of the royal court’s celebrations of Easter from the palace to other locations like Woodstock.<sup>34</sup> However, by 1135, and possibly by 1100, the treasury had been moved to the castle and was certainly there in 1141; the alterations and additions that Henry I made to the fortress may reflect this move and the increasing importance of the castle over the palace as the primary royal residence.<sup>35</sup> Biddle argued that there was some difficulty determining where the treasury was between 1066 and 1141.<sup>36</sup> However, it must have been in the castle in 1100 when Orderic recorded that Henry I ‘galloped at top speed to Winchester castle where the royal treasure was’.<sup>37</sup> It was there in 1135 when William Pont de L’Arche surrendered to Stephen ‘together with the castle, King Henry’s treasury, which the whole of England had abundantly filled from the time of the most ancient kings’.<sup>38</sup> And again in 1141 Henry of Blois gave Matilda ‘the king’s castle and the royal crown, which she had always most eagerly desired, and the treasure the king had left there’.<sup>39</sup> Why had the

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<sup>33</sup> Biddle, pp. 302-5.

<sup>34</sup> Still at Winchester in 1101: Huntingdon, 7, 23, pp. 448-51. Held at Woodstock in 1130: Huntingdon, 7, 41, pp. 486-7; Biddle, pp. 472-3.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, pp. 302-5, 472-3, 489-91.

<sup>36</sup> Biddle, pp. 302-5.

<sup>37</sup> ‘*Henricus concito cursu ad arcem Guentoniae, ubi regalis thesaurus continebatur festinauit*’, Orderic, 10, 15, pp. 290-1.

<sup>38</sup> ‘*eius se occursui gratanter obtulit, ipsumque ditissimum regis Henrici aerarium, quod tota ex antiquissimis regibus Anglia copiose referserat, eius deliberatione cum castello contradidit*’, *GS*, 1, 4, pp. 8-9.

<sup>39</sup> ‘*regisque castello et regni corona, quam semper ardentissime affectarat, thesaurisque, quos licet perpaucos rex ibi reliquerat*’, *GS*, 1, 58, pp. 118-9.

treasury, and the royal residence, moved away from the palace? Biddle never provided an exact answer but argued that these were

...as sharp an indication as any that the nature of the relationship between Winchester and the crown had undergone an essential change. Henceforth the castle, strengthened and remodelled on frequent occasions from at least as early as the beginning of the twelfth century, was to be the sole royal house in Winchester.<sup>40</sup>

So we can be fairly certain that when the chroniclers discuss the empress' possession of a castle in Winchester either after the battle of Lincoln or during the siege of Winchester in 1141 where she had 'made her home in the castle', these are references to the royal castle.<sup>41</sup> With the royal residence and treasury moving to the castle by 1135, what was to become of the palace?

When Stephen received the royal castle from its castellan in 1136, he turned it, and the treasury, over to his brother Henry of Blois, bishop of Winchester, who 'obtained a substantial degree of control over its [the royal palace] site and buildings', by the early 1140s.<sup>42</sup> Henry also constructed Wolvesey in the south-east corner of the city and, as Blair described and Biddle agrees, created a 'magnificent hall... [and] compact and defensible palace of courtyard plan'.<sup>43</sup> But was it the bishop's castle or his palace? How did its contemporaries perceive it? The *Gesta Stephani* chronicled that the empress then targeted the 'bishop's castle, which he had built in very elegant style in the middle of the town and of his palace, which he had fortified strongly and impregnably just like a castle'.<sup>44</sup> Also, when Queen Matilda's army arrived, the situation was reversed 'as the inner besiegers of the bishop's castle were themselves very closely besieged'.<sup>45</sup> The first *Gesta Stephani* passage

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<sup>40</sup> Biddle, pp. 472-3.

<sup>41</sup> 'regisque castello', *GS*, 1, 58, pp. 118-119; 'in castello suscepit hospitium', Worcester, pp. 298-9.

<sup>42</sup> Biddle, pp. 295-8, 302-5, 489-91.

<sup>43</sup> Biddle calls Wolvesey a 'palace'. *Ibid*, pp. 491.

<sup>44</sup> See p. 262, n. 32, *GS*, 1, 63, pp. 126-7.

<sup>45</sup> 'sic in inuicem contrarii habebantur, ut qui episcopi castellum interius obsidebant', *GS*, 1, 64, pp. 130-3.

certainly separates two buildings: *castellum* and *domus*; Wolvesey and the royal palace.<sup>46</sup>

Biddle argues that ‘assuming that the author of the *Gesta* was consistent in his use of *castellum*, it appears that this building should be identified with the royal palace, and that the *domus* should therefore be equated with Wolvesey’.<sup>47</sup> However, as the introduction of this thesis argued, the *Gesta* consistently used *castellum* for castle and rarely used a synonym or applied *castellum* to any other structure. So Biddle’s assumption, based on the Latin and argument of this thesis, is incorrect. The *castellum* in this passage is Wolvesey castle and *domus* the palace.

On the other hand, the location of the *castellum* in the centre of the city is a larger issue since Wolvesey is located in the south-east corner of the city. The chroniclers recorded that the siege was focused on the bishop’s castle and from where the ‘fire-brands’ set fire to the city.<sup>48</sup> This location of the *castellum*, in the centre of the city, would explain the spread of the fire since Wolvesey ‘is sited too far away from the built-up area for this to have been probable’.<sup>49</sup> Biddle argues the *Gesta Stephani* passage concurs with William of Malmesbury who recorded that the fire-brands were hurled *ex turre pontificis*. Torigni and Huntingdon used *turris* in reference to the bishop’s castle in their accounts of the siege but it is not clear from their records if this was Wolvesey or the palace.<sup>50</sup> Biddle proposed that,

This evidence implies that the *turris* formed part of the castle and was thus located at the royal palace, rather than at Wolvesey, as has previously been believed. It is possible that the bishop had more than one *turris* in Winchester, but the normal meaning of the word at this date is ‘keep’, in the sense in which

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<sup>46</sup> Biddle, pp. 295-8.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> ‘while the one side strove with skill and ingenuity to gain the bishop’s castle the besieged flung out firebrands and completely reduced to ashes the greater part of the town, including the two abbeys (*quia dum illi ad episcopi obtinendum castellum arte et ingenio contendebant, qui intus recludebantur ignibus foras emissis maiorem civitatis partem sed et duas abbatias, in fauillas penitus redegerunt.*)’, *GS*, 1, 65, pp. 130-3.

<sup>49</sup> Biddle, pp. 295-8.

<sup>50</sup> ‘*obsedit turrim Wintoniensis episcopi*’, Huntingdon, 10, 19, p. 740-1. ‘*obsedit turrim Wintoniensis episcopi*’, Torigni, pp. 141-2.

this is applied today to the principal component of a twelfth-century castle. It is perhaps unlikely that the bishop possessed two such structures in a single city.<sup>51</sup> Thus, he concludes that Henry of Blois had gained the royal palace by 1138, fortified it by constructing a keep, and ‘converted it into a building which the author of the *Gesta* could call a castle, *venustissimo constructum cemate*’.<sup>52</sup>

Is Biddle’s analysis correct? He admits the proposal that Henry turned the royal palace into a castle and then built a new palace at Wolvesey, ‘differs from the generally accepted tradition’, but do his assertions follow what contemporaries perceived?<sup>53</sup> If we accept, as he argues, that the mention of a *turris fortissimus* in the Winchester Annal in 1138 refers to the *turris* discussed by Malmesbury and thus, a fortified element at the royal palace; it still does not follow that the royal palace was a castle.<sup>54</sup> There can be no argument that Henry of Blois made fortification alterations to his palace, the *Gesta Stephani* clearly records this – ‘his palace, which he had fortified strongly and impregnably just like a castle’ – so, if contemporaries recorded that the episcopal palace was like a castle, then it was not perceived to be one.<sup>55</sup>

Additionally, Biddle’s argument relies on the destruction of the city of Winchester and the burning of the royal palace in 1141. Biddle argues that it is ‘remarkable that there appears at first sight to be no comment upon the part played by the palace during the events in Winchester which led up to its destruction’.<sup>56</sup> There are records of its destruction,<sup>57</sup> but, if the palace was never besieged, then why would there be a record of a part played? Biddle even admits that perhaps the waste records of the event do not reflect a complete destruction of the city: ‘none of the archaeological excavations in the city has produced evidence of a

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<sup>51</sup> Biddle, pp. 295-8.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, pp. 295-8, 489-91.

