



ANUBHŪTISVARŪPĀCĀRYA'S

CONTRIBUTION TO ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO AVIDYĀ, MĀYĀ, YOGA AND
MOKṢA

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Short Abstract

This thesis seeks to bring to light the major contribution to *Advaita Vedānta* of the little-known 13th century teacher of *Advaita*, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya to the

with reference to his major works on *Advaita*, showing this to be far greater than previously appreciated in the scholastic world.

It explores the particular intervention of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in debates about the status of *avidyā*, *māyā*, *yoga* and *mokṣa*, helping to chart the development of doctrines in schools of *Advaita Vedānta* over time. The specific issues relevant to the argument are the two major traditions interpreting Ādi Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, viz. the *Bhāmatī* tradition of Vācaspati Miśra and

the *Vivaraṇa* tradition of Prakāśātma Yāti's *Pañcapādika Vivaraṇam* with particular

reference to the status of *māyā*.

The thesis argues that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's distinctive contribution lies in his interpretation of the doctrines of *māyā/avidyā*, *yoga* and *mokṣa*, that affirm the role of meditative practice on the path to *mokṣa*. His views, although largely following the *Vivaraṇa* tradition, differ in some important respects. They effectively incorporate an advanced form of *Yogic* meditation into the practice of *Advaita*. He thereby seems to meet certain socio-historical needs of the community by crafting a theology suitable to ascetic and non-ascetic alike. He may also be responding to competing groups or *pūrvapakṣins* in central India in the middle of the 13th century A.D.

The thesis considers the specific concerns of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's

community at the time, along with an evaluation of methods (*sādhana*), *asparśa-yoga*, the use of *Om* and the 'Great sentences'/ *mahāvākyas* like 'This Self is Absolute'/*ayam atmā brahma* advocated to help one realise Total Freedom/*mokṣa*.

The thesis argues that for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya the texts of revelation are a distinctive conjunction of *Yogic* and *Advaitic* ideas, which have profound implications for *Advaitic* realisation.

At this point in history they marked a key development in the *Advaita Vedānta* teaching which has profound significance right down to the present day.

Long Abstract

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (c.1250 A.D.) the little known *Advaitin*, teacher of Ānandagiri, has made an important contribution to the understanding of the nature of *māyā* and *yoga*, largely missed in the scholarly world because his authorship of major works are as yet untranslated from the Sanskrit.

The essence of *Advaita Vedānta* is, what appears as God, the individual souls and the universe, is in reality non-different from the one absolute reality, *Brahman*. In the light of this, the nature of *māyā* and *avidyā* is discussed.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya puts forward the view that *avidyā* is beginningless, indeterminable and positive, and revealed by the ‘witnessing consciousness.’

The focuses of his work is on 1) the nature of *avidyā* and *māyā*;

2) the distinction between the *jīva* and *Īśvara*;

3) the description of the ‘world’ and refutation of *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Bhedābheda* theories; and

4) his view on liberation, with particular reference to his works *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, *Prakatārthavivaraṇa* etc..

The dissertation considers the history, texts and ideas of this little studied *Advaita Vedānta* teacher in context, providing an introduction to his key ideas drawn from his textual corpus, briefly assessing his distinctive contribution to the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition. It explores his particular intervention in broader *Advaitic* debates

about the status of *māyā*, *yoga* and *mokṣa*, helping to chart the development of doctrines in schools of *Advaita Vedānta*.

In Chapter 1 a brief History of *Advaita Vedānta* up to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, with particular reference to the *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa prasthānas* is outlined.

This is given in order to place this mid-thirteenth-century theologian in context, most famous up to now as the initiator of the grammatical tradition of *Sārasvata-prakriyā*.

It is shown how he has offered comprehensive readings from key scholastic texts of the *Advaita* canon 'purifying' the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition from the tendency towards *Viśiṣṭa Advaita* and *Dvaita*, as well as refuting the views of dualist logicians and followers of *Bhedābheda Vedānta*. The thesis has sought to assess his contribution to *Advaita Vedānta*.

Due to the central role of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and Gauḍapāda's *kārikās* in developing *Advaita* and the major contribution of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's *Ṭippaṇam* on this, it is covered rather more fully.

His *Prakatārthavivaraṇa* is the first complete commentary on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Ādi-Śaṅkara from a 'purely' or *Kevala*¹ *Advaita* point of view, composed with the purpose of 'rescuing' the tradition from the influence of Vācaspati Miśra, whose

- ¹ *Advaita Vedānta*:

This is a philosophical school within Hinduism that emphasizes the non-dual nature of reality, meaning that everything is ultimately one, and the individual self (Ātman) is identical with the ultimate reality (*Brahman*).

- *Kevala Advaita*:

This specific branch of *Advaita Vedānta*, associated with Ādi Śaṅkara, takes the non-dualistic principle to its extreme, asserting that *Brahman* alone is real, and the world and individual selves are ultimately an illusion (*māyā*) in the sense of having only dependent reality like the waves and froth compared with the ocean substratum as it were.

- **Key Teachings:**

- **Brahman as the sole reality:** *Kevala* (from the root/*dhātu* *kev* found in *sevana*=service to the One). *Advaita* posits that *Brahman*, the ultimate, formless, and attributeless reality, is the ultimate substratum of pure Consciousness out of which all names and forms arise and to which they return it is the *sat*/unchanging ' that truly exists, whereas all else is *a-sat*/un-real/ changing.
- **The world as illusion (*māyā*):** The world of names, forms, and experiences is seen as a temporary and illusory appearance of *Brahman*, not a separate or real entity.
- **The individual Self (Ātman) as Brahman:** The individual Self, or *Ātman*, is ultimately identical with *Brahman*, and the experience of separation is an illusion.

- **Ādi Śaṅkara's Role:**

Ādi Śaṅkara, one of the most prominent philosophers and theologians, is considered the founder of the *Kevala Advaita* school, and his commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavad Gītā*, and *Brahmasūtras* are foundational to this tradition.

- **Other Schools of Vedānta:**

While *Kevala Advaita* is a prominent school, it's important to note that other schools of *Vedānta*, such as *Viśiṣṭādvaita* (qualified non-dualism) and *Dvaita* (dualism), offer different interpretations of the relationship between the individual Self and *Brahman*.

Bhāmatī, has a tendency to favour a *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa* or *Viśiṣṭa-Advaita* perspective.

His works *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, *Pramāṇamāla-Nibandha*, *Nyāyadīpāvali-Candrikā*, *Nyāyamakaranda-Saṅgraha*, *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī*, as well as his *Ṭippaṇa* on Śrī Śaṅkara's *Gītābhāṣya* and his *Ṭippaṇa* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and 215 *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda, are detailed interpretative commentaries on most of the major texts of post-Śaṅkara *Vedāntic* discourse.

Chapter 2 gives a more detailed discussion of the two great traditions of *Advaita Vedānta*, that of Vācaspati Miśra with his famous *Bhāmatī* commentary on the Ādiśaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Vivaraṇa* tradition going back to Padmapāda's and Prakāśātmā's *Pañcapādikā*. In this we consider the central importance of the theories of error, *avidyā*/ignorance, the *Ātman* and *Brahman*, *Jīvātman*, *Īśvara* and omniscience and liberation in these two central traditions or *Prasthānas* of *Advaita* during its 'middle period' with particular reference to the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* and the *Ṭippaṇa* on *Māṇḍūkyagauḍapādīyakārikābhāṣya*, *Māyā* and *avidyā*, are described as the pillars of *Advaita Vedānta*, as the very purport of scriptures is actually to give proof of *māyā*.

In chapter 3 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's contribution to *Advaita* on the nature of *Brahman* and *māyā* and *avidyā*, is shown to be positive, affirming that Nescience is indeterminable and revealed by the witnessing consciousness. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further demonstrates that the theory that they are different does not stand to reason, and gives substantial evidence to show the theory of non-difference is rooted in the *śruti* and reason. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya demonstrates that reasoning is in support of the multiplicity of nescience. The locus and content of nescience is demonstrated in fact to be *Brahman*, the one consciousness, pure Bliss and indivisible. The inert cannot be the locus or object of nescience since by definition it has no consciousness of its own.

He developed the view in opposition to Vacaspati Mīśra's theory that locus and content are different. The theory that the locus and the content are the same, like that of clay and the pot referred to in the *Chāndogya Upanisad* 6.1.4.

In chapter 4 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's view on the World in the light of *Advaita Vedānta* is presented. According to *Advaita Vedānta*, the view that *Brahman* is non-dual, only holds good if there were no entity apart from it. The souls which may be considered other than *Brahman* were 'proved' in this system to be non-different from

it. "*Brahman* is truth, the world is non-real; the *jīva* is not other than the *Brahman*" is discussed.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya avers in accord with *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1, "this was Existence alone", and that the world is indeed 'unreal'/*mithyā*. So prior to creation this world, now differentiated into names and forms, remains identical with *Brahman*. " One only, without a second", predicates the absence of the world in *Brahman*.

The *Vivartvāda* theory is established in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*. i) " non-existence as the cause" was found to be lacking any reasonable basis; ii) " non-existence of the effect in the cause" was proved to be fundamentally flawed; iii) "existence of the effect in the cause" is divided into two aspects, (a) 'actual transformation' and (b) 'apparent not real change' . While the former was shown to suffer from logical weaknesses , like *a-sat-kārya-vāda*, the theory of 'apparent not real change' was demonstrated to lie at the basis of *Upaniṣadic* thought. Further in relation to the *Buddhist* view iv.) so called 'self-cognition', perception of silver as an external object simply negates their theory that the object is nothing but a mental cognition.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refutes the Prabhākāra's *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Vedānta* position v.) 'non-apprehension', by showing it is contradictory to say the action of a sentient being takes place without cognition of a common substratum.

The theory of the *Naiyāyikas*, vi.) 'misapprehension' is simply the view that nacre which is real appears in the form of silver another real thing, he too refutes. Finally he refutes viii) "non-duality of the word" by showing it is contradictory for the same thing to be both the signified and the signifier, the subject as well as the object. Word can be experienced by sense organs, but *Brahman* cannot. So he then concludes by the establishment of ix.) 'cognition of indeterminability' establishing the non-duality of *Brahman*, because the indeterminable universe does not attain to the status of a second entity.

In Chapter 5 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's view on Liberation is presented with total distinction between activity and knowledge. So realisation of the Self arises from the words of the *Vedas* bringing about cessation of nescience.

He explains that one free from merits and demerits living out only his fructified *karma*, is known as *jīvanmukta*. The true nature of the Self, i.e. the cessation of

nescience is Self-knowledge, which is an indeterminable cessation of even the mental modification which removes nescience.

One Liberated while living, 'attains to' final Liberation on the fall of the body. 'Renunciation' is when mind becomes *Brahman*. This is the "Yoga which is Contactless," and difficult to be comprehended by any *Yogī*.

The way *Advaita* debates on the status of *māyā* and the means of overcoming it are impacted by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's accounts of *māyā* and *yoga*, and his general contribution to *Advaita* also outlined.

The description of the nature of *māyā*, the distinction between *jīva* and *īśvara*, the refutation of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*, the refutation of the theory of the *Bhedābheda* and his subtle exposition on the nature of *yoga* and liberation, linking the *Advaita Vedānta* and the *Yoga Darśana* in a radical new way, so relevant to today's climate, are all given.

Thus he shows that the nature of *māyā* is associated only with pure consciousness, is indeterminable, and One. So, the 'eradication of sin by the sight of 'setu' 'may be an initial help, but more significant is the understanding and practise of a 'Great

scriptural sentences like 'this *Ātman*/Self is *Brahman*' *mahāvākya* or meditation with the help of *Om*, resulting in realisation of the One.

No real object is destroyed by superficial 'knowledge', only by meditation and repetition of *mantra* practiced with great diligence, combined with practices laid down in scriptures, and since ignorance of *Brahman* is destroyed by knowledge, it is indeterminate.

Detachment not just cessation of attachment is the means for restraining the mind, " practice and non-attachment" to sense objects, by realisation of the harmful nature of sense object-attachment. As *Gītā* 6.35 confirms, "mind is hard to restrain and restless; but by practice.. and by indifference it may be restrained"

"Indeterminability is the total impossibility of being ascertained as real and so there is no non-difference from the probandum," as Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains. The chapter explores his claim that the statement of difference from reality and unreality is to bring out the impossibility of ascertainment in those forms.

Indeterminability is 'this' (*māyā*) which appears, but cannot stand reasoning and *Māyā* is subservient to Consciousness, beginningless, indeterminate. He says that

the reflection of Consciousness in it is *Īśvara*. He becomes omniscient etc. because of its modifications. So as the *Śvetāśvatara* 4.10 says

“Know *māyā* to be the cause and the supreme Lord to be its controller”.

Our author further says that Consciousness looked upon as reflected in ignorance is bondage. Since it is accepted that ignorance/*a-jñāna* is destroyed by knowledge alone, it is understandable that liberation results on the destruction of that *a-jñāna* by knowledge. Just as there is a reflection of colour which is itself devoid of colour, there can be a reflection here. He proves that space is reflected by reference to the assumed likeness of each form. As the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 2.5.19 says “That form of his is for the sake of making Him known”.

Again he quotes from *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* on 3.2.18 “Just as the luminous sun, though only one, becomes many by entry (as reflection) in different receptacles of water, similarly, this effulgent one, the birthless Self, is made to appear as different in different bodies because of the limiting adjuncts” and in *Mahā-subhāṣita-samgraha Brahmabindu Upaniṣad* 11 “the Self of all beings,.... appears as one and as many, like reflections of the moon in water”.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refutes Bhāskara’s objection that the description of *jīvas* etc. as reflections is not logical. He says that the connection of face with mirror is

unreal. Face however is real. Further the connection with place (mirror) alone is denied in the form 'The face is not here, but is actually mine'. He thus also rejects the view of *Naiyāyikas* who said that the quality known as 'knowledge' arises from contact of Self with mind.

The idea that Self is possessor of that knowledge he refutes. For he says that the Self is partless, being all pervading. The Self and mind are not capable of mutual contact, they being changeless.

Furthermore he shows that the relationship of quality and its possessor is itself untenable, and that the so called 'six categories' cannot be accepted because there are other categories, such as potency.

He asserts that it is not reasonable to define quality as something attributeless, having generality, for a quality does not exist apart from the substance possessing it.

Similarly, he claims that just as all the spaces confined within the various jars are not darkened when one of the spaces thus confined becomes contaminated by dust, so also is the case with all individuals in the matter of being affected by happiness.

Moreover he states that the *Vaiśeṣika* view that qualities such as desire are not located in the Self is not supported by any authority. For the Self is not possessed of qualities such as desire being eternal and without part, and what is not so, is not

that, such as the body. Since the Self is referred to as existing in the form of individual souls, in the same way as space exists in the form of spaces confined within jars, so the Self exists in the form of composite things just as space exists in jars etc. Therefore the Self is free from real internal difference, being subtle, devoid of parts, all pervading.

In chapter 6 too, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's outlines his refutation of the *Bhedābheda* view that the universe and *Brahman* are both different and non-different, so denying variety in *Brahman*. Moreover he explains that it cannot be said that diversity other than *Brahman* and its effect is real, contradicting Bhāskara's view that no duality other than *Brahman* with its effect exists.

In chapter 6 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's distinctive view is presented, that even in liberation *māyā* ' though the universe which is a manifestation of *māyā* exists, it is not experienced, just as a form is not experienced by one devoid of sense organs. Although it is unreal, it can be 'indestructible' just as it is 'beginningless'. So in the statement of *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1.10 'there is cessation of all *māyā* in the end' indicating it is only the cessation of that part of *māyā* which is called *avidyā*, the cause of all transmigration of the *jīvas*.

The view that *māyā* continues to exist even in a 'state of liberation' is related to the concept of 'individual' liberation. Since the universe is unreal in all three periods of time in the eyes of the liberated person who has reached the state of absolute reality, the acceptance of the existence of *māyā* for enabling the continuance of the universe proves unnecessary. As Gauḍapāda in *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Kārikā* 1.17. puts it, "It is beyond question that the phenomenal world would cease to be if it had any existence. All this duality that is nothing but *Māyā*, is but non-duality in reality."

The conclusion of our thesis is that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's most important contribution connects with his name *Anubhūti* (experience) as the final proof leading to Self realisation. The tradition claims that the final proof of anything requires the authority for anything is in accord with the statements of *Śruti*, the *Smṛti* and the words of the *Mahāpuruṣa*, and the final 'proof' comes through *Anubhūti* ('profound experience of Oneness) i.e the undoubted consonance of the inner organ of mind (computer-mind/*manas*/ power of discerning truth from untruth/*buddhi*/ 'mind's mother substance'/*citta* and *ahaṁkāra*). Hence this is reflected in the traditional *upaniṣadic* stages of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* that is reflected practically in experience (*Anubhūti*) as taught in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.4.4. Thus it paves the way for an *Advaita* which incorporates

the wisdom of Yoga with the profound practical wisdom of *Advaita Vedānta* culminating in the '*asparśa yoga*'. This wisdom is practical for the householder and renunciate alike, as claimed in *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* 3.39 and 4.2 " a Yoga that is devoid of touch, which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial".

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Chapter 1: Brief History of *Advaita Vedānta* up to
 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, with reference to the
Bhāmatī and *Vivaraṇa Prasthānas*.²

In this thesis, we argue that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, although most famous today
 as the initiator of the grammatical tradition of *Sārasvataparakriyā*, needs to be

² 'Methods or approaches having much in common' but not being consciously developed as 'schools' cf. McCrea, L. (2015). Fed by the weight of history: polemic and doxography in sixteenth century Vedānta, *South Asian History and Culture*, 6:1, pp.87-101, DOI: 10.1080/19472498.2014.969012

recognised even more importantly as a great preceptor of *Advaita Vedānta* largely forgotten.

His magnum opus, *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*, has played a key role in restoring the purity of the *Kevala Advaita* tradition in the 13th century, by providing the first full commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* of Ādi Śaṅkara from the largely *Vivaraṇa* perspective, yet has remained anonymous until very recent times. This is his most famous *Advaita* work, the first complete commentary on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, composed with the explicit purpose of rescuing the tradition from the corrosive influence of ‘*Maṇḍanamīśra-prṣṭasevī*,’ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s term for Vācaspati Mīśra, the composer of the *Bhāmatī*.

This contrasts with the only other full commentary, the *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Mīśra, which it is argued falls short of the ‘pure/*Kevala Advaita*’ tradition of Ādi Śaṅkara, Padmapāda and Prakāśātmā. His other works give a sense of the ‘programmatic nature of his interpretative project’ for he commentaries on *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, the *Pramāṇamāla*, *Nyāyadīpāvalī*, and *Nyāyamakaranda* of Ānandabodha, Śrī Harṣa’s *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, as well as Śrī Śaṅkara’s *Gītābhāṣya* and the *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda as well as Śrī Śaṅkara’s *bhāṣya* on it, i.e.

most of the major texts of post-Śaṅkara *Vedāntic* discourse, as well as two primary articulations of the classical tradition.³ He has provided the inspiration for later famous *Kevala* pure *Advaitins*, like his student, Ānandagiri, and the great Vidyāraṇya, famous author of the seminal *Advaita* work, the *Pañcadaśī*, composed a century later.

A complete list of his other major works gives a sense of both his intellectual ambition as well as the programmatic nature of his interpretive project. In sets out to address most of the major texts of post-Śaṅkara *Vedāntic* discourse, as well as two of the primary articulations of the classical tradition.

In his *Tattvāloka*, Ānandagiri, writing under his preinitiatory name of Janārdana, identifies Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya as his knowledge preceptor/*vidyāguru*. As Upadhyāya⁴ conclusively demonstrates in his introduction to this text, there is a wealth of evidence connecting Ānandagiri with King Nṛsiṃhadeva of Kaliṅga in

³ Schwarz, J., IJHS, (2017). 21 *Parabrahman Among the Yogins*, p.365

⁴ Upadhyaya, S. A. 1969. "Introduction." In T. A. Venkateshvara Dikshitar, ed., *Vedānta Tattvāloka* of Śrī Janārdana, xi–xiii. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.

particular and with the Eastern *Purī Śaṅkaracārya Maṭha* in general. This includes indications that he served as the monastic head, or *Śaṅkaracārya* of an *Advaita* lineage based out of *Purī*, the so-called eastern *Maṭha*. As even the most cursory reading of his writings makes evident, Ānandagiri's voluminous writings, which encompass commentaries on the collected works of the historical Śaṅkara, some of his pseudepigrapha, and several independent works on *Sāṃkhya* and *Nyāya*, consistently offer programmatic representations of his teacher's glosses. There is also substantial evidence in the writings of the period connecting our author with many of the key doctrinal innovations of the thirteenth through fourteenth centuries. Thus, for example, in his recent lectures, Śrī Mani Drāvida documents the considerable conceptual and textual debt that the writings of Gauda Jñānottama owe to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's commentaries. Indeed, he shows that much of what has been typically understood as Jñānottama's major contributions to *Advaita* discourse are directly borrowed from his predecessor. Gauda Jñānottama was the teacher of Citsukhācārya, who again has long been associated with a supposed *Advaita maṭha* at *Purī*.

To place these important works from the Medieval period of *Vedānta* in context, we shall start with an overview of *Advaita Vedānta*.

Advaita Vedānta (वेदान्त), also known as *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, is one of the six orthodox (*āstikā* P.4.2.60 'there is God etc') schools of *Vedic* philosophy. The word 'Vedānta' means 'conclusion of the four *Vedas*'. *Veda* (वेद) — refers to the four sacred Vedic texts, the *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda* and *anta* (अंत) — means 'End'. Each *Veda* has four subdivisions – the *Samhitā* (*mantras* and benedictions), the *Brāhmaṇa* (commentaries on rituals, ceremonies and sacrifices), the *Āraṇyakas* ('forest texts for renunciates with a mystical interpretation of rituals, ceremonies, sacrifices and symbolic-sacrifices'), and the *Upaniṣads* ('setting at rest ignorance by revealing the knowledge of the supreme Spirit' [MW 201]; texts discussing meditation, philosophy and spiritual knowledge) and encompasses the ideas that emerged from or were aligned with the profound knowledge which leads to liberation, the culmination of the highest knowledge, oneness of the true Self, *Ātman* with the Absolute, *Brahman*.

Vedānta originally referred to the *Upaniṣads*. It is concerned with the *jñānakāṇḍa* or knowledge section of the *Vedas*, which is called the *Upaniṣads*. *Vedānta* developed into many schools, all of which base their ideas on the authority

of a common group of texts called the *Prasthānatrayī*, 'the three sources': the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*. The *Upaniṣads*, or *Śruti prasthāna* is considered the *Śruti*, the "heard" (and repeated) foundation of *Vedānta*. The *Brahma Sūtras*, or *Nyāya* or *Yukti prasthāna* is considered the reason-based foundation of *Vedānta*, and the *Bhagavadgītā*, or *Smṛti prasthāna* is considered the *Smṛti* (remembered tradition) of *Vedānta*.

Vedānta is one of the six orthodox (*āstika*) schools of Indian Philosophy viz; *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*. It is also called *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, which means the 'latter enquiry' or 'higher enquiry' and is often contrasted with *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* the 'former enquiry' or 'primary enquiry'.

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā deals with the *karma-khāṇḍa* or ritualistic section (the *Samhitā* and *Brāhmaṇas*) of the *Vedas* while *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* concerns itself with the fourth and final and eternal aim of human-kind *Puruṣārtha*⁵, liberation or *mokṣa* from the unending circle of birth and death, *saṃsāra*, to realize one's true nature as Truth, Consciousness and Bliss, *Sat Cit Ānanda*.

⁵ Human effort; any one of the four aims of existence (viz *kāma*, the gratification of desire; *artha*, acquirement of wealth; *dharma*, discharge of duty; *mokṣa*, final emancipation).

The main schools of *Vedānta* are *Advaita* (non-dualism; that teaches the absence of duality in existence). This viewpoint questions the boundaries conventionally imposed between Self and other, mind and body, observer and observed, and other dichotomies that shape our perception of reality. As a field of study, nondualism delves into the concept of nonduality and the state of nondual awareness, encompassing a diverse array of interpretations across traditions, not limited to a particular cultural or religious context; instead, nondualism emerges as a central teaching across various traditions, inviting individuals to examine reality beyond the confines of dualistic thinking, the direct experience of the essential unity, through meditation on the Great Sentences of the *Upaniṣads*, like:

Tat tvam asi (*Chāndogya* VI.8.7) '**Thou art That**',

Ayam Ātmā Brahma (*Māṇḍūkya* 2.) '**This Self is Brahman/Absolute**',

Aham brahmāsmi (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka* I.x.10) '**I am Brahman**'

Prajñānam Brahma (*Aitareya* III.i.3) '**Consciousness is Brahman**' as the direct

path to Self-realization, according to Ādi Śaṅkara (c.A.D.780-820).

Bhedābheda or *Dvaitādvaita* (difference and non-difference) is a tradition of *Vedānta*, which teaches that the individual self (*jīvātman*) is both different and non-different from the ultimate reality known as *Brahman*, according to *Bhāskara* (fl.9th century A.D.)

Viśiṣṭhādvaita (qualified non-dualism; ‘non-duality with distinctions’) is a philosophy that recognizes *Brahman* as the supreme reality while also acknowledging its multiplicity. This philosophy can be characterized as a form of qualified monism, attributive monism, or qualified non-dualism. It upholds the belief that all diversity ultimately stems from a fundamental underlying unity, according to Rāmānuja (d.1137A.D).

Dvaita (dualism) or *Tattvavāda* ‘arguments from a realist viewpoint.’ The *Tattvavāda* (*Dvaita*) *Vedānta* sub-school was founded by the 13th-century philosopher-saint Mādhavācārya⁶, (d.1317A.D). He believed in three entities: God (*Īśvara*), the soul (*jīvātma*) and matter (*jaḍa*). The *Dvaita Vedānta* school believes that God and the individual souls exist as independent realities, and these are distinct, it

⁶ Stoker, V. (2011). Madhva (1238-1317). *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

being said that *Viṣṇu* (or *Nārāyaṇa*) is independent (*svatantra*, 'having the system within themselves'), and souls are dependent (*paratantra*).

Śuddhādvaita (pure non-dualism) is the 'purely non-dual' philosophy propounded by Vallabhācārya (d.1531A.D.), the founding philosopher and guru of the *Vallabhā sampradāya* ('tradition of Vallabhā') or *Puṣṭimārga* ('The path of grace'), a *Hindu Vaiṣṇava* tradition focused on the worship of *Kṛṣṇa*. Vallabhācārya's pure form of philosophy is different from *Advaita* in that it considers God as distinct from the soul, and *Acintya-Bheda-Abheda* (inconceivable difference and non-difference; *acintya* means 'inconceivable', *bheda* translates as 'difference', and *abheda* translates as 'non-difference'). Chaitanya Mahāprabhu (d.1534A.D.) was the founder of *Acintya Bheda Abheda* school and *Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavism*.

This *Gaudīya Vaiṣṇava* religious tradition employs the term in relation to the relationship between creation and creator (*Kṛṣṇa, Himself is Lord, Svayam Bhagavan*) between God and his energies. It can be understood as an integration of the strict *Dvaita* theology of Mādhavācārya and the qualified monism (*Viśiṣṭhādvaita*) of Rāmānuja.

Most major *Vedānta* schools, except *Advaita Vedānta*, are related to *Vaiṣṇavism*, and emphasize devotion (*bhakti*) to God, as *Viṣṇu* or a related 'incarnation'. *Advaita Vedānta*, on the other hand, emphasizes *Jñāna* (knowledge) and *Jñāna -Yoga* over theistic devotion.

Common Features

Despite their differences, all schools of *Vedānta* share some common features:

- *Vedānta* is the pursuit of knowledge of the *Brahman* and the *Ātman*.
- The *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahma Sūtras* constitute the basis of *Vedānta* (known as the *Prasthānatraya*, the three canonical sources).
- Scripture (the eternal Word, *Śruti-Śabda*) is the primary source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*).
- *Brahman-Īśvara* (God) exists as the unchanging material cause and instrumental cause of the world. The exception is that *Dvaita Vedānta* does not hold *Brahman* to be the material cause, but only the efficient cause.

- The Self (*Ātman* or *Jīvātman*) is the apparent agent of its own acts (*karma*) and the recipient of the consequences of these actions, according to *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*.
- Belief in rebirth (*saṃsāra*) and the desirability of release from the cycle of rebirths (*mokṣa*).
- Rejection of the three heterodox Philosophies, *Nāstika Darśanas viz.* Materialist /*Cārvākas*, *Buddhism*, and *Jainism* and the conclusions of the other five Orthodox Vedic Schools of Philosophy, *Āstika Darśanas viz. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and, to some extent the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* (ritualistic interpretations of the *Veda* as *Karma khāṇḍa*, in contrast to the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta* interpretation of the *Veda*, the *Jñāna* (knowledge) *khāṇḍa*(portion).

Scripture

All schools of *Vedānta* propound their philosophy by interpreting the *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavadgītā* and *Brahma-sūtra* texts as *Prasthāna-trayī*, literally, *three sources*. So, all the prominent *Vedāntic* teachers, including Ādi Śaṅkara, Rāmāṇuja, and Madhva, wrote commentaries on these three sources. The 555 *Brahma Sūtras* of

Bādarāyaṇa serve as a synthesis of the teachings found in the diverse *Upaniṣads*, and while there may have been other similar syntheses in the past, only the *Brahma Sūtras* have survived to the present day. The *Bhagavadgītā*, with its syncretism of *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, and *Upaniṣadic* thought, has also been a significant influence on *Vedāntic* thought.

Vedāntins generally agree that scripture (*śruti*) is the only valid means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) regarding spiritual matters (which are beyond perception and inference)⁷. This is explained by Rāmānuja:

A theory that rests exclusively on human concepts may at some other time or place be refuted by arguments devised by cleverer people.... The conclusion is that with regard to supernatural matters, Scripture alone is the epistemic authority and that reasoning is to be used only in support of Scripture

[Śrī Bhāṣya 2.1.12].⁸

For *Advaita Vedānta*, upon which this thesis is centred, the works of *Ādi Śaṅkara* are central.

⁷ Bartley, C. (2015). *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy Hindu and Buddhist Ideas from Original Sources*, Bloomsbury Academic, p.179.

⁸ Bartley, C. (2015).

Metaphysics

Vedāntic philosophies discuss three fundamental metaphysical categories and the relations between the three: 1) *Brahman* or *Īśvara*, the Ultimate Reality;

2) *Ātman* or *Jivātman*, the apparently 'individual self or soul, and

3) *Prakṛti* or *Jagat*, the 'empirical world, ever-changing physical universe, body and matter.⁹

Brahman / Īśvara – Conceptions of the Supreme Reality

Ādi Śaṅkara, in his formulation of *Advaita*, talks of two conceptions of *Brahman*: The higher *Brahman* as undifferentiated Being, 'free from the three strands of inert nature or *Prakṛti* viz. purity/*sattva*, unrestrained activity/*rajas* /inert dissolving power/*tamas*/*Nirguṇa*, and a lower *Brahman* endowed with-qualities/ *Sa-guṇa* as the creator of the universe:

⁹ Hiriyanna, M. (2008) [1948]. *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (Reprint ed.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

- *Parā* or Higher *Brahman*: The undifferentiated, Absolute, Infinite, Transcendental, Supra-relational *Brahman* beyond all thought and speech is defined as *parā Brahman*, free from all distinction or variation/*nirviśeṣa Brahman*, or *nirguṇa Brahman* and is the Absolute of metaphysics.
- *Aparā* or Lower *Brahman*: The *Brahman* with qualities defined as *aparā Brahman* or *saguṇa Brahman*. The *saguṇa Brahman* is endowed with attributes and represents the personal God of religion.

Relation Between *Brahman* and *Jīva / Ātman*

According to *Advaita Vedanta*, *Ātman* is identical to *Brahman* and there is no difference, as quintessentially expressed in the *Upaniṣads* in the form of positive *Mahāvākyas*, *Tat tvam asi* (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.7) “**Thou art That**” ‘*Ayam Ātmā Brahma*’ (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* 2.) ‘**This Self is Brahman/Absolute**’, ‘*Aham brahmāsmi*’ (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I.x.10) ‘**I am Brahman**’ and ‘*Prajñānaṁ brahma*’ (*Aitareya Upaniṣad* III.i.3) ‘**Consciousness is Brahman**’, ‘*Satyam jñānam anantam brahma*’. (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.i.1) ‘**Brahman is truth, Knowledge, and Infinite**’ in later *Advaita*

'*Saccidānanda*' (*Brahma-vidyā Upaniṣad* 109)¹⁰ '**Truth, Consciousness and Bliss**', and culminating in the most famous highest view of all because the key to the ultimate *mokṣa* or liberation lies in removing ignorance, *avidyā*, that **Real/ Sat without a second** (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.2.1) beyond words, uncovered or revealed by the words '*neti neti*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I.x.10) '**(The Self) is not this, not this**'. All these *Mahāvākyas* are said to be potent for Self-realization or *mokṣa*, when practised under the famous discipline give in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.iv.5.

Śravaṇam, Listening, *Mananam*, profound thinking and *Nididhyāsana*, intense meditation and reflection, so as to become One with That or merge in That, a process sometimes called *Tad-ātmya*.

¹⁰ '112 Upaniṣads' (2004). Volume 2. Delhi: Board of Scholars Parimal Publications, p.23

Pre-Śaṅkara *Advaita Vedānta*

It is possible to argue that the *Upaniṣadic* Teachers, *Udālaka Aruni, Aruna* (c.800?B.C.), teaching before all Greek philosophers including, Heraclitus and Parmenides, states in the *Chāndogya* VI.2.1:

In the beginning, my dear, this was pure Being /*Sat* one, without a second, (*Advitīyam*).

Some say that in beginning this was non-being alone, one, without a second; and from that *Asat*, the *Sat* was born.¹¹

And Yājñavalkya in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV.iv.22 says:

This Self is That which has been described as 'Not this, not this.' It is imperceptible, for It is never

¹¹ p.412-3 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, Swāmi Gambhīrānanda, *Advaita Ashrama*, Calcutta (1997)

ChUp 6,2.1सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्। *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam.*

तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्। *tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam |*

तस्मादसतःसञ्जायत॥६।२।१॥ *tasmād asataḥ saḥ jāyata | |*

perceived; undecaying, for It never decays;
 unattached, for It is never attached; unfettered
 — It never feels pain, and never suffers injury.
 (It is but proper) that the sage is never over-
 taken by these two thoughts, 'I did an evil act
 for this,' and 'I did a good act for this. 'He
 conquers both of them. Things done or not
 done do not trouble him.'¹²

These were the first *Advaitin* teachers who provided the beginnings of the World's
 Metaphysical Philosophy as well as that of *Advaita Vedānta*.¹³

¹² p.519-10 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* Swami Mahadhavānanda *Advaita Advaita Ashrama*, Calcutta (1975)'sa eṣa
 neti nety ātmā | aḡṛhyo na hi ḡṛhyate | aśīryam na hi śīryate | asaṅgo na hi saḡyate

| asito na vyathate na riṣyati | vijñātāram are kena vijānīyād ity uktānuśāsanāsi maitreyi | etāvad are khalv
 amṛtatvam iti hoktvā yājñavalkyo vijahāra.' || *BṛhUp_4,5.15* ||

¹³ Scharfstein, B. (1998). *A Comparative History of World Philosophy* SUNY.

Earliest *Advaita-Vedānta* – *Upaniṣads* and *Brahma Sūtras*

The *Upaniṣads* form the basic texts, of which *Vedānta* gives an interpretation.¹⁴ The *Upaniṣads* do not contain ‘a rigorous philosophical inquiry identifying the doctrines and formulating the supporting arguments.’¹⁵ This philosophical inquiry was performed by the *darśanas*, the various philosophical schools.¹⁶

The question is, did an *Advaita* tradition exist in the first five hundred years of the first millenium A.D.? Śaṅkara thinks so, for he refers to his ‘tradition’ *sampradāya* and quotes certain old writers, saying that even a wise man in all sciences is a fool if he has no tradition.¹⁷

¹⁴ Deutsch, E. and Dalvi, R. (2004). *The Essential Vedānta*, World Wisdom, Inc.p.95-96

¹⁵ Balasubramanian, R. (2000). "Introduction". In Chattopadhyana (ed.). *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*. Volume II Part 2: *Advaita Vedanta*. Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, p.xxx

¹⁶ *ibid.* xxxi

¹⁷ Pandey Sangam Lal. *Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Philosophy* (Allahbad:Darshan Peeth, 19740, pp.91ff

Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma Sūtras*

It is usually said that the *Brahma Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, also called the *Vedānta Sūtra*¹⁸, were compiled but there is much unclarity here. Pandey, for example, points out that it may have been compiled in its present form around 400-450 A.D.,¹⁹ but 'the greater part of the *Sūtras* must have been in existence much earlier than that'²⁰ and estimates of the date of Bādarāyaṇa's lifetime differ between 200 B.C. and 200A.D.

¹⁸ *ibid.* xxxii

¹⁹ Nakumara, H. (1950a). p.436

²⁰ Pandey, S.L. (2000). *Pre-Sankara Advaita*. In: Chattopadhyana (gen.ed.), *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*. Volume II Part 2: *Advaita Vedanta*, Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, p.4.

The *Brahma Sūtra*, perhaps an interpretation of teachings of the *Upaniṣads*, could be interpreted as written largely from a '*Bhedābheda-Vedāntic* view. It was and is a guidebook for the great teachers of the *Vedāntic* systems'.²¹ Bādarāyaṇa was not the first person to systematise the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*,²² since he refers to seven *Vedāntic* teachers before him. From the way in which Bādarāyaṇa cites the views of others, it is obvious that the teachings of the *Upaniṣads* must have been analyzed and interpreted by many before him and that his systematization of them into 555 *sūtras* arranged in four chapters must have been the latest version.

²¹ Balasubramanian, R. (2000). p.xxxii

²² Phillips, Stephen, H. (1995). *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, Columbia University Press, p.332;
Balasubramanian, R. (2000) p. xxxiii

However, like Bādarāyaṇa, author of the 555 *Brahmasūtras*, (dated between 100B.C. and 100A.D.²³, whom *Advaitins* call an *Advaitin*, not surprisingly, would not be so called by the followers of other schools, like *Viśiṣṭa Advaita*. He does mention three previous teachers, Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛtsna, in *sūtra* I.4.22: '*avasthiter iti Kāśakṛtsnaḥ*'²⁴ on the relation between the individual self and the true Self, the last of whom Śāṅkara interprets as representing the pure *Advaita* position, but since the *sūtra* is one word it has not been difficult to construct the readings.

Further, as evidence of post *Brahmasūtras Advaitins*, Ādi Śāṅkara speaks of *Vṛttikāras* who wrote commentaries, especially Upavarṣa (c.200A.D.), author of a *Śarīrakamimāṃsāvṛtti* a commentary on *Brahmasūtras* whom he refers to as '*Bhagavān*' in his *Brahmasūtrasbhāṣya* on III.3.53 *eka ātmanaḥ Śarīre bhāvāt*: 'Some deny the existence of the soul, its existence being dependent on the existence of the body.'²⁵

Olivelle suggests that almost all *Samnyāsa Upaniṣads*, which belong to the group of minor *Upaniṣads* and are of a later date than the major *Upaniṣads*, namely the first centuries A.D., have a strong *Advaita Vedānta emphasis* which is evidence for

²³ Pandey, S.L., pp.21-27

²⁴ 1.4.22 *brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* Swāmi Gambhīrānanda, *Advaita Ashrama*, (1996). Calcutta, p.286

²⁵ *ibid.* p.739

a flourishing pre-Śaṅkara *Advaita*.²⁶ Most of the *Sannyāsa Upaniṣads* present a *Yoga* and nondualist *AdvaitaVedānta* philosophy. This may be, states Patrick Olivelle, because major Hindu monasteries of the early medieval period (1st millennium A.D.) belonged to this tradition. Sprockhoff states that before the 3rd-century A.D., six of these *Sannyāsa Upaniṣads* – *Aruni*, *Kundika*, *Kathashruti*, *Paramahansa*, *Jabala* and *Brahma* – were composed.²⁷ The *Āśrama Upaniṣad* is dated to the 3rd-century²⁸ Adishesha's *Paramarthasāra* (c.500A.D.) is clearly another of these early *Advaita* texts.

Between *Brahma Sūtras* and *Śaṅkara*

According to Nakamura, 'there must have been an enormous number of other writings ... in this period, but unfortunately all of them have been scattered or lost

²⁶ *ibid.* pp.17-18

²⁷ pp. 277–294, 319–377 ... Sprockhoff 1976

²⁸ Olivelle, P. (1993). *The Āśrama System: The History and Hermeneutics of a Religious Institution*, Oxford University Press.

and have not come down to us today'.²⁹ In his commentaries Śaṅkara mentions 99³⁰ different predecessors of his *Sampradāya*.³¹ In the beginning of his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara salutes the teachers of the *Brahmavidyā Sampradāya*. Pre-Śaṅkara doctrines and sayings can be traced in the works of the later schools, which does give insight into the development of early *Vedānta* philosophy.³²

Nakumara refers to the names of various important early *Vedānta* thinkers listed in the *Siddhitraya* by Yamunācārya (c.1050A.D.), the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* of Rāmānuja (c.1050–1157A.D.), and the *Yatīndramatadīpikā* of Śrīnivāsa-dāsa. Combined together, at least fourteen thinkers are known to have existed between the composition of the *Brahma Sūtras* and Śaṅkara's lifetime.³³

²⁹ Nakumara, H. (1950a). p.436

³⁰ Roodurmum, P. S. (2002). *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta: Critical Approach*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited

³¹ Nakumara, H. (1950a). p.678

³² *ibid.* p.3

³³ *ibid.* p.3

Not surprisingly, although Śaṅkara is often considered to be the founder of the *Advaita Vedānta* school, a comparison of the known teachings of these *Vedāntins* and Śaṅkara's thought shows that many of the characteristics of Śaṅkara's thought 'were advocated by someone before Śaṅkara'.³⁴ Nonetheless, Śaṅkara 'was the person who synthesized the *Advaita-vāda* which had previously existed before him'. In this synthesis, he was the rejuvenator and defender of ancient learning. He was an unequalled commentator³⁵ and, due to whose efforts and contributions, the *Advaita Vedānta* assumed a dominant position within Indian philosophy.³⁶ Only two writings of the period before Śaṅkaras have survived: the *Vākyapadīya* (5th century A.D.), written by Bhaṭṭarhari, who Philosophy of the *Śabda Brahma*, rooted in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* on ॐ Om Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, especially *Paśpaśānika*, later giving rise to the four stages of speech, viz. Parā Vāk/ silent ॐ Om in the navel, unmoving *Sat Cit Ānanda/Truth Consciousness Bliss*³⁷ and the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* (fl.525?A.D.) Śaṅkara speaks also of two more early *Advaitins*, Brahmanandin or Taṅka (fl.500?) and

³⁴ *ibid.* p.679

³⁵ *ibid.* p.678

³⁶ *ibid.* p.679

³⁷ *Vākyapadīya*, P. (1971), *Motilal*, p.426.

Draviḍācārya (fl.525?A.D.), both commentators on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.³⁸ Thus, *Advaita Vedānta*, existed prior to *Ādi Śaṅkara* but found in him its most famous and greatest expounder.³⁹ Of the *Vedānta*-school before the composition of the *Brahma Sūtras* (400–450A.D.¹²⁷), almost nothing is, as we have shown, known.

Gauḍapāda: Māṇḍūkya-kārikās or Gauḍapādīyakārikās.

However, what is certain is that the first complete *Advaita* Philosophical work is a large part of the 215 ślokas or *kārikās* of *Gauḍapāda* (fl.525A.D.?).⁴⁰ These constitute a kind of commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, whose author tradition identifies as *Gauḍapāda*. These *kārikās* are usually called *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* or *Gauḍapādīya-kārikās*. Since the Buddhist philosopher Bhāvaviveka (fl.550?A.D.)

³⁸ *ibid.* pp.91-93, 199-203

³⁹ Grimes, J. A. (1990). The seven great untenables: *Sapta-vidhā anupapatti*, Banarsidas, M. and Nakumara, H. (1950a), *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy. Part One* (1990 Reprint), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, p.3

¹²⁸ *ibid.* p.3

⁴⁰ *MāṇḍūkyaGauḍapādīya* with *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya & Anubhūtiśvarīpācārya Ṭippaṇam*. (1978). Sanskrit Education Society, Madras

quotes one *kārika* verbatim this is supportive of their authorship as fl.525A.D. The statement by Śaṅkara (fl.780A.D.) that Gauḍapāda was his *paramaguru* and teacher's teacher has to be interpreted in a very liberal manner. Despite many interesting questions about possible *Buddhist* influences, scholars are generally agreed that the second book, *Vaitathya prakaraṇa* and the third books, *Advaita prakaraṇa*, do constitute the earliest extended *Advaita* treatise preserved and known.⁴¹ Gauḍapāda as we have stated, composed the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, also known as the *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* and the *Āgama Śāstra*. The *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* is a concise explanation, in verse form, of the doctrines in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, the shortest but most profound of the ten principal *Upaniṣads*, consisting of just 12 *mantras*/sentences, of which the *Muktikopaniṣad* says,

'The only means by which the final emancipation/ the *Kaivalya* kind of *Mokṣa* is reached is the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* alone, which is enough for the salvation of all aspirants. If knowledge is not attained thereby, study the Ten *Upaniṣads*....'⁴²

⁴¹ Potter, K. (1981). *Encyclopedia Of Indian Philosophies*, Vol.3., Princeton University Press, p.14

⁴² 93. *Muktikopaniṣad*. (2004), Vol.2 112 *Upaniṣads*, ed.Joshi, K.L, et.al, Delhi: Parimal Publications, p.496-7 Vol 2, 'iyam kaivalyamuktistu kenopāyena siddhyati māṇḍūkyamekamevālaṃ mumukṣūṇāṃvimuktaye

Hence, Śaṅkara has composed one of his great *bhāṣyas* on the 215 *ślokas* of the *Kārikā* as well as the 12 *mantras* of the *Upaniṣad* giving them the status of *Smṛti*, like the *Bhāṣya* he composed for the *Bhagavadgītā*. Likewise, we can see the great significance of *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya*, providing the first commentary or *Ṭippaṇam* on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* for this seminal *śruti* text⁴³, the first exposition of the teaching of *Advaita Vedānta*.

According to Hajime Nakamura, not only was the *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* treasured in the *Advaita* tradition, but the text was revered and highly respected in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Dvaita Vedānta* schools of Hinduism as well.⁴⁴ Gauḍapāda's text, adds Nakamura, was treasured but not considered a *śruti* by *Advaita* scholars, while *Rāmāṇuja* and *Madhvācārya* of non-*Advaita* schools considered its first chapter to be a *śruti*.

⁴³ *Māṇḍūkya Gauḍapādādīya with Śaṅkara Bhāṣya and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's Ṭippaṇam* ed. Sastri, S.R; (1978), Madras: Samskrit Education Society.

⁴⁴ Nakumara, (2004). p.280-281

Gauḍapāda⁴⁵ relied on *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* as well as on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣads*. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, was considered to be a *śruti* before the era of Ādi Śaṅkara, but not treated as particularly important. In the later post-Śaṅkara period, its value became ever more important and regarded as expressing the essence of the *Upaniṣadic* philosophy. The entire *Kārikā* became a key text for the *Advaita* school in this later era. Since this text is of central importance to the *Advaita* tradition and *Anubhūti* has provided the first commentary after Śaṅkara, we shall dedicate a whole section to its consideration.

The Gauḍapāda Kārikā has 215 ślokas

which are divided into four chapters:

Chapter One (29 ślokas) —Āgama Prakaraṇa - The Upaniṣadic Traditional

Doctrine

(includes 12 mantras of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*).¹⁶⁵

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*

ॐ *Om* being the supreme symbol for *Brahman* in turn identical with *Ātman*,
the true *Self* of all living beings.

ॐ *Om ity etad akṣaram idaṃ sarvaṃ tasyopavyākhyānaṃ bhūtaṃ bhavad bhaviṣyad iti
sarvaṃ oṃkāra eva yac cānyat trikālātītaṃ tad apy oṃkāra eva'. Māṇḍūkya
Upaniṣad.1.*⁴⁶

**1. The syllable ॐ Om is all this. Of this a clear exposition (is started with): All
that is past, present, or future is verily ॐ. And whatever else is beyond the three
periods of time that is also verily Om.'**

(Mā.Up.Tippanam of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya=Mā.U.Ṭ : *Prominence*—Because *Aum* is
the first word of the first *Upaniṣad*. The purport of the sentence is that ॐ **Om** is the
symbol, the most universal, for *all* the phenomena of the world. Therefore
prominence is given to ॐ **Om** (Name/Subject/*abhidhāna*.)

2. '*Sarvaṃ hy etad brahmāyam ātmā brahma so 'yam ātmā catuspāt.*'

⁴⁶ Gambhīrānada, S. (1998). Volume 2 Eight *Upaniṣads*.

2. All this is surely *Brahman*. The Self is *Brahman*. The Self, such as It is, is possessed of four quarters.' (Waking, Dream, Deep-sleep and 'the Fourth' / *Turīya* the substratum of the first three)

(Mā.U.Ṭ :The second *Upaniṣadic mantra* is "All this is, truly, *Brahman*." Hence the emphasis is on 'All this'—which is the Named/object (*abhidheya*) signified by ॐ *Om*.

"This Self is *Brahman*". The word *this*, meaning that which appears divided into four quarters, is pointed out as the innermost Self, with a gesture (of hand) by the passage, "This *Ātman*". 'By means of the names' 'all this' the *Śruti* statement 'All this is *Brahman*' causes one to cross the apparant duality between the name ॐ *Om* and the named *Brahman*.

Viśva (the waking state), *Taijasa* (dream state), *Prājña* (*Suṣupti* or the state of dreamless sleep) and *Turīya* which is same as *Brahman* or *Ātman*. These four quarters correspond to the three *Mātrās* of ॐ *Om* and the *A-mātra*/'measureless silent ॐ *Om*. ॐA, ॐU and ॐM are the three *Mātrās*. The fourth, which is known as *Amātra* or without a measure, has no corresponding letter or sound. This is *silence* or *Ātman* corresponding to *Turīya*, the Fourth, unchanging Reality.

The idea of sound suggests the idea of soundlessness or silence from which sound may be said to proceed. A reflection of the four states of speech famously first developed in the *Paśpaśānika* of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*⁴⁷ from Ṛgveda 1.164.45

catvāri vāk parimitā padāni tāni vidur brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ 1.164.45

guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti turīyaṃ vāco manuṣyā vadanti"

45. The four kinds of words form the constituents of speech; the learned

Brāhmaṇas,

who have got control over their mind know them thoroughly; three out of four stages of speech being closed in caves, do not twinkle; it is the fourth that is manifest in the talk of men.

and developed further by Bhāṭṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*, viz.

⁴⁷ Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya Paśpaśānika*: S.D.Joshi, J.Roodbergen 1958, CASS, University of Pune, India

Parā Vāk, silent unchanging Supreme Speech, ॐ, *Sat Cid Ānanda, Turīya*, located in the naval.

Paśyantī Vāk, causal realm of speech, 'in-sight', associated with the 16 vowels, or *mātrikā* and the whole alphabet in the form of the 14 *Śiva Sūtrāṇi*, the ॠ of ॐ, 'heart level of speech'

Madhyamā Vāk, middle or subtle speech, ॠ of ॐ, 'ten fingers breadth between larynx and heart',

Vaikharī Vāk, physical speech on the tongue, ॠ of ॐ)

3. 'jāgaritasthāno bahiṣprajñāḥ saptāṅga ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ sthūlabhug vaiśvānaraḥ prathamah pādah.' || MāṇḍUp_3 ||.

3.The first quarter is *Vaiśvānara*, whose sphere (of action) is the waking state, whose consciousness relates to things external, who is possessed of seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and who enjoys gross things.

4. '*svapnasthāno 'ntaḥprajñāḥ saptāṅga ekonaviṁśatimukhaḥpraviviktabhuktaijaso dvitīyaḥ pādaḥ.*' || *MāṇḍUp _4* ||

4.'Taijasa is the second quarter, whose sphere (of activity) is the dream state, whose consciousness is internal, who is possessed of seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and who enjoys subtle objects.'

MāṇḍUp. 5. yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmāyate na kañcana svapnam paśyati tat suṣuptam | suṣuptasthāna ekībhūtaḥ prajñānaghana evādamayo hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prājñas tṛtīyaḥ pādaḥ.'

5. That state is deep sleep where the sleeper does not desire any enjoyable thing and does not see any dream. The third quarter is *Prājña* who has deep sleep as his sphere, in whom everything becomes undifferentiated, who is a mass of mere consciousness, who abounds in bliss, who is surely an enjoyer of bliss, and who is the doorway to the experience (of the dream and waking states)'.

6'ēṣaḥ sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo 'ntaryāmy eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi

bhūtānām.' || MāṇḍUp_6 ||

6. 'This one is the Lord of all; this one is Omniscient; this one is the inner Director of all; this one is the Source of all; this one is verily the place of origin and dissolution of all beings.'

The Self/*Ātman* has three bodily forms: the waking state is the gross body, the dream state is the subtle body and the deep sleep state is the causal body. Beyond all three is the fourth, or *Turīya* which is the eternal consciousness underlying everything which is pure Truth, Consciousness and Bliss. When awake, the Self experiences the *Viśva* – the external objects and the visible; when dreaming, it experiences the *Taijasa*

– the internal mind objects and what appears in the dreams; when in deep sleep, the

Self experiences *Prājña*:

viśvo hi sthūlabhuñi nityaṃ taijasaḥ praviviktabhuk /

ānandabhuk tathā prājñastridhā bhogaṃ nibodhata // MandUpK_1.3 //

1.3. *Viśva* ever enjoys the gross: *Taijasa* enjoys the subtle; and similarly

***Prājña* enjoys bliss. Know enjoyment to be threefold.**

The description of these states of Self is similar to those found in

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad and other *Upaniṣads*. *Gauḍapāda* presents the competing

traditional theories about life in vogue, before and in his times, in *Kārikā* 1.6 to 9.

Some claim creation is the result of the expansion of the *Ātman*, the Absolute Self, all

pervading, already defined in verse 2 as the Absolute *Brahman*. While some claim it

is a mere magic show, but others claim the creation is from God's desire, while still

others claim *Kāla* (time) creates all beings.

The text states there is the fourth dimension of the Self, which is not a state, since It is the unchanging Reality out of which the other 'states' emerge and into which they merge, called *Turīya*, described in verse 7 of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, which on its own sums up the whole teaching of *Advaita*, expressing both *vyatireka*, the 'via negativa' and *anvaya*, the 'via positiva':

*nāntaḥprajñāṁ na bahiṣprajñāṁ nobhayataḥprajñāṁ na prajñānaghanāṁ na prajñāṁ
nāprajñāṁ adṛṣṭāṁ avyavahāryāṁ agrāhyāṁ alakṣaṇāṁ acintyāṁ avyapadeśyāṁ
ekātmapratyayasāraṁ prapañcopaśamaṁ śāntaṁ śivam advaitaṁ caturthaṁ manyante sa
ātmā sa vijñeyah*

7They consider the Fourth/ *Turīya* to be that which is not conscious of the internal (subjective) world, nor of the external (objective) world, nor conscious of both the worlds, nor is it a concrete consciousness, nor usual worldly consciousness, nor devoid of consciousness; which is unseen, beyond empirical dealings, beyond the grasp (intangible), devoid of

qualifications, beyond thinking and beyond description; essentially of the nature of Consciousness as the Self alone; in which all phenomena cease; and which is peaceful, auspicious, and non-dual. That is the Self, and that is to be known.

(Mā.U.Ṭ :Explained mysteriously as the one *Turīya Brahma* is known as the real

nature of the distinctions *Viśva* etc. practically explained as, '**This Self is**

Brahma'(the *mahāvākya* of *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 2) is perceptibly in fact the one means of knowledge'.)

This Fourth 'state', *Turīya*, is the heart of the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* itself is not in reality a state because it is the unchanging substratum of all the three states, waking, dream and deep sleep. It is the Eternal Consciousness itself. This is the Self in the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* and the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* referred to in chapters 8.7 through 8.12 of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, which discusses the 'four states of Consciousness' as awake, dream-filled sleep, deep sleep, and beyond deep sleep. The *Viśva* and *Taijasa* states of Self

– explains Gauḍapāda – can be a source of cause and effect, the *Prājña* is the only cause, while *Turīya* is the unchanging reality beyond both. It is the waking state and dream state that lead to awareness, errors and unawareness. The perceived duality of the world is *Māyā*, when, in reality, there is only non-duality; ॐ *Om*.

In *Kārikā* 1.10 Gauḍapāda states, '*nivṛtteḥ sarvaduḥkhānām īśānaḥ prabhur avyayaḥ /advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ devās turyo vibhuḥ smṛtaḥ*' // *MāṇḍUp K_1.10* //

10. 'The unchanging non-dual One is the ordainer – the Lord – in the matter of eradicating all sorrows. The effulgent *Turīya* is held to be the all-pervasive source of all objects.

The twelfth *mantra* of the *Upaniṣad* points to the method to realize

'**This Ātman/Self is Brahman**' in practice , by merging with the mantra itself.

amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivo 'dvaitaḥ |

evam oṃkāra ātmaiva saṃviśaty ātmanātmānaṃ ya evaṃ veda | | MandUp_12 | |

12. The partless *Om* is *Turīya* – beyond all conventional dealings, in which all phenomena cease; the auspicious,

and the non-dual. ॐ Om is thus the Self to be sure. He who knows thus enters the Self through his self.

(Mā.U.Ṭ:Through the process of 'becoming that' / *tādātmya* , with the letter ॐ Om placed over in its three measures there is perception /experience of inner consciousness (experienced) as ॐ Om. By the higher *śruti/Upaniṣad* is stated the oneness of It with the supreme *Brahman*.)

Gauḍapāda explains:

amātro 'nantamātraś ca dvaitasyopaśamaḥ śivaḥ /
omkāro vidito yena sa munir netaro janaḥ // 1.29//

1.29.Āgama Kārika 29. The ॐ Om, without measures and possessed of infinite dimension, is the auspicious entity where all duality ceases. He by whom ॐ Om is known, is the real sage, and not so is any other man.

Chapter Two (38 ślokas/ verses) — the *Vaitathya-Prakaraṇam*

on Unreality

In the second chapter of *Gauḍapāda Kārikā*, the *Vaitathya-Prakaraṇam* on Unreality, Gauḍapāda states that Unreal are the dream objects during sleep, because the one who dreams never actually goes to the places he dreams of, and because whatever situation he dreams about is something he leaves upon waking up. This is referred to also in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV.3.10: **‘There are no chariots, ... no pleasures, or delights...’** In the same sense, the true reality is covered up for man even in his waking state, explains Gauḍapāda *Kārikā* 3 of Chapter Two;

abhāvaś ca rathādīnāṃ śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam /

vaitathyaṃ tena vai prāptaṃ svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam // MandUpK 2.3.

2.3. Besides, the absence of chariot etc. is heard of in the *Upaniṣad* from the standpoint of logic. They say that falsity arrived at thus (by logic) is reiterated by the *Upaniṣad* in the context of dream:

ādāvante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā /

vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo 'vitathā iva lakṣitāḥ // MandUpK_2.6 //

6. That which does not exist in the beginning and the end is equally so in the present (i.e. in the middle). Though they are on the same footing with the unreal, they are seen as though real.

When we sleep, we feel the external things we dream about are real and the internal states as unreal, but in the awakened state we realize both are unreal. In the same way, in our waking state whatever we apprehend to be real and unreal are both

unreal, covering up the true reality (GK 2.10-15). But this assertion leads to the obvious question, states Gauḍapāda, that if both internal and external are not true reality, who is it that imagines, who apprehends them and who cognizes? Gauḍapāda submits his answer as the *Ātman* (the Supreme Self).⁴⁸ The GK states that while we do grasp objects, we perceive, we think, but this does not connote the nature of reality and unreality, just like our fear of 'a rope for a serpent in darkness':

aniścītā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā /

sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ // MandUpK_2.17 //

17. Just as a rope, the nature of which is not known in the dark, is imagined to be things such as a snake, a water-line, etc., so too is the Self imagined (as various things).

We construct realities, states Gauḍapāda, and imagine *Jivātman* to be various things such as *prāṇa* (breath), *loka* (world), *deva* (gods), *bhoktṛ* (enjoyer), *bhojya* (enjoyables), *sūkṣma* (subtle), *sthūla* (gross), *mūrta* (material), *amūrta* (non-material) and so on (GK 2.20-29). This whole section Śaṅkara has not commented on, so it is

⁴⁸ Potter, K. (1981), p.107-8

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya who is the first to provide analysis of it in a characteristically profound and succinct way.

sūkṣma iti sūkṣmavidāḥ sthūla iti ca tadvidāḥ

mūrta iti mūrtavido 'mūrta iti ca tadvidāḥ // MandUpK_2.23

2.23. Subtlety (is real), say those who know the subtlety, while those familiar with the gross regard it to be so. (Reality is) possessed of a form, say the worshippers of god with form, while the worshippers of the formless (hold reality) to be formless/a void.

(Mā.U.Ṭ.1.*Knowers* —i.e., those who believe (or take) the *Ātman* to be subtle like an atom. 2.*Subtle* —This theory is irrational : for, we feel consciousness simultaneously all over the body. 3. *Knowers*—A sect of materialists who believe the gross body to be real. 4 *Gross* —The gross body cannot be the Ultimate Reality as a dead or sleeping man, in spite of the body being in existence, is unconscious. Any single limb of the body is insentient. Therefore even their aggregate cannot constitute the conscious Reality. 5 *Those, etc.* —i.e., the *Āgamikas* who believe a person, e.g.,. *Śiva* with a

trident or *Viṣṇu* with a disc, to be the Ultimate Reality. These are also imaginary. 6.

Person—This is also an illusion. 7 *Those, etc.* —i.e. The *Buddhistic* ritualists. *Void*—

The idea that the Ultimate Reality is an absolute void' is also an illusion, as a void also should have a knower, and so cannot be the substratum of the positive fact of the empirical! universe.)

We imagine things in our mind, we create things in our mind, we destroy things in our mind, says Gauḍapāda; yet all these things are not different from It, the *Ātman*. All such constructions create dualities in our imagination, are *māyā*. The true reality, state *Kārikā* 2.35, is non-dual and it is *Ātman*:

vītarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ /

nirvikalpo hy ayaṃ drṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ // MāṇḍUpK 2.35

2.35. This Self that is beyond all imagination, free from the diversity of this phenomenal world, and non-dual, has been seen by the contemplative people versed in the Vedas and unafflicted by desire, fear and anger. (Mā.U.Ṭ. Those who have mastered and transcended all attachments, all fear and all anger, all dualities,

know their Self, have realized the non-duality within. According to *Kārikā* 2.38, such wise individuals, do not care about praise from anyone, are beyond all rituals, are homeless wanderers, for they have realized the truth inside them and outside:)

tattvam ādhyātmikaṃ dṛṣṭvā tattvaṃ dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ /

tattvībhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet // MāṇḍUpK2.3

2.38 Examining the Reality in the context of the individual and in the external world, one should become identified with Reality, should have his delight in Reality, and should not deviate from Reality. They ‘remain steadfastly true to nature’.

Chapter Three: (48 ślokas) — *Advaita Prakaraṇa* (Non-duality)¹⁶⁷

Gauḍapāda opens this chapter by observing that devotional worship of any form assumes that the *Brahman-Ātman* is born, *Advaita Prakaraṇa*:

upāsanāśrito dharmo jāte brahmaṇi vartate /

prāgutpatter ajaṃ sarvaṃ tenāsau kṛpaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ // MUṣK 3.1_

3.1. The aspirant, betaking himself to the devotional exercises, subsists in the conditioned *Brahman*. All this was but the birthless *Brahman* before creation.

Hence, the man (with such a view) is considered of narrow outlook:

ato vaksyāmy akārpaṇyam ajāti samatāṃ gatam /

yathā na jāyate kiñcij jāyamānaṃ samantataḥ // MāṇḍUṣK3.2

3.2. Hence, I shall speak of that (*Brahman*) which is free from limitation, has no birth, and is in a state of homogeneity; and listen how nothing whatsoever is born in any way, though it seems to be born.

He states that the non-dual *Brahman-Atman* (Self) can give rise to apparent duality (*Jīvas*, individual souls), while remaining unaffected in the process. To this end, he gives the analogy of space and jars. Self is like space, and the *Jīvas* are like space in jars. Just as space is enclosed in a jar, so is the Self manifested as *Jīvas*. When the jar is destroyed, the space in the jar merges into the universal space, so likewise, in reality are the *Jīvas* one with the Self. *Advaita Prakaraṇa* 3.4-5:

ghaṭādiṣu pralīneṣu ghaṭākāśādayo yathā /

ākāśe saṃpralīyante tadvaj jīvā ihātmani // MāṇḍUpK3.4

3.4. Just as the space confined within the jars etc. merge completely on the disintegration of the jars etc., so do individual souls merge here in this Self.

And:

yathaikasmin ghāṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute /

na sarve saṃprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ // MāṇḍUpK3.5

3.5. Just as all the spaces confined within the various jars are not darkened when one of the spaces thus confined becomes contaminated by dust, smoke etc., so also is the case with all individuals in the matter of being affected by happiness.

Gauḍapāda states that the *Upaniṣads* such as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* teach that one's own *Ātman* (Self) is identical to *Ātman* in all beings and One, and equally *Ātman* is identical with the *Brahman*:

rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātās taittirīyake /

teṣām ātmā paro jīvaḥ khaṇḥ yathā saṃprakāśitaḥ // MāṇḍUpK3.11

3.11. It has been amply elucidated (by us) on the analogy of space, that the individual living being that conforms to the soul of the sheaths, counting from that constituted by the essence of food, which have been fully dealt with in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, is none other than the supreme Self.

Gauḍapāda is explaining that the problems which human beings have in the world (*Samsāra*) are due to the perception of duality (subject-object duality). He says, the duality causes *Samsāra* (problems in the worldly life) and nonduality (one without a second) is the freedom. Hence, "*Advaita*" (nonduality) is the freedom (*Mokṣa*) and duality (*Dvaitam*) is *Samsāra* (Worldly troubles or bondage). According to Śaṅkara's commentary "no-mind" can be attained by constant practice of discrimination between the real and the unreal (repeated discrimination), all based upon reasoning.

Gauḍapāda says “*Amanībhāva*” (no-mind) means managing the mind or spiritualizing the mind. It means when a person realizes the truth about oneself as the “Existence, consciousness, Bliss” (The Absolute or *Brahman*) then, in the mind, there will be no more desiring or reaching out or grasping. When the mind finds nothing out there to grasp then it becomes a “nongrasping mind” (*Agraham*) that is called a “no-mind” state. This “no mind” state is referred to “freedom or liberation” from worldly suffering according to *Advaita Vedānta* Philosophy.

This state of complete identity with nondual *Brahman*, arrived at as a result of discrimination and negation of phenomena, is the *Vedāntic* conception of *Samādhi* (which is quite different from any mystical state described as *Samādhi* in the Yoga system).

(Mā.U.Ṭ)

Duality is (realised as) merely the mind, due to conforming to the disciplined following the practice of synthesis/*anvaya* and analysis/*vyatireka*⁴⁹, its true state (is realised). **For when the mind functions, duality is present,** whatever state is concentrated upon that is merely /nothing but that just as whatever state clay is concentrated upon to form pots etc. that is merely / nothing but that clay, this is the inference.

Due to the impossibility of any absence of the nature of consciousness for the reality of mind, how is there (the possibility of the process of) agreement and contrariety, thus Śaṅkara asks 'How (does the mind cease to function)?

By virtue of the doubting activity of the mind whose nature is consciousness, this whole universe is seen falsely to be vibrating.

The sense is that due to the impossibility of an absence of (the mind's) imaginary nature the process of agreement and contrariety is possible.

While some *Upaniṣads*, acknowledges Gauḍapāda, imply a difference between the individual soul and the *Brahman*, those texts discuss the apparent distinction

⁴⁹ *anvaya* / synthesis and *vyatireka* analysis (positive and negative method). The names and forms are different and illusory, but the one, underlying essence of Atman is the same in all forms.

(duality) when one believes in an apparent creation. In reality, states Gauḍapāda, there is no creation of souls separate from *Brahman*, as in truth they are identical:

mṛllohavīspḥuliṅgādyaiḥ sṛṣṭir yā coditānyathā /

upāyaḥ so 'vatārāya nāsti bhedaḥ kathañcana // MāṇḍUpK3.15

3.15. The creation that has been multifariously set forth with the help of the examples of earth, gold, sparks etc., is merely by way of generating the idea (of oneness); but there is no multiplicity in any way.

However, there is no need to confuse passages meant for spiritual instruction.

According to *Kārikās* 3.17-18:

Svasiddhānta- vyavasthāsu dvaitino niścītā dṛḍham /

parasparaṃ virudhyante tairayaṃ na virudhyate // MāṇḍUpK3.17

3.17. The dualists, confirmed believers in the methodologies establishing their own conclusions, are at loggerheads with one another. But this (non-dual) view has no conflict with them, for them ...

advaitaṃ paramārtho hi dvaitaṃ tadbheda ucyate /

teṣāṃ ubhayathā dvaitaṃ tenāyaṃ na viruddhyate // MāṇḍUpK3.18

3.18. Non-duality is the highest Reality, since duality is said to be a product of it.

But for them there is duality either way. Therefore, this view (of ours) does not clash (with theirs).

Gauḍapāda, admits that dualists disagree with this view, but the ancient texts admit duality in the context of appearances, while ‘non-duality is indeed the highest reality.’

ātmasatyānubodhena na saṅkalpayate yadā

amanastāṃ tadā yāti grahyābhāve tad agram//MandUpK_3.32 /

3.32. (When following the instruction of scriptures and the teacher), the mind ceases to think as a consequence of the realization of the Truth that is the Self, then the mind attains the state of not being the mind; in the absence of things to be perceived, it becomes a non-perceiver.

Mā.U.Ṭ The realisation of that truth of the Self through the instructions of scriptures and teachers is *ātmasatyā-anubodha*.

tena saṅkalpyābhāvāt na saṅkalpyte

When, consequent on this (realisation) which results from the mind's ceasing to imagine, there is left nothing to be imagined,

dāhyābhāve jvalanamivāgneḥ, yadā yasmin kāle tadā tasmin kāle'manastvam

amanobhāvaṃ yāti

like the flames of fire ceasing to be in the absence of fuel, then, at that time, it does attain the state of not being the mind.

grāhyābhāve tan mano'grahaṃ grahaṇavikalpanāvarjitam ityarthah

Owing to the absence of objects to be perceived, the mind becomes devoid of the illusion/doubt of perception. This is the meaning. (32)

Mā.U.Ṭ : *saṅkalpo hi manaso vyāvahārikaṃ rūpam sa ca saṅkalpāpekṣah*

For imagination of the mind is its practical/common life form, and that depends on imagination.

sarvaṃ ca yad asti bhāti ca tad ātmaivety avagame sati saṅkalpyābhāvāt manaso

manastvaṃ na vartate.

And when it is understood that all that exists and manifests/shines that is in fact the Self, due to absence of anything to be wished for the mind no longer exists as mind.

tathāpi sphurati cet tat ātmaiveti Nonetheless if it starts into view that too is in fact the Self alone.

na vivekadṛṣṭyā mano nāmās ityāha- 'amanstvoam iti .3.32

From the discriminatory/*viveka* viewpoint the mind does not (really exist, thus

Gauḍapāda says 'the mind attains the state of not being the mind';

According to *Advaita Prakaraṇa Kārikā* 3.33-36:

akalpamajaṃ jñānaṃ jñeyābhinnaṃ pracakṣate /

brahma jñeyam ajaṃ nityam ajenājaṃ vibudhyate // MāṇḍUpK3.33

3.33. They say that the non-conceptual knowledge, which is birthless, is non-different from the knowable (*Brahman*). The knowledge that has *Brahman* for its content is birthless and everlasting. The birthless (Self) is known by the birthless (knowledge) and it follows that...:

nigrhītasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmataḥ /

pracārah sa tu vijñeyah susupte 'nyo na tatsamah // MāṇḍUpK3.34

3.34. The behaviour that the mind has when it is under control, free from ideation, and full of discrimination, should be particularly noted. The behaviour of the mind in deep sleep is different and is not similar to that (of the controlled mind).

Thus, the brilliant exposition, so clearly rooted in experience continues...:

līyate hi susupte tan nigṛhītaṃ na līyate /

tad eva nirbhayaṃ brahma jñānalokaṃ samantataḥ // MāṇḍUpK3.35

3.35. For that mind loses itself in deep sleep, but does not lose itself when under control. The very mind becomes the fearless *Brahman*, possessed of the light of Consciousness all around.

(Mā.U.Ṭ 3.34-35: *mumukṣūñāṃ jñānaphalaṃ na svargavatparokṣam*

The fruit of knowledge for those desiring liberation is not like heaven , beyond the sight/remote

kiṃ tu tṛptivat pratyakṣam,but it is like contentment immediate, before the eyes!

ato jñānaphalasya manonirodhasya pratyakṣatvāya niruddhasya mansaḥ kīdṛśam

Hence for the immediateness of a restrained mind's fruit of knowledge;

of what kind is the conduct of such a restrained mind?

jñātavyam etat prāsaṅgikam āha – nigṛhītasyetyādinā

This which is innate/inherent is to be realised, he says," That behaviour of the mind which is under restraint,"

antarlīnāḥ guptāḥ anekānārthapravṛttinām bījabhūtā vāsanāḥ vidyante yasmin tasya

The sense is the inherent, hidden, become seeds of various evil deeds, existing as

latent impressions, in which

ātmasatyānubodha eva hutāśanaḥ tena vipluṣṭāni – dagdhāni avidyādīni

*anarthapravṛttibījāni yasya tasya- ityarthaḥ.*the mind is then under ignorance etc., the

seeds of many vicious deeds are burnt in the fire of the realisation of the Truth

which is the Self. *śāntasarvakleśamalasya svatantra- brahmasvarūpeṇa*

avasthānalakṣaṇaḥ ityarthaḥ. 3.34-35

The sense is the behaviour of the mind under restraint, whose characteristic is

abiding with Independent nature of *Brahman* is purged of the effects of all afflictions.

He returns to affirm the essential nature...

ajam anindram asvapnam anāmakam arūpakam /

sakṛd̥vibhātaṃ sarvajñaṃ nopacāraḥ kathañcana // MāṇḍUpK3.6

3.36. Brahman is birthless, sleepless, dreamless, nameless, formless, ever effulgent, everything, and intelligence. (With regard to It) there is not the least possibility of ceremony.

Potter⁵⁰ sums up, 'An awareness that is without conceptual construction and is unborn', and this is identical to the object of that awareness called *Brahman*. This awareness is not a metaphor, nor born. *Brahman* is the *Sat*, the all-pervading Reality. Such awareness shines forth without fear, beyond words and thought, is calm:

Asparśayogo vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ /

Yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinaḥ// MāṇḍUpK3.39

3.39. The *Yoga*, that is familiarly referred to as ‘contactless’ is difficult to be comprehended by any one of the *Yogis*. For those *Yogis*, who apprehend fear where there is no fear, are afraid of it.

This inner contactless concentration, *Asparśa yoga* ⁵¹ is difficult for most, including the *yogis* who see fear in what is fearlessly blissful, but is the highest *yoga*. Such is the awareness that comes from Self reflection, understanding, and giving up attachment to *duḥkha* (pain) and *sukha* (pleasure), where the mind rests in indescribable calmness within, explained by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Ṭippaṇṇam* on 3.42-46 as:

⁵¹ ‘*asparśa-yoga*’ twice GK 3.39,4.2 The word ‘*sparśa*’ is generally used to signify contact of the sense-organs with the sense-objects. Hence any *yoga* or super-conscious experience which has no contact of the senses with the sense-objects may be called as *asparśa-yoga*.

In this work, this epithet has been especially used to denote the direct experience of the *Ātman* or the Self which is beyond the ken of all sense-organs and sense-experience. In this experience the lower self and the consequent ego-sense gets into one leaving unalloyed bliss only. This is the same as ‘*jñāna*.’

The prospect of dissolution of the ego-sense often frightens the ordinary *yogis* and spiritual aspirants who therefore try to avoid it. Those who obtain the greatest happiness, the highest good and the absolute freedom is enjoyed by him free from all the doubts and misgivings.

Te ṣ ā ṁ n i r ā s ā y a ' a j a ṁ p ū r ṇ a ṁ b r a h m a i v ā s m i ' i t i
samprajñātasamādhirūpapratyayapravāhakarāṇena

‘For the sake of getting rid of these [that is, the aforementioned sleep, flight of fancy, desire for happiness, and so forth] by means of the flow of conscious cognition that has the form of *samprajñātasamādhī*, (Yoga Sūtra 1.17) is cognized! I am nothing but the unborn, complete *Brahman*’.

‘For the sake of getting rid of these [that is, the aforementioned sleep, flight of fancy, desire for happiness, and so forth] by means of the flow of conscious- cognition that Gauḍapāda says with the help of discrimination power (*Viveka*) one can attain a “no-mind” state. The “discrimination” or “discerning” is a peculiar method in nonduality, which is philosophical separation done in *Vedānta* for the realization of the truth.^[5]

The spectacle of the ever-changing world in life is not permanent; it means all experienced objects are transient. In the midst of this, one can be able to discern the eternal by **discrimination power (*Viveka*)** in understanding and can recognize the

eternal consciousness, existence, and bliss (Absolute truth or *Brahman*). Having separated in understanding that the mind becomes absorbed in the nondual reality.

For everyone, there are three kinds of experiences in life; waking experience, dream experience, and deep sleep experience. The question is who am I? In all these experiences, **am I the person who is experiencing the waking world? Am I the person who is experiencing dreams of sleeping? Am I the one who knows nothingness in the deep sleep?**

Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad says, 'you("I") are the one consciousness' in which the arouser and the waking world appears, in which the dreamer and the dream world appears, in which deep sleeper and blank state is experienced. This can be understood by analyzing the dream experience, in dreams when we fall asleep, our minds construct a world and a person who will experience the world of objects. It is only when a person wakes up from the world realizes that it was a dream, all of it I saw, all the places I went to, all the time that passed, all the events that happen, and even myself in the dream with the body is all is dreamt by the mind. Here, the mind alone became the subject and the object.

In the same way, during waking state, consciousness alone appears as the waking experiencer (subject) and the world of things (object). This “consciousness” is apart from three states of mind called waking, dreaming, and deep sleep. Hence, it is also called “fourth” (*turīyam*) in *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. In reality, “consciousness” is underlying in all three states.

This separation is called “*Ātma Anātma Viveka*” (discrimination between Self and nonself). The consciousness is neither born nor die, it is the person who born in waking world dies while sleeping, the body born grows, age and dies, and things are created and destroyed. Hence, things in the dreams or the waking world are noneternal or transient who are subject to birth and death but consciousness is not subject to birth and death. *Ātma* (Self) is “*Nityam*” (eternal) and “*Anātma*” (nonself) is “*Anityam*” (noneternal). “*Ātma*” (Self) is “*Nirvikāra*” (unchanging) and “*Anātma*” (nonself) is “*Savikāra*” (Changes). The deeper point to be noticed is, waking, dreaming, and deep sleep states are not different from consciousness, although they seem to be, as dreamer and dream world cannot exist without the dreamer’s mind. The “pure consciousness” is the reality and the arouser, dreamer, and deep sleeper are appearances, just as the person in the dream is an appearance in the mind.

Hence, “*Ātma*” (self) is “*Satyam*” (the truth) and “*Anātma*” is “*Mithyā*” (illusion or false).

Śaṅkara in his invocatory verses on commentary to *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* says

“*Māyāsaṅkhyāturīyam.*” It means the true self is called “fourth” (*turīyam*) when you

count from the point of view of “*Māyā*” (illusion or false perception), but truly

speaking pure consciousness is the one in which those three states are appearances. [

Putting all together, if “*Anātma*” (nonself) is unreal then can we count it?

In general, it is not possible to count the false along with the truth; it means two things cannot be counted together. It is like, ornaments made of gold like a bracelet, ring, and bangles are three in number and when we try to add the gold as the fourth one along with the ornaments then it is a mistake because gold is the one reality and all other ornaments are appearances of that reality. Hence, one cannot count three ornaments along with gold because it is the reality of those three ornaments. Therefore, if one cannot count arouser, dreamer, and deep sleeper and their universes along with the “*turīyam*” (the fourth one) then called “*Ekam eva Advitīyam*” it means “the one without a second” which is famously known as “*Advaita*” (without a second). The consciousness is the “*Advaita*” when this is realized then it leads to “*Amanastham Tad āyati*” the mind becomes “no mind”

(without desires). Mind still works, the world can be seen and it can experience the world and it can do everything but with the knowledge that no separate reality out there apart from his consciousness which he has to chase or get terrified, so he attains the fearlessness (enlightenment). The aim of the dualistic statements of the *śruti (Veda)* is to establish ultimately the identity of *Jīva* and *Brahman*. The *Upaniṣads* accept the empirical view of the world as it appears and explain it by saying that *Brahman*, who is both the material and efficient cause of the universe, created the world with all its beings and then entered into all as the living self.

