


The Reign of Anastasius I, 491-518

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Byzantine Studies

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The Reign of Anastasius I, 491-518

Short Abstract

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D. Phil., Michaelmas Term 1998

Anastasius' long rule at the turn of the sixth century has tended to be neglected, yet it was a critical time in the history of the Later Roman Empire. On his accession, there were many problems facing the state: conflicts, both internal and external, religious disputes, and financial and administrative chaos. It is the aim of this thesis to assess the significance of Anastasius' reign, with a systematic survey of the key areas of imperial government.

After an introductory chapter examining the primary sources, the second and third chapters consider revolts and wars. Chapter Two looks at two internal uprisings, that of the Isaurians (491-498) and that of Vitalian (514-516).

The third chapter concentrates on external conflicts and political relations. The first section considers the Persian offensive (502-506) and the role of the Arabs, while the second part examines the ambiguous position of Theoderic in Italy, and explores how Anastasius sought to stabilize the balance of power with counter-alliances with the Franks and Burgundians.

Chapter Four deals with the doctrinal schism dividing the orthodox from the monophysite. It outlines the background to this crisis and investigates the vicissitudes of Anastasius' policy as he sought to reconcile increasing eastern monophysitism with the west's intransigent orthodoxy.

Chapter Five examines Anastasius' financial rehabilitation of the state and concludes that his success lay in a much wider reorganisation of the empire's resources: he restructured the fisc and introduced changes to municipal administration, agrarian legislation and the organisation of the army. This chapter also considers measures to halt the escalating violence of the faction riots, and it closes with a survey of the emperor's building policy.

The thesis concludes that Anastasius' reign resolved many of the problems facing the empire in the fifth century, paving the way for Justinian in the sixth.

The Reign of Anastasius I, 491-518

Long Abstract

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D. Phil., Michaelmas Term 1998

Anastasius' accession to the throne in December 491, following the death of the emperor Zeno, was greeted with enthusiastic acclamations by the crowds which had gathered in the hippodrome. The citizens of Constantinople were determined that Zeno should not be succeeded by his brother, Longinus. They had disliked an Isaurian on the throne and the infiltration of Isaurians to the top civic and military posts. Zeno's rule had been beset by civil wars, he had done little to alleviate the severe financial problems afflicting the empire, and his Henoticon had caused further division in the Church, particularly between Rome and Constantinople. Such were the problems that Anastasius inherited and over the following twenty-seven years up to his death in 518, he sought to rehabilitate the state financially, tighten administrative and judicial procedures and secure peace on the borders of the empire. In spite of his relative success in leaving the empire strong, both financially and politically, the significance of his reign has tended to be overlooked in studies of this period. This thesis attempts to redress the balance and, by examining in turn the principal areas of Anastasius' rule, provide a re-evaluation of his reign.

The introduction considers the process of Anastasius' election to the imperial throne and his career before becoming emperor. Unfortunately, such details are scarce and we know only that he was a *silentiary* and had a strong interest in theology, having been shortlisted in 488 for the bishopric of Antioch. The problems of the empire that he inherited from Zeno are examined in more detail. The second part of the introduction consists of a review of secondary literature, concluding that the lack of complete studies on the reign makes for a disjointed and often biased picture.

One reason why the reign of Justinian has enjoyed far more attention than that of Anastasius, is that the achievements of the former are readily accessible in the works of Procopius. The sources for Anastasius, on the other hand, are often problematic, being distorted or fragmented. Therefore, the first chapter examines this diverse primary evidence according

to categories of language (Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic and Coptic), and type (chronicle and ecclesiastical history). By examining the author, date and background, the relative reliability of each text is assessed. Related to this chapter are two appendices. The first considers the dating of two literary works, the panegyrics of Priscian and Procopius, over which there has been much dispute. However, both texts could be used in fixing several events of the reign, which are otherwise undated. The second appendix provides a close analysis of a fragmentary papyrus poem, *P. Vindob. 29788B-C*, arguing that the subject of encomium is Anastasius and not the emperor Zeno, as suggested elsewhere.

Chapter Two considers two internal revolts, beginning with that of the Isaurians in 491. The early weeks of Anastasius' reign were occupied with the problem of dispensing with the old regime, a process which resulted not only in the exile of the ambitious Longinus and his family, but also in the mass expulsion of all Isaurians from Constantinople on the charge that they were responsible for inciting faction rioting. Some of the leading Isaurians, namely Longinus of Kardala and the senator Athenodorus, joined forces with Conon, an ex-bishop, and Lilingis, the *comes et praeses Isauriae*, who had already started a rebellion in Isauria. After initial successes for the imperial forces, the war dragged on until 498 when the Isaurian leaders were finally captured. The chapter opens with a review of previous relations between the empire and Isauria, particularly from 441 onwards when the power of the Isaurians increased as a counterbalance to German ascendancy. It is against this background that the causes and various phases of the war under Anastasius are investigated.

The second part of Chapter Two examines the revolt of Vitalian which broke out towards the end of the reign. Discussion is offered on the possible provocation for this uprising, considering in turn three potential reasons: the dissatisfaction of the orthodox with imperial monophysite policy, economic hardship in Thrace, and the pure ambition of Vitalian. An examination of the course of hostilities follows, focusing on Anastasius' conduct of the war, and particularly on his prudent use of negotiation combined with force. The role of the factions and the charioteer, Porphyrius, in defending Constantinople, is touched on. Inasmuch as ecclesiastical affairs played a role in the revolt, the relevant correspondence between Anastasius and the pope is covered here, although it will also feature briefly in sequence in Chapter Four.

The third chapter moves away from internal revolts to consider external conflicts and political relations. The first part investigates various aspects of eastern foreign policy, beginning with a brief review of Romano-Persian relations over the fifth century, and investigation of Anastasius' policy towards the Arabs prior to the outbreak of war with Persia. An amicable alliance with Arab tribes was of crucial importance to the Romans, for they could not afford war on two fronts: if relations with Persia were unstable, peace with the Arabs was imperative. Additionally, friendly relations with the Arabs also helped to secure trade routes south towards the Red Sea and beyond. On the eve of war with Persia, Anastasius did not neglect the opportunity for extra security, and in 502, made an alliance with the powerful Ghassanids and Kindites, based on the promise of mutual assistance in times of war. The discussion extends to explore how Anastasius sought to integrate his new allies into the empire by strengthening religious and cultural ties, and to elaborate further on the theme of economic policy. The island of Jotabe, strategically situated in the gulf of Aqaba at the north of the Red Sea, was reclaimed at this time. Since its capture during the reign of Leo I by an Arab, the Roman Empire had suffered the loss of revenue from custom taxes collected there, and the unrestricted use of this trade route. Anastasius' retrieving of the island fits well with his concern for the financial rehabilitation of the state explored fully in Chapter Five. Similarly, the dating to his reign of a raid by the pro-Roman Axumites against the Himyarites may be connected to the safe-guarding of the trade routes south of the Red Sea.

However, the main focus of the first section of Chapter Three is the Persian war, and again, more specifically, Anastasius' response to the Persian offensive and his direction of the war from Constantinople. His much criticised choice of generals in the first year of the war is re-assessed and imperial success is recognised where it has previously been overlooked. This section concludes that Anastasius created a stable relationship with Persia and ends with a survey of the improvements made to fortifications along the eastern lines of defence, with particular attention to Dara and Resafa.

The chapter closes with a brief review of other uprisings in the east during Anastasius' reign, including that of the Tzani (506), the Mazices (513), and especially the Sabir Huns (515).

The second part of Chapter Three looks at western foreign policy, concentrating chiefly on

the relationship of Rome with the eastern Roman empire and, in conjunction, Theoderic's position as king of the Ostrogoths in Italy. In order to set the scene for his negotiations with Anastasius, the background to Theoderic's invasion of Italy is examined, along with relations between Zeno and Odoacer, and Zeno and Theoderic. An analysis is offered of Theoderic's constitutional position in Anastasius' reign, drawing on a range of historical texts and epigraphic sources. The various vicissitudes in the relationship between emperor and king are explored, and this chapter seeks to illustrate how Anastasius, while establishing a *modus vivendi* with Theoderic, strove to curb the latter's aspiration for greater influence through his own alliances with the Franks and Burgundians.

However, it was not only to the west that Theoderic looked for opportunities of increased power and sovereignty. Parts of the Balkans were also disputed territory between emperor and king. Anastasius was alarmed by the Ostrogoth's seizure from the Gepids of the frontier town of Sirmium in 504, and at the depredations of the Hun, Mundo, who was possibly working in league with Theoderic. Imperial troops sent against Mundo were defeated, and it was not until 508, that the eastern part of Pannonia Secunda (not including Sirmium) was returned by Theoderic.

Problems between Anastasius and Theoderic, resulting from the doctrinal schism dividing the Churches of the east and west, are dealt with so far as Theoderic's role is concerned, but again, they are also mentioned in Chapter Four. This part of the chapter on Italy concludes that despite the problems outlined above, Anastasius and Theoderic developed, to some extent, a good working relationship, and that Anastasius was viewed in hindsight as a relatively pro-Gothic emperor.

The remaining sections of this chapter concern the barbarian raids in the Balkans and Anastasius' measures to reduce their impact by improving defences. The most well-known of these fortifications is the Long Wall, standing just to the west of the imperial capital. Analysis is offered on the two problems surrounding Anastasius' work: the exact nature of his involvement, whether building or mere restoration, and the dating. A survey is also included on defensive works along the Danube *limes*, Black Sea coast and in Moesia II and Scythia.

The chapter ends with the conclusion that while Anastasius lacks the triumph which Justinian enjoyed as a result of his reconquests, the former preserved the western empire intact and pursued a policy of peace and stability at a low cost to the treasury.

Chapter Four seeks to recount the course of ecclesiastical history between the years 491 to 518, with a close analysis of imperial policy. The underlying issues of the orthodoxy versus monophysitism debate and the conflict between emperor and pope are explored through discussion on the Council of Chalcedon, the Henoticon of Zeno and the resulting Acacian schism. Anastasius' relations with successive popes, Gelasius, Anastasius II, (Laurentius) and Symmachus are considered, in order to highlight their differing approaches: the conciliatory attitude of Anastasius II and Laurentius as opposed to the hard-line stance of Gelasius and Symmachus who believed, above all else, in the primacy of the See of Rome and the authority of the pope over that of the emperor in all ecclesiastical matters. The focus of the chapter now moves to Constantinople, which remained largely orthodox, and the eastern provinces, where there was an increasing adoption of monophysitism under the powerful leadership of Severus of Antioch and Philoxenus of Mabbög. Explanation and justification are sought for Anastasius' deposition of four patriarchs, Euphemius (496) and Macedonius (511) of Constantinople, Flavian of Antioch (512) and Elias of Jerusalem (516). Consideration is given to the various synods which took place, especially those at Constantinople (499 and 507), Antioch (508/509 and 513/514), Sidon (511/512) and Tyre (515). Finally, with the revolt of Vitalian, attention returns to the west, where, under the intransigent Hormisdas, the last of the four popes to serve during Anastasius' reign, the schism between Rome and Constantinople continued. The chapter closes with a re-evaluation of Anastasius' religious policy, arguing that, by and large, he maintained a relative cohesion of the eastern provinces, while making continued advances to break the deadlock with the western Church.

The one area in which Anastasius is readily deemed successful is that of domestic policy, particularly in the revival of the state treasury which held three hundred and twenty thousand pounds at his death. It is the aim of Chapter Five to examine how this remarkable recovery was achieved, for while the prosperity of the treasury increased, the emperor managed to implement a number of tax cuts and subsidise provisions for areas suffering damage from war

or natural disasters.

Anastasius began by appointing experienced professional officials to key government positions and refused to appoint any candidate merely on grounds of birth. He also introduced changes to the functioning of municipal councils. He transferred power away from the *curiales*, giving greater responsibility to bishops and the *defensor*, and introducing new tax collectors, known as *vindices*. Such measures were designed to increase efficiency in administration and to weed out corruption. As for imperial legislation, this chapter seeks to illustrate the great extent to which the reforms were designed to compliment each other. Thus, while Anastasius abolished the unpopular gold tax, the *chrysargyron*, he filled the hole in the treasury with contributions from the *res privata*, and created a new official, the *comes sacri patrimonii*, to administer the new application of this fund. The adoption of payment in gold instead of "in kind" for land taxes and the remuneration of the army was the completion of a long process which, by making more efficient use of the empire's resources, was to the greater advantage of the economy. Financial security was further improved by the introduction of Anastasius' coinage reform which helped stabilize the economic outlook. As part of the overhaul of imperial infrastructure, Anastasius also turned his attention to social and judicial reforms. Chapter five systematically examines these key areas of Anastasius' programme of reform, ending with a survey of his building programme of utilitarian works, churches and monasteries, projects only made possible by the general prosperity of the empire.

The chapter also includes a section on the emperor's policy regarding the factions, whose violent clashes increased at the beginning of his reign. The cause of the rioting is examined for each incidence, along with Anastasius' response. It is established that his measures were successful as later insurrection was mainly a result of ecclesiastical differences.

This thesis concludes that the reign of Anastasius deserves greater recognition than it has hitherto enjoyed. Justinian's many achievements were underpinned by Anastasius' considerable success in reversing the economic misfortune of the empire, improving administration, and securing peace and stability on the frontiers.

Contents

Acknowledgements	ix
Abbreviations	x
Introduction	1
Chapter One <i>Historical Sources</i>	12
Chapter Two <i>Civil Wars</i>	
Part One <i>The Isaurian War</i>	33
Part Two <i>The Revolt of Vitalian</i>	50
Chapter Three <i>Foreign Policy</i>	
Part One <i>The Eastern Frontier</i>	69
Part Two <i>Western Foreign Policy</i>	108
Chapter Four <i>Religious Policy</i>	146
Chapter Five <i>Domestic Policy and Administration</i>	206
Conclusion	267
Appendix A <i>Dating the Panegyrics</i>	272
Appendix B <i>A Fragmentary Encomium: P. Gr. Vindob. 29788B-C</i>	277
Appendix C <i>Maps of Pamphylia and Cilicia</i>	293
Appendix D <i>Map of the Balkans</i>	296
Appendix E <i>Maps of the Transcaucasus, Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern Frontier</i>	297
Appendix F <i>The Popes and Patriarchs The Definition of Faith (Council of Chalcedon) Anastasius' Typos</i>	300
Appendix G <i>Key Ministers and Officers (491-518) Legislation (491-518)</i>	304
Bibliography	308

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Fiona K. Nicks

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Abbreviations

- ASRS *Archivio della Società romana di storia patria*
- BAR *British Archaeological Reports, International Series*
- BS *Bibliotheca Sanctorum*, ed. F. Caraffa, Rome 1961-1969, 12 vols.
- BZ *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*
- CIL *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berolini 1862-1986, 17 vols.
- CHr. *Cambridge History of Iran*, ed. E. Yarshater, Cambridge 1983, vol.III(1), "The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods".
- CMH *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, vol.I, "The Christian Empire", edd. H.M. Gwatkin and J.P. Whitney, Cambridge 1911, and vol.IV, "The Byzantine Empire", ed. J.M. Hussey, Cambridge 1966-1967.
- CSCO *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*
- DACL *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, ed. F. Cabrol, Paris 1907-1953, 15 vols.
- DHGE *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, Paris 1912-.
- DMA *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, New York, 1982-1989.
- DOP *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*
- DTC *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, edd. A. Vacant and E. Mangenot, Paris 1903-1950.
- EHR *English Historical Review*
- EI *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, ed. E. Yarshater, London 1985-.
- FHG *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, ed. C. Müller, Paris 1851, vol.IV, 1870, vol.V.
- GRBS *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
- HJG *Historisches Jahrbuch Görres Gesellschaft*
- HTR *Harvard Theological Review*
- ILS *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, ed. H. Dessau, Berlin 1954, vol.1.
- JHS *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
- JÖB *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen byzantinistik*
- JÖBG *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft*
- JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*

- JTS* *Journal of Theological Studies*
- MAH* *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*
- MGH, AA* *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi*, Berlin 1877-1919.
- OCD* *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford 1970 (2nd edition).
- ODB* *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, Oxford 1991, 3 vols.
- NCirc* *Numismatic Circular*
- OS* *Orientalia Suecana*
- PG* *Patrologia Graeca*, ed. J.P Migne, Paris 1857-1866.
- PL* *Patrologia Latina*, ed. J.P. Migne, Paris 1844-1865.
- PLRE* *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, J.R. Martindale, Cambridge 1980, vol.II, A.D. 395-527.
- PO* *Patrologia Orientalis*, Paris 1903-.
- PW* *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart 1893-.
- RESE* *Revue des études sud-est européennes*
- RH* *Revue historique*
- RHE* *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*
- ROC* *Revue de l'Orient chrétien*

Introduction

On 10th December, 491, the day following the death of the emperor Zeno, the widowed empress Ariadne addressed the crowds which had gathered impatiently in the hippodrome. The citizens of Constantinople had two main concerns which they wished to be clearly understood by those responsible for selecting their new emperor. Thus they shouted:

ὀρθόδοξον βασιλέα τῆ οἰκουμένη... Ῥωμαίων βασιλέα τῆ οἰκουμένη¹.

Such conditions were stipulated in order to ensure the rejection of the candidacy of perhaps the most obvious contender, Longinus, Zeno's brother, whom the latter had been grooming as his successor². But Ariadne, imperial ministers and the senate were already certain that there would be no repeat of Zeno's reign which had been beset with acute crises and enduring problems, both political and ecclesiastical. Extremely unpopular in Constantinople, Zeno had been threatened by several internal revolts exacerbated by the stigma of his Isaurian birth, while his involvement in ecclesiastical affairs led to the prolonged schism between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople³. Thus Ariadne reassured her audience in the hippodrome:

ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων αἰτήσεων ἐκελεύσαμεν τοῖς ἐνδοξοτάτοις ἄρχουσι καὶ τῆ ἱερᾷ συγκλήτῳ μετὰ κοινῆς τῶν γενναιοτάτων δοκιμασίας ἄνδρα ἐπιλέξασθαι Χριστιανὸν Ῥωμαίων καὶ πάσης γέμοντα βασιλικῆς ἀρετῆς, ὥστε μήτε χρημάτων, μήτε ἄλλῳ τινί, ὅσον τό γε ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἀνθρωπίνῳ πάθει ὑποκεῖσθαι⁴.

Meanwhile, back in the palace, senior officials and the patriarch of Constantinople, Euphemius, were discussing the question of succession. It was proposed by Urbicius, the *praepositus sacri cubiculi*, that the choice should be left to Ariadne herself, and she selected

¹ De Caer. I.92.

² cf. chapter two, part ~~two~~^{one}, *The Origins of the Conflict*.

³ Internal revolts during Zeno's reign: the usurpation of Basiliscus 475-476, and the revolts of Marcian 479, and Illus 479-488. On the doctrinal schism, cf. chapter four, *The Henoticon of Zeno* and *The Acacian Schism*.

⁴ De Caer. I.92.

the *silentary*, Anastasius⁵. Remarkably little is known about his early life and previous career, and thus to us, his appointment seems somewhat obscure⁶. However, Anastasius was obviously well-known in Constantinople and Ariadne guessed correctly that he would make a popular choice. The crowd gave an enthusiastic response:

ὡς ἔζησας, οὕτω βασίλευσον. εὐσεβῶς ἔζησας, εὐσεβῶς βασίλευσον⁷.

Anastasius' native town was Dyrrhachium in Nova Epirus, the last point on the Via Egnatia, but the new emperor was certainly Ῥωμαῖος by birth and to be preferred over the Isaurian Longinus⁸. Moreover, while Anastasius had not reached the illustrious ranks of the senate, he was one of the three *decurions* of the *silentaries*, and perhaps already known for his efficiency in administration that was to become so apparent throughout his reign⁹. Certainly the crowd hoped not only that the empire would flourish generally:

νικᾶ ἡ τύχη τῶν Ῥωμαίων¹⁰

but drew the emperor's attention to specific measures that needed his attention: namely, the expulsion of informers, and the restoration of the army.

However, in the acclamations at his accession, it is Anastasius' piety which is extolled above all. This now seems paradoxical, given that Anastasius is much criticised in contemporary sixth-century sources for his religious policy. Euphemius had already expressed concern over

⁵ On Urbicius, *PLRE* II.1188-1190, no.1, with Cedr. I.626 and Zon. XIV.3.1.

⁶ Particularly as Anastasius was already about sixty years old, hardly younger than Zeno.

⁷ De Caer. I.92. Anastasius' height and dignified appearance no doubt gave him an imposing presence, able to hold sway over an emotive audience; cf. Mal. 392 and Zach. of Myt. VII.1, with Stein (1949), II.78, Capizzi (1969), pp.234ff, *PLRE* II.79-80.

⁸ For a detailed discussion on the history of Dyrrhachium and its geographical position, see Capizzi (1969), pp.17-28. For references to Anastasius and Dyrrhachium, *PLRE* II.78.

⁹ For a reconstruction of his early career, see Capizzi (1969), pp.47-70. Capizzi calculates that Anastasius was born c.430 and came to Constantinople c.440, and discusses how he might have reacted to the political and ecclesiastical situation he found there. He also looks at his career as a *silentary* and a *silentary decurion* (for which see also *PLRE* II.78-79 with relevant references), and the nature of his friendship with Ariadne. In chapter two, pp.29-46 Capizzi explores Anastasius' family background, as does Cameron (1978).

¹⁰ De Caer. I.92.

Anastasius' unconventional views expounded in the Great Church and only agreed to crown him emperor on receipt of a signed definition of faith, professing his adherence to orthodoxy. At this stage, however, the gathering of Constantinopolitan citizens in the hippodrome was more than satisfied by Anastasius' piety and interest in religion: he had, after all, been a candidate for the bishopric of Antioch in 488¹¹.

When the acclamations, the thanksgiving in the Great Church and the banquets were over, it was time for Anastasius to turn his attention to the troubled empire he had inherited, weakened after decades of civil unrest, barbarian threats and mismanagement of the treasury. Approaching a new ^{half-}millennium, Anastasius must have been conscious that his solutions to the problems of the fifth century must be solutions that could take the empire into the sixth century. Potent external powers, such as the Persians and Ostrogoths, would continue to vex the provinces of the empire and wars could not be fought without a replenishing of the state treasury, a reorganisation of the empire's resources and, as the crowds called for, a restoration of the army.

The exact nature of the problems facing Anastasius on his accession can be better determined by a closer examination of them individually, and we start with foreign threats. After over forty years of peace with Rome's old enemy Persia, there were signs of dissatisfaction with the current peace treaty, and in particular, over the possession of the border town of Nisibis. The treaty of 363 stipulated the return of Nisibis to the Romans after one hundred and twenty years, and after 483, when the Persians had made no move to restore the city, the Romans began to refuse financial aid to Persia. Zeno might well have anticipated a return to war, but made no provision for such an outcome, either in preparing the army, or improving defences in the east.

While there was less danger of a military confrontation in the west, Zeno's vacillation over rights of rulership in Italy left a very delicate situation there for Anastasius. Having made an ineffectual decision over the relative claims to the throne of Julius Nepos (the nominee of

¹¹ cf. Capizzi (1969), p.69 and *PLRE* II.79.

Leo I) and the Scirian Odoacer, he invited Theoderic, son of Theodemir, to remove Odoacer and rule in his place. As he had never defined Odoacer's exact position, Theoderic's role was similarly unclear, and it was thus left to Anastasius to try to define the Italian king's place in the imperial hierarchy.

But not only did Zeno leave an impossible political relationship with the west, he had also all but severed ties between the Churches of Constantinople and Rome. His Henoticon, composed by his patriarch, Acacius, angered the pope, firstly because it ignored the definition of faith agreed at the Council of Chalcedon, which the Church of Rome held to underpin the orthodox faith, and secondly because an emperor had seen fit to dictate the policy of the Church. The pope and patriarch excommunicated each other and the resulting thirty-five year long Acacian schism was to trouble Anastasius' ecclesiastical policy throughout his reign.

Zeno's reign, as was remarked earlier, was peppered with the internal revolts of Basiliscus, Marcian and Illus and much of the emperor's attention was distracted by the depredations of the two Theoderics¹². He certainly did not find the time or inclination to turn to the financial recovery and administrative needs of the empire. He had inherited an empire whose treasury was already depleted by the naval expedition of Leo I (468) and the situation was hardly helped by the usurpation of Basiliscus¹³, the tribute paid to the Ostrogoths in later years, or indeed, payments made by Zeno to maintain the loyalty of his Isaurians during the war with Illus. Even apart from this bribery, Zeno seems to have done little to help the situation, being "lavish and unbusinesslike by temperament"¹⁴.

After the end of the Isaurian war, Anastasius was free to turn his attention to the

¹² cf. Heather (1991), chapter 8.

¹³ As Zeno managed to take with him a huge amount of imperial resources, Basiliscus was compelled to enforce harsh taxation and extort money from the Church.

¹⁴ Jones (1964), I.229; cf Bury (1923), p.401 who comments that Zeno wasted money by donatives to friends and inaccuracies in checking. Efforts during his reign to refill the treasury consisted largely of the unethical measure of the *praetorian prefect*, Sebastianus, who demanded official *suffragium*, a payment for the treasury for every office, and even sold the rights of appointing officials.

administration of the empire. 498 saw the abolition of an unpopular gold tax, the *chrysargyron*, and the introduction of the first stage of his coinage reform. Assisted by a team of carefully selected experienced ministers, Anastasius would, throughout his reign, produce a comprehensive range of legislation designed to stamp out abuse and corruption and tighten the empire's bureaucracy in a number of different departments.

However, before Anastasius could begin to tackle the problems besetting the empire, he had to sweep away the cobwebs of the old regime. His first task was to end the unwelcome dominance of the Isaurians in the capital. With the meteoric rise of Zeno to the imperial throne, the Isaurian population in the city swelled, with many Isaurians infiltrating the top imperial posts. Hated by the people of Constantinople, the Isaurians were driven out of the city by an emperor who must have been relieved to remove the threat of a coup headed by the disappointed Longinus. The ensuing war was to last for seven years and end in victory for the imperial forces.

By and large, Anastasius was successful in transforming an empire which was afflicted by severe economic hardship, inefficient management and plagued by continual political turmoil into a well organised and prosperous state, able to support even Justinian's most ambitious projects. Yet this achievement has been largely ignored and Anastasius has received relatively little attention in comparison with his famous successor. This imbalance is partly the result of Anastasius' unpopular religious policy which has been allowed to overshadow the rest of his reign, and partly Justinian's fortune in having a historian to record for posterity his accomplishments.

Gibbon's dismissive comments on the reign of Anastasius were not encouraging for a revival of interest in the period, as he wrote thus:

After the fall of the Roman Empire in the west, an interval of fifty years, till the memorable reign of Justinian, is faintly marked by the obscure names and imperfect annals of Zeno, Anastasius, and Justin, who successively ascended

the throne of Constantinople¹⁵.

There is only one study of the life and works of Anastasius, the Italian biography, *L'imperatore Anastasio I*, published at the end of the 1960s by C. Capizzi¹⁶. As well as discussing Anastasius' background (chapters one to three), accession (four), and personality (seven), he covers the main aspects of the reign in one long chapter entitled *L'opera politica*, which includes the Isaurian war, religious policy, administrative and financial reforms and foreign policy. The emperor's building programme enjoys a separate chapter (six), in which buildings or sites built or restored by Anastasius are listed. Capizzi's analysis of Anastasius' reforms, while largely adequate, has some significant gaps. There is, for example, no section on Anastasius' army reforms, nor a cohesive discussion on the nature of faction rioting or the emperor's response. Consideration of other measures is severely limited: for example, the significant coinage reform is dealt with in three short paragraphs (pp.153-154). Such deficiencies, along with the additional research carried out on the reign in the past thirty years, render a second biography of Anastasius' reign a worthwhile project.

Separate aspects of Anastasius' rule have, of course, been covered in a number of books and articles. One of the most useful of these must be Charanis' study of Anastasius' religious policy, published originally in 1939, but revised in 1974¹⁷. Charanis includes detailed background information and provides a detailed account of the ecclesiastical disputes in the east, the revolt of Vitalian and the religious situation in the Balkans, and the doctrinal schism between the east and west.

Two books, Chauvot's *Procopé de Gaza, Priscien de Césarée, Panégyriques de l'empereur Anastase Ier*, and Coyne's *Priscian of Caesarea's De Laude Anastasii Imperatoris*, which are essentially commentaries on the panegyrics of Procopius and Priscian, also concentrate on the reign of Anastasius¹⁸. Both however, are obviously limited to aspects of the reign which are

¹⁵ Gibbon (1898), IV.170.

¹⁶ Capizzi (1969).

¹⁷ *Church and State in the Later Roman Empire. The religious policy of Anastasius I, 491-518.*

¹⁸ Chauvot (1986) and Coyne (1991).

dealt with by the panegyricists themselves, and naturally focus partly on Procopius and Priscian, their works, style and so on.

There are a number of articles devoted to various areas of Anastasius' empire. Cameron (1974) and Chauvot (1977) have both published articles trying to establish the dating of Priscian's panegyric. Several articles pertain to Anastasius' building programme, such as Barnea's "Contributions to Dobrudja History under Anastasius I", and the pairs of articles by Croke, Croke/Crow and Whitby on the Anastasian Long Wall and the fortification of Dara¹⁹. A number of works have been written on aspects of Anastasius' legislation, including Oliverio's detailed commentary on the decree concerning the *limitanei* in Libya²⁰, and Metcalf's detailed book on *The Origins of the Anastasian Currency Reform*²¹. The currency reform has sparked much interest among numismatists, resulting in various articles: Bellinger's "The Copper of Anastasius I", Shaw's "Byzantine Folles of Anastasius I" and Grierson's study on "The Monetary Reforms of Anastasius and their economic consequences"²². Only one article, Lamma's "La politica dell'imperatore Anastasio I", tackles the whole of Anastasius' reign²³. Thirty pages long, it provides little more than a superficial overview of the main issues of the reign with little accompanying discussion.

Apart from these individual studies, the Anastasian years of power are included within general histories of the Byzantine Empire. Examples include Bury's *History of the Later Roman Empire*, volume one of Vasiliev's *Histoire de l'empire byzantin*, volume two of Stein's *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, Ostrogorsky's *History of the Byzantine State*, Jones' *The Later*

¹⁹ Croke (1982)(b) and Whitby (1985) on the Long Walls, and Croke/Crow (1983) and Whitby (1986)(b) on Dara.

²⁰ Oliverio (1936).

²¹ Metcalf (1969).

²² Bellinger (1966), Shaw (1963) and Grierson (1967).

²³ Lamma (1940).

Roman Empire 284-602, and volumes one and four of the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*²⁴. Of these, Stein's work is undoubtedly the most detailed and even-handed, while Jones is equally good on administrative and financial matters. On the whole, the others provide a brief summary of the key aspects of the reign, usually acknowledging Anastasius' successful economic reforms, but emphasising the ecclesiastical turmoil. They portray the reign in a negative light, particularly in contrast to Justinian's. Bréhier's entry on Anastasius in the *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques* is fairly detailed and positive in its assessment of the emperor's efforts, but lacks the advantages of the considerable amount of research and interest in Byzantine history generated since the beginning of the century²⁵. Some of the entries in *Pauly-Wissowa* are useful for the Anastasian era, particularly the article by Ensslin on the rebel Vitalian, but the section on Anastasius by Oehler is nothing more than a short summary of his reign²⁶.

Works which focus on the particular aspects of Byzantine history of this period can also be mined for discussion on Anastasius. Thus, for his eastern foreign policy, his involvement with the Arabs is covered by Shahîd in his detailed books on Byzantium and the Arabs in the fifth and sixth centuries²⁷, while accounts of the Anastasian war against Persia can be found in Blockley's *East Roman Foreign Policy*, and especially in Greatrex's new study on *Rome and Persia at war, 502-532*²⁸. Aspects of western policy can be found variously in books devoted to the life of Theoderic or religious policy (for which see below). Useful biographies of Theoderic and studies on the Ostrogoths include those by Hodgkin (1885) and (1891), Mommsen (1910), Caspar (1931), Brion (1935), Jones (1962), Burns (1985), and Moorhead (1992), yet these are naturally written from Theoderic's point of view. Anastasius' relations with Clovis are dealt with in most of the above works, but there are also helpful articles by

²⁴ Bury (1923), Vasiliev (1932), Ostrogorsky (1956), Stein (1949), Jones (1964) and *CMH* (1911) and (1966-1967).

²⁵ Bréhier (1914).

²⁶ Ensslin (1961); Oehler (1894).

²⁷ Shahîd (1989) and (1995).

²⁸ Blockley (1992); Greatrex (1998).

Courcelle (1948-1949) and Ensslin (1936). Notably, there are hardly any works which provide a synthesis of Anastasius' foreign policy. Rubin, in his article "The Mediterranean and the dilemma of the Roman Empire in Late Antiquity", is one of few to address the question of how to maintain the eastern empire, while regaining the west²⁹. Separate studies of either the east or west fail to recognise the stabilising effect of Anastasius' policy of deliberate non-expansion or the dangers over exerting the empire's resources which resulted in the eventual failure of Justinian's ambitious plans of reconquest.