<sup>55</sup> See p. 262, n. 32, *GS*, 1, 63, pp. 126-7; Biddle, pp. 295-8.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid Biddle.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

general burning in the twelfth century'.<sup>58</sup> He continues saying that it was not impossible that the damage was extensive with over forty churches affected 'but the city's principal losses may well have resulted from looting by the victors rather than from the widespread destruction of buildings'.<sup>59</sup> Additionally, the commonplace occurrence of large fires in cities meant that the 'effects of the 1141 siege were perhaps no more than a magnified version of a relatively frequent occurrence;' that like chronicle passages of church destruction in general, the damage done to Winchester might have been exaggerated.<sup>60</sup> Thus, if the damage of Winchester was not as recorded or, did not even start in the assumed location, then Biddle's argument, that the palace was the *castellum* referred to by the chroniclers, based on its destruction, has lost some support. Unfortunately, the records do not provide a definitive answer to this issue; Biddle's arguments could very well be valid. He does propose an excavation of the 'royal palace site, and of the unexcavated south-western quarter of Wolvesey' to settle construction, design, destruction, and dating issue and clarify which was the bishop's castle and which his palace.<sup>61</sup> However, from the passages above, it appears that, at least the *Gesta Stephani* perceived Wolvesey as the bishop's castle and the royal palace had become an episcopal one. This overlap demonstrates that there is a cross-over between palaces and castles and we must examine the contemporary perception of them before categorising them and we must be flexible as they could change as functions evolve.

## **Towns**

When discussing town fortifications, the aspect of 'genuine defensive intent' is no longer relevant. The walls, towers, and gates of town fortifications were clearly intended for

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, pp. 489-91.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, pp. 295-8.

defence: but what type, and for whom, is where the separation occurs.<sup>62</sup> The personal aspect of the castle is relevant here as well since town walls ‘reflected the interests and ambitions of entire communities’.<sup>63</sup> Urban fortifications, while central to the town’s identity, were not ‘automatically built around settlements that had attained a given level of independence’ and, therefore, were not a standard practice for all towns; small and seemingly inconsequential towns may have constructed walls while large and economically important ones did not.<sup>64</sup> The power expressed in fortification elements – like that expressed in palaces, monasteries, and houses – might symbolise the prestige of the citizens if not the town itself.<sup>65</sup> According to Creighton and Higham, town walls were ‘an expression not only of a perceived need for protection, but also a perceived need to express status and identity’.<sup>66</sup> They even argued that this need to signal status to the outside world led to the majority of town walls being far more ‘impressive externally than internally’.<sup>67</sup> The wall broken up by towers and gates ‘presented an icon of power and permanence externally visible;’ however, inside the city, the wall was ‘cluttered by buildings and obscured from view’ and the impact of its design and construction was lost’.<sup>68</sup> The maintenance, upkeep, and implementation of fortification elements was an example of the ‘initiatives of communities acting essentially in their own interests’ with limited and only occasional royal assistance.<sup>69</sup> Although oligarchic power

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<sup>62</sup> The late medieval structures known as *bastides* will not be dealt with in this chapter since they appear outside the scope of this study and as ‘franchised settlements, initially quite small *bourgeois* enclaves and aspiring townships’, can be included in a general sense with the discussion on towns and urban castles. A deeper examination of them has been conducted by Coulson, *Castles*, pp. 182, 239.

<sup>63</sup> Creighton and Higham, pp. 165-6, 250; Higham and Saunders, p. 122; Coulson, *Castles*, p. 182. While from the continent, the passages about Henry I at the siege of Le Mans support this collective identity. Gerald of Wales recorded that ‘the greater part of the fortified places belonging to Le Mans were destroyed by force of arms (*dirutis primum martiis viribus castellis Cenomanniis pluribus*)’ perceiving the fortifications as belonging to the city and not anyone in particular. Gerald, *Princes* (eng), 3, 24, p. 88; Gerald, *Princes* (lat), 3, 24, pp. 282-3.

<sup>64</sup> Creighton and Higham, pp. 21-2, 26, 33

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 34-6, 165-6; Higham and Saunders, p. 122; Coulson, *Castles*, p. 182.

<sup>66</sup> Creighton and Higham, pp. 21, 165-6.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*. Additionally, English ‘kings regarded themselves as overlords of all fortifications, whether castles or town walls. In the urban context this is emphasised by the character of murage grants and by the frequency with which kings instructed towns to improve, or even directly funded defences that they clearly regarded

might have been expressed in the fortifications, they protected the entire community, even if it was an elite one, and were not personal fortified places of residence.

There is a distinct difference between towns developed around castles and towns that had castles ‘inserted’ into them.<sup>70</sup> The first type was the standard medieval town: ‘[seventy-five] per cent of new [i.e. post-Conquest] towns in England before 1150 grew up or were established next to a castle’ because as a centre of distribution for the regional farms the ‘aristocratic residence would generate a market;’ the castle surrounded by this type of development was not considered an urban castle.<sup>71</sup> Castles which created urban developments had a ‘symbiotic relationship, providing mutually supportive military and economic sustenance’ and they were not typically at odds; this situation was ‘evidence not of social division, but of the consolidated power of one lord who exploited his property in a variety of ways’.<sup>72</sup> The second type was created during the years directly after the Conquest when in ‘eleven towns, Domesday records that property and occasionally other taxable assets had been destroyed or disrupted to make way for new urban Norman castles’.<sup>73</sup> These castles ‘introduced a major element of “private [personal] interest” into the defensive scene’ of the medieval town.<sup>74</sup> Even though the majority these castles were royal, they were completely separate from the city itself in the twelfth century both in terms of fortification and administration. They were originally constructed, not to fortify the towns themselves but ‘to hold down populations, as well as to act as centres of political power, and were thus symbols of conquest rather than urban protection;’ they were ‘initially intrusive and

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as parts of the fabric of their kingdom’ p. 249; Higham and Saunders, p. 119. Such assistance can be seen in Henry II grant of a charter of liberties to Bristol from 1164/5. Patterson, pp. 3-4.

<sup>70</sup> Higham and Saunders, pp. 119-22; Schofield and Vince, *Medieval Towns*, p. 53; Creighton and Higham, pp. 68-9.

<sup>71</sup> Schofield and Vince, *Medieval Towns*, pp. 53, 56-7; Higham and Saunders, pp. 120-2.

<sup>72</sup> Higham and Saunders, pp. 120-2.

<sup>73</sup> Creighton and Higham, pp. 68-9; Higham and Saunders, pp. 120-2; Schofield and Vince, *Medieval Towns*, p. 53. For example, at Exeter, 166 houses were demolished for the castle. F. Hill, *Medieval Lincoln* (Cambridge, 1965), p. 54.

<sup>74</sup> Higham and Saunders, p. 119; Schofield and Vince, *Medieval Towns*, p. 53.

repressive'.<sup>75</sup>

Once the Normans consolidated control over the country, the domineering nature of the urban castle faded into one of standard royal administration.<sup>76</sup> It has been argued that urban castles were more like 'administrative offices than residences;' but even though most infrequently served as residences of the king, they were still the private residence of royal officials, usually the sheriff.<sup>77</sup> These types of castles were certainly centres of royal lordship and justice and 'were thus symbols of conquest [and royal power] rather than urban protection'.<sup>78</sup> Some scholars argue that castle fortifications were integrated into the town but this must be in a physical sense since the evidence presented by the chronicles does not support this in sense of possession and authority.<sup>79</sup> Within chronicles, there appears to have been no distinction between the two types of castles discussed above; they were not distinguished based on their creation of or construction in an urban setting. On the other hand, a clear division between the city and the castle was in part due to the latter's role in subjugating the urban populace and its involvement in national defence issues. This division is evident during the sieges of major royal castles like Exeter,<sup>80</sup> Bedford,<sup>81</sup> Winchester,<sup>82</sup> Bristol,<sup>83</sup> and Lincoln.<sup>84</sup> In these circumstances, the city is recorded to have surrendered or have been breached while the castle remains safely in the hands of the besieged. While the

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<sup>75</sup> Creighton and Higham, pp. 68-9; Higham and Saunders, pp. 120-2; Schofield and Vince, *Medieval Towns*, pp. 56-7.

<sup>76</sup> Higham and Saunders, pp. 120-2.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid; Schofield and Vince, *Medieval Towns*, pp. 56-7.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid both.

<sup>79</sup> Higham and Saunders, pp. 120-2.

<sup>80</sup> Worcester, pp. 218-9; Hexham (eng), p. 60; Hexham (lat), p. 151; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 229; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 191; ASC, E, p. 198; Huntingdon, 10, 4, pp. 706-9; GS, 1, 15-7, pp. 30-9.

<sup>81</sup> Worcester, pp. 234-7; Orderic, 13, 36, pp. 510-5; Torigni, p. 134; Howden (eng), vol. 1, p. 230; Howden (lat), vol. 1, p. 192; Huntingdon, 10, 6, pp. 710-1; GS, 1, 23, pp. 46-51, and 2, 94, pp. 184-185.

<sup>82</sup> Worcester, pp. 292-5, 298-9; Malmesbury, *HN*, 3, 54, pp. 100-101; GS, 1, 3 and 63-4, pp. 8-9, 126-33, and 2, 69, pp. 138-139.

<sup>83</sup> Worcester, pp. 248-51, 270-3; Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 27, pp. 54-7; GS, 1, 26-7 and 29-31, pp. 56-9, 62-9.