This explanation establishes the unity of *Brahman* and *Jīva* (individual sense of being), the apparent difference being ascribed to ignorance. The import of the *śruti (Veda)* is this: the nondual *Brahman* alone exists; it is birth less, causeless, and changeless. If one sees multiplicity that is also *Brahman*. The experience of multiplicity in the nondual *Brahman* is due to *Avidyā*.

When one is rooted in the knowledge of the Self that I am the truth then he realizes this entire world is shining forth of the self. The good and the bad is none other than the self. It means the self is the pure consciousness and the entire world is an appearance in pure consciousness. The important difference between *yogic* approach and *Vedāntic* approach that the first approach seeks to free oneself by

erasing "*Samsāra*" (worldly suffering) it is like switching off the movie to overcome horror in the movie, but the latter approach is to recognize what is the world is, like recognizing the movie as it is but not to imagine the movie as reality and suffer from its horror. This recognition gives freedom to oneself from worldly suffering. In dream there is the experience of the separate existence of the perceiver, the object of perception and the act of perceiving. However, after waking it is known that these three-fold experiences to be nothing but the mind appearing as above three. The idea that the dream experiences are different from the mind is due to the ignorance which exists in the dream state. The mind is the substratum of the dream experiences. There is no doubt that the mind which is in fact nondual appears as duality in dream as three things; in same manner that which is nondual *Brahman*, appears as duality in the waking state.

Truly speaking, the snake is identical with the rope. In like manner, the mind which is nondual as *Ātman* appears undoubtedly in dual forms in dreams. Verily in dream, such objects of perception as elephants, etc., or their perceivers such as eyes, etc., have no existence independently of consciousness (mind). Similar is the case in the waking state as well. For (consciousness) mind, which is the highest reality, is

common to both. Therefore, the mind of a *Jñāni* (knower of truth) which is disciplined by discrimination is not so withdrawn from the world, that is to say, *Jñāni* does not go back to the seed state of darkness after self-realization. Thus, it is made the distinction between the mind in deep sleep and that of a *Jñāni's* mind. When the mind becomes free from ideas of the perceiver and the perceived, the duality caused by ignorance becomes one with the Supreme and the nondual *Brahman*.

So to reiterate, the reason for naming "*Asparśa Yoga*" (Yoga of No Contact) is that the *Brahman* (pure Consciousness or Self) and the world are not enemies; the real (pure consciousness) and false (appearance of names and forms in the consciousness) are not enemies. What is the enemy of falsity (believing and asserting the existence to the names and forms) is the knowledge (realization of true existence). The only reality in the pots, jars, plates, etc., (made of clay) is the clay. The names and forms, on account of their changeability and negatability, are unreal.

Similarly, the only reality in this universe is *Ātman*; all other objects which are mere acts of mind, being changeable and negatable, are unreal. Therefore, the duality is perceived when the mind acts and it vanishes when the mind ceases to act; that is to say, when the (activity, i.e. the *Vṛttis* of the) mind is withdrawn unto

itself by the knowledge got through discrimination, like the disappearance of the snake in the rope.

Hence, on account of the disappearance of duality, it is established that duality is unreal or illusory. That which was superimposed upon the rope is identical with the substratum. Only the idea of the existence of the snake apart from the rope is illusion. Similarly, all attributes of *Ātman*, such as materiality or immateriality, etc., are, in reality, identical with *Ātman*. To concede any separate existence to the attributes independent of *Ātman* is illusion. *Ātman*, the nondual, changeless and causeless reality, alone exists. All that exists is *Ātman*. Even that which is imagined as means for the realization of *Ātman* is not separate from the *Ātman*. Hence, knowledge of reality is the enemy of falsity, but reality as such is not the enemy of falsity. Hence, the world here and now, in reality, is *Brahman* (pure consciousness or absolute) and in which the world and its objects appears and disappears without any contradiction. It is because of the "*Brahman*" (pure consciousness) the world is appearing and because of its experience of the world is possible. Hence, the knowledge of the "*Brahman*" is the end of the "worldly suffering" or transcendence of all worldly miseries, is known as "*Brahma Jñāna*" (knowledge about the truth).⁵²

⁵² Reddy Juturi, Ravi Kumar; International Journal of *Yoga- Philosophy, Psychology and Parapsychology* March 9, 2022, IP: 106.206.79.150]

Mā.U.Ṭ: Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya on 3.39

, *Ṭippanī* on the *Māṇḍūkyakārikās*, page 123

yadi paramārthabrahmasvarūpāvasthānaphalakam idam advaitadarśanaṃ,

If this vision of 'Non-duality' is the fruit of abiding in the true nature of the highest

truth, *Brahman*,

kimiti sarvair nādriyate, ity āśaikya, āha asparśayoga iti...hetugarbhitaṃ viśeṣaṇam |

why is it not revered by all? Thus having doubted, 'he says;

'the *Yoga* of non-contact' thus the qualification contained in the cause.

varṇāśramādidharmeṇa pāpādimaleṇa ca sparśo na bhavaty asmād iti advaitānubhava

asparśaḥ, sa eva yogaḥ jīvasya brahmabhāvena yojanam....

By the virtue of the observance of the rules of caste and order

and by the impurities of sin etc. there is not 'contact' from us, thus the experience of

'non-duality' is 'non-contact'. That joining of the soul with the experience of

Brahman Yoga alone is *Yoga*.

Further on 3.39.

Mā.U.Ṭ: Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, Ṭippaṇī on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikās page 123

*yoginaḥ karmināḥ śrotriyāḥ brāhmaṇyādi asmākaṃ yāsyatīti manvānāḥ alepakavādāt
trasyantīty arthaḥ |*

Though it is devoid of all fear, the Yogis who see fear and who think that it might cause their own destruction, entertain fear in what is fearless. The idea is that those men without discrimination who, on account of fear, are won't to see their own destruction, are afraid of it. (39)

utseka udadher yadvat kuśāgreṇaikabindunā.

manaso nigrahas tadvad bhaved aparikhedataḥ//MandUpK_3.41 //

3.41. Just as the ocean can be emptied with the help of the tip of a blade of *Kuśa* grass that can hold just one drop, so also can the control of the mind be brought about by the absence of depression.

In place of a god on earth, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya presents us with the *Brāhmaṇas* as dunces, apt to say such things as “When we close our eyes, we see darkness. When we open the eyes, we see pots, and so forth. But, we never see *Brahman*.”

Mā.U.Ṭ: Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, Ṭippanī on the Māṇḍūkyakārikās 3.41, page 124:

*kṣṇor nimīlane andhakāraṃ paśyāmaḥ unmīlane ghaṭādīni na kadācid brahma iti matvā
yady udvijante tadā manonirodho 'pi teṣāṃ na sambhavati anudvignacittānāṃ tu
janmasahasraiḥ sambhāvyaḥ ity āha aparikhedata iti | upāyena nigrhṇīyād vikṣiptaṃ
kāma bhogayoḥ /suprasannaṃ laye caiva yathā kāmo layas tathā // MandUpK_3.42 //*

3.42. With the help of that proper process one should bring under discipline the mind that remains dispersed amidst objects of desire and enjoyment; and one should bring it under control even when it is in full peace in sleep, for sleep is as bad as desire.

At the same time, the interpretive decision to grant a certain amnesty to the worldview of the wandering *Yogin* offers our author the rhetorical space for importing terms and concepts originating in the *Yogadarśana* of Patañjali into the discourse of *Advaita Vedānta*. In brief, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya appropriates the concepts of conceptual *samādhi* (*samprajñātasamādhi*) and nonconceptual *samādhi* (*asamprajñātasamādhi*) and proceeds to identify their homologies within his system. Drawing quite explicitly on Śaṅkara's definition of upāsana as an unbroken mental concentration that derives its conceptual content from the *mahāvākyas*, he tells us: "For the sake of getting rid of these [that is, the aforementioned sleep, flight of fancy, desire for happiness, and so forth] by means of the flow of conscious cognition that has the form of *samprajñātasamādhi*, is cognized 'I am nothing but the unborn, complete *Brahman*' .

cf. *Mā. U.Ṭ* :Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, Ṭippanī, page 126: *yatra yatra mano dhāvati tatra tatra kṣayiṣṇutvādidoṣānu- sandhānena ca krameṇa kṣaye, kadā brahma sampannaṃ cittam bhavatīti, tadāha yadā na līyata iti*

As in classical *Vedānta*, however, and for precisely the same reasons as Śaṅkara, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya understands such a linguistically bounded approach as

incapable of providing the practitioner with the direct experience of *Brahman* that culminates in liberation. Again, for both scholars and ordinary human beings, no matter how disciplined, are fallible creatures with limited capacities for mental focus. Thought cannot become *Brahman*, because whenever a practitioner has to move his body or engage in other activities, the mind strays away from its single-pointed focus on the cognitive content of the *Upaniṣads* and becomes enmeshed in sense objects that associate it their intrinsic faults. Only through one pointedness /*ekāgratā*, the totally union of mind and heart with the '*mahāvākya*' like , '*āyam ātmā Brahma*' '*This Self is Brahman*' does one become one with or merge with it. This is culmination, the '*asparśa yoga*' of '*nididhyāsana*' prescribed in the *Bṛhad* 2.4.5.

Referred to by Anubhūti on GK 3.47

svasthaṃ śāntaṃ sanirvāṇaṃ akathyaṃ sukhaṃ utamaṃ.

ajam ajena jñeyena sarvajñaṃ paricakṣate.//MandUpK_3.47 //

47. That highest bliss is located in one's own Self.

It is quiescent, coexistent with liberation, beyond description and birthless. And since It is identical with the unborn knowable (Brahman), they call It the omniscient (Brahman).

Mā.G.K.Ṭ *yena brahmarūpeṇa asaṃprajñātasamādhau cittam vyavatiṣṭhate tad viśinaṣṭi.*

svastham ityādinā ātmasatyānubodhena lakṣyate -prāpyate iti tathoktam

(That supreme Bliss having the characteristic of the realisation of the truth that is one's own True Self) mind/*citta*, established in non-cognitive samādhi, having its very nature as *Brahman*....

Chapter Four (100 ślokas) — *Alātaśanti Prakaraṇa*

(‘Quenching of the Firebrand’)

The last chapter of *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* has a different style to the first three, opening by expressing reverence for all ‘the greatest of men’, who are like the cosmic space through their awareness of non-duality, free from self-contradictions and confusion, and who understand *Dharma*. Thus:

jñānenākāśakalpena dharmānyo gaganopamān /

jñeyābhinnena saṃbuddhas taṃ vande dvīpadāṃ varam // MāṇḍUpK4.1

4.1. I bow down to the One who is the chief among all persons, who has known fully the souls resembling (infinite) sky, through his knowledge-space and is non-different from the object of knowledge.

And:

asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattoasukho hitaḥ /

avivādo 'viruddhaś ca deśitas taṁ namāmy aham // MāṇḍUpK4.2

4.2. I bow down to that Yoga that is well known as free from relationships, joyful to all beings, beneficial, free from dispute, non-contradictory, and set forth in the scriptures.

As has been said, there is no real contact between the “*Brahman*” and “*Samṣāra*;” hence, no actual enmity is possible. Therefore, “*Samṣāra*;” cannot disturb or harm the “*Brahman*” (pure consciousness or self) as like all water in the mirage cannot wet single grain of sand in the desert.

Hence, the false world cannot harm the real Self because there is no point of contact between reality and falsity. If two things exist then only there is a question of contact, but when it only seems to exist then it is not possible to have contact. There is only one reality that appears as the Self and the world.

(World seen as it is unreal but after realizing the substratum of it, identity of "Self" and "world" established) like in a classic example of pot and clay, the constituent of the pot is clay and which is the material cause but after examination of the pot, one finds the top to bottom inside out it is all clay there is nothing called pot because every bit of it is clay and no such separate thing as pot. Finally, one realizes, clay alone is real, the pot is the name and a form with a particular use ("*Nāma Rūpa Vyavahāra*").

It is a change in paradigm and it is a change in understanding and as a result, the shift takes place internally that there are no two things that exist in reality, like Self and the world, gold and ornaments, and pot and clay.

Therefore, "*Asparśa Yoga*" says the Self (*Brahman*) is "*Asparśa*" (no contact) with the appearance of the world.

Thus the problem of *Sam̐sāra* (bondage) and liberation (*Mok̐ṣa*) is the problem of duality (*Dvaita*) and nonduality (*Advaita*). This is further reduced to “mind” and “no mind” (*Amanībhāva*, GK 3.31). Because of the movement of the mind, one thinks that there is a world of duality which leads to bondage and suffering.

As a result, “no-mind” is the key which can be attained. The “*Yogī*” says by “*Samādhi*” (Absolute calmness of the mind) which means shutting down the world; don’t get involved in the world.

Another approach to “no mind” is given by Gauḍapāda here in *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* where he says “*Ātmasatyanubodhena*” by “*Viveka*” (Discrimination) of the self (*Ātma*) and not-self (*Anātma*) means by seeing (realization) that Self is eternal and not-self is not eternal and by seeing the Self is unchanging and the not-self is changing and by seeing the Self is real and not-self is appearance finally one can realize that the Self alone truly exists (*Advaita* or nonduality) and recognition of this truth one can attain “no mind” (*Amanībhāva*).

Thus, *Advaita* (nonduality) guides one to freeing from sense of individual limited being into limitless as a result transcending from suffering and bondage.

Advaita declares that the entire vastness of time and space is nothing other than the Self which is infinite consciousness in which the entire universe appears.

In Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's commentarial works one finds a subtly executed reimagining of the nature of *Vedāntic* meditation. While the stance is codified and more widely disseminated through the writings of his disciple Ānandagiri.

Ānandagiri's own commentary on Gaudapada's *Kārikās* recycles much of the language of his teacher, transforming the questioning apologetics of the original into decided doctrine. Indeed, this author has a habit of programmatically transfusing Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's incorporation of *samprajñātasamādhi* and *asaṃprajñātasamādhi* as important *Advaita Vedāntic* terms of art into his commentarial writings. (See, for example, the conclusion of his commentary on the *Pañcīkaraṇa*, the preface to his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, or his *Ṭīkā* on the *Bhagavadgītā*.) Incidentally, it is worth noting that both Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya and Ānandagiri precede Vidyāraṇya, with whom this formulation is often associated, by at least a century.

Ānandagiri's first work, composed under the guidance of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, was written under the rule of Nṛsiṃhadeva, the king of Kaliṅga, who reigned from 1238–64. Vidyāraṇya, in contrast, is traditionally held to have taken *sannyāsa* in 1331 and died in 1386. It finds its most powerful expression in

our author's *Ṭippanī* on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* of Gauḍapāda. In contrast to Śaṅkara, who treats the contactless yoga (*asparśayoga*) as an integral part of the *Advaita* tradition, Anubhṭisvarūpācārya reads the introduction of this concept in this fundamental text of *Advaita* as a defensive response to the challenge of rival traditions, offering an explanation of what our author perceives as the troubling but undeniable reality of the relative marginality of the *Advaita* tradition. As he tells us, "If it is the case that the *Advaita Darśana* is that of which the result is the condition of the true nature of *Brahman*—the supreme reality—why is it not revered by everyone? In answering this doubt (Gauḍapāda) says '*asparśayoga*'.

Gauḍapāda's term for the practice, which seems to be attested to in no other source, is contactless yoga (*asparśayoga*), and as Śaṅkara explains, it involves a state of affairs in which "no relation (*sambandha*) exists...with anything or at any time." In other words, it entails a radical program of *pratyāhāra* in which there is complete withdrawal of the senses from sense objects.

Śaṅkara identifies three stages in this process. First, one needs to continually recollect that everything is full of suffering, as this serves as the impetus for

withdrawing from the enjoyment of sense objects. Once this has been accomplished, the *Advaitin* then must learn to maintain unbroken mental equanimity, even in the state of deep sleep. Finally, eschewing even the state of the blissful enjoyment that is intrinsic to the nature of mental equipoise, the practitioner “becomes” *Brahman*, which is to say, abides in a unitary state of being completely divorced from all external inputs and sensations.

asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattoasukho hitaḥ /

avivādo 'viruddhaś ca deśitas tam namāmy aham // MandUpK_4.2 //

4.2.

I bow down to that Yoga that is well known as free from the touch of duality, joyful to all beings, beneficial, free from dispute, non-contradictory, and set forth in the scriptures.

In his construal of the term, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya completely suppresses the older theological intent and methodological significance of the notion of a contactless *Yoga* as comprised of a progressive and systematic severing of logical associations with sense objects. Instead, in his reading, it is the *yoga* itself that comes to be understood as “untouched,” in the sense of being unaffected by any external contaminants, such

as sin or normative conduct. What, one might ask, does this *Yoga* entail? He tells us, it consists of nothing but the yoking of the *jīva* with the nature of *Brahman*.

He then elides from one of the foundational texts of his tradition an unambiguous polemic directed against the *yogic* practitioner. Then he substitutes in its place a critique of the *Brāhmaṇa* ritualist, who is represented as rather adverse to *Advaita* doctrine. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya accomplishes this task by connecting the term *yogin* with new meaning. As he tells us, “The word *yogins* means ritual actors—*śrotrīyas*—people who are thinking, ‘*Brāhmaṇa*-hood goes to us,’ because of the doctrine of noncontamination, they are afraid’.

Gauḍapāda’s *asparśayoga* functions in situ both as a cherished ideal and a technique for criticising the views of his rivals, who are, once again, *yogins*.

These two verses (3.39 and 4.2) could prove the key to the view put forward that from the thirteenth century onward *Advaita Vedāntins* come to reassess their tradition to make a place for noncanonical *yogas*.

The passage on 3.39, informed by Śaṅkara’s commentary states: “That which is called contactless *yoga*, is perceived with difficulty by all the *Yogins*. For, the *Yogins*

are afraid of it, they see fear in that which has no fear." These *Yogins*, Śaṅkara tells us, who are "devoid of the insight from the *Vedānta*," abide in this terrible state because they are afflicted by a fundamental cognitive misunderstanding. Because they do not recognize that "the truth of the supreme reality is obtainable only from the effort to understand the truth of the Self," they labour under the misapprehension that the contactless *yoga* entails the complete destruction of the Self. Essentially, despite all their pretenses to the contrary, traditional *Yogins* fail because they do not gain control over their own minds, a failure that is based upon wrong notions about the true nature of self-mastery.

In contrast to his opponents, Śaṅkara understands mental discipline as an almost purely cognitive process dependent on the proper mastery of learning how to discriminate between eternal and noneternal things/*nityānityavastu viveka*.

Whereas the *Yogas* of both the *Patañjalian* and *Śaḍaṅga* traditions incorporate into their practice the forging of deliberate uninterrupted bonds, both with discrete objects of perception and with a sovereign power, as we have seen, for Śaṅkara

liberation entails radical disconnection; it is simply a matter of silencing mental chatter and bodily impulses as they operate at increasingly subtle levels.

Nevertheless, from the thirteenth century onward, numerous theologians at both the edges and institutional centre of the discourse on *Advaita Vedānta* endeavor to enact such a rapprochement.

The substantive reassessment of the *Vedāntic* construal of meditation in the the writings of the mid- thirteenth-century theologian and institution-builder Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, more than a century before Vidyāraṇya.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya seems to have set out to establish a tradition of interpretation,

with institutional ties to the region around Purī, offering comprehensive readings of the key scholastic texts of the *Advaita* canon from a doctrinally and methodologically unified perspective, with the aim of purifying his tradition and refuting the views of the dualist logicians and followers of *Bhedābheda Vedānta*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya envisions an *Advaita Vedānta* that is explicitly nonsectarian. Not only does he refuse to identify *Brahman* with any particular deity in a

substantive fashion, but in his *Ṭippanam*/ sub commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, he actively holds up for ridicule a range of ritual practice. Indeed, for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, there is no substantive difference between modes of religious decorum —such as the bearing of matted locks or the shaving of the head —and more questionable signs of religious commitment—such as carrying a *mālā* while marking one's brow with soil from under a tulasī plant or worshipping the goddess with ritual offerings of liquor and meat. In each of these cases, human beings are clinging to equally fruitless systems of signification out of a fear of annihilation.

In GK 4.11: The *Vaiśeṣika* points out how the *Sāṃkhya*s, holding the view of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, talk illogically:

kāraṇaṃ yasya vai kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ tasya jāyate /

jāyamānaṃ katham ajam bhinnaṃ nityaṃ katham ca tat // MāṇḍUpK4.11

4.11. The cause must undergo birth according to one who holds that the cause itself is the effect. How can a thing that is birthless take birth, and how can a thing be eternal when it can be subject to (partial) disintegration?

They say that the *Pradhāna* is eternal. How can it be eternal if it is *bhinnam*, split up, disintegrated (transformed), partially? For a composite thing, a jar for instance, which is subject to partial disintegration, is not seen to be eternal in this world. This is the idea. The meaning sought to be imparted is that it involves a contradiction on their part to say that a thing may be broken up partially and yet be birthless and eternal.

As Gauḍapāda, elucidating the same idea, says:

kāraṇād yady ananyatvam ataḥ kāryam ajaṁ yadi /

jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraṇaṁ te kathaṁ dhruvam // MāṇḍUpK4.12

4.12. If (according to you) the effect be non-different from the cause, then on that account the effect, too, is birthless. And if that be so, can your cause be still eternal, it being non-different from its effect which is subject to birth?

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya comments that this verse is meant to make the meaning of the previous one clearer. For if your object be to maintain that the unborn cause is identical with the effect, then it necessarily follows that the effect also becomes equally unborn. But it⁵³ is certainly a contradiction to say that a thing is an effect and

⁵³ *It, etc.*—For, an effect is that which is born out of a cause.

at the same time unborn. There is a further difficulty. In the case of identity⁵⁴ of the cause and the effect, how can, according to you, the cause, which⁵⁵ is non-different from the born effect, be permanent and immutable? It is not possible to imagine that a part of a hen is being cooked and that another part is laying eggs! If the identity of cause and effect be maintained, then it may be asked if the cause be identical with the effect or if the effect be identical with the cause. In the former case of identity, the effect becomes unborn and in the latter case the cause becomes something born and loses its immutable and permanent character.

Gauḍapāda points out here that there is this further consideration:

ajād vai jāyate yasya dṛṣṭāntas tasya nāsti vai /

jātāc ca jāyāmānasya na vyavasthā prasajyate // MāṇḍUpK4.13

4.13. That disputant has certainly no supporting illustration who holds that the effect is produced out of an unborn cause. If the produced effect is held to be born out of another born thing, that too, leads to no solution.

⁵⁴ *Identity, etc.*—If cause and effect be identical then how can one distinguish between the cause and the effect?

⁵⁵ *Which is, etc.*—If the cause be identical with the born effect, then the cause cannot be called permanent and immutable, as birth means change. This view avoids this difficulty by denying any *act* of birth in the cause. There is only one existence, *viz.*, *Brahman*, which is called the cause by ignorant people whose mind is still moving in the causal plane.

Having quoted the key dualistic premise of *Sāṃkhya darśana*, he examines it, and then asks how and why is cause eternal? The text states that the *Sāṃkhya* premise ‘cause is born as its effect’ leads to infinite regress, which is not persuasive. The *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* then expresses the theory of *Ajāti-vāda*, viz. The absolute is not subject to birth, change and death. It is *aja*, the unborn eternal, so the empirical world of appearances is considered unreal, and not absolutely existent. Like *Sāṃkhya’s* premiss, the text praises and cross examines it, in three ways: first, non-origination premises make sense when neither the point of origin nor the end of something is known, but we know the point of origin of any example of something produced and there *Ajativāda* premise commits the *Sādhyasama* fallacy of reasoning by offering examples of what is yet to be proved.

Thirdly, *Kārikās 4.29–41*, state that neither *saṃsāra* nor *mukti* has a beginning nor an end, because if something is born it must have an end, and something that is unborn has no end. *Kārikās 4.45–52*, state that only *viññāna*/Consciousness is real, explaining it with the metaphor of a fire stick before and during the time it burns:

rjuvākrādikābhāsam alātaspaṇḍitaṃ yathā /

grahaṇagrāhakābhāsam viññānaspāṇḍitaṃ tathā // MāṇḍUpK4.47

4.47. As the movement of a firebrand appears to be straight or crooked, so it is the vibration of Consciousness that appears to be the knower and the known.

Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya comments with supportive clarification from Anubhūti that:

In order to explain the truth regarding the Ultimate Reality already stated, it is thus said: As in common experience it is noticed that a fire-brand when moved, appears straight, crooked, etc., so does Consciousness appear as the perceiver, the perceived, and the like. What is that which appears as the perceiver, the perceived, etc.? It is Consciousness set in motion. There is no motion in Consciousness. It only appears to be moving. This appearance is due to *Avidyā* or ignorance. No motion is possible in Consciousness which is ever immovable. It has already been stated that Consciousness is unborn and immovable.

Kārikās 4.53–6 assert again there is no causation, no effects, and states that everything is impermanent:

evaṃ na cittajā dharmās cittam vāpi na dharmajam /

evaṃ hetuphalājātim praviśanti manīṣiṇaḥ // MāṇḍUpK4.54

4.54. In this way the external entities are not the products of Consciousness; nor is Consciousness a product of external entities. Thus, the wise confirm the birthlessness of cause and effect.

Gauḍapāda explains the very nature of cause and effect:

yāvād dhetuphalāveśas tāvad dhetuphalodbhavaḥ /

kṣīṇe hetuphalāveśe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ // MāṇḍUpK4.55

4.55. Cause and effect spring into being so long as there is mental preoccupation with cause and effect. There is no origination of cause and effect when the engrossment with cause and effect becomes attenuated.

Nothing is eternal and without origination by nature, however, from the Real standpoint everything is the birthless Self; state *Kārikās* 4.57–60:

saṃvṛtyā jāyate sarvaṃ śāśvataṃ nāsti tena vai /

sadbhāvena hy ajaṃ sarvaṃ ucchedas tena nāsti vai // MāṇḍUpK4.57

4.57. Everything seems to be born because of the empirical outlook, therefore there is nothing that is eternal. From the standpoint of Reality, everything is the birthless Self; therefore there is no such thing as annihilation.

Kārikās 4.61–81 re-emphasize the premise about impermanence and non-origination of the changing apparent world. Attachment to unreality causes desire,

sorrow (*duḥkha*) and fear, while detachment leads to freedom from such states and to *samādhi*. It is again being shown what is the nature of the object of vision of the wise:

abhūtābhiniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate /

vastvabhāvaṃ sa budhvaiṣa niḥsaṅgaṃ vinivartate // MandUpK_4.79 //

4.79 Since owing to the belief in the existence of unrealities, Consciousness engages Itself in things that are equally so (i.e. unreal) , when one has the realization of the absence of objects, Consciousness becomes unattached and turns back.

Mā.U.Ṭ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, MāṇḍūkyakārikāṬippanī 171:

asmākaṃ śreyo bhaviṣyatīti mithyābhiniveśamātrāt svābhiniveśānu- rūpe cittaṃ pravartate

—kasyacit jaṭādhāraṇādaṃ kasyacit keśolluñcchinādaṃ kasyacit tulasīmūlamālādaṃ,

kasyacit surāmāṃsopahārādibhiḥ śaktyarcanādaṃ ity arthaḥ

In each of these cases, human beings are merely clinging to equally fruitless systems of signification out of a fear of annihilation. Our author reserves more substantive,

but nonetheless equally dismissive, philosophical refutations for the purveyors of different forms of Śaiva theology, identifying their value systems with some of the more obscure *pūrvapakṣas* offered by the text.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya associates those who identify themselves with the knowing of tattva and the knowing of mūrta as representing two discrete Śaiva traditions. The first, the knower of tattva, on the basis of their revealed scriptures, understand the universe to be comprised of the principles of ātman, avidyā, and Śiva. Since the entirety of their worldview is derived from a single source, our commentator accuses this community of the logical fallacy of circular reasoning, and then belittles their dualistic tendencies, remarking that “even Śiva, if he is something other than the self, would be inauspicious (aśiva).” See

Mā.U.Ṭ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya on 2.20.

prāṇa iti prāṇavidō bhūtānīti ca tadvidaḥ /

guṇā iti guṇavidas tattvānīti ca tadvidaḥ // MandUpK_2.20 //

20. The knowers of *prāṇa* hold *prāṇa* (to be the cause of the world),while the knowers of the elements regard the elements (to be the cause). Qualities (are the

cause), say the knowers of qualities, whereas the knowers of categories consider categories (to be so).

Mā.U.Ṭ: Ṭippanī 65: *ātmā avidyā śiva iti saṃkṣepatas trīṇi tattvānīti śaivāḥ | tatra, yadi
tāvat āgāmād eva yatsiddhiḥ anyonyāśrayam | na cānyat tatra pramāṇam upalabhyate |
śivo 'pi ātmano 'nyaś cet aśivaḥ syāt rajjusarpavat |*

The followers of *Āgama*, on the other hand, are taken to task for believing that the supreme reality is embodied and takes the form of the trident-bearing lord. An embodied entity, our *Vedāntin* infers, must be made up of the elements, and thus like any other entity available to our experience, would partake of internal differentiation, which would of course render it distinct from the supreme reality.

The canonical theological claim that *Śiva* deliberately assumes the imagined semblance of a body (*vigrahakalpanam*) so that he can play (*līlā*) in the world, as if he had a body, is treated by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya as nonsense. Either *Śiva* has a body that he uses to play in the world, in which case he is distinct from the supreme reality, or, lacking a body, he is incapable of playing and intervening in the world of experience. See Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, on

*ajam anidram asvapnaṃ prabhātaṃ bhavati svayam /
sākṛdvibhāto hy evaiṣa dharmā dhātusvabhāvataḥ // MandUpK_4.81 //*

4.81. This becomes birthless, sleepless, dreamless, and self-luminous.

For this entity is ever effulgent by Its very nature.

There are three stages of understanding, state *Kārikās 4.87–89*⁵⁶: *Laukika* (ordinary, which cognizes object and subject as real), *Śuddha-laukika* (purified ordinary, perceiving is considered real but not the objects) and *Lokottara* (supramundane, where neither objects nor perceiving are cognized as real).

Now the following text starts to show our own process of arriving at the truth:

savastu sopalambhaṃ ca dvayaṃ laukikam iṣyate /

avastu sopalambhaṃ ca śuddhaṃ laukikam iṣyate // MāṇḍUpK4.87

4.87. The ordinary (waking) state is admitted to be that duality, coexisting with things of empirical reality and fit to be experienced. The objectless ordinary (dream) state is admitted to be without any object and yet as though full of experience.

Śaṅkara explains, now the following topic is introduced as an explanation of the *Vedāntic* method of arriving at truth. The word *Savastu* in the text implies objects that are perceived in our empirical experiences. Similarly, the word '*Sopalambha*' in the text implies the idea of one's coming in contact with such objects. This constitutes the world of duality, common to all human beings and known as the waking state, which is characterized by the subject-object relationship and which alone is the sphere of all our dealings including the Scriptural, etc. The waking state, thus characterized, is admitted in the *Vedānta* Scriptures. There is another state which lacks the experiences (of the waking state) caused by external sense-organs. But there exists in that state the idea of coming into contact with objects, though such objects are absent. This is admitted (in the *Vedānta*) as the dream state, which is again common to all, and different from and subtler than the gross state of waking. The following verse gives a fuller explanation:

avastv anupalambhaṃ ca lokottaram iti smṛtam /

jñānaṃ jñeyaṃ ca vijñeyaṃ sadā buddhaiḥ prakīrtitam // MāṇḍUpK4.88

4.88. There is another state (admitted by the wise) which is free from contact with (external) objects and free from the idea of coming into contact with objects. This state is beyond empirical experience. It is traditionally described by the wise that the three, Knowledge, knowledge of objects and the knowable or realizable thing is the Supreme Reality (ultimately knowable in experience).

Śuddha-laukika (purified ordinary, perceiving is considered real but not the objects) and *Lokottara* (supramundane, where neither objects nor perceiving are cognized as real). The *jñeyam*, the object of knowledge, is comprised of all these three states, for logically there is no object of (knowledge) over and above these, the objects fancied by all the sophists being verily included in them. *Vijñeyaṃ*, the object of realization, the supreme Reality, which is called the Fourth, that is to say the non-dual and birthless Reality that is the Self. All this, ranging from the ordinary to the realizable thing, *prakīrtitam*, is declared; *sadā*, for ever; *buddhaiḥ*, by the wise, by the seers the ultimate Truth/ *summer bonum*, by the knowers of *Brahman*:

jñāne ca trividhe jñeye krameṇa vidite svayam /

sarvajñātā hi sarvatra bhavatīha mahādhiyaḥ. MandUpK4.89

4.89. On acquiring knowledge (of the threefold object) and on knowledge of the objects in succession, the supreme Reality becomes self-revealed, then there emerges here, for the man of supreme intellect, the state of being All and enlightened forever.

Kārikās 4.90–100 presents an *Agrayāna* (vehicle, ‘stepping in front to defy the enemy’ MW p.6/2) to knowing. The text states, 4.92:⁵⁷

ādibuddhāḥ prakṛtyaiva sarve dharmāḥ suniścītāḥ /

yasyaivam bhavati kṣāntiḥ so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate // MāṇḍUpK4.92

4.92. All the souls are, by their very nature, illumined from the very beginning, and their characteristics are well determined. He, to whom ensues in this way the freedom from the need for any further acquisition of knowledge, becomes fit for immortality.

⁵⁷ 4.92 ‘ādibuddhāḥ prakṛtyaiva sarve dharmāḥ suniścītāḥ/ yasyaivam bhavati kṣāntiḥ so 'mṛtatvāya kalpate’

Duality is for the unwise, nonduality and undifferentiated Reality is for the wise and difficult to realize.

Śaṅkara and Anubhūti aver that according to the view of the ignorant the destruction of the veil covering the real nature of *Ātman* is not possible. This is a (tacit) admission by the *Vedāntist* that the (real) nature of the *Jīvas* is covered by a veil. It is not so. The *Jīvas* are never subject to any veil or bondage imposed by ignorance. That is to say, they are never free from any bondage (which does not at all exist). They are pure by nature; illumined and free from the very beginning as it is said that they are of the nature of eternal purity, knowledge and freedom. If so, why are *Jīvas* described as capable of *knowing* (the Ultimate Reality) by teachers who are competent to know the Truth, *i.e.*, those who are endowed with the power of discrimination? The reply is that it is like speaking about the sun as *shining* though the very nature of the sun is all-light, or speaking about the hill, which is ever free from any motion, as always *standing*.

The last *Kārikās* say 4.99-100⁵⁸:

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṃ dharmeṣu tāyinaḥ

sarve dharmās tathā jñānaṃ naitad buddhena bhāṣitam // MāṇḍUpK4.99

4.99. The knowledge of the enlightened man, who is all-pervasive, does not extend to objects; all the souls, also, like knowledge (do not reach out to objects).

This view was not expressed by the Buddha.

After realizing that State of non-duality, at the end of the treatise a salutation is uttered in praise of the knowledge of the supreme Reality:

durdarśam atigambhīram ajaṃ sāmyaṃ viśāradam /

buddhvā padam anānātvaṃ namaskurmo yathābalam // MāṇḍUpK4.100

4.100. After realizing that State of non-duality which is inscrutable, very profound, birthless, uniform, and holy, we make our obeisance to It to the best of our ability.

Śaṅkara explains that:

The knowledge of the wise man, that is to say, of the one who has attained to the Supreme Reality, is ever unrelated to other⁵⁹ objects or *Jīvas*. This knowledge is

⁵⁹ *Other, etc.*—‘It is because objects or *Jīvas*, different from knowledge or *Ātman*, do not exist’. Anubhūtiśvarūpa

always centred in or is identical with *Jīva* (i.e. *Ātman*) like the sun and its light. The word '*Tāyin*','of the all-pervading one, who has no interstices like space,' '*All-light*', in the text signifies that which is all-pervasive like *Ākāśa* or, it may mean that which is adorable or all knowledge.

All entities, i.e., *Jīvas* (beings like so many *Ātmans*) are as unattached as the *Ākāśa*, and ever-un-related to anything else. Knowledge (*Jñāna*) which has been compared to *Ākāśa* in the beginning⁶⁰ of this chapter is non-different from the knowledge of the wise one who is all-light. Therefore, the *Ākāśa* like knowledge of the wise does not relate itself to any other object. This is also the essence of the *Dharmas* /all entities. The essence of all the entities is the essence of *Brahman*, and is, like *Ākāśa*, immutable, changeless, free from parts, permanent, one and without a second, unattached, non-cognizable, unthinkable and beyond hunger and thirst.

The *Śruti* also says: 'The knowledge (characteristic) of the seer is never lost' (*Bṛhad.*

Upa. 4.3.23 *na hi draṣṭur drṣṭir viparilopo vidyate*). This knowledge regarding the

⁶⁰*Beginning, etc.*—Compare the first verse of the fourth chapter. 'I bow down to the One who is the chief among all persons, who has known fully the souls resembling (infinite) sky, through his knowledge-space and is non-different from the object of knowledge.'

Ultimate Reality, non-dual and characterized by the absence of perceiver, perception and the perceived, is not the same as that declared by the Buddha⁶¹. The view of the Buddha⁶², which rejects the existence of external objects and asserts the existence of ideas alone, is said to be similar to or very near the truth of non-dual *Ātman*. However this knowledge of non-duality which is the Ultimate Reality can be attained through *Vedānta* alone.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya provides in his *Ṭippanam* a most insightful commentary on this crucial section, as in the above passage he makes these four clarifications of Śaṅkara's bhāṣya, expounding the quintessence of *Advaita Vedānta*, which is developed by his pupil Ānandagiri and others, especially a century later by the great sage Vidyāraṇya.

Advaitins particularly have traditionally challenged the *Buddhist* influence.⁶³

Modern Western Indic scholars generally accept that Gauḍapāda was influenced by *Buddhism* as debaters are wont to be influenced by their opponents and surveys

⁶¹ *Buddha*—The reference is to the views held by the Buddhist idealists.

⁶² *The view, etc.*—Metaphysically speaking, Buddhistic philosophy is nearest to Advaita Vedānta in its dialectics.

⁶³ Potter, p.109

cover multiple contemporary points of view, at least in terms of using terminology shared by *Buddhism* and *Vedānta* to explain his ideas, but add that Gauḍapāda was a *Vedāntin* and not a *Buddhist*, continually being focussed in all his work on the *Advaita*, *Asparśa-Yoga*, the *One Consciousness*, *Kevala-Advaita*.

It remains significant that Śrī Gauḍapādācārya Maṭha is said to have been founded as early as c.740A.D., (also known as *Kavalē maṭha*, Ponda, Goa), the oldest *maṭha* of the South Indian *Sarasvatī Brāhmānas*.

Early medieval period - Maṇḍana Mīśra and Ādi Śaṅkara

So, before we consider two of Śaṅkara's first four disciples, *Padmapāda* and *Sureśvara*, let us give a brief overview of Maṇḍana Mīśra and Śaṅkara himself.

Maṇḍana Mīśra c. 8th century A.D. was a great scholar of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (*karmakhāṇḍa* or the philosophy of the ritualist system) and *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā* (the *Jñāna-*

khāṇḍa or *Advaita Vedānta* systems of thought). As a follower of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* school of philosophy and disciple of the great Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, he focused on the *karma-khāṇḍa*/ 'way of action' of the *Veda*, and was a staunch defender of the holistic *Sphoṭa* doctrine of language. Maṇḍana Miśra was also a contemporary of Ādi Śaṅkara, and is said to have become his disciple.

Moreover, he wrote an important work on *Advaita*, the *Brahma Siddhi*.⁶⁴ Being a follower of the *Karma Mīmāṃsā* school, he was a ritualist, performed all of the ritualistic duties prescribed by the *Vedas* and expanded a philosophical rational basis for this traditional way of interpreting the *Vedas*. Although he started life as a *Mīmāṃsaka*, he changed his name and he is said to have become a *sannyāsin* and an *Advaitin* after he and his wife were defeated by Śaṅkara in debate.⁶⁵

Maṇḍana Miśra has often been identified with Sureśvara (fl.800-900A.D.) one of Śaṅkara's first great disciples. In fact both, he and Maṇḍana Miśra were contemporaries of Śaṅkara. Both interpreted Śaṅkara "on the basis of their personal convictions."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Kuppaswami Sastri, S. (1984), *Brahmasiddhi*, by Maṇḍanamiśra, with commentary by Śaṅkhaṇḍī. 2nd ed., Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications

⁶⁵ *ibid.* p.30-31

⁶⁶ *ibid.* p.32

However, according to Kuppuswami Sastri and many others, it is not likely that Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of *Brahmasiddhi*, is identical to Sureśvara in spite of the fact that the tradition is correct in describing Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara as contemporaries. His critical edition of the *Brahmasiddhi* also points out that the name Maṇḍana Miśra is both a title and a first name, which is a possible cause for the confusion of personalities. The Maṇḍana Miśra's brand of *Advaita* differs in certain critical details from that of Śaṅkara, whereas Sureśvara's thought is very faithful to that of Śaṅkara.⁶⁷ Kuppuswami Sastra has pointed out that Sureśvara and Maṇḍana Miśra had different views on various doctrinal points:

a) The locus of *avidyā*: according to Maṇḍana Miśra, the individual *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*, whereas Sureśvara teaches that *avidyā* regarding *Brahman* is located in *Brahman*. These two different stances are also reflected in the opposing positions of the *Bhāmatī Prasthāna* and the *Vivarāṇa Prasthāna*.

b) Liberation: according to Maṇḍana Miśra, the knowledge which arises from a *Mahāvākya* like *tat tvam asi* is insufficient for liberation. The direct

⁶⁷ *ibid.* p.33

realization of *Brahman* is liberating, which can only be attained by meditation.⁶⁸

However, according to Sureśvara, it is the direct knowledge of the *Śruti/Mahāvākya*/which always represents 'Guru's living eternal voice' which is directly liberating, while meditation is at best a useful aid. Maṇḍana Miśra, who was a contemporary of Śaṅkara, may have been more influential in the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition than is usually acknowledged.⁶⁹

Some scholars, like Roodurmun, argue that until the 10th century, *Ādi-Śaṅkara* was overshadowed by his older contemporary Maṇḍana Miśra. In the first few centuries after Śaṅkara, it was Maṇḍana Miśra who was considered to be the most important representative of *Vedānta*. His influence was such that some regard his work to have 'set forth a non-Śaṅkaran brand of *Advaita*'⁷⁰ The 'theory of error' set forth in the *Brahmasiddhi* became the normative *Advaita Vedānta* theory of error with its emphasis on *anirvacanīya*/undiscernability (of *Brahman*).

⁶⁸ Sharma, C. (1997). *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, p.261

²⁰⁵ *ibid.* p.261

⁶⁹ King, R. (2002). *Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India and 'The Mystic East'*, Routledge, p. 128

⁷⁰ Roodurmum, p.31-32

Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī* provides the link between Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara, attempting to harmonize Śaṅkara's thought with that of Maṇḍana. According to *Advaita* tradition, Śaṅkara reincarnated as Vācaspati Miśra 'to popularize the *Advaita* System through his *Bhāmatī*.'

Many biographies of Śaṅkara describe how Maṇḍana Miśra is said to have first met Ādi Śaṅkara. Since it was customary in the time of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana for learned people to debate the relative merits and demerits of the different systems of *Hindu* philosophy.

Śaṅkara, the exponent of *Advaita* philosophy/*Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, sought out Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, the leading exponent of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* philosophy. However, it is said at that time, Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, was slowly immolating himself as a penance for his sins! After reading some of Śaṅkara's work and realizing the depth of his knowledge, he directed Śaṅkara to his greatest disciple, Maṇḍana Miśra, (who was leading a *gṛhastha*/householder's life), to debate the merits of their respective schools of thought. While trying to find the house of Maṇḍana, Śaṅkara asked for directions and was told the following:

You will find a home at whose gates there are a number of caged parrots discussing abstract topics like — Do the *Vedas* have self-validity or do they depend on some external authority for their validity? Are *karmas* capable of yielding their fruits directly, or do they require the intervention of God to do so? Is the world eternal, or is it a mere appearance? Where do you find that which was not pleasant?

According to *Vedic* ritualistic rules, it is inauspicious to see an ascetic on certain days and Maṇḍana was angered to see Śaṅkara, an ascetic, on the death anniversary of his father. Maṇḍana initially hurled insults at Śaṅkara, who calmly replied to every insult with wordplay. The people in Maṇḍana's house soon realized Śaṅkara's brilliance and advised Maṇḍana to offer his respect. Finally, after a verbal duel, Maṇḍana agreed to offer his respects.

Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara agreed that Maṇḍana's wife Ubhaya Bharatī, who is considered to be an incarnation of the goddess *Sarasvatī* in the folklore of Mithila, would be the arbiter for the debate, and that the vanquished would become a disciple of the victor and accept his school of thought. The debate spanned many

days and ranged over many different subjects within the *Vedas*, and the arguments of both competitors were compelling and forceful. Śaṅkara finally emerged victorious. However, Maṇḍana Miśra's wife, who was the judge, would not accept an ascetic as having complete knowledge since he did not have any debate with Śaṅkara⁷¹ about knowledge of *Kāmasūtras*. Śaṅkara was then given six months to research "the art of love" and then resume the debate. According to legend, he entered into the body of a king, who had just died, to learn these sciences. Later, after obtaining the necessary knowledge, the debate resumed. After a long debate, Maṇḍana accepted defeat. As agreed, Maṇḍana is supposed to have become a disciple of Śaṅkara and assumed the name Sureśvarācārya, although most scholars now agree on linguistic grounds, that this could not have been possible.

⁷¹ Vidyananda, M. (1996). *Sankara Digvijaya: The Traditional Life of Sri Sankaracharya*: Translated by Swami Tapasyananda, Chennai: Sri Ramakrishna Math; p.81-82

Ādi Śaṅkara (788–820), was born in the 8th century A.D. into a poor *Brahmin* family at Kaladi, present day Kerala, India. In his short life of 32 years, during a period of religious conflict and intolerance, Ādi Śaṅkara revived the *Advaita* philosophy to its pristine form. he travelled all over India discussing with people and convincing them that the correct way to Realization is the way of *Vedānta*; and to worship is just one means that anyone can take, provided that what you do and think is the same. It is quite possible to experience the Absolute anywhere, because the Absolute is all pervading.

His brilliant exposition of *Advaita* could be summarized in the statement ‘attributed’ to him but probably by a later *Śaṅkara*, ‘*Brahman* is real, the world is illusion. The *Jīvātman*/the soul is not other than *Brahman*’ (*Brahmajñānavālīmālā* 1.20).⁷²

⁷² *Brahmajñānavālīmālā* ‘*Song of Supreme Knowledge*’ 1.20 ‘*Brahma satyam jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*,’ School of Philosophy, Sydney (2010) p.94
¹⁷⁷ Nakamura, p.679

Also known as *Śaṅkara Bhagavatpādācārya* and *Ādi Śaṅkarācārya*, he represents a turning point in the development of *Vedānta*. After the apparent growth of the influence of *Buddhism* on *Vedānta*, culminating in the works of Gauḍapāda, Ādi Śaṅkara gave what some consider a more specifically *Vedāntic* character to what some called '*Buddhistic*' elements in these works, synthesizing and rejuvenating the doctrine of *Advaita*. Though Gauḍapāda's fourth chapter, '*The Alātaśānti-prakaraṇam*' uses *Buddhist* terminology, doctrinally Gauḍapada's work is *Vedāntic*, and not *Buddhist*.⁷³

So, within those thirty-two years, Śaṅkara wrote a commentary on the *Prasthānatraya*, the *Brahma Sūtra*, the *Ten Principle Upanisads* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*. Anyone who wanted to propound a philosophy had to explain those three books and his ideas of how these work in the creation. He wrote commentaries and quite a number of poems which were sung in the praise of different gods as well.

By his travels around India, he established the teachings of the *Vedānta*. He also established a system of worship of God – serving God, pleasing God; God will

⁷³ TRV Murti (2008 [1955]), *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Routledge, p.116

then grant the bonus. Using ideas from ancient Indian texts, Śaṅkara systematized the foundation for *Advaita Vedānta* in the 8th century A.D., reforming Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta* tradition. His thematic focus extended beyond metaphysics and soteriology, laying strong emphasis on the *Pramāṇas* that, 'lead to valid knowledge, reasoning methods that empower one to gain reliable knowledge, i.e. *Śabda/Śruti* or *Upaniṣads*'.⁷⁴ Śaṅkara only accorded a provisional validity to the knowledge gained by inquiry into the words of the *Śruti* (Vedas) and did not see this as the only *Pramāṇa* of *Brahmajñāna*. The affirmations of the *Śruti*, need to be verified and confirmed by the knowledge gained through direct experience/*anubhava* or *anubhūti*, *Bṛhad.* 2.5.19; '...**This is the Self, the witness of all/** *ayam ātmā brahma sarvānbhūḥ.*'⁷⁵

The authority of the *Śruti*, therefore, is second only to this *anubhūti*, the unitive experience that is *Sat Cit Ānanda*, as this alone is its realization.⁷⁶ It would seem significant that our author's very name, Anubhūti-svarūpācārya reflects this assumption, in line with his great master Śaṅkara's teaching. Mayeda concurs,

⁷⁴ *Bṛhad. Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* 2.1.20, Potter, p.189

⁷⁵ cf. *Bṛhad.* 2.5.19. '*ayam ātmā brahma sarvānbhūḥ...*'

⁷⁶ Rambachan, A. (1991). *Accomplishing the Accomplished: Vedas as a Source of Valid Knowledge in Sankara*, University of Hawaii Press, p. xii–xiii

adding that Śaṅkara maintained the need for objectivity in the process of gaining knowledge from things (*vastu-tantra*), and considered subjective opinions (*puruṣa-tantra*) and injunctions in *Śruti* (*codana-tantra*) as secondary.⁷⁷

Mayeda cites Śaṅkara's explicit statements emphasizing epistemology or what is generated by 'means of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa-janya*) in section 8.133 of *Upadeśasahasrī*; 'It is only through evidences such as words, inference etc...that all things become known to those who do not know them'⁷⁸ and 1.1.4 of *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 'But that (*Brahman* is to be known from scripture) because It is connected (with the *Vedānta* texts) as their purport.'⁷⁹

Thus, the Śaṅkara tradition has four means of valid proof, *Śruti*, *smṛti* (*Gītā* etc.), *mahāpuruṣa* (words of realized beings) and as the final authority *anubhūti* intuitive experience (of undoubted consonance with one's own *antaḥ karaṇa*/inner-organ of mind or heart).

⁷⁷ Mayeda. (2006). pp. 46–47.

⁷⁸ *Upadeśasahasrī* 1.18.133 'Śabdād anumater vāpi pramāṇād vā tato 'nyataḥ/siddhiḥ sarva padārthānāṃ syād ajñāṃ prati nānyathā.'

⁷⁹ *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.4. 'Tat tu samanvayāt.' and Potter, p.124

Ādi Śaṅkara cautioned against 'cherry-picking' a phrase or verse out of context from *Vedic* literature, and remarked that the *Anvaya* (theme or purport) of any treatise can only be correctly understood if one attends to the *Samanvayāt Tatparya Liṅga*, that is six characteristics of the text under consideration:

i) what is common in *Upakrama* (introductory statement) and *Upasaṃhāra* (conclusions);

ii) *Abhyāsa* (message repeated);

iii) *Apūrvatā* (unique proposition or novelty);

iv) *Phala* (fruit or result derived);

v) *Arthavāda* (explained meaning, praised point);

vi) *Yukti* (verifiable reasoning).⁸⁰

While this methodology has roots in the theoretical works of *Nyāya*, Śaṅkara applied it with his unique exegetical method called *Anvaya-Vyatireka*, which states that for proper understanding, one must ‘accept only meanings that are compatible with all characteristics’ and ‘exclude meanings that are incompatible with any.’⁸¹

This insight into rules of reasoning and hierarchical emphasis on epistemic steps is ‘doubtlessly the suggestion’ of Śaṅkara in the *Brahma Sūtra*, an insight that flowers in the works of his first disciple Padmapāda.⁸² Merrell-Wolff states that Śaṅkara accepts *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* as a source of knowledge as he develops his philosophical theses, yet never rests his case on the ancient texts alone, but rather proves each thesis, point by point using *pramānas* (epistemology), reason and experience.⁸³

⁸⁰ Thibaut, G. (Translator), *Brahma Sutras: With Commentary of Śaṅkara*, p. 31–33 sūtra 1.1.4

⁸¹ Comans, M. (1996). *Śaṅkara and the Prasankhyānavāda*, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 24, No.1, p.49-71.

⁸² Phillips, S. (2000). in Perrett, R.W. (Editor), *Epistemology: Indian Philosophy*, Volume 1, Routledge, pages 224–228 with notes 8, 13 and 63

⁸³ Merrell-Wolff, F. (1995). *Transformations in Consciousness: The Metaphysics and Epistemology*, State University of New York Press, pp. 242–260

Historical Context: Śaṅkara lived at the time of political instability that followed the Gupta Dynasty and King Harsha of the 7th century A.D. It was a time of social and cultural change as the ideas of *Buddhism*, *Jainism*, and various traditions within *Hinduism* were competing for followers.⁸⁴ *Buddhism* in particular may have influenced India's spiritual traditions in the first 700 years of the 1st millennium A.D.⁸⁵ Śaṅkara and his contemporaries through their understanding of *Buddhism* and the ancient *Vedic* traditions, transformed the extant ideas, particularly reforming the *Vedānta* tradition of *Hinduism*, making it India's most important tradition for more than a thousand years.

⁸⁴ Mahadevan, TMP. (1968). *Shankaracharya*, National Book Trust, pp.283–285,

⁸⁵ Potter, K. (1998). *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and his pupils*, Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 1–21, 103–119

Writing: Ādi Śaṅkara is best known for his systematic commentaries (*Bhāṣyas*) on the *Prasthāna-trayī*, the triple basis of *Vedānta*, i.e. the *Mukhya*/Ten principle *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra*. Śaṅkara's magnum opus is his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, the fundamental text of *Vedānta*. Śaṅkara's *Vivarāṇa* (tertiary notes) on the commentary by Vedavyāsa on the *Yogasūtra* as well as those on *Apastamba Dharma-sūtras* are accepted by most scholars as authentic works of Ādi Śaṅkara too, along with his most important original philosophical work, the *Upadeśasahasrī*.⁸⁶

Among the *Stotra* (poetic works), the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra*, *Bhajaḡovinda Stotra*, *Daśa-ślokī*, are also likely to be authentic.⁸⁷ Of other original *Prakaraṇas* (chapters/treatises), 76 works are attributed to Ādi Śaṅkara. Modern-era Indian scholars

⁸⁶ Isaeva, N.V. (1993). *Shankara and Indian Philosophy*, SUNY Press, p.93-97

⁸⁷ *ibid.* p.93-97

Belvalkar and Upadhyaya accept five and thirty-nine works, respectively, as authentic.⁸⁸

Commentaries on *Nṛsiṃha-Purvatāpanīya* and *Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣads* have been attributed to Ādi Śaṅkara, but their authenticity is highly doubtful.⁸⁹ Similarly, commentaries on several early and later *Upaniṣads* attributed to Śaṅkara are not accepted as authentic by Hacker, and are likely works of later *Advaita Vedānta* scholars; these include the *bhāṣyas* on *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad*, *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, *Kaivalya Upaniṣad*, *Paramahaṃsa Upaniṣad*, and *Gopālatāpanīya Upaniṣad*.⁹⁰

Influence of Śaṅkara

Śaṅkara's status in the tradition of *Advaita Vedānta* is unparalleled. He travelled all over India to help restore the study of the *Vedas*. His teachings and *sampradāya*/

⁸⁸ Pande, G. C. (1994), *Life and Thought of Śaṅkarācārya*, Motilal Banarsidass Publ, p.113115

⁸⁹ *ibid.* p.113

⁹⁰ Hacker, Paul. 'Sankaracarya and Sankarabhagavatpada: Preliminary Remarks Concerning the Authorship Problem, in *Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedānta* (Editor: Wilhelm Halbfass) (1995), State University of New York Press.

tradition form the basis of *Smārtism*, a synthesis of four philosophical strands: *Mīmāṃsā*, *Advaita*, *Yoga* and *theism*, even though Śaṅkara himself specifically refutes *Mīmāṃsā*, *Yoga* and *theism*. The *Smārta* tradition rejects theistic sectarianism, and it is notable for the domestic worship of five shrines with five deities, all treated as equal – Śiva, Viṣṇu, Sūrya, Gaṇeśa and Śakti. He introduced the *Pañcāyatana*, the simultaneous worship of five deities – Gaṇeśa, Sūrya, Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Devī. Śaṅkara taught that the ultimate reality is impersonal and *Nirguṇa* (attributeless) and that any symbolic god serves the same equivalent purpose. All deities were but different forms of the one *Brahman*, the invisible Supreme Being.⁹¹

It would seem that Ādi Śaṅkara apparently unified two apparently distinct philosophical doctrines, namely *Ātman* and *Brahman*.⁹² Śaṅkara's influence extended to reforming Hinduism, founding monasteries, edifying disciples, disputing opponents, and engaging in philosophic activity that, in the eyes of Indian tradition, helped revive 'the orthodox idea of the unity of all beings' in *Vedānta* thought.⁹³

⁹¹ Klostermaier, K. (2007) *A Survey of Hinduism*, Third Edition, State University of New York Press, p.40

⁹² Ashley, B. M. (2006). *The Way toward Wisdom.*, p.395

⁹³ Isaeva, N. V. (1992). *Shankara and Indian Philosophy*. State University of New York Press, p.2

The Maṇḍana Mīśra's brand of *Advaita* differs in certain critical details from that of Śaṅkara, whereas Sureśvara's thought is very faithful to that of Śaṅkara.⁹⁴ Kuppuswami Sastra has pointed out that Sureśvara and Maṇḍana Mīśra had different views on various doctrinal points:

a) The locus of *avidyā*: according to Maṇḍana Mīśra, the individual *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*, whereas Sureśvara teaches that *avidyā* regarding *Brahman* is located in *Brahman*. These two different stances are also reflected in the opposing positions of the *Bhāmatī Prasthāna* and the *Vivaraṇa Prasthāna*.

b) Liberation: according to Maṇḍana Mīśra, the knowledge which arises from the *Mahāvākyas* like *tat tvam asi* is insufficient for liberation. The direct realization of *Brahman* is liberating, which can only be attained by meditation.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ *ibid.* p.33

⁹⁵ Sharma, C. (1997). *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, p.261

²⁰⁵ *ibid.* p.261

However, according to Sureśvara, it is the direct knowledge of the *Śruti/Mahāvākya* which is directly liberating, while meditation is at best a useful aid. Maṇḍana Miśra, who was a contemporary of Śaṅkara, may have been more influential in the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition than is usually acknowledged.⁹⁶

Some scholars, like Roodurmun, argue that until the 10th century, *Ādi-Śaṅkara* was overshadowed by his older contemporary Maṇḍana Miśra. In the first few centuries after Śaṅkara, it was Maṇḍana Miśra who was considered to be the most important representative of *Vedānta*. His influence was such that some regard his work to have 'set forth a non-Śaṅkaran brand of *Advaita*'⁹⁷ As stated the 'theory of error' set forth in the *Brahmasiddhi* became the normative *Advaita Vedānta* theory of error with its emphasis on *anirvacanīya*. Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī* provides the link between Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara, attempting to harmonize Śaṅkara's thought with that of Maṇḍana. As stated, according to *Advaita* tradition, Śaṅkara reincarnated as Vācaspati Miśra 'to popularize the *Advaita* System through his *Bhāmatī*.'

⁹⁶ King, R. (2002). *Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India and 'The Mystic East'*, Routledge, p. 128

⁹⁷ Roodurmum, p.31-32

Sureśvarācārya (fl.760A.D.) was said to be one of the four main disciples of Śaṅkara, along with Hastāmalaka, Padmapāda and Toṭakācārya, and was the first head of Śṛṅgerī Maṭha, one of the four Maṭhas that Śaṅkara later established. The ‘theory of error’ set forth in the great work on *Advaita* by Maṇḍana Mīśra (fl.690A.D.) (considered by some as one with Sureśvarācārya!), *Brahmasiddhi*, became the normative *Advaita Vedānta* theory of error, *anirvacanīyatā*.⁹⁸ It was Vācaspati Mīśra’s (fl.960A.D.) commentary on this work that linked it to Śaṅkara’s teaching. His influential thesis in the *Advaita* tradition has been that errors are opportunities because they ‘lead to truth’ and fully correct knowledge requires that not only should one understand the truth but also examine and understand errors as well as what is not truth.

His attitude toward Śaṅkara was that of a ‘self-confident rival teacher of *Advaita*’ and his influence was such that some regard the *Brahma-siddhi* to have ‘set forth a non-Śaṅkaran brand of *Advaita*’⁹⁹. Maṇḍana Mīśra’s brand of *Advaita* differs

⁹⁸ Roodurmum, *Anirvacanīyatā*, p.31

⁹⁹ Roodurmum, p.31

in certain critical details from that of Śaṅkara, whereas Sureśvara's thought is very faithful to that of Śaṅkara.

According to Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī and others, after a close study of *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika*, (admitted definitely as works of Sureśvara) and the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra they concluded: 'we are here in the presence of two separate individuals...' Sharma, like Hiriyanna and Kuppuswami Sastra has also pointed out that Sureśvara and Maṇḍana Miśra had different views on various doctrinal points outlined above.¹⁰⁰

i) According to Maṇḍana Miśra, the individual *jīvātma* is the locus of *avidyā*, whereas Sureśvara contends that *avidyā* regarding *Brahman* is located in *Brahman*. As stated the two different stances are also reflected in the opposing positions of the *Bhāmatī prasthāna* and the *Vivarāṇa one*.

ii) *Mokṣa/Liberation*: according to Maṇḍana Miśra, the knowledge which arises from the *mahāvākyas* (like *tat tvam asi*) is insufficient for *Mokṣa/Liberation*. Direct realization of *Brahman* can only be attained by correct

¹⁰⁰ Sharma, C. (1997). *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, p.290

knowledge. This requires that not only should one understand the truth but also examine and understand and dispel error by knowledge of truth.¹⁰¹

Advaita Vedānta sub- prasthānas/'schools'

Padmapādācārya, (fl.740A.D.) is considered by tradition to be Śaṅkara's earliest and most beloved disciple, of whom he was a younger contemporary.

Padmapāda, together with Sureśvara developed ideas that led to the founding of the so called *Vivaraṇa Prasthāna* tradition of commentators. The only surviving work of Padmapāda, known to be authentic is the *Pañcapādikā*, written in response to Śaṅkara's request for a commentary on his own *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, and once written was destroyed by a jealous uncle. The surviving text is supposed to be what Śaṅkara could recall of the commentary. Certainly, all that survives of the work is an extended gloss on the first four *sūtras*.

Padmapādācārya's life exemplifies the *Guru-Śiṣya* relationship. For Padmapādācārya, the *Guru* is everything and the command of *Guru* is ultimate. Once when he was on the opposite bank of a river, Śaṅkara who was on the other side is said to have called him, and Padmapādācārya, without even thinking that he

¹⁰¹ Sharma, p.291

might be drowned in a swollen river, began walking and a lotus appeared on every step that he would take and hold his feet from drowning - and that is why he came to be known as *Padma-Pāda* - 'Lotus - Feet'. His devotion exemplifies the relationship of *Guru* and *Śiṣya*.

In his *Pañcapādikā*, Padmapāda develops a complete epistemology on the basis of Śaṅkara's concept of *adhyāsa* ('superimposition' —'the apparent presentation to consciousness of something as something else').¹⁰² In developing, expanding, analyzing, and criticizing this notion, Padmapāda paved the way for a developed epistemology of *Advaita Vedānta*.

Also important is Padmapāda's 'critique of difference'; he argued that the relationship between the *jīvātman* (the empirical self) and the *Ātman* (the underlying, spiritual Self) was that of reflection to prototype. According to this

¹⁰² BSB Introduction 'āha - ko'yam adhyāso nāmeti /ucyate smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ/tam ke cit anyatrādhyāsa iti vadanti/kecit tu yatra yad adhyāsaḥ tad vivekāgrahaṇanibandhano bhrama iti/ any tu yatra yad adhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakṣate iti/ sarvathāpi tvanyasyānyadharmāvabhāsatām na vyabhicarati/ tathā ca loke'nubhavaḥ - śūktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsaḥ, ekaś candraḥ sadvitiyavad iti'// If it be asked, 'What is it that is called Superimposition?'- the answer is - "It is awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a foreign (different) location as a result of some past experience. With regards to this, some say that it consists in the superimposition of the attributes on one thing on another. But others assert that wherever a superimposition on anything occurs, there is only a confusion arising from the absence of distinction between them. Others say that the superimposition of anything on any other substratum consists in fancying some opposite attribute on that very basis.

theory of reflection (*pratibimba-vāda*), the *jīva* is an appearance of Absolute reality (*Brahman/Ātman*) as reflected in ignorance.

This theory has the effect of moving from the view of Padmapāda's predecessors that the self was to be rejected as not *Brahman* to the view that enlightenment brings an understanding that everything is *Brahman*: 'Thus the *jīva* or 'face in the mirror' is none other than *Ātman* or the original face.' For Padmapāda, as for Śaṅkara: 'the ascertainment of the essential Self is not so much a matter of a 'mystical' experience occurring in time, but a matter of enquiry consisting of the careful and concentrated introspection of and reflection upon one's ordinary experience.'¹⁰³

Sureśvara, also known as Sureśvarācārya, (fl. 760A.D.) was as previously stated one of the four first immediate disciples of Ādi Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara is said to have entrusted to Sureśvara his first monastic institution, the *Śṛīgerī Śārada Pīṭham*. Sureśvara was the Advaita tradition's *Vārttikakāra* (commentator), meticulously and critically examining Śaṅkara's work. In his non-commentatorial work, the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, he presents *Advaita* philosophy clearly and simply.

¹⁰³ Comans, M., (2001). 'Later Vedānta', in Brian Carr & Indira Mahalingam ed. *Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy*, London: Routledge, p. 213

Although Maṇḍana Miśra has often been identified with Sureśvara, Kuppuswami Sastri, Potter and other scholars, as we have stated consider it is not likely that Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of *Brahmasiddhi*, is identical with Sureśvara, but the tradition is correct in describing Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara as contemporary.¹⁰⁴

After Śaṅkara's death, several subprasthānas developed. Two of them still exist today, the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa*. Two defunct traditions are the *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapāda and *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman (fl 950 A.D.) on which our Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya produced his brilliant *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*. These were superseded by Prakāśātman's great work *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa* as the *Vivaraṇa* tradition or *prasthāna*.¹⁰⁵ These traditions worked out the logical implications of various *Advaita* doctrines. Two of the problems they encountered were the further interpretations of the concepts of *māyā* and *avidyā*.

Vimuktātman – *Iṣṭa-Siddhi* (c.fl.950 A.D.)

Vimuktātman is one of the most important *advaitins* of the

¹⁰⁴ Kuppuswami Sastra, S. (1984). *Brahmasiddhi*, by Maṇḍanamiśra, with commentary by Śaṅkhapānī. 2nd ed.: Sri Satguru Publications, Dehli, India, pp.30-40.

¹⁰⁵ Roodurmum, p.40

post-Śaṅkara period. His famous work, the *Istasiddhi*, is widely

acclaimed as a standard treatise. It is in much the same tradition as

Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa prasthāna*. *Iṣṭasiddhi* was developed

further by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*¹⁰⁶.

It is one of the four *Siddhi*-works, the other three being

Advaitasiddhi, *Brahmasiddhi* and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*.

Except that he was a disciple of Avyayātman, nothing more is

known about him. He is said to have written one more work

called *Pramāṇa-vrtti-nirṇaya* which is not yet published.

Madhusudana Sarasvati, at the end of his great

classic *Advaita-siddhi*, refers to three *Siddhi* works, viz. *Ishta-siddhi*,

¹⁰⁶ Shastrigal, R.K., Mylapore, 2006

Naishkarmya-siddhi, and *Brahma-siddhi*. The *Brahma-siddhi* of

Mandana may be said to devote itself to the definition (*lakṣaṇa*)

and testimony (*pramāṇa*) of *Brahman* indicated in the expression,

Brahmajijñāsa, that of the desire to know *Brahman*. The

Naishkarmya-siddhi of Sureśvara is interested in showing the how

of *Brahman*-knowledge, i.e., whether it is by knowledge alone or

by action that release is possible by the qualities of the reflecting

medium. Thus the *jīva* seems to have acquired the qualities of the

mind which is the reflecting medium. In this sense the reflection

theory is preferable to the limitation theory which does not have

any such feature. *Bhamatī* prefers the limitation theory while

Vivarāṇa prefers the reflection theory. But neither positively rejects

the other view. This is based on the *Bhumikā* of Polagam Srim

Rama Sastri as explained by Dr Mani Dravid Sastrigal in 2020.

The *Iṣṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman engages itself rather in the

question of the why of *Brahman*-knowledge, enquiring into the

nature and cause of error, that is, the world. In short, ontology,

ethology and epistemology may be said to be the respective

contents of these three *Siddhis*. When expounding the means of

release at the end of *Iṣṭasiddhi*, Vimuktātman explains that the

intuition into the oneness of Reality alone can remove *avidyā*

completely. For this intuition, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*

are the means. Calmness and equanimity are prescribed till renunciation of all actions takes place. Even sacrifices indirectly help this process by creating purity of mind. The *asambhavana* (the notion of improbability) and *viparīta-bhavana* (the notion of contrariety) with regard to the real nature of *Brahman* are removed by the scripture by means of an explanation of the nature of *Ātman* beginning with *astitva*/existence or reality and ending with freedom from hunger and thirst. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.¹⁰⁷ repeats nine times the declaration: *tat-tvam asi* "That(*Brahman*) thou art (*Śvetaketu*)," dispelling every time an illusion about Reality.

If *śravaṇa*, or hearing, once only without these aforesaid means could bring

¹⁰⁷ VI.8.7 etc. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* Swāmi Gambhirānanda .Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, India 1997.

about intuition, they would be futile. When the mind is sufficiently pure to receive the final illumination mellowed by these disciplines, then *śravaṇa*, of the *Vedānta* texts results in the intuition removing the specific illusion every time it is repeated. Here too, Vimuktātman does not see eye to eye with the school of Maṇḍana which holds that mediate knowledge arising from *śravaṇa*, needs to be transformed into immediacy by repeated meditation. He, on the contrary, suggests that from *śravaṇa* itself, intuition takes place, provided it comes at the top of all spiritual equipment.

As has been stated Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya composed his own commentary

on the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*¹⁰⁸, where Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya,

¹⁰⁸ R.Krishnamurthi Sastrigal(2006) *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*, a critical study, Adi Sankara Advaita Research Centre, Chennai.

among other things expounds at length regarding *Māyā, Jīva, Īśvara, Bandha*

and *Mukti*.

The *Iṣṭasiddhi* has been quoted as authority in many subsequent texts.

His school of thought was eventually replaced by Prakasatman's *Vivarana school*.¹⁰⁹

Prakaśātman (c. 1200–1300)¹¹⁰ wrote the *Pañcapādika-Vivaraṇa*, a commentary on the *Pañcapādika* by Padmapādācārya¹¹¹ The *Vivaraṇa* lends its name to the subsequent school. According to Roodurmum, "[H]is line of thought [...] became the leitmotif of all subsequent developments in the evolution of the Advaita tradition."

The Vivarana school takes an epistemological approach. Prakaśātman was the first to propound the theory of *mūlāvidyā* or *māyā* as being of "positive beginningless nature",¹¹² and sees *Brahman* as the source of *avidyā*. Critics object that Brahman is pure consciousness, so it cannot be the source of *avidyā*.. Another problem is that contradictory qualities, namely knowledge and ignorance, are attributed to

¹⁰⁹ Roodurmum, Pulasth Soobah (2002), *Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta: A Critical Approach*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹ *ibid.*

¹¹² *ibid.*

Brahman.

Late medieval times – "yogic Advaita"

Śaṅkara is very well-studied, but "scholars have yet to provide even a rudimentary, let alone comprehensive account of the history of *Advaita Vedānta* in the centuries leading up to the colonial period"¹¹³, hence the important contribution of this thesis on Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, c. 1250 A.D. to an understanding this very era. Sarvajñātman (10th century) is well-known as the author of the *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka* (a concise exposition of Ādi Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*). His other works include the *Pancaprakriyā* and the *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*.

The *Iṣṭasiddhi* has been quoted as authority in many subsequent works. For example, in the *Pramāṇamāla*¹¹⁴, Ānandabodha,(11th century AD) says "The same thing has been said by the *Guru*. The effect is not anywhere else than in the cause, if it is not there, where could it be?" Also in *Nyāyamakaranda*, "Or, the cessation of nescience is the Self itself."

¹¹³ Allen, Michael S.; Venkatkrishnan, Anand (25 September 2017). "Introduction to Special Issue: New Directions in the Study of Advaita Vedānta". *International Journal of Hindu Studies*. **21** (3): 271–274. doi:10.1007/s11407-017-9218-9.

¹¹⁴ ibid. p.2 *Pramāṇamāla*, *Nyāyadīpāvalī* and *Nyāyamakaranda*, Chowkamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1907. "etadevoktaṃ gurubhiḥ 'nānyatra kāraṇātkāryaṃ na cet tatra kva tad havet iti" *Pra.m.* p.4

It is significant that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya has himself composed commentaries on both of these works by his master, as well as the third '*Nyāya-dīpāvalī*'¹¹⁵.¹¹⁶ ¹¹⁷

One of the well-known polemical writers of *Advaita* metaphysics, Ānandabodha (11th cent. A. D.) (also called Ānandabodhācārya) and the special features of these works are: Refutation of the *Sāṅkhyan* theory of multiplicity of selves and the apparent difference of objective entities; The theory that everything other than *Brahman* is *mithyā* (false) since it is *dṛśya* (perceived); A new definition of *mithyātva* (falsity) viz., *ṣadbhin-natvam mithyātva* (falsity is being different from the real); *avidyā* is positive in the sense that Cessation of *avidyā* is an entity of a fifth category different from *sat* (real), *asat* (unreal), *sad-asat* (real-unreal) and *anirvacanīya* (indefinable).

Dasgupta¹¹⁸ says of Ānandabodha, that he "is a great name in the school of Śaṅkara *Vedānta*."Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (c. 1250 AD.), the teacher of Ānandajñāna (i.e. Ānandagiri), also wrote commentaries on all three works. From this it is clear we have a profound continuity and originality arising from the *Guru-*

¹¹⁵ *ibid.* p.2 *Pramāṇamāla*, *Nyāyadīpāvalī* and *Nyāyamakaranda*, Chowkamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1907. "ātmaivājñānahānir vā iti cācāryavacanam udāharanti " iti Nyā. M. p.359

¹¹⁶ 'Nibandhana' on Ānandabodha's '*Pramāṇamālā*-' (*Brahma Vidyā*, The Journal of Advaita Sabha, Kumbakonam, 1956; Madras Trien. Cat. R. 3268) '*Saṅgraha*' on Ānandabodha's '*Nyāyamakaranda*' (Adya Library manuscript; Tekkemaṭham, Kochin),

¹¹⁷ 'Nibandhana' on Ānandabodha's '*Pramāṇamālā*-' (*Brahma Vidyā*, The Journal of Advaita Sabha, Kumbakonam, 1956; Madras Trien. Cat. R. 3268) '*Saṅgraha*' on Ānandabodha's '*Nyāyamakaranda*' (Adya Library manuscript; Tekkemaṭham, Kochin),

¹¹⁸ p.116 S. Dasgupta (1975) Vol.2 *A History of Indian Philosophy* Motilal .Delhi. India.

paramparā of these two, Vimuktātma and Ānandabodha, both critical of Maṇḍana-Miśra(750-850) and Vācaspati Miśra.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's next great **preceptor** it has been said, appears to have been **Śrī-Harsha**¹¹⁹. As mentioned previously the very fact that he pays his obeisance over four verses to him, more than for any other teacher, speaks volumes for his deep respect, even adoration of this great Advaitin teacher, whose most profound work *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā'*/ Sweets of Refutation, he himself brilliantly comments upon in his *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā*¹²⁰¹²¹. Indeed his is the first complete commentary on this work, the second being Citsukhācārya's commentary which however is incomplete.

Śrī Harṣa, was a 12th century A.D. great *Advaita* poet and preceptor, who discusses various themes, such as *pramāṇa*/ the means of valid knowledge. Śrīharṣa's thought was influential for both *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thinkers and also for the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition.^[2]

¹¹⁹ R. Thangaswami p.244 "Advaita Vedānta Literature" Madras University.

¹²⁰ c.f. P.E.Granoff (1947) Philosophy and Argument in late Vedānta: Śrī Harṣa's '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*' D.Reidel .Boston.U.S.A.df

¹²¹ E.A.Solomon. *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā* on Śrī Harṣa's '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*',(1990) Gujarat University

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya , c. 1250 AD.

According to Karl Potter's Bibliography¹²², Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, is to be dated approximately 1270 A.D. This is supported by the evidence of Amalānanda¹²³, (1247-1347), in his *Vedāntakalpataru*¹²⁴. This commentator on Vācaspati Miśra's (fl.940) *Bhāmatī* examines the criticisms of it pointed out by *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*, and seeks to refute them without mentioning the name of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. At the end of his *Kalpataru*, Amalānanda mentions that he wrote under the Yādava King of Devagiri, Kṛṣṇa, (1248-1259 A.D.) and his brother Mahādeva. So we may take it that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya flourished between the middle of the 12th Century and the first half of the 13th Century.

As to where Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya was born and lived, much has to be largely inferred from odd references. Though we may infer he was born in South India¹²⁵, perhaps

¹²² Karl Potter's bibliography (<http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/ckeyt/txt3.htm>)

¹²³L. Vasudeva Sarma, Preceptors of Advaita 1968 T.Mahadevan. ISBN-13: 9788185208510 Samata Books, Chennai, India

¹²⁴ Bhāmatī, Commentary of Vācaspatimiśra on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara, with the *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda and the *Parimala*, Nirnaya Press, Bombay,1917.

¹²⁵ Dakṣiṇadeśa

Kumbhakoṇam,¹²⁶ because he was a *Hayagrīva*¹²⁷ worshipper, and this is where such worship is centred in India.

According to Shastri Navala Kishor's¹²⁸ *Bhūmikā*, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, who was the original author of *Sarasvata-vyākaraṇam*, as well, and some say of the *Sārasvata-sūtras* themselves, (although it is mainly attributed to Narendrācārya (10th century)). He was an exalted hermit of Vāraṇasī. Moreover he was a monk following the sect of *Hayagrīva* worship and a disciple of a *Sārasvata-sannyāsin* in Vāraṇasī where he became learned in Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Vedānta.

It may be that from Varanasi he went on to Uttara Pradeśa to find Ānandabodha (1050 to 1150 A.D.) as his teacher. Ānandabodha had Ātmavāsa and Vimuktātma as his teachers and seems to have agreed to be the teacher of Anubhūtiśvarūpa. We only know that “Ānandabodha came from Uttara Bhārata, i.e. North India, Uttara Pradeśa.”¹²⁹

126 cf. verse at end of Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī (intro. page 24)

127 *Hayagrīva* is a horse-headed *avatāra* of the Lord *Viṣṇu* in Hinduism. See appendix for more detail.

128 Shastri Navala Kishor, *Bhūmikā* p.9 v 19 ed. of Candrakīrti Muni's commentary v 19 kartāsyā kāśyām anubhūtiśvarūpam āsīd udāsī mahatām vareṇyam dr.m.joshi p.4 *Sarasvati-sanyasi -Hayagrīva sect.*

129 Potter p. 512 and Thangaswami p. 239.

He seems to have later gone, perhaps with his teacher Ānandabodha to live in the borders of Gujarat, Kathiawar district, and Dwaraka for advanced study of Nyāya and *Vedānta*. Tripathi¹³⁰ says that the fact that Janārdana (i.e. Ānandagiri) was his pupil and that the study of *Sarasvata-Prakriyā* has prevailed especially in Gujarat from the 13th century makes it probable that he had a long stay in Gujarat (in Kathiawad), and perhaps in Dwaraka.

Coming now to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's disciples, clearly the most important and influential was Ānandagiri.¹³¹ T.M.Triparthi has dated Ānandagiri, 1260-1320, native of Gujarat who apparently became Dvāraka's *Śaṅkarapīṭhādhiśa*, though some regard him as native of Andhra Pradesh in South India, (his other names being Janārdana, Ānandajñāna, Ānandajñānagiri, Ānandaśaila, and Bodhapṛthivīdhara). This famous commentator on *Vedānta* says that his work *Tattvaloka* is a companion to *Prakaṣārthavivarāṇa*, written by his teacher, *vidyā-guru*, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the middle of 13th century. (This is also accepted by Dasgupta.) He also refers to him in several other places (viz. *Taittirīyopaniṣad bhāṣya-vyākhyāya*, p.31; *Muṇḍaka-bhāṣya-*

¹³⁰ T.M.Triparthi(*Tarkasamgraha of Anandajñāna* ,introduction. GOS, 1917 'as in 'Tarkasamgraha' Janārdana as Ānandagiri is described as *Dvārakādhiśa* and *Dvārakādhipati* (p.142).

¹³¹ T.M.Triparthi *Tarkasamgraha of Anandajñāna* ,introduction. GOS, 1917

vyākhyāya p.32; Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vyākhyāya p.23; Kaṭhopaniṣad- bhāṣya-vyākhyāya p.122- Ānandāśram Sanskrit Series.) However his 'dīkṣa-guru' was Śuddhānanda pupil of Citsukhācārya(1120-1220 AD). At the end of his commentary (*Tarkaviveka*) on the *Padārthatattvanirṇaya* of Ānandānubhava or Gaṅgāpuri Bhaṭṭāraka, Ānandagiri says he wrote it during the rule of Nṛsimdeva of Kalinga (i.e. Orissa) that is either Narasimha I (AD 1238-64) or Narasimha II (AD 1278-1306) so he flourished in the thirteenth century.

