KANT'S SYSTEM OF PERSPECTIVES AND ITS THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

by

Stephen Palmquist

St. Peter's College, Oxford

Submitted to the Faculty of Theology, Oxford University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Trinity Term, 1987
Dedicated to Tom Soule,
who first quickened within me
the Twin Virtues of
Respect for Mystery
and an
unrelenting Quest for Understanding.
Short Abstract of:

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Part One examines the general structure of Kant's System. Chapter I argues that his System cannot be fully understood without appreciating its radically theological orientation. Chapter II introduces the 'principle of perspective', and defines perspective as the 'context of' or 'way of considering' a philosophical question and standpoint as the subject-matter which is under consideration. Chapter III suggests that a fixed, architectonic pattern gives Kant's System its 'Copernican' character.

Part Two investigates the epistemological underpinnings of Kant's System. Chapter IV defines his four main perspectives (the transcendental, empirical, logical, and practical) as dealing with the synthetic a priori, the synthetic a posteriori, the analytic a priori, and the analytic a posteriori, respectively. Chapter V applies this perspectival framework to Kant's six primary 'object-terms': 'thing in itself', 'transcendental object', and 'appearance' denote the object as viewed from the transcendental perspective; 'phenomenon', 'negative noumenon', and 'positive noumenon' denote the object as viewed from the empirical perspective. Chapter VI argues that faith in the thing in itself is the necessary starting point for Kant's System.

Part Three uses the formal principles established in Parts One and Two to interpret the Critical System itself. Chapters VII-IX regard the three Critiques as systems based, respectively, on theoretical, practical, and empirical standpoints.

Part Four discusses the theological implications of Kant's System. Chapter X portrays his theology as he himself regarded it: as a theism which urges a right respect for God by denying the possibility of human knowledge of His existence, yet allows for an adequately certain belief through moral and teleological arguments. Chapter XI interprets Kant's philosophy of religion as an experiment designed to prove that Christianity can serve as the universal religion of mankind. Chapter XII demonstrates Kant's deep concern for religious experience, and argues that the Critical System as a whole was intended to pave the way for a Critical mysticism.
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Detailed Abstract of:

Kant's System of Perspectives and its Theological Implications

This thesis is divided into four parts, each of which contains three chapters. Part One examines the general structure of Kant's philosophical System. Part Two investigates its epistemological underpinnings. Part Three uses the formal principles established in Parts One and Two to interpret the Critical System itself. And Part Four attempts to replace the typical interpretation of Kant's theology and philosophy of religion as an austere, deistic agnosticism with a more tenable interpretation which takes account of its richness and depth, and in so doing prepares the way for a balanced theological outlook.

Part One

Chapter I argues that, although his philosophy is often regarded as having only negative theological implications, Kant himself intended it to have significant positive theological implications. Indeed, his System can hardly be fully understood without appreciating its radically theological orientation: the ideas of God, freedom and immortality constitute the guiding-thread of all Kant's Critical endeavours.

Chapter II introduces the 'principle of perspective', which requires a philosopher to determine the 'context of' or 'way of considering' a given question or set of questions before attempting to provide the answer(s). II.1 examines the various meanings of 'perspective' in ordinary language. II.2 demonstrates the ubiquity of this concept in Kant's text (including four subsections specifying 467 occurrences of 'perspectival equivalents' in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason). II.3 outlines the three main applications of the principle of perspective to Kant's philosophy, which together define the sense in which it is a System of Perspectives. The overall perspective of the entire System is the Critical Perspective. Each of Kant's three Critiques assumes a general perspective (i.e. a subject-matter: either theoretical, practical, or empirical), which is called its standpoint. Four fundamental perspectives operate within each Critique: the transcendental, logical, empirical, and practical perspectives.

Chapter III suggests that a fixed, architectonic pattern gives Kant's System of Perspectives its 'Copernican' character. III.1 describes the Copernican aspect of the Critical Perspective in terms of the assumption that objects conform to the subject rather than vice versa. III.2 explains Kant's distinction between transcendental and general logic, and provides a statistical analysis of the types of divisions preferred in the Tables of Contents to Kant's three Critiques. III.3 summarizes an argument developed elsewhere which explains Kant's rationale for preferring threefold and fourfold divisions and describes the logical structure of his twelfold division of the categories. This pattern (viz. four perspectives, each of which gives rise to three elements, or 'steps' in the argument) determines the structure of Kant's most important arguments (as described in Chapters VII, VIII and XI).

Part Two

Chapter IV defines some of Kant's key terms and shows how they work together to form the four fundamental perspectives mentioned in II.3. IV.1 distinguishes between experience as immediate, nonreflective input, experience as mediate and constructed (which Kant calls 'empirical knowledge'), and knowledge as that which arises out of reflection upon experience. IV.2 defines the distinction between a priori and a posteriori in terms of knowledge the validity of which is dependent upon particular experiences (a posteriori) or not dependent on particular experiences (a
priori), and defines the distinction between analytic and synthetic in terms of knowledge the validity of which depends solely on the principle of contradiction (analytic) or upon nonlogical, intuitive elements as well (synthetic). IV.3 combines the a priori-a posteriori and analytic-synthetic distinctions to show how they give rise to four classifications, each of which arises out of a type of 'reflection', which is itself based on one of Kant's four fundamental perspectives. Reflection based on the empirical perspective attempts to determine what 'is true' about the objects of one's experience; its goal is to establish synthetic a posteriori knowledge. Reflection based on the transcendental perspective attempts to determine the subjective conditions which 'must (interestingly) be true' if experience is to be possible; its goal is to establish synthetic a priori knowledge. Reflection based on the logical perspective attempts to determine what 'must (trivially) be true' because the logical laws of thought require it to be so; its goal is to establish analytic a priori knowledge. Reflection based on the speculative perspective mistakenly attempts to establish synthetic a priori knowledge of transcendent reality; Kant argues that this must be replaced by reflection based on the practical perspective, which attempts to determine what 'may be true' about our idea of transcendent reality. Although Kant does not do so, there is a case for portraying the latter as aiming to establish analytic a posteriori belief.

Chapter V uses this perspectival framework to help distinguish between the six terms Kant uses to describe the various stages in the epistemological development of the object of knowledge. V.1 reveals a gap in the first Critique between Kant's introduction of the terms 'thing in itself', 'transcendental object', and 'appearance' and his introduction of the terms 'phenomenon', 'negative noumenon', and 'positive noumenon', and suggests this gap can be accounted for by noting that the Aesthetic, Analytic of Concepts, Analytic of Principles, and Dialectic adopt, respectively, the transcendental, logical, empirical, and practical perspectives. V.2 explains how the first set of terms assumes the transcendental perspective: the thing in itself is the object considered apart from any relation to the subject; the transcendental object is the object as related to the subject but wholly undetermined; and the appearance is the object as determined by the subject's form of intuition. V.3 explains how the second set of terms assumes the empirical perspective: the phenomenon is the object as known in the real world (i.e. as intuited and conceptualized); the negative noumenon is that aspect of an empirically known object which enables the subject to regard the object as outer (i.e. as objectively real); and the positive noumenon is the empirically known object viewed (mistakenly) as if it represented, as such, the object in all its transcendent reality.

Chapter VI argues that faith in the thing in itself as the radically unknowable starting-point of Kant's System establishes the ultimate justification for adopting the transcendental perspective. VI.1 describes the general meaning of 'faith' in Kant's usage. VI.2 demonstrates that Kant regarded faith not only as a moral tool used for the systematic justification of God, freedom, and immortality, but also as a theoretical tool which is required to open the door to the entire System of Perspectives. VI.3 contrasts this approach with that which regards transcendental arguments as the only valid key to the justification of the transcendental perspective, and proposes that Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of the thing in itself can actually be regarded as his concession to the sceptic. VI.3 considers the relationship between such theoretical faith and Kant's well-known moral faith in the ideas of practical reason.

Part Three
Chapter VII interprets the Doctrine of Elements in the Critique of Pure Reason as a system based on the theoretical standpoint (thus it is called 'systemt'). VII.1 describes the general function of 'representa-
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In Kant's epistemology, and then outlines the four 'stages' in system:

1. Intuitive sensibility assumes the transcendental perspective and examines the nature of intuition apart from conceptualization;
2. Conceptual understanding assumes the logical perspective and deals with the nature of conceptualization apart from intuition;
3. Determinate judgment assumes the empirical perspective and investigates the nature of judgments which synthesize intuitions and concepts;
4. Rational inference assumes the practical perspective and argues that the constitutive use of paralogisms, antinomies, and ideals must be replaced by a regulative use of the ideas of practical reason.

VII.2 tentatively interprets the six steps in Kant's presentation of the first two stages as:

1.a. the thing in itself is originally represented as a transcendental object;
2.a. sensations are synthesized by the imagination and thus determined to be perceptions;
3.a. self-conscious thought is schematized to ensure that its concepts are synthesized with corresponding intuitions;
4.a. the schematism of reason proposes an ultimate, unconditioned goal for empirical knowledge;

VII.3 tentatively interprets the six steps in the third and fourth stages as:

3.a. respect for the moral law encourages the agent to choose to obey (autonomy), even if this requires the denial of heteronomous inclinations;
4.a. the unity of reason determines the unconditioned to be a regulative idea;

Chapter VIII interprets the Doctrine of Elements in the Critique of Practical Reason as a system based on the practical standpoint (thus it is called systemp). VIII.1 correlates the four stages in systemp (free volition, the moral law, moral activity, and the final end of morality), respectively, with the three chapters of the Analytic and the chapter constituting the Dialectic, and refutes the common misinterpretation of the phenomenon-noumenon distinction, according to which systemp has to do only with some mysterious transcendent realm of 'noumenal acts'. VIII.2 tentatively interprets the six steps in the first two stages of systemp as:

1.a. the desire to act upon a good disposition gives rise to a good will;
2.a. a universalizable maxim serves as a moral principle;
3.a. respect for the moral law encourages the agent to choose to obey (autonomy), even if this requires the denial of heteronomous inclinations;
b. the categorical imperative defines this choice as an unconditional rule for action;

c. a practical judgment leads the agent to perform the moral action (i.e. to do one's duty);

4.a. the postulate of immortality enables us to regard virtue as a possibility for the responsible moral agent;
b. the postulate of God enables us to see justice done in the distribution of happiness in proportion to virtue;
c. the assumption of a kingdom of ends provides a context in which the highest good (the union of virtue and happiness) can be attained.

Chapter IX interprets the various theories expounded in the Critique of Judgment as pointing towards, but not expounding, a system based on the empirical standpoint (thus it is called system b). IX.1 describes the general sense in which system b is the synthesis of system e and system f. IX.2 summarizes Kant's account of aesthetic judgment (subjective finality): to judge something to be beautiful or sublime is to regard a natural object (system e) as grounded in something supersensible (system f). IX.3 summarizes Kant's account of teleological judgment (objective finality): to judge something to be a physical end, or an organism, is likewise to read a quasi-moral content into a natural object. Such judgments assume a transcendent designer of all of nature--"in short, a God".

Part Four

Chapter X reinterprets Kant's theoretical theology as preparing the way for a balanced theological outlook. X.1 describes Kant's belief that God possesses an intuitive understanding and an intellectual intuition (i.e. the ability to create an object merely by thinking of it and to know an object merely by intuiting it), and outlines Kant's view of the relationships between philosophy, theology, and religion: rational theology depends on philosophy for its theoretical justification and on religion for its practical justification. X.2 puts Kant's criticisms of the theoretical arguments for the existence of God in their proper perspective by demonstrating that they are only fallacious when they are assumed to provide a speculative knowledge of God's existence; even Kant's own moral argument cannot (and is not intended to) do that. X.3 discusses the much-neglected positive emphasis of Kant's rational theology: viewed from the theoretical standpoint the traditional theistic arguments can have legitimate regulative functions, such as encouraging a person to adopt a rational faith in the transcendent; viewed from the empirical standpoint, the teleological argument actually requires the assumption of a transcendent author of the world (but nevertheless fails to establish theoretical knowledge); and viewed from the practical standpoint, Kant's moral postulate requires the moral agent either to assume God's existence or to admit that moral action is ultimately irrational. X.4 describes several of the models Kant proposes for clarifying the conception of God's nature; such models can be legitimately developed once the existence of God is assumed on faith.

Chapter XI interprets Kant's philosophy of religion as a highly successful experiment, designed to test the extent to which Christianity can serve as the universal religion of mankind. XI.1 emphasizes Kant's crucial distinction between pure religion (i.e. the inner resolution to view all one's duties as divine commands), ecclesiastical faith (i.e. any outer dogmatic structure which serves as an historical vehicle for pure religion), and universal religion (i.e. an empirical vehicle for pure religion which can be adopted by all mankind). XI.2 argues that Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason expounds a system of religious perspectives (thus referred to as system h), with its four 'books' corresponding, respectively, to the four fundamental perspectives, and tentatively interprets the six steps in the first two stages (viz. radical evil and conversion to the good) as:
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1.a. a person's original innocence determines the good predisposition to be a potential for good;
   b. radical evil corrupts this potential by encouraging a person to adopt an evil maxim;
   c. a propensity to evil ensues which gives rise to an evil heart;
2.a. the inscrutable grace of God offers salvation by providing an inner archetype of perfect humanity;
   b. practical faith in this archetype enables a person to adopt a good maxim;
   c. a conversion is then required in order to establish a good heart.

XI.3 tentatively interprets the six steps in the third and fourth stages (viz. the church and the religious service of God) as:
3.a. converted individuals come together to form an ethical commonwealth;
   b. by placing itself under laws of virtue this commonwealth becomes a people of God;
   c. a people of God which submits itself to archetypal forms of human organization becomes a visible church;
4.a. the visible church practices natural religion by regarding all duties as divine commands;
   b. by committing itself to a specific set of revealed scriptures it becomes a revealed faith;
   c. when natural and revealed religion are combined in this, their proper order, the members of such a church perform the true service of God, and thereby render themselves well-pleasing to God.

XI.4 highlights the revolutionary aspects of system. It counters the dangers of a 'conserving conservatism' with a 'liberating conservatism', and the dangers of a 'liberating liberalism' with a 'conserving liberalism'.

Chapter XII demonstrates Kant's deep concern for religious experience, and argues that his entire System of Perspectives paves the way for a Critical mysticism which could replace the usual, fanatical mysticism. Evidence is taken from Kant's life and from his life-long belief in the voice of God in Conscience and the hand of God in Nature. Further evidence can be drawn from assessing Swedenborg's influence on the Critical System (via Kant's pre-Critical work, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics), and from examining the theological ideas presented in embryo form in his Opus Postumum.
Note on References

References are listed in the body of the text, except when accompanied by remarks of substance. The letter-number combination denotes one of the works listed in the Bibliography. The number(s) after the colon refer to the page numbering, except when otherwise specified in the relevant Bibliographical entry. When a reference is to the same work as that of the immediately preceding reference within the same paragraph, only the page numbers are given.

Kant's works are listed separately at the beginning of the Bibliography; to keep them separate from other 'K' entries, they are numbered according to 'Kt'. (Thus, for example, the Critique of Pure Reason is referred to as 'Ktl'.) The page numbers given in references to Ktl are to the second German edition ('B'), except when preceded by the traditional 'A' to denote material which is unique to the first edition.

In order to minimize the obtrusiveness of lengthy references in the text, the following abbreviations will be used:

alt. = translation altered
a.q.i. = as quoted in
cf. = compare
e.a. = emphasis added
e.g. = for example
f = and following (pages)
i.e. = that is,
n = note
q.a. = quoted above
q.i. = quoted in
s.e. = see especially
s.a. = see also
t.b. = translator's brackets
viz. = namely.

Quotes are always reproduced exactly as they appear, with the following two exceptions: (1) changes in translation are sometimes made, but only when specified in the text (as with the term 'perspective', discussed in II.2); and (2) italics (underlining) are occasionally omitted if their original purpose is obscured by the brevity of the quote.
Acknowledgements

The financial support for my four and one-half years of research in Oxford came from a variety of sources. First and foremost has been the money earned by my wife's faithful labours at several different jobs. A close second was almost three years of free rent at the North Oxford Overseas Centre in return for our minimal (and in any case, pleasant) duties as Assistant Wardens. Thanks is also due in recognition of funds received from the 'Overseas Research Student Fees Support Scheme' offered by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom, from the Oxford University Committee on Student Hardship, and from the Oxford Society. Finally a word of sincerest thanks and gratitude goes to the numerous friends and relatives whose generous gifts and kind support have been a constant source of encouragement and help.

The unenviable task of supervising a free thinker was, in the present case, fulfilled by four individuals, each of whom contributed helpful advice in varying degrees. Peter Bide convinced me in my first term at Oxford to postpone my proposed study on the topic of love in order to make an in-depth study of philosophical theories of human nature. When this study took me into the deep waters of Kant and nineteenth-century German philosophy, Rev'd Bide knew just the person to take over. John Macquarrie has ably supervised me for ten terms over the past four years. His many detailed comments about my work have often proved most helpful. And his advice that I ground my speculative tendencies in the solid ground of some historical figure or figures was instrumental in influencing me to put aside my inquiry into human nature for the time being in order to pursue the more narrow inquiry developed in the present thesis. For two terms I had the privilege to study under the supervision of a philosopher. John Kenyon put up with me for two lively discussions and pointed out the need for rigorous thinking in a thesis which claims to be philosophical. W.H. Walsh used his expertise in philosophy, and particularly in Kant-scholarship, to encourage me in my work just at the point when I was beginning to wonder whether my approach would actually be intelligible to anyone else.

Others who have read and discussed bits of my work from time to time, often providing valuable suggestions, are Peter Strawson, Paul McKechnie, the late David Long, and Richard Mapplebeckpalmer. Of these, contributions from the latter have by far been the most stimulating and helpful. Rev'd Mapplebeckpalmer has read most of what I have written while in Oxford, and has taken the time and effort to dig with me in countless hours of discussion deep into the heart of my subject. Among the many invaluable seeds of thought planted in my mind during these sessions were those which resulted in my choosing the word 'perspective' as the name for the key conception in my interpretation of Kant, and in the perfection of my use of models as visual aids in clarifying the resulting System.

More important than all these sources of help and encouragement has been the steadfast and loving support on all fronts provided by my dear wife, Dorothy. While training as an artist, she introduced me to Tom Soule, to whom together we dedicate this thesis. For it was during a discussion of his ideas one evening seven years ago that the two of us hit upon an intuition, the implications of which we are still in the process of thinking through in works such as the present one. While on the one hand she has been willing to put aside the desire to pursue artistic talents in order both to work and raise a family, she has on the other hand willingly read, commented upon, and discussed everything I have written since that evening. Without her encouragement, the unrelenting pressures of academic life in a place like Oxford would have been sufficiently depressing on several occasions to cause me to give up and return to the sunny beaches of Santa Barbara.

S. Palmquist, March 1985
Preface to this Revised and Abridged Version

The first version of this thesis was submitted in March 1985 and examined orally on 23 May 1985 by Professor Graham Bird and Professor Richard Swinburne. During the examination they pointed out several ambiguities in my argument, which they believed required revision before the thesis could be accepted for the D.Phil. degree. The changes they recommended, as specified in their report, are quoted below:

1. The formal logical apparatus must be removed or it must be expounded adequately, and its application to the three [sic] perspectives justified more fully.

2. The notion of a perspective must be made clearer. The candidate must justify more fully his claim to find this notion as widely as he does in the Text of Kant.

3. The candidate must make more satisfactory distinctions between the six 'object terms' of chapter 5 and their division into empirical and transcendental perspectives.

4. The candidate must justify more fully his view that the practical perspective yields analytic a-posteriori knowledge [sic].

At the end of the oral examination the examiners made clear that point (1) presented by far the most important problem, without which the thesis would not have been referred. I therefore spent one year attempting to perfect the 'formal logical apparatus', quite apart from its application to my interpretation of Kant; this resulted in my writing Plj. The additional research prepared the way for expounding the logical apparatus much more clearly and adequately in the thesis. However, after revising the thesis along these lines, I was strongly advised (see below) that, even in its revised form, it would probably be met with just as much disapproval as the old version, and that it would require too much time and space to elaborate the argument in the minute detail required to convince analytic philosophers that such an a priori logical apparatus can be a useful tool. So I reluctantly agreed to extract the apparatus from the thesis and submit the revised version in its present, 'abridged' form. This mainly involved summarizing the last half of Chapter III (formerly Ch. VI [=Plj]), omitting three sections from Chapter One, and omitting the fourth sections from Chapters II and IV-IX. The need to adopt this course of action confirms the validity of a warning given to me very early on by one of my former supervisors, which I have always had trouble heeding, to the effect that an Oxford D.Phil. is intended to demonstrate 'scholarship rather than creativity'.

I have dealt with the other three points raised by the examiners in the following ways:

2. The former section I.3 has been greatly expanded and made into a completely separate chapter (Ch. II). In the four subsections to the new II.2 I have modified my former claim that the term 'perspective' is an accurate translation of various of Kant's terms to read that these terms can be interpreted as referring to an implicit 'principle of perspective'; I have also added tables specifying the page and line numbers for 467 'perspectival equivalents' in Kant's first Critique. Section II.1 is added in order to explain the meaning of this principle much more thoroughly, and section II.3 is added in order to provide an overview of the three different ways in which I apply it to Kant's System. In addition, I have highlighted throughout the thesis the perspectival nature of the various aspects of Kant's System.
(3) I was unable to comply with this third point as stated in the examiners' report because I saw no way of changing my argument so as to make 'more satisfactory [i.e. different] distinctions'—not, at least, without compromising my integrity by proposing distinctions I believe represent a false interpretation of Kant. Although opinions differed on certain points during the oral examination, I was able to produce ample evidence for each distinction as presented in the former version. Nevertheless, I have tried to provide additional evidence for the validity of my interpretation of Kant's distinctions. The major changes are in four respects: (i) in V.1 I have clarified and enlarged my discussion of the correlation between Kant's four perspectives and the four main divisions of the Doctrine of Elements in the first Critique by providing statistical evidence based on a computer-based analysis of Kant's word usage; (ii) in V.2 I have added a summary of the four ways of using the word 'appearance', in hopes of clarifying the simplicity of my position; (iii) in V.2-3 I have provided slightly more textual evidence for each distinction, especially for that between the thing in itself and the positive noumenon, and for the preconceptual nature of the transcendental object; and (iv) in V.3 I have toned down my argument that the role of the negative noumenon is to confer objective reality by acknowledging that this is only part of Kant's theory. In order to emphasize the great extent to which my interpretation actually coincides with that put forward by Professor Bird, I have also added in Chapter V about twenty new references to appropriate passages in his book [B20].

(4) I have published a separate article [Plh:(II)] developing my understanding of the classification 'analytic a posteriori'. Three pages of excerpts from this article are included in the new IV.3. Aside from minor revisions, however, my argument that the practical perspective yields analytic a posteriori belief (not 'knowledge', as stated in the examiners' report) remains unchanged. I have taken this approach because the problem raised during the examination was not the difficulty of associating the practical perspective with analytic a posteriori belief, but the more fundamental difficulty of justifying, apart from an interpretation of Kant's philosophy, the right to speak of the analytic a posteriori at all. My article defends that right in detail. Given that the analytic a posteriori is a legitimate classification, its application to the practical perspective should raise no new problems.

In addition to the above changes I have also: (a) dropped the former Chapter III [=Plb]; (b) included the full version of the formerly summarized Chapter II [=Pla], now as Chapter VI; (c) added two completely new chapters on Kant's philosophy of religion (Chs. XI and XII), which provide added evidence of the importance of the principle of perspective (and of Kant's emphasis on reason's architectonic structure); and (d) omitted all explanatory footnotes, in order to make room for the two new chapters. The Bibliography has also been significantly expanded, especially the 'Kant texts' section, which now presents an exhaustive listing of Kant's works and of all their published English translations.

Much of the credit for any added clarity in this thesis due to the above-mentioned revisions is due to Professors Bird and Swinburne for drawing to my attention various weak points in my argument. Had they not referred me, I doubt if I would have ever had sufficient motivation to improve the logical apparatus (which makes the unabridged version even clearer), nor to do such a thorough reworking of my thesis. I would also like to extend my thanks to my supervisors, to Rev'd Alan Padgett, and to my wife, Dorothy, for reading and giving helpful comments on some or all of my thesis since its referral.
From June 1985 I was jointly supervised by Professor John Macquarrie and Mr. Michael Inwood. Although we met on only one occasion, Mr. Inwood's extensive written comments on the first version proved to be invaluable: they helped me to recognize the ambiguities in my text which gave rise to some of the examiners' recommendations, especially with respect to point (2). Unfortunately, he unexpectedly resigned as my supervisor in April of 1986, before I was ready to begin revising the thesis. Professor Macquarrie carried on supervising my first attempt to revise the thesis, until we came to the chapter on the logical apparatus. Because of his natural sympathy with my approach, he found it difficult to criticize the revised version, but he also recognized the dangers of leaving the apparatus in. So he passed me on to my sixth and final supervisor, Dr. David Brown. It was Dr. Brown who, after much frank and open debate, convinced me that the removal of the logical apparatus was necessary, no matter how well I believed I could defend it in a subsequent oral examination. He was both willing and able to discuss the issues involved with candour and little prejudice. I am also very grateful to him for taking the time out of his extraordinarily busy schedule to reread the entire thesis in its final, revised and abridged version, suggesting numerous clarifications of detail.

Kant's response to difficult academic disagreements, arising as they generally do out of a clash of prejudices, has been instructive to me. In a letter to Christian Garve [K2:10.321 (in Z1:104-5)] Kant defends himself at length against an unjust review of the first Critique; but then, with characteristic acumen, he confesses that the true source of such discrepancies often lies elsewhere:

Oh cares of men! Weak men, you pretend that you are only concerned with truth and the spread of knowledge, whereas in fact it is only your vanity that occupies you!

S. Palmquist
June 1987
"Sapere aude!

"Have courage to use your own reason!"

---Kant [Kt38:35]
'Sapere aude!

"Have courage
to use your own reason!"'

--Kant [Kt38:35]
PART ONE: THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF KANT'S SYSTEM

Chapter I

Introduction: Kant's Theological Metaphysics

Did Kant destroy the possibility of theology? Did he seek to undermine its legitimacy by abolishing its metaphysical foundation? The answer given to such questions will reflect to a large extent one's overall understanding of what Kant was attempting to do in his Critical philosophy.

Theologians, at least since Ritschl and the 'back to Kant' movement, have tended to give an affirmative answer, interpreting Kant 'as an antimetaphysical moralist' [B4:655]. If theology is to survive, it must on this view cut all ties with metaphysics and perhaps even, following Barth's lead, with philosophy as a whole. Whatever his view on the relation between theology and philosophy, the theologian who interprets Kant in this way is sure to agree with Cupitt that 'we [theologians] who live after Kant must walk the negative way' [C15:57].

Philosophers too have generally agreed in assessing the Critique of Pure Reason [Kt1], at least, as 'the most thorough and devastating of all anti-metaphysical writings' [W7:38]. Gilson extends this judgment to the whole of Kant's Critical work, maintaining that 'Kant...had no metaphysical interests of his own' [G9:310]. Since 'a new philosophical cycle was to begin' [220] with Kant's thoroughgoing 'rejection of metaphysics' [229], Gilson regards any of Kant's theories or statements which border on the metaphysical as superfluous nonessentials which he merely borrowed 'from hearsay' [310]. Findlay sums up this tendency rather concisely: 'It is usual nowadays to think of Kant as some sort of incipient positivist, always verging towards a belief in
the total non-significance of ideas lacking all empirical illustration' [F2:3].

Not all philosophers and theologians, however, interpret Kant's intentions so negatively. Findlay himself goes on to say that, even though 'Kant's theory of knowledge...has aspects that can with justice be called "positivist", it is not at all positivist in its account of the necessary underpinnings of such knowledge' [F3:5]; 'Kant's theory of knowledge cannot, therefore, be called positivist, though it is quite right to see something like positivism in his account of what we can effectively know' [9]. Barth agrees that it is wrong to view Kant as 'a kind of super-sceptic', or as the 'all-annihilating one'; for his criticism is always intended as 'an affirmation of reason.... Kant both has and demands an almost unconditional faith in reason' [B4:270-1; cf. W20:16]. England adds that it is 'only the validity of a certain type of metaphysics' which Kant denies [E3:207], for 'what is really implied in the critical position is...the substitution of an immanent metaphysics for the older transcendent metaphysics' [113-4]. And Wood goes so far as to suggest that 'Kant himself was in many ways...an "existentialist" theologian' [150]!

Numerous of Kant's own comments could be construed as defending a positivism of some sort. For example, he urges us 'to believe that we have approximated to completeness in the empirical employment of [a] principle only in proportion as we are in a position to verify such unity in empirical fashion' [Kt1:720, e.a.]. If this is positivism, however, it is far from straightforward; for he continues with the caveat: 'a completeness which is never, of course, attainable.' Moreover, when Kant turns away from such empirical considerations his position becomes explicitly nonpositivistic. To assert 'that there is and can be no a priori knowledge at all', chides Kant, 'would be like proving by reason that there is no such thing as reason' [Kt4:12].

Another popular misconception of Kant is that he started out as a
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typical Wolffian rationalist, and only began formulating his Critical principles after being jarred by Hume out of his rationalist complacency. Yet a careful and open-minded reading of Kant's pre-Critical works yields quite a different impression: 'From the beginning he made no attempt to hide his dislike of the compact mass of Wolffian doctrine' [V4:3]; rather, his lifelong goal was to discover and follow 'the correct philosophical method and by means of it to construct an eternal metaphysics' [2]. Here Kant reveals, some fifteen years before the publication of Ktt1, his awareness of the crucial difference between 'speculative' and 'Critical' metaphysics, and his desire to concentrate his attention on the latter. His philosophical 'panacea', then, 'was not discovered by a sudden stroke of intuitive genius but [was] allowed slowly and painfully to reach ripe elaboration' [3; s.a. M5 and W10].

This development is exemplified quite clearly in the occasional explicit statements concerning metaphysics which Kant gives in his pre-Critical works. In Ktt18:367-8(112-3), for example, he confesses:

Metaphysics, with which it is my fate to be in love, although only rarely can I boast of any favours from her, offers two advantages. The first is that it serves to solve the tasks which the questioning mind sets itself when by means of reason it inquires into the hidden qualities of things. But here the result only too often falls below expectation...

The other advantage is more adapted to human reason, and consists in recognizing whether the task be within the limits of our knowledge and in stating its relation to the conceptions derived from experience, for these must always be the foundation of all our judgments. In so far metaphysics is the science of the boundaries of human reason. And...this use of metaphysics...is at the same time the least known and the most important, and...is obtained only late and by long experience.

Rather than interpreting Kant in terms of either positivistic empiricism or 'pure rationalism' [02:188; B4:345], my argument in this thesis will be that Kant is most accurately interpreted as offering us --to borrow one of his own expressions--'a third thing'. The easily misunderstood title, 'transcendental idealism', is the label most often used to denote Kant's synthesis between empiricism and rationalism. But since this phrase properly refers to just one part of his Critical Sys-
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Interpreting Kant's philosophy in terms of the 'principle of perspective' will enable us to account for the potentially confusing recurrence of both empiricist and rationalist (as well as other) extremes in his Critical philosophy.

If Kant was neither a straightforward positivist nor a traditional rationalist, the question yet remains how he intended his philosophy to relate to theology. As far as methodology and terminology are concerned, Barth is largely correct to say Kant 'was purely a philosopher and his philosophy is not in the least dressed in the garb of theology' [B4:339]. Indeed, as Sykes points out, Kant wrote an entire essay [Part I of Kt65] 'the whole object of [which] is to demonstrate the necessity of an institutionalized rivalry between theology and philosophy...' [S32:100]. But 'theology' in these instances refers for Kant only to what is more accurately called 'biblical studies' or 'revealed theology', a discipline which Kant himself, even in his book on religion [Kt8], never practised. Once the meaning of the word is widened to include any serious, scholarly study of God, religion, and related subjects, his philosophy can be seen in many respects to be 'theological' in orientation.

Prior to Kant most philosophers used theology--and in particular the implications of God's existence (which they believed they had proved)--to bridge gaps they were unable to bridge by philosophical means alone. Two obvious examples are Descartes' assumption that God's existence guarantees that 'regarding objects which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived' [D3:IV.119], and Berkeley's theory that objects which are not being perceived by any subject can be said to persist only because they are being perceived by God. Kant, however, severely criticizes such an approach:

To have recourse to God...in explaining the arrangements of nature and their changes is...a complete confession that one has come to the end of his philosophy, since he is compelled to assume some-
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thing of which in itself he otherwise has no concept in order to conceive of the possibility of something he sees before his very eyes. [Kt4:138]

This removal of God from his traditional place in the 'gaps' of philosophical inquiry is commonly interpreted as an example of Kant's positivistic and antitheological disposition. What is often ignored by such interpreters is that, as we shall see in V.2, Kant replaces this traditional assumption with that of his famous, or infamous, concept of the 'thing in itself'. He has a number of reasons for doing so [see VI.1-2], among which are the preservation of the integrity of philosophy and the protection of theology from its sceptical and agnostic critics. For he regards the thing in itself as the unknowable question mark of philosophical inquiry [see Plb:§§2-3]; God is freed to play a far more important and determinant role. There is a sense, as we shall see, in which God transcends even the thing in itself, and so, for Kant, is radically unknowable. But there is another sense in which God is immanent; indeed, this rich concept of 'a living God' [Ktl:661] forms the very heart of Kant's entire philosophical task. The interplay between these two aspects of his concept of God constitutes a valuable contribution to theology, for which he has rarely, if ever, been given full credit.

Although it is true that Kant always spoke primarily as a philosopher, it is also true that 'the Critical philosophy left his basic beliefs untouched' [W10:143] and that the three 'ideas' which guided his entire Critical endeavour, viz. 'God, freedom, and immortality' [e.g. Ktl:xxx; Kt4:3-4; Kt7:473], are all largely theological in their orientation. Thus it should come as no surprise that the concept of God 'was constantly recurring throughout the various stages of [Kant's] intellectual development' [H21:13]. The inordinate attention usually paid to the arguments in the Transcendental Analytic of Ktl veils the fact that for Kant even the first Critique was designed to secure the validity of these beliefs [s.e. W10].
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Wood is one of the few interpreters to acknowledge and develop the theological tenor of Kant's philosophy. (The works of Collins [C11] and Despland [D5] are also noteworthy in this respect.) Wood says:

Kant is fundamentally unable to conceive of the human situation except theistically... For Kant's real aim is not to destroy theology, but to replace a dogmatic theology with a Critical one: to transform rational theology from a complacent speculative science into a critical examination of the inevitable but perpetually insoluble problems of human reason, and a vehicle for the expression of our moral aspirations under the guidance of an autonomous reason. [W20:17]

He claims, quite rightly, that 'there is widespread misunderstanding of Kant's ideas' concerning his criticism of the proofs for God's existence [10; cf. X.2]. Moreover, Kant's Lectures on Philosophical Theology [Kt26] show, according to Wood, 'that [even] the traditional theology was to a large extent compatible with Kant's critical philosophy' [W20:149]. Indeed, Kant's concern for and influence on theology extended to numerous empirical details: not only does Barth credit him with having 'understood what the idea of a Church was' and as having also 'understood what grace was' [B4:339], but Sykes regards him 'as one of those who prepared the way for the fragile advances of the Second Vatican Council' [S32:103]--three theological accomplishments of no small merit!

Kant himself makes it clear in numerous places that his task is ultimately positive with respect to theology. His famous claim 'to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith' [Ktl:xxx] certainly implies something of this sort [but s.a. VI.1]. A large portion of the second edition Preface to Ktl is devoted to clarifying that 'all objections to morality and religion' have been 'for ever silenced' by his critique of pure rational knowledge [xxxii; s.a. K2:10.143, a.q.i. E3:79]. Likewise in the Critique of Practical Reason [Kt4] he aims to prevent 'the possibility of making theology merely a magic lantern of phantoms' [Kt4:141]. And if Kant's own testimony is not evidence enough, 'his friend and biographer, Jachmann' informs us, as Greene
notes, 'that, in private conversations with his friends "the philo­sopher and the man spoke out in undeniable testimony to an inner feeling and a genuine conviction [of God's existence]"; and that "in the true sense of the word he was a worshipper of God"' [G13:lxvii-lxxviii].

Copleston argues against the common trend in both theology and philosophy according to which philosophers such as Heidegger and theologians such as Barth stand willingly back to back, facing opposite directions. He urges 'that an adequate understanding of the Christian faith requires philosophical reflection, and that it is not facilitated by a wholesale rejection of metaphysics' [C12:53]. Taking into account the theological orientation of Kant's philosophy may help to reverse this trend, which is traceable in both disciplines to various misinterpre­tations of Kant. The theologian and the philosopher might then be more willing to stand face to face; for Kant destroyed the old parent­child relationship of theology to philosophy not in order to make them complete strangers, but rather to enable them to work side by side towards a common goal. 'The ultimate aim' of such cooperation, Smith suggests, is 'to overcome the emptiness and formality of philosophy and to frustrate the obscurantist and parochial tendencies in theology' [S21:8].

A thorough study of Kant's philosophy and its theological implica­tions can be particularly helpful in fulfilling this task because he is respected almost universally by philosophers as one of the greatest philosophical thinkers in the history of Western philosophy. Indeed, many would agree that 'Kant, in modern times, has replaced Aristotle as a kind of intellectual reference system' [G4:135]. Likewise, the number of theologians and philosophers of religion who respect Kant's achieve­ment is so large as to render any attempt at an exhaustive list merely pedantic. Many theologians would agree with MacKinnon's view that Kant is 'surely the supreme German philosopher' [M1:135; s.a. M2:22-6 and L3:16]. Even Gilson, who has fundamental disagreements with Kant,
regards him as the primary philosophical alternative to Thomas Aquinas for the Christian [G8:114]. What Barth says of Kant's influence on nineteenth-century theologians would apply to most (non-Barthian) theologians in the present century as well: 'He stands by himself... a stumbling-block and rock of offence..., someone determinately pursuing his own course, more feared than loved, a prophet whom almost everyone even among those who wanted to go forward with him had first to re-interpret before they could do anything with him' [B4:267]. If indeed Kant is the primary figure in the modern Western philosophical tradition, the theologian can hardly ignore him. For, as Wood suggests: 'To face up squarely to the problems of the tradition, as Kant did, remains by far the most straightforward and intellectually honest way for a modern theologian to discharge his philosophical responsibilities' [W20:151]. To interpret Kant in a way that is philosophically acceptable and yet leaves open a legitimate field in which the theologian can work would therefore effectively establish much-needed common ground between philosophy and theology.

But the respect Kant evokes from philosophers and theologians is only a secondary reason for embarking on a new, theologically-conscious interpretation of this over-worked philosopher. A more important reason stems directly from what we have been discussing in this section. Kant is far too frequently interpreted in a one-sided fashion, especially by those who (conveniently) claim that large portions of his work are irrelevant to or inconsistent with the 'truly Critical' material. Because of the confusion this creates, especially for anyone whose primary concern is not philosophical, many theologians and philosophers of religion have ignored or repudiated the importance of Kant. Once again, the examples are too numerous to list, but two cases can be cited.

Flew's book on the philosophy of religion is a typical example of the many similar works which entirely ignore the relevance of Kant's views on the subject: he devotes only two paragraphs [F4:5.44-5] to a
brief description and trite criticism. Hartshorne's treatment of Kant is even more dangerous because it gives the impression of being more knowledgeable. With Reese he voices the common objection: 'Of all criticisms of philosophical theology, probably none has been so influential as those of Kant.... [However,] Kant's criticisms depend, more than is commonly noted, on certain features of his own system which are now usually rejected' [H8:142]. They then severely misinterpret and trivialize, among other things, Kant's doctrine of sensibility [147]. As evidence of their failure to grasp the essential thrust of Kant's philosophy, they accuse him of being 'imprisoned in the half-truths in which the monopolar prejudice, the neglect of the principle of polarity, is bound to result' [146]. Each of these criticisms, however, and especially the latter, betrays an acceptance of overly simplified or one-sided interpretations of Kant—interpretations which assume that a theologian who accepts Kant must give up most or all of his endeavours. The implications of such a second-hand approach are brought out more clearly in Hartshorne's defense of the Ontological argument [H7], which is itself based on a neglect of Kant's principle of perspective [see X.2]. Describing Kant as a 'calamitously overestimated German philosopher' [221], he explicitly rejects Kant's Copernican revolution [232], and evinces his ignorance of Kantian methodology in general when he boldly states: 'Unbelief [in God] is confusion or else belief is confusion. There is no third possibility' [135; but see Ch. VI]. Such philosophers of religion and theologians remain unaware of the true contribution Kant has made to their subject. This alone, if nothing else, calls for a fresh statement of just what that contribution is, so that the doors of theological reflection can remain open even for the Kantian (and, indeed, vice versa).

Our answer to the question with which we began, therefore, is that Kant destroyed not so much the possibility of theology as that of the one-sided rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment, under which he him-
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self had been nurtured. His genius, however, was to have done this without going to the opposite extreme of positivism. In the process of working out his new approach, he proposed numerous theories which are highly relevant to the theologian. But because his theological interests are so deeply imbedded within his philosophy, and because the commonly accepted interpretations ignore this and other important emphases, it will be necessary to reinterpret his entire Critical System before bringing into full view its thoroughly theological intentions.

My reinterpretation will begin in Part One by emphasizing the thoroughly systematic nature of Kant's philosophy. In Chapter II I will argue that Kant's System can best be understood by interpreting it as a 'System of Perspectives'. (The word 'system' will be capitalized whenever it refers to the overall plan of Kant's systematic works, but not when it refers to one of the specific systems--e.g. one of the Critiques--within this System.) Section II.1 will introduce the principle of perspective and explain the ordinary usage of the word 'perspective'; section II.2 will demonstrate the importance of this concept for Kant, but will not distinguish between technical and nontechnical perspectives; and section II.3 will present a brief outline of the relationships between the technical perspectives in his System, the details of which will be filled in and defended in Parts Two and Three. (Only in these later Parts, therefore, will the importance of doctrines such as the primacy of practical reason come into full view.) My intention will be to prove not that such an outline is unambiguously presented by Kant, but that it is there in the text, and that Kant could have clarified his arguments by using 'perspective' as a technical term in describing the structure of his System. Chapter III will then complete our discussion of the general structure of Kant's System by examining the difference between general logic and transcendental logic [III.2] and by suggesting that the perspectival relationships between parts of his System are determined by fixed, architectonic patterns [III.3].
Chapter II

The Principle of Perspective

1. Kant's Perspectival Revolution

In the first edition Preface to his first Critique, Kant declares that he will supply 'the key' which can solve every 'metaphysical problem...to which [pure reason] itself gives birth' [Kt1:Axiii]. Similarly, in the second edition Preface, he claims to 'furnish an excellent touchstone of what we are adopting as our new method of thought, namely, that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them' [xvii.e.a.]. This 'new point of view' [xviii-xix] defines Kant's 'transcendental' turn, which is universally recognized as the fundamental presupposition of his Critical System. He describes it as a 'Copernican revolution' in philosophy [xv-xcii], an epithet which we will discuss further in III.1. The main tenet of this 'new method', or 'new perspective' for philosophical inquiry is that the nature of the object of any rational activity is now assumed to be determined (at least in part) by the nature of the subject. The validity of this key assumption rests not so much on a set of arguments (though Kant does provide some arguments for extra support), as on the overall coherence of the System to which his new perspective gives rise. Although the full implications of his assumption will therefore emerge only gradually as we interpret his Critical System, we can nevertheless examine in this chapter the System's general perspectival character.

In the first Critique Kant names the System built on his new method of thought 'transcendental philosophy' [Kt1:25]. The problem with this label is that it is too general: transcendental philosophy covers not only the topics dealt with in the three Critiques, but also the elaborate metaphysical systems to which Kant believes they give rise. Moreover, Kant also uses the term 'transcendental' in several more
specific ways, as I have argued in P1d:§4 and Plf:§2 [s.a. IV.2]. In order to avoid these difficulties, he later gives the 'transcendental idealism' developed in Kt1 the new title 'Critical idealism' [Kt2:375], thus suggesting that the aspect of transcendental philosophy expounded in the three Critiques should be regarded as composing 'Critical Philosophy'--a label which is fortunately preferred by most commentators. A 'critical' approach is one which accepts the new, 'transcendental perspective' as its touchstone, but is limited to the task of forming an 'estimate of what may be expected from our faculties' [Kt1:766], particularly as regards 'the sources of synthetic a priori knowledge' [249]. (The meaning of this phrase will be brought out in IV.2-3.) Kant then develops the explicitly metaphysical aspects of transcendental philosophy in several post-Critical treatises [s.e. Kt3 and Kt6].

In spite of the widespread recognition of the importance of the transcendental perspective as the touchstone of Kant's Critical System, the full significance of the 'perspectival' approach to philosophy, which it implies, is rarely appreciated. To counteract this neglect, I will argue that the general transcendental assumption which guides the Critical method implies most fundamentally a thoroughgoing 'perspectival revolution' in philosophy [Kt1:x-xvi]. For the transcendental (or Critical) Perspective in general includes within it several levels of subordinate perspectives, which are equally important in guiding the development of the various systems and subsystems which compose the Critical System. Thus a 'principle of perspective', as I shall call it, can be seen functioning throughout the System: transcendental philosophy begins by giving the subject the determining power formerly given to the object on general matters, such as those regarding the nature and form of knowledge; so any change in the conditions adopted by the subject as the System develops will have a profound effect on the way the subject characterizes the object. Kant's primary interest, of course, lies in determining the general forms which the subject neces-
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sarily adopts in interpreting experience, and which therefore cannot simply be changed at will. But in the course of determining the nature and operation of these 'synthetic a priori' forms of experience, and of describing how they arise, he does find it necessary to alter the way the subject and object are assumed to be related at various points. Each change of this sort can be regarded as a change of perspective.

Before we examine the extent to which the principle of perspective is imbedded in Kant's writings, we must take a step back and ask just what is meant by the word 'perspective' as it is being used here. My use of this term is rooted in its ordinary use, as we shall see; but it is also influenced by the analogical relation between formal logic and certain simple geometrical figures, which I have examined elsewhere [Plj]. In the construction of geometrical figures, as in ordinary language, a 'perspective' on an object refers primarily to the angle at which a subject views it, together with any distortions which may be imposed upon it by the manner in which it is being viewed. Thus, if I wish to represent a circular object as viewed from a point outside its circumference and on a different plane, I will draw an ellipse. Such distortions arise whenever we try to draw a higher-dimensional figure on a two-dimensional surface. For example, a common method of distorting a three-dimensional figure so as to depict its depth is to draw any border lines which are hidden from view as dotted lines. A drawing which in this way imposes the limitations of a lower dimension onto a higher-dimensional figure is often called a 'perspective drawing' [see 05:2.2142]. Obviously, the perspective of such drawings changes whenever the angle from which we are viewing the object changes.

In ordinary language, as in geometry, a perspective is primarily a 'way of considering an object'—i.e. a 'method of perceiving' its form and the details of its composition. A person's perception of an object may be described in different, but equally valid ways, if it is viewed from different angles, or perspectives. Some of these differences are
due to the nature of the object itself: an ordinary table looks quite
different when viewed from the top as when viewed from the side. Other
differences may arise from the nature of the subject: if I am wearing
someone else's spectacles, my perspective on the table might be dis-
torted, no matter which angle I view it from. Still other differences
arise out of the relation between the subject and the object: a table
top which looks square when viewed from a vantage-point directly above
its centre will look like a trapezoid if it is viewed from a point
above the centre of one of the sides, or like a line if it is viewed
from a point on the same plane but off the table's surface, or indeed,
like a point if it is viewed from a great distance. All these factors--
the nature of the object, that of the subject, and that of their rela-
tionship--work together to determine a 'perspective' in this ordinary
sense of the word. To abstract from all possible perspectival limita-
tions in such cases leaves us with nothing but a concept. Thus, we can
think 'table' without experiencing a real table, and hence without
adopting any physical perspective on it, but we cannot experience a
real table without imposing some spatio-temporal perspective on the
object of our perception.

The word 'perspective' also has another common meaning, according
to which it refers to the conceptual limitations which are imposed on a
given situation. Thus we might say: 'Ronald Reagan is a good actor,
but as a President (i.e. from a political perspective), he leaves a lot
to be desired.' Here we are concerned not with what might be called
'perceptual perspectives', but with 'conceptual perspectives'--i.e. with
various ways of thinking about an object, or 'methods of reflecting' on
its form and the details of its composition. Once again, different
perspectives can arise from differences either in the object, the sub-
ject, or the relation between the two. But in this case, to abstract
from all possible perspectival limitations would leave us speechless,
with nothing but the possibility of intuiting an unknown 'x'. (Compare
the fundamental role of the 'thing in itself' as the unknowable start­ing point of Kant's System, as discussed in V.2, VI.1-4 and VII.2.)

This second sense of 'perspective', which is directly analogous to the word's primary meaning, is closely related to my use of 'perspec­tive' as a technical term in interpreting Kant's Critical System. For the various words and phrases which can be regarded as 'perspectival equivalents' all describe a 'conceptual perspective' of one sort or another. (A perspectival equivalent is any term or phrase whose meaning in a given context can be accurately expressed by some form of the word 'perspective'.) When Kant talks, for example, about the 'empirical employment of the understanding', he is clearly referring to a certain way of considering objects, a method of reflecting upon them, which can be described as 'empirical'. Consequently, the same notion can be ex­pressed in modern English by referring to the 'empirical perspective'. Although Kant's perspectival terms are often used in connection with the various 'faculties' of the subject, such as 'understanding' or 'sensibility', the latter are never regarded as the names for types of perspectives as such; rather the faculties are names for that in the subject which has the power to adopt a perspective. (Thus, for example, the phrase 'the perspective of the understanding' always means 'the understanding's perspective', not 'the understanding perspective'.) Deleuze's admirable interpretation of the relation between the various faculties in Kant's System [D4] provides a good description of the structure of the System, but fails to recognize the perspectival relation between its parts.

My use of 'perspective' as a technical term will refer to the systematic context into which an object (e.g. a philosophical question) is placed by virtue of the method of reflection assumed by the subject. In this sense a 'perspective' is similar to what logicians call a 'uni­verse of discourse': i.e. 'a given context, or range of significance' [S22:56], or more generally, 'the field within which all objects of our
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discourse are found' [B22:3.4]. But the perspective itself is not identical with the subject-matter of a given inquiry—for it determines the general character of the latter—but rather with the rules and methods adopted by the subject in the attempt to relate subject and object in a synthetic unity. It is for this reason that the principle of perspective is especially crucial for metaphysical inquiries: 'Metaphysical propositions are perspectives. They determine the point of view from which all human experience or all our science and anticipations can be coordinated' [C7:63].

Perspectives can take on many different forms in such ordinary usage, since there is no limit to the number of ways a 'systematic context' can be defined. Indeed, as we examine in II.2 Kant's use of perspectives, we shall see that he too employs his perspectival terms in a variety of ways, only some of which can be regarded as technical.

2. Textual Evidence: Kant's Use of Perspectival Equivalents

In the past few decades more and more interpreters have begun to recognize the problem-solving potential of emphasizing Kant's distinction between various perspectives [see e.g. B20:39; W9:195]. The interpretations of Bird [B20], Prauss [P14], Allison [A4-A8] and Pippin [P9] are especially noteworthy in this respect, although in no case is 'perspective' used consistently as a technical term. The problem to which the notion is most commonly (sometimes exclusively [e.g. in P9]) applied is that of the relation between the 'appearance' and the 'thing in itself', which I shall treat in detail in V.2. The most purposefully developed use of the term I have found is that of Genova, who uses 'perspective' technically to denote 'logically distinct functions, relations, and functional parallelisms' [G4:137]. His only real application of the principle to Kant's text, however, is when he draws a general distinction between the 'vertical perspective' and the 'horizontal perspective' in each of the three Critiques [G4:141-6].
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By far the most significant use of the term 'perspective' is made by those who connect it directly with Kant's Copernican revolution, which, according to Capaldi, is intended to 'lead to a change in perspective' [C3:235; cf. Kt1:xviii-xix, q.a.]. For instance, this is implied, though left undeveloped, by Yovel's reference to the 'Copernican perspective' [Yl:977]. Kant's Copernican revolution just is the assumption: 'Everything that has its basis in the nature of our powers' [Kt1:670] can only be understood properly from some perspective. Consequently, the 'critique' of these powers is concerned primarily with determining the 'right employment' of the various perspectives man can adopt [670]. Only those interpreters who fail to grasp this essential aspect of the Critical method can construe Kant's use of words such as 'knowledge' and 'experience' as positivistic [see J4:670-3; cf. Ch.IV].

Despite the large number of interpreters who use perspectival terminology in passing, no one has yet put forward a thoroughgoing interpretation of Kant's System which takes this insight into account. Allison, who succeeds, I believe, in demonstrating 'that Kant's position is far more coherent than is commonly supposed' [A8:76], has come closest to doing so in recent years; nevertheless, because his attention is limited to the part of Kant's System generally called 'transcendental idealism', it is lacking in several crucial respects [see Plc:125n,146-7]. By contrast, my goal is to apply the principle of perspective to Kant's entire System more consistently and thoroughly than it has been applied in the past.

One reason for the lack of emphasis on perspectives by Kant-scholars up until now is, no doubt, that the word 'perspective' rarely occurs in existing translations of Kant's works. (The only occurrence I have found is in Kt7:482, where it translates 'Aussichten'.) This is primarily due to the fact that the way in which I am using the word 'perspective' is a comparatively recent development. In Kant's day the German word, die Perspektiv, would ordinarily have been used only in
physical contexts, such as when referring to the angle of one's vision of a sensible object. Although this may sufficiently explain why the concept of perspective as a technical principle has been neglected for so long by most interpreters, it is not a sufficient reason for continuing to ignore this key concept. Accordingly, I will henceforth substitute the word 'perspective' for the words used by the translator whenever I quote a passage in which Kant is clearly working with the principle of perspective. This will make it possible to provide clear textual evidence without interrupting the text with bracketed alternative translations, and without continually referring back to this chapter, where the form of and rationale for such translations is being explained more fully. The new translations are not necessarily more accurate (though this can be argued in some cases), but they should always reveal Kant's meaning more clearly. This procedure should create no confusion: since Kemp Smith and other translators virtually never use 'perspective', the reader may assume the translation is altered whenever 'perspective' is used in a quote from Kant.

Although Kant himself does not state the principle of perspective explicitly, he hints at it on many occasions and, more importantly, utilizes it throughout his Critical works. England alludes to Kant's dependence on this principle when he reports in E3:73n that 'his habit was to "turn everything upside down" with utter indifference to his own arguments or those of others, and to regard [philosophical problems] from all possible points of view.' This tendency characterizes virtually all his writing, though as a rule, the later the work, the greater and more explicit is the use Kant makes of the principle of perspective. As early as his first publication, he introduces a perspectival distinction between 'physical' or 'absolute necessity' and 'moral' or 'hypothetical necessity' [Kt1:400(230-1)], which foreshadows the Critical distinction between the theoretical and practical perspectives. In attempting to solve the problem of free will v. determinism, he points
out that the crucial factor to consider is 'whence a thing is necessary' [(400(230-1))]--i.e. in the context of which perspective it is determined to be necessary. In both cases the certainty provided by a thing's necessary status is 'by [its] own reasons', which is the early Kant's Leibnizian way of saying that 'certainty' means something different for each different perspective in which it arises. However, when he points out the need for a change of perspective, he actually seems to be assuming what the Critical concept of perspective precludes, that man can adopt God's perspective [see e.g. 414-5(250-1)].

Most of Kant's secondary works share a concern for understanding concepts and questions 'in a right sense' [Kt11:402(233)] before attempting to reach any firm conclusions. Even in his 'scientific' essays, Kant aims to strike a 'middle way' between two sides of an argument, as in Kt55:323(90), where he states a 'thesis' and an 'antithesis' concerning the moon's influence on the temperature of the air, and concludes that 'there is no contradiction' in holding both sides at once. Likewise, in his early philosophical essays, such as Kt17, Kant recognizes that the philosopher's method 'completely changes the perspective' from that, for instance, of the geometer [289]. For the philosopher should attempt to understand 'not only objects, but their relations to man's reason'; in this way he can determine 'the boundary stones'--i.e. he can define the perspectives--'which in future never allow investigation to wander beyond its proper district' [Kt18:368-9(116)].

The implications of this principle remain undeveloped until they are elaborated in the Critical System. But in Kant's later secondary writings, perspectival equivalents are used more frequently, and often take on quite significant roles. (For instance, see his use of 'view' in Kt64:265n(193n) and Kt23:389(161) [s.a. 394(168)].) In Kt10, published a few years before his death, perspectival equivalents occur on virtually every page: he talks about the categories enabling us to view knowledge from different 'angles' [38(43)], and he repeatedly
employs the concepts of 'horizon' [40-4(44-9)] and 'sphere' [e.g. 102-9(107-15)]. Finally, Kant's interest in the perspectival is implied in the very title of his last self-edited book [Kt66], Anthropology from a Pragmatic Perspective [Hinsicht]!

Kant's reliance on the principle of perspective is most obvious when he makes comments such as that we should 'inquire whether we do not assume a different standpoint' from anyone who proposes a different answer to the same question before we declare their conclusion to be fallacious [Kt5:450]. This clearly implies Kant's belief that the same question can be answered in different, but equally valid, ways, if different perspectives are assumed. (He gives a simple example in Kt28: 86n(238n): the question as to who has a right to claim ownership of a book has one answer (viz. 'the author') if a person 'takes the book as a writing, or a speech', but another (viz. 'the proprietor of the copy') if it is regarded 'as the mute instrument merely of the delivery of the speech'.) Thus it is of utmost importance for the philosopher to distinguish clearly between the available perspectives before trying to answer any philosophical question. Unfortunately, because he never explicitly states it as a principle, Kant has never been given the credit for the emphasis he does put on perspectives—an emphasis which determines to a great extent the course of the Critical method itself.

A careful investigation of the text of Kant's Critical works would provide the ultimate proof of the great extent to which he uses terms which have perspectival connotations. In four subsections to II.2 I will attempt to provide the first step of such a thoroughgoing investigation by picking out the perspectival equivalents Kant uses in the first Critique, and by comparing the value of Kemp Smith's translation to that of the (often paraphrased) perspectival translation. I will confine my attention to the first Critique, not because it is any more or less rich in perspectival equivalents than the other two, but because it is the only one for which proper lexical tools are available.
in both English and German. Using Martin's Sachindex [M6] in conjunction with a computerized concordance of Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's first Critique [Pli] makes it possible to carry out an exhaustive analysis and comparison of the text and its translation. The references of the relevant perspectival equivalents will be summarized in tabular form at the end of each subsection. Within each subsection the numbers in curved brackets will refer to the number of occurrences of the immediately preceding word(s), as determined by their entries in M6 or Pli. (Plurals and other variations of words are included in all word counts, unless a derivative form is specified.) Since Kemp Smith's terms always overlap with various German terms used by Kant, the English and the German totals given in each section will not add up to the same number. Moreover, the English concordance includes both A and B editions, whereas the German index includes only the words occurring in B.

Kant's use of perspectival equivalents can be conveniently divided into four types according to their English translations: on 47 occasions Kemp Smith translates Kant's perspectival intentions by using an 'exact' equivalent, such as 'standpoint' or 'point of view'; on 164 occasions he uses a 'categorial' equivalent, such as 'connection', 'relation' or 'modes of...'; on 256 occasions he uses an 'instrumental' equivalent, such as 'use' or 'employment'; and on innumerable other occasions he uses an 'incidental' equivalent, such as 'aspect', 'in respect of' or 'in view of'. These categories can be regarded as arbitrary groupings of Kant's usage, used here merely to simplify our examination of Kant's and Kemp Smith's often careless and unsystematic use of terms. The terms which can be regarded as falling into each of these categories will be examined, respectively, in the following four subsections.
II. The Principle of Perspective

A. Exact Equivalents

The two English expressions 'point of view' (28) and 'standpoint' (17) can be regarded as exact equivalents of the term 'perspective'. Kemp Smith uses these two expressions to translate ten different German words. The three most common of these are: Gesichtspunkt (14), translated nine times as 'point of view' and four times as 'standpoint'; Standpunkt (9), twice as 'point of view' and six times as 'standpoint'; and Absicht (117), five times as 'point of view' and once as 'standpoint'. In the second edition Preface Kemp Smith translates Denkart (6) as 'point of view' four times, when it is used to refer to the 'new' or

Table II.1: Exact Equivalents (47)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>point of view</th>
<th>standpoint</th>
<th>intellectual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gesichtspunkt</td>
<td>23.39 346.12 557.10 562.38 592.20 604.36 641.34 654.32 666.7</td>
<td>23.37 341.35 424.12 635.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standpunkt</td>
<td>419.23 420.4</td>
<td>71.32 343.7 419.28 543.4 543.7 543.8* 658.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absicht</td>
<td>13.5 25.5 530.28 647.22 649.27 649.28*</td>
<td>650.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denkart</td>
<td>20.31 22.3 23.17 25.35</td>
<td>19.16 20.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seite (betrachtet)</td>
<td>23.33 467.24</td>
<td>28.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beziehung</td>
<td>647.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grunde</td>
<td>150.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stellung</td>
<td></td>
<td>84.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paraphrased</td>
<td>419.12 527.9 639.11</td>
<td>229.16 542.33 640.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>= 28</td>
<td>= 17</td>
<td>= 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Implied grammatically in the German text.

Note: The numbers in this table and those that follow refer to the page and line numbers of each perspectival equivalent in Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's first Critique.
'changed' Denkart of the Copernican revolution, and twice as 'intellectual' when it is used to refer to an 'intellectual revolution'. (In the latter case it would have been more accurate for him to have used a phrase such as 'revolution in perspective' or 'perspectival revolution'. Hence we can include these two occurrences in our list of exact perspectival equivalents.) Three occurrences of Seite (in conjunction with betrachtet) and one occurrence each of Beziehung, Grunde, and Stellung are also translated in one of these two ways, though ordinarily translated differently. The remaining eight occurrences are paraphrased versions of texts which have no equivalent for the English expression in question. By supplying these extra words, Kemp Smith explicates what is implied by the context, viz. Kant's dependence on the principle of perspective.

With the possible exception of Denkart, there is no evidence of a consistent pattern in either Kant's or Kemp Smith's usage. But this terminological asymmetry is relatively insignificant here, since both the original and the translation use these words interchangeably in most of the 47 occurrences mentioned above. Both use these and other perspectival equivalents rather haphazardly to refer to a diversity of specific perspectives, as well as to perspectives, or perspectival distinctions, in general. Since a new translation of these equivalents requires simply substituting 'perspective' for 'point of view' or 'standpoint', it is unnecessary to specify any examples. In the remaining sections, however, examples will be used to help clarify equivalents which are more cryptic, though in many cases, more illuminating.

B. Categorial Equivalents

Several terms which would ordinarily be classed under one of Kant's 'dynamical' categories—i.e. under the category of relation or that of modality—are actually perspectival equivalents in certain contexts. The English reader naturally tends to assume that terms such as
'connection' and 'relation' are related in some way to the third category, and phrases such as 'mode of knowledge' and 'mode of thought' to the fourth. But in both cases Kemp Smith has obscured Kant's meaning by using the same English word to translate a number of German words which have different connotations. In this section, therefore, we shall uncover some of the most obscure, yet most profound, perspectival equivalents in Ktl.

Most of Kemp Smith's 190 uses of the word 'connection' are accurate translations of technical terms such as Verbindung (66), Verknüpfen (48), Verknüpfung (76), and Zusammenhang (59). But on a number of occasions, especially when using the phrases 'in connection with' (14) or 'in this connection' (7), he is actually paraphrasing the original text, which does not contain any of these technical terms. It is unfortunate here, as elsewhere, that he should use an otherwise technical term in nontechnical contexts, when he could just as easily have used some other paraphrastic expression. As is the case with other incidental phrases such as 'in respect of' or 'in view of' [see II.2.D], in most of these paraphrastic occurrences of 'connection' the term does not refer to any technical perspective. That is, although in many instances such phrases could be rendered 'from this perspective', to do so would be just as nontechnical a use of 'perspective' as is Kemp Smith's use of 'connection'. There are, however, at least ten occurrences of 'connection' in which the context suggests that Kant does intend to refer to some technical perspective. Of these, there are three instances of Absicht [Ktl:538,723,736], one of Ansehung [712], one of Betrachtung [662] and one of Rücksicht [806] (all of which are also mentioned in II.2.D below) which can be translated loosely as 'perspective'. There are also two instances in which 'perspective' can translate Beziehung [108,588] (a term discussed later in this subsection) and one in which Kemp Smith paraphrases the German [xixn]. The remaining occurrence, the only one which contains one of Kant's technical
II. The Principle of Perspective

words for 'connection', is worth mentioning as an example of how such phrases can be more accurately translated. In Kt1:491 Kemp Smith translates 'in Verbindung mit demselben' as 'in connection therewith'—a rendering which leaves the reader guessing as to what kind of 'connection' Kant has in mind. By contrast, translating this phrase paraphrastically as a perspectival equivalent clarifies Kant's meaning: 'As befits a transcendental philosophy, [the 'dry formulas' of reason] have been divested of all empirical features, although only from this [i.e. the empirical] perspective can their full splendour be displayed.'

The 'categorial' term Kemp Smith uses most frequently in contexts which, properly construed, deal with perspectives is 'relation' (447), a word which ordinarily refers straightforwardly to the category of relation or to its application in specific cases. Once again he translates several German terms with this one English term. Kant's use of Relation (18) always refers unambiguously to relation in the categorial sense (e.g. 'die Kategorien der Relation' [Kt1:288]). In such instances Kemp Smith's use of 'relation' is obviously correct. But an examination of Kant's use of the two terms most often translated as 'relation', viz. Verhältnis (194) and Beziehung (134), reveals an unfortunate equivocation in Kemp Smith's usage. The former is almost always used, like Relation [e.g. 486], in some categorial sense, usually as a reference to a relation between two or more items of the same or similar type. Kemp Smith's translation of Verhältnis as 'interrelations' on two occasions [318,341] is therefore quite appropriate. The latter, by contrast, almost always implies a more abstract, 'perspectival relation', such as that between 'the Understanding' and 'Objects in General' in Kt1:All5—a relation in which one side is clearly in control of, or establishes a perspective for viewing, the other side. Of course, exceptions can be found to this general rule [see e.g. 302]. Indeed, Beziehung and Verhältnis are occasionally used in such close conjunction that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
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between them. Nevertheless, the distinction is an important one, for I have found only two occurrences of **Verhältnis** which can be paraphrased with a perspectival equivalent, yet **Beziehung** can be so translated in 51 of its occurrences without obscuring—indeed, often clarifying—Kant's meaning (see Table II.2). Moreover, in most of the other passages in which Kemp Smith uses 'relation' for **Beziehung**, adding the adjective 'perspectival' would clarify Kant's meaning by distinguishing it from strict categorial interrelation. (Such passages are not included in Table II.2, however, since the reference to perspectives is only indirect.) A few sample translations will help clarify the important difference between **Beziehung** and **Verhältnis**.

**Beziehung** often occurs in phrases which 'bridge' one sentence or clause with another. Thus, in contexts such as Ktl:524, where Kant says 'Nur in anderweitiger **Beziehung**', Kemp Smith's translation ('Only in another sort of relation') leaves the reader wondering 'Relation? Relation of what to what?' But the translation, 'Only from another perspective', unambiguously conveys the perspectival emphasis of this passage. Or again, when Kant says 'einmal in anderweitiger, vielleicht praktischer **Beziehung**' [668], he is not intending to say anything whatsoever with respect to the category of relation; hence 'in some other, perhaps practical, perspective' brings out Kant's meaning far more clearly than Kemp Smith's paraphrase, 'in some other relation, perhaps on practical grounds'. Occasionally, when Kant specifies more clearly what is in relation to what, Kemp Smith's translation as '...in relation to...' is rather less ambiguous. But in most cases, and especially when two ways of considering a single object are being discussed, '...from the perspective of...' or '...the perspective of...on...' can do the same job without having to employ a categorial term nontechnically. Accordingly, Ktl:136 would be translated: 'The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition, from the perspective of sensibility, is... The supreme principle of the same
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possibility, from the perspective of understanding, is...

Although it cannot usually be paraphrased in terms of a perspectival equivalent, Verhältnis is quite frequently used by Kant in conjunction with some perspectival term, or even to explicate what the principle of perspective itself entails. The most significant example occurs in KtI:316-7, where Kant defines 'reflection' as 'the consciousness of the Verhältnisse of given representations to our different sources of knowledge'. He then goes on to explain that it is this relation that gives rise to, or determines, which perspective is under consideration at any given time: 'only by way of such consciousness [i.e. only by discerning the differences between our perspectives] can the relation of the sources of knowledge to one another [i.e. their role in a System of perspectives] be rightly determined.' Elsewhere he lists three types of Verhältnisse: '(1) the relation to the subject; (2) the relation to the manifold of the object in the appearance; (3) the relation to all things in general' [391]. These three types of 'relation of representations' define three of Kant's technical perspectives: the practical, the empirical, and the transcendental perspectives, respectively [see IV.3]. By contrast, the logical perspective is concerned with a 'mere comparison [blosse Comparation]' of representations which do not necessarily stand in any relation to each other [318] (cf. the speculative perspective, which is concerned with the consideration of an object 'in itself, and therefore apart from any perspective [Beziehung] of the outer senses' [A358-9]). These passages are typical of many others in which Kant uses 'Verhältnis' to describe the perspectival character of his System.

In addition to Relation, Verhältnis, and Beziehung, Kemp Smith translates several nontechnical words as 'relation', words which can sometimes be regarded as direct equivalents of 'perspective'. I have found two relevant occurrences of Absicht, one each of Beziehungsweise, relativ and Verknüpfung, and five in which Kemp Smith uses the word
II. The Principle of Perspective

paraphrastically (see Table II.2). The most common nontechnical word translated as 'relation' is Ansehung, which can be regarded as a perspectival equivalent in thirteen of its occurrences. As one would expect, the perspectival equivalents which are based on such nontechnical words are often used to refer to very specific perspectives which do not, as such, play a dominant role in Kant's System of Perspectives. A good example is when Kant says: 'The practical idea..., from the perspective [Ansehung] of our actual activities is indispensably necessary' [385]. The words 'actual activities' are not in this context intended to describe a technical perspective operating in Kant's System (though they may, in fact, be related to some such perspective). Taking these additional words into consideration brings the total number of equivalents of 'perspective' which Kemp Smith translates as 'relation' up to 76.

Moving now to the terms which seem at first to be associated with the category of modality, we find that most references to the 'mode of' something describe specific elements which arise within a given perspective. Thus Kant frequently describes time and space in terms of our 'mode of intuition [Art der Anschauung]' [e.g. Kt1:52] or of our 'mode of representation [Vorstellungsart]' [e.g. 54]. Such phrases could be roughly paraphrased as '...the elements characteristic of a(n)...perspective'; but, unlike the other translations suggested so far, to do so would not only stray too far from the original meaning of the words used, but would also involve replacing a relatively simple phrase with a rather cumbersome one. Therefore it will suffice in most cases merely to keep in mind that Kant's modal language often provides significant, though indirect, descriptions of his various perspectives. There are, however, several exceptions.

While there is admittedly no reason to paraphrase Kant's modal language when its literal meaning fits the context, a change is justified whenever it both flows more smoothly with the context and helps to
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convey Kant's meaning more accurately. I have found this to be the case only once each in regard to Kant's use of the terms Art (276) [Ktl:768] and Modis (13) [304]. Six other exceptions are paraphrased translations, where no direct equivalent of 'mode' is specified in the German: the phrases 'mode of reflecting upon' [375], 'in all its possible modes' [676], 'mode of employing reason' [740], 'mode in which reason handles' [743], 'mode of their presentation' [772], and 'mode of procedure' [884] can all be translated more accurately using 'perspective'. (Three similar occurrences of 'mode(s) of employment' [675,740,751] are included in II.2.C below.) All other perspectival equivalents in this category fall into two groups: 'mode of knowledge' and 'mode of thought'.

In a footnote on page 42 of his translation, Kemp Smith explains that he uses the phrase 'modes of knowledge' in translating the term Erkenntnisse because 'the term "knowledge" cannot be used in the plural'. His way of avoiding this difficulty is inadequate, however, for two reasons: first, such a translation risks equivocation, because Kant already has a technical word for 'mode' (Art); and second, it risks unintelligibility whenever the context deals with knowledge in general, rather than with its specific contents. To avoid these risks Erkenntnisse can be translated more accurately as 'items of knowledge' in the latter type of context, and as 'epistemological perspectives' in the former. Most contexts in which 'items of knowledge' occurs can then be regarded as conveying, at least indirectly, some perspectival nuance, since all such 'items' can be known only from some perspective. Unfortunately, the context is ambiguous in many of the 50 occurrences of Erkenntnisse and its derivatives [see e.g. Ktl:6]; nevertheless, in 30 of these it seems legitimate to use the paraphrased, perspectival translation (see Table II.2). Doing so produces helpful translations such as in Ktl:870: 'It is of utmost importance to isolate the various epistemological perspectives according as they differ in kind and in
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origin, and to secure that they be not confounded owing to the fact that usually, in our employment of them, they are combined.'

Several other expressions can be translated in a similar fashion. Kemp Smith translates 'eine Erkenntniss' as 'a mode of knowledge' [Ktl: 33] and as 'knowledge' [865], yet in both cases the context actually suggests something more like 'an epistemological perspective'. The same holds true for his use of 'mode of knowledge' as a translation for Erkenntnissart (9) on three occasions [25(twice),808], along with the passages in which he translates this term in various other ways (see Table II.2). The most important example of Erkenntnissart as a perspectival equivalent is in Ktl:25, where Kant defines 'transcendental' as 'knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with our epistemological perspective on objects in so far as this perspective is to be possible a priori.' In at least five instances Kemp Smith translates Verstandeserkenntnisse (20) and Vernunfterkenntnisse (26) in modal terms when their meaning is brought out more clearly by translating them as perspectival equivalents. At one point the latter is translated cumbersomely as 'modes of knowledge obtainable by reason' [109], whereas it could be more simply stated as 'reason's epistemological perspectives'. An equally good example with regard to the former is when Kant's 'alle möglichen Verstandeserkenntnisse (darunter die empirischen)' [676], rendered loosely by Kemp Smith as 'knowledge of the understanding in all its possible modes (including empirical knowledge)', is translated more literally as 'all the understanding's possible epistemological perspectives (including the empirical)'.

