
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British Representatives to International Parliamentary Assemblies: 1949 - 1970



Dov Solomon Zakheim
B.A. (Columbia)

St. Antony's College
Oxford

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ABSTRACT

For over twenty years, beginning in 1949, more than a score of British Members of Parliament, and an additional handful of Peers, have absented themselves from Westminster for up to two months of the Parliamentary session with the approval, indeed upon the authorisation of party leaders, in order to serve as delegates to one or more international parliamentary assemblies. Two of these assemblies, those of the Council of Europe and of Western European Union, have consistently concerned themselves with projects for bringing about closer British participation in the movement for European integration. Nevertheless, not only has virtually no attempt been made to discern a relationship between British parliamentary activity at these assemblies and the evolution of British attitudes toward European integration, but in fact no study has been expressly devoted to any aspect of British service in, or attitudes to, any of these bodies. The present study seeks to provide a clear picture of the nature of British involvement in the work of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in particular, and to a lesser extent, that of the WEU Assembly and of the North Atlantic Assembly. It endeavours to determine the functions which British delegates, and the party leaders who directly or indirectly approved their appointment, ascribed to the assemblies, and to outline the way in which their view of the assemblies' functions affected their own activities at those bodies and their work at Westminster and in their constituencies. Clearly, parliamentary views about the functions of these assemblies may have undergone some change over time, and special attention therefore is devoted to the evolution of British governmental, party and delegate attitudes to the work of the assemblies,

particularly that of the Consultative Assembly - the oldest, best known and most active of the three - from 1961 onwards, that is, from the year of Britain's first overture for EEC membership.

In order to obtain a clear picture of the functions which British delegates and party leaders attributed to the assemblies, four such functions- the legisl ative, consultative, promotional and educative- have been singled out for special consideration during the course of the study. An assembly can be said to fulfill a legislative function if some, many or all of its decisions are held to be binding with the force of law upon its members; in order to fulfill a consultative function, however, it need only relate to an executive which is bound to seek its advice before embarking on a course of action. The assembly fulfills a promotional function either when it promotes or publicises the work of an organisation to which it is linked, or when it promotes a particular ideal or concept, such as Atlantic or European unity. It may also fulfill a promotional function when it serves as a platform for the promotion of the policies or opinions of individual delegates: this latter activity has sometimes been termed 'parliamentary diplomacy.' Finally, the assembly fulfills an 'educative' function if it provides delegates with an introduction to, or details about, questions and issues that they could not easily obtain while serving in their home parliaments. An assembly can fulfill this function, and indeed the promotional function as well, without having a direct relationship with any other organisation or inter-governmental body.

This study is divided into three parts, which approach the question of British parliamentary activity in and in relation to the assemblies from three distinct angles. Part I deals with the British contribution to the institutional development of the

assemblies prior to I960. It demonstrates that during the 'fifties British M.P.s and Peers, following the example of their party leaders, hardly ascribed any positive function to any of the assemblies, other than to note the possible 'educational benefits' that accrued to them from a brief membership of the delegation, and therefore accorded the assemblies a low priority on their list of parliamentary obligations. Chapter I outlines the evolution of Labour's opposition to the granting of any legislative powers to the Consultative Assembly and argues that Conservative behaviour during the first Assembly sessions served to intensify the Labour Government's reluctance to see the Assembly assume even a truly consultative role vis à vis the Council's Committee of Ministers. Finally, it is shown that by the time Labour left office, it had ceased to take the Assembly seriously in any respect- thanks in good measure to the quixotic attempts of federalists to press for its conversion into a European legislature- and that the new Conservative Government in practice took equally as little notice of the Assembly as its predecessor had done. Chapter 2 continues the historical account of the Consultative Assembly's declining influence on the course of European developments and highlights the creation of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (later the North Atlantic Assembly) and of the Assembly of Western European Union. It demonstrates that British indifference to the older assembly extended to the two new bodies: they too were seen as at best 'educative institutions'. The promulgation of the British Government's I957 Grand Design for the amalgamation of the assemblies, and the support which British delegates extended to the proposal, were the logical outcome of the retention of this view. The failure of the Grand Design meant that the assemblies would continue to exist as separate units; it also seemed to ensure that British parliamentarians would never take very much notice of any of these

bodies.

After having reviewed institutional developments until I960, the study turns in its second part to the delegations and the delegates. Chapter 3 outlines the structure of delegations to the assemblies, and emphasises the close links that exist between delegation leaders and party leaderships in Westminster. It notes the educational and occupational backgrounds of delegates and stresses that delegates clearly were not chosen primarily with a view to their receiving the 'educational' benefits the Whips spoke of. Prior to I960, no fixed pattern conditioning the choice of delegates was discernible; after that date it is shown that delegates to the Consultative and WEU Assemblies were chosen with policy considerations in mind- that policy being Britain's determination to enter the EEC. Chapter 4, in in the course of an examination of the effects which service at an assembly may have upon the pattern of an M.P.'s relations with his constituency, indicates that the assemblies' promotional possibilities were virtually ignored by British delegates throughout the period under review. Delegates appeared to be concerned primarily with ensuring either that their prolonged absence at the assemblies did not arouse constituency displeasure, or obversely, that their work at these bodies was presented as an aspect of the good work that they were doing on behalf of their constutuents. It is shown, in addition, that prior to I960 a smaller percentage of delegates publicised their assembly activities in their election addresses than did so after that date, when European affairs in general became more widely publicised as a result of British attempts to join the EEC.

Part III turns to British activities at the assemblies themselves, notably the Consultative Assembly, whose deliberations produced more

recommendations for action to be taken in a variety of fields than did those of the other assemblies during the I949-I970 period. It seeks to demonstrate that after I960 it became the conscious policy of first the Conservative and then the Labour Government to present Britain's 'European' credentials to continental politicians, and that one way of their doing so was to foster a more active British presence at the European Assemblies. Chapter 5 considers first of all post-I960 British participation in the elaboration of projects to enhance the institutional prestige and effectiveness of the assemblies. It reveals that apart from the work of a few British delegates to the North Atlantic Assembly, such participation was, as in previous years, virtually non-existent. However, the utilisation in Chapter 6 of a quantitative analysis of committee posts held by British and other delegates both before and after I960 reveals that with respect to other activities, British participation increased markedly after I960, and indeed increased both in absolute terms and relative to other delegations. It is also shown, on the basis of an analysis of oral and written questions on assembly affairs that were tabled in the House of Commons, that after I960 there was a marked increase in the level of delegates' follow-up to Consultative Assembly recommendations once M.P.s had returned to Westminster. That the increase in British activity at the assemblies was very much due to the evolution of British policy toward the EEC is further made clear in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 classifies the committees of the Consultative Assembly into ordinal groupings in an attempt to analyse the overall contribution of the Assembly to the practical work of the Council of Europe, 'practical work' being defined as the completion of European conventions and agreements . It is shown that the Assembly's contribution was disappointing in view of the nearly 900 recommendations it passed between

I949 and I970, and that with respect to its committees, those whose focus was on on areas that were highly 'politicised,' notably the purely political, economic and agricultural spheres, contributed least towards the framing of conventions. However, it is noteworthy that a significant number of offices held by British delegates after I960 were on precisely those committees; for it was those committees which devoted most attention to aspects of the question of British entry to the EEC. Chapter 8 studies British participation in the work of international party groups, whose block votes often held the key to assembly and committee offices. It is shown that with respect both to the Consultative Assembly and that of WEU (the NPC/NAA had no such groups up to I970), British participation in group affairs, notably Conservative participation, became more active after I960, when entry to the EEC became government policy. It was then felt that British activity in the groups would be a useful stepping-stone to the assumption by British delegates of additional committee posts, which in turn would enable them to take a prominent part in assembly activities and thereby help to demonstrate the sincerity of Britain's 'European' intentions.

The examination of British participation in assembly affairs concludes with a discussion of the role of British delegates in organising and sustaining assembly support for British entry into the EEC. Chapter 9 also delineates the interplay between those efforts and the pro-Market activities in Britain. It is shown that not only were leading advocates of entry at the assemblies also at the forefront of the pro-Market campaign in Britain, but that in general, delegates to the Consultative and WEU Assemblies formed a larger proportion of M.P.s supporting entry than they did of M.P.s opposing it. Though it is difficult to tell whether some delegates

were pro-Market because they had served at the assemblies, or served at the assemblies because they were pro-Market, there nevertheless appears to have been a direct link between service at the Consultative and WEU Assemblies and support for the Government pro-entry motion in the crucial vote of October I97I.

The final chapter summarises the evidence for concluding that the delegates adopted the view of the assemblies' role that was prevalent among their party leaders, whatever that view happened to be. It was the evolution of Government attitudes towards European integration from the caution of the 'fifties to the enthusiasm of the 'sixties which directly led to the development in the 'sixties of a new British parliamentary interest in the affairs of the Consultative and WEU Assemblies that contrasted sharply with the apathy that marked parliamentary attitudes to those bodies during the previous decade. On the other hand, the juxtaposition of British activity at the NPC/NAA with that which obtained at the other assemblies, when placed within the functional framework that embraces this entire study, reveals that with respect to the general question of the functions of international assemblies, British views underwent only marginal modification after I960. Both in the 'fifties and in the 'sixties British delegates and the Whips who chose them attributed little importance to the real, imagined or hoped-for legislative or consultative functions of the assemblies. As for the 'educative' function, while in practice it does seem to have been fulfilled to some extent by the European assemblies- as evidenced by the way in which most delegates supported entry into the Communities in the October I97I vote- this was in no way a result of conscious efforts on the part of the Whips to exploit that function. On the contrary, in Labour's case, the fulfillment of that function worked against the

interests of the Whips in 1971-72. Only with respect to an aspect of the promotional function does a slight change in attitude really seem to have taken place. Whereas in the 'fifties virtually no emphasis was placed on the quasi-diplomatic possibilities afforded by the assemblies, the experience of the following decade indicated that some importance came to be attached to the concept of 'parliamentary diplomacy,' though only when its practice was seen to promote the policy goals of the British Government itself.

Essentially, British delegates and party leaders came to view the European assemblies as showpieces for demonstrating to other politicians the 'sincerity' of British Europeanism and British willingness to work in a 'community spirit' within the EEC. At no point, however, did they wish to accord to the assemblies any status which might permit them to influence the governmental or political process in Britain, and the assemblies never were able to assume such status. With Britain's successful entry into the European Community and her membership of the European Parliament, itself not only a consultative assembly but also a possible legislative chamber as well, any importance the other European assemblies may have assumed in British eyes during the 'sixties was sure to diminish rapidly. The NAA, on the other hand, though it previously had commanded less attention in Britain because of its emphasis on Atlantic co-operation, was unlikely to be overshadowed by the European Parliament precisely because of its Atlantic orientation. Instead, it held forth the possibility of serving as a forum for British parliamentarians to exert a moderating influence on differences that might arise between Britain's Community and North American partners. Clearly the NAA's greatest value to British parliamentarians lay in the future, while the hour of the Consultative and WEU Assemblies had come to an end with British entry into the European Community.

Preface

This study was prompted by my desire to examine an aspect of Britain's relations with Western Europe which did not involve merely producing a restatement of the analyses of other people. Its final form deals not only with matters pertaining to Anglo-EEC relations, but also touches upon the triangle of American relations with Britain and Europe. Thanks to graduate fellowships awarded to me by the National Science Foundation (1970-73) and Columbia College (1973-74) I was able to amass a fairly substantial collection of hitherto unexamined private papers from sources located on both sides of the Atlantic.

I wish to thank Mr. Uwe Kitzinger, my supervisor from 1970 to 1973, who from the very first - and even after he assumed a special advisory post at the European Commission in Brussels - was ever ready to devote as much time as was necessary to any problem that arose out of my work and who constantly provided me with invaluable advice and criticism.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANF	Atlantic Nuclear Force
BTO	Brussels Treaty Organisation
CNIP	Centre National des Indépendents
CDS	Campaign for Democratic Socialism
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
COMISCO	Committee of the International Socialist Commission
CPA	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
DAU	Declaration of Atlantic Unity
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
MLF	Multilateral Nuclear Force
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NAFTA	North Atlantic Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC	National Executive Committee (Labour Party)
NPC	NATO Parliamentarians Conference
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
PLP	Parliamentary Labour Party
SFIO	Section Francaise de l'Internationale Socialiste
SPD	Sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

One by-product of Britain's persistent attempts in the 'sixties to seek entry into the Common Market was the notable increase in the volume of published material which dealt with British relations with the EEC. Almost every aspect of those relations - political, economic, social, even religious - has been subjected to analysis, often from more than one perspective. Britain's accession to the EEC has encouraged the appearance of yet additional studies of her relations with the Continent, which take into account her new situation.

Despite this plethora of material, one aspect of the subject which has been the victim of scholarly indifference has been that which concerns British-European contacts on the international parliamentary level. Such contacts have been fostered in particular by the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly, which has met several times each year since 1949, as well as by the Assembly of Western European Union and the Nato Parliamentarians' Conference (now the North Atlantic Assembly). Nevertheless, almost no attention has been paid to these institutions in the specific context of British-European relations, with the exception of a few studies which have devoted some attention to this question within a more general examination of their structures and functions.[1]

Indeed, the existence of these assemblies hardly has merited much

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1. See in particular A.H.Robertson, The Council of Europe: its Structure, Functions and Achievements, 2nd ed. (London, Stevens, 1961) and European Institutions: Co-operation: Integration: Unification, 3rd ed. (London, Stevens, 1973); Kenneth Lindsay, Towards a European Parliament (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1958) and European Assemblies: the Experimental Period: 1949-1959 (London, Stevens, 1960). A brief analysis of the assemblies from a purely British perspective can be found in Max Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreign Policy: A study in British Administrative Experience: 1947-59 (London, Allen and Unwin, 1961).

notice even within the context of the British political system, despite the fact that each year since 1949 twenty-five or more M.P.s have absented themselves from the House of Commons for a number of weeks in order to take part in their deliberations. Clearly it is worth discovering whether those M.P.s (and the Peers who accompanied them on the delegation) were doing anything at all while they were abroad; whether their activities at the assemblies contributed in a positive way to the realization of their programmes (and the nature of those programmes must be spelled out) and whether those activities had any effect on their own work at Westminster and in their constituencies.

It must immediately be pointed out that even a superficial study both of post-war British-European relations and of British parliamentary affairs since 1949 reveals that the effects of the assemblies upon the course of those relations or upon the working of the British political system as a whole were virtually minimal. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that British academics in particular have taken little notice of the assemblies, especially after 1961 when attention came more and more to be focussed on the EEC and its possible implications for Britain if she became a member.

To be sure, the Consultative Assembly initially attracted a good deal of attention as a possible embryo of a European 'legislature,' whose repercussions, if it did evolve into a legislative body, would be of major importance not only to British-European relations but also to the way in which Britain was governed. If the Assembly ever were to be accorded the 'limited functions but real powers' that Federalists, both European and British, demanded, it clearly could pass acts which, if also agreed to by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, could have the force of law in Britain. Parliament would thus be presented with binding acts not of its own making.

This hypothetical situation never arose, however. While all parties adhering to the Statute of the Council of Europe were nominally in support of European 'unity,' it became clear that the term had only a vague meaning, which was defined in different ways by different governments. Many leading figures in the Six - Benelux, France, West Germany and Italy - were interested in achieving a federal European structure, in which there would be a division of powers between a centralised authority and its component member states. It was partly to achieve this end that the Six were ready to integrate sectors of their economies and even their defence arrangements along principles which permitted a majority of their number to determine policies that were binding upon all of them. Britain, on the other hand, attached far more importance to the relationship with the Americans, without whom Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, believed that 'no serious step forward was possible.'[1] Closely tied to the need to preserve the 'special relationship' was Britain's desire to contain Soviet encroachment in the West. The consequences of the Berlin blockade of June 1948 occupied Bevin far more than those of the Hague Congress of the previous month.[2] There was also the Commonwealth relationship to consider. Britain stood at the head of an empire whose break-up could not yet be envisaged. In 1948-49 Britain truly was at the centre of what Winston Churchill once termed 'three overlapping circles' of Atlantic, Commonwealth and European relationships.[3] Within the strictly European context, therefore, Britain would go no further than to interpret 'unity' as the product of a growing series of agreements reached unanimously by all member

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1. Beloff, New Dimensions, p.48.
2. ibid., p.49.
3. Noted in Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community: 1955-1963 (London, Oxford University Press, 1964), p.230. See also R.B. Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity: 1947-1956 (London, LSE/Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp.20-27.

states of the Council of Europe. If unanimous agreement on a course of policy was not a necessary condition for its implementation, Britaih preferred to forego participation in its formulation and to avoid being subjected to its jurisdiction.

As a result of the divergent views of Britain and the Six on the optimum approach to Western European integration, a stalemate developed in the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers. The Consultative Assembly's attempts to employ the new Council of Europe structure as a base upon which to build an economically and politically integrated Europe were in vain: the Assembly found that it was not being consulted, and that its advice went unheeded. Britain's refusal, under both Labour and Conservative Governments, to accept anything but intergovernmental methods of co-operation (while the NATO integrated military command was most welcome),[1] led the Six, who in any event were determined to press ahead with a more closely integrated Europe, to create their own smaller community along the lines they preferred. The Council of Europe forfeited its briefly held position as a major focus for European co-operation: that position now devolved to the institutions of the Six. The Consultative Assembly became a debating society, the victim of bombastic rhetoric and of endless paperwork, producing poorly formulated recommendations that were usually ignored by an apathetic Committee of Ministers.

The creation of the Western European Union Assembly in 1954, and of the Nato Parliamentarians' Conference the following year, the latter without even formal governmental sanction, only meant that M.P.s had more

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1. It is perhaps noteworthy that Ernest Bevin was still Foreign Secretary when the Atlantic allies agreed in principle on an integrated military command (September 1950) and when the SACEUR was appointed three months later. The office of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) opened in February 1951, the month when illness forced Bevin to resign his office.

assemblies to travel to. Neither body made any great strides towards exerting any substantial influence over governmental policy-making and agreement in the areas to which it addressed itself.

Small wonder then, that the only full-length studies devoted to the assemblies were usually apologia, and often contained plans that aimed at reviving their fortunes. Scholars seeking the background to important British-European developments hardly turned to these institutions; they were regarded as mere talking-shops.

It may be added that in a dimension other than that of the assemblies' direct effects on the course of British-European relations or on the functioning of the British political system, namely their potential as a stimulus for fostering common viewpoints and attitudes among delegates, these bodies proved equally as disappointing. The European assemblies, which it was thought might particularly encourage a 'European consensus' among delegates, simply did not develop as the forerunners of the federal Europe many of those delegates had pined for. Two studies which appeared in 1960 concluded that neither the Consultative Assembly nor the Assembly of WEU promoted any such consensus among delegates. These studies, based upon records of the delegates' voting behaviour in assembly roll-calls, revealed that on the contrary, it was the national party that was usually the 'repository of loyalties' at the assemblies.[1]

This conclusion seemed to set the seal of judgement on the assemblies. It had been hoped that despite their legislative impotence they still

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1. Ernst B. Haas, Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe (London, Stevens, 1960), p.66. See also Haas and Peter H. Merkl, 'Parliamentarians against Ministers: The Case of Western European Union,' International Organisation XIV (1960), 37-59.

influenced the opinions of their members. It now appeared that they failed on this score as well. It seemed by 1961 that there was little more than could be said about the role of the assemblies in furthering European co-operation and integration.[1]

Nevertheless, in spite of the disappointing performance of the assemblies in terms of their influence on major European developments, one is left with the fact that during the 'sixties and after British M.P.s and Peers continued to attend sessions of these assemblies. It is still important to determine what they did during their service at those bodies, both before and after the British Government first announced its intention to negotiate for Britain's entry into the EEC. How did they, as British delegates, and the party leaders who, directly or indirectly, approved their appointment, view the role and/or functions of the international parliamentary assemblies in which Britain was represented

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1. Since 1960 very little indeed has been added to what already had been written about the role of the assemblies in this sphere, particularly with regard to British-EEC relations. A further article by Merkl on party groups examined voting records at the Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies until 1962 and could but add that only the Christian-Democrat Group at WEU (to which no British party was affiliated) seemed to rival the cohesion of national delegations ('European Assembly Parties and National Delegations,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII (1964), 50-64). PEP's European Political Parties, ed. Stanley Henig and John Pinder (London, Allen and Unwin, 1968) briefly discusses the party groups at the two assemblies (pp.468-77). A revised version of Robertson's European Institutions (London, Stevens, 1973) briefly outlines the role of the WEU Assembly in promoting British-EEC contacts after 1960 and also takes account of the later developments 1970-72, again only briefly. Another revised version of an older volume, PEP's European Unity: A survey of the European Organisations (London, Allen and Unwin, 1968) likewise includes some passages on the Consultative and WEU Assemblies role in this area (pp.140-42, 339, 340). Oliver Crawford, Done This Day: the European Idea in Action provides an impressionistic, unsystematic account of the activities of the Council of Europe with some reference to the Assembly's contribution. J. Allen Hovey, Jr., The Superparliaments: Interparliamentary Consultation and Atlantic Co-operation (New York, Praeger, 1966) deals primarily with the need to create an Atlantic Assembly.

between 1949 and 1970 - the year that the successful round of negotiations for British entry into the EEC began? How did the delegates' view of those functions affect on the one hand, their own activities at the assemblies and, on the other, their work at Westminster and in their constituencies? Furthermore, the fact that the assemblies may not have played a crucial role on the world stage does not deny them any role at all. What role did they fill and what was the British contribution to their activities? Did the British Government ever follow the lead outlined by these bodies in any matter upon which they pronounced?

These questions demand answering if only because - and this point must again be stressed - delegates absented themselves from Britain up to two months each year, often while Parliament was sitting, in order to take part in assembly deliberations. Furthermore, the passage of time since most studies of the assemblies appeared highlights certain specific questions about the attitude of British governments and delegates to the work of the assemblies from 1961 onward, that is, from the year of Britain's first overture for EEC membership. Can it be said that British delegates continued to view all three assemblies in the same light as they had prior to 1960? Did they view all three assemblies the same way? If not, why not?

This thesis will attempt to develop the theme that British delegates generally adopted the view of the assemblies' role that was prevalent among their party leaders, whatever that view happened to be. In positing this relationship between delegates and party leaders, some doubt must be thrown on the traditional, as well as official,[1] formula that represents delegates

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1. Ernest Bevin spoke of 'an assembly of individuals,' Hansard, 5th series, 1948-49, 469, 2210.

as speaking in the assemblies only as individuals. According to this view, no backbencher is said to be able to bind his government to pursue any policy which he has advocated at an assembly. None of his statements can be taken to be official government pronouncements (unless he is himself a member of the government and explicitly states that he is speaking in its name). Every delegate has the right to present his own opinions at the assembly, whether or not they coincide with those of the party to which he belongs; every delegate is free to vote as he wishes on every recommendation, resolution or opinion under discussion there.

To be sure, it is quite true that no delegate has ever been able to bind his government by a statement he made at the assembly; some delegates have in fact chosen to forget their own pious pronouncements in the assembly chamber when they found themselves in a position to implement them. It is indeed for this reason that the term 'delegate' is employed throughout this thesis in preference to 'representative,' which would seem to accredit parliamentarians serving at the assemblies with an authority they do not in reality possess. However, the notion that delegates, in addition to their inability to bind their governmental or party leaderships, are also independent of those leaderships must be called into question. It already has been noted above that the voting records of delegates between 1949 and 1959 reflected their general adherence to the national party 'line.'[1] Furthermore, if one accepts as even partly valid the finding that most M.P.s agree that 'free trips abroad...(are) awarded for loyal party service and ...that rebel MPs (are) ...deprived of these trips,'[2] then one must

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1. See above p.5.
2. Robert J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips: An analysis of Dissention, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties (London, Macmillan, 1968), p.247.

recognise that the delegate who wishes to be able to make more than one trip abroad probably will find his 'independence' circumscribed to some extent. There have of course been cases of delegates who spoke out against their party with impunity and nevertheless were permitted to remain on the delegation, but these are exceptional, as are the cases of those delegates who were quickly replaced for being 'unco-operative.'[1]

Of course, nothing like a Westminster-type whip can be said to operate at the assemblies. The chapter which touches on the origins of the Council of Europe will, it is hoped, outline why a true whip never came to be instituted at Strasbourg, despite some evidence that the Labour party, then in government, originally had planned for such a whip to be enforced. When one speaks of influencing delegates one has in mind a far more subtle and complex process, one which permits delegates to speak out and vote as individuals while most of them nevertheless conform to and propagate their party's views.

Given this process, which must be presented in detail, this thesis posits that until 1960 British delegates and their political leaders were far more certain about what the assemblies were not than about what they were and how they should or did function. Until 1960 British M.P.s and Peers hardly ascribed any positive role to any of the assemblies other than to point out possible 'educational benefits' that accrued to them from a brief membership of the delegation - for most M.P.s it did not extend for more than two sessions - and therefore accorded the assemblies a low priority on their list of parliamentary obligations. I submit that

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1. Examples of the first category are RWG Mackay and Robert Boothby. Among members belonging to the second group are Neil McBride, Robert Maxwell, and indeed Boothby himself in 1953 (sources: interviews). For brief biographies of delegates see Appendix I.

this vagueness about the assemblies' functions was due primarily to the ambivalence of British governmental policy toward Europe (and the parallel ambivalence of whichever party was in opposition). However, when that policy became more sharply defined-when Britain under the Tories and then under Labour first began to ponder entry into the EEC and then applied for entry - the role of the assemblies was brought more sharply into focus as a subordinate aspect of Britain's overall aims in Western Europe. The assemblies, or at least two of them, were now viewed as forums for proclaiming Britain's 'Europeanness.' The effects of this new orientation were reflected in delegates' activities at Strasbourg and Paris, at Westminster, and in the country at large - and the motive force for this orientation lay not in the views of delegates but in those of their political leaders.

In order to validate this hypothesis, the views which both pre-and post-1960 British party leaders and delegates had of the utility and purpose of the assemblies must be analysed at length. Furthermore, not only must the above mentioned relationship between British policy and the behaviour of delegates to the assemblies be established beyond doubt, but the activities of delegates after 1960 must be outlined in some detail.

Primary attention will of necessity have to be devoted to the largest of the three assemblies, that of the Council of Europe. Both the nature of the available material and the length of the period under review dictate that this must be the case: from 1949 to 1955 the Consultative Assembly was the only one of its type in existence. However, neither the WEU Assembly nor the Nato Parliamentarians' Conference deserve to be excluded from the present analysis. With regard to the WEU Assembly, previous studies have already shown that, however frivolously it may have been

called into existence,[1] it came to play an extremely useful role for Britain in the early 1960's when entry to the EEC had not yet been decided upon by the British Government as a definite policy objective.[2] This role deserves greater elaboration. Furthermore, because it brought together only the parliamentarians of the Six with those of Britain, some reference to its deliberations and activities may help to underscore the link between the respective European policies of Britain's major parties and the behaviour of British delegates in the company of their continental counterparts at the Council of Europe.

The usefulness of the NPC/NAA to this study emerges in a different respect. Although it was created as an unofficial body, the conference soon came to be viewed both by politicians and by scholars as an assembly that was similar in substance, if not form, to the others.[3] It is noteworthy, however, that its membership has not been limited to European states - it includes representatives from the United States and Canada - nor its competence to European concerns. Indeed its primary focus has always been on NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, not on European co-operation and integration, and its raison d'être has been said to be the participation of American Congressmen and Senators in its deliberations.[4] Given the absence of the motive force of a fundamental change of British policy in relation to the issues with which it was most concerned - the stability of the Atlantic Alliance, the NPC/NAA can to some extent provide

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1. See below, chapter 2, pp. 109-111.
2. See in particular Nora Beloff, The General Says No: Britain's Exclusion from Europe (London, Penguin, 1963), pp.102-105.
3. For example, Max Beloff's New Dimensions considers the NPC together with the others and notes the relative merits of the 'informal' as opposed to 'formal' assembly (pp.36-37). See also Peter G. Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affairs (London, Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp.52-54. For an indication of the British Government's view see the discussion of the 'Grand Design' below, chapter 2, pp.117-125; see also pp.101-106.
4. Lindsay, European Assemblies, p.31; PEP, European Unity, p.420.

a focus for contrast between the behaviour of British delegates at its own meetings and that of delegates to sessions of the European assemblies where, it is posited, the effects of Britain's new attitude toward EEC entry were strongly felt.

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In addition to the major themes outlined above, several subsidiary issues are also considered in the thesis. Two questions in particular deserve notice. The first concerns the way in which the party Whips choose their delegations. To say that they only choose 'good boys,' those who toe the party line, hardly exhausts the subject and tells us very little about the workings of the Whips' office in this particular area. Certain considerations apart from Members' docility must enter into the calculation of choosing a delegation. A search for these, one of which no doubt is the importance that the Whips attach to each assembly, may be of relevance not only to delegations to assemblies examined here, but to other types of delegation such as those which are sent to the Inter-Parliamentary Union or on good-will visits.

Secondly, this study may provide some indication of how British politicians initially envisaged Westminster's future relationship with the European Parliament in light of their experience at the other assemblies. It is noteworthy that the first leader of the British delegation to the Parliament, Peter Kirk, spent over a decade at the Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies. Seven of Britain's eleven other representatives from the Commons in 1973 had also served at Strasbourg and Paris. The British Government has clearly considered that experience at the assemblies is a worthwhile introduction to the European Parliament.

A look at the pattern of delegates' relations with their party leaderships, with their constituents and with assembly party groups while serving at the Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies could provide the broad outlines of what British membership of the European Parliament holds in store for her representatives there.

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In a sense this study is set on two planes. On the one hand it is a study of international parliamentary relations. On the other hand it focusses to a great extent on domestic British politics both within and outside Westminster. The two strands of this enquiry can be seen to come together in the analysis of the degree to which changes in British party policies and attitudes toward Western Europe influenced in turn the British conception of what role or function international parliamentary assemblies should or could perform, and the behaviour of British delegates to those assemblies both at the assemblies themselves and in their work at Westminster and in Britain generally.

It is perhaps worthwhile at this stage to outline the various possible functions attributable to the assemblies that will be considered in the course of this study. Four functions deserve such consideration: the legislative,,consultative, promotional and educative functions. The first of these can be defined in a fairly straightforward way: the assembly acts as a legislature, with some, many or all of its decisions held to be binding with the force of law upon its members.

The consultative function is not dependent for its effectiveness upon any grant of legislative authority to the assembly. As long as a policy-making body is obliged to seek the assembly's advice before deciding upon

a course of action, the assembly can be, and is, termed 'consultative.'[1]

To carry out promotional activities the assembly need not be linked to a policy-making body in any way. It may promote the work of a larger organisation of which it is a part or to which it links itself, NATO for example, or the Council of Europe, or it may promote an ideal or concept, such as that of Atlantic or European unity. It has been stated that international organisations themselves consider this function to be the most important aspect of the international parliamentary assembly's work.[2]

The assemblies' 'promotional function' may also be taken to refer to their serving as a platform for the promotion of opinions and policies within the assemblies themselves: taken in this sense the function may be termed one of fostering 'parliamentary diplomacy.' This phrase was first coined in relation to the activities of the United Nations General Assembly. It can be taken to mean the existence of a continuing organisation with a broad frame of reference; public debate - often reflecting the views of national governments or, in the context of the assemblies under review, national parties; rules of procedure governing that debate, and the statement of conclusions in a formal resolution arrived at by some kind of majority.[3] Likewise, it can be defined as 'unofficial explorations' by assembly delegates and their exertion of 'moral pressure' to bring about solutions in their national parliaments to problems which their governments have not been able to solve.[4] Parliamentary diplomacy is, according to

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1. The consultative assembly of course differs from the legislative assembly in that its advice, though sought, need not be heeded. Thus Allen Hovey defines interparliamentary consultation as 'primarily a means by which members of national parliaments may be enabled to enhance their influence over and support of certain intergovernmental agencies and activities' (Superparliaments, p.150; my emphasis).
2. Beloff, New Dimensions, p.85.
3. This definition was formulated by Dean Rusk; it is noted in Ernst B. Haas, 'International Integration: the European and the Universal Process,' in Stichting Grotius Seminarium, Limits and Problems of European Integration (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1963), p.9.
4. Lindsay, Towards a European Parliament, pp.84-86.

this view, the creation of unofficial channels of communication between delegates which allow for the launching of a wide range of initiatives on delicate subjects, all of which can be withdrawn without embarrassment if their success seems unlikely in view of their unacceptability to some or any of the parties concerned. Both definitions of 'parliamentary diplomacy' deserve consideration. It is obvious, however, that the latter use of the term implies a more active, possibly more effective, involvement of individual delegates in the conduct of international relations.

Finally, the educative function is geared to the personal needs of the delegates themselves. Legislators are provided with an introduction to and details about international problems that they could not otherwise easily obtain while serving in their home parliaments. In some cases they may be given access to information which will aid their advocacy of a particular cause within their home legislature. It is with this, the educative, function in mind that one observer has described the assemblies as a 'campus...for mutual education.'[1]

Each of these functions[2] will be accounted for at various stages of this study. Part I will concern Britain's reluctance to ascribe to the assemblies a positive role until 1960, particularly her rejection of any legislative role for these bodies and her downgrading of their consultative capabilities. The origins of each assembly will be touched upon, with special emphasis on the early development of attitudes and practices that persisted during the remainder of the period under review.

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1. Roger Morgan, Western European Politics since 1948: the Shaping of the European Community (London, Batsford, 1972), p.85.
2. Another function, that of providing a reward to MPs for faithful service to the party, has already been noted above (pp. 8-9). Though they clearly can fulfill this function, and do, they hardly can be said to exist primarily in order to fulfill it, nor indeed are they best suited for this purpose. A government sponsored tour or attendance at CPA or IPU meetings is far less exacting and more pleasant for MPs than attendance at a committee meeting at Strasbourg (Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affairs, p.55).

Part II turns to the delegates themselves: their backgrounds, the links they maintain, in the context of their service abroad, with their party leaders and - in a separate chapter - with their constituents. The degree to which the assemblies were seen to perform an educational function is examined, as is the degree to which the values and goals that they promoted were in turn promulgated by the delegates upon their return to Britain. Part II will also serve as a bridge between the first part - concerning British apathy toward assembly affairs prior to 1960 - and the third, which highlights post-1960 attitudes and involvement in assembly activities. Both chapters of Part II will commence their respective analyses of the choice of delegations and of delegate-constituent relations with the early years of the Council of Europe, but both will continue those analyses through the 'sixties until 1970.

Part III will then analyse the activities of delegates at the assemblies themselves, comparing the situation before 1960 with that which entailed afterwards. An opening chapter will devote itself to the major theme of Part I, the institutional development of the assemblies, and will seek to indicate that British delegates after 1960 continued to be indifferent to the assemblies' attempts to add to their political stature if not authority and influence. Then, after an attempt at an overall quantitative assessment of the delegates' involvement in assembly affairs from 1949 to 1970, Part III will examine various aspects of that involvement: in the formulation and follow-up of Consultative Assembly programmes (the records of that assembly providing the best possibilities for a detailed analysis that goes deeper than mere quantitative tabulation), and in the interplay of party groups. Britain's attitudes to the work and functions of all three assemblies will be re-considered, and the relationship between those attitudes and British governmental policy will be explored. The final chapter will be devoted solely to the Common Market issue. It will examine the role of delegates in advocating or opposing British entry both in Britain and at the assemblies and will

consider in particular the degree to which they exploited the 'parliamentary - diplomatic ' possibilities afforded them by those assemblies.

It was not long ago that a perceptive historian once dismissed both the Council of Europe and WEU as 'the scrap-heap of obsolete Western political institutions.'[1] His verdict was pronounced in 1961. This study hopes to prove that, in light of developments in the ensuing decade, it was perhaps somewhat hasty and premature.

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1. Quoted in D.C.Watt, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1961 (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), p.35.

Part I

Britain and the International Assemblies: 1949-1959: The Decade of Apathy

Chapter 1

From Hostility to Indifference: British Attitudes and Policy toward the Consultative Assembly: 1948-51

A. From The Hague to Strasbourg

In most accounts of the origins of the Council of Europe and its Consultative Assembly it is the British Labour Party that emerges as the villain of the piece. 'Un-European,' 'Anglo-Saxon,'[1] 'narrowly nationalistic,' 'faithless to its own internationalist Socialist principles:'[2] such is the manner in which the nature of Labour's response to the French initiative in support of the plan for a European assembly is described. Were it not for Labour, one is led to conclude, the assembly would no doubt have assumed a 'legislative' character, as the forerunner of what eventually would - or at least might - have become a European federal government.[3] Instead, a Council of Ministers was imposed like an albatross upon the shoulders of the projected assembly and, as a result, it could only assume 'consultative' status when it came into being.[4]

The broad outlines of this picture seem irrefutable. It is well-known that France supported proposals for an assembly and that Britain opposed them; that France finally agreed to a compromise whereby the British counter-proposal for a committee of ministers was combined with

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1. Dorothy Pickles, The Uneasy Entente: French Foreign Policy and Franco-British Misunderstandings (London, RIIA/OUP, 1966), p.33.
2. Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy: 1914-1965 (Stanford University Press, 1969), pp.143-46.
3. R.W.G. Mackay, Towards a United States of Europe: An analysis of Britain's role in European Union (London, Hutchinson, 1961), p.100.
4. Lindsay, Towards a European Parliament, p.7.

the assembly plan to form the Council of Europe.[1] What has not been as fully documented is the nature of France's original proposal, nor indeed have the reasons for France's willingness to compromise on the British proposal at all been explored. Furthermore, the term 'consultative' as it was understood by the negotiating parties deserves further elaboration. To be 'consultative,' as defined in the introduction to this study, an assembly must be in a position to proffer its advice to a policy-making body. With respect to the Council of Europe's assembly Britain clearly deemed that policy-making body to be the Committee of Ministers. Did the French share the British view? Could not the assembly have performed a consultative function even if the committee had not been created? If the French did indeed possess a somewhat different concept of 'consultative' status from that entertained by Britain, what factors had led the two governments to their conflicting views?

For the key to these questions, particularly of course, the last, it is necessary to examine closely not only the proposals put forward by both Britain and France during the negotiations of the Council's Statute, but also to review the policy orientations of British and French political leaders when the 'European idea' first gained its momentum in the years 1947-48. Accordingly, British and French governmental attitudes to European questions will be analysed in turn, before consideration of the 1948-49 negotiations is undertaken.

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1. Accounts may be found in Robertson, The Council of Europe, pp.5-6; Elisabeth Barker, Britain in a divided Europe: 1945-1970 (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp.81-85; F.S. Northedge, British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment: 1945-1961 (London, Allen and Unwin, 1962), pp.140-42, among others.

Britain: Bevin, Labour and Europe

For Ernest Bevin and his colleagues in the Labour Government that came to power in 1945, Britain's major European policy preoccupation - indeed general foreign policy preoccupation - was the growing hostility of the Soviet Union to its former allies. During and immediately after World War II the Labour Party had generally been well-disposed to Russia, the 'new economic democracy,...natural ally of Socialist Britain and the ultimate guarantor of the European revolution.'[1] However, Bevin, whose early duties as Foreign Secretary in the Attlee government took him to the 1945 Potsdam Conference, was quickly divested of any such optimism about the prospects of co-operation with Britain's erstwhile east European ally. 'The Russians had shown themselves even more difficult than anyone expected,' Attlee later recalled, "after Potsdam one couldn't be very hopeful any longer.'[2] The Foreign Secretary, whose attitudes to the Soviet Union were coloured by his abhorrence of Communist excesses,[3] soon came to view the Soviet threat to peace as greater than that posed by the German problem. Indeed British policy toward Germany was 'conditioned entirely by an interaction between Britain's rational fears of a revival of German nationalism and militarism and her increasing fears of the Soviet Union.'[4] And whereas Germany was a defeated nation, occupied by its conquerors who had no fear of its refusal to accept the terms imposed upon it, Russia was a victorious power, with the greatest land territory in the world, 'one solid great land power,' as Bevin described it.[5] Fears of Germany were harboured in terms of its future potential, fears of the Soviet Union came more and more to be expressed in the present tense.

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1. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus, p.156
2. Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers: the War and Post-War Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee (London, Heinemann, 1961), p.78.
3. Ibid., pp.59-60; see also Gordon, op.cit., p.120.
4. D.C.Watt, Britain looks to Germany: British Opinion and Policy towards Germany since 1945 (London, Wolff, 1965), p.55.
5. Hansard, 5th series, 1946, 419, 1358.

Indeed it was as early as February 1946 that Bevin pointed to Moscow as the source of 'the danger to the peace of the world.'[1]

Bevin's dual concern regarding relations with Russia and Germany merged in a single policy goal: the attempt to bring about a permanent American commitment to the security of Western Europe. Although Bevin had to contend with initial American suspicions of British imperialist designs, and with a degree of American reluctance to give the Soviet Union the impression that it was being 'ganged up' on,[2] he never lost sight of the fact that security against both Soviet and German aggression could only be obtained with the co-operation of the United States. By late 1947 it was clear that Bevin's determined pursuit of American partnership was producing the hoped for results. The Truman Doctrine meant that British aims in Greece and Turkey would be underpinned by American finance; the Marshall Plan was the blueprint for the economic revival of Western Europe. In the military sector, Bevin first pursued a policy of closely binding Britain's Western European allies into a military pact, but the creation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in the winter of 1947-48 was 'only a first step.'[3] His ultimate aims were achieved only with the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, of which it has been stated, 'no single act of his term of office gave him a more satisfying sense of achievement.'[4]

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1. Quoted in Gordon, Conflict, p.108.
2. Ibid., pp.111-112.
3. R.B. Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity: 1947-1956 (London, LSE/Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1972), p.65.
4. Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London, Deutsch, 1956), p.289.

Bevin's view of the German threat as part of the larger questions of Soviet belligerence and the quest for a binding commitment from America to uphold Europe's security had much to do with his refusal to entertain any talk of Britain's joining a European federation. While a federation without Britain was, in 1947-48, virtually unthinkable, in view of the economic weakness of Western Europe, a federation with Britain as a member made little sense in terms of her own - and the continent's - security and economic needs. It was not in a European grouping alone that Britain could ultimately find military and economic security against either the possibility of a future revival of German militarism or the more immediate and imposing threat of Soviet belligerence. The key to that security lay only in the creation of a permanent link with the United States. However,

> that link...could neither be created nor kept in repair without the exercise in Washington of an independent British influence, derived from the long diplomatic experience of the United Kingdom and its world-wide status symbolised, though not exclusively, by the Commonwealth. 1

Seen in this perspective, European federation was clearly a policy which Britain could only follow at the peril of losing the American relationship, even though America itself might actively foster the federation idea.[2] Given what seemed to be a choice of policies, Bevin naturally opted for the more realistic[3] of the two, and preferred to look to America, rather than to a federation, to underwrite Britain's short and long-term security needs.

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1. Northedge, British Foreign Policy, p.48.
2. For a discussion of American support for a federal integrated Europe see Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe (London, Faber, 1963), especially pp.14-20.
3. Bevin did not reject the idea of federation in principle, but 'he saw it as the end not the beginning of a long process of co-operation,' Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin: Portrait of a Great Englishman (London, Hutchinson 1952), p.266.

If reasons of weltpolitik were a major factor in Bevin's rejection of federal schemes, so too were internal party political considerations within Britain. The impetus for the growing movement for a European federation had been provided by Winston Churchill, Leader of the Opposition, who, in a speech at the University of Zurich on 19 September 1946 had called for 'a kind of United States of Europe.'[1] He then had proceeded to organise the United Europe Movement in London 'to conduct in Britain a campaign for the unity of Europe,'[2] without, however, specifying whether Britain itself was to be included in that union. Churchill's activities had been matched by the creation of other 'federalist' organisations on the Continent,[3] and in December 1947 the International Committee for the Co-ordination of Movements for European Unity was formed with Duncan Sandys, former Conservative minister and Churchill's son-in-law, as its chairman.

The fact that Churchill, Sandys and other stalwarts of the United Europe Movement, notably Harold Macmillan and David Maxwell-Fyfe, were also leading Opposition figures only served to arouse the suspicions of Bevin and his Labour colleagues. In the first place, the Conservative campaign smacked of the strident sort of anti-Communism that Labour

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1. European Movement and the Council of Europe (London, Hutchinson, 1949), p.32.
2. Ibid. p.33.
3. By 1947 the following organisations had come into being: European Union of Federalists (chairman, Dr. H. Brugmans, former Dutch Minister) which co-ordinated federalist societies in Western Europe;
   Economic League for European Co-operation (chairman, Paul van Zeeland, former Belgian Prime Minister) whose aim was to sponsor research into technical problems raised by the proposed economic union of Europe;
   French Council for United Europe (chairman, Raoul Dautry, former French Minister) whose aims parallelled those of the British United Europe Movement; Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (chairman, M. Bichet, former French Minister) was the international union of members of Christian Democratic and Centre parties whose programme stressed European unity;
   Socialist Movement for United States of Europe (chairman, Michel Rasquin, chairman of the Luxembourg Socialist Party) see ibid., pp.33-34.

preferred to avoid. Whatever his fears of Soviet designs, Bevin had never ceased to hope for an eventual accommodation with Russia. On the other hand, European unity was seen in some Right-wing circles as a means for further dividing the world against Russia. That Churchill's call for European unity at Zurich in September 'followed logically after his appeal at Fulton, Missouri in March for resistance to the Soviet menace'[1] did little to diminish Bevin's distaste for the federalist design.

Furthermore, the Conservatives increasingly seemed to be using the federalism issue to further their party political ends. With Churchill and his colleagues chafing in opposition, and the prospect of a General Election before 1950 exceedingly dim, there seemed much to be gained from capitalising upon the forum which the movement for European unity provided them. As Labour's reluctance to entertain any notion of British participation in a federation became more apparent, and Conservative criticism of Labour's European policies more vocal, Bevin and his colleagues were confirmed in their conviction that the whole issue was merely a Tory ploy to heap further abuse on the Government's policies. The fact that Churchill himself had never explicitly stated that he favoured Britain's own participation in the scheme, though he did nothing to prevent others from coming to that conclusion,[2] only added to Labour's indignation. Again, the question of power and responsibility came into play. If Britain joined a federation, the decision and the responsibility would be Labour's, not Churchill's, and Labour, not Churchill, would have to bear its consequences.

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1. Northedge, British Foreign Policy, p.137.

2. See Arnold Zurcher's comments on fine Conservative distinctions between 'union' and 'unity' in The Struggle to Unite Europe: 1940-1958 (New York University Press, 1958), p.29.

To be sure, support for the idea of a European federation, both in Britain and in Europe, stemmed not only from the Right. Indeed, it has been asserted that in ignoring the support for federalism that was manifest both within his own party and among continental socialists, particularly the French SFIO, Bevin was giving lie to yet another of his objections to British membership in a European federation, the threat that membership in a free-enterprise oriented group would pose to Britain's socialist programme, particularly her nationalised industries.[1] It should be pointed out, however, that the support which the movement for a federation received from Labour came from the margins, rather than the centre of the party. Although it originally had been well-disposed to the concept of a European federation, the Labour Left had viewed the rightward shift of European opinion with some concern, and came to view the prospect of a Christian-Democrat led federation with increasing alarm. Thus both Labour critics and supporters of the Labour Government joined hands in opposition to the federation concept for fundamentally the same reasons: the need for Britain to maintain her freedom to carry out a Socialist programme. Though over 100 Labour M.P.s signed R.W.G. Mackay's motion on Western Union which called for 'a political union strong enough to save European democracy and the values of Western Civilisation,'[2] Mackay was soon deserted en masse by Labour moderates who followed the Government's lead and by a Left who rapidly came to view any possibility of a 'Third Force' linking left-wing governments in France and Britain as merely wishful thinking.[3]

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1. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus, pp.142-148.
2. Early Day Motion no. 33 (13 March 1948).
3. For a discussion of the Labour Left's disillusion with the SFIO see Leon D. Epstein, Britain - Uneasy Ally (University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp.123-124.

The disillusion with French Socialists was not without good foundation; from Labour's point of view, if anyone was betrayihg Socialist principles it was the SFIO not British Labour. Socialist internationalism was a worthy cause, but only if that internationalism was Socialist. The SFIO had never been the dominant power in France, but after 1947 it was clear that whatever visions it may have had of such domination had been compromised by the behaviour of its leaders in government. It was a Socialist, Paul Ramadier, who as Prime Minister dismissed the Communist members of his government on 4 May 1947, to the consternation of elements in the Labour Left.[1] Content to retain their ministerial posts in 'Third Force' governments dominated by the Centre, particularly the MRP - the French equivalent of a Christian-Democratic party - the Socialists earned the contempt even of their own supporters as they passed resolution after resolution at their congresses which were consistently ignored by their MRP partners in government.[2] Labour had at least enacted Socialist reforms, the SFIO seemed at times to be socialist in name only: hardly a force to be taken seriously when contemplating the possible effects of joining a continental-dominated federation.

From Bevin's point of view, therefore, the choice was clear. Whatever the terms of reference - military - strategic, economic, party political - Britain stood to lose much by joining a federation and had little to gain. His response and that of the Labour leadership to the federalists' organised initiatives in support of their cause was hardly surprising. Faced with the imminent convening by the Committee for the Co-ordination of Movements for European Unity of a congress at The Hague in support of 'the European idea,' the Labour National

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1. Ibid., pp.120-121, 123; New Statesman, XXXIV (May 10, 1947), pp.325-326.

2. See the acid comments of Alexander Werth in a section entitled, 'The Tragi-Comedy of French Socialism,' France: 1940-1955 (London, Hale, 1956), pp.411-414.

Executive Committee issued a directive that Labour members, particularly M.P.s, should boycott the proceedings. 'European Unity was too serious a business to be left to a bunch of unofficial amateurs,'[1] was the way a Conservative later described Labour's attitude. Twenty-three M.P.s did in fact attend the Congress,[2] and some of them, particularly Gordon Lang, who later shared with Sandys the secretaryship of the British section of the European Movement, Harry Hynd and Mackay, took an active part in the deliberations of the political, economic and social and cultural committees which usually preceded the vast plenaries in the Knights' Hall of the Dutch Parliament.[3] But those twenty-three M.P.s represented less than ten per cent. of the party's parliamentary strength; none of them were ministers; and neither Lang, nor Hynd nor Mackay had ever held, or were ever to hold, ministerial office. The majority of the PEP, including some younger M.P.s who had been favourably disposed to the idea of European unity,[4] had closed ranks behind the leadership and the Hague Congress was, as far as Britain was concerned, a Conservative show, dominated by Churchill and his fellow Conservative leaders of the United Europe Movement.[5]

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1. Anthony Nutting, Europe will not Wait: A warning and a way out (London, Hollis and Carter, 1960), p.22.
2. The figure is quoted in Anthony Short, British Policy towards European Union: 1945-51, unpublished B. Litt. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1960, p.144.
3. The Congress included 713 delegates from sixteen countries and observers from ten others (Robertson, Council of Europe, p.3.)
4. Indeed, Richard Crossman, who had originally intended to attend the Hague Congress, nevertheless withdrew at very short notice (Short, British Policy p.129).
5. Although he was not identified as a keen European, Anthony Eden also attended the Hague Congress and chaired the plenary session that considered the report-back from the political committee.

France: Bidault and Schuman, Germany and Europe

If Bevin and the British Government came to be more and more concerned with the growing Soviet threat, which somewhat overshadowed the long-term prospects of relations with Germany, the German problem never lost its immediacy for post-war French governments. France's fears of a German revival, conditioned by her defeat and occupation during the war - fears which clearly were of a nature that Britain could not fully appreciate - led Fourth Republic governments to seek drastic economic and geographic measures to ensure her security. For three years French policy, as first enunciated by General de Gaulle in 1945, was to press for the decentralisation of Germany, with initially the Rhineland, as well as the Ruhr and the Saar regions completely detached from its political and economic system. France's views led her to adopt a somewhat intermediate position between those of the other occupying powers, who had excluded her from the Potsdam Conference. Like the Soviets, France went to great lengths to exploit the economic resources of her zone for her own purposes and to press for even more favourable reparations terms.[1] France's efforts to instill in the Germans a new set of principles and values corresponding to her own also bore some similarity to what the Russians were attempting to do in their own zone,[2] though the French programme matched that of the Russians in neither direction nor intensity. On the other hand, Russia's suppression of democracy within her zone, and her refusal to take the existence of the other zones at all into account in her management of her own zone brought France closer to the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. Finally, on the question of centralisation she stood alone: the Soviets demanded full centralisation, the Allies a federal solution, while France held out against any centralising tendencies, at least as long as she was

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1. See Alfred Grosser, La IV^e République et sa politique extérieure (Paris, Armand Colin, 1961), pp.202-203.

2. Northedge, British Foreign Policy, pp.69-70.

not guaranteed the complete separation of the Rhineland, Saar and Ruhr.[1]

The growing and unceasing tension between the Soviet Union and the USA and Britain forced France to backtrack on her efforts to serve as a 'mediator' while achieving her own ends. The plan for the detachment of the Rhineland was soon forgotten, while opposition to the economic centralisation of the western zones became progressively weaker almost as a direct function of Soviet recalcitrance on any of the major questions confronting the allies. When France and Britain signed the Treaty of Dunkirk on 4 March 1947, it was formally directed against Germany, but, as Georges Bidault, who signed the Treaty in his capacity of Foreign Minister, later recalled,

> I had another undeclared reason for wanting it (the treaty) .... every exhausting and fruitless conference with the Soviet Union made me less and less certain of success. An Anglo-French alliance would provide an essential basis for other agreements, if the worst came to the worst and we had to organise a system of defence. 2

Bidault's change of attitude[3] was significant. More than almost anyone else, he had come to be identified with France's annexationist policies.[4] But by the time he signed the Dunkirk Treaty, and certainly

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1. Grosser considers French obstinacy on the decentralisation question to have been in part a bargaining posture in order to obtain economic and strategic concessions (ibid., p.198).
2. Georges Bidault, Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault, trans. Marianne Sinclair (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p.142.
3. Bidault may, of course, have injected a good deal of hindsight into his account of his feelings on signing the Dunkirk Treaty, however, his German policy had slowly been breaking down and was shattered by the Moscow Conference. It is not inconveivable, therefore, that he did attach greater significance to the Dunkirk Treaty than he publicly admitted at the time. (see Werth, France, pp.305-310; Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France, trans. Elaine P. Halperin (University of Chicago Press, 1970), p.23.)
4. Werth, op.cit., pp.305-306; Grosser, IV^{e} République, p.203.

after the end of the March-April Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow, Bidault found that he would get no support from the Kremlin for his designs for the Ruhr and the Saar, while the Soviets continued to press for centralisation. Furthermore, already in July 1946 the British and the Americans had merged the economic administration of their zones, and the pressure for France to join her zone with 'Bizonia' increased with every show of Soviet belligerence. France had lost her flexibility; she now had a choice to make.

France chose the West, but did so with some reluctance. To be sure, Bidault formally announced in June 1947 that 'France is no longer a mediator,'[1] and indeed the following month, faced with Soviet refusal to co-operate in an American funded programme for European recovery, he joined Bevin in inviting all other European governments (except Spain) to a conference that would lay the groundwork for that programme. However, with respect to the German question France continued to maintain a semi-independent profile. France's refusal to merge her zone with Bizonia continued into 1948. Furthermore, even when it became clear that the Anglo-Americans were determined to create a West German state, France continued to insist on the internationalised administration of the Ruhr's economy. Indeed France went so far as to oppose the redrawing of Germany's provincial boundaries, in the faint hope that even when a federal state came into being, the maintenance of provincial loyalties might counteract the centralising tendencies of the new federal government.[2] Clearly France was finding it difficult to relate to the prospect of the reincarnation of her old enemy, even in a somewhat abbreviated form, so soon after the trauma

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1. Quoted in Watt, Britain Looks to Germany, p.59.

2. Northedge, British Foreign Policy, p.83.

of her occupation.

Faced with the bankruptcy of his former German policy, and with the imminent creation of a German state, whose foundations were formally laid by the London Agreements of June 1948, Bidault groped for a new policy in which to ensure France's security against a future German threat. Within a month of the London Agreements he had found the key to that new policy, and it lay in the events that had taken place at The Hague early in May.

Of the many resolutions which the Hague Congress passed during its sessions on 8-10 May, that to which the leaders of the movement for European Unity attached the greatest importance was the call for the immediate convening of 'a European Consultative Assembly, whose members should be nominated by the Parliaments of the participating nations.'[1] Embodied in the proposal was the political framework in which a united Europe could be spawned, and it was the vision of a united Europe which now seemed to Bidault to hold the answer to the German problem. Speaking on 20 July to a meeting of the Consultative Council[2] of the Brussels Treaty Organisation,[2] which had been created by the Brussels Treaty that had been signed the previous March, Bidault called for the creation of an economic and customs union and of a European parliamentary assembly. Membership of both the union and the assembly would be open not only to the six Brussels Treaty partners but to other European nations as well.

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1. Quoted in European Movement, p.47.
2. The Brussels Treaty, signed on 4 March 1948 by Britain, France and Benelux, created a Consultative Council which was the major inter-governmental body that oversaw and co-ordinated its military as well as cultural programmes.

Bidault did not specifically mention Germany in his proposal, but his speech to the National Assembly that month indicated that Germany was certainly one reason, if not the reason, for his advocacy of a programme for a united Europe. He made it clear that his German policy had failed:

> Not that we were at all eager to let Germany be divided, especially into two parts, nor did we want the Western part of Germany to be re-organised; but we cannot just leave the ruins of the former Reich as a black hole right in the centre of Europe, if we want to reconstruct this continent.

But he went on to outline his new policy blueprint:

> First of all, Germany has to become a peaceful member of the European community...France has taken the firm position that it will back a constructive policy for Europe, and it has shown that it wants this irrevocably...by its adherence to the Brussels pact and by its participation in the programme of European reconstruction ....We can only speak in terms of Western Europe and West Germany for the moment. Nevertheless, we must build up Europe, and we must find some place in it for Germany....We will do all we can to create a united Europe, for this is the only way we can reconcile the countries of Europe...France would be wise to reconcile itself eventually with the presence of Germany in Europe and in the Free World, for no other reconciliation would be genuine. 1

In outlining France's new attitude Bidault commanded the support of his own party, the MRP, as well as of substantial segments of the Radical and centre groups and the Socialists. Indeed Bidault was by no means the most 'European minded' of his party's leaders; that distinction belonged to Robert Bichet, the party's secretary-general, and to Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Francois de Menthon, both of whom held ministries in Fourth Republic governments. The majority of the party was not, however, as committed as these three; it merely was content to follow the lead of Bidault and his MRP successor at the Quai d'Orsay, Robert Schuman.[2] The docility of the MRP was crucial, for it allowed both Bidault and Schuman to pursue their policies at their own pace, without undue haste.

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1. Assemblée Nationale, débats, 11 Juin 1948, 2e seance, pp.3455, 3459. translated in Bidault, Resistance, p.161.
2. On the MRP's pre-1950 attitudes to Europe see Grosser, La IVe République, pp.125-127.

Schuman, who succeeded Bidault in the July 1948 government reshuffle after having himself served as Prime Minister since the previous October, was a somewhat more committed 'European' but was not a 'federalist' in the sense that Teitgen and de Menthon were. He was not overly enthusiastic about a European constituent assembly, nor did he believe that federalism was realistic as an immediate goal.[1] In stating that 'in wanting to move too quickly, one gravely compromised the Europe of tomorrow,'[2] Schuman shared with Bevin the view that federalism was only the long-term desired outcome of more practical steps to achieve European unity. However, it was in their conception of what were 'practical steps' that the two men, and their governments, differed. Whereas Schuman accepted Bidault's plan as a practical first step, Bevin could not accept anything that resulted in a binding British commitment to follow directives not of her own government's creation, even if the framework in which these directives were imposed was not a federal union. Bidault's scheme for an economic and customs union meant that Britain's economy could come to be regulated by forces outside her control; it therefore could not receive British support. The assembly was meant to draw up the blueprint for the economic union: Bevin's opposition to the plan in general naturally led him to disapprove of its parliamentary component as well.

The Creation of the Council of Europe: Labour's Doubts not Dispelled.

When Georges Bidault proposed the creation of a parliamentary assembly to formulate proposals for an economic union, he went no further than the

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1. For a discussion of Schuman's attitudes to federalism see René Hostiou, Robert Schuman et l'Europe (Paris, Cujas, 1969), pp.102 ff. It is noteworthy that Schuman supported Briand's federal schemes during the inter-war years (see Robert Rochefort, Robert Schuman (Paris, Cerf, 1968), p.234.
2. Quoted in Hostiou, Robert Schuman et l'Europe, p.103.

resolution passed by the Hague Congress which had called for a 'consultative' body. The assembly was not meant to legislate a customs union into existence, it simply would make recommendations to the Brussels Treaty powers who would then consider their next moves. In itself, therefore, the assembly proposal embodied no circumscription of any government's powers. Nevertheless, not only did Bevin look askance at the idea, but even Paul-Henri Spaak, later considered to be one of Europe's leading federalists, was 'startled'[1] by Bidault's proposal and hesitated to commit his government to its support.[2]

It was the leaders of the movement for European Unity who initially sustained the momentum of Bidault's remarks. Duncan Sandys canvassed the capitals of Britain's Brussels Treaty partners to get them to give their official blessing to the assembly proposal. On 29 July Spaak declared in the Belgian Senate that his government favoured the assembly proposal in principle.[3] Sandys then concentrated his efforts on Schuman and on 18 August, the same day that Sandys' committee submitted to the Brussels Treaty partners a memorandum on the procedure for establishing the assembly, the French government announced that it supported the proposals and would bring them to fruition.[4] Accordingly, on 23 August Schuman asked Spaak for his full support for the plan, and when the Belgian replied in the affirmative, the two leaders set out to convince their Brussels Treaty partners.[5]

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1. Bidault, Resistance, p.165.
2. Frederick L. Schuman, 'The Council of Europe,' American Political Science Review XLV (1951), p.728.
3. Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats Inachevés: De l'espoir aux déceptions (Paris, Fayard, 1969), p.24.
4. See F.X.Rebattet, The 'European Movement': 1945-1953: A study in National and International Organisations working for European Unity unpublished D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1962, p.366.
5. Spaak, op.cit., p.25.

It was Britain that needed convincing; the Government was strongly opposed to the idea. Bevin saw the plan as an 'attempt to put the roof on before we have built the building.'[1] Attlee wrote to Churchill (who was actively campaigning in support of the assembly plan) that 'this is not the right time for Governments to take this major initiative...I cannot but feel that it would be best that it should not be brought forward at this stage.'[2]

Britain was overreacting to the proposal. As noted above, the assembly was meant to be no more than an advisory body empowered to suggest - but not force - the means for the creation of an economic union. But the Government's doubts hardly were allayed by the behaviour of European federalists who indeed endowed the assembly with the aura of an embryonic federal institution: at a meeting of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's European Parliamentary Union at Interlaken in September, R.W.G.Mackay and his European colleagues unveiled a plan for a bicameral federal legislature for Europe that presumably was to evolve from the assembly then being considered by the Brussels Treaty powers.[3] Talk of the assembly in these terms lent plausibility to the otherwise overstated objections of the Labour leadership, as exemplified by Hugh Dalton's remarks to the October 1948 Labour Party Conference. Labour's accomplishments since 1945, Dalton claimed, were

> in grave danger of being sacrificed on the 'doctrinal altar of a federal Western Europe'... (Labour's) participation had to be... limited strictly to the 'functional approaches of inter-governmental co-operation,' the federal approach amounting to mere 'conclaves of chatter boxes.' 4

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1. Hansard, 5th series, 1948, 456, 106.
2. Quoted in European Movement, p.53.
3. The EPU plan is noted in Schuman, 'Council of Europe,' p.728.
4. Gordon, Conflict, p.145 (from Labour Party Conference Reports, 1948 pp.177-79).

Given on the one hand the Tories' ingenuous presentation of their views on European unity,[1] and on the other, the impracticality of plans put forward by federalists like Mackay (who belonged to the Coudenhove-Kalergi group), the debate in Britain about the merits of an assembly assumed an air of artificiality that only served to colour the Government's attitude to the actual proposals that France and Belgium put forward. In response to the Franco-Belgian plan for a consultative assembly, Britain countered on 25-26 October with a proposal for the creation of a European Committee of Ministers - yet another inter-governmental body. Britain's sole concession to her partners was to countenance the creation of a commission to study methods of achieving greater unity in Europe, including the plan for an assembly.

The five-power commission thus created was chaired by Edouard Herriot, who led a five-man delegation that included three other politicians: de Menthon (MRP) and Guy Mollet (SFIO), both keen federalists and Paul Reynaud, a Modéré, who had been the last Premier of the Third Republic. Though each of these men had ministerial backgrounds, none of them were serving in the French government at the time that they were appointed to the commission. Furthermore, according to Hugh Dalton, who led the British delegation, they 'seemed divided among themselves, and ...have no instructions from, nor any contact with, their Government.'[2] In contrast, the British delegation had but one politician apart from Dalton, T.H.Gill, but as a Labour backbencher he was completely over-shadowed by Dalton, who was the only minister at the conference. If it was clear that Dalton was in full command of the delegation, it also was obvious that he took his orders directly from Bevin. Lord Gladwyn, who

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1. See above, p.25.
2. Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945-1960 (London, Muller, 1962), p.314.

as Gladwyn Jebb had been the Foreign Office's representative on the delegation, recalls that it was Bevin who remained 'quite adament' on all points relating to federal proposals while Dalton 'would have been prepared to be a little more accommodating.'[1]

It is not difficult to understand why Britain retained such tight control over her delegation while France did not. Britain - or rather Bevin - felt that no concession to 'federalism' could at all be allowed, and all proposals had therefore to be scrutinised for their federalist content. Schuman, on the other hand, also no rabid federalist, was fully aware of Bevin's anti-federalist views, which of necessity would have to be accounted for in any agreement with Britain that resulted in the creation of a new European structure. The appointment of federalists to the French delegation was no more than an underlining of France's initial negotiating position. Ultimately that position would have to be compromised.

After meeting throughout November and early December, and receiving further proposals concerning the assembly from the European Movement on 23 November and 9 December, the commission submitted on 16 December a proposal which incorporated both the British and the French lines. A new Council of Europe was to be established consisting of a consultative assembly, a secretariat and a committee of ministers. The assembly was to be composed of representatives designated by their national parliaments, presumably without the intervention of governments.

. It was this latter point which remained unacceptable to the British government. The fact that the assembly was only consultative, and that its advice clearly - by definition - could not bind the Committee of

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1. Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, p.223.

Ministers, was not enough to placate Bevin. He feared the independence of the delegates: the assembly would, if nothing else, provide the Conservatives with a highly-publicised platform which they could exploit at Labour's expense. The fact that the Tories were consistently taunting Labour for its 'backwardness' and that Churchill had been somewhat flamboyantly presenting the 'European' case[1] only served to harden Bevin's attitude. The British response to the commission's proposal was embodied in a new plan: the creation of a Council of Europe composed of a Committee of Ministers and a 'European Conference' with national delegations led by a minister and voting en bloc.[2] In this way the parliamentarians could have their assembly while serious opposition to Labour's policies would be muzzled. As for the Ministerial Committee, it would act only on the basis of a unanimous vote but 'might...develop later into a European Cabinet.'[3]

It was now the turn of the French and Belgians to refuse to give way. The independent parliamentary nature of the assembly was considered essential, British claims about its becoming a forum for opposition leaders notwithstanding. For the British, however, the spectre of such a forum was very real indeed. Dalton recorded in late January that

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1. See, for example, Macmillan's account of Churchill's 'march on Downing Street' in Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune: 1945-55 (London, Macmillan, 1969), p.163.

2. Spaak, Combats, p.27.

3. Dalton, High Tide, p.315.

> a body constituted on our lines could do useful work, but that one on the French lines would be a mere talking shop, in which irresponsible people would carry academic resolutions and often embarrass governments engaged on practical tasks. Such an Assembly moreover, would make a wonderful platform for Churchill on the one hand and the Communists on the other....The whole mentality of the French is to be against the Government and mistrustful of the Executive. Nor have they much sense of discipline and teamwork in a delegation. André Philip (an outspoken French Socialist)... has been canvassing in London for the French view, on the ground that we want a body which can criticise both the British and the French Governments at the same time! 1

Nevertheless, on 28 January 1949 Britain reversed her position, withdrew her new scheme and accepted the compromise agreed to by the negotiating commission. Confronted by the refusal of the 'four' to bend any further, Bevin could not allow Britain to appear to be obstructing European progress and recovery. To do so was not only to invite intensified Conservative criticism of Labour's policies, but also to risk alienating the United States, many of whose leaders had begun to conclude that some kind of political union in Western Europe would suit America's interests.[2] But Bevin had not shed any of his misgivings about the assembly proposals. Indeed he went to great lengths to ensure that once it came into being its deliberations would be of no practical consequence. Throughout the meetings of the April 1949 Ten-Power Ambassadors' Conference[3] that drew up the Council of Europe's statute, concession after concession was made to Sir Gladwyn Jebb and his team of British negotiators, despite the fact that the president of the conference frequently communicated with the leaders of the influential European Movement (as Sandys' group was now

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1. Ibid., p. 316.
2. H.J. Heiser, British Policy with regard to the Unification Efforts on the European Continent (Leyden, Sythoff, 1959), p.35; see also Beloff, United States and Unity of Europe, p.52.
3. The Brussels Treaty Powers invited Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and Italy. As all but the latter sympathised with the British position, their presence at the conference strengthened Britain's negotiating hand vis à vis the other Brussels Treaty Powers (see Rebattet, 'European Movement', p.390.

called)[1] and met with them on 6 April. To be sure, the assembly was endowed with several procedural characteristics that owed their origin to continental custom: seating was to be in a hemicycle, with delegates addressing the assembly from a podium and not, as in Britain's Parliament, from their seats; provision was made for a Bureau consisting of the assembly's president and vice-presidents who would be responsible for arranging the assembly's programme and timetable of debates; and provision was made for the creation of subject committees which would draft reports and recommendations to the Committee of Ministers for possible implementation.[2] Finally, the 'individuality' of delegates was symbolised by their being seated according to alphabetical order and not, as in most parliaments, by party, or, as at the United Nations General Assembly, by country.[3] Nevertheless, Jebb's request that the assembly should be composed of no more than 100 M.P.s - a request against which Sandys vehemently protested - was virtually met in full by the other powers when they agreed that a maximum of 18 delegates should sit for the larger nations (all told

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1. The European Movement came into being on 25 October 1948 with Churchill, Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi of Italy and Léon Blum of France forming an all-party team of Presidents of Honour. Its structure was finalised at a Conference in Brussels in February 1949: Sandys became chairman of the newly-formed International Executive Committee while Macmillan, Maxwell-Fyfe, Robert Boothby of the Conservatives, the Hynd brothers and Lang of Labour and Kenneth Lindsay, Independent Member for Oxford University, were members of the Committee, and Lord Layton, a leading Liberal, editor of the News Chronicle, and a good friend of Churchill's, served as one of the committee's vice-chairmen. Much of the Movement's influence derived from the prominent positions many of its continental leaders held within their home countries (see Rebattet, 'European Movement', pp.171-186, 209-269, on the Movement's activities in the 'Six' and 356 ff., on the Movement's efforts to promote a consultative assembly.)

2. A brief description of the structural framework of the Assembly, and of the place of committees within that framework, appears in Chapter 7 below, pp. 262 ff.

3. For an idealised view of the 'independence' of delegates see Lindsay, Towards a European Parliament, pp.67-71, but see below, pp. 46-48, 63-65 and Chapter 3, pp. 131 ff.

101 'representatives' took their seats at the 1949 session of the assembly). The British desire that matters of defence policy be excluded from the assembly's deliberations - an important substantive point - also was satisfied. The equally crucial British demand that assembly resolutions and recommendations needed the approval of the Committee of Ministers and that in important matters that approval had to be unanimous was met with as well. So was Britain's refusal to permit Communists to serve as assembly delegates. So too was the demand that ministers should be permitted to attend as delegates, a request that Lord Gladwyn has since labelled 'a mistake...which detracted from the democratic element in the house itself.'[1] Even the location of the assembly was due to a British suggestion. Gladwyn had studied at Strasbourg and loved the town; he convinced Bevin to agree to his idea and then elicited the approval of the French and Benelux. Duncan Sandys, when informed that the Council's seat would be at Strasbourg, thought that it would be an ideal spot as a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation[2] but worried about communications and transport which were (and to a great extent still are)[3] appalling. Perhaps, as George Brown later conjectured, this was precisely why Bevin enthusiastically adopted Gladwyn's suggestion and pressed it upon his continental colleagues.[4]

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1. Interview with Lord Gladwyn, June 1971.

2. Strasbourg is located on the Franco-German border. The capital of the Alsace region, it was annexed by Germany after the Franco-Prussian war and returned to France after World War I, only to be invaded again by Germany in World War II.

3. There are still no direct flights from Heathrow to Strasbourg.

4. See Lord George Brown, In my Way: The Political Memoirs of George Brown (London, Gollancz, 1971), p.206. See also Gladwyn, Memoirs, p.224.

It is noteworthy that in spite of all the concessions that were made to the British, the Four, and Schuman in particular, retained their optimism about the value of the assembly and the Council to the cause of European unity. The essence of the Assembly, according to Schuman, remained intact. Bevin may have feared the creation of a legislative, proto-federal body, and Mackay and other federalists may have hoped for the same result, but that had not been Schuman's immediate aim - he was not disappointed. As he pointed out to the French National Assembly in July 1949, two months after the Statute had been signed in London and a month before the Consultative Assembly was to meet at Strasbourg, the pressing need was for the development of a 'European spirit' that would progressively eliminate political nationalism and economic autarky, and for an organisation to come into being which could foster and nourish that spirit. 'I believe,' Schuman declared

> that the principal guarantee of peace in Europe resides in the fact of having been able successfully to establish a European organisation in which a new Germany will be spiritually and morally absorbed and encircled, which will find in it every possibility of acting and living in the service of humanity.

Given the Council of Europe's 'moral' and 'spiritual' role, the precise powers of the assembly were of lesser consequence. Its uniqueness and federalist promise lay in the independence of its delegates, though that very independence necessitated a consultative role for the assembly: 'One could not envision that a portion of national sovereignty could be transferred to an international assembly composed of delegates deprived (démunis) of all governmental authority and responsibility.' Indeed Schuman added that 'no transferral of sovereignty would be possible without legislative authorisation, (that is) truly constitutional.' However, Schuman concluded, 'the essential value of the Council of Europe is to be in existence and to be commencing its functioning barely one year after a European government first formulated its creation in an official proposal.'[1]

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1. Assemblée Nationale, débats, 9 Juillet 1949, pp.4489, 4490.

If the French maintained their optimism about the future of the Council of Europe, Bevin maintained his pessimism. To be sure, Britain signed the statute on 5 May 1949 and it seemed that 'Bevin had succeeded in making the Council of Europe quite harmless from the British point of view.'[1] But the 'independent' status of the delegates had been preserved intact. As Schuman had pointed out, it was this factor which embodied the assembly's uniqueness. The Statute indeed provided for each member state's government to decide on its own formula for appointing representatives to the Assembly, and Labour, as majority party, therefore could establish the terms by which delegates were sent. Nevertheless, it seemed impossible to prevent an independent Tory voice from establishing itself at Strasbourg. Such a voice was likely to be highly critical of Labour policies while it advocated alternatives which the British Government could not, in its view, realistically follow. Bevin doubted Churchill's sincerity over the European issue; he had no reason to expect that Churchill's behaviour at Strasbourg would be any more responsible than it previously had been. Bevin therefore continued to view the prospects of the assembly's activity with dismay, and the subsequent behaviour of the Tories did little to alter that view. If Bevin at first took the assembly somewhat too seriously, the Conservatives did not take it seriously enough.

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1. Barker, Divided Europe, p.84.

B. The Assembly's First Sessions:
Federalism vs. Functionalism; Tories vs. Labour

When the Consultative Assembly held its first sitting on 10 August 1949 it prepared itself for four weeks of discussion and consideration not only of the political future of Europe, but of questions concerning European co-operation in the economic, cultural, legal and social spheres. To this end, and in conformity with continental practice, five subject committees were quickly created to formulate reports to the Assembly and recommendations to the Committee of Ministers relating to each of these areas, in addition to a committee which was established to concern itself with the Assembly's rules of procedure. However, from the very first day of the session the question of the future institutional structure of Europe and the place of the Council of Europe within that structure tended to overshadow virtually all other matters, at least as far as the British delegation in particular was concerned, and continued to do so for the first three years of the Assembly's existence. It is to this question, which was embodied in the federal-functional debate, as well as to the bickering between Assembly delegates from Britain's leading parties which indeed affected their attitudes to that debate, that the remainder of this chapter will be devoted. The content of the many economic, social, cultural and legal proposals that emanated from the committees during the first Assembly sessions will be reviewed in a later chapter, where their ultimate fate at the hands of the Committee of Ministers also will be considered as part of an assessment of the Assembly's overall contribution to the practical work of the Council during the first two decades of its existence.[1]

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1. See below, Chapter 7.

The role of the Conservatives at Strasbourg had been Labour's immediate concern after the signing of the Council of Europe Statute in May 1949. The party leadership was determined to dilute as much as possible the potential influence of the Conservative section of Britain's delegation to Strasbourg. Initially Labour had hoped to send only its own party members to the Assembly,[1] but it soon became obvious that Britain would be alone in doing so. Churchill was then given permission to choose the Conservative team. He proceeded to name his closest colleagues in the European Movement - Maxwell-Fyfe, Macmillan and Boothby, as well as David Eccles and Ronald Ross, the latter providing the delegation with an Ulster Unionist voice which proved extremely useful in countering the efforts of the Irish delegation to win continental support for a British withdrawal from Ulster.[2] Excluded from the delegation was Anthony Eden, whose feelings about European unity were at best lukewarm.[3] The Conservative group was in fact relatively homogenous. None of them federalists, all supporters of the vague concept of 'European unity,' each of the six Conservatives was an accomplished orator and between them they faced no continental language barrier. Four were front-benchers, three of them former ministers. From Labour's point

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1. See Gordon Lang's speech in the Commons, Hansard, 5th series, 1949, 467, 1626.
2. Sean Macbride, the Eire Foreign Minister, proposed in the Committee of Ministers that the Assembly be permitted to discuss 'the best methods of settling the disputes between member states,' with a view to lining up continental support against British policies in Ulster. After his motion was defeated in the Committee by an 11-1 vote, William Norton raised the matter in the Assembly; Ross spoke against him. Norton's motion, almost identical to Macbride's, was ruled out of order and the matter was closed (see reports in The Press and Journal (Aberdeen), 'Council of Europe has its First Clash', August 10, 1949, p.1; 'Preparation at Strasbourg: Ministers' Meeting,' ibid., p.4; see also Consultative Assembly, Reports, 1st session, 1949, pp.40, 90-96 passim).
3. Noel Salter, former Council of Europe official and later Secretary General of WEU, considers that Eden was 'kept off' by the Churchill clan' (interview, July 1971). For the view that Eden's exclusion from the delegation coloured his attitudes to federalism see The Earl of Kilmuir, Political Adventure (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p.177.

of view they were a dangerous team.[1]

As for Labour, Attlee seems to have taken steps to ensure that if the entire British delegation to the August 1949 session would not speak as one voice, Labour certainly would. The Prime Minister named the delegation himself on the advice of the Chief Whip, William Whiteley, and in consultation with Bevin. The procedure, like that of the Conservatives, differed markedly from that employed on the Continent whereby delegates were elected on a party-proportional basis from their legislative chambers. Attlee left nothing to the whims of the Commons - no elections took place. To lead the delegation Attlee named two Ministers, Herbert Morrison, Lord President and Leader of the House and Dalton, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, as his Deputy. If that were not enough to ensure that Labour's official position would be faithfully promoted to the assembled continentals, William Whiteley himself was also named a delegate. The delegates' independence may formally have been signified by the absence of a two-or three line whip, but it was difficult to imagine a delegate deliberately risking the displeasure of two senior ministers and his Chief Whip even if they could not order him into a given division lobby. Indeed the authority vested in the delegation leaders was so great that upon the delegation's arrival in Strasbourg it was found that the doors leading to the offices of the delegation leaders were marked 'Lord President, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Chief Whip.'

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1. According to the provisions of the Statute each delegation could send a number of substitutes equal to that of its representatives. The Conservatives named the Earl of Birkenhead, Charles Mott-Radcliffe, Major Peter Roberts, Major James Harden, Geoffrey Lloyd and John Foster. Only Foster and Birkenhead actually spoke from the Assembly floor.

Pointed enquiries from delegates about the use of the whip led to the hasty removal of the signs, but the impression must have remained.[1]

The remainder of the Labour delegation reflected the leadership's desire to present a 'balanced' team. It included a Welsh barrister, Lynn Ungoed-Thomas, who served on the Assembly's Legal Committee; a Scottish former schoolmistress, Margaret Herbison, who filled Labour's seat on the Cultural Affairs Co mittee; a Trade Unionist, Fred Lee; and a Co-operative designated M.P., Will Nally. Also included on the delegation were Maurice Edelman, who spoke French and German, and Aidan Crawley, who also was proficient in French. This 'balance' was to some extent also reflected in the choice of Labour substitutes. Mabel Ridealgh was a Co-op sponsored M.P., Gilbert Mitchison a barrister and James Callaghan had some knowledge of French.[2]

Of all the backbenchers on the delegation (there were eight serving as representatives) only one, Kim Mackay, was known to be a supporter of the federalist cause. His inclusion on the delegation was probably due to Labour's desire to show its tolerance of minority views within the party, though Dalton had feared that Mackay could become a 'source of danger to... (the delegation's) unity and effectiveness.[3] It is noteworthy that

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1. The incident was reported in The Press and Journal of Aberdeen, the leading newspaper in Robert Boothby's Aberdeenshire constituency, in an article entitled 'Parliament of Europe is set in Motion,' August 9 1949. The pro-Tory paper sent a special correspondent, Stephen Coulter, to Strasbourg and his reports on the Assembly's proceedings made front page news on virtually every day of the first fortnight of its existence.

2. Callaghan was the only substitute to take part in the Assembly's deliberations. Significantly, he too was a front-bencher, serving as a Junior Minister for Transport.

3. Dalton, High Tide, p.324.

Mackay had no connection with the European Movement but belonged instead to Coudenhove-Kalergi's EPU.[1] Labour considered the Movement to be virtually a front-organisation for the Conservatives; Gordon Lang and Harry Hynd, who were among the Movement's leaders, were not chosen as delegates.[2]

Labour suspicion of Conservative motives seemed justified almost as soon as the Assembly's session began. The issue that first brought on a party clash was the question of the election of a British vice-president of the Assembly. The Assembly presidency had gone by unanimous vote to Paul Henri Spaak, who had been turned out of office in May. Churchill had been offered the post but refused, possibly because it might have conflicted with his activities as Leader of the Opposition. Three of the four vice-presidents were elected unanimously. Only the fourth - the post set aside by mutual consent[3] for a British delegate - involved an electoral contest. Morrison, the delegation leader, wanted Whiteley to assume the post. At a meeting of the entire delegation he tried to win unanimous support for the nomination. The Conservatives, feeling themselves bulldozed into a choice they certainly did not prefer, refused to go along

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1. The EPU never joined the European Movement (Zurcher, Struggle, p.22). For a detailed account of the inter-relationships of the various organisations working for European unity, see Rebattet, The 'European Movement'.

2. John Hynd, a keen federalist, was named as a substitute, but never took an active part in the Assembly's proceedings. Lang, with Conservative support, protested his exclusion, though the fact that he had that support probably confirmed to the Labour leadership the wisdom of its decision (see Hansard, 5th series, 1949, 467, 1626 and 469,17.)

3. It was agreed that three of the five posts on the 'Bureau' would be held by delegates from each of the bigger powers - Britain, France and Italy, a fourth would be held by a delegate from the Benelux states, and the fifth would be held by a delegate from one of the remaining member states. With allowances for the enlargement of the Council's membership, the system has persisted throughout the Assembly's existence (Council of Europe Secretariat, Manual of the Council of Europe: Structure, Functions and Achievements (London, Stevens, 1970), p.42).

with Morrison's request.[1] Churchill, who had been absent from the delegation meeting, then put forward his own choice, Lord Layton. Layton was the Liberal delegate, the party having been considered by the Whips to be entitled to one of Britain's eighteen delegates on the rough calculation of the proportion of seats it held in the Commons. He had received the invitation from Attlee (who formally sent out all the invitations) because he was well-known as a leading Liberal 'European.'[2] Layton himself was unhappy with Churchill's tactic and wanted to withdraw.[3] Churchill convinced him to stand and threatened that if he withdrew: 'I will never speak to you again. You will have betrayed me. You will have betrayed the whole Liberal Party.'[4] There ensued a great deal of canvassing on both sides with the continental Socialists grudgingly agreeing to support Whiteley while the Greek and Turkish delegations committed themselves to Churchill's instructions. The European Movement also supported Churchill. The Conservatives, judging from Harold Macmillan's account, conducted a smear campaign against Whiteley, and not without success. Layton won by five votes, 52-47.

It must be asked whether this electoral battle was really necessary and what it stood for. Morrison's determination to elect Whiteley was, it would seem, part of Labour's overall strategy to ensure that the British delegation, indeed the Assembly, took a moderate, rather than federal stance on European issues. But Morrison badly miscalculated European, or indeed, British reactions to his move. The Conservatives were provided with an opportunity to discredit Bevin's constant profession that he was a

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1. Macmillan, Tides, p.169.
2. Attlee's letter to Layton read: 'In view of the close interest which you have taken in the question of closer co-operation between the countries of Western Europe, I shall be very glad if you feel able to accept nomination...' (Attlee to Layton, 31 May 1949; Layton Papers, in possession of the 2nd Lord Layton).
3. Macmillan, op.cit., p.170.
4. Ibid.

'good European': Whiteley was portrayed as the classic 'Little Englander.'[1] The European Socialists disapproved as well. Led by such keen federalists as Guy Mollet and André Philip, many of them felt - or thought they felt - closer to the Conservatives than to Labour. Layton later recalled that as he walked back to his seat after his election, 'M. Rolin, a Belgian Socialist friend of more than twenty years' standing... leaned over... to congratulate me, but added, "I had to vote against you as I had promised to support a socialist. But I have never been so happy to have been beaten before."[2] Finally, there was the valid argument, put forward by Layton, that it simply was wrong to suggest that a man 'whose business in London was to guide and direct the members of a particular party' should be placed 'in a position of authority over an all-party delegation'[3] especially, it might be added, in the atmosphere of distrust that pervaded the delegation.

The Conservatives, however, did little to improve the atmosphere, indeed they positively poisoned it even more. It is somewhat surprising that Churchill should have turned to Layton, rather than to one of his own party-cohorts, to stand for the office, if it was necessary for a member of the Opposition to stand for the post at all. The wisest move would have been to press for a Labour delegate less obviously out of place in a continental climate than Whiteley to be the British nominee. Dalton could have been one possibility - he was at ease in the Vosges surrounding Strasbourg, loved the region's food and spoke French.[4] Edelman could have been a good non-ministerial choice, or indeed, Mackay, if the Tories insisted on a federalist. By choosing Layton, who was not

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1. Ibid.
2. Lord Layton, unpublished autobiography, chapter entitled 'The Council of Europe Starts,' p.6.
3. Ibid., p.5.
4. See Dalton's account of his stay in Strasbourg in High Tide, pp.320-321, 326.

even an elected Liberal politician, Churchill was reasserting his party's independence of Labour's leadership at Strasbourg and showing that he intended to make life very difficult indeed for Morrison and his group. In so doing he merely added to Labour's conviction that the Tories were less European than simply anti-Labour. The fact that the Conservative campaign was, by Macmillan's own account, 'rather reprehensible, but very enjoyable'[1] - a curious attitude indeed - only intensified that conviction. It is noteworthy that in outlining his reasons for distrust of the European Movement a month after the end of the Assembly session, Morrison specifically recalled its role in the Whiteley affair:

> My people have strong suspicions that the European Movement was working in association with the British Conservative machine at Strasbourg - against the Labour Party representatives, and, from certain information that has come to me about activities against Willie Whiteley, this leaves a very unpleasant impression. 2

Labour's annoyance at Conservative behaviour, and its inclination to view the European Movement as an extension of the Tory Party, only intensified as the session progressed. Morrison and Dalton were particularly incensed by what they considered to be Sandys' irresponsible behaviour. The Conservative secretary of the Movement had obtained offices above the Assembly chamber for the Movement's private use and from there he directed its activities at Strasbourg. His assistant, Dunstan Curtis, later to become Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, constantly 'hawked'[3] resolutions drafted by the Movement to the assembled delegates; occasionally he even ventured onto the Assembly floor - a practice unheard of in Westminster which particularly annoyed Morrison. Sandys also organised twice weekly dinners[4] for the Movement's leaders, among whom were a number of continental Socialists but only Mackay of Labour.

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1. Macmillan, Tides, p.170.
2. Morrison to Lord Layton, 4 October 1949 (Layton Papers).
3. Interview with Dunstan Curtis, December 1971. The phrase is his own.
4. The session lasted thirty days from 10 August to 8 September.

All this activity was, in Labour's view, irresponsible: Sandys and his assistants were not members of parliament and had no business involving themselves in the formulation of a parliamentary assembly's policy. Dalton stressed this point in protesting against the circulation of what he termed 'A resolution inspired by the European Movement and signed by certain members of the Assembly,' which dealt in radical federal terms with numerous economic questions under consideration in the Assembly debates.[1] He was annoyed that delegates 'should be as it were puppets whose strings are pulled by persons who are not members of this Assembly,' and requested that the resolution be ruled out of order. The ensuing debate resulted in the resolution's being referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and also highlighted the degree to which Labour stood alone: Crawley, Lee and Ungoed-Thomas of Labour supported Dalton; Philip of France, Jacini of Italy, and Maxwell-Fyfe opposed him. Spaak, chairing the session, and a leading figure in the European Movement, professed not to understand Dalton's procedural quibblings and claimed, innocently, that he could do nothing about 'documents circulated outside the Assembly.'[2]

Labour's isolation was not helped at all by the personality of its delegation leader. Morrison, even by Dalton's account, was 'a fish out of water.'[3] Speaking no French, the lingua franca at the Assembly,[4]

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1. In particular it called for the creation of a European Economic Union with a preferential tariff wall around it, and for a multilateral payments system. To a large extent its terms were incorporated in the report of the Assembly's Economic Affairs Committee (Rebattet, European Movement, p.393; Consultative Assembly, Documents, 1st session, 1949, Document 3[illegible].
2. Consultative Assembly, Reports, 1st session, 1949, p.656.
3. Dalton, High Tide, p.323.
4. See ibid., note 1; Morrison was as unfamiliar with French sensibilities as he was with the language. At a reception of the Anglo-French Society at Strasbourg he insisted on addressing his audience - in English - and embarrassed the assemblage by noting that 'war between England and France is unthinkable' and referring to the Norman Conquest (Stephen Coulter, 'Morrison Speaks: Eyebrows Raised: And a Few Understood What he Said,' The Press and Journal, (Aberdeen), August 15, 1949).

unfamiliar with continental parliamentary practice, much of which the Assembly had adopted,[1] Morrison upon coming to Strasbourg, had probably envisaged a situation somewhat similar to the UN General Assembly where national delegations held firm and debates were conducted on an interstate level.[2] He could not accustom himself to the individual initiative permitted to delegates - they could sponsor their own motions - or to the political by-play of Churchill, with whom he was constantly publicly quarrelling.[3] And he certainly had no love for the European Movement, whose leader was in Morrison's eyes first and foremost a Conservative politician. When Morrison left Strasbourg half-way through the session he did so with a sigh of relief, happy to be rid of the place.[4] He clearly had been the wrong man to lead the delegation. But his basic instinct about the Conservatives and the European Movement was not far off the mark. Dalton's simile about puppets and strings was virtually repeated by Macmillan years later in his recollection of the Assembly's first year: 'Behind the scenes, Duncan Sandys continued to pull the strings.'[5]

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1. See above, pp.41, 45 and below, Chapter 7, pp. 262 ff..
2. Dalton had had the General Assembly in mind when he had put forward Britain's plan for the creation of a conference with each delegation voting as a bloc (Dalton, High Tide, p.316). That Morrison still sought a unified British stance at Strasbourg is evident from Macmillan's account of the delegation's first meeting of the 1949 session (Macmillan, Tides, p.169).
3. Perhaps the best-known incident concerned the granting of an expense allowance to John Foster, a Conservative substitute. Churchill and Morrison exchanged words and gestures, to the discredit of both men (see ibid., pp.172-73; Dalton, op.cit., pp.321-22; Lord Morrison, Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography (London, Odhams, 1960), p.279; The Times, 11 August 1949; The Press and Journal (Aberdeen), 11 August 1949, p.1).
4. Dalton, op.cit., pp.323-324.
5. Macmillan, Tides, p.176.

Labour's differences with the European Movement did not merely concern parliamentary procedure or the choice of candidates for assembly or committee[1] posts. Far more fundamental was their split on substantive issues along 'federal' and 'functional' lines, particularly with regard to the future of the Council of Europe. Although it originally had called for a consultative assembly, by the time the session at Strasbourg had begun the European Movement had shifted its line. Its parliamentary supporters, most prominent among whom was Labour's own Mackay, now urged the transformation of the Council and its Assembly into a 'political authority with limited functions but real powers.'[2] The Labour leadership, on the other hand, had feared this very development more than anything else, as its behaviour during the negotiations for the creation of the assembly clearly had shown.

Aware of the existence of repeated calls for the adoption of a federal structure for Europe,[3] Labour had instead promoted what it termed a 'functional' solution: Europe's problems should be dealt with in a pragmatic fashion as they arose in particular sectors of its affairs, social, economic or political. Decisions should be taken only with the unanimous consent of the countries concerned and their scope should be limited to the problem in question. Labour, with the support of Scandinavian delegates (whose governments also shied away from federal proposals[4]) again put forward this view at Strasbourg, and the ensuing clash with the European

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1. No Labour delegate was elected committee chairman, though Maxwell-Fyfe became chairman of the Legal Committee. Dalton held the European Movement responsible for thwarting the attempts of Aidan Crawley and Maurice Edelman to win committee office (see below, chapter 8, p. 304). Will Nally, however, did become vice-chairman of the Social Committee.
2. Robertson, Council of Europe, p.85, n. 11 records that the phrase originated not with Mackay but with a French delegate.
3. Within the umbrella European Movement, the strongest proponents of a federal constitution for Europe were its Dutch, French and Italian councils, as well as the European Union of Federalists and the Socialist Movement for a United States of Europe; leading figures in all these groups were among the Continent's most prominent politicians. See Rebattet, European Movement, pp.61-67, 402, see also above, pp.35-36.
4. As did the Irish Government; see CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp. 108-109.

Movement and its bloc of Franco-Italian-Benelux supporters was a bitter one, lasting through the first three sessions of the Assembly's existence.

That Labour opposed a radical transformation of the Consultative Assembly into a proto-federal legislature does not mean that it refused to consent to some alterations in its character and procedure. At the beginning of the 1949 session, Churchill vehemently had attacked the Statute's provision that the permission of the Committee of Ministers was necessary before any subject could be debated by the Assembly. Although Labour speakers defended the text of the Statute as it stood, the Committee of Ministers quickly agreed to permit the Assembly to debate any subject falling within the scope of Article I of the Statute (i.e. all economic, social and political matters, but not defense), and thereby permitted the Assembly to set its own agenda.[1] Such approval could of course not have been forthcoming without British Labour's co-operation with its fellow members of the Committee of Ministers.[2] Furthermore, and more significantly, Labour did not oppose Churchill's call for German admission to the Council of Europe.[3] Indeed, in the months that followed the Assembly's session it was the British Government that first indicated its approval of a plan - subsequently adopted - for West German admission to the Council as an associate member.[4] Far from

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1. For details of the debate see Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 1st session, 1949, pp.33, 40, 48, 54.
2. That the decision to allow the Assembly to fix its own agenda was considered to be of major importance is clear from Macmillan's recollection that it represented 'a substantial victory for the Assembly' (Tides, p.173).
3. For Churchill's speech see Consultative Assembly, Reports, 1st session, 1949, especially pp.284-286.
4. An account of Britain's favourable attitudes to the plan for German membership of the Council of Europe is found in Lord Layton's auto-biography in a chapter entitled, 'West Germany is invited to join the Council of Europe'.

serving as a stumbling-block for what was regarded as a highly-charged proposal,[1] the British Labour Government was instead a catalyst for its speedy realisation.

Nevertheless, Labour could not go so far as to accept the 'limited functions but real powers'[2] formula if that meant, as it seemed to mean,[3] the laying of a foundation for a federal structure. No Labour delegate, apart from Mackay, lent his name to any of the motions put forward by assembly delegates which called for the establishment of the Council as a 'political authority' or at least for studies of its possible establishment along these lines. And Dalton was quick to reject Mackay's plans for the 'takeover' of the CEEC by the Council of Europe,[4] and, as noted above, was incensed by the federal-oriented resolution on economic problems that the European Movement had sponsored. If there was no other major clash at the 1949 session over the question of the Council's future it was primarily because Guy Mollet, rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, was anxious not to offend the British and therefore deliberately omitted the controversial phrase from his report to the Assembly, although it had figured prominently in many of the motions submitted to the Committee for its consideration.[5] To be sure, when the report was debated in the Assembly

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1. The Assembly was visibly stunned by Churchill's speech (see ibid. p.286; Macmillan ranked Churchill's speech with those he made at Fulton and Zurich, Tides, p.176.
2. In French the motions read 'limited aims' ('buts délimités').
3. Most motions employed the phrase without elaborating upon its meaning, but significantly Mackay, who signed one of these motions, also submitted one for the 'establishment of a democratic federation of Europe' - see Consultative Assembly, Documents, 1st session, 1949, nos. B,D,G,R.
4. Consultative Assembly, Reports, 1st session, 1949 p.512. He instead called for 'better liason' with OEEC.
5. See note 8 on this page.

Mackay put forward his amendment that 'the Assembly considers that its aim and goal is the creation of a European political authority with limited functions but real powers.'[1] However, by this time the Assembly had already determined that not enough time had been spent in consideration of the question of the future structure of Europe and the Council and had instructed the Committee to continue its study and report back in time for the 1950 session.[2] There was therefore, from Labour's perspective, little point in opposing Mackay's amendment, the terms of which would inevitably be raised in the Committee by Mollet if by no one else: Mackay was the only British delegate to speak in the debate on the amendment and it was adopted with no vote recorded.[3]

Labour's abstention on the Mackay amendment, coupled with the spate of recommendations on the economic, social and legal transformation of Europe[4] which the first session produced led the Assembly's president, Paul-Henri Spaak, to declare, 'I shall leave Strasbourg with the certainty that the United States of Europe are possible.'[5] However, as far as Labour was concerned, the unity of Europe along the lines projected by the federalists at Strasbourg was far from a certainty if it was at all possible. Labour was convinced, as Morrison put it, that 'what emerges from Strasbourg is that the Labour Party here and for that matter, Socialist Parties in Europe - as no doubt other parties - will have to do some constructive thinking about the importance of Western Europe.'[6]

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1. Consultative Assembly, Reports, 1st session, 1949, p.1032.
2. Ibid., p.972.
3. Ibid., p.1036. Anthony Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, p.25, claims that 'among those who spoke and voted for this project to a man were the British Conservatives.'
4. These proposals are discussed in Chapter 7 (see also above, p. 45).
5. Consultative Assembly, Reports, 1st session 1949, p.1328.
6. Letter from Morrison to Lord Layton, 4 October 1949 (Layton papers).

That the direction of that 'constructive thinking' with respect to the Assembly was not at all 'federal' was quickly made clear in a report on its activities which Denis Healey, the party's International Secretary, produced in September.[1]

Healey felt that the Assembly could perform two useful functions: it could serve as a 'producer of useful ideas' and as 'a sounding board for European public opinion.' However, the 1949 session, in his view, had failed on both counts. Delegates had supported unrealistic, often imprecise plans for European unity which were put forward and formulated by the European Movement. Unlike Morrison, Healey was prepared to recognise that the Movement was not simply a 'tool' of the Conservatives, and that 'it would be truer to say that the British Conservative Party dishonestly identifies itself with the European Movement for the sake of the latter's international influence as an anti-government organisation.' But the Movement nevertheless did oppose the 'present approach of governments' (none were named) and the Assembly, by supporting the Movement at every turn, had 'tended to behave as its instrument.' As far as the second function was concerned, Healey felt that the level of most speeches had been poor and the press reporting of the session 'malicious' and inaccurate. 'So far the Assembly has given some cause for anxiety and little for enthusiasm,' he concluded. If the Assembly's prestige was not to be destroyed irreperably by the refusal of the Committee of Ministers to entertain any of its projects (a refusal which Britain could ensure), it was necessary for the British delegation to put forward 'a few concrete and striking proposals which are fully, if tacitly, supported by the British Government.'

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1. Denis Healey, 'Report on the Council of Europe to the Labour Party' September 1949 (papers of Dr. Hugh Dalton, deposited in the British Library of Economics and Political Science, London - henceforth referred to as the Dalton Papers).

Healey did not specify what these 'striking proposals' might be. It was clear nevertheless from the tone of his report that in order to win the government's tacit support - which he interpreted to be the key to the support of the Committee of Ministers and, more presumptuously, to the future of the Council of Europe - these proposals would have to fit easily into the government's preferred framework of 'functional' inter-governmental co-operation on European matters. The exact nature of the 'striking proposals' were outlined in the National Executive Committee's official statement on European Unity,[1] which appeared on 13 June 1950 and was co-authored by Healey and Hugh Dalton (who soon afterwards based his instructions to the 1950 Labour delegation upon its contents).[2]

The immediate stimulus for the publication of the statement on European Unity was the announcement by Robert Schuman on 9 May of a plan to pool the coal and iron resources of France, West Germany and the Saar (and any other interested nation) under the direction of a supra-national High Authority. Faced with the need to take a stand on the Schuman proposals, the Labour party responded[3] with 'the most elaborate defense to date of the government's policy,'[4] in which the future role of the Council of Europe and its Assembly came in for considerable comment. Bevin's vision of Britain's place in the world was again reiterated: Britain was not only a European power; her extra-European commitments

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1. European Unity: A Statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party (London, Labour Party, 1950).
2. Hugh Dalton, 'Council of Europe: Consultative Assembly: Note by the Minister of Town and Country Planning,' June/July 1950 (Dalton papers).
3. The document, it should be stressed, was a party, not a government statement. Macmillan (Tides, p.193) claims that Attlee never read or approved it. Gordon (Conflict, p.303, n.67) notes, however, that Dalton and Healey were careful to obtain NEC permission before publication. It is difficult to see how Attlee could not have been aware of its preparation; if he was, then he must have given it his tacit support.
4. Ibid., p.147.

could not be ignored. Britain was quite ready to adopt a supranationalist orientation - but only within a Socialist framework. The possible domination by anti-Socialist (whether Communist, Fascist or cartel) forces which the Schuman plan represented was unacceptable to Britain's Socialist Government. Similarly, Britain could not accept the principle of a federal European Parliament. Such a parliament would of necessity be dominated by non-Socialist forces. Even without Communist representation from France or Italy, Socialists could still account for only one-fourth of all the representatives to the Consultative Assembly. Direct election of delegates would only confirm this distribution, if not actually go further to weaken the Socialist position (Labour no doubt had the 1950 general election as well as the Communists in mind).[1] If such an assembly were given legislative powers it could paralyse Britain's socialist advances in the name of 'European unity.'

The document stressed the 'independence' of the delegates, the aspect of the Assembly that had irritated Bevin the most and which he had unsuccessfully attempted to do away with. 'Independent' delegates were, according to Labour, by definition irresponsible. They behaved as 'a sort of unofficial Opposition to the European Governments as a whole.'[2] Since the Assembly could not be converted into a legislative body, it had, of necessity, to remain consultative. Its 'consultative' function, according to the document, was not to supervise the work of inter-governmental organisations and 'ultimately to usurp their functions.' Rather it was to put forward and plan projects which could not fall within

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1. Labour had won the 1950 election by a bare eight seat majority. However, European Unity was hardly a campaign issue (see H.G. Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950 (London, Macmillan, 1951), pp.121, 137, 218; see also Dalton, High Tide, pp.335-336).

2. European Unity, p.13.

the province of these organisations. One possible project - which was, by happy coincidence, dear to the heart of the Labour leadership, was to press governments to direct their economic policies to the goal of 'full-employment.' Movement towards a policy of full-employment in Western Europe would not only help to bridge the gap between classes, but would help fend off the threat of extremist revivals in Germany, Italy and France and thereby would make it possible for Britain to think seriously in terms of European unity. The question of implementing full-employment policies in Western Europe could not be raised at meetings of inter-governmental organisations. No government could be presumptuous enough to interfere in the domestic affairs of another (and, the document could have added, certainly not Britain, who so fiercely defended her own freedom to plan her economy). But an assembly of European parliamentarians, responsible to no one, could raise the matter, and with some likelihood of success, as the previous efforts of the International Labour Organisation in this field had already proved. In pressing for full employment policies in Europe the Assembly would be making a valuable contribution to European unity, for it would win the allegiance of the working class and would help to overcome class barriers that bred extremism, that in turn scared away Socialist Governments from federal schemes. 'As social standards become more uniform,' trumpeted the document, 'a major obstacle to Union will disappear.'[1]

The statement was criticised in many quarters as being isolationist;[2] and, to some extent, isolationist it was. Yet Labour was also guilty of

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1. Ibid., p.15.
2. The Times, carried in addition to a critical leader of its own on 16 June 1950, reports of widespread American, French and of course British Conservative hostility to the statements (15 and 16 June 1950).

maintaining a double-standard. What the party was seeking to do was the exact thing it attacked the federalists for doing: using the Consultative Assembly as a weapon for forcing certain policies upon unwilling governments. Labour resented any attempt to pressure Britain into joining a European Union which could influence her planning of her domestic economic policies, but at the same time Labour wanted the Assembly to exert moral and political pressure upon continental governments to adopt as a major priority the full employment policy that was so dear to Labour's economic programme. That some governments, while not in principle opposed to the policy itself, might nevertheless consider the lobbying efforts of the Assembly on behalf of granting high priority to full employment every bit as meddlesome as Britain considered the activities of the federalists simply did not figure in Labour's calculation. It was Labour's amazing sense of self-righteousness, of the knowledge that it alone possessed the cure to Europe's economic ills, that permitted it to broach no criticism of its own policies by others while it recommended the infallible solution to Europe's problems.

Labour's set of double standards also extended to the question of delegates' independence. Presumably it was the independence of delegates that rendered the Assembly unfit to assume legislative powers. Yet were the delegates independent? Healey's memorandum spoke of Labour's representatives pushing striking proposals with tacit government consent. The NEC statement indicated what proposals would win that consent and Dalton's guidelines for the delegation then impressed the delegates quite firmly with the need to press the policies enunciated in the statement. Dalton prefaced his memorandum with the remarks that 'in theory each of these (Labour) representatives speaks and votes in his individual capacity, but in practice I hope and believe they will work together as a team.'[1] He then went on to state that

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1. Dalton, 'Council of Europe...,' p.1.

> Our chief initiative should, I am sure, be on Full Employment. This would follow the lines set out on pp.13-15 of the National Executive's Statement on 'European Unity'....This should be our main positive British Labour line at Strasbourg, and we should plug it on all possible occasions, both in general debates and on committees.

Could one say that there was any independence here? Dalton's instructions also called for the delegation's support for the theme of 'Social Justice': 'We should urge, in particular, that all countries represented at Strasbourg should level up their Social Security arrangements towards those of the best, such as our own.'[1] On the other hand, federalist projects should be 'resisted.' Churchill's projected proposals for full German membership of the Council of Europe should be 'discouraged.' Prejudice against inter-governmental organisations, such as OEEC, should be 'combatted.' Was there very much left to the delegates' independent initiatives? In truth, Britain's Labour delegates were not going to be independent at all. Nor indeed, in Labour's own analysis, were any of the other delegates. When the NEC statement noted the independence of delegates from their party line it glossed over Labour's true view that continental delegates could not possibly diverge from the reactionary line of their party leaders. For if they were truly to be independent, could they not vote as their consciences dictated, in support at least of some of Labour's infallible policies? But just as Labour could not countenance eighteen Mackays on its own delegation so it could not envision other delegations with independent voices, unblinkered by the party ideology that often prevented progress within the national sphere. Indeed the Conservatives seemed to prove Labour's point. In 1949 they were no more 'federalist' than Labour. Their federalism was, in Labour's eyes, merely an attempt to win power for the Assembly to undo at Strasbourg whatever progress Labour had made at Westminster. No Conservative had veered from

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1. My emphasis.

Churchill's line on any point; all had worked closely with Sandys and mouthed the same evasive remarks about Britain's role in Europe. Labour had functioned as a unit (with one exception). The Conservatives had functioned as a unit. Did not the continentals do so as well? In practice, Labour behaved on the assumption that they did.

Labour clearly had allowed the Assembly very little room for manoeuvre. Its own policy was rigidly defined; its attitudes to continental politicians were marked by contradictions which only could be resolved if they fell into line with Labour's policies (as the Scandinavians had: Dalton patronizingly wrote of them: 'They are apt to be retiring, and we must try to persuade them to play a more active part.'[1]). The Conservatives were in no mood to work with Labour. A return to Government seemed a matter of time - and not a very long time - and the Tories felt that Britain should help to mould the Schuman Plan, which, as Macmillan put it, was, in May/June 1950, merely a plan to have a plan.[2] The federalists likewise hoped for radical progress, the first step of which they saw as the Schuman Plan. When the NEC statement pronounced that

> At its second session the Assembly faces a choice which may determine its whole future. It can continue to juggle with projects of constitutional engineering which lead only to sterile and exhausting wrangles with the Committee of Ministers. Or it can boldly attack a problem vital to Europe's survival (full employment). If it chooses the first course it will discredit not only itself but the whole movement for European unity...3

it sealed the Assembly's fate, as far as Labour was concerned.

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1. Dalton, 'Council of Europe...,' p.4.
2. Macmillan, Tides, p.194. The Conservatives believed that by participating in the six-power talks, Britain could influence the direction of the plan to her own advantage (ibid., pp.193-96).
3. European Unity, p.15.

Full employment did not materialise as the Assembly's major concern. Instead the Assembly, after voicing its approval of the Schuman Plan[1] (a Conservative amendment which fancifully provided for British participation in the Schuman Plan talks was also carried[2]), proceeded to recommend the creation of specialised authorities, similar to that proposed for coal and steel, to regulate European transport[3] and agriculture.[4] Churchill had gone further and called for a European Army,[5] and the Assembly had seconded his proposal as well.[6] The Assembly also saw to it that it was not left out of the blueprint for a new Europe. Recommendations were passed which provided that the specialised authorities were to be created within the framework of the Council of Europe; that any member of the Council should be free to accede to any or all of them; that existing European agencies should be more closely co-ordinated; that parliamentary supervision should be established over inter-governmental organisational activity; and that a protocol be inserted into the Statute of the Council to provide for all of these changes.[7]

Next to these innovative, even radical, recommendations, Labour's stress on 'full employment' seemed somewhat pedestrian. The party indeed secured an overwhelming Assembly vote in favour of a long recommendation that urged governments to take measures to counter unemployment within their frontiers.[8] However, in its turn, Labour was far from forthcoming

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1. Consultative Assembly, Texts Adopted, 2nd session 1950, Recommendation 6.
2. See Consultative Assembly, Reports, 2nd session, 1950, pp.1000-1004; 1042.
3. Texts Adopted, Recommendation 7.
4. Ibid., Recommendation 8.
5. Reports, pp.222-228.
6. Texts Adopted, Recommendation 5.
7. Ibid., Recommendations 1,4, 16 and 17.
8. Ibid., Recommendation 25.

on either the matter of the Assembly's competence or that of creating new specialised authorities. Labour initially opposed the General Affairs Committee's recommendations for co-ordinating the specialised authorities within the Council of Europe's framework and for widening its competence to include supervision of existing organisations, particularly OEEC.[1] The wrangling in the General Affairs Committee between Dalton and Guy Mollet - exploited, Dalton alleged, by Duncan Sandys in order to further divide the Socialists[2] - almost led to the Frenchman's resignation as Committee rapporteur. When Labour finally agreed to two of the Committee's recommendations, Dalton still found it necessary to issue the 'unpopular'[3] reminder to the Assembly that Labour delegates could not be bound by their vote at Strasbourg when they returned to Westminster. With respect to the two key votes on specialised authorities, Labour dispensed with qualifications and did not vote 'yes' at all. Only Mackay and Maurice Edelman (of a total of eight Labour delegates present at the vote) supported Churchill's recommendation for a European Army. These two were again the only Labour delegates who supported the Assembly's Coal and Steel recommendation, though on the Conservative amendment specifically calling for British participation even they did not deviate from the party line (Mackay probably for the reason that it did not go far enough to tie Britain to a supranational Europe).

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1. Dalton had been most emphatic about this point in his circular to the Labour delegation (Dalton, 'Council of Europe...') Labour abstained en masse in the First Assembly vote on the Committee's recommendations (August 18th).
2. Dalton to Ernest Bevin, 21 August 1950 (Dalton papers).
3. Dalton wrote to Mollet encouraging him to stay on and alleging that his resignation would merely play into Sandys' hands as well as those of all anti-Socialists (Dalton to Mollet, 21 August 1950, Dalton papers).
5. Dalton's adjective: High Tide, p. 335; see Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 2nd session, 1950, p. 1212.

If Labour had little to be pleased with after the August part of the Assembly session, it was even less disposed to be optimistic about the future prospects of the Assembly after its November session. To be sure, relations between Labour and Continental delegates improved at the second part-session.[1] However, this may have been due to the growing realisation on each side that the other could not be won over. Furthermore, the approval of one particular proposal, the Mackay protocol, seemed to confirm to Labour the lack of realism that marked Assembly debates and the degree to which it set impossible sights for its future development.

The Strasbourg protocol had first been put forward by Mackay in 1949 and again in August 1950.[2] It was considered by the General Affairs Committee in between the two 1950 part-sessions and presented as an appendix to a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers for its consideration of changes in the Council's structure. The protocol called for a merger of the OEEC and the Brussels Treaty Organisation with the Council of Europe, with all three organisations to be under the direction of one committee of ministers and one assembly, and for the amendment of the Council's charter to allow it competence in defence matters. The protocol also provided for the conversion of the Council of Europe into a parliament of Europe with the Committee of Ministers as its Upper House and the Consultative Assembly as the Lower House. The Consultative Assembly was to be initially composed of nominees from member

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1. See the comments of a continental Socialist, M. van der Goes van Naters, 'Observations on European Unity,' memorandum attached to a press communique of the COMISCO study group on European unity, December 1950, p.5. (Labour Party, International Department, Archives).
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 2nd session, 1950, pp.1166-1176. For the text of the protocol see Texts Adopted, 2nd session, 1950, Recommendation 31, Appendix II. Mackay's protocol actually went through two stages of development, first when agreed to by the General Affairs Committee, and then when Mackay put forward a final version in a report dated 16 October 1951, after the Committee's proposals were virtually set aside by a special committee of Ministers' deputies.

parliaments and later of directly elected members. The Council was to have no legislative power, but would be given ad hoc competence in particular matters. This would permit the Assembly to pass recommendations having the force of law on the subject in question and would, over time, result in the passage of a body of European legislation. Finally, the protocol envisaged the creation of a small executive council responsible to both Houses (the Committee of Ministers was given a veto over legislation passed by the Assembly). The Council would organise the Assembly agenda, prepare its legislation and would be responsible for administrative organisation. It would also be in charge of the administration of international organisations attached to the Council of Europe and would be entrusted with implementing all bills passed by the Council. Mackay clearly intended the executive council to serve as an embryo European cabinet; the whole system was envisaged as a forerunner of a European government.[1]

Labour's immediate reaction to the General Affairs Committee's recommendation to forward the protocol to the Committee of Ministers was to have nothing to do with the scheme. Seven delegates voted against the recommendation, another abstained; Mackay was alone in supporting it. For the longer term Labour seems to have concluded that the Assembly could not be taken as a serious body. Early in the new year the Cabinet decided that Ministers should no longer be members of the delegation to the Consultative Assembly.[2] Dalton, for one, thought

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1. For Mackay's outline of, and views about, the protocol see R.W.G.Mackay, European Unity: The Strasbourg Plan for a European Political Authority with Limited Functions but Real Powers (Oxford, Blackwell, 1951), pp.7-26 and Mackay, Towards a US of Europe, pp.120-123.
2. The exact date is unclear, but an exchange of letters between Dalton and James Callaghan indicate that the Cabinet took its decision before mid-February (Callaghan to Dalton, 20 February 1951 and Dalton to Callaghan 23 February 1951 - Dalton papers).

the Cabinet had acted wisely.[1] Most probably it had acted upon his own recommendation, since he had led the delegation in August and November 1950.

The decision to replace Dalton with William Glenvil Hall,[2] a former minister, must be seen as marking a significant change in Labour's view of the Assembly's usefulness. Originally opposed to the concept of a consultative assembly, Labour had come to interpret 'consultative' as meaning the promotion of policies which did not impinge on the right of each government to follow its own policy programmes, but which, with the assembly's moral support, would command the attention - and hopefully the positive support - of those governments. By reducing the stature of its own delegation leadership, Dabour seemed to be concluding that the Assembly was in no position to exercise any measure of moral authority that would result in the implementation of major new policies. The Assembly wanted legislative power, a quixotic demand in Labour's view, but spent far too little time on the issues Labour considered most important - full employment and improved social security - though it did pass recommendations in support of these goals. Whatever it did accomplish in terms of vocally supporting these 'approved' social policies was therefore devalued by its more grandiose aims, like the Mackay protocol, and it was unlikely that governments would take its proposals seriously. The Consultative Assembly therefore was 'consultative' in name only. It might do some work on, for example, human rights, but, as Dalton later pointed out, if a nation honoured human rights, it did so without the

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1. Hugh Dalton, 'Council of Europe: Consultative Assembly,' memorandum attached to note to Clement Attlee, 7 March 1951, with copies to Morrison, Bevin and Whiteley (Dalton papers).

2. Ibid.

need of a formal declaration. If it did not, no declaration could change its policies.[1] The value of the declaration was symbolic, and so too was the value of the Consultative Assembly. In practical terms Labour was no longer any more ready to utilise its consultative potential than it had been to create a federal parliament. The Consultative Assembly, like an ex-minister, deserved respect, perhaps attention, but little more.

It remained for the Conservatives to set the seal on the Assembly's hopes for future development. The Tories had been no more enthusiastic about a legislative assembly or about Mackay's proposals than Labour was. Though they were not in government, and therefore did not feel as immediately the threat which a federal, or even quasi-legislative Mackay-type assembly posed to their policies, the Tories shared with Labour a preference for the unitary system with which they were familiar in Britain, a system whereby all legislative authority stemmed from the Crown in Parliament. There were no competing centres of power in this system; local councils were not comparable to state or provincial governments.[2] No Conservative delegate had shared Mackay's experience of living in a federation (Australia) where more than one legislature existed and the powers of each had been roughly demarcated over time.[3] Granted that, under the Mackay plan, the Commons could press for a British veto of Assembly 'bills' in the Committee of Ministers, it was nevertheless virtually certain (as Mackay intended it to be[4]) that at some stage the

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1. Dalton, High Tide, p.330.
2. Although some M.P.s are also members of local councils, ultimate authority clearly stems from Westminster. See Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America, rev. ed. (Boston, Gunn, 1950, pp.243-47.)
3. For the Australian experience see H.R.Anderson, 'The Constitutional Framework' and S.R.Davis, 'Diversity in Unity,' in S.R.Davis, ed. The Government of the Australian States (London, Longmans, 1960, pp.31-53, 652-685, 701-173. See also K.C.Wheare, Federal Government (London, RIIA/OUP, 1946), pp.1-3, 16-17, 19-22.
4. Mackay, Towards a US of Europe, pp.121-123.

Government would accede to the counter-pressures of its partners in the Committee and yield some legislative powers to the Assembly. In time the Assembly would rival Parliament as a law-making body. Nevertheless, it would be only a handful of British M.P.s who could hope to exercise influence on the direction of the laws passed by the Assembly. The vast majority of M.P.s in the Commons would be forced to submit to legislation passed by an assembly four-fifths of whose delegates would not be British. Worse still, even those M.P.s who were members of the Assembly would find that they could not devote their full attention to its affairs and to the enactments it passed. For if the Assembly were truly to function effectively, it hardly could limit itself to two part-sessions each year. The inevitable extension of its timetable would force M.P.s to choose between spending less time at Westminster or less at Strasbourg. Given the role of the Commons in the British legislative process - as a corridor of influence, a means of direct confrontation with Ministers, of questioning Government activity and proposing new courses of action[1] - M.P.s would find that prolonged absence from Westminster would virtually exclude them from the workings of that process. Few M.P.s would choose to be so excluded and would absent themselves from Strasbourg, thus defaulting on their opportunities to change the course of European legislation.

These arguments were specifically put forward in 1950 by two Conservative delegates, Lady Tweedsmuir and Sir Ronald Ross, the latter doing so at great length.[2] None of their fellow delegates contradicted

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1. For the view that M.P.s influence the course of legislation (though they do not legislate) see Ronald Butt, The Power of Parliament (London, Constable, 1967), pp.415,425,437; Ian Gilmour, The Body Politic (London, Hutchinson, 1969), pp.272-275. Bernard Crick also tends to this view in his critique of Parliament, The Reform of Parliament, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), see especially, pp.26-28, 76-78.
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 2nd session, 1950, p.1574.

their views. Indeed Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys and Julian Amery put forward an amendment to the assembly recommendation on the protocol which sought to make it clear that delegates had not bound themselves to support it in principle.[1] The amendment was withdrawn only when its essence was incorporated into the recommendation. However, even when the Tories cast their 'yes' vote Macmillan again emphasised that 'I and my friends cannot be tied to the principle involved.'[2]

During the first part of the 1951 session, after the Committee of Ministers had indicated its dissatisfaction with the protocol, the Conservatives, like Labour, preferred to have the matter dropped. Henry Hopkinson counselled 'realism;' Duncan Sandys felt that 'the achievement of legal powers..."real powers" - is not, in my opinion, our most important task.'[3] Eventually the Tories went along with a proposal to allow continued discussion of the protocol in the General Affairs Committee, though Labour persisted with its demand that the matter be dropped.[4] In practice, however, the parties hardly differed on the issue; neither gave any further indication that HMG was prepared to accept the protocol in principle, much less in its present detail.

It became even more difficult to detect any difference in the position of the parties at the November 1951 session. The Conservatives had won the October general election; significantly, Europe had again failed to serve as a major campaign issue.[5] The new Government adopted its predecessor's

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1. Consultative Assembly, Documents, 2nd session, 1950, Document 148, amendment no. 4.
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 2nd session, 1950, p.1646.
3. Ibid. 3rd session 1951, pp.31-34. Only David Maxwell-Fyfe publicly associated himself with Mackay's proposals. See their letter to The Times, 9 January 1951, quoted in Mackay, Towards a US of Europe, pp.122-123.
4. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 3rd session, 1951, pp.442-443 (remarks of A.Crosland), 445-446 (remarks of H.Macmillan), 447 (remarks of W.G.Hall), 448.
5. See D.E.Butler, The British General Election of 1951 (London, Macmillan, 1952), p.17.

view of Britain's role in world affairs. Europe was again seen as but one of three primary British interests, the other two of which, America and the Commonwealth, deserved equal if not greater attention.[1] As had been the case when Labour was in power, the Korean conflict (which had begun in June 1950) and Soviet intentions in particular preoccupied British policy-makers to a greater extent than did plans for European integration. This continuity in British foreign policy priorities was bound to disappoint continental supporters of European integration. For Britain still had before her yet another opportunity to play an active role in the creation of an integrated European community. In October 1950, French Premier René Pleven had proposed the creation of a European army to incorporate German units at regimental level with those of other member countries. The purpose of the Pleven Plan was twofold: On the one hand it would satisfy growing American demands for German rearmament in order to strengthen the West's hand against the Soviet threat; on the other, it would be another advance toward European integration along the lines set by the plan for a coal and steel pool.[2] It was noteworthy that much of the publicity for the idea of a European army had emanated from none other than Winston Churchill, in the form of a key motion and speech to the August 1950 session of the Consultative Assembly.[3] Britain, still under Labour government, had adopted a stance similar to that which it had displayed toward the Schuman plan: co-operation with the new institution

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1. Eden recalls in his memoirs 'Though my handling of some events would have been different from his (Bevin's), I was in agreement with the aims of his foreign policy and of most that he did,' The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London, Cassell, 1960), p.5; see also Manderson-Jones, Special Relationship, p.130.
2. For a discussion of Britain, the US and the creation and fall of EDC see ibid., pp.97-120; Beloff, US and Unity of Europe, pp.76-83; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, pp.33-38, 55-68; Eden, Full Circle, pp.29-52, 146-149; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change: 1953-1956 (London, Heinemann, 1963), pp.397-402.
3. Consultative Assembly, Documents, 2nd session, 1950, Document 47; Official Reports, 2nd session, 1950, pp.222-228.

was acceptable, membership in it was not. Britain had sent only an observer to the February 1951 conference that met to draft what became the treaty for a European Defence Community. However, the Conservatives' return to office in October 1951 seemed to herald a new British policy toward membership of EDC: that at least was what the French in particular hoped for.[1] The Conservatives did not wish to appear ill-disposed to European projects and to this end appointed David Maxwell-Fyfe, the new Home Secretary and a sincere European,[2] as leader of the British delegation to Strasbourg in November 1951. But the 'atmosphere of hope and expectation' which not surprisingly prevailed at the Assembly's opening sitting was soon dissipated by the delegates' realisation that Britain's government might have changed but its policy had not. Maxwell-Fyfe's major speech to the assembly hardly pointed to a reversal of British policy toward EDC, though it did not completely close the door to British membership of the organisation. However, Eden, now Foreign Secretary, put an end to speculation that very night. Speaking in Rome, he announced that Britain had no intention of joining the EDC on any terms. As Maxwell-Fyfe (whose own portfolio did not permit him to exert much influence over the formulation of British foreign policy) recalled, 'the sense of betrayal felt by our European friends at Strasbourg was acute, and their condemnation bitter.'[3] In reply to an 'angry round robin' sent to him by Robert Boothby and the rest of the Conservative delegation, Eden could merely say, 'I'm sorry.'[4]

Paul-Henri Spaak resigned in disgust as President of the Assembly, to concentrate his efforts on solidifying a Little Six without Britain.

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1. Northedge, British Foreign Policy, p.155
2. Macmillan, Tides speaks of Maxwell-Fyfe's devotion to the European cause, often in the face of Eden's opposite views (pp.463-65, 471-472).
3. Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p.187. Kilmuir and Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, p.41, try to place the blame on Eden for the 'betrayal', but Spaak, Combats, pp.46-48, seems to blame the Conservative delegation as well.
4. Nutting, op.cit., p.41.

The Council of Europe no longer appeared to him as a workable focus for fostering the integration of Western Europe. The Six were in any event determined to press ahead with their plans for closer co-operation; the events of November 1951, however, meant that henceforth the Council of Europe, with its assembly, was relegated to the periphery of European affairs. With little hope of attaining legislative status, the Assembly was thus robbed of a meaningful 'consultative' function as well: the Conservatives, as much as Labour, had seen to that.

Conclusion

Was Labour's attitude to the Council of Europe and its Assembly 'un-European' and 'Anglo-Saxon'? Probably no more than was that of the Conservatives. Neither party supported the notion of British membership in a European federation. If Labour was more apprehensive about the creation of a consultative assembly than the Tories were, it was precisely because they were so manifestly active in the federalist-oriented European Movement, the organisation which did most to further that project. It was primarily a very parochial fear of Conservative party-political tactics, a fear that did not prove unjustified, as well as apprehension over federalist designs for the assembly's future, which likewise materialised, that helped to blinker Labour's view of the exact nature of the French proposals for an assembly. For the French leaders themselves were hardly federalist, and their proposals, though framed on the basis of a perspective of European affairs that differed to a great extent from that held by Britain, did not in themselves involve an attack on the British Government's executive powers which that Government, viewing with somewhat justified alarm the activities of federalists and Tories, attributed to them.

Once the assembly met, a less party-political stance on the part of Churchill at Strasbourg might have paved the way for a more accommodating

Labour view of the Assembly's role and perhaps even for the Government's realisation of the possible gains that could accrue to it from joining the Schuman Plan talks and moulding them to its advantage, a policy that the Conservatives privately advocated. Such an attitude, which would have allowed the Assembly greater scope for initiatives that would not be dismissed out of hand - a true 'consultative' function - would in turn have weakened the federalist case. Mackay's protocol, injudiciously timed as it was, would have commanded less attention than it actually received as the Assembly was seen to be fostering British co-operation with the Six within a 'functional' framework. But apart from his statesmanlike pronouncements on German admission to the Council and on the need for a European Army, Churchill was content to allow his team of delegates to carry on with their parochial party-political snipings at Labour and did not seem to regard them as totally out of place at Strasbourg, which in fact they were. As a result, Labour's own narrowly nationalistic attitude, exacerbated by persistently hostile and devious Conservative behaviour, only grew ever more intransigent; the quixotic Mackay proposal hardly alleviated matters. Eventually Labour concluded that Strasbourg could not even serve to promote policies which it (Labour) considered viable, and that the Assembly need not be taken seriously at all. And the Conservatives, while paying their lip-service to the Assembly, behaved no differently from their predecessors when they returned to office. If there are 'villians' in this story, they include not only Labour, but the Conservatives - and even the federalists - as well.

Chapter 2

The Consultative Assembly and its Offspring: In search of a role: 1952-59

The period 1952-59 opened with a British Foreign Secretary's plan for finding some useful work for the Consultative Assembly and closed with the final laying to rest of a different proposal initiated by a different British Foreign Secretary to achieve the same result. In between the airing of these two plans three new assemblies, all of them modelled to some extent on the Consultative Assembly and two of them having a British membership, had come into existence. Indeed British M.P.s played an active part in creating one of the latter two, namely, the Nato Parliamentarians' Conference, and in organising the other, the Western European Union Assembly. Yet the impact of both bodies upon European affairs was so negligible that the second British plan for the Consultative Assembly also sought to do away with the other two assemblies at the same time. Why were they created in the first place - and what led some British M.P.s to take an interest in them, given the ineffectiveness of their prototype? What were they meant to do? And why did the British Government seek to do away with them?

This chapter will attempt to demonstrate that the answer to these questions is closely tied to the difference between the most common normative view of the way a consultative assembly should function[1] and

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1. This was formulated in the introduction, pp. 13-14, as the situation whereby an executive body is obliged to seek the assembly's advice and opinion before it decides upon a particular course of action.

the way in which the British Government and the delegates sent to Strasbourg actually came to view that function, given the Council of Europe's clear failure by 1951 to exert any recognizable degree of influence over the course of European affairs.

The Creation of the Nato Parliamentarians' Conference

'The Council of Europe is dying,' announced Geoffrey de Freitas, a former Undersecretary for Air in the Attlee Government, to the House of Commons in July 1953, just four years after the Strasbourg assembly had first met. Strasbourg had never recovered from the 'betrayal' of 1951. Its European outlook was 'parochial...of little significance in an age in which Europe has ceased to dominate the world.' De Freitas instead called for the inclusion of Canadian and American representatives in a new 'Atlantic Council, with a committee of Ministers and a Consultative assembly,' that would arise out of Strasbourg's ruins.[1]

De Freitas was hardly overstating his case; the Council of Europe had not fared very well since its furore over Maxwell-Fyfe's announcement in 1951. To be sure, early in 1952, shortly before the European Coal and Steel Community was to begin functioning,[2] Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, had put forward a memorandum to the Committee of Ministers on the 'remodelling' of the Council of Europe as the basis for its future relations with the new organisations of the Six. Eden reaffirmed Britain's refusal to countenance any transformation of the Council of Europe into a 'quasi-federal' institution with legislative and executive powers and the right to be consulted by Member Governments

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1. Hansard, 5th series, 1953, 518, 328. De Freitas had also raised this issue at Strasbourg; see Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 5th session, 1953, p.105.

2. On 25 July 1952 the ECSC Treaty came into force.

on matters within its competence. Instead, his aide mémoire favoured a 'two tier' system for the Council. The Six would use its facilities to conduct their business in their present or future supranational organisations, while the Fifteen would continue to meet, as previously, at Strasbourg and to receive annual reports from the OEEC, the first of which had been presented to the Assembly in 1951. The Fifteen would also consider developments in the Six that were of interest to Western Europe as a whole.[1]

The British Government had argued in its aide mémoire that the utilisation of the Council of Europe in this fashion would prevent the duplication of European bodies, would provide the ECSC with tried and true machinery and would instill a new sense of purpose into the Council's work. What the Government at no point made clear, however, was exactly what powers of decision, or even advice, would accrue to the Council and its Assembly as a result of the new arrangement. British spokesmen at the Assembly, including Eden himself,[2] stressed the importance of the link with the institutions of the Six rather than the actual scope for new Assembly activities. Indeed, some members of the British Government, notably Macmillan, Maxwell-Fyfe and Sandys, felt

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1. Consultative Assembly, Documents, 4th session, 1952, no.11, pp.288-292 and 292-300. See also Robertson, Council of Europe, pp.94-96; Hovey, Superparliaments, pp.109-114; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, pp.41-46; Eden, Full Circle, pp.47-48.

2. 'Nor are these proposals...simply a device to find new activities for the Council of Europe...This is not their central purpose. It is, above all, as a practical means of preserving the essential unity of Europe that I commend these proposals to you.' Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 4th session, 1952, p.281. See also the remarks of Julian Amery, pp.145-149; Alfred Robens, pp.165-167; Lord John Hope, pp.181-183 and Donald Wade, pp.189-192. The emphasis was on relations with the Six, not on the resuscitation of the Council of Europe.

that the Plan actually would weaken the Council of Europe.[1]

In any event, little had come of the Plan for better or for worse. Having been somewhat poorly received by the Consultative Assembly,[2] it evoked no desire on the part of the Six to submerge their new institutions within the larger Strasbourg framework. The Plan only brought about minor changes in the relationship between the Council and the ECSC. Henceforth the ECSC High Authority would report annually to the Consultative Assembly, members of the Authority would attend certain Assembly committee meetings and short one-or two-day meetings would take place between delegates of the ECSC Common Assembly and those of the Consultative Assembly - that was the extent of the changes wrought by the Eden Plan.

The Consultative Assembly continued to meet, of course, and to pass recommendations and resolutions. Some of these recommendations were implemented, like those concerning the European Declaration of Human Rights; others eventually came to nothing, like the 'Strasbourg Plan' for an economic association between Europe and its overseas territories, including the Commonwealth. But while these activities persisted apace, and as will be shown below, met with at least some degree of success,[3] their cumulative impact on European affairs continued to be marginal. Other projects apart from the Eden Plan had not materially changed the Council's institutional fortunes: Assembly votes in favour of amalgamation with the OEEC in 1952 and June 1953 produced no union

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1. Macmillan, Tides, pp.470-472.

2. See for example, the remarks of Georges Bohy, Belgian Socialist Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 4th session, 1952, pp.80-82, and of Rolf Edberg, Swedish Social Democrat, ibid., pp.108-110.

3. See below, Chapter 7.

of the two organisations.[1] Similarly, a plan for a 'confederal' Europe, with the Council of Europe as its key institution, got no further than the pen of Robert Boothby, the idea's originator.[2] The Council, particularly the Assembly, seemed - as de Freitas contended - to be going nowhere very quickly.

For some British delegates, if their pronouncements at Strasbourg and Westminster were to be believed, the Assembly's function was meant to be a modest one in any case. Apart from promoting useful, if unspectacular, projects for European co-operation, the Assembly also enabled delegates to meet with their counterparts across the Channel and learn their views on important issues.[3] As Alfred Robens, Labour's delegation leader in 1952, pointed out, as more M.P.s came to Strasbourg they came to form within their party a nucleus of informed opinion on Europe.[4] Clement Attlee is reported to have deliberately sent younger delegates to Strasbourg with precisely this end in mind.[5] Indeed the party Whips on both sides of the House had come to employ the same argument that Robens had put forward: the function of the Consultative Assembly was an 'educative' one.[6]

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1. It is noteworthy that the British delegation split on the key vote on amalgamation of 30 May 1952. Five Conservatives supported the recommendation, as did the Liberal, but the two Ministers on the delegation, Anthony Nutting and Lord John Hope, both abstained, as did Lord Tweedsmuir and the entire Labour delegation.

2. Boothby's vague idea was meant to represent a half-way house to federation. See Robert Boothby, 'The Future of the Council of Europe,' International Affairs, XVIII (1952), 331-337 and 'What is Britain's Role in Europe?' in Elma Dangerfield and Howard Russell, eds., Britain and Europe (London, European and Atlantic Digest, 1952), pp.3-7.

3. See Alice Bacon's remarks at the Consultative Assembly; Official Reports, 4th session, 1952, p.319; see also Gilbert Longden's remarks, Hansard, 5th series, 1953, 518, 283, and those of Lord John Hope, ibid., 518, 2328, and of Donald Wade, ibid., 518, 2332-2333.

4. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, op.cit., pp.399-401.

5. See Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain joined the Common Market (London, Thames and Hudson, 1973), p.225.

6. See John Blondel, 'The United Kingdom,' in Lindsay, European Assemblies, p.139.

As will be shown below, [1] there is some evidence that allows for the conclusion that the Whips' pronouncements about the educative value of the Assembly did not prevent them from passing over 'educable' M.P.s in favour of the more worldly-wise to serve at Strasbourg. Nevertheless, whether the Whips were serious or not, it was on the basis of this view of the Assembly as an 'educative' body that Geoffrey de Freitas made his plea for its conversion into an Atlantic assembly.[2] De Freitas viewed his projected assembly as 'a meeting place of parliamentarians,' where there could be 'freer discussion' than took place on the governmental level. Parliamentarians stood to learn much from each other, and, because 'back-benchers' in the United States and on the Continent were at times as powerful as government ministers, it was essential that their views be known.[3] Significantly, de Freitas' concluding remarks dealt with the question of the proposed assembly's relationship with NATO: he would have none of it. Any such relations 'would raise complications which are unnecessary and should be avoided.' Portugal was a member of NATO but should not be a member of the Assembly: there were neutrals in the Assembly who would not join NATO. It was an 'educational' meeting place, not a 'development of NATO' that de Freitas sought.[4]

De Freitas was not the first legislator to call for a permanent meeting-place for North American and European parliamentarians. Two years earlier, a similar scheme had been put forward by Senator Guy Gillette

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1. Chapter 3.
2. 'I see its (the Consultative Assembly's) significance only as a means of educating parliamentarians from the fourteen different European countries in the different points of view, the different trends, of other parliamentarians.' Hansard, 5th series, 1953, 518, 329-330.
3. Ibid., 518, 329.
4. Ibid., 518, 532-533.

of Iowa at the November 1951 meeting at Strasbourg of American legislators and Consultative Assembly delegates which de Freitas himself had attended. Furthermore, Lord Layton, also present at that meeting, had published his own blueprint for an Atlantic Assembly the following year.[1] But the most powerful early support for the idea came from a group of American Atlantic Unity activists who had established contacts with middle- and high- level State Department officials, Senators, Congressmen, and like-minded citizens of the European NATO allies. Their forum was the Atlantic Union Committee, a federalist-oriented group that had been inspired by Clarence Streit, whose first published work advocating an Atlantic federation of democratic nations - Union Now - had appeared in 1939.[2] Livingston Hartley, a member of the Committee's administrative staff and later one of its Directors, had published an article in the November 1951 issue of Streit's Atlantic-federal journal, Freedom and Union, on the possibility of encouraging national legislatures to initiate a movement for an Atlantic assembly.[3] And in May 1952 the committee's Board of Governors met in Ottawa with a group of Canadian Members of Parliament and Guy Gillette and adopted a resolution which urged the NATO legislatures to 'give consideration to the creation of a North Atlantic Assembly, composed of parliamentary representatives of the peoples concerned.'[4]

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1. See Hovey, Superparliaments, pp.13-14 and p.14, f.n.2.
2. Istvan Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement: Its Significance in World Politics (New York, Fountainhead, 1965), p.27. The committee's leadership included Will Clayton, a former Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Lithgow Osborne, a former Deputy Director-General in UNRRA's European Bureau (1943-44) and US Ambassador to Norway (1944-46), Owen Roberts, a former Justice of the US Supreme Court, and Elmo Roper, the opinion researcher.
3. See letter from Livingston Hartley to John Tilney, M.P. (10 October 1952; Declaration of Atlantic Unity Papers deposited by Walden Moore in the Columbia University Library, New York).
4. Livingston Hartley, 'Towards an Atlantic Assembly,' Atlantic Community Quarterly, IV (1966), 104.

The Americans' conception of what the Assembly should be was not, however, at all in accord with de Freitas' plans. As Hartley made clear in a letter to John Tilney of Federal Union, whose organisation had also endorsed a plan for an Atlantic Assembly,[1] 'what is desired is to add to the existing NATO structure a consultative assembly of NATO legislators, not to create a new structure comparable to the Council of Europe.' Elaborating on 'the mission of such an Assembly' Hartley noted that 'The Ottawa resolution and our Committee's resolution both provide that it would "have as its objective the implementation of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty."'[2] Article 2 stated that

> The Parties will contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage collaboration between any and all of them. 3

However, while the North Atlantic allies intensified their co-operation on military matters during the early 1950's,[4] Article 2, the only non-military provision in the Treaty, remained virtually a dead letter.[5]

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1. Federal Union's secretary, Douglas Robinson, had co-sponsored a resolution on an assembly at an 'Atlantic Conference' at Oxford in September 1953, which was held under the auspices of The British Society for International Understanding (Alistair Kyle to Walden Moore, 16 July 1952 - DAU Papers). Federal Union, founded in 1938, was itself a founder member of the European Union of Federalists and the World Movement for World Federal Government. Tilney, a Conservative M.P. was one of its vice-presidents, as were Douglas Dodds-Parker, another Conservative M.P., Harry Hynd and Henry Usborne, Labour M.P.s, and Clement Davies, the Liberal leader, as well as R.W.G. Mackay.
2. Hartley to Tilney, 10 October 1952 (DAU Papers).
3. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Handbook: 'The North Atlantic Treaty,' Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1971, p.52.
4. On the military side they had established a somewhat integrated command staff, set force goals, and had opened a Nato Defence College.
5. All the Governments had done was to establish in September 1951 a Ministerial Committee to consider implementation of Article 2 (ibid., p.18).

Hartley and his colleagues felt that a NATO-linked assembly would promote schemes for non-military co-operation between the allies. Indeed, they believed that the Assembly would act as an integrative force by promoting 'a real sense of community' in the North Atlantic area.[1]

Clearly, Hartley was not merely seeking an 'educative' assembly, though obviously the new institution would fulfill that function as well. Instead the Atlantic union group wanted a structure that was indeed very similar to the way in which the Consultative Assembly should have functioned if it were truly 'consultative': the new body would give advice (which ideally should be sought but in Strasbourg's case was usually freely offered) to a governmental body, the North Atlantic Council. It thereby would promote the 'Atlantic ideal' much as the Consultative Assembly sought to promote the 'European ideal.' Put another way, Hartley hoped that the assembly, by promoting the non-military aspects of NATO co-operation, would help to bring about its transformation into what came to be termed (particularly by Karl Deutsch) a 'pluralistic security community.'[2] If de Freitas stressed the 'educative' aspects of the Assembly's function, Hartley was more concerned with its 'promotional' possibilities.

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1. Hartley to Tilney, cit.

2. See Karl W. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton University Press, 1957), especially 190-194. There were elements in the Atlantic Union Committee that preferred a federal Atlantic Union, what Deutsch terms an 'amalgamated security community,' but Hartley and Walden Moore, his closest collaborator, had more moderate goals (see Szent-Miklosy, Atlantic Union Movement, pp. 14-16).

It was the Hartley version of a NATO-linked body that gained the wider support as the movement for an assembly slowly gathered momentum in late 1953 and the course of 1954. Towards the end of 1953 the Norwegian Government laid the matter of an Atlantic Assembly before the North Atlantic Council. The Council merely responded with the passage of a resolution that called for the creation of parliamentary NATO associations in member countries which at some future date might gather in a conference of some kind.[1] However the Norwegians did not withdraw their proposals and the Americans went ahead with their campaign for a NATO assembly. During the early part of 1954 Hartley and Walden Moore, the Executive Director of the Atlantic Union Committee, began work on a draft 'Declaration of Atlantic Unity,' whose focus was to be on aspects of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including a proposal for an Atlantic assembly. At the same time they asked Wishart Maclean Robertson, Speaker of the Canadian Senate, Alistair Stewart of the Canadian House of Commons and Patrick Nicholson, an Ottawa journalist, to write a draft of their own.[2] Both drafts were completed during the spring of 1954 and the question of an Atlantic assembly proved to be the vital difference between them. Robertson, who in May 1954 organised the first of the parliamentary NATO Associations that had been called for in the North Atlantic Council resolution of the previous December, wrote to Moore that 'many (in Canada) felt that it (an assembly) is not very practical...that is just my view and I have dropped it in my draft.'[3] Nevertheless, the American view

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1. See The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Parliamentarians' Conference 1955-59, Intro. Geoffrey de Freitas,M.P. (London, Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government, 1960), p.7.
2. Walden Moore, 'Short History of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity 1954-64,' in Walden Moore, ed. Second Declaration of Atlantic Unity: Tenth Anniversary 1954-64. (New York, n.p., 1964), p.38.
3. Noted in letter from Walden Moore to Col.H.Mugent Head, 24 May 1954 (DAU papers). Head, a former India Army officer, whose contacts included Churchill and General Ismay (who as Lord Ismay was NATO's first secretary-general), was a keen Atlantic federalist who had been collaborating with Moore since 1949 (Moore to David Barton, 30 July 1962 - private papers of Mr. Barton, London). He seems to have worked with Moore on the 'American' draft.

prevailed, and the combined draft declaration, completed by mid-June, included a request for 'the creation of an advisory Atlantic Assembly, representative of the legislatures of the member nations, which would meet periodically to discuss matters of common concern.'[1]

It was envisaged that the declaration would attract prominent signatories, 'a group of leading citizens of the countries concerned (who wished to) declare publicly their common belief in certain principles and in specific policies of Atlantic unity.'[2] These signatories, especially the 'sponsors' of the declaration (who would recruit additional signers in their home countries), would function as a committee of correspondence whose leaders would, when appropriate, voice its opinions in print and by deputation to political leaders, in response to developments in Atlantic affairs. No formal organisation as such was established or planned, but Walden Moore was appointed Director with Hartley as his Associate.

The Declaration of Atlantic Unity was released to the press on 4 October 1954. It bore the signatures of 160 leading citizens from nine NATO countries, of whom slightly less than half were American. The publication of the Declaration evoked a favourable response from NATO and particularly was encouraging to Finn Moe, the chairman of the Norwegian Storting's Foreign Affairs Committee, who had instigated his government's original assembly proposal to the North Atlantic Council.

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1. Walden Moore, ed. Declaration of Atlantic Unity (New York (?), n.p., 1954), pp.11-12. Other proposals in the Declaration included specific economic measures to promote freer trade among members of the Alliance, the establishment of an 'Economic Advisory Council' to advise NATO bodies on the effect of their policies on the standard of living of member countries, and the establishment of NATO Parliamentary Associations in member countries.

2. Moore, 'Short History,' p.33.

He now went ahead and invited the legislatures of seven other NATO countries to send representatives to a conference to take place in Oslo or Paris in June or July of 1955.[1] Because he was under the impression that the United States Congress would not welcome an invitation, he did not include the Senate and House of Representatives among the chambers of parliament to which he wrote on 11 November.[2] However, the DAU group helped to remedy the situation. After a meeting which it organised in New York on 17 November, at which Moe outlined his initiative and Robertson promised his support for the plan, Lithgow Osborne wrote on behalf of the DAU to the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees to clarify their attitude. They succeeded in establishing that the American Congress would respond positively to an invitation to attend a conference, and this was accordingly sent to the Speakers of the House and the Senate (Vice-President Nixon) on 19 January 1955.

While these developments were taking place across the Atlantic, the assembly project slowly was gathering support in Britain. Shortly after the Norwegians had tabled their proposal at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Denis Healey, Labour M.P. for Leeds South East,[3] announced in the Commons that 'very reluctantly, and against much personal experience at Strasbourg' he had concluded that there was a need for 'the establishment of some sort of Parliamentary assembly for the principle countries of NATO.' Healey noted that American legislators

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1. Letter from Douglas Robinson to Clement Davies, M.P., 13 January 1955 (DAU papers). Robinson was Moore's liaison for DAU in Britain (see below).

2. Hartley, 'Atlantic Assembly,' At. Com. Q'ly., 105.

3. Healey, formerly the party's International Secretary, had won his seat in a 1952 by-election.

were isolated from European opinion while their European counterparts misunderstood them. Parliamentary and public apathy and ignorance were preventing the development of a coherent Western policy.[1] In supporting Healey's call for a NATO assembly with primarily 'educative' functions, an Economist leader pointed out that even Ministers showed 'a lamentable ignorance' of the workings of the NATO organisation. What was needed therefore was not a legislative assembly, but a gathering of parliamentarians 'say once a year for two weeks...for debate and informal contact' and for receiving reports, both oral and written, from NATO officials.[2]

The publication of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity contained evidence of additional British support for the assembly idea. Walden Moore's collaborators and contacts in Britain, Douglas Robinson of Federal Union and Noel Miskin,[3] the DAU's British sponsor, successfully persuaded 51 leading British politicians, academics and business and union leaders to sign the Declaration. Its parliamentary signatories included Robert Boothby, John Tilney, Edwin Leather, a long-time supporter of Atlantic Union,[4] Clement Davies, the Liberal leader, and fourteen other Conservative and Liberal M.P.s. No Labour M.P.s had signed the Declaration, however, possibly because friction in the

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1. Hansard, 5th series, 1953-54, 522, 655-657.
2. 'Atlantic Assembly,' The Economist, CLXIX (December 26, 1953), 943-44.
3. Miskin was a London solicitor who had been active in Federal Union.
4. Leather, Conservative M.P. for North Somerset, had introduced a motion into the Commons which encouraged Atlantic unity. He was a member of the House of Commons Friends of Atlantic Unity group. (Letter from Owen J. Roberts to E.H.C. Leather, January 23, 1951- DAU papers).

party over defence matters prevented even some sympathizers with the DAU's aims from officially associating themselves with the document.[1] Robinson followed up his activities in support of the Declaration itself with an effort to establish a British NATO parliamentary association from whose ranks delegates to the conference proposed by Finn Moe would be chosen.[2] He soon found, however, that it was easier to get parliamentarians to sign a paper full of well-meaning pronouncements than to get them actually to devote their time to a specific project. His closest collaborator was Davies,[3] while of the two M.P.s who had spoken out in the Commons on the assembly issue, Healey seemed merely willing to take passing interest in Robinson's scheme[4] while de Freitas took no part in it at all.

De Freitas, in fact, was still very much at odds with Robinson's (and Moore and Hartley's) view of what function the assembly should fulfill and how it should be established. In a second speech to the Commons, in letters to the editors of The Times and The Economist, in a Friends of Atlantic Unity pamphlet, he continued to stress the need both to create an assembly from out of the existing Strasbourg parliamentary institution

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1. Robinson wrote Moore on 21 December 1954 that Denis Healey had told him several months before that 'it was his intention to drop out of all-party groups like F.A.U. (Friends of Atlantic Union). It "embarrassed" his position in the Labour Party.' (DAU papers). For a discussion of splits in the Labour Party over the defence issue, and of the Labour Left's opposition to the Atlantic Alliance in the early 'fifties, see Epstein, Britain-Uneasy Ally, esp. pp.236-245, 251-264.
2. Robinson to Davies, 13 January 1955 (DAU papers). Robinson felt that even if the proposed conference were never held, the various NATO parliamentary associations could function in a similar but less formal way (ibid.).
3. Robinson wrote Moore on 19 January that Davies was 'determined to get a Parliamentary Association established...in good time for it to stake a claim to representation...at the Conference of Parliamentarians:' DAU papers. Davies' involvement is also outlined in his letter to Robinson of 14 January 1955 and Robinson's letter to Moore of 13 Jan.1955 (DAU papers)
4. Robinson's regular and highly detailed correspondence with Moore gives no evidence of Healey's interest in the scheme apart from Robinson's assumption that Healey would attend a meeting in the Commons to discuss the matter (letter to Moore, 3 March 1955 - DAU papers).

and to ensure that the new body was not connected with NATO.[1] His views do not seem to have won much sympathy in Britain, and certainly did not win over the Government - in reply to de Freitas' speech Anthony Nutting, on behalf of the Government, stated that he saw no need to transform the Strasbourg Assembly[2]- but it was de Freitas, not the DAU group, who played the key role in organising Britain's delegation to what became the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Working on his own, without Government support, de Freitas had engineered an invitation from the Speaker of the Norwegian Parliament to the Speaker of the Commons to choose British delegates to the forthcoming assembly. De Freitas hoped that the Speaker would turn to de him[illegible] for advice, since he had been the first to speak in Parliament on the question of an Atlantic Assembly, and the Speaker did just that. De Freitas then appealed to Walter Elliot for help. Elliot, a former Conservative Cabinet Minister and a senior back-bencher, was initially indifferent to the scheme, but de Freitas eventually prevailed upon him on the basis of their personal friendship.[3] Elliot then proceeded to bypass a hostile Foreign Office[4] and to use his personal influence in the Treasury to ensure a grant for the British

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1. For de Freitas' position see: Hansard, 5th series, 1954, 522, 1320-1323, 1326-1327; Geoffrey de Freitas, 'An Atlantic Council,' The Times (17 December 1953), p.9; Geoffrey de Freitas, 'Letter to the Editor: Atlantic Assembly,' The Economist, CLXX (January 16, 1954), 157; Geoffrey de Freitas 'The Case for an Atlantic Assembly' (ii) in NATO is not Enough: Two Approaches to an Assembly intro. Lord Tweedsmuir (London, Friends of Atlantic Union, n.d., March 1955?), pp.17-24. Robinson described the latter article as 'infuriating' (letter to Moore, 3 March 1955. - DAU papers);
2. Hansard, 5th series, 1954, 522, 1324-1328. An Economist leader supported de Freitas against Nutting, but more because of Nutting's opposition to the assembly idea in general than for the specific content of de Freitas' position ('Foreign Office Nightcap,' The Economist, CLXX (January 30, 1954), 310).
3. Unattributable interview, May 1971.
4. Hartley's letter to Robinson of March 23, 1955 spoke of a circle in the Foreign Office that opposed the entire assembly idea (DAU papers).

delegates to the Conference. In the meantime, the Speaker decided that a Parliamentary NATO Group was now unnecessary, and a dejected Robinson concluded

> that, while members of the Opposition will be present in Paris, they will in fact be chosen by the Speaker in the House, which means that he will pick members of the Labour Party least likely to embarrass the Government party representatives. In other words, none of the British MPs in Paris is likely to be a strong proponent of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and certainly not a strong proponent of any of the more radical measures in the Declaration. 1

Robinson was wrong about the way the delegates were to be chosen, for it was de Freitas and Elliot, not the Government, who influenced the Speaker's choice of delegates.[2] However, as both M.Ps saw the purpose of the new assembly as primarily educational, it is not surprising that of the sixteen British delegates only two, Gilbert Longden and Joseph Grimond,[3] were on record as being in support of the platform outlined in the Declaration of Atlantic Unity. Though Robinson became the conference's Executive Secretary, he clearly was not in a position to press his own views too strongly upon the delegates when it was not even certain whether the conference was to become a permanent institution.

The British Government may not have had a direct hand in choosing the delegation, but its attitude to the conference was manifest in at least one aspect of the delegation's composition: no Minister attended the conference as a delegate. From the Government's point of view the

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1. Robinson to Moore, 17 March 1955. At one point it seemed that two meetings would take place, one in Oslo sponsored by the Norwegians, and one in Paris, for which Robertson of Canada sent out invitations in March 1955. An agreement was apparently reached providing for one meeting under joint Norwegian-Canadian sponsorship (DAU papers).
2. Interview with Douglas Robinson, March 1971; unattributable interview, May 1971.
3. Grimond, the Liberal Chief Whip, replaced Davies, another keen 'Atlanticist,' as the Liberal Commons delegate when Davies' illness forced him to withdraw from the delegation (report in The Times, 1 July 1955, p.6.).

entire proceedings were 'unofficial' and to have sent a Minister would have been to bestow an unnecessary status upon the meeting.[1] To some extent the Opposition followed the Government's lead. The most prominent Labour front benchers were not in attendance at the conference; instead it was Philip Noel-Baker, a former Cabinet Minister in the Attlee Government who was to remain on the Front Bench until 1959, and de Freitas himself who headed the list of Labour delegates. As for the Conservatives, their most prominent delegates were Elliot and John Maclay, a former Minister of Transport who in 1955, after the conference, was appointed Minister of State in the Colonial Office.[2] The composition of the delegation was thus a far cry from the prominent galaxy of delegates which Britain had sent to Strasbourg in 1949. Indeed it was more similar to the 1955 delegation to the Consultative Assembly, with which it shared a total of six delegates from the Commons or the Lords, including Maclay and Noel-Baker.

The reasons for the reluctance of both Government and Opposition leaders to grant too much status to the conference are not hard to find. In 1954-55 parliamentary assemblies were just not the attraction - or threat - they had seemed to be in 1948-49. The Consultative Assembly had come to be considered primarily as a talking-shop and, if de Freitas' view of the new body would triumph, it too would be little more than an enlarged debating society with American and Canadian membership. What need then for a second 'educative' training ground for M.P's (if that was what the Consultative Assembly really was)?

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1. The 'United Kingdom Delegation Press Release I' dated 3 July 1955 stated that 'the Conference is not regarded as a "NATO Conference" as such' (North Atlantic Assembly Archives, Brussels).

2. He later became Scottish Secretary in 1957. In 1955 Maclay also served as President of the Western European Union Assembly, see below, pp.113 ff.

Furthermore, 'Atlantic Unity' was not 'European unity' - for the Conservatives it represented Britain's most important alliance, for a faction of the Labour Party it represented a concept to which it was entirely opposed. The Conservative Government therefore seemed inclined to prefer to guard against parliamentary meddling in NATO - it had not spoken out in favour of the original Norwegian proposal and had opposed de Freitas' scheme - which the conference could be taken to represent. At the same time, with Labour in Opposition and its Left wing fundamentally opposed to the NATO concept,[1] it was clear that no leading Socialist would risk splintering his party to support the creation of an institution which might prove as ineffectual as the Council of Europe. One Consultative Assembly was enough, why have two, or even three - if one counted the WEU Assembly that had been created that same year.

The proceedings of the conference session did little to dispel the prevailing attitude which leaders in both parties adopted in relation to its prospects. The major decisions the conference took, after much wrangling between the British and Canadian delegations in particular, concerned its own future. It was to meet again, with delegates again chosen by the speakers of their parliamentary chambers.[2] A standing committee - 'continuing committee' - was to plan future conferences. It would not press for 'consultative status' within NATO, for the time

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1. See Epstein, Britain - Uneasy Ally, pp.119-128, 240-245, 251-255; Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party, 4th ed. (London, Macmillan, 1972), pp. 99-100, 109-113.
2. Robertson, who had been elected conference President, preferred the creation of an inter-parliamentary association of parliamentary NATO groups who would send delegates to a conference (this was close to Robinson's view of the way delegates should be chosen). The view that prevailed was held by Elliot with the support of the British delegation. The Canadian position was outlined in a speech by M. Blaine, a Dutch delegate, see NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Verbatim Record of the afternoon Meeting of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries, 20 July 1955, Palais de Chaillot, Paris XIV (3.30 pm), p.14. (Mimeographed/ North Atlantic Assembly archives). The British position is outlined in NPC, Resolution submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation (mimeographed, 20 July 1955) (NAA archives).

was not yet ripe for such a move because of governmental opposition.[1] Apart from these decisions, all of which pointed to the creation of another 'educative' talking shop, the conference was briefed by NATO military and civil officials, including Lord Ismay, the NATO Secretary-General.[2] British delegates made a number of speeches during the three days of plenary debate that followed the briefings; on the other hand, the Americans, who might have been expected to dominate the debates, played a relatively minor role.[3]

Immediately the conference had ended, the 'continuing committee' met and formalised Elliot's position as Treasurer. It is noteworthy that he stressed to the meeting that detailed thought should be given to the next conference, with special emphasis to be laid on the subjects which the parliamentarians 'might <u>usefully</u> discuss.'[4] The point about useful discussion was extremely crucial, at least as far as the opinion of British political leaders was concerned. The conference had only proved that it could be useful for North American legislators to meet with their European counterparts. It had not proved, however, why they should meet in a separate assembly. This point was put to Senator Robertson when he met with Attlee, Hugh Gaitskell, Herbert Morrison and other Labour front-benchers in August 1955. In their unanimous view NATO was a purely military organisation. Canada and the United States

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1. <u>The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Parliamentarians' Conference</u>, p.9.
2. Other speakers included General Gruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); General de Chassey; Air Marshal Dawson; Sir John Hodsdell, Civil Defence Advisor to NATO; Premier Guy Mollet of France and Jean Monnet; former President of the ECSC High Authority.
3. See <u>Verbatim Record</u> for all sessions: important speeches were delivered by Maclay, in his capacity as President of WFU, Elliot, in support of his own resolution, de Freitas and Healey. It should be noted that no Senators represented the USA, only six members of the House of Representatives attended the session.
4. Letter from Robinson to Moore, 31 August 1955 (DAU papers). My emphasis.

should send delegates to the Consultative Assembly, as they had in 1951.[1] The fact that Labour did not hold the Strasbourg assembly in high regard merely meant that the conference had not been seen as much of an improvement, and that it was therefore still better to have one assembly only.

Robertson came away from the meeting convinced that he had persuaded Labour's leaders to support the idea of a NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, and to some extent he had: Hugh Gaitskell attended the 1956 conference as a Labour delegate and during its debates expressed the view that the conference should continue to meet on a regular annual basis.[2] However, the fact that the Labour leadership may have come to terms with the conference, and that the Government, for its part, had contributed to its expense account[3] did not necessarily mean that the bulk of parliamentary opinion attributed much importance to its activities. Although it usually is difficult to generalise at all about 'parliamentary opinion,' a unique questionnaire commissioned by the NPC early in 1956 does allow for certain conclusions to be drawn about the state of that opinion at the time on the assembly question.

The questionnaire, entitled Towards an Atlantic Community....An International Survey of Parliamentary Opinion in the NATO Countries,[4]

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1. Robertson informed Moore of this meeting, and the latter passed the information on to Robinson in a letter dated September 22, 1955 (DAU papers).
2. NPC, Press Release 4: "Towards an Atlantic Community," speech by the Rt. Hon. Hugh Gaitskell, 21 November 1956, p.6. Gaitskell's attendance at the conference was in part due to the fact that Lyndon Johnson, the Senate Majority leader, also attended (see below, p. 152). Gaitskell also endorsed the NPC's aims in a special 'NATO Supplement' in The Scotsman published in 1956 (Interview with Douglas Robinson, March 1971).
3. Ursula Branston (of the Conservative Research Department) to Moore, 31 August 1955 (DAU papers).
4. Offset report, prepared by Attwood Statistics Limited, Rotterdam 1956.

was launched shortly after the NATO Ministerial Council announced on 5 May 1956 that it was establishing a Committee on non-Military Co-operation in NATO . The questionnaire had originally been intended to guide the Standing Committee (as the continuing committee was now termed) in its preparation for the 1956 conference, but it took on added significance when the new committee - Gaetano Martino of Italy, Lester Pearson of Canada and Halvard Lange of Norway, foreign ministers all - agreed to study the findings of the survey before meeting with the Standing Committee in September. 5,289 copies of the questionnaire were distributed to parliamentarians of the NATO countries. All members of the Commons were polled, as were 211 Peers. The findings for some of the key questions are provided in the tables below. Responses from four other NATO countries have been included for comparative purposes.

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TABLE A

States with the highest percentage of parliamentarians replying to the questionnaire: in descending order of precedence

A. Netherlands*	Total	Cath	Lab	A.R.	C.H.	Lib	Com	Other
States General								
Second House:	100	30	30	12	9	9	6	4
Actual Returns:	53	12	21	4	8	6	1	1
Percentage	53	40	70	33	89	67	17	25
First House:	50	17	14	7	6	4	2	-
Actual Returns:	26	6	10	3	4	3	-	-
Percentage	52	35	71	43	67	75	-	-
Total:	150	47	44	19	15	13	8	4
Actual Returns:	79	18	31	7	12	9	1	1
Percentage	53	38	70	37	80	69	13	25

B. Norway*		Lab	Con	Lib	Agr	C. Dem.	Com
Storting	157	84	27	15	14	14	3
Actual Returns:	73	28	18	11	8	8	-
Percentage	46	33	67	73	57	57	-

C. Iceland(*)		Ind	Prog	Social Democratic	Workers' Union
Althing:	52	19	17	8	8
Actual Returns:	17	11	4	2	-
Percentage	33	58	24	25	-

cont/.....

Table A cont/.....

D. United Kingdom*	Total	Con (& Nat. L., UU)	Lab	Lib
**House of Commons	630	347	256	6
Actual Returns	201	113	85	3
Percentage	32	32	33	50

E. Canada		Lib	Prog.Con.	Co-op	S.C.	Other
House of Commons:	264	168	53	23	15	5
Actual Returns	77	36	12	8	1	-
Percentage	29	33	23	35	7	-
Senate:	91	79	8	-	-	4
Actual Returns	19	17	1	-	-	1
Percentage	21	22	13	-	-	25
Total:	355	247	61	23	15	9
Actual Returns	96	73	13	8	1	1
Percentage	27	30	21	35	7	11

Notes:

* Member of Council of Europe

(*) Returns received after publication of first report, were published in an additional NPC report.

** Only 211 of the 341 members of the House of Lords were contacted; of these 42 were not affiliated to the major parties. 64 Peers replied (30 per.cent.); the overall percentage remained unchanged.

Parties: Cath - Catholic; Lab - Labour; A.R. - Anti-Revolutionary;
C.H. - Christian Historical; Lib - Liberal; Com - Communist
Ind - Independent; Prog - Progressive;
Con - Conservative; Nat.L. - National Liberal;
Prog.Con. - Progressive Conservative;
Co-op - Co-operative Commonwealth Federation;
S.C. - Social Credit

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It will immediately be seen from Table A that while British parliamentarians replied to the questionnaire in substantial numbers, even in Westminster Atlantic affairs could hardly be said to command the attention of a majority of M.Ps. The reasons for the low percentage of returns are manifold. A natural disinclination to waste one's time on questionnaires probably accounted for the immediate disposal of many of them, particularly those sent to American legislators (of whom a mere 9 per cent. completed their forms). More important is the fact that only a few parliamentarians tend to specialise in foreign affairs, and the percentage that do is likely to be relatively larger in a smaller

legislative chamber.[1] It should be noted that the Commons has no foreign affairs committee as do most other parliaments, and that while there are parliamentary party foreign affairs committees that function, most M.Ps accord priority to domestic questions, primarily because constituency pressures force them to do so.[2] Thirdly, British parliamentarians, like parliamentarians from the other major NATO powers, were less likely to stress the importance of non-military co-operation and consultation within the alliance. Indeed as the table indicates, the Americans, who dominated the alliance, and the French and Germans, enmeshed in the EEC negotiations, were at the time even less inclined than the British to see NATO in anything other than military terms (despite the efforts, particularly in the USA, of groups like DAU). It is noteworthy that the members of the Committee of Three who were studying methods of non-military co-operation within NATO were all leaders of 'Middle' or 'Small' powers within the Alliance.[3] The creation of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference fit neatly into this pattern as well: its prime movers had been a Norwegian M.P. and a Canadian Senator. Finally, even for those British M.Ps who did take some interest in the affairs of the Atlantic alliance, the prospects of a relationship that seemed stable enough (before Suez) nevertheless was unlikely to command as much attention in 1954-56 as did the more agitating aspects of the Cold War, the developing crisis in the Middle East and the break-up of Empire.

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1. The size of foreign affairs committees - where the parliamentary specialists are expected to be found - does not increase in proportion to the size of their respective legislative chambers. For example, the 96 member Senate of 1956 had a 13 member foreign relations committee (13.5%) while the 487 member Bundestag had a foreign affairs committee consisting of a total of 42 full and alternate members (8.3%) and the 595 member French National Assembly had a 44 member foreign affairs commission (7.4%).

2. See the comments of Peter G. Richards on this subject in Parliament and Foreign Affairs (London, Allen & Unwin, 1967), p.164. There is no reason to believe that the situation was any different ten years before Richards' book appeared.

3. For comment on this point see Harald von Riekhoff, NATO: Issues and Prospects (Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1967), p.111.

In comparison with these matters, the non-military prospects of the Atlantic Alliance was virtually a non-issue.

If one now turns to questions about the Atlantic assembly project in particular, one finds that even those who responded to the questionnaire in the first instance were hardly in agreement as to the functions of the assembly or indeed whether it should exist at all.

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TABLE B

From NPC Questionnaire:

Would you favour the development of a parliamentary assembly of NATO countries with consultative status?

	Total %	Neth. %	Norway %	Iceland* %	U.K. %	Canada %
Yes	69	82	51	94	58	74
No	27	17	46	6	37	21

*See note (*) in Table A above.

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It will be seen that not everyone who replied to the questionnaire favoured the creation of a consultative Atlantic assembly. Given the failure of so many parliamentarians to reply, all that one could say - even in the case of the Netherlands[1] - was that less than half, and often far, far less than half, of any given NATO legislature could be said to favour the creation of a consultative assembly. Of course, what was meant by the term 'consultative' is a separate question; Britain's case will be discussed below, after the examination of a few more sets of replies to the questionnaire.

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1. 43.5% of all Dutch parliamentarians could definitely be said to favour the development of an Atlantic consultative assembly. This figure represented the highest percentage for any parliament of a NATO state.

TABLE C

From NPC Questionnaire:

Responses to questions on the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference

	Total %	Neth. %	Nor. %	Ice.* %	U.K. %	Canada %
a) Do you consider that the Conference of MP's from the NATO countries has an important role to play in achieving a closer understanding?						
Yes	86	83	89	88	79	96
No	10	14	7	6	16	3
b) Do you think that the Conference should meet - more than once a year?:-						
Yes	29	29	9	-	28	18
No	63	57	85	94	64	79
- for longer than a week? :-						
Yes	20	12	11	30	20	29
No	66	70	78	59	65	60

* See Note (*) in Table A above.

Most respondents were quite willing to say that the conference in its present form, ill-defined and unofficial, was a 'good thing' for the Atlantic Alliance, but, as with most good things, too much of it spoiled the effect, 'too much' in this case being meetings more than once a year for more than a week.

Clearly the conference was seen as de Freitas had originally portrayed it: a meeting place for parliamentarians where views could be exchanged and they could learn from one another. Of course, an 'educative' assembly could hardly be expected to play more than a modest role in the conduct of the Alliance's affairs; but, as the following results show, that was all

that M.P.s expected of it. In the order of NATO's priorities, at least as far as revising the Treaty was concerned, a parliamentary assembly hardly figured at all.

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TABLE D

From NPC Questionnaire:

Responses to questions on Revision of the North Atlantic Treaty

	Total %	Neth. %	Nor. %	Ice.* %	U.K. %	Canada %
a) Should the Treaty be revised in any respect?:-						
Yes	51	52	50	100	52	53
No	32	22	30	-	37	27
b) Suggested revisions: More emphasis on economic aspects	14	12	14	-	11	25
Greater political co-operation	5	9	5	-	3	3
Closer co-operation in general	3	6	1	23	4	1
Establish a parliamentary assembly	2	3	-	-	4	-
Other suggestions	27	12	23	-	32	21
c) Date of revision:- Before 1959	9	8	14	-	8	8
Wait till 1959	6	5	7	6	4	4

* See note (4) on Table A above.

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That British M.P's in particular saw the NATO assembly/conference at best as little more than an 'educative' experience similar to that which the Consultative Assembly offered can be further substantiated from a memorandum which gave the names of the British respondents to the questionnaires and outlined their specific comments and

observations.[1] Delegates or former delegates to the Consultative Assembly accounted for about one-sixth of all British respondents and nearly 85 per cent., of them supported the idea of a consultative NATO assembly. Though it may be concluded that attendance at the Strasbourg assembly (as well as at the new WEU assembly, to be discussed shortly) convinced M.P's of the need for a truly 'consultative' body, it may also be posited more realistically that those M.P's who had been to a 'consultative' assembly knew at first hand its inherent weaknesses and harmlessness and therefore saw no reason to oppose the creation of yet another so-called consultative body - especially if, as two-thirds of British respondents wished, it met only one week each year. Put more bluntly, if the Strasbourg Assembly was viewed as merely an interesting debating society - and something of a free holiday trip as well -[2] why not create another such body, even if it were 'officially' linked to NATO, since it would only provide M.P's with additional opportunities to share what was primarily a rather pleasant experience?

There was, however, a second logical conclusion to be reached if the assembly were meant to fulfill no more than an 'educative' function: It could be amalgamated with the other existing bodies that performed a similar task. This in fact was the course proposed by Sir James Hutchison, an active Conservative delegate to Strasbourg who later would achieve prominence at the WEU Assembly: he favoured the idea of a consultative Atlantic assembly only because he hoped the governments might eventually create 'a common debating assembly to incorporate those already in

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1. 'Some replies of the United Kingdom Members of Parliament to certain of the questions contained in the International Survey of Parliamentary Opinion in the NATO countries initiated on July 1956 by the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries' (Confidential memorandum, n.d.. Aug/Sept. 1956 (?) - Barton papers).

2. See my comments on this point, pp. 8-9 and 15 f.n. 2.

existence.' Viscount Bridgman, a Conservative Peer who had never attended an assembly session, put it another way: 'If a Parliamentary Assembly is set up it should replace Strasbourg - not enough right type of M.P's to go around otherwise.' Anthony Kershaw, a conservative M.P, who likewise had not attended an assembly (though he later would), also felt that the Strasbourg assembly should be merged with a NATO body.[1] In fact the British Government was thinking very much along the same lines, as events were soon to prove.

In September 1956 the 'Three Wise Men' - as the committee of three were termed - met with representatives of the NPC Standing Committee and of the DAU as well, and issued their report in which it was stated that

> the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences... (and) that invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain of these meetings. 2

The Committee clearly had not accepted the notion of a 'consultative' assembly, or of one 'officially' linked to NATO. The conference was seen to continue in its present form, as primarily a source of information and contact for interested M.Ps.

At its December meeting, the North Atlantic Council unanimously approved the committee's report, and consequently its recommendations about the NPC. At the same meeting, however, Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, put forward a plan termed the 'Grand Design', which called for the creation of a new parliamentary assembly to replace all

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1. These comments appeared in the memorandum noted above, 'Some replies...' Not all M.P's and Peers bothered to comment at all, and only seven other delegates, four Conservatives and three Labour, mentioned the assembly idea, with one of them specifically opposing a body that was anything more than educational and another demanding the assurance that national parliamentary supremacy would remain intact.
2. 'Non-military co-operation in NATO: Text of the Report of the Committee of Three,' NATO Letter, Special Supplement to No. 1, (1957), p.3.

those already in existence (including, it was later established, the NPC) except for the ECSC/EEC assemblies, which were of a different order, and might function as a 'tier' of the larger group. Clearly the British Government felt that if the Consultative and WEU Assemblies and the NPC all functioned the same way, there was little point in continuing to finance the activities of all three of them; one could do the job just as well. It has been shown that in the case of the NPC, the 'job', in British eyes, was an educative one; presumably the Government considered the WEU Assembly to fulfill the same function. Since that assembly has thus far hardly been mentioned in this study, it may at this point be worthwhile briefly to recount its origins and early development before returning to discuss the fate of the 'Grand Design' in greater detail.

The Creation and Early Years of WEU's Assembly

The Assembly of Western European Union came into being as an after-thought, the by-product of high-level ministerial negotiations which created Western European Union itself out of the framework of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in the wake of the collapse of the European Defence Community. The EDC,[1] first proposed by French Premier René Pleven shortly after the Schuman Plan had received a warm reception from the Six, was meant to integrate fully contingents of a West German army at regimental level with those of the other proposed member countries (the Six and possibly Britain). The authors of the plan thereby hoped to satisfy mounting American demands for German rearmament and at the same time, by bringing German participation in European defence measures in line with her participation in the ECSC, to further Europe's advance along the road to political integration. Indeed the EDC Treaty, signed in May 1952 after drawn-out negotiations, provided in Article 38 for the study of the

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1. References for a discussion of British and American policy regarding the creation of EDC are to be found on p.74, f.n. 2.

constitution of a permanent Assembly which would embody one of the elements of a 'federal or confederal'[1] structure that would be the germ of a European Political Community.

By 1954, however, the future of the Community was far from certain; on 30 August it was pronounced dead, as the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty. It is not the place here to analyse at length the reasons for the EDC's failure to materialise.[2] Briefly, they centered on France's fear of a remilitarised Germany whose frontiers were as yet unsettled,[3] and on Britain's refusal to join the supranational community. British guarantees, as embodied in a final April 1954 agreement with the EDC which provided for the inclusion of British units in EDC formations and of EDC units in British formations, as well as in the extension of the commitment from a planned twenty years to fifty, were not enough to reassure the French. When France failed on 22 August to convince her five partners to alter the Treaty's supranational elements, and then failed in a final attempt to get Britain to join the EDC, the stage was set for the crucial Assembly vote on the anti-EDC motion to 'move to other business' which sealed EDC's fate and that of the political community as well.

Even before EDC collapsed, John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, had made it plain to Anthony Eden that a failure to save the organisation might result in a 'parting of the ways' between Britain and Western Europe on the one hand, and the United States on the other.

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1. Quoted in Council of Europe, Manual, p.116.
2. For a useful discussion of the collapse of EDC see Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds., France Defeats EDC (New York, Praeger, 1957).
3. Alfred Grosser, 'Germany and France: A Confrontation,' in ibid., rates fear of Germany as probably the single most important underlying cause of French opposition to EDC (p.54).

America would shift its attention to South-East Asia, where Communism seemed uncontained.[1] Now that EDC had indeed failed, Eden was faced with the consequences of Dulles' dire predictions - with their threat to the 'special relationship' - as well as with America's continued determination to bring Germany into NATO, French apprehension notwithstanding. The Foreign Secretary could not but conclude that 'the Americans had left it up to the British to perform the rescue operation.'[2]

Within a month of the French National Assembly's vote on EDC, Eden had found a way out of the European dilemma. Seeking German entry into NATO, but wishing at the same time to dispel French fears of renewed German militarism, Eden packaged his proposals with the framework provided by the Brussels Treaty Organisation. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 had provided for full British membership, and as such represented an advance over EDC. It was to remain in force for thirty years after the Atlantic Treaty lapsed. It provided for non-military (cultural and economic) as well as military co-operation. It was an inter-governmental, not a supra-national organisation. A solution within the BTO framework therefore held forth the prospects of a rearmed Germany and of Western European political co-operation, while it assured France of full British participation in its activities and decisions because they embodied no supranational elements.

Eden proceeded to call for a conference of leaders of the Six,[3] Britain

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1. Eden, Full Circle, pp.57-58; see also Manderson-Jones, Special Relationship, pp.119-120.
2. Manderson-Jones, Special Relationship, p.121.
3. He in fact embarked on a successful tour of Bonn, Brussels and Rome and met Dulles in London before flying to Paris to get France's agreement to attend.

the USA and Canada to discuss his plan and then secured the agreement of all concerned to attend the conference. It opened on 28 September, barely a month after the collapse of EDC, but by the time it was concluded six days later, Western Europe's military reorganisation crisis had been resolved. The key to the successful outcome of the conference was not, as Dulles seems to have hoped it would be, the retention of much of the EDC's supranational element - Eden had not had that in mind at all. Nor was it the prospect of European Unity which the conference's Final Act held forth. Rather it was Britain's unprecedented guarantee to maintain a permanent military presence on the Continent. Eden later recalled that when he announced that Britain would maintain four divisions and the Tactical Air Force on the Continent for as long as the majority of the Brussels Treaty powers desired, 'the reaction was immediate ....From this point on, the conference moved rapidly forward.'[1]

The Brussels Treaty Organisation was revamped and upgraded. Two new bodies, a working party for the co-ordinated production and standardisation of armaments and an agency for the control of armaments, were added to its framework. In addition, the old Brussels Treaty Council was accorded greater political status. Hitherto a consultative body, it was now stated to be 'a Council with powers of decision.'[2] Finally, the change in the Council's status brought about the introduction of a parliamentary element which previously had been excluded from the BTO. Part II Section 12 of the conference Final Act stated that

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1. Eden, Full Circle, pp. 168-69; for Dulles' reaction see Beloff, US & Unity..., pp. 82-83
2. 'The Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, held in London between September 28 and October 3, 1954,' reprinted in Western European Union, Brussels Treaty: Texts of the Treaty, the Protocols and other Documents concerning Western European Union (Paris, WEU, 1967), p.183.

> The Brussels Council will make an Annual Report on its activities concerning the control of armaments to the Delegates of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 1

It was hardly surprising that the conference negotiators elected to extend to delegates to the Consultative Assembly the very circumscribed consultative duties mentioned in the ~~Final Act~~. There was no need for a new assembly to be created merely for the purpose of debating Council reports on armaments control. On the other hand, the Council of Europe seemed a most appropriate forum for a debate of this kind. Its Assembly was already conducting debates on similar, non-military questions and, if the two-tier principle outlined in the Eden Plan could be applied, restricted Assembly debates on Brussels Treaty matters would not compromise the position of the Council's neutral members. Matters were also facilitated by the fact that since 1952 the Brussels Treaty Organisation had submitted to the Assembly reports on its cultural and social activities. To have the Council issue yet one more report to the same assembly albeit in restricted session, seemed only logical.

Logic, however, did not prevail. Within three weeks of the completion of the London Final Agreement, a new assembly had been signed into existence. Thanks to a virtually last-minute suggestion from Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, the Protocol signed at Paris on 23 October which brought Western European Union into existence included a 'coiffure parlementaire;' [2]

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1. Ibid., p.187.
2. Quoted in J.J. Fens, 'The Influence of the Assembly of WEU in the field of Western Defence,' Assembly of Western European Union, Ten Years of Seven Power Europe (Paris, 1964), p.98.

> The Council of Western European Union shall make an Annual Report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 1

It was not easy to perceive the reasons for the decision to create a new assembly. It has been stated that the Swedes in particular objected to the inclusion of defence matters on the Consultative Assembly's agenda, even if it were to meet in restricted session.[2] Plausible as that explanation may be, one nevertheless wonders why the original arrangement was initialled in the first place. The parties to the agreement must surely have been aware of Neutral attitudes to a two-tier assembly plan, if only because they had been highlighted during the extended debates at Strasbourg over the adoption of the Eden Plan. Judging from the brevity of the article establishing the assembly - it was not again mentioned in the agreement - and from its failure to provide any concrete guidelines as to the form the new body should take (a precaution that had been taken when the Consultative Assembly was established), one can only assume that the decision to create a new assembly was taken impulsively rather than with any degree of forethought. Swedish objections to the original scheme may have been a contributory factor in its subsequent rejection, but hardly more than that.

Few British M.P's publicly commented on the creation of a new assembly; those who did reacted negatively to the new developments. Geoffrey de Freitas, who at the time was contending that the Council of Europe with its Consultative Assembly should be converted into a Council of the Atlantic was strongly opposed to the creation of yet another 'educative' assembly - for that was all he expected it to be. In the Commons he termed

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1. 'Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,' Article V, reprinted in WEU, Brussels Treaty, p.25.
2. See Lindsay, European Parliament, p.20.

the development 'monstrous;'[1] at Strasbourg he explained that if defence issues were to be discussed at all, it was better that this were done within the context of a body including North American representatives rather than in one which comprised only half of the Consultative Assembly.[2]

A similar view, for different reasons, was expressed by Herbert Morrison, who had led the British delegation to Strasbourg in 1949.[3] While he had then opposed any attempts to add to the Assembly's powers, he now considered that that already 'frustrated' body would become even more so since the creation of a new assembly would leave it with still fewer matters to consider. Morrison clearly felt that the new assembly's functions would hardly differ from those of the Consultative Assembly, in which case it was pointless to have M.P's going through the same motions at WEU that marked their trips to Strasbourg. In his view, therefore, if new matters were to be discussed, it was best that they should be discussed in a restricted version of the existing assembly; the creation of any other body was completely pointless.[4]

The new assembly was created all the same, and the logical posture for its opponents to assume was that it should be tied as closely as possible to the Consultative Assembly, since in that way their activities could be co-ordinated and duplication avoided. This certainly was the view

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1. Hansard, 5th series, 1953-54, 533, 424.
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 6th session, 1954, pp.953-955.
3. For Morrison's statements see Hansard, 5th series, 1953-54, 533, 423-424.
4. A third opponent of the Assembly scheme was Lord Layton, who felt that the cause of European unity was best served by concentrating all 'European' activities in the Council of Europe. Unlike Morrison he was not content with the Consultative Assembly retaining its present functions; unlike de Freitas he did not wish to extend its purview outside Europe (see Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 6th session, 1954, pp.930-931).

of John Maclay,[1] who became rapporteur of the Consultative Assembly's General Affairs Committee and who, after consultation with the Foreign Office,[2] produced a report and resolution that recommended that the committees and secretariat of both assemblies be identical, that the clerk of the WEU Assembly double as the Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe and that candidates for the WEU Assembly Bureau be drawn from the Bureau of the Consultative Assembly.[3]

Maclay's report, though it was approved by the Consultative Assembly after some debate, soon proved to be a dead letter. The Assembly of Western European Union held its first meeting on 7 July 1955 and proceeded to elect Maclay as President, possibly because Britain had been the initiator of WEU, possibly also because it was hoped that the election of a British president would serve to further intertwine British relations with the Six[4] since in WEU 'the differential was the presence of Great Britain.'[5] However, it also elected a 17 member 'committee on organisation' to assist Maclay, and to draw up the rules of procedure and decide upon the assembly's committee structure. The committee's chairman and rapporteur was a Dutch Socialist, M. van der Goes van Naters, who was determined to press for as much independence as the assembly could obtain within the limits of the one article that had brought it into existence. Under his leadership the committee produced

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1. Others who expressed this view were Ronald Bell and Christopher Hollis, delegates to Strasbourg (ibid., pp.876: Hollis; 924: Bell).
2. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, had told Maclay that he would have preferred that a British delegate did not draw up the blueprint for an assembly that Britain had never pressed for (Interview with Viscount Muirshiel (John Maclay), February 1973).
3. For Maclay's draft resolution see Consultative Assembly, Documents, 6th session, 1954, no.322.
4. Interview with Viscount Muirshiel, Feb.1973. Merkl reaches a similar conclusion, 'European Assembly Parties,' Jl.Conflict Resolution, 54,f.n.12.
5. Noel Salter, 'Western European Union: The Role of the Assembly: 1954-63,' International Affairs, XL (1964), 35.

not merely a set of rules of procedure but also a 'charter' which asserted the assembly's control over its own budget, allowed for its consideration of economic, cultural and social matters similar to those under review at the Consultative Assembly, claimed the right to appoint its own administrative staff, not merely the Clerk,[1] and introduced the rules of procedure. Perhaps most significant of all, at least in the delegates' view at the time, the charter claimed for the assembly the right to pass a 'motion to disagree' with the Council. The motion was intended to be a vote of censure particularly directed at the Council's executive agencies. While it could not bring about the Council's dismissal, as a similar vote in the ECSC Common Assembly could remove the High Authority, it was hoped that it might nevertheless bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on recalcitrant ministers.[2]

Van der Goes and his supporters on the committee clearly were determined that the new assembly, unlike the Consultative Assembly, should be 'consultative' in function as well as in name. With independent status, and in possession of the power publicly to disagree with ministers, the assembly would be in a strong position to demand that it be consulted on all issues affecting the new WEU organisation. It certainly would not be in a position to take decisions of its own accord, but in fully exercising its 'consultative' powers, it would be able to influence those decisions.

The van der Goes committee's militant stance was hardly what Maclay had anticipated in his report to the Consultative Assembly: the tone of that document clearly was one of a general preference for the maintenance

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1. The Secretariat serving Assembly committees would thereby be ultimately responsible to the Assembly alone rather than to the WEU Council or member governments.

2. For the text of the draft charter and rules of procedure see WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 1st session, 1955, Document 3, pp.178-193.

of the status quo in assembly-ministerial relations. Indeed when first confronted by some of the committee's more radical demands, Maclay seemed inclined to submit them to the WEU ministerial Council for approval, which they were unlikely to receive.[1] Soon, however, Maclay concluded that as long as the committee did not press further than the limits imposed by the assembly's formal consultative status, there was no reason to prevent it from formulating its proposals.[2]

The completed committee report met with provisional assembly approval in October 1955, but was hardly welcomed by the WEU Council. The Council was certainly not pleased with the prospect of facing an assembly vote of censure, and Council President Paul-Henri Spaak had specifically told the assembly that the Council wished it to follow Council of Europe procedure in budgetary matters.[3] Eventually, however, negotiations between Maclay, van der Goes, and the committee's vice-chairman on the one hand, and the Council on the other,[4] resolved the problem of the motion to disagree by altering its terms so that it could only be tabled in specific reference to an item in the Council report submitted to the assembly, rather than in response to any action taken by the Council. Similarly, negotiations between Maclay and John Edwards on behalf of the Assembly (Edwards chaired its Budgetary Committee) and representatives of the Council,[5] led to agreement that the assembly could prepare its own budget, and that, in addition, the entire WEU budget would undergo assembly scrutiny.

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1. Interview with Noel Salter, July 1971.
2. Interview with Viscount Muirshiel, February 1973.
3. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 1st session, 1955, p.25. For the Council's attitude to the proposal for a motion to disagree see ibid., p.154 (remarks of Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen).
4. A major meeting was held on 21 November 1955.
5. Meetings between the Council at ambassadorial level and Maclay and Edwards were held on 3 January and 24-25 February 1956.

Both sets of concessions were seen as crucial to the assembly's independence. Van der Goes felt that even in its revised form, the proposal for a motion to disagree was still valuable; in any event, he now asserted, the motion had never been meant to serve as a vote of censure.[1] Edwards, a Labour M.P. who was a keen 'European' and, like van der Goes, hoped to exploit as fully as possible the assembly's 'consultative' potential, likewise viewed the Council's concessions to the assembly on budgetary matters as 'revolutionary gains' for that body.[2]

Edwards was exaggerating; the right to control its own budget, at the time approximately one-ninth of that of the Consultative Assembly,[3] was hardly the power of the purse. The motion to disagree likewise proved to be of marginal importance - as the Council of Ministers had insured it would be.[4] As one analysis has pointed out

> By the second year, the present style of Council-Assembly relations began to crystallize...No new departures in substantive policy originated in the Assembly. Instead the debates tend to create a parliamentary opinion favorable to defence measures already decided by the governments. 5

In effect therefore, while the efforts of Maclay, Edwards, van der Goes and other members of his committee (including George Thomson, Labour M.P. and Sir James Hutchison, , Conservative) successfully won for the assembly certain specific rights that had not been granted to the

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1. WEU Assembly, Proceedings: Documents, 2nd session, 1956, p.38.
2. Ibid., p.75.
3. Ibid., p.76, f.n. 1.
4. During the first ten years of WEU's existence the Assembly did not successfully pass one motion to disagree. In May 1957 a motion to disagree was debated (and passed by simple, but not the required absolute, majority) in response to the decision to withdraw 'certain British troops' from Europe. It is claimed that even the holding of the debate 'had a striking effect on European public opinion' (The Assembly of Western European Union, Paris, WEU, n.d.), p.9). However, it is difficult to tell whether the assembly led or followed public opinion on this sensitive issue.
5. Haas and Merkl, 'Parliamentarians Against Ministers,' p.50.

Consultative Assembly,[1] they did not succeed in creating an institution whose independent existence was seen as either viable or necessary. The assembly's introduction of procedural innovations could not alone justify its existence when set against the degree to which its review of WEU cultural and social affairs duplicated the activities of the Consultative Assembly in these fields. More importantly, the WEU Assembly was not seen to make a positive contribution to the formulation of European defence policy; its recommendations were considered but not heeded. Anyone who viewed the Consultative Assembly's function as being primarily of an 'educative' nature could not but see that of WEU in the same light and conclude that there was no need for the two bodies, identical in membership except that WEU had fewer member states, to continue to exist side by side. This indeed was the British Government's conclusion - and it was outlined in the 'Grand Design.'[2]

The Grand Design and After

When Selwyn Lloyd put his proposal to the NATO council in December 1956, all four existing assemblies were clearly overlapping in one or more areas under their purview, and three of them[3] were virtually powerless. The WEU Assembly's consideration of social and cultural problems in the Six and

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1. In addition to those innovations noted on p.114 above, the charter also provided for the President's convening of extraordinary sessions without prior consent from the Council; for the direct transmission of resolutions to international organisations; for the hearing of officials and the appointment of committees of investigation; and for the official recognition of party groups.
2. See Roberton's comments in European Institutions, pp.144, 222-223.
3. The Common Assembly did seem to exercise a significant degree of supervision over the activities of the High Authority. It also had the right to 'censure' the High Authority, a right it never used (see P.J.G.Kapteyn, 'The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community as a Representative Institution,' in Lindsay, Assemblies, pp.217-223). The European Parliamentary Assembly had not yet had the chance to demonstrate its influence over the Commission or lack thereof.

Britain overlapped with the work of the Consultative Assembly, which since 1952-53 had conducted wide-ranging debates on European affairs and received reports from a growing list of non-military international organisations. Both the WEU Assembly and the NPC had military/defence committees that focussed on NATO (of which WEU is an affiliated part). Finally, the European Parliamentary Assembly, like the ECSC Common Assembly which it was to either join or replace, would cover much the same ground as the Consultative Assembly in the social and economic fields.

Lloyd's proposal, which not only sought to do away with much of the unnecessary duplication represented by the existence of four separate assemblies, but also provided for the relating of the new assembly to all inter-governmental organisations on an ad-hoc basis, represented to a great extent the endorsement of de Freitas' proposals which the Government had rejected some three years earlier. Like the de Freitas plan, the new assembly would not be formally linked to any one international organisation. Again in line with the Labour M.P.'s proposals, the assembly would include not only European representatives, but those of North America as well. It clearly could not be termed 'consultative' in the true sense of the term (though it was labelled as such), since no organisation or executive would regularly consult its opinion,[1] though it might be so consulted on the ad-hoc basis envisaged by the Design. In practice, however, the new assembly was most likely to serve as at best an 'educational' experience for M.P.s that would encompass a range of concerns that was broader than that of any existing assembly but that nevertheless would allow for a reduction in the amount of time M.P.s. had to spend at international assemblies. Since the existing assemblies themselves were seen to function

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1. Though de Freitas' plan did provide for an 'Atlantic' Committee of Ministers, he never dealt with its duties or relationship with the Assembly. It was on the assembly that he constantly focussed.

primarily in an 'educative' way, the Grand Design clearly represented the most efficient blueprint for exploiting their benefits as fully as possible.

However, just as not everyone had accepted de Freitas' view of the way an Atlantic assembly should be created and should function, so did the Grand Design and its underlying premises meet with opposition from several quarters. At the May 1957 session of the Consultative Assembly, at which David Ormsby-Gore, the British Minister of State, spelled out in full detail the nature of the Grand Design, it was clear that many delegates had grave reservations about its contents. Some speakers emphasised the need to reform the inter-governmental bodies, and pointed out that the Design had glossed over this need in overly stressing the shortcomings of the assemblies. Indeed it was felt that most certainly in the case of the Consultative Assembly, the blame for its inefficiency should be laid at the Committee of Ministers' doorstep.[1] Some Italian delegates felt that there was no need at all to amalgamate the assemblies. They put forward a plan which merely sought to achieve as far as possible an identity of membership in all assemblies, none of which would be done away with.[2] One of them pointed to the danger of abolishing the links that presently were maintained between the assemblies and executive bodies. Such a move would damage whatever degree of consultative status - however meagre - the assemblies had managed to achieve for themselves.[3] Finally, delegates from the Neutral countries were apprehensive about the inclusion of Atlantic affairs in the purview of the new assembly.[4] Their refusal to be associated, even in an indirect

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1. See, for example, the remarks of Étienne de la Vallée Poussin of Belgium, Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 9th session, 1957-58, pp.36-37.
2. The Italian proposal was outlined by Giuseppe Dardanelli, ibid.pp.214-216.
3. See ibid., for the remarks of Antonio Azara of Italy, pp.213-214.
4. See for example the remarks of Declan OCastello (Ireland), ibid., especially p.104. See also Georges Bohy's remarks, ibid., p.166.

way, with Atlantic alliance/defence matters was as strong as it had been five years earlier, when the Eden Plan was the subject of Assembly debate.

Underlying many of these objections was the notion that the present assemblies served, or could serve, as more than mere 'educative' bodies. The stress on the Consultative Assembly's failure to move a recalcitrant Committee of Ministers, and on the need to preserve those 'gains' that it had achieved since its inception, clearly were based on the presumption that, given the support of executive bodies, the Assembly could fulfill the 'consultative' function it had been - and was still - meant to fulfill. If there was duplication of effort, this could be avoided by means of the Italian plan, which, as one observer has pointed out,[1] won greater support from the Assembly than did the Grand Design. What was most needed, however, was for the executive inter-governmental bodies to rationalise themselves and to co-operate with the assemblies. It is noteworthy that in October 1957, when the Grand Design was again debated in the Assembly, a renewed call for the amalgamation of the Council of Europe and OEEC was debated at the same time.[2] If this amalgamation were brought about, the 'consultative' functions of the Assembly, now extended to the OEEC, would be further enhanced.

To some extent the Neutrals' objections to the plan were also based on a similar presumption that the assemblies were meant to fulfill a 'consultative' function and that even if they did not do so at present they were likely to at some future date. If the new assembly were to relate

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1. Robertson, European Institutions, p.228. See the Consultative Assembly's Official Reports for 1-3 May 1957.
2. The plan had been put forward by Étienne de la Vallee Poussin of Belgium, ibid., pp.608-613, 658-659.

to NATO or to WEU even on a non-regular, ad-hoc basis, the Neutrals would have good grounds for fearing that their position was being compromised. On the other hand, if the assembly were merely seen as an 'educative' body their fears would appear less substantial: it is noteworthy that de Freitas foresaw no such difficulties for Neutral participation in his scheme, since it allowed for no official link with NATO.[1] Clearly it was upon the presumption that the new assembly's function (like that of the existing bodies) was to be primarily 'consultative' rather than 'educative' that the Neutrals based their objections.

The Neutrals were not alone in opposing the inclusion of Atlantic affairs in the list of subjects to be considered by the new assembly. Douglas Robinson, the NPC executive secretary, adopted a similar point of view, but with different ends in mind. Like the Neutrals, he too viewed the functions of the assemblies as meant to be primarily 'consultative' and he hoped to achieve that status for the assembly he served. Both for that reason, as well as for the obvious reason that he did not wish to see the organisation he had so recently helped to create be done away with so quickly, Robinson tried to mobilise his NPC Standing Committee in opposition to a scheme that would drown the NPC in a formless, weak structure. As he wrote to the Standing Committee in May 1957, after learning that the NPC would certainly be included in the Grand Design,[2]

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1. See above p. 83.

2. The NPC's position on the Grand Design was originally unclear, perhaps because Selwyn Lloyd hesitated to press for its abolition at the same meeting in which he was voting for a report on co-operation (made all the more timely by the Suez crisis) that had called for that body's continued existence. However, a confidential Foreign Office report of 4 April 1957 entitled 'Scheme for a General Parliamentary Assembly for Europe,' the contents of which became known to Robinson that month, made clear that the NPC was included in the Design.

> The Grand Design should be developed as a purely European conception...The Parliamentary NATO Conference should remain in separate existence...It is the only body in which the legislators of the United States and Canada already act as equals with their European counterparts... Without the Conference, "an Atlantic Community" is never likely to become "The Atlantic Community". 1

Strong and wide-ranging as it may have been, the opposition to the Grand Design nevertheless found little solid support from British M.Ps, particularly not from those who spoke on the subject in the Consultative Assembly. Most M.Ps speaking at Strasbourg generally approved of the Government's plan; Sir James Hutchison and James Ramsden, both Conservatives, were especially strong in its support.[2] On the other hand, when a proposal was put forward during the debates on the Design which called for additional meetings to take place between delegates to Strasbourg and members of the assemblies of the Six, the reaction of some British delegates, including the delegation leader, Dame Florence Horsbrugh, was a rather negative one. Peter Kirk pointed out that delegates were 'already drowning in a sea of paper.'[3] Dame Florence Horsbrugh supported his view, adding that what was needed instead was a rationalisation of the assembly's work and asked 'Are we studying too many subjects? Are we giving too many reports? Are we making too many recommendations?... Could we have some scheme of priorities?'[4] Finally Godfrey Nicholson, a veteran Conservative backbencher who was completing his second and final session as delegate to Strasbourg, summed up the difficulties

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1. Douglas Robinson, 'The Grand Design and the Parliamentary NATO Conference,' 'strictly confidential' memorandum 'to all members of the Standing Committee,' SC/May/57/3, 4 May 1957, pp.3-4 (DAU papers).
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 9th session, 1957-58, pp.106-108 (Hutchison) and 226-28 (Ramsden). See also the remarks of Hugh Gaitskell (ibid., p.153) and of Robert Boothby (pp.138-140).
3. Ibid., p.627.
4. Ibid., pp.637-638.

involved in initiating more time-consuming activities for delegates[1]

> How are we going to man this great new Assembly or Assemblies?... Our first duty as members of parliament is to our own parliament... to our own electors and constituencies. Many of us have our own profession or business...we shall not get the right type of man to spend more than three or four weeks in the year outside his own country....In 1957 we shall have spent about six weeks in Strasbourg and many days in Committees in Paris or elsewhere. I ask you Mr. President, how much time can you devote to your parliamentary duties in Belgium? We must make up our minds on this problem before going any further. 2

Why did British delegates take so obviously different a line on these questions from their continental colleagues? It was not a question of federalism vs. functionalism that was at stake here. The explanation therefore would seem to lie yet again in the way delegates viewed the true functions of the assemblies. The action of the British Government - its presentation of the Grand Design proposal - can be seen as having been a perfectly sensible one if the Government adhered to the view that all existing non-EEC assemblies were primarily 'educative' and therefore overlapped with each other. The support which British delegates voiced for the Grand Design likewise appears sensible if they are seen to have adopted the same view of the assemblies' role. Indeed Sir James Hutchison has already been quoted as calling for 'a common debating assembly' (my emphasis).[3] James Ramsden said virtually the same thing when he wished that the NPC should not 'develop into yet another assembly.'[4] If the NPC were meant to perform a specifically 'consultative' role the need for its continued existence would be more apparent; indeed it was in these terms that Douglas Robinson couched his own arguments. But if the NPC were

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1. His remarks were reminiscent of those of Lady Tweedsmuir and Ronald Ross in response to the Mackay Plan, see above, p. 72 and f.n.2.
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 9th session, 1957-58, p.655.
3. See above, pp. 104-105. Debate, and the resultant exchange of views, was of course a key element in the 'educative' process fostered by an assembly. See above, p..83 and f.n.2 on that page, for the way in which de Freitas interwove the notion of 'free discussion' with that of 'educating parliamentarians...in the different points of view.'
4. Consultative Assembly, op.cit., p.227.

merely another 'educative' assembly, then de Freitas' views on the subject were more to the point, and Ramsden, having very much argued what was de Freitas' case, could be presumed to be of the same opinion.[1]

It does not seem too wild a speculation to assume that other delegates held a similar view of the nature of the assemblies' functions. It would explain not only their support for the Grand Design[2] but their wish to cut down on the Consultative Assembly's work as well. Because its role was seen to be primarily educational rather than innovative, what mattered more was not the absolute number of meetings that were held or of recommendations that might be passed, but the degree to which delegates learned from their experiences. Its purpose could hardly be fulfilled if delegates

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1. A number of M.Ps felt that the NPC should continue to exist as an independent unit, but significantly, they argued their point on the grounds that the new assembly should preserve its 'European' nature. Thus Arthur Holt wrote (to Martin Maddan, British DAU sponsor, on 16 May 1957) 'it is very essential to build up the European feeling on really strong foundations...there should be no question of the Canadians and Americans - either from their point of view or ours - joining in a real European Assembly at the moment.' Similarly Robert Boothby felt that while on the one hand it was clear that 'it would be constitutionally impossible for any of them (American legislators) to become members of an Assembly like that of the Council of Europe, even though it was of a purely consultative character,' on the other hand, 'The Europeans don't want the Americans and the Canadians in... because they don't want to tie Europe irrevocably to the Western military alliance. If they do, all hope of German reunification, and ultimately of getting some of the countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain to participate in the work of the Council of Europe goes by the board.' Boothby even wanted discussion of WEU matters to be transferred to the NPC so that the latter aim could be realised. His primary interest clearly was the 'European' angle. As for the NPC, he advised Martin Maddan, to whom he wrote, to 'make the best' of it (letter of 21 July 1957). Other MPs to take views similar to those of Holt and Boothby were John Rodgers, Eric Johnson and Jo. Grimond (Barton papers).

2. The only Assembly vote on the plan, calling for further ministerial study of its terms, won unanimous British support (CA, Minutes of Proceedings, 9th session, 1957, p.40). No British delegate spoke against the Grand Design.

returned home with myriad recommendations buzzing through their brains and in possession of a more bewildered view of European affairs than when they first left Westminster. Better therefore, to rationalise the assemblies, or, if that proved too difficult - or complicated (as Nicholson seems to have felt) - then the next best step was to rationalise the work of each of the assemblies themselves, particularly the most time-consuming of the three, the Consultative Assembly.

At the end of the day, little came of the Grand Design, just as little had come of the Eden Plan. Eventually, as a result of a new set of proposals put forward by Pierre Wigny, the Belgian Prime Minister, as a follow-up to the Grand Design the executives of the Council of Europe and WEU finally agreed in 1959 to a plan whereby the social and cultural functions of the latter were transferred to Strasbourg.[1] Nothing, however, came of the debates on amalgamating the OEEC with the Council of Europe,[2] nor of suggestions put forward by several delegates, including Robert Boothby, to house all of the assemblies under one roof.[3] Each assembly continued on its own, passing recommendations, holding debates, sponsoring contacts between MPs and providing them with the opportunity for some travel abroad - but hardly performing 'consultative' duties. The attempt at rationalisation had failed, but not because rationalisation was not needed.

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1. Council of Europe Secretariat, Manual, pp.122-123; Hovey, Superparliaments, p.73; Robertson, European Institutions, pp.140-142.

2. See above p. 120 note 2 .

3. For Boothby's comments, see Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 9th session, 1957-58, pp.139-142. A proposal along these lines was put forward by Karl Mommer, a German Social Democrat, and was debated on 24-25 October 1957 (see ibid., pp.608,657).

Conclusion

Beginning with the so-called 'betrayal' of 1951, and even more so after the failure of the Eden Plan to amount to a real reorganisation of the Council of Europe, British Government leaders and the Whips of both parties came to look upon the role of the Consultative Assembly as at most an 'educative' one. It was with a similar view in mind that Geoffrey de Freitas, pronouncing that Assembly, indeed the Council as a whole, nearly dead, called for its regeneration as a 'Council of the Atlantic.' Had the Consultative Assembly functioned as a truly 'consultative' body, responding to calls from the Committee of Ministers for its advice, de Freitas' proposal would hardly have appeared viable. But the Consultative Assembly had no such relationship with the Committee of Ministers and de Freitas continued to press his point until, as a result of his efforts-as well as of those of a group of American activists who for their part hoped to create a 'consultative' Atlantic assembly which would 'promote' Atlantic 'integration,' the NPC was brought into existence in 1955. However, this new institution was no more 'consultative' than its predecessor; indeed it was not recognized as an 'official' body and did not have even a pro-forma relationship with NATO. To make matters worse, it was not the only new assembly to appear on the international scene. Apart from the ECSC Common Assembly, which came into being in 1952 with a more specific (though not completely defined) role to play in the Coal and Steel Community of the 'Six', another so-called consultative assembly was created almost as an afterthought to service WEU, which grew out of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in 1954. Though this assembly attempted to have a more meaningful relationship with the Brussels Council than the Consultative Assembly had with its Committee of Ministers, the net result of its much vaunted and much debated 'charter' was that formally it had instituted a number of procedural innovations but in practical terms it was no more 'consultative' than the older Strasbourg assembly.

The British Government's response to these developments, none of which it had initiated, was to work for a return to one assembly, or at most two assemblies, one for the 'Six' and one to include all 'debating or consultative' assemblies, to borrow the term used by a Government Minister.[1] Still motivated by the assumption that parliamentary assemblies were primarily an educational experience for M.Ps - for what other purpose had the Government ever attributed to what it termed 'debating' assemblies (and, as soon will be shown, even this function was not always exploited and the assemblies' utility as a source for pleasant trips for M.Ps at times came into play) - the Government put forward a 'Grand Design' to amalgamate them. The Design came to nothing. By 1960 all three bodies continued to exist, functioning in more or less the same way, two of them 'official,' one 'unofficial,' all providing trips for M.Ps and nominally an educational experience as well. The British Government had evinced no intention of converting any of these assemblies into truly 'consultative' bodies - although it had put forward two major plans for assembly reform, and would not even countenance the granting of formal 'consultative' status to the NPC. Indeed, in the 'Grand Design' the Government had attempted to do away with whatever consultative role the assemblies already may have achieved. It is also noteworthy that Selwyn Lloyd's proposal did not have as its primary aim the harmonisation of British relations with the Six, as the Eden Plan manifestly had. British policy towards the integrating Six was highly muddled in 1956-57, when the EEC came into being,[2] and if the Eden Plan represented a weak attempt to employ the Council of Europe as a medium for reorienting Britain's relations with the ECSC group, the 'Grand Design' did not even bother to

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1. David Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in presenting the details of the 'Grand Design' to the Consultative Assembly, CA, Official Reports, 9th session, 1957-58, p.75.
2. For a fuller discussion of British-EEC relations in this period, see below, Chapter 9, pp. 330-335 passim.

make much of an attempt at all.[1] All that Britain sought was a simplification of the multiple structure of 'educative' bodies. With no positive policy toward European integration, only a free trade area plan to counter the creation by the Six of a common market, the Government hardly was going to outline a reorganisation of the assemblies that could lead to an increase in the pressure for that integration (something which Mackay, on the one hand, and Hartley, in his sphere, both had wished to achieve).

British delegates to the assemblies likewise made no such proposals after 1951; clearly they were unready to go further than the Government's official line which, to all intents and purposes, the Opposition shared.[2] Despite the continual changes in delegation personnel,[3] the prevalent British attitude remained the same throughout the 'Fifties: No British delegate had revived the Mackay protocol, which the delegates of both parties, following the view of their respective leaders, had overwhelmingly rejected in 1951. And it was the continental, not British, delegates - Conservative or Labour - who attacked the 'Grand Design' for attempting to undo whatever 'consultative' opportunities the assemblies - particularly the Consultative Assembly - had created for themselves.

British parliamentarians, like their party leaders and Whips, were in fact far more sure of what the assemblies should not be - legislative bodies - and of what they were not - consultative bodies - than of what they were. Those who may not have subscribed to the view, first enunciated in 1952 by Labour's delegation leader at Strasbourg and somewhat later by a

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1. Ormsby-Gore made it clear to the Consultative Assembly that the 'Design' was not meant to encroach upon the assembly of the Six, and suggested only that 'perhaps' there be joint meetings and administrative facilities (Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 9th session, 1957-58, p.75).
2. It should be recalled that on the vote to amalgamate the OEEC and Council of Europe, all Labour delegates, like the Government's ministerial delegates, abstained (see above, p. 82 f.n. 1).
3. For a full discussion of this subject see Chapter 3 below.

Conservative Minister in Westminster,[1] that the assemblies' function was educative certainly were hard-put to say what their function was,[2] while even the attribution to them of an 'educative' function hardly justified the existence side by side of three different assemblies.

With the approach of a new decade it seemed that the assemblies would remain mired in their irrelevance, at least as far as British parliamentarians were concerned. They played no role in the formulation or execution of Government policy. They were not consulted by their own executive organs. After just over a decade of existence the Consultative Assembly, and its younger sister assemblies, were clearly destined for Europe's 'scrap-heap', vestigial organs that continued to exist, though few knew why.

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1. Alfred Robens (Labour) and Lord John Hope (Conservative), see above, p. 82 , f.n.'s 3 and 4 .

2. The assemblies might have played a 'promotional' role, promoting the ideals of European or Atlantic unity, providing for the practice by British delegates of 'parliamentary diplomacy' or furnishing a scene for unofficial contacts between British Government representatives and continentals upon whom they wished to press a policy angle. Suffice it to say here that the British delegation hardly exploited any of these possibilities. The first of them will be touched upon at length in Chapter 4. 'Parliamentary diplomacy,' as far as British delegates were concerned, never happened. And the Government used the Assemblies only as a sometime forum for set-piece speeches by Ministers, but as little more than that.

Part II:

The Delegations and The Delegates

Chapter 3

The Delegations: Structure and Composition

Taken at face value, membership of the British delegation to the Council of Europe, WEU or the North Atlantic Assembly seems to be a very inviting proposition to the average backbencher. There are no obligations incurred: one may speak freely and vote freely and at the same time mingle with continentals and enjoy the best food in the best restaurants that the host city has to offer. It is hardly surprising that for some time there seem to have been hardly enough places on the delegation for all MPs willing to fill them.[1] In theory, any member of the House of Commons (or Lords) can join the delegation. Nevertheless, the doctrine that Members are independent of the Government (or of the Opposition leadership) has been adhered to only when it suited the party leaders to do so, and as a consequence, more care has often gone into the selection of delegates, particularly those sent to the Consultative Assembly, than might otherwise have been expected.[2]

The question of 'Who Goes to Strasbourg' (to quote the title of a chapter in Kenneth Lindsay's book on the Council of Europe)[3] is one for

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1. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.143.

2. John Edwards, leader of the Labour delegation in the mid-'fifties once told delegates that 'all members of the delegation went to Strasbourg as individuals and were entitled to put forward any point of view so long as it was made plain that they were not committing the Labour Party. Nevertheless efforts were made to co-ordinate views and to express a common attitude on major questions, and, on matters on which Party policy had already been formulated, a spokesman would express this policy on behalf of the delegation'. (European Co-operation Sub-Committee of the International Committee: Minutes of meeting held on 17th April 1957 with delegations to Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies), roneoed; Labour Party - International Department Archives, Transport House, London - henceforth referred to as L-I).

3. Towards a European Parliament, p.24.

each Chief Whip to decide in consultation with the leader of the delegation, the delegation whip, perhaps with a senior member of the delegation, and with the approval of the leader of his party. The statute of the Council of Europe has left it to the national Parliaments to decide on the mode of choosing their delegates for the Consultative Assembly.[1] In the British case, the modified two-party system obtaining in Parliament as well as the absence of 'committees by which Parliament might provide for the discussion of foreign affairs in a confidential atmosphere along non-party lines',[2] have fashioned the organisation and conduct of her delegations to Strasbourg. As has been shown above,[3] in 1949 the Labour Government feared that an unruly delegation could complicate official British responses to the question of European federation. It was also aware that the Conservatives were avowedly in favour of closer British involvement in the process of European unity along lines that it opposed. The Government therefore took steps to ensure that the British delegation, or at least the Labour delegation, would at one and the same time be responsive to its wishes and nevertheless not be construed as an officially representative body which could enter into binding commitments made at Strasbourg. The Chief Whip was given the responsibility of choosing the delegates, Herbert Morrison, as a leading Minister, was appointed delegation leader and a Foreign Office team accompanied the delegation to Strasbourg.[4] At the same time an official

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1. Article 25; reprinted in Robertson, Council of Europe, p.261.
2. Beloff, New Dimensions, p.82.
3. Chapter 1, pp. 46-49.
4. Max Beloff points out that members of the Opposition ask for less guidance from the Foreign Office officials than do Government delegates, so as not 'to inhibit themselves from criticism'. This in part causes a situation in which 'British delegations are unequally served, in that those from the Government benches are likely to be briefed in much greater detail on the official line' (New Dimensions, pp.82-83). Apart from conducting briefings, the officials almost certainly also serve as a channel of communication with the Government, and their presence cannot but remind the leader of the Government party delegation that his activities must be conducted within the confines of Government policy. On the role of the Chief Whip in 1949 see above, Chapter 1, pp.47-48, 49-50.

disclaimer was issued which established that no decision or vote by the delegation would be taken as binding upon the House of Commons.[1]

When the Conservatives returned to power in 1951, Churchill adopted the Labour Government's practice, both in the manner of choosing delegates and in the maintenance of the official doctrine that delegates were independent, unwhipped and not able to bind their fellows at Westminster.[2] Furthermore, the Tories, like Labour, sent a member of the Government to lead the delegation, though after 1951 the leader was only of junior ministerial rank. The practice of both the Conservative and later the Labour Opposition, meanwhile, hardly differed from that of the Government. The delegates were chosen by the Chief Whip; the leader was an important front bencher.

From the start it was the Prime Minister who formally named the delegation. Every delegate received a personal letter from him informing him or her of his/her appointment and requesting that the matter be kept confidential until the official insertion of the names into Hansard, which was done a few days later either through an official announcement or in reply to a Member's question.[3] Substitutes' names were not announced at first, but, as it became clear that their functions were virtually identical to those of 'official representatives', their names were also included in Hansard.[4]

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1. See Jean Blondel 'United Kingdom', in Lindsay, Assemblies, pp.134-135. Morrison, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, stated that delegates were chosen to be as representative of parliamentary opinion as possible, but were not 'delegates' in the legal sense of the term and were 'individually responsible'. (Hansard, 5th series, 1949, 469, 1412.). Declarations of this kind were frequently repeated to allay fears of opponents of federalism who suspected that the Commons might be forced to adopt federal policies as a result of commitments made in Strasbourg debates: see ibid., 1950, 480, 1453.
2. See, for example, Churchill's reply to Sir. H. Williams, ibid., 1952, 499, 1666.
3. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.134.
4. For a discussion of the development of the substitutes' role at the Consultative Assembly, see below, Chapter 7, pp. 264-265.

The efforts of both the Labour and Conservative Governments to show the continentals (as well as their own backbenchers) that the delegations to Strasbourg could not be construed as truly official in any way proved to be highly successful. Observers of the delegation soon noted that delegates nonetheless seemed to comply with the broad outlines of their party's policy and generally voted as a cohesive unit.[1] This fact seems far less surprising if the role of the leader and of the delegation whip is given special consideration.

Blondel writes that the role of the leader was 'to exert a degree of supervision over the delegation'[2] but does not go into any detail about what supervision entailed. In general, the role of the leader of the Government delegation has been one of serving as the delegation's primary channel of communication with Westminster party leaderships, with other Governments, with other delegations and with the international group to which the party delegation may belong. Not all of these channels are of equal importance. Links with Westminster are imperative if the delegation's attitudes to a specific assembly proposals are accurately to reflect Government (or Opposition) pronouncements concerning that branch of policy in which the proposal falls. Of almost equal importance is the need to be informed of initiatives taken by other delegations, which, as the case of the Irish delegation noted in Chapter 1 illustrates,[3] may be at variance with British interests. Relations with party groups, while useful, have not demanded as much attention for these groups have never displayed the cohesiveness that marks the policy positions and voting records of national delegations.[4]

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1. This was true of most members of the Assembly, see Robertson, European Institutions (1959) p.64.
2. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.143.
3. See above p. 46 and f.n. 2.
4. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of British parties and assembly party groups.

The leader of the Opposition delegation has similarly maintained links with his leadership, with other delegations and with party groups. Of necessity, his lines of communication with Westminster have led to the office of his party leader rather than to the Government and perhaps Whitehall.

If the leader serves as his delegation's focus of contact and communication with London and within the assembly, the role of supervising delegation activities seems almost from the start to have been left to the leader's second in command, from whose role the position of delegation whip later evolved. Both Macmillan's and Dalton's memoirs reveal that this was indeed the case during the early meetings of the Consultative Assembly: Churchill planned the great speeches while Macmillan saw to it that delegates voted for the appropriate motions; Morrison led the floor debate against Churchill while it was left to Dalton to evaluate the work of the delegates and recommend future Labour appointees.[1]

The position of the leader of the Government delegation was without doubt a paradoxical one. On the one hand he was ostensibly a private member; his statements could not commit the Government to policies recommended by the Assembly and he was free to speak and vote as he chose. On the other hand he was a Minister of the Crown,[2] and in practical terms he could not espouse

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1. See Macmillan, Tides, p.176; Dalton, High Tide, pp.324-325.

2. As noted above, pp. 69-70 in early 1951 the Labour Cabinet decided against including Ministers on future delegations to Strasbourg. Accordingly, William Glenvil Hall, a privy councillor and former minister who had been a delegate in 1950 was selected to lead the 1951 Labour group and did so at the May session. By November, however, Labour was no longer in office and the Conservatives preferred to have a Minister leading the delegation (Hugh Dalton, 'Council of Europe: Consultative Assembly', undated memorandum attached to letter from Dalton to Attlee, 7 March 1951; Dalton to James Callaghan, 23 February 1951; Dalton papers).

any policy that would bring him into conflict with his colleagues at home. When such conflict did occur, as when David Maxwell-Fyfe's assurance to the Assembly on British policy toward the EDC was flatly contradicted by Anthony Eden in Rome that very evening, the result was embarrassment for the Minister and disenchantment among Members of the delegation, with, of course, no change in Government policy.[1] As a result, it appears that junior Ministers who came to lead the delegation, such as Anthony Nutting or Lord John Hope,[2] restricted themselves to making speeches which rephrased (but did not revise) Government policy and, while they nominally belonged to some of the Assembly's committees, usually did not write reports and certainly did not seek committee posts.

The leader of the Opposition delegation was obviously in an easier position; he was freed of the burden of collective responsibility. Nevertheless, even a leader who took an active part in assembly affairs, and not all did, was bound to follow the main directions of the party line and had only limited independence when it came to speaking out on crucial issues. George Brown's hurried phone call to Hugh Gaitskell from Strasbourg in September 1962, on the morning before delivering a major speech on Labour's attitude to Common Market entry, amounted in effect to a request for the leader's 'clearance'.[3] In this case, 'freedom of expression' never entered into the equation; no formal whip could have been more binding.

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1. For a more recent account of the tensions that mounted at Strasbourg after the speeches of Maxwell-Fyfe and Eden in 1951, see the correspondence in The Times between Lord Boothby and Lord Salisbury, 17, 22 and 27 April and 1 and 4 May 1972; see also Chapter 1, pp. 74-76.

2. Lord John Hope did co-author a report in 1953 on the Statute of a European Political Community, but his case was an exception to the general rule that Ministers did not join committee work.

3. Goerge Brown, In My Way, p.217.

In the mid-fifties, after the collapse of the European Defence Community and the creation of Western European Union, the Government stopped sending Ministers to lead the delegations and instead sent former Ministers to Strasbourg.[1] Similarly, no Ministers were sent to the newly created NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (whose delegates came to be chosen by the Chief Whip, though their invitations formally came from the Speaker of the House of Commons, not the Prime Minister). Blondel speculates that 'in appointing ex-Ministers, the Prime Minister and Chief Whip may well have wished to reward them for past service'.[2] One may add that in not appointing Ministers, the Prime Minister and his Chief Whip showed that they were fully aware of the decline of the Council of Europe, of its increasingly peripheral importance in European affairs.

At the same time as the Government elected to send former ministers to Strasbourg they also began to send along a party Whip. It became the Whip's job, as 'delegation whip', to ensure that delegates were placed on appropriate committees,[3] usually those on which they wanted to serve, but sometimes on those which for some reason best suited the Government's needs regardless of the individual member's wishes. The delegation whip also saw to it that Members were present for important votes - in the late 'fifties these usually concerned the question of a free trade area including Britain, Scandinavia and the Six, while in the 'sixties they dealt with British entry to the Common Market. Finally, the Government's whip tried

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1. Strasbourg was the seat of the WEU Assembly until 1959, when it moved to Paris (though in 1961 it met in London).
2. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.143.
3. From Hugh Dalton's memoirs one gathers that it was he who placed delegates on committees in 1949 and 1950. His reports on delegates' activities, which can be found in the Dalton Papers, as well as his recommendations on the choice of delegates for 1950, often with a view to their appointment to particular committees, are recorded in High Tide, pp.324-325. It should be noted that while Dalton's report on the 1949 delegation was submitted to Attlee in writing, it has since become normal practice for delegation leaders and whips to report orally to the party Chief Whip and possibly the leader as well.

to steer committee posts into the hands of either his party's delegates, or of delegates from countries that were sympathetic to the British position on Europe (in the sixties this usually meant trying to keep Gaullists out of committee posts).

Prior to the arrival of the party Whips at Strasbourg it had been the responsibility of the representatives of the Conservative Central Office and Transport House to service the delegation. Party officials wrote speeches for the delegates, briefed them on important resolutions, ensured that they were present for assembly votes and advised them whether to vote for or against (or to abstain from voting on) the issue in question.[1]

It was the Labour party that first sent a Whip to Strasbourg. He of course served in an unofficial capacity so as not to infringe on the delegates' formal right of free speech.[2] John Edwards, who assumed the leadership of the delegation in 1955, had become very active at Strasbourg and held a number of committee posts as well as the Vice-chairmanship of the Socialist group at both assemblies. The need arose for someone to concern himself solely with the more mundane workings of the delegation, which itself was growing larger as substitutes came to occupy much the same position at the Assemblies that official representatives held. It probably was felt that the job was one best filled by someone with greater authority among the Labour Members than a Transport House official, so it fell to a member of the

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1. Interview with Dr. Saul Rose, formerly of the International Department, Transport House, June 1972.

2. The position of the delegation whip was clarified at a delegation meeting in mid-1955. In response to a remark by Lord Henderson that 'constitutionally we were not a group and that Herbert Bowden had acted unofficially' as a whip, Herbert Morrison said that 'he should act as a de facto whip' ('Meeting of the British Labour Delegation to the Council of Europe on Monday, 25 July 1955, at the House of Commons', roneoed notes; L-I).

Whips' Office who was designated a member of the delegation. By 1957 the Conservatives also had one of their Whips serving as whip to the delegation.

As noted above, both the delegation leader and whip play an important role in choosing the party's delegates. They are most aware of the particular functions delegates must perform at the Assemblies and their advice is usually heeded by the Chief Whip, who makes the final selection. His choices are influenced by a number of considerations. The need to have a delegation that will co-operate with the party leadership clearly is a key factor in the Chief Whip's calculation, but it enters into his construction of the delegation as a whole. A loyal voting record is certainly not a sufficient condition, and at times not even a necessary condition, for an individual Member's eligibility as a delegate.[1]

Many of the other factors that determine the choice of individual delegates are the same as those which shaped Hugh Dalton's delegations of 1949 and 1950. For example, both Dalton and later delegation leaders had to include a number of 'specialists' on their delegation, to provide expertise for the discussion in committee of legal, economic or military questions. Language proficiency had not been a paramount criterion for membership of either the Labour or the Conservative delegation, but both usually have had at least one French speaker and one German speaker; the low proportion of linguists meant that most delegates could have only restricted contacts with their continental counterparts, with the general exception of the Dutch, Scandinavians and the many Germans who were often fluent in English.[2]

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1. For example, Hugh Dalton recommended that R.W.G.Mackay be included on the 1951 delegation notwithstanding his authorship of the 'so-called' "Mackay Protocol", which, is, of course, quite unacceptable to us'. To have dropped Mackay 'would give the appearance of victimisation'; Dalton feared that the Tories might offer Mackay a place on <u>their</u> delegation, 'thus creating, even if he refused such an offer, much public fuss and troublesome discussion' ('Council of Europe...', Dalton papers).

2. See above, Chapter 1, p. 48; see also Blondel, in Lindsay, <u>Assemblies</u>, pp.141-142. Additional details about the need for certain professionals were supplied by more recent delegates to the assemblies.

It fell to the Chief Whip to decide upon matters such as regional representation, with the Conservatives having to pay special attention to the needs of the Ulster Unionists (generally speaking two delegates from Northern Ireland were included on the Conservative team) while Labour Chief Whips always took care to include at least one Welsh member and two Scots on their delegation as well as a member of the Co-operative party.[1] In addition, it was for the Chief Whip, and only for the Chief Whip, to decide who needed to be rewarded for good behaviour with a trip abroad; who was a rebel whose absence would make life at Westminster easier for a while, which ex-Minister had to be placated with a place on the delegation, for whom the Strasbourg experience would serve as a good preparation for a ministerial career,[2] and for whom it would serve as an outlet for activities that were frustrated at Westminster.[3] Finally, the Chief Whip alone decided who did <u>not</u> go to Strasbourg, for many Members were denied that opportunity.[4]

To some extent, all of these considerations, apart from the need for professional specialists, did not in theory demand from MPs a particular educational or occupational background before they could be eligible for appointment to the delegation. Theory, however, proved to differ widely from practice. In 1949 neither delegation accurately reflected the balance of educational and occupational backgrounds of its parliamentary party members. No less than five of the eleven Tory MPs who went to Strasbourg

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1. The need for a delegate from the Co-operative Party is noted in Dalton's memorandum, 'Council of Europe...' (Dalton papers).
2. As will be shown, this is not as important a factor in the desi[illegible]nation of delegates as has sometimes been assumed (see p.146-147).
3. George Jeger, for example; see below, p.164.
4. For example, Hugh Dalton recommended that Wilfred Burke be included as a delegate, since he was a member of the National Executive's International Sub-committee; Burke never served on the delegation (Dalton, 'The Council of Europe..!; Dalton papers). For a more recent example see the comment of Arthur Lewis, <u>Hansard</u>, 5th series, 1971, 823, 1322.

had attended Eton, a fact which in itself was not surprising inasmuch as most of the leading Conservatives who were active in the United Europe Movement were old Etonians[1] (as was Duncan Sandys, Churchill's chief-of-staff at Strasbourg[2]), but which by no stretch of the imagination mirrored the percentage of old Etonians in the Parliamentary Conservative Party. Furthermore, all of the Conservative delegates had been to public school, though fully 22 per cent. of the Conservative benches in the Commons were filled by men who had not benefitted from an education of this kind.

It has been contended that Labour's opposition to Europe was due to 'the background of culture and education' that marked the Conservative delegation.[3] However, Labour's delegates reflected educational backgrounds that were similar to those of their Conservative counterparts. Eight of Labour's nineteen delegates (42%) had attended public school; only twenty-two per cent. of the PLP were old public schoolboys. Three of the Labour delegates (16%) had had only an elementary education, or elementary schooling supplemented by adult courses. One hundred and twelve members of the PLP (23.5%) had never had a secondary education. Education, or lack thereof, therefore could hardly have accounted for Labour's opposition to 'Europe'. Indeed it was Anthony Crosland, Highgate and Oxford educated, professional lecturer and economist, who, while a delegate to Strasbourg, pointed out that

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1. Interview with Mr. Noel Salter, July 1971. Mr. Salter recalled that while attending a function at the Hague Congress he noticed that all the Tories at the top table were wearing their Etonian ties - all, that is, except Churchill, who had discreetly not worn his Harrovian tie.

2. Macmillan, Tides, p.165.

3. Christopher Layton, 'Labour and Europe', Political Quarterly, XXXIII (1962), 43.

> It is...urgently necessary, if we are to avoid a great wave of bitterness and disillusionment in the future, that we should make clear, what is in fact the case, that there is no chance, within any forseeable period, of any British Government merging its sovereignty in a supra-national Council of Europe. 1

If Labour's delegation could not be said to have been as intellectually 'backward' as might have been thought, it was also hardly representative of the economic strata within the PLP. Two members of the 1949 Labour delegation were barristers, three more could be classified as workers.[2] Comparable figures for the PLP were thirty-two for the former group, one hundred fifty-five for the latter.[3]

The relegation of Labour to the Opposition benches in 1951 did not bring about a marked change in the composition of the delegation, nor did that delegation become to any great degree more 'representative' of the parliamentary party. In 1953, for example, eight of Labour's twelve delegates had received a university education, and all had completed secondary school; less than half of the PLP had university degrees and over a fourth had never completed their school studies.

Labour's delegation gave a disproportionate place to the professional element within the party. About two-thirds of the delegates were either teachers, or lecturers, or civil servants. Labour also sent a barrister to Strasbourg. These occupational groups accounted for less than half of the PLP. The 1953 statistics for professional people reflected no substantial change from the composition of earlier delegations, for example those of

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1. Anthony Crosland, MP., 'Prospects for the Council of Europe', ibid., XXII (1951), 143.
2. One of the 'workers' on the Labour delegation was William Whiteley, the Chief Whip.
3. Sources for figures on the Commons for all election years given in this chapter are the Nuffield Election Studies and Times Guide to the House of Commons for relevant years. For additional figures see Appendix 2.

1949 and 1951 (when comparable figures for professionals and journalists on the delegation were 68 and 56 per cent). Given the notable absence of workers - none were delegates in 1953 - as well as the unsurprising absence of company directors on the delegation, it may be concluded that the Labour Whips felt it best suited the party to send mostly educated professional men to Strasbourg. It is probable that the Whips found Members from working class backgrounds not terribly interested in European developments or in the Council of Europe. Possibly too, as a former Labour official recalls, the Whips felt that there was little point in sending 'salt-of-the-earth' working class types who would remain virtually 'incommunicado' and would gain little from their experience abroad.[1] The educated professional MP would be more likely to have learned a foreign language and to have travelled abroad and therefore would find it easier to adjust to a foreign environment and to work closely with politicians of other nationalities.[2]

Conservative delegations to Strasbourg in the early fifties resembled those of Labour in some respects, though a Minister did lead the delegation. Generally they included a number of promising young politicians with good ministerial prospects. For example, serving on the 1953 delegation were Edward Boyle and Julian Amery, both of whom were at a later date to achieve Ministerial office. But, not unlike Labour, the Conservatives sent a large number of delegates whose careers were never to lead them beyond the back benches; seven of the nine non-Ministerial Tory delegates in 1953 were never to rise past office in their parliamentary party committees.

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1. Interview with Dr. Saul Rose, June 1972.

2. See the comments of G. Matthew Bonham, 'Participation in Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Effects on Attitudes of Scandinavian Parliamentarians', Journal of Common Market Studies, VIII (June 1970), 331-333.

In one respect, however, the Conservatives did differ sharply from Labour: their delegates were permitted to return to Strasbourg for several years, in order to win committee posts, or simply because their reputations at Strasbourg enhanced the image of the Conservative Government.[1] Already by 1954 Robert Boothby had spent five years at Strasbourg and Julian Amery four. Boothby's ministerial prospects at Westminster were exceedingly dim, but for a time he had enormous prestige on the Continent. Amery became repporteur of the important General Affairs Committee. Both men were even reinstated to the delegation after they were dropped in 1953, presumably for opposing the official Government line on EDC and abstaining on an important vote. The return of Boothby in 1955 and of Amery in 1956 clearly indicated that the Conservatives were even ready to overlook past disputes if the return of a Member to Strasbourg enhanced the party's reputation in Europe.

Labour's delegates were not similarly encouraged by their party. It became an unwritten rule that Members, apart from some rare exceptions, were to return to Strasbourg only once, if at all. Jean Blondel's 1959 study of the British delegation reveals that for the first ten years of the Assembly's existence Labour Members served at Strasbourg for an average of 1.78 years, which was hardly enough time for them to learn much about the place, much less be elected to any position of responsibility there. It has been asserted that the party leadership and Whips' Office thought of Strasbourg as a place where MPs received an 'education' of sorts, where backbenchers who devoted the greater part of their Parliamentary time to the consideration of local and national issues were given an introduction to European politics.

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1. Not all delegates returned for more than one year, most served for a total of two (Blondel gives the average figure as 2.25; Lindsay, Assemblies, p.140). There were, however, enough exceptions to this rule to lead observers to think that all Conservative delegates served for at least three years (ibid). See Appendix 3.

For these purposes, conludes the theory, two years service, if not one, was deemed adequate, and in this context, committee chairmanships were both irrelevant and an unnecessary waste of the Member's time and energy.[1]

It is, however, questionable whether it was for 'educative' reasons that Members were so quickly rotated, with few of them being given the opportunity to win committee offices at the assemblies. Given the competition to join the delegation, and the Whips' supposed concern that as many MPs as possible learn about European institutions, one would have expected a broad cross-section of MPs of both parties to be included on the delegation. However, the very people who most needed the sort of education that Strasbourg could provide, particularly the working class MPs whose education had carried them no further than the first forms of secondary school, were conspicuously absent from delegation after delegation. It therefore would seem that if the Whips saw the Strasbourg experience as a sort of education, it was not an education in the ordinary sense of the word. Perhaps they indeed did feel, as was noted above, that professional, university educated Members would be in a better position to appreciate the 'European experience' then would their working class colleagues. It seems, however, far more likely that, as so many Conservative delegates have scornfully asserted, Labour simply did not care about Strasbourg except insofar as it provided a holiday for Members, and therefore ensured that as many people as possible could have a slice of the cake. This rather lighthearted attitude on the part of most of the leadership and many backbenchers naturally worked against the interests of those MPs who would have preferred to have stayed on at the Assembly and to have played a more active part in its activities. These Members were a distinct minority. Though many Members wanted to remain on the delegation, it was for reasons that ran directly counter to the desire for more work, and, under these circumstances the Whips' attitude that no group should

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1. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.140.

monopolise this Parliamentary 'perk' seemed a fair one.

The high rate of turnover in the British delegation during the first years of the Assembly's existence often meant that relative newcomers to the House of Commons were given the opportunity to visit Strasbourg. A number of Conservative and Labour Members of the 1951 delegation to Strasbourg had first entered the Commons the previous year.[1] The 1952 Labour delegation included Denis Healey, victor in a Leeds by-election only several months earlier. Healey, however, was no stranger to Strasbourg, having accompanied the Labour delegations of 1949 and 1950 in his capacity as Secretary of the International Department at Transport House. Several other Members joined the delegation only one, two or three years after they first took their seats in the House, including Peter Kirk, who, after becoming one of the youngest Members of the 1956 House of Commons, became the youngest Member of the 1956 British delegation to the Council of Europe.

With a few exceptions, most newer members of the Commons who joined the Strasbourg delegation served there for only short periods. In Labour's case Clement Attlee perhaps did intend that the Council of Europe should serve as a 'training ground' for future ministers,[2] though Healey, having been to Strasbourg the previous three years was unlikely to learn much more from another year there. The Conservatives' reasons for sending more junior members of the Commons were probably similar. Both parties, however, also sent very senior members of the House to Strasbourg for brief periods, and they were certainly not sent for 'educational' reasons. Relaxation rather than education was probably more appropriate to their case.[3] Perhaps the most notable exceptions to the rule, as far as 'elder statesmen' were concerned,

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1. Anthony Crosland, Eirene White, Llewelyn Williams and George Darling, Labour, and Julian Amery and Henry Hopkinson, Conservatives.
2. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, p.225, noted above, p.82.
3. 'Elder statesmen' included Walter Elliot (38 years in the Commons when named to the delegation in 1956) and Edith Summerskill (25 years in the Commons when named to the 1953 delegation).

were Robert Boothby and Florence Horsbrugh. Boothby had already served over thirty years in the Commons when he first attended a session at Strasbourg in 1949. He subsequently attended seven more, becoming Vice-chairman of the Assembly's Economic Committee and taking a leading part in many of its political debates. Florence Horsbrugh had twenty years' experience in the Commons behind her when she first became a delegate to the Consultative Assembly in 1955. She subsequently became leader of the British delegation (1956) and was instrumental in organising the Conservatives, together with other like-minded delegates, into an Independent group.[1]

The appointment of Florence Horsbrugh as leader of the delegation in 1956 seemed to indicate that the Conservatives had come to share Labour's light-hearted approach to the choice of delegates to the Consultative and WEU Assemblies. No longer did the Tories feel the need to send a Minister along to Strasbourg; an ex-minister was enough. Nevertheless, within a few years, certain changes in the composition of the delegation seemed to indicate that Conservative party leaders were again giving more serious thought to their choice of delegates.

To be sure, in terms of educational and occupational background the delegations of the late 'fifties hardly differed from their predecessors.[2] Nevertheless, the presence of certain new Conservative delegates, particularly Ronald Russell and Sir Knox Cunningham, whose enthusiasm for European integration was lukewarm at best, indicated a conscious attempt on the part of the Whips to present to continental politicians a balanced picture of British and Parliamentary attitudes to Europe. They wished to make it clear

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1. See Chapter 8, pp. 314.
2. It is perhaps noteworthy that the percentage of Cambridge graduates on the Conservative delegation increased while that of Oxford graduates dropped markedly. S.E.Finer has argued that in the late 'fifties Oxford graduates 'were more European ... than their opposite numbers from Cambridge', S.E. Finer, H.F.Berrington & D.J.Bartholomew, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons: 1955-1959 (Oxford, Pergamon, 1961), pp.117-120.

that to many British opinion leaders the Commonwealth was very much first priority and Europe at best a poor second. A more 'balanced' delegation added weight to the British contention that the Free Trade Area proposals were as far as a majority of parliamentary opinion was willing to carry economic relations with Europe.

The desire to emphasise Britain's reluctance to take part in a customs union did not, however, alter the new policy of sending ex-ministers to Strasbourg. To have sent a Minister to lead the delegation would hardly have served the purpose of letting continental delegates know what British backbenchers thought about the Common Market. Ministers were indeed at times sent to address the assemblies on specific occasions.[1] However, to have sent even a junior minister as a full-time delegate would only have served to mislead the continentals into thinking that the Government was taking a greater interest in the activities of the assemblies, which it certainly was not.

The Labour Party had little need to engage in the calculations that seem to have motivated the Conservative Whips. It was not in Government. In any event, the Party retained its relative indifference to assembly affairs, and its delegates reflected its attitude. Probably because this indifference was one that was shared by members of both ideological wings within the party, the delegation to the assemblies easily managed to include representatives of both wings among its members. Just as the 1949 delegation boasted no less than four Labour Members who voted against the Government in the National Service Bill division of 1 April 1947,[2] so did

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1. For example, Reginald Maudling, the Paymaster General, who was conducting the Free Trade Area negotiations on behalf of the British Government, addressed the Consultative Assembly on 23 Oct.1957. Consultative Assembly Official Report, 9th session, 1957-58, pp.524-532.

2. The four were Will Nally, Fred Cooks, Mrs.Mabel Ridealgh and Margaret Herbison. Nally took part in the 1949 debates; Herbison was likewise a full delegate in 1950. For a discussion of the 'revolt', see R.K. Alderman, 'Discipline in the Parliamentary Labour Party 1945-51', Parliamentary Affairs. XVIII (1964-65), 299. See also Gordon, Conflict, pp.202-203.

later delegations also include Labour MPs who were most closely identified with the 'Left'.

Indeed, the number of delegates who, as S.E.Finer has shown, could be included among the 'hard-core' fifty MPs of the Labour Left, grew larger throughout the fifties. Percy Wells, who had also defied the Government on the National Service issue, joined the delegation in 1951. George Darling, another of Finer's hard core, served in 1952. Alderman Harriet Slater joined the delegation in 1956. A year later, Charles Royle, who had signed the 1948 Nenni Telegram,[1] and who had been replaced as a Whip in 1954 after voting with the Bevanites on the amendment to the Atomic Energy Authority Bill (the front bench had opposed the amendment) was also added to the delegation.[2] That year too, Alice Cullen and Hugh Delargy, both among Finer's fifty, also joined the delegation.

To be sure, just as some delegates who were not identified with the Left, but who were considered 'Europeans', served at Strasbourg, so too were 'European' members of the 'Left' included on the delegation. Richard Crosman, for example, was a Bevanite who nevertheless belonged to the Labour Group for Europe that was organised in 1948 and had intended to travel to the Hague Congress:[3] he was a delegate to Strasbourg in 1953. Leslie Hale, another Labour delegate who was a member both of Finer's 'hard-core' and of the Labour pro-Europeans,[4] joined the Strasbourg delegation in 1957;

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1. A number of Labour MPs sent a telegram of support to Pietro Nenni, leader of the Left-Socialists, during the Italian General Election of 1948. This embarrassed the Government and led to the expulsion of John Platts-Mills from the PLP. A number of purported signers denied ever having done so and the final total stood at twenty-two (see The Times, 29 April 1948, p.4); see also Epstein, Britain: Uneasy Ally, p.82.
2. See R.K.Alderman, 'Parliamentary Party Discipline in Opposition: The Parliamentary Labour Party: 1951-64', Parliamentary Affairs, XXI (1967-68), 128.
3. See above. p. 28 f.n. 4.
4. Short, British Policy..., pp.119,125.

In general however, most Labour Members of all ideological persuasions who travelled to the assemblies were not keenly interested in the cause of a united Europe[1] and were certainly not interested in the assemblies themselves. This was most certainly true of Labour's leading shadow ministers who attended sessions of the Consultative Assembly. Few seem to have credited it with very much importance, or taken a particular interest in its workings. Thus Hugh Gaitskell, who only the year before had become leader of the Labour Party, missed every sitting of the 1956 session to which he was nominally a delegate, and attended but four of the thirty-five sittings held the following year. His record at WEU Assembly meetings was equally poor: he missed every sitting of both the 1956 and 1957 sessions. Not surprisingly, Gaitskell neither joined any committees nor held any Assembly office. He was clearly encumbered with more important party matters at Westminster, but it would have probably have done less harm from the assemblies' point of view not to have joined the delegation at all, than to have become a representative only to ignore the assemblies' activities.

Kenneth Younger's record as a delegate in 1957 was hardly better. He was about to terminate his parliamentary career, and had been sent to Strasbourg because it was felt that some senior party member with foreign affairs experience had to be included on the delegation. He was not unsympathetic to the ideals and aims of European unity, but felt that with the imminent creation of the EEC 'other bodies were bound to be peripheral'. He was more interested in the work of WEU, serving on its Defence Committee, the most important of that Assembly's Committees (he joined no committees at Strasbourg) but did not rejoin the delegation in 1958.[2]

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1. The Labour Left went further than the party's official line of opposition to British participation in supranational European projects. The Left also was against British membership of any inter-governmental organisation which might serve to intensify the divisions between Eastern and Western Europe. See Ian Mikardo, 'Bevanite view of Europe', in Elma Dangerfield and Howard Russell, eds. Britain and Europe (London, European & Atlantic Digest, 1952) pp.29-31.
2. Interview with Sir Kenneth Younger, July 1971.

James Griffiths likewise joined the WEU Defence Committee when he was a member of the delegation in 1958-59, but, like Younger, took little interest in the committee work of the Council of Europe. Neither Strasbourg nor Paris seem to have influenced Griffiths in any way: he took so little notice of the two Assemblies that he did not bother to discuss his experiences in - or indeed even mention - either of them in his political autobiography.[1]

Apart from John Edwards who served first as chairman of the Socialist group and later as resident of the Council of Europe Assembly, and Fred Mulley, who was an active rapporteur of the WEU Defence Committee, few Labour front- or back-benchers gained any prominence at the assemblies. The attitude that the assemblies served as a 'tip to reward boys with a good voting record',[2] persisted in Labour circles and seemed to have some validity though other calculations also entered into the picture and some of the left-wing delegates clearly were not 'good boys'. The indifferent attitude of the Labour delegates, coupled with the Conservatives' decision to put ex-ministers at the head of their delegates, evoked little optimism among assembly supporters. Kenneth Lindsay, himself a former MP, who had witnessed every session of the Consultative Assembly, noted the sad observation of a British MP that 'There is a serious deterioration at Strasbourg', and added somewhat ruefully

> If you go to a parliamentary assembly, it is necessary to give as well as receive. The British too often appear to be applying the brakes, instead of contributing new ideas. It is unfair to send to Strasbourg frustrated ex-Ministers and it is a poor compliment to Europe to send relays of second eleven teams in order that they may gain experience of European politics. 3

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1. Pages from Memory (London, Dent, 1969).
2. Interview with Sir Kenneth Younger, July 1971.
3. Lindsay, Towards a European Parliament, p.37.

Interestingly enough, although the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was a far newer and less prestigious organisation than the Council of Europe, it was able to attract a fair number of leading Labour politicians during the first five years of its existence (1955-59). Though the Conservatives sent no ministers to the Conference,[1] a number of leading Labour MPs seem to have been attracted by the notion of the Conference as a place which would facilitate the formulation of a coherent Western policy if Americans were made aware of European attitudes.[2] They were intrigued by the idea of having a permanent parliamentary forum which fostered contact with leading American statesmen as well as with NATO military and civil officials. Denis Healey, who was an early supporter of the Conference's plan for some form of parliamentary consultation on NATO affairs, attended the Conference's first two sessions. George Brown was a very active delegate from 1956 to 1959. Edward Short, later Minister of Education under Harold Wilson and then Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, attended the 1959 and 1960 Conferences. Even Hugh Gaitskell showed interest in the Conference, attending in 1956 on the urging of Geoffrey de Freitas and after having been told that Lyndon Johnson, the Senate Democratic Majority Leader (and therefore, under a Republican administration, Gaitskell's opposite number as leader of the Opposition), would also be attending the Conference.[3]

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1. It was 'unofficial'; see Chapter 2.
2. This view was also held by some Conservatives, notably Walter Elliot. See Colin Coote, A Companion of Honour (London, Collins, 1965), p.264. For a Labour view see Denis Healey's speech in the Commons, Hansard, 5th series, 1954, 522, 655-657.
3. On 9 Oct.1956, Geoffrey de Freitas wrote to Walden Moore: 'I can tell you in confidence that I have spoken to Mr.Gaitskell and there is a strong possibility that he will go to the NATO Conference'. In a reply of 24 Oct. Moore described de Freitas' news as 'most welcome' and added: 'In this connection I wrote to General Billotte (who will be advisor to the French delegation) as follows: "I think there might be considerable value of holding one or more small private conferences between a few key members of the French, British and US delegations (say 3 or 4 from each) together with 3 or 4 persons from other delegations"... If you, Colonel Elliot and General Billotte think well of this idea we will approach Senator Lyndon Johnson and Congressman Wayne Hays (leader of the US House of Representatives delegation) who I expect will be agreeable'. Five days later de Freitas replied: 'I entirely agree that some small private conferences ... would be a great help. I know that Hugh Gaitskell also thinks the same', Gaitskell and Johnson both attended the 1956 conference (DAU Papers).

It was easier, however, to be an 'active' or 'interested' member of the Parliamentarians' Conference than of the Consultative Assembly. Being active in the former in effect meant attending the session, since committees rarely met (two of the committees, those concerning military and cultural affairs, only convened during the week-long session of the Conference itself), and their membership '[could not] be regarded as permanent or standing'.[1] Had the committee activities of the Conference been as demanding upon its members as were those of the other two assemblies upon theirs, Labour leaders very possibly might have been somewhat less willing to join British delegations to the new and unofficial organisation's plenary sessions.

Generally speaking, Conservative and Labour delegates to the NPC seem to have been drawn from the same body of Members that provided the bulk of the delegation to the Council of Europe. As Jean Blondel has noted, half the NPC's membership from 1955 to 1959 had at some time attended sessions of the Consultative Assembly, and some delegates had attended both assemblies in one year.[2] The changeover of both Conservative and Labour Members was very high, even higher than that of delegates to Strasbourg (whose own rate of turnover was the highest among the Council of Europe's members). Neither the Labour nor the Conservative delegates averaged two years of service at the NPC, and very few individual delegates returned more than once. There was a very high percentage of public school and Oxbridge or service college graduates at the first NPC session, particularly among Conservatives, which was far higher than the corresponding percentage for delegates to the Council of Europe's assembly.[3] This trend persisted throughout the 'fifties. Just as in 1956 twelve of the sixteen British delegates (including Peers) had

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1. Douglas Robinson, Executive Secretary. (NPC), 'NATO Parliamentarians Conference Committees - Some Observations' (London, mimeographed, 1959), p.1. (papers of Mr. Robinson, London).
2. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.138.
3. 13 of 16 delegates (including Peers) had been to public school, 75% had been to Oxbridge or the service colleges, principally Sandhurst or Dartmouth. Corresponding figures for delegates to Strasbourg in 1955 were 54% & 52% and for the House of Commons 52% & 40%.

attended public schools (nine of them were Conservatives), so in 1960, fourteen of the eighteen (including Peers) delegates were old public school boys. Both in 1956 and 1960 no delegates had had anything less than a secondary education. Though the number of men (curiously, no woman MP attended the Parliamentarians' Conference until 1960, or indeed, subsequently[1]) who attended service colleges had dropped markedly by 1960, the Conservative delegation in particular still included a number of Members who had close connections with military affairs (both in 1955 and in 1960 four of the Conservatives' delegates were former career soldiers[2]).

Peers were certainly well represented on the delegation; in fact, the proportion of representatives of the Upper House on the delegation to the NPC was noticeably higher than that for the Consultative Assembly. The practice of sending Peers to international parliamentary assemblies dated back to the first session of the Council of Europe, when Lord Layton represented the Liberals and Lord Birkenhead attended a number of sittings as a Conservative substitute delegate. Though the Tories continued to send at least one Peer to every subsequent session at Strasbourg, Labour did not send a Peer until 1956, a year after it sent one to the opening Parliamentarians' Conference. The Liberals had also sent a Peer to the first Conference, and the Conservatives had sent two, making a total of four Members of the Upper House as opposed to twelve Members of the Commons. By 1958 the Tories alone were sending four Peers to the Conference and two years later the total rose to six, five of them Conservatives.

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1. It is difficult to understand why women have always been reluctant to attend the NPC. Baroness Elliot of Harwood, widow of Walter Elliot, first joined the delegation in 1959 and became very active in the social and educational work of the assembly. There seems to be no specific reason why other women have not been interested. Perhaps they have felt that if they must travel to an assembly at all, it would be more worthwhile to go to Strasbourg. Women have also been inconspicuous in the work of WEU. Perhaps the NPC/NAA has conjured up for women a picture of similar to that created by WEU, namely, that of a body discussing purely military matters.

2. Paradoxically, the military bias in Conservative delegations was far from what many proponents of support for Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty (which urged non-military co-operation) had in mind when they pressed for an assembly.

The fact that so many Peers were named to the delegation (though it is impossible to tell how many actually attended the sessions as no attendance figures were kept) indicated the extent to which the Government party Whips felt that the Conference was a waste of time for most MPs. Had the Conference been seen to have been as important as many of its supporters thought it was, the number of Peers would have dropped markedly, with at most two being sent, as was the case with the Strasbourg delegation. Equally likely, Members themselves were not particularly interested in the Conference,[1] and their indifference made it necessary for the Whips to fill their places with Peers.

Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of the NPC's link with Canada and its 'Atlantic' rather than 'European' orientation, a large number of the Conservative delegates who did come from the Commons were drawn from what Finer termed the party's pro-Commonwealth group, notably the soldiers (who as Finer showed, were predominantly 'Commonwealth stalwarts')[2]. On the other hand, left-wing Labour MPs shied away from the Conference's proceedings. At least one ostensible Labour left-winger did attend the NPC: Robert Mellish (who was on Finer's list) was a delegate in 1958. But he was hardly a 'hard-core' left winger and in any event was clearly an exception. In general, the Left's deep seated anti-American, anti-militarist sentiments meant that few of its members would attend the Conference, especially as the NATO Parliamentarians came to find that they could exert little influence on the affairs of NATO itself. By the beginning of the 'sixties the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference had not yet become an assembly of any consequence, and given the urgency with which 'Europeans' came to view the need for British accession to the Common Market, it commanded for less attention during the decade than did either the Council of Europe or WEU.

1. This observation is at least partly confirmed by the figures in Tables A, B, and C in Chapter 2, pp. 98-99, 101, 102.

2. Finer, et al., Backbench Opinion, pp.90-91, 190.

Kenneth Lindsay's lamentations over the demise of the Council of Europe soon proved to be premature, for the 1961 British application for entry to the EEC brought about a marked change in the Government's attitude to the Council of Europe and WEU. The realisation that Britain needed to make as many friends as possible on the Continent in order to ease itself into Europe seems to have led the Conservative Whips considerably to improve both the quality and the outlook of the delegation to Strasbourg and Paris. A number of younger Members, with their ministerial careers ahead of them, some of whom for some time had been in close touch with each other on matters pertaining to European and Common Market affairs,[1] were despatched to Strasbourg in the early sixties to improve relations with continental MPs. Maurice Macmillan came in 1960, and remained at Strasbourg throughout the period of Britain's application to the Common Market, keeping his father's Government well informed of the development of continental attitudes at Strasbourg and WEU, and trying to win over new supporters for Britain's cause. Robert Mathew, who had joined the delegation in 1959, was permitted to stay past the usual two or three years' term in order to perform a similar function, primarily at WEU. Peter Kirk also continued to serve as a delegate, and endeavoured to employ his position as Chairman of [illegible] WEU's [illegible] General Affairs Committee on behalf of British entry to the EEC.[2] James Scott-Hopkins, whose concern for guarantees for the Commonwealth was matched by his desire for British accession to the EEC, remained a delegate in 1962, when he became a junior Minister for Agriculture, to lend further credibility to the seriousness of Britain's purpose.

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1. Robert Mathew, Peter Kirk and James Scott-Hopkins corresponded with each other and with other similarly pro-European Conservative MPs in late 1960 when British entry was being mooted in Britain (letters from Scott-Hopkins to Mathew, 8 August 1960; from Kirk to Mathew, 8 August 1960 - papers of Robert Mathew, MP in possession of his former wife, Mrs. Leslie Hope, Slimbridge, Glos).

2. See below, Chapter 9, pp. 337-340, 348-349.

The Government's policy-oriented approach to the assemblies meant that all other considerations relating to the composition of the delegation, including questions of patronage and of regional balance were now reduced to secondary importance. It is perhaps noteworthy that Oxbridge graduates formed both a very high proportion of the delegation and were among its leading Europeans. The eight Etonians on the 1962 delegation included Maurice Macmillan, James Scott-Hopkins and Robert Mathew. MacMillan and Scott-Hopkins had gone on to Oxford, whence Peter Kirk and three other delegates had also been graduated. Mathew was a Cambridge graduate, as were John Peel, another 'European', and three other delegates.

The Government nevertheless took care to include delegates who had explicit reservations about entry, or were even opposed to it. The pro-Commonwealth MPs were evolving into anti-Marketeers, and Ronald Bell, Ronald Russell, John Eden, and probably the Ulster Unionists, Mrs. Patricia McLoughlin and Henry Clark, were ready to put the case against British entry to any delegate who was willing to listen to them. As one member of the Conservative delegation of that period has noted, it was important that the continentals realised that British reservations about certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome were legitimate, and not merely a bargaining counter. That point was best put across by someone like Ronald Russell, who was well-liked at Strasbourg and voiced his opposition in 'an acceptable way'.[1] But with the exception of John Eden's vote against a 1961 WEU resolution urging British entry,[2] none of the doubters actually voted against the numerous WEU and Council of Europe resolutions urging a speedy and successful conclusion to the negotiations, and were content to register their dissent through abstention.

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1. Unattributable interview, May 1972.

2. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 7th session, 1961, p.31.

The Labour Party came to adopt a rather negative stance toward the question of British entry to Europe, one which hardened as the negotiations continued.[1] Consequently, the fact of the British application made little difference to the composition of the Labour Party delegation at Strasbourg. George Brown led the delegation throughout the entire period of the negotiations, and, judging from his memoirs, his experiences at the European assemblies led him to believe that joining Europe was Britain's best course for the future.[2] But a number of other leading Labour politicians were not as enthusiastic, and seemed to carry on the legacy of Hugh Dalton and Herbert Morrison. Thus Michael Stewart attended the Consultative Assembly's deliberations for but one year, 1961, missed most of its sittings and all of those of the WEU Assembly, and remained skeptical about British entry to Europe until after he became Foreign Secretary in 1965.[3] Patrick Gordon Walker, attending the Council of Europe for the first time in ten years, missed most of the Consultative Assembly's sittings, and all of WEU's. In one of the few sittings he did attend he spoke of British entry to the EEC in only the most cautious of terms.[4] Christopher Mayhew, a junior front bench spokesman on foreign affairs, John Stonehouse and other more junior front benchers all abstained on a number of Common Market resolutions and generally echoed Gordon Walker's lukewarm statements about the advisability of British entry into the EEC. Even Brown's more sympathetic pronouncements in the Strasbourg chamber in September 1962 rang rather hollow as the Commonwealth Labour leaders in London issued a negatively worded communiqué shortly after his speech had been delivered, in spite of Hugh Gaitskell's agreement by telephone that morning on the text of Brown's prepared statement of Labour's

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1. Camps, Britain and the European Community. pp.448-452, passim.
2. It is noteworthy that Brown's first taste of the Council of Europe assembly left him 'disenchanted' and that he had left the delegation at his own request. It was during his second tour of duty that his views became 'European'. Lord George-Brown, In My Way, p.207.
3. See Kitzinger, Diplomacy, p.282.
4. Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 14th session (1962), p.96.

policy.[1]

Despite Labour's hardening attitude to entry, the number of Left-wingers on the delegation seems to have fallen during the 1961-63 period. Only Horace King, who figures on Finer's list of the fifty 'most Left' members, was included on the delegation and he seemed to favour accession.[2] King left the assemblies after the 1961 session and apart from John Stonehouse, a front bencher, no member of the 'Left' joined the delegation until after Labour came to power in 1964. It is difficult to establish why the Left suddenly disappeared from the delegation. It may be that Gaitskell did not want to commit himself too strongly to opposition at the outset of the application, and he may have felt that it would serve no good purpose to send vocal opponents of entry to Strasbourg. Possibly, too, the matter was simply one of patronage. The debate over Clause Four[3] was still a vivid memory and, as a result, supporters of the CND campaign might simply not have merited any pleasure trips to Strasbourg since their behaviour had been far from exemplary, at least as far as Gaitskell was concerned.

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1. Brown had phoned Gaitskell after hearing from Labour party officials at Strasbourg that the Commonwealth Labour leaders were moving against entry. The incident not only reveals the tight links between the delegation and Party leaders, but also indicates that while party officials had given up some of their duties to the delegation whip, they continued to play an important role at Strasbourg, linking the delegation to the party leadership. See George Brown's account in In My Way, pp;216-217.

2. See his speech to the Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 13th session, 1961, pp.766-768.

3. Hugh Gaitskell had unsuccessfully fought in 1960 for the revision of Clause Four of the Labour Party constitution which called for the common ownership of all 'means of production, distribution and exchange'. Shortly afterwards he put forward a party statement on defence which was attacked by proponents of unilateral nuclear disarmament, some of whom had also opposed the Clause Four revision and hoped to see him removed from the party leadership. Though defeated over the disarmament question at the 1960 Scarborough Labour Party Conference, Gaitskell successfully reasserted his position at the Blackpool Conference the following year. See Pelling, Short History, pp.120-122, 125-126 for a brief account of the dispute.

In other respects, however, the Labour delegations of the early 'sixties were rather similar to those that preceded them. The 1962 delegation included but one worker, Michael Cliffe, and one railroad clerk, George Rogers, though a total of ninety of the 258 Labour Members elected in 1959 were railroad, mine or manual workers. Apart from George Brown and Frank Tomney, both former trade union officials, the delegation again reflected the established bias in favour of intellectuals and professionals: a barrister, a solicitor, an author, two journalists, an economist and an accountant completed the Labour group. If any changes were to be made in the selection of the Labour delegation, they were yet to come.

The changes did indeed come after the 1964 Labour victory at the General Election. Once Harold Wilson began to feel that entry into the Common Market was a possible policy alternative for his Government, he took steps to ensure that Europeans would recognise that he was serious about his soon to be professed intentions. This, of course, was no easy task. Labour's attitudes to European unity had been anything but positive, and Wilson himself had been a strong opponent of Common Market entry in 1962-63.[1] It was therefore decided[2] that one way of proclaiming Labour's seriousness of purpose, if the need ever did arise to proclaim it - Wilson in 1965 was far from sure about his Common Market plans[3] - was to improve the quality of the Labour delegation's activities at the Council of Europe's Assembly. In particular it was felt that more Labour Members should become involved in working on reports concerning European affairs. But the matter was not easily settled, for Labour had always displayed a nonchalant attitude towards the workings of the Strasbourg Assembly. It was therefore extremely difficult to get Labour

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1. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, p.279.

2. Unattributable interview, May 1972.

3. Wilson claims not to have decided on entry until late 1966 see Harold Wilson, The Labour Government: 1964-1970: A personal record (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971), pp.293, 296-300 passim. See also Kitzinger, op.cit., pp.280-284.

Members to go to Strasbourg in a serious frame of mind and to encourage them to play an active part in the Assembly's committee work. The task was left primarily to Ronald Brown, brother of the then Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who in 1965 was sent to Strasbourg as delegation whip with a specific mandate from the leadership to upgrade the delegation's activities.

Brown was faced with a number of difficulties, in addition to those already noted. In the first place, it had been Labour's practice to send delegates for two years only. Brown reportedly insisted on having most delegates remain at Strasbourg for three years, so that they could be eligible to claim some committee posts.[1] In one respect it was easier for him to ask for a three year rule since the duration of Strasbourg's sessions had shortened considerably. It had been a complaint of virtually all Members, whether Labour or Conservative, that constituency pressure forced them to return from Strasbourg after a relatively short period of service there.[2] Though Labour had had its own particular reasons for rotating delegates at frequent intervals, the Conservatives had also found it necessary to restrict most delegates to two years' service.[3] However, in 1958, the length of the part-sessions was shortened from ten or twelve days to less than a week, with many, if not most part-sessions ending at weekends. This change ensured that almost all British delegates would be able to return to their constituencies in time for their weekend surgeries. By 1965, a considerable number of MPs, mostly Conservatives, had already stayed at Strasbourg for a third session, and Brown's efforts, which had clashed with

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1. Committee posts were not distributed strictly on the basis of seniority, (see below Chapter 6 pp.236-43) but senior members had a better claim to them. The rate of turnover after Brown's arrival at Strasbourg seems to confirm that he did intervene in the matter of tenure.
2. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, pp.138-139. An unconfirmed story told by a number of observers at Strasbourg recalls that even Geoffrey de Freitas was in trouble with his Lincoln constituency in the 'fifties, and was once toasted at a dinner as 'no doubt the next mayor of Strasbourg'.
3. See above, p. 144 , f.n. 1.

his brother's views on the question, ultimately ensured that the Member who attended the Council of Europe for less than three sessions was the exception and not the rule.

Secondly, Brown found Harold Wilson reluctant to send a full complement of substitutes to Strasbourg. It had never been Labour's practice to do so, nor indeed, had the Tories filled all their substitute places, but Brown argued, successfully in the end, that it was ridiculous to talk of increasing Labour's involvement in Strasbourg's activities if not even all the places on the delegation were filled.[1]

Finally, Edward Short, Labour's Chief Whip, was reluctant to permit his backbenchers to remain at Strasbourg if crucial divisions were to take place in the House. Naturally, Members who were on the delegation were paired with Conservatives, but the tiny Government majority of four did not seem to permit the extended absence of any Members. If was only after Brown vehemently protested that committee meetings at Strasbourg were being disrupted by reports of possible upcoming divisions at Westminster which sent Members scurrying for their bags and passports that Short finally relented, and permitted the delegates to remain for the entire Council of Europe or WEU session without interruption.