At the end of the *Tattvāloka*, Janārdana acknowledges his indebtedness to the *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*. A careful study of which S.A.Upadhyaya states, shows that Janārdana has more or less followed the mode of argument adopted by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa* and even quite often used words and expressions, found in the latter¹³². Although, according to S.A.Upadhyaya¹³³, the traditional list of *Dvārakāpīṭha-Ācāryas* does not refer directly to Ānandajñāna, nor to the identification of Viśvānubhava and Viśvarūpa as equal to Sureśvara, as T.M.Triparthi claims, so this inference still needs corroborative evidence. From his specifically paying obeisance to Dvārakādhiśa in the *Tattvāloka* we can infer that he

¹³² *Tattvāloka*, Introduction, S.A.Upadhyaya pp. xxii-xxv Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Delhi. 1969

¹³³ *ibid.* S.A.Upadhyaya p.xv

was staying in Kathiawad, Gujarat and perhaps in Dvāraka, as perhaps was his *vidyā-guru* Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya .

Another pupil of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya was Narendragarī or Narendrapurī. He was author of a *Ṭippaṇa* on *Īśā Upaniṣad-Śāṅkarabhāṣya* and a commentary on *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* as well as some kind of commentary on Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's *Sārasvataprakriyā* since his name is mentioned by Amṛtabhāratī's in his commentary on *Sārasvata-prakriyā*. A pupil of Narendragarī was Prajñānanda¹³⁴ (1300-1400), the author of *Tattva-prakāśikā*, (a commentary on the *Tattvāloka*), in which he bows to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the third verse as his *Parama-guru* as well as to Narendragarī as his *gurus*¹³⁵. Also Gayāpālācārya author of '*Darpaṇaṭīkā*' greatly respected by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, for he calls him *Ācārya* in connection with *BS 2.3.50 ābhāsa eva ca* 'And (the individual soul) is only reflection (of the Supreme Soul/Self)'.

In addition we can consider individuals with whom Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya disagrees. It is clear that his main opponents within *Advaita* are those who he sees as compromising the purity of Ādi Śāṅkara's teaching, which includes especially Maṇḍana Miśra and Vācaspati Miśra, by regarding the *jīva* as the *āśraya*/abode of *avidyā*/ignorance which would thus be treating the *jīva* as *aneka*/many. Similar are those in his own generation like Śuddhānanda, and Citsukha who compromise the

¹³⁴ T.M.Tripathi's intro. to *Tarkasaṃgrah* GOS III,1917

¹³⁵ E.A.Solomon. *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā* on Śrī Harṣa's '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*', (1990) Gujarat University

Advaita in the direction of what Ādi Śaṅkara calls *jñānakarma-samucchaya*/'combining knowledge with action' as a means to liberation in opposition to the fundamental teaching of Ādi Śaṅkara that only through knowledge is liberation possible. Furthermore they are largely wedded to the theory of *avacchedavāda*/'delimitation' to explain the nature of the soul. On the analogy of the apparent limitation of the artless ether by a pot, so the artless Absolute is said to be conditioned as it were by *avidyā*. This contrasts to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's exposition of the *pratbimbavāda* theory that the soul is a reflection of the Absolute *Brahman* even though it is without shape, because there is no rule that an object like the soul does not have to have a material shape. Thus he strongly defends the Kevalādvaita of Ādi Śaṅkara.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya calls Vācaspati Miśra, as we have stated, 'Maṇḍana-*prṣṭasevī*/'simply obedient servant to the thought of Maṇḍana' not only in his magnum opus, '*Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa*'¹³⁶ but also in the *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā*¹³⁷ because of Vācaspati Miśra's strong leaning towards the views of Maṇḍana Miśra, who was regarded as harbouring *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* ritualist views from his earlier life and supporting *jñānakarma-samucchaya*/the combination of the way of ritualism with that

¹³⁶ *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa*'PK p.789 commentary on BS 3.4.48

¹³⁷ p. 324 E.A.Solomon. *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā*' on Śrī Harṣa's '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*',(1990) Gujarat University

of knowledge instead of subscribing to Ādi Śaṅkara's teaching that knowledge alone liberates.

So Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya also points out that one of his contemporaries, Citsukha (1220-1284) who wrote *Tattvapradīpikā* with commentary by Pratyakṣarūpa called *Nayanprasādinī* ascribes 'Ekajīvanvāda' to the 'Iṣṭasiddhi' of Vimuktātman. According to 'Ekajīvanvāda' the knowledge of *Brahman* arises to the aspirant who is the only soul, from the preceptor, the *Upaniṣads* and from the worship of God, although they are only apparently real. The soul whose *avidyā* is removed by the rise of the knowledge of *Brahman* remains in its own self-luminous nature which is liberation. The liberated soul does not remain as a *jīvanmukta*. Since according to this view there is no other soul excepting the one who has attained the knowledge of *Brahman*, the state of *jīvanmukta* is not admitted. Thus according to 'Ekajīvanvāda' it is *Brahman* that undergoes transmigration and gets liberated. This view according to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya has been attributed falsely, to Vimuktātman because it goes against the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 1.4.10¹³⁸ **'Whoever among the divine beings or the**

¹³⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 1.4.10 "tad yo yo devānāṃ pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhavaat tathārṣiṇāṃ tathā manuṣyāṇāṃ".

sages or men realises *Brahman* becomes *Brahman*', which is declaring the existence of many souls.

Citsukha also wrote a commentary on Śrīkharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, and on Ānandabodha's *Nyāya-makaranda* and *Pramāṇaratna-mālā*— and the *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, called *Bhāṣya-Bhāvaprakāśikā*, which could suggest a certain rivalry between them! Citsukha is preceptor of Sukhaprakāśa and *vidyā-guru* of Amalānanda and possibly of Ānandagiri.¹³⁹ However, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refers to him as '*Traipuraśālagrāma-upāsaka*', i.e. worshipper of *Śiva* and *Viṣṇu* and a religionist, so not well inclined to the discipline of *Vedāntic* metaphysical thought. Amalānanda's (1247-1347) '*Śāstradarpaṇa*' which closely follows the *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati, criticises Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, as well as in his *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī*. Sukhaprakāśa was his *vidyā-guru*. A junior contemporary of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, Citsukha was the preceptor of Sukhaprakāśa and so the *vidyā-paramaguru* or grand preceptor of Amalānanda. It is also believed that Śuddhānanda, the *dīkṣa-guru* of Ānandagiri was Citsukha's ¹⁴⁰pupil. From this it seems that Amalānanda was a junior contemporary of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya.

¹³⁹ Śrīkaṇṭha Śāstrī Indian Historical Quarterly XIV *A Bibliographical Survey* p.410

¹⁴⁰ pp.245-251 R.Thangaswami

According to Śrīkaṇṭha Śāstrī, Ānandagiri also must have been Sukhaprakāśa's¹⁴¹ pupil as well. This perhaps explains why Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya perhaps felt bitter about Citsukha and his line of pupils¹⁴².

We shall now systematically consider the nine known works of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in a sequence that may possibly correspond to the order of their original composition according to Solomon¹⁴³.

Thus a possible order and context of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's works can reasonably be taken as the following:

(i) '*Saṅgraha*'¹⁴⁴ on Ānandabodha's '*Nyāyamakaranda*', possibly composed in Gujarat. Among other things it refutes the doctrine of the plurality of selves maintained by the *Vaiśeṣikās*, the *Sāṃkhya*s, the *Jainas* and the *Prabhākāra Mīmāṃsakas*.

¹⁴¹ p.410. Indian Historical Quarterly Quarterly XIV "Advaita Vedānta Literature- A Bibliographical Survey"

¹⁴² p. 41 A.Solomon

¹⁴³ ibid. E.A.Solomon Introduction. *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā* on Śrī Harṣa's '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*' (1990) Gujarat University

¹⁴⁴ '*Saṅgraha*' on Ānandabodha's '*Nyāyamakaranda*' in manuscript form in Tekkemaṭham, Kochin, Kerala and a transcript is available at the Adyar library, Madras

(ii) '*Candrikā*'¹⁴⁵ on Ānandabodha's '*Nyāyadīpāvalī*' where by inference he proves the falsity of the world- appearance/*māyā* on the analogy of the illusory silver which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya develops further.

(iii) '*Nibandhana*'¹⁴⁶ on Ānandabodha's '*Pramāṇamālā*', proving the Self is of the nature of pure consciousness using similar arguments to that in his '*Candrikā*' on Ānandabodha's '*Nyāyadīpāvalī*'.

(iv) '*Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*'¹⁴⁷ where Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya expounds at length regarding *Māyā*, *Jīva*, *Īśvara*, *Bandha* and *Mukti*. As in his '*Gaudapādīya-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*' he refers to some *Advaitin* writer, (perhaps Citsukha) whom he accuses of not having seen the '*Iṣṭasiddhi*' of Vimuktātman, teacher of Ānandabodha one of his teachers, and so of wrongly attributing '*Ekajīva-vāda*' to him. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya describes him, as was said previously as an '*Upāsaka*' of *Traipura Sālgrama* averse to

¹⁴⁵ '*Candrikā*' on Ānandabodha's '*Nyāyadīpāvalī*' (Deccan College 766 of 1891-95; Madras Des.Cat. 15306. Published in the Annals of oriental research, University of madras, 1954-58

¹⁴⁶ '*Nibandhana*' on Ānandabodha's '*Pramāṇamālā*'-Madras Trien.Cat.R.3268. edited with Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's *Nibandhana* and Citsukha's *Sambandhokti*, AOR 14,1957-58, 54-72 S.Subrahmanya Sastri . Published first in the Advaita Sabhā Series, Kumbakonam, 1956

¹⁴⁷ '*Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*' Madras Govt.Oriental MSS, Library, Mad.trien.Cat.-R.No 4384 Dr. R. Krishnamurthi Sastrigal 2006 Adi Sankara Advaita Research Centre, Chennai, India. which was the basis of the commentary by Jñānottama, and formerly wrongly treated as the author.

Brahmavidyā. Here too he rebuts the *Naiyāyikas* who had made fun of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* as a storehouse of *Jātyuttaras*/'higher casts', counterfeit or sophistical answers or rejoinders, resembling answers (*uttara*) because they are stated in the place of correct answers. However the potency of his arguments against their dualism is never countered! E.Solomon¹⁴⁸ speculates that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya became inclined to write his commentary on the *Iṣṭasiddhi* after his three commentaries on the works of his immediate teacher Ānandabodha, who was himself pupil of the great *Advaitin* Vimuktātman. That in turn may have led him to write his own *ṭippaṇas* on the *bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara on the *Bhagavad Gītā*, *Gaudapādīya-kārikā* and *Brahma Sūtra*.

(v) '*Gītābhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*'¹⁴⁹This *ṭippaṇa* on Śaṅkara's *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, with the commentaries of Ānandagiri and Bellankonda-Rāmarāya-Kavi is brief, explaining only the textual portions which are difficult, for example in Ch.2 vv 11ff Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya criticises Bhāskara and his theory of *Jñāna-karma samuccaya*.

¹⁴⁸ p.44 E.A.Solomon Introduction. *Śiṣyāhitaiśiṅṭikā* on Śrī Harṣa's '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*',(1990) Gujarat University

¹⁴⁹ '*Gītābhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*',MSS Adyar library; Catalogue 1, p138b Śrī Dakṣiṇāmūrti Maṭha 2015 with the commentaries of Ānandagiri and Bellankonda-Rāmarāya-Kavi

(vi) '*Gaudapādīya-Śāṅkarabhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*'¹⁵⁰, is an extremely important work on the seminal text of *Advaita*, where Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya among other things criticises '*Ekajīvanvāda*' and '*sarva-mukti*' clarifying his position on the plurality of *Jīvas* and the untenability of *mukti* for all when one is released. Equally significant with '*Prakaṣārtha- Vivaraṇa*', although to date almost unknown to the scholarly world, is this *Ṭippaṇam* on the first major text of Advaita Vedānta the *Māṇḍūkya-Gauḍapādīya-bhāṣya*.

Especially significant we shall see later are his comments on *Asparśa-Yoga*/ 'the Yoga which is contactless since it has no relation with anything, as in it there is not two' in *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* 3.39 and 4.1.¹⁵¹, as well of course his commentary on verses 2. 20-28 not commented on at all by Ādi-Śāṅkara.

(vii) '*Prakaṣārtha-Vivaraṇa*'¹⁵² on '*Brahma Sūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*'.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's most famous Advaita work is the first complete

¹⁵⁰ '*Gaudapādīya-Śāṅkarabhāṣya-Ṭippaṇa*', MSS . Two in Tekkemaṭham, Kochin. Ed. S.R.Krishnamurti Sastri (1978) Sanskrit Education Society, Madras.

¹⁵¹ 3.39,41 *Māṇḍūkya-Gauḍapādīya Śāṅkara-bhāṣya-Ṭippaṇam*." *sarvasambandhākhyasparśavarjitatvāt*" Swāmi .Gambhirānanda(2000) Eight Upaniṣads, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta

¹⁵² *Prakaṣārtha-vivaraṇa*' on '*Brahma-Sūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya*',ed. T.R.Chintamani, Madras University Sanskrit Series 9, 1939.

commentary on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* composed with the explicit purpose of rescuing the tradition from the influence of “*Maṇḍanamis’ra-prṣṭha-sevī*”/slavish follower of Maṇḍana”, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s term for Vācaspatimisra, the composer of the famous *Bhāmatī*, the first full commentary on *Brahma Sūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya*.

Here Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya discusses *Māyā*, *Ajñāna*, *Īśvara*, plurality of *jīvas*, and the impossibility of release for all when one attains release, which can be compared with those in Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s ‘*Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*’. He severely criticises Bhāskara for his *bheda-abheda* theory and *Jñāna-karma samuccaya* views as well as Vācaspati’s views embodied in his famous commentary on the *Śaṅkara bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Bhāmatī*. Amalānanda, in his commentary *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī* rejects Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s criticisms! V.Raghavan¹⁵³ describes the *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa* as a *vivaraṇa* on the *Brahma Sūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya* in the line of the ‘*pratibimba-vāda*’, criticising Vācaspati’s line found in his *Bhāmatī* on *Brahma Sūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya*.

¹⁵³ V.Raghavan “*Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya- Author of Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa, ‘Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa’*, etc. pp.352-368 Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. XXIII, 1942.

(viii) '*Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā*'¹⁵⁴ on Śrī Harṣa's(1075-1175 A.D.) '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*', which refutes the definitions of the *Nyāya* system upholding the reality of the categories of experience. He aimed to show that the world and all worldly experiences are only phenomenal and unreal, the only reality being the self-luminous *Brahman* of the nature of pure Consciousness. Śrī Harṣa contends that whatever is known by the *pramāṇas* is really indefinable and unreal, having only relative existence based on empirical modes and conventions. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's '*Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā-Ṭīkā*' was probably written while he was in Gujarat, and is effectively the first full commentary available, because Citsukha's is incomplete.

(ix) *Sarasvata-Prakriyā*¹⁵⁵, and according to some also the author of the *Sarasvata-sūtras* (of the *Sarasvata* School of Grammar). The fact that this was apparently written while Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya was living in Gujarat would partly explain why it was so popular there from the twelfth century right up to the last century, makes it probable that he had a long stay in Gujarat (Kathiawad), perhaps in Dwaraka.

¹⁵⁴ E.A.Solomon Introduction '*Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇīṭīkā*' on Śrī Harṣa's '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*',(1990) Gujarat University

¹⁵⁵ *Sarasvata-Prakriyā*, Sanatkumar Joshi (2011) Mahiman publishing House, Vadora, India.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya was author of the *Sārasvata-prakriyā* as well as some say of the *Sārasvata-sūtras* themselves, often attributed to Narendrācārya (10th century). He was apparently a monk following the sect of *Hayagrīva* worship and a disciple of some *Sārasvata-sannyāsin* in Vāraṇasī where he became very learned in *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nyāya* and *Vedānta*. He salutes *Hayagrīva*, his favourite deity, whose blessings he invokes for all good persons, at the beginning and end of most of his works, including the *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī*, *Sarasvata-prakriyā*, *Pramāṇamālā-nibandhana*, and the beginning of *Nyāyadīpāvalī-Candrikā*. He pays homage to *Sarasvatī* as well as *Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha*.

In the *Sarasvata-prakriyā* there is found a most interesting controversial discussion on Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's use of the form *puṁkṣu* in the court. T.M.Tripathi¹⁵⁶ explains the word *pums*, viz. *puṁkṣu* (locative plural) as an incorrect reading, which should have been *puṁsu* but takes this form because the word *asambhave*/regarding the unborn or birthless Persons'- the plural indicating plurality of respect. The tradition is that 'One day Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya was speaking in the court and in the course of a debate he uttered *puṁkṣu* instead of the grammatical form *puṁsu*. Scholars present asked for an explanation and he gave as his authority the *Sārasvata-*

¹⁵⁶ T.M.Tripathi intro.p.x.

Sūtras. He was asked to produce the work. He went home and propitiated goddess *Sarasvatī* and obtained the grammar from *Sarasvatī* in one night! This tradition is supported by the fact that there is a special *sūtra* here for the formation of *puṅkṣu* in the sense of *Paramātman*, the Supreme Self and this form is not found in any other grammar¹⁵⁷. Next day he removed the doubts of the scholars of the court (by manifesting his grammar).

In the *Sārasvata-Sūtras* and *Prakriyā* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya we find in the section on *hasānta puṅliṅga śabdās i.e.* consonant ending masculine words¹⁵⁸ this unique form .

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says that in the case of this word *Pums k-āgama* (augment *k*) occurs before the termination to show that plurality is impossible in regard to 'pums' that is to say *Puruṣa* or *Ātman*. Raghavan says¹⁵⁹ if *asambhave puṃsaḥ kaka san* is a *sūtra*, it would be one of the proofs to show that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya himself composed the *sūtras* also. However the number of the *Sārasvata-Sūtras* in the MSS

¹⁵⁷ *asambhave puṃsaḥ kaka san* 7.46 note 2 Cau) Caukhamāmudritapustakam 'Paramapurūṣe..puṅkṣu , laukikeṣu puruṣeṣu puṃsu' [p.293 M.S.Joshi Mahiman, Vadodara 2011

¹⁵⁸ *'asambhave puṃsaḥ kak sau. Asambhave'rthe puṃsaśabdasya kag-āgamo bhavati supi pare. kakāreḥ kitkāryarthaḥ. Akāra uccāraṇārthaḥ. asambhave iti ko'rthaḥ . Vedāntaikavedasya paramātmanā bahutvāsambhave vācye satt puṃsaśabdasya kag-āgamobhavati sufi pare.'*...

¹⁵⁹ V. Raghavan says p.358

and commentaries is not uniform and in Rāmāśrama's *Siddhānta Candrikā*, a gloss directly on the sūtras, this *sūtra* is not found. Thus it must be a *vaktavya*, or *vārttika*, i.e a supplementary sub-rule introduced by the *Prakriyākāra* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya and to the composition of the system of *Sarasvata* Grammar. In a footnote to this anecdote Mr. Tripathi draws attention to a passage in the *Sarasvata dīpikā* of Satyaprabodha Bhaṭṭāraka (1498 AD) which explains the form *pumkṣu* and cites its occurrence in a verse in the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman. In the *Sarasvata sūtras* and *Prakriyā* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya¹⁶⁰ we find in the section on *Hasantapumlinga śabdās*, bearing out the observation of Satyabodha quoted by T.M. Tripathi¹⁶¹.

As to any indication of anything personal about Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, we find in his *maṅgala* verses he even expresses his oneness with *Brahman*. He has *anuṣṭubh* verses in place of, or in addition to the *Maṅgala* verses either at the beginning of at the end of his work or sections of them. In these he usually makes a statement as to his being the Supreme *Brahman*.

¹⁶⁰ *Prakriyā* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya p. 153 Purvarddha, Haridas Skt Series,

¹⁶¹ T.M. Tripathi. *Tarkasaṅgraha* p.X

He also has a verse which seems to contain allusion to some personal detail about himself, as someone who had studied the works well, but could not devote attention to the works for a long time, and so felt distressed for not being able to comment on them or explain them (*vākya-asāmarthya*) in more detail. It is for such a person that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya wrote his glosses for the removal of that *saṃtāpa*/distress¹⁶²!

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's works are mainly to explain difficult portions of texts, rather than enter into lengthy refutations of other's views. He alludes at such places to the refutations of these views by others. If he feels passages are easy to understand he remarks that such a portion is *spāṣṭārthaḥ*/'having obvious meaning'.

If we consider the range of texts which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's corpus includes it is I believe not unreasonable to agree with many of Jason Schwarz's¹⁶³ insights into the possibly pivotal role Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya plays in the early modern history of *Advaita Vedānta*. One of the interesting and important things these texts appear to propose is a meeting of apparently *Yogic* and *Advaitic* ideas centering on the key role

¹⁶² E.Solomon makes a very interesting speculative comment 'p. 27 Could he be referring to his Guru who could not find time to devote time to such works, however much he wanted to? Śrī Harṣa?

¹⁶³ Schwarz, J. *Parabrahman Among the Yogins* 21, IJHS pages 345–389(2017)

of *anubhava* or *anubhūti*/experience as perhaps related to the third of the key Advaitic triad, *śravaṇam*, *mananam* and *nididhyāsanam*, famously given by Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5 and 4.5.6.¹⁶⁴

These works effectively incorporate an advanced form of *Yogic* meditation into the practice of *Advaita*. He thereby seems to meet certain needs of the community by perhaps expressing a theology suitable to ascetic and non-ascetic alike.

This thesis argues that these texts propose a distinctive merging of *Yogic* and *Advaitic* ideas, which have important implications for *Advaitic* practice, i.e. subtle body practices, at this point in history, which mark a key development in the *Advaita Vedānta* teaching.

As Jason Schwarz¹⁶⁵ puts it “ Anubhūtisvarūpācārya seems to have set out to establish a tradition of interpretation, with institutional ties to the region around Dwaraka, offering comprehensive readings of the key scholastic texts of *Advaita*.”

¹⁶⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5 and 4.5.6. “*ātmā vā are drṣṭavyo:śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitaṅvyo Maitreyi*”. *Mukti Upaniṣad* 1. “*Śravaṇamanananididhyāsāni..*”

¹⁶⁵ Schwarz, J. Parabrahman Among the *Yogins* IJHS pages 345–389(2017)

A complete list of his major works which we have just briefly outlined gives one a sense of a hugely important teacher of *Advaita Vedānta* seeking to maintain the purity of Ādi Śaṅkara's teaching.

Chapter 2: Vācaspati Miśra *Bhāmatī* tradition and the *Vivaraṇa* Tradition of Padmapāda and his *Pañcapādikā*

Padmapāda (fl.740A.D.) was, as has been stated, possibly Śaṅkara's earliest and most revered direct disciple. His *Pañcapādikā* is a commentary on the first four *sūtras* of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. It is not clear whether Padmapāda's work went

beyond this point, but this is all that has come down to us. He seems to have diverged from Śaṅkara in his description of *avidyā*, designating *prakṛti* as *avidyā* or *ajñāna*.

Vācaspati Miśra – *Bhāmatī prasthāna*

Vācaspati Miśra (fl.960A.D.) wrote so broadly on various branches of Indian philosophy that later Indian scholars called him ‘one for whom all systems are his own’, or in Sanskrit, a *sarva-tantra-sva-tantra*. Vācaspati Miśra was a prolific scholar and his writings include *bhāṣyas* on key texts of almost every one of the six orthodox *Darśanas* of Vedic philosophy with notes on *nāstika*/heterodox traditions *Buddhism*, *Jainism* and *Carvākas*.¹⁶⁶ He also wrote one non-commentatorial work, *Tattvabindu/ Drop of Truth*, focusing on *Mīmāṃsā* theories of sentence meaning.

Vācaspati Miśra is credited with influential commentaries such as *Tattvakaumudī* on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, *Nyāyasucinibandha* on the *Nyāya-sūtras*;

¹⁶⁶ Larson, G. J. and Bhattacharya, R. S. (1987). *The Encyclopedia Indian Philosophies*, Volume 4, Princeton University Press, pp.301-312

important texts on *Advaita Vedānta* like *Nyāyakārikṣa* (an *Advaita* work on the science of reason), *Tattva-vaiśārādī* on the *Yoga Sūtras* and others.¹⁶⁷

He also wrote the *Brahmatattva-samīkṣa*, a commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Brahmasiddhi*, which provides the link between Maṇḍana Misra and Ādi Śaṅkara and attempts to harmonize Śaṅkara's thought with that of Maṇḍana Miśra.

According to *Advaita* tradition as previously referred to, Śaṅkara reincarnated as Vācaspati Miśra 'to popularise the *Advaita* System through his *Bhāmatī*' commentary on the most famous work of Śaṅkara, 'the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*'.

It is believed that his most famous work '*Bhāmatī*' was inspired by his devout wife. The '*Bhāmatī*' tradition is derived from this *Bhāmatī*.¹⁶⁸The '*Bhāmatī*' tradition takes an ontological approach. It sees the *Jīva* as the source of *avidyā*. It sees meditation as the main factor in attaining liberation, while the study of the *Vedas* and reflection are additional factors.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Isaeva, N. (1993). *Shankara and Indian Philosophy*. USA: State University of New York Press, pp.66 and 124

¹⁶⁸ Roodurmum, p.39

¹⁶⁹ *ibid.* p.37

In summary, Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī* attempts to harmonize Śaṅkara's thought with that of Maṇḍana Miśra. Following this line of reasoning, later authors in the *Bhāmatī* tradition describe the individual *jīva* as the locus of *avidyā*, i.e. *avidyā* is ignorance or false knowledge, but it pertains to the individual, who is subject to it. *Brahman* is never subject to *avidyā*, but controls it in its capacity as *Īśvara*. This tradition describes two functions of *avidyā* - one is its capacity to veil the truth/ *āvaraṇa-śakti*, and the second is its capacity to project an illusion/ *vikṣepa-śakti*. It also describes *avidyā* in terms of a root *avidyā* (*mūlāvidyā*), which is universal, and is equivalent to *māyā*, and an individual *avidyā* (*tulāvidyā*), which vanishes when *Brahmajñāna* arises. Thus, it develops its theses primarily along ontological lines. However, if the individual *jīva* is the locus of *avidyā*, and the individual *jīva* is also a product of *avidyā*, this would lead to an infinite regress, which the *Bhāmatī* avoids by positing an infinite series of beginningless *jīvas* and *avidyā*-s.

Thangaswami¹⁷⁰ has suggested fifteen main assumptions of the *Bhāmatī* *prasthāna*:

1. *Karmas* are useful for giving rise to the desire to know the Self;

¹⁷⁰ Thangaswami, R (1980). *A Bibliographical Survey of Advaita Vedānta Literature*, p. xvi Intro.

2. The realization of *Brahman* arises through the instrument of the mind.
3. There is an injunction in the text '*Ātman* should be realized'; (and) for that purpose it should be heard, reflected and meditated upon¹⁷¹;
4. Meditation is the principal factor, and *Vedāntic* study and reflection are its subsidiary factors;
5. '*Jīva*' is Consciousness limited by '*ajñāna*' and '*Īśvara*' is Consciousness transcending the limiting adjuncts/*upādhaya*;
6. The locus and content of '*ajñāna*' are different;
7. The primal *ajñāna*/nescience is manifold. To maintain the distinction between bondage and release in the case of souls, Vācaspati Miśra admits a plurality of ignorances (*māyā-s*) severally related to each and every soul. If one soul attains the knowledge of *Brahman*, then *māyā* related to it will be removed and that soul alone will be liberated. Other individual souls continue to be conditioned by their respective *māyā-s* and hence they are in bondage.

¹⁷¹ '*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavya nididhyāsitavyo maitreyī*' *Bṛhad* 2.4.5 & 4.5.6

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the soul is the substratum of *māyā*.¹⁷²

8. It is only *Brahman* that is conditioned by the *vṛtti*/'modification of mind' that is the content of the direct knowledge of *Brahman*.

9. The first factor in the fourfold-aid¹⁷³ is the discrimination between the Eternal/*nitya* or Real and the Non-Eternal/*a-nitya* non-Real, giving up attachment to enjoyments here and hereafter, the fulfilment of six conditions such as *śama*/tranquility/self-restraint and *dama*/detachment/restraint of the organs.

10. The injunctive-text, 'One's own recension of the Veda must be studied/'*svādhyāyo dhyetavyaḥ*' (based on *Taittīrya Upaniṣad* 1.11.1)¹⁷⁴ has for its fruit the knowledge of the meaning of the *Veda*.

¹⁷² 'Bhāmatī yasyaiva jīvasya vidyā utpannā tasyaivāvidyā apanīyate, na jīvāntarasya.bhinnādihikarāṇayoḥ avirodhaḥ. tat kutaḥ samastasaṃsārocchedaprasaṅgaḥ', Krishna, S.A. (Ed.) (1982) *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* (with *Bhāmatī*, *Kalpataru* and *Parimala*) (1982). Chawkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, p.398

¹⁷³ *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* I.I.1 'Prasthānatraya Vol.VI Matrubbhumi Grandhavedhi, Kerala, India(2011)V.Panoli p.13-4 'nityānityastuvivekah,ihāmutrārthabhogavirāgaḥ,śamadamādisādhanasampat, mumukṣutvaṃ ca'

¹⁷⁴ 'Svādhyāyo' dhyetavyaḥ" *Pañcapādika Vivaraṇam* Of Prakāśātma Yati', Sastri, P.S. (1997).

11. The world-creation is explained by adopting the theory of '*tripli-cation*' according to which Being differentiated things by making fire, water and food triple (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.4.1-4*).¹⁷⁵

12. The omniscience of *Brahman* is derived from the essential nature of *Brahman*;

13. The mind is a sense-organ;

14. '*Avidyā*' is located in the '*Jīva*'.

15. The nature of '*Jīva*' and '*Īśvara*' is explained by the theory of '*avacchedavāda*' and '*pratibimbavāda*'. These are known as limitation theory and reflection theory to explain the meaning of the *mahāvākya* '*tat tvam asi*'. The *jīvāt mā*/individual soul and the *paramāt mā*/Supreme Soul or Self have totally opposite characteristics. Doubt as to how there could be identity between

¹⁷⁵ '*trivṛtkarāṇa*' 'In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 'creation is explained as occurring through the process of triplication, according to which the differentiation of things proceeds according to the involvement of three 'divinities' corresponding to the three elements fire, water and food (or earth)', Potter, K.H. (1981). *Advaita Vedānta Encyclopedia Indian Philosophy*, Vol III, Delhi: Motilal, p.88

them is resolved by these two theories, by pointing out that the space inside a pot is the same as the total space and a reflection is not different from the original that is reflected (*Brahma Siddhi*).¹⁷⁶

Vimuktātman (fl. 950 A.D.) Vimuktātman is one of the important *advaitins* of the post-Śaṅkara period. His famous work, the *Istasiddhi*¹⁷⁷, is widely acclaimed as a standard treatise. It is in much the same tradition as Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa prasthāna*. *Iṣṭasiddhi* was developed further by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*. (Cf *Shastrigal.R.K.Mylapore 2006*). It is one of the four *Siddhi*-works, the other three being *Advaitasiddhi*, *Brahmasiddhi* and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. Except that he was a disciple of Avyayātman, nothing more is known about him. He is said to have written one more work called *Pramāṇa-vṛtti-nirṇaya*, which is not yet published.

¹⁷⁶ 'avaccheda-vāda and pratibimbavāda'. These are known as limitation theory and reflection theory. These theories are intended to explain the meaning of the *mahāvākya* 'tat tvam asi'. The *jīvātmā* and the *paramātmā* have totally opposite characteristics. A doubt therefore arises as to how there could be identity between them. This doubt is resolved by these two theories, by pointing out that the space inside a pot is the same as the total space and a reflection is not different from the original that is reflected. In the case of reflection there is the additional feature that the reflection is affected. *Brahmasiddhi* III.47 etc. Maṇḍana Mīśra Sastri S.Kuppuswami (1937). Government Oriental Library, Madras.

¹⁷⁷ *Iṣṭa Siddhi* of Vimuktatman Hiriyanana, A. (1933). India: Oriental Institute of Baroda.

Madhusudana Sarasvati, at the end of his great classic *Advaita-siddhi*, refers to three *Siddhi* works, viz. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, and *Brahma-siddhi*.

The *Brahma-siddhi* of Maṇḍana may be said to devote itself to the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and testimony (*pramāṇa*) of *Brahman* indicated in the expression, *Brahmajijñāsa*, that of the desire to know *Brahman*.

The *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* of Sureśvara is interested in showing the how of *Brahman*-knowledge, i.e., whether it is by knowledge alone or by action that release is 'achieved' by the qualities of the reflecting medium. Thus, the *jīva* seems to have acquired the qualities of the mind which is the reflecting medium. In this sense, the reflection theory is preferable to the limitation theory which does not have any such feature. *Bhāmatī* prefers the limitation theory while *Vivaraṇa* prefers the reflection theory. But neither of them positively rejects the other view. This is based on the *Bhumikā* of Polagam Srim Rama Sastri as explained by Dr. Mani Dravid Sastrigal in 2020.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Sundaram, P.K. (2008). *Perceptors of Advaita*, Chennai: Somata Books, p.75-83

The *Iṣṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman engages itself rather in the question of the why of *Brahman*-knowledge, enquiring into the nature and cause of error, that is, the world. In short, ontology, ethnology and epistemology may be said to be the respective contents of these three *Siddhis*.

When expounding the means of release at the end of *Iṣṭasiddhi* Vimuktātman explains that the intuition into the oneness of Reality alone can remove *avidyā* completely. For this intuition, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* are the means. Calmness and equanimity are prescribed till renunciation of all actions takes place. Even sacrifices indirectly help this process by creating purity of mind. The *asambhavana* (the notion of improbability) and *viparīta-bhavana* (the notion of contrariety) with regard to the real nature of *Brahman* are removed by scripture by means of an explanation of the nature of *Ātman* beginning with *astitva*/existence or reality and ending with freedom from hunger and thirst.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*¹⁷⁹ repeats nine times the declaration: *tat tvam asi*, 'That (*Brahman*) thou art (*Śvetaketu*), dispelling every time an illusion about Reality'.

¹⁷⁹ See *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI.8.7- VI.15.3

If *śravaṇa*, or hearing once only without these aforesaid means could bring about intuition, they would be futile. When the mind is sufficiently pure to receive the final illumination mellowed by these disciplines, then *śravaṇa*, of the *Vedānta* texts results in the intuition removing the specific illusion every time it is repeated. Here too, Vimuktātman does not see eye to eye with the school of *Maṇḍana* which holds that mediate knowledge arising from *śravaṇa*, needs to be transformed into immediacy by repeated meditation. He, on the contrary, suggests that from *śravaṇa* itself, intuition takes place, provided it comes at the top of all spiritual equipment.

Prakāśātman (fl. 975 CE) *Vivaraṇa Prasthāna*

The name of the *Vivaraṇa prasthāna* is derived from Prakāśātman's *Pañcapādika-Vivaraṇa*, a commentary on the *Pañcapādikā*¹⁸⁰ of Padmapādācārya, great pupil of Śaṅkara, (most of which has been lost). The book was so called because *Pañcapādikā* follows the traditional five steps in expounding a text:

¹⁸⁰ Swami Maheshananda Giri's Introduction to Śrī Padmapadacarya's *Pañcapādikā* with commentaries of Śrī Prakāśātmanmuni etc. Śrī Dakishinamurti Math Prakashan, Varanasi (2009) Madras Government library has a manuscript (R- 3224), which is a commentary on *Pañcapādikā* up to the *Īkṣādhikaraṇa of Brahma-sūtra*.

i). indicating different words by dissolving external

and internal *sandhi*,

ii). giving their meaning,

iii). indicating the relational subdivisions of words

iv). syntactical connections of words and,

v). removing doubts that may arise in understanding the meaning of the

work.

The term *Pañcapādikā* refers to the whole text, whereas the *Vivaraṇa* by the great scholar Prakāśātman explains only a portion of the work. However, this part is so brilliant that the perspective presented has proved more profound and enduring even than that of the greatness of the *Bhāmatī*, and its author, Vācaspati Mīśra.

From the standpoint of reconciliation within the *Advaita* traditions of the *Brahma-siddhi* and the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* as well as outside the *Advaita* traditions viz.

Sāṅkyha, and *Nyāya*, *Bhāmatī*'s contribution is momentous. However, from the viewpoint of Śaṅkara's interpretations, it is not totally faithful.

Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa* was the first to propound the theory of the Divine power viz. *mūlavidyā* or *māyā* as being of 'positive beginningless nature' and clearly indicated that *Brahman* is the wielder of this power.¹⁸¹ Of course, in so doing, he is being totally faithful to Ādi Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on

Gaudapādakārikā 1.7¹⁸², '**Others steeped in cogitation about creation consider origination as an exuberance (of God), while by others it is imagined that creation is comparable to dream or magic'** expounding:

Māṅdūkyaopaniṣad v.6

eṣaḥ sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo 'ntaryāmy eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya

prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām | | *Māṅḍū Up_6*

¹⁸¹ *ibid.* Swami Maheshananda Giri's Introduction to *Pañcapādikā*, p. iii

¹⁸² *Gaudapāda kārikā* "vibhūtiṃ prasavaṃ tv anye manyante sṛṣṭicintakāḥ / svapnamāyāsarūpeti sṛṣṭir anyair vikalpitā // MandUpK_1.7 //

This one is the Lord of all; this one is the knower of all; this one is the inner Director of all; this one is the Source of all; this one is verily the place of origin and dissolution of all beings.

According to Roodurmum, 'his line of thought [...] became the leitmotif of all subsequent developments in the evolution of the *Advaita* tradition.'¹⁸³

The *Vivaraṇa prasthāna* takes an epistemological approach. It sees *Brahman* as the source of *avidyā*. Critics object that *Brahman* is pure consciousness, so it can't be the source of *avidyā*.

It gives a clear enunciation that no knowledge occurs without an object. Some of the main tenets of the *Vivaraṇa* tradition are as follows:

- i) Illusion, an indescribable/*anirvacanīya* object is produced from the ignorance of the substratum. The object serves its purpose of producing objective knowledge and may even give rise to activity. For example, seeing a rope as a snake one might run away and hurt oneself due to fear.

¹⁸³ Roodurmum, p.40.

- ii) *Karma* is responsible for the rise of knowledge of the Self.
- iii) Knowledge of *Brahman* can be attained from the *Upaniṣadic Mahā-vakya* texts like *tat tvam asi, ayam Ātmā Brahma, aham Brahmāsmi* and *Prajñānam Brahma*, each of which is potent for Self-realization.
- iv) Study/*śravaṇam*, of these texts is the main factor in gaining *jñāna*, while reflection/*manana* and meditation/*nididhyāsanam* are only additional aids.

In summary, The *Vivaraṇa* tradition concentrates on epistemological approaches to establishing *Advaita*. Thus, these authors hold that since there is only the One *Brahman*, that Itself is both the locus of *avidyā* and the object of *avidyā*.

A keen analysis of perception and inference is done, through which the non-reality of difference is established. In this approach, the later authors share company with both Padmapāda and Sureśvara. The one problem which critics have with this school of thought is that since *Brahman* is of the nature of pure consciousness, to

describe *Brahman* as the locus of *avidyā* would go against the omniscience of *Brahman*. It would also attribute contradictory qualities, namely knowledge and ignorance, to the same *Brahman*. The *Vivaraṇa* authors get around this problem by distinguishing between pure consciousness and valid knowledge (*pramāna-jñāna*). Pure consciousness is *cit*, the real essence of *Brahman*, but valid cognition at the *vyavahārika*/worldly practical level presumes *avidyā*. The ultimate substratum of all cognition, and therefore also of this *avidyā*, is *Brahman*.

As in expounding the nature of the *Bhāmatī Prasthāna*, Thangaswami's¹⁸⁴ gives fifteen main assumptions of the *Vivaraṇa prasthāna*:

1. *Karma* is responsible for the rise of the knowledge of the Self;
2. The direct knowledge of *Brahman* arises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*;
3. There is no injunction in the Vedic text 'Ātman should be realized' etc. (*Bṛhad.* 2.4.5 & 4.5.6) There is however a restrictive injunction;¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Thangaswami, R. (1980). Intro, *A Bibliographical Survey of Advaita vedanta Literature*, p. xvii

¹⁸⁵ a formal statement saying that *Ātman* alone should be realized ...etc.

4. *Vedāntic* study is the principal factor, and reflection and meditation are the subsidiary features (in knowledge);

5. '*Jīva*' is the reflected image of *Brahman* in '*avidyā*'.

6. The locus/*āśraya* and content/*viśaya* of '*māyā*' or '*avidyā*' is the same, pure consciousness. It alone is veiled. *Prakāśātman*¹⁸⁶ and *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya*¹⁸⁷ express this view, that pure consciousness is the locus of '*māyā*'.

7. The Primal nescience is one only; *Prakāśātman* admits that *māyā* or *ajñāna* is one only.¹⁸⁸ *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya* too expresses this view.¹⁸⁹ This view is based on the Upaniṣadic texts, '**one should know then, that *prakṛti* or nature is *māyā* (illusion)**

¹⁸⁶ *Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa* p.210, '*na tāvad ajñānam āśrayaviśayabhedāpekṣam. kintu ekasminneva vastuni āśrayatvam āvaraṇaṇi ceti kṛtyadvayaṃ sampādayati...*'

¹⁸⁷ *Prakāṭārtha Vivaraṇa (PV)*, Vol.1 '*ekā tāvad anādir anirvācyā bhūtaprakṛtiḥ cinmātrasambandhinī māyā.*', p.3 BSB 1.1.1

¹⁸⁸ *Vivaraṇa 'ātmāśrayam ātmaviśayaṃ ca ajñānam antareṇa anātmāsu prativiśayaṃ bhāvarūpājñānasadbhāve pramāṇābhāvāt*', p.97

¹⁸⁹ *PV Vol.*, '*Ekā tāvad anādir anirvācyā bhūtaprakṛtiḥ cinmātrasambandhinī māyā*', p.3 BSB 1.1.1 L.22

and that the Great Lord (*Maheśvara*) is the *māyin* (the illusion-maker) (*Śveta.Up.*
iv.10)¹⁹⁰

8.'The whole universe is filled with objects which are parts of His being.'
(*ŚvetaśvataraUpaniṣad* 4.10)¹⁹¹ and,

'There is one unborn Female (*māyā*, the uncaused substance of the universe)
white, red, and black (representing *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*)...(Mahānārāyaṇa
Upaniṣad 12.5),¹⁹² where '*māyā*' and its equivalent '*ajā*' are used in the singular
number.

9. The content of the direct knowledge of *Brahman* is pure *Brahman*.

The first factor in the fourfold-aid¹⁹³ is the discrimination between what is Eternal/
nitya and what is non-Eternal/*anitya*;

¹⁹⁰ *ŚvetaśvataraUpaniṣad*, '*māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyān māyinaṃ tu maheśvaraṃ / tasyāvayavabhūtais tu vyāptam sarvaṃ idaṃ jagat.*'// 4.10 //

¹⁹¹ *ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 12.5, '*ajām ekāṃ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām.*'

¹⁹² Vimalananda, M. (2010). Ramakrishna math, Calcutta.

¹⁹³ BSB '1 *nitya anityavastuviveka*, 2 *iha amutrārthabhogavirāgaḥ*, 3 *sama damādi sādhanasampat*, 4 *mumukṣutvaṃ ca.*'

10. The injunctive- text ‘One’s own recension of the *Veda* must be studied’¹⁹⁴; has for its fruit the learning of the *Veda* by rote not knowledge of the meaning of the *Veda*!

11.The world-creation is explained on the basis of the theory of *quintuplication*.¹⁹⁵

12.The omniscience of *Brahman* is based on the modes of “*avidyā*.”

13.The ‘mind’ is not a sense-organ; as the *Muṇḍaka* 2.2.8 says,

‘When That (*Brahman* which) is both high and low is seen, the knot of the heart is untied. All doubts are solved; and all his *karma* is consumed’¹⁹⁶, thus mind is removed by knowledge of *Brahman*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states it is only ‘*avidyā*’ that is removed by the knowledge of *Brahman* and not *māyā*. The objection then would be that if knowledge of *Brahman* is a modification of mind and mind is the effect of ‘*avidyā*’, so knowledge of *Brahman*

¹⁹⁴ Sastri, P.S. (1997), ‘*Svādhyāyo’ dhyetavayah’ Panchapādika Vivaraṇam Of Prakāśātma Yati.*

¹⁹⁵ *Pañcīkaraṇavārttika or Praṇavavārttika Advaita Āśrama , Calcutta, (1972). p.560 - 562.*

‘*trivṛtkaraṇa*’ attributed to Śaṅkara. ‘In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, creation is explained as occurring through the process of triplication, according to which the differentiation of things proceeds according to the involvement of three ‘divinities’ corresponding to the three elements fire, water and food (or earth)’. Śaṅkara’s comment indicates that he is not very particular about this and that the alternative accounts in terms of quintuplication/*pañcīkaraṇa* is equally or more appropriate in explaining certain things, especially the quintuplicated/*pañcīkṛta* five elements, earth, water, fire air and ether (5 *mahābhūta*) p.88, 265, 318, Potter, K.H. (1981). Vol III Advaita Vedānta, *Encyclopedia Indian Philosophy*, Motilal, Delhi.

¹⁹⁶ *Muṇḍaka* 2.2.8, ‘*bhidiate hṛdayagranthiśchidyante sarvasaṁśayāḥ kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare.*’

too is the effect of '*avidyā*'. How is it that the effect, knowledge of *Brahman*, removes its cause, '*avidyā*'?

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya answers that, just as the fire arising from rubbing one bamboo against another destroys the bamboos in their entirety and then gets itself extinguished so the knowledge of *Brahman*, which is a mental state and thus an effect of '*avidyā*' destroys its cause and gets itself destroyed.¹⁹⁷

14. '*Avidyā*' is located in Pure Consciousness.

15. The nature of '*Jīva*' and '*Īśvara*' is explained by the theory of '*pratibimba-vāda*'.²⁵²

The reflected face is nothing but the original with the state of reflection/*pratibimbatva* superimposed upon it. It is this state which is indeterminable and the reflected image being the same as the original is real. Padmapāda's view of *pratibimba-vāda* is in stark contrast to the *ābhāsavāda* according to which the reflected image as such is indeterminable.

¹⁹⁷ *Iṣṭa Siddhi Vivaraṇa* p.101 "yathā vinaśyad āśrayā vināśakriyā svāśrayaṃ nāśayati, dāhasaṅyogo'pi svāśryadāhahetuḥ yathā, tathā jñānaṃ svopādānam api nāśayati svayaṃ ca naśyati iti na anavasthā ityarthah".

Following Padmapāda, Prakāśātman in the *Pañcapādhika-vivarāṇa* explains the nature of God/*Īśvara* and the soul/*jīvātmā* as the reflected image of *Brahman*, the original *bimba* in *avidyā* on the analogy of the reflection of a face in a mirror. This is foreshadowed in the *Brahmabindūpaniṣad*, v.12

‘eka Eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte vyavasthitaḥ. Ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat.

‘Only One, intuitive of all creatures, is residing in the heart of every creature. As the reflection of the moon looks differently according to the existence of ponds, the intuitive in its different forms is perceived’.²⁵²

The reflection theory is preferable to the limitation theory because, in the case of reflection, there is the additional feature that the reflection is affected by the qualities of the reflecting medium. Thus, the *jīva* seems to have acquired the qualities of the mind which is the reflecting medium. In this sense, the reflection theory is preferable to the limitation theory which does not have any such feature.

Bhāmatī prefers the limitation theory while *Vivarāṇa* prefers the reflection theory. But

neither of them positively rejects the other view.¹⁹⁸ Being, uniform and yet multiform, it appears like moon in a pond.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya while admitting an indeterminable difference between *māyā* and *avidyā* says that both God and the souls are the reflected images of Brahman, in the *Prakatārtha-vivaraṇa*, the *Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivaraṇa*¹⁹⁹ and in his *Ṭippanam* on *Māṇḍūkya-gauḍhapādīyaśāṅkara-bhāṣya*.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Bhumika of Polagam Sri Rama Sastri, as explained by Dr. Mani Dravid Sastrigal, '*yat punaḥ darpaṇajalādīṣu mukhacandrādipratibimbodāharaṇam, tat ahaṅkartuḥ anidam aṅśo bimbād iva pratibimban na brahmaṇo vastvantaram, kintu tv eva tat, pṛthag avabhāsaviparyaya svarūpatāmātraṁ mithyā iti darśayitum.*' V. p.295 '*Mukhacitsvarūpayośca bimbātmatāṁ pramimīmahe mithyāṅśaparyudāsenā. na ca mithyāṅśasya bandhamokṣau kintu svarūpasyaiva*' p.104

¹⁹⁹ ISV '*Idam atra rahasyam - cinmātratantrā anādir anirvācyā mahadādiprakṛtiḥ māyā. tasyāṁ citpratibimba īśvaraḥ. bimbakalpaṁ tu nirvikalpaṁ brahma caitanyālabhanam. tasyā eva māyāyāḥ pricchinānantapradeśeṣu āvaraṇavikṣepaśaktimatsu ajñānābhidheṣu pratibimbitāṁ tad eva caitanyam anantajīvavyavahārāspadam bobhavīti.*', p.363

²⁵⁵ PV Vol 1 *ekā tāvad anādy anirvācyā bhūtaprakṛtiś cinmātrasambandhinī māyā.tasyāṁcit pratibimba īśvaraḥ tatpariṇāmair eva sarvajñatvādīmān ; bimbakalpaṁ nirvikalpaṁ brahmakaivalyāvalambanam.tasyā eva paricchinānirvācyānantapradeśeṣvajñānābhidhāneṣv āvaraṇavikṣepaśaktimatsu pratibimbitāṁ tad eva caitanyam anantajīvavyavahārāspadam.* BSB 1.1.1, pp.3-4

²⁰⁰ Mā.U.K.Bh.Ṭ '*atreyāṁ prakriyā - cinmātratantrā anādy anirvācyājñāneṣu āvaraṇavikṣepaśaktimatsu māyāvyaṣṭīṣu pratibimbitāṁ tad eva caitanyam anantajīveṣvāspadam.*', p.6

The section in the *Prakatārtha-ivaraṇa* in which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya discusses this is called *darpaṇa-ṭīkā* ('Commentary on the Mirror').²⁰¹

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains the distinction between the released souls and the bound ones. *Māyā*, known as the primal cause of the world referred to above in the *Brahmabindūpaniṣad*:

'As the reflection of the moon looks differently and according to the existence of ponds, the intuitive in its different forms is perceived'.

The statement in *ŚvetaśvataraUpaniṣad* 4.10

'But one should know Nature/ prakṛti to be māyā ' (*'māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt'*) is one only, gives authority for this view. *Māyā* possesses only the power of projection (*vikṣepa śakti*). However, it has indeterminable parts each consisting of the power of concealment (*āvaraṇa śakti*) and the power of projection (*vikṣepa śakti*). These indeterminable parts are called *avidyā*. The reflection of pure consciousness in *māyā* is God with only *vikṣepa śakti*, so there is no concealment (*āvaraṇa śakti*) of his

²⁰¹ PV *Ābhāsa eva ca*"...l. 19, 'Parācakramire cātrācāryāḥ darpaṇaṭīkāyām ityuparabhyate.' p.660 BSB 2.3.50.

omniscience, and that in *avidyā* is the soul/*jīvātmā* with both power of projection (*vikṣepa śakti*) of the characteristics of agency, enjoyership etc. and concealment (*āvaraṇa śakti*) of *Brahman/ātman*.²⁰²

Although Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman and Prakāśātman consider *māyā* to be identical to *avidyā* and to possess the power of concealment (*āvaraṇaśakti*), which implies the non-omniscience of God, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya considers *māyā* and *avidyā* as two aspects of *prakṛti*. The reflected image of *Brahman* in *māyā* is God, and since it does not have the *āvaraṇaśakti* it does not conceal the true nature of *Brahman* from God, so God is omniscient.

On BSB 2.3.50 **‘And (the individual soul) is but a reflection (of the Supreme).’** *‘ābhāsa eva ca’*

²⁰² Mk.Bh.Ṭ, ‘kṛtsnapariṇāmitvena amśino’vyākṛtasya vikṣepaśaktisvadbhāve’pi āvaraṇaśakty abhāvāt tadupādhir īśvaraḥ ‘sarvajño’ham’ iti prasiddhyati. paricchinnatvena tad amśānāṃ susuptākhyājñānānām āvaraṇavikṣepaśaktimatvāt tad upādrikā jīvā ajñāḥ prasiddhyanti.’ p.20 v.3 of Mā.Up.3. ‘jāgaritasthāno bahiṣprajñāḥ saptāṅga ekonaviṃśatimukhaḥ sthūlabhuk vaiśvānaraḥ prathamāḥ Pādaḥ’. **The first quarter is Vaiśvānara whose sphere (of action) is the waking state, whose consciousness relates to things external, who is possessed of seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and who enjoys gross things.**

Śāṅkara states that the soul is not the same as *Brahman*; nor is it a different entity.²⁰³ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains;

the reflected image of a face in a mirror, for example, is not the original sun; nor is it different from it... The state of reflection is indeterminate as it is caused by the defect, proximity of the mirror. When the defect is removed, the state of reflection will be removed and the face will remain as a mere face (*mukhamātram*) and not as the reflection of the original face²⁰⁴.

Viewed in this light-the reflected image of *Brahman* is *Brahman* with characteristics such as agency etc., superimposed upon it owing to the defect, *avidyā*. When that is removed by direct knowledge of *Brahman* arising from the *mahāvākya* of the *Upaniṣads*, such as *tat tvam asi*, the characteristics of agency, etc., presented upon

²⁰³ BSB 2.3.50, 'ābhāsa eva ca eṣa jīva parasyātmano jalasūryakādivat pratipattavyaḥ. na sa eva sāksāt, nāpi vastvantaram'.

²⁰⁴ PV, Vol 2, p.659.1.18 on BS 2.3.50. "yathā darpeṇa mukhapratibimbam darpeṇa mukhapratibimbam darpaṇādḥinatvāt pratibimbabhāvaḥ svopacārato darpanakṛtamucyate, tatra yathā darpaṇakṛtameva alpatvama līmasatfvādi bhāti, tathā citpratibimbe jīve'pi yatkiñcidabrahmsvarūpam bhāti, tat sarvam avidyākṛtam eveti bandhāsidiḥ. yathā ca pratibimbam bimbam eveti vākyenopādhitat sthatāvyāvartanena mukhasvarūpaikyam eva lakṣyate, tatathā 'tat tvam asi' ityavidyā - tat sthatvavyapohnanena sabāhyābhyantaradig deśakalānavacchinnacaitanyam jyotiśvarūpaikyamev lakṣyati iti ko 'pyatrāvakaraḥ.

Brahman would be removed and what would exist then is the non-dual *Brahman* which is Liberation.²⁰⁵

The Consciousness that serves as the original (*bimba-caitanya*) is the one in which the released soul would remain. When a particular soul attains the knowledge of *Brahman*, its limiting adjunct, *avidyā* will be removed; and the soul will remain as the original consciousness. This is liberation. The other *avidyā-s* continue to exist and the *jīvātmā-s* remain in bondage until they attain the knowledge of *Brahman*. The latter does not remove *māyā*, whose transformation is the world. Hence the bound souls experience the objects of the world. The released soul, however, does not experience the world that exists, like the blind man does not experience the colour that exists.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ PV, 'yathā darpaṇe mukhapratibimbaṁ darpaṇādḥīnatvāt pratibimbabhāvaḥ svopacārarato darpaṇakṛtam ucyate, tatra yathā darpaṇakṛtam eva alpatvamalīmstvādi bhāti, tat sarvam avidyākṛtam eveti bandhāsiddhiḥ. yathā ca pratibimbaṁ bimbam eveti vākyenopādhitatsthatāvyaṁvartanena mukhasvarūpaikyam eva lakṣyate, tathā 'tat tvam asi' ityavidyā tatsthatvarūpaikyameva lakṣayati iti ko'pyatrāvakarāḥ,' p.659, l.18ff BSB 2.3.50

²⁰⁶ PV Vol.1 'Ekā tāvad anādir anirvācyā bhūtaprakṛtiḥ cinmātrasambandhinī māyā. tasyām citpratibimba īśvaraḥ. ...bimbakalpaṁ tu nirvikalpakaṁ brahma kaivalyāvalambanam. tasyā eva paricchinmānirvācyānantapradeśeṣu ajñānādīdhāneṣu āvaraṇavikṣepasaktimatsu pratibimbitaṁ caitanyam ananta-jīva-vyavahārāspadam.... yasya bimbakalpanirvikalpabrahmātmānubhavaḥ tasya svopadhyajñānabhaṅge tajjāntaḥkaraṇāpasaraṇe pramātrtvānupapattau svarūpāvasthānaṁ muktiḥsajjāghaṭīti. yastu māyāvivarto mahābhūtaḥ prapañcaḥ sa vidyamāno'pi nirandriyeṇeva rūpaṁ nānubhobhūyate'. p.3, BSB 1.1.1 L.22. Mk Bh, p.17.

Furthermore, *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya* does not recognize *māyā* and *avidyā* as distinct principles, rather he advocates their identity.

Advaita Theory of Error in Bhāmtī and Vivaraṇa Prasthānas

The *Advaita* theory of error is said to be the logical consequence of the failure of non-*Advaitic* theories to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of error. These rival theories like that of *Bhāskara*, interpret such *sūtras* as BSB 2.3.50

'And (the individual soul) is only a reflection (of the supreme Self) to be sure' (*ābhāsa eva ca*) in the sense that the doctrines of *Advaita* are false, not aware of the full implications of *pratibimbavāda*, stating that *pratibimba* is *avastu* 'not real'.

According to *Bhāskara* there are only two categories - real and absolute nothing. Unlike the *Advaitins* he does not admit a third category, *anirvacanīya*.

So, if *pratibimba* is *avastu*, 'not real', then it is an absolute nothing like a hare's horn, an absolute nothing not eligible for liberation. So according to *Bhāskara* the theory that the soul is the reflected image of *Brahman* is wrong.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in accord with the *Vivaraṇa prasthāna* in his *Prakāṭārtha-Vivaraṇa* rejects Bhāskara's objection, identifying his theory of error as *anyathākhyāti*. According to *pratibimbavāda* the original appears as if present inside the limiting adjunct. It is not a non-real entity or *avastu* as Bhāskara thinks. His criticism is answered in the *Vivaraṇa*²⁰⁷ and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya records so in *Prakāṭārtha-Vivaraṇa*.²⁰⁸

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further argues that the grounds on the basis of which it is said that *Brahman* cannot undergo reflection are not valid.

In commenting on BSB on BS 3.2.20, 'Since *Brahman* has entered into the limiting adjuncts, it seems to participate in their increase and decrease , The illustration is apt since the illustration and the thing illustrated have propriety from this point of view.'²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ *Vivaraṇa* p. 294

²⁰⁸ PV 'tatra asau[bhāskaraḥ] svapararahasyānabhijñā iti śocyā eva. tathā hi svapakṣe tāvat tasyānyathākhyātivāditvāt deśāntare sad eva mukhaṁ darpaṇasaṁsṛṣṭaṁ bhāti. tatra saṁsargābhāso vibhramaḥ mukhāvabhāsas tu avibhrama eva. asmākam api nedaṁ mukhaṁ iti svarūpabādhābhāvāt. nātra mukhaṁ kintu madīyam eveti deśasaṁsargamātrabādhayā svarūpaikyapratyabhijñānāt ekasmin ekadeśasthe mukhe bhedo bhinnadeśasthatī ca anirvācyā bhātīti kutaḥ pratibimbasyopādhisthatayā.'

²⁰⁹ BS 3.2.20 'vṛddhihrāsabhāktvāmantarbhāvādubhayasāmañjyādevam

BSB 3.2.20 'Since *Brahman* is inside limiting adjuncts, it participates, as it were in their increase and decrease. The illustration (comparisons of the soul to sun's reflections etc.) is proper since the two things compared have validity from that view point' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 1.4.10)²¹⁰.

He reduces those grounds to, '*Brahman* cannot undergo reflection; because it has no material and also because its limiting adjunct is not located in a place distant from it.' Also, he affirms that the grounds on the basis of which it is concluded that *Brahman* cannot undergo reflection are false, and the *pratibimbavāda* is free from defect.²¹¹

In contrast, Vācaspati Miśra advocates the theory of delimitation or *avacchedavāda* to explain the nature of the soul/*jīvātma*, and not *pratibimbavāda* on the grounds that reflections are always possible only in respect of those objects which

²¹⁰ BSB 3.2.20 'Vṛddhihrāsabhāktvam antarbhāvād ubhayasāmānyasyād evam.'

²¹¹ PV. 'Brahma na pratibimbabhāvam gantum arhat amūrtatvāt... vicchinnadeśasthopādhidhuratvāt...iti dravyayoge tāvad aprayojakatvam ekam dūṣaṇam . rūpe cānaikāntaḥ, rūpavataḥ sūryādeḥ pratibimbabhāve rūpasyāpi pratibimbasyāvarjanīyatvāt ityasyākāṣe vyabhicāraḥ sphuṭa eveti nodbhāvitaḥ', p.773, 1.22. BSB 3.2.20

have material form. *Brahman* is not so, so there is no possibility of it being reflected in any medium.^{212,213}

The partless *Brahman* is conditioned as it were by *avidyā*. This conditioned entity is the soul, the substratum or locus of *avidyā*.

Avidyā-s are many, (the *nānājīvada view*), so souls are many according to the text of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*,

Whosoever amongst the divine beings or the sages or men realises *Brahman* becomes *Brahman*²¹⁴, as well as both *avacchedavāda* of *Bhāmatī* and *pratibimbavāda* of *Vivaraṇa prasthānas*. *Brahman* that transcends each *avidyā* is the content and is termed God/*Īśvara*.

Vācaspatimiśra like Prakāśātman, recognises that mind too serves as the limiting adjunct/*upādhi* of the soul. Indeed, Śaṅkara on BSB 3.2.9 states, 'Every same

²¹²'*Bhāmatī*: 'ūpavaddhi dravyam atisvacchatayā rūpavato dravyāntarasya tad vivekena grhyamāṇasyāpi chāyām grhṇīyāt, cidātmatvarūpo viṣayī na viṣaycchāyām udgrāhayitum arhatai. yathāhuḥ 'śabdagandharasānām ca kīdrśī pratibimbitā' iti', pp. 7-8

²¹³ 'bhāsamānasvarūpasya avastutoam. parācakramire ca atrācāryāḥ darpaṇatīkāyām ityuparamyate.' p.p. 659-660
1.27 on BSB 2.3.50 ābhāsa eva ca

²¹⁴ 'Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.4.10. 'tad yo yo devānām pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhat tatharṣiṇām tathā manuṣyāṇām'.

soul returns from sleep because of the reason of action, remembrance, scriptural authority, and injunction’ and says,

‘It is *Brahman* itself that is metaphorically spoken of as *jīva* due to its association with the limiting adjunct’ BS 3.2.9²¹⁵

Mind being the locus of specific manifestation of the soul.

Vācaspatimiśra states it should also be held as the limiting adjunct of it. The *avacchedavāda* adherents then proceed to criticize *pratibimbavāda* on the basis there could not be a reflection of *Brahman* since it has no material shape, discounting the fact that an object may be reflected without material shape, as for example colour or light.

For Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivaraṇa*,²¹⁶ and others in the *Vivaraṇa prasthāna* have emphasized the cognition of the expansive ether in water that is only ‘knee-deep’ affirms the reflection of ether therein as of course sound since this has *ākāśa*/ether as its *tanmātra*/subtle element.

²¹⁵ BS 3.2.9 ‘sa evade karmānusmṛtiśabdaviṣibhyaḥ’...BSB “na jīvo nāma kaścit parasmāt anyah vidyate , yah jalabindur iva jalarāśeḥ sato vivicyeta. sadhva tu upādhisamparkāt jīva ityupacaryate iti asakṛtprapañcitam.’

²¹⁶ ISV ‘Nabhaso’nekopādhiṣu yugapad anekapratibimbadarśanāt jānughne’pi gambhīratāyāḥ sākṣisiddhatvāt’. p.363

So, in this area, we find accord between Vācaspatimiśra's *Bhāmatī* and other advocates of *avacchedavāda* and Prakāśātma, Vimuktātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya with *Vivaraṇa prasthāna's pratibimbavādas*. Since minds are many, the reflected images of *Brahman*, the souls in *avidyā*, are many.

So, there is a crucial harmony in the two prasthānas advocating *nānājīvāda* as opposed to *ekajīvavāda*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains how this is not against the spirit of *Advaita* because the distinction of many souls that is valid in the realm of phenomenal existence is only empirically real, the *vyāvahārika* dimension, and in no way contradicts the identity of the soul with *Brahman* which is the absolutely real *pārmārthika* or *tātvika* dimension.²¹⁷

However, it must be said that there remains a major difference in the question as to whether the soul/*jīvātman* or *Brahman* is the locus of *avidyā*.

²¹⁷ ISV 'na cādvaitavirodhaḥ vyāvahārikapramāṇasiddhiḥvyavasthāyāḥ tātvikādvaitavirodhitvābhāvāt', p.366

Bhāmatī holds the view that the *jīvātmas* are the locus of their respective *avidyās*, implying that there are as many *avidyās* as there are *jīvātmas*, so it is easy to account for the liberation of one *jīvātma* on the dawn of right-knowledge while the rest under nescience remain bound.

Vivaraṇa prasthāna in contrast, advocates one *avidyā* located in *Brahman*, and not in the *jīvātman*. This teaching results in a contradiction at the empirical level, when *Vivaraṇa prasthāna* has the problem of a plurality of *jīvātma-s* but one *avidyā*. This they solve with two types of *avidyā*, *mūlājñāna* and *avasthānājñānas*, the former operating at the level of *Brahman*, the latter at the level of *jīvātma-s*.

Nonetheless, on examination of these two *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa prasthānas*, it becomes clear that in fact they have an enormous amount in common. Both share the teaching of *jīva-Brahman* identity as also *avidyā* and its products - the *upādhis* / limiting adjuncts such as *buddhi*, senses, body etc. to be responsible for the apparent sense of perishability of the *jīvās*. Both believe in the purity and eternality of the

jīvātma-s/selves and in being essentially free from agentship, enjoyership etc, in their true *Saccidānanda* / ‘Truth Consciousness and Bliss nature, and True knowledge as the means to *Mokṣa*/Liberation.

The apparent disagreement lies in the question of the locus and number of

avidyā-s as also the *jīva-Brahman-relation*. In the end, the seeming plurality of *jīvātma-s*/selves, whether interpreted as *pratibimba*/reflection of *Brahman*

or as *avacchedas*/limited entities, is but illusory or unreal.²¹⁸

The *Jīvātma*, *Īśvara* and Omniscience

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *MāṇḍūkyaḡauḡapādīyaṢippaṇa* explains that when modal *avidyā* is removed by a *vṛtti*, a modification of mind in the form of the object, the knowledge of the object ensues as a matter of course.²¹⁹

²¹⁸ Roodurmun, P.S. (2010). Delhi: Motilal, pp. 162-163

²¹⁹ ‘Mk.Bh.Ṣ.’*Ghaṡādeś cid vivartatvāt svādhiṡṡhānacittād ātmyena sphuraṇe prāpte cid āvaraṇājīṇānapratibandhāt ghaṡādir na prakāśate, ghaṡādyākārapramāṇena tasminn ajjīṇāne’pasārīte nāntarīyakam ghaṡādisamvedanam bhavati*’, p.35 on v.7.

Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa Prasthānas' Concept of Brahman and

Mokṣa

Both agree that *Brahman* knowledge is of the nature of *Ananta-ānanda*/Absolute Bliss.

It is the cessation of all sorrow, bondage, transmigration and personal desire here or hereafter.

Both the *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa prasthānas* hold that Self-realization need not result in the death of the body. Thus, due to residual impressions/*vāsanā* there is persistence of the body until the exhaustion of *prārabdhakarma*.

Such a *jīvanmukta* is the man of steady wisdom/*sthitaprajña* referred to by Lord Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Gītā²²⁰.

Such a one is in the world but not of it, waiting the fruition of the results of works/*karma* already being undertaken/*prārabdha-karma*. While both traditions believe *Mokṣa* is to be attained through listening/*śravaṇa*,

mental study /*manana*, and profound meditation to become one/*nididhyāsana*, in accordance with the *śruti* texts *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5 and

²²⁰ BG 2.55 '*prajahāti yadā kāmān sarvān pārtha manogatānātmany eva ātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthitaprajñas tadocyate*', The Lord said:55. **When a man satisfied in the Self alone by himself, completely casts off all the desires of the mind, then is he said to be one of steady knowledge**'.

4.5.5,²²¹ Vācaspatimiśra believes *śravaṇa*/listening to great *Upaniṣadic* texts or *adhyayana*/study) and *manana* are significant in leading to the generation of the desire to know *Brahman*.²²² Prakāśātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya etc. consider all three are enjoined on the seeker of true knowledge and hence have the status of injunctions either as principal or auxiliaries. Thus, the *Vivaraṇa* considers *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* as auxiliaries to the principal *śravaṇa*.²²³

It seeks to establish the precedence of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* for the apprehension of the purport and inner meaning of the *mahāvākyas* like ‘*tat tvam asi*’/‘*Thou art that*’,²²⁴ as well as the experiential knowledge, i.e. *anubhūti* of the unity of *Ātman* and *Brahman*, with the aim to lead to Self-realisation, due to their potency through their power to dispel *avidyā* directly.²²⁵

In contrast is the view of *Bhāmatī* which gives equal credence to the way of works, ritual/‘*karmakhāṇḍa*’ of the *Veda*, emphasising purificatory acts or rituals like *nitya-karmas* ‘and *naimittika-karmas*’ combined with resorting to the *Upaniṣads* of the

²²¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 2.4.5 and 4.5.5. ‘*ātmano vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavya nididhyāsitaḥ maitreyi.*’

²²² Mahadevan, T.M.P. p.280

²²³ *ibid.* p.290

²²⁴ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.7

²²⁵ Mahadevan, T.M.P. p.292

knowledge path/'*Jñānakhāṇḍa*'. Along with acts of austerity, charity etc. all are considered necessary prerequisites for the *jijñāsu*/seeker of the knowledge of *Brahman*. Indeed according to the *Bhāmatī* there can be no *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* without the mind having been purged through such 'purificatory' *karmas* and through the atonement for sins by ritual observances of *nitya-karmas* 'and *naimittika-karmas*' etc.²²⁶ This is in agreement with Ādi Śāṅkara who lists these among the requisites for any contemplation on *Brahman* or the generation of the desire to realize the *Ātman*/the true Self.²⁸¹

Prakāśātman, on the other hand considers that no rites are 'required' prior to *Brahmajijñāsā*/deliberation on *Brahman* or even as an aid to Self-realization. However, these acts lead to the *jijñāsu*/seeker to successfully undertake *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* through cleansing the *antaḥkaraṇa*/inner organ of mind (i.e. *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *aharṅkāra*), then indeed they are indirectly instrumental in the rise of true knowledge.²²⁷

From this, it becomes clear that the majority of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's assumptions are in harmony with this *Vivaraṇa* tradition.

In conclusion, it should be clear that the basic problem is still that of reconciling the *upaniṣadic* dictum of One changeless *Brahman* with the evidence of the senses, which imply a mani-fold universe full of change.

The *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa prasthānas* are therefore only varying approaches towards the same basic problem. There are some other authors who share both lines of thought. An early example is Amalānanda (fl 1255 A.D.), and a later example is Appayya Dīkṣita (fl 1585 A.D.), whose *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* is an encyclopedic compilation of various views. Appayya points out that the differences among the authors of the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa prasthānas* are not fundamental philosophical ones, but rather a result of differing emphases and style of argumentation.

Taken alone, each *prasthāna*/school has its own logical problems. However, each is a way of describing a logical philosophical approach to the insight of Oneness that cuts through all language and logic. Finally, there are authors who cannot be classified under either school. These typically tend to be the earlier authors in the post-Śaṅkara *advaita* tradition. Thus, we have early teachers like Jñānaghan (fl c.900 A.D.), and slightly later ones like Sarvajñātman (fl. 1027 A.D.), Śrī Harṣa (fl 1140 A.D.) possibly one of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's (fl 1250 A.D.) teachers

and Citsukha (fl 1295 A.D.). The last three named striking an independent route and demolishing all non-duality through examining the premises of the *Nyāya* logical system, while most of the others develop on the arguments first seen in Padmapāda and Sureśvara's works.

After Ādi Śaṅkara, it can be argued, that *Advaita* flowed in two directions, the *Bhāmatī* School and the *Vivaraṇa* School.

In the course of time, the *Vivaraṇa* school seems to have fallen into desuetude as compared with its rival; and for this, two reasons at least are clearly discernible:

- (1) The basic text of the *Vivaraṇa* school, namely, the *Pañcapādikā*, is available only in the form of a fragment while that of the other '*Bhāmatī*' is in its complete form, which covers the *Bhāṣya* on all the 555 *sūtras*.

The *Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa* which is unfortunately found limited to just four of them.

It is not unreasonable to assume that the Bhāṣyakara's mind is more fully brought out in the *Bhāmatī*, which deals with all the *sūtra* topics, rather than in the extant fraction of the *Pañcapādikā*, whatever be the relative merits of the two *Vyākhyānas* to the average student, for both alike represent *Vivaraṇa*

Śārīraka's *Advaita*.

Unlike Padmapāda whose known achievement is only in the field of one *Darśana*, Vācaspati the author of *Bhāmatī* has to his credit works of recognised authority in all the six *Darśanas*. His works in *Nyāya*, *Sāṅkhya* and *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* have earned him a prestige which naturally magnifies his stature in the realm of the *Vedānta*. This is an advantage not matched in the case of *Padmāpada*. In addition to these two facts, we may also note that some scholars hold the view that while *Vācaspati (Bhāmatī)* scrupulously keeps close to the letter of the *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*, while Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā* tries to supplement the original with something of his own thought in the process of clarification and argument.

This impression of *Bhāmatī's* greater literal approximation to the original may be another reason for *Vivaraṇa's* comparative lack of popularity. On the other hand, thinkers and writers of no inferior standing mindful of the doctrinal possibilities of the *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* have looked upon the *Vivaraṇa Pañcapādikā* literature as an invaluable source of light and guidance. This should be evident when it is recalled that among the contributors to this literature is the great Madhava Vidyāraṇya, author of the *Vivaraṇa-*

prameyasāṅgraha as of the more popular *Vedānta Pañcadaśī*. However even more important is the magnum opus of our 'very little known author Anubhūtiśvarūpa's *Prakaṣārthavivaraṇa*, the first full commentary on all 555 *sūtras* of the *Brahma-sūtra-Bhāṣya* of Ādi Śaṅkara from the *Vivaraṇa* perspective. The question of the place of the *Vivaraṇa* school in the history of *Advaitic* thought is one that awaits the attention of the researcher. But there is no doubt that Padmapāda's arguments are sound and have a strong appeal. His painstaking interpretations in the *Pañcapādikā* with hair splitting differentiations will certainly excite the admiration of succeeding generations with unabated vigour. The hairline subtleties of his writings perhaps can only be compared with the critical analysis resorted to in the *Navya Nyāya* school of later times.

Being a direct disciple of Śārīrakācārya Śaṅkarācārya, (788-820A.D?.) Thus, Padmapāda's time can be fixed at 820A.D. and scholars have generally agreed on this point. Padmapāda is reputed to have written two works both of which have fortunately survived. One of them is the *Pañcapādikā* which is a commentary on the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on the first four sutras of the *Brahma Sūtras*.

The name *Pañcapādikā* however suggests that the original commentary was obviously on five sūtras, out of which one was lost subsequently.²²⁸ The latter thereupon dictated to him the *Catussūtri* portion of the work which he remembered. That accounts for the incompleteness of the present work if this legend can be trusted. The second work attributed to Padmapāda is the *Atmabodhavyakhyāna*, also called the *Vedantasāra*. Although he had left us two works, his reputation is based on the sure foundation of the *Pañcapādikā*. According to Das Gupta this *Pañcapādikā* is one of the most important of the *Vedānta* works known to us.

It was commented upon by Prakāśātman (A.D.1200) in his *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* and of course by our largely unknown author Anubhūtiśvarūpa's *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*. The *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* was later further commented upon by

²²⁸ In his introduction to the Siddhanta Bindu (G.O.S. No. LXIV) on p. xci, the editor Mr. P. C. Divanji has recorded an interesting story explaining the circumstances under which part of Padmapāda's book was lost. The legend goes on to say that when Padmapāda had finished his task of composing the full text of the *Pañcapādikā* he was seized with a desire to go out on a pilgrimage. Before he could put that idea into practice, he went to his *guru* like an obedient disciple for permission to leave. Śaṅkara at first was not willing to let him go, but as he was insistent, he ultimately gave permission much against his wishes. Padmapāda started on his journey all the time carrying the *Pañcapādikā* along with him. On the way to Rameśvaram, he halted at the house of his maternal uncle who was a follower of the *Prabhākāra* School of *Mīmāṃsā*. To this uncle, Padmapāda showed his *Pañcapādikā* wherein he had refuted *Prabhākāra* and supported the Śaṅkara view-points. Thereafter, he left for Rameśvaram leaving all his belongings with his uncle including his new book *Pañcapādikā*.

In his absence, the uncle thought that if *Pañcapādikā* gains publicity and popularity it will injure his masters' doctrines which may ultimately go out of currency. Thinking thus he hit upon the trick of destroying the manuscript by setting fire to his own house. Padmapāda informed his master about this disaster on his return, and bitterly regretted having gone out on pilgrimage against his advice.

by Vidyāraṇya (fl.1350) author of *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, and Akhandananda (A.D.1350) in his *Tattva dīpana*. Among other writers on *Vivaraṇa* may be mentioned the names of Ramananda Sarasvatī (fl.1670 A.D.), the author of *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, and in this long line of *Vivaraṇa* authors, Ramananda is perhaps the last great scholar. Das Gupta places him in the early part of the 17th century on arguments which appear to be sound.

Chapter 3: Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's Contribution to *Advaita* on the

Nature of *Brahman* and *māyā/avidyā* with particular reference to his

Major Works

Brahman as Truth, Knowledge, Infinity, Cause of the World,

With and Without Attributes

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (c.1250A.D.), makes an important contribution to the understanding of the nature of *Brahman*, *māyā* and *avidyā*. He starts by dealing with the essence of *Advaita Vedānta*. God, the individual souls and the universe form the subject matter of many religions and philosophies. They are considered distinct realities by the schools of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Dvaita*. However, for *Advaita Vedānta*,

these three are apparent variations in the reality of a transcendental entity homogeneous, bliss and non-dual, non-different from the one absolute reality, *Brahman*.

Advaita is that wherein there is a total absence²²⁹ of duality. It, thus, stands for the non-dual entity, which is the only reality. Thus, the system expounding the nature of such a reality is also '*Advaita*'.

Māyā and its 'aspect' *avidyā* the cause of the illusory manifestation of the non-dual consciousness as God/*Īśvara*, the soul/*jīvātman* and the world/*jagat*. Of these, the world is *mithyā*/indeterminable as real or as an absolute no-thing. God is a complex of pure Consciousness and *māyā*, while the soul is a complex of pure consciousness, *avidyā* and mind. Thus, the essential nature of God and the soul is pure Consciousness, the former referred to as *Brahman* while the latter as *Ātman*.

So, it follows that God is always aware of His identity with *Brahman*, being ever-released/*mukta*. Only the soul undergoes transmigration/*samsāra* by falsely

²²⁹ 'na vidyate dvaitam dvidhābhāvaḥ yatra tadadvaitam' *Siddhānta Bindu*, p.456, *Madhusūdhana-sarasvatī*.

identifying itself with the mind. Its true goal is to realize the knowledge of its true nature as *Ātman*, identical with *Brahman*., i.e. ‘Self-realization’. It arises from the study of the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*, the Great sentences/*mahā-vākya* like *tat tvam asi*/ ‘Thou art That’. So the *Upaniṣads* are the sole means of knowing *Brahman*.²³⁰

The soul/*jīvātman* is an agent of actions-sacred and secular as the experiencer of the results of actions. It experiences the three states of waking/*jāgarita*, dream/*svapna* and deep sleep/*suṣupta*. The soul experiencing the states of waking and dreaming, in turn, is compared to a large fish that swims alternately to both banks of a river and is described as such in *Bṛhad* 4.3.18²³¹

**As a great fish swims alternately to both the banks (of a river),
eastern and western, so does this infinite being move to both these
states, the dream and waking states.**

²³⁰ ‘*Tam tu aupaniṣadam puruṣadam pṛccchāmi*’ *Bṛhad. Up.* 3.9.26

²³¹ *Bṛhad. Up.* 4.3.18

tad yathā mahāmatsya ubhe kūle anusaṃcarati pūrvam cāparam ca | evam evāyaṃ puruṣa etāv ubhāv antāv anusaṃcarati svapnāntam ca buddhāntam ca |

The same *Upaniṣad* describes the likeness between the soul that experiences the deep sleep state and a hawk or falcon which having become tired after roaming in the sky, hastens to its nest (*Bṛhad. Up. 4.3.19*).²³²

In the state of deep sleep/*suṣupta-sthāna*, sense-organs do not function, and mind provisionally merges in *avidyā* (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad v5*):

That state is deep sleep where the sleeper does not desire any enjoyable thing and does not see any dream. The third quarter is *Prājña* who has deep sleep as his sphere, in whom everything becomes undifferentiated, who is a mass of mere consciousness, who abounds in bliss, who is surely an enjoyer of bliss, and who is the doorway to the experience (of the dream and waking states).²³³

²³² *Bṛhad. Up. 4.3.19* 'tad yathā asmīnnākāśe śyeno vā suparṇo vā viparipatya śrāntaḥ saṅghatya pakṣau saṁlayāyau dhriyate evamevayam puruṣaḥ.'

²³³ *Māṇḍūkya_5* 'yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmāyate na kañcana svapnam paśyati tat suṣuptam | suṣuptasthāna ekībhūtaḥ prajñānaghana evānandamayo hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prājñas tṛtīyaḥ pādaḥ ||'

The soul remains as pure Consciousness associated with ignorance/*avidyā*. This is evidenced by the recollection that one has after coming back to the waking state from a deep sleep in the form, 'I slept happily and I knew nothing when I was asleep', the recollection involving reference to both bliss and ignorance, so that there must have been the experience of both in the state of deep sleep as described.

As has been stated in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* v5 above, deep sleep is characterized by the absence of functioning of the instruments of knowledge, viz. sense-organs and mind. Nonetheless, there is an experience of bliss and ignorance! This experience must be derived from a principle which according to Śaṅkara and Anubhūtiśvarūpa, is to be admitted a Self-luminous Consciousness. It manifests of Its own accord as bliss in nature, as the *Upaniṣads* like *Māṇḍūkya* declare. It follows that Consciousness, which is Self-luminous is identical with bliss. Since ignorance too is manifested, the state of deep sleep is characterized by the presence of pure Consciousness and *avidyā*. So *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.1.²³⁴ states that in the state of deep sleep the soul remains as *Sat*, that is *Brahman*.

²³⁴ *Chā* 6.8.1 'sato saumya tadā sampanno bhavati'.

In the state of dream, the sense-organs have ceased to function, it is only the mind that is active. Soul associated with mind, experiences the dream state. In the waking-state, soul is associated with mind, sense-organs and the physical body and experiences the objects of the world. So, it is that the soul experiences these three states in turn.

From the above it follows that waking, dream and deep sleep states are variable and hence not real, on the principle that the Real is that which does not change, *sat*, whereas the unreal is *a-sat*, which changes. The characteristics of agency and experiment are shown not to be real in view of the fact that they are not noticed in the deep-sleep state. The main reason for their absence is the absence of mind. Thus, it is that we infer it is the association of mind with the soul which is responsible for the rise of the above characteristics. So, the relation between soul and mind cannot be real, because the former is sentient while the latter is insentient., thus the relation is false. Since this is 'occasional' a cause must be referred to, i.e. *avidyā*. Hence, when *avidyā* is removed the soul would cease to be a soul and will remain as pure Consciousness, which is liberation/*mokṣa*. This is the 'fourth-state' or *Turīya*, which in truth is not a state because It never changes.

Śaṅkara and Anubhūtiśvarūpa explain that this is exactly what Śrutis like v.7 of *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* declare:²³⁵

They consider the Fourth to be that which is not conscious of the internal (subjective) world, nor of the external (objective) world, nor conscious of both the worlds, nor is it a concrete consciousness, nor usual worldly consciousness, nor devoid of consciousness; which is unseen, beyond empirical dealings, beyond the grasp (intangible), devoid of qualifications, beyond thinking and beyond description; essentially of the nature of Consciousness as the Self alone; in which all phenomena cease; and which is peaceful, auspicious, and non-dual. That is the Self, and that is to be known.

As the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* puts it: 4.3.7²³⁶

²³⁵ *Māṇḍūkya v.7 'nāntaḥprajñāṁ na bahiḥprajñāṁ nobhayataḥprajñāṁ na prajñānaghanāṁ na prajñāṁ nāprajñāṁ adṛṣṭam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayasāraṁ prapañcopaśamaṁ śāntaṁ śivam advaitaṁ caturthaṁ manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyah || 7'*

²³⁶ *Bṛhad. Up. 4.3.7. 'katama ātmeti -- yo 'yam vijñānamayah prāṇeṣu hr̥dy antarjyotiḥ puruṣah |'*

Which is the Self? ... This infinite entity (*Puruṣa*) that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of the organs, the (Self-effulgent) light within the heart (intellect). Assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it moves between the two worlds; it thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were. Being identified with dreams, it transcends this world — the forms of death (ignorance etc.)

This so clearly speaks of the true nature of the soul as Self-luminous Consciousness.

The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.1 quoted earlier states that the soul remains as *Brahman* in the state of deep sleep, and the *Brahma Sūtra* 3.2.11²³⁷ states, '**Not even according to place can *Brahman* have a twofold characteristic, for everywhere (It is taught to be without attributes)**'.

On which Śaṅkara observes that 'with the help of *Upaniṣadic* texts, the nature of that *Brahman* is being ascertained with which the individual soul becomes unified in sleep when its limiting adjuncts become quiescent'. On this Anubhūtiśvarūpa most helpfully elaborates in his *Prakāṣarthavivaraṇa*. Here is discussed whether *Brahman* is endowed with attributes or not, which is necessitated by the fact that there exist

²³⁷ BS 3.2.11 'na sthānato'pi parasyobhayaliṅgaṃ sarvatra hi.'

two different sets of *Upaniṣadic* texts, one stating *Brahman* to be endowed with attributes and the other as attributeless. The *Chāndogya* text 8.1.5.²³⁸ **'He has ... unfailing desires, unfailing will'**, conveys that *Brahman* is endowed with attributes. Likewise, *Taittirīya* 3.1.1.:²³⁹ **'Crave to know well that from which all of these beings take birth, that by which they live after being born, that towards which they move and into which they merge, that is *Brahman*'**, speaking of *Brahman* with the characteristic of being the cause of their world.

In contrast, *Bṛhad* 3.8.8²⁴⁰: **'It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither red colour nor oiliness, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor ether, unattached, neither savour nor odour, without eyes or ears, without the vocal organ or mind etc.'**,

speaks of *Brahman* as free from all attributes/*nir-guṇa*.

Here, both Śaṅkara and Anubhūtiśvarūpa reject the *prima facie* view that this indicates *Brahman* intrinsically possesses these two aspects and assert that it is not

²³⁸ *Chāndogya* 8.1.5 '*satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ*.'

²³⁹ *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1.1. '*Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayanty abisaṁviśanti, tad vijijñāśasva tad brahmeti.*'

²⁴⁰ *Bṛhad* 3.8.8. '*asthūlam anaṅṣv ahrasvam adīrgham alohitam asneham acchāyam atamo 'vāyṣv anākāśam asaṅgam arasam aḡandham acakṣuṣkam aśrotram avāḡ amano.*'

possible to ascertain that one object intrinsically possesses attributes, yet at the same time is free from attributes, because an object will not acquire a different nature even by association with an adjunct/*upādhi*. Thus, a crystal which is transparent never becomes non-transparent because of its association with resin etc. So, the cognition of the crystal as non-transparent is certainly erroneous. In the same way, as BS 3.2.11²⁴¹: **‘Not even according to place can *Brahman* have a twofold characteristic, for everywhere (It is taught to be without attributes) ... (BSB 3.2.11).**

Moreover, adjuncts are conjured up by ignorance. Hence, even if we take up either of the two characteristics, **‘it is *Brahman* that is absolutely attributeless and unchangeable’** ... and BS 3.2.15 15. **‘And like light, *Brahman* can (be assumed to) have different appearances, so that the scriptures may not become purportless’.** (BSB).

Thus, whatsoever is brought about by an adjunct is not the essential characteristic of a thing, since the adjuncts themselves are conjured up by ignorance. And we said in the respective contexts that all social and *Vedic* behaviours crop up only when the beginningless ignorance is taken for granted. As Anubhutiśvarūpa

²⁴¹ BS 'na sthānato 'pi parasyobhayaliṅgaṃ sarvatra hi.' 3,2.11 BSB
'upādānām cāvidyāpratyupa sthāpitatatvāt.'

The words, *satyam*/truth etc. have the same case endings and are juxtaposed so that they convey the identity of their senses, which is only possible if they communicate *Brahman* as of the nature of reality etc., and not of one possessing reality, as its qualities.

This subtle but fundamental difference by which words communicate *Brahman* as of the very nature of a living reality is known as 'secondary signification', and not as an object possessing these qualities known as 'primary signification' through a relation, a quality, an activity or a class-characteristic. The words *satyam*/truth etc. cannot convey *Brahman* through primary signification because *Brahman* is free from quality, an activity or a class-characteristic. *Bṛhad* 4.3.1:

'this infinite being is unattached' and 4.4.22 **'unattached, for It is never attached'**

which states that *Brahman* is supra-relational and being such it is unattached, specifically denying the relation of any factor in the case of *Brahman*. Hence, the words of the *Upaniṣad* can communicate *Brahman* through secondary signification only. For *Brahman* is the One, Eternal reality, the Essence of the world through which all finite things exist. The word *satyam*/truth primarily signifies a blend of *Brahman* and empirically real phenomenal elements. *Jñāna* /knowledge, according to Śaṅkara

and Anubhūtiśvarūpa is the blend of the mental state/*vṛtti* inspired by the reflection of consciousness in it and *Brahman* as pure Consciousness. This blend is known as knowledge.

Ānanda/bliss is the reflection of the bliss form of Consciousness in the mental state which arises owing to the contact of sense organs with pleasant objects. So, the word *Ānanda* primarily signifies a blend of the mental state and the reflection of the bliss form of Consciousness in it. In the same way, space is considered in ordinary experience to be *ananta* / without end/infinite so not conditioned by time space and 'objects'/names and forms. The word *ananta* primarily conveys the blend of *Brahman* and the phenomenal entity - space.

In the texts Taittirīya 2.1.1,

'Brahman is truth/*satyam*, knowledge/*jñānam*, and infinite/*anantam*' and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 3.9.28. affirms, **'Knowledge/*vijñānam*, Bliss/*ānandam* *Brahman*'**, the four words *satyam*, *jñānam*, *anantam* and *ānandam* are juxtaposed with the same case-endings to convey the identity of their senses, where the primary senses are complex entities and their identity would require the identity of their

adjectival parts too,²⁴⁵ being varied there cannot, in fact, be identity one with another, nor can there be of complex entities which are the primary senses.

Hence, the need to resort to secondary signification. So, words like *satyam* etc, do convey *Brahman* - the substantive by abandoning the adjectival parts through the function known as *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇa*, the function through which a word retains a part of its primary sense and abandons another part of it, as 'This is That Devadatta' leaving out their adjectival parts and convey their substantive parts, the person-in-himself. This is expounded by Sarvajñatma in his great work *Samkṣepasārīraka* adopted by the *Advaita* tradition to deal with the special nature of '*maha-vākya*s' or '*eternal śruti*', '*Vedic*' utterances, which are potent for Self-realisation and are of a different order to ordinary sentences. Such sentences '*tat-tvam-asi* / **Thou art That**' but are beyond time and space. Hence, the text as a whole conveys one concept, *Brahman*. This sense is known as, 'whole/non-fragmentary meaning' / *akhaṇḍārtha*.

However, if it is objected words like *satyam*, etc. convey one and the same sense, namely, *Brahman*, they are just synonyms, then Anubhūtiśvarūpa in his commentary *Nibandha* on Ānandabodha's *Pramāṇamālā*²⁴⁶ answers this objection.

²⁴⁵ Veezhinathan, N. *The Samkṣepasārīraka*, Introduction, pp.17-19

²⁴⁶ *Nibandha* p.106 '*pravṛttinimittabhedam antareṇa ekasminnarthe vṛttiḥ paryāyatā. Prakṛte pravṛttinimittabhedāna paryāyatā...*'

He states 'that it is true that these words convey one and the same object, yet they do not become synonyms as their primary meanings, known as *pravṛttinimitta* are different as they serve as the ground for the use of the words in regard to their secondary sense. If the words convey the same object through the same ground / *pravṛttinimitta* then they are synonymous. In the present case, on the contrary the words communicate *Brahman*, through different grounds so they are not synonymous.

A further objection is raised that if all the words are admitted to convey the same sense, one word should be sufficient and the other superfluous. Anubhūtiśvarūpa answers this in his *Iṣṭa-Siddhi-Vivaraṇa*²⁴⁷ by stating that 'each word has a specific role to play. So, the words *satya*, *jñāna*, *ananta* and *ānanda* give the knowledge that *Brahman* is of the nature of 'reality, consciousness, infinitude and bliss, and respectively eliminate that *Brahman* is non-real, insentient, limited and afflicted, so each serves a unique purpose and is not superfluous.

Another objection raised against the contention that *Brahman* is secondarily signified by the words of the *Upaniṣads* is that in ordinary experience it is found that

²⁴⁷ *Iṣṭa-Siddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.55 'jñānena viśeṣaṇāj jādyavyāvṛttiḥ ānandena viśeṣaṇāt dukhaḥvyāvṛttiḥ, satyena viśeṣaṇāt anṛtavavyāvṛttiḥ, anantena viśeṣaṇāt paricchinna vyāvṛttiḥ.'

the word Ganges, secondarily signifies the sense of banks, which is known to be its primary meaning. From this, we may deduce an invariable relation, whichever is secondarily signified is the primary meaning of a word. Thus, *Brahman* not being the primary meaning of any word, cannot be secondarily signified.

This view Anubhūtiśvarūpa strongly rejects. In his *Iṣṭa-Sidhi-Vivaraṇa* he says that ‘just as the criterion for the rise of smoke is fire only and not the tawny colour in it, similarly the criterion for taking a word in its secondary sense does not lie in the latter being known as the primary meaning of some other word, rather what is required is that what must be known is the sense that is to be secondarily signified’. For *Brahman*, being Self-luminous, manifests of its own accord. So, there does not arise any doubt or contrary notion regarding the existence of one’s Self which is identical with *Brahman* (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* v 2: ‘**This Self is *Brahman*’*āyam ātmā Brahma*’). Hence it could be secondarily signified. This view is based on *Samkṣepaśārīraka*.1.153²⁴⁸**

²⁴⁸ *Samkṣepaśārīraka*.1.153 “*Mānāntarādhigatātā hi na lakṣaṇayam kiñcitkarī bhavati piṅgalatāvagneḥ. dhūmasya janmani hi piṅgalatā na hetuḥ yadyapavasthitavatī hetubhukśarīre.*”

The criterion for taking a word in its secondary sense does not lie in its secondary sense being known by other proofs (as related to the primary sense of the word), just like the tawny colour of fire is not the criterion for the rise of smoke. Though the tawny colour subsists in fire, yet it is not instrumental in giving rise to smoke.

Now, it has been already said that the *Upaniṣadic* teaching is that the soul is a blend of pure Consciousness, *avidyā* and mind. It acquires the characteristics of agency and experiment due to false identification with mind, whereas God is a blend of pure Consciousness and *māyā* and He has the characteristic of being the cause of this universe due to association with *māyā*. The essential nature of God and the soul remains pure Consciousness, the former being designated *Brahman* and the latter as *Ātman*. On this basis it becomes easier to explain the major text/*mahāvākya*.²⁴⁹

The words *Tat tvam* have the same case ending and are juxtaposed/*samānādhikaraṇa* , so they are intended to convey identity of sense. *Tat* 'That', primarily signifies God/*Īśvara*, who is as stated a complex of pure Consciousness

²⁴⁹ *Tat tvam asi* (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8.7). *Advaita Āśrama*: Svami Gambhīrānanda, Calcutta (1997)

and *māyā*, having the characteristic of being the cause of this universe or world. The word *tvam*/ 'Thou', primarily signifies the soul/*jīvātman* a complex of pure Consciousness, *avidyā* and mind, and believes himself to be an agent of actions and an experiencer of the result of actions. So, there cannot be any identity between the two in view of the contradictory features present in them. To resolve this, there is a resort to secondary signification. The word *tat*/ '**That**' through the process of *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇa* leaves out (*jahad-*) a part of Its primary sense, *māyā*, and Its characteristics and conveys (*a-jahal-lakṣaṇa*) the other part, pure Consciousness, which is designated a *Brahman*. The word *tvam*/ 'Thou' by the same process of *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇa* leaves out (*jahad-*) a part of Its primary sense, *avidyā*-mind, and its characteristics and conveys the other part, pure Consciousness, which is designated as *Ātman*. The whole sentence, *Tat tvam asi*, conveys the non-difference/*advaita* or identity between the two. The significance of the sentence is the identity of *Brahman* and *Ātman*. This is the explanation Anubhūtiśvarūpa gives in his *Nibandha*.²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ *Nibandha* p.109: 'Tattvamasi sāmānādhikaranyena Tattvaṃpadārthayostāvat ekatvam avabhāsate . Tac ca mukhyayoḥ na sambhavati . tathā hi sābhāsamāyopādhi jñānānandaād advitīyaṃ brahma tatpadābhidheyam. ... tvaṃpadena ca sābhāsakaryakataṇasamghātopādhisāṃsārikapratyak caitanyam abhidhīyate ...na ca tayor aikyaṃ sambhavate, viruddhadharm ākrāntatvāt ... tasmāt mukhyārtha parigrahe'nupptīyā śabalapadārthābhyāmekasvarūpaṃ lakṣyata ityārthaḥ' .

So, these two words, *Tat* and *tvam* communicate a single concept through secondary signification. However, Anubhūtiśvarūpa in his commentary, *Saṅgraha* on Ānandabodha's *Nyāyamakaranda*,²⁵¹ shows that words can convey a single concept even without resorting to secondary signification. He gives as an example, a *sūtra* from Pāṇini's great *Aṣṭhādhyāyī* 'prātipadikārtha-liṅga-parimāṇa vacana -mātre prathamā || PS_2.3.46 || 'where the sense is that of the Nominal-stem -- or of gender only, or measure only or number only, the 1st case-affix is used'.

So, for example, the stem part *Rāma* and the nominative case-termination are not synonymous, yet they convey together the single entity - the incarnation 'Rāma existing'. Thus, Pāṇini accepts the import of the words which are not synonymous with being the only one concept which is *akhaṇḍārtha*. See the words of the previous Śaṅkarācārya of the Northern seat, Jyotirmath, in 1993²⁵²:

(The unlimited) is the substratum. It always remains the same and always remains one. It has no divisions. Therefore it is called *akhaṇḍa*. This is the real state of consciousness, the primordial state.

²⁵¹ *Saṅgraha* p.144 'prātipadikārtha -liṅga-parimāṇavacana-mātre prathameti prātipadikārthaḥ sanmātram eva ekarasam vastu tadeva prathamāvibhakterapyartha iti pāṇiniḥ smarati sma.'

²⁵² 'Conversations with Maharāja Śrī Śāntānanda Sarasvatī: Volume 4, (2018). School of Philosophy and Economic Science, London, p.169.

Hence, there need be no doubt concerning the view that the import of a sentence could be a single concept. Indeed, this is the very view set forth in the

Samkṣepaśārīraka.1.274:²⁵³

The venerable Pāṇini holds that the nominative case suffix added to the nominal stem does not convey any sense other than sense of the stem.

Hence Pāṇini a master of all schools of thought, accepts the import of the words (which are not even synonymous) to be the unitary object.

So, according to *Advaitins* the *Upaniṣads* speak of *Brahman* as non-different from the essential nature of the soul and as of the nature **Truth, Consciousness and Bliss/Sat Cit Ānanda**, indeed as pure Consciousness, specifically stated in *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 3.1.3²⁵⁴ '**Consciousness is Brahman**'.

²⁵³ *Samkṣepaśārīraka.1.274. 'Prātipādikānya natiriktaviṣayāṅ prāha bhagavān prathasābditavibhaktiā. Pāṇinirataḥ sakalatarkasamayajño vṛṣṭi vacasoranatiriktaviṣayatvam.'*

²⁵⁴ *Aitareya Upaniṣad 3.1.3 (2001). Consciousness/Prajñānam is Brahma Vol. 2 Eight Upaniṣads Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta*

In order to explain the relation to *Brahman*, the sentient principle of the world of phenomena/*prapañca* the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1.3²⁵⁵ introduces the principle of *māyā* with the *śloka*:

**The sages, absorbed in meditation through one-pointedness of mind,
discovered the creative power, belonging to the Lord Himself and hidden
in its own guṇas . That non-dual Lord rules over all those causes - time, the
self and the rest.**

This refers to *māyā*'s existence in the Self-luminous Consciousness, *Brahman*.

Brahman is Bliss

In his introduction to *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam* 256, Anubhūtiśvarūpa states that 'The doubt about difference arising from the word 'form' is removed by saying Bliss is *Brahman*'s very nature'. Moreover, since the words *Brahman* and Bliss are used in

²⁵⁵ 'Svetasvatara Upaniṣad 1.3 te dhyāna yogānugatā apaśyan devātmaśaktiṃ svaguṇair nigūḍhām / yaḥ kāraṇāni nikhilāni tāni kālātmayuktāny adhiṭiṣṭhaty ekaḥ // 1.3 // Sethumadhavan, T.N. (2011). Published In Esamskriti.com 1st September, 2011 Shri Ganesh Chaturthi Nagpur

²⁵⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*, p.26 'vighrahasabdāt prāptāṃ bhedaśaikāyāṃ nirasyati-ānando ' syāt iti'.

grammatical apposition/*samānādhikaraṇa* they have the same purport. So, while *Śruti* speaks about, 'The supreme Self/*Paramātmā* ', in statements such as

'Know Brahman to be Bliss' in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.6. these two words, *Brahman* and *Bliss*, are everywhere used in apposition. In this third section, the *Ānandavallī*, after first referring to *Brahman* by the word 'That' in the sentence,

'From that, which is this Ātmā, space was born',

and using the word *Ātmā*, there for *Brahman* itself, it is shown that *Ātmā*, which is the same as *Brahman* (*Māṇḍūkya* v.2 '*ayam ātmā brahman*') it has been shown is the material cause of the universe. Then, by the sentence **'Know Brahman to be Bliss'**, the identity of the two is expressly declared and by the sentence,

'From Bliss alone all these beings are born' *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.6. It is further shown that Bliss which is the same as *Brahman* is the material cause of the universe, so *Brahman*, *Ātman* and Bliss are one and the same.

The Brahman is Indivisible

Anubūtiśvarūpa further states that when it is said that *Brahman* is

Truth-Consciousness-Bliss/ Sat Cit Ānanda, the doubt may arise whether Truth, Consciousness and Bliss are the attributes of *Brahman*, because sentences occur which do describe It as possessing such attributes. This is not so, for Ādi Śaṅkara's pure or *Kevala Advaita's* stand is that *Brahman* is devoid of attributes/ *nirguṇa*.

There, such sentences as '**Brahman is Truth-Consciousness-Bliss**' being definitions, are like the sentence '**The most resplendent is the Moon**' non-relational in nature. Thus, although the primary meaning/ *vācyārtha* of the words '**Brahman is Truth, knowledge, Infinite**' each indicates the attributes of reality and the like, are different since their implied meanings/*lakṣyārtha* are one and the same, the indivisibility of *Brahman* is not affected at all.

Anubūtiśvarūpa says in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivarāṇa*,²⁵⁷ 'Though there is a difference in their primary meaning, the words, '**Truth, knowledge etc.**' should be seen as denoting the same entity by their implied meaning. So, by the description as 'Consciousness' insentience is excluded; by the description as 'Bliss' sorrow is

²⁵⁷*Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivarāṇa*, p.55 'jñānena viśeṣaṇāj jādya-vyāvṛttiḥ, ānandena viśeṣaṇād duḥkha-vyāvṛttiḥ, satyena viśeṣaṇād anṛta- vyāvṛttiḥ, anantena viśeṣaṇāt paricchinna-vyāvṛttiḥ, evaṁ jaḍaduḥ khānṛta-paricchinna-vyāvṛtteḥ, sarvapramāṇagocaraṁ yad ekarasaṁ brahma sambhāvitam, tad eva śabalapadārthānām adhiṣṭhānatayā mukhyārtha sambandhi lakṣayanti siddhimātreṇa.'

excluded; by the description as 'Existence' unreality is excluded; by the description 'Infinite' limitation is excluded. Thus, by the exclusion of insentience, sorrow, unreality and limitation the one homogenous *Brahman* which is inaccessible to all means of knowledge is arrived at, which itself is indicated as the substratum of the multifarious objects by the implied meaning related to the primary meaning through usage'.

Anubūtiśvarūpa continues,²⁵⁸ 'it is not only on the strength of the scriptures that it has to be accepted that the Self/*Ātmā*, which is the same as *Brahman*, is blissful in nature, but its blissful nature is to be accepted also because liberation, i.e. remaining established in one's real Truth-Consciousness-Bliss/*Sat Cit Ānanda* nature, is well known as the unsurpassed human goal. For everyone desires liberation, in truth. Everyone wants only happiness. Moreover, since liberation, called 'remaining in one's own true nature is well known as the goal of human life, it must be concluded that the Self is of the nature of Bliss. Nor should it be thought that

²⁵⁸ *Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivarāṇa p. 28* 'Api ca kevalamāgmalena brahmarūpasyātmanaḥ sukha rūpatvaṃ svīkaryam, kintu mokṣasya svarūpāvasthāna rūpasya nīratīśaya puruṣārthātsvaprasiddhyāpi sukha rūpatvaṃ vācyam. Sarvo'pi hi jano mokṣam arthayate . Sukham eva sarve vāñchati iti mokṣasya svarūpāvasthānākhyaya puruṣārthatvaprasiddhyapi , ātmā sukhārūp eveti mantavyam. Dukḥābhāvarūpatvāpi pumarthatvaṃ bhavatu- iti na śaṅkanīyam.Tadātve sukhābhāvatvenapuruṣārthatvāsyā prasaṅgena , vinkigamanā na syāt .'

liberation could be a human goal by being merely the absence of sorrow, for then there will be no conclusive reasoning, liberation not being a human goal, owing to the absence of happiness’.

Vimuktātman states in the *Iṣṭasiddhi* ²⁵⁹:

[E]verything being the product of *Brahman's avidyā*, and everything being illumined by his luminosity, He being the creator of all and Himself all forms, his omniscience is understandable’

So, Anubūtiśvarūpa in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* ²⁶⁰ replies by raising a doubt ‘as to how If *Brahman* is homogeneous, can It be the creator of all, omniscient etc?’ He replies ‘That same homogeneous Consciousness is denoted by the word *Īśvara*/God and is by the modifications of His own limiting adjunct, *māyā* denoted by the words ‘omniscient’ etc.’

²⁵⁹ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.246 ‘*Tasya ca brahmaṇaḥ tad avidyotthatvāt sarvasya, tadbhāsā ca bhāsyatvāt , sarvakṛttvasarvarūpatva sarvajñātvād yupapattiḥ.*’

²⁶⁰ *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa* p.256 ‘*nanvekarasaṁ ced brahma kathaṁ sarvakartṛtva sarvajñatvādisambhavaḥ ityāśaṅkhyāha - tasya cetti . Ekarasacittantre māyāyāṁ pratibimbitaṁ tadeva caitanyam īśvarapadaavācyam svopādhi māyā pariṇāmaiḥ sarvajñādiśabdavācyam .*’

Anubhūtiśvarūpa has dealt with this same subject in his *Prakatārthavivaraṇa*

²⁶¹, 'The modifications of the internal organ of mind, which is the limiting adjunct of the *Jīvātman*/soul, catch the reflection of Consciousness and knowership arises for the *Jīvātman* as a result of this union. Similarly, the modifications of *māyā*, the limiting adjunct of *Brahman*, catch the reflection of Consciousness and by the light of such reflection the universe as it exists in all three periods of time becomes directly objectified and so there is omniscience for *Brahman*'. So, it follows:

Just as, for *Jīvātman*, the internal organ is the limiting adjunct for knowership, *māyā* is the limiting adjunct for knowership for *Īśvara*/God. Therefore it follows that *Brahman* with *māyā* as the limiting adjunct can become omniscient.

So, this view of Anubhūtiśvarūpa's, that omniscience is due to immediate experiential knowledge /*aparokṣa-anubhūti* , resulting from the reflection/*pratibimba* in the modifications of *māyā* in contrast to the views of many other later *Vedāntins*

²⁶¹*Prakatārthavivaraṇam* quoted on p.119 of *Siddhāntaleśsaṅgraha* 'yasya jīvasya svopadhyantaḥkaraṇapariṇāmāḥ citpratibimba grāhīṇaḥ santīti tat pratibimbataiḥ sphuraṇaiḥ kālatrayavartino'pi prapañcasya parokṣyeṇa ākalanāt sarvajñatvam ; evaṁ ca yathā jīvasya jñatṛtvoopādhir antaḥkaraṇam evaṁ īśvarasya māyā'pi jñatṛtvoopādhir bhavatyeva . Tathā ca brahmaṇi māyopādhikaḥ sarvajñatvasambhavaḥ it bhāvah !'

like Vidyāraṇya, the authors of the *Tattvaśuddhi* and the *Kaumudī*, is declared by Acyutakṛṣṇānandatīrtha²⁶² alone to be truly in accord with Ādi Śaṅkara's tradition.²⁶³

This explained by Śaṅkara in BSB p.172 the omniscience of *Brahman* thus:

For the transmigrating individual subject to ignorance/*avidyā* etc., the rise of knowledge may be dependent on the body etc, but not for God/*Īśvara* for whom there is no ignorance to obstruct knowledge ... To those whose grace alone the adepts in *yoga* attribute the knowledge of *yogis* about past and future events, is it necessary to say that God/*Īśvara* who is eternal and has eternal knowledge about creation, sustenance and dissolution?

The authority for holding that the omniscience, etc of *Īśvara* is due to the possession of the power of *māyā* given in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 6.8.²⁶⁴:

²⁶² *Acyuta kṛṣṇānandatīrtha*, 'māyāvṛttibhis sarvajñatvasamarthanam eva bhāṣyasammatam'.

²⁶³ *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, p.171-2, 'Api ca avidyādimataḥ saṃsāriṇaḥ śarīrādyapekṣā jñānotpattiḥ syāt, na jñānapratibandhakāraṇarahitasya īśvarasyayat prasādādhi yoginām api atītānāgataviśayam jñānam icchanti yogaśāstravidaḥ , kim u vaktavyam, tasya nityasiddheśvarasya sṛṣṭisthitisaṃhṛtaviśayam nityajñānam bhavatīti.'

²⁶⁴ *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* : 'na tasya kāryam karaṇam ca vidyate na tatsamaś cābhyadhikaś ca dṛśyate / parāsyā śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca' // 6.8 // Sethumadhavan, T.N. (2011). Published In Esamskriti.com 1st September, 2011 Shri Ganesh Chaturthi Nagpur

He is without a body or organs; none like unto Him is seen, or better than He. The *Vedas* speak of His exalted power, which is innate and capable of producing diverse effects and also of His omniscience and might.

In the light of this, the nature of *māyā* and *avidyā* is to be discussed. After putting forward possible objections and seeking to refute them in turn, it is shown how Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya puts forward the view that *avidyā* is positive, beginningless, indeterminable and revealed by the witnessing consciousness.

This chapter presents Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's discussion as arising partly out of his consideration of Vimuktātman's views, as to whether *avidyā* is only one or many. The chapter concludes with Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's rather special view at this time that even after liberation *māyā* exists, after consideration of the alternative theories of difference and non-difference of Bhāskara and others discussed by him and sought to be refuted after further consideration of different views about the locus and content of *avidyā*.

Historical Background about the Nature of *Avidyā*

There is a millennial-old dispute about the nature of *avidyā*, which, though commonly translated as ignorance, has a much wider significance in *Advaita Vedānta*. *Avidyā* has not only an epistemological meaning, but an ontological sense which is the major focus of debate. The topic of *avidyā* has a long history of controversy in the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition predating Ādi Śaṅkara (c.780-820A.D.) It was Śaṅkara's treatment of *avidyā*, however, that triggered centuries of polemics by rival schools that criticized it, and *Advaitins* who defended it.

Śaṅkara's views on *avidyā* are also the focus of the current debate among *Vedāntins*. The question is, how significant is the concept of *avidyā* as one of the core tenets of *Vedāntic* thought? Are differences of opinion mere scholastic disputes over words or modes of expression [which] have but little philosophical significance, as²⁶⁵ Dasgupta maintains? Of what significance is the nature of *avidyā* in understanding Śaṅkara and the thought of his later exponents like Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya?

²⁶⁵ Das Gupta, Vol.2 p.11

Śaṅkara's commitment is to an inquiry into the nature of *Brahman*, not *avidyā*.

This he clearly demonstrates on three different occasions where he abruptly dismisses a line of questioning that is pursuing the locus (*āśraya*) of *avidyā*.

When asked to whom *avidyā* belongs, Śaṅkara replies that it belongs to the one who is asking the question, 'If you ask, "Whose then, is this *avidyā*?", we say, "It is yours, the one who asks", or "it belongs to the one who sees it!" Here, one says, "Whose is this *avidyā*?" For whomever it is seen, it is his alone.' Then Śaṅkara goes on to say that the question, 'Who sees *avidyā*?' is meaningless because the question itself assumes that *avidyā*.²⁶⁶

In the *Upadeśasahasrī*, the same question is framed slightly differently. It asks whether the mutual superimposition (*adhyāropa*) of the body and the Self on one another is done by the assemblage of the body, etc, or by the Self? Śaṅkara responds, 'whether it is done by the assemblage of the body, etc., or it is done by the Self, what of it?' When the student persists and concludes that the superimposition is done by himself, Śaṅkara cryptically replies, "Then don't do it." He says further in *Upadeśasahasrī*²⁶⁷: '*Avidyā* is the superimposition of the attributes of one thing over

²⁶⁶ Ingalls, D.H.H. (1953). 'Śaṅkara on the Question 'Whose is Avidyā, *Philosophy East and West*, no 1, p.69-72

²⁶⁷ *Brahma-sūtra-Bhāṣya* 4.1.3 Swami Gambhirananda p.821 '...*tasmādātmetyeva īśvare mano dadhīta*' "Hence one should fix one's mind on the Self which is God.'

another, just as silver is attributed to mother-of-pearl or just as a stump is taken for a man or vice versa' (BSB I.2.54).²⁶⁸ These answers may be a method of circumventing the logical difficulties in assigning the locus of *avidyā* either to the individual (*jīva*) or *Brahman*, as Mayeda²⁶⁹ suggests. They may be a way of dealing with the reality of *avidyā*, as Hacker suggests, observing that these answers, though not philosophically exact, are pedagogically compelling²⁷⁰. In any event, they underscore Śaṅkara's commitment to revealing the nature of *Brahman*. To that end, they removed *avidyā*, without investigating its nature, a topic that, in contrast, occupied the attention of many of his successors. There is good reason for this preoccupation, however.

The concept of *avidyā* is crucial to the *Advaita* position. Without it, there is no nonduality (*advaita*). The perceived duality is sublated as a reality by the knowledge of an underlying non-dual reality. Understanding the duality as real is an error, which is a function of ignorance (*avidyā*) of the non-dual reality.

²⁶⁸Jagadananda, S. (1970). *Upadeśasahasrī*, Sri RamaKrishna Math Madras, p.36, 'Avidyādhyāropitaṁ yatra yat tadasat tatra dṛṣṭam, yathā rajatam śuktikāyām, sthāṇau puruṣaḥ.'

²⁶⁹Sengaku, M. (1979). *A Thousand Teachings, translation with Introduction and notes of the Upadeśasahasrī of Śaṅkara* (University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, p. VII

²⁷⁰ Hacker, P. (1995:65-66). 'Distinctive features of the doctrine and terminology of Sankara: Avidya, Namarupa, Maya, Īśvara', In Wilhelm Halbfass (ed.), *Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedanta*, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp.72-100.

Recognising that the tenability of *advaita* is dependent upon the establishment of *avidyā*. Criticisms of *avidyā* are numerous among the opponents of *Advaita Vedānta*. If the concept of *avidyā* can be dismantled, *advaita* is untenable. The most well-known, though not the first, serious critic of *avidyā* was Ramanuja (1017–1137) who opened the *Śrībhāṣya*, his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, with a 140-page *mahā-siddhānta*, offering seven reasons why *avidyā* as presented by Śaṅkara is untenable (*saptānupapatti*)²⁷¹. This of course underlines how far back this serious dispute goes.

The conflict over the nature of *avidyā* has been primarily between the *Viśiṣṭādvaitins* like Ramanuja or the *Mādhva dvaitins/dualists*²⁷² who explain that the universe is not fundamentally illusory but is instead a real creation of *Brahman*, on the one hand, and the *Advaitins* on the other who see it as fundamentally illusory. This has continued into the 21st century.

An interesting development has occurred which is the focus of more recent controversy. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswatī (1880–1975 A.D.) explained that the universe is not fundamentally illusory but is instead a real creation of *Brahman*.

²⁷¹ Vireswarnanda, S. (2003). *Brahma Sutras: Sri-Bhasya with Text, English Rendering, Comments According to Sri Bhasya of Sri Ramanuja, and Index*.

²⁷² Sarma, D. (2003). *An Introduction to Mādhva Vedānta*. Ashgate World Philosophies Series. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. xiii + 159.

A prolific author and professed *Advaitin*, he criticized the *Advaita* tradition's interpretation of *avidyā*, not as an opponent of Śaṅkara, but as an adherent. He advanced the view that all the post-Śaṅkara commentators, apart from Sureśvara (c.750 A.D.), and including by implication Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya have misinterpreted Śaṅkara's representation of *avidyā*. As a result, he maintained, the current *Advaita* tradition, exemplified by the Sṛṅgeri and Kañchi Śaṅkarācārya Maṭhas, is propagating an inaccurate view of Śaṅkara.

Moreover, one that is incompatible with non-duality (*advaita*) and with liberation (*mokṣa*)²⁷³. Swami Satchidanandendra offered his own interpretation of Śaṅkara on *avidyā*. He claimed to have found endorsement for this in Gauḍapāda (c.6th century A.D., *Paramaguru* of Śaṅkara). His focus was on the *suṣupta-sthāna*, the third or deep sleep state of consciousness, the *m* of the sacred syllable *Om* (formed from *a-u-m*): *a*, representing the first or waking state and *u* representing the second or dream state and *m* as the deep sleep or *suṣupta-sthāna*) to the neglect of *Turīya*,

²⁷³ Satchidanandendra Saraswati, S. (1964). *Vedānta-prakriya-pratyabhijñā*. Holenarsipur: Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya. Translated by A.J. Alston (1989). *The Method of the Vedānta, A Critical Account of the Advaita Tradition*. London, New York: Kegan Paul International.

the Fourth or Absolute unchanging substratum of all states, 'the partless *Om*'²⁷⁴. This suggests extremely selective reading and ignorance of the central importance of Śaṅkara's and Anubhūtiśvarūpa's *Advaita* to the whole of *Upaniṣadic Śruti*, whose quintessence the *Māṇḍūkya-Gauḍapādīyākarikā* is widely acknowledged to express. Consequently, he reduced the lineage of authentic *Advaitācāryas* to Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and, implicitly, himself. He urged a return to the study of Śaṅkara. This study should be without what he considered the contaminating influences of the post-Śaṅkara commentators. In his lifetime he appealed to the *Advaita* tradition to concur with his position, engaging in a life-long dialogue with representatives of the Sṛṅgeri and Kanchi *Śaṅkarācārya Maṭhas*, and with traditional *Advaita* *pandits*. These *Advaitins*, and their contemporary counterparts, reject Sacchidanandendra's understanding of *avidyā*, finding it, in turn, inadequate for the establishment of non-duality (*advaita*) and liberation (*mokṣa*). Through publications and public debate, they have defended the view of *avidyā* elaborated by the post-

²⁷⁴Gambhirananda, S. p.221. *Eight Upaniṣads*. Vol. 2 'amātrās caturtho'vyavahāryaḥ prapancopaśamaḥ śivo'dvaita evam omkāra ātmaiva saṁviśaty ātmanā'tmānam ya evam veda'12. 'The partless Om is the Fourth (Turīya)-beyond all conventional dealings, the limit of the negation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious, and the non-dual. Om is thus the Self to be sure. He who knows thus enters the Self through his Self'.

Śaṅkara commentators and argued for its fidelity to Śaṅkara.²⁷⁵ Among these post-Śaṅkara *Advaitin* commentators, was Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (c.1250A.D.). As stated, this little known *Advaitin* was possibly the disciple of Śrī Harṣa²⁷⁶(fl.1140A.D.) and Ānandabodha²⁹⁵(fl.1150A.D.). Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya who himself was the teacher of Ānandagiri(fl.1300A.D.)²⁷⁷ has made an important contribution to the understanding of the nature of *māyā* and *avidyā*. He starts by dealing with what he calls the essence of *Advaita Vedānta*. It is said as was explained that for bathing in the ocean of this *Advaita Vedāntaśāstra* three bathing ghats are needed, firstly *śrutiprasthānam*, i.e. the ten principal *Upaniṣads*, secondly *smṛtiprasthānam* i.e. the *Bhagavadgītā*, and thirdly *sūtraprasthānam*, i.e. the *Brahmasūtra*. The essence of this *śāstra* is that what appears as God, the individual souls and the universe is in reality non-different from the one absolute reality, *Brahman*. The cause of these diverse appearances is *māyā*, also called *avidyā*. The one *Brahman* is of the nature of

²⁷⁵ Vittala Sastri, S. (1975). *Mulavidya-bhasya-vartika -viruddha*. Holenarsipur: Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya.

²⁷⁶ Solomon, E. A. (Ed.) (1990) *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī- Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's Commentary on Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, M.J.Jadia. Gujarat University Navrangpura, Ahmedabad-38009. *Pramāṇamālā, Nyāyadīpāvalī, and Nyāyamakaranda*, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's Commentary on three key works of Ānandabodha, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1907.

²⁷⁷ Revathy, S. (1990). Three Little Known Advaitins: Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, Advaitavidyācārya, and Kavītārkika Cakravarti Nṛsiṃhabhaṭṭopādhyāya . Madras: University of Madras.

Existence, Consciousness, Infinitude, Bliss and One without a second. When *Brahman* gets associated with *māyā* it gets the name *Īśvara*, *jīva* and the universe²⁷⁸.

He states the scriptural origins of *Māyā* and the Purport of the scriptures giving proof of *māyā*.

According to later *Advaita* there are two entities, the seer (*dṛk*) and the seen (*dṛśyam*)²⁷⁹ of them, the seer is conceived of as threefold – *Brahman*, *Īśvara* and *jīva*.

The seer is known as twofold – *māyā* ‘magic or illusion’²⁸⁰ and the universe. Among all these, *Brahman* alone is the absolute reality, eternal, pure, of the nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, all-pervading and non-dual. That alone appears as *Īśvara*, etc., through *māyā*. Thus, *māyā* is a central pillar of *Advaita Vedānta*²⁸¹.

²⁷⁸ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (2006) *Iṣṭa Siddhi-Vivaraṇam (ISV)* SastrigaL R.K. a critical study of *Iṣṭa Siddhi-Vivaraṇam* a commentary on *Iṣṭa Siddhi (IS)* of *Vimuktatman*. Chennai. India. Adisankara Advaita Research Centre.

²⁷⁹ cf. *Dṛk-dṛśya-viveka*: Vidyaranya, ‘Inquiry into the nature of the seer and the seen’, also called *Vākyasudhā* (‘Nectar of speech’). This work is sometimes wrongly attributed to Ādi Śaṅkara.

²⁸⁰ ‘*māyā viśvam māti yasyām, mīmeti vā*’, ‘In whom the whole (universe) is measured out’; *mā a pa a* 24.2 *māne* 2.53; *measure māñ ju ā a* 26.1. *māne śabde ca* 3.6 *measure, sound. Unādi. 549.māchāsasibhyo yaḥ* 4.109. *magic, illusion*

²⁸¹ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (2006). *Iṣṭa Siddhi-Vivaraṇam (ISV)*, p.28

The Purport of the Scriptures Giving Proof of *Māyā*

The nature of *māyā*, which is also named *avidyā*, is described in the *Nāsadīyasūkta*

*Ṛgveda 10.129.1-3*²⁸²:

1. Then even non-existence was not there, nor existence,

There was no air then, nor the space beyond it.

What covered it? Where was it? In whose keeping?

Was there then cosmic fluid, in depths unfathomed?

2. Then there was neither death nor immortality

nor was there then the torch of night and day.

The One breathed windlessly and self-sustaining.

There was that One then, and there was no other.

²⁸² *ṚgVeda 10.129.1,2,3 'nāsad āsīn no sad āsīt tadānīm nāsīd rajo no vyomā paro yat | kim āvarīvaḥ kuha kasya śarmann ambhaḥ kim āsīd gahanam gabhīram || na mṛtyur āsīd amṛtam na tarhi na rātryā ahna āsīt praketaḥ | ānīd avātam svadhayā tad ekam tasmād dhānyan na paraḥ kim canāsa || tama āsīt tamasā gūlham agre 'praketaḥ salilam sarvam ā idam | tucchyenābhv apihitam yad āsīt tapasas tan mahinājāyataikam.' || RV_10,129.03 RgvedaedAufrecht.txt*

3. At first there was only darkness '(mist')/*tamas* wrapped in darkness.

All this was only unilluminated cosmic water.

That One which came to be, enclosed in nothing,

arose at last, born of the power of knowledge. There was not the non-

existent nor the existent then... Darkness was in the beginning covered by

darkness. ³⁰¹

Here, after stating the non-existence of the entire universe made up of the elements during the *mahāpralaya*, some covering which is different from both existent and non-existent is mentioned and that is indeed *māyā*.

Also, in *Taittirīyasamhitā* (4.6.27.) by the word 'mist' according to Sāyaṇabhāṣya the indeterminable *avidyā*, is meant. "Being covered by mist, because of being covered by ignorance, which is like mist, one does not know. Mist is not absolutely unreal, because it obstructs the vision; nor can it be termed real, since it cannot have contact with other forms such as wood and stone. So, also, *avidyā* is not absolutely unreal, because it covers the real nature of *Īśvara*; nor can it be described as real, because it ceases on being negated"²⁸³.

²⁸³ Sāyaṇabhāṣya on *Taittirīyasamhitā* 4.6.27. us.archive.org, p.2163

Further in *R̥gveda* 10.129.2²⁸⁴ it is stated, **‘Then there was neither death nor immortality...’** This too has been taken as perhaps one of the earliest hints at *Advaitic* teaching. Likewise in *R̥.V.10.129.3* *tamas* is equivalent to *māyā* and termed *ajñāna* is *bhāvarūpa* a positive entity, ‘not real’ but not negative, being the material cause of the world.²⁸⁵ *Manu* 1.5²⁸⁶ famously develops this theme when it says,

‘This (universe) existed in the shape of darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed, as it were, in deep sleep’.

The earliest reference to the word *māyā* in the *Upaniṣads* is the key text at the end of the *Madhu Brāhmaṇa* in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.5.19:

²⁸⁴ *R̥.V.10.129.2* ‘*na mṛtyur āsīd amṛtam na tarhi.*’

²⁸⁵ 1.129.03 ‘*tamaḥ āsīt tamasā gūḷham agre apra-ketam salilam sarvām ā idam tucchyena ābhū api-hitam yat āsīt tapasaḥ tat mahinā ajāyata | ekam // RV_10,129.3 //3.* In the beginning, pregnant darkness was By dissolving darkness secretly enfolded. Unformed, unseparate that Fluid was this entire creation. or 1. ‘There was not the non-existent nor the existent then; there was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond. What did it contain? Where? In whose protection? Was there water, unfathomable profound? 2. There was not death nor immortality then. There was not the beacon of night nor of day. That One breathed windless by its own power. Other than that there was not anything beyond. 3. Darkness was in the beginning hidden by darkness; indistinguishable, this all was water. That which, coming into being, was covered with the void, that One arose through the power of heat’. (A. Macdonell)

²⁸⁶ *Manu* 1.5 ‘*āsīd idam tamobhūtam aprajñātam alakṣaṇam apratarkyam avijñeyam prasuptamiva sarvataḥ*’ 5. This (universe) existed in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed, as it were, in deep sleep.

(He) transformed Himself in accordance with each form; that form of His was for the sake of making Him known.

The Lord on account of *Māyās* (notions superimposed by ignorance) is perceived as manifold, for to Him are yoked ten organs, nay, hundreds of them. He is ten and thousands- many and infinite. That *Brahman* is without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior. This Self, the perceiver of everything, is *Brahman*. This is the teaching.²⁸⁷

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.1 after stating the nature of *Brahman* as non-dual, etc., it is further stated that It is the creator of the universe. ‘That from which all these beings are born...’, and the origin, sustenance and dissolution are in *Brahman*. In the *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 4.10.²⁸⁸ the principle of *māyā* is postulated for attributing

²⁸⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 2.5.19 'Rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva tadasya rūpaṁ praticakṣaṇāya. Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate yuktā hyasya harayaḥ śatādaśety ayam vai harayo'yaṁ daśa ca sahasrāṇi bahūni cānantāni ca tadetat brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ayam ātmā brahma sarvānubhūr ityanuśāsanam.'

²⁸⁸ 'māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyān māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram /

tasyāvayavabhūtais tu vyāptaṁ sarvaṁ idaṁ jagat' // 4.10 /T.N. Sethumadhavan September 2011
tnsethu@rediffmail.com

the act of creation to *Brahmā*. It is spoken of as the material cause for the creation of the universe and as the power of *Brahman*,

‘Know *māyā* to be *prakṛti* and the supreme Lord as the wielder of *māyā*’.

Māyā is referred to in *Upaniṣads* as *śakti* present in the Self-luminous *Brahman*, the transformative material cause of the world, which dissolves back into it and proceeds out of it, so it is absolutely dependent on the *Brahman*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya shows that Udayana’s criticism that *śakti* is not a separate category is not a sound statement²⁸⁹ because it is clearly shown to be so in this context and elsewhere.

Moreover, in the *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 1.3²⁹⁰ it is stated ‘**by practising meditation they saw the divine power/*śakti* in themselves, concealed by its own *guṇas*’.** This all clearly supports the view that *Advaitins* hold as to the existence of *māyā* in the Self-luminous Consciousness - *Brahman*. The relation between *māyā* and *Brahman* cannot be real since *Brahman* is sentient while *māyā* is *jaḍa*²⁹¹ (insentient).

²⁸⁹ *Prakathārthavivaraṇa* =PV p. 292/18 *pratibandhakābhāvasya kāraṇatvānupapatteḥ kāryabhāvābhāvavyavasthāsiddhaye pratibandhakāvyavahārasiddhaye ca śaktir abhyupagantavyā.*

²⁹⁰ *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 1.3 *te dhyānayoḡānugatā apaśyan devātmaśaktiṃ svaguṇair nigūḍhām”// 1.3 //* Tyagisananda, Swami, (1949)

²⁹¹ *jaḍa* fr. *jal āvaraṇe* 10.10 *cover + a-c*, p.3.1.134 cold, frigid; stiff, torpid, motionless, apathetic, senseless, stunned, paralysed.

Hence, they argue the relation must be false. The cause of this false relation is *māyā* itself. If we were to admit some other cause, it would be asked whether that cause is related to *Brahman*. If not, then it cannot bring about the relation of *māyā* to *Brahman*. If related to *Brahman* then what is the cause for the relation? If some other causes were admitted, then we have infinite regress.

Thus, *māyā* itself is responsible for its relation to *Brahman*. *Māyā* in this way related to *Brahman* undergoes transformation/ *pariṇāma* in the form of the world. *Māyā* and the world have the same level of reality, empirical/*vyavahārika*, as both are removable by direct knowledge of *Brahman*, the Supreme reality/*pāramārthika*. The *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 4.10.²⁹² speaks of *māyā* as located in the *Brahman* and as the primal cause of the world, referring to material causality in respect of *māyā*. The same *Upaniṣad* as was quoted earlier, 1.3 speaks of ‘**the divine power/śakti**’, which Śaṅkara also refers to in the BSB 1.3.30²⁹³

‘When this universe becomes dissolved, it is dissolved leaving its potentiality unaffected. It is from that potentiality that the next creation

²⁹²*Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 4.10 ‘*māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt* /know *Māyā* to be the primal cause the world’. Tyagisananda, Swami (1949), *Ramakrishna Matha*, Madras: India

²⁹³BSB 1.3.30 ‘*pralīyamānam api cedam jagacchaktyavaśeṣameva pralīyate, śaktimūlameva ca prabhavati*’, ‘When this universe becomes dissolved, it is dissolved leaving its potentiality unaffected. It is from that potentiality that the next creation proceeds’. ³¹⁴ *ibid.* ...*itarathā ākasmikatvaprasaṅgāt*

proceeds' where he states that the world at the time of dissolution merges in the *śakti*, also called *māyā* and it proceeds from it at the time of creation. If this is not admitted, then there arises the contingency of the world arising accidentally/*ākasmikatva*. From this it follows that *śakti*, is a separate category. This view is totally opposed to that of the *Naiyāyikas* like Udayana, who reduce *śakti*, to the category of an *abhāva* /absence, and whose view Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refutes by showing *śakti*, is a separate category.²⁹⁴ Moreover, the *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad* 4.10. states,

'know Māyā to be the primal or material cause of the world.'

Since *abhāva*/non-existence cannot serve as the material cause of any entity and since *Māyā* is said to be the material cause, *Māyā* is the equivalent of *ajñāna* or *avidyā*. It is a positive entity and not an absence of knowledge.

Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa, p.94²⁹⁵ states, '*ajñāna* cannot be recognised as absence or negative, since it is directly experienced, like happiness' and

"Even those who accept *a-bhāva* (negation) do not cognise negation without cognising the substratum of the negation";

²⁹⁴ Naiyāyusumāñjali, p.27 *pratibandho visāmagrī tad hetuḥ pratibandhakaḥ* PV vol.1 p.292 l.9-10 *Iṣṭasiddhi=IS* p.66 '*na hi abhāvāśrayam apratītya abhāvam*'

²⁹⁵ *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*, p.94 '*ajñānam, na abhāvagamyam, aparokṣatvāt, sukhavat..*'

as the snake has rope as its substratum or ornaments the gold, or waves the ocean. From this too, it is clear that *a-vidyā* is not a mere absence of knowledge it conveys something positive.

Moreover, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refutes the arguments of *Naiyayikas* that *tamas* is a mere absence of light because it possesses unmanifested touch and is a substance with the power to conceal.²⁹⁶

Hence, the ground of inference (*hetu*), namely, non-discernibility by touch is not present in this view/ *pakṣa*, and so the inferential argument presented by the *Naiyayikas* suffers from the fallacy, *śvarūpāsiddhi*.²⁹⁷ In so doing they are treating *tamas* as a substance because it possesses a form and such is a valid argument. *Tamas* is a positive entity because it has the power to conceal, like a wall.²⁹⁸ The absence of that to be proved/*sādhya* of his inferential argument is not ascertained by perception as claimed by the *Naiyayikas*. So, the ground of inference is not vitiated by the fallacy/*bādha*. The inferential argument is sound and *tamas* is proved to be a positive

²⁹⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*=ISV p.363 '...āvāraṇavikṣepaśaktimatsu...'

²⁹⁷ PV 139.16 BS 1.1.2 '*tamaso*'pyanubhūtasparśatvābhyupagameṇa hetvasiddheḥ.'

²⁹⁸ PV 138.24 BS 1.1.2 '*tamo bhāvaḥ,āvāraṇatvāt, kudyavad iti prayogaḥ.*'

entity²⁹⁹ on the ground that it has the power to conceal. *Māyā* too has the power to conceal the true nature of the pure Consciousness-*Brahman*, referred to in RV 1.129.3 as a positive entity.³⁰⁰ Since *Māyā* is said to be the material cause, the equivalent of *ajñāna* is a positive entity and not the absence of knowledge.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya develops this argument further in his *Iṣṭasiddhiśvaraṇa*.³⁰¹ There he says the perceptual experience of ignorance or *ajñāna* or *Māyā* in the state of deep sleep. Absence of knowledge cannot be the content of perceptual experience. Hence the contents of perceptual experience, i.e. ignorance or *ajñāna* or *Māyā* must be a positive entity, like pleasure. *Ajñāna* or *Māyā* cannot be viewed as the annihilative non-existence or *dhvaṃsa* of knowledge because *dhvaṃsa* is subject to origination and *ajñāna* is beginningless. For never does one have the experience that *ajñāna* has come into existence at a given point in time.³⁰²

²⁹⁹ PV 139.8,9 BS 1.1.2 'anvayaavyatirekābhyāṃ tamaso'bhāvatoāvagamāt kālātyayāpad iṣṭatā' ³²¹ Śveta 4.10 'māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt', 'know *Māyā* to be the primal cause the world'.

³⁰⁰ RV 1.129.3 above

³⁰¹ ISV p.94 'ajñānaṃ na abhāvagamyaṃ aparokṣatoāt sukhaat.'

³⁰² ISV p.95 'janimatvājanimatvavailanyabhāvāt.'

Moreover, as Vimuktātman has said, nor is *ajñāna* only mutual non-existence/*anyonyābhāva* of knowledge, because mutual non-existence is present in objects of the world whereas *ajñāna* or *Māyā* are located in pure Consciousness so as such *ajñāna* cannot be viewed as mutual non-existence/*anyonyābhāva* of knowledge.³⁰³

Ajñāna is a positive entity, not an antecedent negation of knowledge.³⁰⁴

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya proves antecedent negation of knowledge cannot be viewed as *ajñāna* because it is an *abhāva* like *dhvaṃsa* etc.³⁰⁵ So, in summary, for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, *jñāna* or *Māyā* is a positive entity, serving as link between Brahman/pure Consciousness and the world of phenomena, the *śakti* of Brahman, totally dependent for existence and manifestation. Its shadow as it were.

Returning to the *śruti* evidence on *māyā*, we find in the *Kaivalyopaniṣad* 1.12³⁰⁶

it is said

³⁰³ IS p.66 'itaretarābhāvasya viśayāśrayatvāt, ajñānasya ca ātmaikāśrayatvāt.'

³⁰⁴ Saṃkṣeṣpāśārīraka into. p.70 referring to *Advaita Siddhi* p.555

³⁰⁵ ISV p.95-96 'jñānaprāg abhāvaḥ na ajñānam, abhāvatoāt, abhāvāntaravat.'

³⁰⁶ *Kaivalyopaniṣad* 1.12 'sa eva māyā-parimohitātmā śarīram āsthāya karoti sarvam.stry-anna-panādi vicitra-bhogais sa eva jāgrat paritṛptim eti'. 'His mind deluded by *Māyā*, he (the Self), identifying with his body, performs all actions (perceptions, feelings, thoughts). In the waking state it is he who attains fulfilment {or strives to attain fulfilment} through a variety of objects like women, food, wine & so on'.

'that same Self is deluded by *māyā*' and in *Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad* 4.1.³⁰⁷,
 'Created by *māyā* like magic'. Again, the *Bhagavad Gītā* 5.15³⁰⁸ states 'Knowledge is
 covered by *avidyā* and so living beings are deluded' and 7.25

'Being enveloped by my *Yoga māyā*, I am not manifest to all.'

Śaṅkara explains *Yoga* means the combination of the three *guṇas*; that itself is
māyā; being enveloped by that *yoga māyā*, 'I am not manifest to all'. In contrast, the
Bhagavad Gītā says 7.14 'Those who take refuge in Me alone transcend this *māyā*'.

This is explained in the *Śaṅkara bhāṣya* as 'Me', the wielder of *māyā* and their
 own self; (thus) giving up all rites and duties, they alone cross over this *māyā*, which
 deludes all; they become free from the bondage of transmigration. So on the basis of
 this and other references, Prakāśātman says *māyā* is one only not many.
 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya also argues this. Further support is found in *Mahānārāyaṇa*
Upaniṣad 12.5

³⁰⁷ *Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad* 4.2. 'indrajālam iva māyāmayam.'

³⁰⁸ *Bhagavad Gītā* 5.15.

'There is one unborn Female (*Māyā*, the uncaused substance of the universe) red, white and black (representing *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) producing manifold offspring of the same nature' ³⁰⁹

Māyā and its equivalent *ajā* are singular. Only that part of *Māyā*, which is indeterminable whose transformation is the mind by being associated with a particular soul/*jīvātman* has attained the knowledge of *Brahman* is removed. Every other soul will be related to its mind and cause, the part of *Māyā* and thus would remain bound till it attains the knowledge of *Brahman*. Thus, by admitting indeterminable parts of *Māyā*, the distinction between the released souls and bound ones is maintained. As *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.8 states

'(When Brahman is realised) the mind is removed/split and all doubts are dispelled'.

Thus, bondage and release respectively consist in the relation and non-relation of *Māyā* to the soul. *Māyā*, known as the primal cause of the world in *Śvetāśvatara* 1.3 is one only, but it has indeterminable parts each one consisting of the power of concealment (*āvaraṇa śakti*) and the power of projection (*vikṣepa śakti*). These indeterminable parts are called *avidyā*. The reflected image of pure

³⁰⁹ *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 12.5 '*ajām ekāṃ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām*.'

Consciousness in *Māyā* is God, and that in *avidyā* is the soul/*jīva*. As Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*, Vol 1, BS 1.1.1. pp 3-4³¹⁰ explains, that it is the Consciousness that serves as the original reflection (*bimbacaitanya*), which is the One in the form of which the released soul would remain. When a particular soul attains the knowledge of *Brahman*, its limiting condition, i.e. *avidyā* will be removed; and the soul will remain as the original consciousness. This is liberation. The other *avidyās* continue to exist and the soul remains in bondage till they attain the knowledge of *Brahman*. This does not remove *Māyā* whose transformation is the world. Hence bound *jīvas* experience the objects of the world. The released *jīva* however, does not experience the colour that exists.³¹¹

Śaṅkara's *paramaguru Gauḍapāda* in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (on which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya wrote his *Ṭippanam*) refers many times to *māyā*, as in the *Āgama Prakaraṇa* 1.16. Gauḍapāda states.

³¹⁰ *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*, Vol 1, BS 1.1.1. p.p.3-4

³¹¹ PV p.3-4 BS 1.1.1 'ekā tāvad anirvācyā bhūtaprakṛtiḥ cinmātrasambandhinī māyā. tasyāṃ citpratibimba īśvaraḥ. ... bimbakalpaṇi tu nirvikalpakam brahma kaivalyāvalambanam. tasyā eva parichinnānirvācyānantapradeśeṣu ajñānabhidhāneṣu āvaraṇavikṣepaśakimatsu pratibimbitaṃ caitanyam ananta-jīvoavyavahārāspadam . yasya bimbakalpaniroikalpabrahmātmānubhavaḥ svopādhyajñānabhaṅge tajjāntaḥkaraṇāpsaraṇe pramāṭṛtvānupapattau svarūpāvasthānaṃ muktiḥ sajjāgḥaṭīti . yas tu māyāvivoarto mahābhūtaḥ prapañcaḥ sa vidyamāno'pi nirindriyeneva rūpaṃ nānubobhūyate.' cf ISV p.364; MK Bh.T. p.17 'atreyam prakriyā - cinmātratantrā anādyanirvācyabhūtaprakṛtiḥ māyā 'vyākṛtādiśabdavācyā. tasyāṃ pratibimbitaṃ tadeva caitanyaṃ āropakasvabhāvena svopādhinā prāpitavikāraṇaḥ sarvajñatvādidharmikam īśvarasañjñakam bhavati.'

'When the *Jīva* who is sleeping because of beginningless *māyā* is awakened...'

and then in the *Advaita Prakaraṇa*, *Kārikā* 3.10

'the aggregates (of bodies and sense organs) are all brought forth by the *māyā* of the Self, as in dream'.

Further, in 3.19, he states 'This birthless one (Self) becomes differentiated through *māyā*; and not in any other way whatsoever'. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya advocates the identity of *Māyā* and *avidyā*, as two aspects of *prakṛti*. He asks, Is *Māyā* the material cause of the illusory appearance of shells as silver etc?

In ordinary experience we find that illusory appearances of shell-silver etc are removed by the direct knowledge of the world that exists like the blind man who does not experience the shell, etc; hence something other than *Māyā* must be admitted as the material cause of the illusory appearances referred to above. It is 'modal ignorances' *avasthājñāna/tūlājñāna/ tūlāvidyā*, which are many. When there arises the mental state in the form of pot by sense-contact, the modal ignorance/*tūlājñāna* is removed, and this results in the manifestation of pot'.³¹²

³¹²*Vimuktātman*, *Iṣṭa-siddhi IS*, Gaekward's oriental Series, No.LXV, 1933, p.63; *Prakāśātman V* p.99; AS ISV p.94 'ajñānābhāve śukterajñānatāyā abhāvāt pramāṇajñānam api śuktau na syāt. ataḥ pramāṇapravṛtyanyathānupapatyā śuktyajñānam vaktavyam.'

Māyā is one according to Prakāśātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, it is many according to Vācaspatimiśra; and all three admit the semblance of ignorance/ *tūlājñāna* to account for the illusory appearances of shell-silver etc and also for the non-manifestation of pot prior to the functioning of the sense-organ.

The world is admitted being indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing. It is *mithyā*. However, it does appear and there must be a cause for its appearance, viz. *Māyā* necessarily of the same order as the effect, i.e. the world. On this ground, *Māyā* is held to be *mithyā* or indeterminable. Also, if *Māyā* were real there would be two real entities, *Brahman* and *Māyā* and so the non-dual character of *Brahman* would be contradicted. Since it cannot be characterised as real or as an absolute nothing, it is viewed as *mithyā* or indeterminable. This *māyā* is also referred to in the *Brahmasūtra* 3.2.3³¹³: **‘But the dream creation is mere *māyā*, because of not being a complete manifestation’.**

Śaṅkara of course frequently refers to *māyā*, especially in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. For example, on BS 1.4.3. he points out the difference between the *Advaitic* view and the *Sāṅkhya* view. If we admit some previous state as an independent cause of the universe, we will be accepting the theory of *Pradhāna* as

³¹³*Brahmasūtra* 3.2.3 ‘*māyāmātrāṇi tu kārtsyenānabhivyaktasvarūpatvāt.*’

the cause. However, this previous state of the universe is held by us to be under the control of the Supreme Lord and not independent³¹⁴.

It might be said further that in the state of deep sleep, there was the experience of ignorance as indicated in the *Upaniṣads*; but many might say it is not a positive entity, only an absence of knowledge. However, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya contends that it cannot be because the absence of knowledge will never become the content of perceptual experience, like 'I slept happily and knew nothing, when I was asleep'. There arises the perceptual cognition of the absence of (for example) a pot. It presupposes the knowledge in the form of the remembrance of the pot which is negated/*pratiyogin*. So, if there is no cognition of the pot, there cannot be the perceptual cognition of the absence of pot. In the same way, if there were to be perceptual cognition of the negation of knowledge, then there must be the knowledge of the negatum/*pratiyogin* which here is knowledge. The content of the perceptual experience, namely ignorance or *avidyā* or *ajñānam* or *māyā* must be a positive entity³¹⁵.

³¹⁴ BSB 1.4.3 '*yadi vāyam svatantrān, kācitprāgavasthān jagataḥ kāraṇatvenābhyupagacchema, prasañjema tadā pradhānakāraṇavādam. parameśvarādhiṇā tvayam asmābhiḥ prāgavasthā jagato'bhyupagamyate na svatantrā.*'

³¹⁵ Sastrigal, ISV, p.94 '*ajñānam na abhāvagamyam aparokṣatvāt sukhavat.*'

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states, *māyā* and the universe are indeterminate/*anirvacanīya* because they cannot be categorised as real, unreal or both real and unreal'³¹⁶.

Here he is following Ānandabodha, his teacher, who in his *Nyāyāmakarānda* like Śāṅkara takes *avidyā* to be virtually the same as *māyā*. Although there is a reference to *mūlāvidyā*/root-ignorance this is not a tacit approval of Vācaspati's view of two *avidyās*, for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya recognises only one, which is beginningless and indescribable/*anādi-anirvacanīya*. It is the cause of both ordinary illusions such as mistaking a shell for silver and the world illusion/*māyā*.³¹⁷

Following in the line of Śāṅkara, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya describes *Īśvara*/God as qualified by *māyā*. The *jīva*/soul is qualified by *māyā* and its effects, the gross and subtle bodies. The real nature of *Īśvara* and *jīva* is *Brahman* alone. He explains that since *Īśvara* is aware of his identity with *Brahman*, he is ever free.

The *jīva*/ soul, because of identification with the gross body, etc. has forgotten its real nature and does not know its identity with *Brahman*, therefore it is a

³¹⁶ *ibid.* ISV p.87 '...*Sad-asad vilakṣaṇam...*'

³¹⁷ *ibid.* ISV p.94 '*ajñānābhāve śukter ajñātātāyā abhāvāt...*'

transmigratory being. This of course is simply following the *Upaniṣadic* teaching in

Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.18:

‘As a great fish swims alternately to both the banks (of a river), eastern and western, so does this infinite being move to both these states. the dream and waking states’ etc.³¹⁸

When such a *jīva* realises his identity with *Brahman*, he is said to be liberated. Thus, such liberation is only attained when the *jīva* is rid of *avidyā*, which conceals his real nature as *Brahman*. The cessation of *avidyā* takes place only through the knowledge of the identity of *Brahman* and the *ātmanā*, the indwelling self. It is, therefore, for the realization of such an identity with *Brahman* and the indwelling Self that the entire *Vedānta* is practised. Śaṅkara says in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* BSB 1.1.1:

‘In order to eradicate the cause of this evil and to realise the oneness of the Self, a discussion of the entire *Vedānta* is begun.’

Udayana (fl.984 CE), the famous *Nyāyika* logician, without admitting *śakti* as a separate category admits *abhāva* as the cause of an effect. So just as fire is the cause

³¹⁸ *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* BU IV.3.18 Madhavacarya ‘*Tad yathā mahāmatsya ubhekule anusañcarati pūrvam cāparam caivamevāyam puruṣa etāv ubhāv antāv anusañcarati svāpnāntam ca buddhāntam ca*’. ³⁴⁶ BSB 1.1.1 ‘*asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante*.’

of burning, so it is in the absence of a counteracting factor, i.e. a spell, the cause.

Thus, the *Naiyāyikas* do not accept *śakti*, as a separate factor.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya shows that the 'spell' is what causes the obstruction and is *śakti*, so Udayana's criticism of it as not a separate category is not sound.³¹⁹ Thus, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya agrees with the *Upaniṣads* and Śaṅkara that *Māyā* is that *śakti* present in the self-luminous *Brahman*, totally dependent on it. It is the transformative material cause of the world which at the time of dissolution merges back into it and at creation proceeds out of it.³²⁰

Māyā which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya also terms ignorance/*ajñāna* is a positive entity/*bhāvarūpa*, agreeing with one of his teachers Ānandabodha. This he shows does not mean that *māyā* is real, but only that it is not negative. Being the material cause of the universe, it should be regarded as positive. It is called the *śakti* of *Brahman*³²¹ because it is totally dependent on *Brahman* for its manifestation and existence.

³¹⁹ PV VOL.1 p.292 'Pratibandhakābhāvaya kāraṇtvānupapatteh...'

³²⁰ Śveta U. 4.10 'māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt...'

³²¹ Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.8 '....parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāvīkī jñānabalakriyā...'

In the *Nāsadīyasūkta Ṛgveda 10.129.3*, it says

'Prior to creation this entire world was concealed by *tamas*...' ³²²

This would seem to refer to *māyā*, into which the universe merges back at the time of *pralaya*, as *tamas*. The *Naiyāyikas* treat *tamas* not as a positive entity but as merely the absence of light, not a substance. From their standpoint *māyā* or *ajñāna* or *avidyā* which are compared with *tamas* will be merely the absence of knowledge not a positive entity.

Hence, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya critically examines the *Naiyāyika* conception of *tamas* and proves that it is a positive entity. He does this through the following argument:

- a. *Tamas* is a substance because it possesses a form, like the cloud.
- b. *Tamas* is a positive entity because it has the power to conceal, like a wall. A is rejected by the *Naiyāyikas* with the statement:

"*Tamas* does not have a form because it is not discernible by

³²² R.V.10.129.3 '*tama āsīt tamasā gūḍham agre*.'

touch, like the soul...hence the inference fails to establish

possession of form, due to the defect, *bādha*.³²³

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya using his skill in dealing with *Naiyāyikas* developed from his commentaries on *Ānandabodha*, counters by stating that *tamas* is admitted possessing unmanifested, i.e. 'subtle' touch. Hence the *hetu*/ground of inference, non-discernibility by touch is not present in the *pakṣa*/alternative and so the argument suffers from the fallacy *śvarūpasiddhi*/ whereby the quality alleged to belong to a subject is not really proved.³²⁴ The argument that *tamas* is a positive entity, which *Naiyāyikas* seek to refute by the perception that it is known that darkness or *tamas* is only absence of light and hence not a positive entity itself fails according to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya since one could just as well prove, 'that light is not a positive entity, only the absence of *tamas*.' Due to the absence of a *sādhya*/major term of his argument the ground is not vitiated by the *bādha*/fallacy, the argument is sound and *tamas* is proved a positive entity: '**So *tamas* being a motivating entity has the power**

³²³ PV vol.1 p.139 '*Tamo na rūpavat sparśahīnatvāt.*' *ityanumānabādhaḥ* *ibid...hetvasiddheḥ.*

³²⁴ Subject is not really proved³⁵²

to conceal'. *Māyā* too also has the power to conceal the true nature of consciousness

- *Brahman*, as referred to in *Nāsadīyasūkta Ṛgveda* 10.129.3.³²⁵

If we have knowledge of the negatum, knowledge itself exists and so cannot be merely the cognition of its negation. Thus, there is the perceptual experience of ignorance/*ajñāna* or *avidyā* or *Māyā* in the state of deep sleep. Absence of knowledge cannot be the content of perceptual experience. Hence the content of perceptual experience of ignorance/*ajñāna* or *avidyā* or *Māyā* must be a motivating entity, according to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*.³²⁶

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains how *Māyā* and *ajñāna* or *avidyā* cannot be like the destruction of non-existence or *dhvaṃsa* of knowledge because *dhvaṃsa* has a beginning whereas *ajñāna* is beginningless. This is because one never does have the experience of *ajñāna* coming into existence at a particular time.³²⁷ On the other hand, it cannot be said that *ajñāna* is only the *anyonyābhāva*/the mutual non-existence of knowledge, because mutual non-existence is well-known to be present in objects of the world. *Māyā* or *ajñāna* in contrast is located in pure consciousness.

³²⁵ *Ṛgveda* 10.129.3. Ibid.

³²⁶ p.94

³²⁷ ISV p.96 '*janimatvājanimatvavailakṣaṇyabhāvāt*.'

In this respect *ajñāna* therefore cannot be viewed as the mutual non-existence of knowledge.³²⁸

Ajñāna is not to be considered as the prior negation of knowledge because knowledge is known to remove *ajñāna*. On this view, knowledge will be the destruction of the prior negation of knowledge. Thus, at the rise of knowledge, prior negation of knowledge, which is held to be *ajñāna*, will not be present, so there is no occasion for knowledge as such to remove it.

Thus, it must be considered that *ajñāna* is a positive entity and not a prior negation of knowledge. Then Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya demonstrates that the *prāg-abhāva*/the prior non-existence of knowledge cannot be considered as *ajñāna* because like *dhvaṃsa*/destruction etc. it is an *a-bhāva*/negation.³²⁹

So, in summary, for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya and his lineage, *Māyā* or *ajñāna*, is a positive entity linking *Brahman* - pure consciousness and the phenomenal world. It is called the *śakti* of *Brahman* because it is totally dependent on *Brahman* for its manifestation and existence.

³²⁸ IS p.66 'itaretarābhāvasya viśayāśrayatvāt, ajñānasya ca ātmaikatvaśrayatvāt.'

³¹⁷ IS p.66 'itaretarābhāvasya viśayāśrayatvāt, ajñānasya ca ātmaika.'

Avidyā is Positive

Śaṅkara's immediate disciple, Sureśvara and others have also explained all the perceived differences such as *Īśvara, jīva etc.*, as well as the distinctions of bondage and release etc, by enunciating the principle of *māyā*.

Similarly conflicting views of all schools of thought and the variegated nature of the universe become intelligible (only if *avidyā* is established). Therefore, Vimuktātman says that the sixth and eighth chapters of *Iṣṭasiddhi* have been devoted to the subject of *avidyā* and its removal. Here he is stating that the concept of *avidyā* is very useful for the attainment of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, viz. 'the desired goal', because the concepts of bondage and liberation are dependent on it.

In the view of *Advaitins*, this *avidyā* is beginningless and indeterminable. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*³³⁰ expresses an objection. 'The word *avidyā* is a compound with the negative *nañ=a*, meaning "the absence of *vidyā*, i.e. not *vidyā*. The negative has three meanings, its absence, the opposite of it, and different from it.'

³¹⁸ *tvāśraya*

He then answers this objection, '*Ajñāna* cannot be the absence of knowledge.

To cognise absence the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are either perception, (*pratyakṣa*) or non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). *Ajñāna* cannot be known by these means. Since *ajñāna* /*avidyā* is removable by a *pramāṇa* it cannot be known through a *pramāṇa*. It cannot be revealed by something antagonistic to it, because of being removable by it, like darkness.'³³¹ He is saying here that ignorance is experienced by all through direct perception in the form 'I am ignorant.' He says *a-jñāna* cannot be cognised as absence (or negative) since it is directly experienced, like happiness'³³².

One authority for ignorance being removable by knowledge is the *Bhagavad Gītā* 5.16 '**But for those whose ignorance/*a-jñāna* has been destroyed by knowledge...**'³³³

Sarvajñātman (fl.1027), another of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's great predecessors from the *Vivaraṇa* tradition, in his *Samkṣepaśārīraka* also says:

Since *a-vidyā* veils the Self, it cannot be non-existent. Even those who are experts in determining the nature of non-existence do not assert that non-

³¹⁹ *tvāt* p.84 ... *tad dheyatvāt tamovat.*

³³² ISV p.94 ... *sukhavat*

³³³ B.G. 5.16 *Jñānena tu tad ajñānanāṁ yeṣāṁ nāśitam ātmanāḥ*

existent entity can veil anything. Lord Vāsudeva also has stated that *a-jñāna* is a veil and so we conclude that it is a positive entity.³³⁴

Similarly, Prakāśātman(fl.975) in the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇam* establishes clearly the existence of *a-vidyā* as a positive entity by means of perception, inference and presumption (*arthāpatti*). Essentially, 'In experiences such as: 'there is no knowledge in me', and 'there is no experience (in me) of absence of knowledge.'³³⁵

This is because, if the Self, which is the *dharmī* (possessor of the attribute) and the *pratiyogī* (counterpart or correlate) knowledge, are known, then since knowledge is present, the experience of the absence of knowledge is not possible. If it is said that the *dharmī* and the *pratiyogī* are both not known, then the cognition of absence is not possible, since the cognition of absence depends on the knowledge of the *dharmī* and the *pratiyogī* .³³⁶

In other words, according to Vimuktatman in his *Iṣṭasiddhi*, 'Even those who accept *a-bhāva* (negation) do not cognise negation without cognising the substratum

³³⁴ Veezhinathan, N. (1985). *Samkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman 1.320*. Radhakrishna Institute for Advanced Philosophy, University of Madras, India.

³³⁵ *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇam*. p.89-94

³³⁶ *ibid.* p.89-94*abhāvajñānasya dharmiprtiyogijñānasāpekṣatvāt*

of the negation' just as the snake has rope as its substratum or ornaments gold, or waves the ocean. The cognitions such as 'I am ignorant', 'I am deluded' are experienced only without the *pratiyogī* /counter-correlate. From this too, it is clear that *a-vidyā* is not a mere absence of knowledge it conveys something positive.

Again, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇam* , 'In such statements as 'I am ignorant, 'I am deluded' ignorance is experienced without a *pratiyogī*.' He then has the opponent saying, 'since ignorance is destroyed by the birth of knowledge, it is proper to say that ignorance is the prior non-existence of knowledge.'³³⁷ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya gives the *samādhānam* /reply:

It cannot be asserted from the mere fact of the removal of ignorance by knowledge that ignorance is prior non-existence of knowledge. When a lamp is lit darkness is destroyed. However from this it cannot be concluded that this darkness is the prior non-existence of light. Therefore there is no universal rule that, 'merely because when one thing comes into existence another thing is destroyed'.

³³⁷ ISV p.66 ... *abhāvavādinō'pi*

The latter is the prior non-existence of the former, 'Since ignorance is opposed to knowledge, the destruction of ignorance by the origin of knowledge is perfectly logical.'³³⁸

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya then states, **'It cannot be concluded that ignorance is only absence (of knowledge), merely on the argument that such destruction is not logically possible otherwise, because its destruction is possible and also because of ignorance being opposed (to knowledge).'**'

Though ignorance is removed by knowledge, it is not of the nature of absence (or negation). Rather it is something which is opposed to knowledge, different from negation (*a-bhāva*) and indeterminable (*a-nirvacanīya*). It is expressed by the word *a-jñāna*/ignorance, to show that it is other than knowledge. This is like the word *a-dharma*, which means something opposed to *dharma* and of the nature of sin (*pāparūpa*)³³⁹. All of which serves to underline the scale of the ignorance/ *ajñāna* in the whole of our 'normal life'! It is as if we were living in darkness

³³⁸ ISV p.98*tannivṛttiḥ sūpapadyate*

³³⁹ *ibid.**dharmavirodhī pāparūpaḥ padarthaḥ kathyate tadvat*

compared to the sage for whom the Self is everywhere and all is reflecting its light

(cf. Gita 2.69)!³⁴⁰

Ignorance /*Avidyā* is Indeterminable

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says that ignorance is also found to be expressed in a positive manner by the words *māyā*, mist etc. Vimuktātman, before him in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*³⁴¹ says, 'It is called *a-jñāna* because of being opposed to knowledge or being other than knowledge. It is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) and insentient (*jaḍa*) and is described by the words *māyā* etc. which do not convey any negation.'

This is the reason Śāṅkara, in the *ānumānikādhikaraṇa* of the *BSB* (1.4.1) says that this *avidyā* can be expressed in a number of ways, as unmanifest/*avyakta* in some places and space/*ākāśa*, indestructible/*akṣaram* and illusion/*māyā* elsewhere

³⁴⁰ B.G. 2.69. 'yā niśā sarvabhūtānāṃ tasyāṃ jāgati sañyamī yasyāṃ jāgrati bhūtāni sā niśā paśyato muneh.' 'What is night to all beings, therein the self-controlled one is awake. Where all beings are awake, that is the night of the sage who sees.'

³⁴¹ IS p.69*māyādīśabdaiḥ aparyudāsenāpi ucyate.*'

and that has necessarily to be accepted, that it serves a purpose.³⁴² Just as when we go every night into deep sleep and come out often refreshed it is a positive experience because we have temporarily merged in the *avyakta*, the unmanifest nature of the Absolute or *Brahman!*

Although Prakāśātman, in the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇam*,³⁴³ establishes the positive nature of *ajñāna*, by inference, he wishes also to establish its indeterminability (*anirvacanīyatā*). This is precisely what Vimuktatman does in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*. There he says on the one hand, 'That *a-jñāna* is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) and insentient (*jaḍa*)'. On the other he states the locus of *avidyā* is the Self, that *avidyā* cannot be said to be either different or non-different from the Self, nor can it be described as existent or nonexistent. Moreover in ³⁴⁴ BSB 1.4.1., 'sā ca avāśyābhyupagantaṅyā . arthavatī hi sā.'

³⁴² IS p.208*svarūpam nāpyanyā anyānanyā vā*...

³⁴³ *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇam*, p.81 ...*anirvacanīyatvam eva teṣāmapī dṛṣṭam*.

³⁴⁴ *Iṣṭasiddhi* says, 'ignorance is not the nature of the Self, nor different, nor different-cum non-different.'

Chapter 4: The World/*prapañca* with Particular

Reference to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya

In the previous chapter, the nature of *Brahman* and *jīva*, according to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, was presented. The examination of the perceived universe or *prapañca* is now the natural next step.

Many diverse theories clearly exist as to the origin of the universe. According to *Advaita Vedānta*, *Brahman* is non-dual, which nature could only hold good if there were no entity apart from it. The *jīvātman*/soul, which may be considered other than *Brahman* are proved, in this system, to be non-different from it. On the other hand, the world of duality is given in perception is admitted to be non-real/*mithyā*. All of which is summed up in the famous dictum attributed to Ādiśaṅkara³⁴⁵, '***Brahman is truth, the world is nonreal/illusory; the jīva is not other than the Brahman***'. This naturally raises the question as to how the world could be taken as *mithyā*?

³⁴⁵ '*Brahma satyaṃ jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*', v.20 *Brahmajñānavallīmālā*, School of Philosophy, Sydney (2010)

In answer, traditional *Advaitins*, like Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya would hold that the *śruti* text, *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1³⁴⁶

‘O good looking one, in the beginning this was Existence alone, One only, without a second’,

affirms that the world is indeed *mithyā*. For this text, ‘in the beginning this was Existence alone’ states that prior to creation, this world, now differentiated into names and forms, remained identical with *Brahman*. The ‘complementary’ part of the text, ‘One only, without a second’, predicates the absence of the world in *Brahman*, so conveying that *Brahman* associated with the world is free from the world.

Similarly, the *śruti* text, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.3.1.347 ‘*Brahman* has but two forms- gross and subtle’, says that two factors define *Brahman*; those which possess form, mainly earth, water and fire, and those which do not, air and ether, thus confirming that the world exists in *Brahman*. However, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.3.6³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1, ‘*Sad eva somya idam agra āsīt, ekam evādvitīyam*’. Swami Gambhirānanda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta (1997)

³⁴⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.3.1., ‘*dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe - mūrtaiḥ caivā mūrtaiḥ ca, ...*’ Swami Madhavananda, Advaita Ashram, (1993), Calcutta.

³⁴⁸ *ibid.* 2.3.6, ‘*athāta ādeśo neti neti*’.

declares by the words ‘...Now therefore the description (of *Brahman*): ‘Not this, not this’’, the non-existence of the world in *Brahman*.

So, these *śruti* texts from the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* and the *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad* on the one hand affirm the existence of the world in *Brahman*, precluding it existing elsewhere and on the other hand later on negate the existence of the world in *Brahman*.

By definition, an object is not real if it does not exist in the substratum in which it ‘appears’. As ‘silver’ is observed to be non-existent in the shell where it appears, so it is ‘unreal’. Similarly, the world is said to be ‘non-existent’ in *Brahman*, where it is said to ‘exist’, so it is ‘non-real’ or *mithyā*.

Brahman, according to the *Upaniṣads*, alone is *sat*, that which is not sublatale/*bādha* in the three divisions of time viz. past, present and future³⁴⁹, whereas the *asat* is that which is not capable of being.³⁵⁰ So, *Brahman* alone is *sat* and factors like ‘a hare’s horn’ etc. fall under the category of *asat*. On the other hand, ‘shell-silver’/*śuktirajata*³⁵¹ is sublated (contradicted, being excluded by a superior proof e.g. ‘it is

³⁴⁹ *ibid.*, ‘*kvacid apy upādhanu satīn pratīyamānatvānadhikaraṇatvam*’.

³⁵⁰ *Advaitasiddhi* p.16, ‘*trikāla-abāhyatvarūpasya [vyatireko nāsatvam]*’

³⁵¹ cf *Upadeśasahasrī* 1.2.55 etc.

shell not silver') by the knowledge of the shell and so it is not *sat* or real. It is perceived as existent in the substratum/*āspada* (e.g. 'shellness'), i.e. the '*this-ness*' of the shell, and so it is not *asat* or an absolute no-thing. Thus, silver is said to be *mithyā*. It is *anir-vacanīya*/indeterminable either as real or as an absolute no-thing or as both. So too according to the *Upaniṣads* the world too is sublated by the direct knowledge of *Brahman*. To arrive at this point the following theories have to be disproved, only to be superseded by the *vivaratvāda* theory, whereby the cause appears as the effect without itself undergoing any change, on the basis of the *śruti*, *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1³⁵²,

'Crave to know that from which all these beings take birth, that by which they live after being born, that towards which they move and into which they merge. That is *Brahman*' and *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.10,³⁵³

'Know, then, that *prakṛti* or nature is *māyā* (illusion) and that the Great Lord (*Māheśvara*) is the *māyin* (the illusion-maker). The whole universe is filled

³⁵² *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1, 'yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante / yena jātāni jīvanti / yat prayanty abhisamviṣanti / tad vijjñāsasva / tad brahmeti'.

³⁵³ *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.10, 'māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyān māyinaṃ tu maheśvaram / tasyāvayavabhūtais tu vyāptam sarvam idam jagat' // 4.10 //

with objects which are parts of His being'. On the basis of these texts, it is admitted that *Brahman* appears as the world through *māyā*.

In *Advaita Vedānta*, post-Ādiśaṅkara, the major theories that have to be refuted before the *vivaratvāda* theory is established are the following , evaluated by Vimuktātman in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa* and the *Prakaṣārtha-Vivaraṇa* respectively, which are now considered in order.

- i) *Abhāvakarāṇavāda of the Buddhists/ 'The theory of non-existence as the cause'*
- ii) *Asatkāryavāda or ārambhavāda of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school/ 'The theory of the nonexistence of the effect in the cause'*
- iii) *The Sāṅkhyas Satkāryavāda / 'The theory of the existence of the effect in the cause' divided into two aspects*
 - (a) *The theory of pariṇāma-vāda/ a theory of 'actual transformation'*

- (b) The theory of *vivarta-vāda*/ a theory of apparent not real change or transfiguration
- iv) *ātma-khyāti*/ self-cognition
- v) *a-khyāti*/non-apprehension
- vi) *anyathā-khyāti*/ misapprehension, i.e. asserting that something is not really what it appears to be according to sensual perception
- vii) *asat-khyāti*/ cognition of the non-existent or unreal,
- viii) *śabdādvaita*/ non-duality of the Word
- ix) *anirvacanīya-khyāti*/ cognition of indeterminability

i) **Abhāvakaraṇavāda/ 'The theory of non-existence as the cause'**

This theory has been principally used and fully established in the Buddhist *sampradāya*. Essentially, it could be summed up in the metaphor expressed in the *Nyāsa sūtra* of Gautama 4.1.14³⁵⁴, 'Before a sprout comes up the seed is destroyed' i.e. the sprout is seen to originate only after the destruction of the seed. It follows that one can say that the sprout originates from 'non-existence' of the seed. In the same way, a pot comes into existence only by destroying the ball of clay. It follows, according to Gautama, 'From non-existence arises existence, since it does not arise without destroying' hence the theory is called 'The theory of non-existence as the cause' / *Abhāvakaraṇavāda*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*³⁵⁵, 'Since the birth of the sprout is not seen to take place without the destruction of these, the non-existence of the seed is the cause of the sprout' and the *Buddhists*, Some say, 'In the beginning this was non-existence alone, one only without a second. From that non-existence was born existence; to substantiate their view. Gautama then goes on to

³⁵⁴ *Nyāsa sūtra* 4.1.14, 'abhāvād bhāvotpattiḥ nānupamṛdya prādurbhāvāt...'

³⁵⁵ *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa* p.74, 'bijopamardam vinā aṅkarotpatter adarśanād bijābhāvo'ṅkurakāraṇam'.

refute the theory as illogical, for though at the time of origin of the sprout the seed is destroyed the destruction of the seed is not in fact the cause of the sprout. Rather, the subtle ingredients of the seed, which continue in the sprout, are the real 'cause' of the sprout. 'Since birth (of a sprout) is not possible from destroyed seeds, otherwise it would mean even dead parents can produce offspring'. As the *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.26³⁵⁶ explains,

'Not from non-existence, since this is not seen.'

Śaṅkara³⁵⁷ then elucidates by saying:

If something can come out of non-existence it would be unnecessary to resort to specific causes. Then there would be no distinction between non-existence arising from destruction of a seed etc. and the non-existence of the horn of a hare, etc. both being equally devoid of existence...

Moreover, if causality of non-existence were to be accepted, then one wanting sprouts would not collect seeds.

³⁵⁶ *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.26, 'nāsato'dṛṣṭatvāt'.

³⁵⁷ *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* 2.2.26, 'yady abhāvāt bhāva utpadyate... śaśaviṣāṇādīnāṃ ca niḥsvabhāvatvāvīśeṣād abhāvatve kaś cid viśeṣo'sti'.

So Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*,³⁵⁸ 'Anyone who wants sprouts will not collect seeds if seed is not the cause'. So too the *Abhāvakaraṇavāda* is rejected in *śruti*, *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.2,³⁵⁹

'How indeed could it be so, O dear one ... how could existence (in fact) arise from non-existence?':

ii) *Asatkāryavāda* or *ārambhavāda* of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school 'The theory of the nonexistence of the effect in the cause'

The theory of the non-existence of 'the effect in the cause"/*Asatkāryavāda*, is the main creation theory of the *Naiyāyikas*. Essentially, they teach that every effect comes into existence from its prior non-existence. The effect does not exist in its cause prior to its origination. It is by the causal operation of the efficient cause, like the weaver, the effect, namely the cloth which is non-existent prior to its production comes into existence through the relation known as *samavāya* or 'inherence' over and above its cause³⁶⁰, the threads. So, cloth and other like effects do not exist at all

³⁵⁸ *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa* p.74, 'bijaṃ tarhi kāraṇaṃ na bhavati anīkurārthinā bījasañcayo na syāt'.

³⁵⁹ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.2, 'kutas tu khalu somyaivaṃ syāt katham asataḥ saḥ jāyate'.

³⁶⁰ *Kārikāvalī /Bhāṣāpariccheda*, 23, '...samavāyi-kāraṇaṃ dravyasyaiveti vijñeyam..' by Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana (1634).

before their origination in the form of threads etc. In other words, there is an absence of cloth etc. in the causes such as previously existing threads. That *abhāva*/ 'absence' is the efficient cause/*nimitta-kāraṇam* for the origin of cloth. On this basis, every effect/*kārya* is non-existent/*asat* before its origination. It only comes into existence subsequently by an operation of the cause. The threads constitute what is known as the *samavāyīkāraṇa* or the inherent cause. The threads are parts, while the cloth is the whole and between the parts and the whole. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school admits the relation previously mentioned as *samavāya*. In the threads, the cloth is said to arise through this relation, and so the threads are termed *samavāyīkāraṇa*. This school says only a substance, here 'threads', could serve as the inherent cause.

Tantu-saṁyoga /Conjunction of the threads also, which is brought about by the efficient cause is necessary for the rise of the cloth. This *tantusaṁyoga* /conjunction is termed *asamavāyīkāraṇa* or non-inherent cause. Conjunction is a 'quality' whereas the threads are 'substance' and between the two there is a relation of *samavāya* or 'inherence'. Thus, the conjunction of the threads exists through the relation of 'inherence' in the threads, which constitute the *samavāyīkāraṇa* of the cloth and by being present in it. It is the cause of the origination of cloth, technically called the

a-samavāyīkārāṇa of an effect.³⁶¹ Different from the two and yet serving as the cause is the *nimitta-kārāṇa* or efficient cause.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory of causation is termed *a-sat-kārya-vāda* because according to it, the effect is non-existent in its cause prior to its production. It is called *ārambhavāda* because according to this theory, the effect is an *ārambha/* or a 'new creation'.

Arising from this basic theory, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school argues that 'atoms' which are 'eternal' and 'partless' constitute the inherent cause of the world. They claim there are four kinds of atoms: earth, water, fire and air.

At the beginning of creation, there arises, by the will of God, movement in each atom, atomic in size. Two atoms join to produce a binary compound (*dvy-aṇuka*), which has invisible or atomic size (*aṇutva*) and minuteness in length (*hrasvatva*). Three such binary compounds produce a triad (*try-aṇuka*), which has visible size (*mahatva*) and visible length (*dīrghatva*). Four such triads produce 'form' a

³⁶¹ Ibid., 'guṇakarmamātravṛttijñeyam athāpy *a-samavāyīhetukam*'"

(*catur-aṅuka*) having greater visible size and length. Thus, the effects - earth, water, fire and air are produced.³⁶²

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* after examining these views of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* shows there is no basis for admitting that the *catur-aṅuka* arises from the group of four triads. He quotes from the *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, which says that the *catur-aṅuka* arises from four atoms, and it is the collection of the latter that is responsible for the rise of visible size in it.³⁶³

According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* the atoms constitute the inherent cause of the binary compound, while the conjunction of the two atoms constitute the non-inherent cause. God is the efficient cause. They seek to establish the existence of the atom on the basis of the threefold inference:

³⁶² *Tarkasaṅgraha-dīpikā*,:Annambhatta. (1976). Progressive Publishers, Calcutta. p.85, 'īśvarasya cikīrṣāvaśāt paramāṅuṣu kriyā jāyate.tataḥ paramāṅudvayasamyoge sati dvyaṅukam utpadyate.tribhir eva dvyaṅukaiḥ tryaukam utpadyate. evaṁ catur aṅukādikrameṇa mahatī pṛthivī, mahatya āpaḥ, mahat tejaḥ mahāvāc āyur utpadyate'.

³⁶³ PV p. 491, 'Rāvaṇapraṇīte bhāṣye drśyate yad dvābhyām dvyaṅukābhyām ārabdhe kārye yan mahatvam utpadyate tv anya pracayaḥ a-samavāyikāraṇam'.— on BS 2.2.11., 'mahad dīrghavad vā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyam', 'Rather (the universe may originate from Brahman) even as the great and long (triads etc.) originate from the short (*dyad*) or the inexpensive atom'. Swami Gambiranada, (1996). BSB Advaita Ashrama. Calcutta

Gradation in limited size ends somewhere; It has the characteristic of being a gradation; which is like the gradation in great size.³⁶⁴

The inferential argument given by Śrīdhara (c.991) in his *Nyāyakandalī* ³⁶⁵

concludes:

Gradation in great size ends in *ākāśa* or *Ātman*. Similarly, the gradation in limited size must end in a particular object, the atom.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, however argues that in the argument given, *hetu*/cause is fallacious. According to logicians, a subject of inference or *pakṣa* must be a valid one. Gradation here is the *pakṣa*, which cannot be taken as a quality of size, because size is itself a quality cannot have another quality. It cannot be viewed as a generic attribute because a generic attribute being uniform in nature does not admit of differences such as superiority or inferiority. Gradation, however does possess the

³⁶⁴ *ibid.* p.515., '*alpa-parimāṇatāratam yaṁ kvacid virāntam, parimāṇatāratamyatvāt; mahatparimāṇatāratamyavat*'. On BS 2.2.17, '*aparigrahāc cātyantam anapekṣā*.' This (theory of the atom as the cause) is to be entirely ignored, since it is not accepted (by the worthy). Swami Gambiranada (1996). *BSB Advaita Ashrama*. Calcutta.

³⁶⁵ *Nyāyakandalī*, p.79 commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, composed by Śrīdhara in 991

latter, so it is not a generic attribute. So, since the *pakṣa* could not be proved, the *hetu*, which seeks to establish something in it, is associated with³⁶⁶ fallacy *āśrayāsiddhi* (PV P.515). The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* assert that atoms are the ultimate cause of the world and are eternal. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's analysis, shows that neither the atoms nor their eternal nature can stand logical scrutiny.

He argues that if it is said that 'gradation' is a *dharma* which would end in a *dharmin*/one having a *dharma* or feature, which is the size, which point *Advaitins* would accept. However, then the factor wherein 'gradation' ends is not the atom the logicians think, but only its size.

So, the above inferential argument does not prove the existence of the atom.³⁶⁷ The *Naiyāyika* logicians seek to prove the existence and eternal nature of the atom on the basis of *mahāvīdyā* syllogisms. So, in relation to the *sapakṣa*/instance in which the major term is found, that to be proved/*sādhya* is cloth-ness/*paṭatva*. Cloth has a feature/*dharma-vān*, namely cloth-ness. It is different /*anya* from *etat-*

³⁶⁶ 'fallacy *āśrayāsiddhi* 'PV P.515, 'Tatrāśrayāsiddhiś ca hetuḥ. tathā hi prāmāṇika eva āśraya iti tārīkikāṇām āgrahaḥ.tārakamyam pramāṇato nirūpaṇam kahate.na tāvat tārakamyam guṇaḥ. Parimāṇasya guṇāntarābhāvāt. Na jātiḥ, utkarṣādīmatvāt " on BS "2.2.17 "aparigrahāc cātyantam anapekṣā'.

³⁶⁷ *ibid.* p.515 l.12., 'dharmaṭve ca tv anyā svadharminī parimāṇe viśrātātvat sādhanam'.

paramāṇutva/'the characteristic of being this particular atom, which is present in this particular atom/*etan-niṣṭhadharma* and which is different from eternity/*nitya-vyatirikta*. Hence, cloth-ness is proved in the *sapakṣa* wherein the logical reason/*hetu-prameyatva* for proveableness too exists. In relation to the *pakṣa*, *nityatva* itself is the *sādhya*.

Thus, the atom has a feature/*dharma-vān*, eternity/*nityatva*. It is different/*anya* of the atom as the cause) is to be entirely ignored, since it is not accepted (by the worthy)" from *etat-paramāṇutva* which is present in this atom/*etan-niṣṭhadharma* and which is different from eternity/*nityatva-vyatirikta*. Thus, *eternity* is proved in the *pakṣa* wherein the logical reason *hetu-prameyatva* too exists.³⁶⁸

The eternal nature of the atoms is proved by a *hetu* of the *anvaya-vyatirekī* type: 'Atoms are eternal; because they are partless substances; like the self'.³⁶⁹ The *hetu* is *anvaya-vyatirekī*, thus: whichever is a partless substance, is eternal like the self. Whichever is not eternal, like the pot, is not a partless substance. Thus, the eternal nature of the atoms which is proved on the basis of this cause/*hetu* of the

³⁶⁸*ibid.* l.18, 20-21, '*paramāṇur nityatva-vyatiriktaitan niṣṭhadharmān yad dharmavān...premeyatvāt paṭavat*'.

³⁶⁹ *ibid.* p.514 l.14-15, '*nityāḥ paramāṇavaḥ, niravayavad dravyatvāt, ātmavat*'.

affirmative and negative/*anvaya-vyatirekī* type, is proved by this *mahāvīdyā* syllogism.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya rejects this syllogism, stating that the present *hetu*, which seeks to prove the *sādhyā*/‘the eternal nature of the atoms’ is a fallacious one as it can be used to prove the opposite side too, i.e. the *virodha*/fallacy.

He explains³⁷⁰ that the *pakṣa*/‘the atom has non-eternality/*anityatva* as its feature/*dharmavān*, . It is different/*anya* from *etat-paramāṇutva*/this supreme-atomicness which is present in the supreme atom/*paramāṇu*/ present in this atom/*etan niṣṭhadharma* . The latter is different from the feature, non-eternality/*anityatva*. So, the syllogism aimed at proving ‘the eternal nature of the atoms’ can well prove the reverse, non-eternality. Hence the *mahāvīdyā* syllogisms, supposedly free from fallacies are not, for on the basis of these neither atoms nor their eternal nature can be proved.

³⁷⁰ *ibid.* p.515. l.18, ‘*paramāṇur anityatva-vyatirikṭaitan niṣṭhadharmānyadharmavān, prameyatvāt, paṭavat*’.

Furthermore, the very theory of causation known as *asatkāryavāda* or *ārambhavāda*, is rejected as is clearly stated in the *Sārabodhinī* commentary on the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudhī* ³⁷¹.

The effect is existent due to the fact that it can be brought into existence; however, what does not exist cannot be brought into existence; just like yellow in blue or a human horn.'

The defect of this theory hinges on the well-known fact that the relationship in the form of a quality/*dharma* and its possessor/*dharmin* is possible if only two entities exist, i.e. the quality and its possessor. Moreover, such a relationship is clearly understandable if both the entities exist at the same time/*ekakāle*. So, since according to this *Naiyāyika* theory, the pot does not exist before its origination/*utpatteḥ pūrvam*, how could its quality/*dharma*, nonexistence */asattvam*, alone be present? If one says that non-existence, a quality of the pot, exists even before the pot comes into existence, we have to admit that the pot would also exist before its origination, due to the very fact that a quality/*dharma* cannot exist without its possessor/*dharmin* and so that would mean that the effect is not non-existent before

³⁷¹ *Sārabodhinī* on the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudhī*, p.233, 'kāryam, sat, kāraṇāt kriyamāṇatvāt, yan na sat tan na kriyamāṇam yathā nīlam pītam naraviṣāṇam vā', quoted by Dr Krishnamurthi Sastrigal in *Istasiddhi Vivaranam* p.183.

its origination. Moreover, there is a further defect in this *asatkāryavāda*, due to the fact that a person who desires a particular effect follows only a particular cause/*pravṛtti-viśeṣa*. Such an action is not *in* harmony with *a-satkāryavāda*. For if it is said that it does not exist in water, the person who wants a pot could as well take water (for making a pot!) Or a person who wants oil could take curd!

Furthermore, this theory has been powerfully refuted in the *Brahma-sūtras* by *sūtras* 2.2.17 where it is stated, and 2.2.11³⁷²,

Rather (the universe may originate from *Brahman*) even as the great and long (triads, etc.) originate from the short (dyad) or the infinitesimal (atom)' and the following six sūtras.

Consequently, it is established in the *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa* by Bāḍarāyaṇa, Śāṅkara and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya that the *asatkāryavāda*, also called *ārambhavāda* is not cogent:

iii) The Sāṅkhyas satkāryavāda / 'The theory of the existence of the effect in the cause' the theory of pariṇāmavāda/ a theory of 'actual transformation' or pradhānakāryavāda...

³⁷² BS 2.2.11., 'Mahad dīrghavad vā hrasvapariṇāmaṇḍalābhyām...'

According to the *Sāṅkhyas*, who advocate *satkāryavāda*, according to which theory an effect such as a pot exists even before its origination, when it is said that the effect pre-exists in its cause, what is meant is that it exists in its subtle form and a causal operation brings about the transformation of what is subtle into a gross form. Thus, the effect is not a new creation but only a transformation of what is subtle into a gross form. Hence, this theory is designated not only as *satkāryavāda* but as *pariṇāma-vāda*.

The *Sāṅkhyas* maintain that the material cause of the world is *prakṛti*, which is insentient/*jaḍa*, consisting of the three strands, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tattva*. These stand respectively for 'happiness', 'misery' and 'ignorance'. The *prakṛti* has a twofold function, one relating to the period of dissolution where the three strands/*guṇas* are in equilibrium, where it is termed *pradhāna*, when the world remains there in a subtle form. When the equilibrium is disturbed the *guṇas* come to be related to one another through primary and subsidiary relations and the second function, creation unfolds the transformation of subtle into gross form.³⁷³

³⁷³ *Sārābodhinī*, pp.303-304, quoted by Dr Krishnamurthi Sastrigal in *Istasiddhi Vivaranam*

Following Bādarāyaṇa and Ādi Śāṅkara, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states that happiness, etc., which are mental modes, are distinct from the objects as they are caused by the latter.

Objects of the world are not the same as the mental modes, as *Sāṅkhyas* maintain.³⁷⁴ Hence, the assertion that the world is characterized by happiness etc., is wrong. Thus, the very concept of *prakṛti* is false.

The *Sāṅkhyas* claim that the *prakṛti*, which is insentient/*jada* transforms itself into the form of the world of its own accord. The only other 'eternal' entity, *puruṣa* is totally distinct from it and supra-relational. So, the *prakṛti*, which is insentient, gets itself transformed into the form of the world without being guided by any intelligent being.

On the basis of the following three major inferential arguments, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya rejects this view.

Firstly, the world cannot be the creation of an independent insentient entity because it is of a variegated nature, like a mansion.³⁷⁵

³⁷⁴ PV p.472 l.13, 'sukhādīnām āntaratvāt śabdādīnām ca bāhyatvapratīteḥ sukhādy antayo bhāvānām asiddhā ityarthāḥ. Kiñca śabdādīnām sukhādīnimittatvapratīteḥ nimittanaimittikayoś ca bhedasya presidia na śabdādīnām sukhādy ātmakatvam iti'.

³⁷⁵ ibid.p.471,l.12f, 'vimataṁ na svatantrācetanānirmitam ,vicitrakāryatvāt prāsādādivat'.

Secondly, *prakṛti* is not the independent cause of the world because it is insentient like the lump of clay.³⁷⁶

Thirdly, the world is created by an intelligent being because it consists of orderly arrangements, like mansions.³⁷⁷

So, in summary, an insentient being, without being guided by an intelligent being, is not capable of giving rise to an effect of its own accord. As Bādarāyaṇa declares in *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.1³⁷⁸,

‘And that which is inferred (*pradhāna*) is not (the cause) owing to the impossibility of explaining the design, as also for other reasons.’

Even if we say *prakṛti* is capable of giving rise to the effect by being guided by an intelligent being, *puruṣa*, because it is insentient, like a lump of clay, this is in contradiction of the *Sāṅkhya* tenet that *prakṛti* is totally independent of *puruṣa*. Moreover, if *prakṛti* is admitted to be dependent on *puruṣa* then the situation would be similar to *māyā* which is dependent on the *Brahman* and which is admitted by *Advaitins* as the transformative material cause of the world. So, the *Sāṅkhyas* would

³⁷⁶ *ibid.*1.13f, ‘*pradhānam na svatantram jagatkāraṇam, kevalācetanatvāt, mṛn-mātravat*’.

³⁷⁷ *ibid.*1.14f, ‘*idaṁ jagat viśiṣṭabuddhimat kartṛpūrvakam, viśiṣṭaracanatvāt, prāsādādivat*’.

³⁷⁸ *BS* 2.2.1, ‘*racanānupapattés ca nānumānam*.’ Swami Gambiranada (1996). BSB Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta.

then be adopting the *Advaitins'* line of reasoning, as Gauḍapāda explains in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā-Alātīśātīprakaraṇam.4.4* | **A thing that already exists does not pass into birth (*Sāṅkhya* argument); and a thing that does not pre-exist (*Naiyāyika* argument) cannot pass into birth. These people while disputing thus, are really non-dualists, and they thus reveal the absence of birth.**³⁷⁹

The *Sāṅkhya's* theory of causation, which assumes the effect pre-exists in cause in a subtle form and the causal operation brings about manifestation of what is subtle into gross form, *sat-kārya-vāda* is also shown to be unsound, as similarly the *Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika* doctrine of *asat-kārya-vāda*, asking the question whether manifestation is existent or non-existent.

If it were existent, then it need not be brought into existence, and the causal operation would become futile. If to overcome this difficulty it is held that manifestation is non-existent, then the causal operation brings into existence that which is not existent prior to its production, which is *asat-kārya-vāda*.

³⁷⁹ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā-Alātīśātīprakaraṇam.4.4*, 'bhūtaṃ vidyamānaṃ vastu na jāyate kiñcid vidyamānatvād evātmavad ity evaṃ vadannasadvādī sāṅkhyapakṣaṃ pratiśedhati saj janma'.

Thus, if *Sāṅkhyas* admit this second alternative, they would be subscribing to *asat-kārya-vāda*, which they have rejected! It is only by the operation on the cause that the effect, such as a pot, is manifested.

So according to this view the cause and effect are not totally different. Furthermore, this non-difference compatible with difference is accepted, so that cause and effect are 'real'. Since the effect cannot be viewed as either identical or different from the cause, neither can it be viewed as either existent or non-existent in the cause prior to its production. Hence, as we shall see following *Advaitins* like Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya it is *a-nirvacanīya*/indeterminable.

However, in the dualistic *Sāṅkhya*, as distinct from the non-dualistic form referred to in chapter two of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, 2.16³⁸⁰,

'Of the unreal no being there is; there is no nonbeing of the real. Of both these is the truth seen by the seers of the Essence';

the cause of the entire universe is held to be *prakṛti*, formed of the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and also known as *pradhāna*. It is that which is said to

³⁸⁰ *Bhagavad Gītā*, 2.16, 'nāsato vidyate bhāvo nā 'bhāvo vidyate sata ubhayor api dṛṣṭo'ntas tv anayos tattvadarśibhiḥ'.

become transformed as the universe in the form of *mahat*, etc. at the beginning of creation.

In spite of *pradhāna* being *jaḍa*/insentient, the performance of this action by it is said to be understandable, like milk, though being inert is seen apparently acting to nourish the calf. As the Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* 57³⁸¹expounds,

'Similar to the action of milk for nourishing the calf is the action of *pradhāna*. For the liberation of the ignorant *Puruṣa*'.

This *pradhāna-kāryavāda* form of the *satkāryavāda* is discussed and refuted in the ten *sūtras* of the second chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.1-10³⁸² beginning with

'Due to the inexplicability of design and other reasons the inferred one is not'.

The essence of these could be summarized as: Well known in the world is the fact that a sentient being like a potter makes pots etc. by molding things like inert clay.

However, since the *Sāṅkhya darśana* expounded in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* denies the existence of a sentient Īśvara activating the *pradhāna*, how could the transformation

³⁸¹ *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* 57, 'vatsavivṛddhinimittam kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir ajñasya/ puruṣavimokṣanimittam tathā pravṛtṭiḥ pradhānasya'.

³⁸² BS 2.2.1, 'racanānupapattēś ca nānumānam'.

of the insentient *pradhāna* by itself into the form of the universe be possible? Hence, the *pradhāna-kāryavāda* is untenable .

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Prakāṭārtha-vivaraṇa* on this passage as well as on *Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* and in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*³⁸³ explain,

'If *pradhāna* is independent, its existence and apprehension not being dependent on anything, 'it' would be the 'seer', devoid of the *guṇas*, *sattva* etc. and be the self like the Self itself'.

Thus, he establishes that the *pradhāna-kāryavāda* or theory of *pradhāna* as cause of the universe is *anupapana*/illogical.

It is further pointed out in the *Brahma-sūtra-Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* and the *Prakāṭārthavivaraṇa* by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya that the *pariṇāma-vāda*/ a theory of 'actual transformation' as propounded by Bhāskara removes the defect of attributing activity etc., to an insentient being.

By including *Īśvara* as a cause, *Brahman* associated with *māyā* is proposed as the transformative material cause /*pariṇāmy upādāna-kāryam* and a conclusion proposed that there is a *bheda-abheda*/ disunion-and-union/dualism and non-dualism

³⁸³ *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*, p.371, '*Pradhānasya svātantrye sattāpratītyor nirapekṣatvalakṣaṇe sati dvirūpatvam; sattvādiguṇarāhityam, ātmatvaṃ ca ātmavad eva syāt*' .

or 'difference -cum-non-difference' between *Brahman* and the *jagat*/universe and that the universe is *satya*/real. Bhāskara states³⁸⁴:

This universe is a particular state of *Paramātmān*, so it's reality /*vastutva* being of the nature of existence/*sad-ātmakatvāt*. Further being omniscient /*sarvajñatva*/ *sarvaśaktimatvāt*/and omnipotent it could be said that it would transform itself of its own will.

He further states that *Brahman* possesses a two-fold power, power of enjoyer/*bhoktṛśakti* and power of enjoyment/*bhogyāśakti*. By unfolding these two, it differentiates itself as the souls/*jīvātma* and the world respectively without being affected thereby. This is what is meant by saying that *Brahman* gets itself transformed into the forms of the souls/*jīvātma* and the world/universe.

The soul, by being identified with the mind, acquires agency and other characteristics, which are all 'real'.³⁸⁵ Such a view, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya points out,

³⁸⁴ Bhāskarācārya p.96, commentary on *Brahma -sūtra*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Depot, Benares, 1903

³⁸⁵ Bhāskara-bhāṣya, p.85, '*paramātmā svayam ātmānaṁ kāryatvena pariṇamayāmāsa ityarthah. śaktivikṣepaṁ kṛtaoān*'. P.105, '*Īśvasrasya dve śakti bhavataḥ. bhogyāśaktiḥ ekā bhoktṛśaktiś ca aparā*'. PV p.378 L.23, on BS 1.4.26, '*ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt*'. '(Brahman is the material cause) because of action related to Itself by way of change of form'. Swami Gambirananda (1996). *BSB Advaita Ashrama*. Calcutta.

is not reasonable since the 'reality' of the universe is specifically denied by the *śruti*,

Chāndogya 6.4.1,³⁸⁶

'Transformation has only words as its basis and is name only',

'Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam'.

Furthermore, because it is not possible for a partless-entity to take the form of an effect in reality, as space being *nir-avayava*/ without parts cannot *vastutaḥ*/in reality take the rounded etc. forms of a pot, etc. Therefore, in the *Brahma-sūtra* 2.1.14

Vyāsācārya³⁸⁷ says,

'There is non-difference of those cause and effect on account of the texts about origin etc'.

After first propounding the theory of *pariṇāma-vāda*/actual transformation so as to remove the error of the enjoyed objects/*bhogyā* being identified with the *bhoktṛ*/enjoyer, which would be the result if the *prapañca*/universe is accepted as the effect/*kārya* of *Brahman* then is established the theory of *vivarta-vāda*/ a theory of apparent

³⁸⁶ *Chāndogya* 6.4.1., '*Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam*'.

³⁸⁷ *Brahma-sūtra* 2.1.14, '*tad ananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdābibhyaḥ*'.

not real change or transfiguration, as his real view in the *tad-ananyatva-adhikaraṇa*³⁸⁸

which states that,

‘There is non-difference of those (viz. cause and effect) on account of the texts about origin, etc.’

Bhāskara argues that the world is not *a-nirvacanīya* as *Advaitins* think. It is ‘real’ by being the real transformation of *Brahman*.³⁸⁹

However, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya records in the *Praktārtha-vivaraṇa* that Bhāskara contends that the *Upaniṣadic* texts convey difference as well as non-difference between the soul/*jīvātman* and *Brahman*.³⁹⁰

Moreover, Bhāskara and his disciple Keśava, earliest known exponents of the *bhedābheda theory*, argue that *Brahman* remains changeless prior to the creation of the world and not subsequent to it.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, then underlines the inadequacy of the *pariṇāmavāda* / a theory of ‘actual transformation’ by using *śruti* texts from the *Upaniṣads* to show

³⁸⁸ *Brahma-sūtra* 2.1.14, ‘*tad-ananyatva-adhikaraṇa*’, ‘*tad-ananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*’.

³⁸⁹ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya* p.96, ‘*paramātmano’vasthāvīśeṣaḥ prapaco’yam. Ata eva vastutvaṃ sadātmakatvāt*’.

³⁹⁰ *PV* p.444 l.19, ‘*yad any abhāṇi bhāskareṇa ‘pramāṇasiddhatvāt ko’yam virodhaḥ iti*’. On *BS* 2.1.20 “*yathā ca prāṇādi*’. ‘And this (effect non-difference from the cause) is just as in the case of the outgoing breath etc’. Swami Gambirananda (1996). *BSB Advaita Ashrama*. Calcutta.

that both difference and non-difference cannot be accepted as existing in the same place, as the *pariṇāma-vādin*s argue, because they are opposed to each other. If the universe were to be taken as 'real'/*vāstvikatva*, the following *Upaniṣadic* texts would be contradicted: *Bṛhadāraṇakopaniṣad* 4.4.20³⁹¹,

'It should be realized in one form only, (for It is unknowable and eternal/unchanging)'.

Further, it is said in *Kaṭhcopaniṣad* 4.11³⁹²,

'There is no plurality whatsoever here. He who sees as though there's difference here, goes from death to death';

and again, in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.4,

'All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only. Earth as such is the reality',

i.e. the effect/*vikāra* is non-real as it is referred to by name and the verbal usage that one is the cause and another is the effect is devoid of any content

³⁹¹ *Bṛhadāraṇakopaniṣad* 4.4.20, '*ekadhaivānudrṣ etad apramayaṁ dhruvam*'.

³⁹² *Kaṭhcopaniṣad* 4.11, '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*'.

(whereas Bhāskara and his disciple Keśava argue the effect as such is real and not 'un-real' as *Advaitins* argue); *Chāndogyopaniṣa* 6.2.1³⁹³,

'One only, without a second'

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 3.4.2³⁹⁴,

'Everything other than this is imperishable'.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya critically examines Bhāskara and his disciple Keśava's views that *Brahman* unfolds its power of *bhoktrśakti* and *bhogyāśakti*, thereby 'becoming' the souls and world respectively. He argues that the concept of *śakti* itself does not hold good, for it is not clear whether it is non-real or real. If non-real, then it is identical with *māyā* admitted by the *Advaitins*. If it were real, it would stand logical analysis, but it does not.

Śakti cannot be taken as either identical with *Brahman* or as different from *Brahman*. For when it is said that *Brahman* has *śakti*, then *Brahman* is the *dharmi* / possessor of *dharma* and *śakti* is the *dharma*. However, the relation of *dharma-dharmi-bhāva* cannot apply between two things absolutely distinct, nor between two things absolutely identical.

³⁹³ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.4, 'vācarambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam'; 6.2.1 "Ekam evādvitīyam'.

³⁹⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.4.2, 'ato'nyad ārtam'.

One cannot say there is a relation of 'identity-difference' between *Brahman* and *śakti*, because *bheda* and *abheda* are known to be opposed to each other. Just as the cognition of difference in reflected moons in different vessels filled with water is sublated/*bādha* by the cognition of identity or oneness of the moons, so it follows that identity or oneness is opposed to difference. *Bheda* and *abheda* being thus opposed to each other cannot co-exist, so the concept *bhedābheda* itself is shown to be invalid.³⁹⁵

Śakti relates to the *śakya* /object affected by it which can be neither real nor an absolute nothing. This is due to fact that the real being existent always cannot be effected nor can the absolute nothing be effected.³⁹⁶

The logical consequence is that the *śakti* of *Brahman* has to be taken as 'unreal' since it cannot reviewed either as identical or as different from *Brahman*

i.e. it is *a-nirvācyā*, and *śakya*/its object cannot be taken as either real or as an absolute nothing. The non-real *śakti* of *Brahman* being only the *māyā* of *Advaita*.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ PV p.378 l.23 ff, 'yac ca bhāskareābhāṇi śaktivikṣepakatvaṁ parimāṇitvaṁ iti, tatra sā śakti asatyā satyā va? Ādye māyāsamkhyam. Carama nirūpaṇāshīṣṇutvaṁ vācyam. nirūpaṇaṁ na kahate satyā ca iti vyāghātāt. Nirūpyamāṇe ca nātyantabhede abhede vā śakti tadvadbhāva. bhinnābhinnatvaṁ ca virodhād eva nāṅgaṁ dhārayati. Candrabhedasya tad ekatvajñānena ... bādhadarśanāt virodhaḥ sthita eva ...'

³⁹⁶ ibid. p.379, 'śakyam api tasyā sad-sad vā na nirūpaṇaṁ sahate'.

³⁹⁷ ibid. p.379, 'parā'sya śaktir iti cānirvācyaprapaṅcā māyāivetyavocāt'.

A further proposition made by Bhāskara that perceptual experience in the form *mṛdghataḥ*/earthen-pot, points to difference and also non-difference between the pot and the lump of clay, which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya proves incorrect. This is due firstly to *bheda* and *abheda* being opposed to each other and not being able to coexist. Secondly, the experience earthen-pot/*mṛdghataḥ* proves not difference-cum-identity between pot and clay, which simply proves that the pot is neither identical nor different from the lump of clay, nor can it be seen as existent or non-existent in the cause before its origination.

The pot having no independent existence apart from the clay is *a-nirvacanīya*, so the claim that *bheda* and *abheda* is based on scriptural means of valid knowledge/*pramāṇa* is incorrect.³⁹⁸

Likewise, the assertion Bhāskara makes that difference-cum-identity between the soul/*jīvātman* and *Brahman* is based on the *pramāṇa* of *Upaniṣads* is not cogent. Nondifference is natural, whereas difference is only adventitious. The *Upaniṣadic* texts conveying non-difference point to identity, the essential nature of *Brahman*,

³⁹⁸ PV p.444, l.19, 'yad apy abhāṇi bhāskareṇa 'pramāṇasiddhatoāt ko'yaṁ virodhaḥ iti. Tatra brūmaḥ - satyam, yadi bhedābheda-grāhaka pramāṇaṁ syāt. Na tāvad mṛdagaḥa itī pratyakṣam, tasya ghaṭasya mṛdātmatāmātraviṣayatvena bhedābhedayor audāsīnyāt'.

whereas conveying difference merely restates the difference caused by *upādhi*/ limiting adjuncts.³⁹⁹

Moreover, Bhāskara's disciple Keśava's view that *Brahman* undergoing change is not in conflict with the *śruti*, like for example *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad* 4.4.20,

**'It should be realized in one form only, for It is unknowable and eternal/
unchanging'**

because it refers to the changeless *Brahman* before the state of creation, not subsequent to it. Such an interpretation is refuted by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. The text speaks of the changeless nature of *Brahman* without referring to any specific point of time not 'before creation'. For those texts speaking of *Brahman* as the 'cause of the world implying that It undergoes change refer to *Brahman* falsely identified with 'effects' being projected by *māyā*. This is similar to the metaphor of the shell free from silver yet appearing to be related to 'silver' that is non-real.⁴⁰⁰

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further rejects Keśava's view that *Upaniṣadic* texts speaking of *Brahman* as changeless are few and futile and therefore to be rejected,

³⁹⁹ PV p.447 l.23, 'aupādhikabhedāmbanā bhedaśrutih, svābhāvīkabhedāmbanā cābhedaśrutir iti na kaś cid virodhaḥ'.

⁴⁰⁰ ibid. p.378, 'yac ca keśavena pralepe - virodha eva nāsti vikārotpatteḥ pūrvaṁ kāraṇasyāvīkāritvāt tad abhiprāyāḥ śrutaya iti, tad asat, aviśeṣapravṛttāyāḥ śruteḥ pīḍāprasaṅgat ... ukteḥ svato'rūpyatve'pi mithyārūpatādātmyavat nirvikārasyāpi sadā māyopādhīkavīkāraṇīyatvāt sṛṣṭīśruteḥ'.

while those speaking of the creation of the world by *Brahman* are many and fruitful and therefore to be accepted.

He points out that in that case, the 'injunctive texts', which are few in the *karmakāṇḍa*/ritualistic section of the *Veda* are to be taken as stultified by the recommendatory passages because they are many.⁴⁰¹

Moreover, a text that speaks of *Brahman* is not futile/*alpatvam* as Keśava states.

For example, in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7.⁴⁰²:

For, whenever an aspirant gets fearlessly established in this unperceivable, bodiless inexpressible/immutable/changeless, and unsupporting *Brahman*, he reaches the state of fearlessness. For, whenever the aspirant creates the slightest difference in It, he is smitten with fear. Nevertheless, that very *Brahman* is a terror to the (so-called) learned man who lacks the unitive outlook.

⁴⁰¹ *ibid.* p.378, l.10, 'na tāvad alpatvaṁ bhaṅgakāraṇam, karkāṇḍe'pi arthavādādibhyo'lpatvena bhaṅgaprasaṅgāt'.

⁴⁰² *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7, 'yadā hy evaiṣa etasminn adṛśye 'nātmye 'nirukte 'nilayane 'bh ayam pratiṣṭhāṁ vindate / atha so 'bhayaṁ gato bhavati / yadā hy evaiṣa etasminn udaram antaraṁ kurute / atha tasya bhayaṁ bhavati / tat tv eva bhayaṁ viduṣo 'manvānasya / tadapyeṣa śloko bhavati'/(*TaittU_2,71*)

That is to say, the one who has realized identity with *Brahman* which is changeless/*a-niruktam* attains the nontransmigratory nature, viz. *Sat Cit Ānanda/mokṣa*, while the one who cognizes duality experiences transmigration. Thus, such *Upaniṣadic* texts speaking of creation have for their content the indeterminable/*anirvacanīya* creation of the world.

That is confirmed through a *pramāṇa*, the *Upaniṣadic* text, speaking of *Brahman* as changeless is confirmed through reason/*tarka* for 'if *Brahman* were subject to change then it would be composed of parts and therefore non-eternal'. Hence, the above text is more powerful than texts speaking of the creation of the world by *Brahman*, thereby implying that *Brahman* is subject to change.⁴⁰³

Keśava claims that *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1.⁴⁰⁴:

'O good looking one, in the beginning this was Existence alone, One only, without a second. With regard to that some say, 'In the beginning this was existence alone, one only, without a second. From that non-existence issued existence',

⁴⁰³ PV p.378 l.18, '*pramāṇānugrāhakaḥ tarkaḥ*' iti nyāyavidō vāvadanti. Tad anugrāhakatvaṁ ca balavattvōpādanam eva. Ato vikāritve sāvayavattvōnityatvōdiprasaṅgalakṣaṇatarkānugrāhītāvikāritvaśruter eva bābhakatvam'.

⁴⁰⁴ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1, '*sad eva saumya idam agra āsīt ekam evādviktīyam*'.

is referring to the non-dual nature of *Brahman* prior to the creation but not subsequent to it. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya proves that this is wrong because this text from the beginning of the '*sad-vidyā*' section of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* referring to the state of dissolution is expounding the non-dual nature of *Brahman* then and even after creation of the world remaining non-dual only. This is declared in the concluding part of the '*sad-vidyā*' section, *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.16.3.⁴⁰⁵

'That which is this subtle essence, all this has got That as the Self. That is the Truth. (That is the Self. Thou art That, O Śvetaketu. He understood that from him)'. According to Ādi Śaṅkara, this means the entire world given in perception / *idam sarvaṃ* is *Brahman* only/*aitad-ātmyam* and the latter is real. These being in apposition cannot convey 'identity' between the world, which is insentient and *Brahman*, which is sentient. The appositional relationship therefore can only be taken in the sense of *bādha*/sublation. The text then means that *Brahman* is that wherein there is absence of the world, so *Brahman* is non-dual. Thus, in the beginning of the '*sad-vidyā*' section, referring to the state of dissolution when *Brahman* is non-dual as it is in the concluding part of the same section. This serves to

⁴⁰⁵ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.16.3, '*aitad-ātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyam*'.

underline the contention of Keśava that *Brahman* is non-dual prior to creation but not subsequent to it, which is in fact contrary to the *Upaniṣadic* teaching.

Keśava further argues that the following *Upaniṣadic* text from *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* II.1.10⁴⁰⁶,

‘He who sees as though there is difference here, goes from death to death,’

does not reject duality, but simply reproves cognition of duality.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya rejects Keśava’s argument by saying that if duality were real, then the reprisal of the cognition of duality would not hold good. Moreover, the usage of the word *iva*/‘as it were’ in the expression *nāneva* which means ‘duality as it were’ would not hold good, if duality were ‘real’.⁴⁰⁷

He then bases his continuing arguments on the famous *śruti*, we have referred to once already from *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.4.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁶ *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* II.1, ‘mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati’.

⁴⁰⁷ PV p.370, l.21-22, ‘satye bhede tad darśanasyāpi nindānupapatteḥ...iva śabdāyogyāc ca’.

⁴⁰⁸ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.4, ‘vācārambhanam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam’.

‘(‘O good looking one, as by knowing a lump of earth, all things made of earth become known): All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only. Earth as such is the reality’,

which affirms the non-reality of the effects and the reality of the cause. Pot, the effect is merely referred to, it is not real for it is neither identical with nor different from the clay, so it is *anirvacanīya*/not real.

The question then is what is real? *Chāndogyopaniṣad* says it is clay alone/*mṛttiketyeva satyam*, as it exists prior to the creation of the pot, at the time of the existence of the pot and after its destruction. So, the causal factor alone is real and the effect is non-real or *anirvacanīya*.

Keśava has retorted by saying the ‘*vācārambhanam -śruti*’ negates only the difference between cause and effect. This effect is in fact ‘real’ and not ‘unreal’ as *Advaitins* claim.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya dismisses Keśava’s objection by first asking what is meant when it is said that ‘the effect is real?’ Does he mean that the reality of the effect is the same as that of the cause or different from it? If it is the first, then that is

the *Advaitin* view. However, if the second then the promises in the *Upaniṣads*, which affirm that by the knowledge of *Brahman*, the cause, there would arise the knowledge of the effects, would all be contradicted. Thus, the true import of the 'vācārambhanam-śruti' is only the non-real nature of the effects.⁴⁰⁹ There is non-difference of those (cause and effect) on account of the texts about origin etc.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further argues that contrary to the *Bhedābheda* view that as clay is subject to change, so too will *Brahman* change in the form of the world, so the world is 'real'. The point of similarity between clay and *Brahman* is that both have the characteristics of being the material cause in regard to their respective objects.

⁴⁰⁹ 'vācārambhanam-śruti' is only the non-real nature of the effects.

PV p.416-417, l.23ff.. 'yat punar bhāskareṇa vyākhyātam ', 'vikāro vācyo nāmadheyam vācakam ; etad ubhaya vāco vāg indriyasyārambhanam vag indriyam hy ubhayam ālambya vyavahāram pravartayati" iti tad asat, pūrvāparāsaṅgateḥ; pūrvabhāge hi mṛdviññānena mṛtkāryaviññānam prastutam, tatra hetvākāṅkṣāyam mṛtsattayaiva tatkāryasya sattā pṛthaksattvam nāstītyetad eva vaktavyam, na tv akiñcitkaram vāca ubhayārambhakatvam; paratrāpi mithyā virodhyarthā bhidhāyinaṃ satyaśabdaṃ mṛdy eva prayuñ jāno āmnāyo vikāro pūrvatrāntattvam uktaṃ sūcayati. Yad api keśavenāvādi "vācārambhanam-śrutyā kāraṇāt kāryasyāntikabhedo niśidhyate; svarūpeṇa tu kāryasya sattvam eva', 'iti, tatra svarūpeṇa sattvam iti ko'rthaḥ? kiṃ kāraṇasattaiva kāryasvarūpasattā, kiṃ vā sattāntaram? Tatrādye na vivādaḥ. Dvītiye naikaviññānena sarvaviññāna pratijñānasiddhiḥ kāraṇasattā kāryasattāparijñānābhāvāt; abhedaj jñāne bhedād ajñānam api syāt. Mām tv anirvācyānām vikārānām kāraṇasattayaiva sad vyavahāragocaratatvāt kāraṇasattāparijñānena sarvsattāparijñānaṃ sidhyatīti' on BS 2.1.14, 'tad anayatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ'. Swami Gambirananda (1996). BSB Advaita Ashrama. Calcutta.

If *Brahman* was thought to be subject to change then like clay it too should be considered insentient. It thus follows that *Brahman* should be considered the material cause of the world as clay is the material cause of the pot, etc.⁴¹⁰ On the one hand, texts like *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1.1.⁴¹¹

‘(Bṛḡu, the well known son of Varuṇa, approached his father Varuṇa with the formal request, ‘O, revered sir, teach me *Brahman*’. To him, he (Varuṇa) said this: ‘Food, vital force, eye, ear, mind, speech - (these are the aids to knowledge of *Brahman*).’ To him, he (Varuṇa) said: ‘Crave to know that from which all these beings take birth, that by which they live after being born, that towards which they move and into which they merge. That is *Brahman*;’

such speaks of *Brahman* as the material cause of the world, but others indicate *Brahman* is ‘supra-relational’ and ‘unattached’ e.g. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.3.15.⁴¹²

**‘He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state), for this infinite being/
puruṣa is unattached’,**

⁴¹⁰ PV p.424 l.21 “mṛdādidṛṣṭānto’pi ananuatve na pariṇāmitve. anyathā jaḍyasyāpi prasaṅgāt”.

⁴¹¹ *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1.1, ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante / yena jātāni jīvanti / yatprayanty abhisamvoisanti / tad vijijñāsasva / tad brahmeti’.

⁴¹² *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.3.15, ‘asaṅgo hy ayaṁ puruṣaḥ’.

and further e.g. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.22.⁴¹³

It is imperceptible, for It is never 'perceived; undecaying, for it never decays;) unattached, for it is never attached', 'partless' and actionless, and again

Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 6.19⁴¹⁴ says

'(To Him), who is without parts, without actions (the highest bridge to immortality)..,'

so precluding the viewing It as the material cause. To solve this apparent contradiction between two types of *Upaniṣadic* texts, the principle of *māyā* is made available, as for example in *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.10⁴¹⁵

'Know then that *māyā* to be the *prakṛti*/material cause (and the wielder of *māyā* is the great Lord)'.

Thus, *Brahman*, though partless, as associated with *māyā* is considered the 'material cause' of the world. This apparent 'contradiction', where in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* *Brahman* is the material cause and in the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* it is *māyā*, is resolved by resort to the two kinds of change, *pariṇāma* which possesses the

⁴¹³ *ibid.* 4.4.22, 'asaṅgo na hi sajjate '.

⁴¹⁴ *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.19, 'niṣkalam niṣkriyam'.

⁴¹⁵ *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.10, 'māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt'.

same characteristic as that of the material cause and *vivarta* which has the characteristic that is different from one possessed by the material cause.⁴¹⁶

Māyā and the world have the characteristic of *jāḍya*/insentience, so the world is the *pariṇāma* of *māyā* which is the transformative material cause/*pariṇāmāyupādāna* of the world. *Brahman* is the substratum of *māyā*, the transformation of which is the world.

Whatever characteristic that is present in the world is *jāḍya*/insentience and in *Brahman*, it is *citta*/ Consciousness. Hence, they each possess different characteristics/*dharmas*. So the world is the *vivarta* of *Brahman*, which is the *vivartopādāna* of the world.

This theory explaining how *Brahman* remains as the substratum without any change is *vivartavāda* and is the very position Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya emphasizes in his *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣyaṭippaṇam*.⁴¹⁷

The *pariṇāma-vāda*/ a theory of 'actual transformation' could confer reality on the effect, a view not acceptable to *Advaitins*, who would only go for the *vivartavāda*/

⁴¹⁶ *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, p.45-46, 'kāraṇasalakṣaṇo'nyathābhāvah pariṇāmah, tad vilakṣaṇo vivartah'.

⁴¹⁷ *Bhagad-gītā-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇam*. p.53, 'māyāyās ca pariṇāmatvād upādānatvaṁ yonityam . Tad upādher īśvarasya sopādhivikārāśrayatvam eva upādānatvam'. P.56, 'māyādvārakam eva jagad ādhāratvam'.

transfiguration, which teaches the appearance of an immutable cause in the form of an unreal effect.

This is succinctly expressed by Sarvajñātman (fl. 1027 A.D.) in his famous *Advaita -vedānta* classic '*Samkṣepaśārīraka* , (a metrical summary of the teachings of Ādi Śāṅkara's central teaching in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*) 2.65-66⁴¹⁸;

'The wise hold that the production of real and varied objects from the one composite object is 'transformation', like the production of plants from the earth; the appearance of many unreal and varied forms from an immutable object is well known too, to be transfiguration like different moons appearing due to different waves'.

4 ia) Within the theory of *satkārya-vāda*, is the theory of *vivarta-vāda*, a theory of apparent not real change or transfiguration, or the indescribability of the universe.

⁴¹⁸ Veezhinathan, N. *Samkṣepaśārīraka* , 2.65-66.

Vimuktātman (fl.950 CE) in his *Iṣṭasiddhi* and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, in his *IṣṭasiddhiVivaraṇa*, strongly support this *vivarta-vāda*/ theory of apparent not real change. The former teaches that,

‘What is denoted in the *śrutis* and *smṛtis* by the words *māyā* and *avidyā* is the material cause of the universe’.

Thus, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.5.19 ⁴¹⁹states,

‘The Lord because of *māyā* (notions superimposed by ignorance) is perceived as having manifold forms (for to Him are yoked ten organs, nay hundreds ... many and infinite’;

and so too the *Śvetāsvataropaniṣad* 4.10 ⁴²⁰

‘Know *māyā* to be *prakṛti* and the supreme Lord as the wielder of *māyā*’.

⁴¹⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.5.19, ‘Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate’.

⁴²⁰ *Śvetāsvataropaniṣad* 4.10, ‘māyām tu prakṛtiṁ vidyān māyinarīn tu mahēśvaram’.

Similarly *smṛti* support is given to the teaching, equating *māyā* to *prakṛti* and

Brahman as the cause in *Bhagavad Gītā* 13.19⁴²¹

**‘Know both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* to be without beginning; know the *vikāras*/
modifications and the *guṇas* to be born of *prakṛti*’;**

and also in *Bhagavad Gītā* 14.4.⁴²²

**‘O son of *Kuntī*, of the forms born from all the wombs, the great nourisher
(*māyā*) is the womb; I am the father who deposits the seed’.**

So just as in the world/*vyavahārika*-dimension, things created by a magician with the help of magic, such as elephants, etc. are accepted as illusory or unreal, so too the illusory nature of the universe is to be accepted. Furthermore, the existence of the universe is denied in the locus in which it appears. It is established to be illusory like the nacre-silver.

⁴²¹ *Bhagavad Gītā* 13.19, ‘*prakṛtiṃ puruṣaṃ caiva viddhy-anādī ubhāv api. vikārāṃś ca guṇāṃś ca viddhi prakṛti-sambhavān*’.

⁴²² *Bhagavad Gītā* 14.4, ‘*sarvayoniṣu kaunteya mūrtayaḥ sambhavanti yā. tāsāṃ brahma mahad yonir ahaṃ bījapradāḥ pitā*’.

So for example Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya quotes the śruti text, *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* 4.11⁴²³

‘There is no plurality whatsoever here’

as proof that the existence of the universe is denied in the locus in which it appears. It is illusory like the nacre-silver. He further teaches, in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivarāṇa*⁴²⁴, **‘Since by the denial of the effect in the locus in which it appears, the effect is known to be illusory, its cause, *mayā* has also to be considered to be similar’.**

Earlier, Vimuktātman clearly was hinting at this when he said in his *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁴²⁵:

[T]here is no effect different/*bhinna* or non-different/*abhinna* or even both different and nondifferent / *bhinnābhinna* from *Brahman* ... so the effect being merely an expression of *māyā*, like the illusory silver, its denial by **‘There is no plurality whatsoever here’ is valid.**

⁴²³ *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* 4.11, ‘*Neha nānāsti kiñcana*’.

⁴²⁴ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivarāṇa* p.182, ‘*pratipannopādhanu kāryasya niṣedhena kāryasya mithyatvāvagamāt , tad upādānabhūtā māyāpi tadanurūpā grāhyā*’.

⁴²⁵ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.146, ‘*tasmād na bhinnam, abhinnaṁ bhinnābhinnaṁ vā brahmaṇaḥ kāryam samasti.ato māyā vilasitam eva rūpyam iva kāryam iti* “*Neha nānāsti kiñcana*”*iti tataḥ niṣedho nyāyyaḥ*’.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.184⁴²⁶ takes the argument further in his refutation of Bhāskara's *bhedābheda* theory of *Advaita*,

'For, manifoldness /*nānātva* is considered as something different from both *Brahman* and its effect, then "Bhāskara's *bhedābheda* theory, according to which there is nothing other than the *Brahman* and its effect will be contradicted'.

Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭasiddhi* affirms the causeless/imagined indeterminable nescience of the universe/ *jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ kalpyamānam anirvacanīyam* by saying, 'that the universe is a product of *māyā* is realized from the *śruti* texts, *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.10.⁴²⁷

'*māyā* is to be understood as the material cause'

and *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.5.15⁴²⁸

'*Indra* (the all powerful Lord) is seen as having many forms because of his *māyā*', and indeed

'this *māyā* is created by Me', etc. Hence, it is proved that indeed the universe is a product of *māyā*'.

⁴²⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.184, '*sakāryād brahmaṇo'nyannāstīty advaitaṁ bhāskarābhimatam.tasya hāniḥ prasajyate*'.

⁴²⁷ *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.10, '*māyāṁ tu prakṛtim ...*'

⁴²⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.5.15, '*Indro māyābhiḥ.... māyā hy eṣā mayā sṛṣṭā.*' *Tasmāt māyānirmita jagad iti siddham* '.

However, such a view appears to contradict the ordinary *vyavahārika*/worldly view that in practice, the universe is actually experienced as 'real' by *pramāṇas*/means of valid knowledge like perception, which are prior to scripture. In which case, the question is how can it be described as indeterminable/*anirvacanīya*?

Moreover, the reality of the *pramāṇas* like *śruti*/hearing etc. has to be accepted for imparting the very knowledge of the truth of *Advaita*. Likewise, just as the *guru*, disciple etc. have to be accepted as real, so the universe should also be accepted as real.

In answer to such an objection pure/*Kevala Advaitins*, like Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, argue, firstly, that perceptual knowledge/ *pratyakṣa* cannot be invariably real, since many perceptions like, 'the two moons', 'nacre-silver' etc. are found to be unreal. As a result, we can argue that perceptual knowledge tainted by the possibility of being invalid is in fact weaker than the scriptural knowledge which is totally free from such a defect. Hence, on the strength of the science of astronomy, the perception of the moon as a very small object, is rejected as invalid.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya also in his commentary *Candrikā* on the *Nyāyadīpāvalī* of Ānandabodha(fl. 1150)⁴²⁹ and in his *Prakatārtha-vivaraṇa* rejects the contention of the non-reality or indeterminability of the world as opposed to perception/*pratyakṣa* in forms like ‘the pot is real’/*ghaṭaḥ san* etc. For he advocates a two-fold distinction of reality or ‘unsublatedness’ as ‘sublatedness for all time and unsublatedness’ until there arises the knowledge of *Brahman*, on the basis of the⁴³⁰ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.1.20. text,

‘Its secret name (*upaniṣad*) is ‘The Truth of truth.’ The vital force is truth, and it is the Truth of that’.

The word *prāṇas* here is said to stand for the entire world. So, from this text we gather that ‘the reality or unsublatedness’ in *Brahman* is ‘superior’ while the one that is in the world is ‘inferior’.

⁴²⁹*Candrikā*, p.35, ‘*tathā śrutir api paramasarijñā mṛdāde sāmvyavahārikasatyatānupamardenaiiva prathamam tāvāt kumbhādyaalikabhāvam vivakṣati, paścān mṛdāder api alīkapratipādanād advaitasatyatvam prasādhayitum ityarthah*’, p.35, ‘*prāṇādīnām sāmvyavahārikam eva satyatvam satyaśabdenābhidhīyate*’.
 PV. P.416 l.19, ‘*āgamād bhedasya mithyātvaṅmāt tad grāhakāṇām pratyakṣādīnām dehātma pratyayavad vyavahārikatvād dehavyatiriktātmgṛāhakapramāṇasya avirodhavad advaitāgmasyāpi avirodha iti bhāvaḥ*’; on BS 2.1.14, ‘*tad anayatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*.’ ‘There is non-difference of those (cause and effect) on account of the texts about origin etc.’ Swami Gambirananda (1996). *BSB Advaita Ashrama*. Calcutta.

⁴³⁰ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.1.20, ‘*tasyopaniṣad satyasya satyam, prāṇā vai satyam teṣām satyam*’.

Here, 'superiority' and 'inferiority' are explained as 'unsublatedness' eternally and unsublatedness for the time being, the former pertaining to *Brahman* and the latter to the world. Thus, from the text *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.3.8⁴³¹,

'As rivers flowing down, become indistinguishable on reaching the sea by giving up their names and forms, so also the illumined soul (who has realized *Brahman*), having become freed from name and form, reaches the self-effulgent *Puruṣa* that is higher than the higher (*Māyā*)',

which speaks of the sublation of the 'world' by knowledge of *Brahman*, it is to be concluded that unsublatedness in respect of the world is unsublatedness until there arises knowledge of *Brahman*. That is to say perception gives us knowledge of the objects of the world as empirically 'real' / *vyavahārika-satya*.⁴³² However, what has been called the '*vācārambhana-śruti*' of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.4, indicates that worldly 'objects' could never have unsublatedness forever, i.e. are not absolutely

⁴³¹ *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.3.8, 'yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre' stam gacchanti nāmarūpe vihāya; tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parāt param puruṣam upaiti divyam'.

⁴³² Empirically 'real' / *vyavahārika-satya*.

real/have '*paramārthika-satya*. Hence, it turns out that there is no conflict between this "*vācārambhana-śruti*" and 'perception'/*pratyakṣa*.

Bhāskara on the other hand argues that the world is 'real' and definitely not 'non-real', *mithyā* or *anirvacanīya*. He says it is true that knowledge of silver in a shell is perceptual knowledge but is fully sublated by one cognising the true nature of the substratum, that is, the shell. The absence of sublating cognition and the defect shows that knowledge of the pot etc. is valid, so the pot too is not non-real, as with every object of the world.⁴³³

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya counters by saying that the world cannot be viewed as real because subsequent to its perceptual cognition, there does not occur any sublating cognition. So, for example, there may be perceptual cognition of the moon as of limited size, and subsequently no cognition sublating this. This, however, is never grounds for considering the cognition of limited size to be valid or its content to be real. However, *āgama* texts do give rise to the knowledge of the moon as of great size, which sublates the cognition of the moon as of limited size.

⁴³³ *Bhāskara-Bhāṣya* p.94, '*katham vā mithyātvam avagatam. Na tāvat pratakṣānumānābhyām. tābhyām hīdam prapañcajātaṁ paricchinnam. Na cātra karaṇadoṣabādhakapratyayau staḥ. Pṛthivyādijñānasya āsaṁsāraṁ sarveṣāṁ prāṇinām anuvṛtteḥ. ataḥ pāramrthika evāyam bhedaḥ tannibandhanasya vyavahāraḥ*'. cf. PV, 428 l.19ff.

Thus, on the basis of this sublating cognition it is assumed that distance constitutes the defect of perceptual knowledge of the moon as of limited size. So as long as one experiences phenomenal existence no perceptual cognition sublates that cognition and yet it is not considered valid or its content real. Hence Bhāskara's claim that perceptual cognition of the objects of the world as valid and its content is real on grounds of there being no subsequent perceptual cognition sublating it, is incorrect.⁴³⁴

Indeed, *śrutis* like *Chāndogya* 6.1.4⁴³⁵,

'All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only. Earth as such is the reality/*vācārambhanam* '

lead to the cognition that the worldly objects are not real, thus sublating perception of them and resulting in the removal of the false notion/*avidyā* that 'the world is real'. It follows that this false notion, which continues while one is in the

⁴³⁴ PV p.428, l.20-23, '*tatra yadi pratyakṣabādhābhāvāt satyatvam abhipretam, tadā candrapradeśikatvaṅvarṇa-dairghyādidehādyaṅtmabhāvānām api satyatvaprasaṅgaḥ. Teṣām āsaṅsāram anuvṛtteḥ*' on BS 2.1.14, '*tad anayatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ.*' There is non-difference of those (cause and effect) on account of the texts about origin etc.' Swami Gambirananda (1996). *BSB Advaita Ashrama*. Calcutta.

⁴³⁵ *Chāndogya* 6.1., '*vācārambhanam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛtiketyeva satyam*'.

transmigratory realm, is no way valid and its content that the world is 'not real', for it is non-real only.⁴³⁶

A further important argument Bhāskara puts forward is an inferential proof that knowledge of *Brahman* too is 'unreal' according to *Advaita*, so it cannot be a means to *mokṣa*. **Knowledge of *Brahman* too is 'non-real'; because it has originated from *avidyā* (which even the *upaniṣads* must be, as aspects of name and form/ 'nāma-rūpaiva' *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.8); like knowledge of the world'**⁴³⁷

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya answers that true it is that knowledge of *Brahman* as such is 'nonreal' simply because it is only a 'mental state' which arises in response to hearing the *mahāvākya*ni/major texts of the *upaniṣads* inspired by the reflection of *Brahman* in them. That mental state being a modification of the *upādhi*/limiting adjunct mind, is a product of *avidyā* and so is non-real, and 'mediate' and thus too knowledge of *Brahman* as such is 'non-real'. However, through (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*

⁴³⁶ *ibid.* 1.23ff., 'atha tatra ānumānikasya āgamikasya vā bādhasya vidyamānatvāt tata doṣasyāpi kalpyamānatvād asatyatā sadā siddhau avagamyate. Tarhi ihāpi āgamānumānayoṛ upanyastatvād avidyādoṣasya ca sambhāvitatvāt prāg anirjñātam api mithyātvam avagamyatām'.

⁴³⁷ Bhāskara-Bhāṣya p.34, 'brahma-jñānaṁ mithyā jñānatvāt prapañcajñānavat', cf PV, p.428

2.4.5). **'Listening, reflection and profound meditation on them to unite with them'**⁴³⁸/*śravanam, manana and nididhyāsanam'*

It can be experienced as 'immediate' and 'direct', so its content or substratum *Brahman* is real.

The *upaniṣadic* texts like,⁴³⁹

'secret name (*upaniṣad*) is 'The Truth of truth.' The vital force is truth, and it is the Truth of that'⁴⁴⁰

state that *Brahman* is absolutely real, so the reality of the content of knowledge of *Brahman* enables it to be the means to *mokṣa*/liberation.

If then Bhāskara was seeking to establish that knowledge of *Brahman* as such is 'non-real', this is already accepted by *Advaitins*. His argument then suffers from *siddhasādhana*/proving of anything already proved or the performance of mystical or magical rites. On the other hand, if he wishes to claim that the 'content' of

⁴³⁸ *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad* 2.4.5, *ātma vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavya nididhyāsitaḥ...*

⁴³⁹ *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 6.8.7, *'Tat satyam'*.

⁴⁴⁰ *Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad* 2.1.2, *'tasyopaniṣad satyasya satyam, prāṇā vai satyam teṣāṃ satyam'*.

knowledge is 'non-real' then his argument is sublated by⁴⁴¹ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, who rejects the argument of Bhāskara that scripture too is a *mithyāpadārtha*, like the horn of a hare by importantly clarifying the concept of *mithyātva*/non-reality. *Raju-sarpa*/ rope snake is not an absolute 'nothing' but a non-real sublated by perceptual knowledge,

'This is only rope and not a snake'. Once a trustworthy person/*guru* instructs that, then there arises mediate knowledge, 'it is not a snake', though the cognition 'snake' will continue. However, the false notion of its reality will be removed. That which can be sublated by perceptual knowledge is *mithyā*/non-real. The horn of a hare, on the other hand, cannot be sublated by perceptual knowledge, so it is *tuccha* / not *mithyā*. Hence, the world and scripture of which it is a part is *mithyā*/non-eternal, still having practical efficiency existing until there arises knowledge of *Brahman*.⁴⁴²

⁴⁴¹ *Upaniṣadic* texts which speak of *Brahman* as real. ⁵³⁶ PV p.428-9 l.25 ff., 'yathoktam brahmajñānam api tarhi mithyā syāt , avidyāprastūtatvāt jñānatvād vā prapañcājñānavad iti , tad atiphalgu. Svarūpamithyātvāsādhane siddhasāadhanatvāt,viṣayamithyātvāsādhane ca āgamabādhitvāt'.

⁴⁴² *ibid.*p.429 l.1ff., 'yac ca mithyāśabdasya tucchārthakatvaṁ grhītvā āgamasyābodhakatvādivaganam, tat, pararahasyāvijñānavijṛmbhitam iti upahasanti sujñāḥ. tathā hi - mithyātvaṁ nāma bādhavatam. Tac cājñānakāryasya pratyakṣabādhē jñānanivartyatvam. Parokṣabādhē mayākārye paramārthasatyatvavaidhuryaprakāṭikaraṇam. Na ca tādrśamithyātvāvīśiṣṭasādhakriyāyām kācit kṣatiḥ , ghasyevānityatāvīśiṣṭasya ...'

To recap, from the standpoint of absolute reality, the entire world is non-real or *mithyā*, but prior to the rise of knowledge of *Brahman* an internal distinction is made and certain factors are sublated when the knower exists. The dream state and the erroneous cognition of *śukti -rūpya* / shell-silver etc., are under this category. However, the sublating cognition is other than the knowledge of *Brahman*. These factors are ‘apparently real’/*prātibhāsika-satya*. Factors other than the above are sublated along with the ‘knower’ and include objects of the waking state and are termed ‘empirically real’/*vyavahārika-satya*. Knowledge of *Brahman* is the sublating cognition.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains with an analogy. Although milk and wine are liquid substances, yet the drinking of milk does not cause intoxication, while wine drinking does because each has a specific characteristic of its own.

In light of this, the drinking of wine in a state of dream does not require a propitiatory rite as it possesses only ‘apparent reality’, while in a state of waking a propitiatory rite is needed due to its being ‘empirically real’.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴³ PV p.429 l.8 ff., ‘kṣīrasurādīnām dravyadravyatāvīśeṣe’pi avāntaravāilakṣaṇyāt arthakriyāsāmarthyabhedavat svapnajāgaritayoḥ mithyātāvīśeṣo’pi avāntaravāilakṣaṇyāt arthakriyāsāmarthyavīśeṣopapatteḥ’ cf also p.424, l.15 ff., ‘yadā svapna eva śuktyādi satyam rūpyādy asatyam ityavāntaravibhāgo na viruddhyate ...’

For the attainment of the knowledge of non-duality the empirical differences in the form of the scriptures as the authority, the *Guru* as the instructor, and the disciple as the receiver of the instruction are essential.

However, it is not necessary that the *Guru etc.* should be real in the absolute sense and should never be sublated. True knowledge often arises from what is not absolutely true. For example, as Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.232⁴⁴⁴,

‘the qualities of sound such as length, etc. being superimposed on letters, the apprehension of the correct meaning is seen as a result, because of the letters being qualified by length, etc. even though they are illusory (in the absolute sense)’. According to the *Naiyāyikas*, there cannot be measures such as short and long for sound, which is a quality, even though sound according the *Bhāttas*⁴⁴⁵ is a substance such measures are not possible because it is all pervasive. Nonetheless measure appears to exist because of illusion and from that correct knowledge is seen to arise....’ **Though ‘the reflection of a lamp in water is unreal as such, its**

⁴⁴⁴ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.232, ‘*dhvanidharmasya dairghyādeḥ varṇeṣu samāropitatvena tad dharmatayā mithyātve’pi dairghyādiviśiṣṭām eva varṇānām vyutpannatvāt satyabodhakatā iṣṭā’.*

⁴⁴⁵ *Bhāttas*, followers of Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, (fl.700) the great mīmāṃsaka scholar

capacity to lead to the inference of a lamp existing outside the water is seen in the world'⁴⁴⁶.

Similarly, the indication of a real result by a dream has been pointed by Bādarāyaṇa or Vyāsa in *Brahma-sūtra* 3.2.4⁴⁴⁷,

'A dream is also an omen, for so it is known from the *Upaniṣads*, and experts say so'.

Thus, even from what is unreal, real knowledge does arise. Further to this, by virtue of the statement in the *śruti* text, *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.8.⁴⁴⁸,

'As rivers flowing down, become indistinguishable on reaching the sea by giving up their names and forms, so also the illumined soul, having become freed from name and form, reaches the self-effulgent *Puruṣa* that is higher than the higher (*Māyā*) 'say that the universe comprised of names and forms is negated by knowledge, it follows that the universe is *mithyā* (neither real nor unreal)'.

It is said by Vimuktātman in *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p.39⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁶ ibid. p.91, '*jalāpantārtipradīpapratibimbasya viśiṣṭarūpeṇāsatyasyāpi jalānantavartidīpānumāpakatā loke dṛṣṭā*'.

⁴⁴⁷ *Brahma-sūtra* 3.2.4, '*Mūcakaśca hi śruter ācakṣate ca tadvidah*'.

⁴⁴⁸ *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.8, '*yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre*' *stam gacchanti nāmarūpe vihāya; tathā vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parāt param puruṣam upaiti divyam*'.

⁴⁴⁹ *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p.39, '*jñānamātrāpanodyatvaṁ nānyathā bandharūpyayo*'.

The removal of bondage and (illusory) silver by mere knowledge is not possible otherwise’.

It follows from the universe being *mithyā* (neither real nor unreal) that like nacre-silver it is also indeterminable as unreal or real.

However, this ‘indeterminability’ has first to be established in the case of an illusion. So first we will set out the different theories and present the refutations given by Vimuktātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya before establishing the theory of indeterminability/*anirvacanīyatvam*.

4 iib) Theories of misapprehension or erroneous cognition/

khyāti

These are summarized by Vimuktātman in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*.⁴⁵⁰ **‘Some consider the silver that appears in an illusion as ‘real/sat’, others as ‘unreal/asat’**

⁴⁵⁰ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.218

and yet other as 'indeterminable/*anirvacanīya*. Hence, the need for them to be examined. The three theories which come under the category 'cognition of the existent' /*sat khyāti* are:

i) *ātma-khyāti*/ self-cognition,

ii) *a-khyāti*/non-apprehension and

iii.) *anyathā-khyāti*/misapprehension, i.e. asserting that something is not really what it appears to be according to sensual perception.

The remaining two are

iv.) *asat-khyāti*/cognition of the non-existent or unreal, and

v.) *anirvacanīya-khyāti/cognition of the indeterminable.*

The first four are to be rejected and the last accepted and established, according to both Vimuktātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Iṣṭasiddhi* and the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* respectively.

4 iiic) *ātma-khyāti/ self-cognition*

This is said to be the view of the Buddhists, that ‘Silver does appear as ‘This is silver’. Vimuktātman in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁴⁵¹ states, ‘This silver is real because it is cognized like any other cognition’. This theory concludes that silver in the form of internal cognition appears as if outside, and this is the illusion.

However, there is no proof that silver is only in the form of a cognition and the experience of the illusion as ‘This is silver’ is not proof of this. The cognition appears as existing in front, but with no hint of being internal. Underlining these views of *Iṣṭasiddhi* is Ānandānubhava’s (fl.1190 A.D.) commentary on Vimuktātman

⁴⁵¹ ibid. p.40, ‘*idaṃ rūpyaṃ sat, khyāteḥ, khyātyantaravat*’.

in *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī* ⁴⁵² saying, ‘**The perception (of the silver) as an external object negates the theory that the object is nothing but mental (or inner cognition)**’

and Ānandabodha (fl.1150 A.D.), pupil of Vimuktātman in his *Nyāyamakaranda*.⁴⁵³ In turn, commented on by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Samgraha*,

‘Since the appearance of the false external form of the silver has necessarily to have a substratum, it is not logical’.

4. ivd) *a-khyāti*/non-apprehension

This theory is attributed to the *Prābhākāras*/followers of the great *Mīmāṃsaka* guru Prabhākāra (late 6th century A.D.). For them, the *Iṣṭasiddhi* ⁵⁴⁹says ‘there are two cognitions in ‘This is silver’ and not only one. Of them, the cognition as ‘this’ comes from the sense organs and it has for its object the ‘this’ aspect of the ‘*nacra*’ in front of the eye. The cognition of silver is ‘recollection’ *smṛti*. As Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya

⁴⁵² *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*, p.161, ‘*dhīrūpasādhanam tu bahiṣṭvapratītibādhitam*’.

⁴⁵³ *Nyāyamakaranda*, p.100, ‘*rajatasya asatyāyā eva bāhyatāyāḥ pratibhāsasyāśrayanīyatvena ayuktam*’ ⁵⁴⁹ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.42, ‘*dve ete dhiyau na ekaiva.tatredam iti akṣajā purovasthitasūktīdam anśaviṣayāḥ; rūpyadhīḥ smṛtiḥ*’.

points out in his *IṣṭasiddhiVivaraṇa*⁴⁵⁴, 'Due to some defect in the mind, the fact that it is only recollection is obscured and it stands as mere apprehension/*grahaṇarūpaiva*'. As Vimuktātman puts it in his *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁴⁵⁵, 'the two cognitions 'this' and 'silver' which are both real give rise to their both being looked upon as erroneous/*anyathārtha*', (due to non-discrimination between the two cognitions).

According to the theory of *a-khyāti*, because of the non-apprehension of difference, the composite consciousness is accepted directly without intervention of so-called 'illusory' knowledge, so even the cognition 'this is not silver' negates only the 'idea' of identity. According to this theory, there is no 'illusion' or erroneous cognition.

In refutation of *a-khyāti* Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya points out in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-*

*Vivaraṇa*⁴⁵⁶:

⁴⁵⁴ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.62, '*mānasadoṣavaśāt pramuṣitasmaraṇābhimānavat grahaṇarūpaiva avatiṣṭhate*'.

⁴⁵⁵ *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p.42, '*tena idamrūpyajñāne yathārthe ayathārtha-vyavahāraṇi*'.

⁴⁵⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.152, '*vidyamānāpyakhyātiḥ agnipaiṅgalvat bahir aṅgam, na kāryahetuḥ. Yadi khyātau satyām api akhyātyabhāvōparādhenā bedhāgrahāparādhenā na pravṛttiḥ syāt tadā tatrākhyātiḥ hetutvena kalpyeta; na tu tathā' sti. Akhyātau tu satyām api khyātv abhāvāt susupttau pravṛttir na dṛṣṭā. ataḥ khyātir eva pravṛttihetuḥ*'.

Even if there is *a-khyāti* (non-apprehension) it is an external factor, like the reddish brown colour of fire and is not the cause of any effect. For even when there is cognition, there is no activity because of the absence of apprehension of difference, it could be said that non-apprehension is the cause, but that is not true. In deep sleep, even though there is non-apprehension no activity is seen because of the absence of cognition. Therefore cognition/*khyāti* alone is the cause of activity.

In this way the theory of *a-khyāti* is proved untenable.

4. ve) *Anyathākhyāti*/misapprehension/cognition differently,

i.e., asserting that something is not really what it

appears to be according to sensual perception

Anyathākhyāti is the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*'s theory. Before considering this, it will be well to consider Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's general criticisms of their categories. The school

holds firstly that whatever is known has real existence, which is totally opposed to the *Advaita* view that everything except *Brahman* is non-real/*mithyā*. Our author shows that all the categories put forward are faulty, so none can be considered real. The very purpose of definition, to have knowledge of the object to be defined, does not stand logical scrutiny, since definition is only a specific characteristic which is present in the object defined. However, the knowledge of the object that is defined could be had only when we have knowledge of the definition, so we have the defect of 'mutual dependence/*parasparāśrayāpātāt*.⁴⁵⁷ Given that the purpose of definition is to distinguish the object defined from other objects and the definition of a substance is possession of quality/*guṇatvam* distinction from non-substance is to be inferred in the substance.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says further that one cannot have knowledge of a 'non-substance' unless one has knowledge of a substance, just as one cannot recognize untruth unless one knows truth. So, only when the definition of a substance is known can one have knowledge of a substance and, thus, knowledge of

⁴⁵⁷PV p.507 1.1ff., '*lakṣaṇam ca na lakṣyasvapāvāgataye, parasparāśrayāpātāt. lakṣyaniṣṭhatayā dṛṣṭasya lakṣaṇatvam, tad balāc ca lakṣyadrṣṭir iti*' on BS 2.2.17, '*aparigrahāc cātyantam anapekṣā*'. 'The theory of atom as the cause is to be entirely ignored, since it is not accepted by the worthy'.

non-substance. So, only when there is knowledge of non-substance in this way arises the function of definition of substance to distinguish it from non-substance. Thus, the defect of 'mutual-dependence/*parasparāśrayāpātāt* is clear.⁴⁵⁸ He explains that it is only when the distinction between a quality/*guṇa* and substance/*dravya* is known can one have the knowledge that substance is the substratum of a quality and then one can.⁴⁵⁹

Furthermore, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya shows that the very classification by the *Vaiśeṣika* school of six categories, substance, quality, action, universal, particularity and inherence, is defective because *śakti* has been proved to be a separate category. Similarly, the list of 'substances' as nine is also defective as *tamas* also has been proved to be a separate substance.

Further, the 'qualities' are said to be twenty-four but apart from them there are qualities like 'valour' etc. So, if the response is to say this can be included as one

⁴⁵⁸ *ibid.* p.507 l.3ff., 'nāpi dravyalakṣaṇam adravyavyāvṛttaye.siddhe dravyalakṣaṇe tat pratiyogikādravyasiddhiḥ, tat siddhai ca tad vyāvṛttaye dravyalakṣaṇam iti parasparāśrayāpātāt.

⁴⁵⁹ 'Knowledge of the distinction between quality and substance' PV p.507 l.11, 'guṇavat/guṇa dravyam iti vyavahartavyam, guṇāśrayatvāt, na yad evaṁ na tad evam, yathā vastvantaram iti, tad api pralāpamātram. Hetor asiddhatvāt . Siddhe dravyaguṇavibhāge tad āśritatvasiddhiḥ. Tad balāc ca guṇātirikṭadavyasiddhir iti itaretarāśrayatā'. kkkkkk9

of the twenty four then it is easier to assume that everything can be included under one principle, *sat* or *Brahman*.⁴⁶⁰

The defect of ‘mutual-dependence/*parasparāśrayāpātāt* is further demonstrated in considering the category ‘universal’/*sāmānya*, e.g. pot-ness. However, in order that it may be known as present in all pots, it requires knowledge of the latter. So, pots are known as the ‘revealing media’ of ‘pot-ness’.⁴⁶¹

Finally, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya argues that one of the key categories of the *Nyāya* school, *pramāṇa* is also not sound. This is defined by Bhāskara as all-knower/*sarvajña* in his *Nyāyasūtra* as ‘the instrument of valid knowledge’.⁴⁶²

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya questions the meaning of ‘*samyaganubhava*’. If it stands for ‘knowledge of real objects’, one must ask whether that ‘real object’ is known through a *pramāṇa* or not. If the first, it could only be when the definition of a *pramāṇa* is known that there will result knowledge of the real object through the

⁴⁶⁰ *ibid.* p.508 1.4 ff., ‘*tamasāś ca dravyatvam asādhīti na navaiiva dravyāṇi.kāṇād ādiparipaṭhitaguṇātirikṭās ca guṇāḥ krauryaśauryādaya upalabhyante. antarbhāvakaḥpanāyām ca satyaikasmin sā laghīyasī*’.

⁴⁶¹ *ibid.*, ‘*siddhe vyaktibhede anugatasiddhiḥ tatsiddhau ca tadvyāñjakatvena vyaktisiddhir iti parasparāśrayāpātāt na sāmānyasiddhiḥ*’.

⁴⁶² *Nyāyasūtra*, p.10, ‘*samyaganubhavasādhanam pramāṇam*’.

very function of that *pramāṇa*. Similarly, it is only when knowledge of the real object occurs that one could have knowledge of *pramāṇa* as its instrument.

The second alternative also does not hold good because the *Nyāya* school accept that it is only on the strength of a *pramāṇa* an object is properly known.⁴⁶³

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya having proved the definitions and categories of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school to be faulty, it is evident that the real nature of things cannot be arrived at through such a school. The whole world consisting of name and form though given in experience and *prasiddha* is not ultimately valid or *pramāṇa-siddha*. Such is the real implication of the *vivarta-vāda* of *Advaita*.

It is in relation to this that the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.1⁴⁶⁴ of Ādi Śaṅkara states, **‘But some others say where there is superimposition of one thing on another, the latter, (the substratum) itself is fancied as having some opposite attribute’.**

⁴⁶³ PV p.562 l.11ff, ‘*tatra samyaganubhavaśabdena kiṃ satyārthapratibhāso vivakṣitaḥ...l.18.kiṃ ca satyārthatvam api pramāṇāt, uta apramāṇāt. Ādye parasparāśrayaḥ. Dvitiye pramāṇabalenaiva vastusiddhir iti niyamahāniḥ’.*

⁴⁶⁴ *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* PV p.8, ‘*anye tu yatra yad adhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparītadharmakalpanām ācakṣate’.*⁵⁶¹ *Bhāmatī*, p.30, ‘*yatra śūktikādaḥ, yasya-majater adhyāsaḥ tasyaiva śūktikādeḥ, viparītakalpanānirajatatvadharmakalpanām iti yajñā’.*

On this, Vācaspatimiśra in his *Bhāmatī*⁴⁶⁵, says,

'The meaning is that, in nacre etc. there is superimposition of silver etc. fancying an opposite attribute, i.e. of 'silverness' in the nacre'.

Vimuktātman also mentions it in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁴⁶⁶ 'Therefore it has to be accepted that nacre which is real appears in the form of silver, another real thing'.

4. vif) Four different forms of the *Anyathākhyāti*/

misapprehension theory and their refutation by Vimuktātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Iṣṭasiddhi* and the *Iṣṭasiddhi-*

Vivarāṇa

⁴⁶⁵ *Bhāmatī*, p.30., 'yatra śuktikādaḥ, yasya-mrajater adhyāsaḥ tasyaiva śuktikādeḥ, viparītakalpanānrajjatavadharmakalpanām iti yajñā'.

⁴⁶⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.46, 'tasmāt śuktikā satī, sadantararūpyātmanā khyāti ityabhyupeyam'.

The cognition of an object that has become different’/Anyathābhūtasya
vastunaḥ khyāti

The view that *Anyathākhyāti*/misapprehension/cognition differently, is the cognition of an object which has become something else and cannot apply to an actual happening.

Here, the question is: is the becoming of the same object as another object meant here?

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* shows that this is not possible. For being the same object and a different object are opposed to each other like darkness and light, so cannot happen in the same thing. This is due to the fact that being ‘that’ and being ‘different’ are contradictory like a pot and its destruction’.⁴⁶⁷ If such a possibility were to be accepted, then everything could always become something else, an absurdity that could in no way be countenanced.

Another alternative explanation of this view is that it means the becoming of a different object as different. This too clearly does not stand to reason.

⁴⁶⁷ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, p.235, ‘tathābhāvānyathābhāvayoḥ ghaṭatpradhvaṇsayor iva virodhāt’.

Or the view that something of one nature becoming of another nature suffers from the defect of infinite regression. So, just as the second change of form is with reference to a previous form, so the previous form would be the modification of another earlier form, which in turn would be the modification of yet another earlier form ad-infinitum, so that no change is in fact established at all.

So, it has been said both in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁴⁶⁸ and the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, 'Neither for a thing of that form nor for what is of another form is there becoming something else. For one thing cannot become another. So it is mere illusion'.

Thus, the view of the supporters of *Anyathākhyāti* that nacre is cognized as silver is not cogent. As Vimuktātman⁴⁶⁹ says,

'Nacre cannot become something else, nor even attain the nature of another, viz. silver. So, the apprehension of one as another is, in fact, mere māyā/illusion needs to be accepted'.

⁴⁶⁸ *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p.225, 'tasmān nāsty anythā bhāva:bhavato'bhavato'pi vā. Na cānyasyānythābhāvaḥ māyāmātram asau tataḥ'.

⁴⁶⁹ *ibid.* p.235, 'nāto'nyathā bhavecchuktiḥ nānyarūpyātmatām gatā. ato'nyasyānyathākhyātiḥ māyāmātram itīṣyatām'.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya⁴⁷⁰ further says, ‘The taking of another form is established, as otherwise the meaningfulness of the scriptures which prescribe *karma* and *jñāna*/knowledge can’t be upheld’. So, we find in the *śruti* text, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.1.2.⁴⁷¹

‘(The organ of speech ... is the Supreme *Brahman* ... knowing thus, meditate upon it ...) becoming a god one attains to the gods’,

and in the *smṛti* text *BGītā*, 8.6⁴⁷²

‘O son of Kuntī, whatever a person thinks of when giving up the body, that very entity he attains, having always been absorbed in the thought of it’.

Since real transformation into another form is impossible, scriptures cannot transform an object; they only instruct and do not create. As Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya⁴⁷³ goes on to say, ‘It is clear to even cowherds, even without scriptures, that they should focus their efforts on the attainment of happiness and

⁴⁷⁰ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, p.247, ‘jñāna-karma-vidhāyakaśāstrārthavattvānyathānupapatyā anyathābhāvaṃ sādhayati’.

⁴⁷¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.1.2, ‘*devo bhūtvā devān apy eti*’.

⁴⁷² *BGītā*, 8.6, ‘*yaṃ yaṃ vāpi smaran bhāvaṃ tyajaty ante kalevaram.tan tam evaipi kaunteya sadā tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ*’.

⁴⁷³ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, p.248, ‘*sukhaduḥkhaprāptiparihārau mayā sampādanīyau iti śāstraṃ vinaiva bhṛntyā gopālāder api siddham*’.

dispelling misery, because of illusion'. The scripture merely teaches this end can be achieved by this means/*idam anena sādhyam* but does not declare them to be real.

The key point is that the attainment of the nature of *Brahman* is not something new, only the removal of the wrong notion that it has not been attained, hence the

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4.4.6⁴⁷⁴,

'the man who does not desire never transmigrates... Being *Brahman* Itself, one attains *Brahman*'.

It follows that immutability is not affected by the sense of doership etc. experienced due to delusion. Hence, Ādi Śaṅkara's statement in the *Adhyāsabhāṣyam*,⁴⁷⁵

'... when there is superimposition of one thing on another, the latter is not touched in the least by the merits and demerits of the thing superimposed'.

Therefore, it is established that this first meaning of *Anyathākhyāti* that the cognition of an object which has become different or something else cannot apply to an actual happening is not reasonable.

⁴⁷⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.6 "Brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti".

⁴⁷⁵ PV BS 1.1.1. *Adhyāsabhāṣyam* , 'tatraivaṃ sati yatra yad adhyāsaḥ tat kṛtena doṣeṇa guṇeṇa vā aṇumātreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate'.

4. viig) *Anyathākhyāti* as the cognition that exhibits an object differently/*arthasya anyathākhyāpanam*.

This view is only meaningful if the transformation of one thing into another can be established. Vimuktātman⁴⁷⁶ says,

‘Since cognition/*jñāna* is in itself without form, the exhibition as another object has to be attributed to the limiting adjunct in the form of that object’.

So, the impossibility of an object becoming something else has been already proved, it follows that exhibition/*khyāpanam* of an object differently by the cognition has to also be rejected as contrary to reason.

The unreasonableness of this view is clearly brought out by the analogy of a blind man witnessing a dance. Vimuktātman⁴⁷⁷ explains further:

⁴⁷⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhi*-p.263, ‘*jñānasya svato nirākāratvāt arthopahādrikam evānyathākhyāpanam vacyam*’.

⁴⁷⁷ *ibid*.p.255, ‘*grhyate*’*vartamāno*’*rtho vartamānadhīyā yadi.avartamānayā buddhyā vartamānagraho na kim. Syāc ced andho*’*pi sampaśyēt pūrvabuddhyā nartanam.nedādīm sāsti cen mā bhūt pūrvam tvāsīd ghaṭo yathā*’.

If an object which is not present is cognized by a present knowledge, why cannot an object which is present be cognized by a knowledge which is not present? If it could be, then even a blind person would be able to witness a present dance by his past vision. If it is said that it, the dance, is not present now, let it not be; it existed earlier, like a pot.

It is pointed out that even a defect will certainly not reveal a thing which is not present. This is expressed in *Iṣṭasiddhi* ⁴⁷⁸

‘through a defective knowledge of an object which is present can arise, but with a non-existent thing that is not possible’.

The *Naiyāyikas* include ‘similarity’ (e.g. of nacre and silver) as a cause of illusion, but this is roundly rejected by both *Vimuktātman* and *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya*. *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁴⁷⁹ states,

‘If illusion arises from a defect, what need to posit the cognition of a similar object?’ So, in the creation of illusions it is pointed out that ‘similarity is not the

⁴⁷⁸ *ibid.* p.259, ‘doṣāc ca bodhanaṃ satte sattve nāsattve yujyate tataḥ’.

⁴⁷⁹ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.281, ‘doṣād bhramaś cet kiṃ tena sadṛśārthagraheṇa te’.

'cause' as in 'the conch is yellow' *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*⁴⁸⁰ extends the argument to refer to the central concepts in *Advaita* of *anvaya-vyatireka*:

The relationship of cause and effect is indeed determined by the method of affirmation and negation/ *anvaya-vyatireka*. Since that is not there in similarity it is concluded that it is not the cause- e.g 'the conch is yellow'.

4. viii.h) The third postulation about *anyathākhyāti*, that 'the cognition itself becomes something else' / *svayam eva jñānasya anyathābhāva*, as the rise of the cognition of silver in nacre.

This is categorically rejected by Vimuktātman in the third chapter of *Iṣṭasiddhi* and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*. The cognition of an object as

⁴⁸⁰ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, p.287, '*anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ hi kāryakaraṇabhāvāvadhāraṇam.sādṛśye tad abhāvāt na kāraṇam ity upapādayati - śaṅkhaḥ pītaḥ*'.

something else has just been rejected while dealing with the second definition, so it follows that this definition too is untenable;

It is proper that what is spoken of as 'cognition of silver' has silver as its basis ... If the cognition of silver has arisen from nacre, why could it not be cognition of nacre itself? Therefore the birth of the cognition of one object in another is not becoming something else.⁴⁸¹

Other than the illusion, 'This is silver', no cognition is experienced which manifest the nacre as well as the idea of silver. So, there is no knowledge in the form, 'cognition of silver appears as if relating to nacre'. Thus, it is established that the 'third definition' is also unreasonable.

⁴⁸¹ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.289, 'evam rūpyadhīḥ ityukte tasyām rūpālambantvam eva nyāyyam iti katham śuktyālambanatā syāt. Tad uktam 'śuktidhīr eva kim na syāt rūpyadhīḥ 'śuktijā yadi. Tasmād dhiyo 'nyathābhāva nānyatrānyadhiyo janiḥ'.

4. ix.i) The fourth postulation about *anyathākhyāti*, 'the cognition of an object as another object which is its negation' / *ekasya vastunaḥ svābhāvavastvantarātmanā khyātiś ca.*, examined in the fifth chapter of *Iṣṭasiddhi*

Here, Vimuktatman is presenting the doctrine that⁴⁸²:

In this view nacre which is real appears in the form of another reality, silver....

Negation of an object is nothing but a different object ... So in this particular

form of *anyathākhyāti*, even when both are existent, the position is, as nacre,

the object of right cognition and it is the object of illusory cognition in the

form of its negation, silver.

Therefore, the fourth definition of *anyathākhyāti*, based on the theory that non-existence is existence in another form, is unsound.

⁴⁸² *Iṣṭasiddhi*. P.46, 'asmin pakṣe śuktiḥ satī sad antararūpyātmanā bhāsate....abhāvo nāma na bhāvāt pṛthag asti.....tathā asmin pakṣe anyathākhyātivīśeṣarūpe dvayoḥ sattvō'pi 'śuktiḥ svātmanā samyagjñānasya viśayaḥ 'svābhāvarūpyātmanā bhrāntijñānasya viśayaḥ' iti vyavasthā'.

So, the four alternative definitions of *anyathākhyāti* having been refuted, it is established that this theory is not viable. Hence, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*⁴⁸³ explains,

The piece of nacre that is not capable of appearing as silver, does in fact not appear as that, while the silver which does appear is not something else. Hence, the statement ‘cognition as something else’ is contradictory like the statement ‘my mother is a barren woman’.

Thus, the three theories of *sat-khyāti*, i.e. *ātma-khyāti*/ self-cognition, *a-khyāti*/ non-apprehension and *anyathākhyāti*/misapprehension/cognition differently, previously outlined, having been refuted, so the theory of *a-sat-khyāti* is now to be considered.

⁴⁸³ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.293, ‘yat śuktiśakalam rūpyātmanā khyāty anarham tat, tad ātmanā na khyāty eva. Yac ca rūpyam bhāti tat anyathā na bhavati.tasmāt “khyātiḥ atha cānyathā’ iti gīḥ ‘mātā vandhyā mama’ - itivat viruddhā’.

4. x.j) The theory of *a-sat-khyāti*/ cognition of the non-existent or unreal

Vimuktātman states that the object/*padārtha* which appears as ‘this is silver’/*idam rūpyam* in an illusion is certainly non-existent/*tucharūpa*. Its non-existent nature is known from the fact of its being sublated/assimilated into the larger entity/*bādhena* in the form, ‘This is not silver’. A knowledge reveals/*bodhayet* an object/*vastu*; it does not destroy it. Vimuktatman⁴⁸⁴ further states, ‘Sublation of course does not destroy an object, since knowledge only reveals the reality’. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya⁴⁸⁵ then develops the argument further by saying:

‘[T]he doubt about only absence of existence being shown by sublation and not its non-existence is removed by showing the absence of existence is in fact nonexistence ... Therefore, it is only non-existent silver that is revealed in an illusion ... Therefore too it has to be accepted that even in an illusion there is no cognition of anything other than *māyā* and so the silver is only *māyā* or indeterminate.’

⁴⁸⁴ *Iṣṭasiddhi*. p.154, ‘*na bādho vastu nāśayati, tattvanivedakatvāj jñānasya*’.

⁴⁸⁵ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.198. ‘...*tasmāt tuccham eva rūpyam bhrāntyaṃ bhāti ...*’

So, the statement, 'The non-existent does not shine' is not a self-contradiction due to the denial of the cognition of anything other than the cognition of the non-existence of the nature of *māyā*.

Moreover, a non-existent thing cannot be expressed by a word. The relationship of 'signifier' / *vācaka* and 'thing signified' / *vācya* can exist only in respect of two existent things. When the thing signified does not exist, (like the 'silver' or the 'snake'), how can the signifier produce knowledge of it? If it were to be obstinately asserted that a non-entity can be signified by a word then there would be abandonment of its very basis. The object would then not be non-existent because it then becomes capable of being signified (by a word). 'Non-existent' having no existence apart from the word, a relationship of signifier and signified is impossible, for such a relationship is only possible when both exist.

4. xi.k) Śabdādvaita and its refutation

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*⁴⁸⁶ explained above that, 'if the signified and the signifier is non-different there cannot be signifier-signified relationship' in response to which the nihilist/śūnya-vādī, using the grammarian's argument claims that "the word itself is the signified and the signified". So, the word 'word' while signifying all words other than itself, signifies itself too. Likewise, the relationship signifier signified is considered as for one and the same thing, the sound called 'sphoṭa' 'crowned by them in the place of Brahman in the 'empire of non-duality' /advitīyatvasāmrājye⁴⁸⁷ However, in line with Ādi Śaṅkara in his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* 1.iii.28,

⁴⁸⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.199, 'abhinne vācye vācyavācakabhāvo na sambhavatītyuktam tatra vaiyākaraṇamatāvalambanena śūnyavādī pratyavatiṣṭhate atrāheti'.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 'śabda eva vaktā vācyaś ceti manyante Svasaiva vācyatvaṁ vācakatvaṁ ca śabda-śabdavat - vyavasthāpayanti.'śabda:' itīdaṁ padaṁ svetarat sarvaṁ śabdajātaṁ vadat svam api (śabdaśabdam) vadati yathā, tad vat ekasyaiva vācyavācakabhāvo bhavatu. sphoṭākhyah śabda eva brahmasthāne tair abhiṣicyate advitīyatvasāmrājye.'

'it is selfcontradictory for the same thing to be both the signified and the signifier since one thing cannot be at the same time the subject as well as the object'.

Their statement that 'the word itself is *Brahman* ' as distinguished from the the Śruti statement "**The Word/*Praṇava Śabda/ॐ Om is Brahman*"(*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 1) is not tenable. It is established by experience that the word is not *Brahman*.**

If *Brahman* is of that nature, then it would not have *Brahman-hood* at all. It is indeed for this reason that *Brahman* is not accepted as non-different from the universe, as there would be the contingency of its being other than *Brahman*.

(Then how are the words denoting non-difference justified?) Therefore, the statements, such as 'All this is the *Ātman*' do not teach its non-difference from the universe, but state only its non-duality, by indicating the superimposed nature of the universe.

Moreover, the word can be experienced by the sense organs, but the *Brahman* is not accessible to the senses; how can there be non-difference between the two? *Difference* alone has to be accepted.

A doubt is raised. In practice, we accept an internal sound which cannot be experienced by the ear, etc. or known by the intellect. That can be *Brahman*.

In response, he says that if such a sound is not self-luminous, then since there is no proof of its existence, its existence would not be established. If such a sound is claimed to be self-luminous, then it would be the *ātmā* itself, since *ātmā* alone is self-luminous. If it is the *ātmā* then it cannot be a sound (or word), since the *ātmā* alone is the knower of sounds, and the knower and the known are different.⁴⁸⁸

The counter argument given is in the form of a quotation from the *śruti* texts,⁴⁸⁹ 5.2., '**Satyakāma, this very Brahman, that is superior and inferior is indeed this Om**' and indeed equally powerfully from the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁸ Sastrigal. Anubhūtiśvarupacārya. (2006) *Iṣṭa Siddhi-Vivaraṇam (ISV) Pūrvapakṣa* p.273, '*ātmatve ca tasya śabdatvaṃ na syāt, ātmanaḥ śabdajñānatvāt, jñajñeyayoś ca bhinnatvāt*'.

⁴⁸⁹ *Praśnopaniṣad* 5.2., '*etad vai satyakāma parañcāparaṃ ca brahma yad omkāraḥ*'.

⁴⁹⁰ *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 1 and 2, '*Om ity etad akṣaram idaṃ sarvaṃ tasyopa-vyākhyānaṃ bhūtaṃ bhavad bhaviṣyad iti sarvaṃ omkāra eva yac cānyat trikālātītaṃ tad apyomkāra eva*'.

1 and 2:

The syllable ॐ is all this. Of this a clear exposition (is started with): All that is past, present, or future is verily ॐ And whatever else is beyond the three periods of time that is also verily ॐ. All this is surely Brahman. The Self is Brahman. The Self, such as It is, is possessed of four quarters.

Here it is clearly stated that the 'Word' 'Om' is *Brahman*. This seems to be being denied in the rejection of *Sphoṭa* and the *Śabdādvaita* standpoint. Both *Vimuktātman* and *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya* answer this objection by saying that these *śrutis* and others are concerned with meditation/*upāsana* on *Om* as *Brahman* and are not claiming to lay down the identity of the word itself and *Brahman*. Hence it is not established by these statements that *Brahman* is of the form of the word/*śabdārūpatva*.

Thus, having refuted the theory of *Śabdādvaita* in this way the *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁴⁹¹ says in conclusion, 'Hence the non-duality of the Self alone is established and not the non-duality of word or non-duality of pot'. Here *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya* in his

⁴⁹¹ *Iṣṭasiddhi*. p.176, 'tasmād ātmādvaitam eva siddhyati, na Śabdādvaitam, ghaṭādvaitam vā'.

*Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇam*⁴⁹² explains that “by the words ‘or non-duality of pot’ it is brought out that the non-duality of word is in fact impossible, like the non-duality of pot, by taking the word ‘or’ as equivalent to ‘like’.

The outcome of this whole discussion is that all theories of *asat-khyāti* are unsound or unfit/*asamañjasa*.

4. xii.1) The theory of *Anirvacanīyakhyāti* according to *Advaita*

Since for the illusion/*bhrānti* or its negation/*bādha* there is a failure of proof whether the superimposed thing/*āropya* exists or does not exist at the place of the illusion and due to the contradiction of being asserted as both existent and non-existent, it can only be held that the superimposed thing is different from both the existent and non-existent and hence indeterminable/*anirvacanīya*.

The superimposed thing/*āropya* is created at that time by ignorance/*ajñāna* to which it co-responds and has ignorance, its substratum/*adhiṣṭhāna*, as its content.

⁴⁹² *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇam*, ‘ghaṭādvaitam yathā asambhavati evaṃ śabdādvaitam asambhavati iti vyākhyā kṛtam kṛtā ‘ghaṭādvaitam vā’ iti vā śabdasya ivārthatvaṃ svīkṛtya’.

This illusion continues until it ceases on the realization of the nature of the substratum.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇam* ⁴⁹³ further clarifies, 'Reason and unreality/*sattva* and *asattva* can be the causes of absence of sublation/*bādhā-abhāva* and nonappearance/*akhyāna* respectively, but not of what is different from both reality and unreality.'

Although Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya has stated previously⁴⁹⁴ that 'like the co-existence of unreality and reality, the co-existence of difference from both is also not possible because of contradiction between them'. ⁴⁹⁵

Such contradiction is just bringing faults/*illogical/doṣāvaha* only in a real object. In an indeterminate/*anirvacanīya* thing, which is a mere appearance such an illogicality/*anupapatti* is a mere ornament!

He goes on to brilliantly explain further the essential nature of indeterminate/*anirvacanīya*.⁴⁹⁶ 'The use of the words 'different from'/*vailakṣaṇya* is

⁴⁹³ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇam* p.187, 'sattvāsattvayoś ca bādhābhāvākhyānaprayojakatvam, na punar asadvailakṣaṇayoh'.

⁴⁹⁴ *ibid.* p.71, 'sad-asattvasamuccayavat vailakṣaṇyasamuccayasyāpi virodhād asambhavaḥ'.

⁴⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 'virodhaḥ khalu vastubhūte padārthe doṣāvahaḥ. Anirvacanīyasya ca pratibhāśasiddhatvena tādrśānupapattiḥ bhūṣaṇam eva bhavati'.

⁴⁹⁶ *ibid.* p.72, 'vailakṣaṇyavācayuktir api tat tad rūpanirūpaṇāsahiṣṇutvaprakāṣanārthā. Na tu vailakṣaṇyasamuccayasya satyatvārthā. anirvācayam hi etad eva yat 'prakāśate, tarkam ca na sahata iti'.

only to bring out the impossibility of its being categorized in a particular manner, and not to indicate the actual coexistence of the many differences in one thing. What appears, but cannot stand logical examination/*tarkam ca na sahate*, is the nature of (what is called) 'the indeterminable'/*anirvācyatva* '.

The natural question this raises is then, if 'silver' for example is *anirvacanīya* how can it appear as existing?

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya⁴⁹⁷ explains that just as the 'this-ness of the nacre'/*śukti-idamāntā* is associated with the appearance/*bhāna* of (illusory) silver, similarly the reality of the nacre/*śukti-sattā* (reality pertaining to pure Consciousness limited by nacre) becomes associated with the silver because of illusion/*bhramāt*. Or else, the reality experienced there is accepted as different from empirical reality/*vyavahārika-sattva-vilakṣaṇa*. So, there is no contradiction/*virodha*.

Clearly an opponent of the concept of 'the indeterminable'/*anirvācyatva*, might well say, 'Since no word expressing indeterminability of what is superimposed/*āropya* is found anywhere in the scriptures or in worldly writings/*vede loke ca*, how can indeterminability be declared?'

⁴⁹⁷ *ibid.* p.158, 'yathā śuktīdamāntāyāḥ rūpye bhānam iṣyate evam eva śuktisattāyāḥ (śuktivac chinnacaitanyaniṣṭhāyāḥ) evaṃ saṃsargaḥ rūpye bhramād bhavati. athavā tatra prāṭītikaṃ sattvaṃ vyavahārika-sattva-vilakṣaṇaṃ svīkriyate. ato na virodhaḥ'.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya elsewhere ⁴⁹⁸ explains,

‘In illusion silver is seen on this/*idam iti rajatam* or duality in the moon/*candre dvitva*. That being so, those things cannot be denied there itself, since it is seen in a valid knowledge that whatever is experienced as existing cannot be denied there itself ... So in statements like ‘this is not silver’/*nedam rajatam* or there are not two moons/*dvau candrau*, as well as the sentence *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.19,

‘(Through the mind alone (It) is to be realized)there is no diversity here’/

‘Neha nānāsti’⁴⁹⁹,

‘the negative/*nañ* does not mean denial, but the meaning is only the indeterminability of what is seen has been indicated because of the absence of actual silver, etc. So, in some such place it is indeterminability that is indicated by the negative ... For by the declaration of the absence of two actual moons, etc. what is meant is the indeterminability/*anirvācyatva* of what is seen. Thus, the intended meaning of the negative is indeterminability’.

⁴⁹⁸ *ibid.* 161, ‘*idam iti rajatam vā candre dvitvam vā bhrame pratītam.evañ ca tayor viśayayoḥ tatraiva niśedho nāṅgikartuñ pāryate.*’ ‘*Yo yad bhāvajñāna-gocaraḥ sa tatraiva na niśedhyaḥ ‘iti vyāpteh satyajñāneṣu grhītatvāt.tataś ca tataś ca nedam rajatam na dvau candrau,*’ *ityādi vākyeṣu ‘Neha nānāsti’ Ityādau ca nañāḥ na niśedhakatvam, kiñ tu svābhāvikarajatādyabhāvabodhanena pratipannasyānirvacanīyatve tātpariyam, svīkriyate.evañ ca etādṛśasthale nañśabdasya tātpariyabalāt anirvācyatvam bodhyate ... svābhāvikacandravitvādyabhāvabodhena pratipannasya anirvacanīyatve tātpariyam. Ato nañśabdātātpariyāt anirvācyatvaniścayāḥ.*

⁴⁹⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.19, *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.11, ‘*Neha nānāsti kiñcana.*’

In addition to the above explanation about the place of indeterminability/*anirvācyatva*, Vimuktātman establishes in the *Iṣṭasiddhi* that the concept makes statements concerning birth and destruction of the universe meaningful. For he says,⁵⁰⁰

‘no origination or destruction either of what is real or what is un-real is possible and yet the *śruti* speaks of origination and destruction of the universe is declared. Hence the indeterminability of the universe is established as meaningful from the *śruti* and reasoning.’

Moreover, there is also support from the *smṛti*, in the *Bhagavadgītā* 2.16,⁵⁰¹

‘Of the unreal no being there is; there is no non-being of the real. Of both of these is the truth seen by the seers of the Essence’.

Finally, this last statement is as it were glossed by the beautiful words of Toṭakācārya in his *Śruti-sāra -samuddhāraṇa*, 141⁵⁰²,

⁵⁰⁰ *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p151, ‘*sad-asaj janmanāśau na, jagaj janmalayau śrutau.ato’nirvācanīyatvaṁ prasiddham śrutiyuktitaḥ*’.

⁵⁰¹ *Bhagavadgītā* 2.16, ‘*Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ. Ubhayor api dṛṣṭo’ntas tv annoys tattvadarśibhiḥ*’.

⁵⁰² *Śruti-sāra-samuddhāraṇa*, 141, ‘*atra na kathañcana janma bhavet tad asattvata eva khapuṣpam iva. Na sato’sti bhavaḥ purato’pi bhavāt yata ātmavad eva sad iṣṭam iti*’.

'There can by no means be a birth for the unreal, because of its being unreal like a sky-flower. For the real there can be no origination, it being already (always) existent, because the real is accepted as like the Self alone.'

So, it has been established by *Śruti*, *smṛti* and *Mahāpuruṣas* as well as by *yukti* /reason that *anirvacanīyakhyāti* is the most suitable theory in respect of an illusion. By means of this theory, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya and other great *Advaitins* have firmly established the nonduality of *Brahman* declared by the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahmasūtras*, so that the indeterminable universe does not acquire the status of a second entity.

Chapter 5: Liberation (*mokṣa*) in

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's

Known Works

Introduction

According to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, *Brahman* when reflected in *māyā* is God and in *avidyā* is the soul/*jīvātman*. As God is always aware of His identity with pure consciousness/*Cit*/*prajñānam* which is called *Brahman* His essential nature, is **ever pure, conscious and liberated**.⁵⁰³

It's only the soul/*jīvātman*, which by being overpowered by its limiting adjunct/*upādhi*, ignorance/*avidyā* that falsely identifies itself with the inner organ of mind/

⁵⁰³ cf. 'nitya-śuddha-budha-mukta-svabhāva'; 'His true nature is ever/pure/conscious/released' of frequent occurrence in BSB of Ādi Śaṅkara.

antaḥkaraṇa "and undergoes transmigration/ *saṃsāra* consisting of being an agent/ doer/*kartr* an enjoyer/*bhoktr*/ and a knower/*jñātr*. These characteristics/*lakṣaṇa*, belonging to the mind are falsely superimposed on the soul/*jīvātman* because of the mind's false relation to soul/*jīvātman*, caused by ignorance/*avidyā*. They are therefore false, illusory/*mithyā*. On the removal of this false relation, i.e. the removal of ignorance/*avidyā* its cause, the soul/*jīvātman* ceases to be a soul/*jīvātman*, remaining as pure consciousness/ *Śuddha Caitanya* which is *Ātman* non-different from pure Consciousness, the essential nature of God/*Brahman*. This is liberation/ *mokṣa*. As Ādiśaṅkara says in his famous *bhāṣya* on *Brahma Sūtra* 1.1.4⁵⁰⁴,

'Ātman is non-different from Brahman⁵⁰⁵ and to be Brahman is liberation.'

The apparent relation between mind and *jīvātman*, caused by ignorance/*avidyā* will be removed, say Ādiśaṅkara and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya by direct knowledge ... of the identity of the true nature of the soul/*jīvātman* with the true nature of God/

⁵⁰⁴ BSB 1.1.4 'ātma ca brahma...brahmabhāvaśca mokṣaḥ.'

⁵⁰⁵ c.f. *Mahāvākyāni*, 'Ayaṃ Ātmā brahma' *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 2; *Ahambrahmāsmi* 'Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad.'

1.4.10; 'tat tvam asi' *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*

6.8.7 'prajñānariṇi brahma'' *Aitareyaopaniṣad* 3.4

Brahman. That knowledge arises so the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. 2.4.5⁵⁰⁶ informs us from the major texts of the Upaniṣads,

‘for it is the Self *that should be heard of śrotavya*, reflected upon (and meaning enquired into and analysed on the basis of reasoning)/ *mantavya* and profoundly meditated upon/*nididhyāsita*vya.’

As Ādiśaṅkara states in his Introduction to the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* 1.1.1

and in turn expounded by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*.⁵⁰⁷ He declares,

‘the import of all the *Vedāntic* texts is being enquired into with a view to attain knowledge of the identity of *Ātman/ātmaikatva* and *Brahman*. This latter is essential to remove *avidyā*- the cause of the profound error, the false relation of mind and soul/*jīvātman*.’

From which follows the views of all traditional *Advaitins*, like Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, that knowledge is the sole means to liberation. So, ritualistic

⁵⁰⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. 2.4.5. ‘*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo*.’

⁵⁰⁷ *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa (PV)* p.21 l.1 BSB 1.1.1 ‘*asya anarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntāḥ ārabhyante*.’

action/*karma*/ does not lead to liberation. If *mokṣa* identical with *Brahman* were to be considered as resulting from *karma* it would have had to come under one its four divisions:

- (i) origination/*Utpatti*
- (ii) attainment/*āpti*
- (iii) modification/*vikṛti*
- (iv) ceremonial purification/*saṃskṛti*, which it so clearly does not.

For that which is originated or modified cannot be eternal like Liberation. Nor is there any question of it being attained, for It is one's true Self and is ever attained. Nor can it be ceremonially purified since *mokṣa* is identical with *Brahman*, which is Absolute perfection and purity, so cannot be directly brought about by *karma*.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁸ PV p.66 l.9 BSB 1.1.4. 'yasya tu utpādyo mokṣaḥ, tasya mānasam vācikaṃ vā kāryam apekṣata iti yuktaṃ. tathā vikāryatve ca. tayoh pakṣayoh mokṣasya dhruvam anityatvam'. 'It is but logical that as for the man who regards liberation as something to be produced, he will have to think that depends on the activity of mind, speech or body. Similar is the case of thinking of liberation as a modification of something. In both these cases it (liberation) is certainly transitory'...p.67 l.1 'na ca āpyatvenāpi kāryāpekṣā, svātmasvarūpatve saty anāpyatvāt ... l.4. nāpi saṃskāryo mokṣaḥ, yena vyāpāram apekṣate. saṃskāro hi nāma saṃskāryasya guṇādhānena vā syāt doṣāpanayanena vā. na tāvāt guṇādhānena sambhavati, anādheyātīśayabrahmasvarūpatvān mokṣasya. nāpi doṣāpanayanena.'

However, *karma* is most useful in regard to the rise of the knowledge of *Brahman*, the only means to *mokṣa*. Hence Ādiśaṅkara and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya declare, in *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* 3.4.26.⁵⁰⁹ On the basis of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣadic* text, 4.4.22⁵¹⁰:

***Brāhmaṇas*/Men of spiritual birth desire to have the knowledge(*vividiṣanti*) of *Brahman* by the study of one's *veda* in the (celibate stage/*Brahmacarya*) by performance of sacrifice and offering of gifts in the (house-holder stage/*gṛhastha*), as well as by fasting (in which one limits food as a religious observance) usually in the (hermit stage/*vanaprastha*), it is concluded that knowledge of *Brahman* does require performance of *karma*, like sacrifice etc. So this text expresses the cause, relation between sacrifices, etc. and the (rise of) knowledge of *Brahman*.**

Ādiśaṅkara declares that although the relation of duties to knowledge of *Brahman* is not known through any other source except this text, yet it cannot have the direct

⁵⁰⁹ PV p.964 l.8 BSB 3.4.26. 'yajñādīnām vidyāsādhanaabhāvaṁ darśayati.'

⁵¹⁰ Bṛhad. 4.4.22. 'tam etaṁ vedānuvācānena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena, dānena, tapasānāśanena.'

force of an injunction, we can assume it has the power of an injunction as indicated in the *sūtra* BSB 3.4.27⁵¹¹:

Nor is liberation something to be purified, presupposing an action. Purification can be affected by making things more qualitative or by eliminating adverse effects ... the former does not operate since liberation is the very nature of *Brahman* ... eternally pure ... It is impossible that any action should abide in the Self ... for it is eternal and cannot be purified ... He who desires to have the knowledge of *Brahman* should perform sacrifice, etc.

When sacrifices etc., are performed without desire for their fruits, they lead towards knowledge of *Brahman*. So, it is the difference in attitude or emotional ground/

Bṛhad. 4.4.22. 'tam etaṁ vedānuvācānena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena, dānena, tapasānāśanena.' ⁵¹¹ibid.

'yajñādīnāṁ tattvadarśanasya ca sādhyasādhanabhāvasyāpūrvatoāt, pañcamalakāraparigraheṇa brahmānubhāvakāmo yajñādīny anutiṣṭhed iti vidhānāt.' nityasuddhabrahmasvarūpatvān mokṣasya....tasmāt jñānam ekam muktvā kriyāyā gandhamātrasyāpyanupraveśa iha nopapadyate.'

bhāvanā that holds the key to the difference in fruits. As Ādiśaṅkara states with confirmation from Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* 3.4.27:

In the *smṛti* texts such as the *Bhagavad-Gītā* it is explained that sacrifices, etc., when performed without desire for their fruits (i.e. *karma-yoga*) become means to knowledge of *Brahman*.⁵¹²

This cleanses one's heart and leads to an intense desire to have knowledge of *Brahman* (*vividiṣā*), an ascertainment that everything apart from *Brahman* is non-eternal by being an effect. This is known as the power of discrimination between the eternal and the transient substance in any situation/*nityānityavastu-viveka*.⁵¹³

Following Ādiśaṅkara, this leads to detachment from any desire for the enjoyment of the fruits of one's action in the present or in the future' /*ihāmutrārthabhogavirāga*

⁵¹⁴,

⁵¹² *ibid.* 'smṛtiṣ api bhagavadgītādyāsu anabhisandhāya phalam anutiṣṭhati yajñādīni mumukṣor jñānasādhanāni bhavantīti prapañcitam.'

⁵¹³ PV p.28 l.16 BSB 1.1.1. 'nityānityavasuviveko nāma ātmaavyatiriktaṃ sarvaṃ kāryatvād anityam nitya ātmaiva kṛtakṛtvābhāvād ityādyavadhāraṇam.'

⁵¹⁴ *ibid.* l.17, 'ihāmutrārthabhogavirāgo nāma vartamānaśarīrasthitihetubhūtāpratiṣiddhānnapānavyatiriktavaiṣayapraṇāyātikarāṇecchāvairuddo niścalaścetovṛttiviśeṣaḥ.'

a mental state opposed to having more than one needs for bare sustenance of life. In turn, this leads to *śamādisampat*⁵¹⁵, ‘a perfection of such practices as control of the mind, control of the senses and organs’, etc. The first two of these (six) are *śama* and *dama*, respectively, meaning the abandoning of mental functions and of external senses forbidden in scripture and secularly with a determination that these are not conducive to spiritual health! The third, *uparati* involves abandoning even obligatory duties of scriptural injunctions, i.e. asceticism. The fourth, *titikṣā*, endurance of opposites, heat and cold etc., not detrimental to one’s life⁵¹⁶. The fifth is *samādhāna*⁵¹⁷, precise mental application to study *Vedānta*, etc., avoiding excess sleep and disinclination. Lastly, faith/*śraddhā* in the authority of scripture and the *guru*’s teachings. These six are enjoined as means to knowledge of *Brahman* in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.23,⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁵ *ibid.* l.19, ‘śamo nāma antaḥkaraṇavyāpārāṇāṃ pratiśidhānām api laukikānāṃ svādhikāraṇiṣpattyupayogināṃ niṣphalatvāvadhāraṇapūrokaḥ parityāgaḥ. dama nāma bahiṣkaraṇavyāpārāṇāṃ uktalakṣaṇānāṃ parityāgaḥ.

⁵¹⁶ *ibid.* l.22, ‘uparatir iti ...sattoaśusiddhau nityānām api vidhita eva parityāgaḥ. titikṣutoam nāma śītoṣṇādidvandvānāṃ svādhikāranirvṛtтыapekṣitajīvanavicchedahetuvyatiriktānām sahiṣṇutā.’

⁵¹⁷ *ibid.* l.24. p.28-29, ‘samādhāna nāma vidhitasitāśravaṇādipratikūlanidrālasyaādivirodhenacetaso’vasthānam’

⁵¹⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.* 4.4.23. ‘tasmād evamvīt śānto dāntaḥ uparataḥ titikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvā ātmany eva ātmānam paśyati.’

'Therefore he who knows it as such becomes self-controlled, calm, withdrawn into himself, enduring and concentrated and sees the Self in his own self (body)'.

Then arises *mumukṣutva*-desire for liberation, pure consciousness free from *avidyā* and its effects.⁵¹⁹ This desire to realise liberation results in the desire to realise the knowledge of *Brahman*, 'the sole means to liberation. This is the four-fold aid/*sādhana-catuṣṭaya* to study of *Vedānta*.'

The key question then is whether the merit /*punya* arising from pursuit of *karma-yoga* lasts until the rise of the desire to know Brahman (*vividiṣā*) or until the knowledge of *Brahman* itself (*vedanā*)?

Three *advaitins* uphold the first alternative, Sureśvara, Vācaspatimiśra and Sarvajñatman, whereas Prakāśātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya hold to the second, viz. the merit arising from observance of *karma-yoga* continues until the knowledge of *Brahman* itself arises.

The term seek to know/*vividiṣanti* occurs in Bṛhad. 4.4.22⁵²⁰:

⁵¹⁹ *ibid.* l.1. p.29, 'cito'jñānatatkāryāvacchrdo bandhaḥ tad viyogo mokṣaḥ tad viṣayecchā mumukṣutva.'

⁵²⁰ Bṛhad. 4.4.22, 'tam etaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena, dānena, tapasānāśanena.'

The *Brāhmaṇas* seek to know/*vividiṣanti* It through the study of the *Vedas*, sacrifices, charity, and austerity consisting in a dispassionate enjoyment of sense-objects. *vividiṣanti* consists of the root /*dhātu vid* and desiderative suffix *sa/saN pratyaya*.

The general rule is that of the two, the sense of the root/*dhātu/prakṛti* and the sense of the suffix/*pratyaya* the latter has greater force. Here, according to Sureśvara et.al. the sense of the suffix/*pratyaya*⁵²¹ being desire, one's duties are related to that and not to its object, knowledge. Whereas the view of Prakāśātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, (who as we have seen is also a very famous and distinguished grammarian) is that although in general the sense of the suffix/*pratyaya* is of greater force than the sense of the stem/*aṅga*, this does not hold in the case of the desiderative suffix *sa/san pratyaya*. ' So in worldly usages like "He desires to go on horse" (*aśvena jīgamiṣati*) etc., the means, i.e. the horse is understood only in relation to the object of desire, the act of going 'the sense of the *aṅga/prakṛti*/stem, and not the desire itself, which is the sense of the desiderative suffix *sa/san pratyaya*.'

⁵²¹ *Mahābhāṣya* 3.4.67, '*prakṛtipratyayau pratyayārthaṃ saha brūtaḥ tayos tu pratyayaḥ pradhānyena*.'

Similarly, in the scriptural text referred to above, (*Bṛhad. 4.4.22 Brāhmaṇas/ Men of spiritual birth desire to have the knowledge (vividīṣanti) of Brahman by the study of one's veda, by performance of sacrifices etc ... 'is to be directly related to the direct knowledge of Brahman which is the object of desire and which is the sense of the stem/aṅga/prakṛti and not to desire itself which is the sense of the desiderative suffix sa/san pratyaya.'*⁵²²

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya confirms and takes further the above in his *Nibandha* on Ānandabodha's *Pramāṇamālā*, adding that *aśvena jigamiṣati* communicates that the horse is the means to the activity of going and not to the attainment of the village, which is the result of the activity of going. Likewise, the performance of sacrifices etc., is the means of knowledge of *Brahman*, which is desired and not to liberation, which is the result of the knowledge of *Brahman*.⁵²³

⁵²² *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha p.306, 'aśvena jigamiṣyati...ityādilaulikaprāyoge aśvādirūpasādhanasya ...san pratyayābhīhitecchāviśaya eva gamanādau anvayasya vyutpannatvāt...prakṛtyabhihitāyām vidyāyām yajñādīnām viniyoga'h.'*

⁵²³ *Nibandha p.119, 'tatrāpi [aśvena jigamiṣyati ityatrāpi] ity atrāpi laulikaprāyoge aśvasyeṣyamāṅgamankriyāsādhanatvam eva na tu grāmaprāptisādhanatvam, gamasyaiva tatra nirapekṣakāraṇatvāt tathehāpi iṣyamāṅgajñānasādhanatvam eva yajādīnām, na tu mokṣasādhanatā.'*

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his grammar, *Sarasvata-vyākaraṇa* incorporates a special setting aside *-sūtra/apavāda* which sets aside general *utsarga-sūtra* that the sense of the *pratyaya* is primary and the sense of the stem/*aṅga/prakṛti* is secondary: *gauṇaḥ prakṛtyarthaḥ anyatra sāt*.⁵²⁴

In his commentary/*vṛtti* on this, he states the general *utsarga-sūtra* sense that the *pratyaya* is of greater force than the stem/*prakṛti* must be superseded as far as the desiderative *san pratyaya* is concerned. This is because in the expression involving use of desiderative *san pratyaya* such as one desires to cook with the fuel (*kāṣṭhena pipakṣati*) it is fuel which is the means to the act of cooking which is the sense of the stem/*aṅga/prakṛti* and not to the desire for cooking which is the sense of the *san pratyaya*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya restates this view in the *Prakaṣārthavivaraṇa* BSB 3.4.26.⁵²⁵ Three centuries later, Appayya Dīkṣita succinctly summed up the distinction between the two views described above in *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*.

⁵²⁴ the sense of the *aṅga /prakṛti/stem* is secondary: *'gauṇaḥ prakṛtyarthaḥ anyatra sāt'*.

⁵²⁵ PV p.965 l.17 BSB 3.4.26, *'prakṛtipratyayau pratyayārthaṃ saha brūtaḥ sano'tra iti smaraṇād iṣyamāṇatayā prādhānyāc ca jñānenaiva sambandhaḥ, kāṣṭhena pipakṣati dātṛeṇa lulūṣati itivad ity arthaḥ.'*

According to the desire to have the knowledge of *Brahman* option/*vividiṣāpakṣa*, merit arising from the performance of *karma* gives rise to the desire to have the knowledge of *Brahman/vividiṣā* but does not provide opportunity for *Vedāntic* study, etc., so knowledge of *Brahman* would not necessarily follow the performance of *karma*. In contrast, according to the knowledge option/*vedanāpakṣa*, merit arising from performance of *karma* does provide opportunity for *Vedāntic* study, etc. Thus, invariably arises direct knowledge of *Brahman*. However, in both views' *karma* is only distantly conducive to knowledge of *Brahman* since it has to be given up.

Upaniṣads like Śvetāśvatara 6.21.⁵²⁶,

'Śvetāśvatara, in proper manner spoke about *Brahman*, the Supreme, the pure, to advanced ascetics, what is pleasing to the company of seers',

affirm that *sannyāsa* must be adopted by those who seek knowledge of *Brahman*. Likewise, the *Kaivalyopaniṣad* 2 declares,

'it is neither by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation alone some have realized *Brahman*.'

⁵²⁶ Śvetāśvatara 6.21, 'Śvetāśvataro tha vidvān atyaśrāmibhyaḥ pavitram, provāca samyagrṣi-saṅghajuṣṭam'.

The stage of life where one is devoted to meditation on *Brahman* is *sannyāsa*.

This is not possible in the case of those who are in one of the first three stages of life *viz.* celibate student stage/*brahmacarya*, householder stage/*gṛhastha* or setting off into the forest stage /*vanaprastha*, because they have to perform duties relating to their respective stages. The non-performance of these would entail the sin of omission. In the case of the ascetic there is no possibility of this as he has renounced all *karmas*.

Further on in Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's commentary on *BSB* 3.4.20⁵²⁷ he quotes *Maitrāyaṇībrāhmaṇa* as saying an ascetic must carry a bamboo staff, live on alms collected from those who are not falsely accused or degenerate and renounce his sacred thread. Further, he quotes a question raised in the *Kauṣītakī brāhmaṇa* as to what actually constitutes the sacred thread⁵²⁸ for an ascetic/*parivrājaka* and states that **meditation upon *Brahman*/*ātma-dhyānam* is the sacred thread for him.**⁵²⁹

The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* declares that *sannyāsa* is an essential qualification of an aspirant to pursue *Vedāntic* study, reflection and profound meditation 3.5.1a:

⁵²⁷ *BSB* 3.4.20, 'vidhir vā dhāraṇavat/ rather it is an injunction as in the case of holding the sacrificial fuel) and not a mere illusion'.

⁵²⁸ *PV* p.953 l.17 on *BSB*, 'atha parivrāḍ...sārvavarṇikaḥ bhaikṣacaraṇam abhiśastapatitavarjanī ...ekam vaiṇavaṇī daṇḍam ādadīta.'

⁵²⁹ *PV* p.954 l.2, 'kim asya yajñopavītaṇī...idam evāsya yajñopavītaṇī yad ātmadhyānam'

Having attained mediate knowledge of this very Self/*Brahman*, the *Brāhmaṇas* /persons of spiritual birth renounce the desire for sons, for wealth and the worlds, lead a mendicant's life in order to gain direct knowledge of *Brahman* 3.5.1b.⁵³⁰

Therefore the knower of *Brahman*, having known all about Vedāntic study (*pāṇḍityam nirvidya*), should try to live on that strength, (i.e. *mananam*/reflection; *bālyena tiṣṭhāset*) which comes of knowledge; having known all about this strength and scholarship, he becomes meditative (*muniḥ*) having known all about meditateness and its opposite (*maunam ca amaunam ca nirvidya*), he becomes a knower of *Brahman* (*brāhmaṇa*).

Further in the *Brahma Sūtra* 3.4.47⁵³¹ it is said,

'In the case of a partial application of knowledge/*pakṣeṇa* by one possessed of (imperfect) knowledge/*tadvataḥ*, (which leads to enlightenment) an injunction is

⁵³⁰ *Bṛhad.* 3.5.1, 'etam vai tam ātmānam viditvā brāhmaṇāḥ putraiṣaṇīyāś ca vittaiṣaṇīyāś ca lokaiṣaṇīyāś ca vyutthāyātha bhikṣācaryam caranti..... tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityam nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset | bālyam ca pāṇḍityam ca nirvidyātha muniḥ | amaunam ca maunam ca nirvidyātha brāhmaṇaḥ | sa brāhmaṇaḥ kena syād yena syāt teneḍṛśa eva | ato 'nyad ārtam | tato ha kaholaḥ kauṣītakeya upararāma.'

⁵³¹ *BS* 3.4.47, 'sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣeṇa tṛtīyam tadvato vidhyādivat.'

implied in another auxiliary (viz.meditativeness)/*sahakāryantaravidhiḥ* which is the third/*tṛtīyam* (as much as in the cases of the strength which comes from knowledge and scholarship:

[O]n account of its uniqueness (of not having been heard elsewhere); this is like the main injunction (being applicable to the subsidiary acts/*vidhyādivat*) It discusses the import of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.5.1b⁵³² and states that the latter prescribes meditation also as a means to knowledge of *Brahman* in the case of one who is an ascetic having mediate knowledge of *Brahman* [*tadvataḥ*].

Ādiśaṅkara states that the expression *tadvataḥ* has to be taken to mean an acetic with mediate knowledge, on account of BS 3.5.1a which affirms that asceticism/*sannyasa*,

⁵³² ...*tasmāt brāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityam nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset bālyam ca pāṇḍityam ca nirvidya atha munih maunam ca amaunam ca nirvidya atha brāhmaṇaḥ.*

' an essential condition for attainment of knowledge of *Brahman* along with *śama* and other factors.⁵³³ Since all these are stated to be means to knowledge of *Brahman*, they are proximate means to the latter.⁵³⁴

The ascetic having the mediate knowledge of *Brahman* is given the means by Yājñavalkya in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.4.5⁵³⁵ to attain the immediate knowledge,

'The Self, my dear Maitreyī, should be realized (*draṣṭavyaḥ*) -should be heard of (*śrotavyaḥ*), reflected on (*mantavyaḥ*) and meditated upon (*nididhyāsitaḥ*).'

5. i) Ādisaṅkara and following him Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya make a total distinction between activity and knowledge.

Knowledge of an object depends upon the object and not on the choice of the person, so cannot be enjoined, whereas actions like sacrifices depend on the will of

⁵³³ PV,p 988 l.10 BSB 3.4.47. 'tadvataḥ vidyāvataḥ sannyāsinaḥ. katham ca vidyāvataḥ sannyāsina ity avagamyate? tad adhikārāt - ātmāna viditvā putrādyeṣaṇābhyo vyutthāya 'atha bhikṣācaryam caranti'.

⁵³⁴ BSB 3.4.27'evaṁvoid iti vidyāsaṅyogāt pratyāsammāmi vidyāsādhanāni śamadīni'.

⁵³⁵ Bṛhad 2.4.5 Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitaḥ.

the person so can be enjoined.⁵³⁶ Thus, should be realized/*draṣṭavyaḥ*. Here is not said to be injunctive because knowledge cannot be commanded.

The gerundive/future passive participle/*kṛtya-pratyaya tavya* in *draṣṭavyaḥ* generally conveys the sense of 'command'. However, Pāṇini also ordains it in the 'sense of fitness' (P.3.3.169, '*arhe kṛtyatṛcaśca. Pratyayas kṛtya, tṛc and Lii* occur after a root/*dhātu* when the agent is denoted as deserving or fitness injunction⁵³⁷, it comes to mean in the context **Ātman is fit to be realized.**' However, since hearing/*śravaṇa*, reflection/*manana* and profound meditation/*nididhyāsana* are prescribed as means to knowledge of *Brahman* in *Bṛhad* 2.4.5. are of the nature of mental activities they can be enjoined according to Sureśvara⁵³⁸, Prakāśātman⁵³⁹ and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya⁵⁴⁰.

Here we find an important difference from the teaching of Vācaspatiśra in his *Bhāmati* on the *B.S.Bhāṣya* of Ādiśaṅkara, who considers these three, *śravaṇa*,

⁵³⁶ PV p.45 l.4.BSB 1.1.2, '*kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṁ śakyaṁ laukikaṁ vaidikaṁ ca karma ... na vastuyāthāthyajñānaṁ puruṣabuddhyapekṣam. kiṁ tarhi vastutantram eva*'. Vide: p.46 l.17, '*pratyakṣasya karma/ viṣaya -janyatvāt yathāvastveva manovyāpāraḥ samyagjñānam*'.

⁵³⁷ cf. *Sārasvataprakriyā* 1.63;2.51

⁵³⁸ *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* 1.88, '*Niyamaḥ parisaṅkhyā vā vidhyartha'tra bhavet*'.

⁵³⁹ *Pañcapādika-vivarāṇa* p.773. '*Śravaṇādayas tu kriyārūpatvāt samyagdarśanasya drṣṭādrṣṭopakāritayā vidheyā eva*'.

⁵⁴⁰ PV p.987 l.22 on BSB 3.4.47, '*vicāreṇa sakalayauktikāsambhāvanānirāse sati cittagatāsambhāvanānivartanena tattvasākṣātkaraṇāya jñānābhyāso maunariṁ vidhīyate*'.

manana and *nididhyāsana* as of the nature of knowledge. Since knowledge cannot be enjoined, these cannot be enjoined, so there is no injunction in respect of *śravaṇa* etc.

This is a view derived from Maṇḍana Mīśra with his Ritualistic/*Pūrvamīmāṃsā* tendencies .

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in contrast in his *Prakaṣārthavivaraṇa* on the *BSBhāṣya* of Ādiśaṅkara advocates the position that there is an unprecedented injunction/*a-pūrvā-vidhi* in the text *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.⁵⁴¹,

‘The Self, my dear Maitreyī, should be realized, should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon’.

He teaches that the texts of *Vedāntic* study. i.e. *śravaṇa* etc., are the means to knowledge of *Brahman* is not known through any means of valid knowledge/*pramāṇa* excepting this *śabda-pramāṇa* or *śruti*-text from the *Upaniṣad*. It thus gives knowledge of something unknown and hence is an unprecedented injunction/ *a-pūrvā-vidhi*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya argues that although in ordinary experience/*laukika*, we know that study of a text does give rise to mediate knowledge of its subject;

⁵⁴¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5, ‘*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavya’ḥ.*’

however, what is in fact conveyed by the text '**It is to be heard**'/*śrotavyo* etc., is the knowledge of something that is unknown. So, *Vedāntic* studies are means to the immediate experiential knowledge in the 'now' to 'that'. 'That' is the *Brahman* which is immediate and direct'/*sākṣād aparokṣāt Brahma.*, not known through any *pramāṇa* accepting this unprecedented injunction/*a-pūrva-vidhi śruti*-text. This view he says is that of Ādi-Śaṅkara ⁵⁴² on *Brahma-Sūtra* 3.4.47.⁵⁴³:

In the case of meditateness which leads to enlightenment an injunction has to be admitted, which is the third, as much as in the cases of the strength which comes from 'knowledge' and scholarship 'on account of its uniqueness (of not having been heard elsewhere)'.

He then proceeds to say 'profound meditation'/*nididhyāsana*, which conduces to knowledge too must be admitted to have been enjoined like 'hearing'/*śravaṇa* and *manana*

⁵⁴² PV p.987 l.11, Ādi-Śaṅkara on *BS* 3.4.47, '*vidyāsahakāriṇo maunasya bālyapāṇḍityavad vidhir evāśrayitavyaḥ, apūrvatvāt.*'

⁵⁴³ *BS* 3.4.47, '*sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣeṇa tṛtīyam tadvato vidhyādivat.*'

(*bālyapāṇḍityava* 'strength derived from knowledge and scholarship').

This Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya⁵⁴⁴ explains, 'is because it is unknown hitherto as an aid to the direct knowledge of *Brahman*'.

To summarise the exposition so far: The *A-dvaita* tradition expounded by Ādiśaṅkara and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya is that *karma-yoga* is the remote means to direct knowledge of Brahman, and *śama, dama etc., sannyāsa, śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana*, are the 'proximate' means.

We now consider the instrumental cause. For Ādiśaṅkara, Prakāśātman and following him Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*, the *Mahāvākyāni*, like '**Thou art That (Brahman)**' *tat tvam asi* constitute the instrumental cause of the direct knowledge of *Brahman*, whereas for Vācaspatiśra and many others consider mind to be so.

⁵⁴⁴ PV p.987, L. on BSB, '*Tat tv asākṣāt karaṇāya jñānābhyāso maunaṁ vidhīyate.*'

Thus, in respect of 'listening'/*śravaṇa* etc., Anubhūtiśvarūpa accepts an unprecedented injunction/*apūrvavidhi*, whereas according to Vācaspatimiśra there is no injunction at all.

Prakāśātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpa consider that the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* are the instrumental cause of knowledge of *Brahman*, whereas Vācaspatimiśra considers mind to be so. The latter's view is based on *Upaniṣadic* texts like, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*. 3.1.9 ⁵⁴⁵, '**This subtle self is to be realized by the mind**', *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 3.12⁶⁴⁴ **This is to be realized by the concentrated intellect**', and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.4.4.19 ⁵⁴⁶ '**(The Self) is to be realized by mind only**'.

Vācaspatimiśra in *Bhāmatī* says *Upaniṣads* cannot serve as the instrumental cause of the direct knowledge of *Brahman*. It is because, being in the form of words, they partake of the character of ordinary sentences and could, therefore, give rise only to mediate knowledge.

Hence, a formal study of the *Upaniṣads* would give rise to the mediate knowledge of *Brahman*, which is known as *śravaṇa*. When the *Upaniṣadic* truth is

⁵⁴⁵ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*. 3.1., 'eṣo'ṅur ātmā cetasā veditavyaḥ. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*. 3.12 'dṛśyate tv agryayā buddhyā.'

⁵⁴⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.4.4.19 "manasaivānudraṣṭavyam.'

analysed on the basis of reasoning , there arises the knowledge that it is true. This knowledge too is mediate in character and it is termed *manana*. When the mediate knowledge arisen from the *Upaniṣads* is confirmed by reasoning and is continuously maintained with earnestness, then it is known as *nididhyāsana*. This leaves its traces, and the mind aided by the latter, *nididhyāsana* gives rise to the direct knowledge of *Brahman*⁵⁴⁷. Its immediate knowledge can be had only from an instrument of immediate knowledge. As has been affirmed according to Vācaspatimiśra, mind is the instrumental cause of the knowledge of *Brahman*.

In contrast, Prakāśātman, in his *Vivaraṇa* argues that it is not correct to say that verbal testimony as such would give rise only to mediate knowledge of the object.

The mediacy or immediacy of knowledge does not depend upon the instrument of knowledge but on the object. If the object is immediate, then there would arise immediate knowledge of that object from sentences too. Here *Brahman*

⁵⁴⁷ *Bhāmatī* p.57, 'tasmāt nirvicikitsavākyārthabhāvānāparipākasahitam antaḥkaraṇa tvam padārthasyāparokṣasya tat tad upādhyākāraṇeṣedheṇa tatpadārthatām anubhāyati iti yuktam ...'

being identical with one's own Self is immediate, and so its knowledge too, that arises from the *Upaniṣad*, is immediate.⁵⁴⁸

Anubhūtiśvarūpa, while affirming the *Vivaraṇa* view outlined above, states that mediacy and immediacy are not the characteristics of knowledge, which is a mental state. However, they are the characteristics of the object, while the knowledge that reveals the object is immediate. This he explains in both his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* and his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣyaṭippaṇam*.

Since, obviously, *Brahman* is the most immediate, so the knowledge which rises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* and which is of the nature of a mental state is also immediate only.⁵⁴⁹

Thus too, in *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣyaṭippaṇam*⁵⁵⁰ on *Māṇḍūkya* 7, and *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, **Due to the naturalness of perceptible-consciousness of the *Turīya* Self**

⁵⁴⁸ *Vivaraṇa* p.403, 'brahmaṇa eva sarvasaṁvid upādānatvād brahmākāraśabdapramāṇa janyasaṁvedane'pi tad abhinnaṭayā vā taj janakataṭayā vā brahmāpi prathamam eva aparokṣataṭayā avabhāṣate.' Nṛsimhāśrama (1958) Madras Government Orienta Seriesm Vol.CLV, Madras.

⁵⁴⁹ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.60, 'bhedābhedaśaikāpratibandhāt jātam apyadvitīyavijñānaṁ saṁśayaśiraskam avatiṣṭhate. Nyāyais tu pratibandhavidhvaṁse vākyād eva nirṇayaḥ'.

⁵⁵⁰ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣyaṭippaṇam* on *Māṇḍūkya* 7, p.35, 'turīyasyātmanaḥ svato'parokṣasaṁvit svabhāvatoāt tad ākāraṁ śābdam api vijñānam aparokṣam. Na ca śābdasya parokṣajñānanakatvaniyamah. Pārokṣasya jñānagatasya viśayapārokṣyopādhikatvāt.'

Itself, the form of that being, due to verbal testimony is perceptible.⁵⁵¹ Here, what is focused on is the *Brahman* declared in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* ⁵⁵²3.4.1,

‘the Brahman that is immediate and direct.’

Anubhūtiśvarūpa’s views thus expressed are also based on *Upaniṣadic* texts like, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.9.26⁵⁵³,

‘I ask about that *puruṣa* who could be known only from the *Upaniṣads*’ and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.7.6⁵⁵⁴, ‘That statement of his he learnt/realized following the instruction of the preceptor.’

From such statements, we learn that *Upaniṣads* constitute the instrumental cause of realising *Brahman*. Furthermore, the text, *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.6⁵⁵⁵,

⁵⁵¹ *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* p.161 “*aparokṣavyaṅjakam jñānam aparokṣa jñānam. Nānyaj jñānagataṁ kiñcid āparokṣyaṁ nāmāsti. Brahma tu ‘yat sākṣād aparokṣāt’ iti śruteḥ āparokṣyasvabhāvam. Atas tad vyaṅjakam tat toam asyādivākyokttham antaḥkaraṇavṛttirūpa jñānam aparokṣam*”.

⁵⁵² *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.4.1, ‘*yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma*’.

⁵⁵³ *ibid.* 3.9.26, ‘*taṁ tu aupaniṣadam puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi...*’

⁵⁵⁴ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.7.6, ‘*tad dhāsyā vijajñau*’.

⁵⁵⁵ *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.6, ‘*yan manasā na manute*’.

'(Brahman) is that which is not manifested by mind', is specific in denying the instrumentality of mind as cause of the knowledge of *Brahman*. Moreover, by virtue of the complement of that mantra, *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.6⁵⁵⁶,

'Brahman is that which is not manifested by mind',

it is not only the immature mind but mind in general that is referred to here. Hence, it denies that mind in general is the cause of knowledge of *Brahman*, as followers of Vācaspatimiśra would contend. This text from the *Kena Upaniṣad* appears to deny the instrumentality of *Upaniṣads* in respect of the knowledge of *Brahman* too through primary signification/*mukhyāvṛtti* even by speech, thus *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.4⁵⁵⁷, **'Brahman is that which is not manifested by speech'**, but the words of the *Upaniṣads* do convey *Brahman* through 'secondary' signification.

So, the followers of Vācaspati Miśra must admit the text **'Brahman is that which is not manifested by mind.'** So, it seems *Kena.1.6* denies the instrumentality of *Upaniṣads* in respect of the knowledge of *Brahman* through 'primary signification'/*mukhyāvṛtti* only but not through 'secondary signification'. Hence, the *Upaniṣadic* texts, which state that *Brahman* is to be realized by mind, must be taken as conveying

⁵⁵⁶ *ibid.* 1.6, 'yenāhur mano matam.'

⁵⁵⁷ *ibid.* 1.4, 'yad vāca anubhyuditam.'

that mind in general is the cause in respect of the direct knowledge of *Brahman* because the latter is only its modification.

Hence, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.5.3⁵⁵⁸, **'He sees with the mind'** etc., confirm this view. It is only the sense of sight that is the instrument of visual perception, which only arises if the mind is attentive, and not otherwise.

Prakāśātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya consider *Upaniṣads* to be the instrumental cause of the direct knowledge of *Brahman*, as does his direct pupil Ānandagiri, as well as other indirect pupils Vidyāraṇya and other subsequent great *Advaitins*.

In summary, this major tradition of **pure/kevala-Advaita** says that the merit arising from *karmayoga* endures until there arises direct knowledge of *Brahman*. The proximate means to this direct knowledge of *Brahman* that arises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*, are the six treasures tranquility/*śama*, self-command/*dama* etc., renunciation/*sannyāsa* (=uparati), listening/*śravaṇa* to scripture, reflection/*manana* and profound-meditation/*nididhyāsana* and union with that merit arising from

⁵⁵⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.5.3, 'manasā hy eva paśyati.'

karma-yoga directs the mind towards the Self which is identical with *Brahman*.⁵⁵⁹

Śama, dama, etc., check the tendency to act in a way that thwarts one's spiritual development.

According to the view that there is a unique injunction/*apūrva-vidhi* in regard to *śravaṇa, mañana* and *nididhyāsana*, there arises, from the pursuit of the latter, an unseen merit which helps the rise of the direct knowledge of *Brahman*. In addition, it gives rise to the visible result of removing the false notion/ *pramāṇāsambhāvanā*- that the *Upaniṣads* do not teach the non-dual *Brahman*, and the false notion / *prameyāsambhāvanā*- that the *Upaniṣadic* truth is contradicted by perception etc.

and so is invalid, and the false notion/ *viparītabhāvanā*- that the of 'I' and 'mine' in regard to objects that are different from the Self.⁵⁶⁰ This is because the final authority after the *Upaniṣads* etc. *Śruti*, the *Bhagavad Gītā* etc. *Smṛti* and words of the Realized being, is *anubhūti*, the personal profound inner experience 'the undoubting consonance of the heart and mind' , the dawning of *viveka*/discriminative

⁵⁵⁹ PV p.968, on BSB 3.4.28, '*sarvānnumatiś ca prāṇātyaye tad darśanāt*', 'All kinds of food are permitted only when life is in danger; for so it is revealed'. l.13, '*yajñādīnāṃ ca adṛṣṭena cātmanā cittaśuddhiṃ pratyakpravaṇatām cotpādya jñāna sādhanatvāt*'.

⁵⁶⁰ PV p.987, on BSB 3.4.46, '*sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣeṇa tṛtīyaṃ tadvato vidhyādivat*', 'In case of a partial application of knowledge by one possessed of (imperfect) knowledge, an injunction is implied in another auxiliary (viz.meditativeness) which is the third; this is like the main injunction being applied to the subsidiary acts' ... l.22, '*vicāreṇa sakalayauktikāsambhāvanānirāse sati cittagatāsambhāvanānivartanena tattvasākṣād karaṇāya jñānābhyāso vidhīyate*'"

knowledge of sun of reason which never sets within the 'inner-organ of mind'/
antaḥkaraṇa, i.e. thinking mind/*manas*, reason/*buddhi*, heart-mind/*citta*, ego/
ahaṁkāra, which is often cauled 'enlightenment'.

5. ii) The view that realization of the Self /Liberation arises
 from the words of the *Vedas* themselves/*śābdāparokṣavādaḥ*.

The concept that Self can only be known from the *Vedas*, explained on the
 strength of such passages as *Bṛhadārayaka Upaniṣad* 3.9.26⁵⁶¹,

'I ask you about that Being who can be known only from the *Upaniṣads*.'

However, so that *Upaniṣadic* statements such as *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*
*II.iv.1,II.x.1*⁶⁶¹,

⁵⁶¹ *Bṛhadārayaka Upaniṣad* 3.9.26, 'tam tu aupaniṣadam puruṣam pṛcchāmi'⁶⁶¹ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.iv.1,II.x.1, 'yato
 vāco nivartante'.

‘That from which words turn back’/ *yato vāco nivartante,*

may not be contradicted, it is explained that the Self is taught by the *Vedas* only by implication and cannot be expressed through the primary sense of the words (*lakṣaṇayā bodhya ātmā*) not by the primary sense of words (*abhidhayā tu agamyah*). Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains in his *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivarāṇa*, ‘The *Vedas* have that (*Brahman*) as their content, by being the cause of the removal of the superimposed unmanifestedness’.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says Immediate knowledge/*aparokṣa-jñānam* , is the knowledge that manifests directly/*āparokṣyavyañjakam jñānam*. No other knowledge is indeed direct. This is known from the *śruti*, *Bṛhadārayaka Upaniṣad* 3.4.1⁵⁶² as

‘direct and immediate’.

Therefore, the knowledge in the form of mental modification arising from such statements as

‘That thou art’, which manifests It, is immediate, like the knowledge arising from such sentences as ‘I am luminous’.

⁵⁶² *Bṛhadārayaka Upaniṣad* 3.4.1, ‘yat sākṣād aparokṣāt Brahma.’

All of the following Scriptural references to *Mokṣa*, which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya quotes support the above. So, in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 6.16⁵⁶³ we hear,

‘He who is the support of both the unmanifested *prakṛti* and the *jīva*, who is the Lord of the three *guṇas* and who is the cause of bondage, existence and Liberation from *saṃsāra*, is verily the Creator of the universe, the Knower, the inmost Self of all things and their Source-the omniscient Lord, the Author of time, the Possessor of virtues, the Knower of everything.’

Again, *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad Gauḍapāda Kārikā Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa* 4.30,⁵⁶⁴

‘Moreover, if the world be beginningless, its termination will not be achieved. And there will be no eternality for Liberation that has a beginning.’

Furthermore, *Maitrī Upaniṣad* 6.30⁵⁶⁵ declares:

⁵⁶³ *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, ‘yo brahmāṇaṃ vidadhāti pūrvaṃ yo vai vedāṃś ca prahiṇoti tasmai / taṃ ha devam ātmabuddhiprakāśaṃ mumukṣur vai śaraṇam ahaṃ prapadye’ // 6.18 //

⁵⁶⁴ *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad Gauḍapāda Kārikā Alātaśānti Prakaraṇa*, ‘anāder antavattvaṃ ca saṃsārasya na setsyati /anantatā cādimato mokṣasya na bhaviṣyati’. // MandUpK_4.30 //

⁵⁶⁵ *Maitrī Upaniṣad* 6.30, ‘Om, śucau deśe śuciḥ sattvastaḥ sad adhīyānaḥ sad-vādī sad-dhyāyī sad-yājī syād iti. ataḥ sad brahmaṇi satyābhilāṣiṇi nirvṛtyo’nas tatphalacchinna-pāśo nirāśaḥ pareṣv ātmavad vigatabhayo niṣkāmo’kṣayyam aparimitaṃ sukham ākramya tiṣṭhati. paramaṃ vai śevadher iva parasyoddhāraṇaṃ yan niṣkāmatvam. Sa hi sarva-kāma-mayaḥ puruṣo’dhyavasāya-saṅkalpābhinnaliṅgo baddhaḥ. Atas tad-viparīto muktaḥ. Atraika āhur guṇaḥ prakṛti-bheda-vaśād adhyavasāyāt-mabandham upāgato’dhyavasāyasya doṣakṣayād dhi mokṣaḥ.’

ॐ *Om*, One in pure place, himself pure, abiding in goodness, studying the real, speaking of the real, meditating on the real, sacrificing to the real; Henceforth absorbed in the Real, *Brahman*, is he who yearns for the real, becomes another. He has the reward of having his bonds (fetters) cut, becomes void of expectation, is freed from fear in regard to others as in regard to himself, void of desire, he remains having attained imperishable and immeasurable happiness. Verily freedom from desire is, as it were, the highest prize from the choicest treasure. For a person who is made up of all desires, who has the marks of determination, conception and self-love is bound. He who is opposite to that is liberated... On this point some say (*Sāṃkhya*s), it is the quality which, through the force of the differentiation of nature, binds the self with determination (and the like) and from destruction of the fault of determination (and the like) liberation results.

Further, the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* 6.34.8⁵⁶⁶ states,

⁵⁶⁶ *Maitrī Upaniṣad* 6.34.8, 'tāvan mano niroddhavyaṃ hr̥di yāvāt kṣayaṃ gatam etaj jñānaṃ ca mokṣaṃ ca śeṣānye grantha-vistāraḥ'.

‘So long should the mind be restrained in the heart till it reaches its end, that is knowledge, that is liberation. All else is but extension of the knots that bind us to the life.’

Likewise, the same Upaniṣad says 6.34.11,

‘Mind, in truth, is the cause of bondage and liberation for mankind; for bondage if it is bound to objects; freedom from objects, that is called liberation.’

Furthermore, the *Muktikopanisad* 2.68⁵⁶⁷ declares,

‘The bondage of *vāsanā* is the [real] bondage, while the destruction of *vāsanā* is salvation. After wholly abandoning the *vāsanās*, give up even the desire for liberation/salvation’.

Since the tradition treats *mokṣa* as not different from the *Brahman* or *Ātman*, it is clear the *Upaniṣads* which are ‘not of human origin’/*Apauruṣeya*, *Śruti*’ or *Vedānta* are full of phrases potent for liberation, like *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1⁵⁶⁸,

⁵⁶⁷ *Muktikopanisad* 2.68, ‘*badho hi vāsanābaddho mokṣa syād vāsanākṣayaḥ. vāsanāṃ samparityajya mokṣārthitvam api tyaj’.*

⁵⁶⁸ *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1. ‘*Brahmavid āpnoti param...’* *ibid.* 2.7, ‘*yato vāco nivartante’.*

'The knower of *Brahman* attains the Supreme...' 2.7.

'That from which words turn back' and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.3⁵⁶⁹,

'The knower of *Ātman*/Self crosses over all sorrow.'

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, ⁵⁷⁰ 'The *Vedas* have that (*Brahman*) as their content by being the cause of the removal of the superimposed unmanifestedness'.

It is said that though the knowledge arising from such sentences as *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*⁶⁷², '**Thou art That**' is only verbal, the knowledge is certainly immediate because its content is immediate. As Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states in *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*,⁵⁷¹ 'Even verbal knowledge has an immediate content, since it has the immediate Self as its object, like the sentence of human origin conveys the self illuminosity of the Self'. So, the *smṛti* text *Gītā* 7.29⁶⁷⁴ states,

'Whoever resorting to Me striving for liberation from decay and death, they realize in full that *Brahman*, the individual Self and all action';

⁵⁶⁹ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.3, 'tarati śokam ātmavid iti...'

⁵⁷⁰ *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa* p.90, 'āgamasya cādhyastāprakāśavyāvṛttihetutoāt tadviśayatvam'.

⁶⁷² *Chāndogya* 6.9.4., 'tat tvam asi'.

⁵⁷¹ *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, p.122, 'śābdam api jñānam aparokṣārtham bhavati, ...yathā ātmana svayamprakāśatā vyutpādam pauroṣeyam vākyaṃ'. ⁶⁷⁴ *Gītā* 7.29, 'jarāmaraṇamokṣāya māmāśritya yatanti ye te brahma tad viduḥ kṛtsnam adhyātmanī karma cākhilam'.

and again *Gītā* 13.34⁵⁷²,

‘They who by the eye of wisdom perceive the distinction between the field and the knower of the field and the dissolution of the Cause of beings – they go to the Supreme’.

And further, the *Gītā* 18.30⁵⁷³ says,

‘That which knows action and in action, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, fear and absence of fear, bondage and liberation, that intellect is *Sattvic*, O Partha’.

Similarly, Bādaryāṇa in the *Brahma-sūtra* 2.3.30⁵⁷⁴ declares,

‘And because the contact between the soul and the intellect persists so long as the worldly state of the soul continues, there can be no defect, for this is what is met with in scripture’.

⁵⁷² *Gītā* 13.34, ‘*kṣetrakṣetraññāyor evam antaram jñānacakṣuṣā. bhūtaprakṛtimokṣam ca ye vidur yānti te param’.*

⁵⁷³ *Gītā* 18.30, ‘*pravṛttim ca nivṛttim ca kāryākārye bhayābhaye. bandham mokṣam ca yā vetti buddhiḥ sā pārtha sāttvikī’.*

⁵⁷⁴ *Brahma-sūtra* 2.3.30, ‘*yāvad ātmabhāvitoṣ ca na doṣas tad darśanāt’.*

Ādiśaṅkara says in his *bhāṣya on this* ⁵⁷⁵:

As long as this *jīvātman* continues to be in a state of transmigration, as long as this state of transmigration has not been brought to an end by right knowledge, so long will its association with the *buddhi*/discriminative faculty not cease. The *jīva*-hood and the transmigratory state of the *jīva* will continue as long as this association with *buddhi* etc. continues.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya⁵⁷⁶ further reiterates, ‘though the knowledge rising from the sentences such as ‘**thou art that/*tat tvam asi***’ is only verbal, the knowledge is immediate because its content is immediate.’ ‘Immediate knowledge/*aparokṣa-jñāna* is the knowledge that manifests directly. No other knowledge is indeed direct’. That *Brahman* is of the nature of ‘immediateness’ as has been said and known from the śruti, *Bṛhad* 3.4.1⁵⁷⁷ ‘**direct and immediate**’.

⁵⁷⁵ PV p.629 l.17, ‘*yāvad ayam ātmā saṁsārī bhavati, yāvad asya samyagdarśanena saṁsāritvaṁ na nivartate, tāvad asya buddhyā samyogo na śamyati; yāvad eva cāyaṁ buddhy-upādhisambandhaḥ, tāvad evāsyā jīvatoṣaṁ saṁsāritvaṁ ca.*’

⁵⁷⁶ ISV p.122, ‘*yad api śābdam eva tathāpi tasyāparokṣārthaviśayakatvāt aparokṣatvaṁ eveti ...śābdam api jñānam aparokṣārtham bhavati, ... yathā ātmana svayamparakāśatāvuyutpādakam pauruṣeyam vākyam.*’

⁵⁷⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad* 3.4.1, ‘*yat sākṣad aprokṣād brahma.*’

Therefore, the knowledge in the form of the mental modification arising from statements such as '**That thou art**', which manifests it, is immediate. So, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says in *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa* p.161⁵⁷⁸, "like the knowledge arising from sentences such as '**I am luminous**. This is the meaning'.

Earlier it has been said by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya that *Brahman* when reflected in *māyā* is God and in *avidyā*, is the soul. God is always aware of His identity with pure consciousness, termed *Brahman*, His essential nature, and so He is ever released. Only the *jīva*, which by being overpowered by its limiting adjunct, *avidyā*, falsely identifies itself with mind and undergoes transmigration, consisting of being an agent, an enjoyer/experient and a knower.

These characteristics belong to the mind but are falsely superimposed upon the *jīva* because of the mind's false relation to it, whose cause is *avidyā*. These are false/*mithyā*. When this false relation is removed, the *jīva* will cease to be a *jīva* but would remain as pure consciousness, *Ātman*, non-different from *Brahman*, the essential nature of God which is *mokṣa*/liberation, as Śrī Śaṅkara says in the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.4. *Tattu Samanvayāt* 1.1.4 (4)

But that (*Brahman* is to be known only from the Scriptures and not independently by any other means is established), because it is the main

⁵⁷⁸ *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa* p.161, 'yathā 'aham prakāśaḥ' ityādivākyajanyaājñānam ity arthaḥ'.

purpose (of all Vedantic texts).

Anubhūtiśvarūpa, while affirming the *Vivaraṇa* view outlined above, states that mediacy and immediacy are not the characteristics of knowledge, that is, a mental state. However, they are the characteristics of the object, while the knowledge that reveals the object is immediate. This he explains in both his *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa* and *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣyaṭippaṇam*. Since obviously *Brahman* is the most immediate, the knowledge which rises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* and which is of the nature of a mental state is immediate only. Further, 'Due to the naturalness of perceptible consciousness of the *Turīya* Self, It Self, the form of that being, also due to verbal testimony, It is perceptible.'

Anubhūtiśvarūpa's views, thus, expressed are based as we said previously on *Upaniṣadic* texts like, *Bṛhad* 3.9.26⁵⁷⁹,

I ask about that *puruṣa* who could be known only from the *Upaniṣadic* statements' like *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.7.6'.⁶⁸³

⁵⁷⁹ *Bṛhad* 3.9.26, 'tāṁ tvaupaniṣadaṁ puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi'. *Chāndogya*. 6.7.6, 'tad dhāsyā vijajñau.'

That statement of his he learnt/realized (following the instruction of the preceptor). From such statements we learn that *Upaniṣads* constitute the instrumental cause of realising *Brahman*.

Furthermore, the text, *Kena Upaniṣad 1.6*⁵⁸⁰,

'(Brahman) is that which is not manifested by mind,'

is specific in denying the instrumentality of mind as cause of the knowledge of *Brahman*. Moreover, by virtue of the complement of that mantra *Kena 1.6*⁵⁸¹,

'(Brahman) is that which is not manifested by mind,'

is specific in denying the instrumentality of mind as cause of the knowledge of *Brahman*. Moreover, by virtue of the complement of that mantra *Kena 1.6*⁵⁸²,

'that by which they say the mind is encompassed' / 'yenāhur mano matam.'

Brahman is that which is not manifested by mind, 'it is evident that this refers to not

⁵⁸⁰ *Kena Upaniṣad 1.6*, 'yan manasā na manute.'

⁵⁸¹ *Kena 1.*, 'yenāhur mano matam.'

⁵⁸² *Kena 1.*, 'yenāhur mano matam.'

only the immature mind but mind in general'. Hence, to reiterate , it denies that mind in general is the cause of knowledge of *Brahman*, as followers of Vācaspatimiśra would contend.

This text from the *Kena Upaniṣad* denies the instrumentality of *Upaniṣads* in respect of the knowledge of *Brahman* through primary signification/*mukhyāvṛtti* even by speech, *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.4 ⁵⁸³,

'*Brahman* is that which is not manifested by speech/*yad vācā anabhyuditam*',

'but the words of the *Upaniṣads* do convey *Brahman* through secondary signification'.

So, the followers of Vācaspatimiśra must admit that the text '*Brahman* is that which is not manifested by mind', *Kena.1.6* denies the instrumentality of *Upaniṣads* in respect of the knowledge of *Brahman* through primary signification/*mukhyāvṛtti* only but not through secondary signification. Hence, the *Upaniṣadic* texts, which state that *Brahman* is to be realized by mind, must be taken as conveying that mind

⁵⁸³ *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.5, '*yad vācā'nabhyuditam*'.

in general is the cause in respect of the direct knowledge of *Brahman* because the latter is only its modification.

Thus, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.5.3⁵⁸⁴, **'He sees with the mind'**

etc., confirm this view. It is only the sense of sight that is the instrument of visual perception, which only arises if the mind is attentive, and not otherwise.

5 iii) *Avidyā-nivṛttiḥ*/ Cessation of nescience/ignorance

The entire eighth chapter of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* and the *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivarāṇa* is dedicated to the cessation of ignorance since that is another name for liberation. In other words, *mokṣa*/ liberation has as its form cessation of bondage, which in turn is of the nature of ignorance, since it is the product of ignorance. Therefore, Sureśvara states in his *Vārttika*⁵⁸⁵,

'Cessation of ignorance is liberation and that (ignorance) is called bondage'.

This leads to the next major question, Is *nivṛttiḥ* /cessation possible or not?

⁵⁸⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.5., 'manasā hy eva paśyasi',

⁵⁸⁵ Sureśvara *Vārttika*, 'vidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ sā ca bandha udāhṛtaḥ.'

Destruction of ignorance by knowledge is experienced by everyone. All begin to eat cooked rice only having first ascertained that the thing placed before one is cooked rice. As Vimuktātman says in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁵⁸⁶ 'This has to be accepted by you also. Indeed, without accepting it you cannot even live, what to say about disputing!'

5 iv) Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya asks the question, What is the nature of cessation of ignorance?

Vimuktātma, author of *Iṣṭasiddhi* and inspiration for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, says that if the cessation of *avidyā* is real and different from the Self, then there would be a second reality in addition to the self, with the cessation of *avidyā* ... If the cessation of *avidyā* is unreal, then since an unreal thing cannot be brought into existence, it cannot be generated by knowledge ... Since reality and unreality are contradictory, they cannot both exist together ... It is the invariable rule that everything which is indeterminable is caused by *avidyā*. So, if the cessation of *avidyā* is accepted as indeterminable, it would follow that *avidyā*, being its cause, also exists. Moreover, if *avidyā* is indeterminable/*anirvācya*, its cessation, which is of the nature

⁵⁸⁶ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.83, 'sā tvayā'pi hyeṣṭavyaiva na hi tām anicchan jīvitum api śaknuyāḥ, kiṁ punar vivāditum.'

of its destruction/*nāśā*, cannot be said to be of the same nature, since it is established by experience that a thing and its destruction are different. If the cessation is illusory, its counter-correlate/*pratiyogin* would be real. Since no way other than the four mentioned above can be stated, cessation of ignorance cannot happen at all because it is impossible and cannot be explained. There is no point in the existence of the fifth way in addition to these four. Indeed, this has been said by Vimuktātman in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁵⁸⁷, 'And no other form of cessation is known,' as according to Vācaspatimiśra, mind is the instrumental cause of the knowledge of *Brahman*.

In contrast, Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* argues that it is not correct to say that verbal testimony as such would give rise only to mediate knowledge of the object. The mediacy or immediacy of knowledge does not depend upon the instrument of knowledge but on the object. If the object is immediate, then there would arise immediate knowledge of that object from sentences too. Here, *Brahman* being identical with one's own self is immediate, and so its knowledge too that arises from the *Upaniṣad* is immediate.

⁵⁸⁷ *Iṣṭasiddhi* p.83, 'na cānyo nivṛttiprakārah prasiddho'sti'.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, while affirming the *Vivaraṇa* view outlined above, states that mediacy and immediacy are not the characteristics of knowledge, that is a mental state. However, they are the characteristics of the object, while the knowledge that reveals the object that is immediate. This, he explains in both his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* and his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣyaṭippaṇam*.

Since obviously *Brahman* is the most immediate, the knowledge which rises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads* and which is of the nature of a mental state is immediate only.

In the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* and in *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣyaṭippaṇam*⁵⁸⁸ on v.7.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says:

Since the *Turīya Self* is itself of the nature of immediate Consciousness, the verbal knowledge in the form of that is also immediate. There is no rule

⁵⁸⁸ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣyaṭippaṇam*.p.35 on v.7 'turīyasyātmanaḥ svato'parokṣasamvit svabhāvatvāt tad ākāraṇī śābdam api vijñānam aparokṣam. Na ca śabdasya parokṣajñānatvaniyamaḥ, parokṣyasya jñānatasya viśayapāroksyopādhitvāt'.

that words can give rise to mediate knowledge only; knowledge is mediate only when it has as its limiting adjunct (or content) a mediate object.

Thus, Prakāśātman and Anubhūtiśvarūpa consider *Upaniṣads* to be the instrumental cause of the direct knowledge of *Brahman*, as do his direct pupil Ānandagiri, Vidyāraṇya and subsequent great Advaitins.

In summary, this major Śāṅkara tradition of pure *kevala-Advaita* says that the merit arising from *karma-yoga* endures until there arises direct knowledge of *Brahman*. The proximate means to this direct knowledge of *Brahman* that arises from the major texts of the *Upaniṣads*, are the six treasures *śama, dama etc., sannyāsa (=uparati), śravaṇa, mañāna* and *nididhyāsana*.

That merit arising from *karma-yoga* directs the mind towards the Self, which is identical with *Brahman*⁵⁸⁹. *Śama, dama, etc.*, check the tendency to act in a way that thwarts one's spiritual development.

According to the view that there is unique injunction/*apūrva-vidhi* in regard to *śravaṇa, mañāna* and *nididhyāsana* and there arises, from the pursuit of the latter,

⁵⁸⁹ PV p.968 on BS 3.4.27, 'śamadamādyupetaḥ syāt tathāpi tu tadvidhes tadarīgatayā teṣāṃ avāśyānuṣṭheyatvāt'. (Even though there be no injunction about sacrifices etc.), still one must be endowed with calmness, self-control and the like, since they are enjoined as subsidiaries of knowledge; and hence have to be practiced as a matter of course'. 'ca...adṛṣṭena cātmanā cittaśuddhirṅ pratyakpraṇatām cotpādya jānasādhanatvāt'.

an unseen merit which helps the rise of the direct knowledge of *Brahman*. In addition, as has previously been stated in another context, it gives rise to the visible result of removing the false notion /*pramāṇāsambhāvanā* that the 'Upaniṣads do not teach the non-dual *Brahman*', the false notion *prameyāsambhāvanā*- that the *Upaniṣadic* truth is contradicted by perception etc., and so is invalid, and the false notion of *viparītabhāvanā*- 'I' and 'mine' in regard to objects that are different from the Self.

'On the contrary they teach that *Brahman* of realization, which is immediate and direct. How⁵⁹⁰' observance of *śravaṇa* etc., is discussed in *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. It is ascertained that the rise of the knowledge in this life itself depends upon the absence of impediments likely to be caused by fructified demerits. If, however, there are impediments, then knowledge would arise in the next life.

The *śruti* text *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 2.5⁵⁹¹,

⁵⁹⁰ cf. PV p.987 on BSB 3.4.47

⁵⁹¹ *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 2.5, 'taduktam ṛṣiṇā - garbe nu sann anveṣām avedam ahaṁ devānāṁ janimāni viśvāsatāṁ mā pura āyasīr arakṣam adhaḥ śyeno javasā niradīyam'. itigarbha evaitacchayāno vāmadeva evam uvāca' PV on SB 3.4.52

'This fact was stated by the seer, 'Even while lying in the womb, I came to know of the birth of all the gods. A hundred iron citadels held me down. Then, like a hawk, I forced my way through by dint of the knowledge of the Self.'

The fact that Vāmadeva said this while still lying in the **mother's womb**, indicates that Vāmadeva had attained the knowledge of *Brahman* when he was in his mother's womb. There is no possibility of *śravaṇa etc.*, then. It is evident from this that Vāmadeva must have pursued this means in the previous life and knowledge did not arise then due to impediments.

Anubhūtiśvarūpa holds the view,⁶⁹⁵ (*PV BSB 3.4.52*) that the above will hold good only if we admit there is an injunction in respect of *śravaṇa, etc.* For it is only then there will arise merit from their observance, and it will endure and give forth its result, '**knowledge of *Brahman***' in the next life. However, Vācaspatiśra, who does not accept any injunction in respect of *śravaṇa, etc.* cannot acknowledge the possibility of the rise of knowledge in the next life.

Anubhūtiśvarūpa explains that the direct knowledge of *Brahman*, by its mere rise, removes the covering power *lāvaraṇa*-phase of *avidyā*. The soul, free from doubt and contrary notion regarding its true nature, perceives the world of objects, and agency, etc., that are projected by projecting power, the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā*

without being deluded by them, i.e. soul/*jīvātman* is 'in the world but not of the world'.

What of the merits and demerits accumulated in previous lives and this life before the rise of knowledge of *Brahman*? The answer lies in *Chandogya Upaniṣad* 5.24.3⁵⁹²,

'As to that, as the fibre at the tip of a blade of reed becomes completely burnt when thrown into fire, so all sins of him who, having this knowledge thus, performs *Agnihotra*-sacrifice, become completely burnt',

and also *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁵⁹³ 4.4.22, states that,

'He conquers both of them (merit and demerit).' i.e. knowledge of *Brahman*, derived from the *Upaniṣadic* texts, destroys all merits and demerits acquired prior to its rise.

This is stated, thus, in *Brahma Sūtra* 4.1.13⁵⁹⁴,

⁵⁹² *Chandogya* 5.24.3, '*tad yatheṣīkātūlam agnau protaṃ pradūyetaivaṃ hāsya sarve pāpmānaḥ pradūyante ya etad evaṃ vidvān agnihotraṃ juhōti.*'

⁵⁹³ *Bṛhad Upaniṣad* 4.4.22, '*uthe u haivaiṣa ete tarati, nainam kṛtākṛte tapataḥ.*'

⁵⁹⁴ *BS* 4.1.13, '*tad adhigama uttarapūrvāghayor aśleṣavināśau tad vyapadeśāt.*'

'On the realization of That, there occurs the non-attachment and destruction of the subsequent and previous sins respectively, because it is declared so.'

In the same way, direct knowledge of *Brahman* prevents accumulation of fresh merit or demerit. This is because the knower of truth does not have any sense of agency in respect of any action he may perform in the future. His realization is in the form⁵⁹⁵:

I am *Brahman*, free from the characteristic of being an agent or an enjoyer in the three periods of time- past, present and future; I never was an agent or enjoyer; nor am I now, nor will I be in the future.

When such is the case, there is no possibility of being rendered impure by any demerit nor pure by any merit". Or as *Chāndogya* 4.14.³⁵⁹⁶ teaches,

⁵⁹⁵ BSB 4.1.13, '*pūroasiddhakartṛtva bhokṛtva viparītaṃ hi triṣu api kāleṣu akartṛtva abhokṛtvasoarūpaṃ brahma aham asmi na itaḥ pūroam api kartā bhoktā vā aham āsaṃ na idānīm na api bhaviṣyatkāla iti brahma vit avagacchati*' / (Revathy, S trans.)

⁵⁹⁶ *Chāndogya* 4.1.14, '*yathā puṣkarapalāśa āpo na śliṣyanta evam evaṇvidi pāpaṃ karma na śliṣyata iti*'.

'As water does not stick to a lotus-leaf, even so sin does not cling to one who has realized the Self',

which is what is being discussed in *BS 4.1.14*⁵⁹⁷ **"In the very same way there is no attachment to the other (i.e. of virtue) as well, 'Liberation must follow as soon as the body falls.'** *BS 4.1.15*⁵⁹⁸ and further,

'only those past (virtues and vices) get destroyed which have not begun to bear fruit, for death is set as a limit of waiting for liberation.'

Thus, it is ascertained that only merits and demerits accumulated/*sañcita* are destroyed and not those fructified /*prārabdha* , as it has started yielding fruit in the form of the present body by being present in which the *jīvātman*/soul has attained knowledge of *Brahman*. Further *Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.14.2*⁵⁹⁹, declares,

'For him (knower of truth) the delay is for that long only, as long as he does not become freed (from the body). Then he becomes merged (in Existence/*Brahman*).'

⁵⁹⁷ *BS 4.1.14, 'itarasyāpy evam asaṃśleṣaḥ pāte tu' .*

⁵⁹⁸ *BS 4.1.15, 'anārabdhakārye eva tu pūrve tadavadheḥ'.*

⁵⁹⁹ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.14.2, 'tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye 'tha saṃpatsya iti'.*

Anubhūtiśvarūpa follows Śrī Śaṅkara in explaining this text as saying that in the case of the knower of truth there is a delay in attaining *Brahman* until the fall of the body (BSB 4.1.15). From this, it is known that the body continues to exist after the rise of the dawn of *Brahman* knowledge. This implies the existence of fructified *karma*/merits and demerits. This again is how it is known that knowledge of *Brahman* destroys all merits and demerits except the fructified one.⁶⁰⁰

Anubhūtiśvarūpa explains how on the basis of an analogy. Just as after sun rise, the darkness in an inner department is not removed, so even after the 'dawn' in the form of knowledge of *Brahman* fructified merits and demerits are not removed. Furthermore, the rise of knowledge of *Brahman* is said to depend on fructified *karma* because knowledge could be attained by a *jīvoātman* only when it remains in a body, obtained only by fructified *karma*:

⁶⁰⁰ PV. P.1030 on BSB 4.1.15. l.17 'śarīrapātasam ayam eva tad eva sampadyata iti jñānotpattiyantaram sat sampatteḥ avadhikaraṇaliṅgāt śarīrapātāvadhikaraṇaliṅgāt kañcit kālaṃ śarīravasthānam gamyamānam karmasadbhāvam gamayati...'

As a potter's wheel or a discharged arrow must be allowed to work itself out through its effects being experienced, since it cannot be checked in the middle. Hence one has to wait until its force is exhausted.⁶⁰¹

The *Upaniṣads* provide evidence that knowledge is not effective in dispelling fructified *karma*, for they speak of Uddālaka and other realized souls who continue to live in the body even after the rise of the knowledge of *Brahman*.⁶⁰² So *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2 says,

'For him the delay is for that long only (as long as he has not become freed).'

The sustaining of the body is the fructified *karma*; and the latter is sustained by the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā*, which is not destroyed by the direct knowledge of *Brahman*.

Anubhūtiśvarūpa uses an inferential argument to explain this:

a) Knowledge of *Brahman* does not annihilate the root -cause of fructified *karma*.

⁶⁰¹ *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya-ṭippanam* and in *Prakāṣartha-Vivaraṇa*, p.1030. l.21. (BS 4.1.15), 'yathā tamo nivartanasamarthe savitari udite'pi apavarakapraviṣṭam tamaḥ na nivartate, tathā udite'pi jñānadvākare pravṛttaphalam karma na nivartisyate ...'

⁶⁰² *Prakāṣartha-Vivaraṇa* p.1031.l.6. (on BS 4.1.15), 'anārabdhakārye eva tu pūrve tadavadheḥ'. 'Tattvajñānasya ca tan nivartanapāṭavaśūmyatvam uddālakādīnām tattvadarśinām eva śarīradhāraṇaviśayaśrutismṛtiliṅgaiḥ ... anuḡrhitāt 'tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ' iti liṅgād gamyata iti bhāvaḥ'.⁷⁰⁷ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2, 'tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye 'tha saṃpatsya iti'.

b) This is because it is the effect of fructified *karma*; like the experience of happiness and misery.⁶⁰³

Here, as was stated earlier, the root-cause of fructified *karma* is the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā*. Śāṅkara states, 'This false-ignorance, even when sublated, continues for a while owing to past tendencies like continuance of the vision of double moons.'⁶⁰⁴

Anubhūtiśvarūpa explains that the word *saṃskāra* in *saṃskāraśāstra* means 'that which reveals' (*saṃskaroti-vyanakti*), 'the one moon as two' (*dvitīyam candram*), and is the revealing medium, 'the vessel filled with water'. Although two moons appear, this is contradicted by the perceptual knowledge that it is one. However, one continues to perceive the two moons because of the revealing medium, even though one has the knowledge that it is false. The appearance of two moons will be removed by the knowledge of the oneness of the moon at the very time of the removal of the revealing medium.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰³ PV P.1031 l.14. (on BS 4.1.15), 'Prayogo'pi 'brahma jñānam na pravṛttaphalakarmabījadāhakaṃ , Pravṛttaphalakarmakāryatvāt, bhogavat iti'.

⁶⁰⁴ "BSB 4.1.15, 'bādhitam api tu mithyājñānam dvicandrajñānavat saṃskāraśāstra kañcit kālam anuvartata iti'.

⁶⁰⁵ PV P.1031 l.16. (on BS 4.1.15), 'saṃskaroti vyanakti dvitīyam candram iti saṃskāraḥ jalapatrādīḥ tadvaśāt. yathā pramāṇarūpeṇa bādhitam api candrabhedajñānam kañcitkālam anuvartate, jalapatrādivigamakālinam eva candraikatvajñānam nivartakam , tadvad iti vyavasthā'.

Here too it is the *vikṣepa* -phase of *avidyā* that is to be referred to by the word *saṃskāra*. It projects the characteristic of agency, etc. upon the knower of truth. The appearance of duality will be removed by the continuing knowledge of *Brahman* when removal of the *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā* takes place on the fructified merits and demerits being exhausted by experiencing their fruits.

5. v) One free from accumulated merits and demerits living out only his fructified karma is known as *jīvanmukta*.

As *One free from accumulated merits and demerits* has once and for all realized the falsity of the world of objects, he is no longer under its influence. Since he has realized the truth and is embodied for the time being, he imparts knowledge of *Brahman* to (so called) 'others' who he realizes are in truth a reflection of his own Self.

When his body falls, the *jīvanmukta* remains as pure *Brahman*. As *Chāndogya*⁶⁰⁶ explains,

⁶⁰⁶ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2, '*tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye 'tha saṃpatsya iti*'.

'For him (knower of truth) the delay is for that long only, as long as he does not become freed (from the body). Then he becomes merged (in Existence/ Brahman).'

Anubhūtiśvarūpa explains the distinction between the liberated soul and the bound ones by first advocating two aspects of *prakṛti*, *māyā* and *avidyā*. *Māyā*, as has been discussed, is the transformative material cause of the world. *Avidyā* is the limiting adjunct of the *jīvātman*. Since *avidyā*-s are many, the *jīvātman*-s too are many. If a particular *jīvātman*/soul attains knowledge of *Brahman*, then the covering/*āvaraṇa*-phase of *avidyā* is removed first. The *vikṣepa*-phase of *avidyā* is removed later on when the fructified *karma* of the soul is exhausted. The soul/*jīvātman* will then remain as *Brahman*/pure Consciousness. Other souls conditioned by their respective *avidyā*-s will continue to exist. *Māyā* will not be removed by knowledge of *Brahman* as a particular soul realizes. Consequently, the world, the transformation of *māyā* too, will continue to exist as the field of experience of happiness and misery for other bound souls.

If *māyā* and the world exist even in the state of liberation, which is identical with *Brahman*, one would expect the non-dual character of *Brahman* to be contradicted.

However, this is not so, because such a contingency could arise only if there existed real entities apart from *Brahman*. Here, *māyā* and the world are non-real, and the existence of non-real entities will not in any way impair the non-dual character of *Brahman*.

Bhāskara in his commentary on *Bhagavad Gitā* 2.13⁶⁰⁷ on the famous verse,

‘Just as in this body of the embodied (Self) passes into childhood and youth and old age, so does He pass into another body. There the wise man is not distressed’,

criticizes the *Advaita* position. He says if *Brahman* were admitted to be attaining the state of souls, then if a particular soul attains liberation, there would be occasion for all other souls to be instantaneously released.⁶⁰⁸

This is based on the prevalent view in *Advaita* that the cause of *Brahman* attaining to the state of souls is *māyā*, which is one and which is removed by the knowledge of *Brahman*. If one soul attains the latter, then *māyā*, which is one will be

⁶⁰⁷ *Bhagavad Gitā* 2.13, ‘dehino’smin yathā dehe kaumāram yauvanam jarā tathā dehāntaraprāptir-dhīras-tatra na muhyati’.

⁶⁰⁸ Bhāskara *Gītābhāṣya*, ‘yeṣāṃ punaḥ paramātmaiva sākṣād anupraviṣṭaḥ śarīreṣu tad aṃśo jīvo nāma nāstīti matam, teṣāṃ ekasmin mukte sarvamukti-prasaṅgaḥ’.

removed. As a consequence, all other souls too, being free from *māyā* will be released.

However, this criticism by Bhāskara is proved invalid in light of Anubhūtiśvarūpa's clarification of the nature of liberation as described above.

Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahma Sūtra*, along with Ādiśaṅkara's *bhāṣya* and Anubhūtiśvarūpa's *Prakaṣartha-Vivaraṇa* explain that it gives three views on the nature of the liberated state. Jaimini's view expressed in *BS 4.4.5*⁶⁰⁹ is that from references etc. (in the *Upaniṣads*), it is evident that the liberated soul becomes established in the attributes that *Brahman* has.

The liberated soul identical with *Brahman* remains one possessing omniscience, lordship and other qualities because the *Upaniṣads* describe *Brahman* as possessing these qualities.

Auḍulomi's view⁶¹⁰ in *BS 4.4.6*, '**says that the liberated soul becomes established in consciousness as consciousness itself, that being its true nature**'. His authority

⁶⁰⁹ *BS 4.4.5*, '*brāhmaṇe jaiminir upanyāsādibhyaḥ*'. 5 Jaimini says that from references etc. (in the *Upaniṣads*) (it is evident that the liberated soul) becomes established in the attributes that *Brahman* has.

⁶¹⁰ *BS 4.4.6*, '*citi tanmātreṇa tad ātmakatvād ity auḍulomiḥ*'. 6. Audulomi says that the liberated soul becomes established in consciousness as consciousness itself, that being its true nature.

is *Bṛhad* 4.5.13⁶¹¹ speaks of *Brahman* as pure Consciousness only. Qualities like omniscience, etc. are illusorily superimposed upon *Brahman* by the *upādhi*/limiting adjunct- *māyā*. Texts speaking of *Brahman* as omniscient refer only to *Brahman* as associated with *māyā*. Omniscience is not the essential nature, whereas Consciousness is; therefore, the liberated soul identical with *Brahman* remains as pure Consciousness.

Bādarāyaṇa himself says in *BrahmaSūtra* 4.4.7⁶¹² **‘even so, there is no contradiction since the earlier nature exists according to *Upaniṣadic* references’.**

In other words, pure Consciousness is the nature of *Brahman* and omniscience, etc. constitute the nature of God, a complex of *Brahman* and *māyā*. He who realizes *Brahman*/ ‘pure Consciousness’ remains as Consciousness. Who meditates on God becomes God-like possessing omniscience etc. Thus, Jaimini’s view is the empirical standpoint, while Auḍulomi speaks from the transcendental standpoint, according to the view of Anubhūtiśvarūpa⁶¹³. Also, on account of the existence of former

⁶¹¹ *Bṛhad* 4.5.13, ‘*prajñānaghana eva*’.

⁶¹² *BS* 4.4.7, ‘*evam apy upanyāsāt pūrvabhāvād avirodham bādarāyaṇaḥ*’.

⁶¹³ *PV* p.1096, 1.8, ‘*evam apy upanyāsāt pūrvabhāvād avirodham bādarāyaṇaḥ*’. 1.10, ‘*caitanyamātram pāramārthikam svarūpam, aiśvaryādikaṁ māyopādhikasya ... ; tataḥ paramārthabrahmavid caitanyamātrarūpeṇa avatiṣṭhate. Sopādhikabrahmavit sopādhikam aiśvaryam prāpnoti iti na jaiminyauḍulomibhyām api vivaditavyam*’.

qualities admitted owing to references (in *Upaniṣads*) and so on, there is no contradiction (between the two), so thinks Bādarāyaṇa. That is, He rejects the contention of Bhāskara that the liberated soul remains as possessing consciousness, omniscience etc., as its qualities. Bhāskara argues that liberation cannot be equated with pure Consciousness because to remain as pure consciousness cannot be a human end. He thus argues that the author of *Brahma Sūtra* admits that *mokṣa* is a state where the soul remains as omniscient, conscious of everything, yet still in a state of *dvaita*/duality.

Rather, the state of liberation is characterized by absence of mind, the general cause of all cognitions and of the sense organs which are instruments of the specific cognition. This has to be admitted on the basis of *Praśnopaniṣad* 6.5⁶¹⁴

'as rivers get absorbed reaching the sea ... so also these sixteen parts of the all seeing *Puruṣa*, that have *Puruṣa* as their goal, disappear on reaching the *Puruṣa*.

'This speaks of the dissolution of all factors mentioned in the state of liberation.

Thus, in the absence of any means of knowledge in the state of liberation, there

⁶¹⁴ *Praśnopaniṣad* 6.5, 'sa yathemā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudrāyaṇāḥ samudraṃ prāpyāstaṃ gacchanti bhidhyete tāsāṃ nāmarupe samudra ity evaṃ procyate | evam evāsyā paridraṣṭur imāḥ ṣoḍaśakalāḥ puruṣāyaṇāḥ puruṣaṃ prāpyāstaṃ gacchanti bhidhyete cāsāṃ nāmarupe puruṣa ityevaṃ procyate sa eṣo'kalo'mṛto bhavati tadeṣa ślokaḥ'.

would be no possibility of the liberated soul acquiring any knowledge. As such, a liberated soul cannot be said to be conscious of everything. However, it does remain as **'pure Consciousness'** (PV on BSB 4.4.7).⁶¹⁵

Anubhūtiśvarūpa explains that Bhāskara further claims that if liberation is equated with consciousness, then it will be different from bliss and as such, it cannot be a human end. Anubhūtiśvarūpa says that Bhāskara's contention that consciousness is different from bliss on the ground that when it is manifested at the time of the experience of misery, bliss is not manifested is not correct. A fair complexioned body gets itself reflected in an impure mirror, and a fair colour is not noticed in the body that is reflected, so fair colour is not manifested. On this ground, we do not say fair colour is not the nature of the body. Hence, it must be admitted that the essential nature of an object may not be manifested owing to the limiting adjunct. Here, bliss is the essential nature of consciousness manifested in the mental states which arise from the contact of sense-organs with pleasant objects. This is similar to the manifestation of the fair colour in a mirror that is pure. But in the mental states which arise owing to the contact of sense-organs with unpleasant

⁶¹⁵ PV on BSB 4.4.7. P.1096 L.17, 'Kim āgantukabodhena sasambodhatvaṃ kiṃ vā svābhāvikenā? Ādye tat kāraṇaṃ mana ādi vaktavyam; tadā ca kalāvilyaśrutibādhaḥ ...na ca svarūpajñānena sarvajñatvam, tasya svato viśayoparāgābhāvāt'.

objects, the bliss-aspect is not manifested. This is similar to the non-manifestation of the fair colour in the body that is reflected in an impure mirror. Hence, consciousness is identical to bliss. However, bliss is not manifested at the time of the experience of misery when consciousness manifests. Misery is a mental state that arises due to contact of the senses with 'unpleasant objects' so that in that state, the bliss-nature (*sat cit ānanda*) will be covered over, so the natural bliss reflection will not be recognized (PV BSB 4.4.7-8).⁶¹⁶

Thus, liberation is identical with pure consciousness, bliss in nature, so Bhāskara's criticism is not valid. Thus, Bhāskara and Amṛtānanda, his follower, rejected the Advaita teaching that knowledge is the sole means of liberation.

Only non-real factors can be removed by knowledge. Poison is not removed by mere recollection of Garuḍa but by intense meditation upon Him by uttering the sacred formula relating to Him. The latter is not knowledge but activity - mental and vocal. The discernment of defects in the objects does not remove desire. It only gives rise to detachment which is a mental state that is the opposite of desire. Hence, there

114 PV p.1097 l.6ff., 'yac cānyac cakranda - caitanyamātrāvasthānani cen mokṣaḥ tadā nirānandatvaprasaṅgaḥ , na hi caitanyam evānandaḥ , duḥkham avasthāyām api caitanyābhivyakteḥ, Yasmin vyajyamāne yan na vyajyate na tat tatsvabhāvam , yathā nīlam na pītasvabhāvam iti,.....tasmāc caitanyasukhātmakatve bābhānupalambhāt cid ātmanas ca nirupādhikapṛitigocaratenānandātmatāsiddher na mokṣasya nirānandanatvaprasaṅgaḥ'.

is no removal of desire that is real by the discernment of defects. In the same way, it is not the mere visual perception of the sacred *setu/ Rāma's* bridge that is admitted to be removing the sins. On the other hand, it is the observance of several vows associated with taking bath in the sacred *setu* that removes sin. Hence, it is activity and not mere visual perception of *setu* that leads to the removal of sins.

Hence, knowledge could remove only a non-real entity and not a real one.

Agency etc. are non-real, so they are removed by knowledge of *Brahman*. On realization of *Brahman*, the soul is said to cease to be a soul and remains as *Brahman/* liberation.

This brings Anubhūtiśvarūpa back to the concept of the cessation of ignorance/*avidyā-nivṛtti* and the apparent ways. Indeed, the whole of the eighth chapter of Vimuktātman's famous work, *Iṣṭasiddhi* is devoted to this simply because *avidyā-nivṛtti* is in fact liberation/*mokṣa*. Hence the great Sureśvācārya ⁶¹⁷ concurs in his *Vārttika* when he says –

'the cessation of ignorance is liberation and that ignorance is bondage'.

This naturally leads to the question as to what is the nature of this cessation?

Four ways are obvious:

⁶¹⁷ Sureśvācārya *Vārttika*, '*avidyāstamayoḥ mokṣaḥ sā ca bandha udāhṛtaḥ*'.

Firstly it is 'not-real'/na sattva. For if cessation of *avidyā* is real and different from the Self, then there would be a second reality in addition to the Self, with the cessation of nescience. Thus if the rule is accepted that duality is due to it, the contingency would arise of it also being real. If it is held that cessation of nescience is of the form of the Self itself, then the Self being ever existent, the cessation of nescience also of that form would also be ever existent rendering Scriptures un-necessary!(*Iṣṭasiddhi* p.83)⁶¹⁸

Secondly, it is 'not-unreal either'/nāpy asattva. If cessation of *avidyā* is un-real, then since an unreal thing cannot be brought into existence, then it cannot be generated by knowledge. Moreover, if cessation of *avidyā* is un-real in nature is not different from the Self, it would be always existent so, knowledge etc. would be useless. If accepted as different from the Self, it would be a second Self (*Iṣṭasiddhi* p.83).⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁸ IS p.83, 'yadi avidyānivṛttiḥ ātmarūpaiva svīkriyate tarhi ātmanah sadātanatvena tadrūpāyā avidyānivṛttir api sadātanatvaprasaṅgadvārā śāstrādīnām vaiyarthyaṁ bhavet'.

⁶¹⁹ ibid. p.84, 'yady avidyānivṛttir asattī syāt tarhi asataḥ ajantatvena asyā jñānajanyatvaṁ na syāt. Nahi nṛṣṅgam kutaś cij jāyate ...'

Third, 'not both real and unreal'/*sad-asattvam api na*. Since reality and unreality are contradictory, they cannot both be together (*Iṣṭasiddhi*).⁶²⁰

Fourthly, 'not also indeterminable'/*nāpi aniroacanīyatā*.

If cessation of avidyā is accepted as indeterminable, it follows that ignorance its cause also exists. Moreover, its cessation, of the nature of destruction, cannot be of the same nature, as a thing and its destruction are different. If cessation is illusory, its counter correlate would be real.

5 vi) Theory of the fifth way

Since the cessation of ignorance does not fall within the above four forms, it is claimed to be impossible. But it is held that a form different from these forms and known as the fifth is possible. This is called the fifth form because it is different from the four forms, just as the pure Self, which is beyond the three states, is known as the fourth (*Turīya*).⁶²¹

⁶²⁰ *ibid.*, '*sattvāsattvayoḥ parasparaviruddhatvāt ubhayasamuccayapakṣaḥ asmbhavī*'.

⁶²¹ *IS* p.85, '*asya ca prakārasya prakāracatuṣayāt bhinnatvena pañcamprakāratvoktiḥ. yathā avasthātrayātītaḥ śuddhaḥ ātmā turīyaḥ kathyate tavat*'.

Clearly, Vimuktātman and Anubhūti in this whole scheme have been inspired by Gauḍapāda's Kārikā 4.83⁶²² in *Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa* :

By asserting that the Self exists, does not exist, exists and does not exist, or again does not exist, does not exist, the non-discriminating man does certainly cover It up through the idea of changeability and unchangeability, and non-existence.

Categorization of ignorance as being of this fifth form is well known as the original idea of the Iṣṭasiddhi's author Vimuktātman:

It is reasonable that the cessation of ignorance is of a nature different from real, unreal, real-cum-unreal and indeterminable modes, since ignorance is indeterminable and the said modes have been rejected. The sacrificial offering should indeed be in accordance with the nature of the yakṣa (deity).⁶²³

⁶²² Gauḍapāda's Kārikā 4.83, 'asti nāsty asti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti vā punaḥ / calasthīrobhayābhāvair āvṛṇotyeva bālīśaḥ //

⁶²³ IS p.85, 'sadasatsadasad anirvacanīyaparakārebhyo hyanyaparakāraivājñānasya nivṛttiryuktā. Anirvacanīyatvāt tasya; uktaparakārāṇām tvayaiva nirastatvāt. Yakṣānurūpo hi baliḥ'.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya introduces this view in the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*. He answers by adopting the ‘fifth mode which is characterized by difference from the real as well as the unreal and different from removability by knowledge alone’.⁶²⁴

The cessation of ignorance being well established and it having been decided that it does not fall within the four modes, another mode has necessarily to be accepted. The means of valid knowledge known as presumption applies here.

Its capacity to establish a fact is stated thus:

If it (the actual state of affairs) cannot be accounted for otherwise, the proposition that accounts for the actual state of affairs crushes the objection, accepting what is not seen; that alone is most powerful.⁶²⁵

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further states in *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, ‘Even on the view that the cessation of nescience is of the fifth mode it should be considered only as unreal/*Mithyā* here’.⁷³¹ Ignorance is indeterminable because it is removable by knowledge. Therefore, the secret is that, ‘since by the denial in the scriptures in the form ‘**There**

⁶²⁴ ISV p.119, ‘sadasadvailakṣaṇyāvachchinnam jñānamātrāpodyatvavilakṣaṇam pañcamaparakāram ādāya pariharati’.

⁶²⁵ *ibid.*, ‘anyathānupapattiś cet asti vastuprasādhikāpinaṣṭy adṛṣivaimatyam sauva sarvabalādhikā’.⁷³¹ *ibid.*, p.119, ‘avidyānivr̥tṭeḥ pañcamaparakāratvapake’pi mithyātvam eva...’

is no difference here', (Bṛ 4.4.19)⁶²⁶ everything other than the Self is understood as unreal, the cessation of ignorance, even if it is of the fifth mode, is false/*mithyā*.⁶²⁷

The idea is that illusoriness in the sense of incapability of being specifically determined, or being manifested by Consciousness or being denied by scriptures does exist there.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states in *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa*, 'because such a cessation is not of the nature of ignorance, its illusoriness (*mithyātvam*) in the sense of being removable by knowledge or sublatability is not accepted'⁶²⁸. It is accepted as an entity which is not destructible by right knowledge, and hence, even though the cessation is *mithyā*, it is spoken of as being of the fifth mode.

Even though this theory of the fifth mode is mentioned by Vimuktātman in *Iṣṭasiddhi*, he is not totally attached to it; it is propounded only as a possible theory in the first chapter. The theory which is approved by him is stated thus in the eighth chapter – 'the known content or the knowledge of the content is the extinction of its

⁶²⁶ Bṛhad Upaniṣad 4.4.19, 'Neha nānāsti kiñca na'.

⁶²⁷ ISV p.119, 'śrautaniṣedhena ātmātiriktasya avastutvāvagamāt pañcamaparakārā'pi nivṛttiḥmithyā ...'

⁶²⁸ *ibid.* p.377, '... avidyātmakatvābhāvena jñānanivartyatvarūpaṁ mithyātvam athavā bādhyatvaṁ neṣṭam. Samyagjñānānāśyatvarūpaṁ ca sattvam iṣṭam, ataḥ mithyābhūte'pi nāśe pañcamaparakāratvavāco yuktiḥ'.

ignorance, so establishing the homogeneity of the Self'.⁶²⁹ The cessation of ignorance /*avidyā* is the Self itself; then only *Ātmā*/Self remains.

5 vii) Being of the nature of the known Self.

Maṇḍana Mīśra himself says in his *Brahma Siddhi* 3.106 ⁶³⁰ 'Non-dual, unchanging knowledge itself is said to be the removal of ignorance.' Likewise, Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* ⁶³¹ says, 'Just as the snake imagined in a stick ends up as the stick, **the universe ends up without doubt as the eternal Consciousness through the words (of the *mahāvākyas*)**'.

⁶²⁹ IS p. 339, 'jñāto'rthas taj jñaptir vā tad ajñānahāniḥ'.

⁶³⁰ *Brahma Siddhi* 3.106, 'vidyaiva cādvayā śāntā tadastamaya ucyate'.

⁶³¹ Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* p.268, 'daṇḍāvāsānaniṣṭhaḥ syāt daṇḍasarpō yathā tathā.nityāvagataniṣṭhaḥ syāt vākyāḥ jagad aśmāyam.'

5. viii) Or, the cessation of ignorance is the form of Self-knowledge.

Vimuktātman explains that since, in the world, it is seen that when the nacre, etc. is known, it is said, 'my ignorance has been destroyed', the knowledge of the nacre, etc. is itself experienced as the removal of the ignorance of nacre. Similarly, here also, it may be that the 'knowledge of *Brahman* is itself the removal of ignorance of *Brahman*. That knowledge arises on the rise of the means of valid knowledge in the form of the *mahāvākya*.' 'Even though knowledge is the very nature (of *Brahman*), it becomes the fruit of the connection with the means of valid knowledge'.⁶³² On this view, reaffirmed by Anubhūti, the question of impermanence of liberation does not arise at all.

⁶³² IS p., '...*Brahmajñaptir eva tad ajñānahānir bhavati.sā ca jñaptiḥ mahāvākya-rūpamāṇodaye sati jāyate. Yadyapi jñaptiḥ svarūpabhūtā tathāpi pramāṇasambandhāt phalāyate*'.

5. ix) Or, the cessation of ignorance is indeterminable.

This has been established in *Nyāyamakaranda* of Ānandabodha, as a sound view.⁶³³ It is for this reason that it has been said, ‘does not an entity which is unreal in nature perish through an unreal destruction?’ This has been elaborated in Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam* thus:

Do not colours such as blue and yellow, etc. which are seen in a dream or in magic and are unreal in nature perish through an unreal destruction?

Similarly, the destruction of ignorance, which is unreal, takes place only through an unreal destruction. This view has also been stated in Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* BS 1.4.6.634,

‘The dawn of knowledge is also by the glory of the limiting adjunct of the Self; the destruction of ignorance brought about by it is certainly indeterminable’.

⁶³³ *Nyāyamakaranda* p.359, ‘ata evoktaṃ mithyābhāvena bhūtaṃ kiṃ mithyā nāśān na naikyati’. ⁷⁴⁰

Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam p.377, ‘mithyāsattvena jātaṃ svapnamāyādidṛṣṭaṃ nilapītādimitthyānāśāt kiṃ na nahati? Tātraiva ajñānasya mithyābhūtasya mithyānāśenaiva nāśo bhaviṣyati’.

⁶³⁴ *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* p.335 BS.1.4.6, ‘trayāṇām eva caiva upanyāsaḥ praśnaś ca’, ‘And thus there is the presentation of three things (fire, individual soul and Supreme Self) alone, and the question is also concerned with them’. L.22, ‘vidyodayo’pyātmanaḥ upādhimahimnaiva.tat kṛtaś ca avidyāstamayaḥ anirvācyā eva’.

Posterior non-existence, another name for destruction, does not need a material cause Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states in *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* BS 2.1.14.635, ‘Since destruction does not have any material cause, the contingency of ignorance existing does not arise’.

Also, in the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*⁷⁴³ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says, ‘Since destruction is without any material cause, there is also no question of another ignorance’.

Again, in the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*⁶³⁶ it is said:

There is no rule that whatever is unreal is to be included in ignorance or its effects, since it does not apply in the case of the connection of ignorance and divisions of *jīva*, etc.

Therefore, in *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, two views have been expressed: indeterminability by giving prominence to the superimposed object and of the true nature of the Self by giving prominence to the substratum. After stating that the cessation of what is

⁶³⁵ *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* p.430 BS 2.1.14., ‘*tad anayatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*’. There is nondifference of those (cause and effect) on account of the texts about origin etc. *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, ‘*dhvaṃsasya nirupādānatvāt nājñānāntaraprasaigo’pi*’.

⁶³⁶ *ibid.* p.119, ‘*na ca mithyābhūtasya avidyātkāryāntaratvaniyamaḥ. Avidyāsambandhajīvavibhāgāu vyabhicārāt*’.

indeterminable is also indeterminable by giving prominence to the superimposed, he says that, 'the destruction of nescience is the Self itself, by giving prominence to the substratum (i.e the 'rope', pure Consciousness, substratum of the 'snake' ignorance)'.
 In the *Māṇḍūkyaṭippaṇam* on *Āgama prakaraṇa 1.17* it is said, **'It is beyond question that the phenomenal world would cease to be if it had any existence. All this duality that is nothing but *Māyā*, is but non-duality in reality'**⁶³⁷

also it is said:

also it is said:

It is well known to disputants that the absence of a thing can be validly postulated only if the existence of that thing is known by a valid means of knowledge. Since, according to us, even the cessation of the illusory universe is not a reality, so there is no contradiction with *Advaita*.

This subject has been explained in two ways in the *Iṣṭasiddhi* thus:

⁶³⁷ *Māṇḍūkyaṭippaṇam* on *Āgama prakaraṇa 1.17*, 'prapañcanivṛtyā cet pratibudhyate 'nivṛtte prapañce katham advaitam ity ucyate. prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ / māyāmātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ //'. p.41 l., 'prāmāṇakasyaiva abhāvah prāmāṇikaḥ prasiddho vādinām. asmākaṁ tu mithyābhūtaprapañcasya nivṛttir api na vastu iti na advaitavyāghātaḥ'.

(1) Just as fire, even though born of bamboos, burns the bamboos completely and itself becomes extinguished, similarly the mental modifications in the form of the Self, having been destroyed, ignorance itself perishes,

(2) Or, *Brahman* itself, associated with that mental modification, having burnt ignorance and its effects, burns the mental modification also, and it alone remains.

Just as fire, after burning the oil, etc. with the help of the wick, does not leave the wick too, so also the Self alone remains without a second⁶³⁸.

5 x) *Jīvanmukti*/Liberated even while living

The *Bhagavad Gītā* says 2.55⁶³⁹, **'When a man, satisfied in the Self alone by himself, completely casts off all the desires of the mind, then is he said to be one of steady knowledge'**. Further, it says 2.56⁶⁴⁰,

⁶³⁸ IS p.70, '*...tadvad ātmā eko'vaśiṣyate advaita iti*'.

⁶³⁹ *Bhagavad Gītā* 2.55, '*prajahāti yadā kāmān sarvān pārtha manogatān ātmany eva ātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthitaprajñas tadocyate*'.

⁶⁴⁰ *Bhagavad Gītā* 2.56, '*duḥkheṣv anudvigna-manāḥ sukheṣu vigata-sprhaḥ | vīta-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ sthita-dhīr munir ucyate* | |BhG_2.56| |'⁷⁴⁹ *Muṇḍaka upaniṣad* 6.14.2, '*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*'.

'He whose heart is not distressed in calamities, from whom all longing for pleasures has departed, who is free from attachment, fear and wrath, he is called a sage, a man of steady knowledge'.

According to the *Muṇḍaka upaniṣad* 6.14.2,⁶⁴⁹

'The knower of *Brahman* becomes *Brahman* itself'.

The state of being *Brahman* is attained simultaneously with the rise of knowledge. So, how can there be a continuation of *prārabdha karma* and what is the need for accepting the state of *Jīvanmukti*?

The answer is that the *karma* that has already taken effect has to continue till it exhausts its effect, like the discharged arrow. So *Jīvanmukti* is proved by the evidence of the enlightened.

Thus, there is the *śruti*, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2,⁶⁴¹

⁶⁴¹ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2, 'tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye'tha sampatsye'; ISV, 'brahmībhāvāvābhidhānam tu śrutau abrahmatvabhramavyāvṛttyabhiprāyam ...'; *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.12, 'atha sampatsye'.

‘For him the delay is only so long as he is not liberated (from the body) and then he becomes merged in Existence’.

Moreover, the experience of knowers of *Brahman* is seen to be the same in the world.

It has been said in the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*,

‘*Jīvanmukti* is proved by the obstruction of the *karma* which has already taken effect and by the experience of the enlightened’. ‘The statement in the *śruti* about attainment of the state of *Brahman* is intended only to remove the wrong notion that one is not *Brahman*⁷⁵¹. The *śruti*, Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3.12⁷⁵² says,

‘then he becomes merged in Existence’ (Chā. 6.14.2).

In order that *śruti* statements remain uncontradicted, this meaning is understood that attainment, ‘of immortality is only to exclude any cause for future’ bondage. Postulation of *Jīvanmukti* because of the existence of *prārabdha karma* alone does not contradict it.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*⁶⁴² says, ‘The statement about being liberated even while living is intended only to exclude any cause of further

⁶⁴² ISV, ‘āgāmibandhakāraṇavyāvṛttyabhiprāyaṃ jīvito’pi muktatvābhidhānam. Ata eva ‘jīvan’ atha muktaḥ iti aviruddham padadvayam’; IS p.77

bondage. Therefore, the two words living and liberated are not contradictory’.

In fact, such a defect does not exist because the continuance of a trace of ignorance, which is needed to experience *prārabdha karma* is postulated in *Iṣṭasiddhi*. Vimuktātman⁷⁵⁴ says, ‘There is no defect in accepting that even for the enlightened person there is a residuum of ignorance just sufficient to bring about the apparent enjoyment of the presidium of *prārabdha karma*’.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says⁶⁴³ in this context, ‘Just as a seed which has lost the power to sprout because of damage caused within it by worms, can still be described as a seed, similarly, even though the power of ignorance, (the limiting adjunct of the *jīva*), to give rise to a future body has been burnt off, to affirm the survival of a trace of the ignorance capable of continuing the present body is not contradictory’.

Elsewhere, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says in the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*⁶⁴⁴:

⁶⁴³ ISV p.p.108, ‘yathā’ntaḥ kīṭaduṣṭabijasya bhāvyaṅkurādijananaśaktiprahitaṅvāpī vartamānabijavyavhārasampādakatvaṁ tathā āgāmiśarīrādyārambharūpeṇa dagdhasya jīvopādher ajñānasya vartamānakāryasampādanarūpeṇāvasthānam avidyāleśaḥ na viruddhyate’.

⁶⁴⁴ *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam* p.106, ‘yathā kṛtsnatamonivartanasamartho’pī savitā aparakapratibandhāt tad gatatamo evaṁ na nivartayati, tathā prāptaphalakarmapratibandhāt vidyāpī avidyāleśaṁ na bādhati. Tat kṣayakāle tu santatyā vartamānā sarva avidyāleśaṁ api bādhati’.

Just as the sun which is capable of removing darkness completely does not remove the trace of darkness inside a room because of being obstructed by the enclosure, similarly knowledge does not remove a trace of the ignorance because of obstruction by the karma which has begun to operate. On the exhaustion of that karma that trace of ignorance which remained is also destroyed.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further says in his *Ṭippaṇam* on *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* in *Advaita*

Prakaraṇam 3.37:⁶⁴⁵

The Self is free of all sense-organs, and is above all internal organs. It is supremely tranquil, eternal effulgence, divine absorption, immutable, and fearless ... Though the mind continues to shine because of the trace of nescience, it remains only in the form of the effulgence of the Self.

⁶⁴⁵ *Advaita Prakaraṇam* 3.37, 'sarvābhilāpaviḡataḡ sarvacintāsamutthitaḡ /</l> supraśāntaḡ sakṛjjyotiḡ samādhira
acalo 'bhayaḡ // p. 121, 'Ṭippaṇam on Māṇḍūkyakārikā. "Avidyāleśāt Valasad api manaḡ ātmaprakāśarūpeṇaiva
vyavatiṡṡhate

Jīvanmukti is referred to in Kaṭha Upanisad 5.1⁶⁴⁶,

'Having become liberated (while still living) he is emancipated (i.e. does not take up his body again)'; and in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.7⁶⁴⁷,

'Just as the lifeless slough of a snake lies cast off in the ant hill ceases to be considered as 'I' (by the snake) the body of the enlightened person is no longer considered as 'I' by him'.

So too in *Brahma Sūtra* 4.1.13⁶⁴⁸, **'On the realization of That (Brahman), there arises non-clinging and destruction of the subsequent and previous sins respectively, because it is so declared'** and 4.1.15⁶⁴⁹,

'of his former actions only those which have not begun to yield results (are destroyed by knowledge), for death is the limit'

i.e. On the rise of knowledge of *Brahman*, future sins do not cling. They do not attach to him and previous sins are destroyed.

⁶⁴⁶ Kaṭha Upanisad 5.1 'vimuktaś ca vimucyate // etad vai tat //'.

⁶⁴⁷ Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.7, 'tad yathā ahinirvalayinī pratyastā śayīta'.

⁶⁴⁸ BS 4.1.13, 'tad adhigama uttarapūrvādhayor aśleṣavinśau tadvyapadeśāt'.

⁶⁴⁹ BS 4.1.15, 'anārabdhakārye eva tu pūrve tad avadheḥ'.

Knowledge arises only by reflection on scriptures taught by the *guru*. As states

Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.12.2⁶⁵⁰,

‘One who has a *guru* attains knowledge’ and the *smṛti* text *Bhagavad Gītā* 4.34⁶⁵¹,

‘Know this by long prostration, by enquiry, by service. Those men of wisdom who have realized the truth will teach thee wisdom’.

5. xi) *Videhamukti*/Liberation on the fall of the body

When the body of a *Jīvanmukti* which depends on *prārabdha-karma* falls , he immediately attains *Videhamukti*, which is final liberation, free from any further embodiment .

‘Having become liberated (while still living) he is emancipated (i.e. does not take up a body again)’ (*Kaṭha* 5.1, ‘*vimuktaśca vimucyate*’).

⁶⁵⁰ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.12.2, ‘*ācāryavān puruṣo veda*’.

⁶⁵¹ *BhG* 4.34, ‘*tad viddhi praṇipātena paripraśnena sevayā | upadekṣyanti te jñānaṃ jñāninas tattva-darśinaḥ*’ | *BhG_4.34* |

This is the view of many Advaitins other than Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya,⁶⁵² who declares the existence of *māyā* and the universe produced by it thus, '*Māyā* does not completely cease to exist even in the state of 'deliverance' on the release from the body/*Videhamukti*. Only that part of *māyā*, which is the ignorance of the liberated person, is destroyed by the knowledge of the reality'. Therefore, even after the liberation of one person, the universe, which is the effect of *māyā* continues. However, this universe is not experienced by the *Videhamukti*, just as a person who is devoid of the appropriate sense organs cannot experience forms.

Even if the eternality of *māyā* and the universe is accepted, like their beginninglessness, there will be no contradiction to non-duality, because they are illusory (in the sense of *mithyā*). This is said in *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam* ⁶⁵³, 'The universe which is an apparent transformation of *māyā* is not experienced even though it exists, just as forms are not experienced by a person without the sense organs'.

It is also said in *Prakaṣarthavivaraṇa* ⁶⁵⁴ that,

⁶⁵² ISV p.364, '*māyāyāḥ videhamuktikāle'pi na sampūrṇatayā nivṛtiḥ.māyāpradeśarūpaṁ muktapurūṣājñānam eva tattvajñānena nivartate*'.

⁶⁵³ ISV p.165, '*...nirindriyēṇeva rūpaṁ nānubhūyate*'.

⁶⁵⁴ PV P.4, '*Yastu māyāvivartaḥ mahābhūtādiḥ prapañcaḥ sa vidyamānaḥ ...*'

‘the universe consisting of the elements, etc. which is a transformation of *māyā* is not experienced, though it exists, just as a person without the sense organs cannot experience forms’.

This view if accepted would answer the objection as to how the universe can continue to exist if it is destroyed along with its cause by the knowledge of the liberated person..!

5 xii) Renunciation

Marcaurelle, in ‘Freedom through Inner Renunciation’⁶⁵⁵ says of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, ‘we find with him the first clear definition of *uparati* as physical renunciation within the *Vivaraṇa* school. *Uparati* is on attainment of purity of mind, the abandonment- as per the rules- of even the regular [rites].’ No alternative definition is given by the author. However, in fact, as we see when discussing ‘*Asparśa yoga*’, this is not the case. In his commentary on BS 3.4.38 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya holds the opposite view, namely, that the discipline of knowledge is also accessible to householders and others who have not taken up physical renunciation:

⁶⁵⁵ Marcaurelle (2000). in *Freedom through Inner Renunciation*. State University of New York, p.178-179

For [physical] renouncers, the prescription of hearing etc., is obligatory, because according to *śruti*, they ensure sin by not doing it. But for others, it will be optional, because prescription of hearing etc., is with reference to knowledge [which is optional for them], and because there is no prohibition [of hearing etc., in their case].

Marcaurelle, says Anubhūtiśvarūpa reinstates an inconsistency ... on the one hand, Self-knowledge was universally accessible irrespective of modes of living and, on the other hand, physical renunciation as *uparati* was a *sin qua non* for the discipline of knowledge ... such a restrictive interpretation ... he borrowed (?) from Sureśvara'

The so called 'inconsistency' that Marcaurelle speaks of is more apparent than real in view of this understanding expressed very clearly in his discussion of Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkyakārikā. This has been echoed more recently by the Śaṅkarācārya of Jyotiṣ-maṭha Maharāj Śrī Śāntānanda Sarasvatī 1985⁶⁵⁶:

⁶⁵⁶ Maharāj Śrī Śāntānanda Sarasvatī (1985), p.213, vol 3. School of Economic Science, 2018.

The Vedic tradition mentions *nivṛtti* and *pravṛtti* (e.g. Śaṅkara's *Gītā Bhāṣya*).

Nivṛtti means renunciation and *pravṛtti* means participation. They are two ways open to the seeker of liberation. First are those who take to total *nivṛtti* renunciation. They do not prescribe anything for any particular person, place or time. Their teachings are general and universal. Ācāryas on this way are Śukadeva, Vāmadeva... and very few others ... The second tradition takes to *nivṛtti* through *pravṛtti*, renunciation through participation. Teachers of this tradition are Janaka, Vasiṣṭha and many more sages who carried on as householders. Internally, within themselves, they retain total renunciation, but externally participate in worldly activities (they are 'in the world but not of it') ... On the way of liberation, *nivṛtti* through *pravṛtti*, which Janaka or Vasiṣṭha or (a) School follow ... one has to resort to practical particular situations in time and place, without forgetting the initial aim of renunciation (of the fruits) for liberation ... the application of the universal to the particular.'

5. xiii) *Asparśa-yoga*/Yoga which is Contactless

A radical understanding of the nature of Vedāntic practice is strongly expressed by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his Ṭippaṇa on the *Māndukya Kārika* where Gauḍapāda has used the term '*asparśa-yoga*' twice (3.39 and 4.2). The word *sparsā* is generally used to signify contact of the sense-organs with the sense-objects. Hence, any *yoga* or super-conscious experience which has no contact of the senses with the sense-objects may be called *asparśayoga*. In this work, this epithet has been especially used to denote the direct experience of the *Ātman* or the Self which is beyond all sense-organs and sense-experience. In this experience, the lower self and the consequent ego-sense disappear, leaving unalloyed bliss only. This is the same as *jñāna*. The prospect of dissolution of the ego-sense often frightens the ordinary *yogis* and spiritual aspirants who therefore try to avoid it. For these obtain the greatest happiness, the highest good and the absolute freedom, free from all the doubts and misgivings.

Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* 3.39⁶⁵⁷ states that,

⁶⁵⁷ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 3.39, '*asparśayoga vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ, yogino bibhyati hyasmād abhaye bhayadarśinaḥ*'.

'The *Yoga*, that is familiarly referred to as contactless is difficult to be comprehended by any one of the *Yogis*. For those *Yogis*, who apprehend fear where there is no fear, are afraid of it', because the duality of 'Me' as striving *Yogi* and God or *Ātman* remains.

ĀdiŚaṅkara⁶⁵⁸ explains,

'That which is known as the *Yoga* without any touch, since it is devoid of any touch that implies relation with anything, is well known in all the *Upaniṣads*. That which is perceived with difficulty by all the *Yogis*, i.e. by those *Yogis* who are devoid of the knowledge imparted in the *Vedānta*-texts, is *durdarśaḥ*/difficult to be seen. The meaning is that it is attainable only through Self realization which necessitates (continuous) efforts. Though it is devoid of all fear, the *Yogis* who see fear and who think that it might cause their own destruction, entertain fear in what is fearless.

So, the idea is that those men without discrimination who, on account of fear, are won't to see their own (ego) destruction, are afraid of it".

However this is in contrast to Śaṅkara, who treats the contactless *yoga* (*asparśayoga*) as an integral part of the scriptural patrimony of the *Advaita* tradition.

⁶⁵⁸ MandUpKC_3.39, '*asparśayogo nāmāyaṃ sarvasaṃbandhākhyasparśavarjitatvādasparśayogo nāma vai smaryate prasiddhamupaniṣatsu / duḥkhena dṛśyata iti durdarśaḥ sarvairyogibhir vedāntavihitavijñānarahitaiḥ sarvayogibhiḥ / ātmasatyānubodhāyāsālabhya evetyarthaḥ / yogino bibhyati ...*'.

As Jason Schwarz,⁶⁵⁹ has pointed out, Anubhtisvarūpācārya reads the introduction of this concept in the root text as a defensive response to the challenge of rival traditions, offering an explanation of what our author perceives as the troubling but undeniable reality of the relative marginality of the *Advaita* tradition. As he tells us,

‘If it is the case that the *Advaita Darśana* is that of which the result is the condition of the true nature of *Brahman*—the supreme reality—why is it not revered by everyone?’

In answering this doubt (Gauḍapāda) says ‘*asparśayoga*’. One of the special contributions of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya to the understanding of Liberation in *Advaita* is found in his *Ṭippaṇa* on Gauḍapāda’s *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. These are, as Schwarz⁷⁷³ puts it, ‘subtly executed but in fact rather radical reimagining of the nature of *Vedāntic* meditation’. While his teaching stance is widely disseminated through the writings of his disciple Ānandagiri, it finds its most powerful expression in his *Ṭippaṇa* on Śaṅkara’s *Bhāṣya* on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* of Gauḍapāda and the *Bhagavad Gītā*. In contrast to Śaṅkara, who treats the contactless yoga (*‘asparśayoga*) as an integral part of the scriptural tradition of *Advaita*, Anubhtisvarūpācārya reads the introduction of this concept in the seminal text of

⁶⁵⁹ Jason Schwarz, (2017). *Parabrahman Among the Yogis*. IJHS.

Advaita as a defensive response to the challenge of rival traditions , offering an explanation of what our author perceives as the relative marginality of the true *Advaita* tradition.

By his interpretation of the term '*asparśayoga*' , Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya changes the significance of the notion of a 'contactless *Yoga*' as comprised of a progressive and systematic severing of logical associations with sense objects. Instead , in his reading, it is the *yoga* itself that comes to be understood as 'untouched' . The sense is of being unaffected by any external contaminants , such as sin. What, one might ask, does this *Yoga* entail? He tells us , it consists of nothing but the **yoking /union of the *jīva* with the nature of *Brahman***, expressed Gauḍapāda in *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās*, 3.46⁶⁶⁰,

'then it (the mind) becomes *Brahman*' .

Having already brought *Vedāntic Yoga* into closer conceptual alignment, replacing the highly critical view of *yogis* in Sureśvara in line with wider realities of 13th century discursive realities, he substitutes in its place a critique of the *Brāhmaṇa* ritualist, who is represented as rather adverse to *Advaita* doctrine.

⁶⁶⁰ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās*, 3.39, '*niṣpannam brahma tattadā*'.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya does this by a fresh interpretation of the word *yogin*. In

Māṇḍūkya-kārikās, 3.39,⁶⁶¹ ‘*Tippana*

the word *yogins* means ritual actors—*śrotriyas*—people who are thinking, *Brāhmaṇa*-hood comes to us, because of their doctrine of purity, ... are afraid’.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya commenting on *Māṇḍūkya Gauḍapīya Kārikā* 3.41⁶⁶² says, ‘**By a tireless effort such as that by which the emptying of the ocean, drop by drop, is aimed at with the help of a Kuśa grass, the conquest of the mind will become possible through absence of dejection’**

presents us with the *Brāhmaṇas* as ignorant, apt to say, ‘When we close our eyes, we see darkness. When we open the eyes, we see pots, and so forth. But, we never see *Brahman*’⁶⁶³. Thus underlining the pitiable condition of his opponent, he remarks that as he ponders over his own poor reasoning, ‘the poor *Brāhmaṇa* begins to lose

⁶⁶¹ *ibid.* *Tippanī* p.123, ‘*yoginaḥ karmināḥ śrotriyāḥ brāhmaṇyādi asmākam yāsyatīti manvānāḥ alepakavādāt trasyantīty arthaḥ*’.

⁶⁶² *MāṇḍūkyaGauḍapīya Kārikā* 3.41. ‘*utseka udadder yadvat kuśāgreṇaikabindunā. manaso nigrahas tadvad bhaved aparikhedataḥ*’.

⁶⁶³ *MāṇḍūkyaGauḍapīya Kārikā Tippanī* p.124, ‘*kṣṇor nimīlane andhakāraṇ paśyāmaḥ unmīlane ghaṭādīni na kadācid brahma iti matvā yady udvijante tadā manonirodho ‘pi teṣāṃ na sambhavati anudvignacittānāṃ tu janmasahasraiḥ sambhāvvyate ity āha aparikhedata iti*’.

the capacity to restrain his mind that is essential for liberation and is condemned to transmigrate for countless lifetimes’.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, by deciding to include elements of the *Yogadarśana* of Patañjali into the discourse of *Advaita Vedānta*, introduces the concepts of conceptual-*samādhi* (*samprajñātasamādhi*) and nonconceptual- *samādhi* (*asamprajñātasamādhi*) in his commentary on *MāṇḍūkyaGauḍapīya Kārikā* 3.45,

‘One should not enjoy happiness/pleasure in that state; but one should become unattached through the use of discrimination. When the mind, established in steadiness, wants to issue out, one should concentrate it with diligence’. 3.46., ‘When the mind does not become lost nor is scattered, when it is motionless and does not appear in the form of objects, then it becomes *Brahman*’.

Drawing on Śaṅkara’s definition of *upāsana* as an unbroken mental concentration that derives its conceptual content from the *mahāvākyas*, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says in his *Ṭippaṇa* on vvs. 42-46⁶⁶⁴, **‘For the sake of getting rid of these [that is, the aforementioned sleep, flight of fancy, desire for happiness, and so forth] by means of the flow of semantic cognition that has the**

⁶⁶⁴ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says in his *Ṭippaṇī* on vv. 42-46 page 126, ‘teṣāṃ nirāsāya “ajam pūrṇam brahmaivāsmi” iti samprajñātasamādhirūpapratyayapraṇāhakarēṇa...’

form of *samprajñātasamādhi*, it is cognized as ‘I am nothing but the unborn, limitless Brahman.’

However, like Śaṅkara, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya understands such a limited approach is due to its dualistic assumptions deriving from ego that ‘I am the doer’ incapable of providing the practitioner with the direct experience of *Brahman/sākṣād aparokṣāt anubhūti/* that culminates in liberation. Again, both teachers understand that thought cannot become *Brahman*, because whenever a practitioner has to move his body or engage in other activities, the mind strays away from its single-pointed focus on the cognitive content of the *Upanisads* and becomes identified with sense objects that they associate with their intrinsic faults.

Unlike Śaṅkara, however, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya locates the solution to this dilemma, not merely in the radical withdrawal of the senses. Instead of seeking to understand *Brahman*, he expresses in his commentary on *MāṇḍūkyaGauḍapīya Kārikā* 3.47⁶⁶⁵, ‘**That highest bliss is located in one’s own Self. It is quiescent, existent with liberation, beyond description and birthless. And since it is**

⁶⁶⁵ *MāṇḍūkyaGauḍapīya Kārikā* 3.47, ‘*svasthaṃ śāntaṃ sanirvāṇam akathyaṃ sukham uttamam /ajam ajena jñeyena sarvajñaṃ paricakṣate //*’.

identical with the unborn knowable (*Brahman*), they call It the omniscient (*Brahman*)’.

On the final verse of the *Advaita Prakaraṇa* of *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* 3.48⁶⁶⁶ he explains that ‘No individual being, whichever, takes birth. It has no source (of birth). This (*Brahman*) is that highest Truth where nothing whatsoever takes birth’.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Ṭippaṇa*⁶⁶⁷, further states that instead of:

Seeking to understand *Brahman*, thought merges or assumes the nature of *Brahman*, and thereby comes to abide in non-cognized *samādhi*, in other words, in [*Brahman*] in the Ātman ... one’s true Self ... When we say it abides in its own state ... Just as the sweetness of sugarcane in milk, and so forth, is discernible only by one’s own perception, in that same way, because the conceptual objects of a *Yogin* who is absorbed in non-

⁶⁶⁶ *ibid.* 3.48, ‘na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ saṃbhavo 'sya na vidyate /etat tad uttamaṃ satyaṃ yatra kiñcin na jāyate’.

⁶⁶⁷ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Ṭippaṇī* on v 48 page 127, ‘pūrvagrantheṣu uktānāṃ manonirodhādīnām upāyānām vyāvahārikam eva satyatvaṃ mandādhikāriviśayatvāt, ato nopāyasatyatvena advaitavirodhaḥ, paramārthasatyam tu ajaṃ sarvaṃ iti, taddarśanasyaiva uttamādhikāriviśayasya tattvāvedanaṃ prāmāṇyam ityāha na kaścīd iti’.

conceptual/*asamprajñāta-samādhi* are entirely non-generalisable —in other words, the sense is the inexpressible [*Brahman*].

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya acknowledges that Yogic texts about Yogic practices then as now have predominantly focused on what one might call more materialist end, rather than Liberation or Self Realization.

However, by his introduction of *Yogic* concepts , he has facilitated a much greater flexibility in the *Vedāntic* tradition. Moreover, this has been without losing or compromising the purity of the Ādiśaṅkara's teaching that the sacred syllable ॐ *Om*, *Upaniṣadic Mahāvākyas* or *mantras* explained by the living *Guru*, who has realized them, provide the knowledge which alone dispels the *avidyā* deluding the *jīvātman* to reveal the true eternal nature. That eternal true nature is said to be *Mokṣa/Sat Cit ānanda/Truth Consciousness and Bliss, Paramātman/the Supreme Self* or *Brahman*, which becomes real by grace of the living realized teacher.

Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, we shall summarise the aims and content of the first five chapters of the thesis and put forward some conclusions. In the abstract, we presented a basic overview, substantiated in the five chapters that have followed. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (c.1250A.D.), the little known *Advaitin* who was the teacher of Ānandagiri, has been shown to have made an important contribution to the understanding of the nature of *māyā* and *Yoga* in *Advaita Vedānta*, which has so far been largely forgotten in the modern scholarly world. This is largely because his authorship of his major works have only recently been recognized, so that even the most outstanding modern scholar in this area, Karl Potter⁶⁶⁸, editor of the

⁶⁶⁸ Potter, Karl. (1981). ‘Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies’: Volume III “Advaita Vedānta” and Volume XI “Advaita Vedānta From 800 to 1200 (2006), Dehli: Motilal, Banarsidass.

Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, and author of the two key volumes specifically on *Advaita*, viz. Volume III *Advaita Vedānta* (up to 800A.D.) and Volume XI *Advaita Vedānta From 800 to 1200* does not make any serious reference to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya even though he comes within the sphere of the volume.

This very fact itself shows the importance and originality of the current thesis in revealing more about this relatively unknown but important *Advaita* preceptor of the Middle Ages in central India, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya.

The author started by dealing with what he calls the essence of *Advaita Vedānta*. What appears as God, the individual souls and the universe are all in reality non-different from the one absolute reality, *Brahman*. In light of this, the nature of *māyā* and *avidyā* was discussed. After putting forward possible objections and seeking to refute them in turn, it was shown how Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya put forward the view that *avidyā* is beginningless, indeterminable and positive. Furthermore, he showed how it is revealed by the witnessing consciousness.

The five areas focused on in the thesis have been:

- 1) his description of the nature of *avidyā* and *māyā*,

- 2) his distinction between the *jīva* and *Īśvara*,
- 3) his description of the 'world/*prapañca*' and refutation of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* theories
- 4) his refutation of the *bhedābheda* theory and
- 5) his views on liberation, including that *māyā* does not completely cease to exist even in the state *videhamukti*, but only that part of *māyā*, which is the nescience of the liberated person, is destroyed by the knowledge of Reality. Therefore, even after the liberation of one person, the universe, which is the effect of *māyā* continues. This view was considered with particular reference to his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*, *Prakatārthavivaraṇa* and his other works.
- 6) He finally reaffirmed the central role of *Kevala Advaita* in *Vedānta*, integrating through the concept of *Asparśa Yoga* aspects of the *Yoga Darśana* into *Advaita Vedānta*.

The thesis has considered the history, texts and ideas of this little studied *Advaita Vedānta* teacher, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, introducing his key ideas drawn from his textual corpus and has briefly assessed his distinctive contribution to the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition. It has explored his particular intervention in broader *Advaitic*

debates about the status of *māyā*, *yoga* and *mokṣa*, helping to chart the development of doctrines in schools of *Advaita Vedānta* over time. The specific issues relevant to the argument were related to what have been called the *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa* debates, were dealt with in detail in chapter two.

According to Potter's bibliography,⁶⁶⁹ Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya is to be dated approximately 1270A.D. and according to Thangaswami's⁶⁷⁰ between 1200 and 1300A.D. This is supported by the evidence that Amalānanda⁶⁷¹, (1247-1347), provides in his *Vedāntakalpataru*⁶⁷². This commentator on Vācaspati Miśra's (fl.940) *Bhāmatī* examines the criticisms of it pointed out by *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* and seeks to refute them without mentioning the name of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. At the end of his *Kalpataru*, Amalānanda mentions that he wrote under the Yādava King of Devagiri, Kṛṣṇa, (1248-1259A.D.) and his brother Mahādeva. So, we may take Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya as having flourished between the middle of the 12th Century and the first half of the 13th Century.

⁶⁶⁹ Karl Potter's bibliography (<http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/ckeyt/txt3.htm>)

⁶⁷⁰ Thangaswami, (1980). *Advaita Vedanta Bibliography*, India: University of Madras, p.244.

⁶⁷¹ Vasudeva Sarma, L. (1968). *Preceptors of Advaita*. T. Mahadevan. Chennai, India: Samata Books.

⁶⁷² Bhāmatī, (1940). *Commentary of Vācaspatimiśra on Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara, with the Kalpataru of Amalānanda and the Parimala*, Bombay: Nirnaya Press.

In chapter 1, a brief History of *Advaita Vedānta* up to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, with particular reference to the *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa prasthāna*⁶⁷³ was outlined. This was given in order to place the ‘mid-thirteenth- century *Advaita* Preceptor and institution builder’, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, most famous up to now as the initiator of the grammatical tradition of *Sārasvataparakriyā* but as indicated in the current thesis even more important as as great post Śāṅkara Preceptor of *Kevala Advaita*, inspired by Śrī Harsha and himself inspiring Ānanda Giri more than a century before and (indirectly) Vidyāraṇya. It was shown how he has offered comprehensive readings of the key scholastic texts of the *Advaita* canon from a unified perspective apparently ‘purifying’ the *Advaita Vedānta* tradition at the time from the tendency towards *Viśiṣṭa Advaita* and *Dvaita*. Further he refuted the views of dualist *Nayayika* logicians and followers of *Bhedābheda Vedānta*.⁶⁷⁴ As all of his nine original works were composed in Sanskrit, and none of the eight philosophical works has yet been translated into English, the thesis has had to rely on readings from these original texts.

⁶⁷³ ‘methods or approaches having much in common’ but not being consciously developed as ‘schools’ cf. Lawrence McCrea (2015) *Freed by the Weight of History: Polemic and Doxography in Sixteenth Century Vedānta*, *South Asian History and Culture*, 6:1, 87-101.