A huge amount of material exists on theological matters, which again incorporates the reign of Anastasius. The list of relevant works is far too long to detail here, but includes works pertaining to the west and the papacy: Brezzi (1936) and Dvornik (1951) on Gelasius' policy, Alessandrini (1944) and Cessi (1919) and (1920) on the Laurentian schism, and two articles by Bertolini (1929) and (1941) on the political and ecclesiastical situation in Rome. Studies on religion in the east tend to focus on particular figures, such as Severus (Bauer's "Die Severus - Vita des Zacharias Rhetor"), and Philoxenus (de Halleux's *Philoxène de Mabbog*), but useful general books include Honigmann's *Evêques et Evêchés monophysites d'Asie antérieure au VIe siècle*³⁰. There are a limited number of concentrated surveys of Anastasius' handling of the ecclesiastical crisis from his point of view. Those that come closest are Bardy's chapter entitled "Sous le régime de l'Hénotique: la politique religieuse d'Anastase" in Fliche's and Martin's *Histoire de l'église*, Moeller's article, "Un fragment du Type de l'empereur Anastase I" and the relevant chapters of Duchesne's *L'Eglise au VIe siècle*, and especially of Frend's *The Rise of the Monophysite Movement*³¹.

While even his most severe critics do not deny that Anastasius' administrative measures left the state better organised and more prosperous than it had been for some time, few have ever considered Anastasius' reforms as a cohesive policy. Again, analysis must be sought in either

²⁹ Rubin (1986)(a). He has also published an interesting article in the *BAR* series (1989), which explores Anastasius' relations with Southern Arabia.

³⁰ Bauer (1967), de Halleux (1963); Honigmann (1951).

³¹ Bardy (1948), Moeller (1961), Duchesne (1925) and Frend (1972).

general studies of the period, such as those of Karayannopulos (1958), Jones (1974), Lemerle (1979), Hendy (1985), Delmaire (1989), Kaplan (1992) and Treadgold (1995), or in articles on more specific measures: for example, Karayannopulos (1956) on the *chrysoteleia*, Monks (1957) on the *res privata*, Claude (1969) and Chrysos (1971) on the introduction of the *vindices*, and de Laet (1949) on the collection of customs taxes. Useful discussion on Anastasius' policy on the faction riots which erupted during his reign is found in Cameron's two books, *Porphyrius, the Charioteer* and *Circus Factions*³². Less helpful studies are conducted by Jarry in his article and book on *Hérésies et factions* in which he unsuccessfully attempts to divine Anastasius' social and religious inclinations from his treatment of the factions³³.

It is clear from the above survey, that the reign of Anastasius suffers not from a simple lack of research, but from a lack of sympathetic evaluation that would reveal a broader picture of the years 491-518. Details of policy, both political and religious, foreign and domestic, fragmented in discussion throughout a wide range of articles and books, are easily overlooked or, placed out of context, suffer a biased interpretation. It is also noticeable that many of the key secondary sources were composed at the turn of this century. Apart from those mentioned above are Brooks' "The Emperor Zenon and the Isaurians" (1893), Merten's *De bello Persico ab Anastasio gesto* (1906), and Rose's *Die byzantinische Kirchenpolitik unter Kaiser Anastasius I* (1888). A century on, Anastasius' reign could now benefit from additional research undertaken on this period and new editions of some of the primary texts.

It is the object of this thesis to provide an analysis and re-assessment of the reign of Anastasius. It will consider systematically the various issues and problems facing Anastasius throughout his long rule: civil wars (chapter two, *The Isaurian War* and *The Revolt of Vitalian*), foreign policy (chapter three, *The Eastern Frontier* and *Western Foreign Policy*),

³² Cameron (1973) and (1976).

³³ Jarry (1960) and (1968).

Religious Policy (chapter four) and *Administration and Domestic Policy* (chapter five)³⁴. An evaluation of the primary evidence is essential for such a study, as it is on this that we must rely for accounts and judgements of Anastasius' reign. It is thus with the historical sources that we begin in chapter one.

³⁴ Lack of space precludes the investigation of the one remaining significant aspect of the reign of Anastasius, his patronage of literary and cultural activities. He encouraged men of literary talent by seeking to appoint only learned and cultured men to positions of responsibility, and his court became a forum for culture and a centre where literature could flourish. A group of poets led by the grammarian and panegyricist, Priscian of Caesarea, devoted themselves to the popularising of Latin and fostered close links with western intellectuals. The congenial atmosphere at court also provided a focus for other writers such as Christodorus of Coptus, who visited the capital and composed works in praise of Anastasius. In the provinces, other literary centres thrived, particularly Gaza, from where Procopius wrote his panegyric. Some of these ideas are explored in my forthcoming article in a volume based on the *Race, Religion and Culture in Late Antiquity* conference held at the University of Wales, Swansea, in July-August, 1998.

Chapter One

Historical Sources

Anastasius had no one historian to record the events of his reign and thus his achievements must be sought in a variety of world chronicles and histories. However, as each author often had his own bias, whether religious (Evagrius and Zachariah of Mytilene) or regional (Malalas and Marcellinus Comes), one must always be aware of possible partiality, bearing in mind the identity of the author, the reason why he was writing and for what audience. Moreover, as the texts of some of the main contemporary authors, such as John of Antioch and Theodore Lector, are fragmentary, one has to turn to later and more unreliable sources: the *Chronicon Paschale* and Theophanes, for example. Snippets of information about eastern policy and ecclesiastical affairs can be gleaned from the various Syrian chronicles and even some Arabic sources. Evidence concerning the west must be sought in the work of the Latin writers, the Anonymous Valesianus, Jordanes and Cassiodorus; and for the religious controversy, the papal records contained in the *Liber Pontificalis* and the *Collectio Avellana* should be considered. Because of the diverse nature of the historical sources, it is often difficult to build up a coherent picture of Anastasius' reign, and this makes a careful study of the relevant material even more crucial.

Greek Sources: the Chronicles.

Let us start by considering our Greek texts, and in particular, the chronicles. Widely regarded until recently, as at "the lowest level of historical analysis"¹, chronicles are now increasingly viewed as perfectly respectable forms of historical writing². Certainly, interesting and contemporary information about Anastasius can be found in the chronicle of John Malalas³,

¹ Browning (1987), p.179.

² Croke, p.27, in Jeffreys et al. (1990), and Croke and Emmett (1983) p.116.

³ Jeffreys et al. (1986), p.xxii quote some of the criticisms usually levelled at Malalas: for example, that of Vasiliev (1958):

Confused in content, mixing fables and facts, important events and minor incidents, it is clearly intended not for educated readers but for the masses.

whose purpose in writing is clear from the prologue:

...to relate as truthfully as possible a summary account of events that took place in the time of the emperors up till the events of my own life which came to my hearing, I mean indeed from Adam to the reign of Zeno and those who ruled afterwards...

It appears from this passage that he was born in the 480s-490s⁴ and thus from the reign of Zeno he used oral sources, his own personal experience and current documents, such as imperial laws, decrees and letters. From the Syriac root "mll" (from which "Malalas" is derived) meaning "rhetor" and from Evagrius' reference to "John the rhetor", it seems that the chronicler was relatively well educated and followed a bureaucratic career, first at Antioch, probably working in the office of the *comes orientis*, and later in Constantinople⁵.

The chronicle focuses on events at Antioch but the archives in the office of the *comes orientis*, to which the author arguably had access, offered information pertaining not only to Antioch but also to the whole region, including the war in Isauria, the building of Dara and the earthquake at Rhodes⁶.

More importantly, Malalas provides us with eyewitness accounts⁷. As the style alternates between brief annalistic entries and fuller narrative sections, it is clear where Malalas has been present himself, or used an oral informant. It is probable that the detailed report on

They argue, however, that:

such judgements fail to understand the extent to which Malalas was conditioned by contemporary knowledge and interpretation...

That the chronicle is full of the anecdotal and remarkable with no rhetorical speeches, descriptive passages, and colloquial language, would have made it entertaining and attractive, and it is not an indication of Malalas' incompetence; cf. Browning in *DMA* (1983), II.512. For the text of John Malalas, book XVI, see Dindorf (1831), and the fragments published by Mommsen (1872); and for the translation, E. and M. Jeffreys and R. Scott (1986).

⁴ The exact date is debated by Jeffreys et al. (1990), pp.3-4.

⁵ Jeffreys et al. (1990), p.11.

⁶ Mal. on the Isaurians, 393-4; Dara, 399; the earthquake, 406.

⁷ For example, Mal. on John Isthmeos, 395; the 507 AD riot and the basilica of Rufinus, 395-8; and the Persian war, 398-9.

Vitalian's rebellion in 513 and the conversation between the emperor, Marinus and Proclus came from Marinus the Syrian himself⁸. As the account of the riot following the Trishagion controversy is also centred around the latter⁹, it is possible that Malalas met Marinus, a fellow Syrian, when he moved to Constantinople; they were both moving in bureaucratic circles¹⁰.

Regarding religious outlook, Malalas does not allow this to determine the tone of his chronicle¹¹. As he does not openly condemn the Trishagion in 512, nor indicate a religious motive for Vitalian's rebellion, he is sometimes regarded as a monophysite¹². However, it has been clearly argued that Malalas was orthodox, and in any case, much more interested in presenting simple, factual accounts, rather than dwelling on the religious aspects.

The only source that Malalas cites in his section on Anastasius is that of Eustathius of Epiphaneia¹³. He produced a universal history (no longer extant), which spanned the years from the Trojan war to the reign of Anastasius, ending with the siege of Amida in 502-3¹⁴. In another passage, Evagrius indicates that Eustathius wrote a work about the capture of Amida in 504¹⁵.

How reliable would Eustathius have been as a source for Anastasius? For the early part of his chronicle, it seems he summarised sections from a wide range of Roman historians, but

⁸ Mal. 402-6.

⁹ Mal. 406-8.

¹⁰ *PLRE* II.726-8, Marinus 7; Jeffreys et al. (1990), p.209.

¹¹ For a detailed discussion on Malalas and his religious views, see Jeffreys et al. (1990), pp.11ff, esp. p.16.

¹² As argued by Cernousov (1926), p.68ff.

¹³ Fragments edited by Müller (1851). Eustathius is mentioned by Mal. 399, Evag. I.19; II.15; III.26, 29, 37; V.24, and the *Souda*, E.3746. For further details, see Allen (1988).

¹⁴ Evag. III.29.

¹⁵ cf. *PLRE* II.435-6, Eustathius 10, where Martindale argues Eustathius was dead by 504.

it is probable that as he was a contemporary of Anastasius, his account of his reign would be fairly accurate. This is important to establish, as many writers besides Malalas used Eustathius as a source, especially Procopius for the siege of Amida, Evagrius who praised him highly, Joshua, Theodore Lector and Theophanes¹⁶.

It is unfortunate that the *ἱστορία χρονική* of John of Antioch survives only in fragments, preserved for us through the excerpts of Constantine Porphyrogenitus¹⁷. The work was a world chronicle from Adam to Heraclius in 610, but there is a significant stylistic break between the extracts covering the period up to Anastasius, which were written in classical Greek, and the few surviving fragments from 518 to 610, which were composed in much more colloquial language. Mango concludes that the manuscript used by Constantine's excerptors was in two parts: a main section in classical Greek up to 518 and then a continuation in vulgar Greek. It is impossible to know if John of Antioch was the author of one or both of the sections, or merely the compiler¹⁸.

If the chronicle was composed soon after 518, then it can be considered an important contemporary source for Anastasius. Concerning the revolt of Vitalian, much detail is recorded which would be fitting if it were composed shortly afterwards¹⁹. This would explain why the command of the imperial forces opposing the third attack of Vitalian is attributed to the new emperor, Justin, rather Marinus. That the account is fairly discreet and no blame is attached to Vitalian (Anastasius' cancellation of supplies to the troops is ostensibly the reason for the uprising) might be because Vitalian was back in power²⁰.

¹⁶ Allen (1988), p.3. For Theodore Lector, see Hansen (1971), pp.xviii-xix.

¹⁷ Edited by Müller (1851 and 1870), and the fragments published by Mommsen (1872); for comments see *ODB* II.1062; Jeffreys et al. (1986), p.xxxv; (1990), pp.251-2, and pp.331-4.

¹⁸ Mango (1990), pp.12-14.

¹⁹ John of Ant. fr.214e.

²⁰ Marcellinus Comes 519.3 also attributes no blame to the reinstated Vitalian.

The anonymous *Chronicon Paschale* was composed at the beginning of the seventh century²¹. The author concentrated on Constantinopolitan events such as natural disasters, riots, building works and news of military achievements. However, his prime interest in religious affairs is an indication of a career in the ecclesiastical bureaucracy where he would have had access to official records and documents²².

For Anastasius' period, the Chronicler presents incorrect chronology, and as he follows Malalas almost exclusively, adds no new evidence. The names of the consuls are confused twice (493-4 and 501), the account of the building of Dara is obviously misdated (498 instead of 507), and the 512 rioting is misplaced and dated to 517²³.

The later chronicle sources are even more problematical. The ninth-century Theophanes continued the work of George Syncellus²⁴. For Anastasius, it seems that he used several contemporary fifth-sixth century sources; Eustathius of Epiphaneia for the Isaurian revolt and Persian war, and Theodore Lector for ecclesiastical events and the Persian war²⁵. For Vitalian's revolt, Theophanes uses both Theodore Lector and Malalas and his account is rather muddled: he dates the beginning of the trouble to 513 (usually dated to 514), and he confuses Hypatius, the *magister militum per Thracias*, with Hypatius, the nephew of the emperor. His entry for the years 514/515 consists of either a misplaced description of the second confrontation, or an approximate account of the third battle.

The benefits of the use of primary sources are thus outweighed by confusion of different

²¹ Text edited by Dindorf (1832), and partially translated by L.M. and M. Whitby (1989).

²² L.M. and M. Whitby (1989), pp.xxvii-xxviii.

²³ *Chron. Pasch.* 517, contra Marc. C. 512, cf. Mal. 406-8. Mal. puts the 512 rioting (undated) just before Anastasius' vision of 518, which has obviously confused the *Chronicon Paschale* author.

²⁴ Text edited by de Boor (1883), vol.I, and tr. Mango and Scott (1997). For detailed arguments on proportions of the chronicle attributed to Theophanes and George Syncellus, see Mango (1978), pp.9ff, Jeffreys et al. (1990), p.41, and Mango and Scott (1997), pp.lii-lxiii. For a summary of views on Theophanes' sources, see the *ODB* III.2063.

²⁵ Theoph. AM 5996-5998. For Theophanes' use of Procopius for the Persian war, see Mango and Scott (1997), p.lxxxii, xciiif.

accounts and the material is often arranged to convey personal impressions; for example, Anastasius is "the one who rules wickedly"²⁶.

Also belonging to the ninth century is the chronicler, George Monachus, who covered the period from the Creation to the death of the emperor Theophilus in 842, and concentrated mainly on ecclesiastical history²⁷. There are lengthy sections on the riots following the introduction of the monophysite Trishagion and the early relationship between Euphemius and Anastasius; the Isaurian revolt is included as a prelude to Euphemius' deposition²⁸. Snippets of other information (from Malalas or Theophanes), such as the incursion of the Sabir Huns, are also added²⁹.

From the twelfth century survive the chronicles of the monk, George Cedrenus and the court official, John Zonaras³⁰. Their accounts contain no new information but are merely conglomerations of earlier sources. Zonaras, covering a wide range of material from Anastasius' reign including doctrinal issues, legislation, administration and foreign policy, is generally reckoned to be fairly accurate³¹, while despite the criticism against Cedrenus that he was deficient in historical knowledge and showed a great lack of judgement³², his chronology is actually fairly good. He tends to follow Malalas (and the *Chronicon Paschale*)

²⁶ Theoph. AM 5982-5983. For the problems inherent in Theophanes' text, see Browning (1983), p.513 and his treatment of the sources, Mango and Scott (1997), pp.xci-xcv.

²⁷ Text edited by de Boor (1904), and revised Wirth (1978).

²⁸ On the Trishagion, 620-1; and Euphemius and the Isaurians, 623-5.

²⁹ On the Huns, 622. For further information on George Monachus, see the *ODB* II.836, Smith (1880), II.251, Kazhdan in *DMA* (1985), V.401-402, and Jeffreys et al. (1986), p.xxxiv and (1990), pp.45f.

³⁰ Text of Cedrenus is edited by Bekker (1838-1839); that of Zonaras by Pindar and Büttner-Wobst (1841-1897).

³¹ See the *ODB* III.2229, Smith (1880), III.1331, Kazhdan in *DMA* (1989), XII.745-746, and Jeffreys et al. (1990), p.47.

³² Smith (1880), I.658.

closely³³.

An even later chronicle source is that produced by the fourteenth-century historian, Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopoulos³⁴. He gives a relatively full account of Anastasius' reign, particularly focusing on church matters, but also the Isaurian revolt, the Persian war, Vitalian, administration and building projects. For this period he follows Evagrius³⁵.

Greek Sources: the Ecclesiastical Histories.

The ecclesiastical history of Evagrius is an important authority for the reign of Anastasius³⁶. After teaching in Constantinople, he returned to Antioch to practise law, where he and John Scholasticus became the legal advisers of Gregory, the patriarch of Antioch. His interest in Persian affairs probably sprang from the latter's involvement. He wrote an ecclesiastical history (428 to 594), in which, despite his aim to justify Chalcedonian orthodoxy and refute the recently published history of the monophysite Zachariah, he is perhaps surprisingly moderate in his views and portrayal of events; he still admired Anastasius' piety and constant desire for peaceful solutions³⁷. He paid close attention to the primary texts, mainly Eustathius, Joshua, Malalas and Procopius, and like many others, his position gave him access to official documents such as the patriarchal archives of Antioch. Occasionally, he provides our only source for certain letters.

However, the history has no chronological framework; events are dealt with thematically, secular or religious and even then taken out of order. The abolition of the *chrysargyron* (498)

³³ For example, on Dara, Cedr. 630 cf. Mal. 399 (*Chron. Pasch.* 498), and on Anastasius' vision, Cedr. 635-6 cf. Mal. 408-9 (*Chron. Pasch.* 518).

³⁴ Text (book XVI, chapters 24-45) is edited by Migne (1865).

³⁵ See Smith (1880), II.1180-1181 for a discussion on the value of Nicephorus as a historian.

³⁶ For the text, Bidez and Parmentier (1898), and a full study on Evagrius, Allen (1981).

³⁷ Evag. III.34. His account nevertheless contains some anomalies; for example, contrast his opinion with that of Theodore Lector on Celer (III.32 cf. 487ff) and the deposition of Flavian (III.30 cf. 497ff.). Evagrius was born some time between 532 and 537, and was therefore writing during the second half of the sixth century.

is placed after the Persian wars (502-5)³⁸, and the revolt of Vitalian (514-516) before the Trishagion riot (512)³⁹.

The details of events are also rather inaccurate in places, or vague⁴⁰, and there is even confusion when primary evidence is used, as Evagrius experiences difficulties in integrating this raw material into his narrative. For example, the letter to Alcison from the Palestinian monks attributing Flavian's deposition to Philoxenus does not support his own statement that bishops were only deposed by Anastasius if they acted contrary to the doctrinal beliefs of their sees⁴¹.

Theodore Lector, a reader in St. Sophia, produced two works on ecclesiastical history⁴². The first was a compendium of church history from Constantine to Constantius II which was probably intended to serve as an introduction to a second work in two books, covering the period from Theodosius the Younger to Justin and Justinian. Unfortunately, only fragments remain of each, although much can be restored from, for example, Theophanes who uses Theodore extensively. While Theodore Lector is a valuable source for Anastasius as a near contemporary and worked in a position where he had access to official ecclesiastic documents, it is clear that he allowed his strong Chalcedonian belief to colour his account of the monophysite Anastasius.

Greek Sources: Hagiographic Texts.

The most important work in this category is undoubtedly Cyril of Scythopolis' *Life of St. Sabas*, which provides an invaluable account of the doctrinal affairs of the Church of

³⁸ The Persian wars, III.37; the *chrysargyron*, III.39.

³⁹ The revolt of Vitalian, III.43; the riot III.44.

⁴⁰ Key incidents are only treated briefly: for example, the Isaurian revolt, III.35; the Arab plundering III.36; and the Persian wars III.37.

⁴¹ Allen (1981), p.149.

⁴² Text edited by Hansen (1971); for further details, see the *ODB* III.2042 and Smith (1880), III.1047f. His dates are unknown, but as his history ended in 527, it is assumed he was writing during Justinian's reign.

Jerusalem, finally leading to the deposition of Elias in 516 and the installation of John⁴³. Ultimately, Anastasius is depicted unfavourably, as he was responsible for the ousting of Elias, but earlier, in the three recorded interviews between saint and emperor, he is presented as being moderate and reasonable in his views; indeed, he even supplies Sabas with funds⁴⁴. Cyril, who lived just after the reign of Anastasius (c.525-c.559), knew Sabas personally, and is generally known for his historical accuracy⁴⁵.

There is a brief paragraph in the *Life of Daniel the Stylite* (409-493) on Anastasius' reign, in which the emperor is complimented on his good legislation and impartial government of the state⁴⁶. The biographer, younger than Daniel, was possibly composing during Anastasius' reign⁴⁷.

John Moschus, a monk (d.619), produced a compilation of monks' lives and moral tales known as the *Patrum Spiritale*⁴⁸. He includes the apocryphal story about the deleted years of Anastasius' life⁴⁹.

Greek Sources: Histories and Quasi-Historical Works.

Several near contemporary historical works concerning Anastasius remain to be discussed. In the first two books of the *Wars*, Procopius provides a rather patchy account of the Anastasian war against the Persians, concentrating almost exclusively on the sieges of

⁴³ Text edited by Schwartz (1939), pp.85-200 and translated into French by Festugière (1962).

⁴⁴ Deposition of Elias, LVI; interviews, LI, LII and LIV.

⁴⁵ cf. *ODB* I.573.

⁴⁶ Text, chapter 91, translated by Dawes and Baynes (1948).

⁴⁷ For discussion on the dating (end of the fifth century, or c.600) see the *ODB* I.585 and Dawes and Baynes (1948), p.2.

⁴⁸ The best edition remains that in *PL* 87.3, cols.2847-3116.

⁴⁹ John Moschus, chapter 38, cf. *Mal.* 408-409 and the *Chron. Pasch.* 518. For information on John Moschus, see Smith (1880), II.1116f.

Amida⁵⁰. In the *Wars*, and particularly in the *de Aedificiis*, the achievements of Anastasius are deliberately underrated in highlighting those of Justinian⁵¹.

A contemporary of Procopius, the civil servant, John the Lydian, wrote about Anastasius in his treatise on Roman magistrates⁵². John, an antiquarian, values Anastasius' appreciation of culture and lauds the emperor for various acts of generosity. Deeds which earn John's disapproval are attributed to the real villains, Marinus the Syrian (for administration) and Areobindus, Patricius and Hypatius (for the Persian war)⁵³.

Also from the sixth century, the *Codex Iustinianus* is invaluable for its preservation of the record of Anastasius' legislation⁵⁴.

The composition of the *Oracle of Baalbek* is another contemporary source for Anastasius, but not particularly useful⁵⁵. In 502-503, a Christian editor, Chalcedonian in persuasion, expanded the late fourth century work, the *Theodosian Sibyl*, but is inaccurate in his description of Anastasius and over the length of his reign⁵⁶. Moreover, he does not conceal his opposition to either Anastasius' religious views; καθελεί τοὺς τηροῦντας θεοσεβειαν⁵⁷, or his administration of the state;

....μισῶν πάντα τοὺς πτωχοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ τοῦ λαοῦ ἀπολέσει δικαίως

⁵⁰ Edited by Haury (1963-1964) and Dewing (1914).

⁵¹ See the comments by Greatrex (1998), p.74, with n.6 on Procopius' objectives, and p.120.

⁵² *de Magistratibus Populi Romani*, translated and edited by Carney (1971) and Bandy (1983).

⁵³ Anastasius is praised III.47; criticism of Marinus III.49 and the three generals III.53. Maas (1992), pp.108-9, explains how John compressed the events of Anastasius' reign to illustrate his argument of how portents could foretell future events.

⁵⁴ Text edited by Krueger (1954), vol.II, and translated into English by Scott (1932).

⁵⁵ Text edited by Alexander (1967).

⁵⁶ On the editor of the *Oracle of Baalbek*, see Alexander (1967), pp.136-140; on the dating of the text, pp.41f. The description of Anastasius is given at lines 165ff, cf. Mal. 392, and on the length of his reign, see Alexander (1967), pp.83-84.

⁵⁷ *Oracle of Baalbek* 169-170.

ἀδίκως...⁵⁸,

thus devaluing the historicity of the text⁵⁹.

Finally, from the *de Caerimoniis* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, we are fortunate to have a detailed record of the process of Anastasius' accession to the imperial throne⁶⁰.

Latin Sources: the Chronicles.

The Illyrian, Marcellinus Comes produced an annalistic chronicle continuing that of Jerome from 379 to 518 and then onto 534⁶¹. Although he lived in Constantinople working as a *cancellarius* of Justinian, he offers detailed and sometimes eye-witness accounts of the barbarian invasions of the Balkans in 499, 502 and 517, and the earthquake of 518. For incidents in Constantinople he provides a comprehensive and often our only account, as for the factional riots after the Brytae festival⁶² and the riots in 512. It is possible that he made use of oral sources, particularly for the Persian war, when his information comes from the *magister officiorum*, Celer, or from official despatches⁶³.

As for impartiality, the firm adherence of the Illyrians to orthodoxy and their opposition to the monophysite emperor is reflected in the chronicler's antipathy towards Anastasius and his religious policy⁶⁴. In the section on Vitalian, Anastasius is again portrayed unfavourably:

...Porro Anastasii simulationibus atque periuriis per Theodorum internuntium

⁵⁸ *Oracle of Baalbek* 168-169

⁵⁹ On the historical value of the text, see Alexander (1967), pp.75ff, esp. pp.95-97.

⁶⁰ *De Caerimoniis* I.92, edited by Reiske (1829).

⁶¹ Text and translation, see Croke (1995). Marcellinus also wrote *De Temporum Qualitatibus et Positionibus Locorum*, from which (Croke (1984), pp.77ff conjectures) comes the passage on the building of Dara. See further, *PLRE* II.710-711, Marcellinus 10, and see Croke (1995), pp.xix-xxvii.

⁶² Marc. C. 501; Croke (1995), p.111.

⁶³ Marc. C. 502-4.

⁶⁴ Marc. C. 494.

inlectus atque inlusus.....⁶⁵.

There is a section on Anastasius in the chronicle of Victor Tunnenesis, a north African bishop⁶⁶. Strongly orthodox himself, his chronicle is weighted towards doctrinal affairs, to the detriment of the emperor's character. The author also perpetuates some of the more sensational stories about Anastasius⁶⁷.

Latin sources for Ecclesiastical Policy.

The series of papal biographies contained in the *Liber Pontificalis* is invaluable for the study of the doctrinal rift between Constantinople and Rome which continued and widened through the reign of Anastasius⁶⁸. The *Lives* of Felix, Gelasius, Anastasius II, Symmachus and Hormisdas charter the relationships of these popes with Anastasius, giving details of correspondence and embassies between the two sides.

An even fuller source for relations between the Churches of the east and west is that of the *Collectio Avellana*⁶⁹. This is essentially a collection of letters including, of primary importance, correspondence of varying tones between emperor and pope: for example, the conciliatory letter of Anastasius II to the emperor⁷⁰, and the rather less conciliatory *Apologeticus Symmachi episcopi Romani adversus Anastasium imperatorem*⁷¹. Also of

⁶⁵ Marc. C. 514.

⁶⁶ Text in *PL* 68, cols.941-962, and Mommsen (1894).

⁶⁷ Vict. Tunn. 518 on Anastasius' death.

⁶⁸ Text edited by Duchesne (1955), vol.I.

⁶⁹ There are several editions; see esp. Thiel (1868) and Gunther (1895-1898). The "Life, letters and decrees" of the popes of Anastasius' reign had already been published by Mansi, vol. VIII, (1762) and similar information was included in the *Ecclesiastical Annals* of Caesar Baronius, vol.VI (1596). Both include lengthy quotations of letters of the emperor and popes. More recently, the *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, ed. Jaffé (1885-1888) provides excerpts from the registers of popes, their actions and extracts from their letters.

⁷⁰ Mansi (1762), VIII.188, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.744, Thiel (1868), pp.615f.

⁷¹ Mansi (1762), VIII.213ff, Thiel (1868), p.700ff.

especial interest are the letters of Hormisdas, not only to the emperor⁷², but to his own envoys bound for Constantinople⁷³, and Anastasius' epistle seeking the support of the senate⁷⁴. Such primary evidence vividly illustrates the shifting doctrinal positions of the late fifth and early sixth centuries.

Details concerning the Laurentian schism and the 516 embassy despatched by Hormisdas are recorded in the *Historia Romana* (book XVI) of the eighth-century Paul the Deacon⁷⁵. In contrast, Landolfus Sagax, continuing the work of Eutropius and Paul, records not only the affairs of the Church (the origins of the Laurentian schism, the Trishagion riots, and the ecclesiastical consequences of Vitalian's revolt), but also the incursions of the Persians, Bulgars and Huns. He is also not averse to including the more apocryphal stories circulating about the reign of Anastasius⁷⁶.

More limited in scope for Anastasius' period is the *Breviarium Causae Nestorianorum et Eutychianorum* of Liberatus, a Carthaginian deacon⁷⁷. He dealt solely with the affairs of the eastern Church; the deposition of Macedonius, and Severus' adoption and teaching of monophysitism⁷⁸.

Latin sources for Anastasius' Western policy.

Information concerning Anastasius' western policy can be found in the writings of those Latin authors who devoted themselves to recording the events of the reign of Theoderic. The author of the passages known as the *Excerpta Valesiana*, who compiled his material at the

⁷² Mansi (1762), VIII.388, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.773, Thiel (1868), p.747, Gunther (1895-1898), no.110.

⁷³ Mansi (1762), VIII.386, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.774, Thiel (1868), p.748, Gunther (1895-1898), no.116.

⁷⁴ Thiel (1868), p.765, Gunther (1895-1898), no.113.

⁷⁵ Text edited by Droysen (1879). For discussion, see the chapter in Goffart (1988), esp. pp.357-70.

⁷⁶ Text is also edited by Droysen (1879). For the deaths of Macedonius and Anastasius, book XVII, pp.366-367.

⁷⁷ Text (chapter XIX) in *PL* 68, cols.969-1052.

⁷⁸ Further details in Smith (1880), II.777.

end of Theoderic's reign (c.526), records the establishment of peace between Theoderic and Anastasius secured through Festus, and the return of the *ornamenta palatii* to Rome⁷⁹. His statement has fuelled lengthy discussions on the relative status of Italy at the time.

Valuable material for the study of Byzantine-Roman relations is provided by the senator, Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus (c.485-c.580). As *magister officiorum* at the court of Theoderic the Great, he was in the position to produce a well-informed history of contemporary events: his chronicle is an excellent source for Theoderic's activities in Italy during Anastasius' reign, and for the king's aspirations for the expansion of Italy⁸⁰. However, Cassiodorus' most significant contribution to source material was his *Variae*, a collection in twelve books of the edicts and letters of Theoderic (prepared by Cassiodorus himself)⁸¹. The second book begins with a letter from Theoderic to Anastasius, dated 510, asking for confirmation of the appointment of the consul Felix. Again, this has provoked discussion on the extent of Theoderic's independence from Constantinople.

A contemporary of Cassiodorus was the historian Jordanes, who produced a three part history: the *Romana*, of which only the section on Roman history from Romulus to 550/551 remains, and the *Getica*⁸². These two texts provide some useful information on the relationship between Constantinople and Ravenna: Theoderic's status in Italy, his ousting of Byzantium's allies (the Gepids) from Sirmium, and Anastasius' despatch of a fleet against the Italian coast⁸³. The *Romana* also includes information about Anastasius' wars against the Isaurians, Bulgars, and Vitalian; Jordanes concludes that the proliferation of enemies facing the emperor was due to his impiety⁸⁴.

⁷⁹ Text edited by Moreau and Velkov (1968), and see their introduction for a study on the author.

⁸⁰ The *Chronicon* is most easily available in PL 69, cols.1213-1248.

⁸¹ The *Variae* edited by Mommsen (1894) and translated into English by Hodgkin (1886) and Barnish (1992).

⁸² Both edited by Mommsen (1882). See further, the *ODB* II.1072 and Goffart (1988), chapter 2.

⁸³ *Rom.* 349, *Get.* 300-1, *Rom.* 356.

⁸⁴ *Rom.* 359.

Lastly, in a consideration of Italy, the varied works of Ennodius, the bishop of Pavia, should be consulted⁸⁵. He himself led some of the embassies from Hormisdas to Anastasius but, being personally involved in the doctrinal rift, his writings are heavily biased. Neither the *Panegyricus Theoderico regi dictus* (favouring the king), nor the *Libellus adversus eos qui contra synodum scribere praesumerunt* (which passionately defended the Synodus Palmaris of 501), presents a balanced view of the political or religious situation in Italy⁸⁶.

For Anastasius' policy towards Gaul, the *Historiae Francorum* of Gregory, bishop of Tours, is our source⁸⁷. Gregory became bishop of Tours in 573 and produced his history of the Franks and *Miracula* during the next two decades, before his death in the 590s. The passage describing the bestowal of the consular codicils on Clovis has led to a heated debate on the nature of the consulship and the reason for Anastasius' gesture⁸⁸.

Syriac Sources: the Chronicles.

For a contemporary account of the Persian wars, the chronicle of Joshua Stylites is probably the most reliable source⁸⁹. The chronicle is preserved only in the work of Ps-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre and the identity of the original author has formed the subject of intense speculation. The conclusion at present favours Joshua, the priest at the monastery of Zugnin near Amida, as the scribe, and a citizen of Edessa as the author⁹⁰.

From the nature of the information in the chronicle, it is clear that the author was personally involved with the war effort in Edessa, and, as he claims, had met ambassadors on both sides.

⁸⁵ Ennodius, *Opera*, edited by Hartel (1882).

⁸⁶ Smith (1880), II.19-20.

⁸⁷ Text edited by Krusch (1937-1951), and translated into English, Dalton (1927). Generally on Gregory, see Goffart (1988), chapter 3.

⁸⁸ Greg. II.38.

⁸⁹ For an English translation, Wright (1882), and Watt and Trombley (1998).

⁹⁰ For various discussions on Joshua and the author, see Wright (1884), pp.77-8, Duval (1900), pp.188ff, Torrey (1950-1), pp.439ff, and esp. Palmer (1990), passim, Brock (1992), pp.10ff.

He leaves valuable eye-witness accounts of the events of the Persian war, detailed information about the local situation, such as plague, famine and natural disasters, and he notes Anastasius' help in times of need⁹¹. Information regarding Anastasius' abolition of the *chrysargyron* is also given, with the description of the joyful reaction to the news at Edessa⁹².

The sixth-century James (Jacob) of Edessa, monophysite monk and patriarch, composed a chronicle as a continuation of Eusebius' canon (326 AD) to 692⁹³. The now damaged text does include a section on Anastasius, mainly devoted to notices on natural phenomena, appointments and dismissals of bishops and patriarchs, the capture of Amida and the revolt of Vitalian. James also edited the *Hymns* of Severus and of John of Beith Aphthonia (Severus' biographer) which are very relevant for Anastasius' reign: they include celebrations of the emperor's victories over Vitalian, the Huns, the Persians and polemics against games and entertainment⁹⁴.

There is a series of Syriac anonymous chronicles which contain brief annalistic entries on eastern affairs during Anastasius' reign, especially church news and reports on the Persian war. The earliest of these chronicles is the *Chronicon Edessenum*, compiled about 540⁹⁵. It includes notices about Euphemius and Macedonius, the fortunes of Edessa during the Persian war and the tale of Anastasius opening the coffin of the martyr Euphemius to remove and burn the Book of the Chalcedonian Council. The author obviously had access to the archives of Edessa and documents from Antioch⁹⁶.

⁹¹ The plague, 26; earthquakes, 34; the locusts, 38; famine, 39ff; and the emperor's help, 42.

⁹² Josh. 31.

⁹³ English translation by Brooks (1899).

⁹⁴ The *Hymns* edited by Brooks (1911).

⁹⁵ Latin translation by Guidi (1903).

⁹⁶ Wright (1884) pp.101ff; Duval (1900), pp.189-90; Brock (1992), p.3f.

The *Chronicon miscellaneum ad AD 724 pertinens* and the *Chronicon anonymum AD 819 pertinens* offer very short entries for the reign of Anastasius, the former concerning Severus, and the latter on Kavadh's assaults on Amida and Edessa⁹⁷. The *Chronicon ad AD 846 pertinens*, compiled by a monophysite monk, gives an assortment of information ranging from lists of patricians and natural phenomena to a more lengthy account of the rise of Philoxenus and Severus and the fall of Flavian⁹⁸. Lastly, the *Chronicon anonymum ad AD 1234 pertinens*, composed by a thirteenth-century monk, provides a long description of the siege and capture of Amida and a notice on the foundation of Dara⁹⁹.

The chronicle of Michael the Syrian is another important source for Anastasius¹⁰⁰. He was a Jacobite patriarch of Antioch (1166-69) and his chronicle (from the Creation to his own day) is favourable to the monophysite emperor. Michael provides us with detailed accounts of the Persian war, the foundation of Dara, the Trishagion riots, the deposition of Macedonius and the deeds of Philoxenus, Severus and Simeon the Disputer¹⁰¹.

The eastern Syriac chronicle of Elias, the metropolitan bishop of Nisibis (1008-48), is of some use for Persian history before and during the Anastasian war, though adds nothing new¹⁰². Finally, the *Universal Chronicle* of Gregory Abul Faraj (Bar Hebraeus), who lived in the thirteenth century, contains in an appendix a legend about the building of Dara¹⁰³.

⁹⁷ Latin translation of the *Chronicon ad 724* by Chabot (1903) and *Chronicon ad 819* by Chabot (1952). For brief information on the latter, see Brock (1992), p.13.

⁹⁸ Latin translation of the *Chronicon ad 846* by Chabot (1903). Again, brief comments can be found in Brock (1992), p.14.

⁹⁹ Latin translation of the *Chronicon ad 1234* by Chabot (1952). See Brock (1992), pp.17-18 on the identity of the author.

¹⁰⁰ French translation by Chabot (1899-1910). For Anastasius, see book IX, chapters 7-11. A detailed study on Michael by Tisserant is available in the *DTC* (1927-30), vol.X, col.1711ff, and see Brock (1992), p.16 for a table of the sources which Michael claimed to have used.

¹⁰¹ Persian wars, IX.7; Dara, IX.8; riots, IX.7; Philoxenus and Severus, IX.10; Macedonius, IX.9, and Simeon, IX.9.

¹⁰² Latin translation by Brooks (1910). For comments, see Brock (1992), p.26-27.

¹⁰³ English translation by Budge (1932). See Wright (1884), pp.265ff.

Syriac Sources: Ecclesiastical Works.

Of the Syriac ecclesiastical histories that of Ps-Zachariah rhetor, bishop of Mytilene, is the most important¹⁰⁴. There is some debate as to whether he was the monophysite Zachariah Scholasticus, author of the *Vita Severi*. The problem lies in the fact that, as bishop of Mytilene, his appearance at the Chalcedonian synod at Constantinople in 536 indicates that at some point he had converted from his earlier monophysite beliefs. However, it is plausible that the monophysite Zachariah would have made such an expedient conversion under the new orthodox government¹⁰⁵.

All that is left of the *Ecclesiastical History*, originally written in Greek, is a Syriac epitome, compiled by a monk of Amida, completed in 569. Only books III-IV (451-491) were actually written by Zachariah; VII-XII were compiled in 569. The later author also used other primary sources, such as Eustathius for the siege of Amida¹⁰⁶.

The history treats very favourably the monophysite Severus, Marinus the Syrian, and the emperor himself, and was dedicated to Eupraxius, a *cubicularius* at the court of Anastasius, and a prominent supporter of Severus¹⁰⁷. The work includes a very detailed account of the relations between the emperor and Macedonius leading up to the deposition of the latter¹⁰⁸, and the rebellion of Vitalian where he is portrayed as a barbarian who held imperial power in contempt¹⁰⁹. It is clear that the same strong monophysite support evident in the *Vita Severi* is also present here.

¹⁰⁴ Latin translation by Brooks (1919-1924). For a general study, see *PLRE* II.1194-1195, Zachariah 4, and Allen (1980), pp.471-474.

¹⁰⁵ For discussion on the identity of the various Zachariahs, see Brock (1992), p.4f; Kugener (1900), p.202ff, Honigmann (1952), p.194ff, Bauer (1967), pp.210ff, and Allen (1980) who believe there is only one Zachariah; contra Frend (1972), pp.202-203 who believes the writer of the ecclesiastical history is not the author of the *Vita Severi*.

¹⁰⁶ See Greatrex (1994), p.8

¹⁰⁷ Zach. of Myt. III-prologue; on Marinus VII.9; on Severus VII.12.

¹⁰⁸ Zach. of Myt. VII.7-8.

¹⁰⁹ Zach. of Myt. on the Isaurians VII.2; on Vitalian VII.13.

Several *Vitae Severi* in honour of the great monophysite figure survive in Syriac. Zachariah, as a fellow student of Severus in Alexandria during the 480s, was well placed to write a biography and includes much information on their student days. He was working in Constantinople when Severus arrived in 508 with his deputation of monks and wrote up to Severus' patriarchate, thus providing a contemporary, if biased, account. A second composition glorifying the life of Severus was written by John, the abbot of the monastery of Beith-Aphthonia¹¹⁰. He died in 536, and so must have been contemporary with Severus and Anastasius.

Another interesting source for Severus and one which allows great insight into the religious controversy is the collection of his own letters¹¹¹. The epistles contain Severus' own views on the Henoticon and Anastasius' *typos*, plus information about various synods¹¹².

Of the ecclesiastical history of John, the monophysite bishop of Ephesus, the second part covering the reign of Anastasius is preserved in the chronicle of the eighth-century Ps-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre¹¹³. Born in 507, John would have been growing up in the later years of Anastasius' reign and he made use of the contemporary Malalas, Joshua and Zachariah¹¹⁴. He concentrates on recording natural phenomena, the Persian war, the Trishagion riots, the exile of Macedonius and various church councils. The work is heavily biased in favour of monophysitism.

¹¹⁰ Latin translations of both *Lives* by Kugener (1907).

¹¹¹ Translated by Brooks (1903-1904) and (1919-1920).

¹¹² Sel. Let. I:2; I:1; and I:20.

¹¹³ The second part of John of Ephesus' history is also preserved in the chronicle of Michael the Syrian, and the chronicles to the years 846 and 1234. See Nau (1897) for the text of John's history, and Wright (1884), pp.102ff and Brock (1992), pp.5f for comments. For Ps-Dionysius, see the English translation by Witakowski (1996). See his introduction, pp.xix-xxiii, Wright (1884), pp.196ff and Brock (1992), pp.10ff for the identity of the author.

¹¹⁴ For a full study of John's sources, see Witakowski (1991), pp.252ff.

John's *Lives of Eastern Saints* is also a valuable source¹¹⁵. In the *Life* of the Persian Mar Simeon is preserved a letter (at Simeon's request) from Anastasius to the Persian king, requesting that the Christians in Persia should not be persecuted¹¹⁶.

Arabic Sources

One of the most important Arab historians is the ninth-century al-Tabari who wrote a huge world history. Although he does not directly cover Anastasius' Persian war, he does discuss the life and deeds of Kavadh (and Persian-Arab relations) which provides useful background information¹¹⁷.

The tenth-century Christian Arab historian Agapius of Menbidj (Hierapolis) also produced a universal history, entitled the *Book of Time*¹¹⁸. Adding nothing new, he offers the usual brief annual entries on the appointments and banishments of bishops, the fortification of Dara, the Trishagion riot and natural phenomena.

Lastly, the second part of the eleventh century anonymous *Chronicle of Seert*, also known as the *Nestorian History*, dealing with the period 484-650 contains a section on Anastasius¹¹⁹. It discusses Anastasius' conversion to monophysitism and the subsequent riots, the early life of Severus and the background to the Persian war; as usual, the centre piece is the siege of Amida.

Ethiopic Sources.

The *Conflict of Severus* by Athanasius is preserved only in Ethiopian¹²⁰. The author was

¹¹⁵ English translation by Brooks (1923-6).

¹¹⁶ *PO* 17 (1923), no.X, p.137ff.

¹¹⁷ French translation by Zotenberg (1867-1874). See generally, the *ODB* III.2003.

¹¹⁸ French translation by Vasiliev (1910-1912). Biographical information can be found in the *ODB* I.35.

¹¹⁹ French translation by Scher (1911).

¹²⁰ English translation by Goodspeed and Crum (1908).

probably a patriarch of Antioch, living about a century after Severus, but although further removed in time than the other biographers, Zachariah and John, Athanasius claims accuracy and authenticity, as his grandfather and father both knew Severus. The *Life* traces the conflicts faced by Severus, such as the opposition of Julianus of Halicarnassus and Macedonius.

Another work of which only the Ethiopian version is extant is the chronicle of John, bishop of Nikiu¹²¹. The seventh-century monophysite begins his chapter on Anastasius with a tale of how the emperor was exiled by Zeno, and continues with the riots in Constantinople and Antioch. John then traces the religious strife in some depth, before ending with a detailed description of Vitalian's revolt and defeat.

Coptic Sources.

The *History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria*, composed by Severus, bishop of El-Eschmounein in High Egypt, consists of short biographies of all the patriarchs¹²². It therefore serves as a useful reference for those patriarchs who operated during Anastasius' reign.

There is thus, as stated at the outset, a considerable diversity among the various sources that have a bearing on Anastasius' reign. When attempting to use them to evaluate this emperor, it is crucial to be aware of bias and possible manipulation of evidence¹²³.

¹²¹ English translation by Charles (1916), chapter lxxxix. See the *ODB* II.1066 for further information about John and the transmission of the chronicle.

¹²² English translation with introduction by Evetts (1907).

¹²³ Details of historical events can also be found in the literary works produced during Anastasius' reign: for example, the panegyrics of Priscian and Procopius (for the dating of which, see Appendix A), the poems attributed to Christodorus in the *Anthologia Graeca* (IX.219 and IX.656), and the encomium, *P. Gr. Vindob.* 29788B-C. For a discussion on the identification of the honorand and author of this fragmentary work, see Appendix B.

*Chapter Two: Civil Wars**Part One: The Isaurian War.*

The first seven years of Anastasius' reign (491-498) saw the emperor largely preoccupied with the uprising of the barbaric and generally peripheral Isaurians, who had, however, lately become the dominant force in east Roman politics. It is the aim of this chapter to trace the events of this revolt under the new emperor, with analysis of its origins, the main battles and the final rounding-up of the leading rebels. In order to fully recognise the extent of Anastasius' achievement in effectively crushing Isaurian defiance towards the empire, and to understand the psychological and political reaction in Constantinople¹, it is necessary first to examine Romano-Isaurian relations; the continual aggression displayed by the Isaurians towards the empire and their recent deployment by the imperial government as a counter-balance against German dominance.

Geographical and Political Boundaries².

In antiquity the area of Isauria was incorporated under the general heading of Cilicia, corresponding roughly to the sub-division of Cilicia Tracheia (Rough Cilicia). The coastal province of Cilicia had for its boundaries the Taurus mountains to the north, the Melas river to the east (forming a boundary with Pamphylia) and the Amanus mountains to the west (the Syrian border). Cilicia Tracheia formed the western part and was a mountainous region, quite unlike the rich and populous plains of Cilicia Pedias to the east³. Tracheia first fell into Roman hands as part of the lands bequeathed to the senate in 133 BC by King Attalus III of

¹ Capizzi (1969), p.90.

² See the various maps in Appendix C.

³ For a detailed discussion of the name and geography of Isauria, see Capizzi (1969), p.90 with references to the relevant primary material, Mitford (1980), pp.1230-1234 and Hill (1996), p.3. The Isaurians are mentioned first by Homer, *Iliad* VI.184-185 and are found in Herodotus' *Histories*, I.28, II.17, II.34 and VII.91. They were also known as the ancient Solymi, cf. Proc. *Pan.* 9, Prisc. *Pan.* 81, Theod. *History of the Monks of Syria* X.5: τίς γὰρ τῶν τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένην οἰκούντων ἀνήκοος τῶν κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν συμβηβεκότεων κακῶν ὑπὸ τῶν πάλαι μὲν Σολύμων, νῦν δὲ Ἰσαύρων ὀνομαζομένων; cf. Chauvot (1986), p.121.

Pergamum⁴. The rapid degeneration of the inhabitants of this area into brigandage and piracy⁵, brought them into a conflict with Rome which was to continue for the next five centuries. Several attempts were made to curb their piratical activity, including the intervention of P. Servilius Varius in 80-74 BC⁶, and Pompey the Great in 68 BC. The latter cleared the coast of Cilicia Tracheia, winning a decisive battle at Coracesium, the main centre of piratical activity, and reportedly captured one hundred and twenty settlements along the coastline and in the Taurus foothills⁷.

Pompey received great acclaim for this victory and his subsequent reorganisation of Cilicia, yet the history of this province is one of shifting boundaries both geographical and political⁸, and continued aggression towards the empire. Periods of relative peace and prosperity always yielded to renewed hostility. Thus after nearly a century of peace, Isaurian chieftains raided

⁴ cf. Mitford (1980), p.1234.

⁵ Strabo XIV.5.6. notes,
εὐφροῦς γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ τόπου πρὸς τὰ ληστήρια καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.....
referred to by Hopwood (1983), p.173.

⁶ On this campaign, see Magie (1950), I.287-290, with II.1170, n.22 for the contemporary sources, Piganiol (1967), p.480, Mitford (1980), pp.1235-1236 and Capizzi (1969), p.91.

⁷ On Pompey's campaign and reorganisation, see Magie (1950), pp.375-376 and Capizzi (1969), p.91, Mitford (1980), pp.1236-1240 and Hill (1996), p.4. Anastasius' achievement in suppressing the Isaurians is said to surpass the efforts of both Servilius *Isauricus* and Pompey, thus Prisc. *Pan.* 84-86:

Quod nec ductorum Servilius optimus olim,
Pro merito laudum cui nomen Isauricus illo
Marte datum fuerat, potuit praestare Latinis.

Anthol. Graec. II.398-406:

καὶ πρόμος εὐκαμάτων Πομπήιος Ἀύσονιῶν,
φαιδρὸν ἰσαυροφόνων κειμήλιον ἠγορεύων,
στειβόμενας ὑπὸ ποσσὶν Ἴσαυρίδας εἶχε μαχαίρας....
κεῖνος ἀνὴρ.....ὃς βασιλῆος
ἠγαθέην ἐφύτευσεν Ἀναστασίῳ γενέθλην.....

and Prisc. *Pan.* 15-18:

Sed tamen egregio, Pompei, cede nepoti.
Namque genus, quod tu, terrarum victor ubique,
Indomitum Tauri linquebus collibus altis,
Hic domuit penitus convellens semina belli;

⁸ On the fluidity of boundaries, Capizzi (1969), p.91 and Mitford (1980), pp.1239-1241, 1247, 1250-1251. It was under the reorganisation of either Antoninus Pius or Hadrian that the boundary between Cilicia Tracheia and Pedias separated the province into two quite distinct regions; the term Cilicia remained associated with the Plains, while Tracheia became known as Isauria (contra Chauvot (1986), p.122).

Lycia and Pamphylia sparking a counter-offensive by the emperor Marcus Aurelius Probus (276-282 AD). He set out against them in 279/280 and the Isaurians surrendered after their leading rebel was killed⁹. The second half of the fourth century was plagued by a series of incursions: the Isaurians intercepted shipping on the waters between Cyprus and Asia Minor, and ravaged Lycaonia, Cilicia and Pamphylia, reaching, by the beginning of the fifth century, Cappadocia and the Pontus¹⁰. The Isaurians were finally brought to order in 408 by the Armenian general, Arbazacius, who penetrated the mountainous interior of Isauria, destroying fortresses and massacring the population, a strategem which successfully drew home the Isaurian raiders.

The Balance of Power: Isaurians and Germans.

Between 408 and 441 little is heard of the Isaurians; they were possibly paid a donative¹¹. They surface again in 441 when Marcellinus Comes recorded that:

Persae, Saraceni, Tzanni, Isauri, Hunni finibus suis egressi Romanorum sola vastaverunt¹².

Given their past record and this renewed insurrection, is it not surprising that in 447, Theodosius II entrusted the defence of the imperial capital against Attila, to the Isaurian Flavius Zeno? It can be shown however, that this rise of the Isaurians coincides with the decline of German influence, which resulted from Theodosius' growing dissatisfaction with German army service. In 441, the Huns easily breached the Danube frontier with no opposition, because Arnegisclus, who should have been defending, was organising the murder

⁹ Magie (1950), I.720-721, and Rougé (1966), pp.285ff, with the *Historia Augusta*, Probus 16.4-17.1 and Zos. I.69-70.

¹⁰ See Stein (1959), I.141-142, Rougé (1966), pp.292-299, Brooks (1893), p.211, Bury (1923), I.157, n.4, and Jones (1964), I.192. On the 359-368 raids, Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX.13 and XXVII.9.6, and for witness accounts of the Isaurian incursions into Armenia and Cappadocia at the end of the fourth century, see the letters of John Chrysostom who was in exile at this time, *eps.* 13-15. For records of the raiding by region, see Philostorgius XI.8 on Cyprus, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, *History of the Monks* X.5 on Syria, and Jerome, *ep.* 114, on Phoenicia and Galilee.

¹¹ cf. Thompson (1946), p.19.

¹² cf. Prisc. fr.10; Stein (1959), I.291f and Capizzi (1969), p.92.

of the Vandal John, the *magister militum per Thracias*¹³, while in 443, the army commanded by Arnegisclus, Aspar, the powerful *magister militum per Orientem*, and Areobindus was severely defeated in the Chersonese by Hunnic troops¹⁴. Angered by this incompetence or worse, treachery, and generally tired of the oppressive German presence, Theodosius froze all German promotions, instead rewarding Zeno for his defence of the capital with the consulship in 448 and 449 and the post of *magister militum per Orientem*. Other Isaurians also gained promotion, while Zeno built up a substantial power base resting on his fellow Isaurians who accompanied him to Constantinople, private armies of *bucellarii* and the imperial troops under his command.

It is still unclear, however, why Theodosius II should transfer his favour to the Isaurians in particular, and there is plenty more evidence for their unpopularity at Constantinople, even during their period of ascendancy¹⁵. The populace then, should have been relieved by the accession of Marcian in 450, a protégée of Aspar, and during the seven years of his reign, Germanic influence was once again predominant. Aspar controlled the government, while his son Ardaburius took the post of *magister militum per Orientem*. It is probable that Flavius Zeno died shortly after Marcian's succession¹⁶. However, while the Isaurian ascendancy had been fairly short-lived, it provided a welcome alternative to Germanic influence, which would not be forgotten. On the other hand, it also provided an effective example of how Isaurians could dominate the empire more effectively from within, rather than as a continual external

¹³ Proc. *de Aed.* IV.5.6 on Attila's attack; John of Ant. fr.206 and the *Chron. Pasch.* 441 on the murder of John. On Arnegisclus, *PLRE* II.151 and John the Vandal, *PLRE* II.597, no.13.

¹⁴ Aspar, *PLRE* II.164-169; Areobindus, *PLRE* II.145-146, no.2.

¹⁵ There is evidence, even at this early stage, for the distrust of the people of Constantinople for this race; most of the population was not reassured by Zeno's defence of their walls and fled at the sight of the Huns - see Thompson (1946), p.23. Zeno almost brought ruin to the empire by interfering in the eunuch Chrysaphius' negotiations with Attila, who then proposed an alliance with Theoderic. See further Thompson (1946), pp.23-25 with relevant sources, *CMH* I.467 and Stein (1959), I.298 with references to Prisc. fr.15. It is suggested in Damascius' *Life of Isidore* 290, that the Isaurians brought to the strongly orthodox Constantinople a pagan revival; cf. Thompson (1946), pp.28-30. Isauria itself, however, was certainly Christianised.

¹⁶ Thompson (1946), p.30 and Chauvot (1986), p.123 speculate from Jord. *Rom.* 333, that Zeno died in 453. It is possible that he was too unwell in 450 to contest the elevation of his rival's candidate. On Ardaburius, *PLRE* II.135-137, no.1.

barbaric threat.

On the death of Marcian, Aspar placed Leo on the throne who at first seemed willing to submit to the authority of his barbarian patron, but soon wished for independence¹⁷. He insulted Aspar by giving his daughter Ariadne (promised to the latter) to a certain Isaurian chieftain, Tarasicodissa of Rousamblada, who subsequently changed his name to Zeno, in memory of his famous predecessor¹⁸. At the same time, he took the office of *comes domesticorum*. As before, the Isaurians flourished as Germanic power declined, to the extent that the choice of officers selected to lead the ill-fated expedition against the Vandals in 468 completely excluded Aspar and his colleagues. The naval command went to Basiliscus, Leo's brother-in-law, while two Isaurians, Marsus and Heraclius, led the land forces¹⁹.

The chronology and details of the events between 467 and 471 are rather muddled as both the Isaurians and Germanic factions strove for supremacy and influence²⁰. Zeno held the consulship in 469 and was also appointed *magister militum per Orientem* in which capacity he went to Isauria, ironically to suppress the brigand Indacus²¹. During his absence, Leo was persuaded to make Aspar's second son Patricius, Caesar (though an Arian and therefore extremely unpopular), and marry him to his younger daughter, Leontia²². Ardaburius, however, continued to stir up trouble, this time trying to win over the Isaurians in

¹⁷ cf. Brooks (1893), pp.210-211, and on the increasingly strained relations between Aspar and Leo, see the *CMH* I.469f.

¹⁸ On the name Tarasicodissa, Bury (1923), I.318. On the marriage and date, Brooks (1893), p.212, Bury *ibid.*, Stein (1959), I.358 and Capizzi (1969), p.93. It is agreed that as Zeno and Ariadne's son, Leo II was six in 474, the marriage can have taken place no later than 467 (Brooks suggests 466). On Zeno's rise from obscurity, see also Chauvot (1986), p.123.

¹⁹ Prisc. fr.53.1, cf. Proc. *B.V.* III.6.5-25, Theod. Lect. 399, Theoph. AM 5961. Brooks (1893), p.213 suggests that it was just after the Vandal disaster that the plan to assassinate Aspar was first formulated.

²⁰ It is not clear for example, at what point Ardaburius was discovered in treasonable communication with Persia, whether before or after the Isaurians arrived in Constantinople; cf. *V. Dan. Styl.* 55 and *Candid. fr.* 1, with Stein (1959), I.358 and Baynes (1925), pp.398-399.

²¹ Despite formal power in the empire, many natives of Isauria continued in their old customs; *V. Dan. Styl.* 65.

²² For the details and sources, Stein (1959), I.360 and Brooks (1893), pp.213-214.

Constantinople²³. This power struggle continued to 471, when a plot was hatched: Aspar and Ardaburius were slaughtered in the palace and the new Caesar, Patricius, was wounded²⁴. The Goths however, remained powerful. A guard of Aspar, Ostrys, prevented from breaking into the palace by the *excubitores*, went to join Theoderic, son of Triarius, who rose up against the empire²⁵. After taking Arcadiopolis and threatening the suburbs of Philippi, Leo agreed to pay them two thousand pounds of gold a year and recognised Theoderic as ruler of the Goths.

The Emperor Zeno.

This agreement lasted until 474 when Leo I died, leaving the empire in the hands of his grandson Leo II, under the regency of Zeno (his father). The young Leo co-opted Zeno as joint emperor but as he died only a few months later, Zeno soon found himself as the sole emperor of the east. There is copious evidence in the sources of the odium and contempt for the Isaurians, particularly exacerbated at this time, by the undoubted increase of Isaurians in the garrison at Constantinople and their domination of the top posts²⁶. The first impetus for an attempt to overthrow the regime came from within the court. Verina (Leo's widow) and her brother Basiliscus, having secured the services of Illus and his brother Trocundes, tricked Zeno into leaving Constantinople and took control of the city. Basiliscus, now emperor, sent Illus and Trocundes to fight Zeno who had retreated to his native Isauria²⁷. However, when

²³ cf. Brooks (1893), p.213 and *CMH* I.470. On the hatred in Constantinople towards these Isaurians, see John of Ant. fr.206,1.

²⁴ Marc. C. 471. See Stein (1959), I.361 on Leo's plot. Hermanric, Aspar's youngest son, was warned by Zeno and escaped to Isauria, where he married a relation of Zeno, Brooks (1893), pp.214-215.

²⁵ On Ostrys, Brooks (1893), p.215 and Stein (1959), I.361. Theoderic's rebellion, Malch. fr. 2 and Brooks (1893), p.215.

²⁶ See. esp. Josh. 12, Anon. Val. 40ff, Evag. III.1 and Zon. XIV.1-2, and for an unfavourable portrayal of Zeno, Malch. passim. Illus, the *magister officiorum* was equally disliked, cf. Bury (1923), I.394 and Stein (1949), II.9. On general animosity towards the Isaurians, Bury (1923), I.389-390, Jones (1964), I.224, Capizzi (1969), p.94, Chauvot (1986), p.123 and Brooks (1893), p.216 who points out that the Romans were now subject to a race which they had unsuccessfully tried to subdue for over five hundred years.

²⁷ Zeno left Constantinople on 9th January, 475. Many Isaurians fled with him; of those who remained, a great number were slaughtered in the anti-Isaurian reaction. For details, Brooks (1893), p.216, Bury (1923), I.391, Stein (1959), I.363.

they did not receive the agreed payment from the usurping emperor, the brothers changed their allegiance and with Zeno began to march on the capital, entering it in August, 476²⁸. Basiliscus and his family were seized and the usurper was later beheaded in Cappadocia. From this point, the story of the Isaurians is very much dominated by the figure of Illus, the *magister officiorum*, who wielded great influence over the emperor. Though he was ostensibly on Zeno's side, he had taken the precaution of capturing his brother Longinus, who was to be used as a pawn over the next few years of uncertainty. It is perhaps not surprising that two assassination attempts were made against Illus; on the second, finding Verina the instigator of the plot, he demanded custody of her from Zeno and sent her to Dalisandus²⁹.

Meanwhile, during this intrigue among the Isaurians, the two Gothic Theoderics began to ravage Thrace and Illyrium³⁰. Zeno at first assumed the command himself, but subsequently changed his mind. Accused of cowardice, it is more likely that he realized that even a partial withdrawal of Isaurian troops from Constantinople would result in a revolt³¹.

As the Theoderics were incited to peace³², there came a second attempt to cast off the unwelcome Isaurian rule. In 479, Marcian, son of the western emperor Anthemius, seeking vengeance for the banished Verina, raised a rebellion in Constantinople³³. He claimed that he was the rightful emperor on the somewhat spurious grounds that his wife, Leontia, had been born while Leo was ruling and Ariadne, the elder, before. He easily gained control of

²⁸ Basiliscus had made himself very unpopular on account of his religious policy (he was a monophysite); *CMH* I.473 and Jones (1964), I.225. His nephew Armatus, sent to prevent Zeno from entering Constantinople, also changed allegiance (though he was later murdered by those he had helped), Brooks (1893), p.218, Bury (1923), I.392-393 and Stein (1959), I.364.

²⁹ Evag. III.27; Brooks (1893), pp.218-219, *CMH* I.475, Bury (1923), I.394, Stein (1949), II.10.

³⁰ It was thus imperative for Zeno to retain Illus' loyalty at this time. For an overview of relations between Zeno and the two Theoderics, see Heather (1991), pp.272-293.

³¹ See Brooks (1893), p.219, *CMH* I.474-475, Bury (1923), I.394-395 and Jones (1964), I.225-227.

³² Theoderic, son of Theodemir, was defeated by the *magister militum*, Sabinianus; Theoderic, son of Triarius, was bought off.

³³ On the chronology of this rebellion and Verina's banishment, Brooks (1893), p.219.

the city, but committed a grave error in delaying his attack on the palace, for it gave Illus the opportunity to bring over relief forces of Isaurians from Chalcedon, and the next day, he crushed the rebellion with a mixture of bribery and fighting. Marcian managed to escape, but repulsed from Ancyra by Trocundes, his revolt ended in his imprisonment in Isauria³⁴. His brother Procopius and another leader, Bousalbus, were more successful and escaped to the safe-haven of Theoderic, who was in league with Marcian. The former had arrived before the walls of Constantinople rather too late to be of assistance and finding himself facing a sturdy defence by the Isaurians, pretended that he had come to help Zeno and departed after receiving gifts³⁵.

After the revolt of Marcian, there followed a third attempt on Illus' life; during the circus games a blow was struck at his head, cutting off his ear³⁶. The plot had been instigated by Ariadne who wanted her mother recalled from Dalisandus³⁷. Illus departed for Antioch, ostensibly to recover and holding the official position of *magister officorum*, but his act of taking his closest supporters was a clear indication that war was imminent³⁸. Both sides then made their final preparations; Illus drummed up support not only from Isauria, but he also solicited help from Persia, Roman Armenia and Italy³⁹, while Zeno bought off

³⁴ cf. Brooks (1893), pp.219-221, Bury (1923), I.395 and Jones (1964), I.227.

³⁵ Theoderic continued his incursions into Roman territory and even attempted another assault on Constantinople, but subsequently retired to Thrace where he died in a riding accident. His son Rekitach, who succeeded him, was murdered in 484 by Theoderic (son of Theodemir), who united the two Gothic parties under him.

³⁶ Mal. 387, Josh. 13, Evag. III.27.

³⁷ Mal. 387 with Bury (1923), I.395-396, contra Josh. 13.

³⁸ See Brooks (1893), pp.222-223 on this episode, the dating and a list of supporters who accompanied Illus. It seems that Zeno tried to avert war by giving Illus the task of appointing *duces*, usually undertaken by the emperor; his attention was distracted by Theoderic who was still ravaging Thessaly and Macedonia, and he was concerned for his brother's safety.

³⁹ While initially Persia and Roman Armenia agreed and Odoacer refused help, it was in fact only the latter who did send support.

Theoderic, exiled Illus' friends and bestowed their land on Isaurian cities⁴⁰.

Illus chose Leontius, ironically an envoy sent from Zeno, as emperor⁴¹, and with even greater irony, "legalized" the whole affair with the support of Verina⁴². She crowned Leontius emperor in Tarsus, and circulated proclamations to Antioch and the provincial governors of the east and Egypt, announcing the accession⁴³. Leontius entered Antioch triumphantly on 27th June, 484, and was generally received well elsewhere⁴⁴. However, Illus' forces were quickly reduced by the imperial troops led by John the Scythian⁴⁵, and confined in the Isaurian castle of Papirios, first Verina, then gradually his other supporters died or were killed⁴⁶. At some point during the seige, Longinus returned to Constantinople, having either escaped or been released by Illus, perhaps in hope of mitigated treatment should

⁴⁰ This last step was part of an ongoing battle between emperor and general to win the support of Isaurians. Later Illus arranged an annual donative of fourteen hundred pounds of gold (John of Ant. fr.214b, contra Evag. III.35 who gives the figure of five thousand pounds). See Stein (1949), II.30, Capizzi (1969), p.94 and Chauvot (1986), p.123 on how this was a notable strain on the state budget. On the preparations for war, Josh. 15, Mal. 388, John of Ant. fr.214; Bury (1923), I.396, *CMH* I.477-478, Stein (1949), II.28, and Jones (1964), I.228-229. Zeno formerly dismissed Illus from his position as *magister militum per Orientem* and appointed in his place John the Scythian.

⁴¹ Eustath. fr.4 and Mal. 388 wrongly make Leontius one of the original rebels, contra Josh. 14 and Jord. *Rom.* 352 where Leontius is Zeno's envoy; cf. Brooks (1893), p.225 and Stein (1949), II.28 on the primary sources. The forces sent with Leontius were led by two Isaurians, Conon, son of Fuscian (a bishop of Apameia) and Lingis, a half-brother of Illus.

⁴² Josh. 14, Theod. Lect. 437, John of Ant. fr.214.5. Illus realized that he was too unpopular with the Romans to become emperor himself, and his first choice, the previous usurper Marcian, refused (or Illus subsequently changed his mind).

⁴³ For the full text, Brooks (1893), p.226. Verina played on Zeno's unpopularity, exacerbated by his promulgation of the Henotikon.

⁴⁴ Except at Chalcis and Edessa, Josh. 16. See Stein (1949), II.29 on the new government of Illus and Leontius, and generally *CMH* I.478 and Bury (1923), I.398.

⁴⁵ Evag. III.27, Josh. 17, John of Ant. fr.214.6, Theoph. AM 5977; Stein (1949), II.29. Theoderic was initially sent at the head of a Gothic contingent, but was quickly recalled; perhaps Zeno suspected his loyalty.

⁴⁶ Mal. 389, John of Ant. fr.214.6, Josh. 17, Evag. III.27, Theoph. AM 5976 and 5983; *CMH* I.478-479 and Stein (1949), II.30. Illus was left with only a few supporters, having dismissed over two thousand because of the scarcity of provisions and concerns over treachery. Trocundes was killed by imperial troops when out raiding for supplies, while Pamprepus, the pagan who had foretold success for Illus' enterprise, perished at the hands of the rebels themselves when his prophecy proved false. For a description of the castle of Papirios and its impregnability, see Josh. 12 and 17 and Coyne (1991), p.110.

his coup prove unsuccessful⁴⁷. After a siege of four years, the defences of the castle were breached, betrayed by the garrison, and Illus and Leontius were executed, and their heads displayed at Constantinople⁴⁸.

Anastasius and the Isaurians.

Zeno had only three years to enjoy the fruits of his victory. He died in April 491 and with him perished Isaurian dominance of the empire. The previous section has examined the ascendancy of this race of barbarians within the empire prior to the accession of Anastasius: such a background should be of help in our understanding of the nature of the problem under the new emperor. For example, the difficulty of fighting the Isaurians in their native territory was recognised from Rome's earliest confrontations in the first century BC, and even Zeno took four years to reduce Illus in the mountainous regions. The one factor which had altered to the Isaurians' disadvantage was the complete change in the balance of power in the east. Under Theodosius II, Marcian, Leo and even Zeno himself, there was a constant interplay between the Goths and the Isaurians, a constant battle for power and influence at the imperial court, while the eastern emperors struggled to avoid the fate of the western empire, now under barbarian rule. From 488, the Goths, now in Italy, no longer formed part of the delicately balanced equation, thus reducing or nullifying the need for an Isaurian counterforce. Within a very short space of time, the Isaurians lost both their bargaining power and their imperial influence, and it was hardly surprising that Anastasius should take his first opportunity to rid the empire of this unpopular race⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ Marc. C. 485, Mal. 386, Theoph. AM 5975. Longinus was appointed *magister militum praesentalis* and held the consulship twice (486 and 490), a position that was not usually filled more than once by someone other than the emperor - a sign that Zeno was priming his brother as his successor.

⁴⁸ The garrison was not rewarded for its treachery, but were all killed. Marc. C. 488, Mal. 389, Josh. 17, Vict. Tun. 488.2, Theod. Lect. 438, Theoph. AM 5980, and John of Ant. fr.214.6 who is not entirely unsympathetic to the rebels, perhaps because of their orthodoxy. 488 was a successful year for Zeno, as he also managed to rid the eastern empire of the menace of the unpredictable Theoderic and his Gothic hordes, by sending them off to fight Odoacer in Italy.

⁴⁹ We have seen plenty of evidence of the ill will felt towards the Isaurians in Constantinople, eg. Josh. passim. See also Prisc. *Pan.* 19-37, and Proc. *Pan.* 9, on their pillaging and insolence before Anastasius became emperor. This is not for once, mere panegyric rhetoric, as Josh., Zach. of Myt. VII.2 and Georg. Mon. 624 all comment of the Isaurians' unruly behaviour at the beginning of Anastasius' reign; cf. Vasiliev (1952), I.140

The Origins of the Conflict.

On the death of his brother, Longinus was eager to succeed to the throne, but was thwarted by Ariadne's choice of Anastasius⁵⁰. The following sequence of events in the worsening relations between emperor and Isaurians and, indeed, throughout the course of the war is often unclear, obscured by conflicting source evidence.

The first opportunity for removing the Isaurians from the imperial capital came in the first few months of Anastasius' reign. He accused them of instigating the riot in the hippodrome described thus by Marcellinus Comes:

Bellum plebeium inter Byzantios ortum parsque urbis plurima atque circi igne combusta⁵¹.

The riot was ostensibly a protest against the unpopular city prefect Julian, and Anastasius, though firmly suppressing this insurgence, replaced the prefect with his own brother-in-law, Secundinus⁵². It is not clear from John of Antioch's account whether there was any foundation in Anastasius' accusation that the Isaurians had any involvement in this riot, or whether it was merely an excuse for a mass expulsion of Isaurians⁵³. Whatever the substance behind Anastasius' claims, Zeno's brother Longinus was banished, according to

and Chauvot (1986), p.123.

⁵⁰ Longinus' ambition for the throne, Evag. III.29, Theoph. AM 5983; Stein (1949), II.82, Capizzi (1969), p.95, and Brooks (1893), p.231 who comments on Longinus' unpopularity and incompetence.

⁵¹ Marc. C. 491. John of Ant. fr.214b links this riot to the expulsion of the Isaurians, contra Mal. 393-395 and Marc. C. who do not mention the connection. Theoph. AM 4985 refers to the "many outrages" committed by the Isaurians, possibly referring to their part in this riot.

⁵² cf. the section on riots in chapter 5.

⁵³ Brooks (1893), p.232 wrongly believes this riot was provoked by religious discontent, cf. chapt. 5. There is no evidence that the Isaurians were strongly Chalcedonian orthodox, or indeed that the people of Constantinople preferred Chalcedonian Isaurians to the monophysite Anastasius; see Bréhier (1914), col.1449. Brooks is also unnecessarily concerned that Bury (1923), I.432-433 (who followed an account by A. Rose, *Kaiser Anastasius I*, Dissert. Halle-Wittenberg 1892) is associating the expulsion with the riot of 493 (not 491). However, it does seem clear that Bury was referring to the 491 riot and closely follows the account of John of Antioch. The confusion arises because Marcellinus Comes, in his description of the 491 riot, does not mention that the imperial statues were pulled down, as reported by John of Antioch. This is not a significant omission, however, as such vandalism was a common feature of city riots; the burning of the circus, on the other hand, also mentioned by John of Antioch, which is much rarer, is connected by Marcellinus with the 491, not 493 riot. See further Brooks (1893), p.233, and noted by Mommsen (1872), p.340.

some sources, to the Thebaid where he died of starvation eight years later⁵⁴. Longinus' mother, wife and daughter were exiled to the Bithynian coast where they were forced to subsist on charity⁵⁵. Longinus of Kardala, the *magister officorum* (484-491) was also expelled, his case not helped by his ardent support of his namesake's claim to the throne⁵⁶. Another prominent Isaurian to be banished at this time was the senator Athenodorus⁵⁷. Because of a discrepancy in the sources, it is unclear though whether Anastasius expelled all the Isaurians in the capital, or whether they left of their own accord, fearing that with no influence a massacre such as that under Basiliscus might follow⁵⁸.

At the same time, Anastasius also imposed other penalties on the Isaurians. He withdrew the annual donation introduced by Illus in 484, which Zeno had continued⁵⁹, all Isaurian property was confiscated, including the imperial robes which were put up for auction⁶⁰, and the castle of Papirios was destroyed.

The First Years of Hostilities.

On their arrival back in Isauria, the banished Isaurian leaders joined their compatriots, who

⁵⁴ John of Ant. fr.214b, Zon. XIV.3.20, contra Theoph. AM 5984, who records that Longinus was exiled to Alexandria where he was ordained a priest and died seven years later.

⁵⁵ John of Ant. fr.214b, Evag. III.29.

⁵⁶ It is important to distinguish Longinus of Kardala from Longinus, Zeno's brother, as Evagrius III.29 (and Niceph. Cal. XVI.36) fail to do, cf. *PLRE* II.688 and Allen (1981), p.144 on how this error leads to much confusion in Evagrius' subsequent section on the Isaurian war at III.35. On Longinus of Kardala, see Theoph. AM 5983-5984 and Coyne (1991), p.65.

⁵⁷ John of Ant. fr. 214b and Theoph. AM 5987-8. John of Antioch mentions a second Athenodorus, calling him " 'Αθηνοδώρου τοῦ ἑτέρου" to distinguish him. Evag. III.35 conflates the two Athenodori, and calls the one figure Theodorus, a mistake noted by Bury (1923), I.433 and Allen (1981), p.155. Thus, at the end of the war, Evagrius has the heads of Longinus, Zeno's brother, and Theodorus being sent to Constantinople, when he means Longinus of Kardala and the two Athenodori.

⁵⁸ Theoph. AM. 5985 - Anastasius expelled the Isaurians because of their crimes, contra Evag. III.35 (following Eustath. fr.5) the Isaurians left at their own request, cf. Coyne (1991), p.96.

⁵⁹ Presumably this was the fourteen hundred (or five thousand) pounds of gold although Jord. *Rom.* 354-355 reported that this was not the sum in question, but an additional payment given by Zeno after the defeat of Illus.

⁶⁰ cf. John of Ant. fr.214b. The withdrawal of the Isaurian donative and the money raised from the confiscations and auction would have been used to sustain the war against the Isaurians; Stein (1949), II.83.

had started a revolt at the announcement of Anastasius' accession⁶¹. This rebellion was led by Conon, the ex-bishop of Apameia⁶², and Lilingis, the *comes et praeses Isauriae*⁶³. Their forces combined with those of Longinus of Kardala and Athenodorus totalled up to one hundred and fifty thousand, and they had access to supplies and arms in a store established by Zeno⁶⁴.

These generals now masterminded a series of offensive strikes, before advancing to Cotyaeum in Phrygia⁶⁵. Here they were met by the imperial forces led by the experienced John the Scythian, the *magister militum per Orientem*, (483-498) and John the Hunchback, who succeeded Zeno's brother, Longinus, as *magister militum praesentalis* (492-499)⁶⁶. Also holding high commands were Justin, the future emperor, the Goth Apskal, Sigizan and Zolbo

⁶¹ It is clear that the revolt in Isauria broke out immediately after the emperor's accession, before the riot and banishment of Isaurians from the capital, thus John of Antioch, fr.214b:

καὶ ταῦτα ἤδη ἀγγελθείσης τῆς κατὰ <τὴν> χώραν αὐτῶν ἀποστάσεως.

Bury (1923), I.432, Stein (1949), II.83 and Jones (1964), I.230, contra Croke (1996), p.107 who seems to suggest that inhabitants of Isauria revolted as a result of the exile of their countrymen from Constantinople. Prisc. *Pan.* 52-60 also reverses the events, cf. Chauvot (1986), p.126. The only problem visualised by Brooks (1893), p.233, with accepting that the revolt broke out in Isauria immediately after Longinus' failure to accede to the throne, is how the castle of Papirios could be destroyed, as described by John of Antioch, if the Isaurians were already in a state of rebellion. However, the *CMH* I.479, suggests that the castle was demolished before the rebels had a chance to reoccupy it.

⁶² John of Ant. fr.214b, *PLRE* II.306f, Conon 4, Stein (1949), II.83 and Capizzi (1969), p.97.

⁶³ Lilingis was the half-brother of Illus (*PLRE* II.683) referred to as "Λογγινίην τὸν χωλὸν" by Mal. 393, "Lilingis, segnus quidem pede", by Marc. C. 492, "Νιλιγγίς" by Theoph. and "Λίγγις" by the *Souda*. See Müller (1870), p.30, n.5 and Mommsen (1872), p.342 for detailed discussions contra Brooks (1893), p.231 who argues against the identification made by Bury, Rose, Mommsen and Müller of this figure with Lingis, commander in the war against Illus. Allen (1981), p.155 points out that Evagrius mistakenly calls Lingis, Indes.

⁶⁴ Theoph. AM 5985 gives the figure one hundred and fifty thousand, cf. John of Ant. fr.214b one hundred thousand. Both sums are probably exaggerated, designed to emphasise the success of the imperial troops, cf. Stein (1949), II.83. The forces included Isaurians and Romans, both voluntary and those under compulsion. Chauvot (1986), p.127 suggests that the volunteer Romans would rather fight for pagan Isaurians than a monophysite emperor. However, as previously discussed, Isauria had been Christianised, and there was still little religious trouble at this stage of the reign.

⁶⁵ Proc. *Pan.* 9, Theoph. AM 5985, Zon. XIV.3.22. Capizzi (1969), p.98 suggests that Constantinople was their ultimate goal.

⁶⁶ *PLRE* II.617-618, John (the Hunchback) 93. On both Johns, Theod. Lect. 449, John of Ant. fr.214b, contra Theoph. AM 5985 who is incorrect in his statement: ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ Θρακῶου στρατεύματος ἡγουμένων.

at the head of the Hunnic forces and Diogenianos⁶⁷. Though the imperial army only numbered two thousand, the Isaurians, who were not used to fighting on open battlefields, were defeated, and Lilingis was killed⁶⁸. The Isaurians fled taking refuge in their strongholds among the Taurus mountains, creating the same problem as that faced by the imperial army under Zeno.

In 493, the Isaurian city of Claudiopolis on the Calycadnus was besieged by Diogenianus, who was in turn blockaded by the Isaurians who came down from the mountains and surrounded the imperial forces to the point of starvation. They were rescued however, by John the Hunchback, who forced the mountain passes and mounted a sudden attack, and in the ensuing battle, the ex-bishop Conon was fatally wounded⁶⁹. After this second defeat, the rebels did not risk another open battle, but confined their activity to guerilla warfare in the mountains. They were supported by the Isaurian Longinus of Selinus, who smuggled in food supplies via the sea port of Antioch, close to Selinus⁷⁰.

The Role of Euphemius.

Evidence for the role of Euphemius, the patriarch of Constantinople, in negotiations with the

⁶⁷ John of Ant. fr.214b where Justin is described as one of the ὑποστράτηγοι. Diogenianos is present in the account of Theophanes AM 5985-5986 under the name of Diogenes. He was said to be a kinsman of Ariadne, Mal. *de insid.* 37, PLRE II.362, Diogenianus 4.

⁶⁸ The small figure of two thousand for the imperial troops, given by John of Antioch, is surely another exaggeration to highlight imperial success; cf. Brooks (1893), p.234 and Bury (1923), I.433. On the battle of Cotyaeum, see Marc. C. 492, Mal. 393-394, John of Ant. fr.214b, Jord. *Rom.* 355, Theod. Lect. 449, Evag. III.35, and Theoph. AM 5985. On the dating of the battle, Brooks (1893), p.234 discusses whether it took place during the winter (given John of Antioch's διέμεινεν τὴν τοῦ χειμῶνος ὥραν) at the beginning or end of 492. It is not dated precisely in any of the sources, but it is clear from the account of Marcellinus Comes, who places it in the fifteenth indiction, that the battle should be assigned to the beginning of 492 (or the very end of 491), contra Theoph. AM 5985 who refers to the winter months at the end of 492. Though Mommsen (1872), p.340ff (and Rose) follow the latter's chronology, Theophanes starts the war a whole year later, and it seems preferable to follow the sixth-century Marcellinus, rather than the ninth-century Theophanes.

⁶⁹ Mal. 394 records Conon's death by spear; Theoph. AM 5986.

⁷⁰ On this smuggling, Brooks (1893), p.235 and Stein (1949), II.84. Prisc. *Pan.* 103-117 emphasises the eventual destruction of the fleet used by Longinus in this enterprise:

Quid tempestates memorabo fluctibus ortas,
Atque hostis Lyciae proiectas litore classis,

(lines 107-108).

Isaurians is not widespread among the sources⁷¹. As discussed in my chapter on religious policy concerning the downfall of Euphemius, Anastasius, seeing that military action against the Isaurians in their own territory was time-consuming and ineffective, began negotiations involving the patriarch. Euphemius passed on the information to John, the patrician and father-in-law of Athenodorus, who in turn notified the emperor of his patriarch's indiscretion. Thus,

ὄθεν τὰς τῶν Ἰσαύρων ἐπιβουλάς Εὐθυμῖω ἐπέγραψεν.

A couple of assassination attempts were then made against Euphemius, both of which he escaped unharmed.

The Conclusion of the War.

The Isaurians were to hold out in their mountain strongholds for the following four to five years. Again though, there is difficulty in reconciling the sources both on events and dating⁷². The first breakthrough for the imperial army came in 497 when John the Scythian besieged and finally captured Longinus of Kardala⁷³ and at least one and probably both of the Athenodori⁷⁴. He sent the heads of Longinus and one Athenodorus to the emperor who paraded them impaled on poles, while the head of the other Athenodorus was displayed at Tarsus⁷⁵. In recognition of his services, John the Scythian held the consulship in 498. In

⁷¹ Theod. Lect. 449f, Theoph. AM 5987 and Georg. Mon. 624-625. Brooks (1893), p.235 briefly mentions this episode, but see chapter four below on religious policy.

⁷² There are discrepancies in the sources over the length of the war. Marc. C. states in his entry for 492 that the war would last for six years. Theod. Lect. 449 merely reports that the war continued for at least five years, that is to 497, and does not say anything about how the rebels were dealt with, cf. Capizzi (1969), p.99, who comments on Theodore's vagueness. Vict. Tunn. places the deaths of Athenodorus and Longinus in 495 which is obviously far too early, cf. Clinton (1845), p.712. Theoph. AM 5985 says that the war ended three years after the battle of Cotyaeum, again too early. He also wrongly conflates the actions of the two Johns into one offensive (AM 5988).

⁷³ Evag. III.35 and Theoph. AM 5988.

⁷⁴ Mal. 394, Marc. C. 497, Vict. Tunn. 495, Theod. Lect. 449, Theoph. AM 5988.

⁷⁵ The best way of reconciling the account of Marc. C. which states that Athenodorus' head was displayed at Tarsus and the account of Theoph. which reports that Athenodorus' head was impaled on a pole at Constantinople, is to suggest that both the Athenodori were captured and beheaded in this year, cf. *CMH* I.480, Capizzi (1969), pp.98-99 and Chauvot (1986), p.127. Marc. C. is the only source for the head of one Athenodorus being displayed at Tarsus.

this year, the round-up of the remaining chief Isaurians continued under the command of his colleague, John the Hunchback, who was also rewarded for his success with the consulship in 499. Longinus of Selinus was captured at Antioch-on-the-Cragus by Priscus, an officer on John's staff⁷⁶. He and another prominent rebel, Indes⁷⁷, were sent to Constantinople where they were led through the streets and displayed for ridicule at chariot races⁷⁸. Longinus was subsequently sent to Nicaea where he was tortured and beheaded⁷⁹.

The final settlement of the Isaurians came with their enforced exodus to Thrace where they could be useful in fighting the barbarians who made frequent incursions across the Danube⁸⁰, and also perhaps, near enough to Constantinople to assist in any defence of the city, if necessary⁸¹. The remaining Isaurian strongholds were now destroyed⁸².

⁷⁶ Marc. C. 498 and Theoph. AM 5988. Marc. C. is the only source to mention the involvement of Priscus, cf. *CMH* I.480 and Capizzi (1969), p.99.

⁷⁷ Named as one of the leading rebels at the end of the conflict, by Mal. *de insid.* 37, Eustath. fr.6, and Evag. III.35, cf. *PLRE* II.591.

⁷⁸ On the spectacle in the hippodrome, see Evag. III.35, (Niceph. Cal. XVI.36) and Prisc. *Pan.* 171-173:
Ipse locus vobis ostendit iure tropaea,
Obtulit et vinctos oculis domitosque tyrannos
Ante pedes vestros mediis circensibus actos.

Chauvot (1986), p.127 suggests that this was a publicity stunt to regain popularity for the monophysite emperor, although again it seems that Chauvot is ascribing to Anastasius' early years the unpopularity he suffered later in his reign. Moreover, triumphal processions after an imperial victory were the norm; Allen (1981), p.155 states that the displaying of the enemies' heads on poles was common practice.

⁷⁹ Marc. C. 498, Evag. III.35 and Theoph. AM 5988.

⁸⁰ Marc. C. 498, Prisc. *Pan.* 123ff, Proc. *Pan.* 10, Theoph. AM 5988. As the Isaurians were probably settled on the waste-lands of Thrace, it seems that Procopius was being rather generous to Anastasius in saying,
ἀλλ' οἷα πατήρ ἀγαθὸς σωφρονεῖν μόνον παιδεύσας ὡς σεαυτὸν ἐκάλει καὶ πόλιν
ἐδίδους, ἦν αὐτὸς ἐδημιούργησας, καὶ χώραν εὐδαίμονα,
cf. Coyne (1991), p.120.

⁸¹ cf. Capizzi (1969), pp.99-100. He also suggests that settled among the hostile population of Thracians, Anastasius may have expected the numbers of Isaurians to conveniently decline, eventually leading to their total extinction. The *CMH* I.480 does not go as far as to see this as part of the emperor's plan, but remarks that after two wars and the deportation of thousands of Isaurians to Thrace, the population of Isauria would certainly have been reduced and the neighbouring provinces of Isauria freed from the continual plunder they had previously suffered.

⁸² Mal. 393, Josh. 23, Prisc. *Pan.* 119-129, cf. Coyne (1991), p.120.

Thus ended the period of Isaurian dominance; thereafter they played no further role in politics, but rather served Rome fighting in the army⁸³. Having served their purpose in providing a counterbalance to the dominant Gothic power, the Isaurians found to their cost that they could only capitalise to a limited extent on this need for a counterforce. Constantinople would not tolerate another Isaurian succession to the imperial throne and in his defeat and resettlement of the Isaurians, Anastasius achieved a popular victory which emperors had sought for over five centuries⁸⁴.

⁸³ They served Anastasius faithfully in his war against the rebel Vitalian. We also find mention of them in Justinian's armies; for example, three thousand are reported in action at Sicily, cf. Proc. *B.G.* V.5.2ff, Stein (1949), II.339-340. They twice, however, betrayed the army; on December 17th 546, four Isaurians opened the Asinarian Gate, aiding Totila's first capture of Rome, see Proc. *B.G.* VII.20.4-16, with Bury (1923), II.242 and Stein (1949), II.584, and again on January 16th 550, Isaurians opened the Porta Ostiensis, thus helping Totila's second capture of Rome, see Proc. *B.G.* VII.36.7-14 with Bury (1923), II.250 and Stein (1949), II.593. On the other hand, Totila was disappointed in the loyalty of the one thousand strong Isaurian garrison at Naples which refused to betray the city to him, cf. Proc. *B.G.* VII.6.2 and Stein (1949), II.573. Brooks (1893), p.237 reports that the *Souda* mentions an Isaurian revolt at the time of Heraclius, but there is no other source evidence. The Isaurians who remained in their native land and who were now deprived of their traditional livelihood, ie. brigandage, turned to casual building work, cf. Mango (1966), p.363. Theoph. AM 6051 describes Isaurians working at St. Sophia. From Hill (1996), it seems that building was a skill the Isaurians had made use of in the past, and Zeno had sponsored many building programmes in Isauria and throughout the empire. Hill (1996), p.8 argues that with the change of emperor, and the ensuing hardship as a result of the war, many Isaurians were forced to look for casual labour on Anastasius' building projects, for example, at Dara.

⁸⁴ It is therefore not surprising that the Isaurian victory is celebrated in the literature of this period (see chapt. 6), thus Proc. *Pan.* 9-10, and Prisc. *Pan.* 10-129 who stresses the clemency of Anastasius. There are many references to Anastasius' Isaurian war; for example, in *Anthol. Graec.* II.405-406, IX.210.10 and IX.656.19. Christodorus wrote an *Ἰσαυρικὰ* which is no longer extant. Vasiliev (1952), I.140 comments that Anastasius did the empire a great service in finally solving the problem of the Isaurians by deporting them to Thrace, while Jones (1964), I.230 remarks on the fact that this time, the pacification of the country was thorough.

Part Two: The Revolt of Vitalian

After the successful conclusion of the Isaurian war in 498, Anastasius was not troubled again by civil war until towards the end of his reign, when the ambitious and enterprising Vitalian rebelled. This insurrection posed a serious threat to the stability of Anastasius' rule. Professing championship of two critical issues of financial and religious policy, Vitalian raised a large and loyal following and no fewer than three times threatened the security of the imperial capital itself. Despite some serious reverses, using a mixture of diplomacy and force, Anastasius was able to stave off the demands of Vitalian and drive the pretender into exile.

Vitalian and his Army.

ὅτι συνεκύκα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Θράκην Βιταλιανός, ἀνθρωπίσκος βραχὺς καὶ τραυλὸς τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὰς ἄκρας τοῖν βλεφάροιν ὑποκεκαυμένος, υἱὸς ὦν Πατρικιόλου πατρίδα ἐσχηκότος Ζάλδαβα τῆς κάτω Μυσίας πόλισμα βραχὺ¹.

Such is John of Antioch's introduction to Vitalian. He was the son of Patriciolus, the previous *comes foederatum*, and in 503, he had his first taste of warfare when he accompanied his father to the Persian war². The only evidence that Vitalian was married comes from the account of Zachariah of Mytilene, who comments that he behaved particularly cruelly towards Hypatius (the emperor's nephew) because the latter had insulted his wife³. Michael the Syrian believed that Vitalian was the nephew of Macedonius, but perhaps only because of the ostentatious support he gave to the deposed patriarch⁴.

This much we know about Vitalian's immediate family; what of his nationality? From John

¹ John of Ant. fr.214e.1.

² Josh. 60, Proc. *BP.* I.8.3, Vict. Tunn. 510, Theoph. AM 6005; cf. Barnea (1960), p.363. On Patriciolus, *PLRE* II.837.

³ Zach. of Myt. VII.13.

⁴ Mich. Syr. IX.9; cf. Ensslin (1961), col.374. Croke (1995), p.117 suggests that Vitalian and Macedonius were cousins.

of Antioch we learn that he was born in Zalbada in Moesia Secunda. However, he is termed "Vitalianus Scythia" by Marcellinus Comes, and "Θραξ γένος" by Evagrius and Malalas, while Zachariah of Mytilene indicated that his family was of Gothic descent⁵. It is evident though, that whatever his origins, he was highly Romanised⁶. The nationality of the troops which he commanded in his capacity as *comes foederatum* in Thrace is also problematical⁷. Again there is discrepancy in the sources; Malalas, Theophanes and Cedrenus record Huns and Bulgars, while John of Antioch and Evagrius refer only to Huns⁸. The crucial point is that Vitalian was able to detach the loyalty of these groups to the empire, and transfer it to himself as a private individual, a rebel against the state. From John of Antioch's description of him as a small man with a stammer, he hardly appears the figure of a charismatic general able to unite the masses behind a cause or lead an army to victory against the imperial forces. Yet Vitalian obviously enjoyed great influence in the Balkans and he made a clever selection of two controversial issues, religious and financial, which were guaranteed to secure a large and devoted following⁹.

⁵ Marc. C. 514, cf. Stein (1949), II.178; Evag. III.43; Mal. 402 followed by Zon. XIV.3.35-36 and Niceph. Cal. XVI.38, and Zach. of Myt. VII.13 and VIII.2.

⁶ Stein (1949), II.178, Barnea (1960), p.363 and Croke (1995), pp.117 believe that Vitalian was half Roman and half Gothic; contra Charanis (1974), p.81 who states that he was half Hunnic and half Gothic. Stein (1949), II.179-180, referring to Schwartz (1934), pp.252f, comments on the close relationship between Theoderic and Vitalian, which perhaps stemmed from their shared nationality. However, there is only Zachariah's evidence for Vitalian's Gothic roots and Patriciolus is hardly a Gothic name. Mommsen (1872), p.349 and Ensslin (1961), col.374 also discuss the issue of Vitalian's nationality, as does Vasiliev (1950), p.108 who suggests Slavic descent and Vulpe (1938), p.325 who describes Vitalian as the "Romanised son of a Gothic *comes*".

⁷ Vitalian as *comes foederatum* would be under the orders of the *magister militum per Thracias* and would have had command of some of the regiments of federates stationed in Thrace.

⁸ Georg. Mon. 619 mentions Goths, Huns and Scythians, contra Mal. 402, Theoph. AM 6006, Cedr. I.632, John of Ant. fr.214e.1 and Evag. III.43. The problem is discussed at length in the secondary sources; eg. Mommsen (1872), p.350. Bury (1923), I.448 and Charanis (1974), p.81 believe that the troops were mainly Bulgarians, contra Ensslin (1961), col.374 and Capizzi (1969), p.123 who comment that Vitalian had a great number of Bulgars and Huns. The problem probably arose because contemporary writers themselves were unsure about these rather distant (though terrifying) and relatively recent tribes who threatened the peripheral provinces of the empire; cf. Barnea (1960), p.364.

⁹ On Vitalian's undoubted influence and popularity with his army, Manojlović (1936), p.659 and Duchesne (1925), p.37. Even his enemies acknowledged his skill and courage in war, Charanis (1974), p.81.

*Causes of the Revolt.**a) Religious Policy.*

Many contemporary writers present the revolt as a crusade, a protest staged by the orthodox Vitalian against the monophysite Anastasius. Thus Malalas begins his account of Vitalian's insurrection:

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας ἐτυράννησε Βιταλιανὸς ὁ Θράξ διὰ πρόφασιν
τινα, φησί, λέγων ὅτι διὰ τοὺς ἐξορισθέντας ἐπισκόπους¹⁰.

and similarly Theodore Lector wrote:

Βιταλιανὸν τὸν υἱὸν Πατρικίου κόμητος φοιδεράτων οἱ ἐν Σκυθία καὶ
Μυσία καὶ λοιπαῖς χώραις ὀρθόδοξοι παρεκάλουν κινηθῆναι κατὰ
Ἀναστασίου τοῦ δυσσεβοῦς¹¹.

The doctrinal dispute which raged during Anastasius' reign will be fully explored in chapter four. Briefly, the revolt reflected the worsening relations between the generally orthodox Illyricum under pressure from Rome to break all ties with the see of Constantinople, and the increasingly monophysite Anastasius. Relations between the emperor and papacy had already deteriorated; apart from a short spell of hope (496-498) when Anastasius II was pope, the emperor had enjoyed little success in patching up the Acacian schism which he had inherited from Zeno¹². With much of Syria and Egypt now firmly monophysite, it was the Latin-speaking western provinces, Illyricum, Scythia and Moesia Secunda, that came under assault from both sides. The Illyrian bishops were invited into communion with Rome, but were too afraid of imperial consequences to signal whole-hearted support for the western Church¹³. Orthodox zeal however, was kept alive during this period by the Scythian monks

¹⁰ Mal. 402.

¹¹ Theod. Lect. 503. See also Marc. C. 514, Zach. of Myt. VIII.2, Vict. Tunn. 510 and Theoph. AM 6005.

¹² Stein (1949), II.179 suggests that Vitalian was in contact with the Holy See from a very early stage; cf. Cessi (1920), p.219.

¹³ See a letter purportedly from the bishops of Illyricum to Symmachus asking for his help in promoting orthodoxy; Jaffé (1885-1888), no.763, Thiel (1868), p.709, and Mansi (1762), VIII.221, and a letter from Dorotheus, the bishop of Thessalonica, to Hormisdas; Gunther (1895-1898), no.105 and Thiel (1868), pp.742ff; cf. Charanis (1974), p.80.

who had continued in communion with Rome from the time of the Acacian schism¹⁴.

The eastern Church itself was also fragmented by schisms. There had been rioting in the largely Chalcedonian capital, especially in 512, at Anastasius' introduction of the monophysite version of the *Trishagion*. By 514, three orthodox patriarchs had already been deposed, Euphemius and Macedonius in Constantinople, and Flavian in Antioch. Vitalian, it appears, was personally acquainted with Flavian and Macedonius, thus explaining his demand for their re-installment in their sees¹⁵. In 514, it must have seemed that Vitalian was the ideal person to unite the various pockets of the discontented orthodox into an organised revolt; in particular he had a loyal army and could expect the support of the Chalcedonian populace of Constantinople.

b) *Economic Policy.*

Vitalian was fortunate though in representing the cause of not one but two sets of dissidents, and his second ostensible motive for revolt perhaps explains, more than doctrinal disputes, the devotion of his army and its betrayal of the state. John of Antioch gives as the main reason for the uprising, Anastasius' withdrawal of the *annona* owed to the federal troops¹⁶.

¹⁴ For Vitalian's relations with the Scythian monks, see the discussion by Charanis (1974), p.81 who refers to F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche*, Leipzig 1887, pp.293ff and E. Schwartz, "De Monachis Scythiis" in *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum* t.4, vol.2, Munich 1914, p.vff.

¹⁵ Vitalian was a friend of Flavian, see *CMH* I.485, Bury (1923), I.448, Capizzi (1969), p.123, contra Stein (1949), II.179, n.2 who suggests that Flavian was Vitalian's godfather. Such a connection or even a close friendship would explain the extreme hatred of Severus and Vitalian. Severus was directly responsible for Flavian's downfall and took his place as patriarch of Antioch (512). He also wrote a hymn commemorating Vitalian's defeat in 516 (discussed later). It is possible, as commented earlier, that Macedonius and Vitalian were related, cf. Zach. of Myt. VII.13.

¹⁶ John of Ant. fr.214e.1. This could explain the unpopularity of the *magister militum*, Hypatius, who might be blamed for implementing this legislation which would have deprived the *foederati* of provisions to which they were entitled; cf. Zach. of Myt. VII.13. On the withdrawal of the *annona*, Barnea (1960), p.363-364 and *PLRE* II.1172. Mommsen (1872), p.350 comments on how easy it would be for Vitalian, as leader of the *foederati*, to stir up discontent. The reason for this provocative legislation in a programme of generally carefully thought-out and non-controversial economic reforms, is unknown. It has been suggested that as the numbers of *foederati* increased, it was impossible to maintain from the imperial treasury the *annona* due to them, cf. Holmes (1905), p.180. It is well known that Thrace, seriously affected by barbarian incursions, found it hard to pay its taxes and could not produce enough *annona* to support its army without the imposition of the *coemptio*. Thus, the reduction of *annona* to troops possibly resulted simply from the inability of the province

From the same source, we also learn that

ν' χιλιάδας πολεμικῶν τε καὶ ἀγροίκων ἀνδρῶν

enlisted under Vitalian. The disaffected peasants suffered from the exception to Anastasius' new law which abolished the old system of *coemptio* (the enforced sale of essential provisions at a fixed price) everywhere else, except in Thrace, where the normal tax yield was too low to support the army¹⁷. Though essential for the maintenance of the army in this province, the *coemptio* would have been heavy burden for the peasant farmers, especially when they already suffered frequent barbarian raids across the Danube¹⁸. According to Theodore Lector, Vitalian promised gold, weapons and supplies to those who would rally to his cause, thus suggesting that the poverty and harsh conditions of these Danubian regions played no small part in Vitalian's revolt¹⁹.

c) *Ambition.*

It will become apparent throughout the following account of the series of offensives and subsequent negotiations, that despite the seeming cohesion and sincerity of Vitalian's motives, as outlined above, these were secondary to his private incentives of greed and ambition. He manipulated the religious discord, hoping in his championship of orthodoxy to find himself with a ready-made band of supporters. Similarly, he utilized the dissatisfaction of the *foederati* under his care and the genuine poverty of the rural population, in order to depose Anastasius and realize his own ambition for the imperial throne. His army and supporters may have believed that they were fighting for a common cause, but Vitalian was surely fighting for his own²⁰.

to provide enough supplies.

¹⁷ See the section on the χρυσοτέλεια τῶν ἰουγῶν in chapter 5. Manojlović (1968), p.659 comments on the support of the Balkan peasants who were opposed to Oriental monophysitism. It is more likely though, that the financial complaints were more immediate.

¹⁸ cf. Barnea (1960), pp.363-364.

¹⁹ Theod. Lect. 503. Zach. of Myt. VII.13 emphasised the amount of gold and booty seized by Vitalian in his first offensive, which was obviously important in maintaining the loyalty of his allies.

²⁰ This is the view generally held today. Bury (1923), I.447 remarked that Anastasius' unpopularity over his ecclesiastical policy and this piece of economic legislation created an ideal opportunity for an ambitious soldier such as Vitalian to attempt to dethrone him. Hodgkin (1895-1899), p.459 also believed that Vitalian

*The Beginning of the Conflict*²¹.

Vitalian began his uprising in 514²², with the murder of two senior officials on the staff of the *magister militum*, Celerinus and Constantine²³. The general at this time, Hypatius (not the emperor's nephew), was unpopular, most likely as he was seen as the scapegoat for Anastasius' recent legislation²⁴. Moesia Secunda quickly fell into Vitalian's hands after he had won over by bribery the *dux*, Maxentius²⁵, and continuing this run of success, the rebel captured Carinus, a financial official and a friend of Hypatius. Vitalian offered to spare his life in return for the imperial gold he had in his possession and a promise that he would hand over Odessos, which, as the head-quarters of the *magister militum per Thracias*, was a city of great strategical importance²⁶. With a force numbering fifty thousand, Vitalian then advanced towards Constantinople, while Hypatius withdrew inside the city walls²⁷.

In response to the supposed theological motives of the rebel, Anastasius fixed bronze crosses on the city gates and he displayed on the altar of the Great Church parchment inscribed with

feigned interest in the theological dispute as a pretext for war, while taking advantage of the grievances of his army over their loss of pay. The Huns, as ever, needed little encouragement to ravage Roman territory. Vasiliev (1932), p.143 and Lamma (1939-40), p.186 agree that his goals were essentially political.

²¹ See Appendix D for a map of the Balkans showing the area of conflict.

²² Marc. C. 514 contra Theoph. AM 6005. *CMH* I.485, Bury (1923). I.448, Stein (1949), II.180 and Capizzi (1969), p.123 all follow Theophanes' dating of 513. However, a 514 start better suits the dating of two letters sent by Anastasius to the pope Hormisdas (discussed later) just after the first phase of the rebellion in December 514 and January 515; cf. Charanis (1974), p.81 and Croke (1995), p.117. Again, it makes better sense to follow the sixth-century Marcellinus than the often inaccurate ninth-century Theophanes.

²³ They were both assessors; *PLRE* II.275, Celerinus and *PLRE* II.315, Constantinus 16.

²⁴ The two Hypatii are often confused; eg. Mommsen (1872), pp.349-350, Stein (1949), II.178 and Croke (1995), p.117. For discussion, Lamma (1939-40), p.187, Greatrex (1996), esp. pp.140-142 and Mango (1997), p.241. Bury (1923), I.448 comments on this Hypatius' unpopularity with the army; cf. *PLRE* II.577, Hypatius 5, with references.

²⁵ cf. *PLRE* II.738.

²⁶ John of Ant. fr.214e.1; *PLRE* II.261, Carinus 3.

²⁷ John of Ant. fr.214e.1 contra Marc.C. 514 who gives the figure of sixty thousand; cf. Croke (1995), p.117. This force included his *foederati*, reinforced by rustic peasants. Stein (1949), II.180 comments on the extraordinary number of this army, raised by a rebel, at this time. It was said that Hypatius did not have enough troops on hand to face the barbarian multitude, John of Ant. fr.214e.1, Mal. 402, Capizzi (1969), p.124.

Vitalian's real motive; usurpation of the imperial throne²⁸. Undeterred however, Vitalian established himself at the Hebdomon (seven miles from the city centre) and began to close on the Golden Gate²⁹.

It was also at this time that Anastasius reduced taxes on the imports of livestock into Asia Minor by twenty-five per cent. This measure has been seen as the emperor's response to the perceived criticism of his economic policy as a motive for the uprising³⁰. Incidentally, such a reform might have helped to ensure a safe reception should Anastasius have been forced to flee across the Bosphorus after a successful assault by Vitalian.

On these and subsequent events, most sources give confused or compressed accounts as outlined briefly below. Malalas reports that after Vitalian had gained control of Thrace and Scythia as far as Odessos and Anchialus, Anastasius sent out Hypatius, the *magister militum*, who was betrayed and captured, thus attributing to the first Hypatius the fate of the second (the emperor's nephew)³¹. Evagrius has Vitalian devastating Thrace and Moesia as far as Odessos and Anchialus and then attacking Constantinople with Hunnic troops. Hypatius was captured owing to the treachery of his own men and had to be ransomed³². Theophanes describes a battle in which sixty-five thousand Romans fell, a confrontation he has obviously confused with a later battle in which John of Antioch reported that sixty thousand out of the eighty thousand imperial troops perished³³.

²⁸ John of Ant. fr.214e.2; Hodgkin (1895-99), p.461.

²⁹ Marc. C. 514. *PLRE* II.1172 describes how Vitalian arranged his troops from sea to sea, so that the city was cut off by land, and then moved relentlessly towards the Golden Gate without opposition.

³⁰ See John of Ant. fr.214e.2; Stein (1949), II.181, n.1 and my section on *reductions and rebates of taxes* in chapter five.

³¹ Mal. 402 followed by Holmes (1905), p.180 and Vulpe (1938), p.325. *PLRE* II.1172 comments that Vitalian controlled Thrace, Moesia Secunda and Scythia and refers to the following primary sources, Mal. 402, Evag. III.43, John of Nikiu LXXXIX.72, Theoph. AM 6006, Cedr. I.632 and Zon. XIV.3.28.

³² Evag. III.43, cf. Zach. of Myt. VII.13.

³³ Theoph. AM 6005.

We return now, however, to the main narrative with Vitalian encamped around the walls of Constantinople. At this point, the account of Marcellinus Comes, hitherto useful, stops with the remark:

porro Anastasii simulationibus atque periuriis per Theodorum internuntium
inlectus atque inlusus octavo die quam urbem accesserat remeavit.

The subsequent settlement is found in the history of John of Antioch. Patricius, the *magister militum praesentalis* in the Persian war (502-506) and a benefactor of Vitalian, was sent to negotiate, and Vitalian, though too mistrustful to enter the capital himself, agreed to send his most senior officers to negotiate³⁴. His goals were two-fold: Hypatius must be removed and the injustices to the *foederati* remedied, and the Church of Rome should be allowed to settle the doctrinal rift³⁵. According to other sources, the deposed patriarchs, Macedonius and Flavian were to be reinstated³⁶. Negotiations were conducted on Anastasius' behalf by Theodorus³⁷. Wooed by gifts, the officers were easily convinced by the emperor's promises of compliance and returned to Vitalian, who had little choice but to retreat to Moesia Secunda and await developments³⁸.

The Second Stage of Conflict.

It is interesting that Anastasius had no thought of forcing a physical confrontation. It is probable that he had insufficient forces on hand for a full defence of Constantinople and it was sound strategy to employ diplomatic means to remove Vitalian from the immediate vicinity of his capital and then continue the war in enemy territory³⁹.

³⁴ *PLRE* II.840-842, Patricius 14.

³⁵ Bury (1923), I.449, Stein (1949), II.180, Capizzi (1969), p.124 and Charanis (1974), pp.82-83. See also Marc. C. 514 and Vict. Tunn 510.

³⁶ Theod. Lect. 509 and Cedr. I.632.

³⁷ *PLRE* II.1095, Theodorus 55.

³⁸ Only eight days after he had arrived, Marc. C. 514 and John of Ant. fr.214e.4.

³⁹ At such short notice and with the city cut off by Vitalian's manoeuvres, it was impossible for Anastasius to recall troops from elsewhere in the empire; cf. Capizzi (1969), p.124.

The next stage, then, was for Anastasius to replace the unpopular Hypatius with Cyril, who was despatched forthwith to Moesia Secunda in pursuit of Vitalian, presumably with instructions to dispose of this would-be usurper at the earliest opportunity⁴⁰. Again though, there are discrepancies in the sources as to subsequent events. Malalas reports that there was a battle in which many fell; Cyril was successful eventually and entered Odessos, but Vitalian bribed the gate-keepers and pursuing the general into the town, slaughtered him in his residence⁴¹. Evagrius, however, states that the first battle was indecisive and that Cyril was routed due to the desertion of his own soldiers and was captured in Odessos⁴². Marcellinus and John of Antioch do not mention any preliminary hostilities, only relating that Vitalian went to Odessos and killed Cyril there⁴³. Theophanes mentions the capture of Cyril, but his account is very confused. He compresses different parts of the campaign: the capture of Odessos, the slaughter of Cyril, the plundering up to Constantinople and the second attack on the city from Sosthenium, all in the same sentence⁴⁴.

As it is very probable that Vitalian was holding Odessos, having gained possession of it from Carinus, it seems likely that there was a battle which ended in victory for Cyril and gave him control of Odessos to where he now retreated. If Odessos had still been held by Vitalian's rebel troops, it would hardly have been a suitable place for Cyril to withdraw to. Moreover, if Vitalian had to fight or bribe the guards to let him in, this implies that the city was no longer in his hands. There is no report of the town changing hands by agreement, so it can

⁴⁰ Thus Mal. 402, Evag. III.43 and John of Ant. fr.214e.5; cf. *PLRE* II.335, Cyril 3.

⁴¹ Mal. 402, John of Nikiu LXXXIX.76.

⁴² Evag. III.43. Croke (1995), p.118 and *PLRE* II.1173 believe that there were several indecisive encounters before Cyril then withdrew to Odessos.

⁴³ Marc. C. 514.3 portrays Cyril as more of a pimp than a general:

Cyrillum lenocinantem magis quam strenuum militae ductorem inter duas paelices Vitalianus repperit dormientem....

contra John of Ant. fr.214e.5:

οὐκ ἀσυνέτω, οὐδὲ πολεμικῆς ἐμπειρίας ἀμαθεῖ.

See also Stein. (1949), II.180.

⁴⁴ Theoph. AM 6006; cf. Mango (1997), pp.243-244. Mommsen (1872), p.353 comments on the differences between the accounts. On Vitalian's suspicions of Cyril's plans and surprise attack on Cyril, Capizzi (1969), p.124.

be assumed that Cyril managed to regain control of it during a battle at this time.

When Anastasius heard about this incident, he had Vitalian decreed a public enemy by the traditional method of senatorial decree⁴⁵. He then appointed Alathar, a Hun, as the new *magister militum per Thracias*, placed his nephew in supreme command of the army and Theodorus in charge of finances, and consigned eighty thousand soldiers to the expedition⁴⁶.

The clearest and fullest account of subsequent developments can again be found in the history of John of Antioch⁴⁷. The first engagement went in favour of the imperial forces, after which Anastasius held a celebratory ceremony in the Great Church. However, serious reverses followed, including the humiliating capture of Julian, an official in the bureau of the *magister memorialis*, who had followed the expedition as an observer⁴⁸. Another official, Timothy, one of the *protectores*, was killed in the hostilities⁴⁹. With his army, Hypatius withdrew hurriedly behind a palisade of wagons at Acrae on the Black Sea, near Odessos, but the enemy mounted a surprise attack and easily penetrated the crude defence. The imperial troops fled, terrified; many were slaughtered by the enemy, while others perished by falling down precipices in the darkness which, as John of Antioch wrote, was caused by the magic arts of the barbarians. Sixty thousand Romans died on this occasion, a figure no doubt exaggerated, but indicative of the scale of the disaster for the imperial forces. Several senior officers were captured, including Alathar⁵⁰. Hypatius tried to escape by jumping into the sea, but his head betrayed him and he too was captured by the Huns. They accepted ransom

⁴⁵ John of Ant. fr.214e.6, Jord. *Rom.* 358.

⁴⁶ *PLRE* II.49-50, Alathar, *PLRE* II.577-581, Hypatius 6, esp. p.579. The figure of eighty thousand is surely an exaggeration, cf. Stein (1949), II.180.

⁴⁷ John of Ant. fr.214e.6-11. But see also the relevant sections of Mal. 402-403, Evag. III.43 and Theoph. AM 6006.

⁴⁸ Julian was carried about in a cage before being ransomed, *PLRE* II.641, Julianus 25.

⁴⁹ John of Ant. fr.214e.7, cf. Mommsen (1872), p.353 and *PLRE* II.1122, Timothy 5.

⁵⁰ See *CMH* I.485, Stein (1949), II.181 and Ensslin (1961), col.375. Alathar and colleagues were captured by the Bulgars and then ransomed by Vitalian.

from Vitalian who kept the emperor's nephew as a valuable negotiating pawn⁵¹. An imperial embassy of Uranius, Polychronius and Martyrius sent out to negotiate with ransom money totalling one thousand, one hundred pounds of gold, was seized at Sozopolis and the town fell into the rebel's possession⁵². These victories enabled Vitalian to pay his barbarian allies richly and gave him possession of all the fortresses and cities of Moesia and Scythia⁵³.

For a second time, Vitalian was in a position to bring his forces to the suburbs of the imperial city⁵⁴. At this time, there was a faction riot in the capital caused by a ban by Anastasius on the celebration of certain festivities⁵⁵. The extent to which Vitalian encouraged or was encouraged by this riot cannot be determined⁵⁶. It was possibly helpful that Anastasius' attention may have been momentarily distracted, but it was a serious miscalculation on Vitalian's part if he expected to channel the grievances of the factions into his own cause. As will be discussed later, it was Anastasius who utilized most effectively the power of the factions.

⁵¹ *PLRE* II.1173 comments that Vitalian's treatment of Hypatius during captivity was especially humiliating (he was kept in a pigsty), because Hypatius had formerly insulted his wife, cf. Zach. of Myt. VII.13 and VIII.2.

⁵² *PLRE* II.1187, Uranius 6, *PLRE* II.896, Polychronius 3, and *PLRE* II.732, Martyrius 7. On this embassy and its capture, Marc. C. 515 and John of Ant. fr.214e.11.

⁵³ See Bury (1923), I.450, Stein (1949), II.181, Ensslin (1961), col.376 and Charanis (1974), p.84.

⁵⁴ On the date, mentioned as 514 by Capizzi (1969), p.125, see Stein (1949), II.180f, Peeters (1950), p.21 and Ensslin (1961). cols.375-376.

⁵⁵ John of Ant. fr. 214e.12. The night prefect, Geta, was killed in the disturbances, *PLRE* II.511.

⁵⁶ Many historians see a clear link between the riot and Vitalian's operations. Brooks in *CMH* I.485 wrote that it was now expected that Vitalian would be proclaimed emperor. Capizzi (1969), p.125 believed that Vitalian would have been very encouraged by the riot and would be confident of help from the populace during an attack on the city. Charanis (1974), p.84 thought that Vitalian would be emboldened by the dual danger threatening Anastasius. Stein (1949), II.181 commented that the success of Vitalian at Acrae gave courage to the masses who then rioted. Vulpe (1938), p.325 went as far as to say that the inhabitants of Constantinople, rioting against Anastasius, were ready to open the gates to Vitalian. Such reasoning however, seems very unlikely to hold the truth. There is nothing to suggest that the riot was in any way different to the many other factional disturbances which had plagued Anastasius earlier in his reign. There is no evidence that the people of Constantinople wanted to get rid of Anastasius as they had Zeno, when they lent assistance to Marcianus in 479. Vitalian and his army surrounded Constantinople on three separate occasions giving the townspeople plenty of opportunity to betray their city, yet there is no hint of any such attempt.

In his second attack on Constantinople, Vitalian sent ahead his cavalry and fleet of two hundred⁵⁷, while he and the army marched along the coast until they reached Sosthenium at the northern end of the city⁵⁸. Again and probably more so after the disastrous loss at Acrae, Anastasius was in no mood for battle. He sent John, the *magister militum praesentalis*, known as the son of Valeriana, with other senators to negotiate⁵⁹. The terms of the treaty included the ransom of Hypatius for nine hundred pounds of gold and gifts⁶⁰, the appointment of Vitalian as *magister militum per Thracias*, and Anastasius' promise to convene a synod at Heraclea to be attended by all bishops⁶¹. On the stipulation of Vitalian, the treaty was confirmed by the emperor, the senate, the leaders of each division of the *scholarioi* and the people⁶².

Anastasius and the Church of Rome.

Contrary to the statement of Gibbon quoted by Charanis:

In this pious rebellion [Vitalian] depopulated Thrace, besieged Constantinople, exterminated sixty-five thousand of his fellow Christians, till he obtained the recall of the bishops, the satisfaction of the pope, and the establishment of the

⁵⁷ The fleet was gathered in Thracian ports. On the use of his fleet here, Duchesne (1925), p.37f.

⁵⁸ See John of Ant. fr.214e.13, Mal. 405, Marc. C. 515, Vict. Tunn. 514, John of Nikiu LXXXIX.77, Theoph. AM 6006.

⁵⁹ *PLRE* II.608, John 60, Hodgkin (1895-1899), p.462 comments that again Anastasius had no intention in keeping any of the agreements reached in these negotiations.

⁶⁰ cf. John of Ant. fr.214e.14 and Marc. C. 514.3. The exact sum of ransom has been much discussed. Marcellinus mentions the nine hundred pounds demanded here and the one thousand one hundred pounds offered previously and captured at Sozopolis, a total of two thousand pounds of gold. As John of Antioch mentions a sum of five thousand pounds, this must include the extra gifts demanded by Vitalian which must have amounted to three thousand pounds. See Stein (1949), II.181, *PLRE* II.1173 and Croke (1995), p.118. For a completely different tradition, see Theodore Lector 511 and Theophanes AM 6006 where Hypatius' father Secundinus, begs Vitalian to release his son from chains in Moesia.

⁶¹ John of Ant. fr.214e.14, Theod. Lect. 510, Vict. Tunn. 514, Theoph. AM 6006 and Cedr. 632. It was arranged that both Vitalian and Anastasius should contact Hormisdas; it was imperative that Rome was represented, cf. Schwartz (1934), p.252f.

⁶² cf. Capizzi (1969), p.125.

council of Chalcedon⁶³,

Vitalian never obtained his theological objectives. Yet this was not for lack of serious attempts by the emperor to heal the rift with the western Church⁶⁴. On 28th December, 514, he despatched a letter inviting Symmachus to preside over the synod at Heraclea which was to be held on 1st July, 515⁶⁵. This letter however, did not reach the pope until 14th May, 515, arriving later than a second epistle from the emperor, sent on 12th January, 515, which arrived on 14th March, 515⁶⁶. Why were two letters sent so close together? It is probable that Vitalian, suspicious of Anastasius' interventions after reneging on their previous treaty, vetted the first letter or sent it to the court at Ravenna to be checked. The second letter was sent directly to the pope; possibly Anastasius was aware that the first might be intercepted⁶⁷.

Hope blossomed with the death of the intransigent Symmachus and the accession of Hormisdas on 19th July, 515. His first letter to Anastasius was conciliatory and asked for more information about the proposed synod, though of course by now the original date for the convening of the council had already passed⁶⁸. By the time he had got round to sending an embassy to Constantinople, the other bishops had already gathered and dispersed⁶⁹.

The papal ambassadors arrived in August 515, bearing with them the pope's requirements for communion to be established again between the sees of Constantinople and Rome. He demanded assurance that the doctrinal formulae agreed at the council of Chalcedon would be

⁶³ Gibbon V.140, quoted by Charanis (1974), p.85.

⁶⁴ On this correspondence between Anastasius and the pope, see my section on the revolt of Vitalian, chapter four.

⁶⁵ Gunther (1895-1898), no.109, Thiel (1868), p.741.

⁶⁶ Gunther (1895-1898), no.107, Thiel (1868), p.742, and Mansi (1762), VIII.384.

⁶⁷ Sundwall (1919), p.223, n.1, Stein (1949), II.182 contra Capizzi (1969), p.126 who believes that the first letter was deliberately delayed by Anastasius himself.

⁶⁸ Hormisdas' letter - Jaffé (1885-1888), no.771, Thiel (1968), p.745 and Gunther (1895-1898), no.108.

⁶⁹ contra Cedr. 632 who states that Anastasius violated the treaty; he omits all mention of communication between emperor and popes.

upheld; that those seen in the eyes of the pope to be the main perpetrators of heretical movements be expunged from the diptychs; namely, Nestorius, Dioscorus, Timotheus Aelurus, Peter Mongus and Acacius; that all exiled bishops be retried at Rome; and finally, that all cases against catholic bishops be tried in the papal court. Anastasius must sign the *Libellus* (the formula of Hormisdas) which demanded the absolute submission of emperor to pope⁷⁰.

Anastasius sent back the embassy in the winter of 515, replying that he had not openly censured Chalcedonian orthodoxy, and thus no specific guarantee of his support was necessary. He added that he could not anathematize the heretics as requested by the pope without causing further disquiet and bloodshed⁷¹.

The Defeat of Vitalian.

Correspondence was to continue for at least another year or two between Anastasius and Hormisdas, but for Vitalian, this was hardly the reconciliatory response he had demanded, and it provided the excuse to make a third attempt on Constantinople. Before he did so, however, at the end of 515 there was an incursion of the Sabir Huns who laid waste Cappadocia as far as Lycaonia⁷². John of Antioch mentions this in conjunction with Vitalian's third assault on the capital, possibly implying that they were working in collusion with the rebel; they would invade the eastern provinces, while Vitalian would strike against Constantinople from the west⁷³.

It was also in 515, though the exact timing is unknown, when Anastasius removed Vitalian from his position as *magister militum per Thracias* and appointed in his place a certain

⁷⁰ On the members of the embassy and the documents they brought with them, see my section on the revolt of Vitalian in chapter four.

⁷¹ Gunther (1895-1898), no.125, Thiel (1868), pp.761ff. Duchesne (1925), p.39 commented that this reply indicated that Anastasius was not afraid of Vitalian. While engaging in correspondence with the popes, it seems that Anastasius ignored Vitalian's request that he restore Macedonius and Flavian to their posts. It is possible that Macedonius was already dead by now, and it would have been virtually impossible to shift Flavian's powerful monophysite successor Severus, from his seat in Antioch.

⁷² John of Ant. fr.214e.15 and Marc. C. 515.

⁷³ See Mommsen (1872), p.357 and Charanis (1939), p.93.

Rufinus⁷⁴. With no immediate prospect of a reconciliation between the Churches of the east and west, Vitalian had every reason to stage another attack on Constantinople.

Vitalian drew up his forces at Sycae⁷⁵ and Anastasius, determined to respond with force this time, tried to appoint as generals Patricius and John, son of Valeriana, who had negotiated the previous treaties⁷⁶. However, they refused, giving the excuse that as they had once been friends of Vitalian, if they were now defeated, they risked the accusation of treachery⁷⁷. Anastasius then gave control of the campaign to the *praetorian prefect* and financial minister, Marinus the Syrian⁷⁸. His victory over Vitalian was made possible by the use of "θεῖον ἄπυρον", a chemical compound invented by the Athenian philosopher Proclus⁷⁹, which was hurled against the enemy ships, thus described by Malalas:

...καὶ ἀνήφθησαν ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ πυρὸς τὰ πλοῖα ἅπαντα Βιταλιανοῦ τοῦ τυράννου καὶ ἐποντίσθησαν εἰς τὸν βυθὸν τοῦ ρεύματος μεθ' ὧν εἶχον Γότθων καὶ Οὔννων καὶ Σκυθῶν στρατιωτῶν συνεπομένων αὐτῷ⁸⁰.

Once the fleet had been destroyed or put to flight, Marinus was able to land his army at

⁷⁴ Marc. C. 516; *PLRE* II.954-957, Rufinus 13, Mommsen (1872), p.358, Capizzi (1969). p.127, Charanis (1974), p.92 and Croke (1995), p.119.

⁷⁵ Vitalian hoped (in vain) that the Isaurians and other mercenary troops stationed in this area would join his cause.

⁷⁶ Marcellinus Comes omits all mention of this third engagement.

⁷⁷ Mal. 404.

⁷⁸ *PLRE* II.726-728, Marinus 7. On Marinus in this role, Bury (1923), I.451 and Stein (1949), II.184. That Marinus was substituted for Patricius and John is generally accepted, although it is Justin's role in the defeat of Vitalian which is cited by the reliable John of Antioch. Apparently Justin, at this time in the lowest ranks of the army, attacked one of the rebel ships and captured all its crew, an act which generated such fear that the rest of the fleet fled. As commented in chapter one, if John of Antioch was indeed writing at the beginning of Justin's reign, this might account for his exaggerated role here. It is of course, perfectly possible that Justin did capture an enemy ship, but that this was just one incident in the battle, and that the main commander was still Marinus.

⁷⁹ Mal. 405-406, John of Nikiu LXXXIX.78ff, and Zon. XIV.3.29-30; *PLRE* II.919. Proclus 8. Incendiary weapons had been used from the time of the Assyrians, and Malalas is not referring to the "Greek fire" invented by Callinicus for use against the Arabs in 678. See further, *ODB* II.873, Partington (1960), *passim*, esp. p.5 and Haldon and Byrne (1977).

⁸⁰ The fullest account of the battle is given by Mal. 405 (summarised by Evag. III.43) and John of Nikiu LXXXIX.81-84.

Sycae where he successfully engaged with the rebel forces who either managed to escape or were slain⁸¹.

Vitalian himself fled at night to Anchialus where he remained for the next couple of years⁸². Many of his supporters were killed including the Hun, Tarrach, Cyril's assassin, who was tortured and burnt at the stake⁸³. Meanwhile, Anastasius led a procession to Sosthenium which had been the main headquarters of Vitalian where he offered thanksgiving for his success⁸⁴.

Involvement of the Factions.

In the main sources for our period, there is no evidence of any involvement of the factions on either the imperial or rebel side. However, there are possible references to Vitalian's revolt in the epigrams inscribed on the base of a statue dedicated to the charioteer Porphyrius⁸⁵. The relevant poems are quoted below:

Οὐ μόνον ἐν σταδίοις σε κατέστεφε πότνια Νίκη,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμοις δειξεν ἀεθλοφόρον,
 εὐτ' ἄρ' Ἦναξ πολέμιζεν ἔχων Πρασίνοὺς ὑποεργοὺς
 ἄγρια μαινομένῳ ἐχθρῷ ἀνακτορέῳ,
 καὶ πέσεν αἰνοτύραννος ἐπιφθιμένης τότε Ἑρώμης,
 ἦμαρ δ' Αὔσονίης ἦλθεν ἐλευθερίας.
 τοῦνεκα τοῖς μὲν ἔδωκεν Ἦναξ γέρας, ὡς πάρος εἶχον,
 σὸν δὲ τύπον τέχνη ἔξεσε, Πορφύριε⁸⁶.

⁸¹ See Bury (1923), I.452, n.2 on their position on the Bosphoros shore.

⁸² cf. Mal. 406, John of Ant. fr.214e.16-17. Evag. III.43, Theoph. AM 6007, Cedr. I.632-633 and John of Nikiu LXXXIX.86 who wrote:

But Vitalian after his defeat... fled with his followers in fear and terror... and on the morrow everyone forsook him and left him alone.

⁸³ John of Ant. fr.214e.17-18. *PLRE* II.1052-1053 and Stein (1949), II.184-185.

⁸⁴ Mal. 405 and John of Nikiu LXXXIX.87.

⁸⁵ Cameron (1973), pp.126-130 and Vasiliev (1948), pp.43-44.

⁸⁶ *Anthol. Graec.* XVI.350.

and

᾽Ωφελεις ὄπλα φέρειν, οὐ φάρεα ταῦτα κομίζειν,
 ὡς ἐλατῆρ τελέθων, καὶ πολέμων πρόμαχος.
 εὔτε γὰρ ἦλθεν ἄνακτος ὀλεσσιτύραννος ἀκωκή,
 καὶ σὺ συναιχμάζων ἦψαο ναυμαχίης·
 καὶ διπλῆς, πολύμητι, σοφῶς ἐδράξαο νίκης,
 τῆς μὲν πωλομάχου, τῆς δὲ τυραννοφόνου⁸⁷.

Cameron argues convincingly that both of these epigrams concerning Porphyrius' part as a soldier / charioteer (XV.50.2 and 4) in a sea battle (XV.50.4) against a usurper (XVI.350.5) are referring to the war against Vitalian. Sea battles were rare in the sixth century in the Mediterranean and there are no other records of usurpers defeated at sea for this period. The other epigrams on this base also contain references to Porphyrius' dual role; thus epigram XVI.347:

Σῆν τροχαλὴν μάστιγα καὶ ἀσπίδα δῆμος ἀγασθεὶς
 ἤθελέ σε στῆσαι διπλόον, ὥσπερ ἔδει,
 ἠνίοχον κρατερόν καὶ ἀριστέα· διχθὰ δὲ χαλκὸς
 οὐκ ἐχύθη, ψυχὴν σεῖο τυπωσάμενος.

and the allusion to Porphyrius' loyalty to Anastasius during the crisis in epigram XVI.348:

Πορφύριον σταδίοισι τίνος χάριν ἠνιοχῆα
 δῆμος ὁ πρῶτα φέρων ἄνθετο τῶν Πρασίνων;
 αὐτὸς ᾽Αναξ κήρυξε. τί γὰρ πλέον, ὅττι γεραίρει
 εἵνεκεν εὐνοίης, εἵνεκεν ἵπποσύνης⁸⁸;

It appears then, that some members of the Green faction, led by Porphyrius, helped in defence of the city against Vitalian, as at XVI.350.3. It is possible that, as well as manning the walls, they took part in the pursuit of the enemy on the Galata side of the Golden Horn after the

⁸⁷ *Anthol. Graec.* XV.50. See Cameron (1973), p.127 for an explanation of why this poem should be included in the Planudean series between 349 and 350 which both refer to Porphyrius.

⁸⁸ Cameron (1973), pp.128-129. On XVI.347 and its parallels with the other epigrams, pp.129-130.

fleet had been defeated⁸⁹. That the factions were involved in active service should perhaps be explained by the urgency of the threat against the city, rather than any desire of the "monophysite" Greens to keep out the "orthodox" Vitalian⁹⁰. As will be discussed in chapter five, the divide of monophysite Greens and orthodox Blues is a largely artificial construct⁹¹. It is the Greens who are mentioned here, because at this time Porphyrius was racing for them, and in appreciation of his support, Anastasius allowed his faction to erect a monument in his honour.

Conclusions.

Vitalian remained an exile until after the death of Anastasius in 518; he was recalled to Constantinople under Justin's edict which granted pardon to all those banished by his predecessor. If there was any doubt about the sincerity of Vitalian's supposed motives for revolt, it is clear from his behaviour in the early years of Justin's reign that ambition for imperial power had been his ultimate goal. In his negotiations with Anastasius, apart from the first settlement when he demanded the removal of the unpopular Hypatius from office, the financial claims of the *foederati* are entirely ignored. Instead, Vitalian focused on the theological issues, and it is the promotion of strict orthodoxy which is his main concern under Justin. On his recall from exile, he demanded assurances of faith from Justin and Justinian. The popularity he gained from his violent persecution of the monophysites made him a dangerous rival to Justinian, who contrived his murder in July 520⁹². Thus, as under

⁸⁹ Cameron (1973), p.128 notes that this is the earliest recorded military activity of the factions, not otherwise attested until 539.

⁹⁰ Cameron (1973), p.126 contra Vasiliev (1948), pp.43-44.

⁹¹ As mentioned previously, the faction riot which broke out in Constantinople just before Vitalian's third attack, was not staged as a deliberate ploy by the Blues in his favour. Confusion is perhaps caused by Theophanes AM 6005 who states that during the 512 riot, the crowds proclaimed Vitalian emperor. He is clearly mistaken as all other sources cite Areobindus.

⁹² For a full account of Vitalian's brief period of ascendancy under Justin, see Vasiliev (1950), pp.108-114. Peeters (1950), p.49, n.1 comments on the political significance of the capture of Anastasius' nephew for Vitalian's hope of seizing the throne. Anastasius, already very old in 516, would not be expected to live much longer. Vitalian as a semi-barbarian had plenty examples from the west of barbarian rulers (eg. Ricimer). To have killed Hypatius while he had the chance would, however, have destroyed his credibility as a genuine reformer.

Anastasius, Vitalian's ambition was only very thinly cloaked by his championship of orthodoxy; indeed, even under Anastasius, it is noticeable that his demands become more personal as the conflict wore on. In the second round of negotiations, he claimed the position of *magister militum per Thracias* for himself.

Vitalian's ambitious uprising was costly for Anastasius. The imperial forces suffered some serious defeats, especially at Acrae. There was also the murder of Cyril, himself sent to assassinate Vitalian, and the humiliating capture of senior officials, particularly that of Hypatius, the emperor's nephew. There were important lessons to be learnt for the future as well. As has been pointed out,

By bringing his heterogenous troops close to Constantinople and by obtaining from the government enormous sums of money, Vitalian revealed to the barbarians the weakness of the empire and the great riches of Constantinople and taught them something about combined movement on land and sea⁹³.

Despite set-backs and losses, however, Anastasius deserves some credit for directing the course of the war to preserve the security of the imperial capital and government. Criticised for using diplomacy rather than force, it was not however, a last resort. He was able to muster an army under Cyril and later, a huge force was assembled under Alathar and Hypatius. This does not suggest that he was short of troops, but that he considered it preferable to remove Vitalian from the environs of Constantinople by negotiation before risking a battle. His decisive victory in 516 ensured that Vitalian did not again threaten the stability of the empire until his recall by Justin. Anastasius' victory was celebrated by Severus, the monophysite patriarch, who composed a hymn, *On Vitalian the Tyrant and the Victory of the Christ-loving Anastasius the King*⁹⁴. "God the Word...has cast down and destroyed rebel tyrants", he wrote, as he commemorated Anastasius' survival of this one attempt to depose him during his twenty-seven years of power.

⁹³ Uspenskij, F.I. *Istorija vizantijskoj imperii*, Petersburg 1913, I.352, quoted by Vasiliev (1952), p.109.

⁹⁴ *PO* 7.710.

*Chapter Three: Foreign Policy**Part One: The Eastern Frontier*

Anastasius' reign was not only disturbed by these internal uprisings, for the emperor also faced conflict on an international level. In the month of August 502 AD, the Great King of Persia, Kavadh, with a motley band of Persians, Arabs and Huns, crossed his border into Roman Armenia and headed towards the fortified city of Theodosiopolis. Within a short time, the town was his, and Kavadh was ready to move on to his next victim. This was the start of the new Persian campaign against the Romans, and Kavadh's decision to invade Roman territory at this time proved to have critical consequences for relations between the two states. This aggression was not only the first sign of a rift since the reign of Arcadius between these two traditionally hostile powers, but it was the first in a war that was to last intermittently for the next one hundred and thirty years, until the rise of Islam.

Such a significant moment deserves consideration. What were the reasons behind Kavadh's action and what was the reaction of Anastasius? Kavadh was undoubtedly the aggressor, but was his invasion provoked or justified? How far was Anastasius responsible for what happened, or was the war inevitable after such a long period of peace between two naturally hostile, ambitious and jealous states? In a wider context, Anastasius' measures to preserve peace along his eastern frontier must be considered: his dealings with the Arabs as clients, his financial support for the inhabitants of the provinces affected by war, and his programme of building and fortification, both defensive and offensive, are all significant factors of his foreign policy in the east.

However, for now, it is necessary to turn back the clock to the end of the fourth century. Many of the issues and themes essential to our understanding of the war under Anastasius originated and developed from the end of the fourth century and throughout the fifth.

Romano-Persian Relations, 363-502.

While a full discussion of the events from 363 to 502 is unnecessary, a brief indication of the

relevant aspects for the war under Anastasius is however, indispensable¹. In the year 408, just before the death of Arcadius, negotiations were held between Rome and Persia. Arrangements were made concerning the protection of Christian subjects in Persia, the restriction of trade to selected towns close to the frontier², and possibly included a recommendation from the dying king, that his young son, Theodosius, come under the protection of Yezdegerd I³.

The following reign of Theodosius witnessed only two rather minor disturbances of this peace⁴. The first flared just before the death of Yezdegerd I (420), with the intolerance of the Persians to Christian proselytism, and the reign of the anti-Christian Varahran V heralded a general persecution of Christians⁵. The ensuing war lasted just over a year, with the Romans emerging as victors. In 422, a treaty was negotiated, which established peace for one hundred years⁶.

The second disturbance came in 440, soon after the accession of Yezdegerd II. The cause is unclear; possibly the Persians were suspicious of the erection of the fortress Theodosiopolis on the Persarmenian border. Yezdegerd II invaded Roman Armenia but, threatened by an

¹ For relations between Rome and Persia from 363 to 502, see Blockley (1992), *passim*, Whitby (1988), pp.202ff, Howard-Johnston (1995), Greatrex (1994), chapters 2-3.

² Bury (1923), II.3.

³ Proc. *B.P.* I.2.1-10, Theoph. AM 5900; and for further discussion, Bury (1923), II.2 and Greatrex (1994), p.25 on Procopius' account.

⁴ See discussion by Greatrex (1993).

⁵ Theological differences were a constant problem. The later condemnation of Nestorianism made relations increasingly awkward. At the synod of Sidon in 486, the bishop Barsauma, with the approval of the Persian king, made Nestorianism the official doctrine of the Persian Christian Church. Meanwhile, Zeno closed the theological school of Edessa which advocated Nestorianism, and banished Nestorians from the empire; cf. Capizzi (1969), p.175 and Labourt (1904), pp.156ff.

⁶ The terms of the treaty forbade the persecution of Christians and stated that neither side should receive Saracen subjects of each other; cf. Bury (1923), II.5.

invasion of Hephthalite Huns, he was easily induced to accept a truce in 442⁷. A peace was concluded, involving the confirmation of the 422 treaty and the addition of further clauses, to the effect that neither side should build a fortress within a certain distance from the frontier, and, it has been argued, that the Romans should contribute a fixed sum for the defence of the Caspian Gates against invading barbarians⁸. This demand of the Persians for money was thought to stem from the 363 treaty, a view based on a passage of John the Lydian, where he states

ὥστε κοιναῖς δαπάναις ἄμφω τὰ πολιτεύματα φρούριον ἐπὶ τῆς εἰρημένης
εἰσόδου κατασκευάσαι, ἐπιστήσαι τε βοήθειαν τοῖς τόποις πρὸς
ἀναχαιτισμὸν τῶν κατατρεχόντων δι' αὐτῆς βαρβάρων.

However, at this time, the Romans were occupied to the west and the north, and the Persians, who were more exposed to the threat from the undefended Caspian Gates, built a fortress there and installed a garrison. "ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀφορμῆς", John continues, "οἱ Πέρσαι Ῥωμαίοις ἐπετέθησαν,...". Sporacius, sent by Theodosius I to negotiate was unable to reach an agreement, and,

ταῦτα ἕως τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς Ἀναστασίου διεσύρη λαλούμενά τε καὶ
τυπούμενα καὶ ἀπλῶς ἠρτημένα⁹.

It has been disputed, however, whether there ever was, in fact, any agreement in the 363 treaty about shared defences¹⁰. Just after this treaty (369-370), the Persians complained of Roman interference in this area, which hardly suggests that they had previously sought

⁷ The Hephthalite Huns were a significant factor in the Anastasian war. During the fifth century, these so-called "White Huns", having crossed from beyond the Oxus, drove away the Kushans/Kidarites, and eventually became overlords of Sogdia, Khoten and over thirty other regions; their empire, it is said, stretched from the Caspian sea to the Indus. Little is known about their origins, name, or location, yet they proved to be an important factor in Romano-Persian relations, for Persia could not afford a war on two fronts and on occasion was forced to hastily conclude peace with Rome, in order to concentrate on the barbarian threat. On the other hand, if cultivated properly, the Hephthalites would fight for Persia against Rome. See Greatrex (1994), chapter 3, section a), for a detailed discussion of the Hephthalites and Procopius.

⁸ The "Caspian Gates" refer to passes in the Caucasus Mountain range, especially the Dariel pass to the north of Iberia. The Persians built the fortress of Biraparach to prevent Hunnic incursions. See Appendix E, Map 1.

⁹ John Lydus, *de mag.* III.52-53.

¹⁰ Blockley (1985), pp.63ff, cf. Bury (1923), II.6 and Rawlinson (1875), III.433ff.

co-operation. The identification of talks with Yezdegerd concerning the defence of the Caucasus with the 442 treaty is not certain, and there are no references in Priscus to substantiate the view of a formal treaty.

Joshua admits that the Persians often received pecuniary assistance from the Romans; but what was the nature this assistance¹¹? He emphasises that he is not referring to tribute payments, and indeed, it is clear that such financial aid was furnished as a result of the 363 treaty which promised mutual assistance¹². It is obviously important to consider carefully the nature of the payments from Rome to Persia, in order to evaluate the justification for Anastasius' policy in repeatedly refusing Kavadh's demands for financial help.

Another sticking point was the site of Nisibis. Throughout much of his reign, Zeno had helped the Persians in their wars against the Huns and had even provided the ransom money for Peroz's release after he had been captured by the Hephthalites¹³. However, after 483, the Romans were less inclined to lend their support, for they claimed that Persia had repudiated an agreement of the 363 treaty, which stated that after the lapse of one hundred and twenty years, the border garrison town of Nisibis should be returned to the Romans. When the Persian king, Balash, applied to Zeno for help, the latter replied:

The taxes of Nisibis which you receive are enough for you¹⁴.

The validity of this claim, which was later employed by Anastasius, is rather questionable, but there was a definite hardening of Roman policy towards Persia after 483¹⁵.

Kavadh, King of Persia.

The final task of this opening section must be to introduce Kavadh, the Persian king who was

¹¹ eg. Josh. 9-10.

¹² cf. Josh. 8 and Mal. 449-450, who includes a letter from Kavadh referring to the promise of mutual assistance.

¹³ Josh. 10.

¹⁴ Josh. 18.

¹⁵ cf. Blockley (1985), p.67.

to threaten the eastern provinces of Anastasius' empire. In general, the authority of the Great King of Persia had been gradually eroded by the powerful nobility and Zoroastrian priests. Kavadh, however, managed to manipulate the ideas propagated by the growing Mazdakite movement to counterbalance the influence of these opponents¹⁶, and his reign was consequently one of the most secure for some time.

Nevertheless, the king could not escape the plotting of the aristocracy and was imprisoned in the so-called "prison of oblivion" in 497¹⁷. He did manage to escape with the help of his wife, sister or a friend by the name of Siyāvash, and he sought protection from the Hephthalite king. According to one source, Kavadh married his own niece (Peroz's daughter) at the Hephthalite court, and he was certainly given troops and resources to recover his throne¹⁸. Zamasp, now the ruling king in Persia, known for his clemency and justice, had no desire to stand in the way of his brother and abdicated voluntarily. His fate and that of the other nobles is uncertain; doubtless a certain Gousanastades was killed as he had suggested this fate for Kavadh after his dethronement¹⁹. The effect of Kavadh's humiliation and subsequent restoration to his throne on his relations with Rome, will be apparent when we come to discuss the causes of the 502 war.

¹⁶ Mazdak preached to the lower classes that all men are equal, and he advocated community of property and women. It is unclear whether the king was a sincere partisan of this early communism or merely supported the rise of the Mazdakite movement against the interests of the aristocracy. This question is debated by Christensen (1925), pp.90ff and (1944), chapter 7. See also Greatrex (1998), pp.50ff, *CHIr.* III.1.150ff and Labourt (1904), pp.154ff.

¹⁷ Joshua's account (chapter 23), that Kavadh knew of the conspiracy in advance and fled to the territory of the Huns, is contradicted by all other sources which claim he was deposed and imprisoned.

¹⁸ Josh. 24. If these events seem astonishing given the unsettled nature of Persian-Hephthalite relations, one must remember that Kavadh had spent much of his early life at the Hunnic court as a hostage for his father's maintenance of peace.

¹⁹ See the different traditions concerning the dethronement of Kavadh from the *Royal Sassanid Chronicle* in Christensen (1925) pp.25ff. For a detailed discussion of the life of Kavadh generally, see Christensen (1925), pp.90ff and Merten (1906), pp.159ff. Note the error of Procopius *B.P.* I.5.2, who confuses Kavadh's brother Zamasp with Blases, the successor of Peroz.

*Romano-Arab Relations, 441-502*²⁰.

The Arabs, like the Hephthalites, played an important role in Romano-Persian relations. In the 441-2 war, the Arabs had intervened in support of the Persian cause, and there are records of many Arab raids against Rome throughout the fifth century²¹. The threat posed by the German tribes encouraged the Romans both to seek peace on their border with Persia and to create a stable front on the Arab peninsula. To this end, during the fifth century, the Salîhids became guardians of Roman interests on this border as *foederati*. They were ideally placed to protect the commercial interests of the Romans, who were seeking new outlets for trade in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean²². Moreover, as orthodox Christians, the Arabs were more acceptable than the Arian Germans.

With the turn of the century, this long standing arrangement was to shatter, partly because of the general breaking of peace along the eastern frontier of the Roman Empire, but mainly because of the advent and dominance of a new Arab tribe, the Ghassanids²³. As part of an agreement with the Salîhids to settle on Roman *limes*, the Ghassanids agreed to pay tribute and to become orthodox Christian (if not already so). The former condition was to cause problems as was noted by the Arab historian, Ya'qūbī,

And then a disagreement developed between them and the king of the Romans because of the tribute which he used to collect. A man from the Ghassanids by the name of Ğid' struck one of the officials of the king of the Romans with his sword and killed him...²⁴.

Ya'qūbī goes on to describe the ensuing war, and how peace was eventually established on the condition that the Ghassanids could chose one of their own tribe to rule over them. Further evidence concerning the clashes between the Romans and the Arabs in 500 is found

²⁰ See Appendix E, Map 2, for the Arabian peninsula.

²¹ cf. Shahîd (1989), pp.37-8, 55ff.

²² The Germans now dominated the western Mediterranean.

²³ For the dating of the Ghassanids' appearance on the scene, see Kavar (1958)(b), pp.146ff.

²⁴ Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, I.235, quoted by Kavar (1958)(b), p.151.

in the chronicle of Theophanes, who records that Romanus, the *dux* of Palestine, conducted a series of operations against the Arabs who had attacked along the whole frontier, and defeated Jabalah, the Ghassanid chief. The eventual agreement, reached in 502 between the warring sides, was recorded by various other Greek historians²⁵.

But how did what was essentially a local disagreement about tax between two Arab tribes come to attract the attention of the imperial government in Constantinople, and what was its significance for Anastasius' oriental policy as a whole? The Romans had supported the Salihids as protectors of the Arab border and their trade route, but at a time when war was breaking out on the eastern front, they could not afford to turn down the chance of an alliance with a new and powerful tribe²⁶. It is probable that Ya'qūbī exaggerates a little:

And when the king of the Romans saw [the Ghassanids'] prowess and fortitude in war and their resistance to his armies, he did not wish to have them against him...,

yet it is clear that Anastasius recognized the benefits of an alliance with this warlike and dominant tribe, should hostilities with Persia develop.

Such an arrangement was very significant given the general decline of the Arabian frontier by the end of the fifth century and beginning of the sixth, by which time the fortifications of the Diocletian system of defence had been abandoned and many troops had been withdrawn to more threatened borders. Although some *duces*, *limitanei* and imperial soldiers could still be found, regional security was increasingly left to Arab *foederati*, especially along the south-east frontier²⁷. To ensure the efficacy and loyalty of such federates was the prime task of Anastasius on the brink of war with Persia, and he needed little reminder of the consequences of allowing Persia the opportunity to cultivate Arab alliances. Even during his own reign there had been a certain amount of manipulation of Arab allegiance by the Persians. In

²⁵ Eustath. fr.6, Nonnosus *FHG* IV.179, Evag. III.36, Theoph. AM 5990.

²⁶ Sartre (1982), p.159 points out that the 498 incursions of various Arab tribes (which will be discussed later) demonstrate the inefficiency of the Salihids in protecting their ally, Rome, from these violations.

²⁷ For a more detailed account of the policing of the Arab borders by Arab *foederati*, see Parker (1986)(b), pp.149-151. For the decline in frontier security, see Devreesse (1942), pp.270-273 and Capizzi, (1969), pp.177ff.

491/492 it is reported that the Arabs invaded Phoenicia Libanensis, reaching as far as Emesa²⁸. As we shall see later, this was a time when Kavadh was seeking financial assistance, but was refused²⁹. It is highly likely that this Arab incursion of 491/492 was conducted by the Lakhmids on behalf of their patron kingdom, to indicate Persian displeasure, but retain the truce³⁰.

If in want of further salutary examples, Anastasius could look even more recently to 498, when according to Theophanes, there was an invasion by three Arab groups³¹; the first concerned tented Arabs who entered Euphratensis, but were defeated by the Roman commander, Eugenius³². These tented Arabs are described as allies of Persia, under the Lakhmid, al-Numan. It is unlikely that Anastasius in any way directly provoked this incursion; the initiative came from Kavadh, who, recently restored to the Persian throne and anxious to flaunt his authority, demanded money from Anastasius and showed his displeasure at the emperor's refusal with a display of military force from his clients.

Another argument which indicates Persian involvement, centres on religion and the location of the Arab's defeat, Bithrapsa, which has been identified as Sergiopolis (Resafah)³³. Such an attack on this Christian holy place points to the work of a strictly orthodox Zoroastrian king anxious to clear himself from any suspicion of Mazdakism.

Anastasius could therefore see the benefits to the Persians of using Arab allies in attacks against Rome without breaking the 442 truce, and sought to respond by making his own

²⁸ Cyril of Scyth. *Vit. Abrah.* I.

²⁹ Josh. 23.

³⁰ cf. Shahîd (1989), p.120.

³¹ Theoph. AM. 5990, and Evag. III.36. See Shahîd (1989), pp.121 and pp.125-129 for the operations of the other two Arab groups.

³² *PLRE* II.417, Eugenius 5. Shahîd (1989), pp.121ff gives a detailed account of this invasion. See also Greatrex (1998), p.78, with n.20.

³³ The significance of this site will be discussed later, cf. Shahîd (1989), pp.124-125.

alliances with rival Arab tribes.

The Arabs and Anastasius' Financial Policy

There is also evidence to suggest that Anastasius was aware of the benefits of an Arab alliance for his financial policy. The chronicle of Theophanes offers a report on the operations of Romanus, the Roman officer who defeated the Arabs in 498, including the famous recapture of the island of Jotabe³⁴.

During the reign of Leo I, a certain Arab, Amorkesos, deserted from Persian alliance and settled in the province of Arabia, from where he launched raids against his former patrons. He seized the isle of Jotabe, a small island in the Red Sea in the gulf of Aqaba³⁵, and expelling all the Greek tax collectors, he gathered the custom dues himself. Leo did not remonstrate, but in 474 transferred Jotabe to him along with the title of *phylarch*, giving him surveillance over two great commercial routes, the land route from Bostra to Medine and beyond, and the sea route from Clysma to Yemen and the Indian ocean. Leo was not entirely naïve, for, by giving Amorkesos the phylarchate, he was also giving him the responsibility of policing and securing these trade routes.

There had been no change in the situation since Leo's involvement; why the sudden innovation in Roman policy now? The answer must be sought not just in Anastasius' foreign policy but more explicitly in his financial policy. The arrangement of Leo had been somewhat degrading to Rome and full of potential disaster; Amorkesos could easily block Rome's trading route, and already the empire was deprived of an important source of income in the loss of custom dues. Significantly, the year 498 which saw the ending of the Isaurian war, allowing Anastasius free to turn his attention to other matters, also saw the death of

³⁴ Theoph. AM 5990; *PLRE* II.948, Romanus 7. Theophanes noted his role in the successful campaign against Hujr, son of the Kindite Arethas, and Jabalah, son of the Ghassanid Tha'laba. The Kindites went to the aid of the Ghassanids, but were themselves defeated, and Hujr was captured. See further on Romanus, Aigrain (1924), col.1197; he also defeated Hujr's brother, Badicharimos who, in 501, invaded Palestine, Phoenicia and Syria.

³⁵ On the geography of Jotabe, Proc. *B.P.* 1.19.1-7, with Appendix E, Map 2; and for a detailed history, Abel (1938). On Romanus' operations, Theoph. AM 5990, Rubin (1989), pp.388ff and Shahîd (1989), pp.125-127.

Amorkesos. It was thus a convenient time for Anastasius to break off the original treaty.

Evidence for Anastasius' interest in the Arabs as part of his Oriental policy can be found in an edict which survives in fragments from various parts of Oriens and Libya. The version from Qasr al-Hallabat in the province of Arabia contains fragments concerning camels and dromedaries (associated with Arabs of the frontier forces). Another fragment refers to an Arab phylarch in the province, indicative of the rise of many new phylarchates under Anastasius. Significantly for our discussion on foreign economic policy, other fragments decree that the *dux* of Mesopotamia be financed from the revenues of the province's *commercarius*, and the *dux* of Palestine be financed from the *commercarius* of Clysma. This would have greatly increased the incentive of the *duces* and *commercarii* to safeguard trading routes and police the borders more diligently against smuggling³⁶.

*Foreign Economic Policy and the Axumite Kingdom*³⁷.

There are further signs of Anastasius' concern with the maintenance of a commercial route to the Far East which avoided Persian control. In the fourth century, commercial traffic between India and Toprobane (Sri Lanka), and Constantinople was safeguarded at the southern approach to the Red Sea by alliances with the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum and the kingdom of Himyar. A trading route independent of Persia allowed Rome to avoid a Persian monopoly of the trade route which would inevitably lead to restrictions on trading posts, the loss of custom taxes to Persia, and inflated prices. The Axumites shared the desire to avoid Persian constraints and this may account for the conversion of the Axumite kingdom to Christianity, a move designed to foster harmonious relations³⁸.

However, there is evidence from the fourth century of serious threats to the trade route. One

³⁶ For discussion on this edict, see Parker (1986)(b), pp.30ff and Shahîd (1989), pp.131-133, with notes 1-8 for relevant bibliography. The latter examines the different versions and dates the edict to pre 498.

³⁷ See again, Appendix E, Map 2.

³⁸ In turn, this common interest of Rome and Axum may have sparked off the persecution of Christians in the kingdom of Himyar by the Jewish king, Dū-Nuwās, who tried to establish an independent state between Persia and Rome, causing concern to both.

such menace was the raiding of the Blemmys which made the route unsafe and demonstrated the weakening power of the Axumites who were supposed to keep such assaults under control. The strong adherence of the Himyarites to Judaism created another problem³⁹. It has been argued convincingly that two punitive expeditions of the Axumites against the Himyarites took place during the reign of Anastasius⁴⁰. If this dating is correct, this is another indication of Anastasius' successful directing of foreign and economic policies; the temporary triumph of the Axumites reasserting their authority over the Himyarites brought ease and security to the trade routes again⁴¹.

From this brief survey of the Axumites, one can see the sheer breadth of Anastasius' complex foreign and economic policy. It seems that he saw not only the benefits of cultivating the Arab tribes, but also the advantages of resurrecting the power of the Axumites to serve the empire's interests, in both military and economic spheres.

The Foedus of 502.

We now return to the *foedus* of 502, described thus by Eustathius:

Ἐπεκώμασαν οὐκ εἰς τὸ συνοῖσον σφίσι κατὰ τῆς Ῥωμαικῆς ἐπικρατείας καὶ οἱ Σκηνῖται βάρβαροι, τὰ τε τῆς μέσης τῶν ποταμῶν τὰ τε τῆς Φοινίκης ἑκατέρας καὶ τὰ Παλαιστίνων ληισάμενοι πράγματα. Οἵπερ κακῶς παρὰ τῶν ἑκασταχοῦ στρατηγούντων παθόντες, ὕστερον τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἤγαγον, πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πασσυδεὶ σπεισάμενοι⁴².

It has been argued convincingly that the truce included both the Kindites and the Ghassanids, the new Arab *foederati*. The evidence for the inclusion of the latter and their importance as

³⁹ Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 846, Mal. 433-434, Theoph. AM 6035 on the retaliatory expedition of the Ethiopians against the Himyarites for their slaughter of Roman merchants.

⁴⁰ It is unnecessary to reiterate this well argued proposition, cf. Rubin (1989), pp.389ff and Blockley (1992), p.88.

⁴¹ Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that M'adīkarib Y'afur, installed by the Axumites as king of Himyar instead of Dū-Nuwās, led an expedition in the interests of Rome against the invading force of al-Mundir III; cf. Rubin (1989), pp.399-400.

⁴² Eustath. fr.4.

perceived by Anastasius for relations with Persia, can be found in an Arab source: the Ghassanids emerged victorious over the Salihids and,

this happened during a period of hostilities between Rome and Persia, and the king of the Romans feared lest they should join hands with Persia against him, and so he wrote to them and tried to draw them to his side. Their chief at that time was Tha'laba Ibn 'Amr....And the two parties entered into an agreement...⁴³.

The agreement was one of mutual assistance; the Romans would provide forty thousand troops in times of need, and the Ghassanids, twenty thousand⁴⁴.

The argument for the Ghassanids' inclusion in the 502 treaty is substantiated by a statement from the chronicle of Joshua the Stylite who wrote concerning July 503, that,

the Arabs of the Greek territory also, who are called the Tha'labites went to Hira (the capital) of al-Numan and found a caravan which was going up to him...they fell upon them and destroyed them and took the camels...⁴⁵.

If these Tha'labites who attacked the pro-Persian Arabs can be identified with the Ghassanids, this incident is an indication of the success of Anastasius' Oriental policy: the Ghassanids become Roman allies, they make a treaty promising mutual assistance, and now they help the Romans during the war against Persia by attacking pro-Persian Arabs. Tha'laba was the grandfather of Jabalah who took part in the military operations preceding the 502 *foedus*. The Romans made the truce with Tha'laba, the old chief of the tribe, as they did with Arethas, the old Kindite chief, whose sons Hujr and Madikarib, had been involved with

⁴³ Ibn Khaldūn (quoting Ibn-al-Kalbī), II.279-280, quoted by Kawar (1958)(a), pp.238-239. Shahīd (1995), pp.3-8 also uses the account of Theophanes to argue his case for the inclusion of the Ghassanids in the 502 *foedus*.

⁴⁴ In another account of the *foedus* found in the text of Ibn Habīb (a fuller version of the Hishām al-Kalbī history), Anastasius proposed the agreement of mutual assistance, "on condition that you will not interfere between us and Persia". This seems to indicate the neutrality of the Arabs and it is possible that Anastasius was only concerned to ensure the impartiality of the Arabs before he embarked on a war with Persia. However, future developments, with the Tha'labites attacking Hira and a certain al-Aswad fighting with Areobindus against the Sassanians, surely belie the truth of this statement; either this account of the *foedus* is incorrect, or participation on the battlefield was a later arrangement. For the text of Ibn Habīb, see I. Lichtenstädter, Hyderabad 1942, pp.371-372, quoted by Shahīd (1995), pp.8-9.

⁴⁵ Josh. 57, quoted by Shahīd (1995), p.13.

the fighting⁴⁶.

The Arabs and Christianity.

The Ghassanids converted to Christianity as part of their deal to settle on the *limes*, and it is assumed that the Kindites converted with the signing of the 502 treaty, if they were not already Christian⁴⁷. It is likely that both the Ghassanids and Kindites were Chalcedonian, as Anastasius himself was not yet openly monophysite, but the Ghassanids certainly changed affiliation later, as they came under the influence of the powerful and persuasive Severus and Philoxenus. Conversely, the Kindites, in Palestina Prima probably stayed Chalcedonian under the sway of Elias, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and St. Sabas⁴⁸. It is clear, though, that Anastasius sought to deepen ties with his Arab federates, using religious affiliation. The Ghassanid phylarch was invited to attend the consecration of the church of Sts. Sergius, Bacchus and Leontius, in Bostra, the capital of the province of Arabia. The significance of the patron saint of the cathedral should not be overlooked; Bacchus was also the patron saint of the Ghassanids. The phylarch was also present at Severus' consecration as patriarch of Antioch, probably at the invitation of Philoxenus. Attendance at such events was a diplomatic gesture designed to impress and increase cultural and ecclesiastical ties⁴⁹.

Thus, these allies were being gradually assimilated into the religion and culture of the Roman empire to increase their loyalty. Yet Anastasius' diplomatic efforts did not stop there. Attempts were also made, again by Philoxenus and Severus, to convert the Lakhmids of Hira to monophysite Christianity.

⁴⁶ There is no point in reiterating the detailed argument of Kawar (1958)(a), pp.251-255 who refutes Rothstein (1899), pp.90-92, who believed the Tha'labites were the Kindites. See also Olinder (1927), pp.52-53 and Greatrex (1998), p.99.

⁴⁷ On the Ghassanids, see Ya'qūbī, *Historiae*, I.205; cf Shahîd (1995), p.694, and on the Kindites, Shahîd (1995), pp.696-697. For the spread of Christianity and the erection of Christian churches in Arabia, before and during the reign of Anastasius, see Aigrain (1924), *passim* and Capizzi (1969), pp.185-187.

⁴⁸ On the different doctrinal positions concurrently held in the east during Anastasius' reign, see chapter four, *Anastasius and the East: the deposition of Euphemius*.

⁴⁹ cf. Shahîd (1995), pp.697-699.

There survives a letter from Philoxenus (himself a Persian) to Abū Ya'fur, the *stratelates* of the Lakhmids after al-Numan, in reply to a letter from Abū Ya'fur himself. If the latter was a Christian, it is possible that, outraged by the severe monophysite persecution in Persia by the Nestorians, he wrote to Philoxenus for help. The bishop did not delay in taking the opportunity to exhort Abū Ya'fur and the Lakhmids (allies of the Persians) to monophysitism. Such a blatant attempt to win over Persian allies did not escape the notice of the Persian king, and al-Mundir III was hastily installed at Hira⁵⁰. This perhaps partly explains the incursion of al-Mundir into the Holy Land⁵¹. The monophysites were not to be so easily defeated though, and in 513, Severus attempted to convert al-Mundir himself. It is not clear whether the Lakhmid chief was a Nestorian at the time⁵², but as a vassal of the Persian king, he was not to be induced to monophysitism⁵³.

It is, therefore, clear that religious affiliation could be used as a powerful diplomatic weapon. Further evidence of Anastasius' use of ecclesiastical conversion as a part of his foreign policy, can be seen in the monophysite mission to South Arabia, the farthest limit of monophysite activity. Key monophysite areas were Himyar, Hadramawt, and especially, Najrān where Philoxenus consecrated two bishops. The Arabs of Najrān were closely related to the Ghassanids and this may have contributed to their enthusiasm for the monophysite cause⁵⁴.

*The Arabs and the Persian Wars*⁵⁵.

In the run-up to the Persian war (and continuing thereafter), it seems clear that Anastasius pursued a carefully thought-out policy towards the Arabs to ensure the safety of the peripheral

⁵⁰ See the detailed argument of Shahîd (1995), pp.702ff.

⁵¹ This will be discussed in context later.

⁵² It is possible that he converted to Chalcedonianism for a short time under the influence of his orthodox wife, Hind. For more on al-Mundir and his religious persuasion, see Aigrain (1924), cols.1225-1226.

⁵³ cf. Shahîd (1995), pp.706-709.

⁵⁴ Shahîd (1995), pp.709-711.

⁵⁵ See Appendix E, Maps 1 and 3 for the eastern frontier and the main sites of action during Anastasius' Persian war.

provinces of his empire. He abandoned the ineffectual Salîhids, scored a military victory over and made a treaty with dominant tribes, the Ghassanid and Kindites, a key factor of which was the promise of mutual assistance in times of war, and finally sought to bind his new allies closer with cultural and religious ties⁵⁶.

Given that Anastasius took such great care to secure this alliance with the Ghassanids and Kindites, it would be useful here to give a brief overview of the role of the Arabs in the Persian war, before pursuing a chronological analysis of the conflict⁵⁷. Reports show that the pro-Persian allies played a greater role than their pro-Roman counterparts⁵⁸. This seems largely due to the activities of al-Numan, the Lakhmid king, who can be traced helping at the siege of Amida and plundering the region of Harrân as far as Edessa where he took eighteen thousand, five hundred captives⁵⁹, until his death in 503, from a head wound received at the battle of Opdana (Khābūr), near Circesium⁶⁰. Just before he died he urged Kavadh to continue with the attack against Edessa itself⁶¹. Persian Arabs can also be found attacking Aborras and Saruj and attending the siege of Edessa. One of the boldest Arab attacks came from the new Lakhmid king, al-Mundir, who attacked Arabia and Palestine, reaching Palestina Prima⁶². The invasion was probably aimed at the Ghassanids who had settled in Arabia and possibly Palestina Tertia, and could be seen as an expression of anti-Christianism against the Holy Land (his father al-Numan had attacked Sergiopolis). Furthermore, there was the certainty of fine treasures from ecclesiastical foundations. Al-Mundir was able to penetrate

⁵⁶ For the 502 *foedus* as a milestone in Roman-Arab relations and in connection with the Persians, see Kavar, (1958)(a), p.250.

⁵⁷ For a list of the occasions of Arab participation in the Romano-Persian war with discussion, see Shahîd (1995), pp.13-17.

⁵⁸ Josh. passim.

⁵⁹ cf. Greatrex (1998), p.88.

⁶⁰ Josh. 51-52,57.

⁶¹ A full discussion of Numan's role can be found in Aigrain (1924), cols.1224-1226 and Devreesse (1945), pp.253ff.

⁶² For a discussion on the dating, see Shahîd (1995), pp. 26-28, and on the success of this venture, see Greatrex (1998), p.107, with n.97.

as far as he did, since the *duces* of Arabia and Palestine were away fighting in Mesopotamia and Osrhoenē. It is perhaps surprising that the *Life* of St. Sabas does not give any details about Arab attacks on monasteries, but when in Constantinople, Sabas did ask Anastasius for a *κᾶστρον* to protect his monasteries against the Saracen incursions⁶³.

The expedition of the Tha'labites (Ghassanids) to Hira, the base of the Lakhmids, was recounted above. Another example of pro-Roman Arab action takes place just before the treaty of 505 when Arab *foederati* took part in the general raids of the army camped at Amida, and also in the plundering of Persian territory⁶⁴. The phylarch, al-Aswad, also played a significant role in fighting for Areobindus in the north of the Diocese of Oriens⁶⁵.

After the end of the Persian war, Joshua explains that the Roman and Persian Arabs who continued to plunder enemy territory were put to death by their own commanders⁶⁶. Joshua is probably referring to non-federate Arabs (as *foederati* should know better), who saw the peace as no reason to give up their lucrative raids. As Joshua himself wrote,

to the Arabs on both sides this war was a source of much profit, and they wrought their will upon both kingdoms⁶⁷.

The severe action of the governments on both sides demonstrated their strong desire for peace. After this and the signing of the 506 treaty, the Arabs remained quiet, even after 513, the official end of Anastasius' seven year truce.

The Persian War 502-506

We turn now to the war between Rome and Persia and begin with an assessment of the causes. The initiative seems to have been on the side of Kavadh, who in 491 applied to Zeno

⁶³ Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LI.

⁶⁴ Josh. 79.

⁶⁵ Theoph. AM 5997, with Shahîd (1995), pp.20-21 for discussion on al-Aswad as a Kindite.

⁶⁶ Josh. 88f.

⁶⁷ Josh. 79.

for financial assistance. Before the embassy could reach Constantinople however, Zeno died and Kavadh ordered his ambassadors to return immediately to Anastasius, not with the usual diplomatic acknowledgements of congratulations to the new ruler and assurances of continued peace, but with a renewed demand for money under the threat of war. Anastasius refused, indicating that he had better uses for the money and following Zeno's precedent, cited the refusal of the Persians to return Nisibis⁶⁸. A year or two later, taking advantage of Anastasius' involvement in the Isaurian war, Kavadh tried again. This time Anastasius went so far as to offer a loan on receipt of a written acknowledgement⁶⁹. At this point, Kavadh had no opportunity to go to war, as he was preoccupied with unrest among the Persarmenians and internal problems within Persia, caused by his own affiliation to Mazdakism.

The Greek sources record that another demand for money was made in 498 after the restoration of Kavadh⁷⁰. It is reasonable to suppose that he turned to Anastasius because of the huge debt he owed the Hephthalites⁷¹. The old maxim, "divide and rule" was behind Anastasius' refusal; it was sound policy to foster bad relations between the Persians and Huns, two potential enemies. However, as Joshua mentions no demand in 498, it is possible that the Greek sources have confused this demand with earlier attempts in order to explain more easily the invasion in 502⁷². John the Lydian, as previously mentioned, erroneously blames the upkeep of the Caspian Gates for the break down of Roman-Persian relations. While his account is obviously confused, it is possible that there were negotiations concerning the

⁶⁸ Josh. 20.

⁶⁹ Bury (1923), II.10, with n.5 and Stein (1949), II.93 see the offer of this loan as offensive, cf. Blockley (1992), p.89, who believes it was a means by which Anastasius could extricate himself from any treaty obligation.

⁷⁰ Proc. *B.P.* I.7.1-2, Theod. Lect. 552, Theoph. AM 5996.

⁷¹ That Kavadh needed money specifically for the Hephthalites (rather than as a payment for the upkeep of the Caspian Gates), seems to substantiate the earlier argument that pecuniary assistance could be demanded from time to time on the strength of the treaty which promised mutual help. Kavadh probably applied for money in 491, not for any specific cause, but just to take advantage of any weakness caused by change of emperor.

⁷² Josh. 25 vouches for the authenticity of his account:

...some of [these narratives] I found in old books; others I learned from meeting with men who had acted as ambassadors to both monarchs; and others from those who were present at these occurrences.

Caspian Gates at this time. Procopius records that Kavadh later claimed that he had offered to sell the fort at the pass to Anastasius who had refused⁷³. This offer is confusing in itself as, at another point, the fort is offered to Anastasius by the Hun Ambazouces⁷⁴. Apparently, Kavadh regained control of the fort after the Hun's offer, so either the king's offer was made at a later date, or he offered something clearly not in his possession.

Whatever the finer details, it is possible that the offer to hand over the Caspian fort to Anastasius is confused with the earlier rumour concerning the joint upkeep of security there, thus in turn confusing John the Lydian⁷⁵. As for Anastasius' policy here, while it could be argued that he had let slip the opportunity to control the strategically placed fort, there were sound reasons for refusing the offer⁷⁶. On one hand, the location made it very difficult to support a garrison of soldiers there, while on the other, it was sound policy to encourage (rather than impede) the Hunnic raids into Persian territory⁷⁷.

Whether or not a demand for financial aid was made in 498, Kavadh was determined to lead an invasion into Roman territory. It is very likely that after his dethronement and imprisonment, he now wished to prove himself a competent and successful warrior against the traditional Persian enemy, and therefore establish his position more securely. He was plagued by internal problems, including the revolts of the Tamuraye and Kadiseni⁷⁸,

⁷³ Proc. *B.P.* I.16.4.

⁷⁴ Proc. *B.P.* I.10.9-11.

⁷⁵ This view seems more plausible contra Rubin (1986)(a), pp.40ff and (1986)(b), pp.677ff, who believes that an agreement about shared defence of the Caspian Gates was made in 363 and represents Rome's actions throughout the fifth century as trying to extricate herself from the unwelcome position of owing money to Persia. He sees Anastasius' offer of a loan as an advance payment for the Caspian Gates subsidy. Rubin also depicts the Roman government in a dilemma; with defences dilapidated they could not afford to risk war by not paying, yet it was demeaning to be seen as a tribute-paying state.

⁷⁶ For further discussion, Isaac (1992), pp.230-231.

⁷⁷ Eg. the Hunnic attack on Persia just before the outbreak of war; cf. Zach. of Myt. VII.3.

⁷⁸ Josh. 24.

difficulties with the Armenians⁷⁹, and famine (499). Kavadh, studying the situation in Constantinople from his position in Persia and piecing together what he knew of the problems of the Byzantine treasury during the reigns of Leo and Zeno, could be forgiven for thinking that Anastasius refused his requests for economic aid because of his own financial problems, and would be willing to pay subsidies to prevent an expensive war. He did not know that, during the first decade of his reign, Anastasius had taken extensive measures to restore the diminishing treasury⁸⁰, and was in a position not to be bullied by aggressive Persian threats. It is clear that Anastasius did not irresponsibly seek war with Persia; only a few years earlier he had denied help to the Armenians in a situation which would have led to direct conflict with Persia, but he would not yield to what amounted to blackmail⁸¹. There is a clear consensus in the sources that Anastasius was legally justified in refusing to make the payments⁸².

Kavadh was, however, more accurate in his assessment of the strength, or lack of it, of Roman defences. Eastern forces and garrisons were somewhat depleted and defensive structures had fallen into disrepair. Moreover, at the outset of the war, the Persians enjoyed the support of the Hephthalites, the powerful Lakhmids and the Jews⁸³.

The First Phase of the War - 502-503.

Kavadh opened his campaign in August 502 by marching into Roman Armenia. Theodosiopolis swiftly changed hands through the alleged treachery of its governor, Constantinus, who defected to the Persian cause, taking up a military command. As an important border fortress, Theodosiopolis was the obvious first target for Kavadh, particularly

⁷⁹ After his restoration to the throne, Kavadh offered freedom of worship to the Armenians provided that they supported him against the Romans, which they reluctantly agreed to. On Armenia, see Grousset (1947), p.231 and Merten (1906), p.160.

⁸⁰ cf. chapter five outlining financial policy.

⁸¹ On the Armenians, Stein (1949), II.93.

⁸² Proc. *B.P.* I.7.3, Theoph. AM 5996, Eustath. fr.6, Mich. Syr. IX.7.

⁸³ The Jews, as will be mentioned later, allegedly conspired at Constantia to admit the Persians; cf. Widengren (1961), p.144.

as its defences were inadequate and dilapidated and there were few Roman troops⁸⁴. There is some dispute in the sources as to whether Constantinus betrayed the city and fought for the Persians, before returning to the Romans in 504, or whether he was taken prisoner and died in Persia⁸⁵. There is little to recommend one version in favour of the other. The argument of treachery could have been invented as an explanation of why the city fell so easily in comparison to Amida⁸⁶, but one needs to explain the identity of the Constantinus referred to by Joshua in chapters 48, 55 and 74. It is likely that the Greek sources did not wish to record the treachery of a Roman officer, or they confused him with Olympius, *dux* of Constantia, who was detained as a prisoner and died on Persian territory⁸⁷.

As to the fate of the city, Joshua reports that

Kavadh consequently plundered the city, and destroyed and burned it, while Zachariah of Mytilene said that he treated the inhabitants kindly. Procopius records the rebuilding of the city by Anastasius, which might appear to substantiate Joshua's claim, yet it is clear that the city was in great need of repair well before the arrival of Kavadh⁸⁸. Again it is difficult to know which account to support; the main purpose of the campaign, as will be seen, was to gather resources in the form of plunder, so looting the city rather than completely destroying it, would be sufficient. On the other hand, complete destruction of the first city in the campaign might encourage the obedience of other cities in the path of the invading army.

Whichever ploy was used at Theodosiopolis, Kavadh marched swiftly on to Martyropolis, the main city of Sophanene, which surrendered shortly after being attacked. The satrap,

⁸⁴ See Greatrex (1998), p.79 with n.25, on Constantinus and the civilian nature of the *comes Armeniae*, and Whitby (1986)(a), *passim*, on the state of the defences.

⁸⁵ Josh. 48, Theoph. AM 5996; contra Mal. 398.

⁸⁶ This, however, could be explained by the time lapse before Kavadh reached Amida, which allowed a little more opportunity for preparation.

⁸⁷ For the latter view, see *PLRE* II.313-314, Constantinus 14, and II.804, Olympius 14.

⁸⁸ Josh. 48, contra Zach. of Myt. VII.3; Proc. *de Aed.* III.3-4, *B.P.* I.10.18-19.

Theodorus, offered him the public taxes of the previous two years and according to an oriental source, a gold cup. Kavadh was pleased to accept this offer of money and was magnanimous enough to spare the city and its environs, particularly as Sophanene was now Persian⁸⁹.

By October, Kavadh was at the gates of Amida. The defences of the town were hardly enough to deter the Persians from immediate success, yet the fortitude of the inhabitants forced a three month delay on Kavadh, not to mention significant losses and damage to Persian morale. The siege which eventually ended in triumph for the Persians and a brutal massacre of Amidans forms the focal point of many historians' accounts of the whole war⁹⁰. As much detailed study has already been done on the course of the siege of Amida, it will suffice to give a brief summary of events emphasising the significant factors⁹¹.

Amida, as the prosperous capital city of Roman Mesopotamia, was another obvious target for Kavadh, and it is a reflection on the Persian king's continuing need for plunder that he prepared to besiege the city in unfavourable climatic conditions⁹². Again, although the Amidans were forewarned of the imminent assault, they hardly had time to repair their defences, nor summon any Roman troops; any defence would have to come from the civilian inhabitants themselves, and Kavadh could be forgiven in thinking that the efforts of his own troops would be vastly superior to the amateur attempts of the citizens.

On the contrary, the sources are full of the ingenious devices of the defenders against the battering rams, and offensive mounds of the Persians. They undermined and set fire to the

⁸⁹ Those who argue that Theodosiopolis was spared because Martyropolis was, should note that there is no record of the former offering money to the Persian king. For the benefits of the route between the two cities for plunder, see Greatrex (1998), pp.80-81. On the poor state of defences at Martyropolis, see Adontz (1970) pp.113-114. On Martyropolis generally, see Merten (1906), p.163 and Greatrex (1998), p.81 with n.31 for the relevant sources.

⁹⁰ Josh. 53ff, Zach. VII.3, Proc. *B.P.* I.7, Evag. III.37, *Chronicon ad 1234* L-LI. Merten (1906), pp.141ff has a detailed discussion on the various versions.

⁹¹ Eg. Merten (1906), pp.164-174 and Greatrex (1998), pp.83-94.

⁹² Proc. *B.P.* I.7.3. on the harsh winter conditions.

first mound, and destroyed the second with a "scorpion"⁹³. After this last setback, Kavadh prepared to depart, though, hoping not to leave empty handed after three months, he asked the governor of Mesopotamia for a payment. In response, the Amidans demanded that he should recompense them for the damage caused to their territory.

Some sources attribute the fall of Amida to the hubris of the Amidans in demanding money from Kavadh, and to the indecent actions of female prostitutes on the walls towards the Persian king, particularly as Kavadh himself claimed to have seen a vision of Christ promising the fall of the city. However, it is more likely that the city fell through more mundane and practical reasons. One of the Persian commanders tracing an Amidan entering and leaving the city discovered a passage into Amida. It was unlucky for the Amidans that the monks of the monastery of St. John the Urtian guarding the tower at the end of the passage were asleep, after a religious feast, and were easily overpowered⁹⁴. Again there were allegations of treachery, especially as the archimandrite of the monastery was Persian⁹⁵.

The complete capture of the city the next morning was no easy task for the Persians, even with a foothold in the city already. There was fierce fighting before the city finally fell⁹⁶. The fate of the city, suitably harsh after such prolonged resistance, is again indicative of Kavadh's need for funds⁹⁷. He thoroughly looted the town, particularly ecclesiastical foundations, and the leaders who had rejected his demand for payment were punished. Kavadh finally departed, giving orders for most of the remaining population to be taken to Persia and installing a garrison of three thousand under the command of Glon.

⁹³ A "scorpion" was a machine designed to hurl huge rocks; cf. Greatrex (1998), p.89, n.48.

⁹⁴ Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 814. See Dilleman (1962) pp.313-314 for the identity of the monks.

⁹⁵ Josh. 53, Marc. C. 502, Theoph. AM 5996. The *Narrationes Variiae* xvii-xviii, has a long passage concerning the sins of the inhabitants and the fall of Amida.

⁹⁶ Kavadh stood at the base of the city walls and ordered all Persian deserters to be cut down.

⁹⁷ On the numbers killed, see Zach. VII.4, Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 814, and Elias of Nisibis 814. See Christensen (1944), pp.341-342, for a justification of Kavadh's actions.

The successful outcome of the siege of Amida perhaps then justified the three month delay and the suffering inflicted on the Persian army. Moreover, this was not the only military operation of the winter months⁹⁸. The Persian king sent out various contingents on plundering expeditions. Among these units were the Hephthalites, the Lakhmids who successfully ravaged the regions around Carrhae and Edessa where walls were hastily repaired against them, and a mixed group of Persians, Huns and Arabs who headed for Constantia. The Persians of this latter group were attacked by the *duces* Eugenius and Olympius, but the Romans, despoiling the Persian dead, delayed in mobilizing a second time and were defeated⁹⁹. However, Eugenius marching back to Theodosiopolis was able to easily overcome the garrison left by Kavadh and retake the city for the Romans¹⁰⁰.

Anastasius' Response - 503.

So far we have focused on the course of the war from Kavadh's point of view; we now turn to Anastasius' reaction. On receiving the tidings of the invasion, Anastasius immediately sent an ambassador, Rufinus, to offer money and peace terms¹⁰¹. Kavadh was in no mood to

⁹⁸ There is some evidence in the *Annals* of Eutychius 132, concerning a Persian attack on Alexandria during the Amidan siege:

Kobades Persarum rex [urbem] Amedum aggressus ipsam vastavit, missoque Alexandriam exercitu magno quidquid extra urbem fuit incendit. Multaque et gravia praelia, pugnaeque frequentes, inter Kobadis regis Persarum et Anastasii Romanorum imperatoris comites acciderunt.

Such an expedition is highly unlikely, both because of geographical reasons and because there is no mention of it in any other source, Byzantine or Egyptian. It is probable that Eutychius confused Egyptian Alexandria with Alexandretta near the Issus. Later when the Romans were investing Amida, they took provisions from this Alexandretta, so it is likely the Persians did too, and this is what has confused Eutychius. For this argument, see Jarry (1966), *passim*, followed by Blockley (1992), p.90; cf Capizzi (1969), p.181, with n.357.

⁹⁹ For more details, see Merten (1906), pp.175-176 and Greatrex (1998), pp.87-89. See *PLRE* II.417, Eugenius 6.

¹⁰⁰ There is some dispute over the identity of this Theodosiopolis. Stein (1949), II.94, Capizzi (1969), pp.181-182 and Martindale in *PLRE* II.417 all agree that Eugenius retook Armenian Theodosiopolis, the capture of which was described by Josh. 47; contra Greatrex (1998), p.89, n.47, who believes Mesopotamian Theodosiopolis is meant here, though there is no evidence in the major sources on the Persian war for the capture of the latter.

¹⁰¹ It is interesting to speculate on when Anastasius might have heard about Kavadh's proposed invasion. As the latter had first to assemble his forces, one might think that news would filter through, but it seems that Rufinus was only to offer money if Kavadh had not yet begun his invasion, implying that there was little leeway. See further Lee (1993), p.115, Stein (1949), II.194 and Merten (1906), p.164.

have the beginning of his campaign interrupted and detained Rufinus until the fall of Amida, after which he sent him back to Anastasius, the bearer of unwelcome tidings.

As for the sending of an army to the province so lacking in defences and defenders, Anastasius reacted swiftly by initially despatching some troops to garrison various cities over the winter months. This move prevented any more surprise take-overs of cities, and left him time to raise a much larger army for the beginning of the summer, when campaigning would begin in earnest¹⁰². The size of the army is disputed, varying from fifteen thousand to fifty-two thousand¹⁰³. Marcellinus' figure of fifteen thousand seems far too small in the light of Procopius' statement that this was the largest force ever assembled; later he refers to an army of thirty thousand in the 540s¹⁰⁴. It has been calculated that the quantities of wheat for the Roman army referred to by Joshua would feed an army of between thirty-two thousand, five hundred and forty thousand for six months, a figure much closer to Joshua's own claim¹⁰⁵. Anastasius appointed as generals, Areobindus, the *magister militum per Orientem* and the two *magistri militum praesentales*, Patricius and Hypatius, the emperor's young nephew. Subordinate officers included Justin (the future emperor), Patriciolus and his son, the future rebel, Vitalian, Romanus and the Lazian Pharesmanes¹⁰⁶. The prefect Apion was also despatched, to be stationed at Edessa in charge of provisions for the army¹⁰⁷.

In the light of suspected disagreements between Areobindus, Patricius and Hypatius, Anastasius has often been criticised both for splitting the command and for his choice of generals. Looking to his recent success in the Isaurian war, however, Anastasius could argue

¹⁰² According to Procopius *B.P.* I.8.1, Anastasius only sent a force when he heard that Amida was under siege. Joshua's account (54) of a more gradual deployment is the much more likely scenario.

¹⁰³ Marc. C. 503, fifteen thousand, contra Joshua 54, fifty-two thousand (forty thousand with Hypatius and Patricius, and twelve thousand with Areobindus).

¹⁰⁴ Proc. *B.P.* II.24.16.

¹⁰⁵ Josh. 54; cf. Jones (1964), pp.231-232, Howard-Johnston (1995), p.166.

¹⁰⁶ Proc. *B.P.* I.8.1-3, Zach. of Myt. VII.4, John Lydus III.53 and Theoph. AM 5997.

¹⁰⁷ On Apion, see Stein (1949), II.95, Capizzi (1969), p.182 and *PLRE* II.111, Apion 2.

the benefits of a joint command which had resulted in a victory. As to the individuals, in theory, they were of impeccable character and background. Areobindus was the great-grandson of Aspar, and through marriage to Anicia Juliana, was the son-in-law of the western emperor, Olybrius, and indeed, it appears that his integrity and actions during the war were often distorted to show him in an unfavourable light. After all, not only did Anastasius bestow upon him the title of honorary consul in 506, but the Constantinopolitan mob called upon him to become emperor in 512, in place of Anastasius; it seems unlikely that they would have favoured a disgraced general in such a way¹⁰⁸.

Patricius too was an obvious choice¹⁰⁹. He had been a consul in 500, and despite the reverses of the Roman army under his command, he was not recalled to Constantinople with Hypatius. He was described as

*vir senex aequus ac fidelis, verumtamen ingenio parum acuto*¹¹⁰.

That he was still trusted after the war by Anastasius is evident from the important missions delegated to him; in 512 he was sent with Celer to pacify the crowds during the Trishagion riots, and in 514 he was sent as an envoy to Vitalian.

It is perhaps the appointment of his nephew, Hypatius, which has been most criticised¹¹¹. However, again Anastasius would have had his reasons: Hypatius had been consul in 500 with Patricius and there is some evidence that he had military experience from fighting against the Isaurians¹¹². As the war went against the Romans, Anastasius perhaps thought it prudent to recall Hypatius to avoid any accusations of favouritism, but clearly thought him sufficiently qualified to appoint against Vitalian at a later date. Furthermore, such a selection of high-standing and even imperially connected generals was designed to intimidate the Persians,

¹⁰⁸ *PLRE* II.143-144, Areobindus 1.

¹⁰⁹ *PLRE* II.840-842, Patricius 4.

¹¹⁰ *Zach. of Myt.* VII.4.

¹¹¹ *PLRE* II.577-581, Hypatius 6.

¹¹² *Mich. Syr.* IX.11. There is also a suggestion that he might have taken part in skirmishes against the Bulgars in the 490's; cf. *Prisc. Pan.* 299-300, with Cameron (1974), pp.313-315.

and Hypatius, as a close relative, could be seen as a direct representative of the emperor on the battlefield.

The campaign, which opened in May 503, began successfully for the Romans with several victories for Areobindus near Nisibis to which he laid seige¹¹³. The Persians, however, quickly gained the upper hand with the help of the Hephthalites and Arabs, led by the deserter Constantinus, and Areobindus withdrew. He sent for help from Patricius and Hypatius who were engaged in besieging the Persians in Amida. They, it is claimed by Theophanes, refused to send support out of jealousy¹¹⁴. Such an analysis is, however, most probably a distortion of events, coloured by later developments. By the time Areobindus' summons for assistance reached them, the siege towers were prepared for the climax of the investment and it is hardly surprising that they would be reluctant to leave Amida. As Joshua wrote,

But when they had finished building the towers at a great expense,...then they found out what had happened on the frontier, and they burned the towers and departed thence, and went after the Persians, but did not overtake them¹¹⁵.

The failure of Patricius and Hypatius to reach Areobindus in time, forcing him to abandon his camp at Apadna and flee to Constantia and Edessa, caused bad feeling between the generals, which Theophanes misplaces in his account. It was only natural that Areobindus was annoyed at the loss of his camp, while Patricius and Hypatius were frustrated at having to abandon their siege.

Ironically, the absence of Hypatius and Patricius had some positive benefits for the progress of the siege. The Persians grew careless, making expeditions into the countryside for plunder; on one occasion, the Persian commander Glon was ambushed by Pharesmanes and captured.

¹¹³ According to Zach. of Myt. VII.4, Areobindus attacked Amida first with Patricius and Hypatius before his action on Persian territory; cf. Greatrex (1998), p.97, n.71. The initial success of the Areobindus with only twelve thousand troops against the twenty thousand strong Persian force belies the critical accounts of his generalship.

¹¹⁴ Eg. Theoph. AM 5997.

¹¹⁵ Josh. 56. The account of the contemporary Joshua is more reliable and plausible than the ninth-century Theophanes.

He was later executed by the Roman generals when the garrison refused to come to terms¹¹⁶.

Meanwhile, Kavadh decided to advance westwards from Nisibis, but he found the three generals blocking his route: Areobindus barred the road to Constantia and Edessa, while Patricius and Hypatius obstructed his path to Amida¹¹⁷. Again though, the three did not co-ordinate their movements well and while the latter two remained in place, Areobindus retreated to Constantia. In the ensuing battle between Patricius and Hypatius and the Persians, it seems that the Romans were initially successful in killing an advance party of Hephthalites, but lack of caution thereafter brought defeat upon them¹¹⁸. Following the skirmish with the Huns, they relaxed, preparing lunch and bathing in a stream. Thus, off their guard, they were surprised by the Persians and defeated. By August, the Roman army had withdrawn across the Euphrates to Samosata.

The retreat of Areobindus and the defeat of the *magistri militum praesentales* has often been seen as a prime example of their incompetence. The former is depicted as inept, and fond of dancing and music, while Patricius and Hypatius are seen as cowardly and inexperienced¹¹⁹. However, it is possible to see Areobindus' withdrawal as prudent, given that he still had only twelve thousand troops and as Procopius writes, Kavadh was marching against him, "παντὶ τῷ στρατῷ¹²⁰." As for the fate of the other two, it seems only reasonable that after the success against the advance party of Huns, the army should rest, particularly, as Procopius notes, since it was lunchtime. As the soldiers were "distressed by the heat" and fresh from battle, it was natural too that they should want to bathe. The ensuing disaster appears to be more due to bad luck than incompetence on the part of the

¹¹⁶ See the slightly different accounts of the same incident by Zach. of Myt. VII.5, Proc. *B.P.* I.9.5-19 and Josh. 56, and the discussion by Merten (1906), pp.149ff and Greatrex (1998), pp.98-99.

¹¹⁷ Proc. *B.P.* I.8.10.

¹¹⁸ See Merten (1906), pp.179-180 for discussion of the different sources on this episode.

¹¹⁹ John Lydus, *de mag.* III.53.

¹²⁰ Proc. *B.P.* I.8.11.

generals.

As Areobindus now moved from Constantia and installed himself at Edessa, Kavadh determined to invest this city, believed to be holy. Procopius relates the story of the letter from Jesus promising the prince of Edessa, Abgar, recovery from gout and eternal freedom for the city¹²¹. The Lakhmid king had already tried to persuade Kavadh to attack Edessa, shortly before his death, which, according to Joshua, resulted from this blasphemy¹²². The Persian army arrived at Edessa at the beginning of September 503, after Kavadh, for various reasons, had decided to bypass Constantia which lay on his route¹²³. He settled down to besiege Edessa, but after a short time initiated negotiations. Areobindus, suspecting treachery, was very wary of setting up a meeting with the Persian embassy either inside or outside the city¹²⁴. Eventually he met with the envoy, Bawi, who demanded for the Persians ten thousand pounds of gold and an additional sum of gold every year, thus another example of Kavadh's aim of financial gain throughout the expedition. Areobindus refused and offered a one-off payment of seven thousand pounds of gold¹²⁵.

At the break down of negotiations, Kavadh turned his attention to the surrounding area, despatching contingents of Persians and Hephthalites to Carrhae, and Lakhmids to Batnae. Both ventures were unsuccessful: the leader of the Huns was captured by the garrison at Carrhae, and the Arabs, after initial success, were defeated by forces under Patriciolus and Vitalian¹²⁶. As the Roman army regrouped at Samosata, Kavadh decided to make a renewed effort against Edessa, but withdrew hurriedly at a minor sortie of a few Edessans.

¹²¹ Proc. *B.P.* II.12.26.

¹²² Josh. 58, with Segal (1970), p.112.

¹²³ The Romans had a narrow escape, for the Jews had plotted to betray the city. The conspiracy was discovered just in time and the Jews were put to death, cf. Josh. 58. For discussion, see Merten (1906), pp.180ff, and Greatrex (1998), pp.101-103.

¹²⁴ Josh. 59.

¹²⁵ Greatrex (1998), p.104 points out that the terms offered by Kavadh and refused by Areobindus were "remarkably similar" to those accepted by Justinian less than thirty years later.

¹²⁶ cf. Greatrex (1998), pp.104f.

His demand for hostages, the return of prisoners of war, and seven thousand pounds of gold, was met with an offer of the *comes* Basil, as a hostage, fourteen Persian captives, and two thousand pounds of gold to be paid after twelve days¹²⁷. Kavadh agreed, but the next day, he demanded the money immediately.

Such arbitration shows Areobindus as hardly incompetent. On the approach of the Persians, he organised the destruction of buildings lying outside the city walls and brought the holy relics into the city; he was shrewd in his suspicion of Persian treachery before the talks with Bawi; and he managed to reduce the Persian demands for gold. After Kavadh's last request for immediate payment, Areobindus claimed back the hostage Basil and accused the king,

Now we know that you are no king; for he is not a king who says a word and goes back (from it) and deceives. And if he deceives, he is no king.

Further assaults on the city were unsuccessful, and so Kavadh departed, going south to the Euphrates and to Lower Mesopotamia¹²⁸.

Thus, Kavadh had not been particularly successful; the capture of Amida was his one major achievement. Despite his superior forces, he had been unable to force Areobindus into open battle and failed, both by diplomacy and by force, to benefit from the vast riches of Edessa¹²⁹. Although in this first year, the Roman generals had failed to take the initiative, they had certainly halted Kavadh's advances, and some progress had been made. Offensive forays into Persian territory had been conducted by Areobindus and Patricius. They certainly do not deserve the criticism of Procopius¹³⁰, and this account should demonstrate that Anastasius should be blamed neither for splitting the command nor his choice of generals.

¹²⁷ Josh. 61; for a discussion on hostage-taking, see Lee (1991), p.371.

¹²⁸ See Greatrex (1998), p.106, with n.93 on Kavadh's defeat and the vindication of Christ's promise to Edessa. His retreat south to Lower Mesopotamia took him past Batnae, which surrendered, and Callinicum, which he unsuccessfully attacked, cf. Josh. 61-65.

¹²⁹ cf. Capizzi (1969), pp.182-183, who sees Kavadh as returning in triumph to Persia with two thousand pounds of gold; but this is nothing compared to his original demand.

¹³⁰ Proc. *B.P.* I.8.20.

Anastasius' Response - 504-505.

The operations of the second year when Hypatius was replaced by Celer, the *magister officiorum* with supreme authority, have often been presented as advantageous to the Romans in comparison to the previous year. Again the Roman command was split and a three-pronged campaign was mounted¹³¹. Celer invaded Arzanene, Areobindus made inroads into Persarmenia and Patricius continued to besiege Amida. The army benefitted from the substantial reinforcements sent by Anastasius with Celer, and they were encouraged by the worsening conditions for the besieged Persian garrison at Amida¹³². The inhabitants of the frontier provinces were similarly heartened by Anastasius' cancellation of the taxes in Mesopotamia and Osrhoenes¹³³.

Even before the opening of the campaigning season, Patricius destroyed a market set up outside Amida, killing the merchants and, after retreating to the Nymphius (a tributary of the Tigris), defeated a force of Persians sent by Kavadh¹³⁴. Patricius then settled down to besiege Amida while the main army under Celer was stationed at Resaina (Mesopotamian Theodosiopolis). Kavadh tried to send another force to prise away the besieging army, but was unsuccessful, his path blocked by Celer¹³⁵. The Persian king himself could not press the issue, as he had left the scene to deal with an invasion of the Sabir Huns in the Caucasus¹³⁶. At the same time, Celer ordered the *dux* Timostratus to capture the livestock

¹³¹ Bury (1923), II.13 commented "the evils of a divided command had been realized," although the command was again split. That there was no sensationalism over the recall of Hypatius can be inferred from Joshua (70), who does not even mention the episode. Moreover, it seems certain that his version in which Apion is sent to Alexandria to organise supplies there, should be favoured over Theophanes' account (AM 5998), in which both Apion and Hypatius were recalled. Proc. *B.P.* I.9.1 wrongly states that Areobindus was recalled. On Celer, see *PLRE* II.275ff, no.2 and Greatrex (1998), p.108.

¹³² Josh. 64 on Celer's reinforcements, and 76 on the famine at Amida. See also Proc. *B.P.* I.9.1-3.

¹³³ Josh. 66 on the edict of 25th December 503, with Segal (1970), p.121.

¹³⁴ Josh. 66. For details of Patricius' retreat from Amida and subsequent victory at the Nymphius, see Greatrex (1998), pp.109-110, with n.102.

¹³⁵ See Greatrex (1998), p.110 for a more detailed discussion.

¹³⁶ For a summary of the argument over which type of Huns was involved (Hephthalite, or Sabir), see Greatrex (1998), p.110, n.104. On the Sabir Huns, see Howarth (1892), pp.613-616.

of the Persian army at Nisibis, before joining Patricius at Amida¹³⁷.

Here the Romans enjoyed some success in tunnelling under both the outer and inner city walls, but the joyful cry of an Armenian women, "the Greeks are entering the city" alerted the Persians, who forced back the attackers¹³⁸. Thwarted again, Celer left Patricius to maintain the siege, while he turned his attentions to other operations. Areobindus led an incursion into Persarmenia, not only causing much damage, but also encouraging the desertion of one Armenian chief, with his army, from Persia to Rome¹³⁹. Again, Nisibis almost fell to the Romans who defeated part of the Persian garrison¹⁴⁰. During the winter of 504-505, Celer himself led an expedition into Persian territory, plundering and killing all males over the age of twelve¹⁴¹. As a complement to this military action, Anastasius gave further encouragement to the towns of Mesopotamia with the cancellation of taxes for another year.

However, by now the Romans were suffering the same hardships of besieging a city during winter that the Persians had undergone the previous year. They were therefore not averse to negotiations for peace with Kavadh. As for the Persian king, there were several reasons why he was desirous of ending the war he had initiated. The main object of his offensive had been financial gain; he had nothing to gain now his advantage had been lost and Persia was being successfully plundered by the Romans. Moreover, occupied as he was with the invasion of the Sabir Huns, he could not give his full attention to the Romans. These reasons, coupled with the realization that the garrison in Amida could not hold out much longer (and negotiation would bear more fruit than surrender), induced Kavadh to send the Persian *spahbadh* to return Roman hostages and propose peace, on the condition of the safety of the Amida garrison. Celer and the Romans cunningly outwitted the *spahbadh* over the matter of

¹³⁷ *PLRE* II.1119-1120, Timostratus.

¹³⁸ Josh. 71.

¹³⁹ Josh. 75.

¹⁴⁰ Josh. 75 and Theoph. AM 5998; cf. Greatrex (1998), p.113, with n.113.

¹⁴¹ Josh. 79, Marc. C. 504, Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 816, Theoph. AM 5998.

provisions for the garrison, but Celer could not rally the Roman troops, and was forced to agree to the terms and the surrender of Amida for a large sum of money¹⁴².

The End of the War.

The truce was eventually concluded in November 506¹⁴³. The actual terms of the agreement are not clear. John the Lydian refers to moderate payments offered by Anastasius; it is clear that these are one-off payments. There is no evidence for annual subsidies and as the Romans were in a stronger position during the peace talks than the Persians, it is unlikely Anastasius would have agreed to any regular payments¹⁴⁴. The settlement made was designed to keep Kavadh quiet while Anastasius continued improving fortifications along the frontier.

The war now over, Anastasius continued to look after the welfare and reward the loyalty of the war-torn frontier provinces. Before the signing of the truce, he again cancelled taxes throughout Mesopotamia and sent Urbicius, the former *praepositus sacri cubiculi*, to Amida and Edessa, to distribute largesse¹⁴⁵. Even after the treaty had been ratified, he instructed Celer and Calliopius to carry out a review of the economic situation in the east¹⁴⁶.

They decided that the whole tax should be remitted to the district of Amida, and half of it to that of Edessa...

Celer himself gave the governor of Edessa a sum of money to distribute in presents to the

¹⁴² Zach. of Myt. VII.5 - 1100 pounds of gold; Proc. *B.P.* I.9.4 - 1000 pounds; Theoph. AM 5998 - 3 (or 30) talents; Marc. C. 503 records "inmenso dehinc auri pondere..." Josh. 81 mentions gifts rather than a sum of gold. See Greatrex (1998), pp.114-115 for a detailed discussion of the negotiations.

¹⁴³ See Josh. 97, with Merten (1906), p.196, for suspicions of treachery during the negotiations and Greatrex (1998), p.117.

¹⁴⁴ Greatrex (1998), pp.117-118, contra Stein (1949), II.99ff, Blockley (1985), p.68, and Capizzi (1969), p.184.

¹⁴⁵ These payments were partly in acknowledgement of the bad behaviour of the soldiers, particularly the Goths, billeted in the cities. The stationing of Celer's army at Edessa from April to September, 506, while the general waited for a successor for Bawi who had died, also caused much suffering and complaints. See Josh. 92 and Zach. of Myt. VII.5 for the remission of tax, and Josh. 93-96 on the behaviour of the soldiers. For further details, see Segal (1970), pp.160-162 and Greatrex (1998), pp.115-116.

¹⁴⁶ On Calliopius, see *PLRE* II.252, no.5. He had been the successor of Apion as *hyparch* at Edessa in charge of provisions. See further, Mathison (1986), p.49 and especially, Croke (1984), pp.83ff.

citizens¹⁴⁷.

*Anastasius' Eastern Defensive Building Programme*¹⁴⁸.

A simple survey of Anastasius' contribution to frontier defence improvements is much more difficult than it might seem, for several reasons. Much of the evidence comes from the *De Aedificiis* in which Procopius is seeking to emphasise the achievements of Justinian; it is probable that consequently he exaggerates and embellishes the latter's achievements at the expense of those of Anastasius. It is, however, impossible to know to what extent Anastasius suffers by comparison. Archaeological evidence for many sites is unclear; there are no surviving sixth-century imperial building inscriptions, and no particular development of technique, making it very hard to distinguish one phase from another.

It is possible though, with care, to construct an outline of Anastasius' work on these defences¹⁴⁹. Anastasius turned his attention to those cities which had fallen at the outset of the war; for example, Theodosiopolis was strengthened and provided with new walls, thirty feet in height¹⁵⁰. General improvements to the fortifications were made at Citharizon and Melitene¹⁵¹, and the walls at Europus were upgraded¹⁵². It is uncertain if there was any repair work carried out at Amida; it may be that none was necessary as the walls had successfully withstood the sieges of both Persians and Romans. Entry into Amida was gained through secret passages rather than by the destruction of the walls¹⁵³.

¹⁴⁷ Josh. 99-100.

¹⁴⁸ See Appendix E, Map 3.

¹⁴⁹ cf. Croke and Crow (1983) contra Whitby (1984), (1986)(a) and (1986)(b).

¹⁵⁰ Proc. *de Aed.* III.4.1-9, though he plays down the importance of Anastasius' contribution.

¹⁵¹ Proc. *de Aed.* III.4.19, with Howard-Johnston (1989), pp.218-219.

¹⁵² Josh. 91, with Capizzi (1969), p.214.

¹⁵³ It is thought that Anastasius was responsible for providing the necessary funding to enable the bishop, John, to construct the Church of the Forty Martyrs at Amida in 512; cf. Capizzi (1969), pp.215-216.

South of the Tur Abdin, at sites such as Batnae, BIRTHA¹⁵⁴, and Edessa, Anastasius encouraged local initiative in repairing or constructing fortifications backed by imperial funds. Eulogius, the governor of Edessa, was entrusted with the rebuilding of the wall of the fortress at Batnae, as well as with reconstruction of Edessa, for which Anastasius gave him two hundred pounds of gold. In these situations, responsibility often passed to the bishop. Twenty pounds were also allocated to the bishop for the repair of the city wall and other expenses¹⁵⁵.

Dara

The major deficiency of the Roman defensive system though, apart from the dilapidated state of individual forts, was the absence of a strong base on the border from which to launch attacks into Persian territory. Since the capture of Nisibis in 363, Roman defence of Mesopotamia had to be based at Amida, sixty miles behind the frontier and at Constantia, similarly far from any line of action and rather small and weak¹⁵⁶. Without doubt the most well-known item in the programme of building and fortification is that of Dara, the fort designed to fill the gap in the Roman line of defence¹⁵⁷.

It was towards the end of the war that the Roman generals complained to Anastasius that it was almost impossible to wage war along the frontier against the secure Persian base of Nisibis, when they had no base of their own to attack from, or retreat to. The sites of

¹⁵⁴ Anastasius gave "a considerable sum of money" to the bishop of BIRTHA, Sergius, for the erection of a defensive wall; Josh. 91.

¹⁵⁵ On Batnae, Josh. 89, and on Edessa, Josh. 87, with Capizzi (1969), pp.224-225.

¹⁵⁶ The frontier fortress of Circesium on the Euphrates was abandoned as a strategic defensive centre, when the *legio quarta Parthica* was transferred to Beroe and Callinicum, which became the seat of the *dux* of Osrhoene.

¹⁵⁷ On Dara, Evag. III.37 following Mal., Proc. and an unknown source. Evagrius' account is close to that of Zachariah's VII.6. It has been suggested that they were both using similar local traditions from Amida, which being close to Dara, was probably used as the head-quarters for building operations. See further, Allen (1981), p.157 and Ensslin (1927), *passim*. For the entry by Marcellinus Comes, see Croke (1984) and (1995), p.121. Details are also found in the *Chron Pasch.* 498, Niceph. Cal. XVI.37, and the chronography of Bar Hebraeus, *The Legend of the Building of Dara*. For modern scholarship on Dara, see Croke and Crow (1983) and Whitby (1986)(b).

Ammudis and Dara were examined for their suitability, and the latter was selected because of its good water supply and naturally defensive position (on three hills).

Zachariah of Mytilene gives a very precise account of the organisation of the funding of the new city:

And the king [Anastasius] gave gold to Thomas the bishop [of Amida] as the price of the village [the site of Dara] which belonged to the church; and he bought it for the treasury. And he liberated all the serfs who were in it, and granted to each of them his land and his house...¹⁵⁸.

Such generosity to previous inhabitants would secure their loyalty, imperative at such an important border post. Moreover, to ensure that the fortifications were secured as quickly as possible before Kavadh's attention was freed from the Huns, Anastasius made sure that the workers were always paid well and on time. This guaranteed a large and eager work force which performed diligently, and as Zachariah records,

Consequently, many [of these craftsmen] grew rich and wealthy....from the east to the west workmen and craftsmen flocked together. And the overseers [clergymen from Aleppo] who were over the work also received a liberal allowance and their wallets were filled¹⁵⁹.

The Persians were generally too occupied with the Huns to do much more than issue verbal protests, although skirmishing parties were sent out from Nisibis. To counter this, the Romans moved a unit under Pharesmanes to Amida from Edessa to offer protection to the workers. It is said that the city took two to three years to build, and comprised of not only strong defences, but also public baths, cisterns, storehouses, porticoes, and statues of Anastasius¹⁶⁰. Dara grew in importance, becoming the seat of the *dux* of Mesopotamia and

¹⁵⁸ Zach. of Myt. VII.6, quoted by Mundell (1975), p.219.

¹⁵⁹ Zach. of Myt. VII.6 quoted by Mundell (1975), p.223.

¹⁶⁰ The Roman *hyparch* Calliopius was placed in charge of the building work. It is claimed by Marcellinus Comes 518 that he even traced out the perimeter of the city with a hoe, in the traditional manner.

was renamed "Anastasiopolis"¹⁶¹.

Anastasius did not neglect the spiritual needs of the new city, which was given the status of a metropolis, and was a monophysite stronghold until 519. Initially, Dara came under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Amida and the bishop Thomas was involved in the planning of the city. The emperor gave Thomas "several hundred pounds of gold" and later to the presbyter of Dara, Eutychian, "he gave holy vessels and gold for the building of the Great Church"¹⁶². From the account of Procopius, we know that there were two churches at Dara, St. Bartholomew's and the Great Church. He, however, claims that it was Justinian who was responsible for their building:

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱερὰ πεποιήται δύο, τὴν τε μεγάλην ἐκκλησίαν καλουμένην καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἀποστόλου βαρθολομαίου νεών¹⁶³.

However, as discussed above, Procopius' account is to some extent unreliable. In support of an Anastasian date for the churches, evidence from Theodore Lector can be cited, who reports that Anastasius sent the relics of St. Bartholomew from Cyprus to Dara¹⁶⁴.

In her article on Dara, Mundell draws attention to a funerary relief depicting Ezekiel carved on the façade of a tomb cut into the quarries to the west of the Dara. The carving of the archivolt of the tomb is very similar to that on the north gate of the city walls and the tetraconch at Resafa, a city which also benefitted from imperial funding at the beginning of the sixth century. Mundell also points out that as the cycle of Ezekiel was often seen as foreshadowing the General Resurrection, it would make sense if the funerary relief belonged to the period of Dara's foundation, around the time of the anticipated Second Coming. Mundell relates this image to the aniconic mosaic at the Jacobite monastery of Qartmin; if the relief at Dara was specifically monophysite, then this demonstrates further Anastasius'

¹⁶¹ Marc. C. 518 claimed that Dara retained its old name; see the discussion in Capizzi (1969), p.217, Croke (1984), pp.84-85, and Palmer (1990)(a), p.149.

¹⁶² Zach. of Myt. VII.6, quoted by Mundell (1975), p.219.

¹⁶³ Proc. *de Aed.* I.3.26.

¹⁶⁴ Theod. Lect. 558, Niceph. Call. XVI.37.

influence in the doctrinal outlook of the whole city¹⁶⁵.

The fortification of Dara is one of Anastasius' major achievements for several reasons. Firstly, because while he had previously rebuilt fairly substantial forts, the development of Dara from a small settlement into the centre of Roman eastern defence was entirely his own creation, however much altered by Justinian later. Secondly, it represented the eastern part of Anastasius' policy, as in the Balkans, of creating a defensive system close to Rome's frontier. Thirdly, unlike the other repair work which was defensive in nature, this fort was also constructed as an offensive base. It placed further pressure on the Persians by forcing them to maintain two armies, one to cover the Caspian Gates against the destructive Hunnic invasions, and the other to cover Dara¹⁶⁶.

Resafa (Sergiopolis/Anastasiopolis).

As we have seen from the building of Dara, Anastasius did not neglect cultural or religious aspects in his endeavour to improve fortifications on the eastern front. At Sergiopolis, the walls show more than one phase of construction, and it is certain that Anastasius was responsible for the two main churches of central plan, devoted to the cult of St. Sergius¹⁶⁷. Significantly, developments here can be related to the emergence of the site as a pilgrimage shrine and the growing religious interest of the Ghassanids in the cult; this cannot be a coincidence and Anastasius' attention to detail in matters of culture and diplomacy was to prove of great benefit to him with the Arabs' continued loyalty. As further propaganda, the emperor renamed the city, "Anastasiopolis"¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁵ Mundell (1975), pp.225, 227. The Qartmin monastery will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five.

¹⁶⁶ See Blockley (1985), pp.69ff.

¹⁶⁷ Butler (1969), pp.81-82 argues against the evidence of the Arab writer Ibn Butlân that it was Anastasius who was responsible for the churches. He refers to the text of Procopius, who states that Anastasius was responsible for large buildings in the Euphratensis in the early sixth century; the historian would have almost certainly have ascribed them to the reign of Justinian, if there was any doubt.

¹⁶⁸ For more on Sergiopolis, see Whitby (1986)(a), p.724.

Conclusions.

It only remains now, to draw together the various strands of Romano-Arab relations and the Romano-Persian war to form a full picture of Anastasius' foreign policy in the eastern frontier of his empire. Firstly, through the *foedus* of 502 Anastasius provided himself with a useful alliance with two increasingly important tribes, the Ghassanids and Kindites, which would counter the Persian use of their Lakhmid allies, as well as generally protecting Rome's Arab border. Thus diplomatic tactics were used to save Roman manpower and the treasury. In particular, Anastasius used the spread of monophysitism to deepen cultural ties with his new *foederati*. Pursuing the economic theme, and related to the Arabs, was the freeing of Jotabe from Arab control, thus improving Rome's commercial routes and relieving Roman merchants of heavy custom dues. As for the war with Persia, Anastasius tried to avert it, "that blood might not be shed on both sides¹⁶⁹," but was strong enough not to give in to threats from Kavadh. His direction of the war, especially for the first year, has often been criticised, but as has been shown by careful examination of events, it is clear that the opening of the Roman campaign was not as disastrous as often portrayed, nor the generals as incompetent. The second year was positively successful, with Kavadh forced to sue for peace. Anastasius was able to secure peace with relatively little loss to his treasury, and was able to take the opportunity of Kavadh's distraction to begin repairing and restoring the damaged frontier defences. Anastasius was a shrewd enough financier to see that well defended towns would be less vulnerable to attack and plunder, and was worth the initial outlay in improving fortifications. He realized the importance of the support and loyalty of the threatened provincials, hence the tax remittances¹⁷⁰.

Further Aspects of Eastern Policy.

From 506 to 518, Anastasius' reign was remarkably free from trouble on the eastern front. An uprising of the Tzani in 506, who invaded Pontus, was swiftly dealt with¹⁷¹. In 513, there was another uprising, this time in Roman Armenia, which had to be suppressed, and the

¹⁶⁹ Josh. 50.

¹⁷⁰ See Capizzi (1969), p.187 for a positive view of Anastasius' eastern policy.

¹⁷¹ Theod. Lect. 466; Howard-Johnston (1989), pp.217-218 on the Romanisation of the Tzani.

Mazices attacked Libya, pillaging Cyreneia¹⁷². Perhaps the most serious trouble was the incursion into Cappadocia by the Sabir Huns who poured in through the Caspian Gates. Anastasius again responded by remitting taxes for three years and strengthening fortifications¹⁷³.

It has been claimed that Anastasius left the eastern part of the Roman Empire in better condition, economically and militarily, than it had been since the beginning of the reign of Theodosius II¹⁷⁴. Diplomacy, alliances with the Arabs, a firm line with Persia, careful attention to the treasury and a new fortification and building programme ensured the relative security and prosperity of the eastern provinces and *limes* to the end of his reign.

¹⁷² On Roman Armenia, *Chronicon ad 724*, Mich. Syr. IX.11; on the Mazices, John of Ant. *exc. de virt.* fr.216. See Stein (1949), II.105 and Howard-Johnston (1986), p.218.

¹⁷³ Marc. C. 515, Mal. 406, John of Ant. fr.214e.15, Cedr. 633; Capizzi (1969), pp.209-210.

¹⁷⁴ Blockley (1992), p.94.

Part Two: Western Foreign Policy.

In the latter part of the fifth century, the western half of the Roman Empire was not the central focus of imperial attention. Anastasius mounted the throne after a succession of emperors who had turned away from the west and concentrated their energy on the problems which beset the east: namely, religious strife, relations with the Persians and internal coups. After Leo I's spectacularly disastrous endeavour to recover Africa, there was no money in the treasury and little inclination for any more experiments in this direction, until Justinian, ambitious to restore the classical borders of the old Roman Empire and relying on a full treasury carefully accumulated by Anastasius, was able to make the attempt.

Yet it would be wrong to ignore the west in an examination of Anastasius' foreign policy. It was during his reign that the ambiguous position of Theoderic was settled, and firm relations were established with the Franks and Burgundians. Anastasius also had to contend with complications in the Balkans. He is famous for his work on the Long Wall, but he made a substantial contribution as well to defences along the Danube, and in Scythia and Moesia II, which are often attributed to the general building programme of Justinian described in Procopius' *de Aedificiis*. Our task must be to re-examine the archaeological evidence for these sites, and to offer a reconsideration of Anastasius' notable involvement in affairs to the west of his capital.

Zeno and Odoacer.

It was in 497 that, in exchange for a promise to ensure the pope's acquiescence to the Henoticon, Festus returned to Rome from Constantinople with the news that Anastasius had finally agreed to recognise Theoderic's status in Italy and to restore the *ornamenta palatii*¹. This was the third attempt of Theoderic to clarify his status in Italy. Much has been written about the nature of his position constitutionally², but this subject is of prime significance

¹ cf. chapter four, *Relations with Rome: Anastasius II*.

² This includes general works on the period, for example, Bury (1923), I.453-469 and Stein (1949), II.116-119, plus specific studies on Theoderic, Gaudenzi (1888), pp.21-38, Hodgkin (1891), pp.131ff, Brion (1935), pp.227ff, Ensslin (1947), pp.78-83, Jones (1962) and Moorhead (1992), pp.35-50.

when considering Anastasius' outlook towards the western parts of his empire. How much in terms of power and authority, in theory or in practice, did Anastasius cede to the Ostrogoth and was there any choice left to him at this stage? What were the subsequent relations between king and emperor? In order to create a full picture of these events, it is necessary to consider in tandem, both the position of Odoacer in Italy and Zeno's terms for Theoderic's conquest of Italy.

In 474 AD, Julius Nepos, the nominee of the emperor Leo I, was proclaimed emperor at Rome³. Almost within a year, however, he had fled to Dalmatia, as the *magister militum* and patrician, Orestes, advanced on Ravenna and had his son crowned emperor⁴. Like his predecessor's, Orestes' sovereignty lasted barely a year, ending abruptly with a mutiny of the German soldiers, caused by his refusal to grant them land and permanent settlements in Italy. He was slain by one of his chief officers, the Scirian Odoacer, who entered Ravenna and had himself proclaimed king by the Goths⁵.

But Odoacer was not king of Italy and, indeed, he seemed to harbour no ambitions to rule Italy independently. Italy remained under the sovereignty of the eastern emperor and was governed by Odoacer, king of the Goths, but *magister militum* to the Romans. He returned the *ornamenta palatii*, the imperial insignia, to Constantinople as they were no longer required in Rome⁶.

At the same time, however, envoys from Nepos arrived in Constantinople asking for sympathy and aid to restore Nepos to his throne. This put Zeno in something of a dilemma; for while he was legally obliged to support Nepos, given the instability of the east he could not afford

³ Julius Nepos (*PLRE* II.777-778, no.3) was chosen by Leo to depose Glycerius (*PLRE* II.54), who ruled Italy briefly (473-494) after the murder of Anthemius by the Burgundian, Gundobad.

⁴ On Orestes, *PLRE* II.811-812, no.2, with the relevant sources.

⁵ Orestes' son, Romulus, was forced to abdicate, but his life was spared; cf. Anon. Val. 38. On Odoacer, *PLRE* II.791-793.

⁶ It is worth pointing out that Odoacer had the support of the Roman senate; cf Bertolini (1929), p.465 and (1941), pp.25ff and Chastagnol (1966), pp.24ff.

to send an army large and powerful enough to defeat the well-trained Germanic warriors of Odoacer. Thus, Zeno compromised and left the matter vague. He instructed the senate to take back Nepos, and while he praised Odoacer and conferred on him the patriciate, he urged him to acknowledge Nepos. Naturally Odoacer did not do so⁷.

Nepos was murdered in May 480, and even with his removal from the scene, relations between Zeno and Odoacer did not improve. The emperor suspected Odoacer's involvement in the revolt of Illus, while Odoacer, encouraged by the Ostrogoths, prepared an expedition into the Balkans. A counter assault of the Rugians against Italy instigated by Zeno was intercepted and the Rugians defeated⁸.

Zeno and Theoderic.

It was at this point that Zeno hit upon the ideal solution⁹. Odoacer should no longer rule in Italy; his place should be taken by Theoderic, the leader of the Ostrogoths. For a long time, Zeno had faced the menacing presence of the Ostrogoths on his northern frontier; to send them to Italy would kill two birds with one stone. According to the Anonymous Valesianus, an agreement was reached whereby,

si victus fuisset Odoacar, pro merito laborum suorum loco eius, dum adveniret,
tantum praeregnaret¹⁰.

Theoderic, son of Theodemir, had succeeded his father as king of the Ostrogoths in 471, having spent much of his early life in Constantinople as a hostage for his father's good

⁷ For Odoacer's constitutional position, see Bertolini (1941), chapt.2; Jones (1962), pp.126-127, and Thompson (1982), pp.65-71.

⁸ Bury (1923), I.410-411.

⁹ See esp. Lot (1939), pp.135ff and (1966), pp.239ff.

¹⁰ Anon. Val. 49. Bury (1923), I.422, believes that Zeno reserved all the imperial rights of sovereignty. The agreement is very vague, however, and perhaps deliberately so. Until Theoderic had proved successful, there was little point in trying to thrash out terms.

behaviour¹¹. In 475, he led his people from Pannonia to Lower Moesia. The next six years witnessed various shifting relationships and alliances between this Theoderic, Theoderic Strabo (son of Triarius) and Zeno¹², but even after the death of Theoderic Strabo in 481, stormy relations continued between Theoderic (son of Theodemir) and the emperor. Although appointed *magister militum* in 483 and consul in 484, Theoderic could still be found devastating Thrace in 486 and marching on Constantinople in 487. But after another rapprochement with Zeno, in 488 he set out from Moesia at the head of about one hundred thousand followers, bound for Italy¹³.

Before Theoderic could pit his strength against that of the Goths in Italy, a preliminary obstacle had to be surmounted. The town of Sirmium, located on his direct route to Italy, was held by the Gepids who opposed the migration to Italy. Eventually, Sirmium was captured by the Goths and they continued on their way, although behind them, the Gepids regained possession of the town¹⁴.

Meanwhile, the Ostrogoths pressed on and by August 489 were ready to commence their offensive against Odoacer. Again, the events of this war have been chronicled fully by others, and there is no need to recapitulate the details here¹⁵. Suffice to say that Odoacer's initial lines of defence were quickly penetrated in two decisive battles. As Odoacer fled to Ravenna to endure a two year siege, Theoderic struggled to consolidate his hold on north Italy and bring the rest of Italy over to him. The commander, Tufa, who surrendered to Theoderic, subsequently rebelled against him, while Gundobad sent an army to devastate north Italy and

¹¹ For the early life of Theoderic, see Hodgkin (1891), chapt.3, Brion (1935), chapt.2-4, Ensslin (1947), chapt.1, Claude (1980), pp.143ff, and Moorhead (1992), pp.12-17.

¹² A brief sample of the vast amount of secondary literature covering this includes, Bury (1923), I.411-422, Ensslin (1947), chapt.2, Stein (1949), II.10-15, Wolfram (1988), pp.278ff, Heather (1991), pp.240-308 and Moorhead (1992), pp.15-17.

¹³ A detailed account of Theoderic's journey to Italy can be found in Stein (1949), II.54-58 and Heather (1991), chapt.9.

¹⁴ This episode is significant for later events.

¹⁵ See eg. Bury (1923), I.422-428, Bertolini (1941), pp.37f, Ensslin (1947), pp.62-78, Capizzi (1969), p.159 and Moorhead (1992), pp.17-30. On Odoacer's flight, see, Ennod. *Pan.* p.271, lines 8ff and the Anon. Val. 50.

the Vandals took advantage of the war to reclaim Sicily¹⁶. Despite a strict blockade, Odoacer managed to hold out until the beginning of February 493, when it was agreed in negotiations conducted by the two bishops of Ravenna, that Theoderic and Odoacer should rule Italy jointly¹⁷.

Such an agreement is rather strange under the circumstances. Theoderic's arrangement with Zeno had made no provision for any joint rule; one of the main reasons for sending Theoderic was to get rid of Odoacer. A concentration of the forces of two of the most powerful Germanic leaders in the western half of the empire would surely have appeared as rather a threat to the east. It seems, however, that Theoderic had no intention of sharing his rule, for on March 15th he slew Odoacer himself¹⁸. Odoacer's son was exiled to Gaul, but subsequently executed, his wife was starved to death, his brother was murdered, probably on the same day, and his soldiers were killed.

Theoderic now took up the reins of government and immediately began to organise the settlement of his own people on the land. Yet the nature of his status was always left unclear, and the following section seeks to offer a reconstruction and discussion on his ambiguous position in Italy.

Theoderic's Constitutional Position.

a) The Embassies

In 490, after the initial defeats of Odoacer, Theoderic sent an embassy to Constantinople, led by a certain Flavius Rufus Postumius Festus, the *caput senati*¹⁹. It is recorded that the Goth sent the envoy to Zeno,

¹⁶ Theoderic was generally supported by the Italian people who massacred Odoacer's garrisons in their towns.

¹⁷ See Gaudenzi (1888), pp.21-22 on the sources for this "agreement" of Theoderic with Odoacer.

¹⁸ On the charge that Odoacer had been conspiring against him; Proc. *B.G.* V.1.25, Anon. Val. 54-56, Jord. *Get.* 293-294.

¹⁹ *PLRE* II.467-469, no.5. A record of the embassy can be found in the Anon. Val. 53, with Mathisen (1986), p.44.

ab eodem sperans vestem se induere regiam.

Unfortunately, Zeno died while the embassy was in the eastern capital, and as the agreement between the emperor and chief seems to have been of a private nature, there was little obligation or indeed incentive for a new emperor to uphold such an arrangement. The stipulation of Theoderic's rule, "until Zeno should come", was now null and void²⁰. Even if this had not been the case, Anastasius would have had little reason to concern himself with Festus and the other Roman legates. He would have been justified in thinking that Theoderic was showing presumptuous haste in asking for recognition in Italy (only to be granted after the defeat of Odoacer) while Odoacer was still at large (albeit besieged in Ravenna) and his supporters, including the Burgundians, still very much undefeated. Moreover, Anastasius had other matters to deal with. Much closer to home, the Isaurian crisis posed a far greater risk.

For a variety of reasons then, Festus returned empty-handed to Rome. Theoderic was not to be daunted though, and after defeating Odoacer, he sent another embassy to Anastasius, this time headed by Flavius Anicius Probus Faustus Niger, another eminent senator²¹. There is no proof, but on the evidence of subsequent negotiations (in 497), it is possible that Anastasius offered recognition of Theoderic's status, if the pope could be persuaded to accept the Henoticon, thus healing the east-west schism²². Rejected on this score, there seems to have been, nevertheless, some degree of reconciliation; Anastasius permitted Theoderic to nominate one of the two consuls²³.

There were no further extensions of privileges until a second embassy led by Festus was despatched from Italy in 496. In the January of 497, in return for the senator's promise to persuade the pope to subscribe to the Henoticon, Theoderic received his long-awaited

²⁰ cf. Hodgkin (1891), p.133.

²¹ *PLRE* II.454-456, no.9; cf. Stein (1949), II.113, and Bertolini (1941), pp.39-40 who stresses the role of the senate in these negotiations.

²² See my chapter on the religious policy of Anastasius. A discussion on Theoderic, his relations with the popes, and role in the ecclesiastical crisis will follow later.

²³ For a discussion of the terms of this concession, see Bury (1923), I.453 with n.2, Stein (1949), II.111ff and Capizzi (1969), p.163.

recognition, as is recorded;

facta pace cum Anastasio imperatore per Festum de praesumptione regni, et omnia ornamenta palatii, quae Odoacer Constantinopolim transmiserat, remittit²⁴.

However, three fundamental questions remain to be answered. What was the constitutional position of Theoderic? What status did Theoderic actually want? Finally and most importantly, what was Anastasius' interpretation of Theoderic's position and why did he choose to recognise Theoderic? All sources are rather vague on the constitutional position, and the authority, in theory or in practice, of Theoderic. It is of course possible that Anastasius left the arrangement deliberately vague to disguise the underlying dilemma. For as was once said,

To abandon the Roman claim to Italy was unthinkable. But to reconquer it was impossible²⁵.

Discussion of Theoderic's position divides conveniently into three categories: contemporary material, both textual and epigraphic; the actions and ambitions of Theoderic (do they betray imperial, regnal or magistral control?); and the outlook of Anastasius (what power did the eastern emperor believe he had conferred on the Ostrogoth?).

b) *The Evidence*

i) *Primary Evidence: Textual Sources.*

Hints on how Theoderic's position was perceived can be gleaned from Procopius' *Wars*²⁶.

²⁴ Anon. Val. 64, Jord. *Get.* 295. On the *ornamenta palatii*, Gaudenzi (1888), p.32 and Wolfram (1988), p.284.

²⁵ Thompson (1982), p.75.

²⁶ Procopius makes several statements indicating that while Theoderic did not outwardly assume imperial rule, he behaved as an emperor, thus at *B.G.* V.1.26:

καὶ βασιλέως μὲν τοