SHORT ABSTRACT

While historians of Britain in the 1640s have long been attracted by the English New Model Army and in recent years by the English royalist armies, the armies fielded by the Scottish Covenanters have suffered a strange neglect. It was not until the work on this thesis was well-advanced that the crude nature of previous efforts became apparent. In an attempt to provide a basic understanding of the Covenanting forces, this thesis synthesizes a mass of material relating to the religious aspects of the armies. Two crucial questions emerged: did the military reflect Scottish society or any part of it; were the Covenanters' forces godly armies seeking to evangelize the areas they occupied?

These themes have been interpreted broadly to include the rules of war, the army chaplains, religious manifestations in military life, the moral behaviour of the soldiers, and the role of the armies in spreading the presbyterian faith. In addition to those topics, an examination of the soldiers' relations with civilians and the political activities of the military have been included. The first most clearly allows one to determine whether the Covenanting armies attained the status of godly armies. The political question arises out of the close relationship between religious and political activities in the period.

With the exception of family legal papers the entire spectrum of Scottish seventeenth-century sources was inspected. The records of the
Estates and its committees, the General Assembly and its Commission, form the basic sources for a view of national developments. At the local level the burgh, presbytery, family and kirk session records proved invaluable. Unfortunately few diaries, memoirs or letters survived. English materials—primarily state papers, pamphlets and newsbooks—were also helpful.

The findings of this thesis suggest that the armies of the Covenanter failed to achieve the ideals set for them.
In the last decade several scholars have turned their attention to Scotland in the 1640s. Dr. David Stevenson has produced four volumes and many articles on the Covenanters between 1637 and 1651, which concentrated on political and ecclesiastical history. In the former field he is responsible for the first large scale study of the Covenanting state. His two most recent volumes (on Alasdair MacColla and on Scottish-Irish relations) have illustrated the importance of the Highlands and Ireland in Covenanting policy. The second of them has provided the first definitive history of a Covenanting army - that in Ulster. Dr. Walter Makey has played a pioneering role in establishing the history of the Church of Scotland as an institution in the 1640s, explaining how the governing of the Kirk changed between 1639 and 1651. He has also provided us with sociological and professional information on the clergy and elders. Mr. Edward Cowan has written a biography of the 1st marquis of Montrose and is currently completing one on the 1st marquis of Argyll. Ms. Margaret Steele is working on the propaganda of the Covenanters. Mr. Alan MacInnes has nearly finished a thesis on the local organisation of the Covenanters from 1637 to 1641. The first local study of this kind, done by Mr. R.A. Bensen, examined the presbytery of Dunfermline and its experiences during the 1640s. Nevertheless, the research in
progress on the Covenanters scarcely constitutes a highly developed field of inquiry.

The armies, with which this thesis specifically deals, have received incidental treatment in Mr. Cowan's, Mr. Bensen's and Mr. MacInnes' work. Only Dr. Stevenson has devoted more than an occasional reference to them. His most recent volumes provide an in-depth treatment of the Ulster army (1642-8) and a sketch of the home armies (1644-7). The history of the Covenanters and their armies contain a richness both of topics and of source materials. The major function of the national and local units of Scottish government in the 1639-1651 period was the provision of men, money and supplies for armies which served not only in Scotland but also in England and Ireland. Therefore, the greater our understanding of the armies, the more we shall learn about Scottish government, society and life in general during the 1640s.

The aims of this thesis on the religious aspects of the Covenanting forces are two-fold. First, it seeks to determine whether the armies reflected the societies they served. The armies initially consisted of civilian recruits both from the countryside and burghs. These men were accustomed to a life of peace, Scotland not having had any wars since the 1570s. In time the recruits became professional soldiers, although for some the paymaster never replaced the authority of the chaplain. Time and again a change at the national level was discovered to have its counterpart in the military. The second matter considered is whether the Covenanters fielded godly armies according to the standard of the day. The records of the Covenanters themselves indicate that such was their intention. The story of their successes and failures in the pursuit of this end receives attention throughout the study. Having set out with these two questions in mind the manner of proceeding became
obvious: every topic relating to army behaviour had to be examined. With the exception of family legal papers the entire spectrum of Scottish seventeenth century sources was inspected. The records of the Estates and its committees, the General Assembly and its Commission form the basic sources for a view of national developments. At the local level the burgh, presbytery, family and kirk session records proved invaluable. Unfortunately, few diaries, memoirs or letters survived. English materials - primarily state papers, pamphlets and newsbooks - were also helpful.

The materials for a history of the armies are found in a great variety of places. State, church and family papers contain information on levying and quartering soldiers. A limited number of diaries, memoirs, letters and histories refer to the causes of the wars, the armies' campaigns and size. Chapter one contains the results of the background research. Each of the eleven armies (those of the First and Second Bishops' Wars, Ulster, the Solemn League and Covenant, 'home', New Model, Engagers, Whiggamores, Covenants, Western Association and Kingdom) receives separate treatment. The beginning of each section discusses the causes of war, both perceived and real. The details of the raising of the army constitutes the second subsection. The Kirk - both at the national and local levels - played an influential role in determining the successes of a levy. There is not enough evidence to establish whether or not the parish officials adapted the details of the Swedish conscription system. The local nobles were probably too strong for that to occur. Nevertheless, the ministers and heritors worked together to select recruits, a system much in advance of that used in England. A brief account of the campaigns and size of the army forms the next two topics of each section. The difficulty in determining both the population
of Scotland and the size of the armies makes it impossible to estimate the drain on manpower reserves. The final section of each army's short history examines the social status of the colonels. It rapidly becomes apparent that those who controlled the political apparatus commanded the army. For example, the coming to power of the lairds in the 1649 parliament is reflected in the men selected to command the army. Unlike England, the politicians controlled the armed forces of their party. In England political and military leaders often diverged; in Scotland the opposition either remained silent or else raised the standard of rebellion.

The second chapter answers the question: what was the Covenanters' image of a godly army? Borrowing both from Swedish and Scottish examples, Alexander Leslie, commander-in-chief of most of the Covenanters' armies, produced the Articles of War. These rules dealt not only with the military duty of soldiers and military-civilian relations, but also established the guidelines for religion in the army. Leslie stated the need for chaplains and set aside specific times for worship. More important, he adapted the civilian kirk session-presbytery arrangement for the army. That unique innovation was no mere theoretical model but actually functioned in the armies of the Covenanters.

The chaplains who served the armies are the focus of the third chapter. The discussion on the method of selecting them reveals that control of the process slipped from the hands of the presbyteries and colonels into those of the church executive - the Commission of the General Assembly. Proximity to the area of conflict or to the Commission often meant that presbyteries contributed unequally to the provision of chaplains. Despite the financial attraction of service, ministers served the armies out of ideological conviction. This conclusion is
reinforced when one compares the chaplains with the ministers of the Church of Scotland. Like the average minister the chaplains possessed a university degree, a parish and a family. However, they exhibited a much greater tendency to join either the radical clergy in the 1650s or the nonconformers in the 1660s. Undoubtedly, the presence of radical ministers as chaplains influenced both the soldiers' behaviour and ideology to some degree.

The wide variety of religious manifestations within the armies provides the material for chapter four. Beginning with an examination of services set by Leslie, the first section of the chapter investigates the observance of fasts and thanksgivings. Evidence concerning the set worship is often sketchy, however it is much better for the other observances. The next section discusses the part played by religion before battles. Atrocities committed by the Covenanters are investigated to determine the role played by religious prejudice and the chaplains. The chapter ends by discussing the soldiers' acceptance of God's providence in events.

The following two chapters form different parts of a single theme - the godliness of the armies. Using church records chapter five investigates the soldier as sinner. The records reveal that sex was the chief preoccupation of the soldier in his leisure time. Acts of violence against persons and drunkenness had no great attraction for the soldiers. Cavalry-men were more notorious sinners than the foot soldiers and certain regiments cultivated poor reputations. However, the low number of recorded cases of sins does not suggest that the men in the Covenanting forces were 'scandalous and profane'.

The state of military-civilian relations is examined by looking at each of the eleven armies in turn. In every case the poor supply
condition of the army is easily established. Lacking financial resources the Covenanter state and its chief ally – the English parliament – could not create an adequate commissariat for provisioning the armies. Instead each of the armies had recourse to free quartering (legally or illegally) foraging and imposing cess. Even in the instances where such activities were ordered by the state, the civilians complained of the soldiers’ oppression. For example, on three occasions in England in the mid-1640s the exactions became so intolerable as to cause risings. Drawing on the legal tradition of commissions of fire and sword and traditional family feuds, plundering and destruction were considered legitimate means of wreaking havoc on the enemies of the Covenanters. However, the soldiers often carried out such destruction without their officers’ authority. In sum, the Covenantter soldier appears the equal not of the English New Model or the continental soldier but of the English royalist soldier. This comparison is not exact, for the Covenantter soldier probably exhibited a higher moral standard than his royalist counterpart.

The Kirk showed its concern for the Covenanting soldier in many ways. Chapter seven begins with the campaign by the Commission of the General Assembly to establish the criteria for recruiting troops in 1651. In that controversy the Kirk lost both in its conflict with the state and within itself. Spiritual care for the armies was a more fruitful field. Various church courts set fasts and thanksgivings as the situation demanded. The provision of charity for soldiers and their dependants served as a more concrete expression of the Kirk’s concern. On certain occasions the Commission volunteered the Kirk’s assistance in raising money, supplies or regiments. The armies often benefitted from this intervention by the Kirk.

The political issues which emerged within the Covenanting armies
were not as interesting as those which developed in England. The growth and victories of royalism form the main theme in chapter eight. Until 1646 the royalist officers attempted several plots, but it was only in that year that a substantial number of officers promised to support Charles I, on condition that he imposed presbyterianism on England. Following the king's agreement to this in 1648 nearly all the officers supported him. However, a minority of officers and soldiers accepted the leadership of the Kirk, which opposed the Engagement. From 1648 to 1650 the Church and state united in the policies of forcing the Engager soldiers to repent and of purging the army. These policies resulted in a backlash against the kirk party in 1651 and against presbyterianism in 1660. Although a militant royalism permeated the army in 1651, it had not gained the allegiance of all former officers. In the autumn of 1650 a group of kirk party officers had joined with other laymen and some clergy to form the Remonstrant party. The Remonstrants split into two groups: the moderate one favoured a strictly controlled Covenanted monarchy with no toleration; the radical group espoused republicanism and toleration. Neither branch attracted many soldiers, and after the defeat of its army it became chiefly clerical. The bonds of traditional Scottish society and the control of the Kirk over the religious life of the armies inhibited the growth of radical politics.

The final chapter deals with the efforts of the armies and their chaplains to establish presbyterianism in the localities outside Scotland. In England the Covenanters faced every imaginable disadvantage against such a policy, including religious prejudice and hatred of their oppressive soldiers. Nevertheless, in 1640–1 the army presbytery, with some success, tried to inculcate the English of the
northeast with presbyterianism. The occupation of 1644-7 was less fruitful. Overall the religious legacy of the English occupations was meagre. Ulster presented a situation entirely favourable to the Covenanters. The people were fiercely presbyterian, despite suffering a decade of persecution. There the burden imposed by the army was offset by its service as a shield against the Irish catholic rebels. The army presbytery worked with the support of the army. Thus, by 1648 when the army ceased to exist the presbytery had transformed itself into a civilian one which ran the ecclesiastical affairs of protestant controlled Ulster.

This thesis thus seeks to establish the importance of religion throughout the Covenanting armies. The armies may have failed to earn the title of godly, nevertheless their behaviour was not as bad as that of some of their contemporaries and better than that of others. Given an adequate supply system, the Covenanters' forces might well have gained a place in history along with Gustavus Adolphus' early armies and the English New Model Army.
THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE SCOTTISH COVENANTING ARMIES, 1639–1651

Edward Mackie Furgol

St. Cross College

Presented for the degree of D.Phil.

University of Oxford

Hilary, 1982.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: THE SWORD OF THE LORD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: THE LAWS OF THE LORD</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: THE HOUSE OF LEVI</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4: RELIGION IN THE ARMIES</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5: THE GODLY ARMIES: PART I</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SOLDIER AS SINNER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6: THE GODLY ARMIES: PART II</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE RAPACIOUS WARRIOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 7: THE CHURCH AND THE ARMIES</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 8: POLITICS AND THE ARMIES 1639–1651</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 9: THE ARMIES AND THEIR CHAPLAINS AS</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENTS OF PRESBYTERIAN EXPANSION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I: THE DIARY OF MR. JOHN LAUDER OF</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYNINGHAME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When one considers the importance of religion in Covenanting Scotland and the developments in the historiography of the English civil war a study of the religious aspects of the Scottish Covenanting armies has long been appropriate. The apparatus of the Covenanting state was geared towards the raising and care of armies. Thus, the military aspect of Scottish history in the 1640s has implications in numerous other topics (for example, the activities of the Kirk). Consequently, the entire range of Scottish records proved useful for this study.

The aid of numerous institutions has proved helpful. The staffs and collections in the Bodleian Library, British Library, Public Record Office, Institute of Historical Research Library, Presbyterian Church Historical Society Library, Widener Library, Houghton Rare Books Library, Boston Public Library, Royal Irish Academy, Trinity College Dublin Library, National Library of Ireland, Representative Church Body Library, Public Record Office Northern Ireland, Presbyterian House Library Belfast, Strathclyde Regional Archives, University of Aberdeen Library, University of St. Andrews Library, St. Andrews Public Library, New Register House, West Register House, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh Public Library, University of Edinburgh Library, Department of Scottish History (Edinburgh) Library, New College Library and the Scottish Record Office receive my deep gratitude. I would like to express my thanks to my parents, St. Cross College, the University of Oxford Hardship Committee and the Department of Scottish History, Edinburgh, for the financial assistance which they rendered me.

Correspondence with the following postgraduates has elucidated several
points for which I am grateful: Mr. R. Ritchie, the Rev. B. Kingsmore, Mr. T.P.J. McCall, Mr. P.A. Lucas, Mrs. N. Murphy, Mr. W. Dumble, Mr. G.E.M. Tarlin, Mr. R. Burkinsher, and Miss A.L. Hughes. Dr. S. Burrell, Dr. R.G. Cant, Mr. B. Lenman, Professor J. Cameron, Mr. R.A. Bensen, Dr. I. Cowan, Mr. E. Cowan, Mr. A. MacInnes, Mrs. M. Steele, Mr. M. Mirabello, Miss S.A. Millsopp, Dr. P. Dukes, Dr. D. Stevenson, Miss A. Laurence and Dr. W. Makey all receive my hearty thanks for their comments in conversation or by letter. The Rev. W.B. Aitken kindly allowed me to examine the originals of the Dumfries presbytery records which are under his care. Dr. D. Stevenson permitted me to read the typescript of his book on Scottish-Irish relations in November, 1978, which proved to be very useful. For their friendship and hospitality the Graingers, Mr. M.S. Brzeski and Miss E. Ewan receive my gratitude. My parents and my wife, Mary, have rendered invaluable assistance and encouragement. I would like to thank Professor G.W.S. Barrow and Dr. M. Lynch for reading and commenting on the thesis in its entirety. My advisors Dr. T.C. Barnard and Dr. G.E. Aylmer have proved unstinting in their aid. I must also thank my typist Mrs. D. Williamson for her patience and perseverance. Nevertheless all errors, omissions or faults in this work should be laid solely at my feet.
ABREVIATIONS

Aberdeen Council, i-ii.


Aberdeen Letters, ii-iii.


Acts Parl. Scot., v-vi, i-ii.


Adair.

Adair, P., A True Narrative of the Rise and Progress of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, ed. Killen, W.D. (Belfast, 1866).

Ancram Correspondence, i-ii.


Argyll.


Army, i-ii.


Articles, 1639, 1640, 1644, 1650.

Articles of militarie discipline (Edinburgh, 1639); Articles and ordinances of warre for the present expedition of the Armie of the kingdom of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1640); Articles and Ordinances of warre, for the present Expedition of the Army of Scotland (London, 1644); Articles and Ordinances of War, by the Committee of Estates and His Excellencie, the Lord General of the Army (Edinburgh, 1650).

Baillie, i-iii.

The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, Principal of the University of Glasgow, 1637-1662, ed. Laing, D. (Bannatyne Club, lxxii, parts 1 and 2, lxxvii, 1841-2).

Balfour, Annales, i-iv.


Bensen, 'Dunfermline'.


EL.

British Library.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bod. Lib.</th>
<th>Bodleian Library.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commons Journals, ii-vi.</td>
<td>Journals of the House of Commons, ii-vi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSR</td>
<td>Kirk Session Records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makey, Church.</td>
<td>Makey, W., The Church of the Covenant, 1637-1651 (Edinburgh, 1979).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makey, 'Ministers'.</td>
<td>Makey, W., 'Ministers in Scottish Parishes, 1648' (a list of the ministers with biographical data kindly loaned to me by the author).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>National Library of Scotland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRH</td>
<td>New Register House, Edinburgh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Presbytery Records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office, London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRONI</td>
<td>Public Record Office, Northern Ireland (Belfast).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCEB</td>
<td>Representative Church Body Library, Dublin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Synod Records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Strathclyde Regional Archives, Glasgow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevenson, 'Covenants'</td>
<td>Stevenson, D., 'Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates, Scottish - Irish relations in the mid-seventeenth century' (a recently published book which the author kindly allowed me to consult in ms.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathbogie</td>
<td>Extracts from the Presbytery Book of Strathbogie, 1631-54, ed. Stuart, J. (Spalding Club, vii, 1843).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCD</td>
<td>Trinity College Library, Dublin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRH</td>
<td>West Register House, Edinburgh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.1</td>
<td>Commanders of northeastern Forces March–June 1639</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.2</td>
<td>Commanders in Leslie's army 1639</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.3</td>
<td>Commanders of Forces in other areas March–June 1639</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.4</td>
<td>Commanders of Home Forces 1640–1641</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.5</td>
<td>Commanders in Leslie's Army 1640–1641</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.6</td>
<td>Commanders of the Ulster Army 1642–1648</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.7</td>
<td>Commanders in the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.8</td>
<td>Second colonels in the same army</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.9</td>
<td>Third colonels in the same army</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.10</td>
<td>Commanders in the Home Armies 1644–1647</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.11</td>
<td>Commanders in the New Model Army 1647–1648</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.12</td>
<td>Colonels and Routmasters by the Act of 5 May 1648</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.13</td>
<td>Colonels appointed by the 5 August 1648 Order</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.14</td>
<td>Colonels identifiable by English POW Lists</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.15</td>
<td>Commanders by the 28 February 1649 Act of Levy</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.16</td>
<td>Commanders from the pay list of 31 July 1649</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.17</td>
<td>Commanders of Foot regts. by the 3 July 1650 Act</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.18</td>
<td>Colonels in the Army of the Kingdom 1650–1651</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>Method of Selecting Chaplains</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2</td>
<td>Presbyteries providing more chaplains than the majority of presbyteries, listed by importance %</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.3</td>
<td>Chaplains refusing or exempted from service</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.4</td>
<td>Type of Service %</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.5</td>
<td>Table of Previous and Further Service</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.6</td>
<td>Identification of Ministers %</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.7</td>
<td>Education % (100 base for total universities)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.8</td>
<td>Chaplains with wives %</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Chaplains with children %</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Political Views of Chaplains %</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>Allegiance of Chaplains in 1622 %</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Scandalous Speeches</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Scandalous Behaviour</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Fornication</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Fathering of Bastards</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Adultery</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Punishments by army, sex and sin</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Sin by branches of service</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Sins per army</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Engager Repentance</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

While historians of Britain in the 1640s have long been attracted by the English New Model Army and in recent years by the royalist English armies, the armies fielded by the Scottish Covenanters have suffered a strange neglect. It was not until the work on this study was well-advanced that the crude nature of previous efforts became apparent. The Covenanters' armies, particularly their military operations, represent a field of research which has not been overworked like some other civil war period topics. In an effort to provide a basic understanding of the Covenanting forces, this study synthesizes a mass of material relating to the religious aspects of the armies. Two crucial questions emerged: did the military reflect Scottish society or any part of it; were the Covenanter forces godly armies seeking to evangelise the areas they occupied?

The scope of such themes may be either strictly or broadly interpreted. These themes have been interpreted broadly to include the rules of warfare, the army chaplains, religious manifestations in military life, the moral behaviour of the soldiers, and the role of the armies in spreading the presbyterian faith. In addition to those topics, an examination of the soldiers' relations with civilians and the political activities of the military have been included. The first is of relevance to this work because it most clearly allows one to determine whether the Covenanting armies attained the status of godly armies. The Swedish armies in the 1620s and the English New Model Army achieved their halo of saintliness due to their respect for civilians and their property. The political question enters into the study as there was a close relationship between religious and political activities in the period. Often political stances reflected a man's or a group's acceptance or rejection of particular religious beliefs.
As wide-ranging as the topics chosen for study were the type of sources consulted. With the exception of family legal papers the entire spectrum of Scottish seventeenth-century sources was inspected. The records of the Estates, its committees, the General Assembly and its Commission form the basic sources for a view of national developments. At the local level the burgh, presbytery, family and kirk session records proved invaluable. The abundance of these two categories was unfortunately not matched by the survival of correspondingly many diaries, memoirs and letters which would have served to round off the picture. English materials — primarily state papers, pamphlets and newsbooks — were also helpful. Contrary to the view of some, the materials for research in Scottish history in the mid-seventeenth century are plentiful and diverse.

The lack of a proper history of the armies created several dilemmas during the study. To ease the way for those interested in the period covered, the first chapter serves as a basic introduction to the history of the Covenanting forces. The reasons why they were raised; how they were raised; how large they were; where they campaigned; and under whom they fought are all treated in the chapter. The subsequent chapters deal with the religious aspects already mentioned.
CHAPTER ONE: THE SWORD OF THE LORD

In the latter part of March 1639 two bodies of Covenanters troops were on foot in Scotland. The larger army (9-11,000 men under General Alexander Leslie of Balgonie and the earl of Montrose), advanced against the royalist forces in the Aberdeen area. The smaller force (3,000 horse and 2,000 foot) led by several nobles marched south from Edinburgh to protect the Borders against the expected advance of Charles I's forces.\(^1\) With those two efforts the Covenanters had begun a series of military activities which would involve them for twelve years in campaigns throughout the British Isles. Besides numerous campaigns within Scotland, their armies would invade England four times (1640, 1644, 1648 and 1651) and occupy portions of northern Ulster for six years (1642-48). The purpose of this thesis is not to retail the exploits of these forces [which has been done to a largely inadequate degree by previous historians] but to study the religious aspects of these armies.

The origins of the First Bishops' War lay with the policies of Charles I, which from his accession in 1625 until the Glasgow Assembly of 1638, managed by their arbitrariness and tactlessness to alienate every major social and political group in Scotland. However, his policies alone did not account for the creation of the National Covenant in February 1638. The roots of that document lay deep in Scottish history and federal theology.\(^2\) The National Covenant bonded the opponents of 'Thorough', in its Scottish context, to each other and to God. Two conflicting premises underpinned the bond: protection

---

\(^1\) Spalding, History, ii 107; SRO GD. 112/39.389.

of the reformed religion and allegiance to the king. Although not initially recognised as mutually incompatible, by 1649 these suppositions had rent the Covenanting movement and the Church of Scotland asunder. However, in spring 1639 unity remained unbroken. Unfortunately the opponents of the Covenant were directionless without royal orders and lacked organisation.

To explain the Covenanters' grounds for resistance, Alexander Henderson, moderator of the General Assembly of 1638, wrote a treatise entitled 'Defensive Arms.' Henderson's work appeared before the Royal army neared the Borders, yet his call to arms was not premature. Charles had decided if necessary to solve the Scottish problem by military means in spring or summer 1638. Henderson developed several themes: the duty to God above all human authority, the contractual nature of the monarchy, and the right of self-defence stemming from natural law.¹ The parish ministers circulated Henderson's arguments throughout the kingdom.

Although the Covenanters presented a united front in 1639, diverse factors had contributed to it. Neither Henderson's pamphlet nor pieces of coloured cloth fully explained the ability of the Covenanters to oppose the king with appearance of solidarity. A sizeable portion of the Covenanting party did accept the religious nature of the war, e.g. the ministers, the burgesses, many lairds and certain members of the nobility. Two other powerful motives induced some men to support a military effort in 1639. Some nobles and lairds saw the struggle which broke out in 1637 as mainly political with religious overtones. Others were driven on by a hatred of the English and Irish who constituted the potential invading armies. It would be rash to distinguish too clearly between the three impulses. An individual

¹NLS, Wodrow MSS Folio 27, ff. 36-38.
such as the earl of Argyll might be motivated by all three factors. On the other hand, to assume that religious considerations alone provided the Covenanters with reasons to raise armies over-simplifies the picture in the years after 1641.

The preparations of war in 1639 extended back to the autumn of the previous year. Despite a reputation for political violence Scotland had not fought a war for nearly seventy years. Thus two elements - arms and trained officers - were essential for the creation of a force capable of resisting the king and his Scottish royalist allies. The purchase of armaments from the United Provinces had begun as early as July 1638 and continued throughout the winter. In early 1639 (the exact date is unknown) the Tables (the Covenanter rival government sitting in Edinburgh) ordered the shires to establish committees of war. These assemblies received specific instructions to fill the ranks of lieutenant colonel, sergeant major, ensign and sergeant with veterans who could drill the new levies. Already Alexander Leslie, defender of Stralsund against Wallenstein and subsequently a Swedish Field Marshal, having returned to Scotland, had sent for Scottish officers in German, French, Dutch and Danish service. A contemporary writer suggested that the mercenaries returned solely to live off the discomfort of their native land. However, the loyalty of certain members of this group either to the moderate or extreme Covenanter factions in the coming years implies some degree of commitment to issues in addition to a desire for wages.

---


2SRO, P.A. 7.2/52, f. 123v; Spalding, History, i. 90.

3Spalding, History, i. 88.
The Tables began to promulgate more specific instructions to the shires regarding the levying of military forces in late winter - early spring 1639. Scotland was divided into four regions for purposes of defence. Troops were first levied in the southeastern and southwestern quarters for the defence of the Borders.\footnote{SRO, 7/2/52, f. 23v; NLS, MS. Acc. 6026 f. 524; Baillie, i. 192; Gordon, Affairs, iii. 204.} Later in April the Tables ordered the fourth man to Edinburgh from 'everie schyir or burghe' south of the Spey and the eighth man from the area west of the river. The shires were also required to send in muster rolls and lists of arms to Edinburgh.\footnote{NLS, Acc MSS. 6026 f. 524. The fourth man, literally one quarter of the fencible men. Fencible men, all men excepting certain professions, between 16-40 years of age were liable to national service. No mention is made of the origins of this practice by contemporary writers. I assume the source to have been 'Scotch service' or the national levy of the middle ages.}

Before troops appeared in the field various bodies issued further orders. The Tables could specify the number of troops which a county must put out. In the case of Fife a levy of 2,400 men was authorised to oppose an army 'of papists and such as ar of the prelattis factioune' led by Charles.\footnote{SRO, GD. 26 7, f. 158.} The shire committees or committees of war also possessed the authority to determine the number of troops each parish or burgh must supply.\footnote{SRO, GD. 16. Sec. 50.5; Shearer, Dunfermline, p. 217.} Underpinning these governmental bodies were the parishes and nobles. The ministers, elders, heritors and parish commissioner held the responsibility of enumerating the fencible men and selecting those required for the army.\footnote{SRO, GD. 16. Sec. 50.5, 6; GD. 26. 12.5, 7; KSR Holy Rude Stirling 24. 6. 1639; NLS, Lee Papers 3496 (KSR Lasswade), 26.4.1639. Burnet, Lives, p. 146.} Throughout Scotland in the seventeenth
century the ties of kin had remained stronger than in England. This bond of kinship allowed nobles or heads of families to call out retinues and tenants, which provided them (and in this war, the Covenanters) with a ready made military force.\(^1\) For example the earl of Argyll, the most powerful clan chief and noble, used these familial ties throughout 1639.\(^2\)

Despite the unity of the Covenanters and the measures mentioned above the most important army (that of Leslie which guarded the eastern Borders) suffered from a shortage of manpower. On three occasions in May Leslie or nobles with the army sent letters to the Tables requesting men. On 18 May the letter from the army announced that it awaited the coming forth of the Lord's people '... to helpe the Lord against the mighty...'. The letter also called for those 'whose heart God' did not move 'to come to the Lord's battall...' to fast and pray.\(^3\) Despite the knowledge that the parishes of southern Scotland had called out the fourth man on 26 May, another summons to join the army was written on 30 May. This appeal stated that those who hung back during that hour of need were neither Christians nor Scotsmen in the eyes of heaven.\(^4\) This appeal was not without effect for at least one Lothian parish seems to have responded.\(^5\) Unfortunately the loss of records of the Tables and of the committees of war prevents one from drawing a fuller picture


\(^2\) SRO, GD. 112/39.754, 762, 766, 772, 774.

\(^3\) Baillie, ii. 438-440.


\(^5\) SRO, KSR Livingston, 2.6.1639.
of the creation of the armies of the First Bishops' War.

More definite material exists for an examination of the armies and their campaigns. Other than armed meetings of Covenanters nobles and lairds in the northeast the first 'army' of the cause was that alluded to above under Leslie and Montrose. This force, numbering 9-11,000 men, occupied Aberdeen, a centre of royalism and Gordon power (30 March - 12 April); then it campaigned in the northeast. The earl of Argyll also quartered in Aberdeen (11 and 17 April) but with a much smaller force. In late April 4,000 men under the earl Marischal took Aberdeen for the Covenanters again. Nearly a month later the Marischal appeared in Aberdeen commanding 2,000 men to be quickly joined by Montrose with 4,000. They in turn rendezvoused with 1,000 men under the northeastern Covenanters and 4,000 men led by the earl of Seaforth, lords Lovat and Reay, the sheriff of Moray and the lairds of Innes and Pluscardine. For several in this last group the campaign was an exercise to protect their own interests rather than a declaration of loyalty to the Covenant. Montrose led his third expedition to Aberdeen in mid-June. On that occasion his army of 4,000 fought a two day battle at the Brig of Dee against a royalist army under lord Aboyne. In most instances the forces in the northeast campaigns were nothing more than bodies of kinsmen and tenants coming out under their chief or landlord, which hardly

16,000 men came from Angus and Perthshire, and 2,000 more under the Forbeses and Frasers joined them, Louise B. Taylor (ed.), Aberdeen Council Letters (London, 1950), ii.130; Spalding, History, i.107.

2John Stuart (ed.), Extracts from the Council Register of the Burgh of Aberdeen, Scottish Burgh Record Society viii, p.159; Spalding, History, notes that 500 men stayed on 11 April and 800 on 17 April.

3Aberdeen Letters, iii.117.
deserved the title of 'army'. This phenomenon persisted throughout the 1640s. The similarity of these forces to traditional feudal bodies influenced the nature of warfare in the northeast as well as in the Highlands. In both areas the destruction of property and the theft of animals were more common than battles or skirmishes.

Further south the critical area was the eastern Borders. There Leslie encamped his army first at Dunbar and later at Duns Law. The estimates of the size of this army vary from 10,000 to 30,000. Even attempting an educated guess does little more than limit the range from 12-20,000. Leslie's army remained in the Borders from 20 May until it disbanded on 20 June following the Treaty of Birks. Leslie believed that his force would have been incapable of preventing a successful invasion by experienced troops. The quality of the king's rabble must have been worse, if he refused to risk it against the Scots.

During 1639, the Covenanters fielded armies in several other areas. Along the shores of the Firth of Forth an unknown number of men from Fife and the Lothians watched the marquis of Hamilton's fleet with its contingent of 5,000 men aboard (late April to early June). On the west coast, Argyll occupied Arran and Dumbarton Castle, and took measures in the shire of Argyll against an Irish invasion. In the western Borders two mercenaries, Sir Robert Munro and Colin Pitscottie, led the forces which garrisoned Dumfries and

---

1 The estimates of the army's strength were as follows: 10-12,000, John C. Hodgson, 'The Journal of John Aston', North Country Diaries (Surtees Society cxviii, 1910) p. 28; 20,000 Baillie, i 210; 23,000 Burnet, Lives, p. 175; 26-30,000, Balfour, Annales, ii 324; and 30,000 Hist. MSS. Comm. III, 77.

2 Gordon, Affairs, ii 205.
subdued the area's royalists. Without exception 1639 was a year of military success for the Covenanters.

An examination of the men who commanded the units of the armies in 1639 indicate the prevalence of the nobility as the leaders of the Covenanters. However, in the northeast where the Forbeses and Frasers were strongly anti-Gordon and pro-Covenanter, the number of lairds commanding troops is high.

Table 1: Commanders of northeastern Forces March - June 1639

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Foot and horse retinues</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leslie's army was under almost exclusively noble control in the higher ranks. That reflects the dominance of kinship and feudal obligations as means of recruiting troops and the political hegemony of the nobles in the Covenanting cause.

Table 2: Commanders in Leslie's army 1639

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot (a)</th>
<th>Guards</th>
<th>Horse (b)</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) These are either full or half-regiments of foot. However, the term 'regiment' should be used cautiously when referring to the forces of 1639. They bore little resemblance to continental regiments or ones later fielded by the Covenanters.

(b) In this army the horse were brigaded with the foot.

The forces throughout the rest of Scotland which may be identified provide further evidence of the support the Covenanters had amongst the nobility.

1Aberdeen Letters, ii. 130-1; Spalding, History, i.107, 112, 119, 125, 139-40, 155.

2Baillie, i. 200, 211-2.
Table 3: Commanders of Forces in other areas March–June 1639

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only in the western Borders did mercenary captains provide the sole leadership of regiments and larger forces. But it was there that the Covenanters faced royalists in strong castles. Thus, having professionals on the spot was helpful if not obligatory. It should be pointed out that Leslie's appointment, which was unique in Scottish history, does not contradict the image of a noble-dominated military. Fear that a noble commander-in-chief would only contribute to rather than dissipate the innate factiousness of the nobility led the Tables to select Leslie, who possessed an impressive reputation. In general nobles would predominate in positions of independent command throughout the period.

Following their victory in the First Bishops' War the Covenanters refused to lay down the sword which they had picked up in their battle against royal policy. Leslie continued to hold the post of Lord General. Fortifications earmarked for demolition remained intact. During the winter months shires paid cess for the retention of mercenaries. The Covenanters, after two years of openly opposing the king, realised that disarmament meant eventual defeat. On the other hand Charles' first military failure against the Scots only led him to try that course once more.

Within Scotland Charles had allies among the Gordons under the marquis of Huntly and the southwestern Roman Catholics led by lords

---

1 Salfour, Annales, ii. 321; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1639, 39; Spalding, History, ii. 118.

2 Burnet, Lives, p. 196; Aberdeen Council, i. 194-195. On 19 December 1639 Aberdeen burgh and shire, for example, paid £503 6s. 8d. Sc. (monthly) for its pension of twelve officers and underofficers.
Herries and Maxwell. To subdue these opponents the Covenanters needed little recourse to propaganda (aside from labelling them 'rebels'). These royalists, 'incendiaries' or 'malignants' (the last description would be applied to royalists throughout the 1640s) were clearly enemies of the Covenanters and their political and religious policies. Furthermore these divergences between royalists and Covenanters on a national level were usually exacerbated by traditional rivalries at a local level. The antagonisms which brought armed conflict between these two groups were always present. The invasion of England presented the Covenanters with far greater difficulties.

The grievances of 1639 still existed in the following year. The Covenanters evidently believed that Charles was untrustworthy and that their gains of 1638-39 were in peril. After negotiating with lord Savile for an invitation, from opponents to Thorough in England, to invade that country, the Scots took the high road to England on 21 August. The advance faced several risks. Would the ancient rivalry of England and Scotland reunite the English behind Charles? Could the army survive without money or an adequate commissariat? How would Scotland respond to an invasion of her king's southern kingdom? In a pamphlet, Considerations of the Lawfulness of their Expedition into England manifested, published shortly after the invasion, the Scots justified their behaviour. The pamphlet, full of biblical and historical allusions, is too long to analyse in depth here. Once again the Scots argued that God was their leader. They also attacked

... the Prelacy in England, the Fountain whence all those Babylonish streams issue unto us! The Lord therefore is still on the back-trade, and we following him therein, cannot yet be at a stay. Yea, we trust, that shall so follow forth the trade, as to chase home the Beast, and the false Prophet to Rome, and from Rome out of the world.¹

¹Impartial Collection, i. 412-416.
Other tracts stressed political as well as religious motives in attacking England. The Scots claimed that the religion and liberty were in danger and that the only way in which they could gain the king's ear was by military activity. It is undeniable that the invasion of 1640 ensured the 'triumph of the Covenants'; as a method of petitioning a hard-hearted king the invasion succeeded.

Although the Covenants' claim to be overthrowing the papacy was extreme, their other points represented valid concerns. If the Covenants possessed the right to petition the king (which Charles had previously challenged) they had no guarantee of a hearing. One would have more sympathy for Charles if the Scots' grievances were about minor matters. The contrary, however, was true; Charles' policy was the uprooting of presbyterianism, the restoration of bishops and the renewal of royal control over Scotland. In this situation the Scots' propaganda about the king had a firm foundation in reality.

The methods utilised in raising the forces which opposed the king in 1640 closely resembled those employed in 1639. Once more the ministers played an important part by stirring up the people for the cause. The clergy now also passed on the orders of the shire committees to their congregations. Although military service was unpopular, the shires supplied their quotas of men and arms. In Aberdeen the desertion of fencible men obliged Colonel Sir Robert Munro to press troops for his regiment. While Munro and Marischal

---

1Burnet, Lives, p. 223; The Intentions of the army of the kingdom of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1640), pp. 4-5; Ancram Correspondence, i. 104-5; Spalding, History, i. 248.


3Cal. S.P. Dom, 1640, 207.
successfully raised troops in that burgh, the colonel of the Forbes regiment failed to complete the levy of his men in Aberdeen. Rivalry among the nobility delayed the levy in Angus. There the shire committee initially refused Leslie's order to supply lord Carnegie with a regiment. The committee desired its troops to serve only under Montrose. Argyll continued to exercise his power in raising his vassals and tenants for the cause. There is no direct evidence of other nobles using their influence in raising troops, but that they did so may be assumed from the structure of Scottish society. As in 1639, Huntly and the catholics of the Nithsdale area provided the only internal resistance to the Covenanters' levy. Elsewhere the authority of the Committee of Estates remained unchallenged.

Further parallels between the First and Second Bishops' Wars appear in the strategy adopted by the Covenanters — internal enemies were subdued before the main body marched south. In 1640 the use of Aberdeen as a base for campaigns in the northeast served as the cornerstone of Covenanters' military strategy there. The operations in the northeast began with the Marischal's occupation of Aberdeen on 5 May. Munro with 800 foot joined the earl in late May. After little over two months of campaigning in Strathbogie and Banffshire Munro had silenced the opposition of the Gordons and their allies. In the south Covenanters forces besieged and captured Edinburgh castle, and also the castles of Caerlaverock and Threave. In the west Argyll led a

1 Stevenson, Revolution, p.205; Wedgwood, Peace, p.309; Spalding, History, i.238, 249.

2 Spalding, History, i.211, 215–216, 229, 265.

3 Fairley, Sinclair, pp. 25–6.

4 SRO, RH, 13.18; Spalding, History, i.198, 204.

5 Gordon, Affairs, iii.1635, Spalding, History, i.217; Mark Napier (ed.), Memorials of Montrose and his Times (Maitland Club, lxvi), i.259.
force of 4,000 Campbells, which the Committee of Estates had authorized him to raise for the purpose of ravaging the lands of the earl of Atholl, lord Ogilvie, the Farquharsons and their allies in Badenoch, Lochaber and Rannoch and the Braes of Angus and Mar. Armed with this commission, which suited both his ambitions as a clan chief and his loyalty to the cause, Argyll devastated the territories of Ogilvie and others during a six week campaign (18 June – 2 August 1640).\(^1\) With their control over Scotland fully established, the Covenanter could permit Leslie to invade England.

Leslie commanded a larger and better organized army in the Second Bishops' War. Estimates of its strength ranged from 15,250 to 37,000. The lower number is based on a report of the Covenanters' regimental sizes presumably made by an English spy; the high one is a guess by a panic-stricken English source. Once again the true number was closer to the lower estimate (17,775).\(^2\) Unlike Leslie's first army this one possessed staff officers. Three Scottish mercenaries held the posts of lieutenant general, major general of foot and general of artillery.\(^3\) Without a doubt this campaign was Leslie's most successful of his Scottish career. In the thirteen days following the rendezvous at Coldstream (17 August) it had

\(^1\)SRO, RH 13.18; Baillie, i, 260.

\(^2\)Interestingly, it was the English who wildly inflated the figures – 32,000, Hist. MSS. Comm. iv. 295; 37,000, Cal. S.P. Dom. 1640-41, 31. Scots' estimates were 26,500, Gordon, Affairs, iii. 257; 25,000, Baillie, i. 247; 16,000, Spalding, History, i, 214. One English guess put the number at 22,500, John Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1680), iii. 1222. My estimate is based on PRO, SP 16/461/5911, f.134, which gave the total of 15,250, plus the following additions: Life Guard of Foot 425 (SRO, E100/1/1, E100/112, PA. 16.2 Account of Ld Register's regt.), Elcho's 400 (William Fraser, Memorials of the Wemyss of Wemyss, Edinburgh, 1888), i. 242; Erskine's 400 (PRO, SP 16/461/5711, f.121), Lothian's 400 (J.W. Kennedy, 'The Teviotdale Regiment', Hawick Arch. Soc., xxxv (1903), 59; Montrose's 900 (Gordon, Affairs, iii. 257).

\(^3\)They were respectively Sir James Livingstone (lord Almond and later the earl of Callendar), Guthry, Memoirs, p.70, William Baillie of Lamington and Sir Alexander Hamilton, Balfour, Annales ii. 283.
crossed the Tweed, routed an English force at Newburn on Tyne and captured Newcastle, the town which supplied London's winter fuel. While the rapidity of the Scots' success in the field brought Charles to the negotiating table, it was not sustained. Leslie's forces, awaiting the treaty, were to occupy Northumberland and Durham for nearly a year before returning to Hirslaw in Berwickshire to disband. The impact of that occupation will be discussed more fully in chapters five and nine.

The preponderance of noble colonels and commanders continued in the forces of the Second Bishops' War. Nobles and lairds controlled three-quarters of the units in the home forces (which in this war are grouped together in Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Foot retinues</th>
<th>Horse regt.s</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But the home armies had more mercenary colonels than Leslie's army. That situation is best explained by the use of these men in militarily sensitive areas (the Gordon's homeland and Nithsdale) where martial skills were essential. Argyll faced unorganised clans or ones whose chiefs were susceptible to diplomacy. Defeat in either region could have resulted in defeat for his forces.
in withdrawing troops from Leslie's army to deal with the royalists; it could have also encouraged royalists initially reluctant to oppose the Covenanters by force of arms to take the field. Again Leslie's army was almost exclusively commanded by the landholding classes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Guards</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The nobility led the vast majority of regiments. While some members of the nobility might cleave to the royalist line, at this time the Covenanters possessed almost a monopoly of militarily active members of that class.

As in 1639 the disbanding of the Covenanters' forces in 1641 was incomplete. On the advice of Leslie (soon to be ennobled as the earl of Leven) three regiments of infantry remained under arms. The Covenanters wished to retain these troops to overawe royalist opponents. However, they would become part of the Ulster expeditionary force hired by the English parliament from the Scottish one.

The causes of the native Irish rising in Ulster on 21 October 1641 need not detain us. The Scottish Parliament had almost immediately accepted Charles' request for an army to subdue the rebels in that province. The Covenanters had no objections to the idea. However, the negotiations were protracted. The Scots wished to extend their

---

1 PRO, SP 16/461/57 II, ff.1200-1; SP 16/464/59 II, ff.6-134; Baillie, ii. 470; Balfour, Annales, ii. 303, 384.

2 They were 1,000 men of Cochrane's regiment, later under Colonel Home, Munro's 1,400 men, Spalding, History, i. 335, and Lord Sinclair's 477 men, MLS, Dep. MS. 175/85/1. Source of Leslie's advice, SRC, PA. 7.2/74, f.157.
influence, protect Scottish settlers and remove potential threats, the Irish rebels who might ally with the royalist clans in Scotland and the power of the earl of Antrim. It is possible the Covenanters also hoped to gain monetarily from the high rates of pay offered by the English parliament. Arguments with the English parliament, which was to pay and supply the army, arose over the army's size, pay and location of its garrisons. Eventually in spring 1642 an acceptable treaty was drafted, permitting the first Scots troops to leave for Ulster.

Recruiting the Ulster army proved a difficult task initially. The colonels quickly took up, but lower ranks proved harder to fill. The mercenary officers, who had served in the Bishops' Wars, complained that the nobles monopolised the entire officer corps. That attitude led many mercenaries to return to the continent or join English armies in England and Ireland. Desertions among common soldiers in Munro's and Home's regiments (two-thirds of the standing army) rose when the officers informed them of their next assignment. Soldiers who remained grew bitter when they learned that the pay scale would not change until they reached Ireland. Recruiting for the other eight regiments foundered until senior officers were appointed. The majority of recruits were from either the tenantry of noble officers or the veterans of the 1639-41 armies, bored by civilian life and attracted by bounties. By spring 1642 three regiments were ready to sail for Carrickfergus, one of the garrison towns and later headquarters for the army.

---

1 Richard Bellings, 'Fragmentum Historicum', Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica (Dublin, 1772), ii. 312-313.

2 Stevenson, 'Covenanter', 74.

3 Ibid., 63.

4 Ibid., 70, 71.
Although the Scots parliament had promised the English an army of 10,000 men and officers, the actual number was greater. By autumn 1642 the Scots had 11,371 men in Ulster. However, the Scots failed to sustain that number of troops. By a combination of dearth, evacuations and defeat the army would shrink to not more than 4,000 men by 1647.¹ This army, like that of the Second Bishops' War, possessed a general staff. Leven was the commanding general; the earl of Lothian filled the post of lieutenant general; Sir Robert Munro held that of major general; while Sir Alexander Hamilton was the general of artillery. For six years the Covenanters' Ulster army was to play an important role in the Irish war.

From 1642 to 1648 the Ulster army campaigned in Antrim, south Down, Armagh, Tyrone, Sligo and northern Leinster. The army possessed outlying garrisons at Dungannon, Mountjoy, and Newry, but the main quarters stretched along the coast from Ardmagillan to the Lecale. Supply difficulties prevented the Scots from maintaining offensive operations for periods of over thirty days. That handicap kept them from mounting an effective siege of Charlemont, the rebels' northernmost stronghold. Their strategy seems to have been to reconquer the Irish controlled parts of Ulster where it was possible and to establish garrisons. When that strategy proved impossible Munro had his soldiers seize cattle or destroy the grain of the Irish. That enabled him to enlarge the area free from the Irish. Following the defeat at Benburb (June 1646) Munro, then commander of the army, kept his forces in garrisons along the Antrim and north Down coasts. In September 1648, following the withdrawal of about 2,000 men to join the Engager army, Colonel George Monck's Parliamentary troops easily surprised the army's

¹Ibid., 68, 230.
garrisons and disarmed the men. Thus the Ulster army passed away in Ireland; in Scotland the Parliament would form remnants into the Royal Foot Guards.

Once more noble colonels predominated in Ulster.

Table 6: Commanders of the Ulster Army 1642-1648

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regts</th>
<th>Horse troops</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> While the colonels were nobles, in all but one instance command fell to mercenary lieutenant colonels.

Their presence on the army rolls probably proved helpful in recruiting as it had before. However, their infrequent stays or non-appearance in Ulster led to disunity among the officer corps and lack of activity in the army. Only four colonels remained more or less continuously with their regiments. In the six other cases the lieutenant colonels became the effective commanders.<sup>2</sup> The Ulster army is the first (and less well-known) of two examples of the English parliament hiring troops from the Covenanters in the 1640s.

In the summer of 1643 the Scottish parliament and General Assembly of the Church entered into negotiations for an alliance with the English parliament. Historians have concentrated on the religious clauses of the Solemn League and Covenant, the treaty which resulted from those deliberations. Contemporaries in Scotland had other

<sup>1</sup> Stevenson, 'Covenanters', 70, 324.

<sup>2</sup> The marquis of Argyll, the earls of Eglinton, Leven, Lindsay and Lothian, lords Glencarm and Sinclair, the laird of Lawers and Colonels Sir Robert Munro and Home of Heugh commanded the ten regiments. Argyll, Leven, Eglinton and Glencarm spent only a few months in Ulster. Yet only Argyll had made arrangements for devolving command of the regiment on to its lieutenant colonel. Ibid., 70.
objectives in mind, if their statements can be believed. A proclamation of 18 August from the Scots parliament stated that troops were being raised to defend

... the true protestant religione the liberties of the kingdome his mat[jes]ies honour and the peace and saiftie of this thair native country...

In September the session clerk of Carnock, Fife, recorded that the levy was ready

... to go into England to withstand the violence of the Papists armie that wer engaged to invade us and take away the godspell from us.

Zachary Boyd, a minister addressing Leven, expressed the views of many clergy.

This is the maine quarrell of Britaine this day; Satan in great wrath with the forces of the Antichrist are in the open field; the Lord is going to Battell against them and he hath chosen your Excellencie to be his Gideon...

In 1644 the Scots began to emphasise the positive aspect of the alliance - church reform. By 1646 the President of the Scottish parliament would inform Westminster that settling church government was the principal purpose of the Covenant. An analysis of the factors involved in making the Solemn League and Covenant may clarify the situation.

---

1 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i.44.
2 NEH; KSR Carnock, 24.9.1643.
3 Baillie, ii.484; Fife, p. 135.
4 Zachary Boyd, The Sword of the Lord (Glasgow, 1643), p. 5.
5 SRO, PA. 11.2b, f. 90.
Desire for security impelled both the representatives of the laity, sitting in the Convention of Estates, and those of the Kirk, gathered in the General Assembly of 1643, to accept Sir Henry Vane's offer of an alliance with the parliamentarians. The victorious royalist campaign of summer 1643 combined with fears of a militant papistry (represented by the earl of Newcastle's Northern army) and rumours of Henrietta Maria's plots in York to raise the Highlands with aid from the Roman Catholic earl of Antrim, emphasised the precarious position of the Covenanters. An alliance with parliament seemed imperative, if only to ensure the preservation of the [revolution] settlement of 1641. The ultimate reasons why the pact extended civil and military considerations to include a religious article lay in Archibald Johnston of Wariston's political analysis and the aims of the Kirk. Wariston believed that security would best be ensured by a religious covenant; a covenant would be less easily repudiated as circumstances changed, or so he thought. The radical clergy hoped that if a non-Erastian presbyterian church were imposed on England, that the success could be repeated in Scotland. The presbyterian system established there between 1638 and 1641 relied heavily on the feudal rulers. With the establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, the Covenanting statesmen believed that they had discovered the basis for tranquility in Britain, security for Scotland. Security, or the fears about it, caused the Scots to accept the English alliance. Church or governmental reform were recognised to be the methods of preserving the Scottish

1 Makey, Church, pp. 69, 71-2.

revolution. The reader need not be reminded how unsuccessful either course was in achieving and maintaining security.

Although the Solemn League and Covenant specified that the Scots should provide only one army for service in England, in reality they raised two and several other regiments besides. The initial levy, which crossed the Tweed on 18 January 1644, consisted of men raised since September 1643. However, most of the recruiting occurred in late November and during December. The second levy commenced in the spring of 1644. By late June, it had reached sufficient strength to enter England under the command of the earl of Callendar. Examination of how these forces were raised will provide further insight into the nature of Covenanting Scotland.

The raising of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant came under the jurisdiction of three bodies—parliament, the committees of war, and the church courts. On 26 August 1643 parliament named the colonels of the shire regiments. In October the Estates ordered the colonels of the shires to muster all fencible men between sixteen and sixty. Following the selection of recruits the colonels were to rendezvous with the army. The Estates hoped the October levy would provide an army of 32,000 foot and 2,720 horse. On 23 November the Estates issued a new order for levying the army. This time the shires were required to provide a total of 22,500 foot and 2,420 horse. The reduction in numbers from the October act arose from the exemption of certain shires, whose forces were to oppose native royalists and Irish

---

1 Stevenson, Revolution, p295. The first troops to enter England were 600 foot and three troops of horse. The Convention had raised them in July to keep internal order. In September they garrisoned Berwick. For their significance in religious matters see below, pp. 314-5.

2 Ibid., pp. 293-4.
invaders. As November drew to a close, the Estates furnished further orders regarding the rendezvous and the cavalry levies. By 30 December Leven's army had assembled on the border. Over five months later (5 June 1644) the Committee of Estates issued an act for augmenting Callendar's forces in southern Scotland. In less than three weeks, on 25 June, that army entered England to oppose the royalist resurgence in the north under Montrose and to increase Covenanter influence in English politics. The Estates contributed the overall direction for the levies, but it was the local bodies which ensured that the movement had soldiers.

Unfortunately in both cases exact details on the levying of troops is patchy. The committees of war (one for each shire) had become a considerable power in local affairs by 1643. They had charge of the levies within the counties. The principal responsibilities of the committees were to apportion men within the shire and to pressure those apportioned to send out their men. While these bodies managed to provide Leven with an army by late December 1643, they failed to supply all the men required by the Estates.

The northern shires (that is north of Aberdeen) were to provide troops to coerce recalcitrant royalists into submission. Argyll, Bute and Dunbartonshire had the responsibility for defending Scotland against Irish forces, Ibid., pp. 295-6.

The evidence of the Committees' failure to provide all their men appears in several sources. On 23 December 1643 the courts in Edinburgh adjourned until 1 February so that landowners could return home and fill their recruiting commitments, SR0, Pr. 11.2, ff. 7v-8, 23, 51v, 69, 78v, 86. The Estates issued an order on 3 January 1644 to Maris, laird of Morphie and Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Strachan authorising them to raise the deficiencies for Marischal's regiment, "Minutes of the Committee of Loan Monies and Taxations of the Shire of Aberdeen", The Miscellany Vol. III of the Spalding Club, ed. John Stuart (Spalding Club, xvi, 1846), p. 149.
If the committees initiated the process of raising the troops from the shires, it was the landowners, presbyteries and kirk sessions which carried out their orders. From late August 1643 until early April 1644 we find evidence of the Kirk's responsibilities in the levying of men. Parish ministers worked as the mouth piece of both the Estates and shires by reading their orders concerning the acts of levy and rendezvous.\(^1\) The minister and elders in each parish together drew up lists of fencible men, which they submitted to the shire committees.\(^2\) The parish also had the responsibility of choosing the soldiers, who would fill the parishes' quota.\(^3\) However, the ability of the parishes to accomplish their tasks lay with the acceptance of the cause by the nobility and lairds.\(^4\) Without their support the parishes would have found the task well nigh impossible. From the evidence of 1648 and 1649, when bitter divisions existed between the landowners and the Kirk, we can see that support of both groups was essential for a successful levy. Unfortunately, there are few details which survive concerning these two levies, particularly that of June 1644.

However, the number of Scottish troops is known. When Leven entered England, he had 18,000 foot, 3,000 horse and 500-600 dragoons.

\(^1\) SRO, PR Brechin, 24.8.1643; PR Dunoon, ii. f.10; PR Perth, ii. 800, 802; PR Stranraer, i. f. 51v; KSR Livingston, 27.8.1643.

\(^2\) SRO, GD. 158.390.1; PR Haddington, 26.10.1643, 3.4.1644; KSR Edinburgh, St. Cuthbert, v. f. 343v; Old Kelso, 24.9.1643; Slains, 17.12.1643; NRH, Largo, 20.2.1644, 8.3.1644; D. Robertson, South Leith Records (Edinburgh, 1911), pp. 45, 47; Spalding, History, ii. 59, 196.

\(^3\) SRO, KSR Tyninghame, i. ff. 139v-140; NRH, KSR Carnock, 24.12.1643; Minutes of the Synod of Argyll, ed. C. MacTavish (Scottish Historical Society, 3rd series, xxxvii), pp. 80-1.

\(^4\) Several notices indicate the importance of the nobles' assent. In Argyll and territories subject to the marquis his influence played a major role in putting out men. SRO, GD. 112/391. 847, 848; The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor, ed. Cosmo Innes (Spalding Club, xxix, 1859), p. 291. Dislike of a fellow peer could prove disastrous as seen in the case of Lord Gordon's regiment, whose levying the earl of Marischal opposed, Spalding, History, ii. 178. By 20 August 1644 Lord Gordon's major had issued receipts for only 48 troopers and horses, NLS, Gordon-Cummings Papers 87/2.
under his command,\(^1\) or 3,320 fewer men than the parliament had authorized. The army of Callendar brought Leven an additional 6,800-8,000 men. These two armies combined with various regiments and troops independently raised would have given Leven a force somewhere in the excess of 30,000 men.\(^2\) Irregular supply, desertion, combat, disease and the necessity of providing soldiers to fight Montrose in Scotland and secure northern England would reduce the number of effectives dramatically. Twenty-three regiments (the equivalent of nearly half the army) would serve against Montrose at some time or other between autumn 1644 and winter 1646. In the summer campaign of 1645 Leven's field army consisted of 9,000 foot and 5,500 horsemen. By mid-January 1646 the field force (excluding officers) was only 6,943 strong. Unfortunately, the number of troops garrisoning the northeast and Cumberland remains a mystery. Yet it would be surprising if they numbered above 4,000 men. By summer 1644 Leven controlled a formidable instrument of victory. His failure to utilise it more effectively was due to the army's lack of supplies and Leven's concern over the defence of Scotland.

As with his previous two armies Leven possessed a general staff in the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant. Indeed, due to the separate organisation of Callendar's force, there were two staffs. The original staff had Sir William Baillie of Lamington as the lieutenant general of foot, David Leslie as major general of horse,

\(^1\) Terry, Leslie, pp. 176, 180.

\(^2\) If Leven's regiments and troops (excluding the Life Guards) had been at full strength simultaneously, he would have led an army of 41,520. That is (thirty-three regiments of foot at 1,000 men a piece) 33,000 foot, (fifteen regiments of horse at 480 troopers each) 7,200 horse and (twenty-two troops of horse at 60 troopers each) 1,320 additional horsemen.
and Sir Alexander Hamilton as general of artillery. In Callendar's army Sir James Lumsden held the post of major general of foot and Sir James Ramsay had that of major general of horse. These soldiers with their years of experience in continental warfare presented the Scots with an advantage which the parliamentarians had lacked in 1642.

The view propagated by the Independent party and preserved by generations of historians that the Scots vanished from the fields of conflict after the siege of York and battle of Marston Moor is incorrect. The fixation of so many upon Cromwell may explain this view; for only at York and Marston Moor did the Covenanters' intervention coincide with Cromwell's presence. Be that as it may, by the time of their departure in February 1647 the Scots had participated in four major sieges - Newcastle, Carlisle, Hereford and Newark. That they fought no other major battles during this period is due to two factors. One was the absence of large royalist forces in the areas in which they campaigned; an other equally significant fact was Leven's preoccupation with the fear that Charles or a significant English royalist army would link up with Montrose and thus wreak havoc in Scotland, if not England. This strategic philosophy forced Leven to linger in the north rather than marching south which would have brought him to grips with the Oxford army. That the Scots army remained in England after Charles' surrender in May 1646 arose from the presbyterian party's desire for military support and the Scots' anxiety over settling the

---

1 A List of the Severall Regiments and Chief Officers of the Scottish Army (London, 1644.)

2 Army, i. lvii-lviii. See pp. 12, 14-6.
army's pay claims. On 25 January 1647 the Army of the Solemn
League and Covenant began its withdrawal from England, a manoeuvre
which it completed on 12 February. Within a few weeks the army
was largely disbanded. Those not cashiered formed the Scottish
New Model Army (a force primarily concerned with internal security).

The background of the commanders in the Army of the Solemn
League and Covenant initially mirrored that in the earlier Covenanter
forces. However, with the passing of time a formerly less signi­
ficant group - the mercenary veterans - gained prominence.

Table 7: Original Commanders in the Army of the Solemn
League and Covenant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Nobles</th>
<th>Lairds</th>
<th>Mercenaries</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foot regt.s</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse regt.s</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Second colonels in the same army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Nobles</th>
<th>Lairds</th>
<th>Mercenaries</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Third colonels in the same army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Nobles</th>
<th>Lairds</th>
<th>Mercenaries</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Army, i. xxvi-1xxii.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
The nobility was unquestionably the largest single group among the original unity commanders. The nobles' commands were also the most prestigious. Whereas independent horse troops accounted for nearly a third of the lairds' commands and slightly over half of the mercenaries' charges, they represented less than a tenth of the nobles' units. On the other hand the nobles initially held twenty-seven out of fifty colonelcies. The important role played by the nobles in raising the levies explains this situation. The large number of noble colonels also indicates that strong support for the Covenanter policies continued among that group. The increase in the number of mercenary colonels who were Scots (except in one case) from eight to fifteen is probably explained by the nobles' resignations arising from war-weariness and a desire to play an active role in political developments. However, the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant was hardly a mercenary army, because the landowning classes retained their control of three-fifths of the regiments and just under half of the independent horse troops. The monopoly of commands by mercenary officers reached its peak in the New Model Army, but declined thereafter.

Several months after the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant crossed the Tweed (19 January 1644) the Covenanter forces faced a new military threat. While fears of foreign invasion had led the Covenanter forces to send forces to Ireland and England, it was an internal threat – the rising of the marquis of Huntly – which caused them to raise the first forces of the home armies of 1644-47. On previous occasions they had felt the need to accompany their military activities with propaganda. However, with Huntly's rising in spring 1644 the need for such declarations ended. The security of the Covenanter state was in direct danger, its preservation provided the casus belli.
Despite the rapid disintegration of Huntly's forces, the royalists were not without troops. In summer 1644 Alasdair MacColla MacDonald landed in Argyll with three regiments from Ireland. MacColla's main purpose in invading Scotland was not the destruction of the Covenanter regime and the promotion of Charles' cause, but the harassing of the Campbells and the recovery of lands taken by them. During the month of August Montrose sneaked back into Scotland, making a rendezvous with MacColla in the Braes of Atholl. Montrose with his ability to raise the Highland clans for the king and MacColla with his veterans of the Irish war presented the Covenanters with formidable foes. In 1645 the Gordons (the only clan with cavalry) joined Montrose, further strengthening his army. Fortunately for the Covenanters the southern royalists never enthusiastically supported Montrose's coalition. Montrose's failure in the south combined with the regional interests of his army prevented him from providing Charles with a Scottish royalist army for use in England. On the other hand the Covenanters, from autumn 1644 to summer 1647, were forced to divide their troops between Argyll and the northeast to crush the royalists, as well as to call in men from the Ulster and Solemn League and Covenant armies.

With constant marching and countermarching by Montrose the Covenanters faced continual military problems within Scotland between 1644 and 1647. Initially, a field army of regular troops did not exist. However, following Montrose's early victories, elements of the Solemn League army came north, providing the foundation for a powerful field force. Troops also returned from Ulster. Prior to the arrival of these veteran contingents and later to augment their strength when

Montrose was in a particular area, the Covenanters raised local levies for short service. These men possessed questionable military value as they were generally untrained and lacking in bravery, factors which contributed to nearly all Montrose's victories. A third component in the home armies were new long service levies; for example those called for by parliament on 4 February 1646. Since the destruction of each Covenanter army by Montrose forced them to raise new forces, a detailed account of each force would require an inordinately lengthy discussion. Instead an impressionistic picture of the home armies will be presented.

The Covenanters faced several problems in raising the home forces. The Estates' and parliament's frequent threats to proceed against those who failed to appear at a rendezvous probably indicate attempts to combat latent royalism, war-weariness and neutralism. There are signs of the latter infecting the civilian population. On at least one occasion a minister insisting '... it was no part of my calling...', refused to call out the fencible men. The plague, a problem over which the Covenanters had no control (and the whole impact remains unknown due to the lack of sound population statistics) struck heavily in the burghs, Argyll and south Perthshire. Parliament,  

1SRO, PA. 7.232.23; PA. 7.3.86; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i. 446.  
2Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i. 582.  
3SRO, PA. 7.232.23; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i. 432, 446.  
4SRO, KSR Queensferry, i f. 35v.  
5Bensen, 'Dunfermline', p. 150.  
issuing the first order for recruitment of the armies after the 1644-45 visitation of the plague, exempted most of Fife, all of Edinburgh and East Lothian from sending out men.\(^1\) In the Covenanting regions of the Highlands and the lands bordering the glens there are indications that roving royalists forced the Covenanters to stay at home to protect their property.\(^2\) The combination of all these factors seriously weakened the military response to the Covenanters' appeals.

On the local level recruiting continued in the patterns previously established. Ministers continued to hold the responsibilities of listing fencible men and announcing levies.\(^3\) However, with the royalist resurgence in the northeast that region turned a deaf ear to the clergy's call for troops.\(^4\) The nobles and gentry retained an important role in raising troops. Examples of their influence occur in the southwest, northeast, the Borders, Fife and Argyll.\(^5\) Nevertheless all of these efforts proved incapable of raising an army which could defeat Montrose.

For each campaign the Covenanters engaged in between spring 1644 and February 1647 they found it necessary to raise new forces. In 1644 Argyll (thrice), lord Burleigh (twice), lord Elcho and Lieutenant General Sir William Baillie of Lamington led Covenanter armies. In the following year Argyll and his surrogate, Sir Duncan Campbell of

---

\(^1\) Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i. 583.

\(^2\) SRO, RH. 14. 18.

\(^3\) SRO, PA. 16.1 (Fencible Men East Lothian 1645), PR Jedburgh and Kelso, 23.1646; PR Linlithgow 23.7.1645; KSR Ceres, i. f.7; KSR Humsie, i. f. 24v; KSR Kilconquhar, i. f. 62v; KSR Slains, 29.8.1666; KSR Tyninghame, i. ff. 151v, 154v; NHR, KSR Largo, 29.8.1644; Spalding, History, ii. 226, 276, 284, 293, 321-2; South Leith, p. 50.


Auchinbreck, Major General Sir John Hurry and Baillie were to lose armies at Inverlochy, Auldearn, Alford and Kilsyth respectively. A year later Argyll and Major General John Middleton commanded two field armies. These home armies manoeuvred and fought with Montrose (and other royalists) in a region limited in the south by a line from Perth to Glasgow and in the north and west by the Great Glen. However, Montrose's defeat in September 1645 occurred in Selkirkshire. With the exception of the spring campaigns of 1644 and those following David Leslie's destruction of Montrose's army at Philiphaugh, the Covenanter record is one of unrelieved defeat. Although their forces ravaged large tracts of royalist lands, their own losses in property far outweighed those of the royalists. Without the intervention of Leslie's cavalry the Covenanters would have found it impossible to reverse the trend of defeat begun outside Perth on Tippermuir.

To simplify the analysis of the commanding officers of contingents in the home armies, the troops which returned from Ireland and England are omitted from the discussion. The home forces of 1644-47 resemble those of earlier armies regarding those who led them. Once more nobles held the majority of regimental colonelcies. However, due to the fighting in the northeast the lairds once again figure prominently. Many brought out retinues of kin and tenants, which made them the single largest source of commanders in these wars. With one exception mercenary officers did not command regiments.

Table 10: Commanders in the Home Armies 1644-47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Foot retinues</th>
<th>Horse troops</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Aberdeen Letters, iii. 118; Intelligence from the south & d of Scotland, written from Edinburgh, April 24, 1644 (London, 1644); Spalding, History, ii. 216, 260; Guthry, Memoirs 151. 167. 173. 183. 187. 189. 190.
However, Hurry, Baillie and Middleton, all professional soldiers, commanded the armies at Auldearn, Alford, Kilsyth and in the northeast in 1646. The lower rate of pay for home service helps to explain the absence of professionals. Another reason for their scarcity was the ad hoc recruiting of many forces, which the nobles and lairds would be in a better position to accomplish. The New Model Army which combined the home armies and the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant possessed a large number of mercenary commanding officers. However, initially there was no problem in finding recruits for that force.

The Scottish New Model Army came into existence in February 1647 following the disbanding of the newly returned Army of the Solemn League and Covenant. At that time a need for the army still existed. The Covenanters faced the tasks of crushing Huntly in the northeast and driving MacColla out of Argyll and the southern Hebrides. However, a large army was unnecessary for these functions. Furthermore, the ministers claimed that retaining all the troops would impoverish the country. One of their contemporary critics suggested that the clergy supported disbanding in order to have royalist elements purged from the army, leaving troops loyal to them.¹ By July the last serious resistance had ended; Huntly was imprisoned and MacColla had fled to Ireland. With no immediate reason for maintaining an army, petitions from the country began to reach the Committee of Estates requesting that the army be disbanded as it was oppressive. The Hamiltonian royalists, who held positions in the government, hoped to accomplish this before Argyll returned to Edinburgh. Unfortunately for them the Committee agreed to disband the army not immediately, but on 20 October 1647, if the Committee found that action to be expedient.

¹Guthry, Memoirs, pp. 240-1.
The marquis of Argyll returned to the capital, where he encouraged his faction to oppose the disbanding. Simultaneously, the Commission of the General Assembly decided that the army was necessary for the defence of 'true religion and the Covenant'. On 13 October the Commission sent a remonstrance to the Estates enunciating these views. Two days later the Commission sent letters to the presbyteries explaining its position, asking that the letters be read in all parishes. Finally, Argyll won the crucial vote in the Estates, which continued the army in being until the March 1648 parliament. To emphasise that the army was not aimed at England the Covenanters issued the following declaration:

... they have been, and shall be ever ready to joyne with their Brethren of England, in all things that tend to the preservation of the Solemn League and Covenant, and the peace and prosperity of both Kingdomes, & etc.

Argyll's faction had hoped that the existence of an army would keep Scotland out of an English war; future events show that they had miscalculated.

In 1647 parliament faced none of the problems of earlier or subsequent Covenanter governments in raising an army. Two forces - the home and the Solemn League and Covenant armies - existed from which drafts could be taken. On 28 January and on 5 February 1647 parliament passed two acts establishing the New Model Army of 6,000 foot (seven regiments) and 1,200 horse (fifteen troops of horse and two companies of dragoons) from soldiers not cashiered from the standing armies. By March 1648 three additional regiments of foot, two troops

---

1 SRO, PR Peebles, 25.11.1647; RCGA, i. 314-318; Baillie, iii. 23; Guthry, Memoirs, p. 240; Turner, Memoirs, p. 51.

2 W. Wheatly, A Declaration of the Scottish Armie concerning their immediate marching towards the Borders of England (London, 1647), pp. 4-5.

of horse and one company of dragoons had been added to the army.¹
In early 1648 David Leslie informed Sir Robert Campbell of a new
levy of three regiments to '... kipe the kingdom in obedience...²
These troops were never to be raised, however. The New Model
Army was the Covenanters' last wholly successful regular army.

Although the earl of Leven held the title of General of the
army, he never led it in a campaign. Age had debilitated the earl
and the field command devolved upon Lieutenant General David Leslie
and Major General Middleton. In May 1647 Leslie began a campaign
which cleared MacColla and his men from Argyll and the Hebrides. Two
months earlier Middleton had started his campaign to crush the
northeastern royalists, the successful completion of which in July
has been mentioned above. From July until the Engager rise to
power in spring 1648, the army remained quartered in small units
throughout Scotland.

Unlike all previous and succeeding armies of the Covenanters,
mercenaries predominated in senior positions in 1647.

Table 11: Commanders in the New Model Army 1647-48³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Horse troops</th>
<th>Dragoon co.s</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹SRO, PA. 15/10, ff. 1-11.
²SRO, GD. 112/39.372.
³SRO, PA. 15.10 ff. 1-4; NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio 63, f. 74; Army, pp. civ-v; Guthry, Memoirs, p. 240.
Considering the failure which had accompanied the nobles' intervention in military affairs during the 1644-47 campaigns at home, it is quite possible they sought to avoid further loss of prestige as well as escape financial exhaustion. The prestige imparted by the nobles' presence in the armies of the Bishops' Wars, the Irish rising, the English Civil Wars and the 1651 campaign were unnecessary here. There was little likelihood of high level negotiations nor was there a need to recruit soldiers. Furthermore, the nobles may have wished to devote all their energies to political activities now that peace reigned in England or to the rebuilding of estates ruined by royalist raids. The mercenaries, on the other hand, had preserved their employment, even if the pay had fallen. These officers could remain in an area to which some of them might originally have been drawn by ideological bonds. For the professional officer Scotland in 1647 offered a soft option; with employment on the continent declining the best place for the Scottish mercenary was at home. The opportunity for financial gain and allegiance to the Covenants may explain the presence of a relatively large number of lairds amongst the commanders. Considering the future history of the Covenanting gentry, the ideological loyalty probably played a greater role than profit in ensuring that lairds found their way to positions of military responsibility. The composition of the command structure of the New Model Army differed significantly from that of its predecessors and successors.

In a series of political manoeuvres the duke of Hamilton, his brother the earl of Lanark and the earl of Lauderdale made an alliance with Charles I on the Isle of Wight known as the Engagement. In April 1648 they gained control of the Scottish parliament. The agreement with Charles stipulated that the Scots would ally with the
English royalists to restore Charles to power in return for three
years' establishment of presbyterianism in England. Hamilton,
who led the Scottish Engagers, found it politically inexpedient
to ally with the recently defeated Scottish royalists. Instead
the duke sought support from the moderate Covenanters, and also
from English royalists and presbyterians. While Hamilton failed
to divulge the precise terms of the Engagement, he issued
declarations proclaiming his objectives to be the establishment of
presbyterianism, the freeing and restoring of Charles, and the
establishment of peace in Britain. In explaining why they levied
a new army, the Engagers claimed it was

... for preserving of Peace and keeping His
Majesties subjects in a dutifull obedience to
the Laws, and Publique Judicatories, and in a
Christian unity among themselves.  

In a declaration to the English presbyterians Hamilton stated he would
risk all to rescue Charles from prison

... and to make him as glorious a King as
ever reigned in Europe, to settle Religion
according to the Covenant, & to establish
and preserve the peace of both Kingdoms,
according to our Solemn League and Protestation.  

The Engagement signalled the triumph of the monarchist aspect of the
National Covenant over its religious component. It is unlikely that
Charles would have established presbyterianism for even a trial period.
The king's strong and consistent opposition to the creation of a
presbyterian Great Britain and Ireland in 1646 had caused the Scots to
abandon him then. In the past (for example 'The Graces' in Ireland),
Charles had promised his opponents their desired objectives only to

---

1 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 30; 'A Letter from the Duke of Hamilton to
the Ministers at Lancaster', Tracts relating to the military proceedings in

2 A Letter Concerning the Soldiers and their Orders about the Commissioners
sent from Parliament to treat with the Kings Majesty (London, 1648), p. 2.

3 A New Declaration Set forth by the Lord Ge. Hamilton (reprint ed.
repudiate the deal when he had regained control of the situation. Whether Hamilton offered the religious terms of the Engagement knowing that the king would renege on them is of lesser importance than that some Scots realised that Charles was untrustworthy, particularly in matters where his beloved church policy was involved. The cause of the Engagement might have paid lip-service to the Covenant and presbyterianism and it might have gained the support of many lay Covenanters; nevertheless, its success would have resulted in royalist regimes not only in England, but also in Scotland.

When the Covenanters were united they fielded armies approaching the size they desired, but the divisions of 1648 prevented the recurrence of past successes. The opposition to the 1648 levy was more vocal and widespread than on any previous occasion. However, most of the New Model's officers joined the Engagers, providing them with expert recruiters and commanders. The Engagers, besides taking control of the New Model and recalling troops from Ireland, issued two orders for levies within Scotland. The first act of levy (4 May 1648) laid down proportions for all the counties, which if filled would have created an army of 27,750 foot and 2,160 horse. In August the Estates ordered Seaforth and other Highland leaders to raise around 3,000 troops. If these forces had been raised, the Engagers would have been a potent military force in Britain. For their cause unfortunately the troops existed more on paper than in reality.

1 The Tailor Hall (Edinburgh), Petition against the Engagement had Leven, Leslie, General John Holburn, Sir John Brown and Colonel Scott as signators. An amendment by Middleton vowing allegiance to parliament led to its suppression, Diplomatic Correspondence, ii.455-6.

2 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii.54-5.

3 SRO, PA. 7.232.57.
The few successes and the general failure of the Engagers deserve some attention. On 5 May the Commission of the General Assembly strongly attacked parliament for proceeding in matters of religion without consulting the Commission. Following the Commission's lead, the synods, presbyteries and kirk sessions petitioned the committees of war and parliament to halt the levy until the Commission was satisfied that the Covenants had not been abandoned.¹ The burghs of Dumfries and Glasgow along with the committees of war in the west and those of Fife and Mid-Lothian supported the Commission with similar petitions to parliament.² The ministers followed up these petitions with sermons against the Engagement and the levy.³

¹The following is a list of the ecclesiastical judicatories which presented petitions against the Engagement: SRO, Synod of Moray, ii. f. 84; Synod of Perth and Stirling, i. ff. 85, 79-89; PR Ayr, 17.5.1648; PR Biggar, ff. 177-8, 196; PR Dumbarton, 16.5.1648; PR Dunfermline, i. f. 40; PR Haddington, 7.6.1648; PR Linlithgow 24.5.1648; PR Peebles, 29.5.1648; PR Perth, iii. f. 18; PR Paisley, 25.5.1648; PR Stranraer, i. f. 136; All the kirk sessions of Paisley, PR Paisley, 25.5.1648; KSR Corstorphine, i. f. 17; KSR Falkland, i. f. 74; KSR Kingsbarns, i. f. 18; KSR Liberton, i. f. 40; KSR Livingston, ii. f. 15; KSR Newburn, 28.5.1648; KSR Queensferry, i. f. 49; KSR Stow, i. f. 132v; NRE, KSR Anstruther Easter, 30.5.1648; PR Glasgow, iii. 106-8, also the petitions of Rutherglen, Barony kirk, Lequham, Cader, Govan, Monydie and Carank are recorded on 101-5; NLS, Wodrow MS Folio 29, f. 61 (the six kirk sessions of Edinburgh town); Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 691 (a joint petition of the Presbyteries of Dunbar and Haddington); Hist. MSS. Comm., lxxii, Synods of Angus and Mearns, 229, Merse and Teviotdale, 228, Dumfries, 231, Lothian and Tweeddale, 240-2. Presbyteries of Lanark, 234 and Kirkcaldy 236; Strathbogie, p. 89; St. Andrews (Abbotsford Club, vii), p. 41; Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh, ed. Marguerite Wood (Edinburgh, 1938), pp. 403-4 (Edinburgh presbytery).

²The burghs of Glasgow, Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, ed. James Warwick (Scottish Burgh Record Society, xii), 133-4 and Dumfries, David Stevenson, The Battle of Mauchline Moor (Ayrshire Collections, xi, no. i), p. 4, as well as the Committees of War for the shires of Haddington, Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 691, Fife Hist. MSS. Comm., lxxii, 235, Ayr (NLS, Wodrow MS. Folio 20, f. 59); Kirkcudbright, Wigton, Lanark and Renfrew (Stevenson, Mauchline Moor, p. 4) petitioned parliament against embracing the Engagement. For a pro-Engager petition (that of Linlithgowshire War Committee) see Hist. MSS. Comm., lxxi 235.

³Diplomatic Correspondence, ii. 482, 492; Guthry, Memoirs, p. 274.
These efforts proved so successful in delaying the levy that Colonel James Turner took extraordinary steps to bring out the levies in Glasgow and Renfrewshire. By quartering large numbers of soldiers in the homes of Covenanters, Turner both filled his quota and forced these Covenanters to join the Engagement. In other areas the Engagers resorted to kidnapping men from bed or taking them from church during the sermon. Church and family records indicate that certain burgh councils and many landowners supported the levy. Nevertheless, the forces of the duke of Hamilton were much smaller than had been hoped. The duke entered England not with an army greatly outnumbering the potential parliament forces, but with one of only 14,000 - 15,000 men. The Engagers had succeeded in raising less than two-thirds of the 4 May levy.