<sup>84</sup> Orderic, 6, 13, 43, pp. 538-45; Torigni, pp. 139-40, 146; Worcester, pp. 292-3; Newburgh, 1, 8, and 13, pp. 60-3, pp. 72-3; Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 241-3, 246-7, 249; Howden (lat), vol. 1, pp. 199, 207-8; ASC, E, p. 201; LE (eng), 3, 72, p. 395; LE (lat), 3, 72, p. 320; GS, 1, 54, pp. 110-115, and 2, 94 and 114, pp. 184-5, 220-1; Huntingdon, 10, 13 and 22 and 24, pp. 724-5, 744-9.

defences of one might have been broken, the cross-purposes of a city surrendering despite the castle's intentions demonstrates just how separate these entities were.

### **Religious Buildings**

For the later Middle Ages, Saunders argued that fortifications were used as much to 'to mark the division of the religious establishment from the secular world as to discourage the everyday straying of animals and thieves'.<sup>85</sup> While many were enclosed with a simple bank and ditch, some had stone walls, mural towers, and 'frequently... a substantial gatehouse which was the public face of the monastery'.<sup>86</sup> The 'economic basis of the monastic community' needed to be defended; 'precinct walls at rural [religious] houses do not appear in England until the very end of the [twelfth] century'.<sup>87</sup> He argues that when there is an implication of further fortification this usually included 'barbicans in front of gatehouses, the use of machicolations and sometimes the provision of gun-ports'.<sup>88</sup> However, and as this thesis has argued, that does not mean these fortifications had a 'genuine defensive intent;' they could have simply been symbols of the religious house's attempt to display their prestige or status.<sup>89</sup>

At Lindisfarne, alterations were made to the twelfth-century church to increase its fortification in the fourteenth century.

[T]he nave and chancel walls were vaulted and elevated to provide a fighting platform... [there were] two splayed cruciform loopholes for crossbows... that the whole of the western, northern and chancel walls received a crenellated and loop-holed parapet... the southern entrance to the cloister was protected by a barbican... two paralleled walls, each over a metre thick and provided with grooves, indicates that there was a fortified gatehouse built into the south wall of

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<sup>85</sup> Saunders, 'Attitudes towards Defence', p. 51.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid; Higham and Saunders, p. 120.

<sup>87</sup> A. Saunders, 'Attitudes towards Defence at English Monastic Houses and Granges', *IBI* 50 (1998), p. 51; Le Patourel, *Norman Empire*, p. 318; Higham and Saunders, p. 120.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid both.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid both.

the cloister, protected by a portcullis... walls ran south from each end of the cloister to enclose an outer court containing domestic and guestrooms.<sup>90</sup>

Amid the violence of the Hundred Years War, raiding along the southern coast was a real threat to religious establishments; and while only Tynemouth Priory could have held out ‘against a concerted attack’, the need for some level of fortification existed.<sup>91</sup> According to Jenkins, in 1385, ‘Lindisfarne asked the king’s permission to take down their perimeter walls as they could no longer take the strain of garrisoning them’ which was ‘rejected, [and] they were sent another two cannon and an artillery expert’ illustrating there was a perceived threat.<sup>92</sup> He continues arguing that ‘the expense and disruption of erecting and manning strong defences, as at Lindisfarne, was a serious obstacle for most monastic communities’, thus, despite any desire to express status, the need for strength was perceived and thus fortification was undertaken.<sup>93</sup> While this examples is from outside our scope of the twelfth century, it demonstrates reasons for religious fortification that might have been present in the previous centuries, particularly during periods like civil war.

While these arguments may seem to contradict the perception argued by this thesis, the distinction between a fortified church and a castle was clearly made in the twelfth century. Since many were made of stone, and the belfry towers of parish churches were often the strongest and tallest building in the area, they provided refuge for the surrounding populace.<sup>94</sup> We see the castle being used as a refuge (*refugium, receptaculum*) providing security for their owners and their families.<sup>95</sup> However, we also see other buildings,

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<sup>90</sup> Harrison, *Castles of God*, pp. 73, 77.

<sup>91</sup> Jenkins, ‘Monasteries’, p. 17; Coulson, ‘Hierarchism in Conventual Crenellation’, pp. 83, 91–2; C.J. Brooke, *Safe Sanctuaries: Security and Defence in Anglo-Scottish Border Churches 1296–1603* (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 73–5.

<sup>92</sup> Jenkins, ‘Monasteries’, p. 18; Brooke, *Safe Sanctuaries*, p. 75.

<sup>93</sup> Jenkins, ‘Monasteries’, p. 20.

<sup>94</sup> Bonde in Reyerson and Powe, p. 83; Cronne, *Reign of Stephen*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>95</sup> Malmesbury, *HN*, 2, 21, pp. 395-6; Newburgh, 1, 32, pp. 130-1; *GS*, 1, 9 and 31 and 47, pp. 16-9, 66-9, 98-101, 104-5, and 2, 117 and 119, pp. 226-7, 234-7; Worcester, pp. 284-91.

particularly churches, used as refuge (*refugium*).<sup>96</sup> This one role could be performed by any structure strong enough to withstand a basic attack and since castles, by the twelfth century, and churches were typically made of stone, they became obvious sanctuaries. But a church was not intended to be used as a tactical tool in warfare and its use as such was considered blasphemous. Unfortunately, this fortification meant that churches could be ‘encastellated’ and were used as castles by secular forces. According to Cronne, ‘few soldiers hesitated for a moment when confronted with the military desirability of using or destroying a church’.<sup>97</sup>

In 1140, during the siege of Hereford, Geoffrey Talbot was recorded by John of Worcester to have ‘attacked Hereford and gone into the minster of St. Aethelberht king and martyr as if it had been a stronghold’.<sup>98</sup> The *Gesta Stephani*’s narrative is more gruesome:

Entering the church of the Mother of God, the cathedral church of the episcopal see, and impiously driving out the ministrants at God’s table, he recklessly brought in a throng of armed men and turned the house of prayers and a place of atonement for souls into a confusion of strife and a haunt of war and blood. It was indeed dreadful and intolerable to all men of righteous feelings to see a dwelling of life and salvation transformed into an asylum of plunderers and warriors. While everywhere the townsmen were uttering cries of lamentation, either because the earth of their kinsfolk’s graveyard was being heaped up to form a rampart and they could see, a cruel sight, the bodies of parents and relations, some half-rotten, some quite lately buried, pitilessly dragged from the depths; or because at one time it was visible that catapults were being put up on the tower from which they had heard the sweet and pacific admonition of the bells, at another that missiles were being shot from it to harm the king’s garrison. So Geoffrey most furiously assailing from the cathedral the king’s troops shut up in their castle...<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Worcester, pp. 284-91; *GS*, 1, 64, pp. 130-3, and 2, 73, pp. 146-7. Refuge (*refugi, confugio*) was also used in reference to people like Robert of Gloucester, Geoffrey of Anjou, and Empress Matilda: Hexham (eng), pp. 57-8; Hexham (lat), pp. 146-7; *GS*, 1, 22, pp. 46-7.

<sup>97</sup> Cronne, *Reign of Stephen*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>98</sup> ‘*Fama uolante regie maiestati nuntiatur inimicos iurate quidam pacis uiolatoes Herefordiam inuasisse, monasterium Sancti AGeberti regis et martyris uelut in castellinum munimen penetrasse*’, Worcester, pp. 276-7.

<sup>99</sup> ‘*Ingressusque in episcopalis sedis principalem Genitricis Dei ecclesiam, expulsis irreuerenter mensae Dei ministris, armorum coetum temerarie induxit, domumque orationum et animarum propiciatorium in dissensionis tumultum, in belli et sanguinis conuertit recessum. Erat profecto horrendum, omnibusque pie sentientibus impatiendum, cernere uitae et salutis habitaculum in raptorum et bellantium permutatum asylum: ciuibus ubique lacrymose eiulantibus, uel quia suorum cimirterium in castelli sustollebatur uallum, parentumque et cognatorum corpora alia semiputrefacta, alia recentissime humata, crudele spectaculum, ab imo videbant incompassiue retracta; uel quia de turri, unde dulces et imbelles audierant tintinnabulorum monitus, nunc balistas erigi, nunc ad regales dammandos in palam erat missilia torqueri.*

The last line clearly states that Geoffrey was using the cathedral but the method in which he is using it against the royal castle, the stationing of a garrison inside, and the creation of fortification elements from the graveyard, match John of Worcester's perception of the cathedral being used like a *castellum*. Perhaps more infamous was Geoffrey de Mandeville's incastellation of Ramsey Abbey. In 1143, after Stephen stripped him of his castles and title, 'completely taken over by madness, [he] occupied the noble monastery of Ramsey. The company of monks was put to flight, and then he put in a garrison'.<sup>100</sup> The *Gesta Stephani* recorded that he 'put in a garrison and turned it into a castle for himself'.<sup>101</sup> The church was perceived by the chronicler to have transformed from a spiritual refuge to a military resource in the war against Stephen. Clearly, 'fortified' is connected with castles in the author's understanding and, subsequently, in his description of the church, but this religious building was not to be used for warfare and the two commanders were condemned by the chroniclers.<sup>102</sup> These churches might have fortifications but the installing of a garrison, increasing fortification, and using it as military resource was compared to the castle as if these were the natural characteristics of this structure and not of the religious building.