In the second group of modal expressions, the phrases 'mode of thought' and 'mode of thinking' translate the terms Denkungsart and Art zu denken, respectively, five times each. Nine of these ten uses can be translated as direct perspectival equivalents. In Ktl:704, for example, Kemp Smith's 'a distinction bearing on the procedure of thought' can be replaced simply by 'a perspectival distinction' as an accurate
Table II.2: Categorial Equivalents (164)

| CONNECTION (10) |  
|----------------|------------------|
| Absicht        | 451.21 565.25 573.28 |
| Ansehung       | 558.38 |
| Betrachtung    | 527.7 |
| Beziehung      | 115.16 480.29 |
| Rücksicht      | 618.25 |
| Verbindung     | 422.24 |
| paraphrased    | 23.33 |

| RELATION (76) |  
|---------------|------------------|
| Absicht       | 371.13 634.8 |
| Ansehung      | 226.4 307.4 319.32 320.24 337.2 340.2 350.23 376.28 389.22 427.6 458.35 566.27 634.9 |
| Beziehung     | 26.4 26.5 29.14 34.36 84.20 84.21* 109.39 116.12 143.10 150.7 150.9 155.25 155.28 186.15 193.32 215.8 |
|               | 223.10 228.23 242.35 252.36 253.30 258.10 264.32 267.13 267.15 274.17 306.11 317.19 317.23 317.26 339.25 340.5 340.6* 341.5 352.26 370.37 371.17 371.29 371.31 441.14 443.3 443.6 474.28 476.5 505.8 530.37 554.34 555.37 563.4 610.23 646.17 |
| Beziehungs-    | 275.8 |
| weise         |      |
| relativ       | 371.16 |
| Verhältnis    | 288.27 649.17 |
| Verknüpfung   | 386.18 |
| paraphrased   | 259.34 302.3 319.10 435.34 655.35 |

(continued)
Table II.2 (continued)

### MODE (8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art</th>
<th>594.18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modis</td>
<td>256.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paraphrased</td>
<td>313.19  536.12 576.18 578.24 597.13 668.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MODE OF KNOWLEDGE (47)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Erkenntniss</th>
<th>65.6 656.28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erkenntnissart</td>
<td>22.39 48.9 59.9 59.9* 194.11 267.9 277.32 277.37 619.25 661.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erkenntnisse</td>
<td>45.27 45.36 58.23 96.1 122.15 133.28 134.34 136.16 136.17 143.20 161.20 176.21 179.32 188.21 193.20 311.6 325.18 595.29 607.22 608.9 617.15 630.8 633.40 651.32 653.11 653.14 655.34 656.26 659.19 660.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verstandes-erkenntnisse</td>
<td>100.18 536.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vernunft-erkenntnisse</td>
<td>115.32 656.16 667.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MODE OF THOUGHT (and related phrases) (23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art zu denken</th>
<th>206.39 263.20 277.13 375.22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betrachtung</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denkungsart</td>
<td>23.11 33.14 244.28 282.26 424.15 475.8 475.12 540.17 540.25 547.27 553.35 599.31 599.37 605.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinnesart</td>
<td>457.5 475.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paraphrased</td>
<td>363.23 497.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Implied grammatically in the German text.*
translation of 'ein Unterschied der Denkungsart'. Elsewhere, Denkungsart is contrasted twice with Sinnesart:

[Reason's] empirical character (the sensible perspective [der Sinnesart]) is completely and necessarily determined in the intelligible character (the conceptual perspective [der Denkungsart]). ... [Appearances] yield an immediate knowledge only of the sensible perspective. The action, in so far as it can be ascribed to the conceptual perspective as its cause, does not follow therefrom in accordance with empirical laws... [579]

But Kemp Smith also translates Denkungsart once as 'manner of thinking' [493], 'procedure of thought' [704], and 'way of thought' [776], twice merely as 'thought' [xviii,776], and four times as 'way of thinking' [xxxvii,326,683,785]. In each of these passages, as well as the three other times Kemp Smith uses 'way of thinking' [53,A399,615], the relevant phrase can readily be taken as a perspectival equivalent. This group (including Sinnesart) therefore yields 23 further equivalents. When added to the number of relevant occurrences of 'connection' (10), 'relation' (76), 'mode' (8) and 'mode of knowledge' (47), discussed above, this brings the total number of categorial equivalents to 164.

C. Instrumental Equivalents

Another class of terms which can often be translated as perspectival equivalents is composed of words which ordinarily have an 'instrumental' function. Kemp Smith translates such expressions in terms of either the 'use' (165) or the 'employment' (349) to which a concept or object can be put, or which can be made of it by some 'faculty' of the subject. His translation is more accurate in regard to these terms than in any of the other cases considered in these subsections. For in all but an insignificant handful of their occurrences, Kemp Smith's 'use' or 'employment' translates Kant's 'Gebrauch' (427). Nevertheless a somewhat looser translation is oftentimes not only more readable, but also helps to highlight the perspectival implications of Kant's use of this term.

Of the 165 occurrences of 'use' in Kemp Smith's translation, 94
are verbs, either on their own (thus being irrelevant to our present concerns) or else in conjunction with a helping verb, such as 'make'. In the latter case 'make use [Gebrauch machen]', though not itself translatable in perspectival terms, is often used in close conjunction with an explicit description of some perspective. (A similar point could be made concerning the verb 'employ' (107).) For it is only from a given perspective that we can 'make use' of (or 'employ'), for example, the categories [Ktl:A402]. In such cases these words serve as a signpost, indicating that one or another of Kant's technical perspectives is being discussed. This clear hint is unfortunately obscured by Kemp Smith when he occasionally makes a loose translation of the original wording. Thus, for instance, his translation of '...von eben der Kategorie einen empirischen Gebrauch macht' [A402] as '...use the same category empirically' would be more accurate, and would point more directly to Kant's perspectival intentions, if it were changed to '...make an empirical use of the same category' (in which case 'an empirical use' refers rather more clearly to 'a use from the empirical perspective'). Inasmuch as the occurrences in which 'use' is not a verb all have the same sense as the word 'employment', they can be discussed together.

When the term Gebrauch is applied to a specific object (e.g. 'the employment of the concept...' [Ktl:179e.a.]), it usually serves again as a signpost to some particular perspective; that is, rather than being a directly translatable equivalent, it indirectly refers in about 50 cases to a perspective on something. This occurs most frequently when Kant contrasts 'the transcendental employment of a concept' with its 'empirical employment' [e.g. 298]; but references to the application of other perspectives, for instance by way of 'logical employment' [e.g. 390] or 'practical employment' [e.g. A365], are quite common as well. However, when the same term is applied to a 'faculty' of the subject, such as understanding (Verstand) or reason (Vernunft), its
'instrumental' sense is usually not intended to be stressed. That is, no specific 'use' of anything is really under consideration in such contexts, but only some general type of use, some 'perspective'. Thus, although there is a small number of exceptions, Kant's use of terms such as Verstandesgebrauch (36) ('employment [or 'use'] of understanding') and Vernunftgebrauch (31) ('employment [or 'use'] of reason') can usually be translated directly into perspectival terms. The former always refers to the field in which concepts are applied to other representations (e.g. to other concepts or intuitions), so it can be translated as 'conceptual perspective', or if the context permits, simply 'perspective'. Likewise the latter can be translated rather straightforwardly as 'rational perspective', a term which can be used to describe either the overall systematic context presupposed by any legitimate use of reason, or any of the narrower perspectives which operate within the former. An examination of the text along these lines reveals 21 occurrences of 'use' and 235 occurrences of 'employment' which can be regarded as direct perspectival equivalents.

Since Kant's perspectival use of Gebrauch not only provides us with the greatest number of equivalents, but is also by far the most consistent of the terms dealt with here in II.2, I shall conclude this subsection with four examples of how it might be translated. (1) Kemp Smith translates the clause 'eines anderen Vernunftgebrauchs eben desselben Begriffs' [Kt1:A404n] as 'of this same concept being put by reason to yet another use'. A more straightforward translation is 'of another rational perspective even for this same concept'. (2) Kemp Smith sometimes separates the parts of a compound, technical term, and in so doing, further obscures its perspectival implications. Thus 'dem gemeinsten Verstandesgebrauche' [4-5] becomes 'from the understanding in its quite ordinary employment', whereas it could be rendered more simply as 'from the commonest conceptual perspective'. (3) Much of the wordiness generally associated with Kant's style can be eliminated by
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*Including compound forms and forms implied grammatically in the German text.*
such perspectival translations. For example, 'ist dieser Begriff auch zum praktischen Gebrauche nöthig und hinreichend' [A365-6] flows more smoothly as 'even this concept is necessary and sufficient from the practical perspective' than as Kemp Smith's 'the concept is necessary for practical employment and is sufficient for such use'. (4) On three occasions, apparently recognizing the need for something more than just 'employment', Kemp Smith translates Gebrauch as 'mode(s) of employment'. But, instead of 'the understanding in its manifold and special modes of employment' [675], a better translation of 'dem manigfaltigen und besonderen Verstandesgebrauche' would be 'our manifold and particular conceptual perspectives'. In this and the other two contexts [cf. 740,751] the perspectival translation not only preserves Kant's wording more literally and avoids the awkward and ambiguous phrase 'mode of employment', but it brings to the fore Kant's reliance on the principle of perspective.

D. Incidental Equivalents

The full extent of Kant's employment of perspectival equivalents could be articulated only by preparing an entirely new (and when necessary, paraphrased) translation of the original text. This becomes especially obvious when we turn our attention to the many nontechnical and apparently insignificant words which can be regarded in certain contexts as perspectival equivalents. To prevent the task from becoming unmanageable, I have limited the scope of the present subsection to a brief sketch of some of these incidental, but sometimes contextually significant, words.

Two closely related groups of words are used so frequently and so variously by Kemp Smith as to render any accurate analysis of them a formidable, if not an impossible task. The first group consists of words describing the 'paths' (45) which the Critical System follows. Among its members are words such as 'aspect' (11), 'manner' (164),
'procedure' (79) and 'way' (201). Thus, for example, Kant frequently intends 'auf beiderlei Art' ('in either way' [Ktl:768]) to imply some perspectival difference evident in the preceding context; this phrase can then be translated as 'from either perspective'. Moreover, the 'path' analogy itself is often used in close conjunction with other perspectival equivalents [see e.g. 591]. A similar group of expressions makes use of words such as 'regard' (532), 'respect' (239), 'sense' (436), 'side' (62) and 'view' (230). When these words appear in phrases such as 'as regards' [e.g. 384], 'in respect of' [e.g. 844], 'in a twofold sense' [e.g. xxvii] or 'in view of' [e.g. 503], they can usually be regarded as perspectival equivalents. Since examples of such phrases were cited above in II.2.B (viz. phrases such as 'in this connection' and 'in some other relation'), and since the perspectival translation of such terms is usually obvious, no further examples need to be given at this point. It will suffice instead to make the obvious point that if Kant had been fully aware of his dependence on the principle of perspective, he could have avoided much of his unnecessarily repetitive wording. (For example, '(in aller Absicht) in aller Beziehung' could have been expressed simply as 'from every perspective', rather than as '...in every relation (in all respects)...' [381].)

One of the main problems which would deter any further examination of these incidental terms is the lack of symmetry between Kant's own usage and that of Kemp Smith's translation. Terms such as Absicht, Ansehung, Betrachtung, Beziehung, and Rücksicht, all of which have cropped up in previous subsections, are translated in a great variety of overlapping ways. No correspondence between context and translation is consistently followed, least of all in those instances in which such terms can be regarded as perspectival equivalents. If a new translation were to be made, consistency with respect to these and similar words and due attention to context would reveal, no doubt, several hundred additional cases in which perspectival terminology can be used to
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clarify Kant's meaning. Of course, the translation which highlights the perspectival implications of a passage would not always be the best translation when other factors are taken into consideration. (The actual practice in each case would depend on the extent to which the translator is willing to depart from a strict rendering of what Kant actually wrote in order to bring out Kant's meaning.) Nevertheless, the potential for finding numerous other perspectival equivalents of this 'incidental' variety insures that the total number of possible equivalents in Kant's first *Critique* is well above the total established in the previous three sections (467). Thus we can take this number, which might otherwise be regarded as reflecting too much freedom in translation at certain points, as a conservative estimate--especially if the various indirect equivalents which have been cited from time to time are also taken into consideration.

The importance of Kant's use of perspectival terminology can be highlighted by comparing the number of instances in which the text of the first *Critique* can be read in this way (perhaps five or six hundred) with the number of occurrences of the terms describing the four main perspectives--the transcendental (636), the empirical (720), the logical (153) and the practical (123)--or of other obviously technical terms (and their derivatives), such as 'space' (460), 'time' (710) and 'category' (273). Moreover, an exhaustive consideration of Kant's other Critical works would reveal his dependence on the principle of perspective to be even greater.

3. The Levels of Perspectives in Kant's System

Although the detailed study of Kant's usage given in II.2 provides ample proof that the principle of perspective can be extracted as an idea implicit within Kant's text, it does not prove that Kant himself was aware of the extent to which he depended upon it. On the contrary, the fact that he failed to give any technical explanation of it probab-
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ly indicates that he was not purposefully following a well-formulated principle. Nevertheless, by using the concept of a 'perspective' as a technical umbrella-term to cover the relevant occurrences of these various (otherwise non-technical) words and phrases, we will be able to clarify how Kant's Critical 'touchstone' actually works itself out in the unfolding of his System—a crucial point which is easy to miss if we have to depend only on the rather muddled literal translations of Kant's usage. Describing the various levels at which perspectives operate in Kant's System will demonstrate the thoroughgoing extent to which it can be regarded as a 'System of Perspectives'.

By far the most common purpose for which Kant employs his perspectival terminology is to define the rules and other important characteristics of the four mutually exclusive (but complementary) 'reflective perspectives' (i.e. methods of philosophical inquiry), which he treats as fundamental. The validity of each of these perspectives can be judged by examining its presuppositions, the rules according to which it operates, and its general implications for related perspectives. The presuppositions and defining rules of these four main perspectives will be specified in IV.3; and their 'larger implications' for the Critical System will become apparent gradually throughout Part Three. For the moment it will suffice merely to provide a brief preliminary sketch of how they fit into the various systematic levels of perspectives which can be gleaned from Kant's Critical works.

The first level is that on which the four 'fundamental' perspectives mentioned above arise. Within the context of each of his three Critical systems four terms are repeatedly used in connection with various perspectival equivalents: viz. 'transcendental', 'empirical', 'logical' and 'practical'. The importance of understanding the special meaning Kant gives to each of these terms would be difficult to over-stress, for they define the four perspectives which divide each of the Critical systems into orderly subsystems. To attempt a summary at this
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point of how each of these defines a distinct type of philosophical inquiry would be futile, since each is inextricably bound up with all the others (none being itself sufficient to describe an entire system) and with several other technical terms of Kant's which have not yet been defined. Their full description will come in Chapter IV.

The second level on which the principle of perspective operates is that of each of the three systems (i.e. the three Critiques) which compose the Critical System. Just as each of Kant's systems is formed around a set of four perspectives, which define the rules and limitations for answering its various questions, so also the entire Critical System is formed around a set of three 'systems of perspectives', each of which is based on a general perspective which determines the special character of the four subordinate perspectives for that particular system. In a sense, each of these four subordinate perspectives is the same in all of its three manifestations, since its character is primarily determined by the subject's input; they appear in different forms, however, because the character of the 'metaperspective' which guides each system is primarily determined by the object's input (hence it prescribes the subject-matter or 'domain of investigation' for a given system [see R10:127]). For example, Kant insists in the Preface to the second Critique that 'the concepts and principles' discussed in the first Critique will have to be reexamined because they 'are now seen in transition to an altogether different perspective from that used in the first Critique' [Kt4:7]. This, of course, refers to the fact that pure reason is applied to 'theoretical' matters in Kt1 and to 'practical' or 'moral' matters in Kt4—a change in perspective which, as we shall see, is more radical than any of the changes within each system.

In order to distinguish between this type of systematic perspective and those which operate within each system, I will refer to each as a 'standpoint'; for a general perspective of this sort is, as it were, the point at which one stands to view the 'horizon' of perspec-
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tives in a given system. Whenever the context suggests that a perspec-
tival equivalent is referring to one of Kant's general perspectives, it
will therefore be translated as 'standpoint' rather than 'perspective'.
And in order to facilitate concise and unambiguous reference to each of
the three systems which are defined by these standpoints, I shall adopt
the following notation. The system of perspectives in Kt1, which as-
sumes 'the theoretical standpoint' [Kt4:14], will be called 'system_t',
whereas that in Kt4, which assumes 'the practical standpoint' [15],
will be called 'system_p'. Kt7 systematizes different sorts of 'judg-
ment' from an 'empirical standpoint', as we shall see in IX.1; hence
its system will be called 'system_e'. (Any reference to the concept of
'system' in general will be written without these subscripts.)

The 'highest', or most general level on which Kant employs per-
spectival terms was utilized at the beginning of this chapter, where I
quoted his claims to have established 'a new perspective' from which
all philosophical inquiry can proceed. This over-arching 'Critical
Perspective'--viz. the assumption that the subject imposes certain a
priori forms on the object--defines the systematic context into which
all three Critical systems fit. Because of its general character,
Kant's discussion of this Perspective is confined primarily to the
'Preface', 'Introduction' and 'Doctrine of Method' sections of his
Critical works. Our interpretation of his System, however, will be
concerned primarily with the theories developed in the 'Doctrine of
Elements' sections, so this general level will rarely come up in our
subsequent discussion. When it does, it will be distinguished from the
first level by capitalizing the initial 'p'.

The perspectival levels which operate in Kant's Critical System
can be adequately summarized by depicting their relationships in the
form of a diagram. Figure II.1 shows how each of the systems in the
Critical System is ideally composed of the interaction between some set
of four subordinate perspectives, each of which in turn gives rise to
the 'elements' of the system. The primary task of my perspectival interpretation of Kant will be to determine the extent to which this structural schema describes the System Kant actually describes in his three Critiques.

An examination of the formal structure of all three systems [see e.g. Pld§§3-4] would assume a logical standpoint, and so give rise to a logical system of perspectives (system\(_1\)), which is not actually part of the Critical System as such. Nevertheless, it may be helpful at this point to clarify one possible misunderstanding with regard to the logical coherence of a System of Perspectives and its various levels. Logicians ordinarily assume that a 'system' cannot contain two elements which are contradictory, since this would destroy its coherence: 'A and not-\(B\) may both be constituents in [system] \(S\), and there may be another system that contains both \(A\) and \(B\); however, 'no system can contain both \(B\) and not-\(B\)' [S22:199]. At first sight, the principle of perspective might seem to break this fundamental logical rule, since it permits Kant to construct a system which can include both '\(B\)' and

Figure II.1: The Perspectival Structure of Kant's Critical System

The Critical Perspective (The System)

- The theoretical standpoint (system\(_t\))
- The practical standpoint (system\(_p\))
- The empirical standpoint (system\(_e\))

The transcendental perspective

THe Elements of the System
'not-B'. But it does not. On the contrary, once the levels of perspectives in Kant's System are explicated, it is easy to see how contradictory elements can coexist by virtue of their membership in different systems or subsystems within the overall System. The logical law of contradiction is not broken, so long as one recognizes and respects the boundaries of each perspective and the level to which it belongs. For the only elements in the one Critical System which could destroy its coherence by contradicting each other would be the theoretical, practical and empirical standpoints as such. Likewise, the only elements in each of these three systems are their four perspectival subsystems. The elements within a subsystem must be thoroughly and consistently interrelated; but this does not prevent one such element from appearing to contradict an element which belongs in another subsystem, when their perspectival context is neglected. (To disagree would be like claiming that a man and his dog cannot both be animals, since one is four-legged and the other is not.)

A final level on which 'perspective' can be taken (which could be called 'level 0') should also be mentioned briefly, since the word is sometimes used in this sense in ordinary language. The term 'perspective' can refer to the 'world view' adopted by specific individuals in assimilating their diverse experiences [see e.g. H25:16,20,32,42-4 and H26:68,147]. Inasmuch as each person's experience is unique, anyone who formulates a 'perspective' for coping with his experiences will do so in a slightly different way--though there are bound to be broad similarities between the individuals forming any given community. A situation in which there are as many different perspectives as there are different people adopting perspectives is not likely to be of much interest to philosophers, who tend to be concerned with establishing general conclusions about the way things are. Hence it is not surprising to find that Kant's perspectival equivalents are hardly ever to be taken in this way. In fact, when they are, they are generally
intended to make points such as that 'philosophy has no business any more' when it comes to dealing with perspectives which 'must be taken from experience alone' [Kt18:369(117)].

Distinguishing between the various types of perspectives in Kant's System provides us with important insights not only into the architectonic structure according to which he built his System, but also into the meaning of numerous otherwise cryptic remarks. For instance, we now have the interpretive tools necessary to understand the comment concerning systemp in Kt4:8, where Kant expresses his hope that he has sufficiently explained 'the right standpoint from which the whole can be rightly sketched.' Likewise, when he warns all 'independent thinkers' of the dangers of adopting 'at one and the same time...two employments which differ widely in the treatment they require' [Kt5:388], we can now substitute the rather ambiguous 'employments' with the technical term 'perspectives', thus clarifying the thoroughly Critical nature of such a warning. For in the Critical System, 'no principle can safely be taken from one perspective, without [taking it] at the same time from the overall perspective [i.e. the standpoint] it is examined to have from the entire pure rational Perspective' ('kein Prinzip mit Sicherheit in einer Beziehung genommen werden kann, ohne es zugleich in der durchgangigen Beziehung zum ganzen reinen Vernunftgebrauch untersucht zu haben') [Kt1:xxiii]. Even though each system of perspectives establishes 'a different order of things' [see e.g. Kt5:457]--that is, a different way of interpreting the nature of one and the same set of things--the unity of the System is preserved by the fact that 'there can be but one and the same reason which must be differentiated only in application' [391].

Kant frequently reminds his reader that any purported philosophy which ignores the principle of perspective by (for example) mixing 'pure principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name, for what distinguishes philosophy from common rational knowledge is its
II. The Principle of Perspective

treatment in separate sciences of what is confusedly comprehended in such [common] knowledge' [Kt5:390]. For the philosopher, therefore, the Critical Perspective, which gives rise to the principle of perspective, does not have equally valid alternatives in the same way that lower-level perspectives do. Kant's System is exclusive in the sense that it entails the assumption that any non-perspectival philosophical system will inevitably fall into the same sort of errors which plague 'common rational knowledge'. The most common philosophical fallacy to result from a careless mixing of perspectives is that which involves 'a confounding of an object of pure understanding with appearance'; Kant calls this 'a transcendental amphiboly' [Kt1:326]. Whenever a philosopher ignores Kant's Critical Perspective (i.e. his Copernican turn) by placing the objective world on a pedestal and suppressing the role of the subject, thus implicitly disregarding the principle of perspective as well, such fallacies almost always ensue. When interpreting Kant, such neglect is always disastrous: his theories inevitably end up being judged to be filled with contradictions and ambiguities, whereas a perspectival interpretation of the same theories often renders them consistent and meaningful. Without the principle of perspective, therefore, reason itself becomes the source of illusion; yet with this principle, it is 'the ultimate touchstone of truth' [Kt20:146].
Chapter III

The Architectonic Form of Kant's Copernican System

1. The Copernican Turn

Kant rather boldly compares the contribution made to philosophy by his Critical System with that which Copernicus made to astronomy. Just as Copernicus explained 'the movements of heavenly bodies' (i.e. of the planets, stars, and sun) by denying 'that they all revolved round the spectator' (i.e. the earth), as they indeed appear to do, and suggesting instead that the earth and other planets revolve around the sun while the stars remain at rest, so also Kant attempts to explain our knowledge of objects in general by denying 'that all our knowledge must conform to objects', as it indeed appears to do, and suggesting instead 'that objects must conform to our knowledge' [Kt1:xvi; cf. Kt65:83]. This 'change in perspective' [Kt1:xxii], which is the 'touchstone' of Kant's entire Critical System [see II.1], reveals that 'we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them' [xviii]. The philosopher's primary attention, therefore, is directed away from the objects of knowledge and is focused instead on the subject (i.e. on man) and his own mental activities.

On this point, at least, there is widespread agreement among interpreters. Kant's Copernican revolution has been said to consist (for example) in the claims that:

- human knowledge can only be understood if we hypothesize the activities of the knower [C3:237];
- the epistemological conditions for knowing natural entities are at the same time the ontological conditions for their existence as such [i.e. empirically] [Y1:977];
- the universality and necessity of synthetic a priori propositions as established by...critical argumentation are...specifically relativized to the workings of the human intellect [R4:318; cf. 321];
or the objects of human knowledge can only be *legitimately* described...if they are 'considered' in relation to the human mind and its conceptual scheme. [A8:52]

Unfortunately, the agreement among Kant-scholars on general matters such as this does not carry over into matters of detailed interpretation or critical evaluation. Indeed, inasmuch as Kant never provides a thorough and consistent explanation of the logical relationships between the many subjective elements in his System--such as those in Ktl concerning knowledge, which he discusses in the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements'--there will probably never be widespread agreement concerning their intended meanings and relative importance. But in spite of the negative answer which two centuries of interpretive scholarship have given to the question of the unity of Kant's System, it seems incongruous to regard Kant as a 'megaphilosopher' and yet to confess that he failed in so basic a task. I shall therefore attempt in this chapter to provide an outline of the formal structure of his System which will reveal its architectonic unity. My underlying goal will be to set the stage for an analysis of the content, and thus of the detailed arguments, of the Critical System itself [see Part Three]--one which could facilitate widespread agreement among interpreters.

2. Kant's Logic and the Structure of His Three Critiques

Kant has often been accused, even in his own lifetime, of filling his philosophy with prefabricated divisions simply in order to support his architectonic plan. What such critics fail to understand is that this prefabrication is intimately bound up with the Copernican revolution in philosophy: rather than attempting to discover distinctions which exist independently of the subject, the philosopher's task is to convert the mass of unorganized knowledge into an ordered System by examining the structure which is *imposed* on the world of experience by the subject. Or, as Kant himself puts it, such divisions, which are evident in other disciplines as well, such as in the natural scien-
tist's reduction of matter to the four elements of 'earth,...water,...
air,...and salt', are the result of 'the influence of reason on the
classifications we make' [Kt1:674]. Instead of pursuing the relation­ships between such classifications in order to discover an overall pattern (an architectonic unity), critics who ignore this point assume (as it were, a priori) that the precise number and order of these divisions is insignificant. (It is not surprising how often they complain in the next breath about Kant's lack of systematic unity!) The only way to correct this interpretive error is to establish pre­cisely what relationship holds, according to Kant, between the patterns suggested by reason's architectonic structure and the organization of his Critical System. Once this is done, a more detailed analysis of the types of patterns which reason 'prefabricates' for the human subject will provide the interpreter with an accurate model for interpreting Kant's System. But first it will be helpful to examine Kant's conception of logic in general and of the functions it can fulfil.

Although Kant himself did not write anything like a 'critique' of logic, he did lecture regularly on the subject--indeed 'often twice a year...from 1755 to 1796' [H4:xvi; cf. J3:5]--so his logical methodolo­gy was repeatedly in the foreground of his thought. Moreover, before his death he did supervise one of his followers, Jäsche, in editing his lecture notes for publication [Kt10]. In his Preface Jäsche explains why Kant did not choose to set out his logical theory on his own:

His task of scientific foundation of the entire system of philo­sophy--the philosophy of what is realiter true and certain--that incomparably more important and more difficult task, which only he alone could carry out in his originality, did not permit him to think of working out a logic by his own hand. He could, however, very well leave this work to others who with insight and unbiased judgment could use his architectonic ideas for a truly well adapted and well ordered treatment of that science. [J3:7]

Jäsche's edition of Kant's Logic is indeed generally regarded as an authentic representation of Kant's own position.

The most important distinction in discussing Kant's logic is be-
between formal or 'general' logic and material or 'transcendental' logic [see Kt22:193-4; R10:1-25]. England describes this distinction with admirable clarity in E3:98: "General logic" is concerned with forms of connection between concepts abstracted from experience, while transcendental logic is concerned with the source of their relation in the realm of fact." This distinction, then, is rooted in the distinction between the 'real use' and the 'logical use' of the understanding which Kant was always careful to make, even in his pre-Critical works [see e.g. Kt19:393]. The question posed by general logic is: 'since the understanding is the source of rules, according to what rules does it proceed itself?' [Kt10:12(13-4)]. In order to answer this question, pure general logic 'abstracts from all content of the knowledge of understanding...and deals with nothing but the mere form of thought'; consequently, it 'has nothing to do with empirical principles', such as those given in psychology [Kt1:78; s.a. Kt10:12(14-5),45(50)]. For it 'teaches us nothing whatsoever regarding the content of knowledge, but lays down only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding' [Kt1:86; s.a. Kt10:15(17)]. Since 'it has reason for its subject matter' [14(16)], it pays no attention to 'how representations arise' [33(38)]. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, derives its structure directly from general logic [R10:4]; thus it uses the abstract forms of general logic, but always refers them back to some general content. By doing so, it can establish knowledge—the transcendental knowledge which can be gained by adopting the Critical Perspective—whereas general logic on its own 'is not confined to any particular kind of knowledge made possible by the understanding' [Kt1:736]. 'Formal logic shows how to clarify concepts, transcendental logic how to construct objects' [H4:xix; cf. Kt10:63(65)].

General logic, therefore, is not regarded by Kant as a Critical system, for it 'is more than mere criticism' [Kt10:15(18)]. On the contrary, it is 'a separate, self-contained science grounded in itself'
III. Kant's Architectonic System

[J3:8; s.a. S22:474,496], 'a science of the necessary laws of thinking' [Kt10:13(15)]; indeed, it is 'the vestibule of the sciences' [Kt1:ix]. Rather than fulfilling a material function in Kant's System, as does transcendental logic, general logic serves as the systematic, architectonic form of the whole [cf. H4:xxii]. 'In this duality [between formal and transcendental logic] primacy, i.e. the status of being the point of departure, is given to the sphere of Formal Logic.... The two Logics are thus two aspects [viz. formal and material] of the same function [viz. thinking about judgment]' [R10:7; cf. H4:xvii]. Just as natural science is orderly because it is grounded in the principles established by transcendental logic [see VII.3], even though the latter is not actually a part of the former, so also is the Critical System grounded in and ordered by the separate system of general logic [cf. Kt10:13(15)]. Given this understanding of general logic, we can henceforth refer to it as 'system\textsubscript{1}', provided that in so doing it is regarded not as equal to, but as standing over and above, the three systems which constitute the material of Kant's Critical System.

Kant's first two Critiques both include a Doctrine of Elements (Elementarlehre) and a Doctrine of Method (Methodenlehre). Apparently the latter serves a formal role in relation to the former: it is appended in order to clarify the form according to which the content (the 'elements') of the system is patterned. Thus, after introducing this distinction in Kt1:29, Kant adds: 'Each of these chief divisions will have its subdivisions, but the grounds of these we are not yet in a position to explain.' This leads the reader to expect such an explanation in the Doctrine of Method. Yet in both cases Kant disappoints us, giving instead an apparently haphazard treatment either of definitions of basic Critical concepts and explanations of their interrelationships, or of various metaphysical implications of his Critical principles. What is still missing, then, is an account of why he prefers certain ways of dividing and ordering both his general exposition and
his analysis of the particular topics with which he deals. In order to get some idea of just what sorts of divisions he preferred, we can begin by making a brief, a posteriori analysis of the Tables of Contents in each of his three Critiques. The logical basis of his preferences, however, can be determined only by comparing them with an a priori analysis of the actual architectonic structure of thought [see III.3].

Of the twenty-seven total divisions in Kt1 [see Table III.1], we find that one is ninefold and two are sevenfold. 59% of all the divisions are either twofold (ten in all) or fourfold (six in all), and 30% are threefold (eight in all). The general structure of both Kt4 and Kt7 is, by contrast, much simpler [see Tables III.2,3]. Together they contain just thirteen divisions, two of which are ninefold, one fourfold, one threefold, and the remaining nine, twofold. Two points can be made with respect to these figures: (1) Kant's obvious preference, as indicated in Table III.4, for the divisions of two (47.5%), three (22.5%), and four (17.5%) may reflect a priority for such divisions in his conception of the very architectonic structure of reason; and (2) if so, he did not devote enough attention in his exposition to consistently revealing how these divisions determine reason's architectonic structure—that is, not enough for it to be as readily useful to the reader as it (apparently) was to him.

Our analysis of the Table of Contents in each of Kant's three Critiques reflects only a sampling of his preferred divisions. Nevertheless, it does provide a clue as to the type of divisions which prove to be most important within the text itself—with one exception. Anyone undertaking even a cursory study of Kant's philosophy is likely to be astounded by his insistence on the uniqueness and completeness of his table of twelve categories, from which he derives several other twelvefold tables throughout his Critical works. A twelvefold division never occurs in the Table of Contents of any of the Critiques; however, this number is explicitly used by Kant as a composite of other, more basic
Table III.1: Analysis of the Table of Contents to Ktl (Second Edition)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions:</th>
<th>I. Doctrine of Elements</th>
<th>II. Doctrine of Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of divisions: 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts of P.R.</th>
<th>Inferences of P.R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§1 §2 §3</td>
<td>§1 §2 §3 §4 §5 §6 §7 §8 §9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency: 2's 3's 4's 7's 9's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2's</th>
<th>3's</th>
<th>4's</th>
<th>7's</th>
<th>9's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In this and the following two tables, subdivisions are included only for sections which are given numbers or letters in the Table of Contents provided in the K2 edition; all divisions using § are ignored.*
III. Kant's Architectonic System

Table III.2: Analysis of the Table of Contents to Kt4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions:</th>
<th>I. Doctrine of Elements</th>
<th>II. Doctrine of Method</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analytic</td>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>Chapter II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialectic</td>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of divisions: 6

Frequency: 2's 3's 9's

4 1 1

Table III.3: Analysis of the Table of Contents to Kt7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions:</th>
<th>Introduction: I - IX</th>
<th>Aesthetic Judgment</th>
<th>Teleological Judgment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analytic</td>
<td>Beautiful</td>
<td>Sublime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialectic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of divisions: 7

Frequency: 2's 4's 9's

5 1 1

Table III.4: Total Frequencies of Critical Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>2's</th>
<th>3's</th>
<th>4's</th>
<th>7's</th>
<th>9's</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Kt1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Kt4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Kt7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
divisions which do occur (viz. two, three and four). In light of the great importance he attaches to his twelvefold divisions, we may find that, by examining the relationship between his use of twelvefold divisions and his use of divisions of two, three and four, our understanding of the formal structure of his architectonic can be greatly increased. For the architectonic simply is the organization of divisions into patterns of interrelated wholes—and eventually, into an interrelated System.

3. Formal Logic as Kant's Pattern for Transcendental Logic

Ideally at this point in my interpretation I would describe the actual structure of an architectonic system as Kant saw it. In P1d:275-82 I have already made a first attempt at such a description by pointing out how the essentially twofold nature of analytic operations and threefold nature of synthetic operations (as Kant himself proposes in Kt7:197n) can be combined to produce a twelvefold pattern (2x2x3=12). And in Plj I have examined in great detail, quite apart from the context of Kant's philosophy, the extent to which a small group of abstract mathematical symbols, such as +, - and x, can be used to describe the formal relations which exist between real (as opposed to logical) objects—a distinction Kant himself makes with respect to these symbols in several places [e.g. Kt1:488; Kt6:385; Kt8:(22-3); s.e. Kt16:172-4]. Unfortunately, the excessive length of this study renders it impracticable to defend the use of these symbols adequately in the space available in this thesis (but see Plj:6.4, where I apply this apparatus to the interpretation of system presented below in Chapter VII.) Nevertheless, it will suffice merely to point out that one of the systematic patterns which these symbols can be used to describe is that which applies to any system of real objects which can be analysed into four groups, each of which can be constructed by means of a synthesis of three elements. Of course, this is precisely the
III. Kant's Architectonic System

The formal pattern which combines a fourfold with a threefold operation to produce a system of twelve interrelated elements can be used to describe the architectonic structure of the elements in Kant's System in three ways: (1) in order to explain the structure of one particular element in one of his Critical systems (e.g. the twelve categories); (2) in order to explain how all the elements work together to compose a complete (twelvefold) system; or (3) in order to discern the relationship between the works which constitute Kant's overall System of Perspectives [see Pld:82-8]. The first of these is too specific to be treated in a general interpretation such as this. In Part Three I shall touch upon the second by examining the extent to which each of his systems can be interpreted as having the potential to correspond to such a twelvefold pattern. I will not, however, specify the values of the formal interrelations between the elements. The explanatory power of explicating these formal values should not be underestimated, for they would provide an apparatus for determining the structural soundness (or lack thereof) exhibited by each of Kant's systems. Yet it would require rather more space than is available, and would in any case be unwise without a much more detailed analysis in this chapter. The question of the actual extent to which the content of his systems conforms to the rigorous pattern prescribed by architectonic logic will have to be put aside for treatment elsewhere.

The third application for the architectonic—viz. to the overall organization of Kant's System—can be treated briefly at this point without going into the details of the logical relations involved. The twelvefold pattern which was hinted at in Figure II.1 (three standpoints x four perspectives), is one in which three groups, each containing four elements, are related to each other. Figure III.1 (which is the basis on which I chose to number Kt1-Kt10 in the order given in the Bibliography) depicts the synthetic relationship of the three main
III. Kant's Architectonic System

Figure III.1:
An Analysis of the Relationships Between Kant’s Major Systematic Works

(a) Theoretical Works:

Kt3

Empirical Knowledge

Kt1

Kt2

(c) Empirical Works:

(Kt9?)

Kt10

Purposive Experience

Kt7

Kt8

(b) Practical Works:

Kt6

Moral Activity

Kt4

Kt5

systems, according to which system_e is the synthesis of system_t and system_p, by arranging three crosses (each with four endpoints) at the vertices of a triangle. (Apart from their synthetic unification in system_e, as we shall see, system_p has primacy over system_t.) Kant's Critical System constitutes just one aspect (the transcendental aspect) of his overall System of Perspectives; this is represented by placing each Critique in the same position on its respective cross. Each Critique is depicted (by an arrow) as arising out of some element in the empirical aspect of the System, such as empirical knowledge, moral activity, or purposive (i.e. aesthetic, teleological, religious, etc.) experience. And each is supplemented by a work in which the synthetic
approach to the system is rendered analytic (viz. Kt2, Kt5 and Kt8 [see Ch. XI]), thus suggesting that these works constitute the logical aspect of the System. Each of these analytic treatises is written as a preparation for a treatise in metaphysics proper (viz. Kt3, Kt6 and Kt9 [see Ch. XII]); the latter constitute the practical aspect of the System, thus completing the circuit of explanation. The structural form of such patterns of explanation is determined by system1, as elaborated in Kt10. All of Kant's secondary works [Kt11-Kt66] fit into one or another of the classes specified in this formal description of his System of Perspectives. The validity of this way of organizing Kant's works, and of his Copernican Perspective in general, is examined in greater detail in Pld.§4, and the correspondence between the four perspectives and the endpoints of each cross is elaborated in Plf.§4. But the ultimate test of this scheme is its compatibility with the detailed textual content contained in Kant's works. Carrying out such a test, particularly with reference to his Critical works, will be our main task in Part Three. But first we shall examine in Part Two the epistemological underpinnings of the Critical 'wing' (viz. Kt1, Kt4 and Kt7) of Kant's System of Perspectives.
1. The Fundamental Distinction

Kant's Critical philosophy is notorious for its terminological ambiguity and apparent inconsistency. The interpretive confusion that often results is at least a contributing factor to the conclusion of many commentators, such as Strawson, that large chunks of Kant's System (e.g. his 'transcendental idealism') are 'unintelligible' and 'incoherent' [S25:38-42]. Yet I believe, with Kant [Ktl:Axxi], that if his works are approached with 'the patience and impartiality of a judge' (and perhaps even with 'the benevolent assistance of a fellow-worker'), rather than with a set of analytical tools with which to dissect his every sentence, then almost all of his theories can be understood in surprisingly simple and consistent terms. Accordingly, I shall make an initial step in this chapter towards the substantiation of this supposition by interpreting and interrelating some of the fundamental distinctions which serve to structure all three Critiques.

The root distinction, underlying directly or indirectly all others in Kant's Critical philosophy is that between 'knowledge' (Erkenntnis) and 'experience' (Erfahrung). Yet unfortunately, in spite of (or perhaps, because of) its ubiquity in Kant's writings, it tends to remain an obscure and uncriticized presupposition for both Kant and his many interpreters and critics. The main reason for this neglect seems to be that he invokes a variety of distinctions which define knowledge and experience more precisely, with the result that the more common terms naturally appear to be less technical and in no need of special treatment. The purpose of this chapter will be to explicate the knowledge-
experience distinction which is implicit in Kant's System by integrating it with the most important of these more obviously technical distinctions: firstly with his pure-empirical and subject-object distinctions, secondly with his a priori-a posteriori and analytic-synthetic distinctions, and thirdly with his distinctions between the empirical, transcendental, logical, and practical perspectives.

The wide range of connotations which the terms 'knowledge' and 'experience' have in ordinary language might induce an interpreter to regard any secondary distinctions with suspicion. One might insist that they must inevitably share the indistinct nature of the primary distinction from which they are derived, notwithstanding any intelligibility they seem to have on their own. Such a proposal, however, is unsound; for, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, Kant's own explanations of his terms can be interpreted in a relatively clear and plausible fashion. Moreover, even though he does not say much about knowledge and experience as such, he does say enough to supply us with a sufficiently coherent starting point.

In ordinary use, 'experience' can refer generally to a subject's concrete, immediate (i.e. uninterpreted) encounter with an object. This 'immediate experience' provides the raw material upon which more abstract functions such as 'determinant judgment' and 'reflective judgment' operate [see e.g. Kt7:385-6], for in such experience the subject has neither determined the given object to be an object of knowledge nor reflected upon its epistemological status. Walsh distinguishes in W6:221-2 between such 'immediate' experience and the more 'developed' sense of experience, noting that this distinction is reflected in Kant by the difference between Empfindung (feeling, sensation) and Wahrnehmung (perception). Kant himself never to my knowledge uses the phrase 'immediate experience'; but he seems to imply something of this sort by his use of 'experience' in many pre-Critical passages, as when he says that the 'reason of knowing' something (the 'ratio quod') is always
given in 'experience' [Ktll:392(220)] or that in metaphysics 'concepts derived from experience...must always be the foundation of all our judgments' [Ktl8:367-8(113)]. Likewise, Kant's use of 'possible experience' in Ktl denotes 'not only the totality of the objects of experience but also Erfarhen itself as spiritual act' [V4:96; see VII.2]. But the best example of this usage is when he begins the Introduction to Ktl with the proclamation: 'There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience' [1]. Several sentences later he adds that, although 'all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.' That is, all knowledge must be related to someone's immediate experience in order for it to qualify as actual knowledge [cf. 629]; yet this does not preclude the possibility that certain aspects of our knowledge might be derived from some other source. Thus, as we shall see, Kant uses the word 'experience' in this ordinary, indeterminate and nonreflective sense throughout his Critical works.

But in explaining how some knowledge is grounded in a source other than immediate experience, Kant develops another, less typical, meaning for 'experience'. He describes this more determinate type of experience as a concrete 'synthesis of perceptions' [Ktl:792,161] in which various 'objects of possible experience' [73] are made actual objects of knowledge through the cooperation of the subject's two main powers of cognitive judgment: intuitive sensibility (which produces sensation) and conceptual understanding (which produces thought) [74]. This process, known also as determinant judgment, implies a differentiation between two kinds of knowledge: the validity of 'empirical' knowledge is determinable only by appealing at some point to sensible experience [2-3; cf. 34], while that of 'pure' knowledge is determinable without reference to sensibility, to the extent that 'there is nothing that belongs to sensation' in it [34-5]. Kant claims that empirical knowledge is tied so closely to experience that the two can, for us, be equated:
'Empirical knowledge is experience' [165-6; s.a. 147,218]. In this new sense (developed fully only in the second edition of Kt1), experience is no longer the immediate chronological starting point of all knowledge, but one of several 'species of knowledge' [xvii,196; cf. 314]. Unlike empirical knowledge, pure knowledge is related only indirectly to experience: it arises out of the subject's abstract reflection on the general nature of experience [316-9], and is pure in virtue of its primary dependence on the subject rather than the object of knowledge [5-6; s.a. Kt7:179]. But in order to engage in such reflection, we must be consciously aware of our experience, not in its immediate state, but as empirical knowledge; for experience in itself is 'the ultimate unconditional given, within which all reflection arises' [Gl:248-9].

So far, Kant's use of the words 'knowledge' and 'experience' seems to be relatively clear. The latter refers either to the original encounter between subject and object (i.e. 'immediate experience') which yields actual knowledge through determinant judgment, or to the 'empirical knowledge' which is so produced; and the former refers either to this same empirical knowledge, or to the knowledge which can be inferred from experience by reflecting in other, more abstract ways. But this account of his primary distinction will be of use to the interpreter only if it provides an adequate context for interpreting Kant's secondary distinctions. In IV.2, therefore, I will introduce the four classes of knowledge which arise out of two of his secondary distinctions. I will then examine in IV.3 the types of reflection which lead to such knowledge, thus delineating the essential perspectival pattern which determines the form of each of Kant's Critical systems.

2. Two Secondary Distinctions

The knowledge-experience distinction is rarely discussed as such by either Kant or his commentators because, as mentioned above, experience (even though it has chronological priority in its immediate form)
is defined in terms of knowledge. Despite the negligible attention it has been given, however, this distinction will turn out to form the context in which all Kant's other distinctions are set. But before this can be fully demonstrated, a good deal more will have to be said about the 'knowledge' side of the distinction. In this section, therefore, I will specify how four basic types of knowledge arise out of the two most prevalent of Kant's secondary distinctions, the a priori-a posteriori and the analytic-synthetic, both of which are concerned not only with knowledge, but with the various ways reflective knowledge and immediate experience are related.

On the surface, the bifurcation of knowledge into a priori and a posteriori types seems to be readily comprehensible. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge derived directly from--or the truth of which is contingent upon--the meeting of subject and object in immediate experience. A priori knowledge, on the other hand, is 'given' or 'innate' knowledge which is derived from a source--or the truth of which is--'absolutely independent of all experience' [Kt1:2-3]; hence it is both necessary and universal [3-4]. But upon closer investigation, two problems arise: first, How does this distinction differ from that between pure and empirical knowledge? and second, If 'all our knowledge begins with experience', then what sense is there in saying that a priori knowledge is somehow 'independent of all experience'? I will consider these questions in the following two paragraphs.

Although Kant ordinarily uses the terms 'pure' and 'a priori', as well as the terms 'empirical' (i.e. impure) and 'a posteriori', interchangeably, they should not be regarded as mere synonyms [see e.g. Pl6:4n], for he does occasionally make a technical distinction between them. The pure-impure distinction discriminates between knowledge which does (impure) and does not (pure) depend directly on sensation, whereas the a priori-a posteriori distinction discriminates between knowledge which is grounded in the subject's experience of an object (a
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posteriori) and that which the subject brings to experience, which must therefore be grounded primarily in the subject itself (a priori). Presumably, knowledge can be a priori even if it involves sensation in some way [Kt1:3,28-9]; or it can be a posteriori without having anything to do with sensation. These possibilities cannot be rejected merely by virtue of the meanings of the words involved. Hence, although examples of pure a posteriori and impure a priori knowledge might be hard to come by, the distinct classes must be acknowledged as logically possible. Nevertheless, they are of minimal importance, since the two pairs are almost always treated coextensively: impure a posteriori knowledge is knowledge derived from a subject's experience of an object (a posteriori) and requiring sensation (impure), while pure a priori knowledge is knowledge brought to experience by the subject (a priori) and requiring no sensation (pure) [x,4-5,124-5].

The status of a priori knowledge in relation to experience should become more evident when I relate the distinctions of this section to the four fundamental reflective perspectives in IV.3. But for now several remarks can be added which should dispel some of the ambiguity shrouding the meaning of the word 'knowledge' in the phrase 'a priori knowledge'. Knowledge which arises a posteriori seems not to be troublesome because it is by definition based on experience. A priori knowledge, by contrast, 'which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me' [Kt1:xvii; s.a. xviii,xxiii,A128-9], and which is therefore objectively valid 'antecedently to all experience' [198], is rather more ambiguously called 'knowledge'. This ambiguity can be cleared up by recalling the distinction made in IV.1 between immediate experience (which can lead to 'empirical knowledge') and reflective knowledge (which is known only if experienced, but which might be traceable to some other source). When this is stressed, both a posteriori and a priori knowledge can be regarded as abstractions from immediate experience--though, as will become evident in IV.3, they
abstract in different directions. 'A priori' does not denote knowledge which is actually known apart from experience; rather, it refers to knowledge whose validity rests on more than just a subject's encounter with particular objects in experience. Kant could have made his meaning less confusing either by not calling the determinate form of experience 'empirical knowledge', or by not using the word 'knowledge' for that which arises out of one's reflection on experience. Using the same word for both gives rise to uncertainty on the part of the reader as to which sense of the word 'knowledge' he intends when he uses the word without a qualifying adjective (e.g. in Kt1:26 he apparently fluctuates between both meanings). Fortunately, once the choices are explicated, the context usually makes his intention sufficiently clear.

Kant also has a more general use for the a priori-a posteriori distinction which should be mentioned briefly at this point. Sometimes when he speaks loosely Kant equates all philosophical or 'metaphysical' knowledge with the a priori and all ordinary or 'physical' knowledge with the a posteriori [e.g. Kt7:174,475]. Thus he says 'knowledge through reason and a priori knowledge are the same thing' [Kt4:12; s.a. Kt7:167-8]. This is the sense England has in mind when he says a priori truths 'enable us to understand the "why" of a thing or event', while a posteriori truths 'enable us to know its existence as a fact' [E3:45]. Wolff rightly criticizes Kant's tendency to identify 'the formal (space, time, categories) with the a priori and the material (sensation, empirical concepts) with the a posteriori' [W16:304]; but he goes too far when he adds that this causes Kant to 'be irresistibly drawn to assimilate all knowledge to a priori knowledge.' For Kant's loose usage of these terms is never more than a tendency: as we shall see, he ordinarily is very careful to limit the a priori to certain specific sorts of philosophical knowledge. Moreover, as suggested in Pld:§4, this broad use of terms is itself quite legitimate once it is understood as a reference to the overall Perspective of his Critical System.
(Indeed, Kant treats the term 'transcendental' in a similarly loose way [e.g. Ktl:80-1].) In any case, it is certainly a mistake to equate the a priori-a posteriori distinction, as Paton suggests, with the formal-material distinction [P4:61]. Since such loose use of technical terms is likely to lead to misunderstanding and equivocation, interpreters should avoid it wherever possible. Accordingly, I shall henceforth treat 'a priori' (and 'transcendental') in the strict sense, and attempt to differentiate more precisely the various sorts of knowledge with which Kant is concerned.

The other important secondary distinction Kant makes between types of (reflective) knowledge is that between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' judgments. Unfortunately, he describes this contrast in a wide variety of ways, which are difficult if not impossible to integrate into a single, consistent picture. Garver, for instance, finds no less than 'twelve theories of analyticity contained in or suggested by Kant's discussion' [G2:245]! Moreover, perhaps as a result of such variety, the nature and validity of this distinction has been a matter of considerable debate in recent years. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to embark on a detailed examination of this particular subject in a general discussion of this sort. Nevertheless, examining a selection of the most significant comments of both Kant and his critics will help differentiate Kant's version of the distinction from some of the un-Kantian versions which have recently been suggested.

Probably the best known of Kant's descriptions of these terms is that in an analytic judgment the predicate is already 'contained in' the subject, while in a synthetic judgment the predicate 'lies outside' the subject [Ktl:10; cf. Kt22:232; see e.g. H4:111]. A more illuminating, yet less frequently cited description of this distinction is Kant's claim that judgments can be determined to be analytic only by applying the laws of logic to the previously determined meanings of their terms, while judgments can be determined to be synthetic only
'under the condition that an intuition underlies the concept of their subject' [Kt22:241; s.a. Kt1:749; Ktlo:111(117); A5:60,164]. As Allison says: 'Synthetic judgments assert [real] relations [of concepts to objects], while analytic judgments merely assert logical relations between concepts' [54]. With these descriptions in mind, we can use Kant's own pictorial representation of 'particular judgments' in Ktlo: 103(108-9) (according to which the subject is depicted as a square and the predicate as a circle), to show how (e.g.) 'Yellow is a colour' and 'This table is yellow' are propositional representations of analytic and synthetic judgments, respectively:

(A) **Analytic Judgments:**

(B) **Synthetic Judgements**

Beck translates Kant's distinction into less metaphorical terms: if "X is A" implies logically "X is B", the judgment is analytic', but if B is 'related to A by virtue of the fact that both are predicates of the same X', then it is synthetic [B6:5,10; cf. Kt1:A8]. Synthetic propositions, then, are informative: they provide information about the subject which is not necessarily implied by the meanings of the words (e.g. this table would still be a table whatever its colour). Analytic propositions, on the other hand, are, strictly speaking, not informative: the predicate provides only what can be inferred from the subject by means of the laws of logic. Although this description of Kant's analytic-synthetic distinction is given predominantly in terms of single, subject-predicate propositions, it is unfair to charge Kant with limiting his logic to such propositions [as in F5:88]. On the con-
trary, says Wolff, 'nothing could be further from the truth' [W16:188]. The great variety of applications Kant gives for his analytic-synthetic distinction [s.e. H4:xxii-cxv] is evidence enough of his awareness of the complexity of propositional logic. Subject-predicate examples simply provide a manageable way of grasping the general characteristics of this distinction.

Kant leaves no doubt as to how all this applies to empirical knowledge: 'Judgments of experience, as such, are one and all synthetic' [Kt1:11]. Only when we attempt to interpret such determinate judgments by reflecting upon them does some knowledge come to be regarded as analytic. The bulk of the discussion of the analytic-synthetic distinction by recent philosophers has suffered needlessly by neglecting the implications of this salient qualification. The result has been a running debate over whether the terms refer to a difference of kind or merely to one of degree. The position Kant would adopt on this point becomes evident once his admittedly subtle distinction between immediate experience and reflective knowledge is sharpened (as I am attempting to do in this chapter): both views would be accorded a measure of validity. Kant himself uses the distinction primarily as a tool for organizing various forms of reflective knowledge according to their logical status. Thus, his distinction is clearly one between different kinds of knowledge. But, in order to locate the sources of both analytic and synthetic knowledge in immediate experience, this rigid distinction of kind would have to be reinterpreted in terms of varying degrees. The point of Kant's assertion that all judgments of experience are synthetic is simply to emphasize that the term 'analytic' will apply only to certain forms of reflective knowledge, and never to nonreflective experience. It in no way disallows the legitimate formulation of a less restrictive analytic-synthetic distinction in which the terms are not so mutually exclusive. Indeed, I have explored some of the possibilities in Plf:§2 and Plh:§§II.3-4.
The main question raised by Kant's introduction of the distinction between analytic and synthetic kinds of reflective knowledge is: How does he intend to integrate it with his distinction between a priori and a posteriori kinds of reflective knowledge? Some recent philosophers tend to equate the two distinctions (as well as that between 'pure' and 'empirical'); but such an oversimplified approach is not only inadequate [B19:227f], but obviously unkantian. If, then, the two distinctions are not equivalent, four possible classes of reflective knowledge arise out of their combination: knowledge by reflection might be classified as 'analytic a posteriori', 'analytic a priori', 'synthetic a priori', or 'synthetic a posteriori'. I shall conclude this section by examining briefly what each of these four classes would entail.

To begin with, the impossibility of analytic a posteriori knowledge is generally considered to be 'quite evident' [P6:182-3]: indeed, it is a nonsensical contradiction in terms if, as is often the case, 'analytic' is equated with 'a priori'. Kant himself seems to encourage this conclusion by saying: 'it would be absurd to found an analytic judgment on experience. Since, in forming the judgment, I must not go outside my concept, there is no need to appeal to the testimony of experience in its support' [Ktl:11; cf. Kt2:268]. However, notwithstanding Kant's resulting lack of concern for classifying any knowledge as analytic a posteriori, some theorists do maintain that this class provides the best description of certain types of knowledge [see e.g. C2:353-4; H4:1-li; M8:34-42; Plh:§§II.2-4]. I shall discuss this possibility at some length in IV.3. Suffice it to say at this point that we should expect such knowledge, if it is possible, to have its validity grounded in some way in experience (a posteriori), and yet also to proceed by making inferences solely on the (analytic) basis of an application of the laws of logic to the concepts or propositions involved.
The second class of reflective knowledge, the analytic a priori, is rather more clearly delineated by Kant. It includes any judgment which, given some previously understood meaning for the terms involved, can be reduced to a logical tautology. This definition of analytic knowledge is what Kant has in mind when he makes such statements as: 'if the judgment is analytic...its truth can always be adequately known in accordance with the principle of contradiction' [Kt1:190; cf. Kt2:267]. The truth value of such knowledge is both independent of experience (a priori) and determinable solely by the application of logical laws to the concepts involved (analytic).

The third class of reflective knowledge, the synthetic a priori, is by far the most important for Kant, at least in Kt1. Indeed, he says in Kt1:19 that 'the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?' It is a problem because it is not immediately evident how a judgment could be a priori without being analytic. Such knowledge would be valid independently of any particular experience (a priori) [171-2], yet it would also supply new information about the concepts involved (synthetic)—information not deducible by means of formal logic [cf. S23:10 and K11: 22-7]. This class of knowledge is of utmost importance to the philosopher because the propositions composing it would be necessarily true without being in any sense trivial: just as the analytic laws of logic determine the general form of what a person can think coherently, so also such synthetic a priori judgments would determine the general form of what a person can experience coherently (i.e. of how a person can convert immediate experience into empirical knowledge). They would provide a solid foundation upon which not only empirical knowledge, but also a philosophical system of knowledge, could rest.

Finally, synthetic a posteriori knowledge is the least troublesome (but also, for Kant, the least philosophically interesting) of the four classes of knowledge. All the knowledge arising out of such empirical
factors as scientific experimentation, psychological introspection, the citing of examples, and appeals to 'common sense' falls into this class. Consequently, it is usually in this sense that the word 'knowledge' is intended when it is uttered in ordinary language. Such knowledge consists, quite simply, in judgments which have their validity grounded in various facts of experience (a posteriori), and in which intuitive content is supplied to the concepts involved—content which is not logically implied by their conventional meanings (synthetic).

3. The Four Reflective Perspectives

The foregoing discussion of Kant's two secondary distinctions between types of knowledge and of the four classes to which they give rise has relied heavily on the supposition that these divisions are intended by Kant as classifications only of knowledge by reflection, and not of immediate experience. In this section I propose to support and enlarge upon this claim by discussing the four methods of reflection, or perspectives [see II.3], which Kant says can be adopted in considering various objects of knowledge. These will include the empirical, transcendental, logical, and practical perspectives, respectively. But first it will be helpful to make some general comments about Kant's use of the word 'reflection'.

Kant distinguishes 'reflection' (Reflexion) from 'comparison' and 'abstraction' by defining it as the act of 'going back over [Überlegung] different representations' in order to determine 'how they can be comprehended in one consciousness' [Kt10:94(100)]. These three 'acts of the understanding' are similar inasmuch as they are all 'logical acts...by which concepts are generated as to their form' [94(100)]. But elsewhere he puts special emphasis on reflection as the only act by means of which truly philosophical concepts can be generated, for 'reflective judgement' is 'our critical faculty' [Kt7:408; s.a. 395; V2:446,451]. The description 'going back over...' implies that the
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representations which give rise to various philosophical perspectives have already been 'gone over' once. This indeed is precisely what Kant intends to get across by his distinction between 'determinant [bestim-mende] judgement' and 'reflective [reflectirende] judgement' [Kt7: 385-6]: 'Determinant judgment', interprets van de Pitte in V2:445, 'is constitutive of the world of experience and is thus objectively valid. Reflective judgment, on the other hand, is merely an interpretive technique which we employ in order to bring organic entities and systematic unities within our powers of comprehension. It thus carries only a subjective validity.' This distinction is closely related to that between immediate experience and reflective knowledge: determinant judgment converts immediate experience into empirical knowledge by subsuming a particular intuition under a given universal concept, and reflective judgment converts empirical knowledge into more abstract forms of reflective knowledge by positing the universal which serves as the guiding principle for a given set of particulars [Kt7:179-80]. With this distinction clearly in mind, we can now examine the nature of the four fundamental perspectives in Kant's Critical System.

In the first two Critiques Kant does not use the word 'reflection' as a technical term for the activity of viewing objects from an empirical perspective. Instead, he uses phrases such as 'the empirical employment of understanding' or 'the empirical employment of reason' [see II.2.C] whenever he wishes to describe some aspect of the empirical perspective as it operates in one of these systems. (Many of the empirical elements introduced in these systems are presented merely as by-products of other perspectives [e.g. Kt1:152; Kt5:390]; but the constitutive role of the empirical perspective in system \( T \) will be discussed in V.3 and VII.3, and that of system \( P \), in VIII.3.) However, Kant sometimes mentions the role of reflection in the empirical perspective in passing, as when he describes an 'empirical deduction' as one which 'shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through
experience and through reflection upon experience' [Kt1:117]. In the third Critique, by contrast, Kant's use of the phrase 'reflective judgment' is equivalent, Evans suggests, to his former use of the phrase 'empirical employment of pure reason' [E4:483; s.a. G5:457], thus implying that the standpoint which guides system\(_e\) is that of the empirical perspective. Each perspective guides a standpoint in this way [see II.3], but for the remainder of this section I will concentrate for the most part on their role in system\(_c\). (In Part Three the differences which arise when the perspectives are applied from other standpoints will be made more clear.)

A person who adopts an empirical perspective reflects upon particular objects of experience without attempting to 'go beyond' their relation to immediate experience. In empirical reflection there is no need to discriminate between the respective roles of the knowing subject and the known object, because the two are fused in experience. This continuity between immediate experience and knowledge resulting from empirical reflection is, no doubt, what leads Kant to make the (technically imprecise, but rhetorically effective) claim that 'empirical knowledge is experience' [see IV.1]. Strictly speaking, empirical knowledge denotes only that synthetic a posteriori knowledge which arises out of empirical reflection on the objects of one's experience (i.e. on what Kant calls 'phenomena' [Kt1:A248-9,306]). Thus, empirical knowledge of 'cause', for instance, refers neither to the actual experience of some particular cause, nor to the ability to determine its subjective or objective ground; rather it consists in the ability to answer the question 'What is the cause of X?' by thinking and reasoning straightforwardly about one's experience from an empirical perspective.

In ordinary experience, we usually do not distinguish between our experience and our reflection on experience, since any type of reflection must itself be part of our immediate experience in order to bring forth knowledge which is actually known [see IV.2]. Thus, in everyday
life all reflective perspectives tend to be mixed indiscriminately. (This is the situation, incidentally, which gives rise to the need for a Critical Perspective, a philosophical System within which our various perspectives can be distinguished in an orderly fashion.) On its own reflective experience attempts to give elegance to its vulgar counterpart, nonreflective experience. In the case of empirical reflection, however, the transition from vulgarity to elegance tends to be gradual, because of the affinity between immediate experience and empirical knowledge--i.e. because of the need to appeal to our sensible experience whenever we try to establish synthetic a posteriori knowledge. But in each of the other three types of reflection, which we shall discuss below, the qualitative transition tends to be rather more sudden.

Of all the perspectives in Kant's System, the transcendental perspective plays the most important role [Kt1:25-6; cf. P3:1.226-30 and E5:29]. Indeed, the a priori-a posteriori distinction itself first arises in this context. Unfortunately, the fundamental significance of the 'transcendental reflection' with which this new perspective is concerned is easily overlooked by the reader, because Kant waits until an Appendix in the middle of Kt1 to discuss its importance in detail [Kt1:316-49]. The reason he waits until this point is that, before he can show how transcendental reflection reveals the errors of all non-Critical philosophers, he first has to specify the doctrines which can be established by adopting his transcendental alternative. But this gives the misleading impression that transcendental reflection is more a convenient tool for the comparison of various treatments of specific philosophical issues than an essential methodological tool for the Critical Perspective itself.

Kant does, however, give one of his clearest accounts of what the transcendental perspective entails as early as Kt1:25 [cf. 185,196-7]: 'I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with our epistemological perspective on objects in so
far as this perspective is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy.' In Kt1:A96 Kant says his task as a transcendental philosopher is to 'enquire what are the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests, and which remain as its underlying ground when everything empirical is abstracted from appearances [i.e. from the objects of experience].' A transcendental perspective, then, presupposes the subject-object distinction: it attempts to determine what there is in the subject a priori which makes possible its knowledge of the objects it experiences. Because these conditions must be added to the object by the subject to produce such empirical knowledge, they are (methodologically) synthetic as well as being a priori. That the knowledge arising out of this radically epistemological perspective concerns only a set of synthetic a priori forms embedded in the subject is spelled out explicitly by Kant when he says 'the word "transcendental"...never means a reference of our knowledge to things, but only to the cognitive faculty' [Kt2:293; s.a. Kt1:74-5].

When Kant finally gets around to describing what transcendental reflection is, he says it is the act of determining 'in which faculty of knowledge [given representations] belong together subjectively--in the sensibility or in the understanding' [Kt1:317]; in so doing one determines whether or not each representation is pure. Accordingly, such reflection is the necessary first step in adopting a transcendental perspective; for it would be impossible to abstract everything empirical from experience without first differentiating between what is pure and what is impure (i.e. empirical) [80-1]. But in a broader sense [see IV.2], all the steps involved in determining the synthetic a priori forms of empirical knowledge can be regarded, without straying too far from Kant's intentions, as arising out of transcendental reflection. Thus, transcendental knowledge of 'cause', for instance, refers neither to the actual experience of some particular cause, nor to the ability
to determine such a cause through empirical reflection; rather, it consists in the ability to answer the question 'What is the status of causality in the general relation of a subject to an object?' by reflecting transcendently on the synthetic a priori conditions for the possibility of experience.

Two remaining points should be made concerning the transcendental perspective to help guard against possible misunderstanding. First, one common use of the word 'transcendental', according to which it refers to a special kind of consciousness, or to 'the grasping of things as they are in themselves' [Mi:163], might lead to the mistake of confusing the transcendental perspective with the 'ivory tower' perspective of the typical non-Critical metaphysician, who assumes it is possible to ascend reflectively to such heights as to attain a perfectly objective (or transcendent) view of reality. Kant leaves no doubt as to his rejection of this approach by devoting the bulk of the Dialectic to the task of disclosing the error inevitably bred by this 'logic of illusion' [Kt:349]. Indeed, such error is precisely what he believes he can avoid by emphasizing the differences in the various perspectives which can be adopted legitimately in the quest for knowledge. By referring to the synthetic a priori as 'knowledge', he is not claiming to possess a special type of knowledge which is actually known independently of the limitations of experience; rather, like all knowledge, it can be known only when a person experiences a certain kind of reflection. This seems to be the point he is trying to make when, in response to a misunderstanding of his use of the word 'transcendental', he says it 'does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make knowledge of experience possible' [Kt2:373n]. When properly understood, adopting the transcendental perspective can be seen not only to be legitimate, but to be the 'duty' of the philosopher [see Kt:319]. By determining the epistemological foundations on which our
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awareness of experience is built [195], it reveals that human knowledge is inextricably tied to certain limits it cannot transcend.

The second point is that Kant does not limit synthetic a priori knowledge to the philosopher. On the contrary, he says that 'in all theoretical sciences of reason synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles' [Ktl:14]. But adopting a transcendental perspective in order to analyze such principles is nevertheless important (philosophically) because it is only through transcendental reflection that their status can be shown to be synthetic a priori [cf. 81,316-7 and 749-50]. The extent to which the mathematician, for example, knows his principles to be synthetic a priori is the extent to which he has reflected transcendentally on their status. 'Transcendental knowledge', therefore, is the knowledge that a given proposition is synthetic a priori.

Distinguishing between the empirical and transcendental perspectives is recognized by many recent commentators as being essential to an adequate understanding of Kant's Critical philosophy [see II.2]. Unfortunately, these commentators usually emphasize this distinction so much that another, equally important distinction tends to be ignored [see e.g. B20:36-51,140-8; A4:194]. Although it is true that most of the problems Kant tries to solve in Ktl are, as Allison says, solved 'by means of the perspectival conception of the relation between the transcendental and the empirical' [A4:203; but see Ktl:189-91], the perspectival conception of the relation between the logical and the practical, as I shall demonstrate in the remainder of this section, is just as important to the overall methodology of Kant's System of Perspectives. For as he says in Kt10:72(80), 'all our conviction is either logical or practical.'

Immediately after introducing 'transcendental reflection' as a technical term, Kant contrasts it with 'logical reflection' [Ktl:318-9]. He says at this point only that the latter 'is a mere act of com-
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parison' which takes 'no account whatsoever of the faculty of knowledge
to which the given representations belong' [318]. That is, from a
logical perspective, there is no need to determine whether the objects
of reflection 'are noumena for the understanding, or are phenomena for
sensibility' [325], because all that matters is their compatibility
with the laws of logic [189-91]. The logical perspective is the 'merely
formal' employment of reason which 'abstracts from all content of know­
ledge' [355]. Logical reflection is like all types of reflection, how­
ever, in being ultimately dependent on the 'possibility of experience'
[195]. It is similar to empirical reflection in that it operates with­
out distinguishing between the subject and object of experience; and it
is similar to transcendental reflection in that it seeks to establish
a priori truths; but it is different from both in that it 'has nothing
to do with the origin of knowledge, but only considers representations
...according to the laws which the understanding employs when...it
relates them to one another' [80]. This means the aim of logical
reflection is always analytic: it is concerned only with determining
whether or not the representations in a given proposition are related
in a form which can be reduced to a tautology [see Z2:169-70]. The
tools used in such reflection are those enumerated by what Kant calls
'pure general logic' [Kt1:78], and the goal towards which it works is
the systematic delineation of the analytic a priori knowledge which is
applicable to a specific science [76].

Just as the a priori-a posteriori distinction makes sense only if
one engages in transcendental reflection, the analytic-synthetic dis­
tinction makes sense only if one engages in logical reflection (yet, once made, both distinctions relate to the classes of knowledge which
arise in all four reflective perspectives); for as Schulze accurately
declares, the latter 'division is itself derived immediately from the
principle of contradiction' [S8:174; cf. P9:98-9]. Kant is careful to
point out that an accurate understanding of this distinction requires
transcendental reflection as well, since general logic is unconcerned with the synthetic a priori [Kt22:242-5]. But this in no way detracts from the need to stress the logical character of its analytic side in order to bring out the difference between it and the empirical versions of the distinction. For Kant, the status of a proposition can be determined to be analytic only through logical reflection [see 01:336]; therefore, a proposition which is considered (by means of transcendental reflection) to depend on some synthetic element, such as intuition, may or may not be logically synthetic. Consider, for example, the question 'How do you know that all bachelors are unmarried?' We cannot show our knowledge to be logically analytic by appealing to experience and answering 'Well, all the bachelors I've ever known, now that I think about it, have been unmarried, therefore...', or even by answering 'Being a bachelor is always connected by linguistic convention with being unmarried, therefore...'; the only way to show such knowledge to be logically analytic would be to answer 'If (given a previously agreed upon use of terms) we map that proposition onto the laws of logic, it eventually reduces to a tautology, therefore...'. Analytic truths might be employed in the context of an empirical argument, but no one could know they are analytic without engaging in logical reflection.

When the analytic-synthetic distinction is regarded in this way, borderline cases, such as 'An unprotected human being cannot survive prolonged exposure to temperatures above 100°C' or 'Water boils at 100°C' or 'His mother did not die two weeks before he was born' [W13: 493-4], all turn out to be synthetic; for the necessity they possess holds only because the natural laws which limit our experience make their contradiction physically impossible. The inevitability of including some such empirical factors in any definition contributes to the inadequacy of 'deducible by definition' as a description of analytic a priori knowledge. This is the mistake made by Waismann when he argues
that 'a statement is analytic if it can, by means of mere definitions, be turned into a truth of logic' \[W1:31\]. His example, 'All planets move around the sun', is actually logically synthetic: it can be 'turned into' an analytic 'truth of logic' only by taking up into the definitions of its terms various 'idiomatic (linguistic) operators' which are contingent upon empirical rather than logical verifiability.

The fourth and final type of reflection is that which yields 'practical knowledge' \[Kt26:(42)\] when a subject adopts a practical perspective. The best way to back up my proposal that practical reflection should be regarded as the correlate of logical reflection in a way comparable to the transcendental-empirical correlation would be to show from Kant's own words that it yields the one class of knowledge which has so far gone unmentioned in this section, the analytic a posteriori. But this alternative is precluded by his unfortunately broad understanding of a priori knowledge, according to which it refers not only to the knowledge yielded by transcendental or logical reflection, but to that which is necessary in any non-physical sense \[see e.g. Kt1:661; IV.2\]. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, although he intends his practical philosophy to replace the traditional form of metaphysical reflection, he never makes it entirely clear just how the logical status of the knowledge yielded by these two types of reflection differs. I will therefore first examine the status of traditional metaphysical reflection, and then proceed to examine how Kant's practical perspective differs from it.

As early as the Introduction to Kt1 Kant states unambiguously that 'metaphysics...ought to contain a priori synthetic knowledge. For its business is...to extend our a priori knowledge' \[Kt1:18; cf. Kt2:273-4\]. He later adds that the metaphysician cannot obtain this goal 'by mere [or 'naked' (bloss)]] reflection', but only by clothing it with 'inference' \[Kt1:366\]. Inference is required because 'the [metaphysical] concepts of reason...are concerned with something to which all
experience is subordinated, but which is never itself an object of experience'—namely, 'the unconditioned' [367]. In itself, the unconditioned is, as Allison points out, 'an analytic principle, depicting what is contained in our concept of a thing in general' [A6:237-8]. Because it is a pure concept 'transcending the possibility of experience', Kant calls it an 'idea' [Ktl:377,382-3]. But the metaphysician who attempts to use such ideas synthetically to make inferences without first engaging in transcendental reflection is likely to assume that synthetic a priori judgments can apply directly to the unconditioned, as if it were an intuitable object of ordinary experience [325-6,410,662-3]. The 'misinterpretation' of the 'concepts of reflection' [336], which characterizes this 'speculative perspective' [669], inevitably leads to the sort of ambiguity and illusion which Kant attempts to dispel in the Dialectic [354-5]. In each case the fallacy arising out of speculative reflection has the same essential character: metaphysical reflection which is not based on transcendental reflection will be patterned solely along the lines of empirical and logical reflection; that is, it will attempt to produce synthetic a priori knowledge by conflating the logical perspective and its a priori aspect with the empirical perspective and its synthetic aspect.

Kant not only argues in detail against the specific errors involved in the various sorts of speculative reflection; he also proposes an alternative to this traditional metaphysical perspective. Metaphysical reflection must, he maintains, be patterned primarily after transcendental reflection. Just as transcendental reflection searches for the elements of pure theoretical reason whose application is necessary for the possibility of natural experience, so also metaphysical reflection should search for the elements of pure practical reason whose application is necessary for the possibility of moral experience. The former compose the 'metaphysics of nature' and define Kant's theoretical standpoint, while the latter compose the 'metaphysics of morals' and
define Kant's practical standpoint [Kt5:388; see II.3]. Practical elements are also introduced into system_t, however, in the form of 'transcendental ideas' [Kt1:383-4], such as 'God', 'freedom', and 'immortality'. Because each idea is 'a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience' [383], Kant stresses that in system_t 'it remains a problem to which there is no solution' [384].

Inasmuch as knowledge gained through transcendental reflection is synthetic a priori, Kant presumes (somewhat carelessly) that knowledge gained through legitimate practical reflection (whether from a theoretical or a practical standpoint) must also be synthetic a priori, 'though only from a practical perspective' [Kt1:xxi; s.a. 364,691]. However, he does not put nearly as much emphasis on the significance of the synthetic a priori status of practical knowledge as he does in the case of transcendental knowledge, nor does he provide any reasons for giving it this status. His apparent reason is to call attention to various similarities which do exist between the practical and transcendental perspectives. Yet there are also some major differences, which have to be ignored or underemphasized if one is to continue thinking of the two as yielding the same class of knowledge. (Kant himself lists three such differences, which should have been enough to convince him of the need to classify practical knowledge with a different status: (1) 'A transcendental deduction cannot...be effected' in respect to practical ideas; (2) rather than constituting empirical knowledge, they serve merely 'for the guidance of the empirical perspective'; and (3) their validity, though objective, is 'indeterminate' rather than determinate [691; s.a. 697-8].)

The terms 'synthetic' and 'a priori' both take on significantly different meanings in Kant's description of the practical perspective in system_t. 'A priori' is no longer used to define an element as a necessary and universal subjective condition for the possibility of
experience; it is now used to define an idea which is in the subject only because it is inferred from a certain type of immediate experience [Kt1:367-8], which plays no part in making experience in general (i.e. empirical knowledge) possible, and whose application to immediate experience is neither necessary nor universal [830]. As Kant himself says: 'No actual experience has ever been completely adequate to [an unconditioned idea], yet to it every actual experience belongs' [367]--a fact which would seem to require the resulting knowledge to be not a priori but analytic [cf. A6:237-8], especially when it is considered together with his assertion that 'the criterion of the possibility of synthetic knowledge is never to be looked for save in experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong' [Kt1:630]. Likewise, 'synthetic' no longer refers to knowledge whose truth is verified by appealing to some factual, intuitive content [cf. A5:72-3]; it now refers to knowledge whose truth is dependent on its compatibility with various practical 'laws' [Kt5:388]. As Kant again says: 'in the practical perspective, our sole concern is with the carrying out of rules' [Kt1:384-5e.a.]--a concern for the instantiation of practical ideas in experience which would seem to be more a posteriori than synthetic, especially when it is considered together with his claim that 'the indispensable condition of reason's entire practical perspective' is that 'the idea of practical reason can always be given actually in concreto, although only in part' [384-5].

If I am right in pointing out these shifts in meaning, then, whenever Kant says 'X is synthetic a priori from a practical perspective alone', we can interpret this as meaning 'X is analytic a posteriori'. For the changes he makes to his ordinary sense of 'a priori' when he applies it to the practical perspective actually convert it into his strict sense of 'analytic', and those he makes to his ordinary sense of 'synthetic' convert it into his strict sense of 'a posteriori'. Why does Kant neglect these discrepancies in his usage? The explanation I
would offer is that, since his ultimate goal is to defend rather than to destroy many of the traditional doctrines of metaphysics [Ktl:xxiv-xxxi; see Ch. 1], he must have thought (in keeping with his rationalist background) that to give a different status to practical knowledge would set it too far apart from that of traditional metaphysical knowledge; so instead, he inadvertently altered the meanings of his terms and (supposedly) preserved the same status. In addition, as I suggested earlier, there is some similarity between transcendental and practical knowledge: just as the former makes natural experience possible in system\(_T\), the latter can be regarded as making moral experience possible in system\(_P\).

Now these terminological changes may seem drastic, yet I do not believe they entail any substantial revision of the various theories Kant puts forward in the Dialectic of Ktl or in his moral philosophy (although they do require some hitherto unorthodox interpretations of what he is saying at certain points). On the contrary, referring to the knowledge arising out of practical reflection as 'analytic a posteriori' clarifies its status by abiding more strictly than Kant himself does to the meanings he originally gives his terms. However, inasmuch as Kant himself does not use this phrase, it may be helpful to explore its meaning in a bit more detail before discussing its implications for his System any further.

In Plh:II I argue that the category of 'contingent a priori knowledge', recent interest in which was initiated by Kripke in K13, is actually a perfect example of what (given a proper understanding of Kant's terms) should be called 'analytic a posteriori knowledge'. Kripke argues that any proposition which 'fixes the reference' of a name, such as 'One meter is the length of stick S at t0' [see K13:54-5], is 'a priori' since its 'truth follows from a reference-fixing "definition"' [64n] and is contingent since the name is a 'rigid designator' (i.e. since 'in every possible world it refers to the same ob-
ject' [48]) and its description is non-rigid. Yet for Kant, as we have seen, the fact that a proposition's truth follows from a definition does not make it a priori, but analytic; and the fact that an empirical object's description could have been otherwise makes it epistemologically a posteriori (as well as physically or ontologically contingent). (What sense would it make to fix the reference of 'one meter' by referring to a stick in Paris, but stipulating that no one is able to experience the stick in question, since it has an a priori status?) Thus Kripke's analysis of naming provides us with a modern example of analytic a posteriori knowledge.

Accepting the analytic a posteriori as a legitimate epistemological category enables us to distinguish, in a way which neither Kant nor Kripke succeeded in doing, between the status of 'naming' and 'defining'. To name requires that we adopt a practical perspective, according to which we act 'as if' (or stipulate that) a certain object is to be rigidly designated by a certain word. That is, we subsume an object as experienced (a posteriori) under a given concept (analytically). To define, by contrast, requires that we adopt a logical perspective, according to which we devote all our attention to accumulating a set of properties which describe a concept uniquely. That is, we subsume a set of general characteristics (a priori) under a given concept (analytically). Naming is in certain key respects prior to the synthetic a posteriori knowledge which we gather from the empirical world, whereas defining generally comes after and on the basis of a good deal of empirical information. (We therefore honour babies by naming them, but honour the elderly or the dead by telling stories, or even writing biographies, about their lives.)

Once the possibility of analytic a posteriori knowledge is admitted on the basis of an analysis of naming, various other types of propositions can also be included in this category. Propositions which use a word or words in some 'counter-conventional' way, such as is
often found in poetry and other creative activities, 'may be striking enough to recommend a new convention' [Q3:118] and so earn the status of analytic a posteriori. A rather more mundane example taken from philosophy is Descartes' famous cogito argument, which is cogent only if it is regarded from this practical perspective. To say 'I think, therefore I am' only expresses a necessary truth if it is taken as an analytic a posteriori principle: 'I know from experience (a posteriori) that I can and do think, and this implies (analytically) that I exist.' The mistake of Descartes and others who regarded such arguments as establishing the a priori certainty of the immateriality of the soul, or even the a priori certainty of one's own existence, is, as Kant himself argues in the Paralogisms [Ktl:A341-405,399-432], to confuse logical implication (i.e. analyticity) with real implication (i.e. syntheticity). Of course, interpreting the cogito as a practical proposition divests it of much of its philosophical interest, inasmuch as it no longer confers absolute (a priori) certainty on its conclusion.

Given the legitimacy of 'analytic a posteriori' as an epistemological category, what is the difference between it and Kant's special 'synthetic a priori' category? The synthetic a priori and analytic a posteriori are similar categories of knowledge insofar as both are concerned with conditions imposed on the world by the subject (in contrast to the analytic a priori and the synthetic a posteriori categories, which are concerned with information which can be drawn out of, or deduced from, what we find in experience), but they differ by virtue of the fact that one imposes general conditions (a priori) with intuitive (synthetic) content, whereas the other imposes particular conditions (a posteriori) with conceptual (analytic) content. (An interesting practical example of the analytic a posteriori and synthetic a priori can be found in the religious rites of initiation and sacrificial offering, respectively. Interpreted as an example of the former, the Christian ritual of infant baptism represents the official naming
of a baby: a conceptual (analytic) content, the name, is imposed upon the baby through a specific transforming experience (a posteriori). The celebration of the Eucharist, on the other hand, represents God's (a priori) imposition of a universal (synthetic) 'yes' upon mankind--an acceptance which is repeatedly celebrated because it does not depend on any particular experience of the accepted individual).

Kant himself explicitly compares the logical and practical standpoints in Kt35:(2-3): 'like logic, practical philosophy does not concern itself with a particular sort of cases of practical activity but deals with the practice of free actions in general without reference to any case whatsoever.' Both types of reflection depend on certain laws, either 'of the understanding' or 'of the will'. Just as the highest principle of logical reflection is revealed in system1 to be the law of contradiction [Kt1:189; cf. III.3], so also the highest principle of practical reflection is revealed in systemp to be the law of 'duty' [Kt5:397; Kt4:32] or 'the categorical imperative' [Kt5:420; Kt4:21]. In both cases the law is analytic in relation to other laws in its system because it can be used to test the validity of such subordinate laws, yet it cannot itself be verified by appealing to a higher law. The difference is that, whereas logical laws are necessary a priori for all thinking and are thereby equally applicable in principle to all experience, even in systemc, practical laws apply to what ought to be the case, a posteriori, in 'matters of conduct' [Kt1:575], and 'allow for conditions under which what should happen often does not' [Kt5:388]. Thus, for example, we call a man 'good' by judging the extent to which his behavior, considered a posteriori, coincides analytically with the idea of 'perfect goodness'--that is, the extent to which his behavior is, as it were, 'contained in' that idea of perfection. Likewise, in systemc the unconditioned ideas of reason must be presupposed to refer to the analytic totality of some empirical synthesis [Kt1:701;
IV. Knowledge and Experience

Kt4:132,134; see VII.3], so our knowledge of them can be described most adequately as the analytic a posteriori counterpart of the analytic a priori knowledge gained through logical reflection.

Interpreting both the practical perspective of system $t$ and the practical standpoint of system $p$ in terms of analytic a posteriori knowledge does not imply that the 'ought' of practical reflection is determined by the empirical 'actions and conditions of the human volition'--a view which Kant explicitly denies [Kt5:390; cf. Kt1:575-6]. Rather, I am arguing that when, for example, Kant says our awareness of an 'ought' expresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept' [575], the part he thinks makes such knowledge synthetic (i.e. its appeal to a 'possible action') actually makes it a posteriori, and the part he thinks makes it a priori (i.e. the fact that its 'ground' is a concept such as 'God' or 'goodness', rather than an appearance of God or of something good) actually makes it analytic. How else could a perspective be 'practical' except by proposing an analytical connection between an abstract concept and an a posteriori experience which ought to be subsumed under it?

If Kant's practical perspective is to be regarded as yielding knowledge which is analytic and a posteriori, then what sense can be made of his assertion, quoted in IV.2, that 'it would be absurd to found an analytic judgment on experience'? Admittedly, this statement does imply that Kant saw no use for the label 'analytic a posteriori' as describing a class of knowledge. Such an attitude results from his tendency to limit the use of 'analytic' to the knowledge arising out of the logical perspective, and that of 'a posteriori' to the knowledge arising out of the empirical perspective. Had he considered the possibility of describing the knowledge produced by the practical perspective as analytic a posteriori, he could have reworded his rather extreme condemnation in such a way as to bring out its two essential points more clearly: first, that it would be absurd to found any
logically analytic knowledge on experience (because it is a priori); and second, that the need to found practically analytic knowledge on experience makes it impossible ever to reach the 'absolute certainty' which is possible in some other types of reflection (so that in a sense it is absurd to regard it as 'knowledge'). Is not this latter assertion just what Kant is alluding to when he says he intends 'to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith' [Kt1:xxx]? Indeed it is. And when this is recognized, the audacious claim that practical reflection is concerned with the analytic a posteriori becomes rather more tame.

Kant's whole point in the Dialectic of Kt1 is to demonstrate how the limitations imposed by transcendental reflection prevent the metaphysician from attaining knowledge through speculative reflection. In place of the latter he proposes the need for a reasoned faith in the (analytical) ideas as subjectively necessary presuppositions of the practical perspective in system_t [see VI.4]. An idea on its own always remains a 'problematic concept' [Kt1:445n]. So we must believe it to be true even though it lies 'out beyond' the limits of the empirical perspective [825]. To do so is to view it 'as if' if were analytically applicable to all experience [698-703]. Likewise, viewing myself in system_p as if I am a free agent is the only way I can coherently explain my actions as being 'moral'. Kant says in Kt4:134 that such practical presuppositions, whether in system_t or system_p, do not 'extend' my knowledge in any way, for 'no synthetic proposition is made possible by conceding their reality.' But neither does the 'as if' commit me to believe in a 'philosophical fiction' [S2:233]. On the contrary, it connotes that, although the transcendental limits of my experience in system_t make it impossible for me to know I am free, I do have very good reasons in system_p for believing I am free: namely, that my (a posteriori) experience of morality in general must be presupposed to contain within it analytically the notion of freedom [cf. Kt1:702-3 and Kt4:132,134]. Accordingly, the most accurate
statement of Kant's position is that, whereas speculative reflection attempts to establish the synthetic a priori status of metaphysical knowledge-claims, practical reflection admits that their status cannot (and need not) be anything other than analytic a posteriori belief.

This general account of the four fundamental perspectives in Kant's Critical System is, of course, only a preliminary step towards a coherent interpretation of his philosophy. Fully substantiating my claim that Kant's philosophy is profoundly coherent [see IV.1] will necessitate applying this framework to innumerable problems and ambiguities which arise both in his writings and in those of his interpreters and critics. It will therefore be most suitable to proceed from here to an interpretation of the 'thorny' topics of the transcendental object (which includes notions such as the 'thing in itself', 'appearance', etc. [see Ch. V]) and the transcendental subject (i.e. the role of intuition, conceptualization, etc. [see Part Three]). We will then be prepared to use this interpretation as a guide to determining the profound theological implications of Kant's System [see Part Four]. By constantly keeping in mind the perspectival framework offered in this chapter, our analysis of the many details of this System will perhaps enable it, as Kant hoped, to 'secure for itself the necessary elegance of statement' [Kt1:xlv].
Chapter V

Critical Perspectives on the Object of Knowledge

1. Kant's Six 'Object-Terms'

Kant's use of the word 'object' (Objekt or Gegenstand) is a potential source of much confusion and ambiguity. Sometimes he uses it in a broad sense either nontechnically to refer to an ordinary 'thing' encountered in immediate experience, or technically to refer to anything which stands in some potential, actual or necessary relation to the knowing subject. At other times he uses it in a narrower sense to refer to an object in general as it is viewed at one of several stages in the knowing process. Consequently, its meaning is not always evident when Kant uses it without a qualifying adjective [cf. B20:76, G11:778 and IV.3]. The first step to coping with this situation is to recognize that he explains the role of the object in his theory of knowledge (i.e. in system) primarily by implementing six technical 'object-terms' (as I shall call them). A clear understanding of these special terms and of their perspectival interrelationships will provide an interpretive framework for understanding Kant's use of the word 'object' when it appears on its own.

Throughout Ktt Kant makes frequent use of three object-terms (viz. 'thing in itself', 'transcendental object' and 'appearance'). Because he does not describe their relationships univocally, his interpreters and critics have made numerous proposals as to how these terms should be treated. Oftentimes they are defined in conjunction with one or more of three other, less used object-terms (viz. 'phenomenon', 'negative noumenon' and 'positive noumenon'), which Kant formally introduces towards the end of the Analytic in Ktt:A248-9,306-7. These terms, which I will discuss in this chapter, compose one of the most obscure, yet most fundamental, conceptual networks in the entire Critical System.
Most interpreters take two or more of Kant's six object-terms to be synonymous. Certainly the most commonly equated terms are 'appearance' with 'phenomenon' and 'thing in itself' with 'noumenon'; but other synonymies have also been suggested [see Plc:123n]. Among those who admit the possibility of distinguishing between one or another of these pairs, many would nevertheless agree with Weldon that the difference 'is not of any great importance' [W14:107]. Such tendencies reflect a widespread neglect of what should be regarded as an important fact when interpreting Kant's usage: that he does not make any significant use of the second set of object-terms until his elaboration of the main tenets of system t (using only the first set) is nearly complete. In light of the considerable effort Kant put into constructing his System according to an architectonic plan, in relation both to the particular terms in which it is expressed and to its general outline [see Ktl:xxvii-xxviii and Ch. III], it seems likely that such a sudden change of terminology could serve as a 'clue' of some sort to help us understand his theory. The introduction of a new set of object-terms in the middle of Ktl would be redundant unless their meanings were designed specifically to go beyond those of the original set.

Although some commentators do distinguish between all or most of Kant's object-terms, I have been unable to find any who try to account for the gap (which is rarely even acknowledged to exist) between his introduction of the two sets. This neglect, though unfortunate, is only a minor problem, however, since the task of determining what Kant means by each term is fundamental, and is not necessarily dependent on an understanding of why he introduces them in the order he does. Indeed, the main purpose of this chapter will be to determine the extent to which each term can be given a distinctive meaning without misrepresenting Kant's intentions; the explanation of the late introduction of the second set of terms will be significant only insofar as it aids in this task. My goal will be to give an account of Kant's six object-
terms which is sufficiently clear and consistent to demonstrate their fundamental role in forming the objective structure of system $t$, and so also to prepare the way for a thoroughgoing interpretation of its subjective elements in Chapter VII.

The conceptual key which can, as I have argued in II.1-3 and IV.3, unlock many of the complexities, ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies in Kant's System is the 'principle of perspective'. By recognizing its thoroughgoing influence, especially as applied to the fundamental distinction between the transcendental and empirical perspectives in system $t$ (to which the object-terms have their primary application), it should be possible to render his theory of the object of knowledge at least intelligible, if not to establish its validity. As explained in IV.3, adopting an empirical perspective in one's search for knowledge involves examining particular experiences in order to determine what 'is true' (synthetic a posteriori) about them, without necessarily distinguishing between the subject and object of knowledge. But adopting a transcendental perspective involves carefully distinguishing the subject from the object and examining experience in general in order to determine what 'must be true' (synthetic a priori) about it--i.e. in order to determine the conditions of knowledge which make experience (i.e. the 'empirical knowledge' of the empirical perspective) possible [Ktl:28-9]. Since Kant's theory is couched in these 'radically epistemological' terms [A8:44], his discussion of 'different objects' should be interpreted as referring not so much to ontological distinctions as to 'different perspectives' on one object, encountered in ordinary (immediate) experience [cf. P16:74-5]. Thus, as Allison puts it, 'the general distinction between the transcendental and the empirical...is not intended as a distinction between two kinds of being, but between two perspectives or manners in which we can consider one and the same thing' [A4:194; s.a. B20:29].

Throughout Ktl Kant frequently discusses the implications of the
transcendental and the empirical perspectives together in the same passage. This gives the impression that all such passages are equally concerned with establishing the elements applicable to both sides of this perspectival distinction. In one sense this is quite true. For it is possible to pinpoint transitions from one perspective to the other in specific passages, such as Bird does in B20:14 with regard to Ktl:A121. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter VII, Kant does introduce both empirical and transcendental elements at virtually every step in system. Nevertheless, a comparison of the purposes of the general 'stages' into which the various steps in system are organized [see VII.1] reveals several important shifts in perspectival emphasis. These shifts can actually be correlated quite closely with four of the major divisions of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements [Ktl:33-732].

Kant starts by focussing in the Aesthetic on the transcendental perspective. For, although he asserts that objects are both 'ideal' when viewed from the transcendental perspective and 'real' when viewed from the empirical perspective, the primary goal of his exposition is to elaborate the basis and implications of the former claim. Thus, as Bird hints in B20:47-51, the Aesthetic more or less assumes the empirical reality of space, time and objects, but argues for the transcendental ideality of space, time and objects. The first shift occurs in the transition from the Aesthetic to the Analytic of Concepts. In the latter section Kant takes a step back from the perspectives concerned with transcendental ideality and empirical reality and adopts a logical perspective, from which objects are viewed as relating not to sensibility--not to time and space--but to the understanding and its concepts (logos). Thus in this section the transcendental and empirical perspectives are more or less of equal importance, inasmuch as both are subordinate to the main goal of establishing the status of the categories as 'pure concepts of understanding'.

In turning from the Analytic of Concepts to the Analytic of
Principles, Kant is modulating from the logical to the empirical perspective. This is evidenced first by the reintroduction of time in the schematism, and then by the reintroduction of space in the chapter on the Principles (especially in the second edition, where it includes the revised Refutation of Idealism). The Analytic of Principles focuses primarily on the empirical perspective in the sense that its primary target is the description of the synthetic a priori principles which determine objects in the ordinary physical world to be empirical objects (a task quite different from that of the Aesthetic, which seeks to establish the synthetic a priori 'form of appearances'). The reader of KtI who fails to realize that Kant intends the 'objects' dealt with in the Refutation of Idealism and throughout the Analytic of Principles to be regarded as empirical objects [cf. E3:107n] is bound to misunderstand the significance of Kant's arguments in these sections.

Finally, having completed both the empirical and the transcendental sides of systemt, Kant modulates in the Dialectic from the empirical to the practical perspective, where he considers the limitations of holding both the transcendental and the empirical perspectives simultaneously. Both the dogmatic acceptance and the sceptical rejection of numerous speculative knowledge-claims are shown to result from an improper confusion of these two key perspectives. The alternative is to view such notions as God, freedom and immortality as practical ideas which serve the end of unifying knowledge, rather than as legitimate transcendental and/or empirical objects of knowledge. Thus systemt ends by giving equal weight once again to the transcendental and empirical perspectives, for both are subordinated to the practical.

One way of assessing the plausibility of this overview as an account of the perspectival organization of KtI would be to compare the relative frequency with which Kant uses the terms 'transcendental', 'logical', 'empirical' and 'practical' in the Aesthetic, Analytic of Concepts, Analytic of Principles and Dialectic. Table V.1 uses Pli to
### Table V.1: Frequency of Perspectival Labels in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements (TDE) of Ktl

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Notes:

1The shaded boxes indicate the set of figures which should be most significant for each column and row, in order for Kant's usage of these four key terms to support my overview. (Page numbers refer to Kemp Smith's translation of Ktl.)

2The average numbers per page provide an accurate means of assessing the relative importance of a given word in each section (as listed in the rows), because the differences in the number of pages in each section are in this way taken into account. However, these figures are not as useful as a means of comparing figures in a column, because words differ widely in their total numbers of occurrences.

3The percentages provide an accurate means of assessing the relative importance of each word in a given section (as listed in the columns), because the differences in the overall usage of each word are in this way taken into account. However, these figures are not as useful as a means of comparing figures in a row, because the sections differ widely in the number of pages they occupy.
make just such a comparison. The results, predictably, are not altogether conclusive, because of the above-mentioned fact that Kant often develops the transcendental and empirical implications of his theories side by side. Moreover, the four key words are not always used in their strict, perspectival senses, so the most we can expect out of such an analysis is a rough idea of Kant's tendencies. Nevertheless, the tendencies revealed by the table confirm at least the possibility, if not the probability, that the correlations I have made are accurate.

The following conclusions (in order of certainty) can be drawn from the table. (1) The overall emphasis of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements is clearly on the transcendental-empirical, rather than on the logical-practical, distinction: the former terms are used over six times more frequently than the latter. (2) If 'practical' is to be specially associated with the perspective assumed in any one part of the Doctrine of Elements, it must clearly be with the Dialectic; for all but two of the 44 occurrences of this word come in this section--by far the highest percentage of occurrences on the entire table. (3) The 'logical' cannot be associated with the Aesthetic, but is used significantly in the other three sections. However, it is used half again as many times per page in the Analytic of Concepts as in the two succeeding sections. Moreover, it has a higher percentage of use in the Analytic of Concepts than any of the other terms in that column. (4) Because of the ubiquity of 'transcendental' and 'empirical' (both occurring an average of more than once per page), they are the terms most difficult to associate with any one section in particular. The most significant difference between their frequencies of use comes in the Analytic of Principles, where 'empirical' is used nearly half again as often as 'transcendental'. The percentage of 'empirical' is also higher, though 'logical' surpasses both in this section--a reflection of the close connection between the two parts of the Analytic. (5) Finally, the frequency of 'transcendental' and 'empirical' in the Aesthetic is
almost identical. But because the former is in general used by Kant slightly less frequently than the latter, its percentage of total usage ends up being slightly higher (5.1% as compared with 4.7%). Thus Table V.1 supports the proposed correlations between perspectives and sections of text—though admittedly with varying degrees of probability.

In Chapter VII I shall examine in detail the extent to which the theories elaborated in Kt1 support this interpretation of the perspectival modulations in systemt. If it is accurate, then it would seem reasonable for Kant to introduce a new set of object-terms at some point in the Analytic of Principles. This would help the reader to know whether the 'object' referred to at any given point is meant to be viewed transcendentally or empirically. As it turns out, this is precisely what he does: 'thing in itself', 'transcendental object' and 'appearance', I propose, refer to various ways of considering the object from the transcendental perspective, while 'phenomenon', 'negative noumenon' and 'positive noumenon' refer to parallel ways of considering the object from the empirical perspective. The latter set is introduced at the end of the Analytic of Principles, once the synthetic a priori rules governing the empirical perspective have been fully established. Moreover, the Appendix [316-49] added after the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena emphasizes the perspectival nature of his theory as it is worked out to that point. What more appropriate place could there be for these sections than just before the Dialectic, where Kant always assumes that the two perspectives are fully compatible?

This perspectival interpretation of the progression of Kant's argument in Kt1 seems far more plausible, and accords to him a great deal more integrity as a philosopher, than the alternative interpretations which tend to depict him as unknowingly propounding contradictory and incompatible theories in the Aesthetic, the Analytic and the Dialectic. For the purposes of this chapter, I shall therefore adopt it as a tentatively valid hypothesis. In accordance with its description
of the general movement of Kant's thought from the transcendental to the empirical, I will examine the terms applicable to the former perspective in V.2, and those applicable to the latter in V.3.

2. Kant's Transcendental Object-Terms

Kant's transcendental perspective in system $T$ is concerned not with particular objects but with 'objects in general'. When an empirical act of knowing is viewed from the transcendental perspective, it is therefore described in terms of a knowing subject 'representing' to itself an unknown thing in the form of a 'representation'. This unknown thing, Kant argues, cannot be represented as it is in itself, because its original representation must stand in some relation to the person perceiving it; that is, a thing in general, regarded from the transcendental perspective, must be able to become an object of experience in order for it to be known by a subject. The original representation of an unknown thing, which in this form is nothing but a completely indeterminate 'something in general=x' [Kt1:A104], is called 'the transcendental object' [236,A109,etc.]. Bird observes that 'the unknown' as a description of the transcendental object 'is not a reference to any mysterious realm of intelligible objects' [B20:79]; rather it refers to the general epistemological requirement of 'having experience'. Thus it presents 'a philosophical task to solve' [79]: viz. how does the unknown 'x' (an object of possible experience) come to have the status of a real object of empirical knowledge? The steps from the former to the latter point, and the rules governing them, will be examined in full in VII.2-3. For now it is enough to point out that to view a person's experience of a real empirical object from the transcendental perspective is to 'posit' [Kt1:667] that the transcendental object is in some way based on the unknowable 'thing in itself'. The latter is Kant's term for an object as considered in its original, unrepresented, and so 'transcendent', form: 'The true correlate of sensibility, the
thing in itself, is not known, and cannot be known, through [any] representations; and in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it' [45; s.a. VI.2 and Plb:108-13].

The problem which inevitably arises for the interpreter of Kant is that, if the thing in itself is unknown and unknowable, it would seem to be difficult, if not impossible, to defend Kant's use of it as the transcendental starting point for system. One reaction to this difficulty is to conclude that 'Kant was simply mistaken' [W3:3], and that the thing in itself is knowable after all; but I have argued in Plb that this approach is radically untenable, both in itself and as an interpretation of Kant. Another reaction is to drop the thing in itself altogether, decrying it as a 'verbal gymnastic'[H10:19] which is superfluous to Kant's essential argument [e.g. 17-21; S25:38-42]. However, this phenomenalist approach, though a coherent alternative, does not solve the problem, but merely ignores it or denies its existence. By contrast, I will argue in VI.1-3 that faith is an adequate justification for our initial assumption of the thing in itself; but in order to understand its function (and hence, its legitimacy), it will be necessary to present a clear and coherent interpretation of the System to which it gives rise. I shall begin this task in the present chapter by demonstrating that Kant's theory of the object of knowledge is self-consistent, even when it comes to his doctrine of the thing in itself.

Much of the unwillingness of Kant's interpreters to accept his starting point results from a common misunderstanding about what the unknowability of the thing in itself entails. When Kant denies the knowability of the thing in itself, he is not denying empirical knowledge, for the thing in itself does not directly 'affect' the senses: the affection of a subject's sensibility by an object occurs only in immediate experience. (Hence empirical knowledge of the thing in itself would be a contradiction in terms.) In fact, from an empirical perspective the objects of everyday experience (of which we certainly
do have knowledge) can be regarded (nontechnically) as things in themselves [see V.3]. But in its technical sense, the concept of the thing in itself is implied by a limitation which arises once a person reflects on affection from a transcendent perspective. This limitation is that transcendental knowledge of the conditions and sources of empirical knowledge is not possible unless one regards the object as an object of experience. Accordingly, it is the possibility of gaining transcendental knowledge of the thing in itself which Kant denies. Empirical knowledge arises out of the experience of a real object, but transcendental knowledge arises out of reflection on the transcendental object (which is itself empirically unknowable [KtI:641-2]). Considered in its transcendent state, however, as a thing in itself, even its existence is open to legitimate doubt. (This, I believe, is Kant's concession to the sceptic [see VI.3].) But once it is accepted as a valid assumption, its unknowability is self-evident and unproblematic [see A7:319-20]. For the unknowability of the thing in itself simply means that nothing can be known about empirical objects if they are considered apart from all relation to the forms by which a knowing subject experiences them.

Unfortunately, Kant's doctrine of the transcendental object is no less obscure than his doctrine of the thing in itself [see B20:36]. The former is certainly closely related to the latter—indeed, so closely that the two are sometimes wrongly interpreted as merely synonymous terms. Ewing, for example, follows Vaihinger and Kemp Smith in claiming that 'it is hardly possible to doubt that the transcendental object is identified with the thing-in-itself' [E5:101]. Nevertheless, it is also closely related to the determinate forms of the object's representation in experience. Accordingly, Walker insists that the thing in itself is 'entirely different' from the transcendental object [W2:107], and Paton suggests (with some uncertainty [P3:II.449]) that the transcendental object should be identified with the concepts produced by
V. Critical Perspectives on the Object

the unity of apperception [443f]. But Paton's dubious interpretation of Kt1:A250 ignores the fact that Kant says the transcendental object is the 'correlate of the unity of apperception' [e.a.], and that it 'cannot be separated from the sensible data' [A250]; elsewhere Kant adds that it 'lies entirely outside the sphere of our understanding' [621]. If it can be identified neither with the thing in itself nor with any of the determinate forms of an object's representation, then the transcendental object must be regarded as a preconceptual, nonsubjective (but none the less transcendental) element in experience. Kant implies this in a reference to reason's pursuit of the unconditioned, which can also be applied to the relation between the thing in itself and the transcendental object:

reason relentlessly seeks the unconditionally necessary and sees itself compelled to assume it [of the thing in itself], though it has no means by which to make it comprehensible and is happy enough if it can only discover the concept [viz. the idea; cf. the concept of the transcendental object] which is consistent with this presupposition.... [Even though] we do not indeed comprehend [it,]...yet we do comprehend its incomprehensibility... [Kt5:463]

(Kant often refers to the concept of the transcendental object [see B20:5], and discusses this notion widely outside the Aesthetic. In such cases it refers not to the transcendental object as such, which, as Buchdahl argues against Bird in B26:64f, has its primary function in relation to sensibility, but rather to the general assumption that some aesthetic element is assumed as given throughout the system.)

A more plausible account of the transcendental object is put forward by Findlay, who says Kant

mainly uses the term 'Transcendental Object' when he conceives of such objects...as being what we have to conceive as being the underlying, unknown ground of appearance and experience; while the term 'Thing-in-itself' is mainly employed when he conceives of them as existing independently of whatever we may conceive or believe. [F3:3; cf. Kt1:A190-1]

Along the same lines, Allison says Kant's purpose in introducing the transcendental object is to show that the thing in itself 'for us can be nothing more than a mere something-\( x \)' [A8:60]. Indeed, only when
the thing in itself is regarded as a transcendental object (i.e. as an element in experience) does its 'existence' take on a literal meaning for us [cf. Kt26:(68)]. Yet in spite of these clear distinctions, both Findlay and Allison tend to use the terms indiscriminately [e.g. F3:16-24; A8:69].

A model which can help to avoid such imprecision is to picture the mediating function of the transcendental object as a doorway between the thing in itself and the subject: although it is directly related to both, it cannot be wholly identified with either. (Compare Bird's 'bridge' metaphor in B20:73.) As such, it refers to an object, considered transcendentally, as it would be just at the point of being apprehended by a subject (hence, not to a thing in itself), but without taking into account the subject's determining influence. Only this object is 'given', though not as a determinate object of 'experience' [Kt1:522-3,642]. Thus Kant equates 'an object in general' (i.e. a transcendental object) with 'an object as it may be given in intuition' [411n, e.a.]—a fate which is denied to the thing in itself. Since the transcendental object bridges the gap between the undeterminable thing in itself and the determinate forms of a represented object, it is not surprising that Kant regards it as similar at times to the thing in itself and at other times to the determinate object.

Once we have a clear understanding of Kant's initial assumption that the thing in itself can be represented to a knowing subject only as a transcendental object, it becomes easier to understand his elaborate theory of how the transcendental object comes to be represented in a determinate form through intuition and conceptualization. Most of the details of this theory will not concern us until Chapter VII; but Kant does make use of yet another object-term, which we must examine if our analysis of his transcendental perspective on the object is to be complete. That term is 'appearance'.

In Kant's primary transcendental sense appearances are objects in-
V. Critical Perspectives on the Object

Tuited in time and/or space by a subject [Kt1:A384]. Since 'the transcendental object of our...sensible intuition gives [such] intuition' [585], the resulting appearances must in some way 'conform to' the former [522-3]: indeed, 'the transcendental object [lies] at the basis of appearances' [641; s.a. A104-10], which in turn reflect 'the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something' [Kt2:314-5; s.a. B20:78]. Inasmuch as the 'transcendental appearance' (as I shall call it) is 'grounded' in an unknown something which exists independently of the subject [Kt2:314,354; cf. B20:4-5,76], the transcendental object (and indirectly, the thing in itself as well) can be regarded as 'the cause of appearance' [Kt1:344; cf. Kt2:287].

(The justification for employing this notion of a 'transcendental cause' will be discussed briefly in VI.2. Some of the problems associated with its use, and with the transcendent employment of the categories in general, will be discussed in VIII.1. It will suffice here to say that Kant prefers such 'fundamental relations' to be 'taken from experience alone' [Kt18:69(117)], to the extent that if one persists in using them in a transcendent (albeit metaphorical or 'non-literal' [see B20:117]) sense, one must recognize that 'philosophy has no business any more' [Kt15:117; cf. B20:76].)

Notwithstanding their transcendental relationship with the thing in itself, such appearances 'constitute an object which is merely within us' transcendentally [Kt1:A129]: from the transcendental perspective these transcendental appearances 'do not exist in themselves but only relatively to the subject' [164] as 'possible perceptions' [246; cf. A250,A375n,527]. Kant defines an appearance as an 'undetermined object of an empirical intuition' [34], and explains that we 'have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance' [xxvi]. The result is that the one transcendental constituent of knowledge which we do encounter in experience—viz. the transcendental appearance—is
'ideal' rather than 'real' (hence the name 'transcendental idealism' [see e.g. A369; s.a. Plc:130n]).

Kant employs the term 'appearance' in several other ways as well, which I will expound briefly in hopes of dispelling any tendency to regard them as contradictory. By applying the principle of perspective to his use of this term, the variety of its meaning turns out not to be 'incoherent' or 'absurd', as some commentators have suggested [S13:43; P16:75; s.a. E3:103], but to be merely a reflection of the complexities inherent in a rigorous investigation of the epistemological facets of human experience. As portrayed above, the word's primary sense is as a transcendental term employed in the context of the transcendental perspective. Another equally straightforward sense is as an empirical term employed in the context of an empirical perspective. Kant clearly distinguishes in Ktl:69-71 between an ordinary empirical appearance and his special transcendental type: the former is an imperfect or illusory perception, whereas the latter is that aspect of a real empirical object which, being 'inseparable from the [act of] representation of the [empirical] object, is not to be met with in the object [=thing] in itself, but always in perspectival relation to the subject' [70n; cf. B20:51,192]. But he uses the term 'appearance' in the former, empirical sense only on rare occasions [e.g. Ktl:428].

The trap into which the interpreter must be careful not to fall is to think these two senses of 'appearance' provide an exhaustive account of Kant's usage. On the contrary, two other, more subtle senses are discernable. First, an empirical appearance can be regarded from a transcendental perspective. In such a case the appearance would be nugatory, since illusions play no part in constituting empirical knowledge (as transcendental appearances do). Consequently, Kant mentions this possibility only in order to pass it off as insignificant [Ktl:69-71,278-9,349-50,A376; s.a. B20:15-6]. But the second subtle use is one which plays a crucial role in system: a transcendental appearance can
be regarded from an empirical perspective. In this case appearances are
the things and objects which make up the natural world of our everyday
experience. Only when this transcendental term is viewed from the
empirical perspective, then, is Grabau correct in suggesting that 'for
Kant appearance in experience is the mode in which we grasp reality'
[G11:771]; for when it is viewed from the transcendental perspective it
implies our inability to grasp reality. Likewise, only from the empiri­
cal perspective is it proper to say 'the domain beyond the sphere of
appearances is not full of things in themselves, but is empty' [775;
cf. Kt1:310; Kt2:361]. There is never any need to refer to the thing
in itself in experience [45]; for the transcendental appearance, viewed
from the empirical perspective, is a 'real' rather than an 'ideal'
constituent of knowledge (hence the equally valid name, 'empirical
realism' [see Kt1:A371,A375; Plc:132n]).

Neglecting the difference between the two perspectives from which
a transcendental appearance can be viewed will almost always render an
interpreter's account of Kant's theory inadequate. Barker, for
instance, sees the two ways Kant has of talking about appearances, but,
ignoring their perspectival relationship, regards them as 'by defini­
tion mutually exclusive' [B3:281]. He accuses Kant of unknowingly con­
tradicting himself [289], inasmuch as he 'decisively embraced neither
the [empirical] theory of appearing nor the [transcendental] theory of
appearance, but oscillated between them without recognizing any need
for making a choice' [283]. But when the principle of perspective is
taken into consideration, we can see that no 'choice' has to be made,
since both theories have their own valid sphere of application. This
interpretive key enables us to reconcile such claims of Kant's as that
appearances are 'in us' (transcendentally) even though they exist as
objects of perception 'outside us' (empirically) [cf. Kt1:59 and A373].

Kant's varied use of such an important term inevitably gives rise
to some confusion. The foregoing account of the four ways in which 'ap­
It may be helpful at this point, therefore, to summarize the results:

1. A transcendental appearance viewed from the transcendental perspective is a representation in the knowing subject which, though undetermined, is ready to be assimilated into a perceptual experience. This is an appearance in Kant's primary technical sense.

2. An empirical appearance viewed from the empirical perspective is an ordinary perceptual illusion. Kant uses the word in this nontechnical sense only occasionally.

3. To view empirical appearances from the transcendental perspective would be to attempt to include perceptual illusions in an explanation of the possibility of experience. Kant explicitly warns against this use of the word.

4. A transcendental appearance viewed from the empirical perspective is a real object of empirical knowledge. This is an appearance in Kant's secondary technical sense.

Fortunately, Kant helps to reduce the chances of confusion by introducing, at the end of his discussion of the conditions and rules governing the empirical perspective, a new object-term denoting an appearance in the fourth sense. This new term, 'phenomenon', is the first member of the empirical set of object-terms to be examined in V.3; but before doing so, I will attempt to clear up some possible misconceptions regarding the thing in itself and its relation to the other transcendental object-terms.

Many interpreters who ignore the perspectival relationship between Kant's object-terms interpret them as referring to things which are somehow actually different objects [e.g. P16:75-6; K4:217-8; S25:90-1]. Such an interpretation finds support in Kant's careless use of the word 'object' [see V.1]. For he sometimes calls the thing in itself an 'object' [e.g. Kt1:70n] even though--inasmuch as it is 'in itself' before it is represented to a subject--it is strictly speaking no more than a possible object (i.e. a thing which might become an object through representation [cf. G11:778]). But interpreting the thing in itself as an object which transcends the object given in experience, yet stands in some sort of 'causal' relationship to it, creates the insurmountable problem of explaining what this means without assuming a transcendent employment of the categories, which would contradict
Kant's own Critical principles [see VII.2 and B20:75-6].

Fortunately, the perspectival interpretation of Kant's System reveals a more coherent picture. The various stages in the determination of an object of knowledge all result from the taking up of some perspective by the subject; the thing in itself, however, is independent of any perspective, because it is not actually viewed by the subject at all [S13:42]. Kant has this in mind when he speaks of the thing in itself and its representational determinations as two equally legitimate ways of referring 'to the very same thing' [Kt2:344; s.a. Kt1:xxvii and Gl1:771n]: 'The thing in itself (ens per se) is not another object [than the appearance], but another perspective (respectus) on the representation of the same object' [Kt9(Ala:653); see H18:37-9]. In this sense we can say that 'the thing in itself is...given in its appearance' [Gla:471]. The latter is 'a thing considered in a certain relation, in virtue of which it falls under a certain description', and the former is 'the same thing, considered in abstraction from this relation, and therefore as not falling under this description' [A8:54]. Those who ignore or overlook this interpretive key, and continue to refer to the thing in itself as an object, often end up using the term in a way closer to Kant's use of 'phenomenon', in which case (as we shall see in V.3) the object under consideration is knowable in principle.

This interpretation of Kant's transcendental object-terms as referring to 'one and the same object considered from two perspectives' [S4:173]--or, more properly, to a distinction between the subject's perspective on an object and the lack thereof--has been made by quite a few interpreters in recent years [see Plc:133n]. But in most cases it is not sufficiently set in the context of the distinction between the transcendental and empirical perspectives in general. (Some writers, for example, tend to equate the two distinctions, or at least to neglect the difference.) In such cases the interpretation falls victim all
too easily to criticisms such as those put forward by Gram [G12:6-9]. His objections, which are based on empirical reflection, can be overcome only by recognizing that the basis of Kant's distinction is transcendental [cf. A8:54,66], and that it can be made only by engaging in transcendental reflection [43-5]. There is, of course, an empirical sense in which the very same terms can be used, such as when Kant speaks of appearances subjectively as mere empirical ideas or images in the mind, and of things in themselves objectively as independently real material objects [see Ktl:45,70,313-4]; but such usage must be carefully distinguished from the transcendental usage [as in A6:227-8, 252-3], and is best reserved for Kant's explicitly empirical set of object-terms [see V.3].

When the thing in itself is interpreted from the transcendental perspective as referring to an empirical object insofar as it is not an object of any subject's knowledge, it becomes a more reasonable (indeed almost a trivial) notion to maintain; for, whatever else might be required for the possibility of empirical knowledge, we obviously cannot know a thing empirically without encountering it as a represented object. 'To state that we know only appearances and not things in themselves is', as Schrader rightly asserts, 'to state an obvious tautology, namely that objects are known only as they are known' [S4:173]. Moreover, if the thing in itself were interpreted in this way and yet rejected, it would be impossible to give any plausible account of the source of 'the empirical differences in shapes and sizes' of the objects of everyday experience [P3:1.139; cf. E5:191-2]. Only what is common to all representations is, for Kant, supplied a priori by the subject in the act of representing. So the thing in itself must be posited and assumed to determine in some sense the raw material for any possible object of knowledge. In other words, a thing other than us must be represented to us in a perceivable form, otherwise we could never become conscious of it; and this, Kant assures us, 'would practi-
cally amount to the admission of [its] non-existence' [Kt1:117n].

In accordance with this interpretation, Kant's claim that things which are represented in the form of transcendental appearances or of the transcendental object also exist apart from the subject in the unrepresented form of the thing in itself can be understood (and hence accepted) as an argument against Berkeleyian idealism. Berkeley's view—sometimes attributed to Kant, usually by those who reject the thing in itself [e.g. S25:242,246]—is that the existence of a thing is due only to the nature of the knowing subject (possibly with some help from God). But Kant's view is that a subject's knowledge of a thing, and so also the representations which constitute that knowledge, exist only in the subject. Whereas for Kant the existence of a real object is ultimately derived from the thing in itself which exists independently of any subject, for Berkeley objects have no nature at all 'in themselves' [Kt1:69-71; cf. VI.3]. Berkeley's error results from his failure to see the difference between regarding an object from an empirical perspective and regarding it as a thing in itself. Kant's modulation to the empirical perspective in the Analytic of Principles is intended at least in part to point up this important difference; hence it is to his much-neglected empirical object-terms that we shall now direct our attention.

3. Kant's Empirical Object-Terms

Why does Kant wait until the last chapter of the Analytic of Kt1 to introduce his empirical set of object-terms? I suggested in V.1 that he has a very specific reason: empirical terms for his primary transcendental distinctions are now required because the same object which he began by viewing from the transcendental perspective is now being viewed from the empirical perspective. The empirical status of the object under consideration in the Analytic of Principles, and so also the function of this section in systeme, could perhaps have been
conveyed more clearly by introducing these new terms at the beginning of this section, rather than postponing their introduction until after the Principles governing the empirical perspective have been fully elaborated.

Kant does hint rather early on that, whereas an appearance (i.e. a transcendental appearance regarded from a transcendental perspective) is 'an empirical intuition...which becomes experience' (i.e. becomes empirical knowledge) through 'the concept of understanding arising from it' [Kt66:142(22)], a 'phenomenon' is an appearance which is already 'in agreement with the category' [Kt1:186]. In his secondary writings he uses 'phenomenon' in much the same sense: it refers to 'an object of experience' [Kt23:401n(179n)] or '...of the senses' [391n(165n)], the detailed knowledge of which 'can be confirmed by experience' [Kt55:83; s.a. Kt53:76(156)]. Although in these works he prefers this term to the term 'appearance' [see e.g. Kt46:435(101),440(109),453-5(130-3); Kt55:318; Kt57:234], he does explain the difference between them in Kt19:394: 'in phenomena that which precedes the logical use of the intellect is called appearance, and the reflective cognition which arises when several appearances are compared by the intellect is called experience.... [Thus] the objects of experience are called phenomena...' Kant's first proper definition of 'phenomena' in Kt1 agrees with his usage elsewhere: phenomena are 'appearances, so far as they [i.e. the appearances] are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories' [A248-9].

An appearance, then, is the undetermined or 'nondescript' form of what is destined to be regarded as an empirical object, while a phenomenon is such an object 'into which appearances may be discriminated by means of the understanding' [B20:56-8,53; cf. Kt1:34]. When the two terms are interpreted as names for 'the same things, only viewed in different ways' [B20:54], it becomes evident that phenomena are always transcendental appearances (viz. 'categorised appearances' [55]) viewed
from an empirical perspective, but that appearances viewed from the transcendental perspective are not phenomena because they are regarded as if they had not yet been categorized (and thus, known empirically). Therefore, just as the transcendental object is transformed into an appearance only when the transcendental forms of intuition are added to it, so also the appearance is transformed into a phenomenon only when it has been synthesized with the categories in such a way as to become a real, determinate object of empirical knowledge.

Given this interpretation, the term 'phenomenon' should not be deemed to be 'pejorative', nor to 'imply that the reality we elaborate in judgment is somehow defective'. On the contrary, it refers straightforwardly to the very type of object with which science is concerned, an 'immediately perceived' object of everyday experience [Kt1:A371]; but it does so in such a way as to remind the reader that if this empirical phenomenon were to be viewed from a transcendental perspective, then it would have to be regarded (but not 'condemned' [F3:20]) as an appearance. Accordingly, nothing could be more damaging to an interpreter's understanding of system T than Weldon's predication of the thing in itself as 'the necessarily unattainable goal of empirical investigation' [W14:140]; for Kant not only maintains that the goal of empirical investigation is always and only the phenomenon, but also that this goal is adequately attainable [see B20:24]. 'Our right to aim at an explanation of all natural products on simply mechanical lines is in itself quite unrestricted' [Kt7:417]. Although it may be true that 'the complete determination of an individual [object] is an infinite task' [W20:41e.a.; cf. Kt7:418], Kant allows that for empirical purposes 'the cognition of [phenomena] is most veridical' [Kt19:397]. Indeed, he says that, even though from a transcendental perspective phenomena are regarded merely as appearances, they 'should be treated in science as if they were things-in-themselves relatively to us as empirical beings' [a.q.i. E5:179; s.a. Kt2:353 and B20:42]. In
other words, 'empirically construed, an object "in itself" just denotes the correlate (Phänomena) of empirical judgments' [P8:375; cf. A8:67]. This is the case, of course, only because the objects we think of empirically as independently existing 'things' are the same entities as those which must be called 'appearances of a thing in itself' from the transcendental perspective.

If the phenomenon is the final goal of empirical investigation, then why does Kant also introduce the 'noumenon' at this point [Ktl: 306]? His expressed reason is not to stress the importance of the change from the transcendental to the empirical perspective, which these terms signify; this he does in the Appendix to the Analytic [316f]. Rather, he introduces the 'noumenon' in order to emphasize that the transcendental elements in his account of the synthetic a priori construction of empirical knowledge can be applied only to objects of possible experience. To elucidate this limitation, he needs specifically empirical object-terms not only for the transcendental appearance, but also for the object in its unknowable state. The former need is clearly fulfilled by the word 'phenomenon'; but it is not so clear in what sense the word 'noumenon' can be an empirical equivalent of either the transcendental object or the (transcendent) thing in itself.

As we saw in V.2, the thing in itself is the reality which is knowable as represented to us in the form of a transcendental appearance, but which is by definition unknowable in its unrepresented form. Once the unknown thing is considered to be a transcendental object standing in some relation to a transcendental subject, it can be determined through intuition to be a transcendental appearance, and through conceptualization and synthesis to be an empirical object [see VII.2-3]. With this transcendental progression in mind, it seems natural to infer in empirical reflection that the empirical object, which we can now call a phenomenon, must be related 'to something, the immediate representation of which...must be something in itself, that is, an
object independent of sensibility' [Kth:A252e.a.]; hence it must be related to 'an object determinable through mere concepts [341], or to 'an object of a nonsensible intuition' [A249]. In other words, 'something which is not in itself an appearance must correspond to [the phenomenon]. For appearance can be nothing by itself, outside our mode of representation' [A251].

To regard a phenomenon as released from the subjective conditions of appearance which particularized it (viz. from 'our mode of intuition' [Kth:307])--i.e. to regard a particular object of knowledge as if it could be an object without being represented--is to form the concept of what Kant calls a noumenon. This 'entirely indeterminate concept of an intelligible entity' [307] accompanies a phenomenon [A251] whenever an object is judged empirically to have 'objective reality'; for this judgment consists precisely in determining that the phenomenon has such an independent (and thereby in itself unknowable and indeterminate) nature. 'The understanding, when it entitles an object from an [empirical] perspective mere phenomenon, at the same time forms, apart from that perspective, a representation of an object in itself'--i.e. a noumenon [306; s.a. B20:74]. Hence--as in the case of 'phenomenon' and 'appearance'--a noumenon is always a thing in itself, but a thing in itself is not a noumenon unless its representation is considered to be particularized as an object in a subject's phenomenal experience. In both cases the new terms are brought in as empirical equivalents for the original, transcendental terms. (Incidentally, this explains why Kant never uses 'noumenon' until the third chapter of the Analytic of Principles, and then occasionally equates it with 'thing in itself' in subsequent sections: in these sections Kant is dealing with the mistake of viewing the thing in itself as an object--or vice versa--in which case it is proper to treat it as synonymous with 'noumenon'.)

Kant is careful to warn, however, that the concept of 'noumenon' arises out of an 'ambiguity' which 'may occasion serious misapprehen-
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For although 'even the wisest of men' has a tendency to speculate on this basis [Kt1:397], it is a mistake to conclude that the noumenal aspect of objectively real phenomenal objects opens up to us 'a world which is thought as it were in the spirit (or perhaps intuited), and which would therefore be for the understanding a far nobler...object of contemplation' [Kt1:A250]. To do so would entail viewing the noumenon in a literal way as 'an intelligible object' [31le.a.] or an 'object of pure thought' [393e.a.]; but when viewed from man's limited, empirical perspective, 'noumenon' is 'not the concept of an object, but is a problem unavoidably bound up with the limitation of our sensibility' [344]. As a phenomenal being, man can acquire empirical knowledge only by means of sensible intuition: 'our kind of intuition does not extend to all things, but only to objects of our senses, ...consequently its objective validity is limited' [342-3]; yet we can infer from this that 'a place therefore remains open for some other kind of [non-human] intuition, and so for things as its objects' [343].

Our ignorance of that 'space' in which we could experience the noumenon as an empirical object raises yet another problem. Such ignorance is required by system $t$, because from the transcendental perspective a thing can be an object of knowledge only if it is represented intuitively to our senses as an appearance, and not directly to the understanding as a thing in itself [Kt1:307]. Yet some knowledge of the noumenon seems to be necessary in order for us to judge that an empirical object is an objectively real phenomenon. Rather than eliminating this difficulty by retracting one of his claims, Kant uses the understanding's natural but unattainable desire to know the phenomenon as a noumenon to uncover a number of longstanding philosophical illusions in the Dialectic. In order to clarify how it is possible to know the objective reality of phenomenal objects in spite of our necessary ignorance of their noumenal nature, we must examine how he refines his
terminology by proposing one final distinction.

The meaning of the general distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, as well as the particular sense in which 'noumenon' is intended to be regarded solely as an empirical object-term, remains in somewhat of a muddle [cf. W9:159-67] unless we take into account Kant's distinction between the negative and positive aspects of the noumenon---a distinction which, as we shall see, is closely related to, though not synonymous with, his distinction between the thing in itself and the transcendental object. In its negative sense, the noumenon is 'a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition'; and in its positive sense, it is 'an object of a non-sensible intuition'[Kt1:307].

The positive noumenon would supply direct, quasi-perceptual knowledge of the thing in itself without requiring the knower to represent it in terms of time, space and the categories [Kt22:208; s.a. F3:3-4 and S13:43]. Although the possibility of such knowledge for other types of being 'must not be absolutely denied' [Kt1:344], Kant insists it is of no use so far as man's empirical knowledge is concerned: 'What things-in-themselves may be I do not know, nor do I need to know, since a thing can never come before me except in appearance' [332-3]. The assumption that our knowledge of empirical objects is a knowledge of things in themselves, and thus of positive noumena, is what Kant believes gives rise to illusions such as those he tries to dispel in the Dialectic, where he argues that the closest metaphysics can come to such knowledge is to put faith in an 'idea of practical reason' as a guide to the unification of empirical knowledge [385,498; cf. IV.3, VI.4 and VII.3]. It is important, therefore, not to equate the thing in itself with the positive noumenon: the former is the unknowable basis of transcendental appearances, while the latter is (for us) an unrealizable concept denoting an immediate empirical knowledge of the thing in itself. Al-Azm describes this difference succinctly when he says: 'The noumenon is a strictly epistemological concept; the
thing-in-itself is an ontological concept' [A2:520].

Although his moral philosophy puts certain qualifications on his theory of knowledge [see e.g. Kt4:48 and Ch. VIII], Kant's position in Ktl is that, because our intuition is necessarily sensible, 'a "noumenon" must be understood as being such only in a negative sense' [Ktl:309]; it 'is not indeed in any way positive, and is not a determinate knowledge of anything' [A252]. The positive noumenon is epistemologically useless: 'our understanding...cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and...it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something' [312]. Nevertheless, the negative noumenon serves an important purpose as a limiting concept:

[It] is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge... [For] the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of appearances is for us empty... The concept of noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept... [Yet] it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility... [310-1]

To apply the concept of 'noumenon' negatively, therefore, is merely to recognize that a phenomenon has 'a non-phenomenal' aspect--i.e. that it is not a mere phenomenon (an empirical appearance)--and that, as Bird warns in B20:75, this aspect 'must not be supposed to refer to any object.' As such, the negative noumenon 'is not only admissible, but as setting limits to sensibility is likewise indispensable' [Ktl:311].

Alluding to Kant's doctrine of the noumenon, Strawson argues: 'In order to set limits to coherent thinking, it is not necessary, as Kant...attempted to do, to think both sides of those limits. It is enough to think up to them' [S25:44]. This criticism is invalid, however, not only because it presupposes the inadequate interpretation of the thing in itself according to which it is equated with the noumenon and regarded as a separate object from the appearance [90-1,238-9,245], but also because it depicts Kant as trying to set limits to 'coherent thinking' rather than to 'empirical knowledge'. Kant himself admits that coherent thinking is limited by the law of non-contradiction, which cannot be
overruled [Ktl:191]. Likewise, he holds that we cannot know both sides of the limits of empirical knowledge [cf. B20:27]. But these views do not preclude the need to think both sides of the limits of knowledge by means of a concept such as the noumenon. In any case, the negative noumenon does not pass beyond the 'bounds of sense', but merely marks the boundary. Rejecting it would make it impossible, in the context of Kant's theory, to establish the objective reality of any objects of knowledge whatsoever! Only the positive noumenon passes beyond this boundary, and must thereby be accepted by faith, if it is accepted at all [see VI.4 and VIII.3]. But even though it is epistemologically useless, the positive noumenon is not logically incoherent: as Bird contends, 'to think them as things in themselves'--that is, as positive noumena--is simply to admit 'that intelligible objects are conceivable, that is to say not logically impossible' [192].

The negative noumenon corresponds to the transcendental object [Ktl:344-5,A358] in much the same way as the positive noumenon corresponds to the thing in itself, and the phenomenon to the transcendental appearance. Just as the transcendental object is 'the thought of an object in general' [B20:80] as it is originally represented pre-conceptually from a transcendental perspective in its undetermined but determinable state [Ktl:A250,A253], so also the negative noumenon is the final representation of that same object, which, though previously determined, is now regarded conceptually from an empirical perspective as indeterminate once again. The latter is 'the concept of the "concretization"...of the transcendental object'; it is the transcendental object 'construed empirically, or "in terms of" actual empirical knowledge' [P8:377]. We can therefore call the transcendental object the first possible representation of an undetermined object as it 'comes in' to systemT (the thing in itself not being a representation at all), and the negative noumenon its last possible representation as it 'goes out' of that system.
Kant's solution to the problem of how to determine a thing's objective reality--i.e. its independence from the knowing subject--has a transcendental and an empirical side. The former will be discussed in VII.3, in terms of the role of 'conceptual rules, and agreement in the application of concepts' [B20:80] in conferring objectivity. But Kant's view of what it is in the object which enables it to be regarded as objectively real is now evident: a thing has objective reality if it can be viewed from the transcendental perspective as being rooted in the transcendental object and from the empirical perspective as giving rise to a corresponding negative noumenon. Kant explicitly says the function of the transcendental object is to 'confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality' [Ktl:A109; see B20:78]. Similarly, he implies (rather obscurely) that a negative noumenon must correspond to a phenomenon if the experienced object is to be regarded from the empirical perspective as independent of all subjects [Ktl:306-7].

The need for the negative noumenon to accompany the phenomenon in order for the object to be regarded as objectively real is parallel to the need for a concept to accompany an intuition in order for a judgment to be regarded as objectively valid [see VII.2]. This is because the phenomenon is primarily that which is intuited (though, being empirical, it is also conceptualized), whereas the negative noumenon is primarily conceptualized (though, being empirical, it is related to intuition via the phenomenon). The negative noumenon is that aspect of an object which is experienced as nonsensible, so it refers to our 'experience' of its concept. Likewise the phenomenon is that aspect which is apprehended by our senses; without an awareness of its noumenal aspect, we could not distinguish a phenomenon from an empirical appearance (i.e. from an illusion). Therefore, the transcendental object and the negative noumenon function as elements in system T only if it is assumed that the knowledge being examined is actual knowledge.
My reconstruction of Kant's theory of objective reality can be summarized as follows. The judgment that a thing is an objectively real constituent of empirical knowledge is described in system \( t \) as the judgment that a phenomenon has a negatively noumenal aspect. (This empirical judgment is also described transcendentally in terms of a transcendental appearance which is determined to be a phenomenon by virtue of the fact that it is related transcendentally to (i.e. it is a representation of) the thing in itself through the mediation of the transcendental object.) In making this judgment we require no knowledge of what the object is in itself; it is only necessary to know (or indeed, to believe [see Ch. VI]) that a given phenomenal object has the noumenal mark of independence. The possibility and necessity of regarding the phenomenon in this limited manner is precisely what Kant wishes to defend by introducing the concept of a negative noumenon; for its purpose is to guarantee the objective reality of a phenomenal object by establishing its connection with the transcendental object, but without requiring any knowledge (transcendental or empirical) of the object as it is in itself.
Chapter VI

Faith as Kant's Key
to the Justification of the Transcendental Perspective

1. Faith and the Transcendental Turn

Kant is sometimes reproved for not having devoted more attention to the question of how Critical philosophy is possible [e.g. W9:249-55]. To compensate for this neglect, Kantian philosophers tend to focus on one or more of three methods of justifying his transcendental perspective (and particularly his infamous presupposition of the 'thing in itself'). Interpreters have stressed the role it plays: first, in the overall System to which it gives rise; second, in Kant's special theory of transcendental idealism; or third, in relation to his transcendental arguments. Part Three of this thesis will provide a version of the first type of justification; a version of the second type has been given in V.2 [s.a. VII.2]; and I have thoroughly discussed the possibility of the third type in Plb. However appealing Kant's System may or may not turn out to be once our interpretation brings out the consistency and coherence of the theories which constitute it (and perhaps even their correspondence with reality), we must concede that such an approach on its own could not provide an entirely conclusive justification for Kant's 'transcendental turn'. In this chapter, therefore, I will touch upon each of these methods, but only in order to demonstrate their secondary importance to Kant's own justification for assuming an unknowable reality as his epistemological starting point. Though almost always neglected by interpreters, this fourth method, I will argue, is his ultimate and indispensable key to the justification of the transcendental perspective, so it accounts for his failure to justify it in other ways.

In Kt2:371 Kant suggests it is occasionally necessary for the
philosopher to adopt 'a rational faith which alone may be possible for us, sufficient to our wants, and perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself.' Although this would appear at first sight to be precarious ground on which to build an epistemological foundation for a philosophical system [cf. S25:241], Kant seems to treat it not only as sufficient, but as the necessary support for both his transcendental and his practical perspectives [see e.g. Kt20:142]. Establishing such an approach as philosophically valid will not only provide an initial justification of his starting point, but will also turn out to play an important role in our discussion in Part Four of the theological practicability of his System. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, will be to demonstrate that Kant does in fact use faith as the justifying key to his transcendental perspective, and to defend its legitimacy in this role.

Before discussing the implications of this rather unconventional claim, we must understand what Kant means by the word Glaube (translated as either 'faith' or 'belief'). Schrader may be right in saying 'the term faith is not used in any conventional sense' by Kant [S4:183]; but this does not justify his charge that it therefore 'serves to confuse the function of the critical method as applied to moral experience' [183]. For if we make an effort to understand Kant's own special use of the word and apply it consistently, then it can serve instead to clarify the nature of his Critical method.

Most commentators limit the application of all Kant's comments on faith to his moral philosophy, ignoring or denying their application to his epistemology [e.g. W14:109]. For instance, his claim to 'deny knowledge [Wissen], in order to make room for faith' [Kt1:xxx] is often taken out of its wider context and regarded solely as an allusion to the way the denials of the Dialectic make room for the faith of practical reason. (Kemp Smith's translation tends to encourage this by dissecting Kant's one long paragraph at Kt1:xxiv-xxxi into five para-
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Kant's immediate point in making this assertion is indeed to stress the need for faith in one's employment of practical concepts such as 'God, freedom, and immortality'; but it is rarely acknowledged that his general argument depends on the premise that the same 'attitude of reason' must also hold true in system \( \mathcal{E} \) for the thing in itself. Just as he regards the faith of practical reason as the legitimate response to our lack of knowledge concerning God, freedom, and immortality, so also he regards the faith of theoretical reason as the legitimate response to our lack of knowledge concerning the thing in itself. The two cases are directly parallel; in fact, Kant's overall purpose in the paragraph in which the statement occurs is to demonstrate their similarity, and in so doing to establish the priority of faith in the thing in itself for both epistemological and moral reflection.

Admittedly, the great majority of Kant's references to faith do concern its role in his practical, rather than in his theoretical, system; and in a few cases he even seems to deny the validity of applying it to the latter [see e.g. Kt7:472,475]. The least ambiguous of these apparent denials comes in Kt10:69n(76-7n): 'The belief of reason...can never be directed to theoretical cognition, for there the objectively inadequate holding-to-be-true is mere opinion. It [i.e. faith] is merely a presupposition of reason from a subjective, though absolutely necessary practical perspective.' However, this and all such statements are not intended to deny the need for rational faith in the thing in itself; for this presupposition, though indeed theoretical, is not intended as a 'theoretical cognition' of an 'object' [s.e. Kt23:396-7n (173-4n)]. Only when such knowledge is the goal (i.e. only within the limits of system \( \mathcal{E} \)) does the use of faith lead to a 'mere opinion'. By contrast, the thing in itself is precisely that sort of subjective 'presupposition of reason' which Kant is here describing as being supported on the pillar of rational faith. Once this is fully understood, it becomes impossible to regard the thing in itself as a
'wild card', slyly included in Kant's epistemology solely 'for the purpose of his ethics' [W9:159-60; s.a. 166; M7:144]; for, even though he fails to explicate his position, he clearly implies that faith in this rational presupposition forms the very ground in which the Critical System is planted.

Kant describes faith as 'the moral attitude of reason in its assurance of what is beyond the reach of theoretical knowledge' [Kt7:471; s.a. 469]. He is most interested in such 'realities which transcend experience' [L3:44] when they have their primary positive function in system, and therefore inspire such a 'moral attitude'; nevertheless, he admits that 'even in purely theoretical judgments there is an analogon of practical judgments, to the mental entertaining of which the term "belief" is appropriate' [Kt1:853]. Moreover, Kant clearly states that even a belief in a transcendent reality such as God depends not just on practical faith, but also on 'pure rational faith, because pure reason alone (in its theoretical as well as practical standpoint) is the source from which it springs' [Kt4:126].

In both practical and theoretical contexts, faith's 'assurance' can result from either ordinary 'contingent belief' or special 'necessary belief'. The latter, strictly Critical kind of belief, is based on the assumption that 'I know with certainty [ich gewiss weiss] that no one can have knowledge [kennen] of any other conditions which lead to the proposed end' [Kt1:852]. This assumption does not entitle us to 'speculative knowledge' [Wissen] concerning the conditions in question [Kt2:371]; instead it means the conditions are regarded as sufficient 'only subjectively' [Kt1:850]. For 'rational belief...is a subjectively sufficient assent associated with the consciousness that it is an objectively insufficient assent; therefore...[it] can never be converted by all the natural data of reason into knowledge, because the ground of assent in this case is merely subjective' [Kt20:140-1]. Accordingly, 'the expression of belief is, from the objective perspective, an
expression of modesty'--i.e. of an awareness of our ignorance--yet it is, 'at the same time, from the subjective perspective, an expression of the firmness of our confidence' [Kt1:855; s.a. 498-9; Kt2:278]. In spite of our ignorance, therefore, the 'conviction' which results 'is often firmer than any knowing. In knowing one still listens to counter-reasons, but not in belief, because this turns not on objective grounds but on the moral interest of the subject' [Kt10:72(80)].

Ewing aptly observes that 'faith does not mean for Kant belief on authority or belief without ground, but believing what we have adequate grounds for believing but cannot absolutely prove' [E5:9]. Along these lines, Kant notes: 'Belief is no special source of cognition. It is a kind of holding-to-be-true with consciousness of its incompleteness' [Kt10:67n(75n)]. As such, faith involves, at least in the case of the thing in itself, the formation of something like a hypothesis. Kant defines the latter as: 'The holding-to-be-true of a presupposition as a ground' [84(92)]. In working with a hypothesis 'we conclude from the truth of the consequence to the truth of the ground'; and although 'hypotheses always remain hypotheses, that is, presuppositions whose complete certainty we can never attain', nevertheless 'the more consequences can be derived from a hypothesis, the more probable it is' [85 (92-3)]. Kant says metaphysics itself does 'not permit of hypotheses' [86(93)]. But this does not prevent the Critical philosopher from putting faith in the thing in itself as the starting point of his metaphysical System; on the contrary, as we shall see, this metacritical hypothesis enables him to avoid depending on such hypotheses within his System [see Kt20:141-2]. Moreover, the systematic consequences of presupposing the thing in itself [see Part Three] lend a measure of 'objective validity' [see Plc:137n] to this hypothesis, which initially is supported only by the subjective validity of faith. Thus theoretical as well as practical faith 'lies at the foundation of the critical philosophy' [W20:20], and is, in fact, 'the outlook, the
In the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to defend this interpretation of the role of faith in Kant's philosophy by relating it to three specific issues. First, I will elaborate on what it means to say the thing in itself must be accepted on faith [VI.2]. I will then contrast this approach with that which regards transcendental arguments as the only valid method of justifying this assumption [VI.3]. And finally, assuming my interpretation is correct, I will consider the relationship between theoretical faith in the thing in itself and moral faith in the ideas of practical reason [VI.4]. If I am successful, I will have demonstrated not that Kant believed he had established his System as undoubtedly 'true', but rather that he held transcendental philosophy to be 'true' only for those who choose to follow his initial leap of faith.

2. Filling the Transcendent 'Space'

In discussing the concept of 'noumenon'--a term related to, but not to be equated with, 'thing in itself' [see V.3]--Kant says:

The relation of sensibility to an object [i.e. to the thing in itself] and what the transcendental ground of this unity may be, are matters undoubtedly so deeply concealed that we...can never be justified in treating sensibility as being a suitable instrument of investigation for discovering anything save always still other appearances--eager as we yet are to explore their non-sensible cause. [Ktl:334]

He concludes on this basis that the only legitimate function of this 'empty' concept is negative: 'to mark the limits of our sensible knowledge and to leave open a space which we can fill neither through possible experience nor through pure understanding' [345; cf. A8:46].

What Kant does not explain at this point is whether (and if so, how) this 'space' can be regarded by us as filled in any way. Since 'noumenon' refers to the empirical counterpart of the reality which Kant views transcendentally as the 'non-sensible cause' of appearances [Ktl:334], he must regard this space as being 'filled' in some sense by
the thing in itself. For us the thing in itself is unknowable by definition [cf. Plb], so it would not fill the space beyond our sensibility with an actual noumenal object, or with any other knowledge of 'the relation of sensibility to an object' [334]; it would merely provide us with a label for the belief that there is a supersensible 'ground' of the world as we know it. The only problem this raises is, of course, how to justify such an assumption.

Allison argues against this interpretation in A8:49:

Properly construed, this problem is not, as is generally believed, that of somehow justifying the assumption of the existence of unknowable entities. Rather, it is to show the possibility and the significance of...considering things [i.e. empirical objects] as they are in themselves, which means as they are apart from the conditions under which we can know anything about them.

On the whole, Allison's interpretation is a good one; for Kant is indeed primarily concerned with investigating the various 'perspectives' from which 'things' can be considered [see IV.3; Plc:g4]. Consequently, a good deal of what he says about the thing in itself can be interpreted as referring to how the concept of 'things apart from our knowledge of them' can be analysed. But this, surely, is not what Kant has in mind when he talks about the thing in itself as the 'cause' of appearance [as in Kt1:334]. On the contrary, he is regarding the thing in itself as that which fills the transcendent space which is for us unknowable. To regard it in this way is to hypostatize its concept, so that its existence (in some transcendent, but analogously categorial sense of the word) must be presupposed [cf. 855]. And any talk which even alludes to such hypostatization of unknowable concepts does require some justification.