Considering the ineptitude of Hamilton the potential recruits who remained in Scotland were fortunate. Once inside England (8 July 1648) a northern royalist force of 3,000 - 4,000 men under Sir Marmaduke Langdale joined Hamilton. A speedy march south was

---

1 Baillie, iii. 47-8; Turner, Memoirs, pp. 53-5.
2 SRO, PR Linlithgow, 21.3.1649; Cupar, 136; Robertson, Lenark, 60-1.
3 Burnet, Lives, p. 451; Fotheringham, Diplomatic Correspondence, ii. 524; SRO, PR Garioch, 17.7.1650; PR Perth, iii. 66, 71, 75, 123, 126, 153, 171; PR Dingwall, i. f. 35; GD. 33.1, f. 193; GD. 75.654-5, 657, 658; NLS, Gordon Cummings Papers 67, ff. 609, 639; Kinloch, Cupar, 128-9.
4 Burnet, Lives, p. 451 estimated the strength of horse at 4,000, which was 1,900 more than the act of levy specified.
5 Lt. Gen. Cromwell's Letter to the Honourable William Lenthall, Tracts relating to the military proceedings in Lancashire, ed. George Ormerod (Chetham Society, ii, 1844), p. 266; The Scottish Army Advanced into England (London, 1648), p. 11. Estimated strengths of the Scots army ranged from 7,000 foot and 3,500 horse, Scottish Army, pp. 10-11; 10,000 foot and 4,000 horse Burnet, Lives, p. 451; 12,000 foot and 5,000 horse, Ormerod, 'Cromwell's Letter'. 265-6. The combined army was thought to be 21,000 strong, 'A Particular of the Several Victories', Tracts, ed. George Ormerod, p. 271; 24,000 men (18,000 foot and 6,000 horse) E. Robinson, A Discourse of the war in Lancashire, ed. William Beaumont (Chetham Society, lxii, 1842), p. 148, fn. 122; 25,000 men (Baillie of Lamington - 18,000 foot and 8,000 horse) Commons Journal, v.682; and 30,000 strong, Baillie, iii. 51.
essential, if the Engagers hoped to divert Cromwell and Fairfax from crushing the royalist risings in Wales and East Anglia.

Hamilton, however, failed to move. He attempted to rally the Lancashire presbyterians to his cause, but due to the opposition of the Scottish church the duke was unable to gain their support. Hamilton's army was also plagued by insubordination and hampered by a lack of artillery. Sir Alexander Hamilton, general of artillery, had reached his dotage and failed to make provision for supplying the army with cannon. General George Munro, who commanded the forces sent from the Ulster army, refused to accept orders from Hamilton's lieutenant generals Baillie and Callendar. Thus Munro's men hung back from the main army, merely protecting the supply line to Scotland. Eventually the Engagers headed south in appalling weather conditions without supplies, plans and effective leadership. The destruction of Hamilton's forces (which began at the battle of Preston) arose not only from Cromwell's skill as a commander, but also from Hamilton's lack of martial qualities. By 25 August the Engager troops were either dead, prisoners of the English, or in flight to Scotland. The parliamentarians estimated the total Engager casualties at between 10,000 - 12,000 captured and 3,000 - 5,000 killed. With the Engager army shattered Cromwell headed north to ensure the fall of their regime.

The origins of the commanders in the Engager army resembled that

---


3Commons Journal, v.682; Ormerod, 'Several Victories', p.271. The story of Engager forces in Scotland, which disbanded only in late September, will be told in the section on the Whiggamore raiders.
of other armies fielded by the Scots. However, a third of the colonels or routmasters [German: Rittmeisters] were new to command positions. Despite the Estates' appointment of twice as many lairds as alternates or colonels in the August levy the nobles retained most of the commands.

Table 12: Colonels and Routmasters by the Act of 5 May 1648

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Alternates</th>
<th>Horse troops</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Colonels appointed by the 5 August 1648 Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Dragoon regt.s</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The Earl of Seaforth commanded both regiments.

The strong noble support for the Engagement appears most strikingly when the English lists of prisoners of war are consulted.

1 The duke of Hamilton the earls of Roxburgh, Dumfries, Moray, Kellie, Erroll, Buchan and Traquair, lords Carlyles, Ross, Cochrane, Banff and Spynie, George Keith (heir-apparent to the earl Marischal), the lairds of Collington, Kilravock, Duffus, Lemlair, Macleod, Ludquarn, Garthland and Lockhart of (?) and Sir James Drummond of Machanie held their first commands as colonels or routmasters (or alternates for either) in the Engager army, Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 54-6.

2 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 54-60.

3 SRO, BA. 7.2.32.57.
As some of these nobles were without previous experience as officers in the Covenanting armies, the Engagement may truly be seen as a change in Covenant politics. (A similar phenomenon is observable in the Army of the Covenants, where many lairds who had formerly no political or military experience appear in parliament and as army commanders). The cause of the appointment of alternates arose from the Engagers’ knowledge that certain colonels might not serve their cause. Their fears were justified, for a fifth of the appointed commanders refused the charge. Although the Covenanters (both before and after 1648) appointed a professional soldier as commanding general, the Engagers chose Hamilton. The duke had already shown his military ineptitude on the fields of Germany in the 1630s and off the Scottish coast in 1639. That alone should have persuaded the Engagers to select another man, even if that meant passing over their political leader. By placing Hamilton in command of the army the Engagers ensured that the factiousness of nobles and professional soldiers would rage unabated. The Engagers failed to realise that with a traditional army (one whose commanders came from the landed and titled classes) only a king or a mercenary could provide the needed leadership which maintained unit.

1 Three Letters Concerning the Surrender of many Scottish Lords (London, 1648), pp. 3-4.

2 The earls of Buccleuch and Sutherland, lords Elcho, Kinghorn and Palmerino, the Master of Forbes, the laird of Naughton, Sir John Brown, Lieutenant General David Leslie, Colonels Robert Montgomery, Archibald Strachan and Gilbert Kerr listed in the 5 May 1648 act refused to accept their posts, Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 54-6.
The political triumph of the Engagers was not uncontested by the more extreme Covenanters. The extreme kirk party, or Whiggamores, opposed the Engagers unsuccessfully in June, but successfully in September 1648. These two risings ushered in an era of extremist Covenanter military activity which finally ended in 1679 with their defeat at Bothwell Brig. Calling the extremists' forces in 1648 an 'army' is inaccurate. In both instances they lacked the usual military command structure. During the June rising they possessed no sense of purpose. However, in September Argyll and other nobles (once more confident in their course of action) led the badly-armed Whiggamore forces which with the support of Cromwell's troops, forced a treaty upon the Engagers. This called for the disbanding of the Engagers' and the Whiggamores' armies but left the Whiggamores in control of the government.

The origins of the June rising lay in two different sectors - one noble, the other peasant. During May 1648 Argyll and his allies in Fife, Stirlingshire and the west contemplated a rising against the Engagers. However, they failed to act. About 1 June a group of 2,000 - 3,000 west country men met at Loudoun Hill and asked Leslie to lead them. His failure to respond led them to retire homewards. Simultaneously men from Lanarkshire fleeing the levy and army deserters began to arrive in Ayrshire. On 10 June the nobles and gentry of

1NLS, Wodrow MS Folio 29, f. 66.
2Baillie, iii. 48; Guthry, Memoirs, pp. 270-2.
3Stevenson, Mauchline Moor, p. 7.
4NLS, Wodrow MS Folio 29, f. 66.
Ayrshire met in Riccarton. There they decided against a rising. Fife had remained quiet and 3,600 Engager troops under Callendar had just arrived in Ayrshire. Before ending their meeting the landowners sent a message informing the body of men at Mauchline Moor, who had gathered for communion and to consider the situation, of their intention to do nothing. Those who had fled the Engagement levy were now joined by the tenant farmers of Kyle and Cunningham. Conventicing, exclusive theories of a radical theological nature motivated these farmers. This body on the Moor numbering 2,000 men was guided by seven ministers and five officers.

The engagement at Mauchline Moor resembled more an exercise in crowd dispersal than a battle. On 12 June Major General Middleton arrived with six troops of horse. Despite reaching an agreement with the rebels to disband, through the meditation of the ministers, Middleton ordered his troops to charge. Following some resistance by the deserters, who were excluded from the agreement, and the more fanatical peasants (chiefly from Lanarkshire), the extremists dispersed to their homes. The casualties on both sides were slight, but the basis of the first chapter in Covenanter hagiography had been created.

With the destruction of Hamilton's army in England four forces

\[1\] Ibid., Baillie, iii.48.

\[2\] Walter Makey, 'The Church of the Covenant' (University of Edinburgh Ph.D. thesis 1976) pp.381, 384, 389-391, 393. However, they were essentially more conservative than their English counterparts. They respected and sought clerical leadership, rather than rejecting it.

\[3\] Baillie, iii.49 specifies that 1,200 were mounted and 800 were on foot. Baillie, iii.53 and Turner, Memoirs, p.56 mention their leaders.

\[4\] A pro-Covenanter source claimed 5-6 Covenanters killed, 5-6 mortally wounded and several others wounded. The same source gives the figures of 30 Engagers killed and 60 wounded, NLS, Wodrow MS Folio 29, f. 65v. Baillie reported 40 casualties in all, Baillie, iii.49. An Engager source mentions no wounded or killed, but 60 peasants and five officers captured, who were all pardoned, Turner, Memoirs, p.56. For fuller accounts of the skirmish, please see NLS, Wodrow MS Folio 29, ff. 65-68; Baillie, iii.48-49; Turner, Memoirs, pp. 55-56.
began to converge on the eastern Lowlands. Munro led the survivors of the invading army, fewer than 5,000 men. Lanark, the commander of the Engager forces in Scotland, brought 2,500 - 3,000 men to join Munro. The extreme Covenanters (now labelled Whiggamores due to the predominance of south-westerners among them) headed towards Edinburgh. Meanwhile, Cromwell headed north in hopes of ending the Engagers' dominance in Scotland. The Whiggamore, in contrast to the later risings, had broad support throughout Lowland Scotland.

However, the rising began in the west, as did all those of the Restoration period. Acting upon the news of Hamilton's disaster at Preston, Colonel Robert Montgomery, son of the earl of Eglinton, attacked a troop of Lanark's horse. Soon afterwards Eglinton, Cassillis, Loudoun and Kirkcudbright, with extensive support from the ministers, raised a force of 6,500 peasants armed with farm implements from Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, Ayrshire and Wigtonshire. Meanwhile Argyll levied between 700 - 1,000 men from his own clan, the Lennox and western Stirlingshire. Eventually Scotts under the earl of Buccleuch and many Fife lairds with their tenants would join the Whiggamores. The extremists also enjoyed the support of several professional soldiers. Although the Whiggamores claimed they had planned to rise before hearing of Hamilton's defeat, there is little

1Burnet, Lives, p. 469; Rushworth, Historical Collections, viii. 1264, 1273.

2For numbers and the area of support please see Burnet, Lives, pp. 465, 470-1; Guthry, Memoirs, pp. 285-6. The ministers' aid is seen in SRO, PR Ayr, 27.9.1648; PR Stranraer, i. f. 141; KSR Colmonell, i. 131; Burnet, Lives, p. 265.

3Guthry, Memoirs, p. 292. That the local church support played a role in bringing out Fife can be seen from SRO, KSR Ceres, 10.9.1648.

4Burnet, Lives, p. 470 mentions Leven, David Leslie and Major General Sir John Brown; Guthry, Memoirs, p. 291 lists Colonels Ker and Hepburn and tantalizingly refers to 'others'.
evidence to support such a statement.\footnote{It is suggested the claim to have set a date was a face-saving device, Stevenson, \textit{Mauchline Moor}, p. 15.}

Despite the Engagers' advantage in possessing trained soldiers, it was they and not the extremists who collapsed. Engager troops even won both skirmishes – Linlithgow and Stirling – of the short campaign. However, the Commission of the General Assembly, now in possession of a military arm however brittle, issued statements on 13 and 26 September ordering the Engagers to disband or face excommunication.\footnote{RGGA, ii. 58, 73.} Cromwell's forces, which entered Scotland in mid-September, probably caused Lanark greater concern. Negotiations between the Engagers and Whiggamores commenced on 14 September and ended on the 27th with the Treaty of Stirling. The Treaty stipulated that both armies would disband immediately. However, 1,500 Whiggamores were exempted. They would disband on 10 October following the disbanding of the Engager forces north of the Tay. The troops from the Ulster army were to receive quartering and shipping back to Ulster. Instead the civilians of the west attacked and plundered them as they marched to the port of embarkation.\footnote{Burnet, \textit{Lives}, p. 477.} Their troubles did not end there; Monck's seizure of the Scottish ports in Ulster left these Engagers without a place to go. The Treaty may have left the Whiggamores nearly bereft of troops, nonetheless they now controlled the government.

The forces of the kirk party, henceforth entitled the Army of the Covenants, existed for two reasons – maintenance of internal order and from February 1649 protection of Scotland from English invasion.
The second danger grew with time for the Commonwealth was committed to military action in Ireland during 1649 and could not undertake a pre-emptive strike against Scotland until summer 1650. The kirk party viewed both malignants—royalists and sectarian English Parliamentarians—with equal distrust. They perceived the former as politically dangerous and willing to overthrow the Covenants and presbyterian church government in order to restore the king to power. The latter they viewed as heretics, destroyers of monarchical government and eventually (with the establishment of toleration in England and the invasion of 1650) as breakers of the Covenant of 1643. Notwithstanding its opposition to the malignants, the kirk party was not republican but monarchist. Hence the proclamation of Charles, prince of Wales and duke of Rothesay, as Charles II in February 1649. The kirk party had not eliminated the tensions between loyalty to religion and allegiance to the king, which had appeared in the National Covenant.

During its two years in power the kirk party issued several acts of levy. Save in July 1650, these calls to arms went largely unheeded. On 14 October 1648, the kirk party which controlled the Committee of Estates, authorised a levy of 2,730 foot and 620 horse to join the 700 men already on foot. In February 1649 parliament ordered a levy of 12,800 foot and 5,200 horse from all the shires. Although these levies had created an army on paper of 22,050 men, there were only 3,107 foot and 2,231 horse in the army on 31 July 1649. Discovery of this tremendous shortfall may have led parliament to issue its second act of levy for the defence of the kingdom on 6 August 1649.

---


This new levy called up an additional 10,049 foot and 3,254 horse. Nevertheless, on the eve of Montrose's invasion in early 1650 the Army of the Covenants consisted of only 3,000 foot and 1,500 horse. Several months later its strength had increased by only 1,000 horse. On 25 June 1650 and again on 3 July parliament ordered a national levy for the defence of the king (who had landed in Scotland) and the laws, liberties and religion of the kingdom against the sectarian army. Regardless of the danger to the country all those prohibited from holding offices by the Act of Classes of January 1649 were forbidden to join the levy. Furthermore parliament had delayed in passing an act of levy until it had promulgated an act for purging the army of malignants and profane troops. The levy of 3 July called out 21,248 more foot and 2,779 horse. Probably the danger to Scotland had much to do with the success of this levy. When Cromwell met the Scots at the battle of Dunbar, the Army of the Covenants consisted of 16,000 foot and 7,000 horse. Following the defeat at Dunbar the army shrank to 4,000 - 5,000 men. The exclusion of most of the nobility and large numbers of the more important lairds from the political and military life of the nation, by the Act of Classes and ecclesiastical censure, helps to explain the difficulties in raising troops.

1 NLS, Adv. MS 23.7.12, f. 96v; Wishart, Montrose, p. 291.

2 The purging of the army which had occurred nearly from its inception will be discussed more fully; see below, pp. 239-45, 288-94.

3 NLS, Adv. MS 23.7.12, ff. 107, 108, 111v.
Like the Engagers the kirk party could only rely on one of the two pillars necessary for a successful levy. Where the Engagers had had massive support from the landowning classes the extreme Covenanters could only count on the church for aiding the levying of troops. The burghs, where the kirk party had strong bases of support, had suffered heavily from the plague of 1644-45. This led to a decline in the number of men they were required to put out. Although the English invasion led many outside the kirk party to offer their services, parliament rejected their aid because it would have restored malignants to positions of public authority contrary to the Act of Classes. The evidence of any support for the two levies of 1649 is slight. With the greater danger in 1650 the church courts received orders from the Committee of Estates to help forward the levies. The parishes also seem to have taken a more active role in that year. Following its army's defeat at Dunbar, the kirk party attempted to raise new levies through the use of loyal nobles and the church. The relative failure of the two levies of 1649, when the army was aimed at internal foes, contrasts sharply with the success of the 1650 levy, which was meant to oppose an invading army of English sectaries. These differences suggest that the lairds and heritors, who apparently did little to further levies for use against fellow countrymen, would

1 SRO, PA. 3.2.3. (1.5.1650). Only 250 were required from Edinburgh as opposed to 1,200 in 1643. In the levy of 3 July 1650 Edinburgh, Perth, Stirling and Dundee received exemptions from supplying men, Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 509.

2 Only the parishes of Humbie, Tyningham and Greenlaw record activities promoting those levies in SRO, PA. 16.1, KSR Tyningham, i. f. 185v, and NHK, KSR Greenlaw, 6.5.1649, respectively.

3 SRO, PR Biggar, i. f. 54; PR Haddington, vi. f. 124; PR Lanark 1.8.1650; Lanark, 86.

4 SRO, GD. 75, 66.4.1; KSR Carluke, i. f. 13.

respond to the call of the kingdom.

The Army of the Covenants' military reputation has suffered heavily from its defeat at Dunbar. However, that battle was the only reverse the army suffered. Indeed under the leadership of Lieutenant General David Leslie it accomplished a great deal. In February 1649 the army received its first challenge - the royalist rising in the Highlands by Thomas Mackenzie, laird of Pluscardine. On 22 February this group took Inverness and subsequently destroyed the fortifications there. Parliament responded by enacting the 28 February act of levy and by sending Leslie north. While Leslie was pursuing Pluscardine's force, he learned of a rising in Atholl under lord Ogilvie and Major General Middleton. Coming to terms with the northern royalists, Leslie returned south. There he received the submission of the Atholl gentry, as their two leaders had fled north. Once more Leslie turned his attention north, for Pluscardine had begun to stir again. However, at Balvenie a small force of three horse troops and twelve musketeers under Colonel Gilbert Ker routed the royalist force of over 1,000 men. The following spring at Carbisdale Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Strachan with five under-strength troops amounting to about 230 horsemen and several hundred local foot inflicted a similar stunning defeat on Montrose's army of Danes, Germans and Orcadians. These two victories provided excellent propaganda for the ministers and lairds who supported the theory that God would only favour an army free from malignants and sinners. Undoubtedly the greatest challenge of Leslie's career was the Dunbar campaign. Leslie kept calm and bested Cromwell up to the eve of the battle. As the defeat at Dunbar has often been laid at the door of the clergy,
the battle will be more fully discussed below.¹

The disaster in East Lothian did not end the existence of the Army of the Covenants. In October Leslie faced a royalist rising under Major General Middleton. On 4 November the two officers signed a treaty at Strathbogie, which granted indemnity to the royalists at the price of their disarming. The continued retention of political control by the Army of the Covenants' masters was questionable by this time. In the southwest a radical movement had risen challenging the Estates at Perth. By mid-December the Commission of the General Assembly would lay the foundation for the creation of a truly national army by issuing the Public Resolutions. The Army of the Covenants would be subsumed into the Army of the Kingdom.

The commanders of forces in the Army of the Covenants mirrored those of the Engagement in several ways. As in the Engagement forces, many men new to the military scene received commands. So too did parliament place men without military experience in positions of command. In this case it was the lairds, not the nobles, who came to prominence.² The reason for this phenomenon is not hard to find; it reflects the change in the representation of lairds in parliament. The parliament of 1649-1650 possessed more obscure lairds as commissioners of the shires than any other parliaments of the period 1641-1651. The absolute and relative decline in the number of noble commanders is easily explained by the exclusion of most of Scotland's nobility from any public activities due to their malignancy or support for the Engagement. The elevation of many inexperienced lairds to commands in 1649-50 may explain the disgraceful behaviour

¹For sections on purging army and Dunbar, see below, pp. 239-45, 288-94.

²Five nobles, twenty knights and lairds and three professional soldiers were given regimental or troop commands who had hitherto not held commands, Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii.217-8, 598-9.
of the officers at Dunbar.

Table 15: Commanders by the 28 February 1649 Act of Levy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Horse regt.s</th>
<th>Horse troops</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Commanders from the pay list of 31 July 1649

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Horse troops</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Commanders of Foot regt.s by the 3 July 1650 Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot colonels</th>
<th>Alternates</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army of the Kingdom would more closely resemble the earlier armies of the Covenants, principally those of the 1644-47 period. However, the army raised in western Scotland in autumn 1650 resembled the Army of the Covenants: it possessed a combination of professional soldiers and lairds as commanders.

The Western Association Army (as the force under the control of the Western Remonstrants was called) has a decidedly complex history for such

---


2 Ibid., vi, part i. 489.

3 Ibid., vi, part ii. 599.
a short existence, September - December 1650. The army possessed two foundations - one legal, the other ideological. After Dunbar the Committee of Estates, hoping to distract Cromwell from marching on weakly defended Stirling, granted Colonels Gilbert Ker and Archibald Strachan a commission to raise troops in the west.¹

In a short time a meeting occurred at Kilmarnock between representatives of the shires of Ayr, Lanark, Renfrew and Wigton. There Patrick Gillespie, a radical minister, persuaded the assembled gentry and ministers to raise a force of horse under Ker, Strachan, Colonel Robert Hackett and Sir Robert Adair of Kinhilt, Ulster.

The ideological basis for this army stretched back to the Engager-Whiggamore controversy. Of more immediate importance was the Remonstrance of the West Kirk of Edinburgh of 13 August 1650. In that document certain officers professed their loyalty to the Covenants, yet they condemned the sins of Charles II and his parents. Both Ker and Strachan in addition to many southwestern ministers strongly adhered to these beliefs. So it is hardly surprising that on 17 October the army issued the Western Remonstrance at Dumfries. This document strongly attacked the kirk party's dealings with the king, their plans to join with royalists and Highlanders, and their rejection of the Covenants and trust in God. The Remonstrance also condemned Charles II's lying and his continued support for malignants, whom he wished to see regain power. The Remonstrants acknowledged their own sinfulness and denied being sectaries, but claimed they upheld God's cause.² In common with most dissenters the Remonstrants

¹SRO, EA. 7.24, f. 14.
²RCGA, iii. 95-106.
suffered from attacks by enemies outside their circle and dissension within it.

Despite the initial enthusiasm for raising a force in the west, support for it soon proved thin. The meeting at Kilmarnock had decided to create its army out of routed troops from Dunbar and volunteers. Strachan provided an entire cavalry regiment, which had fled from Dunbar. Certain local lairds (but only one noble—lord Cathcart) raised volunteers. Indeed, three local lairds commanded troops in the army. However, Wigtonshire proved laggard. Nor did the Carrick district of Ayrshire aid the levy heartily. The presbyteries of Paisley and Stranraer strongly supported the levy, as did many ministers in the southwest. As the weeks passed Ker's failure to act prompted the Estates in Stirling to encourage him to fight by placing the two dragoon regiments recruited in the Lennox and Dumfriesshire under his command. These efforts culminated in the creation of an army approximately 2,000 strong, whose raising had imposed financial losses to both landowners and tenants.

The campaign of the Western army was complicated by numerous factors. Its supporters in the Estates hoped that the army would place them in power. Cromwell believed he could reach an understanding with its leaders and detach the army from Charles II. Ker and Strachan

---

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. lxxii, 251; James Paterson, History of the county of Ayr (Edinburgh, 1847), i. p. 127 fn.
2 SRO, PR Stranraer, i. f. 210v; Baillie, iii. 112.
3 SRO, PR Paisley, 10.9.25.9.1650; PR Stranraer, i. ff. 206v-7, 210v-211v.
4 SRO, PA. 11.11. ff. 79-9v; Baillie, iii. 120.
5 Ibid., 112, 118; John Nicoll, A Diary of Public Transactions, ed. D. Laing (Bannatyne Club, liii, 1836), p. 36.
approached Cromwell asking him to withdraw, thus granting them a free hand against the Estates and malignants. Eventually, Strachan and some officers around him lost their posts for advocating a pro-sectarian, pro-English policy.\textsuperscript{1} Manoeuvres like this hardly aided in establishing a coherent military strategy. Ker, save for marches which kept him as far from the English as possible, took no decisive action. Therefore, in late November the Estates commissioned Colonel Robert Montgomery, of Whiggamore rising fame, to march south with a force and to take charge of Ker's troops. Montgomery informed both the Committee of the West and Ker of his advent. On Sunday 1 December he arrived at Campsie, in the northern area of the Association. However, Ker had decided on the previous evening not to unite with Montgomery. Instead he made plans to attack the English garrison at Hamilton, an unfortified town in Lanarkshire. Apparently motivated by a desire to uphold the cause of the Remonstrants (now that Cromwell had rejected his terms) and to gain momentum for a struggle with the Committee of Estates, Ker forsook his policy of inaction. The result was disastrous. His attack fell not upon a small garrison but on a body of several thousand English horse under Major General John Lambert. By noon on 1 December the Remonstrants' remnants had fled to Kilmarnock and Paisley. The military threat to both the Estates' left (political) and Cromwell's left (strategic) had vanished like hoarfrost. The road towards the creation of an army of the kingdom, towards which both the Estates and the Commission of the General Assembly had been inclining following Dunbar and the Remonstrance,\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}Baillie, iii.122.
was now open again.

The Army of the Kingdom is a force remembered for its defeats and little else. The difficulties in persuading the kirk party and the Commission of the General Assembly to accept malignants, even with reservations, received little notice until the appearance of Dr. Stevenson’s book. The subsequent success of the 1651 levy has been forgotten. The necessity of augmenting the army to oppose Cromwell’s march north from Edinburgh was unquestioned among the moderate members of the kirk party. However, it was not until 14 December that the Commission of the General Assembly issued the Public Resolutions, which authorised parliament to recruit any man into the army regardless of past malignancy or sins, if he publicly satisfied the church. This cumbersome, and as Major James Turner termed it, hypocritical procedure continued until 4 June 1651. On that day parliament repealed the Acts of Classes. From that time any fencible man could join the army, regardless of his past. Charles II led the only truly national Scottish army of the era. For it was joined by troops from nearly all parts and many clans, which had not served in previous Covenanter armies, joined this one.

The Scots took great care in raising the Army of the Kingdom. On 20 December 1650 parliament issued a list of colonels, which contained the names of many royalists, Engagers and Highland chieftains. Three days later it promulgated the Covenanters’ last act of levy. However, additional colonels were appointed throughout 1651. Owing to the danger to the kingdom the act stipulated a levée en masse, with certain exceptions on political and moral grounds. Considering the political background of the colonels it is likely that those exceptions

\[1\] Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, specifically pp. 180-94.
were overlooked. The act also authorised the parish ministers or two elders to list all fencible men, which they were to present to the colonels. Despite the dangers of an English attack, the Scots failed to produce a sizeable fighting machine until late spring 1651.

Support for the defence of the kingdom came from many quarters. The church strove to aid the levy from its various levels of authority. The Commission of the General Assembly ordered its two undeposed ministers in Orkney to assist the landowners with the levy. The presbyteries, in unoccupied areas, authorised the reading of the act of levy or encouraged the people to join the army. However, certain presbyteries, for instance that of Paisley, opposed the levy for its inclusion of malignants. From the slender evidence that survives the kirk sessions apparently contributed to the national effort. Probably of greater importance, because of their unity of purpose, were the nobles and lairds. The state papers continually mention both groups' aid to the levy. The shire committees and burghs, too, worked for the creation of a strong army. Nonetheless, in an enterprise where unity might be expected

---

1 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, p. 194.
3 RCA, i. 242.
4 SRO, PR Fordyce, 8.1. 29.1.1651; PR Paisley, 9.1, 10.1.1651; Kirkcaldie, 367. See also below, pp. 242-4.
5 SRQ, GD. 214.303; KSR Dairsie, 86, 15.6.1651; KSR Kinglassie, i. f. 29v; KSR Slains, i. 213-214, 216-217; Nicoll, Diary, p. 50.
(and was indeed necessary) it was often lacking. The English threat failed to draw the Scots together; instead Charles and the Estates faced many problems which even the Engagers had escaped. Although the Engagers had recourse to quartering on opponents of the levy, their army was meant for invasion, not home defence. On several occasions in 1651 regiments in the Army of the Kingdom, often with official sanction, quartered on delinquents in providing their quota of men.\(^1\) In Highland areas official recruiters had their levies disbanded by jealous chieftains or lairds.\(^2\) Elsewhere colonels quarrelled with the committees of war.\(^3\) As the year advanced burghs faced the dangers of English attack by sea or failed to sustain their burden due to sheer exhaustion.\(^4\) Unfortunately the exact effect of these obstacles must remain unknown. What is evident, however, is that the mighty effort required and expected under the circumstances, was not all it should have been.

The Army of the Kingdom had the problem of fluctuating numbers with an ever-increasing number of staff generals. By mid-May the new recruits had swollen Leslie's remnant to 15,000 foot and 4,000 - 5,000 horse.\(^5\) On 18 July the infantry mustered 19,943 men.\(^6\) However, less than two weeks later when the army headed south on its course towards death or victory, it stood at no more than 21,000 strong and

\(^1\)SRO, GD. 16.50.62; P.A. 11.11, f. 35v.
\(^2\)SRO, P.A. 7.7, f. 209; Thurloe, Papers, i. 168.
\(^3\)SRO, GD. 124.13, ff. 4, 5, 6; Thurloe, Papers, i. 169.
\(^4\)SRO, P.A. 11.11, Montrose (f. 103) is an example of the first, Dundee (f. 90v) of the second.
\(^5\)Bod. Lib., MS Carte 29, f. 438, 443; Balfour, Annales, iv. 397.
\(^6\)SRO, P.A. 16.5.
possibly as few as 11,000. The number of general officers grew over the spring, more in response to the necessity of satisfying personal ambition than to actual military need. On 3 February Colonel Robert Montgomery became Major General of Horse; Sir John Brown took the post of Major General of Cavalry; Major General John Holburn was promoted to the title of Lieutenant General of Foot; and Lieutenant General John Middleton received the same charge over the horse. Three months later the Committee appointed Colonels Colin Pitscottie and Thomas Dalyell of the Binns Major Generals of Foot. The Estates also gave high ranks to the duke of Buckingham, commander of the English contingent, Edward Massey, his major general, Major General Jonas Vandruschke and Lieutenant General David Leslie. No other Scottish army of the period was so encrusted with military brass.

Despite the army's initially large numbers and its grand number of general officers, it failed to solve its military problems successfully. In mid-July Lambert landed in Fife, initiating a threat to the Scots' left flank. At the battle of Inverkeithing on 20 July a Scottish force of 4,000 - 5,000 men under Brown and Holburn suffered a disastrous defeat. The rich farmland of Fife, the land route north and the Scottish left were all under English control or potential control. Desperate, Charles led a spectacular dash south, reaching Worcester from Stirling in 24 days. The Scottish effort was to no

---

1 Ormerod, 'Several Proceedings in Parliament', Tracts, p. 292, lists 6-7,000 foot and 5-6,000 horse. Turner (Turner, Memoirs, p. 94) gives the totals of 9,000 foot and 4,000 horse. Robinson, War in Lancashire, p. 69, puts the Scots at 15,000 strong. Bod. Lib. MS Tanner 54, f. 142 estimates the army's strength at 14-15,000 foot and 6,000 horse. Though given the casualty lists of 12,000 dead and captured and the difficulty of reaching Scotland from Worcester, a lower number may be preferred.

2 SRO, P.A. 7.4.87.

3 SRO, P.A. 7.24, f. 120.

4 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, p. 201.
for on 3 September Cromwell with a mixed force of regulars and militia closed in on the city. After a bitter day of fighting both the Covenanter and royalist cause were lost. Opposition continued in Scotland from certain nobles – for instance Argyll, Huntly and Balcarres – and isolated fortresses such as the Bass Rock, Dunottar and Dumbarton castles. However, the years of Scotland's most intensive military activity in the seventeenth century, if not in her history (excepting the 1296–1329 period), had ended in defeat. Having begun by raising troops to oppose an episcopalian English royalist policy, the Covenanter and other Scots fell victim to the sectarian English parliamentarians and Cromwell's military genius.

The commanders of the Army of the Kingdom differed in several respects from those of earlier Covenanting forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Foot regt.s</th>
<th>Alternates</th>
<th>Dragoons</th>
<th>Horse regt.s</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nobles</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lairds</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the nobles, malignants abounded. Correspondingly there were probably fewer than one-fifth of the nobles who might be called kirk partymen. However, the nobles did predominate as a group, even if none of the general officers belonged to that caste. The lairds were also represented; combined with the nobility, the landowners accounted for

\[1\text{SRQ, EA. 7.24, ff. 14v-15, 26, 35, 37, 65, 92; EA. 11.11, ff. 54v-5, 80v, 82v, 93, 94, 96v, 99v, 101v, 103v; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 623-5, 655; Balfour, Annales, iv.210-212.} \]
more than three-quarters of the colonels. Obviously, their ability to bring out kin, friends, servants and tenants was strongly counted upon to counteract war-weariness and the loss of recruiting grounds and manpower. Probably the most interesting phenomenon was the dramatic increase in the use of Highland chiefs and leaders as colonels. In 1639 there had not been a single Highland regiment. In 1650-51 parliament and the Estates authorised the levying of twenty regiments of Highland foot and one of horse. Thus, clansmen-colonels had nearly a third of such positions. From the muster of 18 July 1651 we learn that of the regiments present the Highland ones accounted for approximately twenty per cent of both the regiments named and the men present. These men, whom the Covenanters had been reluctant, if not unable, to call upon, obeyed the summons of the king. Charles II's army in 1651 thoroughly represented Scottish society north of the Forth-Clyde line.

The Covenanters had begun their military activities in direct opposition to the king. Yet in little over a decade the Scots had become the firmest allies of the monarchy. The initial tension within the National Covenant allowed such a change to occur in a Scottish context. The military activities of the Covenanters tell the story of a party which became accustomed to the use of armed forces, and even adept at its use, to secure political and religious ends. However, having achieved military successes, and unable to gain political victories, the Scots became enamoured of and committed to use of the sword whether of the Lord or of the king. Thus the Scots were confronted with the prospect of continual military activity in order to secure victory or avoid defeat. That Cromwell and his army defeated them in the end lies partially with the divisions in Scottish society and partly with the quality of Cromwell's generalship and his men's fighting abilities.
CHAPTER TWO: THE LAWS OF THE LORD

The following discussion seeks to provide the necessary background to a study of the religious manifestations within the armies, or more particularly to establish the meaning of the term 'godly army' in its Scottish context. An examination of that ideology will form the first part of the chapter. A short discussion of Scottish parish religious life follows. The major topic of this chapter will be a discussion of the Articles and Ordinances of War. The last section, which concerns the appointment of chaplains to the armies, provides the final piece of background for the next chapters. The chaplains had to remind their charges of the ideological nature of the struggle, to maintain religious services and discipline, and to aid the officers in regulating the behaviour of the soldiers.

The National Covenant formed the foundation of unified action by the various elements of Scottish society discontented with the policies of Charles I. In 1643 the Solemn League and Covenant formed the basis of union between the Scottish Covenanters and the English parliamentarians. The origins of both Covenants have been mentioned in the previous chapter, but the dynamic linking the two documents has not been examined. The presbyterian clergy who had developed Scottish Covenant theology worked under three important assumptions. They believed that the Scottish reformation's success indicated God's special favour for Scotland. Secondly they were followers of the presbyterian Hildebrand, Andrew Melville, that is desiring to establish a church independent of the state. Finally, they viewed the reformed church as a supranational organization and wished to erect a reformed church which would replace the Church of Rome as the church of Europe.¹ A combination of these three beliefs with the

¹S.A. Burrell, 'The covenant idea as a revolutionary symbol, 1596–1637', Church History xcvii (1958): 221-22
Calvinist Covenant theology of the 1580s provided the Covenanting clergy of the late 1630s with a powerful new ideology which they wanted to spread.

By taking a further step, the Covenanting ministers were presented with an even more appealing prospect. The re-establishment of presbyterianism in 1638, seemingly the fulfilment of prophecies of a second reformation of the Church of Scotland, and the signing of the National Covenant in 1638 confirmed the contentions of some ministers that Scotland was the New Israel. Samuel Rutherford, the leading theorist of the radicals, proclaimed that Scotland was mentioned in the scriptures, principally in Psalms and Ezekiel. Simultaneously members of the clergy foretold the coming of the Jubilee (that is, the ruling of human society by divine law and the advent of the apocalypse), especially after the acceptance of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643. Thus, the desire for the establishment of a British reformed church along Scottish lines in the 1640-48 period had more powerful support than desires for unity, security or the establishment of a church on the premises of the Second Book of Discipline. While the Scots did not have or develop theories of social revolution (as did sections of the English Puritan movement), during the 1640s they did hold principles of religious revolution, whose fulfilment required a tremendous effort ending only in death, destruction and heavy loss of capital for Scotland. A pamphlet of 1640 succinctly summarizes the views of the Scottish Covenanters. 'The Lord hath honoured us to be his agents...' in the

---


2 Burrell, 'Covenant idea', 348; principally Psalms 2:8; 45; 72.

3 Burrell, 'Apocalyptic vision', 22-3.
work of ending episcopalian ('Egyptian') bondage, redeeming the kirk from the accumulation of corrupt religious practices, planting the Christian religion in formerly barren areas and vindicating the true religion from Rome.¹

With the acceptance of Scotland's role as the new Israel went a strong bias in favour of the Old Testament. The Kirk had made no distinction between the moral codes of the two testaments, regarding both as equally authoritative.² Such an attitude had much potential for application in the situation of the 1637-1651 period. References in the Old Testament to the Israelites rebelling against tyrannical kings provided an example for the wars against Charles I.³ Sabbatarianism sprang from the Hebrews and had an impact both on civil society (which continued for the most part of the early 1640s in its familiar patterns) and on military operations. The massacres of Philiphaugh and Dunaverty were incited by ministers quoting the Book of Samuel.⁴ The Western Remonstrants and later the Protesters delighted in the tale of Gideon's army, which proved that God favoured small battalions of the elect before the vast hosts of the godless.⁵ The influence of the Covenanter ideology combined with the example of Israel served as an internal source for the concept of the godly army, since the Covenanting soldier was originally a civilian, and religious practices within Scotland were familiar to him.

¹ The intentions of the army of the kingdom of Scotland, Declared to their Brethren of England (Edinburgh, 1640), p.4.
⁴ I Sam. xv.
⁵ Judges vii. 2-23.
On Sundays two services were held in the parish church which all residents of the parish were required to attend. Drink could only be sold for a limited time between services; markets and dancing were forbidden. The services themselves consisted of prayers, psalms, reading from scripture and, most importantly, the sermon. The only other regular service was the mid-week prayer meeting, save in large burghs where there were two.

Communion was only available at long intervals and the preparations usually required several Sundays or an entire weekend. Throughout the Covenanting period the General Assembly, its Commission or other ecclesiastical judicatories often ordered parishes to observe fasts and thanksgivings. In the first case the abstinence was limited and food could be consumed at the end of the day. In the latter instance there are few signs of feasting, but many of sermons. In both cases observation required long hours of church attendance.

Besides going to church the Scotsman came into contact with the Kirk through its courts. The courts of elders and ministers operating at the levels of synod, presbytery and kirk session could judge a large variety of cases. Parishioners convicted might escape from punishment altogether, if it was a first offence. However, grave sins or those committed by a person of reprobate character would lead to public repentance at the very least and possibly to monetary fines. In more extreme cases sinners could be handed over to the civil magistrates for additional punishment or be banished from the parish. The penalty of excommunication was the strongest weapon of the church. The victim suffered not only spiritual punishment, but also lost the ties of marriage, community and kin, as well as the right to function as a civil office holder. Certainly, the men who formed the armies of the Covenanters had their origins in a land, theoretically, organised
like Calvin's Geneva.

In 1639 when Alexander Leslie (later ennobled as the first earl of Leven) former Marshal of Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus and Christina, received his commission to command the Covenanters' armies, he became responsible for the defence of Covenant, religion, crown and country. Furthermore Leslie had charge of the discipline of the army. The Articles and Ordinances of War which Leslie drew up set forth the rules for the governing of the army in the First Bishops' War and later editions did the same for other armies of the Covenanters. That Leslie's acquaintance with the rules promulgated by Gustavus and Oxenstierna in 1621 influenced those for his own army is unquestionable.¹

The work of Gustavus and his minister was eclectic in nature, but not in presentation. They examined numerous military codes, both Swedish and continental, from the middle ages to their own times. Their labours resulted in a military code suitable for a national, not a mercenary army, making it one which could be easily adopted in Scotland.² The Swedish articles established three levels of court-martial: an inferior court-martial, a superior court-martial and finally the king. The code authorized prayers twice daily and a weekly sermon. Church attendance was compulsory; drunken chaplains leading services and soldiers drinking during hours of worship faced punishment. Swearing, blasphemy, sacrilege, moral offences and duelling were prohibited. Whores could not travel with the army. The code also specified the duties of soldiers in military matters (which included digging entrenchments). The punishments could be severe; there were forty capital crimes as


²Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, ii. 240.
well as some punishable by decimation (the execution of every tenth offender) and by running the gauntlet. The following quotation summarizes the legacy of Gustavus' system in the British situation.

Gustav Adolf had provided the Protestant world with the idea of a Protestant army, with a standard of piety which never died in the hearts of those Scottish soldiers of fortune whom the King's personality had ennobled into warriors for truth. They took back the idea, the standard, the tradition to their native country; and they infused them into the army of the Covenant. And when that army succumbed at last to the genius of Cromwell, its leaders (if they had been honest with themselves) might have recognized in the victor an adept of the same school as themselves, who united in his own person (as they had failed to do) the military and moral heritage of the Swedish king.

Following the Swedish example most of the armies of the Covenanters possessed written codes of behaviour. Editions of Leslie's Articles appeared in 1639, 1640, 1642, 1644 and 1650. In the case of 1650 members of the Committee of Estates with some ministers revised Leslie's version. Even the Engager army had a military code, but no copy of it exists. On 9 June 1651 the Committee of Estates appointed Hamilton, Argyll, the laird of Blackhall and Sir James Murray to revise the Articles. Their new edition was approved on 19 July, but no known copy has survived. Undoubtedly the home armies (1644-47), which partially consisted of regiments drafted from


3 The 1642 and 1644 editions are nearly identical.


6 SRO., MS. P.A. 11.11, ff. 53, 101v.
the Ulster and Solemn League and Covenant armies, and the New
Model Army (which proceeded from the Solemn League and Covenant
army) served under the rules promulgated in 1644. The Whiggamore
army of 1648 and the Western Association Army of 1650 seem not to
have had any formal rules of war. Nevertheless both armies possessed
commanders who were familiar with Leslie's ordinances. These
commanders would be likely to retain the code of discipline under
which they had previously served. Gustavus Adolphus' and Leslie's
influence on the Covenanters' military code extended from the
beginning to the end of the period.

When thou goest out to battell against thine
enemies, bee not afraid of them, and keep thee from
every wickedness.¹

The above admonition appears only on the title page of the 1639
edition, yet it applies equally well to the later versions. The
discussion which follows will cover all the aspects of the Articles
roughly conforming to the order in which they appear in the first
edition. Prior to the first article two pieces of introductory
material, the method of announcing the rules and the soldiers' oath
generally appeared. Before the army could take to the field Leven
ordered that the Articles be publicized at the general rendezvous.
While the 1640 edition authorizes the announcement before each regiment,
brigade and all the officers, the subsequent editions merely stipulated
that majors read them to the officers. All the versions agree that
the officers were then to read the articles to their companies or
troops. The General could authorize future readings when he thought
fit. Each colonel and captain were obliged to own a copy.

¹Deut. xx. 1, xxiii. 9, from Articles (1639), p.1.
Following the announcement of the orders, the soldiers had the duty of swearing an oath. Three extant versions of the oath exist; the earliest one of 1639, the next from 1640–42, the later of 1644–50, embodying the effect of the Solemn League and Covenant version. As can be seen by reading the texts the only difference lies in a change from offering allegiance to a national cause to an international one — the wider spread of presbyterianism. To simplify matters the changes in the 1644–50 version are placed in square brackets following the phrase of the 1640–42 version.

I N.W. promise and sweare to be true and faithfull in my service to the Kingdome of Scotland, according to the heads sworne by me in the Covenant: [in this service, according to the heads sworn by me in the Solemn League and Covenant of the Three Kingdoms;] To honour and obey my Lord Generall, and all my Superior Officers and Commanders, and by all means to hinder their dishonour and hurt: To observe carefully all the Articles of Warre and camp discipline: never to leave the defence of this cause, nor flie from my colours so long as I can follow them: To be ready to watching and warding and working so far as I have strength: To endure and suffer all distresses, and to fight manfully to the uttermost, as I shall answere to GOD, and as GOD shall helpe me.

The swearing of the oath by the soldiers officially inducted them into the army and acknowledged their acceptance of the superior authorities within it. In the case of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant all members of the Committee with the Army (appointed by the Committee of Estates) together with the General Officers and Colonels were required to swear an oath as well as take the Solemn

\[\text{References}\]

1. Articles, (1640), p. 3; Articles, (1644), p.1; Articles, (1650), p. 2. As the 1642 edition is identical to that of 1644 (which is more readily accessible) references to 1644 should be taken to stand for 1642 as well. While the 1639 edition has no ordinance for promulgating the code, this was done on 20 May before the army, Lawson, Epis. Church, p. 617.

2. Articles, (1640), pp. 3-4; Alexander, earl of Leven, Camp Discipline, or the Soldiers Duty (London, 1642), p. 2; Articles, (1644), pp. 1-2; Articles, (1650), p. 2. The first version is lengthier but agrees in substance with the others; Articles, (1639), pp. 5-7.
League and Covenant. In the oath they promised to be faithful in service according to the Solemn League and to always defend the cause as the private soldiers did. However, they also vowed neither to divide nor to obstruct resolutions reached by common consent nor to enter into treaty with the enemy, nor to make factions or plots.\footnote{SRQ MS. P.A. 11.2b, f. 4; Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 80, ff. 210v, 211v; Acts Parl Scot., vi, li 70. The Army of the Kingdom also possessed a special oath for officers, RCGA, iii. 360.} Remembering the propaganda presented by all of the Covenanter regimes which raised armies, these oaths would have proved acceptable even to the armies (such as the Engagers\footnote{SRQ MS. P.A. 11.2b, f. 4; Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 80, ff. 210v, 211v; Acts Parl Scot., vi, li 70. The Army of the Kingdom also possessed a special oath for officers, RCGA, iii. 360.}) whose rules of war we do not possess.

In all the editions of the Articles the first three topics dealt with were the same. The first article of Leven's code established its uniqueness from all other codes and created an army which was literally a branch of the church. In Article I Leven ordered the establishment of regimental kirk sessions, consisting of the chaplain and several elders. While the later editions merely state that the kirk sessions should operate as parochial ones, the 1639 Articles specify in detail what Leven desired. The regimental sessions were to use Scripture and the discipline of the Church of Scotland as their standard. They had power to judge cases of fornication, whoremongering, adultery, swearing, cursing, drunkenness, Sabbath-breaking and scandalous behaviour. Following the practice of parishes during peacetime, the sessions were to bring sinners to repentance or to censure them. However, the regimental ecclesiastical organisation possessed a positive side as well. The regimental church was even
given deacons with the same duties as their civilian counterparts, to care for the poor, needy and disabled members of the regiment.\(^1\) (Unfortunately, no mention exists as to how these disbursements would be regularly funded and no evidence has been discovered.)

To ensure religious uniformity in the army and to deal with cases referred from the regimental kirk sessions Leven created the 'General Eldership', or 'common Ecclesiastical Judicatory', that is the Presbytery of the Army. The presbytery consisted of all the ministers in the camp and one elder from each regiment. It was to possess a moderator and clerk just as civil presbyteries did. The presbytery was directly subject to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.\(^2\) No records remain to suggest that Leven created his presbytery at war with the help of the clergy. However, the clergy's aid is the most probable reason for his adapting the church's organisation to military needs.\(^3\) Because of the unparalleled departure which Leven's rule made on this matter, it is worth examining the situation in other European armies of the early modern period.

It will quickly become apparent that in the case of establishing a civilian ecclesiastical structure in a military setting Leven was a great innovator. Despite Scottish regiments in Dutch, Danzig, Swedish and French service having their own chaplains, in none of those cases did the officers erect (or even hope to erect) a presbytery.\(^4\) The closest parallel to the Articles occurred in the Netherlands. Yet even there Scots garrison chaplains belonged initially

---

\(^1\) Articles (1639), pp. 3-4; (1640), p. 4; (1644) p. 2; (1650), pp.2-3.

\(^2\) Articles (1639), p. 4; (1640), pp. 4-5; (1644), pp. 2-3; (1650), pp.2-3.

\(^3\) This suggestion was kindly made by Dr. W. Makey, in conversation.

to the appropriate civilian Dutch classes and later to the Synod of English and Scottish Clergy of the United Provinces, never to a military one. However, that situation hardly provided Leven with a precedent. The Spanish Army of Flanders (a force with highly developed religious care) certainly possessed a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure for its chaplains, and one very different from civilian Roman Catholic practice. Each company had a chaplain and each tercio a chaplain major and predicat. A Vicar General had authority over their activities. The clergy serving the Spanish forces also differed from those who cared for the civilian Roman Catholics. In general they belonged to the Dominican and Franciscan orders. Although Jesuits could only serve as 'temporary' chaplains, by 1600 they had gained the right to vet the clergy appointed to chaplaincies. Looking to the Swedish example, we find that chaplains formed a consistory order under an almoner-general. That was certainly not a reflection of the Lutheran diocesan arrangements characteristic of the Swedish church.

As far as England is concerned it is unfortunate that neither Ian Roy in his thesis on the Royal Army nor P.R. Newman in his thesis on the earl of Newcastle's army make any mention of the religious structure of the armies. However, more is known about the parliamentary forces.

1Drysdales, Presbyterians, p. 257.


5Parker, 'Military Revolution', 199, footnote 13.
The parliamentarian armies, which initially possessed many presbyterian chaplains never established presbyteries. After 1644 they had few regimental chaplains. Indeed the armies between 1645 and 1647 were without any ecclesiastical structure whatsoever. In summary it may be said that the Covenanting movement alone established a religious organisation in its armies which paralleled that of the society from which the armies originated.

Some have questioned whether the army presbyteries actually operated. The evidence on the matter is unequivocable. The General Assembly of 1642 noted that the clerk of the army presbytery for the First Bishops' War had lost the records. For the following year, which witnessed the Second Bishops' War, we have a portion of the minutes as well as a reference by Baillie to the presbytery's operation. The minutes of the presbytery of the Ulster army (which became the first civilian presbytery of Ulster) have long since vanished. Fortunately Patrick Adair in his history refers to the work of the presbytery frequently. Evidence of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant's presbytery occurs in the records of the General Assembly. There is no sign that the New Model Army possessed a presbytery. Nevertheless, it certainly had chaplains during campaigns, who presumably met together. When components of

4 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio MSS. 31, ff. 27-34; Baillie, i.268.
5 Adair, pp. 93-95, 97, 106, 138, 140, 148.
6 General Assembly, p. 396.
this force were quartered throughout Scotland, they were subject to the ecclesiastical discipline of the parishes in which they resided. While it is doubtful whether the Engager Army set up a presbytery, there is no evidence to suggest that it did not. The Whiggamore Raiders, with the large number of ministers present from the Commission of the General Assembly, the southwest and Fife, probably had some form of ecclesiastical meeting. The Army of the Covenants, particularly during the Dunbar campaign, had chaplains of a strong presbyterian allegiance in attendance and, undoubtedly had a presbytery. In the previous year the regiments were in the same situation as those of the New Model Army during its time in quarters. The Western Association Army not only possessed a presbytery, but one which supplied leadership to the Association.¹ From the records of the Commission of the General Assembly we learn that the Army of the Kingdom's presbytery functioned.² Leven's pious hope was a reality; the Covenanters were a people at war.

Article II of Leven's code authorized the military counterpart of the kirk sessions and presbytery - the courts-martial. Again the 1639 edition gives more details than the succeeding four. All agree that higher and lower courts should exist for the settling of 'questions, debates, and quarrellings' between officers and soldiers and others in the camp, and to maintain camp discipline.³ However, the edition of 1639 alone specifies that the lower court shall be regimental and that it shall consist of the colonel or lieutenant colonel, two captains, two lieutenants, two ensigns, four sergeants and two quartermasters. The same edition listed the members of the

¹Makey, Church, p. 82.
²RCGA, iii. 486, 487, 494.
³Articles (1639), p. 4; (1644), p. 2; (1650), p. 3.
higher court as follows: the commanding general, or field marshal provost, the general of artillery, the major general of foot, the general of horse, the quartermaster general, the musters masters, all the colonels (or lieutenant colonels if the former was unavailable) and a secretary. In both courts the judges were to swear an oath before God at the convening of the court.\footnote{Articles, (1639), pp. 4-5. The secretary also served as the army historian. As is often the case with the Covenanters' armies neither his records of the trials nor of the campaigns have survived. For other information see Articles (1640), pp. 4-5.} Following the king's ratification of the Covenanters' victory in 1641 the courts-martial became subject to the Committee of Estates.\footnote{Articles (1644), p. 3.} While in Article I Leven deviated from the precedent of his mentor, Gustavus Adolphus, in Article II the earl followed the king's example.

In Article V of the 1639 edition (or Article III in the subsequent versions), Leven adopted the Swedish example in the form of worship. In 1639 Leven laid down the reasons why he felt public prayers in the army were necessary. The Covenanting soldier was in the service of God; his Covenant was the reason for war. Success depended on aid from Him. Thus, it was important to supplicate and worship God. In all the editions Leven authorized morning and evening prayer daily. In addition to those services, the chaplains would preach two sermons on Sundays (in the morning and afternoon) and on two week days, if time permitted. The signal for the commencement of these set services and any special ones would be announced by trumpet or drum. On the sounding of these instruments all markets within the camp and sales would cease on pain of forfeiture of goods. Any chaplains or soldiers absent from services were liable to monetary fines and other
punishments. The civilian who hoped to escape the necessity of church attendance by joining the Covenanters' armies would find himself faced with a compulsory religious or church service, not merely once a week but every day.

Following these three ordinances Leven outlined the proper behaviour in human relationships and in military duties. Murder and rape were capital offences. The sins of adultery and fornication carried the same penalties as in peace time (public repentance and a monetary fine). Thieves and robbers (particularly from the slain) faced severe, but unspecified punishment. Slandering of the cause, the King, Kingdom(s), Country, Lord General, Parliaments, Convention of Estates or Committee with the Army were treasonable offences. Collaboration of any kind with the enemy was also treasonable. In any case of treason Leven ordained the death penalty. Regarding the carriage of officers and soldiers the Articles laid down specific rules. Officers must 'live in godliness, soberness, and righteousness'. Swearing, quarrelling and drunkenness by an officer led to demotion by at least one rank and trial by the courts-martial. Dereliction of duty by failing to train the soldiers adequately, by stealing pay or by concealing a mutiny was punished by a similar penalty. Officers lacked the power to cashier men or issue passes without the General's permission. Nor could commanders join or leave the army as they saw fit. Disobedience in these matters

1 Articles (1639), pp. 7-8; (1640), p. 5; (1644), p. 3; (1650), p. 3.
3 Articles (1640), pp. 5-5; (1644), p. 3; (1650), pp. 3-4. In the instance of 'Kingdoms', and 'Parliaments', the reference is to the English alliance of 1643, (1644), p. 3.
4 Articles (1640), p. 6.
5 Articles (1640), p. 7; (1650), p. 4.
led to a court-martial. The penalties for disobedience of the ordinances regarding the behaviour of soldiers were far stiffer than those of their superiors. Leven ordered the common soldiers to honour and obey their commanders and to remain silent when commands were given. Violation of these orders led to imprisonment. Any verbal or physical violence against any officer led to death. Mutiny or silence regarding a mutiny was a capital offence. Desertion, duels against individuals in the enemy's camp and resisting the provost would bring the soldier before a court-martial.

Leven enjoined his men to live as friends and brothers. Anyone found guilty of breaking the tranquility of the community of the army would be first imprisoned, then upon further offences cast out of the army.

Following these articles Leven concluded the Articles with a long section on military duties. In the article concerning rules on the march Leven forbade the theft of horses, cattle, goods, money or anything else. All goods must either be paid for or a receipt left by the soldiers taking them. Failure to obey this injunction led to death. The third article of the Ripon treaty (16 October 1640) stated that the Covenanters would not molest Roman Catholics, episcopalian or their friends, nor tax or plunder them. On two occasions in February 1644 the Committee with the Army laid down the death penalty for plundering (even of Roman Catholics). It also ordered

---

1^Articles (1640), p. 7; (1650), p. 4. Absence for one month led to loss of commission, Acts Parl. Scot., vi, ii. 54.

2^Articles (1639), pp. 8-9; (1640), pp. 7-9; (1650), p. 5.

3^Articles (1644), p. 6.


5^Gen. Ass., p. 301.
the execution of soldiers who removed supplies without the authorization of the commissary general or his staff or disobeyed their orders. The Committee justified its order on the grounds that previous foraging activities had disrupted supplies and angered the civilian population. The destruction of houses, fruit trees, the wasting of the countryside and firing of towns and villages during the march without orders were all punishable offences. Soldiers who straggled or encouraged straggling would also be punished for their offence. The rigidness of the Articles appears in other spheres of activity which they regulated.

The importance of true musters for the armies of the period cannot be over-emphasised. Without an accurate muster the general would lack true knowledge of the size of his army, which would hinder military planning. Officers and muster masters, who falsified the rolls, might profit personally, however they would dissipate the resources of the state in so doing. Thus, Leven ordered that those who presented false musters would face punishment.

Owing to the impoverished state of the Covenanters, and more importantly to a general failure in European armies prior to the late seventeenth century to develop an adequate commissariat system, private victuallers played an important role in ensuring regular supply for the Scots armies. In recognition of that Leven promised

2Articles (1639), pp. 11, 14; (1640), pp. 10–11; (1644), pp. 7–3; (1650), p. 7.
4Articles (1639), p. 10; (1640), p. 11; (1650), p. 7.
5On 6 April 1644, in recognition of the inefficiency of the current methods of foraging, the Committee with the Army ordered each regiment to appoint a commissary to receive all provisions for the regiment and to accompany its foraging parties; SRQ, P.A. MSS. 11.2, f. 41. While this represented an advance over the anarchic system of soldiers foraging without central control, it was still far behind the magazine and advance purchase system of the late 17th and 18th centuries.
protection to victuallers and their goods. He also restricted
the ability of soldiers to sell goods. In return for these
privileges Leven protected the interest of the army by ordering
the punishment of any victualler who sold spoiled goods or
detained soldiers. Furthermore the army's marshal set the
prices of goods, which prohibited excessive profiteering.¹

The lack of the Covenanters' resources may also explain the
harsh penalties concerning damage or loss of arms. Improper care
and pawning of weapons were serious offences. Soldiers could face
financial penalties, beatings or both.² The loss of arms or
horses by gambling, sloth or neglect led to the offender's demotion
to the pioneers, where he must serve until he could purchase new
weapons.³

In the matter of behaviour within the camp Leven was equally
strict. Mutinous behaviour over quartering was an offence.
Mutiny by officers was a capital offence. Soldiers who mutinied
faced decimation and service in the pioneers until they recovered
their position by a valiant act. Unauthorized departure or staying
in the camp could lead to death. Negligence on guard duty was also
a capital offence.⁴

The discipline of the Covenanters was as severe off the battlefield
as on it. In these two categories the penalty for disobedience to

¹Articles (1640), p. 11; (1650), p. 7.
²Articles (1639), p. 14; (1640), pp. 9-10.
⁴Articles (1639), pp. 11, 13; (1640), p. 12; (1650), p. 7.
the Articles was nearly always death. At the moment of alarm all soldiers in camp were to go to their company's colours. The man who received a deserter or himself deserted or threw down his arms at this critical time would suffer death (possibly as an immediate example for the others).\(^1\) A regiment which charged but fled before striking blows with the enemy was to face a court-martial inquiry. If the officers were adjudged guilty they would be censured. If the fault lay with the soldiers, they would be decimated with the survivors being demoted to the pioneers until they proved themselves worthy of military service.\(^2\) After a victory, killing a surrendering enemy or failing to attack one who continued to resist led to death. Ransoming enemy soldiers, spoiling, pillaging, burning, wasting or disbanding without orders after a victory carried the penalty of death.\(^3\) Yet victories could assure financial reward, if a soldier captured enemy commanders or colours, or was the first man to scale a wall or enter a breach.\(^4\) At the end of several editions of the Articles the following coda appears:

> Matters that are clear by the light and law of nature are presupposed: Things unnecessary, are past over in silence: and other things may be judged by common customs and constitutions of war, or may upon new emergents, be expressed afterward.\(^5\)

Although Leven's Articles are comprehensive and strict, it would be

---

\(^1\) Articles (1639), p. 12; (1640), p. 12.


\(^3\) Articles (1639), 15; (1640), p. 13; (1644), p. 9; (1650), p. 8.

\(^4\) Articles (1650), p. 8.

\(^5\) Articles (1644), p. 10; (1650), p. 8.
foolish to suppose their enforcement can be predicated from their good intentions and rigour. The Lawes and Ordinances of Warre of Charles I's Oxford army listed fifty-one offences punishable by death.¹ Nevertheless, that army's lack of discipline was and is notorious.²

Both Gustavus Adolphus and Leven recognised that chaplains aided the officers in maintaining discipline and in cultivating godliness in the army. Another advantage in having chaplains with the army was their ability to inspire troops, as Berthold Brecht recognised in his play Mother Courage.

The Chaplain: You haven't heard me preach. Why, I can put such spirit into a regiment with a single sermon that the enemy's a mere flock of sheep to them and their own lives no more than smelly old shoes to be thrown away at the thought of final victory! God has given me the gift of tongues....³

The Swedish king realised that ministers from the same region as a particular regiment would be the most efficacious method of reaping the three benefits mentioned above. Therefore, he ordained that each regiment would have two chaplains appointed by the local ecclesiastical authorities, instead of being hired by military powers.⁴ The Covenanters followed his example to a remarkable degree.

From 1639 to 1651 no Covenanter army took the field without chaplains. The regiments of the First and Second Bishops' Wars possessed chaplains from the same region appointed by consultation

²In chapters 5 and 6 I shall closely examine the behaviour of the Covenanting armies to determine whether they were 'godly'.
⁴Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, ii. 241-2.
between the colonels and presbyteries. The Ulster army's supply of chaplains came from two sources - hired expectants (seminarians awaiting charges) and parochial clergy appointed by presbyteries.

One of the acts of the Committee of Estates authorising the creation of the Solemn League and Covenant army (23 November 1643) ordered the shires to provide the men with 'bibles and psalmebooks'. However, the Committee deemed that insufficient for the spiritual care of its soldiers. For the same act stated:

   And for the better keeping the soldiers in order, discipline, and punctual performance of duties of gods worship, ordaines a minister to bee designed by the each Presbitery to come out with each Regiment.

In the following three years the Commission of the General Assembly required that 'each Presbitery' send out a minister to the local regiment. The Commission in 1647 adopted Lieutenant General David Leslie's plan for supplying the New Model Army with chaplains. Leslie was to have his own chaplain; the troops of horse would share two, but each foot regiment would have one. In 1648 the Engagers, despite their antagonism to the church, petitioned the General Assembly to appoint chaplains to the army. The Assembly not unnaturally refused, never-

---

1 See below p.88-99 for full details on the appointment of chaplains for these and subsequent armies.

2 For example John Scott, SRO, Presbytery Records of Jedburgh, 13, 15.7. 1642, and James Simpson, Presbytery Records of Dalkeith, 16.6.1642 were hired and ordained for their respective regiments. Andrew Fairfoul, for instance, was appointed by his presbytery, SRO., Kirk Session Records of North Leith, 26.7.1642.

3 Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 7, f. 500v.

4 Ibid.

5 SRO, Peebles, 4.1.1644; Kirkcaldie, 17.7.1645, p. 289; SRO, Brechin, 28.5.1646.

6 RCGA, i. 204.

7 Baillie, iii. 57.
theless the Engager colonels recruited chaplains from amongst the expectants. The radicals, when they requested a supply of chaplains for the standing regiments and levies from the Assembly, met with greater success in 1650. Twice after Dunbar the Commission ordered the presbyteries to send out chaplains to the regiments.

On 23 April 1651 the Commission petitioned the king, the Committee of Estates and the Committee of the Army to authorise the appointment of chaplains for each regiment. That their request was granted may be seen by an examination of the receipts of the treasurer of the army. It is thus evident that the appointment of chaplains to regiments by ecclesiastical judicatories according to their respective localities was common practice in the Covenanting armies. As Scotland had not fought a war in nearly seventy years, foreign example necessarily provided the model for the method of supplying the army with ministers. As in so many other things it was the example set by Gustavus Adolphus' regulations which served as the guidelines for the Covenanters. It may be objected that the failure to supply each regiment with two chaplains was a deviation from that king's ordinances. However, it was a necessary modification. In 1639 the Covenanting clergy were merely a faction within the Church's body politic. To secure their control over the parochial charges the Covenanters deposed ministers of scandalous life and

---

1 RCGA, ii. 74, 97, 106.
3 RCGA, iii. 160, 165.
4 Ibid., 403.
5 SRO., MS. P.A., 16.2.
those sympathetic to episcopacy.\textsuperscript{1} The strain on the Church's manpower of filling these parishes and supplying the regiments with just one chaplain was intense. To have attempted to send out two ministers with each regiment was far beyond the means of the Church of the Covenant.

This chapter began with a discussion of what distinguished the Covenanters from their European contemporaries — the apocalyptic and Old Testament ideology of a kind that left no scope for lay improvisations. It then treated areas where the similarity between a foreign example (that of Sweden) and what the Covenanters adopted as their rules of war and method of supplying the armies with clergy indicates an extremely close correlation. In the first matter the Covenanters combined the Scottish tradition of entering into bonds or 'bands' for mutual support and alliance with Calvinist Covenant theology and a respect for the Old Testament. It produced a unique synthesis. The second illustrates the Covenanters' willingness to adopt wholesale, what had served to create the most 'godly army' of the seventeenth century up to that time. The following chapters will examine in detail how close the Covenanters came to establishing 'godly armies' with particular reference to pastoral care (and the men who provided it), the impact of religion on military operations, the morality and discipline of the armies, the Church's concern for and care of the armies, politics and the armies and finally the military and the ministers' role as agents of presbyterian expansion. The Covenanters were not just an army which marched on the orders of the Lord; it was a church under arms.

\textsuperscript{1}D. Stevenson, 'Deposition of Ministers in the Church of Scotland under the Covenanters, 1638-1651', \textit{Church Hist.}, xli (1975), 321-35.
CHAPTER THREE: THE HOUSE OF LEVI

Just as the armies of the Covenanters have been neglected by historians, so has the institution of the chaplaincy. There were a number of different methods of choosing ministers to serve the army; a discussion of these forms the first portion of this chapter. Included within that section will be a discussion of the motives for service. Granted that ministers did attend regiments were they present in sufficient numbers to make any impact? The next section presents the life of the chaplains and its dangers. The last two sections of the chapter examine the ministers' education, age, experience in the parishes and the chaplains' politico-religious views as compared with those of their peers.

A complete study of the Covenanting pastorate is impossible. It is not the abundance of sources but their scarcity which obstructs the researcher in this task. The records of the presbytery of the army have nearly all vanished. They would have provided the starting point by revealing the names and length of service of the chaplains. The disappearance of that source led to an examination of the records of the General Assemblies and their Commissions and to those of all the subordinate church courts. Unfortunately, many of these, too, have suffered loss or destruction from fire, theft or careless disregard. Thus of 400 chaplains, only 298 can be positively identified. As many as 51 may one day be attached with certainty to a particular parish. In some cases four different ministers shared the same name as a chaplain; these are potentially identifiable chaplains. Of the remaining 50 plus, there is not even the problem of confused identity. They are unknown to have taken part in the events of the mid-seventeenth century in any capacity other than serving as chaplains. Even with the positively identified chaplains there are problems. These chaplains were assigned approximately 500 tours of duty. It has often been impossible to determine whether a minister served and if he did how long he spent with the army. This is
not to say that little may be said of the ministers. Once identified, Scott's *Fasti* provides biographical information on parish ministers who served. However, as the ministers left few diaries, letters, or account books, much must remain unknown.

From 1639 to 1651 all Covenanting armies possessed ministers in attendance. How these ministers came to be there is the problem. Many armies were levied and disbanded (in victory or defeat) before one method of appointment became standard. This problem may be due to the lack of records, rather than to the inability of contemporaries to reach a decision on the best method of selecting chaplains.\(^1\) Whichever is the case, a trend appeared from 1646 when the records of the Commission of the General Assembly commenced. The proportion of chaplains it appointed increased for the New Model, and Covenants armies, finally culminating in nearly total control of the process in 1650-1651, with the Army of the Kingdom. The growth of the Commission's influence and power in this matter reflected that in the Church itself. From its foundation in summer 1641 the Commission began to play a larger role in the governance of the Church. By 1648 the Commission may be described as a state within a state, so potent was it in ecclesiastical matters.\(^2\) The initiative formerly displayed by individual presbyteries in all spheres no longer existed. Objections to the Commission's dictates, when they occurred, were ignored or accepted only by a minority of the clergy (for example the Remonstrant-Protestor movement in early 1650s). Not only had the ecclesiastical courts lost their ability to appoint chaplains, but also the colonels and officers' roles as selectors of chaplains declined. In the case of the Army of the Kingdom the colonels nominated or requested a chaplain in only one known case.\(^3\) Yet these

\(^{1}\)In the cases of three armies (those of the Second Bishops' War, Ulster and Solemn League and Covenant) the method of appointment is known in less than half the total number of ministers.

\(^{2}\)Makey, *Church*, p. 93.

\(^{3}\)That of David Ochterlony of Finaven, Brechin presbytery, SRO, PR Brechin, 2.20.1651.
trends required several years to become established; the methods of selecting chaplains initially rested with local church courts and the regiments. To observe the change we shall begin with the First Bishops' War and observe the changing process until 1651.

The war of 1639 was Scotland's first in nearly seventy years. In 1639 the synods (chiefly represented by that of Argyll) and the presbyteries appointed the chaplains.\(^1\) In some cases the presbyteries acted upon a request for ministers from a regimental colonel. That occurred in Jedburgh presbytery, which appointed four ministers to serve consecutively the earl of Lothian's Teviotdale regiment.\(^2\) Other presbyteries, (Lanark, Paisley, Stirling and Perth) acted without consultation with the colonel.\(^3\)

\(^1\) A wide variety of sources were consulted for the compilation of the tables in this chapter. What follows is a short list of those sources: the synod, presbytery and kirk session records in the SRO, N.R.H., St. Andrews Lib., SRA., University of Edinburgh Library, W.R.H., Presbytery of Dumfries (please see bibliography for complete list) and the following printed records: General Assembly; Army i-ii; Bensen, 'Dumferline'; Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for the Advance of Money, ed. M. Green (London, 1885, i-ii); R. Douglas, 'Diary', in Memoirs of James Burns, ed. J. Maidment (Edinburgh, 1832); Scott, Fasti i-viii; J.B. Leslie, Supplement to 'Armagh Clergy and Parishes' (Dundalk, 1948); P.W. Lilley, 'Rev. John Livingston', Hawick Arch. Soc. Trans., (1934), 49-51; List of the prisoners of war who are officers in commission (London, 1651); J. and S.G. McConnell, Fasti of the Irish presbyterian church (Belfast, 1951); Makey, 'Ministers'; RCGB, i-iii; Records of the Committees for Compounding, ed. R. Walford (Surtees Soc., cxi (1905)); Kirk of Scotland; J.S. Reid, History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, ed. W.D. Killen (Belfast, 1867); in addition to them - P.R.O., SP 16/492/58 (Argyll's regiment in Ulster, second muster roll, 16.11.1642); SP 28/120 (Muster roll of the Scottish Army in Ireland by Hew Kennedy, April-November 1642); SP 28/120 (Muster roll of the Scottish Army in Ireland by Thomas Clayton, September, November 1642); SP 41/2 (Muster roll of the Scots Army in England, January 1646); Nat. Lib. Scot., 'Mr. Robert Traill's Diary', Wodrow Letters Quarto xix; MS. Wodrow Analecta Folio xxxi. For the chart of selection methods of chaplains (Table 3.1) please see pp. 90-91.

\(^2\) SRO, PR Jedburgh and Kelso, 29.5.1639.

\(^3\) SRO, PR Lanark, 9.5.1639; PR Paisley, 11.4, 23.5, 1639; PR Stirling, 2.5.1639; PR Perth, ii. 612.
Table 3.1: Method of Selecting Chaplains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>FBW</th>
<th>SBW</th>
<th>UA</th>
<th>SLCA</th>
<th>HA</th>
<th>NMA</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>WR</th>
<th>AC</th>
<th>WAA</th>
<th>AK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>GKS</th>
<th>P.Amy</th>
<th>Cont. GA</th>
<th>P.Amy CGA</th>
<th>Privy C. P</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argyll</th>
<th>CofW</th>
<th>Covr. Ld.s</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations:**
- No. - number of tours of duty; ? - method of appointment unknown; K - method of appointment known; GA - General Assembly; CGA - Commission of the General Assembly; Col. - colonel; S - Synod; P - Presbytery; Off. - Officers; Regt. - Regiment; Ld. Gen. - Lord General; Self - the minister; Parl. - Parliament; GKS - Garrison Kirk Session; P.Amy - Presbytery of the Army; Cont. - Committee of Estates; Privy C. - Privy Council; Lindsay - earl of Lindsay; Argyll - marquis of Argyll; CofW - Committee of War; Covr.Ld.s - Covenanter Lords; WA - Western Association; ? - Unknown.
The monopoly of appointments by the synods and the presbyteries mirrors the large role played by the civilians in the localities in their organisation of resistance to Charles. The problems of securing chaplains, which remained insoluble throughout the period, increased in the Second Bishops’ War. Once again the synods and presbyteries controlled the majority of appointments. The colonels or regiments increased their influence to over a fifth of the cases. Agencies outside the localities and regiments made their first impression in the appointment process during this war. Yet their influence was meagre and was not sustained. The appointment procedure at the local level is revealed in the church records. In Jedburgh presbytery, for instance, the earl of Lothian appeared requesting a minister for his regiment. The presbytery proceeded to nominate a leet of six, who left the room during the vote. The presbytery elected two of the six, whom it ordered to join the regiment. Matters did not always move so smoothly. The presbyteries of Kirkcaldy and Dumbarton refused to supply ministers to regiments which had been levied from several presbyteries. By making this difficulty over jurisdictions, Dumbarton managed to send out not a single chaplain during the war. The presbytery of the army at Newcastle insisted on the arrival of the relieving ministers despite a surplus of ministers with the army. A surplus would not be achieved again, which suggests that the methods of 1640 were efficacious, if not efficient.

---

1 See table 3.1.

2 SRO, PR Jedburgh and Kelso, 15.7.1640.

3 Kirkcaldie, pp. 183-4; SRO, PR Dumbarton, 1.12.1640, 12.1, 9.2, 23.3.1641.

4 NLS, MS. Wodrow Analecta Folio xxxi, ff. 29, 32v. The presbytery of the Army desired that each regiment have its own minister.
The selection of the ministers for the Ulster army differs from the processes used in all other cases. It is true that the synod of Argyll's appointments account for over a third of the known ones. However there were no known selections by presbyteries. While the Commission did have a hand in later appointments (after 1645), the earlier ones occurred without reference to that body or the General Assembly. Instead the Privy Council informed certain presbyteries that

for the service of the Kirk in this Irish expedition discreet young men throughout the several parts of the kingdom had reserved admission in the ministerie for several regiments...¹

In Jedburgh presbytery we may observe what occurred when one of these 'discreet young men' was chosen. On 13 July 1642 William Kerr, laird of Newton and captain in the earl of Lothian's regiment, appeared with a petition from the regiment's officers for the ordination of John Scott, who had previously been nominated by the earl. The officers requested Scott's ordination to occur on the 15th at Jedburgh, where a portion of the regiment was quartered. The presbytery agreed and the ceremony took place as requested.² There are few instances in any of the other armies of ministers being specifically ordained to serve a regiment.³ This practice indicates that the Ulster army would have a long tour of service overseas and that it was not one for which the church courts were chiefly responsible. However, when the supply of chaplains is analysed it will become apparent that the method chosen for supplying the Ulster force was unsuited for the task.

The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant presented the Church of Scotland with great difficulties in the matter of supplying chaplains. The

¹SRO, PR Jedburgh and Kelso 13.7.1642.
²Ibid., 13.7.1642, 15.7.1642. His length of service is unknown.
³William Kininmonth, Strathbogie, pp. 111-2, 115; one of the only ministers ordained for military service in this period.
army in the First Bishops' War had fielded only eighteen full or half-regiments; that of the following year consisted of twenty-eight regiments. The Army of the Solemn League, however, consisted of the equivalent of fifty-seven regiments. During the same period the Ulster army had ten regiments and the home armies possessed even more. By deciding to intervene on a grand scale in England, the General Assembly and Committee of Estates had made it nearly impossible for the clergy to staff adequately the army in England with chaplains. Each regiment (or group of units equal to a regiment in size) required four ministers, each to serve three months every year. The Covenanting clergy failed to supply the army with enough ministers.  

Several approaches to selecting chaplains were attempted in the hope that one form would prove successful. The initial procedure for selecting a minister involved the colonel and the presbytery. In Ayr presbytery, for instance, the earl of Glencairn requested a chaplain through one of his captains. The presbytery acceded to his request, appointing one of their number. Similar proceedings occurred in the presbyteries of Brechin, Dumbarton, Haddington, Jedburgh, Kirkcaldy and St. Andrews. The General Assembly deemed this method a failure, for few relief ministers had reached the army to replace those who went out in January. On 3 June 1644 the Assembly passed an act explaining the proper method for appointing chaplains. The colonels or their officers would compile a list of three ministers with the advice and approval of the army presbytery. The list would then go to the presbytery from whence the regiment originated, but if the leet included ministers from several presbyteries the Commission of the General Assembly would receive the names. Then one of the church courts would select one

1See pp. 108-9.

2SRO, PR Ayr, 29.11.1643.

of the ministers for three months service. The procedure for relieving these ministers would follow the same course. Ministers failing to attend to their charges faced suspension. To encourage the ministers the General Assembly requested that parliament supply their travelling funds. Two years later in recognition of the failure of the General Assembly's scheme, the Commission of the General Assembly took indirect action in the matter. That body ordered presbyteries to force ministers appointed to regiments to leave in fifteen days or to suspend those who stayed behind. The methods of selecting or ensuring supply of ministers discussed here reveals only some of the methods of selection actually utilised.

In choosing ministers for the Solemn League and Covenant army the Commission of the Kirk began to arrogate power to itself at the expense of local judicatories. When it is remembered that the vast majority of known appointments made by the Commission occurred after the spring of 1646 (when the army had less than a year of life) its quest for power comes into sharp focus. Acting on their own, the presbyteries could become involved in disputes over which of them should supply a minister to a regiment raised from within several presbyteries. The Commission could disregard such provincial attitudes in selecting chaplains. An example of the Commission's ability to override local reluctance appears in Jedburgh presbytery, whose dispute with Kelso presbytery was solved by a fiat from the Commission. Of the methods of appointment known less than half of the tours of duty are represented. If known they might reveal that the presbyteries had the giant's share of responsibility for

---

1 General Assembly, p. 398.

2 SRO, PR Brechin, 28.5.1646.

3 SRO, PR Dumbarton, 9.3.1644; PR Jedburgh and Kelso, 3, 12, 24.1.1644.

appointments. Yet as things stand a different picture appears. The Commission accounts for 35% of the appointments; the Assembly accounts for another 15%. The presbyteries had a role in a quarter of the appointments. Colonels' or officers' influence appeared in less than a fifth of the cases. These figures starkly reveal the advent of the Commission as a power within the Church. In the case of the Solemn League and Covenant army the Commission possessed both the time and interest to select chaplains. It is likely that the Commission regarded the army in England as more important than those facing Montrose, who by 1646 had been eclipsed.