## Conclusion

This concept of incastellation is common in other medieval buildings. While a castle

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*Galfridus igitur regis milites in castello suo reclusos infestissime a templo propugnans*, *GS*, 1, 53, pp. 108-11.

<sup>100</sup> *LE* (eng), 3, 82, pp. 403-4; '*Hic totus rabie invectus, Ramseiam nobile monasterium invadens, fugata monachorum caterva, custodiam posuit*', *LE* (lat), 3, 82, p. 328.

<sup>101</sup> '*militibusque impositis, castellum sibi adaptavit*', *GS*, 2, 83, pp. 164-5.

<sup>102</sup> Another example in the Great War when Henry II took 'many fortified places and castles, together with the city of Saintes, and two fortresses there, one of which was called Fort Maior, as also the cathedral church of Saintes, which the knights and men-at-arms had strengthened against him with arms and a supply of provisions (*et multas munitiones, et castra, et Sanctonensem civitatem, et duas turres in ea, quarum una vocabatur turris Major, et ecclesiam episcopalem Sanctonensem, quam milites et servientes contra eum victu et armis munierant, ceperat*)'; however, there is no condemnation of this event. Howden (eng), vol. 1, pp. 380-1; Howden (lat), vol. 2, pp. 60-1.

included an element of military resourcefulness, palaces were constructed to express and enhance political, social, and economic power; they could have been defended but when they were, they were described as ‘fortified strongly and impregnably just like a castle’.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, despite the inclusion of fortified elements, personal traits, and some resourcefulness in other medieval buildings, they are distinguished from castles in their use as a military resource. Being described as ‘like a castle’ demonstrates that the structure was not typically used in the manner described and comparing it to the castle was the natural reference for an audience to understand the description of the building. This chapter has demonstrated that the characteristics argued by this thesis were understood by contemporaries as defining elements of the castle and were not, in combination, characteristics of any other medieval buildings. While there is clearly some overlap between palaces and fortified manors, what is crucial is the perception of the contemporaries and their vocabulary. They did not perceive the space as defined, or de-defined, as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource as they do the castle.

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<sup>103</sup> *‘quam ad instar castelli fortiter et inexpugnabiliter firmarat’*, *GS*, 1, 63, pp. 126-7.

# Chapter 6: Beyond the Twelfth-Century Anglo-Norman Regnum

This thesis has demonstrated the contemporary perception of the castle as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource by examining each aspect independently, simultaneously through case studies, and in comparison to other medieval buildings. However, the test of any definition is its application across a variety of circumstances. Therefore, in order to substantiate the contemporary perception of the castle, this chapter will examine it outside the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum. Perceptions from eleventh-century England, eleventh- and twelfth-century France, and thirteenth-century Ireland will be explored briefly to test this perception of the castle. What these brief examples demonstrate is that castles were perceived as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resources but with varied emphases on these elements and their influence and importance based on the political, military, and social atmosphere and circumstances in the castles. Typically, military resourcefulness increased with conflict and social importance enhanced during peace with the political element connected in both situations.

The use of castles in the Norman Conquest of England has been previously discussed but contemporary perceptions have not. First, it is important to mention Crouch's argument that pre-Conquest England did not have a 'model of class formation' based on the castle.<sup>1</sup> According to him,

...most great earls and other major landholders...to embank the ditch [of] their principal halls... and even put up characteristic gatehouses, which were a recognised mark of social pretension...[these] certainly would have advertised their personal wealth and status, but the full apparatus of fortification that developed in France in the late tenth century did not happen in pre-Conquest England. There were no masonry great towers, no mural walkways and turrets,

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<sup>1</sup> Crouch, *Birth of Nobility*, p. 204.

and no barbicans. Without robust and sophisticated fortifications at their command, pre-Conquest magnates could not defy the king with any hope of long resistance to counter-attack.<sup>2</sup>

These lords were still able to exert power and lordship and this demonstrates that castles ‘were not necessary for class formation within the aristocracy;’ while the castle was the resource used in France, there was an ‘alternative model to the localization of power’.<sup>3</sup>

During the Conquest, the emergence of the castle introduced a new aristocratic resource and this is demonstrated in William of Poitiers’ narrative of the event. His perception of the castle as a refuge is demonstrated by William the Conqueror’s landing at Pevensey and quickly constructing castles there and at Hastings ‘as a refuge for themselves and a defence for their ships’.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, William is warned by a messenger to remain ‘behind fortifications’ and not to rush into battle; William replied that he would ‘not take refuge in the shelter of ditch or walls’ and sought battle immediately.<sup>5</sup> Supporting the perception of twelfth-century chroniclers that castles were used to control territory and the populace, William of Poitiers records that the Conqueror ‘hoped above all that once he had begun to reign any rebels would be less ready to challenge him and more easily put down. So he sent men ahead to London to build a fortress in the city;’<sup>6</sup> also, a castle was constructed in Barking ‘as a defence against the inconstancy of the numerous and hostile inhabitants. For he saw that it was of the first importance to constrain the Londoners strictly’.<sup>7</sup> The author also records that by possession of castles in Winchester and Dover, William Fitz Osbern and Bishop Odo of Bayeux would ‘govern all the kingdom of England’ in the north and south respectively perceiving the castles as the resource through which

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, pp. 205-7.

<sup>4</sup> ‘*quae sibi receptaculo, nauibus propugnaculo forent*’, Poitiers, 2, 9, pp. 114-5.

<sup>5</sup> ‘*intra munitiones mane...Non me tutarer ualli aut moenium latebris*’, Ibid, 10, pp. 116-7.

<sup>6</sup> ‘*praesertim sperans ubi regnare coeperit rebellem quemque minus ausurum in se, facilius conterendum esse. Praemisit ergo Lundoniam qui munitionem in ipsa construerent urbe*’, Ibid, 29, pp. 148-9.

<sup>7</sup> ‘*dum firmamenta quaedam in urbe contra mobilitatem ingentis ac feri populi perficerentur. Vidit enim inprimis necessarium magnopere Lundonienses coerceri*’, Ibid, 34, pp. 160-3.

these men would govern and control the regions.<sup>8</sup> This is further demonstrated when Eustace of Boulogne attempted to take Dover in the Conqueror's absence: 'If indeed he had been able to gain possession of that strong site with its seaport his power would have been extended more widely and that of the Normans correspondingly diminished'.<sup>9</sup> This demonstrates that the castle was certainly perceived as a military resource in conquest, but also as a political, social, and economic tool of colonisation enabling the Normans to dominate their newly conquered territories.<sup>10</sup>

This pattern was continued in the thirteenth century during the conquest of Ireland and the patronage of the conqueror and his magnates was mirrored. During his narrative of this conquest, Gerald of Wales recorded that King John of England sent John the constable of Chester and Richard de Pec to Ireland in order to 'take joint control of the government'.<sup>11</sup> They are recorded as building castles for barons throughout Leinster:

So first of all a castle was built for Raymond at Fotharta Onolan, and another for his brother Griffin. The third castle was built at Tristerdermot in Ui Muireadhaigh for Walter de Ridelisford, the fourth for John de Qahull on the river Barrow not far from Leighlin, the fifth for John of Hereford at Collacht.<sup>12</sup>

Hugh de Lacy, another powerful English baron sent to conquer Ireland, is recorded as doing the same:

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<sup>8</sup> 'The town of Winchester is famous and strong.... William built a fortress within the walls of the city, and left there William Fitz Osbern, the chief man in his army, so that he could govern all the kingdom of England to the north in his place during his absence. (*Guenta urbs est nobilis atque ualens.... Huius quoque urbis intra moenia munitionem construxit. Ibidem Guillelmum reliquit Osberni filium, praecipuum in exercitu suo, ut in vice sua interim toti regno Aquilonem uersus praeesset.*)' Ibid, 36, pp. 164-5. 'As for the castle of Dover, he entrusted it to his brother Odo, together with the adjacent south coast, which goes by the old name of Kent (*Castrum uero Doueram Odoni fratri suo commissit, cum adiacente ora australi, quae nomine uetusto Cantium dicta*)', Ibid, 37, pp. 164-5.

<sup>9</sup> '*Equidem fore, si firmissimo loco hoc sit potitus cum portu marino, ut potentia eius latius distendatur, sicque potentiam Normannorum diminutum iri*', Ibid, 47, pp. 182-5.

<sup>10</sup> Brown, *Normans and the Norman Conquest*, pp. 43-5, 98-9, 234-6, and *Origins*, pp. 77; Bradbury, *Siege*, p. 57; Le Patourel, *Norman Empire*, p. 303.

<sup>11</sup> '*advenerunt in insulam circa kalendas Maii college duo, Iohannes scilicet constabularius Cestrensis et Ricardus de Pec, ad curam regiminis*', Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 22, pp. 194-5.

<sup>12</sup> '*Erectum est igitur apud Fotheret Onolan primo castrum Reimundo et aliud fratri eiusdem Griffino; tertium in Omuredhi Gualtero de Ridenesfordia apud Tristerdermoth; quartum Iohanni de Clahulla super aquam Berue non procul a Lechlinia; quintum Iohanni Herefordensi apud Collacht*', Ibid.

Hugh de Lacy built a very large number of castles. Among these is the castle he built for Meiler at Timahoe in the province of Laois... He also built a castle for Robert de Bigarz close by, in Ui Buidhe; a castle for Thomas of Flanders not far from there, in the furthest part of Ui Muireadhaigh, separated from Ui Buidhe by the waters of the Barrow; and a castle for Robert Fitz Richard at Norrach. in Meath he built the castle of Aonard, the castle of Killare, a castle for Adam de Futepoi, another for Gilbert de Nugent and many others which it would be tedious to enumerate individually.<sup>13</sup>

These thirteenth-century barons used the castle as a tool of patronage in their subjugation of Ireland. Gerald of Wales also noted that while the Irish had prophecies of overthrowing the English, they would not succeed because ‘the whole island [was] subdued from shore to shore and fortified with castles’.<sup>14</sup> The fortified, personal, and multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle clearly persisted in thirteenth-century perceptions.

When reading Gerald of Wales’ narrative of the conquest of Ireland, one passage clearly demonstrates the resourcefulness of the castle:

Moreover, the command of the cities on the coast and the castles, together with the adjacent lands, and revenues which should have been spent for the benefit of the realm in general and to the detriment of its enemies, were all entrusted to men who, since they spent all their time in the greedy pursuit of wealth within the walls of the city, and their lives were one uninterrupted round of gluttony and drunkenness, uselessly squandered everything, the citizens rather than the enemy being the losers.<sup>15</sup>

The perception that the castles were not effective is clearly attributed to the men who held them and their flaws. Had these men been able to effectively use the resources at their disposal, then the conquest would have been a far greater success. This passage

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<sup>13</sup> ‘Hugo vero de Laci in hoc adventu plurima castra construxit. Inter que Meilerio castellum in provincia de Leis erexit apud Tahmeho...castellum quoque Roberto de Bigarz ibi prope, scilicet apud Obowi; castellum Thome Flandrensi non procul ab hoc, in ulteriore videlicet Omuredhi parte, Beruensis fluminis interlabentibus undis; castellum Roberto filio Ricardi apud Norrach: in Media vero castellum de Clunaret, castellum de Kilair, castellum Ade de Futepoi, castellum Gilleberto de Nungent et alia multa que singula per ordinem enumerare longum esset’, Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> *insula Hibernica de mari usque ad mare ex toto subacta et incastellata*, Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 34, pp. 232-3.

<sup>15</sup> ‘Urbium quoque maritimarum et castrorum custodia, cum terris adiacentibus et tributis, que in publica regni commoda et hostium gravamina dispensari debuerant, talibus est assignata, qui aurum assidue intra muros aucupantes, iugi crapule temulencieque dati cum civium, non hostium damno cuncta inutiliter consumebant’, Gerald, *Conquest*, 2, 36, pp. 238-9.

demonstrates the implicit but not direct association of the concept of the castle as a multifunctional resource.

Those lords given territory by William the Conqueror were part of a system of ‘magnate control over well-defined localities as [was] the norm in their home regions’ and this fresh top-down implementation of lordship and castle possession in England centralised control under the Anglo-Norman kings in a very different way to France.<sup>16</sup> ‘Where Charlemagne... had failed, the kings of England largely succeeded. For a long time feudalism was to be the ally, the foundation, of royal power, and not its adversary, as it was in France’.<sup>17</sup> One example of this was the late tenth- and ‘early eleventh-century construction of the Courcy lordship in the Remois at the expense of the king of the Franks and the archbishop of Reims’.<sup>18</sup> According to Crouch, the Courcys had ‘acquired, or simply chosen to build’ castles developing a lordship out of nothing based on these fortifications.<sup>19</sup> However, Crouch argued that this was not a symptom of ducal weakness since it occurred ‘during the time of the powerful Norman rulers Richard I (942-96) and Richard II (996-1026)’.<sup>20</sup> However, and as it occurred in England, ‘new lordships might arise out of a collaboration as much as competition between princes and their magnates...acts of patronage cemented bonds between prince and dependants’.<sup>21</sup>

The chronicle on Louis VI the Fat written by Abbot Suger of St. Denis illustrates that eleventh- and twelfth-century France perceived the castle similarly to the Anglo-Norman regnum. When Count Theobald of Blois ‘devised a scheme to widen his borders by erecting a castle on an estate called Allaines, in the lordship of Le Puiset, which he held in fief from the king’, the theory of royal licensing for castle construction is demonstrated; because

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<sup>16</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 133-4.

<sup>17</sup> Fourquin, p. 76.

<sup>18</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. 133-4.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid; Brown, *Normans and the Norman Conquest*, pp. 43-5.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid both.

Louis ‘would in no way approve of his action, the count offered to provide evidence through Andrew of Baudement, steward of his land, that they had made an agreement on this point. The king in return offered to support his case that he had never made such an agreement’ and would prove his point through a duel.<sup>22</sup> Suger perceived the control of castles as crucial to royal security and was a target in ending rebellion and a resource in starting it; the destruction and confiscation of castles was used to prevent rebellion and as punishment.<sup>23</sup> Suger also perceived that the custody of castles was important to political and social relationships,<sup>24</sup> and that patronage and loyalty could be secured for king or baron by the possession or gifting of castles.<sup>25</sup> For example, Count Matthew Beaumont ‘took full possession of the castle of Luzarches, half of which he held by reason of his marriage, and with arms and armed men attempted to fortify the tower in his own interest.’ Having dispossessed its rightful holder Hugh, the count forced him to beg the king for help. Louis ordered Matthew to court to defend himself but when the count did not appear, Louis ‘assembled a large host, moved swiftly against him, and attacked the castle of Luzarches’.

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<sup>22</sup> Suger (eng), 19, pp. 84-90; ‘*machinabatur marchiam suam amplificare, castrum erigendo in potestate Puteoli quod de feodo regis fuerat, apud villam que dicitur Alena, Quod cum rex omnino recusaret, comes pactum hoc offerebat per Andream de Baldamento, terre sue procuratorem, ratiocinare, rex vero et ratione et lege duelli nunquam se pepigisse per Ansellum dapiferum suum, ubicumque secure vellent, defendere*’, Suger (lat), 19, pp. 132-42 (verso).

<sup>23</sup> Suger (eng), 3 and 8 and 12 and 19 and 21 and 24-5, pp. 30-2, 39-43, 59-60, 84-90, 95-103, 106-10; Suger (lat), 3 and 8 and 12 and 19 and 21 and 24-5, pp. 18-20, 34-42, 78-80, 132-42, 154-68, 174-8, 180-2 (verso).

<sup>24</sup> Suger (eng), 11, pp. 55-8; Suger (lat), 11, pp. 70-6 (verso).

<sup>25</sup> ‘What could Hugh do but rush to the defender of the kingdom, throw himself at his feet, and pour forth his tears? He beseeched him to comply with the request of an old man and bring help to a person seriously wronged. “I would rather, most beloved lord,” he said, “that you took possession of all my land, since I hold it of you, than that my dishonourable son-in-law get control over it. Death would be better than dispossession by him.” Struck by sorrow for a misfortune that would make one weep, the lord Louis extended his hand in alliance, promised to give aid, and sent away the man whom hope had made joyful; and this “hope did not disappoint him.” (*Quid faceret Hugo, quam quod ad regni defensorem festinans, pedibus ejus prostratus, obortis lacrimis, supplicat ut seni condescendat, gravissime gravato opem ferat?* « *Malo, inquit, karissime domine, te terram meam totam habere, quia a te eam habeo, quam gener meus degener hanc habeat. Emori cupio, si eam auferat.* » *Cujus lacrimabili calamitate animo compunctus, amabiliter manum porrigit, suffragari promittit, spe exilaratum remittit*)’, Suger (eng), 3, pp. 30-2; Suger (lat), 3, pp. 18-20 (verso); ‘He begged as a suppliant that the king, in his munificence, return his lordship, restore his inheritance from his father, and in return receive him as a serf or tenant to be used as he wished. (*rogat suppliciter ut regia munificentia honorem reddat, paternam hereditatem restituat, tanquam servum aut inquilinum deinceps habeat, pro voluntate utatur.*)’ Suger (eng), 18, pp. 81-3; Suger (lat), 18, pp. 122-8 (verso). Other examples include Suger (eng), 8 and 19, pp. 39-43, 83-90; Suger (lat), 8 and 19, pp. 34-42, 132-42 (verso).

The king succeeded and ‘took it by assault after a great struggle, fortified its keep with a guard of knights, and restored the fortress to Hugh as he had promised.’<sup>26</sup> By targeting this castle, Louis was able to exert his power over a rebellious baron who refused to accept his lordship and had used the castle to subvert royal authority. He also tied Hugh closer to him by upholding his position as liege-lord and reinstating the castle to him.

In terms of the castle as a military resource, Suger describes that fortification (or being described as fortified) was related to the presence of a garrison<sup>27</sup> and supplies;<sup>28</sup> the tactic of sallying to defend the castle and the use of pillaging,<sup>29</sup> blockades,<sup>30</sup> and siege engines like ballistas and catapults to take the castle.<sup>31</sup> Suger provides a very detailed description of a siege tower:

A lofty machine towering three storeys high over the combatants was raised up, and its elevation above the castle prevented the enemy archers and crossbowmen of the front line on the inside from moving about or even being seen... A wooden bridge was attached to the towering machine; it reached out at a height that would enable it to be let down a little above the oak wall and thus provide easy entry into the castle for those coming across it.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Suger (eng), 3, pp. 30-2; *Interea Bellimontis comes Matheus contra Hugonem Claromontensem, virum nobilem, sed mobilem et simplicem, cujus filiam duxerat sponsam, longo animi rancore contendens, castrum nomine Lusarchium, cujus medietatem causa conjugii suscepit, totum occupare, turrim sibi armis et armatis satagit munire... Quod cum refutasset, ulcisci festinans defensor, collecto exercitu multo, in eum exiliit prefatumque castrum agrediens, modo armis modo igne impugnans, multo congressu expugnavit, turrimque ipsam militari custodia munivit et munitam Hugoni, sicut sponponderat, restituit.* Suger (lat), 3, pp. 18-20 (verso).

<sup>27</sup> Suger (eng), 3 and 19, pp. 30-2, 84-90; Suger (lat), 3 and 19, pp. 18-20, 132-42 (verso).

<sup>28</sup> Suger (eng), 7 and 19, pp. 37-8, 84-90; Suger (lat), 7 and 19, pp. 30-2, 132-42 (verso).

<sup>29</sup> Suger (eng), 7 and 15 and 19 and 24 and 26, pp. 37-8, 64-8, 84-90, 106-9, 111-5; Suger (lat), 7 and 15 and 19 and 24 and 26, pp. 30-2, 88-96, 132-42, 174-8, 184-92 (verso).

<sup>30</sup> Suger (eng), 7 and 11 and 15 and 18-9 and 24 and 26, pp. 37-8, 55-8, 64-8, 81-90, 106-9, 111-5; Suger (lat), 7 and 11 and 15 and 18-9 and 24 and 26, pp. 30-2, 70-6, 88-96, 122-8, 132-42, 174-8, 184-92 (verso). Including siege castles: Suger (eng), 21 and 26, pp. 95-103, 111-5. Suger (lat), 21 and 26, pp. 154-68, 184-92 (verso).

<sup>31</sup> Suger (eng), 11 and 18, pp. 55-8, 81-3; Suger (lat), 11 and 18, pp. 70-6, 122-8 (verso).

<sup>32</sup> Suger (eng), 11, pp. 55-8; *Parantur deinceps castris eversioni bellica instrumenta, erigitur tristegas tres pugnantibus porrigens supereminens machina, que castro superlativa propugnatorii primi sagittariis et balistariis ire aut per castellum apparere prohiberet... Herebat machine eminenti pons ligneus, qui, se excelsius porrigens, cum paulisper demitteretur super glandem, facilem descendentibus pararet ingressum*, Suger (lat), 11, pp. 70-6 (verso). Another siege tower described on Suger (eng), 7, pp. 37-8; Suger (lat), 7, pp. 30-2 (verso).

In terms of the physical appearance of castles, he provides a description of a motte-and-bailey<sup>33</sup> and that a castle was ‘rebuilt after a week of steady work’, demonstrating how quick some constructions were.<sup>34</sup> He also describes the castles of Crécy and Nouvion as ‘very formidable...with a marvellous rampart and lofty towers’, and Crécy separately as ‘well-fortified;’ however, this passage ends when Louis, with a ‘powerful band of armed men, or rather by the hand of God, he abruptly seized the castle and captured its very strong tower as if it were simply the hut of a peasant’.<sup>35</sup> Were Louis’ siege tactics and soldiers extremely strong? Was Crécy not that well-fortified? Was Suger exaggerating? There is also a description of an ‘impregnable’ castle which was ‘well-fortified with a stout rampart...with its oak wall on top and the deep roaring stream below’.<sup>36</sup> While this description of a wooden earthwork with a moat may not measure up against the stone constructions later in the century, it is perceived by Suger as ‘nearly impregnable’ and, conceivably, an advanced form of fortification. Additionally, Suger demonstrates the strategic importance of the location of castles:

For, Corbeil on the river Seine, Chateaufort on the right, and Montlhéry on the road midway between them encircle the countryside around Paris. And the chaos and confusion that took hold between Paris and Orléans had made it impossible for the inhabitants of either city to travel to the other without the permission of those faithless men, unless they went under strong guard. But the aforesaid marriage broke down this barrier and restored welcome access to each for both groups.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Suger (eng), 19, pp. 84-90; Suger (lat), 19, pp. 132-42 (verso).

<sup>34</sup> Suger (eng), 21, pp. 95-103; ‘*Restitute itaque castro continua septimana*’, Suger (lat), 21, pp. 154-68 (verso).

<sup>35</sup> Suger (eng), 24, pp. 106-9; ‘*fortissima castella, Creciacum et Novigentum, vallo mirabili, altis etiam turribus...Creiacum munitissimum castrum divertit... armatorum potentissima manu, quin potius divina, inopinate castrum occupat, turrim fortissimam ac si rusticanum tugurium expugnat*’, Suger (lat), 24, pp. 174-8 (verso).

<sup>36</sup> Suger (eng), 11, pp. 55-8; ‘*castrum munitissimum valio arto et rigido, superius glande, inferius torrentis profunditate pene inexpugnabili, aggreditur*’, Suger (lat), 11, pp. 70-6 (verso).

<sup>37</sup> Suger (eng), 8, pp. 39-43; ‘*Cumque a fluvio Sequane Curboilo, medio vie Monte Leherii, a dextera Castello Forti pagus Parisiacus circume ingeretur, inter Parisienses et Aurelianenses tantum confusionis chaos firmatum erat, ut neque hi ad illos neque illi ad istos absque perfidorum arbitrio nisi in manu forti valerent transmeare. Verum prefati causa matrimonii sepem rupit, accessum jocundum utrisque reparavit*’, Suger (lat), 8, pp. 34-42 (verso). Another example includes Suger (eng), 11, pp. 55-8; Suger (lat), 11, pp. 70-6 (verso).

These castles controlled movement in their region demonstrating their strategic location.

The issue of castles along borders is also demonstrated by the Vexin castles with which, when in the hands of William II

... in defence of his land, he girded nearly the entire Norman march, as far as his duchy extended, with many knights at heavy cost. Ancient natural castles and fortresses, however, defended the king of the French; and the men of Flanders, Ponthieu, the Vexin, and other borderlands fought valiantly for him at no cost.<sup>38</sup>

Here, the king of France is using castles to defend his territory from William II. But the kings of England also endeavoured to secure their possession of Normandy and the border 'was tightly protected by an impressive line of new castles and by the channels of the unfordable rivers that flowed there'.<sup>39</sup>

The personal nature of the castle is demonstrated by the benefit castles gave their possessors. Suger demonstrates that possession of castles provided lordship and power over territory: by taking possession of Andelys, Enguerrand of Chaumont, Louis 'brought under his full control all the land up to the river Andelle—everything from the river Epte all the way up to Pont-Saint-Pierre'.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, the loss of a castle was detrimental and severely felt. When Hugh of Crécy and his father lost Gournay to King Louis, they 'reddened with shame; their resentment deepened, and they did not stop belittling the royal majesty'.<sup>41</sup> He also used the castle to denote nobility and status.<sup>42</sup> Throughout his narrative,

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<sup>38</sup> Suger (eng), 16, p. 75; '*cum universam pene Normannie marchiam, sicut se ducatus extendit, multa militia et sumptuosius stipendiis ad terre defensionem circumcingebat. Rex vero Francorum antiquis et naturalibus castris et municipiis, gratuita Flandrensium, Pontivorum, Vilcassinorum et aliorum collimitaneium strenua impugnatione... gratia peculiari*', Suger (lat), 16, pp. 110-2 (verso).

<sup>39</sup> Suger (eng), 26, pp. 111-5; '*Verum quia Normannorum marchia, tam regum Anglorum quam Normannorum ducum nobili providentia, et novorum positione castrorum et invadaliu fuminum decursu extra alias cingebatur*', Suger (lat), 26, pp. 184-92 (verso).

<sup>40</sup> Suger (eng), 26, pp. 111-5; '*quo terram usque ad fluvium qui dicitur Andella, a fluvio Etie usque etiam ad Pontem Sancti Petri, omnino subjacere cogebat*', Suger (lat), 26, pp. 184-92 (verso).

<sup>41</sup> Suger (eng), 15, pp. 64-8; '*rancore animi emulato pro amissi castri Gornaci erubescencia, a regie excellentie derogacione cessabant*', Suger (lat), 15, pp. 88-96 (verso).

<sup>42</sup> 'The renowned young man and his followers seized a large number, and among them were the noble Count Simon, the noble Baron Gilbert of L'Aigle, who was equally respected in England and Normandy, and Pagan of Gisors, for whose sake the castle of Gisors was first fortified (*quorum famosus juvenis at sui cum plures alios, tum comitem Symonem, nobilem virum, Gillebertum de Aquila, nobilem et Anglie et*

Suger's perception of the castle is consistent with those of the Anglo-Norman chroniclers with it being used as the location of administrative and judicial proceedings,<sup>43</sup> a refuge,<sup>44</sup> a prison,<sup>45</sup> a residence,<sup>46</sup> and a bargaining tool in marriages.<sup>47</sup> Finally, a clear perception of the castle as a resource records that the castle of Sainte Severe was made 'very noble and famous by the knights who held it by hereditary right, and by its large garrison of foot soldiers'.<sup>48</sup> The possessor's use of the castle has increased the castle's fame and status.

De Vries called the period of castle construction following the Crusades a 'golden age' which 'produced perhaps the finest examples of what modern students see as the archetypal medieval castle;' he is referring to the thirteenth-century Edwardian constructions.<sup>49</sup> However, the competition between castle fortifications and artillery touched on in Chapter 1, was instrumental in the decline of the castle.<sup>50</sup> Whether this was the previously discussed counter-weight trebuchet or the development of the cannon, the ability of the castle to provide resistance during a siege was altered and its walls became little more than momentary opposition. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the castle's waning military effectiveness translated into a reduction in its political, social, and economic resourcefulness.

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*Normannique illustrem baronem, Paganum de Gisorcio, cui castrum idem primo munivit*', Suger (eng), 1, p. 26; Suger (lat), 1, pp. 8-10 (verso); 'Leo, a nobleman of the castle of Meung', Suger (eng), 6, p. 36; 'virum nobilem Mauduni castri', Suger (lat), 6, p. 28.

<sup>43</sup> 'With no delay he summoned Burchard before his father's court at the castle of Poissy for judgment (*Nec mora quin prefatum Burcardum ante patrem castro Pinciaco ad causas submonitum coegerit.*)', Suger (eng), 2, p. 29; Suger (lat), 2, p. 16.

<sup>44</sup> 'They had advanced only a short distance from their castle so that their retreat, if necessary, would be quite short (*aggressus, cum ei extra castrum haud procul, ut breviori, si confert, regrederetur fuga*)', Suger (eng), 2, p. 30; Suger (lat), 2, p. 18.

<sup>45</sup> Suger (eng), 6 and 15, pp. 36, 64-8; Suger (lat), 6 and 15, pp. 28, 88-96 (verso).

<sup>46</sup> 'Present in that very tower were the wife of Guy and his daughter, who was betrothed to the lord Louis (*Erat siquidem in eadem turre uxor prefati Guidonis et filia domino Ludovico desponsata*)', Suger (eng), 8, pp. 39-43; Suger (lat), 8, pp. 34-42 (verso).

<sup>47</sup> Suger (eng), 3 and 7-8 and 15 and 18, pp. 30-2, 37-43, 64-8, 81-3; Suger (lat), 3 and 7-8 and 15 and 18, pp. 18-20, 30-2, 34-42, 88-96, 122-8 (verso).

<sup>48</sup> Suger (eng), 12, pp. 59-60; 'nobilissimum et hereditaria militie possessione famosum, pedite multo populosum', Suger (lat), 12, pp. 78-80 (verso).

<sup>49</sup> DeVries, *Medieval Military Technology*, p. 235.

<sup>50</sup> Kennedy, *Crusader Castles*, p. 9.

The fourteenth-century castle of Bodiam demonstrates the later medieval desire to exhibit social and political power through incastellation regardless of its debated superficiality. This castle was constructed with a highly fortified style, but some scholars see this as a statement of power but not serving a defensive purpose. Crouch argued that ‘knighthood... became the mercury in the barometer of social pressure’ and that this ‘triggered a cascade effect in society, where other social groups had to define themselves against what was generally perceived to be a manifestly exclusive noble class’.<sup>51</sup> Since castle possession was attributed to kings, magnates, and barons, emulation of these classes naturally included the emulation of castles.<sup>52</sup> We have already seen in chapter 5 that religious buildings, towns, and manors included defensive attributes for more than a military purpose. Gaining permission to crenellate not only expressed wealth but, since these fortification elements were associated with the castle, associated the possessor with the upper classes.<sup>53</sup> Scholars like Coulson have argued that by constructing Bodiam to appear highly fortified, the owner was following the noble tradition of living in a castle-like building and using it to symbolise his wealth and power.<sup>54</sup> Speight echoes Coulson saying that ‘the preferred aesthetic, that which symbolised power, was the one which highlighted the defensible quality of architecture, whether the particular building was defensible or not’.<sup>55</sup> The style, expense, and faux-military symbolism was beneficial to displaying wealth, status, and power, even without the military force to support it.

Consistent with this chapter, and thesis, Smail argued that,

Any ruler needs organized force at his disposal as a final sanction for his authority. It is required both against the external enemy and to preserve internal order; it has both a military and a police function. Part of the force available to a medieval ruler was embodied in his castles. There were instruments of his policy

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<sup>51</sup> Crouch, *English Aristocracy*, pp. xvi, 3-4.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 205-7.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>54</sup> Coulson, *Castles*, and ‘Peaceable Power’, pp. 69-96, and ‘Structural Symbolism’, pp. 73-90.

<sup>55</sup> Speight, ‘An Englishman’s Castle is his Home’, p. 45.

towards his neighbours and were used as fortresses have been used throughout history.<sup>56</sup>

By briefly examining the use of the castle across Europe and throughout the medieval period, this chapter has demonstrated that, like the castle of the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum, medieval castles elsewhere were ‘multi-functional buildings and their roles might be defensive, offensive, administrative, judicial, for accommodation, as a demonstration of power, and as a place of refuge’.<sup>57</sup> The contemporary perception of the castle as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource remained consistent whether it was in France, England, or Ireland, and whether it was in the eleventh century or the thirteenth.

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<sup>56</sup> Smail, ‘Crusaders’ Castles of the Twelfth Century,’ p. 133.

<sup>57</sup> Phillips, *Crusades*, p. 82.

## Conclusion

While the fortified and private aspects of medieval castles have been accepted for many decades, the multifunctional resourcefulness of the castle as a status symbol, an icon of power, and a tool of lordship is a relatively new concept with little previous research undertaken. This study has used the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum as a case study for the proposed definition and contemporary perception and understanding of the castle as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource. This study has attempted to address the ‘bundles of characteristics that have been put together under a single label by successive generations of historians with different interests and different understanding of the past’ by returning to the sources, to the words of the chronicles, in order to substantiate these characteristics.<sup>58</sup> But, as Reynolds argued in reference to the terminology of fiefs, vassals, and feudalism,

Definitions, explicit or implied, also vary because some who propound or imply them assume that the character of an institution is determined by its origins, some rely on what is assumed to be its fully developed form, and yet others postulate some kind of ideal type of platonic form as lying behind empirical formations.<sup>59</sup>

This statement also applies to this study.

The previous chapter briefly examined other regions and periods to test the applicability of this argument and concluded that it would be possible to extend the definition of the castle as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource beyond the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum. While the evidence used by this study demonstrates that fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource can be used for castles of the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum, and in certain cases other regions, deeper research into

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<sup>58</sup> Reynolds, pp. 10-1, 32-3

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 1.

these regions and periods may uncover further characteristics or broaden this definition. Closer examination of regions like the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Italy, and the Holy Land across the medieval period might only expose a difference in emphasis on these elements based on circumstances. However, it is entirely possible that the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman castle was perceived by its contemporaries in a completely different manner from castles in other regions. Reynolds' pan-European study of fiefs and vassals could be used as a model for analysing the vocabulary of the castle across periods and regions in a detailed analysis of its origins, development, and decline in order to come to a more thorough understanding of this medieval phenomenon. However, as Smail pointed out, 'no one scholar can hope to master the sources for the history of so great a subject through a millennium, such works need to be rooted in the more limited researches of specialists'.<sup>60</sup> It is my hope that this definition and characterisation will be challenged and applied more deeply outside the scope of this study in order to test its accuracy.<sup>61</sup>

We should return to the questions posed by this thesis in the introduction: did the resourcefulness and understanding of the castle change as the strength of royal government fluctuated? Were castles in the Anglo-Norman regnum described or understood differently across these reigns and various stages of conflict? Was any one use or aspect of the castle considered more dominant in particular situations? Simply, the answer is no. While there may have been more emphasis on the military resourcefulness of the castle and thus its fortifications and garrison during discussion of a siege, the chroniclers still understood the political and social repercussions of personal possession. Despite the greater frequency of castle-warfare during Stephen's reign, the chroniclers still emphasised and perceived the personal and political/social resourcefulness of the castle. This consistent perception of the

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<sup>60</sup> Smail, p. v.


<sup>61</sup> Such research is already being undertaken on the 'castles' of Chester in the thirteenth century by Swallow, 'What law says that there has to be a castle?'.

castle as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource throughout Stephen's reign was mirrored by the narratives of Henry I and II. This study has demonstrated that resourcefulness and understanding of the castle did not change as the strength of royal government fluctuated. Castles in the Anglo-Norman regnum were not described or understood differently across these reigns and various stages of conflict. And, because of the multifunctional nature of the castle, no one use or aspect of the castle was considered more important in particular situations. This study has demonstrated that throughout the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman regnum, the castle was consistently and continuously perceived by its contemporaries as a fortified, personal, and multifunctional resource.



## Appendix B: Fortified

Figure 1: Basic castle development across Europe.<sup>63</sup>



<sup>63</sup> *Castle: castle types, Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/media/99675/Three-main-castle-types-motte-and-bailey-stone-keep>, accessed March 8, 2013.

Figure 2: Goodrich, example of a fossed castle<sup>64</sup>



Figure 3: Bodiam, example of a moated castle<sup>65</sup>



Figure 4: Pleshey, example motte-and-bailey<sup>66</sup>



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<sup>64</sup> Photo by author.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Photo courtesy C.M. Clack, <http://www.chelmsford.gov.uk/community/news/pleshey-castle-open-tours>, accessed March 28, 2014.

Figure 5: Distribution of Castle Types<sup>67</sup>




Figure 6: Clifford's Tower, York, stone tower built on top of the older motte<sup>68</sup>



<sup>67</sup> Map created by Phillip Davis and included with his permission. <http://www.gatehouse-gazetteer.info/minorcas.html>, accessed on March 8, 2013.

<sup>68</sup> Photo by author.

Figure 7: Corfe Castle<sup>69</sup>



Figure 8: Dover Castle<sup>70</sup>



Figure 9a: Warwick Castle: Motte topped with enclosing mural defences<sup>71</sup>



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<sup>69</sup> Photo by author.

<sup>70</sup> Photo © [www.Skyscan.co.uk](http://www.Skyscan.co.uk), accessed May 13, 2014.

<sup>71</sup> Photo by author.

Figure 9b: Warwick Castle: Motte in bottom right with new keep in middle right<sup>72</sup>



Figure 10: Tower of London<sup>73</sup>



Figure 11: Rochester Castle<sup>74</sup>



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<sup>72</sup> Webbaviation, [www.webbaviation.co.uk](http://www.webbaviation.co.uk), accessed on March 8, 2013.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> [http://netia59a.ac-lille.fr/froissart/article.php3?id\\_article=609](http://netia59a.ac-lille.fr/froissart/article.php3?id_article=609), accessed April 29, 2013.


Figure 12: Wallingford<sup>75</sup>



Figure 13: Beaumaris<sup>76</sup>



Figure 14: Bristol with River Avon on south-western side and River Frome on northern side<sup>77</sup>



<sup>75</sup> S. Conlin, 2007, <http://www.earlivers.org.uk/regimental-history/wallingford-castle>, accessed on March 8, 2013.

<sup>76</sup> Source CADW, <http://cadw.wales.gov.uk/daysout/beaumaris-castle/?lang=en>, accessed on March 8, 2013.

<sup>77</sup> J.F. Nicholls and J. Taylor, *Bristol Past and Present* (Bristol, 1882), [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bristol\\_Castle\\_plan\\_ancient\\_times.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bristol_Castle_plan_ancient_times.jpg), accessed April 29, 2013.

Figure 15a: Winchester in 1100<sup>78</sup>




Figure 15b: Winchester in 1148<sup>79</sup>



Figure 16: Lincoln Castle (Orientation: North is right)<sup>80</sup>



<sup>78</sup> Biddle, Fig. 26.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, Fig. 27.

<sup>80</sup> <http://www.visitlincoln.com/things-to-do/lincoln-castle>, accessed March 8, 2013

Figure 17: Chepstow above a bend in the River Wye.<sup>81</sup>



Figure 18: Plan of Exeter locating castle in the middle of the city<sup>82</sup>





Figure 19: Map of Northern Syria<sup>83</sup>



<sup>81</sup> Photo © www.Skyscan.co.uk accessed April 29, 2013.

<sup>82</sup> [http://www.exetermemories.co.uk/em/\\_buildings/castle.php](http://www.exetermemories.co.uk/em/_buildings/castle.php), accessed April 29, 2013.

<sup>83</sup> Smail, p. 144.

Figure 20: Mining/Sapping<sup>84</sup>



Figure 21: Ram<sup>85</sup>



Figure 22: Mangonel<sup>86</sup>



<sup>84</sup> Porter, *Medieval Warfare in Manuscripts*, p. 48. © The British Library Board, Royal 16 G VI, f. 74.

<sup>85</sup> [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: battering\\_ram\\_from\\_rear.JPG](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: battering_ram_from_rear.JPG), accessed March 8, 2013.

<sup>86</sup> Photo by author.

Figure 23: Ballista<sup>87</sup>




Figure 24: Tower with bridge, ram, and archers<sup>88</sup>




Figure 25: Counter-weight Trebuchet<sup>89</sup>



<sup>87</sup> Smail, p. 252.

<sup>88</sup> Mansell Collection/Time Inc.,

[http://www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/middleages/topic\\_3/illustrations/imtower.htm](http://www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/middleages/topic_3/illustrations/imtower.htm), accessed March 8, 2013.

<sup>89</sup> Photo by author.

## Appendix C: Dover Castle furnishings<sup>90</sup>

Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



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<sup>90</sup> All photos by author.

Figure 4



Figure 5



Figure 6



## Appendix D: Simultaneous Elements

Figure 1: Exeter depicted<sup>91</sup>




Figure 2: Bedford depicted<sup>92</sup>



Figure 3: Salisbury (Old Sarum)<sup>93</sup>



<sup>91</sup> <http://www.exeter.gov.uk/index.aspx?articleid=2958>, accessed April 30, 2013.

<sup>92</sup> [http://www.galaxy.bedfordshire.gov.uk/webingres/bedfordshire/vlib/0.digitised\\_resources/bedford\\_castle\\_picture.htm](http://www.galaxy.bedfordshire.gov.uk/webingres/bedfordshire/vlib/0.digitised_resources/bedford_castle_picture.htm), accessed April 30, 2013.

<sup>93</sup> <http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/daysout/properties/old-sarum/>, accessed March 20, 2013.

Figure 4: Malmesbury<sup>94</sup>



Figure 5a: Sherborne gatehouse, upper level (above top window) later addition<sup>95</sup>



Figure 5b: Sherborne great hall cascading arches<sup>96</sup>



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<sup>94</sup> Photo by author.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

Figure 5c: Sherborne window decoration example<sup>97</sup>



Figure 5d: Full Complex of Sherborne<sup>98</sup>



Figure 6: Devizes<sup>99</sup>



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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> <http://www.aboutbritain.com/SherborneOldCastle.htm>, accessed March 20, 2013.

<sup>99</sup> 'Copy from a postcard view of The Castle, Devizes, Wiltshire, in the 1930s. The original castle was demolished in 1646 and the present one built by the Leach family in 1838; rock-faces additions were made between 1860 and 1880'. Photo by The Wiltshire & Swindon History Centre <http://eshop.wiltshire.gov.uk/getshopitem.php?id=130>, accessed March 20, 2013.

Figure 7: Newark<sup>100</sup>



Figure 8: Sleaford<sup>101</sup>



Figure 9: Ely Castle<sup>102</sup>



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<sup>100</sup> Photo by author.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Image by Phillip Davis. <http://www.gatehouse-gazetteer.info/English%20sites/151.html>, accessed March 20, 2013.

## Appendix E: Crenellation Examples<sup>103</sup>

Norwich



Conway



Caernarvon




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<sup>103</sup> All photos by author.

Bodiam



Peterborough Psalter, England, c. 1300. Brussels, Bibliotheque Royale Albert rer KBR, MS 9961, 9962, fol. 91 v.



Gallican Psalter ('the Luttrell Psalter') c.1325-1340, MS, 42130



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