Having obtained these concessions, Brown proceeded to bind the delegation into a coherent body by instituting daily delegation meetings and taking charge of the placing of delegates on Assembly committees.[2]

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1. This report, too, is easily verified by Assembly records. In 1964 (Jan.) the Tories sent nine representatives and six substitutes; Labour sent seven representatives, four substitutes. Corresponding figures for May 1966 were Conservatives: seven representatives, six substitutes, Labour, ten of each.

2. Labour had held frequent delegation meetings during the early years of the Consultative Assembly. This practice apparently lapsed, and lapsed yet again after Brown's departure, though post-1970 delegations have been meeting once more on a regular basis. The Conservatives met regularly at least from the late 'fifties onwards, when Dame Florence Horsbrugh called delegation meetings in her suite before the session began, and then presided over the group called 'Les Amis de Dame Florence' (see Chapter 8) which were mostly representatives from her own delegation.

In addition, together with Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, who returned to lead the delegation after an eleven year absence from Strasbourg, he attempted to set an active example for his fellow Labour delegates. He joined two committees each at Strasbourg and Paris, and became rapporteur of WEU's Space Committee. De Freitas assumed a far more important post, that of Vice-President of the Consultative Assembly. The following year, 1966, with some significant exceptions, the delegation was chosen on the basis of candidates who would play a more active part in the affairs of the two assemblies, The exceptions were the representatives of the strong Labour anti-Market group in the House, which consisted mostly of left-wingers, but included a small but significant group who had fought with Gaitskell against the unilateralists in 1960-61.[1]

Because Labour had traditionally sent some 'rebels' to Strasbourg, it was extremely difficult to exclude Renée Short and Derek Page from the delegation simply because they were anti-Marketeers. In any event, Wilson had not yet committed himself on the EEC issue. To no one's surprise, the anti-Marketeers proved to be very outspoken on the question of British accession to the Common Market, even after Labour's application was announced. At one stage they allegedly complained to the Whips that they were not being permitted to express themselves as freely as they would have liked.[2]

Apart from the tandem of 'antis', the remainder of the delegation consisted of members who were either favourable or open to persuasion. Patrick Gordon Walker, by now already one of the convinced, led the delegation. Geoffrey de Freitas, the previous leader, became, with the Labour Government's express blessing and through its instigation, the first British President

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1. Members then not usually associated with the Left who nevertheless opposed accession to the EEC included Douglas Jay, after he left the Labour Government in 1967. William Blyton, in the House of Lords at the time of Labour's application, was also an opponent of entry though he had rallied to the support of Gaitskell against the unilateralists in 1960-61 (he signed a letter to Campaign in support of Gaitskell in February, 1961: see Campaign number 3 (March 1961), p.4, and signed the Tribune statement of May 5, 1967).

2. Unattributable interview, May 1972.

of the Consultative Assembly since John Edwards, after a close election contest with a right-wing Italian, Vittorio Badini Confalonieri. Ivor Richard, rapporteur for the Legal Committee in 1965-66, Maurice Edelman, who returned to Strasbourg in 1965 after a fifteen year absence and served as rapporteur of the Political Committee, Arthur Blenkinsop, Robert Edwards, Alan Fitch-like Brown, a party Whip - were all considered keen pro-Marketeers. So too was Lord Listowel, the Peer on the Labour delegation. Eric Heffer had not yet openly announced his opposition to entry. And George Jeger, who had fallen out with Wilson and was finding it difficult to catch the Speaker's eye in the Commons, found a new sense of purpose at Strasbourg and became yet another active Labour delegate, joining a total of four committees in the two assemblies.

As in previous years, the delegation had a high proportion of university graduates (65 per cent. compared with 56 per cent. for the PLP) including seven graduates of Oxbridge. Furthermore, no less than eight of Labour's representatives were lecturers or journalists, and a further four could also be classified as professional men. Only one mineworker, one skilled worker and one trade union official were included in the group of twenty. Given the change in the occupational and educational make up of the PLP after the 1966 election,[1] the bias in favour of the university-educated, professional group was not as stark as it had previously been. Nevertheless, as David Butler has shown, the changes in the composition of the PLP between 1951 and 1966 were not as great as they were generally believed to have been[2] and consequently, certain occupational elements within the PLP were still under-represented at Strasbourg.

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1. D.E.Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966 (London, Macmillan, 1966), p.210: 'The professional element is greatly increased and the workers' element is vastly reduced while the proportion of graduates is half as high again in the new intake as in the old'.

2. ibid., p.211.

The activities of the delegation assumed greater urgency in 1967 when the Government actually applied for entry to the Common Market. George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, wanted a Minister from the Foreign Office to lead the delegation as a deliberate indication of the seriousness of Britain's desire to join the Common Market. The obvious choice was Fred Mulley, then the Minister of State, as he had been an active delegate to Strasbourg and the WEU during the late fifties. Mulley declined - he was in any event replaced by Lord Chalfont at the Foreign Office in May,[1] and although the Foreign Office did not particularly want any Minister to attend what was essentially a back-bench assembly, it was finally decided that William Rodgers, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, should lead the delegation. His team once again included a number of staunch pro-Europeans, and, much as a number of Conservatives had put Britain's case for entry to the assemblies in 1961-63, so Samuel Silkin and Maurice Edelman in particular attempted to win over as many continental politicians as they could to the British cause.

The experiment of sending a Minister to Strasbourg was not particularly successful. Rodgers did little more than address the Assembly on a few occasions; he had neither the time nor the inclination to join in the work of the committees.[2] The bulk of the delegation's affairs were left to Brown and other active representatives. Rodgers returned to Strasbourg in 1968, but made even less of an impression. His stay was brief and uneventful, especially as Labour had not yet planned any new moves on the Common Market issue.

While Labour was experimenting with tighter control over the delegation, more active involvement in the assemblies' work, and finally, ministerial leadership, the Conservatives maintained their interest in Europe, including the affairs of the European assemblies. In 1965 they elected the staunchly

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1. Uwe Kitzinger, The Second Try: Labour and the EEC (Oxford, Pergamon, 1968), p.15.
2. For a fuller account of Rodgers' activities see Chapter 9. pp. 357-360 passim.

pro-European Edward Heath leader of the party - the first time the Tories had held a vote for that post, and thereby ensured strong Conservative support for any future approach to Europe.[1] Within the context of the assemblies, the Conservatives displayed their pro-European sentiments by sending both prominent front benchers and leading 'Europeans' to their sessions. Christopher Soames and Reginald Maudling, whom Heath had defeated for the leadership, served on the 1965 delegation and held the Vice-Presidency of the WEU Assembly for a half-session each. Duncan Sandys, his ministerial career behind him but his European reputation intact, and Peter Kirk, returned to Parliament after the loss of his seat in 1964, both rejoined the delegation in 1966. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the former Prime Minister and Shadow Foreign Secretary, became delegation leader in 1966; Geoffrey Rippon, later to become Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Britain's Chief Common Market negotiator, assumed the delegation leadership in 1968. As if further to underline the Tories' European commitment, no equivalent replacements were found for Ronald Bell and Sir Ronald Russell, both vociferous anti-Marketeers, when they left the delegation in 1965.

Labour's delegation underwent further changes after the collapse of Wilson's overtures to the Six. Labour was still interested in joining Europe, but the plans for doing so were of necessity postponed to a more propitious time, and it does not seem to have been deemed necessary to continue treating the Council of Europe as anything more than a back-bench talking shop. Samuel Silkin's appointment as leader of the delegation, in 1968, coupled with Ronald Brown's departure as delegation whip, marked the return to a more loosely disciplined, less intensively involved Labour delegation. To be sure, a number of keen Europeans remained on or were added to the Labour group; these included Silkin himself, Donald Chapman, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, President of the Consultative Assembly until 1969, Arthur Blenkinsop, Robert Maclennan and Paul Ross. But the departure of Mrs.Short and Eric Heffer,

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1. See Kitzinger, Diplomacy, pp.147-151.

who was by then an outspoken anti-Marketeer, only meant that the 'antis' would not be as vocal as they had previously been; they were well represented however, by Dr. Maurice Miller, Sir Myer Galbern and Mrs. Lena Jeger, all of whom had signed the 1967 Tribune statement against entry. Miller's temporary departure in 1970 merely made room on the delegation for Ernest Fernyhough, whose independent-mindedness ranged from his opposition to the 1947 National Service Bill to his signing of the Tribune statement that opposed the Labour Government's EEC application twenty years later. The continued presence of avowed anti-Marketeers on the delegation and the fact that Silkin, however 'European' his sympathies, was still a mere back-bencher who had replaced one of the Government's most influential junior ministers, contributed to a decline in the Labour delegation's newly found prestige. So too did the resentment caused by the Socialist's Group's nomination of Silkin for the Secretary-Generalship of the Council of Europe, as well as the flurry of ill-feeling surrounding Robert Maxwell's brief appearance at Strasbourg.[1]

In one respect, Labour's delegation did not change: it was still the preserve of the university-educated professional group within the party. Eight of the delegates held Oxbridge degrees, six more had been to university and an additional two to technical college. Only two of the delegates were former workers while ten were professionals, two were journalists, two were businessmen and one a technician. By June 1970 it seemed that once again Labour had come to conceive of Strasbourg as merely a place where the intellectuals and professionals were given a free trip and a week's good

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1. By means which some of his fellow Labour delegates did not consider terribly fair, Maxwell quickly assumed the vice-chairmanship of the Council of Europe's Science and Technology Committee although the Socialist group had agreed to support one of its Swiss members for the post. He seems to have quickly lost interest in the Council's work and either resigned from the delegation or was dropped after the session had ended. (Based on confidential interviews). On Silkin's quest for the post of Secretary-General see below, pp. 325 ff.

time, three times a year.[1]

The Conservative delegation to some extent was also unrepresentative of the parliamentary party as a whole. It was noteworthy that virtually the entire delegation was composed of either barristers, former foreign office officials, company directors or journalists (these occupational categories comprised less than forty per cent. of the Conservative Members elected in 1966). However, the occupational composition of the delegation made little difference to Conservative policy. About two-thirds of the delegation, from Geoffrey Rippon down, were confirmed Europeans.[2] Many of the delegates were not only long-time veterans of the House of Commons,[3] but were also very familiar faces at Strasbourg. That their ministerial careers - if they had ever had any - were, with a few obvious exceptions, behind them seemed to be outweighed by their well-known European commitment. The Conservatives even went so far as to allot the Ulster Unionists but one place at Strasbourg instead of their usual two, since the delegates from Northern Ireland often were unsure about the merits of British accession to the EEC. The Conservatives' aim clearly was to maintain their ten-year-old image on the Continent as Britain's party of Europe; by June, 1970 they had succeeded in doing so and fifteen months later confirmed that image beyond any doubt.

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1. It is somewhat surprising that after the defeat of June 1970, Labour again began to display a renewed sense of purpose at Strasbourg, especially as Labour's official policy began to veer against entry. Perhaps the leadership endeavoured to show that while Labour was anti-EEC it was not anti-Europe and would co-operate whole-heartedly with the work at Strasbourg and Paris, because the Council of Europe and WEU were intergovernmental bodies. Certainly many of the party's most outspoken opponents of entry who served at Strasbourg became among the delegation's most active members.

2. These included Norman St. John-Stevas, Rippon, Kirk, Sandys, Dame Joan Vickers, Percy Grieve, John Peel, Duncan Sandys, Sir John Rodgers and Simon Wingfield Digby.

3. Rodgers, Digby and Sandys had all served in the Commons for at least twenty years.

Though Britain's application for accession to the EEC tended to enhance the standing of the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and WEU, the North Atlantic Assembly also attracted more attention in the 'sixties than it had managed to do previously. The Atlantic Alliance and NATO often seemed to lead a very precarious existence in the early 'sixties, due to de Gaulle's dislike of 'Anglo-Saxons' and determination to establish France as an independent military power to be reckoned with. The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (which in 1967 assumed the title of 'North Atlantic Assembly') became the scene of constant disputes between the Gaullists and the delegates of their former NATO allies. The Assembly's focus on problems of redefining NATO's role of preventing economic tension between America and the EEC, and of the feasibility of the NAFTA[1] concept all attracted British parliamentarians. They also appreciated the radical improvement in secretarial and staff services as well as the brevity of sessions and of biannual committee meetings, the prospect of military tours to America[2] and the generally lavish treatment of delegates at the Assembly's annually rotating sites. It soon came to rival the Council of Europe in terms of the numbers of Members wishing to attend its sessions. Even letters of protest were reportedly received when the delegation was changed.[3]

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1. 'NAFTA was the somewhat unrealistic proposal, associated with Senator Jacob Javits among others, to form a North Atlantic Free Trade Area between the USA, Canada and EFTA, which the EEC might then also wish to join'. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, p.286. See also Kitzinger, Second Try, pp.36-40. Javits was an active delegate to the NPC.

2. The first such tour was organised in 1957 (The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation P.C., p.20).

3. Robert Edwards, leader of the British delegation in 1968 and 1969, told the NAA Standing Committee in July 1968 that protest letters were received from some delegates who had been replaced. He added that 'there was a waiting list for membership from Members of the House of Lords and House of Commons'. (NAA, Standing Committee, Minutes, 8 July 1968).

Nevertheless, the Government's official attitude to the Assembly remained an indifferent one, as did that of the Opposition leadership, both perceiving that for the time being the Assembly was merely a talking shop and nothing more. No Ministers were sent to the Assembly; it was still deemed a completely unofficial body (though it continued to receive grudging financial support from the Government). Furthermore, the Whips did not feel it deserved enough attention to allow for the absence from Westminster of a full complement of MPs; there were seven Conservative and Labour Peers on the 1968 delegation, six in 1969 and five in 1970, compared to the total of three Conservative and Labour Peers on the 1969 and 1970 delegations to the Council of Europe.

Delegations to the NAA seemed to have become somewhat more representative of the Commons in the late 'sixties than they previously had been. The domination of Conservative delegations by members who had attended service colleges and were products of the regular forces was slowly coming to an end; though by its very nature the Assembly was bound to attract Members who were interested in military affairs. The 1960 delegation had included six graduates of service colleges; in 1965 and 1968 only one, Lord Crathorne, was a British delegate to the NPC/NAA. Labour's delegation seemed to be reflecting somewhat less of the bias in favour of professional men that had been its mark in previous years. In 1956 and 1965 three barristers were among Labour's delegation. In 1968 only one barrister was a Labour delegate to the NAA. On the other hand, whereas in 1960 no trade union MPs were among Labour's delegates, in 1968 three such MPs attended the NAA. Labour's delegation could not be called fully 'representative' - in 1968 no manual workers were among the party's delegates - but it certainly was more so than it previously had been. In general, however, it could still be said that all three assemblies were continuing to serve as a meeting place for the educated, the professionals and the businessmen who sat on the back-benches of both parties.

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It was pointed out in the previous chapter that since the early 1950's leading British party spokesmen as well as some backbench delegates to the assemblies (and, as seen in this chapter, the party Whips as well) had emphasised the 'educational' value of those bodies. In the light of the evidence presented in this chapter this claim must clearly be seen more as a justification for the continued existence of the assemblies rather than as a true description of their functions. The predominant social background of the delegates, particularly with respect to the Labour delegation, was not of the kind one would have expected to discover if parliamentarians were being sent to the assemblies primarily in order to be educated into the ways of European affairs. Were the Labour Whips sincerely interested in exposing a wide cross-section of MPs to European issues they surely would have increased the number of backbenchers with trade union or working-class backgrounds who were appointed to the delegation. As for the Conservatives, while the composition of their parliamentary party clearly allowed for few, if any, working-class types to be included among the roster of delegates to the assemblies, there nevertheless was no reason for their appointing any extremely senior backbenchers as delegates, unless they were actually to lead the delegation.[1] One instead would have expected younger MPs to predominate on the delegation, when in fact they did not.[2]

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1. Not all of them did lead the delegation; see above, p.146 and f.n.3 see also Appendix 4.
2. As Appendix 2 indicates, during the 1950's (and indeed afterwards), there never was a wide divergence between the percentage of Tory MPs over the age of 50 who sat in the Commons and the percentage of that group on delegations to Strasbourg. With respect to the NPC the over 50's were over-represented virtually throughout the period under review. In every documented case the over 50's accounted for at least three members of the Conservative delegation to the Assembly in question. One would have expected this group, which tends to provide the largest percentage of Ministers (see Jean Blondel, Voters, Parties and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics, (London, Penguin, 1960), p.156.) and therefore comprised a lower percentage of the pool of Tory backbenchers from which delegates were drawn in the 1950's, to have furnished fewer members of each delegation, if the Whips had really intended that membership of an assembly should serve as primarily an education for MPs. (Appendix 2 also shows that a similar observation applies even more strongly in Labour's case).

The assemblies continued to meet during the 1950's and British parliamentarians continued to be sent to them. Some reason had to be given for allowing about thirty MPs to pair off and miss numerous divisions at Westminster: preceding chapters have shown that the assemblies were attributed neither a 'legislative' nor truly 'consultative' role, and it perhaps was not enough for Whips to say that those bodies merely served to provide an outlet for the interests of old men, party 'rebels' and journeyman backbenchers. If the British attitude to the work of the assemblies was cavalier, there was no need to broadcast it to Europe. Besides, for some backbenchers the experience truly was useful and educational. The assemblies did indeed provide a setting wherein the MP could learn at first hand about foreign affairs, in their economic and cultural as well as political aspects. They provided the would-be minister with one possible rung, albeit not a very high one, on the ladder to the top. For the MP whose work at Westminster focussed solely on home affairs, Strasbourg, Paris or the NAA, each with its wide range of activities, afforded him a golden opportunity to add to his parliamentary work. By stressing this aspect of the assemblies' role the Whips could endow them with some semblance of positive utility to which at least some delegates truly subscribed.

The 1960's had witnessed changes in the delegations to Strasbourg and the WEU which had been made in order to allow for the attendance of a greater number of pro-Marketeers at the assemblies. This move had been designed to supplement Britain's efforts to curry favour on the Continent by winning the support of European MPs who might prove to be effective lobbyists in their own countries on behalf of Britain's cause. It made little difference to the Whips that many of the pro-Marketeers happened to be products of that very same highly-educated professional and business class that already dominated the delegations. It was only Britain's larger policy considerations that had prompted the closer interest they took in the choice of delegates for the Consultative and the WEU Assemblies. In the case of the

North Atlantic Assembly, where these considerations did not enter into the calculation, few if any changes were made merely to take account of the 'representative' nature of the delegation.

The Whips continued to claim that the assemblies - all of them - were an 'educative' experience for the backbencher who knew little about European or Atlantic affairs.[1] Nevertheless, whatever truth there may have been to the Whips' claim, it was compromised by the fact that in practice, those MPs who were most in need of the type of education and experience the assemblies offered proved to be the least likely to receive it. The 'education' which those MPs who did attend the assemblies received was not due to any conscious effort on the part of the Whips to expose them to it, and, as will be shown in the analysis of the October 1971 Commons vote on EEC entry,[2] it may well have ultimately proved far too effective - at least as far as the Labour Whips were concerned.[3]

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1. Unattributable interviews, January 1972, May 1972.

2. See below, Chapter 9, pp. 365-366.

3. This chapter has only briefly (on pp.160-164) touched upon the relationship between the manner in which delegates were chosen and the contribution of the British delegation to the work of the assemblies, particularly the Consultative Assembly. This question will be dealt with at length in Chapters 6 and 7 below.

Chapter 4

The Delegate and his Constituents

Every Member of Parliament who joins the British delegation to an international assembly is aware that his membership of that delegation will force him to be at least intermittently absent from Britain, in order to serve on a committee or attend the assembly's plenary session. During his trips abroad he will of course be inaccessible to those of his constituents who may wish to contact him for some reason, and he realises that they may on occasion insist that he justify his frequent absences on assembly business. A delegate, if pressed by his constituents to account for his absence, will probably couch his reply to them in terms of the value of the delegation's work at the assembly, and indeed of the value of the assembly itself. Whether he will bother to mention the assembly at all if they take no notice of his absences is, however, an entirely different matter.

In practice, MPs have differed as widely in their methods of reporting on their international parliamentary work to their voters as they have in their overall attitudes to the assemblies themselves. These differences can be traced to a number of factors, the most important of which are the Member's strength in his local constituency - the respect he commands within his party, and his dedication to the ideals of the assembly he serves. As will be seen below, a Member who is devoted to the work of, say, the Council of Europe, will nevertheless have to tread warily if his management committee displays xenophobic tendencies. A Member who could not care less about the international assembly he serves will hardly bother to mention it to his constituents, and will not hesitate to give their slightest interests priority over its needs and demands. Other factors, such as the safety of the seat and its remoteness from London, all enter into the equation which has led some MPs to withhold all accounts of their international parliamentary activity from their constituents and others

actively to publicise their work in the hope of not only commanding their constituents' admiration for their importance in continental parliamentary circles, but also winning their support for the ideals of European or Atlantic co-operation and unity which the Council of Europe and Western European Union, and the North Atlantic Assembly, respectively attempt to foster.

For the MP from a London constituency, attendance at one or more of the three assemblies has been no problem at all and has often been converted into an asset. Almost all London-based Members live in or near their constituencies and consequently have little difficulty organising regular surgeries and staying in close touch with their constituents. Under such circumstances, a local party will see little harm in the Member's spending four or five days on the Continent. Admittedly, during the first few years of the Council of Europe, sessions stretched over a number of weeks. However, since the 'mid-fifties[1] sessions of all three assemblies have tended on the average to last less than a week, with the result, as one Labour Member from a London suburb who served at the WEU and Council of Europe assemblies put it: 'I had one (a surgery) last Friday and I'll have one this Friday'. At a pinch, said the same MP, his wife could always substitute for him. The net result was that he found that not only was he able to ward off any thoughts among party activists that he was neglecting his job, but, through clever press releases, he was able to win his supporters' and voters' admiration for the recognition his party and country had awarded him when he was chosen to the Strasbourg delegation.

Another London-based MP, again from the Labour benches, found that the constituency voters did not necessarily object to their Member's service on

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1. The longest part of the 1958 session lasted only 7 days. Subsequent sessions have tended not to last more than six days per series of meetings.

the Strasbourg and Paris delegations. However, it was necessary to work 'extra hard' within the borough to sell to constituents the idea that the Council of Europe and WEU were useful organisations. As a result, the Member was always 'near the borderline of trouble' for being absent too often, but managed to steer clear because of residence in London, hard work and the relative political sophistication of many constituents.

For Members representing provincial constituencies the situation has always been more complicated. Most Members have endeavoured to live in or near their constituency if it is not too remote from London;[1] Conservative MPs in particular have found themselves forced to attend many local social gatherings, often to a greater extent than their Labour counterparts. One Labour MP recalls that Nigel Nicolson, former Conservative MP for Bournemouth, East, once complained to him that he found himself seated next to the same local people 'every week'. Even safe constituencies can be difficult to please, as Nicolson discovered to his dismay. The Conservative MP in particular finds that he must be careful to avoid the charge of neglecting his constituency by not returning home often enough at weekends, a charge that could easily be levelled at a Member who becomes too much involved in the work of an international assembly. Nevertheless, most Conservatives (as well as Labour) Members avoid this pitfall; indeed, since the Council of Europe was established in 1949, nine Conservative MPs have served on the British delegation for six or more years. In only one case, that of John Peel, MP for Leicester, S.E., was the complaint reportedly voiced that he had neglected his constituents in favour of his international commitments.[2] Many Members from provincial constituencies

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1. Peter G. Richards, The Backbenchers (London, Faber, 1972), p.164.

2. This occurred in 1971 when Peel's constituency faced amalgamation with a neighbouring borough.

do not even bother to tell their constituents (or local party leaders) that they have gone, because the sessions are of such short duration. As one Conservative MP who has no air service from London to the home division observed, 'Nobody bothers much; they are rather pleased that I go'.

Labour MPs whose constituencies are outside London are not expected to play the social role to the degree that it is demanded of their Conservative counterparts. That, at least, is the claim of one Labour Member with a provincial constituency.[1] A notable exception, however, is that of Welsh Labour MPs, who do return home every Friday to be seen in pubs and at dinners with their fellow Welshmen. Clearly, for the Welsh Member, a place on the British delegation to an international assembly could be a problem, involving as it does a good deal of time spent outside the country. But the attitude of one Welsh MP, who asked to be quoted anonymously, seems to sum up the way around their difficulty. 'For me the constituency is number one; number two is the House of Commons, and the Council of Europe is an adjunct to my House of Commons work'. The same MP is reported to have missed an important Council of Europe committee meeting in Bonn in order to be guest speaker at the dinner commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the local rugby football team.

At least one Welsh Member attempted to show local voters that international parliamentary work is a 'good thing'. Donald Coleman, Labour MP for Neath, often discussed his activities at Strasbourg in his weekly column in the Neath Guardian, 'The Week in Westminster'. In so doing he incidentally introduced the Council of Europe to many Welshmen who may perhaps have never heard of it before. His intent, however, was very much more to record his own parliamentary service than to spread the gospel of Europeanism:

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1. Unattributable interview, March 1972.

> Last week the Council of Europe met in Strasbourg for the third and final meetings of the 20th Session of that Assembly of European Parliamentarians, and, as a member of the United Kingdom delegation, it was at Strasbourg, and not Westminster, that I carried out my duties. 1

For the Conservative or Labour MP living outside Wales and London, there is clearly relatively less need to account for one's comings and goings during the parliamentary session. Membership of an international parliamentary organisation can either be publicised for his benefit, or if he prefers, not be publicised at all. Some MPs feel quite strongly that travels abroad should not be advertised. A Labour member from an industrial constituency has remarked: 'I did not mention the Council of Europe in the local newspapers since I produced no actual results there. It was not like a trip to Australia or somewhere to negotiate something'. One of his colleagues added, 'it's not a good thing (to inform the constituency) if you don't live there'. Certainly the member who knows that his constituents do not approve of trips to the assemblies would be foolish to mention them. For example, Dick Taverne, who succeeded Geoffrey de Freitas as MP for Lincoln and was aware that his constituents had not been kindly disposed to de Freitas' frequent absences on assembly business, seems to have refrained from raising the subject at all when he served on the Council of Europe delegation in 1965.

There are, on the other hand, some Members who are infrequent visitors to their constituencies and who nevertheless make full use of the opportunity to publicise their assembly activities. A case in point is that of Sydney Scholsfield Allen, Labour MP for Crewe, Cheshire, who came under heavy fire during the 1959 General Election for being away from his constituency too often and had to publicly explain why he did not feel it necessary to

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1. Donald Coleman, 'The Week in Westminster', The Guardian (Neath) (6 February 1969), p.9.

hold surgeries at regular intervals.[1] Despite these attacks he certainly tried to convert his membership of the Council of Europe delegation to good account, and seems to have had no fear that his activity abroad might be linked to his absences at home. In May 1959, some four months before the election, the Crewe Chronicle carried a long report of Allen's speech to the Strasbourg Assembly on penal reform, which 'incidentally' mentioned that Allen had been interested in penal reform for thirty years.[2] Several months later, during the election campaign, the newspaper, in its biography of the Labour candidate, noted that 'Mr. Allen has been honoured by being elected a representative for the British Government on the Council of Europe and has recently attended a meeting of the Council'.[3] Finally, the newspaper reported that at Allen's adoption meeting, the former Mayor of Crewe, presiding, told the gathering that Allen was 'a man so well respected that he was appointed by the Government as a member of the Council of Europe'.[4]

Both Conservative and Labour Members who do reside in their constituency, and find that their international parliamentary activities encounter little opposition, may of course also elect to publicise these activities for their political benefit. Donald Coleman's approach was noted above. For him, as well as for other MPs, mention in the press has often served a dual function, not only publicising the Member's activities (this time from a source more 'objective' than the election address), but also giving constituents a clearer idea of what these organisations are all about. A newspaper article, if it is to be at all coherent, will of necessity present some picture of the assembly's work,

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1. Mr. Allen on his "Full-Time Job" in The House', The Chronicle (Crewe), 3 October 1959, p.7.
2. 'Crewe MP backs report on penal reform', ibid., 2 May 1959, p.14.
3. 'The Candidates', ibid., 19 September 1959, p.20.
4. 'You People in Crewe don't know how well off you are - Mr. Allen', ibid., 26 September 1959, p.24.

simply by discussing the issue at hand and the Member's activities in relation to it. In most cases, it has been the Member's speech that has formed the basis for newspaper articles. However, if a Member is particularly interested in or prominent at the Assembly he may wish to direct more frequent attention to its activities.

For example, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, a long-time member of the British delegation to the Council of Europe (as well as to the other two assemblies), President of the Council's Assembly, and a leading 'European', spared no effort to let his constituency learn of both the importance of the Council of Europe and the particular role he played there. On 3 May 1966, the Northamptonshire Evening Telegraph, Kettering's daily newspaper, carried an article under the headline 'Sir Geoffrey Elected to European Post' which reported his election to the presidency of the Consultative Assembly.[1] During the ensuing years of his presidency the newspaper did not hesitate to publish his remarks at Strasbourg, as well as an occasional photo, including one of de Freitas next to Harold Wilson and Alec Douglas-Hume at Strasbourg 'when the Premier gave his historic Common Market speech to the Council',[2] which de Freitas proceeded to reproduce in his 1970 campaign address. Indeed de Freitas not only made his mark in the local press with his speeches and activities abroad, but also mentioned his international parliamentary activities in speeches on his home ground as well.[3]

In general, the amount of space that the assemblies will command in the delegate's local press will depend on the topicality of the subject,

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1. 'Sir Geoffrey Elected to European Post', Northamptonshire Evening Telegraph, 3 May 1966, p.1.
2. 'Proud Moment for Kettering's MP', ibid., 27 January 1967, p.3.
3. 'Sir Geoffrey Urges: Fight Racialism', ibid., 4 May 1968, p.8.

the quality of the Member's press release or the way he presents his activities, and the Member's own newsworthiness. Anthony Kershaw, employing a 'travelogue' technique to describe his journeys as a delegate to all three Assemblies ('Strasbourg in the autumn is a city of river mists, pale sunshine...;[1] A smooth, sandy beach faces the rollers of the Atlantic'[2]), also managed to mention a number of issues that were discussed at the Assemblies. Robert Boothby, who could do no wrong in his constituency's eyes,[3] commanded headlines every time he spoke at the 1949 Council of Europe session. Scholefield Allen, Arthur Bottomley and William Molloy[4] have at times benefitted from two- and three-column reports of their speeches replete with generous quotations. But Bottomley and others have also sometimes shared a different fate: a few lines' notice on a hardly looked at page.[5]

Liberal MPs are faced with a different type of problem. Because the Liberals are so short of parliamentary manpower, they have frequently relied on Peers to represent them at international Assembly meetings, and the question of constituency relations has rarely arisen. In fact, Lord Gladwyn, Liberal delegate to the Council of Europe and WEU since 1966, recalls that at one stage he could not even get a Liberal MP as his substitute and was forced back into the Lords, where Viscount Norwich

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1. 'A Letter from Strasbourg: From Anthony Kershaw MP., at the Council of Europe', Stroud News and Journal, 8 October 1965.
2. 'Narrow Squeak in Central Park: New York Impressions by Anthony Kershaw', ibid., 22 October 1965.
3. For an appraisal of Boothby's popularity by one who did not fare as well see Nigel Nicolson, People and Parliament (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1958), p.48.
4. For example: 'Crewe MP backs report on penal reform', The Chronicle, 2 May 1959, p.14; 'Mr. Bottomley at Europe Assembly', Chatham, Rochester and Gillingham News, 3 October 1952, p.1; "Let's Issue a European Health Card", says Ealing MP.,' Middlesex County Times and West Middlesex Gazette, 2 October 1970, p.7.
5. 'European Unity: Mr. Bottomley on Britain's Part', Chatham, Rochester and Gillingham News, 15 May 1953, p.4.

offered to go along.[1] There are tremendous pressures on Liberal MPs - between them they must serve on all committees of the House and must share the burden of party work. As one Liberal Member pointed out, although his constituents were 'very internationally minded', and gave him no problems when he attended the one-week annual sessions of the North Atlantic Assembly, as far as membership of the Council of Europe was concerned, it would take up too much of his time.

On balance it would seem that a high proportion, though probably not a majority, of Members have indeed felt it worthwhile in some way to publicise their activities on the international parliamentary stage, without fear of constituency resentment for the time they have spent abroad and with the positive hope of increasing their stature in the eyes of the local electorate. The others, the majority, have decided, for whatever the reasons - and certainly not excluding those mentioned above - to be silent about their activities at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Western European Union Assembly and the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. It should be noted that those parliamentarians who have publicised their activities have not necessarily been the most 'active', while in many cases those who kept silent have been very much involved in assembly work.[2]

One factor in their decision to publicise their activities or not seems to have been the relevance of those activities to Britain's European policy in general. In the same way as changing Government attitudes to Europe

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1. Interview with Lord Gladwyn, June 1971. Viscount Norwich served as the Liberal substitute delegate from 1966-1969 inclusive.
2. A list of delegates citing their assembly experience in their election addresses appears in Appendix 6. Among leading delegates to the Assemblies who did not mention their activities in addresses which were issued in the election year immediately following their service at the Assemblies were: Conservatives Peter Kirk (1959, 1970), John Maclay (1959), Anthony Kershaw (1964, 1966) and Douglas Dodds-Parker (1966, 1970) and Labour MPs Samuel Silkin (1970), William Rodgers (1970) and Ronald Brown (1970).

influenced the composition of delegations to the Consultative and WEU Assemblies, so it seems did it affect the willingness of MPs at least to inform their constituents that they were members of those delegations. This, at least, is the tentative conclusion yielded by an examination of the election addresses of sitting delegates[1] between (and including) the 1951[2] and 1970 General Elections. The 'election address', sent by a parliamentary candidate to every voter in his constituency, usually includes, apart from the address itself, a biography of the candidate - listing events that he deems most important to himself and interesting to voters as well as a message from his wife and possibly some photos. This 'individual manifesto - a statement of what he (the candidate) considers to be the most important or the most appealing of the issues at stake',[3] is often the most widely read of election material. It can therefore be assumed that Members will mention their international parliamentary activities if it is important to them and they feel it is commendable to their voters.

It should be recalled that at the time of the 1951 General Election the Conservatives were vociferous proponents of what they termed 'European unity' and had distinguished themselves at Strasbourg, whereas Labour displayed a thinly-veiled negative attitude toward the entire concept. Nevertheless, none of the Conservative candidates who were prominent at Strasbourg made any mention of the Council of Europe in their election addresses: not Boothby, not Maxwell-Fyfe, not Eccles and not Churchill.

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1. 'Sitting delegates' are those MPs who had served on the delegation at any time since the previous General Election. MPs who died before the election, who were elevated to the peerage, or simply who did not stand again were not considered as they of course printed no manifestos .
2. I did not consider the addresses of the 1950 election as I would have been restricted to a very small number of MPs; by 1951 there had been a number of changes in the delegations of both parties.
3. D.E.Butler, The British General Election of 1951 (London, Macmillan, 1952) p.51. I am indebted to Dr. Butler and to the Library of Nuffield College, Oxford, for permission to examine their collection of election addresses.

True, Boothby spoke of 'Western Union', and Eccles, Macmillan and Churchill all touched upon a 'United Europe'[1] but direct reference to the Council of Europe was left to John Foster, who in the opening portion of his statement noted that

> In 1950 I was re-elected as your Member. Since then I have been active in Parliament, and a delegate to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. There I supported Mr. Churchill in his efforts to bring Britain into partnership with the democratic powers of Western Europe. 2

For the rest of the Tories in 1951 it was enough to speak of 'European unity', though perhaps some of them felt that there was no need to stress the Council of Europe in their election addresses as they were in any case clearly identified with that body. This must surely have been true in the case of Robert Boothby who, as noted, in 1949 and 1950 had commanded a good deal of newsprint and often headlines[3] in the Aberdeen Press and Journal.

On the Labour side it is not surprising that most of the election addresses of MPs who were delegates to Strasbourg made no mention of that fact. Three exceptions were George Darling, Lynn Ungoed-Thomas and William Glenvil Hall. Darling and Ungoed-Thomas had been elected for their respective constituencies only the previous year and may have felt that mentioning their Strasbourg service would impress voters; Hall, a long-time member for Colne Valley, had assumed leadership of the Labour delegation earlier that year, in accordance with Dalton's recommendation to Attlee that ministers need not accompany the delegation.[4]

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1. Election addresses of Robert Boothby, Aberdeenshire, E; Rt.Hon. Winston Churchill, Woodford; David Eccles, Chippenham, Wilts; Rt.Hon.Harold Macmillan, Bromley - all 1951.
2. Election address of John Foster, Northwich, Cheshire, 1951.
3. See above, p.181 and Chapter 1, p. 48 , f.n. 1.
4. Dalton, High Tide, pp.333-334.

David Butler records that in 1951, relatively more importance was attached to addresses, as 'appreciably less printed matter was distributed in this election (than in that of 1950).[1] Had delegates wished to publicise their activities at Strasbourg, the addresses would have served as an excellent medium for doing so. That only 14.5 per cent. of all Conservative and Labour delegates whose addresses were examined,[2] did elect to mention their service abroad clearly indicates the extent to which even in its supposedly heroic days the Council of Europe was not usually thought to be of much interest to the average voter.

If the Council of Europe attracted little notice in the 1951 campaign, it could hardly have been expected to do better in 1955, by which time it had been bypassed as a prime focus for European political and economic co-operation. Though once again election addresses were probably the most widely read of campaign literature,[3] few delegates felt the need to include in their address any mention of Council of Europe. Only three Conservatives gave even brief mention to the Assembly, and it was only a former delegate, Duncan Sandys, who thought it worthwhile to devote more than one line to his activities at Strasbourg.[4]

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1. Butler, General Election of 1951, p.52. Butler states that a British Institute of Public Opinion poll found that 52% of those interviewed claimed to have read at least one election address (ibid).

2. Because the Nuffield collection of election addresses does not include the address of every candidate in every election, it was only possible to obtain a percentage of the total number of addresses produced by delegates to the Council of Europe (the addresses of NPC delegates were not analysed systematically because not enough were available to allow for more than the most general observations). These percentages were always substantial, however, varying from 47% of all delegates' addresses in 1955 to 79% in 1970 (see Appendix 6 for a complete breakdown of percentages as well as of the mention made by delegates of both major parties). Furthermore, the sample, while not strictly random, cannot be called biassed either. It would seem, therefore, that one could draw at least tentative conclusions from what is probably the best available evidence.

3. A Gallup Poll found 57% of the electorate claiming to have read an election address. Butler notes that this finding was 'in defiance of all the other evidence of increased apathy'. D.E.Butler, The British General Election of 1955 (London, Macmillan, 1955), p.37.

4. Sandys was an exceptional case: he had helped create the Assembly (see Chapter 1). Unlike other delegates, and most former delegates, he could state that 'he organised the international campaign which led to the creation of the Council of Europe'. Election address of D.Sandys, Streatham, 1955.

Labour delegates were only slightly more forthcoming in their addresses. Six delegates made some mention of their service at the Council of Europe, one, George Thomson, even going so far as to indicate that 'refugees are his particular concern'.[1] Nevertheless, the six represented but a third of Labour delegates' addresses that were examined and, if both parties are taken together, only 25 per cent.of the delegates mentioned the Assembly. Perhaps the best illustration of the indifference of many MPs to the Council of Europe once they had left Strasbourg was the election address of Nigel Nicolson. Nicolson was serving at the Council of Europe at the time of the General Election. He thought it worthwhile to indicate to his voters that his 'main interests are in foreign affairs'.[2] He let his voters know that in his brief tenure in Parliament he had travelled to Germany and America on parliamentary business. He did not mention the Council of Europe at all.

The number of Conservative MPs who felt it worth their while to mention their membership of an international parliamentary assembly increased somewhat in 1959. This was perhaps partly due to the greater importance which the Government attached to Britain's relations with Europe, given the failure of the Maudling negotiations, the birth of the European Economic Community, and the imminent creation of the EFTA. It was certainly in spite of the fact that the Council of Europe had fallen upon hard times.[3] Of course, by 1959 the WEU Assembly and the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference had also come into existence, and they too were sometimes mentioned, but if any international assembly had

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1. Election address of George Thomson, Dundee East, 1955.
2. Election address of Nigel Nicolson, Bournemouth East & Christchurch, 1955.
3. This is certainly the view of long-serving members of the Council of Europe staff interviewed in May 1971. Sir Kenneth Younger, a delegate in 1957 recalls that with the creation of the EEC 'we all saw the writing on the wall... other bodies were bound to be peripheral'. (Interview, July 1971).

commanded the attention of the British public (and it is fairly certain that none did) it would have been the Council of Europe.

Of the seven Conservative MPs who mentioned the Council of Europe, David Price took the unusual step of including a picture of himself 'advocating the British plan for a European Free Trade Area before the Council of Europe'.[1] Phrased in such terms, Strasbourg was indeed newsworthy. But perhaps the most interesting use any Conservative delegate, indeed any member of the delegation, made of the Council of Europe was the way in which it was presented to the public by Knox Cunningham, Ulster Unionist Member for South Antrim. Describing the electoral contest as the 'South Antrim election to the Imperial Parliament' and campaigning under the motto 'the Union under the Crown we will maintain', Cunningham stated in his campaign biography in very much the same shrill vein that 'from 1956 until 1959 he was a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the Council of Europe at Strasbourg where he stated Ulster's case and replied to the delegates from the Republic of Eire'.[2]

No Labour address could match Cunningham's skillful employment of the Council of Europe to buttress his platform, but a few Labour MPs felt that the Assembly at Strasbourg was worth mentioning at length. For example, Thomas Steele's biography, written by the chairman of his constituency association, stated that

> his work has been recognised in a wider field as he holds the position of Vice-President of the influential Defence Committee of Western European Union and is a United Kingdom delegate to the Council of Europe. 3

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1. Election address of David Price, Eastleigh, Hants, 1959.
2. Election address of Knox Cunningham, South Antrim, 1959.
3. Election address of Thomas Steele, West Dunbartonshire, 1959.

Other Labour Members included statements of a similar nature in their addresses, indicating that service at Strasbourg or WEU was a signal honour bestowed upon an MP by his party leadership. Nevertheless, the total number of Labour Members who mentioned the Council of Europe or WEU was actually lower than in 1955. In any event, European affairs were not high on Members' priorities in 1959: the question of British relations with the Common Market was generally 'neglected'.[1] If the addresses of delegates of both parties are taken as a whole, only about 20 per cent. made any mention of international Assemblies. Included among the many Members of Parliament who did not mention any Assembly were John Maclay, who had served as the first President of the Assembly of WEU in 1955, and Peter Kirk, who had already been a delegate to the Council of Europe and WEU for four years and was very active in both bodies. None of the six MPs included in the sample who had attended the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference mentioned that Assembly in their addresses.[2]

By the 1964 election Britain had applied for entry to the Common Market and had been blocked by General de Gaulle's veto. Although the EEC question could hardly be called a major issue in 1963-64, Butler and King termed it 'a fringe diversion',[3] the Council of Europe and WEU seem to have retained, if not increased, their attractiveness to Conservative MPs, probably because these Assemblies were two of the very few listening

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1. D.E. Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959 (London, Macmillan, 1960), p.72. Butler and Rose found that 62% of electors who had been polled claimed to have read election addresses (ibid) p.133).

2. The six were John Maclay, Charles Fletcher-Cooke, John Hughes-Hallett (Conservatives) and Hugh Gaitskell, Roy Jenkins and Thomas Steele (Labour).

3. D.E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1964 (London, Macmillan, 1965), p.131.

posts that had remained open to the British Government on the Continent. Competition among MPs for places on the British delegation had become very keen after Macmillan's announcement of August 1961 and remained keen after the veto.[1] It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the largest ever percentage (61%) of Conservative delegates mentioned their international parliamentary activities in their election addresses, some of them also referring to their Council of Europe or WEU Assembly committee posts. Among those who called attention to their assembly committee work was Peter Kirk, chairman of the Consultative Assembly's important Political Committee. As was noted above, Kirk had not mentioned Strasbourg at all in his previous election address, though at the time he chaired its Committee on Non-Represented Nationalities. Another Conservative who publicised his committee work was Philip Goodhart. He not only noted his work on the WEU Defence Committee, but added that he was also a member of the NPC Defence Committee; in so doing he was one of the few delegates to the Conference to mention it in his election address.

Labour seemed even less interested in Europe as a campaign issue than the Conservatives,[2] and only a very few Labour MPs mentioned the Council of Europe in their addresses. 22 percent. of the Labour Party candidates referred to no aspect of foreign affairs in their 1964 addresses;[3] only 20 per cent. of Labour delegates' addresses included mention of any international assembly.

Two years later British voters were once again called to the polls and by then the question of British entry to the EEC was once again under consideration by the Government. With both parties endorsing some sort

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1. This is the view of informed opinion at Strasbourg, as well as among a number of British MPs.

2. Butler and King, General Election of 1964, pp.131-132.

3. ibid., p.143.

of approach to Europe,[1] and the Council of Europe and WEU still important focal points for contacts with the Six, a larger than ever number of sitting and former delegates to the Assemblies devoted some space to them in their election addresses, though the number of voters claiming to have read these addresses had dropped substantially in 1964 and was to rise only slightly in 1966.[2] Again there were a number of variations on the standard theme of inclusion of the years of service in one's biography. Aidan Crawley, the Conservative candidate for West Derbyshire, referred to his membership of the Consultative Assembly in 1949; at the time he was a member of the Labour Party. Duncan Sandys, whose associations with the Assembly also spanned its existence, stressed his role in its creation; and, to mark his return to Strasbourg, added that he was still 'playing a leading part' there.[3] Sir Ronald Russell, who was not a pro-Marketeer by any standard, nevertheless pointed out that he had served at Strasbourg since 1957. Peter Emery wrote of his chairmanship of Strasbourg's Public Health Committee and added a picture in his address captioned 'Peter Emery puts the views of Britain's electors at the Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg'.[4]

Labour MPs were often equally enthusiastic about their international parliamentary affiliations. For example, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas' address listed his leadership of the British delegation to Strasbourg under the heading 'international experience'.[5] Lady Megan Lloyd George wrote to

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1. Butler and King, General Election of 1966, p.110: 'Mr Brown on tour at Stowmarket responded immediately: "Going into the Common Market is not an issue between us. What is an issue is whether one does it rationally or in a headlong manner".'
2. Down to 46% in 1964 and 49% in 1966 (ibid., p.198).
3. Election address of Duncan Sandys, Streatham, 1966.
4. Election address of Peter Emery, Reading, 1966.
5. Election address of Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, Kettering, 1966.

her Welsh electors 'Gwasanasthais hefyd fel cynrychiolydd Preydeining ar Gyngor Ewrob ac ar Gyngor Undeb Gorllewin Ewrob'.[1] And Robert Edwards noted his activities at Strasbourg in a section of his address entitled 'Services to the People'.[2] All told, half of the addresses of all delegates mentioned the Council of Europe and/or WEU Assemblies.

For the first time several sitting as well as former delegates to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference mentioned that body in their addresses. These MPs[3] may well have concluded that the publicity surrounding France's disagreements with her NATO allies had made the organisation topical enough for people to note mention of the NPC in an election address.

With the Labour Party about to re-open negotiations for British entry to the EEC and the Tories still firmly in favour of entry, a number of candidates who stood in June 1970 had something to say about Europe.[4] And, more than ever before, delegates and former delegates to international parliamentary assemblies and, not surprisingly, to the Council of Europe in particular, mentioned their association with those bodies. Several former Conservative delegates recalled their services at Strasbourg. These included Maurice Macmillan, who also reminded voters that he had been rapporteur of the Consultative Assembly's Political Committee. A number of sitting delegates again went to some length to describe their activities. Philip Goodhart boasted that he 'was the first member of

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1. Election address of Lady Megan Lloyd George, Carmarthen, 1966 ('I have served you as a British representative on the Council of Europe and the Council (sic) of Western European Union'.
2. Election address of Robert Edwards, Bilston, 1966.
3. These included Gilbert Longden, John Peel and Sir Fitzroy Maclean (Conservatives), and Kenneth Lomas (Labour), who mentioned his North Atlantic Assembly committee activities.
4. 'Surprisingly, in view of commitments of all three parties to enter Europe "if the terms are right", only 38% of Conservatives and 23% of Labour candidates referred to... (the Common Market issue), many of them in a way that did not make their own position clear'. David Robertson, 'The Content of Election Addresses and Leaders' Speeches', in David Butler & Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 (London, Macmillan, 1971), p.440. See also ibid., p.159.

Parliament to be a member of the British delegation to the Council of Europe (and WEU) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly as well as the United Nations General Assembly'.[1] Eldon Griffiths' address stated that 'at meetings of the Council of Europe he is becoming a force for the future... (and) is... making a name for himself and his constituency on a wider stage'.[2] John Peel told his Leicester constituents that he was 'at present British Vice-President of the Assembly of Western European Union'.[3] Geoffrey Rippon hoped to impress his voters by noting that 'in 1968 he succeeded Sir Alec Douglas-Home as leader of the Conservative Party's delegation to the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union'.[4] Finally, Duncan Sandys still prided himself on his ancient associations with Strasbourg.

Labour Members' efforts to impress their voters with their international records were equally evident in 1970. Alfred Broughton, last seen at Strasbourg in 1958, told his voters in 1970 'I wish to remind Electors that I was selected to serve as a United Kingdom delegate to the Council of Europe'.[5] Maurice Edelman informed his constituents that he was 'a founder member of the Council of Europe'.[6] Sir Geoffrey de Freitas' elaborate address referred several times to the Council of Europe, where he had just completed his term as President of the Consultative Assembly, and included the picture of himself with Harold Wilson at Strasbourg which had appeared in his local newspaper.

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1. Election address of Philip Goodhart, Beckenham, 1970.
2. Election address of Eldon Griffiths, Bury St Edmonds, 1970.
3. Election address of John Peel, Leicester South-East, 1970.
4. Election address of Geoffrey Rippon, Hexham, 1970.
5. Election address of Sir Alfred Broughton, Batley and Morley, 1970.
6. Election address of Maurice Edelman, Coventry North, 1970.

Lena Jeger and Robert Edwards seem to have been the only candidates who linked their membership of the Council of Europe to the question of Britain's relations with the EEC.

Edwards, a staunch proponent of entry, whose associations with the European Movement pre-dated the Hague Congress, dealt at great length with 'Britain and the European Community' in his election address:

> During my membership of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of Western European Union (1965-69) I became Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Regional Development and Local Government and the Chairman of a major Committee of Western European Union... Whilst these international and European activities have convinced me of the need for Britain to become active members of an enlarged European Community it is my conviction that a Labour Government is the most likely to negotiate conditions of membership. 1

Mrs Jeger's approach was quite the opposite.

> I don't support the Common Market as at present set up. I am a representative of the UK on the Council of Europe and work happily for international progress on many problems. But I must oppose a system which combines high food prices with mountainous surpluses of food in a hungry world. I prefer to look for wider international co-operation. 2

In general, on both the Conservative and Labour sides, there were pro-Market delegates who noted their membership of the Council of Europe delegation and those who did not. Similarly, while most anti-Market delegates made no mention of any international parliamentary assembly, at least one, Sir Ronald Russell, did indicate that he had served at Strasbourg.

Although few delegates chose to draw a connection between their service at a European Assembly and the Common Market issue, it seems that once European affairs began to command the attention of the British public more delegates saw fit to mention their service at Strasbourg and Paris. It was

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1. Election address of Robert Edwards, Bilston, 1970.
2. Election address of Lena Jeger, Holborn and St Pancras South, 1970.

noted above that only 14.5 per cent. of all delegates to Strasbourg mentioned the Council of Europe in their 1951 election addresses; only one Conservative had noted his service at the Assembly. In 1959, however, 54 per cent. of the Conservative delegates' addresses mentioned either the Consultative Assembly, or the WEU Assembly, or both, and that figure never dropped below 46 per cent. in any of the ensuing elections, standing at 56 per cent. in 1970. Similarly, once it became clear that the Labour party might support entry into the EEC, the percentage of Labour delegates mentioning the assemblies in their election addresses rose equally, if not more sharply: from 20 per cent. in 1964 to 55 per cent. in 1966 and 47 per cent. in 1970.[1] Inasmuch as the addresses are pieces of pure advertising, it is not surprising that once the widespread discussion of European affairs made the European assemblies seem a more topical subject, those delegates who were active at the assemblies, and even those who were not as active, should elect to mention them in their addresses. That not all active delegates mentioned the assemblies was not necessarily due to any apathy, but probably more to their coming to the conclusion that perhaps it was wiser in their case not to mention their international parliamentary work in the most widely distributed item of their local campaign.[2] Furthermore not all MPs may have agreed that election addresses are the best way

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1. Seven delegates mentioned the North Atlantic Assembly in their 1970 addresses. This represents 58 per cent of the incomplete sample of NAA delegates' addresses, and, like the 57 per cent figure for 1966, is certainly an improvement over the 1959 election when no delegates mentioned the NPC. Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from these results because the total number of delegates sent from the Commons to the NAA during the periods 1964-66 and 1966-70 was far smaller than the corresponding total sent to the Council of Europe (17 to the NAA in 1966-70 and 14 in 1964-66 compared with 59 and 32 to Strasbourg, respectively). One can only make the general observation that, as in 1966, some delegates perhaps thought that NATO was topical enough for mention to be made of the Assembly in their addresses. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the presence of Peers on the NAA delegation).

2. On the continuing importance of election addresses see Butler and King, General Election of 1966, p.198.

to publicise their activities at the assemblies. No doubt some took the view that the election address, whether it is looked at or not, is sent flying in the direction of the dustbin almost as soon as it is received,[1] and that other means of publicity, articles in the local press for example,[2] were more attractive and worthwhile.

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The discussion of delegates' relations with their constituents has so far dealt with their efforts to present their membership of the British delegation to an assembly in a light that would win local party and voter admiration.[3] Nevertheless, it has been noted that prolonged absence abroad can evoke the resentment of the local constituency party and have dire consequences for the Member. Two cases, both admittedly extreme, may serve to illustrate the degree to which delegates can be enmeshed in local difficulties as a result of their active participation in assembly affairs.

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1. David Butler & Anthony King on the 1966 addresses: 'The form was almost as depressing as ever' - not the kind of material that would be filed in a library. Butler and King, ibid.

2. As was true of Anthony Kershaw: see above p. 181.

3. Although it is the delegates to the assemblies who would commonly be expected to publicise their activities to their constituents, there is on record at least one case of a non-delegate who also employed the assemblies for his own political benefit. Sir Richard Glyn, chairman of both the Commons Committee on Estimates' military expenditure sub-committee and the Conservative parliamentary defence committee, had been invited to attend a WEU Defence Committee meeting in Paris early in 1964. Also invited was Denis Healey, chairman of Labour's parliamentary defence committee. Only Glyn attended the meeting, and he found that Lord Grantchester, the Liberal delegate who sat on the committee, was also absent. He proceeded to report the absence of Liberal and Labour delegates in his local party broadsheet, adding that 'surprise has been expressed at the slight attendance by representatives of a Party claiming to be a potential alternative Government for Britain' ('Report from PARIS', The Plain Speaker, IX (March 1964), I). Healey of course was not a delegate and Granchester had sent his apologies. Robert Mathew, MP for Honiton, which bordered on Glyn's North Dorset constituency, received an irate letter from Grantchester, to which he replied: 'I should have thought that any adult person would fully understand that Dick Glyn's crack was party political ... I cannot think that it should be taken too seriously'. (Grantchester to Mathew, 13 May 1964; Mathew to Grantchester, 16 June 1964, Mathew papers).

The first case is concerned not so much with the difficulties MPs faced as with the steps they (three Members were involved) felt they must take if they were not to get into trouble with their constituency parties. On 27 December 1964, 'Cross-Bencher', author of the caustic Sunday Express column 'Politics and Personalities', sharply criticised Conservatives Ronald Bell, Peter Emery and David Webster for sponsoring a motion calling for week-end or double-shift work 'to be re-introduced at the ports to keep trade rolling', while they seemed much less anxious to work themselves:

> There have been 46 divisions so far in this Parliament... Mr. Emery has missed 19 of them; Mr. Bell 20; and Mr. Webster 25... Which suggests that, where certain MPs are concerned, a few extra shifts would not come amiss either. [1]

All three Members were delegates to the Council of Europe and WEU during the period in question. Both Emery and Webster, and possibly Bell (who had been absent at every plenary sitting of each assembly but may have attended committee meetings) had missed divisions because of their international parliamentary duties, and had been properly paired, but the article implied that they had been absent without authorisation.

It was Emery who felt most threatened by the 'Cross-Bencher' article. Though he, like Webster, had let his constituents know of his European parliamentary duties in his 1964 election address, he had been returned by the tiniest of margins - ten votes - a margin which an unflattering article like that of 'Cross-Bencher', with its insinuations of irresponsibility, could have helped to wipe out.

Emery and his colleagues began legal proceedings against the Sunday Express, contending that the article had clearly and erroniously implied that they had missed divisions without authorisation, and they won their case. The following week, on the page opposite that on which 'Cross-Bencher'

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1. 'Cross-Bencher', Politics and Personalities: The Loneliness of Quintin', Sunday Express, 27 December 1964, p.16.

appeared, the Express ran a small item under the heading 'Mr. Peter Emery, MP' which stated that

> We learn that meetings of the Western European Union and the Council of Europe in Paris as (sic) one of our parliamentary delegates kept him away from 11 of these divisions (19)... If the Cross-Bencher story had given the impression that Mr. Emery had been neglecting his duties then we apologise to him. 1

Similar apologies were made to Bell and Webster opposite the 'Cross-Bencher' columns in late January and late February.[2] In the event, Emery, who had the most to lose, did not hold his seat in 1966, but it does not seem to have been due to the potentially damaging article that had been written about him fifteen months earlier.

The fears that spurred Emery to seek justice from the Sunday Express, fears which were referred to in the opening paragraphs of this section, very much materialised in the case of Ian Lloyd, Conservative Member for Langstone, Portsmouth.

Lloyd had been elected to Langstone's seat in 1964 with a margin of almost 9,000 and had been comfortably re-elected two years later. The constituency, now redistricted, was one of the largest in the United Kingdom, with over 110,000 electors, and Lloyd found it extremely difficult to keep up with all the local engagements and functions at which his presence was virtually obligatory, given the usual norms for Tory MPs. When he accepted an invitation to be a substitute delegate of the Council of Europe and Western European Union he seems to have encountered very little reaction on the part of his constituents. But, as Lloyd became more active in the

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1. 'Mr. Peter Emery, MP' ibid., 3 January 1965, p.17.

2. 'Mr. Daniel Webster, MP' ibid., 24 January 1965;
   'Mr. Ronald Bell, MP' ibid., 21 February 1965.

assemblies' committees and he was forced to leave England on more than one occasion, he soon ran into his first set of difficulties. 'Cross-Bencher' took aim at Lloyd's division record. Recalling the experience with Emery and the others, 'Cross-Bencher' prudently granted that many of Lloyd's absences were due to sessions at the Assemblies but added that 'even allowing for his brief absences on Council of Europe business, his voting record is not too impressive'.[1] Lloyd was incensed by the article and brought the case to the Press Council, contending that the Editor of the Sunday Express had not given him the right to reply to the allegations, which, he felt, had overlooked many assembly committee meetings which corresponded with his absences during divisions. Though the Press Council upheld Lloyd's complaint, its decision was only issued the following October.[2] By then the article had caused an uproar in the constituency. The matter had been raised in the 1970 election campaign, when Lloyd faced a stiff challenge from Roger Kenward, the Labour candidate. Kenward explicitly attacked Lloyd on the basis of the 'Cross-Bencher' article, which prompted one Lloyd partisan to send a long, vindicative letter to the Hampshire Telegraph defending Lloyd's trips on assembly business.[3]

Lloyd managed to hold his seat in the election, and to more than double his first majority, winning by a 17,241 margin. Nevertheless, after three months the absenteeism issue flared up again, this time within Lloyd's constituency party leadership. Lloyd was apparently asked either to forsake his business interests, which were considerable, or to resign from the

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1. 'Cross-Bencher', 'Rather Grand', ibid., 8 March 1970, p.16.
2. 'An MP and the Sunday Express', ibid., 17 October 1970.
3. Joe Swain, 'Ian Lloyd is "respected by both sides"', (Letters to the Editor), Hampshire Telegraph, 23 April 1970, p.2.

delegations to the Council of Europe and WEU.[1] Lloyd refused to do either, and, ignoring a warning by the vice chairman of his constituency party, went off to America in early October 1971 primarily on business for the WEU Science and Technology Committee. During his absence, his opponents on the constituency party management committee obtained a 35-8 vote against adopting him as candidate for the Havant and Waterloo constituency that was to replace Langstone at the next election.

On returning from America, Lloyd attacked his detractors on the Executive, claiming that they had misled their fellow Executive members on the matter of his Parliamentary record. His protests did not prevent the Executive from deciding to appoint a selection committee to look for a new candidate, but the Executive did consent to give Lloyd a hearing early in December. Several days before the hearing was to take place, Lloyd received help from what seemed an unlikely quarter, given the local setting of the dispute. In a telegram to the chairman of the Langstone Conservative Association, Olivier Reverdin, President of the Consultative Assembly, and a Swiss national, noted the imminence of Britain's entry into the EEC and added

> Let me stress the sense of surprise which would result if Mr. Lloyd were to be rejected now precisely because of his European connections.... May I ask you to impress upon your colleagues that Mr. Lloyd's great contribution to our work should be seen as benefitting directly every one of his constituents. 2

Reverdin's intervention in the affairs of a local constituency party seems to have been unprecedented and was probably unwise. A letter addressed to the constituency association from a leader of the assembly

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1. '"Officers disloyal" - Mr. Lloyd', The News (Portsmouth) 27 Oct.1970, p.1. Also unattributable interview, November 1971.
2. 'Council of Europe Makes Plea for Mr. Lloyd', The News (Portsmouth), 1 December 1971.

to which Lloyd was allegedly devoting too much attention, and who was a 'foreigner' as well, was hardly likely to satisfy the association's doubts about Lloyd and probably would only confirm them.

This in fact is what seems to have happened. Frederick Johnson, the constituency chairman, courteously replied to Reverdin and avowed his support for the Government's European policies. But he pointedly noted that Lloyd

> has already informed us that he cannot devote any more time to the constituency.... I am sure you will appreciate that there is not much future in being a good European Parliamentarian, if by lack of attention, you lose your home seat.[1]

Lloyd was unable to alter the Executive's opinion when he met with them on 6 December. He did manage to obtain permission to hold a general constituency vote in January on the matter, and he received the 'grass-roots' vote of confidence he was seeking.[2] Though calls were then made for the resignation of Lloyd's opponents on the Executive, no one resigned, and, when most of them were re-elected in the constituency's 3 March poll for a new Executive, it was clear that Lloyd's battle was far from over.

Whatever the eventual outcome of the Lloyd affair,[3] it proved that the safety of a seat made little difference to the safety of an MP who served in an assembly abroad. To be sure, the Langstone Executive denied that Lloyd's activities as a delegate to the Council of Europe had been a factor in its decision not to readopt him, and contended that because the new seat would be marginal it was necessary to find a candidate with

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1. ibid.
2. 'Tories reject executive decision to drop MP', The Times 4 Jan.1972, p.1; 'Tory MP Wins Party Vote', The Daily Telegraph, 4 Jan.1972; 'Tory Officers to Canvass Against Sitting MP', ibid., 5 Jan.1972.
3. Lloyd eventually was adopted for the new Havant and Waterloo seat and was returned in 1974 by a majority of 9188.

a chance to win it.[1] Nevertheless, the matter seems to have focussed not so much on the marginality of the new seat as on the propriety of Lloyd's prolonged absences in Europe and America.[2] Given the adoption of new Conservative Party rules establishing annual election of permanent constituency selection committees, it is hardly surprising that a number of MPs involved in European and Atlantic activities aired their fears of potential obstacles to their readoption and pointed to even greater difficulties once Britain sent representatives to the European Parliament.[3]

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Writing in 1964, Peter Richards observed that 'there is no evidence to show that Members take a great deal of notice of the opinions of constituency associations'.[4] Eight years later, however, he found that 'the reactions of constituents are now more complex... Recent events have shown that Members may encounter serious trouble from local supporters on matters where the Whips are silent'.[5]

There is no doubt that, with careful planning, an MP can happily busy himself in European or Atlantic affairs, away from what one Member has called 'the sheer grind of constituency work', and free from constituency complaints of indifference and neglect. Nevertheless, he may find the strain somewhat telling. Robert Mathew, Conservative Member for Honiton and an active delegate to Strasbourg and Paris in the late 'fifties and early 1960's, summed up the exasperation felt by many of his colleagues who shared his

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1. 'Lloyd "confident" of adoption', The News (Portsmouth) 23 Oct.1971, p.1.
2. Certainly the local press did not accept the Executive's explanation at face value: See 'An MP and his constituents', ibid., p.6.
3. 'New Tory Rules Under Attack', ibid., 11 December 1971.
4. Peter G. Richards, Honourable Members: A Study of the British Backbencher, 2nd ed. (London, Faber and Faber, 1964), p.23.
5. Richards, The Backbenchers, p.155.

extensive commitments. 'I am really rather astounded at what you say', he wrote to a constituent who complained about his absence at a local function,

> Those of us in public life are pretty hard driven and in addition to our work have to show the flag at meetings etc., in our Constituency. In my Constituency there are about 60 branches which means that if each branch is visited once a year I still have not completed the rounds... The one thing I have always refused to do is to be owned, body and soul, by those who elect me.... People often forget that we are human beings. I have, in addition to very considerable European and British Parliamentary interests, to attend to a constituency... a family and a business. I think one is entitled to some understanding. 1

Most MPs who attend the assemblies get that understanding.[2] Those delegates who feel reasonably secure may then elect to publicise their activities, though some, like the Member who regularly discussed his assembly activities with his Executive, publicise their work precisely because they feel insecure. Significantly, the same Member added that while he utilised available opportunities to explain his work at Strasbourg, if he ever neglected his constituency, if he missed visits home or left letters unanswered, the first thing would seize upon would be 'my European excursions'.[3]

It is because the fear of being attacked for taking too many 'excursions' is real enough in the minds of most MPs that many of them refrain from actively publicising the extent of their assembly activities.

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1. Mathew to a constituent, 15 March 1960 (Mathew papers).
2. The relative freedom which some MPs are given to conduct their Assembly affairs is illustrated by the case of Samuel Silkin, Labour MP for Dulwich who in 1968 made clear his willingness to resign his seat if he were elected Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. Silkin lost the election, and despite understandable grumbling in some constituency quarters was readopted as Labour's candidate for Dulwich and held his seat in the 1970 election.
3. Interview, Dec.1971; at least one other MP also reported that she briefed her Executive Committee regularly on her trips to Assembly business: Interview, December 1971.

Few are under the illusion that the safety of their seat will protect them against such attacks; Lloyd's case has only proved their point. In any event, many of them feel that the risk of provoking constituency ire simply is not worthwhile: European affairs do not particularly interest the constituent. As noted above, in 1970 the question of British entry to the EEC never materialised into a major campaign issue. It should therefore come as no surprise that even in 1970 European assemblies were not mentioned in the addresses of a number of delegates who were standing for re-election. Nor can it be considered remarkable that almost twenty years after Ronald Bell chided fellow British delegates for not stimulating any press or public interest in the work of the Council of Europe,[1] a Consultative Assembly report could still find that 'too little has been done to explain to the general public that members of international assemblies do perform a useful, indeed essential task'.[2] If over those twenty years so many delegates have been reluctant even to inform their constituents of their connection with international assemblies, how can it be expected that the assemblies should have received anything but the most limited exposure to the British public?

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1. Hansard, 5th series, 1953, 518, 2377.

2. See M. Van Der Stoel, 'Introductory Report on the role of organised political movements in the building of Europe', Consultative Assembly, Document 3005 (roneoed), p.15.

Part III

Assembly Activities:
The British Parliamentary Role

Chapter 5

British Parliamentary Involvement in the Quest for the Institutional Reform of International Assemblies - 1960-70

The first two parts of this study have examined the origins and early institutional development of the three assemblies at which Britain has always been represented, and have outlined the composition of her delegations and the manner in which delegates have balanced their assembly activities against their other, local responsibilities. It is now necessary to look at those activities in greater detail.

The participation of British delegates in assembly affairs falls into three distinct categories. The first is that which relates to each assembly's attempts to improve its political viability: its search for governmental support, for legislative influence if not power, for financial stability and for prestige. The second concerns the various projects which each assembly puts forward for implementation, either by governments or on its own. Finally there is the question of relations with, or involvement in, the affairs of the party groups that have been formed at two of the three assemblies. Accordingly, each of these categories will be dealt with in separate chapters of their own. Inasmuch as the major developments concerning the institutional fortunes of all three assemblies took place before 1960, and as such have already been recounted in Chapters 1 and 2, this brief chapter merely will outline further developments - or lack thereof-during the 1960's, particularly with respect to the NPC, whose several attempts at achieving 'consultative' status attracted some degree of British parliamentary support. Two chapters will then be devoted to the analysis of British parliamentary participation in assembly projects, both in general quantitative terms and in a substantive overview, and a third chapter will consider British involvement in international party group activities. In addition, a special chapter will be devoted to British parliamentary participation in the assemblies' debates on the Common Market

issue, which dominated the agendas of both the Consultative and WEU Assemblies for over a decade.

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Throughout the 1950's, at least one unequivocal statement could be made concerning British parliamentary attitudes to the work of the 'European' assemblies: with very few exceptions, a handful in fact, delegates to these bodies, in line with the views of their party leaders, opposed the attribution to them of any legislative function and did little to enhance their 'consultative' powers. At best the Consultative and WEU Assemblies were seen as places where delegates could establish contacts with their continental counterparts, could learn about European affairs. At worst they were viewed as a source of free holidays.

Insofar as the question of adding to the assemblies' institutional powers was concerned, the 1960's witnessed hardly any change in the prevalent British attitude of the previous decade. That is not to say that British delegates maintained their apathy towards assembly activities, or continued to view them as tourist-havens, or at best 'educational' bodies. It is certainly conceivable that delegates could have played an active role in assembly affairs, and could have appreciated, for example, the 'promotional' possibilities afforded by the assemblies, without wishing to grant them additional powers or status. Whether the delegates' attitudes to the work of the assemblies as they were then in fact constituted underwent any change at all is the subject of ensuing chapters. With respect to the question of <u>reconstituting</u> the assemblies, however, the events of the 1960's proved that British delegates' attitudes were still quite negative.

It was particularly during the first part of the decade that efforts were made to revive the Council of Europe's flagging fortunes. The first of these was launched in September 1961, and did not stem from British parliamentary sources nor from the Government, which was far too preoccupied

with entry into the EEC. The 'reformers', principally led by Auguste Pinton, a French Opposition deputy, had found that neither the Assembly's attempts to merge with the OEEC,[1] which was undergoing its own structural change (and was soon to become the OECD with Spain as a new member), nor reports to the Committee of Ministers on restructuring the Council were likely to produce any results.[2] Pinton was led to conclude that what was needed was a working group, comprised of members of the General Affairs and other committees, which would examine the whole problem of the way the Council of Europe functioned. His proposal, put forward in September 1960, was adopted with some modifications on 27 April of the following year and a 'working party on the reactivation of the Council of Europe' came into being. Although no British delegate took part in the brief discussion that preceded the Assembly's decision to authorise the creation of the working party,[3] Robert Mathew's name was included among the Bureau's suggestions for its membership which the Assembly accepted.

Mathew served on the 'working party' for less than a year. He was a keen 'European'; during the early 'sixties he actively utilised the Strasbourg and WEU Assembly framework to win sympathy for the British application to the EEC. His record as a delegate was impeccable: he served on six British delegations to the two assemblies, and served as vice-chairman of the Consultative Assembly's Legal Committee and as the chairman of the WEU Assembly's Budget Committee. Yet he showed little enthusiasm for his work on the 'working party'. He was a rapporteur on

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1. See above, Chapter 2, for mention of the Assembly's attempts to bring about a Council of Europe - OEEC merger.

2. See Pinton's speech of 27 April 1961 in Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 13th session, 1961-62, pp.235-239. Earlier reports on reactivating the Council of Europe had been presented by Pierre-Henri Teitgen (1959), J.J.Fens (1960) and Michel Junot (1961).

3. There was no recorded vote on the draft order to create the working party.

one aspect of its findings, but at about the same time he confided to Edward Heath, then Lord Privy Seal, that he could not work up any excitement over the project

> in view of the fact that Governments are clearly unable to give any definitive answer at this stage before the shape of the new Western Europe is settled one way or the other as a result of the present negotiations. 1

The committee's administrative inefficiency must have annoyed him as well. At one stage the committee's secretary was sending him material to an address that was six months out of date.[2] Finally, Mathew was not particularly satisfied with his chairman either. The chairman had turned out to be none other than Pinton himself. A Strasbourg delegate of twenty years' standing as well as a former Minister, Mathew described him to Heath as 'slightly self-important.' Pinton had wanted to secure an interview with Harold Macmillan to discuss the goals of the working party and Mathew, somewhat irked by the Frenchman's presumptuousness, fobbed him off with a meeting with Heath.[3] When the two men met, Mathew was present along with Lujo Toncic, an Assembly vice-president. Pinton did most of the speaking, Heath seemed bored and replied in a sterile manner; Mathew said nothing at all.[4] Not long after the meeting Mathew resigned, on the grounds that it was a mistake to propose to reform the Council of Europe's structure until the future of Europe became clear and it would be known whether Europe would be 'of the Six, of the Seven, or of the Ten'.[5]

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1. Mathew to Heath, 31 January 1962. (Mathew papers).
2. Letter written, but possibly not posted, by Mathew to M. Mouchot, Committee Secretary of the Working Party (no date): 'I know how inefficient the organisation is. But surely it is possible to prevent mail going to an address already some 6 months out of date' (Mathew papers).
3. Mathew to Heath, 31 January 1962.
4. Working Party on the Reactivation of the Council of Europe. 'Audience granted by Mr. Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal, at the Foreign Office in London on 12 Feb.1962 at 11.30 a.m.' (roneoed document, AS/rel; (13) 13 Draft, Strasbourg, 20th Feb.1962 - Mathew papers).
5. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 14th session, 1962-63, p.328.

No British delegate had taken part in the brief discussion that had preceded the creation of the working party; no British delegate replaced Mathew when he resigned. No British delegate took part in the brief debate that preceded the Assembly's vote on the recommendation put forward by Pinton's committee in May 1963.[1] And only three delegates, two Tories and a Liberal, voted for the recommendation. Six Labour delegates, including George Brown, the delegation leader, and two Conservatives voted 'No' while another Conservative delegate abstained. In addition, Lord Crathorne, the Conservative delegation leader, and five other delegates - three Conservatives, two Labour - were absent during the vote.[2] At best it could be said that British delegates were indifferent to the proposals, at worst, the statements of Mathew and the 'no' votes seemed to indicate that they were fairly hostile to them. Had there been strong British feeling in favour of the scheme, some delegate would have spoken during the debates, some delegate would have replaced Mathew, some delegate might even have tabled a motion on aspects of the report. But nothing was done at all. Most British delegates could not have cared less about Pinton's plans; those who cared at all, generally wished to do away with them.

In the end, little came of the 'working party's' activities, still less of the abortive proposal to link the OECD with Strasbourg so that the Assembly would service the new organisation.[3] When the work of the Council of Europe finally was reorganised, it was on the initiative of Peter Smithers, a former delegate to the Assembly, who was elected

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1. Consultative Assembly, ibid., 15th session, 1963-64, pp.174-179, 201-203.
2. Ibid., p.207. Among those voting 'no' was Peter Kirk, who, even more than Mathew, was a committed 'European'. Presumably he shared Mathew's views, and possibly the rest of the delegates, bar those who voted 'yes,' did so well.
3. See Hovey, Superparliaments, pp.121-128; Council of Europe Secretariat, Manual, p.123; Joseph Harned, 'Atlantic Assembly - A Genesis,' Journal of Common Market Studies III (1964), 183-189; see also below, pp. 214 ff.

Secretary-General of the Council in 1964. Acting in his new capacity as Secretary-General, Smithers proposed the institution of a work programme in which the Council's goals for the year were outlined in clear-cut form.[1] While the programme did not include the work of the Assembly, every attempt was made to align its recommendations with projects that it was hoped were virtually certain to win Government - and therefore the Committee of Ministers' - approval. It was Smithers' belief, and events proved him right, that there was enough common ground between the governments on the Council to allow for countless useful, and perhaps at times eye-catching, Council of Europe projects in the social, cultural and educational fields. In addition, Smithers sought to utilise the Council of Europe as a medium for developing and widening its members' links with Eastern Europe, and in this matter the Assembly came to play a prominent role.[2]

Once Smithers' work programme came into force, most discussion about reorganising the Council of Europe came to an end.[3] Given Britain's application for EEC entry in 1967 and her renewed initiative in 1970, it was clear that Mathew's earlier arguments were still valid: it would be pointless to discuss further changes in the Council of Europe while the EEC was about to be enlarged.

Similar considerations had limited discussion of a reorganisation of WEU, which since 1960 had been serving as a focus for Britain's relations with the Six.[4] It was not until 1971 therefore, that Lord Gladwyn seriously raised the question of WEU's (and its assembly's) future once the Communities

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1. See his speech to the Consultative Assembly: CA, Official Report, 17th session, 1965-66, pp.46-53.
2. CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.66-79, 136-138.
3. Debates on the work programme were held at regular intervals, but they were meant to discuss its proper implementation rather than to point to new structural reorganisation within the Council. See for example the remarks of Arthur Blenkinsop, the only British speaker to take part in the 1 Feb.1968 debate on the work programme, Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 19th session, 1967-68, pp.836-860, 861-867.
4. See below, Chapter 9.

were enlarged.[1] Even then little action was taken for some time after his report appeared.

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If one turns to the institutional development of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, one is presented with an entirely different set of circumstances from those which fashioned the Consultative Assembly's classic demand for 'limited functions but real powers.' Whereas the Council of Europe appeared to many British and continental federalists to be the first step on the road to European union, and the Consultative Assembly the vehicle by means of which they hoped that union would be achieved, the NPC began merely with the hope of serving as a parliamentary forum for promoting non-military co-operation within what was de facto a military alliance. An Atlantic union or federation had never really entered the picture. In the case of the Council of Europe it was not difficult to see why legislators pressed for real 'powers': for if nothing else, as Ernst Haas has pointed out, 'the mere fact that parliamentarians are called upon to exercise an equivocal "control" over some "executive" has impelled the overwhelming majority to speak in terms of federal legislative powers'.[2] But in the case of the NPC, where the goal was 'co-operation', which at times was a euphemism for the sorting out of misunderstandings that arose between the Alliance's principal members, and where indeed no executive had been linked to the Conference, the demand for additional 'powers' did not seem entirely relevant. Indeed, the most the NPC ever sought was official recognition, 'consultative' status,[3] and an

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1. Gladwyn recommended that the EEC should take over 'the whole WEU machine as it is and to a certain extent merging it with the existing EEC apparatus': Lord Gladwyn, 'The Brussels Treaty and the European Institutions: Prospects for Western European Union', WEU Assembly, Proceedings: Documents, 17th session, 1971, no.554. (The quotation is from page 13.)
2. Haas, Uniting of Europe, p.391.
3. For a definition of the 'consultative' function see above, pp.13-14 and p.14 f.n.1. Hovey also terms consultative status as the authority to 'review, criticize, advise, [illegible], and publicise' (Superparliaments, p.151).

executive with which it could consult. Such status would have ensured the Conference of permanent financial support as well as of access to more information that all too often was the sole province of NATO's civil and military officials. Were the NPC to remain permanently in its present state, a mere talking-shop, it would be doomed to irrelevance. While no doubt in isolated instances its committees might initiate useful projects within the broad scope of Atlantic activities, it could not be taken seriously as a viable organisation.

A look at the development of the NPC during the 1960's reveals that it steadily became more firmly rooted in Atlantic affairs and did manage to achieve a limited degree of recognition from both the NATO organisation and its constituent governments. However, because this recognition was only partial, and of a de facto kind, the story of the NPC's efforts to achieve official status is one of unremitting failure. Consequently, a description of British parliamentary activity in this domain - unlike developments in the Council of Europe such activity on the part of a few British individuals was conspicuous in the NPC during the 'sixties - nevertheless is one of fruitless exertion.

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With the death of Walter Elliot in January 1958, the NPC had lost one of its strongest supporters at Westminster. Not only had Elliot continued to serve as Treasurer of the fledgling body, but he had provided financial support from his own pocket,[1] and had used his influence as an Conservative elder statesman to convince the Foreign Office to contribute to the Conference's coffers. Geoffrey de Freitas, who replaced him as Treasurer, and Lord Crathorne, who became delegation leader in 1959 (and leader of the Council of Europe delegation in 1961), continued to press for the Conference's reconstitution as a consultative assembly; but Elliot was sorely missed.

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1. Interview with Douglas Robinson, March 1971; interview with Baroness Elliot of Harwood, July 1971.

Two years after Elliot died Douglas Robinson left the NPC to take up a position with the Liberal party. Having had his closest links with British politicians, particularly with those who, like Maddan, had present or former connections with Federal Union, and working from headquarters that were across the square from the Palace of Westminster, he had tried, with some success, to stimulate parliamentary interest in his organisation. His departure, and replacement by Otto van H. Labberton, a Dutchman, coupled with the transfer of the Conference's administrative offices to Paris, meant that the Conference would become even more remote from British MPs. Unless some changes were made in its constitution, it was likely to become in most Members' eyes a replica of the infrequent Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and International Parliamentary Union gatherings which were good fun but were rarely taken seriously by anyone. Unfortunately, those changes could only be brought about by means of parliamentary pressure on governments, and in the British case, the move to Paris foreboded an absence of parliamentary interest, not to mention pressure.

The last major activity (apart from the 1959 Conference) Robinson directed from his office was the Atlantic Congress of 1959 where the question of official consultative status was once again mooted. Surprisingly, in view of the general lack of parliamentary interest in NPC affairs, a number of British parliamentarians not usually associated with the NPC took part in its planning. In fact, British participation in the project was manifest from its earliest planning stages in late 1957 until the actual holding of the sessions in London eighteen months later.[1]

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1. Among British politicians most active in organising the Congress were Lord Crathorne, chairman of the 'United Kingdom committee for the Atlantic Congress 1959', George Brown, his Vice-chairman, and Geoffrey de Freitas, chairman of the company which administered the Congress' funds (the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, pp.32-33; DAU papers).

Nevertheless, the Congress was not particularly successful in attracting new delegates to the NPC,[1] and it was even more disappointing on the question of consultative status for the 'assembly.' DAU sponsors Martin Maddan, a Conservative MP, and David Barton had co-authored a petition on non-military co-operation which had included a clause on the need for the North Atlantic Council officially to recognise the right of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to advise it on political, economic, cultural and social questions and to receive an annual report from the Secretary-General. The petition had been presented to the Congress in the name of the sponsors of DAU on the opening day of its proceedings;[2] By the end of the Congress most of its clauses had been endorsed outright; that of the future of the NPC was only "recommended for consideration". Endorsement of the clause on the Assembly in the DAU petition might not have meant very much; failure to endorse it, however, must surely have been a severe setback for the project's sponsors, and for the NPC leadership who organised the Congress.

Between 1959 and 1962 a number of plans which included the redefinition of the NPC's scope and powers were aired in Council of Europe circles. However, it was not until the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg took steps to investigate the suggestion that a new parliamentary assembly be created to debate the work of the newly established OECD that the NPC at its November 1962 meetings officially decided to broaden its own scope to include all matters relating to the new OECD.

Though the Parliamentarians' Conference had been slow in coming to grips with the issue of parliamentary supervision for the OECD, Walden Moore and

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1. Of the delegates to the Congress only Lady Elliot of Harwood and Lord Jellicoe subsequently attended conference sessions.

2. Moore, 'Short History of DAU', in Moore, ed. Second Declaration, p.43.

other Atlantic enthusiasts had, characteristically, already been considering the matter since 1960.[1] His proposal that the NPC expand its scope to become an 'OECD Assembly' was taken up at the 'Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations', a conclave of leading citizens that met in Paris in November 1961 for the purpose of making recommendations to promote 'greater co-operation and unity of purpose' within the Atlantic Community.[2] The Convention's proposals, outlined in its 'Declaration of Paris', had specifically urged that

> the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference be developed into a consultative Atlantic Assembly, to meet at stated intervals...3

When the NPC Political Committee finally produced its own proposals on the matter, they were, curiously enough, contradicted not only by the Council of Europe's plan, but by another set of NPC proposals that emerged from a different committee at the same time.[4] The Political Committee had recommended the transformation of the Conference into a two-tier assembly which would permit the neutral countries of the OECD to attend a second plenery session which would debate Atlantic matters not related to defence or strictly political issues. However, the NPC 'Special Subcommittee on Institutionalization' envisaged no change at all for the NPC in the immediate future, given the prevailing attitudes shown by Foreign Office officials in the Alliance's major capitals.

British parliamentarians were to be found on both sides of the question and, if the Consultative Assembly's position on an OECD Assembly is taken into account, on all three sides of the issue. Lord Ogmore, a Labour Peer, chaired the NPC Political Committee and was in agreement with

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1. Walden Moore, 'Extract from Report to U.S.Sponsors, Declaration of Atlantic Unity... dated May 5, 1960' (Barton papers).
2. Moore, ed., Second declaration, p.57.
3. Ibid., p.60.
4. The episode is recounted in Hovey, Superparliaments, pp.129-132.

its general conclusions (though he did not write its report).[1] He clearly must have felt that the NPC could only attain its full potential as an invaluable parliamentary arm of NATO if it were granted 'consultative' status. On the other hand, Lord Silkin - another Labour Peer - as vice-chairman of the NPC's Special Subcommittee's working group supported the view that there was no immediate need to obtain 'consultative' status; the Conference was a limited affair that at best might prove useful in a marginal way. As for the Consultative Assembly, especially its General Affairs Committee (one of whose rapporteurs was Maurice Macmillan) from which the proposal for an OECD assembly emanated, European affairs were the immediate priority. If any expansion were to take place in the international parliamentary sphere, it should be within the European, rather than the Atlantic context.

Although Strasbourg's stress on the primacy of European affairs came to be adopted by many British parliamentarians during the 'sixties, as shortly will be shown, the view Ogmore represented did not give precedence to Atlantic affairs over those concerning Europe: it certainly had no anti-EEC overtones. On the contrary, it was precisely because France had vetoed Britain's application for entry only two months before that the NPC Political Committee felt in March 1963 that 'formation of ...an (Atlantic) Assembly (was) a matter of urgency...as an antidote to the chauvinistic virus now abroad.'[2] Nevertheless, whatever its underlying rationale, the proposition that the Atlantic Alliance could best be strengthened by the immediate creation of a consultative NATO assembly commanded only minority

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1. John V. Lindsay and Eric P. Swenson, 'Report on the meeting of the officers of the Political Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, London, March 1-2, 1963' (Private papers of Mr. Peter Cusick, New York).

2. Ibid. Active British 'Europeans' who also supported plans for a consultative Atlantic assembly included Martin Maddan, of DAU and 'Britain in Europe' (described on pp. 341below); Lord Crathorne, leader of the delegation to Strasbourg, 1961-63, who discussed the Atlantic assembly project with President Kennedy and American legislators in Washington in the spring of 1963 (letter from Walden Moore to Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, MdB, 28 May 1963, Barton papers); and Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, about whom see immediately below.

support not only among British parliamentarians attending the 1963 NPC meetings, but among all Conference delegates that year.

Two years later, the question of 'consultative' status for the NPC again came to the fore. Late in 1965, Walden Moore, still the Director of DAU and as committed as ever to the cause of a consultative assembly for NATO, urged Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, who was returning as a delegate to the Conference after a three year stint as High Commissioner in Ghana and Kenya, to take up the cause of the Atlantic Assembly project at the November Conference.[1] Although de Freitas many years before had strongly opposed the concept of a 'consultative' assembly for NATO, he had long ago come to terms with the idea and as early as 1956 had commended it to his Government.[2] De Freitas agreed to press Moore's case at the NPC and successfully secured the unanimous passage of a resolution calling upon the Political Committee to 'prepare a report on the possibility of converting the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a Consultative Assembly of NATO, in an official relationship to the North Atlantic Council'.[3] Though he was also heavily involved in Council of Europe activities, and indeed became President of the Consultative Assembly the following spring, de Freitas undertook to write the report on the NPC's future. Not surprisingly, de Freitas approached Moore and his coterie for help when he drafted his report.[4] Indeed de Freitas had moved much closer to Moore since the early days of the NPC; in 1966 he finally signed the Declaration of Atlantic Unity,[5] after a decade of stubbornly refusing to do so.

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1. Moore to Patrick Gordon Walker, 29 October 1965 (Barton papers).
2. Hansard, 5th series, 1956, 562, written answers 235.
3. Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, 'Conversion of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a Consultative Assembly of NATO', Draft Report (NPC - (J. 36 PC (66) 10); 1966), p.1.
4. Moore to Patrick Gordon Walker, 29 October 1965.
5. De Freitas to Barton, 3 March 1966; De Freitas soon became a DAU sponsor.

The report which de Freitas presented to the Conference in 1966 did not envisage the participation of Neutrals in the new Assembly's deliberations. The OECD had not proved to be vital enough to demand the presence of Neutrals at an Atlantic Assembly, and, as de Freitas told the Political Committee in May 1966

> At the Council of Europe he welcomed the... neutral countries, but... He feared all sorts of problems arising if the neutrals were admitted to the Conference. The presence of the neutrals might lead to considerable watering-down of the activities and the scope of the Conference. 1

Thus were laid to rest the NPC's plans for overseeing OECD affairs, plans which had led to the mix-up of three years before.

De Freitas urged that the Assembly adopt a charter which would then be approved by the NATO governments and brought into existence in the form of an international agreement similar to that which established the international monetary fund and the world bank. In this way, 'if any NATO countries did not wish to help to set up an Assembly, the others could proceed without them, but leave the door open for them to come in later': French obstruction was thus obviated.

The functions of the new assembly were to resemble those of the other European 'parliaments'. It would have the power to make recommendations to the North Atlantic Council; to receive regular reports from the Secretary-General; to question and receive answers or formal refusals to answer; to invite representatives of the Secretary-General or the North Atlantic Council to appear before the Assembly and to question them orally. The key relationship would be with the Secretariat General rather than with the North Atlantic Council, 'which is composed of national representatives who would have to reach agreement to adopt any common position on a request or inquiry from the Assembly'.[2]

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1. NPC, 'Minutes of the Political Committee held at NATO Headquarters on 10 May 1966' (J. 98 PC (66) 30), p.16 (Cusick papers).
2. De Freitas. 'Conversion', p.2.

At first sight it might seem strange that de Freitas, despite a disclaimer to the contrary, was attempting to create an Atlantic version of the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly, a body which, but for the peculiar circumstances of Britain's relations with Europe during the 'sixties, had become, politically speaking, a harmless talking shop. The crucial difference, however, lay in the composition of the two assemblies. The presence of U.S.Legislators, who were not bound by party Whips, meant that often what they said could be a factor in the American political system. It would be much more difficult for a ministerial body brazenly to rebuff the inquiries of a high-powered group of Senators and Congressmen, some of whom were chairmen of committees that played a vital role in the American legislative process, than to administer a similar slight to more co-operative Government, or ineffective Opposition, back-benchers. Furthermore, whereas at Strasbourg the dissemination of information had rarely been a crucial issue, within the NATO context it was paramount; indeed, it was primarily for that reason that Governments were reluctant to grant any sort of official recognition to the Assembly. The 'consultative' assembly that de Freitas envisaged therefore still would serve primarily an 'educative' function but, given the security aspects of NATO's activities, once MPs could receive a full briefing on defence matters, their advice was likely to command greater attention from the NATO authorities than it otherwise would have done. Interpreted in this way, an 'educative' function for the NPC ultimately led to its performing a true 'consultative' (in the sense of advice-giving) function as well.

To be sure, de Freitas did not expect governments to capitulate so easily to the NPC's demands. Nevertheless, he was certain that they would have to give it a guarantee of financial support if it became an official assembly.[1] Better services and secure financial support would

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1. 'Minutes of the Political Committee', p.18.

enable the Assembly to enhance its prestige, until it would eventually reach the point where it could exert its political muscle to gain access to more information and to have its recommendations taken more seriously. It was this goal that de Freitas aimed for in the short term.

The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference approved de Freitas' proposals and even went so far as to rename itself the North Atlantic Assembly. But true official recognition could only be forthcoming if the North Atlantic Council unanimously endorsed the Assembly's proposals. This it failed to do. One stumbling block was Britain, which was opposed to any strengthening of the Assembly.[1]

Moore, ever pressing in support of the Assembly scheme, fumed at the British stance and tried to engage support on both sides of the House to change the Government's attitude. In 1966 he met with a number of Conservatives, and urged them to press for official Opposition support for the implementation of the Atlantic Assembly project.[2] Three months later he wrote to Edward Heath, who was also approached by Maddan on the matter, but the Leader of the Opposition's reply was non-committal.[3]

Moore's efforts at changing the Government's attitude proved equally fruitless. In November 1966 he had met with Lord Walston, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the following month had written to George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, whose acquaintance he had made when Brown was an active delegate to the NPC.[4] Moore also wrote to Fred Mulley, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office from 1967-69, with whom he was on first-name terms, and who was a signatory of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity. All of his approaches led him nowhere because the Government were

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1. Moore to Lithgow Osborne, November 5, 1966 (Barton papers).
2. Recorded in a letter from Moore to Lithgow Osborne, 5 Nov.1966 (Barton papers). The Conservatives were Peter Emery, DAU Honorary Treasurer, Earl Jellicoe, Gilbert Longden, Sir Michael Wright and Martin Maddan.
3. Heath to Moore, 7 February 1967.
4. Moore to George Brown, 7 December 1966 (Barton papers).

able to retreat under the cover of the unanimity rule of the North Atlantic Council, and it was known that France was opposed to any changes in the NPC's status.[1]

Moore's efforts were paralleled by those of de Freitas, Robert Edwards, who became leader of the British delegation in 1967, and a number of other British delegates, some of whom raised the matter in both oral and written questions in the House, only to receive a variant of the same stock-in-trade reply that 'while we accept in principle the objective of an official North Atlantic Assembly, this would require the agreement of the whole alliance'.[2] It is possible that as EEC entry was again the major issue confronting Britain, the Government preferred not to risk annoying the French by supporting the rather incidental notion of a consultative Assembly in the North Atlantic Council. Whatever the reason, the Government's position on the question remained firm - and negative.

In 1968 Manlio Brosio, NATO 's newly-appointed Secretary General, agreed to make regular statements to the Assembly; to lend it the services of his staff; and to deal with it through the offices of NATO's political directorate. That same year the North Atlantic Council replied for the first time to recommendations passed by the Assembly in its previous session. But these technical concessions did not fully alter the Assembly's status. Its relationship to NATO remained unofficial. As far as British parliamentarians were concerned, however, the situation still merited little attention. As Geoffrey de Freitas, who in 1970 again reported on

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1. Moore to Patrick Gordon Walker, 29 Oct.1965. In Aug.1967 Walter Dowling, Director-General of the Atlantic Institute, confirmed continuing French 'doubts' about the proposal, though it was not clear whether these doubts were merely about the need to move the NAA to Brussels if it became a NATO organ, or whether they were of a more fundamental nature. (Letter to Moore, 25 Aug.1967 - Barton Papers).

2. Fred Mulley's reply to a question by John Peel: Hansard, 5th series, 1968, 775, written answers, 247. See also ibid., 775, 450; ibid., 759, written answers 10. Edwards also approached Mulley with little success (NAA, Standing Committee, 'Minutes of Meeting of 8 July 1968', p.9).

the question of the Assembly's status, had remarked in a letter in July of the previous year 'Everyone I know in Parliament, whether in the Government, on the Opposition Front Benches, or on the backbenches, is so concerned about Europe that they are unlikely to spend much time in consideration of Atlantic matters'.[1] The observation was not only valid for the 1969-70 period; it summed up British attitudes, at least as far as the NPC was concerned, over the entire decade.

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The institutional aspirations of all three assemblies, embodied and enumerated in the creation of committees and the passage of reports and recommendations, may have differed in degree from one to the other, but they all shared a common fate: unceasing frustration. In each case, at least as far as British MPs were concerned, it was the development of new British overtures to the EEC that contributed to that frustration. With respect to the 'European' assemblies, no British delegate had come forward in strong support of any proposal for the reorganisation of the Council of Europe, while the one British member of the Consultative Assembly's committee that was studying the question of reorganisation resigned because he felt that the expansion of the EEC had to be completed first. The reform of WEU likewise evoked little enthusiasm on the part of British delegates, for essentially the same reasons. As for the NPC, or NAA as it chose to style itself, it made a number of attempts to attain an 'official' 'consultative' relationship with NATO, but it could only arrest a very few British parliamentarians in support of its aspirations, though even their pro-forma realisation would already have afforded to it the prospect at least of fulfilling a truly 'educative' function as well. Nevertheless, for the majority of British parliamentarians, many of whom were far more concerned about European developments, the NPC, even more than the other

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1. De Freitas to Moore, 30 July 1969 (Barton Papers).

assemblies, continued to appear as little more than a pleasant paid holiday where one learned a bit about NATO, had a chance to hob-nob with North American legislators and lulled oneself into thinking, as some British delegates appear to have done, that on a personal level the 'special relationship' between MP and Senator, Peer and Congressman, still remained special.[1]

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1. Based on a number of unattributable interviews. This attitude seems to have been shared on the American side. Congressmen, when interviewed, still thought there was a 'special relationship' with the British, not least because of language affinity. Professor H.G. Nicholas has asserted that the 'special relationship' exists primarily in the non-governmental, non-institutional spheres of contact between Americans and the British, that it is informal but nevertheless very real: H.G. Nicholas, Britain and the United States (London, Chatto and Windus, 1963), pp.171-176.

Chapter 6

Participation in Assembly Affairs
An attempt at quantitative analysis

It is perhaps as difficult to measure the degree to which a single delegation to an international parliamentary assembly participates in its affairs as it is to assess the activities of the assembly as a whole. Of the latter difficulty, one observer has written that

> evaluating their (the assemblies') performance scientifically would call for measuring the volume of public discussion attributable to each assembly, determining the extent to which parliamentarians' participation has modified their views of political issues, and drawing up a balance sheet that sets the roster of assembly recommendations against the corresponding actions taken by national governments.... For the most part, interparliamentary consultation does not lend itself to such quantitative analysis. The evidence is necessarily fragmentary and the judgments are ultimately subjective. 1

Similarly unquantifiable, though for a different set of reasons, is the aggregate of assembly-related activities in which delegates to international assemblies participate. One cannot measure the effects on assembly policy of backroom discussions by delegates during sessions, or, indeed, between them. Nor can one quantify the incidence - or value - of private discussions which delegates may hold with Ministers of their Governments in relation to a given assembly recommendation.[2] The brevity and, worse still, the confidentiality and inaccessibility of committee records make it extremely difficult to ascertain the degree to which any committee member, including its chairman, played an active role in its deliberations. Can one say for certain that a speech in the assembly chamber in support of a recommendation indicates that the speaker played an active role in its formulation? How much importance can be attached to the absence of a delegate during an

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1. Hovey, Superparliaments, pp.3-4.

2. See Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.145.

important debate, or indeed to his presence? Can one say that if a delegate tables a question in his national parliament in relation to an assembly recommendation he is probably campaigning privately for its adoption? Can one say that if no such questions are tabled, the recommendation has been ignored? Many of these questions are unanswerable; no documentation exists to resolve them one way or the other.

The yardsticks for measuring delegates' activities in relation to the international assemblies they attend are therefore as inadequate and incomplete as those which measure the efficiency of the assemblies themselves. Nevertheless, some of these yardsticks provide at least a rough guide as to the extent of the delegation's involvement in assembly affairs and, in the case of the British delegation, can allow for some general conclusions to be offered about the nature, as well as degree, of that involvement.[1]

There are two categories of tools that can be employed to measure the involvement of British delegates. The first is to be found in the context of the assemblies themselves and comprises the list of committee offices held by British delegates and the reports which they put forth. There are other indications of delegate participation in assembly affairs to be found within this context, notably speeches and motions, but, as Blondel has noted[2] neither of these is particularly reliable. British politicians, like their counterparts elsewhere, seem to relish the opportunity of rising to speak before their fellow parliamentarians just for the sake of hearing their own voices. Nothing can be more frustrating to a British MP than not 'catching the Speaker's eye' in the Commons. All he has to do at the Assemblies, however, is to sign a register of Speakers and, at the appropriate

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1. This and the following Chapter will deal with the gamut of assembly activities that are embodied in recommendations with the exception of questions pertaining to institutionalisation, which were discussed in Chapters 1,2 & 5 and to British-EEC relations, to be considered in Chapter 9.

2. Blondel, in Lindsay, ,Assemblies, pp.145-146.

moment, the 'Speaker' is hypnotised. For many delegates that is reason enough to want to speak. It is therefore sometimes almost impossible to tell where egocentricity ends and interest in the recommendation at hand begins. As to motions, these are usually signed by a number of delegates, so that it is extremely difficult to tell who initiated the motion. Furthermore, even if a motion is signed by one delegate, he may have formulated it together with a number of colleagues; in this case as well its origins are untraceable.

The second category of 'tools' for analysis are to be found in the context of delegates' activities at Westminster. Within this context motions, in the form of Early Day Motions, and speeches, particularly in Commons debates, would be useful indicators of delegates' involvement in assembly affairs were more of them available on record. However, only a handful of Early Day Motions have been tabled since 1961 on matters pertaining specifically to the work of the Council of Europe or WEU, and none at all concerning the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Though a number of general motions have been tabled since 1960 on the question of British entry to the EEC, they cannot be considered the exclusive province of delegates as that issue has since 1961 been of a magnitude to command the attention of most British politicians.[1] Similarly, though a number of debates have been held on Britain and the EEC and EFTA, very few have specifically dealt with any other issue raised by the three assemblies, separately or collectively. For a more complete source of information which might provide a basis for conclusions about delegates' assembly-related activities, one must turn to the collection of oral and written questions about Council of Europe, WEU and NPC/NAA affairs that has grown yearly since the creation of each assembly. These questions provide at

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1. It will be discussed in Chapter 9.

least an indication that some attention is being paid to the recommendations, resolutions and opinions that are formulated by each assembly every session.[1]

If one first looks at the indicators drawn from British participation at the three assemblies themselves, one finds that there has been a somewhat uneven distribution of British representatives among the various committees of the three assemblies. At the Council of Europe, Britain always provided a high proportion of committee chairmen and vice-chairmen combined,

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TABLE E

Council of Europe - Consultative Assembly
British Chairmanships and Vice-Chairmanships

		1949-59	1960-70	Increase
a)	Avg. tot. no. of delegates (1) per annum.	236	265	12.0%
b)	Avg. annual no. of British delegates (1)	29	33	13.8%
c)	(b) as percentage of (a)	12.3%	12.7%	3.2%
d)	Tot. chairmanships and vice-chairmanships available (2)	308	388	27.3%
e)	Tot. chairmanships available (2)	112	136	10.7%
f)	Tot. British-held chairmanships and vice-chairmanships	53	54	1.9%
g)	Tot. British-held chairmanships	7	18	157.1%
h)	(f) as percentage of (d)	17.2%	13.9%	-19.2%
i)	(g) as percentage of (e)	6.2%	13.2%	120.0%

(note 1): figures include substitutes. Substitutes have functioned in the same way as 'representatives' and have come to be treated as such by the Assembly's rules of procedure. See above pp. 47 f.n. 1, 48, 133, 162 and below, pp. 264-265.

(note 2): every chairmanship and vice-chairmanship was considered 'available' each year of its existence, even if held by the same delegate for several years (thus the chairmanship of the Political Committee, if held for two years by a Belgian and for three years by a Dane, was nevertheless considered 'available' five times. Statistics compiled on basis of data furnished by Documents of Consultative Assembly).

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1. Another possible yardstick would be the degree to which delegates inform their constituents of their assembly activities. An attempt to employ some method of quantitative analysis to a virtually unquantifiable problem is outlined in Chapter 4.

but in fact her proportion of chairmanships was far lower before 1960 than afterward. The holding of a vice-chairmanship does not necessarily indicate that a delegate played - or was ready to play - a truly active role in committee affairs. A number of delegates have assumed their posts immediately upon first arriving at Strasbourg, before they could possibly have made their mark upon the work of the Assembly.[1] The position has no fixed responsibilities: some vice-chairmen will preside over sub-committees, some will produce reports on behalf of their committees (statistics on rapporteurs appear in Tables H and I), but others have done neither. Chairmen, on the other hand, are generally appointed after several years of service at the Assembly. Indeed Blondel has noted[2] that tenure is an important factor in the choice of committee chairmen, and that British MPs tended to be at a disadvantage because their stay at the Assembly was so short. Their duties are certainly arduous: they not only have to chair their own committees, and serve ex officio - and often actively - on sub-committees, but also are statutory members of the Assembly's Standing Committee, which oversees the day-to-day functioning of the Assembly the year round, and participate in the Joint Committee of Assembly and Committee of Ministers representatives if a question in their own committee is under its consideration. Given the burden of committee work at the Assembly - which, according to the Assembly staff, consumes more energy and effort than the plenary sessions[3] - as well as the tenure 'requirements' involved, it is clearly significant that the number of British-held chairmanships more than doubled after 1960 not only in absolute terms, but in relative terms as well.

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1. British delegates who assumed vice-chairmanships during their first session at Strasbourg include Edith Burton (Social Committee, 1954), Robert Chichester-Clark (Committee on Rules of Procedure, 1959); Mark Hewitson (Committee on Refugees, 1951) and William Ross (Rules of Procedure, 1952).

2. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, pp.147-148.

3. Council of Europe Secretariat, Manual, p.45.

If one turns to the WEU Assembly, however, one does not find a similar increase in Britain's share of committee chairmanships (though her share of vice-chairmanships did increase). Indeed it declined, though it barely dropped below her percentage of assembly delegates. However, the figures are both exaggerated and distorted by the fact that WEU had only five

TABLE F

WEU Assembly
Chairmanships and Vice-Chairmanships

		1955-59	1960-70	Increase
a)	Avg. annual tot. no. of delegates (3)	166	176	6.0%
b)	Avg. annual tot. of British delegates (3)	29	33	13.8%
c)	(b) as percentage (a)	17.4%	18.7%	0.7%
d)	Total offices available (4)	51	175	343.0%
e)	Annual average of (d)	10.2	15.9	57.8%
f)	Total chairmanships available (4)	21	60	188.9%
g)	Annual average of (f)	4.2	5.5	30.9%
h)	British-held offices	11	34	209.0%
i)	Annual average of (h)	2.2	3.1	40.9%
j)	British -held chairmanships	6	11	83.3%
k)	Annual average of (j)	1.2	1	-16.7%
l)	British share of offices ((h) as percentage of (d))	21.5%	19.3%	-10.2%
m)	British share of chairmanships ((j) as percentage of (f))	28.6%	18.3%	-31.5%

(note 3: see Table E note 1;) (Note 4: see Table E note 2)

committees until 1965, and has added only one since then (there are presently thirteen committees functioning at Strasbourg), and are also affected by the imbalance involved in comparing figures for an eleven year period with those for a five year period. Thus the fact that one man, John Edwards, chaired the Budget Committee for five years, from 1955 to 1959, already would account for Britain's having a 20 per cent.'share' of chairmanships in that period. The significant WEU figures involving British delegates lie rather in the breakdown of offices actually held by them.

TABLE G

Breakdown of WEU Committee Offices held by British Delegates

(figures in brackets represent share of available posts)

	1955-59	1960-70	Increase	
Defence Committee:				
Chairmanships	1 (25%)	3 (27%)	8%	8%
Vice-chairmanships	2 (25%)	6 (27%)	8%	
General Affairs Committee				
Chairmanships	0 (-)	4 (36%)	(-)	
Vice-chairmanships	0 (-)	3 (14%)	(-)	
Cttee. on Rules of Procedure				
Vice-chairmanships	4 (50%)	5 (23%)	-54%	
Budget Committee				
Chairmanships	5 (100%)	4 (36%)	-64%	-18%
Vice-chairmanships	0 (-)	5 (23%)	(-)	
Science and Space Committee				
Vice-chairmanships	-	3 (25%)	(-)	

It will be seen that the most significant increases involved the important General Affairs Committee, which during the 1960's was responsible for formulating the Assembly's many recommendations concerning British entry to the EEC. The British share of offices on the Defence Committee also increased slightly. It was, on the other hand, with respect to the lesser committees that the decline in the British 'share' of chairmanships was to be found. Like the Committee on Rules of Procedure, the Budget Committee's importance was at best a marginal one, except in the technical internal sense of having some say over WEU's budget. As was noted above,[1] that budget was not a terribly large one, and the significance of the committee was proportionally small.

It is noteworthy that three of the post-1960 chairmanships in the two assemblies - and it should not be forgotten that they had identical personnel insofar as Britain and the Six were concerned - went to delegates with relatively brief tenures. This development does not necessarily belie

Blondel's belief that British politicians could not hope to assume committee chairmanships as long as they were only attached to the delegation for brief periods of two or three years.[1] It is noteworthy that the three delegates in question - Samuel Silkin and Arthur Blenkinsop, who became chairmen of the Consultative Assembly's Legal and Social Affairs Committees, respectively, but a year after they joined the delegation, and Robert Edwards, who became chairman of the WEU Defence Committee after two years as a delegate - were all Labour MPs and had became chairmen at a time when the Labour Government was actively pressing for British entry into the EEC. One may surmise that many continental delegates to the assemblies were willing to allow relative newcomers to assume committee chairmanships in order to emphasise their support for the British application and for the notion that Britain was primarily a European power. Had Britain shown as much interest in European developments and schemes during the previous decade as she did in the 'sixties, and had more British delegates to the assemblies displayed a strong interest in attaining committee chairmanships in order to show by deed as well as word that they were 'good Europeans,' those chairmanships may well have proved to have been available.

Evidence derived from a comparison of the number of British-held rapporteurships at the WEU Assembly from 1960 onwards with corresponding figure for the previous five years also lends some support to this conclusion. It must be reiterated that the importance of the committee rapporteur is second only to that of its chairman; although his report must

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1. Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, pp.147-148. His argument is weakened, however, by his taking into account delegates' total tenure though at the time they assumed their committee posts it was difficult to foretell whether their tenure would exceed the usual two or three years. Other British delegates who held committee chairmanships inthe 'sixties had served longer terms at the assemblies. For example Peter Kirk, who chaired several committees at both Strasbourg and Paris in the 'sixties, first attended assembly sessions in 1956. See Appendices 1 and 8.

be approved by the committee, the nuances of that report are always his own.[1] As shown in Table H, Britain's annual share of rapporteurs at WEU rose by 23.7 per cent. in the 1960-70 period. Significantly, in the all-important General Affairs and Defence committees, the number of British rapporteurs jumped from two to 11 and from 6 to 22 respectively, a combined increase in the annual average of 88 per cent. These substantial increases in British activity at the Assembly can without doubt be traced to WEU's special importance in the 1960's as a point of contact between Britain and the Six.

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TABLE H

WEU Assembly - Rapporteurships

	1955-59	1960-70	Increase
a) Avg. annual tot. no. of delegates (5)	166	176	6. %
b) Avg. annual no. of British delegates (5)	29	33	13.8%
c) (b) as percentage of (a)	17.4%	18.7%	0.7%
d) Tot. rapporteurships available (6)	58	180	210.3%
e) Annual avg. of (d)	11.6	16.4	41.4%
f) Tot. British-held rapporteurships (6)	12	46	283.3%
g) Annual avg. of (f)	2.4	4.2	75.0%
h) (f) as percentage of (d)	20.7%	25.6%	23.7%

(note 5: see Table E note 1), (note 6: see Table E note 2)

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Although figures for Britain's share of rapporteurships at the Consultative Assembly again reveal a slight decline after 1960, it must be noted that despite this fall Britain continued to provide proportionately more rapporteurs than her share of seats at the Assembly. Given the marked increase in the absolute number of reports delivered to the Assembly, it is

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1. For a discussion of the importance of the rapporteur in continental legislatures see K.C.Wheare, Legislatures (London, OUP, 1963), pp.156-157 and Michel Ameller, Parliaments: A Comparative Study on the Structure and Functioning of Representative Institutions in Fifty-Five Countries, rev.ed. (London, IPU/Cassell, 1966), pp.120, 168-170.

perhaps not surprising that Britain's delegates did not assume as great a share of the workload as they previously had done, especially as their share of chairmanships had indeed increased substantially.

TABLE I

Consultative Assembly - Rapporteurships

		1949-59	1960-70	Increase
a)	Avg. tot. no. of delegates per annum (7)	236	265	12 %
b)	Avg. annual no. of British delegates (7)	29	33	13.8%
c)	British 'share' of delegates	12.3%	12.7%	3.2%
d)	Tot. Rapporteurships available (8)	316	555	75.6%
e)	Tot. British-held rapporteurships (8)	50	80	60.0%
f)	British 'share' of rapporteurships	15.8%	14.4%	-8.9%

(note 7: see Table E note 1), (note 8: see Table E note 2)

Furthermore, a committee-by-committee analysis reveals that in absolute terms the number of British rapporteurs either increased or remained the same on every committee but one, the rather insignificant Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, with the largest increases taking place on the important Legal, Economic and Agricultural Committees. Indeed, were the Committee on Rules of Procedure left out of the calculation, Britain's share of rapporteurships would actually have reflected a 9 per cent. rise after 1960, from 13.4 per cent. to 14.6 per cent.

It is noteworthy that not only in the 1960's, but throughout the existence of both assemblies, the highest proportion of British chairmen, vice-chairmen and rapporteurs were to be found in the leading committees of both bodies.[1] Nevertheless, British delegates could be found holding

1. Major committees would include the General Affairs and Science committees of both assemblies, WEU's Defence Committee and the Consultative Assembly's Legal, Economic, Social, Cultural and Agricultural committees. An outline of committee activities appears in Chapter 7.

committee posts in virtually every field of activity considered by one or both of the assemblies. In general, the distribution of committee posts among the two major parties has been fairly even, with the exception of the Cultural, Agricultural and Regional Affairs Committees in which Conservatives have predominated. The Legal Committee has been a haven for barristers of both parties, and delegation whips have tended to gravitate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privilege.

Although the above figures for Britain's share of the CA/WEU committee posts obviously is inversely proportional to the overall figures for all other delegations (i.e. in the case of WEU, for example, the 'Six' share of committee posts is seen to have declined after 1960), it may nevertheless be instructive to compare the experience of the British delegation with that of several other representative delegations at the assemblies. Clearly, it is in the context of the Consultative Assembly that these comparisons can best be made, for that assembly's membership allows for a wider range of delegations to choose from, and, due both to its earlier creation and its longer annual sessions, it provides more material for analysis.

Of the sixteen nations presently members of the Council of Europe (Britain excepted), five have been selected for comparative analysis: the delegations of Belgium, France, West Germany, Sweden ahd Turkey. Each of these delegations, with the exception of the German, have been charter members of the Consultative Assembly (the German delegation appeared on the scene in 1950) and thus can be compared over the long-term. Three of them, Belgium, France and the Federal Republic, were members of the original ECSC/EEC 'Six'. Two of the three, France, with the largest delegation[1]

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1. The figures in the tables that are presented below, with the exception of figures for pre-1960 Turkish delegations, are for both representatives and substitutes, as were those in Tables E-I. For comment on the role of substitutes see above, p.227 Table E, note (1) and below, pp. 264-265.

to the Consultative Assembly (18 representatives, the same number as that of Britain, Germany and Italy) and Belgium, with a seven-man representation, reflect their national multi-party political systems. Germany, on the other hand, has a modified two-party system similar in some respects to that of Britain, which is reflected in its delegation membership. In comparing these delegations for their respective share of Assembly posts, it therefore may be possible to determine whether the number of parties that are represented on a delegation bears any relationship to the relative number of committee posts that the delegations hold. In other words, does the multiple nature of their party representation provide these states with a better or poorer chance to gain a better than proportional share of committee posts?

The statistics derived from the other two 'representative' states, Sweden and Turkey, both with multi-party systems, will also be of value in helping to establish the relationship. But these two delegations deserve consideration for other reasons as well. Sweden falls into two categories of assembly groupings. She is both a Neutral state as well as one of the Council's Scandinavian group of states. Sweden shared Britain's early antipathy toward federalist causes but, like the other Assembly Neutrals (except Ireland) - and unlike her Scandinavian neighbours Denmark and Norway - she did not follow Britain in reversing her anti-integrationist position and applying for membership of the EEC. It is worth discovering whether the permanence of her attitude to questions of European integration was reflected by a stable measure of participation in Assembly affairs that did not undergo marked change after 1960. Finally, Turkey is one of a number of Council of Europe members - Malta, Greece (when it was a full member) and Cyprus are the others - which are not usually associated with any sub-regional or political grouping (though they in fact account for the Council's South-Eastern flank) such as Scandinavia, 'the Six' or the traditional 'Neutrals'. Having been a charter member of the Consultative Assembly and unlike Greece -

the other charter member of the four - not having missed a number of Assembly sessions, the Turkish delegation would appear to be the most suitable of this group for comparative study.[1]

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TABLE J

Britain and Five Other Council of Europe States:
A Comparison of Committee Offices

A) Delegates (share of delegates in brackets)

	1949-59	1960-70	Increase
Total	236	265	12 %
UK	29 (12.3%)	33 (12.7%)	13.8% (3.2%)
France	36 (15.3%)	36 (13.6%)	- (-11.1%)
Germany	36 (15.3%)	36 (13.6%)	- (-11.1%)
Belgium	13 (5.5%)	14 (5.3%)	7.6% (-3.6%)
Sweden*	12 (5.8%)	12 (4.5%)	- (-22.6%)
Turkey	9 (3.8%)	17 (6.4%)	88.8% (68.4%)

* From 1962 onwards Turkey sent a team of substitutes together with the team of representatives; all other states sent substitutes from 1949.

B) Chairmanships and vice-chairmanships (share in brackets)

	1949-59	1960-70	Increase
Total	308	388	27.3%
UK	53 (17.2%)	54 (13.9%)	1.9% (-19.2%)
France	49 (15.9%)	38 (9.8%)	-25.5% (-38.4%)
Germany	38 (12.3%)	75 (19.3%)	85.0% (56.1%)
Belgium	48 (15.6%)	42 (10.9%)	-12.5% (-30.1%)
Sweden	12 (3.9%)	7 (1.8%)	-41.7% (-53.8%)
Turkey	7 (2.3%)	2 (.5%)	-71.4% (-78.3%)

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1. The Consultative Assembly has grouped its members in two different ways. For purposes of electing Assembly Vice-Presidents, the four big powers (UK, France, Germany, Italy) form one group; the Scandinavian countries a second; Benelux, a third; Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, a fourth; and Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland, a fifth. For the purposes of allocating committee seats, the groups are: the big powers; Austria, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey; Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Norway (Council of Europe Secretariat, Manual, pp. 42-43).

TABLE J cont/.....

C) Chairmanships only (share in brackets)

	1949-59	1960-70	Increase
Total	112	136	12.7%
UK	7 (6.2%)	18 (13.2%)	157.1% (120.0%)
France	30 (26.8%)	13 (9.6%)	-36.7% (-64.2%)
Germany	10 (9.0%)	33 (24.3%)	230.0% (170.0%)
Belgium	23 (20.5%)	18 (13.2%)	-21.6% (-35.6%)
Sweden	8 (7.1%)	5 (3.7%)	-37.5% (-47.4%)
Turkey	0 (-)	0 (-)	- (-)

D) Rapporteurships (share in brackets)

	1949-59	1960-70	Increase
Total	316	555	75.6%
UK	50 (15.8%)	80 (14.4%)	43.4% (-8.9%)
France	53 (16.5%)	91 (16.4%)	71.7% (-0.6%))
Germany	42 (13.3%)	71 (12.8%)	69.7% (-3.8%)
Belgium	54 (17.1%)	56 (10.1%)	3.7% (-40.1%)
Sweden	11 (3.1%)	30 (5.4%)	17.3% (74.9%)
Turkey	5 (1.9%)	5 (1.0%)	- (-52.6%)

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The figures in Table J clearly indicate that not all Assembly delegations shared fortunes exactly opposite to those of Britain in the two eleven-year periods. While Belgium and France, both extremely active delegations (as Table J-C in particular indicates), did lose their commanding hold of Assembly chairmanships and vice-chairmanships as Britain gained more of them, Germany, like Britain, added to its share while Turkey held not one chairmanship during the entire 1949-70 period. It will be seen that before 1960 the Belgians in particular held more offices than their share of delegates would have indicated they should, while Britain, Germany and Turkey held less than their 'share'. One reason for the different fortunes the delegations encountered at Strasbourg was the length of their tenure there, which in Britain's case, as noted above, was very short indeed. Table K indicates the variations in the average and median tenure from one delegation to the next. It will be seen that Belgium has always had a relatively low turnover frequency while Turkey has had a very high one. The Belgians generally appoint their

TABLE K

Britain and Five Other Council of Europe States: A Comparison of Delegation Tenures

	1949-59		1960*-70		Increase (in average)
	Med.	Avg.	Med.	Avg.	
United Kingdom:					
Conservatives	2.0	2.3 yrs	3.0	3.1 yrs	34.8%
Labour	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.3	27.8%
Liberals	3.0	2.7	2.0	2.0	37.0%
Total	2.0	2.20	2.0	2.75	25.0%
France:					
Gaullists and allies (!)	4.0	3.4	4.0	5.0	47.1%
Right-wing parties (!!)	1.0	3.3	3.0	3.8	15.2%
Socialist parties (*)	4.0	5.1	3.0	5.5	7.8%
Non-Socialist Left (**)	4.0	5.6	4.5	5.9	5.3%
Centre parties (***)	7.0	6.6	4.5	5.3	-19.4%
Total	3.0	4.50	4.0	4.98	10.7%
W. Germany:					
Christian Democrats/ Christian Socialists	4.0	4.7	4.5	6.0	27.6%
Socialists	4.0	4.7	5.0	6.0	27.6%
Free Democrats (Lib.)	4.0	5.0	3.0	2.8	-44.0%
Total	4.0	4.60	4.0	5.55	20.7%
Belgium:					
Social Christians	7.0	6.1	8.0	9.8	60.7%
Socialists	5.0	6.4	5.0	6.2	8.1%
Liberals	2.5	3.8	5.5	5.5	44.7%
Total	5.0	5.65	5.0	7.20	27.5%
Sweden:					
Conservatives	8.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	-
Peasant Union/Centre	7.0	7.0	4.0	8.3	18.6%
Social Democrats	6.0	5.2	4.5	5.3	1.9%
Liberals	4.5	5.3	5.0	5.8	9.4%
Total	5.0	5.25	4.0	5.89	12.2%
Turkey:					
Popular Republicans	1.0	1.3	1.5	2.1	61.5%
Democrats (pre '61)	3.0	3.6	-	-	-
New Turkey (post '61)	-	-	1.0	1.5	-
Justice (post '61)	-	-	2.0	2.4	-
National Republican/ Peasant	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	100.0%
Total	1.0	1.26	2.0	2.11	68.4%

Notes: *- many delegates obviously began their term of service before 1960. In order to ensure that a long pre-1960 tenure did not distort the figures, pre-1960 tenures were only included in the calculation if the delegate continued to serve after 1962 (i.e. for at least a fourth of the second period).

(!) UNR/UDT/UDR/RPF and Independent Republicans
(!!) CNIP, Moderates, Peasant parties, Indepéndents, Algerian parties
(*) FGDS, SFIO, PSU
(**) Radicals, USDR, RGR, CAD, Republican Centre, Gauche Démocratique
(***) MRP, PDM, Centre Démocratique

(Source for classification: Henig & Pinder, eds. European Political Parties)

delegations for a tenure that stretches at least until the complete or partial renewal of the particular one of the two legislative chambers that has assigned the delegate his term of office. Renewals are, however, not only possible, but frequent as well. No less than eleven Belgian delegates (out of a total of 47) have served a decade or more at the assemblies. Perhaps not surprisingly therefore, four of them have served as committee chairmen, five others were vice chairmen, while nine of them served as rapporteurs on at least three different occasions. The Turks, on the other hand, have never sent a single delegate (of their total of 131) to the Assembly for more than seven years and sent only three for that period. Each Turkish chamber appoints its delegates for but a single-year term, and, unlike the Belgians, the Turks tend not to renew their delegates' mandates, and if they do, it is generally for an additional year only. The French and the Germans, like the Belgians, also appoint their delegates for multiple year periods: each French chamber appoints its representatives until its partial or complete renewal, while all German delegates serve for the duration of the legislature. Thus while the average and median tenures for French and German delegates are about the same, and are within a year of the tenure of Belgian delegates; they are double those of British delegates, whose appointment is on a renewable annual basis. The fact that Germany radically increased its share of committee offices after 1960 is probably due at least in part to its having arrived on the Strasbourg scene a year late, so that all committees already had their incumbent officers while there already were previous claimants for whatever vacancies were likely to occur in the early 'fifties. By the mid-'fifties, however, long-serving German delegates were in a good position to claim committee offices, particularly chairmanships, as seen in Table L below.

The importance of tenure, however, must not be overstressed, as not only the figures for the British delegation, but those for the Swedes clearly indicate. Obviously if one delegation, like the Belgian, had more than its

share of offices, some other delegation would have had to have less than its share. Table L shows that in 1955 no less than ten of twelve chairmanships were held by delegates of four states. Clearly several states apart from Britain and Turkey accounted for no chairman at all, regardless of the average tenure of their delegates.

TABLE L

Britain and Five Council of Europe States
Chairmanships - Selected Years

	1949	1952	1955	1958	1961	1964	1967	1970
UK	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	4
France	2	3	3	2	1	1	2	1
Germany	0	0	2	2	3	3	2	1
Belgium	0	2	3	3	1	1	2	1
Sweden	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	0
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Committees	6	9	12	12	12	12	13	13

With regard to the various parties comprising the delegations, it will immediately be noted that their respective tenures vary somewhat. In general, however, it can be seen that all parties of each state examined follow a similar tenure pattern, which of course is heavily influenced by the rules set by each legislative chamber for the appointment of delegates, rules which apply to all parties equally if delegates are elected for fixed terms by proportional methods.[1]

It might be thought that states with multi-party representation might be at a disadvantage in adding to their total of committee offices, since

1. See Appendix 9 for a breakdown of the way in which each delegation to Strasbourg is appointed. Unlike the British methods, French, Belgian, German, Swedish and Turkish delegations are all appointed by their assembly chambers (on proposals by their party groups).

each member party would have but a few delegates at the Assembly, who would thereby as a group have a poorer chance of obtaining the offices they seek. However, it should be recognised that at the Assembly there function a number of international party groups (about which more will be said in the second chapter following), to which most delegation parties belong, and with whose support individual delegates stand for - and win - committee office. Turkish delegates have traditionally remained aloof from such interstate party activity, and their paltry office holdings may result as much from that aloofness as from their short tenures at Strasbourg. Though it may still be countered that even within the party group a delegation with fewer members must be at a disadvantage, one can point to the Belgian and French delegations, particularly the small Belgian delegation, which even after 1960 continued to hold more than its 'share' of committee offices, despite the division of its fourteen man team into three distinct party delegations. As a glance back to Table K, particularly for the pre-1960 period reveals, tenure, rather than size must have been the crucial factor insofar as the Belgian delegation was concerned.

In opening this brief comparison of the record of British participation in Strasbourg committee affairs with those of five other delegations, mention was made of the different ways in which these states related to the EEC: France, West Germany and Belgium as founder members, Britain as an applicant, Turkey as an associate, Sweden as a bystander. It had previously been posited that the increase in British activity at the Assembly after 1960 was stimulated by the Government's decision to apply for EEC entry and the delegates' consequent efforts to display their 'Europeanness' at the assemblies. Does the comparison with figures for the other five states bear out this hypothesis?

If one turns to the EEC member delegations first, one finds that

German delegates, who had no reason to ' rove' their 'Europeanness', improved their share of committee offices even more than did the British delegation. However, as was pointed out above, Germany's pre-1960 share of offices - which incidentally was greater than Britain's - was weakened by the fact that the delegation was not present at the Consultative Assembly's opening session. Given the resulting smaller share of German-held offices before 1960, and taking into account the fact that German delegates served at Strasbourg twice as long as British delegates, the German increase was not unexpected.[1] In any event, to claim that British delegates became more active at the Assembly after 1960 is not to say that they comprised the most active delegation there. That British delegates were comparatively active relative to other delegations is the crucial point, and the figures reveal that they were.

Belgium and France are seen to have lost their commanding share of committee posts after 1960. It may be suggested that this loss came about only because they had a disproportionate hold on committee offices (relative to delegation size) in the first place and, by the same token, both Germany

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1. An additional factor that may have influenced both the increase in the number of Assembly offices held after 1960 by German delegates and the parallel decline in the number of offices held by French delegates (which is discussed in the following paragraph) was Germany's continued role during the 1960's as a pillar of Europeanism while Gaullist France tended to act as a brake on efforts toward more intensive European integration. Too much cannot be made of this point, however, because if such differences were reflected in the degrees of French and German participation in the activities of European parliamentary bodies (and, given the fact that if is the parliaments of both states, rather than the executive of each, that appoints delegates - see below, p. 293 and Appendix 9 - it is questionable whether such differences were reflected at all) they were most likely to have taken effect at the European Parliamentary Assembly, whose sole concern was with questions affecting the present and future policies of the EEC (For a discussion of German and French policies concerning European integration in the 1960's see Miriam Camps, <u>European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis</u> (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), especially pp.1-125 <u>passim</u>. and pp.196-236 <u>passim</u>.)

and Britain added to their share of offices because these were quite small before 1960 in relation to the size of their respective delegations. However, the figures for the Turkish delegation indicate that this inference cannot be drawn. Turkey's pre-1960 share of committee offices was small relative to her delegation's size and, in spite of an almost 90 per cent. increase in its size (and a 70 per cent. increase in its average tenure) after 1960, its share actually dropped by about 60 per cent. (80 per cent. in terms of chairmanships and vice-chairmanships alone). If it were in the nature of things for a delegation with less than its share of offices before 1960 to have increased its share over time, surely the record of the Turkish delegation should have been better than it was. Furthermore, if one compares the records of the Swedish and Belgian delegations, one finds that similar delegation sizes and average tenures have not resulted in similar degrees of participation in Assembly affairs either before or after 1960, though the Swedes did somewhat improve their position relative to the Belgians after 1960. Nevertheless, the gap between the two countries' performance remained wide; similar size and average tenure had not, with time, resulted in a similar pattern of activity for the two delegations.

Delegation size clearly matters only to some extent and tenure likewise can only be considered a partial explanation for the record of a given delegation's activity at an assembly. Delegates do not always attain a committee post simply because they are members of a committee, or have been so for some time. Indeed, in Britain's case, her delegates were not in the main veteran assembly-goers. To explain her newly found interest in the Consultative Assembly, and possibly partly to explain as well the continuing marginality of the Turkish and Swedish impact upon Assembly affairs, one must look elsewhere - to Government policy and the EEC issue. The latter two states remained aloof from the movement for an expanded Community and had no desire especially to display their 'Europeanness'. Britain's aims were quite the reverse, therefore, as the above figures have shown, the performance of her delegates after 1960 was quite the reverse as well.

If the survey of British parliamentary activity at the 'European' assemblies which preceded the comparative analysis reveals a spread of interest in all fields of activity, with special emphasis on the major committees of both bodies, a review of British participation in the NPC/NAA committee framework yields somewhat different results. It should be noted that the committee structure of the NPC/NAA has never been as well organised or as efficient as those of the other two assemblies. Reports have often been brief, patchy and poorly researched, due in part to the understaffing of the organisation and its limited budget.[1] The recommendations which the Conference's committees have put forward annually have often been even vaguer than those tabled in the other assemblies and have been far fewer in number.[2] It may be argued that an assembly whose committees meet at most biannually cannot be considered in the same terms as assemblies whose committee meetings are convened even more often than their thrice-yearly plenary part-sessions. Nevertheless, the relative inactivity[3] of the NPC/NAA's committees must detract from any importance that might be attached to the number of committee offices that British delegates held.

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1. See Hovey, Superparliaments, p.158.

2. For example, in 1963, the NAA's Military Committee, presumably one of its most important committees, put forward but one recommendation which merely reasserted the Assembly's faith in NATO and made virtually no detailed proposals of any kind. That same year the WEU Defence Committee tabled six recommendations and two resolutions (For years the NPC/NAA did not seem to differentiate between 'recommendation' and 'resolution', using the terms interchangeably: see for example International Secretariat, NPC, Resolutions and Reports, 1957 and Reports and Recommendations, 1964; North Atlantic Assembly, Addresses Reports Recommendations, 1968). The NPC/NAA did not even begin to number its recommendations until 1971.

3. Each NPC/NAA committee submitted a maximum of two reports each year. At the Council of Europe and WEU major committees often submitted up to ten reports each session.

Bearing this important reservation in mind, one finds that British delegates have been relatively prominent in NPC/NAA committee affairs, but not to the degree that was outlined in the context of the other assemblies. Furthermore, one finds that there have been no marked increases in the number of British delegates who came to hold committee posts at the NPC after 1960. Most important of all, it can be seen[1] that since 1955 only a handful of British delegates have held any posts at all. As individuals each of them had an impressive record at the Assembly, but their work can hardly be taken as evidence of wide-ranging British participation in the Assembly's affairs.

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It was pointed out above[2] that only oral and written questions can provide a measure of the degree to which delegates followed up their activities at the international assemblies with additional, related efforts at Westminster. It is unfortunate that from the vast records of Hansard only isolated questions may serve as a yardstick for the measurement of delegates' activities: one cannot avoid the realisation that within the gamut of British parliamentary affairs the questions specifically raised by the assemblies commanded very little attention indeed.[3] Nevertheless, [illegible] parliamentary questions, to a far greater degree than motions, are the major avenue open to MPs by means of which they may take the initiative to indicate their independent opinions about and interests in virtually any issue of their choosing. Parliamentary questions can therefore at least to some extent provide the data base from which conclusions may be drawn about the pattern of British delegates' assembly-related activities at Westminster during the 1949-70 period.

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1. See Appendix 8.
2. Pp. 226-27.
3. For example, questions on Consultative Assembly activities - which comprised about 75 per cent. of all questions on international assembly affairs, themselves accounted for less than one-tenth of 1 per cent. of all questions tabled in the Commons between 1948-49 and 1969-70 (see below, p. 247 , f.n. 4.

It should be noted that in conducting this second examination, only certain oral and written questions relating to European or Atlantic affairs were considered suitable for analysis. Questions which referred to general developments in the European or Atlantic fields upon which an assembly may have issued some pronouncement but which clearly were of interest to British parliamentarians who were not members of the delegation were not considered at all. For example, while the Council of Europe and WEU may have issued a number of recommendations and resolutions on British entry to the EEC, it was hardly to be expected that only delegates to the assemblies would table questions about the matter. After 1960 European affairs were hardly the province of a small group of specialist MPs and had prompted a wide variety of questions from a growing number of MPs on different aspects of British-EEC relations. Similarly, questions relating to NATO were hardly the province of delegates to the NPC/NAA. In addition to members of the Labour Left, who constantly tabled questions about NATO force — strength and nuclear policy in NATO and WEU and who rarely were members of the NPC/NAA delegation, many other Members who had never been to the Conference were also wont to table questions about NATO, particularly when a crisis had developed within the Alliance in the mid-sixties.[1] Therefore, only oral and written questions which <u>directly</u> concerned the assemblies have been considered for analysis. These fall into three broadly distinct categories. The first consists of questions that dealt with matters concerning the choice of delegation personnel, their travel grants and arrangements and their conduct at the assemblies, especially their presence at votes. The second comprises questions which attempted to elicit a statement of Government

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1. It should be noted that Blondel includes in his analysis general questions on European political and economic affairs, and bases some of his conclusions on the percentage of delegates who asked these questions between 1949 and 1959. (see Blondel, in Lindsay, <u>Assemblies</u>, pp.152-155).

attitudes to recommendations passed by an assembly which had not yet been acted upon in any way. The third consists of questions which sought to encourage the Government's accession to conventions which traced their origins to an assembly recommendation. Questions in both the second and third categories were referring only to operative recommendations, which were addressed to Governments for the undertaking of a specific action, and not to procedural or declarative recommendations, the former being for internal assembly purposes and the latter serving as rhetorical restatements of principle.[1]

Turning first to the Council of Europe, one finds that the number of questions answered in relation to Consultative Assembly affairs rose markedly after 1960, and particularly after 1965.[2] Eighty-seven questions on the implementation of assembly recommendations were tabled in the Commons between 1949 and 1959; the corresponding figure for questions tabled after 1960 which actually named specific assembly recommendations[3] was 175, twice the earlier total. Indeed figures for the 5-year period 1965 to May 1970 alone represent a 26 per cent. increase over the number of questions tabled before 1959.[4]

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1. I have used Hovey's definitions: Superparliaments, pp.6-7.
2. As was noted above, there were too few debates about the Council of Europe for any judgment to be made. Blondel has analysed the question of delegates who participated in general debates about Europe and the EEC. This subject will be dealt with in Chapter 9. (see Blondel, in Lindsay, Assemblies, pp.150-152.
3. Blondel's list includes questions on the ratification of conventions which originated in an assembly recommendation. The figures for the 1960-70 period are only for questions which specifically mention recommendations, not for those which deal with conventions. Were questions in the latter category included in the post-1960 list, the contrast would be even greater.
4. It should be noted that a comparison of the total number of questions, both oral and written, which were answered between 1948-49 and 1958-59, with the corresponding total for the second eleven year period, reveals an increase of only 32.8% (154,033 for 1948-59; 194,639 for 1959-70). It is also noteworthy that the 26% figure given above on the difference between the total number of questions on Council of Europe affairs in the 1949-59 and 1965-70 periods was not parallelled by a similar increase in the total number of questions answered during those years. Compared with the 154,033 questions answered in 1948-59, 128,825 were answered in 1964-70. (I am indebted to the House of Commons Journals Office for providing me with statistics on questions listed in Hansard).

The increase in the number of questions recorded in Hansard after 1960 that concerned Council of Europe Assembly recommendations was shared fairly evenly by the two major parties. Of the seven delegates who were most active in obtaining answers to these questions, three were Conservative and four Labour. The total tabled by the latter group was 63,[1] and by the former, 62.

It is noteworthy that whereas between 1949 and 1959, 69 per cent. of MPs whose questions on the implementation of assembly recommendations appeared in Hansard were either sitting or former delegates to Strasbourg, during the 'sixties, delegates past or present accounted for no less than 96 per cent. of the authors of such questions. Indeed, 90 per cent. of MPs tabling these questions were members of the delegation at the time they did so. These figures do not necessarily mean that other MPs took no interest in Council of Europe affairs, or rather, that they took less interest in those affairs than in previous years. The significance of the rise both in the number of questions tabled and in the percentage of delegates who tabled them lies in its support of the hypothesis already noted several times above: that there was a distinct revival of British parliamentary interest in Council of Europe affairs once Britain became seriously interested in EEC membership, and that that revival was directly due to Britain's new European policies. British delegates to the Council of Europe wanted to show continental delegates, especially those from the Six, that they were 'good Europeans'. Questions tabled in the Commons about Council of Europe affairs, questions which often were reproduced in full in reports of the Assembly's Parliamentary and Public Relations Committee, provided them with an easy device for displaying their active support for the Assembly's work and thereby enhancing their 'European' credentials.

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1. These figures are for members tabling questions that specifically referred to recommendations passed by the assembly: Labour; Carol Johnson (34), Geoffrey Rhodes (13), Arthur Henderson (8), John Rynd (8); Conservatives: Dame Joan Vickers (27), Rafton Pounder (21), David Webster (14). No other delegates tabled more than four questions.

It was not only MPs who supported British entry into the EEC who sought these credentials. Indeed, the tabling of questions on Council of Europe affairs helped to reinforce the claims of certain anti-Marketeers that while they opposed entry to the EEC they were willing to work for a broader concept of European unity and co-operation, one that embraced all of Western and ultimately Eastern Europe. Among the most active questioners of the 'pro-Europe' anti-Marketeers were Geoffrey Rhodes, who on one occasion tabled eight different written questions relating to Consultative Assembly recommendations, and Rafton Pounder, who once produced a string of twelve written questions.[1]

In the main, most active delegates who were also opposed to EEC entry were drawn from the Labour Left, though the Conservatives did produce a number of anti's, apart from Pounder (an Ulster Unionist), notably Ronald Russell. After Labour came to power in 1964 and soon began to become more interested in the Council of Europe than ever before, the Left began to demand that the delegation should reflect a fair balance of opinion between pro - and anti-Marketeers. A number of questions were tabled in the Commons on this matter and on one occasion Harold Wilson specifically mentioned his appointment of two left-wing delegates, as evidence of the balance which he provided for on the delegation.[2] It was therefore not only the more committed pro-European delegates who played a leading part in assembly affairs and then proceeded to call attention to those affairs once they were back at Westminster. Anti-Marketeers did so as well, but for precisely the opposite reasons.

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1. Rhodes: Hansard, 5th series, 1970, 797, written answers, 385, 388, 391-393. Pounder: ibid., 1967, 748, written answers, 119-122. See also Lena Jeger's comments in Chapter 4 above, p.193.
2. Hansard, 5th series, 1968, 757, 586. The two were Eric Heffer and Renée Short. Both put several questions with anti-EEC overtones which dealt with general aspects of British-EEC relations but neither seems to have tabled questions dealing specifically with assembly recommendations.

The increase in the number of parliamentary questions on Council of Europe activities embraced the whole gamut of its work. Frequently one MP would table a series of questions which included reference to a number of recommendations on widely unrelated subjects. In general, after 1960 it was the British member of the Assembly's Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations who tabled long lists of written questions referring to recommendations recently passed by the Assembly and who attempted to elicit the Government's position on each of them. Once a particular recommendation had been noted in a question, it rarely formed the basis of another unless a delegate had a special interest in seeing the recommendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers[1] or because no action had been taken on the matter for some time.

The work of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations has been an important factor in drawing the attention of member governments to the recommendations passed in the Council of Europe's Assembly. The committee studies the legislative procedures of each parliament and provides advice and assistance - including draft questions - which encourages delegates to initiate discussion of Council of Europe activities in their own parliaments. The increase in the number of questions tabled in the Commons which concern Assembly recommendations is certainly due in part to the work of this committee. Nevertheless, the activities of the Committee

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1. Usually because the delegate had been closely involved in framing the recommendation. See the fourth and sixth annual reports of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations (then known as the Working Party on Relations with National Parliaments) for a description of its work in the British parliamentary context. Consultative Assembly, Documents, 12th session, 1960-61, document 1193, esp. pp.18-19 and 14th session, 1962-63, document 1446.

cannot in themselves account for proliferation of these questions after 1960.[1]

The post-1959 increase in the number of questions tabled about Assembly recommendations was somewhat paralleled by an increase in the number of questions that concerned other aspects of Council of Europe affairs. Though the majority of questions in this category were tabled by delegates or former delegates, a substantial number of questions were tabled by MPs who had never been to the Assembly. Most of the questions of non-delegates dealt with the manner in which the delegation was chosen and the expense allowances granted to delegates. Arthur Lewis, for example, contended that the delegation was a 'closed club' and persistently demanded to know by what criteria MPs were chosen to serve at the Assembly.[2] As noted above, left-wing MPs also found fault with the choice of delegates; they contended that the delegation did not adequately represent their views about Britain and the EEC. Other questions, particularly about Government ratification of Council of Europe conventions, were primarily the province of delegates, though some former delegates also tabled questions on this theme. In general, however, once an MP ceased to be a member of the delegation he no longer tabled any

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1. It is extremely difficult to assess the effect of the activities of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations on the number of questions tabled in the Commons that related to Council of Europe activities. The Committee tabulates parliamentary 'interventions' in categories which lump oral questions together with debates and written questions with motions. For the purposes of the present calculation, based only on questions, the Committee's tabulations are of limited value. Furthermore, the Committee's figures on 'interventions' reveal that the percentage increase in Britain between 1956 (when its first report was issued) and 1959 was greater than between 1959-60 and 1969-70 whereas for all member states of the Council of Europe, the percentage increase was greater for the latter period. One would thus be led to conclude that the Committee's effect in Britain, though certainly important, was not as great as it was in other countries, and that the marked increase in the number of questions tabled in the Commons was due to other factors as well. See Blondel in Lindsay, Assemblies, p.154, and A. Glenn Mower, 'The Official Pressure Group of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly', Int. Org. XVIII (1964), 292-306.

2. Hansard, 5th series, 1963, 678, 1306.

questions on Council of Europe activities. This phenomenon supports the observation made earlier that MPs saw the Council of Europe as a place where they could meet their European counterparts and engage in some worthwhile 'European' activities and projects, but that they did not see it as a primary or permanent focus for their interests.[1] Strasbourg's usefulness as a forum for displaying one's European credentials clearly diminished once an MP had left the delegation never to return. One again concludes that it was that usefulness, rather than the intrinsic importance of the Assembly's recommendations, that mattered most to British parliamentarians.

If the relative abundance of questions on the Council of Europe allows for tentative conclusions to be drawn about the scope and degree of British participation in its affairs after 1960, the scarcity of questions on WEU allows for almost no conclusions to be drawn at all. All one can suggest is that WEU was not regarded as primarily an 'operative' assembly. The majority of questions that do appear in Hansard concerning WEU affairs relate to the activities of the Council, or to speeches made by Government officials to the Assembly, not to the work of the Assembly itself. Of the 66 questions tabled on all aspects of WEU affairs between 1959 and 1970, only 19 dealt with Assembly recommendations, resolutions or opinions, eleven of which had been tabled by delegates.

The rarity of questions on WEU Assembly activities did not necessarily indicate that delegates took no part in WEU affairs; the list of committee chairmanships and rapporteurships held by British delegates at the Assembly seems to point to the opposite conclusion. It is possible that because delegates to WEU were also delegates to the Consultative Assembly they felt that it was best to employ question time to follow up their Strasbourg proposals, which were often less sensitive than recommendations on military

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1. See above, Chapters 2 pp. 122-29 and Chapter 5, 205-210 , passim, and pp. 222-223.

affairs, and were therefore more likely to be accepted by the Government. If this was indeed the case, it could be inferred that while delegates were active at the WEU Assembly, the organisation was appreciated more for its value as a meeting ground for Britain and the Six than as a source of practical proposals meriting close parliamentary and governmental scrutiny.

An examination of questions tabled in the Commons relating to NPC/NAA affairs yields results that are equally if not more meagre than those derived in relation to WEU. Apart from a number of questions which were tabled in relation to the Conference's quest for official status, only on four occasions in the period 1959-70 did MPs table questions about the Assembly's affairs. On three of these occasions the questioners were not even delegates; only on 19 February 1968 did a delegate, Kenneth Lomas, table questions concerning recommendations that had been put forward by the Assembly, though he did not specifically cite any of them.[1] It should not be concluded, however, that there was no follow-up at all on the part of British delegates to the NAA's activities. A number of Peers who were long-time delegates to the Assembly called attention to its work in a number of debates in the House of Lords. However, these debates, like those held in the Commons on the Council of Europe, were few and far-between. Furthermore, their debates in any event 'seldom excite...public attention... most of the labours of the Lords might as well be carried on in secret session for all the public attention they receive'.[2] Since the most that can be hoped for from a Lords debate on the Assembly is publicity - legislation is out of the question and the Government does not have to commit itself in any way[3] - debates in the Lords, even if they were held

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1. Hansard, 5th series, 1968, 759, written answers 11-12. The other questioners were Emmanuel Shinwell (twice) on the appointment and expense accounts of delegates and Harry Hynd, who requested that NPC reports be distributed to MPs.

2. Gilmour, The Body Politic, pp.303-304.

3. See Herbert Morrison, Government and Parliament: A Survey from the Inside (London, Oxford University Press, 1954), pp.174-176.

more frequently, could only be of marginal value. Given the reservations already noted above with respect to the committee-related activities of delegates to the NAA, one can only conclude that, apart from those delegates who actively worked for its conversion into a consultative assembly, most British parliamentarians bothered as little about the NPC/NAA after 1960 as they had in the preceding five years.

The foregoing study, quantitatively incomplete as it of necessity must be, does within its limits seem to indicate decisively that there was a trend towards greater involvement in Council of Europe (and to some extent WEU) affairs after 1960. The discrepancy between the number of questions tabled in relation to Strasbourg and NPC/NAA affairs, as well as the evidence of the greater number as well as spread of committee posts held at the Consultative Assembly as opposed to the NPC both underline this conclusion. It has been argued above that the existence of the Consultative Assembly's Parliamentary Relations Committee cannot in itself account for the changes that have been noted after 1960 (and in any event cannot account for the increase in the number of British held committee posts). The same argument would seem to hold true with regard to the fact that there was no such committee at the NAA. The existence of a parliamentary relations co mittee might have resulted in additional questions being tabled in the Commons on NPC/NAA affairs, but the gap between the post-1960 totals for the NPC and those for Council of Europe affairs seems toogreat to have been bridged merely by virtue of the creation of that committee.

This chapter has dealt with delegates' activities in abstract quantitative terms. To have included in it case studies of some assembly activities in which delegates took part would perhaps have been somewhat beside the point, for they could not have helped to indicate to any great extent the overall degree of delegates' involvement in assembly affairs. In a sense the examinations that have already been made of delegates'

attitudes to the institutionalisation of the assemblies are case studies, but, as has been pointed out, those issues differed in kind from specific projects undertaken by an assembly. There is certainly a need for some discussion of these projects, and of the British contribution to their success, and it is therefore to them that the next chapter will turn.

Chapter 7

The Programmes and Activities of the Council of Europe: An Overview of the British Contribution to the Assembly's Role

It was pointed out at the beginning of the previous chapter that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the performance of an international parliamentary assembly. The volume of public discussion on an issue that can be considered attributable to the assembly's deliberations, the extent to which delegates modify their views on a particular question as a result of their experiences at an assembly and the influence of assembly recommendations upon the course of governmental decision-making all do not easily lend themselves to quantification. Certainly the latter difficulty looms very large in the case of the two assemblies that discuss defence matters, the NPC/NAA and the WEU Assembly. The Parliamentarians' Conference has no direct relationship with governments through any inter-governmental body and, as was pointed out in previous chapters, it has been unsuccessful in its attempts to establish such a relationship. Its inability to relate in an official way with the North Atlantic Council or with NATO has deprived delegates of access to classified military information, and thus has somewhat undermined their ability to formulate meaningful recommendations on NATO affairs. Indeed, as likewise has already been noted, many of the Assembly's recommendations are vaguely worded and are attached to brief and seemingly under-researched reports. In these circumstances one would be extremely hard-put to substantiate a claim that a given NPC/NAA recommendation directly led to the implementation of a particular NATO or North Atlantic Alliance policy.

With respect to WEU, one is presented with the existence of an official relationship between the Council and the Assembly. Assembly recommendations must be considered by the Council, and the latter's report likewise is considered, and commented on, by the Assembly. But this official relationship, though it does exist, is nevertheless somewhat deceptive. With respect to

defence matters WEU actually is a functional part of NATO - WEU has no independent command - and the Assembly has no formal ties with the larger organisation. Furthermore, although access to classified information is vital to the presentation of high-grade reports and recommendations on defence matters, WEU delegates, like those of the NPC/NAA, find that it is the North Atlantic Council that decides what information is to be released and that invariably allows access only to unclassified material.[1] Despite these difficulties, the quality of the Assembly's reports in defence matters, its most important concern, is still considered to be exceptionally high.[2] Nevertheless, on the crucial question of the implementation of the recommendations attached to those reports, the Assembly's record is very disappointing. 'In the course of nine sessions', one observer remarked in 1964, 'the WEU Assembly...adopted some forty "recommendations" concerning defence to which the Union's member governments ... in most cases, paid no attention'.[3] A more recent study did not point to any improvement in the situation. The Assembly was reported to provide 'a useful annual critique on NATO's strategy and its defence preparedness,'[4] but nowhere was it stated that governments had taken any heed of that critique. Clearly, even in dealing with its most important concern,[5] one that is matched by no other assembly (since WEU only addresses itself to matters pertaining to European,

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1. See Palmer and Lambert, eds., European Unity, pp.336-37, 346.
2. Paul Borcier, Eight Years' Work for European Defence: A Political Survey (Strasbourg, WEU, 1964), p.11.
3. Ibid. The above quotation undermines the theme of Borcier's pamphlet - it is meant to be an apology for the Assembly's existence - for it conveys in unequivocal terms the Assembly's ultimate ineffectiveness.
4. Palmer and Lambert, op.cit., p.344.
5. The Assembly also played an important role in helping to provide the groundwork for British entry to the EEC. This political aspect of its work will be dealt with as part of a separate chapter devoted to the role of the assemblies and British delegates to them in the quest for EEC membership (Chapter 9).

not Atlantic defence) one can only gauge the Assembly's possible successes in subjective terms. For the purposes of this chapter's enquiry, which seeks to establish an objective, concrete relationship between assembly activity and inter-governmental organisational decision-making, the record of WEU's activities and the governmental response to them does not provide material for substantive and meaningful analysis.[1]

It is, in fact, only with respect to the Consultative Assembly that there exists the possibility of gauging the direct relationship between assembly recommendations and governmental activity and decisions within an inter-governmental organisation. Like WEU, the Council of Europe embodies a direct and official link between an assembly of parliamentarians and a ministerial body, the Committee of Ministers. Unlike WEU, however, the Council of Europe itself has fathered a number of inter-governmental conventions, codes and agreements that were, by definition, approved by its Committee of Ministers and ratified by a fixed number of member governments. And unlike WEU, or indeed the NPC, it is possible to trace directly the role of the Assembly in initiating these conventions and agreements, for many of them first reached the Committee of Ministers in the form of Assembly recommendations. One can therefore to some extent compile a balance sheet of Council of Europe Assembly activities, weighing those recommendations which led to the formulation of conventions against some of those which were ignored, and indeed determining, at least in terms of a rough estimate, the percentage of completed conventions and agreements that owed their origins to the initiative of the Consultative Assembly. In making this assessment one can also determine the British contribution to these Assembly projects and to compare it with that of the other delegations whose activities were

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1. Apart from defence questions, and matters pertaining to British-EEC relations within WEU (see preceding footnote) all other issues considered by the Assembly are also usually discussed in the Consultative Assembly and thus cannot be analysed purely within the framework of WEU activities.

analysed on a quantitative basis in the previous chapter.

It must immediately be pointed out that not all debates held in the Consultative Assembly, or proposals which it passes, are - or have been - directed to the Committee of Ministers. Many are addressed instead to a group of member nations of the Council, or to one of the international organisations that periodically report to the Assembly. Some indeed have been addressed to the Committee of Ministers but passed on to other organisations or to a group of states and were then implemented by them. A well-known example of the latter case is the proposal for a European Army that Winston Churchill publicised at Strasbourg in 1950 which found expression in the project for a European Defence Community. The EDC was elaborated outside the Council of Europe framework, but the proposal for a European Army had originally been addressed to the Committee of Ministers.[1] Clearly, by taking into account only those Assembly recommendations which led to conventions or agreements within the Council of Europe framework, one is arbitrarily ignoring a number of possibly valuable proposals that were indeed realised outside that framework. However, one is here attempting to analyse the contribution to the work of the Council itself; resolutions addressed to other organisations are, strictly speaking, irrelevant for the purposes of this inquiry.

At this point the term 'initiative' demands definition. One cannot speak of initiative in the strict legislative sense of first proposing a bill for enactment: the Assembly, indeed the Council, has no legislative power. All the Assembly can do is issue a recommendation which governments, acting within or outside the Committee of Ministers, can elect to implement. What is here meant by initiative is merely the procedure whereby an organ of the Council first airs a specific proposal. Within

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1. CA, Texts Adopted 1st session, 1949, Recommendation 3.

the context of the Council's own activities, the Assembly will be credited with the 'initiative' if none of the Council's other organs, namely the Committee of Ministers, its committees of experts on specific subjects, and the special conferences convened within the Council's framework, have not previously themselves first considered the given proposal. With respect to Assembly resolutions addressed to outside bodies and institutions, the Assembly can only be credited with the 'initiative' if no other outside institution, or indeed individual, has publicised the given proposal at any time prior to the Assembly's deliberations on the question.

A further observation about Assembly 'initiatives' must be made. Clearly, there is a crucial difference between an Assembly recommendation which is phrased in vague, general terms, and one which outlines in at least some detail the desired course of action. In the former case the term 'initiative' even as presently defined, is almost inapplicable. To be sure, the Assembly has come up with an idea - but it has done little more than that, and its 'contribution' to the Council's work, or to the activities of European governments or institutions, should not be overrated. Churchill's proposal falls into this latter category. He supplied the idea, but hardly the initiative for the EDC. Account must therefore be taken to some extent, of the degree of specificity of the Assembly's proposals, and of the degree to which the details of the final outcome of the Committee of Ministers' work matched those of the original proposal.

The activities of the Council of Europe embrace a wide range of subject areas and the Assembly addresses itself to practically all of them. As noted in Chapter 1, the Assembly rationalised its work by means of a system of subject committees; since 1949 about 93 per cent. of all its recommendations, resolutions and opinions have first been drafted in committee.[1] As will

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1. The remainder of its recommendations, resolutions and opinions are formulated by special committees and working parties, by individual special rapporteurs, or by the Bureau.

shortly be demonstrated at length below,[1] the committee system thus provides the natural framework within which may be categorised and analysed the work of the Assembly and the contribution of given delegations to that work. It must immediately be noted, however, that with respect to the contribution of specific delegations and delegates to the committees' work, assessments cannot be made with any high degree of precision. As was noted in the previous chapter, the confidentiality of committee deliberations, and worse still, the brevity with which committee debates are recorded in the confidential minutes, make it exceedingly difficult to assess the degree to which a given delegate participates in the formulation of committee proposals. One may, of course, refer to the plenary debates on the given recommendation once it has come before the chamber. But it will be found that debates are not limited to committee members only (of whom each national delegation has at least one), nor do speakers who were committee members refer solely, or even primarily, to the relevant debates within committee. Anyone may speak at the Assembly: all he has to do is sign the register of speakers. Many speakers, including committee members, will talk at great length, providing the Assembly with personal views about aspects of the issue in question which may or may not be touched upon in the recommendation, and which may or may not have been discussed in committee. Amendments to committee recommendations and resolutions are not solely the product of committee members' efforts. They may, and often are, proposed by other delegates. Furthermore, even when a committee member moves a given amendment, he may be doing so on behalf of a number of colleagues. Therefore, as is true of motions, which have been commented above in Chapter 7, amendments cannot be utilised as a source of measuring the degree of participation of a given delegate or delegation. One is therefore left with the work of committee chairmen and rapporteurs as the only source of measuring delegation activity. The rapporteur issues a report which conveys his personal opinions

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1. See pp.262ff.

on the issue under consideration: these may vary slightly with the details of the recommendation but generally conform with its intent. The rapporteur generally will defend the recommendation before the Assembly and, on technical questions, may be the only speaker before the question is put to the vote. The chairman's involvement in the formulation and presentation of a given recommendation is more difficult to determine. It may be that a chairman will have taken no interest in the formulation of a given proposal. However, the high frequency of cases when a chairman is applauded by his rapporteur for his work in committee, and the equal if not greater frequency with which a chairman speaks on a recommendation issued by his committee - often being the only delegate to speak apart from the rapporteur - allows for the assumption that chairmen do take an active part in the affairs of their committees. The importance attached to the office and the competition for a vacant chairmanship would seem to reinforce this view: delegates who already do not have an active interest in the affairs of a given committee are unlikely to be successful candidates for that committee's highest office.

It was noted immediately above that the committee system provides a natural framework within which assembly activities may be categorised and analysed. At this point some consideration of the exact place of committees within the institutional framework of the Assembly is in order, for only when the importance of committees relative to other Assembly organs is clearly outlined, can an analysis of their activities have any meaning. Accordingly, it is to this question that this chapter now turns before embarking on an analysis of Assembly activities.

The Assembly and Its Committees

It was briefly noted in Chapter 1[1] that the Consultative Assembly, like most continental parliaments and unlike the British, established a number of

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1. See above, pp. 41,45.

subject committees which, according to the Council of Europe's Statute 'may consider and report to it (the Assembly) on any matter which falls within its competence...examine and prepare questions on its Agenda and... advise on all matters of procedure'.[1] At first the committees were meant to be four in number, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure that were drafted by the governmental preparatory commission before the Assembly first met.[2] However, the Assembly's temporary committee on the provisional rules of procedure, which was chaired by Herbert Morrison, suggested six committees instead, to deal with general affairs, cultural, economic, social and legal and administrative concerns, and the Assembly's rules of procedure.[3] After debate in the Assembly, the membership of the committees was set at 23 for the General Affairs, Legal and Economic committees and at 18 for the rest. The larger powers - the United Kingdom, France and Italy - were alloted three delegates on each committee, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway were to have one on each, while Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey were to have two delegates on the larger committees and one on the smaller.[4]

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1. CofE Secretariat, Manual, p.305.

2. See Consultative Assembly, Documents, 1st session, 1949, Document 2 (p.8,fn.1

3. See Consultative Assembly, ibid. (pp.7-10).

4. Morrison's committee originally had proposed that each committee should consist of 15 members. Morrison and Hugh Dalton subsequently suggested that the figure be 18, while Pierre-Henri Teitgen of France called for 23 members of each committee. The final compromise decision was based on a suggestion by David Maxwell-Fyfe. However, despite the fact that the proposals emanated from the quarrelling British parties, party politics did not enter into this particular matter. The Assembly witnessed a combined Tory-Labour vote which helped defeat the Pietgen proposal and Maxwell-Fyfe's plan passed by only a 43-46 margin as all delegates were evenly divided on the question. (see Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 1st session, 1949, pp. 334-360).

In time additional committees, many of which began life as 'special' committees, were added to the Assembly framework (and indeed some were dropped) so that by 1957 there were twelve committees, including the permanent working part on parliamentary relations, and by 1967, thirteen. These dealt with Political Affairs, Economic Affairs and Development, Social and Health Questions, Legal Affairs, Culture and Education, Science and Technology, Regional Planning and Local Authorities, Rules of Procedure, Agriculture, European Non-Member Countries, Parliamentary and Public Relations, Population and Refugees, and the Budget. Their memberships varied from eighteen to thirty-three, the maximum size of the committees having been increased in allowance for the growth of the Consultative Assembly as a whole. The 3-2-1 principle of national representation was maintained, and extended to the new Council of Europe members. The big powers, including West Germany (from 1950), held three seats on each committee; the small states, to whose ranks Cyprus (1961) and Malta (1965) were added, had one on each; and the 'intermediate' powers, including Austria (1956) and Switzerland (1963), had two seats on the larger committees and one on the smaller.

Membership of the committees is not confined to representatives only. Indeed if it were, many small delegations would be strained to provide their delegates - or delegate - for each committee, especially as some committees meet simultaneously. The matter of substitutes' membership on committees was first raised during the 1949 session when the British delegation opposed free substitution on committees on the grounds that the status of full 'representatives' would be devalued as a consequence.[1] Smaller delegations, on the other hand, argued that only the employment of substitutes would enable them to participate in the deliberations of all six Assembly committees.[2]

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1. For the British view see Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 1st session, 1949, for the comments of Morrison, pp.382-383, Lynn Ungoed-Thomas, p.386 and Will Nally, pp.376-378.

2. See for example the comments of Messrs. Norton, ibid., p.376 and MacEntee, ibid., p.378, both of the Irish delegation.

The Assembly finally agreed to a compromise proposal put forward by Herbert Morrison and R.W.G. Mackay, whereby only small delegations could employ their substitutes for full-time committee membership with the matter to be reviewed in future.[1] However, as the number of committees proliferated over the years, substitutes came to be treated as equal to 'representatives' and some even served as vice-chairmen or rapporteurs, though none held a chairmanship. Indeed substitutes were officially recognised in 1964 as equal in all but name to the 'representatives' on their delegations.[2]

The output of the committees is divided into three main categories: draft recommendations, resolutions and opinions, most of which are attached to reports or to brief explanatory memoranda. Recommendations are directed exclusively to the Committee of Ministers, which in due course acts on them, usually after obtaining the advice of a committee of experts or of another international organisation. The decision is then communicated to the Assembly and, if the Committee has agreed to conclude a convention, the communication often will be in the form of a request for an Assembly opinion on the terms of the convention draft. Resolutions, as opposed to recommendations and to most opinions, are not addressed to the Committee of Ministers but are either meant for the internal organisational purposes of the Assembly, or as an announcement to the world of the state of the prevailing opinion among delegates, or as a direct reply-and comment on- the report which an international organisation, such as OECD, has presented to it. Recommendations require a two-thirds majority for adoption; resolutions only need a simple majority. In practice most recommendations and resolutions pass by a wide margin, even if there is a demand for a roll-call.[3]

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1. See Morrison's remarks, ibid., p.386, and Mackay's, ibid., pp.388-389. The text of the debate appears on pp.368-396.

2. See the report of Camille Linden of Luxembourg on revisions of the rules of procedure, ibid., 15th session, 1963-64. Document 1691, pp.25,26.

3. See below, Chapter 8, pp.299-301 for an elaboration of this point.

The work of the committees has been described as 'the most important development in the procedure of the Assembly'.[1] Originally the committees were meant to meet only during Assembly sessions but, after pressure from the Assembly, the Committee of Ministers agreed to permit committees to meet at other times as well.[2] Since the Assembly has developed the practice of debating a proposal only after a report has been received from the relevant committee, and since reports, if they are to be properly researched, take some time to be produced, committees invariably have to meet frequently outside the plenary sessions. In fact there are now reportedly 'on an average, about two committee meetings all the year round'.[3]

In addition to the subject committees whose activities are to be analysed below, brief mention must first be made of two other committees whose function is purely organisational. The 33-member Standing Committee, constituted under rule 42 of the Assembly's rules of procedure, acts on behalf of the Assembly between sessions, and may pass recommendations in its name if the situation so warrants. It includes the Bureau of the Assembly - the President and his Vice-Presidents, as well as the chairmen of the subject committees. The Joint Committee, created in 1950, serves as the 'organ of co-ordination of the Council of Europe'[4] bringing together representatives of the Assembly with those of the Committee of Ministers. Though its terms of reference are very wide: 'examining the problems which are common to the two organs of the Council',[5] its effectiveness has been limited by the unanimity rule which governs the decision-making of the Committee of Ministers. Since 1961 a series of 'colloquies' between Ministers and delegates have taken place which, though in effect merely expanded versions of the

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1. CofE Secretariat, Manual, p.44.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.45.
4. Ibid., p.48.
5. Quoted ibid.

Joint Committee, nevertheless are considered by the Council of Europe Secretariat to have encountered greater success in fostering better communication between delegates and Ministers on the Committee.[1]

An Overview of the Committees' Work and of the Contribution of Certain Delegations to it.

The Assembly's thirteen subject committees may be differentiated into five general categories which reflect the varying nature and orientation of their activities. There are, first of all, those committees which are primarily, if not totally, concerned with the Assembly's internal organisation. A second group consists of committees which until 1970, at least, fulfilled almost entirely a review function, studying the activities of organisations or states and issuing resolutions and recommendations which either supported and elaborated upon those activities or castigated them. A third group is comprised of committees for whom the review function was their major task, but which at times have issued practical proposals for action to be taken within the framework of the Council of Europe. The penultimate category comprises those committees that between 1949 and 1970 devoted equal energies to the promulgation of practical proposals for Council of Europe action and to the review of activities taking place within the Council and elsewhere. Finally, the last category embraces committees that directed their attention solely to the fate of Assembly recommendations and resolutions in the national parliaments: their concern was with follow-up activities.

Into the first category may be placed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and the Committee on the Budget. Apart from the efforts of the latter to bring about the establishment of uniform rules for a European Civil Service, which finally led to the adoption by a conference of governments and international institutions of a 1967 'final act'

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1. Ibid., pp.48-49.

containing 'Model Staff Regulations of the European Civil Service' (which have yet to be implemented), neither committee's activities have been addressed to anything other than the internal workings of the Assembly and they therefore require no further attention in the context of the present analysis.[1]

The second group includes the Committee on Science and Technology and the Committee on Non-Member Countries. The former was created in 1967 to review European scientific developments heretofore under the purview of the Culture and Science Committee. It receives reports from European Organisations such as Cern (Centre for European Nuclear Research), Esro (European Space Research Organisation) and Eldo (European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organisation). Although it issues a number of recommendations annually, none was implemented by the Committee of Ministers in the 1967-70 period. As for the Committee on Non-Member countries, its primary task has been to review developments in Eastern Europe. A creation of the cold-war period and mentality - it came into being in 1951 - its recommendations on the state of affairs in Eastern Europe have had little effect on the policies of states in that area. Its recommendations on positive action to be taken within the Council of Europe framework to alleviate the situation of exiles from Eastern Europe were never implemented.[2]

The third category comprises the largest number of committees: those dealing with political, economic, agricultural, cultural, municipal and regional affairs, and with population and refugee problems. All began their

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1. For the Committee's efforts on the European Civil Service see the reports of Robert Bichet of France, CA, Documents, 9th session, 1957, Documents 659 & 766 and those by Adolf Molter of Belgium, ibid., 12th session, 1960, Document 1133 (on behalf of the Legal Committee) and 16th session, 1964, Document 1743 (for the Budget Committee). See also CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.59-60. It should be noted that the Budget Committee merely reviews past Council of Europe Budgets, but submits recommendations on the present Assembly Budget directly to the Committee of Ministers.

2. For its proposal on a European Fund for Exiles, see ibid., 3rd session, 1951, Document 61 (report by Kurt-Georg Pfleiderer of West Germany); for the proposal for a Cultural Fund for Exiles, see ibid., 6th session, 1954, Document 248 (report by Pfleiderer).

existence with a view to producing Council of Europe action in the subjects of their concern; all six came to be devoted primarily to reviewing, and commenting upon, the activities of institutions within and outside the Council. The reasons for this evolution are not, however, common to all the committees. The first three were forced to adopt review functions as most of the proposals they initiated were consistently ignored by the bodies to which they were addressed, notably the Committee of Ministers. On the other hand, the latter three committees succeeded in pressing for the creation of specialised expert bodies dealing with their subjects who then took the initiative in producing proposals for implementation. The committees then began to review the activities of the institutions they had created while only at infrequent intervals adding their own initiatives to those already under consideration.

It is noteworthy that the proposals which the General Affairs, Economic and Agricultural committees put forward, and which the Committee of Ministers rejected, were all of a highly-charged political nature, whereas those proposals that they put forward which the Committee of Ministers implemented were of a far less controversial nature. The General Affairs Committee, chaired in 1949-51 by Georges Bidault of France, with Guy Mollet as General Rapporteur, encountered no success at all in its efforts to promote a change in the political constitution of Europe, efforts of which the Mackay Protocol, discussed in Chapter 5 above, was the best known. Instead it could only win ministerial agreement on the sole right of parliaments to appoint delegates,[1] on the right of the Assembly to determine its own agenda (see above, Chapter 1)[2] on the possibility of creating 'specialised authorities' within the Council of Europe framework and on the ability of

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1. Inserted as an amendment to the Statute, 1951: see CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.48-49.

2. See above, p.56.

a few member states to conclude 'partial agreements' within the Council of Europe framework, the abstention of other member states in the Committee of Ministers not having the effect of invalidating those agreements.[1]

Apart from these relatively minor successes, the General Affairs Committee (renamed Political Committee in 1953), could point to very few tangible changes either in the structure of the Council of Europe or in the political fortunes of Europe generally that were the outcome of any of its proposals from 1951 to 1970. In 1952 a report by Paul Struye led to the admission of Austria to the Consultative Assembly as an observer; Austria became a full member of the Council of Europe and its Assembly after the entry into force of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty.[2] A 1966 report by Bertrand Flornoy of France, based on a motion by Maurice Edelman, led to the holding of a first-ever conference between Latin-American politicians and delegates of the Consultative Assembly.[3] Finally, reports by Dutch delegate Max van der Stoel on the post-1967 situation in Greece contributed to the climate in the Assembly that led to Greece's expulsion from its midst.[4]

While the admission of Austria and the expulsion of Greece from the Assembly were of some political significance, they surely represent a poor record of practical achievement for twenty years' effort. To be sure, the committee's demand in 1952, based on a report by Nicolas Margue of Luxembourg, for immediate consideration of the future political constitution of the proposed EDC even before its terms were ratified did lead to the creation of an 'ad hoc' assembly drawn from Consultative and ECSC Common Assembly delegates who drafted a Treaty for a European Political Community.[5] However,

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1. The Statutory Texts are reproduced in CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.310-312.
2. See CA, Documents, 3rd session, 1951, Document 991, see also Manual, p.16.
3. CA, Documents, 17th session, 1965, Document 1956 (Edelman motion) and 18th session, 1966, Document 2177 (Flornoy report).
4. Ibid., 20th session, 1968, Documents 2384 & 2467.
5. Ibid., 4th session, 1952, Document 6; Texts Adopted, 4th session, 1952, Resolution 14.

the Treaty became a dead letter the day EDC was rejected by France. A similar fate awaited the committee's plan for a 'Europeanised' autonomous Saar territory with close economic links to both its German and French neighbours, the states that were disputing its future status. A modified version of the plan, named the van der Goes van Naters plan after its Belgian author, met with Franco-German approval but was rejected by the Saar electorate in an October 1955 referendum that returned the region to the Federal Republic.[1] Thus at the end of the day in both cases, the contribution of the committee had amounted to precious little in practical terms.

It is not difficult to trace the major reason for the committee's inability to achieve a superior record of successfully implemented proposals. The committee, probably more than any other, was at the very centre of the federal-functional dispute that raged in the Assembly during its early years. The relegation of the Assembly to the backwaters of European politics after 1951 sealed the fate of the committee's efforts: the committee's adoption of a review function was in fact an adoption of a low political profile, a coming to terms with the reality of the Assembly's political impotence in European affairs.

Similar reasons explain the record of the Economic Committee. It too found its more radical proposals for the economic development of Europe ignored by Ministers and Governments. The only 'success' of its early years was the completion of a series of conventions on patents that had been inspired by a 1949 report of Henri Longchambon of France which provided a draft European patent convention.[2] However, it was only the idea, rather than the substance, that the Committee of Ministers adopted. The conventions

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1. See CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.126-127 and CA, Documents, 4th session, 1952, Document 7 and 6th session, 1954, Document 225 & appendix.

2. Ibid., 1st session, 1949, Document 75 & appendices. See also Manual, pp.246-247.

were drawn up by committees of experts and the main thrust of the Longchambon recommendation, the creation of a European Patents Office, was never implemented.

Clearly a call for a patents office, or for the creation of a conference of postal ministers with a view to creating a postal union, or for an association of airline companies to control aviation, or for a European Transport Council were less likely to arouse political controversy than plans for the liberalisation of trade and payments, or for the joint development of European overseas territories (the Strasbourg Plan), both of which touched at the heart of national economic independence and decision making.[1] In the event, apart from the patents agreements, the Economic Committee's proposals on post, airlines and transport led to the creation of special conferences that themselves merely issued recommendations.[2] On the other hand, the plans and calls for government action in the economic field which demanded more than mere consultation remained stillborn. By the late 'fifties the Economic Committee had likewise come to terms with the Assembly's political weakness: it too adopted a review function, addressing itself to reports from European and international economic organisations and to the European economic situation in general. It continued to make some proposals for concrete action - such as its call for a European highway code[3] - but these met

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1. The need for liberalisation of trade and payments was stressed in the 1949 report of David Eccles, CA, Documents, 1st session, 1949, Document 30. For the fate of most of the committee's proposals see M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (London, Stevens, 1959), p.200. For the Strasbourg Plan, see CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.163-165 and CA, Documents, 4th session, 1952, Document 64, and Texts Adopted, 4th session, 1952, Recommendation 26. See also the experts' report ('Study Group for the Development of Africa') on a revamped set of proposals, Documents, 9th session, 1957, Document 701.

2. Post: see report by Roger Motz of Belgium, ibid., 3rd session, 1951, Document 533; Airlines: report by J. van de Kieft of Netherlands, ibid., Document 23; Transport: report by Maurice Lemaire of France, ibid., 4th session, 1952, Document 72. See also Manual, pp.145,157.

3. Carl Czernetz of Austria was most closely concerned with road policy: see ibid, 13th session, 1961, Document 1275; 14th session, 1962, Document 1465; 16th session, 1964, Document 1817; and 20th session, 1968, Document 2442. See also Texts Adopted, 13th session, 1961, Recommendations 275, 276.

with no greater success than did the efforts of previous years.

The Committee on Agriculture was an offshoot of the Economic Affairs Committee, in whose purview agricultural affairs originally were included. Like its parent committee, it began life with a proposal for radical action to be taken in its sphere of competence. In this case, it was based on a 1950 Economic Committee report by Henri Longchambon of France that called for a conference of Ministers of Agriculture, Assembly delegates and representatives of national and international organisations to elaborate proposals for a European Agricultural Authority.[1] Upon the new Committee's creation, René Charpentier produced a 1951 report calling for a treaty that would provide for an Agricultural Authority within the Council of Europe framework.[2] As was the case with the major proposals put forward by the Economic Committee, the plan for an Agricultural Authority was politically controversial. With farming interests playing an important part in the political systems of all European states, agriculture was considered too sensitive an issue to be released from the complete control of national authorities. Not surprisingly the plan for an authority came to very little in practice. As a result of the report, a Ministerial Committee on Agriculture and Food was created, but this inter-governmental body was a far cry from the supranational authority the Assembly's Agricultural Committee had sought for.

The failure of this proposal to materialise brought to a quick end the committee's forays into the field of political controversy. Henceforth it addressed itself primarily to the review of European agricultural developments and to the consideration of problems that were more technical than political. In this vein it was able to promote conventions on the marketing of wines and spirits and on the regulation of the transit of live animals,

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1. See ibid., 2nd session, 1950, Document 86 and Official Reports, 2nd session, 1950, p.1072.

2. See CA, Documents, 3rd session, 1951, Document 4; Texts Adopted, 3rd session, 1951, Recommendation 3.

though by 1970 only the latter had come into force, while the former awaited ratification.[1] In general, however, it did not address itself to the need for new conventions as much as it sought to provide constructive observations on the agricultural developments of the day.

While the subject matter to which the Committees on Municipal and Regional Affairs, Cultural Affairs, and on Population and Refugees addressed themselves in itself was hardly devoid of political content, or indeed controversy, within the context of European co-operation, they did not give rise to disputes in the way that questions about political and economic affairs generally did. Assembly proposals for European cultural co-operation originally had been intended to supplement its radical programme for the political and economic transformation of Europe. In themselves, however, the cultural proposals, which dealt with such matters as the recognition of equivalence of university degrees and the need for a European Cultural Centre and which sought to effect the spread of the 'European idea',[2] depended merely upon intergovernmental co-operation rather than on the creation of supra-national authorities, and therefore did not threaten to infringe national government prerogatives. Similarly, no proposal was ever aired for the creation of a supra-national body for local authorities - the notion was inconceivable - nor could co-operation on refugee problems be envisaged in supranational terms at that time. The task of all three committees, as its leaders and members saw it, was to further co-operation as much as possible: in the first instance institutions had to be erected which could study cultural, municipal and refugee questions respectively

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1. Wines and spirits: CA, Documents, 10th session, 1958, Document 896 (report by Emmanuel Temple of France); 15th session, 1963, Document 1681 (Robert Hauret, France & Henry Clark, Britain) & Document 1729 (Albert Brochon, Switzerland); see also CofE Secretariat, Manual, p.162 & f.n.42. Live animals: CA Documents, 9th session, 1957, Document 740 (report by Fred Mulley, Britain) and 13th session, 1961, Document 1253 (Antoine Guitton of France). Committee proposals for a European Farmers Statute were aired in 1966 and 1969. The Statute was signed in 1972 and awaits ratification at time of writing.

2. See CofE Secretariat, Manual, p.205.

and which, with the aid of the Consultative Assembly, could plan and press for European-wide action where it most was needed.

The fact that the subject matter of all three committees was less highly charged politically allowed for the realisation of a number of committee proposals for action within the Council of Europe framework. These included conventions on equivalence of pre-university diplomas and of periods of university study, both of which specifically had been called for in reports by Victor Larock of Belgium, rapporteur of the Cultural Committee;[1] the annual award of a 'Europe prize' to a municipality actively promoting the European idea, a scheme first outlined in Ziyad Ebuzziya's 1953 report on behalf of the Municipal Affairs Committee;[2] and the commission of an expert study on refugee problems in response to Etienne de la Vallée Poussin's report, on behalf of the Committee on Refugees, which called for a provisional service within the Council of Europe framework to study the social and legal problems of refugees.[3] Most important, however, was the respective sponsorship by each committee of plans for the creation of special institutions within the Council of Europe framework to focus upon questions with which the committees concerned themselves. The first such institution to be created was the office of the 'special representative' for refugees, which had been called for in 1951 reports by Georges Pernot of France and E. da la Vallée Poussin of Belgium on behalf of the Committee on Refugees.[4] To be sure, the reports had also called for the creation of a European Refugees Office, and no such office was established. Nevertheless, at least one office came into being: in 1953 Pierre Schneiter, a former French Minister, was appointed 'special representative' on a provisional basis. Three years later, shortly after his proposal for a European Resettlement Fund was

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1. CA, Documents, 1st session, 1949, Document 59; 2nd session, 1950, Document 33; Manual, pp.205,214,229.
2. CA, Documents, 5th session, 1953, Document 210.
3. Ibid., 2nd session, 1950, Document 102.
4. Ibid., 3rd session, 1951, Documents 43 (Pernot report) & 72 (Poussin report).

implemented by the Committee of Ministers, his mandate was extended indefinitely.[1] A 1955 report by Jacques Chaban-Delmas of France, chairman of the Municipal Affairs Committee, called for the creation of a European Conference of Local Authorities: within three years the first such conference had met and in 1961 it was chartered as a permanent body with advisory status within the Council of Europe.[2]

The creation of a specialised Council of Europe institution to deal with cultural matters was a somewhat longer process. The first step was the signing of a European Cultural Convention in 1954. This convention provided for a committee of experts to administer future Council of Europe programmes relating to cultural matters. The convention represented a first stage of the multilateral cultural agreements called for in the 1949 Cultural Committee report.[3] It did not, however, provide for the financing of cultural activities within the Council's framework. This hurdle was overcome by the establishment in 1959 of a European Cultural Fund, in line with a proposal for such a fund made by Christopher Hollis four years previously.[4] That same year WFU's cultural activities, which stressed educational programmes, were transferred to the Council, in line with a 1956 proposal in a report by Nigel Nicolson.[5] The stage was now set for the creation of the Council for Cultural Co-operation, which came into being in 1962, and which co-ordinated all Council of Europe activities in the cultural and educational field. Plans for the CCC had been

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1. CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.196-197. A 1955 report by Poussin had called for the extension of Schneiter's mandate; CA, Documents, 7th session, 1955, Document 367.
2. Chaban-Delmas had in fact first proposed the creation of a Municipal Affairs Committee: see ibid., 3rd session, 1951, Document 85. For his report on a Conference of Local Authorities see ibid, 7th session, 1955, Document 406: see also Manual, pp.286-287.
3. A report on the convention was presented by Christopher Hollis, see CA, Documents, 6th session, 1954, Document 308.
4. Ibid., 7th session, Document 354; see also CofE Secretariat, Manual, p.205
5. CA, Documents, 8th session, 1956, Document 573.

produced by a committee consisting not only of experts and ministerial representatives, but also of the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Assembly Cultural Committee (Ole Kraft of Denmark and Willem van Remoortel of Belgium).[1]

With the creation of specialised institutions dealing with refugee, municipal and cultural affairs, the initiative on these matters passed from the Assembly to these bodies. Most new proposals and programmes stemmed from these institutions simply because they had access to full-time expertise and were concerned solely with their particular subject areas whereas delegates serving on the subject committees not only were not truly experts in their field, but many of them also were not even 'parliamentary experts,' that is, they did not specialise in these matters on parliamentary subject committees. This certainly was true insofar as British delegates were concerned; the only truly subject-oriented committees they served on were the informal parliamentary party committees.[2] In each instance, whether on cultural affairs, municipal affairs, or refugee policy, the role of the committee became primarily one of review and response to the proposals of their corresponding Council of Europe specialist bodies. To be sure, each of the three committees continued to put forward original proposals of its own. For example, a 1963 report by Ludwig Weiss of Austria on the need for a co-ordinated European programme to preserve Europe's historical sites inspired the drafting of a convention on the subject which was signed in 1969.[3] Similarly, the

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1. See Manual, pp.205-206.
2. In December 1966 the Labour Government proposed the creation of Standing Committees on Agriculture and on Science and Technology. The former only lasted until 1968. Even those delegates who do serve on subject committees in their home parliaments are unlikely to be experts in all the fields to which they address themselves at Strasbourg: delegates might be members of two or three committees and alternates on one or two more. It is most unlikely that they would serve on three to five corresponding subject committees in their own parliament.
3. CA, Documents, 15th session, 1963, Document 1570.

'European Water Charter' first suggested by Georges Housiaux of Belgium in his capacity of committee rapporteur, was adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 1968 as part of its campaign against fresh water pollution.[1] In general, however, most activities embodied in committee proposals that led to action by the Committee of Ministers were of a transient nature: conferences involved no long-term commitment.[2] It is noteworthy that but one formal agreement - that on historical sites - was reached on the basis of proposals from any of the committees once their corresponding specialised institutions had been established within the Council of Europe framework.

Unlike the record of the Political, Economic and Agricultural Committees, that of the Cultural and Municipal committees and the Committee on Refugees did not represent a retreat to a review function after sustained failure to have any radical and politically controversial programmes accepted by the Committee of Ministers. Instead it reflected the adoption of a complementary position to organisations of their own creation which were to provide the technical expertise while the committees provided the constructive criticism and political support within the Council. To be sure, the review function of the Population/Refugees Committee in particular extended to other organisations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, whose annual reports received the committee's scrutiny and comment, and usually its commendation as well. In this respect the committee's work was no different from that of the Economic Committee that likewise scrutinised annual reports of organisations such as the OECD. However, the important difference between the functions of the two committees

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1. For Housiaux' report see ibid., 19th session, 1967, Document 2240 (see also 17th session, 1965, Document 1965) and CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.201-202.
2. Examples include the 1970 Conference of Ministers of Regional Planning called for in a 1968 report by Gerhard Flamig of the Federal Republic (CA, Documents, 20th session, 1968, Document 2382) and the 1966 Conference on Population Trends in Europe first called for in a 1963 report by Ronald Russell (ibid., 15th session, 1963, Document 1689.) See also the reports by Georges Margue of Luxembourg, 18th session, 1966, Document 2130 and 19th session, 1967, Document 2197.

was that in the case of the former, when it reviewed and supported the report of the 'Special Representative' for Refugees, it was in fact providing additional political support to a programme already elaborated within the Council of Europe framework. Appeals to and consultation with the Committee of Ministers thereby arose not only from its relationship with the Assembly, but from that which it had with a second institution within the Council that already had elaborated the programme. Thus while the review functions of all Assembly committees were not to be downgraded, even if their practical effects could not easily be measured - a point which will shortly be re-examined - with respect to the work of the Council of Europe itself, the review functions of the Municipal, Cultural and Population/Refugees Committees in particular, were of special importance.

Turning to that category of committees whose activities between 1949 and 1970 were more evenly divided between the promulgation of proposals for practical action by the Committee of Ministers and the review of developments in their respective subject areas, one finds that it consists only of the Social and Legal Affairs Committees. Like the subject interests of the Cultural, Municipal and Population/Refugees Committees, those of the Legal and Social Committees did not in themselves contain the seeds of major political controversy among the member states of the Council. Indeed it is significant that what may possibly be the Legal Committee's greatest contribution to the work of the Council of Europe, its elaboration of a European Convention on Human Rights, was accepted by the member states as a convention but one year after the Council had begun to function and at the very time that the federal-functional dispute was most intense. Human rights is a politically charged issue, but only when its terms are contested by two systems that embrace opposite views about its nature and preservation. With respect to the Council of Europe's member states, all preserved a certain standard of human rights within their system by the very definition of their being signatories to the Council's Statute. To be sure, differences arose

over the interpretation of a number of human rights, and these differences produced complications in the drafting of the convention. However, in its broadest terms, the Convention did no more than reaffirm in a way that, it was hoped, was capable of enforcement, the de jure if not de facto state of affairs within each member of the Council. Most of the other efforts of the Legal Committee, likewise reflected values that at least in their broadest terms were common to all member states. As for the Social Committee, its proposals did not seek to exacerbate possible divisions over socialist versus non-socialist approaches to welfare;[1] rather it sought upward harmonisation of existing policies and a general improvement along policy lines that at least some member states had already set for themselves. With respect to both committees, the federal-functional question did not arise; nor did that of the imposition or creation of any supra-national authority. Inherently, therefore, the proposals put forward by the Legal and Social Committees, like those of the Municipal, Cultural and Population/Refugee Committees, had far brighter prospects of acceptance and implementation by the Committee of Ministers than did those of the Economic, Political and Agricultural Committees. However, the creation of specialised expert bodies to co-ordinate Council of Europe activities in legal and social matters did not remove most of the initiative in these concerns from the hands of the Assembly subject committees as did similar developments in the fields of cultural, municipal and refugee affairs. Both the Legal and Social Committees continued to produce new proposals for action by the Committee of Ministers, and a number of these were implemented. It is for this reason that the two committees belong in a class of their own.

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1. Henri Heyman of Belgium, who produced the committee's first report calling for uniform social security programmes in Europe was a Social Christian, the equivalent of a Christian-Democrat.

The list of conventions and other Council of Europe decisions and activities owing their origin to proposals outlined in reports of the Legal and Social Committees is a rather long one, but some of these conventions deserve mention if only to indicate the technical nature of these committees' interests. Under the leadership of David Maxwell-Fyfe of Britain (chairman from 1949-51), the Legal Committee produced proposals for a Human Rights Declaration, including provision for the Commission and Court of Human Rights. The former allowed for the hearing of individual petitions against member states, the first time that individuals were granted recognition in international law. In addition to the Convention itself, the Legal Committee also directly inspired the drafting of a protocol which added to the Convention's nomenclature of rights those of property, free choice of children's education, and the vote in free elections. These rights had originally been intended to form part of the convention itself, but political controversy had been so protracted that they were only agreed to once the convention was complete.[1]

Other proposals emanating from the committee in the years 1949-51 were the 1950 call for a European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, which finally was signed in 1957,[2] and the proposal for a convention on extradition, which likewise was adopted in modified form in 1957.[3]

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1. See Maxwell-Fyfe's comments to the Assembly, CA, Official Reports, 2nd session, 1950, pp.326-328; see also CA, Documents, 3rd session, 1951, Documents 31, 34, 93 & 96. For a discussion of the workings of the Convention and the institutions it created see CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.261-283.

2. This convention called for the submission of all legal disputes, such as those involving interpretation of a treaty, to the International Court of Justice. It also allowed for the submission of non-legal disputes to arbitration or conciliation. See the report by M. Bastid of France, CA, Documents, 2nd session, 1950, Document 1221 and Manual, p.245.

3. Ibid., 3rd session, 1951, Document 92.

Conventions first proposed under the chairmanship of Henri Rolin of Belgium (1951-58) included those for compulsory motor insurance for civil liability (first report, 1956, convention signed, 1959);[1] for arbitration in private law disputes (first report, 1957, convention signed 1966);[2] and for the reduction of multiple nationality (first report, 1953, signed 1963).[3] Under the chairmanship of Hermod Lannung of Denmark (1959-66) the list of committee reports that formed the basis for conventions included a 1961 report on the need to harmonise laws on the adoption of children (convention signed 1967);[4] a 1965 report on the need for a draft convention to settle conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal matters (convention signed 1970);[5] a 1965 report calling for a convention that would ensure that crimes against humanity would not be subject to statutory limitations (convention signed 1973);[6] and a 1966 report calling for the establishment of a registration system for wills (convention signed 1972).[7] Though at the time of writing (1974) no convention had as yet been produced as a result of reports issued during the chairmanship of Samuel Silkin of Britain (1967-70), the committee's activities during that period had not slackened. Its practical adcomplishments included the initiation of a symposium for the co-ordination of research on Eastern European legal systems (chaired by Eduard Wahl, vice-chairman of the Legal Committee)[8] and the expulsion of Greece from the Consultative Assembly in 1969, due in great part to the report of Silkin and his related activities in the Assembly.[9]

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1. Ibid., 8th session, 1956, Document 560; Manual, p.249; see also 10th session 1958, Document 364.
2. Ibid., 9th session, 1957, Document 769; see also Manual, p.251.
3. CA, Documents, 10th session, 1958, Document 805.
4. Ibid., 13th session, 1961, Document 1312; see also Manual, pp.174-175.
5. Ibid., 16th session, 1964-65, Document 1873, report by Michel de Grailly of France. See also his motion, ibid., Document 1841.
6. Ibid., Document 1868, see also Motion by René Radius, Document 1859.
7. Ibid., 18th session, 1966, Document 2160.
8. See ibid., 19th session, 1967, Document 2312.
9. Ibid., 19th session, 1967, Document 2283. Silkin was the first to call for Greece's expulsion from the Council of Europe, see CA, Official Reports, 19th session, 1967, p.306; see also below pp.324-325.

It is noteworthy that since 1963 the Legal Committee, like the Cultural Committee, has had an 'opposite number' on the 'executive' side of the Council of Europe, namely the Council for Legal Co-operation (CCJ), which co-ordinates the Council of Europe's legal programme in the same way as the Council for Cultural Co-operation co-ordinates its cultural projects.[1] The reasons for the Legal Committee's retention of the initiative on numerous questions is no doubt due in some measure to the fact that its membership is almost totally - if not totally - composed of lawyers, who therefore have the professional expertise to pinpoint problems and suggest their solutions. That the committee should be fully endowed with so many professionals should come as no surprise, for lawyers traditionally form a substantial proportion of parliamentarians in many Western European countries.[2] It should also be noted that the scope for legal co-operation is vast, and that in view of the particular need for specific agreements in all types of legal matters, the success of the Legal Committee in seeing its proposals adopted as written agreements should come as no surprise, given also the usually non-political terms in which they are framed.

The Social Committee's record of contributions to the practical activity of the Council of Europe likewise was a strong one throughout the entire period under review. Its initial reports, prepared by Henri Heyman of

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1. The idea for a body to co-ordinate Council of Europe activities in the legal field originated with the Assembly's Legal Committee. See CA, Documents, 14th session, 1962, Document 1533 and CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.243-245 (The 1962 report was presented by Hermod Lannung of Denmark.)

2. For example, lawyers formed the highest occupational proportion of Belgian legislators in 1964 - 24.8% (see Gordon L. Weil, The Benelux Nations: The Politics of Small Country Democracies (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p.167; the highest occupational proportion of British MPs elected in 1966 - 17.6% (The Times Guide to the House of Commons 1966 (London 1966)); and the second highest proportion of members elected to the 1967 French National Assembly - 10% (see Philip M. Williams, The French Parliament: 1958-67 (New York, Praeger, 1968), p.34. See also Ralf Dahrendorf, 'The Evolution of Ruling Groups in Europe,' in Mattei Dogan & Richard Rose eds., European Politics: A Reader (London, Macmillan, 1971), p.385.

Belgium, called for harmonisation of national social security programmes and for a European Code on Social Security.[1] Heyman's reports were lengthy and detailed, outlining the state of national social security programmes at the time and providing a draft code on Social Security. The Committee of Ministers' response came in the form of two interim agreements and protocols on social security (for the multilateral extension of bilateral social security agreements), both of which came into force in 1953, and a Convention on Social and Medical Assistance (which made nationals of member states eligible for mandatory social security and medical care benefits of any other member states in which they resided) came into force the following year.[2] The code on social security took longer to operationalise: signed in 1964, it came into force in 1968, setting minimum standards for a variety of social security benefits for which all workers were covered with no exceptions.[3]

A 1951 report by Heyman led to the creation of the Social Committee's opposite number within the Committee of Ministers framework, termed, confusingly, the social committee. This new committee worked closely with its Assembly counterpart to produce the European Social Charter, which was meant to 'supplement in social matters, the Human Rights Convention'.[4] The idea had originated with a 1953 report by Heyman;[5] before the charter was signed in 1961, it had gone through various draft stages, two drafts having been produced by the Assembly's Social Committee.[6] The document, perhaps

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1. CA, Documents, 1st session, 1949, Documents 53 & 79 and 2nd session, 1950, Documents 1 & 82.
2. CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.175-176.
3. Ibid. pp.176-177. See CA, Documents, 9th session, 1957, Documents 655 & 746 for additional reports on the subject by Heyman and Willi Birkelbach of Germany, respectively.
4. Palmer and Lambert, European Unity, p.157.
5. CA, Documents, 5th session, 1953, Document 133; see also Texts Adopted, 5th session, 1953, Opinion 10.
6. CA, Documents, 7th session, 1955, Document 403; 8th session, 1956, Document 433. See also report of Adolf Molter of Belgium, 11th session, 1959, Document 1035.

the most significant of the Council's agreements in the social field, set out in both general and specific terms a series of social rights that member states should seek to maintain in their national policies, demanded the immediate acceptance of certain of its provisions by contracting states, and established machinery for supervising their implementation.[1]

Other contributions of the Social Committee to the framework of Council agreements were less all-embracing, though in themselves certainly of some importance. A 1954 report by René Radius of France (who chaired the committee from 1959-61 and 1963-65) led to the adoption of a 1955 agreement on the exchange of war cripples with a view to medical treatment.[2] Two 1961 reports by Radius led to the calling of a conference on air pollution three years later; it resulted in the creation of a Committee of Experts on Air Pollution to elaborate a co-ordinated European policy to cope with the problem.[3] A 1963 report by Paul Meyers of Belgium called for the completion and publication of a European Pharmacopoeia to provide for the uniform description and evaluation of medicaments circulating in Europe. A convention was signed in 1964, and the first volume of the massive work was completed in 1969.[4] A 1964 report by Elinor Hubert of Germany led to the signing in 1969 of a convention on the treatment of young people serving as au pairs in other member states.[5] Finally, on the basis of a 1966 report by Meyers, as well as the activities of the expert social committee, the Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution in 1967 on the harmonisation of national rules for the training and professional status of social workers.[6]

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1. Manual, pp.168-169.
2. Ibid., p.181; see also CA, Documents, 6th session, 1954, Document 283, and 7th session, 1955, Document 464 for Radius' second report on the subject.
3. See ibid., 13th session, 1961, Documents 1292, 1349; CofE Secretariat, Manual, pp.202-203.
4. See ibid., pp.190-193 and CA, Documents, 15th session, 1963, Document 1699.
5. Ibid., 16th session, 1964, Document 1830; see also 18th session, 1966, Document 2072.
6. Ibid., Document 2132, see also Manual, p.172.

The range of the Social Committee's interests resembled that of the Legal Committee in its breadth and in some instances its technical nature. Its output on practical matters was smaller than that of the Legal Committee, not so much because initiative was ceded to the expert social committee, though to some extent it was, but simply because the documents it produced, notably on social security and the European Social Charter, were of a general all-embracing type. It must be noted, however, that no matter how wide the Social Committee's scope of activity was, the scope of the expert committee and of the Committee of Ministers' branch generally was even wider. This observation likewise applies to legal affairs, and, as shortly will be indicated, the supposedly recalcitrant Committee of Ministers actually initiated through its experts committees more agreements and recommendations than did the Consultative Assembly during the 1949-70 period. Before exploring this point in detail, and drawing therefrom certain conclusions about the magnitude of individual delegation contributions to the work of the Council, brief mention must be made of the final category of committee, that dealing with the follow-up to Assembly activities.

The class of committees dealing with follow-up action on Assembly recommendations and resolutions includes in fact only the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations.[1] Created in 1956 with a clear-cut task, it proceeded to develop methods of selecting particular recommendations for distribution to delegation 'spokesmen' (usually members of the committee) in national parliaments who then were meant to publicise the recommendations by means of questions, motions, personal approaches to Ministers, or the initiation of debates on the general subject to which the recommendations

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1. Comments about the work of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations as it relates to the British parliamentary context appear on pp. 250-251 and p. 251 f.n. 1.

referred.[1] In its first year of activity, the working party on parliamentary relations, as it then was called, published a manual on national parliamentary procedure which was to serve as a guide for appropriate action to be taken within a given legislature to publicise an Assembly text.[2] In time the working party itself came to issue suggestions on appropriate steps to be taken within national parliaments to publicise the texts it had selected. During the 1960's it began to distribute translations of its selected texts in all members' national languages;[3] to submit assembly texts to rapporteurs and chairmen of national parliamentary committees when they were studying an issue to which these texts related;[4] and to pass on to national parliaments the texts of all resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers and transmitted by them to the Assembly.[5] With respect to the public relations side of its work, the committee was less innovative, tending to follow the lead of the Council of Europe's Directorate of Press and Information, with which it worked on close terms.[6]

The measure of the committee's success clearly was to be found in the degree to which its efforts resulted in the airing of its selected texts in national parliaments. To gauge the effectiveness of its work, the committee has produced annual tables of what it has termed 'interventions in national parliaments' which, taken at face value, have shown a marked rise in the number of interventions on assembly texts since the committee first began to function. However, a number of

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1. CA, Documents, 9th session, 1957, Document 640 (report by Karl Czernetz of Austria).
2. Ibid.
3. See ibid., 18th session, 1966, Document 2095 (report by Albert Dassié of France on activities of the working party).
4. See ibid.
5. Ibid., 21st session, 1969, Document 2591 (report by Astrid Bergegren of Sweden).
6. For a typical outline of the committee's work in this area see the report of Geoffrey Rhodes, ibid., 22nd session, 1970. Document 2733, p.5.

TABLE M

Interventions in National Parliaments

	Documents Tabled (1)	Debates (2)	Individual Steps Taken by Representatives (3)	Total
1956-57	39	12	18	119
1957-58	119	54	32	205
1958-59	151	124	41	316
1959-60	167	110	32	309
1960-61	174	82	28	284(4)
1961-62	194	99	27	320
1962-63	220	104	26	350
1963-64	372	139	13	524
1964-65	425	110	3	538
1965-66	310	110	14	434
1966-67	412	126	19	557
1967-68	595	162	5	762
1968-69	679	119	3	801
1969-70	777	117	11	905

Notes:
(1): includes written questions and replies, reports, draft bills, motions
(2): debates, oral questions, elections, wholly or partly prompted by Council of Europe affairs
(3): Letters or visits to Ministers or other persons
(4): Period of ten months only

Source of figures, categories and their definition: annual reports of Working Party/Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations, Consultative Assembly, Documents, 9th-22nd sessions, 1957-1970.

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qualifications must be made about the committee's presentation of its figures.[1] Taking the 'documents' category first, one finds that ministerial replies to questions are treated as separate documents from the questions themselves. Thus in effect the number of documents is artificially almost doubled. Had this rather questionable method of classification been employed throughout the 1956-70 period, the relationship between each year's total would have remained constant. However, one finds that until the report for the period 1963-64, the categories 'documents tabled', 'special

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1. In addition to the following observations see also above, p. 251, especially f.n. 1.

or general debates' and 'individual approaches' were employed in the committee's tables without any indication of what these terms stood for.[1] It was only with the report for 1963-64 that the definitions employed in Table M were first utilised. And it is significant that the total figure for documents soared from 220 in 1962-63 to 372 for the following period.[2] The one year increase of 69 per cent. represented the highest jump since the committee's inception. If, however, one subtracts the committee's figure of 101 written replies which it included in the 'documents tabled' category, one is left with a figure of 261 for the 1963-64 period and with a resultant increase of about 18 per cent. which is in line with increases of previous years.

If one turns to the 'debates' category one finds an additional major difficulty. In this case, it is not that oral replies are included in the figure, which in fact they are - in addition to oral questions - since indications from previous years point to the consistent inclusion of oral answers in the 'debates' category. The difficulty lies rather in the problem of determining just to what extent the Consultative Assembly's interest in a given issue was a factor in the holding of a parliamentary debate in relation to it. Can it seriously be posited that a debate in Parliament, the Assemblée Nationale or the Bundestag on the question of British entry to the EEC was held solely because the matter was the subject of a Consultative Assembly recommendation? Would not that debate have been held even if the Consultative Assembly had never existed? Clearly, by including debates on matters 'partly prompted by Council of Europe affairs' the working party defeated its entire purpose of giving an accurate measurement of its own influence in having Assembly documents and issues considered in national parliaments.

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1. See the reports of the working party, beginning in 1957, in CA, Documents.
2. For both sets of figures see the report of Camille Linden of Luxembourg, ibid., 16th session, 1964, Document 1791, especially pp.6-8.

Finally, on the question of approaches to Ministers, the committee's third category, it must seriously be asked in what ways does the committee determine the frequency of these approaches and indeed their very nature. The committee's figures are provided to it by the secretariat of the Council of Europe which in turn receives them from secretariats of national parliaments. Even assuming that the figures passed on by these secretariats are completely accurate with respect to documentary evidence, one must nevertheless ask how they could possibly tabulate what in general - apart perhaps from letters - are informal approaches. Does a quick chat in the lobby of the Commons on a subject relating to - but not necessarily solely connected with - a Council of Europe interest count as an 'approach'? Again one is left with the feeling that the figures are more misleading than anything else. The absolute figures presented by the Committee clearly point to its having some measure of effect on Consultative Assembly-related activity in national parliaments. But the measure itself is a different matter, it cannot be determined from the figures presented by the committee - it almost certainly is not as great as those figures would imply - and it may not be measurable at all.

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It was noted above that not all committees of the Assembly were responsible for initiating proposals that led to practical action by the Committee of Ministers within the Council of Europe framework. Table N reveals the breakdown of committee 'initiatives' leading to Council of Europe conventions and agreements - including as initiatives all recommendations which called for a specific policy even if they did not outline it in the form of a draft convention or agreement (in any event, it has been the committees of experts appointed by the Committee of Ministers that have drafted conventions or agreements for final approval and adoption). It will be seen that most initiatives leading to conventions and agreements which emanated from the Assembly dealt with matters covered by the committees listed in categories three and four. It must also be noted, however, that

when placed in the overall context of Council of Europe activity, the Consultative Assembly's performance was hardly outstanding. Certainly the initiation of but 14 agreements after 1951 is a paltry record when one takes into account that the vast majority of the Assembly's nearly 900 pre-1970 resolutions and recommendations were issued after that year. These observations must be borne in mind when assessing the contribution of individual delegates to the work of the Assembly; that 'work', insofar as it relates to Council of Europe activities, must be placed in its proper perspective.

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TABLE N.

Council of Europe Conventions and Agreements:
Source of Original Proposals

Subject Area	Consultative Assembly 1949-51	1952-59	1960-70	Other Council of Europe Organs* 1949-51	1952-59	1960-70
General Affairs	4	0	0	4	4	0
Economic Affairs	3	0	0	0	2	0
Agriculture	0	1	0	0	0	0
Social Affairs	3	2	2	0	2	6
Legal Affairs	5	6	2**	0	2	15
Cultural Affairs	4	0	1	0	1	2
Refugee Questions	0	0	0	0	1	0
Total	19	9	5	4	12	23
Grand Total			33			39

*Includes proposals emanating from Committee of Ministers' expert committees, special conferences within the Council of Europe framework and from office of 'special representative for refugees'.

**Does not include two conventions adopted in 1972 and 1973 respectively, based on reports presented on behalf of the Legal Committee during the 1960's.

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Clearly, for the purpose of determining the participation of specific delegations in the formulation of Assembly projects leading to conventions and agreements, one need only take into account the holding of offices on those committees whose work at some point led to the formulation of such agreements. It is clear, however, that, as outlined both in the body of

this chapter and in Table N, certain committees produced far more proposals that were implemented than did others. Before turning to the contribution of delegations to the proposals themselves, it is worth noting in Table O the distribution of delegation activity among what may be termed the Assembly's major committees. The figures for Britain reveal a general increase in activity after 1960, and indeed so do those for all other countries listed. British activity was most notable in legal affairs throughout the period under review, as well as in economic, social and agricultural affairs after 1960. The Belgians were most active in the General Affairs and Social Committees, while French activity was most noticeable on the Agricultural, General Affairs, Legal and Economic Committees. The Germans have been most

TABLE O

Chairmanships and Rapporteurships of Committees Issuing Recommendations for Implementation as Council of Europe Conventions and Agreements: Selected Delegations.

Period A = 1949-51 Period B = 1952-59 Period C = 1960-70

a) Chairmanships

	GA			Eco			Ag			Soc			Leg			Cul			Pop/Ref		
Period:	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
UK	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	5
Belgium	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	3	1	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	3	7	-	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

b) Rapporteurships

UK	2	7	7	4	8	16	-	1	9	-	4	8	2	5	16	-	3	5	-	1	4
Belgium	2	11	13	2	4	8	-	1	-	3	8	8	-	5	4	3	6	1	2	4	8
France	2	4	12	3	5	12	1	8	25	-	7	7	6	3	10	-	-	5	1	1	4
Germany	-	5	6	-	8	5	-	-	1	-	6	8	-	7	14	-	5	12	-	4	5
Sweden	-	2	2	-	5	12	-	3	-	-	-	9	-	-	2	-	1	2	-	-	-
Turkey	-	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1

active on the Legal and Cultural Committees, the Swedes on the Economic Committee and the Turks on no committee in particular. Only guesses may be

hazarded as to why certain committees were dominated by members of particular delegations. The personal preferences of particular delegates (who, especially if they were chairmen for a number of years, are responsible for high figures on the chairmanships part of the table[1]) clearly are an important factor in their participation in committee affairs. Such preferences need not be in line with prevailing government views and need not be indicative of them. As can be seen from Appendix 9, most delegates are individually elected by parliamentary secret ballot; the degree to which a Government or even party leader can influence a delegation elected in this way is somewhat problematical. The direct influence of the British Government, a theme which this study has sought to stress, is to a very great degree facilitated by the situation whereby it is party leaders that choose delegates who then need not submit themselves to election. Bearing this qualification in mind, it nevertheless seems likely that Belgian interest in the General Affairs Committee was related to that country's strong interest in the principles of European co-operation and integration.[2] French activity on the Agricultural Committee was no doubt at least partly due to that country's particular concern about the effects of European co-operation on her important farming industry.[3] Finally, Swedish activity on the Economic Committee, most notable after 1960, may have been partly inspired by that country's desire to foster economic co-operation in the spirit of EFTA, which, like its ill-fated predecessor, the Free Trade Area, had elicited little

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1. For an explanation of the way committee officerships have been tabulated in this study see above, p.227 Table E, note (2).
2. For a brief review of Belgian attitudes to European integration see Weil, Benelux Nations, pp.231-245.
3. French attitudes on European agricultural policy, as well as French activity in the Consultative Assembly's Agriculture Committee are outlined in Marcel Faure, Les Paysans Dans La Société Francaise (Paris, Armand Colin, 1966), pp.266-285.

hostility and some measure of support from the Consultative Assembly.[1] As far as Britain is concerned, it will be seen that the interests of its delegation lay not only in the work of committees that led in the initiation of Council of Europe agreements - notably the Legal and Social Committee, but to only a somewhat lesser extent also in those more 'politically' and review orientated committees - particularly the Economic and Agriculture Committees after 1960. Indeed, a breakdown of the actual number of delegates closely linked through their work in the Assembly with the elaboration of conventions and agreements (Table ?) reveals that after 1951, and certainly after 1960, few British delegates had any direct part in the formulation of proposals that led to Council of Europe agreements. Clearly, the increase in overall British participation in Assembly affairs, outlined in the previous chapter, was not merely geared to British participation in the formulation of practical Council of Europe policies. It is significant that British activity on the three most identifiably 'political' committees - Agriculture, Economic Affairs and Political Affairs - accounted for over 40 per cent. of all British chairmanships and rapporteurships after 1960, for it was these committees that concerned themselves most closely with the question of British entry into the EEC. Possible reasons for the interest of other delegations in these committees have been noted above, but so too has it been noted that with respect to those delegations, the direct influence of Government policy on delegation activities is somewhat problematical. In Britain's case, however, a relationship has been traced between Government policy and delegation behaviour. Does that relationship indeed account for the prevelance of British delegates in offices of those committees dealing with the EEC issue? How did delegates manage to win offices on these committees, or indeed any Assembly committee?

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1. Though the Assembly noted in its recommendations that it preferred a unified economic policy for Europe, it nevertheless welcomed the creation of EFTA, and received annual reports from the organisation. Indeed, the Assembly's line on economic policy was so neutral that it had even endorsed the British Free Trade Area proposals of the late 'fifties while at the same time calling for an integrated European common market. See Consultative Assembly, Texts adopted, 8th session, 1956-57, Recommendation 130; 9th session, 1957, Recommmendation 152; 11th session, 1959, Recommendation 210; & 12th session, 1960, Recommendation 266.

TABLE F

Chairmen and Rapporteurs of Committees from which Assembly Proposals Leading to Council of Europe Conventions and Agreements Originated: Selected Delegations.

	1949-51 Ch	Rap	Tot	Cttees	1952-59 Ch	Rap	Tot	Cttees	1960-70 Ch	Rap	Tot	Cttees
UK	4	1	4	Leg	0	2	2	Ag; Leg	0	0	0	-
Belgium	1	7	8	Cul; Leg; Soc	5	1	6	Leg; Soc	0	1	1	Leg
France	7	10	17	GA; Leg; Eco	0	1	1	Soc	2	2	3	Leg; Soc
Germany	0	1	1	Leg	0	5	5	Leg	0	0	1	Soc
Sweden	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-
Turkey	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-

	Initiated In: 1949-51	1952-59	1960-70
Total conventions and agreements with which delegates of above states were associated:	19	9	3
Total conventions and agreements initiated by Consultative Assembly:	19	9	5
Total conventions and agreements concluded within Council of Europe framework:	23	21	28

Was there a co-ordinated British effort to win offices for delegates, or did they do so as individuals? The answers to these questions lie in the one aspect of Assembly activities that has yet to be considered: the work of international party groups.

Party groups often have been the key to delegates' winning the committee posts analysed above. It must be shown whether British delegates worked within the party group system and to what extent British participation in that system was viewed as yet another aspect of the effort to win support for Britain's quest for EEC entry. Accordingly it is to the party groups that the next chapter is devoted. It will then be followed by direct consideration of that key relationship that has been referred to above and at so many stages of this study and that particularly governed British activity in the 'political' committees: the relationship between the movement for British

entry into the EC and British parliamentary attitudes to and activities in the Consultative Assembly and indeed, WEU and the NAA as well.

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Chapter 8

International Party Groups

International party groups, which bring together assembly delegates of ostensibly (but not necessarily) similar ideological persuasion, were organised with remarkable speed after the birth of the Council of Europe. Indeed, by 1953 both the Consultative Assembly and the new ECSC Common Assembly could boast of three fully organised party groups, those of the Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats, each of whose members were drawn from most delegations. Not surprisingly, a number of students of international parliamentary assemblies, as well as some students of European integration, have devoted some attention to the growth, development, and prospects of these groups. Ernst Haas and Peter Merkl in particular have accorded considerable attention to the subject, both in Haas' lengthy volume on The Uniting of Europe and in subsequent shorter studies of political behaviour in the Consultative and WEU Assemblies.[1]

Basic to the Haas-Merkl studies is the assumption that 'parliamentarians in their conduct have the facility of furthering the growth of practices and codes of behaviour typical of federations quite apart from the specific advocacy of substantive federal measures'.[2] In analysing the role of the ECSC Common Assembly, Haas conceded that it was able neither to bind parent legislatures to its resolutions nor to control in a meaningful way either the High Authority or the Council of Ministers or both. Nevertheless, he argued that in the Assembly,

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1. Haas, Uniting of Europe; Consensus Formation; with Merkl, 'Parliamentarians against Ministers'; Merkl, 'European Assembly Parties'; see above, p.5 f.n. 1 and p.6 f.n. 1.

2. Haas, Uniting of Europe, p.390.

> continuing supranational communications channels are established physically and ideologically, probably 'spilling over' eventually into the ranks of national parliamentarians not regularly deputised to go to Strasbourg. It is in this connection that the role of European supranational political parties becomes crucial. 1

In Haas' view the parliamentary political parties which came into existence during the first session of the Common Assembly were the prototype of federal political parties. 'Typically' Haas pointed out, 'the cohesion of federal parties is most strongly developed in the nomination and election of federation-wide officials';[2] in the Common Assembly, the party-group competition for committee posts seemed to be a development along the same lines. While none of the groups displayed either ideological homogeneity or cohesive voting patterns,[3] they did seem to emerge as putative government and opposition groups, the Christian Democrats assuming the former role and the Socialists the latter, with the Liberals choosing sides on the basis of the issue at hand. The Assembly thus appeared to function along the lines of a continental chamber and as such was 'a faithful mirror of regional group conflict, and therefore a vehicle of political integration'.[4]

Haas' study of consensus formation at the Council of Europe was based upon the principles he had outlined in his earlier volume. In attempting to assess whether any partisan consensus oh European issues could be said to have developed at the Consultative Assembly, Haas analysed the results of Assembly roll-call votes on the assumption that these votes would reveal whether delegates voted along national party, national, or party group lines. The degree to which delegates aligned themselves with party group positions would be a guide to the formation of a partisan, European-wide consensus at the Assembly, itself 'an indicator of the degree of integration which prevails'[5] there.

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1. Ibid., p.413
2. Ibid. p.414.
3. Partly because few issues were allowed to come to the vote. (ibid., p.437).
4. Ibid., pp.436-437.
5. Haas, Consensus Formation, pp.4-5.

Unfortunately, Haas could find little evidence of any such consensus being formed. 'Fundamentally', he stated, 'the national party is the repository of loyalties at Strasbourg'. Party groups did hold meetings, nominate candidates for assembly and committee office and attempt to formulate common positions on issues debated at the Assembly, but

> the voting record... demonstrates that intragroup discussion of substantive issues does not consistently produce a substantive partisan consensus. 1

The 1960 Haas-Merkl study of the WEU Assembly employed the same analytical methods and yielded fundamentally the same conclusions.[2] Merkl's 1964 analysis, carrying forward the study to the 1962 sessions of both assemblies, was somewhat more optimistic. Party groups, he contended, had come to rival national parties as an object of the delegate's loyalty. The Christian-Democratic group at the WEU Assembly in particular seemed to have adopted the characteristics of a truly European party, reflecting greater cohesion on a number of key votes than did the other party groups and the majority of national delegations.[3]

Merkl contended that the approach he and Haas had employed, the 'behavioural approach', seemed vindicated by his latest findings.[4] However, both his contention and his methods seem slightly dubious. Both Haas and Merkl had admitted that the Council of Europe's relative lack of political influence hardly stimulated delegates to adopt partisan views on Assembly recommendations.[5] Since partisan disputes might seem to weaken the Assembly's resolve in the face of an indifferent Committee of Ministers, most recommendations were agreed to unanimously or nearly unanimously. Nevertheless, both Merkl and Haas argued that some indication of partisan political activity

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1. Ibid., pp.66-67.
2. Haas and Merkl, 'Parliamentarians against Ministers', pp.57-58.
3. Merkl, 'European Assembly Parties', p.63.
4. Ibid.
5. Haas, Consensus Formation, p.15; Merkl, 'European Assembly Parties,' p.55.

could be derived from the numerous votes which had produced sharper divisions within the Assembly. Merkl, who analysed his data in sets of six sessions each, 1949-55 and 1956-62, should have noticed that the number of divisions had dropped in the latter period (from 70 to 64).[1] If delegates were thinking more along partisan lines, surely the trend should have been towards increasing, not fewer divisions. This observation is borne out by the decline in the number of votes in subsequent sessions until 1970. Compared with the 64 votes of the 1956-62 period, only 19 took place in the following eight years. Clearly, the figure of less than three divisions a year hardly provides the basis for an analytical framework that can yield conclusions about the partisan views of delegates whether in party group or indeed national terms. However great or small the 'indices of cohesion' which Haas and Merkl employ may prove to have been for those 19 votes, these must clearly pale into insignificance next to the 75 per cent. figure for the decrease in the number of votes actually held. Indeed one could be led to take the decline in the number of votes after 1962 as an indication that delegates had become less sharply divided over assembly issues than they previously had been.

With respect to the WEU Assembly, the statistical casuistry which Haas and Merkl seem to have employed is not as immediately apparent. Issues related to defence are perhaps more likely to arouse partisan views; the 37

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1. Merkl divides the thirteen sessions into 'two halves' of what appear to be six sessions each (ibid., p.56). He mistakenly labels the 1949-55 period sessions 1-6 instead of sessions 1-7. It may be pointed out that on the basis of the corrected error, the decline from 70 to 64 divisions may be explained by the extra session accounted for in the 'first half'. However, extension of the analysis to the 1962-63 session, thereby allowing for two periods of seven sessions each, reveals that there still were more divisions in the earlier period (70-68). My own calculations for both periods yield 86 divisions for the former and 49 for the latter, in which case the argument outlined in the text becomes even more decisive.

votes held between 1963 and 1969 is at least an increase over the 35 held in the previous seven years. Nevertheless, that increase is only of the most marginal order. Furthermore, these 37 votes cannot be measured in isolation; they must be placed in the context of the 128 resolutions and recommendations agreed to by the Assembly between 1963 and 1969. Even allowing for a fair number of procedural matters that were passed unanimously,[1] it is clear that if as many as 2/3 of all recommendations and resolutions were agreed to with no dissent, partisan activity was hardly the rule at WEU.

Party groups may indeed have been meant to stimulate a federal consensus among delegates and might in some way have done so, but the Haas-Merkl method does not provide an adequate yardstick for measuring the groups' success. However, the groups also have other functions, such as attempting to secure for their members committee and assembly office as well as simply fostering contacts between members of like-minded parties.[2] The Haas-Merkl approach, geared only to proving the federal character of the groups, generally pays somewhat less attention to these other functions which, however mundane, have characterised the activities of the groups since their inception. It is, however, in relation to these other functions, rather than to a more hypothetical notion of federal consensus-formation, that one must study

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1. Haas & Merkl, 'Parliamentarians', p.53. Haas also seems to discount other issues, particularly social questions, that likewise commanded unanimous agreement. That they evoked no partisan dispute at Strasbourg does not necessarily indicate that they would have commanded unanimous approval in the more politically effective context of the national parliament. The validity of Haas' arbitrary choice of voting data as a source of generalisation about delegates' partisan behaviour seems highly dubious. In any event, such limitations cannot explain away the great drop in the number of votes taken at Strasbourg after 1962.

2. Palmer & Pinder, eds., 'European Unity,' p.124: Merkl, 'European Assembly Parties', pp.52-55.

the relations of the British party delegation with these groups. Only in this manner can one more readily comprehend why the Labour Party was willing to work closely with the Socialists from 1949, while the Conservatives, who originally had remained an aloof, independent group, decided to move closer to the Christian-Democrats in the mid-'sixties.[1]

The Labour Party and the Socialist Group.

When the Labour delegation arrived in Strasbourg in August 1949 its leaders entertained some hopes of achieving co-operation with fellow Socialists from the Continent. To be sure, Labour opposed any co-operation with the European Movement, to which were affiliated two Socialist Groups, the Mouvement Socialiste pour les États Unis de L'Europe and the European Union of Federalists.[2] Nevertheless , at the May 1949 meetings in Baarn of the Committee of the International Socialist Commission (COMISCO), Labour had joined continental Socialists in passing a vague resolution on 'European Union'.[3] Furthermore, Labour seems to have raised no objection to the COMISCO decision to invite the French SFIO to organise a permanent secretariat for Socialist delegates at the new Consultative Assembly. The secretariat was duly organised and Guy Mollet, leader of the SFIO, was present at its

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1. This chapter will only deal with relations between British delegations and party-groups in the Consultative Assembly and WEU. There were no party-groups in the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference/North Atlantic Assembly until late 'sixties, when Robert Edwards, leader of the British delegation, and Max van der Stoel of Holland launched a Socialist Group with Edwards as its first chairman. Because American delegates, particularly the Democrats, were extremely suspicious of the word 'Socialist' (paradoxically, the generally more conservative Republicans seemed to have a clearer understanding of the situation), the group had to proceed very cautiously; until 1971 the group met only once before the Assembly and not at all during the week of committee meetings usually held in June.

2. See above, Chapter 1, p. 24 f.n.3 . Labour reaffirmed its decision to 'play no part in the European Movement' in February 1949 ('The Labour Party and the European Movement', undated, unsigned Labour Party memorandum, p.2. - L-I).

3. M. van der Goes van Naters, 'Observations on European Unity' (Report attached to 'Press Communique' of the COMISCO Study Group' meeting of 16-17 December 1950), p.4. (L-I).

installation in Strasbourg several days before the Assembly's opening session.[1] All Socialist representatives to the Assembly then met on 10 August and agreed to meet again each week while a committee of one delegate for each country would meet more frequently. A Dutch proposal for the creation of a formal Socialist Group was heavily defeated. It was felt that the Socialists were too small a minority at the Assembly; they needed the support of other parties of the moderate Left.[2] Labour indeed hoped to have a left-wing majority supporting many of its economic proposals.[3] It soon became clear, however, that even the Socialists themselves were far from united. More than half of the delegates, including leading Socialists such as Paul-Henri Spaak, in whom Hugh Dalton placed great trust,[4] were members of the European Movement, Labour's bête noir. Duncan Sandys, the Movement's general secretary, was ever ready to exploit divisions within the group over questions of European unity and he had little trouble doing so, for Labour even distrusted many of the movement's Socialist supporters. Dalton particularly suspected André Philip, a prominent French Socialist, of 'leaking' details of Socialist Group meetings to the Conservatives[5] and indeed even accused his own delegate, R.W.G. Mackay, of 'talk[ing]...too much' to Conservatives and 'other unsympathetic types'.[6]

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1. Letter from G. Brutelle, Secretaire général adjoint, Parti Socialiste SFIO to M.C. Bolle, Secretary, Sub-Committee of COMISCO (Circular 45/49, International Socialist Conference, 3 August 1949 - L-I).

2. Denis Healey, 'Report on the Council of Europe to the Labour Party', September 1949, p.5. (Dalton papers).

3. Hugh Dalton, 'Notes for Labour Party', 12 September 1949, p.1. (Dalton papers).

4. 'Spaak is a great rock on which to rest', ibid., p.2.

5. Ibid., p.1.

6. Letter from Dalton to Clement Attlee, 10 September 1949 (Dalton papers).

Labour soon found that its disagreements with other Socialists resulted in the defeat of a number of its candidates for committee posts. Dalton held Philip responsible for Maurice Edelman's failure to obtain the rapporteurship of the Economic Committee which instead went to the Conservative David Eccles. Similarly, Dalton thought that Aidan Crawley would have become chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 'but for a European Movement intrigue'.[1] The defeat of William Whiteley for the Assembly Vice-Presidency, which Labour bitterly resented, has already been described above.[2]

The uneasy relations between Labour and the continental Socialists - with the exception of the Scandinavians with whom Labour usually agreed[3] - were no incentive to the formation of a formal political group. Nevertheless, the group was formally launched by 1950 with Guy Mollet as its leader. Not surprisingly, in view of the endless federalist-functionalist debates that dominated the 1950 session, the Socialist group was hardly a cohesive unit. As he had before the 1949 session, Dalton again hoped to secure an assembly majority on 'all issues which we think important', but he expected the worst.

> This will not be at all easy, and we must often be prepared to be in the minority. We cannot, I am afraid, count on the solid support of other Socialist representatives, e.g., on Federalism, to which the French and Dutch are much addicted, and on proposals to increase the powers of the Consultative Assembly. 4

His fears were almost confirmed at the Assembly's session. At one stage Mollet was ready to resign as rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee upon learning of Labour's refusal to support the committee's 'compromise' proposal to extend the Council of Europe's competence and control to include existing European bodies and those which the Schuman Plan proposed to establish.

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1. Ibid.
2. Chapter 1, pp. 49-52.
3. Dalton subsequently endeavoured to maintain Labour's good relations with the Scandinavians (Letter to Bevin, 21 August 1950) - (Dalton papers).
4. Hugh Dalton, 'Council of Europe: Consultative Assembly: note by the Minister of Town and Country Planning', March 1950 (Dalton papers).

Mollet's resignation would, in Dalton's view, 'have done great damage to the already strained relations between our party and the French Socialists'.[1] Dalton felt that Duncan Sandys was once again exploiting Labour's difficulties with the French and the Minister wrote to Mollet, who finally withdrew his threat to resign, that 'your resignation would have played straight into the hands of our common enemies and would have been exploited by their Press ... believe me, my dear friend'.[2] Labour finally found itself able to accept most of a new recommendation put forward by Mollet's committee, one which did not commit Britain to joining any supranational organisation or activity but encouraged other states to do so if they so wished.[3] Nevertheless, despite all the tension, Labour never withdrew from the Socialist Group. At the November 1950 session, Mollet resigned as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee 'in order to resume complete freedom as a French Socialist delegate and as President of the Inter-Group'.[4] And, in what was one of the earliest examples of what was to become a standard function of international party groups, the Socialist members of the General Affairs Committee successfully recommended that Mollet be replaced by Miss M. Klompe, whom they saw as 'a fairly progressive member of the Dutch Catholic Party'.[5] She was not a Socialist, but, as Labour had learned to its expense, it was already obvious that the various parties would have to co-operate with each other if the Assembly was to have any hope of functioning smoothly and efficiently.

The November 1950 session witnessed the relaxation of the friction that had bedevilled Labour relations with continental Socialists at Strasbourg. As Anthony Crosland recounted shortly afterwards, relations between British

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1. Dalton to Ernest Bevin, 21 August 1950 (Dalton papers).
2. Dalton to Mollet, 21 August 1950 (Dalton papers).
3. Consultative Assembly, Documents, 2nd session, 1950, no.121, pp.1092-1093.
4. van der Goes van Naters, 'Observations' p.5.
5. Ibid.

and continental Socialists improved markedly, partly because Bevin tolerated the creation of specialised authorities (though it was made clear that Britain would not join the Coal and Steel Community) and partly because the Conservatives, as they saw that power was within their grasp, had begun to backpedal from their European pronouncements, thereby making it clear that they shared Labour's reluctance to join in supra-national projects.[1] Differences, particularly over the optimum course for European unification, continued to exist. Nevertheless, after Labour returned to the Opposition benches in 1951 there was little need to emphasise the differences that divided European Socialists. Without doubt, Kim Mackay's proposal for converting the Consultative Assembly into a legislative lower chamber divided the British and Scandinavians from the rest, but that division arose on purely national lines outside the Socialist context. The Conservatives, both of Britain and Scandinavia, were also strongly opposed to the scheme.[2] The absence of strong disagreement within its ranks notwithstanding, the Socialist Group was hardly a politically forceful unit. In 1955, when John Edwards, a former Economic Secretary to the Treasury in Attlee's government, became the group's first British chairman, the group was still an unofficial body, though its counterpart at the Common Assembly had been officially recognised since that chamber's inauguration in 1952. Furthermore, it had yet to speak with one voice. Despite COMISCO's pious pronouncements about the co-ordination of a Socialist position at the Assembly,[3] and despite the group's frequent meetings at Assembly sessions where attempts were made to reach an agreed position on the issues under review, no delegate had ever spoken to the Assembly on the group's behalf.

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1. Crosland, 'Prospects for the Council of Europe', p.144.
2. See Crawford, Done This Day, pp.61-63.
3. 'Press Communiqué on the Meeting of the COMISCO Study Group', p.2.

Indeed the group was beset by problems more basic than that of its inability to agree on policy. Lack of official recognition meant exclusion from the Council's Budget, the effects of which can be seen in the following exerpts from the report on a July 1955 Labour party delegation meeting:

> Regarding meetings of the Socialist Intergroup: After SR (Saul Rose, Labour's International Department Secretary) left they (the delegates) had to rely on van der Goes van Naters (of Belgium) to translate and one morning George Thomson made an important speech and v.d.Goes said he was unable to translate it because he had not understood it. Could the Socialist International lend us an interpreter for a week to translate at Intergroup meetings and also at our lunches? 1

Even the practice of using the group as a vehicle for securing committee posts, one that was hardly of major importance, given the Assembly's peripheral role in European affairs, had nevertheless gone awry: Labour delegates complained that faulty group co-ordination had lost them a number of offices.[2]

If these difficulties were not enough for Edwards to tackle, he found an additional one within the context of his own delegation. Apart from Edwards himself, only a handful of Labour delegates were committed to the group's work. In view of the political vacuum in which the group functioned it is hardly surprising that most delegates were indifferent, or 'didn't have a clue and... went along for the ride.'[3]

To be sure, some attempts at improving Labour's attitudes towards the Council (and by extension the Socialist Group) had preceded Edwards' arrival on the scene. For example, Alfred Robens, who led the delegation from 1952 to 1955, and Geoffrey de Freitas submitted a memorandum to the Labour NEC's International Sub-committee which recommended that the Council of Europe 'be regarded as the political centre and parliamentary forum for Western

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1. 'Meeting of British Labour delegation to the Council of Europe on Monday, 25th July 1955 at House of Commons', p.1. (L-I).
2. Ibid., p.2.
3. Interview with Dr. Saul Rose, June 1972.

Europe'. Though the National Executive's Sub-committee had hesitated to act upon the details of this recommendation, the tenor of the Sub-committee's deliberations nevertheless allowed Saul Rose to write to delegates that

> It is desirable that the work of the various European organisations should be considered and discussed in the Consultative Assembly... In general, the attitude of the Labour Party should be one of maximum participation and co-operation for practical objects, short of membership of supra-national or federal institutions. 1

Despite, or perhaps because of, the limitations of the final few words of Rose's note, co-operation within the Socialist Group was one way for Labour delegates to display 'maximum participation... for practical objects'. Nevertheless, the vagueness of Labour's intentions hardly encouraged delegates to take more than passing notice of the Socialist Group's activities. John Edwards was very much the exception.

When the Assembly of Western European Union came into being in 1955 it was able to win for itself the right to draw up its own charter. Among other things, the charter provided for the formation of party groups, and thereby gave them a status not yet enjoyed in the Council of Europe. When John Edwards became chairman of the Socialist Group of the Council, he automatically assumed leadership of the WEU group.[2]

Edwards proved to be an active and dynamic chairman. Under his leadership, contacts between the groups and the Socialist International were placed on a more formal basis. The International agreed to the group's suggestion of 13 October 1956 to have two representatives of the group's bureau - one of them the chairman - attending meetings of the International's bureau.

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1. Saul Rose, 'International Sub-committee of the National Executive Committee: The Council of Europe and Western European Co-operation', March 1955, p.2. (D-I).

2. See Haas and Merkl, 'Parliamentarians', p.51 f.n.38. The Socialist Group was organised in April 1956.

It also agreed to send a representative to the group's principal meetings and to send its resolutions to the group for propagation in the Assembly.[1]

Administrative improvement was also undertaken. At long last, through the efforts of the Socialist Group, the Council of Europe granted to all groups for use during sessions all necessary administrative facilities, including interpreters and translators.[2] Grants for the groups became available in 1953; until then the International covered Socialist Group expenses.

By far the most important development during Edwards' first year as chairman of the Socialist Group was his speech in the name of its entire membership during the October debate on the European Social Charter.[3] It was an event of some significance when Edwards rose to 'speak ... not in a personal capacity but in my capacity as Chairman of one of the political groups';[4] no one had ever done so before. However, if those who saw the groups as well-springs of federal development considered 26 October 1956 an auspicious day, they were soon disappointed. Edwards' speech did not mark the beginning of a new period of Socialist harmony. There were still deep divisions within the group's membership. As far as Labour was concerned, all it sought was co-operation within the Assembly and the Socialist Group; federal or supranational solutions favoured by many Socialists, were in Labour's view still out of the question. Indeed, it was an active effort on the part of Edwards and his colleagues, with the tacit approval of the Labour Party, that had helped to bring about at least that modicum of co-operation. As Edwards had made clear to the Labour delegates in 1957, 'attempts were

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1. 'Relations Between the Socialist Inter-Group at the Consultative Assembly of the CofE and the Socialist International', Socialist International Circular No. 60/56 (9th November 1956) (L-I).
2. Fernand Georges to Bureau Members (Socialist International), 'Socialist Groups at European Parliamentary Assemblies', Socialist International Circular No. B.19/57 (23 February 1957) p.3. (L-I).
3. A brief sketch of the history and contents of the European Social Charter appears on pp. 284-285.
4. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 8th session, 1956-57, p.914.

also made to express a common socialist point of view wherever this was possibbe',[1] though there was no doubt that party policy took precedence over Socialist agreement. A spirit of co-operation did not guarantee positive agreement and achievement, but its presence within the group ensured that achievement remained within the realm of possibility.

Though the co-operation fostered by the group and the Socialist International led to a harmonisation of British and Continental Socialist attitudes to the European Free Trade Area proposals,[2] consensus within the group after 1957 was in any event facilitated by the decline of the Council when the Treaty of Rome was negotiated. The increasing vagueness of resolutions and the Assembly's reluctance to decide upon matters that had not already been dealt with by outside parties or governments contributed to a feeling of stagnation and an overflow of bureaucratic paperwork. 'A growing procedural consensus, within and among party and national groups, was achieved at the expense of substantive consensus'.[3] The Berlin debate of 1959, in which for the first time the leaders of all three political groups spoke for them, was not so much an example of what Fernand Dehousse, President of the Consultative Assembly, called 'increased and more coherent activity in Assembly debates on the part of the political groups'[4] as an attempt 'to emphasise the solidarity and unity of the assembly on a critical issue'.[5] Though Edwards had worked to activate the Socialist group, in a climate of stagnation it could only stagnate as well.

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1. 'European Co-operation Sub-Committee of the International Committee: Minutes of Meeting held on 17th April 1957' The meeting was held jointly with members of the Labour delegations to the Council of Europe and WEU. (D-I).
2. Haas, Consensus Formation, p.54.
3. Ibid., p.59.
4. Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 10th session, (1958-59), p.355.
5. Lindsay, European Assemblies, p.63.

The position of the Socialist Group at the WEU was hardly brighter despite the Assembly's unique role as an official forum for the international parliamentary discussion of defence policy. In fact, it was precisely the subject under constant review - defence - which exercised the Labour Party during the 'fifties, coming to a head at Scarborough and Blackpool in 1960-61. Though the Assembly's official recognition of groups enabled them to play a larger part in its organisation, procedure and debates, during the mid-'fifties the Labour Party found itself disagreeing on most defence issues with all comrades but the SPD.[1]

If the Socialist Group was unable to promote a policy consensus among its members, it did improve upon its ability to secure assembly and committee offices for them. These still carried with them merely the trappings of political influence rather than its substance. Nevertheless, the changing course of European affairs, with many members of the Council of Europe consolidating into rival trading blocs, seemed to hold forth the possibility that the Council might command greater interest in policy-making circles, as a point of contact between the EEC and EFTA. It was this possibility which motivated the nomination and election of John Edwards to the Consultative Assembly presidency in 1959.

Edwards' election was in no small part due to the Socialist Group, which he continued to chair after James Griffiths had replaced him as delegation leader in 1953. His nomination seems first to have been mooted at the Socialist Group meetings of 1959, reports of which were passed on to Labour front-bencher and delegate Hilary A. Marquand by French delegate Marius Moutet. Marquand, after hearing others express a similarly favourable attitude towards Edwards' candidacy, passed the suggestion on to Labour Party Leader Hugh Gaitskell, who also had been informed of the Socialist International's support for Edwards. Gaitskell was converted to the idea

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1. Haas and Merkl, 'Parliamentarians', pp. 54-57.

and agreed to permit Edwards to remain at Strasbourg beyond the period usually allotted to Labour delegates. Marquand thereupon replied to Moutet asking him to guarantee French Socialist support as well as canvass for the support of non-Socialist delegates, who might agree that the election of a Socialist would not only be 'a deserved recognition of European Socialist opinion' but, since the candidate was British, would be particularly opposite at 'this crucial moment in the history of the Council of Europe'.[1] Marquand's arguments, which proved to be virtually identical with those used in support of Sir Geoffrey de Freitas' candidacy five years later, attracted the majority of delegates to Strasbourg, both Socialist and non-Socialist. The British Government, with the support of the Socialist Group, put forward Edwards' name and he was decisively elected - the first British delegate to assume the Presidency.[2]

Edwards' untimely death in Strasbourg within a year of his election was a severe blow to the fortunes of the Council of Europe. It also marked a decline in the Labour Party's relations with the Socialist Group. Labour's subsequent coolness toward Britain's intended application for entry to the EEC was not endearing to Socialists of the Six. Though the Socialist Group continued to function, it was unable to speak with one voice on the most important issue on its agenda between 1961 and 1963 as long as leading Labour delegates (George Brown excepted) were lukewarm or hostile to British entry.

When the Labour Party under Harold Wilson converted en masse to Europeanism in the mid-'sixties and began to encourage British participation in Strasbourg and WEU assembly affairs,[3] Labour delegates found support for their

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1. Letter from Hilary A. Marquand to Marius Moutet (in French), 14 Apr.1959. (By courtesy of Council of Europe archives, Strasbourg).
2. He was not the first Socialist, however. That honour had gone to Paul-Henri Spaak, President from 1949-51.
3. See above, Chapter 3, pp. 160 ff.

cause not only among their Socialist brethren but among delegates in general. There was thus no great need to work within the possibly narrow confines of the Socialist Group on this issue, nor does there seem to have been any attempt to appeal specifically to Socialists. Indeed such an attempt might have served to alienate Gaullist France and the Christian-Democratic government of Germany, with whom Britain was trying so hard to curry favour (with abysmally little success in the case of the former). Nevertheless, though Labour avoided couching its European designs in partisan terms, it did so in the context of the Consultative Assembly's elections for committee and assembly offices. Party groups were the key to securing these posts, which, if held by British delegates, could serve as indicators to continental delegates of Britain's sincere 'European' designs. The Labour Government seemed particularly interested in the posts of President of the Assembly and Secretary-General of the Council which were vacated in 1966 and 1969, respectively, for which it nominated two Labour members with 'European' credentials. However, the Conservatives had their own strategy at these elections, and it is therefore necessary to examine their relationship (as well as that of the Liberals) with party groups in order clearly to underline the fierceness which marked Conservative-Labour battles in Strasbourg elections during the 'sixties.

The Conservatives at Strasbourg and WEU.

Unlike the Labour Party or the Liberals, the Conservatives found no like-minded confrères on the Continent when they first attended the Council of Europe in 1949. The Tories were not linked to any group, and had no desire to join that body to which they bore the closest affinity, the Christian-Democrat Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, for whom neither its federalist bent nor its primarily Catholic denominational orientation held any particular appeal. So the Conservatives came to Strasbourg as a national party with no international strings attached, and, although they co-operated with European federalists (and at the start provided the leadership for the federalist movement), the extent of that co-operation was limited to support for

European integration. When Britain was asked to join the ECSC and the EDC the Conservatives (with some exceptions) echoed their government's reluctance to join in supranational schemes. The Tories did, however, form an unofficial partnership with the Scandinavians, who, like themselves, preferred anti-denominational (or at least Protestant) conservatism to Catholic Christian Democracy and advocated the 'functional' pragmatic development of Europe involving inter-governmental co-operation and a minimum of legislated institutional changes. Nevertheless, despite their seemingly identical attitudes to a number of key European issues, the Scandinavians and Conservatives did not formally organise themselves for some time. It was Dame Florence Horsbrugh, a former Minister of Education who had just been appointed leader of the Conservative delegation in 1958, who concluded that the situation was an absurd one, especially as Britain at that very time was attempting to establish closer economic relations with the Continent. Together with the Scandinavian Conservatives and the Irish Fine Gael, whose respective countries joined Britain the following year to form the European Free Trade Association, the Tories organised an Independent Group both at Strasbourg and at Paris. During her leadership, the group was known as "Les Amis de Dame Florence".[1]

Although the new group could not compare in size with the other major political alliances, it nevertheless played an important role in the two Assemblies' annual horse races for committee and assembly posts. With a varying strength of about 30 votes, half of them British, the group was able to make itself felt at election time and the German Christian-Democrats were quick to cultivate Tory co-operation.

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1. The section on Dame Florence and her 'friends' is based in the main on interviews with members of the delegations she led as well as with [illegible] officials at Strasbourg. Unfortunately, she seems to have destroyed many of her papers and left little evidence of her work as leader of the delegation in the late 'fifties.

Any federation of the two groups was ruled out, however, due to the intransigence of the Scandinavians on the one side and the Italians on the other. It is indeed curious that at a time when Europeans were all interested in some form, though not necessarily in the same degree, of co-operation, religious predilections should have proved to be a stumbling block to as comparatively innocuous a proposal as that of amalgamating the two groups. Yet the Scandinavians objected to working with the Christian-Democrats because of the latter's 'Christian' i.e. predominantly Catholic, apellation. On the Christian-Democrat side the Italians persistently objected to the inclusion of parliamentarians from Protestant countries in what was predominantly a Catholic grouping. (When pressed about the Protestant element in the German Christian-Democrat delegation Mario Rumor, Secretary-General of the Italian Christian-Democrats, reportedly replied that they had come in from the start while the British were a late arrival). Despite these seemingly insurmountable hurdles to actual amalgamation, a common outlook to many questions resulted in an affinity between the Tories and the German Christian-Democrats (much as the SPD and Labour often saw eye to eye on defence matters) which set the stage for closer co-operation between the Tories and the Christian-Democrat group as a whole.

The Conservatives launched a more serious effort to join the Christian-Democrats once the question of entry to the EEC had been clearly established as Britain's key European policy question. The Tories at Strasbourg and Paris were particularly eager to establish or strengthen contacts with their continental counterparts, many of whom went on to become leading Ministers in their national governments.[1] What opposition there may have been to this

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1. Fritz Erler, reported to the Socialist International's Vienna Congress, that 'today there is hardly a single Foreign Minister who has not himself sat at one time on the benches of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe'. ('The European Institutions and the Socialist International', Socialist International Circular No. v/57 (30 September 1957), p.5 - L-I). As if to underline this point, within a year of Mathew's writing to Maudling, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a former Christian Democratic delegate to the Council of Europe, became Chancellor of the German Federal Republic.

move from within the Conservative ranks - chiefly from those delegates who saw the Scandinavians, as one put it, as 'more like our own people', tended to fade away as those delegates, most of whom were lukewarm to Market entry, were gradually phased out of the delegation.

The development of what became agreed Conservative policy can best be seen in a letter to Reginald Maudling, the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the 1965 British delegations to the Council of Europe and WEU, from Robert Mathew, who had only recently returned to the assemblies after eighteen months service as a junior Foreign Office Minister in the Conservative Government. 'The first thing that strikes me,' wrote Mathew,

> is that there is an argument for the Conservative members becoming part of the European Christian Democratic Group in the WEU and the Council of Europe....European Parliamentarians seem to be thinking and acting more along party political group lines than formerly. This is no doubt, is much influenced by the evolution of the "European Parliament" of the Six. Moreover, in the last six years I have personally known of cases in which we Conservatives missed out on elections to chairmanships etc, simply because the Christian Democrat Group were not prepared to give us full backing since we were not members of the Group, and indeed, in the Council of Europe, ran our own "groupe des non-inscrits". I know of some harsh references among the Christian Democrats having been made to our British "stand offishness"... Our own Socialists seem to be thinking more on party political lines in Europe and a number of them are not in favour of always working as a united British national group. There is a definite change among some of the Socialists about this.... In short, I think we stand more to gain than to lose by joining the Christian Democrat Group at this stage.[1]

Mathew, a keen observer of developments at the assemblies, had correctly noted the changes in Labour's attitudes. His suggestion reflected the opinions of other Conservative delegates[2] and did not fall on deaf ears: the election of Edward Heath to the leadership of the party that year had further strengthened the Conservatives' commitment to EEC entry.[3] Though

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1. Mathew to Maudling, 11th June 1965 (Mathew papers).
2. Mathew noted that he had obtained the support of Nicholas Ridley and Anthony Kershaw on this point. (ibid).
3. See Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, pp.147-150.

progress at the Council of Europe came slowly, by 1967, thanks to an agreement with Mario Rumor (and to the fact that the Scandinavians did not enter into the picture) the Christian-Democrat group at WEU merged with the Tories to form the "Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives". Scandinavian opposition prevented a similar arrangement at the Council of Europe, but liaison between the Tories and the Christian-Democrats was so greatly improved (due in no small measure to the fact that the same men and women did sit together as a group at WEU) that soon the Tories began to attend Christian-Democrat Group meetings, though they were not officially entitled to vote. As Georg Kliesing, the German chairman of the group (1968-70), never permitted anything to come to a vote anyway, the Conservatives became de facto members, in addition to forming part of an official liaison group between the larger body of Independents and the Christian-Democrats. Though the Tories continued to press for a formal merger of the two groups, by 1970 such a merger was not in sight, the Scandinavians persisting in their opposition to joining a group labelled 'Christian'.

The Liberals.

The relationship between the Liberals and their continental counterparts has always been a peculiarly complicated one. Traditionally, British Liberals have been to the Left, sometimes far to the Left, of the Continental parties of the same name. The Italian Liberal Party, for years a political home for "'notables" and southern landowners who found the newly organised mass parties distasteful', also came to draw support from local companies and business associations. Their conservatism extended to unsuccessful opposition to the Christian Democrats' plans for an 'opening to the Left'.[1] Similarly, French Liberals counted in their midst members of the CNIP, whose ranks included ex-Vichyites and Rightist extremists, as well as the more centre-left Radicals.[2] And the German FDP in its post-war phase, and indeed until only

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1. Henig and Pinder, European Political Parties, pp.238-239.
2. ibid., pp.120-121. Radicals would include in particular the Gauche-Democratique, and the new Radical Party.

recently, was a strong-hold of the type of free enterprise thinking more and more associated with conservatism of the Right and had a strong following among conservative Protestants.[1] It is therefore somewhat surprising, given a situation in which British Liberals 'find little in common with the German Free Democrats and nothing at all with the Italian Liberals'[2] that they should have participated in the affairs of the Liberal groups of the Strasbourg and Paris assemblies from their respective inceptions in 1952 and 1956. Indeed the Liberals have furnished them with two chairmen, Lord Grantchester and more recently, Lord Gladwyn. The paradox is further sharpened by the fact that the British Liberal Party, in view of its anaemic representation in the Commons, could never send more than two representatives, of which one was a substitute, and was so pressed for manpower that it at most sent one Member of the Commons.

Certainly one explanation for the British Liberals' prominence among their namesakes at the assemblies was the calibre of the men they sent to represent them. Walter Layton, Liberal delegate until 1957, a respected figure in European circles and a friend of Churchill who played a prominent role at the Hague Congress, was elected Vice-President of the Council of Europe's Assembly in 1949, and was unanimously re-elected Vice-President until his departure. Lord Grantchester, his successor, was a leading advocate of free trade who therefore appealed to his Liberal friends: he became leader of the Council of Europe's Liberal Group, as well as of that of MEU, which had been the first to organise itself after the newer assembly had been formed. It was Lord Grantchester as well who was one of the organisers of the unofficial meetings of Parliamentarians from EFTA countries that for a time were held regularly before sessions of the Council of Europe.[3]

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1. ibid., p.55.
2. ibid., p.438.
3. The Group had only a minor impact on Assembly affairs. Donald Chapman recalls that the meetings were interesting, others held exactly the opposite view. (Interview with Mr. Chapman, May 1972).

Finally, Lord Gladwyn, who became chairman of the Liberal Group at Strasbourg and WEU, was a well-known Foreign Office official of the first rank whose association with European assemblies dated back to his participation in the Council of Europe's preparatory conference, and who later became an outspoken advocate of British entry into the EEC.

With the party group, like the parent Liberal International, hardly noted for its cohesion, it perhaps was convenient for all concerned to elect a prestigious chairman and spokesman who would function more as a figurehead than as an executor of an agreed Liberal programme.

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By the mid-1960's, first the Conservatives and then Labour had come to appreciate the need for co-operation with the assembly party groups. As noted above, the leaderships of both parties seemed to feel that the assumption of assembly posts by British delegates would be taken by many continental delegates as a sign of Britain's increasing interest in European affairs. Furthermore, certain committee and assembly posts provided their holders with access to leading government officials on the Continent; Britain's cause could only be helped if these offices were manned by supporters of her entry to the EEC. Consequently, to obtain these offices the parties divided along party group lines, and their battles were fiercest in 1966, when the Consultative Assembly elected its new president, and 1969, when it voted for a new Secretary-General.

Smithers and de Freitas; Greece and Silkin.

In 1957 Ludovico Benvenuti became the first active politician to assume the Secretary-Generalship of the Council of Europe, a post which previously had been primarily administrative, where 'no real responsibility - and therefor neither credit nor blame - could be said to centre'.[1] Benvenuti, however, had been leader of the Italian delegation at the 1956-67 Common Market

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1. Crawford, Done This Day, p.240.

Conference and was 'well versed in European unification at the Ministerial and Parliamentary levels'.[1] His term of office was therefore expected to be marked by more political initiatives than those of his predecessors. Unfortunately, the years 1957-64 hardly saw a revival of the Council's prestige or enthusiasm; if anything, in some respects Strasbourg seemed to have reached a new nadir.[2] From 1961 onwards the British application to the EEC made the Assembly a more interesting place to attend, but it had little effect on the organisation and the role of the Council of Europe.

Nevertheless, Benvenuti's lacklustre record did not deter member governments (who submitted nominations for the Secretary-Generalship) from once again putting forward the names of political figures as their candidates. Accordingly, two of the three candidates nominated in 1964 were politicians - and the prize was one that commended itself to that class of politician who could not attain first rank status at home but who was perhaps too talented to be permanently relegated to second eleven status.[3] The Belgians nominated Fernand Dehousse, federalist, Socialist Senator, President of the Consultative Assembly until 1961, though not a terribly successful one. The Greeks put forward Polys Modinos, not a political figure at all, but Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The British proposed Peter Smithers, a tested politician who from 1962 was serving as Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, as well as an active member of the European Movement and a delegate to Strasbourg from 1953-55 and 1960. Britain's decision to put forward its first candidate ever for the post of Secretary General was clearly motivated by her desire to strengthen her toehold on the Continent after General de Gaulle's veto, and was interpreted as such by a number of daily

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1. Ibid., p.241.

2. This is the view of officials at Strasbourg.

3. After Smithers' election the Financial Times wrote of him: 'Mr. Peter Smithers ...has earned...golden opinions from his Senior Ministers but never anything impressive in the way of promotion....His new job is virtually tailor-made for him.' (16 January 1964).

newspapers.[1] Until that moment Britain had reserved for herself the position of Deputy Secretary General, held in succession from 1949-62 by Aubrey Halford (1949-52), Anthony Lincoln (1952-55) and Dunstan Curtis (1955-62).

There is no indication that in previous elections of Council of Europe, as opposed to Consultative Assembly, officials British delegates had voted along anything but national lines. In 1963-64, however, George Brown, then leading the Labour delegation, seems from a number of accounts to have opposed Smithers' candidacy and to have canvassed against it. Labour's opposition was not difficult to understand. Smithers was a Tory, and Labour anticipated an electoral triumph in the near future. Even were Labour itself to apply for British entry - and Brown had by then become a staunch pro-European[2] - it might be better not to have a Conservative in what perhaps would be a key post in European affairs, and certainly not a Conservative who was disliked by some on personal grounds.[3]

At first it appeared that Labour and the Scandinavian Socialists would vote for Dehousse. Two days before the vote, the Socialist Group decided to support his candidature and Paul-Henri Spaak, specially attending the meeting of the group, urged all Socialists to vote according to the agreed decision.[4] But Dehousse's federalism did not endear itself to the British, who seem to have voted either for Modinos, or even for Smithers (George Brown notwithstanding), demonstrating once again the inability of the Socialist Group to

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1. 'This (the nomination) is seen as a clear indication of the importance which the Government attach to the Council of Europe at the present time' 'Post for MP will Mean By-Election' The Times (16 Jan.1964). 'Mr. Smithers' decision to stand for election is part of Britain's policy of strengthening all possible links with Europe after the Brussels breakdown (Walter Farr, 'Britain Gets Big Europe Council Job', Daily Telegraph, (16 Jan.1964).
2. Lord George-Brown, In May Way, pp.207, 216.
3. Unattributable interview, August 1971.
4. Farr, 'Britain Gets Big Europe Council Job', Daily Telegraph, 16 Jan.1964: Jean Claude Hahn, 'A L'Assemblée de Strasbourg: Le Candidat brittanique P. Smithers est élu séc géné du Conseil de l'Europe', Le Monde, 16 Jan.1964.

muster unity on an important vote, in spite of a call for such unity by one of the leading Socialists on the Continent, the Belgian Foreign Ministers. Smithers was nearly elected on the first ballot and, after Dehousse dropped out of the running, the Scandinavians, Labour defectors and the British Conservatives formed an EFTA bloc that carried Smithers to an easy 75-52 victory[1] on the second ballot.

Two years later the Tories and Labour again joined battle, this time over the election of the President of the Consultative Assembly. The Wilson Government had designated Sir Geoffrey de Freitas for the post. A longtime delegate to international assemblies, de Freitas was a former front-bencher who seems to have lost his chance for ministerial office when he accepted a Macmillan appointment as High Commissioner to Ghana in 1961. Led by Duncan Sandys, the Tories' delegation leader, who hoped to become President of the WEU Assembly and knew that there could not be a British monopoly on the presidency of both assemblies, the Conservatives sought to repay Labour for its opposition to Smithers' candidacy. Sandys is reported to have attempted to persuade the Christian-Democrats to vote against de Freitas.[2] However, the Labour MP managed to win some powerful support. He had the strong backing of the Government: his pro-European convictions were well known and his assumption of the presidency could serve as another preparatory step for a Labour application to the EEC.[3] Labour Ministers reportedly canvassed Assembly delegates on his behalf. He also won the support of Pierre Pflimlin, the outgoing Assembly president, who after meeting with de Freitas concluded that

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1. Hahn, 'L'Assemblée du Conseil de l'Europe évoque l'affaire mercredi', ibid., 15 January 1964. The account of Smithers' election is also based on a substantial number of unattributable interviews.
2. Based on a number of unattributable interviews.
3. One long-time observer of Strasbourg affairs recalls Michael Stewart having asked him as early as 1964 whether he thought de Freitas had any chance of being elected to the Presidency of the Council of Europe Assembly.

his election would help a possible British effort to enter the EEC. Finally, similar reasons led Karl Czernetz, the Austrian chairman of the Socialist Group, to decide against standing himself and instead to give de Freitas united Socialist support.[1] That the Italian Liberal who opposed de Freitas, Vittorio Badini Confalonieri, had already been president of the WEU Assembly also worked in the Englishman's favour: some delegates opposed the monopoly of assembly offices by an individual delegate. De Freitas' guaranteed support proved to be only just enough to secure him victory - he won on the first ballot by a mere vote.

If the Smithers election evoked partisan reactions among the British and the de Freitas election intensified them, then the Silkin election could be said to have brought them to their climax. Peter Smithers had proved to be an energetic and efficient Secretary General; when, in January 1969, names were submitted to succeed him, he had been granted a six months extension in office.

Of the candidates whose names were put forward, the favourite seemed to be Per Hækkerup, the Danish Social Democrat, a former Foreign Minister and long-time member of the Council of Europe. The Germans had, almost as an afterthought, suggested Karl Mommer, Vice-President of the Bundestag. The British had nominated Samuel Silkin.

Silkin was leader of the British delegation to Strasbourg, Vice-Chairman of the Socialist Group there and chairman of the Consultative Assembly's Legal Committee. A long-time 'European', his brother John, the Chief Whip, had recommended that his name be put forward after he received a letter to that effect from a senior member of the Labour delegation.

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1. For press reports see 'Albany', 'Father of Europe,' Sunday Telegraph 10 April, 1966; 'A British President at Strasbourg', The Guardian 28 April 1966.

Silkin, who reportedly 'had got to the point in his parliamentary career when he didn't think Wilson wanted him'[1] (a not atypical stimulus toward activism at Strasbourg), had particularly distinguished himself in the Assembly's enquiry into the Greek coup d'état.

Unlike most matters that were discussed at Strasbourg, the Greek issue had aroused strong partisan responses from Assembly delegates. Initially, all delegates had immediately condemned the colonels' coup d'état of April 1967 (the Assembly had met that month).[2] However, by January 1968, the question of the new régime's violation of fundamental human rights had been referred to the European Commission of Human Rights, and the Assembly divided over the proper course of action to take until the Commission reached a decision. Silkin was a leading Socialist advocate of giving the Greek régime a time-limit to return to parliamentary democracy and to expel Greece from the Council of Europe if the time-limit was not met.[3] Most British Conservatives and Christian-Democrats counselled patience and argued that no action could be taken as the case was sub judice in the Commission.[4] Silkin, who together with a Belgian Socialist colleague had just returned from a visit to Greece, was able to marshal the support of the Socialist Group, all Labour delegates and the Legal Committee which he chaired for the passage of a resolution which set May 1969 as Greece's time-limit to return to a parliamentary system. The resolution added that if by January 1969 no changes had taken place in Greece, the Assembly would not recognise the credentials of Greek delegates and would recommend to the Committee of Ministers that Greece be expelled from the Council of Europe.[5]

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1. Unattributable interview, May 1972.
2. See the remarks of Karl Czernetz and Paul Struye, Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 19th session, 1967-68, pp.5-7.
3. Silkin had already outlined his position in September 1967: see ibid. p.306.
4. The term was used by Eldon Griffiths (ibid., p.773), Anthony Kershaw (ibid. pp.776-777) and Douglas Dodds-Parker (ibid. p.777.)
5. ibid., pp.774-775, 312, 833.

The passage of the resolution was a sharp defeat for the Right, including, of course, British Conservatives; Peter Kirk in particular had sought to have it rejected on procedural grounds.[1] The Conservatives' tactics soon came in for strong criticism at Westminster. Four days after the Assembly's part session ended, a number of Labour MPs tabled an early day motion that condemned the Tories' behaviour in opposing the passage of the resolution on Greece.[2] Kirk and a number of delegates quickly replied with an early day motion of their own, which singled out Silkin for condemnation since he had blocked the approval of new judges for the Court of Human Rights on the grounds that one of the nominees was Greek.[3] Despite the partisan charges, by the time the resolution came into effect it was clear that the Greek régime had no intention of permitting a return to parliamentary democracy. Most Conservatives, including Kirk, voted for the Assembly's recommendation to expel Greece from its midst.[4] Nevertheless, Silkin could hardly be said to have endeared himself to right-wing delegates at the Assembly. His appeal as a candidate for the Secretary-Generalship - his name was submitted shortly before the vote to expel Greece took place - seemed virtually limited to the Socialist Group.

There were also a number of drawbacks to Silkin's candidature. The fact that he spoke no French made him seem to pale beside the multilingual Smithers (who spoke no less than five languages). That Smithers himself was British also hurt Silkin's cause; the Council of Europe generally tried to

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1. ibid., pp.713-714, 772, 783.
2. Early Day Motion no. 143 (7 Feb.1968). The motion attracted 70 signatures including Silkin's.
3. Amendment to EDM no. 143 (8 Feb.1968). Kirk tabled the amendment which attracted 16 signers including seven other delegates to the Assembly.
4. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 20th session, 1968-69, pp.926,963. Geoffrey Rippon registered the only Conservative abstention; no Tory voted against the recommendation. (A resolution passed without a roll call on 26 Sept. 1968 had moved the deadline for Greece's reform of its system forward from May 1969 to January of that year, ibid., pp.579-588).

apportion its plums to as many member countries as was possible. Not even his fellow Labour delegates were unanimously behind him: one senior delegate expressed somewhat pained surprise upon hearing of the British nomination. At least two others seem to have suspected favouritism on the part of Silkin's brother, the Chief Whip, though it is unlikely that the nomination was a case of patronage, especially since John Silkin's recommendation does not seem to have been taken independently (and in any case needed Foreign Office approval and probably that of Harold Wilson as well).

Silkin's chances seemed even dimmer when it became clear that the Right were putting forward only one candidate, Lugo Toncic Sorinj, former Austrian Foreign Minister. According to one Conservative version, Toncic was by no means the first choice of the Right. It had been hoped that Gunner Hekscher, a Swedish Liberal, would stand for Smithers' post. A small delegation of non-Socialists, including at least one British MP, had travelled to Stockholm to obtain the Swedish Government's approval of his candidature, but the Social Democratic Government refused. The Right was thus left with Toncic, though the Tories did not settle upon their voting intentions until shortly before the election.

With Toncic standing alone, the Socialists called a meeting at the January session to get two of their three candidates to stand down. 'Silkin and Mommer agreed to stand down if one of the others could command a majority but Haekkerup refused'.[1] The Socialist Group leaders finally decided to take matters into their own hands. On the eve of the May session at which the vote was to take place, Karl Czernetz and other leaders of the group opted for Silkin over Haekkerup and Mommer; the latter was on the point of withdrawal anyway. The Danish and German Governments withdrew their nominations,

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1. 'Miscellany: Sporting Sam,' The Guardian, 1 April 1969.

and the Socialists seemingly agreed to respect the group's decision.[1] But that decision, though it may not have in any way been influenced by the intensive British Government lobbying on Silkin's behalf then taking place, provoked a bitter reaction on the part of the Scandinavians. Toncic won easily; needing 66 votes for a first ballot victory, he received 77.

It soon became obvious that there had been mass defections in the Scandinavian Socialist ranks. It was also clear that many delegates resented British designs to monopolise the post; if, as one cynical anti-Market delegate said, in 1964 'it was Britain's turn, the European organisations are run by whose turn it is',[2] in 1969 it was Britain's turn no longer. Finally, observers agreed that Silkin had not matched Toncic's 'campaign' efforts. The Austrian had travelled extensively in pursuit of votes.

Toncic's election also provoked bitter recriminations from Labour delegates. They accused the Tories of rejoicing over the victory, and of making a deal with the Christian-Democrats to secure Peter Kirk the Chairmanship of the Political Committee.[3] It was conveniently forgotten that it would have been hardly surprising even had a deal indeed been made; the Conservatives had moved closer to the Christian-Democrats, and were working with them in the same way as Labour worked with continental Socialists.

The post-election disputes, and the events leading up to the election itself, made it clear that overweening rivalry between the groups, and excessive Government intervention in their affairs, was exceedingly unhealthy. The groups therefore decided after the election that in future there should be some sort of agreement on the candidates for positions in all three assemblies. This development, however, seemed to indicate that as the groups

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1. 'Silkin's Chance in Strasbourg', The Times, 12 May 1969; 'Mommer verzichtet', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 May 1969.
2. Unattributable interview, July 1971.
3. David Woodhead, 'MPs Clash on Europe Post', Sunday Telegraph, 18 May 1969; 'WEU Threat to Sandys by Labour', The Daily Telegraph, 19 May 1969.

faced the 'seventies they would have even fewer opportunities openly to differ with each other.

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The political groups in all three assemblies (if one includes the weak Socialist group at the NAA), with their low indices of cohesion and their general reluctance to bring matters to the vote, clearly did not amount to much during the 'fifties and 'sixties. Certainly no great effort was made to explore the federal potential of these international party 'fraktionen'.[1] Nevertheless, British delegates to the assemblies were hardly distressed by the groups' inability to develop along federal lines: from 1948 onwards both major parties had consistently opposed British participation in proto-federal schemes of any sort. During the 'fifties, the Conservatives formed an assembly group of their own; Labour participated in the Socialist Group merely in order to achieve a modicum of co-operation with fellow Socialists within a framework that in practice involved no federal entanglements. In the 'sixties, however, both the Conservatives and Labour came to view the groups within the context of British-EEC relations, the EEC having become the main issue which fashioned Britain's European policies. With de Gaulle's rejection of Macmillan's overtures to Europe, Britain had found herself with the Council of Europe and WEU as two of her very few institutional points of contact with her cross-Channel neighbours. Co-operation with and popularity in the Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies thus became useful for the British Government after 1963, and for Labour within two years afterwards. Working more closely with the assembly party groups was one way to achieve that co-operation and popularity. The new Conservative willingness to work with the Christian-Democrats and Labour's co-operation with the Socialists in assembly elections

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1. This is the term Murray Forsyth employs to describe the party groups - they are not 'full-blooded parties' (Henig and Pinder, eds., European Politics Parties, p.495).

were primarily motivated by a British desire to display convincingly her 'European' sentiments to continental politicians. Ultimately, therefore, British interest in assembly party groups, like British efforts to attain committee and assembly office, was rooted in the change of British policy vis à vis the Common Market.

Preceding chapters have examined the degree to which this change in overall policy toward Europe affected British interest and involvement in assembly affairs. The following chapter will attempt to discuss the role of delegates both at the assemblies and in Britain in the movement to secure the goal of Britain's new policy - entry into the EEC.

Chapter 9

The Campaign for British Entry into the EEC:

The Role of British Delegates to International Assemblies

Of the many issues which commanded the attention of parliamentarians at the Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies after 1956, that of Britain's relations with the EEC was probably the most crucial, the most pressing and, until 1972, the most vexing and frustrating. Countless reports and recommendations streamed forth from both assemblies, urging first the creation of an OEEC-wide Free Trade Area and then after 1960, British accession to the EEC. Though for years these recommendations seemed to be to no avail, their very existence, and the overwhelming approval which they virtually always received, testified to the sustained strength of pro-entry feeling among continental parliamentary circles and formed a useful complement to the activities of pro-Market groups in Britain.

As will be shown, British delegates to the assemblies often found themselves playing a key role in ensuring the passage of these continental displays of support for British entry, and of authoring some of the more crucial reports and recommendations. For many of them their work at Strasbourg paralleled their pro-Market activities at home, activities in which they were often joined by many former delegates to the assemblies. Indeed, from the very first years of the EEC's existence, delegates and former delegates to the European Assemblies were to be counted among the leading advocates of closer British association with the activities of the Six.

Until 1960 the question of Britain's relations with the EEC was rarely posed in terms of joining it or refusing to do so. Britain had reportedly played an 'active part' in the work of the Intergovernmental 'Spaak' Committee that the Messina Conference of the Six had established to examine how further action in the field of European integration, especially a common

market, could be achieved.[1] Nevertheless, the British had withdrawn from the committee in November 1955. They felt that the creation of WEU the previous year had 'firmly re-established' European relationships and were preoccupied with other matters; they also did not think the project feasible.[2] After Britain refused in June 1956 to participate in the drafting of the treaties on the basis of the Spaak report,[3] a number of MPs called on the Government to reconsider its position. Robert Boothby and Arthur Holt, both delegates to the Council of Europe that year, joined Geoffrey Rippon in an adjournment debate plea for a change in British policy.[4] John Hynd and Rippon also tabled early day motions on this theme: they attracted 170 signatures including nine members of the 1956 delegation to Strasbourg.[5] However, when Britain did respond to the creation of the EEC, it was in terms of a proposal for an OEEC-wide industrial free trade area in which the Common Market could function as a customs union in relation to countries outside the free trade area.[6]

Those MPs who had advocated British participation in the creation of the EEC now rallied in support of the Government's new proposals which seemed to hold forth the prospect of closer association with the Continent. Among these 'Europeans' were to be counted a number of MPs who had served at Strasbourg, including Roy Jenkins and John Edwards, who, speaking in the Commons, welcomed the Government proposals on behalf of Labour,[7] and Arthur

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1. Camps, Britain and European Community, p.25. For a discussion of the Spaak Committee's work see pp.29-45.
2. ibid., pp.45-49; see also Max Beloff, New Dimensions, p.96; Nora Beloff, The General Says No: Britain's Exclusion from Europe (London, Penguin, 1963), p.74.
3. Camps, op.cit., p.66.
4. Hansard, 5th series, 1956, 555, 1672-74.
5. Rippon: Early Day Motion No.101 (10 July 1956); Hynd: Early Day Motion No.105 (17 July 1956). Hynd's motion attracted the signatures of 21 former delegates to Strasbourg.
6. See Camps, op.cit., pp.93-129.
7. Hansard, 5th series, 1956, 561, 99-103 (Jenkins) & 146-54 (Edwards). Edwards noted that the Consultative Assembly had endorsed a free trade area scheme (ibid., 147). Both signed Hynd's motion of the previous year.

Holt, who did the same in the name of the Liberals.[1] Of the fourteen speakers in the Commons debate on the Free Trade Area, seven had been to Strasbourg and all welcomed the Government's policy. Furthermore, fourteen present or former delegates appended their names to Geoffrey Rippon's new early day motion which also voiced support for the Free Trade Area plan.[2]

Not all delegates and former delegates to the assemblies were, however, in favour of closer ties with Europe. Attendance at Strasbourg debates was no guarantee that a delegate was, or would become, a pro-European. Labour's policy of rotating its delegates, and to a lesser extent a similar Conservative policy, meant that a delegate could very well be one who had no special feelings about Britain's European connection but who was happy to travel to France at the Government's expense. It is thus not very surprising that some Labour delegates to Strasbourg in 1956 could be among the signers of an early day motion that called for the establishment of a Commonwealth equivalent to the Council of Europe. The motion, which was sponsored by Fred Peart, himself a former delegate to Strasbourg, thereby reiterated the importance of the Commonwealth connection in the face of the Government's preoccupation with the Free Trade Area proposals.[3] Equally there is no particular irony in the fact that Tufton Beamish, who had been to Strasbourg for three consecutive sessions, could lend his name to an amendment to Rippon's motion urging the Government to 'resist attempts to lure Great Britain into federal, supra-national common market and customs union organisations ... and rather to work out ... means of economic co-operation that would respect national sovereignties'.[4]

Nevertheless, at Council of Europe and WEU debates on the question of closer British ties to the Continent, advocates of such ties clearly

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1. ibid., c.116-123.
2. Early Day Motion No. 28 (12 December 1956).
3. Early Day Motion No. 38 (28 January 1957).
4. Amendment to Early Day Motion No. 28, cit.

predominated, just as the list of signers of early day motions revealed that of those present and former delegates who took a stand at all, 'pro-Europeans' were in the majority.

For Members who wished to speak at length on the Free Trade Area proposals, the assembly chambers of Strasbourg and Paris were more accommodating than that of the Commons. Between 1956 and February 1959 there took place in the Commons only two debates on the issue, one of them an adjournment debate in which Sir James Hutchison, President of the WEU Assembly, called for a speedy agreement with the Six and received a favourable but unexciting reply.[1] At the Council of Europe, however, there were a number of debates on the issue, with recommendations being put forward in October 1957 and again in October 1958. On both occasions it was a British delegate, John Hay, who took a leading part in the debates in his capacity as rapporteur of the Assembly's Economic Committee. In 1957 he and a number of other delegates attempted to convince continental politicians that Britain was not opposed to the development of the Common Market but that there were certain economic factors peculiar to her that made it impossible for her to join a customs union or include agriculture in her free trade Area scheme.[2] Indeed, some British delegates voiced their reservations even about the plan, and Ronald Russell in particular emphasised Britain's special links with the Commonwealth.[3] Ultimately, Hay's report and a joint recommendation from the Economic, Political and Agricultural Committees which favoured the British case were overwhelmingly adopted with only three abstentions (one of them Russell's). The following year a second report from Hay met with similar success, though circumstances had changed the tone of his approach to the

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1. Hansard, 5th series, 1958-59, 595, 345-354. On 28 March 1958 the issue was debated on a private motion. Roy Jenkins and John Hay were among the eleven backbenchers who took part in the debate and were perhaps the most enthusiastic of all speakers who supported the free Trade Area scheme (ibid., 585, 711-803; Jenkins: 726-732; Hay: 764-777).
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 9th session, 1957-58, vol.II. pp.486-494, 682-687.
3. ibid., pp.561-564.

assembled delegates. His emphasis was now on the need to point to the urgency of the matter - the negotiations had bogged down - and to the 'consequences of failure'.[1]

Within a matter of months the Free Trade Area proposals were a dead letter and it became clear that Britain would have to mount a new initiative towards the EEC. At Strasbourg in January 1959 some British delegates, David Price in particular,[2] pointed to the need to alter Britain's Free Trade Area proposals to bring them more closely in line with the economic organisation of the EEC. A proposal along these lines also came from John Edwards, leader of the Labour delegation and candidate for the presidency of the Consultative Assembly. He told the House of Commons on 12 February 1959 that

> The concept of a Free Trade Area ... is not a unifying idea .... We believe that the European Economic Association should aim at promoting over as wide an area as possible a grouping whose basic objective should be economic expansion, full employment, and social progress. 3

But of the twelve back-bench speakers, of whom six had been to Strasbourg (with three mentioning their experiences there in the contexts of their speeches[4]), it was Mark Bonham Carter, a former delegate and spokesman for the Liberals who put forward the most radical idea:

> The Government should state that they are willing to consider joining the Common Market and that, with that end in view, they are initiating conversations at once with the Commonwealth and with the other OEEC countries.[5]

The Government was not ready to follow the Liberals' advice, nor indeed were most MPs. At Strasbourg in April, the calls were indeed for a new

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1. Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 10th session, 1958-59, pp.798-799.
2. ibid., pp.387-890.
3. Hansard, 5th series, 1958-59, 599, 1399-1400.
4. ibid., 1426 (Hendrie Oakshott); 1450 (Sir James Hutchison); 1453 (Charles Royle).
5. ibid., 1430-31.

initiative, and British delegates - Anthony Kershaw, Fred Mulley and David Price - were among those who made them.[1] There was, however, no talk of British entry to the EEC - not even from Lord Grantchester, the Liberal delegate - and the recommendation passed, as usual, by a huge majority, merely called for a reopening of the stalled negotiations.

When the Government finally acted, it was to launch the European Free Trade Association in September 1959. Though MPs still did not call for British entry to the EEC, with the exception of the Liberals, the House of Commons debate on 14 December revealed a growing impatience on the part of some Opposition members with the general drift of the policy followed by the Government. Roy Jenkins, leading for the Labour Party, was 'unconvinced that the form, as compared with the principle and idea of EFTA, is likely to make it easier for us to have (a)... rapprochement between the Six and the Seven ....What we wanted was free trade with a difference ... what we have here is free trade ... in the classical, negative sense'.[2] John Hynd followed him by countering - or attempting to counter - any and every argument that could possibly be used against undertaking to negotiate for entry to the EEC. It was clear that though Arthur Holt was alone in re-echoing the Liberals' call for entry, he would not be along for long. Though John Edwards, who along with Jenkins was Labour's leading European, died while serving as President of the Council of Europe, Hynd, Jenkins and several other members and former members of the Labour delegation to Strasbourg were soon to form the nucleus of a Labour group of pro-Marketeers, parallelled by a similar Conservative group, with many of its leaders likewise drawn from Strasbourg delegations.

It was not until the spring of 1960 that these groups began to coalesce. In January the Council of Europe had again discussed European economic situation, but no proposal for British entry to the EEC had been put forward.[3]

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1. Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 11th session, 1959-60, pp.277-279 (Kershaw), 305-308 (Mulley) 312-317 (Price).
2. Hansard, 5th series, 1959-60, 615, 1076, 1077.
3. Fred Mulley did call for the harmonisation of tariffs in some sectors: Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 11th session, 1959-60, pp.752-753.

Significantly, the Liberals, who by January had been on record as pro-Market for almost a year, had missed a key opportunity to rally support for their stand as they failed to co-ordinate their Westminster and Strasbourg policies. Lord Grantchester was 'a convinced free trader'[1] and he seems to have shown no inclination to press the case for EEC entry at the Council of Europe. The Assembly thus remained in the grips of the free trade area concept, with the one British party that advocated entry failing to do so in the Assembly chamber. When Labour and Tory MPs made their first call for entry, they did so in the Commons and not in the Consultative Assembly, despite the fact that many of them were delegates to that Assembly.

On May 26th, parallel with a Liberal early day motion calling for the opening of negotiations with Britain's EFTA partners with a view to negotiating British entry into the EEC, Roy Jenkins and 24 Labour backbenchers, of whom twelve, like Jenkins, had spent some time as delegates to the Consultative Assembly and WEU, tabled an early day motion which urged the Government to launch

> a new initiative towards the Six, involving a willingness to join Euratom; the acceptance of the principle of a customs union; and some sacrifices of British sovereignty, if this is necessary, to promote closer political unity. 2

A month later Gilbert Longden for the Conservatives tabled a somewhat similar early day motion which attracted 27 signatures, including six of Strasbourg delegates (of whom Longden himself was one), four of them serving on the 1960 team.[3]

Though a total of 52 backbenchers signing the motions was hardly an imposing figure in itself, it did represent a substantial core of support

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1. Hansard (Lords), 1959, (28 July), 218, 681.
2. Early Day Motion No. 93 (26 May 1960).
3. Early Day Motion No. 99 (23 June 1960), 4230. The four delegates to Strasbourg were Peter Kirk, Robert Mathew, Peter Smithers and David Price.

for a prospective Government application for entry. Despite the lateness of their call, and their silence at Strasbourg, it could not be denied that many of the men who had been delegates to Strasbourg since 1949 were in the forefront of those MPs who set the parliamentary tone in favour of entry. Of course, Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys, David Eccles and Lord Kilmuir had all been to Strasbourg too, but being Government Ministers, their calculations were on a totally different plane from those of backbenchers signing early day motions.

Although Macmillan had become convinced of the importance of British accession to the EEC,[1] he was slow to reveal his intentions. In the meantime, backbenchers began to mount a pro-entry campaign in both the Commons and the Assemblies. In June the WEU Assembly took its first step in the direction of supporting entry when it passed a recommendation calling for British accession to EURATOM. The Assembly had until then devoted little time to what was primarily the question of Britain's economic relations with Europe. It was, after all, meant to discuss defence problems, and was in the process of transferring its cultural programmes to the Council of Europe.[2] But the Consultative Assembly seemed to be passing resolutions that were being ignored. Furthermore, while the composition of the Consultative Assembly made it politically difficult for anyone to sponsor resolutions calling for anything but multilateral EFTA-EEC talks, the WEU Assembly, with its membership limited to Britain and the Six, was in a position to call for bilateral negotiations, since it had been mandated to oversee all aspects of relations between the seven constituent members.

Late in March 1960 Peter Kirk, chairman of the WEU General Affairs Committee, suggested in a letter to The Times that as a first step to joining

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1. See Camps, Britain and European Community, pp.230-232, 293; Nora Beloff writes that Macmillan only reached a final decision at the end of 1960: General Says No, p.104. Macmillan's memoirs reveal very little on this matter: see Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day: 1961-63 (London, Macmillan, 1973), pp. 3-15.

2. Council of Europe, Secretariat, Manual, p. 125.

the EEC, Britain should join the ECSC, since it was already an Associate Member of that organisation.[1] Arthur Conte, the rapporteur of Kirk's committee, set to work on a report for presentation in June which incorporated Kirk's idea.[2] In the meantime, another committee member, Michel Junot, answered a leader comment in The Times that 'a British offer to enter Euratom ... would probably seem laughable on the Continent'[3] with the assertion that 'the reverse is the truth' and that

> what is needed is an unmistakeable gesture from London. The proposal ... from Western European Union gives to Great Britain a more favourable opportunity than may occur again. [4]

Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, had already told the Consultative Assembly in January that it had been a mistake for Britain not to have joined the ECSC;[5] in June John Profumo, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, responded to Conte's report by going even further:

> The British Government ... will certainly be ready to consider anew the proposal that Britain should join Euratom, and, indeed, the European Coal and Steel Community as well. 6

Several speakers, including John Hynd, Scholefield Allen, Maurice Macmillan and Robert Mathew took Profumo at his word and successfully pressed for the passage of the General Affairs Committee recommendation urging British accession to Euratom.

A month later the pro-Marketeers presented their case in a Commons foreign affairs debate. Seven of fourteen speakers supported entry -

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1. Peter Kirk, 'The British Question-Mark to Europe', in Assembly of WEU, Ten Years.... p.108.
2. Ibid. See also Arthur Conte, 'Western European Union and the building of Europe', ibid., pp.83-95.
3. The Times, 16 May 1960- quoted in Junot's letter in ibid., 24 May 1960, p.13.
4. Ibid.
5. Camps, Britain and European Community, p.239.
6. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 6th session, 1960, II, p.137.

though Conservatives were more cautious in their pronouncements. Of the seven, four had been present at the WEU the previous month.[1]

The WEU Assembly's proposal came to very little. Some leading Europeans, including Jean Monnet, felt that Britain should enter all the Communities or none of them. The Governments of the Six were not willing to discuss accession to part of the system until they knew Britain's position on entry to the EEC and the British Government was not yet ready to decide one way or the other.[2] Nevertheless, the WEU Assembly was still to prove useful to Britain. Harold Macmillan had decided in the summer of 1960 to use Kirk, Mathew and other keen pro-European Conservative delegates to WEU as 'go-betweens to survey Britain's European prospects without taking formal initiatives which might have provoked once again politically embarrassing rebuffs'.3 Working closely with the Foreign Office, the Tory delegates on the General Affairs Committee - Kirk its chairman, Mathew and Maurice Macmillan - formulated a draft recommendation urging outright British entry to the EEC which they presented to the committee at its November meeting. The meeting had been deliberately planned to coincide in time and place with a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Six in Brussels. Immediately the committee agreed to the resolution the ministers were informed of its contents and were asked to meet with the committee's members.[4] If Britain's intentions were by then not yet clear, they were more obvious after the WEU Assembly met in December. Kirk, Anthony Kershaw and John Hynd strongly urged approval of the recommendation which was presented by a Belgian delegate.[5] When some Gaullists put forward an amendment to weaken

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1. John Hynd, Maurice Macmillan, Austen Albu, Fred Mulley; Gilbert Longden, a former delegate, also spoke in favour of entry.
2. Camps, Britain and European Community, pp.291-293.
3. Nora Beloff, General Says No, p.103.
4. ibid.
5. Adolf Molter. The Recommendation stated that 'negotiations be opened between the member Governments of Western European Union with a view to expediting an arrangement between the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom, which will result in the United Kingdom acceeding to the European Economic Community as a full member'. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 6th session, 1960, IV, p. 21.

the recommendation's contents, Robert Mathew and Florence Horsbrugh, the delegation leader, quickly brought forth a counter-amendment. The unfriendly amendment was then dropped after 'discussion'[1] with the British delegates. The recommendation was then approved by 53-1; all British delegates present at the vote supported the recommendation. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that the Conservative delegate with the gravest doubts about EEC entry, Ronald Russell, was absent from the vote and that his substitute voted in favour.

It is noteworthy that the recommendation could only have been put forward at WEU. Within the WEU context it could not offend the Neutrals and Britain's EFTA partners, though Maurice Macmillan still found it necessary to justify the recommendation to the Consultative Assembly in April 1961. Furthermore, it was at WEU that a British delegate, Kirk, chaired the key General Affairs Committee, on which the popular Robert Mathew and the Prime Minister's son, Maurice, also sat.

Early in 1961 Kirk was despatched as an unofficial ambassador to the capitals of the Six (officially he travelled as chairman of the General Affairs Committee) to explore reactions to Britain's proposed change of policy.[2] It was after French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville informed Kirk on 1 February that 'the organisation of Europe was inconceivable without Britain inside' that Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal-in charge of European relations, made his initial statement about the possibility of Britain joining the Six behind a tariff wall.[3] In June the WEU Assembly met in London, to emphasise the importance of Britain's solidarity with the Six, and was welcomed by Harold Macmillan (who made no major pronouncement on British

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1. The withdrawer of the amendment used the phrase (ibid., p.90).
2. Nora Beloff, General Says No, pp.104-105: Miss Beloff notes that 'until the Prime Minister had persuaded his own cabinet colleagues that entry was a good idea, it was obviously impossible to be too frank with foreigners'. Kirk, in WEU Assembly Ten Years.... p.110.
3. Nora Beloff, General, p.105. Kirk had reported directly back to Heath.

intentions). Edward Heath was present when Robert Mathew, rapporteur for the General Affairs Committee, put forward a report and recommendation urging the speedy commencement of negotiations for British accession.[1] Most speakers welcomed Mathew's proposal; Ronald Russell's fears for the Commonwealth and Sir John Maitland's reservations about agriculture only added a realistic note to the British case.[2] The recommendation was passed overwhelmingly; when the Assembly next met, Harold Macmillan had already announced Britain's intention to negotiate for entry into the EEC.

The pro-Marketeers had not only asserted themselves at WEU. Equally important was their activity in the pro-entry campaigns inside Britain. In the spring of 1961 the Campaign for a Common Market was created with Lord Gladwyn as chairman. Gladwyn, the former ambassador to Paris, recalls that Roy Jenkins approached him to chair the Campaign.[3] Jenkins served as its vice-chairman; its secretary was Peter Kirk, who thus came to divide his time between Britain and the Continent in working for the European cause.

Gladwyn also chaired 'Britain in Europe', an organisation of active, younger pro-Marketeers (mostly in their thirties and forties), which seems to have had close links with the Government (according to Gladwyn the Foreign Office had asked him to chair the Group).[4] Former delegates were again to be found in Britain in Europe's ranks; the names of its leading figures were again the same: Kirk and Jenkins.

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1. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 7th session, 1961, p.122.
2. Maitland voted for the recommendation, Russell abstained, John Eden voted 'no'. For Maitland's remarks see ibid., pp.149-51; Russell: 120-122.
3. Lord Gladwyn, Memoirs, p.338. Jenkins - and Peter Kirk - had been planning a common market campaign since the summer of 1960: see Lord Windlesham, Communication and Political Power (London, Cape, 1966), pp.164-165. They were joined on the preparatory committee by Mark Bonham-Carter, a former Liberal MP who had also been to Strasbourg.
4. Lord Gladwyn, op. cit., p.334.

Anti-Marketeers tended to express their views in early-day motions both before and after the Macmillan announcement. Some MPs joined the anti-Market groups like the Anti-Common Market League that sprang into existence late in 1961, but there seem to have been no former 'Strasbourgers' among them. On the other hand, seven former Labour delegates signed Lynn Ungoed-Thomas' motion calling for a Commonwealth Conference on Europe in the face of

> the threat to the survival of the Commonwealth from the pressure, not only to make this country enter into a European Common Market but also to subject its independence and its membership of the Commonwealth to a political union with Germany, France, Italy and Benelux. 1

Four delegates, two of them members of the 1961 delegation, were among the 45 signers of Robin Turton's motion opposing 'any national derogation of British sovereignty resulting from the entry of Great Britain into the European Economic Community'.[2]

The Commons debate on 2-3 August again revealed that past and present delegates to Strasbourg were counted among the most vehement anti-Marketeers as well as among the strongest proponents of entry. Though Strasbourg delegates accounted for almost a third of the speeches made in the two day debate, three of those seven delegates spoke against entry, and two of the three pointed to their Strasbourg experience as reasons for their opposition to entry.[3]

None of the former delegates favouring entry cited their Strasbourg experiences, though Maurice Macmillan pointed to the weakness of the two assemblies he attended in order to assuage Members' fears about the European Parliament's federal potential.[4] There was, however, no real need for the

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1. Early Day Motion No. 124. (12 June 1961).
2. Early Day Motion No. 155. (26 July 1961).
3. William Blyton and Ronald Russell - Hansard, 5th series, 1960-61, 645, 1530 (Blyton) and 1566 (Russell).
4. Ibid., 1722.

speakers to refer to the assemblies, since this was often done to illustrate the speaker's credentials and in the case of all four speakers their credentials were well known.[1] The division on the Government motion at the end of the debate resembled previous divisions over the European question that had taken place over the past few years; the Conservatives voted as a bloc and Labour abstained (there had been a straight vote on a Labour amendment to the Government motion - the amendment was defeated). For Labour pro-Marketeers the abstention meant no compromise in principle; for Tory anti's abstention was the only escape route. It was a route which Russell, among others, found it necessary to follow, though John Eden surprisingly voted with the Government.

Between September 1961 and February 1963, five debates were held on the progress of the negotiations, 77 backbench speeches were made, and 19 of them were by 13 delegates and former delegates to Strasbourg. A review of the contents of those nineteen speeches would be extremely tedious and repetitive. But it is worth noting that of the nineteen, only three, these by John Stonehouse, William Blyton and Maurice Edelman were against entry. Blyton was a long-time opponent of any co-operation with Europe that smacked of federalist implications. Stonehouse served on the Labour delegation to Strasbourg during the 1961-63 period - the Labour Whips having no qualms about sending an anti-Marketeer to Strasbourg when even the leader was not yet sure of the position he would adopt on the issue. His experiences there were to lead him later to tell the House:

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1. Macmillan, John Hynd, Jenkins - who later resigned from the front bench to be more active in the pro-entry movement, and Peter Smithers, whose pro-entry activities reportedly won him a junior Foreign Office Ministry in 1962 (Camps, Britain and European Community, p.364, f.n.55). For examples of MPs who cited experience at Strasbourg as part of their European 'credentials' see the remarks of Charles Royle and Hendrie Oakshott, Hansard, 1958-59, 599, 1453 (Royle), 1426 (Oakshott).

> members of the EEC when they found...we wanted to keep links with the EFTA, with the Commonwealth and with the rest of the world... were shaken ... because they had the impression... that we were accepting wholeheartedly political union in Europe and that we would not expect to keep our Commonwealth ties .... Members of the European Economic Community do not understand the importance, politically as well as economically, of the Commonwealth ties to this country. 1

Edelman was a more curious case. He had attended the Hague Congress in the face of official Party disapproval, and had been a delegate to Strasbourg the following year. In the mid-'sixties he was to join the Labour Committee for Europe and in 1971 was among the Labour rebels in the October 28th vote. But in 1961-63 he seemed a committed anti-Marketeer, prophesying the demise of the Commonwealth - 'a disaster not only for Britain but for the rest of the world' - if Britain were to enter the EEC.[2] It was clear that in his case Strasbourg had made little difference one way or the other.

Few of the pro-Marketeers in the Commons saw any need to mention Strasbourg in their speeches. In the Lords, however, Lord Boothby, who had spent so many years at Strasbourg, mentioned the Assembly in each speech he made on the question of the EEC. At one stage he lamented the rejection of the Strasbourg Plan;[3] had it been accepted by the European Governments, there would have been no Commonwealth problem in the negotiations. Another Peer who recalled his Strasbourg experiences was Lord Morrison, though those experiences hardly foreshadowed his later rather pro-Market sympathies.[4] Of the former delegates to Strasbourg who sat in the Lords (and there were several, but not many), only Lord Listowel expressed very strong reservations about entry, though not even he stated that he opposed it on any terms.[5]

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1. Ibid., 1962-63, 671, 1133-39.
2. Ibid., 1961-62, 662, 589-90.
3. Hansard (Lords), 1960-61, 234, 263-64. The Strasbourg Plan had recommended the utilisation of the economic resources of the member states of the Council of Europe for the development of overseas countries associated with them. See above, p. 272 and f.n. 1.
4. Ibid., 173-83.
5. Ibid., 193-206.

Speeches in the House of Commons (or Lords) and parliamentary questions (which were so numerous and covered so many aspects of the negotiations that it would be impossible to deal with them adequately within the framework of this chapter) were of course but two of the many means by which parliamentarians voiced their support for or opposition to the Government's decision to negotiate for entry. For those MPs and Peers who were delegates to the Council of Europe and WEU, there were not only the Early Day Motions to sign, organisations to join (and perhaps letters or articles to write), there were also, of course, the platforms afforded them by the assemblies to which they belonged.

Throughout the 1961-63 period, it was the WEU Assembly which dealt with specific points at issue between Britain and the Six. The Consultative Assembly devoted more time to relations between the Six and all the EFTA partners,[1] since the Scandinavians and Neutrals at Strasbourg were constantly in need of reassurance that Britain would not short-sell their interests. Thus a number of British delegates, both pro- and anti-Marketeers, were at pains to explain to their anxious EFTA colleagues that Britain was taking her partners' interest into account.[2] From April 1961 onwards the Assembly's recommendations were always phrased in terms which provided for an EEC agreement with all EFTA states[3] - such terms were indeed enshrined in the EFTA London Agreement of June 1961.[4]

A second issue which both pro- and anti-Market British delegates constantly raised was that of the Commonwealth. Ronald Bell, Ronald Russell

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1. Similar themes were discussed at the joint meetings of the Council of Europe and the European Parliamentary Assembly, at which there were usually some British delegates in attendance.
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 13th session, 1961-62: see speeches by George Brown, p.50 and Anthony Kershaw, pp.219-223.
3. Consultative Assembly, Texts Adopted, 13th session, 1961-62, recommendation 337.
4. See Camps, Britain and European Community, pp.355-356.

and a number of Labour speakers confirmed the contention of pro-Marketeers like Maurice Macmillan that the Commonwealth issue was a legitimate concern in Britain, not merely a bargaining counter. When the negotiations reached a crisis stage in mid-1962, Conservatives attempted to justify British reservations about the Commonwealth and EFTA fears and to place the onus on the Six to make some concessions on these points in order to find a way out of the impasse.[1] At no point, however, did the Conservatives object to the insertion in Assembly recommendations of clauses urging the further supra-national development of the Six while the negotiations progressed. Peter Kirk had pleaded that delegates of the Six cease to look upon the British as 'opponents'.[2]

Meanwhile, at the WEU Assembly, the harmony that marked the passage of the June 1961 recommendations only lasted through the December session which passed two further recommendations on the subject.[3] By the following June, however, it was evident that all sides were impatient with the direction the talks were taking (reports of which the Assembly received from its own observer at the negotiations Conference). A recommendation put forward by the General Affairs Committee which urged the formulation of a draft protocol of accession which Britain and the Six would have to discuss within a short, strictly-enforced time limit was strongly opposed by speakers from both British parties[4] as well as by some French Independents and some Christian-Democrats. A modified recommendation was likewise opposed by the British. James Scott-Hopkins for the Conservatives joined Christopher Mayhew of Labour to put forward an amendment that provided for the preservation of Commonwealth trading patterns pending the negotiation of world commodity agreements.[5]

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1. See speeches by Kershaw and Maurice Macmillan, Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 14th session, 1962-63, pp.551-553 (Kershaw) & 524-29 (Macmillan).
2. Ibid., p.638.
3. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 7th session, 1961, IV, pp.36, 46.
4. See for example the remarks of Christopher Mayhew and Maurice Macmillan: ibid., 8th session, 1962, II, pp.67, 83.
5. For statements by Scott-Hopkins and Mayhew see ibid., pp.129-130.

Though the amendment was narrowly defeated, it won the support of all British delegates except Peter Kirk, the committee's chairman, who abstained. Only Kirk voted in favour of the recommendation itself; the British delegation abstained en masse.

The British delegation again clashed with the General Affairs Committee over a recommendation outlining the future forms of a European political union. Robert Mathew was the only delegate to participate in the debate on the question; 'cool off' was his message. Talk of political union would only enhance the British anti-Marketeers'[1] case; the recommendation came at an inopportune time. British delegates, with the exception of Kirk, John Peel, Philip Goodhart and Viscount Stonehaven (who voted in favour) abstained from the voting. Like most WEU recommendations, it was carried by a large majority.

By December 1962 the stalemate in the negotiations seemed insoluble, and British pro-Market delegates had no compunction about making their impatience known to their fellow WEU delegates. Maurice Macmillan defended Britain's reservations over guarantees for EFTA and the Commonwealth and warned that Britain might have to reconsider its application 'if the changes in the structure of the Treaty of Rome, and the principles underlying its application, are too great'.[2] Britain's disillusionment with the protracted negotiations was perhaps best summed up by Sir Otho Prior-Palmer who asserted

> I have always been a passionate advocate of ... entry (to the EEC) ... My passion is subsiding ... I wonder if there are some in Europe who are perfectly aware of this and are quite deliberately playing their cards accordingly. 3

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1. Ibid., pp.116-118.

2. Ibid., pp.124-25.

3. Ibid., pp.128-129.

Peter Kirk attempted to counter this note of British despair by calling for support for a new General Affairs Committee recommendation urging the conclusion of talks in time for the signing of the accession protocol on the anniversary of the Treaty of Rome (March 25th[1]). The recommendation was duly passed, though without the support of Labour delegates who had unsuccessfully tabled an amendment that reiterated the five conditions for entry enunciated by Hugh Gaitskell at the party's 1962 Conference.[2]

During the 1961-63 period, Peter Kirk's appeals to the Six were not only made on the floor of the Assembly chamber. Although he did not lead the delegation, he continued to serve as the Government's leading unofficial spokesman to the parliamentarians and Governments of the Six. His long tenure at Strasbourg, his linguistic ability (fluent French and German), and his chairmanship of WEU General Affairs Committee won him the ear of both Ministers and MPs. Kirk attempted to obtain stronger support from the Governments of the Six by the indirect method of employing parliamentarians as lobbyists on Britain's behalf. He directed his major efforts at the Germans and the French. In addition he travelled in particular to Bonn on a number of occasions to speak to members of the Bundestag and once to meet with Gerhard Schroeder, the Federal Republic's Foreign Minister. As chairman of the General Affairs Committee Kirk could arrange committee meetings with members of the EEC Council of Ministers; he met Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, both in committee session and privately. In October 1962 Kirk sensed that matters had taken a turn for the worse, and his memorandum to Heath confirmed similar reports that the Government were receiving from other sources as well.

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1. Ibid., pp.156-159; the text of the recommendation is on p.38.
2. The conditions were safeguards for the Commonwealth; adequate arrangements for EFTA countries; arrangements for British agriculture; freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy; freedom to carry out national economic planning. See Camps, Britain and European Community, pp.448-452.

Kirk worked apart from the formal framework of the British delegation (though as one anti-Market delegate recalls, everyone was aware of Kirk's activities), but he was often assisted by Robert Mathew, a former General Affairs Committee rapporteur, who also had a fine command of French and German. Unfortunately, their work bore few tangible results: on the Friday before de Gaulle's veto, Couve de Murville was still assuring Kirk and his committee colleagues that there would be no veto.[1] Nevertheless, both Kirk and Mathew seem to have been rewarded for their efforts; Kirk became a junior Minister at the Defence Ministry, Mathew a junior Minister in the Foreign Office.

The question of British entry to the EEC was discussed in one other parliamentary forum, the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. It was recognised that British entry to the EEC would alter 'Atlantic' as well as European relationships - President Kennedy in particular felt that it could only strengthen the Alliance.[2] Nevertheless the NPC's short, annual session meant that it could only superficially discuss the issue.[3] As far as British delegates were concerned, not all were pro-Marketeers and some were anti.[4] None of the pro-Market delegates[5] matched the lobbying of Kirk and Mathew at Strasbourg and WEU; in any event, the European assemblies, which concentrated on the question, seemed more appropriate scenes for such activities.

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1. Unattributable interview, December 1972.

2. See Camps, Britain and European Community, pp.336-337, 431.

3. Lord Crathorne admitted as much when he opened a debate on NATO and European Unity 'with particular reference to 8th annual NATO Parliamentarians' Conference' on 13 Feb.1963. Hansard (Lords), 1962-63, 246, 987-994. Several speakers devoted most of their remarks to the NPC rather than to the subject of European unity.

4. See Lord Shepherd's comments, ibid., 1961, 234, 243.

5. Among them were John Peel, Philip Goodhart, Anthony Kershaw, Baroness Elliot of Harwood, Lord Silkin and Lord Crathorne.

Before turning to events after the veto, mention must be made of some of the other pro- and anti-Market activities in which delegates to Strasbourg were to be found. The favourite vehicle of anti-Market delegates, particularly the Conservatives, was the early day motion, a device which has often been used to broadcast backbench discontent.[1]

In March 1962, 44 Tories, including Ronald Russell, John Eden and Norman Pannell signed an amendment to a Liberal motion which stressed that 'if we cannot secure special arrangements to protect the vital interests ... of the Commonwealth ... Britain will not join the Common Market'.[2] Russell and Pannell again appeared on the order paper in support of a July anti-Market motion signed by a total of 44 Conservatives,[3] and were joined by Ronald Bell in supporting a motion in December which demanded British firmness in the negotiations even if it would result in their 'discontinuance'.[4]

Labour anti-Marketeers employed the order paper but once, in March 1962, foreshadowing the conditions for entry which the leadership would adopt in October: freedom to conduct an independent foreign policy and domestic economic planning; safeguards for the Commonwealth, for British agriculture, for the EFTA.[5] The motion was tabled by James Griffiths, Labour front bencher and former Strasbourg delegation leader, and was signed by seven other delegates and former delegates.

For supporters of entry, the main focus of activity outside the parliamentary framework was in the various organisations that were working to win the country's support for the Government's policy. Britain in Europe

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1. For a discussion of the significance of early day motions see Finer, et.al., Backbench Opinion, pp.7-9 and Hugh Berrington, 'The Conservative Party: Revolts and Pressures - 1955-61', Pol.Q. XXXII (1961), 363-364, 367-368.
2. Early Day Motion No. 78 (amendment) (21 March 1962).
3. Early Day Motion No. 148 (30 July 1962).
4. Early Day Motion No. 43 (13 December 1962).
5. Early Day Motion No. 74 (7 March 1962).

and the Common Market Campaign have already been referred to. They were to merge after the veto, early in 1963, after having conducted parallel pro-entry campaigns.[1] Shortly after the Macmillan announcement another new organisation had come into being, the Labour Common Market Committee, with Roy Jenkins, already active in the Common Market Campaign, again playing a key role.[2] Only party members were invited to join the Committee. Some of its aims were

> to rally European minded Labour Party, TU (trade union) and Co-operative members.... to counteract biased anti-European propoganda .... To co-operate with Socialists in Europe and help strengthen the progressive forces within the Common Market. 3

It put itself forward as 'neither a party group nor a party-within-a-party', in contrast with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Campaign for Democratic Socialism, from both of whose ranks it drew members.[4] A leaflet advertising its special meeting at the 1961 Blackpool Conference listed eighteen MPs among its members; eight of them, including Jenkins, its chairman, had been delegates to the Consultative Assembly. Indeed, one long-serving member of the Committee has asserted that the Strasbourg delegates of the early 'fifties' formed the 'backbone' of the Committee.[5] In fact many of the Committee's charter members were more recent delegates to the Consultative Assembly. Backbone or not, it is clear that throughout the formative years of the Committee one-time delegates were prominent on its rolls: in 1962 they accounted for 13 of its 34 members from the Commons.[6]

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1. 'The Merger', Common Market Campaign, No. 10 (April 1963), p.3.
2. The Committee was launched on 14 Sept. 1961 (Windlesham, Communications, pp.169-170).
3. From a Labour Common Market Committee leaflet (October 1961).
4. Newsbrief of the Labour Common Market Committee, No.3 (Jan/Feb 1962), p.1. (Papers of Mr. R. Colin Beever, London. Mr. Beever served as the LCMC's first Hon. Secretary).
5. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, p.226.
6. From an LCMC leaflet distributed before the 1962 Conference at Brighton.

Roy Jenkins was also actively involved in the pro-Market work of yet another organisation, the Labour Party Campaign for Democratic Socialism. CDS had originally been founded by William Rodgers and other party activists to support Hugh Gaitskell's battle with the supporters of unilateral nuclear disarmament, who seemed triumphant after the 1960 Labour Conference at Scarborough. Though some anti-Marketeers were among CDS' parliamentary sympathisers (it was officially a 'grass roots' organisation) they were outnumbered by supporters of entry including former Assembly delegates Austen Albu, Antony Crosland, Eric Fletcher, Geoffrey de Freitas, George Jeger, Horace King, Bruce Millan, Fred Mulley, Frank Tomney, and, of course, Jenkins.[1] The CDS asserted in its manifesto that 'we are convinced Europeans,'[2] and in July 1961, before the campaign against the unilateralists had been won, CDS' broadsheet Campaign carried an unsigned leader, written by Jenkins, which did not go so far as to advocate entry, but urged members to consider its positive implications. There followed in ensuing editions of the broadsheet pro-Market quotes from leading figures in the party, and these set the stage first for a leader in March 1962 which refuted arguments against entry and then, in July, for one which pronounced itself in favour of entry at the very time that Hugh Gaitskell was visibly moving to an anti-Market line.

The CDS pressed hard for a neutral Labour line at the 1962 Brighton Conference. The 'Brighton Conference issue' of Campaign contended that the political considerations surrounding entry added up to 'an overwhelming case for Britain joining the Common Market'.[3] But despite pleas from Jenkins and Anthony Crosland on the night before his speech,[4] Gaitskell

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1. From a list of parliamentary supporters in Campaign, No.3 (Mar.1961),p.4.
2. A Manifesto Addressed to the Labour Movement, n.d., issued on 16 Oct.1960. The phrase reappeared in 'Socialists and the Common Market', Campaign, No. 18 (July 1962), p.1. For the origins - and original goals - of CDS see Windlesham, Communication, pp.94-102.
3. 'Common Market Crisis', Campaign, No. 20 (October 1962), p. 1.
4. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, p.226.

pronounced himself against entry except on the most difficult terms. Undaunted, and with the unilaterists virtually neutralised after the 1962 Brighton Conference, the CDS continued to devote much of its energy to the Common Market question.[1] However, once Labour came to power in October 1964, the Campaign declared its task completed[2] and left it to the Labour Common Market Committee, now restyled the Labour Committee for Europe, to carry forward the pro-entry standard.

By October 1964 the issue of British entry into the EEC seemed less topical, particularly in Britain.[3] At Strasbourg the delegates soon[4] turned their attention to more pressing issues such as the GATT - Kennedy round negotiations and the Community's internal crisis. Until 1966 British-EEC relations commanded only the occasional resolution urging a resumption of the negotiations.[5]

The situation at WEU was much the same. Meeting shortly after the April 1963 session of the Consultative Assembly, delegates had little to add to what had been said the previous month. The Assembly adopted a recommendation urging that the WEU Council maintain contacts between the Six and Britain so that some transitional agreement could be reached until British entry to the EEC was achieved.[6] Nevertheless, the feeling among British representatives was that France was forcing the EEC down an economic path that suited her own interests and that would make it harder for Britain to join in the future.[7]

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1. See 'After Brighton: Jobs to be Done', Campaign, No.21 (Nov.1962), p.4.
2. See Windlesham, Communication, p.150.
3. See Butler and King, General Election of 1964, pp.131-132; Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, pp.132-135.
4. At the Consultative Assembly meetings of April 1963 several bitter exchanges took place between Conservative and Labour delegates during the Assembly's post-mortem of the negotiations. See the remarks of George Brown and Nicholas Ridley, Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 15th session, 1963-64, pp.112-115, 126-129.
5. See for example recommendation 356, Consultative Assembly, Texts Adopted, 15th session, 1963-64, ... Recommendation 356.
6. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 9th session, 1963, II. pp.35-36.
7. See Maurice Macmillan's remarks, ibid., pp.70-33.

For the next two years WEU, like the Consultative Assembly, turned to other matters. A typical list of recommendations adopted by the Assembly in that period, that of November 1965, dealt with the political future of NATO, a European mobile force, European space activities and the state of European security. The resolution on British-EEC relations (every session passed one) could only urge closer co-operation within the Council among the Seven, as well as co-operation between the EEC and EFTA.[1]

The NPC likewise turned to more pressing issues. It agonised over the key issue of France's attitude to and position in NATO, and also dealt with France's refusal in 1965 to work with EEC institutions and its implications for the Alliance as well as the Kennedy Round negotiations. Finally, the MLF/ANF controversy also occupied the limited time of the Conference sessions.[2] The British - EEC question hardly claimed full attention at the Atlantic-oriented Conference.

In the House of Commons meanwhile, no further debates were held on European issues. However, during both the last phase of the Tory administration and when Labour came to power, questions from backbenchers either sought assurances that there would be no negotiations in the foreseeable future, or urged that they should be undertaken once more. Strasbourg delegates figured in both approaches.[3]

In the meantime, the pro-Market organisations slogged on. In 1965 Lord Gladwyn, chairman of the merged Common Market Campaign/Britain in Europe, joined the Liberal Party and became its delegate to the Council of Europe.

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1. Ibid., 11th session, 1965, IV, p.19.
2. For a discussion of the MLF controversy see Camps, European Unification, pp.144-156. France's attitude to the EEC stand in the Kennedy Round talks held during the EEC crisis is outlined on p.72.
3. See for example, John Stonehouse's question on 10 February 1964 (Hansard, 5th series, 1964, 689, 4) and that of Gilbert Longden on 18 March 1965 (ibid., 1965, 708, 1470-71).

Thus, like Peter Kirk, who was on the new organisation's Council of Management, Gladwyn found himself combining his pro-entry activities at home with advocacy of the British case on the Continent. Gladwyn took charge of yet another pro-entry group in 1966, the 'Campaign for Europe', which urged that Britain should welcome the full political implications of the EEC. Created by Britain in Europe,[1] its original list of 14 suggested officers included ten delegates or former delegates to Strasbourg.[2] Signatories of its 'Declaration for a European Political Community', included 17 MPs and Peers. Of the seventeen, eleven had been one-time delegates to Strasbourg. Christopher Mayhew assumed the Campaign's Deputy Chairmanship, Peter Kirk became a joint honorary secretary. Five delegates to Strasbourg, of whom Ivor Richard, Samuel Silkin, Francis Noel-Baker and Eldon Griffiths were on the 1966 delegation, agreed to join the Campaign's Committee.

Another MP who came to share his time between pro-Market activities at Strasbourg and in Britain was Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, who succeeded Shirley Williams as Chairman of the Labour Committee for Europe in March 1966 and became President of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly the following month. Within the LCE leadership, de Freitas was joined by two other delegates with Strasbourg experience. Tom Bradley was serving as a delegate in 1966; Robert Edwards was also a member of the delegation de Freitas led. Joining the LCE at about the same time as de Freitas became its chairman were about 20 new recruits from the Commons, some of whom were recently elected to Parliament, while others, like Maurice Edelman and Ernest Popplewell, both former delegates to Strasbourg , had been serving at

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1. The first meeting of Britain in Europe's provisional committee for the Campaign was held on 15 November 1965. (Papers of Britain in Europe, in files of the European Movement, London).

2. The ten were Francis Noel-Baker, Sir Edward Boyle, Robert Mathew, Eldon Griffiths, John Hay, Dick Taverne, Brian Walden, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, Peter Kirk and Gladwyn (Britain in Europe, Executive Committee Meeting - Minutes (BIE/44, 2 June 1965 - BIE papers)).

Westminster for some time.[1] By late 1967 the Committee included over 100 MPs and Peers of whom 40 per cent. had been to Strasbourg at some time. Under de Freitas' chairmanship the Committee heard reports after each session at Strasbourg from one of its members who was on the delegation.[2] At one stage de Freitas tried to persuade the Labour Government to keep anti-Marketeers off the delegation.[3] His efforts were unsuccessful, but the membership rolls of the LCE clearly indicate that a substantial percentage of Labour delegates to Strasbourg identified themselves as supporters of entry.

It was Geoffrey de Freitas, in his role as President of the Consultative Assembly, who invited Harold Wilson to address the Assembly in the course of his journey to the capitals of the Six. Wilson responded by preparing what was intended to be 'a major declaration' and sending an advance copy to General de Gaulle.[4] As Wilson himself recalls, the speech on 23 January produced the desired effect at the Assembly.[5] His declaration that 'we mean business' and his reiteration that 'the Government are approaching the discussions ... with the clear intention and determination to enter the European Economic Community, if as we hope, our essential British and Commonwealth interests can be safeguarded'[6] was seconded by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, leader of the Conservative delegation, who emphasised that 'the movement for British entry into the European Community may now be seen against the background of Broad national unity'.[7] A resolution welcoming the new British initiative was adopted at the end of the political debate; there was no demand for a roll-call vote.[8]

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1. Membership lists of the LCE were affixed to its notepaper, which was periodically revised, and from which the above calculations have been made. It is noteworthy that whereas 33% of MPs in the LCE had been to Strasbourg, only 17.5% of non-LCE Labour MPs were former delegates to the assemblies.
2. Interview with Mr. Colin Beever, November 1972.
3. Labour Committee for Europe, 'Minutes of the 14th (36th) meeting (20 July 1965)', p.2.
4. Wilson, Labour Government 1964-70, pp.333-334.
5. Ibid., p.333.
6. Consultative Assembly, Official Report, 18th session, 1966-67, p.645.
7. Ibid., p.650.

The Strasbourg Assembly did not consider any further recommendations on the subject the following May. Nevertheless it commanded much of the Assembly's attention. The British Government had named William Rodgers, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, as delegation leader. It was the first time in a decade that a Minister was chosen to lead the delegation. Speaking to the Assembly, Rodgers pointed to the significance of his dual role before going on to assure delegates that in his Government's view 'the Treaty of Rome and the Community's system pose no problems for Britain' and adding on the thorny issue of relations with America, 'there is no special relationship ... which provides an impediment to our association with Europe'.[1]

It was in May as well that the Houses of Commons and Lords debated and voted on the Government motion in support of the application. Though all three parties officially favoured entry, a determined group of anti-Marketeers, drawn from both parties, had already put its views forward before the debate began. In February 117 Labour MPs, eleven former delegates to Strasbourg among them, had signed a motion 'regretting' that the pro-Marketeers had seized upon Wilson's trip to the capitals of the Six to press for entry and reiterating that Britain would only enter the EEC if her 'essential interests' and those of her partners were safeguarded.[2] 17 Conservatives, among them former Strasbourg delegates Ronald Bell, Ronald Russell and Knox Cunningham, signed a motion in April which called on the Government to delay its application until 'the people (could) ... make an informal assessment' of the effects of entry on Britain's constitutional and economic framework.[3] Finally, only three days before the debate was to take place in the House, 75 Labour MPs, of whom five were recent delegates to the Consultative Assembly, signed a statement in the May 5th issue of Tribune outlining their reasons for opposing entry.[4]

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1. Ibid., 19th session, 1967-68, pp.45-46.
2. Early Day Motion No. 427 (22 February 1967).
3. Early Day Motion No. 522 (27 April 1967).
4. 'Britain and the Common Market: A Statement signed by 74 Labour Members of Parliament', Tribune (May 5, 1967).

In the Commons debate, however, it was the Strasbourg pro-Marketeers who predominated. Delegates and former delegates to Strasbourg accounted for about half of the speeches made from the backbenches during the three day debate. 15 of these 19 speeches were in favour of entry.[1] The vote was overwhelmingly in support of the Government's motion: as far as delegates and former delegates to Strasbourg and Paris were concerned, 112 voted for entry, six voted against, three abstained.

In the Lords the Government's motion was agreed to without a division. Only four delegates to Strasbourg had taken part in the two day debate - Gladwyn, Lords Grantchester, Champion and William Blyton; and the latter was as opposed to entry now as he had been when he was in 'the other place'. Silent in the debate, but one whose views on the subject were well-known, was Lord Boothby, who himself had initiated a debate on British entry the previous year, forming a powerful pro-Market combination with Gladwyn, which worked as a team to rebut anti-Market arguments.[2] Only one former delegate to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference spoke in the debate, Lord Sherfield, and he favoured entry.[3]

In the aftermath of de Gaulle's 'velvet veto' at his press conference of 16 May 1967, William Rodgers found it necessary to reiterate to the WEU Assembly in June that Britain was determined to 'maintain the momentum of our application' and to counter many of de Gaulle's arguments about the obstacles Britain would have to overcome before she was fit to join the EEC.[4]

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1. Of the nine front benchers who spoke in the debate, seven had been to Strasbourg.
2. The debate was held on 29 June 1966, see Hansard (Lords), 1966-67, 275, 664-690, 694-699, 704-769.
3. Ibid., 282, 1248-52. The 1967 Parliamentarians' Conference passed an Economic Committee recommendation and a Political Committee resolution which favoured entry, but which did not state that entry was an urgent matter (NPC, Economic Committee recommendation, document K.193 (1967); Political Committee Resolution, document K.210).
4. For de Gaulle's statement see Kitzinger, Second Try. pp.179-188. For Rodgers' statement see WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 13th session, 1967, II, pp.87-90.

The Assembly passed a recommendation urging the Six to accept Britain's application and commence negotiations; it did not receive the support of representatives of the French coalition partners, the four Gaullist delegates and two Independent Republicans.[1] When the Strasbourg Assembly met again in September, the French again raised doubts about the British application, echoing the French President's reservations about Britain's relationship with America and the problem of Britain's balance of payments and Sterling's role as a reserve currency.[2] Maurice Edelman, who had reported for the Political Committee in May, again put forward a report and recommendations urging the acceptance of Britain's application and again these were passed, with French amendments defeated.[3] By December, however, the French delegation did not bother to put forward amendments to the latest recommendation supporting British entry. General de Gaulle had made clear his opposition to British entry at his 27 November press conference[4] and all the desperate speeches of Rodgers and other British delegates at Paris made very little difference to the EEC Council of Ministers' official reply to Wilson's overture ten days later.[5]

It should be noted that throughout the twelve months of Labour's attempt to open the EEC door, the Consultative and WEU Assemblies fit into the Government's strategy for entry, though only in a peripheral way. De Freitas' election to the Presidency of the Consultative Assembly had helped Labour to enhance its developing pro-European image; Wilson's speech at Strasbourg had put Labour's Europeanism in more concrete terms. Rodgers' appointment to the

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1. Ibid., p.23.
2. Consultative Assembly, Official Reports, 19th session, 1967-68, pp.370-375.
3. Ibid., pp.368-369, 462-475.
4. See Kitzinger, Second Try, pp. 511-517.
5. See for example the statements of Rodgers, Kirk, Norman St. John Stevas and Duncan Sandys, WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 13th session, 1967, IV, pp.162-65, 190-93, 183-84, 169-70.

delegation enabled him to try to spread Labour's European gospel among parliamentarians of the Six, and - at Strasbourg - among those from EFTA as well. He was not terribly successful; especially as far as the French were concerned. He spoke no French, and found that the French delegates he met had unimpressive political credentials. A specially organised dinner for French and British delegates at the Maison des Tanneurs at Strasbourg proved to be a flop. Apart from this attempt at influencing French delegates, Rodgers seems to have limited himself to making set speeches at the assemblies, and, while attending the WEU meetings at Paris, meeting with officials from the Quai D'Orsay. Apart from Rodgers, Maurice Edelman played an important role as rapporteur for the WEU Political Committee, but that Assembly's role was hardly as important as it had been in 1961, when it made the first official call for British entry into the EEC.[1]

France's obstinate refusal to consider the British application produced an unbridgable chasm in the WEU Assembly: the five and Britain against France. This gap was almost formalised when the leaders of the three political groups, none of which included Gaullists, called a press conference on 6 December to announce their support for British accession to the EEC. In their so-called 'Declaration of Paris', the Liberals, Christian Democrats (who had informal links with the British Conservatives) and the Socialists denounced de Gaulle's conduct at his press conference, and hoped that in spite of French obstruction the EEC Council of Ministers would open negotiations 'forthwith' at its upcoming meeting.[2] Like the British speeches, the Declaration had no positive effect on the meeting. What it did do was to embitter relations between the French and other delegates, and to foreshadow the opposition to France's decision to absent herself from meetings of the WEU Council as long as it seemed that Britain was using the WEU as a 'back door' into the EEC.

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1. Unattributable interview, February 1972.
2. WEU Assembly, Proceedings, 13th session, 1967, IV, pp.122-123. For a Gaullist reaction see the remarks of Michel de Grailly, pp.125-126.

Most delegates at the October 1968 session of the WEU Assembly welcomed the Harmel[1] proposals for obligatory consultation among member states of WEU in the domains of foreign and defence policy, and for technological and monetary co-operation. Max van der Stoel of Holland presented the General Affairs Committee's report, recommendations and resolutions supporting the Harmel initiative, and Samuel Silkin, Lord Gladwyn and Duncan Sandys, on behalf of the three British parties, echoed their approval. But Edmond Nessler, speaking for the Gaullists, called the resolution 'unacceptable' and, together with his colleagues, absented himself during the vote.[2] France subsequently boycotted WEU Council meetings as a protest against implementation of part of the Harmel plan.[3]

It was not until the Hague Summit, when Georges Pompidou was forced[4] to leave the door open for British entry, that Duncan Sandys could announce that the delegates at WEU were meeting in 'an infinitely happier mood' and even Edmond Nessler seemed more conciliatory than ever before, adding, however that France's policy had not changed at all, only the circumstances had.[5] When the Assembly passed yet another recommendation urging the opening of negotiations, it seemed finally to be based on a realistic assessment of the situation, though Nessler's remarks about the 'imprudence' of using the WEU Council to lobby for British entry,[6] indicated that a good deal of mistrust still existed between French parliamentarians and those of the other six member states.

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1. Pierre Harmel, Foreign Minister of Belgium.
2. Ibid., 14th session, 1968, II, pp.105, 30, 141. For van der Stoel's remarks pp.84-85; Gladwyn: 98-100; Silkin: 102-104; Sandys: 106-107. Lord Chalfont, Minister of State at the Foreign Office also welcomed van der Stoel's remarks, ibid., p.94.
3. France registered her protest at the WEU Council meeting of 6 Feb.1969.
4. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, p.36.
5. Western European Union, Proceedings, 15th session, 1969, IV, pp.50-52. (Sandys) and 84-86 (Nessler).
6. Ibid., p.86.

When the Conservatives came to power in June 1970 there was as yet no indication that France and Britain would reach agreement over her entry to the EEC; negotiations had not yet begun. But at the WEU Assembly shortly before the election there was some cause for optimism: France was returning to the Council of Ministers and thus one of the symbols of French opposition to British entry had at last been removed.[1] Delegates to the WEU Assembly, and to that of the Council of Europe, finally came to feel that when they spoke of Britain inside the EEC they were discussing realities and not merely a hypothetical situation.[2]

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The events of 1970-73 are really beyond the scope of this dissertation but it is worthwhile assessing where delegates to Strasbourg and WEU stood when Britain's Parliament finally did vote to enter Europe on 28 October 1971, after sixteen months of intensive negotiation at Brussels and Paris and of equally exhaustive debate in Britain.

All three parliamentary Presidents of the European Movement, which led the non-governmental pro-Market campaign, were former delegates to Strasbourg. While Sir Alec Douglas-Home served at Strasbourg late in his career, Roy Jenkins was a delegate to the Council of Europe at a time when he was making some of his earlier pro-European speeches. There is no indication that he became advocate of EEC entry while he attended meetings of the Consultative Assembly and WEU in 1956, but some of his close associates would not exclude Strasbourg from the many influences that led him to become a leading proponent of British entry to the EEC in 1970-71-72. George Brown has written that attendance at the Assemblies alone did not convert him to Europeanism, but it was an important factor in that conversion.[3]

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1. See the remarks of Vittorio Badini Confalonieri, President of the WEU Assembly, ibid., 16th session, 1970, p.39; see also the Assembly's reply to the Council, ibid., p.20.
2. See the remarks of Donald Chapman and of Bernard Destremau of France, ibid., pp.67-69.
3. George-Brown, In My Way, p.207.

The European Movement's Deputy Chairman was Sir Geoffrey de Freitas: he had been actively involved in Strasbourg's affairs from the first years of his attendance there in 1951. Twenty years later he was a respected European, former President of the Consultative Assembly, and was also serving as chairman of the Labour Committee for Europe.

Two of the Movement's three vice-chairmen were closely associated with Strasbourg: Duncan Sandys had worked for a Council of Europe in 1948 when Gladwyn Jebb opposed it; now as Lord Gladwyn he too had actively advocated Britain's entry in the assembly chambers while serving as a Liberal delegate since 1965. Carol Johnson, an honorary secretary, had been a delegate to Strasbourg from 1962 to 1964.

Of the members of the European Movement's General Purposes Committee, William Rodgers had been a delegate as a member of the Government in the 1967-68 period, Tufton Beamish had been a delegate in the early 'fifties and Joan Vickers had been serving on the delegation since 1968. Norman St. John Stevas had first come to Strasbourg as an independent observer in 1949; he served as a delegate almost twenty years later. Christopher Mayhew came to Strasbourg as a delegate in 1962; six years earlier he had signed John Hynd's motion urging Britain to rejoin the Spaak committee discussions.

The list of former delegates to Strasbourg who were members of the European Movement's executive committee is too long to enumerate in detail here. It included nineteen former delegates (seven Conservative, eleven Labour, one Liberal) of whom nine had served at Strasbourg before 1960 and ten after. From this brief review of the backgrounds of the Movement's officers, one can conclude - and this seems substantiated by the backgrounds of the other delegates on the Movement's Executive, that while membership of the Council of Europe did not necessarily mean that a delegate would become a pro-Marketeer, in the words of a leading pro-Marketeer who had been there, 'it helped'. That 47 of the 141 parliamentary members of the Labour Committee

for Europe, including six of its eight officers, as well as seven of the original eleven members of the Conservative Group for Europe, had all been on the British delegation to the Consultative Assembly, only confirms the pro-Marketeer's observation. So too does the fact that 34 per cent. of the signatories of the Labour Committee for Europe's Guardian advertisement of 11 May 1971[1] had been to Strasbourg while delegates accounted for only 17.1 per cent. of those Labour MPs whose names did not appear on the Guardian list.

Of course, as has also been pointed out throughout this chapter, not all delegates to Strasbourg were pro-Marketeers and some were quite the opposite. Indeed, many anti-Marketeers found further sustenance for their conviction when they came to Strasbourg. One found that European MPs were 'different ... talk poetry ... their parliamentarians' approach to life is different, since their country is run by a bureaucracy'. Another, speaking for a group of committed Labour anti's, recalled that 'we were appalled at prices - in Strasbourg and Paris ... by the high cost of living ... the more MPs see the EEC, the less they like it, especially CAP'.[2]

It is therefore not surprising that fifteen MPs who had served at Strasbourg were among those who signed John Silkin's anti-Market early day motion of 19 January 1971[3] or that Ronald Russell and Ronald Bell should have signed a similar Conservative motion some months before[4] or that nine former delegates should be patrons of the Common Market Safeguards Campaign.[5]

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1. For comment on the Guardian advertisement see Kitzinger, Diplomacy, pp.299-300.
2. Unattributable interviews July 1971, November 1971.
3. Early Day Motion No. 225 (19 January 1971).
4. Early Day Motion No. 52 (23 July 1970).
5. Ronald Bell, Lord Blyton, Ernest Fernyhough, William Molloy, Reginald Paget, Frederick Peart, Geoffrey Rhodes, Sir Ronald Russell, Renee Short.

Without doubt the key indicator of where former delegates to the Consultative and WEU Assemblies stood on the Common Market question was the division list of the Commons vote of 28 October 1971, which accepted in principle Britain's entry into the EEC on the terms the Government had negotiated. To be sure, the three-line Labour Whip and the Conservatives' Whip that was dropped only at the last moment[1] influenced the way many MPs voted. Nevertheless, one can gauge the position of former delegates in terms of the percentage of Labour delegates among Labour rebels compared with their percentage among those who obeyed the Whip and, on the other hand, the percentage of delegates among the Tory rebels compared with that of the Tories voting for entry. It is in these terms that the Strasbourg ingredient in the background of MPs seems to take on some value. The percentage of delegates among the Labour rebels was almost twice as great as among Labour MPs voting 'no' (34.8% - 18.2%). In contrast, the percentage of delegates among Tory rebels was half that of Tories who voted 'aye' (6.9% - 14.1%). These figures take on even greater significance when it is considered that ignoring the Whip is more difficult than obeying it, that most rebellions are never carried to the division lobby.[2]

Pressure for conformity within the Labour party increased as the vote drew near; while almost all former delegates opposing entry were found among the 'nos' on 28 October not every pro-Market ex-delegate found himself in his preferred lobby.[3] Nevertheless, the percentages of those who actually did rebel seem once again to confirm at least the modest conclusion that too many active pro-Marketeers had been to Strasbourg for it not to have made any difference at all to their attitudes on the EEC issue. Unlike the

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1. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, pp.186-188.
2. See Finer, et al., Backbench Opinion, pp.3-4, 7-9; Gilmour, Body Politic, p.268-288.
3. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, pp.316-318. Among those voting against their inclinations were Shirley Summerskill and Sir Arthur Irvine.

North Atlantic Assembly, which touched only superficially on the question of Britain and the EEC, and which therefore could not have made any lasting difference to delegates one way or the other, the Consultative Assembly, with its twenty-odd year advocacy of closer British ties to Europe, and WEU, which parallelled and often surpassed the efforts of its sister assembly, cannot be overlooked in the story of how Britain joined the EEC. The Assemblies must be taken into account not only for the recommendations which they passed at certain crucial times, but also for the contribution, however small, that they made to the pro-Market inclinations of many MPs on both sides of the House of Commons.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

During the years 1951 to 1960, few British delegates to the assemblies of the Council of Europe and WEU took those bodies very seriously. Their attitude was not unique in British parliamentary circles; it was shared by the party leaders and Whips who appointed the delegations, and indeed had been influenced by their views. Delegates' tenures at Strasbourg were usually very brief and undistinguished; few attained important office in the major assembly committees. Fewer still publicised their - or any - assembly activities when they returned to Britain: assembly recommendations and resolutions were aired at most infrequently at Westminster or in the delegates' local constituencies, and often not at all. However, parallel with the attempts of successive British governments in the 1960's to secure entry into the EEC, there developed among British parliamentarians a new interest in the affairs of the European parliamentary assemblies which contrasted sharply with the apathy that had marked their attitude to those institutions during the previous decade. During the 1960's, the desire to impress continental politicians with the 'sincerity' of Britain's new Europeanism led the party Whips to choose many of their assembly delegates on the basis of their known pro-Market orientations and to encourage all British delegates to play a greater part in assembly activities. Because leaders in both parties seemed to feel that the possession of important committee and assembly posts was likely to have a favourable impact upon the attitudes of continental delegates, both Conservative and Labour delegations sought to obtain for their own members as many of these posts as was possible. Both delegations also became more actively involved in the work of the assembly party groups, which often held the block votes that were the key to electoral success at the assemblies. They came to compete bitterly, and at times publicly, for these offices, thereby violating the assemblies' unwritten code of preserving the utmost discretion when dealing with these matters. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, both the Conservative and the Labour Governments attempted

for the first time to use the assemblies in a different dimension: as a medium for opening new channels of communication with the governments of the Six.

It is clear that the evolution of Government attitudes to European integration from the caution and even skepticism of the 'fifties to the enthusiasm of the 'sixties directly influenced the pattern of British parliamentary participation in assembly affairs. Yet it may nevertheless be asked whether the change of British policy toward Europe was the only cause of the new British interest in the assemblies. Could that interest also have resulted in part from a fundamental revision of the view British parliamentarians had of the function of international assemblies generally? The record of British responses to attempts to add to the institutional capability and influence of the Consultative Assembly, as well as the contrast between the record of British activity at the NPC/NAA since 1955 with that which obtained at the European assemblies, reveals that in fact British views of the functions of international assemblies underwent only marginal modification after 1960. The nature of this modification can perhaps best be appreciated if the behaviour and activities of delegates are assessed in relation to the different functional categories attributable to the assemblies - legislative, consultative, promotional (with its sub-category, parliamentary-diplomatic) and educative - which have been considered in this study.[1]

During the 1950's, the function that the assemblies seemed to fulfill best of all, at least from the British point of view, was the educative one. Plans for creating a legislative chamber out of the Consultative Assembly came to nothing, in part because Britain's Labour delegates, following the lead of her Government, as well as her Conservative delegates, in line with the view of their own leaders, both strongly opposed them. Similarly, the consultative function, while formally ascribed to both the Consultative and

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1. See the introductory section to this study, pp.13-15 for a discussion and definition of these functions.

WEU Assemblies, in practice came to mean very little as the inter-governmental bodies they were meant to advise, the Committee of Ministers and the WEU Council, rarely took notice of their recommendations. Though on several occasions[1] plans were put forward for a Council of Europe - OEEC merger by means of which it was hoped that the Assembly could reassert in meaningful terms the 'consultative powers' which it commanded in theory alone, most British delegates displayed little enthusiasm for the idea and none actively advocated any alternate proposal for enhancing the Assembly's status and influence. Indeed, although they knew that in reality 'consultative powers' was an empty phrase, British MPs were reluctant to work actively even for the mere granting of such status to the NPC, which had come into existence as an 'unofficial' assembly.

The 'promotional function' of the assemblies likewise was a concept that in the 'fifties existed more in theory than in practice, at least insofar as British delegates were concerned. The Consultative Assembly was designed to promote the European idea as well as to publicise the work of the Council of Europe,[2] and the NPC was meant to gain attention for NATO's activities and to foster 'Atlantic co-operation,'[3] yet British MPs who attended assembly sessions hardly took notice of their deliberations in them once they returned to Britain. A few debates in the Commons and some mention in the local press or a number of election addresses was all the publicity that delegates accorded to the Council of Europe. The WEU Assembly and the NPC merited even less notice. If British MPs did feel that the assemblies had a promotional function, they certainly did nothing to show that it had any chance of fulfillment.

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1. These attempts were made in 1950 (as part of the Mackay Protocol), 1952, 1953 and 1957: for British attitudes see above, pp. 68-73, 80-81 & 118-125 passim.
2. See Robertson, Council of Europe, p.45.
3. See Hovey, Superparliaments, pp.41-43.

With respect to that other aspect of the promotional function, the promotion by delegates of initiatives and policies at the assemblies - termed parliamentary diplomacy - insofar as Britain was concerned, it too was virtually non-existent. To be sure, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe had been closely associated with the formulation of the 1950 Human Rights Convention, a document which formed the basis for one of the best known programmes of the Council of Europe, the attempt to preserve individual rights by means of submitting governments to the jurisdiction of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. However, even Maxwell-Fyfe's initiative was not addressed to the directly 'political' realm - in the sense employed in Chapter 7 - in which parliamentary diplomacy, if it was to be at all meaningful, must necessarily function.[1] In any event, certainly after 1951 no British delegate was seen to promote any major political programme of his own comparable to the van der Goes plan for the settlement of the Saar dispute. Similarly, there is no record of any unofficial overtures to other states that British delegates made on behalf of their government prior to 1960.[2] Only in the more general sense of continuing to serve as members of an international organisation which produced formal conclusions after debate (in which national or party views often were formally expressed) could British delegates be said to have been engaged in parliamentary diplomacy. But, to reiterate the point made in the introduction to this study, parliamentary diplomacy of this sort is often ineffective and almost meaningless, as the record of practical accomplishments even of the Consultative Assembly makes all too clear.

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1. See above, Chapter 7, especially pp.271-273, 275, 279-280, and 294. Ernst Haas has argued that the Council of Europe's work in the field of human rights, unlike most of its other endeavours, involves 'a new supranational political process which can generate new expectations and policies.('International Integration', p.13). While this view of the 'political' nature of the Council's work in the area of human rights does not affect the force of the central argument outlined above, it may in any event need some qualification, see above, pp. 70-71, 279-280.

2. Lindsay refers to U.W.Kitzinger's The Economics of the Saar Question, 2nd ed. (Oxford, mimeographed, 1958), for a discussion of 'parliamentary diplomacy'. Kitzinger does not specifically discuss the subject and in any event makes no direct reference to the 'diplomatic' efforts of British delegates to the Consultative Assembly.

All that was left, therefore, of the assemblies' possible functions was, in the British view, the educative one. The Whips pointed to the value of the assemblies as places where MPs could learn about European or Atlantic affairs, could meet with fellow legislators and could specialise in certain fields of interest that were far removed from their local concerns in the Commons.[1] An NPC or WEU - sponsored trip to military bases, with briefings by the military command, or confidential assembly committee meetings with foreign ministers and officials, were experiences that were not the usual fare for the MP at Westminster. This view of the Whips was, of course, a reflection of party leadership attitudes to the assemblies. As early as 1952 the Labour delegation leader had spoken of the Consultative Assembly's value as an education for MPs and the following year the Conservative delegation leader and Government Minister, Lord John Hope, had uttered similar sentiments. That the Government maintained this view was also clear from its advocacy of the 1957 Grand Design. This plan for the amalgamation of the Consultative Assembly with the more recently created WEU Assembly and NPC was predicated upon the assumption that all three bodies performed a similar educative function in addressing themselves to overlapping areas of competence. To be sure, WEU had sought to assert its formal 'consultative' status in a meaningful way, but its efforts had produced few results in practical terms. The NPC, for its part, had been granted no official status, so that its hopes for performing anything other than an 'educative' role were confined to the realms of the distant future. From the British Government's point of view the Grand Design made good sense, and British delegates, in supporting that Design, made it clear that they too shared the Government's assumptions.[2]

It must, however, be noted that the manner in which Government leaders, and particularly party Whips, chose delegates for service at the assemblies

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1. See above, Chapter 3, pp. 144-145, 173.

2. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 117-125.

somewhat belied their remarks about the usefulness of those bodies. On the Labour side in particular, there was a notable shortage of MPs from working-class backgrounds serving on delegations to the Consultative, WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies, despite the fact that it was this very class of politician whose prior exposure to European or Atlantic affairs was likely to have been extremely limited. Furthermore, had the party leaderships seriously appreciated the educative value of the assemblies, they would have ensured that MPs with good ministerial prospects should attend assembly sessions so as to add to their understanding of European and international affairs. Yet younger MPs hardly predominated on either party delegation at any time while older, long-serving members often were appointed as delegates. One is left to conclude that at least to some extent, reference to the 'educative' function was merely a cover to account for the absence of so many MPs from Westminster each year - on expense account no less - to attend assembly sessions. The need to reward some MPs with paid holidays, to be free of party rebels for a while, possibly even to provide bored Members with something to do, all were factors that together weighed virtually as much in the choice of delegates as did the recognition of the need to exploit the assemblies' educative role.

Indeed, even if one were to accept at face value the Whips' evaluation of the assemblies' educative role, it is clear that by limiting the importance of the assemblies to that function alone, British party leaders relegated them to one of the lowest rungs of political influences bearing upon national policy and international relations. They were seen as mere talking shops, hardly to be taken seriously, and not surprisingly, in some eyes, were a rather expensive waste of time.

There is no indication that the attitudes of most delegates differed from those of their leaders on this question. They echoed their leaders' statements about the 'educative' value of the assemblies, but in practical terms few assumed positions of leadership on assembly committees and equally

few followed up assembly activities with related action in Westminster or in their constituencies. Even if they were ready to view the assemblies as fulfilling an 'educative' function, British delegates were no more willing to take the work of those bodies seriously than were their party leaders and Whips.

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British parliamentary perceptions of the legislative and consultative functions of the assemblies remained substantially unaltered during the 1960's. British parliamentarians were no more inclined to favour the granting of legislative powers to such assemblies than they previously had been. With respect to the lesser, consultative functions of the assemblies, their responses were likewise a throw-back to their negative attitudes of the 'fifties. The plan to 'institutionalise' the NPC, by creating an Atlantic Consultative Assembly, found little support among most British parliamentarians and none at all among the party leaderships. Similarly, the plan to 'reactivate' the Council of Europe, which included a project for revitalising the Consultative Assembly, fell on deaf British ears and could not even command the interest of delegates who were actively involved in other aspects of assembly affairs. In any event, the overall concept of 'consultative power' was very much a vague one. Could one describe as a 'power' the ability to pass recommendations to an executive body which, even if it took notice of them, was itself in many cases powerless to initiate action upon them? The WEU Council, the Committee of Ministers, even the North Atlantic Council were not to be confused with the EEC Commission. The latter could at least formulate proposals, the former bodies depended on the unanimous agreement of all their members for any action to be taken. The continued and unstinting opposition of one member state was enough to vitiate any recommendation regardless of the number of times it was placed on the table for consideration. On the other hand, if a proposal was framed in terms that were not objectionable to member governments, it was likely to be accepted whether or not the assembly that put it forward was officially

'consultative'.[1] What became clear in the 1960's, particularly from the case of the NPC/NAA, was that in effect 'consultative' status meant little more than that the Assembly would be guaranteed a steady annual income. There was little likelihood that the NPC's delegates would be given access to confidential NATO information even if the Conference became 'official'; as was seen in Chapter 5, even supporters of the plan for consultative status admitted as much. Therefore, if 'consultative status' came to be defined simply in terms of a secure budget, there was no need for parliamentarians to press for such status since the NPC/NAA was receiving funds in any event. If, however, 'consultative status' meant obligatory consultation with an executive body, then in the context of all assemblies except the European Parliamentary Assembly, the term was meaningless, since it was only in the latter case that the Assembly's recommendations were in a true position to influence the nature of policies that were already being framed by an executive body (the Commission). Clearly, British parliamentary indifference to the assemblies' quest for 'true' 'consultative' status was not without at least some justification.

The strictly promotional function of the assemblies also seems to have commanded as little interest from MPs in the 'sixties as it did during the previous decade. To be sure, the assemblies received somewhat more publicity from British delegates than previously, particularly in election addresses. Furthermore, far more questions on Consultative Assembly affairs in particular were asked in the Commons in the 'sixties than had been the case from 1949-59. However, taking the latter case first, questions in the

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1. For example, a 1957 NPC report by Senator Henry Jackson of Washington on the need to increase the number of trained scientific personnel in NATO led to the establishment of the NATO Science Committee. The NPC's reports were not usually as effective, but as this case makes clear, the fact that the NPC was not 'official' did not in itself prevent its recommendations from eliciting action from the North Atlantic Council. (See NPC, Resolutions and Reports,1957, pp.51-66 (for Jackson's report) and NATO Parliamentarians' Conference; 1955-1959, p.39).

Commons were hardly the most efficient way of selling the 'European ideal' or the work of the Council of Europe to the public at large. Nor is it likely that MPs intended that their questions should serve such purposes. The Consultative and WEU Assemblies, through their Committees on Parliamentary and Public Relations, seemed to set great store by the number of questions that were tabled in national parliaments. Since British MPs were trying to impress their continental colleagues with their European zeal (and probably were taking greater interest in European affairs anyway), questions in the Commons were a handy device by means of which they could prove their point. Publicity for home consumption was, however, a different matter. Publicity was, of course, the motive for MPs mentioning the assemblies in the local press or in election addresses. It is arguable, however, that the anticipated publicity was intended for the MP himself rather than for the assembly he served. As was seen in Chapter 4 many delegates simply did not bother to inform their constituents of their membership of a British delegation to a parliamentary assembly. Others quite deliberately thought it wiser not to publicise their assembly activities at all so as to avoid charges of absenteeism and the attendant wrath of the constituency party executive. The fear of such charges led three MPs to contemplate court proceedings against the Sunday Telegraph; the reality of their consequences was suffered by Ian Lloyd. For many of those MPs who did more than briefly publicise their assembly activities in their election addresses, it would seem that on the one hand they hoped to win voter admiration for their 'prominence' at these international conclaves, and on the other, they wished to justify their frequent absences abroad to potentially volatile party activists within their constituency. In general, neither election addresses nor reports of the Member's speeches at an assembly that appeared in the local press told very much about the nature of that assembly's activities, except insofar as those activities formed the content of the speeches themselves. However, viewed from the perspective of the MP who wished to defend his absences or win additional voter support (the latter

is indeed very unlikely in any event[1]) these references to the assemblies adequately served his purpose. Growing British preoccupation with European issues during the 'sixties made it likely that more people would appreciate their MP's membership of an assembly which devoted most, if not all, of its attention to precisely those issues. It is clear, therefore, that whereas British MPs did provide the assemblies with greater publicity during the 'sixties, they did not by any means help the assemblies to fulfill a promotional function. If an MP promoted anything at all within his constituency in relation to his service at the assemblies, it was his own political fortunes and nothing more.

Some modification of the British attitude toward the diplomatic-or parliamentary—diplomatic -aspect of the promotional possibilities afforded by the assemblies does seem to have taken place after 1960. To be sure, there again was no evidence of members promoting major initiatives of their own, comparable to the van der Goes plan; indeed, if one turns back to Table P of Chapter 7, one finds that after 1960 British delegates could not be directly associated even with those minor initiatives of the Assembly that the Committee of Ministers did implement. However, as the efforts of Peter Kirk and William Rodgers in particular manifestly indicate, both the Conservative and then the Labour Government came to appreciate the usefulness of the European assemblies as possible scenes of unofficial 'diplomatic' approaches by British delegates to representatives of other governments, notably those of the Six, on behalf of the British Government. Nevertheless, the lesson of Kirk's experiences in 1961-63 as well as of Rodgers' disappointment in 1967 was that the assemblies could only facilitate such diplomatic efforts to a limited extent. Kirk's contribution ultimately met with failure - all the recommendations of the Consultative and WEU

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1. Richards, Backbenchers, p.160.

Assemblies could not prevent the crisis of the 1962 Brussels negotiations or the French veto of the following January. It should also be recalled that even Kirk's successful approaches to the Six in 1961 (when he tested the ground for a possible British approach for entry to the EEC) were far from the only unofficial channels of communication existing between London and the EEC capitals at that time. The Rodgers non-approach of 1967 only underlined the difficulty of obtaining better results within the context of the assemblies than had already been achieved elsewhere. By the decade's end 'parliamentary diplomacy', tried and tested as it had been, was accepted by British delegates as a possible course of action which their membership of the assemblies afforded them, though one that was unlikely to prove fruitful except in the most propitious circumstances, and one which they hardly considered to be a primary focus of assembly activity.

There remains once again the educative function. The assemblies clearly were a useful source of information for British parliamentarians who particularly welcomed the numerous committee reports, as well as the confidential briefings and the military tours available to them. MPs and Peers were able to develop an expertise in particular aspects of European or Atlantic affairs that allowed them to participate fully in the assemblies' formulation of special projects for international co-operation. The assemblies also enabled British parliamentarians to familiarise themselves with continental and/or North American points of view which often were expressed with surprising frankness during plenary debates. Finally, and indeed significantly, there is some evidence that MPs' views on European affairs were to some extent influenced by their experience at the assemblies: that at least is a conclusion to be drawn from the existence of a large proportion of former and sitting delegates to the Consultative and WEU Assemblies among those MPs actively working and voting for British entry into the EEC, whether or not their party leaders shared their views. As was pointed out at the end of the previous chapter, one cannot presume to

draw a direct correlation between membership at these assemblies and voting behaviour on the crucial evening of 22 October 1971. However, as was likewise noted above, the correlation between membership at the Consultative and WEU Assemblies and defiance of the party whip is greater among pro-Market rebels than among anti-Market rebels to such a decisive extent that one must include attendance at these assemblies as at least an element - even if it is of indeterminate magnitude - of the various influences that fashioned the pro-entry attitudes of numerous British MPs.

It must, of course, be recognised that the party Whips certainly did not expect the assemblies to influence the behaviour of delegates to so great an extent that they would be ready to defy an anti-Market party line. Whatever the actual measure of this influence, however small it may have been, it still had not been anticipated either by the Whips of the 'sixties, who indeed sent pro-Marketeers to Strasbourg and Paris, or by the Whips of the 'fifties, whose behaviour indicated that they took the assemblies less than seriously. If by their reference to the 'education' which the assemblies offered, the Whips meant the influence which these bodies wielded, it was only in terms of influence of a kind that the Whips subjectively considered positive. In general however, their behaviour in the 'sixties, when they chose delegates who were already committed to entry, indicates that such 'positive' influence also was not what was sought from these bodies. On the other hand, it cannot be said that, in line with their more restricted interpretation of 'educational' in terms of information-giving, the Whips chose their delegates solely or even primarily with a view to having their understanding and knowledge of European affairs expanded by means of their membership of an assembly. This is not to say that either party leaders, or Whips, or delegates themselves were totally blind to the useful 'educational' role that the assemblies performed. However, it was not in terms of that function alone that the importance of the assemblies was to be measured: if delegates were encouraged to take an active part in assembly affairs, the value of these institutions clearly was being assessed in more than 'educative' terms.

The true value of the assemblies in British eyes lay in a combination of both their educative and parliamentary-diplomatic possibilities in a way that had not yet been envisaged at the end of the 'fifties, when they were considered to be 'mainly places where individual members can acquire some knowledge of the attitudes of their fellow parliamentarians in other countries'.[1] The behaviour of British delegates during the 'sixties reveals that they came to view the European assemblies not only as centres for the acquisition of knowledge but more importantly as showpieces for demonstrating to others the 'sincerity' of British Europeanism and British willingness to work in a 'community spirit' within the EEC. It was certainly in these terms that the Consultative and WEU Assemblies proved to be most useful to British policy makers. The increased British activity in assembly affairs generally, the struggle for committee and assembly posts, the unofficial quasi-diplomatic overtures to leaders of the Six, the delegates' appeals to continentals on the floor of the assembly chambers - all were aspects of Britain's efforts to win greater support for her entry into the EEC.

The observation that British parliamentarians accorded some utility to the assemblies during the 1960's should not be taken to imply that the assemblies came to exert any influence or effect on the nature and workings of the British political system. Since their creation, these bodies had been limited in their effectiveness by their ultimate dependence on governments for the implementation of their recommendations and by the inability of delegates speaking and voting in the assembly chamber to commit anyone other than themselves to a specific course of action embodied in a recommendation. The refusal of British delegates to entertain any thought of alloting legislative and even true consultative functions to the assemblies helped to ensure that their effect on the workings of individual political systems, and certainly on the British system, would be at the best minimal. The change in British attitudes to the assemblies during the 1960's led to the employment

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1. Beloff, New Dimensions, p.85.

of these assemblies by a key element in the system (the Government) as tools to further a specific aim which the system had generated rather than to their development as influences upon the system itself.

With Britain's successful accession to the European Community in 1973 it was clear that the value of the Consultative and WEU Assemblies even as tools for the furtherance of specific British governmental policies would sharply diminish. Britain now also sent representatives to the European Parliament, which not only could serve as a platform for making British views known to European parliamentarians, but also, by virtue of the Treaty of Rome and subsequent Community directives and agreements, seemed likely to play a legislative role within the EEC. The Parliament already had consultative functions which, however diluted they were in practice, nevertheless were exercised in a more meaningful way than those of the Consultative and WEU Assemblies because of the Parliament's working relationship with the EEC Commission. Therefore, although the non-EEC European assemblies were to continue to deliberate upon European affairs, and the Consultative Assembly in particular would focus on the relations of European non-EEC member states with those of the EEC,[1] the overall impact of those deliberations was likely to be even more marginal than it previously had been. It followed, almost as a necessary consequence of this new state of affairs, that as long as the European Parliament was not directly elected and the British delegation continued to be chosen by party Whips primarily from among the ranks of the Commons, Britain's MPs would prefer to attend the Parliament's sessions rather than those of the other assemblies (it was unlikely that they would find the time to attend all three, for members had long ago noted the difficulties involved in serving only at the Consultative and WEU

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1. For example, the Anglo-Icelandic fisheries dispute of 1972-73.

Assemblies).[1]

The fate of the North Atlantic Assembly was, however, an entirely different matter. The NAA, which focussed on the whole range of Atlantic affairs, and devoted but a part of its brief annual sessions to British-EEC relations, had not attracted the attention of British party leaders and Whips during the 1960's. They had not especially encouraged British delegates to the NAA to take a great interest in its activities, and few delegates had done so. However, it was precisely because its terms of reference extended beyond European affairs that the NAA could not be said to have been eclipsed by the enlarged European Parliament. Indeed, Britain's entry into the EEC was likely to enhance the NAA's usefulness to Britain as a forum for easing the tensions between her European and American allies. Because American legislators were in a strong position to influence their country's trade policies, and because the EEC appeared to them as a commercial rival, it was important that they be made aware of Europe's intentions and point of view. Britain's legislators, with their traditionally close relations with their American counterparts at the NAA, were likely to view themselves in a position to help ease European-American irritants through unofficial consultations facilitated by that Assembly. The situation was perhaps unlikely to arise whereby delegates to the NAA would speak privately to foreign ministers on behalf of the British Government under the cloak of assembly activities in the way that Peter Kirk had done at Strasbourg in the early 1960's. However, on a less exalted scale, contacts and influence, and mutual education, could yet prove worthwhile.

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1. Lindsay, Assemblies, pp.45-46, see also above, Chapter 2, p.123. At the time of writing none of the European Community countries had as yet held direct elections to the Parliament. Several plans for the election of British representatives had been put forward, including those by Michael Stewart ('Electing the Community Parliament', New Europe, I (May 1972), 9-11) and Lord Kennet ('Making Two Parliaments Work', New Statesman LXXXV (27 April 1973), 576-578), both of whom had served as Labour delegates to the Council of Europe and WEU. Although by early 1974 Labour had as yet sent no representatives to the Parliament, it was impossible to foretell whether the party's boycott would be of a long-term nature.

The NAA probably would continue to hanker for recognition as a 'consultative' assembly; however, it was unlikely that most British parliamentarians would attach any importance to that development if it ever took place. It was as special meeting places for politicians, not as consultative bodies, that the European assemblies had been of greatest use to Britain in the 'sixties and had served to influence - at least to some extent - the subsequent behaviour of many of her delegates in deciding that she join the European Community. It was therefore also as a meeting place that the NAA seemed potentially most useful to Britain, as some of those meetings could at some time take on a special significance for her, as well as for Europe and North America. As for the Consultative and WEU Assemblies, the likelihood of their serving as a primary focal-point for British-European contacts was minimal. Their hour for Britain came when she applied for entry to the EEC, and was over when that application was finally successful.

Appendix I.

Notes on British Delegates to the Assemblies Whose Names Appear in this Study.

ALBU, b. 21.9.03. - Lab. (Edmonton, 1948-); MS eco aff, (1965-67); CA/WEU (1960-61), NPC (1964)

ALLEN, S.S. b. 3.1. 1898. - Lab. (Crewe, Ches (1945-); CA/WEU (1959, 60); R. CA Leg. Com (1959,60), V Ch (1960)

AMERY, Rt Hon H.J. b. 27. - C. (Preston N (1950-66; Brighton Pavilion, 1969-); JM War Off (1957-58), Colonial Off (1958-60); SS Air (1960-62); M Aviation (1962-64), Public Building and Works (1970-72), MS Foreign Off (1972) CA (1950-53, 1956); R GA Com (1952).

BACON, Rt Hon A.M. (now Lady Bacon) b. Sept, 1911 - Lab. (Leeds, NE (1945-55), Leeds SE (1955-70); MS Home Off (1964-67), Ed and Science (1967-70); CA (1949-53).

BELL, R.M. b. 14.4.14. - C. (Newport, Mon (1945-50), S Bucks (1950-); CA/WEU (1953-54, 1962-65), R. WEU Proc. Com (1963).

BIRKENHEAD, Earl of - C. CA (1949-51).

BLENKINSOP, A. b. 30.6.11. - Lab. (Newcastle Upon Tyne E (1949-59), South Shields (1964-); JM Pensions (1946-49); Health (1949-51); CA/WEU (1966-70); Ch. CA Soc. Com (1968), R. (1968-69); R. CA Cul. Com (1968).

Table of Abbreviations.

C- Conservative
L- Liberal
Lab- Labour
JM- Junior Minister
MS- Minister of State
M- Minister
SS- Secretary of State
CA- Consultative Assembly
P- President
VP- Vice-President
T- Treasurer
Ch- Committee Chairman
VCh- Vice-Chairman
R- Rapporteur
Com- Committee
S- Spokesman

GA- General Affairs
Pol- Political Affairs
Eco- Economic Affairs
Cul- Cultural
Leg- Legal (and Administrative)
Pop- Population and Refugees
Ag- Agriculture
Soc- Social
Loc- Local Authorities
Mun- Municipal and Regional Affairs
Proc· Rules of Procedure & Priveleges
Sci- Science and Technology
UnRepN- Non-Represented Nations
Bud- Budget
Mil- Military
Def- Defence

BLYTON, W R.(now Baron Blyton)b. 2.5.I899. - Lab. (Houghton-Le-Spring, I945-64); CA (I950-5I).

BOOTHBY, R. G.G.(now Baron Boothby)b. I900. - C. (E. Aberdeenshire, I927-58); JM, Food (I940-4I); CA/WEU (I949-57), Vch CA.Eco.Com (I952-56).

BOTTOMLEY, Rt Hon A.G. b. 7.2.07. - Lab. (Chatham, I945-50; Rochester and Chatham, I950-59; Middlesborough E, I962); JM, Commonwealth Office (I946-47) Bd of Trade (I947-5I); SS Commonwealth Of (I964-66); M. Overseas Development (I966-67); CA (I952-54); R. Ref Com (I953), Eco. Com (I954).

BROOMAN-WHITE R.C. b. I6.2.I2. - C. (Rutherglen, Lanarks I95I-64); Govt Whip (I957-60); CA/WEU I953-54, I957-58, R. UnRepN Com (I954).

BROWN Rt Hon G.A. (now Baron George-Brown) b. 2.9.I4. - Lab (Belper, Derby S, I945-70); JM, Ag and Fisheries (I947-5I), M. Works (I95I); First SS and SS Eco Affairs (I967-66), SS For Aff (I966-68); Dep Leader Lab Party (I960-70); CA/WEU (I95I-53, I960-63); R.CA Eco, Com (I953) Vch WEU Def Com (I96I-64); VP WEU As'ly (I962-64).

BROWN R.W. b. 7.9.2I. - Lab. (Shoreditch and Finsbury, I964 -); Govt Whip (I966-67); CA/WEU (I965-66); NPC (I965-66) R WEU Space Com (I965) V ch (I966-67); R CA ScTech.Com(I967).

CALLAGHAN, Rt Hon L.J. b. 27.3.I2. - Lab (Cardiff S, I945-50, Cardiff S.E. I950); JM Transport (I947-50), Admiralty (I950-5I); Chanc Exchcq (I967-67); SS Home Off (I967-73) CA (I949-50, I954).

CHAPMAN, W.D. b. 25.II.25. - Lab (Northfield, Birmingham, I95I-70); CA/WEU (I967-70) R.CA ECo Com (I968-70) R. WEU Sci Com (I969).

CHESHAM, Baron. b. I8.6.I6. - C. JM, Transport (I959-64) CA/WEU (I954-56).

CHURCHILL Rt Hon, Sir W.L.S.
b. 30.II.I874.
- C. (Oldham, I900-06, Manchester NW I906-08 (as L); Dundee I908-22; Epping, Essex (I927-45); Woodford (I945-64); JM Colonial Office (I906-08), Pres Bd of Trade (I908-I0), SS Home Off (I9I0-II-, First Ld Admiralty (I9II-I5), Chan Duchy Lancaster (I9I5), M. Munitions (I9I7), SS War and Air (I9I9-2I), Air and Colonies (I92I-22), Chan Exchcq (I9[illegible]-2[illegible] First Ld Admiralty (I939-40), PM, M. Def (I940-45, I95I-52), PM (I952-55); CA (I949-5I).

CLARK, H.M.
b. II.4.29.
- Ulster Un (Antrim N. I959-70); CA/WEU (I962-65) R. CA Ag Com (I963-64).

COCKS, F.S.
b. 25.I0.I882.
- Lab. (Broxtowe, Notts. I929-53); CA (I949-50).

COLEMAN, D.R.
b. I9.9.25.
- Lab. (Neath, I964-); CA/WEU (I968-

CRATHORNE, Rt Hon Baron (Sir Thomas Dugdale)
b. 20.7.I897.
- C. (Richmond, Yorks, I929-59); Govt Whip (I937-40), Dep Chief Whip, (I94I-42), M. Ag and Fisheries (I95I-54); CA/WEU (I958-65); NPC (I958-70); R. CA Ag Com (I958) VP CA (I962-67), VP WEU Ass'bly (I96I), P. NPC (I962-63).

CRAWLEY, A.M.
b. I0.4.08.
- Lab. (Buckingham, I945-5I, as C Derby S.W. I962-67). CA (I949).

CROSSLAND, Rt Hon C.A.R.
b. 29.8.I8.
- Lab. (S Glos, I950-55, Grimsby, I959-MS Eco, Aff (I964-65); SS Ed and Sci (I965-67); Pres Bd of Trade (I967-69); SS Local Govt, Regional Planning (I969-70); CA (I950-5I).

CROSSMAN, Rt Hon R.H.S.
b. I5.I2.07.
- Lab. (Coventry E, I945-); M. Housing and Local Govt (I964-66), Leader HC, Lord Pres Council (I966-68), SS Social Services (I968-70); CA (I953).

CULLEN, Mrs. A.
b. I892.
- Lab. (Gorbals, Glasgow, I948-69); CA (I958-59).

CUNNINGHAM, Sir, S.K.
b. 3.4.09.
- Ulster Un. (South Antrim, I955-70), CA/WEU (I956-59).

DALTON, Rt Hon. H.
b. I887.
- Lab. (Camberwell, Peckham, I927-29; Bishop Auckland, I929-3I, I935-59); JM For Off, (I929-3I); M. Eco Warfare (I940-42); Pres Bd of Trade (I942-45); Chance of Exchcq (I945-47); Chanc of Duchy of Lancaster (i948-50); M. Town and Country Planning (I950-5I), of Local Govt and Planning (I95I); CA (I949-50).

DARLING, Rt Hon. G
b. I905.
- Lab. (Hillsborough, Sheffield (I950-) MS Bd of Trade (I967-68); CA/WEU (I95I-53, I970-); VP CA (I970).

DAVIES, Rt Hon. C
- Lib. (Montgomeryshire I929-64); Leader Liberal Party (I945-56), NPC (I955-59, I962).

de FREITAS, Rt Hon, Sir G.S.
b. 7.4.I3.
- Lab. (Central Nottingham, I945-50; Lincoln (I950-6I); Kettering, I964-); JM: Air (I946-50), Home Off (I950-5I); High Commissioner: Ghana (I96I-63); Kenya (I963-64); CA/WEU (I95I-54, I965-70); NPC/NAA (I959-60, I962, I966-); R: CA Leg Com (I95I, I953-54); Pol Com (I969-70); VP CA (I965), P. CA (I966-69); and NPC (I957-59); R. Pol Com NPC/NAA (I956-57, I969).

DELARGY, H.J.
b. I908.
- Lab. (Thurrock, Essex I950-); Opp Whip (I95I-52); CA/WEU (I959); NPC (I966) R. CA Cul Com (I959).

DIGBY, S.W.
b. 2.I9I0
- C. (West Dorset, I94I-); Civ Ld Admiralty (I95I-57); CA/WEU (I967-70) R. WEU Def Com (I968).

DODDS-PARKER, Sir A.D.
b. 5.7.09.
- C. (Banbury, Oxford, I945-59, Cheltenham, I964-); JM. For Aff (I953-57, I955, 57), Commonwealth Relations (I954-55); CA/WEU (I954, I965-68, I970) NPC (I968- R WEU Def Com (I968).

DOUGLAS-HOME, Rt Hon Sir A.F.
b. 2.7.03.
- C. (S Lanark, I93I-45; Lanark, I950-5I; Kinross and W Perths, I963-); JM For Off (I945), MS Scottish Off (I95I-55); SS Commonwealth Relations (I955-60), Leader H. Lords, Ld Pres Council (I957-60); SS For Aff (I960-63); PM (I963-64); Ldr Opp (I964-65); SS For and Commonwealth Aff (I970-); CA/WEU (I966-69); VP WEU Ass'ly (I966).

DUDLEY-WILLIAMS, Sir M.D.
b. I7.6.06.
- C. (Exeter, I95I-66); NPC (I959-6I).

ECCLES, Rt Hon Sir D (now Viscount Eccles) b. I8.9.04. - C. (Chippenham, Wilts, I943-62); M Works (I95I-54); Ed (I954-57); Pres Bd of Trade (I957-59); M. Ed (I959-62); M Arts (I970-); CA (I949-50). R. Eco Com (I949-50).

EDELMAN, M. b. 2.3.II. - Lab. (Coventry W, I945-50; Coventry N, I950-); CA/WEU (I949-50, I965-69); R.CA Pol Com (I965-69), R. WEU GA Com (I965, I967, I969).

EDEN, Sir J. b. I5.9.25. - C. (Bournemouth W, I954-); MS Technology (I970-72) CA/WEU (I960-62); NPC (I963-64) R.CA Cul Com (I96I).

EDWARDS, Rt Hon. L.J. b. 27.5.04. - Lab. (Blackburn I945-50; Brighouse and Spenborough (I950-59); JM: Bd of Trade (I949-50), Treasury (I950-5I); CA/WEU (I955-59); P Socialist Gp (I956-59) VP CA (I957-59) P.CA (I959); R.CA Eco Com (I955), Proc Com (I957) Ch and R WEU Bud Com (I956-59).

EDWARDS, R. b. I906. - Lab. (Bilston, I955) CA/WEU (I965-69) NPC/NAA (I966-69); S. CA Loc Auth Com (I969), R. CA Pol Com (I967) R. WEU Def Com (I965), V Ch and R. (I966), Chm and R. (I967-68), Chm (I969) VP CA (I969).

ELLIOT of HARWOOD, Baroness. b. I5.I.03. - C. NPC/NAA (I959-) Chm Cul (I96I-63).

ELLIOT, Rt Hon. W. b. I888. - C. (Lanark I9I8-23; Kelvingrove, Glasgow I927-45, I950-58; Scottish Universities, I946-50); JM: Scottish Office (I923-27, I924-26, I926-29), Treasury (I93I-32); M Ag and Fisheries (I932-36); SS Scotland (I936-38); M. Health (I938-40); Dir PR War Off. (I94I-42); CA/WEU (I956) NPC (I955-57) T. NPC (I955-57).

EMERY, C. b. 27.2.26. - C. (Reading I959-66; Honiton I967-); JM Trade and Industry (I972-); CA/WEU (I964-65, I970-7I) R WEU Def Com (I964-65).

FERNYHOUGH, E. b. 24.I2.08. - Lab. (Jarrow, I947-) JM Employment and Productivity (I967-69) CA (I970).

FITCH, E.A. b. I0.3.I5. - Lab. (Wigan, I958-); Govt Whip (I964-70); CA/WEU (I966-69), R. CA Com UnRep M (I969), WEU Com Par Rel (I969).

FLETCHER, Rt Hon Sir E. b. 26.3.03. - Lab. (E Islington, I945); M without Portfolio (I964-66): Dep Speaker H Commons (I966-68) CA (I95I).

FOSTER, Sir J.G. b. II.I904. - C. (Northwich, Ches 1945-); JM Commonwealth Off (I95I-54); CA (I949-5I, I953-54).

FRASER, Rt Hon. T. b. I8.2.II. Lab. (Hamilton, Lanarks I943-67); JM Scottish Office (I945-5I); M Transport (I964-65) NPC (I955).

GAITSKELL, Rt Hon H.T.N. b. 9.4.06. - Lab (Leeds S I945-62); JM, Fuel and Power (I946-47), M Fuel and Power (I947-50), MS Eco Aff (I950), Ch Excq (I950-5I), Leader Lab Party (I955-62); CA/WEU (I956-57) NPC (I956).

GALPERN, Sir M. b. I903. - Lab. (Shettleston Glasgow I959-); CA/WEU (I968-70).

GLADWYN, Baron (Sir Gladwyn Jebb) b. 25.7.00. - L. For Off (I927-60) Ambassador to France (I954-60); CA/WEU (I966-67); NPC/NAA (I965-67) R. CA Eco Com (I968), R WEU GA Com (I966).

GOODHART, P.C. b. 3.II.25. - C. (Beckenham I957-); CA/WEU (I960-63); NPC/NAA (I964-) R. WEU Def Com (I962).

GORDON WALKER, Rt Hon P C- b. 7.4.07. Lab. (Smethwick I945-64; Leyton I966- JM, Commonwealth Off (I947-50); Commonwealth (I950-5I); For Aff (I964-65); M Without Portfolio (I967); SS Ed and Sci (I967-68); CA/WEU (I95I-53, I962, I966) NPC (I963).

GRANTCHESTER, Baron b. I4.8.I893. - L. CA/WEU (I957-66); R WEU GA Com (I964).

GRIFFITHS, E.W. b. 25.4.25. - C. (Bury St Edmonds, I964-) JM Housing and Loc Govt (I970-), CA/WEU (I967-70). R. WEU GA Com (I969).

GRIFFITHS, Rt Hon, J. b. 9.I890. - Lab (Llanelly, Carmarthen I936-70); M Nat'l Insurance (I945-50), SS Colonies (I950-5I), Wales (I964-66); CA/WEU (I958-59).

GRIEVE, W.P. b. 25.3.I5. - C. (Solihull, Warwicks, I964-); CA/WEU (I969-70).

HALE, C.L. b. I3.7.02. - Lab. (Oldham, I945-50; Oldham W (I950-68); CA/WEU (I957-58).

HALL, Rt Hon W.G. b. I887. - Lab. (Portsmouth Central I929-3I; Colne Valley Yorks, I939-63) JM. Treasury (I945-50); CA (I950-5I).

HARRIS, H.W. b. 2I.9.I883. - Independent (Cambridge U I945-50); CA I949.

HARVEY, Sir A V.
b. 3I.I.06. - C. (Macclesfield, Ches I945-7I), Ch I922 Com;NPC (I955-56).

HAY, J.A.
b. 27.II.I9. - C. (Henley, Oxon, I950-); JM, Transport (I959-63), Civil Lord Admiralty (I963-64); JM, Defence (I964);CA/WEU (I956-59); NPC (I964) R: CA Eco Com (I957-58), Loc Authorities (I957); Vchm WEU Proc Com (I957).

HEALEY, Rt Hon. D.W.
b. 30.8.I7. - Lab. (Leeds S.E. I952-55, Leeds E, I959); SS: Def (I964-70), CA/WEU (I952-54,I963-65);NPC (I955-56).

HEFFER, E.S.
b. I2.I.22. - Lab. (Walton, Liverpool I964-); CA/WEU (I965-69).

HERBISON, Rt Hon. M.M.
b. II.3.07. - Lab.(N. Lanark, I945-70); JM Scottish Off; M Pensions and Nat'l Insurance (I964-66); M of Social Security (I966-67);CA (I949).

HOLT, A.F.
b. 8.8.I4. - L. (Bolton W, I95I-64) Chief Whip (I962-64); CA/WEU (I956-58), R.CA Eco Com (I957).

HOPE, Rt Hon Lord J.A. (now Baron Glendevon)
b. 7.4.I2. - C. (N. Midlothian and Peebles, I945-50; Pentlands, Edinburgh (I950-64) JM: For Off (I954), Commonwealth Off (I956-57), Scottish Off (I957-59); M Works (I959-62); CA (I952-54), R.GA Com (I953-54).

HOPKINSON, Rt Hon H.L.D'A. (now Baron Colyton)
b. 3.I.02. - C. (Taunton, Somerset, I950-56); CA (I950-5I).

HORSBRUGH, Rt Hon Baroness (Dame F Horsbrugh).
- C. (Dundee I93I-45, Moss Side, Manchester I950-59) JM: Health (I939-45), Food (I945) M. Ed (I95I-54); CA/WEU (I956-60), R.CA. Pol Com (I959).

HOY, Rt Hon, J.H.
b. 2I.I.09. - Lab (Leith 45-50, Leith, Edinburgh (50-); JM Ag Fisheries and Food (I967-70); CA I949-5I.

HUTCHISON, Sir J.R.H.
b. 4. I893. - C. (Glasgow Central, I945-50; Scotstoun Glasgow I950-59) JM: War Off (I95I-54) CA/WEU (I955-59); NPC (I957, 58); P WEU As'ly (I957-59) R. Ch WEU Def Com (I956).

HYND, J.B.
b. 4.4.02. - Lab. (Attercliffe, Sheffield I944-) Chan Duchy of Lancaster, M for Germany and Austria (I945-47) M. Pensions (I947); CA/WEU (I949, I960-6I); R: CA Eco Com (I96I), WEU GA. Com (I960).

IRVINE, Rt Hon. Sir A.J. - Lab. (Edge Hill, Liverpool, I947-74); Solicitor General (I967-70); CA/WEU (I96I-62).

JEGER, G.
b. I9.3.03. - Lab. (Winchester, Hants, I945-50; Goole, Yorks, I950-), CA/WEU (I955-57), (I966-67).

JEGER, Mrs, L.M.
b. I9.II.I5. - Lab. (Holborn and St Pancros S, I953-59, I964-); CA/WEU (I969-).

JENKINS, Rt Hon R.H.
b. II.II.20. - Lab. (Southwark Central I948-50; Stechford Birmingham (I950-); M Aviation (I964-65); SS Home Aff (I965-67); Chanc of Exchcq (I967-70); CA/WEU (I955-56) NPC (I957); R CA Rco Com (I956).

JELLICOE, Earl
b. 4.4.I8. - C. JM Housing and Local Govt (I96I-63); Ist Lord of Admiralty (I963-64); MS Def (I964); CA/WEU (I965,66), NPC (I959-6I), R: CA Cvl Com (I965), WEU Def Com (I966).

JOHNSON, C.A.
b. II.I903. - Lab. (Lewisham S I959-); CA/WEU (I962-64).

JONES, D.T.
b. I0.I899. - Lab. (Hartlepools I945-59); CA/WEU (I95I, I955-57), V ch AC Mun Com (I955-57).

KERSHAW, J.A.
b. I4.I2.I5. - C. (Stroud, Glos I955-); JM: Public Bldgs and Works (I970-7I), For Off (I97I-); CA/WEU (I959-62, I965-68) NPC (I958-67); R: CA Leg Com (I960); CA Eco Com (I962, I966-67); CA Loc Auth Com (I966); WEU Def Com (I96I-62); WEU Sci Com (I967); NPC Eco Com (I959-60), Ch (I965-67).

KING, Rt Hon, H.M.
b. 25.4.0I. - Lab. (Test, Southampton, I950-55, Itchen, Southampton, I955-70); Dep Speaker Commons (I964-65), Speaker (I965-70); CA/WEU (I960-6I) R: CA Cul Com (I960).

KIRK, P.M.
b. I8.4.28. - C. (Gravesend, Kent, I955-64; Saffron Walden I965-) JM: War Off (I963-64) M Def Army(I964), (I970-72); CA/WEU (I955-63, I966-70), Ch: CA UnrepN Com (I959-6I), WEU GA Com (I960-63), WEU Bud Com (I968-69), CA Pol Com (I969-70).

LAYTON, Baron
b. I5.3.I884. - L. CA/WEU (I949-57); NPC (I959) VP CA (I949-57) R: CA Eco Com (I95I, I953).

LEE, Rt Hon F.
b. 3.8.06. - Lab. (Hulme, Manchester, I945-50, Newton, Lancs (I950) JM M Labour and Nat'l Service (I950-5I); M Power (I964-66), SS Colonies (I966-67); Chan of Duchy of Lancaster (I967-69), CA (I949).

LLOYD GEORGE, Lady M. - Lab. (Anglesey I929-3I (as L.), I93I-45 (Ind L.), I945-5I (L.), Carmarthen, I957-66); CA/WEU (I964-65).

LLOYD, I.S.
b. 20.4.2I. - C. (Langstone Portsmouth I964-); CA/WEU (I968-7I), R. WEU Sci Com (I969).

LOMAS, K.
b. I6.II.22. - Lab. (Huddersfield, W, I964-); NPC/NAA(I967-), R: Ed Com (I969-70).

LONGDEN, Sir G.
b. I6.4.02. - C. (S.W.Herts, I950-); CA/WEU (I953-54, I957) NPC (I955-56).

McBRIDE, N.
b. I3.4.I0. - Lab. (Swansea E, I963-); Govt Whip (I966-70); CA/WEU (I966).

MACKAY, R.W.G.
b. 3.9.02. - Lab. (Hull N.W. I945-50, Reading N I950-5I); CA (I949-5I).

McLAUGHLIN, Mrs. P.
b. 23.6.I6. - Ulster Un. (Belfast W, I955-64); CA/WEU (I96I-64) R. CA Soc Com (I962).

MACLAY, Rt Hon J.S. (now Viscount Muirshiel)
b. 23.6.I6. - C and (Montrose Burghs I940-50, Renfrews. W. I950-64); Nat'l L JM Production (I945) M Transport and Civil Aviation (I95I-52), MS Colonies (I956-57); SS Scotland (I957-62); CA/WEU (I955-57) NPC (I955); R. CA GA Com (I954); P WEU As'ly (I955-56).

MACMILLAN, Rt Hon M.H.
b. I0.2.I894 - C. (Stockton-on-Tees I927-29, I93I-45; Bromley, I945-64), JM: Supply (I940-42), Colonies (I942); M Resident Allied HQ N.W. Africa (I942-45); SS Air (I945), M: Housing and Local Govt (I95I-54), Def (I954-55); SS For Aff (I955), Chanc Exchcq (I955-59), PM (I957-63); CA (I949-5I).

MACMILLAN, Rt Hon M.V.
b. 27.I.2I. - (Halifax, I955-64; Farnham, I966-); JM, Treasury (I963-64); Chief Secy Treasury (I970-72), SS Employment (I972-); CA/WEU (I960-63); R: CA Pol Com (I96I-62).

MADDAN, W.F.M.
b. I0.I920. - C. (Hitchin, Herts I955-64, Hove I965- NPC (I957).

MAITLAND, Sir J.F.W.
b. I903. - C. (Horncastle, Lincs I945-66) CA/WEU (I958-6I); NPC (I963) R: CA Ag Com (I960-6I).

MARQUAND, Rt Hon H.A.
b. 27.I2.0I. - Lab. (Cardiff E, I945-50. Middlesbrough E, I950-6I) SS. Overseas Trade (I945-47), Paymaster Gen'l (I947-48), M. Pensions (I948-5I), Health (I95I); CA/WEU(I957-58).

MATHER, R.
b. 9.5.II. - C. (Honiton, I955-66) JM: Bd of Trade (I957-59), F Off (I963-64); CA/WEU (I959-63, I965-66)R. CA Leg Com (I960) V Ch R (I96I), R (I962); R: WEU CA Com (I960-62), Ch R WEU Bud Com (I965-66).

MAUDLING, Rt Hon R.
b. 7.3.17.

– C. (Barnet, Herts, 1950-); JM Aviation (1952), Treasury (1953-55), M. Supply (1955-57); Pres Bd of Trade (1959-61), Paymaster Gen'l (1957-59), SS Colonies (1961-62); Chanc Excheq (1962-64): SS Home Off (1970-72) CA/WEU (1965) VP WEU Ass'ly (1965).

MAXWELL, I.R.
b. 10.6.23

– Lab. (Buckingham 1964-70) CA/WEU (1968) NPC (1966) Vch R WEU Sci Com (1968).

MAXWELL-FYFE, Rt Hon. Sir D.P. (Earl of KILMUIR)
b. 29.5.00.

– C. (W. Derby, Liverpool, 1935-54), SS Home Off, and M. Wales (1951-54) Ld Ch (1954-62) CA (1949-51) Ch, R Leg Com (1949) R (1950).

MAYDON, S.L.C.
b. 15.12.13.

– C. (Wells, Somerset 1951-70). JM. Pensions and Nat'l Insurance (1962-64); CA/WEU (1955-56); NPC (1960-61).

MAYHEW, C.P.
b. 12.6.15.

– Lab. (Norfolk 1945-50, Woolwich E 1951- JM: For Aff (1946-50), MS Def (1964-66); CA/WEU (1962).

MELLISH, Rt Hon. R.J.
b. 3. 1913.

– Lab. (Rotherhithe 1946-50, Bermondsey 1950-), JM Housing and Local Govt 1964-67), M Public Building and Works (1967-69), Chief Whip (1969-70), Opp Chief Whip (1970-); CA/WEU (1951, 1954-55); NPC (1958, 1962).

MILLAN, B.
b. 5.10.27.

– Lab. (Craighton, Glasgow, 1959-); JM Defence (1964-66), Scottish Off (1966-70); CA/WEU (1961-62).

MILLER, Dr. M.S.
b. 16.8.20.

– Lab. (Kelvingrove, Glasgow 1964-); Ass't Govt Whip (1968-69); CA/WEU (1968-70).

MITCHISON, G.R. (now Baron MITCHISON).
b. 3. 1890.

– Lab. (Kettering 1945-64) JM: Land and Natural Resources (1964-66); CA (1950-51.

MORRISON, Rt Hon H.S. (Baron MORRISON).
b. 3.1. 1888.

– Lab. (S Hackney 1923-24, 1929-31, 1935-45, E Lewisham 1945-51, S Lewisham 1951-59), M. Transport (1929-31), Supply (1940), Home Security and SS Home Aff (1940-45), Deputy PM (1945-51), Lord Pres Council, Leader H Commons (1945-51) SS For Aff (1951), Dep Leader Opp (1951-55); CA (1949, 1954-55), Ch R. Proc Com (1949)

MULLEY, Rt Hon F.W.
b. 3.7.18.

– Lab. (Park, Sheffield 1950-), M: Def Army (1964-65) M: Aviation (1965-67) MS. For Off (1967-69) M: Disarmament (1967-69), Transport (1969-70); CA/WEU (1958-61); NPC (1963-64); R: CA Eco Com (1959, 1960); WEU Def Com (1958-59) R and Vch (1960).

NALLY, W.
b. I3.I2.I4. - Lab. (Bilston, Wolverhampton, I945-50, Bilston, I950-55) CA(I949-50) Vch Soc Com (I949-50).

NICHOLSON, Sir G.
b. 9.I2.0I. - C. (Morpeth (Nat'l Con) I93I-35, Farnham I937-66); CA/WEU (I956-58).

NICOLSON, N.
b. I9.I.I7. - C (Bournemouth E and Christchurch I952-59); CA/WEU (I955-56), R. CA Cul Com (I956).

NOEL-BAKER, Rt Hon P.J.
b. II.I899. - Lab. (Coventry I929-3I, Derby I936-50, Derby S, I950-70) JM: War Transport (I942-45), MS (I946-47); SS: Air (I946-47), Commonwealth Aff (I947-50); M. Fuel and Power (I950-5I); CA/WEU (I955) NPC (I955, I957).

NORWICH, Viscount.
b. I5.9.29. - L.; CA/WEU (I966-69); NPC (I968-70).

NUTTING, Rt Hon Sir H.A.
b. II.I.20. - C. (Melton Leics, I945-56), JM: For Off (I95I-54), MS (I954-56); CA (I952-54).

OGMORE, Baron.
b. 22.II.03. - Lab. JM: Colonial Off (I947-50) Commonwealth Off (I950-5I) M. Civil Aviation (I95I) NPC (I957-58, I96I-63), V Ch, Pol Com (I962), Chm (I963).

PAGE, J.D.
b. I4.8.27. - Lab. (King's Lynn, I964-70); CA/WEU (I966-67) R EA Soc Com (I966).

PANNELL, R.A.
b. I7.4.0I. - C. (Kirkdale, Liverpool, I955-64); CA/WEU (I963-64).

PEEL, Sir W.J.
b. I6.6.I2. - C. (Leicester, S.E. I957-), CA/WEU (I96I-67); NPC (I959-); Ass't Govt Whip (I960-6I); Whip (I96I-64), VP WEU Assly (I967-69). P. (I972-); R. CA Proc Com (I969-70), Vch WEU: GA Com (I967-69) Proc Com (I963-67).

POPLEWELL, E.(now Baron POPLEWELL)
b. I0.I2.I899. - Lab. (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, W, I945-60), Whip (I947-5I); Dep Chief Whip (I955-59); CA/WEU (I955-57) R: CA Proc Com (I956), WEU Proc Com (I956).

POUNDER, R.J.
b. I3.5.33. - Ulster Un. (Belfast S I963-); CA/WEU (I965-68); R. CA Cul Com (I966).

PRICE, D.E.C.
b. 20.II.24. - C. (Eastleigh, Hants I955-); JM: Bd of Trade (I962-64); Technology (I970); CA/WEU (I958-6I), R. CA Eco Com (I960).

PRIOR-PALMER, Sir O.L.
b. 28.IO.I897.
- C. (Worthing, W Sussex I945-50; Worthin, I950-64) CA/WEU (I961-62); NPC (I956-62 Vch NPC Mil Com (I957), Ch (I958-60).

RAMSDEN, Rt Hon J.E.
b. I.II.23.
- C. (Harrogate I954-) JM. War Off (I960-63), SS War (I963-64), M Def Army (I964), CA/WEU (I955-57).

RHODES, G.W.
b. 7,II.28.
- Lab. (Newcastle-opon-Tyne E, I964-) CA/WEU (I967-70), R CA Cul Com (I969) Vch WEU Proc Com (I969).

RIDDALGH, Mrs. M.
b. II.6.I898.
- Lab. (Ilford N. I945-50) CA (I949).

RIDLEY, Rt Hon N.
b. I7.2.29.
- C. (Cirencester and Tewksbury I959-) JM. Technology (I970-72) CA/WEU (I962-66), R: CA Eco Com (I963-64), WEU GA Com (I964).

RIPPON, Rt Hon A.G.F.
b. 28.5.24.
- C. (Norwich S I955-64, Hexham I966-) JM Aivation (I959-6I), Housing and Local Govt (I96I-62); M: Public Buildings and Works (I962-64), Techonology (I970), Cha Duchy of Lancaster (I970-72), SS Environ ent (I972-); CA/WEU (I968-70).

ROBENS, Rt Hon A.(now Baron ROBENS).
b. I8.I2.IO.
- Lab. (Wansbeck, I945-50, Blythe I950-60) JM Fuel and Power (I947-5I), M Labour and Nat'l Service (I95I) CA I952-54, R. GA Com (I954).

ROBERTS, E.
b. 22.9.IO.
- Lab. (Merioneth I945-5I), CA (I950-5I).

RODGERS, Sir J.C.
b. 5.II.06.
- C. (Sevenoaks, Kent I950-); JM Bd of Trade (I958-60), CA/WEU (I969-).

ROLGERS, W.T.
b. 28.II.28.
- Lab. (Stockton-on-Tees I962-); JM: Eco Aff. (I964-67), For Off (I967-68); MS: Bd of Trade (I968-69), Treasury (I969-70), CA/WEU (I967-68).

ROSE, P.B.
b. 26.I2.34.
- Lab. (Blackley, Manchester I964-); CA/WEU (I968-69).

ROSS, Sir R.D.
b. I3.7.I887.
- Ulster Un (Londonderry I929-5I); CA (I949-50).

ROYLE, C.(now Baron ROYLE).
b. 23.I.I896.
- Lab. (Salford W. I945-64), Govt Whip (I950-5I) CA/WEU (I957-58) R. CA Ag Com (I958).

RUSSELL, Sir R.S.
b. I904. - C. (Wembley S I950-);CA/WEU I957-66; R. CA UnrepN Com (I96I), ChR (I963), ch (I964); R: Ref Com (I963).

St JOHN-STEVAS, N.A.F.
b. I8.5.29. - C. (Chelmsford I964-); JM: EDucation (I97I); CA/WEU (I967-70) R. CA Leg Com (I968).

SANDYS, Rt Hon D.E.
b. 24.I.08. - C. (Norwood, Lambeth I935-45, Streatham, I950-), JM: War Off (I94I-43), Supply (I943-44), M: Works (I944-45) Supply (I95I-54) Housing and Local Govt (I954-57), Defence (I957-59), Aviation (I959-60), SS Commonwealth Aff (I960-64), CA/WEU (I950-5I, I965-) R: CA CA Com (I950), WEU Def Com (I965-66).

SCOTT-HOPKINS, J.S.R.
b. II.I92I. - C. (N. Cornwall I959-66, Derbys W I967-); JM: Ag Fisheries and Food (I962-64), CA/WEU (I96I-62, I970-).

SHEPHERD, Baron.
b. 27.9.I8. - Lab. Opp Chief Whip Lords (I964), Govt Chief Whip (I964-67), NPC (I959-6I).

SHORT, Rt Hon E.W.
b. I7.I2.I2. - Lab. (Newcastle-upon-Tyne Central I95I-); JM. Treasury (I964-66); Postmaster Gen'l (I966-68); SS Ed and Science (I968-70), Dep Leader Lab Party (I972-); NPC (I959-6I).

SHORT, Mrs. R.
b. 4. I9I9. - Lab. (Wolverhampton, N.E. I964-); CA/WEU (I965-68).

SILKIN, Baron.
b. I889. - Lab. (Peckham, Camberwell I936-50). M Town and Country Planning (I945-50), NPC (I963-65).

SILKIN, Hon S.C.
b. 6.3.I8. - Lab. (Dulwich I964-), CA/WEU (I966-70), Ch R. CA Leg Com (I967-70).

SLATER, Mrs. H. - Lab. Co-op (Stoke-on-Trent I953-66), Govt Whip (I964-66) CA/WEU (I956-57).

SMITHERS, P.H.
b. 9.I2.I3. - C. (Winchester I950-64), JM For Off (I962-64), CA/WEU (I953-55, I960) R: CA Mun Com (I955) Sec'y Gen'l C of E (I964-69).

SOAMES, Rt Hon A.C.J.
b. I2.I0.20. - C. (Bedford I950-66), JM: Air (I955-57), Admiralty (I957-58), SS War (I958-60), M Ag Fisheries and Food (I960-64), Ambassador to France (I968-72), Commissioner of EEC (I973) CA/WEU (I965-66) VP WEU Ass'ly (I965).

STEELE, T.
b. I5.II.05. - Lab. (Lanark I945-50, Dunbartons W. I950-70), JM: Nat'l Insurance (I946-50) CA/WEU (I950, I958-59, I964) NPC (I959-6I) V Ch WEU Def Com (I958-59).

STEWART, Rt Hon. M.
b. 6.II.06. - Lab. (Fulham E, I945-55, Fulham, I955- Govt Chip (I946-47), JM: War (I947-5I), Supply (I95I), SS: Education and Science (I964-65), For Aff (I965-66), First SS (I966-68), Eco Aff (I966-67), For and Commonwealth Aff (I968-70); CA/WEU (I96I).

STONEHAVEN, Viscount.
b. 25.7.08. - C. CA/WEU (I955-58, I96I-64)R: CA Cul Com (I96I-62), Ag Com (I962-64), WEU Def Com (I957), Vch WEU Bud Com (I96I-64).

STONEHOUSE, Rt Hon J.T.
b. 28.7.25. - Lab Co-op (Wednesbury I957-), JM: Aviation (I964-66), Colonies (I966-67), M Aviation (I967), MS Technology (I967-68) Postmaster General (I968-69), M: Posts and Telecommunications (I969-70) CA/WEU (I962-64).

SUMMERSKILL, Rt Hon E. (now Lady SUMMERSKILL)
b. I90I. - Lab. (Fulham W. I938-55, Warrington, I955-6I), JM: Food (I945-50), M Nat'l Insurance (I950-5I), CA (I953).

TAVERNE, D.
b. I8.I0.28. - Lab. (Lincoln I962-72, I973-) JM: Home Off (I966-68), MS: Treasury (I968-70), CA/WEU (I965).

THOMSON, Rt Hon G.M.
b. I6.I.2I. - Lab. (Dundee E I952-72), MS: For Off (I964-66), Chan Duchy of Lancaster (I966-67), MS For Off (I967), SS Commonwealth Aff (I967-68), M Without Portfolio (I968-69), Chanc Duchy of Lancaster (I969-70), Commissioner EEC (I972-); CA/WEU (I954-55) R. CA Proc Com (I955).

TOMNEY, F.
b. 27.5.08. - Lab (Hammersmith, N. I950-), CA/WEU (I962-64).

TURTON, Rt Hon Sir R.H.
b. 8.8.03. - C. (Thirsk and Malton I929-), JM: Nat'l Insurance (I95I-53), Pensions and Nat'l Insurance (I953-54), For Off (I954-55), M Health (I955-57), NPC (I957).

TWEEDSMUIR, Baron.
b. 25.II.II. - C. CA (I952-53).

TWEEDSMUIR, Lady.
b. 25.I.I5. - C. (Aberdeen S I946-66), JM: Scottish Off (I962-64) MS: For Off (I970-); CA (I950-53).

UNGOED-THOMAS, Hon Sir A.L.
b. 29.6.04. - Lab. (Llandeff and Barry I945-50, Leicester, N.E. I950-62), Solicitor Gen'l (I95I), CA (I949).

VICKERS, Dame J.H.
b. I907. - C. (Davenport, Plymouth I955-), CA/WEU I967-), R: CA Soc Com (I969), R. WEU Com par R. (I969), Ch (I970-)

WADE, D.W. (now Baron WADE).
b. I6.6.04. - L. (Huddersfield, W. I950-64), L. Whip (I956-62), CA/WEU (I952-54, I962-64, I970).

WEBSTER, D.W.E.
b. 20.I0.23. - C. (Weston Super Mare I958-67), CA/WEU (I963-66), R. Vch Eco Com (I965-66).

WELLS, P.L.
b. 8.6.I89I. - Lab. (Faversham, Kent I945-64), CA (I95I).

WHITE, Miss E.L.
b. 7.II.09. - Lab. (East Flint I950-) JM: Colonial Off (I964-66), MS: For Off (I966-67), Welsh Off (I967-70) CA (I95I).

WHITELEY, Rt Hon W.
b. 30.I0.I882. - Lab. (Blaydon, Durham I922-3I, I935-55), Lab Whip (I927), Chief Whip (I942-55) CA (I949).

WILLIAMS, L.
b. 22.7.II. - Lab. (Abertillery, Mon, I950-65), CA (I95I-53).

WILSON, Rt Hon (J.) H.
b. II.3.I6. - Lab. (Ormskirk, I945-50; Huyton I950- JM: Works (I945-47) Overseas Trade (I947); Pres Bd of Trade (I947-5I); Leader of Lab Party (I963-): PM, Ist Ld Admiralty (I964-70); Leader of Opp (I970-); NPC (I962)

YOUNGER, Rt Hon Sir K.G.
b. I5.I2.08. - Lab. (Grimsby I945-59), JM: Home Off (I947-50), MS (I950-5I), CA/WEU (I957), R CA Pol Com (I957).

Appendix 2.

Age, Education, Occupational Background of Conservative and Labour MPs Serving as Delegates to International Parliamentary Assemblies: Selected Sessions.

A) AGE.

	House of Commons.		C of E/NEU (includes substitutes)		NPC/NAA	
	CON	LAB	CON	LAB	CON	LAB
1945[1]			**1949**			
20's	5 (0.2%)	10(2.5%)	0 -	0 -		
30's	43 (20 %)	77(19.6%)	3(27.3%)	6(31.6%)		
40's	76 (36 %)	109(28 %)	5(45.5%)	7(36.8%)		
50's	44(21 %)	113(28 %)	1(9.1%)	2(10.5%)		
60's	28 (13 %)	51(13 %)	1(9.1%)	4(21.1%)		
70+	7 (3 %)	18(5 %)	1(9.1%)	0 -		
1950[2]			**1951**			
20's	2 (0.6%)	0 -	0 -	0 -		
30's	69 (23 %)	39(12 %)	2(15 %)	2(14.2%)		
40's	119 (40 %)	98(31 %)	5(38 %)	7(50 %)		
50's	73 (24.5%)	98(31 %)	3(23 %)	3(21.4%)		
60's	27 (9 %)	71(22.5%)	0 -	3(21.4%)		
70+	7 (2 %)	9(2.8%)	1(8 %)	0 -		
1951[3]			**1953**			
20's	2 (0.6%)	2(0.7%)	0 -	0 -		
30's	73 (22.7%)	36(12.2%)	6(46.2%)	5(41.7%)		
40's	116 (36 %)	91(30.8%)	4(30.8%)	6(50 %)		
50's	92 (28.7%)	85(28.8%)	3(23.1%)	1(8.3%)		
60's	31 (9.7%)	74(25.1%)	0 -	0 -		
70+	7 (2.1%)	7(2.3%)	0 -	0 -		

General Notes:

1). The seven sample years were chosen with a view to:

a) taking into account the fact that most delegates' tenure lasted two or more years.

b) allowing for the closest comparison with election year figures for the Commons, with minimal changes caused by subsequent by-elections.

2). Sources given below for election years apply to all categories (age, education and occupation) unless explicitly stated otherwise in the footnote.

1. Source: based on Times Guide To the House of Commons, 1945.

2. Source: based on Times Guide To the House of Commons, 1950, (Education) H.G. Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950.

3. Source: Butler, General Election of 1951.

AGE (Continued)

House of Commons.		C of E/WEN (includes substitutes)		NPC/NAA	
CON	LAB	CON	LAB	CON	LAB
1955[4]		**1956**		**1956**	
20's 5(I.4%)	0 -	I(8.3%)	0 -	0 -	0 -
30's 52(I5.I%)	20(7.2%)	3(25 %)	I(8.3%)	0 -	I(20 %)
40's I26(36.6%)	72(26 %)	3(25 %)	2(I6.7%)	I(II.I%)	2(40 %)
50's II5(33.4%)	I08(39 %)	3(25 %)	8(66.7%)	5(55.6%)	2(40 %)
60's 40(II.6%)	58(20.9%)	2(I6.7%)	0 -	I(II.I%)	0 -
70+ 6(I.7%)	I9(6.9%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
1959[5]		**1960**		**1960**	
20's I0(2.7%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
30's 62(I7 %)	I8(7 %)	6(46.2%)	I(9.I%)	0 -	0 -
40's I37(37.5%)	57(22.I%)	3(23.I%)	3(27.3%)	3(50 %)	2(33.3%)
50's II9(32.6%)	I03(39.9%)	4(30.8%)	5(45.5%)	2(33.3%)	3(50 %)
60's 34(9.3%)	59(22.9%)	0 -	2(I8.2%)	I(I6.7%)	I(I6.7%)
70+ 3(0.8%)	2I(8.I%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
1964[6]		**1965**		**1965**	
20's 3(I.0%)	I(0.3%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
30's 78(25.7%)	44(I3.9%)	4(28.6%)	I(I0 %)	0 -	I(I6.7%)
40's II2(36.8%)	78(24.6%)	2(I4.3%)	3(30 %)	2(40 %)	2(33.3%)
50's 86(28.3%)	I06(33.4%)	6(42.9%)	5(50 %)	3(60 %)	3(50 %)
60's 23(I7.5%)	70(22.I%)	2(I4.3%)	I(I0 %)	0 -	0 -
70+ 2(0.7%)	I8(5.7%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
1966[7]		**1968**		**1968**	
20's 2(0.8%)	8(2.2%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
30's 42(I6.6%)	77(2I.2%)	I(8.3%)	3(I5.8%)	0 -	2(28.6%)
40's 93(36.8%)	94(25.9%)	5(4I.7%)	7(36.8%)	2(33.3%)	3(42.9%)
50's 85(33.6%)	I07(29.5%)	3(25 %)	6(3I.6%)	4(66.7%)	I(I4.3%)
60's 30(II.9%)	6I(I6.9%)	3(25 %)	3(I5.8%)	0 -	I(I4.3%)
70+ I(0.4%)	I6(4.4%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -

Notes:

4. Source: Butler, General Election of 1955.

5. Source: Butler and Rose, General Election of 1959.

6. Source: Butler and King, General Election of 1964; Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1964.

7. Source: Butler and King, General Election of 1966; 'Education' Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1966.

B) EDUCATION.

	House of Commons.		C of E/TEU (includes substitutes)		NPC/NAA	
	CON	LAB	CON	LAB	CON	LAB
1945			**1949**			
Oxford	59(28.1%)	38(9.7%)	6(55.5%)	2(10.5%)		
Cambridge	42(20 %)	22(5.6%)	3(27.3%)	2(10.5%)		
other University[1]	18(8.6%)	77(19.6%)	0 -	6(31.6%)		
Service Colleges	30(14.3%)	2(0.5 %)	2(18.2%)	0 -		
Eton	56(26.7%)	13(3.3%)	5(45.5%)	1(5.3%)		
Other Publics	108(51.4%)	74(18.8%)	6(55.5%)	7(36.8%)		
Other Secondary[2]	27(12.9%)	141(35.9%)	0 -	5(26.3%)		
Elementary[3]	1(0.5%)	112(28.5%)	0 -	3(15.8%)		
1950			**1951**			
Oxford	92(30.9%)	29(9.2%)	7(53.8%)	2(14.3%)		
Cambridge	64(21.5%)	17(5.4%)	2(15.9%)	2(14.3%)		
O-Un	34(11.4%)	90(28.6%)	0 -	3(21.4%)		
S-Col	38(12.8%)	1(0.3%)	1(8.7%)	0 -		
Eton	79(26.5%)	4(1.3%)	7(53.8%)	1(7.1%)		
O-PS	144(48.3%)	57(18.1%)	3(23.1%)	3(21.4%)		
O-Soc	33(11.1%)	106(33.7%)	0 -	4(28.6%)		
Elementary	1(0.3%)	79(25.1%)	0 -	3(21.4%)		
1951			**1953**			
Oxford	102(31.8%)	39(13.2%)	8(61.5%)	2(16.7%)		
Cambridge	66(20.6%)	18(6.1%)	3(23.1%)	1(8.3%)		
O-Un	47(14.6%)	81(27.5%)	1(7.7%)	5(41.7%)		
S-Col	NA -	NA -	1(7.7%)	0 -		
Eton	76(23.7%)	4(1.4%)	7(53.8%)	0 -		
O-PS	164(51.1%)	56(19 %)	4(30.8%)	3(25 %)		
O-Sec	38(11.8%)	73(14.6%)	0 -	8(66.7%)		
Elementary	4(1.2%)	78(26.4%)	0 -	0 -		

Notes:

1. Includes Technical Colleges.

2. Includes Grammar Schools.

3. Includes Elementary and Adult Education.

NA - Not Available.

EDUCATION (Continued)

	House of Commons.		C of E/NEW (includes substitutes)		NPC/NAA	
	CON	LAB	CON	LAB	CON	LAB
1955			1956		1956	
Oxford	105(30.5%)	29(10.5%)	6(46.2%)	2(16.7%)	1(11.1%)	2(40 %)
Cambridge	77(22.4%)	17(6.1%)	2(15.4%)	3(25 %)	1(11.1%)	1(20 %)
O-Un	36(10.5%)	64(23.1%)	1(7.7%)	2(16.7%)	1(11.1%)	0 -
S-Col	NA -	NA -	1(7.7%)	0 -	3(33.3%)	0 -
Eton	78(22.7%)	4(1.4%)	3(23.1%)	1(8.3%)	2(22.2%)	1(20 %)
O-PS	182(52.9%)	58(20.9%)	9(69.2%)	1(8.3%)	6(85.7%)	2(40 %)
O-Sec	43(12.5%)	46(16.6%)	1(7.7%)	3(25 %)	0 -	2(40 %)
Elementary	8(2.3%)	94(33.9%)	0 -	3(25 %)	0 -	0 -
1959			1960		1960	
Oxford	104(28.5%)	34(13.2%)	4(30.8%)	1(9.1%)	2(33.3%)	1(16.7%)
Cambridge	79(21.6%)	12(4.7%)	6(46.2%)	1(9.1%)	0 -	2(33.3%)
O-Un	35(9.6%)	55(21.3%)	1(7.7%)	3(27.3%)	0 -	1(16.7%)
S-Col	NA -	NA -	1(7.7%)	0 -	4(66.7%)	0 -
Eton	73(20 %)	3(1.2%)	6(46.2%)	0 -	2(33.3%)	1(16.7%)
O-PS	190(52.1%)	44(17.1%)	3(23.1%)	2(18.2%)	3(50 %)	3(50 %)
O-Sec	43(11.8%)	47(18.2%)	0 -	4(36.4%)	0 -	1(16.7%)
Elementary	6(1.6%)	92(35.7%)	0 -	1(9.1%)	0 -	0 -
1964			1965		1965	
Oxford	93(30.6%)	43(13.6%)	6(42.9%)	1(9.1%)	2(40 %)	0 -
Cambridge	69(22.7%)	19(60 %)	5(35.7%)	2(18.2%)	2(40 %)	2(33.3%)
O-Un	43(14.1%)	110(34.7%)	0 -	4(36.4%)	0 -	3(50 %)
S-Col	28(9.2%)	0 -	4(28.6%)	0 -	1(20 %)	0 -
Eton	64(21.1%)	2(0.6%)	5(35.7%)	0 -	4(80 %)	1(16.7%)
O-PS	159(52.3%)	57(18 %)	8(57.1%)	3(27.3%)	1(20 %)	2(33.3%)
O-Sec	51(16.8%)	148(46.7%)	1(7.1%)	5(45.5%)	0 -	2(33.3%)
Elementary	4(1.3%)	71(22.4%)	0 -	1(9.1%)	0 -	0 -
1966			1968		1968	
Oxford	84(33.2%)	55(15.2%)	6(50 %)	3(15.8%)	2(33.3%)	0 -
Cambridge	63(24.9%)	31(8.5%)	5(41.7%)	4(21.1%)	2(33.3%)	0 -
O-Un	31(12.3%)	137(37.7%)	0 -	8(42.1%)	0 -	4(57.1%)
S-Col	13(5.1%)	1(0.3%)	0 -	0 -	1(16.7%)	0 -
Eton	54(21.3%)	3(0.8%)	4(33.3%)	0 -	2(33.3%)	0 -
O-PS	141(55.8%)	68(18.7%)	6(50.0%)	3(15.8%)	3(50 %)	1(14.3%)
O-Sec	45(17.8%)	172(47.4%)	2(16.7%)	12(63.2%)	0 -	3(42.9%)
Elementary	3(1.2%)	77(21.2%)	0 -	1(5.3%)	0 -	1(14.3%)

C) OCCUPATION

	House of Commons.		C of E/NEU (includes substitutes)		NPC/NAA	
	CON	LAB	CON	LAB	CON	LAB
1945			1949			
Barristers	41(19.5%)	32(8.1%)	4(36.4%)	2(10.5%)		
Teachers, Lecturers	3(1.4%)	41(10.4%)	0 -	2(10.5%)		
Forces	34(16.2%)	6(1.5%)	0 -	0 -		
Other Professional	29(13.8%)	78(19.8%)	4(36.4%)	5(26.3%)		
Company Directors	39(18.6%)	1(0.3%)	1(9.1%)	0 -		
Other Business	35(16.7%)	50(12.7%)	0 -	2(10.5%)		
Journalists	5(2.4%)	35(8.9%)	1(9.1%)	4(21.1%)		
White Collar[1]	5(2.4%)	14(3.6%)	0 -	1(5.3%)		
Farmers	11(5.2%)	3(0.8%)	1(9.1%)	0 -		
Trade Union Officials	0 -	9 -	0 -	0 -		
Workers[2]	0 -	155(39.4%)	0 -	3(15.8%)		
1950			1951			
Barristers	49(16.4%)	28(8.9%)	3(23.1%)	2(14.3%)		
T-Lec	5(1.7%)	38(12.1%)	0 -	1(7.1%)		
Forces	33(11.1%)	2(0.6%)	0 -	0 -		
O-Prof	47(15.8%)	68(21.6%)	3(23.1%)	4(28.6%)		
C-Dir	44(14.8%)	1(0.3%)	3(23.1%)	0 -		
O-Bus	65(21.8%)	38(12.1%)	0 -	1(7.1%)		
Jour	14(4.7%)	29(9.0%)	1(8.7%)	1(7.1%)		
W-Col	16(5.4%)	12 (3.6%)	0 -	0 -		
Farmers	27(9.1%)	4(1.2%)	0 -	0 -		
T.U. Off	0 -	38(12.1%)	0 -	3(21.4%)		
Workers	0 -	64(20.3%)	0 -	1(7.1%)		
1951			1953			
Barristers	61(19 %)	28(9.5%)	4(30.8%)	1(8.3%)		
T-Lec	5(1.6%)	42(14.2%)	0 -	3(25 %)		
Forces	32(10 %)	2(0.7%)	1(7.7%)	0 -		
O-Prof	34(10.6%)	30(10.2%)	3(23.1%)	4(33.3%)		
C-Dir	76(23.7%)	4(1.4%)	2(15.4%)	0 -		
O-Bus	59(18.4%)	34(11.5%)	0 -	0 -		
Jour	13(4 %)	33(11.2%)	3(23.1%)	0 -		
W-Col	12(3.7%)	6(2 %)	0 -	1(8.3%)		
Farmers	15(4.7%)	2(0.7%)	0 -	0 -		
T.U. Off	NA -	NA -	0 -	3(25 %)		
Workers	0 -	108 (36.6%)	0 -	0 -		

Notes:

1. Includes party workers and political organisers.

2. Skilled and unskilled; Data for workers from R.B. McCallum and Allison Readman, The British General Election of 1945, (London, Macmillan, 1946).

OCCUPATION (Continued)

	House of Commons.		C of E/CEU (includes substitutes)		HPC/NAA	
	CON	LAB	CON	LAB	CON	LAB
1955			**1956**		**1956**	
Barristers	66(19.2%)	27(9.7%)	I(7.7%)	2(16.7%)	I(11.1%)	I(20 %)
T-Lec	4(1.2%)	39(14.1%)	0 -	I(8.3%)	I(11.1%)	0 -
Forces	47(13.7%)	3(1.1%)	I(7.7%)	0 -	3(33.3%)	0 -
O-Prof	42(12.2%)	28(10.1%)	2(15.4%)	3(25 %)	I(11.1%)	I(20 %)
C-Dir	62(18 %)	2(0.7%)	5(38.5%)	0 -	I(11.1%)	0 -
O-Bus	51(14.8%)	34(12.3%)	2(15.4%)	0 -	I(11.1%)	I(20 %)
Jour	19(5.5%)	27(9.7%)	I(7.7%)	I(8.3%)	I(11.1%)	0 -
W-Col	17(4.9%)	7(2.5%)	0 -	I(8.3%)	0 -	0 -
Farmers	31(9.0%)	5(1.8%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
T.U. Off	NA -	NA -	0 -	I(8.3%)	0 -	2(40 %)
Workers	I(0.3%)	97(35 %)	0 -	3(25 %)	0 -	0 -
1959			**1960**		**1960**	
Barristers	72(19.7%)	27(10.5%)	3(23.1%)	3(27.3%)	I(16.7%)	2(33.3%)
T-Lec	5(1.4%)	36(14 %)	0 -	I(9.1%)	0 -	I(16.7%)
Forces	37(10.1%)	3(1.2%)	2(15.4%)	0 -	3(50 %)	0 -
O-Prof	53(14.5%)	30(11.6%)	0 -	3(27.3%)	I(16.7%)	I(16.7%)
C-Dir	68(18.6%)	I(0.4%)	I(7.7%)	0 -	I(16.7%)	0 -
O-Bus	50(13.7%)	34(13.2%)	4(30.8%)	I(9.1%)	0 -	0 -
Jour	26(7.1%)	25(9.7%)	3(23.1%)	I(9.1%)	0 -	0 -
W-Col	11(3.0%)	7(2.7%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	I(16.7%)
Farmers	38(10.4%)	3(1.2%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
T.U. Off	NA -	NA -	0 -	2(18.2%)	0 -	0 -
Workers	I(0.3%)	90(34.9%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	I(16.7%)
1964			**1965**		**1965**	
Barristers	65(21.4%)	34(10.7%)	5(35.7%)	2(18.2%)	I(20 %)	2(33.3%)
T-Lec	8(2.6%)	51(16.1%)	0 -	I(9.1%)	0 -	2(33.3%)
Forces	28(9.2%)	2(0.6%)	I(7.1%)	0 -	0 -	0 -
O-Prof	46(15.2%)	44(13.9%)	4(28.6%)	0 -	I(20 %)	I(16.7%)
C-Dir	45(14.8%)	5(1.6%)	2(14.3%)	0 -	I(20 %)	0 -
O-Bus	39(12.8%)	32(10.1%)	I(7.1%)	2(18.2%)	0 -	0 -
Jour	20(6.6%)	27(8.5%)	I(7.1%)	2(18.2%)	I(20 %)	0 -
W-Col	16(5.3%)	18(5.7%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
Farmers	35(11.5%)	2(0.6%)	0 -	0 -	I(20 %)	0 -
T.U. Off	NA -	NA -	0 -	2(18.2%)	0 -	I(16.7%)
Workers	2(0.7%)	103(32.5%)	0 -	I(9.1%)	0 -	0 -
1966			**1968**		**1968**	
Barristers	55(21.8%)	36(10 %)	3(25 %)	3(15.8%)	0 -	0 -
T-Lec	4(1.6%)	72(19.8%)	I(8.3%)	2(10.5%)	0 -	0 -
Forces	19(7.2%)	3(0.8%)	0 -	0 -	0 -	0 -
O-Prof	36(14.2%)	41(11.3%)	4(33.3%)	4(21.1%)	3(50 %)	3(42.9%)
C-Dir	40(15.8%)	3(0.8%)	I(8.3%)	I(5.3%)	0 -	0 -
O-Bus	41(16.2%)	51(14 %)	0 -	I(5.3%)	0 -	0 -
Jour	17(6.4%)	29(8 %)	2(16.7%)	2(10.5%)	I(16.7%)	0 -
W-Col	9(3.6%)	31(8.6%)	I(8.3%)	I(5.3%)	0 -	0 -
Farmers	27(10.7%)	2(0.6%)	0 -	0 -	I(16.7%)	0 -
T.U.Off	NA -	NA -	0 -	I(5.3%)	0 -	2(28.6%)
Workers	2(0.8%)	109(30 %)	0 -	2(10.5%)	0 -	0

Appendix 3.

Length of service of British delegates to the Consultative, WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies: 1949-70.

Council of Europe and WEU

5 or more years service as representatives or substitutes (if served for two distinct periods, the duration of each is given in brackets).

Peers

Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
Stonehaven	8 (4,4)	Listowel	7	Manchester	9
Crathorne	6			Layton	8
				Gladwyn	5

MPs

Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
Kirk	12 (8,4)	de Freitas	9 (3,6)	Made	8 (4,3 - 1 as Peer)
Peel	10	G Brown	7 (3,4)		
Russell	9	Edelman	7 (2,5)		
Boothby	8	J Edwards	5		
Kershaw	7 (4,3)	R Edwards	5		
Mathew	7 (5,2)	Heffer	5		
Bell	6 (2,4)	A J Williams	5		
Dodds-Parker	6 (1,5)				
Sandys	6 (1,5)				
Amery	5 (4,1)				
Foster	5				
Horsbrugh	5				
Hutchison	5				

Delegates with four or more years' service:

Con:	29	(12)
Lab:	18	(2)
	47	14

(figures in parentheses are those of Jean Blondel in Lindsay, European Assemblies, p. 140).

NPC/NAA

5 or more years

Peers

Conservative		Labour	
Crathorne	12(11 as Peer)	Ogmore	5
Lady Elliot	10		
Goschen	5		
Windlesham	5		

NPC/NAA

MPs.

Conservatives		Labour		Liberal	
Peel	I2	de Freitas	I2	Hooson	7
Kershaw	I0	C Pannell	5	Davies	5
Maclean	8	Henderson	5		
Goodhart	7				
Prior-Palmer	7				

Average tenure for British delegates

Council of Europe 3-73.

Peers	MPs	All
Con: 2.75 years	3.I5 years (2.25)	3.I years
Lab: 3.25 years	2.26 years (I.75)	2.4 years
Lib: 4.8 years	3 years (-)	4.0 years

(figures in parentheses are those given by Blondel in Lindsay, European Assemblies, p. I40).

NPC/NAA

Peers	MPs	All
Con: 4.50 years	2.63 years	3.I3 years (I.75)
Lab: I.80 years	3.75 years	2.66 years (2.00)
Lib: I.79 years	I.85 years	I.83 years (I.78)

(figures in parentheses from Blondel in Lindsay, Assemblies, p. I37).

Appendix 4.

Service in the House of Commons Prior to Appointment as a British Representative to an International Parliamentary Assembly.

Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies.

One year or less.

Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
Harden	I949	Crosland	I95I	Bonham-Carter	I959
Hopkinson	I950	Darling	I95I	Thorpe	I960
Amery	I95I	White	I95I		
Cunningham(U.U)	I956	Williams, L.	I95I		
Kirk	I956	Healey	I952		
		Brown, F.	I965		
		Heffer	I965		
		Richard	I965		
		Short, R.	I965		

Two years.

Conservative		Labour	
Hyde (U.U)	I952	Thomson	I954
Longden	I952	Lawson	I956
Smithers	I952	Reynolds	I960
Vaughan-Morgan	I952	Millan	I96I
Brooman-White	I953	Page	I966
Campbell (U.U)	I954	Silkin	I966
Pitt	I955	Summerskill, S.	I966
Ramsden	I956	Walden	I966
Grosvenor(U.U)	I957		
Woodhouse	I96I		
Pounder(U.U)	I965		

Three years.

Conservative		Labour	
Boyle	I953	Slater, H.	I956
Fletcher-Cooke	I954	Taverne	I965
Nicolson	I955	Rhodes	I967
Armstrong(U.U)	I957	Williams, A J.	I968
Price, D.	I958	Coe	I969
Clark(U.U)	I962	Maclennan	I969
Ridley	I962		
Griffiths, E.	I967		
St. John-Stevas	I967		

Twenty years or more (years in Commons in parenthesis).

Conservative		Labour	
Boothby	(25)1949	Cocks	(20)1949
Churchill	(47)1949	Dalton	(21)1949
Macmillan	(23)1949	Whiteley	(23)1949
Ross	(20)1949	Glenvil Hall	(23)1950
Elliot	(38)1955	Summerskill, E	(25)1953
Horsbrugh	(25)1956	Noel-Baker, P	(21)1955
Nicholson	(23)1956	Griffiths, J	(22)1958
Dugdale	(23)1958	Henderson	(27)1959
Errington	(20)1963	Stratchey	(20)1963
1 Dodds-Parker	(20)1965	Lloyd George	(29)1964
2 Sanoys	(25)1965	3 Idelman	(20)1965
Digby	(26)1967	Lannan	(20)1965
		Yates	(20)1965
		4 Jeger, G	(21)1966
		5 Darling	(20)1970
		Fernybough	(23)1970

NATO Parliamentarians' Conference/North Atlantic Assembly.

One year or less.

Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
Hughes Hallett	1955	Aldritt	1955	Hooson	1963
Litchfield	1960	Hamling	1965		

Two years.

Conservative		Labour	
Sharples	1956	Prentice	1959
Maddan	1957	Carmichael	1964
Peel	1959	Howie	1965
		Maxwell	1966

Three years.

Labour	
Bishop	1967
Lomas	1967

Twenty years or more.

Conservative		Labour		Liberal	
Elliot	(38)1955	Noel-Barker	(21)1955	Davies	(27)1956
Turton	(28)1959	Paget	(20)1965		
Maclean	(22)1963				
Dodds-Parker	(23)1968				

1. First served at Consultative Assembly, 1954.
2. First served at Consultative Assembly, 1950-51.
3. First served at Consultative Assembly, 1949.
4. First served at Consultative Assembly, 1955-57.
5. First served at Consultative Assembly, 1951.

Appendix 5.

The 'Labour Left' at the Consultative and WEU Assemblies: I949-70.

Voted against Government: National Service Bill, I April I947.[I]

Cocks	I949-50
Herbison	I949
Lee	I949
Nally	I949
Randall	I958-59
Ridealgh	I949
Royle	I957-58
Wells	I95I
Yates	I964-65

Supported Atomic Energy Authority Amendment, 29 April I954.[2]

Allen, S.S.	I959-60
Blenkinsop	I966-70
Chetwynd	I952-54
Crossman	I953
Darling	I95I-52, I970
Delargy	I959
Fernylough	I970
Royle	I957-58
Slater, H.	I956-57
Snow	I949, I965
Taylor, J.	I959-60
Willey	I956 - I958
Yates	I964-65

List of 50 'Most Left' Labour MPs in S.E. Finer, et.al., Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons: I955-59

Cullen	I958-59
Darling	I95I-52, I970
Delargy	I959
Fernyhough	I970
Hale	I957-58
Jeger, L.	I968-70
King	I960-6I
Lee	I949
Mellish	I95I, I954-55
Royle	I957-58
Slater, H.	I956-57
Yates	I964-65

I. For the significance of this vote, see R.K. Alderman, 'Discipline in the Parliamentary Labour Party: I945-5I', Parliamentary Affairs XVIII (I964-65), 299.

2. For the significance of this vote see, R.K. Alderman, 'Parliamentary Party Discipline in Opposition', p. I28.

Appendix 5 (continued)

Signers of Tribune Statement opposing British application for entry to EEC, 5 May 1967.

Galpern	1968-70
Molloy	1970
Page	1966-67
Short, R.	1965-68
Yates	1964-65

Appendix 6:
Delegates Mentioning the Council of Europe/WEU Assemblies in their Election Addresses: 1951-70.

1951 election.

Conservatives			Labour		
* Delegates, 1949-51:	15		* Delegates, 1949-51:	29	
Addresses examined:	10	(66.7%)	Addresses examined:	17	(58.6%)
No mention:	9		No mention:	13	
Mention:	1	(10%)	Mention:	4	(23.5%)
Foster			Crawley		
			Darling		
			Glenvil Hall		
			Ungoed-Thomas		

1955 election

Conservatives			Labour		
* Delegates, 1951-55:	31		* Delegates, 1951-55:	33	
Addresses examined:	19	(61.3%)	Addresses examined:	18	(54.5%)
No mention:	16		No mention:	13	
Mention:	3	(15.8%)	Mention:	6	(31.6%)
Boyle			Bowden		
Longden			Chetwynd		
Smithers			Darling		
			Glenvil Hall		
			Peart		
			Thomson		

1959 election

Conservatives			Labour		
* Delegates, 1955-59:	24		* Delegates, 1955-59:	27	
Addresses examined:	13	(54.1%)	Addresses examined:	13	(48.1%)
No mention:	6		No mention:	9	
Mention:	7	(53.9%)	Mention:	4	(30.8%)
Cunningham			Allen, SS		
Fletcher Cooke			Broughton		
Hay			Lawson		
Hughes Hallett			Steele, T.		
Maitland					
D. Price					
Thomas					

1964 election

Conservatives			Labour		
* Delegates, 1959-64:	29		* Delegates, 1959-64:	30	
Addresses examined:	18	(62.1%)	Addresses examined:	10	(33.3%)
No mention:	7		No mention:	8	
Mention:	11	(61.1%)	Mention:	2	(20%)
Emery			Delargy		
Errington			Stonehouse		
Goodhart					
Gresham Cooke					
Kirk					
Macmillan, M.					
Pannell, N.					
Price, D.					
Russell					
Webster					
Worsley					

* See note on page following.

I966 election

* Conservatives			* Labour		
Delegates, I964-66:	I7		Delegates, I964-66:	I5	
Addresses examined:	I3	(76.5%)	Addresses examined:	9	(60%)
No mention:	7		No mention:	4	
Mention:	6	(46.I%)	Mention:	5	(55.5%)
Emery			de Freitas		
Errington			Edelman		
Peel			Edwards		
Russell			Lloyd George		
Sandys			Snow		
Webster					

I970 election

* Conservatives			* Labour		
Delegates, I966-70:	20		Delegates, I966-70:	39	
Addresses examined:	I6	(80%)	Addresses examined:	30	(76.9%)
No mention:	7		No mention:	I4	
Mention:	9	(56.3%)	Mention:	I6	(46.7%)
Grieve			Boyden		
Griffiths, E.			Coleman		
Lloyd, I.			Darling		
Peel			de Freitas		
Rippon			Edelman		
Rodgers, Sir J.			Edwards		
Sandys			Fitch		
Scott-Hopkins			Harrison		
Vickers			Jeger, L.		
			Johnson, J.		
			Richard		
			Rose		
			Summerskill		
			Williams. A.L.		

* The term 'delegates' denotes delegates to the assemblies whose addresses appeared in the elections noted above. Peers, MPs who died before the election, and retiring MPs obviously are excluded from consideration.

Appendix 7.

Additional Statistics from the NPC Questionnaire of July 1956 entitled 'Towards an Atlantic Community..... An International Survey of Parliamentary Opinion in the NATO Countries'
(see Chapter 2).

A: Number of British Parliamentarians Replying to the Questionnaire

	Total	Conservative-Nat'l Lib- UU	Lab	Lib	Other
House of Commons					
No. sent	630	347	256	6	-
No. replies	201	113	85	3	-
Percentage returns	32	32	33	50	-
House of Lords					
No. sent	211	115	36	18	42
No. replies	64	33	10	6	15
Percentage returns	30	29	28	33	36
Total					
No. sent	841	462	292	24	42
No. replies	265	146	95	9	15
Percentage returns	32	32	33	38	36

B: Replies to question: 'Would you favour the development of a parliamentary assembly of NATO countries with consultative status?'

(from confidential memorandum entitled: 'Some replies of United Kingdom Members of Parliament to certain of the questions contained in the International Survey of Parliamentary Opinion in the NATO countries initiated in July 1956 by the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO countries').

	(a) All Replies	(b) Total Replies In Memorandum	(c) Replies of Former Assembly Delegates*	(d) (c) as Percentage of (b)	(e) (c) as Percentage of (a)
Yes	154 (58%)	146 (76%)	32 (84%)	22	21
No	98 (37%)	45 (24%)	6 (16%)	13	6
Total	265 (100%)	191 (100%)	38 (100%)	20	15

* In memorandum

Appendix 8.

British Representatives Holding Office In International Parliamentary Assemblies: 1949-70.

Council of Europe.

President.

J Edwards Lab.	1959
De Freitas Lab.	1966-69

Vice-President.

Layton L.	1949-57
J Edwards Lab.	1957-59
Horobrugh C.	1960
Crathorne C.	1962-64
De Freitas Lab.	1965
J Edwards Lab.	1969
Darling Lab.	1970

General Affairs Committee:

Chairman: Kirk C.	1969
Rapporteur:	
Mackay Lab.	1950
Sandys Lab.	1950
Maclay C,	1954
Robens Lab.	1954
Younger Lab.	1957
Henderson Lab.	1960
M. Macmillan C.	1961-62
R. Edwards Lab.	1967 (Acting)
De Freitas Lab.	1969-70
Kirk C.	1970 (acting)

Economic Affairs Committee:

Vice-chairman:

Boothby C.	1952-53, 56
Webster C.	1965-66
Kershaw C.	1968

Rapporteur:

Layton L.	1951, 53
Boothby C.	1951, 53
Hope C.	1953-54
Bottomley Lab.	1954
J. Edwards Lab.	1955
Jenkins Lab.	1956
Holt L.	1957
Hay C.	1957-58
Mulley Lab.	1959-60
Price C.	1960
Hynd Lab.	1961
Kershaw C.	1962, 67-68
Ridley C.	1963-64
Webster C.	1965-66
Gladwyn L.	1968
Chapman Lab.	1968-70
Digby C.	1970

Legal Affairs Committee:

Chairman:

Maxwell-Fyfe C. [I]	1949-50
Silkin Lab. [I]	1966-70

Vice-chairman:

S S Allen Lab. [I]	1960
Mathew C. [I]	1961

Population and Refugees Committee:

Rapporteur:

Bottomley Lab.	1953
Tandall Lab.	1959
Russell C.	1961, 63

Committee on Unrepresented Nations

Chairman:

Reamish C.	1951-54

Continued.

I. Barrister.

Rapporteur:

Maxwell-Fyfe C.	1950
De Freitas Lab.	1951,53,54
Hyde C.	1953
S S Allen Lab.	1959
Kershaw C.	1960
Mathew C.	1960-62
Errington C.	1963 (acting)
Richard Lab.	1965
Brewis C.	1966,68
Silkin Lab.	1967,68,70
St. John Stevas C.	1968
Maclennan Lab.	1969
Rose Lab.	1969

Regional Affairs/Local Authorities Committee:

Vice-chairman:

Jones Lab.	1955-57
Edwards Lab.	1968

Rapporteur of Spokesman

[3]Smithers C.	1955
Hay C.	1957
Errington C.	1965
Balniel C.	1966 (acting)
Kershaw C.	1966 (acting)
R. Edwards Lab.	1969
Vickers C.	1970

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Priveleges.

Chairman: Morrison Lab. 1949
Vice-chairman: [2]Peel C. 1968

Rapporteur:

Morrison Lab.	1949
Hay Lab.	1951
Ross Lab.	1952
[5]Oakshott C.	1954,56
[5]Popplewell Lab.	1956
S S Allen Lab.	1960 (interim)
Rogers Lab.	1961
Chichester-Clark.(UU)	1961
G Jeger Lab.	1963

Kirk C. 1959-61
Russell C. 1963-64

Rapporteur:

Beamish C.	1952
Brooman-White C.	1954
Kirk C.	1958-59-60
Randall Lab.	1959
Willey Lab.	1959 (acting)
Russell C.	1963
Fitch Lab.	1969

Agriculture Committee:

Vice-chairman; Kirk C. 1968

Rapporteur:

[2]Willey Lab.	1957
Crathorne C.	1958(acting)
Royle Lab.	1958
Maitland C.	1960-61
Stonehaven C.	1962-64
[4]Clark C.	1963-64
[4]Brewis C.	1967
Kirk C.	1967-68
J. Johnson Lab.	1969

Social Affairs Committee:

Chairman: Blenkinsop Lab. 1958-70

Rapporteur or Spokesman:

Burton Lab.	1954-55
Lansdowne C.	1958
McLaughlin (UU)	1962
Page Lab.	1966
Blenkinsop Lab.	1968-69
Vickers C.	1969
L Jeger Lab.	1970

Continued.

2. Former Minister of Agriculture.
3. Chairman of Con Housing and Local Government Committee.
4. Farmer.
5. Whip - or former Whip.

Cultural Affairs Committee:

Vice-chairman: Peart Lab. I954.

Rapporteur:

Hollis C.	I953-54
Nicolson C.	I956
Delargy Lab.	I959
King Lab.	I96I
Eden C.	I96I
Stonehaven C.	I96I-62
Pounder (UU)	I966
Jellicoe C.	I966
Blenkinsop Lab.	I968
St Helens C.	I969
Rhodes L.	I969

Science and Technology Committee:

Vice-chairman: Maxwell Lab. I968

Rapporteur:

R Brown Lab.	I967
Maxwell Lab.	I968
I Lloyd C.	I969

Budget Committee:

Chairman: Listowel Lab. I967-70
Vice-chairman: Smithers C. I955
Rapporteur: Listowel Lab. I967

Western European Union.

President.

Maclay C.	I955-56
Hutchinson C.	I957-59

Vice-President.

Mulley Lab.	I960
Crathorne C.	I96I
Henderson Lab.	I96I-62
G Brown Lab.	I962-64
Listowel Lab.	I964
Maudling C.	I965
Soames C.	I965
Douglas-Home C.	I966
Peel C.	I967-69

Defence Committee:

Chairman:

Hutchison C.[6]	I956
R Edwards Lab.	I968-70

Vice-chairman:

Steele Lab.	I958-59
Mulley Lab.	I960
Brown Lab.	I96I-64
Snow Lab.	I965
R Edwards Lab.	I966

Rapporteur:

General Affairs Committee:

Chairman: Kirk C. I960-63
Vice-chairman: Peel C. I967-69

Rapporteur:

Willey Lab.	I957
Kirk C.	I959,66,68
J Hynd Lab.	I960
Mathew C.	I960
Grantchester L.	I964
Midley C.	I964
Edelman Lab.	I965,67,69
Gladwyn L.	I966
E Griffiths C.	I969

Continued.

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6. Colonel, Army.

6 Hutchison C. I956
7 Stonehaven C. I957
Hughes Hallett C. I958-60
Mulley Lab. I958-60
8 Kershaw C. I961-62
9 Goodhart C. I962
Kennet Lab. I962-64
Emery C. I964-65
Jellicoe C. I966
K. Edwards Lab. I966-68
Sandys C. I965-66
10 Jellicoe C. I966
K Edwards Lab. I966-68
Digby C. I968
Dodds-Parker C. I968

Budget Committee:

Chairman:

J Edwards Lab. I955-59
Mathew C. I965-66
Kirk C. I968-69

Vice-chairman:

J. Taylor Lab
Stonehaven C. I961-64
Kirk C. I967

Rapporteur.

J Edwards Lab. I956-58
Mathew C. I961-62,65,66
Kirk C. I968-69

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges:

Vice-chairman:

5 Popplewell Lab. I956
5 Oakshott C. I956
Hay C. I957
Chichester-Clark(UU) I959-61
5 Peel C. I963-64
Rhodes Lab. I969

Rapporteur:

Thomson Lab. I955
Bell C. I963

Science and Space Committee:

Vice-chairman:

Errington C. I965
R Brown Lab. I966-67

Rapporteur

R Brown Lab. I965,66
Kershaw C. I967
Chapman Lab. I969

Working Party on Parliamentary and Public Relations:

Rapporteur: Vickers C. I969
Fitch Lab. I969

NATO Parliamentarians' Conference/ North Atlantic Assembly.

Treasurer:

W Elliot C. I954-57
De Freitas Lab. I957-59

Political Committee:

Chairman: Osborne Lab. I961-63

Military Committee:

Chairman:

Prior-Palmer C. I958-60

Continued.

7. Vice-Admiral.
8. Chmn Con Military Cttee., I962-64.
9. Editor, Disarmament and Arms Control, I962-65.
10. Naval Officer.

Vice-chairman:

De Freitas Lab. 1965
Hooson L. 1968-70(chairman of working party on East-West relations)

Rapporteur:

De Freitas Lab. 1956-57
Hooson L. 1966

Science and Technology Committee:

Rapporteur: Jellicoe C. 1960

Education Committee: (formerly including cultural affairs).

Chairman: Lady Elliot C. 1962-64
Vice-chairman: Lady Elliot C. 1961

Maclean C. 1965,69,70.

Vice-chairman:

Prior-Palmer C. 1957
Goodhart C. 1966-67
(chairman arms standardization sub-committee)

Economic Committee:

Chairman: Kershaw C. 1965-67

Vice-chairman: Bishop Lab. 1968-70
(Chmn payments sub-committee)

Rapporteur:

Kershaw C. 1959-63
Bishop Lab. 1970

Appendix 9.

Procedure for the appointment of Representatives to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe

(Information available as of 1 April 1968)

source: Progress Report of the Bureau, Standing Committee and Permanent Working Party on Parliamentary and Public Relations, CA, Documents, 20th session, 1968, Document 2385.

	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CYPRUS	DENMARK	FRANCE	FED. REP. GERMANY	GREECE	ICELAND	IRELAND
		Law of 13.10.61			Law of 23.7.49	Laws of 11.6.51 and 4.8.53			
Number of seats	6	7	3	5	18	18	7	3	4
Are representatives and substitutes necessarily members of parliament?	Theoretically, no in practice, yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Theoretically, no in practice, yes
How are candidatures allocated among the political parties?	Proportional	Proportional	Proportional	Proportional	Agreement of the chairmen of pol.gps.	Proportional	Agreement of the chairmen of the political groups	Agreement of the chairmen of the political groups	Allocation between the majority and the opposition
How are candidatures presented (joint lists etc.)?	List presented by the political groups	List presented by the political groups	List presented by the political groups	List presented by the political groups	List presented by the political groups	Joint motion by the groups	List presented by the Committee on International Co-operation		List drawn up by the Prime Minister after consultation
Who appoints representatives and substitutes?	Nationalrat: 4 Bundesrat: 2	Chamber: 4 rep; 3 sub Senate: 3 rep; 4 sub	House of Representatives	Folketing	Assemblee Nationale: 12 Senat: 6	Bundestag	The President of the Chamber		The Dail
Method of voting	By show of hands				Secret ballot if no unanimity on the list presented by the groups	By show of hands			
Majority required	Absolute	Absolute			Absolute	Absolute			
What is the official instrument of appointment?	Minutes of the election sitting		Resolution of the House of Representatives	Minutes of Proceedings of the Folketing	Minutes of the election sitting	By act of the President of the Bundestag			Minutes of the sitting at which the Government notified the Dail
Term of office in the Consultative Assembly under national law	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)	Until complete or partial renewal of the Chamber assigning the term of office	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)	Until complete or partial renewal of the Chamber assigning the term of office	Duration of the legislature	One session of Consultative Assembly (renewable)		One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)

	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	MALTA	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	TURKEY	UNITED KINGDOM
	Law of 23.7.49								
Number of seats	18	3	3	7	5	6	6	10	18
Are representatives and substitutes necessarily members of parliament?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Theoretically, no in practice, yes	Theoretically, no in practice, yes	Theoretically, no in practice, yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
How are candidatures allocated among the political parties?	Agreement among the political groups	Agreement of the chairmen of pol. gps.	Agreement among the political groups	Agreement among the political groups	Proportional	Agreement among the chairmen of pol.gps.	Agreement among the political groups	Agreement among the political groups	Proportional to the political groups in the House of Commons
How are candidatures presented (joint lists etc.)?	List presented by the groups	List presented by the chairmen of the groups	List drawn up by the Prime Minister after consulting Ldr. of Opp.	List presented by the groups	List presented by the groups	List presented by the groups	List presented by the groups	List presented by the groups	List presented by the groups
Who appoints representatives and substitutes?	Chamber: 9 Senate: 9	Foreign Affairs Committee	House of Representatives	Jointly by the Presidents of both chambers	Storting	1st Chamber: 3 2nd Chamber: 3	Each Chamber its own members	Each Chamber its own members	The Prime Minister
Method of voting	Secret Ballot				By standing and sitting	By show of hands	Secret ballot		
Majority required	Absolute		Majority			Absolute	Absolute		
What is the official instrument of appointment?	Minutes of the election sitting	Grand-ducal Order	Resolution of the House of Representatives	Joint decision of the Presidents of the 2 Chambers	Minutes of the Stortings sitting	Joint decision of the Presidents of the 2 Chambers			Publication in the Official Report (Hansard) of Prime Minister's answer to a written parliamentary question
Term of office in the Consultative Assembly under national law	Duration of legislature	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renwable)	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)	6 years	1 year	One session of the Consultative Assembly (renewable)

Appendix 10.

Conservative and Labour 'Rebels' in the vote of 28 October 1971 who had served at the Consultative and WEU Assemblies: 1949-70.

Conservatives.

All rebels: 41
Delegates-rebels: 3

Bell
Pounder
Russell

Labour.

All rebels: 89 (20 abstentions)
Delegates-rebels: 30 (8 abstentions)

Albu	
Allen, S.S.	(a)
Blenkinsop	
Bottomley	(a)
Bradley	
Brown, R.	(a)
Crosland	(a)
Delargy	(a)
De Freitas	
Edelman	
Edwards, R.	
Fitch	(a)
Gordon Walker	
Hannan	
Jenkins, R.	
Johnson, C.	
Johnson, J.	(a)
Lawson	
Maclennan	
Marquand	
Mayhew	
Mulley	(a)
Rodgers, W.	
Rose	
Silkin, S.	
Stewart, M.	
Taverne	
Thomson	
Tomney	
Willey	

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A Archives. (i)
B Private Papers - large collections. (i)
C Private Papers - small collections. (ii)
D Other Papers. (iii)
E Other Unpublished Material: Documents, Theses. (iii)

II Printed Sources. (iii)

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2 Books.
3 Articles.
4 Other Material.

B Secondary Sources. (vi)

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D) OTHER.

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Who's Who.
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III. INTERVIEWS:

A total of 54 persons were interviewed during the period March I97I to March I973. Meetings usually ranged between 30 and 90 minutes in length, a number of persons were interviewed more than once. 33 interviews were given on an off-the-record basis and they are listed below by category rather than name.

Members of Parliament (all delegates or former delegates to CA/WEU or NPC/NAA, or all of them).

2I MPs - I2 Conservative (5 Ministers or former Ministers)
IO Labour (5 former Ministers)
I Liberal

IO Staff members of International Organisations.

4 Council of Europe
I WEU
2 NPC/NAA
3 NATO Secretariat

Beever, R. Colin.	30.II.72.	Former Secretary, Labour Committee for Europe.
Blumenfeld, Erik.	I.2.7I.	CDU Member of Bundestag; delegate CA/WEU and NAA.
Chapman, Donald.	26.5.72.	Former Labour MP and delegate to CA/WEU.
Clark, Frank M.	I9.4.7I.	Pennsylvania Congressman, delegate to NPC/NAA.
Crathorne, Lord.	20.7.7I.	Former Conservative MP and Minister; former delegate to CA/WEU and NPC/NAA; President NPC I962-63.
Curtis, Dunstan.	I5.I2.7I.	Former Deputy Secretary General, Council of Europe.
Cusick, Peter.	I4.4.7I.	Advisor to Senator Jacob Javits of New York; observer at NPC/NAA sessions.

Elliot of Harwood, Baroness.	7.7.71	Conservative delegate to NPC/NAA; widow of Walter Elliot, a founding officer of NPC.
Ferdinand, Dr. Horst.	25.1.72.	Secretary to German delegation CA/WEU.
Gladwyn, Lord.	3.6.71.	Former Foreign Office Official; former Ambassador to France; delegate to CA/WEU; former delegate to NPC/NAA.
Hartley, Livingston	19.4.71.	Associate Director, Declaration of Atlantic Unity.
Hays, Wayne.	19.4.71.	Ohio Congressman, delegate to NPC/NAA since 1955.
Hutchison, Sir James.	15.1.73.	Former Conservative MP and delegate to CA/WEU, President of the WEU Assembly, 1957-59.
Lindsay, Kenneth.	31.5.72.	Former Independent MP, observer at numerous CA sessions, author.
Moore, Walden.	28.1.71.	Director, Declaration of Atlantic Unity.
Muirshiel, Viscount.	12.2.73.	Former Conservative MP, Minister; former delegate to CA/WEU; President of WEU Assembly, 1955-56.
Robinson, Douglas.	1.3.71, 16.3.71.	Former Executive Secretary NPC, 1955-60.
Rodino, Peter.	19.4.71.	New Jersey Congressman, delegate to NAA.
Rose, Dr. Saul.	1.6.72.	Former International Secretary, Labour Party.
Salter, Noel.	26.7.71, 7.12.72.	Former Deputy Secretary General, WEU Assembly, 1955-63.
Younger, Sir Kenneth.	19.7.71.	Former Labour MP and Minister, former delegate to CA/WEU.