Kant maintains that 'the modest language of a rational belief [vernünftigen Glaubens]' enables us to 'assume...the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life' [Kt2:278e.a.]. The assumption which guides 'the will', or 'practical reason' [Kt4:15], concerns the
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does not regard [this assumption] as involving any difficult, problematic step: it is rather...a primordial certainty which stands in no need of justification, even if its lack of empirical content means that it can never be ranked as knowledge.... [Thus] we cannot but conceive of, and believe in, such non-apparent objects or aspects of objects, even though we can have no knowledge of them. [F3:2]

But he errs in saying the thing in itself 'stands in no need of justification'; for Kant does not regard it merely as an unsupported 'extra' which can be accepted or rejected, and which is peripheral to the main purposes of Critical philosophy [cf. S25:38-42]. On the contrary, his entire System is an attempt to provide good reasons for assuming that the objects of our experience are appearances which are grounded in the unknowable thing in itself. He adds faith to these reasons as the ultimate justification of his presupposition because he thinks it is impossible ever to prove its objective validity. In VI.3 I will
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consider in more detail why he thinks this is so. But before turning to this question I will touch upon one of Kant's most important 'reasons' for having faith in the thing in itself.

If the philosopher adopts faith in the thing in itself at the outset of his transcendental inquiries, then he will find it is not necessary to appeal to faith to justify his empirical inquiries. Kant states this rather obscurely in Ktl:xxxixn:

it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of our knowledge, even of our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.

This passage might at first sight appear to contradict the claim that faith is Kant's key to justifying his assumption of the thing in itself [cf. S26:117]. It would do so if 'things outside us' referred to the thing in itself as regarded from the transcendental perspective [see e.g. S20:3.35]. But this could not be Kant's intention, since he goes on to give a brief summary of the proof he has supplied in his Refutation of Idealism [Ktl:xxxixn-xlin]. The empirical idealist against whom he is arguing doubts the real existence of empirical objects--i.e. objects of experience, or, as Kant calls them, phenomena. So the 'things outside us' in this context must be phenomena [see V.3]. Moreover, Kant would never claim to have provided a proof for the existence of the thing in itself, since he consistently regards it as unknowable.

Far from contradicting my interpretation, Kant's statement confirms it by implying that the philosopher can avoid the 'scandal' of having to take refuge in faith to justify his acceptance of phenomena (i.e. 'things outside us' from the empirical perspective) [as in H27: 1.3.7] only by having faith in the thing in itself (i.e. in the reality of 'things outside us' from the transcendental perspective). In other words, the philosopher will be unable to prove the objective reality of empirical objects unless he presupposes that these objects are pheno-
mena which, when regarded transcendentally, are appearances of the unknowable thing in itself. If he does muster up enough faith to make such a presupposition, the way is open for a completely adequate solution to this longstanding philosophical problem. The solution, quite simply, is that from the empirical perspective 'inner experience itself [the real existence of which the empirical idealist does not doubt] depends upon something permanent which is not in me, and consequently can be only something outside me' [KtI:xl-xxlin]--namely, phenomena. Not only can phenomena be proved to exist, they can also be regarded as (in principle) completely knowable by the scientist [see V.3]. But if the philosopher cannot bring himself to take this initial step, then he will inevitably confuse the transcendental and empirical perspectives, and, taking the objects of experience to be things in themselves, find himself unable to prove his belief in their existence.

Kant would surely be disappointed to find that his solution to this 'scandal' has not prevented it from continuing to spread--indeed, to thrive--in some philosophical circles to this day. A good example is Quine's declaration that 'in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind' [Ql:41]. He bases this on the rather more plausible supposition that 'The totality of our so-called knowledge and beliefs...is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges' [39; cf. IV.4]. But the 'man-made' nature of all knowledge does not preclude the philosopher from discerning different kinds of knowledge or belief; it does not require him to reduce all knowledge to mere 'cultural posits', as Quine suggests [41]. Quine is unable to make any strict distinction between knowledge of 'physical objects' and belief in the 'gods' for the same reason which led Berkeley to his empirical idealism: both philosophers confuse the transcendental with the empirical perspective and consequently fail to distinguish between faith in the thing in itself and faith in matters of empirical interest.
The reason philosophers such as Berkeley and Quine refuse to take advantage of Kant's transcendental faith is obviously that they assume a fundamentally different approach. But why some philosophers, on the other hand, shun the need for faith in the thing in itself even though they do accept the bulk of Kant's System is not quite so evident. Probably the most common example of the latter is found among those Kantians who attempt to pick up where Kant left off in his use of 'transcendental arguments' (i.e. proofs by reference to the possibility of experience). To the alternative offered by such philosophers, therefore, we must now turn our attention.

3. Transcendental Arguments and Kant's Refutation of the Sceptic

Kant himself never uses transcendental arguments on behalf of the thing in itself; instead, he limits their use to determining what must be presupposed to be true about the phenomenal world in order for our experience of it to be possible [e.g. Kt1:38,A402]. Paton thus has good reasons for suggesting that the validity of presupposing the thing in itself 'is not considered by Kant to be in need of proof', and that such a proof would have seemed 'ludicrous' to him [P3:170; s.a. M9:56; II:756]. But this is not entirely fair, since Kant does occasionally supply rather brief arguments for his presupposition, such as that if experience has bounds, then 'that which binds it must lie quite without it' [Kt2:360]. Such comments do provide a possible basis for attempting on Kantian grounds to construct a transcendental argument for the necessary existence of the thing in itself.

Chipman constructs such an argument by paying close attention to Kant's own statements. He gathers together a number of fragmented bits of reasoning and forms them into a single, surprisingly complete, transcendental argument:

(a) The objects of experience exist only as spatiotemporal appearances,
(b) Insofar as we judge that there are appearances, we must be prepared to judge that there are things appearing,
(c) To speak of a thing appearing is, by implication, to make use of the concept of a thing-other-than-as-it-appears, 
Ergo,
(d) Objective experience requires us to postulate things-other-than-as-they-appear, or things in themselves. [C6:491]

Although Chipman thinks Kant's theory of the thing in itself is 'consistent', he admits that even this reconstructed argument remains 'inconclusive' [489]: 'Kant has not succeeded in establishing that we must postulate things in themselves as a necessary condition for the possibility of objective experience, but...their possibility must nevertheless be countenanced' [498].

Walker attempts to compensate for the inconclusive nature of such reconstructed forms of Kant's position by straying rather further from Kant's own methods. He maintains that, once we recognize that 'Kant was simply mistaken' to think the thing in itself must be completely unknowable, the way will be open to construct transcendental arguments which can establish some highly significant conclusions about its nature [W3:3]. But, as I have argued in Plb, his position is radically incoherent both in itself and as a basis for interpreting Kant. For if his transcendental arguments prove anything, they yield conclusions only about the phenomenal world--conclusions which Kant himself has already supplied.

Philosophers who attempt to construct a transcendental argument for the validity of presupposing the thing in itself apparently fail to see the reason why 'the formal character of transcendental arguments does not interest [Kant]' [Kl:421]; as a result, like 'the critic who dissect a transcendental argument [i.e. one which Kant does give] with merely formal instruments', they 'may miss the heart of the matter' [423]. It is indeed unfortunate that Kant himself does not present his argument as clearly as Chipman has shown to be possible. But it is not surprising that even in its clearest form it is not undeniably conclusive. For Kant never intends his comments to provide anything but good
reasons for assuming the thing in itself as the starting point of his transcendental perspective.

When Kant says, for instance, that the presupposition of the thing in itself is 'not only admissible, but unavoidable' [Kt2:314-5], he is implying not that a transcendental argument could ever prove it to be necessary, but that it is unavoidable for anyone who wants to ask transcendental questions (i.e. questions about the subject and/or object of experience, which assume the transcendental perspective). To ask such questions without presupposing the thing in itself (as in some versions of phenomenalism) is 'to be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears' [Kt1:xxvi-xxvii]. For, as George rightly says, 'if Kant's theory of objectivity is correct, it is not for us men to say that there are objects of representation but no things in themselves' [G7:194]. It may be that representations are somehow generated out of nothing; but if we wish to construct a coherent theory of the phenomenal world, on the basis of the transcendental perspective, then it is more consistent to presuppose that they are rooted in the thing in itself. Therefore, the 'heart of the matter', which is likely to be missed by those who wish to prove the validity of Kant's presupposition, is that doubt in its validity can in the end be countered only by faith.

This interpretation of Kant's intentions reveals a fundamental point at which he agrees with the sceptic: both Kant and Hume maintain that there is a sense in which objects are unknowable, so that even the philosopher cannot claim to have objectively valid knowledge of them. For Kant this is true only so long as objects are regarded as things in themselves; but this should not be taken as an attempt at entirely refuting the sceptic. For his response to being 'awakened' by Hume was not, as Russell suggests, to conjure up 'a soporific which enabled him to sleep again' [R14:731]. Rather, having realized that the sceptic's doubts can never be entirely satisfied merely by means of logical proof
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and disproof, he formulated the doctrine of the unknowable thing in itself as his concession to the sceptic [see e.g. Kt2:20 and Kt4:53].

Transcendental arguments are designed to convince the sceptic that experience is possible only if the object is regarded as an appearance, which conforms to certain synthetic a priori forms of knowledge, supplied by the subject (namely: space, time and the categories). When the role of these arguments is taken into consideration, it becomes evident that Kant's position is not, as Schaper suggests [S2:237], that we must view the world 'as if' these forms of knowledge apply to objects, even though we know that in reality they do not, or that objects of experience 'can be taken "as real" for all empirical purposes'; on the contrary, it is that these forms must really apply to empirical objects and that such objects must be empirically real in order for experience itself to be possible. If the arguments are successful, the sceptic is still allowed (indeed, encouraged) to regard the thing in itself as unknowable, but he must now also admit that empirical knowledge of objects is possible so long as it is regarded as representational; for such knowledge is not a direct apprehension of the thing in itself. However, the sceptic is not forced to admit that the representations of experience are grounded in the thing in itself--a view more likely to be rejected by Berkeley than by Hume [see V.2]. Kant does not construct a transcendental argument on the latter point because he knows the sceptic's acceptance of it depends in the end on his willingness to adopt some amount of faith.

This conclusion enables us to accept Hartmann's suggestion that all systems of transcendental philosophy 'can be explained only from within, not from without' [H3:249] without jeopardizing the success of Kant's attack on Hume's scepticism. Kant is here attempting not so much to force the sceptic (or any other 'outsider') to relinquish his position, as to integrate the valid insight acknowledged by the sceptic (that reality in itself is not knowable) with the valid insight acknow-
ledged by the rationalist (that reality as we know it is necessarily characterized by certain unchanging forms), and in so doing to provide the impartial observer with a coherent alternative to both extremes.

Kant's success, though by no means complete, can be measured by the fact that philosophers who refuse to adopt faith these days are generally not so sceptical (or perhaps, not so forthright) as to admit to drowning their despair in food, backgammon and merriment, as Hume did [H27:1.4.7]; instead they adopt one of several agnostic positions, from which they either ask transcendental questions without committing themselves to belief in the thing in itself (as in phenomenalism), or ignore transcendental questions altogether (as in pragmatism). Kant would have nothing to say to the latter group, except perhaps that their pragmatism itself only makes sense within the broader context of Critical philosophy. But to the former group he would question the authenticity of their supposedly 'transcendental' questions by pointing out the incoherence of adopting a 'phenomenal' view of the world without assuming something transcendent which necessarily limits our knowledge. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that either group would be anxious to listen.

4. Theoretical Faith and Practical Faith

Now that I have clarified the role of faith as Kant's key to justifying the transcendental starting point of his Critical philosophy, I shall touch upon its role as the practical goal of system. It is important for us to consider the latter not because practical faith is essential to the justification of his transcendental turn [Pla:444n], but because it is often regarded as the only context in which he refers to faith [see e.g. W19:13-25]. We must therefore conclude our discussion by examining how practical faith in the ideas of reason differs from theoretical faith in the presupposition of the thing in itself.

An idea of reason is a concept which serves to unify our interpre-
VI. Faith As Kant's Key

Speculative metaphysicians make the mistake of believing they can reason their way to knowledge of such unconditioned objects. But Kant denies this possibility, insisting that, because an idea is merely a concept, with no corresponding intuition, it can never constitute knowledge of the unconditioned. Instead, it can be employed effectively only by those who are willing and able to have faith in the practical value of its use [499-500].

Kant says practical faith 'refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence in that furthering of the activities of my reason which confirms me in the idea, and which yet does so without my being in a position to give a speculative account of it' [KtI:855]. Another, better known description of what is involved in adopting such faith is that it entails viewing certain objects of experience 'as if they had their ground' in the object represented by an idea [709], even though the reality of this object is not objectively knowable. In suggesting this interpretation, Kant is intimating that we should regard the idea not as a 'philosophical fiction' [S2:233], but as our best approximation of what the unconditioned object really would be, if we were able to gain knowledge of it. Because its speculative employment can never be legitimate, faith in the idea is required in order to justify its practical employment.

How, then, are the ideas of reason and the faith on which they depend related to the thing in itself and the faith on which it depends? Many of the claims Kant makes in discussing the ideas can be applied directly to the thing in itself as well. He says, for example, that through the ideas 'we really know only that we know nothing [about transcendent reality]' [KtI:498]; and the same can be said of the thing in itself [cf. 45]. Moreover, Kant's references to the thing in itself in his discussion of the ideas often connote that the two notions are
inextricably related [e.g. 593-4; Kt2:353-4]. But the closeness of their relationship should not lead us to agree with those interpreters who propose that the thing in itself should actually be included as an idea of reason [e.g. S2:238]. To do so would be to ignore the difference between Kant's transcendental and practical perspectives. For when the thing in itself is mentioned in the context of a practical perspective (such as Kant adopts whenever he discusses the ideas), it always refers to what the thing in itself would be if it were an unconditioned object of knowledge; and, as we saw in V.3, this is precisely what he means by the (technically more accurate) term 'positive noumenon'. The ideas are concepts of what might be true about the thing in itself as positive noumenon, based on what we actually encounter in experience; they are regulative, rather than constitutive, of experience. By contrast, the thing in itself as such is a transcendental presupposition referring to that which is ultimately constitutive of (at least) the matter of experience, but which is not considered in experience to be either regulative or constitutive. When this distinction is taken into consideration, it becomes obvious that Kant's reference to the thing in itself as such from the transcendental perspective is quite distinct from his connection of the thing in itself as noumenon with the ideas from the practical perspective.

The fact that Kant positions the thing in itself and the positive noumenon at opposite ends of the spectrum of knowledge indicates that the sort of faith employed in each case is at least in some respects different. In its transcendental use it is directed towards a single, necessary, theoretical presupposition: the whole realm of transcendental reflection is closed to the philosopher who is unwilling to adopt faith at this point. In its practical use, on the other hand, it is directed towards a variety of practical presuppositions, the denial of which may or may not affect the coherence of the overall System. But apart from the difference in the object to which it is directed and in
its relation to that object (as determined by its position in the unfolding of system\textsubscript{T}), the kind of faith required at these two points is really the same. It is the reasoned decision to treat as true a presupposition which cannot be verified objectively, but which is suggested by the objectively known facts to be the best (or perhaps, the only) choice available which will enhance the unity of the systematic context (i.e. of the perspective) to which it belongs. When Kant adopts rational faith in the thing in itself, it generates a systematic movement of thought through the whole spectrum of human knowledge, which comes full circle to rest where it began, with faith in the unknown, considered now as the tool of practical reason.

Numerous implications follow from this understanding of the role of faith, particularly in the areas of moral philosophy and philosophical theology. The most obvious example, however, concerns those philosophers whose ultimate goal is to reach a certainty which is in no sense dependent upon faith. Philosophers of all sorts can readily be found who tend towards this attitude: Heidegger can serve as a typical case. He describes philosophy as a science of 'thinking' which excludes all faith, relegating the latter to theology \cite{Hil:10,27,205-6}. But if I am correct in my interpretation of Kant's justification for the type of reflection which Heidegger himself practised, and if Kant is correct in putting it forward, then philosophers who push aside faith in this way are in danger of either letting their overconfidence in the powers of unaided human reason lead them to make unwarranted speculations (e.g. about 'Being'), or letting their lack of confidence prevent them from making any significant affirmations at all \cite{Kt:20:145-7}. For there would then be an important sense in which faith is not only relevant, but vital to the task of the philosopher (as well as that of the theologian). As Bradley puts it, 'philosophy demands, and in the end rests on, what may fairly be termed faith. It has, we may say, in a sense to presuppose its conclusion in order to prove it' \cite{B:24:15}. 
Another example of how this perspectival view of the role of faith is applicable to theological issues is the potential it has for resolving the age-old theological controversy over the question of the relationship between faith and reason. With all his 'Enlightened' emphasis on the superiority of reason, Kant saw that transcendental reflection must be preceded by faith if it is to be consistently and coherently employed. Yet at the same time, he saw that reason precedes faith when it is viewed in a practical context. The theologian, I suggest, could apply this twofold understanding of faith to his own interests by arguing that religious faith likewise precedes reason transcendentally (e.g. when considering the necessary conditions for salvation), even though reason precedes faith in practical matters (e.g. when considering the significance of a particular doctrine).

Other examples could be provided, but are peripheral to our purpose in this chapter, which has been to clarify the unfortunately obscure emphasis Kant put on faith. Although Kant's transcendental perspective can, as we have seen, be partially justified in other ways as well, our conclusion has been that faith is Kant's key to its ultimate justification. Thus we can say with Weldon that Kant is 'entitled to his view that the nature [indeed, the very 'existence'] of things in themselves inevitably remains for us a matter of belief, not of scientific metaphysical knowledge' [W14:11]. Only when we follow Kant in replacing our natural tendency towards dogmatism or scepticism with a rational faith in the legitimacy of the transcendental presupposition will we be in a position to understand, and so also to judge the validity of, his Critical System. Just as practical faith in the ideas can 'bring unity into the body of our detailed [i.e. empirical] knowledge' [Kt1:675], so also we may find that such theoretical faith can bring unity into our understanding of the nature of human knowledge in general. For in both cases, as Kant says in Kt43:222(82), 'faith... provides...a clear light to enlighten philosophy itself.'
PART THREE: THE CRITICAL SYSTEM

Chapter VII

Kant's System of Theoretical Perspectives

1. The Four Stages of Representation in General

The task set before us here in Part Three is to put forward a more detailed interpretation of Kant's System, beginning in this chapter with his system of theoretical perspectives (developed mainly in Kt1), by attempting to fill the formal structure of his architectonic, as elaborated in P1d§3 [s.a. III.3], with the content provided in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements of each Critique. One of the risks of modulating from formal to transcendental logic in this way will be that of oversimplification—i.e. of making distinct what Kant (perhaps purposefully) left obscure, or vice versa. Consequently, I shall not pretend to have discovered texts in Kant's writings which match perfectly with each of the twelve formal expressions given in P1d:281, nor to have accounted adequately for all of his multitude of apparently technical terms. Instead, I shall merely pick out those arguments which seem to constitute the essential tenets of his system, and leave unexplained their architectonic interconnections. Such an explanation is possible, but an adequate treatment would require far more space than is available here.

As suggested in P1d§4, the form of my interpretation of system will be as follows. Its four major 'stages' are concerned with the analysis of the nature of (1) sensibility and (2) understanding [VII.2] and of (3) judgment and (4) reason [VII.3]. Each stage has three logical (not chronological) 'steps', arranged in a synthetic pattern. Thus, I will interpret Kant's presentation of the 'conditions of knowing' in system as containing a total of twelve steps. Each step is itself
established as necessary by means of a threefold (synthetic) argument. The various 'elements' which operate in each step can therefore be regarded as constituting a ninefold pattern in each stage (the formal structure of which is discussed in Plj:4.1, but does not need to be described here). The threefold structure of each step in Kant's presentation can be adequately understood by demonstrating how it is manifested in a very general, but also very important, example. Once this is done, we will discuss the general character of each of the four stages in system and their structural relationship. These two introductory tasks will prepare us for a detailed study of each stage.

We saw in V.2 that Kant's whole theory of the synthetic progression of the elements of knowledge is based on the assumption that the knowing subject must 'represent' to itself an unknown thing in the form of a 'representation'. The power to perform this function is attributed to the 'faculty' of representation. Two ambiguities concerning this claim must be cleared up immediately, since the confusion which might otherwise result could easily hamper our understanding of almost every step. The first is that the term 'representation' can be used either as a verb to name an a priori function of knowing, or as a noun to name the state of the object once it is determined by this function. This means the effect on an object of the faculty of representation (i.e. of the function of representing) is to determine that it is a representation (i.e. a represented object). The same ambiguity arises with many of Kant's other terms as well, and may explain at least in part why, as Wolff points out, 'statements about knowing and statements about knowledge tend to be interchangeable' for Kant [Wl6:73n]. Fortunately, as long as both possible meanings are kept in mind, the intended meaning can usually be determined from the context with a fair amount of certainty.

The second ambiguity concerns Kant's frequent use of the word 'faculty'. This and many of the terms used in connection with it are...
'the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology' [S25:97]. The only proper response, they say, is to 'de-psychologize' his theory in order to purify its truly philosophical content [H5:288]. And this, of course, involves analysing the arguments in modern terms in hopes of finding consistent and/or conclusive bits of reasoning—a procedure the interpretive value of which is questionable. But there are two responses which can be offered in defence of Kant's terminology. The first is that, although it appears to the twentieth-century reader as if he is arbitrarily inventing words at each step in his theory, most of these terms were familiar to philosophers in Kant's own time. 'Indeed', Weldon tells us, 'it is not too much to say that all Kant's leading conceptions...and much of his greatly abused architectonic are clearly foreshadowed in the [works of his predecessors]' [W14:52; s.a. P3:I.100n and V4:82-8]. This alone, of course, does not justify our continued use of such terms; but it does suggest that they are meaningful in their own context, so that they cannot simply be discarded by the interpreter without seriously misrepresenting Kant's System.

The second reason why we should continue to use Kant's faculty terminology when interpreting his philosophy is that it is not, in fact, intended to be psychological in any way. (Kant clearly distinguishes on several occasions between transcendental philosophy and empirical psychology [e.g. Kt1:152].) Instead, as Vleeschauwer points out, Kant's use of apparently psychological terminology assumes a 'different perspective' [V4:88]: it is simply the way he has chosen to refer to the subjective functions of human knowing in his radically perspective-bound philosophy. Because philosophical analysis is always limited to one perspective at a time (at least, if it is to be coherent), the functions can be regarded as distinct even though each faculty performs its own function on 'one and the same territory of experience' [Kt7:175]. Van de Pitte defends Kant in much the same way when he says:
Kant is unable to define sensibility (except as receptivity), the categories, or the imagination (except as the agency of synthesis). Yet this inability does not at all trouble him. For it is not the faculties of the mind [as such] that he is concerned with, but the functions which must be fulfilled if experience is to be possible. [V3:1024-5]

An examination of representation makes a good introduction to Kant's way of arguing not only because it reveals these typical ambiguities, but also because he uses the term in connection with almost every step in his theory [cf. Kt1:94,376-7]. Representation itself 'cannot be explained at all', since it 'would have to be explained again through another representation': human knowledge 'always presupposes representation' [Kt10:34(38)]. 'All representations', he insists, 'can themselves become objects of other representations' [Kt1:A108]; so his entire discussion of the conditions of knowing can be regarded as an account of the faculty of representation applying a series of conditions to the object which is to be conditioned, so that the latter is represented in a more and more determinate form of representation, until all such steps eventually lead to the fully determined knowledge of the represented object.

Kant defines an 'organism' in Kt7:376 as 'an organized natural product in which every part is reciprocally both end and means.' Taking this comment, together with his subsequent claim that the interrelationships between the parts of an organism are 'founded upon...the causality of an architectonic understanding' [388-9], to apply not only to physical organisms, but to rational systems as well (as he suggests in Kt1:xxii,xxxvii-xxxviii), can help us to understand the formal relationship between each of his twelve successive threefold arguments (or steps). The first part of each step will specify the material given, i.e. the conditioned element, which is carried over from the conclusion of the previous step; the second part will specify the formal function, i.e. the condition, which is supplied by the subjective faculty involved; and the third part will specify the unity of these, thus yielding a
new level in the determination of the object. The 'end' of each argu-
ment (i.e. the third part) then becomes the 'means' (i.e. the first
part) for the next: the object at this new level of determination
serves as the material for the next step; and the process continues
until the object is finally represented as fully determined. This
reciprocal development is a perfect example of 'the causality of an
architectonic understanding'. Kant alludes to this synthetic pattern
when he notes that a transcendental argument is required whenever 'an a
priori determination is synthetically added to the concept of a thing'
[Kt1:286]. But even though the Critical philosopher is concerned pri-
arily with the transcendental aspects of the elements defined by each
argument, Kant often discusses their empirical aspects as well. I shall
mention this empirical side of many of the arguments discussed, but
concentrate mainly on their transcendental character (using 'transcen-
dental' here in the broad sense in which all the conditions of knowing,
regardless of the stage in which they arise, are transcendental).

We can now examine the structural relationship between the four
stages of system₄. The first and second stages of system₄ deal with
the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Kant describes the
functions of these 'two sources of representation' [Kt1:327] in the
Transcendental Aesthetic and in the (Transcendental) Analytic of Con-
cepts, respectively. He defines sensibility as 'the capacity (recepti-
vity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are
affected by objects' [Kt1:33; cf. 75 and Kt6:210n]. In other words,
'the senses' are 'the first foundation of all judgments' [Kt18:361
(102)], so that the aim of the first stage is to discover how the
material for knowledge (i.e. sensation) arises through the function of
intuition. Special attention is paid to the role of 'representations
which are not empirical' [Kt1:A99]; thus the faculty of sensibility
adopts the transcendental perspective in system₄ [cf. V.1]. However,
Kant defines understanding in a number of different ways. Indeed, he
assigns to 'understanding' almost as wide a variety of possible meanings as he does to 'representation'. So it is important to determine which of his meanings applies to the second stage of system$_t$ and how the understanding in this sense is related to sensibility.

'Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge' [Kt1:137]. As such, it is 'the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge' [75]. Kant analyses this general meaning in Kt66:138(19):

understanding (in the most general sense of the term)...
must include: 1) the power of apprehending given [representations] to produce intuition..., 2) the power of abstracting what is common to several of these to produce a concept..., and 3) the power of reflecting to produce knowledge of the object.

As we shall see, this threefold division of the general powers of the understanding directly corresponds to the first three stages of system$_t$ (i.e. to intuitive sensibility, conceptual understanding, and determinate judgment, respectively). But Kant later distinguishes this general type of understanding from sensibility by calling the former 'the higher cognitive power' and the latter 'the lower'. He then specifies that, as 'the higher cognitive power', the faculty of understanding 'consists in understanding, judgment, and reason [196-7(68-9)]'. And these three terms refer directly to the second, third, and fourth stages of knowing (i.e. to conceptual understanding, determinate judgment, and rational inference, respectively). In its most general sense, therefore, according to which the understanding is equally well describable 'as a spontaneity of knowledge..., as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts, or again of judgments', as a 'faculty of rules', and as 'the lawgiver of nature' [Kt1:A126], it is involved in some sense in every stage of knowing.

Inasmuch as we shall be discussing sensibility, judgment, and reason as stages in their own right in VII.2-3, the use of understanding as the name for the second stage must refer to its more specific sense, as one aspect of the higher cognitive power in general. Kant uses the
word in this narrower sense when he says 'the understanding...thinks only, and does not intuit' [Kt1:139]. But within this specific usage, the word 'understanding' is occasionally utilized even more specifically as a description of any one of the three functions which combine to make up the second stage [e.g. 134n]. Fully aware of its multifarious meaning, Kant observes that 'the proper task of a transcendental philosophy is the 'dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts a priori' [90-1]. Rather than discussing every variation at this point, let us now examine the relationship between understanding and sensibility.

As the second stage of knowing, understanding is always closely related to sensibility. In fact, Kant himself speculates that these 'two stems of human knowledge' may 'spring from a common, but to us unknown, root' [Kt1:29]. Whereas sensibility provides the transcendental material for empirical knowledge, understanding in the second stage provides 'the logical form of all judgments' by forming self-conscious thoughts which correspond to sensations [Kt1:140e.a.; s.a. 143]. Understanding in this context is therefore always conceptual understanding. Like sensibility, understanding is an abstract function, in the sense that it is concerned not with concrete objects of real experience, but with one aspect of our knowledge of such objects in abstraction from the other. The faculty of sensibility considers intuition in abstraction from conceptualization and is always 'passive, consisting in receptivity', while the faculty of understanding considers conceptualization in abstraction from intuition and is 'active and manifests power' [Kt66:140(21)].

The third and fourth stages of system deal with the faculties of judgment and reason, and are presented in the (Transcendental) Analytic of Principles and in the Transcendental Dialectic, respectively. Kant defines judgment as 'the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it' [Kt1:93]: it is the empirical
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realization of the understanding in its concrete relation to sensibility. The role of the third stage in clarifying how judgments are possible is succinctly summarized in Kt7:407: 'understanding must wait for the subsumption of the empirical intuition...under the conception, to furnish the determination [of an empirical object] for the faculty of judgment.'

Kant defines reason in a deceptively similar way, as 'the faculty of inferring, i.e. judging mediately' [Kt1:386; s.a. Kt14:59(93)]. Rational inference, or 'syllogism' [Schluss], refers to the subjective function whereby certain universal conditions are determined to apply to an object of judgment which cannot be discovered through judgment alone [Kt1:360-1]. 'Concepts of understanding', he explains, 'first provide the material for making inferences' [366-7]; judgment now serves as the form under which such conceptual material is subsumed in order to be synthesized in an inference [360-1]. Because the role of sensibility drops out in this fourth stage [Kt1:363; cf. R10:65], rational inference, as we shall see, often tends to be employed speculatively. (This occurs when the understanding adopts sensibility's transcendental perspective, rather than the logical or empirical perspectives which properly belong to it; as Kant clearly states in Kt1:345, 'employing the understanding transcendently' is 'contrary to its vocation'.) But in their proper, Critical employment, the objects ultimately determined through inference 'serve only for the completion of reason's empirical perspective' [Kt1:593; cf. 714]—i.e. only to complete our systematic understanding of the nature of empirical objects.

Keeping in mind this description of the formal relations between the four main stages of system will help us to steer a straight course through the rough waters of Kant's terminology. In VII.2 we will examine the six steps which constitute the first two stages of this system, the stages which deal with intuition and conceptualization in abstraction from each other; and in VII.3 we will examine the third and
fourth stages, which deal with our concrete judgment and inference concerning real objects of empirical knowledge.

2. Intuitive Sensibility and Conceptual Understanding

Kant's exceedingly broad understanding of terms such as 'representation' and 'understanding' makes it necessary for him to introduce other terms to describe both the objective and the subjective elements which operate at each particular step. Since we have already considered at great length several of the most important of these more specific terms [see IV.1-V.3], we can assume with only the briefest reminders that their meanings are already sufficiently understood. Two such terms come up in the first step of Kant's twelvefold progression.

We saw in V.2 that the 'thing in itself' is a symbolic name for that aspect of an object of knowledge which transcends our modes of representation, and which is therefore unknowable [s.a. Plb]. As such it does not have the status of a formal condition of knowledge. When considered as determined only to the extent of being represented by a subject through an 'original' act of representation, the thing in itself can be called the 'transcendental object'. This first representation of reality in the form of an undetermined object is the material step in the sensibility stage in system [see Kt1:347]. As Kant says in Kt6:217n, 'the architect of a system' must begin with the 'concept...of an object as such.'

Although he never uses the phrase 'original representation', this formal condition is clearly implied by Kant. For he frequently uses 'original' in close conjunction with 'representation', usually when referring either to the original (i.e. non-empirical [Kt1:72]) representations of space [40] and time [48], in contrast to the 'original apperception' in which the second stage culminates [see e.g. A107]. The closest he comes to using this phrase is when he refers to 'original receptivity' in Kt1:A99, in which case 'original' indicates, as in step
one, the bare fact that a thing must be represented as an object in order for us to know it empirically [33; s.a. W5:297]. Moreover, in Kt10:64(71) he does call representation 'the first degree of cognition', thus suggesting its role as the first step in system\_T. The first step can therefore be regarded as that in which the thing in itself is originally represented in the form of the transcendental object.

The next step maintains that the transcendental object must be represented as an 'appearance' through the process Kant calls 'intuition'. Once again, the meaning of the third term of this argument was fully discussed in V.2, where we referred to it, when viewed from the transcendental perspective of system\_T (i.e. sensibility), as a 'transcendental appearance'; but the role of intuition as the 'form of appearances' [Kt1:223; s.a. 323-4] has yet to be explained. This process of intuition, or 'immediate representation' [41; cf. 33], is neither an imaginative activity nor a capacity for 'mystical insight' [R6:240-5], but the function whereby the undetermined object is interpreted by the subject as a mass of unorganized representations called the 'manifold [Mannigfaltige]' (i.e. 'multiplicity' or 'variety'). Once the original given, the transcendental object, is intuited [Kt1:A394], so that it has the formal limits of sensibility imposed upon it, it becomes a manifold of appearances and can serve as 'the data for a possible experience' [A119,298]. 'Possible experience' is Kant's way of referring to immediate experience [see IV.1] when it is viewed from the theoretical standpoint. But another formal limit, as we shall see, must be imposed by the understanding in the second stage [A119] before the contents of this possible experience can become 'data for a possible knowledge' [296]. Kant holds these formal limits to be 'concepts which are of two quite different kinds..., namely, the concepts of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as concepts of understanding' [118]. The former, as given here in stage one, are the source of our 'awareness of individual entities', while the latter,
to be given in stage two, are the source of our awareness of their general nature [Ktl:136n, 298].

The manifold of appearances is sensible only when it appears in the context of space and/or time—i.e. only when these intuitive 'forms of sensibility' [Ktl:522] are applied to it. (Since this is 'the only kind of intuition we possess' [302], Kant calls a (transcendental) appearance 'the undetermined object of an empirical [or 'sensible'] intuition' [34].) Kant says: 'The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity, a capacity of being affected in a certain manner with representations, the relation of which to one another is a pure intuition of space and time' [522]. Thus time and space, the two pure forms of all human intuition, 'come before appearances and before all data of experience, and are indeed what make the latter at all possible' [Ktl:323; s.a. 208 and Ktl9:399; cf. P3:1.112].

Kant proposes two ways in which this sensible intuition can be manifested in the human subject: through 'inner sense' (i.e. the soul) and through 'outer sense' (i.e. the body) [Ktl:50, 69, 400]. He proposes:

Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility [42].

Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intu­ition of ourselves and of our inner state [49].

Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever [50].

This means that all objects which appear to the inner sense—i.e. 'the sum of all representations' [220]—are intuited in the context of time, while both time and space are required for an object to appear to outer sense [182]. 'Time and space, taken together, are the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and so are what make a priori synthetic propo­sitions possible' [55-6].

Because the pure intuitions of time and space are not forms 'in­hering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property' [Ktl:45], but exist 'only in us' [59], they cannot claim 'absolute reality' [52].
Kant explains that 'these a priori sources of knowledge, being merely conditions of our sensibility, just by this very fact determine their own limits, namely, that they apply to objects only in so far as objects are viewed as appearances, and do not present things as they are in themselves' [56; cf. A7:320]. For this reason, 'pure intuition' can also be called 'transcendental intuition', thus clarifying that it refers only to 'intuition considered from the transcendental perspective'. The sole application of transcendental intuition is to enable the representations of the first step, which could otherwise be regarded only as a transcendental object, to become represented as appearances here in the second step.

This second condition not only determines the intuitive form of sensibility, but also enables the matter which is provided by the transcendental object to be revealed in the appearances; for as Kant says, 'appearances contain in addition to intuition the matter for some object in general [i.e. the transcendental object]' [Kt1:207]. The third condition of sensibility, therefore, must be to actualize these formal and material conditions in a synthetic unity; that is, the appearances, or sensible intuitions must actually be sensed, thus representing the manifold of appearances as a manifold of sensations [74].

Kant does not devote much attention to this third step in his argument, perhaps because its conclusion is so obvious. It is important to point out, however, that, from the transcendental perspective, the 'sensations' in this third step are not sensations as we actually experience them, but refer only to the objective level of determination of the object produced by the faculty of sensation in abstraction from the understanding. (Kant does sometimes view sensibility empirically, in an active sense—as, for example, when he says 'inner sense presents to me...' [Kt1:321]. But insofar as it is viewed transcendently, sensibility is the purely passive capacity for receiving objects, some of which will eventually help constitute knowledge.) This third step
completes the sensibility stage of system$_T$ and establishes sensation as 'the material of sensible knowledge' [74]. Some of these sensations, of course, might not end up becoming conscious, since they have not yet been conceptualized in such a way as to produce possible knowledge [Cl:I.352-5]. However, unconscious sensations are not epistemologically interesting, so Kant ignores them and concentrates instead on those destined to help make up empirical knowledge [Kt1:A111].

As mentioned in VII.1, the aim of the understanding in the second stage is to provide the abstract conceptual form for the matter presented to it by sensibility. This does not mean that 'All intuitional process is conceptually controlled' [E3:89], but that in order to produce empirical knowledge, such material processes must submit to the formal 'control' of conceptual processes. In Kt1:A94 Kant lists three 'conditions for the possibility of experience', which must hold true in order for thought to arise out of a manifold of appearances: '(1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) the synthesis of the manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception' [s.a. 104,A115]. He then reminds us that the Aesthetic (i.e. the first stage) culminates in the first of these conditions, sensation [A94-5]. The second stage, as expounded in the Analytic of Concepts, now assumes the logical perspective, which culminates in the function of self-conscious thought; therefore, the other two conditions listed in Kt1:A94 must function as two of the steps in this second stage.

Kant's account of the fourth step of system$_T$ is somewhat muddled by his use of several terms in very similar ways with no clear explanation of their relationship. In particular, the terms 'imagination', 'perception', and 'apprehension' are easily confused, because they all take part in the function of synthesis, which Kant regards as the 'first application' of the understanding to sensibility [Kt1:152], and
which he defines as 'the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge.... Synthesis of a manifold...is what first gives rise to knowledge' [103]. 'The understanding does not', according to Kant, 'find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects that sense' [155]. This 'synthetic influence of the understanding upon inner sense' is what Kant ordinarily refers to as 'the transcendental act of imagination' [154]. In itself, apart from the illumination provided by the fifth and sixth conditions as they 'bring this synthesis to concepts', the imagination is 'a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious' [103]; it simply 'connects the manifold of sensible intuition' [164] in such a way as to form an inner image of the sensations involved.

This application of imagination to sensations results in a conscious 'association of representations' [Kt1:A121], which Kant calls perception [160,164]. Perception is the act in which appearances are 'combined with consciousness' [A119-20] to produce 'objects of perception' [207]; it 'contains sensation' as its 'matter' [208-9]. Accordingly, perception can be described as 'representation accompanied by sensation' [147], as long as it is a 'sensation of which we are conscious' [272]. In short: 'Perception is...a consciousness in which sensation is to be found' [207; cf. Kt22:217]. Since this consciousness, which forms sensations into perceptions, arises only through the synthesis of imagination, 'perception' can be thought of as a general description of the whole process (i.e. the four steps) leading up to and including this synthesis. Kant suggests this when he declares the entire second stage to be that in which 'our faculty of knowledge...advances from particular perceptions to universal concepts' [Kt1:118].

An accurate summary of the complexities of this fourth condition would have to take into account the variety of expressions Kant uses to
describe synthesis, which is not required for our purposes. Instead, we need only to emphasize that the essential function of this 'first principle of the human understanding' [Ktl:139; s.a. 152] here in step four is to synthesize the manifold of intuitions in order to produce a conscious perception. No matter which terms we use to describe it, this fourth step serves, by means of a transcendental synthesis, to 'bring the manifold of intuition on the one side into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other' [Ktl:A124; s.a.164].

Apperception, however, does not follow synthesis immediately in system (i.e. it does not function as the form to be imposed upon the perceptions represented in the material step); rather this function is fulfilled by the 'pure concepts of the understanding' (i.e. the 'categories') [see e.g. Ktl:A119], while apperception, as we shall see, acts as the synthetic condition of stage two. For 'our understanding...can produce a priori unity of apperception solely by means of the categories' [145e.a.]; indeed, such 'transcendental unity...is thought in the categories' [151]. The categories, as 'the conditions of the necessary unity of apperception', and not apperception itself, can be regarded therefore as doing for stage two what 'the formal conditions of space and time' do for stage one [All0e.a.; s.a. 136]--a parallelism stated even more explicitly by Kant in Ktl:A111. Whereas 'the categories contain, from the perspective of the understanding, the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general' [167], space and time contain the grounds for the same possibility, from the perspective of sensibility. Since Kant believes that 'All synthesis...is subject to the categories' [161], he describes the latter as categories of synthesis, to which the object as given in step four, that is 'perception, must completely conform' [162], and which as such prepare the way for the unity of apperception in step six. 'Consequently, all possible perceptions...must be subject to the categories' [164-5].
Whereas the second condition of the first stage gave rise to objects of intuition (i.e. appearances), that of the second stage gives rise to objects of thought (i.e. concepts). Kant defines thought rather loosely as 'knowledge by means of concepts' [Ktl:94], but more precisely as 'the act which relates given intuition to an object' [304]. In Ktl:A124 he explains that 'concepts...are brought into play through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception', thus implying that they arise out of the application of categories to conscious perceptions here in step five. The connection between the activity of (what I shall call) 'categorization' and its resulting concepts is frequently made explicit, as when Kant refers to the categories as 'forms of thought' [e.g. 150,289,305] (as opposed to space and time as 'forms of intuition'), or as 'the pure form of the conceptual perspective on objects in general' [305], which determine 'the thought of an object in general' [158]—thereby suggesting a correlation between the intuitive determination of the transcendental object in stage one and its conceptual manifestation in stage two [see V.2]. Since the categories function as 'the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances' [A128], a concept produced by categorization 'is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule' [A106].

Kant often stresses the necessary, reciprocal relationship between intuitions and concepts: 'Now there are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible, first, intuition, through which it is given, though only as appearance; secondly, concept, through which an object is thought corresponding to this intuition' [Ktl:125]. Just as perceptions are intelligible only when related to concepts, so also concepts are objectively valid only if they are related to perceptions [272]. But in spite of this reciprocity, Kant assumes it would be beneficial to examine the function of categorization in its own right. In fact, he believes that by theoretically abstracting from the particular content of all perceptions and examining
their general content [A245], he will be able to compile a complete list of all the a priori categories of pure understanding. Indeed, there is a sense in which the twelve categories correspond directly to the twelve steps in system—\(t\)—a correspondence which Kant himself begins to elaborate in Kt1:742-3 when he says quantities can be 'exhibited a priori in intuition', while qualities can be known 'only through concepts'. In any case, our need to abstract from experience in order to arrive at the categories [Kt1:165] does not contradict the fact that they function in system—\(t\) as 'independent cognitive acts' [R10:89]. For as Wallace says: 'The pure or abstract categories have their home in logic' [W4:171]—i.e. in the logical perspective of system—\(t\).

Before arguing in the Transcendental Deduction for the status of the categories in general as the fifth condition of knowing, Kant lists and briefly describes each of his choices in the passage known as the Metaphysical Deduction [Kt1:91-116]. He asserts that 'the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four heads': quantity, quality, relation and modality [95]. Each of these four 'forms of judgment' has 'three moments', or 'derivative concepts'; but we need not discuss them here since Kant himself admits that 'in a merely critical essay the simple mention of the fact will suffice' [107]. After listing the twelve resulting functions in a Table of Categories, he makes a number of rather presumptuous claims regarding their all-sufficiency. He decrees, for example, that the twelve categories taken together 'specify the understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers' [105], so that there need never be 'any addition to the transcendental table of categories, as if it were in any respect imperfect' [115]. Not only does this table 'reveal and make noticeable every gap in the understanding' [265], but it will also, he predicts, supply 'the complete plan of a whole science' [109].

Despite the ostentatious nature of such assertions, Kant devotes little effort in Kt1 to the defence of his twelve categories or to the
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clarification of their individual meanings [but see Kt10:101-9(106-16)]. Instead he boasts: 'In this treatise, I purposely omit the definitions of the categories' [Ktl:108]. But he later confesses that 'we are unable to define them even if we wished' [A241]. The fact that he never even explains the nature of their twelfold structure—a task which I have attempted in Pld:§3—has given rise to the commonly held opinion that Kant 'was stupid to the point of perversity in the detail of his doctrine of categories' [M2:213; cf. 244-5]. His justification for such neglect would have been to point out that the categories only obtain 'reality' when their 'application' is taken into account [see Kt7:385], and that he does eventually support his initial dogmatic account by examining in the third stage of system how each category is actually applied in empirical knowledge [see VII.3]. The main purpose of Kant's arguments in the Analytic of Concepts is to establish the formal status of the categories, so he gives a detailed account only of their general function. The general function of this fifth step, the formal step in the logical perspective of system, is to form a concept out of a conscious perception by means of the categories.

Even though Kant establishes the categories by abstracting all sensibility from experience, he is careful to remind us that 'the categories, in themselves mere forms of thought, obtain objective reality' only when they are applied 'to objects which can be given us in intuition' [Ktl:150-1]. That is, since 'the categories are not in themselves knowledge, but are mere forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions', it follows that 'no synthetic proposition can be made from mere categories' [288-9]—in themselves they define the formal character of the logical perspective in system. So, although in the second stage Kant occasionally exaggerates the status of the categories, he is careful to warn elsewhere that 'the pure category does not suffice for a synthetic a priori principle' [304]. Categories enable us to know things 'only through their possible application to
empirical intuition' [147] -- a function which will not be fully explic- cated until the third stage.

In the sixth step of system, the faculty of 'transcendental apper- ception' synthesizes the material perceptions with the formal concepts developed by the understanding: only through a 'synthesis according to concepts' can 'apperception demonstrate a priori its complete and necessary identity' [Ktl:A112]. Whereas categorization functions as the 'form of thought' (i.e. of stage two), the unity of apperception realizes the whole purpose of the understanding in the second stage, so it 'constitutes the form of all knowledge of objects; through it the manifold is thought as belonging to a single object' [A129e.a.]. Its function as the synthetic step in this formal stage of system leads Kant to characterize it as 'the radical faculty of all our knowledge' [A114]. Indeed, he goes so far as to say: 'The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge' [135]; 'this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself' [134n; s.a. A119 and Wl6:145].

Kant defines transcendental apperception as a 'pure original unchangeable consciousness' [Ktl:A107], and as 'the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations' [A116]. As Paton suggests, its original character indicates that 'the unity of objects is derivative' [P3:II.71]. Indeed, from the transcendental standpoint of system, 'the original synthetic unity of apperception' [Ktl:135] is 'the source of all combination [i.e. synthesis]' [154e.a.] and so 'lies a priori at the foundation of empirical consciousness' [220; s.a. A116]. The categories themselves are said to impose 'synthetic unity' on the objects of perception, thus converting what is varied and manifold into a more-or-less unified object (via the concept). But the object is not fully unified until it is assimilated into one person's consciousness: 'it is only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) that I can say of all perceptions
that I am conscious of them' [A122]. Apperception is therefore the synthetic condition for recognizing that the material presented by the imagination's synthesis of the manifold, as well as the concepts produced by categorization, consists of elements in which I participate (i.e. self-conscious thought). Of course, imagination might be able to synthesize, and categorization to conceptualize, without ever arriving at the unity of apperception; but such a nonunified combination of the manifold would be irrelevant to system\text{\textsubscript{1}}, since it could not give rise to empirical knowledge.

The first stage of knowing supplied the sensible material for a possible experience. The second stage has now informed us that 'the pure understanding, by means of categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experience' [Kt1:A119]; as such it has supplied the intelligible form for a possible knowledge. Kant accurately summarizes his analysis of the first two stages of 'the act of knowing' in Kt7:238: 'a given object [step one], through the intervention of sense [steps two and three], sets the imagination at work in arranging the manifold [step four], and the imagination, in turn, [sets at work] the understanding in giving this arrangement the unity of concepts [steps five and six].' To complete system\text{\textsubscript{1}}, these two epistemological building-blocks must be synthesized in judgment; and the resulting empirical knowledge must be grounded in the ultimate unity of the idea of practical reason. In the next section, we shall follow Kant's argument through these two final stages.

3. Determinate Judgment and Rational Inference

A source of possible confusion in interpreting the third and fourth stages of system\text{\textsubscript{1}} is that Kant sometimes seems to suggest that empirical knowledge has already been actualized in the first two stages [e.g. Kt1:94,104; cf. W16:159,227]. But when he asserts, for example, that 'Intuitions and concepts constitute...the elements of all our
knowledge' [Ktl:74], he does not mean that the presence of intuition and conceptualization alone is always sufficient to constitute empirical knowledge [see e.g. E3:98; E5:36; P16:2]. For he continues in Ktl: 75: 'These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.' Although there is, as mentioned at the close of VII.2, a sense in which the first stage supplies us with possible experience and the second with possible knowledge, the essential Critical doctrine is that actual empirical knowledge arises only when the first two stages are combined from the empirical perspective of determinate judgment (i.e. stage three).

The synthetic role of the third stage in relation to the first two implies that 'a third something is necessary' in order for an object to be judged. This third thing, Kant says, is the 'possibility of experience' [Ktl:194-5]. By this he means that the intuition and concept of an object must be able to be synthesized in actual (determinate) experience. The object can then be said to 'exist', as long as 'the perception can, if need be, precede the concept' [272]. An object of thought can thus become empirically known as an object of judgment only if it is possible for that object to be given in intuition [146].

On this basis we must qualify Kant's claim that thinking 'is the same as judging' [Kt2:304; s.a. Ktl:106] before his intended meaning can be rendered intelligible. Thought and judgment are not synonymous terms as he occasionally intimates; otherwise, the forms of judgment [95] would be identical to the forms of thought [106]. Rather, judgment is thought which makes use (or at least can make use) of intuition. A clear understanding of their perspectival relationship will guard against the temptation to assume a strict 'identification of thinking and judging' [H4:xlvii]. For the two faculties refer to different levels in the determination of the object by the understanding: 'Now the only use which the understanding can make of these concepts [i.e. those...
which arise out of the logical perspective] is to judge by means of them; so from the empirical perspective, 'we can reduce all acts of understanding to judgments, and the understanding may therefore be represented as a faculty of judgment' [Ktt:93-4].

Kant concisely summarizes the first two steps of this third stage in Ktt:175: first, the schematism [176-86] 'will treat of the sensible conditions under which alone pure concepts of understanding can be employed'; and second, the principles [187-294] 'will deal with the synthetic judgments which under these conditions follow a priori from pure concepts of understanding'. The third step, though for some reason neglected by Kant in this preview of the content of the third stage, is expounded just where we would expect to find it, in the third chapter of the Analytic of Principles [294-315]. By providing 'a summary' of the theory through the distinction between 'phenomena' and 'noumena' [295], this chapter explicates how the actual judgment of objects establishes objectively valid empirical knowledge. As we shall see, the new terminology introduced in this ninth step also leads us directly into the fourth stage.

Kant's seventh condition of knowing, 'the schematism of the pure understanding' [Ktt:179], specifies just how the categories are applied 'to sensibility in general' [A245]. The second stage has already shown that the categories stand in a necessary relation to sensibility, for the former arise out of the abstraction of all spatial and temporal content from the latter [161-2]. But in order for these categories, and the concepts they determine, to be used validly in experience, they must be grounded in something concrete once again [171]. Consequently, the third (synthetic) stage begins by positing something which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet...sensible. Such a representation is the transcendental schema [177].
Kant describes this first 'condition of judgment (the schema)' [304] as that in which the object is determined to be a 'manifold and an order of its parts' [861]. To fulfill this function, schematism must furnish the abstract, self-conscious thought (step six) with the transcendental unity of one time [178; cf. P3:II.40].

Just as he believed the transition from the first to the second stage to have been accomplished by the transcendental imagination in the fourth step, so also Kant bases the transition from the second to the third stage on the work of this most mysterious of human powers here in the seventh step. He says, for instance, that a 'schema is in itself always a product of imagination' [Ktl:179]. As with the first application of imagination, he confesses he cannot explain how it works, because 'schematism...is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to open to our gaze' [180-1]. But he does warn that the schema 'has to be distinguished from the image', because, although it may be represented in an image, it is fundamentally the 'representation of a universal procedure of imagination [viz. 'schematism'] in providing an image for a concept' [179-80].

Kant summarizes the fourfold, categorial division of the schemata rather concisely in Ktl:184-5, where he defines them as 'a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules', and relates them 'in the order of the categories to the time-series, the time-content, the time-order, and lastly to the scope of time in respect of all possible objects'. By limiting the categories in these four ways, these schemata, each of which is itself a 'sensible concept of an object in agreement with the category' [186], insure that the abstract concepts of stage two 'are altogether impossible, and can have no meaning, if no object is given for them' [178]. This means that thoughts can never be more than subjectively valid if they do not correspond to a possible object of outer intuition; for as Paton says in P3:II.393, when an
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object is objectively valid, 'the matter of inner sense is derived from outer sense.' Thus, the seventh step in system is the material beginning of the synthetic procedure of judgment, whereby 'sensibility...realises the understanding in the very process of restricting it' [KtI:187].

Once the schematism is shown to have secured the necessary relation between sensibility and understanding, Kant turns his attention to what is often regarded as the most important part of system: 'the judgments which understanding...actually achieves a priori' and which he calls 'principles' [KtI:177]. Although he is not entirely consistent in his use of these terms, he ordinarily refers to the particular, empirical laws of the understanding as 'rules' and reserves the word 'principle' for the transcendental laws of the understanding to which all rules must conform. 'Principles a priori', he explains, 'are so named not merely because they contain in themselves the grounds of other judgments, but also because they are not themselves grounded in higher and more universal modes of knowledge' [188]. However, Kant is not interested at this point in every type of a priori principle. Inasmuch as the principles of mathematics, for example, 'are derived solely from intuition, not from the pure concept of understanding' [188], they do not qualify as principles of judgment. Similarly, the analytic principles of formal logic can be excluded, because, as we shall see, every principle of judgment must be synthetic. But regardless of which type of principle is under consideration, the schematism requires that 'all principles...have significance and validity only as principles of the empirical, not of the transcendental, perspective' [223], and that as such they will inevitably contain some impure elements [cf. IV.1 and C14:253]. For 'outside the field of possible experience there can be no synthetic a priori principles' [KtI:304-5].

The principles whose functions Kant intends to disclose in step eight are the formal 'conditions of the unity of empirical knowledge in
the synthesis of appearances'--i.e. in the synthesis of the third stage--which of course, 'can be thought only in the schema' [Knt:223]. Since they function as 'rules for the objective employment of the [categories]' [200], they can be completely revealed under four headings, each corresponding to one category: the principles of quantity are 'axioms of intuition', quality are 'anticipations of perception', relation are 'analogies of experience', and modality are 'postulates of empirical thought in general'. Kant divides these four types of principle into two basic groups: mathematical principles are those 'involved in the a priori determination of appearances according to the categories of quantity and quality', and dynamical principles are those correlated in a similar fashion to relation and modality [Knt:200-1; see Pld:278-9]. The former deal with the synthesis of various homogeneous aspects of an object and can be known with 'intuitive certainty', while the latter deal with the synthesis of heterogeneous aspects and 'are capable only of a merely discursive certainty.'

A detailed account of the nature and role of each of the twelve principles which can be derived from the basic four is unnecessary at this point, since our primary concern in this thesis is not with the specific arguments in any one of Kant's systems. It will suffice instead merely to point out that the key element supplied by the principles is the determination of an outer context into which the inner representation of the object as schematized (step seven) can be placed. Just as the form of time was reintroduced in step seven, so also the form of space is reintroduced here in step eight, so that at this point 'intuitions...are in all cases outer intuitions' [Knt:291]. Establishing that, if the object is to be empirically knowable, it must be represented in terms of the formal conditions of quantity (extensive magnitude) and quality (intensive magnitude), and that it must stand in a possible, actual, and necessary relation to the subject, is, no doubt, an indispensable part of this task; but outweighing all of these...
is the task of establishing that the object must be represented as a permanent substance which is both cause and effect in a reciprocally interdependent nexus of substances. It is for this reason that the analogies, whose purpose is to 'declare that all appearances lie, and must lie, in one nature' [263], occupy well over half of the space Kant devotes to the proof of the principles. Taken together, the four principles provide 'the ground of experience itself, and therefore precede it a priori' [Ktl:241]; for their application requires us to assume that our representations have a certain 'relation to an [empirical] object', through which they 'acquire objective meaning' [242]. As such, this eighth step provides the transcendental foundation for all scientific, empirical investigation: 'We can extract clear concepts of [the principles] from experience, only because we have put them into experience, and because experience is thus itself brought about only by their means' [241].

Kant's final task here in the third stage of his argument is to clarify the sense in which our time-schematized principles are actually employed in the production of empirical knowledge [cf. B20:152]. The synthesis of an object's inner determination in time via schematism, and its outer determination in space via application of the principles, constitutes 'an empirical judgment' [Ktl:246]—i.e. an item of empirical knowledge. Thus the ninth condition of knowing is that an empirical object must actually be judged to be empirically real. However, Kant is often less than clear about how this function actually operates. He suggests at one point, for instance, that 'judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practised only, and cannot be taught', and that 'the one great benefit of examples' is that they sharpen the judgment [172-3]. Fortunately, he does occasionally offer a more precise explanation of his intended meaning.

Kant defines judgment as 'the faculty...of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule' [Ktl:171]. From
VII. System

the empirical perspective, all the judgments which result can be called 'rules' [304]; even the principles themselves are rules insofar as they are manifested in real judgments [Kt2:305]. But in its transcendental use as one of the twelve steps in system, 'judgment' refers to the act of using the principles to determine an 'objectively valid' relation between two representations: Kant gives the example of combining the representations 'body' and 'heavy' in the judgment 'The body is heavy'. The word 'is' in such a proposition expresses the primary role of judgment, which is to bring 'given items of knowledge...to the objective unity of apperception', and thus 'to distinguish the objective unity of [such] representations from the subjective' [Kt1:141-2]. This means the objects of knowledge are no longer regarded as being merely in the subject, as they were in the first two stages, but are now acknowledged also to have some sort of independent reality of their own; for their representations are 'combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be' [142; s.a. Kt7:20; B20:145; P3:1.571].

But this claim on behalf of judgment raises a problem which is not easily solved: If representations exist only in the subject, and if the object (i.e. the thing) cannot be known it itself, then how can we know that two representations are actually united in the thing represented, or indeed, that they would always be so united for any subject? In hopes of reaching a convincing answer to this question here at the end of the third stage of his synthetic progression, Kant takes a new look at the first stage in light of what has now been revealed in the second and third. It is here that he introduces his now famous (or infamous) distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal.

The terms 'noumenon' and 'phenomenon' have been exhaustively discussed in V.3, where they were clearly differentiated from terms such as 'thing in itself' and 'appearance', which, as we saw in VII.2, relate mainly to the first stage of system. Kant's official introduction of the new 'object-terms' here in the third stage is intended to
summarize the theory as it now stands by pointing up the difference in
the perspective from which the object is viewed in the first and third
stages, and in so doing to prepare the way for the fourth and final
stage of his theory. The clarification achieved by the new terms can
be evinced by revising our accounts of steps eight and nine.

The phenomenon, as we saw in V.3, is the empirical object viewed
from the empirical perspective. We can now add that the empirical
object first comes to be determined as such through the application of
the formal principles to a schematized object in step eight. This
modification stresses that the object, which is determined to be an
object by the principles (and the objective reality of which is to be
determined through judgment in step nine), is not a thing in itself, but
only an empirical object represented in outer sense as an object in
space. A thorough investigation of the function of the principles (es­
pecially that of substance, in which all the others are rooted) would
be necessary before we could fully understand just how Kant thinks they
can fulfill their task in determining an appearance to be a phenomenon
[Kt2:304]. But such a detailed treatment would be an unnecessary di­
gression from our general line of inquiry. Instead, assuming that they
do, in fact, succeed in their function, we will focus our attention on
the main function of the phenomenon-noumenon distinction, which is to
shed light on the ninth condition and its relation to the fourth stage.

As we concluded towards the end of V.3, our judgment of a thing to
be 'objectively real' from the empirical perspective depends on the ex­
tent to which we can validly represent it as a 'negative noumenon'.
Just what this 'mark of independence' is, however, is not altogether
clear. It has to do with abstracting the conditions (and the resulting
material) of sensibility from the object just enough to postulate
whether it could be known from a non-sensible perspective. Accordingly,
in the process of realizing the goal of the empirical perspective in
stage three, the synthetic function of judgment also determines how the
object, as a real item of empirical knowledge, will be presented to the
fourth and final stage—i.e. its noumenal character is at this point
judged to be either positive or negative [see V.3]. The former will
give rise to a speculative perspective, and the latter to a practical
perspective, in stage four [see IV.3]. As such, judgment clearly looks
forward to the fourth stage, where the object is released from sensibi­
ity and treated, so far as is possible, as a noumenon.

One of the main uses to which Kant puts his distinction between
the phenomenon and the noumenon is to emphasize that the understanding
can produce valid empirical knowledge only when it is applied within
the phenomenal realm, the realm of 'possible experience'. The impor­
tance of this maxim for system\textsubscript{r} in general can scarcely be overemphasiz­
ed, since the 'possibility of experience' not only makes possible our
ordinary a posteriori knowledge of the world, but also 'gives objective
reality to all our a priori modes of knowledge' [Ktl:195]. Despite its
unifying function, experience itself (i.e. as immediate) is not one of
the twelve conditions of knowing; it is, as it were, the 'hub' around
which all the formal conditions of knowledge must revolve in order for
us to know an object [cf. Pld:281 and Plf:§4]. We have seen that sen­
sibility views the object transcendentally as it appears (stage one),
and understanding views it as it is, either logically, in abstraction
from sensibility (stage two), or empirically, in synthetic union with
sensibility (stage three). Our only remaining task in interpreting
system\textsubscript{r}, therefore, is to consider the fourth stage, in which Kant
explains how reason views the object practically, as it may be.

Both the subject-matter and the organization of Kant's Dialectic
in Ktl [349-732] tend to obscure rather than illuminate the nature of
its role in presenting the fourth stage of system\textsubscript{r}. For, although it
occupies far more space than the sections which describe each of the
other three stages [see Table V.1], the Dialectic concentrates rather
less than the others on expounding the relevant steps in the synthetic progression of the formal conditions of knowing. Instead, that which is only a secondary task in the other sections—namely, the specification and discussion of various philosophical implications of the revolutionary aspects of the theory—becomes Kant's primary task in the Dialectic. This, of course, is a change Kant has to make in order to prove the inadequacy of traditional rational metaphysics. But as a result many commentators ignore the fact that the positive theory which he puts in place of traditional metaphysics is an integral part of system\textsuperscript{t} [but see E3:116 and IV.3]. They tend to detach the Dialectic from the rest of K\textit{t1} as if it could do just as well standing on its own as a self-sufficient set of arguments. But, because our interest here in Chapter VII is limited to the essential content of that portion of the Doctrine of Elements which evinces the architectonic form of Kant's theory of knowing, we shall ignore the main part of the Dialectic, Book II [K\textit{t1}:396-670], where Kant exposes and dispels of the illusory 'dialectical inferences' which uncritical human reason naturally tends to make [353-4,397], and focus instead on Book I [349-96] and the Appendix [670-732], where Kant offers his positive alternative to the former.

The goal of reason in the fourth stage is to complete what remains incomplete in the empirical knowledge attained in step nine—i.e. to determine, as far as is possible, the noumenal basis of the phenomenal world. Given the fact that stage three judges all objects of knowledge to have some sort of noumenal character, the fourth stage is not just an optional extra, added to fulfil the requirements of the architectonic, or to pose some philosophically interesting points about the nature of human reason; on the contrary, it is the final set of conditions without which our empirical knowledge would risk losing its objective reality. The function which fulfils this task Kant calls 'inference'. Thus, here in the fourth stage we become conscious of existence 'mediately through inferences which connect something with perception'
He explains in Kt1:58(92) that 'a distinct concept is possible only by means of a judgment, a complete concept only by means of an inference.' But inference, as we might expect, is itself the result of a three step process.

The problem inherited by the fourth stage from the third is that 'no experience [i.e. object of empirical knowledge] is unconditioned' [Kt1:383]; yet the very judgment which yields empirical knowledge depends on our ability to determine an object's participation in some sort of unconditioned (noumenal) reality. So the first task of reason in the fourth stage is to 'prescribe to the understanding [regarded as judgment (step nine)] its direction towards a certain unity...in such a manner as to unite all the acts of the understanding, in respect of every [empirical] object, into an absolute whole' [383]. The abstract representation involved in establishing the unifying 'direction' of reason in its relation to the object as determined by the understanding is what Kant calls 'a schema' of reason [698]. Just as the schema of understanding requires that the concepts from the previous step be applied only in the field of experience, so also the schema of reason requires that reason can perform its unifying function only 'in reference to the world' [726]--i.e. to the objects of real judgment from the previous step.

The object as determined by the schematism of reason here in the tenth step acts as the material element for the fourth stage; Kant calls it 'the unconditioned' [Kt1:379]. The object as unconditioned is that 'to which reason leads in its inferences from experience, and in accordance with which it estimates and gauges the degree of its empirical employment, but which is never itself a member of the empirical synthesis' [367-8]. The tenth condition of knowing, therefore, applies the schematism of reason to an item of empirical knowledge in order to represent the object as unconditioned. Kant asserts that this activity of finding 'for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the under-
standing the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion' is 'a principle of pure reason [which] is obviously synthetic; the condition is analytically related to some condition but not to the unconditioned' [364]. (This refers, incidentally, not to the epistemological status of the object in stage four [see V.3], but to the method adopted for the whole system.)

Positing the object as unconditioned in step ten does not in itself establish the ultimate unity of all empirical knowledge; for the unconditioned object 'can never come before us, since it cannot be given through any possible experience' [Ktl:511]. As a result, reason must exert its unifying influence on the unconditioned, in much the same way as the faculty of understanding does (by means of the categories) on the perceptions of the second stage and as the faculty of judgment does (by means of the principles) in the third stage [378, 383, 692-3]. This means the schematism of reason must construct its object 'in accordance with the conditions of the greatest possible unity of reason' [698]. Such unity is 'not the unity of a possible experience ..., which is that of understanding' [363]; rather it is 'an a priori [read: 'analytic'—cf. 358 and IV.3] unity by means of concepts', which is imposed directly on the understanding [359; cf. 392]. Reason in this step establishes itself as 'the faculty of principles' [356]: 'Knowledge from principles is, therefore, that knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular [an a posteriori fact] in the universal through [analytically related] concepts' [357].

The 'pure concepts of reason' which are produced by the influence of this rational unification on the unconditioned object are called 'transcendental ideas' [Ktl:378]. Kant explains that 'the idea is posited only as being the perspective from which alone [the unity of reason]...can be further extended' [709]; it is the concept of an object which 'transcends the possibility of experience' [377]—i.e. 'a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be
given in sense-experience' [383]. 'Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so also reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas' [672]. Hence 'it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed always in accordance with such ideas' [699]; for they provide the form of rational inference, which, when applied to the object as unconditioned, brings us one step closer to the realization of rational principles for the unification and systemization of judgment.

Each member of Kant's favourite trio of theological concepts (God, freedom and immortality [see Ch. I]) is represented by one of the three primary ideas of reason: the Paralogisms of Pure Reason [KtI:A341-A405, 399-432] assesses the idea of the soul; the Antinomy of Pure Reason [432-595] assesses the idea of the world; and the Ideal of Pure Reason [595-670] assesses the idea of God [391-2]. Each of these has a legitimate employment, but tends to be used to make 'pseudo-rational' conclusions [397]. As mentioned above, we shall omit from this chapter any detailed discussion of these ideas. It will suffice at this point to note that they can be used to construct either a legitimate or an illegitimate version of the twelfth and final condition of knowing. Both versions are concerned with realizing the object which is represented in an idea by actually inferring its validity. The 'concepts derived from pure reason', Kant insists, 'cannot be obtained by mere [i.e. empirical] reflection without inference' [366]. (Concluding his system in this way is rather appropriate, since the German word for inference (Schluss) also means 'conclusion' or 'end'.) The difference between them arises 'not [from] the idea in itself, but [from] its use only, [which] can be either transcendent or immanent' [671; cf. 697-8].

The transcendent, or 'constitutive' use of the ideas in inference is employed by those who adopt the speculative perspective, and inevitably leads to metaphysical illusion [KtI:352-4, 537; see IV.3]. The speculative metaphysician mistakenly takes the judgment of the nega-
tively noumenal character of the object in step nine to be a positively
noumenal judgment about the object as it is in itself. As a result, he
naturally assumes 'that there is an actual object corresponding to the
idea' [510]. This 'objective employment of the pure concepts of reason
is...always transcendent' [383]; for it attempts to establish rational
principles 'which profess to pass beyond' the 'limits of possible
experience' [352]. The goal of such speculative inference is 'the
ascribing of objective reality to an idea that [properly] serves merely
as a rule' [537]. Establishing such objective reality in regard to a
transcendent object would yield synthetic a priori knowledge of reality
(i.e. of the positive noumenon) [see e.g. 386]. Such a 'representation
of an individual existence as adequate to an idea' is called 'an ideal'
[Kt7:232]. Thus, the illusory version of step twelve attempts to pro­
duce synthetic a priori knowledge of an ideal by applying speculative
inference to an idea. Kant leaves no doubt that this use of the ideas
invariably ends in failure: 'The cause of failure we must seek [not in
the unconditioned object, but] in our idea itself. For so long as we
obstinately persist in assuming that there is an actual object corre­
sponding to the idea, the problem [of establishing objective knowledge
of the object]...allows of no solution' [Ktl:510].

The solution to this problem can be found only by adopting a prac­
tical perspective [see IV.3], according to which the ideas are employed
immanently in inference, as regulative principles [see VI.4]. Kant ex­
plains in Kt10:86-7(94) that 'speculative cognitions...[are] those from
which no rules of behavior can be derived... [They] are always theore­
tical, but conversely, not every cognition is speculative; viewed from
another perspective, it can at the same time be practical.' This prac­
tical perspective requires that the unconditioned object represented in
the form of an idea be 'viewed as if it were a real [object]' [Kt1:712;
cf. 699] for the purposes of empirical inquiry and systematic unity.
But this use of the ideas is 'valid only in respect of our rational
perspective on the world' [726]: 'For the regulative law of systematic unity prescribes that we should study nature as if systematic and purposive unity, combined with the greatest possible manifoldness, were everywhere to be met with, in infinitum' [728]. This activity differs from the speculative reification of the object inasmuch as it is performed only for practical ends, without assuming that objectively valid knowledge of transcendent reality can be established in this way. All we can legitimately do is to 'ascribe [to an idea], from the [practical] perspective of this unity, such properties as are analogous to the concepts employed by the understanding in the empirical perspective' [705-6; cf. D6:264-5]. (An example of how this might be done will be explored in Chapter X.)

This alternative perspective for step twelve accepts that the ideas can be properly applied only when the object in step nine is judged to have a negatively noumenal character. For 'the idea instructs us only in regard to a certain unattainable completeness, and so serves rather to limit the understanding than to extend it to new objects' [Kt1:620]. Since the idea is now confined within such negatively noumenal limits, its validity 'can be proved through experience' [830] by demonstrating in practical inferences how 'an actual case' [387] (a posteriori) is subsumed (analytically) under the idea in question, even though 'the object of [the idea] can never be given empirically' [390]. Far from having a mere "donkey's carrot" validity [M2:248], Kant argues that 'The practical idea is...always in the highest degree fruitful, and from the perspective of our actual activities is indispensably necessary' [Kt1:385; s.a. 544-5]. The goal of practical inference, as the synthetic step in the fourth stage, is therefore to establish analytic a posteriori belief [cf. IV.3]. Once the philosopher accepts that each of his ideas must be regarded 'as an idea only and not as an entity', he will be able to replace the 'Logic of Illusion' with a 'Logic of Regulative Principles' [R10:86]. For reason's entire pure
endeavor has 'its source exclusively in the practical interests of reason' [Ktl:825].

Imposing the rational unity of practical inference established in the fourth stage onto the empirical objects of the third stage secures the objective reality of all empirical knowledge. For in this final stage, 'pure reason combines all its epistemological perspectives into a system' [Ktl:394]. Although the extent of an object's participation in the thing in itself is still not definitely known, we have at this point established as much as is possible to establish from any human perspective. For the level of subjective determination of the object has come full circle: that which began merely as a transcendental object is now treated as if it were subsumed under its unconditioned cause. The idea of the systematic whole of which each object of knowledge is a conditioned part provides the necessary context for objective knowledge—a context which could not be provided by the unknowable thing in itself. The twelfth condition therefore concludes not only the fourth stage, but the entire system of theoretical perspectives.
CHAPTER VIII

Kant's System of Practical Perspectives

1. The Shift from the Theoretical to the Practical Standpoint

Having proved their usefulness in the arduous task of interpreting Kant's most famous system, the principles established in Parts One and Two can now be employed in interpreting his second system, which is concerned not with the theoretical, but with the practical standpoint. Thus, for example, we shall find that system P has the same twelfalf structure as system T. However, numerous fundamental differences between these systems emerge once the general difference in their standpoints is discerned. For, just as system T [see Ch. III] adopts the logical perspective as its standpoint, and system T [see Ch. VII] adopts the transcendental perspective as its standpoint, so the system examined here in Chapter VIII will adopt the practical perspective as its standpoint [see Figure II.1]. With a clear understanding of such formal similarities and differences, it should be possible to interpret system P without going into quite as much detail as was necessary to interpret system T. But before delving into the details of system P we shall discuss some of the peculiarities of its general relationship with system T.

First, Kant unfortunately devotes even less effort to explaining the general architectonic structure of his argument in system P than he did in system T. He does occasionally give some hints as to the procedure he is following [see e.g. Kt5:392; Kt4:16,89-91], but his precise meaning in such cases is usually obscured by the ambiguity of using terms to refer to both systems at once. Because their standpoints differ, the meaning of technical words such as 'principle', 'concept', or 'sense' [16] is bound to be different in the two systems. Yet both systems follow the same logical form. Indeed, the structure of the outline of Kt4 indicates that Kant intends to follow the same pattern as in Kt1. The
main difference is that, instead of having an Aesthetic and two 'books' of Analytic, as in Kt1, Kt4 simply has an Analytic divided into three chapters. The reason for substituting an Analytic in place of the Aesthetic of system\textsubscript{T} is that system\textsubscript{P} begins not with the faculty which limits reason (viz. sensibility), but with reason's own limitation of itself. Taking account also of their respective Dialectics, therefore, both outlines are divided into four stages.

Even Kant's key distinctions, such as a priori-a posteriori, analytic-synthetic, and transcendental-empirical, take on a rather different meaning in this new system [see G13:liv]. In system\textsubscript{T} the practical perspective gives rise to certain analytic a posteriori beliefs [see IV.3]. When system\textsubscript{P} adopts this perspective as its standpoint, such beliefs are no longer merely 'regulative' (as in system\textsubscript{T}); rather they gain 'objective reality' [Kt1:836]. This is possible only because the practical perspective generates 'a special kind of systematic unity, namely the moral' [855]. Within the context of the resulting system, pure reason now formulates principles which themselves can be regarded as, for example, synthetic a priori, and thus as objectively valid for moral experience, even though their status as viewed from system\textsubscript{T} is analytic a posteriori. The four main stages of system\textsubscript{P} are therefore similar to those in system\textsubscript{T}, but with one crucial difference: rather than being perspectives on knowledge (epistemological experience), they are perspectives on intentional action (moral experience) [Kt35:(1-2); Kt10:110(116)]. In system\textsubscript{P}, as Kant asserts, 'reason is given to us as a practical faculty, i.e., one which is meant to have an influence on the will' [Kt5:396]; and 'will' is 'the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws, i.e. according to principles' [412e.a.]; indeed, 'will is nothing else than practical reason.' As Paton suggests, Kant's 'fundamental assumption is that the will is as rational in action as intelligence [i.e. the understanding] is in thinking' [P4:140].

The implications of this essential perspectival difference for the
content of system$_p$ are brought out by Kant in his only concise description of the relationships between its first three stages:

...practical reason is concerned not with objects in order to know them but with its own capacity to make them real... Consequently, it does not have to furnish an object of intuition, but as practical reason it has only to give a law of intuition... [It] must begin from the possibility of practical fundamental principles a priori [stage one]. Only from these can it proceed to concepts of the absolutely good and evil in order first to assign them in accordance with those principles [stage two]... Only then could [it deal] with the relation of pure practical reason to sensibility and with its necessary influence on it, i.e., the moral feeling [stage three]...

...the division of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason must turn out to be similar to that of a syllogism, i.e., proceeding from the universal in the major premise (the moral principle [stage one]), through a minor premise containing a subsumption of possible actions (as good or bad) under the major [stage two], to the conclusion, viz. the subjective determination of the will (an interest in the practically possible good and the maxim based on it) [stage three]. [Kt4:89-91; cf. G13:li-liii]

If we assume that the Dialectic [Kt4:107-48] is the fourth stage, this summary of the threefold division of the Analytic of system$_p$ reveals the following list of its stages: (1) the synthetic a priori perspective on action applies the principle of freedom to the undetermined will; (2) the analytic a priori perspective formally defines morality in terms of the moral law and its categories; (3) the synthetic a posteriori perspective describes the real actualization of duty through moral feeling; and (4) the analytic a posteriori perspective posits the ideal ends or implications of morality. These four stages will be discussed in pairs in the following two sections. Before doing so, however, it is essential to refute what is almost certainly both the most common and the most destructive misinterpretation of the general relationship between system$_t$ and system$_p$.

On several occasions, Kant makes comments such as that our moral experience enables us to 'transport ourselves into the intelligible world as members of it' [Kt5:453; s.a. Kt4:42-3,106]. Interpreters who take such passing comments as representative of Kant's official Critical theory assume he is positing 'two irreconcilable natures, the one
abstractly rational and noumenal, the other phenomenal and purely sentient' [G13:lxii]. But this ignores his emphasis on the principle of perspective. For Kant's usual view is that we do not possess two natures, but two perspectives from which one and the same experience can be viewed. 'The idea of a moral world has...objective reality', he insists, 'as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical perspective' [Kt1:836]. Our experience of the world, therefore, can be regarded as having two sides or aspects to it: the phenomenal, which is revealed in system_t, and the noumenal, which is revealed in a negative way in system_p. But without a clear grasp of the derivation of the phenomenon-noumenon contrast from the perspectival powers of the subject, the interpreter is bound to misinterpret this key distinction.

Thus, for example, Smart condemns 'Kant's relegation of freedom to the noumenal self, which cannot be found in experience' [S20:3.60] along with his 'mysterious' theory about 'a choice made in an individual human outside space and time' [3.37]. Yet, as we shall see, Kant proposes no such theories. With the exception of a few isolated passages, where he slips into a less precise way of expressing his views, he clearly portrays the noumenal as a concept whose only value (even for system_p) is as a 'negative', or 'limiting', concept [Kt5:458; s.a. P4:269] which, as such, is immanent in the phenomenal world of our experience. Kant not only describes system_p generally as the outworking of an immanent metaphysics [Kt5:387-8], but also states specifically that, with the move from the speculative to the practical perspectives, reason's 'transcendent use is changed into an immanent use' [Kt4:48; cf. 16,105]. Something which 'for understanding' is 'transcendent' might be 'immanent' for reason in a different system of perspectives [Kt7:403]. For instance, the 'transcendent conceptions' of system_t can yet be 'regulative principles whose function is immanent and reliable, and which are adapted to the human [type of] perspective' [403]. Hence the 'noumenal
world' is simply the phenomenal world viewed from the perspective of freedom. And this means that freedom is found in experience [474]; it is only absent when experience is viewed from the standpoint of system_\text{T} [Kt1:843]. Likewise, there is nothing mysterious about the choice freedom allows us to make: the experience of which it is a part can be analysed in terms of system_\text{T} and so be revealed to be in space and time; but it can also be analysed in terms of its moral implications, thus abstracting from such theoretical conditions.

That the phenomenon-noumenon distinction as employed in system_\text{P} is not intended to transcend, or 'undo', the theories of system_\text{T} is also made amply clear by Kant [see e.g. Kt7:482-5]. For each of his systems 'is grounded in and limited to human experience' [S16:1xxxvi]. Therefore, a proper understanding of the perspectival relationship between system_\text{T} and system_\text{P} can resolve 'the enigma of the critical philosophy' [Kt4:5], viz. the problem of how the categories can properly refer to a supersensible object: 'The inconsistency vanishes because the use which is now made of these concepts [i.e. the standpoint from which they are now viewed] is different from that required by speculative reason' [5-6]. The chief difference is that the 'practical standpoint', as he declares in Kt4:5, requires 'no theoretical determination of the categories and no extension of our knowledge to the supersensible.' Because it is concerned only with action and its moral basis, not with knowledge, 'the application of the categories to the supersensuous, which occurs only from a practical standpoint, gives to pure theoretical reason not the least encouragement to run riot into the transcendent' [57].

The same holds true for the concept of 'the intelligible world'; for 'although I have a well-founded idea of it, still I do not have the least knowledge of it' [Kt5:462]. Instead, the intelligible world should be regarded as 'the supreme limit of all moral inquiry' for two reasons:

both in order that reason may not seek around, on the one hand, in the world of sense, in a way harmful to morals, for the supreme motive [of action]...; and so that it will not, on the other hand,
impotently flap its wings in the space...of transcendent concepts which we call the intelligible world... [462]

Why so many interpreters and critics have ignored Kant's firm and precise warnings about the proper interpretation of the phenomenon-noumenon distinction as it applies to the relation between system\textsubscript{t} and system\textsubscript{p} is difficult to say. It generally has to do, at least in part, with an insufficient understanding of his principle of perspective, resulting in the condemnation of such warnings as unintelligible. In any case, assuming we have tentatively cleared Kant of the charge of noumenal speculation, we can proceed to investigate the details of system\textsubscript{p}.

2. Free Volition and its Moral Law

System\textsubscript{p} is an analysis of how the 'faculty of desire'--i.e. practical reason, or the will--functions in the process of a person's moral experience. Kant defines the faculty of desire in a living being as 'the faculty such a being has of causing, through its ideas, the reality of the objects of these ideas' [Kt4:9n; s.a. 48; Kt7:178n]. In particular, it is the will which functions as 'a kind of causality of living beings so far as they are rational' [Kt5:445-6]. Thus, system\textsubscript{p} carries on within the limits set by system\textsubscript{t}, picking up right where stage four of system\textsubscript{t} left off, with practical knowledge of ideas, yet goes beyond the latter in the sense of forging a new path of perspectives. The crucial difference in this new path is that its 'object' is no longer 'a thing but only the manner of acting' [Kt4:60]. Therefore, 'the objects of these ideas' should no longer be regarded as objects of knowledge (i.e. representations), but as objects of action (i.e. ends).

In this section we shall examine the first two stages of this new path: first, free volition and its maxim (the material of morality), and secondly, the moral law (the form of morality).

The starting-point in system\textsubscript{p} is the 'disposition' of the individual acting subject. As 'the ground of moral responsibility' [S16:cxviii],
the disposition guides 'the adoption of the particular maxims on which individual decisions are based' [cxv]; in so doing it 'gives rise to morality' [Kt35:(22)]. The problem is that this 'ultimate subjective ground of decision' [S16:cxv] is not, as it were, out in the open for all to view. On the contrary, we must 'confess', insists Kant, 'that we cannot cite a single sure example of the [good] disposition' [Kt5:406]. Thus, from the empirical perspective an action's 'moral worth' is 'always doubtful' [406]: 'for when moral worth is in question it is not a matter of actions which one sees but of their inner principles which one does not see' [407]. Apparently, the disposition is to system₁ what the thing in itself is to system₀: the transcendent presupposition which is required for entry into the system. In place of 'practical knowledge' (the twelfth step in system₀), therefore, the good (or evil) disposition stands at the origin in system₁. Because this 'noumenal, timeless choice' [W10:144] is transcendent, it is both impossible and unnecessary to judge as to the nature even of our own disposition: 'Only God can see that our dispositions are moral and pure' [Kt35:(80); s.a. Kt8:49-50(44-5); Kt6:391-2]. All that is necessary for us is to adopt a moral faith, which might simply be called a desire to act. As such it is directly parallel to the theoretical faith required for system₀, i.e. the desire to know, which is implicit in the original act of representation.

A moral act ultimately requires a good disposition. But, because the disposition transcends both our knowledge and our action, we must regard the nature of its 'influence' on the elements in system₁ as a mystery. Nevertheless, here in step one of Kant's presentation of the conditions for moral activity, the subject bases its desire to act on the assumption of a good disposition, thus positing for itself a good will. A good will is 'the supreme condition of all good [actions]' [Kt4: 62; cf. Kt5:396], for only it can be 'good without qualification' [393]: it 'constitutes the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be
happy' [393]. It is, however, 'undetermined with reference to any objects' [444]. Just as the first step in system\textsubscript{T} establishes the most general, but as yet undetermined objective condition for knowledge (the transcendental object, with its assumed relation to the thing in itself), so also the first step here in system\textsubscript{P} establishes the most general, but as yet undetermined subjective condition for moral action—namely, that the desire to act upon a good disposition establishes a good will as the basis for moral action.

The second step also follows the pattern of system\textsubscript{T} (where the object is intuited in space and time), by determining the formal condition of stage one to be 'the rational concept of transcendental freedom' [Kt7:211; s.a. Kt4:3]. It is important to note that, although freedom is a transcendent idea in system\textsubscript{T} [Kt7:468], it becomes immanent in the form of a transcendental idea (i.e. concept of reason) here in stage one of system\textsubscript{P}. This 'mere idea...holds only as the necessary presupposition of reason in a being that believes itself conscious of a will' [Kt5:459]. Thus, when Kant declares that 'practical reason...provides reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, i.e. to freedom' [Kt4:6], he immediately adds: 'This is a practical concept and as such is subject only to practical use...' By this he means, as Paton rather boldly puts it, that 'unless we can act on this presupposition there is no such thing as action, and there is no such thing as will' [P4:219].

In the third stage, as we shall see in VIII.3, 'the freedom of the will' manifests itself as 'autonomy, i.e. the property of the will to be a law to itself... Therefore a free will and a will under moral laws are identical' [Kt5:446-7]. This realization of freedom in moral activity depends, however, on the prior assumption of freedom here in step two, as a limiting condition of the will, 'which must be assumed, presupposed and believed of our own will if moral volition in general is to be conceived as a possibility for us' [W19:36]. Therefore 'the Kantian definition of freedom (or autonomy) in general' is 'self-limitation'
[Y1:975] or 'internal determination' [W10:9, cf. 53]. As in the second step of system\(_p\), a free will can be divided into 'inner freedom' and 'outer freedom' [Kt6:405]. But this empirical distinction can be ignored, since it plays no part in Kant's Critique [Kt4], but only in his *metaphysics* [Kt6], of morality.

Adopting a transcendentally free perspective releases us from a strict confinement to sensible intuition (step two of system\(_p\)) as a means of interpreting our experience [Kt4:46; cf. Kt8:50-1(46) and W19:74]; for 'freedom...transfers us into an intelligible order of things' [Kt4:42], but only in the sense that it gives us a purely rational perspective on our experience. Such freedom does not require 'another kind of intuition than the sensuous', i.e. 'a causa noumenon' [Kt4:49], as some interpreters mistakenly allege [e.g. GL3:11]. On the contrary,

'practical reason...does not concern itself with this demand... But the concept which reason makes of its own causality as noumenon is significant even though it cannot be defined theoretically for purposes of knowing its supersensuous existence' [Kt4:49-50].

'Now the concept of a being which has a free will is that of a causa noumenon... But because no intuition, which [for us] could be only sensuous, can support [the practical] application [of this concept], causa noumenon is, for reason's theoretical perspective, an empty concept, although a possible and thinkable one' [55-6].

But despite its inability to function positively in system\(_p\) as such, freedom does have a positive function in system\(_p\): 'although an intelligible world...is for us a transcendent conception [in the context of system\(_p\)]--as is also freedom itself, the formal condition of that world--yet it has its proper function' as an immanent conception in system\(_p\) [Kt7:404].

From the standpoint of system\(_p\), then, freedom 'makes necessary the concept of an intelligible world' [Kt5:458]--i.e. of a nonsensible perspective on experience. Given the relationship between freedom and the noumenal substrate of the world in its phenomenal interpretation, freedom functions positively as 'a causality of reason' for system\(_p\) [458], enabling this noumenal concept to serve as 'the keystone of the
whole architecture of [the Critical System]' [Kt4:3]. In systemp this
'unconditioned causality, and its faculty, freedom,...are determinately
and assertorically known; thus is the reality of the intelligible world
definitely established from a practical standpoint, and this determinateness,
which would be transcendent (extravagant) for theoretical
purposes, is for practical purposes immanent' [105]. So aside from this
single positive role, practical reason does not generally enable us to
'think theoretically and positively' about the idea of freedom [133],
for systemp does not convert the 'may be' of the fourth stage of systemp
into an 'is' [104], but only into an 'ought to be'.

The third step in systemp was never clearly expounded by Kant, so
we had to conjecture, based on the requirements of his architectonic,
what he must have intended the reader to take for granted. But Kant
expounds the third step in systemp much more clearly: it is that a
subject who desires to act freely must choose the 'end', or 'object', of
his desire. Since its object also participates in systemp, the causality
of freedom, though itself nonsensuous, is nevertheless always 'a cause
that is sensuously determined in respect of its effects' [Kt7:465]. In
systemp this object is supplied by a 'maxim', a term which Kant discus-
ses quite thoroughly.

'A maxim is the subjective principle of volition' [Kt5:400n; s.a.
421n]; its function in stage one is to specify 'the will to act in a
certain kind of way in a certain kind of situation' [P4:83]--for in-
stance in a form such as 'I will do X as a means to Y' [84]. Because it
is based on a good (or evil) will, a maxim is 'absolutely good or evil
in all respects and without qualification' [Kt4:60]. In Kt4:33 Kant
relates it directly to step two: 'freedom is itself the formal condition
of all maxims, under which alone they can all agree with the supreme
practical law [stage two]', thus leaving no alternative but to regard
step three as the original formulation of this maxim. However, maxims
are not acted upon until stage three, where they are described as having
three aspects, each of which corresponds to one of the other three stages: 1) 'A form, which consists in universality', through the influence of stage two; 2) 'A material, i.e. an end', through the influence of stage one; and 3) 'A complete determination...[enabling it] to harmonize with a possible realm of ends [stage four of system_p] as with a realm of nature [system_e]' [Kt5:463]. Kant alludes to the dual function of a maxim when he says in Kt8:31(26): 'The term "act" can apply in general to that exercise of freedom whereby the supreme maxim...is adopted by the will [in step three], but also to the exercise of freedom whereby the actions themselves are performed in accordance with that maxim [in step nine].' Wood describes the former as the act in which 'the autonomous agent himself rationally determines the matter of his maxim, and gives himself ends, rather than merely receiving his ends from nature' [W19:61]. Kant clearly indicates that an action's 'moral value' depends 'merely on the principle of volition [given in step two] by which an action is done, without any regard to the objects of the faculty of desire' [Kt5:399-400e.a.]. Yet this does not alter the fact that 'the setting of ends before oneself is the essential mark of freedom' [P4: 181]. Thus any maxim in which any end is chosen can serve to constitute the content of a moral action, provided it conforms to the further conditions set out in stage two, rather than itself acting as the determining ground of the latter.

Free volition provides the foundation for synthetic a priori propositions in a moral system, just as sensibility does so for a theoretical system [cf. IV.3 and VII.2]. Such propositions themselves are not fully revealed until stage three. So at this point in system_p we still know little more than the a priori 'possibility' of freedom: 'We do not understand [freedom], but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know' [Kt4:4]. For, although freedom is a necessary condition for the moral law [4n], nevertheless, looking back from the perspective of moral experience (stage three), 'it is the moral law which
leads directly to the concept of freedom' [30]. Indeed, this transcendental concept of freedom 'lies at the foundation of all moral laws' [96]; without it 'no moral law and no accountability to it are possible' [97]. The details of this close relationship between free volition and the moral law become more clear in stage two, to which we will now turn in order to discover how free volition can take on a necessarily moral character.

Kant sometimes describes the second stage of his argument as 'the deduction of freedom as a causality of pure reason' [Kt4:47-8], or simply as 'the deduction of the moral law' [46]. Unlike its counterpart in Kt1:129-69, this deduction does not concern knowledge of the properties of objects, which may be given to reason from some other source; rather, it concerns knowledge in so far as it can itself become the ground of the existence of objects, and in so far as reason, by virtue of this same knowledge, has causality in a rational being. [46]

This difference makes Kant's account of this deduction far simpler than that of the categories of system. After an unsuccessful attempt in Kt5 to put forward an a priori argument for its validity, in Kt4 Kant takes refuge in what he believes is man's universal awareness of the moral law. For it 'is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are a priori conscious, even if it be granted that no [empirical] example could be found in which it has been followed exactly' [Kt4:47]. In this sense the moral law is for system what the basic laws of formal logic are to system: viz. facts which can be proved neither by a priori nor by a posteriori proofs, but which must be accepted by any rational being who wishes to act morally (or think logically). In both cases 'we impose [the law] on ourselves and yet recognize [it] as necessary in itself' [Kt5:401n]. Thus Kant concludes that 'the objective reality of the moral law can be proved through no deduction' [Kt4:47]. Or, stated more accurately, its only deduction is the simple fact that it imposes itself upon the moral ex-
experience of all rational beings as the only possibility for the formal stage of \textit{systemp}. As such, it 'is the formal rational condition of the employment of our freedom' \cite{kant:7:450, e.a.}: without this logical perspective in \textit{systemp}, transcendental freedom would be, so to speak, 'stranded' in the noumenal world.

As a result of this way of satisfying the need for a deduction, Kant never deals with the second stage of \textit{systemp} in its proper, step-by-step form. Instead he cites various ways of formulating the moral law, apparently hoping that one or another of these will strike the morally attuned reader as a 'fact' of his own moral experience. This moral fact of an inner 'law-abidingness' \cite{p4:71; cf. 180} itself enjoys a status parallel to the categories in \textit{systemp} (i.e. step five). But Kant's elaboration of the moral law does give some clue as to the details of steps four and six as well.

Each of Kant's formulations of the 'categorical imperative' (which shall be discussed further when we consider step eight) includes one of two elements that fit into \textit{systemp} at this point. The first is the requirement that moral agents be willing for their maxims to 'serve at the same time as the universal law (of all rational beings)' \cite{kant:5:438; s.a. 402,421,434}. In \textit{kant:4:30} Kant expresses this formula of 'universality' as: 'So act that the maxim of your will [step three] could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law.' And in \textit{kant:6:224} he describes the process more fully:

> you must...begin by looking at the subjective principle of your action. But to know whether this principle is also objectively valid, your reason must subject it to the test of conceiving yourself as giving universal law through this principle. If your maxim qualifies for a giving of universal law, then it is objectively valid.

Of course, this test does not have to be performed each time a maxim is adopted; but any maxim must be able to be universalized in order to function in \textit{systemp}. For this reason 'universality' is nowadays called 'universalizability' \cite[e.g. \textit{W10:111}; cf. \textit{P6:85-6}].
The fifth step is the function of 'law-making', a condition which is also intimated in some formulations of the categorical imperative [Kt5:434,438]. This step provides the categorization of the moral law itself, the logical breakdown of its 'categories of freedom'. These categories serve here as 'the analogue to the categories of the understanding' [G13:lii; cf. Kt4:65], the main difference being that the former 'are without exception modes of a single category, that of causality', the causality of freedom [65]. This does not imply, however, that in stage two practical reason 'organizes blind moral intuition into a rational moral apprehension' [G13:lii]. For as Kant clearly explains:

...the elementary practical concepts have as their foundation the form of a pure will [i.e. the second step of stage one; viz. freedom] given in reason and thus in the faculty of thought itself.... [Moreover,] the practical concepts a priori in relation to the supreme principle of freedom [in stage one] immediately become cognitions, not needing to wait upon intuitions in order to acquire a meaning. This occurs for the noteworthy reason that they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer (the intention of the will)--an achievement which is in no way the business of theoretical concepts. [Kt4:65-6]

Kant begins Chapter Two of the Analytic by defining 'a concept of an object of practical reason' as 'the representation of an object as an effect possible through freedom' [Kt4:57]. This indeed is the ultimate function of stage two: to form a concept which corresponds to the object as it is given in the maxim at the close of stage one. Step five fulfills this function, inasmuch as the 'categorization of freedom' (as I shall call it) yields for the first time 'the concepts of good and evil' [66], which, in the context of systemₚ, refer 'to actions and not to the sensory state of the person' [60]. (Kant lists these categories in a table which, of course, has the same form as that in Kt1:106; but he gives even less argument for each category here than he did in systemₚ.) 'It is the concepts of the good and evil which first determine an object for the will' [Kt4:67]. Even though a maxim has been universalized as being worthy of everyone's consent, the object to which it refers is not determined to be 'good' or 'evil' until it is placed under
these categories of freedom here in step five. For 'the moral law is that which first defines [these] concept[s]' [64].

The one version of the categorical imperative which does not include 'universality' contains instead an element which functions as step six: 'Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only' [Kt5: 429]. Kant fleshes out the nature of this 'predisposition of the will to personality' [S9:civ-cv] rather well. Because man has within him 'the ground of a possible categorical imperative' (i.e. the moral law as its form), he 'exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means' [Kt5:428e.a.; cf. P4:167-75]. In Kt7:435 Kant argues that 'man is the final end of creation. For without man the chain of mutually subordinated ends [in nature] would have no ultimate point of attachment.' 'Everything in creation', therefore, 'can be used merely as a means; only man...is an end in itself' [Kt4:87]. For this reason 'respect' (see step seven) 'always applies to persons only, never to things' [76]. Strictly speaking, however, such respect is 'really for the law, which [a person's] example holds before us' [78]. Just as the 'I' of apperception enables the understanding to serve as the supreme limiting condition of sensibility in system, so also the 'us'--i.e. the 'principle of humanity and of every rational creature as an end in himself'--serves here in system as 'the supreme limiting condition on freedom of the actions of each man' [Kt5:430-1]. Indeed, the former is dependent on the latter for its legitimacy: 'the person as belonging to the world of sense is subject to his own personality [via apperception] so far as he belongs to the intelligible world [i.e. the world of persons]' [Kt4:87]. Kant's distinction between free volition as the first stage of moral activity and the moral law as the second will enable him in step seven to allow for those who freely reject the moral law; but the implication of this sixth step is that in so doing they reject their own personhood.

In the logical perspective of system, a universal moral principle
serves as the matter which comes under the formal condition of the
causality of freedom, and in so doing gives rise to human personality.

Silber summarizes this entire stage rather effectively in S16:xciii:

The moral law [stage two] which demands that the individual act
according to a maxim [step three] that is capable of universalization
[step four], is a law [step five] that defines the conditions
for the fulfillment of personality [step six], just as the law of
noncontradiction [in system\textsubscript{1}] and the rules of understanding [in
system\textsubscript{2}] define the conditions for the fulfillment of mind.

The material and formal stages of system\textsubscript{P}, free volition and its
moral law, have now been specified in sufficient detail. But no moral
act has yet taken place at this midpoint of system\textsubscript{P}. Nor has anything
been said about the ultimate purpose or goal of such activity. These
are the topics Kant deals with in the third and fourth stages of his
system, to which we shall now turn our attention.

3. Moral Activity and its Final End

In the third stage of system\textsubscript{P} the moral agent employs what Kant occasion­
ally calls 'the practical faculty of judgment', which is directly
parallel to the judgment employed in system\textsubscript{T} [Kt5:404]. Here in
system\textsubscript{P}, he explains, 'the power of judgment first shows itself to ad­

tantage when common understanding excludes all sensuous incentives from
practical laws' [404]. The agent does so by actually choosing to submit
his maxim to the determining conditions of the moral law, so that his
'empirical nature can be directed by...ethical imperatives' [R10:111].
Kant names such a choice 'autonomous'. But an alternative possibility,
which we have not yet discussed, would be to choose instead a perspec­tive
on the object which is rooted not in the free will of the faculty
of desire, but in the sensibility of the faculty of knowledge, and in so
doing, to regard the attainment of happiness as an incentive to action
instead of the moral law. A decision of this type Kant entitles 'heter­
onomous'. Before the seventh step in system\textsubscript{P} can be delineated, it will
be necessary to explore the details of this choice as it relates to
Kant's System.

'The dependence of the faculty of desire on sensations is called inclination, and inclination always indicates a need' [Kt5:413n]. Whenever this need is fulfilled by assuming 'an object of the will...as prescribing the rule which is to determine the will, the rule is nothing else but heteronomy' [443-4]. In actions performed on this basis, 'the will does not give itself the law, but an external impulse [Antrieb] gives it to the will' [444]. This 'impulse', or 'motive', is 'external' to system inasmuch as it is derived directly from system [see Kt7:443]. Hence 'the material of the faculty of desire' (stage one) consists in this case not of maxims based on free will, but of 'objects of the inclination' [Kt4:74]—i.e. of sensible intuitions viewed from the practical standpoint of moral action. Such heteronomous choices 'all revolve around the principle of one's own happiness' [34]. For 'all men have the strongest and deepest inclination to happiness, because in this idea all inclinations are summed up' [Kt5:399; s.a. 405 and W19:81-2]. Indeed, happiness sums up all inclinations in much the same way as the moral law sums up all free volition.

When faced with an empirical choice between autonomous and heteronomous action—between drawing one's maxim from 'desires' or from 'inclinations' [Kt5:427]—'the will stands, as it were, at the crossroads halfway between its a priori principle which is formal and its a posteriori incentive which is material' [400]. Although 'it is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an object and therefore a material' (i.e. something to fill step three), the material is not always 'the determining ground and condition [of the agent's use] of the maxim' [Kt4:34; s.a. W10:28-9]. On the contrary, if an action is to be relevant to morality, 'The mere form of a law, which limits its material, must be a condition for adding this material to the will but not presuppose it [i.e. the material] as the condition of the will' [34]. In other words, the heteronomous will 'goes outside itself and seeks [its determining]
law in the property of its objects', while the autonomous will requires
that 'I should act this or that way even though I will nothing else'
[Kt5:440-1]. The choice, therefore, is between taking the object di-
rectly from systemₐ and then imposing it upon the will as a heteronomous
inclination, or taking it from the will itself (in step three) and then
allowing the moral law to form it into an autonomous desire. In the
former case the primacy of theoretical reason is assumed, so that the
material is made the determining factor in an action, whereas in the
latter this function is fulfilled by the formal stage, the moral law,
thus presupposing the primacy of practical reason.

At this point it is important to emphasize that heteronomous action
should not be regarded as immoral or evil action, but as amoral action—
action which never directly touches upon man's system of moral perspec-
tives as such [cf. W10:101]. Thus Wood declares: 'Too much emphasis
has been given to the "moroseness" of Kant's ethics, and to his supposed
hostility to inclination and sensibility. This attitude is neither
typical of Kant, nor characteristic of his best and most mature thought'
[W19:109; s.a. P4:55-7]. Indeed, heteronomous action is opposed to moral
action only if it is regarded as a moral alternative to acting autono-
mously. For Kant warns in Kt1:375: 'Nothing is more reprehensible than
to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done,
or to impose upon them [in systemₐ] the limits by which the latter [sys-
temₐ] is circumscribed.' Apart from such a 'pernicious error' [Kt6:214],
then, nothing is intrinsically wrong with the heteronomous actions which
all men perform most of the time: our ordinary habitual or skilful
activities, the fulfilment of our genuine needs, and even our indulgence
in various pleasures do not make us 'evil' even though they may be
causally determined heteronomously. Only if one's original disposition
favours such action to the point of partially or altogether excluding
specifically moral actions when such opportunities do present themselves
is one's choice to act heteronomously actually evil. Kant affirms that
a person need not 'renounce his natural end, happiness... He [simply] must not make it a condition of his obedience to the [moral] law' [Kt30:278(64); q.i. W19:51; s.a. Kt4:93]. What is needed, therefore, is a condition provided by practical reason itself which can balance out this danger for the moral agent. As Lauener puts it, the will here in stage three 'does not act morally from itself as a phenomenal arbitrium liberum and therefore needs an incentive, which counteracts the sensuous stimuli' [L2:143].

In accordance with this need, Kant suggests a moral incentive for autonomous action which corresponds to the relationship between happiness and heteronomy. This motive goes under various titles, such as 'moral feeling', 'interest', 'schema', or 'respect'. Moral feeling is 'the subjective effect which the law has upon the will' in a moral agent [Kt5:460]. Although it is subjective, such feeling is a necessary mediating step between 'the thought of the possible action' (step six) and 'the action or its effect' as such (step nine); so 'any consciousness of obligation [step eight] has moral feeling as its basis' [Kt6:398]. The function of moral feeling in step seven, then, is to produce 'an interest in obedience to the law' [Kt4:80]. This 'interest in the practically possible good [step six] and the maxim based on it [step three]' pave the way for the concluding stage of the Analytic's argument: 'the subjective determination of the will' [90; cf. Kt6:211]. 'Interest is that by which reason [actually] becomes practical, i.e. a cause determining the will' [Kt5:459]. It encourages us to renounce the temptation to let happiness determine the form of all our actions. A maxim 'is thus morally genuine only when it depends [for its actualisation] on the mere interest in obedience to the law' [Kt4:79].

However, just as the origin of the schema in system[p] is essentially a mystery, so also 'an explanation of how and why the universality of the maxim as law (and hence morality) interests us is completely impossible for us men' [Kt5:460]. Kant himself develops this comparison
further in KT4:68-9:

Here [in step seven of systemp] we are concerned not with the schema of a case occurring according to laws but with the schema (if this word is suitable here) of a law itself... [It] connects the concept of causality [in stage two] to conditions altogether different from those which constitute natural connection [viz. transcendental freedom].

... Thus...the understanding can supply to an idea of reason not a schema of sensibility but a law. This law...may...be called the type of the moral law.

The schema enables us 'to use the nature of the sensuous world as the type of an intelligible nature, so long as we do not carry over to the latter intuitions and what depends on them but only apply to it the form of lawfulness in general' [70].

Kant's favorite way of referring to this moral 'schematism' is in terms of the respect which the moral law naturally deserves to be given [cf. L2:141-2]. He notes that respect is 'the effect of the law on the subject and not...the cause of the law' [KT5:401n]. It 'is a feeling produced by an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one which we can know completely a priori and the necessity of which we can discern' [KT4:73]. Indeed, here in step seven the entire 'moral realm' --the whole system of practical perspectives--'is presented to us as an object of respect' [82]. (In this sense, 'respect for the law is not the incentive to morality; it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as an incentive' [76]. It is 'the conformity with Law of the maxim' [KT6:389].) But this result is not achieved until the second stage is actually imposed upon the first, for 'no kind of feeling...may be assumed as prior to the moral law and as its basis' [KT4:75; cf. L2:140-5]: 'Respect [is] the consciousness of the direct constraint of the will through law... [I]t produces exactly the same effect [as 'the feeling of pleasure'], but from different sources' [KT4:117]. This moral feeling is 'a positive assistance to [the moral law's] causality', because it 'removes a resistance' to the moral law [75] by providing an incentive or 'moral interest' [KT5:401n] for morality which can 'counterpoise'
that of happiness [405; s.a. Kt6:215,405; Kt4:78]: it 'weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations through humiliating self-conceit' [79]. Respect motivates the will in the third stage to replace sensibility with free volition, thus 'precluding all inclinations from having a direct influence on the will' [80]. 'It does not serve for an estimation of actions or as a basis of the objective moral law itself but only as an incentive to make this law itself a maxim' [76; s.a. Kt6:398]--i.e. to unite stages one and two. Through such respect, therefore, the moral agent 'is immediately inspired to obedience by the moral law' [Kt7:452e.a.].

There is an important difference between the transcendental freedom in stage one and the empirical freedom here in stage three. Empirical freedom functions through 'the free faculty of choice'; but this faculty is determined in step five by the 'categories of freedom', which in turn 'have as their foundation the form of a pure will' [Kt4:65-6]--i.e. transcendental freedom (step two) rather than intuition. Thus from the empirical perspective, 'free will' refers not to our transcendental freedom to determine a nonsensible object for our will, but to our empirical freedom to choose whether our actions are to be determined by the objects in the sensible world around us or by our own power of practical reason. (This distinction is pointed up by Kant's fairly consistent use of Wille to refer to the will's use of transcendental freedom, and Willkür to refer to its use of empirical freedom.) Only in the empirical sense is Silber right to call freedom 'the third thing "X" in terms of which the proposition expressing the synthetic relation of the concept of the will [stage one] to the concept of the moral law [stage two] is...analytic' [S16:xxivn; s.a. P4:200,213].

Once an agent has chosen empirically to respect the law as a determining factor for its maxim, the law must be reimposed in a 'schematized' form, suitable for empirical obedience. Only in this form, which unifies stages one and two in a single principle [Kt4:47-8], is the
moral law truly 'a law of causality through freedom' [47e.a.]. This eighth condition in System P is provided by the 'categorical imperative', 'the imperative of morality' [Kt5:416]. An imperative is defined by Kant as an 'objective principle valid for every rational being' [420-1n]; it is a 'practical law' [400n,420] expressed in terms of 'a command' [413]. It 'indicate[s] the relation of an objective law of reason [stage two] to a will [stage three] which is not in its subjective constitution necessarily determined by this law' [413]. An imperative is 'categorical', as opposed to 'hypothetical', if it 'pre­sent[s] an action as of itself objectively necessary, without regard to any other end' [414]: 'If the action is good only as a means to some­thing else, the imperative is hypothetical; but if it is thought of as good in itself...[it] is categorical.' Thus 'the [categorical] impera­tive contains besides the law [stage two] only the necessity that the maxim [step three] should accord with the law' [420-1].

From the categorical imperative are derived various other 'practi­cal universal laws', which are 'principles which contain the determin­ing ground of the will because of their form and not because of their matter' [Kt4:27; s.a. Kt5:416; Kt6:226], the former being given in stage two ('the moral law'), and the latter in stage one ('the object of the will') [Kt4:27; s.a. P4:95-6 and Wl9:44]. These 'rules of a practical reason' [Kt4:65], then, are maxims which have been fully determined by the moral law. As such, they are part of 'the world of sense', so they 'contribute nothing to the theoretical use of the understanding..., but only to the a priori subjection of the manifold of desires [stage one] to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral law [stage two]' [65]. However, they are analogous to the theoretical principles of nature given in step eight of System P [Kt7:171]: in an ideal world, such rules, based on the categorical imperative, would be 'the ground of all actions of rational beings, just as natural law is the ground of all appearances
Indeed, Kant even says 'this categorical ought presents a synthetic a priori proposition' [454; s.a. 420].

Because the categorical imperative eliminates all sensible 'conditions' from the rules it yields, these rules must be recognized by the agent as 'unconditional' commands, i.e. as 'laws independent of all antecedent reference to ends or aims' [Kt7:173]. Hence they 'must completely determine the will as will, even before I ask whether I am capable of achieving a desired effect or what should be done to realize it' [Kt4:20]. A moral action may well fulfill various sensible inclinations as well, since human agents must 'represent their ends amid the sensible world of which they are a part' [W19:45]; but these will not be the motive for acting, and will therefore be irrelevant to the action's moral status [cf. 61].

None of Kant's various formulations of the categorical imperative should be taken as its 'official' form; for the question of what is being commanded is at this point subordinate to the fact that something is being commanded as a morally necessary action. Perhaps its most profound version would be the simple command: 'Do your duty' [Kt6:390]. This command is fulfilled only in step nine, where a moral action is actually performed:

The action which is objectively practical according to [the moral] law and excludes inclination from its determining grounds is called duty...

The concept of duty thus requires of action that it objectively agree with the law, while of the maxim of the action it demands subjective respect for the law as the mode of determining the will through itself. [Kt4:80-1; s.a. 31]

In terms of the categorical imperative which serves as its basis, 'duty is practical unconditional necessity of action' [Kt5:425]: it 'directs categorically, irrespective of the objects of desire [given in stage one]--the subject-matter of volition--and, consequently, of any end whatsoever.'

Although the form of an action determines its moral worth, it is
nevertheless the matter (i.e. the end, as given in the maxim) which is actually being carried out when a person does his duty [Kt6:393-4; s.a. P4:73; W19:55,64-5]. And since the matter of any action is inextricably bound up with the sensible conditions of system, and so with inclination, the effort required to make it conform to the requirements of the moral law may vary greatly. Indeed, it is because our obedience to this law sometimes requires turning our backs on various inclinations that such obedience is called duty [cf. Kt35:(15-6) and Kt6:378]. In such instances duty involves 'a necessitation [step eight] to an end we adopt reluctantly' [385]. Our motive for obeying, however, is not duty itself, but respect for the moral law [Kt8:27-7(22-3); s.a. Ple]; for Kant, duty is technically 'the necessity of an action executed from [i.e. motivated by] respect for the law' [Kt5:400e.a.]. Regarded as a motive, duty would imply the 'wooden imitation' [P4:51; cf. Kt5:409] of rules imposed upon a person from some outside source, such as tradition. Kant severely criticizes the 'fantastically virtuous [man] who admits nothing morally indifferent...and strews all his steps with duties, as with man-traps'; for such an approach 'would turn the sovereignty of virtue into tyranny' [Kt6:408]. But regarded as an action, it is simply a person's free, empirical obedience to a moral command, which must present itself as a command because of the potential conflict which exists between a person's finite sensible nature and his feeling of respect for the moral law [cf. P4:70-1,113-6].

But regardless of how strict the requirements of duty are, Kant insists it is always at least possible to fulfil them, since they are rooted in the agent's own rationality:

Whenever we bring any flattering thought of merit into our actions, the incentive is already mixed with self-love and thus has some assistance from the side of sensibility. But to put everything else after the holiness of duty and to know that we can do it because our own reason acknowledges it as its law and says that we ought to do it—that is, as it were, to lift ourselves altogether out of the world of sense [i.e. to render system temporarily irrelevant to our activity]... [Kt4:159]
This ninth condition insures that Kant's moral theory is not that of 'a pharisaical formalist' [B9.ix; s.a. P4:74-6], by requiring that genuine moral activity (not just mere 'legality', i.e. action which happens to conform to the moral law without being based on respect [Kt6:389,393] and on a moral maxim [218,224]) become an actual part of one's empirical nature. Wood puts forth Kant's case admirably when he says that to be virtuous, one must

act on valid maxims, and hence labor to attain the ends represented ...as the matter of such maxims.... [Accordingly,] there can be no "reign of law" without a purposeful relation to the world of action and a genuine attempt to transform that world in accordance with the law of morality. [W19:64; cf. G15:xxiii]

The decision by which a moral agent 'applies what is asserted universally in the rule (in abstracto) to an action (in concreto)'--i.e. the function which actually gives rise to the performance of duty--is 'practical judgment' [Kt4:67]. Kant devotes little attention to explaining this term, not only because of its similarities to both theoretical judgment and 'common rational judgment' [Kt5:404], but also because the preceding eight steps of system are a Critical analysis of what constitutes this empirical function in man's moral experience. Moreover, he analyses its actual manifestation in experience in Kt6, where he 'deals with the four main types of duty: juridical duty, perfect duty to oneself, imperfect duty to oneself, and duty of virtue to others' [G15: xxxv]. But the details of his analysis of these duties are irrelevant to system as such.

Kant has now shown in his exposition of the first three stages of system that 'the concept of freedom is as thoroughly deduced from the perspective of moral experience as is the concept of causality from the perspective of scientific experience' [S16:lxiiin; cf. Kt4:141-2]. This leaves to the fourth stage the task of justifying the other metaphysical concepts around which his System revolves: viz. God and immortality. Concerning his treatment of these topics Kant warns that 'reason in its
practical use is not a bit better off [than in system\textsubscript{p}]. As pure practical reason it likewise seeks the unconditioned for the practically conditioned..., under the name of the highest good' [108; cf. W19:91]. The question which sets off Kant's attempt to complete his system of moral perspectives is: What is the ultimate purpose or 'final end' of our moral activity? His answer to this question comes in the fourth stage of system\textsubscript{p}, discussed primarily in the 'Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason' [Kt4:107-148], where the 'object' of the entire system is 'presented to the will' [64].

Before expounding the content of this stage, its 'object' must be carefully distinguished from the 'object' given in the maxim in step three. As Kant explains, whenever 'the representation of an effect is at the same time the ground determining an intelligent efficient cause to its production, the effect so represented is termed an end' [Kt7:426; cf. P4:166-7]. As such, all moral actions are ends, for they are all effects resulting from a person's free, intelligent causality. No 'antecedent reference' is made to these actual ends in the moral principles given in step eight [173], but only to their 'matter' or 'object' as given in step three [see e.g. Kt4:27]. Kant is referring to this transition from step three to step nine, from a possible action to a real action, when he speaks of making an 'object' an 'end' [W19:42-3]. Despite his occasionally inconsistent use of these terms, their use in stage four is clearly distinguishable from their other uses, for they now refer not to any particular end, but to a single, 'final' end, which is 'not to be taken as the determining ground of the pure will' [Kt4:109]. On the contrary, 'the whole of pure reason...is presented to reason through its final end in the sphere of the practical' [Kt1:xxxviii]. 'A final end is an end that does not require any other [subsequent] end as a condition of its possibility' [Kt7:434]. As 'man's morally rational ideal of the complete and perfect goal of human life' [G13:1vi], this end is 'an idea that has objective reality for us in practical matters'
In this way, as Wood notes, Kant distinguishes 'between what the law commands us to do'—viz. dutiful realization of particular ends—'and what it commands us to seek'—viz. the highest good as a final end [ML9:94].

'The idea of a final end in the employment of freedom in obedience to moral laws' provides us now with 'a principle which, from a subjective perspective, is constitutive'—i.e. it constitutes the true 'object' of systemp [Kt7:453]: 'The achievement of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law' [Kt4:122]. 'This sumnum bonum is formed', Kant argues, 'by the union of universal happiness with the strictest morality' [Kt7:453]. The latter entails 'moral perfection' [Kt4:128], or 'virtue' [110], which depends upon 'the strength of man's maxims in fulfilling his duty' [Kt6:393]. Kant maintains that 'virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever appears to us to be desirable and thus of all our pursuit of happiness' [Kt4:110]. We saw in stage three that 'to further one's happiness can never be a direct duty, and even less can it be a principle of duty' [93]; nevertheless happiness does fulfil a necessary function in systemp, for 'practical reason does not require that we should renounce the claims of happiness' [93]. On the contrary, in order for virtue to become the 'perfect good... happiness is also required' [110]. Happiness 'is one end...which we may presuppose as actual in all rational beings so far as imperatives apply to them' [Kt5:415]. That is, it is the 'idea of a state' [Kt7:430] which ought to follow upon one's dutiful obedience to such imperatives—an idea which every moral agent actually possesses.

Kant is careful to keep virtue and happiness distinct, as the tenth and eleventh steps on the path to the highest good: 'happiness and morality are two specifically different elements of the highest good and therefore their combination cannot be known analytically... The highest good is a synthesis of concepts' [Kt4:112; s.a. Kt66:277-82(143-7)].
Their difference is analogous to that between the unconditioned and the idea in system^: 'virtue is...the condition having no condition superior to it [cf. the unconditioned], while happiness...always presupposes conduct in accordance with the moral law as its condition [cf. the idea as an item of knowledge]' [Kt4:110-1]. 'The highest good will therefore consist', Wood observes, 'in a complete and total attainment of both of these components' [W19:92]. Kant unambiguously expounds the logical relationship between the three steps of stage four in Kt4:119e.a.: 'the supreme good (as the first condition of the highest good) is morality; and...happiness, though it indeed constitutes the second element of the highest good, does so only as the morally conditioned but necessary consequence of the former.' The key aspect of the relationship between these two conditions is that their combination in the highest good requires that 'the greatest happiness is thought of as connected in exact proportion to the greatest degree of moral perfection possible to creatures' [129-30e.a.]; for 'the moral value of happiness is conditioned by a virtuous character as the worthiness to be happy' [W19:89; s.a. 126].

Our actual attainment of the highest good is, Kant admits, severely limited by the fact that the 'connection of the conditioned [viz. happiness] with its condition [viz. virtue] belongs wholly to the supersensuous relations of things and cannot be given under the laws of the world of sense, even though...the actions which are devoted to realizing the highest good, do belong to this world' [Kt4:119]. To ignore this limit is to ignore Kant's warning in Kt4:108 (q.a.) concerning the danger of dialectical illusion in system^p. For, as he reminds us in Kt7:403,

what ought necessarily to happen frequently does not happen. Hence it is clear that it only springs from the subjective character of our practical faculty that the moral laws must be represented as commands, and the action conformable to them as duties, and that reason expresses this necessity...by an "ought to be"...

In spite of this limitation, however, any moral agent who wishes to be fully rational must find a way to conceive of its final end:

It is a duty to realize the highest good as far as it lies within
our power to do so; therefore, it must be possible to do so. Consequently, it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume whatever is necessary to its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in relation to which alone it is valid. [Kt4:143n]

As Ward affirms, 'practical reason necessarily aims at the preservation and development of all purposes (including the essential purposes with which nature is concerned in man, human happiness and perfection)' [W10:112-3]. If morality is to be conceived as ultimately rational, therefore, a 'supplement to our impotence' is required in the case of both virtue and happiness [119].

Concerning virtue, Kant argues that 'complete fitness of the will to the moral law is holiness, which is a perfection of which no rational being in the world of sense is at any time capable. But since it is required as practically necessary,...[we must assume] an endless progress to that complete fitness'; and this in turn requires 'the supposition of the immortality of the soul' [Kt4:122]. Likewise 'the second element of the highest good, i.e., happiness proportional to that of morality', is often not realized in particular moral situations, so the moral agent 'must postulate the existence of God as necessarily belonging to the possibility of the highest good' [124]. The postulate of God alone makes it possible 'to equate virtue and happiness' [G13:1viii], in the sense of conceiving how the level of the latter can match the level of the former [see Kt7:452; Kt8:7-8n(6-7n)]. Thus, 'the existence is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality' [Kt4:125]. Such a being must be 'capable of actions by the idea of laws'; hence it must not only be 'a rational being': it must be 'God' [125]. Kant defends this postulation 'of a moral author of the world' in Kt7:453:

As this assumption at least involves nothing intrinsically self-contradictory [cf. Systemp, stage four] [we] may quite readily make it from a practical standpoint, that is to say, at least for the purpose of framing a conception of the possibility of the final end morally prescribed to [us].
At this point it must be made clear that the postulates of God and immortality, as well as that of freedom, 'are not theoretical dogmas, but presuppositions of necessarily practical import' [Kt4:132]. Thus the argument Kant uses to defend them is not one which is intended necessarily to convince every sceptic [Kt7:450-1]. Rather, it is, as Wood aptly calls it in W19:29, 'a reductio ad absurdum practicum, an argument leading to an unwelcome conclusion about the person himself as a moral agent.' Since the three ideas of practical reason are 'immanent and constitutive' for systemp [Kt4:135], we cannot reject them without rejecting the rationality of morality itself. Therefore, only the sceptic who desires to act morally is forced to choose between regarding moral activity as essentially irrational (and thus failing to understand the nature of morality) or accepting the practical reality of freedom, immortality, and God. Only moral beings who understand what is involved in morality will be convinced by Kant's argument [146].

Kant is trying to convince anyone who does not wish to be either immoral or irrational to adopt a moral faith in the transcendent objects to which his practical postulates refer [Kt7:469]. Nothing can force anyone to do so, however, for this 'faith of pure practical reason...is a voluntary decision' [Kt4:146]: it 'springs from the moral disposition [cf. step one] itself', so 'it is itself not commanded.' As such, moral faith is not simply a version of Freudian 'wish-fulfilment' [see W19:182-7], nor do its empirical roots in Christian Theology preclude the concept of 'faith' from being 'freely approved by reason' [Kt7:471-2n; cf. P4:197]. For the 'reflective' faith in which Kant is interested must be distinguished from 'dogmatic faith, which proclaims itself as a form of knowledge' [Kt8:52(48)]: the 'matter of faith' with which the former is concerned is not intended to be made an 'article of faith'--for it 'cannot, like matters of fact, depend on theoretical proofs' [Kt7:469n]--but rather on 'a practical need' [Kt4:126]. 'The "belief" of which Kant speaks is', therefore, 'a condition for purposive voli-
tion, or for the rationality of that volition' [W19:23; s.a. 151]. Moral faith provides, as suggested in our already sufficiently detailed discussion of faith in Chapter VI, the primary link between system\textsubscript{T} and system\textsubscript{P}. For the moral faith in system\textsubscript{P} is a belief in the practical necessity of the reality of the objects of the very 'transcendental ideas' presented in system\textsubscript{T} [cf. 145]--a faith in the practical value of concepts which for system\textsubscript{T} must always remain 'problematic' [Kt1:445n].

Kant makes it quite clear that the adoption of moral faith is in no sense a guarantee that the virtue possible in an immortal life or the happiness given by a just God to the morally acceptable will be realized to any extent whatsoever by the human moral agent. Concerning proportional happiness, for example, he says in Kt4:128-9:

> But the moral law does not of itself promise happiness, for the latter is not, according to concepts of any order of nature, necessarily connected with obedience to the law [i.e. to virtue].... [Proportional] happiness cannot (as far as our own capacity is concerned) be reached in this present life and therefore is made only an object of hope.

This inadequacy of human moral agents to realize the highest good leads Kant to conjecture as to what the proper context for its fulfillment would actually be. Insofar as it points forward to the fulfilment of the highest good, 'the principle of autonomy of the will...leads to a very fruitful concept, namely that of a realm of ends', a 'realm' or 'kingdom' (Reich) being understood as 'the systematic union of different rational beings through common laws' [Kt5:433]. Thus, although Kant sometimes seems to be saying that the moral agent should have only his own virtue and happiness as his highest end, this notion of a realm of ends clarifies that, as Wood argues convincingly, 'the moral good of all finite rational beings is the unqualified and unconditioned end of the finite rational moral agent' [W19:78]. From the practical perspective of the realization of step twelve, therefore, 'Morality [step ten]... consists in the relation of every action [step nine] to that legislation [step eight] through which alone a realm of ends [step twelve] is
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possible' [Kt5:434]. Kant believes such a realm should 'be thought of as united under a sovereign [step eleven] so that [it]...no longer remain[s] a mere idea but...receive[s] true reality' [439]. In fact, he says 'the sumnum bonum...is alone possible under [the] sovereignty' of 'the Sovereign Head legislating in a moral Kingdom of Ends' [Kt7:444]. 'Duty', in such a case, 'pertains not to the sovereign in the realm of ends, but rather to each member, and to each in the same degree' [Kt5:434].

From the empirical perspective of actual moral activity (step nine) such a realm of ends is 'certainly only an ideal' [Kt5:433]. Indeed, it is 'possible only by analogy with a realm of nature' [438]. The moral agent should nevertheless act as if the highest good is attainable by striving after it as an ultimate goal, with the hope that it will eventually be realized in some (perhaps supersensible) form. Wood defends such a position in W19:98: 'Just as the ideas of reason in the first critique were necessary, and could not be simply dismissed as foolish chimeras, so the ideal end of finite rationality cannot be simply ignored, or relegated to the comfortable status of an "unattainable ideal."' Instead, the 'holiness of the will', as conceived of in the context of a realm of ends, is 'a practical ideal which must necessarily serve as a model which all finite rational beings must strive toward even though they cannot reach it' [Kt4:32]. For us, then, virtue is 'the unending progress of [our] maxims toward this model' [32], a progress which, as Wood puts it, might then be 'regarded by God as in some sense morally equivalent to holiness' [W19:120].

Once some sort of 'realm of ends' is accepted as a necessary condition or context for the eventual fulfilment of the highest good, systemp is complete. For in this final step, we 'end where we started, with the concept of an unconditionally good will' [Kt5:437]. The good will which was posited as an unknown in step one is now regarded as being fully determined in every rational moral being, thus fulfilling the final end
towards which all moral activity points.

Kant consistently argues that the 'proper territory' of pure reason is 'that of practical principles' [Kt1:822], a view which is usually described in terms of the 'primacy' of practical reason [Kt4:119-21]. 'Primacy' in this sense refers neither to the logical order of the two Critical systems (for system\textsuperscript{t} has primacy in this sense [cf. W10:97-8]) nor to the ability of system\textsubscript{p} 'to comprehend [system\textsuperscript{t}] within [its limits]' [Kt4:121]. On the contrary, it has to do with the question 'Which interest is superior?' [120]--i.e. Which system must look to the other for its ultimate value? Since stage four of system\textsuperscript{t} ends in failure when its ends are assumed to be purely theoretical (i.e. speculative), and succeeds only when those ends are regarded as practical, the fulfilment of the latter is clearly of utmost interest to the former. Moreover, as Kant says in Kt7:442, a good will is the 'final end of the world', and 'must be presupposed as that in relation to which the contemplation of the world [in system\textsuperscript{t}] may itself possess a worth.' However, the Critical philosopher's task is not yet completed: for just as theoretical reason benefits from pointing inwards towards a new, practical system, so also practical reason benefits by beckoning the Critical mind to systematize still deeper levels of experience.
1. The Shift from the Practical to the Empirical Standpoint

Many commentators devote all their attention to Kant's 'two great 
Critiques' [O2:173] without ever acknowledging the role of the third 
Critique in Kant's System. One reason for this may be that the systems 
of both theoretical and practical perspectives are primarily concerned 
with establishing objective conclusions, whereas a system of empirical 
perspectives 'is only subjective' [Kt7:286]. Nevertheless, it is a 
serious misunderstanding of Kant, particularly for those concerned with 
the theological implications of his System, to regard his dichotomy 
between theoretical and practical reason as implying there to be 'no 
"third" way' to interpret experience [S20:4.37]. For such an approach 
ignores Kant's attempt to synthesize system_t and system_p in system_e.

Judgment in system_e is both free (as in system_p) and yet based on 
a sensible object (as in system_t): it 'contains a principle of subsump-
tion, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions 
...i.e. of the imagination, under the faculty of concepts, i.e. the 
understanding, so far as the former in its freedom accords with the 
latter in its conformity to law' [Kt7:287]. The resulting 'free play of 
imagination and understanding' [218] enables system_e to function as the 
synthesis of system_t and system_p. It is important to note, however, that 
the term 'judgment' now refers neither to the determinate judgment in 
the third stage of system_t, which uses principles of pure understanding 
to establish empirical knowledge, nor to the practical judgment in the 
third stage of system_p, which uses moral principles to realize moral 
activity; rather it refers to 'reflective judgment', which is 'a prin-
ciple to itself', one which 'must serve as a mere subjective principle 
for the employment of our cognitive faculties in...reflecting upon
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objects of a particular kind' [385].

Kant chooses two kinds of objects to submit to reflective judgment in systeme: objects which the faculty of aesthetic judgment judges to be beautiful or sublime, and objects which the faculty of teleological judgment judges to contain within them an inherent organization or natural purpose. The common factor in these two types of judgment is 'finality', or 'purposiveness', which Kant defines as 'conformity to law on the part of the contingent' [Kt7:403]. It is manifested subjectively in aesthetic judgment and objectively in teleological judgment. In each case finality serves as 'a mediating concept between the mechanistic nature of the first Critique and the demand of moral freedom [in systeme]' [Wt10:131]. Despite the similarity of their function in Kant's System, aesthetic and teleological judgment are naturally distinct types of experience, each of which gives rise to its own version of systeme.

The fact that Kant chooses to analyse two distinct kinds of experience in his treatment of systeme typifies the generally poor organization of Kt7, which is most evident in his failure to present in systematic (i.e. architectonic) form the elements involved in such experiences, as we have come to expect. In place of the sense of logical flow which characterizes the first two Critiques is an oftentimes rambling and almost haphazard treatment of his various topics. But Kant's difficulty here is due at least as much to the nature of his subject-matter as to his own carelessness. For the standpoint has shifted in systeme from the practical to the empirical; and with this shift the priority of form in the first two systems gives way to a priority of content. Kant still devotes much of his attention to formal considerations, but cannot specify precisely a complete set of universally valid 'elements', since these are bound to differ with every different sort of empirical content which is put into the system. By regarding various experiences as primarily noncognitive, without distinguishing the concepts and intuitions which may accompany them, systeme takes us the farthest distance
from system, where formal considerations are so important as to exclude content altogether. Therefore the most we can expect is to trace such experiences through the structure provided by system, without necessarily forcing them to 'fit' exactly.

Even though the content of system cannot be specified as neatly as in system and systemp, some explanation must be made of how Kant's doctrines of aesthetic and teleological judgment fit into the interpretation developed so far. Doing so in IX.2-3 will yield an adequate account of how Kant intended to complete his Critical System; but in addition it will supply some indispensable background for the discussion of the theological implications of Kant's System in Part Four.

2. The Aesthetic Judgment of Subjective Finality

Kant divides all objects of Aesthetic judgment into four types: 'an object is to be counted either as agreeable, or beautiful, or sublime, or good (absolutely)' [Kt7:266]. At times he treats these as if they constitute the four stages of aesthetic judgment, such as when he relates each to one of the four categories [266-7]. Thus the agreeable and the beautiful are both predicates of a 'judgement of taste'. The former, being impure, are 'judgements of sense (material aesthetic judgements [=stage one])' and the latter, being pure, are '(as formal [=stage two]) alone judgements of taste proper' [223]. The sublime and the good, by contrast, stem from 'a higher, intellectual feeling' [192], similar in some ways to respect in stage three of systemp [271] and to the highest good in stage four [208]. Yet in the end Kant does not develop system along these lines. For he devotes very little attention to the agreeable or the good, presumably because the former is too mundane (it always concerns only 'what pleases immediately' [208]), and the latter too extraordinary to require a thorough Critical analysis. The beautiful and the sublime, by contrast, both have unique combinations of sensible availability and mysterious rationality which give the Critical
philosopher an intrinsic interest in them [see W10:132]; but they are experiences which differ too much to function together in a single system. Our discussion will begin, therefore, with a general examination of what Kant has to say about the judgment of taste, regarded as 'the faculty of estimating the beautiful' [203n].

The name 'aesthetic' is intended to convey the fact that such judgments are primarily noncognitive: 'The judgement of taste...is not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic' [Kt7:203]. Such judgments are subjective, not objective [214] and are 'not founded on concepts' [282]; hence 'there neither is, nor can be, a science' constructed out of them [355]. For 'an aesthetic judgement...affords absolutely no...knowledge of the Object. It is only through a logical judgement [i.e. stage three of systemT] that we get knowledge' [228]. Although an aesthetic judgment has 'no bearing upon the Object', it does have a type of 'subjective universal validity' [215]. Unlike the logical judgment, however, it 'does not postulate the agreement of every one...; it only imputes this agreement to every one' [216]. That is, it is 'only an idea' [216], according to which the subject treats the object 'as if' everyone would judge it in a certain way.

Despite its noncognitive character, 'the understanding has...its role in the judgement of taste...[viz.] not that of a faculty for cognizing an object, but of a faculty for determining that judgement and its representation (without a concept) according to its relation to the subject and its internal feeling' [Kt7:228-9]. But in forming this vague, nonconceptual determination of the object, 'understanding is at the service of imagination' [242]; for 'imagination must...be regarded in its freedom...as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions' [240]. In the first stage of systemE, therefore, the formal element is determined not by sensibility, as in systemT, nor by practical reason, as in systemP, but by imagination. In both systemT and systemP, 'the representation is referred to the Object, but in [systemE] it is
referred solely to the Subject and is not available for any cognition' [206]. As a result, the second stage (the formal work of understanding) must conform to the first (the material given), rather than vice versa.

One of the clearest ways to distinguish between the various types of aesthetic judgment is to determine the function of 'delight' in the judgment. Kant regards delight as the key to an aesthetic judgment's 'estimate of the object', and compares its function in \( \text{System}_a \) to that of schematism in \( \text{System}_t \) [Kt7:218-9]. 'The delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object is called interest' [204]. The judgments which determine 'the agreeable and the good' are both 'invariably coupled with [such] an interest in the object' [209]. But since real existence is properly a matter to be decided in the context of \( \text{System}_t \) [cf. 251], one must have 'complete indifference' as to 'the real existence of the thing...in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste' [205]. For a pure judgment of taste 'relies on no interest', yet it may produce one [205n]; it 'is uninfluenced by charm or emotion (though these may be associated with the delight in the beautiful), and [its] determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form' [223; cf. IX.3], not 'sensation' [226].

The different functions of delight in various sorts of aesthetic judgment require different assumptions about the agreement of others. Thus, concerning judgment of the agreeable, it is proper to say 'Every one has his own taste (that of sense)' [Kt7:212]; whereas that of the beautiful must be placed 'on a pedestal' of 'subjective universality' [212]. For in the latter type of judgement, a person must regard his delight in the object as resting on what he may also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every one. Accordingly he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the judgement logical... [211]

This 'subjective universal communicability...is...the mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding' [217-8]. Hence,
even though its validity is 'merely subjective', a judgment of taste is regarded from the empirical standpoint as 'extend[ing] its claim to all Subjects, as unreservedly as it would if it were an objective judgement' [285].

Notwithstanding the apparent rigidity of this requirement of subjective universality, Kant does not exclude the possibility of two people reaching legitimate, but different, conclusions in their aesthetic judgment of a single object. In such a case, if both parties were truly judging aesthetically, 'both would...be judging correctly' [Kt7:231]; for the assumption made by the judging subject 'is not that every one will fall in with [his] judgement, but rather that one ought to agree with it' [239]. 'The ought in aesthetic judgements' is therefore 'only pronounced conditionally' [237]. To assert 'I think the object [is] beautiful' is, for Kant, to 'attribute that delight to every one as [subjectively] necessary' [289]. In other words, I must assume that the delight I now experience would come to anyone who experiences the object with the precise perspective from which I now experience it, and that anyone who experiences such delight must regard that object as beautiful. This is what Kant means when he says 'we are justified in presupposing that the same subjective conditions of judgement which we find in ourselves are universally present in every man, and further that we have rightly subsumed the given Object under these conditions' [290].

In order to support his theory that a pure judgment of taste is based on a delight which is regarded as subjectively universal and necessary, Kant requires a 'Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgements' [Kt7:279]. The method he employs is to 'demonstrate the universal validity of a singular judgement expressing the subjective finality of an empirical representation of the form of an object' [280-1]. Or, more simply, he shows how 'something can please in the mere formation of an estimate of it (without [reference to one's] sensation or concept [of it])' [281; cf. 286,306]. He first points out two 'logical peculiarit-
ties, which distinguish a judgement of taste from all cognitive judg­ments' [281]: first, 'it has universal validity a priori, yet without having a logical universality according to concepts'; and second 'it has a necessity...which depends upon no a priori proofs' [281]—indeed there is not even any 'empirical ground of proof that can coerce anyone's judgement of taste' [284]. To attempt any such proof would be to treat an aesthetic judgment as a logical one: the former apply only to indi­vidual experiences, rather than to general types of experience [285]. As a result, the deduction of aesthetic judgments consists simply in clarifying their peculiarities, a task which relies heavily on the pre­sentation of examples [283]. Thus Kant devotes a good deal of attention [291-336] to developing a number of examples of the ways in which 'sin­gular judgements...unite their predicate of delight, not to a concept, but to a given singular empirical representation' [289]—i.e. to an 'aesthetic idea' [342].

Kant's main concern in Part One of Kt7 is to apply this theory of aesthetic judgment to our apprehension of the beautiful and the sublime. Our discussion so far has been concerned almost wholly with the former, so at this point it will suffice merely to mention how the judgment of taste applies specifically to the beautiful object. We can then discuss its application to the sublime in rather more detail.

The beautiful is defined as the object of a disinterested, necessity delight [Kt7:211,240]. The 'object' in this case, however, is wholly subjective: 'apart from any reference to the feeling of the Sub­ject, [beauty is] nothing' [218]. The subject estimates an object to be beautiful 'on the ground of a mere formal finality, i.e. a finality apart from an end' [226]. 'Beauty is the form of finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from the representation of an end' [236]. This 'purposiveness without purpose' [W10:132], which character­izes the beautiful, will always contain

a necessary reference...to delight. However, this necessity...is
not a theoretical objective necessity... Nor yet is it a practical necessity... Rather..., it can only be termed exemplary.... Since an aesthetic judgement is not an objective or cognitive judgement, this necessity is not derivable from definite concepts, and so is not apodictic. [Kt7:236-7]

Kant uses the experience of beauty as a means of shedding light on the otherwise obscure concept of 'moral goodness'. In Kt7:352 he declares: 'All intuitions by which a priori concepts are given a foothold are...either schemata or symbols.' Unlike schemata, symbols 'express concepts without employing a direct intuition for the purpose, but only drawing upon an analogy with one' [352]. Given this sense of 'symbol', Kant proposes that 'the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good' [353]. By this he does not mean that a beautiful object in system_e is necessarily related to, or dependent on, the notion of moral goodness in system_p, but only that the experience of beauty is analogous to the experience of moral goodness, and that, just as respect for the moral law gives moral goodness a foothold in the will, so this analogy can give this moral concept a foothold in nature itself. The analogy is between particular intuitions of beautiful objects and rational, moral ideas, both of which extend the subject's view beyond mere sensibility to something 'intelligible' [353]: aesthetic ideas 'strain after something lying out beyond the confines of experience' [314]. They 'point to a higher ground of nature, which can be partially symbolised in nature but finally lies completely beyond it' [W10:134]. For 'the indeterminate idea of the supersensible within us' is 'the unique key to the riddle of [aesthetic judgment]' [Kt7:341]. So 'taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense' [356]. By means of this analogy it unites system_e with system_p in a single experience.

A similar synthesis of systems results from Kant's investigation of the 'sublime' in terms of system_e. He defines the sublime as 'an object (of nature) the representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to a presentation
of ideas' [Kt7:268]. Or, more simply, it is 'that... in comparison with which all else is small' [250]. Like beauty, its ultimate source 'is not to be looked for in the things of nature, but only in our own ideas' [250]. The difference is in their 'subjective grounds': beauty is grounded in the 'sensibility' of system^, whereas sublimity is grounded in the 'practical reason' of system^p [267]. 'The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of the object, and this consists in limitation, whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves...a representation of limitlessness' [244]. As a result, the former 'pleases in the mere estimate formed of it', while the latter 'pleases immediately by reason of its opposition to the interest of sense' [267].

The sublime is opposed to the interest of sense inasmuch as it arouses a feeling of fear which is counterbalanced by an idea of salvation. 'The feeling of the sublime', Kant holds, depends on both 'a displeasure that makes us alive to the feeling of the supersensible side of our being... and consequently a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility falling short of the ideas of reason' [Kt7:257-8]. In judging an object to be sublime, 'the aesthetic estimation of magnitude' gives us 'at once a feeling of the effort towards a comprehension that exceeds the faculty of imagination for mentally grasping the progressive apprehension in a whole of intuition, and, with it, a perception of the inadequacy of this faculty' [255]. In so doing,

just as the aesthetic judgement in its estimate of the beautiful refers the imagination in its free play to the understanding... so in its estimate of a thing as sublime it refers that faculty to reason... [256; cf. 266].

For just as in the estimate of the beautiful imagination and understanding by their concert generate subjective finality of the mental faculties, so imagination and reason do so here by their conflict. [258]

The fear aroused by the imagination thus takes refuge in the salvation offered by the ideas of reason.

Kant summarizes the delight which pertains to both the beautiful
and the sublime by analysing it in terms of the categories of understanding: it 'must in its quantity be shown to be universally valid, in its quality independent of interest, in its relation subjective finality, and the latter, in its modality, necessary' [Kt7:247]. The 'universal validity' of sublimity is, however, even more tentative than that of beauty [see 279]. In fact, at one point Kant says 'there is absolutely no authority for my presupposing that others will...take a delight in' what I regard as sublime; but he immediately adds that, if we assume its 'moral birthright, we may still demand that delight from every one' [292]. The essential difference here is that 'the object is...put to a subjectively-final use, but it is not estimated as subjectively-final on its own account' [280]--i.e. on account of its form, as is beauty.

Interpreting the experience of the sublime in terms of a system of empirical perspectives provides another way of uniting systeme and systeme. This time, however, the analogy is not based on a supersensible 'ground external to ourselves', manifested in the form of a beautiful object, but on 'one merely in ourselves', manifested in the formlessness of a sublime object [Kt7:246]. For the person who experiences the sublime must possess 'a native capacity for the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e. for moral feeling', because 'without the development of moral ideas, that which...we call sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying' [265]. This clear revelation of the intelligible nature of our own being is analogous to the intelligibility presupposed by and revealed in moral activity. Both inspire 'admiration and respect' in their object [245]. Since the object experienced as sublime is a natural object, it unites from the empirical standpoint elements which otherwise belong to the theoretical and the practical.

Whether our experience of finality is grounded in the beautiful form we impose upon an object which delights us, or in the rational pleasure we derive from an object which refuses to conform to the empirical limitations of our senses, it is in both cases an experience of
subjective finality—i.e. finality which arises primarily from the perspective adopted by the subject. Both 'should, in strictness, be attributed merely to the attitude of thought, or, rather, to that which serves as basis for this in human nature' [Kt7:280]—viz. the reflective perspective of the subject in system_e. We do experience another kind of purposiveness, however, which is objective, and which is therefore judged to be immanent in the object in a way quite foreign to aesthetic judgment. To this version of system_e we shall now turn our attention.

3. The Teleological Judgment of Objective Finality

Kant defines 'objective finality' as an object's 'adaptability for all sorts of ends, i.e. an infinite manifold of ends' [Kt7:266]. The teleological judgment of such finality in system_e produces knowledge, viz. 'teleological knowledge...of nature' [378], just as the aesthetic judgment of subjective finality produces the experience of beauty and sublimity. The former is similar to system_t (which produces empirical knowledge), and the latter to system_p (which produces moral experience). But teleological judgment is also related to system_p: the main requirement for an object to have objective finality 'is that its form is not possible on purely natural laws [i.e. those given in system_t]...but that, on the contrary, even to know it empirically in respect of its cause and effect presupposes conceptions of reason', as given by the 'will' in system_p [370]. One of Kant's clearest explanations of the relationship between teleology and system_t and p is in Kt5:436n:

Teleology considers nature as a realm of ends [in system_e]; morals regards a possible realm of ends [i.e. stage four of system_p] as a realm of nature [i.e. system_t]. In the former the realm of ends is a theoretical idea for the explanation of what actually is. In the latter it is a practical idea for bringing about that which is not actually real but which can become real through conduct...

An object which has objective finality is either 'a product of nature' or 'a product of art' [Kt7:370]. Kant confines his discussion to the former insofar as it manifests itself as 'a physical end', i.e.
an end which is 'both cause and effect of itself' [370-1]. His own
description of a physical end is relatively clear:

Now the first requisite of a thing, considered as a physical end,
is that its parts, both as to their existence and form, are only
possible by their relation to the whole.... [The] second requisite
is...that the parts of the thing combine of themselves into the
unity of a whole by being reciprocally cause and effect of their
form.... [That is,] the part must be an organ producing the other
parts—each, consequently, reciprocally producing the others....
For a machine has solely motive power, whereas an organized being
possesses inherent formative power... [373-4]

Objects which 'are only possible as physical ends' possess 'intrinsic
natural perfection', and 'are therefore called organisms' [375]:
'organisms...first afford objective reality to the conception of an end
that is an end of nature and not a practical end' [375-6]. Man differs
from other earthly organisms in that he 'is able...to construct by the
aid of his reason a system of ends' [427]. Thus 'the teleological esti­
mate of nature, supported by the physical ends actually presented to us
in organic beings, [entitles] us to form the idea of a vast system of
natural ends' [380], which Kant sometimes calls a 'causal nexus' [e.g.
372,384]. This refers to nature, regarded here from the standpoint of
systemt; as such, objective finality 'offers us a bridge between a
natural world where everything is mechanical and a moral world where
everything is free' [P4:191].

The fact that a physical end is 'given in nature...seems to convert
our idea of it into a constitutive teleological principle' [Kt7:405].

