Political Projects of Unity in Divided Communities:
Discourse and Performance of *Ubumwe* in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies at the University of Oxford.

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ABSTRACT

The present thesis explores the politics of reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda by focusing on one of its little-studied aspects— the government-led project of 'unity building.' To uncover the type of unit(ies) that are actually produced (not just officially envisioned), the analysis operates at three interconnected levels— i) at the level of the discourse of unity and reconciliation (studying its proper logic in addition to the ways in which it is shaped/structured by other discourses, such as security or prosperity/development); ii) at the level of concrete strategies and policies; and finally iii) at the level of 'enaction' through a score of official (and purportedly 'local' and 'traditional') activities. Many of the activities considered here have received no in-depth study. The official activities are explored both in toto and through an in in-depth analysis of one key exemplar – the *ingando* camps – transitory and transient spaces of re-education/sensitisation and reintegration tailored for selected segments of the population.

The thesis demonstrates the ways in which the process of *kubaka ubumwe* / unity-building is profoundly politicised. Detailed attention is paid to exposing the way in which i) political dynamics affect the very conception of 'unity' and 'reconciliation;' ii) the manner in which power and the state mould unity and reconciliation activities, determining what can be achieved through them (or not); and finally iii) the ways in which the government appropriates the whole unity-building process for other than stated aims. The research shows how unity is shaped to imply consent, homogeneity and non-dissension, thus serving specific governmentality goals in the highly controlling environment of the authoritarian state (producing docile and legible subjects). Furthermore, the thesis shows how the process of unity and reconciliation is subsumed to the broader social engineering project of the state aimed at shaping citizens' 'mentalities' and at their transformation into 'perfect development subjects.'

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION **1**

CHAPTER 1. Situating the Research Topic……...2
Importance of the Study……..... 2
Research Questions…….4
Literature: Key Ideas, Gaps and Contributions…….....6
i. A Politography of Unity……...….6
ii. Politicisation of Reconciliation and Transitional Justice……13
iii. Rwanda and African Studies: A Strong State in the Midst of the 'State Weakness Paradigm'……....21
Section and Chapter Overview……..……...23

CHAPTER 2. Methodology and Ethics……..26
Emplacing the Researcher: The Post-Genocide Present……...26
Politography in a Politically Divided Society: Is There a 'Fact'? What is 'Data'?.....39
Methods and Triangulation: Beyond Narrative, Towards A Structure of Voice……..43
Data Sources: On Entering the Entrails of the Unifier…and Getting Out…….……...…46
Sampling, Data Collection and Data Analysis…….….52
Ethics……...…….56

SECTION II. THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA **64**

CHAPTER 3. Legitimisations of Political Power.…….…….……..67
Guarantors of Security: The Uses of Fear.....68
i. The Foundational Violence of Post-Genocide Security…..……..……..…68
ii. Securitized State and Discourse: The Friend-Enemy Distinction as an Ordering Sub-Text in Rwanda…..……..……....73
iii. Enemies 'At Home:' Divisionism and Genocide Ideology……..……..74
iv. Security's Rule: The Rule of Fear?.....79
Guarantors of Prosperity: Consent for Development…..…….……..……..81
i. The Contours of Feigned Plurality: Making Maltipartyism Within Consensual Politics……84
ii. The Pyramid Cannot Stand on Its Head: Accessibility and Stability of Power in Rwanda……...….91
Guarantors of Social Harmony: The Layers of Political Unity……...….97
i. 'To Have One State:' Migration as a Political Tool……...….98
ii. The Blurry Borders of Rwandaness: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion……100
iii. Identity in Politics: Official De-Ethnicisation, Silent Engineering…….....103
iv. The Story of Unity and Disunity: The Genealogy of a Discursive Consensus…….108
Conclusion: Implications for Unity and Unity-Building……..…..111

CHAPTER 4. The Apparatus of 'Reach' and the Presence of State in People's Lives……..……...113
The Administrative Apparatus……115
i. The Vertical Structure: From *Gihugu* to *Mudugudu*…..…….115
ii. '*Umuryango* RPF:' The Parallel Structures of the Party……..119
iii. The Lateral Structure: Multiple Responsibilities and Indirect Control……....124
iv. *Imihigo* Performance Contracts: Incorporating Family and Individual to the State Structure……...126
v. Decentralisation: Dispatching of Control?……...…130
The Information Apparatus…….……131
The Spectrum of State-Led Activities…..……...135
What Counter-Weights to the State?.....140
The 'Uses' of the State: Government's Goals……142
i. Producing 'Governable' Subjects…….……..144
ii. Forming 'Changed Mentalities'…….……147
Conclusion……...……...……150

CHAPTER 5. Dynamics of Power and Its Effects in Daily Life……..……151
The Workings of Power……..……...……...151
Power's 'Productiveness'……..……155
i. Management of Voice and Silence in Rwanda……155
ii. The Landscape of Feelings, Attitudes and Relations..……..161
What is 'Dissent'?.....166

Conclusions to Section……175

SECTION III. MAKING 'UBUMWE:' THE IMAGERIES, PLANNING AND PERFORMANCES OF 'UNITY' IN RWANDA **177**

CHAPTER 6. Unity's Multiplicities: The Concepts and Strategies of Making a Social Whole in Rwanda……..180
Ubumwe n'Ubwiyunge: Getting at the Conceptual Complexity……180
i. Unity as 'Being Together'……...…182
ii. Unity and Reconciliation: The Proximity of the Terms…….....…185
iii. The Concept of 'Restoration' ……188
Government Conceptions and 'Strategies' of Unity……...189
i. The Nationalist View……...…189
ii. Building 'Rwandanness:' The One Overarching Loyalty……...…190
iii. Restoring 'Rwandanicity:' The Values and Culture that Make A Rwandan.....195
iv. 'Oppositional Constitution:' A Greater 'Other' Makes a Greater 'Us'……...197
v. 'The Common Vision:' Forgive and Forget in the Name of Development…….199
vi. Performative and Exploratory Strategies…….....200

CHAPTER 7. (En)acting Unity: Activities of 'Unity and Reconciliation' in the Contexts of Power……...…...203
Discursive Delimitations of the Subject…….203
i. The Political Economy of Naming and Characterisation…..…….204
ii. Governmental versus Non-governmental? A Blurried Line…….....206
iii. The Dynamics of Depoliticisation: Development Language, Normalization, Traditionality……207

What is in a Name? Power and Performance……210
i. 'Local-level,' 'Participatory,' 'Traditional:' Contesting the Labels……210
ii. The Theatre of Unity and Reconciliation……212
iii. Governmentality Needs: Making Dutiful and Responsive Citizens……220
iv. Party Agendas: Helpful Partners and Useful Stages……223
v. Transforming Subjects: Interpenetration of Themes and the All-Purpose Mainstreaming Fora……227
(While Inside…)……229
Claimed and Actual Effects……233
i. Unity and Reconciliation 'Found:' Measuring Desired Impacts……233
ii. Actual Effects: From 'Effectiveness' to 'Productiveness'……236
What Kind of 'Unity'?……240

CHAPTER 8. *Ingando*: Camping in the Service of Nation-Building……243
Evolutions and Inspirations of a 'Tradition'……247
Ingando as a Social Situation in Contemporary Rwanda……259
i. Dimensions of Contrast……259
ii. Important Shared Aspects……261
iii. Characteristics Shared with Other Activities……262
Selective Targeting and the Meaning it Unlocks……265
Interpretations and Analysis of Components……271
i. A Typical Day at *Nkumba*……272
ii. Military Training……273
iii. Lectures……275
iv. *Igitaramo* (Cultural Get-Together)……282
The Main Goal of *Ingando*: What are the Camps 'All About'?……283

CHAPTER 9. Effects of Ingando Camps: Rites of Collective Passage to the New Rwanda……289
The Expected Effects: Reconciliation, Unity, Peace and Solidarity……289
A Crucial Ingredient: The Spatial and Performative Nature of *Ingando*……297
i. A Camp: Separation and Concentration……298
ii. Internal Structure: Order and Hierarchy……300
iii. Enaction: Experiencing Through Simulation……301
Ingando's Wider Conjectures: Power, State and Governmentality……304
i. *Ingando* as a Total Institution……304
ii. The King and His Castle at Lake Muhazi: Sovereignty and Indirect Control in a Simulated Social World……306
iii. *Nkumba* Production: A Convergent Elite? ……310
Collective Rites of Passage to a 'New Rwanda:' Liminality and the Reproduction of Power……314

SECTION IV. CONCLUSIONS **320**

CHAPTER 10. Civic Education and Social Transformation in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Forging the Perfect Development Subjects……321
The Transformation Process……322
The Perfect Development Subjects……325

'Poverty Causes Conflict' and 'Riches Reconcile:' 'U&R' in the Service of Development……..…330
The Concept of Development in Rwanda…….…….…….…….……335
The Effects of Development in Rwanda…….340
i. Disempowerment through Depoliticisation……..……..340
ii. Mystifications in the Conflict-Development Nexus……..…….342

CHAPTER 11. The Process of Building Unity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Findings, Lessons, Limitations and Further Research…….346
Summary of Key Findings…….…….346
Contribution to Knowledge……..……..351
Implications for the Future…….……352
i. Is the Project Inclusive or Exclusive?.....352
ii. Is the Project 'Unifying' or Divisive?.....354
iii. What has been the Role of Outsiders?.....355
Limitations and Further Research……..……357
i. Scientificity in Markets of Regulated Truth……..……..357
ii. The Relative Exclusion of the Theme of Resistance……...358
iii. Case Study Approach and Going 'Forward and Beyond'……...……361

APPENDICES:
Appendix 1. Mutobo and TIG Questionnaire……..363
Appendix 2. Question Schedule for Butare— Student Participants of *Ingando*……..365

BIBLIOGRAPHY……..366

LIST OF IMAGES

Image 1. Villagisation in Rwanda….....350

Image 2. *Ingando* Graduation Ceremony….....350

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. Location of *Ingando* Camps Visited During Fieldwork……..…….……..xiii

Map 2. A Sketch of the Nkumba *ingando* camp…….……xiii

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AERG	*Association d'Etudiants Rescapés du Génocide* /Genocide Survivors Student Association
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
CNDP	*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* /National Congress for the Defense of the People
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DFID	Department For International Development (UK)
EAC	East African Community
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ES	Executive Secretary
FAR	*Forces Armées Rwandaises* /The Armed Forces of Rwanda
FARG	*Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide* /Victims of Genocide Fund
FDLR	*Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* /Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
GNU	Government of National Unity
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDP	Integrated Development Program
IO	International Organization
IRDP	Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
KIST	Kigali Institute of Science and Technology
LDF	Local Defense Forces
LDGL	*Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs* / Great Lakes Region Human Rights League
MDR	*Mouvement Démocratique Républicain* /Democratic Republican Movement
MIGEPROF	Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MINICOM	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MTN	Mobile Telephone Networks
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NUR	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
NRM	National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
NTK	New Times Kigali (daily newspaper)
PARMEHUTU	*Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu* /Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement
PL	*Parti Libéral*/Liberal Party
PRI	Prison Reform International
PSD	*Parti Social Démocrate* /Social Democratic Party
RANU	Rwandese Alliance for National Unity

RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RwF	Rwandan Franc
SCUR	Student Clubs for Unity and Reconciliation
TIG	*Travaux d'Intérêts Généraux*/Community Service
ULK	*Université Libre de Kigali*/Kigali Independent University
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
US DOS	United States Department of State
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

GLOSSARY

Abakangurambaga – 'those who wake up the masses'/local 'promoters'
Abaturage – population
Abunzi – informal dispute settlement system at village level
Agasozi Ndatwa – examplary hills
Akarere (pl. Uturere) – district
Amacakubiri – divisionism
Amajyambere – development
Gacaca – 'popular'/community courts (justice 'on the grass')
Icyunamo – mourning period
Imihigo – annual 'performance' contracts
Ingando – camps or retreats for selected populations
Ingengabitekerezo ya Jenoside – genocide ideology
Intara (pl. Intara) **–** province
Interahamwe – 'those who work/attack together' (name of genocide militias)
Intwari – heroes
Inyangamugayo – gacaca judges
Itorero – 'advanced' ingando
Kubohoza – coercion to join a political party
Njyanama – sector assembly of all adults
Ubudehe – 'mutual assistance' program at cell level
Ubumwe – unity
Ubunyarwanda – Rwandanicity
Ubusabane – a community 'get-together' festival
Umudugudu (pl. Imidugudu) – village (referring both to an administrative level and to planned villages constructed after the genocide)
Umuganda – community works (one Saturday each month)
Umurenge (pl. Imirenge) **–** sector
Umuryango – family
Umusanzu – contribution
Umuyobozi – an official/head of
Umuzungu (pl. Abazungu) – white person
Ubwiyunge – reconciliation

MAP 1. Location of *Ingando* Camps Visited During Fieldwork



Map 2. A Sketch of the Nkumba *ingando* camp



SECTION I. **INTRODUCTION**

CHAPTER 1. **Situating the Research Topic**

Importance of the Study

Rwanda is a unique case study in community reconstitution. The 1994 genocide claimed up to a million[1] lives, produced millions of refugees and spawned a continental war, touching every life inside the country and beyond. It has been a tragedy of mass proportions not only in terms of victims but also perpetrators— it was literally 'massively' carried out, often by 'intimate enemies' (Theidon 2006) – people from the vicinity or even neighbours. The result is a society where the dividing lines run through every community.

The resulting divides are themselves complex. Far from the simplistic yet popular accounts of a bi-polar society of Hutus and Tutsis struggling to be reconciled, the society represents a complicated web of tensions between survivors, *genocidaires* and moderate Hutu,[2] between those who suffered, those who saved, those who killed or simply stood by and that 'segment of the population that blurs the [victim-perpetrator] dichotomy, inhabiting Levi's grey zone of half-tints and moral complexities' (Levi 1995, in Theidon 2006:436). Further to this, close to 40 percent of the present population hails from various countries in the diaspora and tensions exist among Tutsi returnee groups (the 'Uganda boys,' the *Dubais* from DRC, returnees from Tanzania, Burundi and beyond) as well as between returnees and those who stayed behind (the *Sopecya*).

[1] The exact number of victims is not known. Estimates by NGOs, researchers and the government span from 500,000 to a million victims.

Into this context comes a government dominated by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in which Tutsi returnees from Uganda are overrepresented (Ansoms 2009,[3] Reyntjens 2004 and 2006, Zorbas 2004, Prunier 2009) and which dominates a 'strong' state; a minority government that is nonetheless set to deliver 'unity'—'Rwandan officials are prompt to point out that the aim of the state at this critical juncture is to build a nation' (Lemarchand 2009:65). But in the complex social context delineated above, how do today's Rwandans learn to 'live together again'? Since living 'side by side' is not really a choice but a given[4], what does the state's social engineering project consist of?

The present thesis focuses merely on one aspect of reconciliation—the politicised project of *kubaka ubumwe* or 'unity building.' The process can also be referred to as 'nation-building,' which itself falls under the overarching concept of government-led 'identity (re)engineering.' The study approaches unity-building as an unknown object and tries to learn about all of its aspects— the conceptualizations of unity and division, their dissemination, and their enaction through 'unity and reconciliation' activities. Reconciliation is envisioned as a multidimensional project (Oomen 2006) composed of justice or retribution, restitution (whether reconstitutive, rehabilitative or symbolic), truth-telling, commemoration and other memory-related performances, as well as identity

[2] Many of them showed 'proactive resistance' (Lemarchand 2009).
[3] For quantification of this claim see Ansoms 2009:294 (numbers gathered over years by Marysse and Reyntjens).
[4] There has been no 'breakaway statehood' and no signs of 'de-facto ethnic separation' such as in post-war Bosnia. The different groups in Rwanda do live intermingled on the hills.

politics. [5] The study, however, does not delve into questions of reconciliation as forgiving, justice, or restitution (though it may indirectly reflect on these). Instead, it focuses squarely on identity politics and, more specifically, on 'promotion of national unity' (Oomen 2006:12).

Research Questions

Fieldwork tends to modify researchers' treatment of a topic: Learning shapes what one wants to know. Some key themes only assume salience or full relevance on the ground. I went to Rwanda set to study the 'depth' of de-ethnicisation (the attempt of the government to erase divisions and install a common identity) and *ingando* camps as a government tool of unity-building. After some months in the field, two themes came out repeatedly from my field notes, which in the end 're-centred' my thesis.

First, there was the 'gap'— systematic discrepancies between official accounts (e.g. of 'unity and reconciliation' activities) and what was actually witnessed. Within the short span of weeks, another theme/social dynamic emerged— the 'presence' of the state in people's lives and the insertion of power and control through local activities. It became clear that the policy of de-ethnicisation and *ingando* or other activities of unity and reconciliation cannot be understood outside of the broader political dynamics, and that these activities have to be seen as yet another encounter with the state and government at the local level.

5 Oomen (2004:12) classifies transitional justice as subsuming the following (at times definitionally overlapping) components: retributive, restorative, distributive justice, promotion of national unity, and truth-telling.

As a result of my fieldwork, I reformulated and broadened my interest. Beyond simply focusing on 'official versus counter-narratives' or 'claimed versus actual effects in unity-building and reconciliation,' I found it meaningful to go deeper and ask questions about power and the state. '*How is power organized and legitimized in post-genocide Rwanda, and how does this affect how 'unity' and 'reconciliation' are construed and pursued?*' The word 'unity' has ambiguous meaning on its own. As Wittgenstein (that 'patron saint of the ethnographic study of meaning') suggests, 'meaning of a sign (word, picture, and sound) is best determined through its use' (Kubik, in Schatz 2009:36). Only then the sign assumes its distinct shape and 'taste.' In Rwanda, *ubumwe* is not an obscure word but an intensely-deployed term (along with its opposite— division). Its meaning arises in a highly politicised, tense environment of a post-genocide society.[6] With view of this, I posed the following questions: '*How does politics inscribe itself into the very conceptualization of 'unity' (in the official discourse) and in what ways does it determine the nature (not only possible outcomes) of activities called 'unity and reconciliation'? How, to what extent, and to what ends does the government appropriate the wider discourse of 'unity and reconciliation' and the activities organized in its name?*

Besides studying the way power works at the macro level, I wanted to see how it functions at the micro-level as well: *How do the political dynamics determine what can be achieved through purportedly 'local,' 'traditional' and 'grassroots' activities? What*

[6] With its strong and distinctive connotations, *ubumwe* is very reminiscent of the Slovak word '*jednota*' (unity), which to this day carries a distinctive tang of pompous collectivist ideals, disciplined bodies (*spartakiáda* –mass physical exercises and competitions; organized marches such as on May 1st), the elated propaganda of the communist regime.

does participation in these activities mean in the context of a 'strong state' equipped with an intricate system of surveillance and a tight management of voice and silence?

Literature: Key Ideas, Gaps and Contributions

Besides the literature on politics (power, governmentality, resistance); nationalism; and peace, reconciliation and transitional justice, I found myself in dialogue with the (rather scarce) literature on anthropology of the state. In fact, I found myself in a new area of what could be called political 'ethnography of unity-building' as an ongoing dynamic and a contested process in a divided, post-genocide society. Importantly, this is an inter-disciplinary undertaking. The topic requires the simultaneous employment of methods, concepts and literatures from political science, anthropology, sociology and history.

i. A Politography of Unity

This is not a dissertation 'about Rwanda' and yet it is. It is about how a state is trying to create a 'Rwanda,' about the imagined nation and how this is produced from a centre and applied at margins. It is about a project of 'rooting' identity in a place that is in flux and whose difference is multiplying. In a sense, this is an in-depth study of an idea – unity. Rather than observing carefully a given community, I trace and observe actors who nurture an idea, what this idea means to them, how they transmit it to others in disparate corners of the country in disparate social situations, how the idea transforms into action, and how people in disparate corners understand it.

I follow the likes of Crewe and Harrison (1998) or Nordstrom (1997) whose ethnographies were 'grounded in a topic and a process rather than a place' (Nordstrom 1997:10). Nordstrom produced an 'ethnography of a warzone' (1997) while Crewe and Harrison carried out an 'ethnography of aid' as in '[a study of] patterned social relations within a conceptually-bound group of people' (1998:6). The aim is to capture the uncertain process of flux rather than an unfolding of calendrical events and 'customs' of 'a people.'

As a result, the focus of the present thesis does not lie on certainties (e.g. norms) and taken for granted unities (e.g. 'The Nuer' or 'The Yanomami'). Such analysis has been increasingly contested. As an example, Evans Pritchard's (1940) celebrated study of the Nuer of southern Sudan, a classic of anthropology, has been recently challenged by Hutchinson (1996:21) who argued it produces 'the illusion that Nuer culture and social life are somehow above history and beyond change.' Rather than focusing on 'unity, equilibrium and order' and 'things shared,' Hutchinson's *Nuer Dilemmas* (1996) analyses 'confusion and conflict among the Nuer' and the 'conflicts of interest, perspective and power' among various sub-groups, thus 'call[ing] into question the very idea of 'the Nuer' (ibid:28-29). Hutchinson shows how money/commodification of values, war and the state fundamentally *transformed* Nuer communities.

Just as the Nuer of Southern Sudan, Rwandan societies have undergone profound change[7] and this includes changes in 'Rwanda' as a unit(y). In-depth research focusing specifically on contestation and transformation has been carried out by Catherine and

David Newbury, Jan Vansina and Johan Pottier, among others. In *Cohesion of Oppression*, Newbury (1988) destabilizes the concept of a unified and ever-present Rwandan nation through her detailed historical assessment of the periphery of the Rwandan state—the region of *Kinyaga*— and how this area was incorporated into and transformed by the centralizing and expansionist state ruled by the Nyiginya monarchy. As Newbury shows, not even on a small territory such as that of Rwanda is nation something that is 'ever there' but rather an unstable and evolving political project linked to the (sometimes militant) state. Newbury (2001) and Pottier (2002) also destabilise the idea of a simple unity by detailing the fluctuations in the Rwandan territory, continually expanded by forced incorporations of Hutu kingdoms and chieftancies to the Nyiginya state, at times with the help of colonial powers (Pottier 2002:15).

This is not to say that the (often coercive) dynamism of nation-building is new— the nation-state after all presents one of the contemporary 'universalisms,' one of the most successful exports of an idea and a political project. Nonetheless, studies such as those highlighted above do serve to show that no nation, however small, is a 'natural' object and that 'nation-building' everywhere (and especially so in a divided society) is a dynamic and contested process. Hence rather than 'a people,' the thesis takes 'labour in production of a people' as its topic. By looking at the social processes and agents involved in a particular attempt at identity production, it approaches 'a people,' 'unity' and 'reconciliation' as an enterprise.[8]

[7] I.e. mass out-migrations, colonial encounter, capitalism, genocide, mass returns.

Since the notion of 'unity' and the process of 'unity-building' are political, this is a 'politography' of sorts (political ethnography without the 'ethno-' prefix). As a political project, unity-building faces the fundamental tension between i) its stress on things shared, its urge to foment a degree of homogeneity; and ii) the difference, disruption, reconstitution and movement on the ground. This tension between homogeneity and divergence might be starker than elsewhere due to the upheavals Rwanda went through but in its essence it is a tension everywhere. 'Homogenisation' is a key project of the 'high-modernist state' (Scott 1998) that seeks to nationalize itself and strengthen governmentality through other types of social engineering. Homogeneity and 'regimentation' increase legibility of social landscape; in fact, they make 'society' as the field of the state's intervention *possible* (see 'Discovery of Society' in Scott 1998:90). Ultimately, they lead to increased surveillability and control. Based on the above, it is clear that state-building and unity-building are not easily separable. The relation between the *kubaka ubumwe* process and the high-modernist[9] and developmental[10] Rwandan state will be explored throughout the thesis.

Since the state is a key asset to the government in the execution of the *ubumwe* project, and is so at a very local and tangible level, this is also a contribution to the anthropology of the state, which is a recent topic and one largely under-explored. *The Anthropology of the State* (Sharma and Gupta 2006), one of the few existing edited volumes, is

[8] This means that it treats the claim to 'unity of culture' as itself contestable and political (e.g. 'we all speak *Kinyarwanda*, we are one').
[9] Scott (1998:88) defines this state-led process as 'a sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition.'
[10] Developmentalism can be characterized as the 'establishment of political control over society and economics, the obliteration of distinction between state and society, and the conception of state power as something to be mobilized at will for the purpose of changing social relations' (Muller 2008:112).

fundamentally an assemblage of theoretical and applied pieces, few of which directly speak to the theme of 'encounters with the state.' Nonetheless, the volume does add the much-needed perspective of states as 'cultural artefacts' (2006:5) and an institution 'substantiate[d] in people's lives in the sphere of everyday practices' (ibid:11). Day-to-day stateness is after all what *makes politics feasible*:

> At one level, [state] proceduralism is so thoroughly commonplace and ordinary to be [considered] uninteresting. […]At another level, it is these putatively technical and unremarkable practices that render tenable the political tasks of state formation, governance and the exercise of power…they provide important clues to understanding the micropolitics of state work, how state authority and government operate in people's daily lives (ibid:11).

Another edited volume on *Anthropology at the Margins of the State* (Das and Poole, Eds, 2004) explores the state in the spaces where control and 'order' are imperfect or end ('territorial or social margins' in places such as Peru, Colombia, Sri Lanka and South Africa). In the present thesis, however, the 'sightings of the state' (manifestations of bureaucracy, police or military; order-making, disciplining and legibility processes) are not thus limited. On my quest to trace 'unity-making,' I observe the presence of the state anywhere I go— on the streets of Kigali, in the permanent structure of the Nyakabanda cell office, or in a transient rural-based activity.

Another way to approach the theme here is through the literature on the anthropology of politics. Importantly, the aim is not to study politicians 'in their natural habitats' or 'face

to face' (Schatz 2009:1). Neither does the task require observing the operation of bureaucracies and special units or organizations 'up close' (for example Asad on SWAT, in Vincent 2002:65) or the way in which militarized sub-cultures develop in certain societies (for example Hutchinson on the Nuer, in Vincent 2002:39). Instead, the goal is to explore power and politics as 'lived' by ordinary people. Encounters with the state can be seen as merely one aspect of this broader field.

In answering the questions of this thesis (e.g. *How do people experience power and the state?'*) anthropological methods are indeed irreplaceable. For one, they are 'uniquely positioned to explore and understand informal dimensions of power (Abeles 2004); hidden faces of power (Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1980); [...] ostensibly inconspicuous resistance to power (Scott 1990); [or] ambiguous effects of [the] power exercise (Wedeen 1999) (Kubik, in Schatz 2009).' Further to this, observation and participation allow for 'reading' of behaviour in its context and can uncover the way power is mapped into spatial arrangements, procedures and protocols. For example, Gluckman's 'Bridge: Analysis of a Social Situation in Zululand' (in Vincent 2002:53) demonstrates how in-depth observation of a particular social situation (even one particular event) can help understand the 'total situation' (i.e. socio-political dynamics at large; Frankenberg, in Vincent 2002:64). Gluckman's meticulous description of the opening of a bridge by the Native Affairs Department in Zululand served as a 'starting point of analysis,' a way to make explicit the structure of social relations— authority, dominance, inclusion and exclusion, structural unity and lines of cleavage.

The study of 'unity-building' inadvertently draws on nationalism literature, but this dissertation wants to distance itself from it. Nationalism literature has been evolving slowly. Until recently, it was exclusively focused on broad processes – the emergence of nation-states (Gellner 1983, Smith 1986), the bases of a nation (Anderson 1983, Smith 1986, Kohn 1944). The result is a lack of monographs exploring nations as culturally inspired imaginings and intentional political projects consisting of a myriad of acts and labourers.

Having said this, there has been a slow move to a more micro approach. As the 'banal nationalism' thesis has shown (Billig 1996), many small day-to-day actions help us continue the practice of 'imagining.' Brubaker also highlighted the need to focus on the day-to-day and the small-scale (Brubaker 1996 and 2004, and Brubaker et al 2006). Kubik (in Schatz 2009:39) even mentions specific examples of 'ethnographies of nation-building' (namely Herzfeld 1997; or Kwon 2006). None of these authors, however, studied a nation *in the making*, which makes Rwanda a unique and fascinating case study. *How do you 'make' a nation after large-scale community-based violence? How does a government put together a project of unity in a divided society and to what effects?* The thesis takes the opportunity to start exploring this complex political project, at once very abstract and very concrete. On the one hand lies the abstraction of unity, a discursive domain responding to complex fields of power that are not readily visible. Contrasting with this is the almost mundane nature of the project itself— there is an actual institution in charge, there are specific individuals in it, and there is the work they do to make this 'happen.'

ii. Politicisation of Reconciliation and Transitional Justice

The present research also highlights the necessity of opening up the rather depoliticised discourse of transitional justice (legalized) and post-conflict reconstruction (ensnared in technical 'dev-speak') to wider social, historical and political forces that fundamentally shape the nature of their subjects of study. Transitional justice entered academic 'fieldhood' only recently (Bell 2009). It was in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe where a very specific query arose: '*How should societies undergoing political transition deal with a past of violence and human rights abuse?*' Besides this specific historical context, transitional justice was narrowly constituted as a legal discipline. The 'legal stronghold' is being only recently 'de-colonized' by permeation of other disciplines, including anthropology and political science (ibid:6).

As the field evolves, it needs to i) continue to expand outside *legal* queries focused on broad state processes and institutions; and ii) continue moving beyond regime/political transitions (e.g. South Africa, post-Soviet Europe, El Salvador), making its considerations and solutions relevant to contexts of *community violence* (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi): How do people (rather than governments) come to terms with the past? What are the relations between society and the state in this process? How do people react to top-down impositions of meanings and activities? How does the political process enter both broad institutions and policies of transitional justice and daily lives?

With regard to the 'localising' of transitional justice, researchers need to critically reflect on the resurgence and rather uncritical acceptance of 'traditionality' in the sphere of reconciliation. Recourse to 'traditional' solutions or 'hybridized' processes (combination of local and Western approaches) became popular in conflict-affected locales such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Uganda as it represented an antidote to the universalisms of development ('cookie-cutter' solutions) and promised to draw on more authentic sources. Rwanda is a perfect example of this phenomenon with tens of 'traditional' unity, reconciliation, justice and development activities springing up over the past ten years. Locally-sourced activities adapted to specific and contemporary needs are certainly what is required. However, as will be shown, in the case of Rwanda 'traditionality' is imposed on communities from above. The very labelling of something as 'traditional' performs (both intentional and unintentional) political work.

Similarly, we also have to reach beyond the 'human rights' format of analysis. Notwithstanding the important academic exceptions (e.g. Reyntjens 2004, Pottier 2002, Prunier 1995), today the human rights report (HRW, AI, US DOS) is the only continuously updated insight into the political in Rwanda. But while human rights reports correctly describe the *symptoms* of a particular political system, the resulting analysis is dispersed (rights to this and rights to that) and non-specific (lacking cultural and *emic* analysis). Disparate critiques are never tied together into a systematic explanatory framework of power and its legitimisation. A law itself is not 'extra-political.' In certain political systems, judiciary and legislature are answering to the executive and 'prosecution' can be used to achieve political goals. Law also does not assume an *a priori*

'positive' presence just by being 'passed.' Laws have to emerge as usable and used norms. Hence the questions must reach beyond structure and dynamics of the legal universe or the listing of human rights 'breaches' and must touch on the reasons why the laws are created and then manipulated (selectively applied, abused, or breached).

At times, human rights writings (e.g. annual US DOS country reports) also employ a strange discursive technique that disfigures their findings. The reports typically start with a category ('rights of expression'), state that the law is there, and proceed to acknowledge that reality does not correspond to law. Not only is this a fundamentally negative portrayal (suggesting something is missing, there is a gap or an insufficient substance), there is also a false presence established at the start (the laws 'are there' as if that is a meaningful presence). To begin with, 'false presence' is politically manipulated in Rwanda. The state and power work on the premise that tokens— formalities and formulations— are substances and they are exploiting this 'parallel occurrence' or 'doubling' (formal discursive roster and actual tangible practice). On the other hand, the negative analysis, which is all too apparent in human rights writing, is in fact a wider problem. Reports but even academic articles often focus on ambiguous and controversial terms such as 'civil society' or macro terms such as 'political system.' By focusing on the 'negative' in the actual (e.g. there is no democratic representation), these analyses fail to look at how and for what purposes the system *actually* operates, what effects it actually produces and how.

If questions of 'unity' and 'reconciliation' are often depoliticised, how do we *re-politicise* them? There are multiple ways in which one can 'politicise' a phenomenon, and as already insinuated, we can look both at the macro and micro level. In the broadest sense, politicisation refers to 'making the underlying political forces visible.' Their invisibility has itself political implications. Discursive exclusion of topics such as nationalism, unity-building and justice out of this sphere i) makes these arenas more open to manipulation (without repercussion); and ii) pushes these processes out of the 'contestation sphere' – that space where people can legitimately challenge, criticize, and rework a process or an institution.

Which political forces and effects should we look for? At the broadest level, the governing elites, through the use of the state, can appropriate reconciliation processes to other ends. Work by Alexander, McGregor and Ranger on Zimbabwe (*Violence and Memory,* 2000) as well as work by Bozzoli on South Africa, Longman and Rutagengwa on Rwanda, and again Alexander and McGregor on Zimbabwe (compiled in a 2006 edited volume by Bay and Donham) show this specifically with regard to memory. They demonstrate how 'the state through its organs, or through the ruling party, [is] intent on shaping memory to its own vision and interests [producing] political constructions that were not only inaccurate but alienating to the people whose history they were meant to represent. A close look at these cases suggests that the provision of an accurate historical account is at best secondary to the transformative goals of the politics of state' (Bay and Donham, 2006:13).

Within the context of post-genocide Rwanda, examples of work on appropriations of memory and crafting of useful histories include Pottier (2002), Lemarchand (2009) and Hintjens (2009). While these pieces focus primarily on the rewriting of history and the 'new narrative closure' in general (i.e. who narrates and what is/isn't narrated), the present thesis tries to delve beyond these well-researched topics and explore in detail, and based on the multiple activities on the ground, both how the *whole* unity and reconciliation process is explicitly politicised and to what ends it is used by the Rwandan government.

The notion of 'appropriation' has to be used carefully though— not all effects that result from so called 'unity and reconciliation' activities and that might be incongruous with their official identity are the result of 'planned' manipulation by government *cum* state machinery. As Ferguson (1994) has shown in his anthropology of development and state in Lesotho, 'outcomes of planned social interventions can end up coming together into powerful constellations of control that were never intended and in some cases never even recognized, but are all the more effective for being 'subjectless'' (1994:19). Talking of the development projects' tendency to 'fail' and yet to have concrete political effects, Ferguson claims that rather than being 'side effects' of an 'unsuccessful attempt,' these outcomes are perhaps what these projects are 'chiefly about' and need to be studied because they are instrumental in 'expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power while simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticising effect' (ibid:21).

With regard to Lesotho, four concrete political 'instrument-effects'[11] emerged— three related to 'assertions' of the state and one to the 'breaking of resistance.' First, the Tsaba Tseka development project's 'resources and structures were turned to the purpose of…gain[ing] political control over opposition strongholds' (1994:253). In addition, 'a much more direct political policing function was being exercised by other sections of the district administration that the project has helped to establish.' Third, the project also 'facilitated direct military control' (ibid). Lastly, there was the 'conceptual or ideological effect of depoliticising both poverty and the state' (ibid:256). The present thesis does not *a priori* postulate but nonetheless finds and explores such political instrument-effects with regards to Rwanda's unity and reconciliation process. Is it possible that a process generally perceived as 'well-meaning' can produce 'etatisation,' strengthening of control and surveillance, even disempowerment? This complex question will be explored throughout the thesis.

At a more micro level, the very notion of political power needs to be addressed. In Rwanda, power does not only encompass the sovereign decision to kill or spare or the classical biopower notions of 'fostering life.' Rwanda grapples with other fundamental notions of 'survival' of the social body – with 'make live' (*hobera ubuzima*— bless/embrace life), make live 'here' (i.e. forced repatriations) and make live with others (i.e. coexist). From the three Rwandan verbs related to existence— *kuba* ('to be,' referring to the issue of personal existence and identity), *kubaho* ('to be here,' referring to earth, this place, referring to the problem of survival) and *kubana* ('to be with each other,' referring to the problem of coexistence) (Sebasoni 2007:169)— it is the latter—

[11] Foucault's concept (1979) referring to effects that are at the same time instruments of power.

the problematique of coexistence— that is emphasized most by the state. However, *kubana* is not the end-all of government. The *most* important focus is the 'fashioning of life' – or 'make live a certain way,' a way that is both amenable to power and conforming to the ideas of the ideal subject (both individual and collective) capable of delivering itself from the liminal and unfinished space of 'developing.'

The study of power and the state in Rwanda requires an explanatory approach that is not limited to the boundedness of the nation-state (i.e. explaining what happens in Rwanda by what happens in the official territory of the Rwandan state). Such an approach would overlook the transnational determinants of seemingly 'national' realities. Our analysis needs to work through 'connections' – 'economic nodes,'[12] family 'routes,'[13] 'insecurity fields,'[14] core-periphery relations,[15] and imagined rather than just factual 'spheres of legitimacy.'[16] This type of 'connection tracking,' which invariably takes us beyond the territory of the Rwandan state, caters better to how political power works in the region. After all, a lot of what explains RPF's coming to power and its staying there has its locus outside. The physical lines of power lead backwards through the border of Katuma to Kampala and Uganda's NRM (the sponsor of their 1990 invasion) and they lead forwards through the Ruhengeri-Gisenyi-Goma road (the last bit was being upgraded when I was there) to Congo's Kivu regions— Rwanda's hinterland and unwilling resource bank, the

[12] For example, Goma and Gisenyi form a cross-border economic enclave depending on Kigali for survival; see Games 2009 or Herbst 2009.
[13] Many still have family members or cow herds abroad; others spend time living between countries.
[14] For example, being tracked down by Rwandan agents in Uganda (either political persecution or 'tracking down' *genocidaires*, with the latter being misused for the former).
[15] Exploitation of the Kivu regions paying the development of Kigali. Kivu regions are a hinterland to Kigali not Kinshasa.
[16] Referring to the irredentist rhetoric in Rwanda today.

site of Rwanda's continued security-based interventions. Further afield yet sit the well-meaning foreign taxpayers generously feeding the government's coffers.

Besides incorporating a 'transnational' dimension, we need a 'post-liminal' one too. It is necessary to reach beyond Malkki (1995) and the national imaginings produced within liminal spaces of the nation-state system (i.e. exile). Rwanda is an interesting sequel to Malkki, the perfect example of a 'post-return society' where the liminal and marginal has in fact captured the centre and reproduced the most powerful socio-political ontology of the present day. The 'rooting' of peoples (Malkki 1992) in a country that is exemplary at being in flux is done through a distinctly *returnee* nationalist imagination.

All in all, the thesis hopes to offer a fresh look at Rwandan politics by looking at it from a different angle. First, it offers an integrative analysis of power and its apparatus. Academic disciplines tend to artificially fracture the social field, with the result that one merely glimpses the wider structural factors that shape it in fundamental ways. Power moulds not only 'law' or 'unity and reconciliation,' it tries to fundamentally mould life, even if perhaps at the end it has only one definitive power— to disrupt it. Second, more emphasis needs to lie on dynamics as opposed to description. Rather than proclaiming Rwanda as a 'dictatorship' or 'ethnocracy,' counting how many Hutu and Tutsi are in power, the thesis sets out to unravel (at least partially) *the dynamics* that explain the *production* of exclusion. The goal is then to move beyond the study of official discourses and their effects and towards the study of why these discourses and these languages even exist. Processes and dynamics of power do not only structure the world physically

(materializing in construction and destruction, production and spending) but also structure exchange and access, structure exclusion and inclusion, presence and absence (all that which is not to be born(e) in the first place). They also structure unity and difference and their representation 'for ultimately the key to controlling a phenomenon or event is defining it' (Nordstrom 1997:116).

iii. Rwanda and African Studies: A Strong State in the Midst of the 'State Weakness Paradigm'

In terms of African studies more specifically, by exploring a case of a 'dense' and 'overbearing' state, quite in opposition to the dominant paradigm of 'weakness' (e.g. Menkhaus 2010, Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2010, Sogge 2009), the thesis hopes to add to the literature on state and stateness in Africa. 'Strong' states might be a minority in Africa but they are not non-existent.[17] The present thesis approaches state 'hardness' (Forrest 1988) from the viewpoint of i) 'political penetration of society' and ii) 'the extraction of resources' from it (i.e. taxing; ibid: 423). The thesis does *not* consider two additional dimensions included by Forrest—'ideological legitimation' and 'structural autonomy.' States can be 'present' and extractive even if the elites that direct them are not legitimate or remain 'embedded in society' ('neopatrimonial,' or depending on 'personalized rule;' see e.g. Chabal and Daloz 1999).

Within Rwanda studies, the thesis hopes to add to the rather narrow post-genocide political literature. Whereas the topic of genocide continues to attract book-length

[17] The best contemporary African parallel is Eritrea, a state considered 'one of the strongest on the African continent' (Muller 2008:122).

analysis (i.e. Melvern 2004, Straus 2006, Fujii 2009), the post-genocide era is analyzed mainly in NGO or IO reports, occasional academic articles (Reyntjens 2004 and 2006, Hintjens 2008, Ansoms 2009, Ingelaere 2010 and 2009) and only very few full-length manuscripts (e.g. Pottier 2002). An overwhelming focus tends to lie on the DRC refugee crisis, the broader effects of genocide on conflict dynamics in the Great Lakes Region and the Rwandan involvement therein (Prunier 2009, Reyntjens 2009). Discussion of post-genocide Rwanda is also thoroughly suffused by varied analyses of gacaca and the ICTR (Clarc 2010, Ingelaere 2009, Rettig 2008, Oomen 2006, among many others). Overall, the pronouncement Peter Uvin made almost a decade ago still holds true: 'With the exception of legal scholars […] the scholarly world appears to be interested in Rwanda only as a case study of genocide but not as a place whose ongoing political, social, and economic dynamics merit in-depth research' (2001:99).

Not only is the post-genocide era overlooked, there is also an excessive focus on the macro dimension of politics. There is a strong tendency in the literature on the region to focus on policy, key events, decisions, and institutions, i.e. on the dominant narratives. There is no discussion of the 'daily politics' of a Kigali street. This thesis hopes to fill this gap at least partially, by offering an in-depth commentary on the micro-workings and micro-effects of power as reflected through one applied state activity— that of unity-building.

Within the context of Rwanda, the dissertation will also shed light on little-studied activities such as *ingando* and *itorero* that are nonetheless key *vis-à-vis* the social

transformation that the state ultimately attempts. As regards *ingando*, there is simply no scholarly analysis at all. Only Mgbako (2005) has produced what can be considered a short academic appraisal. When *ingando* features in written material, it is usually in NGO reports and newspaper articles, where it is described but rarely analyzed. These descriptions are more often than not uncritical snippets of the official discourse (Purdekova 2008). Besides *ingando* and *itorero*, there is a profusion of other recently instituted and purportedly 'local' and 'traditional' 'unity and reconciliation' activities such as *ubudehe, ubusabane* or *abunzi* and the thesis will dedicate a chapter to their overview and critical analysis.

Section and Chapter Overview

The introductory section closes with Chapter 2 on methodology and ethics. Following this, Section II offers an in-depth analysis of political dynamics. Chapter Three focuses on legitimisations of political power, scrutinising the nature and impacts of three different legitimisation narratives. Chapter Four, in turn, explores the notion of Rwanda as a strong state and studies the extent to which the state is present in people's lives. The chapter explores the intricate administrative and information apparatus, the spectrum of state-led activities, as well as the effects that such structure produces in terms of surveillance and indirect control. Chapter Five considers the micro-dimensions of power in contemporary Rwanda, more specifically the individual and societal 'embodiments' of power and resistances. Finally, the section closes by exploring the implications for the unity-building process.

Section III focuses on the performances of *ubumwe*— on the 'making' of unity through 'unity and reconciliation' activities, specifically (but not exclusively) *ingando*— and how political dynamics fundamentally mould the very constitution as well as effects of these activities. Chapter Six explores the 'multiplicities of unity,' contrasting government's 'nationalist view' with alternative conceptions, and details the various government-employed 'strategies' of unity. Chapter Seven looks at activities themselves, analyzing (among other things) the purpose and accurateness of the characterization of activities as 'grassroots,' 'participatory' and 'traditional.' The chapter also studies the contents of selected activities and shows the different manners in which these are politicised. Chapters Eight and Nine focus specifically on *ingando* camps. More than any other activity, *ingando*'s spatial, symbolic and performative nature, in addition to particular texts being disseminated, make it a key example of the intended social transformation attempted by the government. It is a space where the dynamics of this wider project can best be glanced.

Finally, Section IV focuses on what the performances and broader discourses of unity tell us about the way the Rwandan government conceptualizes and approaches 'social transformation' and delineates the broader goals to which the process of *kubaka ubumwe* is subsumed. Chapter Ten tries to understand the 'new Rwandan' that is to be reconstructed in the liminality of *ingando* or *itorero*. The chapter focuses on government's overall social transformation objectives— the creation of 'perfect development subjects' – and how this overall objective translates into the conceptualization and practices of unity and reconciliation. Chapter Eleven offers final

reflections on the unity-building process and highlights avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2. **Methodology and Ethics**

Besides being a 'means to findings,' methodology is an integral part of the present thesis that cannot be easily separated out— many of my findings reflect back on method itself. In what follows, I first briefly describe the historical, social and political contexts of my fieldwork research. Subsequently, I turn to the issues of method, sources, data and, finally, ethics.

'Emplacing' the Researcher: The Post-Genocide Present

All research is fundamentally addressing a place and time we have witnessed. In my case, the Rwanda I entered could be meaningfully characterized (and not only in chronological sense) as 'post-genocide.' The current generations still 'remember and see.'[18] Besides the ubiquitousness of official memorials (*inzibutso*) ('there are as many of those here as there are MTN shops'[19]) and the memories and stories evoked by most places, there are also scars, disfigurements and screams that serve as reminders. Pink and orange prison uniforms of genocide detainees and dark fuchsia overalls of TIGists (those serving alternative punishments) appear everywhere. Genocide also exerts immense gravity on life narratives, dividing time into its 'befores' and its 'afters.'

The broad political dynamics also still draw on genocide for their force, legitimisation and/or meaning. In late 2008, when my fieldwork began, parliamentary elections had just

[18] Informal discussion with an administrative officer at KIST, March 9, 2009.
[19] Informal discussion with a journalist on the way to Muhanga University, Gitarama, November 21, 2008.

concluded (September 2008) producing a staggering turnout of 98% and a 78.7% victory for the RPF alliance.[20] The victors of the 1990-1994 war thus reaffirmed their unbroken hold on power. Despite this, 'battles' – both physical and ideological – continued. 'Genocide ideology' was presented as a resurgent threat ('genocide ideology is slowly creeping back into society'[21]) and became a prominent item on the government's agenda. Additionally, Rwanda renewed its involvement in the DRC via the proxy of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and its leader, Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi with 'a long track record as Kigali's man' (Prunier 2009:297). In late October 2008, Nkunda initiated an offensive in North Kivu allegedly to protect the Tutsi minority from continued FDLR[22] threat— an entry legitimisation for Rwanda used repeatedly over the past fifteen years. The RPA used proxies to operate in the DRC on at least two other occasions, working through and alongside AFDL in the 'First Congo War' and RCD (later RCD-Goma) in the 'Second Congo War' (Prunier 2009).

The repeated Rwandan presence in the Congo toughened the stance of the international community (Prunier 2009:324). In 2008, despite Kigali's assurances of non-involvement, diplomatic convoys flew both to DRC and Kigali for pressure talks. Increasingly critical reports on the human rights situation led to suspension of aid by Netherlands and Sweden. This further hastened the transformation of Rwanda-donor relations: Immediately after the genocide, the international community was overwrought with guilt for not intervening, which translated into financial generosity and a leniency in judgment

[20] RPF runs as an alliance of six parties, including the Christian Democratic Party, the Islamic Democratic Party, Rwandese Socialist Party, Prosperity and Solidarity Party, Party for Progress and Concord and the Democratic Union of the Rwandese People.
[21] NTK January 17, 2008.

('the genocide credit;' Reyntjens 2004). But a decade later, the world was struggling with the RPF legacy. The 2006 'Brugière Report' (still reverberating in Rwanda) calling for the indictment of top RPF officials accused of shooting down the Habyarimana plane was a 'culmination' of sorts. The report effectively proclaimed the President and other top government officials to be criminals and called for issuing of arrest warrants against them. Finally, in November 2008, the Head of Rwandan Protocol –Rose Kabuye— was arrested in Germany, which triggered large state-organized protests around the country and an outpouring of anger against Germany, France and Europe in general.

Additionally, the geopolitical shift commenced after the genocide –'the policy to exit the 'Francophony' and to enter the 'Anglophony'' (Ansoms 2009:295) continued. Rwanda entered the EAC (East African Community), made an application to enter the Commonwealth and made an abrupt transition by introducing English as an official language of instruction since January 2009. Though the constitution asserted there are three official languages in Rwanda, it increasingly seemed there were only two. The name of a *salon de coiffure* (hair salon) in Nyamirambo perfectly showed the state of linguistic transition—the name on the painted sign said 'Familly'—not the French *famille* anymore and not the English *family* yet.

But there is more to the 'post-genocide' present and this reaches beyond specific political dynamics. Besides being a witness generation still heavied by memory, this is fundamentally a generation of both disruption and reconstitution where people are 're-creating worlds' rather than just 'fine-tuning' them (Nordstrom 1997:13). The genocide

[22] Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (ex-*interahamwe*).

has redrawn multiple maps— of settlement, land, relations. There is the continued impact of death and brutality on feelings (the 'living dead,' the continually resurgent traumatic memory), attitudes ('trust has been driven out of Rwanda, it will wait behind many generations,' Hatzfeld 2007:204) and behaviour (e.g. survivors trying not to cross paths with a perpetrator).

Family or familiar setting has been broken for many and it has been reconstituted in alternative ways. There are children-headed households and *mayibobo* (street children) groups joined by ties of affection. The number of street children has itself been much reduced by their forced incorporation into the institutions of the state (the 'family' of rules and roles). There are 'artificial' families (Sezibera 2009) created by orphaned students grouped under umbrella student survivor associations AERG and FARG.[23] Post-genocide returnees also re-establish familial ties by replanting refugee camp networks in the *imidugudu* (planned villages).[24]

Mass movements of people contributed to disruption. Although forced mass migration has been part of life since time 'memorial' (Vansina 2004; Pottier 2002), the post-genocide in- and out-migrations stand out due to their sheer diversity and scope. The RPF inherited not only a devastated but literally a 'displaced' country, part of which it itself helped to dislocate.[25] Precise figures do not exist, but approximate counts remain

[23] The family members assign the roles of 'mother,' 'father,' 'uncles,' etc to each other. They adopt names such as 'Abavanduzi,' 'Cyuse' or 'Uruyange.' They meet once a month to organize communal events and go to marriages, sign their reports, go to meetings of parents in schools (Sezibera 2009) presentation at the International Symposium On Genocide, Kigali, April 4, 2009.
[24] Jackson, S. (not dated), p.10 [accessed February 2009].
[25] Most IDPs were people fleeing from the advancing RPF (Stockton 1994; Reed 1996).

instructive: Up to 1.5 million Hutu internally displaced[26]; up to 3 million mostly Hutu refugees abroad in Congo and Burundi, fleeing from fear of revenge (so called 'new caseload' refugees; Reyntjens 2004:15), two million of whom returned in 1996/97 (HPG 2007:1); and 0.7 million Tutsi returning immediately after the RPF take-over in 1994-95 (so called 'old caseload;' HPG 2007:1). Since 1994, about 2.1-3.4 million refugees[27] have been repatriated and resettled, a 'record in world history' (Kaiza 2003). The result is that 25-40% of the population[28] is constituted by post-genocide returnees. In some areas, a third of the population is new and in two prefectures half of the inhabitants arrived recently (De Lame 2004:4).

In a certain sense, there is a transition from life in exile, on the move, in camps, to a more settled, constant and controlled 'dwelling.' But the notion of overall 'settling down' should not conjure up 'return' to pre-genocide settlement patterns. Really 'another war'[29] unrolled as Tutsi returnees took over abandoned houses— of those dead or those across in the Congo—some of which they claimed belonged to their families in the first place, before they were pushed to exile (HPG 2007). After Hutu returned *en masse*, 'land sharing' agreements had to be struck in many localities (ibid). Parts of the Akagera Park have been degazetted to accommodate Tutsi old-caseload returnees.[30] In search of security, many survivors and Tutsi returnees have moved to planned *imidugudu* villages.

[26] Some estimates as low as 0.5 million have been proposed. It is possible that some IDPs have been double-counted as refugees.
[27] 0.5-1.5 million IDPs in addition to 1.1 million 'new caseload' Hutu, and 0.5-0.8 'old caseload' Tutsi.
[28] The article refers to a 2006 population figure of 8.7 million.
[29] Interview with a university student, returnee from Uganda, February 2, 2009.
[30] 'To the north of Akagera are the Ugandan returnees, in Kibungo in the south are the Tanzanian and Burundi returnees.' Informal discussion with a Ugandan returnee, October 31, 2008.

Finally, the government commenced large-scale expropriations, mostly of poor neighbourhoods in Kigali (e.g. lower Kyovu Hill, Kimicyanga).

Thousands of detainees (*abafungwa*) lived across Rwandan prisons until 2003 when their own 'return' commenced— when the government initiated *gacaca* and started provisionally releasing detainees charged with lesser crimes. To my questions about life after the 'alternative' punishment of TIG (lit. 'public interest works'), many of my respondents said they will finally go back to 'normal life' (*buzima busanzwe*). This 'return' to 'normalcy,' not unexpectedly, profoundly shook the survivors' hard-won semblance of calm (in their own words, this happened just as 'we were rejoining life…household chores were sweeping bad thoughts into the hole of forgetfulness;' Hatzfeld 2007). Disruption returned ('it was 1994 all over again') and survivors fell into a state of shock (see Hatzfeld 2007).

Besides 'disruption,' the generation is characterized by multiplicities originating from dispersion (living in multiple exiles), violence and varied responses to both. 'Coming together' in post-genocide Rwanda is a concrete process of interchanges, meetings, minglings and clashes of difference or perceived difference. Identities in Rwanda have always been more complex than the Hutu-Tutsi binary suggests,[31] but they are even more so post-genocide.

[31] Authors such as Vansina 2004, Newbury 2001 and Pottier 2002, among others, point to important clan, regional and lineage affiliations.

Besides 'Tutsi victims' and 'Hutu perpetrators,' there are people of mixed Hutu-Tutsi descent and/or marriage who have been facing their own complicated predicament of distrust and (at times) double persecution. There are Hutu who saved, who saved for money, and who both saved and killed. There are Tutsi who killed (some were even members of *Interahamwe*) and Hutu that were mistaken for Tutsi and killed. There were extremist Hutu and moderate Hutu, the latter of which were targeted to be killed. There are the unacknowledged Hutu victims of RPF crimes. Though most killings were carried out by men (e.g. Hogg 2010), women killed too (African Rights 1995) and many women were complicit as silent bystanders (Hatzfeld 2005b). Rwandans also distinguish between the 'ordinary people' who carried out violence and intellectuals who were the masterminds (Hogg 2010:76). Intellectuals in general remain the 'fourth ethnie' (Vidal 1991); Tutsi 'intellectuals' are known to have kept apart from Tutsi 'farmers' even during genocide hunts (Hatzfeld 2007:49). Alongside these fine-tuned distinctions, the grand labels of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' still survive and discrimination based on them continues in a reinforced form. Derisive names for Hutu include '*interahamwe*,' '*igipinga*,' '*tingitingi*.' The Twa are still living on the margins of society— physically, politically and economically (e.g. COPORWA 2009).

Post-genocide Rwanda also comprises multiple returnee groups. There are the 'Uganda Boys' or '*abasaja*' or 'those from U-G.' There are the 'The Dubais' or '*abacongo*' from the DRC, the '*abarundi*' from Burundi. Others came from Tanzania and Kenya but also further afield (from other countries of Africa, Europe, North America). Many returnees did not speak Kinyarwanda when they arrived or spoke other languages better. In fact,

'most of us are still learning Kinyarwanda.'[32] As a result of the recent returns, Kigali represents a mix of cosmopolitan histories that speak not only of dispersed pasts but also transnational presents. There are some who think of themselves as 'Ugandan' or 'Congolese' first. *Luganda, Kirundi, Swahili* or *Lingala* can be heard spoken on Kigali streets and many people still compose sentences in two or three languages ('Kinyafranglais').[33] A returnee friend confessed he speaks English at home, Swahili with friends and Kinyarwanda at work. The way one speaks Kinyarwanda also divulges one's returnee 'origin.' Ugandan returnees speak Kinyarwanda differently than do Burundese returnees.[34] Those who dominate Kinyarwanda beheld it with pride. Rwandans who fall short of fluency are corrected and even looked down upon.[35]

Networks based on country of exile survive but their exclusiveness is seen to have somewhat diminished. 'Just after the genocide… every person was tagged [and people did not intermix]— that place was for survivors, that place was for Hutu, that place for the Ugandans…today, there is no place I cannot go.'[36] The Tutsi returnees and those who stayed behind (the '*Sopecya*' or '*abajepe*,' the survivors) struggle with relating to each other. There are also tensions between the various returnee groups, and between the dominant networks of Uganda returnees (perceived to hold both economic and political power) and the rest (Ansoms 2009, Reyntjens 2004, Zorbas 2004). In survivors' eyes, the returnees are 'running the show,' 'they govern the country' (Hatzfeld 2007:90). 'Some

[32] Informal discussion with a NURC employee, November 17, 2008.
[33] I heard this term in discussion between NURC employee and the Mayor of Gakenke; but also in press: e.g. Rwanda Dispatch (Issue 02, 2008).
[34] Informal chat with our house employee, Nyamirambo, October 29, 2008.
[35] 'Sometimes they even laugh at me, I have been here 10 years and still cannot make a speech without mixing in other languages.' Informal chat with a Congolese of Rwandan background, March 11, 2009.
[36] Interview with a research institute employee, Kigali, April 6, 2009.

say this ethnic thing has been replaced by division of returnees. One of the most hated groups are the Ugandans, how do I say… they are in power.'[37]

The divergence is also reflected through the unsettled nature of key narratives— those of 'history,' 'identity,' and 'conflict.' Government highlights the necessity of 'finding a consensus to make a nation' (*ukuri rwacu*, 'our truth') but even members of government do not fully agree on the seemingly compact key narratives of the official discourse. A veteran RPF party member suggested to me that 'Rwandans are divided on everything.'[38] To begin with, a number of researchers have discussed the ban on ethnicity (or expression of any 'divisionist' identity and ideology) and the promotion of *Banyarwanda* identity (the two parts constituting the strategy of 'de-ethnicisation;' see also Purdekova 2008a or Lemarchand 2009). However, this identity discourse is really much more complex, contradictory and unfinished than readily admitted, starting from the verbal acknowledgments that the genocide was a 'genocide against the Tutsi' to the open pronouncements of many people, including officials of the government, that the official accent on non-existence of ethnicity is 'non-sense.'[39]

An important dismantling of the tight prohibition on voicing ethnicity came when the term 'genocide against Tutsi' (*jenoside yakorewe abatutsi*) was introduced in the Constitution as the official term for genocide.[40] The move created confusion and a multiplicity of interpretations. If there is 'genocide against the Tutsi,' there must be

[37] Ibid, January 21, 2009.
[38] Interview with RPF Communications Advisor, RPF Headquarters, March 23, 2009.
[39] Ibid.
[40] This came in response to allegations of double genocide.

'Tutsi.' This in turn brought the following retort: 'There *are* Tutsi and Hutu but we should not make them the core of our loyalty.' NURC's Director of Civic Education confessed that 'Rwandans can distinguish between Tutsi and Hutu, these are ethnic groups, but we should not accentuate that, we should try and foster the feeling of being Rwandan.'[41] This goes against earlier (and still prevalent) pronouncements that 'ethnicity does not exist.'

In terms of the actual 'speech protocol' with regard to ethnicities, again there are inconsistencies—while it is an unspoken norm that Tutsi and Hutu should not be mentioned, Twa can be spoken about. This last group is small, almost negligible and hence does not matter politically, only inasmuch as the civilizing mission to 'integrate' them matters. But even the word 'Tutsi' could often be heard around NURC ('These Europeans, why do they hate the Tutsi so much?'[42]). The word 'Hutu,' on the other hand, is never spoken publicly; it is mentioned and remains meaningful only *privately*. Officially, the word emerges strictly as part of an ideological discourse meant to negate it or belittle it as identity. Use of the term is perceived as politically threatening, possibly pointing to concentrations of power. Outward accentuation of 'Hutu' identity, especially in politics, almost inevitably brings on accusation of 'divisionism.' The overall result is that 'Tutsi' is often mentioned with pride, whereas a 'Hutu is ashamed of revealing who they are.'[43]

[41] Informal discussion, November 22, 2009.
[42] NURC's Director of Civic Education commenting on arrest of Rose Kabuye in Germany; December 8, 2008.
[43] Informal interview with a MINALOC employee, March 18, 2009.

This official dance-around comes in stark contrast to common daily practices whereby people of all backgrounds still talk of and distinguish 'Hutu' from 'Tutsi.' Racial 'body maps' (Malkki 1994) are part of life's orientation. Off-hand remarks about types of noses and skin tones often figure in informal conversations. My cell leader (a state official) inquired 'What is your tribe?'[44] and people pronounced sentences such as: 'A Hutu can spot a Tutsi at fifty meters, and vice versa;'[45] or 'We [Hutus] look a certain way.'[46] Some believe Hutu and Tutsi are different on the 'inside' too: 'Tutsis are generous, sociable, genuine…they never kill like that…It is because of hundreds of years being reared in this way that we developed an advanced culture.'[47] Many other observers note the currency and salience of racial and ethnic markers in daily social life post-genocide (Hilker 2009; Buckley-Zistel 2009; Zorbas 2009; Hatzfeld 2007 and 2005a).

Similarly, despite the existence of an official history, which is put in circulation through the increasingly controlled press, formal and (especially) informal education and other state-organized activities, the new historical consensus is far from universally accepted. Counter-narratives or perhaps 'side-histories' exist. Paradoxically, the divergences come out most clearly from interviews with the elite. These informants have comparably more freedom to accommodate narratives to their own 'opinion'— to be relatively more honest— than say a participant at an *ingando* camp (especially if ex-combatant or ex-prisoner).

[44] Informal chat at a local store, April 10, 2009.
[45] A Tutsi survivor interviewed by Hatzfeld (2005a:77).
[46] Informal discussion with government (MINALOC) employee, February 26, 2009.

At the RPF Headquarters, that symbolic centre of power itself, Servillien Sebasoni suggests that 'we [Hutu and Tutsi] have opposed memories.'[48] The main points of disagreement include among others: i) the role and legacy of the Nyiginya monarchy (was it unificatory as NURC highlights or exploitative?); b) the interpretation of '1959,' the year when monarchy was abolished, Tutsi rule ended and a Hutu-dominated Republic was established (was this a 'revolution' or the actual beginning of genocide as, again, the NURC suggests?); and finally iii) there is no settled history of the genocide. Narratives denying and minimizing the genocide still exist (e.g. the 'two wars' or 'two genocides' thesis). There is also the non-addressed and extremely sensitive issue of Hutu civilian victims that died at the hands of the RPF. All in all, powerful politically-motivated manipulations, denials and silencings mark the makings of official history.

To sum up, two opposed dynamics intertwine in the Rwanda I 'entered' and that provide context to my research. On the one hand, there is the vibrancy and multiplicities of difference and division —studied based on the clashes and co-existence among self-ascribed, witnessed and proscribed identities, serious divergences in historical narratives and multiple grievances. Into all these multiplicities created by disruptions and restorations comes a powerful state firmly set to make 'one' out of many; to create an overarching identity of *Munyarwanda* (a Rwandan). The way in which this is attempted, the policies and activities that are to deliver it, and the effects that are produced, is the focus of the rest of the thesis.

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[47] Informal discussion with a bus passenger, a Tutsi refugee still residing in Kampala, Rwamagana, March 06, 2009.
[48] Interview with Sebasoni— the RPF Communications Adviser and author of two books on Rwandan history and development; March 23, 2009.

An important caveat is due. It would be fallacious to assume that while Rwanda brims with difference, the state and the government are monolithic. The organization in charge of 'unity and reconciliation'— the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), stipulated under the 1993 Arusha Accords and established in 1999— shows that even the entity responsible for building 'unity' is not unified. Not only is NURC an *ensemble* of individuals with specific backgrounds and different roles and hierarchies, there is also the (at times) uneasy coexistence of official roles and personal agendas.

My observation of NURC from the 'inside' showed clear hierarchies and a distinction between 'ideologues' and 'workers,' with the former group identifying with the ideologies underpinning the work of the commission, holding higher posts and having spent longer time at the commission (usually have been there its inception). During my fieldwork, the head and 'face' of NURC was its 'Executive Secretary'— Fatuma Ndangiza. Ndangiza was a 'big personality,' known by everyone in the field and beyond; many called NURC 'chez *Fatuma.*' Her presence at events instantly raised their perceived profile. She was soft-spoken but had a powerful presence; she exuded the air of a 'wise matriarch' and many commissioners and NURC partners looked at her with respect akin to reverence.

NURC also mirrored wider social exclusions. Most employees and most of those who held power were Tutsi returnees (from Uganda and Congo); Hutu and Tutsi survivors were in the minority. On the other hand, the fact that a commission or even a policy is

internally fragmentable into different motivations and dynamics should not create an impression of an ineffectual or 'weak' state machinery or be confused with lack of very real effects on the ground.

'Politography' in a Politically-Divided Society: Is there a 'Fact'? What is 'Data'?

Speaking of 'facts' as incontestable and replicable truths is always difficult ('all cultural facts are interpretations,' Rabinow 1977:151). This is especially so in Rwanda, which combines an authoritarian setting, context of mass trauma, imperfect information flows (rumour and distrust) and an oral society tailoring messages according to both the interlocutor's interests and the addressee. Eliciting knowledge can mean forming knowledge—instead of 'getting to,' we might be producing meaning. Narrative is fundamentally a stretchy fabric. Words are acts, not just 'information' or 'knowledge' (Theidon 2001:26).

There is also always a degree of uncertainty and in fact fleeing from certainty seems to be a tactic unto itself (be possibly many things and nothing for certain). In settings where information flows imperfectly and yet is key (e.g. in war, under repressive regimes), often a surplus of meaning is produced in society (see Theidon 2001:27 on 1990s Peru); there is 'duplicity' or doubling— the rustling of the leaves can be the wind but also a possible *Senderista* attack, a rock thrown on the tin roof of a Kigali house can be children's play but also disgruntlement of a neighbour or a warning.[49] In a society where press, radio and television, even email and phone are, or are believed to be, controlled, further uncertainty arises when a researcher enters this imperfect information economy in search of 'what

[49] In fact, throwing rocks on the roofs of houses is a widespread strategy of harassment in Rwanda.

really happens.' She finds she depends on informal talk, hear-say, rumour, kitchen table discussions, just as most Rwandans do.

One's positioning vis-à-vis one's addressees matters too. People saw me as a '*muzungu*' (white person), an outsider and a researcher. While skin colour is a generally valid shorthand to privilege (and often, in institutional settings, of power coupled with different degrees of ignorance), it is also a good shorthand to how deep and fast one penetrates Rwandan social circles. The distance, however, is a product of mutual non-rapprochement. After hearing multiple expatriates mention how difficult it is to strike genuine friendships with Rwandans, a NURC employee complained to me 'Purdekova, most *bazungu*, they keep to themselves and do not socialize enough with Rwandans, they do not like to talk to Rwandans.'[50]

Besides being a *muzungu*, a foreign researcher is more generally an outsider, which turns out to be both an asset and hindrance in research. It is an asset because, as a newcomer, you are treated like (and in fact are) a child— you are seen as naïve, you know and understand little about the cultural landscape that surrounds you, you stumble across norms and social rules, toppling them over in the process. This is a position to embrace— people heed your bottomless inquisitiveness, they feel the necessity to 'guide' you and show you how things work. Perhaps more importantly (vis-à-vis a cultural setting imbued with authoritarian control)— if you know all the norms, you are expected to follow them. It is the liminal position of an outside visitor that gives one the freedom to 'get away with' social blunder, which would otherwise not be tolerated. The indirectness of speech

and 'guiding' also open space for dissent ('It is for your *safety* that you should give us a list of your daily whereabouts;' The response: 'No worries, I should be alright. Anyhow, I do not have a pre-planned schedule'). Indeed as an entrant you are 'blind' (which correlates with determination). The more informed you become, 'seeing' the rules, the less resolve you have to do certain things, the more self-editing and self-constraining you become.

On the negative side, being an outsider and a researcher elicits suspicion. A long-term informant later admitted that 'suspicions are there at the beginning, [I was thinking] isn't she recording me?' When I mentioned to another informant I wanted to talk to student *ingando* participants, he said: 'It may work, it may not, there might be mistrust, what does this *muzungu* want, the issue of spies…'[51] He went on to explain: '*Muzungu* is seen with suspicion, even in my Ministry when a *muzungu* would come to visit, they say what does he want, what do I tell to this *muzungu*, he came to destroy us. But it is not only *muzungu*, even someone from Gabon, who speaks French, what do they want, they must be connected to the French…it is a wider problem.'[52]

All of the above suggests both the interviewer and the interviewee position themselves according to the information they need to get or need to get across. Certain points are omitted, others over-emphasized and, finally, unfinished stories are produced. This is not to suggest, however, that 'partially-true,' 'partially-understood' and partially-recorded narratives are not 'meaningful.' These are the 'facts' of ethnography. They are not

[50] Informal chat, January 7, 2009.
[51] Interview with a IRDP researcher, January 21, 2009.

'historical events;' neither are they 'data points.' Rather, these are the most fuzzy accounts closest to lived experience—a mix of the thought, the felt and the reflected-upon, mix of imperfect understanding, desire, dream, belief. Scheper-Hughes (1992:229) called this 'the mundane surrealism of ethnographic description, where it is difficult to separate fact from fiction, rumour and fantasy from historical event, and the events of imagination from the everyday political drama.'

Furthermore, untrue or partially true utterances might and do have powerful impacts. The invading RPF in 1990 might not have been fitted with horns and tails,[53] but this did not detract from the real fear and anger that such war propaganda produced. A Butare-based researcher might not have been a secret agent of international justice, as was passed around in the community, but this rumour did lead to the actual fleeing of people from the village.[54]

An important caveat is due— partiality cannot be embraced entirely. Observation itself is a political act and has to bear this responsibility—it is not enough to 'see,' one has to 'look for;' what is seen and heard is 'witnessed' and what is not, what is pushed aside and hidden, might as well not be. With regard to this, another factor delimiting the worlds we come to describe is *accessibility*. This does not only refer to practical restraints, or the physical access and cooperation of gatekeepers, it also refers to the complex dynamics

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[52] Ibid.
[53] 'Some people were intoxicated [by the propaganda] to the point that [they believed that] those people attempting to come back are not human beings but snakes and devils, intoxicated to the point they thought they had tails….[so] killing them was not killing human beings, but a dangerous animal.' Interview with Director of Language Centre at KIST, March 10, 2009.
[54] Informal discussion with a friend anthropologist, November 24, 2008.

and forces that structure voice and silence in a given society. In politicised, tense and divided contexts, it is hence relevant to ask: '*Whose voices do we listen to and how do we get to them?*' (Nordstrom 1997:45). In Rwanda, there is an attempt by the elites to keep researchers in a 'bubble of knowledge,' listening only to official, appropriate versions of 'each and every thing.'[55] In fact, many themes such as ethnicity, governance and poverty are considered outright 'sensitive' (Ingelaere 2010:42).

In this research context, the 'holy grail' seems to be to reach 'private' or 'hidden' transcripts (Scott 1992). This useful concept needs to be qualified. It is not completely true that all Rwandans 'remain strong opponents but only in the remotest corner of [their] backyard' (Lefort with reference to Ethiopia, 2010:454). There are people who do open up in public places, but they rarely do so *directly* (though even here there are exceptions). People typically use linguistic strategies that 'reveal and conceal at the same time' (Ingelaere 2010:54) such as (from my experience) parables, metaphors, facial expressions and answers in form of rhetorical questions. Inevitably, one has to hone their sensitivity to the 'cryptic and opaque' (Scott 1992:137), which is how the non-official typically gets narrated.

Methods and Triangulation: Beyond Narrative, Towards A Structure of Voice

From all of the above, we can safely deduce that in a post-genocide society governed in an authoritarian way, most social research will involve the gathering of *politicised information*. The same question can produce a different answer depending on the interlocutor and the setting. Public and private transcripts might be discordant, even

[55] A common way to say 'everything' (lit. translation from *buri byose*).

irreconcilable. How do we approach this quandary methodologically? In other words, how do we assess the reliability of information? The present thesis tried to achieve this by employing a mixed- and multi-method approach combining observation, immersion, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, questionnaires, informal exchanges and analysis of primary and secondary materials. An overwhelming accent clearly lies on qualitative methods as these are better situated to elicit the necessary level of detail and thus to get to the intricacies of the topic.

Side-by-side employment of diverse methods is said to allow for 'cross-checking' or 'triangulation' of findings. Cognate answers might add to the robustness of any given finding, though this has been recently questioned. In an essay entitled 'Methodological Triangulation or How to Get Lost without Being Found Out,' Massey (1999) warns against the use of triangulation to 'prove truth' or assert greater validity of a particular finding based on perceived 'data convergence.' The author highlights a number of error types in the very conception of triangulation.[56] All in all, method and data cross-checking can be extremely useful tools in uncovering divergences. This includes hypothesised/predicted divergences, for example among official and unofficial scripts and settings, or among different 'costs' and incentives applying to the two types of script as reflected in the frequency with which they get narrated. On the other hand, it is unclear to what extent triangulation can be used to produce greater validity (ibid).

[56] The most important is the logical fallacy of 'prior method/source confirmation' (arguments of type: if B agrees with A, then A must have been correct) and the logical fallacy of 'mutual confirmation' (circular arguments of type: if B confirms what A said, than both A and B are correct).

With regard to specific types of method, one naturally needs to obtain as much detail as possible on the 'variability of voice' (not only among people but settings) through interviews, discussions and questionnaires. But rather than presenting either side as the 'more complete truth' and not the ideologically-motivated or self-preserving/self-promoting narrative that it is, the researcher needs to focus on the forces underlying production of these different narratives. This is the 'data' we need to elicit and it cannot simply be 'asked.' It can only be produced after months of participant observation, offhand remarks, snippets of life stories, gestures and grimaces, manners in which questions are asked, and assumptions that are never questioned.

As a result, methods have to reflect that fieldwork is not only about the conflicted exercise of 'extraction of voice.' The *emic* dimension cannot be neglected. How people behave tells a lot about what they say (*Is there a discrepancy, dissonance?*) or why they do not talk. Behaviour also makes us understand broad social patterns that 'go' without words, even cultural themes, which contextualize the field of 'voicing.' Perhaps even more importantly, researchers have to understand broad structures as well as micro-strategies of power and their effects on voice/silence and behaviour. These equations and manifestations of power again form the 'structural bed' of 'voicing.'

As Fujii (2007) commented in her essay 'The Truth in Lies: Evaluating Testimonies of War and Genocide in Rwanda,' different ways exist to learn from an 'unfree' testimony (e.g. prisoners accused of participation in genocide). Diverse 'meta-data' besides the 'facts' and 'opinions' given— rumours, inventions, denials, evasions, and silences—help

us decipher ‘the conditions and circumstances in the present that colour and shape what people are willing to say’ and the ‘power relations that shape informants’ current lives.’ Behaviour and broader cultural and power contexts, as well as the performance of voice itself (fitted with gestures, movements, pauses, accents) make us learn about that which is not and cannot be said, and that which is said.

Last but not least, ‘immersion’ proves a useful method. An effective immersion in power dynamics happens through the very assumption of the role of researcher on a controversial topic. Such role-bearer is never outside the political process because the project of presenting and representing and ‘finding out’ is profoundly political. That is why, perhaps paradoxically, it is easy to study ‘micro politics’ —the struggle and clashes over the making and remaking of worlds (and words). This method comes most naturally since ‘being a researcher’ is one of the most prominent identities and a daily ‘activity’ during fieldwork. Immersion provides perhaps the most meaningful and authentic learning. In other words, in a setting like Rwanda the process of finding out is what lets you find out the most. One learns directly and from a micro-political perspective about what it means to do research in a ‘difficult’ (grieving, careful, suspecting, controlling) setting and through this, about that setting itself.

Data Sources

The present thesis draws on 7 months of fieldwork carried out between March 2008 and April 2009. Two research phases can be identified: An exploratory and preparatory phase (March 2008); and the main phase of gathering data (October-April 2009). During this time, I conducted approximately 230 formal and informal interviews and discussions. Out

of these, 117 were semi-structured interviews (including 15 repeat interviews with long-term informants); about 40 informal interviews/discussions (directly relevant to the topic); and 73 questionnaires (with closed-ended and open-ended questions). Local press, radio and Rwanda TV programs as wells as primary documents gathered at universities and archives in Rwanda and unavailable outside the country also inform the thesis.

Most importantly, key data were drawn from observation and participation at multiple activities (*ingando*, *umuganda*, *ubusabane*, official genocide commemoration events, prison visits, etc.) meetings (planning, review, coordination, etc) and events (e.g. state-organized protests). Travel to sights and projects and the continual 'getting to and by' also proved insightful as did the simple fact of 'being' in a place, which thickens understanding by providing complex contexts to words and events (images, double-meanings, behaviours, emotions). For example, being able to participate in a wedding 'Planning Committee' helped me further reflect on Rwandan society but even politics and the state. 'Jokes' and underhanded comments at lunch or even seating arrangements often proved revelatory of attitudes, stereotypes and structures of power. 'Official' and 'unofficial' learning blended into each other.

Nonetheless, 'guided' or 'targeted' observation and participation proved crucial. Throughout my fieldwork (but most intensely in the first three months), I observed the work of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), from the daily 'flows' at the office, internal meetings and meetings with other 'stakeholders' and 'donors,' to participation at activities organized by the commission (*ubusabane*, *ingando*,

concerts, talks). NURC was not only the gatekeeper *to* the 'field' that I wanted to explore, it was also a key part of it (shaper and 'keeper' of the official discourse, organizer of activities).

The 'insider' perspective on NURC was not completely planned. I wanted access to *ingando* camps, not necessarily to be affiliated with the commission. After the first weeks in the field, marked by slow progress, the 'breakthrough' finally came. NURC's Director of Civic Education offered me 'entry.' I could participate in different activities and visit *ingando* camps but in exchange I had to spend 'some days of the week' at the office 'working.' In the end, however, there were no assignments given to me. People spoke in *Kinyarwanda* and rarely informed me about a meeting or a visit until it happened. I 'did nothing' for hours on end, feeling I was 'wasting my time;' my first assignment was to correct one commissioner's Masters Thesis. This made me wonder: Have I 'managed to enter' or have they rather captured me? Do they not prefer to have a potential 'critic' at close range, being able to carefully serve her safe crumbs of knowledge?

Gradually, I sensed a transition. Even though I was not given any tasks and my 'official role' was left undecided (a 'cross-cutting staff,' 'volunteer staff,' a *stagiaire*, a researcher in residence?), I seemed to have both turned from an ambiguous figure to an accepted 'member' (even fitted with the Rwandan name of *Kayitesi*) and learned to understand and make the most of my NURC role of chatting with and shadowing its employees. My role felt frustrating at first, but ultimately proved to be a rich register of learning. Altogether, the experience was bittersweet. I befriended many commissioners, who treated me

warmly and often sought me out for a chat, and yet I felt I was always just a little distrusted, in addition to being controlled and disciplined. Increasingly, I felt I became embedded in something akin to a 'bad-faith economy' (Scheper-Hughes 1992:111) where both sides were 'tricking each other:' I sensed my 'hosts' had to maintain a level of (at times unwilling) helpfulness and I had to maintain a level of (at times unwilling) aloofness (i.e. don't be too assertive about your interests as this might raise suspicions).

A brief note on control is due. In research, one might be embedded amongst 'facilitative' *as well as* 'obstructive' relationships (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:58). In Rwanda, it is perhaps more meaningful to talk of control, management and overseeing of the research process rather than direct 'obstruction' (though the latter is not unheard of). Just as there was a clear 'gatekeeper' in my case, there was an appointed 'overseer,' a young NURC employee that was genuinely friendly but also genuinely interested in the details of my whereabouts and opinions ('Purdekova, it is better if we always know where you are…it is for your safety. It would better if you give me a list of organizations you see each week and when') and set on teaching me about 'protocol' (what should and should not be done, and about the very importance of protocol itself: 'It is better to follow protocol'). My 'guardian' also tried to dissuade me from doing research during commemoration week because people are not their usual selves (i.e. it reflects badly on the progress in unity and reconciliation). He also urged me to submit a report on the 'good impacts of *ingando*' (first explained to me as 'an assessment on your stay [mentioned shortly before I was leaving] because people do not know what is in your head, if you do not write it, they might think there is something confidential.') Control

might also work through 'suggestions'— passing comments insinuating that you know enough (e.g. 'Ah, by this time you know everything!' or 'You know enough no?') or that your work is superfluous ('Purdekova, did you see the assessment we [NURC] did on *ingando*…you did not even have to do your research!'). In Rwanda, you are 'let in' but there is a strong attempt to control what you learn (or at least diffuse); the notion here is '*être amené à la compréhension'* be almost literally accompanied to understanding.

Naturally, my research goal was to explore a wider range of actors and activities. Consequently, since the beginning of fieldwork I was independently setting up and conducting interviews with policy-makers, NGOs and associations, religious authorities, local administrative officials, and importantly, participants of *ingando* and participants of other activities. However, the informal exchanges were those that eventually proved to be most insightful. Observation and participation were also crucial. To get a better understanding of *ingando* as a social event, I wanted to visit different types of the camp besides just the NURC-organized *ingandos* for university entrants. This required negotiation of access in three additional government institutions: The Ministry of Gender and Family Planning (MIGEPROF); Community Work (TIG) Headquarters; and the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). In the end, I was able to visit six different types of *ingando* (five state-organized and one non-state) targeting the following population: Adventist youth, university entrants, youth ex-combatants, adult ex-combatants, released prisoners, and street children.

Few important questions regarding sources and critical approach to evidence remain: *First, out of the bulk of 'multi-sourced' data, what is the proportion of voices that directly challenged official scripts? Second, why should we trust these sources?* To begin with, due to the repressive political system (dynamics of which will be studied in detail), there is no equality between official and unofficial script reproduction. The researcher can get access to the latter, but these will be quantitatively under-represented in the overall sample. This does not detract from the fact that they are *qualitatively* equal as insights into what is usually left unsaid or is misrepresented. Additionally, the relative scarcity of long-term and/or talkative informants introduces more balance into the ratio— Typically, only a few people on both sides (official and non-official) will become key informants providing detailed descriptions and insights.

During my fieldwork, there were many people of different backgrounds with whom I met on one or couple of occasions and who nonetheless critiqued the government or explained the reasons for lack of such critique. However, there were two long-term informants in particular— both Hutu men— whose insights proved key in my understanding of Rwandan political dynamics. *Why trust these sources?* First, these people critiqued at high potential cost to themselves with no gain back.[57] Second, these two informants had 'insider' backgrounds. At the time of my fieldwork, one was still working for the

[57] The perennial worry is that these people have their 'agenda.' Why do they talk at length if most people keep silent? This is not an easy question; not because it is unanswerable but because it is complex and person-specific. Suffice it to say that one informant suffered harassment in workplace and close family members repeatedly suffered from unfair hiring practices. This informant though was secretive about his critique (he was still working for the government!). The other informant was not secretive – he was heard openly criticizing the government at donor meetings, etc. This open behavior puzzled me but it is possible he drew some degree of protection precisely from being known to outsiders ('Look, they imprisoned a government critic!'). Due to aid dependence (and some donors are human-rights-sensitive), the government prefers to deal with dissidence in a more under-handed way.

government (I refer to him as 'Bernard' or 'MINALOC employee'); the other has recently left the government to work at a research institute (I refer to him as 'Augustin' or 'IRDP researcher'). Third, and with relevance to all sources undermining the official picture, while there might not be a way to corroborate a specific claim or figure (*Is the forced contribution to RPF really x?*), the broad underlying claims (*People feel watched* or *Government has spun intricate webs of control*) can be triangulated through employment of multiple methods. As mentioned above, second-hand narratives are not all that one learns from. In Rwanda, everyone, including the researcher, is touched by power (surveillance, control, all kinds of pressures, even threats). Besides immersion (and brushes with power), one uses observation of events, behaviours and contexts (structuring of space) as well as more formal analysis of political dynamics (set-up of an institution, profiles of employees, etc) to try and corroborate what the government tries so hard to make unprovable.

Sampling, Data Collection and Data Analysis

Regarding sample selection, I came to Rwanda with a list of people and/or institutions that I wanted to target. It is through this initial layer that further contacts and recommendations were made. Snowballing proved a good strategy but I always kept in mind the representativeness of the sample, trying to avoid capture in closed networks of people. As concerns data collection, I prepared lists of interview questions. These inevitably transformed over time as I discovered important themes and accumulated more knowledge.

The most structured interviews have been those with *ingando* participants. These took form of questionnaires, with questions formulated in three languages— English, French and Kinyarwanda (see Appendix I). I did the translations myself and then got the French and Kinyarwanda checked and corrected by a Rwandan friend. At NUR in Butare, I delivered the questionnaire in oral form (either in English or French, depending on preference of the student), taking down the responses myself. In Mutobo and *TIG,* responses were gathered in a written form, mostly in *Kinyarwanda* (though all questions were posed both in *Kinyarwanda* and French). I stressed voluntary participation (as much as that is possible in a setting of an *ingando* camp), which brings with itself self-selection biases.

Lastly, let me comment on language, translation and recording of data. Rwandan government is pushing for people to learn English and most government employees do speak it to various degrees. In general, I conducted interviews both in English and French, giving preference to the former when people spoke both. Though I brought a recorder to Rwanda, I never recorded my participants—I felt this would make people more suspicious and uncomfortable with sharing their thoughts. Even note-taking in settings such as *ingando* closing ceremony or in bars drew attention. Even in official settings, note-taking at times unsettled.

Kinyarwanda was predictably the biggest challenge. During the year preceding fieldwork, I tried to study the complexities of Rwandan grammar. Though I mastered the rules of conjugation and the nature of the multiple noun classes, there was still a long way to

spontaneous expression and 'working knowledge.' After six months of additional Rwanda-based study, I was able to translate some easier passages (more often sentences) in newspapers, catch phrases and gists of unity-related speeches (NURC jargon), and could lead basic daily conversations. I built up an extensive vocabulary related to my issues of interest— reconciliation and politics. Naturally, this fragmentary knowledge was insufficient to carry me through in-depth interviews or translation of questionnaire responses. During NURC meetings, unity and reconciliation events and in *ingando*, I was often translated for by people around me, in the latter case by students fluent in English. This felt more acceptable than introducing someone from the outside who, most certainly, would be distrusted (and which in turn would make people more careful around me, thus potentially threatening my insider status). For translation of questionnaires and other written material, I hired a Kigali university student (a returnee from Tanzania).

In a setting such as Rwanda, it is extremely important to render visible all the translation issues that might intercede in the production of 'primary texts.' As has been acknowledged by many researchers, word-to-word equivalence in translation is often an unattainable goal (Temple and Young 2004). The translated text might reflect various editorial choices of a particular translator (abridging, redaction of ideas, etc.). The translated text will also carry meanings that are not apparently visible (e.g. metaphors, sayings, turns of phrase). Knowing this, it proved useful to reflect on the translated text together with the translator, especially when I noticed that he used the same phrasing in English for slightly different Kinyarwanda expressions. It was during this second 'translation' (more resembling a cultural interpretation) that I learned about contexts and

connotations, idiomatic expressions and metaphors and also gained a broader insight into the contexts of what has been said.

Finally, with regard to data analysis, in the field one feels there is never enough data collected. This feeling grows stronger as the researcher gets to know their subject better. After returning from the field, however, I found myself facing a mountain of data. Transcription, processing and analysis took me more than four months. After finishing the transcription process, I read through all material, identifying key themes. Simultaneously, I began to classify the themes into broader thematic groups and arguments. At the end of this process, I had a detailed working structure of the thesis, with most of the key findings and supporting evidence in place.

As with any case study research, a key task is to delimit its 'uniqueness.' This is especially so with a project that accentuates detail and a thick texture on a small-scale, which in turn might create a sense of exceptionality. While indeed the ways in which processes happen and dynamics unfold and actors feel are unique, there are also overlapping trends, dynamics and structures that connect this experience with happenings elsewhere. This is especially so in a country where the governing elites and sections of population spent significant portions of their life abroad. To attenuate this effect, I tried to contextualize my findings as much as possible, bringing in experiences of other countries (on unity-building, reconciliation, camps and retreats, etc). Importantly though, what follows in no way pretends or aims to be a 'comparative study;' we can perhaps characterize it as a 'contextualized case study.'

Ethics

The issue that I have struggled with the most during my time in Rwanda was my involvement with a government institution. On the one hand, NURC was key to my study. It offered access to official unity and reconciliation activities, to learning about the policy and its implementation, about the setting up and carrying out of activities. On the other hand, this naturally brought trade-offs, dilemmas and complications. Would people automatically *associate* me with the government? Aware of this possibility, I tried to carefully manage my image. Most of my interviews were set up on my own and outside of the NURC context, with the obvious exception of conversations and discussions during the NURC-organized activities, interviews with NURC employees and government officials. Even when I mentioned that I was observing the work of NURC at close quarters (quite literally), I always tried to convey the message that I was an 'independent' researcher, protective of information and open to hearing all views.

Ingando camps and the university campus in Butare proved to be the most complicated research spaces. To get to *ingando*, I either went with NURC employees or needed special permits from other government institutions. Eventually, however, I came to sincerely doubt that the 'permission' (or my insistence on 'independence') could add or subtract much in terms of informants' 'carefulness' in what was ultimately a bounded, surveilled space run by government agents. Then again, not all testimonies by 'captives' are the same.[58] In Butare, I was told by NURC to contact the local SCUR (Student Clubs

[58] Those who have been convicted and serve their terms for genocide or divisionism in a way have the least to lose. However, others such as those released or provisionally released, those given 'alternative' punishments (usually much shorter) in exchange for confession by *gacaca,* or those from the Congo (ex-

of Unity and Reconciliation) who would 'facilitate' my research. Having spent enough time in Rwanda already, I knew the close connection between the 'clubs' and the commission. Again, I had to 'manage' this relationship very carefully. In the end, I was left on my own to approach students and carry out one-on-one interviews. But again, I was one of very few *bazungu* around and was seen talking with SCUR members on at least a couple of occasions. Again, perhaps this did not add any *extra* degree to the carefulness that already existed.

During my time at NURC, I also struggled with my symbolic value as an appendage to the commission on various occasions (for example, my 'observation' of activities such as the opening of the 2008 National Unity and Reconciliation Week). I wondered what my silent presence itself accomplished that I might not agree with. Acting 'normal,' was I normalizing things? Could *muzungu* be 'capital'? As another researcher noted early on in my fieldwork: 'They might eventually not like you and think you are really immature and not know how to do things, but you are [still] some kind of a token to be played with.'[59] Even if I was just 'shadowing' the commission (but was I really? I was rarely in their 'shadow' and always visible, occasionally even seated in the first row during events), could this be seen as a second-yes, a leverage one brings along to support the weight of one's words? Could I be providing some (however transient and small) level of legitimisation?

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combatants) being trained before re-entering the society, have very much to lose—one critical statement and they might lose their bargain with freedom.

[59] Informal chat with a friend anthropologist, November 24, 2008.

I understand that this symbolic service as well as the guard over my feelings and opinions is a necessary trade-off. Most researchers experience it and a subset of them is directly asked to by their 'profession.' As Rabinow (1977:47) describes in his *Reflections on the Fieldwork in Morocco*, a researcher struggles with the dictum of 'being [constantly] on one's guard,' always ready to 'suspend disbelief.' In a way, this makes him a 'non-person' or else a 'total persona,' 'willing to enter into any situation as a smiling observer and carefully note down the specifics of the event' (ibid). Just like Scott (1985:xviii) I found such 'judicious neutrality' both useful and an 'enormous psychological burden' resulting in 'my own hidden transcript.'

'Informed consent' was another important ethical issue. Again, upon reflection, this is a complicated endeavour. A researcher might inform people and they might agree to participate but it is the wider contexts that can still make this exchange problematic. On one of the first days in Kigali, I asked one foreign researcher whether it was hard to get the same participants (after a time lapse) for the 'second phase' of a large survey. She suggested that, quite to the contrary, it was *easy*, it was rather worrisome how 'compliant' they were. We discussed the reasons: The 'traceability' of people through the intricate administrative system, the unwillingness to disobey because this was easily 'registered.'

My own research was always preceded by an introduction—I told potential participants who I was, where I studied, what my topic was, why I found it important and why they were invited to participate. Especially in group situations (e.g. *ingandos*), this coincided

with the way visitors (*abashyitsi*) are expected to behave. I stood up in front of the gathering (usually the whole camp) and made an introductory speech. In one-on-one interviews, the introduction was made when I first approached the person. At the end of the interview, I invited my participants to ask questions if they had any. All in all, some participants were talkative and eager to explain while others were reticent, some declined outright, and yet others agreed with an ambivalently pronounced '*ntacyibazo*' ('no problem' meaning 'ok' but in this sense more like 'ah, oh well, ok').

This brings us to a related and pertinent concern: *What is at stake in a research encounter?* Association with inquisitive *bazungu* can create complications vis-à-vis one's community or the government. Neighbours can come knocking on the informant's door asking for a share in the 'gift' (Did you not have a *muzungu* in your house, surely they left *something!*). Informants have to manage perceptions carefully: Sometimes if you close the door, you have to open the window— At the same time as my informant (a local level administrator) wanted to prevent the daily supplicants from entering the small Nyakabanda office (he closed the otherwise open door), he wanted to let them see that nothing 'underhanded' was happening (he opened the otherwise closed window).

Protection of informants and data is a serious matter, especially in Rwanda and when the topic is 'politics of reconciliation.' What can be safely said on the phone or in an email? What is a 'safe' *place* to hold an interview? Offices might not be safe, especially if someone wants to convey sensitive information. But is a cafe or a restaurant or one's house 'safe'? Is a full restaurant or an empty restaurant safer? Can someone who 'looks'

Hutu be seen with a *muzungu* discussing at a table or entering their house without this automatically raising suspicion?

My sense after seven months in the field is that it is almost impossible to find that place, a place where one *feels* safe divulging sensitive information. Even at the large patio of the *Green Corner* restaurant and during the time when most people are still at work, my informant and I were always listened to by someone who without fail sat at the table next to us, staring and listening in, making my informant painfully uncomfortable (we either switched topics or slowly left). Towards the end of my stay, a US anthropologist researching in this locality told me that *Green Corner* is definitely not the safe haven it might have seemed to us—this is a favourite place for the Nyakabanda sector office employees to have their *brochette* and *inzoga*!

'Homes' were equally complicated spaces. I visited a number of Rwandan homes, but for some people and in some contexts (e.g. a voiced Hutu critic bringing in a foreign researcher) it might bring too much attention (of the negative kind). My own home was a complicated space as well. Its owner, as I learned after coming to Rwanda, was the former president of the Islamic Democratic Party (PDI)— a Muslim dominated organization and part of the RPF alliance— and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Habib Bumaya. Though Bumaya 'fell from grace to grass' (NTK, March 22, 2006), having been dismissed from his position in 2006 by the RPF-led government,[60] the house was managed by his brother Mukama— a Member of Parliament. *KwaBumaya*

(*chez* Bumaya), the name by which the house was commonly referred to, was located in Nyamirambo, an area where few *bazungu* lived. It was occupied by researchers and development workers and was receiving many Rwandans, including research assistants. Nonetheless, when it came to sensitive matters, informants were not sure whether the house was 'safe' (Could it be bugged? Was the security guard a spy?) and I could not completely assure them. Fortunately, none of my informants were threatened or punished in any way for their association with me (while I was in Rwanda, or after, as far as I know).[61]

With regard to data protection, one informant asked me indirectly if I was 'keeping jealously all that.'[62] I tried my best to assure that no 'leakage' took place. My computer, where all the transcribed notes were stored, was protected with a password and I always carried my notebooks with me. In addition, I never divulged any sensitive information through email with the exception of some general statements about the situation that could only be traced to me. To assure further protection, I tried to anonymise both relations (where possible) and responses. In institutions, ministries and associations, this type of security could not be created because my informants knew that I knew who they were and it is 'their' perception that matters, not my assurance that their name will not be used. When interviewing *ingando* participants, however, I did not know the participants and I never wrote down their names. In the thesis itself, I either use pseudonyms to refer

[60] After being dismissed, he left for the US to undertake a Masters Degree but he returned while I was still there. I had the opportunity to talk (informally) with Bumaya about reconciliation and unity when he visited the house in March 2009.
[61] I was very fortunate to escape some unpleasant realities that other researchers had to face. I heard first-hand accounts of blackmail, open dissuasion, threats and/or arrests of informants.
[62] Personal communication; February 27, 2009.

to my informants or, more likely, leave out names of persons and institutions altogether. The one exception is higher-ranked government officials.

Finally, let me briefly reflect on the 'role of the researcher' and the aims of this project as a whole so that these cannot be misunderstood or 'misappropriated' by others. To begin with, though in difficult settings each researcher including me struggles with the 'guilt' of not actually 'doing' anything to alleviate poverty and suffering (except in little dispersed ways), I do not try and short-change that quandary by turning this into an 'advocacy' or 'policy' piece of research. There are no 'actionable' points served in bullet points at the end.

Though I do point out in detail the problematic outcomes of the current government's approach to governance, unity and reconciliation and development, this cannot be labelled as first and foremost a 'critique' asking for outside 'punishments' of the regime (e.g. withdrawing aid) because both i) I do not believe in the ultimate effectiveness of such strategies, and ii) this is not the topic here. Additionally, action such as 'closing of *ingando* camps' is in fact a *non*-action: *Ingandos* are merely windows into broader dynamics of the Rwandan state, and it is presumably change in these dynamics and structures that needs to be debated.

First and foremost, this thesis aims to offer an in-depth field-based study of the process of unity-building in post-genocide Rwanda. The key words are 'witness,' 'document' and 'understand.' *Kumva* is the Kinyarwanda verb that combines the empirical of 'see,'

‘hear,’ ‘touch’ with the metaphysical of ‘understand.’ I want to see what happens and why, part of which is to understand why there might be distortions in representation of certain processes, events and activities; and why some things are silenced, by whom and for what purposes. Through a richness of detail and a depth of reflection, the aim is to unlock the complexities of a social process that has not received the attention it deserves.

SECTION II. The Political Process in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Introduction

Post-genocide unity-building and reconciliation are embedded within a broader political context from which they cannot easily be extracted. It is the aim of the present section to demonstrate the ways in which political dynamics profoundly mould this process. Three chapters study three different political aspects— i) legitimations of power (discourse); ii) the presence of state (structure); and iii) the micro effects of power (emotions, attitudes, expectations)— to uncover in detail the profound impact of the 'political' on the way in which 'unity' is construed discursively, pursued strategically and enacted through performance as well as to understand the prospects of this process achieving its stated goals.

The chapter on legitimisation analyses issues of greatest political 'currency' post-genocide around which tacit bargaining revolves (i.e. the political 'promises' to people)— security, prosperity, and social harmony. The subsequent chapter then explores a theme which consolidated after mere weeks in the field; namely the 'presence of the state in people's lives' and the 'totality' of the state system. This is studied through 'apparatuses of power'— the administrative and information infrastructures of the state. The section closes with analysis of micro-power strategies and the feelings, attitudes and behaviours (including resistances) that the political system engenders. Descending from

broad political systems analysis (i.e. parties, formal representation), moving away from state structures however localized, the question becomes: *'How does it feel and what does it mean to live in an authoritarian environment?'*

Overall, the chapters will try to demonstrate how the political machine today i) moulds what unity and reconciliation *mean*; ii) determines what can be *achieved* through unity and reconciliation activities (e.g. *What kind of participation can result in this political setting? What can be 'voiced,' what has to be 'silenced,' and what can be 'extracted' through research?*); and iii) purposefully *appropriates* the unity and reconciliation process as such, shaping its nature in view of government's broader social re-engineering goals. The chapters draw on a varied evidence base: study of the official discourse; observation of political dynamics; semi-structured interviews with government employees across different ministries, RPF members, local state administrators as well as Rwandans outside of officialdom.

The 'insertion' of the political machine into all social change processes, unity and reconciliation notwithstanding, creates its own important effects. This led me to conclude that the question *'Is the unity and reconciliation process successful?'* is not the right question. It leads to the wrong methodology, measuring results that we expect should be taking place. Instead, I observed the activities and realized that they are fundamentally political, might have other than-expected objectives and thus other-than-expected outcomes.

This set of chapters is crucial. It is here that we go beyond discourse, activities and subjects (the social ontology) by studying the forces that shape these and put them into action. After all, how different people understand social diversity that surrounds them cannot be extracted from political dynamics. While such identity maps are 'real' and might have real effects, they are also part of a wider structuring. The same is true for 'unity'— the way in which it is understood, used and pursued is part and parcel of the political process.

CHAPTER 3. **Legitimisations of Political Power in Rwanda**

Many observers have noted and commented on the increasingly authoritarian political system in Rwanda, hidden under a mere 'façade of pluralism' (ICG 2002:10; but also Mamdani 2001, Lemarchand 1997 and 2006, Reyntjens 2004, Zorbas 2004, Buckley-Zistel 2006, Oomen 2006, Edozie 2007). The political analysis that follows, however, is not predominantly an analysis of concentrations of power and structure of government in a given political system (e.g. *Is this an authoritarian system?).* The focus here is on governments' constant pre-occupation with legitimation. Even the most repressive states lean on and exploit the language, whether direct or indirect, of reasons why they are in power and should stay there (Whaites 2008:5).

The question here is not fundamentally judgmental as in '*Is this system legitimate?*' but rather '*What kinds of legitimation are at work and to what effect?*' Fundamentally, the section tries to explain the manner in which the Rwandan state negotiates these basic political sub-texts— the languages it uses, the inconsistencies and thus instabilities (between discourse and fact) that appear, the manipulations that result.

The chapter addresses three key and overt legitimations: i) guarantee of 'security;' ii) provision of 'welfare;' and iii) the deliverance of 'unity as social harmony.' In the process, two additional suppressed legitimatory spheres are discussed— 'liberation from dictatorship' (self-avowed political promise of RPF as it formed) and 'mass political

participation and accountability' (government is legitimate because people form and reform it themselves). Each legitimation brings us closer to the manner in which 'unity' is discoursed and the types of 'unities' that Rwandan politics encourages and discourages.

Guarantors of Security: The Uses of Fear

'I am not asking you to love me, or even to like me, I just want security for everyone.'
Employee at the Ministry of Youth explaining Kagame's approach.

Without doubt and without surprise, the most effective legitimation technique in Rwanda today is utilisation of the 'security provision' card. Security has always been a powerful legitimator but is especially so in countries where millions have only recently faced profound existential insecurity. The wide-spread perception that 'if nothing else, the RPF is to be credited for security in Rwanda' is fed by but also feeding power. The legitimation is so powerful (it really lies at the core of RPF legitimacy) that it took me a long time to deconstruct the 'production of security' in Rwanda and its political currency. Gradually, I asked: At what point does security stop being an undisputable ('obvious') achievement and an innocuous promise and become i) a powerful ploy of a government assuring its continued grasp on power; and ii) a powerful determinant of organization and manifestation of political power? The type of security in today's Rwanda is security as social control. Fundamentally, it is from this mutually enhancing nexus of security and control that government draws its power.

i. The Foundational Violence of Post-Genocide Security

Let us first unpack the claim that the RPF is the guarantor of security before turning to the way in which the meaning of 'unity' is profoundly affected by a securitization of political discourse. In July 1994, the RPF stopped the genocide and restored calm on the territory of Rwanda. The pacification was fully delivered only four years later (in 1998) when the 'explosive' Northern province was pacified (Kinzer 2008:365,215). The RPF also assured that no mass revenge killings took place.[63] In the story of ending the hecatomb, however, the RPF understandably does not highlight the fact that they first increased insecurity when they invaded Rwanda in 1990, used violence for years to achieve their objectives, killed civilians in the process, caused retaliatory violence[64] and contributed to radicalization of the Hutu regime (Kinzer 2008, Lemarchand 2009, Kuperman 2001). However hard we look and think, we cannot avoid the fact that the RPF inhabits a grey zone: They did not plan or carry out the genocide, they could have not known that it would eventually occur, but without their intervention it would possibly not have happened.

In today's Rwanda, however, morality does not operate with grey scales. The RPF paints itself in a heroic light, glorifying militarism, pushing masses through exercises of 'gun demystification' and, importantly, creating a sharp distinction between others' savageness and its 'innocent violence.' The distinction between acceptable and non-acceptable violence, the appropriation (and even proselytization) of justified violence, is

[63] A number of informants highlighted this as a contribution of the RPF.
[64] The four-year invasion has led to at least four distinct waves of retaliatory violence against Tutsi civilians (before the genocide) (Kinzer 2008:99). This has created tensions between the Tutsi within the country and those invading. Also highlighted by Lemarchand (2009:70).

key if a government that got to power through military victory is to even enter the discourse of legitimacy. While those who kill (or give orders, or fail to stop killing) simply *do* rule, 'heroes' *have a right* to rule (meaning they discursively create this right for themselves). The sovereign after all lies above 'good' and 'bad' because it has the power to decide the content of these categories. Thus while the sovereign might dissolve morality through its actions, it can still appropriate it discursively in order to create a haven of righteousness for itself. As will be shown, the RPF uses not only morality (assigning who is friend/good and enemy/bad) but also prosecution (criminalization, 'lawfulness') to achieve political objectives.

This dynamic is directly connected to the wider problem of the belittling of and 'exceptionalism' with regard to RPF crimes. Surely, genocide is an exceptional crime. But the added tragedy of genocide is that it is so unprecedented and so overwhelming that it dwarfs anything and everything else to nothingness. This is exactly the same process that dwarfs the issue of the Twa into oblivion: They are too few in number for their problems and oppression to really matter (both Hutu and Tutsi share self-perceived superiority and a 'civilizing mission' with regard to these people). This is an important reason why the RPF crimes have not drawn as much attention— they 'pale' when compared to the genocide. Nonetheless, tens of thousands of civilians were killed (UN-commissioned but suppressed Gersony Report; Lemarchand 2009, Prunier 2009, UN 2010) and the victims have no redress. At the macro level, '*jenoside*' remains an exclusive horror. At the individual level, 'scales' drop their meaning, and all killing is the same.

During my stay in Rwanda, a number of my informants, some of them students, revealed to me somewhere in the threads of our conversation, that their families were killed by the RPF, yet 'we were not allowed to bury them, not even to mention them.'[65] This literal obscurity of the Hutu bones contrasts starkly with the televised and populous ceremonies of re-burying of Tutsi bones in mass graves and their amassing on shelves in multiple memorials, both of which are culturally inappropriate (Collins 2004, Hatzfeld 2005a:148). Proper burial is believed to bring closure. Exposition of bones, on the other hand, might disallow souls to rest and might bring misfortune. The differential treatment of 'violent death' – on one side ostentatiously displayed and thus 'affirmed,' on the other side adamantly albeit shallowly buried and thus 'nonexistent' – is one of the forces *a priori* undermining any process of reconciliation.

Besides the foundations of insecurity on which today's security in Rwanda is 'guaranteed' the government in Rwanda also remains a major exporter of insecurity in the region. It securitizes Rwanda by destabilizing Congo. The RPF has initiated two invasions (in 1996 and 1998) and a recent proxy war in December 2008. The invasions led to regional involvement (the 'first African World War,' 1998-2003) and have led to a death toll ten times higher than that of the Rwandan genocide itself. Invasions are repeatedly sanctioned to neutralize the enemy — the remnants of the genocidal *interahamwe* militias, which have fled to then Zaire in the aftermath of the genocide and re-organized there under the banner of the FDLR. Academic literature and international reports (Prunier 2009, UN 1998, 2001, 2008 and 2010) however increasingly support the

claim that 'the government uses *interahamwe* to achieve other objectives in the DRC.[66] Rwandan exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, coordinated *by the government* (UN 2001) was used initially to 'finance their [military] operations' (Prunier 2009:220). Eventually, however, 'preserving their stake [mining interests] and control in Eastern Congo became a domestic necessity' (ibid:274).

Security suffuses political discursive space for a number of reasons. As shown, there are threats emanating from the outside— the ex-*interahamwe* most visibly. But there remains also a continuous threat on the inside, and this today forms the cornerstone of the 'unfinished battle' narrative and the continuous pointer for the value of RPF's 'labour' in security production. Presence of internal and external enemies repeatedly underwrites the need for i) the guarantor (i.e. continued presence in power of the RPF); ii) high level of securitisation within the country; as well as iii) repeated intervention in the DRC. In Rwanda's play of legitimisations, security both needs to be present/tangible and to be fragile/precarious. In other words, security needs to remain a salient issue. It is not a given and has to be repeatedly protected from threats. Excessive control over the populace is thus legitimised explicitly through the security card— for securitisation, order is needed as is surveillance. Among other things, this justifies the maintenance of a sizable corps of internal security and policing personnel[67] (which simultaneously resolves the problem of unemployment of demobilised RPF soldiers, the core support segment of the present government).

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[65] Interview with Bernard, February 22, 2009.
[66] Informal discussion with Joseph, a university student, Leipzig, April 20, 2009.
[67] MINECOFIN's (2010a:30, Figure 13) own budget tables clearly show that a full third of the government's budget goes to 'general public service, defense and public order and safety.'

ii. Securitized State and Discourse: The Friend-Enemy Distinction as an Ordering Sub-Text in Rwanda

Security-focused discourse shapes political dynamics in yet a more fundamental way. Lodging of legitimacy in the sphere of security introduces dichotomous thinking to political practice and wider social relations. Security discourse is based on a powerful dichotomy of 'friend' versus 'enemy' and this division matches the discursive distinction between 'unity' and 'division' in Rwanda. In other words, the sense of 'division' needs to be understood with the strong bite of the word enemy in the background. 'Friends' are highlighted and praised; they are the salient category; the aim is to dissuade anything that is not included. One's actions are always watched and evaluated, even in informal social occasions and especially if this is a newcomer.

The enemy category is deleterious. During the genocide, the RPF invasion was reported on the radio as 'aggression by the *inyangarwanda*,' the enemies of Rwanda (literally 'those who hate Rwanda').[68] Symbolically, genocide emerged when a particular race was conflated with enemy and thus thrown to the realm of exception. The logic of categorical murder is not only the logic of genocide but it is, more widely, the logic of war. War is the trigger *par excellence* of a 'state of exception,' permitting all those in the category of 'enemy'/'foe' to be liquidated in order to preserve the corpus of the 'legitimate,' sovereign 'self.' What exactly falls into the category of enemy though is open to manipulation. In Rwanda during the genocide, a purposeful extension fallacy equated all Tutsi with enemy or accomplice (*icyitso*; also Hutus who refused to cooperate; Straus 2006). Killing the Tutsi was relayed as an act of war (ibid), a pre-emptive action to

protect oneself in a state of generalized insecurity, called the 'program of civilian self-defence' by the administration (Stover and Weinstein 2004:50).

But even outside of war and thus more generally, 'threat' and 'enemy' and 'insecurity' have always served as a 'space of exception,' where methods and trade-offs otherwise unacceptable might be legitimized. In one understanding, the realm is created by the sovereign power (hence 'sovereign exception') which can lift specific laws, or which can lift law (and 'sacrifice without killing,' Agamben 1995). Thus a suspension in liberties may result through declarations of 'states of emergency' to quell 'civil disobedience.' In a sense, the Rwandan society has lived in a state of emergency for the past fifteen years, without any signalling mechanism of when this state would end. In what follows below, I want to focus more specifically on the power to throw people and groups of people into spaces of exception by implicitly labelling them 'enemies' and 'threats' through explicit labelling as 'divisionists' or those who possess 'genocide ideology.'

iii. Enemies 'At Home:' Divisionism and Genocide Ideology

Enemies have not disappeared from within Rwanda either. They continue to exist in the disguise of 'divisionism' (*amacakubiri*) and 'genocide ideology' (*ingenga bitekereezo ya jenoside*). These two terms are staples in the political vocabulary and daily political communication. The truth is that the 'home front' has become more salient than the foreign front vis-à-vis security legitimisations. Pointing out the internal threats the government can master enhances its security-based legitimacy claims. Genocide ideology 'is slowly creeping back into the society' (NTK, January18, 2008) but the government

[68] Interview with Bernard, February 13, 2009.

claims it can manage the threat. Kagame warns those who 'sow the seeds of divisionism:' 'We have enough machines to crush the grains.'[69]

'In 2002 officials began the campaign against 'divisionism,' transforming it by 2004 into a campaign against 'genocide ideology' as well (HRW 2008:37).' Between 2003 and 2008, four parliamentary commissions (2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007) investigated and condemned alleged cases of both crimes. The later reports claimed a large prevalence of genocide ideology in secondary schools across the country. The then-Minister of Education was sacked, and all teachers in secondary schools were forced to attend lengthy *ingandos* of up to three months. An internal war of sorts began.

The struggle penetrates all the way to children and to relations between children and parents. The fight literally happens 'at home:' '[We realized] that besides the people we are already dealing with, FDLR, prisoners, maybe we have to do something *at home*.'[70] The reality is that 'hatred goes on and it is taught in families.'[71] A parliamentarian and proponent of the 'law fighting against genocide ideology' explained to me that 'there is genocide ideology among the population, particularly youth. But how is it possible? You were born after the genocide! It is possible only through your parents. …The children [we talked to] promised to be *separated* from their parents in terms of genocide ideology.'[72]

[69] Speech by Paul Kagame, Rebero, March 31, 2003.
[70] Interview with the Mobilisation Expert, Ministry of Youth, February 16, 2009.
[71] Interview with the head of the Conflict Management Centre, Butare, February 4, 2009.
[72] Interview with Evarista Kalisa, Rwandan Parliament, December 9, 2008.

To 'separate' them, the state takes charge. Children as young as nine have been detained. The press reported that 'two primary school girls were jailed over genocide ideology' (NTK, September 13, 2008). Children and youth thus accused are sent to correctional facilities or prisons. Besides punishment, children are targeted for training and are politicised. 'The 4th Children's Summit' held on November 11, 2008 in Kigali has been organized under the banner 'Child Participation in the Fight Against Genocide Ideology.'[73] The direction of parent-child authority is partially reversed and children become additional government campaigners: 'Sometimes our parents or other grown-up people have tendencies to grow seeds of discrimination into us. We need to say no and sensitize them against it' (Kwibuka for NTK, November 14, 2008).

'Divisionism' and 'genocide ideology,' however, are only vaguely defined (AI 2010, HRW 2008). Rwandan judges interviewed by HRW themselves *cannot define* what divisionism is, despite the fact that each has adjudicated and convicted on these charges following the 'I know it when I see it approach' (HRW 2008:34). The vagueness became apparent in many of my own interviews too. Paradoxically, the law-makers gave me the broadest definition. An MP (Connie Bwiza) explained that 'law on divisionism deals with any form of discrimination.'[74] Another MP (Evarista Kalisa), also suggested that 'divisionism is applied when talking about discrimination, when you refuse to certain section of the population to *enjoy their rights*…it refers to *exclusion*.'[75] But the key issue here is what gets and what does not get counted as discrimination. Which discrimination

[73] For an official overview of the summit, consult the MIGEPROF website at <http://www.migeprof.gov.rw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=75&Itemid=131>
[74] Interview with Bwiza, March 23, 2009.
[75] Interview with Kalisa, op.cit.

is made salient, which violence is made visible, who is rendered accusable. The centre—the state and government — never are. If we take this definition, divisionist law would have to incriminate the government itself—as an authoritarian, closed system, it is highly discriminatory and exclusionary against the majority of Rwandans. Under all of its own uncertain terms, the government is guilty.

But let us explore the political currency of these terms. Since divisionism and genocide ideology are now the enemy, the source of insecurity, they are created as a 'space of exception' and a powerful space of 'decontestation.' Despite being 'broad and ill-defined' (HRW 2010:7) or perhaps precisely because of this, these terms are useful and widely-used political tools. They are abusable and they have been (ab)used widely to achieve other than the stated objectives. In general, what results is the deformation, usurpation, and over-spilling of these categories.

In today's Rwanda, 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology' serve as tools to get rid of political opposition ('criminalizing criticism,' HRW 2010:7), business adversaries or to resolve personal disputes. Over the past years, the government used the charge of divisionism to attack any remaining organized opposition and to silence critical reporting. In fact, it has been used as a mechanism to 'silence *any* opposition' (Buckley-Zistel 2006:110): 'Divisionism is basically when you are criticizing the government, that is it.'[76] This applies to critique by researchers, which is presented as 'rooted in genocide ideology and revisionism.'[77] But it is not only open critique that is targeted. 'The

[76] Interview with Augustin, January 21, 2009.
[77] NTK, September 6, 2010.

accusation can be and has been arbitrarily used for anyone who is *not walking in the lines* of the ruling RPF party' (RMP 2003:7). This has included 'dissent from government plans for consolidating land holdings.'[78] The result is the criminalization of any insubordination and the subsequent use of prosecution to quell it.

A connected dynamic with regard to divisionism and genocide ideology is then the tendency of these terms to over-extend beyond the ethnic and to consume all difference and any type of confrontation. The discourse suggests all difference is dangerous, because all difference is potential division, an attitude reflected in attitudes to multipartyism as well. *Amacakubiri* is the Kinyarwanda word for 'divisionism,' and literally means cutting into two. The term is vague because it might suggest creating a forced line of separation but it also might simply extend to everything that tries to differentiate itself from a broader whole.

The discourse of security, based on the meta-structure of friend-enemy, brings a specific logic to legitimation. If the life of the regime is equated with (made indispensable for) the life of the people, then threat to that regime becomes threat to the people (and in need of being 'cleared'). Through this discursive manoeuvre, security exception is extended to preservation of power. Additionally, an independent and powerful social dynamic results. All that is successfully associated with 'divisionism' can be cleared/destroyed, all that is successfully associated with 'unity' prospers. As mentioned, people can be 'framed' as divisionist not only if they are dangerous politically, but also if they are threatening economically, or for other reasons. Accusations of divisionism become a *broadly used*

[78] HRW quotes in an interview with Afrol News, July 2, 2004.

political tool. Accusations reach all levels of society and different social situations. They even structure quarrels among survivors in *gacaca* courts. On at least one occasion, a survivor was accused of genocide ideology by other survivors because he decided to tell the truth in *gacaca* and thus went against a broader collusion to indict a prisoner.[79]

iv. Security's Rule: The Rule of Fear?

The type of security that prevails inside today's Rwanda is security-through-control. The government polices the country so tightly that crime levels are low, there are no violent protests (or any spontaneous protests) and the return of *genocidaires* from prisons and exile has gone without any major outbursts of conflict. But despite the heavy securitisation, genocide survivors are still being killed and still live in fear of *genocidaires* who returned to the hills. This, in turn, is used to legitimise further surveillance by the state through official police, Local Defence Forces (LDFs) and plain-clothes police ('community police'). Despite the profusion of security personnel, self-defence groups (*irindos*) organised by citizens are curiously still required by the government.

Who is really 'at peace' in Rwanda is a political question that gets to the core of the very partial endeavour of 'security production.' Certain insecurities are emphasized (e.g. *interahamwe*, genocide ideology) and portrayed as manageable (*Isn't the capability to dominate them the mainstay of government?*). But other insecurities are simply left aside or silenced. Many survivors repeatedly relive scenes of terror in their trauma episodes, which increase during *icyunamo*, in *gacaca*, and upon meeting with killers on the tiny

[79] Informal discussion with an anthropologist studying *gacaca*, Kigali, April 4, 2009.

paths that crisscross rural Rwanda (Hatzfeld 2005a). Many others live in insecurity, in fear and paranoia for holding certain political opinions or 'sensitive information' without anytime experiencing directed and visible physical violence.

In today's Rwanda, 'threat' has transformed from imminent threat of an invasion or group uprising to a day-to-day mix of securing of the country to protect the regime. And to protect itself, the regime metes out its own violence. This violence at the 'centre' is the most invisible and 'normalized' (Scheper-Hughes (1992) powerfully exposed this with regard to Brazilian *favelas*). It does not operate through mass purges or killings and yet it is still 'physical.' After all, are symptoms inside the body and mind (fear, paranoia, suspicion, helplessness) not violence? And is violence an action, or is it a structure of experience, an obstructed form of being? Is violence not an invasive rupture that causes pain and discomfort and that, fundamentally, constricts people's ability to control the flow/rhythms of their own life?

All in all, the power of the Rwandan 'security' discourse lies in the *fear* that it stirs at the same time as it tries to assuage it. The Rwandan government literally rules through fear—the threats against security it can manipulate and master (*interahamwe* and the enemies on the inside) but also through the fear it creates itself, a fear more general and dispersed, which helps it to rule unopposed. Ultimately, the government is not immune to fear itself— it is built on fear's very back. Politics today is based on '*l'équilibre de la peur*'—the equilibrium of fear.[80] A small minority is ruling over the vast majority because it is afraid of what would otherwise ensue. A powerful distrust of the Hutu masses (their

feelings and intentions) underlies this fear, which due to repression, can neither be affirmed nor diffused.

By surrendering to this fear, the government ignores its own analyses of genocide and namely that genocide resulted not mainly because of some primordial hatred but mainly due to *bad governance*. The wide 'grassroots consultations' of 1996-97 aiming to find 'causes of disunity' among Rwandans found the top three causes to be *inda nini* (greed; literally big stomach), a non-participatory political system (exclusion) and *ubujiji* (ignorance) (Musoni 2003:6), none of which, presumably, is a characteristic of 'a people,' whatever name we give them.

Guarantors of Prosperity: Consent for Development

> 'We are herded like cows, we just hope the place where they bring us has greener grass.'
>
> Rwandan Student.

Security is not a sufficient legitimisation. As a 'developmental state' and 'comparable to other settings where liberation movements have come to power, the 'promise of development' [is] deployed as a 'legitimisation strategy for the state''(Muller 2008:112). The general promise of prosperity is skilfully used to extract further political credit. The Rwandan government has to offer a strong enough compensation— a mirage of future pay-off— to its people most of whom live in poverty and without many rights. But people's expectation of a pay-off is also compounded by the heavy taxation of every person in the first place. In other words, the government is promising not only because of the global hegemonic discourse ('developing' countries are meant to 'modernize' and

amass monetizable wealth), or as a trade-off for loss of rights, but also because people themselves are made into unwilling shareholders to a particular state-led scheme of economic transformation.

Importantly, this section is not concerned with economics and prospects of GDP/capita increase. Rather, I argue that the 'provision of welfare' or 'economic development' as legitimisations lead to the belabouring of images of the government that do not fit with reality (a whole 'dynamics of gaps'). This 'reality-to-please' contrasts quite starkly with the oft-emphasized need for economic and political liberation, thus highlighting a key tension in today's Rwanda— one between the desire for autonomy and the reality of dependence.

'Today we are officially a democracy. Before everyone knew it was a one-party state, but today we say multiparty democracy. […]There is a gap between speech and facts.'[81] *Why is image so important in today's Rwanda? Why belabour and carefully protect images so contrasting with realities on the ground?* Most obviously, this relates to the reality of economic dependence on liberal democratic states. About half of the government budget comes from the outside (48% in 2009/2010 according to the government's own estimates; MINECOFIN 2010b). As a result, it is important to present a pleasing and satisfactory façade to the donors. But the image is crucial for a more general reason— for attraction of investment capital to Rwanda from all possible sources. This results in a gap at many

[81] Interview with IRDP Researcher, February 25, 2009.

levels between the government's self-portrayal as a democracy and a more complicated and definitely discordant reality.

Preoccupation with image feeds into government's general repressive tendencies. It directly strengthens anxiety over critique and its subsequent suppression. Certain representation is essential though it distorts reality, and those who highlight the discrepancy are undermining the project. Researchers are thus also potentially dangerous, and there is palpable nervousness about what they will 'find.' Research is welcome and supported as long as it 'spreads the good news.' Reports done in conjunction with foreign experts are manipulated and re-edited into more 'acceptable' form (e.g. the case of the Joint Governance Assessment (JGA) report). The worry over image also leads to belabouring of image-relevant cultural aspects (cleanliness; *umuganda*'s nature as large clean-up exercise) and governance styles (order and discipline).

Besides the fundraising-friendly and investment-friendly profile, another important reason for the gap ties to internal constituencies rather than external benefactors: The RPF presents itself as 'liberators' of Rwanda and its armed struggle as a 'liberation struggle.' Indeed, when the RPF formed, its platform extended beyond the core principle of right of return for refugees and all Rwandans to their country (which really gave rise to the movement in the first place). Realizing this was not sufficient to either form a broad enough base of power inside Rwanda, or prevent the returnees' mistreatment and discrimination, the RPF opted to include the 'removal of the dictatorship' (i.e. removal of Habyarimana's government) and fostering of unity among all people. Indeed, in an

interview with Senator Inyumba, the RPF war was called 'the struggle for democracy' (Kwinjeh for NTK, 23 August 2008).

i. The Contours of 'Feigned Plurality:' Making Multipartyism Within Consensual Politics

The official discourse claims that 'leaders are in the hands of the people.'[82] Indeed, not only is the whole democracy-relevant developmentalist language ('the right buzzwords,' Prunier 2009:294) present but so is the whole institutional façade. Rwanda 'has parties' and 'holds elections' and has 'separation of powers.' It is involved in 'decentralisation' and carries out 'grassroots consultations' and multiple 'local participatory activities.' Yet, despite the government's claims to the contrary, the Rwandan political system is an authoritarian one (Prunier 2009, Roth 2009). Power is extremely centralized, the executive reigns, one party dominates. Elections are no more than rites of 'continuation.' In what follows, I analyze the government structure[83] and distribution of political power as they appear up close, when the wealth-driven discursive façade is stripped away.

The paragraphs that follow will briefly explore the façade of pluralism versus the reality of severely obstructed opposition. First, 'to have parties' is not enough for a country to move towards democracy. Rwanda has parties but it has no meaningful formal political opposition. Real opposition is either in exile[84] or is severely suppressed.[85] Parties that

[82] Interview the Administrator of the Muhazi Lake *Ingando*, January 28, 2009.
[83] Naturally, the government is not monolithic; it has different competing sections, a shifting power core, high turnover, especially at lower levels. However, none of this prevents the structure from being authoritarian, operating effectively and in a top-down manner.
[84] Most Rwanda opposition, in fact, resides in exile. Approximately twenty opposition parties were created in exile since the 1994 genocide (GLCSS 2006).
[85] In Rwanda, parties that are deemed threatening can be dissolved, as was the case with the MDR of Tswagiramungu, which was accused of divisionism. More recently in the run-up to the 2010 Presidential elections, three new parties critical of the government were not able to stand for elections. FDU-Inkingi and

exist are either part of the RPF 'united front'[86] or its puppet parties.[87] The RPF-dominated government carefully balances 'pluralism for show' and its maintenance of control. The game is useful: 'There are no political parties as such. They are there in the writing, but we really have just one party, we just want to fool you, then you provide support.'[88] 'The other parties are not really parties, [they are] not serious. In fact it is a way of fooling the international community, our godfathers. [Since] they are accusing us of monopartyism, dictatorship, what do we do? [We] tell A, who is a member of our party [RPF] to create her own party,'[89] which will be separate but friendly/aligned and not very active. The result is the desired simultaneity of 'multiple' parties and lack of multipartyism.

There are various mechanisms to assure the desired result of 'non-threatening opposition.' First, a new organic law introduced in 2003 'allowed political parties to be registered only under certain strict conditions. This new law imposed tight restrictions on all political parties, stipulating that they must 'reflect the unity of the Rwandan people' and would be 'prohibited from disseminating information [of] a denigrating and divisive nature…It is not hard to see such sweeping clauses as giving incumbents a means of holding on to power, by harassing and intimidating their political opponents and perceived enemies' (Hintjens 2008:88). Second, to be legally active all parties are

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the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda were 'obstructed from holding meetings necessary to register' (HRW 2010). Only PS-Imberakuri was allowed to register though was unable to stand in elections after Ntaganda was arrested on June 24, 2010 and accused of 'divisionism.'

[86] Seven out of the nine parties form a 'coalition,' a euphemism for what is really united front of RPF party factions.

[87] These other two parties are *Parti Liberal* (PL) and *Parti Social Democrat* (PSD), who some allege are headed by people active in the RPF.

[88] Informal discussion with Bernard, March 18, 2009.

[89] Interview with Bernard, February 22, 2009.

required to be members of the 'Forum of Political Parties' (US DoS 2008: 13), a component of the RPF ruling party, which takes decisions by consensus and has the power to interfere with the internal working of other parties.

The issue really is that opposition (understood as divergence of political programs, political process as contentious debate) is viewed in an *a priori* negative light, as counter-productive— It 'divides' attention, effort and thus energy that should be spent entirely on following a common goal (political consensus to achieve economic development) or else they are seen as political opportunists trying to rally people behind a common 'shield,' in the process stealing constituencies from or simply trying to 'bring down a strong party.'[90] The claim that multipartyism in Africa is fundamentally divisive, together with the vague threats of 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology' (capable of attacking almost all that is simply different; though choosing difference that is politically threatening), is a useful tool to mould, obstruct, or destroy opposition. The undermining of this domain is more 'profound' than readily visible—it starts much before any formal, organized party makes their appearance and works through general suppression of voice and groupness.

Just as it is insufficient to 'have parties,' Rwanda shows that to 'hold elections' is equally nonpredictive of the strength, or really, existence of democracy. Observers have proclaimed Rwandan elections to be neither fair nor free (e.g. Reyntjens 2009). The 97% turnout in the 2003 elections along with the results has been called truly 'soviet-style' (Roth 2009). In the 2008 parliamentary elections, the government allegedly inflated the figures for opposition to avoid an even more embarrassing RPF acclamation (the official

result was 92% win for the RPF; Ibid). All this massive support in a country that, according to its own line, is pervaded by *ingengabitekerezo ya jenoside* (genocide ideology). In general, election results are 'known'— election confirms appointments.

But what happens at the local level, in what manner are people stripped of their power to demonstrate a free choice? Surely, results themselves once made are manipulated. 'All ballots were poured into toilets, some were kept locked in rooms, [they] banned the real votes.'[91] 'I can give you names, names of young people stamping voting cards with their thumbs all night.'[92] Election observers indeed reported, among other things, that those responsible 'did not initially seal ballot boxes' (US DoS 2008:16) and that this happened in 76% of the observed stations (Reyntjens 2009). It is crucial to mention that the mission observed 576 stations out of a total of more than 15,000 (ibid).

Votes might indeed have been 'stolen' from the people. But this can be achieved through other ways than the manipulation of 'results.' It seems it is in the management of the very act of 'voting' where the theft begins. Voting presupposes a choice and a freedom to make it. Rather than looking at the holding of elections or turnouts, it is the nature of participation that we have to analyze. To begin with, it is mandatory to vote (one cannot 'signal' by absenting) all the while there are hardly any parties and all serious contenders are attacked during pre-election time (HRW 2010a and 2010b). The RPF is the only party active locally, they are not only 'present' (with local offices), they are an active

[90] Interview with the Director of the KIST Language Center, a linguist, March 10, 2009.
[91] Interview with Bernard, op.cit.
[92] Second-hand account of an informal discussion, January 15, 2009.

recruiter— there is pressure to join. Anyone can sense the absence of alternatives by remarking the monopolized 'political display.'[93]

The dynamics of voting itself further constrain choice: 'I've been in those places where they make us line behind the candidate of 'choice.' At night or the previous night, the local liaison will go from house to house directing villagers to vote for an RPF operative. These poor villagers know what would happen if they tried to demonstrate their democratic rights.'[94] Essentially, this is selection that has to appear as election: 'They say we choose them [district mayors] but we do not. The political machinery is made in such a way that from top to grassroots, there are structures responsible for choosing people, because they have to make a campaign for them. [You] tell people if you do not choose these [pre-selected candidates], you will get what you deserve.'[95]

Besides overt coercion, there are indirect pressures. People have been misled that the voter's card with a *yatoye* mark ('s/he voted' mark represented by blue thumbprint) will be used as a proof of national identity. There are also allegations of surveillance in the voting process. As regards the 2001 elections of local officials, 'there was no privacy, as everyone had to cast his vote in the presence of a 'helper,' right inside each polling booth' (OPJDR 2001). But further to this, if in Ethiopia (Lefort 2010) 'local residents [in Amhara state] believed that the authorities have unknown means of tracing everybody's vote,' this kind of profound distrust in the possibility of 'anonymity' must only be more

[93] RPF flags hang outside local offices; people wear RPF shirts and Kagame smiles down from framed pictures everywhere. In the world of display, no other party 'exists.'
[94] *Nkunda Rwanda,* an anonymous blogger, has left this message on her discussion page entitled 'The Ironies of Voting in Rwanda.'

pronounced in Rwanda where both distrust and surveillance are deeply entrenched. The conclusion is that there is a multitude of strategies for 'assuring' votes: Both 'preparation' and surveillance, as well as persuasion, deception and coercion prove effective tools in erasing any meaning of 'free vote.'

Finally, rather than a separation of powers, there is an alignment of powers in Rwanda—all align with the dominant executive. 'I remember in 1996/97 or even later, Kagame was defining [to us] 'participatory democracy' [as a situation] where RPF defines priority actions and then …sensitizes people to implement them.'[96] Commandment (Mbembe 2001) in Rwanda operates through 'order' or 'instruction.'[97] Rwandan judges see a discrepancy between laws as they appear on paper and the reality of judicial independence (HRW 2008): 'The principle is one of separation but the executive wants to control everything.' Another judge suggested that independence 'is a state of law, but in fact it is the word of the chief that rules' (HRW 2008:45).

The judiciary is not only non-independent but the lower-end state executives often mete 'justice' extra-judicially. A 2007 HRW report describes collective punishments ordered (outside of their official capacity) by local authorities, which included fines, involuntary labour and beatings. Local HR NGOs also reported that local officials briefly detained individuals who disagreed publicly with government decision or policies. Security forces

[95] Interview with Bernard, op.cit.
[96] Interview with Augustin who used to work for MINALOC on decentralisation, February 25, 2009.
[97] This does not include only 'presidential orders,' 'ministerial orders,' 'instructions of minister of x,' but also 'laws # x,' and many indirect/unofficial prohibitions/prescription (e.g. no walking barefoot; no street selling).

are known to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily and without due process (US DOS 2008:4, Prunier 2009).

Legality is in fact seen as answerable to politics, as if it was 'outside' the political process, a further proof that politics is conceptualized exclusively as commandment of the higher executive. In 2003, a state official told HRW regarding *gacaca* that 'justice is a political problem that needs to be solved politically. The minister of justice, present in the interview, did not question this assertion' (HRW 2008:19). He might as well be talking about 'poverty' or 'disease' or any other passive technocratic category requiring 'intervention.'

Rather than legislature reflecting many visions, ideas and interests pending and struggling for attention and 'legalisation,' what is needed, according to MP Bwiza, is 'one vision, one direction' which, if it is not there, 'it makes it hard to talk of reconstruction of the nation.'[98] Connie Bwiza was also a member of the insurgent RPF, active at the Arusha negotiations in 1993, and member of the first transitional government. From our meeting, she rushed directly to the funeral of the mother of Tito Rutaremara, who is the current Ombudsman and the very founder of the RPF. Whether in administration, legislation, or judiciary, there is a network of people strategically spread to 'execute' the consensus.

One important question remains: *Why favour authoritarianism?* The current government believes that pluralism divides and that 'consensual' politics is best suited to sustain peace and development in Rwanda. The whole democratic process is believed to be

disuniting— elections which might invite rupture, parties which might invite subversion, separation of powers which might spell non-alignment. This belief is reflected even in the official discourse: 'While the RPF agreed to work within a multiparty framework, some of its leaders expressed serious misgivings about the risks posed by such a system. In 1995, Kagame told a journalist that unbridled multipartyism would result in 'dividing people who are already divided' (HRW 2002:4). Electoral law, MP Bwiza told me, is an example of 'unity and reconciliation' legislature because, historically, elections have been 'one of the disuniting factors.'[99] In general, 'there is a consensus to build the nation and to oppose [this] is not good.[100] Besides instability, economic development is also used to legitimise authoritarian rule: 'About six years ago, when we got materials from Singapore, there was a consensus— let's forget politics, let's focus on economics, there will be outcomes benefiting everyone. The [agreed upon] consensus was to be implemented in an authoritarian way. [But] it was not meant to be implemented [by] a little group around Kagame [as it turned out to be].'[101]

ii. The Pyramid Cannot Stand on its Head: Accessibility and Stability of Power in Rwanda

Descriptions of Rwanda as a 'one-party state,' 'authoritarian government' and 'dictatorship' are both correct and tell us very little. *Who holds power and, mainly, how?* The labels of 'Tutsi ethnocracy' and 'Ugandan Tutsi rule,' while drawing attention to specific networks of people that dominate politics, are thin and always slightly incorrect as descriptions (*Is it really 'Ugandan Tutsi' or rather the much narrower 'Gahini Group'*

[98] Interview with Bwiza of the Chamber of Deputies, March 23, 2009.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Interview with the Director of TI Rwanda, November 6, 2008.
[101] Interview with an IRDP researcher, April 6, 2009.

(Prunier 2009:241)?). Each of these broad-sweeping descriptions works with an extension fallacy, 'blaming' a (false) whole group of people and thus directly fuelling a conflict along particular lines. At its core, the problem of dictatorial rule has nothing to do with 'Tutsiness' or being a 'Tutsi returnee from Uganda.' It is not a group or a sub-set of the Rwandan population that is a problem (this always risks an extension fallacy) but rather the political system that has come to place and that excludes most of Rwandans in multiple ways. Rather than descriptions, we need to start understanding the dynamics: *How does the Rwandan political system produce and reproduce itself?*

To begin with, let us briefly analyse the progressive narrowing of the post-genocide power base. The Government of National Unity (GNU) established in July 1994 'closely followed' the ideal of the Arusha Accords with its 'requirement that power be shared among various components of Rwandan society' (Prunier 2009:42). The main factors that led to the increasingly narrow power base were i) 'takeover through victory;' ii) 'concentrated economic power;' and iii) powerful 'distrust.' First, 'Kagame and his inner circle of ex-refugees from Uganda never wavered in their conviction that by deposing the old regime, they have earned the right to shape Rwanda's future' (Kinzer 2008:192). Besides the notions of 'desert-through-victory,' there were also economic factors that narrowed the effective 'ruling class.' After take-over, the RPF attempted to form an interim coalition government 'in the spirit' of the aborted Arusha process. Yet due to the funding structure, with RPF diaspora supporters as the main maecenases, 'every act was undertaken with RPF personnel using RPF funds' (Reed 1996:498). Finally, there was the powerful fear and distrust of Hutu. All three factors can be subsumed under one problem,

namely the issue of 'bad faith of the RPF which formally pretended to respect the letter of the Arusha Agreement while repeatedly violating its spirit' (Prunier 2009:43). As a result of these factors, many 'outsiders' and members of the RPF ex-refugee core were forced or decided to resign.

But rather than in the process of 'narrowing,' I am interested in the dynamics of the resulting 'narrow' power base. *If opposition is not welcome and elections are not free, how does one gain access to power 'from the outside'?* In the absence of free political competition that the ideal of democracy avows, access is possible through networking and 'showing friendly roster' (because some outside of the network are to be employed, referring to unofficial and definitely minimalist 'power-sharing'). The goal is to maintain the monolith of power intact. Networks are a proxy to trust. Hiring to administrative posts, even while appearing to be competitive, in fact draws on one's own circles.[102]

Belonging to the 'community of ideology' is also important and highlights the importance of alignment and consensual politics rather than dissent and oppositional politics. RPF is the prototype of an overlap between network and ideology, but since people are pressured to be members of the RPF, and all in government have to be part of it, 'trust' is 'devalued.' An 'assent' class has to be created through 'education' and 'cooptation,' and this class has different levels of 'adhesion' (e.g. *ingando* graduates, post-ingando 'unity and reconciliation clubs' (SCUR) members and leaders). The fight is especially between the state and parents over the children/youth, because they represent the field of extension of their own ideology to the future, the factor crucial to power's

(in)stability. If the military is a given hard power base, the assent class is the manicured soft power base. Both are important even if their potential for disruption of the status quo is not the same.

There are three additional dynamics that are relevant to the 'stability of power.' In a sense the first two are 'understandings,' which define the assent class. One is a narrative of 'power is accessible,' the other 'large exclusion is justifiable.' Social mobility, though always and still minimal in Rwanda, appears to be one of the most powerful stabilizers of the extremely centralized and exclusionary system. The 'successful upstart discourse' I encountered in Rwanda (coming from a poor rural family, now working in the government, 'look it is possible!') tends to explain away inequalities by situating the locus of control in persons rather than structures, when in fact it might be the latter which directly and indirectly determine success (i.e. one is moving up because 'shows friendly roster' or participates in 'loyalty' groups/networks).

Another stabilizing strategy or rather attitude legitimizing the top-down and centralist regime is 'ignorance as desert.' This is what came out powerfully from my interviews with university student participants in *ingando* (but from other sources as well), who told me that one of the biggest problems is *ubujiji* or ignorance. The RPF website names *kurwanya ubujiji mu gihugu* (fighting ignorance in the country) as one of the main goals on their political platform. An *ingando* lecturer talks of two types of ignorance: 'primary ignorance' referring to illiteracy; and 'negative thinking' when people 'cannot use well

[102] Interview with Bernard, op.cit.

what they learned.'[103] The discourse is one of the'enlightened' class rightfully usurping power from the ignorant masses. People in ignorance 'deserve' to be ruled, those who came out of ignorance deserve to rule.

The third dynamic is 'political clientship.' People are bound to the current political leadership because the patron gave them something (a homeland/possibility of return; salary) that they now repay with loyalty. There are two aspects to this: i) The returnees most benefited from Kagame's rule and they are the natural assent class (though not all equally networked into power); and ii) government jobs are a 'new clientship' (you don't bite the hand that feeds you).

But perhaps even more sensitive than 'Who will take decisions?' is the question of 'Who will judge what results?' Monitoring and evaluation and social science research are extremely sensitive issues. People carrying out these activities have to be carefully selected or monitored; preferably, they should be from the assent class and thus closest 'friends.' 'Last week discrimination [showed itself] in hiring of staff for monitoring and evaluation of the Vision 2020…46 people [were chosen] from two districts in the East, two very close districts [dominated by Ugandan returnees], plus 4 others.'[104] After months spent in Rwanda, it became apparent that the only unproblematic research approach is to elaborate the consensus or choose non-political topics. Research that is 'safe' is supported, flourishes and is exposed at conferences and talks. Research publicizing the 'dynamic of gaps' faces difficulty and various levels of obstruction.

[103] Participation in a class at Nkumba *ingando*, December 16, 2009.

But by extension, any type of 'watchdog' is affected. All entities capable of effecting a counter-surveillance of the state are monitored and targeted if necessary. Besides specific actors and platforms of expression (i.e. media), spaces of potential contention are foreclosed as well. Freedom of assembly is constrained where deemed necessary: In one example, informal communiqués were passed around MINALOC government offices discouraging employees from participating in the Alison de Forges[105] memorial service at the Lycée Notre Dame because it was 'highly political.'[106] In stark contrast, the freedom *not* to assemble, if such freedom existed, is broken continuously as people are summoned to all sorts of speeches, meetings and events. Finally, by a further extension still, since everyone 'sees' and all can 'speak,' everyone needs to be monitored. People understand that simply being present makes them a witness, and this always already puts them in a precarious position.

There is one other reason for the smooth working and reproduction of power. By threatening job security (and possibly integrity if a person is dismissed for a compromising reason), the governance in Rwanda empowers those at its core by disempowering even most people in its 'administrative' positions. *How come there are so many reshuffles, and the machine works as if nothing happens?* 'There is a lot of them [reshuffles]… it is about local relationships, not about performance [even though] they might explain it that way.' With all this turnover, 'you cannot stabilise…after 2 years

[104] Interview with Bernard, op.cit. By people from 'two close districts in the East' he refers to Uganda returnees.
[105] Des Forges, a senior adviser at HRW's Africa division, was killed in a US plane crash on February 12, 2009.

people have to start from scratch. [But] I think it is a strategy of managing power.'[107] The threat of losing the position, the perpetual lack of security creates vigilance. People have to always be careful, non-contrary, trying hard not to upset.

Guarantors of Social Harmony: The Layers of Political Unity

In June 2009, I had the opportunity to serve as an expert witness on a Rwandan national's asylum case. One of the lawyers, who had just overseen similar cases in US courts, told me to expect the following retort from the presiding judge: 'But Rwanda has officially restored ethnic harmony.' This was a powerful reminder of the success of the power's own representation and the invisibility of the gap between this image and the events on the ground. It also demonstrated how outsiders judge identity politics: i) official absence of discrimination is sufficient; and ii) all that matters are questions of official 'ethnic' hatred and discrimination, the latter of which testifies to our bias to ethnicise reality and explain that of Rwanda along a bi-polar spectrum.

Since its formulation in exile, the RPF political platform – 'The Eight Point Agenda'[108]— did indeed include as the most important among its points the promise of 'unity.' 'The first point of RPF politics [was and remains] to reinforce national unity.'[109] In the present section, I would like to offer a broad analysis of unity as a political concept. 'Restored unity' is used, after all, as a powerful legitimisation of rule and a chip to gain foreign support. *But what kind of unified community has the RPF created?*

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[106] Augustin, a former MINALOC employee, recounts in an interview, April 6, 2009
[107] Interview with Augustin, February 25, 2009.
[108] For more detail, see for example Maundi et al. (2006:35)
[109] Interview with the Head of Diaspora Department at the RPF Headquarters, January 23, 2009.

i. 'To Have One State:' Migration as a Political Tool

One of the basic post-genocide decisions was to continue living together in one political community. This is not as commonsensical a proposition as it might appear when we consider that a number of political personalities and academics at the time were juggling as an alternative the official creation of 'Hutuland' and 'Tutsiland.' At the RPF headquarters, Sebasoni[110] told me that 'the President of Kenya, Moi, found a genius response to genocide, to separate the Tutsi and the Hutu! There is also a professor in the US who proposed it.' But 'you know, [President] Bizimungu's wife is a Tutsi…Well, she would have to go to Tutsiland, her husband to Hutuland, and their children to….no man's land [laughing].' Rutaremara[111] suggests that the idea predates the genocide: 'This was long ago, [President] Kayibanda was proposing it, some stupid idea, before independence, he was sending messages to the UN that there should be Hutuland and Tutsiland because they cannot live together. Lemarchand, writing on the history of Burundi and Rwanda, he was quoting it, but Lemarchand did not know the irony, that Kayibanda was a Hutu with a Tutsi wife [giggling].'[112]

However nonsensical the idea of two official entities, we have to understand that *de facto* and informally, the Hutu camps in the Congo *were* a 'Hutuland,' a state within a state with all the 'trappings of sovereignty' (Prunier 2009:47), where millions of people were

[110] Servillien Sebasoni is a Communication Adviser at the RPF and author of two books on Rwanda's history and post-conflict reconstruction. Interview in Kimihurura, Kigali, March 23, 2009.
[111] Tito Rutaremara is a central figure in Rwandan political history. He was the founder of the RPF in exile, later heading the constitutional commission in Rwanda. Currently, Rutaremara serves in the role of Ombudsman.
[112] Interview with Rutaremara, Kigali, January 14, 2009.

organized administratively, governed by their previous authorities, terrorized by militia and soldiers, which coerced them into military exercises and prevented them from leaving. Rwanda itself at that time was 'empty of everything.' [113] It was depopulated. This meant that the 'unified' state that the RPF wanted had to be literally forced into life. In 1996, the first invasion of the Congo had as its main aim the destruction of the militarized camps and forced return of their inhabitants back 'home.' This invasion was preceded and followed by other forced returns or 're-populations' of Rwanda – from Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda (Whitaker 2002, UN News Service 2005, Pambazuka 2010, APA-Kigali 2010).

The manipulations of 'return' did not only concern the Hutu. In fact, right after the genocide, a mass of old-caseload Tutsi refugees returned from Uganda, when, as some recount 'the city still stank, there was blood mixed with stale water and there was the stench of dead people'[114] *But why did so many return immediately after the genocide?* 'You see, it was a policy of the RPF. Although the UNHCR said that resettlement assistance will be planned and phased over 5 years, the RPF told people 'first come, first serve,' and so they all returned at once.'[115] This reflects a number of things. In the politically unstable post-genocide situation, RPF needed to surround itself with strongholds/natural constituencies, but it also needed instant legitimisations – after all, it had fought for the possibility of return and it needed to show masses returning home from

[113] Interview with Bernard, February 13, 2009.
[114] Informal discussion with an NTK reporter (a Ugandan returnee), November 14, 2008.
[115] Interview with a Ugandan returnee (NURC employee), Nyanza, November 17, 2008.

exile rather than a slow and careful trickle. It also needed people who were willing and trustworthy to 'rebuild' the country, starting with burying the dead.[116]

ii. The Blurry Borders of Rwandanness: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion

'Cross-ethnic unity' as an RPF political program predates the genocide. In the diaspora, call to 'unity' was a useful and necessary platform for the RPF because it broadened its political base and increased the discursive sphere of legitimacy. The platform of 'unity' was not *only* about return of all Rwandans from abroad (Hutu and Tutsi) but also about the replacement of the 'discriminatory dictatorship' of Habyarimana with one that disregards ethnicity. A historian of the RPF explains: 'Already Pasteur Bizimingu[117] said that we are not a syndicate of refugees, ours is a political organization meant to remove from power a dictatorship and then set up a new, well-governed system. RPF could mobilize, sure, because many wanted to return, but they had to shape it as a political organization that could speak more widely, to people inside.'[118] The RPF realized that a platform of 'return' was insufficient—i) it did not solve the problem of power (Habyarimana would still rule); and ii) it did not appeal to constituencies within Rwanda. 'Discrimination' was added to 'denial of return.'

The fact that the emphasis on 'cross-ethnic unity' was, first and foremost, a political ploy can be shown through analysis of the performances of 'inclusion/exclusion' in citizenship as exemplified in the differential treatment of Kinyarwanda-speaking migrants since the

[116] Informal chat with a Ugandan returnee (another NURC employee), November 22, 2008.
[117] A Hutu member of the RPF, later the first post-genocide President.
[118] Interview with an 'independent consultant' and author of a manuscript on RPF history, Kigali, January 22, 2009.

RPF takeover. While some became 'returnees,' others became 'refugees.' In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, besides 'old caseload' returnees (referring mainly to 1959 mainly Tutsi refugees) and new caseload returnees (referring to the 1994 mass Hutu out-migration), Rwanda saw the return of both Hutu and Tutsi from much older waves of emigration. They were coming from North Kivu, South Kivu (the *Banyamulenge*), other parts of DRC (e.g. Katanga) and beyond. Later on, however, as ethnically-framed tensions heightened in the Kivus and Rwanda faced large inflows of *Kinyarwanda* speakers (persecuted Tutsi who lived in DRC for generations), these came to be branded and treated as 'refugees.' As mentioned, people from these areas were initially welcomed as 'Rwandan' in the sense that they were free to move and settle. But when the inflow surged, the same people from the same areas, victims of action based on exclusionary citizenship rhetoric (even persecuted as 'friends of Kagame'), fleeing the same fighting that has not yet stopped a decade later, are today treated officially as 'Congolese' and are packed into refugee camps.

'By February 1996, according to UNHCR, there were 37,000 Tutsi refugees in Rwanda' (Prunier 2009:57). The refugees have been doubly excluded, called Rwandese in Congo and Congolese in Rwanda. *Why?* A *Banyamulenge* returnee explains that 'it is politics, the boundaries are what they are and he [Kagame] has to say that, but me, I know that behind all that, there is something, everyone knows they are Rwandese.'[119] A Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese from North Kivu espouses a different understanding: 'These refugees [in Rwanda] they are not Rwandan, they were there when Germany divided Rwanda, [they are] Congolese who speak Kinyarwanda. They are fleeing the

interahamwe.' 'Me: Sure, but you yourself say you consider yourself Congolese and you are not in a refugee camp.' 'For us, [there was] not many [of us] in 1996. But they came late, in 2001, they came [and] there was no place for them [land here in Rwanda]. So lets take them to refugee camps because there were a lot of them.'[120] Indeed, the perceived 'pressures on land' is the reason why these people come to matter at all, and why they matter differently to the Rwandan government when they are inside and outside Rwanda: useful outside (invoked as Rwandans), a burden inside (invoked as refugees, Congolese).

The full contradiction becomes clear when one puts this in light of the *irredentist* discourse in contemporary Rwanda. I was caught unawares when I first heard references to 'Greater Rwanda,' but they repeated themselves in many formal and informal discussions. In an *ingando* history class, the professor told us that 'The word 'Rwanda' comes from the word *kwaguka*— to get larger and larger, to spread, like the plant of pumpkin. Pre-colonial Rwanda was bigger than Rwanda today, it included parts of Congo, Tanzania and Uganda. On 14.5.1910 we lost all of these areas because of the Berlin Conference. Every time I remember that I want to cry. Kivu used to be ours. We lost a third of our current area. Regarding Congo, why can't we pose this question to Europe, these used to be our areas… Look at Rwanda [now], how small it is, can you be proud? [low hum rises from among the thousand people]'[121]

A similar story transpired (in a completely unsolicited manner) on another occasion: '[In the past] Rwenzori mountains [in today's Uganda] were the national border. Masisi and

[119] Informal discussion in Kigali, December 19, 2008.
[120] Informal discussion in Kigali, March 11, 2009.

Rutshuru [North Kivu in Congo] were more committed to the King [than the current Rwanda volcano area—the northern region]…People at the volcanoes, you could not trust them fully…All these areas [he points them out] speak Kinyarwanda. It should have been a normal process to stay with Rutshuru and Masisi areas, they are also good for grazing, rather than Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.'[122] After listening to numerous reveries about 'Greater Rwanda' I understood that foreigners are only 'Rwandan' when it comes handy to the government in Kigali—when it comes to support their expansionary ambitions. When, on the other hand, Kinyarwanda speakers try to flee the insecurity that Rwandan soldiers help to maintain in Eastern DRC, they are treated as refugees; they come to an overpopulated country when they are meant to be a solution to 'overpopulation' by staying where they are, acting as dummies marking the historical sphere of Rwandaness.

iii. Identity in Politics: Official De-ethnicisation, Silent Engineering

Besides 'unity of state' and 'equal citizenship' for all Rwandans inside and outside the current territory (originally interpreted as for all Kinyarwanda speakers), political unity also comprises the more familiar notion of 'identity politics' or more narrowly, 'identity in politics.' The 1993 Arusha Accords became the basis of the Rwandan state, the basic political power-sharing settlement later translated into the constitution. However, the official identity politics did not follow a power-sharing model but rather 'de-ethnicisation'— the decision was to omit all mentions of ethnicity from political and public life, and the criminalisation of any form of 'divisionism.' The idea was to work

[121] *Ingando* class at Nkumba, December 17, 2008.
[122] Interview with the Mobilisation Expert, Ministry of Youth, February 16, 2009.

against any groupness based on category such as race, ethnicity or region, and to simultaneously build a 'common Rwandanness' (*ubunyarwanda*).

In Rwanda, there would be no counting off of 'Hutus' and 'Tutsis' in government like in the neighbouring Burundi. But this simply meant that there would be no official counting of any sort, because any accusation, including that this is a 'minority government' ruled by a small power clique, could be deemed divisionist. This not only foreclosed official debate and criticism of the government, the approach also became literally 'toothless' when it came to solving actual problems of politicised ethnicity and other tensions and divisions. The current identity politics simply shuts off or plain denies problems rather than addressing them. Yet a proper identity politics *is* necessary. Issues of identity cannot just be 'left to themselves.'

Official discrimination indeed has disappeared but under the official façade of laws, discrimination still exists in various forms. Generally, most people within Rwanda today are excluded from political power and divisions cannot be simply viewed along a Hutu-Tutsi spectrum. However, here I want to focus specifically on Hutus and Tutsis because I want to take apart the claim that 'ethnic harmony' has been restored. This does not mean that I believe that 'ethnicity' causes conflict or is the one important social division today from the viewpoint of social justice, quite the opposite. However, 'ethnicity' continues to matter on the ground in Rwanda in terms of interpretation of politics, and it matters to many of those who try to 'read' Rwandan politics from the outside.

An identity politics based on suppression or abolition of difference (here specifically ethnic difference though others are relevant), by the very fact that it fails— it suppresses but does not destroy difference, and does not transform it either— paradoxically gets caught up in 'ethnicisation.' First, its set-up and actions are perceived along 'ethnic lines' ('Ugandan Tutsis' or 'Tutsis' have power) because 'ethnicisation' remains the most popular interpretive lens when it comes to politics. Second, the government itself starts thinking and discoursing in that manner (in a double manoeuvre, addressing the perception it knows is there). In other words, the official discourse is de-ethnicised, but everyone 'talks ethnicity' and judges the government in those terms. The current identity politics, claiming so vociferously to destroy this particular sphere of difference, has in fact not done anything to remove the simplistic interpretive model where ethnicity matters more than anything else. Naturally, the key obstacle is not the lack of proper identity politics as a method of approaching issues of identity, however needed this is, but the environment of equal inclusiveness that would make such method legitimate.

'Ethnic unity' remains a fiction, a wish and yet a useful and successful façade ('Rwanda has changed'). The ideal of 'Rwandanness' has yet to take even a timid root. The war and genocide polarized Hutu and Tutsi as identities by heightening the sense of being one or the other, and strengthening the separation between the two. Anyone who investigates and carefully observes Rwandan life notes that 'ethnicity remains pertinent in both social and political life.'[123] 'Government says 'we are all Rwandan' but in reality….it is still fresh. It is not enough for President and Fatuma coming and saying you are Rwandan…[when] since childhood we hear [another thing]. Segregation is still there,

everywhere.'[124] In a pessimistic reading, the society is paralyzed and 'meaningful participation is not possible' mainly due to 'ethnicity that brought so much distrust.'[125]

As I have already mentioned, the nature of the political system excludes most of the population, Hutu and Tutsi, politically and economically. Discrimination and exclusion have many forms and levels, but there are also ethnicity-specific exclusions. Due to particular dynamics, Hutu[126] are categorically and disproportionately excluded, albeit informally. Most clearly, it is harder for the Hutu to network themselves into the Anglophone returnee power core. They are also at a greater risk of injustice because: i) they are more easily suspected as having participated in the genocide (not all perpetrators have been identified and brought to justice) or maintaining links to the 'enemy' (meaning the rebels in the Congo); and ii) they are more easily framed as having such links or possessing 'divisionist' or 'genocide ideology'. The fact that Rwandan genocide involved mass participation of almost 200,000 Hutus (Straus 2004) contributed to a categorical distrust against them. The fact that not all perpetrators have been identified and the (partly fabricated or inflated) hype surrounding the various 'continuous threats' contribute to the persistence of such suspicions.

How can discrimination along ethnic lines 'happen' in politics if 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' cannot not be officially mentioned? How can someone be implicitly labelled 'Hutu' or 'Tutsi'? There are numerous ways of 'figuring out' ethnicity, none of which requires the

[123] Ibid.
[124] Interview with Protais, Communications Officer at an NGO, Kigali, February 23, 2009.
[125] Interview with IRDP researcher, Kigali, January 21, 2009.
[126] What follows also pertains to persons of mixed Hutu-Tutsi background.

words 'Hutu' or 'Tutsi' ever being uttered. The first heuristic device is what already Malkki (1995:78-104) referred to as 'body maps.' Whatever the margin of error of such a practice and whether or not it is used to any end, the fact remains that many if not most people continue to practice it. Besides visual mapping, names hold identities. Ethnicity is inherited through the father and the full name of your father is thus one's 'ethnic address.' If one cannot 'guess' and does not want to ask, one can 'ask around' and find out who the father is. Places hold clues too: '[During the government hiring process] you are not asked [for] identity card, ethnicity…But in the CV you mention where are you born, and based on where they are born, it is very easy to know who is who.'[127]

A final paradox of this 'abolitionist' identity politics is that despite the rejection of power-sharing, 'balancing' tactics still enter the scene through the back door. The Director of Transparency International Rwanda suggests without hesitation that 'there is a transition situation— yes, a nation but also power-sharing.'[128] An IRDP researcher explains that 'even in politics, ethnicity is a consideration. You don't mention ethnicity out loud but when government is put together the inclusion of different groups is taken into account. Finding a balance between groups, it is done but not talked about.'[129] Another IRDP researcher suggests that if you engage in it, at least be transparent: 'What is it? What does it involve? Among whom do you share?'[130] This again demonstrates how the government falls prey to ethnicised political imagination, discourse and practice, which both i) undermines a 'non-identity-based' conceptualization of power they are

[127] Interview with a MINALOC employee, op.cit.
[128] Interview with the Director of Transparency International Rwanda in Kigali, November 6, 2008.
[129] Interview in Kigali, November 3, 2008.
[130] Interview in Kigali, January 21, 2009.

trying to promote; and ii) undermines their attempt to appear 'representative' and merely highlights the concentration of power.

Any real 'balancing' hardly happens though, and the fact that this is an officially 'de-ethnisized' state does not put pressure on anyone to reach specific ratios. The result is inclusion to satisfy 'pinpointing as proof' and 'selective showcasing.' The play of appearances was in place right from the start. Bizimungu was a Hutu president but real power was in the hands of the 'strongman,' Minister of Defence Paul Kagame. Most cabinet ministers were Hutu but the really important posts 'were assigned to RPF militants and deputies' (Kinzer 2008:192). The calculus of appointments continues to suggest that if the 'minister is Tutsi, the Assistant to the Minister will be Hutu, everyone knows it.'[131] But the perception is that if Hutus are in power, they hold posts of lesser authority: '[There are] 30 ministers, Hutus are not more than 5%.'[132] In addition, 'those few Hutus who have been elevated to high-ranking posts are usually empty suits without any real authority of their own. They are locally known as *Hutus de service* or Hutus for hire' (Rusesabagina interviewed by George, 2006). All in all, even if the notion of 'balancing' is a thin façade, that minimalist effort is still useful for dissimulation. After all, this 'play' is part and parcel of the wider dynamics of gaps.

iv. The Story of Unity and Disunity: The Genealogy of a Discursive Consensus

Finally, the last base layer of 'unity' that I want to introduce is the genealogy of the 'story of unity'— the birth of the official narrative about 'disunity' and 'unity' in Rwanda. The

[131] Interview with an IRDP researcher, January 21,2009.
[132] Interview with MINALOC employee, February 22, 2009.

broad outlines of this 'consensus on history' date to the politics of the Tutsi diaspora but were defined more clearly and formally post-genocide. The consensus closely followed the establishment of the transitional government itself and can be traced to some key events. First, there were the 'grassroots' consultations of 1996/97, where people were questioned on the main reasons for 'disunity.' Later came the more decisive 'Urugwiro Meetings' (Musoni 2003:10) at the Office of the President (May 1998 – March 1999) where the discursive consensus was finally cemented by the 'eminents' of the state (political authorities, religious figures, academics).

The aim of the meetings was to arrive at 'a consensus on the priority programmes and issues necessary for reconstruction of Rwanda as a country' (ibid), the first agenda item being the 'rebuilding of national unity.' Two documents exist summarizing the meetings, one specifically dealing with the 'Unity of Rwandans.' [133] Briefly, it was settled that 'before Europeans' arrival, the Country was characterized by unity' (1999a:11), that 'unity was for all Rwandans: Hutus, Tutsis and Twas' (1999b:4) and that 'White People' were the usurpers of that unity ('when Europeans came, the seed of hatred and disagreement started being sown among Rwanda's children,' 1999a:11). In the last chapter, we learn that 'the Society, RPF *Inkotanyi*' (1999a:12) that is ruling Rwanda is set to restore this [merely dormant] unity. This became the core of the 'official history' propagated ever since.

[133] Two reports were produced: A general one called 'Report of the Reflection Meetings Held in the Office of the President of the Republic From May 1998 to March 1999' (Office of the President; Kigali, August 1999) and one in-depth document on 'The Unity of Rwandans' (ibid).

By way of conclusion, let me highlight some contradictions that arise between the rhetoric of restored unity and the actual political practices as they unfold. The first contradiction arises when we counter-pose the beaming of images of re-established unity (political currency more for the outsider audience), while simultaneously pointing to the unconquered and serious enemy within and without—divisionism and genocide ideology (political currency spent mainly on constituencies inside). The second contradiction arises by the simultaneous deployment of the discourse of 'de-ethnicised' politics (again more useful to broker favour from the outside) and the actual 'silent engineering' undertaken by the government.

The third point is a paradox really and concerns the surprising political value of mere official 'banning' of ethnic discourse. At a NURC meeting with Student Clubs for Unity and Reconciliation (SCUR), a university student relays the following: 'We had a visitor from outside who said 'Here you do not talk about Hutu and Tutsi, you are so developed!'[134] The Rwandan government is exploiting the fixing of African social discourse into an ethnicised straightjacket. If ethnicity is agreed to be a problem, then removing it even just officially creates a notion of improvement. Ethnicised discourse forms the way we perceive political claims making in countries like Rwanda— It attunes us to issues of cultural difference/similarity, making them salient, and it eclipses issues of social equality.

[134] Kigali, January 26, 2009

Conclusion: Implications for Unity and Unity-Building

The above analysis has implications both for the notion of unity (adding to the baggage that is its meaning) and unity-building as a process. To begin with, in a post-genocide society, unity is a securitized concept overlaid with the notion of friend versus enemy. Unity is defined as 'against an enemy;' unity means being on the 'right side.' As such, unity is not truly all-encompassing/totalistic. It is merely the 'politically safe' double of division. Division/divisionism is itself an intensely-deployed category, which is both a punishment and a deterrent. Labelling someone 'divisionist' is both i) a manner of deterring enemies; and ii) a tool for neutralizing 'enemies' by depositing them into a (discursively created) space of exception (with very real effects).

Since it is 'those in power' who decide who is the enemy and what is the 'right side,' unity becomes uniformity and non-dissonance. The meaning of unity arises against the background of consentuality (of rule) and alignment (of powers). Unity means showing a 'friendly' roster, 'unifying' oneself with the wider policies and ideologies; it means consensus, alignment and non-dissention. Unity is thus opposed not only to conflict-prone division but any division and even difference if the latter is perceived as opposition (as politically threatening difference). Unity as consensus (and as not plurality or critique) is presented as necessary for stability, peace and prosperity. All this means that unity as moulded today in Rwanda lends legitimacy to authoritarian rule.

The process of unity-building, on the other hand, can be seen as a top-down project, its outlines and execution being the mainstay of few (a 'minority vision of unity'). Naturally,

this says nothing about the actual enactments and the potential of ownership. But the dynamics of gaps do reveal that surface appearances matter. Even if false and shallow, unity still has political value.

The current government also presents 'unity' largely as 'cross-ethnic' unity and as something 'natural,' something that was there in pre-colonial times and was merely arrested by the colonialists. This discourse obscures a number of important historical and political dynamics, namely that the idea of 'unity' itself has a (political) history, that there was a 'consensus on the story of unity' that can be traced to specific meetings of specific people, that a 'unified state' had to be literally forced into life or that there is no unity if defined as the ability of people to either disregard ethnicity or to be able to get equal access to power and political opportunity.

Besides understanding communicated legitimisations and the discrepancies with performance, there is one more lingering question: *To what extent (if at all) is the government viewed as legitimate?* It is difficult to establish the actual legitimacy of a system that suppresses free expression in anxiety over critique and that precludes meaningful participation. In a situation with no authentic 'affirmative' mechanism, such affirmation has to be, nonetheless, produced. This is how propaganda comes to replace real voice. Legitimation is achieved through pointing to false agreement, false echoes of official discourse and self-glorification.

CHAPTER 4. **The Apparatus of 'Reach' and the Presence of the State in People's Lives**

'Government of Rwanda is like MTN—everywhere you go.'[135]
A joke passed around Kigali.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, one typically discusses the empirical 'weakness' of states, their inability to extend authority, legitimate use of force, administration and services over the whole territory or the whole territory equally (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Widner 1995; Herbst 1996 & 2000). This has become a true 'metanarrative' of stateness in Africa. The difficulty has been traced to the 'non-territorial nature of power'[136] (Herbst 2000:35), which presented most African leaders with the fundamental problem of 'how to broadcast power over sparsely settled lands' (ibid:3). However, as most analysts briefly mention in a side note, there are exceptions to this rule. In a few places in Africa, including the Great Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands, 'there are ecologies that have supported relatively high densities of people' and it is these areas that 'have been periodically able to exercise direct control over their peripheries' (Herbst 2000:11).

Rwanda is the most densely populated African state and it comprises a small territory without any sparsely populated areas. The state's reach is extensive and governments, besides the issue of control of population, are pre-occupied about the issue of territory (manifested in the rise of an *irredentist* rhetoric). These dynamics are in stark contrast to the recent empirical research of Bierschenk and deSardan (1997, 2003) in countries such

[135] MTN is a mobile phone provider recognized by its ubiquitous yellow logo. Personal communication with a researcher friend, May 07, 2010.
[136] Historically, the abundance of land on this continent (Reid 2009, Herbst 2000) made state consolidation a question of control over populations (through construction of loyalties, use of coercion, creation of infrastructure) rather than territories.

as Benin and the Central African Republic where the state is rather absent in local political milieus, these being instead suffused by a tangle of alternative authorities. Rather than asking *'What makes states weak?' and 'What actors and how take the place of the state?'* Rwanda as a case of a 'strong' state makes us pose a different set of questions altogether: *What are the different apparatuses through which the central power reaches people and how 'thick' are they? How do they saturate lived time and space? What, if anything, is 'non-state'?*

Many researchers have noted the strength and intricacy of political administration in Rwanda and how its reach to the lowest levels contributed to the 'effectiveness' and mass nature of the 1994 genocide (Uvin 1998; Stover and Weinstein 2004; Straus 2006). Though governments replace each other, this type of intricate organization, while modified, has remained fundamentally unchanged. In what follows, I study the 'reach' of central power post-genocide through the analysis of i) the 'administrative apparatus' and ii) the 'information apparatus' that lies at its disposal as well as through iii) the spectrum of 'grassroots' activities which it not only organized but through which it governs and finally through the analysis of iv) the structural 'counter-weights' to the state. The analysis is crucial if we are to understand how 'local' official activities (e.g. *umuganda*, *gacaca*, a score of unity and reconciliation activities) are perceived in today's Rwanda, and what can be and is achieved through them.

Administrative Apparatus

'Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes.'
Coordinator of the Lake Muhazi *Ingando*

i. The Vertical Structure: From *Gihugu* to *Mudugudu*

The administrative apparatus of the Rwandan state is characterized by clear hierarchies and an intricate organization leading from *gihugu* (country) to *mudugudu* (village) and, informally, even below. After two recent rounds of revamping, the official structure has the following five levels: 4 *intara* (provinces), 30 *uturere* (districts), 416 *imirenge* (sectors), 2146 *utugari* (cells) and 14,876 *imidugudu* (villages). In 2006, the previously lowest administrative unit of the *nyumba kumi* – a grouping of ten households overseen by non-salaried representatives (comprising some 150,000 people altogether)— was officially replaced by the larger units of *imidugudu*. However, there are reports of *nyumba kumi* being active informally even after this date (USAID 2008). The intricate state organization has roots that reach to the pre-colonial Nyiginya kingdom.[137]

The intricate administrative web, however, does not inspire complex mapping. Rather than spatial representations, the primary governance tool for orientation and targeting is 'tracing' through the spreading webs of people that make up the administration. The structure is conceptualized as a chain, with 'cascade' potential and its multiplicatory effects capture people's imagination. The snowball effect of this structure also means that directives and information in general reach large numbers at all levels fast. More than control over territory (though this aspect matters also), administrative governance

[137] *Umusozi* (the hill), in the kingdom, was the basic socio-political unit, usually divided into several neighborhoods. In each neighborhood, one family head was used as its head by the hill chief, and was called '*umukoresha*.'

emphasizes the direct and indirect control over people produced through access. Official power has to be 'felt,' it has to be localized and intimate rather than simply decreed from a faraway centre.

Let me first approach the 'presence' of the state through the physical presence of administrative structures (offices) at the lower levels.[138] The sector-level administration has the most physical presence and all its buildings are easily noticeable on the landscape: They are low red brick buildings with a sign at the entrance, a clearing of red earth in front, an annex of wooden benches (sometimes fitted with an orange tarpaulin roof), a pole with the Rwandan flag, and usually people queuing in front of the *umuyobozi*'s office waiting for an 'audience.' This is the space where *gacaca* and other important meetings and activities take place. Cell offices, usually comprised of a single small room, are included in the space of the sector. In the *Nyakabanda ambere*[139] ('first Nyakabanda') cell, papers pinned to the wall list the constituent 'villages' (in cities these are really 'quarters'). 'Village' *ibiro* (offices), however, are spread across the communities themselves. They usually comprise a single room with a small tin sign above the door signalling its purpose.

Which is the most important administrative level? All in all, and glanced from a global perspective of power in a highly centralized and authoritarian state, 'no one takes

[138] The description draws on numerous visits to my own sector offices but also those of other Kigali sectors and observation of various local administrative offices within and outside Kigali.
[139] The area where I lived was still referred to as 'Nyamirambo' but in fact it fell under the Nyakabanda sector administration. So this was my sector and within it, Nyakabanda *ambere* was my cell.

decisions at the lowest level… you wait for instructions.'[140] But looking more closely and moving from top down, all decisions at the district level are taken by the Mayor. At levels below this, decisions are taken by the sector head rather than the *Njyanama* council (the sector assembly of all adults) as officially decreed. Meetings and *imihigo* goals [annual targets], for example, should be decided by the council 'but it is never the case. […] They speak of 'council' but it is never there.'[141] In fact, it is military and police that seem to have more clout than administrative decision-makers. 'It is the 'Brigade CO' that is the highest actual authority at district level— the general/colonel that is [stationed] there.'[142] When it comes to *gacaca*, an anthropologist studying the courts found that the police superintendent is more important than the *inyangamugayo* (*gacaca* judge), especially when it comes to backstage 'preparing' of witnesses.[143]

While directives and power might be handed from top down, surveillance and control begin at the smallest, most intimate levels, with reports and requests trickling up: 'All of them are important administrative levels. [But] at the low[est] level, they know the people. If you don't pay your taxes, they know. If you are a drunkard, they know. The policing committees start there. If I want a passport I go to the village authority, who says I am a good citizen, I love my neighbours, pay my taxes…Everything begins there, in the village. They [village leaders] give a paper to the cell authorities, then the sector and it

[140] Interview with an IRDP researcher (Augustin), February 25, 2009
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Informal discussion, April 4, 2009.

ends there. But if there are difficult decisions, there is intervention from the district mayor.'[144]

If the sector complex (which includes cell offices) is where a common person normally 'encounters' the state, officially it is the *akarere* (the district) that is the main political-administrative unit. All 'resident citizens' aged above 18 are members of the district council called *Njyanama,* which is responsible for 'mobiliz[ing] residents, discuss[ing] and prioritiz[ing] problems and tak[ing] decisions for their resolution.'[145] *Njyanama* is a 'consultative council' (*conseil consultatif*) on top of which sits the executive council called *Nyobozi*. As described above, *Njyanama* seems to hardly take any decisions of importance as all are essentially communicated from above. 'The main decision making power lies with an administrative person (the Executive Secretary) who is appointed by the central administration and thus not elected by the population' (Ansoms 2009:307).

The trickle-down system can create a paradoxical inflexibility and confusion. Local administration, which is 'close' to the people and should theoretically be able to decide fast and best manage its tasks, in fact becomes paralyzed and ineffective because it waits until vital information makes it down the tree-like 'plumbing' of the state: 'At *umudugudu* level, I am sure they [usually] don't know until Friday midnight what to do at *umuganda*, until the decision from cell level and higher [is communicated]…The people

[144] Informal chat with a National Curriculum Development Center employee, Kigali, March 30, 2009.
[145] MINALOC website.

don't know what tools to bring…half the people show with machetes when we need hoeing to be done!'[146]

The cell itself has a careful structure of its own. The coordinator of my cell, an *abakangurambaga*,[147] explains that his is a '*travail de bureau*.' 'I sign official documents, take care of all the politics, organize village meetings and I work with the cell committee.' The committee or *komite* is composed of ten people— the coordinator, secretary, and persons in charge of education, health, security, development, finance, training, women, and youth. The youth representative, for example, 'organizes the youth, and for the moment, is involved in combating ideologies that separate the youth [such as] regionalism, racism.' The coordinator also explains to me that the cell committee members 'are elected by the population, it is not voluntary.' The only member of the cell who is paid is the 'ES' (Executive Secretary), the rest of the cell personnel along with all the village administrators are 'volunteers' (corroborated by Ansoms 2009).

ii. '*Umuryango* RPF:' The Parallel Structures of the Party

Just as the local administrative offices are easily recognizable when you pass them in the countryside, so are the little satellite 'FPR' *ibiros* (RPF offices). No other party has local presence. More importantly, the hierarchies of the RPF *mimic* those of the state ('at all administrative levels the two structures are there'[148]) with the result that the lines between ruling party and state are blurred. Already in 1995, HRW (1995:15) noted the existence

[146] Interview with IRDP researcher (Augustin), February 25, 2009
[147] *Abakangurambaga* are literally 'people who wake up the masses;' they act as 'promoters' or liaisons. Interestingly, *abakangurambaga* – highlighted by NURC as one of the local and traditional 'unity and reconciliation resources' – are directly part of the bureaucracy of the state. They used to be part of state structures even pre-1994 when they were known as *animateurs*.

of *abakada* (cadres)— 'an organized group of powerful young people…political officers attached to the RPA…responsible for supervising local political life.' They were 'operat[ing] parallel to the usual legitimate authorities' (ibid). In 2007, the informal parallel institution was made public when the ban on 'political party structures at the grassroots' was lifted and the RPF became the first and thus far the only party to elect officials at the *umudugudu* level. The elected seven-person committees then allegedly proceed to elect[149] cell representatives and so on all the way to the district level (NTK, 9 July 2007).

Besides its parallel nature, it seems 'the party is more powerful than the state. The party controls the state.'[150] RPF structure controls the administrative structure because, after all, the administrators are party members.

Informant: I lost my job in 2005 because I refused to become a party member. You cannot become employee of government if [you are] not party member.

Me: *Is the same person responsible for the two aspects*?

Informant: [Generally speaking] chairman of administration at *umudugudu* level is in charge of the RPF at *umudugudu* level. You find that it is almost the same people [at the two levels], go to cell, sector, almost the same, district, members of the district council, all members of the RPF…not necessarily the same people, but that is a gentle way of hiding of what is really going on.

Me: *What do RPF representatives at local levels do?*

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[148] Interview with Bernard, February 22, 2009.
[149] It is unclear how this process works exactly; i.e. to what extent is the election only a confirmation of pre-selected candidates.
[150] Ibid, March 18, 2009.

> Informant: I used to be a member of my RPF *umudugudu* committee, recruited by force—'nominated'…The [2010] presidential election campaign has already started and those guys are told to make it happen. As secretary of the *umudugudu* level, you have to assume those responsibilities, strategies for voting campaign, for member recruitment, to deal with defectors—those who just move away from the party, [and make sure] that you know each and everybody.[151]

The pro-government NTK reported that 'it is amazing but not a surprise to find that all residents of some areas are members of RPF' (NTK 9 July 2007). The reason is that 'the party machinery is very strong and very harsh. Here we are forced to become members of the ruling party… In the countryside, there is almost 99% if not 100% membership. In town maybe it is little lower, but not below 90%.'[152] Pre-1994, with the advent of multipartysim, the MDR is known to have organized *kubohoza* (means 'liberating,' literally 'help to set free')— dispatches of party members to a person's home for forced, and often violent, recruitment (Pinchotti and Verwimp 2007:16). After the genocide, forced recruitment continued. Before the 2003 elections, 'local officials or party organizers called people to meetings at sector offices where they were publicly pressured to join the RPF. In one case, approximately half the group agreed. Officials continued to 'persuade' those who refused to join…In a sector in another province, people were told that they should aim to make 90 percent of their neighbours into RPF supporters' (HRW 2002:3).

[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.

The membership in the party is couched in the soft and encompassing language of 'family.' The full name of the RPF is *Umuryango* RPF-*Inkotanyi. Umuryango* has different shades of meaning, it can mean 'association' but is used most often to mean 'extended lineage' or simply 'family.' The RPF's self-presentation using the totalist and exclusivist language of a 'front' or 'family' (HRW 2002, NDI 2003) both shows the skilful use of indirect language (an outsider might not recognize coercion in it) and the use of discourse surrounding family to solidify its vision of political 'unity' and 'division.' According to an RPF recruit, 'those who taught me said that the RPF is not a party but rather a family and that all Rwandans should be part of [it]. Those who don't join are outsiders. They are the ones who cause instability in the country. We should build the family to prepare for elections. It would be dangerous to be governed by someone from outside the family' (HRW 2003:3). People were afraid that if they did not join, they would be labelled as subversives, as supporters of 'divisionist' parties or as those who refuse to 'build the country together' (ibid). People are pressured in a more indirect way too:

> At the local level, the authorities were going from house to house handing out forms…[asking for] name, and then there was a question 'When did you join the *umuryango*?' What do you mean? I joined my family when I was born [laughing]… no, the *political umuryango*, they meant *ishaka* by it, the party. It is called *umuryango* because it should be a 'family for everyone'…You see, it is a demagogic approach. It is tricky, because they ask them [the people they visit] 'Why don't you participate in government

> programs?' What do you mean, but this is not national program, this is RPF![153]

Membership in the 'political family' literally comes with a price. Rwanda is not only a new land of fines, it is a land of 'exactions' couched in the language of 'contributions' (*umusanzu*). Raising money and other resources (such as labour) in the community is a changing but ancient practice and it is done on a small scale everywhere. However, the notion of 'contribution' in Rwanda has been hijacked by the state and transformed into multiple exactions such as *umuganda* (labour) or *icyunamo* (in cash) contributions. While non-state organizations such as churches also have their exactions,[154] these are more than overshadowed by the diverse demands of the state. The 'unity and reconciliation' activities are also couched in the language of *umusanzu*, whereby '*chaque doit donner sa contribution*'[155] (everyone should make their contribution).

The RPF structure is unquestionably the most widespread and effective fundraising mechanism in Rwanda. It is a *gutwerera* writ large. *Gutwerera* is the process of raising money from family, friends and the wider community (including co-workers) to pay for a wedding, the financing of which is seen not as a 'private' but 'community' responsibility. If the RPF is the *umuryango*, then elections are the perfect occasion for the political *gutwerera*. Trying to explain the intricate reach of the party, an informant tells me that 'all they [RPF] need is money:'

[153] Interview with Augustin, April 6, 2009.
[154] For example, when the employed and 'able' in the congregation are called forth to contribute their 'one tenth' in a sealed envelope.
[155] Interview with Frédéric, employee at Ombudsman's Office, January 14, 2009.

> For parliamentary elections, every government employee, or lets say RPF member, was forced to contribute a third of his salary. If you don't have a job, [there is] still something to contribute, they fix a minimum contribution. For next year [2010], each employee who is a member of the RPF will contribute half of their salary, that is 125,000 RwF [220 USD]. But every month I also contribute 5,000 RwF to the party, that means every year the contribution to the party is 60,000 RwF.[156]

iii. The Lateral Structure: Multiple Responsibilities and Indirect Control

But there is more to the 'dense' administrative apparatus. First, the state achieves control of the whole machinery through cooptation of *multiple* people into its 'responsibilities.'

> The whole thing is copied from Mao Tse Tung. In my *umudugudu*, there are 235 families, 3 people in charge of *mutuelle de santé*, 5 on official committee, 3 in community policing, 3 in gender based violence committee, 5 in *imihigo* committee, I am one of them, 5 education officers, there is also hygiene people responsible for that….there is a minimum of 50 people responsible for something. This is a way of ensuring …you can't have any 'opening,' [space for] opposition there. In Tung's China, the idea was to have two thirds of people busy with different responsibilities.[157]

At the cell level, responsibilities multiply further— there are youth representatives, *ubudehe* committees, and more. 'But was not this administrative structure there before?' 'It was there but we didn't have all those small committees, commissions…that makes it effective and efficient.' Indeed, responsibilities as well as activities have exploded in the

[156] Interview with Bernard, March 18, 2009.

past decade. Institutions like *imihigo*, *ubudehe*, *itorero* (and their administrative structures) being recently added to the mix.

To 'cooptation through responsibility' should be added the system of lateral (as opposed to simply hierarchical or vertical) controls, whereby there is an 'eye on everybody.' The *itorero* graduates along with local teachers, for example, are part of a so-called 'consultative group' at the cell level. *Itoreros* and teachers both have 'their own identity, their structures, their priorities on which they are required to report,' but they also 'advise the executive committee.' They have 'legal power to give ideas to the cell, and to be an eye on the Executive Secretary for example.'[158]

In the Muhazi *ingando* camp for child ex-combatants, the administrator has established a complex indirect system of rule, a society apart from society, where he is the sovereign. His pupils discipline themselves through a carefully constructed political governance system, which includes a leader and a disciplinarian as well as a '*gacaca*' court to resolve disputes. The children are separated into 'sectors' with rotating duties. Most importantly, 'everybody has an eye on his fellow…even the leader is looking [at] *gacaca*; *gacaca* is watching the leader, everyone is watching their fellow.'[159]

As becomes clear from the above, the state system creates *indirect control* through widespread and locally embedded webs of administration and through cooptation of multiple people into its ranks. To break possible dissent and mobilisation, the system

[157] Interview with Augustin, April 6, 2009.
[158] Interview with Professional for Good Governance, MINALOC, March 12, 2009

offers a number of the dispossessed and disempowered just a little more authority over the rest. But it is really the acceptance (even if unwilling) of the 'role' that transforms, not necessarily the possession of more power.

iv. *Imihigo* Performance Contracts: Incorporating Family and Individual into the State Structure

The recently introduced *imihigo* contracts also reflect the *increasing* permeation of people's lives by the state. *Imihigo* were introduced in 2006 by MINALOC and, as many other activities before and since, they have been presented as a restored 'tradition,' specifically as 'a long-standing cultural practice' of accountability where two parties agree to work towards a stated goal.[160] Though there has been no in-depth analysis of this process or its wider political effects, *imihigo* did receive wide acclaim ('formidable measure of accountability,' 'valuable example to other countries in Africa struggling to implement a truly decentralised approach;' McConnell 2009:14).[161] This is worrisome because, upon close analysis, *imihigo* brings i) deeper permeation of society by the state; and ii) openings for increased coercion.

Imihigo today are annual public pledges of performance, they are official contracts at different levels stating what that particular administrative unit will achieve and how that fits within the broader development agenda of the state (Vision 2020). *Imihigos* started at the level of district, but in 2007 were extended to all lower administrative levels. At district level, *imihigos* are signed by the mayors in front of the President himself. In 2008,

[159] Visit to the Muhazi *ingando* for youth ex-combatants, January 28, 2009.
[160] E.g. MINALOC 2010; McConnell 2009; ERD 2009.
[161] See also e.g. the 2009 European Report on Development (page 96) lauding the *imihigo* model.

Imihigo was extended to the family level: Each family head signs their own *imihigo*. The plan for 2009 was to extend the *imihigo* practice to every individual.[162] 'What do family heads promise to achieve?' 'For example, [to] send all kids to school, [to] assure that everyone has a health insurance, that all join some kind of cooperative, [that] all fight corruption.'[163] *Imihigo* appears to be a very localized public pledge of compliance with national policies.

But *imihigo* does not only permeate the social structure vertically, it is meant to do it horizontally as well. Groups of *itorero* graduates formulate their own *imihigos*. Some NGOs decide to speak of their annual achievement goals in the same language, such as the Rwandan Red Cross.[164] Religious leaders too 'have resolved to adopt performance contracts. […] Their contracts will highlight, among other things, interventions in matters of health insurance and fight against genocide ideology' (NTK, June 24, 2008). Most recently, an article published by the NTK (Asiimwe 2009) suggests that private businesses should sign *Imihigo*:

> We should be looking at how to stretch these performance contracts across all boundaries. They should not only be a thing for the public sector. It could take the form of private, public partnership. For example, MTN, Rwandatel and TIGO could sign annual *imihigo* with the regulatory agency. Private newspapers, radios and television stations could do the same. Private Sector Federation could cluster different businesses and sign performance contracts with members of each cluster.

[162] Prime Minister's Office (2009:6)
[163] Informal chat with a NURC employee, Nyanza, November 17, 2008.
[164] See Wynter, A. (2009)

Every three months, there is an *imihigo* evaluation. At the end of the stated period, reports detailing achievements are prepared at all levels. The district mayors attend a televised event called '*kuvuga ibigwi*' or '*kurata imihigo*' (MINALOC 2008) presided over by the President where they present their performance reports. There are also consultations in which 'people debate why [they] have not finished and accomplished all goals and what have been the obstacles [they] encountered' (ibid).

What are the effects of Imihigo? First, through *Imihigo*, families are effectively incorporated into the administrative hierarchy and come to form its 'smallest administrative unit' (NTK Nov 10, 2008). Effectively though, all individuals are meant to make their 'contribution.' Second, *imihigo* is a top-down mechanism of control. It not only further strengthens surveillance, it is also a mechanism for measuring alignment with government's policies. Local authorities have to 'guide' residents not only to 'embrace' the idea of *imihigo* (NTK, Nov 10, 2008) but also to embrace the policies that are promoted through it (such as 100% enrolment in *mutuelle de santé* scheme) and the labour that leads to achievement of some of the goals.

The pressure to achieve goals can result in coercion. 'If [*imihigo*] targets are not met, district authorities can expect their careers to be negatively affected. Not surprisingly therefore, local authorities use measures such as fines and destruction of property to ensure targets are met' (Huggins 2009:299). Another report also states that 'households that failed to meet their performance targets were fined and could be imprisoned for non-payment at local detention centres called *cachots*' (Thomson 2008:8). 'In an independent

survey commissioned by the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) from mid-2007, more than half of the respondents confirmed some form of compulsion had been used to achieve the *imihigo* targets' (Huggins 2009:299).

In this context, achievement of a target, whether in form of a quantity or a deadline, becomes more important than quality of output: The *imihigo* for *gacaca* at district and sector levels was that it would finish by 2007. 'Such a target,' suggests a PRI report (2007:6) 'runs in the face of serenity and fairness of the hearing as the courts are under pressure and cannot examine the cases before them in detail.' The proof comes from reading a select '*raporo y'imihigo*' (*imihigo* report). The District of Ngoma (2009) report on 2008 achievements might present figures without any sources and yet what it *does* include and *how* is already telling. The report focuses on 'adherence' to state policies (*umuganda* participation, enrolment in *mutuelle de santé*), state 'extraction' (taxes collected) and 'production' (TIG[165] labour value). Participation at *umuganda* (given at 73%) is included under 'good governance.' The only input under 'justice' is the monetized value of TIG labour.

In addition, rather than promoting local priorities as it claims, *imihigo* assures the mainstreaming at all levels into the national development plan. 'I thought it [*imihigo*] was a way to improve the coherence of the planning process, national and local interests, but within the first months it became clear that government promoted the national, not the

[165] Released prisoners are often sentenced by the *gacaca* to some years in labor camps called 'TIG' for *Travaux d'Intérêt Général* (community work).

local priorities.'[166] While my informant agreed that the activity does promote 'some kind of local decision-making,' often what results is a plan to please the centre: 'The mayor on his own is able to raise 20 per cent, maybe 30 per cent of his budget, the rest comes from the ministries, so of course he thinks "I will look at the priorities [of ministries], and will persuade my people these are their own priorities."[167]

v. Decentralisation: Dispatching of Control?

Based on all the above, it appears the state system effectively 'dispatches' rather than 'decentralises' control. The latter would suggests that the centre loses some of its hold but what we witness is not devolution of power to conceive and decide, just the devolution of implementation. Sprawling administration, multiple responsibilities and *imihigo*, in the final balance, do not point to decentralisation of power, but rather to dispatching of power through which, sure enough, control becomes more effective and compliance increases.

The effects are the exact opposite to the discourse: 'Decentralisation' has not only not led to democratisation, it has also directly strengthened authoritarian rule. This brings to mind Habyarimana's aim to transform the *communes* into 'motors of development' (Uvin 1998:24). The attempt meant that 'after years of work, communal development projects served to allow the burgomestres to *better control* their population' (Voyame and others, 1996, 1999; Uvin 1998:25).

[166] Interview with IRDP researcher who worked at MINALOC during *imihigo* inception, January 21, 2009.
[167] Ibid.

The former National Coordinator for Decentralisation supports the above verdicts:

> The World Bank has claimed that we have better performance on this [decentralisation] than other African countries…But despite this talk and despite this attempt [the official process of decentralisation], the majority of decisions concerning the lives of the people come from the centre. Decentralisation has not transferred authority to local levels of government. [Rather], it is a way of management of the country, having structures to transmit information more directly to the people, for them to understand what the government wants. Kagame himself said this in a meeting.[168]

During meetings at the ministry, Augustin supposedly raised the point of lower administrative levels adopting the priorities of the centre:

> When I had these comments, the Minister like[d] to talk of 'unicity' – 'The state is one [he would say], why do you differentiate the national and the local?' I said it should be the electorate, the people [who defines priorities]…When it became apparent that I had ideas that contradict my own minister, I left in 2007, I resigned. I said it was for family reasons, health reasons. So [please] do not tell them the truth! [laughter].[169]

Information Apparatus

The administrative and information systems are interdependent but they do not completely overlap. The system of spreading, getting, and blocking information is even more widespread, and to a large extent informal. The flows of information lead from top down as well as in the reverse fashion. The top-down flow will be addressed later in the

[168] Interview held at IRDP, January 21, 2009.

discussion on 'sensitisation' and 'mobilisation.' Suffice it to say that for this flow, the administrative system proves a highly useful 'irrigation' scheme. The focus here is instead on the bottom-up system of information gathering.

The state does not dispatch control only through creating a widespread network of indirect rule, but also through its network of 'eyes and ears' that is much more 'present' on a daily basis. Both public and some private interaction are surveilled. 'There are some reports that the government monitored homes and telephone calls' (US DOS 2008:10). During the November 2008 state-organised protests against the arrest of Rwandan Head of Protocol in Germany, MTN sent everyone the same messages in Kinyarwanda, urging people to gather at specific places and times. The US government has also allegedly sold Rwanda an email tracking system, which has been misused by the government to check on its critics/opponents and other 'suspicious' individuals.

Regarding informers (i.e. authorities' spies), 'they are almost everywhere. [They] work closely with the police, intelligence and the army. [They] are recruited mainly from the youth, [they are] trained in Akagera Park, between 6 and 12 months. Some state employees at district, cell level [have been trained]. Once they approached me and tried to convince me but I refused. [Those that approach you] promise you will get a job, and they do [indeed] get appointed first.'[170] People suggest there is a spy per organisation and perhaps per office and in fact that all newcomers (to an organisation), foreigners and Hutu are given someone to 'watch' them. '[There is] so many staff in government who

[169] Ibid.
[170] Interview with Bernard, March 18, 2009.

are not paid for what they have in job description, but for intelligence. The guy next to me…if you are a Hutu, it is compulsory, you are given someone to watch you. In many places, [there are] people who do not talk, because every word you say is analysed by those guys.'[171] The Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) seem to be involved in their own tracking and are said to possess lists of people to be 'watched' and potentially targeted.[172]

Surveillance is not only present inside organisations and government administration, but at the lowest levels of the administrative hierarchy, where those responsible after all 'know the people,' and where the two compulsory daily district reports on security source their material. Besides the administrative apparatus, the policing apparatus is also key. The latest addition to the police, *irindos* (civilians' night patrols) and Local Defence Forces (LDF) is the so-called 'community police.' But what is the function of yet another 'police' body? Community police are officially selected by people, they carry no gun and they are not paid. People explained them as 'plain clothes police,' or as not really policemen but simply 'party cadres' selected by the party leadership. 'Community policing is about *information*. Other countries do not have this system but we do because of the past of genocide. It is to prevent crimes before they happen. You don't want to arrive when somebody is already killed, you want to know about the plan before. People are chosen by others in the community on the basis of their integrity and that they like to

[171] Ibid.
[172] Tangible (though problematic) sources include: A 2009 asylum seeker court testimony repeatedly referring to lists; An actual 'hit list' embedded within a document entitled 'Some of the Conclusions of the Ambassadors' Meeting in Kigali,' February 2010. The document contains a list of names identified as 'enemies of the country who should be fought by all means possible and if necessary by assassination' but the original source is unverified. Received from a friend (university student), who in turn received the document from a Kigali-based journalist.

talk, that they are not silent…There are about 10 community police per 150 people say, so you have people in all corners.'[173]

Informers are indeed believed to be everywhere, and many people can simply be used for that purpose when and as necessary. To trace teachers harbouring divisionist ideologies, 'well, there are the students, they know and say what the teachers are teaching, [for example] with regards to history, what kind of examples they are using.' 'Problematic' individuals can be traced in bars and restaurants because 'even waiters, they can be intelligence.'[174] The way in which surveillance happens is described in detail by Begley (2009) who, during her field research on the contribution of Rwandan Muslims to the reconciliation process, found out from one of her informants that 'not just one, but five different men have been following our movements' (ibid:4). This included 'the waiter from the restaurant [who] hired a couple of street kids to follow us [and who in turn] reported to another man on the street who then contacted the Chairman of the RPF' (ibid).

It is difficult to know exactly who represents the 'ears and eyes' of higher authorities, and who is merely curious, a gossip, or generally suspecting, or whether those who observe from a distance do in fact understand anything being said and whether they pass it on. Notwithstanding all this, the perception remains that surveillance and locally traced intelligence are ubiquitous and the effects of this on behaviour are very real. Every researcher in Rwanda either experiences or hears stories of surveillance and notices the resulting self-editing behaviour. It is certainly true that neither email nor phone or even

[173] Interview with Muhazi camp coordinator, op.cit.
[174] Interview with Bernard, February 22, 2009.

certain occasions at home are considered safe for discussing political or otherwise 'sensitive' issues. 'No one really talks on the phone anymore, just the basics and that is it. You only start commenting on something and people stop you.'[175]

The Spectrum of State-Led Activities

While the administrative and information systems describe the general physical 'presence' of the state and its penetration of people's lives for the purpose of extracting loyalties, contributions (monetary and non-monetary), information and specific conducts, the present sub-section looks more in depth at that aspect of state presence that can be called 'saturation' of people's time with multiple state-ordained activities. First, the section shows that the difficulty of taxation in subsistence economies can and is resolved by introduction of alternative but not less potent forms of non-monetary taxation. Second, the actual tax has two components: production for state (labour) and non-production due to state (opportunity cost of time spent on all state-designed activities). Though this requires a much broader analysis than what can be offered here (*How much exaction is acceptable and in fact economically viable?*), it is important to think of the activities in today's Rwanda in this way— in lieu of finances, it is people's time and energy that are appropriated in the production of public goods (the effectiveness of which is to be disputed vis-à-vis evasion, perfunctory effort or lack of necessary skill).

The intricate administrative and information networks together with the imbrications of the party at every level harness the ability of the Rwandan state to 'mobilise' bodies to a political effect or to disperse them with the aim of preventing political expression. The

[175] Interview with Augustin, April 6, 2009.

ability of the state to mobilise its citizens is shown perfectly in the example of the state-organized protests in late 2008. In response to the arrest of Rose Kabuye in Germany, the government organized people from the cell level up. To this end, they used state administrative officials and text messaging. The result was a flood of people organized in their cell units and merging in the centre, clogging Kigali streets with their banners, slogans and songs. But in the north[176] too (and apparently across the whole country) people were gathered at sector level, either sitting on clearings in front of the administrative offices and listening to officials' speeches or marching (rain or no rain) on parts of the Kigali-Ruhengeri road.

Effective 'dispersion' of bodies, on the other hand, was demonstrated not too long after, during the refugee protests[177] in Kiziba and Gihembe camps. In January 2009, upon hearing that the leader of the CNDP ('protector of Congolese Tutsi') was arrested by Rwandan agents, who were supporting him all along, the refugees within Rwanda staged demonstrations. 'It was hundreds of refugees pretty much just marching around their own camp.' [178] However, 'the government thought that it could get out of hand or turn violent so they entered and sought measures to quell the situation. This included no refugees being allowed in or out of the camp until the situation was normalised... Refugees were encouraged...to refrain from any further demonstrations or protests and that's where it stands now.'[179]

[176] On November 19, 2008, when the protests reached their peak, I was travelling with NURC's Director of Civic Education to Ruhengeri.
[177] The only spontaneous protests that *do* happen in Rwanda seem to occur in the refugee camps.
[178] Private email communication between the REUTERS Rwanda correspondent and his superiors in the UK, forwarded to me on January 28, 2009.
[179] Ibid.

Due to the effectiveness of physical mobilisation, people not only *have to* but actually *do* participate in a myriad of activities, some of which are periodic and others ad-hoc. First, there are multiple unpaid administrative and policing duties (e.g. '*irindos*' – the local night patrols composed of village members). Second, there are general activities, which are costly in terms of time (as opposed to labour). Meetings happen both periodically (such as mandatory weekly security meetings) and on special occasions (e.g. on 'Hero's Day,' before elections), during commemoration (e.g. the annual official ceremonies and related activities) or for 'political happenings' (state protests; local RPF meetings). The *gacaca* is convened once a week, which can require extra sessions if a particularly complicated case is being heard.

Third, there are the most clearly labour-exacting duties. The last Saturday of every month is devoted to *umuganda* or 'community work.' *Umuganda* lasts from around eight in the morning until the early afternoon and is followed by a meeting. But 'voluntary' community work does not really have a clear limit. Local leaders have a leeway in trying to enforce extra work, especially in the countryside, where 'surprise *umugandas*' are not uncommon.[180] 'It is in Kigali that there is only one day of *umuganda*. So many districts have [it] even two times.'[181]

Work and meetings are also required as part of the *ubudehe* scheme. In *ubudehe*, cells receive small funds (i.e. 1000 USD) that they complement with their own resources (i.e.

[180] Informal chat with an anthropologist who conducted long-term fieldwork around Butare a couple of years before.

labour) to carry out locally designed projects such as upgrading or formation of anti-erosion terraces, upgrading or construction of roads, construction of schools, etc. *Umuganda* and especially *ubudehe*, where costs are 'matched' by provision of labour for what are often public infrastructure projects,[182] show perhaps most clearly the indirect but effective (in terms of mass targeting and capture) taxing of people in Rwanda.

In addition to the above, increasing amounts of people undergo *itorero* training (similar to *ingando* camps), which involves participation in public works (e.g. construction of a road). *Itorero* graduates draw up group *imihigos* that they pledge to fulfil, which usually means offerings of further free labour for a variety of projects. The pressure to fulfil sector or district *imihigo* goals translates into local authorities's ever greater (ab)use of people's labour. There is also pressure to be an *Agasozi Ndatwa* ('example hill') and *indasikirwa* ('the best of the best'[183]). 'Because [the leaders] want this [these awards], they impose some kind of meetings and work every week, even two times a week.'[184]

The result is that 'the poor do not have time.'[185] Due to varied exactions and insertions of the state, 'people are not doing what they should be doing [farming]. An agronomist [farmer], on Monday he had to go to see if the *gacaca* will continue, Tuesday was the RPF meeting, then other day some other meetings, plus all the social obligations.'[186] Survivors and women who have male relatives in prisons or TIG camps are perhaps

[181] Interview with Augustin at IRDP on February 25, 2009.
[182] Interview with *ubudehe* coordinator at a government ministry, January 30, 2009.
[183] Best among administrative levels such as districts but also among individuals.
[184] Interview with Bernard, a MINALOC employee, January 30, 2009
[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid.

impacted the most. The latter do not only lack the extra labour force and have to divide their time between field, children and state activities, they have the added responsibility of trekking to prisons, bringing their husbands, brothers, or fathers food and other basic necessities. At the National University of Rwanda (NUR) in Butare, one girl answered my question on the most pressing social problems in Rwanda in the following way: 'Poverty is increasing, especially in the countryside. These days there are a lot of government programs from *umuganda, gacaca, ubudehe…umuganda and gacaca*, there is no benefit, *ubudehe* at least it brings something to the person…Tuesday is *gacaca*, Saturday *umuganda*, Thursday *gacaca*…3 out of 6 days [there is something] because Sunday does not count…Plus a lot of meetings. Today at night we have a meeting with the executive secretary of *umurenge,* you cannot resist [refuse to go], otherwise you go to prison…[There is a] lot of government programs these days.'[187]

The manner in which the government 'makes' people comply with different types of exactions from conduct to labour, how and to what extent people try and manage to evade them, and what type of participation and production actually results, will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, we merely note that the state is 'overbearing' in both its penetration and extraction. Multiple activities exist that make their claim on people's resources. The extent is such that public goods and programs might today be taking precedence over private welfare of subsistence farmers. The attention to the former might already be at the cost of the latter— the relative inattention to private production on farms, with rural impoverishment as a result.

[187] NUR campus, Butare, February 5, 2009.

Lastly, there is reason to believe that the rural areas are disproportionately affected—there is greater surveillance and enforcement. 'Not many people go to *umuganda* here in the city, but in the countryside, eh, can you dare not to go even once? You are fined!'[188] Also, in the cities, there is the least need to build basic infrastructures and it is costly to transport city dwellers to work on rural projects, though terrace upgrading and ditch digging are not uncommon during *umuganda*. Also, office work dictates that in cities all state activities happen during the weekends and after work.[189]

What Counter-Weights to the State?

At this point, there are two questions of interest: *What is 'non-state? What is a 'bulwark' to the current penetrating party-state?* The reason why it makes sense to ask the above questions in Rwanda is that the intricate and penetrating state system (increasingly so) has been wholly captured by a specific party with an ideology that aims no less than to transform the society from above. In this goal, the state aims at 'totality' of influence. The state's aspiration is not to annihilate non-state organized life (church sermons, self-help groups, lunch discussions) but rather to have a degree of control and influence over all of these forms.

Importantly, this is not my attempt at discussion of 'civil society,' an ambiguous, highly Europe-indigenous term (Mbembe 2001, Uvin 1998). Even if we adopt a clear proxy—

[188] Interview with Bernard, February 22, 2009

[189] A couple of important specifications: First, the Saturday *umuganda* might directly affect overall sales of small and big businesses as the one rule that remains well-enforced is that all shops must be closed. The same holds for other meetings, gatherings, official protests, etc. Second, there are cases of private sector and public offices closing early due to different state-organized activities (e.g. official protests of Kabuye's arrest).

associational density—we find that in the case of Rwanda 'dense associational fabric' did not prevent fast disintegration of society in genocide (Uvin 1998: 163-179) and clearly proved an ineffective bulwark against, on the other hand, the extreme asset that the state proved to be. This is because the mere existence of NGOs and other formal or informal groupings does not highlight how government fundamentally moulds these— i) attacking them for perceived dissention; and ii) urging them to *cooperate* in the work of the state.

With regards to suppressions of the non-state, we have already discussed the strategies of curbing opposition and of managing dissent and the resulting restrictions on groupness[190] (e.g. political parties, media outlets, but also cultural and human rights organisations that can be and have been attacked as 'divisionist'). With regard to cooperation with the state, *imihigo* contracts are perhaps the best formal demonstration of this phenomenon. They are applied both horizontally and vertically, targeting all possible non-state spheres including the family and the private sector.[191]

'Opposition,' 'dissent' or simply 'unofficial scripts,' from which alternative groupness might arise, certainly do exist in their many shades. There are also bulwarks that are more institutionalized or organized than mere 'critique,' 'apathy' or 'avoidance.' In a semi-organized but underground form, a bulwark against the state exists in the Hutu 'conspiracy of silence' in *gacaca* (Rettig 2008). In addition, personal networks offer a rather fluid and informal bulwark against the state. People of mixed background, whose

[190] 'Groupness' (Brubaker 2004) is the ability and degree to which a collectivity can assume a corporate dimension, be effectively communicating, mutually interacting, and acting on its corporate goals.

affiliations cross ethnicities, are a good example of this phenomenon. While their background exposes them to distrust and even government persecution, they might at the same time get potentially life-saving information on time from an old acquaintance within the RPF establishment.[192]

Despite these and other dynamics that can 'undo' the state, the increasing permeation of the state into all aspects of life reflects the preoccupation with assuring alignment. As a result of this dynamic, neither religious organizations, schools, nor associations or even private sector and the family escape the state's reach— Some of these certainly constitute an alternative source of authority, attention and ideology, but they cannot openly oppose and often are urged to align and assist the state.

The 'Uses' of the State: Government's Goals

To what effects and for what goals is the state's overbearing presence used? Is it simply to keep people 'in line'? Analysing the evolution of practice and thinking on 'government' in Europe, Foucault (1991) notes a transition from 'sovereignty' (whose end is circular, i.e. the exercise of sovereignty) to government with a 'whole set of specific finalities'[193] (Foucault reprinted in Sharma 2006:137). In this new 'biopolitical' context, 'government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population' (ibid:140). In Rwanda, sovereignty and welfare coexist as the ultimate

[191] People question whether there is a 'private' sector at all. Most lucrative businesses are said to de facto belong to the party (are controlled by it) (see Willum 2001:115), and the private sector federation chairman is a political appointee.
[192] This has been the case repeatedly in the asylum case I worked on.
[193] E.g. maximization of wealth; provision of sufficient means of subsistence; assuring 'that the population is enabled to multiply' (ibid).

ends of government. Government is not only about 'care,' focusing on specific transformations in its populace, it is also about the survival of this particular project. Additionally, there is also an 'interim' layer of government that joins the preservation of power with social transformation— governmentality— understood here as the art of producing citizens that not only fit the government's policies but are also capable of accomplishing them. In general, governmentality encompasses 'the techniques and strategies by which a society is *rendered governable*' (Jones 2007:174).

In Rwanda, the state apparatus becomes an asset in the strengthening of governmentality. This occurs at two levels. First, there is the production of 'governable subjects,' meaning subjects that are docile (non-contrary, accepting, responsive) and easily organized (visible, readable, accessible, traceable, orderly). In such effort, homogeneity is preferable to divergence because it is associated with both docility and organization. However, there might be a trade-off between docility and organization that is not easily resolved— Publicly voiceless subjects (i.e. 'docile') are not easily legible (i.e. feelings, opinions do not necessarily dissipate but are guarded). In addition to requirements of homogeneity, people also need to be 'unified' and 'reconciled' at some level, the meaning of which, the production of which, and the constitution of which we explore later. Second, there is the attempt to transform subjects through incorporation of key knowledges. 'Change of mentalities' is seen as a necessary precursor to development. The change is attempted through formal and informal educations systems, and through processes of 'sensitisation' and 'mobilisation'.

i. Producing 'Governable Subjects'

There are various strategies that governments employ to create more governable subjects. 'Socio-scapes' need to be ordered and legible, and this in Rwanda is achieved through intricate administrative, information and physical infrastructure, and a small total area with high population density and almost no uninhabited land. The state's intricate reach also allows for mass gathering and dispersion of bodies. It eases 'tracing:' i) Persecuted individuals, whose names are often on lists, cannot easily 'hide;' In addition ii) tools such as 'mobility cards'[194] effectively trace spaces of reintegration; and iii) 'social maps'[195] effectively outline spaces of development insertion.

'Social engineering,' including identity engineering, is intensely deployed. The integrating theme, encompassing many different control-enhancing techniques, is 'containment.' This strategy broadly relates to the technique of discipline Foucault (1975:166) named *clôture* or 'enclosure.' But containment in Rwanda goes beyond physical enclosure in the Foucauldian sense (as 'capture' in convents, factories and military barracks of the 18th century Europe). Neither does it simply mean capture through improved organisation of analytical space whereby individuals are 'placed' so that they can be more easily seen and reached (thus preventing their disappearance, their 'diffuse circulation,' their 'dangerous coagulation,' ibid:168). 'Containment' in Rwanda does not only intensify 'over*seeing.*' It is also meant to cover up and remove from sight certain 'undesirable' aspects of social reality.

[194] A tool for tracing people (e.g. the relatives of young ex-combatants) by putting together a map of places and landmarks that the young man remembers. Interview with the Muhazi *ingando* coordinator, op.cit

At a physical and visible level, containment is reflected through multiple strategies of controlled and forced movement and stasis. Even at the level of government, one needs 'movement orders' to officiate;[196] here surveillance/legibility is achieved through a centralized signature and stamp. All traders are to be 'contained' in markets— street selling is forbidden. All poor rural farmers are to be contained in rural areas to limit unchecked urbanisation. This is achieved through, for example, restrictions on the type of house that can be constructed in urban areas and the consequent tearing down of sub-standard structures (i.e. mud-brick houses).

Another strategy is expropriation. In Kigali, expropriation involves destruction of 'slums' built on potentially lucrative land (close to the centre; this effectively adds up to economic cleansing). Expropriated residents are moved to the outskirts. With regard to the countryside, in May 2009 the Minister of Natural Resources announced the eviction and relocation of Ruhango (Gishwati Forest) residents and their relocation to a place 'the residents say is a barren and small land compared to Gishwati which has fertile soils.'[197] Additionally, there is containment in villagisation schemes (*imidugudu*). The creation of artificial villages (*imidugudu*) completely changes the traditional settlement scheme in Rwanda from 'dispersed' settlement to a 'regrouped' one (HRW 2001), the latter of which is easier to 'read' and control (Jackson for the IFC, no date). The 1996 National Habitat Policy gave as one reason for the establishment of *imidugudu* that 'regrouping

[195] A MINALOC employee showed me a large cloth with a hand-drawn map of a village, each house being coded according to type of structure (e.g. abandoned) and level of poverty of each household. Every village in Rwanda has such 'social map.'
[196] Officially called '*L'ordre de mission.*'

residents counters the[ir] dispersion, which makes it difficult to 'persuade' (sensitize) them' (in HRW 2001). Besides people, even the genocide human remains are 'contained.' These are gathered in official memorial sites— the only spaces where they, by law, can be laid to rest.

The government's technique of containment reaches beyond Rwanda's territory and comprises forced return of Rwandan asylum seekers. For example, in December 2009, 'the Interior Minister [of Burundi] Nduwimana ordered police to return 103 asylum seekers to Rwanda. Burundi's decision came days after an official delegation from Rwanda told the Burundian government that recently arrived Rwandans should be sent back to Rwanda' (HRW 2009). The goal was to contain unpleasant impressions about RPF-led Rwanda: 'Officials were quoted as saying that they wanted to protect Rwanda's *international image* as a *peaceful country that does not produce refugees* [emphasis added]' (HRW 2009).

Importantly, containment goes beyond physical manifestations. At the level of voice and action, it refers to all that, as a result of power's varied interventions, has been left unsaid and that has not been pursued. The attempt is to contain 'expression' of unofficial scripts, of undesirable opinions, emotions, even identities inside persons and inside unofficial and private spheres. *Why such profound containment?* One answer is certainly increased control. But containment's accent on removal of 'symptoms' (of dirt, poverty, frustration, trauma, voiced ethnicity) is also telling. Such acts of 'social gentrification,' which might

[197] Tindiwensi for NTK 2009.

seem ultimately shallow (they do not remove the underlying problems) nonetheless hold value for the government— they increase the coveted control over image and impression.

ii. Forming 'Changed Mentalities'

In its governmentality endeavours, the Rwandan government does not stop at control measures and containment. It also aims to change mentalities and transfer multiple knowledges that will help transform people into subjects capable of catalyzing change and fulfilling the development plans set forth in official documents. This transformation is to be achieved through formal and informal education. Education, that 'essential terrain of social reproduction' (Muller 2008:122) is used to transmit discourses on patriotism, nationalism and the citizen, all of which outline the expectations of the state with regard to the 'perfect subject.' In fact, 'civic education' (also called 'political education') is included in official curricula. Even at the NURC itself, the most important department is 'Department of Civic Education.' The aim is to create a person who 'responds to the requirements of the country,' a person 'of exemplary character who participates in development and other activities related to good governance and poverty reduction' (MINAGRI 2006:17).

In Rwanda, 'good' education (civic and state-organized) is counter-posed to 'bad' education (passing ideologies inside families, referred to as 'intoxication' or 'contamination' of children by parents). To counter-act the latter, 'they [the teachers] start very early in civic education, from nursery. Just like intoxication starts from very early age, so civic education needs to be started on early.'[198] Education or 'tutelage' does

[198] Interview with the Director of the KIST Language Center, March 10, 2009.

not only start early, it almost never ends. This might be connected to the paternalism characteristic of authoritarian systems, infantilisation of illiteracy, and the high-powered agenda of a developmental state.

Education does not happen only in classrooms or organized activities such as *ingando* camps or *itorero* ('traditional schools'). The 'passing of knowledge' occurs more widely through meetings, radio, television, activities, even songs and slogans on T-shirts and is best understood using the popular and ubiquitous terms of 'sensitisation.'[199] In Rwanda, this word is employed daily in all kinds of settings, including the NURC. The Kinyarwanda equivalents of the English 'sensitisation' or French *sensibilisation* are *gushishikariza* or *kubisenzibiliza* (though these are not used as often). When asked '*How can one combat genocide ideology?*' or '*What is the most important thing to build national identity?*' the instant response by an RPF Headquarters employee and an employee at the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), respectively, was 'sensitisation.'

What is this all-pervading 'sensitisation'? One informant explained it to me broadly as 'to teach someone, to explain things.'[200] But there are nuanced and important differences between 'teach,' 'sensitise,' and 're-educate.' One can 'teach' English but one 'sensitises' others to learn English. One can 'teach' about different ways of approaching justice post-genocide, but one 'sensitises' others to suppress ethnicity. Sensitisation is the urging to

[199] Naturally, this term has foreign origin and is employed everywhere where the word 'development' itself is employed intensely. In other words, it is a staple of vocabulary in places of high insertion of the development enterprise.
[200] Informal discussion with a Rwandan friend, Kigali, December 12, 2008.

adopt certain behaviors, opinions and values. When people are sensitized, they are handed 'indisputably' positive guidelines; these are not to be 'discussed.' Sensitisation of course comprises teaching too (e.g. what is the HIV virus). Finally, 're-education' has a strong pang of trying to remove 'negative' mentalities— genocide ideology, hate and divisionism— and to bring someone from the 'wrong' to the 'good' path. Re-education courses, such as *ingandos* for FDLR ex-combatants or released prisoners, comprise both teaching and a lot of sensitisation, but are special due to the intensity of the attempted 'turn-over.'

Some suggest there is also a difference between training and sensitisation. *Amahugurwa* (training or *formation*) takes 3 or 4 days and involves groups of more than 50 people whereas *ihugurwa* (sensitisation) involves many more people, perhaps 100 or more.[201] Sensitisation can indeed be understood as a mass persuasion/urging exercise. The typical target of sensitisation is *abaturage* – the population at large. 'Population' can be used in its general notion as in 'population of the country.' But in the language of government, *abaturage* refers to the rural illiterate masses. The local authorities also need to be sensitised because 'they are *with* the population day to day.'[202] In today's Rwanda, sensitisation is the most widespread manner of 'passing information' to the masses and is believed to be one of the most important tools in population's transformation. In essence, it is a top-down exercise connoting persuasion, if not simply instruction. Sensitisation's *raison d'être* is not discussion but rather rapid and mass *diffusion* or *vulgarisation* of ideas and attitudes that underpin desired behaviours.

[201] Interview with an employee of Association HAGURUKA, Kigali on January 20, 2009.
[202] Interview with the President of SCUR, January 9, 2009.

Conclusion

The state reach in today's Rwanda is not only deep and manifold with little counter-weight, but it directly leads to more effective political control. Through its presence and indirect control, a state of surveillance is created. This decreases open dissent and tightens the reproduction and reproducibility of the official script. The system does not only create strong governmentality due to its 'reach' – the intimate contact, the responsiveness, its readability of the social 'scape.' It governs through its accompanying effects as well. Suspicion, distrust (strongly compounded by genocide), fear and the resultant decreased dissention all assure that the state is better able to gather and disperse, to stage and broadcast, to attempt its desired transformations.

Overall, the chapter urges a more critical scrutiny of 'local' 'participation' in 'traditional activities,' of their *actual* meaning in the context of strong hierarchies of authority and a highly centralized political system, which has at its disposal a dense state apparatus. One important lesson that arises from the analysis is that 'grassroots' does not always mean 'free of central power,' that 'local' activities bringing together scores of people do not mean power has been 'decentralised,' that people have a greater stake in, 'say' or power over their lives, or that the most pressing issues are in fact openly discussed. Despotism can also be decentralized (Mamdani 1996), and so can disempowerment.

CHAPTER 5. **Dynamics of Power and its Effects in Daily Life**

While the previous two chapters focused on broad political structures and dynamics, the goal of this brief chapter is to analyze the *micro* workings of power and their concrete effects on people. *How does the working of power make them feel? What behavioural strategies result? What is 'dissent' and how does it manifest itself in daily life? What are the consequences of all this for voice and silence and for participation?* The unspoken externality of the Rwandan political system is how it inscribes itself into many bodies producing negative feelings and social attitudes that are both collectively defeating and generating self-limiting behaviour on an individual level. There is no 'balance' between political structure and 'people agency.' In the context of exclusion and structural violence, what do 'resilience' (Betancourt 2010), 'bearing' or *kwihangana* (Zraly 2009) and resistance (Thomson 2009) really mean?

The Workings of Power

'Government' as the 'conduct of conduct' ranges from governing the self ('technologies of the self') to 'governing others' (Lemke 2000:2). The term 'government' already implies the notion of power (i.e. *Who and how can govern others and self?*) and suggests that rather than being negative or positive, power is 'productive' (can either empower or dis-empower). In the 'modern state,' power is mostly about guidance, 'i.e. governing the forms of self-government, structuring and shaping the field of possible action of subjects' (Lemke 2000:3). Fundamentally then, power is not external to subject's wishes, beliefs

and behaviours but inserts itself in these, trying to 'shape and determine' them (Lukes 1974:27). From this perspective, the 'polarity of subjectivity and power ceases to be plausible' (Lemke 2000:12).

Power in Rwanda (just as elsewhere) takes many forms, from physical coercion and indirect pressure to inducement, persuasion and knowledge ('regimes of truth'). Some of these have already been discussed. First, there is discursive power whereby political or personal ends can be achieved by appropriating the implicit logics that structure official narratives. For example, the discourse on unity and division with its dichotomous and security driven meta-structuring devices of enemy and friend can be used to attack anyone that can be construed as political opposition. The attack can be launched through law and prosecution; all that is needed is the allegation of divisionism/sectarianism and/or genocide ideology.

Another highly effective and financially non-burdening technology of power is indirect control and surveillance. The intricate system of administration and information offers both an opportunity to co-opt multiple people to government's ranks, and to mould people's behaviour through the 'overseer' effect. But the power of the gaze does not only derive from 'ears and eyes' being dispersed in the external environment (whereby the very uncertainty but high probability that someone is watching produces effects), the gaze is also gradually *internalized* by a person who will then 'exercise this surveillance over, and against, himself' (Foucault 1980:155).

The power of the discourse and its translation (through extension of its structural logic) into selective coercions by the administration, the courts or the police or into the making of 'helpful' laws and wars, or the power of the gaze, not always clearly identified through a uniform and a body in a *panopticon* (Foucault 1975) and thus strengthened by it being 'possibly anywhere,' are important but not sufficient. There are other more explicit styles of power employed such as coercion, which is necessary to assure attendance, compliance and contributions.

'If you don't go to the activities…you are putting yourself in a trap like a rat. Why? Because there are so many instances when you need medical insurance, travel documents, and wherever you go, whatever service you need, they will ask you, did you participate, where is your *umuganda* card? Automatically, you will not get what you want …this is the social compulsion and social control mechanism used.'[203] This observation seems to comport well with reality. First, refusing administrative services and denying access to markets are two common coercive strategies. Second, to monitor attendance and compliance with policies, the government has resorted to using documents such as *umuganda* and *gacaca* cards, *mutuelle de santé* cards (proving required health insurance payment) or *Umurenge Sacco* cards (required savings deposits).

It has been reported that 'leaders in Kiziguro sector have pegged local authority service to resident's attendance of *umuganda* in order to attract more participants' (Ngabonziza for NTK, Aug 12, 2009). Coercion is often used by local officials anxious to meet *imihigo* targets:

> Commotion erupted in Ruhengeri town on Thursday when residents with no health insurance cards were locked out of the market. Residents were shocked to find gates closed, by sector leaders with the help of local defence personnel who demanded health insurance cards as a requirement to access the market. [..] Jonas Nkomeze, the town cell leader who was manning the entrance said they wanted to ensure that 90 percent of the residents have cleared health insurance dues by the end of this month. [..] Sensitisation campaign for the *Mutuelle de Santé* (health insurance) has been one of the highlights in the performance contracts (*imihigo*) of the district leaders (NTK, March 15, 2008).

A government report (MINALOC, 2006:39) mentions similar type of coercion with regard to assuring contributions to the sector community education fund (*ikigega cy'uburezi*):

> Contributions are supposed to be voluntary depending on the means available to each resident. However, according to several focus groups participants, there is an element of coercion in this process. They claim there are no open sanctions for those who do not pay, but noted that people pay especially on market days and when they want a service from the local government. One interviewee felt it was impossible to sell one's produce on market days unless the education fund had been contributed to.

Besides coercion, power also works through persuasion and inducements. In 2008, a system of *Agasozi Ndatwa* or 'exemplary hills' was introduced with the aim of speeding

[203] Interview with Bernard, a civil servant, February 22, 2009.

up implementation of government development policies detailed in the Integrated Development Program (IDP). Each sector would choose a 'model' village, which should serve as a prototype for others. The strategy was explained to me as follows: 'For example, take the *akarima urugu* (little garden of the enclosure). The aim is that all households should have small garden for carrot, onion, and so on so that they can be more self-sufficient. The *Agasozi Ndatwa* are supposed to be persuasion through successful example—You do not tell people they *have to* plant a garden, but show them a success case and then they want to follow what people on that hill do.'[204] The idea is not new. *Agasozi Ndatwa* sounds similar to the ultimately disappointing system of 'model farmers' instituted under Habyarimana (Uvin 1998:133), 'the aim being that their highly visible innovations would spread to their neighbours by example and imitation.'[205]

Power's 'Productiveness'

i. Management of Voice and Silence in Rwanda

An intricate system of surveillance does not only produce a generalized state of suspicion, it also structures the space of the said and the un-said. Surveillance made me and my informants change topics of conversation or stop talking, in some cases it made us progressively diminish contact. But in its essence, surveillance is meant to restrict the very access to certain scripts and, ultimately, to prevent those scripts from arising in the first place. Fundamentally, as I will show, the discussion on management of voice is a broader analysis of power—the power to represent, stake out, to assert.

[204] Informal discussion with Jean-Claude, a NURC employee, over lunch; January 7, 2009.
[205] The system is (and has been) practiced elsewhere in Africa; an example is present-day Ethiopia.

Many Rwanda researchers talk about the experience of being stuck in the 'Tutsi bubble' and how the international community takes the opinion of those in power as fact. Little is written about *how* this happens, however. First, not all Tutsi agree or in fact are the 'keepers of the truth.' Just like in pre-colonial Rwanda, where there was a class of people – *the abiiru*— who preserved the official history of the kingdom,[206] so today there exists a protocol for creating an official voice. In Rwanda, the right to speak is very concentrated and belongs to select 'guardians.' Depending on the theme, there seem to be specialized collectives that hold the '*ijwi*,' the authoritative voice, being the '*isoko*,' the source of authoritative information on a given subject. Even within these institutions or collectives, there might be 'authorized spokesmen.'

With regard to themes of unity and reconciliation, I was repeatedly referred back to the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) as the ultimate and authoritative source of information. I met with this type of response at government ministries and commissions, NGOs and associations. Naturally, NURC was not the omniscient information bank— it was mostly involved in coordination, policy, national-level meetings and events; in terms of activities, it was organizing only *ingando*. I needed to approach other actors and learn about different activities; I also wanted to hear divergent versions, not authoritative conclusions. But NURC was the official source, and it was the protocol for me to work, if not solely 'within' them, then definitely 'through' them (I gently disobeyed this tacit norm). The constant referral back to the '*isoko*' again

[206] Vansina (2004:4) calls these 'courtiers who were official ideologues in charge of giving meaning to history and of elaborating the official version of its details. It was their task to set it forth, to hold it, to defend it against heresy, to elaborate on it, and to apply it to all the historical genres practiced at the court.'

underlined the tendency to point in the right (i.e. safe) direction, to converge to the appropriate centre.

Though this kind of management of official voice represents a real challenge for the researcher, we need to look at this phenomenon a little more closely. Naturally, official voices do not criticize the government and outwardly second its policies. However, they still have a potential to 'reveal.'[207] Voice, even if 'official' voice, can still produce a personalized, descriptive and enlightening account. One realizes this when orality is taken away, and replaced with the ultimate 'fixed voice'—the written word. It is in fact the written narratives, produced in the desired neo-liberal language of donors and largely for their consumption too, that diverge most from reality.

Though accessing multiple 'official' voices in their diverse settings can indeed be enlightening, without a simultaneous access to unofficial transcripts i) one fails to discover counter-narratives or else the 'full' story of the governing structure (i.e. there is a limit to what official voices 'admit'); ii) one cannot contextualize the official transcripts gathered; and, most importantly iii) one cannot offer an in-depth analysis of the wider political implications vis-à-vis silence and voice. The entrapment of foreigners in the official and the 'fixed' (written rendering of the official story) may result in many informants having a profound sense of helplessness when faced with what they see as unbelievable mis-conception or perhaps literally under-standing of the political situation.

[207] In my experience, only a few people were extremely measured in their response or taciturn. Most people liked to talk, and in some cases, these people who turned into great informants, spending hours with me explaining details of programs, policies or activities, such as the coordinator of the Muhazi *ingando* camp

When I posed some of my 'naïve' questions (e.g. about manipulations of 'genocide ideology' discourse), one of my informants would respond frustrated: 'You can spend your whole life here and not understand what is going on.' Or 'I have been telling you, you cannot catch the reality as it is, but for us…' '[Me:] Do all Rwandans know?' 'They all know, but they prefer to keep quiet.'[208]

The control over voice, besides leading to a lopsided account (with official reality being overrepresented), also results in i) embodied violence; ii) constrictions on participation; and iii) usurpation of the domains of 'authority' and 'validity' (down-grading of the non-agreeable). Fear, for one, pushes people into quietness, often a humiliating silence: 'You [the government] proclaim that unity is there, [that] we are reconciled, but I sit in the office and I do not utter a single word. Just imagine sharing an office with two, three compatriots and all day what they talk about is just insulting you, provoking you, and if you dare to respond, you are automatically accused of *ingengabitekerezo* [ref. to genocide ideology]. To avoid that, you just decide to keep quiet.[209]

Second, the fact that there is a carefully defended official story also means that while discussion forums might exist and people might 'talk,' not everything can be discussed. There are numerous taboo subjects in Rwanda. 'There are two things we don't talk about— the army and the succession of Kagame.'[210] To this must be added topics such as 'ethnicity, Rwandan citizenship, non-selective justice, as well as strategies for addressing

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minutely detailing his own system of 'indirect control' or explaining to me what community police is 'really about.'

[208] Interview with Bernard, March 18, 2009.

[209] Interview with Bernard, February 22, 2009.

reconciliation, impunity, and human rights abuses' (NDI 2003:10). Third and finally, the fact that voice has its designated and concentrated authority means that all that counters the official narrative can not only be punished, it is also pushed into the informal sphere from which it has to be retrieved, but in that case it is dismissed as 'bar talk' or 'gossip.' When voice *is* retrieved, it is stripped of authority.

The flipside of silencing is the purposeful 'urging to voice.' Most clearly, this refers to the *government*'s push for reproduction and thus validation of official scripts. Less apparent is the role of the non-governmental sector (IOs, NGOs and associations). Through a myriad of 'participatory' activities, this sector urges 'free expression' and 'personal opinion.' First, these efforts might create the impression that 'locally-sourced' and 'encouraged' voice is indeed authentic. The perceived ubiquitous surveillance, however, makes this an unlikely presupposition and makes the whole endeavour problematic. Non-governmental 'spaces of voice' can create a false sense of security. As an example, a Kigali-based research institute held 'consultative meetings' and 'debates' with the population on themes such as rule of law, peace and democracy. '[Me:] But aren't people scared to talk? 'Well, we use audio-visual material [to break the ice], we film people and then show it to other groups. When people see others talking, they talk too. […] Even on the issue of arbitrary power, they are scared to talk first— [after all] *the authorities are present at all the forums*; but eventually, they do talk [emphasis added].'[211]

[210] Interview with Augustin, January 21, 2009.
[211] Interview with Yvonne, IRDP Communication and Public Relations Officer, Kigali, November 3, 2008.

Not all in Rwanda, however, concerns the management of *voice*. An equally important struggle regards the breaking of silence. Much remains unsaid about the past that weighs heavily on the present. 'That is the problem, to make those in prisons talk.'[212] The government has been trying hard to break the silence among prisoners, not only for the purpose of clarifying the crime they have committed, but also in order to speed up the process of justice and thus ease the overcrowding in prisons, to bring closure to families of victims, and to implicate others who have participated. For this purpose, the government has created a set of incentives— If a detainee admits to a crime and repents, they are released, pass through a local *gacaca* court, which might send them for some years to a labour and re-education camp called TIG.

There is also talk of a 'conspiracy of silence' in the countryside. Informal organizations are said to exist among relatives of detainees, composed predominantly of women, who urge others to vow silence at *gacaca*. The most talked-about organization is *Ceceka!* ('Shush!' or 'Be silent!'), but there are said to be others such as *Ntubavemo* (Don't betray them!). Efforts such as *Ceceka* represent the building of negative social capital in Rwanda and restrict the operation of *gacaca* (Rettig 2008:38). A prisoner has defined *Ceceka* as 'saying nothing if you are a Hutu. For example…I go to testify, and Hutus will zip it while survivors speak. But it is the Hutus who saw what happened; the Tutsi were hiding' (ibid). Perpetrators are not only protected by the silence of their wives and other family members. Their very entry into society prevents many survivors from speaking out at *gacaca* for fear of retribution.

[212] Informal interaction with a survivor and NURC employee, March 17, 2009.

Finally, political power itself can be conceptualised through the language of voice. In Rwanda, one relevant notion is that of *rukokoma*—a decisive and inclusive political dialogue. The word derives from a Rwandan phrase *inama rukokoma*, meaning the crowd puller (Ugandanet 2003:2). *Rukokoma* was the name for the Arusha sessions in 1991 that eventually led to an agreement to open up the one-party government of Habyarimana, clearing the way for the multi-party system (Africa Watch 1992). Today, in view of manipulated elections and a *de facto* one party system that 'exports' or 'exiles' opposition and suppresses opposing voices inside the country, there is again a call by both Rwandans and some donors for a *rukokoma*, an inter-Rwandese dialogue (RMP 2003:8, 25). Besides *rukokoma*, there is a broader concept of *uruvugiro*— the right to speak. All in all, though in Rwanda there might be many physical places where debates take place, it is only a small minority who today possess *uruvugiro*. Those in power, rather than speaking on behalf of all or many, try hard to make all or most 'speak with their mouths and see with their eyes.'[213]

ii. The Landscape of Feelings, Attitudes and Relations

There is a wealth of literature on the nature of political systems and the relative concentration of power in each. Very little is written, however, on what it means to live in an authoritarian system. Below the macro facts of 'dominance of the executive' and 'lack of opposition,' there is a whole scope of micro-effects, which when witnessed, are a much more potent indictment of the state than broad analytical narratives. Naturally, the 'productiveness' of a repressive system, in terms of feelings and attitudes, has to be seen side-by-side with the lingering effects of genocide. Often they compound each other.

[213] Excerpt from 'Christophe's Story' by Nicki Cornwell (2006:3), where the child's father comments on

There is distrust: 'In this country there is no one to trust;'[214] 'Rwandans do not trust each other.'[215] Trust has to be built because it is never there completely. A survivor explains that genocide makes you 'forever lose a part of your trust in others' (in Hatzfield 2000:17). Another survivor, talks of a 'doubt about everything' that settles on a person who has witnessed, and a distrust of everyone— 'strangers, colleagues, even neighbouring survivors' (ibid:124).

The flipside of distrust is suspicion. 'It has developed as some sort of culture, that wherever you are, you have to be suspicious.'[216] Surveillance definitely further contributes to distrust and suspicion, and ultimately fear and paranoia, especially when trying to share information challenging the official script. When suspicion reaches a sufficient scale, it becomes self-enhancing. Suspecting people can become suspicious. When being observed at close quarters, one tends to lower one's voice, lean over, look around, lay the head on the shoulders to create a more intimate space. The tendency to talk about certain subjects in hushed voices, leaning towards the centre with a changed, serious expression is likely to draw attention. It is communicating that 'they have something to hide.' During my chat with an informant at Simba café, the waitress came to ask if someone could join our table and I reluctantly agreed. 'Are you sure?' my informant asked me in disbelief, 'we are discussing sensitive information!'[217] Our topic was reconciliation in Rwanda.

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the *kubohoza* group coming to his house.
[214] Interview with Bernard, March 12, 2009.
[215] Interview with Augustin, April 6, 2009.
[216] Interview with Bernard, March 18, 2009.

The repressive political system also pushes people to 'falsity.' Official transcript is a currency and a safeguard and at times has to be used or manoeuvred around, even though this might come at some cost to personal integrity. Suppression of opposition and constant surveillance at times forces people into humiliating silence. People's necessity to agree and to support at times forces them to adopt a degrading voice. The feelings that result from reflection on such compromises: shame, frustration, anger, even guilt arising from feelings of duplicity.

In a system tightly controlling voice and silence and the propagation of information through mass media, the only antidote is 'unverified information exchange' which people use on a mass scale daily and which includes rumour, *radio trottoir* (street chat) and informal exchanges dismissed as 'bar talk.' Everything is pushed there—to homes, restaurants and taxis and 'that everything' is proclaimed as groundless. But rumour, though headless and sourceless, remains a powerful tool. It can spread fast and wide and has real repercussions.

For one, rumour can induce fear. The lack of verification mechanisms of the information contained in something 'rumoured' and the resulting impossibility of ascertaining its content, in fact the broader environment of generalized carefulness (arising from suspicions/lack of trust) and uncertainty (controlled information and arbitrariness of power) leads to seeming 'overreactions'—e.g. fleeing to exile in Burundi just because the anthropologist in the community is rumoured to know what they did and to 'hand them over' to the authorities. But such a disproportionate act might in fact be no more than a

[217] Interview with Protais, Communications Officer at an NGO, op.cit.

calculated protection, an insurance against the 'possibility' that the said is true. This eventuality is worth protecting oneself against in the situation of a 'broken market of information.' The fleeing Hutu did not talk to the anthropologist because she talked and worked with genocide survivors. The survivors might have used this privilege to spread the rumour, thereby getting rid of the alleged perpetrators. In a situation of information asymmetry, rumour can induce fleeing, but it can also induce mass return as we saw with the example of the RPF manipulating the UNHCR information about return packages post-genocide.

Imperfect information creates negative externalities— effects that reach beyond the parties who exchange this type of information or who fail to communicate. For example, with regard to the Kigali mass expropriations, rumour creates maps of fear that are broader than the actual area to be cleared. A Gitega sector official told me: 'You see how Gitega is [pointing down to the valley, referring to the poverty]…expropriation, they fear it. …People are coming to see us 'When will we go? When will they come to expropriate us?'[218] People in Kicukiro were rumoured to fear similar rumours. However, a City of Kigali employee (an urban planner) was surprised to hear this. Gitega is not on the 'master plan' as a target for expropriation. 'But maybe they are scared because we visited and assessed the area some months back.'[219]

In other words, power at the micro level works on the principle of 'possibility.' Widespread surveillance and control makes it 'possible' even 'probable' that you too are

[218] Interview at Gitega sector offices, January 21, 2009.
[219] Informal discussion, January 21, 2009.

watched and that this moment is monitored. Arbitrary power cannot be completely predicted, but it does manifest, it is possible. Rumour works because it too is possible. In other words, not knowing exactly prevents us from refuting a given statement with absolute certainty. The principle of 'possibility' undermines perceived control over one's life, it undermines trust, fosters suspicion, even paranoia, and creates fear. The principle of possibility can be used as a tool of suppression. Stigma or 'the blemish' (attack on reputation) is a powerful strategy to neutralise a person. The power of the blemish does not lie in its 'veracity'— one is tainted simply through association. In fact, the less one knows about the details or circumstances of the case, the more powerful the stigma.

The micro effects of power are also recognizable through people's self-censure, self-editing and self-silencing. As Ingelaere (2009:526) mentions, 'the Kinyarwanda word *kwibwizira* entails this idea of auto-censorship. It expresses the idea that people do what authorities want them to do, without the latter asking them to do so or using coercion.' The 'general Truth [official transcripts] widely propagated in the countryside…has instilled a far-reaching degree of self-censorship in the population' (ibid:522; also Ingelaere 2010). My own observation certainly corroborates Ingelaere's findings. At a Kigali-based human rights watchdog, I inquired whether it is sufficient to *mention* ethnicity and get punished for it. 'No, it is not sufficient, however, people self-edit to avoid getting into trouble.'[220] As detailed above, sometimes my informants would switch subjects or stop talking when sensing surveillance. The analysis of voice and silence suggests why many might not open up in the first place or produce mere echoes of the official script without someone urging them to. At the IRDP, I asked whether there is

exclusion in Rwanda. 'This is complicated. [On one hand] there are mechanisms put in place that exclude, and [then] there is auto-exclusion. People are self-excluding…[they say] ah, these are Tutsi things.'[221] Further to this, encounters with the political machine make one revisit their capabilities and possibilities, to restrict their goals ('Muhima is perhaps too controversial to work in;' 'If I include this research module, can they do something?').

Overall, the system of power in Rwanda inscribes itself into human bodies through feelings and attitudes some of which are described above, and these in themselves aid the project of governance. Power at the micro level is often hard to 'see' and measure because rather than a 'flow' between two persons, power is dispersed and embodied. This is why it might be difficult to grasp repression – The *chicote* (the whip), a symbol of disciplining and culture of terror under colonialism, has been replaced by more insidious forms of power. It is precisely these forms that are favoured as 'indeed, power is at its most effective when least observable' (Lukes 1974:1).

What is 'Dissent'?

Dissent is conceptualised here as a power to contest, to reclaim meaning and control over one's life. It is not simply 'resistance;' it is persistence, resilience, it is manipulation. Some in Rwanda interpret dissent as 'refusal' and 'saying no.' One informant tells me that especially in the countryside 'there is a tendency to accept what you hear.'[222] Rather than higher 'proneness to conformity,' however, this might reflect the greater control

[220] Interview on January 9, 2009.
[221] Interview with Augustin, January 21, 2009.

over populations in these areas and their relative lack of resources and options. In general, my informant continues, 'Rwandans should learn to say 'no' to the politicians…The government [managed] to seduce them. ... Even today, the government says close all the shops, and they don't refuse. Otherwise they can go to jail. [But] with that, they will feel anger, you cannot have reconciliation.'[223]

Rettig (2008:41) went further and directly elicited opinions on compliance, summarizing them as follows: 'The [Sovu] community agrees nearly unanimously that 'it is important to obey the authorities.'' Besides the fact that it is problematic to conceptualise dissent as refusal or to look for dissent through questionnaires and interviews, the lack of 'expression' of dissenting opinion itself has to be questioned. People in rural areas do protest actions from the top and do so even in a collective manner. For example, the inhabitants of the Gishwati Forest, upon hearing of their impending eviction in May 2009, uprooted 70,000 nursery trees planted on 40 acres of land (Tindiwensi for NTK 2009). Surely, such ostentatious dissention is a luxury; it is expensive— it can lead one to jail.

Repression and control are strong, which explains both the lack of organized protests, the lack of public criticism, and the relatively high (perceived) compliance and attendance. But the general lack of open refusal to follow orders, and even the overt pronouncement that it is important to follow them, does not mean that i) dissent does not exist; or that ii) people actually 'accept what they hear' and even what they themselves *say*. Interestingly,

[222] Interview with Protais, Communication Officer at an NGO, Kigali, February 23, 2009.
[223] Ibid.

there seems to be awareness even among state agents that the 'acceptance' is only surface-level. A district official in Southern province tells a researcher (Ansoms 2009:298). 'You talk to them [peasants] and you think they listen, but the people do nothing with the good advice you give them. They say "yes" because they are tired of you and your speeches, but they are never convinced…They are resistant, they are really difficult.'

In a system set to produce and oversee suppression and containment, the outcry moves inside of bodies— the revolt is the anger that my informant mentions, the resistance is the refusal to believe. It is a play on words and rules and their appropriation. It is denial, lying, laughter and derision. It is 'foot-dragging', 'working the system' (Scott 1985:xv-xvi), even sabotage. It is maintaining of and passing on of counter-narratives. Multiple strategies of dissent exist in Rwanda, which, just like the power from the top, are more subtle.[224]

One adaptation strategy against surveillance (and compliance) is docking, hiding, evasion— the skilful disappearance from the state's eye. Street hawking, forbidden in Rwanda, is a good example. Most traders (once they scratch together start-up capital for a hawking business) cannot afford fees associated with selling in markets (stall rent, 'trading fee,' clean up fee) or shops (rents). On the other hand, containment in markets and shops eases tax extraction for the state and fosters 'order and cleanliness' which are marketable— they attract foreign investment (and are a 'hallmark,' part of the 'brand'

that Rwanda so meticulously builds). Walking the back streets of Kigali, you indeed do not find 'stalls' and goods spread on pavements. But a new alternative has developed – the 'sauntering salesmen' or 'strolling sellers' clad with goods, slowly passing by. The government does not give up. In order to effectively eliminate the tricking of the state, it started deploying a 'unit of police in plain clothes' (Barigye 2008). But the street vendors are not discouraged either. A woman caught selling in the street explained: 'We can't stop working because we can't stop eating' (ibid).

But surveillance can be played with and used to one's own purpose, not only dodged. For example, one can pass on messages that are not only (or at all) meant for the interlocutor but for those who are 'listening in.' These messages might seem ambiguous if considered only in the context of the 'official' audience— the researcher— but take a specific and clear meaning if the 'surveiller' is incorporated into the scene. During one sensitive discussion at the Green Corner restaurant, my informant and I realised we were listened to and observed by a man who sat right next to us. My informant adjusted to the situation, lowering his tone of voice, turning to me, though he still continued with his critique (unlike another time when we switched to completely different themes such as health). At one point though, unexpectedly, this hushed tone was replaced with an unusually loud voice, as if this was an announcement, a statement to a wider audience: 'Once my teacher at Dar es-Salaam University told us to bear in mind the following statement. Absolute power corrupts and absolutely collapses.'[225]

[224] There are also moments of open 'voicing' and more direct confrontation. For example, a community sent a letter expressing dissatisfaction over expropriation and their insufficient compensation. In *ingando* lecture on materialism, people openly communicated their disagreement,etc.
[225] Interview with Bernard, February 22, 2009.

The monthly *umuganda* is another good example of a variety of dissent strategies. First, there are the tacitly 'excused' groups. Children and old people are not required to attend, but women also seem to have a leeway of either absenting or, if they do come, of sitting down and chatting together behind bushes. 'Normally males go, females not so much.'[226] Another officially excused group are the Adventists who have an alternative day for *umuganda*. Based on the numbers of people strolling the roads freely one *umuganda* day, I joked with a NURC employee that there seems to be an 'awful lot of Adventists in Kigali.' People also manipulate the discourse itself: 'I am doing *umuganda* of my home,' tells me a friend one Saturday. Others said they 'participated by cleaning their living room.'[227]

The strategy of 'dodging rules' and 'pretending to work' during *umuganda* seems to be quite widespread, at least in Kigali. One *umuganda* Saturday, I decided to do a 'transect' tour of Nyamirambo in order to answer the question: *What actually happens in my neighbourhood on umuganda day?* Shops and markets were indeed closed and locked, but hawkers operated. Buses and cars did not pass the main roads, but *motos* (motorbike taxis) did offer rides through back roads and avenues without roadblocks. Multiple people could be seen just strolling and milling around Byriogo at the height of *umuganda*, or just watching the occasional group of men at work on a specific project (usually digging a ditch), or chatting seated on the stoops of houses. A loud chatter of multiple voices could be heard from a lot of *urugos* (enclosures).

[226] Ibid.
[227] Janna Graham's online blog named 'Umva [Listen];' entry from June 2, 2008.

In general, I saw very few organized activities, and in their lieu, apparently, the popular activity was 'sweeping dirt.' Already at 6am that day, I woke up to the persistent 'swoosh swoosh' of multiple brooms (*imikubuzo*) at work. Our security guard explained that people often just clean around their houses, doing *buhabanura*, *gusukura* (cleaning). Another favourite activity consisted of manicuring lawns and grass patches. The perfect example of the 'hollowed out' activity done 'for show' that urban *umuganda* has become was a woman eagerly working at a patch of grass on a small street isle made for a single traffic sign— 'forbidden to turn right.' Yet another skilful compromise was 'leaning over a hoe or shovel.' In the back streets of the Rwezamenyo cell, I saw a number of guys just standing in one position, ready to move and demonstrate involvement if need be by digging a little in the dirt. On the clearing outside of our market, the gate to which was besieged by police, I asked a woman in my broken Kinyarwanda '*Mu munsi y'umuganda urakora iki*?'—What do you do on the day of *umuganda*? '*Gusukura*' (cleaning), she responded resolutely, not flinching the least at the fact that plenty of people, in plain sight, were doing exactly nothing.

Most interesting aspect of the scene, though, were the Local Defense Forces (LDF) in their red overalls, just walking through the streets, with no seeming effect on the co-promenaders and dockers. A tacit agreement seemed to have been struck— as long as *someone* is working and as long as the rules of closing business and traffic are observed, they leave people be. This is how an enforced state activity— whether glorified by state

and some foreign observers, or condemned by those who see it as a restriction of freedom or harmful to business and subsistence— in fact twists into a parodical uselessness.

'Flight' is another dissent strategy, which takes many forms. Herbst (2000) in fact suggests that physical exit rather than voice has been the classical form of dissent in Africa (and a form of escaping tribute payments); whole communities are known to have simply migrated away. This theory should be treated carefully. It does not take into account the fact that people may have attachments to specific places, which makes them stay even if they suffered or suffer outright political persecution, or that migration has tangible costs, which to some are prohibitive. Further to this, in the era of nation-state hegemony, in Rwanda we observe a curious marriage of voice and exit (Hirschman 1970)— multiple opposition groups in exile enact 'voice after exit,' aiming for re-entry to this particular territory if the centre of power can be reformed. But much more local acts of 'flight' occur in contemporary Rwandan state. For example, there are the 'deserters' from TIG labour camps. In the makeshift camp in the Gikomero sector, a daily-updated blackboard announced a total of 44 deserters in a camp of 603 *abahari* (people present).

Besides physical flight, there is escape in sleeping, dreaming, not paying attention. During the seven hour long lectures at *ingando* attended by a thousand students, many dozed off, talked to each other in hushed voices and let their mind trail off (were bored). This happened despite the hawkish looks of the 'disciplinarian' seated by the speaker and despite the soldiers' promenading through the aisles, checking notes and delivering punishments that included pouring water down the collars of the 'dozers.' There are also

many who want to escape the invasive heaviness and ever-present reminders of genocide during *icyunamo*—the April-June commemoration period. Expatriates take vacations outside Rwanda, many Hutus 'close themselves in their houses' to avoid the stares, the scene, the screams. But even some survivors want to escape the pain that comes pouring from everywhere. One evening, when we are all seated in the kitchen, we ask a genocide orphan cared for by my housemate what he wants to do during *icyunamo*: *'Rukundo, ushaka gukora iki mu cyunamo?'* He responds in English in his soft, barely audible voice: 'Sleep…yeah'.

In general, the main micro strategies against the uncertainties of arbitrary power manifest themselves within or 'on' the person. Faced with a strong enemy/friend sense and faced with arbitrary power, the optimum strategy is 'dispersion' and to adopt a multiplicity of 'personas.'[228] The rule is to be nowhere specific, be here and there, be this and that so that you can become dispersed and cannot be pinned down, being perhaps neither an enemy but perhaps neither a friend. 'I am on no one's side,' an employee at *Justice, Paix, Action* tells me after explaining identity-based conflicts within a Rwandan human rights organization. On another occasion, a discussion with a long-term informant finally delivers an answer to a key sensitive question: *How do you resolve the tension between working for the government and being so critical of it?* My informant responds immediately— 'You cheat me you love me, I cheat you that you are my friend.'[229] This is a fitting simile for the broader 'bad faith economy' (Scheper-Hughes 1992:111) where all sides pretend but might feel ill-served in the end.

[228] Meaning 'social masks' or 'versions of self' that all people possess, the appearance one presents to the world.

The strategy can be expanded upon— be many things at once, and the right thing at the right time. In other words, be situation-strategic, be interlocutor-specific. Ingelaere (2009) calls this 'strategic dissimulation.' Indeed, depending on place, people would talk differently to me ('in the office I could not tell you, but here, as a friend…'). But besides this strategy, which is employed everywhere and merely more intensely in post-conflict and authoritarian settings, the 'dispersion' might occur with the same interlocutor/audience. This is the phenomenon I call 'contradiction.' When I came to see one of my long-term informants for the first time and when I suggested I wanted a 'critical assessment,' he exclaimed very seriously: 'I am a member of the ruling party, I cannot be critical!' This pronouncement surprised me since this man was recommended to me informally as a very 'open critic' of the government. But immediately after his exclamation, he nonchalantly moved into a solid two-hour critique. After introductions and some such initial manoeuvres, the debate started thus: '[Me:] I came to talk about unity and reconciliation…' 'Well,' he interrupted me, 'I cannot tell you because here we are promoting peace without reconciliation.'[230]

What does this all show? First, power works within people's bodies, but not necessarily in 'physical contact' with them, rather by affecting and transforming and challenging psycho-physical manifestations— feelings, attitudes, reserves, balances and behaviours. Power in Rwanda is not 'carnivorous' as Mbembe suggests in his 'feasting' metaphor (2001:201). Second, simplistic maps of action and counter-action, repression and dissent,

[229] Interview with Bernard, March 18, 2009.
[230] Interview with Augustin, January 21, 2009.

have to be discarded. Activities and official scripts are hollowed out from within. At the same time as they are imposed, they are contested and contorted, escaped and rewritten in multiple ways. Nonetheless, these strategies are first and foremost reactionary. In the daily lives of most people, these strategies are 'adaptations,' continually updated ways to gain extra ground against the multiple encroachments of the state. In extreme cases (e.g. political persecution), they become 'survival strategies.' In neither case do they change or challenge the fundamentals of power. Thus while there might be simultaneity of action and counter-action, of assertion of broader structures of power and the employment of multiple dissent strategies, there is no balance.

Conclusions to Section

In what way(s) is the unity-building process politically embedded? Most broadly, the government is using the appealing, seemingly non-political profile of unity and reconciliation language to achieve political objectives. Specifically, the discourse on unity and reconciliation is being used as a power instrument to silence and discourage dissent. Unity is not simply a technocratic or post-conflict justice term in Rwanda. It is rather a broader and fundamentally political notion, an attitude that insinuates consent, non-dissention, agreement, convergence.

The three political meta-issues of security, prosperity and social harmony have sufficient gravity to create specific political discourses and specific manifestations of power, which in turn affect the meaning of unity in post-genocide Rwanda and create and set out specific activities. Or, in another (equally valid) formulation, the sufficiently vague

notion of ‘unity’ is imbued with meanings that appropriate it and make it serve political goals other than the harmonious coexistence of the populace.

The state has the power to stage and gather and make a powerful show of its attempts at social transformation. But however ‘localised’ in outlook, the exercise is top-down, from its conception to its execution. The structure of the state is intricate and ‘present’ enough to survey what goes on in private spaces, not mentioning local unity and reconciliation activities. At the most micro level, state-originated surveillance combined with the ‘rule of fear’ fundamentally inscribe themselves into people’s bodies through emotions such as generalised suspicion and distrust and constrict not only what people say and do, but what they want or deem possible.

SECTION III. **Making *Ubumwe*: The Imageries, Planning, and Performances of 'Unity' in Rwanda**

Introduction

On one of the first days in Kigali, an NGO worker I met for lunch posed the following question: *'There are all these unity and reconciliation activities, but what is actually going on?' Under the banner of 'unity and reconciliation,' what is in fact being done by the government?* This question assumed greater significance as time went on and as interesting and systematic discrepancies appeared between official descriptions and what I witnessed. It became clearer that instead of asking '*Do these activities work*?' I should be asking '*How do they work?*' '*What is the nature of these activities?*' and, finally, '*What are their (whether intended or unintended) effects?*'

The previous chapters analysed the core political dynamics in post-genocide Rwanda and the appropriation of terms such as 'unity' and 'division' to serve broader political goals. The present section seeks to offer an in-depth exploration of the daily 'deployments' of 'unity'— the macro- and (mainly) the micro work of nation-building and the nature of the activities intended to carry such work out. There are two broad aims to this section and the thesis as a whole: i) to avoid, as much as possible, any pre-conceived notions of unity and reconciliation (these two terms should not be completely dissociated); and ii) to demonstrate the politicised nature of 'unity and reconciliation' activities, quite in contrast to the usual portrayals embalmed in different forms of depoliticised language.

In what follows, Chapter Six starts by analysing the local understanding of two key concepts of unity and reconciliation. Reconciliation, the overarching concept, is a vague term in academic literature. Often, it is talked about but not explicitly defined (e.g. Lemarchand 2008). In general, reconciliation escapes single definition and seems to mean 'different things to different people.' I circumvent this 'problem' by accepting that, indeed, not only in academia, but also across cultures and within a single society, reconciliation and unity can mean different things to different people. Hence I ask: *Is there a diversity of takes on each term? How are these two terms related and are they easily separable?* To my knowledge, there is no analysis in academic literature of the *local* understandings, their diversity and underlying dynamics (i.e. Why is this notion held by this particular group?). The chapter then goes on to analyse the different 'strategies of unity' – the ways to achieve unity— as they emanate from the *official* discourse. *Is the purposeful rewriting of history positing a pre-colonial unified Rwanda the only strategy used?*

In Chapter Seven, I move to the more complex performative acts/activities that are put forth both to propagate the idea of national unity and to 'enact' it. The aim is to place these activities into contexts and relations of power. As will be shown, power dynamics enter the very conceptualisation of activities, and they affect performance itself. To approach relations of 'conceptualisation,' I look at power over 'meaning-making' through 'naming' and narrative characterization. With regard to performance, I show the ways in which unity and reconciliation activities are politicised— i) performing concrete political work; ii) being used as stages for passing of development messages; and finally iii)

doubling as platforms of state presence/control and exaction. Finally, Chapters Eight and Nine focus specifically on analysis of the little-studied *ingando* camps, offering an in-depth case study of one of the most important government-organised activities.

The key contributions of this section are the following: First, emphasis is placed on the micro work of nation-building in a post-genocide context, rather than (just) institutions and structures. Second, in Rwanda, it is usually the *gacaca* courts that draw attention of academics interested in the 'grassroots' functioning of transitional justice (e.g. Kerekezi, Nshimiyimana and Mutamba, in Stover and Weinstein (eds) 2004, Oomen 2006, Waldorf 2006a and 2006b, Rettig 2008, Clarc and Kaufman 2009; Ingelaere 2009). While it is important to study the 'popular courts,' there are multiple other activities requiring academic attention, activities both organised by the state and non-state actors. Furthermore, in its effort to avoid (as much as possible) any pre-conceived notions of 'unity' or 'reconciliation,' the section helps demonstrate the plurivocality that exists in any society, the way that states might reduce such multiplicities of interpretation in their 'unity-building' projects, how those in power are able to manipulate meanings and capitalize on gaps of understanding (i.e. between foreign donors and local staff), and finally, how it is possible to insert in activities agendas that are not outwardly part of them.

CHAPTER 6. **Unity's Multiplicities: The Concepts and Strategies of Making a Social Whole in Rwanda**

The aim of this brief chapter is to i) explore contemporary conceptions of 'unity' and 'reconciliation' in Rwanda; ii) contrast them with the nationalist vision; and iii) explore the variety of strategies used by the government to achieve 'unity.' Unity is a plural concept and even within the context of Rwanda, different notions co-exist. A 'nationalist' conception of unity is only one among others. Similarly, the government tries to employ a variety of strategies to achieve 'national unity' – building 'Rwandanicity' and 'Rwandanness,' using 'oppositional constitution' and 'being together,' among others. Official activities of 'unity and reconciliation' need to be understood vis-à-vis these broader strategies. In the process of elaborating and narrating these activities, the government clearly borrows from broader cultural understandings, appropriating certain aspects and modifying others.

Ubumwe n'Ubwiyunge **(Unity and Reconciliation): Getting at the Conceptual Complexity**

When donors or the government talk about 'unity,' whose notion of unity are they using? Before embarking on the analysis of activities and their politicisation, an analysis of contemporary notions of 'unity' (*ubumwe*) and 'reconciliation' (*ubwiyunge*) in Rwanda is required. Otherwise, we risk introducing conceptualisations of these terms, which might have little resemblance to how people on the ground understand and treat them. The analysis that follows is the combined product of gradually discovering cultural themes

over months of observation and interviews, and the more explicit collection of interpretations of these terms through questionnaires. Importantly, the aim is not to get to some 'originary' and unchanging meaning, but the current understanding, which is not completely unaffected by politics, contexts, respondents' agendas or persons to whom it is entrusted. [231]

In two settings, namely the Mutobo *ingando* for ex-combatants[232] and the TIG[233] *ingando* for released prisoners, I administered a questionnaire to participants, which included two questions that were not explicitly related to life in the camp: 'According to you, what is 'unity'?' and 'According to you, what is 'reconciliation'?' In this way, I was able to collect around 73 interpretations of the two terms in *Kinyarwanda*.[234] It is surely highly unusual to make Hutu perpetrators or ex-members of armed groups[235] engage in conceptualisations of notions such as 'unity' or 'reconciliation.' However, these groups are a fundamental link in the Rwandan 'experiment' in coexistence. The two respondent groups were in fact quite distinct— ex-combatants were abroad for many years, while TIGists spent years in Rwandan jails— but there seems to be no systematic difference between their responses (e.g. one collection being more homogenous; or collections using different types of phrasing).

[231] Important caveat: A careful balance must be struck between i) acknowledgment of 'cultural themes' that underlie responses, and ii) understanding that the responses are shaped based on the fact that they arise in a *post-genocide context* where careful coexistence is trying to be established. If no genocide took place, but instead Rwanda experienced a different kind of 'collective trauma,' such as foreign invasion, the conceptualisations of 'unity' might have been very different.
[232] This *ingando* camp in the Northern Province is meant as a transition and re-education camp for repatriated Rwandan ex-combatants, mainly from DRC.
[233] 'TIG' stands for *Travaux d'Intérêt Général* (Public Interest Works) and is an 'alternative' punitive system of work camps for released prisoners who have admitted their crime and participated in *gacaca*.
[234] Normally, in Rwanda I communicated in English or French (having to elicit *Kinyarwanda* terms). Gathering responses in *Kinyarwanda* directly allowed me to access a richer register of descriptions.

In a controlled setting of a re-education/reintegration or a work camp, one would expect similarly 'controlled' responses to sensitive questions. Indeed, sensitive questions (e.g. 'Can *ingando* change a person? How?' or 'What have you learnt about pre-colonial history?') invariably received the expected response. The two questions on unity and reconciliation, however, produced a rich variety of responses, though nonetheless central themes were discernable. Most likely, this is because the question did not invoke any judgments ('Is reconciliation possible?' 'Can unity be achieved?').

i. Unity as 'Being Together'

To start with, both terms (unity and reconciliation) invoke social interaction. Starting with *ubumwe* (unity), being 'one' and being 'together' are linguistically related: *mwe* is the root for both concepts (*u-mwe* and *ba-mwe* meaning one, *ha-mwe* meaning together, *ha* indicating a place). The *ingando* descriptions also suggest that being one is really being together and to be together is to be unified. Besides two themes focused on equality/lack of discrimination (e.g. '*bakumva ko bafite uruhare rungana ku gihugu cyabo'* meaning 'they feel they have the same share in their country'), and discovering or seeing basic connections among people (e.g. '*kumenyako muhuriye… '*—'knowing that you meet in…,' meaning to have things in common such as *ubumuntu* or humanity, *igihugu kimwe* or one country, *umuco umwe* or one culture), most interpretations focused on 'experience spent together,' on 'mutualism,' exchange, sharing, dependence, coexistence and occasionally the requirements for this such as respect (*kubahana*), lack of fear (*kutashishanya*) or love (*urukundo, gukundana*).

[235] It is important to note that not all in Mutobo used to fight; some have been cooks, helpers, etc. Also,

Many respondents equated unity with coexistence (*kubana nabandi* or living together with others, *mu mahoro* or in peace, *ntawee ubogamiye* or without problems, *tutiremamo ibice* or without creating divisions). Even more responses suggested an element of coming together, putting together forces and acting together towards a common goal: either explicitly working together (*gukorera hamwe*), or more often expressed with *ugushyira hamwe*, which means acting together, putting together resources and force, or the verb *guhuza* also suggesting putting/gathering together (*guhuza imbaraga* or putting together strength). Respondents often used the idiomatic expression *gutahiriza umugozi umwe* translated to me as 'to be together and to be together' (also explained as 'synergy'). Other responses highlighted sharing and gathering together to share: *basangira bimwe* or sharing everything; *gusangira ibyiza nibibi* or sharing good and bad things; *gusabana* or enjoying together; *kwishyira hamwe ibindi byose bibahwiza hamwe* or gather together in all other things that make people meet together. Many responses also highlighted elements of mutual dependence, suggesting unity means helping each other (*ugufatanye, bafashanya*), supporting each other (*guterana inkunga*), completing each other (*kwuzuzanya*).

Last, and most interesting, is the theme of mutual understanding. Rather than simply the familiar notion of empathy, of being able to comprehend the motives, thoughts and feelings of another, which is hoped to bring tolerance (*ubworoherane*) but still remains a rather individualist concept suggesting a clearly separated and unaltered self, the notion of mutual understanding (*kunvikana*) emerging from the responses was also one of

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many were young and must have been children at the time of genocide.

'meeting in the middle,' of arriving at or adopting a consensus, of having the 'same understanding.' Again, we have the notion of 'meeting' together and 'being together' in thought and feeling. The verb *guhuza* is used again: *buhuriza hamwe muri byose* meaning they meet each other in everything, *guhuza mu bitekerezo* or meeting in thoughts (translated as 'understanding the same way'). The verb *guhura* is also used and means 'to meet:' *kuba muhuje* (to be meeting each other), *muhurije ku kintu kimwe* (meeting on the same thing). Understanding each other as in 'us understanding in the same way' was also expressed through phrases like *bavuga rumwe* (speak the same), *tukagira imyumvire imwe* (having one understanding) or *igikonera cyanje ari cya cyo mugenzi wanjye* (my step is that of my fellow). Interestingly, this 'meeting in understanding' was often highlighted by the students at NUR as well— They suggested that people need to have the same understanding on certain issues.

Clearly, convergence (to some degree) is believed to be essential for social cohesion. The notion is manipulable: It echoes the official political line highlighting consensus and painting divergence of opinion as divisive and thus dangerous. Though there are clear themes that emerge from the interpretations of 'unity,' what strikes the reader is also the sheer diversity of descriptions within these themes, the pluralities of 'unity.' Yet the government purposefully glances over such pluralities, and accommodates and moulds those cultural aspects that best fit its top-down systems of power and its social transformation goals.

ii. Unity and Reconciliation: The Proximity of the Terms

The concept of reconciliation is not too far removed from the above socially interactive conceptualisation of unity. Reconciliation or *ubwiyunge* is merging, coming or joining together.[236] A few respondents even suggested unity and reconciliation 'mean' the same. *Kunga ubumwe*, after all, is a phrase meaning 'to be united.' I argue that these two are not easily separable terms, but rather that they form part of a broader conceptualisation of a healthy society. First, both are forms of 'being together.' Second, the words *hamwe* and *umwe* often appear in descriptions of both terms. Third, aspects of descriptions often overlap, with *kwishyira hamwe*, *ugushyira hamwe*, *ukuvuga umwe* and many other phrases being present in both interpretations.

But whereas unity applies to *umuntu wese*, *abantu* or *wowe numugenzi wawe* (each person, people, you and your fellow), reconciliation applies to victim and perpetrator (e.g. *wahemukiye* and *uwakoze icyaha*, among other terms). Reconciliation was most often described as composed of a specific social interaction –*kubabarirana* or forgiving each other, which then allows for the 'refreshing' of social relations—*mukongera* or to refresh/do again/ return to doing (e.g. *mukongera kuba umwe mu mibereho yanyu*, return to being one in your daily life). Reconciliation is the process of returning to unity; it is the basis on which unity can be built (*ubwiyunge ni kibanzo abanyarwa bubakiroho umubano wabo*). *Kunga ubumwe* ('to unite') is the phrase that mirrors this relationship: The two terms are connected and not separable, and *kunga* precedes *ubumwe*.

Interestingly, the process of *kubabarirana* or mutual forgiveness was described in an almost scripted way, appearing as a ceremony, a rite of at least partial (surface-level) passage: 'You sit down together, the offender asks for pardon, the victim grants it, then you become one as before.' The process was not about feelings but about phrases that need to be passed between and 'granted' by the victim and the perpetrator, almost as if a partial agreement of coexistence was thus being sealed. From the viewpoint of the perpetrator, but also often from that of the government, the business of *kubabarirana* appears to be a social ceremony, the minimum necessary for social coexistence.

Field research conducted by Uvin and Nee (2009) in Burundi resonates with my findings. Uvin and Nee wanted to 'solicit ordinary community members' desires and beliefs regarding justice and reconciliation' (2009:146) and to contrast these with the broad discourses and aims of the transitional justice regime (prosecutions, amnesties, the need for 'truth' symbolized by truth commissions, etc). They found that 'Burundians prefer efforts that help them find ways to *live together again* [on a community level], rather than seeking to establish root causes or apportioning blame [at the level of the state] [emphasis added] (ibid:161).' After all, this 'could not undo what happened…the dead won't come back' (2009:148).

The Burundi research also highlighted that an organizing theme was that of *entente*—'getting along, living without friction, cohabitation or coexistence might be the best word' (ibid:162). Interestingly, 'Burundians themselves talk about *flexibility* when they

[236] *Kwiyunga*—to reconcile/unite (assumes previous separation)—comes from the verb *kuunga* meaning to join or merge by adding the reflexive infix 'iy' and transforming ku- to kw- because it is now a vowel stem

describe how this [coexistence in a divided society] happens. What they mean by this is that they value the capacity to compromise, to go with the flow, to hide their true feelings, to move on' (ibid:166). Buckley-Zistel (2008:137) finds a similar 'necessity of pretence' in Rwanda: 'The Kinyarwanda phrases *kwishyira mu mutuzo* or *kwiha amahoro* mean 'pretending peace' and signify a coping mechanism by which all antagonism is silenced to maintain the social equilibrium.' Just as in Burundi, in Rwanda living 'side by side' is not an option, but the cultural mechanisms of compromise are elaborated and accentuated by the state for its own purposes (represented in wider calls for flexibility and containment).

One caveat is needed with regard to all the above: In the religious and psycho-social healing community (and to many individuals, including some government employees) the concept of reconciliation is different, applying to all people ('*tous les Rwandais, nous sommes malades…tous sont rescapés de la guerre,'*[237] or 'we are all victims of our past, every Rwandan has their own wounds'[238]), and involving the long and individual process of freeing and transformation of feelings. Notwithstanding the divergence of opinion on 'true' reconciliation (e.g. meeting of feelings rather than just bodies and words), and fully recognizing the work of churches and small associations in the 'deep work' of emotion, reflection and dialogue, the fact remains that it is the above-described minimalist ceremonies that comprise the national-level work of reconciliation. Although these are mainly exchanges of phrases, and no more than precursors to enactions of coexistence, they do further tax the inner resources of survivors. Survivors are urged to grant verbal

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verb.

[237] Interview with an employee at *Justice, Paix, Action*, Nyamirambo, Kigali, January 13, 2009.

forgiveness and to live with former perpetrators, and the latter are urged to divulge their acts and ask for forgiveness in the exchange for release. This rough and enforced process can be opposed only by keeping the resultant publicly undesirable feelings, images and narratives enclosed inside, kept as a hidden store of counter-memory.

iii. The Concept of 'Restoration'

On a broader cultural landscape, the notion of 'restoration' appears. The churches are at the forefront: The 'Restoration of Hearts' church headquartered in Kimisagara, Kigali, attracts an immense congregation. The 'born again' movement also works with the idea of a cleansing, offering a fresh/clean start. One of my informants talks of organizing a 'rebirth:' 'Rwandans themselves need to recreate the Rwanda of pre-colonial [golden] ages. The nation that existed by itself, it will *re-exist* by itself' [emphasis added].[239] But to achieve this, people need to regain their 'sense of civism,' which they lost 'through this dark history…some through the influence of the killers, intoxication, others through the loss of relatives in a brutal way, others as a result of this big anger which grew up at the sight of what had really happened' (ibid). 'Cleansing of people's minds' is needed to get rid of these different kinds of emotional 'dirt' (ibid). Another person gave me a chilling account of the lost 'humanity' that needs to be restored among perpetrators: On a bus to Rwamagana, a fellow passenger suggested that 'people think that only the victims need counselling, but it is not true. Those who killed need it too. It takes a lot of counselling to make a person human again.'[240]

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[238] Interview with a World Vision workshop facilitator, Kacyiru, Kigali, October 31, 2008.
[239] Interview with the Director of the Language Center, KIST University, Kigali, March 10, 2009.
[240] Informal talk with a Tutsi living in Uganda, March 6, 2009.

In general, the idioms of 'intoxication,' 'contamination' and 'dirt' are often used, as well as the corresponding notion of 'cleaning,' 'cleansing' and 'medicine.' Bad ideas of the past come out/are let out from inside (*bimuvamo*), are removed (*bikamushiramo*). Restoration is also talked about as bringing people to the 'good path' (*inzira nziza*), the unblemished path (*inzira nde de,* literally whiter than white), the true path (*inzira y'ukuri*). The metaphor of uprooting (*kurandura*) and burning the roots is often used in the official political discourse with regard to genocide and genocide ideology. In the student *ingando* at Nkumba, when someone calls out 'jenoside!,' the *kos* (assembled students) cry out in response: '*Tuyamagane, tuyirandure n'imizi yayo tuyitwike*' (We avoid it, we pull it out, and its roots we put on fire!). Any traveller to the Northern province also notices a political slogan painted repeatedly on house-fronts, which line the winding road. The painted signs date to the era of governor Rucagu, an aggrieved Hutu appointed by Kagame to pacify and 'bring over the North.' It says: 'Pull out genocide ideology by its roots!'

Government Conceptions and 'Strategies' of Unity

i. The Nationalist View

Nationalist conceptions of unity have not figured prominently in the questionnaire responses that I have analysed. Most interpretations of unity and reconciliation revolved around localized 'being together' and interaction with others. There were only a couple respondents who suggested that unity or reconciliation is when 'all feel that they are Rwandan' (*bakunvako bose ara banyarwanda*) or 'to be Rwandans with the same language and culture' (*kuba turi abanyarwanda duhuje umurimi rumwe, umuco*).

Nonetheless, it is precisely this nationalist interpretation of unity that is promoted and pursued by the government. Unity-building is largely nation-building, and only the machinery of the state can set out to 'make' such a large imagined community. Differences in Rwanda are ploughed over not only as potentially politically divisive but also as counter-productive to the leveling necessary for a uniform and cohesive 'nation-state.' Besides the rewriting of history to 'find' an undivided pre-colonial nation, the strategies or 'ways of unity' that are deployed in the official Rwandan discourse are more numerous and more complexly discursively interconnected.

ii. Building 'Rwandanness:' The One Overarching Loyalty

The first strategy is building 'Rwandanness.' Being Rwandan is to serve as the 'greater us' and as primary loyalty. Embracing this imagined abstract community is to turn attention away from any divisions at lower orders. A fresh *Munyarwanda* identity has been created, extols optimistically Grace Kwinjeh in her article on introduction of a new Rwandan ID card (NTK 26 July 2008). But to construe 'Rwanda' as real, it is personalized in the discourse, it takes on anthropomorphic qualities. It comes alive. And where identities such as Tutsi and Hutu are said to be constructed and represent false consciousness (albeit with apparently real consequences) imposed by the colonizer, 'Rwanda' becomes essentialised and everlasting. 'Our beautiful Rwanda will live forever' (*Rwanda yacu nziza uragahoraho!*) a long sweet tone echoes from the speakers at a wedding ceremony. The aim of seminars such as *ingando*, an informant states, is to give all youths, whether from exile, sons of perpetrators or daughters of survivors,' the

opportunity to see the beauty of Rwanda, which has *survived* catastrophes [emphasis added].'[241]

In the official discourse, Rwanda is not just a collection of all the disparate peoples struggling to live together but rather an autonomous and un-destructible realm, which can be accessed within and restored. '[Due to all that has happened] Rwandanness was losing sense' claims the parliamentarian Bwiza, 'so it had to be restored. Of course it is a struggle, a process, but it is coming.'[242] More precisely, the attempt is to restore the 'good' core— the golden ages of Rwandan history construed through historical re-readings as the times of harmonious pre-colonial unity. The founder of the RPF and today's Ombudsman offers the short version of the new official narrative: 'Before the coming of Europeans, there was unity, there were no divisions Hutu, Tutsi, Twa.'[243] 'People lived in harmony and symbiosis' adds a ULK student in his thesis (Gashanana 2005:20) 'conscious of being unified peoples known in *Kinyarwanda* as *imbaga y'u Rwanda*.' A talkative bus passenger adds the chapter on genocide: 'Genocide, it is not Rwandan, it was imported from France, it is the French who brought it here…this kind of killing, it is not African, it is not indigenous to this place'[244]

The official historical narrative was reproduced in the 115 questionnaires and interviews I conducted with *ingando* participants.[245] Only very few of those who spoke/wrote on pre-

[241] Interview with the Director of the Language Center at KIST, op.cit.
[242] Interview with Connie Bwiza of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of Rwanda, March 23, 2009.
[243] Interview with Tito Rutaremara, Kigali, January 14, 2009.
[244] Informal talk with a Tutsi living in Uganda, op.cit. See Purdekova 2008 and 2009 for further exposition and analysis of this historical narrative.
[245] Interviews were held with 40 students at National University of Rwanda in Butare. Questionnaires were administered to 35 ex-combatants at Mutobo and 40 TIGists at Gasabo.

colonial history gave a response diverging from the official line. A student from NUR reflected on history lessons at Nkumba *ingando*: 'They told us how people arrive to post-colonialism… We start from pre-colonial, how we lived peacefully … [Then] colonials began by dividing our people, they told [us] we have three ethnic[ities]…[they] started telling [us] if you have money, cows, you are now Tutsi!...if you are agricultural man, you are a Hutu, if you hunt animals in the forest, you are a Twa. An *ingando* participant from Mutobo wrote: 'We have studied that the bad events that happened in this country were under the sole reason of colonialists. Rwanda did not have 3 ethnic[ities] before, they had 18 [uses *amoko* for both, which means 'type;' the second use referring to clans]. Then whites, seeing that Rwandans were unified, they started dividing [*guca*, lit. cutting] them into three parts, those of Hutu, Twa, Tutsi. Then, there used to be *kiboko* [transl. slave work], *uburetwa* [forced work].' Another Mutobo participant suggested: 'Before colonialism, Rwandans used to coexist nicely [*bari babanye neza*] but when white men [*bazungu*] came, they brought sectarianism. The message I took is that we cannot follow people with bad ideas, because here the white men's ideas have caused genocide to occur.' Shorter descriptions came from TIG: 'Before colonialism, we were one. Colonialists came and divided us,' or 'the colonialists troubled the Rwandan society by dividing it into ethnics, which has ultimately resulted in genocide.'

This 'redemptive history' (though 'true history' from the viewpoint of the official discourse) is very much a product of the immediate post-genocide era. After the genocide, the government (GNU) was faced with an aggrieved society, a mass of perpetrators, and a majority that distrusted, feared or in some cases despised the new

government. The official history had to be a 'restoration' history, a 'usable' historical narrative that would offer a possibility of a life together, a story that would somehow, at some distant level, exculpate the Hutu perpetrators and make them an equal member of Rwanda, with moral worth buried in the glorified pre-colonial past which was usurped by the colonizer. The possibility of restoring pride for all had to be found, and it was offered through the process of cleaning, reforming and refilling. The metaphors and idioms of transformation and restoration post-genocide revolve around 'purging' – purging the sedimented 'dirt' (divisionism, genocide ideology, etc) and embracing the good core (the cultural values of Rwandanness). The activity most closely exemplifying this attempted process of return, redemption, restoration to a purified state is precisely the liminal space of *ingando*.

Rwandanness is present and acknowledged in diverse little ways everywhere on a daily basis. An NTK article (Kagire 2009) capitalizes the words 'Nation' and 'National Unity,' performing a symbolic 'inflation.' Official activities often open and close with the national anthem, songs about 'Rwanda' and 'Rwandaness' are often sung. The mounting of the new flag of unity, introduced in October 2001, can be a happening in itself. The staged fervour and everpresence of 'Rwandanness' are a reflection of the fact that 'Rwanda' is still being built and is not simply 'inherited'— it needs to be actively embraced (repeatedly 'made real'). In the most symbolic show of its importance, Rwandanness enters the ceremonies of the oldest institution—the family. A US DOS report (2008:14) mentions that 'government officials presiding over wedding ceremonies generally required couples to take an oath while touching the national flag.' When a

woman marries an RPF soldier, the military band and the crossed swords under which the bride enters the church remind her that the groom is, first and foremost, a member of the army, the ultimate bride of the 'patria,' however such unit is defined, imagined and demarcated from above.

'Patriotism' and 'heroism' are conducts required for building Rwandaness. What needs to be cultivated is not only respect, but also pride and love for 'Rwanda,' the willingness to sacrifice oneself for it. At the TIG *ingando* for released prisoners, an administrator tells me that the participants learn about patriotism or *l'amour de patrie*, from the Kinyarwanda *rukundo rw'gihugu:* '[They learn] how to love the country, why to love it…that we all are Rwandan, there is no ethnie, that we are one.'[246] The RPF website mentions patriotism as one of the main points of its political program: '*Umuryango RPF-Inkotanyi uzakomeza gutoza Abanyarwanda gukunda Igihugu* (RPF will continue to coach Rwandans to love the Country), *kuba ishema ryo kuba Umunyarwanda* (be proud to be Rwandan) *no kubaka u Rwanda ndetse no kurwitangira* (to construct it and to give ourselves to it/self-surrender to it).'

The government has also recently been elaborating the cult of the 'National Hero' (*Intwari z'u Rwanda*). On 'Hero's Day' (February 1st of every year), people are called to assemble at the Amahoro stadium in Kigali or in their sectors to listen to pronouncements on heroism and how to be a living hero. Universities have 'Heroes' Clubs.' The recently-established 'National Chancellery on Heroes and Medals' is meant to teach values connected to heroism, declare heroes and award recognitions. Official characteristics of a

hero comprise a long ten-point list.[247] As I walked through the 'Heroes' Cemetery' in Remera, I realized that heroes themselves fall into a strict hierarchy: At the top are the '*Imanzi*' (only Fred Rwigema and the unknown soldier), then '*Imena*' (others with tombs in the national cemetery such as king Rudahigwa who opposed the Belgians), and finally there are the '*Ingenzi*' (still an open category with no one yet declared).[248]

iii. Restoring 'Rwandanicity:' The Values and Culture that Makes a Rwandan

'Rwandanness'— identifying first and foremost as Rwandan, and the loyalties and attachments that come with it— is filled with 'Rwandanicity'— the specific nature of 'being Rwandan' (also called *la Rwandité* or *Ubunyarwanda*). The second strategy of unity thus focuses on highlighting the 'one culture' of Rwanda. 'There is no Hutu or Tutsi culture, it is Rwandan culture….when one sings, one sings in a Rwandan way, when one dances, one dances in a Rwandan way.'[249] There is not only one culture, 'culture is what defines us, rather than ethnicity or region.' Such encompassing and defining heritage is again said to have flourished in pre-colonial times: 'You see, colonialism destroyed a lot of these cultural traditions so now we have to go back to recover them through activities such as *ingando* or *itorero* ('civic' education).'[250]

Rwandanicity comprises a set of cultural values (*indangagaciro z'umuco*) that 'defined what people of Rwanda understood themselves to be, what they knew about themselves

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[246] Interview with an administrator at 'Ingando wa TIG,' Gasabo, Gikomero sector, March 4, 2009.
[247] Ministry of Culture and Sports, 2004:11-13
[248] Interview (and cemetery visit) an employee at the Rwandan Academy of Language and Culture, Ministry of Sports and Culture, Kigali, February 10, 2009.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Informal interaction with a returnee from DRC (NURC employee), January 17, 2009.

and how they defined their country' (PRI 2004:111). It specifies not only what makes a 'true' Rwandan but also a 'good' one. What is invoked is not only purity but moral purity. The most important value is said to be *ubupfura*, a complex model behaviour,[251] a composite of many virtues such as '[being] correct, polite, convivial, respected, loving your country, influential socially—assisting orphans, widows, settling problems in community, even economically—you are self-sufficient, with property, not begging, also being honest, dignified, having culture (*kugira umuco*).'[252]

Reinvention of rwandanicity, however, does not depend on the past alone. The social transformation goals of the current government as well as the pragmatic needs at lower administrative levels both determine what gets presented as 'Rwandan values.' 'We are cultivating many new values,' reveals an employee at the Rwandan Academy of Language and Culture.[253] Indeed, these were literally 'announced' in an NTK article (Kwibuka, January 26, 2009): 'The government has decided to promote and instil cultural values in the Rwandan tradition to help speed up development goals.' Soon after, every door in the corridors of government buildings was adorned with a single sheet of paper with the following list of values to internalize in the name of development: 1) speed and respect for time: a country in a hurry (*igihugu cyihuta*); 2) customer service mentality; 3) quality of delivery; 4) completion— towards results; and 5) national pride (*ishema ry'Igihugu*).[254]

[251] The word *Infura* refers to the first born in the family, who needed to be a positive role model, exemplary in all respects (PRI 2004).
[252] Interview with an employee at the Rwandan Academy of Language and Culture, op.cit.
[253] Ibid.

Interpretations at district level can be slightly different again, where meanings are tweaked to local needs— the effective extraction of results from inhabitants so that *imihigo* goals can be accomplished. For example, Gisagara district website in its detailing of the new *indangagaciro* (values) expands *kwihuta* (speed) to 'kwihuta mubyo ukora (kugira umurava)' (speed in what you do, having *umurava*). To have *umurava* is to work hard but with enthusiasm or faithfulness, 'with love…when you want to and need to do it.'[255] The focus on results gets interpreted as respecting *imihigo* (*guharanira kwesa imihigo*).

Rwandanicity as a 'reinvention-in-progress' is meant to fulfill many objectives. At one level, it is undoubtedly a restorative attempt. In this sense it is especially instrumental for the 'fallen ones' (the perpetrators) by showing them an example in their own past, one they should thus 'naturally' connect with and embrace. As Ndekezi (2006:12) explains, in the same way that *ubuntu* is an antithesis to apartheid, Rwandanicity is the antithesis to genocide ideology. Rusagara (in Bergman 2004:8) mentions *ingando* participants 'are *reconstructed* using [this] ideology [emphasis added].' But restoration is just one dynamism of social change. Transformation, to which the state is so arduously applied, is another. 'After genocide, there was a crisis of values,' suggests Fatuma Ndangiza, 'but we need these [positive] values as a way of transforming our nation.'[256]

[254] For an example of the print-out, see MINALOC (2009).
[255] Informal discussion with a NURC intern, February 10, 2009.
[256] Fatuma Ndangiza addressing participants at the 'NURC Meeting with Partners,' Hotel Novotel, March 26, 2009.

iv. 'Oppositional Constitution:' A Greater 'Other' Makes a Greater 'Us'

The strategies of unity do not stop at reinventing and forging Rwandanness and Rwandanicity. 'Oppositional constitution' is another strategy: Contending with a greater 'other' (a challenger, an enemy) can also contribute to creating a greater 'us.' A fight against a threat from the outside or simply an 'enemy' is, and always has been, an effective tool to consolidate forces and identities on the inside (in-groups define out-groups, and out-groups help define in-groups). The threats to be fought against can come from the outside (FDLR, genocide deniers and political opponents in the diaspora, certain foreign countries) or from the inside (divisionists, people with genocide ideology). It is not a coincidence that the latest official Rwandan operation against the FDLR in the Congo (January-February 2008) was called *Umoja Wetu*—Swahili for 'Our Unity.'

Shifting blame for inner turmoil on the other also means exculpating ourselves. Without exculpation at some level, however tacit it is, it would be hardly possible to restore the greater unit of Rwanda. As mentioned previously, part of the official historical re-readings is the claim that divisions were created by outsiders and that genocide ideology was imported by the colonizer. On our trip north to Gakenke, the Director of Civic Education at NURC pointed to the 'countryside ambulance'[257] saying: 'Our culture is so nice, I really do not know why that genocide. It must have been from outside…the genocide was brought from Europe.'[258] An IRDP employee is critical of this interpretation but sees its functionality: 'It is biased history. The responsibility for

[257] Where local residents/neighbors help carry a sick person to nearest health facility or transport.
[258] Informal discussion on the way to Gakenke, Northern region, November 11 2008.

conflict is on the white colonizer, I guess to create this national unity, you have to blame it always on someone else.'[259]

This other-against-us discourse came to the forefront at the end of 2008 when Rose Kabuye, a high-ranked ex-RPF official and the President's Head of Protocol, was arrested in Germany on a France-issued arrest warrant. The arrest of Kabuye in November 2008 brought on large state-organised protests in Kigali and the provinces, which served the nationalist agenda well. This was painted as an unjust act by the once-colonizer ('Europe') against 'one of our own' – *Roza wacu* (our Rose). The song of the same name authored by the famous 'Dokta Claude' was ceaselessly played on the radio and many other tailor-made songs for Roza and against certain European countries flooded the airwaves.

v. 'The Common Vision:' Forgive and Forget in the Name of Development.

Another strategy of unity is the 'common vision' or 'common project' of development, symbolized through 'Vision 2020'— *Icyerekezo 2020* (MINECOFIN 2000). Development can only be achieved by a common effort and it will benefit all— it requires unity and it will strengthen unity once achieved. People in Rwanda are constantly reminded to put aside their problems and sorrows and to focus on the development goals, the brighter future that can only be achieved by working together. This discourse is addressed to all— it is generally meant to divert attention from unhealed sorrows, political rows and grievances of all kinds. And yet the discourse is mostly

[259] Interview with Yvonne, IRDP Communications and Public Relations Officer, Kigali, November 3, 2008.

directed at the survivors (don't languish in the past, look towards the future) and those 'repenting their sins' and re-educating in TIG labour camps. In fact, many of the TIG *ingando* participants include the phrase *kubaka igihugu* (building the country) in their answers to my questions about their work in the camp, but also on unity and reconciliation (e.g. putting together forces to build the country/nation). The general implicit dictum is 'sacrifice today for a better tomorrow' ('like the Unknown Soldier,' urges Kagame; Kagire, NTK February 1, 2009). For TIGistes, the maxim that does not need to be voiced is 'working together to rebuild the country that you have helped to destroy.'[260]

vi. Performative and Exploratory Strategies

Finally, I have identified two more action-based strategies, the first of which – 'performative'— includes all 'unity and reconciliation' activities. All activities are meant to be based on mixing and mingling, spending time together, 'being together,' and thus relate most to the notions of unity and reconciliation expressed by the ex-combatants, TIGistes, and other Rwandans. The attempt is to bring together different populations (perpetrators and other *abaturage*— people in the villages) with the aim of 'making them understand one another through social gathering and discussion.'[261] An aid worker participating in *umuganda* wrote on his blog: 'It was remarkable. The whole purpose of *umuganda* was not just social action, but also to bring people together—to unify.'[262] More often than not, however, these repeated stagings cannot build the 'being together' that was described in the questionnaires I administered—the mutuality, reciprocation,

[260] In fact, two responses by TIGists do directly mention this 'maxim.'
[261] Interview with a MINALOC employee, Kigali, January 30, 2009.
[262] For blog entry, see Halfon (2008)

sharing. 'Being together,' as will be shown, became little more than standing and being huddled together around a stage, watching, singing and clapping together. Unity through these official performances often seemed to mean attending together, hearing the same, behaving alike.

The second, 'exploratory' strategy, is the most interesting though I heard it described only on one occasion— during my interview with the Director of the National Youth Council, a man who led some of the first *ingandos*. The strategy is one of 'internal tourism,' getting 'a feel' for Rwanda as a unit by travelling to its different parts. The underlying idea is that movement brings down barriers and difference-due-to-distance, making a unified 'national' imagining possible. Travel and movement mean breaking from the local imagination of other places, which has often drawn on stereotypes and rumour. 'Because people do not move around, do not visit…many have never travelled more than 30 kilometres out of their house…there are stereotypes, they have names for those in the South, those in the North— *abanyakiga* and *abanyanduga* [he points to the two regions on the map] although how many kilometres are there between the two?'[263] It is the lack of knowledge of 'over there,' he suggests, that makes for fragmentary imaginary communities, and is an obstacle to something encompassing. Moving people around means they can become 'of all the country,' that they can get a feel for the whole, that the whole becomes more directly meaningful.

In what follows, I will mostly focus on the performative strategies of 'being together' as promoted through official government-sponsored unity and reconciliation activities.

However, it needs to be noted that all of the above-mentioned strategies of unity make their appearance *within* the space of these activities. The official historical narratives, calls to heroism and embracing of Rwandanicity, calls to building of the country and pronouncements of progress as a common and overarching goal. All of these discourses are interwoven, point to each other, and make their appearance on the stage.

[263] Interview held in Kigali, January 13, 2009.

CHAPTER 7. **(En)acting Unity: Activities of 'Unity and Reconciliation' in the Contexts of Power**

Discursive Delimitations of the Subject

Which activities did I study and why? The *gacaca* courts have captured the attention of the world, and quite understandably. They have been an 'experiment in justice,' a hybrid attempt to deal with an unprecedented burden— delivering justice after a genocide that involved an estimated 200,000 perpetrators (Straus 2004). But besides *gacaca*, there are a multitude of government-organised 'unity and reconciliation' activities, which have not received attention at all. Besides *ingando* and *itorero*, the former being self-avowedly the flagship activity of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), there is *abunzi*, *ubusabane*, theatre and music performances, *ubudehe,* football games, speeches, conferences, unity and youth reconciliation clubs (SCURS), visits to memorial sites, and more. Some of these activities are organised or were created by NURC, though not all.[264] Not all activities have been 'written down.'[265]

Facing this long list, one might doubt its overarching identity. This myriad activities might seem only ambiguously connected. After all, the label of 'unity and reconciliation'

[264] In fact, the Minister of Local Development (MINALOC), Musoni Protais, is behind multiple current policies and unity and reconciliation activities (he is the 'father of decentralization,' land consolidation, *imihigo*, *umudugudus*, *itorero*, *ubudehe*, Vision Umurenge 2020, etc). Interview with IRDP researcher, February 25, 2009.

[265] Address by Fatuma Ndangiza at Kacyiru, Kigali, January 26, 2009 at the NURC meeting with SCUR Presidents for 2008 Review and 2009 Planning.

has been applied even to activities such as *umuganda*[266] or the work cooperatives (*amakoperative*, *amashyirahamwe*). The general underlying rule seems to be that all that 'brings people together,' from across the different divides, can be designated as 'unity and reconciliation' (i.e. *umuganda* brings all locals from across the divides together in improving their neighbourhood). Yet the most important thing, I realized, is not to prove or disprove that all of these indeed are, at some level, what they claim to be. A much more revealing exercise is to try and *uncover* the rules that guide creation and shifting of 'assigned' identities (i.e. categorisation). Beyond asking '*What is in a name?*' (and uncovering discrepancies) we need to ask '*How are things named?*' and '*What is the power of a name?*'

i. The Political Economy of Naming and Characterisation

Naming and characterisation are important political activities. Appropriating the plural cultural notion of 'being together' and using its most wide interpretation (people gathered together in the same activity) to 'characterize' the nature of activities can be politically expedient, such as calling *umuganda* 'unity-building' or 'a patriotic act to achieve a dirt-free Rwanda' rather than 'compulsory community works' or 'tax on time and labour' (*umuganda* was in fact strongly criticised by the RPF during its struggle). The 'unity and reconciliation' front is soothing; interpreted as unambiguously positive and required in the post-genocide society, it is depoliticised. This is not to suggest that the government

[266] *Umuganda* 'is meant to forge unity, reconciliation among Rwandans, and reduce government expenditure on public services' (Kakimba for NTK, September 29, 2006). Fatuma Ndangiza of NURC: 'It is a civic duty to participate in Umuganda to ensure that all participate in reconciliation and development.' (IRIN, 26 August 2008). Most recently, NTK published an article entitled 'Umuganda is a healing tool' (August 6, 2010).

has a total control over naming/categorization or that *all* things in Rwanda 'wear a mask,' but that indeed the process *is* manipulable.

The other important dynamic at play in naming has more to do with the political economy of fundraising in a developing country dependent on donor funds—maintaining appropriate and sometimes varied 'character fronts' for activities is fundamental to maximize funding. This means a number of things: In a post-genocide society, 'unity and reconciliation' characterization is more likely to attract money and that explains why it is, as a label, stretched into maximum ambiguity. Furthermore, having either multiple 'character fronts' or malleable identities can be useful in attracting fragmented resources from donors. This explains otherwise perplexing occurrences, such as when the logical framework matrix of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) includes *ingando* as an important activity to 'foster private sector development.'[267]

These dynamics, together with most big donors' shallow grasp of the local language, cultural norms, political dynamics and few visits to activities, are the most important determinants for the sometimes large discrepancy between activities as presented in official memos and reports (the official and 'fixed' voice), and activities that actually take place. A powerful reminder of this was an emblematic social event ('emblematic' because revelatory of so many broader dynamics) I called 'The visit of the consultant.' At the 2009-2012 Strategic Plan Meeting of NURC staff with the UNDP consultant,[268] as we were reviewing activities and targets, the visiting consultant (who presided over the

[267] A GTZ-Rwanda employee (and my friend) has overviewed the above-mentioned document for work and noted this; January 20, 2009.

meeting), trying to be jovial, pronounced the following: '*Itorero* [mulling over the word for the first time] he laughed, it sounds like an Italian word…you know, like itooooorero contoore otoore.' Later, as we started to talk about another activity, he interrupted with a confused look: 'Maybe I did not understand *Abunzi* [people in charge of local-level dispute settlement]….is it the same as *gacaca*?'[269]

ii. Governmental versus Non-governmental? A Blurred Line

In my analysis, I focus on *government-organised* 'unity and reconciliation' activities. This is both a purposeful and necessary limitation: The NURC 'Databank of Unity and Reconciliation Organisations' counts more than 600 organizations— some directly, others only marginally involved in issues of unity and reconciliation— and this is supposedly not an exhaustive list. But drawing a fast and clear distinction between government and non-government activities might overshadow the interaction between these two spheres and might (falsely) suggest independence of the latter, its freedom from control and from pressures for 'alignment,' in short insulation from the dynamics of power.

Only about 20 or 30 of these 600+ organizations are official partners of NURC. An active discussion in NURC concerns 'reaching' the rest as they too need to follow the 'National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation.' There is a plethora of community organisations but 'mainstreaming is needed,' suggests NURC's Executive Secretary, 'a way of coordinating all these actors…to build their capacity and monitor what they are doing.'[270]

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[268] UNDP is one of the main donors of NURC.
[269] Meeting at NURC offices, Kigali, December 15, 2008.
[270] Ibid.

The Director of Civic Education, on the other hand, suggests that 'We don't need coordination, but evaluation— Are they in line with the unity and reconciliation policy?'[271] But even without an effective NURC national mainstreaming and control mechanism, NGOs are already directly constrained in what they can and cannot do. Debating ethnicity or campaigning for recognition of Hutu victims of RPF violence, for example, are some of the constraints. More generally, these actors are always already part and parcel of the politics of unity and reconciliation. One of the aspects of this politics is management by the state of the diversity of notions and opinions on unity or reconciliation, and the promotion of its own line.

iii. The Dynamics of Depoliticisation: Development Language and Traditionality

The activities under review are discursively depoliticised and I want to break through this constitution of their character. In what follows, I consider two forms of depoliticisation specifically relevant to objects emerging in fields of power at the interstices of developmental and transitional justice discourse. The first form of depoliticisation is deployment of the development language to depict what these activities are about. The problematic of development i) utilises universalist language suspended above local understandings of social reality; ii) fragments the socio-political field (e.g. 'good governance,' 'rural extension'); iii) and discourses its subjects in a technocratic manner.[272] All of these obscure the insertions of the political apparatus and make political analysis difficult. The standardised language of development can lead to a 'black box

[271] Ibid.
[272] I.e. reduces the problem to a technical issue that requires technical (as opposed to political) solution (Ferguson 1994:256).

effect' when we do not actually know what is in a name, unless we observe the thing itself, the wider social processes, and learn about the process of naming itself.

Besides developmentalist language, there is a mode of depoliticisation more specific to 'unity and reconciliation' activities because it arises from the current post-conflict transitional justice discourse on Africa. It is the discourse of 'traditionality.' All the activities studied in this section, and *gacaca* notwithstanding, are presented as a 'Rwandan tradition,' as 'looking for answers to our problems in the past.'[273] There has been a profusion of such activities lately. *Itorero* are 'traditional schools.' Umuganda is a 'traditional practice of collective work' (MINALOC 2006:61). [274] The reaching to the past for inspiration arises from the 'tiredness with these Western approaches.'[275] While it is true that 'all is made in Rwanda,' [276] that these are 'home-grown' ideas, what goes on is a skilful government-led reinvention, and often plain experimentation rather than a recovery of activities from the popular pre-colonial past or a re-application of 'classical approaches.' What used to be localised activities of communal mutuality (*umuganda*), conflict resolution (*gacaca*) or education (*itorero*) are now government tools of large-scale social transformation. Some activities seem to be only tenuously connected to the claimed precedent (e.g. *ingando*). But tracing the transitions of activities' 'identity' is not

[273] Interview with Director of Programs at the *Conseil National de la Jeunesse du Rwanda*, Kigali, January 13, 2009.
[274] *Umuganda is* 'the tradition of work on public projects,' *ubudehe* 'the tradition of mutual assistance,' *gacaca* 'the tradition of communal resolution of disputes,' *umusanzu* 'the tradition of support for the needy and contribution to the achievement of a common goal' (MINALOC 2003:10).
[275] Informal discussion with NURC's Director of Civic Education, November 11, 2008.
[276] See for example review of Kagame's Closing Speech at the 7th National Dialogue (Kagire for NTK, February 8, 2010). In *Kinyarwanda*, he said 'Gacaca, Ubudehe, Umuganda, Ubumwe n'Ubwiyunge, *byose ni made in Rwanda* [all of these are 'made in Rwanda']. The word 'home-grown' though is used quite often to describe unity and reconciliation activities.

the aim here. I want to highlight the discursive effects of the labelling of activities as 'traditional.'

The main outcomes of the 'traditionality' discourse are the conferral of 'authenticity' and subsequent legitimisation— activities hold unvoiced 'traditional authority.' The tyranny of the 'authentic' lies in its tautological claim on the person. It pre-emptively breaks protest because, after all, you have to be 'it' as this thing is you. The traditionality of activities also depoliticises them, increasing the sphere of customary as arbitrary (Mamdani 1996). Though Mamdani discussed the arbitrariness of customary political authority under colonial rule ('centralised and de-centralised despotism'), the insights into the workings of 'spheres-of-the-customary' are helpful for post-conflict African politics and beyond personal authority. The customary as a boundary is asserted, the contents within it is then sanctioned by the label. In this manner, contours or 'pockets' of the arbitrary are created within which unfreedoms, political manipulation or even economic exploitation can pass unnamed. As Phillip Verwimp noted in his work on pre-genocide Rwandan peasantry (2000:345) 'it is common practice for Habyarimana, as for other dictators, to use *cultural arguments* to justify economic exploitation.[277] Working for the collective good, as Umuganda was called, is a prime example of this [emphasis added].' In the realm of 'traditionality,' culture and politics are discursively separated. An impact assessment of NURC, carried out by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation

[277] The use of the term 'exploitation' might be too strong here. As Pottier (1993) but also Jefremovas (2002) show, a substantial deterioration in conditions occurred only in 1989 when peasantry was really let down by Habyarimana. OPROVIA, Rwanda's para-statal agent dedicated to managing food reserves and smoothing price fluctuations was bailed out almost every year by the Habyarimana-led government. It was in 1989 when the government failed to underwrite OPROVIA's debts. At the same time, the government stopped its support to the peasant Cooperative Movement.

(IJR), suggests that 'ordinary people are more in contact with cultural institutions than political ones' (2005:44). This is true, but not because an 'apolitical' sphere in fact exists or because 'ordinary' people are naturally part of a cultural, non-political world, but largely because they are relegated to such space.

What is in a Name? Power and Performance

i. Local-level, Participatory, Traditional: Contesting the Labels

The aim from here on is to analyse and resignificate the purportedly 'local,' 'traditional,' 'participatory,' 'unity and reconciliation' activities. On the basis of previous analysis of the political system as well as the analysis in this section thus far, we can already start contesting these terms and the meanings they invoke— ownership, tradition, participation, localness, thematic content. To begin with, rather than reflecting some unchanging forms of popular culture, these activities are contemporary and creative tools, which the government uses to achieve concrete political objectives, wider governmentality needs and important social transformation goals (direct politicisation) and which do not remain unaffected by the wider dynamics of power (indirect politicisation).

On the way to 'sensitise' the Gakenke Mayor on the upcoming Unity and Reconciliation Week, I ask NURC's Director of Civic Education: 'Who comes up with all these new ideas for activities?' 'Oh, it is people, they demand them!' Though only hours later she suggests that NURC staff visits all Mayors because 'you have to work with the political actors since they are the *owners* of this work, we just coordinate [emphasis added].'[278]

[278] Gakenke District, Northern region, November 11, 2008.

But the planning of the '*Icyumweru y'U&U'* (Unity and Reconciliation Week) revealed something else altogether about ownership. NURC wrote the concept note including the aims, strategies and possible activities, then 'sensitised' the mayors (going point by point through the document with them). The mayors were then responsible for passing the message to the lower authorities. At the cell level, meetings were to be held, where it would be decided what each cell would contribute. In general, rather than 'people' or 'their political representatives,' it is the higher level executive that seems to provide the creative muscle. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, many 'traditional' activities are in fact traceable to one person— Musoni Protais, the Minister of Local Government.

'Participatory' is another difficult and ambiguous term, as is the term 'local.' People might gather in large numbers but attendance at activities is required. The government closes shops, for example, to assure greater involvement in *umuganda* or *gacaca*. People might speak up but not everything can be discussed. Voice in Rwanda is highly managed, the management aided by the intricate surveillance networks. The result is that taboo subjects exist and counter-narratives are pushed to the informal sphere. Most unity and reconciliation activities are far from 'informal' happenings; they involve authorities of the state. 'Giving people voice' in such context can thus, paradoxically, further strengthen voicelessness. Similarly, 'grassroots' and 'local' activities might not be what their names suggest. The analysis of power showed that 'local' does not always mean 'free of central power' and that, in fact, rather than decentralisation of power, what we see is 'dispatching' or broadcasting of power with the effect of making it more pervasive.

The term ‘unity and reconciliation’ needs to be critically addressed as well. The activities do not necessarily centre only on discussions of nation-building, patriotism, or ‘being together’ as mutuality, exchange and sharing, or any other topics usually connected to these terms. Activities comprise messages that are much more varied and include calls to follow Vision 2020 or to participate in demonstrations. This reflects the fact that unity and reconciliation activities are part and parcel of a bigger project in governmentality.

ii. The Theatre of ‘Unity and Reconciliation’

Re-politicisation can be broken down into three main types. First, I study broad and indirect political effects— the way in which structures of power determine activities’ nature and effects— through the observed theatricity of selected activities. Second, I study a more explicit instrumentalisation of unity and reconciliation activities and actors for concrete political agendas. Third, I focus on how the interpenetration of seemingly unrelated themes serves the task of governmentality and government’s wider social transformation goals. All in all, these three analytical foci should help unravel the nature of ‘u&r’ activities, their effects, and the unity that results. The first part demonstrates why the official goals of unity might be severely undermined. The other two parts explore what other unofficial objectives might be served.

An element of staging and performativity permeates many official activities, though not all. A lot of activities involve performances ‘by and for,’ with a clear stage and separate audiences. Let me demonstrate this staged nature as well as the stage dynamics by offering abridged descriptions of two events – *ubusabane* at the opening of the 2008

Unity and Reconciliation Week and an *ingando* graduation ceremony in Nkumba. Both accounts are drawn from my field notes.

Ubusabane at the Launch of the Unity and Reconciliation Week, Nyanza, November 17, 2008:

> I follow Aloys to the neat rows of plastic chairs under the 'guest tent.' I ask where I can sit and he says he needs to ask the lady organisers, he does not want to 'upset the protocol.' I am seated in the first row, next to me is a military representative (a captain) dressed in his khaki green outfit, next to him a police representative in dark blue, in the centre the Mayor, then Fatuma Ndangiza and further I cannot see. A small cap sits on the head of the military guy, and tucked in one of his black leather boots is a short wooden stick, a symbol of authority, he plays with it at times.
>
> The two 'visitor tents' form an 'L' with a grass clearing in front where the performances and speeches will take place. Many people—the 'local population'--are already assembled, they stand around the 'stage,' completing its invisible contours. They sing and clap. Other people, also singing, are slowly trickling in. Some people carry a large paper sign 'Cooperative xxx supports unity and reconciliation.' On the clearing, there is a microphone and a tall wooden pole. Three guys are trying to mount the flag. We listen to the anthem two times, at the beginning and at the end.
>
> What we are witnessing is called 'ubusabane,' explained as a 'community get-together festival' meant to 'bring people together,' which involves dancing,

singing, theatre, feasting. More and more people come; they form a tight, colourful and rather silent mass. Women and children, old men and old women leaning against their long *inkoni* sticks. They are just watching, observing, no talking, almost no movement. A couple of Local Defence Officers (LDF) in their dark red overalls and with guns stand here and there in front of the line of people. We watch the *itorero*/music troupe perform for a long time; they are always facing our guest tent. There is a small theatre sketch about asking for and giving of forgiveness. There are speeches by the Mayor and Fatuma Ndangiza. There are tree-planting ceremonies. Towards the end, the *itorero* troop members call us (the first row visitors) to join them in dance while the rest sing and clap; people clearly enjoy this and start cheering. The visitors leave after the official activities end; some are giving interviews under the trees. 'Feasting' for visitors takes place apart, in a small restaurant in town.

Ingando Graduation Ceremony, Nkumba, Lake Ruhondo, November 22, 2008:

The sun is shining strong and we walk straight to the large clearing where everything is set up, our backs to the Muhabura volcano, Lake Ruhondo unfolds in front. We sit in the back row of the tent, the first row is reserved for VIPs seated on leather office chairs—President of NURC, Fatuma Ndangiza, head of the RDRC, Minister of Cabinet Affairs, representatives of military and police. On the clearing, a thousand *kos* (*ingando* participants) stand in formation. The VIPs stand up one by one, get introduced, some try the call-and-reply: 'Amahoro!' they exclaim, or 'Jenoside!' and the students respond in unison with the learned response. National anthem plays.

The graduates are meticulously organised in military units (platoons) in front of us, with the leader of each is standing slightly in front of his unit. The *kos* are wearing their gum boots, khaki trousers and, especially for this occasion, a white T-shirt given to them by NURC. All are facing us, holding a piece of bamboo to serve as a gun. There is one overall leader in front who cries out instructions. First is the routine with the 'guns'—all move in unison, perfectly coordinated. Gun to your foot, then lift it again, turn right, then turn again…Then the march starts. Platoon after platoon break off the central formation and march in a circle, in front of the tent and then back to the centre. The leader in front screams something, the rest of the group replies. As each platoon finishes the promenade, it joins the rest in the initial formation. The overall leader cries out: Rwanda viva! All cry back: Viva! raising their bamboo sticks. The thousand new students who arrived just hours ago now sit together on the grass on the side, silently observing the whole ceremony. They are still in their 'civilian clothes.' As soon as the ceremony ends, they will be given uniforms.

Cultural show follows. The *kos* move closer to the visitors' tent and sit down. The *itorero* troupe puts on dances, and warrior and patriotic songs are sung, interspersed by call-and-reply: 'One, two, three' cries out one guy, the reply from the *kos* follows: [hands clapping] 'clap, clap clap…clap clap clap' 'kos!' they scream out. One student recites a poem (*poème de pays*). A number of long speeches follow. There is dancing again, and the 'first row' VIPs are taken by the *itorero* to join them in dance. Most stay only a brief while, some only seconds, then they return to their seat. The five best *ingando* performers receive their certificate from the Minister himself. Their name is called and they march forward, stomping to a halt in front of him. At the very end, the *kos* are allowed

> to 'relax' to music, they start jumping and screaming. After a short while, they are allowed to go, and still screaming, they start rushing headlong across the field to their bungalows to pack their things.

A number of themes come out from the observation of unity and reconciliation activities such as *ubusabane*, *ingando* and *itorero* graduation ceremonies, community games, NURC visits to prisons, but also speeches or presentations. First, the space is always carefully divided, with hierarchies fastly defined and boundaries between people thus apparent, whether these are planned/arise through 'protocol' (visitors and *baturage*) or emerge informally (*baturage* and *batigiste*). Second, the activities feel as if most people come to 'watch a performance.' The performance seems to be literally oriented to the 'visitors,' specifically the elite. The acts are put up to honour and certainly please the 'big people.' The presence of *les grandes personalités*, the important personages, either high-up government officials (ministers) or within NURC Fatuma Ndangiza, are seen as giving weight to the occasion.

The main idea of activities such as *ubusabane* is to 'bring people together,' to make them 'mix' with each other, 'share' food and drink, 'join' in dance, song and discussion, (*On mange et chante ensemble; On cherche des bières, des fantas et organise une fête, une reception…les gens se mettent ensemble'*[279]). But there seems to be a profound gap between the government ceremonies creating physical proximity and community activities based on genuine interaction. First, the design is top-down and attendance

[279] Interview with Nyakabanda sector officer, Kigali, January 19, 2009.

required. A NURC employee reported that in Ngoma district 'only very few people came, coming in slowly because they were tending their fields.'[280] Our Nyanza visit did not raise such concern, though no more than a couple of hundred people showed up. My observation of *umuganda* and some NURC-organised talks, and study of state-ordained activities and behaviours in general, suggests that people employ multiple strategies to evade them, though this might be harder in the countryside and for those that 'need' a service (e.g. to get official documents) and thus need to stay in favour with the local administration.

Second, the carefully hierarchised space that is a general feature of all activities in Rwanda is completely at odds with the notion of 'mixing.' The tightly observed boundaries— the official hierarchies and unofficial divides separating people spatially— point to a lack of communication across these lines. Such dynamics do not resemble the wished-for mingling and mixing that would transform relations in communities through the 'time spent together.' *Umuganda,* meant to bring all people from a neighbourhood together, in fact reflects similar dynamics: People with formal employment go to *umugandas* organised by their employer and thus rarely mingle with their 'community.' TIGistes might be present, but there is no interaction with them. *Umuganda* is also mainly about work rather than 'mixing' (and those who evade it *in situ* chat with their friends). The post-umuganda *ubusabane* is generally a sensitisation session with soft drinks ('fantas') and any interaction consists of lengthy speeches.

[280] NURC meeting to evaluate the Unity and Reconciliation Week, November 27, 2008.

'Unity and reconciliation is very good if it is done by the people themselves, taking the initiative, making it theirs. If they receive it from the top, from the Commission, the impact is very low.'[281] But a spontaneous people initiative requires precisely what communities lack and what top-down activities try to orchestrate— trust, confidence, communication, exchange. Top-down might be ineffective but bottom-up togetherness might not result. Being together, after all, is set within broader structures of power that *a priori* undermine it. Not all grievances can be voiced; in fact certain subjects are taboo. There is widespread fear that critique of government (which includes government's approach to unity and reconciliation) might be punished. Arbitrary power in general closes mouths in public. Information flow is tightly controlled making people depend on rumour and insure themselves with distrust.

iii. Governmentality Needs: Making Dutiful and Responsive Citizens

Besides the indirect effects of power discussed above that affect what can be achieved by 'being together,' the unity and reconciliation activities also fall prey to more explicit political agendas. These are not 'hidden' from view. Only in official written and spoken discourse are they covered up, even then imperfectly. The basic line is that unity and reconciliation activities are meant for people to understand and feel that 'the ethnic cliché surely has no basis'[282] and that '*nous tous, nous sommes Rwandais, nous vivons dans le même pays, on parle la même langue.*'[283] Activities such as ingando are meant to '*enseigner à toute la population pour penser national, pour abandoner l'idéologie de*

[281] Ibid.
[282] Interview with the Head of the Diaspora Department at RPF Headquarters, January 23, 2009.

genocide.'[284] Upon closer look though, other narratives (political, economic) and other key goals besides 'unity' (either as 'being together,' or 'rwandanness' and 'rwandanicity') emerge: creating dutiful and responsive citizens (governmentality); instrumentalising 'unity and reconciliation' actors for direct political goals; and transforming people to create 'perfect development subjects.'

At the planning meeting between NURC and the District Youth Coordinators, a bottle of water and a blue booklet awaited the participants. Only later did I realize that the blue booklet contained the 'National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation' (NURC 2007) that was only recently written down. One of the participants explained that the meeting and booklet are a *ligne de guide*, a guideline. In fact, all actors in the field of unity and reconciliation are meant to abide by the 'little blue book.' Sensitisation on the policy or imparting of its messages, often in a very formulaic form, is in fact the most important component of speeches in unity and reconciliation activities. Confirmation of its main points is what leaders look for in official performances. Rwandans are to make this policy 'their own' (*bakayigira iyabo*).

A telling insight into the significance of 'passing the message' (sensitisation), and the corresponding importance of who delivers it and how, was a NURC employee's evaluation of the opening ceremony for the Unity and Reconciliation Week in the district of Ngoma: 'Police and military authorities were all present. Minister took the word.

[283] 'We are all Rwandan, we live in the same country, we speak the same language.' Interview with a researcher at Ombudsman's Office, previously President of the National SCUR Forum. Kigali, January 14, 2009.

There was the Mayor and also the Executive. The Concept Note was *read well* by the Minister and the *message was clear* to all the participants [emphasis added].'[285] On a different occasion, another NURC employee explains that music concerts by famous artists can be a very good unity and reconciliation activity because 'people will come to hear them [they are popular, will draw masses] and then we can *pass on the message* [emphasis added].'

In general, the content of the policy is vague. The Preamble states that 'this National Policy will particularly help to define the duties of every Rwandan at all levels.' One does learn that people should 'beg for forgiveness and give pardon,' tell the truth (2007:7), or that parents should be sensitised on 'not giving their children names which refer to hatred and violence' (so-called *izina izigenurano*). Concrete prescriptions such as these, however, are drowned out by generic statements. The main duty seems to be 'to be dutiful.' The message is to comply, abide by, and harmonize in accordance with already-settled meanings, wider policies and instructions. Under the heading 'Grassroots Structures,' the first goal highlighted is 'to make known the National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation among the population in such a way that every Rwandan understands it as his/hers and abides by it. The section on 'mass mobilisation' (2007:9-10) sets one of the goals to be 'mobilising Rwandans into responding positively to Government programs.'

Convergence in understanding is sought. The policy document (2007:16) mentions that one role of NURC is to 'attempt harmonizing the *same understanding* of the concept of

[284] 'To teach the population to think along 'national' lines, and to abandon genocide ideology.'Interview with the Activities Coordinator at LDGL, Kigali, January 9, 2009.

unity and reconciliation.' NURC is also the safeguard and disseminator of the 'official history.' As the policy document points out, one of the obstacles to unity and reconciliation is 'various interpretations of the history of Rwanda' (ibid:6). NURC is responsible for putting together new higher education history curricula (contracting out this task mostly to select NUR professors), and vows to 'do research …so that Rwandans could know their *true* history [emphasis added].' NURC is also engaged in light censure of various publication to see if they are 'in line' with the main messages (or not against them). One day I found a young NURC employee (in charge of youth issues) reading a manuscript, with another waiting to be read. The first one discussed 'relations between *abanyarwanda* before the genocide,' the other— Rwandan culture. His task was to write an assessment on the basis of which the books will/will not receive support.

iv. Party Agendas: Helpful Partners and Useful Stages

Just as music concerts can become useful stages for NURC to pass on messages on the importance of abiding by the official policy of unity and reconciliation, so all unity and reconciliation activities are potential stages to pass on specific political messages. The Mayor did get to speak at the Nyanza opening of the '*Icyumweru y'U&U*' (Unity and Reconciliation Week) after all, urging the population, among other things, to gather the next day at the government-organised demonstrations (for the release of Rose Kabuye). Some employees within NURC double as cell leaders, being directly involved in carrying out the work of the party-state. One evening in the quarter of Nyarutarama, the whole NURC involved themselves in diplomatic work, entertaining a delegation from China, a new donor. NURC's President 'took the word' and mentioned that Rwanda does not

[285] NURC meeting to evaluate the Unity and Reconciliation Week, op.cit.

recognize the independence of Taiwan and supports China's one-state-two-systems policy.

Due to its institutional set-up, it is hard for NURC to escape political considerations and at times direct political work. It is not only a government commission, it also undergoes special scrutiny. Since its inception in 1999, NURC was the only national commission made to report by law to the Office of the President: 'No other national Commission had to report to President directly, although the President is [eventually] the highest guarantee for all these institutions…but this one yes.'[286] There were two main reasons: i) Only through the President's Office can the commission 'get thorough review, evaluation, checking, can it be given its due powers to perform, review…because it had to be seen how it is giving [reconciliation and unity];' ii) 'Due to the sensitivity of what is expected to be done…they reported every day to the President.'[287]

But it is NURC's 'helpful partners'— the Student Clubs on Unity and Reconciliation (SCURs or '*skari*')— that show best the imbrications of 'u&r' actors in political work. The first SCURs were established in 1998 to 'continue the work of student *ingando.*' They were meant to be a platform for university students to debate, organise various activities with the aim of preventing the spread of genocide ideology. Mutimura Viktor, the President of the national SCUR forum (and highest 'authority' within the organization), once took me to his small one-room office where the walls were completely covered with photos of SCUR activities: visits to memorial sites, special

[286] Interview with Connie Bwiza, Chamber of Deputies, op.cit.
[287] Ibid.

umugandas, student discussions, visits to genocide orphans and widows' houses, talks at TIG camps, *ubusabanes*, and visits to *ingandos*. As of 2008, NURC counted 361 SCURs. SCUR started at university level but is expanding to lower branches of the education system. The plan is to finish establishing clubs at secondary level, and then focus on establishing them in primary schools.[288]

SCUR is not an independent student organization, however, and their activities are very much overseen and coordinated (and sponsored) from above. From all the partner organizations, it was precisely SCUR that seemed to be most attached to the Commission. Often when I was at NURC, I saw the SCUR President talking to NURC's Youth Coordinator (an ex-President of a university SCUR himself) who was his unofficial higher authority. Going through the SCUR photo albums, I saw NURC's Executive Secretary on a lot of photos, like a calm, affirming matriarch, whom the SCUR President gently called 'our mama.' Monitoring is involved too. In January 2009, NURC held an evaluation meeting, where all university SCUR Presidents were called to present on the achievements of their clubs during the past year. Besides NURC, the newly-created Ministry of Youth has its attention on SCURS too. They provide partial support and plan to 'try and enhance what they [the clubs] do.' In an informal chat, one SCUR President told me they are aware that they are 'an asset to NURC,' which could not do so much without them. After all, following the 2003 downsizing, there are only 35 people working for the Commission.

[288] Discussion with President and Vice-President of SCUR at the National University of Rwanda (NUR), Butare, February 2, 2009.

Besides the fact that this burgeoning pioneer-like body is directly networked into a national commission, itself tightly under scrutiny of the Office of the President, and that it helps mainstream the messages set above, some of SCUR activities count as more direct 'political work.' On January 26, 2009, NURC met university SCUR presidents for '2008 Review and 2009 Planning.' Altogether, 16 presidents presented. Since someone was translating for me, I might have missed parts of each presentation. Nonetheless, from the notes I was able to take, I gathered that many activities suggested political enmeshment. At least three presenters mentioned that their SCUR helped sensitize students to attend *ingando*, and at least two mentioned 'sensitisation for people to participate in these community works [*umuganda*].' One mentioned that their SCUR organised a protest 'against the people who try to minimise the genocide like Jean Luis Brugière.' At least three mentioned sensitisation 'to get new members of SCUR.' These activities could count as 'increasing responsiveness to government policies.'

Most unexpectedly though, at least five presenters mentioned that their SCUR 'helped' or 'participated' in parliamentary elections (held in September 2008). One SCUR President talked of 'participation in the sensitisation during parliamentary elections, to teach the population, to tell them to participate.' This is not only direct political work, it furthers the party agenda. 'Sensitisation to participate' in elections might be interpreted as 'supporting democracy.' But in fact, albeit unintentionally, SCUR are simply ushering people to a ballot box to choose the only salient candidate. Who else besides the RPF can people 'elect' if they are previously pressured to 'join the family' (*umuryango*, euphemism for RPF), if their 'voting' is observed and/or their choice might be scrapped.

Ushering people in these conditions to the polling station merely assures the impressive turn-outs, helps to maintain the surface image of a functioning democracy, and strengthens RPF's discourses of legitimacy. SCUR is not the only 'unity and reconciliation' platform used for political campaigning. Campaigning or consolidation is smoothly woven in wherever it can be: At an *itorero* graduation ceremony 'it was announced that the group [of graduates numbering 42,000] nicknamed *Imbagukiragutabara*[289] intends to back President Kagame if he contests in the 2010 Presidential elections' (NTK Aug 5, 2009).

SCUR is also an example of the indirect way in which actors are co-opted into the work of the government. Youth is a great asset: enthusiastic, seen as still capable of change, unpaid but offered incentives such as ability to learn leadership skills, manage resources and organise events, network with 'big people' and potentially get a higher-profile job. Through the SCUR networks that soon will span multiple secondary and primary schools, control might become more pervasive.

v. Transforming Subjects: Interpenetration of Themes and the All-Purpose Mainstreaming Fora

An observer of unity and reconciliation activities will also notice that a degree of thematic 'interpenetration' tends to characterize them. Interpenetration refers to a situation where i) fields of activity might be officially discursively separated (e.g. family planning, education), but ii) their actual content makes such distinctions more blurry.

[289] Can be loosely translated as 'the peoples who assist recovery.'

Unity and reconciliation might be 'cross-cutting issues,'[290] relevant to discussions across thematic divides. At the same time, multiple topics of sensitisation cut into its own sphere. In almost every activity observed, messages other than unity and reconciliation are transmitted. Even when activities such as *umuganda* and *ubudehe*, which can be only most tenuously interpreted as unity and reconciliation, are not taken into consideration.

Besides expressly political messages already mentioned (urging participants to respond to government programs, participation in elections), there are messages regarding economic improvement, but also other aspects related to progress (*duterimbere*) —participation in health insurance, saving schemes, sending children to school. The Mayor mentioned the Vision 2020[291] in his speech at the opening of the very first U&R week; the guest speaker at the *ingando* graduation ceremony in Nkumba referred a number of times to *vision venti venti* (Vision 2020), also mentioning the importance of 'ICT' and 'knowledge-based economy.' In my sector, an administrator explained *ubusabane* to me by saying people often talk about 'development at the village and cell level, about what can be done.'[292] *Ingando* camps show interpenetration best. Student *ingandos*, for example, combine 'being together' with (re)learning/practicing Rwandan folklore, military drills, and long lectures ranging on history, unity and reconciliation and economics (government policies and especially Vision 2020), among others.

[290] Reference made by a representative of the Ministry of Youth explaining his presence at the January 26, 2009 NURC meeting with SCUR presidents. On another occasion, the Nyagatare district took creative license during the U&R week and, as a NURC employee reported, imparted messages of 'unity and reconciliation' in all weddings.
[291] The 'Vision 2020'—a policy document detailing where Rwanda wants to find itself in the near future. This must be the most intensely disseminated document; most people if not all know it by name.
[292] Interview with a Nyakabanda Sector officer, op.cit.

Development messages might not be explicitly political, but such sensitisation does have a broader governmentality focus—the transformation of people into 'ideal development subjects.' A wider dynamic appears, one reaching beyond unity and reconciliation activities, and namely appropriation of all stages for carrying out this ultimate social transformation goal. Or in other words, 'unity' can be a useful narration tool for various political goals— non-dissidence and convergence (translating into 'following policies'), steps necessary for a future that will 'benefit all' (incorporating specific knowledges and behaviours necessary for 'development'). Unity can be stretched into and does become all of these connotations. Talking about 'Vision 2020' is not 'out of place,' it simply becomes part of 'unity's' narrative whole. Such versatility, and the resultant multi-referentiality of the concept, also explain the many official 'strategies of unity' that we have identified above.

(While Inside…)

Before I turn to the overall effects and impacts of activities, I wanted to demonstrate the difficulty of accessing the 'inside'— the closed-off domain of feelings, private opinions and attitudes that exist off-stage. The domain of the inside is problematic vis-à-vis governmentality objectives because it is potentially very different than the outside behaviour but is undisclosed and hard to reach (e.g. 'genocide ideology is a difficult challenge because you don't really know what people think'). People of all backgrounds return to this theme, regardless of ethnicity, age, gender or type of employment. The strong closing off by people seems to be a mix of cultural aspects (*gukomera*— be strong, *hagarara kigabo*— stand firm like a man, *kwihangana* or bear with it, endure, have patience) political dynamics (management of voice and silence; sacrifice for 'greater

good'— i.e. bearing living with perpetrators) and the social impacts of mass violence (losing trust in others).

Suffering is hidden: A World Vision workshop coordinator working in psycho-social healing suggests that 'in Rwandan culture, normally you do not show pain, the suffering is inside.'[293] There is 'a strict code of behaviour when confronted with great sorrow' (Bagilishya, 2000:347), which highlights self-control and discretion over painful emotions at all costs (ibid). A Rwandan name that best reflects the emotional containment and maintenance of the composed public persona, suggests Bumaya, the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, is '*Nsekambabaye*'—I laugh while inside I suffer.[294] According to a young returnee from Congo, 'Rwandan people are so silent, so quiet, so to themselves... In Congo, if someone is weeping, the whole town knows, here it can be your neighbour weeping and you don't know and they don't want you to know.'[295]

Personal opinion is not shared: At the meeting with SCURs, the Executive Secretary (ES) of NURC states that 'Rwandese have the culture of not sharing what they think, we should change that culture.'[296] The problem is not only veracity but the distrust that lack of perceived disclosure creates. 'In Rwanda…you can have a problem with me but you smile. .. If he [the Rwandan] hates you, you don't even know, he can even smile.'[297] A Tutsi survivor expresses a similar thought: '[Another problem is the lack of] culture of speaking the truth…[me:] You mean after the genocide?...[Protais:] No, even before, that

[293] Interview in Kigali, October 31, 2008.
[294] Informal talk with Andre Bumaya, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kigali, March 25, 2009.
[295] Informal talk with a ULK employee, Kigali, March 11, 2009.
[296] Fatuma Ndangiza at the NURC meeting with SCUR Presidents, January 26, 2009.

is why I say culture….they can smile, but inside the heart, they can even kill you, [though] of course I don't want to generalize.'[298]

People wall themselves off from the outside: Symbolically this is reflected in the fenced-off *rugos* (enclosures). Fences in Rwanda are not only meant to demarcate space but really to close the view. 'I do not even know my next-door neighbours,' tells me another DRC returnee, 'there is all these compounds… even the children just play inside…but this is not the African culture...people are private and calm in Rwanda compared to Congo.'[299]

The outside façade might be one of calm and careful coexistence, but the inside space of contradictory opinion and suppressed feelings does come out at times. A NURC employee reported that the opening of the unity and reconciliation week in Rutsiro was accompanied by a 'big problem:' 'The TIGists were supposed to maintain the banana gardens, but instead they destroyed those gardens that belonged to the Tutsis. They were asked to ask for forgiveness but they refused.'[300] The feelings come out especially during the commemoration months.[301] 'One says that during those three months, there is no unity among Rwandans,' suggests the 'ES' of NURC.[302] This period is 'the serious case,' 'there are many conflicts in this period, many fears [come up]...It is not a good period. Some people think '*abatutsi*…*abahutu*' and survivors don't want to talk to the *abahutu*

[297] Informal talk with a ULK employee, op.cit.
[298] Informal chat with an *ingando* employee, Rwamagana, March 16, 2009.
[299] Informal chat with a Congo returnee, December 2, 2008.
[300] NURC meeting to evaluate the Unity and Reconciliation Week, op.cit.
[301] The trauma comes out in smaller doses before and after the official commemoration. Sometimes a scream can be heard in the neighborhood but usually it is enclosed at home. Those who killed also suffer from trauma.

even if these did not kill. I am never angry, but in that period, I get angry.'[303] Most survivors grieve and many 'collapse' in official ceremonies and at *icyuriro*,[304] screaming while reliving scenes of horror.

It is during ruptures like these that the 'bad faith' economy, based on mere 'surface consent' to co-exist and enacted through ceremonies of 'asking for' and 'granting of' forgiveness, really comes to light. Perpetrators cannot be certain that the survivors really grant forgiveness instead of accepting only to be left alone and please the authorities. The survivors, on the other hand, cannot shrug off the belief that perpetrators do not really repent and use the surface contract to get to freedom. 'All they want is to get out' says a NURC intern bitterly after a prison visit. The unity and reconciliation discourse, after all is not only manipulable by the government itself. After Sara Bawaya, the Director of Civic Education at NURC, delivered her speech at the prison in Ruhengeri, she opened the floor to comments. One man who escaped TIG suggested he wants to *reconcile* and go back out. Another suggested earnestly that 'they [prisoners] want to participate in unity and reconciliation but it would be much easier outside the prison.'[305]

What does all this suggest? Should the theatricity, a degree of ceremoniality that characterize the unity and reconciliation activities, together with the closed of 'inside,' lead us to proclaim that these activities fail? Even people in the government are aware that these are mere *surface level enactments* of unity and reconciliation. However, i) such

[302] Ndangiza at the NURC meeting with SCUR Presidents, January 26, 2009.
[303] Informal discussion with *ingando* employee, Rwamagana, March 16, 2009.
[304] *Icyuriro* is a traditional gathering of people around a fire, in the night, to support those in grief. During the official commemoration Week, large official *icyuriros* are organised all across Rwanda.

enactments are still important; and ii) have various other political objectives as seen above. 'Unity and reconciliation can be done but *cosmetically* [only]…we cannot assume we can come to reconciliation, but rather *unity without reconciliation*.'[306] In that case, we have to ask what concept of unity is it that actually emerges from performance?

Claimed and Actual Effects

i. Unity and Reconciliation 'Found:' Measuring Desired Impacts

Unity and reconciliation activities are supposed to produce 'unity and reconciliation' and certainly this is being affirmed through official discourse and 'found' through government-sponsored research. 'On the national level, the NURC has achieved tremendous success. As Habyarimana [President of NURC] puts it, 'currently the success of unity and reconciliation can be measured at 90%' (Ruburika for NTK, December 14, 2009). A Nyakabanda sector officer tells me that 'unity and reconciliation are advancing well.'[307] At the RPF headquarters, an employee suggests that 'there are many achievements, [one of them] that Rwandans live in peace, together.'[308] Notwithstanding more nuanced takes that emerge through interviews, there is a prevalent official 'feed' that highlights steady and impressive improvements on this front. I want to briefly look at this affirmation and the fault-lines of its methodology.

NURC research suggests that activities are effective and improvements visible, claims supported mainly through various opinion surveys (*sondage de opinion*). US DOS

[305] Visit to Ruhengeri prison, November 19, 2008.
[306] Interview with Connie Bwiza from the Chamber of Deputies, op.cit.
[307] Interview with a Nyakabanda Sector officer, op.cit.
[308] Interview with the Head of the Diaspora Department, RPF Headquarters, op.cit.

Human Rights Report on Rwanda (2008:9) unquestioningly writes that 'during the year NURC released the results of a survey on *gacaca* process and national unity and reconciliation. The overwhelming majority (99% of the general population and 92% of survivors) expressed the belief that the *gacaca* process 'is an essential step towards peace and reconciliation in Rwanda.'' The basic problem with opinion surveys, highlighted by Rettig (2008) but even the Executive Secretary of NURC, is that 'Rwandese have a culture of not sharing of what they think,' that they 'tend to guard their true opinions and to adjust their responses according to what they think the interviewer wants to hear' (Rettig, 2008:2). Such is an expected response in settings fraught with power imbalances. The interlocutor in this particular case is the government, so responses will be especially guarded and tailored. The 'safe response' bias will be especially prominent. Predictably, the 'NURC Opinion Survey on Social Cohesion, 2005-2007' found that 97% of respondents 'agree that the government is doing its best to improve standards of living.' Only China with 89%, the report highlights, comes close to such government approval ratings.

Besides the politics of voice, there are other factors that make achievements in unity and reconciliation either inflated (provided they are there) or simply unreadable. 'Unreadability' refers to the fact that we do not know what has been measured. To evaluate the 'impacts' of NURC (IJR 2005), three broad questions were included in surveys (administered verbally): *Do you know about the NURC*? (meant to measure 'general knowledge'); *What does reconciliation mean to you?* (meant to measure 'ownership'; and *Do you feel that things have changed in Rwanda since 1994?* (meant to

measure impacts). Not only are these questions extremely vague, it was the interviewers who circled categories such as ‘excellent,’ ‘good’ or ‘poor’ (knowledge) based on ‘give me detail’ probes.

If we leave surveys aside and focus on proxies such as the number of activities, attendance or compliance with policies, we come across other problematic dynamics. Taking the number of initiatives, whether in general or government ones, as an indicator is problematic based on all that has been discussed above: What is in fact in a ‘number’ and a ‘name’? What does greater reach mean and who is independent of power? How about the alternative agendas that get inserted into these activities, reworking their very character?

On another level, the attempt by lower authorities not to disappoint on the exigent demands of their performance contracts (*imihigo*) leads to a false idea of achievements in unity and reconciliation (and more broadly) through the following two mechanisms: i) use of stronger force to comply (e.g. tying entry to markets with showing of *mutuelle de santé* card, or tying the provision of administrative services to attendance at *umuganda*); and ii) hushing of problems that do occur (i.e. not reporting on TIG destroying Tutsi banana gardens during 2008 Unity and Reconciliation Week). This latter dynamic echoes what Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003:159) described in a very different context of Benin as ‘“sweeping it under the carpet:” a predominant local strategy of conflict regulation.’

On yet another level, it is difficult to know against what to measure 'improvements.' Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan also remind us that 'face-to-face societies' in general (villages or other localized settlements), which might be perceived as harmonious and homogenous by the short-term visitor, are 'like any other groups, pervaded by conflicts,' which explains why some prefer the term 'back-to-back societies' (ibid:160). 'Bottling up' is a wider strategy of equilibration. Cooperation and mutual dependence coexist with rumour, suspicions and accusation (ibid:161). The coexistence literature is stuck: It tells us that Rwandese used to coexist before the genocide (e.g. tending fields together) and that a form of such mutuality has been re-established, but that various feelings and attitudes were and are bottled inside. What we really need to know is why did these contradictory forces (that were always there) become disequilibriated, and whether and how this can happen again.

ii. Actual Effects: From 'Effectiveness' to 'Productiveness'

Not only is the fuzzy subject of unity and reconciliation (Whose conception and which aspect of it?) further fuzzied through the methods of its measurement, there is a strong sense that some activities put forth to bring it about might actually perform 'negative work:' *gacaca* courts have been said to build negative social capital (*ceceka!* or the conspiracy of silence), lower inter-ethnic trust (Rettig 2008:14) and contribute to rise in community conflicts (ibid).

Certainly there is more at stake in *gacaca* than the other activities that I have overviewed, and these, when looked at through the lens of effectiveness might simply be proclaimed as unable to bring about change (i.e. increase trust and interaction, sense of national

belonging). But here my focus is different— rather than asking 'Are these activities achieving what they say they want to achieve?' I ask 'What are the different effects that are actually produced?' Rather than effectiveness, my focus is on 'productiveness' of social events.

The Tacit Social Contracts. Many activities of unity and reconciliation may well be repeated surface enactments. Theatricity, officiality, spatial hierarchies and separations, and the elusive inside all suggest this. But the performances, with their reproductions of official scripts (the acceptable and expected 'word fronts'), are not without their utility in political governance. By design and not choice, victims and masses of perpetrators in Rwanda have to live in the same communities. A tacit agreement has to be struck in the society about the acceptability and procedurality of this. The 'inside' always escapes, creating an unstable equilibrium, which has to be probed *repeatedly*. Official ceremonies of being together represent such *continual* effort to affirm a fragile contract. The necessity of cohabitation also explains why 'asking for and granting of pardon' is urged by the government. This 'exchange,' almost schematically described in *ingando* questionnaires, is important even if not genuine and deeply felt. Ceremonies everywhere are meant to affirm, to make real, to catalyse desired change utilising acts ranging from 'swearing in,' 'making a pledge,' to 'granting forgiveness,' 'pronouncing a script' through speech or song, dance or a theatre sketch, to a simple 'showing up,' 'being there,' 'taking part.' Just like wedding vows, these do not necessarily produce a happy or a lasting marriage.

This ‘productiveness’ is rarely noticed in academic analyses; instead these activities are outright dismissed as ineffective: Referring to the de-ethnicisation law prohibiting the mention of ethnicity, Lemarchand simply exclaims: ‘As if one could change society by decree!’ (Lemarchand 2008:73). Naturally, the society cannot be changed by decree and the government knows this; hence the more interesting inquiry is to ask ‘what (if any) ends are nonetheless served?’ Even discursive surface-level enactments, whether enforced articulation or active silence, are acts useful to the government with containment/suppression as a wider social strategy.

***Kwitaba*—Participation as Duty.** ‘Kwitaba’ meaning ‘answer, when called’ seems to be a wider ‘cultural theme’ (Spradley 1980:140) that helps understand ‘participation’ in Rwanda. There is a rhythm and symmetry to the notion. Someone starts a song, and all respond in unison; someone calls out and you respond to the rallying call; and you respond to the propaganda in its own language too. The call-and-response can be invoked by an authority as well as in an informal grouping of people joined in song. When it comes to ‘answering’ the call of an authority, you answer the call in its own language (e.g. ‘Vision 2020’ a popular sign on shops and restaurants; banners stating official mottos saying e.g. ‘*abanyarwezamenyo* [the people of Rwezamenyo] support [the motto]’), showing the face they want to see, keeping inside the rest. While people respect the call, you might lull each other into a belief in the genuineness of the act, but it is an unstable equilibrium (because of profound lack of trust).

'*Ubw-itab-ire*' or participation (from *kw-itaba*) in government programs (unity and reconciliation activities notwithstanding) should be read against the connotations it invokes— those of a 'duty,' an obligation to answer the call from above. Today it is invoked 'to respond to the call of *gacaca* courts' (*kwitaba inkiko gacaca*) (e.g. NURC 2004:33) or to 'come to elections' (*kwitabira amatora*), to participate in 'works' (*kwitabira umurimo*), to participate in *umuganda* (*kwitabira umuganda*), and perhaps most overarching—participate in the 'program of the government' (*kwitabira gahunda za leta*) (e.g. NURC 2007:14). All of these invoke a responsibility to share in a common activity, to partake in a public and collective 'good' (*gacaca*— justice; *umuganda*, works and government program— development). The concept of *kwitaba* as a duty to respond thus connects to the notions of 'contribution' (*umusanzu*) discussed in chapters above, and to the notion of *kugira uruhare* (to have a part in, take part), both evoking individual roles in a collective duty.

Governmentality— Control, Exaction and Transformation. At this point, the claim that 'activities of unity and reconciliation are insertion points for political power' should be better understood. The many activities created by the government are at once a sort of tax on people's time and energy, and platforms for governance insertion. Besides the explicit political messages and instrumentalisations that at times characterize unity and reconciliation activities, it is the governmentality effects that are more pronounced. Activities are fora for sensitisation ('passing of messages') but also for making people more 'sensitizable' (e.g. urging them to *respond* to government programs). Last but not least, the unity and reconciliation activities become platforms for the

mainstreaming/dissemination of knowledges, attitudes, and behaviours seen as necessary to transform people into catalysts of development.

What Kind of Unity?

Unity is a plural concept. Many people interpret the interconnected notions of unity and reconciliation as forms of being together, which centres around exchange, mutuality, sharing, and dependence. Surely, a wider sample of respondents would bring further nuance and richness to the already diverse set of conceptualisations. The government, on the other hand, highlights the grander project of national unity and it employs numerous strategies to achieve it. One of the strategies draws on ideas of 'being together' though it alters the notion in the process.

The actual government-led performances of being together, however, do not seem to lead to the desired 'mixing'— exchange and interaction as confidence-building measures. Rather, what we witness is a unity of presence, of being at the same time at the same place, chanting and singing the same, witnessing the same, sitting and sipping together. Unity is coherence of ideas and policies, and non-divergence. Messages are passed to achieve a unity of knowledge base, and more broadly to converge in certain understandings and behaviours that do not necessarily concern healing, coexistence or the truth of what happened. Sensitisation comprises political and wider development messages.

But as we have seen, even 'surface' enactments have their role. They can be seen as ceremonies reaffirming tacit social contracts, a fundamental governance tool in a post-

genocide society where close coexistence (*kubana*) is a not a choice but a given. They can be seen as vital platforms in the work of governmentality, in trying to form more responsive subjects, and subjects equipped with information necessary for their transformation.

The 'making of *ubumwe*' in contemporary Rwanda has its costs too. Mixing is required of people, but true interchange is not enabled. The ceremonies of togetherness thus impose further containment and 'bearing' on behalf of survivors. Unity and reconciliation activities are just a sub-set of state-organised activities and as such cannot be seen outside of the contexts of taxation. *Kwitaba* is answering a call of duty— to attend activities that place the fostering of survival/life of the social body over the individual and over a particular social tissue— the survivors. Containment and 'bearing' in the name of elusive promise of future development has become a peculiar form of healing at the national level.

CHAPTER 8. *Ingando*: Camping in the Service of Nation-Building

Introduction

Since shortly after the genocide, hundreds of Rwandans at a time have been gathered at remote camps where they have stayed for weeks or months, isolated from their communities and families, learning about the history of Rwanda, the 'work of the government,' singing and dancing, doing community work and military exercises together. In the tense atmosphere of late 1990s, when distrust ran high and social relations were severely strained, and when hundreds of thousands returned to Rwanda from various countries in the diaspora (many seeing the country for the first time), *ingando* camps were proposed by the new government as a key tool in 'nation-building.'

But what exactly is *ingando*? The little that has been written (Mgbako 2005) labels *ingando* in broad strokes, as brainwashing or re-education. Indeed, *ingando* is about re-education as it is about governmentality and social re-engineering. *Ingando* is a concentrated interpretive space where wider social dynamics converge. Hence rather than dismissing *ingando* through simplistic, ideological language or unquestioningly accepting programmatic descriptions of the government, the analysis below tries to approach these retreats as worthy of in-depth study.

To make something as transient as the *ingando* camps a centrepiece of a study is not incidental. It aims to underline the importance of transitory experiences and 'enaction' of

our social world that is fundamentally fleeting, requiring constant re-creation through staging of thought through speaking, acting and feeling. Movement is key to understanding Rwanda perhaps more than elsewhere, its recent history being marked by a returnee capture of power and mass movements resulting in transitory and transnational experiences and identities. *Ingando* also allows us to constitute nation-building both as deeply grounded (spatial, local, emplaced) and constructed (continuously belaboured and enacted). *Ingando* shows that rites of passage and acts of transition to static, delimited and territorially based imagined community are, as their name suggests, attempted through physical, symbolic and ideational *movement*.

Despite being a relevant and a revelatory space, *ingando* or, more broadly, encamped experience in service of nation-building, has not received almost any academic attention. Yet the camps remain potentially key from the viewpoint of governmentality: *Ingando* as a space of (intended) intensified transformation connects to the massive social re-engineering exercise underway in post-genocide Rwanda. The fact that NURC's main department is one of 'Civic Education' only further highlights that, even in the sphere of unity and reconciliation, the primary task is to 'shape' the citizen. Furthermore, it is this department that organizes *ingando* and among Commission's activities (*ibikorwa*) in general, it is highlighted as the 'flagship activity.' Due to all the above reasons, it is the contention of the present thesis that *ingando*'s spatial, symbolic and performative nature, in addition to specific texts being disseminated, make it an example *par excellence* of the wholesale transformation attempted by the government.

The 'dynamics of gaps' between official descriptions and what unfolds on the ground is perhaps nowhere greater than in the case of *ingando*. For one, the descriptions are vague and multiple and the research scant, so it is hard to make sense of something variably referred to as 'solidarity camps,' 're-education camps,' 'civic education camps,' 'political awareness camps,' 'reorientation camps' or 'reintegration courses.' One NGO even described *ingando* as '*camps de vacance*' (vacation camps). Various rumours constitute *ingando* either as 'military training,' 'making everyone Tutsi,' or a 'boring succession of lessons.' Interpenetration of themes, on the other hand, allows different Rwandan organizations and ministries to put the camps into their logical matrices ('logframes'), highlighting different aspects of ingando, claiming they foster 'private sector development' or are an aid in 'HIV/AIDS education.'

Notably, *ingando* grapples with a powerful contradiction. Highlighted as building unity and reconciliation among Rwandans,[309] certain *ingandos* are run like military camps and comprise military training. This fact, however, is not acknowledged in any official descriptions. *Ingando* is without doubt a sensitive topic— for the government but especially for the donors. As a result, anyone trying to 'interpret' this activity, so different from official descriptions (e.g. 'peace and leadership camps,' Nyirabega 2004; Nkumba camp called the 'Peace and Leadership Academy') and so potentially condemnable by the international community (that certainly associates peace-building with demilitarisation and not the other way round), will be met by evasiveness if not silence. UNDP is one of the principal donors of NURC and sponsors the camps directly

[309] Ingando was described to me as a unity and reconciliation tool already in my first interview with the administrator of Nkumba *ingando*, March 23, 2008.

(under its 'Programme for Strengthening Good Governance (PSGG)'). After much insisting, an employee sent me a one-page document (UNDP 2008) describing the NURC activities supported by UNDP funding. The document uses a highly *sanitized* language; the word *ingando* is not mentioned and instead the document speaks of 'seminars' and 'workshops' 'on unity and reconciliation' aimed at 'engaging [a given section of the population] about the prevailing genocide ideology.' As will be shown, *ingando* is not only much more than these descriptions suggest, it might be something else altogether.

Is ingando a 'unity-building tool'— exclusively, primarily, partially? If so, what type of unity is being enacted through it? Could ingando also be, for example, a 'technology of power' (Foucault: 1980:135)? In order to find out what is this thing called *ingando*, I approach it from different analytical angles— i) looking at its history; ii) studying it as a social situation by exploring comparisons and contrasts among different *ingandos;* iii) analysing *ingando's* selective targeting (why this choice of target populations?); and finally iv) examining the different components of *ingando* (the actual 'goings-on') and the way they are interpreted by *ingando* participants.

With regard to methods, I studied *ingando* through formal interviews and informal discussions, visits to camps and primary and secondary materials. Almost all of the 200 plus formal and informal interactions have involved a discussion of *ingando*, whether it was a central discussion point or one of many. I have spoken to past and present *ingando* organizers, participants of different backgrounds (age, education, region, ethnicity, occupation, language), as well as diverse people in the government, NGOs, and more.

The responses (gathered through semi-structured interviews and questionnaires) of more than 110 participants from three types of *ingando* (university entrants; ex-combatants and released prisoners) have been an especially rich source of information as have been the *ingando* visits. Altogether, I have been able to visit *ingando* camps eight times and managed to visit six different types of *ingando*. NURC organized only the '*Nkumba ingando'* for university entrants at lake Ruhondo in the North, which I visited 3 times, sitting through 14 hours of class and participating in the closing graduation ceremony. Besides student *ingando*, I was able to visit four other state-organized camps (for released prisoners, street children, youth ex-combatants and adult ex-combatants) and one non-state organized *ingando* (for Adventist youth).

Ingando: Evolutions and Inspirations of a 'Tradition'

As most other activities of unity and reconciliation, *ingando* is highlighted as Rwandan tradition. NURC traces today's camps to the pre-colonial military custom of 'halting normal activities to reflect on, and find solutions to national challenges.'[310] An organizer of the first post-genocide *ingandos* suggests that the name originates from *kuganda*— to camp. It is an allusion to 'military guard duty on the border in the past, you go there and camp.'[311] According to *Inteko Izirikana*,[312] the concept was used in the military domain to signify either i) a space where troops readied for combat; ii) a temporary resting place for the soldiers in their military expeditions; or iii) a temporary accommodation for the king and his entourage during their rounds. In a related interpretation*, ingandos* used to

[310] See NURC website: <http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=12>
[311] Interview with the Director of Programs at the National Youth Council, January 13, 2009.
[312] Local NGO of elderly community members aiming to revitalize Rwandan culture; in Gashanana 2005:9.

be military encampments where the campaign strategy would be reflected on and where soldiers received their final briefing before combat.[313] The salient characteristics of pre-colonial *ingando* then are i) its encamped and transient nature; and ii) the military character of the space.

However, there is no clear temporal continuum to *ingando*. *Ingando* as military retreats stopped along with the days of *abami*'s (kings') grand military exploits. '*Ingando* lost its relevance in the colonial era, together with other monarchic institutions and practices' (Shyaka 2007). The current version shows only a tenuous link to the *ingando* of yesteryear; those few aspects that are indeed shared (i.e. the military component) are precisely those that the government does not prefer to highlight. The fundamentally military gatherings of old times are quite expeditiously reinterpreted as nation-building tools first and foremost: 'In [today's] *ingando*, individuals are reminded to subject their interests to the national ideal and give Rwanda their all' (General Rusagara, quoted in PRI 2004:111).

A number of people outside and, importantly, *inside* the government suggest that today's '*ingando'* is in fact a relatively recent occurrence, dating to a number of identifiable predecessors and influences in the *Tutsi diaspora*. My informants traced *ingando* to the politicisation campaigns and 'raising of awareness' conducted by the RPF first in exile and later within Rwanda as they kept capturing territory before taking over power (during the 1990-1994 war). 'Before 1994 [inside Rwanda], there was no *ingando*, it was inspired in the diaspora. After the [current] government was installed, it started putting this in

[313] Suggested by Rusagara, a General and *ingando* camp instructor (NTK, March 1, 2006).

place.'[314] Tito Rutaremara, the founder of the RPF in exile and a veteran of Rwandan politics confirms this: 'First we were doing them, the RPF, during and before the struggle. […] It started within the RPF and then was adopted by others. NURC [later] used this instrument for all people.'[315]

As already Mgbako (2005) and Reed (1995) hypothesized, RPF mobilisation of support in the diaspora was the main reason for organizing or supporting what became the predecessors of today's *ingando*. According to Rutaremara, *ingando*'s aim was 'to bring people together and share the ideals of RPF. There were three purposes— to politicise people, to bring people to discuss on problems; to remember Rwanda; [and] to bring people to help the needy.'[316] A historian of the RPF suggests that '[*ingando*] was a tool of mobilising members from all over' but while in pre-colonial Rwanda it was exclusively a thing of the military, 'in RPF context [in the diaspora], it was a mix [of different aspects].'[317] 'Camps' or 'retreats' served three main objectives for *banyarwanda* populations in exile. Initially, they were used to raise awareness of being Rwandan, and promote 'solidarity' or self-help. Gradually, politicisation of diaspora members and provision of military training was added.

Today's *ingando* allegedly draws most inspiration from camps organized by Rwandan refugee youth in Burundi. These young people organized retreats for self-help, raising of

[314] Interview with the Muhazi camp coordinator, January 28, 2009.
[315] Interview with the Ombudsman Rutaremara, January 14, 2009.
[316] Ibid.
[317] Interview with an 'independent consultant' and author of a book on RPF history, January 22, 2009

cultural awareness and later politicisation.[318] Importantly, the camps did not start as a RPF mobilization platform. They had to be made into one: 'In Burundi, there was a youth organization that was very strong. When RPF reached Burundi, they transformed this youth organization into RPF youth. But they already had many activities— to meet in some place and help the community—[that were] practiced much before the RPF.'[319]

Ingando also seems to refer to other types of semi-clandestine political meetings in exile. 'People would meet for a month, they could take [over] a home of someone, even in Kampala, and meet there. There were many strategies so that the security and police would not know. 'Just a family visit,' [we would pretend]. There were strict communication rules. But this was just political and cultural, not military, the noise [of military training] could attract some curiosity.'[320] But this changed after the victory of Museveni's NRM in 1986. The Uganda-based Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU) decided to increase its support base by changing its political program and its name to 'RPF.' The party supposedly started organizing 'political/military schools' in Uganda and Tanzania where 'cadres learned about the goals of the RPF and received military training, though without weapons' (Reed 1995:51).

During the 1990-94 civil war, 'political schools' were organized within Rwanda itself with the help of RPF cells based there (Reed 1996:496). 'From 1990 to 1993, the RPF installed participants in *ingandos* or 'RPF schools' for three weeks, after which participants would be expected to return to their villages and disseminate pro-RPF

[318] Ibid.
[319] Ibid.

ideology' (Mgbako 2005:208). 'In the beginning of the 1990s, 1991/92, the RPF had [captured] a piece of land in the north [of Rwanda] and then organized ingando with military aspects there, but even for civilian cadres [they offered] military and political training. If they could, they would train everyone militarily, to demystify weapons, so that people would not be afraid of soldiers. […] If we could train the whole population [we would], it is a way to upgrade their minds to this mystification of army and soldiers.' 'And political education?' 'Political education was most important, there was a message to deliver.'[321]

The overall RPF strategy of consolidating and politicising its support base through special seminars and retreats draws on Yoweri Museveni's own guerrilla strategy during the years of the NRA insurgency (1981-1986) and before. Inspired by Maoist principles, the National Resistance Movement (NRA, composed of many Rwandan refugees in Uganda) had a 'political commissar in every unit and organized political education classes in which 'African history and politics were taught from a revolutionary perspective' (Kinzer 2008:44). Museveni viewed his army as a 'people's army' and his soldiers as 'politicians in uniform' (HRW 1999). RPA/RPF under the leadership of Rwigema and Kagame seem to have followed this approach. In a sense, this campaign of 'winning the hearts and minds' has not finished. The northern part of Rwanda was not pacified until 2000 and the enemy perseveres today in the disguise of 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology.' For Kagame, political conversion is part of the struggle; it is in

[320] Ibid.
[321] Interview with an 'independent consultant' and author of a book on RPF history, op.cit.

reality 'the tricky part' [the real challenge].[322]

But Uganda also offered a more concrete inspiration. Much before the RPF took power in Rwanda, the victorious NRM had translated its own war politicisation agenda into political schools in peacetime. The NRM's wartime 'mobile schools' of political education were transformed upon victory into a permanent institution—The National School of Political Education (HRW 1999). During interviews with Nkumba *ingando* participants, I repeatedly heard them refer to their morning running/parades/marching exercise as *muchaka* or *muchaka muchaka*. After a while, I learned this was Swahili military jargon, an onomatopoeic expression mimicking the 'sound made by military boots during marches' (ibid). It is also the name of NRM political and military education camps described by HRW (1999:66) as 'a political and military science course [and] one of the tools used by the NRM government to increase its political control, targeted particularly at civil servants and graduating students. […] [It includes] demystification of the gun and political education, which included the history of Uganda according to the NRM— a crude form of historical materialism placing blame for Uganda's past woes on the political parties.'

Besides the contents of lessons, the descriptions of a typical day at Chaka-Mchaka correspond very closely to the structure of the elite Nkumba ingando in Rwanda (e.g. 'In the morning, you start with *chaka-mchaka* at 6 a.m. At 10 a.m. the political lectures begin;' HRW 1999). The NRM (Uganda's governing party) also organizes camps called *Kyankwanzi*, which are run by the military and are similar to *Mchaka.* The facility in

[322] Kagame reminiscing on the late 1990s; in Kinzer (2008:215).

Kiboga is called 'National Leadership Institute' (close parallel to the Nkumba camp in Rwanda) and the training is meant to be 'part of preparation for the implementation of the *Bonna Bagaggawale* (prosperity for all) programme.'[323]

Now that we have looked at influences, parallel institutions and inspirations in the past and mostly outside Rwanda, let us look at the history of *ingando* camps *after* the RPF take-over, and let us consider their transformation from wartime and exile political schools to government-employed strategy of social re-engineering on a large-scale and targeting specific populations. When did the new GNU institutionalize *ingando*? Shyaka (2007) writes that the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) 'revived' *ingando* 'after the 1994 genocide' to initially integrate the ex-FAR combatants into the new army. Mgbako (2005:209) suggests the first large-scale *ingandos* were organized in 1996 for Tutsi returnees. David Nsenga, the organizer of the first *youth ingandos* (which he suggests started around 1997/1998), speaks of three main target groups at the beginning: the youth; the Hutu returnees; and Tutsi returnees from different diasporas.

The first *ingandos* for youth were organized by the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports 'with the [financial] support of UNICEF.'[324] In fact, the large tented camps of Gishari (Eastern Province) holding up to 2,000 students, as well as camps elsewhere were also supported by UNHCR and WHO. In 1999, NURC took over the camps for college entrants, while other ministries and institutions organized ingandos for other select populations. *Ingandos* started as tented camps, and only gradually permanent sites and

[323] New Vision Uganda, 2008, 'District Officials to Train at Kyankwanzi'
[324] Interview with the Director of Programs at the National Youth Council, op.cit.

structures were developed like those in Nkumba in the northern region. 'It really started like scout jamborees, conversations by the fire, and later activities were added such as constructions of houses for widows and orphans.'[325]

Organizing retreats of this kind posed huge challenges in the post-genocide Rwanda filled with suspicion and distrust:

> But going on field trips? People ran from the government, they were afraid of them [why?] because they were made to be afraid, people were told 'you would be killed.' We are an oral society, news travel through the tongue. […] In one of the past camps, in what used to be Mutara district, the parents that were sending their children expressed the view, the rumour, that their kids would be killed. 'We will not see them anymore,' they were saying. ..As a result [to deal with this], we played the voices of the children over the radio. It was that much frightening! After some days in the camps, people started to talk, that is in fact how we found out about the rumour.[326]

Even today, after more than a decade of *ingandos*, students at NUR in Butare recall: 'On the first day, I was very afraid of seeing soldiers, guns, and the way they directed us. I was afraid we might die there, the way they beat some of our students, the first day was fear.' Or: 'The first day, they try to terrify us…already as you leave the bus, you already start physical exercise, you carry your bag on your shoulders, you kneel and go…you cannot say any word because you feel fear.' Or: 'The first impressions, you are afraid…because there are people who say that 'you will do forced labour, military

[325] Ibid.

exercises, which are hard.'[327]

Most political figures and camp organizers stress that the main idea of *ingando,* especially in the early stages and for returnees, was to 'open the reality of the country,' build confidence among people, and most importantly, build a sense of national unity. The idea comes up repeatedly.

- NURC Programme Officer for Advocacy (in Mgbako 2005:8):

  > Ingandos were to 'foster a sense of nationalism among the returnee populations from Congo, Burundi, Uganda and Europe, and elsewhere…We thought that if we could remove these people from their daily lives and bring them together to share from a common dish— to eat and sleep together— this would build confidence in the diverse populations of repatriated Rwandans, confidence that we could indeed live together.

- Director of the National Youth Council; an organizer of the first youth *ingandos*:

  > You were frightened of one another [the different returnee groups], there were different cultural attitudes, speaking different languages, the camps were to show that we were all *Banyarwanda*.

- RPF Communications Adviser:

  > Ingando is a seminar of sorts for the youth, those that came from the diaspora and those who have stayed in Rwanda. It shows the most important elements that are common to all, the bases of the nation, what makes the unity of Rwandans, what is the role of ethnicity…how to construct the nation, that is ingando.

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[326] Ibid.

In the rest of the section, we will try and scrutinize this narrative of *ingando*-as-nation-building from different angles. *What type of unity is to be built and how? Is national unity the main purpose and outcome? If there are others, what are they and what is their significance? How does military training and multiple lengthy courses, in addition to cultural performances, fit into the 'nation-building' plan, if at all? Ingando* engineers and administrators themselves suggest that something altogether different than building unity based on cultural learning, confidence building and enactions of 'life together' is at play, and namely the 'cleansing of people's minds' and fostering of 'one way of looking at things.'

- A linguist and Director of KIST Language Centre:

> Ingando was made to address these various backgrounds which prevented people to really work together as before, as it had been for centuries, so one way of addressing [this] was some kind of *cleansing of people's minds from this dirt* accumulated by situations and recent history…[It was necessary] for all people, refugees and people who were here.

- A current *ingando* camp administrator:

> *Ingando* [help] bring together the vision of the country, the policies of the government, it becomes easier for many people to know many things [when they are] in the same place…Before university, students go to Nkumba [ingando], to install sense of patriotism, to equip them with… they must have *one way of looking at things*, especially government policy.

- RPF Communications Adviser:

> We have opposed memories about the history of Rwanda, we do not agree. [But] one needs *a consensus* to make a nation.

For now, however, let us return to the history of *ingando*, and ask the following question: *What might the history of ingando – the influences that shaped it, the inspirations it draws on, the transformations it has undergone – tell us about what it is 'all about'?* To begin with, many aspects of today's *ingando* remind us of where it came from— the left-inspired guerrilla politicisation strategy traceable to a specific era and a number of countries in the region, if not Africa. In a more direct connection, it brings us to the politico-military schools and seminars of the RPF in diaspora, and to the successful translation of political education camps from war- to peace-time in countries such as Uganda and Tanzania. *Ingando* has evolved, it has been adapted to the challenges of a post-genocide society as the government saw them, it has been scaled-up and tailored to different target groups. Nonetheless, *ingandos* in Nkumba or Gato remind us clearly of their predecessors— they are led and organized by the military, and involve, among other things, gun demystification, accent on discipline, physical exercises and military training. Politicisation remains important, with discussions on government policy and political history as part of the curriculum.

As Mgbako (2005) has suggested, *ingando* might be about 'mainstreaming participants into the RPF political ideology.' After all, the success of the RPF armed movement was based on rallying the previously fragmented diaspora around a particular political

platform (its own), it was about maintaining strong internal coherence and a 'unified vision.' This is why the mainstreaming is indeed a form of 'unity' being pursued— the form highlighted at the end of the previous chapter, unity as 'convergence.' Certainly, we could also draw a parallel with the RPF 'capture' of the Burundi refugee youth in the 1980s and say that it continues to try and form 'RPF youth' through *ingando* camps for university entrants. This is not so surprising: All regimes aspiring to ideological domination take care of the incoming elites, which are those meant to reproduce it. The educated youth is both those who are to be transformed in the camps, and those who later need to lead that process.

Unity-building or nation-building is also of course part of *ingando* as it has been historically. Except now this component is not so much a reminder of 'where you really come from' and a manner of maintaining links with a cultural past (and thus a politico-national project) as it used to be in the diaspora. In post-genocide Rwanda, it transformed into an attempt to teach a severely divided population that being Rwandan matters above all else, as well as to teach them what being Rwandan means. It was and remains an attempt to create this overarching loyalty through multiple strategies.

In fact, as will become apparent, all six government 'unity-building' strategies identified in the previous chapter can be found in *ingando*: i) fostering of 'Rwandanness,' which includes the teaching of reinterpreted history and patriotic attitudes; ii) revival of 'Rwandanicity' ('being Rwandan') through cultural performances (song, dance and recital); iii) rallying of people around a 'common vision;' iv) cultivation of the 'greater

us' with reminders about the 'greater other' by performing the military 'mindset'; v) the 'being together,' which can only be effectively attempted in simulated and removed settings; and finally vi) the 'opening of the realities of the country' through travel, through breaking out of the local, through meeting and seeing difference. It is for this reason— because all the multiple strategies find their staging ground here (plus spatial and symbolic aspects)— that the *ingando* camps represent such rich cultural space.

Ingando as a Social Situation in Contemporary Rwanda

i. Dimensions of Contrast

Rwandan *Ingandos* have been targeting different types of population. Those who have gone through the camps include 'old caseload' and 'new caseload' returnees, ex-FAR soldiers and demobilized rebels (adult and youth ex-combatants), provisionally-released prisoners and those serving 'alternative sentences'(TIG program takes a form of *ingando*), prison-born children, public and (as of recently) private university entrants, groups of uneducated youth, college students in diaspora, head teachers of primary and secondary schools and district education officers, civil servants, the *inyangamugayo* (*gacaca* judges), various associations (ATRACO 'taxi' [bus] drivers, tea growers, masons), sexual workers, hawkers ('informal sector workers'), informal cash changers, street children.

Some *ingandos* have been happening periodically (e.g. university entrants), others have been one-time occasions (e.g. teachers and head teachers). *Ingando* can take anywhere from days to (more likely) weeks and months. *Ingandos* for students used to be three months long, this gradually decreased to two months, one month, and currently three

weeks. Teachers also spent three months in *ingando* (June 1-August 2005). All returnees from Congo attended for one month.[328] Youth ex-combatants spend as long in *ingando* as it takes to find a family they can 'return' to, this can mean months, and in extreme cases, years spent in the confined space of the camp. Total numbers regarding attendance have never been published and only very partial counts can be gleaned from documents/press or deducted.[329] *Ingandos* have been organized in all parts of the country. They normally target adults, but recently NURC's Executive Secretary suggested that 'given their impact on society, children should be no exception in these important trainings that instil a culture of togetherness' (Nkurunziza for NTK, May 08, 2009).

Ingandos have been organized by different government organs and non-governmental institutions. NURC in collaboration with other institutions[330] organizes only *ingandos* for university entrants at Nkumba and students from the diaspora at the Gako military academy. But other *ingando* exist. Even when they are not labelled as such, upon probing the organizers readily admit that 'yes, this is an *ingando*.' Ingando is a *form* of social gathering. Most *ingandos* are state-organised. I found only one exception in the form of the Adventist *ingando* for local youth organized by local church administration. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) organizes *ingandos* for adult and youth ex-combatants. The Ministry of Gender and Family Planning organizes *ingandos* for street children. MINALOC is also known to have organized *ingandos*. The City of Kigali has organized *ingando* for masons.

[328] Interview with Bernard, February 13, 2009. Bernard participated in one of the *ingandos*.
[329] About 6,000 university entrants pass annually through Nkumba *ingando* alone; in the years 2009-2012 NURC estimated that 50,000 students would have gone through the camps (NURC 2009).

ii. Important Shared Aspects

Ingandos share important spatial, temporal, symbolic and performative aspects. All *ingandos* are transitory experiences, taking place in an unfamiliar setting. They involve large groups of people (in the hundreds) going through the same experiences. Many *ingandos* are located in remote, secluded areas. Sense of distance and separation is also achieved by lack of communication with the outside— the use of mobile phones is not allowed. Separation is further enhanced by change of attire— in some *ingandos*, people put on uniforms or get new clothes. There is no movement in and out of the camp (with exception of nearby work sites such as in TIG and Adventist *ingando*).

Attendance at all *ingandos* is mandatory.[331] The time is highly structured. Hierarchies are elaborated. There is accent on discipline and respect of authority. Spatial structure of different *ingando* also shows shared characteristics. As opposed to the past when *ingandos* were short-term campgrounds with tents made of wood and plastic sheeting, most *ingandos* today take place in permanent or semi-permanent structures. The exception again is the Adventist *ingando* (and presumably other church-organized *ingandos),* taking form of an ad-hoc tented camp. TIG camps are semi-permanent— they can stay in the same place for years (until tasks are finished) but they are composed of makeshift structures (mainly tree branches and plastic sheeting).

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[330] NURC collaborates with the ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, Defense and the Student Financing Agency of Rwanda (SFAR).

[331] While there is no law requiring attendance, it is far from voluntary; according to HRW (2000), participants attend because they feel obliged to do so or have been told by the authorities that they must. Returning refugees would be unable to find a job without attending, students on government scholarships cannot proceed to university without civic education. A NURC employee told me students have to show their *ingando* certificate before entering university.

In terms of contents, out of the four general categories of activity– military training, manual labour, lectures and cultural activities— all *ingandos* comprise the latter two. Lectures are the most important shared aspect, they are a salient feature of all *ingandos*.[332] All *ingandos* also comprise *igitaramo* or *ikitamadune*— an evening gathering of song and dance. Singing and dancing might be interspersed throughout the day too, for example during breaks between lectures. Military training is not a universal component. After all, most adult and child ex-combatants are all too familiar with it. In the past*, ingandos* for DRC returnees also did not have military training either and were rather focused on 'reconciliation and what we used to call Marxism-Leninism.'[333] However, physical exercise is present in all *ingandos* as well as is the emphasis on discipline. All *ingandos* also involve call-and-reply commands interspersed throughout the day.

As regards manual work, this is of course the main component of TIG. Where others spend 7 hours a day in an *ingando* class, TIGistes perform hard physical labour, with shorter and more spaced classes (after all they are in TIG for years) in the evenings combined with *utemaduni*. But even the two-week long Adventist youth *ingando* had a work task to accomplish— The goal was to build 100 houses for Rwandan returnees from Tanzania in the completely unsettled area of the Akagera Park.

[332] The amount of 'schooling' per day might vary, and is in fact inversely proportional to the length of the camp, with longer *ingandos* having less intense daily education programs.
[333] Interview with Bernard, February 13, 2009.

iii. Characteristics Shared with Other Activities

Just like other complex social situations, *ingando* does not possess a strictly delimited identity. Rather, different camps are tied together in a system of 'family resemblance'— a pool of widely shared aspects where i) no one aspect is essential to all; and ii) a number of aspects, though not every aspect, has to be present for something to be called an *ingando*. At the 'outskirts' of concepts like these, we find pathways to other 'similar' social situations, which might only share one or two characteristics with *ingando.* In other words, its characteristics seep over to or from other activities and can help identify the relatives.

Camps and Retreats. The more distant relatives of *ingando* are the other encamped experiences, which include refugee camps, transit camps, training camps (for police, intelligence officers), scouts jamborees, or retreats. For example, in February Rwandan leaders go on the annual *umwiherero*— a 'week away' meant for planning and strategy. *Umwiherero* means 'to go somewhere where there are no distractions, no communication with the outside world, to think about strategy.'[334] Refugee camps, on the other hand, provide a powerful contrasting liminality. Whereas *ingandos* are meant to be transition spaces to the 'New Rwanda' and social laboratories of the 'new citizen,' refugee camps provide no transition and no integration. They are places of containment symbolizing exclusion from citizenship.[335]

[334] Naturally, retreats are used all around the world by large and small corporations to create a sense of 'togetherness' among people who are fundamentally strangers.
[335] Perhaps the most powerful show of this is the Gihembe refugee camp, home to 17,000 'Congolese' refugees. This compact settlement hugging a hilltop sits right next to the sprawling city of Byumba. The proximity-yet-separateness is so stark that even to the naked eye of a casual observer, this becomes a potent show of the 'exclusionary' double, the city of non-citizens.

Jamborees. An encamped experience close to that of *ingando* is a scout jamboree. Before the 1990-94 war, scout camps were organized in Rwanda by the churches— the J.O.C (*Jeunesse Ouvriere Catholique*) and the *Xaveriens* (Gashanana 2005:9). These groups met regularly in a given place and had a set work goal (hence sometimes referred to as 'work camps;' ibid). The scouts also worked on their physical skills, 'moral' character, and received training regarding 'beneficial practices in daily life' (ibid). Contemporary *ingando* that most resembles a jamboree (and that I have visited) is the Adventist youth camp at the border with Tanzania. Although the Adventist church tries to differentiate itself from the state,[336] its camps (organized three times a year) have, for a number of reasons, become more 'an *ingando*' than a jamboree. On the one hand, there is no military training and there is always a work objective, usually the construction of houses. On the other hand, already during the first moments inside the camp, one can see the spatial hierarchies and the accent on discipline. There are the *igitaramo* in the evenings, interspersed with lectures. There is the direct intermeshing of the state: An organizer told me that it was the state who 'requested them' to put together an *ingando* and construct houses for the returnees. In fact, during the night I visited, I came with NURC to give lectures on unity and reconciliation.[337]

***Itorero ry'Igihugu*— 'The National Academy.'** *Itorero* schools are the closest relative of *ingando*; often referred to as 'advanced *ingando*.' *Itorero* is also highlighted as Rwandan 'tradition.' General Rusagara, an ingando lecturer, relates *ingando* to the

[336] Interview with the Executive Secretary of the East Rwanda Association of the Adventist Church, January 21, 2009.

broader practices of *amatorero* (military regiments) of the pre-colonial period where 'both young men and women would be given lessons in history and culture, trying to instil a common identity' (PRI 2004:111). From interviews and other accounts, it is apparent that *itorero* resembles *ingando*. It includes political education, military training, lessons on patriotism, family planning, fighting of genocide ideology, EAC, among others. All *itorero* close with a mass graduation ceremony held at the Amahoro stadium in Kigali.

Itorero in contemporary Rwanda is a relatively recent occurrence. Nonetheless, it has grand aims of reaching every person. *Itorero* will *profoundly change* the outlook of civic education by making it more embedded at the local level. It will be the first *itorero* graduates— *intore* or 'cadres'— who will then organise *ingando* in all districts and, ultimately, at the lowest administrative level— the village (Kabeera for NTK, 21 January 2011). In the few years since its inception in 2007, about 158, 394 people (as of December 2009) passed through *itorero*. With the structure embedded at administrative levels (and ever lower ones), these numbers should multiply dramatically. Last but not least, *itorero* reaches beyond Rwanda— it has been implemented in the diaspora. In 2010, '350 students underwent the programme in Belgium while over 4,000 are expected to be trained in India this year [2011]' (ibid).

Selective Targeting and The Meanings it Unlocks

Ideally, all Rwandans should pass through *ingando* once in their life.[338] Limited

[337] Visit to Kageyo *ingando* at the Tanzania border, op.cit.
[338] The administrator of Mutobo camp: '[The plan is] by 2020, everyone has passed there.' The administrator of the Nkumba camp: 'Ingando is for all Rwandese..but not all attend due to money and time

resources, however, have not allowed this. Only select groups that 'need it the most' have undergone the camps. *Why are these specific groups chosen?* In what follows, I want to show that selective targeting, in itself, can help us interpret the camps. Selectivity is revelatory because it helps us get at the viewpoint of the organizers and understand the specific social engineering goals that these camps are meant to serve.

Based on my analysis, the government constitutes three broad categories of people as being in special need of re-education: i) groups perceived as *most at disconnect or discrepancy/opposition* with the official discourse and the rules of the 'New Rwanda;' ii) the groups that need to be most *in line* with it; and finally iii) the perceived *social deviants* that need to be 'brought back into the fold' of law-abiding citizenry or simply people perceived in need of proper socialization.

The first group comprises new and old caseload returnees, adult and child ex-combatants, and provisionally released prisoners or prisoners serving alternative sentences in TIG. For these populations, *ingando* is both a physical transitory space (from outside inside their communities) and figurative one as well (from outside inside the new ideology). The transmission of official scripts might be especially important in *ingandos* organised for these populations because they are either most at disconnect with the discourse (returnees, ex-combatants who have lived abroad for an extended period or their whole life); and/or ii) most in opposition to it (released prisoners, some Hutu returnees and ex-combatants, all potentially harbouring 'divisionism'). The camps are like 'foyers of

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constraints.' Mgbako (2005:209): 'The NURC National Plan is for every Rwandan of majority age to attend *ingando* at some point during his or her life.'

return' (whether from exile or prison), aiming to 'close the gap' before actual return to daily life and 'full' entry into Rwanda. 'For example the prisoners, they cannot go from the prison [straight] to the community. They have to go to *ingando* as transition, so that they are prepared before they enter the system.'[339]

Ingando for these populations is really an integration exercise outfitted not only with 'political' and 'history' education, but also more practical lessons on policies and programs of the government, lessons concerning health or literacy education. For a large subset of these groups, this is also a 're-orientation' exercise. While for the old caseload Tutsi returnees the primary attempt was to foster a sense of unity, for the 'new caseload' Hutu *ingando* was equally an attempt to override divisionism. The camps were meant to 'promote ideas of nationalism, erase ethnically-charged lessons of the previous government and spur loyalty to the RPF' (HRW 2000:3).

On 24 May 1997 President Pasteur Bizimungu officially launched a program for 'national political awareness' for the returning Hutu. In his address, he talked about a recently-instituted youth camp: 'This camp, like many others which will take place countrywide are aimed at integrating the youth that have just returned from exile in the current social and political life' (BBC, May 24, 1997). The camps were instituted because the government felt such repatriated people needed 'disintoxication' (AFP November 19 1997), 'clearing of minds' (Xinhua February 18 1998) after exposure to Hutu extremist brainwashing in the refugee camps. The total number of participants, either 'old caseload' or 'new caseload' returnees, is not known and only bare estimates can be

[339] Interview with Muhazi camp coordinator, op.cit.

made.[340]

Often in prison since the end of the genocide, the provisionally released prisoners[341] have been in a sense themselves newcomers to Rwanda. Their re-education was thus as important as for the returnees and perhaps more so as they were seen to be the prime harbingers of divisionism. A prisoner at Nsinda confessed that 'I never thought I would see this country again, I have been living in this country without seeing it. I am sure many things have changed' (Internews January 31, 2003). Jomba Gakumba instructs the ingando participants: 'You have been in prison for long and I want to tell you that Rwanda is no longer the same' (allAfrica February 18 2007). From 2003 when the releases commenced until 2007, approximately 56,000 released prisoners participated in ingando.

'Erasing of old beliefs,' 'erasing of political ideologies of previous regime,' 'reorientation', 'reorienting of minds' and 'sensitisation' were frequently deployed descriptions by a variety of reporters. *Ingando* was further described as teaching the participants how to be 'good citizens' (Hirondelle May 6 2003), aiding their 'harmonious integration into society' (AFP January 27 2003) or 'rehabilitation into society' (Internews February 26 2003), helping them 'learn how to lead a normal life again' (Xinhua April 23 2004), 'how to better associate with members of their own communities' (NTK February 28 2007). 'After being out of touch with the ordinary people, there is a need for them to

[340] By 1997, 44,000 'new caseload' refugees passed through solidarity camps (AFP, November 19, 1997).
[341] To ease prison overcrowding, Kagame issued a decree in 2003 to start a phased provisional release of genocide suspects who confessed and who were either elderly or terminally ill or ran the risk of being in prison longer than the sentences they were expected to incur.

be taught about what the new Rwanda needs. It is not division but unity' (ibid). A participant at Kucikiro camp says that 'we learn that there are no Hutus, Tutsis or Twas, we are all and only Rwandans' (AFP August 12 2005).

The second group comprises those that need to be most *in line* with the official discourses and the rules. On the whole, these are not recent returnees to their communities, their transition is not physical but merely figurative/symbolic (to harness the desired ideologies). This group comprises the educated elite (mainly university entrants in Rwanda and Rwandans studying abroad, but also teachers and education officers, government officials) and the less-educated or non-educated youth. Educated youth is 'especially important' because they are 'the future leaders, the future elite.'[342] The participants realize this: 'They [the government] know we will become valuable, we will work for the country, so we are here to be well prepared.'[343] 'Ingando is to give information to the intellectuals, the *abanyabwenge*.'[344] Educated youth are in fact constituted as both hope and potential danger—it was the elites planning the genocide, after all. The uneducated youth are simply the potential danger—it was the uneducated youth that carried the genocide out. NURC focuses exclusively on 'future elites' while non-governmental organizations (different churches) organize *ingandos* for the rest.

Finally, the third category comprises under-socialized groups or perceived social

[342] Interview with the Nkumba camp coordinator, Kigali, March 26,2008.
[343] Interview with a Nkumba *ingando* participant, Butare, February 6, 2009.
[344] Interview with another Nkumba *ingando* participant, Butare, February 4, 2009.

deviants. The groups targeted include prostitutes, street sellers,[345] children born in prisons, and street children. Children born in prison and given to foster families at age three are sent to 're-education centres' at around age fourteen. There they gain 'understanding of politics,' and are shown 'how one lives in good harmony with other members in the society.'[346] '[Me:] But these children have not done anything.' 'Yes it is true, and it is precisely to allay the fears of the community why they are sent there. It is to show that these children have not participated, and they are sensitised to co-exist with others. It is to show the population, this is not their fault, it is the fault of the adults.'[347]

In this *ingando* category, I am most familiar with the street children *ingando* in Rwamagana. Re-education of street children (*abana bo muhanda*, *mayibobo*) includes many lessons that can be found in other *ingandos* (e.g. history of Rwanda, genocide, fighting of the genocide ideology, the Vision 2020) but it takes place in a unique setting. While most *ingando* camps are simple structures in remote areas, some purposefully trying to demonstrate the 'hardships of life' to its participants (i.e. young adults), for street children the strategy is reversed— they have to be given an incentive to stay. 'If you put them [say] in Gisheri [camp], they will run away, all of them. [So instead] they live in a hotel [at the outskirts of Rwamagana], they eat well, they get enough food, they drink soda.'[348]

[345] 'The police associate hawking…and the wandering way of doing business with social evils.' NTK (29 December 2008).
[346] Interview with 'Association de Solidarité des Femmes Rwandaises' (ASOFERWA) employees, November 3, 2008.
[347] Ibid.
[348] Ibid.

When I first entered the *ingand*o classroom full of kids, I was immediately overwhelmed by a restless and unconstrained energy, limbs flying everywhere, there was curiosity, laughter and loud talk. Precisely because these children were never properly socialized (through family and school) one could see in a sense what the Rwandan socialization process accentuates. Rwandans are very sociable but their behaviour is also well manicured, composed, emotions are contained. Street children are indeed widely perceived as 'unsocialized elements' requiring intervention. Their way of life is associated with 'social evils.' 'Some of them spend long time in the streets, some [are] already using drugs, [there is] no discipline to be adapted, [they] become thieves, stealing, fighting between them causing insecurity.'[349] Street children are 'outside' the social order of society but this has to change— They need to learn the 'love of work, they have to fight like the other children, like the other Rwandese.'[350] They need to find their place in the national development program too. 'There is the Vision 2020, and they should know where they fit in achieving it.'[351]

Ingando: Interpretations and Analysis of Components

The present section considers *ingando*'s contents rather than its contexts. It will describe and analyze three key components – military training, lectures, and cultural activities— trying to answer the following questions: *What happens in these activities and how do participants interpret them? How do participants and non-participants explain what is the 'main objective' of ingando? In other words, how do they constitute what ingando is*

[349] Interview with the Street Children Unit Coordinator, MIGEPROF, February 16, 2009.
[350] Ibid.
[351] A short interlude by one of the caretakers/teachers at the Rwamagana *ingando*, March 16, 2009

'all about'? The section draws on a wide variety of sources— observation, informal discussion as well as 40 semi-structured interviews and 73 questionnaires gathered from three types of participants— university students (who completed *ingando*), adult ex-combatants (undergoing *ingando*), and released prisoners (undergoing *ingando wa TIG*).[352] List of interview questions and a copy of a standard questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1 and 2.

i. A Typical Day at *Nkumba*:[353]

The *kos* wake up very early, at 4-5 am. It is very very cold, it is night. The daily routine starts with *muchaka muchaka*: running, jogging. Then begin the *ingoroangiro*— the military exercises. We do stretching, push-ups, parades ('the walk of the military'). We learn how to hold and shoot *imbunda*— guns, how to dismantle a gun and put it together, how to clean it. Then we eat some sorghum porridge— *masaka*.

After breakfast, at 7:30-8am, lecture starts in the large pentagon-shaped building in the centre of the premises. *Kos* learn different things on different days, according to a set schedule. Every lecture is delivered by a different government representative. The guest lecturers talk about history, philosophy (idealism versus materialism), unity and reconciliation, genocide ideology and ways of avoiding it, military operations (different systems of combat), 'how politics was in the past and now,' and 'the program of our state'— 'policy of Rwanda in each domain,' in economics (Vision 2020), environment, health (family planning, methods of contraception, HIV etc). We also learn about

[352] Accent will be on Nkumba *ingando*. This is the 'flagship' ingando organized by NURC. It brings together young people from different backgrounds (survivors, children of perpetrators, old caseload refugees from different diasporas; both Hutu and Tutsi) and as such it is meant to (in addition to other aspects) 'enact coexistence.'

patriotism— 'the culture of liking our country'— and about *ubutwari*— heroism and 'how our ancestors were heroes.' Classes can take up to 8 hours per day.

The lunch is always beans and maize, with extra rice or sweet potato added for supper. After lunch, either the lecture continues until the evening or there is practice of battle drills on the large clearance. In the evening, from 8pm until 10 -11pm, we gather together for *gitaramo* or *ikitamaduni*. We sit on the ground and sing traditional songs, some people dance in the front. Sometimes there are poems—we say *kwivuga* or *icyivugo*— it is a poetic form recounting good achievements. There are traditional tales, even jokes. Then we go to sleep. It is the same every day.

ii. Military Training.

Ingando at *Nkumba* is 'like a military camp, we behave like an army,' a participant tells me. Indeed, the camp is run by soldiers and all participants change into khaki uniforms and gum-boots upon arrival. They are divided into brigades, platoons and sections, each with its own leader. Each student has a paper card with their name, company, platoon, and section number stapled to the uniform. "RDF" is sewn on the pocket lapel just above the heart. The TIG camps are organized in the same way, though there are no military drills or military clothing. Whereas physical and military exercises are unique to *Nkumba* and *Gako*, the military accent on discipline and uniformity characterizes all *ingandos*. Commands with set replies intersperse lectures as well as the evening gatherings of song and dance: '*Morali!*' calls out a soldier walking between the rows of students gathered for the evening *utemaduni*. '*Mizuri!*' they call back. This type of call-and-reply slogans

[353] Reconstructed on the basis of 40 interviews with students at NUR in February 2009. The question posed: 'Can you describe a typical day at *ingando* at Nkumba?'

can be found in other *ingandos* as well: '*Kos!*' shouts an organizer at Mutobo *ingando* for adult ex-combatants, '*Umoja*!' reply all in unison. '*Abajene*!' calls out the coordinator at the *ingando* for street kids, '*Imbaraga z'igihugu'* (the strength of the country) the crowd shouts back. 'TIG!' calls out a disciplinarian/animator, '*Ubumwe n'ubwiyunge na duterimbere*!' (unity, reconciliation and progress!), the *tigists* call back.

How do *Nkumba* participants interpret the inclusion of military training? Why is it such a pronounced aspect of camps organized by the National *Unity and Reconciliation* Commission? There are three main classes of response. Military training i) changes non-desirable social *attitudes*; ii) builds desired personal *attributes*; and iii) serves for actual physical *defence*. In terms of attitudes, four respondents mentioned that military training is included to demystify the gun, bring people to stop fearing soldiers and 'military matters,' and make them rise in respect by gaining valued skills. Seven other respondents believe military training is included to build desired personal attributes. The training is included 'to change our mentality.' Participants acquire the 'spirit of the soldier,' they become more disciplined and patriotic, they learn how 'not to be lazy, to be active.' Most respondents (eleven in total) believe that military training is included 'to defend in any way your nation' or for self-defence.

All of these aspects speak to the functions of militariness in the camps but they miss an important integrative effect of militariness as regards the type of learning and unity that happens in the camp. As the students themselves often recounted, while at the beginning they feared that the organizers wanted to make proper soldiers out of them, they quickly

realized this was not the case. This is not a proper 'military service.' Nonetheless, the military format is essential. The military camp is a unique space where the military worldview is put into practice. Militariness and specifically exercise are meant to bring order and 'open up mind for learning.'[354] A military context is also where three very specific unities are enacted and reinforced: i) solidification of in-group identity— creation of 'greater us' against the 'other' that threatens and that we prepare to fight; ii) homogenization and uniformity— all dressed and treated the same, all respond not only instantly but equally; and iii) 'oneness'— everyone is an inseparable part of a broader project to which they have to surmise, they act in unison, in a coordinated way. There was one student who pointed out this latter dynamic: 'When they impose those disciplines, you feel the same people, you are one person.'

iii. Lectures

First, let us consider the context in which classes take place and what this might tell us about the type of learning that happens. The lecture theatre is always a single spacious room made to accommodate hundreds to more than a thousand people. This is one reason why *ingando* lectures resemble large sensitisation sessions, where incantation crowds out critical thinking. Though in Nkumba two half-hour question and answer sessions are included in each daylong lecture, it is simply not possible to create an in-depth discussion. The aim of *ingando* is to get to the most people fast. 'Me, I was invited [to Nkumba *ingando*], but we professors, we are not comfortable in that space, [there is] not time for debate. […] I went there once, there were 800 people, it is too many people, they

[354] Interview with Bernard, a MINALOC employee, March 12, 2009.

can't discuss enough. So I say 'no' [now] but don't tell Fatuma! [he smiles]. They are politicians, they are doing their business.'[355]

In Nkumba there is also the added context of militariness that affects the nature of learning. Lengthy critical reflection is in direct clash with the military accent on immediate, unquestioning and coordinated response. Response of this kind directly enters the classroom in the form of interspersed call-and-reply slogans. This is not to mean that there is no dissent. The lecture on religion (materialism versus idealism), for example, was able to spark palpable wave of disagreement. There is also the direct and indirect 'exit:' people sneak out of the classroom or they doze off, wander off in their thoughts or chat with those sitting next to them.

Second, let us look at the diversity of classes. The analysis of content again shows that topics beyond strictly unity and reconciliation are being taught. All these diverse lessons fall under the rubric of 'civic education.' In Nkumba, classes span from philosophy (materialism) to economic policies of the state and family planning. History classes are part of every *ingando*. Lake Muhazi and Mutobo *ingandos* for former ex-combatants also include classes on various policies of the state so that the participants-returnees get a 'clear picture of their country.'[356] The official class list at Mutobo includes 35 different classes, among them patriotism, personal and community hygiene, decentralization or the role of youth in development. The Muhazi camp for child ex-combatants includes 24 diverse lessons in 'civic education,' including again various history classes, STDs and

[355] Interview with the Head of the Conflict Management Centre, Butare, February 4, 2009.
[356] Interview with Muhazi camp coordinator, January 28, 2009.

HIV sensitisation, prevention of malaria, patriotism, or the role of police and community policing. These camps also include basic literacy and numeracy programs, 'socializing activities' for child ex-combatants (comprising learning household tasks such as sweeping and carrying water) and psychosocial support. A similar list applies to TIG but there the added accent is on 'how to live with others, the survivors.'[357] The street children *ingando* also includes various lessons, including lessons on history, 'the love of work,' Vision 2020, or hygiene and health.

As with other unity and reconciliation activities, what we witness is the interpenetration of themes with the goal of transformation of subjects. The three participant groups talk about transformation slightly differently, but the accent is always on altering the way one thinks and understands. The vocabulary of transformation permeates the student responses. *Ingando* 'brings them [the students] together to shape their mind.' The aim is to 'reform the young people,''civilize them,''open them,''to prepare them in mind' 'to change their mentality,' 'change their mental comportment.' 'The main intention is to rebuild youth, [to bring] mindset change;' 'That culture of divisionism, that culture of not having patriotism, that culture of genocide, to eradicate them in us.'

The notion of transformation also comes out from Mutobo responses. An ex-combatant writes that *ingando*'s aim is for 'those who were in the forest [in Congo] to remove their outside opinions;' 'to remove from our heads ideas that are not up to date.' A number of others suggest *ingando* changes a person 'in removing bad ideas and replacing these with good ideas;' 'in eradicating bad understanding (*imyumvire*),' 'in giving good constructive

[357] Interview with one of the coordinators of the TIG *ingando* at Gasabo, March 4, 2009.

ideology (*ingengabitekerezo*) and removing destructive ideology;' 'in removing the ideology of the forest.' The TIGists responses also highlight transformation, again using phrasing of 'good ideas' replacing 'bad ideas,' 'changing bad understanding,' 'removing past ideas' or 'all things of the past' (*ibitekerezo bya kera bimuvamo*). The courses help 'leave our past ideas (*kuva maricuraburindi*— literally to come out of darkness).' '*Ingando* can change a person because you get many courses on distinguishing *the good things* from the bad things (*kuvangura ibyiza mu bibi*).' Because of the 'courses given,' *ingando* can 'change a person who was bad to be good, even in his heart.' *Ingando* is meant to 'bring in a good way a perpetrator.' Using the verb '*gugorora*,' this literally means to 'straighten' a person, like one straightens a young tree so that it grows in the right direction.

Importantly, these lessons represent the issues on which alignment is important, where official scripts need to be upheld. An example of this from students: 'The aim of *ingando* is to be told the truth, to learn about the country, *to have the same view* [emphasis added].' Unity appears as 'unification of views:' 'Hutu and Tutsi used to have different ideas, but after the genocide, in *ingando, on les mettre en unité*' (we unify them). 'Before *ingando*, persons know many things that make them different. After *ingando*, they know the truth, they know the things in the same manner…they know one [a given] thing in the same sense.' Responses from Mutobo camp for adult ex-combatants also highlight convergence: 'The main purpose of *ingando* is to allow me to be on the same line—*murongo (kugendana mumurongo umwe*) as other Rwandans;' 'to know well the *umurongo* [line, verse, transl. line of conduct] of our country of Rwanda that should be

followed (*kigenderaho*).' *Ingando* 'puts someone on the country's line of ideas/conduct' (*umurongo ngenderwaho w'igihugu*). Interestingly, at the end of our discussion, the head of the Centre for Conflict Management confesses to empathy with the alignment agenda: 'I prefer them [the students] to be united than different, even if they are [thus] not specialized in scientific debate.'[358] Collective acceptance at the cost of personal freedom of thought and diversity is construed as a more desirable trade-off than individual critical thought at the possible cost of social division.

Finally, let us consider specific lectures key to building unity, specifically the pre-colonial historical narrative that is compactly reproduced in all *ingandos*, as well as lessons on citizenship scripts (Rwandaness, Rwandanicity). In the TIG camp for released prisoners, the administrator enumerated different classes taught. '[Me:] Do you teach history as well?' 'Of course, that falls under unity and reconciliation!' Indeed, history is construed as central to both reconciliation and unity: In terms of reconciliation, it is the 'restorative history,' opening the possibility of a life together by shifting the 'ultimate blame.' Unity is central to the narrative itself— Pre-colonial history is one of unity among all Rwandans. The elaboration of the imposed nature of these categories is one of the central features of the official narrative taught at *ingando*. A NUR historian tells me that he is 'not comfortable if all history is reduced to that…to looking for the [existence or non-existence] of Hutu, Tutsi, Twa.'[359]

Responses to the question '*What did you learn about pre-colonial history?*' both within a

[358] Interview with the Head of the Centre for Conflict Management, op.cit.

given *ingando* and across *ingandos* produce the same standard narrative without fail. I include only one longer 'panel' (Malkki 1995) pieced together from multiple recollections.

> In pre-colonial times, there was unity among us [*bari umwe*]. Rwandans were together, they intermarried, they loved each other, they completed each other, they shared and they helped each other in everything. The kings ruled well, though nothing is pristine white/without blemish [*ntabyera ngo de*]. We were fighting together attacking our enemies. Our ancestors were heroes, willing even to die for the country. But the whites tried to make separation, they brought sectarianism so that they could rule us. Colonialists divided our people, telling us we have three ethnies—Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Before colonialism, there were no ethnics, only economic stratification, and things like families, like lineages, like clans, *abagesera*, *abatsobe*, *abega*, *abazigaba*, *abasinga*… Tutsi [comes] from "gutunga" – to possess— [that is the] origin of the word. [Tutsi were] *umutunzi* – rich, have cows, it was a social class. Hutu [was] someone who does not have cows, only a cultivator. Hutus [were] sometimes given cows, 1,2 cows…when arrives to 10, you leave that social class, and then you becomes *umutunzi, umukire*, that means rich man. [Then] came Belgians. [They] said Hutu are the short people with big nose, Tutsi are so tall, thin.

'[Me:] *What is the main message of the history course?*' A TIGist replies: 'To avoid the culture of ethnics. We are all one (*umoja*);' '[The message] is to leave the things of ethnicism (*ibyamoko*) that they lied to us about (*batubeshye*).' 'The message is that all

[359] Ibid.

people are equal, they all have the same blood, so they must share the best of the country without discrimination (*ntawe uhenze undi*— lit. without any more extortion (e.g. with milk), deception].' 'The message is that we shouldn't be guided by sectarianism based on ethnics or place of origin and to know that we are all Rwandans.' All in all, the focus lies exclusively on narrating de-ethnicisation even though, as increasing number of studies show, ethnicity is not what *primarily* motivated people to kill (Straus 2006; Fujii 2009).

From the viewpoint of unity-building, other important messages are those concerning Rwandanness (patriotism) and Rwandanicity (specific cultural values making a Rwandan, to be discussed under 'gitaramo'). All official ingando civic education schedules include lectures on patriotism. Among other things, in *ingando* we 'learn how to like our country in our hearts,' 'the culture of liking our country, how you have to do everything good for your country.' 'Patriotism means love of country, for example if someone attacks, [we] are ready to combat.' 'We are there to be taught a sense of patriotism, to defend the country if possible… that is why a little military practice [is included].' 'That is the essence of military training,' the administrator of Muhazi camp explains, 'military training installs patriotism in people.'[360] *Ingando* songs reflect this patriotic zeal. A song sung at Nkumba and entitled 'I will protect your frontier Rwanda' has the following lyrics: 'What will I do to protect? I will stand by on your frontier Rwanda; I will watch all persons that come toward you; I will let in those who carry a peace basket of unity and reconciliation; I will prevent from coming those who carry anything else till I convince them; Rwanda I love you.'

[360] Interview with Muhazi camp coordinator, op.cit.

iv. *Igitaramo*

All *ingandos* include an evening gathering of song and dance called *igitaramo* or *utemaduni*. When *igitaramo* starts it is already dark. In Nkumba, hundreds of students are seated in rows on a grass clearing, girls on the left, boys on the right. Everyone is singing and clapping to the fast rhythm of the song. The soldiers who run the camp are walking in between the long rows with a wooden stick, also singing. A guy is running in half-squat along the rows of kids, urging them on with his outstretched hands and high-pitched ululations to step up the energy of the song. The more intense the song gets, more ululations emanate from the crowd. Up front, there is a small group of drummers and dancers. There are different types of dance performed— *kinimba, komedi, gushirimba*. Two guys are dancing with whistles in their mouth and hands spread wide above their head imitating the horns of the Nyankole cattle. At some points there is tugging at the jackets to symbolize milking of a cow. The 'cow dance' is called *guhamiriza* for boys and *gushayaya* for girls.

Why is gitaramo included? Clearly, the more salient reason is to re-learn 'Rwandan culture.' Gitaramo is included because 'it is the Rwandan culture. [In the past it used to happen] for the king or other leaders, they [would] tell stories, sing, provide entertainment.' Another reason is the sense of unity produced by a mass of bodies joined in song, joined by a single rhythm, movement, utterance. 'In Rwandan culture, when we sing that means we are one.' There are others who explain *gitaramo* simply as 'entertainment.' Though different people highlighted different aspects of the get-together, it seems to be simultaneously all of them.

The Main Goal of *Ingando*: What are the Camps 'All About'?

In most of my interviews and questionnaires (with participants, organizers but also beyond), the following question has been included: 'According to you, what is the main objective of ingando?' In what follows, I want to reflect on the whole body of responses: Is the main aim unity building? Or else, what *is* 'unity-building' according to these responses? Is there agreement on what the main objective is or are the responses varied?

Analysis yields convergence as one of the key themes. The notion of bringing people 'to accord' or 'on the same line' appears repeatedly. Convergence is unity, and unity-as-convergence is the end-point of the process of reconciliation. Nation-building is thus also convergence: 'How to construct a nation, that is *ingando*…[and] one needs a consensus to make a nation [emphasis added].'[361] One such key consensus is the story of the past. The main objective of *ingando* is 'to have the same ideas about history of our country.'[362] The revisited and officialised historical narrative is indeed the centrepiece of all *ingandos*. Though many regard it as the 'true' or 'real' history, this official historical narrative is more functional than objective. 'Convergent,' however, should not be equated with 'consensual.' The narrative has not been arrived at through a continual discussion and is not open to public critique or rejection.

Many people, especially adults, are sensitive to the fact that they are being 're-taught' history and that there is a specific group of people who authored it. 'They teach us

[361] Interview with the RPF Communications Adviser, Kigali, March 23, 2009.

history, though we know it, they tell us what happened though we know it,' a female university student tells me. While waiting at the road-side crossing of *Kabuga wa Musha* in the Eastern province, an unemployed bespectacled teacher, currently 'begging for a job,' approached me and we talked. The teacher fled with masses of other Hutu to Congo. Back in Rwanda, after years of work, *gacaca* accused him and he was imprisoned. After seven years he was released because 'they realized I was innocent.' He attended returnee *ingando* in Nyagasambu in 1997 and described it in the following way: 'What can you teach me on top of what I know? What do you want to teach me about co-habitation, I know how to coexist, I know my history…These people [teaching me] who have come *after* I even left my country.'[363]

The history draws distrust and cynicism for the same reason that the whole NURC unity and reconciliation project draws it— coexistence and love among all Rwandans is being narrated, implemented and overseen by a group overwhelmingly constituted by old-caseload Tutsi returnees from Uganda. Similarly, the problem seems to be not primarily with the content, the 'what' of lessons, but with 'who' teaches and in what context. The main problem is that re-education is organized by people with a particular political agenda, which then translates into the lessons.

As we have seen, the theme of convergence comes out prominently from the participant responses. Convergence is even painted as the desired outcome of a reconciliatory process that *ingando* is meant to foster: 'People cannot be reconciled if they have not

[362] Interview with a researcher at the Office of the Ombudsman, January 14, 2009.
[363] Kabuga wa Musha, January 28, 2009.

talked together...[In *ingando*] people sit together, sort differences, *see things in the same way* [emphasis added].'[364] Students need '*one way of looking at things*, especially government policy.'[365] *Ingando* is there, after all, to teach participants how 'to defend the country and the policy of the country.'[366] The love of nation is conflated with the allegiance to policies of the government.

This brings us to another important theme— politicisation. People working in the non-governmental sector compare ingando with other 'unity and reconciliation' activities saying '*ingando* is different, it is more political.'[367] *Ingandos* are indeed fundamentally political, not only because i) politics and specific policies are being taught ('in *ingando* the government makes its program being known'), or because ii) convergence and 'defence' of policies ushers support to ruling party, thus solidifying its grasp on power; but also because iii) the state takes a keen interest in these specific groups and their 'forming,' re-working, essentially their wholesale transformation into an 'ideal citizen.'

Interestingly, the transformation process makes *lavage de cerveau* (brainwashing) an ambiguous term in Rwanda. As we have seen, transformation indeed accentuates changing thought, 'taking out' the bad mentalities and 'replacing them' by good ideas and attitudes. But while some use the term *lavage* to automatically dismiss *ingando*, others see the same process as an intended and necessary cleansing: '*Ingando* [was

[364] Interview with the Muhazi *ingando* coordinator, January 28, 2009.
[365] Ibid.
[366] Ibid.
[367] Interview with the Peace-Building and Reconciliation Project Manager at OXFAM Rwanda, October 30, 2008.

intended] for all people […] as some kind of *cleansing of people's minds from this dirt* accumulated by situations and recent history [emphasis added].'[368]

It is with this in mind that we have to consider the military aspect of *ingando*. There are some organizers and participants who tag ingando as 'military practice.' Just before entering Nkumba camp on one of my visits, the camp 'facilitator' turns to me and asks: 'Why are you interested in this activity? Why *ingando*? Do you not have *military training* like this in your country? [accent added]' In a fully packed Nyamirambo bus winding its way among pot holes, a third year NUR statistics student and a drop-out of *ingando* asks me what I think of my *ingando* visits. 'Interesting,' I say evasively, trying not to predetermine her response. 'Interesting? They are bad!' she exclaims, 'It is military camps more than anything, they lie to you!'

While it is true that Nkumba *ingando* and *itorero* incorporate military training and that the whole camp is organized in a military manner stressing discipline, hierarchy, response to authority and homogeneity, and while it is also true that no official description of *ingando* mentions militariness but rather promotes *ingando* as unity and reconciliation seminars, to simply conclude that *ingandos* are 'military training camps' is to miss the bigger picture. Such conclusion overlooks the political, and within it the transformative and the conformative that is essential to governmentality. Today, the Rwandan government uses the space of *ingando* primarily to effectuate a transformation— to create what they call a 'citizen,' but which in effect is an ideal development 'subject.' While this project applies to other activities of unity and reconciliation as well, *ingando*'s spatial and

[368] Interview with the Director of the Language Center, KIST, March 10, 2009.

performative aspects (discussed next) make it distinct.

Summary

Briefly, what does the analysis of *ingando*'s components and overall goals show us? How do we reconcile the discourses of unity-building with discourses and activities of reorienting, defence and convergence? Perhaps we can say that unity in the government's imagination includes re-orienting away from certain attitudes and beliefs, as well as convergence of knowledge and opinion, adoption of consensus on key topics such as history and government policy. *Ingandos* are mass sensitisation, education, and re-education centres aimed to transmit not only various types of information, but 'consensuses' on key issues. The RPF believes it has created the contours of a 'New Rwanda;' now it needs to transmit the attitudes, behaviours and knowledges that underlie it. As we have seen, this aspect of cleansing and consensus formation through sensitisation is common to all *ingandos* even if their target groups are extremely different.

The unity-building in *ingando* draws on militariness (its accent on oppositional identity, homogeneity and 'oneness'), patriotism and the (re)learning of rwandanicity. Unity-building, militariness and politicisation are key aspects that cannot be considered in separation. *Ingando* is meant to show its participant that 'defending your country is your primary role, defending the policy of your country is your primary role.'[369] This points again to the 'unicity' or totality of the state and its project— One does not only learn about policies and activities that cross various thematic boundaries, but one needs to be

convergent on these important points. Unity means coming together not only to defend the contours of physical space and the abstract notion of a nation that draws them, but of more technical policies, and the narratives and broader discourses that underpin them.

[369] Interview with the Muhazi *ingando* coordinator, op.cit.

CHAPTER 9. **Effects of *Ingando* Camps: Rites of Collective Passage to the New Rwanda**

Can *ingando* transform a person or a group of people? Can it change social relations? In what sense is *ingando* 'powerful'? The present chapter is an inquiry into *ingando*'s effects. First, the chapter explores the desired effects—the effects one would expect from a unity and reconciliation activity. The rest of the chapter then focuses on actual effects arising from i) the spatial and performative nature of the camps; and ii) the wider political contexts. It is these broader conjectures (rather than just what is taught and done) that help us fully understand *ingando*. *Ingando* is not just a 'school' but is meant to be a more wholesome transformatory experience. Based on the analysis, and combining *ingando*'s two salient features— separation and transition— the chapter will theorize the camp as a total institution and a collective rite of passage to the rules, roles/citizen scripts and ideologies of RPF-led Rwanda.

The Expected Effects: Reconciliation, Unity, Peace and Solidarity

How do we study *ingando*'s desired or 'character-mandated'[370] effects? Is this even possible? The government produces politically-expedient upbeat assessments with little grounding in rigorous factual analysis. Participants and non-participant observers operate within a repressive political system which affects how they can 'judge' a government-sponsored activity, and within a society ripe with rumour and distrust. Critique might be

scarce, but does this mean all are 'indoctrinated'? The politics of voice in contemporary Rwanda has to be used to interpret and contextualize announced 'results.'

'The ordinary citizen generally accepts the existence of *ingando* as an important and possibly even crucial element in the reconciliation and peace relationship process,' writes the author of a government-sponsored *ingando* impact assessment (1996-2006), the only formal appraisal available, with largely unreliable results.[371] The author goes on to suggest that 'even though one can not yet form any conclusions [on] whether *ingando* is effective to unity and reconciliation or not, *since not sufficient empirical studies have been conducted*, it is already possible to make predictions on its effectiveness [emphasis added].' Unsubstantiated predictions and assertions are part of the official discourse: NURC's Director of Peace Building and Conflict Management proclaims that *ingandos* 'help Rwandans to become good citizens' (GYC 2008:10). 'According to NURC's Communications Officer, the programme has been *instrumental* in changing the mindset of the youth... Indications [undetailed] show that *ingando* has had a very big impact on the young people (Kwizera for NTK, August 2 2009) [emphasis added].'

In Mutobo and TIG *ingandos* for ex-combatants and released prisoners, respectively, I have included the following question in the questionnaire: '*Can ingando change a person? How?*' Without fail, every answer to this politically sensitive question has been

[370] I.e. 'unity and reconciliation' activity should produce 'unity and reconciliation.'
[371] Different *ingando* participants were chosen, samples carefully balanced, and yet, the overly positive responses to questions do not necessarily reflect true opinion but rather carefulness. Also, reported findings have a positive slant but are fundamentally vague: 'According to a significant number of respondents (93%), *ingando* enhance the ability of the *ingando* beneficiaries to take control and act in their own best interest relating to the collective or national concerns' (p.52). Or 'Many people consider *ingando* as the most appropriate answer to the identity crisis of the Rwandans as well as the most effective strategy of

affirmative. *Ingando* changes a person in 'thinking and action,' 'because of the courses given,' which if you follow, 'you are changed automatically.' Ideas of past are 'removed,' *ingando* helps people 'correct themselves,' and learn a 'new way of living,' how to live with neighbours, how to 'live with the one we have wronged.' The Mutobo answers were relatively more elaborate and often mentioned learning the 'truth' of things in *ingando*. TIG answers were curt, there were some blank responses, and one TIGist mentioned change is possible 'if you follow the orders.'

Interviews with student participants proved more iterative and responses more diverse. Even though the majority of respondents avoided criticism and highlighted positive effects of *ingando*, critical and sceptical views have been expressed as well. Lengthier and slightly more critical responses might have resulted partly from the different form of data-collection employed (semi-structured interviews) and the space where data collection took place. Interviews were conducted in a less controlled environment—outside *ingando* and on a one-on-one basis. Furthermore, the price of dissent is not the same across the whole population. In Rwanda (and perhaps elsewhere), the rule is that the closer to power, the more openly one can speak one's mind (i.e. those most unafraid to twist or even contradict official scripts were officials of the party and/or government).

On the other hand, the already-mentioned political ambiance (i.e. you cannot say whatever is on your mind and hence do not get an idea of 'dissenters') and 'self-selection' biases result in a greater positive response than would have resulted from a 'perfect sample.' First, a perfect sample would result if all people were free to speak their

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achieving the ideal of unity and reconciliation' (p.61).

mind and if those chosen to participate were not tempering their criticism as a result of indirect co-optations (e.g. university students posturing as the future elite). Second, a perfect sample would result only if everyone who was meant to indeed underwent *ingando* (including the 'dodgers,' 'leavers' and 'objectors' such as the Jehovah's Witnesses who avoid it precisely because they disagree). Finally, a perfect sample would result only if all students approached agreed to participate (again those disagreeing with *ingando* might not want to talk).

My analysis is based either on answers to explicit questions such as '*Can ingando help reconciliation?* or '*Ingando are called solidarity camps. Do you think the camps can build solidarity?*' or on unsolicited narratives addressing 'change.' One student suggested that *ingando* is 'more powerful than *gacaca*, because in *ingando*, people [are] aware of being trained, in *gacaca* [there is] no training… in *gacaca* you are [only] punished.' Change means mostly change in 'understanding' (changing ideology, learning the truth, etc). 'If you know the bad of something, you can't do it.' A number of student participants relate change to 'understanding' that ethnicity does not exist or is not important. The government apparently attempts to create an ethnically-blind cohort and seems successful at it, even if just at the surface level. Such behaviour is still useful in terms of governmentality and might be rewarded.

- 'When you come back [home from *ingando*], you already know Hutu, Tutsi, the history, it is meaningless. We try to consider it as nonsense ideas.'
- 'Of course [*ingando* builds solidarity]. Before entering *ingando*, I was in obscurity. The authorities come [to the camp] and give you a lot of information.

Now I know how to live with others [because] I have already socialized with other Rwandans [in *ingando*]. In our generation, there is no more Hutu, Tutsi, Twa.'

- 'We are different students there, some are Hutu, some are Tutsi, but after being enlightened [we realize] it is not us, but our fathers [who] put a hand [to the genocide]….there is not reason why we should not feel united.'
- 'It changes people... it [*ingando*] helps you everywhere you are going, not to be frightened by different people, different ethnics, you go back to that experience.'

Others refer to genocide ideology: '[*Ingando*] has changed me and others, before [there was] genocide ideology, they teach us to fight it….it has diminished the ideology.' Or: '*Ingando* changes people. Some go *laver la tête* completely [with regard to] this ideology.' 'For me, I don't see profit of genocide…even me, who has family who participated…we both [are] suffering because of genocide, why don't we fight against genocide ideology….how are you a cockroach….we look [the] same, we have the same blood, I see you as me and you see me as you.' Convergence in understanding is itself believed to be a contribution to unity and reconciliation. 'Before, they [the students] know different things, [which] prevents reconciliation. After [*ingando*] they know one thing in the same sense.'

Those more sceptical and critical suggest that *ingando* is limited in some way (as regards time span, temporary effects, limited target groups, etc) or point to wider social problems that undermine the work of *ingando*. The time spent in *ingando* has been narrowed progressively from three months to three or even two weeks. As a result, 'we cannot go in

depth,' 'it depends on the person [whether some solidarity is developed], we spend only little time there.' 'Three weeks are not sufficient for someone to change, for solidarity or reconciliation.' The target group needs to be expanded: 'They train us only intellectuals; they should go to the countryside as well.' 'Another matter [are] the parents…Local authorities try to teach them after *umuganda*, about the different activities of government, but we don't know what they are teaching each other at home. If possible, they should bring parents [to *ingando*].' 'TIGists, [after *ingando*] when they return to society […] the problem [is] the society is not mobilized to give them a second chance...but the released [themselves], I know they are fine, [they] had time to think and ask for pardon.' Others suggest *ingando* is only a preliminary measure: 'For now, yes [it works]….but still another tool [is needed] in the future; this is the first step.' 'We are looking for more effective strategies, but this is for now.'

Some students insinuate direct disagreement with aspects of *ingando* or *ingando* as a whole: 'Some people are not happy about it [*ingando*, saying] it is just to teach about this government, small small portion [of the participants], [they say] it is to promote FPR line. [Well], *it is* to promote their line, but that is good!' Or '[Does *ingando* help reconciliation?] Not at all, we did not do assessment that people who have genocide ideology have changed. I don't think so; even if you leave [*ingando*] and come here [university], there is still genocide ideology present.' Another student suggested, 'I don't think that [*ingand*o creates reconciliation]. You can show people that you agree, but in your head you think another thing...You cannot tell it because otherwise you will be imprisoned.'

Open disagreement does surface, however, when certain sensitive topics such as religion are touched. Previously, I mentioned the murmurs and songs of protest in an *ingando* classroom during a controversial lecture promoting materialism. In such rare situations of collective upheaval, students use the word 'brainwashing' indignantly and against the government ('[Me:] Why is he teaching all this?' 'They want to brainwash us!'). One student suggested through lectures such as these, *ingando* does negative work: 'In the philosophy [lesson], they were telling us god does not exist…they are somehow teaching us to kill each other! They should teach that god loves all of us, Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, we are all children of god.' In other words, much broader issues (*Who comes to teach and how are they perceived? Can a short and narrowly-targeted program of conviviality transform deeply-affected social relations at large?*) determine the prospects of *ingando* but these cannot be solved inside that space and experience.

The most lasting effect of *ingando* seems to be the friendships it creates: 'Youth from all corners of country, they all meet at that particular place, so when they meet they create friendship; during *ingando,* in those exchanges, a sense of unity, togetherness is created.' 'People do change, even when we come here [to university after *ingando*], we are like a family.'[372] All retreats, camps and other closed communities where people 'undergo' things together ('you have been through bad things, tortured together') and spend time socializing produce gregariousness and camaraderie. The group shares these intense experiences with no one else, and can return to them together (a circle of memory). In

[372] These are just two excerpts; there were at least five others who explicitly highlighted friendship as the most lasting effect of *ingando*.

other words, the one pronounced effect of *ingando* seems to be the strengthened sense of groupness among these specific people, who become a cohort of sorts. However, whether this sense of friendship truly runs across all divisions is a question that faces all the methodological obstacles mentioned above.

Finally, how do the non-participants see change in participants? An employee of a local association gives an optimistic assessment: 'People returning from the DRC [ex-combatants], who were in *ingando*, they are 'a cadre' in society, they are not those who will cause trouble, sometimes [they are even] the good examples... They behave as people integrated, there was worry they would be source of insecurity, but they weren't, and it is because they went through *ingando*.'[373] Two quite conflicting views exist on the effects of student *ingando*, reflecting the polarized political environment. In one view, '*ingando* creates thirst for such [positive economic, cultural and political] frameworks […], participants multiply prayer groups, public meetings….because they now have that thirst, that desire for rebuilding.' An IRDP researcher views post-*ingando* students in a very different light:

> 'When these kids go through *ingando*, something happens, there is a feeling of fear [in them], they are only afraid of the challenges, of history, [they] know only of government's program. That is why I hate them [*ingandos*], I never went to visit one, but I can see the outcomes. There are no demands, they demand nothing, there are no demonstrations, no strikes at universities, I keep thinking this must be the result of *ingando*. Another result, and you cannot observe it because you are not Rwandan, if you meet former soldiers,

[373] Interview with the Legal Department Officer at Haguruka, Kigali, January 20, 2009.

> prisoners, former *ingando* trainees, even in family context, and you start to criticize or to have contradictory opinions, they just laugh a little and say nothing, whether Hutu or Tutsi it does not matter, nothing, no opinion.'[374]

These perceptions show that what for one is a welcome zeal to 'rebuild' and a necessary alignment in ideology, for another is a sign of taming, docility and 'indoctrination.'[375] No matter the conflicting views, there is a common axis: Non-participants evaluated *ingando* against concepts such as 'integration,' 'security,' 'critique,' 'opinion' or 'thirst to reconstruct.' There was no mention of 'unity,' 'solidarity' and 'reconciliation' or even 'friendship.' *Ingando*'s effects thus can be seen from a different angle, a much more politicised one. *Ingando* can be seen as a key tool in, and a microcosm of, the wider political project of governmentality and social engineering. The rest of the chapter is thus dedicated to exploring *ingando*'s effects in this sphere.

A Crucial Ingredient: The Spatial and Performative Nature of *Ingando*

As mentioned*, ingando* is about transition and transformation. *But why is 'camping' chosen? Why this particular form of experience? What are the effects of camping that other forms of 'schooling' cannot achieve?* These questions require a broader inquiry into the spatial and performative nature of *ingando*. Having covered 'contents' (activities, lessons, and their meanings) in the past chapter, the analysis turns now to contexts— to spaces and 'being' in a place with others. As will be shown, the experience of camping is itself supposed to do 'desired work.' It is not just what participants learn in class, singing

[374] Interview with Augustin, an IRDP researcher, January 21, 2009.

sessions, or military parades, but where, with whom and how these take place.

i. A Camp: Separation and Concentration

Ingando's participants are 'distanced' from the outside in different ways. The camp is a bounded space in a remote location. For the incoming group, the place is 'far away from home.'[376] Participants are not familiar with the surroundings, the people ('you go with people you don't even know'[377]) or the style of life. Altogether, people are 'out of their element.' The attempt is to create a total separation from the 'outside' and from the 'before.'

Remoteness assures a lack of 'distractions' and 'concentration on the goal.'[378] It creates the possibility of undivided attention ('outside the camp everyone is in his business, there we concentrate'). A good example is the *ingando* for ex-combatants, located about 10 kilometres off the paved road at one of the multiple crevices of Lake Muhazi. The administrator explains the significance of the location: 'It is to avoid distraction. If the camp [was] at the side of the road, then we are trying to give them one direction, and the outside is pulling them in different directions. We are trying to create a circle, we are trying to settle their mind.' An Adventist church functionary also suggests that in the camps 'participants are protected from the bad influences from the parents because they are far.'[379]

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[375] Use of these labels can be strategic too: They are known to upset the Western mind, bringing indignation, and that effect is desirable not necessarily because of adherence to liberal political ideals but because it will reflect badly on the government, possibly undermining it.
[376] Interview with the Executive Secretary of the East Rwanda Association of the Adventist Church, Nyamirambo, Kigali, January 21, 2009.
[377] Interview with a student *ingando* participant, Butare, February 3, 2009.
[378] Interview with *ingando* participant and ex-President of national SCUR Forum, January 14, 2009
[379] Interview with the Executive Secretary of the East Rwanda Association of the Adventist Church, op.cit.

'Concentration' is key in yet another sense— a camp is a concentration of people. This has two governance functions. First, it is logistically easier to sensitise people *en masse* ('it becomes easier for many people to know many things in the same place'[380]). It is also the most expedient way to separate out a social segment for tailored sensitisation ('you have to bring them together to shape their mind'[381]). Second, *ingandos* that mix different social segments (perpetrators, victims, returnees, etc) are meant to serve as 'laboratories of coexistence.' 'You cannot reconcile people if they are not together [in direct contact];'[382] 'if people have not talked together.'[383] But since *ingandos* are not spontaneous but orchestrated concentrations, they constitute 'simulated communalities.' Participants nonetheless have to communicate and interact. *Ingando* forces them to 'be together' in the most extreme sense— to live together in close proximity, sharing aspects of life normally shared only within the family context (e.g. dining, hygiene, sleeping quarters). Finally, concentration is key from the viewpoint of content. *Ingando* has a tight schedule packed with activities and lessons; it is meant to be *école accélérée*,[384] an intensive course.

The proximity and face-to-face contact that *ingando* creates are believed to be significant from the viewpoint of transformation. In general (relevant to all sensitisation activities), the belief is that 'the message gets in better when they can see you [see the speaker].'[385] Further, singing and dancing are believed to create mutual confidence and openness. On

[380] Coordinator of Muhazi *ingando* for child ex-combatants, January 28, 2009.
[381] Interview with a Nkumba participant at NUR, Butare, February 2, 2009.
[382] Interview with a student *ingando* participant, Butare, February 5, 2009.
[383] Coordinator of the Muhazi *ingando* for child ex-combatants, talking about ingando in general, op.cit.
[384] Interview with RPF Communications Adviser, March 23, 2009.
[385] An executive at the Ruhengeri prison referring to NURC's presentation during Unity and Reconciliation Week, November 19, 2008.

my visit to the TIG camp, an administrator called for an *igitaramo* session— 'you will sing and dance a little with them, this will motivate them, this will open them to you, after that you can ask them anything and they will do it.'

Though dancing, singing, chatting and 'experiencing together' have undoubtedly the potential to create fraternality (however durable or fleeting it is), the challenge might be precisely to extend that potential across the divisions that today are most pervasive (e.g. The *tigists* within the camp might grow friendly with each other; but this serves as no assurance that relations between perpetrators and victims are similarly affected). There might be important limits to 'building bridges' through song and dance. 'When you dance with them [normally] they open up, so [before asking questions] at Mutobo *ingando*, we tried that but it didn't work… they [the ex-combatants] have strategic information….[these men] they looked at us as if we were from a different world.'[386]

ii. Internal Structure: Order and Hierarchy

Inside the camp, both physical space and time are highly structured, reflecting importance of order and rules, hierarchies and authority. Every camp has a detailed time schedule, which breaks the day almost to the hour. Most *ingandos* also assure order and indirect control by organizing participants in a military way, dividing them into companies[387], platoons and sections, with leaders called *kapita*. The camp is carefully divided into administrative quarters, dorms for participants, a common dining area, a clearing for

[386] Interview with Bernard at MINALOC after his visit to Mutobo with a delegation from Northern Uganda (seeking inspiration for activities for the conflict-affected northern regions), March 12, 2009.
[387] E.g. TIG has four companies: 'AC,''BC,''CC' and 'DC.'

physical exercises or other types of gathering, and a centrally-located spacious amphitheatre, in some cases called a 'pentagon' (sometimes made in the form of the pentagon) or *l'ecole* where participants gather for classes and evening *igitaramo*.

The 'pentagon' of the TIG camp is an impressive feat of makeshift wooden architecture— a round enclosed arena with a rising scaffolding of benches, in front of which rises a balcony, a pulpit really, where the administrators and teachers deliver their lessons and oversee the evening *igitaramo*. Even in the tented Adventist *ingando* lost among the hills of the Akagera park, space is carefully ordered. An improvised wooden revolving door gives way to the area of the 'political headquarters' (administrators' area) with the main tent referred to as the 'White House.' In front of a large clearing rises a wooden tribune where the administrators or invited speakers deliver their message.

The centrality of the lecture theatre in the spatial order further underlines the centrality of the transformation project itself. The function of order as such is 'that it makes it easier for the government to come and teach.'[388] Order is directly linked to governmentality objectives: Order eases surveillance and increases control. Space and time are disciplined as must be the 'being in them' of participants. Lack of discipline, after all, is listed by NURC's Director of Civic Education in her *ingando* speech as one of the reasons of genocide.[389]

[388] Interview with a Nkumba *ingando* participant, Butare, February 4, 2009.
[389] Visit to Kageyo *ingando* at the Tanzania border, November 12, 2008.

iii. Enaction: Experiencing through Simulation

Enacting certain roles and experiencing certain scenarios is meant to be educative and transformative. 'One thing [is] to be told you are Rwandan, that it is more important than other identities, but another thing to feel it, to identify with that larger group.'[390] 'In general, we want actions rather than words, [we want] change by doing.'[391] Two to three different simulations overlap in *ingando* (depending on which *ingando* we focus on) and create specific 'unities:' i) simulation of RPF military life during the war; ii) simulation of a community where interactions among people and experiencing 'side by side' take place; and iii) simulation of a collective rite of passage through certain activities of separation and transition.

During the *ingando* lunch break, seated at the back of the communal kitchen and working at a dish of beans, corn and rice, a participant (and my translator) excitedly shares his observations: 'They want us to go through what the soldiers went through, the training, the food, this is what RPF soldiers used to eat during the war.'[392] As previously mentioned, the military format draws on and produces specific enactments of unity— us versus other, uniformity, oneness. Let me focus in greater depth on the latter two. Sameness or uniformity is a salient theme in *ingando*— the camps try to create an almost hyperbolic experience, an absolute erasure of differential treatment. Both organizers and students repeatedly highlight sameness as the core unity-producing strategy. Uniformity at the most literal level starts with wearing a uniform (in Nkumba, Gato and in *itorero*,

[390] Interview with the 'Professional for Good Governance,' MINALOC, March 12, 2009.
[391] Interview with Director of Programs at the Rwanda National Youth Council, op.cit.
[392] Visit to Nkumba *ingando*, December 16, 2008.

this is military uniform, in TIG a work uniform). More generally, *ingando* produces a 'uniform experience.' An excited participant recounts: 'We woke up at the same time, we ran together, our beds were made the same way, we wore the same clothes, we clapped the same way, and we marched together, we were *umoja* [unity].'[393] A similar observation: 'We do the same things, drink the same thing, eat the same thing, we sit and we share.'[394] 'Why do they eat beans and corn in *ingando*?' I ask Florence. 'It is to show that you and me… we are at the same level, [there is] no difference, you might be rich and me poor but we eat the same thing, we are one people.'[395] Especially in difficult situations, there can be no differentiation: 'If a case arises of survival, of struggling, you all are supposed to [put your part]…they [the *ingando* administrators] find some [puddles] of water in the lot and we all go inside, we wallow in it like pigs,[396] [to show that] you and me, we are one.'[397]

Besides uniformity with its accent on equal treatment, *ingando* utilizes strategies that create a sense of oneness— of being an inseparable part of a larger unit, which itself is constituted as compact. Observation and interviews reveal three strategies: collective punishment, body coordination, and the rallying call. 'If someone makes a mistake, everyone is punished, there is a kind of connection in that.'[398] 'Everything you do it as a team. If someone does a fault [makes a mistake], they punish you as one, because you are one. For example, they shout 'all of you down!' even if only one person does something

[393] Interview with Nkumba *ingando* participant, Butare, February 5, 2009.
[394] A student at NUR reflecting on *ingando* experience, Butare, February 5, 2009.
[395] Informal discussion with a NURC intern, December 19, 2008.
[396] This punishment is known as *kwiviringita*.
[397] Interview with a Nkumba *ingando* participant, Butare, February 5, 2009.
[398] Interview with a Nkumba *ingando* participant, Butare, February 6, 2009.

wrong.'[399] Military parades also enact such sense of oneness. The very movement of bodies and limbs in coordination makes an individual part of a greater unit, not only of a physical regiment but also (even if only by a figurative extension) of an intangible idea, a larger imagined community. Coordination utilizes the physical to help experience the intangible. Finally, all *ingandos* utilize the rallying call, which is perhaps the most 'concentrated' act in terms of combining different performative strategies of unity. The Nkumba call and reply (*kos*!--> *umoja*!) is the best example: Not only does the reply involve saying 'unity' (*umoja*!), but all have to respond in the same way (uniformity) and in unison (oneness).

Ingando's Wider Conjectures: Power, State, and Governmentality

i. *Ingando* as a Total Institution

The spatial and performative analysis suggests that *ingando* is a 'total institution' (Goffman 1957). A 'total' institution (or if relevant to the whole state, a 'totalitarian system') encompasses person's 'whole being.' The total character is 'symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside.' *Ingando*[400] fulfils all 'totalistic features' listed by Goffman (1957:2)— i) all aspects of life conducted in the same place and under the same single authority; ii) each phase of the member's activity being carried out in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together; iii) all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole circle of activities

[399] Interview with a Nkumba *ingando* participant, Butare, February 4, 2009.
[400] Goffman does not mention camping retreats in his grouping of total institutions (interestingly he mentions a more restricted category of 'retreats from the world or training stations of the religious') though he does state that his list is not exhaustive.

being imposed from above through a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials; and iv) finally, the contents of the various enforced activities are brought together as parts of a single overall rational plan purportedly designed to fulfil the official aims of the institution.

In such settings, 'the central relationship is not guidance or periodic checking […] but *surveillance— a seeing to it* that everyone does what he has been clearly told […] and this under conditions where one person's infraction is likely to stand out in relief against the visible, constantly examined, compliance of the others [emphasis added]'(Goffman 1957:2). Indeed, while the camp itself is hidden to the outside, inside the camp, there is perfect oversight: The space is small, all follow the same schedule and all wear uniform. Individuality is lost to the 'block' management of people (ibid). In TIG camp, a table on a blackboard offers the 'daily counts'— it is literally divided into 'blocks' and represents a schematic symbol of oversight— *abahari* (those present), *abakore* (those working), *abarwaye* (those sick), etc.

'There are reasons for being interested in [total institutions] […] These establishments are forcing houses for *changing persons in our society*. Each is a natural experiment, typically harsh, on what can be done to the self' (Goffman 1957:4). Indeed*, ingandos* are social experiments, manipulable worlds. For now, we can see that separation, size and internal order aids surveillance, which further aids order, and which together allow greater legibility, control and, ultimately, manipulation. But *ingando* camps are also about experience— they are a separation from the mundane and familiar, an intense

experience of full immersion without respite, they involve the enaction of new roles, a breaking down of barriers, interaction with new people.

ii. The King and His Castle at *Lake Muhazi*: Sovereignty and Indirect Control in a Simulated Social World

The Lake Muhazi *ingando* for child ex-combatants is an example of a particularly intense total institution. Though the centre comprises only one administrator and 56 boys (aged 14-18), the intricate social organization within the camp is striking. The administrative divisions, information networks and surveillance, as well as the attempt to 'transform behaviour' are a concentrated reflection on key aspects of the Rwandan state. The camp is also an interesting political entity— a simulated sovereign world unto itself, a pseudo-polity fitted with administrative, political and judicial 'systems' but where power is concentrated in the hands of one man.[401]

A number of aspects help explain why this particular *ingando* is so intense. Not only are these 'children' who are thought to be 'malleable' and the 'nation of tomorrow,'[402] there are also different types of transitions that they have to undergo. The participants grew up or spent a number of years living with an armed group;[403] they need to be 'corrected' and get accustomed to 'civilian life' ('We help them in terms of behavioural change because in DRC they adapted to behaviours that are not good, now they need to be reintegrated to society'[404]). Many never lived with a family, yet in Rwanda the aim is to reunite them with close or distant relatives (they are 'not familiar with activities commonly carried out

[401] '[Me:] How many people work here?' 'I am a manager but also a social worker, it is basically me.'
[402] Interview with the Muhazi *ingando* coordinator, January 28, 2009.
[403] Most come from the FDLR, but also Mai Mai, RCD Goma, Mongoli, RDD and 'other.'

at home, such as fetching water, firewood, helping with the young ones, they do not know the duties, the roles of the child'[405]). Many children have also spent all or most of their life abroad so they need to be updated on the rules and ideologies of the post-genocide government (one of the main goals is 'to give them a clear picture of their country'). The length of time spent in *ingando* adds to the intensity. On average, a child ex-combatant spends months in the camp; this, however, depends on how fast a host relative can be identified. There are two boys who have spent more than four years in *ingando*.

Ingando's ultimate goal is the transformation and 'preparation' of the participants. These need to be 'recovered and updated.'[406] The administrator uses the term 'psycho-social support' though his elaboration of the term suggests it is not trauma counselling (the usual interpretation of the word) he is engaged in, but rather behavioural modification:

> [Psychosocial support] is a tool of behavioural change. When the child comes, it has some behaviours that really need to be eradicated […] I approach the child, talk to it, and see how the child is answering, to see the extent of support that is required, that it requires this direction, orientation […] I do it in a parental way. Depending on the way they are behaving, I bring them from one direction to another direction, I show the best way to

[404] Interview with the Muhazi *ingando* coordinator, op.cit.
[405] Ibid.
[406] Interview with the Muhazi *ingando* coordinator, op.cit.

> cope with their lives, and then I continue to monitor how they are socializing with their fellows.[407]

'But how is that change achieved?' The camp administrator spent hours explaining the intricate system and multiple strategies he has created to assure control, which in turn assures monitoring, which in turn is a necessary tool both in measuring and achieving the desired change in participants. As a result, the Muhazi camp is in fact a perfect case study of the utilisation of separation, surveillance and indirect control in disciplining and 'transforming' participants.

First, control is assured through the elaborate information system of 'ears and eyes.' To learn about the behaviour of a particular participant 'I talk to those *already changed*, [asking them] what is he doing, they tell me […] Then I call him in, he is surprised how I even knew [what he was doing]. But even if I am not here, there are so many eyes. That is one system [emphasis added].' Another system is that of indirect control. It is in fact a political system of sorts, equipped with an executive and a judiciary. 'They have leadership amongst themselves. It is actually a very complicated system which I have developed.'[408] There is a leader— *duvaye*— 'something like a prefect, he is in charge of all the children in the camp. The prefect keeps changing so that everyone can get a chance to be a leader, get experience with managing his own behaviour and helping others.' Under the *duvaye* comes the disciplinarian, responsible for discipline of all, including the prefect 'so that the leader is not a dictator.' Under these posts, there is a

[407] Ibid.
[408] Ibid.

person in charge of logistics and someone else in charge of sports. 'You see, it is like a cabinet.' Additionally, participants are divided into sectors (not military formations like in other *ingandos*) and the camp daily responsibilities are divided among these groups (e.g. sweeping).

Besides executive, there is also judiciary. 'I created *gacaca* [too]...it is better if they can do it [disciplining] themselves, to see the change, if we do it for them, we cannot really see the change. […] The prefect or those responsible for discipline identify you and the mistakes that have been done, and report to the prefect. The prefect delegates [the case] to the chairman of the *gacaca*, the prosecutor and the judges. The *gacaca* will then call you, and will call everyone, because judgment is done in front of everyone.'[409] After thorough investigation and a private judgment by the chairmen and judges, the punishment is announced: 'You, Mr B, have done a mistake, for that you will be punished...sweeping the compound for five days, carrying five jerry cans of water. The case is closed...If, however, the accused says "I confess, I made a mistake, I will not repeat it again," he gets [only] three days of sweeping because he confessed. This is to install unity, reconciliation.'[410] 'It is a very complicated system...Everybody has an eye on his fellow, even the leader is looking [at] *gacaca*, *gacaca* is watching the leader, everyone is watching his fellow.'[411]

How does all this connect to wider social dynamics in Rwanda? Ingando are special social engineering spaces where the change of mentalities, behaviours and acquisition of

[409] Ibid.
[410] This plays off the wider Rwandan system of prisoner release upon their admission of guilt.

knowledges and attitudes are the principal goals. In case of the Muhazi camp, *ingando* is also a miniature politico-social system, with the important difference that the concentrated space of a total institution allows better surveillance and manipulation. The Muhazi camp system reflects wider Rwandan dynamics whereby social control is internalized in the social body (through surveillance and indirect control). Greater docility is assured by delegating 'responsibilities' in the system of indirect governance. Muhazi *ingando* is an example of administrative 'divide and rule.' In the end, it is the administrator who remains on the top of the complex structure of indirect rule. He approximates the figure of the absolute sovereign, a person above 'law'/rules who has the final say, the power to change everything and who programs his simulated social world to achieve his own objectives. This society outside society has been engineered by the quasi-sovereign and is being manipulated to achieve results—it is a social experiment *par excellence*.

iii. *Nkumba* Production: A Convergent Elite?

If the above sections focused on the camp as a condensed laboratory of social engineering, the present brief section focuses on effects and parallels of a different kind— on *ingando*'s learning style accentuating and producing convergence in knowledges and opinions. Though the focus lies on Nkumba and Gako *ingandos* for university entrants, we have to bear in mind that the theme of 'convergence' pertains to all types of *ingando*. Nkumba participants are proclaimed as the 'future leaders' of the country, however, and so very relevant questions of reproduction of power and an acquiescent elite arise.

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[411] Interview with the Muhazi *ingando* coordinator, op.cit.

A student recounts the exalted feeling after ending *ingando* at Gako military academy: 'The ride to Kigali was nothing compared to the one to Gako. All the students were interacting and singing patriotic songs, even those on the streets were cheering and smiling at us [...] Our culture is the same, we all live on the same land, we speak the same language and we all hope for a better Rwanda, we are all *umoja* [one].' Some might indeed turn into true zealots after *ingando*. For others, the intense feelings they experienced gradually dissipate. The 'apassionates,' in any case, just as the 'open critics,' 'dodgers' or 'leavers' are a minority. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the majority of participant responses are homogeneous, and are defined by a positive attitude and a lack of critique.

The politics of consensus requires a proper analysis. Leaving aside self-selection issues, the overall positive judgment and convergence in responses is structurally determined—on the one hand, we have the dynamic of suppression (of voice and certain opinion), on the other, the dynamic of cooptation (into agreement). The result is that it is extremely hard to 'quantify' dissent. It is hard to know what was not said but is believed, and what is said because of clear incentives ('future leaders of the nation') but otherwise would not be. At the same time, not all who do criticize automatically speak the 'truth,' while all those who agree might not be automatically 'parroting propaganda' (hiding away a 'private' reserve of contradictory opinion).

The rather uniform spoken consensus, whether genuine or not, reflects a 'success' of *ingando*. As analyzed above, *ingando* is not really *about* critical thinking but rather

convergence in knowledges (on certain important issues i.e. government policy) and attitudes/behaviours (i.e. patriotism, discipline). A minority evades *ingando*, another small minority never finishes it, and an unknown fraction has negative attitudes towards *ingando* or its aspects. Nonetheless, the unfailing ability to reproduce learned scripts and the homogenous response suggests again that a 'unified citizen corps' has been created, albeit perhaps only on the surface. While surface concord does not mean that the government is successful in creating lasting social harmony or agents that will sow long-term peace, it does manage to form a friendly social cohort that will take over economic and political power. Their understanding of and alignment with the government's program is thus crucial in power's smooth reproduction. *Ingando* is meant to form the social segment – *a loyal elite*— that will not challenge structures but continue them.

In other words, why should responses *not* be overly positive if there are structural incentives for such behaviour? The students are told and believe they are the intelligentsia (separated from the 'illiterates') and future leadership of the country; they are made to see themselves among those who come to teach them (and it is government staff including high officials that come to the North to deliver their message). One does not bite the hand that feeds it (government scholarships) or will feed it (through future employment). Overall, the structural dynamics in contemporary Rwanda are such that greater alignment is a strategy of success (loyalty is rewarded) whereas non-alignment (of 'dodgers' 'leavers' and 'objectors' and open dissenters) is visible and stamps people with a question mark (in the important economy of 'character assessment'— a euphemism for finding non-contrary staffers).

Importantly, being co-opted and brainwashed are two distinct phenomena that should not be confused. 'Brainwashed' is a derogatory term laden with assumptions (of permanent enforced change for example) and one that overlooks the reasons for and contexts of changed behaviour. In private or outside of Rwanda, even the youth 'right hands of the government' might speak differently. 'In Rwanda just after the genocide, I worked for the government in Gikongoro area with youth, not just in *ingando*, also in communities as a trainer. I worked with youth persuading them about how good the RPF are.' Part of the reason why my informant did this was 'because it was a job. I saw that RPF had problems, I did not agree with it on everything, but neither did I agree with the other parties. I also did it because I wanted to know what they [youth] think and to teach them patriotism.'[412] There is a complex dynamic and numerous reasons underlying what we witness as cooptation. In politically tense and controlled settings, people's motivations, perceptions and beliefs cannot be judged as unchanging and one-sided just because their public expression (in an unchanged regime) is.

Repeating the official discourse can be advantageous for the perpetrators as well. This is in fact another 'tacit contract.'[413] Posing as 'reformed' is a way for released prisoners or ex-FAR/ex-FDLR to be accepted to a certain extent or at least not punished more. Behaving as a 'reformed' person can also have its rewards, for example in the form of jobs. 'Some of the released prisoners even become local leaders, for example in the

[412] Interview with a student (of Rwandan nationality) at Leipzig University, Germany, April 20, 2009.
[413] Why is this a 'tacit' rather than 'overt' contract? TIG, for example, is an overt trade-off, an official system of shortened 'alternative' sentence if a perpetrator admits crime and goes through *gacaca*. But that

defence forces, [or] they can become part of the *Njyanama* consultative committee.'[414]

In general, the government is creating a stratum of aligned and partly 'transformed' individuals. Different groups might be managed differently but the aim is always the smooth reproduction of current power alignments. Here we have focused on a specific segment – student *ingando* participants— and how they are 'formed,''reformed,' influenced by and in turn influencing government and state dynamics. This was just a case study, and we have to ask what are the other mechanisms that either help hold the power together or tear it apart? A dynamic analysis means asking who is cooptable, coopted, aligned, at loggerheads with central power, and why this might be the case. Rather than focusing on 'naming' difference (e.g. 'Ugandan returnees support the government'), this method helps produce a fluid and dynamic social differentiation (explaining the why, not the what, the latter of which is not only non-explanatory but also static and always just a (slightly imprecise) shorthand).

Collective Rites of Passage to a 'New Rwanda': Liminality and the Reproduction of Power

Besides producing 'concentrated' learning, *ingandos* are meant to be catalysts of transformation. They are to act as places of transition and can be theorized as 'rites of passage.' The following analysis draws on three main theoretical approaches— Gennep's (1960) concept of a rite of passage with three stages; Turner's (1969) analysis of rite of

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the perpetrators would be 'left alone' or even 'fare better' if they follow the official line is an unspoken, 'tacit' contract.

[414] However, released perpetrators do fall under much greater scrutiny/surveillance in their jobs. Source: Interview at Hagaruka association, January 20, 2009.

passage with special focus on liminality and 'communitas;' and finally, Hobsbawm's (1981) concept of 'invented traditions' and their functionality in modern nation-states. Fundamentally, both Gennep and Turner focus on rite of passage as 'tradition' in small 'face-to-face' societies (e.g. Turner's focus on Ndembu installation rites). Their theories are nonetheless more widely applicable. As Gennep (1909:xvii) himself mentions, 'there is no evidence that a secularized urban world has lessened the need for ritualized expression of an individual's transition from one status to another.' Hobsbawm's brief exposé of 'invented traditions' might be more directly relevant to the dominant political ontology of the present day— the nation-state (a pervasive tradition indeed)— and shows how 'traditions' (including 'rites of passage') can be dynamic phenomena that can be introduced from above to serve socio-political purposes.

Rites of passage are a universal phenomenon. *Rites de passage* 'accompany every change of place, state, social position and age' (Gennep, in Turner 1966:94). Societies across the world utilize them as 'devices…to help with the new adjustment' (Gennep 1909:xiii). Fundamentally then, rites of passage are meant to help an individual (or a group) to cope with and accommodate profound change. In Rwanda, we can talk of a 'social crisis' or 'group crisis,' and hence of 'collective rites.' Gennep himself refers to these in passing, calling them 'rites of intensification' (term by Chapple and Coon 1942; in Gennep xii). Function of such ceremonies is the 'restoration of moral sentiments…disturbed through changes in the social life of the group' (Radcliffe-Brown, in Gennep 1909:xiii) or 'restoration of equilibrium where changes in social interaction impended or had occurred' (Chapple and Coon, ibid). A post-genocide society is a prime example of a profound need

for restoration of social relations. It is not only necessary to restore 'one' political community but also one moral community. Importantly, the existence of rites of passage says nothing about their actual 'effectiveness' as a restorative force. 'Ceremonialism alone cannot establish the new equilibrium, and perfunctory ritual may be pleasant but also meaningless' (Gennep 1960:xvii).

Rites of passage can be sub-divided into rites of separation ('preliminal rites'), rites of transition ('liminal rites') and rites of incorporation ('postliminal rites') (Gennep 1960:10). As regards *ingando*, the very act of camping in an unfamiliar and far-away place is an act of separation. This is further strengthened by restricted movement out of the camp and lack of communication with the outside. Change of clothes or other 'temporary differentiation' (Gennep 1960:74) also represent a rite of separation. Nkumba participants change into military uniform immediately upon their arrival. Street children undergo perhaps the most symbolic separation of all— their tattered clothes are gathered and burnt collectively in a bonfire. The new clothes they are given signify the children start anew, they signify the beginning of a new life.[415]

Separation rites such as these are meant to give way to the transformation that is to occur in the transitional state— 'liminality.' Liminality is induced through separation and encompasses all the time spent in the camp. Turner wrote of the fundamental 'ambiguousness' of the liminal period in which a person 'passes through a realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or the coming state' (Turner 1969:94). Though at one level this claim is apparently correct (the transient nature of camping; the hyperbole

[415] Discussion with one of the *ingando* administrators, Rwamagana, March 16, 2009.

of equal treatment; etc), as we have seen throughout the chapter, *ingando* is a state-organized rite, which is permeated by and reflects wider social dynamics and power constellations, and is ultimately meant to serve grand social engineering purposes. In this sense, we need to critically approach the powerful metaphor of 'betwixt and between,' 'neither here nor there' (Turner 1969:95) that so often describes 'liminality' and conditions such as 'refugeeness.'

Turner (1969) argues that liminality brings about a state of 'communitas' or equality of condition— a space where people are stripped of all social markers ('disiquiliers') and submitted to 'authority that is nothing less than that of the total community,' with cessation of 'society as a structured, differentiated, and often hierarchical system of politico-legal-economic positions, with many types of evaluation, separating men in terms of "more" or "less" ' (Turner 1969:96). While liminality might indeed bring physical and/or metaphorical displacement and the cessation of common or known 'rules' or 'ways' of life, and indeed a temporary state of 'uniform condition' (skilfully doubling as a nation-building tool in *ingando*), which includes sexlessness (e.g. the same uniform for all), anonymity (e.g. demarcation according to military nomenclature; a group name for all initiands such as *kos*) and equal treatment, it by no means signifies a power-less and structure-less vacuum.

In *ingando*, rites of incorporation are not included; though the camps as such are about transition, change and incorporating the citizen into their place in the new government-designed order. The only exception is *ingando* for university entrants where young

people literally 'enact' coexistence by eating, sleeping, exercising and learning together. End of *ingando* again involves a rite of separation— e.g. a graduation ceremony and receipt of a diploma or certificate—which are meant both as i) a closure, an end to a stage; and ii) a way to hasten incorporation and identification with a new role or different status (the certificate is a 'proof' of 'graduation').

Using the 'territorial' imagination, in liminality one 'wavers between two worlds' (Gennep 1960)— one that initiands must forgo for another one. *Ingando* is meant as a 'threshold' and to cross the threshold is an attempt to 'unite [the initiand] with a new world' (Gennep 1960:20). This can happen in a physical sphere (from outside to inside the country; from the prison 'inside' the New Rwanda) and/or a symbolic sphere (from one status or way of being to another). The transformation is not meant to result only through contents of what being taught but also through contexts, the where and how of experience. In the space of liminality, participants are 'out of their element,' they use different words and do unusual things. They are supposed to be reconstituted through this, to become someone else. In certain cases, participants are simply meant to become 'someone:' In *ingando* for street children, the administrator points to the fidgety and buzzing gathering, 'they were no one and now they can be someone.'[416]

As novel re-appropriations of the past in service of a present goal, *ingandos* may also be likened to Hobsbawm's (1983:1) 'invented' traditions (although the term re-invented is more appropriate) defined as 'set of practices...of a ritual or symbolic nature', seeking to 'inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically

[416] Ibid.

implies continuity with the past…preferably a suitable historical past.' Invented traditions are divided among: i) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion and collective identities; ii) those establishing or legitimising institutions and social hierarchies; and iii) those socializing people into particular social contexts (ibid:9). *Ingando* in fact subsumes all three functions, seeking to achieve cohesion by ingraining a new collective identity, using in the process history as a 'legitimator of action' (ibid:12), and attempting to socialize or 'reintegrate' various population segments. As a single act, however, *ingando* differs from traditions that inculcate values by repetition.

Although creation of these 'ritual and symbolic complexes' has not been adequately studied, we know that inventions occur more frequently when 'a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which 'old' traditions had been designed' (Hobsbawm 1983:4). Especially new political regimes 'might seek to find their own equivalents for the traditional rites of passage,' some form of a stylized acknowledgement of or an impetus for the desired transformation of their subjects (Hobsbawm 1983:10). Rwanda's intensive 'production of traditionality' might be a reflection of the attempted departure from its immediate past, yet simultaneous anchoring of the present in the pre-colonial era, which might offer a sense of connection and thus a source of legitimacy.

As a re-invented 'traditionality' and thus 'authenticized' liminality, *ingando* harnesses official script reproduction and, ultimately, helps cement the cohesiveness of the current power arrangement. *Ingando* is also meant as a space of transition into the role of the

'ideal citizen'—overwhelmingly interpreted as person with obligations to rather than rightful demands on the state. In a post-genocide landscape of disruption and multiplicity, *ingando* has been indispensable to teach people what is expected of them in the 'New Rwanda Order' (allAfrica September 14 2005).

SECTION IV. **CONCLUSIONS**

CHAPTER 10. **Civic Education and Social Transformation in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Forging The Perfect Development Subjects**

As we have seen, activities of unity and reconciliation cannot be easily extracted from wider frameworks of power and the tightly knit state apparatus. Similarly, these activities are part and parcel of a broader transformation effort of the Rwandan government. In what follows, I argue that the dense state apparatus is used today to achieve the elusive and ambiguous beacon of 'development' through varied systems and processes of social transformation and that unity and reconciliation activities are merely additional platforms through which progress is to be pursued. In an expeditious manner, the official discourse describes 'unity and reconciliation' as both by-products of 'development' and (in some minimal form) necessary for its achievement.

From this perspective, unity and reconciliation activities are not 'failing.' The exercise has simply a different set of final objectives. What often appears as no more than 'official theatre' becomes a necessary surface-level enactment that is deemed minimal but potentially sufficient to achieve other aims— strengthening of control (minimization of dissent, legibility, the 'drive towards') through and for the successful transmission of knowledges with the aim of transformation of the participant into an ideal 'catalyst' of development. The social body needs to be moulded into a perfect development corps.

Development and progress in Kinyarwanda is *amajyambere* or 'going forward.' The literal translation describes the government project well. Clinging to the past, getting stuck in memories, working slowly on transformation of feelings and relations do not fit within the predominant conception of fast-paced forward-bound transformation. The negative symptoms of the past in the present are to be contained in the name of progress. But the very *notion* of 'unity' also aids a smooth unrolling of multiple reforms, activities and plans of the government. By demonstrating the way in which development affects, moulds and appropriates unity and reconciliation, the chapter tries to better understand both i) what is the 'ideal development subject' that is to be created; and ii) what type of development is indeed unfolding in Rwanda.

The Transformation Process

'We need to be flexible for development'
-- A headmaster of a secondary school[417]

Besides understanding that a certain transformation is desired, it is important to see *how* such transformation is envisioned to occur. 'Flexibility' or making oneself amenable to change is key. The insistence and intensity of sensitisation, represented by multiplicity of state-ordained activities, is meant to make people more responsive to government's plans: 'After the prison visits, debates and *gacaca*, prisoners begin to open up …and even survivors become *flexible* to pardon the perpetrators [emphasis added].'[418] The concept of sensitisation is imbued with notions of steerability, of relaxing one's beliefs, of letting oneself be directed and moved elsewhere.

[417] Focus Media (Kigali), 21 October 2008.

As mentioned, the key in achieving both amenability and the desired change is the change of 'mentalities.' There is literally a government philosophy of transformation, which hinges on ideologies and mindsets rather than resources and aid. 'There is 'superstructure'—ideologies of government, thoughts, laws; and there is 'infrastructure,' the base, economic strength, resources, culture. Once you change the superstructure, you change the infrastructure. There is a saying 'He who is sick but diagnosed with nothing is also healed with nothing.''[419] Poverty as such 'is often reduced to adopting a "good mentality''(Ansoms 2009:297). But this is in fact an overarching discourse, pertinent as much to reconciliation as to agricultural policy (see Ansoms 2009), suggesting that neither of these two can be easily separated.

We have seen this theme of 'mentalities' repeated throughout the thesis and across different types of respondents. NURC's Executive Secretary tells assembled SCUR presidents that *itorero*'s aim is to 'change the behaviour of Rwandans, to change their *mindset*, for U&R, and to create 'agents of change.'[420] The whole official and mainly unofficial education system (*ingandos*, *itoreros*, post-*umuganda* meetings, sector meetings, etc) is utilized to this end of recreating the mindset of the citizen. A MINALOC employee explains that the idea is to have 'an integrated civic education policy just like there is an Integrated Development Program (IDP). One of the issues there [in the IDP] is *mindset change*. We realize it is one thing to give farmers fertilizer,

[418] Discussion with members of 'Tuvindimwe UYAGI' (United Youth Against Genocide Ideology), March 6, 2009 at the Munyinyia Sector office, Eastern Province.
[419] Lecture on the 'Introduction to Philosophy' delivered by a representative of Ministry of Defence Headquarters, Nkumba *ingando*, December 16, 2008.
[420] Ndangiza's speech to SCUR Presidents at the *Les Mamans Sportif*, Kacyiru, Kigali on January 26, 2009.

market, seedlings….but if they [have the] same mindset as before, [they will] not make the best use as they could.'[421]

The process of change is envisioned through the metaphors of cleaning and cleansing. 'Bad' ideologies are 'dirt' (in fact 'bad' and 'dirty' are formed by the same suffix '–bi') and need to be removed, 'chased out,' 'fought.' The different 'states of being' are based on this imagery. One can be 'clean' (represented e.g. by the traits of *inyangamugayo*, *infura*, or the presence of *ubuntu*) or 'corrupted' (possessing *ingengabitekerezo* or other negative ideologies such as divisionism— *amacakubiri*). A corrupted state is indicated in the language of 'contamination' or 'intoxication' (the opposite of healing and 'medicine').

The transformation process centres on the 'passing on' of ideologies. Hence the government's focus on schools and the family: The 2010 'Teacher's Day' in Rwanda was 'celebrated under the national theme [of] 'Developing teachers based on mentality change' (Mutara for NTK, October 5, 2010). With regard to family, just like trauma can be passed down through generations, so can contamination. The urgent task is then to penetrate a relatively closed circle of flow— the family— and prevent the passing on of negative ideologies. Children are seen as pliable ('a tree can be still straightened while young'[422]) and this heightens the resolve of the state to 'distance' them from their parents on key issues. 'We have to identify with them [the youth] so that the message can *seep*

[421] Interview with 'Professional for Good Governance' at the Good Governance and Territorial Administration Unit, MINALOC, March 12, 2009.
[422] From the Rwandan saying *igiti kigororwa kikiri gito* (the tree can still be straightened when it is young).

through [emphasis added].'[423] The Minister of Youth Habineza considers the process to be successful, producing a 'right-minded' cohort: 'Youth are not intoxicated as the elderly...(youth) are willing to work, co-operate and actively participate in peace-building.'[424]

The *ingando* philosophy lecture also revealed another attempt at transformation, one from an 'idealistic' predisposition seen as forcing people into passivity (faith creating an outlook of predestination/destiny/ 'god's plan for me;' the concomitant patience/*kwihangana*) to a more 'materialist' outlook centred on knowledge and active manipulation of one's life-world. 'Opportunities are there, you have to fight for them, they are not 'given.''[425] The attempt is literally to move from 'heart' to 'brain' as a metaphor of life's force. 'Love is not in the heart, man does not cry in the heart [as we say], it is just a pumping organ. ..Instead of heart, we can draw a brain, I brain Kagame. Brain is very important, you get confused because it is passive whereas the heart beats two times per second, but it is the most important part of you.'[426]

The Perfect Development Subjects

The nature of RPF government and its approach to governmentality owes much to their guerrilla past. The past explains not only high militarization but leads to co-legitimisation and half-glorification of military culture and values in today's Rwanda that translate into and are reflected through most aspects of social life, including 'civic education' (and in fact the very notion of a 'citizen'), reconciliation and nation-building, development and

[423] Kyamutetera (2006) interviews the Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture.
[424] Ibid.
[425] Lecture on 'Introduction to Philosophy,' op. cit.

progress, among others. With a small degree of exaggeration, society is harnessed as one harnesses a guerrilla army. There are three distinguishing features to a rule where 'soldiers changed their khakis for suits:' i) strong discipline[427]; ii) politicisation of masses through education[428]; and iii) expectation that you will sacrifice yourself for a greater goal. Respect for authority and respect for hierarchies are also connected to the 'militarized' political imagination.

It is then through the lens of history— the history of the expansive kingdom and the rulers' past as a tight guerrilla group emphasizing discipline and submission to higher goals— that we have to see the resurgence of alternative mass education/re-education/sensitisation centres such as *ingando* and *itorero*. In pre-colonial Rwanda, it was the '*milices*,' or 'social armies' (*armées sociales*) that had their own identities (names or *ibyivugo* and were attached to specific locations) and whose main (but not sole) reason for existence was the physical defence of the country (Kagame 1952).

Today, cohorts graduating from *ingando*, and especially *itorero*, mimic these 'social armies' of the past.[429] In fact, these groups are perhaps more true to their name ('social army') than they were during dynastic times. While participants do receive military training, their *main* aim is the catalysis of desired change and the defence of the politics of the state. *Itorero* and *ingando* graduates 'have been called upon to become catalysts

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[426] Ibid.
[427] Kagame always maintained strict discipline within the RPA and there was a lengthy code of behavior that all soldiers had to abide by (Kinzer 2008).
[428] Inspired by the NRM model underlining the need for 'politicised fighters' but also politicised populations. In a sense, the campaign of 'winning the hearts and minds' has not finished yet.
[429] They even assume *ibyivugo* – a group name and thus a distinct identity. For example, health workers who recently graduated from *itorero* adopted the name *imbagukiragutabara*.

and agents of change in their country's quest for social and economic transformation.'[430] For one, *itorero* graduates (*intore*) put together specific *imihigo* goals they pledge to pursue once back in their communities.[431] More generally, *intore* are expected to become 'opinion leaders' and 'fighters of social change' managing the development corps, the masses; they need to facilitate 'change from bad [mentalities]'[432] for which 'some people [were] trained in each village.'[433] They are referred to as 'social cadres,' even 'yeast:' 'They [the first graduates of *itorero* in each village] become *intore* who… like the *umusemburo*— yeast— will facilitate change.'[434]

Looking at these 'chosen ones'— at the select groups undergoing special training— but also considering the enterprise of 'civic education' in general, which finds its concentrated expression in the camps but permeates the society as a whole, we can ask the crucial question: *Who is the Rwandan that is to be reconstituted in the liminality of ingando and itorero?* In other words, what does the attempt at transformation, as glanced through specific activities, tell us about the 'ideal' that is to be forged? All in all, the goal seems to be the creation of an 'ideal development subject,' defined by at least five characteristics: i) possessions of knowledges deemed essential for development (because 'if one develops oneself, he develops our country'[435]) in addition to leaving two types of ignorance,[436] ii) containment of undesirable thoughts, emotions and behaviours; iii)

[430] Niyonshuti for NTK, November 17, 2009.
[431] Interview with Professional for Good Governance at MINALOC, op.cit.
[432] Niyonshuti for NTK, op.cit.
[433] Ibid.
[434] Ibid.
[435] Interview with the Street Children Unit Coordinator at MIGEPROF, op.cit.
[436] 'The population is still primitive, not primitive of not knowing how to write and read but other, that is 'primary ignorance,' then there is 'negative thinking' that they cannot use well what they learned.' Lecture on 'Introduction to Philosophy,' Nkumba *ingando*, op.cit.

subsuming of individuality to a collective goal; iv) a combative zeal in achieving prescribed targets; and v) loyalty.

When considered from the viewpoint of desirable knowledges, the ideal Rwandan is a collage of beliefs, theories and fragmented dictums comprising the ever-evolving thought-world of the development industry. The knowledges, however, are sifted and interpreted at the local seat of 'development' (still a 'centre' of power) and a distinctly contemporary Rwandan 'modernity' is produced from among the diverse discourses on literacy, hygiene, the importance of savings, discipline, non-deviance, 'service mentality,' timeliness, to name a few. Biopolitical aspects join with multiple others to prop up a developmental subject, a subject that best catalyzes the desired rapid development, a restored and improved vehicle to 'prosperity.'

Importantly, it is not only what one knows that is fundamental (i.e. knowledge of what should be done), but also what she 'in the meantime' contains (e.g. anger and grief before the traumas dissipate or can be forgotten) and displays (i.e. it is not necessary to believe, just voice and enact). There is of course the complex structure too (of surveillance, cooptation, coercion) that helps make the subject 'flexible for development' (i.e. disciplined, legible, responsive). Social engineering in today's Rwanda can be understood against the notions of containment versus flow.[437] Fundamentally, the perfect Rwandan is a person that contains the symptoms of trauma, feelings, discord and disagreement, any

[437] 'Flow' was proposed by Taylor (1992) as an overarching cultural theme in Rwanda. Though Taylor is a medical anthropologist and connected flow to 'healing,' the concept, he argued, applied much more widely (e.g. to flow of gifts in relationships, sanity of relationships based on shared 'flow'). Based on my own

signs of disorder and dirt, so that money/capital can flow. Equally crucial is the subjection of the individual preference and right to the collective (the 'greater good') that is reflected through the accent on containment, docility, the surface displays, as well as the alignment and non-veering from a previously-set consensus.

The ideal Rwandan needs to be both passive and active. While crucial containments are both explicitly prescribed from above and indicated by more implicit norms and received patterns of behaviour (e.g. suppression of feelings, submission to authority), the ideal subject needs to act with zeal in achieving development targets—for example the individual and group *imihigo* targets. At an *itorero* graduation ceremony, those assembled 'vowed [in front of the President] not to be 'lukewarm' or average people but 'firebrands' who will not step down amidst difficulty.'[438]

The actively elaborated notion of 'Rwandanicity,' being re-taught in *ingando* camps [and elsewhere], has most recently been refashioned to include new development-friendly aspects. The NTK (January 26, 2009) reported: 'As the country prepares for the commemoration of the annual National Hero's Day on February 1 [2009], the government has decided to promote and instil cultural values in the Rwandan tradition to help speed up development goals. […] We need a brand for Rwandans.' Minister [Habineza] specified 'speed and respect for time, customer service mentality, quality delivery, completion towards results, and self-respect for national pride as the five core

study of the government's projects of social engineering, I found 'stoppage' and 'containment' equally important—certain containments are necessary if certain flows are to be achieved.
[438] Kagire for NTK, August 3, 2009.

values to be instilled in Rwandans of every corner of the country in order to realize the country's development agenda' (ibid).

'Poverty Causes Conflict' and 'Riches Reconcile': 'U&R' in Service of Development

In which ways is the unity and reconciliation process intermeshed with the overall goals of development, and in which ways is it *subsumed* to this goal? After months spent in the field, I have realized that all of the state activities, those of unity and reconciliation *notwithstanding*, are first and foremost to serve the overarching goal of 'development.' All in Rwanda is being subjugated to this goal. The state's intricate machinery finds everybody and everything relevant in pushing through its program. This also explains the observed intermeshing of messages and thematic overlaps.

In this context, it is not only those working in unity and reconciliation but also, for instance, religious leaders that are urged to 'sensitise their followers on development.'[439] All need to align with and further the goals of the 'Vision 2020 *Umurenge*' (in addition to the MDGs and the five year EDPRS). The annual contribution towards achieving the 2020 targets is to be enshrined in the *imihigo*, which crosscut the society both vertically (are formulated at different levels from the state to the individual) and horizontally (formulated by different social groups such as *itoreros,* institutions). But the subjugation of activities and events to the needs and talk of 'development' go deeper than this.

It is only once we incorporate the high aims of the elite for a 'revolution from above,' a 'rapid transformation of the country within a generation,' that we also understand why,

[439] TV Rwanda, evening news, November 10, 2008.

for example, a survivor of genocide might be pressurized to 'forgive' a genocide perpetrator, even if this might be only a token ceremony. In a system where 'development' is key, even surface-level enactments are useful; containment suffices. The dictum in today's Rwanda seems to be 'forgive in the name of development.' Digging in the morass of hurt, trying to transform feelings means getting stuck, what is needed is containment accompanied by activity, resolve, change and the will to move 'forward.' Clinging on to the past means the opposite, with the important exception of a couple weeks of televised, reported, talked about and thus salient horrors of the genocide. But importantly, the manipulation of 'useful' remembrance— invoking the past to get access to international funds ('milking international guilt' and banking on fear)— is also to service development, even if it thus makes the requested forgiveness more difficult to achieve.

After carrying out fieldwork, it also became clearer that the central strategy of unity is in fact 'unity for economic development' ('the economic liberation struggle'[440]). At the Sixth National Dialogue Conference, Kagame proclaimed that 'we all want development, however much our differences.'[441] The dictum seems to be 'let us forget our divisions, our suffering and anger, and lets work hard for this goal that will benefit us all.' Analysis of the discourse also reveals the prevalence of the following logic: Unity is not only necessary *for* development, but can be achieved *through* it. 'People get integrated when they work together.'[442]

[440] Munyaneza for NTK, February 3, 2009.
[441] Karuhanga for NTK, 19 December, 2008.

But even the notion of unity comes to aid a smooth unrolling of multiple reforms, activities and government plans. As we have seen, the discourse, narratives, plans and performances speak of unity as consent, coordinated action and thought, as non-veering from the line. That is because the basic requisites of the development machine are coherence, cohesion and synergy. These are not phrases from a UNDP 'logical framework' but notions employed locally at conferences, meetings and activities of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). At the 2009 'Meeting with Partners,' the NURC Vice-President explained that 'where there is cohesion, there is coherence (alignment with a vision)' so he is demanding 'all partners to be cohesive.'[443]

A crucial show of how a goal of economic development has the power to mould a whole discourse, in this case the discourse of unity and reconciliation, is the increasing hold of the following claim: 'Poverty causes conflict.' This thesis, long-discredited in academic circles, now forms the core of policy towards unity and reconciliation: 'We [the government] think the cause of long, sustainable conflict is poverty…. so now [we are] orientating [the unity and reconciliation strategy] on trade bills, economic issues, now focusing there, company laws, investment laws, poverty reduction strategies, the IDPRS.'[444] On another occasion, MINALOC´s Communications and Public Relations Officer announced that 'we discovered that poverty is the element which forces people to fight each other.'[445] Major international organizations such as OXFAM also toe the line. The Peace-Building and Reconciliation Manager suggests that 'we believe poverty is

[442] Interview with Director of Language Centre, KIST, op.cit.
[443] Hotel Novotel, March 26, 2009.
[444] Interview with Connie Bwiza of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of Rwanda, March 23, 2009
[445] Interview on 30 January, 2009.

generating conflict.'[446] One of the key OXFAM projects in unity and reconciliation is providing decentralized funding (in form of grants) to *njyanama* councils.

In this discursive set-up, 'coming out of poverty is [becomes] another form of attacking discriminatory thinking …[because] empty stomach thinks discriminatively.'[447] In the words of parliamentarian Bwiza, poverty reduction becomes 'another way of unity and reconciliation;'[448] In the words of the NURC Director of Peace-Building and Conflict Management, reconciliation results as a 'by-product of poverty eradication,'[449] where the latter (poverty eradication) hinges on a demanding and optimistic transformation scenario of Rwanda from a low income to a middle income country by 2020 (MINECOFIN 2000) to be achieved largely through a comprehensive restructuring of the agricultural sector from a 'subsistence domain' into a 'productive, high-value, market-oriented sector' (ibid). But opposing voices do get raised at times in public: 'Poverty is not the problem' suggests the Chairman of *Itorero ry'gihugu* (a Hutu ex-governor of the Northern Province) at the NURC meeting with partners: 'Can we be angry at each other that there is no rain? No, that is god. […] The problem is rich people imposing on poor people.'[450]

The subjugation of unity and reconciliation to development is also reflected through the *content* of the unity and reconciliation activities. Previous analysis shows 'interpenetration of themes' as a salient characteristic of these activities where lessons

[446] Interview with the Peace-Building and Reconciliation Project Manager at OXFAM Rwanda, October 30, 2008.
[447] Interview with Connie Bwiza, op.cit.
[448] Ibid.
[449] Africa Lutheran Communion (AFC) news update, April 13, 2008.
[450] NURC Meeting with Partners at Hotel Novotel, March 26, 2009.

that have little to do with issues of justice, memory or healing are being imparted. Participants at *ingando* and *itorero* receive lessons on family planning, hygiene, and more directly on the economic development of the country. *Umuganda* and TIG sensitize the population to be part of savings cooperatives or to create *akarima kigikoni* (little kitchen gardens). At the meeting with SCUR Presidents, Ndangiza does not fail to mention the 'economic revolution' and the 'green revolution,' both centred on a comprehensive reform of land use, to which all need to contribute.[451] The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 'abides by Vision 2020'[452] and many of their activities incorporate messages about this ultimate overarching 'vision.' *Itorero* is perhaps the best example since it is about 'creating mind-sets that help speed the development agenda.'[453]

The interpenetration of themes (with the overall goal of development) within the space of 'unity and reconciliation' activities is demonstrated well in an article entitled 'Health Workers Vow to Excel' (NTK August 4, 2009) describing an *itorero* graduation ceremony held at the Amahoro Stadium in Kigali where 'President Paul Kagame […] challenged practitioners in the health sector that their role now transcends beyond providing health services to playing a vital role in the economic development of the country…[he] told the 45,210-strong group that they should not only provide health services to individuals, but also to the country saying it equally has life.' At the *itorero* for coffee growers, Fatuma Ndangiza of NURC urged attendees 'to use the training acquired to sensitize others on the need to embrace the concept of economic

[451] Fatuma Ndangiza addresses SCUR Presidents, Kacyiru, Kigali, January 26, 2009.
[452] Ndangiza at NURC Meeting with Partners, op.cit.
[453] Interview with Professional for Good Governance, MINALOC, op.cit.

transformation by the coffee growers and the relevance of such thinking in forging *unity for development'* (NTK June 8, 2009).

The Concept of 'Development'

'Development' is a fundamentally political enterprise. It hinges on promises of 'improvements of life' and its tokens score political credit. Since in today's Rwanda development is presented as legitimation for all kinds of taxations, loyalty and vote extraction notwithstanding, we have to ask some crucial questions: *What concept of development is being pursued in Rwanda? What are the effects of pursuing this type of development? Can 'unity' and 'reconciliation' really be its 'by-products'?*

One dominant aspect of the discourse of 'development,' globally and in Rwanda, is its elaboration of a sense of profound material lack (and lag). The 'development as freedom' thesis (Sen 1999) is definitely not the triumphant approach in Rwanda, which instead accentuates 'poverty' as access to and possession of material goods and services. 'Profound material lack' is an imported notion that nonetheless has made home among the elites and now colonizes the lives in the countryside, though not without resistance.

'Material lack' as a distinct, Western way of gazing at the world. Yet it is this 'view' that disproportionately informs development practice. This gaze does not 'see' the richness of social life, networks, interactions, ties, profound meanings and experiences, only the poverty of things. Every hill in Rwanda is a setting of complex (both horizontal and vertical) social relations of exchange, loyalty, affection and dependence (e.g. DeLame

2005). Riches reside in fertility and children, in possession of cows or a productive plot of land, assumption of authority and responsibilities, in association with specific people and families, around which complex rituals, hierarchies and meanings revolve.

Anthropologists Taylor (1992) and Zraly (2008) address the conflict arising from the permeation of a materialist worldview (capitalist culture) into local Rwanda by studying the uneasy coexistence of the gift and commodity economies. In a gift economy, 'flow corresponds to the movement of goods, which is at odds with a commodity economy requiring to 'block' demands from one's kin and clients to accumulate capital' (Zraly 2008:394). These logics are at times creatively accommodated such as in schemes of 'rotating initial investment' operating on temporary blockage but long term sustained flow (at least in theory). The example is the gift of a cow to a poor family, whereby the family has to give a heifer to another once the cow gives birth. There are variations on this strategy currently practiced in Rwanda. Another example is a 'cash gift.' 'The poorest family who get this amount [should] use it profitably, so that they can move from one category [of poverty][454] to another, [thus] upgrading.' Once you have been upgraded, you have to think of those lacking behind and give a reasonable amount to one of them. *The money is not your money, it has to circulate within the community*, so that in the future, in village A there will be no vulnerable people [emphasis added].'[455]

The relevant question is who does and who does not have access to development in Rwanda? What is the cost of entering the 'circle' because, while circulation is a flow, the

[454] Interview with the Communication and Public Relations Officer at MINALOC, January 30, 2009.
[455] Ibid.

circuit is always finite. The above-detailed vertical networks (where there is a client and a *shebuja* in form of one state agency or another) operate on the power of exclusion and dependence — one requirement besides 'poverty' is being a 'good citizen,' with all that it implies vis-à-vis extraction of loyalties and alternative taxing (i.e. participation in state-led activities, docility). Another example is the cash rewards to the best-performing cell in terms of *imihigo* goals.

This politicised giving from the ultimate *shebuja* (patron)— the state— has to be complemented by an analysis of the extractions the *shebuja* demands. Because while the hand-downs are tokens of development, they have to be measured against all the taxation executed in its name. The thesis has detailed the variety of state-mandated community activities, always 'local' and 'traditional' and 'beneficial' but never optional, properly remunerated, and with dubious effectiveness— *umuganda, ubudehe*, *imihigo*, and more. The amount of activity is never already enough, and the possibilities of mobilizing labour in yet new and more potent ways dazzles the planner's imagination: The '*umuganda fantasy,'* or else the tendency to imagine how community labour can be maximized, is the perfect example. Mutara of NTK (December 19, 2006) informs us that 'they [*ubusabane* and *umuganda*] are abused, if *abuse* can be used to mean people's *failure to thoroughly exploit* the *rich resource* and potential that is embedded in them [emphasis added].' In another NTK article (February 27, 2008) entitled 'Taking *Umuganda* to a Higher Level,' the author conjectures that 'with determination and focus there is no project that needs just sheer manual labour that cannot be undertaken and successfully completed [in *umuganda*] […] Under *Umuganda*, roads can be built.'

'Poverty' as materiality or more narrowly yet, poverty as income, besides the problems of taxation abuse (taxing people's resources for a future promised improvements) and inequalities (to be considered later), completely overlooks others aspects of life's quality, of what makes a life worth living and what makes it a 'good one'— the ability to control and direct one's life (following one's creativity, morals and mores, beliefs and needs) and possess other varieties of 'freedom' (including being free from exclusion, discrimination and other types of inequity), the ability to make a dignified existence, the empowerment that is needed to achieve this. In other words, 'poverty is about privation as much as about oppression' (Uvin 1998:104). Development 'is much more than simply income. It is a process of social change in which different aspects of people's lives cannot be separated— the economic from the social, the cultural from the political and the religious' (Hiebert and Hiebert-Crape 1995, in Uvin 1998:136).

Nonetheless, there is evidence that suggests that the development exercise in Rwanda, today and before the genocide (Uvin 1998; Verwimp 2000), has been always imposed, inequitable and demeaning. Despite Habyarimana's pro-rural rhetoric ('he championed the culture of an agrarian society;' Ansoms 2008:10) and the ties that pre-genocide elite retained with rural milieus through their hills of origin (De Lame 2005 on pre-genocide Rwanda), several scholars highlight that there was nonetheless an *anti-rural bias* in Rwanda in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Marysse 1982, Rumiya 1985, Newbury and Newbury 2000). With regard to agrarian policies more specifically, Pottier shows (1992, 1989) how local agricultural officers often ended up imposing state policies and any

interaction between them and cultivators 'boil[ed] down to a one-way, dogmatic delivery of textbook instructions' (Pottier 1992:151). Traditional knowledge was neglected (Pottier 1989) in the name of 'standardizing and rationalizing agriculture' (Newbury and Newbury 2000: 856). Altogether, 'development' in agriculture became a 'coercive field' (ibid).

If three usually overlooked axes are added to our analysis of Rwanda before the genocide– equity/inequality, inclusion/exclusion and dignity/humiliation, 'the resulting diagnostic contrasts singularly with the almost idyllic dominant image of Rwanda as a nicely developing country. It shows that, for decades, Rwandan society was characterized by rising inequality; exclusion along social, regional, and ethnic lines; and structural humiliation' (Uvin 1998:108). Another important point needs to be made about the imposed nature of development in Rwanda specifically, because while 'much of what has been said about the top-down, vertical nature of the relations between the state and its citizens has been observed all over Africa, what is specific about Rwanda…are the omnipresence and strength of the state and the development machinery. Thus, paradoxically, it is in the 'best' country— the developers' dream location, where things were implemented the way they were stated on paper by a strong, well-endowed state committed to development— that life most resembled a labour camp, with questionable benefits' (Uvin 1998:135).

In contemporary Rwanda, the example of the land reform should suffice to demonstrate the contestable nature of 'development.' Among the many envisioned state-led

development transformations, this one is perhaps the most exigent, invasive and disruptive since the vast majority of Rwandans derive their livelihoods from land. As mentioned above, poverty eradication in today's Rwanda centres on the wholesale re-structuring of the agricultural sector (MINECOFIN 2000; Pottier 2006; Ansoms 2008). The key aim is to 're-engineer the sector into a modernized vehicle for economic growth, with little place left for traditional smallholder agriculture' (Ansoms 2008:7). Plots of land deemed too small and insufficient for sustainable development have to be either given up or 'consolidated.' The fewer and larger consolidated farms are to implement mechanized monocropping of high-yield varieties; those pushed off the land are supposed to find off-farm employment in a growing service sector (Pottier 2006; Ansoms 2008).

A number of analysts of Rwanda's land reform (Bruce 2007; Pottier 2006; Huggins and Musahara 2005; Ansoms 2008) raise critical issues that not only put the feasibility of the government approach into question but that echo the wider political dynamics we have overviewed in the thesis.[456] To begin with, consolidation and monocropping seem to have questionable benefits (in general and in the case of Rwanda; see Huggins and Musahara 2005:313; Bruce 2007:22), while small size farm size does not always spell lesser productivity (Bruce 2007:30). Much more worryingly, the land reform is bound to create a large landless class— all those with farm sizes below 1 hectare or those unable to develop their land 'efficiently' will have it confiscated (Pottier 2006:521). Yet the

[456] Naturally, not all is negative; there are aspects to the Rwandan approach that have been lauded by analysts, particularly the accent on and progress toward gender equality. Daley and Englert (2010) and Daley, Dore-Weeks and Umuhoza (2010) show how, since the passing of the transformational Succession Law of 1999, women's access to land in Rwanda has improved (measured both in terms of equal inheritance and shared land ownership). 'Rwandan women [are] increasingly starting to claim their land

alternatives for this segment of population (estimated 35% of all Rwandans) are less than clear. 'None of the interviewed Rwandan policy makers…had a clear vision of the employment alternatives available to the forseen "surplus" 35% of the population [previously dependent on farm activities]' (Ansoms 2008:23). As Pottier (2006:527) rightly observes, the failure to offer viable solutions to a large mass of landless people might lead to violent conflict in the future.

The dynamics further aggravating the situation are the high inequality in land possession in Rwanda, the increasing urban grasp on rural land, as well as the perceived dominance in acquisition by the urban-based Uganda Tutsi returnee elites. Connected to this is the sensitive issue of abolishing 'customary' land tenure. The problem lies in the selective definition of 'customary,' which suggests political manipulation. In the official documents, 'customary' largely refers to the *ubukonde* system (where lineage heads allocate land) and which used to be the dominant system of tenure in the Hutu chieftancies before the spread of the Nyiginya influence (Pottier 2006:521). Naturally, the ethnic dimension today is silenced (Huggins and Musahara 2005:322; Bruce 2007:31). On the other hand, the royal *isambu* system (where all land belonged to the king but lease agreements existed) is often praised today as an example of 'integrated' land tenure. Further, the undispersed rumours of potential restoration of the *ibikingi* domains (royal cattle pastures where the king or his chiefs afforded rights to cattle grazing) add further to discontent (Pottier 2006: 530). Last but not least, the land access rights of the Twa

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rights and [are] increasingly succeeding in this as the notion of gender equality in marriage and inheritance has taken popular hold' (Daley and Englert 2010:10).

(whose forests have been progressively encroached upon) are not mentioned in the government policy (Huggins and Musahara 2005:322).

Overall, one of the most important questions is *'How will the vast majority of Rwandans be made* to execute the necessary change?*'* Specifically, the very pertinent concern is 'to what extent will this be an *autonomous* process for the families involved' (Huggins and Musahara 2005: 312). Just as the transformation process as a whole, land reform hinges on 'minset change' and 'adopting a good mentality' (Ansoms 2008:20). The problem of 'peasants' resistance to change' is reduced to their 'ignorance' and 'lack of vision' (ibid) rather than any valid concerns they might have. Government says it will 'encourage' people but this is a euphemism for what is essentially a top-down, imposed process where local administrative elites posses sufficient discretion and power to enforce the desired changes. 'If the targets set out in the Vision 2020 document are to be achieved, it seems clear that the process will involve some degree of compulsion by the government' (Huggins and Musahara 2005:316).

In this scenario, the ideal development subject is 'the resource poor farmer who "voluntarily" gives up his/her land in return for "the promise" of a better future' (Pottier 2011- comments on thesis). But since the voluntariness is most likely to turn into selective coercions (just as in the *imihigo* system, possibly even as part of it) and the 'leap of faith' that the farmers are asked to undergo has such uncertain pay-offs, what we face here is a large source of discontent and a potentially explosive situation.

The Effects of 'Development' in Rwanda

i. Disempowerment through Depoliticisation

Depoliticisation of 'development' refers to the process whereby various issues deemed 'developmental' are taken out of contestation (thus being relegated to a sphere of 'non-decision making,' Lukes 1974:22). Yet accessing 'development' is a clear question of power, specifically of acquiescing to the political demands of the centre(s) of power (e.g. being a 'good citizen;' not being 'unpatriotic'). Depoliticisation, where this dimension of development is discursively silenced, itself produces political effects. For one, development is implicitly constituted as an unquestioned good or what Nordstrom (1997:115) calls an 'essentially defined concept'— knowledge 'always already in social epistemology—the foundation from which all questions derive, but which is not itself questioned.' Not only questions but also statements derive from it. The rhetoric is as follows: 'This activity helps development, and development helps you, how can you oppose it?' or 'Others depend on your cooperation to reach this collective good, how can you let them down?' Since development rhetoric is present everywhere and aspires to change most aspects of life, a complex and rather complete disempowerment results. Such situation manifests that people can be directly disempowered, rather than empowered, in the process of 'development.'

Development when re-politicised emerges as an ambiguous political promise that can be used to legitimize present exploitation. The promise of future development is used by the centre to extract taxes in various forms (most often labour and loyalties) in the present. Further, there is a push to *intensify* taxation in order to *accelerate* the 'epic march

towards modernity' (Kinzer 2008: 230). People need to '*kwihutisha amajyambere*,' to hurry up progress. This is driven by the obsession with reaching autonomy and almost autarky through an 'economic revolution' and to resolve the present tension arising from the reality of dependence. People should work more and better; '*Il faut travailler encore plus, s'organiser encore mieux [we need to work even more, organize ourselves even better]'* suggests Kagame.[457] '*Birashoboka*!' is the motto: 'Everything is possible.'

With view of this dynamic, it is hard not to note the imbrications of donors in the top-down state-directed development enterprise. There has definitely been a shift in the global political economy of aid, away from structural adjustment policies urging the scaling back of the state to the renewed approval of state as the leader of economic (and social) development. Only a materialist worldview where 'poverty' is the main villain and rising aggregate incomes the cure to everything can 'logically' conclude from its premises that 'authoritarianism can work.' Pointing to the success of the Asian Tigers, the development machine looks for similar solutions in Africa. Rwanda as a small and historically 'strong' state is the perfect staging ground for this new experiment. In the process, the development community either overlooks the dictatorial nature of Kagame's rule ('development has its cost') or openly condones it as 'benevolent dictatorship' (Mboyo 2009; Easterly 2010).

ii. Mystifications in the Conflict-Development Nexus

Analysis of Rwandan discourse of development shows how 'development' is implicitly presented as *a good unquestioningly benefiting all*. Government officials and foreign

[457] Interview by Soudan for *La Jeune Afrique* N2514 *(2009 :46).*

enthusiasts draw their optimism from the overall (absolute) levels of income increase (i.e. GDP rise) but rarely focus on how these (questionably accurate) gains are redistributed. Detailed empirical studies provide strong evidence that, in fact, inequality *has risen* in Rwanda since the genocide (UNDP 2007; Ansoms 2009). Evidence points to a growing rural-urban divide and a *growing impoverishment of the countryside*. Those at the bottom are taxed the most: 'Rwanda's high growth rates are deceptive in that they hide large and growing inequalities between social classes, geographic regions and gender. […] Rwanda's recent growth has largely bypassed the rural poor, leading to a concentration of wealth at the top of the income distribution… and a deterioration of living conditions at the bottom of the income distribution. […] Growing inequality is not only an obstacle to poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth; it could also *undermine social peace'* (UNDP 2007:5) [emphasis added].

Why tie unity and reconciliation to development as materiality when it is proven that there is no easy connection between either peace and income or 'a good life' and income, and that in fact, 'coming out of poverty' is a contested struggle that often involves violence in the first place (e.g. Cramer 2006)? The answer is that it is useful to tie development and conflict in extraction of foreign resources. At least three interconnected dynamics are at play. First, the *possibility* of violent upheaval is being tacitly negotiated for foreign aid. In a discursive universe where violence/stability and economic progress are connected, the still vivid memory of the genocide is not only useful in extracting 'guilt money' but also investments to prevent a quite possible violence in the future. Second, 'development's' ambiguity and its fragmentation into multiple themes,

institutions, projects, all of which require financing, can be exploited. Conflict is what pressures people to give; development is what assures they give a lot, to multiple shifting fronts.

In a final dynamic, 'strides towards peace' are dangled as 'proof.' The perfect example here are the so-called 'reconciliation villages' supported by the Millenium Village Project, where foreign workers and tourists for a sizeable sum (about 80USD) can go and see 'unity and reconciliation' happen. Creating 'images of peace' for the outsider is part of the extraction dynamic. The visit includes 'a presentation by a perpetrator and a victim and a testimony how they now live together in happiness.'[458] Dangling this image is important both to attract investment and as a reminder of how much can be lost if the situation reverts. Because development is primary, the image of unity and reconciliation is more important than actual unity or reconciliation. In the rationalisations of the state, these then arise not primarily as ends, rather as means first and foremost. This also explains why seemingly shallow activities, suppression of dissent, mere lack of voiced ethnicity ('here you do not talk about Hutu and Tutsi, you are so developed!'[459]) and multiple other containments and 'images of order' that these transmit, a purpose is still served.

Overall then, development is perceived as a common bounty to be achieved, not as the uncertain process producing new inequalities, divisions, accompanied by emergence of struggles and resistances, empowerments and exploitations. There is no 'conflict-free'

[458] A friend (development worker for the GTZ) reflects on her visit to a Millenium Village, April 10, 2009.
[459] KHI SCUR President relays impressions of a 'visitor to Rwanda;' January 26, 2009.

development but some attempts are more likely to entice mass violence than others. What is the verdict in the case of today's Rwanda? Which are the forces releasing the potential for organised violence and which are those that restrain it? In Rwanda, forces *against* (non-state) violence include the tight grasp of the state— the overbearing administrative structures and information networks, the resulting 'presence' in people's lives, the surveillance and indirect control, the display and use of informants, formal and informal police, the dominance and strength of the military, the resulting fear and suspicion. All of this, rather than 'quelling' some form of organised discontent, prevents it from happening in the first place. Oppression (structural violence emanating from the centre) can, however, only assure negative peace (the absence of mass physical violence), not the absence of reasons for discontent.

Forces *for* violence include the political legitimisation of power based on promises of future development. Naturally, such assurances are not unique to Rwanda. We know that in Kenya, among other African states, 'the late colonial period was marked by developmentalist initiatives that among other things could justify colonial rule. These came with arduous physical demands, particularly on rural peoples, yet simultaneously raised expectations for change and prosperity. In Kenya, for example, rural development projects to combat soil erosion contributed to the frustrations that boiled over in association with Mau Mau' (Bay and Donham 2006:5). In Rwanda, the story could be narrated in an eerily similar way. Developmentalist initiatives are being used to justify an authoritarian, high-control and exacting political system, while the results are questionable at best. Can the strength of the suppressive machinery described above

offset the discontents produced by a development process and political process marked by exclusions and inequalities, a process that transforms but demeans?

Peter Uvin (1998:1) opens his book on pre-genocide Rwanda by noting a 'profoundly disturbing contradiction.' The well-planned and massively executed genocide, a culmination of a long process, Uvin notes, starkly contrasted with the *perception*[460] of Rwanda at the time as a '"well-developing" country, seen as a model of development in Africa, with good performance on most of the indicators of development' (ibid). Uvin's analysis of the 'signs' of social decomposition is validated *ex post* by genocide itself. Today, rather than being lulled by overt calm and waiting until a rupture happens, we have to watch out for the signs of instability under the façade of economic growth and absence of large-scale physical violence. We should not wait for violence to occur in order to start analyzing its nature, its causes and its prospects.

[460] Not everyone shared this perception. Just as today, the outward, donor-oriented projection often diverged from what was happening on the ground and what many anthropologists and researchers observed during fieldwork.

CHAPTER 11. **The Process of Building Unity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Findings, Lessons, Limitations and Further Research**

This short concluding chapter comprises some final reflections on Rwanda's *kubaka ubumwe* process. It begins with an overview of the main research findings and the thesis' principal contributions to knowledge. Thereafter, the chapter turns to consider some important implications of this research— the relative inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the unity-building process, the degree to which it has potential to unify or divide, together with the role of outsiders and aid in this process. The chapter closes with reflections on key limitations and avenues for further research.

Summary of Key Findings

The thesis opened with the following overarching questions: *How do today's Rwandans learn to 'live together again'? Specifically, what does the state's project of unity-building consist of?* The inquiry gleaned one aspect of the 'learning' process in particular, focusing on the multiple local and 'traditional' activities of unity and reconciliation organized by the government, such as *ingando*. These activities were placed in the larger framework of 'civic education' where teaching joins sensitisation, mobilisation and re-education in an attempt to promote not only Rwandanicity and Rwandanness but an 'ideal subject' that promises to best fulfil the government's key official policies (stimulation of rapid development) and unofficial agendas (preservation of the power arrangement by producing docile and non-contrary subjects).

To understand what the state project 'consists of,' the thesis approached unity as an unknown object. The research suggests that unity is not a singular concept; and while literature rarely presents unity as fundamentally contested, it is a field of meaning that is struggled over. The thesis placed official interpretations of unity within a wider framework of interpretations and within wider discourses that affect its interpretive 'tinge' post-genocide. It also showed that unity is multi-referential (used to refer to a common overarching identity, one political community, equal citizenship or one culture). Finally, the thesis studied the type of 'unity' that actually arises by contrasting official policy, its application, performance at activities, and more. Overall, the thesis shows that the answer cannot be 'there is *no* unity being built in Rwanda.' Rather, the answer is a complex exploration of the *type* of unity that actually *is* being produced.

As can be seen from the work as a whole, politics is not only treated as a 'significant variable' but as an arena worthy of in-depth exploration for its *varied* effects on the unity-building process. The unity and reconciliation process in Rwanda not only cannot be approached as an entity unto itself, it cannot be understood outside of the political. In a condensed pronouncement, politics is currently the 'key' obstacle to successful reconciliation and nation-/unity-building. In other words, the main problem for unity and reconciliation in Rwanda is not how the ICTR is set up or that *gacaca* does not fulfil all requirements of Western justice (e.g. Waldorf 2006a and 2006b). The main problem lies with i) concentrations of power and the systems of exclusion that result, which in turn translate into the sphere of unity and reconciliation; and ii) the systems of direct pressure and indirect control (surveillance, cooptation), made more pervasive by the overbearing

and exacting state.

The thesis explored the different ways in which post-genocide politics and the state machinery at its disposal dismantle key aspects of the unity-building process: Surveillance, coercion, pressure to consent and suppression of dissent, taboo subjects and social exclusions are some of the factors that hollow out participation, promote containment and perpetuate fear, paranoia and distrust. The government's emphasis is on surface-level enactments, on shallow ceremonies of togetherness and forgiveness/restoration, which, despite their superficiality on the level of emotions or long-term coexistence, still fulfil an important governmentality function.

Fundamentally, the thesis demonstrates that in divided societies affected by history of recent mass violence, unity and reconciliation have a staple presence (they are salient discourses with traction with regards to international funding). Partly because of this, they might be appropriated by elites to serve ends discordant with the prevailing notion of what unity or reconciliation 'work' might entail. The process as a whole might be subsumed to political ends and plans the leadership deems relatively more urgent and/or expedient. The promises of security and progress and the related governmentality aims of transforming the mentality and ultimately behaviours of its subjects come to be both legitimations for the structure of power as-is (the political status quo) and for their appropriations of the unity and reconciliation process. *Kubaka ubumwe* thereby becomes an additional platform for dissemination of political and developmental messages; it comes to highlight the future (*amajyambere*) rather than slow working through the past in

search of understanding and closure; it comes to stress consent and cordiality rather than open discussion of thorny issues; it sacrifices 'small' reconciliation and unity-building (e.g. costly and lengthy grief workshops) at the cost of 'large visual impact' activity (masses gathering at meetings, *umuganda*, *ingando*).

Coming back to the unity that results and in order to connect the unity-building project visually and conceptually, I would like to present two images. The first image is one of *umudugudu* (a planned village) taken by the author outside Ruhengeri. The second image is a newspaper clipping of students marching at the *ingando* pass-out ceremony. Their inclusion at the end (as opposed to the beginning) is purposeful. It is only now that we have enough information and tools (literally the 'broader picture') to analyze these images.

Image 1. Villagisation in Rwanda

source: author

Image 2. Ingando Graduation Ceremony

Students at the pass-out after three-month of Ingando. (Photo /B. Mukombzi)

source: B. Mukombzi for NTK (November 3, 2008)

Could there have been other images chosen that would frame the discussion of 'unity' in a very different manner? Yes, there are indeed many small-scale, non-state activities that speak of idiosyncrasy and individual journeys rather than physical and social regimentation, ordering, collectivity, sameness or non-veering from the line. But my focus in this thesis has been on the official attempts of the government to foster unity and

these two photos are a condensed and visual narrative of that approach. What we observe is the striving for unity as a disciplined, coordinated form of being together, as sameness and consent in the social body. The aim is to create one out of many, homogeneity (associated with order) out of diversity (associated with disorder), convergence (drawing on obedience and discipline) out of divergence (associated with dissent).

Contribution to Knowledge

Having reviewed key findings, what is this thesis' contribution to knowledge? To begin with, this research has drawn attention to little studied unity and reconciliation activities. Rwanda is not simply *gacaca*; there is *ingando*, *itorero*, SCUR and a profusion of other initiatives that lay claims to traditionality, popularism and fostering of unity yet which have not received almost any academic attention. *Ingando*, for example, has never been studied in depth and yet it offers perhaps the best insight into the wider social transformation process attempted in post-genocide Rwanda.

Even more importantly, the thesis shows that all of these activities, in fact the whole unity-building process and the transitional justice arena as such, do not stand on their own but are politically embedded. Most academics do not doubt this but few have shown *how* this might be true. The present thesis has offered an in-depth exploration of post-genocide politics at different levels (legitimation discourses, presence of the state, governmentality objectives, micro dynamics such as embodiments of control) and explored the manner in which these dynamics affect not only i) the activities themselves and their outcomes, but also ii) the very notions of unity and reconciliation and iii) the unity-building process as a whole.

In the process of exploring the nexus between the two projects of politics and unity, we managed to start answering questions that reach beyond 'unity-building' and beyond Rwanda as a case study: How and why does post-genocide politics work the way it does (salience of security, friend-enemy meta-structure, salience of 'divisionism' and its operation as a realm of exception)? What is the nature and effects of a 'strong' state? How are different types of power 'embodied' in both the individual and social body? How does all this in turn predict the scope and effectiveness of government-organized activities or the implementation of its policies?

Implications for the Future

i. Is the Project Inclusive or Exclusive? The unity-building process in Rwanda remains both internally exclusive (who is allowed to shape the 'idea of nation' and the process of unity-building) and externally exclusive (who is an eligible member of the 'nation'). It is *internally* exclusive because unity-building is a political project and in Rwanda it is a project carried out by a non-representative/non-democratic government. The goal of Rwandan nation-building is to replace ethnicity and other potentially 'divisive' sub-state loyalties with an undifferentiating Rwandanness based on shared (reinterpreted) past, culture and language (amounting to another fictive ethnicity) rather than on a shared participation in state-building and state-sharing (a civic project). The project is *externally* exclusive because i) not even all Kinyarwanda-speakers have equal access to citizenship; and ii) those who already have it, by directly challenging those in power or being

perceived as threatening (e.g. whistle blowers), can *de facto* lose it by being pushed to exile, discouraged from returning or silenced.

Surely, exclusions in Rwanda are legitimised in numerous ways and the promises dispensed — on security and development— are dispensed to *all*. *But are all really equal under this dispensation?* As mentioned before, development tends to be a fundamentally contested and divisive process. With regard to security, people are indeed safe, that is unless they stand on the wrong side of opinion (or physical border). Further to this, security (and tokens of development) come at a price and it is important to question whether this 'cost' is justified. Security continues to be elevated over liberties through the powerful tool of 'derogation'— a language of trade-offs, the 'necessary' sacrifices. Yet the 'normative specifications that lower needs [i.e. physical security] must be satisfied before attention is given to higher needs [i.e. political and social rights] could be used to justify deliberate inattention to non-material needs and for preserving an unacceptable status quo' (Fisher 1990:90-91; in Uvin 1998:136). With regard to promises of prosperity, Amartya Sen (2001) claims that the 'Lee hypothesis' (authoritarian states are better at delivering growth) has not been established statistically. Counter-posing economic 'needs' and political liberties in fact creates an illusory trade-off: 'Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing social responses to economic needs, they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves' (ibid:11).

ii. Is the Project Ultimately Unifying or Divisive? Is Rwanda's a self-sustaining stability? The problem with physical security is that sometimes when you have too much of it [i.e. an intensely policed state], the society is secure until it is not— what results is the false calmness of repression that gives away few signs of rupture until that rupture happens. The not-knowing whether or when we might reach the threshold has something to do with that seemingly impermeable official story of peace and harmony, which does not allow for warning signs to be heard until it is too late.

'If ethnicity remains a taboo question, this can go in two directions,' sums up one of my informants, 'either people progressively feel Rwandan, or the second possibility is that this is a volcano.'[461] However, there might be a third possibility that seems to be actually unfolding. People progressively *act* as one, and due to containment and control, this appears genuine to outsiders. There is a loyal assent class formed of relatively privileged youth (university graduates) who truly feel Rwandan first. These young people are directly and indirectly urged to conflate patriotism with defence of ruling ideologies. Meanwhile the real problem is papered over— genocide complexified divides, some of which were made more prominent in the process. Grievances exist in form of exclusions, inequalities and unaddressed tensions. Rwanda is not on the brink of 'another genocide.' This does not mean conflict or violence disappear, they just originate from different sources and are meted out in ways we rarely acknowledge. It also does not mean no mass physical violence will emerge in the future.

[461] Interview with Augustin, January 21, 2009.

In summer 2010, Kagame assumed his last (constitutionally mandated) term as President, which expires in 2017. In some years then, the structural causes of violence (*if* they remain unchanged) might be joined by a proximate cause if the incumbent tries to hold on to power either through usurping it or by managing a status-quo maintaining replacement (e.g. a puppet). At that juncture, we might witness the formation of a broader movement aiming to shift the current constellation of power because it will have more recourse to narratives of legitimacy (constitutional limitations as both real and symbolical end to 'Kagame era'). There will be rising expectations for change; and if no change through political channels happens in this situation, then mass violence might occur. People will be more willing to listen to political entrepreneurs and to accept more radical solutions.

iii. What Has Been the Role of Outsiders? As mentioned above, in Rwanda official descriptions do not always match up with what goes on on the ground. The section on power and the state explored how this gap is maintained internally. But the political economy of the *external* non-probing of the image is equally important. At the macro level, there is the guilt of Western nations for not having intervened to stop the genocide. This has lead to outpouring of aid and reigning in of criticism. At a more micro level, the internal management of voice results in foreigners being captured and maintained in the bubble of the official transcript, which they often come to reproduce.

Due to their non-competence in the local language and mere surface-level skimming of local realities and culture, foreigners are being skilfully manipulated. As in many other

development settings, events and programs are translated into 'likeable' terms and/or terms that fit a specific tender. Foreigners also rarely 'estrange' themselves or 'observe anew;' they come with already-interpreted sights and others are interpreted for them. They do not ask: '*What is in fact this thing whose description we can read in the concept note?*' With catchphrases such as 'democracy' and 'participation,' they do not ask enough: '*What is in a name?*' As a result, outsiders limit their own access, assessment and agency and can end up supporting agendas they do not agree with and/or that are starkly different from what they overtly suggest.

What are the solutions? Most broadly, the political dimension needs to be incorporated into development practice, which today is splintered into hundreds of thematic 'wholes' discoursed in a technocratic manner (agricultural extension, HIV prevention, reconciliation through theatre, etc.). Such analysis would start with noting that international donors increasingly channel aid through direct budget support (in order not to 'circumvent' a legitimate government, the representative of 'the people'). But where almost half of the budget of an *authoritarian* government comes from the outside (mainly UK and the EU), it is safe to conclude that this is 'our government project.' Because whereas the vast majority of Rwandans today have close to no say in how that budget will be spent, in democracies we do have mechanisms to affect the way our taxes will be used— *In that case, should it be empowerment of the vast majority of Rwandans or preservation of a narrow power base of the RPF-led government?* If donors decide on the former, then what is most urgently needed is not 'more money' or 'less money.' Neither is it sufficient to study the way in which people 'withstand' the indignities of their

regimes. What is really needed is finding the ways in which people can assume more control over their own lives.

Limitations and Further Research

i. Scientificity in Markets of Regulated Truth. The present thesis is a reflection on social science inquiry itself, specifically on its limitations in settings where state power and truth are intertwined. In Rwanda, I came to observe a distinctly positivist approach to science (both in academia and government). The assumption is that there are 'facts' which, through statistical manipulation, produce a 'truth' (*ukuri*). Perhaps facts do produce truth; but in a situation where people's responses to government's questionnaires are treated as 'facts' and where the government strongly affects the response, it is safe to conclude that government produces its truth. In the parlance of statistics, we face a major problem of *endogeneity*: It is hard to study government as a separate object of inquiry because it is always already present in the inquiry itself.

In settings such as Rwanda, triangulation (cross-checking results using more than one method) is not the straightforward exercise it might be in other settings. Research tends to accentuate 'authoritative' sources and 'official' settings (Outside of anthropology, what is given more weight, something described as a 'short structured office interview' or a 'long bus chat'?). But in Rwanda, authority and officialdom connote control over final narratives and subsequent promotion of the official line. Strong control causes different methods to produce different results. Additionally, what gets revealed informally often cannot be 'cross-checked' through watchdog reports and official statistics— this is

precisely the data that is covered up.

Despite the fact that it is difficult to 'prove' many *specific* statements, I believe the general conclusions about politics and its effects on the type of nation-building that is officially promoted in Rwanda can be cross-checked in multiple nuanced ways throughout the thesis. This is achieved by simultaneous analyses of i) most broadly, the political machine itself; ii) the political discourses; iii) the contents of what respondents themselves say about activities (e.g. *What is the aim of ingando?*); and last but not least, iv) performance.

Finally, despite the informality, silences, manipulations that define our research endeavour, a wealth of meaning can be found— it merely leads one to questions that reach beyond any given description or 'take;' it leads one from descriptions to the structure constraining description; from description to describing, from narrative to narration and from narration as one expression of self to general being in the world. The researcher has to approach a statement as a complex 'occurrence'— uttered not only in a personal, historical and physical context but in a field of power. It is only such deeper study that can answer that which at times cannot be said.

ii. The Relative Exclusion of the Theme of Resistance. Every author dabbles in authoritarianism. S/he directs research and writing and plays a part in the ordering of reality through employment of specific narrative techniques (e.g. arguments building up to a conclusion). In addition, the author chooses voices, might obscure weaknesses,

presents a false wholeness and fluidity to arguments by inevitably excluding many caveats, exceptions and responses to alternative takes that would extend a set of arguments *ad infinitum*. Such is the predicament of every author. Nonetheless, there is one important theme that has not received sufficient attention in the present thesis yet whose relative exclusion tends to be salient and hence has to be addressed. The topic at hand is 'resistance' and 'personal agency.'

The balance between agency and structure in determining individual and collective behaviour is one of the core questions of social science. The present thesis, by the very way it is *structured* (with its emphasis on state apparatus and permeation of the state into people's lives) offers a partial answer to that question in the particular context of post-genocide Rwanda. The apparent 'disbalance' is not an assumption I 'carried' into Rwanda. In fact, I came there equipped with an analytical framework implicitly producing equality between the two forces of structure and agency— I wanted to study the official discourses of unity and reconciliation versus people's appropriations. But while in Rwanda, the theme of social control and 'presence of state' emerged from my notes as an unquestionable key theme and the more I researched, the more I realized that there is no simple equality between these two forces.

The structure has far more predictive power over what activities will actually happen and how. Though, of course, people have the power to make these hollow and the thesis highlighted some of the ways that people use to escape, dissimulate and subvert what is imposed. Rwandans are in no way 'passive' subjects. But importantly, what people

employ is ‘reactive power.’ This has much to do with the fact that Rwanda is a democracy merely on paper and people do not ‘decide’ and rather are ‘decided for’ and ‘demanded to,’ and while they may always struggle and resist against one thing or many things, it never equals all the impositions that they are forced to undergo. Multiple resistances do exist but it is the structure that fundamentally directs and constrains people’s lives. Certainly, people can get collectively organized and so exert ‘transformative power’ on the structure itself and it would certainly be valuable to study the potentials and opportunities for such peaceful pressure in Rwanda. This remains an important agenda for future research.

In essence, what we discuss is ‘oppression’— a fundamentally ideological category. Oppression as constraint on one’s liberties (structure over personal agency) is the villain in liberal democracies and is construed as ‘necessity’/necessary evil in authoritarian states. In the latter, it has to be legitimized in official discourse and this process has been studied in depth in the present thesis. However, oppression can also be seen from a more philosophical angle. At that level, maybe we can speak of a metaphysical ‘equality’ between oppression and the way people recoup dignity and meaning in their lives through the little resistances that characterise their everyday lives. Coming from a country where a totalitarian system reigned for more than forty years, this angle is crucial to highlight— people certainly did not simply ‘live oppressed,’ they had their ways to ‘recoup’ the *totalita*. But alongside this personal equilibriation, no one could deny that it was the system that set the parameters to multiple aspects of their lives— restricting physical mobility, determining voice and silence, weaving ideology into all discourse and

performance, punishing dissenters. It is in this sense too that the structure triumphs in today's Rwanda.

iii. Case Study Approach and Going 'Forward and Beyond.' This thesis took Rwanda as a case study of post-conflict social relations, specifically unity-building in a society divided by memories of mass, local-level violence. There are inevitable limitations associated with this approach, but it is a trade-off type of limitation— one gains analytical depth at the cost of comparative breadth. In the future, interesting comparative links could be drawn on a number of topics dealt with in the current thesis.

To begin with, Rwanda offers us one specific approach to building unity after mass violence, which could be called 'abolitionist.' Rwanda strives for de-ethnicisation or else replacement of ethnicity and other potentially 'divisive' sub-state loyalties with an undifferentiating Rwandanness. The general strategy is that of 'containment.' But just the neighboring country of Burundi (with a different history but also one of mass violence) shows us a very different approach, one that could be termed 'accommodationist'— identity is not denied or suppressed, but rather accommodated through consociational power-sharing. Does this different approach to identity also connote a different style of forging unity? How does this approach translate to the everyday enactments of nation-building?

The thesis also showed that the performative, experiential and spatial dimensions offer useful insights into nation-building practices. Another area of future research then would

be the uses performance in general and, more specifically, the use of camps and camping (and thus the use of spatiality, separation, rites of passage) by the state for socio-political goals. Camps and camping have been used by political elites (whether official governments or guerrillas/informal authorities) for political purposes not only in other countries of Eastern Africa (e.g. *JKT* in Tanzania) but also in Eastern Europe (the *pioniersky tábor*— the communist youth 'jamborees') and South-East Asia (e.g. *hanawon* transition camps in South Korea for North Korean refugees or *the trai hoc tap cai tao* camps in Vietnam used as spaces of perpetrators' transformation). Despite the prevalence of state-organized camps as unique social engineering spaces, there has been no integrative analysis of this phenomenon.

Last but not least, Rwanda opens the discussion of strong states in Africa and beyond. What are the different dimensions of state 'thickness'? How do people perceive and explain state presence in different places? How do we define and measure 'excessive' presence and what is the full scale of its effects? All in all, the notion of a 'strong' state needs to be qualified and made more robust by exploration of additional settings; in East and Central Africa this would be Eritrea and possibly Burundi. Only a localized ethnographic approach can yield a detailed comparative study and offer an antidote to the vague and over-stretched discourse of state weakness, fragility and failure that has dominated academic and development discourses on Africa in the past decade.

APPENDIX 1. MUTOBO and TIG Questionnaire

Ibibazo/ Questionnaire

Nitwa Andrea Purdeková. Ndi umunyeshuri muri Oxford University. Naje mu Rwanda gukora ubushakashatsi k'ubumwe n'ubwiyunge. Ni muri urwo rwego nshaka kumenya icyo ingando ikumariye. Murakoze cyane.

1. Ufite imyaka ingahe?
Quel âge avez-vous?

2. Umudugudu, Akagari, Umurenge, Intara:

3. Umaze amezi angahe mu ngando?
Vous êtez dans l'ingando depuis quand?

4. Uzamara amezi angahe mu ngando?
Combien de temps vous allez rester ici dans l'ingando?

5. Ku bwawe, imphavu/intego rusange y'ingando ni iki?
A votre avis, qu'est-ce que l'objectif principal de l'ingando?

6. Mbese ushobora kurondora ibikobwa byawe by'umunsi mu ngando?
Pourriez-vous décrire un jour typique/ordinaire dans l'ingando?
Qu'est-ce que vous faites à partir de le matin jusqu' à le soir?

7. Ni ayahe masomo mwiga mu ngando?
Quelles sont les leçons que vous étudiez dans l'ingando?

8. Ku bwawe, ni irihe somo ry'ingirakamaro mu masomo mwize?
Quelle est la leçon la plus utile/ la plus importante que vous avez appris dans l'ingando?

9. Ni iki mwize muri iyi ingando ku mateka ya mbere y'ubukoloni? Ni ubuhe ubutumwa bw'ingenzi wakuyemo?
Qu'est-ce que vous avez appris sur l'histoire pré -coloniale du Rwanda? Quelles sont les messages les plus importantes?

10. Ku bwawe, "ubumwe" ni iki?
Pour vous, qu' est-ce que "l'unité"?

11. Ku bwawe, "ubwiyunge" ni iki?
Pour vous, qu' est-ce que "la réconciliation"?

12. Urizera ko ingando ishobora guhindura umuntu? Gute?

Vous pensez que l'ingando puisse changer la mentalité de la personne?

13. Uzajya he nyuma y'ingando? Uzakora iki nyuma y'ingando?
Où irez-vous après ingando? Que ferez-vous après avoir quitté ingando?

APPENDIX 2. QUESTION SCHEDULE for BUTARE (Student Participants of *Ingando*)

SECTION I. Interview Questions

1. Can you briefly describe your day at ingando (…the different activities from the morning to the evening).

2. What is the purpose/function of each of these activities, as you understand it?
   - Why military training?
   - What is the main purpose of the education?
   - What is the purpose of the evening "gitaramo"?

3. What are the different lectures you had at the ingando school, what were the topics? Describe briefly some of the main message of lectures that you remember.

4. Did you discuss Rwandan history? What were you taught, what were the main messages?

5. Ingando is also called solidarity camps. In your opinion, does ingando build solidarity? If yes, how? Does ingando help reconciliation? In which sense? (define these terms)

6. What do you understand as the *main purpose/objective* of ingando? Why were you asked to attend?

7. What are the main effects of ingando, *if any*? Did you feel changed in any way? Is ingando "powerful" in some way?

8. If you could change anything, what would you change about ingando?

9. Finally, when you look at Rwanda now, today, what are the most pressing social problems that Rwanda faces, that we should focus on and resolve?

SECTION II. Background Information

Age:
Gender:
Year of Ingando:
Time spent in Ingando:
Subject studied at University:
Languages spoken:
Preferred Language:
Home town/region in Rwanda:
How long have you lived in Rwanda:
Where have you lived before? How long?:

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