The home armies of 1644-47 presented the church courts with a special problem. Despite a large influx of troops from Leven's army, the forces facing Montrose and Huntly were largely recruited in an ad hoc fashion. The elements of these armies changed continually as Montrose destroyed one, then moved to a new area where another would be quickly levied to oppose him. The General Assembly and its Commission appointed less than a fifth of the chaplains known to have served in the home armies. However, the Commission issued a general order in July 1645 that each presbytery should supply a chaplain for the levy at Perth (the army which fell victim to Montrose at Kilsyth). The synods of Fife and Argyll chose a third of the ministers. But the presbyteries had a part in over half the selections. Sometimes entire presbyteries would go out to face Montrose with the levies of their area. These cases have not been included in the estimate for corroborating evidence as to which ministers served is lacking. With the return of relative peace in Scotland following Montrose's departure,

1See table 3.1.

2SRO, PR Inverness, 29.8.1644; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, p. 84.

3SRO, PR Ayr, 17.7.1645; Kirkcaldie, p. 289.
Huntly's surrender and the return of Leven's forces from England in February 1647, the number of troops requiring pastoral care declined. The New Model Army should have been fairly easy to supply with chaplains. It had fewer than the equivalent of fifteen regiments. Furthermore, the New Model remained fairly static, engaging only in two campaigns in spring 1647 within Scotland. These two factors permitted the General Assembly and its Commission to appoint chaplains. As the New Model was drawn from numerous regiments which had been disbanded, the territorial interests involved in choosing chaplains for earlier armies had disappeared. The Commission appointed in 85% of the known cases; the General Assembly the remainder. The local jurisdictions could only expedite or impede ministers going to the army but not select them.

The circumstances surrounding the Engaging army meant that the Commission and General Assembly refused to supply ministers. The Engagers could not turn for aid in this matter to the synods and presbyteries. Their general hostility to the Engagement was well-known. Of the approximately 750 beneficed clergy in Scotland, only ten per cent supported the Engagement. The Engagers did recruit seventeen chaplains. Probably the colonels selected these ministers. However that is mere supposition.

The forces in the Whiggamore risings of June and September 1648 also presented the Commission with difficulties, although in these cases it was not a problem of antipathy to their cause. Indeed, the Whiggamores placed the Commission and its lay adherents firmly in control of Scotland. Here the problem resided with the spontaneous nature of their activities. Of the six ministers at Mauchline Moor five became Protesters, which suggests

---

1 RCOA, i. 204-5; General Assembly, pp. 480-2.
2 Kirk of Scotland, p. 502; Baillie, iii. 57.
3 See above, p. 40 and below, pp. 24708.
4 Makey, 'Ministers', p. 105.
5 William Adair, (Scott Pasti, iii.8); William Guthrie, (Ibid., iii.93); Matthew Mowat, (Ibid., iii. 105); John Nevay (Ibid., iii. 120); and Thomas Wylie (Ibid., iii. 94).
a highly developed concern about deviation from the Covenants. Despite the absence of records, these men probably decided of their own volition to join the assembly at Mauchline. Of the ministers accompanying the forces in September, it is known that the presbyteries selected three.\(^1\)

The circumstances surrounding the Whiggamores repeated themselves in 1650. On that occasion the Commission was uncertain or hostile to the Western Association. Ideologically motivated ministers served the army, but there is no sign who or what body appointed them. Again the initiative was probably personal. If individual initiative was the key in both 1648 and 1650 this would fit in with developments in the southwest Lowlands in the Restoration period, where ousted ministers led field conventicles at risk of arrest.

With the restoration of the Commission’s allies to power in Edinburgh, the church courts could once more appoint ministers to regiments, which were in tune with the aims of the Covenants. Between autumn 1648 and October/November 1650 the Commission had a part in nearly 90% of the known appointments. As the methods of appointment are known for the majority of chaplains in this army, the ascendency of the Commission over the presbyteries cannot be disputed.\(^2\) The presbyteries gained a share in the selection procedure only when local levies marched to the summer 1650 rendezvous at Leith.\(^3\) When prolonged service of ministers was involved only the Commission had a say. The Commission's monopoly over appointments continued, and actually increased for the Army of the Kingdom.

Yet did the presbyteries really care about their loss of influence in appointments? A letter of the Commission to Lieutenant General David Leslie suggests that sloth lay at the root of the problem. The Commission wrote that colonels should send lists or general requests for ministers to the respective presbyteries. If that failed to elicit a response the

---

\(^1\) SRO, PR Stranraer, i. f. 141.

\(^2\) See Table 3.1.

\(^3\) SRO, PR Ayr, 24.7.1650; PR Elgin, i. f. 301; PR Peebles, 29.7.1650; PR Stranraer, i. f. 203v.
colonels were to address the Commission, which would select a chaplain from a general list.\textsuperscript{1} The failure of presbyteries to operate this system apparently led the Commission to take charge of the matter. Of the chaplains serving the Army of the Kingdom less than 5\% received their appointment from the synods and presbyteries.

The procedures for appointment of chaplains in the Covenanting armies differed from most European examples. In Sweden the diocese from which a regiment was raised selected its chaplains. Closer to home, in England, the royalists and parliamentarians both suffered from the collapse of church government. There the colonels selected the regiments' chaplains from amongst local clergy.\textsuperscript{2} Only in Scotland did the central government of the Church usurp the power of the localities and colonels in this matter. It may not have occurred as a deliberate scheme (as suggested by the letter to Leslie), but its occurrence illustrates in a new way the increasing power of the Commission of the General Assembly.

Having determined that the Commission replaced the presbyteries and synods, we may go on to examine whether any particular presbyteries had a disproportionate share of the burden in providing ministers (for a burden it was certainly perceived to be). As late as August 1651 the presbytery of Stranraer successfully evaded supplying a chaplain by laying the charge at the feet of Wigton presbytery.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}RCA, iii. 284.

\textsuperscript{2}Conversation with Anne Laurence, lecturer Open University and Oxford D. Phil. candidate.

\textsuperscript{3}SR, PR Stranraer, i. f. 239.
From Table 3.2 we can see that the share of the burden of supplying chaplains was not even. Geography alone may explain the prominence of the Border presbytery of Jedburgh in the Bishops’ Wars; Jedburgh was closer to areas of military activity than other presbyteries. The effort of Inveraray presbytery may be explained by that region’s reliance upon the Covenanting marquis of Argyll, who exercised extensive patronage in his clan territories. The large number of ministers sent out by the presbyteries of Dunfermline, Edinburgh, Haddington, Kirkcaldy and Linlithgow is best explained by their proximity to the Commission, which met in Edinburgh. Although in the instance of the Army of the Kingdom the flight of ministers from Edinburgh and Haddington to Stirling provided the Commission with a pool of manpower which could be readily tapped. The other two presbyteries - Irvine and

Table 3.2: Presbyteries providing more chaplains than the majority of presbyteries, listed by importance %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presbytery</th>
<th>FBW</th>
<th>SEW</th>
<th>UA</th>
<th>SLCA</th>
<th>HA</th>
<th>NMA</th>
<th>WR</th>
<th>AC</th>
<th>WAA</th>
<th>AK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Iv</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Eg</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ll</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Edr</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dd</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iv</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Df</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>LL</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Eg</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Df</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iv</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ll</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Li</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Df</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sb</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Db</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: FBW - First Bishops’ War; SEW - Second Bishops’ War; UA - Ulster Army; SLCA - Solemn League and Covenant Army; HA - home armies; NMA - New Model Army; WR - Whiggamore Raid; AC - Army of the Covenants; WAA - Western Association Army; AK - Army of the Kingdom; J - Jedburgh; H - Haddington; Iv - Inveraray; K - Kirkcaldy; Ll - Linlithgow; Df - Dunfermline; I - Irvine; Pe - Perth; SA - St. Andrews; D - Dalkeith; Db - Dunblane; Edr - Edinburgh; A - Ayr; Cs - Chirnside; Cu - Cupar; Dd - Dundee; Du - Dunoon; Et - Earlston; P - Paisley; Eg - Elgin; G - Garioch; Sb - Strathbogie, Hm - Hamilton.

1 RCOA, iii. 463.
Ayr - which contributed a disproportionate number of ministers, were jurisdictions containing large numbers of radical and highly-motivated clergy. Only a few presbyteries escaped without supplying any chaplains during the thirteen year period; these included Lochmaben, Middlebie, Dumbarton and Kirkwall. The great distance from the areas where the armies campaigned won the latter relief from sending out ministers. The first two presbyteries' records have disappeared, so it is difficult to explain their lack of participation in the business of supplying chaplains. Dumbarton, as we have seen, was notorious for pleading that jurisdictions overlapped with recruiting grounds, thus pushing the responsibility on to a neighbour. It appears then there are three major reasons for a presbytery bearing a greater than average share of the task of supplying chaplains: proximity to the fields of conflict, nearness to the Commission, and ideological commitment.

What considerations motivated the men selected to serve as chaplains? Why would they leave the comforts of home and family for service with an army of social and intellectual inferiors? There are four major reasons why they might have departed from their presbytery to serve the forces of the Covenanters: the opportunity for monetary gain, fear of the church courts, the prodding of a patron and ideological commitment.

Dr. Makey has discovered that the average stipend of a parish minister in the 1640s was £543.¹ It is important to remember that the stipends of ministers were continued during their service as chaplains. Therefore, any pay for military service represented additional income. There are no figures for pay or maintenance allowances in the First Bishops' War. However,

¹Makey, Church, p. 113. Please note that all monetary figures are in pounds Scots, which was the equivalent of 1s. 8d. sterling in the 1640s.
following the Treaty of Ripon the maintenance of chaplains was set at £144 per month. That amount placed them on the same position on the pay scale as cavalry cornets, quartermasters and infantry lieutenants. The Ulster army chaplains should have received £120 per month for service with the General Staff or £72 per month for regimental duties. The chaplains for this army were also entitled to between £72 and £57.12s. per month for maintenance depending on whether the service was with the General Staff or a regiment. The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant retained the same pay rate for chaplains of the General Staff, but increased regimental salaries to £90 per month. Thus regimental chaplains remained at the same level of pay as those of 1640-41. The home armies of 1645-47 set the chaplains' pay lower at £35. 11s. 1d. per month. Ministers serving with those armies were at the same level of pay as cavalry corporals or infantry ensigns. The reduction in the amount of pay arose from a change in paymasters. The Ulster and Solemn League and Covenant armies received their pay from the English parliament, whilst the home armies had the poorer Scottish Estates as their paymaster. There is no mention of what pay chaplains could have expected for service with the New Model, Engager or Whiggamore armies. In 1649 the Scottish parliament authorised salaries of £66. 13s. 4d. per month for ministers with the Army of the Covenants. This increase from the home service pay of the mid-1640s may have arisen from the kirk party's control of the Estates. In any case it placed chaplains on an equal footing with lieutenants of horse or captains of foot, the highest level which they ever reached.

1 SRO, MS. P.A. 16.3.1, f. 14.
2 PRO, MS. SP 17/4/7, f. 1.
3 Army, i. c.
4 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, pt. i. 35.
5 Ibid., vi, pt. ii. 448.
In 1651 the Committee of Estates issued orders to the Committee of Money to pay ministers with the army £60. This grant represented not a monthly wage but a single payment. The financial expectations of ministers rose and fell in accordance with which body paid them and with how well-endowed that body was.

There follows a summary of what the military pay rates could have meant in terms of additional income. The length of service for a chaplain was generally set at three months and all my calculations will be based on a minister serving for that period. Thus a chaplain of Leslie's army in England during the Second Bishops' War would have received an augmentation to his stipend of 7%. A tour of duty with the Ulster army would have netted an increase of 66% for the General Staff chaplains or 40% for those with a regiment. In the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant the additional income was again 66% for the staff chaplains but only 49% for regimental service. A minister with the home armies would have gained a 17% increase in income. Ministers in the Army of the Covenants would have stood to receive a third more. Those with the Army of the Kingdom, receiving a single payment, would have received an 11% addition to their stipend. (However, many of the ministers were deprived of their stipends by the English occupation, so the payment to them represented their only income). In every case the ministers had a definite financial inducement to serve in the armies.

Yet was the situation as good as the rates of pay and the proportions of the increases might suggest? By examining each army in turn the difficulty of a minister increasing his income through military service will appear. The financial records of the army in England 1640-41 have disappeared, so that it is impossible to estimate accurately the chances

---

1 SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 44, 53; P.A. 16/2 (25, 31.7.1651).
of receiving pay. However, the army itself suffered from poor pay and maintenance. The only recorded payments of ministers for that army appear in the presbytery records, which reveal a pay rate one third of that established at Ripon. The Ulster army suffered from a chronic lack of money and the chaplains shared the poor conditions of that force. The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant paid its ministers with something approaching regularity. However, they often received the money in arrears, and generally not for the full length of service. Furthermore nearly half of the chaplains with that army received nothing. In the cases of the New Model and Covenants armies the records are missing. However, the Army of the Kingdom's chaplains did receive their £60. Ministers with low stipends, and schoolmasters or licentiates (both of whom possessed the qualifications for serving as chaplains) may have been tempted by additional income. Nonetheless, knowledge of the irregularity of pay could have spread quickly, at presbytery and synod meetings, if not by letter. Such information would have discouraged both those avaricious ministers in possession of good stipends and those in need of supplementary income. The explanation that ministers served for the purposes of monetary gain is initially attractive due to the large amounts of added income they might have received. The lack of records in the cases when the hard-pressed Scottish parliament would have paid the ministers prevents a final verdict on this proposition. However, the irregularity of pay for the armies under the care of the richer English parliament would suggest that the prospect of receiving pay was so poor that it would not have warranted the departure from a small income in a secure place.

---

1 Baillie complained of lack of money for the chaplains of that army, Baillie, ii. 322. See pp. 201-2 for a discussion of the army's condition.


3 SRO, P.A. 16.2.
Is it possible that fear of discipline by the church courts could have encouraged ministers to serve? In August 1645 the Commission of the General Assembly ordered presbyteries to supply the regiments with chaplains and to censure those failing to go. The Commission of the General Assembly, in 1646, authorised the suspension and withholding of the stipend of any minister who failed to leave for his regiment within fifteen days of receiving notification of service. Interestingly I have never encountered a single deposition or suspension in either presbytery or synod records for delinquency of ministers appointed chaplains. That does not mean that ministers always obeyed the church courts either with alacrity or at all. In Paisley presbytery, for instance, two ministers delayed for over three months and never went out to the army. The explanation for the failure to suspend lazy ministers may lie with some sense of professional solidarity and with a view that service was both onerous and to be avoided. Furthermore, with the departure of a minister to the army the other ministers in the presbytery were burdened with extra duties (including supplying the chaplain's church with a preacher). On that ground alone presbyteries would have been reluctant to send out ministers. Nevertheless such attitudes fail to explain why approximately 350 beneficed clergy went out to the armies.

In England, someone who is studying the English parliamentary army chaplains has discovered that the collapse of the ecclesiastical structure led to colonels taking either private chaplains or parish ministers under their patronage into the armies. Could patrons' pressure account for

---

1 SRO, PR Ayr, August 1645.
2 SRO, PR Brechin, 28.5.1646.
3 SRO, PR Paisley, 12.2, 26.3, 22.4, 7.5.1646.
4 Conversation with Dr. Walter Makey.
5 Conversation with Ms. Anne Laurence, 1977.
service in the Covenanters' armies? For several reasons the answer is no. First, following the Scottish Reformation the crown claimed the extensive patronage of ecclesiastical foundations (which amounted to 86% of all parishes).¹ By 1600 the crown had drawn the greater part of parochial patronage into its own hands.² That circumstance alone made it more difficult for landowners to exercise patronage and consequently to bring ministers, whom they had installed, to the army with them. In over 600 appointments of chaplains only ten were selected by their patrons.³ Therefore, the hypothesis that Scottish clergy were motivated "by the desire or necessity to follow their patrons' orders should be dropped.

One explanation remains to account for the obedience of ministers appointed as chaplains, that of ideological commitment. The chaplains of the Covenanting armies were a largely silent body, leaving few diaries, memoirs or letters. Thus the theory that chaplains served because of loyalty to the cause must rest on negative evidence. The church records reveal that in only seven cases out of the approximately 650 tours of duty did ministers refuse to serve.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3: Chaplains refusing or exempted from service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In another thirteen instances ministers received exemptions. As refusals to serve gained the attention of presbyteries, synods and the Commission, it appears that the ministers responded to the summons to act as chaplains with obedience, if not always with alacrity.⁴ Were the chaplains, however,

²J. Wormald, "Princes" and regions in the Scottish reformation (lecture at St. Andrews University, 12 February 1981).
³Percentage of chaplains selected by patrons: FBW - 4%; SBW - 4%; SLCA - 3%; AK - 3%.
⁴Average length of delays: SLCA - 2 months; HA - 2.75 months.
as a whole more committed to the cause of the Covenants than their colleagues who remained at home nursing their parochial charges? This was indeed the case. The radicals who viewed service in England and Ireland as missionary work, appear as chaplains in a greater proportion than they did in the Church of Scotland. The same is true of future nonconformers. In most armies (save in the Whiggamore and Western Association armies) neither group dominated the chaplaincy but they did account for sizeable minorities. The argument that ministers served for ideological reasons must rest on the following negative evidence: the apparent ineffectiveness of other possible motives, the extraordinarily high degree of compliance with orders to serve as chaplains and the known ideological commitment of a sizeable minority of the chaplains.

Having discussed the motivating factors for those who served as chaplains the question arises as to whether there were enough of them. No complaints regarding the supply of chaplains to the Army of the First Bishops' War have come to my notice. Certainly six, but no more than ten, regiments of Leslie's eighteen had chaplains. In the Second Bishops' War initially there were a sufficient number of chaplains. The Ulster army again began its operations with a full complement of chaplains. In a few months the conditions in that army deteriorated. On 2 April 1644 the officers at Carrickfergus requested that 'ane able and solide minister may be sent over for the headquarters...' to be relieved every three months. Any improvement proved temporary. On 15 October 1647 the Commission of the General Assembly urged the recently settled parish ministers in Ulster to work in the army due to a shortage of chaplains.

---

1. NLS, MS. Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, f. 29v.
2. PRO, SP 28/120.
3. Reid, Presbyterian Church, i. 392.
4. NLS, Advocate MS. 33.4.8, f. 78.
5. RCGA, i. 323.
The situation in other armies was similar.

Between 1644 and February 1647 the Church of Scotland faced an enormous task in supplying ministers for army staffs and regiments. During that time the Ulster army possessed seven regiments; the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant had the equivalent of fifty-six regiments; the home armies fielded an additional nineteen regiments.¹ Those eighty-two regiments required four ministers a year, each of whom served for a period of three months and so required in all 328 ministers. Thus at any one time all 69 presbyteries would have had to have at least one minister with the army and thirteen would have had two serving. Clearly that would have represented an oppressive burden on the presbyteries, which generally had vacancies, and infirm ministers serving. We have already seen that the Ulster army suffered from a deficiency of chaplains. The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant was in a similar condition. In August 1645 the Commission stated that failure to supply the army with ministers at home and abroad was 'one of our grieved sinnes, and causes of our calamitie'.² The General Assembly of 1646 issued a statement identical to that of the Commission.³ The problem never seems to have been solved. In July 1644 nine ministers were with the army.⁴ A year later the number had risen to twenty-seven.⁵ The muster at Muskham in January 1646 reveals that eleven ministers were with the besiegers of Newark.⁶ By July the number had risen to fourteen but by then there were

---

¹See Tables 1.1 - 1.18.
²SRO, PR Ayr, August 1645; Scots Commissioners, p. 77; Baillie, ii. 322.
⁴Army, passim.
⁵SRO, KSR Old Kelso, 23.11.1645.
⁶PRO., SP 41/2.
more regiments quartered together than there had been at Muskham. In January 1647 the number had dropped to four. Certainly it could not be argued that the Solemn League and Covenant army was continually well-supplied with chaplains.

The New Model Army, although smaller in size (less than fifteen regiments) fared little better than its immediate predecessors. In March and April 1647 Lieutenant General David Leslie complained about the paucity of ministers. Ministers did go out to the regiments during the spring yet by 14 July 1647 the Commission again noted the need for chaplains. The supply of chaplains for the army appears to have become a chronic problem by this time.

The difficulties faced by the Engager army in securing chaplains have been noted above. While the Engager acts of levy called for at least thirty-five regiments and the English lists of prisoners name twenty, there were only seventeen chaplains to serve them. The Whiggamore army probably possessed a sufficient number of chaplains. However, that is difficult to determine owing to the loose structure of the force and the incomplete records. The same may be said of the Western Association Army. However, in both cases we shall see that the ministers identified as chaplains with them were radicals.

With the Army of the Covenants the difficulty of ascertaining the exact length of service presents problems. In July 1650 Archibald Johnston noted that the army needed ministers. By September the Commission had appointed ministers to thirty-one regiments, which should have taken care of the pastoral needs of the army at Dunbar. There are indications that this solicitude for the army was not demonstrated in 1649. The circumstances

---

1 RCGA, i. 225; SRC., SR Fife, 6.4.1647.
2 RCGA, i. 289.
3 Ibid., ii. 74.
at the time, however, would have permitted parish ministers to care for
the troops quartered in their area. The attempts of the Commission to
secure an adequate number of chaplains for the Army of the Kingdom has
been noted above. In May 1651 Baillie complained to the earl of
Lauderdale:

Why hes not every regiment a minister?... Had
you ever so many ministers out of charges? 1

By late June thirty ministers were serving thirty-nine regiments. 2
Despite Johnston of Wariston's claim that no chaplains accompanied the
army on the Worcester campaign, at least fourteen ministers fell prisoner
to the English following the battle. An additional eight may have
escaped to Scotland. 3 Although the Commission had succeeded in finding
some ministers, most of the army's 105 regiments were without pastoral
care.

Few of the armies of the Covenanters possessed the required number
of chaplains. Those of the First Bishops' War, Whiggamore raid and
Western Association seem to have been the only ones adequately supplied
throughout their existence but each of the armies existed for less than
six months. Furthermore the identification of the armies with a particular
cause was high. For short periods the armies of the Second Bishops' War
and of the Covenantants managed to have sufficient ministers. Again the
relation between the cause and service with the army was high. Inadequate
supply of chaplains resulted in a lowering of standards of spiritual
discipline and an increase in profanity. 4 Adequate supply, one minister
per regiment, would have ensured a more godly army. The Scots never de-
developed the kind of sects as did the English New Model, which used officers
and soldiers as preachers.

---

1Baillie, iii. 171.
2SRO, PA. 16.2.
4Baillie. ii. 322.
The shortage of ministers was due to several causes. Baillie suggested the lack of money as a reason in 1645.\(^1\) That situation continued for over half a decade following 1645. Yet the armies continued to have chaplains. In the case of those of the Whiggamore and Western Association armies they stood not to gain at all financially. One cause of the Solemn League and Covenant, Home and New Model armies' lack of ministers was the refusals and exemptions which ranged from 3% to 13% of the total tours of duty.\(^2\) However, the other eight armies did not suffer from this particular problem. Regiments, especially cavalry, were often from several presbyteries. The reluctance of presbyteries to supply chaplains in these circumstances has been previously noted. In more general terms it appears that army life and absence from home could hardly prove enticing to a minister in possession of a secure stipend and a relatively easy existence. Nor would the presbyteries wish continually to burden themselves. We have already seen that nine presbyteries took on an unequal share of the burden.\(^3\) Alas, the reasons both for the shortage of ministers and for the presence of those who did serve must remain a mystery in the absence of fresh evidence, which is unlikely to emerge. The wonder is not the paucity of ministers, but that many who had served once returned for further tours of duty.\(^4\)

The lack of records and carelessness in keeping them limits the discussion on the lengths of tours of duty. Thus the lengths of service for chaplains to the First Bishops' War, the Engagement, and Western Association armies will not be discussed. The Whiggamore forces must also

---

1Ibid.
2See Table 3.3.
3See pp. 101–2.
4At least ninety were appointed for second or further service with the same army or a different one.
be excluded from this discussion for those at Mauchline Moor existed no longer than a weekend and those under Leven and Leslie were in the field only a month. Of the remaining seven armies only the Ulster and Solemn League and Covenant's chaplains served an average of three months or longer. The home armies' ministers served nearly three months. All the rest had chaplains whose average stay with the army was two and a half months or less. It appears that distance from the home parish accounts for the longer lengths of service in the cases of the Second Bishops' War, Ulster, Solemn League and Covenant and Kingdom armies. However, the home armies' chaplains served longer than those of 1640-41, which weakens the argument. As it was hoped that the relief minister would arrive prior to the departure from the army of his predecessor, distance may provide the best explanation of the varying periods of service.

Most ministers served with foot regiments. There are variations to this; in the case of the Engager army the absence of detailed information renders any generalisations meaningless; the Western Association army consisted solely of cavalry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.4: Type of Service</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: F - Foot; H - Horse; G - Garrison; GS - General Staff; Gen. - General; ? - Unknown.

1Average length of service in months: SEW = 2.07; UA = 5.4; SLCA = 3.5; HA = 2.8; NMA = 1.8; WR = 1; AC = 1.8; AK = 2.5.
The Whiggamore forces lacked specific military formations. The reason for the prejudice in favour of service with the infantry rests on the church courts. Again we return to the fact that horse regiments generally originated from several presbyteries. None of the presbyteries wished to increase their own duties (and in the matter of chaplains they would already possess responsibility for an infantry regiment). Thus it was the horse regiments which suffered from lack of spiritual guidance.

Having said that, we may nevertheless try to estimate how poorly the cavalry units were served. In the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant regiments of horse accounted for 29% of the army. But only 18% of the chaplains served with the cavalry. The New Model Army had approximately four infantry regiments for the equivalent of one horse regiment. Yet 30% of the tours of duty were for horse troops. In 1651 the horse regiments in the army accounted for 36% of the whole. Despite those forces' weakness (which allowed the chaplains to serve horse brigades instead of regiments), in July 1651 they were poorly cared for. At the time of the presentation of the chaplains' pay only fourteen of thirty-eight regiments of horse had chaplains attached to them.\(^1\) In the case of the other armies the exact proportion of foot to horse is less clear; consequently I have made no estimates for them. Infantry regiments stood a greater chance of having a chaplain, who would provide spiritual care and see to the punishment of sinful soldiers. Cavalry troopers could hope to be freer from such curbs on any scandalous behaviour.

The life of the Covenanting chaplain is one of relative obscurity. Few ministers left records of their sojourns with the armies.\(^2\) The

\(^1\)SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 6, 19v; P.A. 16.2.

\(^2\)See chapters 4, 8 and 9 for discussions of the ministers' impact on military life and operations, their influence on army politics, and their efforts to plant presbyterianism in England and Ireland.
chaplains of the Covenanting armies were not men of war. Indeed, most European chaplains of the post-Reformation period limited their activities to non-violent actions (although this could include inciting violence). The French Calvinist pastors in the war of 1562-4 served as town governors, captains and even private soldiers. However, Calvin's condemnation of such militant activities led to their abandonment.¹ In Mackay's brigade William Forbes, a chaplain, spontaneously led his charges into battle.² Nonetheless most chaplains in both protestant and Roman Catholic armies did not fight or take troops into battle. In 1639 a Scottish account claims that the Covenanter ministers intended to fight. The chaplains were armed and when the alarm was sounded they rushed to the heads' of their regiments, shouting:

In the name of God, let us march up to the enemies, and the Lord of Hosts be with us.³

This account should be treated with care. Baillie claimed that he carried two pistols and swords for protection against robbers.⁴ Evidence from the years after 1639 suggests that the ministers not only had no desire to fight themselves, but were positively forbidden to do so by the military hierarchy. In August 1640 the presbytery of the army asked Leslie what duties the chaplains had during battle. Having consulted the Lieutenant and Major Generals Leslie replied that foreign custom and their own judgment suggested that the ministers exhort and pray with the men before the battle. Once fighting began Leslie believed the location of the ministers should be in the rear.⁵ No accounts from the later 1640s imply that the rubric changed. Although ministers might incite massacres following

²J. Mackay, An Old Scots Brigade (Edinburgh, 1885), p. 56.
³J. Somerville, Memorie of the Somervilles (Edinburgh, 1815), ii. 198.
⁴Baillie, i. 211.
⁵NLS, MS. Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, f. 28.
the surrender of enemy troops they took no part in the fighting. It is therefore evident that the dangers of military life for the ministers were ordinarily much less than that of their charges.

Nonetheless chaplains had the same material advantages and hardships of army life. Leslie's army of 1639 reputedly was well-supplied; consequently the chaplains' standard of living was high. Baillie even ate on one occasion at Leslie's table. In October 1640 (three months after the army had taken the field) the presbytery of the army began to devote time to the problem of maintenance for ministers. Apparently no uniform system of dining existed in the army. Those chaplains who fed at their colonel's tables fared well. There were others who did not receive that hospitality and they had spent their food allowance within three months. The presbytery appointed John Livingstone and Thomas Lawrie to consult with the General Commissary on the matter of maintenance and pay. A week later the presbytery instructed the chaplains to apply to their quartermasters for allowance money which the General Commissary had issued for them. At this point the records cease, so that it is difficult to say how the ministers fared for the remainder of the campaign. It would appear that the ministers probably found themselves enjoying a more secure standard of living than the common soldiers regardless of the conditions of supply prevalent in the army. When pay and maintenance were issued the ministers received more than privates. In some cases they could rely on the colonel's solicitude. However, they could not (and probably would not) have recourse to foraging, which the common soldiers and officers did when supplies ran low.

There are only two other references in later years to the material conditions of ministers with the army. In July 1644 the Commission of the

---

1Baillie, i. 214.

2NLS, MS. Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, ff. 29v, 32, 34.
General Assembly approached the Scottish parliament on the matters of outfitting ministers for military service and their maintenance allowances. The parliament promised to order the army to ensure the maintenance of ministers.\(^1\) The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant suffered from vast arrears of pay and lack of a well-organised and properly financed commissariat. Thus a guaranteed standard of living would have proved beyond the means of the army.

There is no mention of the chaplains' conditions again until 1651. During that period we can only assume that the ministers lived according to the conditions generally prevalent in the army. On 10 July 1651 N. Smith, clerk to the presbytery of the army, addressed the Committee of Estates as follows:

```
Sr It is deare Liveing in this towne [Stirling] and therefore the Gairson minister deserveth singular consideration.
```

Prior to Smith's request the Committee had granted the garrison ministers £69 each for six months pay.\(^3\) Presumably they had paid their outstanding debts with that money, placing them in need again. There is no record of the Stirling garrison chaplains receiving more pay before the surrender of the place on 10 September. In this instance the chaplains received no relief from the desperate supply situation facing the army as a whole. It would be safe to say that ministers on military service were less comfortably off than those who remained in the parishes.\(^4\)

Unlike common soldiers, chaplains could receive permission to depart from the army to attend to their affairs at home. In the Second Bishops' War the presbytery of the army allowed ministers to return to their

---

\(^1\) Balfour, *Annales*, iii. 175; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, vi, pt. i. 197.

\(^2\) SRO, P.A. 16.2, 10.7.1651.

\(^3\) Ibid., 25.6.1651.

\(^4\) Ministers were apparently allowed servants. These could be the minister's own man or one selected from the common soldiers. *Baillie*, i. 211, 270; KR *Tyningham*, i. 118v.
parishes for business reasons, if they promised to ensure that a minister left the presbytery to relieve them or to return to the army themselves. The presbytery granted leave to ministers on two occasions by mid-November 1640. In September 1644 Robert Douglas, moderator of the presbytery of the army, received permission to return to Scotland for business reasons, provided that he returned quickly. Douglas accepted the stipulation and was gone approximately three weeks. It is unknown whether such practices were continued in later years.

Chaplains faced a number of perils, but they occurred rarely. The seven ministers with the rebels at Mauchline Moor were charged with treason by the Engager parliament. However, they were never sentenced. Following the defeat of the Engagement army the Commission of the General Assembly cited eighteen men who had served that army as chaplains, to appear before it. However, only Henry Erskine received a censure and suspension from ministerial functions. Another Engager chaplain repented of his actions. A more uncomfortable threat was falling prisoner to the enemy. After Kilsyth Montrose's men captured Thomas Kirkcaldy and Frederick Carmichael. They were released unharmed, however. Alexander Davidson was the only minister too slow to escape Cromwell's troops at Dunbar. He too was freed. After Worcester fourteen chaplains fell into the hands of the parliamentarians. Again

1 NLS, MS. Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, f. 32.
2 SRO, P.A. 11.2, f. 82v; Douglas, 'Diary'.
4 RCA, ii. 74, 97, 106, iii. 25.
5 Memorials of Montrose and his Times, ed. M. Napier (Maitland Club, lxvi, 1848), i. 229.
most of them were eventually freed.\(^1\) At the fall of Dundee (which was stormed by Monck's troops) two ministers, Andrew Auchenleck and John Robertson, fell captive. They, too, regained their freedom.\(^2\) In only nineteen of 650 tours of duty did ministers become prisoners of war. That number is low considering the large number of defeats inflicted on the Covenanters armies by their enemies from mid-1644 onwards, but perhaps not surprising if the chaplains were customarily at the rear.

The danger of mortality during service was much lower than that of captivity. At the siege of Newcastle in 1644 William Hume died from being hit by an enemy cannonball.\(^3\) A historian has claimed that the English at Dunbar were purposely severe to the clergy. A number are reported to have been killed while exhorting their troops to fight. Dragoons reportedly slashed the faces of others.\(^4\) I have found no cases of any chaplains having died at Dunbar. John Carstairs appears to have been the only minister who was wounded, robbed and stripped.\(^5\) The likelihood of a minister dying during service was very low indeed. The chances of burgh ministers surviving the plague of 1644-45 was much less.\(^6\) Fears for their personal safety during campaigns may have infected ministers, but it should not have been severe.

---


\(^2\) Andrew Auchenleck (Scott, *Fasti*, v. 316); John Robertson.

\(^3\) William Home (Scott, *Fasti*, ii. 364).

\(^4\) R. Chambers, *History of the rebellions in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1828), ii. 280

\(^5\) John Carstairs, *Scott, Fasti*, iii. 460.

In the eyes of the ministers conversion to another denomination was probably worse than death. The only known instance of conversion occurred following the Scottish occupation of Newcastle in 1640. At that time an unidentified minister accidentally met some Roman Catholics, who persuaded him to join their faith.

He afterwards endured much obloquy and insult from the heretic soldiers, which he bore with patience, and piety.1 Chaplains stood an equally small chance of death or conversion. None of the dangers of service could have contributed much to the lack of ministers. The level of service being repeated in two or more armies is as great as ten per cent.2 Furthermore, in all save the armies of the 1649-1651 period over two-fifths (and in some cases four-fifths) of the chaplains accepted further tours of duty.

Table 3.5: Table of Previous and Further Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Previous %</th>
<th>Further %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>53 (with same army)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still, the potential discomforts for men of settled habits and life must have discouraged them from serving with the armies.


2Incidence of repeated service: SBW - 1.1; UA - 1.21; SLCA - 1.11; HA - 1.13; NMA - 1.09; AC - 1.13; AK - 1.09.
Differences exist between the armies in that some possessed more chaplains identifiable as parish ministers than others.

Table 3.6: Identification of Ministers %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CI</th>
<th>PI</th>
<th>UI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: CI - certainly identifiable; PI - potentially identifiable; UI - unidentifiable.

Only two armies — that of the First Bishops' War and the Whig Mores of 1648 — were served by chaplains all of whom are identifiable. The extremely low number of 'known' chaplains in the Engager army arises from the boycott of that movement by almost all beneficed clergy. In the other eight cases 69-89% of the chaplains are identifiable with certainty; another 4-21% may one day be connected with parishes. Only the army of the Kingdom had as high as a fifth of its chaplains drawn from non-beneficed clergy. The dislocation of Scottish life following the occupation by the English parliamentarians explains that. Apparently the Covenanters did much better than historians might have expected in procuring beneficed clergy for service with the army. Dr. Makey thought that a higher proportion of the chaplains would have been unidentifiable. He has suggested that most of the 'unknown' chaplains were probably private chaplains, readers, tutors, licentiates or schoolmasters.¹

¹Conversation with Dr. W. Makey, 24 October 1979.
these vocations would have been university graduates with the necessary training for the ministry. Although my research has not uncovered any tutors or private chaplains who served as ministers with the army, I have discovered men in the other situations who were chaplains.¹

Nevertheless the beneficed clergy account for the majority of chaplains (298 out of 400) and for the plurality of tours of duty (approximately 450 of 650). The ability of regiments to secure ministers in charges with such regularity over a thirteen year period suggests both that the church courts deliberately sought parish ministers for service with the army and that ministers viewed service with the armies as part of their calling.

Fortunately, it is possible to compare ministers who served as chaplains with the typical minister sketched by Dr. Makey in his book *The Church of the Covenants*. Ninety per cent of future ministers entered university at 16 years of age, graduating four years later. The average minister spent the next six or seven years as supply minister or schoolmaster. Following that period of waiting he received his parish and served it for approximately thirty years before dying at the age of fifty-five.² Nearly twelve per cent of the ministers serving in 1648 were on the Commission of the General Assembly.³

---

¹Licentiates: James Home (Scott, *Fasti*, ii. 40); Robert Leighton, (Ibid., i. 332); Robert Row, (Ibid., i. 189); Alexander Symmer, (NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, f. 30); Matthew Mowat (Ibid., f. 29v); John Baird, (PRO, SP 28/120, 214v); Hugh Cunningham, (Ibid., f. 224v); Thomas Peebles, (Ibid., f. 277v); John Scott, (SRO, PR Jedburgh and Kelso, 13.7.1642); James Simpson, (SRO, PR Dalkeith, 16.6.1642); William Kinninmonth, (Strathbogie, p.111); Alexander Smith, (Scott, *Fasti*, ii. 260); Thomas Thompson, (SRA, PR Glasgow, 11.6.1645); Thomas Kirkcaldy, (Scott, *Fasti*, iii. 246); John Knox (Ibid., i. 155); Thomas Lindsay, (Ibid., iv, 343); Robert Mercer, (Ibid., v. 91); James Tweedy, (RCAA, iii. 86); John Wallace, (Scott, *Fasti*, ii. 159); Robert Campbell, (Ibid., iv. 169); Robert Rule, (Ibid., iv. 320); Simeon Knox, (Ibid., ii. 410); Reader – James Livingston, (SRO., PR Linlithgow, 2.4.1645).

²Makey, *Church*, pp. 102-3.

³Makey, 'Ministers', p. 105.
comparison with Dr. Makey's hypothetical minister will follow his sequence.

For the purposes of discussing chaplains and those who were M.A.s, I have limited myself to identifiable ministers. In this aspect the armies did well. The lowest percentage of chaplains with degrees occurs in the case of the Western Association Army, in which only eight-tenths of the identifiable ministers had degrees. In three other instances the number of graduates fell below 90%, but only slightly so. The number of identifiable chaplains in the remaining armies equalled or excelled Dr. Makey's figure.

Table 3.7: Education % (100 base for total universities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M.A.</th>
<th>A'</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: A - Aberdeen; E - Edinburgh; G - Glasgow; SA - St. Andrews; ? - Unknown.

The Engager army does present some problems in this respect, because we know the identity of so few of its chaplains. However, the Commission's reference to the Engager chaplains as expectants or beneficed clergy supports the view that most possessed university degrees. Thus, the chaplains had as good an educational background as the parish ministers.

There is no mention in the records of chaplains being chosen with reference to age or experience. However it appears that the church courts

---

1 [RCGA, i. 74, 97.]
at least unconsciously followed such guidelines. The average age of
the chaplains ranged from 34 years old (Western Association Army) to
43 years of age (First Bishops' War Army). There is however no pattern
of decreasing average ages as the wars went on, but a fluctuating one.
Nonetheless, the theory that the radicals of 1637-1641 were not those
of 1648-1651 is confirmed. The chaplains of the New Model, Whiggamore
and Western Association forces were on average younger than their
counterparts in the armies of the Bishops' Wars.\(^1\) In any case all
the armies possessed chaplains of a mature age.

Regarding the question of the average chaplain's experience in a
parish I have taken the chaplains of absolutely obscure identity into
account to give a clearer picture in this matter. The Engager army
is omitted; only one of its chaplains served a parish during the
campaign. The others fall into a pattern. Although chaplains without
any parochial experience have been included in this average, the number of
years of parish service remains impressive. The range is from five years
(chaplains in the Ulster Army) to thirteen years (those of the First
Bishops' War Army). The second highest average (nine years) occurs among
the chaplains in the Second Bishops' War Army again supporting the contention
that the early radicals were thoroughly experienced men.\(^2\) In comparison
with Dr. Makey's average minister, the chaplains can be said usually to
have served in the army within the first decade of their pastorate when
enthusiasm and interest were presumably high and before physical
disabilities, boredom and lethargy had developed. Therefore it appears
that the ecclesiastical judicatories and colonels selected men of some age

---

\(^1\) Average ages of 'known' ministers: FBW - 43 years; SEW - 38; UA - 36;
SLCA - 42; HA - 38; NMA - 35; EA - 35; WR - 35; AC - 37; WAA - 34; AK - 40.

\(^2\) Average experience of all ministers (in years): FBW - 13; SEW - 9;
UA - 5; SLCA - 7.7; HA - 8; NMA - 6; EA - insufficient data; WR - 7;
AC - 8; WAA - 6; AK - 8.
and experience to serve with the army. Certainly the Covenanter soldiers did not have spiritual directors who were as raw as they were.

If we turn to the incidence of service on the Commission of the General Assembly differences between the chaplains and average ministers appear. In only three cases (Engager, Whiggamore and Western Association armies) were there fewer chaplains with service on the Commission than we should expect to find. The chaplains in the First Bishops' War, the First English Civil War, and the war against Montrose and his allies sat on the Commission in the anticipated numbers. However, in the other five cases more chaplains were members of the Commission than might be expected.¹

While the Covenanter chaplains may not be compared with other Scottish ministers, in the matter of published works,² it is possible to contrast them with the chaplains of the English parliamentary armies. Apparently, one-third of approximately 250 English parliamentarian chaplains produced some sort of publication.³ Only the chaplains of the Engager army failed to produce any published works. Nearly a fifth of the ministers with the Ulster, Whiggamore and Western Association forces wrote material for publication. The number of chaplains in the other forces who published their material ranged from 9% (First Bishops' War) to 3% (war of 1651).⁴ One explanation for the Covenanter chaplains' smaller volume of publications arises from the nature of publishing in Scotland. Fewer presses existed in Scotland than in London. Those which did were under much stricter

¹Experience as members of the Commission (expressed as a percentage of the 'known' ministers): FBW - 14; SBW - 25; UA - 22; SLCA - 15; HA - 13; NMA - 30; EA - 0; WR - 10; AC - 21; WAA - 0; AK - 21; Average 1648 - 11.5%; Average 1649 - 11.93 (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 105).

²Miss M. Steele, Ph.D. candidate, University of Glasgow, 'Covenanter Propaganda, 1637-88'.

³Conversation with Anne Laurence.

⁴Percentages of 'known' ministers in the armies, who produced published works: FBW - 9; SBW - 8; UA - 18; SLCA - 4; HA - 3; NMA - 7; EA - 0; WR - 18; AC - 4; WAA - 18; AK - 3.
censorship than their English counterparts. Consequently, the chaplains would have found it more difficult to have their material printed. Furthermore, there was less theological controversy within Scotland which would have justified a high rate of publications.

Of more practical consideration for a minister who served with the military forces was whether he had any experience of a military environment. Only Robert Douglas had served overseas as a regimental chaplain before receiving his parish in Scotland. The other ministers had remained removed from military service by residing in Scotland or by following different pursuits than Douglas when abroad. Consequently, not a single minister in the First Bishops' War army had had prior service with an army. In the Second Bishops' War army, however, a quarter of the 'known' chaplains had served already. From that point onwards the chaplaincy consisted of a large number of veterans. The 'veteran' chaplains never numbered less than a third of the ministers with the army (Army of the Solemn League and Covenant). On one occasion they accounted for nine-tenths of the chaplains (Western Association Army). It is evident that the armies benefited from having ministers with both pastoral expertise and prior experience in directing the spiritual affairs of soldiers.

Another matter unexamined by historians or sociologists is the patterns of family life in the Scottish clergy of the seventeenth century. This gap makes it impossible to contrast the chaplains with their peers who remained in the parishes. However, we can inquire into the family life of the chaplains themselves. Were they free of care for wives and children? Unfortunately, Scott's Fasti seldom gives the dates of marriage contracts and baptisms, which makes it impossible to establish

---

1Robert Douglas served as a chaplain for a Scots regiment in the Swedish army, (Scott, Fasti, i. 385).

2See Table 3.5.
the dating of such relationships with total accuracy. If the ages of chaplains who had marriage contracts is averaged, it appears that ministers were married at the age of 32. Thus chaplains fall into four categories here: those with a known contract date, those known to have married and serving the armies in their thirty-second year (or older), those who were under 32 when they served but married at sometime and those who never married. The same categories apply with chaplains who had children. (In this case I have added a year to the average age of marriage).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.8: Chaplains with wives %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: / - definitely married when a chaplain; ? - married at some stage, at average age of marriage (32 years old) when a chaplain; ? - married at some stage, but under the average age of marriage; No - never married.

There is never an instance in any of the armies when 'known' married chaplains of a particular army comprised the majority of the army's chaplains. Conversely, only in the case of the Ulster army did the number of unmarried chaplains amount to a majority of the chaplains. However, in all but three armies (the Ulster, Whiggamore and Western Association) the percentage of chaplains in the first two categories accounted for a majority of those serving. It may be assumed then that celibacy was not a pre-requisite for nomination to a chaplaincy. Equally, marriage proved no bar to service which supports the argument that chaplains were mature men.
The circumstances regarding offspring are slightly different.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.9: Chaplains with children %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: / - definitely a father when a chaplain; ? - children at some stage, at the age of 33 years old as chaplain; No - never a father.

Ministers without children made up the majority of chaplains in the Ulster, Engager, New Model, and Western Association armies. In no army did chaplains who were definitely fathers at the time of service comprise the majority of chaplains. Indeed, only the armies of the Bishops' Wars, the Covenants and Kingdom may have had more than half of their chaplains who were fathers. It therefore appears that being head of a family may have provided ministers some protection from serving as a chaplain. Nevertheless, the necessity of caring for a family did not disqualify ministers from serving as chaplains. Yet again the ministers with military service appear representative of their peers in the church.

One major difference distinguished the chaplains from their peers - ideology, both political and religious (to separate the two areas would have seemed odd to contemporaries). The adherents of Montrose among the clergy serving in 1648 accounted for a tiny minority of the ministers.¹

¹Makey, 'Ministers', p. 105.
In only the Engager and Kingdom armies do royalists appear in proportions greater than or equal to their national presence.

Table 3.10: Political Views of Chaplains %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>ResR</th>
<th>Res</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEW</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: s—percentage of original 'known' chaplains of the army surviving to be enumerated; R—Royalists; E—Engagers; ResR—Resolutioner/Royalist; Res—Resolutioners; P—Protesters.

Overall the Montrosian clergy amount to a small fraction of identifiable chaplains, less than half of their national presence. The Engager clergy were equally scarce as chaplains, with the obvious exception of the Engagement army. In 1648 the Engager ministers made up 10.3% of the Scottish clergy. Excluding the Engager army, only the Ulster army possessed a higher percentage of Engagers than the national presence. The Second Bishops' War, Solemn League and Covenant, and Kingdom armies had Engager ministers present at a rate less than the national average. Of

1Robert Brown (Scott, Fasti, ii. 277); Thomas Bullingham (an English royalist), (Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 80, f. 421); David Leitch, (Scott, Fasti, vi. 165); John McCrae, (Ibid., vii. 33); George Haliburton, (Ibid., vii. 339); James Row, (Ibid., iv. 281); Patrick Scougall, (Ibid., v. 222); James Wood, (Ibid., iii. 353); Martin McGilvray, (Ibid., iv. 144).

2Makey, 'Ministers', p. 105.
all identifiable clergy the Engager and royalist clergy together account for 5.7% of the whole. Only twenty-one of the 403 chaplains belonged to the Engager party. The adherents of the conservative ideologies of the 1640s provided the majority of clergy for only one army and accounted for a mere tenth of the chaplaincy in two other armies.

The Resolutioner party presents special problems for there is no agreement concerning how large a portion of the clergy supported it. Dr. Makey has identified only 3.4% of the ministers in 1648 as members of the Resolutioner party. My researches have suggested a figure of 8.2% for Resolutioner chaplains. However, the contemporary accounts differ tremendously from these numbers. Blair guessed that the Resolutioners had the support of 71% of the clergy. Baillie claimed nine-tenths of the clergy supported the party to which he belonged. Something closer to Blair's estimate could be nearer the truth. Yet in none of the armies do the number of Resolutioners even approach a third of the chaplains.

1 See footnote 1, p.128 and Andrew Ballantyne, (SRO, PR Haddington, 4.10. 1649); John Courtney, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 8); David Drummond, (Scott, Fasti, i. 215); Andrew Fairfoul, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 2); Henry Erskine, (NLS, MS. 34.30); Andrew Keir (Scott, Fasti, i. 198); Robert Lawrie, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 2); Robert Leighton, (Scott, Fasti, i. 332); William Marshall, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 50).

2 Makey, 'Ministers', p. 105.

3 Robert Baillie (Scott, Fasti, vii. 395); Robert Blair, (Ibid., v. 233); David Dickson, (Ibid., i. 65); Robert Douglas, (Ibid., i. 386); Alan Fergusson, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 36); Richard Inglis, (Scott, Fasti, iii. 300); John Home, (Ibid., iii. 313); Mungo Law, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 2); Archibald Newton, (Scott, Fasti, i. 171); John Rattray, (Ibid., v. 249); John Smith, (Ibid., i. 132); James Taylor, (Ibid., iii. 206); Archibald Turner, (Ibid., i. 71); List of Prisoners, p. 8; Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 55, f. 57); see above, footnote 1, p. 119.

4 J.K. Hewison, The Covenanters (Glasgow, 1913), ii. 25, footnote 2.

5 Baillie, iii. 299.

6 If we subtract Dr. Makey's number of royalists, Engagers and Protesters from 100%, 77% of the ministers remain to be accounted for. It is known that the majority of ministers supported the Public Resolutions of 14 December 1650.
Indeed, only the First Bishops' War and Kingdom armies suggest that the Resolutioners were a large party among the ministers. The Ulster, Engager, Whiggamore, and Western Association armies possessed no known Resolutioners as chaplains. Therefore it is the case that none of the conservative-moderate parties in the Scottish church provided sustained pastoral care to the soldiers. Only the Engager army would have been entirely under conservative domination. The Army of the Kingdom was under the combined spiritual directorship of royalists, Engagers and Resolutioners; this alliance was hardly a model of unity. The forces of the centre and right were not represented in this army as they were in the country at large.

It was the radicals who exercised a decisive influence on the armies — and one out of all proportion to their numbers. Again we are faced with conflicting figures for evaluating the strength of the Protesters. Hewison claimed that the Protesters represented 4% of the clergy. Dr. Makey puts their strength at 8.1% of the ministers of 1648 and this is probably closer to the mark. They appear to account for 13% of all identifiable chaplains. Unlike the other factions the Protesters appear

1 See Table 3.10.

2 Hewison, Covenanters, ii. 25, footnote 2, 36.

3 Makey, 'Ministers', p. 105.

4 Protesters: William Adair, (Scott, Fasti, iii. 8); Francis Aird, (Ibid., iii. 245); Joseph Brodie, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 86); Colin Campbell, (Ibid., p. 48); Robert Campbell, (Ibid.); Andrew Cant, (Scott, Fasti, vi. 37); Robert Cheyne, (Ibid., vi. 130); John Cruikshank, (Ibid., iv. 241); Andrew Donaldson, (Ibid., v. 21); Alexander Dunlop, (Ibid., iii. 164); John Durie, (Ibid., i. 200); Patrick Gillespie (Scott, Fasti, iii. 462); James Guthry, (Ibid., iv. 318); John Hamilton, (Ibid., i. 82); Hew Kennedy, (Ibid., i. 127); John Livingstone, (Ibid., ii. 99); Thomas Lundie, (Ibid., iv. 171); Matthew Mowat, (Ibid., iii. 105); James Nasmith, (Ibid., iii. 254); John Nevay, (Ibid., iii. 119); Gabriel Maxwell, (Ibid., iii. 35); John Middleton, (Ibid., iv. 183); Alexander Moncrieffe, (Ibid., v. 117); William Oliphant, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 56); Hugh Peebles, (Scott, Fasti, iii. 152); Thomas Ramsay, (Ibid., ii. 57); Robert Row, (Ibid., i. 189); Samuel Row, (Ibid., ii. 86); John Scott, (Ibid., ii. 135); John Seaton, (Ibid., vi. 193); William Seaton, (Ibid., vi. 195); James Simpson, (McConnell, op. cit., p. 49); Robert Traill, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 60); James Tweedy, (Scott, Fasti, ii. 48); James Wilson, (Makey, 'Ministers', p. 58); Thomas Wylie, (Scott, Fasti, iii. 94).
in all but one army, that of the Engagers with whom they totally disagreed. The First Bishops' War and Kingdom armies had less than the national figure for Protester chaplains. Conversely, the Protesters (or those who became members of that party) appeared in three to six times their national strength in four armies (those of the Solemn League and Covenant, New Model, Whiggamore Raid and Covenants). In the remaining armies they were represented in a proportion equal to or slightly greater than Dr. Makey's figure would lead us to expect. The Protester ideology was contrary to the majority view within the country. The large proportion of Protester chaplains supports the contention that ministers accepted their orders to serve with the army out of ideological conviction. Those who became Protesters and probably some of the Resolutioners would have seen service in Ireland and England as an opportunity for presbyterian missionary work.1 Protester partisans on service with the Covenant forces fighting royalists in Scotland enjoyed the prospect of watching the 'Amalekites' being smitten. Of all the groups the Protesters were the most radical and most dedicated to the cause of preserving the Covenants, and ensuring the godliness of the armies by purging them of sinners and malignants.

Further evidence exists to support the theory that ministers committed to presbyterianism and the Covenants served the armies in disproportionate numbers. One of the unending arguments of Scottish Restoration historians centres on determining how high a proportion of the clergy failed to conform in the 1660-64 period. Gilbert Burnet, a contemporary, put the figure at 36%. Hewison, a twentieth-century historian, accepts the estimate that one-fifth of the beneficed clergy were deposed or left their charges upon the introduction of episcopacy. There are other estimates ranging from

---

1 See below for efforts of chaplains in converting the English and Ulster Scots, pp. 311-3, 316, 325-31.
28.4% to 34% of the ministers of 1648 who survived until 1660-64, 26.8% did not conform. Although a figure lower than one-third is generally accepted, the chaplains exceed even the highest proportion assigned to non-conformers among ministers as a whole.

### Table 3.11: Allegiance of Chaplains in 1662 %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nonconformers</th>
<th>Conformers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBW</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBW</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCA</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately two-fifths of the chaplains survived to 1664 (when their allegiance would almost unquestionably be known). The non-conformers account for 65 ministers or 52% of the survivors. The figure is extremely high and cannot be explained by pointing to the Protesters alone, who comprised only 40% of the non-conforming chaplains. Nor is the answer geographical distribution such as the ministers all coming from the south-west where many presbyteries were denuded of clergy. Instead the non-conformers of the 1660s were well-represented as a group in the armies of the Covenanters. It should be emphasised that non-conformity in 1664 strongly indicates more than passive allegiance to presbyterianism and the Covenant in the 1640s. Certainly we could expect these ministers to have had an impact on the armies, if they appeared in great enough numbers.

An examination of the armies will demonstrate that the future non-conformers controlled nearly all of the armies. Once again the Engagers’

---

1 W.L. Mathieson, *Politics and Religion* (Glasgow, 1902), ii. 193; Hewison, op. cit., ii. 163.

2 Makey, "Ministers", p. 105.
army proves the exception to the rule, for none of its chaplains failed to conform. Also, the armies of the Solemn League and Covenant, home and Kingdom had more conformers than non-conformers. Nevertheless in the remaining seven armies the non-conformers were present in approximately twice the numbers that they should have been (in proportion to all ministers in 1664). Even in the Solemn League and Covenant and home armies the future non-conformers accounted for more than a third of the chaplains. The dominance of militant presbyterians is unquestionable. Such a presence in the armies suggests that there was some impact on the politico-religious views of the soldiers. In Chapter 8 a more thorough discussion of the armies and politics will reveal that the armies were loyal to presbyterianism as a religion, though they might have qualms about endorsing all of its political manifestations.

The chaplains of the armies of the Covenant were dedicated men, willing to leave the comforts of home. The high incidence of radicals and non-conformers supports this hypothesis. Yet why, then, did the church fail to supply the armies adequately? Of the several factors which led to insufficient numbers of ministers, the disinclination of the presbyteries to appoint chaplains (which would result in further burdening the ministers left behind) was the most important. Although the information on several aspects of the chaplains remains deficient, much can be said about the selection of chaplains and how that reflects the change in Scottish ecclesiastical polity in the 1640s. The chaplains generally shared the typical education and background of the parish ministers of the Church of Scotland; they were well represented in high places and, in particular, in the Commission of the General Assembly. They belonged, however, for the most part to the radical wing of the Kirk. For these men service in the army overrode the considerations of a comfortable charge, marital bliss and family ties.
CHAPTER FOUR: RELIGION IN THE ARMIES

The religious manifestations within the Covenanting armies were many and varied - from worship services to religious and military observations, to placing the praise or blame for the victory or defeat on Providence. The evidence for these topics varies in quality and quantity. As regards religious services in the armies, presbytery records or accounts of chaplains are the most valuable sources. Unfortunately, there are few of either and it is particularly galling that a literate and university-educated clergy, generally failed to record their experiences in the army. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether the lack of information on certain armies signifies a decline in religious observances and devotion or whether it results merely from the lack (or loss) of sources. Indeed, if there was a trend towards fewer manifestations of piety in the army by say 1646, it reappeared in the Whiggamore Army and the Army of the Covenants. A better basis for determining the godliness of the Covenanters' forces is likely to be provided by the examination of the soldiers' morals and discipline in chapters five and six. The major portion of this chapter is concerned with religious services in the armies' camps, fasts, religious observations and interventions in military operations, and thanksgivings following victories. The remainder of the chapter deals with massacres of prisoners of war and civilians, destruction of religious property, charity, God's providence, and morale in the armies.

The earl of Leven ordered that the army by regiment should have morning and evening prayers daily as well as two sermons on Sunday. Was this observed in practice? For the two Bishops' Wars we possess fairly full accounts of worship in the armies. Although there is a decline in the amount of evidence after that time there is the diary of Robert Douglas, who was with the army of the Solemn League and Covenant for almost all of

1See above, pp. 77-5.
1644. However, following Douglas's account a break occurs in the sources, which is relieved only in the matter of fasts, thanksgivings and religiously incited massacres.

The Army of the First Bishops' War was reckoned by its chaplains to be the most godly of all the Covenanters' armies.\(^1\) Montrose's forces in the north-east shared the same atmosphere of holiness that was ascribed to Leslie's army in the Borders. On 30 March 1639, during the first Aberdeen expedition, Montrose's army halted outside the burgh to hear sermons. Two months later the army heard sermons within the burgh.\(^2\) More is known of the Borders army. For instance on 26 May Alexander Henderson preached a sermon to the army at Dunbar, in which he equated the royalists with the Amalekites and the Scots with Saul and the Israelites.\(^3\) A royalist observer commented that the Scots held daily prayers which included petitions for King Charles.\(^4\) Baillie explained that the presence of ministers known to the soldiers increased their morale. He records that he preached and prayed with joy as a method of encouraging the soldiers. Throughout the camp in the morning and evening, drums signalled the commencement of sermons and prayers. The sole topic of the former was the cause of the Covenant. There seem also to have been spontaneous religious meetings, which occurred more frequently in the evening than morning. During these the soldiers sang psalms, prayed and


\(^{2}\)Dow, op. cit., pp. 77-8.

\(^{3}\)A. Laing, A History of Scotland from the Roman Occupation (Edinburgh, 1904), iii. 60.

read scripture. The novelty of military life, its short duration and the Covenanters' string of victories from 1637 (both political and military) helped encourage the establishment of so godly an army.

Of the Second Bishops' War army's religious practices we know more, principally because of the survival of the army presbytery records for August to November 1640. Fortunately, the comments of two chaplains also exist. Robert Blair stated:

I believe since the days of the reforming kings of Judah there was never two such armies.

John Livingston, chaplain to the earl of Cassillis' regiment, wrote:

It was very refreshing to remark that after we came to a quarter at night, there was nothing to be heard almost through the whole army but singing of psalms, prayer and reading of scripture — but through process of time we declined more and more.

Livingston also recorded that 'tenderness in worship and walking [with the Lord]' declined during his period of service which lasted until November. The presbytery of the army's records possess corroborating evidence for these accounts. On 13 August 1640 an inquiry by the Moderator revealed that the chaplains had held the required services. At the same meeting the presbytery agreed to have prayers kept in tents as well, for the regiments were said to be 'families'. On 20 August a committee of ministers was formed to consider the subject matter for 'discourses and exhortations'. Although it reported, the substance of the committee's work is unknown. Throughout the presbytery's records there is only one

---

1Baillie, i. 211, 213, 214.
2Dow, op. cit., p. 80.
3Lilley, op. cit., p. 50.
4J. Livingston, A Brief Historical Relation of the Life of Mr. John Livingston, ed. T. Houston (Edinburgh, 1848), p. 106.
5NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 31, f. 27-7v.
6Ibid., f. 27v.
mention of a lack of services for soldiers and that was remedied.\textsuperscript{1} The ministers desired to celebrate communion, but the presbytery disagreed with the guidelines suggested by the Committee of Estates. Thus, communion was not celebrated before the records end.\textsuperscript{2} However, the presbytery ordered that ministers should catechise a portion of their regiments daily despite the uncertainty regarding observation of the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{3} Church attendance by the regiments became a major concern to the presbytery once Newcastle fell. This problem was discussed at three meetings in October. The Quartermaster General, at the order of the Committee, assigned the seventeen regiments around Newcastle the use of the chapel at the bridge, St. John's, All Hallows, Trinity Chapel, St. Nicholas', the Spitall or St. Andrew's and the castle hall. Provision was made also to to keep seats free of the soldiers for the use of civilians.\textsuperscript{4} The last known act of the presbytery regarding services was an ordinance establishing morning sermons in place of morning prayers on Tuesdays and Thursdays.\textsuperscript{5} The loss of the remainder of such a valuable source (the army presbytery records) must be much lamented. For it would have revealed whether the religious observances of the army remained constant, declined or increased. Nevertheless the records for August to November 1640 imply that religious observances had a large impact on army life.

The evidence for worship in the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant is sparser than that for the previous two armies. The survival of Robert Douglas's diary is therefore especially fortunate. Douglas was with the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., f. 29v.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., ff. 29v, 32-2v.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., ff. 30v, 32.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., ff. 29v, 32, 33-7v.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., f. 33 (22 October 1640).
\end{itemize}
army from 28 January to 3 November 1644 (save for two weeks in September). Douglas's diary is almost entirely a list of texts of sermons with occasional notes on the sermons. Douglas chose his texts primarily from the Old Testament, particularly the Psalms and Isaiah. Only in one case, on 28 January, did Douglas use a New Testament text (Luke vii.4). The themes of the texts and their messages emphasised topics suitable for an army: repentance, the wickedness of Satan and his allies, God's vengeance, His victory and the necessity of trusting in Him. While the number of services led by Douglas is known, it is impossible to determine how often the other chaplains preached. Indeed that is a problem for nearly all of the armies. The only other mention of ordinary religious observance in the Solemn League and Covenant army is found in account books, which suggest that communion was celebrated in Newcastle in April and July of 1645.

In 1646, 1647, 1649 and again in 1650 when the armies were quartered upon the villages and burghs of Scotland the soldiers were instructed to attend services weekly at the local parish church. Consequently, our knowledge of religious observances by soldiers in these periods is practically non-existent. However, we may assume that the soldiers did attend the services, because there are a few cases of soldiers prosecuted by the kirk sessions for non-attendance. However, positive evidence does exist in at least one instance. On 28 October 1649 Lieutenant Colonel

1 The Diary of Mr. Robert Douglas when with the Scottish army in England, ed. J. Maidment, in Memoirs of James Burns, Baillie of Glasgow (Edinburgh, 1832), pp. 51-79.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 51.

4 Army, i. 280, 282.

5 See below, p. 178, note 5.
Hackett's troops received communion in Dunfermline. The kirk session record states that 'the most part' of the officers and men in the troop were admitted to Holy Communion 'upon their pious and earnest desire', they being free of 'scandalous conversation' according to the testimony of the officers.\(^1\) In general, references to religious observances in this period are scarce. The Army of the Covenants, in July 1650, was recorded as being much addicted to praying, but even more so to the singing of Psalms.\(^2\)

In the aftermath of Dunbar, Perth presbytery approached the committee of war that order be given that 'soldiers commanded by their officers...' attend churches in parishes where they quartered on Sundays.\(^3\) It cannot be stressed too often that the absence of the records of the chaplains' activities has reduced our opportunities for learning about worship in the armies. The existing evidence strongly suggests that the armies of the Bishops' Wars, and to a lesser extent those of the Solemn League and Covenant, Scotland (1644-7) and the Covenants followed Leven's programme of religious worship.

There are, however, fuller sources for a discussion of religious practices not mentioned by Leven. The first of these is the fasts observed in the Covenanters' armies. In 1639 Leven's army is mentioned to have observed weekly fasts.\(^4\) The army of the Second Bishops' War observed at least one fast, on 9 August 1640.\(^5\) The Ulster army possessed a presbytery which quickly moved in to fill the ecclesiastical power vacuum in the

\(^1\) SRO, KSR Duffus, 1/1, f. 15.


\(^3\) SRO, PR Perth, iii. 1070.


\(^5\) See Appendix I, p.344.
province. One manifestation of the presbytery's manoeuvrings to seize control of Ulster's religious life was the appointment of fast days for the army and civilians. The presbytery appointed 27 November and 1 December 1642 as fast days; the reasons given included the low morale of the soldiers due to poor supplies, the continued power of the Irish rebels and the sins of the army, which should have been the instrument of deliverance.¹ In February 1643 the presbytery authorised a fast for the prosperity of the army and the country. Three months later the presbytery set a fast for the sins of the people and army, as well as for the success of the campaign. In January 1644 a fast was appointed for similar reasons. The presbytery also authorised a fast in the autumn of 1644.² It was not until June 1646 that the next fast is recorded. At that time the presbytery ordered a fast of humiliation for the sins which caused the defeat of Monro's army at Benburb.³ Fasts continued throughout the 1640s in the armies and seem to have been a hallmark of the Covenanter armies' religious practices.

The army of the Solemn League and Covenant observed six fasts in the first eleven months of its existence. The most celebrated fast of the army was its first one. On 15 March 1644 an assault on the fort at South Shields had failed. Four days later a fast was held throughout the army. The following day the Covenanters successfully stormed the place with the loss of 7–9 killed.⁴ An officer with the army writing to Scotland stated after the event:

¹Adair, Narrative, p. 99.
²Ibid., pp. 100-1, 122.
³J. Reid, History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, ed. W. Killen (Belfast, 1867), ii. 30.
⁴Extract of Letters Dated at Edinburgh the 14, 16, and 17 of April, 1644 (London, 1644), p. 10; The Taking of the Fort at South Shields (n.p., 1644), pp. 7-; 'A true relation of the proceedings of the Scottish army, from the 12th of March to the 25th', Sunderland Tracts of Other Times (reprint ed. Sunderland, 1842), p. 5.
gods hand in the progress of all is evidentlie
& in a particular maner observable, And since our
solemne humiliation we had heir upon Thursday 19
March business has suceeded far other wys nor formelie
& our enemie has not bein able in anie measure to byd
us, Lord make us thankful.1

Several weeks later on 7 April the army held another fast at Easington.2
During the siege of York the besiegers held fasts on 26 June.3 In 1645
the Commission of the General Assembly appointed a fast for the parishes
in Scotland and the armies at home and abroad.4 The third cause of the
fast centred upon the sins of the armies:

Whereas before their piety and devotion was
admired, and so they were more formidable to their
enemies, now little difference twixt ours and the
Malignant Armies, save in formalitie of worship.5

The Commission listed as the eighth cause of the fast the false confidence
placed in the armies and officers instead of God.6 In February 1646
Lieutenant General David Leslie proclaimed a fast for the army and the
parishes in the Scottish zones of occupation.7 This is the last fast known
to have been kept by the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant.

The home armies also kept fasts. From the earl of Lothian we learn that
the home army observed the fast 8 ordered by the Commission. On 26 and
27 July 1645 the Commission appointed a fast for the home army, parliament
and itself. On those two days the army listened to sermons. On Sunday

1NLS, Wodrow Analecta Quarto Volume 29, f. 60.
2Fort at South Shields, p. 11; Intelligence from the Scottish Army.
3Diary of Robert Douglas', pp. 58, 60.
4Ibid., p. 79.
5A True Relation of the Happy Successes of His Majesty's Forces in Scotls-
under... Montrose (Oxford, 1644), p. 16.
6Ibid., p. 17.
7Two Letters from Lieutenant-General David Leslie to the Right Honourable
8Ancram Correspondence, i. 177.
27 July Robert Blair preached to the earls of Crawford's and Lauderdale's foot regiments (both of which had been recalled from England). In his sermon, Blair rebuked them for their growing sinfulness since Marston Moor, where God had protected them. He prophesied that a lesser foe would defeat them, unless they repented. Within three weeks Crawford's regiment was destroyed at Kilsyth. The last recorded fast of an army before 1648 was followed by a happier result for the Covenanters. Before Leslie's victory over Montrose at Philiphaugh his men had observed a fast. Thus, it appears that the Covenanter forces observed fasts with some regularity until 1646. From that date on there is a gap in the evidence.

It is probably not the case that the soldiers did not observe any fasts from 1645 to 1648. From what is known of the religious situation in Ulster it would have been the case that the army observed the fasts appointed by a presbytery which was of a growing civilian character. In Scotland the soldiers quartered in parishes would have kept the fasts appointed there. However, the army presbyteries do not appear to have authorised fasts during these years, nor were there any authorised by other bodies for the army. A break in this pattern occurs during the short history of the Whigamore army. On Sunday 10 September 1650 a fast for the kingdom and the army was held by the army and Edinburgh. The presence of many ministers, especially from the radical southwest, suggests that much preaching accompanied the fast. Three days later at the Falkirk camp the Commission appointed a fast for the army. From that

---

3. Life of Blair, p. 205.
4. RCGA, ii. 56.
On 30 May 1651 parliament appointed a fast to be observed before the army marched. In late June the chaplains and some colonels arranged a fast for 3 July. The importance of fasts and their incidence declined from 1639 when in a single month four occurred, to 1646-51 when only six are recorded for as many years. Fasts played a role in building up an army's morale and reminding it that its primary trust lay with God (who was all powerful) rather than with unpaid, ill-fed, poorly clothed, lice-infested soldiers.

While the information concerning worship and fasts ends during the first campaigning season of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant, the material for a discussion of religious manifestations during military operations begins to appear then. On Sunday 24 March 1644 at Hilton the earl of Newcastle drew his army up against Leven's. The Covenanters' battlecry was 'The Lord of Hosts is with us'. Three weeks later, on 13 April, Leven halted his pursuit of Newcastle's fleeing army because that day was the Sabbath. Prior to the battle of Marston Moor both the Covenant and parliamentarian soldiers sang Psalms. They fought to the cry 'God with us'. During and after the battle, the chaplains rebuked the fleeing men and urged them to fight next time. As the surrender of York approached the day of the treaty seemed likely to fall on a Sunday. Consequently, the three commanding generals requested that the ministers

---

1 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, pt. ii. 574.
2 Perfect Diurnall (23-30/6 1651), lxxxi. 1119.
3 'Proceedings of the Scottish army', p. 7; C. Terry, 'The Scottish Campaign in Northumberland... 1644', Archaeologia Asiatica 2nd Ser., xxi (1899), 171.
4 SRQ, P.A. 11.2, f. 42v. The Committee with the Army also mentioned that the absence of the cavalry on a foraging expedition inhibited the pursuit, Scottish Commissioners, p. 20.
5 S. Ashe, A Continuation of True Intelligence From the English and Scottish Forces in the North ... from the 16th of June to ... the 10th of July 1644 (London, 1644), p. 5.
6 Life of Blair, p. 192; Dow, op. cit., p. 93.
tell them if that was permissible. The chaplains agreed that it was.\(^1\)

With that any mention of religion affecting the operations of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant ends. In 1644, at least, the army respected and was inspired by the religion for which it fought.

The piety of the home armies was just as apparent. In April 1644, during the campaign of the Teviotdale Covenanters against Montrose, the Covenanters prayed before forming up, upon hearing of the approach of the royalist forces. The next day after hearing that the enemy had fled, the forces prayed in their camp after nightfall.\(^2\) At Tippermuir (on 1 September, a Sunday), Montrose offered Lord Elcho, commander of the Covenanters, an armistice. However, Elcho rejected the offer, claiming 'they had made choice of the Lord's day for doing the Lord's work'.\(^3\)

The ministers with the army then went to work, preaching to the soldiers and reminding them of the Covenant. They spoke lustily, promising an easy and bloodless victory. Frederick Carmichael, minister of Markinch, Fife, said:

> If ever God spoke certain truth out of my mouth, in His name I promise you to-day a certain victory.\(^4\)

The army then formed up and took as its battlecry 'Jesus and no Quarter!'.\(^5\) The promises of the ministers proved false; the Covenanters' defeat was total.

Religious observances and the impact of the ministers on the home armies continued following the defeat of Tippermuir. At the battles of Auldearn, Kilsyth and Philiphaugh the Covenanter chaplains and their charges held religious observances prior to the battle. Before Auldearn

---

2. *Intelligence from the south borders of Scotland ... April 24, 1644* (London, 1644), pp. 5-6.
5. J. Hewison, *The Covenanters* (Glasgow, 1913), i. 410.
the chaplains exhorted their men to fight hard against the combined Irish-Highlander army. They also read many chapters of the Bible to them. The Fife levies in the Kilsyth campaign became filled with fear as they marched westwards. They mutinied twice, on the second occasion at the Stirling crossing of the Forth. Their commanders ordered the ministers to go to their parishioners hoping that they could force the levies by prayer, preaching and persuasion 'to go out to the help of the Lord against the mighty'. Using an appeal to religion, as well as a promise that the Western levies under the earls of Eglinton, Glencairn and Lanark would relieve the men of Fife, the ministers persuaded the levies to march to their destruction.

Leslie's forces, prior to the battle at Philiphaugh and following their fast, sang a Psalm at the Shaw Burn. The home armies of 1644-45 practised a variety of devotions before their battles.

Mentions of ministers influencing the operations, or armies preparing for battle, or campaigns with religious exercises are sparse in the last six years of our period. During the spring 1647 campaign David Leslie halted the army on 27 March, not planning to march again until Monday, 'the morrow being the Lord's day...'. Nothing is known of religion in the Engager army. However, it is true that anti-Engaging clergy tried to demoralise the Engager troops. John Semple, minister of Carsphairn appears to have been extremely zealous in that activity. To Engager officers marching through his own parish he prophesied the army's defeat due to its profanity.

---

1 W. Forbes-Leith, Memoirs of Scottish Catholics During the 17th and 18th centuries (London, 1909), i. 337.

2 Life of Blair, p. 175. R. Chambers, History of the rebellions in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1828), ii. 89.


4 Hewison, op. cit., i. 427.

5 J. Thurloe, A collection of papers, containing authentic memorials of the English affairs (London, 1742), i. 89.
Then Semple went to Dumfries where he made the following prophecy to several regiments assembled in the burgh.

Go ye up to Ramoth-Gilead and prosper; but if ye prosper in the way that ye are going, God never spake by me, for I have beheaded your duke like a sybow; if ye were once in England, his head shall as sure go off him as if I had it in my gown-lap; for God is not with you and he will break you in his wrath. And many of you shall never see your native land again; and those of you that escape however brave ye are now in your fine clothes, ye shall come home bare and naked, swarming with lice, for God shall smite you with one of the plagues of Egypt.¹

The record of religious observances (save those mentioned above) then breaks off until the spring of 1650.

The Carbisdale campaign illustrates what happened with a force of militant Covenanters. On the morning of 27 April 1650 the Council of War of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Strachan's force met at Tain. Several officers objected to marching that day for fear that they must fight on the next day - the Sabbath. However, news reached the Council that Montrose was moving south towards them. The Council determined to fight that day.²

Before setting out, the troops increased their fervour by singing psalms, reading scripture and being led in prayer by Gilbert Hall, the chaplain of Strachan's troop and a company of Lawers' foot. Their departure was delayed by Strachan delivering the only known exhortation by a Covenanting officer.

Gentleman, yonder are your enemies, and they are not only your enemies, they are the enemies of our Lord Jesus Christ; I have been dealing this last night with Almighty God, to know the event of this affair, and I have gotten it: as sure as God is in heaven, they are delivered into our hands and there shall not a man of us fall to the ground.³

Strachan's prophecy was fulfilled and Montrose's hopes of restoring his fortunes lay crushed.

²Chambers, op. cit., ii. 214; A true relation of the happy victory obtained ... upon April 27, 1650 ... (Edinburgh, 1650), p. 4.
³Ibid., p. 5; J. Nicoll, A Diary of Public Transactions (Bannatyne Club, liii, 1836), p. 9; Chambers, op. cit., ii. 225.
The degree of interference by ministers was never higher than at Dunbar. Throughout the campaign the ministers incited the men against the judgement of the commanders. Yet the clergy refused Leslie permission to fight on 1 September 1650, because it was a Sunday. Instead they allowed the parliamentary purging committee to continue its work. The following day, however, they persuaded Leslie to advance off Doon Hill, an exposed position overlooking Cromwell’s port of embarkation. The disaster which resulted from that manoeuvre as well as the officers’ negligence and soldiers’ ineptitude is well-known. The Scottish soldiers appear to have been susceptible to the arguments of the clergy. During their surprise attack on Musselburgh (5 August), the Scots charged to the cry of ‘Give no quarter, but kill all!’ On the eve and morning of Dunbar the ministers promised their charges victory as positively and directly as if the Lord had told them to do so. Indeed some ministers were preaching and praying at the very moment of attack. The battlecry at Dunbar, ‘The Covenant of Faith’, expresses the solidarity between the ministers and their army. That unity vanished following the debacle there.

After Dunbar the chaplains lost their influence over the soldiers. For instance, despite the efforts of seven ministers to persuade the governor of Edinburgh Castle, Colonel Walter Dundas, to resist Cromwell to the uttermost, he surrendered on 24 December after a three month siege. The battlecries used by the Scots in 1651 further confirm the hypothesis that they were dissociating themselves from the ideals of the earlier

4‘A True Relation of the routing the Scottish army, near Dunbar ...’, in Slingby and Hodgson Memoirs (Edinburgh, 1806), p. 276.
5RCOA, iii. 170.
years. At Inverkeithing Holborne's troops fought to the simple cry of 'Scotland'. At a skirmish on the Warrington road in August the Scottish cavalry charged shouting, 'O you Rogues, we will be with you before Cromwell gets up.' There was a move, between 1644 and 1651, away from accepting the guidance of chaplains and preparing for battles by singing psalms, praying and listening to exhortations.

The holding of thanksgivings by the Covenanter armies depended on their gaining victories: hence the absence of such services by the Ulster army, the Engager army and that of the Kingdom. Despite the victories over local royalists and the king's garrisons in 1639 there is no mention of thanksgiving ceremonies held by the army that year. The first notice of a service of praise for victory comes from the northeast. There on 5 June 1640 the earl Marischal and Colonel Sir Robert Munro heard a sermon and gave thanks for the surrender of Drum Castle. Leslie's army was particularly successful and consequently often praised God. Following the safe crossing of the Tweed the army halted to thank God in prayer. Following their victory at Newburn the army held a service of thanksgiving, whose contents are recorded. The sermon was based on the verse 'O give thanks unto the Lord, for His mercy endureth forever'. The chaplain ended the service with the following prayer:

Good Lord bless our King, and open his eyes, that he may see the truth of our covenant. Lord bless the Queen, open her eyes, that she may fly her idolatry. God bless the King's beams. Lord bless our General. Lord bless our army, and send us all well to our own homes.  

1 *A Great Victory God hath vouchsafed by the Lord General Cromwels forces against the Scots* (London, 1651), p. 4.  
4 Hewison, *op. cit.*, i. 349.  
5 *Cal. S.P. Dom. 1640-41*, p. 49.
The next day, a Sunday, the army heard a sermon before entering the undefended town of Newcastle. Following the occupation of Newcastle (later that day), Alexander Henderson and Andrew Cant preached sermons of thanksgiving at St. Nicholas and All Hallows respectively. Upon its disbandment on 25 August 1641 at Hirsel Law there were 'sermons of thanksgiving throughout the armie...'. Clearly the successes of the Second Bishops' War army encouraged it to praise God.

The same occurred in the army of the Solemn League and Covenant during the campaigning season of 1644. Following the fall of York, Robert Douglas, moderator of the army presbytery, gave thanks for the victory. Two days later Douglas and Simeon Ashe, chaplain to Manchester, led a thanksgiving service. After the storming of Newcastle, Douglas preached a thanksgiving sermon to a congregation that included the army's General Staff. There is no record of any further services of thanksgiving. However, it may be assumed that one occurred after the surrender of Carlisle in June 1645. From that date on the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant had no further victories to celebrate. After Carlisle the Covenanters won only three further victories in the field - Philiphaugh, Balvenie and Carbisdale. Only for the last do we have evidence that the Covenanters praised God. "In the verie field the victors gave thanks to God for their happie successe..." The absence of services of thanksgiving either indicates a gap in the evidence.

1 J. Fenwick, 'Christ Ruling in the Midst of His Enemies', ed. M. Richardson, Reprint of Rare Tracts (Newcastle, 1843), i. 52-3.
2 See Appendix I, p. 345.
3 S. Ashe, A Continuation of True Intelligence From the English and Scottish Forces in the North ... 10th July to ... 27th July, 1644 (London, 1644), p. 6.
4 "Diary of Robert Douglas", p. 78; W. Lithgow, A True Experimentall and Exact Relation upon that Famous and Renowned Siege of Newcastle (Edinburgh, 1645), p. 27.
or points to neglect by the Covenanters. Massacres perpetrated by the Covenanters forces is a topic for which evidence is plentiful. In certain cases the motivation for these atrocities arose from traditional feuds, in others the blame resided with blood-thirsty chaplains. It was almost exclusively the Irish who provided the victims for the butchery committed by the Covenanters. From 1642 to 1647 catholic Irish and presbyterian Scottish relations were written in blood. The slaughter committed by Alasdair MacColla's troops following Montrose's victories is notorious. Only once (Aberdeen in 1644) did their atrocities extend to civilians. The Covenanters, however, failed to discriminate between Irish soldiers and civilians.

There are several reasons for the slaughters committed by the Ulster army in Ireland. Following the practices of early modern Europe the Irish as rebels could expect death if they fell into the hands of loyal troops. The royal commission to Argyll authorising him to kill the rebels of Rathlin supports this theory.\(^1\) Revenge for the actual and alleged killings of protestants following the October 1641 rising was another cause.\(^2\) There were other reasons, both religious and cultural. Munro believed that a military reason - the destruction of the rebels' economic base - permitted indiscriminate killing of civilians.\(^3\) The Campbell regiments saw the war in Ireland as a continuation of the traditional feud with the MacDonalds. Yet could all these motives justify the extensive campaign of butchery undertaken by the Covenanter army? Apparently they were sufficient at the time.

\(^1\) G. Hill, *An Historical Account of the Macdonnells of Antrim* (Belfast, 1873), p. 73.


\(^3\) Stevenson, 'Covenanter', p. 104.
The chronicle of blood of the Covenanters in Ulster began soon after their arrival in April 1642. At the occupation of Rathlin Island by Argyll's regiment his troops made short work of the Irish inhabitants. During the first campaign (April to May 1642) Munro's troops perpetrated several atrocities. The campaign terminated with numerous atrocities at Newry, a town formerly held by the rebels. Lord Conway, marshall of Ireland, and Munro ordered sixty Irish soldiers, merchants and tradesmen and two priests to be shot and hanged on Newry bridge. This massacre inspired a group of Scottish soldiers to seize and start to kill 150 women. However, Major James Turner saw this and saved all but twelve. Furthermore, the soldiers were punished for their over-enthusiastic action.

Authorised and unauthorised killings of Irish civilians continued. In both spring campaigns of 1642 Munro ordered herdsmen (who protected cattle, the major resource of the rebels) to be killed. In late May Scottish soldiers, despite the objections of their officers, killed 30-40 Irish men and their wives and children. By the end of 1642 Munro's and the forces of the Laggan had butchered 2,000 Irish in county Monaghan. In 1643 following the Cessation, Munro's troops killed 40 Irish men and 500-700 women and children in the mountains outside Newry. Munro ordered the killing of harvesters of all ages and sexes and the

1Hill, op. cit., p. 73, n. 89.
5J. Curry, Historical and critical review of the Civil War in Ireland (Dublin, 1610), p. 625.
destruction of their homes and produce in hopes of destroying the economic base of the rebels.  

1 General Owen O'Neill, the commander of the Irish rebels, described Munro's behaviour as 'like a mad Bull in furye'.  

2 During the spring 1644 campaign the Scots took only one prisoner of war, 'being the only Mann, or Woman that they mett (left unkill'd) in their whole March, wch cruelty hath occasioned in Many a very great discontent'.  

3 The last atrocity occurred in June/July 1645 when the Scots slew all but four of an Irish garrison containing both men and women which had surrendered on promise of quarter.  

4 The record of the Ulster army may be explained by a multitude of factors but incitement by the clergy does not appear to have been one of them.  

The killing of Irish soldiers and women in Scotland took place from 1644 to 1647, during the period of Irish activity within that country.  

The status of the Irish as rebels and as enemies of the Campbells motivated James Campbell of Ardkinglas, who proudly wrote, 'I took them [the Irish on Islay and Jura in May 1644] and causit cut off[f] above ane hundredth and ffyifteine of them and took some prisoners'.  

5 The victories of Montrose prevented the Covenanters from repeating such activities for many months. In July 1645, however, the Covenantter cavalry murdered a party of Irish and Highland women taken in Methven Wood.  

These actions only foreshadowed the greater atrocities following Philiphaugh and the 1647

---

1 Stevenson, 'Covenanters', pp. 130a-b.  
2 Bod. Lib., Carte MS. 6, f. 569.  
3 Bod. Lib., Carte MS., 11, f. 512.  
4 R. Bellings, History of the Confederation and War in Ireland, ed. J. Gilbert (Dublin, 1866), iv. 354.  
6 Ibid., p. 200.
campaigns in the Isles and the northeast.

The Covenanters believed the Irish troops of Montrose to be murderous savages, 'uncircumcised Philistines', and inbred with an aggressive Roman Catholicism. Their defeats at the hands of such soldiers had not only destroyed their military reputation, but had also lain the foundation for a policy of revenge.¹ When defeat appeared inevitable the Irish at Philiphaugh surrendered to the Covenanters on promise of quarter. However, in sermons following the battle Covenanting ministers proclaimed that sparing the Irish would be impious. Furthermore several nobles present agreed with them. Leslie relented and authorised the slaughter of the Irish much to his personal discredit.² He subsequently claimed to Leven that the massacred Irish were killed in flight. Leslie estimated that his men shot 200 Irish at the post in Newark Castle courtyard (near the field of Philiphaugh).³ Two royalist sources state that 250 died at Newark and fifty were killed later. Not mentioned by Leslie but by both the royalist sources is the killing of women, boys and camp followers without regard to age or sex. Their number is unknown, though one royalist suggested a figure of 300 for the women alone.⁴

In 1646 the slaughters continued. In March 1646 Middleton accepted the capitulation of a castle in Kincardine. He had twelve of the royalist prisoners executed.⁵ Following the surrender of Fyvie Castle to him in mid-April he had all the Irish and deserters in the garrison executed.⁶

²Guthry, Memoirs, p. 203.
⁴Gordon, Distemper, p. 160; Wishart, Memoirs of Montrose, pp. 144-5.
⁵Guthry, Memoirs, p. 215.
⁶Gordon and Gordon, op. cit., p. 531.
To the west in Cowal the Campbells, embittered by the destruction wrought on their land and themselves, began to wreak their vengeance. In mid-May a Campbell force under Ardkinglas attacked the Lamonts, formerly their friends but currently allies of Alasdair MacColla. After the surrender of Ascog and Toward Castles on terms of quarter, the Lamonts taken prisoner were herded to Dunoon before a kangaroo court trial which condemned them to death. The Campbells brutally killed over a hundred Lamonts, and hanged thirty-six clan leaders.¹

The massacres committed by the Covenanter army ended with one final explosion of revenge against the Irish for invading Scotland in 1647. The most controversial massacre perpetrated by the Covenanter's occurred at Dunaverty Castle in the Mull of Kintyre. The garrison included not only Irishmen, but also Highlanders from Kintyre, Lorne and central Argyll. The castle surrendered on the terms of unconditional surrender, which allowed Leslie to do as he liked with the men. Initially, he desired to spare them and Turner urged him to follow that course. Argyll has been accused of persuading Leslie to massacre his enemies, but some question exists regarding his guilt. The guilt of John Nevay, a chaplain with the force, and Thomas Henderson, Leslie's secretary, is unquestionable. Nevay demanded the butchery, reminding Leslie of the example of Saul and the Amalekites. Once again Leslie bowed to the pressure, although he may have quickly regretted it. Two hundred and sixty Irish and Highlanders were massacred; an additional eighty to a hundred were reserved for Sir Robert Moray's regiment in French service.² The cold-blooded killing of the enemies of the Covenants ended with Leslie's campaign.³

¹Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp. 226-7.
²Diplomatic Correspondence, ii. 169; Guthry, Memoirs, p. 243; Turner, Memoirs, pp. 46-7; Stevenson, 'Massacre', pp. 33-4; Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, pp. 226-7.
³See W. Fraser, The Melvilles Earls of Melville and the Leslies Earls of Lorne (Edinburgh, 1890), ii. 96-7. Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla, p. 240, for other atrocities during the campaign.
The atrocities committed by the Covenanting forces differ significantly from those which occurred on the continent during the Thirty Years War. The latter were generally the result of hot-blooded frenzy and were indiscriminate in nature. That is not to say that they were excusable. The Scottish massacres are more horrifying in that they were meditated upon (and in fact premeditated following acts of the parliaments of Scotland and England).¹ Not all of the deaths can be laid at the door of the Lowland Covenanters, however. A significant number were committed or inspired by the Campbells. If the Irish and Highland troops of Montrose showed no mercy to their defeated enemies, the Covenanters with their butchery of civilians or prisoners of war were no better. While ministers did take part in inciting the massacres, the desire for vengeance accounts for a part of the motivation. The horror stories following the 1641 rising in Ulster and the lack of quarter given by the soldiers of Montrose played a large rôle in determining the reaction of the Covenanting soldiers to their victims. In the case of the atrocities associated with the Campbells that is even more the case. The mass murders committed by the Covenanters should be seen from two angles — that of religiously inspired retribution and that of revenge for the destruction and killing inflicted on their own society.

Destruction of property, both civil and ecclesiastical, was also often connected with either the chaplains or religious motivation. In the Aberdeen campaign of March 1639 some fiery ministers urged Montrose to plunder and burn down the burgh in revenge for its royalist sympathies.² Fortunately for the burgh, Montrose refused to follow the ministers' advice. Later that year, following the capture of Aberdeen after the

¹Stevenson, 'Covenancers', p. 171.

²J. Wilson, 'The History of Scottish Affairs', Trans. Literary and Antiquarian Soc. of Perth, i. (1827), 16.
battle of the Brig of Dee, Montrose had decided to sack the burgh. However, Providence intervened in the shape of a ship arriving with news of the pacification.¹ An example of iconoclasm occurred in Aberdeen in June 1640; a portrait 'smelling somequhat of poperie...' was removed.² Another mention of destruction carried out for religious reasons comes from the northeast of England in 1640. Then it was noted that the Scottish soldiers zealously purified the churches.³ Two years later in Ulster the army chaplains roused the army and Scottish colonists against the peaceable Roman Catholic Irish of Lower Ards in order to gain an opportunity to fight and plunder them. The Irish were disarmed, thus defusing the clerically inspired anger of the Scots.⁴ The greatest damage occurred following the surrender of Carlisle in 1645. Lieutenant General Leslie had promised not to deface the cathedral buildings. However, the Scots violated the treaty by pulling down the west end of the cathedral, the cloisters, the chapter house, a portion of the deanery and the prebendal houses of the cathedral in order to fortify the town.⁵ Although this action can be ascribed to hatred of the trappings of episcopacy, an equally likely answer is that the Scots traditionally used the stones from ecclesiastical fabric for building in Scotland, a practice which developed out of laziness, not malice. Compared with the massacres the acts of destruction carried out by the Covenanting armies represent no fixed policy.

¹Baillie, i. 222.
²SRO, KSR Aberdeen, iv. f. 126.
³Fenwick, op. cit., pp. 38, 53. The Scottish soldiers seem to have enjoyed such practices, SRO, KSR Monifieth, ii. f. 122v; Forbes-Leith, op. cit., i. 15.
Destruction caused by groups of soldiers is another matter, which will be discussed later.¹

Throughout the period the Covenanters used soldiers to curtail the activities of Roman Catholics, particularly priests. From 1639-42 the Covenanters sent their troops into homes of Catholics who had refused to attend church or levy troops for the armies. These contingents not only quartered on the recusant, but often stole his cattle and furniture, as well as seizing the housing of the consecrated wafers. Naturally, the troops searched for priests on such occasions. However, all managed to escape.² Harrying of Catholics persisted after 1642, especially intensifying during 1644. Argyll in particular despoiled Roman Catholic landowners. His clansmen and the other Covenanters singled out recusants among the royalists for plundering. On one occasion a party of Covenanters found and wounded a priest who was ill. However, they appear not to have captured any Catholic clerics by the end of 1646.³ The only success the Covenanter troops seem to have had in capturing a priest occurred after 1646. A party of David Leslie's troops seized Father Andrew Leslie, S.J. Father Leslie not only had the indignity of arrest and future imprisonment to contemplate following his capture, he also had to listen to Leslie exclaim against Roman Catholicism.⁴ There is no doubt of the intensity with which the Covenanters conducted their campaign against Catholics.

The benevolent aspects of the Covenanting armies are hard to find. The ideal of charity existed in the office of deacon as explained in the Articles of War. The first mention of concern for sick soldiers appears

¹See chapter six for accounts of destruction.
²Forbes-Leith, op. cit., i. 209-10, 212.
³Ibid., i. 239-41, 269, 272-4, 293-4, 334, 337.
⁴Ibid., ii. 7, 10. 15.
in the army presbytery records of 1640. On 10 September the presbytery appointed Alexander Henderson to ask General Alexander Leslie to ensure better care of the sick in each company. The presbytery also ordered the chaplains to visit the sick of their regiments. A week later the presbytery recommended the care of the sick to the ministers and officers. In the following week the presbytery chose William Bennet and Mungo Law to speak with the Committee of Estates concerning the procuring of warmer clothes for the ill soldiers, now suffering from the cold.¹ The next mention of charitable concern by the army occurs in the account books of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant. There the burial charges of several soldiers are mentioned as being paid for out of the army budget.² The same army collected an offering for the burgh of Kelso, which had burned down in 1644.³ Finally, in 1650 David Leslie ordered that each soldier and officer contribute part of their pay for a benevolent fund for impoverished officers and men.⁴ These references are all that is known of the charitable care provided by the soldiers for themselves or others.

The final section of this chapter concerns the occasions when Covenanter soldiers attributed certain incidents to God's providence or when they acknowledged the interference of the divine within their activities. The history of such attributions runs thinly but continually through the period. In 1639 the slumping of a hill bank exposed many round rocks, which some of the more credulous Covenanters ascribed as a special sign of God's favour, 'for at this tyme all things wer interpeted for the advantage of the Covenantate'.⁵ More serious was Leslie's haranguing the Commissioners in

¹NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 31, ff. 28, 29, 33.
²For example, Army, pp. 434, 476.
³SRO, KSR Old Kelso, 23.11.1645.
⁴SRO, GD. 52/108.
⁵Gordon, Affairs, ii. 253-4. R. Chambers, Domestic Annals of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1861), ii. 127.
that year that God had given them the power to resist the English. He claimed their failure to use the power would result in God's condemnation. The services of thanksgiving by Leslie's army in the Second Bishops' War prove that that army believed that God worked on their side.

The later history of the armies shows much the same faith. The successful crossing of the Tyne on 28 February 1644 was attributed to God's work, because after the Scottish advance the melting snow rendered the river uncrossable for eight days. In March of that year the absence of casualties from a royalist cannonade at Hilton arose from divine protection, according to a source with the army. The Commissioners with the Army gave the praise to God for the victory at Newcastle in October 1644.

It rest now we should give all glory and praise unto God for his great blessing in putting an end to this siege...

The supply problems of the campaign of 1645 were met by appeals to God. One Scot wrote that although men might fail to maintain the army in pursuit of God's cause '... we are confident he will ever enable us to do what hee requars at our hands...'. Later in the campaign, at the siege of Hereford, a Covenanter recorded that when supplies of money and ammunition arrived we are hopeful by God's assistance to give a good account thereof, notwithstanding our soldiers met with all discouragements that can be imagined to be in an Army.

---

1 Baillie, ii. 443.
2 "The Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army, certifying their passing over Tyne", ed. R. Richardson, Reprints of Rare Tracts, ii. 10.
3 'Scottish army ... 12th to 25th March', p. 7.
4 SRO, P.A. 11. 2, f. 93v (to Committee of Both Kingdoms).
5 Deane, A true relation of the proceedings of the Scotch army ... until 10 July 1645 (London, 1645), p. 5.
The victory at Philiphaugh elicited a profusion of praise for God's favour. The official dispatch contained the following eulogy:

God be praised, we have lost no Noblemen, or chief Officer. (We tell you this) so you may joyn with them and us in giving God the praise, who hath wrought all this and all our works for us.1

The examples of the Bishops' Wars and the actions of the war in England and Scotland in the mid-1640s occurred at times when the Covenanters had faith in their own success.

However, the Covenanters acknowledged that God's hand was present in their defeats as well. The best example of this is the defeat of the Ulster army and its British allies by the Irish at Benburb. Major General Robert Munro, commander of the army, stated

The Lord of Hosts had a controversie with us to rub shame on our faces, as on other armies, till once we shall be humbled, for a greeter confidence did I never see in any army then was amongst us, and we be-hooved to taste of bitterness as well as others of both nations; but praised be God, being now humbled before God, we increase in courage and resolution...2

This reliance on the hand of God fits well with the Calvinist tradition based on the Lord which intervenes in human history as portrayed in the Old Testament.

The final years of the Covenanter armies were not without reference to reliance on Providence. The commanders of the Covenanters at Balvenie described their petitioning of God to the Commission of the General Assembly.

We in oure weak maner beged the Lords direction, that Hiss blissing might wait His owne and our labours...

The result was a substantial victory, which the officers subscribed entirely to God.3 Following Dunbar David Leslie attributed the defeat to the hand

---

1Lords Argyle, Craufurd-Lindsay... Despatch on Philiphaugh (London, 1645), s.s.

2Contemporary History of Ireland, i, pt. ii. 678-9.

3RCGA, ii. 263.
of God, as Munro had done. Leslie claimed that victory was his for the asking and that God alone prevented it. The earl of Loudoun also believed that God's wrath led to the Scottish defeat. Finally, the commander of Dunnottar Castle, George Ogilvy of Barras, answered the English demands for surrender by saying that he trusted in the providence of God. The English replied that they owed their success to God's support. But Ogilvy claimed that God's anger against the Scots, not His favour to the English had caused the latter's success. The Covenanters' insistence that God favoured them enough to grant them victories, the resolution to fight on or humbly accept defeat pervaded the ranks of the movement. That the military men themselves spoke in such terms indicates their acceptance of the theory that God acted through history on the level of national concerns. Such an attitude was to be confirmed to the radical Covenanters by the middle of the 1660s.

---

1 Ancram Correspondence, ii. 298-9.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOLDIER AS SINNER

A study of the behaviour of the Covenanting soldier has never been attempted previously. The following chapter - The Rapacious Warrior - surveys the Covenanting soldier's relations with civilians in Scotland, England and Ireland, chiefly the extortion and seizure of supplies and money, the destruction of property and the breakdown of discipline.

Before examining the sins of the soldiers a few words about the available sources are necessary. The greatest part of this chapter rests upon the surviving presbytery and kirk session records in Scotland. Unfortunately, only slightly more than one out of ten kirk session records survive. This prevents the drawing of definitive conclusions about the absolute decline of morality in the armies. Critics could always suggest that the absence of data hides sins which occurred. That we lack the material for a conclusive statement on the various armies' behaviour is doubtless the case. However, the records by their random survival grant us an over-view. Where fewer records of the kirk sessions have survived - the southwest, Argyll, Ross, Sutherland, Caithness, Orkney and Shetland - few armies of the Covenanters appeared. In the eastern half of Scotland, where much campaigning and quartering occurred, the records have survived in greater numbers. Furthermore, the eastern half of the country possessed three-fifths of the parishes.\(^1\)

Something must be said of the specific armies to clarify the situation. The short length of the First Bishops' War probably led the church courts to list the men who served as soldiers under their civilian occupations. The largest portion of the Second Bishops' War army served for the most part in England, but its presbytery record exists for three months. The

\(^1\)W. Makey, 'Ministers', passim; Scott, Fasti, i-vii, passim.
record does not give the impression of an army teeming with sinful men. Indeed, the picture painted by the investigators of sin is one of a relatively moral society. The Ulster Army presbytery records are missing and only one kirk session record from the province survives. Nevertheless the majority of complaints concern the burdensomeness of the army on the civilian population. The Solemn League and Covenant army presents the same problem as that of the Second Bishops’ War forces in England but unlike the earlier army it left no presbytery records. However, the English assailed the army for theft, oppressive quartering, extortion of money and imposing cess on the countryside to the point of poverty. The outrage at Scottish crimes other than these appeared less often. From the evacuation of England in 1647 the records in Scotland are sufficient for our purposes.

Some may object that the regimental kirk sessions and the army presbyteries, whose records are entirely missing after November 1640, contained statistics of offences now lost to us. This objection is facile. First, the Scottish women involved in sexual crimes with soldiers (and these are the majority of recorded sins) were subject to the discipline of the ordinary church courts. Soldiers might not appear before the courts with their partners but they are mentioned in the trials. Furthermore it became the practice of the Commission of the General Assembly and other bodies to grant the power of disciplining sinning soldiers to the Scottish Church courts in the area where the soldiers were quartered. Finally, the church courts made specific enquiries into the behaviour of soldiers in August 1648, in January and February 1650, and in February and

1 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 31, ff. 27-v, 28-9v, 32-4v.
2 Mentions of this practice occur for 1646 in Dow, op. cit., p. 111; for 1647 in RCA, i. 177; for 1648 in The Records of Lothian and Tweeddale, p. 243; and for 1571 in SRO, SR Fife, ii. f. 124v.
3 Baillie, iii. 58.
4 SRO, P.A. 16.1 (1650); PR Dumbarton, 29.11.1650, 12.2.1651; PR Fordyce, 6.2.1650; PR Jedburgh, 16.11.1650; PR Peebles, 7.3.1650; PR Perth, iii. 95.
March 1651. Therefore, the circumstances in Scotland are unique, in that we may tabulate the sins of individual soldiers. While it would be ideal if all the relevant records had survived, those that do remain at least indicate a pattern of behaviour, which is more than historians of other contemporary armies possess.

Sexual misconduct of various degrees constitutes the largest part of the full range of sinful behaviour which brought soldiers before the Church courts or at least to their notice. Fornication not resulting in pregnancy was the most prevalent sin; rape was reported comparatively rarely. While it was impossible for the kirk sessions to uncover every sin, the elders were assiduous in their tasks, particularly as regards sexual sins. There are two reasons which explain their excessive concern with this matter. First, the clergy and the elders subscribed to the ethics of Moses and St. Paul, which strictly condemned extra-marital copulation. Secondly, the parishes wished to discourage illegitimate births which would burden the parish with additional cases requiring charity. Therefore even the preliminaries of an illicit sexual union were regarded as sins and matter for the judgement of the sessions.

The number of cases of scandalous speaking and carriage are few in comparison with those of fornication.

Table 5.1: Scandalous Speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>h</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>FP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAIi</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAIi</td>
<td>1+??</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACi</td>
<td>2+??</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKi</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3+7?</td>
<td>4?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1SRO, SR Fife, ii. ff. 121v-122v; PR Deer, ii. ff. 69, 76; PR Dunfermline, i. f. 155; KSR Ceres, i. f. 38; NRS, KSR Anstruther Easter, 11.3.1651; KSR Largo, 2.3.1651; KSR Pittenweem, 4.3.1651; Kirkcaldie, p. 369; Cupar, p. 163; St. Andrews, pp. 61-2.

2See combined footnote for tables 5.1 and 5.2, p. 165. Abbreviations for all tables in chapter 5 are given on p. 195.
In general only the women suffered for indulging in either (see tables 5.1 and 5.2) but less than half of them underwent public penance. The ambiguity of the records makes it difficult to determine the number of men involved in either sin. For instance, in April 1644 the kirk session of Holy Rude, Stirling cited 'Highland Mary' and Margaret Miller for scandalous conversation with an unspecified number of soldiers. Two soldiers sat on the stool of repentance for either sin. While the units of most soldiers are unknown, it does appear that the majority belonged to horse regiments. As this study continues it will become clear that the better paid cavalrymen committed more sins than the foot soldiers.

---

1Scandalous speeches: SRO, KSR Haddington, i. f. 159v, 166; KSR Queensferry, i. f. 52; KSR Slains, i. 219–20; KSR Stirling, Holy Rude, 15, 22, 29.4.1644; NHR, KSR Anstruther Easter, 26.6, 28.8.1650, 6.5.1651. Scandalous behaviour: N.R.H., KSR Anstruther Easter, 31.3, 16.4, 7.5.1650; KSR Dyke, 31.11.1651; KSR Largo, 26.10.1650; NLS, Lee Papers 3481 (KSR Largo), 13.10.1650; Lee Papers 3494 (KSR Midcalder), 6.7.1650; SRO, PR Biggar, i. f. 327; PR Peebles, 18.4, 2.5, 4–7.1650; KSR Colmonell, i. f. 126; KSR Culross, ii. ff. 57v–68; KSR Edinburgh, Canongate, iv. 37–40; KSR Edinburgh, St. Cuthbert's, v. ff. 323v–4v; KSR Humbie, i. f. 47v; KSR Inverurie, 14, 16, 27.4, 11.5, 1, 15.6, 3, 24.8. 1651; KSR Livingston, ii. f. 10v; KSR Old Kelso, 24.11.1645; KSR Stirling, Holy Rude, 6.3.1649; Kirkcaldie, pp. 321–2, 326; Extracts from the Kirk Session Records of Dunfermline, ed. E. Henderson, (Edinburgh, 1865), pp. 31, 35–7.

2SRO, KSR Stirling, Holy Rude, Stirling, 15.4.1644.
The sin of fornication not resulting in a pregnancy accounts for the majority of sins committed by soldiers in the church court records. Between 1639 and 1651 the records reveal over 150 such cases.

Table 5.3: Fornication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>h</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Me</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>FF</th>
<th>Fr</th>
<th>Fd</th>
<th>fa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBWAI III</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBWAI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBWAI III</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAIII</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLOI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLCII</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLCIII</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI II</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMII</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMIII</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI III</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACII</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACIII</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKII</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKIII</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 See Table 5.3 Fornication: SRO, PR Cupar, 20.5.1647, 17.4.1651; PR Dumbarton, 6.3.1649; PR Haddington, v. 64, 99; PR Jedburgh, 19.9, 3.10.1649, 31.7.1650; PR Perth, ii. 897, 987; PR Strathbogie, ii. f. 227; KSR Aberlady, 17, 25.3, 25.7, 12, 26.9, 3.10.1641; KSR Alves, i. 30; KSR Ayr, ii. ff. 410v-1, 422v, 497v, 3/1ff. 18v, 128, 135v; KSR Bathgate, ii. ff. 51v-53; KSR Burntisland, i. ff. 56v, 159, 187, 192, 195v; KSR Ceres, i. ff. 17v-8; KSR Carluke, i. ff. 4v-5; KSR Colmonell, i. 153, 158-60, 152-1; KSR Culross, ii. ff. 20, 75-7, 80v-1v, KSR Dalkeith, i. ff. 2v, 3v, 10; KSR Duffus, 1/2. 37-8, 41-2, 55-6, 72; KSR Dunfermline, i. ff. 47v, 51v-3, 55v-7, 72v, 113v, 116v, 120v, 127v; KSR Dysart, ii. 82, 112; KSR Edinburgh, Canongate, iii. ff. 265, 268v-9, 270, iv. ff. 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 56; KSR Edinburgh, St. Cuthbert’s, v. ff. 401v-2v; KSR Edinkillie, i. 19, 23, 65, 68-9; KSR Elgin, vi. ff. 101v, 167v-171v; vii. ff. 64v, 86, 88, 94, 97v-8; KSR Elton, ii. ff. 17, 13v-20v; KSR Falkirk, 14.6.1647, 20.2.1649; KSR Fintry, 15.12.1644; KSR Forgue, i. ff. 10v-1v, 12v; KSR Haddington, i. ff. 76, 102, 119v, 121, 125v, 144v, 173-4v, 190v; KSR Kilconquhar, i. 21; KSR Kinghorn, 6.2.1641; KSR Kinnaird, i. ff. 104, 110, 113, 113; KSR Liberton, i. ff. 39v-10; KSR Longside, ii. ff. 65-7v, 69-71v, 72v-4v, 7v-7v; KSR Livingston, 22.12.1644, 2.1, 2.1, 2.9, 16.2, 6.1, 3.12.1645, 2.1, 31.1.1646, 7, 21.2.1647; KSR Montrose, i. 49-50, (footnote continued on next page)
The majority of those involved, both male and female, escaped the stool of repentance. Only in one instance was a soldier found to be falsely accused. In eleven cases the women denied the charge by a public oath. Even without those cases the number of cases remains over a hundred and fifty. Repentance was not demanded of either men or women convicted of this offence in anything approaching the total number of cases. Women were, however, more likely to undergo repentance than men. Three soldiers were released from penance due to military service. In several cases soldiers did penance in their regiments, which illustrates that the armies' ecclesiastical courts functioned. The sin of fornication was the most often referred to the regimental session for the correction of the soldier. The discrepancy between the number of cavalymen charged as fornicators compared with those in foot regiments appears again. Yet no regiment can be described as a notorious haven of fornicators.

The cases themselves make dreary reading. One example will suffice to show the procedure. On 1 July 1646 Isobell Lade appeared before the kirk session of Longside (presbytery of Deer). She confessed fornication with John Cochrane, a trooper in the earl of Dalhousie's horse. The session

Continuation of footnote
from previous page:

55-9, 141; KSR Newton, i. ff. 14v-5; KSR Newtyle, i. 36; KSR Old Kelso, 6, 13.10.1644, 14.3, 14.4, 26.5, 2.6.1650; KSR Pencaitland, i. 14, 15; KSR Petty, 24.8.1645, 30.6, 21.7, 28.8.1650; KSR Scoonie, i. 166-70, 177, 182; KSR Slains, i. 136, 162; KSR Stirling, Holy Rude, 9.6.1645, 15.12.1646, 12, 19.10.1647, 6.6.1648; KSR Tyningham, ii. 2; KSR Yester, ii. f. 29v; NRH, KSR Alyth, 3.11.1645, 30.8.1646, 13.5.1649; KSR Anstruther Easter, 11.3.1651; KSR Blairgowrie, ii. 46, 47, 51; KSR Dyke, 20.4, 7.9.1649; KSR Echt, ii. 14v, 16v; KSR Kirkden, i. 10; KSR Largo, 29.3, 22, 27.9.1646; St. Andrews Lib.; PR St. Andrews, (1641-1656), pp. 105, 174, 237; Kirk Session Records of Dunfermline, pp. 26-7; Kingarth parish records, ed. H. Paton (Edinburgh, 1937), p. 10; Kirkcaldie, p. 269; Bens's 'Dunfermline', pp. 126, 279.

1 SRO, KSR Aberlady, 17, 25.3, 25.7, 12, 26.9, 3.10.1641; KSR Culross ii. f. 67v; KSR Dunfermline, i. ff. 47v, 51v-3, 120v; KSR Haddington, i. ff. 78, 173-4v; KSR Pencaitland, i. 15; KSR Petty, 24.8.1645.

2 Evidence of only one case of fornication was found in Munro's regiment. It was a first offence, SRO, KSR Kilconquhar, i. 21.
ordered her to begin her repentance on the next Sunday. However, Lade delayed her repentance until 15 July. On 2 August the session record states that she had satisfied the church by finishing her repentance.\(^1\) Trooper Cochrane probably escaped the ritual of repentance because his unit had left the area.

The surviving church records themselves state that not all of the cases of fornication came to trial. In the parish of Rhynie for example in 1645 two session meetings mentioned that local women had committed fornication with soldiers and troopers quartered in the area. However none of the cases ever came to trial.\(^2\) Another problem in gaining complete information concerning the soldiers is the women's ignorance. The presbytery of St. Andrews in late 1647 stated that many women fell in fornication with soldiers they could not name.\(^3\) That shielded the soldiers from prosecution by the church courts and also deprives us of the chance of learning their regiment. At present the names of less than a fifth of the fornicating soldiers' regiments are known. It is unlikely that further research will reveal a significantly larger number.

The more serious offence of fathering a bastard by a soldier accounts for the second highest number of sins committed by soldiers.

\(^1\)SRO, KSR Longside, ii. ff. 70v-1.

\(^2\)NLS, Lee Papers 3478 (KSR Rhynie), 4.5, 28.9.1645.

\(^3\)St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, p. 118.
Table 5.4: Fathering of Bastards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>h</th>
<th>f</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>Ff</th>
<th>fa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBWAI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBWAI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLCII</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMIAI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACII</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKII</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soldiers were charged with fathering bastards in fifty-three known cases. Six of these instances were false accusations by the mother, who was attempting to protect the real father. Most of the soldiers escaped the penalties of the church courts. The majority of the mothers also evaded public repentance. There was no involvement by the regimental sessions.

---

1See Table 5.4. NRH, KSR Alyth, 18.8, 6.10.1650; KSR Torryburn, 16.10.1651; NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 31, f. 29; SRO, PR Cupar, 8.3.1648; PR Dunblane, 21.2, 6.6.1649, 28.2.1651; PR Haddington, 7.4.1644; PR Jedburgh, 11.4.1649, 13.3.1650; PR Perth, iii. 9, 55-6; KSR Auchtermuchty, i. ff. 4, 8v; KSR Ayr, i. ff. 137v-8, 146, 150; KSR Geres, i. ff. 34v-5; KSR Culross, ii ff. 13, 16v, 66v; KSR Dunfermline, i. ff. 18-9v, 51; KSR Dalkeith, i. ff. 17v-8; KSR Dysart, ii. ff. 116v, 119; KSR Edinburgh, Canongate, iii. ff. 218, 267v, 268v, 289, 342, iv. ff. 35, 44; KSR Edinburgh, St. Cuthbert, v. ff. 328, 330, 352-3, 364, 385, 386v; KSR Elgin, vi. ff. 16v-7, 40v-1, 42v-3, 44; KSR Haddington, i. 100; KSR Kiloconquhar, i. ff. 84-6v; KSR Markinch, 30.4, 5.5.1644, 5, 19.1.1645; KSR North Leith, 3.4, 22.5, 13.11.1640, 5.2, 30.4, 28.5, 9.7, 7.9.1641; KSR Stirling, Holy Rude, 19.5.1645; KSR Slains, i. 166; KSR Scoonie, i. 72, 108, 122, 126, 130, 132, 139; KSR Gask, Trinity, i. 20v, 28v-9; KSR Wemyss, i. 15, 29.6, 6.7, 26.10.1651; SRA, PR Glasgow, ii. 304, 319; Lothian and Tweeddale, p. 243; Kirkcaldie, p. 374.
and ministers in disciplining the men. The trials for copulation leading to pregnancy resembled those for fornication. The predominance of cavalrymen as sinners is again evident, for they account for two-thirds of the 'known' cases. Siring an illegitimate child was more likely to bring a soldier to the attention of the church courts, because visible evidence existed. Therefore, the surviving records probably contain the total number of cases occurring in those parishes. Considering the hundreds of troops quartered or merely marched through these parishes the forty-seven children fathered by military men is a small number to be reported.

Despite the preponderance of sexual offences in the records, cases of cohabitation are remarkably few. The surviving records mention only seven instances of soldiers illegally living with women between December 1639 and July 1651. Only in one instance was an officer (a Captain Johnstone, who lived on Castlehill, Edinburgh) involved. Intriguingly cohabitation is the only sin in which the number of infantrymen outnumber the horsemen; they do so by five to two.¹

Although the armies after 1645 spent a great deal of time in quarters, few soldiers took the opportunity to settle down with mistresses. There are good reasons why the soldiers failed to avail themselves of the chance for more regular sexual satisfaction. The primary one is economic, for the pay of a soldier in the Covenanting forces was extremely irregular. It was one thing to have a carnal liaison with a serving girl or a tradesman's daughter, it would have been something rather more difficult to provide food and lodging for two on a soldier's income. The second problem was that the church courts could hardly overlook a couple living in sin. Finally,

¹ SRO, KSR Edinburgh, St. Cuthbert, v. f. 289v; KSR Elgin, vi. 98; KSR Haddington, i. 136; KSR Old Kelso, 16.9, 7.10.1649; KSR Shotts, i. f. 33v; KSR Scoonie, i. 161, 169; Lothian and Tweeddale, p. 237.
there were more opportunities for soldiers to indulge in transient sexual relations.

Adulterous unions were more common than cohabitation, but represented a meagre portion of the sexual sins. Between 1640 and 1651 nineteen soldiers were linked with the sin of adultery. In one case the woman delated by the session, Janet Robeson, a servant in Corstorphine, fabricated the name of an officer to protect her real lover.¹ Half of the cases occurred in the period between 1644 and 1647. Preceding and following those years no army possessed more than two men charged with adultery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.5: Adultery²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEWAI11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLCII1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI1I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI1II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI11I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACII1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKII1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adultery, unlike other sexual sins, was a crime for the presbyteries to

¹SRO, KSR Corstorphine, 22.3, 29.3, 5.4.1646.

²See Table 5.5. SRO, PR Biggar, i. 246-7; PR Dumbarton, 20.6.1651; PR Elgin, i. 82; PR Jedburgh, 3.8.1642, 4.3.1644, 5.7.1648; PR Linlithgow, 29.9.1649, 13.2.1650; PR Perth, iii. 115, 117-8, 120, 128; KSR Burntisland, i. ff. 48-9; KSR Corstorphine, 22.3.1646, 29.3, 5.4.1646; KSR Dunfermline, i. f. 172v; KSR Ellon, i. 188; KSR Gargunnock, i. 34; KSR Tilliecolm, i. 145, 151; S.R.A.; PR Glasgow, ii. 401-2; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, p. 201; Kirkcaldie, p. 291; Dundonald parish records, ed. H. Paton (Edinburgh, 1936), p. 55. There was also one case of bigamy: SRO, PR Cupar, 17.4, 1.5, 22.5, 3.7.1651.
investigate. The majority of presbytery records survive for the period; from them it is starkly evident that adultery was not a sin risked by soldiers.

A partial reason for the reluctance to commit such a grave sin may reside in the inherent morality of the soldiers. A more cogent reason is the fear of church courts bringing adulterers to repentance. The case of a Major Osborn of Dunfermline illustrates the point. From 10 May 1646 until 2 April 1650 the kirk session and presbytery of Dunfermline and the synod of Fife tried to force the major to repent. On seven occasions from 10 May until 25 October 1646 the kirk session dealt with Osborn and Euphemia Anderson, the mother of his bastard. The synod stepped in on 7 April 1647 and hounded the pair until Osborn finally satisfied the church. The presbytery was involved in the case from 28 April 1647 until Osborn's satisfaction on 7 January 1650. At fourteen meetings between those dates Dunfermline presbytery spent some time on the liaison.\(^1\) Such determination over nearly four years indicates the problems ordinary soldiers would face. For the most part soldiers and officers found easier ways to gain sexual satisfaction.

The Regiment AT LARGE for a husband I got;  
From the gilded SPONTOON to the PIPE I was ready;  
I asked no more but a SODGER LADDIE.\(^2\)

Robert Burns wrote those lines a century and a half after the defeat at Worcester, but the Covenanter armies were accompanied or joined by whores from 1640. The availability of whores supports the thesis that fornication was the commonest sin in the Covenanting forces. Church courts both in the army and in Scotland cited women for whoredom. However, their itinerant

---

\(^1\) SRO, KSR Dunfermline, i. ff. 48-9v; SR Fife, ii. ff. 86v-7, 93v, 95v, 101v, 105v, 107v, 109v, 112v; PR Dunfermline, i. 3, 11, 21, 24-5, 28, 33, 54, 63, 75, 96-7, 103, 108.

nature makes it difficult to calculate their numbers. It was true then as now that men escaped punishment for using the services of 'infamous' women. Thus we can not calculate the degree to which the soldiers participated in illicit sexual unions with these women. A further problem arises from the indiscriminate reporting of contemporaries, who jumbled whores, soldiers' wives and male servants together when estimating the size of an army's 'tail'.

The Covenanter armies attracted harlots for almost all of the period. The army of the First Bishops' War and those of the radicals in 1648 and 1650 remained free from women of easy virtue. The tail of the Ulster army included prostitutes as well as soldiers' wives.\(^1\) Nevertheless the silence of Adair on the matter suggests that the army did not swarm with prostitutes. Instead, it is possible that the soldiers married Scottish colonists, as many of them settled in Ulster after 1648.

The presbytery of the Second Bishops' War army's minutes reveal the concern of the regimental chaplains over the problem of whores. On 13 and on 28 August 1640, the presbytery ordered the ministers to search through the army for 'infamous' women. On 17 September, with the army now occupying the two northeastern counties of England, the presbytery learned of Leslie's order that colonels should have whores scourged through the quarters of the regiment. That same day the presbytery authorised the session of the earl of Lothian's regiment to examine two Scottish whores — one Stewart and one Borthwick — to discover where they had learned their trade. A week later orders were issued to scourge the two whores. That did not signify that the army was free from prostitutes. For on 15 October the presbytery learned that one Abigail Wemyss had arrived from Scotland to reside with the army as a prostitute. The court delegated two chaplains to search for

\(^1\)Stevenson, 'Covenanters', p. 71.
her and to have the earl of Lothian imprison her. Due to the connivance of a Major Hogg, in lord Boyd's regiment, who had patronised Wemyss, she had escaped. The presbytery record finishes before the affair was settled, but the chaplains were in hot pursuit of the major for assisting the whore to escape the penalties of the presbytery. The presbytery also uncovered the existence of 'debauched houses', which soldiers in the General's Life Guards of foot and horse frequented to the peril of their health. The presbytery lacked the jurisdiction to discipline Novocastrian masters of bawdy houses, as appears from the case of Thomas Armstrong. On 29 October Sir James Maxwell reported to the presbytery that Armstrong kept a 'debauched house', especially during the Sunday services. The assembly detailed one of the chaplains to speak with the earl of Lothian, so that he could have the lord mayor take the necessary steps.\(^1\) After 29 October until 12 November when the record ceases there are no further mentions of whores or houses of prostitutes in the presbytery minutes. It would be a dubious assumption that the army remained free of whores until its departure in August 1641. Conversely, it would be wrong to think that the army quarters teemed with women of questionable virtue, knowing what we do of the first months of occupation.

The most notorious incidence of whoredom occurred in the earl of Sinclair's regiment. By February 1642 that regiment, which spent the winter of 1641-2 in Aberdeen, had shrunk from 500 to 260 men through desertion. A local observer claimed that the men whored and left with child 'honest women servandis' during the occupation. When the army began its travels to Ireland these women followed the regiment - some permanently, others for a short time. Sixty-five women, who returned to Aberdeen after a short time, were tried for whoredom, and fled or were banished.\(^2\)

---

\(^1\) NLS., Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 31, ff. 27v, 29, 32v-34v.

\(^2\) Spalding, History, ii. 10.
With regard to the armies of 1644-47 the information is sketchier. Only Kelso kirk session made a search through the parish for whores returned from the army of the Solemn League and Covenant. The only other reference to women with the army is meaningless for this discussion. The picture for the home armies is correspondingly dark. In May 1644 an unknown number of women were with the army of Argyll at Drum. During the same month fifty-one women, some with children, stayed in Old Aberdeen. They formed the tail of an 'Irish regiment' (that is one of the three regiments which returned that year from Ulster). However, they did not accompany the regiment on military operations, but remained in Old Aberdeen under the care of a captain. The kirk session records of Kilconquhar, Wemyss and Elgin reveal the names of four 'common whoors' who had relations with soldiers or troopers of the home armies.

Whores accompanied both the New Model and Engager armies. Dunfermline kirk session prosecuted Jean Kininmonth for whorish society with soldiers in that burgh and threatened her with banishment in early 1649. The session of Culross pursued Bessie Mackie and Elspeth Robeson for whorish behaviour within the burgh. After judging them guilty the session remanded the two women to the custody of the bailies for punishment. An English pamphlet provides a reference to 'sutty vacabound women', who went with the army through England. They were charged with doing much of the plundering committed by Hamilton's expedition.

---

1 SRO, KSR Old Kelso, 13.10.1644.
4 SRO, KSR Kilconquhar, i. ff. 73-v; KSR Wemyss, 10.1.1647; The Records of Elgin 1234-1800, ed. S. Ree (New Spalding Club, xxxv, 1908), ii. 256.
5 SRO, KSR Dunfermline, i. 65, 67.
6 SRO, Culross, ii. ff. 20v-1v, 23v, 24v.
In April 1650 the session of Kilconquhar prosecuted two women for acting as whores with Lawers' regiment. The Army of the Covenants seems to have been relatively free of whores, possibly due to the enhanced prestige and authority of the church courts during its existence. The next mention of military whores is on 3 July 1651, when the kirk session of St. Andrews began the prosecution of James Newton and Agnes Crombie, a 'vile woman'. Newton had brought Crombie to St. Andrews for the pleasure of the troopers quartered there. The session of Dunfermline, wrote letters concerning Katherine Bulbie, 'a vile harlot', to Major General Massey and the Lieutenant Colonel of the earl of Dunfermline's regiment. Bulbie had shared her favours with the troopers of those two regiments, while they quartered in the burgh, and had then followed them to the camp at Stirling. There is no sign of whether she accepted church discipline. The last mention of whoredom in the Army of the Kingdom occurs in the minutes of Ardclach (presbytery of Nairn), where the session cited one Elspeth Murray for the sin. However, she purged herself by oath. The evidence on the subject of whores with the Covenanting forces is so patchy that few definite conclusions may be made concerning them. That they existed is unquestionable; of their numbers and prevalence we know much less.

Strangely, few crimes involving soldiers and drink appear in the records. Ten women were cited for drinking with soldiers in the entire period. In none of the cases were the soldiers forced to do public

---

1 SRO, KSR Kilconquhar, i. ff. 106v-7.
2 NLS, Lee Papers 3482 (St. Andrews KS), 3, 31.7.1651.
3 SRO, KSR Dunfermline, i. ff. 120v-1.
4 NRH, KSR Ardclach, 20.7.1651.
penance. Four of the cases involved men of the home armies. Three women in the burgh of Culross were cited for the offence with soldiers of the New Model Army. Another two cases occurred with men of the Engager army. The final case involved a woman drinking on a bed with a trooper of the Army of the Kingdom.¹ Probably many such cases occurred as preliminaries to fornication which escaped the sessions.

Drunkenness occurred with somewhat greater regularity, particularly in the 1649–51 period. Prior to 1649 only one trooper was cited for imbibing too much (in 1646) and his actions suggest that he was an alcoholic.² From November 1649 there is a trickle of cases. Two men appeared at kirk session for mere drunkenness.³ In Haddington the session dealt with two troopers for drunkenness and abusing a man. They repented for their action.⁴ The session of Anstruther Easter secured the repentance of two soldiers for being drunk and troubling a woman. The Army of the Kingdom’s soldiers account for the majority of crimes related to drink. Anstruther Easter’s records have complaints against five cavalrmen for drunkenness and disorderly behaviour.⁵ Petty (presbytery of Inverness) kirk session cited a foot soldier for drunkenness alone.⁶ The presbytery of Dumbarton complained to the castle’s commander of his men’s drunkenness among other sins.⁷ Menmuir kirk session dealt with a case of a trooper threatening a married woman while drunk.⁸ Drunkenness accounts for only

¹SRO, KSR Auchtermuchty, i. 12v–3; KSR Botriphnie, i. 6; KSR Ceres, i. 10–1; KSR Culross, ii. f. 18v; KSR Kinnard, i. 78–9, 102–3, 105.
²SRO, KSR Kilconquhar, i. ff. 74v–5, 77v.
³SRO, KSR Montrose, i. 200; KSR Scoonie, i. 129.
⁴SRO, KSR Haddington, i. ff. 158v–9.
⁵SRO, KSR Anstruther Easter, 23.4.1650; 11.3.1651.
⁶SRO, KSR Petty, 18.5.1651.
⁷SRO, PR Dumbarton, 22.4.1651.
⁸SRO, KSR Menmuir, i. f. 61.
a small number of the sins of the armies. Lack of pay may well have been the chief cause for that.

The soldiers managed to find a number of ways to offend the Church's sense of how the Sabbath should be observed. These sins range in seriousness from drinking on the Sabbath to disrupting worship. In 1642 two members of the Ulster army were cited for drinking during services.\(^1\) Another case occurred in July 1646, which also involved the soldier walking with a woman.\(^2\) A similar instance took place in 1647.\(^3\) Between 31 January 1644 and 21 September 1651 the church records reveal few cases. In all but three the courts gained at least the private repentance of the offenders.\(^4\) In 1650 the sessions of Haddington and Culross delated an unknown number of soldiers for non-attendance at the Sunday services. In the latter case the session threatened to inform their officers.\(^5\) These cases are so few as to indicate that in general the soldiers did not profane the Lord's day nor did they refuse to attend church. Such behaviour indicates that the ministry had succeeded in instilling their charges with reverence towards the Sabbath.

The disruption of church services - a more serious affair - spanned a brief period. Between May 1648 and March 1651 seven incidents involving eight principals occurred in Scotland. The first case provides only tantalising titbits of information. A trooper Gibson of Colonel Ferguson's dragoons was charged for a 'gross abuse committed by him at Castleton kirk' in Jedburgh presbytery. The records reveal nothing more;

\(^1\) SRO, KSR Kinghorn, 22.2, 1.3.1642; KSR Pencaitland, i. f. 17v.

\(^2\) SRO, KSR Ceres, i. ff. 10v-1.

\(^3\) SRO, KSR Livingston, 17.4.1647.

\(^4\) SRO, PR Dumbarton, 22.4.1651; PR Perth, ii. 827 (1644); KSR Ardcolach, 21, 29.9, 5.10.1651; KSR Culross, ii. 65, 72; KSR Tilliecultry, i. 64.

\(^5\) SRO, KSR Culross, ii. 53v; KSR Haddington, i. 165.
probably he became a casualty on the Preston campaign. The second instance concerned Major James Turner in Glasgow, who in disagreement with the content of a fast sermon ordered his men out of the church. Later Turner verbally assaulted the ministers in public. These actions led to his excommunication, which was not relaxed until late 1650. In Lanark Captains John Somerville and Hugh Maxwell surrounded the parish church during the morning service, then emptied it of the women. They spent the day imprisoning the men, selecting recruits for the army and quartering their men on the burgh all to the accompaniment of the blasphemies of their troops. They too were excommunicated.

In another incident in Lanark presbytery Cornet Thomas Weir, of James Cunningham's troop, jeered and laughed at the anti-Engagement sermon of John Home in Lesmahagow. Weir reportedly said, 'By God, yee speake not the truth. By God's wounds, yee lie out of God's mouth', while standing up with his hand on the sword. Weir survived the vicissitudes of the campaign to face the discipline of the church, to which he bowed in November. In eastern Scotland only one Engager disrupted a service. This took place in Oldhamstocks parish and the story is much like that of Weir. By January 1649 the offender had satisfied the church. These incidents were motivated more by political or military factors than hatred of things religious.

The remaining two cases belong to a new category. In Turriff presbytery trooper John Prerie, the Master of Forbes' horse, 'upbraided'...
the Rev. Alexander Gordon of Forgue after the mid-week meeting ended. Prerie acted because Gordon had refused to baptise his child until Prerie produced his marriage certificate. Subsequently, the trooper threatened the minister with bodily harm. Prerie did not escape lightly for his colonel cooperated with the presbytery ordering him to appear before it. For his punishment the presbytery ordained that he stand in sackcloth in Forgue parish kirk during the next Sunday service. The final instance of disrupting a service occurred in Wemyss. There a Major Barclay, Quartermaster to the earl of Wemyss's horse, disturbed the service and profaned the Sabbath by molesting the parishioners. Wemyss complained to the session, which referred the case to the presbytery, so that body could petition the king and parliament. The evidence is insufficient to determine the cause of Barclay's offence. The few breaches of the Sabbath by soldiers supports some claim to godliness. If the soldiers had mirrored the behaviour of civilians in this matter, more instances should have been found.

We now turn to sins based on violent acts, which illustrate the hypothesis that discipline declined as the time passed. The Ulster Army accounts for the first two crimes of murder. English pamphleteers savagely attacked the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant as a bestial force. The soldiers of the army definitely committed six rapes, and three murders. An additional ten soldiers were accused of rape. The majority of these crimes occurred in 1646. Two factors explain this phenomenon:

---

1 SRO, PR Turriff, 22.11, 20.12.1649.
2 SRO, KSR Wemyss, 16.3.1651.
discipline in general was breaking down due to the poor supply and pay situation; foreign or English royalist soldiers were responsible for several of the crimes. Soldiers in the home army committed at least two rapes, several assaults, one justifiable homicide and a murder. The authorities had the rapists executed; the others escaped through the connivance of their colonel.¹ The New Model Army was responsible for only one rape and two murders. The perpetrators in neither case came to justice. Indeed, one of the murderers was freed by a band of sixty troopers, who assaulted three members of the Jedburgh watch.²

The presbyteries dealt severely with the soldiers of the Army of the Covenants involved in two duels, one assault and three murders. In one case the Committee of the Shire had a murderer executed; otherwise the offenders seem to have escaped from civil penalties.³ The Army of the Kingdom was responsible for the largest number of violent crimes. Beginning with rape, it appears that soldiers attempted at least one rape and were guilty of the crime on two occasions. A third instance, in Montrose, attracted the attention of parliament, but was found to be a false charge levelled by a whore.⁴ Soldiers in the army were responsible for four assaults and three murders, several of the acts occurring at Guthry House, Forfarshire.⁵ Colonel Gordon, laird of Rothiemay, was forced to do penance for two crimes of manslaughter before heading for Stirling.⁶

¹SRO, PR Elgin, i. 168; PR Lanark, 3.5, 21.6.1649, 8.7.1650; Selected Justiciary Cases, 1624-1650, ed. S. Gillon (Stair Society, xxviii, 1974), iii. 843, 847; Lanark, p. 70; Spalding, History, ii. 235.

²SRO, PR Jedburgh, 15.12.1647, 9, 17.5, 25.7, 23.8.1648; KSR Falkirk, 20.5, 8.7.1647; Ancram Correspondence, i. 222-3.

³SRO, PR Deer, ii. 21, 27, 31, 38, 48; PR Jedburgh, 16.1.1650; PR Perth, iii. 96, 7.3.1650; KSR Edingburgh, Canongate, iv. 22; KSR Symington, 5, 9.6. 1650.

⁴SRO, PR Brechin, 20.2, 15.3, 22.5.1651; PR Dunfermline, i. 162; PR Perth, iii. 179, 182, 183; KSR Burntisland, i. f. 195v; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 678.

⁵SRO, G.D. 188.2/5.1; G.D. 188.25/6.1; PR Deer, ii. 81, 83, 87, 90; PR Dunblane, 24.12.1650, 27.1.1651; KSR Wemyss, 30.3.1651.

⁶Strathbogie, p. 178.
The trend from 1642 to 1651 indicates a slackening of discipline. It is especially interesting to note that neither army of the Bishops' Wars, nor those of the radicals contained soldiers responsible for violent crimes. The rarity of rape throughout the period is best explained by the grave consequences which arose from successful prosecution of the crime. The large numbers of rapes committed by the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant are due to special circumstances, principally the recruitment of foreign or royalist soldiers. The uncommonness of assault and murder suggests that discipline never degenerated to the low level of that on the continent. In general it appears that the Covenanter soldier eschewed violence against fellow Scots and Englishmen, reserving his bloodthirstiness for the massacring of Irish soldiers and civilians.

Several crimes remain to be discussed, which cover a large range of offences. The most serious was the kidnapping of a mercenary's son in 1649 by three members of the Edinburgh castle garrison. A trooper in the home army of 1646 committed fornication in the house of a man whom he threatened with death if he told anyone. The kirk session had the trooper do public repentance for both acts. Another trooper induced the mother of his bastard to abort the foetus. The records do not survive for the presbytery which tried him. Two officers and an enlisted man in the Army of the Covenants appeared before various church courts for blasphemy and slandering the Church. Parliament in 1649 ordered Major George Crier to restore the goods he stole from the people of Ochiltree. In April 1648 a trooper in Ormiston's troop appeared before the session of Haddington for

1. *Justiciary Cases*, iii. 826, 831.
2. SRO, KSR Stow, i. ff. 115-v.
4. RCGA, i. 240; SRO, PR Dumbarton, 1, 22.7.1649; PR Dalkeith, 21.11.1650, 21, 28.3.1651.
blasphemy and threatening a husband and wife. The session secured his repentance. The final case in this miscellaneous group took place in the same burgh in March 1648. Then a trooper and his wife appeared with another couple for 'flyting' (public quarrelling of an abusive kind). The session threatened the military pair with expulsion from the burgh, if they did not behave better in the future.\(^1\) If we assume that the missing church records would have contained another 3600 sins (which they probably did not because many of the missing records cover parishes little frequented by the soldiers) that would still not allow for an offence by each soldier in any of the sizable Covenanting armies. In other words, the soldiers were not notorious sinners.

Military service might mitigate the penalty of a sinner. It could also lead to the delay of a case. Yet it was not universally true that either would take place. The number of soldiers escaping discipline or receiving lightened sentences due to military service is very small.

Table 5.6: Punishments by army, sex and sin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBWA</th>
<th>SEWA</th>
<th>UA</th>
<th>SLCA</th>
<th>HA</th>
<th>NMA</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>AC</th>
<th>AK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>4/2</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>3/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>3/2</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabbath-breaking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8/2</td>
<td>18/5</td>
<td>12/5</td>
<td>9/3</td>
<td>15/1</td>
<td>11/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>3/6</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td>5/2</td>
<td>5/2</td>
<td>5/2</td>
<td>11/1</td>
<td>19/2</td>
<td>5/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repented and received / fines for fornication and bastardy

\(^1\)SRO, KSR Haddington, i. ff. 114–v, 166, 167v, 169.
Indeed many more soldiers underwent penance than escaped it due to their calling. The number of cases delayed due to military service is conspicuously small: only ten between 1639 and 1650. While most of the sinning soldiers escaped the penalties of the church, in less than a thirty-fifth of the cases they did so because their trials were delayed until their return from the armies. It is more important to examine the operation of ecclesiastical discipline within the armies themselves.

The only remains of the army church courts' records are a few folio pages in the National Library of Scotland. The members of the presbytery court sought to discourage fornication and whoremongering, and pursued ways of forbidding violence, plundering, swearing, illegal marriages, and profanation of the Sabbath. In a unique case the presbytery investigated a chaplain - John Drysdale - for scandalous carriage. Despite the disappearance of the records after mid-November 1640, there is continued evidence for the functioning of military church courts. In December 1640 Pencaitland kirk session mentioned the trial of a trooper by the regimental chaplain. In March 1641 a foot soldier confessed to the chaplain and several officers, who may have been regimental elders, that he had fathered a bastard. It is probable that soldiers in the Second Bishops' War were liable to church discipline.

For the succeeding armies the evidence is much slighter. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that soldiers faced the prospect of doing penance while

1 See Tables 5.1 - 5.5.
2 SRO, PR Cupar, 1.4.1647; PR Fordyce, 7.8.1650; KSR Dunfermline, i. ff. 64-v; KSR Dysart, ii. f. 30v; KSR Kilconquhar, i. ff. 74v-5; KSR Menmuir, i. ff. 27v, 44v-5; G.R.H., KSR Alyth, 2.7.1648; KSR Monifieth, 2.6.1639.
3 See Table 5.6 (Punishments). Of about 350 cases ten were delayed and three excused for military reasons.
4 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 31, ff. 27-9v, 32-4v.
5 Ibid., ff. 27v-8, 32, 33-v.
6 SRO, KSR Dyce, i. 15.
7 SRO, KSR Aberlady, 17.3.1641, 25.7, 12.9, 26.9, 3.10.1641.
with their units. Between July 1644 and February 1647 the armies’ judicatories dealt with at least two cases of adultery and four of fornication. From 1647 until 1650 there is a gap in the evidence, because the soldiers stood trial and performed penance in the areas where they were quartered. In June 1650, however, the Haddington kirk session presented a case of possible fornication to the soldier’s unit for its elders to settle. In the Army of the Kingdom there are four references of kirk sessions requesting the regimental chaplain or the presbytery of the army to bring fornicating soldiers to repentance. Sometimes the kirk sessions or presbyteries desired soldiers to perform penance in the parish where the sin occurred. In that case they wrote to the officers of the regiment demanding that the offender appear before them. Between 1646 and 1651 there are eight instances of that occurring. It appears that soldiers could not escape the long arm of the church by flight. Obviously the civilian church courts expected (and received) cooperation in maintaining ecclesiastical discipline from their military counterparts. The simplest explanation for the cooperation of the two authorities is that they shared common personnel—the regimental chaplains/parish ministers. Without those two roles coinciding as often as they did Leven’s system could never have succeeded.

Between February 1648 and spring 1651 various presbyteries carried out investigations into the behaviour of units quartered within their bounds.

---

1 SRO, PR Peebles, 24.7, 7.8.1644; KSR Dunfermline, i. ff. 41, 47v, 51v-2, 53; KSR Haddington, i. 78; KSR Petty, 24.8.1645.
2 SRO, KSR Haddington, i. ff. 173-4v.
3 SRO, KSR Culross, ii. f. 167v; KSR Dunfermline, i. 120-v.
4 SRO, PR Cupar, 20.5.1647, 17.4.1651; KSR Burntisland, i. f. 195v; KSR Culross, ii. 20; KSR Kinnard, i. 104; KSR Longside, ii. f. 69v; KSR Scoonie, i. 16; NRH, KSR Ardclach, 18.8.1650; KSR Kirkden, i. 10. All were cases of fornication except Burntisland, where the case was one of adultery.
5 See p. 120 for ‘known’ ministers with parishes.
Often these arose from the presbytery's initiative, in other cases higher church courts or military officers instigated them. In 1648 the General Assembly authorised an enumeration of the insolencies of soldiers throughout Scotland to provide ammunition for a declaration against the Engager Army. There is no sign that it was ever completed. During the following year two presbyteries examined the carriage of soldiers within their bounds, but found little to complain of. In 1650, presbyteries and kirk sessions carried out surveys of the soldiers' behaviour from the borders to Moray. Generally these investigations originated locally or from the requests of officers. On three occasions the Commission of the General Assembly ordered the inquest. The Committee of Estates joined the Commission in investigating the notorious behaviour of His Majesties Life Guard of Horse. With the exceptions of that regiment and Cranstoun's company of foot, the behaviour of the Army of the Covenants appears exemplary, as the kirk party desired.

The Army of the Kingdom failed to reach the standards of its predecessor. The four presbyteries of Fife synod carried out independent investigations which clearly noted a decline in morality. The report of Anstruther Easter is typical of the worst parishes. Having noted indisciplined behaviour of eight troopers, the kirk session ended its report:

1 SRO, PR Elgin, i. 268; PR Jedburgh, 23.8.1648; KSR Oldhamstocks, 27.8.1648; Faillie, iii. 58.
2 SRO, PR Dunfermline, i. 100; PR Perth, iii. 129; KSR Auchtermuchty, i. 4; Bensen, 'Dunfermline', pp. 192-3.
3 SRO, PR Ayr, 16, 30.1.1650; PR Fordyce, 6, 20.2.1650; PR Peebles, 7.3.1650; PR Perth, iii. 95; KSR Burntisland, i. 192; Ibid., 19.11.1650; KSR Wemyss, 8.1.1650; Bensen, 'Dunfermline', pp. 204, 208-9.
4 SRO, PR Dumbarton, 29.1, 12.2.1650; PR Jedburgh, 16.1, 27.3, 20.4.1650.
5 SRO, P.A. 7.21, ff. 13, 16v, 26, 37; RCA, iii. 75.
6 SRO, PR Dunfermline, i. 155; KSR Auchtermuchty, i. 13; KSR Ceres, i. 38; KSR Cuiross, ii. f. 62v; KSR Falkland, i. 173; KSR Kinglassie, i. f. 33v; KSR Wemyss, 30.3.1651; NRH, KSR Largo, 2.3.1651; KSR Pittenweem, 4.3.1651; KSR Torryburn, 26.1.1-51; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 235; Kirkcaldie, p. 369; Bensen, 'Dunfermline', pp. 213-4, 217.
The above writen declarationes are all true, & are bot a little of that which might have beine declaired concerning the horrible profanitie, insolencie, & oppression of thes soldiers who have beine quartered bot the winter people are so afrayed of danger from them, heirafter that they ... will not declair that which they might.

Both the presbyteries of St. Andrews and Cupar petitioned the king and Committee of Estates against the troops - largely cavalry - quartered in their bounds. These two presbyteries persuaded the April meeting of the synod to supplicate the king and Estates on the same matter. The presbyteries of Dumbarton, Deer, and Stranraer also undertook investigations which condemned the immorality of troops in their areas. Stranraer requested that Wigtown presbytery join it in a petition against the 'enormities both of severall offiers and souldiers within my Lord Galloway's regiment of horse'. Despite the poor supply and pay situation, which loosened the bonds of discipline, and the acceptance of royalist and profane recruits, the Army of the Kingdom retained a greater degree of discipline than continental armies.

There is one regiment, whose behaviour remains to be discussed, that is the earl of Sinclair's foot originally raised in 1640. The behaviour of Sinclair's regiment does not appear in a church record, but that of a contemporary historian - John Spalding of Aberdeen. The regiment arrived in Aberdeen 500 strong in autumn 1641. By its departure from the burgh in February 1642 it had shrunk through desertion to 260 men. The remnant consisted of soldiers who debauched, drank, whored, night walked, fought, swore, and impregnated 'honest women servandis'. Upon the departure of the regiment

1 NRH, KSR Anstruther Easter, 11.3.1651.
2 St. Andrews, pp. 61-2, Cupar, p. 163.
3 SRO, PR Fife, ii. ff. 121v-2v.
4 NEH, PR Deer, ii. 76; PR Dumbarton, 22.4.1651.
5 SRO, PR Stranraer, i. 239.
Spalding caustically commented:

Thus, this ribald regiment heaped up sin to our owne numberles sinis, and did no more good, bot lying idle, consuming honest menis viveris.1

Spalding offers no explanation as to why the regiment decayed so much. The reason undoubtedly lies in the absence of the colonel, if not that of other officers.

Several things can be said about the moral behaviour of the Covenanting soldier. In general the greatest obsession of the soldier was consumating the sexual act. This fixation with sex was not only in the soldier's eyes, but also in those of the ecclesiastical courts. To the civilian ministers and elders no crime seemed more needy of prosecution than ones concerned with lust and its fulfilment.2 In the soldiers' view fornication (and to a much lesser extent adultery) provided carnal pleasure. The sexual act also gave the soldier an opportunity to relieve tension and to remind him of his basic humanity. Sexual sins account for over two-thirds of the known offences of soldiers.3 The desire to rape, kill, duel or rob was less because the pleasure was not as great. More importantly the punishments ordained for these offences (death for murder or theft) discouraged the soldiers from behaving with total abandon.

Cavalrymen were more frequent sinners than foot soldiers. The cavalrymen had at least two advantages over the foot soldier, which would permit him to sin with greater frequency — better pay and a less strenuous life.

1Spalding, History, ii. 10.

2See p. 164.

3See pp. 164-76, 190-1.
Table 5.7: Sin by branches of service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Foot</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>11+x</td>
<td>5+x</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6+x</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SabB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>(AK: Col. Douglas' and Dumbarton Garrison)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duelling</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 105+x | 181+x | 49 | 335+x |

x Signifies that members of that category were involved, but the number of offenders is unknown.

? Signifies that it is unknown which group was involved.

Furthermore he belonged to a part of the army which contained fewer men and dressed more mannerly (as he carried a sword). The extra pay would also explain the citing of more cavalrymen for drinking offences. On the other hand the foot soldier was hardly a romantic character. His life expectancy in a campaign was lessened due to the slow speed at which he could run away. (Dunbar is a good example of the infantry dying or surrendering as the cavalry successfully sped away). His first concern was filling his stomach. Not an easy duty in the light of a constantly inadequate commissariat. While it would be folly to suggest that foot soldiers did not sin, one must remember that they possessed inherent disadvantages. An examination of the proportion of cavalry sinners to those in the infantry is instructive. Foot soldiers

---

1 See chapter six for the state of supply in the armies of the Covenanters.
outnumbered the cavalry four to one in almost all the Covenanting armies. Yet the ratio of all identifiable sinners is 1:2.¹ The cavalry were in all ways the greater sinners of the two arms.

There is a trend that behaviour of the armies declined steadily. Unfortunately, the lack of evidence for the Second Bishops' War and Solemn League and Covenant armies in England and the Ulster Army presents problems in viewing the decline as absolute. However, a colonel in the Second Bishops' War army wrote that 'we are sadder and graver than ordinairie soldiers...'.² The decline in the armies' morality can be examined by comparing the average number of sins committed per month.

Table 5.8: Sins per army (cont'd next page)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>SB</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>DoS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBWA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBWA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3+x</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5+x</td>
<td>2+x</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5+x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8+x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19+x</td>
<td>2+x</td>
<td>17+x</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹See Table 5.7, and chapter 3 (horse to foot ratio).
²Ancram Correspondence, i. 108.
Using that method the Engager Army appears to have been the most sinful and the 1644-6 home armies the least. The Solemn League and Covenant and home armies interchanged personnel often, thus it could be assumed that they would have behaved much the same. Their moral behaviour was better than that of both the New Model and Engager armies. Under the regime of the kirk party the moral character of the army apparently improved; the average of sins per month equalling that of the New Model. With the advent of royalist control of the army and government the moral standard again dropped, but not to the level of the Engager army. What can account for these fluctuations?

The information for making generalisations on the early armies presents some problems. In the instance of soldiers in 1639 their crimes may be masked because the church courts would have treated them as civilians. For the Second Bishops’ War we lack the complete records of the army presbytery. However, the surviving ones mention few sins and they are mainly sexual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Sins per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBB</td>
<td>3 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBWA</td>
<td>17 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>78 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLC</td>
<td>38 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>14 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>14 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>4 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>27 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>10 m.s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using that method the Engager Army appears to have been the most sinful and the 1644-6 home armies the least. The Solemn League and Covenant and home armies interchanged personnel often, thus it could be assumed that they would have behaved much the same. Their moral behaviour was better than that of both the New Model and Engager armies. Under the regime of the kirk party the moral character of the army apparently improved; the average of sins per month equalling that of the New Model. With the advent of royalist control of the army and government the moral standard again dropped, but not to the level of the Engager army. What can account for these fluctuations?

The information for making generalisations on the early armies presents some problems. In the instance of soldiers in 1639 their crimes may be masked because the church courts would have treated them as civilians. For the Second Bishops’ War we lack the complete records of the army presbytery. However, the surviving ones mention few sins and they are mainly sexual.
lapses. It is not until 1644 that the records present us with a clearer picture of the soldier as sinner. Following the 1644-47 period the incidence of sins seems to increase until it explodes with the advent of the Engagers' army, whose hostility to the rule of the Kirk explains its increase in immorality. These men made both a political and a religious statement by accepting Hamilton's command. Their officers had no respect for the Kirk, disrupting its services to recruit men on several occasions. The attitude of the officers relieved the men of military pressure to behave well. The lack of chaplains resulted in spiritual neglect and the collapse of ecclesiastical discipline throughout the army. That situation allowed sin to flourish. The improvement of behaviour following the Engagers' defeat arose from the intense and continued efforts of the clergy and the kirk party to create a godly army. Sinful and royalist officers went; in their place appeared men amenable to the kirk party. An Englishman observed that the Estates and Commission of the General Assembly selected

for the most part in commands ministers sons, clerks and such sanctified creatures who hardly ever saw or heard of any sword, but that of the spirit.¹

Consequently the army possessed officers willing to carry out the kirk party's policy from duty alone, if not from inner conviction. They, the local ministers and chaplains managed to reduce the occurrence of sin. Their success arose both from cashiering sinful and royalist soldiers and from disciplining the remaining troops.

Following Dunbar the kirk party's policy began to disintegrate. Many of the godly officers and men had died or fallen prisoner to the English. The leaven of the loaf had disappeared, and in its place the maggots arrived. The officers previously cashiered as royalists and sinners received charges in growing numbers. By spring 1651 they constituted

¹NLS, Adv. MS. 23.7.12, f. 98.
the majority of the officer corps. When a colonel could say that
the banners should bear the motto 'Covenant for tobacco, strong waters,
and whores' and escape criticism, the end of a militarily imposed
morality had arrived. Furthermore the officers took no pains to vet
the character of their recruits. Although the Church continued to
accept responsibility for providing chaplains, the state refused to
supply godly officers and men. Instead it chose or accepted those
with royalist and sinful pasts, whose only motive was to rid the country
of the English.

The radical armies of 1648 and 1650 appear sinless. It would be a
great wonder if they were indeed pure. These forces existed for a short
time: only a month in 1648 and for three months in 1650. In the case
of the Whigamore forces its constituent elements were mainly civilian
or military volunteers who possessed a large degree of dedication to the
cause. While the Western Association Army possessed fragments of the Army
of the Covenants, it too was a body of fanatical volunteers. One should
think of the religious radicals in the English parliamentary armies or
of Chadoweicz's Polish army when considering the moral character of
these radical armies. Furthermore the short period of service of both
armies would have led the church courts to include most of their soldiers
under a civilian classification. That the veteran troops in 1650 are
not mentioned in any cases probably arises from the scarcity of kirk
session records in the southwest of Scotland. From Clydesdale to the
Solway Firth only thirteen kirk session records survive for this period.
The highly critical accounts of Baillie and Nicoll do not disparage the

1See chapter 8 for the increase in number of royalist officers in 1651.


3See chapter 1 on the recruiting of the Army of the Kingdom.
Western Association Army for being a haven of sinners. Although nothing is known of the devotional life of the two armies, that must have been the focus of its non-military activities and not immorality.

In conclusion it appears that the early armies and those of the radicals had an entirely different vision of their missions from those of 1648 and 1651. For the radicals the practice of religion and campaigning against the enemy were of equal importance. To the soldiers of 1648 and 1651, operating in periods of chaos, the hedonistic life presented a release from the tensions of relations with the civilians and the Church, the problems of supply and, possibly more important, fears of facing a seemingly invincible foe.
### Abbreviations used in Tables for Chapter 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Adultery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Army of the Covenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Army of the Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Assorted sins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLC</td>
<td>Army of the Solemn League and Covenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Fathering of Bastards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cohabitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Drunkenness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disr</td>
<td>Disruption of church service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Drinking on the Sabbath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Engager Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>member of foot regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Fornication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa</td>
<td>false accusation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>First Bishops' War Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fd</td>
<td>Female denied charge under oath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ff</td>
<td>Femal fled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Female punished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>member of horse regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Heresy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Home Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me</td>
<td>Male excused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Male punished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Non-attendance of church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>New Model Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Regimental officer or minister involved in disciplining offender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Scandalous Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBWA</td>
<td>Second Bishops' War Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Scandalous Speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>Ulster Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Wounding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Generals to Majors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Captains to Corporals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Privates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Number unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE GODLY ARMIES: PART II

CHAPTER SIX: THE RAPACIOUS WARRIOR

The relations between the soldiers and the civilians is one of many aspects of the history of the armies of the Covenanters which has remained virtually untouched. Until recently this was a matter that had interested few historians of the 1640-1660 period in Great Britain. That such an important and appealing topic lay in obscurity is puzzling, especially when the historian looks across to the continent. In contrast no one has examined the situations in Scotland and Ireland of the 1640s to discover whether regions of those two countries resembled the devastated areas of Germany. While acknowledging the importance and usefulness of such a study, it is too great a task to be undertaken in this work alone. Instead, this chapter will lay the foundations for further work by focusing upon the relations of the armies of the Covenanters with civilians. Three topics form the principal matter for discussion in this chapter—the armies' condition, their uplifting of cess and supplies, and the damage they created through plunder, pillage and planned or wanton destruction.

The Covenanters' forces generally suffered from the absence of a regular commissariat and also from Scotland's lack of financial resources. Survival, not warfare, often became the first priority of the soldiers. Consequently, discipline was eroded either through the officers' disinclination to punish troops for doing what they knew to be necessary for their survival, or through the officers adopting the same mode of behaviour. It will not surprise the reader to learn that the Covenanting armies enjoyed a reputation for plundering. In certain cases the intensity of these activities increased if the victims were royalists, episcopalians or catholics. As a result of this, the Covenanter forces, unlike the English New Model Army, rarely appeared as liberators of a region from its former rapacious occupiers. This was especially true in regard to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant.
Throughout the period the Covenanters' troops failed to achieve or maintain the standard set by Gustavus Adolphus's army in the 1620s, nor did the behaviour of the English New Model Army inspire the Scots. As will be seen, the condition within the Covenanting hosts probably made such emulation impossible.

Information on imposition and collection of cess, quartering and forced loans appear in numerous sources for the period. These vary in detail from describing the conditions in a particular county, town or burgh to those of a landowner and his tenants. Again accounts of plundering and destruction of property can be so general as to be a sweeping statement for an entire region or so detailed as to list the number of plaids stolen. Certain regions endured the exactions of the Covenanter armies for long periods. Therefore, the soldiers' impact on the following places will be highlighted whenever possible: Aberdeen, Northumberland, the rebel-held lands in Ireland, Coleraine, and parts of western England (in 1648 and 1651). The reason for selecting these regions arises from the complete nature of evidence on them and their similarities to other regions. If there are variations in behaviour or response to military exactions in other regions they will be dealt with in the text. The evidence utilised in this chapter originates from a variety of sources including governmental investigations, planned or spontaneous petitions from the localities, contemporary local histories, and letters, both official and private.

The Covenanters' forces in the First Bishops' War lacked even the basis of an adequate supply system. In 1651, after twelve years of war, the Army of the Kingdom possessed a merely rudimentary commissariat. The raising of money or taking of free quarter by the soldiers themselves were essential for the armies' survival throughout the period. Little information remains regarding the method of supply and condition of Leslie's army on the eastern Borders in 1639. The troops there existed day-to-day. The poor supply situation may have led to the Covenanters' willingness to negotiate with Charles I.¹ Evidence

¹Stevenson, _Revolution_, p. 150.
regarding the relations of soldiers and civilians in this area or in the eastern Lowlands generally is contradictory. A petition from Berwickshire addressed to Cromwell as Lord Protector complained that Leslie's army had impoverished the shire by taking wood and corn. An English diarist with the royal army made a different observation. 'The generall was much admired by souldiours for ... the good discipline of his men'. Such a comment implies that Leslie restrained his men from oppressing the adjacent civilian population, despite the supply situation.

In the northeast the situation was quite different. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century the burgh of Aberdeen had served as the urban focus of Gordon power. It was not surprising that it became the main royalist burgh from 1639. Nevertheless, unlike Oxford, Newcastle or York the royalists failed to fortify the burgh or use it as a base and window to the outside world. Still the Covenanters were not enamoured of the burgh and it suffered continually from the Covenant forces. They occupied Aberdeen four times in 1639, twice threatening to pillage it. The sources disagree on the number of troops who stayed in the burgh and about the length of their stay. The burgh council's own figures recorded in 1639 apparently exaggerate the number of Covenant forces who quartered there. Their claims made on the parliament of Scotland in 1647 for repayment of money spent on quartering for the First Bishops' War totalled £50,249 15s 6d. In addition to quartering his troops on the burgh, Montrose put it to ransom twice for its espousal of the royal cause. The marquis extorted £10,666 13s. 1d. from the burgh in exchange for agreements not to pillage the place. On both occasions the Covenanters kept

1 Hist. MSS. Comm., v. 649.


3 The numbers mentioned in 1639 were 6,000 men in March, and 7,000 men in May. Aberdeen Letters, ii. 130. Those given in 1647 were 4,000 troops each for both months. Ibid., iii. 87. The figure for May 1639 in Spalding, History, i. 140, was 6,200 men.

4 137,600 men times 6s. 8d. equals £15,866.
their word and Aberdeen escaped systematic pillage. In addition to these exactions, the Covenanters confiscated the burgh armoury, which included twelve cannon. The Covenanters' horses further depleted the burgh's resources by eating most of the grain in the surrounding fields. A six month period of freedom from paying for Covenanting troops followed the battle of the Brig of Dee in June. However, on 19 December the earl Marischal forwarded a letter from the south demanding that the burgh and shire pay and maintain a body of officers and soldiers. These exactions, although their direct impact must have pressed heavily in economic terms, must await a study of the burgh itself.

The Covenanters' exactions in quartering and ransom were not all of Aberdeen's sufferings. Bishop Bellenden of Aberdeen's house suffered pillaging on three occasions chiefly by pro-Covenanting Forbeses. Although Montrose blackmailed the burgh on 27 May 1639 to protect it from pillage, he did so after his own troops had helped themselves to grain, chickens and salmon. Instances of plundering appear throughout the rest of Scotland. The bishop of Brechin's house, Holyrood Palace, Terregles House and the estate of lord Ogilvy of Innerquharity also suffered theft of goods or damage to their fabric. Aberdeenshire - the Gordon lands in particular - lost animals and grain to the hungry Covenanter forces. Vengeance against royalists

1 Aberdeen Council, i. 166; Aberdeen Letters, ii. 131; Gordon, Affairs, ii. 234; Spalding, History, i. 119, 156.
2 Aberdeen Council, i. 167-9.
3 Aberdeen Letters, ii. 131; Spalding, History, i. 143.
4 Aberdeen Council, i. 193-4.
5 Gordon, Affairs, ii. 225; Spalding, History, i. 112-3, 139, 141.
6 SRC, G.D. 205.1.27; The Book of Caerlaverock, ed. W. Fraser (Edinburgh, 1873) i. 384; Spalding, History, i. 139.
7 Gordon, Affairs, ii. 229; Spalding, History, i. 143, 147.
and difficulties of supply helped cause the exactions of 1639. In later years Scottish royalists would suffer further losses due to the Covenanters' desire to wreak revenge and feed their armies.

Major General Robert Munro began his campaign in the northeast in March 1640, ending it in October. Initially, the burden on Aberdeen consisted of providing free quarter for between 800 and 1,480 troops. In 1647 the burgh claimed £11,333 6s. 8d. for quartering charges. On three occasions the earl Marischal and his allies forced the burgh to pay loans or blackmail money worth £5,666 13s. 4d. for protection against pillaging. Marischal kept his men under strict control and the burgh received value for money. The Articles of Bon Accord (Aberdeen's sobriquet) recognised Marischal's and Munro's demands of £10,000 for quartering charges, 3,000 yards of hardin for shoes and shirts and 1,200 pairs of shoes worth £720 in exchange for freedom from plunder. By August the provost and bailies complained that these exactions in addition to Munro's arrival from the north with 1,000 recruits were impoverishing the burgh. Munro increased his demands on 9 September 1640 to the outfitting of the burgh's recruits and for £6,666 13s. 4d. from the tax of a tenth. Once more Munro achieved his aim by brandishing the weapon of plundering. On 3 October Munro issued his final demand on the burgh - 2,000 pairs of shoes and 2,000 suits and shirts for Leslie's army. Less than three weeks later the earl of Sinclair's 500-man regiment arrived and remained until February 1642. Initially, the regiment possessed its own funds, but the regiment reverted quickly to free quarter. The burgh agreed to maintain the regiment on promise of repayment. Nevertheless, the provost and bailies requested the Committee of Estates to disband the regiment as an unnecessary
and impoverishing burden upon the burgh. In addition to caring for troops the burgh also paid national taxes and endured property damage and pillage.

Other areas throughout Scotland suffered losses due to quartering. The small burgh of Dalkeith paid £13,868 12s. 6d. between 8 June 1640 and 19 August 1641 in quartering charges. Dumbarton burgh was responsible for maintaining one hundred men (half of the Clydemouth defence force). On one company of foot alone the burgh of Montrose spent £1,433 8s. Dumfries suffered to the same degree as Aberdeen by providing for Lord Kirkcudbright's regiment. Lacking large stocks of ready money, the Covenanters relied on the wealth of the localities to sustain their armies.

The army under Alexander Leslie in England almost immediately ran into difficulties in finding food. By early September 1640 desertion was increasing due to lack of food and discipline within the army. From then on both Scottish and English reports on the state of the army drew a picture of a force in dire necessity, requiring money, food and clothing. For instance, on 10 January 1641 Sir Adam Hepburn of Humber, the treasurer of the army, reported to the Scottish Commissioners in London that little of the money due to the army had been paid by the four northern-most counties of England. The reaction of any army to near starvation conditions in

---

1Aberdeen Council, i. 244, 265-6, 277; Aberdeen Letters, ii. 245, 294; Spalding, History, i. 265, 330. For information on Forbes' regiment, which also oppressed Aberdeen see Aberdeen Letters, ii. 241-3; Spalding, History, i. 254-5, 265, 287.

2Spalding, History, i. 269.

3SRO, P.A. 16.1 (Dalkeith quartering charges by Alexander Calderwood, bailie of Dalkeith).


5SRO, G.D. 137.2.129.


7Baillie, i. 257.

8E.L., MS. Add. 24,984, f. 5; NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.6. (Scottish Commissioners, 15 28.12.1-40, 2, 25.3.1641); Adv. MS. 33.4.8, 10, 13, 16.3.1641; Bod. Lib., Tanner MS. 66, f. 72; The Journal of Sir Simon D'Ewes, ed. W. Notestein (New Haven, Conn., 1923), pp. 141, 151; 334, 365; 398 note 11, 448, 511, 513; Impartial Collection, ii. 237; Lords' Journals, iv. 250.
such regions possessing food and wealth as Northumberland and Newcastle, can easily be imagined.

Unlike Aberdeen, our knowledge concerning the occupation of Northumberland is of a general nature. Yet a wider variety of sources exists for evaluating the impact of the Scottish occupation. The majority of Leslie's army of 17,000 men lodged in Newcastle or its suburbs. On 1 September 1640 the Scots demanded that Newcastle provide bread and ale, for which they would pay or issue receipts. An almost continual complaint of the Covenanters army - profiteering from food sales - commenced on 2 September. Due to the flight of many civilians with all their moveable possessions the burden of providing for the army fell on a smaller population than was normal for the region. The initial amount of bread, cheese, oxen, sheep and beer demanded by the Scots from Durham and Northumberland totalled £545 st. per day. From the start the Covenanters expressed their solicitude towards friendly protestants and their animosity towards the prelates and papists in these exactions. At the beginning of the occupation the Scots wished to use friendly borrowing and sequestration of rents from fugitive episcopalians and Roman Catholics. Neither method provided the necessary funds; the Englishmen employed to collect the money embezzled twice the sum requested. By 8 September 1640 food shortages had forced the cavalry to have recourse to foraging. Seizure of grain ships in the Tyne brought only a temporary respite to the supply problem. Discipline was strict;

1Baillie, i. 257, 259, 262.
2J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1680), iii. 1238.
3NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, 16.3.1641; Balfour, Annales, ii. 383.
4Baillie, i. 259.
5The demands and behaviour of the rebels of Scotland (London, 1640), pp. 1-2; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1640-41, p. 58.
6E.L., Harleian MS. 1219, ff. 281-2; Baillie, i. 251-2; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1640-41, pp. 58, 141; 'Our Demands of the English Lords Manifested', in Reprints of Rare Tracts, ed. M. Richardson (Newcastle, 1845), i. 13.
soldiers caught stealing from those paying the contribution were hanged. 1 Yet the English impression of the Scots was unfavourable. 2 A Newcastle alderman complained that the Scots were 'intolerably insolent and voyolent' in both word and deed. 3 Another local observer wrote that the Covenanters 'tyrannize over people' by laying

... their heavy taxes upon all people, bishops and no bishops, papists and puritans, without particularity... 4

The clamour of English grievances became so intense that the Scottish Commissioners found it necessary to answer them. On 5 October 1640 the Commissioners acknowledged the burden of the army's presence, but claimed that the J.R's of Northumberland had freely offered £300 per day for maintenance. Newcastle had also promised to sustain the army, but subsequently refused to act. The Commissioners claimed that all known thieves of even 'six pence worth' of goods and extortioners had been punished. In answer to a charge that the soldiers had pillaged the houses of episcopalian clergy, the Scots replied that the clergy themselves had committed the crime to blacken the Covenanters' reputation. They also stated that the Covenanters were being blamed for damages and theft committed by the royal army and by country people disguised as Scots. In case further crimes by Scottish soldiers were discovered speedy trials of the guilty parties were promised. The Commissioners then complained that Newcastle had refused to produce beer or bread. What was available to the soldiers by purchase was extortionately priced and of poor quality. The beer was compared with 'suddin water without any substance'. The Commissioners stated that only

the mighty hand of god ... kept soldiers together and from pillaging in a strange country amongest strange people.

1 Cal. S.P. Dom., 1640-41, pp. 29, 62-3; Gordon, Affairs, iii. 260.

2 B.L., Harleian MS. 374, f. 145; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1640-41, pp. 28-9, 42; Demands and behaviour of rebels, pp. 5-8.

3 Cal. S.P. Dom., 1640-41, p. 29; 'A Letre from an Alderman of Newcastle', in Reprints of Rare Tracts, ed. M. Richardson (Newcastle, 1845), i. 11.

supported by an army. This detailed response to the accusations against the Scots did not end the complaints.

In a series of agreements on 16 and 26 October 1640 the Scottish and English Commissioners established the rules governing the cessation of arms and occupation of the various counties. In exchange for £850 per day from the four northern-most counties the Scots promised not to molest any civilians, even episcopalian, Roman Catholics and their allies. The Scots further agreed not to take action against returning refugees or to disrupt trade or the vital crafts of brewing, milling, baking and related occupations. The agreement initially covered a two-month period beginning on 16 October. However, through extensions, the treaty remained in effect until August 1641.

The people of Northumberland suffered throughout this period. In a petition from the county to Charles I, the inhabitants claimed the Scots used plundering or merely the threat of it to encourage payment of the daily assessment of £300. The Scots' demands upon the county's supply of fodder threatened the survival of local cattle. On 10 November a petition requesting relief was debated in the House of Commons. All trade had ceased; many people had fled; unemployment was growing; the Scots had requisitioned houses for quarters, ruined meadows, plundered and paid excessively cheap prices for cattle. The Commons failed to grant the county any relief. Four months later three knights presented a petition for Durham and Northumberland to the English Commissioners for the treaty. They reiterated the complaints of November, but added that dearth and the continual flight of people made it difficult to pay the cess. The Scots themselves recognised that

---

1 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio volume 73, ff. 11-2; and printed in 'Our Demands of the English Lords', i. 13-5; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1640-41, pp. 141-3.
2 NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.6, ff. 94-6, 101-4; and printed in Impartial collection, i. 437-8.
3 Impartial collection, i. 440.
4 Journal of D'Ewes, pp. 22-3; Commons Journals, ii. 25.
5 Hist. MSS. Comm., v. 57.
additional monies would have to be raised to prevent the ruination of the country people.¹ By 5 August 1641 the Scots admitted claims of Newcastle for £2,000 st. and by Northumberland for £10,000 st.² Upon the evacuation of Newcastle Leslie issued a proclamation that all creditors of the Scots army should appear and he would pay them which he did accordingly to the great content of the townsmen...³ Newcastle recouped some of its losses, but it was not compensated for the interruption to the coal trade.

Of the three other counties involved in supporting the Scottish army in 1640-41, only evidence for the situation in Durham has come to light. The condition of that county closely resembled Northumberland's. Petitions appeared throughout the occupation to no avail.⁴ By the time of evacuation Durham was owed £26,000 st. Despite votes for its repayment the debt remained unredeemed.⁵

The effect of the Covenanters' occupations of Scotland and England was startlingly different. While the exactions for supplies in the four northernmost counties of England caused great economic dislocation, Scotland suffered more from plundering and destruction. The Covenanters committed great deprivations in Scotland because they were punishing their direct opponents or destroying their ability to resist. Major General Robert Munro and his regiment of 800 foot accounted for much of the destruction and plundering. In June 1640 Covenanters forces vandalised and took food from Foverone, Udney, Fedess and Fetterneir houses. They also plundered the houses of the laird of Gight, Patrick Urquhart of Lethintye and George Gordon.⁶

¹NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, 16.3.1641; Impartial collection, ii. 237.
³His Majesties Passing Through the Scots Armie (n.p., 1641), pp. 6-7; Peace againe in Sion (London, 1641), p. 7.
⁴B.L., MS. Add. 24, 984, ff. 11-iv; Impartial collection, i. 439-41, 441; Cal. S.P. Dom. 1640-41, p. 51; Hist. MSS Comm., iv. 26, 96; Rushworth, op. cit., iii. 1239.
⁵Recs. Committee for Compounding, p. 41.
⁶Spaldings. History, i. 210-2; Gordon, Affairs, iii. 201-2.
On 5 July Munro commenced his campaign against the royalists of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire. During the occupation of Strathbogey Munro's men despoiled the estate's trees to provide building material for huts. They also collected a herd of sheep, horses, mares and colts numbering 2,500 animals. The soldiers ransomed the sheep and the colts back to their owners at high prices; the mature horses were retained. Following this episode of extortion and theft Munro's men mutinied due to his retention of the ransom money and his imposition of harsh discipline to prevent indiscriminate plundering.\(^1\) The most spectacular destructive act of the campaign occurred at Banff, where Sir George Ogilvy, the laird, possessed a fine mansion. On Munro's orders his troops and local Covenanters pillaged and gutted the house, leaving only the walls. Before returning to Aberdeen on 4 September Munro authorised the pillage of other royalist gentry houses. On 10 September his regiment departed from Aberdeen to the Borders, continuing its deprivations there.\(^2\) Munro justified these actions on the grounds of revenge and of necessity.\(^3\)

Munro was not alone in causing destruction within Scotland. The marquis of Argyll's levelling of the house of Airlie has become legendary. Less well-known is his protection of pro-Covenanters and the punishment of troops oppressing them in any way.\(^4\) In the Borders lord Kerr plundered Lochtour. Colonel Robert Home allowed his men to sack Caerlaverock castle contrary to a treaty protecting it.\(^5\) In Aberdeenshire at least three Covenantant expeditions (independent of Munro's command) took place between August 1640 and March 1641 for the purpose of bringing royalists to heel by oppressive quartering or plundering.\(^6\)

---

1. Balfour, Annales, ii. 382; Gordon, Affairs, iii. 169, 211; Spalding, History, i. 223, 228.


5. P.R.O., SP 16/66/57II, f. 120; Cal. S.P. Dom. 1640, p. 534; Book of Caerlaverock, i. 363-4.

In England the necessity of finding constant food supplies inhibited the Scots from devastating the countryside as they did in the north east of Scotland. From October 1640 until August 1641 Northumberland and the three other northernmost English counties contributed to a daily assessment for the maintenance of the Scots army. A comparison of these exactions with Munro's depredations is fatuous. The physical limitations of what a regiment could take either maliciously or for its own supply are hardly comparable with the needs of a 17,000 man army. On the other hand the demands upon the English counties were legal and theoretically redeemable. The behaviour of the troops in the Second Bishops' War was modified by the necessity of finding supplies and by the desire (in Scotland) of weakening the potential power of royalists.

The next army fielded by the Covenanters was destined for Ulster. The English parliament promised to provide both its pay and supplies. However, the outbreak of the civil war led parliament to neglect the army. Arriving in April 1642 and reaching its greatest strength (11,000 men) in September of that year the Ulster Army occupied parts of the province until September 1648. During the army's existence its size decreased, lessening the burden of supply on the quartering area, yet without improving the conditions of supply within the army.

Complaints concerning the condition of the army were constant - no money, no food, no clothing. As early as May 1642 Major General Sir Robert Munro informed the English that lack of supplies weakened the army. The following year witnessed numerous letters going from the army to Great Britain. In June 1643 Munro and his officers reminded the Committee of Estates that they told them of the 'weake and deplorable condition of our Army' in November 1642. Also in June Munro and the officers in other letters stated '... we have bene so burdensome to these poore people for whose releeff we wer sent over...' and complained of '... great want \\& necessitie of the army...'.

In September Munro himself wrote to the English Commissioners at Edinburgh that the army could not take the field '... being destitut of all things wch wer needful for this service'. The officers issued an ultimatum in late November demanding certain supplies of money, food and clothing by 1 February 1644 or ships to return the army to Scotland. Although the Convention of Estates and the Westminster parliament accepted these reports, the civil war in England and new military demands upon the Covenanters prevented adequate relief from being sent. By mid-November 1643 Baillie sorrowfully commented

> Our armie there is verie considerable, some 8,000 of hunger and cold-beaten souldiers, if ever were any; no duty at all hes been done to them.

The Scottish parliament seriously considered recalling the army for service in Great Britain. However, after much hesitation on both the side of parliament and the officers only three regiments reached Scotland.

The situation in 1644 improved somewhat during the spring only to fall into permanent decline that winter. The army's conditions improved because of a reduction in numbers, the confiscation of two Dutch ships carrying supplies for protestant civilians, and Scottish efforts at relief. That June Munro undertook an ambitious campaign lasting over a month into Leinster. Yet by December the Scots began complaining again of food shortages. On 9 January 1645 the officers informed the Committee of Estates '... we ar put to our former want and reduced to such condition as if your Lordships will not send ... relief we will depart by necessity'. The first three months

---

1 NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8 (Officers and Munro to the Committee of Estates, 14.6.1642), f. 9 (same to Leven, same date), f. 10 (same to General of Artillery, same date), f. 11, ff. 12-4, 17-8, 20 (Munro to the English Commissioners, 18.9.1643), 3d; SRO, P.A. 7.23.2, f. 11; Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 6 (Munro to Ormonde, 25.7.1643), f. 118; MS. Carte 8, f. 11; T. Rymer, Foedera (London, 1735), xx. 546.

2 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i. 12, 17-5; Commons Journals, iii. 338-3; Lords Journals, vi. 59-60, 63.

3 Baillie, ii. 104.


5 Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 13, f.44.

6 NLS. Adv. MS. 33.4.8, f. 85.
of 1645 witnessed the delivery of several letters in the same vein to the House of Lords.\(^1\) The situation remained appalling in 1646, despite numerous appeals for aid.\(^2\) The most influential appeal formed part of the marquis of Argyll's address to the House of Commons.

... never men suffered greater hardships, who might have been provided; for they have lived many times upon a few beans measured out to them by number, and never had any other drink but water...\(^3\)

The army's council of war mounted a campaign for provision of supplies, which lasted for nearly all of 1647 without achieving any results.\(^4\)

Support from the Scottish Commissioners at Worcester House, London, failed to generate any English interest in the situation.\(^5\) In 1648 the Engagers' ability to secure the loyalty of the Ulster Army rested mainly upon their promises to improve the shipment of supplies.\(^6\)

The records of exactions in Ulster are sketchy. However, an examination of the town of Coleraine, county Londonderry will give some indication of suffering endured by civilians throughout the province. Coleraine was a largely English protestant town. Certain national antipathies existed between the garrison and townspeople, which were absent in the occupied sections of Antrim and north Down. On 23 October 1642 the earl of Leven's regiment of foot (ten companies of over one hundred men each) occupied the town. They remained there until Colonel George Monck captured them in September 1648.\(^7\) A complaint of the mayor, burgesses and commonalty to Ormonde mentioned the following exactions. The company captains taxed each acre of land belonging to the liberty of Coleraine at 6s. st. per month.

---

\(^1\)Ibid., f. 87; Wodrow Analecta Folio volume 25, f. 52; Lords Journals, vii. 229, 282.

\(^2\)NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, ff. 99, 110; MS. 29/2/9, 26.3.1646; Lords Journals, viii. 531, 534.

\(^3\)The Lord Marquess of Argyll's Speech (London, 1646), p. 6.

\(^4\)NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, ff. 129-33, 137-7, 142-5, 151-2, 155.

\(^5\)Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 59/2, f. 651.

\(^6\)NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, ff. 157-9.

\(^7\)T.n.T. MS. 546, f. 232.
The soldiers ransacked houses for food. The marquis of Argyll's regiment had sequestered half the townpeople's unplanted lands. To rectify the situation the town requested that Colonel Audley Mervin send two or three companies of his regiment, which could be quartered without hardship, to serve as the garrison.¹ On another occasion the mayor and aldermen complained that the Scottish quartering had reduced many inhabitants to beggary. They reiterated their request for Mervin's English (settler) troops.² The final existing mention of Coleraine is the grimmest. The mayor of Londonderry wrote Ormonde that

the town of Colrane [was] by the Scotts Garrison opprest without pity & even utterly ruinated.³

The record throughout the province is much the same; Scottish soldiers desperate for food oppressed the populace in order to survive.⁴

The army's indulgence in destruction and theft should be seen at two levels - those against the Irish rebels and those inflicted upon the settlers. The damage inflicted by the Scots army upon the rebels was spectacular. In every campaign the army stole cattle from the rebels, driving them to their own quarters. As the main rebel forces always withdrew upon the approach of the Scots (except in 1646), destruction of the economic basis of resistance was the only method of waging war against the Irish. The Scots also destroyed rebel houses and grain.⁵ While these efforts did not lead the opposition to

¹Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 8, ff. 215-5v; MS. Carte 9, f. 283.
²Ibid., f. 436.
³Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 14, f. 41v.
⁴Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 8, f. 219; MS. Carte 9, ff. 275-6v, 301-1v; MS. Carte 11, ff. 541-1v; MS. Carte 13, ff. 3-3v; MS. Carte 14, f. 182; MS. Carte 15, f. 84; MS. Rawlinson A.258, ff. 5-5v; P.R.O., SP 63/261/9, ff. 41-1v; SP 63/261/30, f. 29v; Cal. S.P. Ire., 1633-47, pp. 428, 441; Lords Journals, viii. 656; Scots Commissioners, p. 123; Adair, p. 89; Letters and Papers Relating to the Irish Rebellion, ed. J. Hogan (Dublin, 1936), pp. 185-6.
⁵Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 7, f. 98; MS. Carte 16, f. 275; MS. Rawlinson A.258, f. 5; Hist. MSS. Comm., lxxii. Somerset, 479; T. Carte, Life of the Duke of Ormonde (Oxford, 1735), ii. 239-40, 243; A Contemporary History of Affairs in Ireland, ed. J.T. Gilbert (Irish Arch. and Celtic Soc., xxv, 1879), i, part ii. 422; A Full relation of the late expedition of ... lord Monroe... (London, 1644), pp. 4, 6-7; History of the War in Ireland ... by a British Officer, ed. E. Hogan (Dublin, 1873), pp. 34-5; R. Pike, A True Relation of the proceedings of the Scots ... in the North of Ireland ... (London, 1642), pp. 5-6; A Remonstrance of The (footnote continued on next page)
disband, they created a wasteland incapable of supporting an army. Following the Scots' crushing defeat at Benburb this zone served as a vast no-man's land into which the rebels could not advance without hardship.

Within their own quarters the Scots did not always behave with strict discipline. In the early days of the Scottish occupation a rumour developed that the Scots' plundering was worse than that of the Irish. In July 1642 George Campbell castigated his brother Colin of Ardroseire for allowing the men of Islay to come over to Ulster. George Campbell reported that the army's officers say that ther is noe wrong done in Ireland bot onlie that quhilk is done be those men that comes out of Illa (sic.)......

In 1645 a settler deponed that soldiers of the earl of Lindsay's and Colonel Sir James Montgomery's regiments had divided his goods in May 1644, necessitating his flight to Dublin. On 13 May 1646 the Irish Affairs Committee of the English parliament wrote Munro that reports had reached them 'of some injuries and miscarriages', and demanding that he punish the perpetrators. Compared with the gravity of injuries suffered by the Irish, the lawless and unjustified actions of the Ulster Army appear minor.

The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant shared many characteristics with the Ulster Army, in particular its chronic lack of supplies and its response to those circumstances. Leven's army was also on contract to the

\[\text{(footnote continued from previous page)}\]

\[\begin{array}{l}
\text{beginnings and Proceedings of the Rebellion in the county of Cavan (London, 1642), p. 3; A True and Exact Relation of divers principall actions of a late Expedition in the north of Ireland (London, 1642), p. 2; True Relation of the Proceedings of the Scottish Armie, pp. 4-5; Turner, Memoirs, pp. 21, 25, 28-9; Munroes Raid on Newry in Historical Notices of Old Belfast, ed. R.M. Young (Belfast, 1896), p. 50; Narrative of the Wars of 1641, Friar O'Mellan', Ibid., pp. 211, 233.}
\end{array}\]

\[1\text{A Continuation of the Diurnal Occurences and Procedings ... Against the Rebels in Ireland (London, 1642), p. 4.}\]

\[2\text{The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor, ed. C. Innes (Spalding Club, xxix, 1829), p. 256.}\]

\[3\text{T.C.D., MS. 837, f. 35b.}\]

\[4\text{Ed. Lib., MS. Rawlinson A.258, ff. 17-2.}\]
English parliament in exchange for pay and supplies. Almost immediately it became clear that neither would be provided with any regularity. The records of the Scottish Estates' Committee with the Army fortunately survive for eleven months [January - November] of 1644. As early as 14 January 1644 the committee recorded the complete absence of a commissariat as well as deficiencies in baggage and ammunition horses. From that date until November 1644 the committee recorded the army's need for money, food, clothing and ammunition and tried to procure those items. The army treasurer and Sir Henry Vane the Younger respectively reported to the Committee of Both Kingdoms and the House of Commons of the army's lack of money, clothes, shoes and every other necessity. The efforts of parliament were apparently miniscule in comparison with the needs of the army.

There was no improvement in the army's condition in 1645. In March the army stood in great need of arms, ammunition, food and money to prosecute the war. By May 1645 George Gillespie, a Scottish minister visiting London, wrote that some Scots had become so angered over past treatment that they wished a national war. Gillespie further stated the Scottish exactions of cess had so impoverished the northern counties that the parliament had forbidden further impositions of cess. Instead the Scots were to issue receipts for free quarter. From February until late June at least, no allowance was made for soldiers' entertainment or pay. Fears existed that a mutiny would occur. By July 1645 the soldiers expended two out of every three days in gathering food. Nor were the Scots solely concerned with their own problems. The Scottish Commissioners told the Committee of Both Kingdoms

---

1 SRO, P.A. 11.2, ff. 7, 14, 31v, 36, 38v, 40, 42, 44-5, 47v, 50v, 55v-6, 63-4, 73, 31-1v, 109v, 112.
2 Hist. MSS. Comm., vii. Portland 181; Commons Journals, iii. 572.
3 SRO, P.A. 11.2, ff. 38v, 40, 45v, 47v, 50v, 55v, 53v-4, 73, 91, 109; Committee for Compounding, pp. 89-90.
5 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio volume 27, f. 74v.
6 Lords Journals, vii. 450.
The soldier is discontented, the country people disaffected, the public service disappointed...

The Hereford campaign was a disaster from the perspective of supply. Despite the efforts of parliament to force counties to aid the Scots and Leven's promise of receipt for supplies, during the siege the Covenanters' worst enemies were 'hunger and want'. In late August the Scottish Commissioners complained to the House of Lords that the army had received only one month's pay in the previous seven months. As winter came on the soldiers were suffering from nakedness, hunger and lack of pay.

The sufferings of the army continued in 1646. On 16 December 1645 parliament had authorised several counties to supply the Scots, whose pay would be deducted for supplies. Two months later northern Nottinghamshire still bore the majority of the burden for supplying the Scottish besiegers of Newark. As late as 30 May 1646 supply problems remained unresolved.

Following the Scottish withdrawal to the four northernmost counties in early May, the burden on this area once again nearly impoverished it and so beget outcryes against them [the Scots]...

The supply situation affected the army so deleteriously that Baillie and Denzil Holles suggested that the Independent party had conspired to destroy the army or to cause a national war.

---

1 Hist. MSS. Comm., xxix, Portland, 233-4.
2 Ibid., 263; Lords Journals, vii. 619-20; A Continuation of the Proceedings of the Scots Army before Hereford (London, 1645), pp. 1-3; A Declaration of His Excellency the Earl of Leven ... from the Seige of ... Hereford (London, 1645), p. 1; M. Deane, A true relation of the proceedings (sic.), of the Scotch army since their advance from Nottingham (London, 1645), pp. 2-4; The Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army (London, 1645), p. 3.
3 Lords Journals, vii. 619.
4 Hist. MSS. Comm., xxix, Portland, 301; Lords Journals, vii. 697, 707; Ibid., viii. 29.
5 Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 60/2, ff. 411, 470-7; P.R.O., SP 46/106, f. 309; Lords Journals, viii. 191, 345.
7 Marques of Argyle's Speech, p. 5.
The fears of these presbyterians exaggerated the plans and power of the Independents, who were disenchanted with the Scots' religious position and their possession of the king. Understandably from 1646 until February 1647 the Covenanter forces in England found it necessary to make their own arrangements for supplies of food and money both in order to survive and to maintain their effectiveness as a military power.

The material on military-civilian relations in England during the mid-1640s has been little examined in general and scarcely at all in regards to the Scots military. While it would be worthwhile to pursue these relations in all the counties which experienced Scottish exactions, the mass of material available makes such an effort too great for this particular work. This study is limited to the shire of Northumberland and to the more sensational aspects of the Scottish occupations of Yorkshire and Westmorland.

The initial reports concerning the army's behaviour in Northumberland are coloured by the parliamentarian prejudice of the pamphleteers. At the time of the Scots entry it was necessary to contrast favourably the Covenanter's behaviour with that of Charles I's potential Irish allies, who had been tarred by the 1641 massacres. The pamphlets stated two important things - the Scots paid for their entertainment and that

\[\text{there hath thousands come in to them, and taken the Covenant, and their Army doth exceedingly increase.}\]

To combat the traditional dislike of the Scots (now exacerbated by reports of damage and plundering of estates) a pamphleteer explained that the army faced great temptations as royalist estates littered the line of march.

The honeymoon period soon ended. In late February 1644 the Committee with the Army had to answer English complaints of the theft of sequestered

\[\text{1} \text{A Declaration concerning Sir Edward Peering (n.p., 1644), pp. 5-7; 'A True Relation of the Scots Taking of Cocket Island', in Reprints of Rare Tracts, ed. M. Richardson (Newcastle, 1847), ii. 12; J. Vicars, God's Arke Overtopping the World's Waves (London, 1646), p. 155.}\]

\[\text{2} \text{A True Relation of the Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army ... before Newcastle', in Reprints of Rare Tracts, i. 11.}\]
goods set aside for the army. The Committee authorised the search and
punishment of receivers of the goods in the Scottish border counties.¹
On 16 March the Committee complained that, despite earlier orders of the
Committee and Leven read before the regiments against degradations on
civilian property, burnings, plunderings of houses and goods and destruction
of immovable goods had continued. The Committee ordered Leven to put past
orders into execution and to take further course as was necessary. Even before
that date the Committee had rebuked the army for leaving its quarters without
providing proper receipts. The Committee ordered that those who refused to
issue tickets in the future 'shall die for it without mercy'. On 20 April
the Committee took further action by giving Provost-Marshall James White
jurisdiction 'to punish them [plunderers, robbers and others of that ilk]
with death without any martiall law & further processe'. The Committee
supplied White with a force of horsemen and ordered all officers to obey him.
That September the Committee recorded a report by Sir William Armyne and a Mr.
Barwes that the soldiers of both Covenanting and royalist armies had so
plundered Northumberland and Durham 'that litle is [left] besides the earth
which they could not carry away with them'. The Committee indignantly
answered this charge, claiming that complaints in the two counties had never
reached the army. Contrary to the belief that offenders escaped punishment,
the Committee stated that the army had punished offenders 'even by death some-
times for example to others ...'. The Committee suggested that Fairfax's
broken levies had committed some of the crimes ascribed to the Scots.² Yet
petitions of oppressed Northumbrians implied that the Scottish presence created
economic hardships.³

Following the storming of Newcastle the expected sack of the city did not
take place. Instead the soldiers had to content themselves with what house-

²Ibid., f. 90.
hold goods they could steal from the common people. To provide the army with a regular supply of money the Committee placed the collieries and customs under Scottish control. The Committee of Both Kingdoms agreed to a tax of 1s. 6d. per chalder of coal. However, both houses of parliament protested at the confiscation of customs. Nonetheless, the Scottish Committee, claiming the needs of the army outweighed other considerations, refused to budge from its position.

The situation in Northumberland deteriorated in the following years. In February 1645 Armyne wrote that the county and army were in great distress and both desperately required money. On 13 March Leven issued an order, forbidding imposition of cess, plundering and departure from quarters without issuing receipts. However, less than seven weeks later an official complaint was issued against some regiments for leaving their quarters without payment or granting receipts for them. Theft of horses and attacks on their owners exacerbated local feeling against the Scots. In Whittfield a Captain Burton of Thirwall Castle demanded, on his own warrant, a cess higher than the annual rent. To ensure payment the captain threatened the parish with pillage and slaughter of its animals. The Scots continued to collect their own cess in 1646, despite acts of the English parliament forbidding it. In July 1646 the Northumbrians paid the Covenanters £2,576 st. per month or £85 17s. 4d. daily in cess. The economic life of the region suffered tremendous

---


3Hist. MSS. Comm., xxix, Portland, 212.


5Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 60/1, f. 294; Northumberland County History Committee, A History of Northumberland (Newcastle, 1935), xiv. 334.

6Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 50/1, f. 298.

7Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 59/1, f. 387v. But see above pp. 203-5.
dislocation due to the occupation. However, from the parliamentarian perspective such losses were compensated for by the Scots securing the area from royalists.  

Orders against plundering and destruction of property apparently had no effect. Although we know little about the regiments involved in such activities, a report concerning Colonel Harry Maule's regiment of foot has survived. Maule's foot entered Northumberland from Scotland on 10 May 1646. In ten days his unit had advanced a bare fourteen miles from the border. The regiment rampaged, burned towns and extorted money according to the size of the town. (This may have been an example of Brandenschatz — the first fire insurance, that is charging a town to prevent it from being burnt down). On the regiment's departure from a town it demanded 12s. st. for captains, 6s. st. for lieutenants, 4s. st. for ensigns and 2d. st. for soldiers. Such impositions must have made the Northumbrians happy to hear Leven's announcement of evacuation in January 1647. Leven hoped to do all necessary to gain 'a fair and friendly parting'. He promised that no money would be exacted upon the soldiers' evacuation of towns and that all provisions would be purchased.

The situation in other counties reflected that of Northumberland. It would require too much space to provide details of all the petitions and complaints issued against the Scots in England. The Scottish Commissioners in London, parliament and individuals (including at least one pamphleteer) inveighed against the abuses of the army. Durham groaned under the Scottish


3Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 59/1, f. 666.

4Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 80, ff. 393-4v; Commons Journals, iv. 718; Lords Journals, viii. 345; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1645-47, pp. 189, 191-2; Scots Commissioners, pp. 38, 50-1, 94, 125, 189; Truths Discovery of a black Cloud in the North (n.p., 1646), pp. 2, 10.
exactions in the mid-1640s. From the arrival of the army in Yorkshire during April 1644 until its evacuation in early 1647, that county continually endured losses through quartering, cessing and plundering. The worst period of oppression in Yorkshire occurred from January to June 1646. The major culprits were the horse regiments, principally those of Major Blair, Colonel Hugh Fraser, Colonel Jonas Van Druschke, Colonel Michael Weldon and Colonel Ramsay. They indulged in behaviour resembling that of continental armies – attacking and threatening civilians for both sport (rape) and money. One of the causes of the breakdown of discipline in these units was the recruitment of non-Scots and royalists (both as officers and troopers), into them. Cumberland and Westmorland fared little better during the Scots' sojourn there from September 1644 until January 1647. In May 1650 two former Cumberland county commissioners from Carlisle ward complained of the Scottish horse quartered in the county during the mid-1640s.

an unexpressable burden, especially to this part, whereupon divers lands became destitute of tillage and occupation, divers delinquents' houses and estates were seized by the soldiers...
In counties further south similar opprobrium attached itself to the Scots.

From the summer of 1645 until May 1646 the Scots were present in some numbers south of Yorkshire. During the 1645 summer campaign the Scots marched across the Midlands into Herefordshire. In that campaign Warwickshire provided the Covenanters with free quarter and money. During the siege of Hereford the hoped-for supplies failed to arrive, forcing the Scots to take to foraging. A contemporary anti-presbyterian claimed the five weeks’ siege resulted in losses of £60,000 st. throughout the county. The civilians in Herefordshire escaped personal violence. Indeed, they retaliated against the Scots on several occasions. A present-day historian has suggested that the contemporary estimates of Scottish depradations were exaggerated. The exactions inflicted by Massey’s Gloucester garrison and royalist forces make the Scots’ activities appear negligible.

During the Newark siege Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and northern Nottinghamshire suffered greatly from the Scottish exactions. For instance, Nottinghamshire made claims of over £10,000 st. against the Scots for the period beginning in late November 1645 and ending in January 1646. Leven attempted to maintain order by prohibiting his men from harassing the local populace. Whether he achieved his aim of strict discipline is open to further


2A Continuation of the Proceedings ... before Hereford, pp. 4-5; M. Hill, A True and Impartial Account of the ... Losses ... of the County of Hereford... (London, 1650), pp. 2-6.


4A letter from Geoffrey M. Tarlin (10.9.1980) who is researching on the county during the Civil War.

investigation. Other counties, for example Bedfordshire, were not immune from providing free quarter, paying cess or undergoing plundering. The necessary economic impositions of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant and sometimes criminal activities created hardship in counties where it quartered.

On only three occasions the Scottish yoke resulted in popular reactions. In April 1645 Westmorlanders rose in a body and marched to Newcastle to protest against the Scottish exactions of cess. The mayor and minister of Kendal along with others presented a petition to Leven and Sir William Armyne in Newcastle concerning the Scots' impositions. In a discussion there, the petitioners agreed that the Covenanters had always redressed their grievances. Leven and Armyne agreed not to demand more money from the shire than parliament allowed. They also promised the Scots would not molest them 'by quartering or sending parties to demand anything of them'. In a report Leven and others in the name of the Committee of Both Kingdoms accused the Carlisle royalists of fomenting the rising. Two months later Cumberland rose ostensibly to protest at the imposition of cess and the poor discipline of the Scots. The Scottish Commissioners in London acknowledged a degree of misbehaviour by their troops but complained that royalists and Roman Catholics had led the rising. Only the rising against the reformadoes (officers without charges) in Tickhill, Yorkshire resulted in positive steps being taken to do justice.

The occupation of Tickhill resembles that of a continental town in the Thirty Years War, save in the conclusion of the occupation. The soldiers

---

1 The order: Hist. MSS. Comm., xxix. Portland, 359; for conflicting views see Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 59/1, ff. 395-6; Sherwood, op. cit., p. 211.
3 Ibid., pp. 422-3.
4 Lords Journals, vii. 453-5.
quartered there not only received free quarter, but they also threatened the civilians and their property, and committed extortion, assault and rape. The civilians had two choices — flight or resistance. In January 1646 some of the country people chose the latter. After capturing the offenders, they incarcerated them in a parliamentarian garrison. At three trials which followed, presided over by Lieutenant General Leslie, other Scots and the English parliamentary commissioners in the area, one colonel, two majors, ten captains, six lieutenants and ten other ranks were indicted and tried for crimes. Most were cashiered, at least one was executed and others received acquittals.¹

The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant's occupation of England hardly merited Leslie's boast uttered in early 1646

never Army did live more peaceably, and soberly, than we have done.²

Compared with the English New Model Army this Covenanting force was ill-disciplined and oppressive. However, if compared with either the forces of Charles I or the Covenanters' forces involved in Scottish campaigns the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant was restrained in its behaviour. If it failed to achieve the standard of behaviour expected of an army in the mould of Gustavus Adolphus's early forces, that is understandable. The chronic supply and money problems and the disadvantage of campaigning in centres of royalist sympathies rapidly led to deterioration of discipline, arising from the necessity of making impositions upon the civilian population.

Scotland in the mid-1640s witnessed similar developments in the campaigns against native and Irish royalists. From the few pieces of available information on the state of the home armies of 1644–7, it appears that they suffered from chronic shortages of every commodity. In September 1644 Argyll

¹For background on the trials see Hist. MSS. Comm., xxxiv. 341; Two Letters... Leslie, pp. 5–7; Mercurius Academicus, 2.3.1645, p. 116; for the trials see Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 50, ff. 41v–7, 42r–v; P.R.O., SP 16/514/4, ff. 7–11; SP 16/513/52, ff. 13–12. For a report of oppression on the parish of Garfield, see Ibid., ff. 143–51.

²Two Letters... Leslie, p. 7.
tried to reassure a subordinate about his men's lack of supplies and money. That December the Commissioners with the army reported a great shortage of food. The captain of Stirling Castle garrison in March 1645 complained that his men required food, ammunition and clothing. In April the earl of Lothian's regiment mutinied in Aberdeen due to a lack of pay and clothing. By autumn 1646 the officers and soldiers had had recourse to imposing their own system of quartering. Parliament ordered the army to pay for its quartering by cash provided by the paymaster. However, as the national government had passed at least two other quartering acts (7 November 1645 and 27 January 1646), little should be made of the November 1646 act's probable effectiveness.

A vast amount of information presents the same difficulties in summarising the Covenanter forces' relations with civilians in Scotland as it does in England. The local governments and landowners proved quite thorough in reporting quartering charges to the Scottish parliament. To sift the information rigorously would prove impossible in this short space. Fortunately, the burgh records of Aberdeen permit us to use that place as an example of the results of quartering throughout the country.

Following the departure of Sinclair's regiment in February 1642, Aberdeen had an opportunity to recuperate from the exactions of the Bishops' Wars. The period of rest probably did not permit the burgh to amass a sufficient amount of money to face the impositions of the mid-1640s. From May 1644 until mid-1647 Aberdeen served as a major centre for Covenanter forces marching to and from the north east. Due to the Covenanters' lack of ready cash the troops stayed in Aberdeen on free quarter. In February 1647 the burgh

---


2 SRO, G.D. 75.652; Acts Parl. Scot., vi (27.1.1646).
council submitted a bill to the Scottish parliament totalling £221,036 5s. 2d. for quartering.¹ In addition to those charges the council claimed losses of £361,888 in plunderings and forced loans.² Over an extended period a regiment could become a massive burden. For instance, lord Montgomery's horse (230 troopers) quartered for 105 days and cost £21,735.³ The council's periodic complaints about the burgh's coming ruin proved to no avail. With the commencement of the 1647 campaign Major General John Middleton ordered the burgh to be reoccupied.⁴

The rest of Scotland resembles that of Aberdeen. Other burghs and shires met large bills for quartering in addition to the monthly maintenance. Landowners and their tenants, too, suffered from the efforts of the Covenanting soldiers to keep body and soul together. Usually, the soldiers stole animals, grain, clothing and money, all items which

¹Aberdeen Letters, iii. 85-90; but parliament accepted charges of only £220,036 5s., Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i. 830.

²Aberdeen Letters, iii. 59.

³Ibid., iii. 88. For additional references regarding Aberdeen see Ibid., ii. 368, 381, 384-7, 390-1, Ibid., iii. 2-3, 36-7, 47-8, 51, 57-8, 65-6, 71, 75, 78-9, 81-90, 93, 117-8; Aberdeen Council, ii. pp. 37-8, 41-2, 60, 63, 68, 72, 75; Spalding, History, ii. 225, 229, 237, 252, 270-2, 285, 287, 289, 296, 299, 301, 313.

⁴Aberdeen Letters, ii. 381; Ibid., iii. 45-7, 50, 59-62, 74; Aberdeen Council, ii. pp. 53, 75, 79.
they lacked and required. Interestingly, there is no record of Scottish clubmen reacting to the depredations of the Covenanting hosts. Two factors may account for this passivity. The royalist forces of Huntly, Montrose and Alasdair MacColla MacDonald provided civilians with an opportunity for effective resistance. By joining such forces the civilians stood a good chance of gaining revenge and driving away their


2The burgh of Paisley armed itself in 1644 to resist the quartering of Sinclair's foot. No fighting took place, negotiations having led the burgh to accept two of Lothian's companies, Metcalfe, *Paisley*, pp. 260-1.
Finally most of the areas where the Covenanters campaigned were accustomed to lawless deprivations in peacetime. The reign of James VI had neither pacified the Highlands internally nor taught the factions of the northeast to live peaceably together.

Destruction and plundering occurred with greater frequency and on a larger scale in the Scottish campaigns of 1644-7 than in those in England. Scottish traditions of warfare largely explain this phenomenon. Both the Covenanters and the royalists adopted the strategy of clan warfare or that of royal deputies armed with commissions of fire and sword. Destruction or removal of enemy property formed the basis of both activities. In areas possessing few towns but many fortified houses a policy of garrisoning would have disastrously weakened the Covenanters. Consequently a policy of economic destruction, such as that followed in Ulster, suited the aims of both Covenanters and royalists. Argyll was a leading advocate among the Covenanters of such policies. However, his northeast campaign of destruction in spring and autumn 1644 do not stand in isolation. Indeed, they characterise the Covenanters' efforts to crush the royalists.

Nevertheless, the soldiers sometimes exceeded their orders by robbing and destroying the homes of Covenanters or neutrals. Argyll strongly opposed such activities, calling them the 'things you know I hate'. Indeed, while he remained in personal command, discipline appears to have been strict. Other officers do not seem to have viewed matters with the same rigour. On several occasions Aberdeen burgh suffered from officers extorting money. In early 1647 Campbell of Ardkinglas tried to blackmail the inhabitants of Dunblane and Auchterarder presbyteries regardless of their political loyalties.

---


2 SRC, G.D. 112/39.855, 860; NLS, Deposit 175, Box 87/2.

3 Aberdeen Letters, iii. 69-70, 73; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, i. 705.
The worst example of soldiers turning on Covenanters occurred at Peeblesburgh in mid February 1647. There Sinclair's regiment, marching to embark for Ulster, mutinied for pay and subjected the burgh to extortion, plundering and destruction.\(^1\) At the advent of the New Model Army in late February 1647 the reputation of the Covenanting soldier could not have stood high among the civilian populations of the three kingdoms.

Information on the condition of the New Model Army is scant. However, two letters of Lieutenant General Leslie give some indication that the chronic lack of supplies applicable to all the armies since 1642 continued. In the beginning of his campaign against Alasdair MacColla Leslie complained bitterly of having neither money nor shoes for his men. There were also shortages of ammunition and food.\(^2\) In the more populated areas the New Model Army was under orders both from parliament and its officers not to take free quarter without permission, or money or cess and to issue receipts for quarters. Parliament attempted to create a more equitable system of maintenance by granting relief from the monthly maintenance to shires overburdened by quartering.\(^3\)

Evidence of complaints about quartering appears less frequently for the New Model as compared with the home armies. After 5 March 1647 Aberdeen was exempt from quartering of troops by an act of parliament, which Middleton enforced.\(^4\) Other previously overburdened areas also received relief from quartering.\(^5\) With peace the geographical focus of quartering shifted southwards. Ayr and Cupar presbyteries, and the burghs of Glasgow and Lanark became quartering centres. But parts of the northeast still supported

---

\(^1\) SRC, G.D. 2.53; Ancram Correspondence, i. 204-5.

\(^2\) SRC, P.A. 7.23.2.51, 54.

\(^3\) Aberdeen Letters, iii. 84; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part i. 722-3, 796.

\(^4\) Aberdeen Letters, iii. 92.

\(^5\) SRO, RH 1/4.21.
Covenanter troops. The scattered nature of quartering from July 1647 to April 1648 contributed to easing military-civilian relations and alleviating complaints.

Despite the return of peace, pillaging and other illegal exactions continued throughout the country. One royalist commented after the Restoration:

For there was no more to be done, but once to give them the name of Malignants, and then it was piety to plunder them.\(^1\)

It is impossible to check the veracity of that statement because the only detailed accounts of plundering cover some tenants of the laird of Drum, a royalist.\(^3\) Captain James Livingston, in the Stirling Castle garrison, contrived a different type of oppression. He imposed his own toll on goods passing by the town. Although a court put him to the horn, the outcome of his trial is unknown.\(^4\) With the exception of Captain Livingston, the New Model does not seem to have carried any notorious officers on its rolls. Its smaller size and less active history (only two major campaigns), made it less of a burden than other armies.

The Engagers' coup d'état in April 1648 set the stage for the creation of a much larger army. Fortunately for Scotland the duke of Hamilton intended his army to campaign in England. However, Hamilton's lethargy once in Cumberland and Westmorland created a burden for those counties. While the Engagers themselves have not left reports on their supply problems, the behaviour of the army in England (July-August 1648) and in Scotland (late August-September 1648) suggests that they existed.

In the cases of certain armies of the Covenanters a breakdown of discipline arose from malfunctions in the financial and supply systems; the Engager army underwent no disintegration of discipline. That army never

---

1 For the south SRC, PR Ayr, 2.3.1648; P.A. 7.5.27, f.51; Cupar, p. 108; Recs. Glasgow, ii. 125, 131; for the north SRC, G.D. 30.2058; NLS, Deposit 175, Box 88 (Discharge 18.12.1647 of Quartermaster Alexander Dunbar); 'Goods Plundered in Cromar', iii. 200.


3 'Goods Plundered in Cromar', iii. 196-200.

4 SRO. P.A. 7.5.18, f. 40.
possessed any discipline. While still in Scotland the army learned the trades of oppressive quartering and plundering. By the time of its arrival in England it had no scruples about offending anyone. Free quartering occurred over wide areas. Cess was imposed in Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire. However, the most grievous cause for complaint was the plundering, which failed to overlook 'the very rackenhooks and pothooks...'. Royalist or presbyterian sympathies were not any guarantee of safety. Cromwell's victory at Preston resulted not in removing the oppression, but spreading it further afield. For it led to the flight of the Engagers into Cheshire, Shropshire, Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland. In the last-named county the Scots proved so adept in sweeping up cattle and grain, that Cromwell called them 'catterpillers'. Certainly the inhabitants of all the counties reached by the Scots in 1648 were glad to be rid of them. Hamilton's campaign not only failed in its objective of restoring Charles I, it rendered Charles II's chances of arousing English support decidedly slim.

The behaviour of the beaten Engagers in Scotland probably reaffirmed the extreme Covenanters' hatred of them and may have turned others against them. Although the forces of the earl of Lanark and Colonel George Munro were on foot in Scotland only for the month of September 1648, a considerable amount

---

1 SRC, P.A. 7.5.28, f. 52; P.A. 7.6.18, ff. 71-2; PR Lanark, 22.6.1648; KSR Dysart, i. 92v; KSR Kinfauns, i. 92; Kirk of Scotland, pp. 499-501; Burnet, Lives p. 453; ROCA, i. 536.

2 General comments on damage: Commons Journals, vi. 140; Guthry, Memoirs, p. 283; Lancashire: The bloody battle at Preston in Lancashire (London, 1648), pp. 1-2; 'A Particular of the several Victories, and the Occasions of the Solemn Day of Thanksgiving', in Tracts Relating to the military proceedings in Lancashire during The Great Civil War, ed. G. Omerod (Chetham Soc., ii. 1844), p. 272; 'A True representation of the present sad and lamentable condition of the county of Lancaster...', in Ibid., pp. 277-8; Several Letters of Complaint from the northern parts of this Kingdom (London, 1648), pp. 3-7; Northumberland: Hist. MSS. Comm., iii. 38-3; Rushworth, loc. cit., viii. 1237; Recs. Committee for Compounding, pp. 82-3.
of material has survived describing their exactions. In some instances the information is as detailed as the accounts of Sir James Livingston of Kilsyth. His estates expended £726 5s. 6d. in quartering Munro’s force of 1,461 men and officers and lost more than £1,000 from plundering and extortion. Other sources give only an impressionistic picture. Such a one is from the parish of Wemyss. Engager troops plundered the parish so severely that the kirk session curtailed alms for strangers. Even following the disbanding of the Engager army parties of its troops continued to plunder, particularly around Edinburgh. It is interesting to note that the Whiggamore forces did not attract the attention of civilian complaints. It was not only in England that the behaviour of the Engager army discredited its cause and alienated the civilians, but such was also the case in Scotland.

When the kirk party gained control of Scotland in September 1648, they already possessed a small cadre with which to build their ‘godly’ army. Throughout their period of power the army increased in size; its problems correspondingly became magnified. As early as March 1649 the Stirling Castle garrison mutinied over the lack of maintenance. In early June 1649 parliament attempted to make quartering more equitable by spreading the army throughout the kingdom from Nithsdale in the south to Invernessshire in the north. On 12 June 1649 parliament issued more explicit orders for quartering. Each trooper would receive 12s. per day for himself and his horse; foot soldiers would each receive 6s. daily for their maintenance; plundering was forbidden. The following penalties were imposed on those who transgressed: the offender would restore double the item’s value, forfeit his arrears, be cashiered with disgrace, and be declared unfit for further employment in

---

1 The case of Livingston of Kilsyth is found in SRC, P.A. 7.5.46, f. 74; P.A. 7.6.154, ff. 295, 298-9; P.A. 16.38.23; that of Wemyss is in KSR Wemyss, 29.10.1648. For further information on Engager exactions see ILK, Deposit 175, Box 87/3 (Achintinoull losses May-November 1648); SFO, C.D. 75. 659; KSR Culross, ii. 24; KSR Dalgety, 10.5.1648; KSR Dunfermline, i. 80; KSR Dalkeith, i. f. 40v; P.A. 7.5.42; P.A. 7.6.156, ff. 301-2; KSR Stirling Holy Rude, 5.3-1.10.1648; FR Dunblane, 4.10.1648; N.R.H., KSR Anstruther Wester, 1C.9.-2.10.1648; Acts Forl. Scot., vi, part ii. 484; ECCA, ii. 59, 66; Cal. S.P. Dom., 1649, p. 206; Charters and Extracts from the Burgh Records of Peebles, ed. W. Gregor (Scot. Forl. Rec. Soc., 9, 1872). Pp. 357-8.
positions of trust as well as being punished according to the military code. The committees of the shires received the authority to redress grievances and assign quarters and were instructed not to place troops in new plantations of trees, meadows or orchards. At the end of the month parliament promised to increase the soldiers' pay and to produce it at more regular intervals. These arrangements remained the basis of quartering for the Army of the Covenants.

Evidence regarding the behaviour of the kirk party's army covers the entire period of its existence. As early as January 1649 the Commission of the General Assembly petitioned for the end of free quartering, complaining that it had especially afflicted loyal Covenanters. However, from October 1648 until parliament's acts of June 1649 few complaints appear in the quartering accounts. The situation between June 1649 and Dunbar appears confused. After June 1649, Arbroath (in July 1649) and Inverkeithing (in August 1650) petitioned for relief from quartering. Some areas complained about the plundering and disorderly actions of soldiers. During the Dunbar campaign the most severe criticism centred upon His Majesty's Life Guard of Horse. Certain localities welcomed the soldiers as a means of assisting tax collection. The records of Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Glasgow contain evidence on these military-revenue agents. Apparently, the acts of parliament led to an amelioration of the situation and to a decline in complaints against burdensome quartering.

---

2 RCGA, ii. 170. One of the only complaints was from Peebles: SRC, Peebles, 29.3.1649. For receipts see NLS, Deposit 175, Box 67, f. 671, Box 87/1 (Exactions to 7.5.1649), Box 87/2 (Quartering 1.11.1648-14.6.1649), (Goodwife of Harnpholp's lands 1.3-25.4.1649), (Robert Gordon's lands 1.3-12.6.1649), Box 87/3 (Parish of Rayne 1.11.1648-11.6.1649), (Monymusk May-June 1649), (Lesmoir Barony April 1648-March 1649), SRC, G.D. 97 (Duntreath Muniment 53), KSR Haddington, i. f. 124; P.A. 16.3.8.23; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 441; Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh, ed. M. Wood (Edinburgh, 1938), pp. 25, 166, 195; Recs. Glasgow, p. 168.
3 Aberdeen Council, ii, 11.3-4; Recs. Edinburgh, p. 250; Recs. Glasgow, p. 182.
5 Acts Parl. Scot., vi. part ii. 518; Ancram Correspondence, ii. 300, 302.
Defeat soon worsened the military-civilian relationship. The retreating army not only took quarter at will throughout the central Lowlands, but also destroyed crops during its flight. Petitions against quarterings and notices concerning overburdening appear in several records. Fife suffered particularly from officers of broken regiments, who were insolent and demanding in their behaviour. By December the situation had deteriorated throughout the whole of Covenanter-controlled Scotland. In that month the Commission of the General Assembly presented parliament with a petition against exorbitant quarterings, blackmail, theft and misappropriation of funds by officers and soldiers.¹ The Western Association Army was not immune from criticism. In and around Glasgow the Western Army's quartering caused excessive suffering.² The credit which the Covenanter forces had established between June 1649 and Dunbar was quickly dissipated in the wake of disorganisation engendered by defeat. Even the radicals' army (which had escaped criticism in 1648) was castigated for being oppressive.

The 1648–50 period had witnessed a shift of emphasis from the northeast to the central Lowlands as the scene of military activity. Before this period the south had sustained a much lighter burden than the northeastern, English or Ulster quartering grounds of Covenanter forces. The subjection of the central Lowlands to continual quartering from 1648 and to constant levying of troops from 1639 aggravated a spirit of war-weariness. The desire for peace resulted in a slackening of resistance in 1651 and led to a quick collapse against the forces of Cromwell, Lambert and Monck.

Due to the loss of the richer and more populous lands south of the Forth-Clyde line the material condition of the Army of the Kingdom was poor.


from its inception in December 1650. The official records of its
desperate state commence in late March 1651. In a letter to parliament
the officers complained of a chronic lack of money, required for their
maintenance. The plight of the common soldiers was worse, for they
were starving and naked. \(^1\) Despite constant efforts by the Committee
of Estates to provide money and food, the army's situation became more
desperate with the passing weeks. \(^2\) On 14 May the Committee of Estates
authorised the use of troops to compel payments due from civilians, as
it believed — 'The mayne work now is to provyde meale for the armie'. \(^3\)
On 17 May only six days food remained in the Stirling magazine. Five
days later the Committee informed the earl of Atholl and lord Lorne that
'The necessities of the army for want of meale ... ar so great that we are
loath to express'. \(^4\) The establishment of a committee for victualing the
army on 9 June brought little improvement. Despite its efforts supplies
neared depletion on the 24th. By 5 July the needs of the army had increased
to such an extent that the Estates feared its disintegration once the campaign
began. By 14 July the Stirling magazine had become exhausted and Charles II
pinned his hopes on raising supplies from the antipathetic radical southwest. \(^5\)
The horrible situation of the army naturally had an adverse impact on
military-civilian relations.

Civilian communities previously lightly burdened found themselves
staggering beneath the burdens of providing quarters for troops and of raising
money and food for the army as a whole. Complaints became rife. The
Estates repeatedly issued orders regulating quartering and forbidding
extortion. They frequently promised the redress of grievances. \(^6\) On 11

\(^1\) Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 652.

\(^2\) SRC, P.A. 11.11, ff. 4-5v, 6v, 8v-9v, 15v, 16v, 23v-4, 27v, 36, 40v, 41v,
42v, 51v, 88, 91v, 96v, 100v-1; P.A. 7.24, ff. 105v, 111.

\(^3\) Ibid., ff. 36v, 43, 92.

\(^4\) Ibid., ff. 40, 42v.

\(^5\) Ibid., ff. 52v, 53v, 60, 74, 91-2, 101.

\(^6\) SRC, P.A. 7.24, f. 82; P.A. 11.11, ff. 11-v; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii.
141, 649; RGCA, iii. 231.
April 1651, for instance, the Committee proclaimed that officers who
violated the quartering act would repay at double the cost and be cashiered
as oppressors of the "poore and unworthy to be employed for the relief
of ye king and country".1 The Committee attempted an equitable dis­
tribution of the burdens by setting the areas of quartering itself and
by shifting troops around.2 Nevertheless, numerous counties suffered from
the army's exactions. In Ayrshire, Banffshire and Renfrewshire officers
illegally exacted cess.3 The shires of Ross, Aberdeer, Kincardine, Angus,
Perth, Fife, Stirling, Dumbarton and Lanark endured oppressive quartering.4
As early as 18 April the Committee ordered the Committee of War in Kincardine-
shire to tell the officers and soldiers to be sparing in their demands as
"the country is almost exhausted with burdens...".5 Nor were cessing
and quartering the only impositions created by the army. The soldiers'
insolent and lawless behaviour further contributed to a breakdown in military-
civilian relations, crippling the spirit of resistance.6

The Worcester campaign highlighted the problems of an army whose
reputation was already badly tarnished. The march through the Scottish

1SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 11-v.

2SRO, P.A. 7.8, f. 46; P.A. 7.24, ff. 105v, 111-v; P.A. 11.11, ff. 13-v,
20v, 22, 26v, 35v, 39, 51, 55v, 58-9, 61v, 77, 91v.

3SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 97, 104.

4Renfrewshire: SRC, P.A. 11.11, 37v, 39v; Metcalfe, Paisley, pp. 270-2;
Ross: SRC, P.A. 7.24, f. 84; Aberdeenshire: RH 1/4.25; Kincardinesh/Mearns:
SRO, P.A. 7.8, 31, ff. 72-5; P.A. 11.11, ff. 15, 24v, 35v-4; Angus/Forfarshire:
SRO, G.D. 16.50.61; P.A. 11.11, ff. 34v, 35, 41; ROCA, i, 464; Perthshire:
MRC, P.A. 7.8, f. 64; P.A. 11.11, ff. 56v, 85v-6; Fife: SRO, P.A. 7.24.8,
f. 116; Balfour, Annales, iv. 306-2; Stirlingshire: SRO, G.D. 97 (Duntreath
Muniment 57, 58); P.A. 11.11, ff. 87v, 103; Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii.
686-7; Dumbartonshire: SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 43v-4, 52, 73, 74, Dumbarton
Recs., pp. 63-4, 67; Metcalfe, Renfrew, p. 276; Lanarkshire/Clydesdale:
SRO, P.A. 11.11, f. 64.

5Ibid., f. 15.

6See notes on Army of the Kingdom's behaviour in chapter 5 and SRC, P.A.
borders cleared whole parishes of their sheep and cattle.\(^1\) Upon entering England discipline suddenly improved. Orders against robbing and exactions were issued. Two or three offenders were hanged as an example for the others. The Scots maintained good discipline until entering Merseyside, neither plundering nor attacking civilians.\(^2\) On 8 August the earl of Lauderdale wrote that not 6d. of goods had been stolen.\(^3\) Another contemporary expressed a similar opinion:

> The King's Army of Scots was excellently well governed (in comparison of what his Father's was want to be). Not a souldier durst wrong any Man of the worth of a Penny; which much drew the Affections of the People towards them.\(^4\)

After reaching Warrington the Scots began to seize food. However, the short length of their stay in any one area (no longer than two or three nights), operated against arousing hostile feelings.\(^5\) Nevertheless, the good behaviour of Charles II's army during the Worcester campaign could not offset the damage done to the reputation of the Scottish soldier between 1644 and 1648 by his own activities. Few Englishmen rejoiced at the sight of their king in the midst of a Scottish host, fewer still were willing to join him.

The relations of the Covenanters' forces with civilian populations wherever they campaigned were generally poor. In some places, notably northeastern Scotland and northern England, the hatred of the Covenanters or Scots was reinforced by the campaigns of 1639-51. Additionally, the Covenanter troops had the dubious distinction of alienating supporters, whether in Ulster, the

\(^1\)SRC, KSR Drumelzier, 3.8.1651; Turner, Memoirs, p. 94.


\(^3\)Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 54, ff. 144v, 146-v.

\(^4\)R. Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae... (London, 1696), p. 68.

pro-parliamentarian counties of England or the central Lowlands. The poverty of Scotland and the failure to establish a commissariat caused the Covenanters' forces exactions. The country's poverty hindered the creation of a magazine supply system, backed by stocks of ready money. Without adequate supplies the armies naturally had recourse to other methods, such as imposing cess, free quartering or extortion, to ensure their daily survival. Sometimes units or merely individual soldiers went beyond the essential. That was bound to happen as the bonds of discipline slackened. It cannot be claimed that the Covenanters fielded 'godly armies', if they are compared with the forces of Gustavus Adolphus and the English New Model, whose relations with civilians were exemplary.

In some areas, principally the northeast of Scotland and in rebel-held portions of Ireland, the Covenanter forces treated the local population harshly for their royalist or Roman Catholic sympathies. That course of action was natural in a Scottish context, where such techniques had long been used against rival clan enemies or foes of the crown. The English New Model was, however, prepared to behave decently to civilians even in hostile areas of Great Britain. This partially accounts for Monck's success in subduing Scotland in 1651. That the Covenanters failed to imitate the army of Fairfax and Cromwell is understandable; that they did not attempt to do so was unfortunate for their own cause and image.

Without question even the most moral armed forces aggravated the dislike of civilians for the military. Only the First Bishops' War and Whiggamore armies could be described as exemplary. However, the first oppressed royalists, while the other remained in the field for such a short time that its behaviour is difficult to judge. The most rapacious armies, those of the Engagement and the Kingdom, matched their poor relations with civilians with sinful activity.

A survey of the behaviour of the other armies reveals that, regardless of moral or immoral activity, the soldiers excited the disgust of the civilians. The army of the Second Bishops' War reacted poorly to the bad supply situation
and hostile environment in which it found itself. A more reasonable display of discipline in Durham and Northumberland would have paid dividends in 1644 and later. The behaviour of an army whenever it was in non-presbyterian areas could only influence the local population's attitudes towards that faith. Ulster was a special case as the settlers favoured presbyterianism. It was unlikely that they would be swayed from their beliefs by a rapacious soldier, who protected them from a graver danger - murderous Irish rebels. The forces of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant, the home armies and the Western Association Army show some divergence between sound moral behaviour and good treatment of civilians. In the case of the home armies and the New Model mitigating circumstances existed, for the majority of their victims were royalists. The behaviour of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant declined as its supply situation worsened and as royalists and foreigners began to infiltrate the regiments. The addition of non-homogeneous elements did much to destroy the discipline of Gustavus Adolphus's forces in Germany. The same development in Leven's army had similar results. Nonetheless, the behaviour of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant did much (before 1646) to fortify the strongly episcopalian and Roman Catholic beliefs held in the four northernmost shires of England. The reputation of this army and that of the Second Bishops' War also damaged the presbyterian cause at Westminster.

Turning to the end of the period under consideration we find two armies which appear unlike on the surface. Following the initial purges and parliamentary efforts to regularise quartering procedure, the behaviour of the Army of the Covenants improved to match its moral stance. After the debacle of Dunbar, with the consequent disruption of supplies through the loss of much good agricultural land, relations with civilians deteriorated rapidly. This factor alone would have contributed greatly to preventing the Army of the Kingdom from becoming a 'sword of the Lord'. Parliament's
decision to permit royalists to command and recruit troops whose morality
was of no consequence ensured that the army would vie with the Engager
army for the title of the most rapacious and immoral among the Covenanter
forces.

In many ways the Covenanter forces strove hard to create godly forces.
By the proclamation of articles of war based on those of the king, who
had established the original godly army, and by seeking to procure
regular spiritual care for the troops the Covenanter forces took the correct
first steps. But the success of any code depends on the willingness
both of those in authority to enforce it and of its subjects to accept
it. In the case of the Covenanter forces the two did not always exist.
On some occasions the officers themselves were leading culprits (for
example at Thirsk) and often it seems that they did not care about
observing strict discipline. In certain instances the soldiers rejected
the spirit of the code or of any moral standards. Sinclair's regiment and
Charles II's horse guard are prime examples of such troops. It is
generally accepted that regular pay or supplies are necessary to prompt
any army to behave well. Too often the Covenanter forces lacked material
necessities, which led initially to illegal exactions from civilians and
later to a general decline in discipline. The difficulty in securing an
adequate number of ministers has already been noted. While the presence
of a minister in each regiment would not have ensured moral behaviour and
less oppressive actions towards civilians, it might have reduced the
opposite tendency. The combination of officers unwilling to enforce
Leven's codes, an inadequate number of ministers, and a lack of money
or the absence of a commissariat all contributed to ensure that the
Covenanter forces would not enjoy the title of godly.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE CHURCH AND THE ARMIES

From the first the presbyterian party in the Scottish Kirk had been involved in the agitation against the Prayer Book. When demonstrations changed to rebellion the presbyterian clergy were once more in the vanguard - whether nationally by membership on the Tables, or locally through leading their parishioners to war against Charles I. For the Covenanter clergy the distinction between the spiritual and secular was far from clearcut. They perceived the struggle against Charles and the Laudians as one grounded in the battle against spiritual evil but fought out in the arena of the world. It is not surprising then that the national church was concerned with the make-up of the armies, seeking God's help for them and providing money for their operations. The reaction of the local church organisations to the events of the period arose both from instinctive attitudes and from obedience to the General Assembly and its Commission. On the one hand the parishes supplied charity to war widows, orphans, lame, poor and wounded soldiers as a matter of course. On the other hand the parishes followed the directives of the national church by keeping fasts and thanksgivings and raising money for the relief of prisoners of war or for maintenance of the army. Consequently two major divisions exist in this chapter: between material and spiritual care and between national and parochial efforts. Each shades imperceptibly into the other. With the exception of concern for the members of the army nearly every matter had both national and local implications. In the provision of money - for charitable or other uses - these two aspects can be seen most clearly. What was ordered from on high in Edinburgh could only succeed with the support of the localities.

The Kirk of the Covenanters expressed its interest in military matters from the beginning of armed strife against Charles I. However, its interest

---

1 Rutherford, Quaint Sermons, ed. A.A. Bonar (London, 1885), p. 30; see above, pp. 8-9, 14-5.
in the make-up of the army or in matters dealing with the armies' internal affairs came much later. The church opposed the Engagement because it suspected that it was anti-presbyterian.\(^1\) Then the major fear was not the men who joined the army but the cause for which the army entered the field. Following the radicals' triumph in September 1648 it became necessary to purge the army of questionable elements, that is those who had supported the Engagement. Between late 1648 and September 1650 unanimous support for such a policy existed within all levels of civil and church government. The defeat at Dunbar led to the beginning of the end of such singlemindedness in military policy. By December 1650 the civil government had become converted to a view that all Scots should contribute to the defence of the realm regardless of their political pasts. On 14 December the Commission of the General Assembly decided to support this attitude with the proviso that those previously censured or excommunicated by the church should satisfy it with a ceremony of repentance.\(^2\) A policy which attempted to grant concessions to both the royalist civil government and the radical presbyteries succeeded only in bringing the Commission into conflict with both.

In a matter of weeks after the Public Resolutions the Commission found its new policy challenged by the king and the Estates, who were more concerned with recruiting an army sufficiently large to confront the English than with satisfying the demands of God as the Commission interpreted them. On 25 January 1651 the Commission sent letters of complaint to the king and parliament. The Commission complained that parliament had chosen colonels and officers who were still proscribed by the Kirk. In requesting that the situation be rectified, the Commission justified its requirement by pointing out that the government's policy was unsettling the scruples of many Scots.

\(^1\)See above, pp. 40-1.

\(^2\)See above, pp. 53-3.
Parliament promptly answered the charges and then turned to counterattack the Kirk. The Estates claimed that its committees were doing everything necessary to select only those officers acceptable to the Kirk. In turn the Estates charged the clergy with the delay of the levies; the Estates urged the Commission to discipline such opponents of the cause. The opening rounds of a controversy between the state and the church had been fired only to be followed by a silence of nearly two months.

In mid-March the Commission presented three petitions to parliament in rapid succession. On the 18th the Commission once again complained that officers without testimonies of repentance from the Kirk were serving in the army. The Commission demanded that officers should be competent, honest and approved by the Kirk. Two days later the Commission requested that the Estates impose a previously promised oath of loyalty on the officers, which would show the people the officers' allegiance to the cause. On the 22nd the Commission sent yet another communication to the king and Estates. On this occasion it agreed that officers free of any wrong before the Engagement could receive commissions in the army. On 2 April the Committee of Military Affairs in an apparent answer to the Commission assured it of the Estates' continued support for the Covenants and the liberty of the Church of Scotland.

The tension between the Commission and the Estates remained alive throughout the spring. On 23 April the Committee of Military Affairs testily responded to the Commission's charges that worthy men had gained places on that body. The Committee stated that parliament had selected the members and that it alone could remove them. The Commission answered that it would take the matter to the king. Three weeks later the Committee again replied to charges that royalists and unrepentant men were serving on

---

1 RGCA, iii. 268-70, 296-7.
2 Ibid., iii. 336-8, 352-3, 357-8.
3 SRO, P.A. 11.11, f. 3.
it. It claimed that the Commission's behaviour had led some to disobey its orders and had brought disunity to the cause. As a method of reuniting the country the Committee urged the Commission to approve the repeal of the Acts of Classes. Having decided that correspondence was an unsuitable method of settling their differences both bodies nominated representatives to attend the meetings of the other. The Commission instructed its representatives to inform the Committee that unqualified officers were still serving with the army. Furthermore the Commission shared the Committee's goal of unity. Finally, the ministers promised to present their answer to the possible revocation of the Acts of Classes. The instructions to the representatives of the civil government unhappily do not survive.

On 12 June the Commission sent a petition to the king and parliament. In the first article it demanded that all men take the Solemn League and Covenant or face the discipline of the Kirk. Again it demanded that the officers swear an oath of loyalty. The Commission expressed its desire that none involved in the royalist rising of autumn 1650 be admitted to the army. The next day the Commission issued a remonstrance of a similar tone to the king and Committee of Estates. The ministers claimed that persistent enemies of the Covenants had received charges, which would bring God's wrath upon the cause. Not only was the removal of these men urged but the imposition of the Covenant on the English was also called for. On 30 June the Committee of Military Affairs answered the complaints of the Kirk. It first claimed that God had blessed Scotland with unity; the Committee expressed insincere regret that some committee men were still judged unworthy.

---

1 SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 18, 35, 40v; RCGA, iii. 401-2, 405-6, 426.

2 Ibid., iii. 455-7, 477-8, 486.
The Committee denied that it contained any constant enemies of the Covenants. On the contrary, it claimed that its members would do anything to receive the Commission's approval. However, following the repeal of the Acts of Classes of 1646 and 1649, such posturing for the approval of the Commission had become unnecessary and irrelevant. The Committee of Estates had been captured by the royalists; loyal Covenanter attended in the vain hopes of having some impact upon the proceedings. Despite all its efforts the Commission of the General Assembly had failed to have the state accept its policies. Instead it had been lulled into agreement with the king and Estates, who believed that the cause of Charles II was greater than that of the Covenants, and had lost its ability to influence decisions of state.

Throughout the same period the Commission fought an equally if not more vitriolic battle against the radicals within the Kirk. While the hope of a radical victory in Scotland had been obliterated at the battle of Hamilton in December 1650, the radical clergy remained constant to the idea of a godly army free of royalists and malignants. The presbyteries of Stirling, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Paisley, Deer, Irvine, Ayr, Lanark and Hamilton and the synod of Glasgow and Ayr (which contained six of those presbyteries) issued letters of complaint to the Commission regarding its policy enunciated in the Public Resolutions. These church courts represented approximately 166 ministers, of whom at least eighteen favoured the Resolutions. The arguments advanced by the radicals of each ecclesiastical jurisdiction closely resembled one another.

The first letter of complaint, that of Stirling presbytery, received by the Commission on 3 January 1651, was typical. The presbytery stated it could not follow the orders of the Commission or the Estates as they permitted royalists and Engagers to serve in the army. The presbytery claimed that such a policy of tolerating royalists was contrary to earlier

1 SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 86v-7.
3 Makey, 'The Ministers', pp. 6, 30, 72, 77, 92, 104-5; see also Scott, Fasti, vols. iii, iv, vi, passim.
resolutions of the General Assembly and contrary to the will of God.

It argued that implementation of the Public Resolutions would result in
royalist control of the government and would lead to the withdrawal of
support from the well-affected and to the wrath of God. The presbytery
concluded by stating that the cause and the kingdom were inseparable.¹

Only the presbytery of Hamilton added to these arguments. It claimed that
it was wrong to use the clans and Highlanders, who had slaughtered Covenanters
during the campaigns of Montrose.² Fortunately for the defence of the
kingdom the majority of these Remonstrants lay in the English occupied zone.
Certainly the presbyteries of Stirling, Aberdeen and Deer possessed some
potential to demoralise troops and delay the levies, but those were areas
where royalist popular sentiment was strong.

The Commission quickly acted to assert its authority against the
rebellious presbyteries. On 6 January the Commission drafted its reply
to Stirling presbytery, which served as the basis of its responses to the
other remonstrating presbyteries. The Commission claimed its position was
sound and that Stirling’s action was nothing less than an attack on the
authority of the Commission and the unity of the Kirk. Moving on to the
matter in hand the Commission claimed that only a general levy could raise a
sufficient number of troops to resist the English. Furthermore the Commission
stated that such was the ancient practice, that the current war was a quarrel
of all Scots and that the books of Judges, Kings, Chronicles and I Samuel
supported such a policy. The letter also claimed that there was no danger
of a royalist takeover. It was apparent that God had already turned his
wrath against Scotland and would not remove it until the Scots helped them-

The Commission concluded its answer by claiming the defence of the
kingdom was the equivalent of defence of the cause.³ The Commission’s answers

¹RCGA, iii. 174-80 for Stirling presbytery; for other presbyteries see iii.
194-5, 244-50, 255-7, 274-8, 298-303, 362-3, 390-3; SRC, PR Deer, ii. 60-2,
64-5, 73-1, 77, 83.
²RCGA, iii. 362.
³SRC, PR Paisley, 6.3.1651; RCGA, iii. 201-14; see also iii. 235, 251-2, 252-5,
to the other letters resembled that sent to Stirling. In the reply to Hamilton the Commission asserted that none of the clans which had served Montrose were being employed.\(^1\) Whether these letters satisfied the committed radicals is questionable. However, it is true that only twenty-three of over 150 ministers from these presbyteries openly defied the Commission by protesting against the General Assembly of 1651 (hence the name Protester).\(^2\)

The other local ecclesiastical jurisdictions did not remain completely silent during these exchanges. On 2 April the Synod of Fife passed a resolution supporting the Commission's policy and concurring with the Public Resolutions.\(^3\) Eventually three presbyteries (Peebles, Dumbarton and Chanonry), four synods (Angus and Mearns, Fife, Moray, and Perth and Stirling) and the universities of St. Andrews and Glasgow would issue letters upholding the Commission's position.\(^4\) These bodies represented approximately 320 clergymen, of whom only nineteen defected to the Protester camp.\(^5\)

Although the Commission gained the victory in the intra-church conflict, it was a pyrrhic one as it resulted in the first post-Reformation schism.

During the controversies of 1651 the Commission continued to act as the representative body of the General Assembly. Between 6 January and 9 August the Commission issued a series of letters and warnings to the presbyteries and army, which dealt partially or entirely with the army. On 6 January the Commission wrote the presbyteries that they should give greater support to getting out the levies. It also demanded reports on the ill-affected and issued orders against fraternisation with the English. Concluding its demands, the Commission called for the payment of outstanding money for the Ministers' regiment of horse levied in 1650 and for the

---

\(^1\) Ibid., iii. 381; see above, p. 63.

\(^2\) See above, p. 242, note 3.

\(^3\) SRO, SR Fife, ii. 122-3v; RCGA, iii. 379-81.

\(^4\) Ibid., iii. 379-81, 386-7, 411-4, 418-9, 421-2; SRO, PR Dumbarton, 10.6.1651.

\(^5\) See above, p. 242, note 3.
appointment of regimental chaplains. The next day the Commission issued a solemn warning against dealings with the English and urged service in the army for all but excommunicated, profane and sinful men. It claimed the day of God's favour was at hand. Over two months later, on 20 March, another 'Warning and Exhortation' appeared. The Commission detailed the dangers of sectarianism in the occupied presbyteries, further claiming that religion, the covenanted king, families and possessions were in danger. The Commission promised God's support if the people supported the levies and the ministers stirred up the people to their duty.

On the same day a letter to the presbyteries attacked the recalcitrant, called for observation of a fast and for payment of the arrears for the regiment of horse. Without the divisions in Scottish society the implementation of these desires would have been difficult due to war-weariness; the combination of the two made nonsense of the Commission's orders.

On three occasions the Commission addressed the army officers, exhorting them to labour diligently for victory. On 7 January the Commission called for the officers to do their utmost for defence of the kingdom, urged them to remain loyal, not to slacken their effort and to have faith in God. The letter concluded:

We shall begg for an heroik spirit from on high to be poured out upon you, that yow may acquit yourselves as mightig men of valour for the Lord, your King and his people...

On 5 April the Commission asked the officers to work for unity, eschewing sectarianism and malignancy and backsliding from repentance. The officers were enjoined to trust in God and endure their lack of pay. The Commission finally urged them to establish military and ecclesiastical discipline within the army. Following the departure of the royal army in July the Commission

---

1 RCGA, iii. 193-5.
2 Ibid., iii. 217-28.
3 Ibid., iii. 346-52.
4 Ibid., iii. 353-4.
5 Ibid., iii. 237-40.
6 Ibid., iii. 372-4.
promulgated a 'Warning and Exhortation to Officers of the Army, Noblemen and Gentry in the Country'. The 'Warning' opened with a call to turn towards God, especially by frequent prayer for success. The document went on to urge its audience to fight for the king, their families and homes. By doing so they were to advance and free the oppressed Covenanters. In its concluding lines the 'Warning' asked that its recipients would not withhold their aid, without which God could still ensure success, but it would be better for all if it were given.  

The impact of any of these letters is difficult to determine. The shires most willing in the past to act upon the suggestions of the Commission had either rejected its authority or had fallen under English control. In the rest of Scotland the royalists held sway and ignored the strictures of the Commission and its lay supporters such as Argyll. The Commission, established in 1641, was no longer the state within a state which it had been in the mid-1640s. Its influence upon Scottish life, including the army, had begun to wane after Dunbar. The condition of the Army of the Kingdom absorbed more of the Commission's time and that of the General Assembly than any military force since the Engagers; yet it was the Kirk's least successful intervention in military affairs.

The ability of the Kirk to manipulate an institution like the army depended upon the ministers' role in national affairs. In the early period of opposition to Charles I (1637-41) the Kirk was just one group of many in opposition to royal policy. However, with the establishment of the English alliance in 1643 the Kirk had begun to take a leading role in Scottish politics. From 1643 the Commission sought to widen both its power and the influence of the Kirk in general. Although the Commission and the General Assembly corresponded with the armies from 1644, their voice did not become an important
influence in military matters until after the Engagers gained power in
1648.

The result of the Kirk's opposition to the Engagement levy has already
been observed; the origin of that animosity will now be discussed. On 5
May 1648, the day after parliament passed an act for levying an invading
army to fulfil the conditions of the Engagement, the Commission of the
General Assembly condemned that policy. In a letter to the presbyteries the
Commission stated that parliament had acted on matters of religion without
previously consulting the Kirk. Such an action amounted to breaking the in-
formal concordat between Kirk and state established in the early 1640s. The
Commission ordered the presbyteries to withdraw their support from the levy,
'specially that yow neither send any of your number forth to attend their
forces...' Any minister who served as a chaplain or who supported the levy
was liable to punishment by the General Assembly. On 11 May parliament
responded to this threat to its policy by attacking the Commission in a letter
to the presbyteries. The Estates claimed that opposition to their acts
was illegal. Parliament called upon the presbyteries to stir up the people
for the defence of peace, the king and religion by prayers and sermons. A
little less than a month later the Commission formally condemned the
Engagement. Parliament responded by charging that the Commission had committed
an illegal act by judging an act of parliament. Again the parliament called
upon the ministers to incite the people to support the levy on the pain of
loss of teinds and glebes. An Engager triumph in England would have made the
economic position of the leading opponents to the levy precarious.

However, in mid-summer 1648 the anti-Engagement clergy disregarded the
threat of loss of livelihood and deprivation. Both locally and nationally
these men opposed the Engagement and the levying of troops to support it.

---

1 See above, pp. 40-1.
2 RCGA, i. 531.
3 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 87.
4 Ibid., vi, part ii. 109-10.
On 31 July the General Assembly issued "A Declaration of the General Assembly concerning the present dangers of Religion and especially the unlawful engagement in war, against the kingdom of England; Together with many necessary exhortations and directions to all members of the Kirk of Scotland". The Declaration commenced with a recitation of wrongs committed by soldiers in the new army. The Assembly claimed that excesses originated from the recruitment of Roman Catholics, Irish rebels, royalists and fugitives from church discipline. It condemned the war as an unholy one waged by notorious sinners. The Declaration concluded with an assault upon the aims of the Engagement and its unnecessary war. With the defeat of the Engager army in England and the Whigamore rising in September 1648 the Commission reached the zenith of its power.

The kirk party came to power in the Estates with the defeat of the Engagers. On 16 January 1649 parliament declared that all resistance to the Engagement had been lawful. That included the Mauchline Moor rising which was regarded as an expression of loyalty to the Covenant. The civil authorities also respected the Kirk's demands for a purge of the army. Throughout the rule of the kirk party royalists were forced out of the army, particularly during the 1650 campaign. Following the disaster at Dunbar the kirk party and its clerical supporters retained a precarious control of political and military affairs. However, as they had proved incapable of raising an army able to defeat Cromwell the royalists began to challenge that control.

The power of the Commission and the General Assembly to control membership of the armies successfully was limited by their ability to maintain an alliance with the civil government. Spiritual care for the armies, however,


was a matter not bounded by such agreements. From 1639 the synods, presbyteries, General Assemblies and Commissions attempted to intercede with God for success by holding fasts and thanksgivings in addition to prayers.

Evidence of special prayers for the armies is sketchy but persistent. In 1640 Baillie wrote to lord Montgomery that he and the people prayed for the success of the army daily as their protectors, friends and potential saviours of Britain from the evil policies of Charles I. Kirk session records of the mid-1640s have references to praying for the army. In July 1650 St. Andrews presbytery called upon its ministers to pray in public and private and to establish daily services of public prayer for religion, the covenants, the king and kingdom. At least one parish in west Fife began to hold evening prayers during that period. Daily prayers for the success of the armies may have been much more than these references suggest.

Fasts were the main example of the Covenanting nation at prayer. Between April 1639 and November 1651 various ecclesiastical bodies throughout Scotland ordained at least thirty-five, and possibly eleven more fasts, concerning the army or a desire for peace. The bulk of the fasts were called either when the Covenanters saw the situation in the balance or going against them. The First and Second Bishops' Wars formed a period of balance, when it appeared that either the Covenanters or the king would win all. The initiative for calling fasts at that time shifted from the localities to the central judicatories of the Kirk. Following the Covenanters' victory a hiatus appears in the observation of fasts. Despite the Scottish connections with

---

1 Baillie, i. 254.

2 SRO, KSR Ayr, ii. 34; Bensen, 'Dunfermline', p. 143.

3 SRO, SR Perth and Stirling, 11.4.1639; PR Brechin, 13.6, 13.8.1640; PR Jedburgh, 21.4.1639, 17.6, 13.8.1640; PR Dumbarton, 27.2.1641; PR Paisley, 1.4.1641; KSR Ayr, ii. 338v, 347; Kirkcaldie, pp. 179, 186; Spalding, History, i. 249, 252, 268, 271, 295; W.M. Metcalfe, A History of the County of Renfrew from the earliest times (New Club, xiii, 1905), p. 259.
Ulster and the arrival of a Covenanter army there, both the province and the army there were neglected. This suggests that the ministers, who were responsible for setting fasts, saw Ireland as peripheral to the concerns of the Covenants. The advent of the Covenanter-parliamentarian alliance brought a revival of campaigning in England and Scotland and a corresponding increase in fasts. The following quotation (from the declaration of a fast in early January 1644) is representative of causes of fasts referring to the army.

That we trust not in the expedition to the Arme of flesh, but putting our trust and confidence in God the Lord of Hosts, hee may go out with our Armies and blesse them, and them an happie success to the undertakings...

From 1644 to 1646 (inclusive) the Covenanters held twenty fasts, many corresponding with Montrose's year of victory. Two of the fasts were local in nature; the General Assembly called two others; the Commission of the General Assembly authorised the remainder. A three year lull followed due to a marked decrease in military operations and hostility to the Engagement. Indeed, observances of fasts for the army did not become common again until the eve of Cromwell's invasion. After Dunbar the expected increase in fasts

---


2 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folic Volume 31, f. 43.


4 SRO, KSR Old Kelso, 4.4.1647; Cupar, p. 109; Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 267.

5 SRO, PR Perth, iii. 127, 130; Kirkcaldie, p. 361; The Diary of Mr. John Lamont of Newton, 1649-71 (Maitland Club, xii, 1830), p. 20.
occurred, providing further proof that fasts for the armies were con-
templated and called for immediate causes.1 The Kirk held fasts for the
Army of the Kingdom from April to November 1651. Of five known fasts
the Commission called two;² local judicatories instituted the others.³
Although the Commission did not authorise all of the fasts in 1651,
that situation arose from the English conquest and does not weaken the
argument that in every sphere of church life the Commission reigned supreme.
Despite the desperate condition of the Covenanters in 1650-51, they could
look back to the defeat of Montrose as a sign that God's favour would return
after seeking his aid through fasts and prayers. Thus, it was plausible
from the viewpoint of contemporaries that fasting might prove that a humbled
Scotland should again enjoy the help of the Lord of Hosts.

Proclamation of days of thanksgiving by the local or national kirk also
corresponds with events, although more fitfully. Between 1640 and 1650
thanksgiving services were held for nine victories gained by the Covenanter
forces. The Second Bishops' War generated the observance of two services;
the first after Newcastle's fall and the second following the triumphant
return of Leslie's army in 1641. It is interesting to notice that the
latter was set by Charles I, the Scottish Estates and the Commission of the
General Assembly.⁴ Charles's cooperation here may be seen to be as part of
his campaign to detach the Covenanters from the English parliament. Three
years passed before the Commission authorised the next thanksgiving services,
on the occasions of the victory at Marston Moor and the fall of Newcastle.⁵

---

¹SRO, PR Elgin, i. 303; PR Stranraer, i. 206, 211; KSR Dunfermline, i. 29-v;
RCGA, iii. 50, 143-52; Cuper, p. 159; Kirkcaldie, p. 363; Diary of Lamont, p. 23.
²RCGA, iii. 341-3, 447-9; Strathbogie, pp. 199-200; Baillie, iii. 134.
³SRO, PR Paisley, 26.6.1651; KSR Belhelvie, 9, 11.11.1651; Selections from
the Records of the Kirk Session ... of Aberdeen, ed. J. Stuart (Spalding Club,
iv, 1846), p. 115.
⁴SRO, KSR Ayr, ii. 355; KSR St. Cuthbert's, Edinburgh, v. 300v.
⁵Marston Moor: SRO, PR Haddington, 17.7.1644; N.R.H., KSR Largo, 2.7.1644;
Strathbogie, p. 59; Spalding, History, ii. 254. Fall of Newcastle: Kirkcaldie,
p. 277; St. Andrews, p. 22; Spalding, History, ii. 282.
Despite the importance of the defeat of Montrose at Philiphaugh the
Commission did not respond by setting a national day of thanksgiving.
Instead the presbyteries observed a day of thanks of their own volition.¹
Middleton's successful campaign in the northeast in spring 1647 led
Brechin presbytery to proclaim a day of thanksgiving.² The Commission did
not set another day aside for thanks until the forces under Leslie crushed
the royalist risings of spring 1649. The Commission also proclaimed that
God should be praised for the Whiggamores' victory over the Engagers on the
same day in September 1648.³ Elgin presbytery observed a day of thanksgiv­ing for the victory over the laird of Plascardine at Belvenie of its own
accord.⁴ The Commission ordered a national observance of thanks for mid-May 1650, following Montrose's defeat at Carbisdale.⁵ That was the last
thanksgiving for military victory as the remaining military efforts resulted
only in defeat.

While the Kirk often held days of preaching, prayer, praise and the
singing of psalms 'for the speciall and extraordinarie favoure of god
towards the kirk and kingdom...', thanksgivings were not observed for every
occasion of victory. There are five major occasions when the kirk or its
constituent elements did not authorise thanksgivings. There were none after
the conclusion of the Treaty of Birks in 1639, nor after the fall of York,

¹Thanksgivings for Philiphaugh: Robert Trail's parish held a spontaneous one,
NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto 19, no. 68; Sunday 19 x 23 September 1645: Kirkcaldie
p. 289; St. Andrews, p. 32; Sunday 25 x 30 September 1645: SRO, PR Haddington,
24.9.1645; Sunday in October 1645: PR Ayr, 24.9, 1.10.1645; PR Brechin, i. 38.
²SRO, PR Brechin, i. 135.
³Diary of Lamont, p. 5.
⁴SRO, PR Elgin, i. 220, 222.
⁵RCGA, ii. 381-3; SRO, PR Elgin, i. 284-5; Kirkcaldie, p. 356; St. Andrews,
p. 54; Strathbogie, p. 146; Extracts from the Session Book of Hutton Parish',
Berwicks. Naturalists Club, vii (1873-5), 218. Diary of Lamont, p. 18;
Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 270.
the fall of Carlisle in June 1645, the end of fighting in the English
Civil War in 1646, nor for Lieutenant General David Leslie's successful
campaign against Alasdair MacColla in Argyll and the Hebrides. The
exclusion of these events from the days of thanksgiving indicates that
the Kirk was more apt to seek God's favour than to praise him for bestowing
it. Or conceivably it did not view these events as being of great importance.
The latter supposition is difficult to support. For Leslie's campaign at
least was of great national importance. The mystery surrounding the
exclusion of these events from days of praise will probably remain.

The Kirk offered its armies in the field more than piety; it also
provided material help for the soldiers and their dependants both by
charitable aid and assistance for military needs. In both cases the absence
of many of the account books of the kirk sessions prevents us gaining
anything more than an impressionistic picture. Furthermore, in many
instances the records of the synods and presbyteries do not contain the
financial dealings of those bodies. Yet the survival of some of this
material does provide the chance to examine the Kirk's monetary contributions
to the armies.

An examination of the charitable help presented to soldiers and their
dependants is somewhat simple. In the first place there were the recipients
who would have received relief regardless of other considerations. In that
group are included widows, orphans, women without means of support, and lame
(soldiers). Relief given to poor, sick or wounded soldiers or for their
burial might have arisen naturally from the traditions of Christian charity.
However, in some cases men received charity for no other reasons than that
they were soldiers of the Covenant. Soldiers travelling home or to war, or
prisoners of war all received charity. In most of these cases the relief
contributed by the parishes was voluntary and spontaneous; however, in
certain instances the money was collected as part of a wider effort (either
presbyterial or national). Worse than the lack of complete records is the
absence of any comparable survey of charity given to civilians between
the Reformation and Victorian times. The civilian aspect of this picture
must await further research.

The alms presented by kirk sessions to wives of active soldiers can be
dealt with briefly. Only three parishes are known to have given grants to
such women. Only Dunfermline continued the practice for longer than one
year, granting money in 1640 and 1644. Unfortunately the exact number of
beneficiaries and the amount they received is unknown.\(^1\) From this evidence
it appears that grants to wives of soldiers was not a matter of high
priority to the sessions.

It is difficult to discover the frequency and amount of incidental and
regular aid given to widows, children and unsupported female relatives of
soldiers. In the first place these recipients would have obtained relief
in the normal course of events. Consequently, it was not necessary for the
session clerk to identify them as dependants of soldiers. In at least three
instances parishes contained heirs of war casualties and there is no mention
of them receiving relief as such.\(^2\) On the other hand the records of only ten
parishes signify that war widows received aid. This aid could come in a
variety of forms. Six widows in Dysart, for instance, received their relief
in the form of food.\(^3\) Or it could be given in the form of lump grants, which
was the case for twenty-nine widows, two soldiers' sisters and one orphan in
six parishes.\(^4\) In five instances the beneficiaries were fortunate enough

---

\(^1\) Total money given 21 7s.: SRO, KSR Dunfermline, i. 32\(v\); KSR Tealing,
i. 159\(v\); Culross: Bensen, 'Dunfermline', p. 117; Extracts from the Kirk Session

\(^2\) NLS, KSR St. Andrews (Lee Papers 3483) 9.3.1648; SRO, KSR Ceres, 2.9.1644;
KSR Old Kelso, 10.6.1649.

\(^3\) SRO, KSR Dysart, ii. 54.

\(^4\) SRO, KSR Aberlady, 25.3.1641; KSR Dunfermline, i. 35, which also gave an
unspecifed number of widows £54 14s. in 1644, Ibid., 33\(v\); KSR Dysart, ii. 53;
KSR Kinglassie, i. 14; KSR Newtyle, i. 34\(v\); KSR Tyningham, i. 46\(v\), 162\(v\).
to receive a regular provision from parish funds. In one case a special collection for the relief of Lieutenant Colonel Bryson's widow collected £136 11s. 8d. from several presbyteries. This was extraordinary, because Bryson was the lieutenant colonel of the regiment raised by the ministers. The impossibility of sifting out war widows from ordinary ones places a stumbling block in the way of drawing any firm conclusions. Yet it does appear that soldiers' widows and other dependants were more likely to receive aid than their wives.

Distinguishing lame or crippled soldiers from civilians with the same handicaps is as difficult as discovering the origins of widows. Nonetheless there are records for gifts to over fifty lame soldiers in twenty-one parishes. These grants average 9s. 6d. per man, with the greatest sum being £1 and the least 3s. In one instance a lame soldier received £51 18s. in the form of a trust to support him during his apprenticeship. Unlike the widows, lame soldiers never received regular allowances. Indeed, their grants may have only been necessary to sustain them until they secured some form of employment.

On several occasions extraordinary grants of relief from either the

---

1 SRO, KSR Canongate, Edinburgh, iv. 29, one grant of 10s. per week; KSR Kinghorn, 25.2.1645, three grants of 6s. 8d. weekly; H.R.H., KSR Greenlaw, iii. 77v, a grant of 12s. per month.

2 SRO, PR Paisley, 5.6.1644; KSR Dunfermline, i. 35; KSR Livingston, 26.1.1645; Kirkcaldie, p. 109. See below pp. 269-70 for further details of the ministers' regiments.

3 H.R.H., KSR Greenlaw, 19.1.1650, 12.1, 21.2, 7.3, 25.5.1651; KSR Kettle, 7.5.1648; KSR Liff, 2.3.1645; KSR Monifieth, 31.3.1644; KSR Rothiemay, iii. 53; KSR Scone, 16.8.1640, NLS, KSR Elie (Lee Papers MS. 3153), p. 12; SRO, KSR Anstruther Wester, 31.12.1650; KSR Bervie, ix. 17v; KSR Carnbee, 13.7.1651; KSR Ceres, i. 39; KSR Cambusnethan, xxii. 9v; KSR Dalkeith, i. 27, 29v, 32, 34v; KSR Dunfermline, i. 46, 65v, 83; KSR Dron, 21.6.1648, 2.2.1651, 8.2.1652; KSR Dairsie, 29.2, 15.11.1651; KSR Fergysport-on-Draig, 17.11.1651; KSR Falkirk, 30.7.1652; KSR Falkland, i. 177; KSR Haddington, i. 57, 113v, 150v, 178v; KSR Kinneaird, i. 107; KSR Yester, ii. 70. An unknown number of lame soldiers received 10s. from Dalkeith session, KSR Dalkeith, i. 41v-3v.

4 SRO, KSR Dunfermline, i. 17v.
Committee of Estates or the Commission of the General Assembly were considered, but the only large grant came from England. The listing of names of widows, orphans and lame soldiers due to the English campaigns took some time to be drawn up. In Kirkcaldy presbytery the process lasted from February until July 1647, with the money being disbursed in December. Lanark presbytery commenced the procedure only in December 1647 and the troubles of 1648 prevented the distribution of the money until February 1649. Complications occurred in other presbyteries. Of £60,000 mentioned as the total grant, only £2,539 8s. 2d. is accounted for in the dispersals of thirty-six kirk sessions. In twenty-three parishes over 176 recipients divided just under £2,000. They were given as follows: lame - 72; widows - 42; children - 21; orphans - 16; and mothers or sisters - 11. While this grant emanated from England, its distribution was entirely in the hands of the Scottish parliament and Kirk. The financial capabilities of the one were useless without the local knowledge of the other.

In 1651 the Scottish parliament hoped to establish a pension scheme for disabled officers and soldiers. Again the church was responsible for gathering the names of those eligible. The matter does not seem to have

---

1 For efforts of listing names for the Committee of Estates see SRO, PR Biggar, 27.5.1646; PR Ayr, 7.5, 7.9.1646; KSR Ceres, i. 9; S.R.A., PR Glasgow, ii. 368; Fife, p. 144; St. Andrews, p. 33. For a like effort for the Commission of the General Assembly see SRO, SR Fife, i. 82; PR Linlithgow, 27.5.1646; PR Perth, ii. 10C2; PR Jedburgh, 15.4.1646; PR Brechin, 28.5.1646; KSR Dunfermline, i. 41v.

2 Kirkcadel, p. 307, 312-3, 316, 318. For similar examples see SRO, PR Cupar, 18.2, 22.4, 13, 20.5, 15.7.1647; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 107, 113; St. Andrews, p. 36.

3 SRO, PR Lanark, 7, 28.12.1648, 1.2, 8.3.1649.


5 SRO, PR Peebles, 8.4, 19.6.1647; PR Jedburgh, iii. 28; KSR Burntisland, 23.1.1648; KSR Dunfermline, i. 71v; KSR Kinglassie, i. 6v; KSR Old Kelso, 10.6.1649; N.L.S., KSR St. Andrews (Lee Papers 3433), 9.3.1648.
inadequate in the long term as they suffered from irregularity due to
vacancies if from no other problems. The Kirk could provide money for
exceptional instances, but was too poor and ill-equipped to do so in the
long run.

On two occasions the Kirk contrived to raise regiments by asking the
ministers for either men or money. The initial order authorising the
raising of 'ane regiment for maintainence of religion' under Colonel Arthur
Erskine laird of Scotscaig (Fife) reached the presbyteries in September
1643. In December the Commission of the General Assembly sent the presby­
teries a letter reminding them to send the men out to the rendezvous.
Nevertheless the ministers failed to perform their duty. By February 1644
Erskine had only 300 men under his command, instead of the 1,000 which usually
constituted a foot regiment. On three occasions (two in summer 1644 and
one in February 1645) the Commission demanded that the ministers send out a
man a piece or pay £40 for the outfitting of one. These additional exactions
increased the size of the regiment to 464 men in December 1644. The ministers
were hampered by theft of their recruits by lay recruiters, by laziness,
desertion, poverty, and by the difficulty of sending out men from vacant
parishes. Of more than sixty presbyteries only seventeen refer to the regiment
in their records. Only the presbytery of Dumbarton managed to complete its
levy.1 Despite all their efforts the ministers could not compare with
lansmen as military recruiters.

Recognition of that inadequacy probably persuaded the Commission to
request money rather than men from the parish ministers in 1650. On 3 July

1 E.R.C., PR Ayr, 13.9, 12.12.1643; PR Dunoon, 20.9.1643; PR Paisley, 28.9.1643;
PR Peebles, 19.9.1644; PR Dumbarton, 31.1.1644; PR Dalkeith, 6, 12, 14.12.1643,
16.1, 1.2, 19.3.1644; PR Elgin, i. 56, 99, 100; PR Haddington, 3, 21.1,
7, 28.2, 31.3, 27.5, 21.6.1644, 26.12.1644, 26.2.1645; PR Inverness, 2.11.1643,
22.5.1644; PR Jedburgh, 2.12.1643, 12.1, 7, 21.2, 27.3, 10.4, 2.10.1644,
12.1.1645; PR Linlithgow, 13.7.1643, 31.1, 25.9.1644; PR Lanark, 25.2.1644;
PR Perth, ii. 805, 827, 828-9, 847, 851, 857, 864, 866, 901, 907, 909, 911;
PR Turniff, 30.5.1644; S.A.A., PR Glasgow, ii. 297, 310; St. Andrews, pp.
15, 19; Strathclyde, pp. 5 - 0; Ann. i. 218.
1650 the presbytery of Edinburgh sent out a letter to all the presbyteries calling for the levying of a double regiment of horse (900 troopers) to joyne in so necessarie a worke for the Incouragement of others, and the stopping of the mouths of the Malicious and profane who speak evill of Ministers as though they did myle keep themselves free of public burdens... and to give a public testimonie of their willingness to resist those sectaries...1

The letter proceeded to set the contribution of each minister: those with stipends of £1,000 or over were to supply £133 6s. 8d., all other ministers were to give in £66 13s. 4d. The remaining presbytery records suggest that the ministers acted with alacrity, for several had made the assessment and delivered the money before Dunbar. There is some difficulty in determining the exact amounts collected and disbursed. Only the presbyteries of Brechin, Elgin, Perth, St. Andrews, Kirkcaldy and Stranraer mention the sums gathered in. These six presbyteries contributed £5,840 or less than ten per cent of the £66,666 13s. 8d. the Commission wished to raise. The presbyteries had less difficulty in arranging for the ministers to supply the money for the horse regiment than it did in having them send out levies in 1643. A contemporary observer states that the ministers raised a full regiment of horse (under the command of Colonel Archibald Strachan) 'freelie and franklie'.2

Having reached a discussion about the levying of regiments by the clergy it seems that we have moved a long way from an analysis of the Kirk's desire

1SRC, PR Elgin, i. 298.

2RC&A, iii. 30, 40, 112-3; presbyteries completing arrangements for sending in money before Dunbar, SRG, PR Ayr, 24.7.1650; PR Ereskine, 11, 25.7.1650 (£840); PR Dunblane, 22.7.1650; PR Deer, ii. 37-8; PR Dingwall, i. 72, 75; PR Dumbarton, 30.7.1650; PR Peebles, 20.7.1650; PR Perth, iii. 126 (£2,200); PR Stranraer, i. 204-5 (£666 13s. 4d.); St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 222; Kirkcaldie, pp. 362, 367; St. Andrews, p. 57 (£1,800); Straithoirse, p. 150. Arrears: SRC, PR Dunblane, 23.1, 3.1.1651; PR Deer, ii. 54, 57, 70, 76, 79-82; S.R.A., PR Glasgow, iv. 279; Kirkcaldie, pp. 166-70. There are records of only £6,500 being spent, RCGA, iii. 111. The average size of a 1650 regiment of horse was six troopers of 75 men each, SRO, P.A. 3.2.2., 25.6.1650. For contemporaries' impressions of the regiment see J. Nicoll, A Diary of Public Transactions, ed. D. Laing (Bannatyne Club, iii, 1836), p. 19; Baillie, iii, 113.
progressed beyond the presbyteries authorising the listing of names. 1 Considering the national situation it was not an opportune time for the ministers and elders to be expending their efforts on helping victims of past Covenanter warfare. Still the initiation of such an effort does show the human face of the Covenanter-royalist alliance.

Moving on to the relief granted to poor soldiers, a definite impression emerges of increasing need over the years. Between 1642 and 1647 the records reveal that only fifteen poor or distressed soldiers were the recipients of £25 14s. 5d. of aid. After 1647 and before June 1652 more than eighty-five indigent soldiers received £34 6s. 3d. 2 In general the grants averaged around a few shillings; however one captain received £1. 4s. 3 The increase in the number of recipients was due to the growth of the military profession within Scotland and the release of those employed in it after reorganisation or defeat. The reduction in the amount of assistance had its roots either in the general impoverishment of the parishes by years of exactions or the desire to limit grants to soldiers, who were disliked in some sections of Scotland. Nevertheless, the kirk sessions did feel compelled to provide

1 RCAA, iii. 345; SRO, PR Deer, ii. 66; PR Dunblane, 9, 20.4.1651; PR Perth, iii. 152.

2 SRO, KSR Ayr, iii. 406, 412; KSR Ashkirk, i. 35-6; KSR Bervie, ix. 7; KSR Belhelvie, ii. 99-100; KSR Ceres, i. 16v, 22v; KSR Culross, ii. 69; KSR Carnbee, 28.12.1651; KSR Dalkeith, i. 16, 35-7; KSR Dron, 6.12.1646, 30.4.1648; KSR Dunfermline, i. 72-v, 100v; KSR Dysart, ii. 98; KSR Cambusnethan, xxiii. 70v, 72v; KSR Dairsie, 24.3.1652; KSR Essil, 18.1, 19.5.1652; KSR Gargunnock, i. 36; KSR Kirknewton, i. 52v; KSR Killocony, i. 79, 102, 109v, 110v; KSR Kinglassie, i. 31, 42, 50; KSR Kinnaird, 29.10.1648; KSR Livingston, ii. 12; KSR North Leith, 29.1.1642; KSR Neustyle, i. 12, 39; KSR Old Kelso, 22.10.1648; KSR St. Adrians, Pittenweem, i. 53, 59, 60v-1; KSR 3tow, 27.1.1652; KSR Tealing, i. 12v; N.R.H., KSR Alyth, 16.9.1649; KSR Balmerino, 2.3.1649; KSR Dunino, 9.11, 4.12.1651; KSR Kenneway, 3.12.1650, 28.12.1651; KSR Kettle, 2.11.1651, 3.5.1652; KSR Tealing, 28.5.1649; Records of the Parish of Ellon, ed. T. Mair (Aberdeen 1876), p. 114.

3 SRO, KSR Tealing, i. 132v.
charity from the parish poor box to resident and itinerant soldiers.

The kirk sessions, following the dictates of traditional Christian charity, likewise provided aid for sick or wounded soldiers. Donations for the care of sick soldiers were minuscule compared with the contributions spent for the healing of the wounded. Between 1643 and 1652 only ten parishes appear to have provided for the care of over fourteen soldiers. Most of the money (£8 3s.) was granted between 1643 and 1645; from 1648 to 1652 sessions allocated only £3 1s. 8d. As illness was and is in its nature a more random event than care of wounded (which would follow a battle) it would be futile attempting to draw any conclusions about the differences in grants in the two periods. Parishes would have given aid to wounded soldiers both as a matter of course and from sympathy with the cause. However, it is not the case that sessions spent money for all of the battles fought in Scotland. Indeed, in most of the expected instances no records refer to donations for care of wounded soldiers. Only after Kilsyth, Dunbar and Inverkeithing do the session minutes mention aid rendered to the wounded Covenanters soldiers. Before Kilsyth only two injured soldiers received eight shillings. Following Kilsyth, Holy Trinity, St. Andrews alone spent £35 3s. 8d. in providing a doctor to treat the wounded in that burgh. After Dunbar expenditures on the casualties soared. Fourteen parishes contributed £174 14s. 5d. for the care of over thirty soldiers. Dunfermline and Dysart, in addition to the money spent directly on the soldiers, paid two doctors £24. 5s. for caring for the wounded. Although the Commission of

1 SRC, KSR Ayr, iii. 389v, 415; KSR Cambusnethan, xxxiii. 66v; KSR Dalkeith, i. 22; KSR Dron, 16.5.1652; KSR Haddington, i. 31v, 65, 67v; KSR Kinnaird, i. 107; KSR Markinch, 8.9.1650; KSR Newtyle, i. 38; N.R.H., KSR Balmerino, 5.5. 1650; KSR Kennoway, 2, 16, 30.11.1651.
2 SRC, KSR Largo, 27.6.1642.
3 NLS, KSR St. Andrews (Lee Papers 3483), 2, 23.10.1645.
4 SRC, KSR Ayr, iii. 140, 11-9; KSR Anstruther Wester, 29.10.1650; KSR Cambusnethan, xxiii. 69v; KSR Dunfermline, i. 115v; KSR Dysart, ii. 119v, 121; KSR Kilconquhar, i. 109v; KSR Kinglassie, i. 25v; KSR St. Adrian's, Pittenweem, i. 60; N.R.H., KSR Symington, 6.10, 10.11.1650.
5 SRC, KSR Dunfermline, i. 115v; KSR Dysart, ii. 119v.
the General Assembly ordered a collection for the wounded, the response was meagre. Two parishes raised £88 2s. for that purpose.\(^1\) During 1651 five parishes spent £90 8s. 6d. on battlefield casualties. The parishes of Hamilton and the Canongate, Edinburgh raised £138 13s. 8d. by means of another special collection.\(^2\) In 1652 aid to wounded soldiers fell to £2 6s.\(^3\) Although the armies provided surgeons and medical kits, casualties resulting from what were particularly severe defeats required the assistance of the parishes. The lack of complete records prevents an exhaustive study of money given by the sessions for medical purposes. Nevertheless it does appear true that when the demand arose they did contribute.

The same is true of the burial of soldiers, although evidence is sketchy at best. It is possible to trace the burial of eight dead soldiers in seven parishes.\(^4\) But it is probable that other parishes performed similar services after the battles in their bounds. For instance, in Auldearn parish after the battle the session supervised the burial of over two hundred men in Lawers' regiment of foot.\(^5\) Again, one can recognise the inclusion of Covenanting soldiers in the traditional charity of the parishes.

The final category receiving aid within a parish is that of travelling soldiers. In this instance the number of recipients and the amount of the grant is so small that no generalisation can be attempted. In 1642 Ayr provided three soldiers travelling to Ulster with £3 12s. In the mid 1640s three parishes allocated £3 7s. for travelling soldiers. There are no

\(^1\) SRC, KSR Canongate, Edinburgh, iv. 56; KSR Dalmellington, 13.10.1650.

\(^2\) SRC, KSR Humbie, i. 45v; KSR Ayr, iii. 193; KSR Falkland, i. 188; KSR Dalkeith, i. 67v; KSR Anstruther Wester, 16.9.1650; KSR Humbie, i. 44; KSR Canongate, Edinburgh, iv. 63.

\(^3\) SRC, KSR Essil, 21.3.1652; Parish of Ellon, p. 114.

\(^4\) The parishes spent £20 18s. on these burials and one parish provided the winding sheet, SRO, KSR Ayr, ii. 414; KSR Dunfermline, i. 43v; KSR Dalkeith, i. 41; KSR Humbie, i. 40; KSR Haddington, i. 124v, 128v; N.R.H., KSR Elairgowrie, ii. 99.

specific mentions of grants to soldiers in transit from 1646 until 1652. Then two parishes presented some soldiers with £4 16s. to assist them in their journey.¹ Aid to travelling soldiers was either a form of hospitality or a sign of attachment to the cause. It is not likely to have been a form of bribery to send the soldiers away for the number of recipients is tiny. Instead, it is another category of charitable aid given to soldiers.

In addition to these forms of charity to soldiers the parishes made grants to both unspecified officers and soldiers. It would not, however, be unreasonable to assume that these beneficiaries were either poor or travelling soldiers or both. There is some evidence to support this, for the majority of those aided and most of sums received occur in the 1651–2 period, that is, when the armies had disintegrated and the soldiers were attempting to make their ways home. Between 1640 and 1650 over forty–two soldiers (including three officers) received £41 16s. 4d.² In the years 1651 and 1652 various parishes presented three officers and over 160 enlisted men with £55 13s.³ In addition to that the rural parish of Dairsie, Fife

¹SRO, KSR Ayr, ii. 361v, 375, 389; KSR Dunfermline, i. 46; KSR Markinch, 11.1, 8, 15.2.1652; KSR Tealing, i. 163v; KSR Edinkillie, i. 82; N.R.H., KSR Symington, 3.3.1644.

²SRO, KSR Anstruther Wester, 24.9.1650; KSR Ayr, iii. 140v; KSR Dysart, i. 131; KSR Dalkeith, i. 15v, 17v, 24, 30v; KSR Ashkirk, i. 23; KSR Haddington, i. 124v, 148v; KSR Dunfermline, i. 100v; KSR Dron, 21.6.1648; KSR Falkland, i. 31, 46v; KSR Carluke, i. 14; KSR Kiloconquhar, i. 86, 10c, 107v; KSR Newburn, 12.1.1645; KSR Ormiston, 8.4.1649; KSR St. Adrians, Pittenweem, i. 61v; KSR Stow, i. 92v; KSR Salton, 22.11.1640; KSR Shotts, i. 112; N.R.H., KSR Elphinstone, ii. 46; KSR Balmerino, 24.3.1650; KSR Errol, January 1643; KSR Greenlaw, 18.4, 2.5.1650; KSR Kinnoulay, 9.2.1645, 6.10.1646; KSR Monifieth, 29.9.1650.

³N.R.H., KSR Anstruther Easter, 11.5.1652; KSR Aberdalgie, 2.5.1652; KSR Carne, 5.11.1651, 22.3, 24.5.1652; KSR Chankelkirk, 29.11.1651; KSR Kettle, 3, 7, 15, 30.5.1652; KSR Monikie, 22.2, 7.3.1652; SRO, KSR Ayr, iii. 149v–51, 193; KSR Carluke, i. 15v; KSR Auchtermuchty, i. 16, 19; KSR Dalkeith, i. 69v–71, 72; KSR Dairsie, 2.11.1651; 4.4, 9, 16, 6.6.1652; KSR Dysart, i. 111v; KSR Falkirk, 20.7.1652; KSR Falkland, i. 200v, 206; KSR Haddington, i. 188, 189, 192v, 193v–4, 195v–6v, 197v–8; KSR Kiloconquhar, i. 114; KSR Kinglassie, i. 51; KSR Markinch, 2.5.1652; Parish of Ellon, p. 114.
gave an unspecified number of gentlemen and officers £26 13s. 8d. 

Grants to soldiers in this undifferentiated category by the parishes is the clearest indication that the kirk sessions provided aid due to their sympathy with the cause of the Covenants. Or the parishes may have wished simply to provide the soldiers with money so that they would move on and not become a burden on the parish.

In the aftermath of Dunbar, however, a new type of assistance became necessary — aid to prisoners of war. On 23 October 1650 the Commission of the General Assembly addressed a letter to the presbyteries concerning this matter. The letter began with a report of the condition of the prisoners; in seven weeks 500 soldiers had died, the remainder were suffering from the cold and lack of food. The Commission insisted that the presbyteries authorise their parishes to give money for the prisoners' relief and bring it to Stirling by 14 November. The Commission reminded the presbyteries that this activity was one that only the Kirk could supervise.

The English occupation and the radical antipathies of certain presbyteries hampered the collection. For example, there is no mention of any money being collected in the Synods of Galloway and Dumfries, although both bodies received news of the special appeal. In the radical synod of Glasgow and Ayr, Glasgow and Ayr presbyteries at least sent in contributions, which totalled £845 9s. 1d. In the English occupied southeast Lowlands only two parishes gave contributions totalling £36 7s. 8d. The synod of Perth

---

1 SRC, KSR Dairsie, 9.5.1652.
2 RCGA, iii. 8c-7; SRC, P.A. 7.24, f. 42v.
3 SRC, PR Stranraer, i. 211, 215v; Univ. of Edinburgh Lib., KSR Mouswald, i. 25.
4 The amount from Ayr presbytery is incomplete, N.R.H., KSR Symington, 6.10, 15.12.1650; SRC, KSR Kirkoswald, 14.12.1650; S.R.A., PR Glasgow, iv. 11, 47.
5 SRC, KSR Falkirk, i. 162v; KSR Hutton, 22.12.1650; however, Kelso parish apparently took up a collection, KSR Old Kelso, 10, 17.11.1650.
and Stirling collected over £304. In Fife synod a mere eleven parishes sent in £975 12s. Figures from the synods north of the Tay are few; between the Tay and Moray Firth six parishes collected just over a hundred pounds. The records for the other parishes in this region are missing. By the end of 1650 forty-nine sessions had managed to collect £2,296 11s. 9d.

Money from the collection authorised in October 1650 reached Stirling slowly. In February and March 1651 the Commission chivvied the presbyteries to send in their contributions. Although the radical presbyteries diverted some of the money to the care of their soldiers captured at Hamilton, £133 6s. 8d. reached Stirling in 1651. From the English occupied zone in early 1651 one parish sent in £30. In the area still under Scottish control a minimum of thirteen parishes furnished £543 3s. 6d. Thus, by July 1651 the parishes had collected and delivered at least £2,839 15s. 3d. Some presbyteries, such as Brechin and_Deer, appear to have been unable to gather or deliver funds effectively. The latter took six months bringing

The records are entirely missing from Auchterarder and Dunkeld presbyteries. Figures from Dunblane presbytery: SRO, PR Dunblane, 12.11, 1, 24.12.1650; KSR Dron, 24.11.1650; N.R.H., KSR Aberdalgie, 3.11.1650. The Commission specially commended Stirling presbytery, yet did not mention the amount raised, RCGA, iii. 280.

2 Cumber, p. 159; SRO, KSR Dairsie, 11.11.1650, KSR Dunfermline, i. 116v; Kirkcaldie, p. 365; p. 365; SRC, KSR Burntisland, i. 194v; KSR Dysart, i. 123v; KSR Kinglassie, i. 27; KSR Kenmoss, 10.11.1650; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 229; SRC, KSR St. Adrians, Pittenweem, i. 59v, 60v; N.R.H., KSR Carnbee, 3.11.1650; KSR Largo, 10.11.1650; (other presbyteries), KSR Bisell, 17.11.1650; KSR Blairgowrie, ii. 88; KSR Kirkden, i. 7; SRC, KSR Dysce, i. 77; KSR Edinkillie, i. 54; KSR Menzuir, i. 58; KSR Kortach, i. 117v.

3 See above pp.261-2 notes 3-4, 1-2. Other parishes did make collections but failed to record the amount received: SRO, PR Dunfermline, i. 144, 154, 155-60; PR Deir, ii. 57; PR Fordyce, 26.11.1650; KSR Auchtermuchty, i. 11v; KSR Bervie, ix. 22; KSR Elgin, vii. 82; KSR Petty, 1.12.1650; KSR Soconie, i. 193; N.R.H., KSR Alyth, 9.11.1650; KSR Ardclach, 15.12.1650; KSR Newburn, i. 101; KSR Tealing, 3.11.1650.

4 RCGA, iii. 280, 286, 339.

5 SRC, PR Paisley, 10.1, 6.2.1651; KSR Ayr, iii. 154.

6 SRC, KSR Dalkeith, i. 76.

7 N.R.H., KSR Kettle, 22.6.1651; SRO, KSR Arbuthnott, i. 15; St. Andrews Lib., PP. St. Andrews, i. 240.
in the special collection, yet never managed to deliver it.\footnote{SRC, PR Brechin, 17.4.1651; PR Deer, ii. 57-8, 63-6, 68, 70, 72-3.}

The Worcester campaign made another 10,000 Scots prisoners of the Commonwealth, again requiring the intervention of the Kirk to provide relief. In this instance the role of the Kirk was of greater importance than after Dunbar. No longer could the Committee of Estates assist the prisoners. English hostility to the prisoners continued. It was a matter of little importance to Cromwell and the Rump how many Scots died before being shipped off to the North American colonies or to the West Indies. Between late September 1651 and May 1652 thirty-four parishes in eleven presbyteries (all under English occupation) collected £776 6s. 8d. for these men.\footnote{SRC, PR Paisley, 28.9.1651; SR Fife, ii. 126; KSR Auchtermuchty, i. 18v-9v; KSR Dysart, i. 131v; KSR Hutton, 2.11.1651; N.R.H., KSR Aberdalgie, 23.5.1652; KSR Greenlaw, 16.5.1652; KSR Torryburn, 28.12.1651, 11, 18.1.1652; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, ii. 249-52.}

Generally the presbyteries organised the collections after receiving petitions from the prisoners describing their wretched conditions.\footnote{SRC, KSR Wemyss, 15.2.1652; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 249.} In nineteen months the parishes had raised over £3,500 for their fellow countrymen lying in English prisons. The amount, although small in relation to the number of prisoners, is a credit to the kirk sessions when one remembers that during the period of collection their financial burdens had increased heavily due to taxation and quartering.

From September 1651 the Kirk faced the added responsibility of providing for prisoners in Scotland. The kirk of Yester, East Lothian collected £65 13s. as part of a presbyterial fundraising drive for prisoners held in Edinburgh.\footnote{SRC, KSR Yester, ii. 70-v.} For the most part the prisoners in Dundee received the collections held for prisoners kept in the country. A complete account exists only for the presbytery of St. Andrews, which raised £411 5s. 3d. between September 1651 and February 1652. A minimum of six parishes in
three other presbyteries collected £168 11s. 9d. for the prisoners. Contributions for the aid of prisoners was the single greatest charitable effort undertaken by the kirk for the armies.

Direct support for the military efforts of the Covenanters also came from the Kirk. Through voluntary loans or contributions, or the raising of regiments by ministers the Kirk played a role in sustaining the armies militarily. On three occasions - 1640-1, 1643 and 1651 - the state used the church to solicit and gather voluntary contributions to keep the armies in the field. With less regularity the Kirk acted as a cog in the logistics chain of the armies, either by collecting money or sending out goods. In both the voluntary collections and logistical assistance the Kirk as a whole was involved. When the ministers turned into recruiting agents for the Covenanting armies they went beyond their qualifications. While the efforts of the Kirk in furnishing direct assistance to the Covenanters' military power were not essential to their success, the Kirk's contributions indicate the importance of the cause to the clerical wing of the Covenant movement.

Between May 1640 and June 1641 the Covenanting ministers exhorted their flocks to give voluntary contributions for the care of the army. The records, albeit sketchy, support the opinion that the Covenanters enjoyed greater support south of the Tay than to the north. Within the synod of Lothian and Tweeddale, Dalkeith presbytery raised a voluntary contribution of £2,388 7s. 10d.**

---

1 SRO, PR Cupar, 2.10.1651; KSR Burntisland, i. 197; KSR Auchtermuchty, i. 18v-9; KSR Ceres, i. 41-v; KSR Dysart, i. 131v; KSR Kinglassie, i. 47v; KSR Wemyss, 8.2.1652; KSR Dairsie, 28.9, 15.11.1651; N.R.H., KSR Edzell, i. 20; KSR Kilrenny, 25.11.1651; KSR Largo, 28.12.1651, 19.1, 22.2.1652; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 244, 247-8. Records reveal that an additional £21 13s. 6d. was collected for unspecified prisoners of war, N.R.H., KSR Drumelzier, 23.1.1652; KSR Monikie, 28.12.1651; KSR Tealing, 8.6.1652.
by August 1640.  

Kirkcaldy presbytery, within the synod of Fife, made great exertions in 1640 for the Covenanting forces. In June the ministers contributed £2,640 towards the pay of the mercenary officers in Scottish pay. In July the presbytery delivered £666 13s. 4d. to the laird of Bogie for public expenditure. In September six parishes presented £1,298 13s. 8d. to the presbytery for regiments raised locally.  

Throughout the remainder of the Covenanting south there was strong support for voluntary gifts to the army. Few returns exist for these parishes, however. Stirling, for instance, sent in £866 13s. 8d. Whether these exertions indicate sacrifices on the part of the parishes involved is unknown.

Across the Tay the situation was different. In the synods of Angus and Mearns, and Aberdeen, the collections of the voluntary contributions were dilatory. The presbytery of Brechin, for example, took four months bringing in its money. Too few parish receipts survive to make further generalisations about that area. Information from the synod of Moray is fuller. Both Aberlour and Inverness presbyteries collected money for the voluntary contribution. The figures for Elgin presbytery are comp—

---

1 SRO, PR Dalkeith 6.8.1640. Records for the rest of Lothian and Tweeddale are poor; South Leith parish gave £1,034, South Leith Records, vol. i. ed. D. Robertson (Edinburgh, 1911), p. 34. References to collection of the voluntary contribution appear in SRO, PR Haddington, 15.7.1640, 2.9.1640; KSR Pencaitland, i. 14v; N.R.H., KSR Livingston, 30.8, 6.9.1640.


3 SRO, PR Jedburgh, 29.7, 5, 19.8, 4.9.1640, 23, 29.11.1643; PR Perth, ii. 665-6, 687; Minute Book kept by the War Committee ... in the S'rewarrty of Kirkcudbright, ed. J. Nicholson (Kirkcudbright, 1840), p. 138; Stranraer, £45 (J. Livingston, A Brief Historical Relation of the Life of Mr. John Livingston, ed. T. Houston (Edinburgh, 1848), pp. 106-7); Kilwinning £600 (Baillie, i. 265); SRO, KSR Holy Rude, Stirling, 14, 23.12.1640.

4 SRO, PR Brechin, 23.7.1640; KSR Mermuir, i. 26v.

5 In Fordoun presbytery £33 19s. 8d. from Arbuthnott parish, SFO, KSR Arbuthnott, i. 2; and £32 16s. 9d. from Kinnaid parish, KSR Kinnaid, i. 49; PR Ellon, 7.10.1640; Ellon parish £41 6s. (KSR Ellon, i. 87).

6 SRO, PR Inverness, 10.12.1640; KSR Inveraven, 25.1, 9.5.1641.
There is a possibility that the parishes of the presbytery of Orkney sent in money or food for the army. Nevertheless the parishes south of the Tay exerted themselves more for the cause of the Covenant than did those in the north of Scotland, which endured greater exactions of quartering. The usefulness of the combined contributions for the army would have been marginal at best.

Financial aid from the Kirk was not called on again until 1643, when the Irish army needed supplies. On 4 March the Privy Council passed a resolution authorising a loan of £240,000 (the equivalent of two weeks pay for the army) to be solicited by the ministers and important laymen of each presbytery. Although many presbytery records mention the loan, few specify whether anything was contributed. Fortunately the Register of the Privy Council contains the returns of the loan. Fife synod raised £7,131 6s. 8d.; Linlithgowshire sent in £2,600; and West and Mid Lothian shires contributed £5,000. Nevertheless these were small amounts when measured against the sums loaned by Edinburgh merchants and the members of the government. Their loans totalled over £100,000. The failure of this loan to reach the necessary sum may have led the state to concentrate its efforts more on taxation and sequestration to finance the armies in most of the succeeding years.

1 SRO, PR Elgin, i. 37-8.
2 W.R.H., PR Orkney (microfilm), 1.12.1640, 4.3.1641.
3 For the state of the army in England from September 1640 to June 1641, see above, pp. 201-5.
4 Only the presbytery of Kirkcaldy mentions the amount raised - £4,000, Kirkcaldie, pp. 248, 251. For references to the loan see S.R.A., PR Glasgow, i. 279-80; SRO, PR Paisley, 25.5, 8, 22.6.1643; PR Perth, ii. 771; 773, 775-7, 781, 783; SR Lothian and Tweeddale, 2.5.1643; PR Linlithgow, 22.3.1643; Fife, p. 134; St. Andrews, p. 11.
5 Only one parish in Lothian - Stow - raised a loan (£800); eight ministers outside the burgh of Edinburgh loaned £2,327 7s. 4d.; the remainder of the loans came from individuals (barring four ministers within Edinburgh who raised £2,666 13s. 4d.). Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1554-1660, ed. P.H. Brown (Edinburgh, 1905), viii. 34-30.
It was not until the occupation of much of southern Scotland by the English and the consequent loss of lands high in tax value that the Estates again turned to the Kirk for massive financial assistance. On 16 May 1651 the Committee of Moneys requested that the Commission of the General Assembly ask the ministers in the presbyteries to send in money for the army. The following day the Commission complied with the Committee's desire. The surviving records do indicate that ministers north of the Forth-Clyde line exerted themselves to collect this voluntary contribution. While it is known that the parishes contributed £50,056 14s. 8d. in all, the amounts gathered in by only eight individual parishes is discoverable. The money went towards providing the troops with pay but it caused little reduction of the soldiers' accumulated arrears.

Evidence also exists which shows that the state sometimes called upon the church to provide supplies or clothing for the armies. The former may be dispensed with quickly for few parishes over a period of eight years gave voluntary assistance for the supply of soldiers. Therefore it may be assumed that parochial contributions were not often called for towards the food supply of armies. However, on several occasions the churches were called upon to provide money for clothing soldiers. During the Second Bishops' War the churches sent clothing out to both Leslie's army in England and to

1 SRO, PA., 11.11, f. 38; RCGA, iii. 424.

2 SRO, PR Deer, ii. 73; PR Turriff, 12.6, 17.7.1651; PR Elgin, i. 329; PR Dunblane, 3, 17, 30.6.1651; PR Perth, iii. 176-80; KSR Kinmaird, i. 141; KSR Slains, i. 220; N.R.H., KSR Monifieth, 8.6.1651; KSR Tealing, 15.6.1651; Cuper, p. 164; St. Andrews, p. 62.

3 A total of £1,823 3s. 2d. has been accounted for from the parishes, SRO, PR Perth, iii. 182; KSR Abbotshall, Kirkcaldy, i. 124; KSR Wemyss, 15, 19, 29.6.1651; KSR Kinglassie, i. 37-8; KSR Ceres, i. 40; N.R.H., KSR Aberdalgie, 13.6.1651; KSR Kilrenny, 1.6, 1.7.1651; KSR Newburn, 8.6.1651; D. Stevenson, 'Financing of the Cause of the Covenants, 1638-51', Scot. Hist. Rev., li (1972), p. 121.

4 In 1640 St. Monance gave £46 5s. for the northern expedition, SRO, KSR St. Monance, i. 58v. Humbie provided £53 6s. for supplies in 1644, SRO, KSR Humbie, i. 20. Ceres presented the army with 32s. worth of bread in 1644, SRO, KSR Ceres, i. 16v. The Commission tried to raise supplies for the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant through the parishes in January 1644, SRO, PR Perth, ii. 827, 835.
the soldiers in northern Scotland. In October 1644 the Committee of Estates sent letters to the presbyteries requesting that the parishes raise contributions for 'those indigent Regiments that come frome England' and were currently serving in northern Scotland. The presbyteries of Dalkeith, Haddington and Dundee certainly pressed this collection. Two months later the Committee of Estates again requested money for the provision of 600 suits and pairs of socks and shoes for the earl of Callendar's foot at Stirling from the parishes of Stirlingshire and the presbytery of Linlithgow. The parish of Fintry in Dumbarton presbytery refused to render any contribution due to the accumulated demands upon the parish. However, the parishes in Linlithgow presbytery collected £762 14s. 8d. for the regiment. Scattered notices of collection for clothing for other forces appear until July 1645 in ecclesiastical records.

In general the attempts of the ecclesiastical bodies to raise money for the necessities of the armies appear to have been emergency measures, which were avoided when money was more plentiful. The voluntary contributions of 1640-1 and 1651 occurred during times of limited resources. The loan for the Ulster Army was a desperate measure to stave off disaster in a poorly supplied army. The collections for clothing also appear to have been authorised only when the Committee of Estates was unprepared. The monthly maintenance and the excise gave the Estates more secure sources of revenue than parochial collections. The latter would have proved

---

1. Baillie, i. 262; South Leith, p. 151; Spalding, History, i. 305.
2. SRO, PR Haddington, 16.10.1644.
3. Ibid., SRO, PR Dalkeith, 9.1.1645; KSR Ormiston, 27.11, 12.12.1644; N.R.H., KSR Tealing, i. 146v-7v; 'Extracts from the Register of the Kirk Session of Humbie, from October 1644 to April 1655', Miscellany of the Maitland Club (Maitland Club, xii, 1833), i., pt. ii. 432.
5. SRO, KSR Gargunnock, i. 33; PR Peebles, 3, 17.4.1645; KSR Kilconquhar, i. 66v.
for a godly army. It is true that this chapter has dealt with diverse topics but nevertheless they all focus on the same theme - the Kirk's interest in the army. We have seen how that interest was realised by the Commission of the General Assembly as it battled over the levies of 1651, and in what ways the Kirk attempted to assist the armies, whether by fasts and thanksgivings as ordained by the General Assembly, Commission or the presbyteries, or by parochial, regional or national aid for soldiers and their dependants, and finally by the various efforts to provide funds to put or keep the armies in the field. If one was to judge the efficacy of such measures by their degree of success, the findings would be dismal. The controversy of 1651 resulted in total defeat for the moderate Covenanting clergy. The royalist nobles and gentry recaptured national political leadership and retained it; the radical clergy rejected the Commission's authority and caused the first schism in the Scottish church since the Reformation. The Kirk's attempts to appeal to God for victory often proved fruitless, resulting instead in the humiliating defeats at Dunbar, Inverkeithing, Worcester and Dundee. In charitable work, in which the Kirk had great experience, the degree of success achieved appears more impressive than in other areas of intervention. Nonetheless, a final statement about the efforts to care for soldiers and their dependants must await studies of charity granted to civilians.

The Kirk's contributions to the military effort of the Covenanters are hard to assess. In the case of voluntary contributions and loans for the armies, these were solicited by a state facing tremendous financial demands. The absence of any monetary demands by the Scottish Estates on the Kirk between 1645 and 1651 suggests that the necessity of such exactions arose only in times of fiscal insolvency. Scotland was no longer a medieval kingdom in which a great portion of the nation's wealth lay under the control of the Kirk. Rather the civil governments of the
Covenants recognised that wealth lay in the rentals of lay landlords and in the consumption of goods by the people. Finally, the ministers' efforts to raise regiments indicate both an acknowledgement of their attachment to the Covenants and the recognition that adequate stipends meant increased social responsibility. Viewing the creation of the Ministers' regiments from that perspective they appear important, regardless of their strength. The machinations of the Kirk to control the armies or to provide for them materially died with the conquest of Scotland in 1651. Henceforth the Kirk limited its efforts to charitable endowments for soldiers, which were part of the traditional Christian heritage. As in politics, so too in military affairs, the majority of the Covenanting ministers and their spiritual heirs eventually relinquished designs which had existed and to some extent been achieved between 1639 and 1651.

1Stevenson, 'Financing the Cause', pp. 100-23.
A study of the political aspirations and activities of the armies of the Covenanters may seem insipid to those accustomed to tracing the politicisation and radicalisation of the English New Model Army. However, from the Scottish perspective the armies played an important role in the political life of the nation at various critical points in the 1640s. Generally, until the mid-1640s the Covenanters carried the army along with them in their changes of policy. After the alliance with England in 1643 royalist sentiment began to grow in the armies, but it was not until 1648 that the royalist officers delivered the armies into the control of the royalist politicians, in particular the duke of Hamilton and the earl of Lanark. The royalist triumph proved short-lived, due both to the military power of Cromwell and a rebellion by the more committed Covenanters. The autumn of 1648 witnessed the inauguration of new policies supported by the Estates and the Kirk. In an effort to demonstrate its power the Kirk forced the officers and soldiers of the Engager forces to undergo public repentance for their defiance of the Kirk in 1648. Simultaneously the Kirk, Estates and some of the army officers pursued the policy of purging the army of malignant and profane soldiers in order to secure God's favour and to create a politically reliable force. During the same period a radical form of presbyterianism developed within the army. This trend culminated in the formation of the Western Association Army, the promulgation of the Western Remonstrance and the desertion of some officers to Cromwell. Following Dunbar the royalists staged a successful, but abortive rising. Yet their return to power could only be postponed, for the committed Covenanters had split into two hostile camps. By spring 1651 the royalists had gained control of political and military affairs. Still the moderate kirk party would not accept its exclusion from the decision-making
Unfortunately, its intervention — ordering General Edward Massey to recruit only signers of the Solemn League and Covenant in England — served to distance it further from the king and failed to regain the support of the radical kirk party/Protester party. In many ways the political history of the armies of the Covenanters can be seen as a successful struggle by the royalists to gain control of them for their own ends.

The years 1639–1645 witnessed little political activity within the Covenanting armies. That which occurred was confined to plots by royalist officers. The most celebrated of them was The Incident of 1641. Despite the intrigues of the earl of Callander, lord Sinclair and Major James Turner, the armies remained loyal to the Covenanters and from 1643 to the parliamentarian alliance. On the other hand the activities of the royalist officers suggest that the Covenanters were unable to exclude royalists from their ranks at that time.

In 1646 royalist infiltration and plotting reached more serious dimensions. In the spring Charles sent letters to lord Sinclair and Lieutenant General David Leslie asking that they smooth the way for his reception in the Scots army. This formed part of the machinations of the French ambassador Montreuil, who was attempting to detach the Scots from the parliamentarians. Leslie, however, refused to be a party to the scheme.

1 See above, p. 242.


3 For discussions of politics in the armies in the early period see, Baillie, i. and ii. passim; Guthry, Memoirs, p. 158; Turner, Memoirs, pp. 21, 35–6, 38, 40; J.N. Buchanan, 'Charles I and the Scots, 1637–1649' (Univ. of Toronto Ph.D. thesis, 1965), passim; A. Lang, A History of Scotland from the Roman Occupation (Edinburgh, 1904), iii. 149–50; Stevenson, 'Covenanter', passim; Stevenson, Revolution, passim.
and did not accept his letter. Already the parliamentarians were charging the Scots with being dealers with the king and queen. Yet George Gillespie, a Scottish minister with the Commissioners, wrote that 'for the present the army is well resolved since some disaffected persons went from it'.

Simultaneously, the Covenanters' army began to experience an influx of English royalists from the king's broken forces. On 10 April 1646 the English parliamentary Commissioners at Collingham requested of their Scottish counterparts that unrepentant royalists serving in the Scottish forces be removed. A week later the Scots replied by asking for a list of the royalists. The Covenanters intended both to remove the royalists and to investigate their crimes against civilians. The English Commissioners shortly responded by supplying two lists with the names of unrepentant royalists in the Scots army. These lists contained the names of forty-three officers and twenty-four others. Although now supplied with the names of the men to be purged, the Scots appear to have done nothing until 13 May, after the arrival of Charles, the surrender of Newark and the influx of even larger numbers of Englishmen into the army. Leven issued an order forbidding all fraternisation between the Covenanting troops and royalists, as well as authorising the arrest of any royalist approaching the army. He further ordered his men to report the presence of royalists to the provost marshall for their removal so, '... that we may be justified in the integritie of our intentions, and the better to prevent all misunder­standing our ways'. Charles' reception in Newcastle was austere; Leven made elaborate precautions to prevent royalists from having access to the

1 Buchanan, Thesis, p. 530; NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 27, f. 78.


3 Ibid., pp. 3–5; Lords Journals, viii. 323.
king. Both the special order of 13 May and the security arrangements at Newcastle failed to keep royalists away from the king. Indeed the problem of ridding the army of royalists was never solved. As late as 26 December Leven was still promising to implement orders clearing the north east of royalists. The presence of these disaffected men does not appear to have had a major impact upon the commitment of the Scots to the alliance. However, it did strain the parliamentarians’ faith in the Covenanters and lessened their regard for their allies.

Possibly the questioning of the army’s loyalty led it to proclaim its allegiance to the cause more forthrightly. In late April Leven and the other chief officers in the army drew a remonstrance for circulation in Scotland against the earl of Seaforth’s royalist band. In June the entire army issued three papers proclaiming its adherence to the Covenants and abhorrence of royalism. The first paper originated from the regiments and was addressed to Leven. It protested the army’s loyalty to the reformed religion and the Solemn League and Covenant. The petition went on to request Leven to join the soldiers in a remonstrance of loyalty to the English. This second paper (known as the Declaration of 29 June 1646) was signed by three representatives from each regiment, the members of the General Staff and Leven. The Declaration contained several important points. The army refused to rest until the articles of the Covenant had been fulfilled because it had taken the oath with God in view. The paper condemned royalist connections and denied even the possibility of them. Concerning Charles’ residence in the army, the Scots claimed that it had not turned their hearts from the Covenant. Indeed, they planned to behave so that he could not hope for aid against the cause or the two kingdoms. Once peace had been

---

1 Declaration published in the Scots Army, pp. 6, 9-10, 12-3; Moderate Intelligencer, number 62, 422; A Letter from His Majesties Quarters at Newcastle (London, 1646), p. 5; Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 59/2, f. 522.

2 Lothian and Tweeddale, p. 182.
made the army promised to withdraw from England, for it had only come to assist the parliamentarians and uphold the National Covenant. The signers of the Declaration also presented a petition to the king. They first demanded reform of the Church by him according to the Scottish model. They further desired security for their privileges and for the liberties of the kingdoms. The signers believed Charles' acceptance of the Covenant would unify the kingdoms. The survivors of the past conflict pledged themselves to fight for the Covenant again, if necessary. Finally, the petitioners requested that Charles agree with the advice of parliament, so the armies could disband (or be used as the king and parliament wished), and peace could come.¹

Throughout autumn 1646 the French ambassadors Montereuil and Bellièvre negotiated between Charles and the Scots army in vain. As early as 14 September Bellièvre had extracted a promise from the army to support the restoration of Charles to his position as ruler, if he acceded to their demand of establishing presbyterianism. Yet that was the very thing he would not do, and by 26 October Bellièvre had recognised that without Charles' support nothing could be done.

S'il ne m'accorde de Presbitère, je ne puis rien faire pour lui, et pour peu qu'il retarde, je ne voy plus de certitude qu'il en tire les avantages qu'il en pouvait espérer cy-devant.

Despite the fear of some Covenanters that the soldiers would mutiny unless Charles was restored to a position of honour, the army remained loyal to the Covenant. Certainly there were some colonels who were willing to aid the king without a declaration of intent to establish presbyterianism. However, Leven forbade two of them (Sinclair and the earl of Dunfermline) access to Charles. Indeed, in January 1647 the General permitted only himself and Major General Sir James Lumsden of Innergelly to have audiences with the king. Simultaneously Bellièvre made his last throw of the dice for Charles'

¹The Declaration of His Excellency, the Earl of Leven. The General Officers and all the inferior officers and soldiers of the Scottish Army (London, 1646), nn. 3-71.
cause. He promised David Leslie the dukedom of Orkney, a Carter knighthood, captaincy of the king of England's guards, an initial grant of £6,300 st. and an annual pension of £2,100 st. Leslie refused such impressive bait, maintaining that an agreement on religion was essential. Thus the hopes of Charles, his queen and the French for aid from the Covenanters army foundered upon the officers' stubborn insistence that the king agree to the establishment of presbyterianism in England. Despite the presence of English royalists and Covenanters wishing to make an accommodation with the king, the army maintained its loyalty to the cause of the reformed kirk. Yet within little over a year after surrendering the king to the English many of the officers would shift their ground and support Charles after he had conceded much less than was demanded in Newcastle.

It is over this change in viewpoint - so interesting in itself - that one discovers a gap in the evidence. At the remodelling of the home forces and the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant in February 1647 Argyll and Leslie purged the forces of those tainted with royalist sympathies. Nonetheless the army officers were not united in support of Argyll. Major General John Middleton created a powerful party for the duke of Hamilton in 1647. His influence would be critical in gaining the army for the Engagement in spring 1648. Argyll's support among the officers was more limited - only Leven and Leslie constantly stood by him. The reduction of the officers' pay by a third in autumn 1647 due to Argyll's insistence upon retaining a standing army, probably caused him to lose the confidence of some officers.

---


2 Stevenson, *Counter-Revolution*, p. 82.

3 Turner, *Memoirs*, pp. 49-50; see above, p. 35.
In early April 1648 the Scottish New Model’s loyalty was put to the test. The Engagers had surfaced in parliament and the entire nation was being asked to choose between the king and the Kirk. At the Tailors’ Hall, Edinburgh, the supporters of the Kirk drew up a petition requiring that the army would not fight the English ‘unlesse the Kirk of Scotland doe concur therein’. Leven, Leslie, Major General John Holborne, Sir John Brown, Colonel Walter Scott and some other officers signed the petition. Their intention was that the entire army would sign it, which would present the Engagers with a considerable problem. However, Middleton backed by Sir Alexander Hamilton and Turner claimed that the petition seemed mutinous like those of Fairfax’s army. Instead of dismissing it, Middleton altered the petition to read that the officers would always submit themselves to parliament’s orders. The amended petition was then circulated and gained the signatures of all the officers. In its new form the kirk party had no use for it and discarded the petition as a means of opposing the Engagement. The majority of the army officers had proclaimed themselves by their acceptance of Middleton’s revision to be supporters of the parliament and the Engagement.

This shift from the intransigently presbyterian position of the officers in 1644–7 can be accounted for by several factors. In the first place they had always been willing to support the king, if religion was settled as it was by the Engagement (even if only superficially). Secondly, the clergy had not provided regimental chaplains from July 1647 allowing the soldiers to form their own opinions rather than under the Kirk’s direction. Finally, parliament, not the Kirk, controlled the pay and supply of the army.

1For acceptance and resistance to Engagement, see above, pp. 40–2.

2The Declaration and Propositions of his Excellency the Lord Generall Leven, and divers other Commanders of the standing Army in ... Scotland... (London, 1648), p. 6; Diplomatic Correspondence, ii. 439, 455–c; Turner, Memoirs, pp. 52–3; Baillie, iii. 45.

3See above, p. 109.
Opposition to the Estates' policies would have led to a survival crisis for the army, as well as to loss of pay arrears.

Yet the Engagement did split the army, for some officers and men remained loyal to the Kirk. Leven, Leslie, Holborne, Brown, Scott and dyvers of the commanders of the former armie, refused any charge at this time. But they were not a large enough body to create manning problems in the officer corps of the Engager army. The kirk party loyalists in the regiments of Argyll and Campbell of Ardkinglas refused to follow orders from the Engagers and remained in their quarters. Yet even the Campbell regiments contained officers who put the king before the Kirk. The officers of Major General John Holborne's regiment of foot deserted in support of the Kirk. But Turner prevented the entire regiment from mutiny. The achievement of the Engagers in creating an army and carrying so many veteran soldiers into their camp presented the kirk party with grave difficulties when it came to power in September 1648 following the Engager defeats in England and Scotland.

Not only were the Engagers successful in Scotland, but they also gained the support of the Ulster army. On 7 April 1648 the army Committee of War decided to back the Engagement as the cause of 'religion covenant king and country'. Their accession to the Engagement was not due simply to political or religious reasons. Instead, the officers were chiefly concerned about retaining their claims on back pay and ensuring a constant supply for Ulster. The Committee of War voted to send 2,100 men, including a horse regiment specially raised for the occasion. It also attempted to bring the British protestant forces into an agreement to send troops to Scotland.

---

3 NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, ff. 154-8, 160-2, 164.
However, the activities of the Ulster Army did not proceed without opposition. The Commission of the General Assembly dispatched the Rev. John Livingston of Stranraer to persuade both the army and the Carrickfergus presbytery to condemn the Engagement. The clergy accepted his advice and held a public humiliation against it. In addition, the presbytery sent preachers out to the forces in Antrim, Down and the Lagan in an attempt to dissuade them against accepting the Engagement. These manoeuvres by the clergy brought the wrath of the Engagers upon them. Yet they seem to have had some impact upon the Ulster army. The whole of the earl of Glencairn's regiment (save its lieutenant colonel), and the lieutenant colonel and major of Argyll's regiment opposed the Engagement. The Engagers never succeeded in bringing the former into their camp. Indeed, they excluded it from quartering in the army's zone of occupation. The antagonism between Glencairn's officers and the Engagers was such that they aided Colonel George Monck in surprising the Scottish garrison at Carrickfergus in September 1648. Argyll's regiment was brought over by the simple expedient of replacing the two obstreperous officers. The regiment of Colonel James Campbell of Lawers also opposed the Engagement, but it allowed itself to be shipped over to Scotland. According to Lawers the regiment marched from Scotland to England and back again and was in danger of attack during the retreat by the Engagers, for its failure to join with them. As in Scotland, the Engagement created serious divisions within the army in Ulster. They were more serious there than in Scotland, for the Engagement led to the destruction of the Ulster Army by the disintegration of its levies sent to Scotland, through flight of the loyal Covenanters, and through the capture of its surviving posts by the English parliamentarian troops.

1 Adair, pp. 147-8.
2 NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, ff. 165-6; Adair, pp. 150-1; Diplomatic Correspondence, ii. 519; Stevenson, 'Covenanters', pp. 249, 251-2.
The end of September 1648 witnessed the rise of a more committed and radical party of Covenanters to power - the kirk party. They immediately faced two problems of great magnitude: dealing with the surviving Engagers and creating an army loyal to them. Between mid-October 1648 and June 1651 the church records contain numerous instances of soldiers repenting for service in the Engager forces. Also from October 1648 to October 1650 there is much evidence of the purging of the army. By these devices both the clerical and lay wings of the kirk party were exerting their power over the army and Scottish society in general.

Following the defeat of the Engagers on 6 October 1648 the Commission of the General Assembly decided that the Solemn League and Covenant should be renewed throughout the country. In the same announcement the Commission excluded all members and supporters of the Engagement from taking the Covenant. Three days later the Commission explained the basis of its decision. The Commission stated that all civil and military posts should be purged of Engagers and royalists in order to suppress evil and to advance 'Religion and righteousness', so that God would bless the country. On 1 December 1648 the Commission made further comment on the treatment of the Engagers by the parish clergy. Not only would the Engagers be debarred from office, but they were also considered to be excommunicated and subject to examination by the clergy. Between October 1648 and early July 1649 the Church followed the policy of allowing repentant Engagers to do penance for their sin of opposing the clergy in 1648.

---

1 RCGA, ii. 80, 95-6.

2 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio Volume 29, f. 77.
Table 2.1: Engager Repentance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Nobles</th>
<th>Lairds</th>
<th>Generals</th>
<th>Colonels</th>
<th>Lieutenant Colonels</th>
<th>Majors</th>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Surgeons</th>
<th>Captain-Lieutenants</th>
<th>Captains</th>
<th>Routmasters</th>
<th>Cornets</th>
<th>Ensigns</th>
<th>Quartermasters</th>
<th>Lieutenants</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Sergeants</th>
<th>Corporals</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Unknown rank</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.10.1648-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.7.1649-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1650</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.12.1650</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1650</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.12.1650</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.1651</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>1292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Six were not colonels or officers: the earl of Crawford and lords Carnwath, Herries, Lindores, Cardross and Ogilvie.

---

Although the Commission adopted the procedure of referring nearly all (footnote continued from previous page)
officers seeking testimonies from the Church to the General Assembly of 1649, a large number were admitted to communion at this time.1 During the same period nearly two-thirds of the common and unidentified soldiers did public penance for serving in the Engagement.

The General Assembly of 1649 promulgated a more systematic method of dealing with Engagers. From 20 July 1649 until the abolition of the second Act of Classes on 2 June 1651 the Church followed a definite policy of dealing with Engagers. All former Engager soldiers above the rank of lieutenant were to appear before the Commission of the General Assembly to be examined. The remaining soldiers had to attend their local presbyteries for the same purpose.2 At the same time the Commission conceived a standard repentance order. As over one hundred of the repentant Engagers appeared before the Commission,3 it is fitting to print a typical one in complete form.

The Commission of the Generall Assembly, having considered the petition of Major Harie Gib, and having heard himselfe, personallie present, Doe referre him to the Presbyterie of Edinburgh to try evidence of his repentance, and thereafter to receive him to publik satisfaction for his accession to the late unlawful Engagement, according to his degree of guiltines, and the order prescribed.4

---

(footnote continued from previous page)

1 RCGA, ii. 145, 195, 199-200, 239, 272, 283; and see Table 8.1.
2 Kirk of Scotland, pp. 543-4.
3 See above, p. 284, note 1.
4 RCGA, ii. 394.
Although the procedures adopted in July 1649 continued in force for nearly two years, changes in circumstances occurred which allow one to separate the Engagers received in these years into three categories. From July 1649 until the end of June 1650 the Kirk faced no external pressures which would have led to an acceleration in receiving repentant Engagers. With the arrival of summer 1650 the threat of English invasion had become imminent; yet even following the invasion and the defeat at Dunbar the kirk party maintained a shaky control of the state, only relinquishing it in December 1650, allowing general recruitment into the army of all who satisfied the Church. During the last half of 1650 less than a hundred Engagers were received, of whom just over half had held charges in 1648. The period following the Public Resolutions and prior to the abolition of the Act of Classes, was called by Major Turner the time of hypocrisy. On the one hand he perceived ministers willing to accept feigned repentances as genuine, when they knew they were not. On the other hand Turner witnessed officers, such as himself, condemning the Engagement which they still believed in. As he wrote two decades later,

> If this was not to mocke the all-knoweing and allseeing God to his face, then I declare myself not to know what a fearfull sinne hypocrisy is. ¹

However, it cannot have been large numbers of Engagers that Turner was referring to. In 1651 only forty-four Engagers satisfied the Church, yet they represented a quarter of the repentant nobles, all of the generals and a third of the colonels.² It was also during this time that an entire foot regiment underwent penance and a fast, as so many former Engagers were in it.³ These were most likely to be the most recalcitrant and disliked Engagers, as their penance and acceptance had been so long delayed.

¹Turner, Memoirs, p. 94.
²See Table 8.1.
³RCGA, iii. 409 (the Caithness regiment of foot).
The investigation of references to repentant Engagers has turned up several other interesting pieces of information. The majority of repentant Engagers - over 700 - dealt only with the kirk sessions. A mere twenty-two Engagers appeared before the General Assembly. Thus, the reception of Engagers was a local affair and possibly subject to local pressures. Of nearly 1300 cases, in only fifteen do we find men who refused to do penance for the sin of supporting the wrong side. At the same time one finds only four mentions of men charged as Engagers, who had in fact deserted the army as a protest of loyalty to the Church. The numbers of men claiming to have been forced out and of volunteers was nearly the same. An examination of the cases further reveals that the kirk party did not have to rely on former Engager soldiers to man its army. There are references only to the Perth garrison, Hackett's troop of horse, Colville's company of foot and forty-three individuals as being soldiers in the Army of the Covenants at the time of their repentance. However, Engager soldiers were more willing than the godly peasantry to serve the kirk party. The Church's policy of forcing former Engagers to undergo penance had both short-term and long-term effects. Between 1648 and 1651 the penance ceremony divided the country even further than it had been in the previous years. By 1651 the rifts in Scottish society prohibited unified activity against a foreign invader. Over the longer period the former Engagers turned their backs entirely on the presbyterian clergy, which undoubtedly eased the re-establishment of episcopalianism in 1660. Thus, while the kirk party and the Church gained in the short-term by humiliating their opponents of 1648, over the years that policy worked against them.

1 See above, pp. 283-5, note 1.
2 St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 161; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, p. 152. That quite naturally led to a shortfall in the levies; see above, pp. 49-51.
3 For the levy of 1651, see above, pp. 58-61.
Another effort made by the kirk party and the Commission of the General Assembly to secure their control of the country—purging the army—also had deleterious effects. The Commission opted for this course even before the Engager forces around Stirling had surrendered. Later on 9 October 1648 the Commission conveyed its desires for an army free of royalists and Engagers to the Committee of Estates. The Commission believed that only a pure army would gain God’s favour. On 11 October the Estates acquiesced in the Commission’s demands, but did not act upon them. On the same day the Commission issued its own guidelines for remodelling the army. These state that no Engager officers or soldiers or any profane soldiers would be permitted a place in the Army of the Covenants. Engager soldiers who could prove that they had been forced out and were pious Covenanters could serve in the new army. However, they had to be examined by a minister, undergo public repentance and swear to the Solemn League and Covenant where they were quartered. Two days later the Commission sent the Estates another reminder about purging the army.1 On 10 November the synod of Lothian and Tweeddale issued the following resolution, which supported the Commission’s desire for a godly army.

That the commanderis of the present forces or any uther forces may happen to be raisit may be persones faythfull in the covenant frie from anie malignancie and sectarizme knowne to be no plunderis nor oppressouris but obedient both to civil and ecclesiastick lawis and that the souldiouris under their command may consist of such persones as hes honest testimonie that thereby profain persones and vagaboundis may not be takin in the leavies and that a solid course be takin that church disciplin be usit in the armie.2

A brief respite in the campaign against the Engagers ensued, only to start again in January 1649. On the 18th the Commission petitioned parliament (newly in session) that all Engagers, royalists, oppressors and profane persons be removed from the army. The Estates partially responded to this request (as well as to fulfilling the promise to Cromwell to remove

1RCCA, ii. 62, 80, 95–6, 98, 106–8.

Engagers from public life) and to securing their own position by passing the second Act of Classes on 23 January. The Act of Classes legally purged the army in the following manner. All officers involved in bringing the Ulster Army over and those who led the forces at Mauchline Moor, on the Preston and Stirling campaigns were banned from office for life. All former royalists previously condemned who had joined the Engagement as well as the other army officers could not hold a place of public trust for ten years and had to undergo public penance. All supporters of the Engagement and volunteers in the army were under a five year ban and had to satisfy by repentance. The fourth class consisted solely of sinners, who faced a one year ban and had to satisfy the Church.1

Shortly after the passing of the Act of Classes the Commission again began agitating for a purge of the army. On 9 February the Commission independently announced that soldiers must produce testimonials of loyalty from their kirk sessions or parish clergy or be cashiered. In early March the Commission petitioned the Estates for the establishment of a board of examiners to rout out the undesirable elements from the army. The Commission also insisted that the new levies possess testimonials or signs of purity.2 However, the Estates did not immediately act upon the wishes of the Commission, which implies that the kirk party was not merely a lay extension of the Commission and the General Assembly.

Only on 21 June did the Estates enact a statute which created shire commissions for purging the forces. The act not only authorised the cashiering of royalists and Engagers, but also that of officers who cheated soldiers of their pay and enlisted sinners and non-Covenanters, and of all anti-Covenanters, anti-clericists, blasphemers, despisers of worship and piety,  

2 RCGA, ii. 201, 225-7.
sabbath breakers, oppressors of the people, drunks, thieves and
heretics. Officers under the rank of captain could be replaced by
a nominee of the regimental colonel and the Committee of War in the
purring shire. Supernumeraries, women and boys were also to be purged.
Acceptance of a purged soldier by a captain would cause the captain's
dismissal. Officers were urged to fill up the army with loyal soldiers
from the Ulster Army. Finally, the Estates imposed deadlines on all
the shires for completion of the purging, threatening the dilatory ones
with a fine of £666 13s. 4d. The intentions of the Estates were now
clear; they only awaited implementation.

Unfortunately for the kirk party, the shires did not respond with
enthusiasm to the Act for Purging the Army. On 27 July the General
Assembly issued 'A seasonable and necessary Warning and Declaration'
which addressed the officers involved in purging. The Church advised
the officers to be diligent in their task, if they wished God’s blessing
on their activities. There is no direct evidence that this call to
action led to an acceleration of the business at hand. On 6 August,
following the failure of the shires south of the Tay to report on time,
the Estates promulgated an Act for Prolonging the Purging Report. The
shires south of the Tay were given until 1 October to submit their reports,
those north of the river had until the 15th of that month. Shortly
following this act evidence of the purge appears in the church records in
shires south of the Tay. By the end of September 1649 the presbyteries
of Jedburgh, Linlithgow, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, Cupar and St. Andrews had
investigated the troops and camp-followers in their bounds for the purpose
of removing them from the army. In only one instance are the number of

---

1 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 446-7.
2 General Assembly, pp. 204, 209.
3 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 531.
soldiers subject to purging mentioned; Cupar presbytery names two men in the forces quartered in their area as being sinners. ¹ The lack of records of the Committees of War makes a full accounting of the purges of 1649 impossible. However, the fact that the Commission of the General Assembly continued to press for purification of the army after the October deadlines suggests that the process had not finished.

Between late November 1649 and the end of February 1650 the Commission issued a stream of documents and acts dealing with purging the army. On 23 November it ordered Lieutenant General David Leslie and the garrison chaplain to remove the royalists and Engagers in Perth. Despite the willingness of these men and Perth presbytery to follow the Commission's instructions, the process had not been completed by early May 1650. ² On 2 January 1650 the Commission appointed a committee of ten ministers to work with the Committee of Estates to purge the army. The next day this joint committee apparently issued a document for the treatment of former Engager officers within the army. The officers were given permission to serve as private soldiers, if they satisfied the Estates and Church by 1 March. ³ On 4 January the Commission ordered the presbyteries to act immediately on purifying the forces within their bounds. The order specified that the reports should be filed with the presbyterial moderator or clerk between 17 January and 12 February depending on the distance of the presbytery from Edinburgh. ⁴ Although the presbyteries followed these orders, they did not act upon them with the alacrity which the Commission expected. ⁵

¹ SRO, PR Jedburgh, 15, 22.8.1649; KSR Falkirk, ii. 125; PR Dunfermline, i. 98; St. Andrews Lib., PR St. Andrews, i. 179; Cupar, pp. 147, 149; Kirkcaldy, pp. 358–9.
² RCGA, ii. 325; SRO, PR Perth, iii. 89, 95, 108, 111.
³ SRO, G.D. 45/5.1.116.
⁴ RCGA, ii. 353.
⁵ SRO, KSR Dunfermline, i. 105–v; PR Dunfermline, i. 109; KSR Wemyss, 21.1.1650; PR Peebles, 24.1, 7.3.1650; S.R.A., PR Glasgow, iii. 251.
In February the Commission increased its efforts to purge the army. On the 13th it selected a committee to deal with suspended officers consisting of fourteen ministers and three lairds. Three days later the Commission sent a remonstrance to the army officers. The document expressed the Commission’s concern at the haphazard manner of filling out testimonials and its anger at the disbanding of the committee for purging the army and the failure of the presbyteries to act on the matter.

In considering men for recruitment officers were enjoined

that respect may be had to such who are not only skilfull in warfare, but are also truelie, well affected in [the cause].

On 18 February the Commission sent the Committee of Estates a brief complaint about the suspending of the purging committee. The next day the Commission requested that the Estates revive the purging committee. The churchmen urged the Estates to fill the vacant commissions with

men of approven integritie and constant affection to the cause, and of a sobber and Christian conversation. Wee are farre from undervalueing or despysing abilitie and skill in warfare. Wee acknowledge that is verie much to be regarded.¹

Three days later the Commission again instructed the presbyteries to uplift names of royalist, Engager and sinful soldiers in their midst.² There appears to have been very little activity from that quarter, however, until the new act for purging the army in June.³

The coming of war with the English Commonwealth in the summer of 1650 intensified the campaign for purifying the army of ideologically questionable elements. On 21 June (five days before it passed an act of levy), the parliament passed an act for purging the army. The next day it appointed a committee with representatives from all three estates to carry out the purging.⁴ Amidst the Estates’ preparations for creating an army

¹RCCA, ii. 356, 360-1, 364-5.
²Ibid., 379.
³SRO, PR Peebles, 28.3.1650; PR Dalkeith, 28.3, 18.4, 23.5, 6.6, 27.8.1650; PR Elgin, i. 286. The last acted upon the colonel’s request.
that would secure God's favour and triumph over the sectarian English, Charles II visited the army at Edinburgh and Leith on 23 June. The soldiers received him with joyful shouting and fusilades of musketry and cannon fire, a very different reception from the one his father had received at Newcastle four years previously.¹ Such activities may have caused the Estates to issue instructions to the localities about listing the names of officers selected for the levies to the committee of purging.² Prior to Charles' next visit to the army in late July, the archradical Archibald Johnston of Wariston was soliciting aid for continued purges.³ On 27 July Charles returned to the army and received a greeting from the soldiers similar to the one given in June. Reportedly, the soldiers shouted:

"We have a good cause, Now let us fight for God and our king."¹

The soldiers took to drawing crowns and the royal cypher upon their sleeves; one soldier went so far as to chalk 'I am for King Charles' on his back. Kirk party men such as Wariston were appalled by such sentiments. Consequently, the Estates ordered Charles back across the Forth on 2 August.⁵

The royal visitation of the army apparently convinced the more dedicated purgers that their work had not been thorough enough. On 1 August the Commission ordered the regimental chaplains to send it lists of Engagers and sinners within their regiments, so that they could be removed.⁶ On 2, 3 and 5 August the Commission and Estates purged eighty officers and 2,000 - 3,000 'of the best men'. The purgers finished their

¹The Diary of Mr. John Lamont of Newton, 1649-71 (Maitland Club, xii, 1830), p. 20.
³NLS, MS. 2961 (Culloden Papers), f. 168.
⁴Mercurius Scoticus (Rotterdam, 1650), p. 10.
work 'concluding then they had an Army of Saints, And that they could not
be beaten...'. However, the Commission was not satisfied. On the last
day of the purging it listed as a cause of God's wrath incomplete
purging obstructed by the officers and Committee of Estates.  

There arose a party of men dedicated to carrying the purging to
perfection. Wariston and Sir John Cheisly led it in the Estates.
Colonels Gilbert Ker and Archibald Strachan represented the party of
officers who believed it was sinful to join in arms with royalists and
Engagers. Patrick Gillespie led the clerical wing. Despite the opposition
of Argyll, Leslie and some ministers, the extremists carried the day. On
16 August they conducted a further 'cleansing' of the officer corps. Indeed,
they carried on their activities until the eve of Dunbar. The disaster on
3 September did not give them pause or slacken their zeal. As late as 3
October Wariston and the lord of Brodie purged His Majesty's Lifeguard of
Foot. There are no precise figures on the number of troops purged during
the campaign, but there may have been as many as 5,000. The policy of
purging strengthened the kirk party's control of the nation in the short
term. In the face of invasion it was an unfortunate policy at best.
Purging demoralised the army, reduced its size and deprived it of many
veteran soldiers. While the defeat at Dunbar cannot be solely ascribed
to it, purging paved the way both to that disaster and to the fall of the
kirk party.

Although contemporaries quickly recognised that purging should be
dropped and instead that a national levy be employed in the face of the
English conquest of the rich Lowland recruiting ground, nearly nine months

---

1 NLS, Adv. MS. 23.7.12, f. 99; Balfour, Annales, iv. 69.
2 ROGA, iii. 13.
3 NLS, Adv. MS. 23.7.12, f. 106; SRO, P.A. 7. 24/3, f. 228; Johnston,
op. cit., ii. 19; Baillie, iii. 126-7; Nicoll, op. cit., p. 28; Stevenson,
Counter-Revolution, pp. 174-5.
4 Cal. S.P. Dom., 1650, pp. 309, 324.
passed before it was officially rejected. By 9 September the ministers of Fife appeared ready to accept an alliance with the excluded out of expediency. However, into the middle of October the Church was still hunting for royalists and Engagers to be cashiered. On 12 September the Commission rejected Charles' request to employ Engagers in the army. Three months later the Commission yielded some of its ground by passing the Public Resolutions, which allowed 'all sensible persons in the land... to join the army, if they had satisfied the Church.' Several things lay behind this change of mind. In the first place the absence of the western and more radical kirk party ministers weakened those in the Commission still desiring a pure army. On the other hand there was a sizeable body who recognised that a desperate situation could only be rectified by extravagant actions. By 2 January 1651, many of the Engager officers and nobles were back in the army. However, it would not be until 24 May 1651 that the Commission acquiesced in the repeal of the Acts of Classes. The Estates passed the Act Rescissory of the Acts of Classes on 2 June, with the clause that all still at odds with the Church must satisfy it before taking up public office. However, that saving clause was ignored and brought the Commission back into conflict with the Estates.

So far we have concentrated on the problem of royalism within the Covenanter armies to the exclusion of religious or political radicalism.

1 Ancram Correspondence, ii. 300; SRQ Fordyce, 16-18.10.1650; The Session Book of Dundonald, 1652-1711, ed. H. Paton (Edinburgh, 1836), f. 48v.
2 RCGA, iii. 48, 58.
3 Ibid., iii. 159-60.
4 Ibid., iii. 159; Baillie, iii. 125-6.
5 Ibid., iii. 129.
6 RCGA, iii. 361, 367-8, 370-1, 432, 441-3, 453-5, 459; Acts Parl. Scot., vii, part ii. 672, 676-7; Johnston, op. cit., ii. 62-3; Turner, Memoirs, p. 93. For 'no repentance' see Table 8.1 and note; for the church-state controversy, see above, pp. 239-42.
The forces of the Covenanters never developed a radical politico-religious section to the same extent as the English New Model Army. Nonetheless, a group did sprout within the army of men who sought to follow God's will as closely as possible. This body surfaced in the spring of 1648, when they opposed the Engagement and supported the church. Later in the year some of the regular army officers led the Whiggamore forces. After the victories over the Scottish royalists at Balvenie and Carbisdale this group believed that God granted his favour only to small bodies of men entirely devoted to serving him. Following the defeat of the Engagers in September 1648, some of them strongly supported purging the army to perfection. By mid-August 1650 Leslie had already separated himself from them by opposing this policy. The party's leaders were Colonels Ker and Strachan. Their rise to a position of prominence occurred quickly, as did their fall and rejection by the majority of Scotsmen.

The brief influence of the radical kirk party officers on political and military affairs began in July 1650 when Wariston, Ker and Strachan held secret talks with the officers of the English army. The extremists desired the Commonwealth officers to learn that they opposed royalists and royalism. Simultaneously fears grew within the kirk party that Charles might ally with the royalists. In an effort to allay these fears both the Estates and the Commission pressed upon Charles a declaration of penance for his father's, mother's and his own sins. He initially balked at the

---

1 See above pp. 47-8.
2 See above, pp. 52, 146, 160.
3 See above, p. 296.
4 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, p. 175.
prospect of filial denial and self-mortification. Negotiations with the Church and state failed to lead to much movement on either side.

The radical army officers stepped into this controversy and swung their weight against the king. Ker, fortified by the advice of Samuel Rutherford (the radical theorist and a minister in St. Andrews), played a leading role in drawing up the West Kirk Remonstrance on 15 August. The Remonstrance was a petition from the officers to the Committee of Estates. In it the officers totally rejected royalism, stating instead their allegiance to "the cause, covenant and kingdom." They desired that all royalists be purged from the army, the royal household and Charles' court. For they demanded

that God bee no more provoked by countenancing or sparing of them, least the Lord should desert us and cause us to partake with them in their judgement.

The officers proclaimed that a thorough purging would 'very much refresh the hearts and hands of your Lordships most faithfull and humble servants'. Underlying the petition was the officers' desire for the king's declaration of sins. A delegation composed of lord Burleigh, Sir James Holbourne, Sir John Brown and Ker (all colonels) presented the document to the Committee. That body received it with thanks and promised to implement further purgings, which it did. The following day Charles signed the declaration of sins and withdrew to Perth. The extremist officers were at the height of their power.

Despite the destruction of the purged army at Dunbar, the stock of Ker's group remained high. After the defeat the Committee of Estates commissioned Ker and Strachan to raise troops in the southwest. In the

---


2 Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 28, f. 314v; Ancram Correspondence, ii. 285, 287.

3 Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 28, f. 314v; Ancram Correspondence, ii. 286; for purging after 15 August 1650, see above pp. 294-5.
three months' existence of their army of 2,000 cavalrymen, these officers and the radical clergy of the area indulged more in political than in military activity. The kirk party radicals hoped to use the Western Association Army not only as an instrument to fight the English, but more importantly as one to place themselves in control of the national government. However, these hopes were destroyed in the one battle fought by the army on 1 December 1650 at Hamilton.\(^1\) The politico-religious legacy of this army lived on to widen further the gulf between the two elements of the kirk party throughout the 1650s.\(^2\)

The Western Association issued two Remonstrances to the Committee of Estates sitting in Stirling. On 2 October 1650 the radical clergy produced the Glasgow Remonstrance and attempted to gain signatures for it. This move met with little success. However, as the army moved south, Ker, its commander, and Strachan conferred with Patrick Gillespie, James Guthrie and John Hutcheson. Their meetings resulted in the Western Remonstrance, which was promulgated on 17 October at Dumfries. The document condemned Charles for seeking to place the royalists in power. As he had just participated in The Start—an attempt at defecting to the royalists—there was some truth in the allegation. The Remonstrance then attacked the Estates' plans to ally with the Engagers and complained that the purging had been insufficient. The Remonstrants claimed that they, too, were sinful and were not sectarians like Cromwell's troops. The Remonstrance also included attacks on the members of the Committee of Estates as covetous and oppressive, the latter attribute arising from their desire to restore Charles to the throne of England. The officers joined themselves to the other Remonstrants, signing the Dumfries document.\(^3\)

\(^1\) See above, p. 57.

\(^2\) Baillie, iii. 132; see above, pp. 242-4 for 1651 controversies; NLS, Wodrow Analecta Foil Volume 31, ff. 1-309 (Protester propaganda).

\(^3\) Baillie, iii. 115-9, 122; RCGA, iii. 95-106; Diary of Lanark, p. 24; Nicoll, op. cit., p. 32.
The Commission of the General Assembly took its time in responding to the document. However, on 25 November, after some acrimonious debate by Rutherford and James Guthrie, it condemned it as divisive. The Committee of Estates required even longer to act against the Remonstrants. On 4 June 1651 parliament passed an act against the Remonstrance and authorised the prosecution of its supporters. The Remonstrances were in any event more important in establishing the differences between the moderate and radical kirk party members than in providing the basis of an ideology for which an army could fight.

The band of Remonstrant officers was small and given to division. Besides Strachan and Ker they included ten other officers of the Army of the Covenants: Colonel Robert Hackett, Major Govan, Scoutmaster Dundas, Major Shaw of Sornbeg, Major Stewart, Sir Robert Adair of Kinhilt, the laird of Ralston, Captains Arnott and Giffeand and Lieutenant William Glendinning. Strachan became the leader of a small group of republican officers. He desired that Charles be banished or made a prisoner, believing that that would lead to Cromwell's withdrawal. During October and November he maintained a correspondence with Cromwell, communicating these hopes to him. The discovery of Strachan's secret dealings led the Remonstrants to remove him from his command and to cashier Govan and Dundas. However, fears that Ker might be angered by Strachan's discharge caused the Western Association to retain Strachan in his position, whereby he was able to surrender the remnants of its army to Cromwell after Hamilton. Most of the officers remained presbyterians and royalists to some degree. Ker had remained in communication with Rutherford after

---

1 RGGA, iii. 124-5; the Commission issued a further denunciation on 28 November 1650, Ibid., iii. 133-1; Baillie, iii. 123.

2 Acts Parl. Scot., vi, part ii. 683-4; for details of prosecutions see SRO, P.A. 11.11, ff. 71v, 89v.

Dunbar, which may have led him to reject Strachan's position. To the last Ker remained loyal to the Remonstrance, which was grudgingly royalist. The officers of the Western Association Army represented a tiny group of the officer corps of the Army of the Covenants. They were for a time more important than their numbers suggested. Yet it is doubtful whether they posed any real threat to the Stirling government or to Cromwell.

Strachan was not alone among the officers in deserting to Cromwell. As early as 8 August 1650 Major Bruce Cochrane and a Captain Ballantine, prisoners of war, signed an engagement to Cromwell. On 14 December the Commission passed an act ordering the excommunication of all sectarian sympathisers of any kind. A little less than a month later the Commission excommunicated Strachan under the provisions of that act. By 13 June 1651 Major Andrew Abernethy and William Dundas, brother to the laird of Duddingston, had been excommunicated for advising Walter Dundas the younger to surrender Edinburgh Castle. Also excommunicated were John Swinton the younger of that Ilk and Lieutenant Andrew Govan for residing with the enemy. The Commission also carried out investigations leading to the excommunication of Walter Dundas for his role in surrendering the castle, and it had opened a case against Lieutenant Robert Andrew for residing with the enemy. The Estates naturally took a part in prosecuting deserters. All of the above mentioned with the exception of Lieutenant Robert Andrew but including Major William Johnston were under process for treason on 31 March 1651. On 1 July the Estates exiled Captain Robert Henderson to the north of the Tay for his part in the surrender of Edinburgh Castle. In some of the cases Cromwell had greatly benefited by the officers' conversions and

---

1 Baillie, iii. 113, 122; Nicoll, ii. iii., p. 37; Letters of Rutherford, pp. 651, 654-5.
2 RCGA, ii. 24.
3 Ibid., iii. 163-4, 215-7, 243, 377-2, 437, 484.
5 SRO, P.A. 11.11, f. 89.
from that angle they must be regarded as serious.

The failure of the sectarian sympathisers to build a party within the Scottish army underlines a basic difference between England and Scotland during the 1640s. The Covenanters had retained control of the effective agencies of civil and ecclesiastical government throughout the kingdom and been able to make them work effectively. The majority of officers remained steadfastly loyal to presbyterianism of some sort. Most of them appear to have preferred a society guided by parliament and the traditional rulers of the realm. Some were willing to follow the Church when its course deviated from parliament. But only a small minority desired to create a godly army pure from all former Engagers. And only an aberrant branch of that group thought that the godly of Scotland could be strong friends with the godly of England. In general the officer corps of the Covenanter forces were more conservative than their parliamentarian counterparts south of the border. The common soldier, with some exceptions in 1648, was willing to follow their lead. The Scottish armies did not create their own political philosophies and factions; they merely reflected those of the society which had created them.

The story of the last months of the Covenanter forces is not without political interest, but it is different to that found in England in 1647. Dunbar resulted in many changes in Scotland - the moderate kirk party was weakened in its desire to exclude Engagers and royalists, the radical portion was given its full head and the royalists reasserted themselves. In many ways it would appear wise to treat the royalist rising of October 1650 as a continuation of the problem which had existed for the Covenanters since 1639. However, two major differences distinguished it from earlier royalist insurrections. In the first place this particular rising included
men who had been Covenanters until the Engagement. Secondly, within a matter of months of the end of the rising most of the troops joined the remnant of the Army of the Covenanters at Stirling. The October rising began as part of a plot to restore Charles II to his full authority as king. However, Charles withdrew his support at the last moment. Fearful of punishment the plotters gambled that a rebellion would secure them something.

The royalist rising attracted a varied amount of support and clearly threatened the kirk party's supremacy. In addition to the presence of such longstanding royalists as the marquis of Huntly, the earls of Atholl, Airlie, Seaforth and Erroll, and lords Kintail, Ogilvie and Newburgh, there were a number of men who had supported the Covenanters until 1646 or 1648. The earl of Sinclair was the longest-standing defector. Former Covenanters, who had supported the Engagement, and who joined this rising included the earl Marischal, Major Generals John Middleton and Jonas van Druschke, Colonel Sir George Munro and Lieutenant Colonel William Hurry. After Middleton's victorious skirmish at Newtyle against Sir John Brown's cavalry force, half of lord Brechin's horse and other troops in the area deserted to the royalist army. Following this victory the royalist nobles issued a declaration of intent. Not surprisingly they condemned the Cromwellian invasion. The nobles called for unity in Scotland, but warned that they would take vengeance for any action against them or their supporters. In closing, they promised their loyalty to the presbyterian church, the king's person, power, greatness and authority, the privileges of parliament and the liberties of the subject.¹

The kirk party responded by sending Leslie north with 2,500 horse on 22 October. Two days later the Commission of the General Assembly condemned the rebellion and, showing their disapproval, excommunicated Middleton. On the 26th the Committee of Estates softened its position by issuing a

¹NLS, Adv. MS. 23.7.12, ff. 119v-21; Baillie, iii. 127-8.
general pardon to the royalists who laid down their arms in twenty days. Nine days later Leslie and Middleton signed a treaty at Strathbogie granting the royalists indemnity. In a little over a month the Commission would pass the Public Resolutions, which would allow many of the rebels to take up commissions in the army. As a further sign of the Commission's shift it permitted Middleton to do penance for his excommunication on 2 January 1651. The Estates followed a similar course; its act of levy on 20 December set the stage for the integration of the October risers and for other royalists to command and join the army. With that the Army of the Covenants became the Army of the Kingdom, a force which was almost entirely royalist in its sentiments. The army followed the king's voice in 1651, it no longer dealt with him as an enemy, a potential friend or an ally. Charles II was the master of his army.

In general the officers and soldiers of the Covenant forces appear to have been willing to accept the flow of political events around them. In only a few instances did members of the army play, or attempt to play, a major role in the shaping of political developments. The armies of the first half of the period under examination accepted generally the lead of the Estates or their equivalent and the Kirk. During 1646 the French ambassadors created a party favouring Charles I only by conceding the establishment of presbyterianism. These officers differed from the other Scottish royalists in that they demanded conditions of the king; they broke with the other Covenanters in that they placed a purely Scottish demand upon the king rather than forcing him to accept those of the English parliament as well. In any case Charles refused to play their game in that year. However, by December 1647 the king had changed his tune at least publically:

---

1 RCGA, iii. 90, 93; Ancram Correspondence, ii. 317-8; Diary of Lamont, p. 23; W.S. Douglas, *Cromwell's Scotch Campaigns: 1650-51* (London, 1898), pp. 158-61, 16
2 RCGA, iii. 171-3.

---
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether it was his new attitude, fear of the loss of arrears or the blossoming of latent royalism which brought Middleton's faction of the officer corps to the fore in April 1648 at the Tailors' Hall, Edinburgh. A minority of officers then allied with a small party of nobles and almost all of the clergy to oppose the Engagement. It is only during this period that one sees any sign of the common soldier's interest in politics. Five regiments of foot (three composed of Campbells, one from the fanatical southwest and another under the command of a kirk party officer), refused to obey the orders of the Engagers. Nevertheless, their mutinies failed to provide the spark for rebellion against the Engagers. The Whiggamore rising began with an attack against an Engager troop of horse in the southwest. Its leader was one of the kirk party officers (Colonel Robert Montgomery); however, without the support of the local clergy the rising would not have snowballed as it did. With the advent of the kirk party the officers who had signed the Tailors' Hall petition in its original form returned to command the army. It was during this period that membership of the army of 1648 became a sin and loyalty to the Covenants became a condition to enlistment. After a year of purging, the kirk party and the officers of its army split over the necessity of continuing the purification process. Part of the wing that favoured this went on to lead the Western Association Army, which in turn divided on the issue of reaching an accord with Cromwell and tolerating the sects. Thus, what occurred in the Scottish armies was the isolation and winnowing away of the more radical officers. The radical officers were committed first to presbyterianism, but also to accepting the leadership of the more radical ministers who wanted parity with the state and who sought to determine civil policy by reference to the scriptures. Religious innovations played no part in determining the focus of the officers' loyalties as they did in England. The explanation of this was the same as the reason why they did not attract any significant number of Scotsmen before the arrival of the English in the 1650s. All in
all the Scottish officers and men appear to have been willing to follow
the policies established by the ruling bodies in Scotland. In Scotland,
traditional society (where kin groups still mattered locally and
nationally), persisted throughout this period. There was no influx
of new ideas questioning the foundations of society as was taking
place in England.

Yet why else did the Scottish armies fail to develop along the radical
lines of those in England? In many respects the Scottish army differed
significantly from the English armies. The Scottish clergy were all
royalists to some degree and firmly believed in the order of society as it
was. Nor did they ignore the spiritual care of the armies to the point
where lay preaching became a necessity. The Scottish kirk was a national
church, while in England a multitude of churches developed in the 1640s,
with many varying ideas. In Scotland despite the splits into a number
of groups, the factions did not call into question the Church of Scotland
itself, which allowed relative religious uniformity to persist until summer
1651. Most important the apocalyptic vision of the Covenanters was the
victory of the reformed faith throughout Europe; such an ideal allowed the
traditional functioning of society to continue as long as it supported
that end. Kishlansky claims that a primary cause of politicisation of
the English New Model Army was the break down of parliamentary government. ¹
That never took place in Scotland, where factions in the Estates were
excluded, thus allowing unity at the centre. Nor did the problem of an
act of indemnity cause friction between the Scottish government and armies
as it did in England.² Grants of indemnity after accomplishment of
commissions of fire and sword were common practice in Scotland, and since
many campaigns of this period resembled such activities these acts never

²Ibid., pp. 186, 190.
developed into a bone of contention. While the Scottish armies suffered from irregular pay, soldiers were not subject to arrest for debt. Nor were there prolonged debates between the Estates and the army about the amount of arrears due. The initial causes of friction which existed in England and which led to the politicisation of the army were not present in Scotland. In England, parliament, or a faction in it, feared the army. Could it have been that the rulers of Scotland were on more intimate terms with their armies? That traditional societies allow more contact between the rulers and the ruled must be considered a possibility.

---

1Ibid., pp. 185-7, 198-205, 210, 212, 214-6, 218-21, 227, 238-9, 242, 248.


3To detail the differences between England and Scotland in the 1640s would be a lengthy process, which would only duplicate Stevenson’s exposition on the conservative nature of Scottish as compared with English society, Stevenson, *Counter-Revolution*, pp. 232-40.
CHAPTER NINE: THE ARMIES AND THEIR CHAPLAINS AS AGENTS OF PRESBYTERIAN EXPANSION

The armies of the Covenanters played a not unsubstantial role in the efforts to plant presbyterianism in the localities in northern England and Ulster. The Scots' exertions to extend their faith beyond the frontiers of Scotland arose not from a master plan; instead the Covenanters seized the opportunities granted to them by their occupation of two foreign lands. While the Covenanters certainly recognised that they possessed a vested interest in bringing England into line religiously with Scotland through machinations in London, the ensuing events suggest that they believed advantages could be gained by winning local populations to their beliefs. However, such chances for expansion on a local level depended upon the armies' occupation of foreign soil.

Within the armies themselves the desire to propagate the faith appears to have been restricted to distinct minorities. The private soldiers apparently showed little interest in spreading presbyterianism. Of the officers of the armies of the Second Bishops' War, the Solemn League and Covenant and Ulster, few actively promoted the development of a presbyterian system and the settling of ministers. Not surprisingly the driving force for the extension of the Covenanters' faith resided in the ministers who served the army as chaplains. A large proportion of these

---

men were committed Covenanters,¹ who believed that the expansion of
their faith was as important as ministering to the soldiers. Before
studying the effects of the Covenanter occupations and their aftermaths,
a brief description of the differences between the two occupied areas is
necessary.

The situation in England was in marked contrast to that in Ireland.
The religious geography of Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland and West­
morland differed significantly from that of Antrim, Down, Londonderry,
Tyrone and Donegal. The reasons for the Scottish presence in the two
areas further illustrates the contrast. In the four northernmost
counties of England Scots armies appeared in 1640 and again in 1644
to ensure the security of Scotland. In the case of Ulster the
Covenanter sent an army to extend their influence, protect Scottish
settlers and remove potential threats (the Irish rebels and the power
of the earl of Antrim). The situation also contrasted in the amount of
control which the Scots could exert over local affairs. In England it
was neither politic nor possible to govern the occupied areas as the
Scots might have desired. Ulster, by contrast, presented the Scots with
a region willing to accept their hegemony, despite the resistance of
Ormondist officers and episcopalian clergy. Not surprisingly the impact
of the Scottish armies and clergy in the two areas varied significantly.

The efforts undertaken by the Scots to expand presbyterianism in
the four northernmost counties of England faced more formidable obstacles
than those they would confront in Ulster. The religious geography in these
English shires was such that this alone would have hindered an attempt to
carry presbyterianism south. The fact that the occupations undertaken by

¹See above, pp. 127-33.
the Scots were interrupted (there being two periods of occupation -
1640-41 and 1644-7) almost certainly had important consequences.
Furthermore the presence of an alien force in a royalist and anti-
Scottish region could have hardly helped the army presbyteries in
their efforts. In order to assess the impact of the occupations of
northern England, it is necessary to ascertain the religious loyalties
of the civilian population.

The counties of Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland
lacked substantial pro-presbyterian elements. Indeed, it would be difficult
to imagine an area in England more antipathetic to that faith than these
counties. The eastern pair (occupied by the Scots from August 1640 to
August 1641 and again from early 1644 to February 1647) contained several
large Roman Catholic enclaves. These refuges maintained by local gentry,
include upper Teesdale from Darlington, upper Tynedale from Hexham, North
Tyne valley, Coquetdale and Weardale.1 In the predominantly protestant
areas, Bishop Richard Neile (at Durham 1617-28) had established Arminianism.
Puritan sympathisers existed within Newcastle, Sunderland, Monkwearmouth,
Hexhamshire, upper Derwentdale and one or two small villages such as
Ovingham, and Muggleswick,2 but they hardly provided the basis for
expansion. Berwick, still more of a Scottish than an English town, was a
special case in that public opinion was strongly pro-Covenanter.3 In the

1J. Bossy, The English Catholic Community (London, 1975), pp. 80, 82,
88, 428; M. James, Family. Lineage and Civil Society: a study of Society,
Politics and Mentality in the Durham Region 1500-1640 (Oxford, 1974),
pp. 139-42, 144; W. Dumble, 'Government, religion and military affairs in
Durham during the Civil War and Interregnum' (Univ. of Durham M.Litt. thesis
1978), pp. 7, 10.

2Ibid., pp. 4-6, 236; R. Howell, Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan
Revolution: A Study of the Civil War in the North (Oxford, 1967), pp. 97,
117; James, op. cit., 117-9, 130-1; S. Middlebrook, Newcastle upon Tyne
(Wakefield, 1968), p. 70.

3'Pr The Journal of John Asten, 1639', in North Country Diaries, i., ed. J.C.
west, which the Scots occupied from September 1644 to January 1647, the pattern was more discouraging still. Nearly a fifth of the gentry were Roman Catholics in 1642 but they were not leaders of substantial communities of believers.\(^1\) Protestant non-conformity was extraordinarily sparse. Only Carlisle and Kirkby Lonsdale possessed puritan lecture-ships in 1642.\(^2\) The Scots military and their chaplains faced stiffer initial obstacles in England than in Ulster.

Despite the unfavourable climate in England, the Covenanters did not compromise their beliefs. The soldiers were considered to be generally religious in carriage, and their banners proclaimed their adherence to the Covenant and presbyterianism.\(^3\) Furthermore the presence of Covenanter clergy in the army worked to reinforce the beliefs of the soldiers.\(^4\) The piety of the army, however, in no way lessened the hatred of the English for the Scots.

The record of the first occupation (August 1640 - August 1641) hardly brought credit to the Covenanters and their religion. From the first the Scottish representations stressed the necessitous condition of the army and the difficulty in obtaining supplies at a fair price. In return the English accused the army of destroying and pillaging property and imposing cess. The length of the occupation served not only to increase the complaints by the Scots, but also to intensify the dislike of the Scots and all they represented in Durham and Northumberland.\(^5\) The army's behaviour - based partially on necessity as well as rapacity -


\(^3\) Ancram Correspondence, i. 108; The Life of Mr. Robert Blair, ed. T. McCrie (Wodrow Soc., xiii (1848), p. 163; J. Buchan, Montrose (London, 1928), p. 120.


\(^5\) See above, pp. 203-6.
contributed greatly to the difficulties of softening the hearts of the inhabitants in the north east towards presbyterianism.

While the Scots faced many obstacles in propagating the faith, they possessed one solid advantage. 'All the Priests and Black-Coates' of Durham diocese had fled at their approach. Nor were there any native puritan clergy to replace the episcopalian. Such a situation favoured the Scots, and the presbyterians quickly realised they could act as they wished. On 30 August 1640 the army used the chief church of Newcastle (St. Nicholas) to celebrate its victory at Newburn. Alexander Henderson, the leading Covenanting minister, subsequently preached a sermon in which he elaborately applauded the Scottish victory and insulted the English. The soldiers acted for the presbyterian cause, destroying surplices, service books, altars, railings, founts, indeed anything which they found without a warrant from their King Jesus, who sent them out. In addition to these activities the Scots imposed the National Covenant upon the inhabitants of Newcastle. These activities were not well directed towards bringing the people of the two far north eastern English counties over into the presbyterian camp.

The presbytery of the army was of more importance to local religious affairs than these exertions. The regimental chaplains with several regimental elders held the first weekly meeting of the presbytery on 6 August before crossing the border. The presbytery followed civilian procedures in its meetings, thus making it an ideal instrument for

---

1Dumble, Thesis, p. 38; J. Fenwick, 'Christ Ruling in the Midst of His Enemies', ed. M.A. Richardson, Reprints of Rare Tracts (Newcastle, 1843), i. 52; Nalson, op. cit., i. 428; James, op. cit., p. 175.


3A Letre from an Alderman of Newcastle shewing in part the grievances there (London, 1640).


5Cal. S.P. Dom., 1640-41, p. 50; Hist. MSS. Comm., iv. 307; but see also for a contrary viewpoint, Howell, op. cit., p. 137.
expanding operations within the civilian sphere. During the period for which the records survive (6 August – 12 November 1640) the presbytery had nearly twenty ministers at its disposal at any moment.\footnote{NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, f. 30.}

After the victory at Newburn the presbytery quickly took the ecclesiastical affairs of Northumberland and Durham into its own hands. The ministers

... thought it good to help the vacant kirk of Newcastle with [daily] sermons so long as our camp is here, which they also understand to be the desire of the well affected in the city.\footnote{Ibid., f. 28.}

One must wonder what sort of 'well affected' persons the presbytery meant. The Scots' sermons predictably condemned the local Roman Catholics as 'Popish idolaters' but also criticised the protestants as lovers of the 'Babylonish brats' (a reference to the Book of Common Prayer).\footnote{Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 65, f. 37v.} The presbytery authorised a fast in early October and supplied ministers to preach in St. John's, St. Andrew's, St. Nicholas', All Hallows', Trinity House and the Chapel in Newcastle, as well as at Durham, Gateshead and North Shields.\footnote{NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, f. 29.}

By mid-October, when the lack of popular support had become apparent, the presbytery reduced the daily services to three per week.\footnote{Ibid., f. 32v.} Unfortunately, the clergy with the army in Durham city did not attend the presbytery meetings (which occurred in Newcastle), so the situation there remains open to conjecture. But since the churches there were empty of Anglican clergy, it is probable that the chaplains used the churches for military, if not civilian services.
The Scots who had invaded England to secure their own religious liberty had no qualms about restricting that of the episcopalian. The presbytery forbade services according to the Anglican rite.¹ The flight of the episcopalian clergy and the presbytery's ban had the desired effect. There are only two recorded cases of Church of England services at Newcastle and Durham during the Scottish occupation. The presbytery reacted promptly by sending two ministers to admonish the Scots who attended.² Interestingly, there is no record of active persecution of episcopalian clergy, suggesting that they remained away during the Scottish occupation.

As the sojourn of the Scots lengthened, English puritans from rural areas began to petition the presbytery for preachers. On 8 October Culbert Fenwick, representing the parishioners of Newburn and Stannington, requested ministers for the following Sunday; the presbytery agreed to supply them. Furthermore it appointed a minister to Sunderland due to 'the good affection of the people' and the presence of Scottish troops there.³ Two weeks later John Fenwick approached the presbytery desiring a minister for either Newburn or East Haddon. Again the presbytery complied.⁴ By the time the record stops it had become common practice for the presbytery to appoint ministers to Newburn, Haddon-on-the-Wall and Muggleswick.⁵

The attempt to develop a presbyterian element in the north east during the first occupation proved a failure. Only little Muggleswick — and that hamlet received vocal support from George Lilburne, Mayor of Sunderland —

¹ Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 65, f. 37v.
² NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio 31, f. 29.
³ Ibid., f. 32.
⁴ Ibid., f. 33.
⁵ Ibid., ff. 33v, 30v; A Most Land of Iniquity (n.p., n.d.)
showed great interest in puritanism following the Scottish evacuation.\(^1\) Not a single Covenanting clergyman settled into a charge in Durham or Northumberland. The oligarchy of Newcastle replaced their puritan mayor with a royalist. Two returning episcopalian clergy, whom the Newcastle puritans had earlier petitioned against, received a warm welcome from their former parishioners. The stock of puritanism and presbyterianism, never high, had fallen heavily due to the Scottish occupation of 1640-1.\(^2\)

When the Scots re-occupied Northumberland and Durham in 1644 and then extended their zone of control to Cumberland and Westmorland they faced additional problems in propagating presbyterianism. All four counties had been royalist (i.e. Anglican or Roman Catholic in religion) for nearly two years. However, the royalists' control of the four counties differed. The eastern pair were aggressively for the king; the two western counties passively followed the royalist lead. The likelihood of the Scots accomplishing much without tremendous exertions in an area where inhabitants hated them as ancient foes, recent oppressors and current enemies would make even an uneventful occupation difficult.\(^3\) The Covenanter army stood firmly on two principles - presbyterianism and the right to support themselves - which would present difficulties with people of the area.\(^4\)

The first Covenanter troops to enter England were those forming the Berwick garrison. Their ability to influence religious developments indicates what the Covenanters might have achieved given the freedom to govern the four northernmost counties as they wished. Three weeks after

---

\(^1\) **Hugleswick.**

\(^2\) **Howell, op. cit., pp. 124, 142, 147.**

\(^3\) **Dumble, Thesis, pp. 55, 117; Phillips, 'Royalist North', pp. 173-5.**

\(^4\) **The Declaration of His Excellency, The Earl of Leven... (London, 1646), pp. 5-11; Diplomatic Correspondence, i. 306, 314, 386-7, 393; Hist. MSS. Comm., xxix, Portland, 220-30.**
occupying Berwick, a Scotsman (Alexander Davidson) settled as the vicar of Norham, a village within six miles of the Covenanter garrison. Davidson entered this charge despite a previous provision of it to an Englishman. He retained the benefice notwithstanding the opposition of his parishioners. He later returned the favour of protection of the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant by serving as a regimental chaplain. The case of Davidson indicates that the English counties might have been vulnerable to imposed presbyterianism, if the army had strongly supported it, if there had been a sufficient number of clergy to man the parishes, and if the English had lacked the institutions to resist the spread of that faith.

Following the invasion of January 1644, both the army and the civilians were satisfied with their respective situations. However a rapid deterioration of the soldiers' condition quickly led to disharmony between the English and the Scots. The lack of money and supplies forced the Covenanter troops to demand and confiscate them from the English, first in Northumberland and Durham and after September 1644 in Cumberland and Westmorland. Consequently the English turned against the Scots and all they stood for. The ground for the sowing of presbyterianism was soured.

In the meantime the liberation of these counties from the royalists caused their absorption into the parliamentarian structure of government. Each of the shires possessed a county committee responsible for local affairs under the jurisdiction of parliament. The counties also had sequestration committees, which often received complaints against the Scots. Parliament itself had a role in the control of the area through the Commissioners with the Army and the Committee for Plundered Ministers. Furthermore, the town governments of Newcastle, Durham and Kendal, if not

---


2 See above, pp.212-20.
the other major towns (Sunderland, Carlisle, Berwick, Hartlepool and Darlington) continued to function independently of the army. Therefore, purely civil government continued to operate in the four shires. (This situation differed significantly from Ulster where in 1644 the Scots had overall control).

What, if anything did the Scots army and ministers accomplish during their sojourn in England? The state of the records for Durham and Northumberland between 1640 and 1660 makes it impossible to discover the story from the English viewpoint. The disappearance of the army presbytery records presents a large problem in discovering the extent of Scottish involvement in local religious affairs during the second occupation. The negative evidence that the General Assembly received no petitions for ministers (as it did from Ulster) and that no one left a record of presbyterian history in the 1640s (unlike the case of Ulster) indicates that presbyterianism proved difficult to plant in northern England. Examining the situation county by county, and analysing the state of the presbyterians at the Restoration, will provide further evidence of the Scots' lack of success in establishing their faith in the north.

Northumberland had fallen entirely under the control of episcopal clergy during the earl of Newcastle's period of success. Following the fall of Newcastle, the town was purged of episcopalian clergy. A combination of visiting Scottish ministers, army chaplains and returned English puritan clergy made Newcastle a presbyterian town. The Scots, however, failed to remodel things entirely to their liking. In late 1645 Sir James Lumsden of Innergelly, Governor of Newcastle, reported with

1Phillips, 'County committees', p. 39; Dumble, Thesis, pp. 120, 126-7, 142-3.


disgust the presence of Independents there and in other towns. At the same time the County Committee reported that only eight preachers of presbyterian sympathies could be found to fill the sixty parishes of Northumberland. To remedy the situation the committee requested that parliament appoint young ministers to settle in the shire. Considering the great need for presbyterian clergy it is surprising to learn that only one Scot may have received a charge in the county during this period. However, by 1650 when six Scots were deposed because of their nationality in Northumberland, that county possessed nine Scottish presbyterian ministers. In September 1646 a letter reached parliament warning of potential dangers from returning episcopal clergy, which would arise after the Scottish departure. We may assume from this statement that the Scots played a role in repressing an Anglican resurgence. However, the efforts of the Commission to Propagate the Gospel - not those of the Scots - were responsible for the changes in the shire's religious conditions which were perceptible by the early 1650s.

The Scottish impact on Durham appears equally unimpressive. Many episcopalian clergy retained their charges during the Scottish occupation. However, the Scots managed to depose John Machin (or Mouchon), a clergyman in Durham. The county committee's report to parliament in December 1645,
subsequent to a request for information on the number of clergy available for the establishment of classes, indicates the weak condition of presbyterianism. The committee stated that only twenty-four clergy were available for the six projected classes of Darlington, Durham, Easington, Stockton, Chester and Staindrop. Or in the committee's own words 'in 60 large parishes we cannot raise above one classis'. That group included at least three Scots. Considering that there were eighty-six parishes to be filled, the number of available and well-affected clergy was inadequate.\(^1\) The Scots had a role in the planting of new ministers in the shire; but one of their choices, a certain Shaw, failed to receive a benefice despite vacancies and the support of the earl of Loudoun, Sir George Vane and Sir Richard Bellasis.\(^2\) A combination of the disappointment in not placing Shaw and the Scots' general antipathy to Independents probably explains why the earl of Lothian failed to aid the introduction of some southern English ministers recruited by Sir Henry Vane.\(^3\) The body responsible for changing the religious situation in Durham was the Commission for Propagating the Gospel. Although the Commission supplied the shire with puritan clergy, it never fostered a system of classes.\(^4\) Indeed the Commission deposed three Scots following the outbreak of war in 1650.\(^5\) Clearly Scottish efforts to promote presbyterianism in the northeast produced only meagre results.

The northwest presents a similar picture. The tremendous damage to Carlisle cathedral and its precincts after the Scottish entrance in 1645, combined with oppressive quartering in Cumbria, certainly retarded the development of presbyterianism in a region already ill-disposed to the faith. In 1645 Cumberland possessed only six presbyterian churches

\(^1\)Shaw, op. cit., ii. 368-9; Dumble, Thesis, p. 228.
\(^2\)Cal. S.P. Dom. 1645, p. 98.
\(^3\)Ancram Correspondence, i. 189.
\(^4\)Dumble, pp. 234, 247-8.
\(^5\)Bod. Lib., MS. Rawlinson A.26, ff. 423-v, but one was of Anglican sympathies, Dumble Thesis p. 272.
and lacked even a plan for the establishment of classes. Westmorland with thirty-six parishes in all did possess a plan for classes. That county, however, suffered from a deficiency of suitable ministers. During the period of Scottish occupation the presbyterian faith spread extremely slowly in the four northernmost counties of England.

If we look at the religious legacy of the Scottish occupations we see that the Scots managed to leave a small imprint in the former occupied counties. In Durham twelve clergy are identifiable as presbyterians in 1660, though seven of them subsequently conformed. The Scots presbyterians deposed in Northumberland and Durham (nineteen at most) represented over a third of the forty-three ejected clergy there. All but five had settled after Charles I's execution, and most had arrived following the establishment of the Protectorate. In Cumbria the period of the interregnum had not led to a development of a presbyterian movement as strong as those in the northeast. Neither county established a classis in the 1650s. Of thirty-three ministers deposed by 1662 one (or at most two) were Scots, who had settled in Cumberland. The failure of these thirty plus ministers to establish a classis suggests that the majority of them were not presbyterians. The areas of strongest support for presbyterianism in England, intriguingly, had seen little or nothing of the Scots during the 1640s. Unlike Ulster, the Scottish military and clerical presence in England served only to discredit presbyterianism. The Scots had failed in England in the role

1 B. Nightingale, The Ejected of 1662 in Cumberland and Westmorland (Manchester, 1911), pp. 106-7, ii. 1292.
2 Bod. Lib., MS. Tanner 60/2, ff. 512-32.
5 Ibid., pp. xii-iii; Nightingale, op. cit., i. 106, ii. 1292; William Henderson, John Jackson (Calamy, pp. 257, 290).
of missionaries for the Covenant and its religion at the local as well as the national level.

An accurate assessment of the success of the Scots in furthering presbyterianism in Ulster between 1642 and 1648 can only be achieved by an examination of the religious developments there from the flight of the Earls through the episcopalian–Wentworthian persecutions. Although there were Scots in all the counties,¹ they lived in significant numbers in only five – Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Donegal and Tyrone. It is these five which will bear consideration here but some general comments on the religious situation in Ulster as a whole may prove helpful.

By 1639, 10,000 adult males of Scottish extraction lived in Ulster, most of them originating from the strongly presbyterian southwest Lowlands. These Ulster Scots were concentrated in the valleys and plains of Antrim, north Down and the Laggan, in other words in the rich agricultural lands. These settlers retained close ties with their homeland,² and naturally favoured their old faith. Furthermore, before Wentworth’s accession to power, the desperate need for protestant ministers forced the bishops of Down and Connor and Raphoe to accept Scots university graduates of presbyterian sympathies.³

What was the picture in the localities before the persecutions of the 1630s? The patronage exercised by various laymen helped the presbyterian cause. In Antrim James Hamilton, the first lord Clandeboye and son of a Scottish minister, planted six parishes with men of presbyterian

¹B.L., Muster Roll of Ulster c. 1630, ff. 276–81.


sympathies. Another landowner, Hugh Campbell of Oldstone, county Antrim, used his house for conventicles in the 1630s. In county Down lady Montgomery supported presbyterianism. By 1633, twenty-four parishes of presbyterian sympathy existed in these two counties.

In Londonderry, however, there were no crypto-presbyterians before 1641. Indeed, Roman Catholicism remained strong there and in the Glens of Antrim and in central Tyrone during the pre-Rebellion period. The Laggan region (comprising west Tyrone, east Donegal and south west Londonderry) where Sir William Stewart and lord Castlestewart patronised the faith, formed the western boundary of early presbyterianism. The toleration necessitated by the precarious position of the new protestant church in the 1610s and 1620s vanished in the next decade.

The rise of the Laudian faction (c. 1631) in Ireland and Wentworth's appointment as Lord Deputy in 1632 provided the foundation for the time of persecution. Wentworth's support of the episcopalian clergy was vital, because locally powerful men (Viscount Clandeboy and Archbishop James Ussher) and certain Scottish nobles (the marchioness of Hamilton and the earls of Eglinton, Linlithgow and Wigton) used their influence to protect the presbyterians. The letters of Bishop Bramhall of Londonderry to Archbishop Laud serve as a good index to the importance of Scotsmen in spreading presbyterianism as well as to the effectiveness of the persecutions. On 20 December 1634 Bramhall wrote:

1The Hamilton Manuscripts, ed. T. Lowry (Belfast, 1867), pp. 34-6, 39-41.
2Pearson, 'Settlement', ii. 534.
4J. Berkley, A Short History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland (Belfast, 1959), pp. 3-4.
5Pearson 'Settlement', ii. 775.
7Perceval-Maxwell, op. cit., p. 41.
In the great united dioceses of Down and Connor I found almost the whole resident clergy absolute irregulars, they very ebullition of Scotland, but Conformists very rare, and those rather in judgement than practice.

Bramhall suggested that all could be made well by silencing four or five of the leading nonconforming clergy.\(^1\) Several years later (7 June 1637) Bramhall reported to Laud that the leaders of the nonconforming clergy had fled to Scotland and that all would remain well-ordered if no more Scottish ministers came over. In September 1638 Bramhall informed Laud that despite support from the lower orders for the National Covenant, they possessed 'neither lords to encourage them nor ministers to incite them'.\(^2\)

The settlers' support for the National Covenant permitted the Lord Deputy to wage a thorough and successful campaign against those of presbyterian and Covenanting sympathies between 1639 and 1640. Despite a disinclination to accept the deposition of presbyterian clergy and the imposition of the Black Oath, the pro-Covenanting Scots suffered from numerous weaknesses which precluded resistance. However, riots against conformist clergy in nine parishes in Down and south Antrim during March—April 1641 showed that the victory of Wentworth and his allies was superficial. Later in the spring some Ulster protestants petitioned the English parliament concerning religious grievances.\(^3\) Yet by 1641 all the benefices in Ulster were either in the hands of conforming ministers or vacant.\(^4\) The combined campaign of Wentworth and the episcopal clergy had placed the latter firmly in control of the parishes.

\[^1\] D. Stewart, 'The History of the Presbyterian Settlements in Ireland 1641-1760' (Presbyterian Ho., Belfast, unpublished typescript), pp. 41, 44.

\[^2\] Ibid., pp. 48, 61.


Within a short time the situation degenerated into chaos. The trial of Strafford and the Ulster protestants' petition to Westminster in spring 1641 were harbingers of change. However, the cataclysm which created the opportunity for the resurgence of presbyterianism came neither from the English parliament nor from the British settlers but from the native catholic population. The Ulster Irish, having suffered in many ways since the flight of the Earls and interpreting the protestant petition as a call 'for the extirpation of Prelats and Papists...', rose on 22 October.¹ A rapid string of successes placed them in control of large areas of Ulster, threatening the positions of both English and Scots settlers. Although at least sixteen crypto-presbyterian ministers, who had conformed, remained in Ulster at the Rising's start, they reached Scotland safely by the spring of 1642.² The Rebellion caused the Scottish Estates to offer an army of 10,000 men to the king and English parliament.

The arrangements for sending an expeditionary force to Ulster required several months to negotiate. Consequently, the first contingent of the army only arrived in April 1642, but the army only reached its full strength in July. The distribution of the army's quarters is of particular interest

¹R. Bellings, History of the Confederation and War in Ireland, ed. J.T. Gilbert (Dublin, 1882), i. 15.

²Contrary to J. Reid, History of the Congregations of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, ed. W.D. Killen (Belfast, 1886), i. 31, who maintained that no presbyterian clergy resided in Ulster at the time of the Rising. Attempts to trace the parishes of the following men have resulted in no success. The ministers were David Cant, (SRO, KSR Dunfermline, i. 44v); Robert Colden (KSR Tynninghame, i. 111v); Robert Fairful, (KSR Ayr, ii. 340); James Fithy, (PR Perth, ii. 802); Alexander Foster, (PR Lanark, 4.1.1644); Patrick Glass, (PR Elgin, i. 77); Claud Hamilton, (PR Perth, ii. 783); Robert Hamilton, (Ibid., 836); John Horseburgh, (PR Peebles, 3.3.1642); Robert Leckie, (KSR Gargunnock, i. 33); William Murray, (PR Paisley, 28.7.1642); John Nairn (KSR Gargunnock, i. 41); Robert Nairn, (KSR Kinglassie, i. 15); Paul Reid, (KSR Tynninghame, i. 145v); Colin Rind, (KSR Kinnard, i. 65); Adam Watson, (KSR Tynninghame, i. 136).
in determining the influence of the Covenanting Scots in Ulster. By treaty the Covenanters received the towns of Carrickfergus and Coleraine for garrisoning and supply depots. However, the size of the army and the necessity of securing the British settlements led to an extension of the quartering area. The territory occupied by the Scots (1642-44) stretched from Limavady (just to the west of Coleraine) to the Lecale (south of Strangford Lough), with outliers in Dungannon, Mountjoy and Newry. Belfast, however, remained outside the Scottish quarters until Major General Sir Robert Munro seized it in 1644 following disputes with Ormondist officers over the Solemn League and Covenant. The Scots shared the Ards region (a part of north Down) with local British protestant regiments. In the winter of 1643-1644 three regiments returned to Scotland, which led to the abandonment of the outlying posts. Despite further reductions in manpower the army continued to quarter itself in the coastal crescent previously described.

The religious attitudes of the Ulster army were of some importance in furthering the establishment of a presbyterian system in Ulster. As Leven, the commander-in-chief, only remained in Ulster for a few months (July-September 1642) Munro took the opportunity to play an important role in Ulster affairs. Although the Major General accepted the Engagement in 1648, Patrick Adair (the presbyterian minister of Cairncastle from 1646), recognised him as a valuable patron of the church. Furthermore, Munro's own writings suggest that he was a pious man. Moving down the ranks leads one into an unresolvable controversy. Adair believed that the officers (particularly those of Munro's regiment) supported presbyterianism

---

1 NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, f. 3.
out of expediency, not conviction. However, the officers themselves were at least willing to pay lip-service to that faith. During the protracted discussions (September 1643 to February 1644) with the Scottish Estates over the withdrawal of the army, the officers stated that '... we are affirmed to die in the Lord's cause...', and that the army existed for the '... maintenance of the protestant religion and advancing the covenant and in suppressing the rebellion in Ireland'. The common soldiers were noted as lacking in piety. Their chief interest was probably survival. However, the soldiers of the earl of Glencairn's regiment stood with the Kirk over the issue of the Engagement. In general it seems certain that while the army was not a particularly godly one, it always demonstrated tacit support for presbyterianism.

To the questionable religious commitment of the army must be added its oppressive nature. The failure of the English parliament to fulfil the terms of the treaty relating to supplies (due to the civil war) forced the army to live off those whom it had come over to protect. Thus, as in the occupations of England, the Covenanter soldiers were decried as oppressors. In the case of Ulster the levying of cess, the imposition of free quarter and the activities of poorly disciplined troops was more bearable due to the alternative - an occupation by the Irish rebels - which was certain to be bloody in addition to being materially costly.

Nonetheless, the military's importance in the re-establishment and expansion of Ulster presbyterianism cannot be underestimated. Without the advent of the army it is doubtful that any presbyterian ministers would have either visited or resided in Ulster in the 1640s. Then, ten ministers, who served as army chaplains in 1642, commenced their campaign for presbyterianism on 10 June in Carrickfergus, the site of the army

1Adair, pp. 89, 125, 150.
2NLS, Adv. MS. 33.4.8, ff. 32, 39, 142, 154.
3Adair, pp. 89, 125, 150; History of the War in Ireland from 1641 to 1653 by a British officer of the Regiment of Sir John O'worthy, ed. E. Hogan (Dublin, 1873), p. 50; see above, p. 281.
4See above, pp. 205-10.
headquarters. The army provided valuable assistance to the work of these chaplains in several ways. By pushing the Irish into isolated garrisons far from previous presbyterian parishes in Antrim and Down and by quartering outside those counties, the army presented the ministers with a safe zone in which to work. The army overawed episcopalian opposition by its very presence. Munro and other officers, who as elders attended the meetings of the presbytery, ensured strong support for its activities. Finally, the appointment of Munro as commander-in-chief of the protestant forces in Ulster in 1644 placed a committed presbyterian in the highest and most important position in Ulster. Without a Scots army capable of acting in these capacities, any efforts by presbyterian clergy would have been exercises in futility.

The army's role in planting presbyterianism receives confirmation from other sources. In 1643 a petition reached the Scottish Estates from the inhabitants of Antrim and Down, who expressed their fears over the possible withdrawal of the army. The petitioners warned the Estates that a Scottish evacuation would result in the triumph of the Irish and destruction of the 'Gospel'. In 1645 the English parliamentary Commissioners, realising the importance of Munro's army, granted the Carrickfergus presbytery several privileges. All non-Covenanters were ordered to take the Covenant; the Commissioners granted the newly appointed presbyterian clergy the tithes of their parishes; and finally, the presbytery's jurisdiction throughout Ulster was recognised and it was authorised to carry out a visitation of the Laggan.

2 Adair, p. 130.
3 Ibid., p. 95; Montgomery MSS., p. 32.
5 Adair, pp. 128-31.
The rebirth and growth of Ulster presbyterianism is directly traceable to the activities of the presbytery of the army. There is no evidence that either the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland or its Commission or the army presbytery possessed a plan for the revival and expansion of the Covenanters' religion in Ulster. Instead it appears that the presbytery reacted to the circumstances in which it found itself, thus following the pattern established by the presbytery of the Army of the Second Bishops' War. Although the chaplains and the four regimental elders who attended the first meeting of the Carrickfergus presbytery possessed powers solely over the Scottish army, the resemblance of the presbytery to its civilian counterparts readily permitted it to expand its activities into the civilian sphere. The presbytery concerned itself with founding kirk sessions, procuring ministers from Scotland, disciplining local protestant clergy and filling presbyterian parishes with ministers. The acceptance of the Solemn League and Covenant in spring 1644 throughout the entire British controlled zone of Ulster apparently inspired the presbytery to ask for an official extension of its jurisdiction.¹ That summer, Munro, now commander-in-chief of the protestant forces in Ulster, granted the presbytery jurisdiction over all the civilians in Antrim and Down, as well as the Scottish and British regiments there. To ensure compliance with the new ecclesiastical order Munro commanded both officers and civilian authorities to bring recalcitrant soldiers and civilians before the presbytery.² By September 1648 the Carrickfergus presbytery had achieved both de jure and de facto control over protestant-held Ulster's religious affairs.

¹For a detailed history of the Covenant in Ulster, see M. Perceval-Maxwell, 'The Adoption of the Solemn League and Covenant by the Scots in Ulster', Scotia, ii (1978), 3-18.

²Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 11, f. 582; Adair, p. 119.
How did the presbytery gain such impressive results in such a short period? Here the presence of the Scottish settlers who favoured presbyterianism cannot be ignored. Without their commitment to the faith of Scotland, the presbytery's efforts would have been little more than a waste of energy. The scarcity of ministers in 1642 forced the presbytery to adopt the novel policy of erecting sessions, chaired by army chaplains and supply ministers from Scotland. In that year alone, the presbytery founded fourteen kirk sessions in Antrim and Down.¹

Moreover, in at least four cases the presbyterians had to overcome the opposition of episcopalian incumbents to carry out this policy.² In the remaining ten instances only three of the parishes were definitely vacant, though all of them might have been devoid of pastoral care.³ The foundations of kirk sessions were only part of the presbytery's programme for expansion.

The necessity of obtaining trained ministers for work in Ulster presented a tremendous obstacle for the growth of presbyterianism. The year 1642 witnessed the institution of a policy which ameliorated the situation — the appointment of itinerant supply ministers by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. This device originated when the people of Antrim and Down, supported by Sir John Clotworthy and viscount Montgomery of Ards and the presbytery, petitioned the Assembly

1Ibid., pp. 96, 97.

2Ballymena, (Stewart, Scots, p. 11); Ballywater, (Ibid.); Donaghadee, (Reid, Congregations, i. 111); and Holywood, (Adair, pp. 96, 120).

3The definitely vacant parishes were Bangor, (A. Pearson, Origins of Presbyterianism in County Down (Belfast, 1948), p. 8); Kilyleagh, (Hamilton Manuscripts, p. 35); Templepatrick, (SRO, PR Elgin, 8.9.1642). The following parishes may have been vacant: Antrim, (J. Leslie, Biographical Succession Lists of the Clergy of the Diocese of Down (Eniskillen, 1936), p. 103); Cairncastle, (Ibid., p. 81); Carrickfergus, Comber, Larne, Newtonards, (Stewart, Scots, pp. 10-1); and Portaferry, (Reid, Congregations, i. 214).


for the return of the former ministers. The Assembly replied that Ulster's condition remained too unsettled for the dispatch of permanent ministers and instead appointed three groups of two ministers, each to serve for consecutive monthly periods.¹ [Dr. Stevenson has suggested that this policy sprang from the General Assembly's desire to control the church in Ulster, despite its lack of jurisdiction in the province. If that was the motivation then the Assembly showed wisdom, for the Carrickfergus presbytery consistently followed the Scottish line].

In 1643 the inhabitants favouring presbyterianism and viscount Ards again petitioned the Assembly. The petitioners requested the appointment of twelve or fourteen ministers for coastal parishes in Antrim and Down. On this occasion the Assembly sent a leet of eight supply ministers who would serve in pairs. The Assembly ignored the petitioners' fears that the lack of parochial clergy would allow the episcopalian and Jesuit missionaries to gain ground.² A third petition from Ulster in 1644 thanked the General Assembly for its efforts to retain the Scottish army in Ulster and for bringing over the '... much desired and longed for...' Solemn League and Covenant. The petitioners desired supply ministers at least, 'to keep in the dying lives of twenty-four desolate congregations who are indangered to perish for want of vision'.³ The Assembly once more responded by sending supply ministers.⁴ In 1645, in spite of petitions from Munro for a regimental chaplain, from Londonderry town and from the counties of Londonderry and Donegal for resident ministers, the General Assembly replied by appointing supply ministers. The next three years would witness renewed applications for ministers and ordinands, and

¹SRO, G.D. 26.10.19; General Assembly, 69-70; Adair, p. 100.
²General Assembly, pp. 74, 87; Letters of Consequence from Scotland (London, 1643), pp. 8a-13.
⁴Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 14, ff. 40-1v.
a repetition of the Assembly's earlier responses. But the situation regarding resident clergy was improving all the time. By 1648 supply ministers and chaplains no longer provided the personnel of the Ulster church.

Besides providing pastoral care, the presbytery worked in an important field where the army's presence proved necessary and ensured success - the disciplining of protestant clergy. This worked in several ways - incumbents were deposed and congregationalist/baptists and episcopalian were silenced. The deposition of Church of Ireland clergy had the advantage of removing opposition to the establishment of kirk sessions as well as creating vacancies for presbyterian clergy. This happened at Ballyhalbert/Ballywalter, Blaris (which consisted of two parishes), Greyabbey and the Laggan. The presbytery also deprived episcopalian in order to silence them; this was done on five occasions. In three cases episcopal officials (the archdeacon of Down and Connor, the chancellor of Down and the dean of Connor) were the victims of this policy and in two parish clergy suffered dispossession. Several of them fled to the friendly climes of Dublin. The presbytery allowed their livings to remain vacant.

The presbytery used its authority against protestant clergy in other ways. However, the presbytery managed to keep one episcopalian minister, a certain Black in Belfast, from using the Book of Common Prayer. Twice Independent or Anabaptist preachers appeared in Ulster in the early 1640s. Although the presbytery could not depose these free-lance preachers, it did appoint ministers to combat their heresies. The greatest challenge

---

1Adair, pp. 132, 136, 148; Reid, Congregations, ii. 2-4.
2Adair, p. 120; Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 21, f. 346; Scott, Fasti, vi. 369; Leslie, Down, p. 83; Montgomery MSS. p. 365.
3Adair, p. 120; Bod. Lib., MS. Carte, f. 346; Stewart, Scots, p. 11.
4Adair, p. 100.
5Ibid., pp. 99, 120.
to the presbytery's authority originated in the Route area where eight ministers (including one presbyterian) established an alternative presbytery in 1644. After a series of futile negotiations, the army condemned the Route body as illegal and false. It also deposed John Lithgow, the presbyterian incumbent there. Apparently convinced that parliament recognised only the army presbytery and probably fearful of the Scots garrison in Coleraine, the Route ministers submitted. However, in October 1645 when the English Commissioners arrived, four ministers in the Route petitioned them, complaining that the Carrickfergus body was a foreign and illegal assembly. On 6 October the Commissioners, undoubtedly influenced by the necessity of retaining Munro's and his army's loyalty, rejected the petition. This is the most dramatic example of the presbytery's monopoly over ecclesiastical power throughout the British and Scottish zones of Ulster.

The most important feature of presbyterian policy was the placing of permanent ministers in parishes. The Carrickfergus presbytery discovered four sources of clergy: episcopalians willing to be converted, native Ulstermen, army chaplains and Scottish ordinands. The first group contributed five ministers holding seven parishes, three of which fell within the Scots army's zone of control. The desire to retain their benefices in face of a hostile clergy would explain these defections from episcopalianism. Three parishes - Bushmills/Billy, Ballywalter and Portaferry - received Ulstermen ordained by the presbytery as their ministers. In four parishes

1 Ibid., p. 121.
2 Ibid., pp. 120-2, 127-8; T.C.D., MS. 866 (Memoirs/Letters of the Rev. Thomas Vessey), ff. 239v-40v.
3 This group consisted of the ministers in Bright, (Reid, Congregations, i. 70); Coleraine, (J. McConnell and S. McConnell, Fasti of the Irish Presbyterian Church (Belfast, 1951), p. 51); Donaghadee, (Reid, Congregations, 111); Monreagh and St. Johnstone/Taughboyne, (Ibid., p. 200); and Ramoan, (J. Leslie, Derry Clergy and Parishes (Eniskillen, 1937), p.49).
4 Adair, p. 122, Reid, Congregations, 50, 214.
army chaplains settled as clergymen. Finally, twenty-four parishes gained Scottish ordinands, whom the presbytery ordained, as ministers. Of these thirty-seven parishes fifteen constituted refoundations of former presbyterian parishes: eleven lay in Donegal, Londonderry and Tyrone, beyond the control of Munro's forces. By 1647 what had begun as an army presbytery had transformed itself into a civilian one.

Munro's army, suffering from dearth, evacuations and defeat, became a cipher in Ulster affairs after 1646, but the presbytery's power remained unaffected. General George Monck, commander-in-chief of the protestant forces in Ulster from 1647, and Sir Charles Coote, President of Connaught and commander of the western Ulster forces, patronised the presbytery, but their interest stemmed more from political and military considerations than religious motivation. Even so, their patronage augmented the presbyterians' strength before the years of crisis following Charles I's execution.

The 30th of January 1649 was a watermark in the history of Ulster presbyterianism. From that date the Carrickfergus presbytery lost its monopoly of ecclesiastical power forever. Following the policies of the

---

1Dunluce (McConnell, Fasti, p. 5); Dundonald, (Ibid., p. 42); Holywood, (Ibid.); Ray, (A. Lecky, The Lagan and its Presbyterianism (Belfast, 1905), p. 66).

2Antrim (Adair, p. 122); Ballycarry, (Pearson, Down, p. 2); Ballymena, (Adair, p. 122); Ballymoney, (Ibid., p. 124); Banger, (Ibid., p. 122); Belfast, (Ibid., p. 124); Cairncastle (Ibid., p. 122); Carrickfergus, (Ibid., p. 124); Comber, (Ibid.); Donaghmore, (McConnell, Fasti, p. 43); Dungannon, (W. Latimer, A History of Irish Presbyterians (Belfast, 1893), p. 58); Greyabbey, (McConnell, Fasti, p. 5); Islandmagee, (Reid, Congregations, p. 161); The Lagan, (Adair, p. 130); Larne/Inver, (Ibid., p. 124); Leckpatrick, (McConnell, Fasti, p. 5); Letterkenny, (Adair, p. 130); Newry, (McConnell, Fasti, p. 49); Newtonards, (Reid, Congregations, p. 207); Ramelton, (Adair, p. 130); Raphoe/Convoy, (Lecky, Lagan, p. 73); Templecorran, (Pearson, Down, p. 2); Templepatrick, (The Old Session Book of Templepatrick Presbyterian Church, Journ. Proc. Roy. Soc. Antic. Irel., xxxi (1901), p. 163); Urney, (Adair, p. 130).

3See above, pp. 331-2, notes 3-4, 1-2.

Scottish Kirk the Ulster presbytery waged verbal battles with both royalists and republicans. By condemning the execution of Charles the presbytery brought upon itself a multitude of disasters. It became involved in a pamphlet war with Milton; schism broke out when two ministers signed the Engagement against the house of Stewart. The worst result of its stand was the renewal of anti-presbyterian persecution — this time not by episcopalians but by sectaries. Several ministers fled their charges in the face of harassment, while others were imprisoned. By opposing the royalists in Ulster and urging their parishioners to desert them the presbyterians lost their only safeguard against the parliamentarians and sowed the seeds of episcopalian persecution in the 1660s. Yet the presbyterian church in Ulster had become too strongly established to be uprooted.

Eventually, the persecution by the sectaries ceased, allowing the presbyterians a breathing period before the Restoration. From 1654 to 1660 the presbyterian clergy in Ulster received stipends from the English administration in Dublin. By 1660 seventy-four presbyterian parishes (sixty-nine of them in the counties of Antrim, Donegal, Londonderry and

---

1 News from Ireland Concerning the Proceedings of the Presbytery in the County of Antrim in Ireland (London, 1650), pp. 5-11, 28, 37, 39; W. Tisdall, The Conduct of the Dissenters in Ireland (Dublin, 1712), p. 8; Latimer, op. cit., pp. 59-60; J.B. Woodburn, The Ulster Scot (London, 1915), pp. 119-20; H. Boyd, 'The History of Coleraine from the Londoners' Plantation to the Restoration' (Queen's Univ. Belfast, M.A. Thesis 1933), pp. 132-4. The ministers who went into exile or were imprisoned due to their acceptance of Charles II were Fergus Alexander (Scott, Fasti, iii. 17); James Baty, (Pearson, 'Settlement', i. 424); John Crookshanks, (Lecky, Lagan, pp. 73, 76); Hugh Cunningham, (Pearson, 'Settlement', ii. 555); John Drysdale, (Pearson, Down, p. 16); Archibald Ferguson, (Scott, Fasti, iii. 87); David Gemmill, (Ibid., 155); John Greig, (McConnell, Fasti, p. 37); Thomas Hall, (Ibid., p. 38); Reid, (Congregations, p. 151); William Semple, (Pearson, 'Settlement', ii. 557); Andrew Stewart, (Ibid., i. 254).
Tyrone) existed in Ulster. The episcopalian restoration proceeded rapidly to depose most of these ministers. Many, however, remained in Ulster to serve their former parishioners as non-conformers. Without a doubt the period of security and power for the Carrickfergus presbytery during the Scottish occupation had played a large role in this success as had latent support for presbyterianism.

It would be helpful to look at the views of two contemporaries concerning the army and presbyterianism. The first impression is that of a presbyterian, the second of an episcopalian.

It is certain God made that army instrumental for bringing church government, according to His own institution, to Ireland — especially to the Northern parts of it — and for spreading the covenant...

But, alas! this beautiful order, appointed and settled by his Lordship lasted no longer than till the Scottish army came over and put their chaplains in our Churches; who having power, regarded not law, equity or right to back or countenance them; they turned out all the legal loyal Clergy, who would not desert Episcopacy and the service book, and take the Covenant ... and so they had more pulpits and schools to dispose of to other dominies, for whom they sent letters into Scotland.

What now may be said of the Scottish efforts to expand the areas subject to presbyterianism? Considering the conditions in England, it is easy to see the reasons for the lack of success there. The armies' behaviour, necessary as it was for the forces' survival, rapidly alienated the civilian population of the four northernmost counties. Although fear

---


2 Adair, pp. 124-6, 130, 133, 135-8; Bod. Lib., MS. Carte 9, ff. 361-v; Montgomery MS3, pp. 326, 422; Stevenson, 'Covenanter', pp. 112, 297, 308.

3 Adair, p. 90.

4 Montgomery MS3, p. 127.
of the soldiers probably caused the flight of episcopalian clergy during both occupations, it proved insufficient during the longer second occupation to cleanse the land thoroughly of 'Prelatists'. The continued functioning of the traditional town governments and the establishment of the county committees as well as that of various parliamentary committees meant that civilians retained effective control of the area's political and religious life. The Scots could not uproot and plant ministers as they chose, as they did in Ulster. Unfortunately, the disappearance of most of the army presbyteries' records prevents an exact evaluation of the Scottish efforts in northern England. However, the failure of anyone to record the activity of the presbyteries indicates that no English presbyterian perceived the organisations to be vital to the history of the church.

While England presents a picture of limited success, if not outright failure, the picture in Ulster tells a wholly different story. There again the inhabitants viewed the army as oppressive, yet they also acknowledged it as the saviour of the area from the Irish rebels. Even more important, they realised that the military presence permitted the establishment of the faith which they had espoused before the persecutions of the 1630s and the Rebellion of 1641. The threat of civilians in Antrim and Down to depart from Ulster in 1643 if the army withdrew, indicates how much they valued the army's existence. The success of Scots clergy in using the army presbytery to establish and later to expand presbyterianism in 1642-1649 is unique in the annals of early modern Europe, though it is all the more remarkable since, while accounts exist of the army helping the presbytery in deposing recalcitrant Church of Ireland clergy, there is no evidence of heavy-handed violence being used by the army of occupation.¹

¹Ibid.
In England the Scots appeared as invaders among a native people largely hostile to their unfamiliar ways. In Ulster they were seen as deliverers of related colonists from the harsh and brutal hand of an unsympathetic colonial administration and the ferocity of the rebellious natives. England was an alien land; Ulster was a colony regained.

Having compared the two efforts to expand presbyterianism, it would be useful to contrast the Covenanters' techniques with those of other militant denominations. The well-known examples of post-Reformation European armies working with clergy to establish or uproot sects are few. The Council of Blood in the Netherlands, the Spanish Imperialist forces in Bohemia and the Dragonnades differ significantly from the case of the Covenanters, in that they have gained a reputation for violence against civilians. The piety of the Spanish troops may have been greater than those in the Covenanter armies.\(^1\) However, they were not inclined to show mercy to populations which they considered heretical. The reactions to their occupations — armed rebellion or flight — were much more extreme than that which the Covenanter occupations engendered.

A greater difference between the catholic efforts at converting hostile populations and that of the Covenanters, was that the former generally acted only in pursuit of a deliberate policy. In the Netherlands, Bohemia and the Huguenot sections of France (as well as that of Calvinist Hungary and Transylvania) the operations in the localities were part of policies established in Madrid, Vienna, Paris or Rome. The forces pressing for catholicisation also benefited from being substantially better off, having two important resources which the Covenanters lacked — money and clergymen.

---

Turning to other protestant countries differences are found both between them, the catholics and the Covenanters. The Dutch followed a set policy of protestantisation which eschewed violence. They preferred to pension off catholic priests and permitted liberty of conscience but not of worship. The catholics in the protestant occupied areas of the Netherlands were placed under all possible pressure to convert, short of violent means.¹ The English New Model Army provides a final contrast to the Scots. Not only were the soldiers well-disciplined and not prone to oppress the civilian populations (save the catholic Irish) upon whom they quartered, but they did not rely upon clergymen exclusively for the purpose of disseminating its creeds. In both Scottish and Irish towns the officers and soldiers preached the doctrines of congregationalism, adult baptism and Quakerism to the civilians. Theirs was certainly the most peaceful method of planting a faith, but it was not as effective as the harsh policies of the catholic armies. In comparison with their contemporaries, the Covenanters were in the middle ground (neither wholly violent nor peaceable) and their successes depended upon the ability to be among a population already predisposed to presbyterianism.

CONCLUSION

Having reached the end of this study of the armies of the early Covenanters, certain points deserve reiteration. Much work remains to be done on these armies, particularly on the military topics. It is hoped that this thesis will prove of use both to historians of mid-seventeenth century Great Britain and Ireland and to those of early modern Europe. In the introduction two questions were raised which this study sought to answer. How closely did the Scottish Covenanting armies reflect Scottish society (or that section of the nation) which they served? Were the armies of the Covenanters godly armies? Two more questions arise and need to be considered in this conclusion: a resume of the overall issues and results of the Covenanters' activities, and an analysis of the sources on which my overall findings are based.

Historians of military organizations have often tried to relate the forces they study to the societies they served. In the present case this may be done with success. While it is true that all societies are always in a state of becoming, occasionally the process is more visible to observers. This is the situation in mid-seventeenth century Scotland. The Covenanting army, like the society from which it was recruited, was held together by feudal ties as well as those of kin.

In 1637, despite the feuing of the previous century, Scotland was "essentially feudal" as the major tenants held their land from the king. Some have seen feuing as a process which strengthened the tenantry, weakened the judicial grip of the nobles and even impoverished members of that class. A closer examination of the process of feuing, however, indicates that it provided only a

---

temporary period of prosperity for those tenants lucky enough to receive feu charters (especially for the larger tenant-feuars or bonnet lairds). Indeed, the period of feuing witnessed a large increase in the number of landless peasants. Finally, whilst some tenants did receive feuferme charters for the lands they rented, "charters to noblemen often contained a large number of territories, including whole baronies".\footnote{T.C. Smout, 'Improvements before the Improvers', Times Literary Supplement, 2.4.1982, p. 389; Sanderson, op. cit., p. 78; Smout, People, p. 137.} This tendency for the nobles to benefit from the changes of the sixteenth century has been confirmed by a study of seventeenth century Scottish agriculture.

One important characteristic which distinguished rural society in Scotland from that in England was the extent to which the country was owned and controlled by a limited number of large proprietors.\footnote{I. Whyte, Agriculture and Society in Seventeenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 29-31, 36-7, 113.} The social structure of Scotland derived from the patterns and amount of landholding. Beneath the king stood the nobles and main Highland chiefs, who were above the lairds. Here it is important to remember that Scotland was not held together by the subservient ties of deference which ruled English society. "The vertical ties of kinship and feudalism" united the kingdom of Scotland. Thus, the lairds were often dependent upon the chief of their name, and they accepted that "the nobility were the natural leaders of the community". Consequently, Scotland had more in common with the continent than it did with its southern neighbour.\footnote{Smout, People, pp. 136-7; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 19, 21-"", 29, 305, 307; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, p. 233; F. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland 1651-166 (Edinburgh, 1979), P. 90; Makey, Church, P. 6; W. Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England: A Survey to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1977), p. 100.} It should be remembered that even by the eighteenth century it was not the triumph of the bonnet laird and the disappearance of the aristocracy that was the obvious feature of Scottish society, but the reverse.

In 1637 the political power of the nobility was not fully apparent. The absentee court had led to a decline in the number
of nobles attending the Privy Council. This, combined with Charles I's promotion of bishops to important offices of state, had led to a decline in the nobility's visible political power. However, these developments are not proof that James VI had demolished the nobles' power to govern the state. Instead, he had cultivated the nobles, ruling through them. The chief grievance of the aristocracy against Charles I was their exclusion from the corridors of power. Throughout the early stages of the Covenanters' struggle the nobility served as "Scotland's traditional rulers". Although in 1643 Argyll was forced to rely upon the lower estates to gain the treaty with the English parliamentarians, he was glad of the defections of the Hamiltonian nobles to his party in 1644. In 1648 "the state (dominated by the nobility) won" the first trial of strength between the estates and the kirk.\footnote{J. Buckroyd, Church and State in Scotland 1660-1681 (Edinburgh, 1980), p. 28; J. Wormald, 'Scottish Politics 1567-1625', in The Reign of James VI and I, ed. A.G.R. Smith (London, 1973), pp. 33-6; Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 106-7; Smout, People, p. 114; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, pp. 212-3.} Between 1648 and 1650 the kirk party learned that:

Nobles and many of the greater lairds might be malignant, but the country could not be ruled without them, for there was no alternative base of power in society.\footnote{Ibid., p. 225.}

While the aristocracy enjoyed a restoration of its powers for only a few months before the Cromwellian conquest, the Restoration period would show that pretensions of the radical clergy to rule through the lesser lairds was a chimera.\footnote{Ibid., p. 241.}

In addition to their economic, social, and political power, the nobility and the greater lairds also dominated the ecclesiastical
affairs of the country from 1638. In this instance, with the exception of the General Assemblies, the powerful laymen soon "lost interest in" the Kirk. Although minor members of the laity served on the Commission of the General Assembly and the kirk sessions, that only masked the real power of the nobles and chief lairds. Until 1649 the latter were the patrons of the kirks and the paymasters of the ministers. In any case they were the richest and most powerful men in the Covenanting regime. They granted the Kirk power to harry malignant nobles and lairds (1639-1647). When the Kirk came into conflict with Covenanting governors, (the Engagement in 1648, and the recruiting controversy of 1651), it lost. The Kirk drew a large portion of its strength from the nobles and their important allies. Lacking an alliance with the aristocracy meant defeat for the clergy (for instance, the reintroductions of episcopacy by James VI and Charles II).

So far the traditional nature of Scottish society has been emphasised; we may return to the theme of transition. Into what was Scotland changing before and during the mid-seventeenth century? By 1637 Scotland was no longer a country of medieval magnates imposing their will on king, kin, and tenants alike. Already in the southwest of Scotland landownership had become divorced from wealth, and this was true to some extent of other parts of the Lowlands. The lairds, both major and bonnet, were also recipients of wealth through cash and victual incomes due to price rises and low rents. The lairds formed the backbone of the covenanting movement, and the increase in their status was reflected in both church and state. Furthermore, the estate of burgesses could not be discounted as a cipher. Thus, the nobles could still rule the community but through

1 Makey, Church, pp. 38, 46, 87-93, 152; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, p. 223-4.
2 Makey, Church, p. 6.
3 Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 19.
different means than previously. Not only did they have to take account of the lairds, and burgesses, but it was also necessary to support the Covenants in many areas to muster the traditional retinues. Finally, the style of governing the country changed.

The Covenants imposed a new type of government on Scotland, one where the centre directed the localities. From 1637 the men who became Covenanters began to construct a reliable method of control of local activities. Initially the ministers provided the link between the noble dominated Tables and the shires and presbyteries run by the lairds. From 1637 to 1640 the system of Tables – presbyteries – parishes allowed the Covenanters to control much of Scotland. For a brief period the Privy Council replaced the Tables, but generally the centre was controlled by the Estates in session or the Committee of Estates when they adjourned. After 1641–42 the committees of the shire, or the committees of war replaced the civil presbyteries. The parish ministers continued to be used by the laity as the regime's communications network. However, the clergy received their orders not only from the Estates plus the General Assembly and presbytery, but also from the local committees. By the mid-1640s the Covenanters had established a government by estates in parliament which was able both to levy armies and collect taxes. They had in fact achieved a viable early modern state, which functioned remarkably well in a society unaccustomed to central control.

It is now possible to turn to an examination of how the armies reflected these trends in society. To what degree were the officer corps of the armies in line with traditional society and how were they "modern"? The armies of the First and Second Bishops' Wars,

1Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, p. 36.
2Makey, Church, pp. 21, 23–4.
Ulster, and the Engagers had nobles serving as colonels in over half of the units. The Armies of the Solemn League and Covenant and of the Kingdom both possessed noble colonels in approximately two-fifths of the cases. Only in the home army and the Army of the Covenants did the lairds predominate in positions of command. The first case is explained by the large number of northeastern lairds who brought out their retinues against their traditional enemy - the clan Gordon under the marquis of Huntly. In the second the fact that lairds held over half of the commands (as of 28 February 1649), arose from the political changes resulting from the triumph of the kirk party (which contained few nobles). However, by July 1649 nobles and lairds each held one third of the colonelcies and professional soldiers accounted for the remainder. Furthermore the 3 July 1650 act of levy for infantry regiments, allowed nobles or their heirs a full half of the commands. The lairds in this instance had one fewer colonel nominated than their noble counterparts.  

It is surprising that a regime which has earned a reputation for hostility to the nobility chose so many nobles or their heirs as colonels of foot. This suggests that the nobility possessed a certain prestige as military commanders which the lairds lacked. Such a view is affirmed by the nominations to colonelcies and routmasters by the Restoration regime in July 1667, the lairds received only ten per cent of the commissions to these ranks, the nobility gained nearly all of the remaining commissions.  

Turning to staff officers, a change from the policy regarding colonels is immediately noted. From the start the Covenanters selected Scotsmen with prior military experience on the continent to fill important positions on the staff. The continuity of the

---

1 See above, pp. 16-7, 20, 28-9, 33-4, 36-7, 43-4, 53-4, 62-3.

career of the earl of Leven, who served as the commander of the Covenanter forces from 1639-51 with only two exceptions, is a good example of this policy. Only in extraordinary instances did non-professionals command the armies. Generally, all of the officers on the general staff had seen action in foreign fields or in Scotland before receiving their commissions. The Covenants realised from the beginning of their military struggles that professionals alone could provide the leadership for armies engaged in the more sophisticated style of fighting which had arisen in the sixteenth century on the continent. The Covenants were not constrained by tradition to act against their best interests.

Equally important for the forging of an efficient military machine are the procedures for levying troops. Unlike the English the Scottish landowners possessed an advantage in this regard.

The feudal basis of landholding throughout Lowland Scotland enabled landowners to call on their tenantry, or compel them, to come out in arms. . . . the entire basis of Highland landowning was essentially military in character. This power allowed the Covenants to call out parts of the "feudal host" from as early as November 1638, when Eglinton and the other Ayrshire nobles brought their tenants to the Glasgow General Assembly. With the single exception of the Western Association Army, the methods used for the recruiting of Covenanter forces relied as heavily on traditional means as on improvements developed by the Covenanting regime. The mixture of the two had resulted in a new system, which was neither wholly feudal nor entirely modern (that is based on either the mercenary or Swedish systems of recruitment). The levies of 1648 and 1649 highlight this assertion. The control

---

1See above, pp. 15, 19, 26-7, 34, 36-7, 43-4, 47, 52, 61.
2Whyte, op. cit., p. 17.
3Ferguson, op. cit., p. 128; Makey, Church, p. 47; Smout, People, p. 114.
of the central government by the nobility and the majority of the lairds allowed them to nominate colonels and allocate shire quotas. Yet, the refusal in 1648 of the ministers to liaise between the committees of war and the parishes, or to urge their flocks to support the levy, resulted in a low turnout of recruits for the Engager army. Conversely, when the ministers and their lay allies in the kirk party regime attempted in 1649 to raise a new army, they managed to levy only a small portion of the required soldiers. This failure occurred not only because of the regime's desire to levy politically reliable officers and men, but also from the exclusion of the nobles and many lairds whose assistance was vital to the successful raising of an army.\(^1\) The traditional organizers of military power could not be discounted, nor were those newly given a share in the recruiting process dispensable.

The selection of ministers to serve the armies is one of the few situations in which the Covenanter entirely accepted the role of a new institution at the centre dictating to the localities. The landowner-colonels enjoyed a brief period of significance in choosing their chaplains directly, 1639–41. Afterwards, the Commission of the General Assembly, an organization created only in 1641, managed to bring itself into the position where it monopolised the process.\(^2\) Indeed the Commission also supported the raising of the ministers' regiments, the fight against the Engager levy, the provision for prisoners of war, the purging of the Army of the Covenants, and the recruitment controversy of 1651.\(^3\)

\(^1\)See above, pp. 5–7, 13–4, 18, 23–5, 32, 34, 39–41, 47, 49–51, 56, 58–60.


\(^3\)See above, pp. 269–70, 40–1, 247–8, 261–4, 289–95, 239–44. (These references match the order of the points made).
While the Commission of the General Assembly often came into conflict with adherents of the more traditional modes of governing as well as with its own allies, the radicals on it ultimately failed in their plans regarding the military. One obvious and important feature of the Covenanter armies was their lack of radicalism, and their adhesion to the traditional loyalties towards the crown and nobility. A small faction after 1649 set itself against these two pillars of pre-1637 Scotland. These radicals led by Strachan and Ker proved unable to attract either a significant proportion of the officer corps or the private soldiers to their cause. Instead throughout the period the Covenanter armies were dominated by the double basis of the National Covenant — allegiance to the king and to the presbyterian system of kirk government. Radicalism of the sort prevalent in the English New Model Army or in the Leveller party had few roots either in Scottish society or in the Covenanter armies.¹

The godly army was a concept of recent coinage. While members of a godly citizenry could form a godly army that army did not receive its godliness because of the character of its soldiery before they took up arms, but rather the army achieved that status due to their carriage as members of the military profession in a godly cause. The idea of the godly army (in the protestant world) had its inception with the articles of war produced by Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstierna in 1621. They "provided the Protestant world with idea of a Protestant army, with a standard of piety" which was exported to Great Britain by those who had served in the Swedish army. Gustavus envisaged an army which kept strict moral and military discipline; a military force which did not oppress

¹See above, pp. 3-4, 45-6, 55-6, 273-306, particularly pp. 295-301.

civilians. The soldiers would be inspired and led in worship by ministers who came from the same regions. To provide additional support for his military code, Gustavus instituted three levels of courts-martial. The Scots (through Leven who possessed the support of the clergy), accepted the essence of the Swedish king's code and modified it to better suit their circumstances. The Articles and Ordinances of War defined the proper behaviour for the armies in regard to their constituent elements, their enemies, and the civilian population. In doing so Leven copied the rules of his master. The Covenanters also maintained and carried out a provision of ministers on the same territorial basis as the regiments were recruited. The Covenanters differed in that in addition to a three tier system of courts-martial (regimental, army, committee of estates), they also possessed an ecclesiastical system of discipline which was borrowed directly from the Scottish Kirk. Therefore, the officers and ministers of the Covenanting armies had more tools at their disposal with which to create a godly army. That they largely failed was due to a variety of factors.

It can be established that the armies of the Covenanters were usually not godly in their general behaviour. Certainly the soldiers and officers worshipped and observed thanksgivings and fasts, but this was insufficient in itself. What more was demanded of the armies? A clean moral record and praise for their relations with civilians was critical if the Covenanters hoped to be regarded as successors of Gustavus Adolphus' Swedes. It has been demonstrated from the ample evidence in the records of the kirk sessions presbyteries that the armies were not sinless.

---

1 See above, pp. 68-86.
2 See above, pp. 135-43.
3 See above, pp. 68-9.
Even in those instances where few cases of sin can be found (the armies of the Bishops' Wars, of Ulster, the Whiggamore Raid, and the Western Association), this is more readily explicable by the lack of sources (Second Bishops' and Ulster), and the failure to list civilians who served for short periods as soldiers, than it is by spiritual piety. Unfortunately, the very preciseness of the information regarding the offences of the soldiers presents a problem, for there is no other army of the era to which those of the Covenanters can be compared. Furthermore, while it is possible to some extent to contrast the Covenanters' armies with the Scottish civilian population, it will never be possible to learn whether the armies were godly in the spiritual sense [predicted by St. Paul]. Regarding the matter of the Covenanters' forces behaviour towards civilians there is no doubting that they were generally oppressive. There is only one exception to this statement — the Whiggamore Raid army — a force which existed for only one month. The Army of the Covenanters did manage to achieve the required standard, but the defeat at Dunbar led to a return of the behaviour of previous armies in it. The reasons of the Covenanters' poor record of military-civilian relations chiefly stems from the regime's financial embarrassment, which forced the soldiers to seize food and fodder, and levy cess. However, the impecunious nature of the government is not the sole cause of the armies' poor reputation. In certain instances (campaigns against the Irish rebels and the Gordons), the military followed a deliberate policy of plunder and destruction. In other cases the soldiers appear to have plundered and devastated without regard to military considerations (for instance, the entrance of Maule's foot

1See above, pp. 164-94.
2See above, pp. 196-234, and pp. 234-7 for a comparison of the armies.
into England in 1646). Furthermore, the chronic shortage of chaplains militated against the reliance on the military ecclesiastical courts, and removed a powerful reinforcer of proper conduct. Finally (and there is chiefly negative evidence for this), many soldiers and officers lacked the desire to actualise Leven's programme. Although the armies failed to reach the status of Gustavus Adolphus* and the English New Model armies they were not entirely reprobate.

The godliness of the armies can be related to civilian society in two ways—did the military forces carry out the ideals in the political sphere, and what comparison can be made between civilian and military sinners? In the first matter the information is easier to evaluate. Between 1639 and 1647 the majority of officers and soldiers were in agreement with the religio-political aims of the Covenanters. For instance, the Ulster Army enthusiastically accepted the Solemn League and Covenant (except for one officer). The Army of the Solemn League and Covenant placed allegiance to presbyterianism before loyalty to the king. Despite Montrose’s run of victories few in the home army joined him. In these decisions the armies remained on the side of the godly. The first break with the policy of the godly (by which are meant those who placed presbyterianism before the king), occurred in 1648 when only a few regiments and officers of the Ulster and New Model armies supported the kirk party. The majority was willing to accept the lead of the greater part of the nobility and more important lairds by diluting their religious position of 1646 and by emphasizing the restoration of the king. The Whiggamore Raid was in many ways nothing

1 See above, pp. 199–200, 205–7, 210–1, 214–7, 218, 225–6, 227, 228, 235.
3 For example see above, pp. 214–5, 218, 225, 227–8.
more than a mob under the leadership of some nobles and soldiers which kept its cohesion for a month. During the kirk party regime the army more closely resembled the ideals of the governors than society in general did. However, it would be dangerous to be too dogmatic on this point. The Army of the Kingdom was censured by both the Remonstrant-Protester and Resolutioner groups for its failure to achieve godliness. It is however difficult to determine the attitude of civilians in 1651 other than weariness of warfare.

What can be said about moral conduct in the military and civilian communities, and the Kirk's attitude towards such lapses? In both the military and civilian sphere the ministers and kirk sessions received the support of the civil magistrates in punishing offenders. It has been well-known for some time that a close degree of cooperation existed between burgh councils and burghal kirk sessions. While we have already observed that the rulers of the local rural communities were often not kirk session elders, they did allow the sessions to operate without opposition. In the case of the army, the relationship of the ministers and regimental kirk sessions with the entire officer corps is difficult to establish. Major figures like Leven and Munro supported the work of the military ecclesiastical courts. However, there is only one partial list of regimental elders (that of the Second Bishops' War army). In theory, the military were pledged to aid the work of the ecclesiastical bodies within the army, but it is not readily demonstrable that the officers worked in as close cooperation as did the burgh councils and their kirk sessions. One half to seven tenths

---

1 See above, pp. 47-8, 274-97; for the expansion of presbyterianism and the armies see above, pp. 310-34.

2 See above, pp. 239-44, 192-3, 186-7.

3 Stevenson, Revolution, p. 309; see above, pp. 3-4.

4 NLS, Wodrow Analecta Folio MSS. 31, ff. 27-34; see above, pp. 72-3, 280.
of those summoned before the church courts in Stirlingshire belonged to the class of subtenants, landless labourers, and servants which formed the bottom rank of society.¹ In the armies men with the rank of private account for eighty-five per cent of those cited as sexual offenders. Only in rare instances were commissioned or non-commissioned officers charged with sins.² This suggests that while a military career increased the likelihood of ecclesiastical discipline for the lowliest members of society (who would become privates), it may have granted a great deal more immunity to those in the higher and middle ranks.

It is well-known that the kirk sessions prosecuted sexual lapses more zealously than others. Again using Stirlingshire as the basis for information on civilians, it appears that seventy per cent of the church courts' business consisted of sexual offences.³ In the armies as a whole sexual offences accounted for eighty per cent of recorded offences. This contrast supports the view that sex was the favoured diversion of the Covenanting soldier.⁴ Indeed, if more accurate figures existed concerning the number of whores with the armies,⁵ it would be possible to conclude that sexual lapses occurred to the exclusion of almost all others. The soldier-sinner differed from the civilian-sinner in his choice of moral lapse. Possible

---

¹S.J. Davies, 'The Scottish Church Courts and Social Control 1660–1715', delivered at the History Students' Research Conference III (8.5.1982) and based on his research for a Ph.D. at St Andrews University.

²See above, pp. 164, 165, 169, 171. (Tables)

³Davies, op. cit.

⁴See above, pp. 190–1, 188.

⁵See above, pp. 172–6.
explanations for this are that soldiers were not tempted to breach the Sabbath by working, or that church courts were even more alert to sexual offences in the armies than to other types of immorality.

While some have looked upon the entire period of the early Covenanters as one in which prosecution of sin increased, it was not obvious in the eyes of the Kirk. In 1649 the Commission of the General Assembly looked back on the preceding eleven years and concluded with dissatisfaction that there had been no sign of the improvement of public morality or the seeking out and punishing of sin. Spurred by the desire both to create a godly commonwealth and to regain God's favour, the lay and clerical elements of the kirk party regime embarked upon a thorough campaign to purge malignants and sinners from civil and military offices and to take a strict course with all sinners. The purging of the military as well as repentance for service in the Engagement has already received substantial treatment in this work. The implications of the second part of the kirk party's policy has been ignored by historians. It is true that the Army of the Kingdom was probably one of the most ungodly forces levied by the Covenanters (the prize going to the Engager Army). Yet what is even more striking is that between 1649 and 1651 the ecclesiastical courts cited over two-fifths of the soldiers involved in moral lapses in the entire period under consideration. Certainly it will be necessary to examine the

1 Davies, op. cit.; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, pp. 140-1, 145.

2 For Engager repentance, see above, pp. 282-7; for purging, see Ibid., pp. 288-97.

3 See above, p. 235; for particulars on Engager Army see Ibid., pp. 227-9; for particulars on the Army of the Kingdom see Ibid., pp. 186-7, 192-3, 232-4; for both see above Ibid., pp. 190-1.

4 See above, Table 5, on pp. 190-1.
situation in more civilian jurisdictions before claiming that this figure can be applied to civilians. Nevertheless, it does indicate that the change of policy enunciated by the kirk party in 1649 had concrete results in the armies. Overall however, a variety of factors prevented the Covenanters from fielding godly armies. Still their efforts should be applauded particularly when success was nearly achieved on several occasions.1

It would be both presumptuous and inappropriate to include a lengthy and seemingly comprehensive examination of the causes of the wars, the aims of the Covenanters, and an analysis of their legacy in a study which concentrates on the military and religious aspects of the period, rather than on political and social topics. At the same time it is somewhat artificial to divide any period into rigid categories of social, religious and the like. It may be useful to examine the conclusions of those more expert in the relevant fields in the light of the findings of this thesis.

The first sign of a drift towards conflict between Scottish society and the king can be perceived with the removal of the court to London. The liturgical innovations, particularly those attempted between 1617 and 1621, of James VI, stank of anglicisation to his Scottish subjects. Conflict was only averted when the king retreated from introducing further changes into the religious life of his subjects.2 His son, Charles I, had no qualms about thrusting novelties down Scottish throats, nor was he content to restrict his new policy to ecclesiastical issues alone. The Act of Revocation of 1625 sought to provide the clergy with a more solid income and to wean the lairds and tenants away from the nobles.

---

1 For the Army of the First Bishops' War see above, pp. 190-1, 197-200; for the Whiggamore Raid army see Ibid., pp. 193, 229; for the Army of the Covenants, see Ibid., pp. 192, 229-31.

2 Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 107-8; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 17, 313; Wormald, op. cit., p. 34.
It was immediately viewed as an attack on the lords of erection, heritable jurisdictions which were one of the foundations of feudal society, and even on private property itself. The scope of the revocation was scaled down over the next eight years, but the damage was done. Revocation meant the debilitating of the nobility and Charles continued to pursue that end lustily.¹ He appointed bishops to important offices of state, which was an insult to the nobles, and was responsible for the foundation of arbitrary rule from London. The Balmerino affair of 1633-4, in which the king prosecuted a nobleman for presenting a petition, further illustrated that Charles had no wish to hear the views of the Scottish aristocracy. Plainly he was aiming at a social and political revolution in Scotland.² Tensions were further increased by the ecclesiastical policy of the king and his chief adviser - Laud. Charles sought the anglicisation of the Church of Scotland, which to many Scots seemed the gateway to romanisation. Between 1633 and 1637 Charles hammered away at the independent identity of the Scottish Kirk by his ordinance on vestments (1633), the book of canons (1636), and the prayer book (1637). These innovations in religious matters brought together the ministers, the burgesses, the lairds, and many common people under the leadership of the nobility, which was threatened on the political and social fronts. By 1637 Charles I had managed by his policies to create a Scotland largely united in opposition to his aims. With such a coalition at hand and with so hated a symbol to oppose (the prayer book), the nobles and their supporters broke into open opposition.³ War was by no means

¹Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 110-2; Makey, Church, pp. 12-4; Stevenson, Revolution, p. 41.

²Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 112-3; Makey, Church, p. 16; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 44, 48.

³Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 112-4; Makey, Church, pp. 15, 17; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 43, 45-7, 313.
inevitable in the initial stages, but as the Covenanter party emerged and accumulated successes war drew nearer. The king decided upon the military option in mid-1638. The position of the Covenagers after this was such that success alone could guarantee their safety from prosecution as traitors. By the winter of 1638-9, with the establishment of presbyterianism achieved, war had become inevitable. It was pursued with lethargy between the king and his subjects, but not between the Scottish royalists and Covenagers. The peace of June 1639, was no more than a truce - the Covenagers were already suspicious of the king's ability to keep his word, and he had not abandoned the sword. By the end of 1641 the Covenagers had registered massive gains in the religious and political spheres; in the coming years the security of these gains was their constant concern.¹

The preservation of the Scottish revolution was never achieved. In 1643 the Covenagers turned towards the English parliamentarians in hopes of finding allies to uphold their gains. The events of 1642-3 had further revealed the untrustworthiness of the king. His allies openly plotted against the Covenanting regime. The Covenagers feared that the victory of Charles and his supporters in England would lead to royal military intervention in Scotland. The real architect of Scotland's entry into the conflict was Archibald Johnston of Warriston, who persuaded the General Assembly to petition the Convention of Estates to seek security for the reformed church in Scotland and England. The Convention replied by negotiating with the English delegation in Edinburgh. This resulted in the Solemn League and Covenant which brought the Covenagers into alliance with the English parliamentarians. The document had both a civil and religious nature; the inclusion of the latter was again part of

¹See above, pp. 4, 5, 11-2; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 85, 181, 310.
the Scottish desire for security, as was the imposition of the Covenant upon the parliamentarians. Some Scots welcomed the new war as a crusade to extend presbyterianism to England, but the majority of the Covenanters leadership saw it as the best means of preserving the revolution. The Engagement of 1647, which led to war in England in 1648, was primarily motivated by a desire to restore the king to power in England. This was not simply due to sentimental fantasies among the Covenanters who accepted it. In 1648 they believed that the parliamentarians could no longer be relied upon to build a Britain suitable to preserving the revolution, but Charles had promised to uphold the gains of the Covenanters. Thence the widespread support for the Engagement among the Covenanting nobles and lairds. However, the Kirk and its allies opposed the Engagement as a treaty concluded without reference to the General Assembly. The triumph of the kirk party in September 1648 brought a regime to power which was committed to the preservation of presbyterianism and the monarchy. From 30 January 1649 war between England and Scotland was once more inevitable as the English rejected the monarchy and the Scots proclaimed it (notwithstanding their limitations on royal power and behaviour). To the English the changes in Covenantter policy have always seemed duplicitous. In fact they were based on the constants of the monarchical government of Scotland limited by law and preserved in some way within a British framework.

Recent research has demolished the theory that there was one monolithic Covenantter party. Instead, the historian is faced with an alliance compounded of several factions. The major ones were:

1 See above, pp. 20-2; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 242, 273, 278-9, 287, 290.
2 See above, pp. 37-9, 40, 247-8; Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 123-4, 133; Makey, Church, p. 73; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 284, 286, 312, 298; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, pp. 58, 87, 119, 121.
3 See above, pp. 48-9, 50, 239, 247.
the nobles and their allies, the moderate ministers and their allies, and the radicals. On the surface the aims of the nobles were reactionary, but their methods were revolutionary. Consequently, the nobles created a new constitutional settlement. So one cannot merely state that the nobles wished to "restore their own version of the ordinary processes of feudal government". The nobles chiefly desired the end to all governance by the ministers, whether episcopalian or presbyterian. They also wanted a church government which they would dominate as ruling elders. Thus the nobles called for the control of Kirk affairs by parliament and the General Assembly. The Kirk was also seen as a useful tool to persecute royalists and spread Covenanter propaganda. To achieve these ends the nobles not only rejected episcopacy and sought to restore presbyterian government, but transformed the Estates into a political power which would allow them to govern the country in opposition to or alliance with the king. The nobles quickly realized that gains in Scotland could only be maintained by changing the British constitution, hence their demands for a closer union with England. This union was not to be an incorporating one, as the English had demanded in 1607 and would gain in 1652; instead the Covenanter nobles wanted a federal union. Between 1640 and 1648 the aims of the nobility in their new union remained basically the same (uniformity in church governments, bilateral commissions for foreign policy, and free trade, to name a few). The method of achieving the union shifted from reliance on parliamentarians (1640-1, 1643-5), to improving the union of crowns (1647-8), when the hostility of the parliamentarians became apparent. The chief item in which the nobles desired agreement was church government; yet they did not want a

1 Makey, Church, p. 56.
unified church for Britain. Rather, they hoped for an English church on the presbyterian model, free of sects and bishops. This sort of church would prove no threat to the core of the Scottish revolution settlement.\(^1\) Therefore, the nobles sought not only a return of their former powers - albeit actualized in a new method - but they also worked for a new settlement in the constitutional and religious affairs of Scotland and England.

The moderate ministers (e.g. Baillie), present something of a puzzle, for there are two somewhat incompatible views of their aims. On the one hand they are seen as Melvillians, desiring a kirk free of lay persons (the elders to be clerics); they wished to remove sects, establish presbyterianism in Britain, make the king serve the Kirk, and eliminate the aristocracy.\(^2\) Another analysis claims they accepted the religious settlement of 1638-9, but disagreed with the constitutional changes, favouring the retention of the clerical estate in parliament. They opposed the toleration of sectaries, supported the promotion of a presbyterian Britain. In 1648 the moderates opposed the Engagement not because it originated with the nobility, but because it allowed inadequate protection to presbyterianism and the Covenants and violated the Kirk's right to review religious policies. After the Whiggamore Raid the moderate clergy wished to guide the decisions of the magistrates. They favoured the prosecution of sin and witchcraft which was undertaken in 1649 as well as the actions against former Engagers and the purging of the army.\(^3\) The moderates were probably willing to follow the lead of

---

\(^1\) Ferguson, *op. cit.*, pp. 115, 119, 123-5, 127; Makey, *Church*, pp. 56, 64-6, 68, 71, 73; Stevenson, *Revolution*, pp. 48, 125, 152, 169, 132, 220-2, 284, 286, 297-8, 301-2, 304, 312-4; Stevenson, *Counter-Revolution*, pp. 3-4, 12-7, 58, 89, 97, 119, 121, 216-7, 221.

\(^2\) Makey, *Church*, pp. 10, 19, 39, 67-8, 72, 79, 81, 83, 185.

the Covenanter aristocracy when it suited them, but it is hard to
see them as social revolutionaries.

The Radical Covenanters (personified in their lay ranks by
Warriston and among the clergy by Rutherford), were the Scottish
equivalent of the extreme Puritans. Their programme was all
power to the godly regardless of degree. Like Charles I the
radicals wished to sweep away the nobility and the landowners whose
basis of power was feudalism (the system of vassal-superior, heritable
jurisdictions). In 1638 the radicals supported the nobles in the
Glasgow Assembly when it was argued that episcopacy should be
removed and abjured. This was based on their adhesion to the
principle that all ministers were equal. The radicals wished
their faction of the clergy to determine the ideology of the
country, which the estates' apparatus would implement. They
sought the extension of presbyterianism to England, but it would be
a presbyterianism free of lay control (which was also their aim in
Scotland). The radicals sought to preserve the privy kirk which
had existed in the 1630s by having the General Assembly acquiesce in
the legality of conventicles. For the radicals envisaged the privy
kirk as a revolutionary cell organisation with which they could
oppose the state when its policies were in disagreement with theirs.
(This was done in 1648 and tried again in 1650). With the coming to
c power of the kirk party the radicals hoped to achieve the following:
abolition of patronage with election of the ministers going to the
congregation and the old kirklands reverting to the Kirk, the Kirk's
veto over political and military appointments, and the destruction
of the noble estate to be replaced by the bonnet lairds ruling Scotland
through an impotent king. Even with the defeat of the army which they
had largely created the radicals did not lose hope. The sum of the
radicals' policy in 1650 was an exclusive kirk where only true godly Covenanters could take communion, a state under the control of the pure at all levels, and the restraint of the king until his full conversion to their beliefs. The radicals represented a distinct but articulate minority among the clergy. They could also rely upon the support of the southwestern bonnet lairds and tenant farmers, but they lacked national support or an instrument to force through their revolution. Their success in the early stages can be attributed to the fact that their aims were the same as the nobles', but after 1648 the radicals gained many points of their policy because the kirk party regime under Argyll needed their support to remain in power. As a Scottish phenomenon, the radicals would have as their descendants the militant Covenanters of the Restoration, who declined in numbers but not in fanaticism.

The achievements and failures of the Covenanters can be treated on two levels — one Scottish, the other European. In Scottish terms the Covenanters' achievements were ecclesiastical and political. The clerical episcopal church of James VI and Charles I was replaced by a presbyterian one controlled by the laity. The Covenanters erected parliament into such a powerful body that "the 1641 settlement deprived the king of all power in Scotland". As a consequence of the elevation of parliament the burgesses and lairds received an increase in their political status. The Covenanters also managed to impose a national land tax and to introduce the excise. In military terms the Covenanters were also successful in that they managed to raise armies

1 Makey, Church, pp. 30-1, 52, 54, 56, 63, 66, 75, 77-8, 80-1, 83, 185; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 299, 301-3; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, pp. 91, 106, 34, 175, 180-1, 188, 230, 135-6, 138-40.

2 Stevenson, Revolution, p. 311.

3 Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 116-8, 121; Makey, Church, pp. 57, 73; Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 230, 238-41, 299, 302, 305-7, 309-11.
over a twelve year period despite war-weariness, plague, famine, and defeat.¹ After the Restoration the nobility regained the right to govern to the exclusion of the restored bishops.² Still it cannot be denied that "the covenanting movement was a failure", because "everything possible had gone wrong, nothing had worked out as intended".³ The nobles had lost control over the Kirk by the late forties; the Lowlands failed to impose their policies on the Highlands; the movement was unable to win security for its gains due to an inability to reach a closer union of some sort with England; and the aristocracy lost control of the movement.⁴ While the extension of presbyterianism was a key policy of the Covenanters, their only immediate success was in Ulster.⁵ The triumph of presbyterianism in Scotland occurred only in 1690, when the Kirk was again rent by schism. The Engager controversy wrecked the unity of the Covenanters which had been created by the policies of the kings and necessities of self-preservation.⁶ Even worse was the sundering of the Kirk's unity which arose from the arguments over who should serve the state. The Covenanters themselves underwent a metamorphosis from providing the Scots with a symbol of unity to becoming one of division.⁷ In military terms the Covenanters failed as well. The immediate cause of the regime's destruction were the defeats at

¹See above, pp. 3-63.

²Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, pp. 241, 243-4.

³Ibid., pp. 215-6.

⁴Ferguson, op. cit., p. 129; Makey, Church, pp. 93, 77, 184; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, pp. 213-8, 218-9, 223, 225.

⁵See above, pp. 307-37; for Ulster see Ibid., pp. 320-35.

⁶See above, pp. 40-1, 247-8, 280-2; Makey, Church, pp. 73, 93.

⁷See above, pp. 242-4, 298, 55, 59; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, pp. 228-9, 226.
Dunbar, Inverkeithing, and Worcester. The hopes of creating godly armies were crushed partially because the impecunious nature of Scotland prohibited the Covenanters from founding an adequate commissariat.\(^1\) The legacy of the Covenanter military effort was slim—the adoption by the Restoration regime of the Covenanters' officer corps model and the raising of the Cameronians in 1689. Between 1637 and 1651 the Covenanters scored some major victories on all fronts; yet in the end the problems of disunity and military defeat left the movement shattered.

In a wider context the Covenanters are of greater interest. Compared with other contemporary rebels they rate quite highly. Only the Portuguese managed to secure their rebellion permanently. The English parliamentarians held on to power longer; but, as many English historians forget, they too failed utterly. The Cossacks under Polish rule did wrest their independence from the Polish king, but in turn became enslaved by the Russian Tsar. The rebels of Catalonia, Naples, Ireland, Bohemia–Moravia–Silesia–Lusatia, and the Austrias maintained themselves for only a short time, as did the Frondeurs, the supporters of William II of Orange, and the non-noble Swedish estates. By the criteria of duration and accomplishments the Covenanters did more than these. From a military perspective the Covenanters eclipse most other contemporary rebels. Ultimately, the continuing success of the Covenanter state depended upon the acquisition of wealth (which was the same problem faced by the national monarchies), in order to establish a commissariat and fund arms production and purchasing. This meant that either the armies required a paymaster (for three of the armies the English acted as such), or else the country needed to become more prosperous. The fiscal demands of

\(^1\) On their poverty see above, pp. 196–237, 264–9.
the English Civil War prevented the parliamentarians from providing the money they had promised. The nearly continual state of war disrupted the economy in many ways, and the plague destroyed the chances of Scottish agriculture and overseas trade from growing. It is perhaps true that "the old term 'the second reformation' is worth reviving as it emphasises the religious form of the revolt in Scotland". Nevertheless, the Covenanters represented a more sophisticated movement than many in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their early successes placed the Covenanters in a better position to succeed than some rebels. More importantly the leaders had a coherent policy which was initially supported by victories in the field. The political ineptitude of Charles I which threw his patrimony into turmoil helped the Covenanters to maintain Scotland's independence. Nevertheless, the conquest of Scotland occurred after twelve long years of conflict during which the nation had suffered heavily in loss of property, life, and spirit. The Covenanters sought a federalist solution at a time when countries were moving towards unification or disintegration; only federal union would have provided Scotland with the security she required to exist independently.

Not long ago a distinguished English historian stated that Scottish history of the mid-seventeenth century could never develop to the level of its English counterpart due to the lack of sources. Happily such views are no longer credited. Materials for the period exist in a multitude of forms and in copious amounts. There are some categories in short supply, such as autobiographical works. The Scottish historian is also handicapped by the loss of the complete run of the estates' committees' records, the ecclesiastical records, and more importantly those of the committees of war. The last category of the above list alone has disappeared so completely and so mysteriously

---

1Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 318-26.
that it is as if they never existed. I would suggest that this may be explained by the desire of the Scottish nobles and lairds to destroy any papers which might have provided evidence for their prosecution as traitors in 1660. Still, a great deal remains. There is the problem of how to deal with it. And here a cautionary note must be sounded - the loss of certain records forces the Scottish historian of this period to proceed in certain areas with the wariness of a medievalist.

The ideal quality and quantity of sources was not available for this study. The "lost" records included the following types: the full presbytery of the armies' records would have enabled a closer study of religious worship, the chaplains, and sin among the military. The paucity of ministers' memoirs, diaries, and letters from the army prevents a better understanding of the motivations of the chaplains, their life in the army, and the activities of their charges. The non-existence of similar materials from the soldiers and officers precludes one from creating a stereotype of the Covenanting soldier. If all these materials had existed, then each chapter would have yielded a thesis. In the event it would be extremely unusual for such a complete range of sources to survive.

The problems of the sources have already been discussed. Hence these comments will be of a more general nature. As stated above, it is vain to hope for a detailed or photographic portrait of the Covenantant armies and their religious aspects. The objective could only be an impressionistic picture; to create this a variety of methods were used. Tables, even when the numerical base was small, served to eliminate repetition and provided a clear presentation of all the useful information. In certain chapters the material and conclusions

---

appeared in a narrative with analysis, this of course being the most desirable means of informing a reader as it lends itself to a more fluid prose. In other chapters the material was summarised and explained under general themes. Throughout the thesis extensive use was made of unique sources — the church court records — which have been under-utilised in the past. Due to their previous neglect, there is no established method for their use, but as more studies of different types are completed a consensus may arise on the pitfalls in using them. Often I have had to follow the medievalist's technique of negative argument and conclusion from inference. Without such methods and by failing to proceed to conclusions with caution, the thesis would have contained reckless statements which would have appeared fascinating but would have had extremely shaky foundations. In the final analysis the limitations of the evidence prohibits a firm answer to certain important questions. That is not to say my conclusions are questionable, but that more information had to be examined than would have otherwise been necessary in order to constitute a thesis.

In this study extreme care was necessary, for the objective was almost to gain a window into men's souls, a task verging on the impossible. Scepticism and wariness were the chief tools in this endeavour. In the end there could be no extravagant claims. It was essential that the totality of sources be consulted in reaching conclusions. It must be recognised that there is always room for modifications in the findings if substantial new evidence appears. For the moment the analysis must be accepted, because the sources have been exhausted. Those who demand to know how each soldier thought ask too much. Individuality was underdeveloped, thus making the question invalid. Yet we can ask about the armies and see them from a variety of different perspectives to decide whether or not they were godly. This composite portrait is all that can be attempted.
APPENDIX I

The diary of the Rev. John Lauder of Tyninghame

The minister being ordainit be the presbyterie to serve the leaguer viz to perform divin service to the regiment of East Lothian for a tyme enterit upon fryday the last of July at Dunbar[,] the laird of Waughton being colonel and his eldest sone Lovtenannt Colonel zy [there].

Upon the nynt of August 1640[,] being at the camp[,] I taught at Lantan in the fields besyd Cheisley in the Mers to the regiment at a publack fast befor noon and Mr. John Maghie minister at Dirleton efter noone, the haill camp keipit the fast this day.

Upon the fyfteine day of August being Setturday I came fra the camp at Cheisley in the Mers[,] being relevit be Mr. John Daliell quha came thair being sent be the presbyterie.

Upon the 7 day of August Waughton's regiment mairchit fra Dunbar to Dunglass at night[,] and on the morn the aught of August we came to the fields beside laughton and Choisley and incampit w[ith] the rest and solomenized the fast upon the morn.2

Upon the fyft day of July 1641 Monday [,] according to the directing of the presbyterie[,] I took journey to England to the camp and came to Durrhame saiflie[,] praised be God [,] upon the sevint of July Wednesday betwixt thre and ffourre in the efternoon, accompanied all the way by George Raeburn and Johne Phillip my servand for the tyme I was thair.

1 Scott, Fasti, i. 425; Army, i. 214; SRO, KSR Tyninghame, i. 113, 118v-9, 150v, 158v, 159v.

2 SRO, KSR Tyninghame, i. 113.
Upon the sext day [,] Tuesday [,] I meit w[ith] Mr. Robtt Lauder[,] my brother [,] be the way quha came fra the camp the said fyft of July [,] Monday[,] having bein thair ane month befor [,] as he was ordainit be the prestyterie....

Upon the nynteine day of August [,] Thursday [,] 1641 the Mutinie at Durhame

Upon the twentie day of August [,] Friday [,] we mairchit with the army from Durhame to Newcastle.

Upon the twentie ane day I abaid at Morpeth all the night having come in the eving [,] and came t[o] the camp on Sunday at morn in the fieldis and mairchit to the camp beyond Alun and lay in the fields to the camp that night 22 August.¹

Upon the twentie thrid day of August lay betwixt Alun and Tweid about four myles besouth [the] Tweid.

Upon the twentie ffourt day of August [,] being Tuesday 1641 [,] the armie crossed [the] Tweed and came to histhellaw besyde Caldstreame that night.

Upon the twentie fyft of August sermonis of Thanksgiving through the armie [,] my text being the hundreth twentie sext psalme, the first [,] second and thrid verses[.] not far from this place at this tyme twelvemonth the bygain the armie passed [the] tweid to England and befor at Chausley we had througout the haill armie ane solemne fast upon the nynt of August 1640 [,] my text befor noon being upon the hundreth twa psalme at the 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.18 verses theirof [,] and Mr. John Mackghie minister at Dirleton preichit at efternoon the said day [,] his text being the fyfteine chapter of Jeremiah at the 33 and 34 verses.

¹Ibid., i. 118v.
Upon the said twentie fyft of August about six houris at eving twa [were] execut [,] being shot at the post [,] for the mutinie at durrhame [,] ane of my Lord Ker[ 's] regiment and another of drumfermlingis regiment [,] and at eving the armie disbandit

Upon Thursday at night Waughton[ '] s regiment 26 August came to Dunbar [,] and I came to Cokburnispathe w[ith] Mr. James Wright [,] minister thair [,] that night, and upon the morn being the 27 of August [,] fryday [,] I came to Dunbar and about elevin hours befor noon I maid ane exhortation of thanksgiving to Waughton['] s regiment in the kirkyard of Dunbar and so the regiment was disbandit, and I came to Tyninghame saifie that night at sevin hours at eving and preichit on Sunday the twentie nynt of August.¹

Upon the fyft day of March 1646 Thursday I took Jorney from Newcastle and came to Norham w[ith] Mr. Alexr Davidson [,] minister thair [,] on Settrday at eveing and preichit bothe befir noon and afternoon upon the Lord[']s day at Norham[,] being the aught day of Marche [,] and came to Tyninghame upon the tent of Mairth being the Tysday in the eving saifie [,] praised be God.²

¹Ibid., i. 119.
²Ibid., i. 152.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) Manuscript Sources

Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Carte MSS. (Ormonde MSS.) 3, 5-17, 19-20, 28-29, 32, 80.
Rawlinson MS. A.26 (Commissioners for the Propagation of the Gospel in the Four Northern Counties).
Rawlinson MS. A.258 (Irish Letters, September 1645-September 1648).
Rawlinson MS. B.507.
Rawlinson MS. D.376 (Papers relating to protestantism in Cavan).
Tanner MSS. 54, 55, 58/1, 58/2, 59/1, 59/2, 60/2, 61, 65.

British Library, London.

Add. MSS. 4770 (Muster Roll of Ulster c. 1630).
Harleian MSS. 374, f. 145, 1219, ff. 61-2v (A Proclamation by the Scots the 23. of September 1640), 1,460 (Fisher, F., 'A perfect Registry of all the Colours taken from the Scots at Preston ... and Dunbar').


Acc. 3142, Box V, D.22-3, 29.
Acc. 6026, 13, 1/430-525, 14, 1/526-605, 35, 3/1-23.
Adv. MSS. 23.7.12 (Walker, E., 'A Short Journall of Severall actions performed in the Kingdom of Scotland'), 29.2.9, ff. 104-216 (Culcarres Papers), 33.4.6 (Copies of documents concerning the Scots army and negotiations at Newcastle and London, 1640-1), 33.4.8 (Transactions of the Scots army in Ireland from 1643 to June 1648).

Dep. 175, Boxes 66-7, 87.
Lee Papers 3477 (Kirk Session Dunfermline), 3478 (Kirk Session Rhynie), 3480 (Kirk Session Crail), 3481 (Largo), 3482 (Kirk Session St. Andrews), 3483 (Kirk Session St. Andrews), 3484 (Kirk Session Dunino), 3489 (Kirk Session Elie), 3494 (Kirk Session Midcalder), 3496 (Kirk Session Lasswade), 3500 (Kirk Session Linlithgow), 3501 (Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale).

MSS. 2961 Culloden Papers.

Wodrow Analecta Folio 17 (Guthrie, J., 'The Waters of Sihor or the Lords Defectione'); 25, nos. 13, 15, 97; 27, ff. 36-8 (Henderson, A. 'Instructions about Defensive Arms', 1639); 29, nos. 25, 29, 34-5; 30, nos. 17-8; 31, nos. 4-7 (Presbytery of the Army, 1640), 9-10, 24-5, 33; 63, nos. 36-7; 65 (Commission of the General Assembly Minutes, August-November 1641), nos. 198-201 (Complaint against Sir John Clotworthy); 73, ff. 11-2.

Wodrow Analecta Quarto 29, nos. 22, 35, 41-3, 52.

Wodrow Letters Quarto 19, no. 68 (Extracts from Mr. Robert Traill's Diary).

New Register House, Edinburgh

Old Parish Registers: Aberdalgie, Alves, Alyth, Anstruther Easter, Anstruther Wester, Ardclach, Auchterhouse, Balmerino, Beath, Benvie, Blairgowrie, Carnock, Carnbee, Channelkirk, Dalgety, Drumelzier, Dunino, Dyke, Echt, Edzell, Errol, Greenlaw, Inchturle, Inverurie, Kennoway, Kettle, Kilremmy, Kinglassie,
(New Register House continued)

Kirkden, Larnie, Largo, Liff, Livingstone, Mains,
Monifieth, Monikie, Newburn, Pittenweem, Prestonpans,
Rothiemay, Scone, Symington, Tealing, Torryburn, Tweedsmuir.

Presbyterian Church Historical Society, London.

John Black Papers MS. Volume I, part i, chapters iii-iv ('Presbyterianism in the three Northern Counties').

Presbytery of Dumfries
Presbytery Records Dumfries 5.4.1647-20.9.1659.

Public Record Office, London.

E. 339/1 Return by sheriffs of incumbents holding livings, 1651-7,
1 (Cumberland), 8 (Westmorland), 15 (Northumberland),
31 (Durham).

SF 16/461/57 III, /464/59 II (List of regiments, officers and numbers
1640 army), 429/58 (2nd muster roll Argyll's regiment
in Ulster), 507/117; 513/52 (Meeting to hear complaints
against Scots by inhabitants of Tickhill, Yorkshire),
513/53 (Derby petitions, 1646), 513/56 (False musters
Lord Livingstone's regiment, 1646), 514/4 (Trials at
Tickhill), 539/105 (Leven's Life Guard, Ulster),
539/217 (Adair's horse troop).

SP 17/H/7 (Mr. Auditor Collins' book on Ulster).

Mic. 35.1 (Commonwealth Inquisition of Parishes of County Down,
8.10.1657), 2 (Royal Visitation of Down and Connor,
1633), 4 (Royal Visitation of 1661).

Mic. 36.2 (The State of the Bishoprick of Dowe & Connor, 1632).

Representative Church Body Library, Dublin.

An Account of the livings of the Diocese of Derry, before the Yeare 1641 [1622?]
LIBR/32 Groves' MSS. 1 (Extracts from Carte Papers in P.R.O.),
2 (Incumbents and Curates in 1640, Down, Connor and
Dromore), 3 (Accounts of Soldiers).

Clergy mentioned in Depositions, 1641
Notes relating to the ' Ministers of the Gospel' appointed by the
Commonwealth Government to ministers throughout Ireland.
Abstracted by the Rev. St. J.D. Seymour from the original
documents (since burnt) in the P.R.O., Dublin.
Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh

Synod Records: Fife, Moray, Perth and Stirling.


E.100/1/1 (Muster Roll of Sir Thomas Hope's Troop 1640-1),
2 (Muster Roll of the General's Life Troop 1640-1).

G.D. 1/38.26-4-6, 8-10 Lloyd's Bank Ltd. MSS.
G.D. 1/503,1 Mrs. C.E. Hopkin's MSS.
G.D. 2/53 Misc. MSS.
G.D. 6.1076,2-20, 1074, 1081,1-19, 1080, 1082 Biel MSS.
G.D. 10.749 Broughton and Gally MSS.
G.D. 16. Section 50.5,39,48,60-2 Airlie MSS.
G.D. 18. Section J1.314-5, Section J3.3967 Clerk of Penicuik MSS.
G.D. 25. Section 9 Boxes 2 and 45 Aisla MSS.
G.D. 26.7,9-10, 12.5,7-8 Leven and Kelville MSS.
G.D. 27. Section 3,52 Dalquharran MSS.
G.D. 28 No. 1592 Yester Writs.
G.D. 30.2055,6, 2058 Shairp of Houston MSS.
G.D. 38. Section 1/186, 193 Dalguise - Perthshire MSS.
G.D. 39. Section 2,34-44 Glencairn MSS.
G.D. 45/5. Section 1,94,116, Section 14.67,73,84,116, Section 26.126 Dalhousie MSS.
G.D. 52/106 Lord Forbes MSS.
G.D. 57/497 Messrs. Burnett and Reid MSS.
G.D. 75. 644-5, 652, 654-5, 657-9, 664 Dundas of Dundas MSS.
G.D. 121. Box 104 Murthly Castle MSS.
G.D. 124/13.2, 5-6 Mar and Kellie MSS.
G.D. 137.2129-30, 2132 Scrymgeour, Wedderburn of Wedderburn MSS.
G.D. 157.1500, 1502, 2642 Hume of Marchmont, Scott of Harden MSS.
G.D. 158.390.1-5, 538, 2701.1/1-1/3 Hume of Marchmont MSS.
G.D. 188.2/5, 19/1, 25/6 Guthrie of Guthrie MSS.
G.D. 205. Box 1.27, Box 18/19.LXII 2, Box 22.70a Ogilvy of Innerquahrity MSS.
G.D. 214.30 Professor Hannay's MSS.
G.D. 237.17.no.2 Messrs. Todd, Murray and Jamieson MSS.
G.D. 247 Box 64. Bundle 10 Messrs. John C. Brodie MSS.
G.D. 248.345.1, 539.1, 590.4 Seafield MSS.
P.A. 3.2.1 Minutes of the Parliament of Scotland, 1650.
P.A. 7.2 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1609–42.
P.A. 7.3 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1642–5.
P.A. 7.4 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1646.
P.A. 7.5 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1647–8.
P.A. 7.6 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1649.
P.A. 7.7 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1650.
P.A. 7.8 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1651.
P.A. 7.23/2.11, 14, 17–8, 23, 26, 28, 48, 50–1, 54, 57, 65 Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1642–9.
P.A. 11.2 Register of the Committee of Estates with the Army, January–November 1644.
P.A. 11.6, f. 30v Committee of Estates Acts and Orders.
P.A. 11.11 Register of the Committee for Managing the Affairs of the Army, April–July 1651.
P.A. 15.10 Weems account books, Treasurer of the army, 1648.
P.A. 16.1 Hepburne of Keith–Marischal Papers.
P.A. 16.3.1 Army Pay, 1640–c.1651.
P.A. 16.3.2 Army Accounts, 1642–50.
P.A. 16.3.3 Army Miscellaneous, 1642–51.
P.A. 16.3.8 Army Accounts for Quarterings, 1644.
P.A. 16.3.12 Papers relating to the Army in Ireland.
P.A. 16.5 Book of Receipts of Foot Regiments, 1651.
P.A. 16.6.2–3 Receipts by ministers to regiments and Precepts and receipts Miscellaneous Military, 1651.
RH 1/2/745 Letters of Montrose to the laird of Glenorchy, May–June 1639.
RH 13/15 Journal kept in Culross, September 1650–April 1651.
RH 13/18 Diary, April 1639–October 1640.
RH 15/64/10 Losses of Easter Seggiden, 1644.

Strathclyde Regional Archives, Glasgow.
Presbytery Records Glasgow, volumes i–iv.

Trinity College Library, Dublin.
MS. 550 The Estate of the Diocese of Derry, 1622, The Diocese Of Raphoe, 1622.
MS. 836 Depositions after the Rising, County Armagh.
MS. 837 Depositions after the Rising, County Down.
MS. 838 Depositions after the Rising, County Antrim.
MS. 866 Vessey, T., Memoirs/Letters.
Laing 1.341 Discharge of Colonel Sir James Montgomery's regiment.

Laing III.336 Kirk Session Record Mouseward.

West Register House, Edinburgh.
Kirk Session Record: Inchture and Rossie, Tealing.
RH. 1.14.16-21, 23-5 Maintenance, levies and relief from quartering, laird of Leyes, 1645-51.
RH. 4/83/8 Presbytery Record Orkney.

(B) Printed Sources

(A) primary sources


Act anent the Quarterings (Edinburgh, 1646).


Adair, P., A True Narrative of the Rise and Progress of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, ed. Killen, W.D. (Belfast, 1866).

All the Transaction between the Noblemen and gentlemen now in arms for the Covenant and the officers and soldiers now in arms by authority of the Parliament, of the Kingdom of Scotlant (Edinburgh, 1648).


Articles of militarie discipline (Edinburgh, 1639).

Articles and ordinances of warre for the present expedition of the Armie of the kingdom of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1640).

Articles and Ordinances of warre, for the present Expedition of the Army of Scotland (London, 1644).

Articles and Ordinances of War, by the Committee of Estates and His Excellencie, the Lord General of the Army (Edinburgh, 1650).

Ashe, S., A Continuation of True Intelligence From the English and Scottish Forces in the North ... from the 16th of June to ... the 10th of July 1644 (London, 1644).

Ashe, S., A Continuation of True Intelligence From the English and Scottish Forces in the North, ... 10 July to 27 July (London, 1644).

Baxter, R., Reliquiae Baxterianae; or, Mr. Richard Baxter's Narrative of the Most Memorable Passages of his Life and Times (London, 1696).


Bellings, R., Fragmanum Historicum: or the second and third books of the war in Ireland, Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica: or A Select Collection of State Papers, 11 (Dublin, 1772), 151-420.


The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor 1236-1742, ed. Innes, C. (Spalding Club, xxix, 1859).

Bowles, E., Manifest Truths or An Inversion of Truths Manifest (London, 1646).

Boyd, Z., The Battle of Newburne (Glasgow, 1643).

Boyd, Z., The Sword of the Lord (Glasgow, 1643).

A Brief Declaration of the Barbarous & inhuman dealings of the Northern Irish rebels (London, 1641/2).


Burns, J., Memoirs of the Civil War, and During the Usurpation, ed. Maidment, J. (Edinburgh, 1832).


A Catalogue of the Graduates in the faculties of Arts, Divinity and Law of the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1858).


Clark, R., A Letter Concerning General Monks surprising the Town and Castle of Carrickfergus and Belfast, in Ireland, and his taking General Major Monro prisoner (London, 1648), ss.


A Continuation of Papers from the Scotts Quarters (London, 1646).

A Continuation of the Diurnal Occurences And Proceedings of the English Army Against the Rebels in Ireland, from the first of April, to this present, 1642 (London, 1642).

A Continuation of the Proceedings of the Scots Army before Hereford, 11 August (London, 1645).

Conway, E., A Relation From the Right Honourable The Lord Viscount Conway, of the Proceedings of the English Army in Ulster From the Seventeenth day of June to this present, 1642 (London, 1642).


Deane, M., A true relation of the proceedings (sic.), of the Scotch army since their advance from Nottingham (London, 1645).

A Declaration and Remonstrance of the present engagement of the Kingdome of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1647).

The Declaration and Propositions of his Excellency the Lord Generall Leven and divers other Commanders of the standing Army ... in Scotland (London, 1648).

A Declaration concerning Sir Edward Deering; with a true relation of the Scots proceedings about the surrendering of Newcastle (London, 1644).
A Declaration of His Excellency the Earl of Leven; Concerning the rising of the Scotish (sic.) Army from the Siege (sic.) of the City of Hereford (London, 1645).

The Declaration of His Excellency, The Earl of Leven, The General Officers, and all the inferior officers and soldiers of the Scotish (sic.) Army (London, 1645).

A Declaration of the Army of England Upon their March into Scotland (London, 1650).

A Declaration of The Commons Assembled in Parliament; Concerning the Rise and Progress of the Grand Rebellion in Ireland (London, 1642).

A Declaration of the English Army Now in Scotland, To the People of Scotland, especially those among them, that know and feare the Lord (Musselborough, (sic.), 1650).

A Declaration of the Proceedings of the New Model'd Army in the Kingdom of Scotland, against the Irish Army (London, 1647).

A declaration of the Scottish army concerning their present designe against the Lords and Commons assembled at Westminster (London, 1648).

A Declaration published in the Scots Army, Proclaimed by Ordrer from General Leven at Durham, May 13, 1646 (London, 1646).


The Demands and Behavior of the rebels of Scotland (London, 1640).

Dispatch on Philiphaugh (London, 1645), s.s.

The Diary of Mr. John Lamont of Newton, 1649-71 (Maitland Club, xii, 1830).


A Discovery after some search of the Sinnes of the Ministers (Leith, 1651).


Dugdale, W., A Short View of the Late Troubles in England (Oxford, 1681).


Extract of Letters Dated at Edinburgh (sic.), the 14, 16 and 17. of April, 1644 (London, 1644).

Extracts from the Burgh Records of Dunfermline in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Shearer, A. (Dunfermline, 1951).


Extracts from the Kirk Session Records of Dunfermline, ed. Henderson, E. (Edinburgh, 1865).

Extracts from the Presbytery Book of Strathbogie, 1631-54, ed. Stuart, J. (Spalding Club, vii, 1843).


Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Stirling, i, 1519-1666, ed. Renwick, R. (Glasgow, 1887).

Extracts from the Records of the Royal Burgh of Lanark with Charters and Documents Relating to the Burgh, A.D. 1150-1722, ed. Renwick, R. (Glasgow, 1893).


Forbes, D., Ane Account of the Familie of Innes With An Appendix of Charters and Notes, ed. Innes, C. (Spalding Club, xxxiv, 1864).


A full relation of the late expedition of the Right Honourable the Lord Monroe, Major-General of all the Protestant Forces in the Province of Ulster (London, 1644).

A Full Relation of the Scots March from Berwicke to Newcastle (London, 1644).

A fuller Relation of the taking of Bath ... Also the proceedings of the Scottish Army and their march towards Monmouth after the King (London, 1645).


Gillespie, G., Causes of the Lord's wrath against Scotland (n.p., 1653).

The Glorious and Miraculous Battle at York (Edinburgh, 1644).


Gordon, P., A Short Abrigedement of Britaine's Distemper from 1639-49, ed. Dunn, J. (Spalding Club, x, 1844).
A great Fight in Scotland between the Lord Gen. Cromwel's forces and
the Scots upon the advance of Lieutenant Gen. Lesley, and Col. Massie
from Sterling towards Glasgow (London, 1651).

The Great Victories: I. Obtained by Collonel Jones ... II. The Takin
of Devizes ... III. The Copie of a letter from Lieutenant Generall
Lesley (London, 1645).

A Great Victory God hath vouchsafed by the Lord General Cromwels forces
against the Scots (London, 1651).

Guthrie, W., The Christian's Great Interest, with 'A Large Account of
His Life', Dunlop, W. (Edinburgh, 1788).

The Hamilton Manuscripts, ed. Lowry, T.K. (Belfast, 1867).

Hardy, J., The Fatal Blow given to the Earle of Newcastle Armie by the
Scots (London, 1644).

Hill, M., A True and Impartiall Account of the Plunderings, Losses and
Sufferings of the County of Hereford by the Scottish Army, During Their
Siege Before the City of Hereford, A.D. 1645 (London, 1650).

(1858), 127-35.

His Majesties Passing Through the Scots Armie (n.p., 1641).

Historical Fragments, relative to Scottish affairs from 1635-1664, ed.
Maidment, J. (Edinburgh, 1833).

Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports, iii-v, vii, xxix (Portland),
lxiii (Somerset), lxxii (Laing), lxxviii (Hastings).

Historical Notices of Old Belfast and its Vicinity, ed. Young, R.M.
(Belfast, 1896).

Historical Notices of St. Anthony's Monastery, Leith and Rehearsal of
Events ... in the North of Scotland from 1635 to 1645 in relation to
the National Covenant, ed. Rodgers, C. (Grampian Club, xiv, 1877).

History of the War in Ireland from 1641 to 1653 by a British Officer of
the Regiment of Sir John Clotworthy, ed. Hogan, E. (Dublin, 1873).

Hope, T., A diary of the public correspondence ... 1613-45 (Bannatyne Club,
lxxx, 1843).

Hutcheson, G., Review and Examination of "Protesters no Subverters"
(London, 1659).

Hyde, E., earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars

An impartial collection of the great affairs of state from ... 1639 to

Intelligence from the Scottish Army, Being the Extract of Letters Sent
to Master Bowles, dated April 14, 1644 (London, 1644).
Intelligence from the south borders of Scotland. Written from Edinburgh, April 24, 1644 (London, 1644).

The intentions of the army of the kingdom of Scotland, Declared to their Brethren of England (Edinburgh, 1640).


Journals of the House of Commons, ii-vi.

Journals of the House of Lords, iv, vi-x.


A Large Relation of the Fight at Leith, Neere Edinburgh (London, 1650).

The Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army as also the taking of Cannow Froome (London, 1645).

Leslie, Alexander, earl of Leven, Camp Discipline, or the Soldiers Duty (London, 1642).


A Letter Concerning the Souldiers and their Orders about the Commissioners sent from the Parliament, to treet with the King Majesty (London, 1646).


A Letter from His Majesties Quarters at Newcastle (London, 1646).

A Letter of Great Consequences; sent by the Honorable Robert Lord Monro, out of the Kingdom of Ireland (London, 1643).

The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, Principal of the University of Glasgow, 1637-1662, ed. Laing, D. (Bannatyme Club, lxxii, parts 1 and 2, lxxvii, 1841-2).
Letters and Papers Relating to the Irish Rebellion Between 1642-46,

Letters from Roundhead Officers written from Scotland, ed. Akerman,
J.Y. (Bannatyne Club, cviii, 1856).

Letters from the Head-Quarters of Our Army in Scotland: An Account
of Col. Kerr and Staughan's Overture to the Lord Generall Cromwell
(London, 1650).

Letters of Consequence from Scotland, the first from the Commissioners
in the Generall Assembly there, to the Scots Commissioners in England
(London, 1643).


The Life of Mr. Robert Blair, Minister of St. Andrews, ed. McCrie, T.
(Wodrow Soc., xiii, 1848).

A List of the Prisoners of war who are officers in commission, in
custody of the marshall-general (London, 1651).

A List of the Several Regiments and Chief Officers of the Scottish
Army quartered near Newcastle (London, 1644), s.s.

Lithgow, W., A True Experimentall and Exact Relation upon that Famous
and Renowned Siege of Newcastle (Edinburgh, 1645).

Livingstone, J., A Brief Historical Relation of the Life of Mr. John

London Post, nos. 9, 23, 28, 30.

The Lord Marques of Argyle's Speech to a Grand Committee of Both Houses
of Parliament, the 25 of this instant June, 1646 (London, 1646).

Malbon, T., Memorials of the Civil War in Cheshire and the adjacent

The Marches of the Scots, under the Command of Lieut. Gen. Lesley
(London, 1645).

The Melvilles of Melville and the Leslies Earls of Leven, 3 vols., ed.
Fraser, W. (Edinburgh, 1890).

Memorials and Letters relating to the History of Great Britain in the
Reign of Charles the First, ed. Dalrymple, B. (Glasgow, 1776).

Memorials of Montrose and his Times, 2 vols., ed. Napier, M. (Maitland
Club, lxvi, parts i and ii, 1848-50).

Memorials of the Family of Wemyss of Wemyss, ed. Fraser, W. (Edinburgh,
1888).

Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 to 1652, 2 vols.,


Mercurius Academicus, 5th - 14th weeks.


Mercurius Politicus, 1650.

Mercurius Scoticus, 1650.

Minute Book kept by the War Committee of the Covenanters in the Stewartry of Kirkcudbright in the Years 1640 and 1641, ed. Nicholson, J. (Kirkcudbright, 1840).


Miscellany of the Maitland Club, i, part ii (Maitland Club, xxv, 1833).

Miscellany of the Maitland Club, iii (Maitland Club, xxxv, 1843).

Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, ii (Scot. His Soc., xxvii, 1904).

The Miscellany of the Spalding Club, iii, ed. Stuart, J. (Spalding Club, xvi, 1846).

The Miscellany of the Spalding Club, v, ed. Stuart, J. (Spalding Club, xxiv, 1852).

The Moderate Intelligencer.

Monro, R., Monro his expedition with the Scots Regiment (Called MacKeyes regiment) levied in August 1626 ... 1637 (London, 1637).

Montgomery MSS, i, ed. Hill, G. (Belfast, 1869).

A More Perfect and Particular Relation of the Late Great Victorie in Scotland obtained over Montrose and the Rebels there (London, 1645).

A Most Lamentable Information of part of the Grievances of Mupleswick (n.p., n.d.), s.s.


A New Remonstranc From Ireland (London, n.d.).


News from Ireland Concerning the Proceedings of the Presbytery in the County of Antrim in Ireland (London, 1650).


O'Neill, H.M., 'A Journal of the Most Memorable Transactions of General Owen O'Neill and his party, from the year 1641 to the Year 1650', *Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica: Or A Select Collection of State Papers, ii* (Dublin, 1772), 481-528.


Peace againe in Sion, or Heaven Appeased, man to God reconciled, England and Scotland united (London, 1641).

Perfect Diurnall, nos. 81-4.


The Presbyterie Book of Kirkcaldie, ed. Stevenson, W. (Kirkcaldy, 1900).

Records of Falkirk Parish, i, ed. Murray, G.I. (Falkirk, 1887).


Records of the Kirk of Scotland, containing the acts and proceedings of the General Assemblies, from the Year 1638 downwards, ed. Peterkin, A. (Edinburgh, 1838).


A Remonstrance of the Beginnings and Proceedings of the Rebellion in the County of Cavan, within the province of Ulster in Ireland (London, 1642).

Remonstrance of the Kirk of Scotland, with other occurrences of note certified in papers from the Scots quarters in Newcastle (London, 1646).


Reprints of Rare Tracts Chiefly Illustrative of the History of the Northern Counties, i–iii, ed. Richardson, M.A. (Newcastle, 1845–9).

Fenwick, J., 'Christ Ruling in the Midst of His Enemies'; A Letter from an Alderman of Newcastle shewing the grievances there (8 Sept. 1640); 'Our Demands of the English Lords Manifested, Being at Rippon Octob. 8. 1640'; 'A true Relation of the Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army ... before Newcastle The 8th of February 1643', i. Curtet, 'A True Relation of the Scots Taking of Cocket Island'; 'A Declaration from Scotland Concerning The Advance of the Scots Army who are come into England'; 'An exact relation of the last news from the quarters of the lord generall of the Scottish army, dated from Sunderland, March 12, 1643 0. s. 2; 'A Faithful Relation of the late Occurrences and Proceedings of the Scottish Army ... before Newcastle, 21 February 1644'; 'The Late Proceedings of the Scotch (sic.) Army, certifying their passing over Tyne'; 'The Scots army advanced into England ... from Addarston, the 24 of Jan. from ... the lord generall Lesley's quarters'; 'The Taking of the Fort at South Shields', ii. 'Extracts from the Municipal Accounts of Newcastle', iii.


Row, Jo., The History of the Kirk of Scotland from the Year 1558 to August 1637 with a Continuation by his son John Row (Wodrow Soc., xxii, 1842).


*Scotlands Alarme, Or, Some considerations tending to demonstrate the necessity of our speedie marching to the assistance of our Brethren in England* (Edinburgh, 1643).

*Scottish Dove*, nos. 16, 52, 70-1, 88.


*The Secretary of the Scots Army, His Relation to the Commissioners Concerning the King* (London, 1646).


*Several Letters of complaint from the northern parts of this Kingdom* (London, 1648).


Stewart, *A Full Relation of the Late Victory obtained (through God's Providence)* (London, 1644).

*The Sutherland Book*, Fraser, W. (Edinburgh, 1894).


*Three Letters Concerning the Surrender of many Scottish Lords To the High Sheriff of the County of Chester* (London, 1648).
Three Letters Concerning the Surrender of many Scottish Lords (London, 1648).


Tracts relating to the military proceedings in Lancashire during the Great Civil War, ed. Ormerod, G. (Chetham Soc., ii, 1844). 'A Letter from Duke of Hamilton to the Ministers at Lancaster', 252-3; 'The Last Newes from the Prince of Wales declaring his further proceedings against the Parliament's Forces', 254-5; 'Lt. General Cromwell's Letter to the Honourable William Lenthall, Esq.', 255-67; 'A Particular of the several Victories, and the Occasions of the Solemn Day of Thanksgiving', 270-3; 'A True representation of the present sad and lamentable condition of the County of Lancaster', 277-9; 'Mercurius Politicus, no. 63', 287-8; 'Perfect Diurnall no. 89', 290-2; 'Several Proceedings in Parliament from ... 21 of August, to ... the 28 day of August, 1651', 292-3; 'Another Victory in Lancashire obtained against the Scots by Major-General Harrison', 307-10.

A True and Exact Relation of divers principal actions of a late Expedition in the north of Ireland, by the English and Scottish Forces (London, 1642).

True Informer, nos. 4, 6-7, 11, 28.

A true relation of a second victorie over the Scots at Hamilton (London, 1650).


A True Relation of the Happy Successes of His Majesty's Forces in Scotland Under ... the Lord James, Marquis of Montrose (Oxford, 1644).

A true relation of the happy victory obtained ... upon April 27, 1650, against ... James Grahame (Edinburgh, 1650).

A true relation of the proceedings of the Scottish army, from the 12th of March to the 25th (London, 1644).


A True Relation of the routing of the Scottish army, near Dunbar, Sept. 3, instant (London, 1650).

Truths Discovery of A black Cloud in the North: Shewing Some Antiparliamentary, inhumane, cruell, and base proceedings of the Scotch Army (n.p., 1648).

Tullie, I., A Narrative of the Siege of Carlisle in 1644 and 1645 (Carlisle, 1839).

Two Letters from Lieutenant-General David Leslie to The Right Honourable the Commissioners of Scotland residing at London (London, 1646).


Vicars, J., The Burning Bush Not Consumed, Or, the Fourth and Last Part of the Parliametarie Chronicle (London, 1646).

Vicars, J., God's Arke Overtopping the World's Waves, Or the Third Part of the Parliametarie Chronicle (London, 1646).

Walker, E., Historical collections of several important transactions relating to the late rebellion and civil war of England (London, 1707).


Wheatly, W., A declaration of the Scottish Armie concerning their immediate marching towards the Borders of England (London, 1647).


Wishart, G., The compleat history of the warrs in Scotland under the conduct of ... Montrose (London, 1720).


(2) Secondary Sources

(a) published


Brown, P.H., History of Scotland to the present time, ii, From the Accession of Mary Stewart to the Revolution of 1689 (Cambridge, 1911).


Chambers, R., Domestic Annals of Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution, ii (Edinburgh, 1861).


Curry, J., Historical and critical review of the Civil Wars in Ireland (Dublin, 1810).


Dow, A.C., Ministers to the soldiers of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1962).


Ferguson, R.S., Carlisle (London, 1889).

New Ser., xii (1898), 17-79.


Fischer, T.A., The Scots in Germany (Edinburgh, 1902).

Flinn, M., Scottish Population History from the Seventeenth Century
to the 1930s (Cambridge, 1976).

Francisque-Michel, R., Les Ecossais en France: Les Francais en Écosse,
i (London, 1862).

Gardiner, S.R., History of the Great Civil War, 1642-1649, 4 vols.,


(London, 1936).


Glasgow, M., The Scotch-Irish in Northern Ireland and in the American
Colonies (New York, 1936).


Gordon, R. and Gordon, G., A Genealogical History of the Earldom of
Sutherland (Edinburgh, 1813).

Grimmelshausen, H.J.C.v., The adventures of Simplicissimus, trans. A.T.S.G.

Guthrie, 'The Solemn League and Covenant of the Three Kingdoms', Scot.

Guttery, D.R., The Great Civil War in the Midland Parishes: The People
Pay (Birmingham, 1951).

Haller, W., 'The Word of God in the New Model Army', Church His., xix
(1950), 15-33.

Hambye, E., L'Aumônerie de la flotte de Flandre au xviie siècle, 1623-1662
(Louvain, 1967).

Hamilton, C.L., 'The basis for Scottish Efforts to create a Reformed

Hamilton, C.L., 'Scotland, Ireland and the English Civil War', Albion,
vii (1975), 120-30.


Hancock, P., A Bibliography of Works relating to Scotland, 1916-50
(Edinburgh, 1959).
Hardy, T.D. and Brewer, J.S., Report ... upon the Carte and Carew papers in the Bodleian and Lambeth libraries (London, 1864).


Hill, G., An Historical Account of the Macdonnells of Antrim (Belfast, 1873).


Kennedy, J.W., 'The Teviotdale Regiment', Hawick Arch. Soc., xxxv (1903), 57-64.

Killen, W.D., The Ecclesiastical History of Ireland, ii (London, 1875).


Lane, J., The Reign of King Covenant (London, 1956).

Lang, A., A History of Scotland from the Roman Occupation, iii (Edinburgh, 1904).

Latimer, W.T., A History of Irish Presbyterians (Belfast, 1893).


Lecky, A.G., The Lagman and its Presbyterianism (Belfast, 1905).

Leland, T., The History of Ireland, ii-iii (London, 1773).

Lefèvre, J., 'L'aumônerie militaire à l'époque de L'archduc Albert (1589-1621)', Revue Belge de Philologie et d'histoire, viii (1928), 113-29.


Leslie, J.B., Closhar Clergy and Parishes (Enniskillen, 1929).

Leslie, J.B., Derry Clergy and Parishes (Enniskillen, 1937).

Leslie, J.B., Raphoe Clergy and Parishes (Enniskillen, 1940).

Leslie, J.B., Supplement to "Armagh Clergy and Parishes" (Dundalk, 1948).


MacAfee, W., 'The Colonization of the Maghera Region of South Derry during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', Ulster Folklife, xxiii (1978), 70-91.


McCrie, T., Lives of Alexander Henderson and James Guthrie (Edinburgh, 1846).

Mackay, J., An Old Scots Brigade (Edinburgh, 1885).


McKerrall, A., Kintyre in the Seventeenth Century (Edinburgh, 1948).

An Historical and Genealogical Account of the Clan MacLean (London, 1838).

McSkimin, S., The History and antiquities of the county of the town of Carrickfergus (Belfast, 1909).


Makey, W., The Church of the Covenant 1637-1651 (Edinburgh, 1979).


Matthews, W., *British Diaries* (Berkeley, California, 1951).


Nightingale, E., *The Ejected of 1662 in Cumberland and Westmorland* (Manchester, 1911).


Redlich, F., *De Praeda Militari. Looting and Booty, 1500-1815* (Weisbaden, 1956).


Robson, R.S., *Presbytery in Newcastle-on-Tyne from the Reformation till the Revolution* (Manchester, 1949).


Stevenson, D., 'Deposition of Ministers in the Church of Scotland under the Covenants, 1638-1651', Church His., xlv (1975), 321-35.


Stewart, D.S., The Scots in Ulster The Years Between 1636 and 1642 (Belfast, 1955).

Stuart, J., Historical memoirs of the city of Armagh, ed. Coleman, A. (Dublin, 1900).


Terry, C.S., A catalogue of the publications of Scottish historical clubs ... 1780-1908 (Glasgow, 1908).

Terry, C.S., An Index to the Papers Relating to Scotland in the Historical MSS. Commission Reports (Glasgow, 1908).


Terry, C.S., 'The Scottish Campaigns in Northumberland ... 1644', Arch. Aeliana, 2nd Ser., xxi (1899), 146-79.


Thomson, D.P., James Guthrie, the covenanting minister of Louden and Stirling (Galashiels, 1946).

Tisdall, W., The Conduct of the Dissenters in Ireland (Dublin, 1712).

Treadwell, V.W., 'The plantation of Donegal', Donegal Annual, iii (1955), 41-6.


Van Der Essen, L., 'Documents concernant le vicaire général Francesco de Umara et l'organisation de l'armée espagnol au Pays-Bas pendant la guerre de Flandre (1579-99), Analectes pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique de la Belgique, xxxvii (1911), 263-31.


Whellan, W., _History and Topography of the Counties of Cumberland and Westmorland_ (Pontefract, 1860).


Willcock, J., _A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times_ [the 9th earl of Argyll] (Edinburgh, 1907).


Young, P., *Oliver Cromwell and his Times* (rev. edn.,


(b) unpublished


Makey, W., 'Ministers in Scottish parishes, 1648' (A list of the ministers with biographical data kindly loaned to me by the author).


Stevenson, D., 'Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates, Scottish-Irish relations in the mid-seventeenth century' (The author kindly allowed me to consult the typescript in November 1978; it has been published recently under the auspices of the Ulster Historical Society).

Stewart, D., 'The History of the Presbyterian Settlements in Ireland 1641-1760' (Kept in the Presbyterian Historical Society Library, Presbyterian Church House, Belfast).

ADDENDA


Harvey, C.C., 'Military Papers of the Time of Charles II', *Scottish Historical Review*, xii (1914-15): 143-56.