⁶⁷⁴ cf. Schwarz, Jason, IJHS (2017). 21: *Parabrahman Among the Yogins*, p.365

The thesis has sought to assess his contributions to *Advaita Vedānta* in context. In so doing, a brief history of *Advaita Vedānta* up to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya himself has been provided. His most famous *Advaita* work, the *Prakatārthavivara*, was described as the first complete commentary on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Ādi Śaṅkara and would appear to have been composed with the explicit purpose of ‘rescuing the tradition from the corrosive influence of ‘Maṇḍana Miśra ‘pṛṣṭasevī’ , Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s term for *Vācaspatimiśra*. This composer of the *Bhāmatī* tended to take what is later called a *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa* or *Viśiṣṭa Advaita* perspective, hence subtly deviating from the pure or *Kevala Advaita* tradition of Ādi Śaṅkara.

His other works give a sense of ‘programmatic nature of his interpretative project’ (Schwarz). For his *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* is a detailed interpretative commentary on the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, as are his *Pramāṇamāla-Nibandha* on the *Pramāṇamāla*, his *Nyāyadīpāvali-Candrikā* on the *Nyāyadīpāvalī*, and his *Nyāyamakaranda-Saṅgraha* on the *Nyāyamakaranda*, all three by Ānandabodha. In addition he provided a detailed interpretative commentary on Śrī Harṣa’s *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, the *Śiṣyahitaiṣī*. His *Ṭippaṇa* on Śrī Śaṅkara’s *Gītābhāṣya* has only recently been published and provides insights on key śloka where Śrī

Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* is not clear. Furthermore he has provided the first full *Ṭippaṇa* on Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, and 215 *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda, considered to be the key earliest textual basis of *Advaita Vedānta*, expounding the shortest and most profound of the ten principle *Upaniṣads*, which the *Mukti Upaniṣad* boldly declares to be the one Upaniṣad among all the one hundred and eight it lists as most conducive to liberation. **"The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is enough; if knowledge is not attained from it, then study all the Ten Upaniṣads. Attaining knowledge very quickly , you will reach my abode. If desiring Mokṣa without the body, read the 108 Upaniṣads."**

For this reason this was the text most fully dealt with.

Hence, it is true to say his commentarial interpretations have covered most of the major texts of post-Śaṅkara *Vedāntic* discourse, as well as two primary articulations of the classical tradition, viz. the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* and the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*.

In chapter 2 a detailed consideration of the two great traditions or *prasthanas* of post Śaṅkara *Advaita* , viz the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa* , which latter was shown to

be closer to the Pure or *Kevala* tradition of Ādi Śaṅkara himself as well of course as that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya.

In chapter 3, the thesis outlined Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's contribution to *Advaita* on the nature of *māyā* and *avidyā*, *jīvātman* and *Īśvara/Brahman* with particular reference to his major works, the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*, the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇam* and the *Ṭippaṇa* on *Māṇḍūkya-gauḍapādīya-kārikābhāṣya*, with supporting quotations from the Sanskṛta texts. *Māyā* and *avidyā*, were described as the pillars of *Advaita Vedānta*. This was shown to be linked to the view that the very purport of scriptures is directly to dispel the *āvaraṇa* and the *vikṣepa śakti* power of *avidyā* or *Māyā* to reveal the *Brahman/Ātman*, the true Self.

Furthermore, *Avidyā*, contrary to the usual superficial view of its meaning, was shown to be positive. Our author, entirely in harmony with his great predecessors, Ādi Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman etc, affirms that Nescience is indeterminable, and Nescience is revealed by the witnessing consciousness. So, the real Nature of *Māyā* and *avidyā* is one. The former appears to be like the universal reflection and the latter like the individual reflection. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further demonstrated that the theory that they are different does not stand to reason and

gave substantial evidence to show the theory of non-difference is rooted in the *śruti* and reason. For example, he quotes the profound passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.5.19⁶⁷⁵ having the earliest reference to *Māyā*:

He transformed Himself in accordance with each form; that form of His was for the sake of making Him known. The Lord on account of *Māyā* (notions superimposed by ignorance) is perceived as manifold, for to Him are yoked ten organs, nay, hundreds of them. He is ten and thousands-many and infinite. That *Brahman* is without prior or posterior, without interior or exterior. This Self, the perceiver/*anubhūh* of everything, is *Brahman*.

This was as an example of proof or establishment of *Māyā*. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya further discussed whether *Avidyā* was one or many and demonstrated that reasoning is in support of the multiplicity of nescience. Furthermore, the locus and content of

⁶⁷⁵ Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 2.5.19, 'rūpaṃrūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva tad asya rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇāya | indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate yuktā hy asya harayaḥ śatā daśeti | ayaṃ vai harayo 'yaṃ vai daśa ca sahasrāṇi bahūni cānantāni ca | tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam | ayam ātmā brahma sarvānubhūh | ity anuśāsanam ||'

nescience is demonstrated in fact to be *Brahman*, the one Consciousness, just as the substratum of the proverbial snake is shown to be nothing but rope. So, the inert cannot be the locus or object of nescience since by definition it has no consciousness of its own. He developed the view in opposition to Vacaspati Miśra's theory that locus and content are different. He established the theory that the locus and the content are the same, like the clay and the pot referred to famously in the *Chāndogya Upanisad* 6.1.4⁶⁷⁶, **'All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only.**

Earth as such is the reality.'

In the fourth chapter, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's view on the World/*prapañca* in the light of *Advaita Vedānta* was presented. Whereas, in the previous chapter, the nature of *Brahman* and *jīva*, according to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, was presented. This showed examination of the perceived universe or *prapañca* as the natural next issue to be addressed. Many diverse theories clearly existed as to the origin of the universe in his time, as now. According to *Advaita Vedānta*, *Brahman* is non-dual, which nature could only hold good if there were no entity apart from it. The *jīvātman*/souls, which may be considered other than *Brahman* were 'proved', in this system to be non-different from it. On the other hand, the world of duality given in

⁶⁷⁶ *Chāndogya Upanisad Upanisad* 6.1.4, '*vacarambhanam vikāro nāma-dheyam, mṛttikety eva satyam.*'

perception was admitted to be non-real/*mithyā*. All of which was summed up in the famous dictum attributed to Ādiśaṅkara⁶⁷⁷, '**Brahman is truth, the world is non-real/illusory; the *jīva* is not other than the Brahman.**'

This naturally raised the question as to how the world could be taken as *mithyā*? In answer, traditional *Advaitins*, like Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya have held that the *śruti* text, *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1⁶⁷⁸ '**O good looking one, in the beginning this was Existence alone, One only, without a second**', affirms that the world is indeed *mithyā*. For this text, '**in the beginning this was Existence alone**' states that prior to creation, this world, now differentiated into names and forms, remained identical with *Brahman*.

The 'complementary' part of the text, '**One only, without a second**', predicated absence the world in *Brahman*, so conveying the view that *Brahman* associated with the world was free from the world.

In *Advaita Vedānta* post-Ādiśaṅkara, the major theories that have to be refuted before the *Vivartavāda* theory could be established were, according to our author, the

⁶⁷⁷ '*Brahma satyaṃ jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*' v.20 *Brahmajñānavallīmaḷā*, School of Philosophy, Sydney (2010)

⁶⁷⁸ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1, '*Sadeva somya idam agra āsīt, ekam evādvitīyam*'. Swami Gambhirananda (1997), *Advaita Ashrama*, Calcutta

following evaluated by Vimuktātman in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa* and his *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa* respectively, then taken in order:

- i) *Abhāvakarāṇavāda* of the *Buddhists*/'The theory of non-existence as the cause' was found to be lacking any reasonable basis.
- ii) *Asatkāryavāda* or *ārambhavāda* of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school/ 'The theory of the non-existence of the effect in the cause' was proved to be fundamentally flawed.
- iii) The *Sāṅkhya's Satkāryavāda*/'The theory of the existence of the effect in the cause' was divided into two aspects, (a) the theory of *pariṇāmavāda*/ a theory of 'actual transformation' and (b) the theory of *vivartavāda*/ a theory of apparent not real change or transfiguration. While the former was shown to suffer from similar fundamental logical weaknesses, like *a-sat-karya -vāda*, the *vivarta-vāda*/ a theory of apparent not real change was demonstrated to lie at the basis of *Upaniṣadic Advaitic* thought. Further in relation to the *Buddhist* view.
- iv) *Ātma-khyāti*/ so called 'self-cognition', perception of silver for example as an external object simply negates their theory that the object is

nothing but a mental or inner cognition. Further, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refuted *Mīmāṣaka* Prabhakara's position.

- v) *a-khyāti*/ 'non-apprehension', by showing it was contradictory to say the action of a sentient being takes place without cognition of a common substratum. Even if it is an external feature, like reddish brown colour of a fire, the theory is untenable because cognition alone is the cause of activity.

Further, the theory,

- vi) *anyathā-khyāti*/ 'misapprehension', i.e. asserting that something is not really what it appears to be according to sensual perception, a theory of the *Naiyāyikas*, he points out is simply the view that nacre which is real appears in the form of silver another real thing. He then refuted,
- vii) *asatkhyāti* / theory that cognition of the non-existent or unreal, like the horn of a rabbit by showing that it as being not established its cognition is far from possible.

Finally, he refutes,

viii) *śabdādvaita*/ non-duality of the word by showing it is contradictory for the same thing to be both the signified and the signifier, since one thing cannot be at the same time the subject as well as the object. A word, however, fine can be experienced by sense organs, but *Brahman* is not accessible to the senses.

So, he then concludes by the establishment of the theory,

ix) *anirvacanīya-khyāti*/ 'cognition of indeterminability', sometimes called the 'fifth way'. By this theory, the non-duality of *Brahman*, declared by the scriptures, is firmly established because the indeterminate universe does not attain the status of a second entity.

In our fifth chapter, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's approach to the way of Liberation/*mokṣa* ⁶⁷⁹was presented, showing that Ādisaṅkara, and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, make a total distinction between activity and knowledge. The view he presented was that realization of the Self /Liberation arises from the words of the *Vedas* themselves /*śābdāparokṣavādaḥ* bringing about *Avidyā-nivṛttiḥ*/ cessation of nescience.

⁶⁷⁹ *mokṣa* *mokṣ* *cu u se avasāne asana vā* 10.191 cast, hurl, fling *mokṣayati kṣepaḥ* fr. *muc mocane 'er ac* P.3.3.56. *ghaṅ P.3.3.18. vā* Liberation *Śveta . Up.* 6.16 emancipation, liberation, release from; release from worldly existence or transmigration, final or eternal emancipation Up. Mn. MB;

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya then posed the question, What is the nature of cessation of nescience? To which he retorted that such a one would be free from accumulated merits and demerits living out only his fructified *karma* and is known as *jīvanmukta*.

This Theory of the fifth way was in fact nothing less than, the Being, the true nature of the known Self. In other words, the cessation of nescience is of the form of Self-knowledge. Further, that very cessation of nescience is indeterminable, involving ultimately the cessation of even the mental modifications/*yogaś cita-vṛtti nirodha* (*Yoga Sūtra* 1.2) which removes nescience.

Such an one is *Jīvanmukti*/Liberated even while living, who 'attains to' *Videhamukti*/Liberation on the fall of the body. This, the ultimate 'Renunciation', is when mind become *Brahman*, as Gauḍapāda put it in *Kārikā* 3.46., **'When the mind does not become lost nor is scattered, when it is motionless and does not appear in the form of objects, then it becomes *Brahman*.'**

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya highlighted the extremely subtle formulation given in the same chapter in verse 3.39, 'as the *Asparśa-yoga*/*Yoga* and also in *kārika* 4.2 of the fourth *Alataśānti prakaraṇa* which is Contactless.' The Yoga, that is familiarly referred

to as 'contactless' is difficult to comprehend by any one of the *Yogis*. For those Yogis,

'who apprehend fear where there is no fear, are afraid of it'.

In conclusion/ *nigamanam*, we explored the way that *Advaita* debates on the status of *māyā* and the means of overcoming it were impacted by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya' accounts of *māyā* and *yoga*, and his general contribution to *Advaita*.

Throughout his works, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya has dealt with these profound matters in an original manner, be it the description of the nature of *māyā*/*māyāśvarūpāvarṇanam*, the distinction between *jīva* and *īśvara*, the refutation of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* , the refutation of the theory of the *Bhedābheda*/ difference-cum-non-difference or his subtle exposition on the nature of *asparśa yoga* and liberation/*mokṣa*, linking the *Advaita Vedānta* and the *Yoga Darśana* in a radical new way, so relevant to today's climate. He showed that nature *māyā*/*māyāśvarūpāvarṇanam* is associated only with pure consciousness/*caitanyamātrāśritā*, indeterminate/*a-nirvacanīya*, and only one/*ekā*.

So, he explained, for example, that the eradication of sin by the 'sight' /*dṛṣṭi*/'insight' of 'Setu'/'binding/may be an initial help, but far more significant is the understanding and practising of a *mahāvākya* texts '*aham brahmāsmi* '/' I am *Brahma* *Bṛhad.* 1.4.10), '*Tat tvam asi*/'*That (Brahman) thou art*'(*Chandogya* 6.8.7) , '*Prajñānam Brahman*/'*Consciousness is Brahman*'(*Aitareya* 3.2) and most important of

all perhaps for *Anubhūti* '*Ayam ātmā brahman*'/*This Self is Brahman*'(*Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 2). All of which can combine with with the help of profound reflection or meditation on ॐ *praṇava*/*Om* etc., following the systematic process of *Śravaṇam*/Listening, *Mananam*/profound study, and *Nididhyāsanam*/profound reflection or meditation on these *mahāvākya* texts results in bringing about the great strength of the injunction towards the *anubhūti*/ the experience of *Turīya* as one's Self/the unchanging Reality.

So it is not by 'mere sight alone' that such change occurs.

As he said, '**Ignorance of nacre is indeterminable since it is removed by knowledge of nacre alone, like nacre-silver.**' No real object is destroyed by superficial 'knowledge'. So, by mere remembrance of 'Garuda', poison is not removed, only by meditation and *mantra* practiced with great diligence. Just as the sin of killing a *brāhmaṇa* is eradicated not just by sight of 'setu' but by combined practices laid down in scriptures. So since nescience/ignorance of *Brahman*/*Ātman*/*prajñām*, or pure consciousness is destroyed by knowledge, it is indeterminable/*nirvacanīya* .

Detachment, not just cessation of attachment/ *vairāgyam mā rāganivṛtti* is the means for restraining the mind,⁶⁸⁰ as Patañjali puts it in *Yoga Sūtra* 1.12, 'That can be controlled through *abhyāsa*/practice and *vairāgya*/non-attachment' (*Gītā* 6.35) . Attachment to sense objects is restrained/controlled through practice and detachment, i.e. by realization of the harmful nature of sense object-attachment, a greater detachment (or mental modification) arises. The same teaching, of course, is given in the *Bhagavad Gītā* 6.35:⁶⁸¹

'Doubtless, O mighty armed, the mind is hard to restrain and restless; but by practice, O son of Kunti, and by indifference it may be restrained ,' and 'Indeterminability/*a-nirvacanīyatvam* is the total impossibility of being ascertained as real and so there is no non-difference from the probandum/to be proved/major term/, *sādhyam* .'

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya explains, 'The statement of difference /*vailakṣaṇya* (from reality and unreality is to bring out the impossibility of ascertainment in those forms, not to declare the reality of co-existence of differences. Indeterminability/*a-nirvacanīyatvam* is 'this' (*māyā* /magic show), which appears, but

⁶⁸⁰ *Yoga Sūtra* 1.12, '*abhyāsavairāgyābhyām tannirodhaḥ*/ *Yoga Sūtra* 1.12 "*abhyāsavairāgyābhyām tan nirodhaḥ*'.

⁶⁸¹ *Gītā* 6.35... '*abhyāsenā tu kaunteya vairāgyena ca gṛhyate*'; '*tat tat rūpanirpaṇa asaḥiṣṇutva-prakaṣānārtha* as real or unreal"; "*prakāśate takaram ca na kahate*.'

cannot stand reasoning. With similar clarity, he established the distinction between *jīva* and *īśvara/jīveśvaravibhāgaḥ* .

This is the truth. *Māyā* is subservient to Consciousness, beginningless , indeterminable and the material cause of *mahat* etc. The reflection of Consciousness in it is *īśvara*. He becomes omniscient etc., because of its modifications . So, the *Śruti*, *Śvetāsvatara 4.10* ⁶⁸² says

‘Know *māyā* to be the cause and the supreme Lord to be its controller’:

The same Consciousness, when reflected in innumerable finite parts of that *māyā*, which are called *a-jñāna*, is spoken of as the innumerable *jīvas*.’

‘Consciousness looked upon as reflected in *ajñāna* is bondage. Since it is accepted that *a-jñāna* is destroyed by knowledge alone, it is understandable that liberation results on the destruction of that *ajñāna* by knowledge.’⁶⁸³

He has the objector ask, ‘How can consciousness, devoid of colour be ‘reflected’?’

He replies, just as there is a reflection of colour which is itself devoid of colour, there

⁶⁸² *Śvetāsvatara 4.10*, ‘*māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyān māyinaṃ tu maheśvaraṃ / tasyāvayavabhūtais tu vyāptaṃ sarvaṃ idaṃ jagat* /’

⁶⁸³ ISV p.364

can be a reflection here. In answer then to the question, how can it be proved that space is reflected? He quotes *Śruti Bṛhad 2.5.19*⁶⁸⁴ again,

'He assumed the likeness of each form. That form of his is for His making Him known.'

Again, he quotes from the *Brahma Sūtra Bhaṣya* on 3.2.18⁶⁸⁵,

'Just as the luminous sun, though only one, becomes many by entry (as reflection) in different receptacles of water, similarly, this effulgent one, the birthless Self, is made to appear as different in different bodies because of the limiting adjuncts.'

He further quotes the *Brahma Bindu Upaniṣasad v.11*,⁶⁸⁶

'The one Self of all beings, dwelling in each living being, appears as one and as many, like reflections of the moon in water'

and the *Brahma Sūtra*, 3.2.18⁶⁸⁷,

'Therefore there is the comparison - like the sun reflected in water, etc.'

⁶⁸⁴ Bṛhad 2.5.19 '... rūpaṃrūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva tad asya rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇāya ...'

⁶⁸⁵ *Brahma Sūtra Bhaṣya* on 3.2.18, 'yathā hy ayaṃ jyotir ātmā vivasoān app bhinnā baludhaiko'nugacchan. upādhinā kriyate bhedarūpaḥ devaḥ kṣetreṣ evam ātmā.'

⁶⁸⁶ 'Eka Eva tu bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ. ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat.' Sanskrit quote nr. 7457 (*Maha-subhāshita-samgraha*) *Brahmabindu upaniṣad* 11

⁶⁸⁷ *Brahma Sūtra* 3.2.18, 'ata Eva copamā sūryakādivat.'

While commenting on the *Brahma Sūtra* 2.3.50⁶⁸⁸, he says, and it is certainly a reflection of the Self, 'it was stated by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*⁶⁸⁹ by the use of the word 'certainly' / *eva* in the *Sūtra*.

'And it is certainly a reflection of the Self' it is clear that the revered author of the *sūtras* indicates his acceptance of the theory of reflection expressed in the *śrutis* such as *Bṛhad* 2.5.19⁶⁹⁰ **'He assumed the likeness of each form.'**

Here, Bhāskara⁶⁹¹ had objected that the description of *jīvas*, etc, as reflections is not logical 'since a reflection is accepted to be unreal, how can an inert thing, which is unreal like a hare's horn etc. have bondage or release or competency for performing action?'

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refuted this objection⁶⁹² with the words '...let connection of face with mirror be unreal ... the face however is real.' Connection

⁶⁸⁸ BS 2.3.50 ā, 'bhāsa eva ca'.

⁶⁸⁹ PV P.659.l.11, 'ityevākāraṃ prayuñjānaḥ "rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva" ity ādiśrutisiddhaṃ pratibimbapakṣaṃ svarahasyaṃ sūtrayāmāsa bhagavān sūtrakāraḥ.'

⁶⁹⁰ *Bṛhad* 2.5.19, '.. rūpaṃrūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva tad asya rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇāya ...'

⁶⁹¹ Bhā. Bhā. P.143, 'ābhāsasyāvastutoābhyupagamāt avastunaḥ śaśaviṣāṇādiklpasyācetanasya kuto bandho mokṣaḥ karmādhikāro vā'.

⁶⁹² PV p.659-660, 'mukhasya darpaṇasaṃsargamātram evāstu, mukhaṃ tu sad eveti. ... deśasasargamātrasya bādhopalambhāt...'

with the place (mirror) alone is denied in the form, 'The face is not here, but is actually mine' ... thus Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya upholds the reflection theory.

He went on to brilliantly refute the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika/nyāyavaiśeṣika khaḍanām* arguments, in particular the view of *Naiyāyikas*⁶⁹³ that:

[T]he quality known as 'knowledge' arises from contact of Self with mind ...

'Self is possessor of that knowledge' is refuted. For he says in the

Prakaṣārthavivaraṇa,⁶⁹⁴

'The Self is partless, being all pervading ... mind is partless being atomic.

For there cannot be any contact between partless entities, as between two

Selves ... Self and mind are not capable of mutual contact, they being

changeless...'

⁶⁹³ 'ātmamanassañyogāt jñānākhyo guṇo jāyate.'

⁶⁹⁴ PV p.123, 'ātmā hi nir aṃśaḥ vibhūtatvāt ..manāś cāṇutvān nir aṃśam. niraṃśayoś ca sañyogo nopapadyate. Ātmadvayavat.....Ātma-manasī, na sañyogārhe, niraṃśatvāt, Ātmadvayavat.'

Furthermore, he shows in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam* that the very⁶⁹⁵ 'Relationship of quality and its possessor is itself untenable...' For again in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*,⁶⁹⁶ he stated:

The assertion that there are only six categories cannot be arrived at by one who is omniscient.....because there are other categories, such as potency, similarity.... etc. It is not reasonable to define quality as something attributeless, having generality and action less ... Moreover a quality does not exist apart from the substance possessing it.

We found similar arguments too in his *Māṇḍūkyaṭippaṇam* on *Advaita Prakaraṇa* 3.5⁸¹⁸ Just as all the spaces confined within the various jars are not darkened when one of the spaces thus confined becomes contaminated by dust, smoke etc., so also is the case with all individuals in the matter of being affected by happiness etc. Where he says:⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁵ ISV p.124,'*guṇaguṇibhāvo na siddhyet.*'

⁶⁹⁶ PV p.506-508 BS 2.2.17, '*śad eva padārthāḥ iti avadhāraṇam nāsarvajena pāryate. ...śaktisādṛśyādīnām atiriktānām śad bhāvena avadhāraṇam asaṅgatvam...api ca guṇinaḥ pṛtha guṇā naivopalabhyante*'.⁸¹⁸ '*yathaikasmin ghāṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute /na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ* "// MandUpK_3.5 //

⁶⁹⁷ *Māṇḍ.Ṭi.* p.93 3.5/L.13, '*yad yato bhinnam tat tato'nyatrāpi bhavati bhāti ca. na ca dravyādbhedena guṇadayo bhānti bhavanti vā. Ato dravyapāratantryānyathānuppttyā na dravyād bhinnā guṇāday:..*'

[T]hat which is different from a particular thing, also exists and appears in places other than where the latter is. Qualities etc. do not appear or exist apart from substances ... so substances are not different from substances.

Moreover, as he further explains in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa*,⁶⁹⁸

‘Inherence itself is not supported by any authority’. Not only that, but the *Vaiśeṣika* view that qualities such as desire are not located in the Self. As he further explains in his *Māṇḍūkyaṭippanam* on *Advaita Prakaraṇa* 3.5.,⁶⁹⁹

‘Self is not possessed of qualities such as desire, since it is eternal, without parts, without activity; what is not so, is not that, such as the body.’

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*⁷⁰⁰ uprooted the *Tārkika*’ view that the *jīvas* is different in each body as he explained that ‘things having the same characteristics are called one; those having different characteristics are described as different.

⁶⁹⁸ PV p.509-12 BS 2.2.17, ‘samavāyasyaiva niṣpramāṇikatvāt.’

⁶⁹⁹ Mā.Ṭi. p.86 3.2. 1.1, ‘ātmā, svagattāttvikabhedaśūnyaḥ, sūkṣmatvāt, niravayavatvāt, sarvagatavāt, ākāśavat.’

⁷⁰⁰ ISV P.260, ‘Ekalakṣaṇaṃ hyekam ucyate, bhinnalakṣaṇaṃ ca bhinnam. Sarvasya ca jīvasya cinmātralakṣaṇatvāt ekaḥ para ciddhātuh upādhiṣu jīvo behavet.’

Since all *jīvas* are characterized by pure consciousness, the one supreme Consciousness should be the *jīva* in the limiting adjuncts.'

He further stated in his *Māṇḍūkyaṭippanam* on *Advaita Prakaraṇa* 3.3:

Since the Self is referred to as existing in the form of individual souls in the same way as space exists in the form of spaces confined within jars, and since the Self exists in the form of composite things just as space exists in jars etc., therefore in the matter of birth this is the illustration.

Therefore,⁷⁰¹ 'The Self is free from real internal difference, being subtle, devoid of parts, all pervading, like space.'

In the fifth chapter, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's refutation of difference cum-non-difference/ *bhedābhedakhaṇḍanam* of Bhāskarādaya was outlined. So, in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*,⁷⁰² the view of Bhāskarā and others that the universe and

⁷⁰¹ *Māṇḍūkyaṭippanam* on *Advaita Prakaraṇa* 3.3, 'ātmā, svagatatātvikabhedaśūnyaḥ, sūkṣmatvāt, niravayavāt, sarvagatatvāt, ākāśavat.'

⁷⁰² ISV p.183, 'Neha nānāsti kiñcana' - ityādiśruteḥ brahmaṇi nānātvaniṣedhaḥ artha āhuḥ.tad atra vistarāḥ vivaraṇe khaṇḍitam eva.'

Brahman is both different and nondifferent interpreting the scriptural statement in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.19 and *Kaṭhcopaniṣad* 4.11;⁷⁰³

‘There is no diversity here’ as denying variety in *Brahman* was elaborately refuted. Moreover⁷⁰⁴, ‘It cannot be said that diversity other than *Brahman* and its effect is real. For that would contradict Bhāskara’s view that non-duality means there is no duality other than *Brahman* with its effect.’

Furthermore, our author avers:⁷⁰⁵

[T]he difference-cum-non-difference /*bhedābhed* between *jīva* and *Brahman* cannot be established by perception or any other means of valid knowledge. Due to the fact that *Brahman* is not an object of perception etc it is not possible to know difference or non-difference with reference to it.

Thus, the diversity denied in *Brahman*, which is its material cause, cannot exist anywhere else.

⁷⁰³ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.19 and *Kaṭhcopaniṣad* 4.11, ‘*Neha nānāsti kiñcana.*’

⁷⁰⁴ ISV p.184, ‘*brahmatatkāryātiriktaṁ nānātvaṁ vasu iti na vācyam. Sakāryād brahmaṇo’nyatva dvaitaṁ nāstīyadvaitam.*’

⁷⁰⁵ ISV p.145, ‘*evaṁ nirasyate - jīvabrahmaṇoḥ bhedābjhedau tāvat na pratyakṣādipramāṇaiḥ siddhyataḥ, brahmaṇaḥ pratyakṣādyviśayatvena tddhaṭitayo bhedābhedasya grahitum aśakyatvāt.*’

In the last section of chapter five, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's distinctive view is expressed, for example, that even in liberation *māyā* exists/*mokṣe'pi māyāyāḥ satyam* was duly considered in his *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇam*,⁷⁰⁶ with the expression of:

Though the universe which is a manifestation of *māyā* exists, it is not experienced, just as a form is not experienced by one devoid of sense organs.

Although it is unreal, it can be 'indestructible' just as it is 'beginningless'.

So, in the famous statement in *Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad 1.10*⁷⁰⁷

'there is cessation of all *māyā* in the end',

what is meant is only the cessation of that part of *māyā* which is called *avidyā* and which is the cause of all transmigration of the *jīva*, like the village is burnt'.

The view of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya that *māyā* continues to exist even in a 'state of liberation' is clearly related to the concept of 'individual' liberation and can be appreciated more easily in the context of the Gauḍapāda's teaching in the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā*.

⁷⁰⁶ ISV 36- 465/, 'yastv itaro māyāvivartaḥ prapañcaḥ ca vidyamāne'pi nirindriyeṇeva rūpaṁ nānubhūyate. Mithyātve'pi anāditoavat anucchedasyāpi sambhavāt .bhūyaś cānte viśvamāyānivorṭtiḥ'; Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad 1.10 "kṣaraṁ pradhānam amṛtākṣaraṁ haraḥ kṣarātmānāv īśate deva ekaḥ / tasyābhidyānād yojanāt tattvabhāvād bhūyaś cānte viśvamāyānivorṭtiḥ // 1.10 // .'

⁷⁰⁷ Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad 1.10 'cānte viśvamāyānivorṭtiḥ'

Since the universe is unreal in all three periods of time in the eyes of the liberated person who has reached the state of absolute reality, the acceptance of the existence of *māyā* for enabling the continuance of the universe proves unnecessary. From such a point of view, the universe, as *Kārikā 1.17*⁷⁰⁸ puts it,

‘It is beyond question that the phenomenal world would cease to be if it had any existence. All this duality that is nothing but *Māyā*, is but non-duality in reality.’

Therefore, the view propounded by Anubhutiśvarūpācārya that ‘*Māyā*’ continues to exist even in the state of liberation ... needs further deliberation ...’

The conclusion of our thesis is that perhaps the most important contribution connects with his name ‘*Anubhūti*’ / ‘experience’ as the final proof leading to Self realization, after either the *Śruti*, the *Smṛti* and words of the *Mahāpuruṣ*, or *śravaṇa*, and *manana*, and that practical profound experience of oneness ‘*Anubhūti*’ / experience not different to *Nididhyāsana*, as taught in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 2.4.4. and 2.4.5.* as well as *4.5.5. and 4.5.6.*, paving the way for an *Advaita* which incorporates the wisdom of *Yoga* with the profound practical wisdom of *Advaita Vedānta*,

⁷⁰⁸ G.*Kārikā 1.17* ‘*prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ/ māyā mātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ*’

culminating in the 'asparśa yoga' of *Māṇḍūkya*. *Kārika* 3.39⁷⁰⁹, 'The Yoga, *prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṃśayaḥ / māyā-mātram idaṃ dvaitam advaitaṃ paramārthataḥ // MandUpK_1.17 // Māṇḍūkya Kārika 3.39 Asparśayogo vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ Yogi bibhyati hy asmād bhaye bhayadarśinaḥ* that is familiarly referred to as 'contactless' difficult to be comprehended by any one of the *Yogis*. For those *Yogis*, 'who apprehend fear where there is no fear, are afraid of it'.

This wisdom is practical for the householder and renunciate alike and 4.2,⁷¹⁰

'I bow down to that Yoga that is devoid of touch (with anything that implies relationship), which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial.'

Asparśa-yoga/Yoga, which is Contactless is the most important contribution connecting with his name 'Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya' as the final proof, paving the way for an *Advaita* which incorporates the wisdom of Yoga and is practical for both the householder and renunciate alike.

⁷⁰⁹ *Māṇḍūkya. Kārika 3.39 Asparśayogo vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ Yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinaḥ//MandUpK_3.39 //*

⁷¹⁰ *'asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ / avivādo 'viruddhaś ca deśitas taṃ namāmy aham // MandUpK_4.2 //*

The conclusion of our thesis is that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's most important contribution connects with his name *Anubhūti* (experience) as the final proof leading to Self realization. The tradition claims that the final proof of anything requires the authority for anything is in accord with the statements of *Śruti*, the *Smṛti*, and the words of the *Mahāpuruṣa*, and the final proof is *Anubhūti* (experience) i.e the undoubted consonance of the inner organ of mind (*antaḥ karaṇa*). Hence, this is reflected in the traditional *upaniṣadic* stages of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* that is reflected practically in experience (*anubhūti*) as taught in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.4.4. Thus, it incorporates the wisdom of *Yoga* with the profound practical wisdom of *Advaita Vedānta*, culminating in '*asparśa yoga*', which is non-different from *Brahman*, the means for which realization is so mysteriously summed up in the twelfth verse of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*.⁷¹¹

“The partless/measureless ॐOm is the Fourth (*Turīya*)- beyond all conventional dealings, the limit of the negation of the phenomenal world, the

⁷¹¹ *Maṇḍ.Up.12, 'amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcōpaśamaḥ śivo 'dvaitaḥ | evam oṃkāra ātmaiva saṃviśaty ātmanātmānaṃ ya evaṃ veda.'*

auspicious, and the non-dual ॐOm. ॐOm is thus the Self to be sure. He who knows thus enters the Self through his Self”.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, explains in his *Ṭippaṇa*.⁷¹²

It is said that the letter *Om* through the process of ‘becoming identical in nature’/ *tādatmyāt*, with the letter *Om* placed over in its three measures there is realization of inner consciousness as *Om* ... and the unity of It with the supreme *Brahman* (is experienced).

So, by the very acknowledgement and experience of the *upaniṣadic* statements like, *Maṇḍūkya.Upaniṣad.2* ‘*Om, ayam ātmā brahma/* **This Self is Brahman**’

one becomes It. This wisdom is practical for the householder and renunciate alike, as claimed in *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* 3.39 and 4.2

‘a Yoga that is devoid of touch, which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial.’

⁷¹² *Maṇḍ.Up.12 Ṭippaṇa p.48, ‘Omkārasamvedanaṁ pratykcāitanyam trimātreṇa Omkāreṇa adhyastena tādatmyāt Omkāra ucyate ... tasya pareṇa brahmaṇā aikyam uttarāśrutyā uchate.’*

Appendix

A literature review of references to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya

1. S.K.Belvakar⁷¹³ 'Systems of Sanskrit Grammar' 1915

Belvekar in his book '*Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*' (1915) describes Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya as the person credited with the authorship of the "*Sarasvata-Prakriyā*" as an ascetic. Tradition he says go further and makes him the direct recipient of the revelation of the Goddess *Sarasvatī*, after whom the school gets its name. However Belvakar disputes this claim by pointing out that in his text of "*Sarasvata-Prakriyā*" he provides *vārttikas* which would be incompatible with him being the '*sūtra-kāra*' (composer of the 700 sūtras themselves).

⁷¹³S.K.Belvakar 'Systems of Sanskrit Grammar' (1915) University of Bombay, Pune.India

Bertram G. Liyanage⁷¹⁴ (2015) builds on Belvakar's work. *Sārasvata* (abbreviated as 'S' hereafter) could be placed around 12 – 14 centuries CE. The author of this grammar is recognised by name 'Śrīmat Paramahaṃsa Parivrājakācārya Anubhūtiśrūpācārya' with reference to the colophon of the work. This name itself reveals that he might have been a wandering ascetic with high reputation. According to Sinhala Encyclopedia, he might belong to *Maskarī*, *Vaiṣṇavite* tradition of which the ascetic is supposed to carry a stick. In the opening verse, the author states that his purpose in compiling these aphorisms is to make available the grammar of *Sarasvatī* for the improvement of the knowledge of ordinary people or uneducated people (*bāla*). To fulfil this purpose he has compiled almost 700 rules. However the amount of *sūtras* in printed works varies due to editing. He further comments that lengthy descriptions are excluded (*nātivistaram*) from the work on this ground. Therefore his grammar does not include all the possible forms regarding a certain grammatical point, but most accepted forms or new forms. Some optional formations of Pāṇinian grammar are simply neglected to give much emphasis on the definite rules. Like many post-Pāṇinian grammarians he also deliberately precludes the rules for Vedic grammar.

⁷¹⁴Bertram G. Liyanage, Centre for Asian Studies, University of Kelaniya, word-press, 2015.

The second verse of the work reminds the reader of the famous story of *Indra* (king of gods) who was learning grammar from *Bṛhaspati*. For the author of “*Sarasvata-Prakriyā*” grammar, even *Indra* could not go to the far shore of this ocean of grammar, so then humanity has an excuse!

As for the myth behind the compiling of this grammar referred to by Belvakar earlier and also in this chapter. It is said that one day, in a public speech, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya used the word ‘*puṃkṣu*’. At that time, the scholars from the audience objected to him, saying that its formation is wrong. He did not admit the objection. Then he was required to explain its formation and promised to make it clear next day. He went home and contemplated on goddess *Sarasvatī*. Being pleased with his devotion she gave him 700 rules on Sanskrit grammar and among them there was a sūtra ‘*asambhave puṃsaḥ kak sau*’ clarifying the formation of *puṃkṣu*. This grammar, thereafter, came into being and became well known. While the passage would definitely encourage the students, on the other hand, it throws light on the assumption that this grammar would follow the *Aindra* system closely. There were two grammatical systems with the same name *Aindra*; one is prior to Pāṇini and other being posterior. The author might refer to older system because the later system has no relation with “*Sarasvata-Prakriyā*”. In fact the older *Aindra* system remains

only by name at present, which is an obstacle to reaching a definite conclusion as to whether it was a gift from goddess *Sarasvatī*!

2. **Dasgupta in Volume 2 History of Indian Philosophy** , p.116 states “Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya (late thirteenth century), the teacher of Ānandajñāna, also wrote commentaries on all the three works of Anandabodha”(detailed previously in this chapter, p.192). “Ānandajñāna, also called Ānandagiri, was probably a native of Gujarat and lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. Mr Tripathi⁷¹⁵ points out in his introduction to Ānandajñāna’s *Tarka-saṅgraha* that Ānandajñāna was a spiritual head of the Dvāraka monastery of Śāṅkara, of which Surveśvarācārya was the first teacher. He was a pupil of two teachers, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya and Śuddhānanda. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya wrote five works, viz, (i) a grammatical work called *Sarasvata-*

⁷¹⁵Introduction T.R.Triparthi *Tarkasaṅgraha* Gaekwold Oriental Series , Baroda 1919

prakriyā, (2) a commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikāḥ*, (3) a commentary on Ānandabodha Yāti's *Nyāya-makaranda*, called *Nyāya-makaranda-saṅgraha*, (4) a commentary, called *Candrikā*, on Ānandabodha's *Nyāya-dīpāvalī*, and (5) another commentary, called *Nibandha*, on Ānandabodha's *Pramāṇa-mālā*. Nothing is known about his other teacher, Śuddhānanda. who is different from the other Śuddhānanda, the teacher of Svayamprakāśa of 17th century". Das Gupta mistakenly calls Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya the teacher of Ānandabodha rather than the disciple, on p.194 ! Later on pp.196-198 Dasgupta gives an account of the 'Philosophy of *Prakaṣārtha-Vivaraṇam* '(what Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his colophon defines as '*prārabhyate vivaraṇam Prakaṣārtham etat*'⁷¹⁶ on '*Brahma Sūtra-Bhāṣya*) (A.D. 1200?) without being able to identify its author. He has since been proved to be Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. Cintamani⁷¹⁷, comments, "The importance of this work was first brought to the notice of scholars by Mr Tripathi⁷¹⁸. In his introduction to Ānandagiri's *Tarkasaṅgraha* he says 'Though not the first - for the oldest commentary

⁷¹⁶ Colophon to *Prakaṣārtha-vivaraṇam* '*prārabhyate vivaraṇam Prakaṣārtham etat*' This commentary called *Prakaṣārtha* is undertaken for the purpose of making clear (the meaning of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras*).

⁷¹⁷ p.vi T.R.Chintamani ed. *Prakaṣārtha-vivaraṇa of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya*, Vol.1 Parimal Delhi 1939

⁷¹⁸ p.xiv *Tarkasaṅgraha* Gaekwold Oriental Series , Baroda 1919

is the *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspatimiśra- the *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇam* is the first complete commentary on the *Bhāṣya*, written from the point of view of Padmapāda and Prakāśātman. Padmapāda and Prakāśātman wrote only on the first four *sūtras* of the first *pāda* of the first *adhyāya* . Vācaspatimiśra was a follower of Maṇḍanamiśra (and wrote a commentary on his *Brahmasiddhi*) and on the philosophical side Maṇḍana represents a school different from that of Śrī Śaṅkara...The followers of Padmapāda and Prakāśātman regard Vācaspati, more as a follower of Maṇḍana than of Śaṅkara.This forms the basis of the sneer in the phrase “*vācaspatīs tu Maṇḍanapṛṣṭasevī*” (quoted earlier) in the *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa* (III-iv-77)“. Das Gupta also underlines the importance of this commentary. “ The author does not... reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all references to its name as *Prakaṭar* or to the author of the *Prakaṭārtha* (*prakaṭārtha-kāra*) and not to the author's personal name. This work has been referred to by Ānandajñāna of the thirteenth century' (*Muṇḍaka Up.* p. 32; *Kena. Up.* p, 23; Ānandāśrama editions,. 1918 and 1917 CE), and it may well be supposed that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth century. He certainly preceded Rāmadvaya, the author of the *Vedānta-kaumudī*, who not only refers to the *Prakaṭārtha*, but has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the

argument of this work. The author of the latter holds that the indefinable *māyā* in association with pure consciousness (*cin-mātra-sambandhinī*) is the mother of all existence (*bhūta-prakṛti*). Through the reflection of pure consciousness in *māyā* is produced *Īśvara* (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator *Brahmā*, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this *Brahmā* that there arise the infinite number of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the *māyā*. *Māyā* or *ajñāna* is not negation, but a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug⁷¹⁹. However, being of the nature of veiling (*āvaranatvāt*) and being destructible through right knowledge (*prakāśa-heyatvāt*), it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions⁷²⁰. The well-known *Vedāntic* term *svaparakāśa* is defined in the *Prakāṣārtha* as illumination without the cognition of its own idea (*sva-saṁvinnair apekṣeṇa sphuraṇam*). The Self is to be regarded as self-revealing; for without such a

⁷¹⁹ *ajñānaṃ nābhāva upādānatvān mṛdavat. M.S.p.11* None of these references correspond with T.Chintamani's edition!

⁷²⁰ *āvaranatvāt prakāśa-heyatvāt vā tamavat svarūpena pramāṇayogatve'py abhāva-vyāvṛtti bhramahāraṇatvādi-dharmaviśiṣṭasya prāmāṇikatvaṃ na virudhyate M.S.p.12*

supposition the revelation of the self would be inexplicable⁷²¹. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, the author of the *Prakaṭārtha*, then criticizes the Kumārila's view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhākāra views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject⁷²² and the Bhāskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self. He ultimately holds the view that the mind or *manas* is a substance with a preponderance of *sattva*, which has an illuminating nature, and that it is this *manas* which, being helped by the moral destiny (*adṛṣṭādi-sahakṛtam*), arrives at the place where the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it, and then as a result thereof, pure consciousness is reflected upon the object, and this leads to its cognition. Perceptual cognition, thus defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the revelation of an object.⁷²³ In the case of inference, however the transformation of *manas* takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for

721 *ātma svaprakāśas tato'nyathā'nupapad yamānatve sati*

prakāśamānatvān na ya evam na sa evam yathā kumbhaḥ M.S. 53-54

722*ātma-samavāyī viśaya-prakāśa-jñānam M.S. 54*

723 *manaḥ pariṇāmaḥ saṁvid-vyañjako jñānam M.S.p.24*

the *manas*, being in direct touch with the reason or the *liṅga*, is prevented from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the *manas* that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed⁷²⁴." Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya very much points here towards the analysis in Gauḍapāda's Kārikā 3.35⁷²⁵ 'That very mind becomes the fearless *Brahman*'. As has previously been stated Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya accepted the distinction between *māyā* and *ajñāna* as conditioning *Īśvara* and *jīva* as an *āvaraṇa* or *vikṣepa* power veiling that *Brahman*.

⁷²⁴ *upalabdha-sambandhārthā kāreṇa pariṇatam mano'nāvabhāsa-vyāvṛtti-mātraphalam, na tu sarivid-vyañjakam liṅgādi-sarivid-vyavadhānāt pratibandhāt....M.S. p.54*

⁷²⁵ *Gauḍapāda's Kārikā 3.35 "tadeva nirbhayaṃ brahma.."*

3. T.R.Chintamani Editor of '*Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*' 1939 Volumes I and II

In the preface of '*Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*' 1935 from which we have already quoted, Chintamani makes some most helpful comments about Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's magnum-opus, whose authorship of the '*Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*' had not been discovered at that point.

Although the name is not known, he does explain that ⁷²⁶"the expression, *Prakaṭārthakāra Śrī Caraṇa* , which is used in some Advaitic works in referring to this author, is similar to expressions like *Prakāśātma, Śrī Caraṇa; Śrī Caraṇa* is here an honorific affix like *Bhagavatpāda,*"(for Śrī Śaṅkara)...He states the date of the commentary must be later than Udayana (fl.984) referred to several times, and earlier than Ānandagiri(fl.1300) who refers to this work several times and even confirms he is his *vidyā guru*. Chintamani ascertains the work is probably written before Rāmaṇuja on the grounds that Rāmaṇuja did not become famous until mid 12th century.

He further comments on the name *Prakaṭārthakāra*, conjecturing that the author so named it in contrast to the *Vivarāṇa* of Prakāśātman, which he says is '*Gūḍhārtha-Vivarāṇa*' i.e. a commentary on the hidden or mystic sense of Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* or rather Prakāśātman's commentary on that. It has been explained in a language which is 'terse';

⁷²⁶_{p.vi} T.R.Chintamani Editor of '*Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya*' 1939, Parimal Publications, Delhi ,India

terse in the sense that it cannot be understood easily. In contrast Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya has explained things in a form, which in his opinion is lucid and clear, hence the name *Prakaṭārtha-Vivarāṇa*. Most importantly, where the commentaries of Padmapāda and Prakāśātman's *Vivarāṇa* only dealt with the first four *sūtras* from the Kevalādvaita position of Ādi Śaṅkara, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya has expounded on all 555 *Brahma-sūtras* with Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, so this is hugely significant for the development of *Advaita Vedānta*.

Chintamani also provides a most helpful summary of the content of the *Prakaṭārtha* along with the content of the Śrī Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*. At the beginning of the second volume of the text he also lists the works and authors referred to in the *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa*, providing a fully edited text with footnotes and some variant readings.

4. V. Raghavan⁷²⁷, "Anubhūti Svarūpācārya", 1942 ABORI 23, 1942, 352-36

In 1942 V. Raghavan makes a great contribution to our understanding of Anubhūti-Svarūpācārya by for the first time establishing the authorship of the *Prakāṭārthavivaraṇa*, the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa* etc. as that of Anubhūti-Svarūpācārya.

“In the history of Advaita literature, he has also been known as the preceptor of one Janardana who wrote the *Tattvaloka*. Aufrecht⁷²⁸ adds that Anubhūti-svarūpācārya wrote a gloss on Ānandabodha's *Pramānamālā*⁷²⁹.

⁷²⁷ V. Raghavan, "Anubhuti Svarupacarya", ABORI 23, 1942, 352-36

⁷²⁸ Aufrecht records the reference L, 2869 (ino). The following other manuscripts of it are known now; Madras Trien. Cat. R. 3268; one in Ra4uvailinatham, Cochin ; one in the Mutt at Srīgeri ; and one described in the Trivandrum Curator's Catalogue, II, 310 A.

⁷²⁹ CC. I. p. 17a. Tekkematham, Cochin.

Mr. T. M. Tripathi, in his introduction to the QOS edition of the *Tarkasamgraha*, drew our attention to three more works of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya the *Samgraha*⁷³⁰ on the *Nyāyamakaranda* of Ānandabodha, as well as the *Candrikā* on Anandabodha's *Nyāyadīpāvali* and a gloss⁷³¹ on the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Dr Raghavan states that Mr. Tripathi recorded also an interesting anecdote about the origin of the *Sarasvata sūtras* (p. x) and considered that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya wrote both the *Sūtras* and the *Prakriyā* of the *Sarasvata* grammar.

He refers to another work⁷³² called *Jñānapaṭha*, which is in fact by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, of which nothing more is known, which was then identified as the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*. He discovers that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya wrote a commentary on Śrī Harṣa's

⁷³⁰ Deo. Coll. 766 of 1891-95 ; besides the Dec. Coll, manuscript of this work, we know of other manuscripts : Bikaner Library ; Madras Des. Cat. 15306, wrongly ascribed to Narendrapuri and Tri. Cur. Cat. 298 (entered anon)

⁷³¹ Tekkematham ; besides that we now know of two other Mss., Mad. Trien. Oat. 2911 and Adyar 1 App. ii b.

⁷³² the Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in the Oudh Province for 1872, p. 24, there is entered a work called *Jñānapaṭha*

KhaṇḍanakhaṇḍaKhāḍya called *Śiṣyahitāṣiṇī*⁷³³. “At the beginning or at the end, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya salutes *Hayagrīva* in most of the works. The form of the author’s name occurring in the last verse of this work ‘Anubhavasvarūpācārya’ need not make us hesitate in taking him as one with ‘Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’.” Prajñānanda, author of the gloss on the *Tattvaloka* of Janardana confirms he is the *guru* of Ānandagiri and mentions him as called Anubhavasvarūpa.

Raghavan goes on” Another important work of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya is his *Ṭippaṇa* on Śaṅkara’s *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*. This is a brief gloss available in four manuscripts.⁷³⁴At the beginning of the gloss on ch. 2, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya criticises Bhāskara and his *Jñāna-karma-samuccaya*. In this connection Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refers to another writer on *Advaita*, an Ācārya, as having cited Bhāskara’s text and criticised it in detail ; unfortunately, in none of the manuscripts is the name of that Ācārya clear. There are passages which Ānandagiri reproduces from this *Gītābhāṣya Ṭippaṇa*, in his own commentary on the *Gītābhāṣya*.

⁷³³In the Big Bhandar at Jesalmere, noticed on p. 26 of the Catalogue of the Mss. in the Jain Bhandar at Jesalmere by Dalai (GOS. XXI 1923). The commentary is entered here anonymously, though the concluding verse clearly mentions the author. This seems to be a complete manuscript ;

⁷³⁴ Adyar Library (Cata- logue I, p. 138b), another in the Mysore Library (Cat. I. p. 442), a third in the office of the Curator, Trivandrum (Des. Cat. II, 324), and a fourth in the new collection of the University, Tri- vandrum.

Raghavan further says, "An important work of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, which Mr. Tripathi had already mentioned, is the *Gauḍapādīya bhāṣya Ṭippaṇa*⁷³⁵ which had come to Mr. Tripathi's knowledge⁷³⁶. It is a perusal of this work which led to the discovery of two important works of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya: The *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa* and the *Gauḍapādīya bhāṣya Ṭippaṇa* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. He points out that in the later on pp. 59-60 of his above-mentioned gloss on the *Gauḍapādīya bhāṣya of Śaṅkara*, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya criticises the *Ekajīva vāda* and briefly clarifies his view of the relative plurality of *Jīvas* and *ekamukṭih*, and *sarvamukṭih*, showing the impossibility of release for all, when one gets released. In this context, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya says that he has criticised these views of *ekajīva* and *sarvamukti* in the *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*. Raghavan goes on to say "it has been assumed without examination that the commentary is Jñānottama's⁷³⁷. When he examined this *Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa*⁷³⁸ he found that its author was identical with the author of the above-noticed *Gauḍapādīya bhāṣya Ṭippaṇa* and that the *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivaraṇa* referred to

⁷³⁵ *Gauḍapādīya bhāṣya ṭippaṇa* of which the manuscript in the Tekkematham in the Cochin State. There are two manuscripts in the above Matham, and the Madras and Adyar Libraries, each contains a manuscript.

⁷³⁶ *Mad. Trien. Cat. B. Bo. 2911 and Ad. Cat. I. App. iib.*

⁷³⁷ See Des. Cat. of the Palace Lib. No. 599 ; Cur. Lib. No. 268 .

⁷³⁸ Madras ms. R. 4384

there is the same as this. The matter, for which Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in his *Gauḍapīya bhāṣya Ṭippaṇa* refers is the *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivarāṇa*. In this manuscript⁷³⁹ of the *Iṣṭasiddhi-vivarāṇa* we find an elaborate statement by the author of his position regarding *Māyā, Jīva, Īśvara, Bandha* and *Mukti*.

5. **L. Vasudeva Sarma⁷⁴⁰, “Anubhūtiśvarūpa”: Preceptors of Advaita 1968**

This chapter helpfully brings together what our previous commentators have said and goes on to emphasise one of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s contribution to *Advaita* lies in his views regarding *avidyā* which will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis. Sharma

⁷³⁹ On. pp. 329-333 (Mad. Ms. R. 4384)

⁷⁴⁰ L. Vasudeva Sarma, *“Anubhūtiśvarūpa 1968 Preceptors of Advaita* 153-156. Reprinted TVOS 28.1, 2003, 26-30, Somata Books Chennai, India.

sums up Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's views (p.154) "In *Advaita*, the supreme Lord , the individual soul, and the phenomenal world are but appearances of the transcendental Reality, *Brahman*. The principle that accounts for this seeming diversification of *Brahman* is *avidyā* or *māyā*". Although some Advaitins, like Vidyāraṇya in the *Pañcadaśī*, make a distinction between *avidyā*, the impure-*sattva*-predominant *prakṛti* and *māyā*, and the pure-*sattva*-predominant *prakṛti*, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya does not make any such distinction. He calls the beginningless, indeterminable primal cause of beings which is present in pure consciousness, *māyā*. On the other hand the limited innumerable parts of *māyā* are endowed with the *āvaraṇa*/concealing and *vikṣepa*/revealing powers and are called *ajñāna*⁷⁴¹. So Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya by referring to *ajñāna* or *avidyā* as parts of *māyā* considers them identical. Moreover, Sharma points out that, according to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, *Brahman* itself is both the locus and content of *avidyā* or *māyā*.

Regarding the nature of the Supreme Lord and the individual soul, Sharma explains Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's view as *pratibimba-vāda*, according to which the soul is the reflection of consciousness in *avidyā*, and that consciousness which serves as the original light is the Supreme Lord. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya states that pure consciousness when reflected in *ajñāna* or *avidyā*, a part of *māyā*, is the individual soul. However the

⁷⁴¹ T.Chintamani. *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* Vol.1. p.3.l.24-25

consciousness that transcends *māyā* is the *Śuddhacaitanya*/'pure-consciousness'.⁷⁴² So it is that the 'parts' of *māyā*, termed *ajñāna* are innumerable. So it follows that since the *caitanya*/consciousness reflected in *ajñāna* is what we call the individual soul, and since there are a plurality of *ajñānas*, there are 'as it were' many individual souls, although in truth they are the one *caitanya*/consciousness!

Sharma points out that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya clearly maintains the distinction between the bound and released souls in the following way:

The 'individual soul' who has realized *Brahman*, has his *ajñāna* which is part of *māyā* annihilated and thereby he is *mukta/released*. However although the universe, the transformation of *māyā*, continues to exist, the released soul is not attached to it, like the blind man who cannot see colour even though it 'exists'. *Māyā* could only be annihilated when its 'parts' are annihilated, i.e. when all 'individual souls' attain to the realization of the knowledge of *Brahman*, that is become *Brahman*.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴² *ibid.* p.4

⁷⁴³ *ibid.* p 4 -5

As to the *sādhana*/the way to that realisation, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya expounds the view that the *viddhi*/'injunction' contained in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* ⁷⁴⁴(II.iv.5) defines *Nididhyāsana* as the meditation for the sake of direct vision, "The Self, my dear Maitreyi , should be realized – should be heard of, reflected on and meditated upon; by the realization of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection and meditation, all this is known." The *Vivaraṇa* tradition considers *śravaṇa* as the principal cause whereas Sureśvara treats *śravaṇa* and *manana* to be co-existent. These two culminate in *nididhyāsana*." According to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya this is an *apūrova-viddhi*/ a unique injunction. This is the position Apayya Dīkṣita takes in his *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* as regards an injunction for the study of *Vedānta*, reflection and meditation contained in the *Upaniṣadic* text *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (II.iv.5). Prakāśātman, author of the *Pañcapādhika-vivaraṇa* favours this as a '*niyama-viddhi*' whereas Vācaspatimiśra holds there is no injunction at all. Sharma⁷⁴⁵ concludes, "by refuting the two schools, *Bhedābheda-vāda* Bhāskara and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya rendered a solid service to the cause of *Advaita*".

⁷⁴⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.iv.5 *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotayaḥ mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi*

⁷⁴⁵ p.136 Vasudeva Sarma, "*Anubhūtiśvarūpa 1968 Preceptors of Advaita*" 153-156. Reprinted TVOS 28.1, 2003, 26-30, Somata Books Chennai, India.

6. S.R.Krishnamurthi Sastri and P.V.Sivarama Dikshitar Eds. *Māṇḍūkyaḡauḡapādīya*

with Śaṅkara Bhāṣya and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's Ṭippanam(1978)

By editing with introduction and notes the first commentary on what Potter calls "the first extant piece of literature that can be safely classified as exclusively attributed in Advaita tradition to an author "and is thus arguably the earliest and most important extant work on Advaita, viz.

Māṇḍūkyaḡauḡapādīya with Śaṅkara *Bhāṣya*, S.R.Krishnamurthi Sastri and P.V.Sivarama Dikshitar have

both made a considerable contribution to evaluating the contribution of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya to the

history of Advaita Vedānta.

They have made available one of the key works on Advaita with an extensive Ṭippanam by

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, previously only known as the initiator of the *Sarasvataprakriyā* grammatical

tradition. As Jason Schwarz puts it “ the mid-thirteenth century theologian and institution builder Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya....seems to have set out to establish a tradition of interpretation ..offering comprehensive readings of the key scholastic texts of the Advaita canon ...from a unified perspective, with the aim of purifying his tradition and refuting the views of the dualist logicians and the followers of *Bhedābheda Vedānta*..an Advaita Vedānta that is explicitly and adamantly nonsectarian.”

Krishnamurthi Sastri and Sivarama Dikshitar thus have made available in a single volume a key work helping us to appreciate the development of Advaita teaching after the classical period of Śaṅkara and his immediate disciples, which helps us appreciate key developments in Advaita so evident in the modern period, especially the profound understanding of the connection between *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, *dhyāna* and *asparśa-yoga*, discussed in the *Ṭippaṇam* on 3.39. as assumed by modern Śaṅkarācārya's like Śāntānanda Sarasvatī of Jyotirmath.

Krishnamurthi Sastri and Sivarama Dikshitar assert that one of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's most important contributions to *Advaita* lies in his views on *avidyā*, which are rooted in the Advaita teaching, viz. that the seeming diversification of *Brahman* into the supreme Lord, the individual soul

and the phenomenal world is due to *avidyā* or *māyā*. He does not make any distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*, unlike some Advaitins like, Bhāratatīrtha (Vidyāraṇya). “He holds that the beginningless, indeterminable primal cause of beings which is present in the pure consciousness is *māyā*”⁷⁴⁶. The limited innumerable parts of *māyā* are endowed with a concealing (*āvaraṇa*) and revealing or projecting (*vikṣepa*) power are called *ajñānas*. So by referring to *ajñāna* or *avidyā* as ‘parts’ of *māyā* Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya is considering them to be identical.

7 S. Revathy, *Three Little Known Advaitins*. Madras 1990

In 1990 Dr S.Revathy provided the fullest account so far available on the contribution of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya to *Advaita*, comparing his teachings on *Brahman* and *Māyā*, *Jīva*

⁷⁴⁶ p.xiii S.R.Krishnamurthi Sastri and P.V.Sivarama Dikshitar Eds. *Māṇḍūkyaśāstra* with Śaṅkara Bhāṣya and Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s

and *Īśvara*, the World and Liberation with that of Advaitavidyācārya and Kavitārika Cakravarti Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya. Dr.Revathy makes the very important point at the outset, that although the variety of ways in which the Advaitins discussed may give the impression of more than one “school” of Advaita, she is of the view that the variations in the ways they deal with the issues mentioned, do not jeopardise their commitment to the basic tenets of Advaita which all the writers share. In taking this position she claims to be simply adopting the approach of Appayya Dīkṣita’s famous *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* in which he brilliantly presents a compendium of all the post *Śaṅkara-Advaitins* up to his time.

Dr Revathy⁷⁴⁷ reminds us that effectively Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya became a ‘forgotten author in the history of Advaita’ in spite of producing eight very important works on *Advaita*. His magnum opus itself, the *Prakaṣārtha-Vivaraṇa* alone of those eight works was remembered, and even then his real name was lost since he was remembered simply as Prakaṣārtha-kāra.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s most famous disciple, Ānandagiri, alias Janārdana, was the author of *Tattvāloka*, which he himself says was directly based on the *Prakaṣārtha-*

⁷⁴⁷ p.3 Revathy,S Three Little Known Advaitins. Madras 1990

Vivaraṇa.⁷⁴⁸ As has previously been remarked Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya criticizes some of Vācaspatimiśra's (fl.960) arguments found in his *Bhāmatī*, an exposition of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*. These criticisms Amalānanda (fl.1255) seeks to answer in his commentary, the *Kalpataru* on the *Bhāmatī* without referring to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya by name, details of which are provided in a very important article by Prof. M. Hiriyanna⁷⁴⁹. The point is that the references were identified as Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's. Likewise later Appayya Dīkṣita (fl.1550) in his *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*⁷⁵⁰ makes references to *Prakaṭārtha-*

⁷⁴⁸ p.55 *Tattvāloka*, *Śārīrakamahābhāṣyaprakaṭārthanibandhanam*, *janardano nirīkṣyemaṁ tattvālokaṁ vinimame// iti Śrīmad anubhūtiśvarūpācāryāśiṣyeṇa.....Śrī matā janārdanen vinimite tattvāloke dvitīyo'dhyāyaḥ Tattvāloka* of Janardana, the pupil of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, the famous author of the *Sarasvatīprakriyā* (see above No. 54), is a defence of the *Advaita Vedānta* against the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system. It consists of 60 sections divided into two *Adhyāyas*. For a MS. of the text, see Hall, Index, p. 157 and Aufrecht, Leipzig Catalogue, No. 890. Janardana quotes Bhaskara (Nimbarka) and bases his work on Śaṅkara's *S'ārīrabhāṣya*. The commentary called *Tattvapraṅkāś'ikā* was composed by the author's pupil. A MS. of this commentary (Peterson. Reports, III. p. 208) is dated Samvat 1432. Both the teacher and the pupil appear to have flourished in the 14th century. Our MS. is about 300 years old. The Asiatic Society of Mumbai Granth Sanjeevani

⁷⁴⁹ pp.1-8, M.Hiriyanna:(1945) *Gleanings from the Prakaṭārtha*, *The Journal of the Oriental research*, Vol.15

⁷⁵⁰ pp.8,68,,119 *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* with commentary *Kṛṣṇālaṅkāra*; Eds. SKrishnamurti and N. Veezhinathan, Śrīmad Appayya Dīkṣitendra Granthāvali Prakāśanasamiti, Secunderabad, 1973

Vivaraṇa, as does Rāmānanda⁷⁵¹ (17th century), author of the *Ratnaprabhā* (on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*), who also had access to the *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa*.

As we have already shown, much later Dr V.Raghavan⁷⁵² conclusively showed that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya was in fact the author of *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa*, *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* and other works.

Dr. Revathi explains, following T.Chintamani, how Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in the *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa* systematically refutes the *Bhedābheda* school of Bhāskara followed by Keśava, Mādhava and Amṛtānanda, who expounded the pre-Śaṅkara view of *Bhedābheda*, *pariṇāma*, as well holding to the view '*jñāna-karma-samucchaya*' viz. knowledge and action are joint means to liberation. Likewise Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refutes the dualism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. So Kulārkapaṇḍita (an 11th century Naiyāyikan) developed a technique called *mahā-vidyānumāna* in his *Daśa-śloka-mahā-vidyā-sūtra*⁷⁵³ to undermine the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā arguments for the eternity of sounds and to support the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

⁷⁵¹ p. 561 *Prakaṭārtha-Vivaraṇa*, p.660 *parākrāntarī cātra darpaṇaṭīkāyām ācāryaiḥ ityuprabhyate*; p.818 P-V. 989 *etat sūtrabhāṣyabhāvānabhijñāḥ sannyāsāśramadharmasravanādau vidhir nāstīti vadanti* Rāmānanda(17th century), author of the *Ratnaprabhā*(on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra*,

⁷⁵² V. Raghavan, "Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya", ABORI 23, 1942, 352-368

⁷⁵³ 1920 *Daśa-śloka-mahā-vidyā-sūtra* published with *Mahā-vidyā-Viḍambana* of Bhaṭṭavādīndra in Gaekward's Oriental Series

view that sounds are non-eternal.⁷⁵⁴ Later on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school used special types of syllogisms to prove the existence and eternal nature of the *paramāṇu* instead as the essential cause of the universe. Clearly all these are in direct opposition to the fundamental tenets of Advaita, which state that *Brahman* is the cause of the universe, being the substratum of *māyā*. Moreover, the universe is *mithyā* and knowledge alone is the means to liberation/*mokṣa*.

⁷⁵⁴ pp. 118-125 Dasgupta, *A History of Indian philosophy*, Vol.II

8. A.Solomon; Ed. '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrī Harṣa with *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī Ṭīkā* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya(1990) Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, India

Dr Solomon has likewise rendered a great service by working with manuscripts of the *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī-ṭīkā*, some of which were previously considered undecipherable and unfit for critical study, from photocopies of Palm-leaf MSS, preserved in Bhandars of Jsalmer and Pattan(having only Paricchedas II-IV) publishing it for the first time. Again, although no mention of the author is given, she has been able to prove him to be Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. In addition Dr Solomon has provided a most helpful introduction giving fresh perspectives on Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, not least of which is her hypothesis as to a chronology for his nine works, as well as supporting evidence for Śrī Harṣa himself being one of his teachers.

It is pointed out by Dr Solomon that one of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's characteristics evident in his *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī-ṭīkā*, as in his other works, is that he explains only those textual portions which are difficult. Moreover his fierce criticism of Bhāskara and others from *Bhedābheda* school, as well as 'so called' Kevalādvaitins like Vācaspatimiśra is evident here

too. As he criticised the views of *Ekajīva* and *Sarva-mukti* in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa*, so too here in his *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī-ṭīkā*.

Similar to his views expressed in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* are those here in the *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī-ṭīkā*.⁷⁵⁵ He expounds at length regarding *māyā*, *jīva*, *Īśvara*, *Bandha* and *Mukti*. Indeed Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya refers to some Advaitin, presumably Citsukha previously mentioned, whom he says has not really seen the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, and as a result has wrongly attributed *Ekajīva-vāda* to the work, describing the writer as an *Upāsaka* of *Traipura Śālagrāma*, saying he is therefore averse to *Brahma-vidyā*, i.e. not a true *Kevalādvaitin*.

It may be that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya however is here referring to Pratyakṣasvarūpa, whose only work was his commentary, *Nayanaprasādinī*⁷⁵⁶ on the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha(fl.1295) ascribing *ekajīva-vāda* to the *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, implying that Citsukha also had this view, even though he has not written a commentary on the *Iṣṭasiddhi*. Further in the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇa* Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya gives a rebuttal of a Naiyāyika who had made fun of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* as a storehouse of *jatyuttaras*, (futile responses based on caste!).

⁷⁵⁵ pp.329-333 *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī-ṭīkā*

⁷⁵⁶ p.592 *ekajīvavādidbhr apyayam artho'ṅgīkriyatw ityāha Iṣṭasiddhīti. Nayanaprasādinī*, Ṣaḍdarśana Prakāśana, Vāranaśi, 1974

9. Roger Marcaurelle's *Freedom through Inner Renunciation: Sankara's Philosophy in a New Light* (SUNY, 1999)

Marcaurelle argues that the only renunciation, which Śāṅkara holds to be indispensable for the attainment of liberation is an inner renunciation, a “renunciation of doership—where the object consists of the sense of being the doer of mental and physical actions” (p. 15)⁷⁵⁷. Moreover, on Marcaurelle’s reading, such inner renunciation is available to all human beings who are desirous of liberation, regardless of caste, stage of life, or gender. According to Marcaurelle, this is how Śāṅkara accounts for the attainment of liberation by certain householders and women in the Hindu scriptures. This contrasts with conventional interpretations, according to which such attainments must be explained by physical renunciation undertaken in previous lifetimes.

In his chapter on Post-Śāṅkara Advaita Vedānta Marcaurelle claims that Padmapāda’s *Pañcapādika* provides the basis for the (so-called) ‘*Vivaraṇa* school’. However he says that

⁷⁵⁷ P.15 Roger Marcaurelle’s *Freedom through Inner Renunciation: Sankara’s Philosophy in a New Light* (SUNY, 1999)

Padmapāda(fl.740) does not really comment on the six qualities referred to by Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on *BS 1.1.1* , especially the prerequisites *uparati* (or *uparāma*/quietness) but merely states the names of the other items⁷⁵⁸, nor does Prakāśātma's (most authorities fl.975 CE, though according to Marcaurelle mid.13th.c. without supporting evidence!) *Vivaraṇa* on the Padmapāda's *Pañcapādika* comment on its meaning. Moreover, Marcaurelle claims that 'the idea of physical renunciation as a sine qua non for Self-knowledge originated within the *Vivaraṇa* school outside the commentaries on the *Pañcapādika*. It seems to have been held first by Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya'⁷⁵⁹, especially in his *Prakatārthavivaraṇa*...that was to exert a major influence in the *Vivaraṇa* school'. Then he gives one quote from *Prakatārthavivaraṇa*⁷⁶⁰...apparently supporting his view followed by another diametrically opposed to such an interpretation⁷⁶¹and entirely in line with his whole emphasis on inner renunciation, especially when interpreting *Asparśa-yoga* in Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's *Ṭippanam* on *GauḍapādaKārikā 3.39*"The *Yoga*, that is familiarly

⁷⁵⁸ p.440, Padmapāda's *Pañcapādika*, Shri Dakshinamurti Prakashana, Varanasi

⁷⁵⁹ P.178 Roger Marcaurelle's *Freedom through Inner Renunciation: Sankara's Philosophy in a New Light* (SUNY, 1999)

⁷⁶⁰ p.28 *BS 1.1.1 Prakatārthavivaraṇa*, T R.Cintamani 2012 Parimal, Delhi,

⁷⁶¹ *ibid.* p.810-811 *BS 3.4.38 Prakatārthavivaraṇa*, T R.Cintamani 2012 Parimal, Delhi,

referred to as 'contactless' is difficult to be comprehended by any one of the *Yogis*. For those *Yogis*, who apprehend fear where there is no fear, are afraid of it"⁷⁶²! Marcaurelle then writes of Ānandagiri following his master Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya interpreting 'uparati' as (purely) physical renunciation. However this in no way accounts for his interpretation elsewhere of inner renunciation, as in no way purely physical. For example, Ānandagiri's affirmation of Śāṅkara's interpretation of 'Tena tyaktena' in *Īśopaniṣad 1* as 'aham eva idam sarvaṃ'/'By that renunciation' means (realising) 'I am verily this whole universe'!⁷⁶³

However taken more generally, if Marcaurelle's reading of Śāṅkara is correct then recent movements (i.e. the Ramakrishna Mission, Transcendental Meditation, Siddha Yoga) which seek to make *Vedāntic* spiritual goals and practices available to a wider public become legitimized from the conservative centre of the tradition, thus encompassing all

⁷⁶² *GauḍapādaKārikā* 3.39 "asparśayoga vai nāma durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ ,

yogino bibhyati hyasmād abhaye bhayadarśinaḥ"

p.123 '*Gauḍapādīya-Śāṅkarabhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*', MSS . Two in Tekkemaṭham, Kochin. Ed.

S.R.Krishnamurti Sastri (1978) Sanskrit Education Society, Madras.

⁷⁶³ *Īśopaniṣad verse 1, Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, Panoli.v, Vol.ii, Mathrubhumi Publishing, Calcut-1,(2006)

(such as Western practitioners) seeking inner renunciation and liberation from ignorance to realise the Absolute, the One Self, *Brahman*, God.⁷⁶⁴

10. Michael Comans, 'The method of Early Advaita' 2000 Motilal Banarsidass , Delhi

In this fine study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and Padmapāda, Comans quotes from Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's ⁷⁶⁵ '*Gauḍapādīya-Śaṅkarabhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*' in his notes 19, 20, 27, 29, 43, 59, 63 and 67 in the chapter on Gauḍapāda on Liberation and the Means to Liberation.

However each time he makes the mistake of thinking that Ānandagiri's interpretation or exposition of the *Kārikā* has influenced his master Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's interpretation or explanation of the text. However the exact reverse is the truth for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya had it seems been Ānandagiri's master for many years and the latter has adopted many of the views, even exact wording of his master on several occasions, as S.A.Upadhyaya⁷⁶⁶ has demonstrated in his study of Ānandagiri's

⁷⁶⁴Book Review: *Freedom Through Inner Renunciation: Sankara's Philosophy in a New Light* Roger Marcaurelle (2001) Jeffery Long, 2001, Journal of Religion

⁷⁶⁵p.123 '*Gauḍapādīya-Śaṅkarabhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*', S.Subrahmanyashastri (ed.) Upaniṣadbhāṣyam Vol.1 Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute 1979

⁷⁶⁶*Tattvāloka*, Introduction, S.A.Upadhyaya pp. xxii-xxv Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Delhi. 1969

Tattvāloka. Ānandagiri refers either directly to his master Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya or quite often he simply calls him *Prakatārthavivaraṇa-kāra!*

11. Karl Potter Encyclopedia Indian Philosophies Vol.XI *Advaita Vedānta* From 800 to 1200, Motilal Banarsidass , 2006, Delhi,India.

This most valuable work was written apparently before there was awareness of the significance of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya's contribution to Advaita Vedānta available to K.Potter. However in chapter 19⁷⁶⁷ in spite of his quoting from the extremely important edition edited by E.Solomon of '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*' of Śrī Harṣa with *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī Ṭikā*⁷⁶⁸ no other reference is made to his significance nor even to the extensive introduction on the importance of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya in general and this *Ṭikā* in particular as

⁷⁶⁷ p.557 Karl Potter Encyclopedia Indian Philosophies Vol.XI *Advaita Vedānta* From 800 to 1200, Motilal Banarsidass , 2006, Delhi,India.

⁷⁶⁸ '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*' of Śrī Harṣa with *Śiṣyahitaiṣiṇī Ṭikā* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya(1990) Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, India,

being the first full commentary on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. Furthermore on page 592 Potter fails to attribute the *Iṣṭasiddhi-Vivaraṇam* to Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, instead simply using his much less common name, Ānandānubhava, without reference to the contents or significance of this work, in spite of devoting the whole of chapter 4 to the *Iṣṭa Siddhi* (c.1005) itself by Vimuktātman, whose most important commentator was in fact Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya!

Finally in the endnotes he refers to N.Veezhinathan⁷⁶⁹ *Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya* published by bulletin of the Institute of Traditional Cultures, 1968 but with no indication of its contents!

⁷⁶⁹ 6. 749.9.3 N. Veezhinathan, "Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya--his contribution to Advaita Vedānta", BITC 1968, 191-21 5.749.9.4 N. Veezhinathan, "Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya", TVOS 5, 1978, 379-420

12. *Iṣṭa Siddhi Vivaraṇam* , Critical study Dr.R.K.Sastrigal (Adi Sankara Research Centre, Chennai, India, 2006

S.N.Sastri has performed a most useful service in translating into English Dr R.K.Sastrigal's⁷⁷⁰ thesis on the *Iṣṭa Siddhi Vivaraṇam*, a work until fairly recently wrongly attributed to Jñānottma. As we have previously shown V,Raghavan⁷⁷¹ was able to confirm the view that Jñānottma's commentary published in 1933 was in fact based on Anubhūtiśvarupacārya's *Iṣṭa Siddhi Vivaraṇam*. In this critical study, as well as providing us with an edited Sanskrit text of the *Iṣṭa Siddhi Vivaraṇam*, R. Sastrigal provides information about Anubhūtiśvarupacārya himself, and giving some outline of his teaching, with chapters on *Māya* and *Avidyā*, *Brahman* and *Jīva*, *The World* and *Liberation*.

⁷⁷⁰ *Iṣṭa Siddhi Vivaraṇam*, Critical study Dr.R.K.Sastrigal (Adi Sankara Research Centre, Chennai, India, 2006

⁷⁷¹ V.Raghavan "Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya- Author of 'Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa', 'Iṣṭasiddhivivaraṇa', etc. pp.352-368 Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. XXIII, 1942.

13. **Milind Sanatkumar Joshi, Anubhutiśvarupacarya and His *Sārasvataprakriyā*–a Mahiman Publishing House,2011 Vadora, India**

Dr M.S. Joshi has also provided an invaluable service by having his PhD,

*'A Critical , Historical and textual Study of Sārasvata School of Sanskrit Grammar'*⁷⁷² published,

helping to explain as it does why Anubhutiśvarupacarya's work survived as a popular

Sanskrit Grammar in Gujarat and beyond for seven hundred years, by providing relatively

easy access to Sanskrit language with much simplification of the *Pāṇinian* system, largely

for Muslim rulers and non-*Brahmins*. Part 1 of this work provides a textual analysis of the

Sūtra-pāṭha Naredācārya, who is said to have authored the *Sārasvata* aphorisms after

obtaining the grace of Goddess *Sarasvati*, as Pāṇini obtained 14 sūtras from *Maheśvara*.

Naredācārya, is believed to have lived in the 10th century and to have been the original

author of the *Sārasvata-Vyākaraṇa*, comprising 568 sūtras. The exposition of his aphorisms

by Anubhutiśvarupacarya, who flourished in the 13th century is called the *Sārasvata-*

⁷⁷² Milind Sanatkumar Joshi, *Anubhutiśvarupacarya and His Sārasvataprakriyā*– Mahiman Publishing House,2011 Vadora, India

prakriyā, which has remained as a text- book on grammar till the present day in parts of India. It is this work which is popularly known as *Sārasvata-Vyākaraṇam* and its technical terms are the currently popular ones.

In providing details of Anubhutiśvarupacarya, M.S.Joshi⁷⁷³ quotes from a source he calls the *Bhūmikā* of Śaśtri Navakṣhor and verse in Sanskrit from the *Subodhikā Uttarārdha*. 'A hermit (*mascara* i.e. bearing a bamboo cane/*maskara*) bearing the name 'Anubhūti' as the first member and '*svarūpa*' as the second(i.e. Anubhutiśvarupacarya) has composed an auspicious(*śubha*) text of grammatical operations(*prakriyā*) befitting to the clever (*catrur-rocita*).'

The controversial discussion about Anubhutiśvarupacarya's use of the form *pumkṣu* (referred to earlier) was for use in the *Varanasi* court. This grammatically incorrect usage, instead of *pumṣu* has another shade of meaning, '*asambhave*' 'regarding the Unborn or birth-less Persons'. The plural usage indicates either plurality or the polite the form of respect (for the Divine being). The anecdote gives some ground for Anubhutiśvarupacarya's being a resident of *Varanasi*. He was apparently a hermit of the *Sarasvatī* sect of monks, so residing in a hermitage(*āśrama /maṭha*) of the *Sarasvatī*

⁷⁷³ *ibid.* p.98-99

Sannyāsins, not a wandering monk(*sādhu*). Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya not only salutes ‘*Gaṇapa(pati)*’ one of the *Varanasi* deities but as we have said *Hayagrīva*, suggesting he was connected with a subset of *Sarasvatī Sannyāsins*’.

A final benedictory stanza (*antamaṅgala*) prays to Lord *Haya-grīva* for protection, referring to *Haya-grīva* worship. So, it is possible that Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya belonged to the group of *Sannyāsins* whose sect-deity was *Hayagrīva*/‘having a horse’s head/kneck’.

“ May Goddess *Lakṣmī*’s (*Kamalā*’s) shelter, Lord *Grīva*, whose lotus feet are worshipped devotedly(fully-sucked) by the honey- bees in the form of gods, demons and men, protect you(learners and teachers).”

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya had more than twenty commentators on his work, none radically altering it, so his original form of grammar is still recognisable today in some parts of India.

14. Jason Schwarz JH (2017)21:345-389, Schwarz,Jason; *Parabrahman among the Yogins*

Jason Schwarz is the most recent scholar to refer to the works of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, showing huge appreciation of his importance in the history of Advaita Vedānta. Indeed, although it is not possible to fully substantiate all the claims he has made for Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, the evidence from my on going research accords very much with his broad vision. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya provides one of the key links between the early Advaita of Śrī Śaṅkara and his four earliest disciples and the modern age in which we find the depth of Advaita Vedānta works links closely with the depth of Yoga and its practises for the same purpose or end of 'liberation' in the 21st century, which one could say is the true point of the 'meeting of East and West'.

Jason Schwarz, as has been referred to earlier, summarizes his view: ⁷⁷⁴ "We can locate this substantive reimagining of the *Vedāntic* construal of meditation in the most incongruous of places: the writings of the mid- thirteenth-century theologian and

⁷⁷⁴p.365-366 Jason Schwarz JH (2017)21:345-389, Schwarz,Jason; *Parabrahman Among the Yogins*

institution-builder Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. Perhaps most famous today as the initiator of the grammatical tradition of the *Sārasvataprakriyā*, more than a century before Vidyāraṇya, Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya seems to have set out to establish a tradition of interpretation.... offering comprehensive readings of the key scholastic texts of the Advaita canon from a doctrinally and methodologically unified hermeneutical perspective, with the aim of purifying his tradition and refuting the views of the dualist logicians and followers of *Bhedābheda Vedānta*....Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya envisions an *Advaita Vedānta* that is explicitly and adamantly non-sectarian. Not only does he refuse to identify *Brahman* with any particular deity in a substantive fashion, but in the sub-commentary on *Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, he actively holds up for ridicule a range of ritual practices, constitutive of the identities of specific religious communities..."

In the rest of this thesis we will explore some of these aspects of the teaching of this important but still relatively unknown Advaitin.

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