But Kant warns that

the idea in question is a principle of reason for the use, not of
the understanding [in systemt], but of judgement [in systemt]....
Consequently, while the object may certainly be given in experi­
ence, it cannot even be judged definitely...in accordance with the
idea, but can only be made an object of reflection. [405]

Thus the concept of a physical end is inexplicable in the context of
systemt [395]:

The conception of a causality through ends...has certainly objec­
tive reality... But the conception of a physical causality follow­
ing the rule of ends..., while it may no doubt be thought without
self-contradiction, is nevertheless useless for the purpose of
dogmatic definitive assertions. [397]
Nevertheless, 'certain natural products must, from the particular constitution of our understanding, be considered by us—if we are to conceive of the possibility of their production as having been produced designedly and as ends' [406]. The need, therefore, is for a nontheoretical perspective which is adequate to represent such natural products in this way.

Although the concept of a physical end, or organism—i.e. of 'an organized natural product...in which every part is reciprocally both end and means' [Kt7:376]—is not constitutive of an object, 'yet it may be used by reflective judgement as a regulative conception for guiding our investigation of objects of this kind by a remote analogy with our own causality..., and as a basis of reflection upon their supreme source' [375]. However, the result of 'confusing a principle of the reflective with one of the determinant judgement' is an 'antinomy between the maxims of the strictly physical, or mechanical, mode of explanation and the teleological, or technical [mode]' [389]—i.e. between system$_t$ and system$_e$. But, when viewed properly, in light of the principle of perspective, both modes of explanation are equally valid [409]. For 'mechanical laws' assume 'nature as an object of sense', while 'teleological laws' assume 'nature as an object of reason, and, indeed, nature in its entirety as a system' [409]. As far as primacy is concerned, the principle of teleological law is superior to that of mechanical law: although 'we are ignorant how far the mechanical mode of exploration...may penetrate', we must nevertheless 'subordinate such mechanical grounds, one and all, to a teleological principle' [415].

Kant believes these two types of law can be conceived as united in a single principle. Thus he says in Kt7:412:

The principle which is to make possible the compatibility of the above pair of principles...must be placed in what lies beyond both...[i.e.] in the supersensible, and to this each of the two modes of explanation must be referred.... [F]or if this were not so they could not both enter consistently into the same survey of nature.

If they were not grounded in the supersensible, then either one mode of
explanation would be invalid, or else nature itself would be irrational. In this way Kant's teleology points, at least indirectly, to the concept of God. His views on this matter will be of further concern to us in Part Four, so I shall sketch his argument briefly at this point.

Kant begins by setting out a 'subjective principle for the use merely of the reflective judgement' [Kt7:398]. Although it is subjective, it 'is essentially necessary' as a condition for the teleological version of systemₐ:

By the peculiar constitution of my cognitive faculties the only way I can judge of the possibility of those things [evincing 'objective finality'] and of their production is by conceiving for that purpose a cause working designedly, and, consequently, a being whose productivity is analogous to the causality of an understanding.... For the very notion that they are organized things is itself impossible unless we associate with it the notion of a production by design. [397-8]

This teleological notion is an element in, and thus implies, the common concept of God:

Those natural things which we consider to be only possible as ends constitute...the only valid argument for [the universe's] dependence upon and its origin from an extramundane Being, and from one, moreover, that the above final form shows to be intelligent. Thus they indicate that teleology must look to a theology for a complete answer to its inquiries. [398-9]

Kant is careful, however, to insure that this conclusion be taken only in the context of systemₐ. For of the supersensible 'we are unable from a theoretical perspective to form the slightest positive determinate conception' [Kt7:412]. What this argument proves, then, is not 'that such an intelligent Being really exists', but only that we must assume so in systemₐ because of 'the constitution of our cognitive faculties' [399]. 'For, strictly speaking', Kant reminds us, 'we do not observe the ends in nature as designed. We only read this conception into the facts as a guide to judgement in its reflection upon the products of nature. Hence these ends are not given to us by the Object' [399]. The argument that objective finality requires 'an intelligent cause--in short, a God' is still held by Kant to be 'perfectly satisfactory from every human perspective and for any use to which we can put our reason'
[400]. But we must be careful not to infer on this account that the nature and characteristics which God might have from his own 'perspective' (or perhaps, 'perspectivelessness') are thereby revealed to us. For Kant warns in Kt7:410:

Even the concession that a supreme Architect has directly created the forms of nature...does not further our knowledge of nature one whit. The reason is that we are wholly ignorant of the manner in which the supreme Being acts and of his ideas..., and so cannot explain nature from Him by moving downwards, that is a priori.

The validity of these and other views on God which Kant puts forward will be discussed more thoroughly in Part Four. It is sufficient at this point to summarize Kant's teleological version of system_\text{\textsubscript{e}} by recalling that the finality we come to know in our apprehension of natural organisms, and the order according to which they are connected, constitute an empirical synthesis of system_\text{\textsubscript{t}} with system_\text{\textsubscript{p}}, and that this synthesis points beyond all our perspectives to a transcendent cause of the structure of nature.
1. Critical Perspectives on Theology and Religion

Now that our interpretation of Kant's Critical System in terms of the principle of perspective is complete, we can at long last turn back to the question with which this study began, expressed now as 'Does Kant's System of Perspectives destroy the possibility of theology?' The answer must be 'yes and no': it precludes a certain type of theology, just as it precludes a certain type of metaphysics—viz. that type which is oblivious to the principle of perspective—but it does so only in order to replace such one-sided theology (or metaphysics) with one which takes full account of the difficulties caused by the inherent finitude and ignorance characteristic of the human situation. Before examining just how Kant goes about developing this new type of theology within his Critical framework, it will be helpful to examine first, his most basic theoretical assumptions about the nature of God, and second, his view of the general relationship between philosophy, theology, and religion.

Kant occasionally describes God as having an intuitive understanding [e.g. KtI:145]—i.e. one 'in which through self-consciousness all the manifold would eo ipso be given' [135]. However, he puts very little emphasis on this characterization, since it is really just his way of insuring that we must conceive of God as not being limited by the same conditions to which man is bound (viz. space, time, and the categories [see 139,145-6]). Rather than having to intuit an object, form a concept on the basis of such intuitions, and synthesize the two in an empirical judgment, God must be able to create a real object in the very act of thinking about it. As Paton suggests, there would therefore be in the divine understanding 'no difference between thought and action, since
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its thinking would be essentially creative of reality' [P4:101; cf. Ktl: 138-9]. Such a conception of God entails that His nature is ultimately inscrutable to us, for, although we can form a logically possible concept of an 'intuitive understanding', we cannot comprehend its real possibility. Thus, Kant says 'we cannot form the least conception of any other possible understanding, either of such as is itself intuitive or of any that may possess an underlying mode of sensible intuition which is different in kind from that in space and time' [139].

To grasp the full meaning of the apparently contradictory term 'intuitive understanding', i.e. to know what it refers to, would require what Kant calls 'intellectual intuition'—that is, an intuition not of a transcendental object represented as an appearance (as is ordinarily the case in human knowing [see V.2, VII.2]), but of a purely intelligible being who cannot be represented at all as a sensible object. However, Kant insists that God 'can never be an object of intuition to us' [Ktl: 71]; for 'such intellectual intuition seems to belong solely to the primordial being, and can never be ascribed to a dependent being' [72]. To do so, it would have to 'give us the existence of its object' in the act of intuition itself [72]—a characteristic of the object which for man is always provided by the givenness of the unknowable thing in itself (or the undetermined transcendental object) [see V.2]. An intellectual intuition, e.g. of one's own self, would provide immediate knowledge of the self, rather than simply sensations of the state of one's self as an appearance in space and time [158-9; cf. 309]. This type of intuition would be necessary in order to have knowledge of a positive noumenon [307], which, as we saw in V.3, is impossible for us: 'such a type of intuition, intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge' [308].

Intellectual intuition really amounts to the same thing as intuitive understanding, only viewed from different perspectives: both refer to 'an understanding which should know its object, not discursively
through the categories [nor intuitively through space and time], but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition' [Kt1:311-2]. Viewed from the logical perspective, it is called 'intuitive understanding'; viewed from the transcendental perspective, it is called 'intellectual intuition'. In both cases Kant presents such descriptions of God as nothing more than a speculation as to how we might conceive a being whose nature transcends our own and of which 'we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the [real] possibility' [311]--a being whose faculties of intuition and conceptualization are not distinct, mutually-restrictive faculties, but are combined in a single faculty which creates whatever it thinks and thinks whatever it creates.

Some commentators regard this theory of intuitive understanding, or intellectual intuition, as 'Kant's conception of God in its profoundest form' [G13:xl ix]. But it actually just skims the surface of his theology. For Kant himself regarded this basic statement of the radical transcendence of God's nature not as the last word in all theological reflection, but as its starting point: it sets the primary theoretical problem for theology, a problem which is to be solved only gradually as Kant weaves his theological guiding-thread through his Critical System. The problem, of course, is: how are we to carry on any theological pursuits if God's nature is necessarily unknowable? The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to expounding Kant's answer to this question, and in so doing, the theoretical depths of his rich concept of God will unfold before our eyes.

Theologians and philosophers of religion often group Kant on the side of those who argue 'that God is utterly unknowable', and that therefore 'theology is a useless effort' [J2:1; cf. 42-3]. The latter conclusion does seem to follow naturally from the deistic assumption that God is utterly unknowable, an assumption Kant apparently adopts in his denial of our ability to intuit God. But this interpretation reflects a rather narrow acquaintance with Kant's writings (as, for
example, would result from limiting one's reading primarily to Kt8, together, perhaps, with the relevant passages in the three Critiques, which seem at first to be comprehensible without reading them in their systematic context. Yet, even in the Preface to Kt8 Kant says with no apparent irony that the philosopher and the theologian should see themselves not as rivals, out to destroy each other, but as co-workers, friends and companions of each other [Kt8:8-10(7-10)].

Kant defines theology as 'the system of our knowledge of the highest being'. It 'does not refer to the sum total of all possible knowledge of God, but only to what human reason meets with in God' [Kt26: (23); cf. Kt1:659]. The 'knowledge of everything in God', which Kant calls 'theologia archetypa', is unattainable for man, while 'that part of God which lies in human nature', the knowledge of which he calls 'theologia ectypa', is attainable [Kt26:(23)]. Within the latter he distinguishes between deism and theism: 'Those who accept only a transcendental theology are called deists; those who also admit a natural theology are called theists' [Kt1:659; s.a. 660-1; Kt26:(28-9)]. Contrary to common usage, therefore, Kant believes the distinction between the theist and the deist concerns only one's theoretical standpoint, and has nothing to do with a person's practical obedience to, or empirical experience of, the God whom such theories are intended to describe. A deist, then, is someone who, after engaging in transcendental (and/or logical [see Kt1:660]) reflection on the concept of God, comes up with a positive answer to the question of His existence. A theist, by contrast, is open to these two perspectives as well, but he also adopts an empirical and/or a practical perspective in his theoretical understanding of God. Only from the latter two perspectives can God be regarded not just as 'an original being or supreme cause' (as in the former two), but also as 'a supreme being who through understanding and freedom is the Author of all things'. Thus, Kant maintains 'that the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God' [660-1].
Kant limits his own theological reflection to 'rational' as opposed to 'revealed' theology. He never denies the legitimacy of the latter, but only regards it (rightfully [see XI.4]) as being outside the scope of Critical philosophy. (Interestingly, given Kant's understanding of the terms, those who ignore experience and base the entirety of their theological reflection on a particular set of holy scriptures, assumed to be God's unique revelation to man, are in fact more like deists than theists, since they deny natural theology in favour of a supposed transcendental certainty.) The faith which is necessary to justify one's initial acceptance of a given canon as God's unique revelation is not unlike that necessary to enter into Kant's Critical System [see Ch. VI]. But, whereas revealed theology is set apart from Critical philosophy, rational theology is intimately connected with it. Rational theology is an investigation of the extent to which we can see God manifested transcendentally in system$T$, practically in system$P$, and empirically in system$E$. So we must be careful not to take Kant's theological conclusions as if they apply equally to revealed as to rational theology. For such a category mistake would ignore Kant's careful distinction between the perspectives of the philosopher and the theologian [see XI.1].

By his own definitions at least, Kant is, as we shall see, a thoroughly theistic philosopher. Yet he is fully aware of the problems posed to theological knowledge by human ignorance: 'Both in theology and in religion, but particularly in theology, we are handicapped by ignorance' [Kt35:(85)]. Indeed, he says that sometimes even when we think we have knowledge, we actually have 'no concept at all' of God [Kt26:(24)]. But as Wood points out, this does not make him a deist [W19:155], for he means by this that 'our concept of God is an idea of reason' [W20:79], rather than a concept which rises out of abstraction from appearances. For Kant holds that 'we cannot intuit God, but can only believe in him' [Kt35:(99)]; yet 'in order to believe in God it is not necessary to know for certain that God exists' [[(81)]].
trary, as Wood again conveys Kant's view, 'the "minimum" theology it is necessary to have is a belief that God is at least possible' [W19:31]. Kant believes the ideas of 'God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul are the problems to whose solution, as their ultimate goal, all the laborious preparations of metaphysics are directed' [Kt7:473]; and his System of Perspectives is intended to solve these problems once and for all.

Clearly, then, Kant saw philosophy and theology as complementary pursuits, with the former preparing the way for the latter. But what about the relationship between these disciplines and religion? Religion on its own, Kant holds, 'stands in no need of any speculative study of God' [Kt35:(82)]: 'Speculation concerning God...does not appertain to the sphere of religion, for religion must be practical. Theology, indeed, can contain speculative elements, but to religion these must remain foreign' [(93)]. (Kant's 'criterion', incidentally, for judging 'whether a particular question is religious or speculative' is: 'if, whatever the answer, it will make no difference to our actions, the question is not religious but speculative' [(93-4)].) The proper task of theology is 'a practical one' [Kt26:(24)]: 'it should not make us more learned, but better, wiser, and more upright.' For the only reason it has any 'speculative interest' at all is 'that our reason always needs a highest in order to measure and determine the less high according to it' [(24)]. When it is properly pursued, therefore, theology becomes 'a motive for ethics' (although this does not mean that 'the principle of ethical determination [i.e. the moral law] is theological', for 'it cannot be that') [Kt35:(39)]. 'We need theology', Kant concludes, 'solely on behalf of religion, that is to say, our practical or, in other words, moral standpoint, and need it as a subjective requirement' [Kt7:482]. So theology for Kant depends on philosophy for its theoretical justification and on religion for its practical justification.

These views as to the relationship between philosophy, theology,
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and religion are not necessary elements in Kant's Critical System. But understanding these general assumptions on Kant's part will help us to understand the theological conclusions which are necessarily implied by his System. Thus, in the remainder of this chapter we will examine the philosophical (or 'speculative' in the untechnical sense used above) foundation which Kant's System lays for theological reflection. This will primarily involve discussing the various sorts of arguments for God's existence which Kant says can be put forward. In Chapter XI we will then proceed to discuss the relevance for religious belief and activity of a theological system which takes full account of the principle of perspective. Finally, in Chapter XII we will come full circle by examining religious experience in its own right, and the important part it plays as the consummation of Kant's System of Perspectives.

2. Kant's Criticism of Theoretical Theistic Arguments

Before he could say anything positive about our theoretical understanding of God Kant found it necessary to destroy once and for all what he regarded as dangerously misleading illusions about the extent to which man can establish conclusions about God's existence. If God is to remain God, He must be regarded, at least from a theoretical standpoint, as essentially a transcendent uncertainty. To bring our concept of God down to the level of potentially conclusive theoretical arguments is to reduce God to an object of categorial thought, to regard him as an appearance among other appearances, and in the long run, to regard him as, at least potentially, an object of scientific observation. As we shall see, Kant believes this conception of God as playing a constitutive role in system must be replaced by a regulative use of the concept as an 'idea' of reason.

The theological illusions which Kant sought to expose and destroy are what he calls the 'Ideals of pure reason', each of which stems from one of the three traditional arguments for the existence of God. His
criticism of each is relatively clear and well known. Indeed, most theologians think of Kant's theology first and foremost, if not exclusively, in terms of this criticism. Since there is a good deal of agreement as to its actual content, a rather brief summary of his arguments will suffice to show how in each case they are based on the principle of perspective. This cursory treatment of the most famous element in his doctrine of God will allow more space for developing the less known, but for Kant far more important, elements in his theology. These elements will especially include what is almost always ignored by his theologically-minded interpreters: viz. the interrelationships between the parts of his overall doctrine of God--i.e. his systematic theology in the strictest sense--and its relation to his Critical System. Only by attending to his thoroughly systematic treatment of the concept of God can the richness and depth of Kant's theology be adequately evinced.

Kant categorizes all theoretical arguments for the existence of God under their traditional three headings: the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological (which he calls 'physicotheological'). Given his emphasis on the fourfold structure of the categories, we would expect him to expose not three Ideals of reason, but four, especially because this would accord well with the fourfold divisions of the paralogisms and antinomies. This fourfold division of ideals would therefore yield a complete system of twelve basic illusions into which the theoretician can fall when reasoning about questions concerning ultimate reality. Despite his apparently threefold division, Kant does not disappoint our logical expectations. For the 'Ideal of Pure Reason' [Kt1:595-670] begins by exposing the illusion inherent in a fourth type of proof which he himself had originated nearly twenty years earlier in Kt15. Apparently, this argument, based on the 'complete determination' of empirical objects, and sometimes referred to as his 'possibility proof' [e.g. W20:40-79], is discussed separately not only because it cannot be classified as 'traditional', but also because he believes it forms the
basis for the other three.

Kant summarizes the difference between the three traditional proofs by pointing out the different theological perspectives they assume: 'ontotheology...considers God merely in terms of concepts... Cosmotheology presupposes...the existence of a world in general. And finally, physicotheology makes use of experience of the present world' [Kt1:31-2; s.a. Kt1:633,660]. These three forms of 'speculative theology' correspond directly and unambiguously to the logical, the transcendental, and the empirical perspectives, respectively. Kant's own possibility proof, as we shall see, corresponds in a similar fashion to the speculative perspective [see IV.3].

Kant's 'possibility proof' contends, as Wood summarizes it, 'that the idea of God takes its rational origin from the fact that it is presupposed by any attempt to think of individual things in general as thoroughly determined, and hence as absolutely possible' [W20:62]. Kant explains 'the principle of complete determination' by saying: 'if all the possible predicates of things be taken together with their contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory opposites must belong to [any given thing]'; the principle concerns a thing's 'content, and not merely the logical form' [Kt1:599-600]. Although we can never 'know every possible [predicate] of a thing, and so can never exhibit its complete determination in concreto [601, t.b.], the idea of complete determination, when applied to 'the concept of an individual object', becomes 'an ideal of pure reason' [602]. This ideal is 'the concept of an individual being' which 'possesses all reality' (i.e. 'the concept of an ens realissimum'); hence it is 'the concept of a thing in itself as completely determined' [604]. As such it 'serves as basis for the complete determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists.' But reason presupposes

only the idea of such a being, and this only for the purpose of deriving from an unconditioned totality of complete determination the conditioned totality, that is, the totality of the limited.
The ideal is, therefore, the archetype (prototypon) of all things, which one and all, as imperfect copies (ectyptas), derive from it the material of their possibility... [605-6]

This means, then, that the possibility of all individual things, if we are to think of them as thoroughly determined objects of knowledge, must be derived from 'limitations of a greater, and ultimately of a highest, reality': viz. 'the possibility of that which includes in itself all reality', the ens realissimum [606; s.a. 609]. This, Kant concludes, is 'the concept of God', which, taken as an 'ideal of pure reason...is thus the object of a transcendental theology' [608].

Kant does not want to criticize this argument too heavily, for, as we shall see in X.3, his positive theory of God as an 'idea' is in some respects dependent on the notion of God developed here, but proceeds on practical rather than speculative assumptions. The problem with this argument in its speculative form is that it 'hypostatises' the idea of God by assuming it can be used to determine the nature of God as a real individual object of knowledge, whereas its proper (practical) use is only to clarify the concept of God, 'without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and be itself a thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction' when hypothetised as an object in system [Kt1:608]. Kant blames this illusion on a 'transcendental subreption' [611], according to which a person substitutes 'dialectically for the distributive unity of the empirical perspective, the collective unity of experience as a whole' [610]—i.e. of the transcendental perspective. Despite its tendency to confuse these two perspectives, Kant's possibility proof does establish, as it were, the grounds for speculation: it demonstrates 'that reason requires' the concept of an ens realissimum [620], but it establishes no conclusions whatsoever as to its actual existence. Although it is not technically a theological proof, it sets the stage for each of the three traditional proofs by establishing, from the speculative perspective, a definition of the theoretical concept of God, the existence of which the three traditional arguments try to prove.
The general characteristic of ontological arguments, according to Kant, is that they attempt to prove the existence of 'something the non-existence of which is impossible' [Kt1:620]. In their simplest form such arguments suggest that the very concept of God as 'an absolutely necessary being' [620] necessitates His existence. Kant criticizes this simple form as 'arguing from the logical possibility of concepts to the real possibility of things' [624n; s.a. 626]. If the term 'necessity' refers to a judgment, then its object may be quite intelligible, as, for example, in the case of geometrical judgments such as 'a triangle has three angles'. 'But', warns Kant, 'the unconditioned [logical] necessity of judgments is not the same as an absolute [real] necessity of things' [621]. On the contrary, the former 'is only a conditioned necessity of the thing'. Thus, the above judgment does not imply 'that three angles are absolutely necessary, but that, under the condition that there is a triangle (that is, that a triangle is given), three angles will necessarily be found in it' [622]. The rather obvious point being made here is that if we 'reject the predicate [e.g. 'is omnipotent'] while retaining the subject [e.g. 'God'], contradiction results... But if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; nothing is then left that can be contradicted' [622]. 'The concept of necessity', Kant therefore concludes, 'is only to be found in our reason, as a formal condition of thought; it does not allow of being hypostatised as a material condition of existence' [648].

The only option for the proponent of the ontological argument, Kant contends, is to join it with the concept of God as ens realissimum, established by the possibility proof [Kt1:614,624]. The argument would then assert that in this case real existence is 'contained in the concept of a thing that is possible' because 'all reality' includes existence' [624]; since God is the ens realissimum, the most real being, he must exist. It is in response to this particular version of the ontological argument, and not to all versions whatsoever, that Kant makes
his famous proclamation that existence is not a predicate. There are instances, of course, where existence is a predicate: any empirical acknowledgement of a thing's existence does add something to our concept of a thing—it adds an intuition, which enables us to make a synthetic judgment about that thing (e.g. that it exists). But the ontological argument, we must remember, presupposes the logical perspective, where 'is' is used only in analytic judgments, and so, never serves as a predicate. Within the logical perspective 'is' serves either a real function by indicating 'merely the positing of a thing', or a logical function by acting as 'the copula of a judgment' [626], but it can never convey reality itself [s.a. 667]. This is why Kant says "Being" is obviously not a real predicate' [626e.a.]: nothing is really real from the logical perspective, for when one's attention is limited wholly to concepts, 'the real', as a characteristic attributed to a concept, 'contains no more than the merely possible' [627]. 'Hence the conception of an absolutely necessary being, while doubtless an indispensable idea of reason, is for human understanding an unattainable problematic conception' [Kt7:402].

For the sake of criticizing their general character, Kant reduces all cosmological arguments to a single form: 'If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists' [Kt1:632]. The minor premise is an empirically observable fact. But the major premise depends on the assumption of a series of conditioned existents, caused by other conditions, and ending in some necessary unconditioned existent [cf. 649-51]. This proof, Kant says, appears to be 'the most convincing' of all the proofs, for it 'sketches the first outline of all the proofs in natural theology' [632]; yet for this very reason it rests on even more 'pseudo-rational principles' than the others [634]. He criticizes rather briefly four such 'deceptive principles' in Kt1:637-8: (1) the category of causality does not 'enable us to advance beyond the sensible world
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[cf. 663-4]; (2) rather than leading to a 'first cause', the empirical series of conditions may well be infinite; (3) the unconditioned cannot be regarded in terms of 'real necessity', since the 'removal of all the conditions' would eliminate the only context in which the concept of real necessity has any meaning; and (4) 'logical possibility' and 'transcendental possibility' must not be confused. But his major criticism is that this argument, which 'professes to lead us by a new path', ends up requiring for its validity the ontological argument itself [637], for in both cases the concept of a necessary being must be identified with that of the *ens realissimum* [636].

Kant’s criticism here is not that the cosmological argument is based on the ontological, but that the former requires the latter for its completion (compare the need for an appearance to be conceptualized before it can become an object of knowledge): 'although the cosmological proof presupposes an experience in general, ...it soon abandons this guidance and relies on pure concepts alone' [Ktl:642-3]. He clearly portrays the mutual interdependence of these two types of argument in Ktl:640: 'The whole problem of the transcendental ideal amounts to this: either, given [real] absolute necessity, to find a concept which possesses it [as in the ontological argument], or, given the concept of something, to find that something to be absolutely necessary [as in the cosmological argument].' But neither of these tasks can be fulfilled without confusing the transcendental and logical perspectives, and thus giving rise to dialectical illusion.

A recent proponent of such a priori arguments is Hartshorne, who argues: 'If "God" stands for something conceivable, it stands for something actual' [H6:135]. He thinks this form of the ontological argument avoids Kant's 'slavishly accepted criticism' [H8:97] by allowing that the concept of God might be unintelligible (thus justifying atheism), but insisting that if it is to be intelligible, then 'existence'—and not just logical, but real existence—must be a necessary part of the
concept (thus justifying theism). Hartshorne, however, has clearly failed to grasp the essential perspectival point of Kant's criticism. For Kant's rebuttal would simply be that Hartshorne has never stepped out of the logical perspective, so his conclusion cannot refer to God as a real object, but only to our concept of God: i.e. if he has proven anything, it is that the concept of God must stand for something conceived as actual: its actual actuality, so to speak, necessarily remains uncertain as long as we limit ourselves to the logical perspective, for this perspective, by definition, abstracts from all existing objects.

Hartshorne's other formulation of the argument is also covered by Kant's criticism. "The necessary being", argues Hartshorne, is 'that individual which existence implies' [H6:132]. This is technically not an ontological argument at all, but more like a cosmological argument. It is similar to the argument Kant develops in Kt15, where, as Greene puts it, he contends 'that it is impossible that nothing should exist, hence that something must necessarily exist' [G13:xliiin]. Once he realized that the illusion inherent in this type of argument is due to its conflation of the transcendental and logical perspectives, Kant came to regard the object to which it refers as 'not a rational entity', but 'a fictitious logical entity' [Kt7:468]. Thus he concludes that 'we can no more extend our stock of [theoretical] insights by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts to his cash account' [Kt1:630, t.b]. But if we leave the logical and transcendental perspectives and allow particular experiences to serve as a major factor in the argument, perhaps more satisfactory results can be obtained.

As long as they are regarded as purely theoretical proofs intending to establish certain truths about God, Kant says such arguments as we have discussed so far 'will never descend from the schools and enter into every-day life or be able to exert the smallest influence on ordinary healthy intelligence' [Kt7:476]. The final type, however, is somewhat closer to home, for the 'physicotheological' (better known as 'teleolo-
gical') argument makes use of our 'determinate experience...of the things of the present world' [Ktl:648], and so proceeds entirely 'by the empirical road' [656]. Kant includes in this category arguments from particular causes to a 'supreme cause' [s.e. 649-51], which would ordinarily be considered cosmological. However, the main emphasis of the argument [cf. 653-4,660] is that the immeasurable 'variety, order, purposiveness, and beauty' of the world requires us to 'assume something to support it' [650], viz. 'a supreme Author' [652]. Kant has a deep respect for this argument, 'the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind' [651], and believes it would be 'utterly vain to attempt to diminish in any way [its] authority' [652]. But it operates 'in accordance with the principles of analogy', so it can never establish anything greater than 'probability' [654], although it can help to strengthen the other arguments [651-2]:

The physico-theological proof, as combining speculation and intuition, might therefore perhaps give additional weight to other proofs (if such there be); but taken alone, it serves only to prepare the understanding for theological knowledge, and to give it a natural leaning in this direction, not to complete the work in and by itself. [665]

Thus it is doomed to failure at the outset if its proponent believes it can establish 'apodeictic certainty' [652]; for no 'experience [can] ever be adequate to an idea' [649].

Kant is very careful to clarify the constructive intentions of his criticism of this argument: 'It cannot hurt the good cause, if the dogmatic language of the overweening sophist be toned down to the more moderate and humble requirements of a belief adequate to quieten our doubts, though not to command unconditional submission' [Ktl:652-3]. It can serve the former function best when it is used in conjunction with the other arguments, for the most the teleological argument could prove on its own would be the need for 'an architect of the world who is always very much hampered [just as the human architect is] by the adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator of the world
to whose idea everything is subject' [655; cf. W20:140]. Thus, if the proponent of a teleological argument is to define his concept of God in a manner sufficiently high to match the 'loftiness' of the idea of God, he must fall back upon the a priori proofs, which alone are concerned with 'the existence of an absolutely necessary being' [Ktl:657e.a.]. In the end the physicotheological argument, if it is intended to be a rigorous proof, will therefore suffer from the same illusions as those suffered by the arguments it seems at first to avoid [657-8].

Each argument fails because each is based on the same general assumption: each treats the idea of God as an ideal—i.e. as an object which can be instantiated 'not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is, as an individual thing' [Ktl:596]. But such an assumption is mistaken:

No intuition corresponding to the conception of a being which has to be sought beyond nature is possible for us. So far, therefore, as that conception has to be determined theoretically by synthetic predicates, it always remains for us a problematical conception.... The particular conception of a supersensible being cannot possibly be subsumed in any way under the universal principles of the nature of things... [Kt7:463; s.a. 466]

To succeed in doing so, Kant says, would require 'attributing omniscience to yourself' [480]. If God is conceived as a being who transcends our categories of thought, no argument which depends upon these categories, that is, no theoretical argument, will be able to bring us any closer to the goal of knowledge of the existence of such an object from the standpoint of system: all such attempts 'are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void, and...do not lead to any theology whatsoever' [Ktl:664]. For the problem is not so much with these various attempts to answer the question of God's existence, as with the question itself. As Barth points out in his elaboration of Kant's theology, 'to speak of existence or non-existence is per se not to speak of God' [B4:275]. For to answer the question of God's 'existence'—i.e. to solve the problem once and for all—would require us to be able to say: 'This, not that, is the necessary being' [Ktl:640].
And this is why to regard God as an ideal object, one which 'designates an individual as being among the things that are possible' [639-40], always leads us into illusory thinking.

Thus Kant's criticisms are not intended so much to close the books on all theoretical arguments for the existence of God as to curb the pretensions of those who mistakenly believe such arguments can prove what no argument can ever prove, that the transcendent is knowable as such, without ever having to become immanent. Our idea of God requires the same sort of rational faith in order to be regarded as pointing towards a real object, and so to act as the starting point of theology, as does the thing in itself in order to be justified as the starting point of Critical philosophy. Kant readily admits that the arguments can supplement our faith by providing good reasons 'to postulate the existence of an all-sufficient being', but warns that 'in presuming so far as to say that such a being necessarily exists [i.e. with real, not just logical necessity], we are no longer giving modest expression to an admissible hypothesis, but are confidently laying claim to apodeictic certainty' [Ktl:640]. That he regards these arguments as evidence of man's insatiable desire to reach out towards an unattainable knowledge of the transcendent--evidence which can be used to make tentative assumptions about God's nature [see X.4]--is implied in Ktl:651, where he observes that the postulate of God

is in conformity with the demand of our reason for parsimony of principles; it is free from self-contradiction, and is never decisively contradicted by any experience; and it is likewise of such a character that it contributes to the extension of reason's empirical standpoint, through the guidance which it yields in the discovery of order and purposiveness.

Kant has nothing against the proper use of reason in clarifying our concept of God: indeed, he says 'If what we have in view is the coming to a decision [an act]--if, that is to say, the existence of some sort of necessary being is taken as granted...--then [such arguments] must be allowed to have a certain cogency' [615; cf. W7:128]. Rather he is cri-
ticizing only those 'incautious' thinkers who 'are easily deceived...into taking the limits by which the human mind is circumscribed as limits within which the very essence of things is contained' [Kt19:389]. For to do so is to ignore the supreme principle of Critical thinking, the principle of perspective.

3. Kant's Positive Theology

What distresses many theologians about Kant's criticism of traditional rational theology is that they believe it will, in the long run, have a detrimental effect on the ordinary religious believer. But Kant's disagreement with such a 'sophisticated' conjecture is explicit and to the point:

In religion the knowledge of God is properly based on faith alone.... [So] it is not necessary for this belief [i.e. in God] to be susceptible of logical proof.... [For] sophistication is the error of refusing to accept any religion not based on a theology which can be apprehended by our reason.... Sophistication in religious matters is a dangerous thing; our reasoning powers are limited and reason can err and we cannot prove everything. A speculative basis is a very weak foundation for religion... [Kt35:(86-7); s.a. Kt7:480-1]

The foundation Kant intends to put in its place will be discussed in Chapters XI and XII. What is important here is to understand that even though Kant begins with an essentially negative theological position, and believes he is able 'to discover the fallacy in any attempt of this kind [to prove God's existence], and so to nullify its claims', nevertheless he is not attempting to be 'a particularly combative person' [Kt1:667]. On the contrary, he devotes much effort to the task of showing how an honest recognition of the limitations of human reason leaves plenty of room for drawing positive theological conclusions in a theoretical discussion of God's existence and nature.

The first of Kant's attempts to draw positive theological conclusions is made in Kt1 itself, in an attempt to take account of both sides of a commonly experienced paradox. Kant expresses this paradox in the question: 'Why are we constrained to assume that some one among existing
things is in itself necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the existence of such a being as from an abyss?" [KtI:643]. Dialectical illusion results only if we try to subdue one of these natural tendencies. Those who try to prove God's existence theoretically are repressing the latter, while those who categorically deny God's existence are repressing the former. But if the truth which lies behind both tendencies is grasped, both errors can be avoided. The situation which gives rise to this paradox is that 'I can never complete the regress to the conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being, and yet am never in a position to begin [such a regress] with such a being' [643-4; cf. G8:119-20]. The two sides of this paradox can be made compatible by recognizing the 'merely heuristic and regulative' character of the principle underlying each side:

The one prescribes that we are to philosophise about nature as if there were a necessary first ground for all that belongs to existence—solely, however, for the purpose of bringing systematic unity into our knowledge, by always pursuing such an idea, as an imagined ultimate ground. The other warns us not to regard any determination whatsoever of existing things as such an ultimate ground... [KtI: 644-5e.a.]

Whereas all theoretical arguments about the existence of God are bound to fail in their attempt to establish knowledge of God as an ideal object, these principles suggest that the concept of God can have a valid use after all as long as it is regarded, less ambitiously, as an idea of reason. Since the general character of this regulative employment of the ideas has already been discussed in some detail [see IV.3, VI.4, and VII.3], we can proceed directly to a discussion of its implications for our theoretical understanding of the concept of God.

A theoretical discussion of God's existence and attributes, Kant argues, cannot be based 'upon the knowledge of such a being but upon its idea only' [KtI:729e.a.]. From the standpoint of system, our idea of God is postulated only problematically (since we cannot reach it through any of the concepts of the understanding) in order that we may view all connection of the things of the world of sense as if they had their ground in [it]... In thus proceeding, our sole purpose is to secure systematic unity... [709]
In such usage God is 'an idea which reason is constrained to form as the
regulative principle of its investigation of nature' [725]. As such, it
is used, as we saw in VII.3, as a principle for viewing empirical ob-
jects from a practical perspective, not from an empirical perspective.
(The latter would be a constitutive use of the idea in reference to the
world.) The purpose of Kant's whole theoretical treatment of the concept
of God is to establish the right to use this theoretical concept from
other, nontheoretical standpoints. His criticism of the traditional
proofs does this by demonstrating that, although the concept cannot be
instantiated in experience, it is at least not self-contradictory. The
function of this concept as an idea is then brought in as a further
theoretical demonstration that this hypothesis is plausible (though not
provable), even in systemt. 'Hypotheses', Kant urges, are 'permissible
only as weapons of war, and only for the purpose of defending a right,
not in order to establish it' [805]. Thus the polemic nature of the
debate between dogmatists and sceptics about God's existence makes this
hypothesis especially important: it defeats the dogmatists by refusing
them knowledge, while yet defeating the sceptics by upholding the right
which the dogmatist holds so dear. By establishing peace in systemt,
the regulative use of the idea of God directs our attention forward to
the other Critical systems in anticipation of a more satisfactory justi-
fication for belief in God.

This affirmation of the benefits of the regulative employment of
our idea of God is frequently rejected prematurely by Kant's critics.
One of the most common criticisms is that science (especially since Dar-
win) simply has no use for postulating 'the idea of God...as a heuristic
device in the empirical study of nature' [W20:145]. But this is based
on a complete misunderstanding of the perspective from which Kant is
speaking: he never intends the ideas to be used as regulative principles
from an empirical perspective, such as that adopted by the natural sci-
entist; for he insists that 'just because it is a mere idea, [the idea
of God] is altogether incapable...of enlarging our knowledge in regard to what exists' [Ktl:630-1]. Hence it cannot serve as the constitutive 'ground of the systematic order of the world' [709; cf. 724-5]. (This function is fulfilled on the material side by the thing in itself and on the formal side by reason's architectonic forms [see e.g. 723-4].) Rather, the ideas are to function regulatively only in the context of the practical perspective of system. To think otherwise is to ignore the fact that these regulative principles concern how 'to philosophise about nature' [644, q.a.], not how to investigate nature scientifically.

Indeed, Kant specifically condemns the latter approach:

To have recourse to God...in explaining the [physical] arrangements of nature and their changes is...a complete confession that one has come to the end of his philosophy, since he is compelled to assume something of which in itself he otherwise has no concept in order to conceive the possibility of something he sees before his very eyes. [Kt4:138; s.a. Kt26:(25-6)]

Just as the regulative use of an idea assumes it not to have 'creative power', but to 'have practical power...[, and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions' [Ktl:597], so also such regulative usage implies nothing about how we are to go about gathering empirical knowledge, but only about how we are to structure our beliefs about the source of the ultimate unity of that knowledge: it motivates us to search for systematic unity in our philosophical explanations.

Another frequent complaint against Kant's plea that we be satisfied with regarding God as a regulative idea is made by those theologians who are (as Kant says with respect to the moral philosophers of his day) 'dedicated to the omnipotence of theoretical reason' [Kt6:377]. He continues:

...the discomfort they feel at not being able to explain what lies entirely beyond the sphere of physiological explanation [e.g. the idea of God] provokes them to a general call to arms, as it were, to withstand that Idea, no matter how exalting this very prerogative of man--his capacity for such an Idea--may be.

That is to say, they reject the notion of God as an idea not because it is incoherent, but because it does not provide what they are looking
for, viz. certain knowledge of God's existence and nature. Because Kant says, for example, that 'this Idea proceeds entirely from our own reason and we ourselves make it' [442], they disregard his many other claims to believe in a real, living God, as in traditional theism. Such a premature rejection of his position fails to recognize that, as in virtually every other aspect of his System, Kant reserves the right to give different answers to the same question when different perspectives are assumed.

The two regulative principles mentioned above (viz. that the idea of God is philosophically useful yet empirically unattainable [see Kt1: 643-4, q.a.]), aside from emphasizing yet again that the regulative use is not empirical but practical, also have clear implications about what form our conception of God should actually take. First of all they imply that, since 'we can never reach ['the greatest possible unity among appearances'] within this world, ...we must regard the absolutely necessary being as being outside the world' [645]. But it is not immediately apparent just what type of transcendence Kant is thinking of here or how it differs from that of the ideal, or indeed, of the thing in itself. So let us look briefly into the relationships between these notions.

The thing in itself, which transcends all our perspectives, is perspectiveless and passive. By contrast, the idea of God plays an active role in system\textsuperscript{t}. In the speculative version of system\textsuperscript{t} the thing in itself is the inner 'ground' of all our experience, while God, as an ideal object, is the 'ultimate reality' which transcends the limited sphere of human reality. However, in the practical version of system\textsuperscript{t} (which, of course, Kant prefers), the situation is just the reverse: the thing in itself is now transcendent in the sense that it fills the 'space' outside the circle of our possible knowledge, while God, regarded now as an idea of reason, is transcendent in the sense of pointing beyond system\textsuperscript{t} towards the inward ground of immediate experience.

Kant's dissatisfaction with both of these models of God is evident
in Kt7:392-5, where he criticizes all the traditional ways of explaining the existence of finality in nature. As usual, he categorizes the possibilities in terms of a fourfold division: philosophers posit either 'a living God' (theism), 'a lifeless matter' (materialism), 'a lifeless God' (deism), or 'a living matter' (hylozoism) [392,392n]. Of these four choices Kant clearly favours theism. But he is in no way satisfied with its traditional use in this context, for even theism 'is absolutely incapable of authorizing us to make any objective assertion' [395]. None of the four solutions explains ultimate reality; each merely represents the theories which result from emphasizing one perspective to the exclusion of the others.

An alternative would be to regard God in a more radical sense, as transcending the whole 'plane' of our world--i.e. as standing outside both the thing in itself and our subject-object world of perspectival knowledge. According to this notion, God transcends the very distinction between transcendence and immanence; thus it is in this context that the characterization of God as the 'Ground of Being' has its most profound application. God is not the Ground of Being only in the sense that the thing in itself is the transcendent ground of the transcendental object and its appearance, nor is He the Ground of Being only in the sense that the idea points towards the immanent ground of immediate experience; rather, as Creator of both transcendence and immanence, the 'Ground' of this world must both participate in them and yet remain utterly apart from them. That is, He has a single, all-encompassing Perspective which not only includes the logically original perspectivelessness of the thing in itself, but also encompasses the original human perspective of immediate experience and all the intermediate perspectives which give rise to Kant's System of Perspectives. A model such as this is implied by Kant when he says in Kt4:102:

Just as it would therefore be contradictory to say God is the creator of appearances, it is also contradictory to say that He, as the Creator, is the cause of actions in the world of sense, as these
are appearances; yet at the same time He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (as noumena).

Pressing our model to its limits—and remembering, of course, that it is only an analogy, not a claim to speculative knowledge—we can say that by viewing God in this radically transcendent sense we can understand how He can 'be in a position' to see into the very depths of our hearts, yet also to apprehend the true reality of the things which make up the material of our world.

The radical transcendence of God seems to be what Kant is thinking of in suggesting that God is 'outside the world'. For he proceeds to say that this view of God frees us to derive the appearances of the world and their existences from other appearances, with unfailing confidence, just as if there were no necessary being, while yet we are also free to strive unceasingly towards the completeness of that derivation, just as if such a being were presupposed as an ultimate ground. [Kt1:646-7]

In Kt26:(22) he states his case rather more concisely: 'The world depends on a supreme being, but the things in the world all mutually depend on one another.' This 'assumption' that 'God as the Universal Primordial Being is the cause...of the existence of substance...can never be given up', Kant insists, for it is the basis of all theology [Kt4:100]. So for Kant, God cannot be identified with the world or with our ideas (i.e. our idea of God is in no sense constitutive), yet belief in Him reveals ample evidence of His participation in both (i.e. by means of a regulative employment of the idea of God) [Kt1:647-8].

Kant's theory concerning the regulative idea of God is not the only element in his positive theology. For 'the conception of a Deity...can never be evolved merely according to principles of reason's theoretical standpoint' [Kt7:400]. So in addition to such transcendental theology, he develops his own type of natural theology in Kt4 and Kt7. Although both of these versions of natural theology, which we have already touched upon in VIII.3 and IX.3, assume a nonteoretical standpoint, they do serve a quasi-theoretical function in the overall context of Kant's sys-
X. God's Transcendence From Theoretical Knowledge

Systematic theology. Therefore, a more thorough examination of his moral and physicotheological arguments for God's existence will help to reveal the systematic character of his general concept of God and to demonstrate the richness and depth of this 'guiding-thread' of his System.

Kant's resurrection of the physicotheological proof in KT7 does not nullify his criticism of it in KT1; for the standpoint from which it is discussed is now empirical rather than theoretical. It still concerns the same theoretical concept (God); from the outset, however, it now assumes to establish not theoretical knowledge, but only empirical justification of a practical belief. Even in KT1 Kant explicitly allows for such a usage: he argues that we are 'undoubtedly' permitted, if not required, 'to assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the world', as long as we realize that such an assumption does not in any way 'extend our knowledge beyond the field of experience' [725-6]. He develops this a bit further in KT26:(32-3):

Physicotheology...can enlighten and give intuitive appeal to our concepts of God. But it cannot have any determinate concept of God. For only reason can represent completeness and totality. In physicotheology I see God's power. But can I say determinately, this is omnipotence or the highest degree of power?

The implicit answer, of course, is 'no'. For although it has a positive role to play, physicotheology on its own is 'unable to...serve as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn to form the basis of religion' [KT1:656]. Instead, Kant intends it to point the way outward from experience to moral activity, where theology has a more secure foundation.

Kant argues in KT7 that empirical reflection on 'the clearly manifest nexus of things according to final causes' requires us to conceive of 'a world-cause acting according to ends, that is, an intelligent cause--however rash and undemonstrable a principle this might be for the determinant judgment' [389]. As we saw in IX.3, he bases this assumption on the specific phenomenon of finality in our experience of the world:
In particular he emphasizes that 'the end for which nature itself exists' is man, and that 'it is upon the definite idea of this end that the definite conception of such a supreme intelligent World-Cause, and, consequently, the possibility of a theology, depend' [437]. Viewed from the standpoint of systeme rather than systemt, this argument is, as Wood points out, directed not so much to the theoretical philosopher as to the 'ordinary man' [W19:174]: 'the ordinary man "sees" nature as the work of God, and discerns in it—what no amount of empirical evidence [in systemt] could have demonstrated—the signs of a divine and morally purposive creation' [176]. Yet even from the standpoint of systeme, physicotheology on its own is quite limited, for experience 'can never lift us above nature to the end of its real existence or thus raise us to a definite conception of such a higher Intelligence' [Kt7:438; s.a. Kt26:(38)]. Thus 'physical teleology urges us to go in quest of a theology. But it can never produce one' [Kt7:440]; for 'physico-theology... is of no use to theology except as a preparation or propaedeutic and is only sufficient for this purpose when supplemented by a further principle on which it can rely' [442].

Rather than depending on the speculative proofs of transcendentental theology, however, Kant's physicotheology depends on the proof provided by moral theology from the practical standpoint: 'underlying our procedure [in physicotheology] is an idea of a Supreme Being, which rests on an entirely different standpoint [than that of systeme], namely the practical' [Kt7:438]. Kant sums up the preparatory function of physicotheology in Kt6:481, where, in his example of 'a moral catechism' [479], the final comment of the pupil is:

For we see in the works of nature, which we can judge, a wisdom so widespread and profound that we can explain it to ourselves only by the ineffably great art of a creator of the world. And from this
we have cause, when we turn to the moral order...to expect there a rule no less wise.

We have already examined in sufficient detail [see VIII.3] how the postulate of God plays an important role in the fourth stage of systemP. So it will suffice at this point to supplement that account with a brief summary and an explanation of its specific implications for the theologian's attempt to prove the existence of God. The argument, as summarized in Kt7:446, is that every moral agent

needs a moral Intelligence; because he exists for an end, and this end demands a Being that has formed both him [systemP] and the world [systemP] with that end in view.... Hence...there is in our moral habits of thought a foundation for...form[ing] a representation depicting a pure moral need for the real existence of a Being, whereby our morality gains in strength or even obtains--at least on the side of our representation--an extension of area, that is to say, is given a new object for its exercise.

The resulting concept of 'a moral Legislator' has no theoretical value; yet, Kant continues,

the source of this disposition is unmistakable. It is the original bent of our nature, as a subjective principle, that will not let us be satisfied, in our review of the world, with the finality which it derives through natural causes, but leads us to introduce into it an underlying supreme Cause governing nature according to moral laws.--In addition...we feel ourselves urged by the moral law to strive after a universal highest end, while yet we feel ourselves, and all nature too, incapable of its attainment.... Thus we have a pure moral ground derived from practical reason for admitting this Cause (since we may do so without contradiction), if for no better reason, in order that we may not run the risk of regarding such striving as quite idle in its effects, and of allowing it to flag in consequence.

After presenting his moral argument for the existence of God in Kt4, Kant asks: 'Is our knowledge really widened in such a way by pure practical reason, and is that which was transcendent for speculative reason immanent in practical reason? Certainly, but only from a practical standpoint' [133]. By no means should this be taken to imply that the conclusions of systemP merely 'serve to fill out gaps in the critical system of speculative reason' [7]. Kant does on a few occasions make careless remarks, such as that 'a faith in God built on this [moral] foundation is as certain as a mathematical demonstration' [Kt26:(40)]. (He should at least have added that there is a crucial perspectival dif-
ference between the type of certainty which we have in each case.) But such remarks should not be given priority over the other elements in his carefully thought-out System. For, as he clearly says elsewhere, 'no one will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God [i.e. from a theoretical standpoint]... No, my conviction is not logical but moral certainty' [Kt1:857]. Thus Wood insists 'it would be a great mistake to see in the God of Kant's moral faith no more than an abstract, metaphysical idea. For Kant moral faith in God is, in its most profound and personal signification, the moral man's trust in God' [W19:161].

Kant's moral argument, therefore, is not to be regarded as 'an incontrovertible proof', as the traditional theoretical proofs attempt to be [Kt1:665]. As he says in Kt7:450-1:

This moral argument is not intended to supply an objectively valid proof of the existence of God. It is not meant to demonstrate to the sceptic that there is a God, but that he must adopt the assumption of this proposition as a maxim of his practical reason, if he wishes to think in a manner consistent with morality. As a practical 'presupposition' of our moral activity, it 'cannot be brought to a higher degree of certainty than the acknowledgement that it is the most reasonable opinion for us men' [Kt4:142]. Accordingly, he describes it as a 'doctrinal belief' [Kt1:853], which means that it is 'from an objective perspective, an expression of modesty, and yet at the same time, from a subjective perspective, an expression of the firmness of our confidence' [855]. For one who accepts this practical postulate and decides to believe in God must resolve within himself 'not [to] give up this belief' [Kt4:143].

By accepting the conclusions established by moral theology, and supported by physicotheology, especially the conclusion that theology should be 'founded on the moral principle, namely that of freedom, and adapted, therefore, to reason's practical standpoint', Kant believes theology might 'better fulfil [its] final objective purpose' [Kt7:479]. The limitation of basing theology on practical rather than theoretical reason is that its conclusions are now 'of immanent use only' [Kt1:847]:
[Moral theology] enables us to fulfil our vocation in this present world by showing us how to adapt ourselves to the system of all ends [i.e. system], and by warning us against the fanaticism, and indeed the impiety, of abandoning the guidance of a morally legislative reason in the right conduct of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly from the idea of the Supreme Being [i.e. in system^]. For we should then be making a transcendental employment of moral theology; and that, like a transcendent use of pure speculation, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.

However, once its purely immanent use is understood, the common criticism that Kant's moral postulates are merely 'a side gesture, [pointing] beyond the limits which he himself had drawn' [q.i. Cl:470], is immediately seen to be invalid.

The importance of this point cannot be underemphasized: Kant's moral proof of God's existence is in no sense intended to satisfy the requirements of a theoretical standpoint; rather it directs our attention away from the theoretical, away from scientific knowledge, whether transcendental, logical, empirical, or speculative, and towards the practical standpoint, which serves as the only context in which the theoretical concept of God really carries any weight. He states this as plainly as one could expect in Kt2639:

Thus all speculation depends...on the transcendental concept [of an absolutely necessary being]. But if we posit that it is not correct, would we then have to give up the knowledge of God? Not at all. For then we would only lack the scientific knowledge that God exists. But a great field would still remain to us, and this would be the belief or faith that God exists. This faith we will derive a priori from moral principles. Hence if...we raise doubts about these speculative proofs...we will not thereby undermine faith in God. Rather, we will clear the road for practical proofs. We are merely throwing out the false presumptions of human reason when it tries from itself to demonstrate the existence of God with apodictic certainty. But from moral principles we will assume a faith in God as the principle of every religion.

In Kt7:482 he deliberates with equal clarity:

...we shall not feel that the assurance produced by this [moral] line of proof falls in any way short of the final purposes it has in view [viz. establishing a rational foundation for religion] provided we are clear on the point that an argument of this kind only proves the existence of God in a way that satisfies the moral side of our nature, that is, from a practical standpoint.... [Therefore,] while the categories are here used on behalf of the knowledge of God, they are not directed to the intrinsic, and for us inscrutable, nature of God.

When we proceed in X.4 to examine Kant's account of God's nature,
we must always keep in mind that he is not contradicting his own theoretical principles by suggesting that we can know God's attributes after all, but only urging that, despite our inherent ignorance of God's essence, necessitated by the perspectival nature of human rationality, it is legitimate for practical purposes to make assumptions about God, as long as we recognize the dependence of such descriptions on our own perspectives, and so use the resulting 'knowledge' only as an aid in coping with our earthly existence (especially with respect to our moral activity). One of the main purposes of Kt1 is to prepare the way for such a theology by replacing the positive noumenon with the negative noumenon—i.e. by replacing the rationalist belief in a speculative realm which transcends the phenomenal world with the Critical belief in a practical realm which is revealed in and through moral experience. Any attempt to possess God must therefore be given up and replaced by a willingness to be possessed by God.

Kant suggests in Kt7:444 that 'all transcendental attributes [of God],...attributes that are presupposed in relation to such a final end, will have to be regarded as belonging to the Original Being. --In this way moral teleology supplements the deficiency of physical teleology, and for the first time establishes a [moral] theology.' Thus the moral theology towards which physical teleology directs our attention provides the only adequate philosophical basis for a belief in the existence of God, and so for a regulative use of the idea of God in theoretical contexts [see Kt1:664] by supplying not knowledge but 'a conviction of the existence of a supreme being—a conviction which bases itself on moral laws' [660n]. With this foundation, our concept of God 'meets the joint requirements alike of insight into nature and moral wisdom—and no objection of the least substance can be brought against the possibility of such an idea' [Kt7:462]. With the existence of God thus vindicated as a legitimate object of belief, we can now proceed to examine how much Kant's Critical System enables us to say about God's nature.
4. Rational Models of God’s Nature

Kant’s theology is typically characterized as implying, in the words of Cupitt, 'a non-cognitive philosophy of religion which leaves the believer to be sustained in a harsh world by nothing but pure moral faith' [C15:64]. But in fact, Kant’s theological and religious views are not so 'bleak and austere' [64] as is often assumed. On the contrary, such an assumption, like most misinterpretations of Kant, rests on a failure to understand how the principle of perspective operates in his System. It is true that his practical postulates as such are not much help in facing the harsh realities of human existence, but they are not primarily intended to fulfil such an empirical role; for Kant offers us a good deal more in the way of equipping us with tools to cope with reality. The most significant of these, which concern Kant’s view of God as participating in human morality and as relating on a personal basis with his creatures, will be discussed in Chapters XI and XII; but in this final section of the present chapter we can say something about the tools he offers to the theologian to cope with the realities of human ignorance. These he gives in the form of various models for God’s nature which, far from being 'bleak and austere', represent a balanced and realistic appraisal of some basic theological issues. These models, though rarely appreciated as such, constitute the climax of Kant’s systematic understanding of our theoretical conception of God’s nature.

The primary theoretical model is obscured in Kt1 by the fact that Kant first introduces it in its illusory employment, as a fourfold representation of the 'object of the ideal of reason' [606]. Assuming via the possibility proof that God can be described as the most real being, the *ens realissimum*, Kant suggests He can also be described as 'the primordial being (*ens originarium*)', 'the highest being (*ens summum*)', and 'the being of all beings (*ens entium*)' [606-7]. But Kant proposes a better division in Kt26:(28-9) between three types of 'rational theology': '(a) transcendental, (b) naturalem, and (c) moralem.' The first,
which is itself divisible into cosmotheology and ontotheology [31], he
describes in terms of the ens originarium and the ens summum. The
second refers to physicotheology, and concerns itself with God as ens
intelligentia [highest intelligence] [29, t.b.]. And the third refers
to moral theology, and regards God 'as the summum bonum, as the highest
good.' Each of the four characterizations in such divisions of rational
theology corresponds to one of Kant's four reflective perspectives.

Illusion arises not from the mere positing of such a fourfold
description of God's nature, but only from regarding these terms 'as
signifying the objective relation of an actual object to other things'
[Kt1:607]. Their proper purpose is not to yield knowledge of an ideal
object, but to clarify the relation between our idea of God and our fa-
culty of conceptualization [607]: 'We are left entirely without knowl-
dge as to the existence of a being of such outstanding pre-eminence.'
Although the arguments used to support each term are not sufficient to
establish objective knowledge, we have seen 'that there are in the idea
of reason obligations which are completely valid' [617], even from the
standpoint of system. Since 'we know nothing that is better and more
convincing' than these arguments, and since 'the natural bent of the
common understanding' is towards 'monotheism' (even in cultures which
are predominantly polytheistic), Kant believes they do serve the impor-
tant purpose of encouraging a rational belief and/or clarifying its con-
tent. Thus, although he says the best way to avoid theological errors
is 'by leaving dogmatic judgments severely alone' [Kt35:(85)]--i.e. 'by
not undertaking to judge where [one] does not know as much as is requir-
ed for definitive judgment' [Kt20:136]--he himself nevertheless does
make some cautious judgments about God's nature. He does so because he
believes we do know enough to make such judgments from a practical
standpoint.

Although reason's speculative perspective is unable 'to demonstrate
the existence of a supreme being', a practical perspective on this same
problem 'is yet of very great value in correcting any knowledge of this being which may be derived from other sources [e.g. natural or revealed theology], in making it consistent with itself and with every intelligible perspective' [Kt1:667-8]. Such practical models of God's nature do not fulfil a positive function, as do the forms of theology discussed in X.3, but a negative one. They are intended not to provide conviction, but to clarify our concept once we are convinced. This practical perspective on our theoretical understanding of God thereby guards against 'all counter-assertions, whether atheistic [empirical], deistic [logical], or anthropomorphic [transcendental]' [668-9]. But when it is seen as a supplement to 'a moral theology..., transcendental theology, which before was problematic only, will prove itself indispensable in determining the concept of this supreme being and in constantly testing reason' [669]. It will provide us with 'knowledge of God, though only from a practical standpoint' [Kt4:137].

Kant's System of Perspectives thus gives rise to various attributes of God--i.e. ways in which we must regard God because of the form of our finite perspectival nature. 'God', Kant tells us, 'is the only holy, the only blessed, and the only wise being' [Kt1:131n]. These three attributes represent our concepts of that which transcends each of the three systems in Kant's System. They point to three essential ways in which God relates to man: 'He is thus the holy lawgiver (and creator) [system₄], the beneficent ruler (and sustainer) [systemₒ], and the just judge [system₇]' [131n; s.a. Kt8:139(131); Kt26:(29)]. As long as we regard 'the concept of God [as] one which belongs originally not to physics, i.e. to speculative reason, but to morals', we can go even further and conclude that God 'must be omniscient, ...omnipotent, and similarly omnipresent, eternal, etc.' [Kt4:140]. He explains the perspectival basis of such attributions quite clearly in Kt7:484:

...we are obliged to conceive the eternity of God as an existence in all time, because we can form no other conception of mere existence than that of...duration. Similarly we have to conceive the
divine omnipotence as an existence in all places... All this we do without, however, being at liberty to ascribe any of these thought-forms to God as something cognized in Him.... [Just because] I seek to conceive a supersensible being (God) as Intelligence...I have no right whatsoever to flatter myself that I am in a position to ascribe intelligence to that being and thereby to cognize it by one of its attributes. For in that case I must omit all the above conditions under which I know an intelligence [viz. the categories].

Of course, because God Himself transcends all our perspectives, such attributions cannot be taken as literal descriptions of, so to speak, God's very essence [see Kt7:465]. As Ward puts it: 'The question whether God in himself is like the model is meaningless', for such models have no theoretical significance [W10:82]. 'Practical reason', explains Kant, 'gives significance...to the theoretical concept of a First Being. This significance is given from a practical standpoint' [Kt4:133]. Accordingly, Kant is careful to emphasize the subjective character of such lists of attributes:

...these attributes of the Supreme Being can only be conceived by us on analogy.... [They] enable us to conceive a Supreme Being, not to cognize it or to predicate them of it in a more or less theoretical manner.... Yet the object which we have in view in employing them is not that we wish to determine the nature of the Being by reference to them—a nature which is inaccessible to us—but rather that we seek to use them for determining our own selves and our will.... [For] this being...transcends all our cognitive faculties... But, once the question [of God] touches practical matters, a regulative principle...then becomes also constitutive. In other words it is practically determinant... [Kt7:456-7]

Kant's positive theology not only provides rational models for God's nature, but also guards against innumerable errors in both theology and religion. Kant outlines one such application in Kt7:459:

The fact that, in respect of all our ideas of the supersensible, reason is restricted to the conditions of its practical employment is of obvious use in connexion with the idea of God. It prevents theology from losing itself in the clouds of THEOSOPHY, ...or...of DEMONOLOGY... Also it keeps religion from falling into theurgy...; or into idolatry...

All such errors result from taking one perspective to represent the only true perspective from which reality can be grasped. Thus Kant explains the different views of God taken up by different philosophers as a direct result of the fact that 'each considered the world from a different
Errors such as those listed above rest on a failure to understand not only the principle of perspective, but also, in many instances, the symbolic nature of all our language about God. A 'symbol', Kant explains, expresses a concept 'without employing a direct intuition for the purpose, but only drawing upon an analogy with one' [Kt7:352]. In defence of his use of theoretical models for God's nature Kant then contends that

all our knowledge of God is merely symbolic; and one who takes it, with the properties of understanding, will, and so forth, which only evidence their objective reality in beings of this world, to be schematic, falls into anthropomorphism, just as, if he abandons every intuitive element, he falls into Deism which furnishes no knowledge whatsoever—not even from a practical standpoint. [353]

His theistic alternative is that 'a knowledge of God and His existence, that is to say a theology, is possible by means of attributes and determinations of this causality merely conceived in Him according to analogy, and this knowledge has all requisite reality from a practical standpoint' [484-5].

Because Kant's theology guards against what might be called 'gnostic' errors (such as anthropomorphism), into which dogmatic theologians and philosophers of religion repeatedly fall, he is branded an agnostic. And because his theology likewise takes seriously the objections advanced by the atheist, he is branded a deist. Yet a perspectival interpretation of his rational theology reveals that he was neither a deist nor an agnostic, but a theist in a quite profound sense of the word. Ironically, those who label Kant as a deist or an agnostic are often those who would call themselves theists because of their affirmative response to the traditional arguments of transcendental theology. Yet for Kant this is not good enough: no one can claim to be a theist on the strength merely of logical ingenuity, for theism depends on a belief in a God who manifests Himself as 'a living God' in our immediate experience, whereas the ontological and cosmological arguments portray God 'wholly separate
from any experience' [Kt26:30)]. If anyone is a deist, then, it is not Kant, who believes in a God who purposely hides his true nature from us, but gives us enough evidence to make a reasoned step of faith, after which we are able to understand God's nature with sufficient clarity in terms of our finite human perspectives; rather it is those who put all their trust in the powers of theoretical reason and toil endlessly and in vain to attain knowledge which is not to be had by us men. We shall see in the next chapter that the religious implications of Kant's theism are not always entirely consistent with orthodox Christianity; yet they are not as inconsistent as is often assumed. For, although it is couched in the difficult terminology of a highly complex philosophical system, Kant's theism is not significantly different from the theism expressed by the writer of 2 Corinthians 4:7 when he proclaims that 'the transcendent power [he huperbolē tēs dunámeōs] belongs to God and not to us'.
Chapter XI

Christianity as the Universal Religion of Mankind

1. Pure Religion and Empirical Religion

As a result of the highly abstract character of much of Kant's theology, both in its negative and positive aspects [see Ch. X], there is a general consensus among those who have any opinion on the matter that 'Kant’s God is, most aggressively, the God of the philosophers' [W20:60]. It is a mistake, however, to infer, from the philosophical concept of God which he develops in the three Critiques, that for Kant God was nothing but an abstract philosophical concept. On the contrary, Kant's purpose in developing his 'Critical theology' was to a large extent to defend the legitimacy of his fervent belief in the God of his youth, and to separate the genuine elements of his parents' pietistic tradition from the unnecessary trappings which tended to obscure its true value [see e.g. Kt8:132n(123n)]. Webb fully appreciates this fact: 'Not only did Kant... always believe in the existence of God as a real Being...; but also..., he envisaged the God, in whom he never ceased to believe, after the fashion of the theism current in his youth' [W12:49-50]. Thus it is wrong to interpret his personal lack of participation in organized religion as a denial of the value of religion or Christianity. This is as inaccurate as to interpret his avoidance of the services of doctors and lawyers as a rejection of medicine and government. Instead, all of these can be explained in terms of his tendency to carry the individualism of his youth to an extreme: 'Every man his own doctor, every man his own lawyer, every man his own priest,—that was the ideal of Kant' [W4:47].

My goal in this chapter will be to demonstrate how a recognition of the perspectival character of the Critical System [Chs. I-IX], together with a fair assessment of Kant's true attitude towards God and theology [Ch.X], can shed new light on the implications of his critique of reli-
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...
religion' [Kt7:474]. This threefold conception of religion is itself 'a
pure practical idea of reason' [Kt8:157(145)]. Thus Kant can say both
that 'morality leads inevitably to religion' [Kt8:8n(7n)] and that
'theology also leads directly to religion' [Kt7:481]. According to the
Critical concept of religion, morality and theology lead to religion only
when they are taken together as a synthetic unity by viewing religion as
'morality in relation to God as Lawgiver' [460], or as 'the recognition
of all duties as divine commands' [481; s.a. Kt4:129; Kt8:103-4(95)].

Since 'the mere possibility of such a being [viz. God] is sufficient
to produce religion in man' [Kt26:(27)], Kant suggests that the main
purpose of theology should be 'to form the basis of religion' [Kt1:656].
Yet, as we saw in Chapter X, he argues that all attempts to prove the
existence of God theoretically 'are altogether fruitless and by their
very nature null and void'; they 'do not lead to any theology whatsoever'
[664]. On the contrary, the moral argument [see VIII.3] is 'the only one
needful for religion' [Kt7:474], so 'the only theology of reason which is
possible is that which is based upon moral laws' [664]. For 'in reli­
gion...no assertorial knowledge is required (even of God's existence)';
the only requirement is 'an assertorial faith' [Kt8:153-4n(142n)]. As
long as we keep in mind the primacy of practical reason, the limitations
of theoretical reason will not be a valid excuse for living as though God
does not exist, because a practical faith in God carries us 'farther into
the heart of reality than the purely speculative or scientific reason
could ever take us' [W12:69]. Although Kant's concern for the autonomy
of morality leads him to emphasize that 'morality does not need religion
at all...either to know what duty is or to impel the performance of duty'
[Kt8:3-4(3)], he would also admit that 'without faith in God', as Webb
puts it, the moral law 'must seem to be...a voice crying in the wilder­
ness of an alien world, its presence wherein must remain an inexplicable
and baffling mystery' [W12:86; see e.g. Kt4:129-30; Kt7:474]. As a re­
result, morality both provides a solid basis for theology and tends to lead
the moral agent to religion: 'In religion all our morality ought to reach its fulfilment in respect of its object' [Kt35:(78-9)].

Kant repeats his standard definition of religion in Kt8:153-4 (142-3), and then explains how it can be used to clarify the difference between revealed and natural religion:

Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as divine commands. That religion in which I must know in advance that something is a divine command in order to recognize it as my duty, is the revealed religion...; in contrast, that religion in which I must first know that something is my duty before I can accept it as a divine injunction is the natural religion.

In revealed religion, then, morality must conform to theology, while in natural religion theology must conform to morality [see Kt7:460; Kt39:477(184)]. At times it appears that Kant regards the latter as the only valid approach for the Critical philosopher to adopt when analyzing religion. But as we shall see, Kant's approach is not so simple. For he immediately adds in Kt8:154-5(143) that there are in fact three possible positions: the naturalist 'denies the reality of all supernatural divine revelation'; the pure rationalist 'recognizes revelation, but asserts that to know and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to religion'; and the pure supernaturalist 'holds that belief in it is necessary to universal religion'. He makes it clear that he is concerned with the debate between the pure supernaturalist and the pure rationalist—i.e. with the question whether divine revelation is to be regarded 'as necessary and sufficient, or as merely incidental, to the unique true religion' [155(143); see Kt65:37]. The former position, he says in Kt65:36, is taken up by the 'biblical theologian', who is 'versed in the Scriptures with regard to ecclesiastical faith'; the latter is taken up by the 'rational theologian', who is 'versed in reason with regard to religious faith'.

Kant's foremost concern in Kt8 is to describe the rational character of this 'universal religion of mankind' [Kt8:155(143)] and to determine the extent to which 'Christianity, as found in the Bible, is composed of
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...the canon of religion'--i.e. 'pure religious faith'--as well as providing the 'vehicle' of 'ecclesiastical faith' [Kt65:36-7; s.a. Kt8:123n(113n),135n(126n)]. In order to set the stage for this he adds to his usual (subjective) distinction between revealed and natural religion a further objective distinction (which he tells us 'is very important') between two types of religion, viewed 'with respect to its characteristics which make it capable of being shared with others': viewed objectively, 'natural religion' is that 'of which (once it has arisen) everyone can be convinced through his own reason', while 'learned religion' is that 'of which one can convince others only through the agency of learning (in and through which they must be guided)' [155(143)]. Kant's claim is that, in order for Christianity to be the vehicle of the universal religion, it must be 'objectively a natural religion, though subjectively one that has been revealed' [156(144)]. That is, even though Christianity presents to the believer (subjectively) a set of divine commandments which are therefore to be regarded as duties, it can nevertheless act as a vehicle for true (universal) religion, as long as these commandments can be viewed objectively as capable of being justified rationally as duties in and of themselves. Natural religion and revealed religion therefore, are viewed by Kant not as contradictory, but as complements of each other. This he verifies in Kt35:(83-4) when he says 'supernatural religion is not opposed to natural religion, but completes it. Natural religion is true but incomplete.'

A helpful way of making clear how and in what sense natural religion on its own is incomplete is to take note of the necessarily inner character of all true religion:

there is no such thing as outer religion. All religion is inner, it is entirely a matter of disposition; all outward action is either a means to or an expression of the religion within us: no outward act can be a religious act; acts of religion are within us, because true religion is purely a matter of disposition. [Kt35:(82-3)]

Kant intends this extreme statement to emphasize the radically pure, or transcendental character of his special Critical Perspective on religion:
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just as system\textsubscript{p} lays the transcendental foundation for morality [see VIII.2], and indeed, just as system\textsubscript{t} lays the transcendental foundation for empirical knowledge [see VII.1], so also Kant's system of pure religion lays the transcendental foundation for real (empirical) religious experience. However, if an inner religious disposition is never expressed in any outer form, it can hardly be called a religious act. Thus, Kant expresses his position in a more balanced way in Kt35:(102):

A pure religion...consist[s] solely in dispositions which are directed towards God and imply morality. A mixed religion, in so far as it appeals to the senses, is one which is merely a means to morality. But as man is sensuous and the religious appeal to the senses has its uses, it can be said that man can have no pure religion.

Kant believed his critique of religion could analyze the nature of religion without contradicting 'the literal meaning of the popular faith' precisely because, 'earlier by far than this faith, the predisposition to the moral religion lay hidden in human reason' [Kt8:111(102)]. And for this same reason, viz. the inner hiddenness of the pure religion, revelation can serve an important role by bringing to fruition the essential 'kernal' of pure religious faith within each person [see W19:193-4]. Thus he says in Kt65:8-9 that in Kt8

I make no appraisal of Christianity... In fact, it is only natural religion that I appraise.... [For] revelation is useful in making up the theoretical deficiency which our pure rational belief admits it has (in the questions, for example, of the origin of evil, the conversion from evil to good, man's assurance that he has become good, etc.) and helps...to satisfy a rational need.

In XI.2-3 we shall investigate in more detail how the deficiencies of natural religion give rise to the need for revelation.

The outward manifestation of religion in its imperfect, empirical form is just as necessary for the realization of universal religion as real judgments are for the realization of the categories in empirical knowledge, or as real actions are for the realization of the moral law in moral activity. Religious activity is real from the empirical perspective, but ideal from the transcendental perspective: 'the idea of the objective unity of the religion of reason...is an idea of reason which we
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cannot represent through any intuition adequate to it, but which, as a practical regulative principle, does have objective reality' [Kt8: 123n(114n)]. Thus, even though 'ecclesiastical faith...naturally precedes pure religious faith' [106(97)], 'this order ought to be reversed', when considered from the standpoint of universal religion [106n(97n)].

The perspectival character of Kant's understanding of religion is evident in his claim in Kt8:107(98) that 'there is only one (true) religion; but there can be faiths of several kinds.' This is because 'ecclesiastical faith...appeals to [the] senses, whereas religion is hidden within and has to do with moral dispositions' [108(99)]. Because of its accidental character, each faith must 'be able to cease; whereby is indicated merely the inner stability of the pure moral faith' [135n (126n); s.a. 174(163)]. Nevertheless, 'it remains true once for all that a statutory ecclesiastical faith is associated with pure religious faith as its vehicle' [106(97)]. Wood expresses Kant's position with admirable clarity: 'Kant does not intend that ecclesiastical faith...shall be abolished by progress. Rather, it is to come to an understanding of itself as a vehicle for pure religious faith, so better to serve the pure faith which is its essence' [W19:196; s.a. Kt65:29]. Along these lines Kant distinguishes between 'merely statutory' and 'purely moral laws': 'the concept of the Deity really arises solely from consciousness of [the latter]..., through which the will of God is primordially engraved in our hearts'; nevertheless, 'divine statutory laws' can 'comprise the means to its furtherance and spread' [Kt8:104(95); s.a. Kt65:49].

Kant's discussion in Kt65 of the conflict between the philosophy faculty and the 'higher' faculties of theology, law, and medicine [see 21-2,30] makes it very clear that both the empirical and the pure elements in religion are necessary for the realization of universal religion. Kant does not expect the clergyman to give up his belief in the authority of Scripture any more than he expects the lawyer to ignore the 'law of the land', or the physician to transgress 'medical regulations' [23]. All he
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asks is that, when these 'businessmen' of the higher faculties [18] appeal to reason to justify their positions, they recognize the change in perspective which is involved, and allow the philosopher to criticize their views. Thus he says in Kt65:23:

So the biblical theologian...draws his teachings not from reason but from the Bible; the professor of law gets his, not from natural law, but from the law of the land; and the professor of medicine does not draw his method of therapy as practiced on the public from the physiology of the human body but from medical regulations. As soon as one of these faculties presumes to mix with its teachings something it treats as derived from reason [i.e. as pure], it...encroaches on the territory of the philosophy faculty, which mercilessly strips from it all the shining plumes that were protected by the government and deals with it on a footing of equality and freedom. The higher faculties must, therefore, take great care not to enter into misalliance with the lower faculty, but must keep it at a respectful distance, so that the dignity of their statutes will not be damaged by the free play of reason.

Reason functions as a corrective to revelation, 'making it consistent with itself and with every perspective from which it can be regarded' [Kt1:668]. Nevertheless, the philosopher has no business publicizing his criticism to the laymen, but only to the theologian, whose responsibility it is to interpret revelation in such a way that it is as consistent as possible with reason. The clergyman then takes his lead from the theologian. If a conflict between the philosopher and the theologian should remain unresolved, the duty of the clergyman is to side with the theologian's interpretation of revelation. 'To refuse to obey an external and supreme will on the grounds that it allegedly does not conform with reason would be absurd' [Kt65:25], for this would be to confuse the Critical Perspective of the philosopher with what might be called the Divine Perspective of the theologian. Kant's vision, however, was that the natural conflict between the Perspectives of the philosopher and the theologian could be of lasting benefit for both empirical and pure religion. As Gregor explains in G16:xorviii: 'Genuine peace among the faculties can come only if the ecclesiastical faith and the law of the land are purified to the point where they are completely consistent with a priori principles of reason and can be regarded as applications of them.'
Our discussion so far makes it quite clear that it is wrong to view Kant as 'a deistic classic' [G13:1xxvii; s.a. W19:164]--a view which stems from the mistaken assumption that 'Kant rejected all positive religion' [G9a:194]. Equally mistaken is the claim that Kant merely 'reduced Christianity to a symbolic expression of man's sense of moral duty' [H25:29e.a.]. Admittedly, he did argue that from the Critical Perspective Christianity must be viewed as a vehicle for expressing an inner religious disposition; but he never regarded this as a defect, especially since it is not the only valid way of regarding it. As we have seen, Kant held that it is at the very least possible to regard Christianity as subjectively revealed and objectively natural. He says in Kt6:487 that his critique of religion 'is not...derived from mere reason but is based also on the teachings of history and revelation and considers only the consistency of pure practical reason with these (that is, shows that there is no contradiction between them).' That Kant's personal opinion was that revelation is more than just possible is reflected by the fact that he 'so often and so insistently call[s] himself a Christian' [G9a: 194]. One passage in which he implicitly refers to his own Christian belief also says quite a lot about the importance of a Critical attitude towards such belief: 'I have always...recommended to other believers a conscientious sincerity in not professing or obtruding on others, as articles of faith, more than they themselves are sure of' [Kt65:9e.a.]. Along the same lines, he says in Kt31:337 that in itself 'Christianity has something worthy of love about it', but not when it is 'armed with dictatorial authority instead of its gentle spirit' [339]. The traditional interpretation of Kant, which portrays him as viewing Christianity merely negatively, as the religion 'which least overstepped the bounds of reason' [G9a:194], is therefore quite untenable; its longevity is due primarily to the failure of interpreters to be as broad-minded as Kant himself. Kant's own Critical view is that Christianity 'effected a thoroughgoing revolution in doctrines of faith' [Kt8:127(118)], so that
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of all the 'different varieties of belief in divine revelation...Christianity, as far as we know, is the most adequate' [Kt65:36].

The negative reaction of the government's official religious advisors to Kt8 when it first appeared, which resulted in Kant promising not to lecture or publish anything else on religion until the death of King Frederick William II [see Kt65:10], is well known. But what seems to be ignored is that, after the King died, Kant explained the purpose of his book in much the same way as he had explained it in the preface to Kt8 (which indicates that this explanation was not merely an attempt to appease the government):

My purpose in formulating this title [i.e. that of Kt8] was to prevent a misinterpretation to the effect that the treatise deals with religion from mere reason (without revelation). That would be claiming too much, since reason's teachings could still come from men who are supernaturally inspired. The title indicates that I intended, rather, to set forth as a coherent whole everything in the Bible...that can also be recognized by mere reason. [Kt65:6n]

In a letter to Staudlin [a.q.i. R1:259] Kant adds that in writing Kt8 'I was guided by my appreciation and true respect for the Christian religion, but also by the exigencies of a becoming candour, not to conceal anything but to represent truthfully, how a combination of religion with the purest practical Reason appears to me possible.'

As a final preparation for exploring the details of Kant's critique of religion, we should note that Kant viewed Kt8 as an 'experiment' [Kt8: 12(11)], designed to prove 'that reason can be found to be not only compatible with Scripture but also at one with it, so that he who follows one...will not fail to conform to the other' [13(11)]. In Kant's opinion, as Gregor explains in G16:xiii, 'the experiment was successful. As he would later explain..., this book in no way disparaged Christianity, but, on the contrary, established its credentials as divine revelation in the only way this can be established, by demonstrating its consistency with pure moral religion.'
2. Radical Evil and Conversion to the Good

Kant divided $Kt8$ into four 'books'. The first book deals with 'the indwelling' of 'radical evil in human nature' [$Kt8:19(15)$]; the second, with 'the conflict of the good with the evil principle for sovereignty over man' [$57(50)$]; the third, with 'the victory of the good over the evil principle' [$93(85)$]; and the fourth, with 'service and pseudo-service under the sovereignty of the good principle' [$151(139)$]. These can be regarded as four stages in a systematic critique of religion, which (as we shall see) correspond, respectively, to the transcendental, logical, empirical, and practical perspectives.

To each book in $Kt8$ is appended a 'General Observation', in which Kant discusses one of four by-products, or 'parerga to religion within the limits of pure religion' [$Kt8:52(47)$]. These 'morally transcendent ideas' [$52(47)$] tend to arise in ecclesiastical religion, because of its empirical character, but can actually be counterproductive to the purposes of universal religion if emphasized too strongly. In the order of the four books these ideas are: (1) 'works of grace', or 'imagined inward experience', leading to 'fanaticism'; (2) 'miracles', or 'alleged external experience', leading to 'superstition'; (3) 'mysteries', or 'a supposed enlightening of the understanding with regard to the supernatural', leading to 'illumination'; and (4) 'means of grace', or 'hazardous attempts to operate upon the supernatural', leading to 'thaumaturgy' [$53(48)$]. We will discuss the implications of each of these parerga after discussing the stage to which it applies.

That Kant organized $Kt8$ according to such architectonic patterns comes as no surprise, if indeed, as I suggested in III.3, the book is intended as part of the Critical System itself. To view it as such—i.e. as an alternative, or complement, to the third Critique—involves the assumption that its standpoint is empirical (rather than practical, as Kant's emphasis on morality might at first seem to indicate). That is, Kant's critique of religion should turn out to be a philosophical exami-
nation of what might be called 'organized religious experience'. The extent to which this is so will be discussed in XI.4, and the role of religious experience as such (i.e. apart from its formalization in specific organized religious traditions) will be the topic of Chapter XII. But the task of this and the following section will be simply to describe and interpret the systematic elements of pure religion (along with the parerga to which they give rise), as set forth in Kt8. For the sake of simplicity, this system of religious perspectives will be referred to as 'systemₚ'. Just as in systemₚ and systemₕ, each of the four stages in systemₚ will be analysed in terms of a three-step, synthetic argument.

Although Kant does not refer to it as such, the first stage in systemₚ (i.e. Book One of Kt8) establishes a material starting point for religion which can be called 'transcendental'. It is transcendental in the sense that it deals primarily with the inevitable corruption of the good disposition in human nature by evil, which Kant regards as the material limiting condition for the realization of universal religion, in much the same way that sensibility provides the material limiting condition for the realization of empirical knowledge in systemₚ (and therefore assumes the transcendental perspective [see IV.3]).

The overall presupposition of systemₚ is that there is an 'original predisposition to good in human nature' [Kt8:26(21)]. As we saw in VIII.2, this disposition [Anlage or Gesinnung] is 'the ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of maxims' [25(20)]--i.e. it is the transcendent root of the rules by which an individual makes moral decisions. He finds evidence for this good disposition in the animality, humanity, and personality of man, all of which 'enjoin the observance of the [moral] law' [26-9(21-3)]. This original predisposition to good means a person's entry into systemₚ (i.e. before any actions are actually performed) is characterized by what might be called original innocence. This provides a person with the potential to do good, not only in the first
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temporal act, but in any and every moral act throughout life. As Kant
puts it in Kt8:41(36), every evil action 'must be regarded as though the
individual had fallen directly from a state of innocence'; as long as the
action is freely performed, 'it can and must always be judged as an
original use of his will.' We can therefore summarize the first step as
that in which a person's original innocence determines the good predispo-
sition to be a potential for good action.

The second step in stage one of system\textsubscript{r} introduces the formal condi-
tion of 'radical evil'. 'This evil is radical, because it corrupts the
ground of all maxims' [Kt8:37(32)]--i.e. the disposition--and because 'we
must...hold man himself responsible for it' [32(28)]. As a formal condi-
tion of system\textsubscript{r}, it is, like space and time in system\textsubscript{s}, both synthetic
and a priori: even though evil cannot 'be inferred from the concept of
his species', it 'can be predicated of man as a species' (i.e. universal-
ly) [32(37)]. In Kt64:256-7(193-4) Kant distinguishes between three types
of evil, or 'contrary-to-end' (Zweckwidrige): (1) 'The absolute contrary-
to-end' (i.e. moral evil); (2) 'The conditional contrary-to-end' (i.e.
natural evil); and (3) 'the disproportion of crimes and punishments'
(i.e. injustice). His doctrine of radical evil in Kt8 has to do with the
first of these, though the others are indirectly related.

Unlike original moral goodness, moral evil should not be regarded
'as a natural predisposition but rather as something that can be imputed
to man, and consequently it must consist in maxims of the will which are
contrary to the [moral] law' [Kt8:32(27)]. Radical evil corrupts man's
potential for good, therefore, by offering the control of one's (potenti-
ally good) disposition over to particular evil maxims. It 'is original,
or prior to all the good a man may do' [72(66)]. Man's character is evil
not merely because radical evil dwells in him, but because he inevitably
succumbs to its tempting influence, 'for otherwise the beginning of evil
would not have its source in freedom' [41(37)]. Kant's presentation in
Kt8:32-9(27-34) of numerous examples of evil in man is intended as an
empirical 'confirmation' of man's inevitable weakness [39n(34n)]. He is here rejecting the traditional notion that evil is 'a mere absence...of goodness'; it is this to be sure, but it is also a 'positive' force in its own right, capable of taking over and corrupting man's good predisposition [22-3n(18n); s.a. W12:94].

The third step is the synthesis of the first two. But because the good predisposition in step one is merely potential, whereas the evil maxim in step two has actually been adopted, the synthesis gives rise to a 'propensity [Harge] to evil', which belongs 'universally to mankind' [Kt8:29(24); s.a. W12:103]. This propensity, as 'the subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law', arises because of man's free choice to do evil: it is 'brought by man upon himself' [Kt8:29(24)]. Nevertheless, because of its inscrutable origin in radical evil, Kant would assert that, as Webb puts it, 'the propensity to evil is no less deeply rooted in our nature than if we had inherited it' [W12:113]. It can manifest itself as 'frailty' (inability to do good), 'impurity' (doing good for the wrong reasons), or 'wickedness' (wilfully doing evil) by corrupting, respectively, the animal, human, or personal aspects of the good predisposition [see Kt8:29-30(24-5)]. Kant's favourite expression for the evil disposition which results from the propensity to evil is to call it 'an evil heart' [29(24); s.a. 37(32)].

In the final step of the first stage, therefore, the propensity to evil is applied to an evil maxim in such a way as to produce an evil heart.

The transcendental character of the evil heart is emphasized when Kant reminds us that the choice which gives rise to this evil within us can be regarded as an 'intelligible act, [which] precedes all experience' [39n(34n)]: 'The propensity to evil...is intelligible action, cognizable by means of pure reason alone, apart from every temporal condition' [31(26-7)]. (Occasional comments such as this should not be taken, however, as evidence for some literal noumenal action [see VIII.1]; for 'as sensuous beings we can work against the law, or for its behoof, only in
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the appearance of the intellectual principle' [170n(158n)].

This first stage, which adopts the transcendental perspective in system, is quite clearly Kant's explanation of the 'pure' meaning of the biblical story of the Creation of man in the image of God (good predisposition), his original habitation in the Garden of Eden (original innocence), his Fall into sin (evil maxims) through the tempting influence of Satan (radical evil), and his consequent expulsion from Eden (evil heart) [see Kt8:39-44(34-9)]. It is important to understand, however, that he is not attempting to explain away the biblical story, nor even to pass judgment on its historical status. On the contrary, he stresses that here, as throughout system, his account 'agrees well with...the Scriptures' [41(36)]. Kant himself points out many correlations between system and the biblical narrative, as when he defines 'sin' as 'the transgressing of the moral law as a divine command' [42(37)]. Indeed, as we saw in XI.1, the explication of such correlations is one of his main purposes in Kt8.

What Kant is guarding against is the belief that a merely historical account can provide a sufficient explanation of any stage in the development of pure religion. He argues that 'it is...a contradiction to seek the temporal origin of man's character' [Kt8:40(35)], because that character has its 'origin in reason' [39(34)]. The transcendental perspective must be adopted in order properly to discern the origin of good and evil in men's disposition; no account of actual events in time will suffice, though such empirical accounts may well point directly to their transcendental basis. Thus, for example, the claim 'Man is created good' (cf. Genesis 1:31) means 'the original [pre]disposition in man is good', not that 'he is already actually good' [44(40)]. Likewise, by regarding the doctrine of original sin 'not as a revealed dogma, but as an implication of our own experience', i.e. as radical evil, it can serve as 'the foundation of [Kant's] whole theory of the nature and function of religion in human life' [W12:92-3]. Goldmann makes a similar point in G9a:145:
'The doctrine of radical evil is not a foreign body in Kant's philosophy. It is not only justified but even necessary for the coherence of the system. It is certainly not a concession to the Christian religion.' If any concession is involved, Kant's argument would be that the Christian doctrine is a concession to the requirements of pure rational religion. That is, the only way to verify its validity without presupposing its validity as divine revelation (i.e. without adopting the Perspective of the theologian) is to demonstrate the role it plays in pure religion. Kant readily allows that the theologian, as such, can legitimately formulate his doctrines on the empirical basis of the Scriptures, so long as he recognizes that when he begins to discuss the pure meaning which resides in such biblical accounts, he is adopting the Perspective of the philosopher [40n(35-6n)]. Once this is recognized, it becomes quite evident that in this first stage of system, biblical revelation is established by Kant as being a perfectly adequate vehicle for universal religion.

Throughout Book One of Kant frequently emphasizes that the only way to release oneself from the blame imputed because of one's evil heart is to overcome this evil by living a moral life. The possibility of divine assistance is alluded to, but is consistently presented as something which must not be counted on as an excuse for not changing one's heart [see e.g. Kt8:44(40),45(40-1); s.a. 76(71),83(78)]. For the 'indwelling' of evil in the (originally good) heart of man is what first gives rise to duty; yet 'grace stands in direct contradiction' to the 'absolute necessity' required by 'the idea of duty' [23n(19n)]. Even an outwardly good life, without a change of heart, is not sufficient to meet the demands of the moral law (as given in system P): 'The empirical character is then good, but the intelligible character [i.e. the disposition] is still evil' [37(32)]. What is required is a radical conversion of one's disposition. Such a conversion must be possible, since 'the moral law commands that we ought now to be better men' (and 'ought' implies 'can' [see VIII.3]); yet Kant admits that the requirement to adopt such an unchange-
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able 'new ground (the new heart)' contradicts 'the postulate of the innate corruption of man', at least as far as 'our insight into [its] possibility...is concerned' [50-1(46); s.a. 66-7(60)]. To establish how conversion nevertheless comes about is the purpose of the second stage in system_2. The only hope provided here in stage one is to recall that the innocence of the first step is contained in this synthesis, just as much as is radical evil, so that even in a person with an evil heart, 'a seed of goodness still remains' [45(41)]. 'For man, therefore, who despite a corrupted heart yet possesses a good will, there remains hope of a return to the good from which he has strayed' [44(39)].

Kant's caution on this point is closely connected with his intent to avoid the morally-transcendent idea which arises as a by-product of the first stage. The dependence of religious fanatics on 'works of grace'--i.e. on 'imagined experience' of 'supernatural moral influences in relation to which we are merely passive' [Kt8:194(182)]--is seen by Kant as a misguided attempt to avoid the seriousness of the implications of radical evil in human nature. Dependence on a redeemer in the material stage of one's religious development (i.e. in stage one of system_2) would give rise to a moral laziness which pridefully assumes from the outset that God's grace will certainly erase any evil that we do. Against this parerga he argues not that works of grace are impossible, but that 'it is impossible to define these things theoretically...because our use of the concept of cause and effect cannot be extended beyond matters of experience' [53(48)]. This must not be taken as a denial of supernatural intervention. Kant is very careful to leave a space open for God's grace, but believes the philosopher (who as such has no access to divine revelation) must not presume to understand how it works: 'we can admit a work of grace as something incomprehensible', but we cannot adopt it into our maxims either for theoretical or for practical use' [53(49)].

Unfortunately, Kant's emphasis on the necessity of viewing one's salvation as primarily practical (i.e. in terms of our own works, rather
than works of grace) is often taken by interpreters out of its proper context—namely, his simultaneous recognition of the insufficiency of works as viewed theoretically (i.e. his recognition of the need for faith in God's inscrutable grace). When this happens, the interpreter naturally rejects Kant's programme. But such a rejection is premature: it merely reflects the interpreter's failure to think in terms of the principle of perspective. Otto makes this typical blunder when he says in O3:186 that Kant 'will have no gospel, and no scheme of morals ever stood in more need of one. His yoke is not easy and his burden is not light.' As we saw in XI.1, Kant is careful to distinguish between pure religion, which is religion viewed from the practical standpoint, and ecclesiastical religion, which is religion viewed from the theoretical standpoint. Accordingly, he does indeed refuse to take refuge in a gospel in system, itself; yet, what is almost always ignored is that he readily admits that a doctrine of redemption does have its proper place in system, provided we recognize that this system assumes the empirical standpoint [see XI.4].

The change in perspective between the first and second books of Kt8 is, in fact, most evident in Kant's attitude towards redemption. In Book One, as we have seen, the role of any supernatural influence in conversion is played down. Its purpose, as the material stage in system, is to establish the limitations which evil imposes on any human attempt to realize the good predisposition. This transcendental perspective gives way in Book Two to something along the lines of a logical perspective—that is, to the formal conditions (steps three to six) which, when applied to the limitations of the first stage, can produce the desired result (a good heart), and thus lead to salvation.

The cornerstone of the new perspective in stage two is the 'ideal of moral perfection' which exists in every man as an 'archetype' and which 'can give us power' [Kt8:61(54); s.a. Kt35:(98)]. Because we are unworthy even to possess such an 'ideal of a humanity pleasing to God', it is 'ap-
propriate to say that this archetype came down to us from heaven and has
assumed our humanity' [Kt8:61(54-5)]. For the purposes of pure religion,
no empirical instantiation of this archetype is technically necessary:

From the practical standpoint this idea is completely real in its
own right, for it resides in our morally-legislative reason.... We
need...no empirical example to make the idea of a person morally
well-pleasing to God our archetype; this idea as an archetype is
already present in our reason. [62(55-6)]

Given the evil heart which arises out of stage one, there is no explana-
tion for the presence of this archetype of perfect humanity within us,
other than to assume it is an inscrutable gift of God's grace. For
although the archetype, as 'a perfectly valid ideal for all men, at all
times and in all worlds', is universal, our attainment of it 'will ever
remain a righteousness not our own' [66(59)]. Without this gift as a
starting point, conversion would be impossible. Hence this fourth step
requires that the inscrutable grace of God be applied to an evil heart in
order to place within it the archetype of perfect humanity. As the very
word 'archetype' implies, this 'divine man within us' serves as the ideal
model 'for the complete determination of the copy'--i.e. as the 'standard
for our actions'--once the empirical standpoint of universal religion is
adopted [Kt1:597].

On its own the positing of an archetype of perfect humanity does not
overcome an evil heart. 'For only a faith in the practical validity of
that idea which lies in our reason [i.e. in the archetype] has moral
worth' [Kt8:63(56)]. Borrowing a biblical phrase for the description of
this archetype, Kant goes so far as to say 'Man may...hope to become
acceptable to God (and so be saved) through a practical faith in this Son
of God' [62(55)]. This practical faith enables a person actively to turn
away from the evil heart within and obey the moral law. It is, in fact,
for this reason that an empirical instantiation of the archetype is not
necessary:

each man ought really to furnish an example of this idea in his own
person; to this end does the archetype reside always in the reason:
and this, just because no example in outer experience is adequate to
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Practical faith, then, is more than just a declaration of repentance [see e.g. W10:148]; it gives rise to moral maxims as a sign of one's repentance. Kant says 'the first really good act that a man can perform is to forsake the evil...in his peverted maxim' [Kt8:58n(51n)]. This positive rejection of evil in the fifth step of system, therefore entails adopting a practical faith in the archetype of perfect humanity in such a way as to give rise to a good maxim.

Once we have glimpsed the archetype of perfection and incorporated it into a maxim, a 'conversion', or change of heart, is all that is necessary before we enter 'upon the road of endless progress towards holiness' [Kt8:46-7(42)]. For we have now recognized the corrupting influence of radical evil within us. Thus Kant says: 'Every man must guard against moral self-conceit, against believing himself morally good and having a favourable opinion of himself. This feeling of moral self-sufficiency is self-deception; it is an incurable hallucination' [Kt35: (246); s.a. Kt8:68(62)]. It is 'incurable', that is, if one believes that the appearance of virtue in one's empirical character, which can be 'won little by little', is sufficient, without 'a change of heart' [Kt8: 47(42)]. For 'the moral outcome of the combat' between good and evil which leads to conversion 'is really not the conquering of the evil principle...but merely the breaking of its power to hold, against their will, those who have so long been its subjects' [82-3(77); s.a. 93(85)]. The latter requires 'virtue in its intelligible character', which cannot be brought about through gradual reformation so long as the basis of the maxims remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the man's disposition... He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation..., and a change of heart.

.... That is, if a man reverses, by a single unchangeable decision, that highest ground of his maxims whereby he was an evil man..., he is, so far as his principle and cast of mind are concerned, a subject susceptible of goodness... For Him who penetrates to the intelligible ground of the heart..., i.e., for God, this amounts to
his being actually a good man (pleasing to Him)... [47-8(43); s.a. W10:147-8].

Like the fall which it reverses, such an immediate conversion from an evil to a good will is inexplicable from man's perspective, and as we shall see, may even require divine assistance [see W12:111,120].

This attitude of humility is to be maintained even after conversion, for this sixth step requires us to seek to make ourselves worthy of God's assistance by actively resolving to do our duty. By this Kant does not mean to suggest (a view too often imputed to him) that we are actually capable of making ourselves acceptable to God; on the contrary, he is saying that we have the responsibility of making ourselves worthy of being made by God to be acceptable to him. For our obedience to God (via the moral law) 'must be the effect of our own action and not...of a foreign influence in the presence of which we are passive' [Kt8:108].

'Granted that some supernatural cooperation may be necessary to his becoming good..., man must first make himself worthy to receive it, and must lay hold of this aid' [44(40); s.a. 45(40-1)]. Yet in this context, 'worthiness always has a merely negative meaning..., that is, the moral receptivity for such goodness' [146n(137n)]. So our active attempt to obey God is our way of demonstrating our passive acceptance of God's acceptance. And without such a demonstration, our acceptance of God's acceptance would mean nothing at all. (It would be 'empty', like a concept without an intuition in system; likewise, moral activity without an awareness of its religious implications would be 'blind', like an intuition without a concept [see Kt1:75 and VII.2].) 'We have been converted', Kant declares in Kt35:(245), 'if, no matter how long we may live, we firmly determine to live in virtue.' This change of heart, which restores in us a good disposition, or a 'good heart', should not be viewed as a recovery of what was lost—'respect for the moral law we have never been able to lose'—but as 'the establishment of the purity of this law as the supreme ground of all our maxims' [Kt8:46(42)]. This syn-
thetic condition of the second stage, therefore, requires that the person
who adopts a good maxim must be converted in order to have a good heart.

Since 'conforming our course of life to the holiness of the law, is
impossible of execution in any given time', Kant suggests that God will
judge a 'man's moral constitution' not by his actions but by his disposi-
tion [Kt8:66(60)]. That is, the 'endless progress of our goodness towards
conformity to the law...[will be] judged by Him who knows the heart,
through a purely intellectual intuition [cf. X.1], as a completed whole,
because of the disposition, supersensible in its nature, from which this
progress itself is derived' [67(60-1)]. This divine perspective, however,
cannot be adopted by man, so no amount of introspection can provide man
with 'assurance concerning such a revolution...; for the deeps of the
heart are inscrutable to him' [51(46); s.a. 67-8(61),190-1(179)]. We must
always 'guard against a relapse' [77(71); s.a. 97(88)]. This is because
our 'empirical self-knowledge...yields no immediate insight into the
disposition but merely permits of an estimate based upon our actions'
[75-6(70); s.a. W10:148]. On this basis alone are we justified in hoping
for supernatural assistance (in the form of looking to our disposition
rather than to our actual deeds). Kant hastens to add, therefore, that,
although theoretical certainty concerning the nature of our disposition
'is neither possible to man, nor...morally beneficial', the presence of a
good disposition 'creates in us, though only indirectly, a confidence in
its own permanence and stability, and is our Comforter (Paraclete)'
[Kt8:71(65)].

Kant claims that the 'greatest difficulty' which arises out of this
view of the role of conversion in pure religion is that it is unreason-
able for a person to 'regard the fact that he incurs no new debts subse-
cquent to his change of heart as equivalent to having discharged his old
ones' [Kt8:72(66)]. No matter how good a person becomes, 'he nevertheless
started from evil, and this debt he can by no possibility wipe out'; nor
can it even 'be discharged by another person, so far as we can judge ac-
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cording to the justice of our human reason', for it is 'the most personal
of all debts, namely a debt of sins' [72(66)]. The only way, according to
Kant, 'whereby satisfaction is rendered to divine justice' is to think of
'the infliction of punishment..., consistently with divine wisdom' as
taking place 'neither before nor after the change of heart', but 'during
the change of heart itself' [73-4(67)]. Elaborating on the two sides of
this 'single act' Kant says:

The coming forth from the corrupted into the good disposition is, in
itself (as "the death of the old man," "the crucifying of the flesh"
[cf. Romans 6:2,6; Galatians 5:24]), a sacrifice and an entrance
upon a long train of life's ills. These the new man undertakes in
the disposition of the Son of God [i.e. of the divine archetype of
perfect humanity dwelling in him]..., though really they are due as
punishments to another, namely to the old man (for the old man is
indeed morally another). [74(68)]

From man's empirical standpoint 'the man...is physically the self-same
guilty person...; yet, because of his disposition, he is...morally anoth­
er in the eyes of a divine judge' (i.e. from God's perspective) [74(68)].
Forgiveness is possible because

this moral disposition...--or, (if we personify this idea) this Son
of God, Himself--bears as vicarious substitute the guilt of sin for
him...; as savior He renders satisfaction to supreme justice by His
suffering and death; and as advocate He makes it possible for man to
hope to appear before their judge as justified. [74(69)]

This 'surplus...over the profit from good works', to which 'we really
have no legal claim', is therefore 'itself a profit which is reckoned to
us by grace' [75(70)]. Kant is careful to point out, however, that since
his defence of the idea of justification presupposes that 'the individual
in question is already in actual possession of the required good disposi­
tion', it has no 'positive use', though its 'negative benefit to religion
and morality...is very far-reaching' [76(70-1)].

As in stage one of system^, the theories Kant develops here in stage
two have an obvious affinity to certain Christian teachings. Whereas the
first stage developed the pure meaning of the Old Testament Creation
story, this stage develops the pure meaning of the New Testament Gospel
story. Just as the categories 'save' the possibility of empirical knowl-
ledge from the limiting conditions of sensibility in system, so also in
system, the Gospel of faith in the archetype of perfect humanity 'saves'
the possibility of salvation from the limiting conditions of radical
evil. It will be helpful to examine in greater detail two examples of
the affinity of Kant's pure religion with Christianity: the status of
Jesus, and the method of conversion.

The archetype of perfect humanity obviously corresponds to the
Christian doctrine of Jesus as the Redeemer—a comparison which is likely
to cause the Christian some concern, especially since Kant so resolutely
denies the need for an actual empirical archetype, such as Jesus. Kant's
position here, however, is easily misunderstood. When he says, for
instance, that 'if it were indeed a fact that such a truly godly-minded
man at some particular time had descended, as it were, from heaven to
earth...we should have no cause for supposing him other than a man natu­
rally begotten' [Kt8:63(57)], he is not denying either the divinity or
the virgin birth of Christ. On the contrary, he admits 'that he might be
a man supernaturally begotten', but argues that this supposition 'can in
no way benefit us practically', since the archetype which is within us is
already of 'supernatural origin' [K6:488; s.a. Kt8:161-2(149-50)]. More­
over, it can 'hinder the adoption of the idea of such a person for our
imitation' if we elevate this 'holy person above all the frailties of
human nature', so that 'all transgression on his part [is] utterly impos­
sible: ...such a divine person could no longer be held up as an example'
[64(57)]. So in Kt8:63-4(57-8) Kant is not contradicting the doctrine
that Jesus was God incarnate; rather he is defending the pure meaning of
the doctrine that Jesus was a real man. In Kt8:65(59) he then suggests a
sense in which a claim to divinity has a practical meaning after all:

Now such a godly-minded teacher, even though he was completely
human, might nevertheless truthfully speak of himself as though the
ideal of goodness were displayed incarnate in him... In speaking
thus he would be alluding only to the disposition which he makes the
rule of his actions...

Elsewhere he adds that 'in the appearance of the God-Man [on earth], it
is not that in him which strikes the senses and can be known through experience, but rather the archetype, lying in our reason, that we attribute to him...which is really the object of saving faith' [119(110)]. By working through this archetype, 'God is the pattern of moral perfection' [Kt35:(85)].

These explanations of what divinity might mean from a practical standpoint are, of course, not sufficient to establish the actual divinity of Jesus--only faith in a divine revelation could do that. But they are misinterpreted when they are taken as discounting the significance of Jesus' historical character altogether, as when Ward interprets Kant in W10:151 as maintaining: 'Whether Jesus ever existed or not is beside the point; he is the "archetype of the pure moral disposition", which all men must imitate in themselves.' This represents a typical misreading of the text, which results from lack of attention to the principle of perspective: 'The archetype lies in the understanding' [Kt35:(109-10)], and must therefore be viewed from the logical perspective of system; but 'the Example set before us in the Gospels' is presented from the empirical perspective. Thus Kant can say that 'experience provides not a single example of honesty, of righteousness, or of virtue' [(109)], because these are 'universal principles' (archetypes) when regarded from the logical perspective here in stage two; yet in the next breath he can affirm: 'There are, indeed, examples of righteousness, of virtue, and even of holiness' [(110)], insofar as these are viewed from the empirical perspective. 'Our archetype is not a pattern [i.e. an empirical example] which we must reproduce, but a [logical] rule to which we should conform' [(98)]. Empirical individuals 'can only be judged good or bad by reference to universal principles' [(109)], so the fact that Kant explains the adequacy of Jesus' example in terms of his realization of the archetype does not deny the importance of his life, but authenticates it as worthy of imitation, to the extent that it can be regarded as divine.

All Kant is aiming to do here is to show that from the Critical Per-
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spective, our knowledge of Jesus' humanity leaves open a space for faith in his divinity. In Kt8:119(109-10) he explicitly states that rational faith 'in the Son of God' within us (i.e. the archetype) and empirical 'faith in the God-Man' as an historical person '[do] not...so differ that to begin with one, or the other, would be to enter upon opposing paths': they both represent 'the archetype now as found in God and proceeding from Him, and now, as found in us, but in both instances as the gauge for our course of life.' This confirms Norburn's conjecture in N6:431 that Kant's philosophy of religion 'may serve even today as a vindication of Belief and as a necessary preface to Christology.'

Kant treats the miracle of Jesus' resurrection as a part of his private ministry, occurring after his public ministry had been completed [Kt8:128-9n(119n)]. In so doing he is not, however, discounting the resurrection as a figment of the disciples' imagination. His purpose is rather to emphasize that an understanding of the pure meaning of the event is more important than an understanding of how it actually happened. Thus, he discounts the importance of a literal, materialistic resurrection, an overemphasis on which can actually obscure the fact that 'he (the ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God) would still be with his disciples, even to the end of the world' [129(120); cf. Matthew 28:20]. But he readily admits that 'historical belief' (which is an important part of the ecclesiastical faith which serves as the vehicle for pure religion) in Jesus as the God-Man does 'stand in need of verification through miracles', which in the end 'can be authenticated...only through scholarship' [129(120)]. Nevertheless, he would maintain that, whatever happened to Jesus' bones, he arose in a form which gave (and gives) new life to his followers--and the resurrection faith which results matters more than a theoretical understanding of its precise nature. To put the latter above the former is to succumb to a mistaken belief in the primacy of theoretical reason.

One of the most common criticisms of Kant's philosophy of religion
is that he presents a religion of good works in which he refuses "to regard grace as entering constitutively into the moral life" [W10:149]. His God becomes a cosmic magistrate and policeman who sees to it that the good are given their deserts—an anthropomorphic conception, indeed, of the ultimate end of existence!' [H8:150]. Silber assumes this interpretation when he points out 'a genuine antimony' [S16:cxviii] which supposedly arises out of Kant's position: 'In order to make sense of the idea of personal responsibility, Kant argued [in systemp] that freedom is absolute. Yet by holding that man's responsibility is absolute, he condemned man to an insufferable burden of guilt.' The problem, according to Silber, is that divine forgiveness 'is itself a violation of the moral law.' He therefore concludes: 'We cannot ignore the problem of forgiveness nor can we accept Kant's futile resolution of it' [cxvi].

This conception of God, and the antimony of forgiveness which arises out of it, are read into the text of Kt8 by those who fail to see any perspectival difference between systemp and systemr. In the former, as we saw in VIII.3, Kant uses a 'moral argument' for God's existence, according to which we must assume the existence of a loving (and forgiving) God in order to account for the rationality of moral activity. Despite Kant's repeated warning that 'reward...has no place in God's justice..., but only in His love and beneficence' [Kt5:488]—a conception which is self-consistent only if understood in terms of the principle of perspective—interpreters such as Greene interpret Kant's moral argument as implying the conception of 'God as a "great Paymaster"' [W19:167], and assume this applies equally to systemr. Wood argues against this misinterpretation in W19:169-70:

Kant does not look upon moral faith as an outlook in which man is to anticipate a great "future reward". Rather, trust in God's goodness is described as a reverent submission to God's will.

Moral faith does not consist so much of our expectation of future happiness as an acceptance of present sufferings.... [It] does not 'explain away' or erase our sufferings, but gives us the hope and courage to be content and rationally to pursue a good world in spite of them.
As such, moral faith in divine forgiveness is the rational man's alternative to existential despair [Kt35:117(94)]. It does not violate the moral law because it is not used in system$p$ as a motive for moral action, and because it is not used in system$r$ as a way of avoiding a change of heart. Thus Kant says in an unpublished 'reflection' [q.i. B15:233] that man needs religion for encouragement (i.e. system$p$ needs system$r$) because 'Human nature is incapable of an immediate moral purity; but when its purity is worked upon in a supernatural manner, future rewards have no longer the character of motives.' In its proper sense, then, divine forgiveness, as Webb explains in W12:114-5, is for Kant 'not a work of grace, for which we have to wait...: it precedes conversion... So far as the change is, even to the converted man himself, inscrutable, it can be represented, without detriment to morality, as due to the pardoning act of God.' This view of forgiveness certainly does not condemn us to wallow in guilt, as Silber supposes, but frees us to believe, what would otherwise be irrational, that our change of heart is empirical evidence of a divine gift, so that, even though we cannot achieve theoretical certainty or practical immunity, our burden of guilt is relieved.

In spite of the bad press Kant’s doctrine of conversion has traditionally been given, I believe it provides a plausible model for a Christian understanding of the relationship between faith and works. Conversion does, admittedly, sometimes seem to be presented in the New Testament as a 'declaration of repentance', as when John the Baptist calls the people to 'repent and believe in the gospel' (Mark 1:15) [see Kt65:42]. Almost all Christians would agree, however, that such a declaration is only a genuine conversion when it comes from the heart; and if it comes from the heart it will result in a change of life. Duties which were put to one side in favour of inclinations will now become far more important because they will be viewed as divine commands (cf. the revealed version of the definition of natural religion cited in XI.1). The view that grace is imputed only to those who give a merely theoretical assent
to a given proposition, so that a change in lifestyle becomes an optional extra, is clearly a perversion of biblical teaching. 'No thoughtful person can bring himself to believe this' [Kt8:117(107)]. It is against such erroneous approaches to Christianity that Kant is arguing [see e.g. Kt65:42]. For, as we shall see in XI.3, he is careful to distinguish between moral works and works by means of which some 'religious' people believe they can avoid living morally.

Kant's clearest account of redemption and atonement comes in Kt8: 116-9(106-10), where he reveals 'a remarkable antinomy of human reason' [116(107)]. 'Saving faith involves two elements... The first is the faith in an atonement...; the second, the faith that we can become well-pleasing to God through a good course of life in the future' [116(106)]. But which comes first, faith in vicarious atonement, or faith in one's own works? A belief in the priority of the former ignores that, for any 'thoughtful person', such faith implies a commitment to 'improve his way of life' [117(107)]; but a belief in the priority of the latter ignores the seriousness of the threat posed by the thoroughgoing 'power of the evil principle' [117(108)]. In this form the antinomy 'cannot be resolved theoretically', but only by adopting the practical standpoint [117-8 (108)]: 'The acceptance of...faith in a vicarious atonement is...necessary only for the theoretical concept [of salvation]; in no other way can we make comprehensible to ourselves such an absolution. In contrast, the necessity for the second principle [works] is practical and, indeed, purely moral.' The primacy of practical reason requires us to regard faith in works as logically, though not necessarily chronologically, prior to faith in an atonement. (Chronologically, the two types of faith would best be depicted as occurring simultaneously in the conversion experience.) Thus it is our obedience, and not our faith in the atonement, which 'must be the effect of our own action and not...of a foreign influence in the presence of which we are passive' [118(108-9); s.a. 184-5 (172-3)]. However, this does not imply that such passive belief has no
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place; on the contrary, Kant criticizes this reductionist view as entail-
ing a 'naturalistic unbelief' which 'cut[s] the knot (by means of a prac-
tical maxim) instead of disentangling it (theoretically)' [118-9(109)].
He argues that 'the theoretical demand can be satisfied' by recognizing
the perspectival relationship between the two types of faith: 'The anti-
nomy is...only apparent, since through a misunderstanding, it regards the
self-same practical idea [viz. 'saving faith'], taken merely from differ-
ent standpoints, as two different principles' [119(110)]. The theoretical
misunderstanding caused by the tendency to view our ability to do good
works as a matter of grace and our belief in a vicarious atonement as a
matter of duty must therefore be replaced by a practical understanding of
good works as a matter of duty and vicarious atonement as a matter of
grace [118(109)].

Kant's insistence on the priority of systemₚ over systemₜ, with
his consequent refusal to accept anything but moral activity (not even
doctrinal belief) as an ameliorating substitute for immorality, is surely
an example of the consistency between his philosophy of religion and
Christianity. The purpose of grace is not to enable man to continue
living immorally (see Romans 3:8), but to make up on a supernatural scale
for the inevitable failings in a life devoted to doing God's will (i.e. a
moral life). Kant's doctrine of conversion therefore typifies his ten-
dency to adopt 'a middle ground' between two extremes (man as both good
and evil [Kt8:20(16); s.a. 39n(34n)]; salvation from both faith and works
[see 25n(20n)]), and in so doing confirms again the compatibility of the
Christian Gospel with the purest religion of reason.

The morally-transcendent idea arising out of this second stage, with
its emphasis on the need for supernatural assistance in making man pleas-
ing to God, is a theoretical dependence on miracles--i.e. on the import-
nance of 'knowing through experience something whose occurrence, as under
objective laws of experience [i.e. in systemₜ], we ourselves recognize
to be impossible' [Kt8:194(182)e.a.]. A common misconception of Kant's
Critical System is that the theoretical limitations imposed in KtI rule out the possibility of miracles at the very outset. However, there is no justification in the text for this interpretation, as long as we accept Kant's definition of a miracle as an event 'in the world the operating laws of whose causes are, and must remain, absolutely unknown to us' [86(81)]. For KtI leaves plenty of room for unknown causes of events; what it denies is the possibility of obtaining knowledge of uncaused events. (If miracles were events not caused by nature, then every act of free will would be a miracle for Kant.) Causes can be unknown to us because of our ignorance either of natural laws or of supernatural intervention. Thus Kant distinguishes in Kt8:88n(83n) between 'natural wonders' and 'a real miracle': 'the first opens up the prospect of a new acquisition for the nourishment of reason; that is, it awakens the hope of discovering new laws of nature: the second...arouses the fear that confidence shall be lost in what has been hitherto accepted as known.' This fear led Kant even in his pre-Critical days to believe that miracles in the natural order 'are either not at all or but seldom necessary' [Kt15:112(289)]. After adopting the Critical Perspective, however, he recognizes two possibilities: 'miracles must be admitted as [occurring] daily...or else never' [Kt8:89n(84n)]. From the theoretical standpoint miracles must remain unknown, so 'the modesty of reason demands' that they be regarded as useless for science [89n(84n)]; from the empirical standpoint, however, we can see miracles everywhere in nature. Thus Kant calls our attention to the beauty of the rebirth of a plant from a mere 'seed' each spring, and exclaims that 'no one...will assert that this is a mere result of natural laws; no one, indeed, can claim to comprehend whether or not the direct influence of the Creator is required on each occasion.'

The criticism Kant makes of miracles in Kt8 is not that they cannot happen, but that a superstitious trust in their theoretical reality can do more harm than good to the furtherance of universal religion. The
danger is that a person may 'count on miracles' as an excuse for avoiding a change of heart 'in the affairs of life' [Kt8:87(82)], or may believe that professing belief in certain historical miracles is a 'means whereby we can render ourselves well-pleasing to God' [85(80)]. Such demands indicate a person's 'moral unbelief, that is, ...his lack of faith in virtue' [63(56)]. 'However pious and humble such talk may be, it is full of self-conceit' [Kt32:361n]. Indeed, 'a really firm theoretical faith in miracles' can even lead to 'a senseless conceit' according to which a person believes that 'man could himself perform them and so storm heaven' [Kt6:88(83)]. Against this perversion of religion Kant argues in Kt8: 84(79), when he says 'the true religion' (by which he means Christianity) 'is now here, and from now on is able to maintain itself on rational grounds', even though miracles may well have played an important part in its foundation. Christianity is based on 'the moral disposition'; nevertheless, 'it is wholly conformable to man's ordinary ways of thought... for [its] historical introduction...to be accompanied...by miracles, in order to announce the termination of the earlier religion, which without miracles would never have had any authority' [84(79)]. Far from recommending doubt in the miracles recounted in the Bible, Kant suggests that we 'honor the trappings which have served to bring into public currency a doctrine whose authenticity rests upon a record indelibly registered in every soul and which stands in need of no miracle.'

In addition to Kant's official theoretical meaning of 'miracle', and his occasional allusion to a secondary, empirical meaning [see e.g. Kt8: 89n(84n), q.a.], this word can be (and often is) used from a practical standpoint to refer to the otherwise inexplicable change in a person's disposition. The miracles Kant says we should honour but ignore from the theoretical and practical standpoints are exclusively natural miracles; his own description of a conversion would easily qualify as the prime example of a personal miracle. This is implied, for instance, when he asserts that the realm in which good and evil principles 'have might is a
realm not of nature but of freedom, i.e., a realm in which one can control events only so far as one can rule hearts and minds [or 'spiritual natures' (Gemüther)] [82(76)]. Kant suggests this view of miracles explicitly in Kt32:362n: 'From a morally practical standpoint...the concept of the divine concursus [i.e. of personal miracles] is quite suitable and even necessary. We find this, for instance, in the belief that God will compensate for our lack of justice, provided our intention was genuine...'. But he is careful to warn, as usual, 'that no one should try to explain a good action (an event in the world) as a result of this concursus, for this would be a vain theoretical knowledge of the supersensuous and therefore absurd.' 'Even the Bible', in its treatment of conversion, 'seems to refer, not to supernatural experiences and fantastic feelings which should take reason's place in bringing about this revolution, but to the spirit of Christ, which he manifested in teachings and examples so that we might make it our own' [Kt65:59]. He summarizes both the personal validity of miracles and the danger in an overemphasis on them in Kt8:63(56): 'Only this idea [of perfect humanity]...can establish the truth of miracles as possible effects of the good principle; but it can never itself derive from them its own verification.'

3. The Church and the Religious Service of God

Because evil continues to influence a person with a good heart, and because this evil influence comes primarily through human relationships [Kt8:93(85)], Kant argues that the only way to attain virtue (the very notion of which 'presupposes the presence of an enemy' [57(50)]) is to form 'a union of men under moral laws', i.e. 'an ethical commonwealth' [94(86)]. Without uniting in this way, man (whether his heart is good or evil) remains in 'the ethical state of nature...in which the good principle...is continually attacked by the evil which is found in him and also in everyone else' [96-7(88)]. This concern for establishing a context for the expression of the good heart in the real world of experience
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indicates that Kant is adopting an empirical religious perspective in stage three of system_\textalpha{} [see e.g. 110(100), 115(105)].

Just as the seventh step in system_\textalpha{} provides a schema, or sensible concept, in the context of which empirical knowledge can be realized, so also the seventh step here in system_\textbeta{} provides a kind of 'schema...of an invisible kingdom of God on earth' [Kt8:131(122)] in the form of a visible, ethical commonwealth, through which 'the victory of the good over the evil principle' can be realized [93(85)]. As Kant says in Kt8:94(86),

the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable...only through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race.

He is careful to add that, although the idea of such a commonwealth 'possesses a thoroughly well-grounded objective reality in human reason...subjectively, we can never hope that man's good will will lead mankind to decide to work with unanimity towards this goal' [95(86); s.a. 100(91)]. Elsewhere he tends to be more optimistic, as when he says 'we do not know whether, as such, it lies in our power or not' [98(89)]. But in either case this first step in the empirical stage of system_\textbeta{} establishes the material goal after which all men with a good heart have a duty to strive --viz. an ethical commonwealth.

The next step could be called Kant's religious proof for the existence of God (though, of course, such a 'proof' is not valid from the theoretical standpoint). Because the formation of an ethical commonwealth is a duty, because man cannot trust in his own ability to bring it about unaided, and because 'ought' implies 'can', we must presuppose 'a higher moral Being through whose universal dispensation the forces of separate individuals, insufficient in themselves, are united for a common end' [Kt8:98(89)]. Moreover, if the people themselves are regarded as the source of the ethical laws, the commonwealth would be essentially political, not ethical [98(90)]. Kant therefore argues in Kt8:99(90-1) that the 'highest lawgiver of an ethical commonwealth' must be a being
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with respect to whom all true duties...must be represented as at the same time his commands; he must therefore also be 'one who knows the heart' [see Luke 16:15; Acts 1:24; 15:8]... Hence an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only as a people under divine commands, i.e., as a people of God [see I Peter 2:10], and indeed under laws of virtue.

This eighth step provides the form according to which an ethical commonwealth must be conceived in order to conceive of it as a real possibility: it must be conditioned according to laws of virtue, regarded as divine commands, in such a way as to give rise to a people of God. 'To found a moral people of God is therefore a task whose consummation can be looked for not from men but only from God Himself' [100(92)].

Step nine synthesizes, or realizes, the preceding two steps. The material of an ethical commonwealth in the form of a people of God 'can be realized (through human organization) only in the form of a church' [Kt8:100(91)]. Thus, even though God's help will inevitably be needed, man must 'proceed as though everything depended on him [i.e. on man]' [101(92)]. The difference between the synthetic function in this step and the element to which it gives rise is explained in Kt8:101(92):

An ethical commonwealth under divine moral legislation is a church which, so far as it is not an object of possible experience [cf. the 'negative noumenon' in step nine of system], is called the church invisible (...the archetype of what is to be established by men). The visible church is the actual union of men into a whole which... exhibits the (moral) kingdom of God on earth so far as it can be brought to pass by men.

The ninth step, then, requires men to use the archetype of an invisible church as the pattern for organizing a visible church.

This contrast between the visible and invisible church is parallel to the contrast discussed in XI.1 between ecclesiastical and religious faith. Thus Kant says in Kt8:102-3(94): 'Pure religious faith alone can found a universal church... Yet, by reason of a peculiar weakness of human nature, pure faith can never be relied on as much as it deserves, that is, a church cannot be established on it alone.' The 'weakness' he is here alluding to is one which he himself experienced. For he points out that 'a community of the faithful' will 'not automatically arise'
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merely on the basis of the agreement between the 'free adherents' of pure religion, 'because in such a religion none of those who has seen the light believes himself to require, for his religious sentiments, fellowship with others' [158(146)]. The weakness of pure religion is that an overemphasis on it, to the exclusion of 'statutory ordinances', will actually hinder the continued growth of universal religion. The purpose of the visible church, as an ecclesiastical faith designed primarily to promote pure religion, is to guard against such a tendency. (At this point, incidentally, Kant is apparently criticizing, or at least pointing out the dangers of, his personal tendency to avoid an outward expression of his own pure religious faith.) The visible church is only detrimental to pure religion when it is 'merely statutory' [158(146)e.a.] (which may perhaps explain his dislike of his local church).

Kant describes the characteristics of the invisible church, which the visible church must adopt in order to be 'true', according to the fourfold pattern established by the categories in system. They are: (1) its quantity is 'Universality, and hence its numerical oneness...with respect to its fundamental intention'; (2) its 'quality' is 'purity, union under no motivating forces other than moral ones'; (3) its 'relation', both 'of its members to one another, and...of the church to political power', is determined by 'the principle of freedom'; and (4) its 'modality' is 'the unchangeableness of its constitution', i.e. of certain 'settled principles' which are 'laid down, as it were, out of a book of laws, for guidance' [Kt8:101-2(93)].

The perspectival difference between the first two stages and the third stage is brought out forcefully by Kant when he gives two distinct answers to the question 'How does God wish to be honored?' [Kt8:104-5 (95-6)]. For the first two stages, in which this question is 'answered in a way universally valid for each man, regarded merely as man [i.e. as an individual], ...the legislation of His will ought to be solely moral; for statutory legislation (which presupposes a revelation) can be regard-
ed merely as contingent...' But here in the third stage, when we regard ourselves as obliged to behave not merely as men but also as citizens in a divine state on earth...under the name of a church, then the question...appears to be unanswerable by reason alone and to require statutory legislation of which we become cognizant only through revelation, i.e., an historical faith...

It would be 'presumptuous', however, to regard our dependence on revelation as an excuse 'to take the laws constituting the basis and form of any church as divine statutory laws...in order to save ourselves the trouble of still further improving the church's form': rather, 'it is the divine will that we should ourselves carry into effect' the church's form by learning from past mistakes [105(96)]. The members of a church must humbly accept this task as 'entirely committed to them alone'. Kant is not denying that God will guide men in this task. On the contrary, he warns that 'it would be as great self-conceit to deny peremptorily that the way in which a church is organized may perhaps be a special divine arrangement, if, so far as we can see, it is completely harmonious with the moral religion' [105(96)].

As hinted in the fourth condition for the organization of a universal church (i.e. its unchangeable modality), Kant emphasizes the importance of a church regarding a scripture as 'an object of esteem', and as more important than tradition [Kt8:107(97)]. Along these lines he says in Kt8:107(98):

A holy book arouses the greatest respect even among those (indeed, most of all among those) who do not read it... [Yet] it has never been possible to destroy a faith grounded in scripture..., whereas the faith established upon tradition...has promptly met its downfall when the state was overthrown. How fortunate, when such a book, fallen into men's hands, contains, along with its statutes, or laws of faith, the purest moral doctrine of religion in its completeness... Because of the difficulty of rendering intelligible according to natural laws the origin of such enlightenment of the human race as proceeds from it, such a book can command an esteem like that accorded to revelation.

Kant's discussion of the proper method of interpreting scripture will be discussed in XI.4. Here it is sufficient to clarify the perspective from which he believed a revealed scripture must be viewed. He explains quite clearly in Kt8:109(100) that 'a church dispenses with the most important
mark of truth, namely, a rightful claim to universality, when it bases itself upon a revealed faith.... Yet because of the natural need and desire of all men for something sensibly tenable..., some historical ecclesiastical faith or other...must be utilized.' In other words, the revealed scriptures used by 'such an empirical faith' [110(100)] should never be viewed as an end in themselves, but only as a means to the end of establishing a truly religious faith, even though 'the historical record [i.e. the Bible]...may itself be a miracle (a supersensible revelation)' [85(79)]. The simultaneous need for both universality and unchangeableness is clearly expressed in Kt8:112(103):

The authority of Scripture, as the most worthy instrument, and at present the only instrument in the most enlightened portion of the world, for the union of all men into one church, constitutes the ecclesiastical faith, which, ...cannot be neglected, because no doctrine based on reason alone seems to the people qualified to serve as an unchangeable norm.

As long as 'an historical faith..., having become ecclesiastical, enhances the principle of a continual approach to pure religious faith, ...

[...it can at any time be called the true church' [Kt8:115(106); s.a. 153(140)]. Kant looks forward in Kt8:121-2(112-3) to a gradual development from an emphasis on ecclesiastical faith to a recognition of the primacy of religious faith:

...religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, 'so that God may be all in all' [I Corinthians 15:28].... All this is not to be expected from an external revolution... The basis for the transition to that new order of affairs must lie in the principle that the pure religion of reason is a continually occurring divine (though not empirical) revelation for all men.

Kant describes his eschatological hope in the eventual 'sovereignty of pure religious faith' as 'the coming of the Kingdom of God' [115(105)].

'God himself must be the founder of His kingdom. Yet...[men are] the creators of the organization' [152(140)]. Thus, the culmination of this process is 'a beautiful ideal...which we cannot conceive as a culmination
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in experience, but can merely anticipate, i.e., prepare for, in continual progress and approximation toward the highest good possible on earth' [135-6(126)]. It is this task—the proper use of revelation as an empirical tool for bringing us closer to the Kingdom of God—which Kant sets for the true (visible) church here in the third stage of system.

Kant's theory of the universal church as the People of God progressively realizing the Kingdom of God on earth is not at all intended to do away with the church, as is often supposed. For without the church pure religion would be 'bare' (i.e. 'naked' [bloss]), as the very title of Kt8 implies. (Indeed, Kant explicitly compares 'a church without a religion' to 'garments without a man in them', and 'religion without a church' to 'a man without garments', warning that the latter 'is not well protected' [Kt65:53].) Rather, Kant is offering a challenge to Christianity to develop and encourage a form of church which patterns itself more effectively than the present form on the pure kernel of religious faith which is its lifeline, and which is already available in the teachings of Jesus ('the Founder of the true church' [Kt8:179n(167n)]). All the trappings are allowed to remain, as long as they are viewed from the proper standpoint, as subordinate to pure religious faith. Kant says it is 'our duty' to subordinate historical faith to pure religious faith in this way, for 'the moral believer is ever open to historical faith so far as he finds it furthering the vitality of his pure religious disposition. Only thus does historical faith possess a pure moral worth, because here it is free and not coerced through any threat' [182(170)]. Kant's own disinterest in attending church has given rise to several oft-repeated stories which only cloud the reader's understanding of the doctrine of the church expounded in Kt8. The trappings of the Protestant Church of his day were too important to its members, and their standpoint too firmly fixed in the theoretical, for Kant to accept it as a vehicle for his own religious experience. (The vehicle he put in its place will be discussed in Chapter XII.) But the basic affinity of his 'ideal' church with the true Christ-
ian concept of a church is evident in his claim that the universal church is 'best' compared to a household (family) under a common, though invisible, moral Father, whose holy Son, knowing His will and yet standing in blood relation with all members of the household, takes His place in making His will better known to them; these accordingly honor the Father in Him and so enter with one another into a voluntary, universal, and enduring union of hearts. [102(93)]

One of the most important implications of Kant's doctrine of the church is that it encourages respect for Christianity even though the history of the Christian church is marred with all manner of evils. For, as Kant points out in Kt8:130-1(121-2), these were all the result not of Christianity as such, but of an unbalanced view of Christianity by those who regarded theoretical assent above practical assent. The lesson to be learned from the history of the Crusades, of unjust excommunication of 'heretics', of witch-burning, etc. is that the church will be a channel for covert evil as long as the theoretical standpoint is valued more highly than the practical standpoint. For the doctrinal differences which give rise to much destructive conflict 'cannot be avoided so long as we seek religion without and not within us' [167(155)]. Yet this, says Kant, is the lesson taught by Christianity itself: 'Christianity's first intention was really no other than to introduce a pure religious faith, over which no conflict of opinions can prevail' [131(122)].

Out of this third stage arises the morally-transcendent idea of a 'divinely prompted' understanding of holy mysteries [Kt8:137-8(129)]. For Kant a 'mystery' is a transcendent 'object of reason' which can be understood in terms of the practical standpoint, but cannot be comprehended in terms of the theoretical standpoint [137(129),144(134-5),194(182)]. (He does not use 'mystery' to refer to a feeling for or experience of the transcendent [see XII.1].) The only genuine holy mysteries are the ideals presented to us by practical reason (such as the good disposition in stage one, the archetype in stage two and the Kingdom of God in stage three) 'which God alone can do and the performance of which exceeds our
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capacity' [139n(130n)]; in such cases 'it may well be expedient for us merely to know and understand that there is such a mystery, not to comprehend it.' A dogmatic belief in divine revelation, however, can lead a religious person to believe that we can actually comprehend mysteries which arise out of the theoretical standpoint, through a 'merely passive' process of 'inner illumination' [83(78)]. Our conception of the transcendent is then mistakenly regarded as a knowledge of God's nature, not just as it appears to us 'as moral beings', but as it is in itself [139(130)]. This failure to distinguish between God's perspective and our own leads to speculations which tend to overshadow the possibility of seeing a moral meaning in a mystery; hence 'a bare literal faith in it hurts rather than improves the truly religious disposition' [147(138)]. For 'it is an easy thing for a man to accept these statutes..., whereas the moral improvement of his attitude of will is a long and difficult struggle' [Kt65:60n]. Kant's alternative is to 'read a moral meaning into' such theoretical mysteries, in order that they will 'no longer contain an inconsequential belief but an intelligible one that refers to our moral vocation' [39].

The example Kant gives of a holy mystery which need not be regarded as such is the doctrine of the Trinity, which was discussed briefly in X.4. If we regard this doctrine in terms of 'the requirement of practical reason' to believe in God as a 'holy Legislator', a 'benevolent Ruler', and a 'righteous Judge', then it 'really contains no mystery, because it merely expresses the moral relation of God to the human race' [Kt8:139-40(131); s.a. Kt35:(80)]. Thus Kant argues that, even though God must be regarded as 'one and the same Being' whenever we view Him 'physically' (i.e. from the theoretical standpoint), when we view Him from the practical standpoint 'God wills to be served under three specifically different moral aspects' [Kt8:141(132); s.a. 146-7(136-7)]. The Trinity is a mystery only if we regard it as merely a revealed truth, which is otherwise 'unsuited to man's comprehension' [142(133)].
By no means is Kant denying that the Trinity is a revealed truth; all he is denying is that this is the only standpoint from which it can be regarded. In fact, his intention is to show how reason can come to the aid of revelation without in any way destroying, but instead, confirming, its authority. Thus he explains (with a rather ironic, and potentially misleading, choice of words) that the doctrine of the Trinity 'is a [revealed] mystery (from one standpoint [i.e. the theoretical]) and can yet (from another [practical standpoint]) be revealed'—i.e. 'revealed to us through our [practical] reason' [142(133)]. Kant then lists, in the order of the aspects of the Trinity, three theoretical mysteries whose practical meaning reason reveals: (1) 'The mystery of the divine call... is absolutely incomprehensible' if regarded theoretically, in terms of how a created being can be free to answer such a call, yet is 'quite clear' if regarded in terms of 'a call to citizenship in a divine state'; (2) 'The mystery of atonement' is contradictory if regarded theoretically, since moral 'good cannot come from another but must arise from man himself', yet 'such vicarious atonement' can be understood as a necessary assumption of faith 'from the practical standpoint' as 'a means of supplementing' man's inevitable weakness; and (3) 'The mystery of election', if regarded theoretically as an arbitrary 'decree' of divine will, 'is for us an absolute mystery', yet it can be understood, if regarded practically, as God's response to 'a morally-believing acceptance of [vicarious atonement]' [142-3(133-4)]. If the thoroughly perspectival character of Kant's treatment of the Trinity is overlooked, this passage will almost certainly be misunderstood. Kant is not rejecting the legitimacy of these doctrines, but is authenticating them, by arguing that 'our understanding is by nature unsuited' to attain such theoretical knowledge [144n(135n)], but that the mysteries can be resolved if we view them from the practical standpoint.

This balanced interpretation of Kant's intentions renders inadequate the traditional consensus as to the supposedly destructive character of
his supposedly exclusive attitude towards moral religion. Ward, for example, claims to be expounding Kant's view when he says in W10:150-1: 'In so far as they make historical or factual assertions..., religious doctrines are either superfluous, absurd or even inimical to true morality, since they may lead men to value theoretical beliefs above moral efforts.' Similarly, Webb says 'the historic process itself' has 'no philosophical significance' for Kant [W12:149]. While Kant is indeed deeply concerned to insure that theoretical beliefs never overshadow practical ones, we have seen that he also values history and revealed doctrine as a (philosophically necessary) vehicle for pure religion: naked religion must be clothed if it is to succeed in being universal. Ward describes Kant's position much more accurately, therefore, when he makes the more general statement that for Kant 'human history is itself the Divine sacrifice, since it is the incarnation of practical reason in phenomenal nature' [W10:168]. What Ward fails to see is that this attitude is also apparent in Kant's open-mindedness towards (or at least, toleration of) ecclesiastical faith, as is clearly expressed in Kt35:(112):

...we ought not to mock at religious doctrines, which are only indirectly contrary to morality [i.e. insofar as they advocate the primacy of theoretical reason]; we ought to respect them; for let the religion [i.e. its ecclesiastical vehicle] be what it may, it is still worthy of our respect as a human discipline. Our conduct should tend not to schism but to unity in religion.

The fourth stage in system\(s_r\) establishes the formal conditions under which the church, as given in step nine, can serve God, despite the limitations of earthly existence. Here the ultimate goal of religion, viz. to render man well-pleasing to God, is realized in much the same way as rational inference realizes the ultimate goal of system\(s_t\). Accordingly, we can regard Book Four of Kt8 as developing the implications of the practical perspective of system\(s_r\). And just as Kant presents both a proper (practical) and an improper (speculative) perspective in stage four of system\(s_t\) [see IV.3], so also here in stage four of system\(s_r\) he discusses
both 'the service of God' [Kt8:153-67(142-55)] and 'the pseudo-service of God' [167-90(156-78)]. In what follows we shall therefore examine both alternatives for completing system$_r$.

Kant begins his account of the true service of God with a description of what religion essentially is. Since the definitions set out in this passage apply throughout system$_r$, and serve as the backbone of his entire approach, they were presented in XI.1. His reason for placing this introductory material in Book Four, rather than at the beginning of Kt8, is that religion as such only comes into system$_r$ here in the fourth stage. The radical evil in human nature, the change of heart in an individual, and the bonding together of such individuals in the form of a church, all prepare the way for the expression of true religion; on its own none of these would suffice to compose a religious standpoint. The visible church, as a vehicle for universal religion, provides the context in which truly religious people can serve God, but the service itself comes here in stage four. Thus, after summarizing the arguments of the first three stages in Kt8:162(151) Kant says 'to become convinced of all this is part of religion.'

The tenth step--like the 'unconditional object' in step ten of system$_t$--presents the 'idea of the whole', towards which all previous steps have led; for system$_r$ it is the determination to regard 'all duties as divine commands', and in so doing to realize the purpose of the church as an arena for religion [Kt8:153(142)]. No revelation is presupposed in this first manifestation of religion, so it is at this point a natural religion. Since Kant's definition of religion has been fully discussed in XI.1, this brief summary of the material step in the fourth stage will suffice. To the extent that Christianity encourages this pure form of religion, it can be called 'a pure rational faith' [162(151)].

I have already mentioned Kant's view that religion can be 'objectively a natural religion, though subjectively one that has been revealed' [Kt8:156(144)]. Whereas step ten (the material step in stage four)
views religion in the former way, step eleven (the formal step) views it in the latter way. As we should expect by now, Kant chooses Christianity 'as the medium for the elucidation of our idea of revealed religion' [156(144)], and 'the New Testament, ...as the source of the Christian doctrine' [157(145)]. After offering a moral interpretation of numerous verses from the Gospels [159-62(147-50)], Kant concludes: 'Here then is a complete religion' [162(150)]. Thus Jesus 'can be reverenced, not indeed as the founder of the religion which...is engraved in all men's hearts..., but as the founder of the first true church' [159(147)].

The concept of revelation 'is a pure concept of reason' [Kt8:156 (144)], just as are the 'ideas' in step eleven of system^r. By applying the concept of revelation to a set of Scriptures Christianity can be regarded not just 'as a faith freely assented to by everyone' (i.e. 'a pure rational faith'), but also 'as a faith which is commanded' (i.e. 'a revealed faith') [162(151)]. Kant argues in Kt8:163(151-2) that both of these are necessary, for pure religion (because on its own it is confined within the limits of practical reason) is naked, and must be clothed with revelation:

...where the Christian teaching is built not upon bare concepts of reason [i.e. not on these alone] but upon facts, it is no longer called merely the Christian religion, but the Christian faith... In the Christian church neither of these can be separated from the other as adequate in itself; the ['moral faith'] is indispensable to the ['historical faith'] because the Christian faith is a religious faith, and the [latter] is indispensable to the [former] because it is a learned faith.

This eleventh step, then, requires that revelation, and the scholarly learning needed to preserve and interpret the historical record, be the form which clothes the material of natural religion. It insists that 'the revealed doctrine...must be cherished and cultivated as merely a means, but a most precious means, of making this doctrine [i.e. that of 'natural religion'] comprehensible, even to the ignorant' [165(152-3)].

The twelfth and final step of system^r synthesizes natural and revealed religion in their proper order, so that 'the object and end of
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all religion (which...is conduct pleasing to God)' [Kt65:56] can be realized through 'the true service of the church under the dominion of the good principle' [Kt8:165(153)]. This involves on the one hand regarding all our duties as divine commands, and on the other regarding the statutory laws of the true church, which is itself 'steadily approximating to pure rational faith', as also divinely revealed [153(140)]. The former represents the direct (material) service of God, while the latter represents the indirect (formal) service of God:

...when [men] fulfill their duties to man (themselves and others) they are, by these very acts, performing God's commands and are therefore in all their actions and abstentions...perpetually in the service of God, and...it is absolutely impossible to serve God more directly in any other way (since they can affect and have influence upon earthly beings alone, and not upon God). [103(94)]

The indirect service of God, ordained by statutory divine laws, is intended as a motivating force to encourage and clarify the 'disposition of virtue...which of itself is well-pleasing to God' [173(161)]. Kant elaborates on the proper way of uniting these two forms of service when he explains that 'actions which have no moral value in themselves will have to be accepted as well-pleasing to Him only so far as they serve as a means to the furtherance of what, in the way of conduct, is immediately good' [177(165)]. Keeping in mind the secondary role of all non-moral actions or beliefs, we can summarize this final step as that in which the true service of God, performed by a believer in a revealed faith, renders a person well-pleasing to God. Just as system₁ presupposes an unknowable thing in itself but ends with practical belief in noumenal reality [see VII.3], so also system₁, as we have seen, presupposes an unknowable good predisposition and ends with practical belief in God's acceptance of our conduct as well-pleasing (i.e. good).

Kant expends considerable effort on the task of determining what is not true service of God. In this speculative perspective on religion, (i.e. in 'religious illusion' [Kt8:168(156)]), 'the moral order is wholly reversed' by the supposition that 'revealed faith is to precede religion'
Belief in propositions of which the unlearned can assume themselves neither through reason nor through Scripture (inasmuch as the latter would first have to be authenticated [by scholars]) would here be made an absolute duty... A church founded upon this latter principle does not really have servants..., but commanding high officials... They transform, in this way, the service of the church...into a domination of its members... [165(153)].

Such 'allegiance to the historical and statutory element of ecclesiastical faith as alone bringing salvation' gives rise to 'the pseudo-service of the church' [153(141); s.a. 171(159)], which is the 'pretended honoring of God through which we work directly counter to the service demanded by God' [168(156)]. All forms of ecclesiastical faith are 'alike in worth (or rather worthlessness)' when they take on the character of pseudo-service, because 'there is no essential difference among the ways of serving Him', once the relation of service to morality is taken away [172 (160)]. Kant's criticism of 'penances, castigations, pilgrimages, and the like' is not that such acts are pseudo-service as such, but that they become pseudo-service when people perform them 'because they...testify... to unbounded (though not moral) subjection to His will. The more useless such self-castigations are and the less they are designed for the general moral improvement of the man, the holier they seem to be' [169(157)]. For in such cases, 'however few the imposed observances, so long as these are laid down as unconditionally necessary the faith remains a fetish-faith through which the masses are ruled and robbed of their moral freedom by subservience to a church (not to religion)' [180(168)].

Kant's guiding principle in stage four, which he believes requires no proof, is: 'Whatever, over and above good life-conduct, man fancies that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious illusion' [Kt8:170(158)]. This seems at first to reduce religion entirely to 'good-life conduct'; but this interpretation would contradict his emphasis elsewhere on the importance of statutory laws. The contradiction is easily resolved, however, by understanding the words 'over and above' to mean 'instead of' rather than 'in addition to'. Kant's complaint is not
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against honoring God in non-moral ways in addition to moral ways, but only when the former take the place of the latter. The tendency of interpreters to misunderstand such principles is (as usual) Kant's own fault. For in his earnest attempt to emphasize the primacy of the moral in God's eyes, he sometimes makes assertions which, taken in themselves, would imply such an extreme reductionism. A few examples will illustrate this point:

All these observances [of public divine worship] are at bottom morally indifferent actions; yet, just because they are to be performed merely for His sake, they are held to be all the more pleasing to Him. [106(97)]

There are no special duties to God in a universal religion, for God can receive nothing from us; we cannot act for Him, nor yet upon Him. [154n(142n)]

[That is,] we can do no more than our duty with respect to God... [Kt39:491(207)].

...the cause of all ceremonies is ['unbelief in natural religion']. Men think that ceremonies can take the place of morality, and they seek to win God over by non-moral actions. [Kt35:(92)]

The only thing that matters in religion is deeds... [Kt65:41].

Such strong statements are designed to stress the importance of the perspectival shift Kant is suggesting, away from focus on the outward form and towards a focus on the inner reality of religion. It is a mistake to conclude from their apparent one-sidedness, however, that Kant finds no place whatsoever for such 'morally indifferent actions'. True, he does not wish to regard them as duties, nor as deeds in the moral sense of the word. Nevertheless, he recognizes that they can play a very important (indeed, necessary) supporting role to the main character in stage four—viz. moral conduct—so long as they do not usurp the lead role. For example, when he criticizes the person who defends a primary emphasis on statutory laws by charging that 'when he says that he also gives his heart to God he means by this not the disposition to a course of life well-pleasing to Him but the heart-felt wish that those sacrifices may be accepted in lieu of that disposition' [Kt8:172(160)], Kant is not claiming that all worshippers of God commit this error, but only
those who do not adopt a 'moral disposition'. For 'everything depends... upon whether we rely on the moral disposition alone..., or on pious play-things and on inaction' [173(161)e.a.]. Even superstition 'is only contingently objectionable', since it is actually 'allied to reason' when it is used to help a person 'to work against the obstacles in the way of a disposition well-pleasing to God' [174(163)]. Ecclesiastical ceremonies, then, are not objectionable at all if they are viewed properly.

Kant describes 'devotion' as 'the frame of mind...attuned to acquiring dispositions dedicated to God' [Kt8:170(158)]. As such it is a necessary part of service to God. (Only when 'we ascribe to the frame of mind ...the worth belonging to those dispositions themselves' does devotion become pseudo-service, for only in this case is it 'a procedure which has no moral value in itself' [169-70(157-8)]. Greene misrepresents Kant's position, therefore, when he says 'Kant's absolute insistence upon the reduction of true religion to morality...rendered him incapable of appreciating true religious devotion' [G13:lxxvi].) Kant readily admits that a person with an 'active disposition to good life-conduct' can properly use devotional exercises 'to make himself worthy of the supplementation of his impotence through supernatural assistance' [178(166)]; for in so doing 'he is counting on something supernatural to supplement his natural impotence, yet not on what is effected by man...but on what is received, on what he can hope for but can not bring to pass.' What Kant rejects is the attempt 'through natural acts...[to] conjure up divine assistance' [178(166)]. The difference has entirely to do with the perspective assumed, for, as Kant exclaims in Kt8:179(167): 'So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order in which they are united! True enlightenment lies in this very distinction [between direct and indirect service]; therein the service of God becomes first and foremost a free and hence a moral service.'

Kant expresses the same point in another way when he argues that 'the doctrine of godliness' should be subordinate to 'the doctrine of
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virtue', since the former 'can merely serve as a means of strengthening' the latter [Kt8:183(171)]. Thus he warns in Kt8:185(173):

When reverence for God is put first, with virtue therefore subordinated to it, this object [of reverence] becomes an idol, that is, He is thought of as a Being whom we may hope to please not through morally upright conduct on earth but through adoration and ingrati­ation; and religion is then idolatry. But godliness is not a surro­gate for virtue, whereby we may dispense with the latter; rather is it virtue's consummation, enabling us to be crowned with the hope of the ultimate achievement of all our good ends.

It is important to note that 'put first' in this context means 'relied upon as the end goal', not 'chronologically prior'. For a devout attitude may well (and often does) come before a virtuous act, without nullifying its goodness. Kant's point is that reverence as an end in itself, without leading to good life-conduct, is idolatry. 'True reverence consists in acting according to God's will' [Kt39:495(216)].

The morally-transcendent idea which arises as a by-product of the fourth stage is the concept of 'a supernatural accession to our moral... capacity' [Kt8:191(179)]. As with the other parerga, the main thrust of Kant's discussion of this idea is constructive. He describes the notion of supernatural aid in moral matters 'as a sacred thing', which we should therefore hold 'at a respectful distance' [191(180)]. 'The true (moral) service of God' is the invisible 'service of the heart'; nevertheless, 'for man the invisible needs to be represented through the visible (the sensuous)...in the interest of practicability' [192(180)]. Because of this need, it is good and proper that man should use outward religious ceremonies and acts of worship as a means to further the inward religious disposition. However, he warns that this is 'a means which, although really indispensable, is extremely liable to the danger of misconstruc­tion; for, through an illusion that steals over us, it is easily held to be the service of God itself' [192(180)]. Thus Kant criticizes such a 'means of grace' only when it is employed by a person who believes 'that if he honors the custom (the formality), God will surely accept it in lieu of the act [of adopting a good disposition] itself' [193(181-2)].
For this is a 'self-deception' which 'is internally self-contradictory', because 'that divine aid...itself really aims at nothing but our morality' [192(180)].

Once the 'service of God' is 'brought back to its spirit and its true meaning, namely to a disposition dedicating itself to the Kingdom of God within us and without us', it 'can be divided, even by reason, into four observances of duty' [Kt8:192(181)e.a.]. These duties have traditionally been expressed outwardly in the form of: (1) 'private prayer', which awakens the intention to establish 'goodness in ourselves'; (2) 'church-going', which encourages this intention outwardly 'through public assembly'; (3) 'baptism', through which the 'public assembly' encourages goodness by receiving a member 'into the fellowship of faith'; and (4) 'communion', through which such fellowship is maintained, by symbolizing 'joint participation in all the fruits of moral goodness' [193(181)].

Kant devotes far more attention, in Kt8 and elsewhere, to the topic of prayer than to any of the other three means of grace. This, I believe, is not because he was opposed to it more strongly, but because he valued it more highly. Webb's view, by contrast, is that Kant condemned 'a supposed personal intercourse with God in prayer' as 'a harmful and demoralizing self-illusion' [W12:20]. What Kant actually says, however, is that prayer 'is a superstitious illusion' only when it is regarded as constituting in itself the service of God; for on its own 'it discharges none of the duties to which, as commands of God, we are obligated', inasmuch as 'it is no more than a stated wish directed to a Being who needs no such information' [Kt8:198(186)]. As a result, verbally expressed prayer 'can have no direct bearing upon the divine approval; and for this very reason it cannot be a duty for everyone' [196-7(185)]. What does render us more well-pleasing to God, and what therefore is a duty, is 'the spirit of prayer', which Kant describes as the 'heart-felt wish to be well-pleasing to God in our every act and abstention', and which should be 'in us "without ceasing"' [194-5(183); cf. I Thessalonians
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5:17]. To regard verbal prayer 'as a peculiar service of God and intrinsically good'—i.e. even apart from its spirit—'is superstition' [Kt35: (101)]. He readily admits, however, that, like all aspects of pure religion, the spirit of prayer on its own is naked [bloss]; so in order for it to be useful to universal religion, we often need 'to clothe this wish ...in words and formulas'—an exercise which possesses value only as 'a means whereby that disposition within us may be repeatedly quickened' [Kt8:195-6(183-5)].

Kant believes the devout person should, ideally, try to get along with as few words as possible, because 'the letter' (as opposed to the spirit) of prayer 'rather weakens the effect of the moral idea' [Kt8:197 (185)]. In suggesting this, he is not suggesting that we stop praying, but rather that we recognize that true prayer is something far more profound than what we can possibly express in words. He defends this by arguing that only a prayer prayed in 'the moral spirit of prayer...can be prayed with faith, and by this faith we mean the assurance that the prayer will be heard' [196n(184n)]. Jesus' emphasis on faith in prayer (see e.g. Matthew 17:20) is profound precisely because of its paradoxical nature: 'if [a prayer] is to be heard, it must be made in faith. For if the practitioner has faith, he does not need to ask for it; but if he does not have faith, his petition cannot be heard' [Kt65:10; cf. 56]. The paradox can be resolved by pointing out that this will always remain an ideal goal set up by pure religion: human beings are weak, and therefore need to verbalize prayer in order to confirm their own faith. Kant, who repeatedly defends the rationality of the hope that God will make up for human weakness, would surely admit that God will hear such a verbal prayer, as long as it truly is being used as a vehicle for the pure spirit of prayer.

This notion of prayer as something by which 'man seeks but to work upon himself', rather than 'to work upon God' [Kt8:195n(183n)] is closely akin to what is usually called meditation. In XII.1 I shall explore the
extent to which we are justified in assuming that Kant himself practised a form of meditation. But at this point it will suffice merely to provide a few excerpts from his comments on prayer in Kt35: (99-100,102):

...the purpose of prayer can only be to induce in us a moral disposition; its purpose can never be pragmatic, seeking the satisfaction of our wants. It should fan into flame the cinders of morality in the inner recesses of our heart...

.... It is a weakness in man that to give his thoughts expression he must put them into words... Those whose minds are practised in harbouring ideas and dispositions can discard the aid of words and formal expression. Subtract these from prayer, and what remains? Only the spirit of prayer, the sense of devotion, the guide-line leading the heart to God by way of faith... It is the spirit of the prayer alone which matters.

.... Thus, prayers are not to be regarded as a special way of serving God, but only as a means of awakening within us the spirit of devotion. We do not serve God with words, ceremonies and gestures: we serve Him only by actions which reflect our devotion to Him....

.... The spirit of prayer is a devout and godly disposition. The letter is necessary to us only in order to awaken within us the spirit of prayer.

Unlike the verbal prayer which attempts to influence God, Kant assures us that this meditative spirit of prayer 'can be offered with perfect sincerity even though the man praying does not presume to be able to affirm that the existence of God is wholly certain' [Kt8:195n(183n)].

Kant criticizes 'church-going' as a dangerous 'means of grace' only when a person uses it 'to conceal the bad moral content of his disposition from the eyes of others, and even from his own eyes' [Kt8:199(187)]. Church ceremonies then become 'an opiate for the conscience of such people and a pillow on which they hope to sleep tranquilly' [Kt39:495 (215); s.a. 494(214)]. Against this tendency Kant warns in Kt35: (113) that 'we do not profit God by uttering His praises.... True religion is the religion of the fear of God and of a good life. If a man's actions show no signs of it, he has no religion, let him say what he will.'

To this end man busies himself with every conceivable formality, designed to indicate how greatly he respects the divine commands, in order that it may not be necessary for him to obey them; and, that his idle wishes may serve also to make good the disobedience of these commands, he cries: 'Lord, Lord,' so as not to have to 'do the will of his heavenly Father.' [Kt8:201(189); cf. Matthew 7:21]
When properly employed, however, Kant endorses this 'ceremonial public service of God' as being 'not only a means to be valued by each individual for his own edification but also a duty directly obligating ['the community of believers'] as a group, as citizens of a divine state which is to appear here on earth' [Kt8:198(186-7)]. Such edification 'does not consist in feelings' produced by 'listening or reading and singing', but rather signifies 'the result of devotion in the actual improvement of the man' [198n(186n)]. Kant especially approves of 'public prayer' as 'a moral ceremony': a clergyman's public prayer, for instance, 'cannot only raise the feelings to the point of moral exhaltation (where-as private prayers...lose little by little, through habituation, their influence upon the heart); it also possesses in itself a more rational basis than does private prayer for clothing the moral wish', because it encourages the participants to be united towards a common moral end [196-7n(185n)]. Webb's description of Kant's view of public worship as 'just a machinery for stimulating the moral sentiment in us' [W12:154] is therefore potentially misleading. For Kant is not reducing public worship to an austere means of motivating mechanical obedience to moral laws, but is raising it to its rightful status, as a means of encouraging the devout participants to serve God freely in their lives. Thus he says in Kt39:485(196): 'A religion which makes men gloomy is false; for they should serve God with a joyous heart and not from compulsion.'

Kant's treatment of baptism and communion in Kt8:199-200(187-8) is short and to the point. Baptism 'aims at something holy...but...is not in itself holy or productive of holiness'; it is an 'illusion' to believe this human ritual is itself 'capable, in an instant, of washing away all sins'. Nevertheless, it 'is a highly significant ceremony' when viewed as a commitment to work towards 'the development of a man into a citizen in a divine state'. Likewise, communion 'is a religious illusion which can do naught but work counter to the spirit of religion' if we 'assert that God has attached special favours to the celebration of this solemn-
Yet, when viewed as a means of promoting "churchly community under laws of equality", it contains within itself something great, expanding the narrow, selfish, and unsociable cast of mind among men, especially in matters of religion, toward the idea of a cosmopolitan moral community; and it is a good means of enlivening a community to the moral disposition of brotherly love which it represents. The fact that Kant may not have exhausted the depths of the symbolism contained in these Christian sacraments should not obscure the fact that his intention, at least, is clearly to guard against their misuse by providing a rational explanation of how they can be used to promote universal religion.

In concluding this section, it may be helpful to point out that Kant's treatment of these four ways of expressing reverence for God provides conclusive proof that Kant's philosophy of religion cannot justly be described as a 'religion of works', as is so often assumed. This charge is perhaps valid for systemP, but not for systemR; yet, the former is not a religious system at all, but a moral one which points to the need for a religious system to 'save' it from total impracticability. 'Only if religion is added to [morals]', Kant explains in Kt4:130, 'can the hope arise of someday participating in happiness in proportion as we endeavored not to be unworthy of it.' The uncritical equation of systemP and systemR is therefore the source of this mistaken interpretation.

By contrast, we can now see that Kant has provided in systemR a solution to the controversy over the varying emphases in the Bible on 'faith' and 'works'. On the one hand, the Bible affirms that 'faith without works is useless', yet elsewhere clearly insists that 'you have been saved through faith...not as a result of works, that no one should boast' (Ephesians 2:8-9). The solution Kant gives assumes that 'works' is here being used in two different ways: works in the sense of good life-conduct are necessary for salvation inasmuch as they are, as it were, the proof of the pudding; but works in the sense of ceremonies directed towards God in order to appease his displeasure at our lack of
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good life-conduct (i.e. our lack of 'works' in the first sense) are always condemned because they imply a control of God by man (an ability to bring about 'results') which, if it were possible, would indeed justify man in boasting. Kant's whole intention in formulating notions such as 'practical faith', in urging us to pursue actively the goal of good life-conduct, and in criticizing those who replace this goal with 'works' directed solely to God, is to expound and defend the consistency and rationality of the true Christian message as conveyed in the Bible. And what Christian would deny that the Bible teaches this very same position: that a person 'who does what he can, and trusts God to do whatever else may be lacking, has a truer faith than he who insists upon knowing what God will do, and cherishes the hope that his praise of this may somehow do instead of his own moral service' [W12:154-5]? This is just what Kant is saying when he concludes his book in Kt8:202(190) with the claim 'that the right course is not to go from grace to virtue but rather to progress from virtue to pardoning grace.'

4. The Copernican Perspective on Religion

Without a recognition of Kant's dependence on the Principle of Perspective, books such as Kt8 and Kt65 are bound to be regarded as filled with 'a tangle of contradictions...in which Kant is constantly saying what is on his own terms unsayable' [W10:166], for doctrines are often rejected and then accepted even within the same passage. But with a clear awareness of this principle as our interpretive guide, we have been able to interpret his system of religious perspectives as a balanced approach to the philosophy of religion. Most important is the extent to which it enables us to see the thoroughly constructive intentions of his criticisms with respect to religion in general and Christianity in particular, which he believed to be the one true expression of universal religion. For instance, the transcendent ideas which arise in each stage can now be seen in their proper role as positive 'by-products' (parerga) of the
actual system. Kant's intention in discussing them is to prevent the spread of disease throughout an otherwise healthy system. The most helpful way of describing the advantage of this way of interpreting system over the traditional interpretation is that, whereas it is typically viewed as a reductionistic philosophy of religion, we can now see the thoroughgoing extent to which it follows the pattern set in Kt1 for the entire Critical System, in the form of the Copernican Perspective.

Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion reverses the usual priority given to the external expression of religion over its internal core. Just as Copernicus suggested that the earth revolves around the sun even though the sun appears to revolve around the earth, and just as Kant argues in Kt1 that objects conform to the subject even though the subject appears to conform to the object, so also Kant argues in Kt8 that ecclesiastical faith conforms to pure religious faith even though the latter appears to arise out of the former—or at least, this Copernican Perspective must hold true for any ecclesiastical faith which is to serve as a vehicle for universal religion. What is crucial for system, then, is that the religious person reads a truly religious disposition into the outward observances of ecclesiastical faith (which are to be viewed only as indirectly pleasing to God, not directly as they were before), just as in system, the subject reads various a priori forms into the object (which is now to be viewed as a representation, not as a thing in itself, as it was before). This is what Kant means, for instance, when he asserts in Kt65:37 that 'the only way we can find eternal life in any Scripture whatsoever is by putting it there.' Of course, Kant readily admits that he takes this emphasis directly from Christianity; indeed he sees this as the essence of its revolutionary message. As long as 'Christianity' is taken to refer to a merely ecclesiastical faith, its message therefore sows the seeds of its own destruction. But if the message itself is given priority, as Kant believes was its original intention, then the destruction of any given ecclesiastical form will not
deter the progress of true, universal religion. For universal religion is the ideal of a perfect instantiation in the empirical world of the pure (a priori) religious standpoint to which all people have access.

The question as to which Critical standpoint system is associated with most closely is a tricky one to answer. The title of Kt8 seems to imply a close affinity with systemP, and the emphasis on practical over theoretical reason throughout the book seems to back up this judgment. Yet, as we have seen, Kant is also very concerned with analyzing the form of religious experience in general, and with determining the extent to which various historical faiths can serve as adequate vehicles for pure religion. A glance through the steps of system reveals, in fact, that experiences, such as sin, conversion, church organization, worship, etc. occupy the centre of Kant's attention, while the task of interpreting theoretical doctrines in practical terms is always secondary [see C11:155]. In both cases, however, he attempts to synthesize practical and theoretical standpoints, and this, as we saw in IX.1, is the purpose of the empirical standpoint adopted in systemE. The reason he says his philosophy of religion remains 'within the bounds of bare reason' is to indicate that this synthesis of the practical and theoretical always gives primacy to the practical. But this is equally true of both systemP and systemE. If we see Kt8 as an attempt to show how in the universal experience of religion the practical and theoretical standpoints are inextricably intertwined (as was already briefly suggested in III.4 [s.e. Figure III.1]), then it becomes clear that Kt8 not only belongs in the Critical System, but, given its more systematic organization, could well stand in place of Kt7 as a Critique of Religious Judgment.

We can fully appreciate the extent to which systemF presents us with a balanced religious standpoint only insofar as we recognize how it takes into account all three standpoints in the Critical System: it upholds the importance of theoretical knowledge, but puts strict limitations on its extent, so that practical reason (morality) always has priority in
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determining the meaning of religious doctrines and experiences; yet both of these standpoints are subordinate, as far as religious experience is concerned, to the empirical standpoint, from which, as we shall see in Chapter XII, the devout person can enjoy a private relationship with the Being towards whom our obedience to the moral law is directed and about whom our doctrines are concerned.

An awareness of the primarily synthetic character of system\textsubscript{r} in relation to system\textsubscript{t} and system\textsubscript{p} is the key factor in recognizing both its general non-reductionist purpose and its particular attempt to authenticate the validity of Christianity as the universal religion. (For to associate Kt8 too closely with system\textsubscript{p} leads directly to Smart's unjustified charge in S20:5.15 that 'Kant's exposition of religion' is faulty because 'in essence he reduces it to morality.') Thus, Wood is correct to say Kant 'thought that theology, along with morality, becomes corrupted when it bases itself on empirical principles, and that when men draw their God from nature or experience rather than from pure reason they are more likely to serve him by empty ceremonies than by rational and morally upright conduct' [W20:82]; but this must be taken to imply not that the empirical standpoint is abandoned in system\textsubscript{r}, but rather that it is set on the proper foundation of the primacy of practical reason (just as was system\textsubscript{e} in Kt7).

What is rarely acknowledged in treatments of Kant's philosophy of religion is that he never intended system\textsubscript{r} to criticize or impose strenuous limitations upon the truly devout and sincerely religious person. In light of its synthetic, empirical role in the Critical System, we can now see, however, that system\textsubscript{r} should ultimately serve as an encouragement to such a person, since its main purpose is to analyse just what takes place in the experience of a truly religious individual. The criticism is rather directed against those who he believes do impose severe limitations on the common religious person, and who, in so doing, actually deter his progress. His target is not Christ but the pharisees, not St. Francis
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but St. Thomas, not the layman but the clergy, not the open-minded theologian but the sort who seeks to indoctrinate. If we characterize those who force the religious person into an unhealthy mould by discouraging him from thinking for himself as either 'conserving conservatives' or 'liberating liberals', then Kant's alternative in system_1 is both a 'liberating conservatism' and a 'conserving liberalism'—a revolution directly analogous to the replacement of empirical idealism and transcendental realism with empirical realism and transcendental idealism in system_2.

Kant's liberating conservatism frees the conservative Christian from the need to insist on a theoretical formula which encloses God in a box; yet it does so without requiring that the doctrines which constitute orthodox Christianity be abandoned or even modified. Only one's way of looking at them (i.e. one's perspective) needs to be changed. Likewise, his conserving liberalism preserves for the liberal theologian a living faith in spite of the tendency to deny its reality by over-dependence on the methods of historical/critical scholarship; yet, again, it does so without requiring that the methods on which liberal Christianity depends be abandoned or even modified. Once again, Kant requires only a change of perspective.

The prime targets of Kant's criticism of what could be called 'conserving conservatism' are the clergy who tend to 'complain about irreligion, which they themselves have caused' [Kt65:80]. They cause it by dogmatically insisting on the necessity and sufficiency of the ecclesiastical shell of faith, which inevitably crushes the pearl of pure religion in the laity. What Kant says in Kt32:359 about certain Europeans who take slaves could well be taken as expressing the hypocrisy towards which all conserving conservatism tends: 'while they drink injustice like water, they regard themselves as the elect in point of orthodoxy.' Kant's regulative use of theoretical dogmas offers to the conservative liberation from the unhealthy situation caused by erroneous speculative certainty, yet without requiring that any cherished beliefs be abandoned
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... (so long as they are regarded only as beliefs). He summarizes this balanced alternative in Kt8:71n(65n):

In general, if we limited our judgment to regulative principles, which content themselves with their own possible application to the moral life, instead of aiming at constitutive principles of a knowledge of supersensible objects, insight into which, after all, is forever impossible to us, human wisdom would be better off in a great many ways, and there would be no breeding of a presumptive knowledge of that about which, in the last analysis, we know nothing at all—a groundless sophistry that glitters indeed for a time but only, as in the end becomes apparent, to the detriment of morality.

This would liberate the conservative from the religion-killing tendency to insist on one and only one answer to every theoretical question, yet without requiring the abandonment of any orthodox beliefs. Webb's account of Kant's suggestion as to how best to avoid hypocrisy in our treatment of doctrines which preclude theoretical certainty is that 'we should neither profess our faith in it, nor reject it as certainly false' [W12:159]. This may well have been Kant's personal attitude, but his official stance does not deny the legitimacy of professing faith (as long as it does not obtrude on others [Kt65:9]), but only of claiming knowledge: to 'refrain from judging dogmatically' [Kt35:(85)] simply means that our acceptance or rejection of such doctrines is a matter of faith.

The liberating conservatism of Kt8 can in this way be regarded as another example of Kant's Critical attempt 'to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith' [Kt1:xxx].

The prime targets of Kant's criticism of what could be called 'liberating liberalism' are the biblical scholars, who tend to reject the whole notion of divine revelation as a result of viewing Scripture from the theoretical standpoint. The danger, however, is not so much in viewing the Bible as man-made, but in letting undue attention to its human origins obscure its pure religious message. The biblical theologian who does this 'mistakes the husk of religion for religion itself' [Kt65:45]. When this happens, liberals may find it tempting to liberate themselves from morality as well (especially if they formerly depended on Scripture alone, without considering its relation to the moral law, as the motiva-
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By contrast, a careful distinction between the Perspective of the philosopher and the theologian [see 23-4] can actually enable a person to be both a liberal scholar and a conservative Christian at the same time without compromising one's integrity. Thus Kant explains in Kt38:38 how

'a clergyman is obliged to make his sermon...conform to the symbol of the church. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, even the calling, to communicate to the public all his carefully tested and well-meaning thoughts on that which is erroneous in the symbol... In doing this there is nothing that could be laid as a burden on his conscience.... He thus extracts all practical uses for his congregation from statutes to which he himself would not subscribe with full conviction but to the enunciation of which he can very well pledge himself because it is not impossible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in any case, there is at least nothing in them contradictory to inner religion.'

The theologian's suspicion that the philosopher is 'philosophizing away all the teachings that must be considered real revelation and so taken literally' [Kt65:38] is unfounded, once it is recognized that theoretical knowledge (according to systema) is never able to settle anything about such matters, except whether or not they are self-contradictory.

While it is true that, as Gregor says, Kant upholds in Kt65 'the right of the philosophy faculty to freedom of expression... at the expense of the clergy and the biblical theologian' [G16:xxi], this should not be taken as a denial of the legitimacy of the latter disciplines; his intention is to put them in their proper place by divesting them of power, the speculative source of which is unfit for man in the first place. Thus, he spends a good deal of time discussing the proper 'principles of Scriptural exegesis', which, he says, 'must be philosophical' [Kt65:38]. Since this provides an extended example of the double character of Kant's critique of religion, it will be helpful to examine his views in detail.

Kant lays down two principles of exegesis in Kt8:132-3(122-3):

The first is the principle of a reasonable modesty in pronouncements regarding all that goes by the name of revelation. For no one can deny the possibility that a scripture...may...be regarded as a genuinely divine revelation.... One can hardly expect a new revelation.... Hence the most intelligent and most reasonable thing to do is from now on to use the book already at hand [the Bible] as the basis for ecclesiastical instruction and not to lessen its value
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through useless or mischievous attacks, yet meanwhile not forcing belief in it, as requisite to salvation, upon any man. The second principle is this: that...the sacred narrative...must at all times be taught and expounded in the interest of morality...

The bulk of Kant's treatment of the first principle is directed against the supposedly liberating tendencies of the Enlightenment, by maintaining that belief in some sort of vehicle for religious faith, some divine revelation, is healthy and should be preserved. The tendency of liberals (usually biblical scholars) to deny the authority of Scripture tends to be ultimately destructive to their religious faith. But he also criticizes the extreme conservative, who forces belief in scriptural dogmas, as equally destructive. For such an approach, as we saw in XI.3, takes away the moral freedom of its adherents by imposing what are meant to be laws of virtue in the form of laws of coercion [s.a. Kt65:20,27].

Concerning the second of the above-mentioned principles, Kant argues that 'the highest principle of all Scriptural exegesis' should be 'the moral improvement of men, [which] constitutes the real end of all religion of reason' [Kt8:112(102); s.a. Kt65:41]. He defends this principle in a number of passages, which can speak for themselves:

For the final purpose even of reading these holy scriptures, or of investigating their content, is to make men better; the historical element, which contributes nothing to this end, is...in itself quite indifferent, and we can do with it what we like. [Kt8:111(102)]

Only a moral interpretation...is really an authentic one--that is, one given by the God within us [Kt65:48].

[Therefore] we must regard the credentials of the Bible as drawn from the pure springs of universal religion dwelling in every ordinary man [63].

Its authenticity...can be better established by the effect its reading can produce in the hearts of men than by proofs based on critical examination of the teachings and tales it contains. [661]

The God Who speaks through our own (morally practical) reason is an infallible interpreter of His words in the Scriptures, Whom everyone can understand. And it is quite impossible for there to be any other accredited interpreter of His words [67].

In these passages Kant is not intending to do away with 'Scriptural scholarship (which deals with the historical aspect of [a] religion' [Kt8:114(105)], but rather to put the historical scholar in a proper,
'subordinated' place in relation to the 'Scriptural interpreter', whose task is to determine the rational (moral) meaning of the text [112(103)]. Kant defends this subordination of the historical to the religious (even less popular today than it was two centuries ago!) in Kt65:42:

...faith merely in the sense of theoretical assent...is no part of [pure] religion because it neither makes nor gives proof of a better man... Yet these same propositions can be considered essential requirements for expounding a certain ecclesiastical faith.... However, the teacher should warn [the people] not to ascribe holiness to dogma itself but to pass over, without delay, to the religious faith it has introduced. [s.a. 46,65]

From the truly religious standpoint, 'Scriptural scholarship...settles no more than that there is nothing in the origin of Scripture to render impossible its acceptance as direct divine revelation'--i.e. nothing immoral [Kt8:112-3(103)]. If it is not subordinated to religious faith, the resulting 'historical faith must finally become mere faith in Scriptural scholars and their insight' [114(105); s.a. Kt65:61]. But this is inadequate for universal religion because 'historical ecclesiastical doctrines...at best have in their favor only a probability discoverable by scholars' [Kt8:133(123)]. 'No historical account can verify the divine origin of such a writing. The proof can be derived only from its tested power to establish religion in the human heart' [Kt65:64; s.a. 23,46].

A 'philosophical' interpretation of Scripture, therefore, is 'a thoroughgoing interpretation of it in a sense agreeing with the universal practical rules of pure reason' [Kt8:110(100)]. Even if it is 'forced', such morally-based interpretation 'must be preferred to a literal interpretation which either contains nothing at all [helpful] to morality or else actually works counter to moral incentives' [110(100-1); s.a. 43n(39n); Kt65:42]. The only alternative for the truly religious person would be 'to charge [Scripture] with error' [41; s.a. 63-4,66]. Moreover, 'absolutely no general agreement can be reached [in disputes 'over creedal opinions on matters of faith'] without appeal to pure reason as the expositor [of Scripture]' [Kt8:130(121)]. Kant's main defence of such an approach is that 'this has always been done' down through history
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[110(101)], and that Jesus himself intended his teaching to be taken in this way [159-62(147-51)]. But he provides a more philosophical defence in Kt65:44-5:

I hear biblical theologians cry out in unison against the very idea of a philosophical interpretation of Scripture. Philosophical exegesis, they say, aims primarily at a natural religion, not Christianity. I reply that Christianity is the Idea of a religion, which must as such be based on reason and to this extent natural. But...in so far as the Bible...promotes moral precepts..., we can consider it the vehicle of religion and accept it, from this standpoint, as supernatural revelation. Now only a religion that makes it a principle not to admit supernatural revelation can be called naturalistic. So Christianity is not a naturalistic religion...

Kant is saying that the only way to prevent the liberal from liberalizing Christianity by reducing it to a natural religion (i.e. to an 'ecclesiastical faith without the Bible' [60]) is to provide a philosophical interpretation of the Bible which can conserve its status as divine revelation. This is because, given Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion, a text can be regarded as divine revelation only to the extent that we determine to read it as divine revelation—that is, to see in it the empirical unfolding of the pure religion which is in us a priori [68].

Kant therefore calls 'the Biblical theologian' to 'be at one with the philosopher': each should respect the other as working towards a common goal, though the two Perspectives should not be carelessly mixed [Kt8:10(10)]. Thus Kant defends philosophical interpretation again in Kt8:83-4(78):

An attempt such as the present...to discover in Scripture that sense which harmonizes with the most holy teachings of reason is not only allowable but must be deemed a duty. And we can remind ourselves of what the wise Teacher said to His disciples regarding someone who went his own way, by which, however, he was bound eventually to arrive at the same goal: 'Forbid him not; for he that is not against us is for us' [cf. Mark 9:39-49].

By calling the teachings of reason 'most holy' and the Teacher who first promoted them 'wise', he is not being disrespectful, but merely drawing attention to the common objective of wisdom and holiness, of reason and religion, which is to live a life well-pleasing to God. Kant's hope is that the theologian will recognize this common goal, and hence 'feel
honored' by the philosopher's corroboration [Kt65:45].

Kant's philosophy of religion, then, can be viewed as an Enlightened apologetic for the Christian religion, directed both to unenlightened believers who too readily accept the tutelage of church authorities over their own inner religion and to his unbelieving co-workers in the Enlightenment who mistakenly take this movement as one which leads man away from religion. One of his central concerns is to establish 'how to set about teaching [Christianity] so that it will really be present in the hearts of man' [Kt65:53]; and his answer is that a person is justified in being religious not in spite of, but because of the principles laid down by the Critical System. In particular, the Critical doctrine of the primacy of practical reason requires that 'the inner light' of true religion not be hidden 'under a bushel' of merely ecclesiastical faith [Kt8:201 (189); see Matthew 5:15]. (We shall examine in Chapter XII the extent to which Kant himself lived out this religious impulse.) Perhaps we can blame, with Webb, 'the dryness of the presentation' in Kt8 for the failure of most interpreters to grasp 'the depth and earnestness of [Kant's] moral sentiment, inspired by which he teaches us that there is no getting around God, as it were, whether by knowledge or by ceremonial' [W12:115]. Whatever reason others have had for neglecting Kant's true aim, we must now recognize that he is highly critical of those who regard Enlightenment as a means of smothering the religious impulse in the depths of man's heart. Rather, the torch of Enlightenment should kindle a fire in one's heart as well as a light in one's mind [see Kt8:179(167)]. Thus we can agree wholeheartedly with Paton when he says:

No doubt the moral and religious thought of different ages (including our own) tends to be cluttered up with a lot of extraneous and accidental nonsense; but it is the mark of a great thinker to set aside the nonsense, to get at the core of truth underneath... This is what Kant attempted to do' [P4:197].

Kant's approach to religion not only provides a much-needed alternative to the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, but, by authenticating the status of Christianity as the true universal religion, paves the
way for a balanced attitude towards evangelism. Thus Kant says in a section of Kt8 entitled 'the Christian religion as a natural religion':

'This religion possesses the prime essential of the true church, namely, the qualification for universality... To spread it...as a world religion..., there is needed, no doubt, a body of servants...of the invisible church, but not officials..., in other words, teachers but not dignitaries' [Kt8:157(145)]. The Critical evangelist works not by persuading unbelievers about doctrinal truths which concern only ecclesiastical faith, but by living and encouraging others to live a life of devout service to the God of pure religion. The form of ecclesiastical faith adopted by the 'converts' of such an evangelist must be of less concern to the evangelist than the fact that a conversion, a true change of heart, has taken place and is beginning to work itself out in the form of good life-conduct. Kant's own opinion is that 'of all the public religions which have ever existed, the Christian alone is moral' [51-2(47); s.a. 124-5(115-6)], so that most converts should be able to find an ecclesiastical version of Christianity which can serve as a suitable vehicle. Indeed, 'the seed of the true religious faith...is now being publicly sown in Christendom' [131(122)], so this true form of Christianity 'is directly valid for all men, the final revelation by which we must henceforth abide' [Kt65:49]. (Moreover, it 'has the merit of being compatible with the philosophy and all the wisdom of the ancients' [Kt68:953].) Perhaps it is not going too far, therefore, to suggest not only that Kant's philosophy of religion is still relevant to both the scholar and the layman, but also that it should be adopted as a guidepost for the promotion of true Christianity as we approach the twenty-first century.
Chapter XII

Critical Mysticism: The Birth and Death of Reason

1. Fanatical Mysticism v. Critical Mysticism

Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion, as expounded in system_7., has to do primarily with organized religion and with how a person's participation in it can help to clothe a pure religious disposition with good actions, so as to render the person well-pleasing to God. The 'religious experience' with which the system is primarily concerned is reflective experience; so, like the reflective judgment in system_7., it is based on the empirical standpoint [see XI.4 and Figure III.1]. Religious experience in this sense is not only rational, but completely consistent with the other aspects of the Critical System. However, mystics (as well as many ordinary religious people who would not presume to adorn themselves with such a title) often speak of 'religious experience' in a rather different way. This term can be used to refer not to the act of pleasing God through the overcoming of one's evil heart, as expressed in the moral actions of a group of believers banded together to form a church, but to a more direct form of communication or communion with a personal God. (Schweitzer gives a good description of the mystic in XI:1 as 'a human being looking upon the division between earthly and super-earthly, temporal and eternal, as transcended, and feeling himself, while still externally amid the earthly and temporal, to belong to the super-earthly and eternal.') That Kant admitted the validity of religious experience in the sense of organized religion, and encouraged its promotion as a rational discipline, has been demonstrated in Chapter XI. That he also admitted the validity of immediate personal religious experience, and encouraged its promotion as an important aspect of the Critical System, is a view which (if entertained at all) is almost universally denied by his interpreters. Nevertheless, my purpose in this final chapter will be
to demonstrate that such mystical experience lies at the very heart of the Critical System: it is as important to the System as birth and death are to an individual person, for it sets up the limits and in so doing establishes for the System its ultimate meaning.

Webb notes the traditional view that philosophy is 'the daughter of Religion, and starts upon her career with an outfit of questions suggested by religious experience' [W12:14]. The 'religious experience' to which Webb is referring is not so much the experience of God in humanly organized religion as an immediate personal encounter of the sort I have labelled 'mystical' (even though this term is often reserved for its extreme manifestations). Kant's Critical philosophy, I maintain, does not break with tradition in this respect. For his last book before setting out on the Critical path (viz. Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics [Kt18]) sets before him the question of how the philosopher is to cope with the claims of mystics such as Swedenborg; and the uncompleted book intended to be the crowning work of the System (viz. Opus Postumum [Kt9], as it is now called) provides ample evidence that the ultimate aim of the entire Critical enterprise is to replace the extreme mystical and anti-mystical attitudes with a balanced attitude which can best be called 'Critical mysticism'. Unfortunately, insufficient space remains to include in this thesis a detailed account of just how these two works establish the mystical birth and death of reason in Kant's System of Perspectives. Instead, it will have to suffice to conclude in this section by examining in general the extent to which we are justified in associating Kant with a mystical spirit in this way.

The traditional interpretation of Kant portrays him as consistently denying, or at least ignoring, any 'possibility of an encounter with the transcendent' [S20:5.62], and adds that 'he seems to have found the notion of an immanent God unfamiliar and uncongenial to his mind' [W12:50]. Baelz expresses this view in its classic form in B1:41:
Kant, while recognizing the demands of the moral law inherent in man's own rational being, had no room for any immediate apprehension of God, belief in whom was a postulate and no more than a postulate, inferential rather than direct, mediated by reason rather than immediately given in experience.

Even those who recognize that system is 'not radically unlike the traditional Christian view' of religion [W10:168] generally agree that 'any sense of personal fellowship with God, revelation from God or redemption by God is entirely lacking in the Kantian scheme.' We have already seen in Chapter XI that such claims are too harsh: Kant is always careful to leave a space for God's activity in relation to man (for faith in relation to knowledge [see Ch. VI]); what he criticizes is only man's attempt to grasp or control God in such a way as to force Him into revealing Himself or redeeming man. Accordingly, a few interpreters, rejecting the traditional interpretation, have seen in Kant 'the glimmer of a notion of faith as a "direct interior persuasion" in matters of religious truth' [W14a:530 (quoting John Ballie)]. The recognition that Kant's philosophy is a System of Perspectives can, I believe, transform this 'glimmer' into an unmistakable ray of noon-day sunlight. It may even enable us to defend Du Prel's suggestion that 'the Kantian "Critique of Reason"' points directly to mysticism [D7:1.xxvi].

The belief that Kant disallows any direct experience of God stems from two misunderstandings, which arise only when his dependence on the principle of perspective is ignored. The first arises out of the failure to make the important distinction between mediate experience (i.e. 'empirical knowledge'), and immediate experience [see IV.1]. The fact that 'the glimpses [of 'the infinity in the finite and the universality in the individual'] are distrusted' by Kant [W4:218] is taken by most interpreters as a distrust in immediate experience, when in fact Kant's expression of distrust in such 'glimpses' is always an expression of distrust in their adequacy when viewed from reason's theoretical standpoint (which always aims at and depends on empirical knowledge). If such glimpses are viewed as immediate experiences, and therefore not reflected upon, then
there is no question of distrusting them, because no Critical standpoint is adopted from which such distrust can arise.

The second misunderstanding arises out of the failure to recognize that Kant does not regard the Critical Perspective as one which must be adopted at all times. Only when a person chooses to reflect rationally on experience would Kant argue that the Critical Perspective should be adopted. By no means does this involve a denial that people do have nonreflective (immediate) experience as well. Thus, when Kant makes statements such as 'The philosopher, as a teacher of pure reason...must waive consideration of all experience' [Kt8:12(11)], he is not calling into question the reality or validity of such (immediate) experience, but only reminding us that the a priori excludes the a posteriori. Likewise, his lack of attention to the importance of an immediate encounter with God throughout most of his Critical works does not indicate that he views such an encounter as impossible, but only that he recognizes that it does not occur by means of reflection. Kant's tendency to explain religious doctrines and experiences in practical (moral) terms must therefore be regarded not as a denial of the legitimacy of immediate experience, but merely as an insistence that, insofar as one wishes to explain such experiences, a practical explanation always takes precedence over a theoretical explanation.

Affirming that we have immediate (and hence nonreflective) experience is not problematic; but asserting that God is actually present in such experience does seem to go directly against Kant's own claims to the contrary. 'A direct revelation from God', says Kant in Kt65:47, 'would be a supersensible experience, and this is impossible.' For 'a supernatural experience...is a contradiction in terms' [57]; indeed, 'supersensible experience...is absurd' [Kt23:401n(180n)]. Before we jump to any conclusions concerning the implications of such negative statements, it is important to determine just what Kant means by the words 'supersensible [or 'supernatural'] experience'. Is he declaring that an immediate,
nonreflective encounter between man and God is so absurd an idea as to be an impossible contradiction, or is he only rejecting the supposition that such an encounter can give rise to real empirical knowledge of God (i.e. from the theoretical standpoint of system)? Since most interpreters fail to distinguish between immediate experience and experience in Kant's special, mediate sense, this question is rarely even asked. Once we make this distinction, however, it seems clear that Kant is referring to experience as empirical knowledge whenever he rejects the possibility of supersensible experience. Immediate experience just is; so words like 'contradiction' do not really even apply to it. Moreover, Kant himself was actually open to the possibility of mystical visions in Kt18 and even affirmed an immediate experience of God in Kt9, so it would be a blatant contradiction for him to claim elsewhere that such ineffable experiences are actually absurd. By contrast, a claim to theoretical knowledge of the transcendent (i.e. supernatural) ground of the empirical world clearly would be absurd and contradictory, inasmuch as the presupposition of the entire System is that the transcendent ground (the thing in itself) is unknowable [see V.2 and Plb].

The purely theoretical intention of Kant's various denials of supersensible experience is substantiated by examining the context of such comments. For he never denies altogether that such experiences are legitimate, but only requires that we change the standpoint from which we view them. In Kt65:57-8 Kant is considering whether the 'claim that we feel as such the immediate influence of God' can be used as 'an interpretation of certain sensations' in order to prove that 'they are elements in knowledge and so have real [theoretical] objects'. He concludes that 'we can never make anything rational out of' such an attempted theoretical proof. He admits that such subjective experiences are genuine, but insists that they remain mysterious. Thus he explains in Kt65:47 that the experience of divine supernatural power 'comes to man through his own reason'; it is not a 'direct revelation' in the sense that it does not
come in the form of a sensible experience which is objectively verifiable. (Otherwise, a person watching someone who is having, for example, an apparition of the Blessed Virgin would also be able to see the object just as clearly.) 'The internal experience [e.g. of the mystic], and the feeling (which is in itself empirical...), are incited by the voice of reason only'; yet such feeling does not constitute 'a particular rule for reason..., which is impossible' [Kt23:402(181)]. Here again Kant is explicitly considering whether or not such a feeling suffices for a theoretical proof: if it could give rise to a 'rule for reason' (i.e. for everyone's reason), then it would be objective, and could qualify as a supersensible experience in system\textsuperscript{t}. Kant's point is that all such feelings which arise out of our immediate experience will remain subjective; but the certainty which results from them is not for this reason any less valid [see e.g. Kt1:857]. Thus, he says 'there is no theoretical belief in the supersensible'; yet 'from a morally practical standpoint a belief in the supersensible is not only possible, but it is even inseparably conjoined with it [i.e. with the practical standpoint]' [Kt23:397n (174n)]. So when he says the 'feeling of the immediate presence of the Supreme Being and the distinguishing of this from every other, even from the moral feeling, would constitute a receptivity for an intuition for which there is no sensory provision in man's nature' [Kt8:175(163)e.a.], he is not denying that such a feeling can legitimately be experienced, as Ward suggests [W10:157], but is only insisting that it cannot properly be viewed from the theoretical standpoint--it cannot lead 'directly to the point itself', without 'reasoning from conceptions' [Kt23:395(171-2)]. And this accords well with the mystic's recognition that what is apprehended in a mystical experience remains ultimately mysterious--i.e. it is something the true nature of which cannot be apprehended sensibly. Indeed, this very fact that man cannot have a sensible experience of the transcendent as it is in itself--i.e. one which gives rise to theoretical knowledge--is what gives rise to the need for a mystical experience which
cannot fit properly into any Critical perspective.

Unfortunately, Kant had a rather narrow conception of what mysticism is. He equates 'mystical' with 'magical' in Kt8:120(111), and comments elsewhere on 'the mystical fanaticism in the lives of hermits and monks' [130(121)]. He refers to the 'mystical veil' [83(78)] in such a way as to indicate that for him mysticism implies confusion or lack of clarity. Thus he claims in Kt23:398(175) that mystics seek to establish 'an overlap...from conceptions to the incogitable' by means of 'a faculty to seize that which no conception reaches'. Such efforts usually indicate 'a bent towards fanaticism': because such mystical operations are 'transcendent and can lead to no proper cognition of the object, a surrogate of it, supernatural communication (mystical illumination), must be promised; which is then the death of all philosophy.' Similarly, in Kt31:335-6 Kant argues that 'the speculative man becomes entangled in mysticism where his reason does not understand itself', a situation which is not 'fitting for an intellectual inhabitant of a sensible world'. The example he cites is that 'Chinese philosophers strive in dark rooms with eyes closed to experience and contemplate their nihility.' Mystical experiences as such can hardly be called speculation in Kant's theoretical sense, yet he believes they are subject to the same criticism, because the pantheism on which he believes such practices are based 'is really a concept in company with which their understanding disintegrates and all thinking itself comes to an end.'

Kant's official criticism of mysticism is that it errs only when it gives rise to fanaticism--i.e. only when the attempt at 'communion with God' is believed to 'accomplish [something] in the way of justifying ourselves before God' [Kt8:174(162); s.a. Kt65:54-7]. However, mystics do not have to be fanatics of this sort--indeed, they often are not. In Kt65:46 Kant explains that mysticism in the form of fanatical fantasy which 'inevitably gets lost in the transcendent' can be avoided only by establishing for it an ethical grounding: philosophers should 'be on the
lookout for a moral meaning in scriptural texts and even...impose it on them', because 'unless the supersensible (the thought of which is essential to anything called religion) is anchored to determinate concepts of reason, such as those of morality, ...there is no longer any public touchstone of truth.' So 'mysticism, with its lamp of private revelations' [65] is not illegitimate in itself, but only when it fails to subject itself to the objective principles of practical reason, as expressed, for example, in the Bible. Like all objects to which Kant applies his Critical method, mysticism is rejected only in its extreme form, but is allowed to remain in a more moderate ('Critical') form. Kant implies as much when he says:

And so, between orthodoxy which has no soul and mysticism which kills reason, there is the teaching of the Bible, a faith which our reason can develop out of itself. This teaching is the true religious doctrine, based on the criticism of practical reason, that works with divine power on all men's hearts [Kt65:59].

The three words Kant emphasizes in this passage suggest that his real aim is to defend, in accordance with the real aim of the biblical message, not only a kind of Critical orthodoxy (as we saw in Chapter XI), but also a kind of Critical mysticism. Thus, although Kant criticizes the belief that we can 'by any token, recognize a supersensible object in experience', he readily admits that 'at times there do arise stirrings of the heart making for morality' [Kt8:174(162)]. As a support for the moral life, Kant would not only sanction the attention a mystic pays to such 'stirrings', but, as we shall see, he actively fostered them in his own life. Indeed, whereas fanatical mysticism leads to 'the moral death of reason' [Kt8:175(163)], Kant's Critical mysticism acknowledges what can be called the moral birth of reason.

Most mystics, in fact, regard a concern for the revitalization of everyday life as the end result of the true mystical journey. For the mystical experience is not generally one of confusion or uncertainty, but one of utmost clarity and immediate certainty. Kant's own attitude towards God in Kt9 reflects this same sense of clarity and immediate cer-
tainty. Moreover, just as mystics (contrary to Kant's opinion) do not try to grasp God (or even their own 'nihility') but to open themselves up to be grasped by the transcendent Ground of Being, so also Kant's description of the voice of God speaking through the moral law within is intended not as a way of controlling God, but as a way of recognizing and receiving God's Word immediately and thereby applying it to one's everyday actions.

Kant reveals that he is not entirely antipathetic towards mysticism by appending to his discussion of theology and religion in Kt65 a lengthy letter in which a young student named Wilmans summarizes the content of the Critical System. Kant warns that 'I do not mean to guarantee that my views coincide entirely with his' [69n]; but the title Kant gives to this Appendix ('On a Pure Mysticism of Reason') suggests that his main reason for including this letter is to encourage the reader to flirt with the enticing suggestion Wilmans makes at the end, that true Christian mysticism is entirely consistent with, and perhaps even implied by, the Critical System. (If Kant had objected to this suggestion, he could easily have omitted this last portion of the letter.) Wilmans' argument [74-5] begins at the first point in the letter where he actually addresses Kant, and is worth quoting at length:

I had reached this point in my study of your writings...when I became acquainted with a group of people, called separatists but calling themselves mystics, among whom I found your teachings put into practice almost verbatim. It was indeed difficult to recognize your teachings, at first, in their mystical terms, but after persistent probing I succeeded. It struck me as strange that these people...repudiate all 'divine service' that does not consist in fulfilling one's duties: that they consider themselves religious people and indeed Christians, though they take as their code not the Bible, but only the precepts of an inward Christianity dwelling in us from eternity. I inquired into their conduct and found them (except for the mangy sheep that, from self-interest, get into every flock) a pure moral attitude of will... I examined their teachings and principles and recognized the essentials of your entire moral and religious doctrine...:...they consider the inner law, as they call it, an inward revelation and so regard God as definitely its author. It is true that they regard the Bible as a book which in some way or other--they do not discuss it further--is of divine origin; but,...they infer the divine origin of the Bible from the consistency of the doctrine it contains with their inner law. For if one asks their reason, they reply: The Bible is validated in my heart, as you will
find it in yours if you obey the precepts of your inner law or the teachings of the Bible. For the same reason they do not regard the Bible as their code of laws but only as a historical confirmation in which they recognize what is originally grounded in themselves. In a word, if these people were philosophers they would be (pardon the term!) true Kantians.... Among the educated members I have never encountered fanaticism, but rather free, unprejudiced reasoning and judgment in religious matters.

If Kant really was interested in the prospects of such a Critical mysticism, then we would expect some evidence of a mystical tendency both in his own life and in his philosophical writings. Although it is rarely taken at face value, there is actually ample evidence of such a tendency in both areas. Kant's belief in God was based not on theoretical proof, but on an existential 'conviction that dawns most spontaneously in all minds' [P5:64], which is quite close (if not identical) to the sort of immediate certainty of the transcendent claimed by mystics. As Norburn puts it in N5:432: 'Kant himself never doubted the existence of a Supreme Being... He claimed that our awareness of God came by another route, a route not open (like logic) to the clever devil.' Moreover, Kant sometimes uses phrases which imply some sort of communicative relationship between God and man (such as 'God tells us' [e.g. Kt35:(98); s.a. Kt65:67]), as does his belief that duties can be regarded from the religious (empirical) standpoint as divine commands. For instance, he says in Kt6:490 that 'the sort of moral relation that holds...between God and man surpasses completely the boundaries of ethics and is altogether inconceivable to us.' Ward somehow construes this to mean that God and man are not related [W10:158]; yet Kant's point surely is that a relation holds between God and man, even though the nature of such a relation is 'inconceivable' from the theoretical standpoint.

Kant's favourite idiom for expressing the relation between God and man, which he employs on numerous occasions in his later writings, is that of the 'voice of God' which speaks to man through the common participation of God and man in practical reason. The question as to how this 'voice' is experienced--i.e. as an inner feeling, as an audible voice, or
even as an (apparently) outer vision—is not important, as long as the person who experiences it recognizes that it comes not as a direct (i.e. theoretical) communication, but indirectly, through the mediation of our 'morally legislative reason' [see Kt1:847, q.i. X.3]. To let our activity be guided by this mysterious, inwardly impelling force or spirit is to let ourselves be guided by God. Because God's voice comes to us through the mediation of practical reason, it will always agree with the moral law within us:

For if God should really speak to man, man could still never know that it was God speaking [i.e. the voice does not convey theoretical knowledge]. It is quite impossible for man to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and recognize it as such. But in some cases man can be sure that the voice he hears is not God's; for if the voice commands him to do something contrary to the moral law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may be ...he must consider it an illusion. [Kt65:63]

Kant draws attention away from the theoretical and towards the practical, as usual, in order to guard against fanaticism. But his references to this 'voice' are by no means entirely negative. On the contrary, he associates it with a specific empirical faculty, which he calls 'conscience'. Kant describes conscience in Kt39:495(215) as 'the representative of God, who has His lofty seat above us, but who has also established a tribunal in us.' That it is an empirical faculty is evident from the fact that Kant describes it as 'a third thing' which mediates between 'the moral judgment and the moral law' [Kt35:(69)]. 'Conscience is a state of consciousness which in itself is duty [cf. stage three of systemp].... [It] is the moral faculty of judgment, passing judgment upon itself' [Kt8:185-6(173-4)]. Through this 'consciousness of an inner court in man' [Kt6:437; s.a. 399-400], God shows Himself to be both transcendent ('above us') and immanent ('in us'). Kant does not, however, identify our conscience with God; rather 'conscience must be conceived as a subjective principle of responsibility before God for our deeds' [438], for 'I, the prosecutor and yet the accused as well, am the same man' [438n]. God, as the third person in the Trinity, is 'the real Judge of men (at the bar of
conscience)' [Kt8:145n(136n)]: 'the Judge of men...(the Holy Ghost)... speaks to our conscience according to the holy law which we know' [140n (131n)]. 'The judge within us is just' [Kt35:(67)], then, because it is conscience commanding on God's behalf in accordance with the moral law.

This experience of the voice of God can always be trusted as a person's 'guide' [Kt8:185(173)]; the problem is to be certain that the voice one appeals to for guidance really has its source in the conscience: 'an erring conscience is a nonentity; ...I may err...in the judgment, in which I believe to be in the right: for that belongs to the understanding...; but in the consciousness, whether in fact I believe to be in the right (or merely pretend it), I absolutely cannot err' [Kt64:268(210)].

It is potentially misleading, however, to interpret Kant as saying that 'God's will cannot be...ascertained otherwise than through our conscience' [W12:86]; for Kant does not mean that we cannot learn of God's will in any other way, but only that whatever the outward form (e.g. a passage from Scripture, a sermon, or an inner 'voice'), the validation that it is from God occurs when the message touches our conscience. If a message touches the depths of our being (i.e. the conscience of our practical reason), then we can be sure it is from God. In proposing this view, Kant is not freeing individuals to follow the whims of their desires so long as they convince themselves not to feel guilty. That would be to ignore the voice of conscience. Rather, the ultimate goal of all reflection--and so also of doing philosophy--is to learn how to distinguish properly the voice of God from the impure incentives which speak against the moral law. Along these lines Kant says in Kt31:336 that 'practical wisdom...abides alone with God. And to respond to this Idea, by not obviously acting against it, is what we might perhaps call human wisdom.'

Kant's theory of the individual conscience as the means by which God judges man is entirely consistent with Jesus' teaching about judgment in the Sermon on the Mount. Both insist 'it is impossible to judge the virtue of others from their actions; that Judge, who looks into all hearts,
has reserved that judgement for Himself' [Kt16:200(49); cf. Matthew 6:1,16 and 7:1-5]. Along these lines Kant criticizes 'the forcing of conscience' which clergy tend to impose on laity, which can 'forbid thought itself and really hinder it' by assuming that doubting theoretical doctrines is 'tantamount to lending an ear to the evil spirits' [Kt8:133-4n(124n)]. For a person can become aware of 'the verdict of his future judge' not by examining the correctness of various theoretical beliefs, but only by considering 'his awakening conscience, together with the empirical knowledge of himself [i.e. of his actions] which is summoned to its aid' [77(71)]. This implies that God will judge us on the basis of the judgment of our own conscience, which seems to be part of what Jesus intended to convey in proclaiming that 'in the way you judge [yourself and others], you will be judged [by God]; and by your standard of measure, it shall be measured to you' [Matthew 7:2]. In any case, Kant's understanding of the role of conscience provides significant evidence that he was concerned not only with 'the rational "form" for the decision-making procedure that a Christian would follow, anyway, ...if he acted fully in accordance with Jesus' teachings' [Tl:195]--a description which does accurately describe the purpose of system--but also with the existential experience of the relation between God and man.

Further evidence of Kant's concern for understanding the experience of a relationship between God and man can be gleaned from his description of 'devoutness' as 'an indirect relation of the heart to God' [Kt35: (89)]. This theme has already been discussed at length in XI.3. Here it will suffice to recall Kant's emphasis on devoutness as a way of preparing oneself to act, rather than as a way of manipulating God. This is precisely the emphasis mystics usually put on spiritual exercises such as meditation, prayer and fasting. Most mystics use such disciplines not to grasp God, nor to render themselves well-pleasing to God, but to open themselves up to the immediate presence of God, so that the ordinary actions of their everyday life become imbued with divine energy. That Kant
encourages such Critical mysticism is clear when he proclaims that the true prayer is that in which God's 'all-seeing eye penetrates into our innermost souls and reads our thoughts' [Kt35:(98)] and which should as a result 'fan into flames the cinders of morality in the inner recesses of our heart' [(99)]. The traditional view, that 'a private relation to God ...is in Kant's eyes incompatible with sound morality and sane reason' [W12:155-6], is therefore based on a mistaken interpretation of Kant's criticism. Kant encourages a private relation between God and man through a mutual participation in practical reason; he objects only to the supposition of a public (theoretical) relation based on a pretended sensible intuition of God himself. In other words, he accepts the importance of 'mystery, i.e., something holy which may indeed be known by each single individual but cannot be made known publicly', as long as we understand that 'it must be moral' and 'not for theoretical use' [Kt8:137(129)]. Thus, when he criticizes 'the tendency of prayer to turn God, the proper object of faith, into an object of intuition' [W10:63; see Kt35:(115)], he is not arguing that any attempt at 'fellowship with God' is 'imaginary' [W10:62; s.a. W12:155], but that our experience of such fellowship (which, in itself is neither practical nor theoretical, but empirical) can be adequately explained as being rooted only in our practical reason. Far from denying the validity of a fellowship based on practical faith, Kant actually defends its sufficiency: 'We do not know God by intuition but by faith.... Now faith is undoubtedly no less vigorous a faculty than intuition' [Kt35:(114-5); s.a. Kt8:52(48)].

A criticism which is often made of Kant is well-expressed by Otto in 03:143: 'It is one thing merely to believe in a reality beyond the senses and another to have experience of it also; it is one thing to have ideas of "the holy" and another to become consciously aware of it as an operative reality, intervening actively in the phenomenal world.' Webb applies this criticism directly to Kant in W12:22: 'With Science and with Morality one feels that Kant was completely at home... With Aesthe-
tics, and with Religion...the case is otherwise. The circumstances of
his life denied Kant any extensive experience of visible beauty, whether
natural or wrought by art.' He adds that, in spite of his 'congenital
incapacity for much that is most characteristically religious', Kant's
philosophy of religion 'is epoch-making in theology' [24; s.a. 60]. To
back up these judgments Webb would presumably refer to the well known
biographical details of Kant's life: to the fact that he never strayed
more than ten or twenty miles from his birthplace in Königsberg; to his
rigidly structured daily schedule, so mechanical that his neighbors, it
is said, could set their clocks by his daily comings and goings; and to
his lack of church attendance [see e.g. K9a:38,43]. Yet none of these
facts points necessarily to a philistine attitude towards life. On the
contrary, many mystics would affirm that the more one travels, the more
difficult it is to maintain the mystical centre of one's experience (i.e.
one's 'home'). Surely one does not have to view natural wonders such as
the Grand Canyon or Mount Everest in order to appreciate God's presence
in a flower: the most ordinary landscape is quite capable of evoking a
deep (mystical) response from a person who is intimately familiar with
it. And generally it is not the philistine who is disciplined, but the
mystic; for only in the context of a disciplined life can the voice of
God be clearly distinguished from one's own inclinations. Moreover, it
seems extraordinarily odd to assume that someone who is capable of ex-
pounding the heart of the Christian message, as Kant did so profoundly in
Kt8, was himself uninterested in (to say nothing of congenitally incap-
able of!) religious experience as such.

If we ignore the well known descriptions of Kant's life and charac-
ter, and consider the facts carefully and with an open mind, it turns out
that there is ample evidence that he not only believed in a theoretical
ideal which manifests itself in our practical reason, speaks to our con-
science, and communes with us in prayer, but also actively experienced
the reality of God in his daily life. Webb admits that 'there is no doubt
that Kant could...have given in all sincerity an affirmative reply to the question: 'Whether he feared God from his heart' [W12:28]. But Rabel goes much further in R1:vii:

Kant was a profoundly religious man.... When Kant had discovered [on one of his daily walks] that in a bad summer swallows threw some of their own young out of the nest in order to keep the others alive, he said: 'My intelligence stood still. There was nothing to do but to fall on one's knees and worship.'

(Wallace relates the same story in more detail in W4:53, and adds that once Kant said 'he had held a swallow in his hand, and gazed into its eyes; "and as I gazed, it was as if I had seen into heaven."') To the average person, out of touch with the voice of God, the observation that swallows had killed their own young would be more likely to evoke confusion or disgust with the evils of nature than an attitude of worship. Yet for Kant, who believed we should always try 'to discover the good in evil' [Kt39:495(216)], it evoked an overwhelming sense of divine Providence [s.a. Kt46:431(95)]. Note, however, that it evoked this response of fearful respect for God precisely because he was unable to understand it: reason rests in the face of immediate experience; yet this rest is not so much a death as a new birth, if reason accepts its submission to a higher power. This is the alternative offered by Critical mysticism.

The two-fold aspect of Kant's mystical world-view is expressed most clearly by his famous exclamation in Kt4:161-2e.a.:

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as though obscured in darkness or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon: I see them before me, and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence.

Such a statement could only be made by a person who had spent long hours meditating on the hand of God in nature and on the voice of God in conscience. The starry heavens and the moral law obviously symbolize for Kant systemt and systemp, respectively. But what 'fills the mind with awe' is not empirical knowledge of the stars or moral activity as such, but rather a meditative observation of how these wonders operate in our
immediate experience. There is no third object of meditation representing system$_q$ because this system is not concerned with knowledge, but with feelings. 'Feelings are not knowledge and so do not indicate [the presence of] a mystery' [Kt8:138(129)t.b.]. His explanation in Kt7 of purposiveness in nature and of beauty as the 'symbol of morality' [see IX.2-3] should therefore be regarded as attempts to justify, from an empirical standpoint, the feelings of awe which arise out of meditation on the mysteries of system$_t$ and system$_p$. Only this assumption—that Kant's own religious experience arose more profoundly in his personal contact with conscience and with nature than in his participation in organized religion—can adequately explain why he chose beauty and teleology as the topics of Kt7 (the Critique which he explicitly regards as providing a religious answer to the question 'What may I hope?' [see XI.1]) rather than more traditional forms of religion. The rest of this section will be devoted to a closer look at these two objects of Critical meditation.

We have already considered in some detail how, as Webb puts it, 'Kant's attitude towards the moral law is always profoundly religious, full of...what Professor Otto...taught us to call das Numinoses' [W12: 58]. Kant says, for example, that our soul regards 'with the highest wonder' and with exalted 'admiration...the original moral predisposition itself in us' [Kt8:49(44)], for 'the very incomprehensibility of the predisposition...announces a divine origin' [49-50(45)]. An autobiographical remark towards the end of his life shows that Kant put into practice the theory he propounds:

...when composing my writings, I have always pictured this judge as standing at my side to keep me not only from error that corrupts the soul, but even from any careless expression that might give offence. And...now, in my seventy-first year,...I can hardly help thinking that I may well have to answer for this very soon to a judge of the world who scrutinizes men's hearts [Kt65:9-10].

His meditative attitude towards the moral law can be adequately summarized as an attempt not to know God, but to recognize and accept His proper role as 'a knower of hearts' [Kt64:269(212)].
Unfortunately, commentators are usually not as aware of Kant's profound religious attitude towards nature. Webb, for instance, laments 'that Kant did not more clearly perceive in his own attitude in the presence of the starry heavens a proof that Religion has other roots than the experience of moral obligation' [W12:177]. However, just because Kant believed no theoretical proof can be adequate to demonstrate the existence of God does not mean that he failed to appreciate the immediate presence of God in nature, viewed empirically. On the contrary, as we saw in IX.3, Kant admits the force of the teleological argument for God's existence, as long as it is viewed as an empirical, rather than a theoretical, proof. Surely, this indicates just as clear a perception of the presence of God in the experience of nature as in 'the experience of moral obligation'—though in neither case is this perception or feeling a sufficient basis for theoretical proof. Indeed, evidence of Kant's meditative attitude towards nature can be found both in the details of his life and in the contents of his writings.

Kant's mother, whom he greatly respected, taught him at an early age to appreciate his natural surroundings [W4:12,53]. As he once told his friend Jachmann, 'she planted and tended the first seeds of good in me. She opened my heart to the impressions of nature; she awakened and widened my ideas, and her teachings have had an enduring, healing influence on my life' [a.q.i. K9a:16]. In his early adulthood (between 1746 and 1755) Kant worked as a live-in tutor for several wealthy families who lived on country estates near Königsberg. During these seven or eight years [cf. W4:19-21 and K9a:22-3] he must have had ample opportunity to experience the hand of God in nature, as his mother had taught him. (He also sometimes preached sermons in the village churches.) And even after becoming a professor at the age of forty-six [W4:34], he disciplined himself to break away from the lively conversation at his dinner table at four in the afternoon in order to enjoy an hour or more of peaceful walking. These walks he usually took in solitude, either on the 'Philosophers'
Embarkment' along the river Pregel or to the north-west of town along various garden paths [40-1; K9a:481]. (He also enjoyed 'going for excursions into the country surrounding his native town', especially to the 'idyllic' forest just a mile to the north-east, where he composed Kt57, his pre-Critical essay on the feeling of beauty [K9a:27-8].) As he walked, he was careful to keep his mouth closed and breath through his nose, because he believed this could help prevent disease, but also, no doubt, as an excuse for walking alone in silence [49]. Such an interest in keeping disciplined periods of silence and solitude is likely to give rise to a religious experience of some sort, even if one is not consciously fostering a mystical bent. (Furthermore, Kant usually fasted on 'nothing but water' in between his once a day afternoon meals [49].) That Kant may have been more conscious of the spiritual benefit of his disciplined lifestyle than is generally recognized is suggested by the fact that, upon returning home from his walks, he would spend the next few hours doing what could be called meditating: 'As darkness began to fall, he would take his seat at the stove, and with his eye fixed on the tower of Loebenicht church would ponder on the problems which exercised his mind' [W4:41].

The impact of Kant's meditative mind-set on his attitude towards nature is clearly reflected in his writings on nature. For example, he says in Kt46:431(95): 'Man, who is intrusted with the oeconomy of the earth, not only possesses a capacity, but takes a pleasure in learning to know it, and through his introspections glorifieth the Creator.' The book which contains Kant's most important 'introspections' into nature (viz. Kt43) and which gave rise to a revolutionary theory of the universe (often called the Kant-Laplace theory), has at times an 'almost mystical tone' [W4:108]. In the 'Opening Discourse' Kant explicitly links his introspections into nature with his experience of the presence of God: 'at each step I saw the clouds...dissipate, and...the splendour of the Highest Being break forth with the most vivid brilliance' [Kt43:222(81)].
As he draws his discussion to a close he exclaims at one point that 'God paints himself in all his creatures' [360(190), alt.], thus implying the view he develops in Kt7 of nature as the artwork of God. And in the final paragraph he makes a profound statement of the mystical experience of the hand of God in nature: 'In the universal silence of nature and in the calm of the senses the immortal spirit's hidden faculty of knowledge speaks an ineffable language and gives [us] undeveloped concepts, which are indeed felt, but do not let themselves be described' [367(196), alt.].

This attitude towards nature is by no means limited to Kant's pre-Critical works. In Kt19:410, when he had already adopted the Critical doctrine of intuition, he nevertheless affirms that 'we intuit all things in God.' Far from giving up this view in his later life, the entire Critical System can be regarded as an explanation of its implications [see e.g. Kt6:481]. Thus a comment much like that quoted from Kt43:367(196) is made in Kt8:197(185-6):

...the contemplation of the profound wisdom of the divine creation in the smallest things, and its majesty in the great...is a power which cannot only transport the mind into that sinking mood, called adoration, annihilating men, as it were, in their own eyes; it is also, in respect of its own moral determination, so soul-elevating a power that words, in comparison, ...must needs pass away as empty sound because the emotion arising from such a vision of the hand of God is inexpressible.

The main difference between this and his pre-Critical eulogy of the mystical contemplation of nature is that he now distinguishes between the fanatical tendency to allow oneself to be annihilated by the mystical 'vision' and the Critical mysticism according to which one accepts the inexpressible but immediate presence of God as a private confirmation of the moral postulate of God's existence. The philosopher whose 'bent' in life is supposed to have been 'remote' from any emotional experience of God's presence [W12:60] confirms in Kt64:264(204-5) that a full appreciation of God's presence in one's contemplative experience of conscience and of nature is, in the end, the only solution to the problem of evil:
The world, as a work of God, may be contemplated by us as a divine publication of the designs of his will. For there [i.e. in 'an authentic theodocioe', as provided by our experience of God] God is by our reason the very expounder of his own will announced by the creation; ...that is not the exposition of a reasoning (speculative) practical reason, but of a practical reason possessing potency, which... may be considered as the immediate declaration and voice of God, by which he giveth a meaning to the letter of his creation.

A detailed study of Kt18 and Kt9 would confirm this portrayal of Kant as a Critical mystic; yet no space remains to include its results. Instead, it must suffice to conclude by relating Kant's dual emphasis on the experience of God in conscience and nature to his metaphor of the Critical philosopher as standing on the shoreline between the sea and the beach. As Beck suggests in B15:11: 'Kant speaks of hugging the shore of experience and staying far away from the high and stormy seas of metaphysical speculation. Yet that may have been where his heart was.' Indeed, we can picture Kant standing on the wet sand at the beach near Königsberg, with the waves periodically splashing over his feet, feeling the setting of the sun in his heart and the gradual appearance of the stars overhead. This imagery is admittedly somewhat fanciful, yet it is suggested by Kant's own favourite metaphors, and can be regarded as quite an appropriate symbol of his System of Perspectives. For the Critical philosopher stands at the crossroads of immediate experience and casts a reflective gaze over the earth of knowledge on one side and the sea of faith on the other, and recognizes that only on the border between these two can a person fully appreciate the awesome presence of God in light of conscience within and the majestic stars above; for none of these perspectives on its own suffices to define human nature. Kant is not called the 'sage of Königsberg' for nothing. As a true sage, he makes his home quietly on the borderlands, denying all extremes (including extreme mysticism), yet offering the common man a vision of life—a Critical mysticism—which can be enjoyed by anyone who is willing to submit to the God of the shoreline, the God who always escapes our theoretical grasp, yet speaks to us in the universal experiences of nature and conscience.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Bibliography is divided into two parts: 'Kant texts' and 'Secondary sources'. Part One contains three sections: (I) Kant's primary systematic works (arranged in logical order, as determined in III.3 above); (II) his secondary writings and published lectures (classified by subject-matter first, then chronologically); and (III) writings unpublished during his lifetime. Classifications in (II) are made according to what I consider to be the dominant theme of each work, though several choices would be possible in some cases, where the work deals with several themes; terms such as 'scientific' and 'historical' should be regarded in Kant's special, rather loose, sense. 'K2' refers to the standard, Berlin Academy edition of Kant's works (as listed in Part Two of the Bibliography). The German title and year of each work is specified first, followed by the translation used in quoting each work (if any); all other known translations are then listed in brackets. Translations of excerpts are mentioned only for works whose translation has not been published in full. Partial translations (i.e. more than half, but not complete) are always listed. Books translating more than one of Kant's works or containing significant secondary material, are listed by the letter-number code assigned in the second part of the Bibliography. Page references in the text are to the K2 pagination, followed by the translator's pagination (in curved brackets) for translations in which the K2 pagination is not provided. The only exceptions are: Kt1, references to which are to the second (1787) German edition (B), unless the material is unique to the 1781 edition, in which case the page number will be prefixed with an 'A'; the texts used for Kt26 and Kt35 are not included as such in K2, so only the translator's pagination (in brackets) is given. Quotes from untranslated works (in either part of the Bibliography) are either my own, or else taken from some secondary source (which is then specified in the reference using the abbreviation 'a.q.i.').
Kant Texts (Kt)

Primary Systematic Works


Kt9: Opus Postumum, notes written mostly between 1796 and 1803 (see Ala), K2:21-22.passim. Suggested title: The Ideal of the Physical and at the same time Morally-Practical Reason United under One Sense-Object.

Bibliography (Kant texts)

II. Secondary published works (and lectures)

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2. Practical

a. Ethics and Law


Kt30: Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, 1793, K2:8.273-313. Tr. H.B. Nisbet as On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice' in N5:61-92. (Also tr. anonymously in R5:1.159-223; Hastie in H9:31-76 (Parts II and III only); Friedrich in F6:412-29; and E.B. Ashton [Philadelphia: 1974].)

Kt31: Das Ende aller Dinge, 1794, K2:8.325-39. Tr. R.E. Anchor as The End of All Things in B11:69-84. (Also tr. anonymously in R5:2.423-44.)


b. Education


Kt38: Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, 1784, K2:8.33-42. Tr. L.W. Beck as What Is Enlightenment? in B11:3-10 (and in B5:286-92). (Also tr. anonymously in R5:1.1-14; Friedrich in F6:132-9; and Nisbet in N5:54-60.)


3. Empirical

a. Philosophy of Nature


Bibliography (Kant texts) 353


Kt44: \textit{Meditatioinum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio}, 1755, K2:1.369-84. Tr. L.W. Beck as \textit{Succinct Exposition of Some Meditations on Fire in B15:23-44.}


Kt46: \textit{Geschichte und Naturbeschreibung der merkwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens, welches an dem Ende des 1755sten Jahres einen grossen Theil der Erde erschüttert hat}, 1756, K2:1.429-61. Tr. anonymously as \textit{History and Physiography of the Most Remarkable Cases of the Earthquake which towards the End of 1755 Shock a Great Part of the Earth in R5:2.93-142.}


Kt49: \textit{Entwurf und Ankündigung eines Collegii der physischen Geographie nebst dem Anhange einer kurzen Betrachtung über die Frage: Ob die Westwinde in unsern Gegenden darum feucht seien, weil sie über ein grosses Meer streichen}, 1757, K2:2.1-12. Excerpts tr. G. Rabel as \textit{Outline of a Course of Lectures in Physical Geography to which is appended a brief contemplation of the question, whether the West Winds in our Region are humid because they pass over a large Sea in Rl:35-6.}

Kt50: \textit{Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe und der damit verknüpften Folgerungen in den ersten Gründen der Naturwissenschaft}, 1758, K2:2.13-25. Excerpts tr. G. Rabel as \textit{Magister Immanuel Kant's New Doctrine of Motion and Rest and of the consequences attached to it in the first Principles of Natural Science, by which at the same time his lectures in the present half-year are announced in Rl:37-9.}

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b. Philosophy of Man


Kt64: Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee, 1791, K2:8.253-71. Tr. anonymously as On the
Failure of All the Philosophical Essays in the Theodic\(\acute{\text{e}}\) in R5:2.189-215. (Also tr. M. Despland in D5:283-97.)


*Kt65 would fit more appropriately into section II.2.A, between Kt34 and Kt35. Unfortunately, I recognized this after it was too late to change the numbering system.

III. Unpublished Writings

1. Letters (K2:11-13.passim)

   Most important letters are translated in Z1 (but see also A5, K6, R1 [excerpts] and S15).

2. Reflections (K2:14-19.passim)

   There is no substantial translation of the reflections (but see B27:225-37). The subjects in the volumes of K2 are as follows:
   14 = Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Physical Geography.
   15 = Anthropology
   16 = Knowledge and Reason
   17 = Metaphysics
   18 = Metaphysics
   19 = Moral, Legal and Religious Philosophy

   Kt67: B15:202-13; from K2:15.903-34.
   Kt68: B15:228-38; from K2:15.939-53.

3. Other (K2:20.passim and 23-28.passim)

   The subjects in these volumes of K2 are as follows:
   20 = Aesthetics, Metaphysics, and Misc.
   23 = Notes in margins of Kant's books.
   24 = Lecture notes on Logic (2 vols).
   25 = Not available.
   26 = Not available.
   27 = Lecture notes on Moral Philosophy (3 vols).
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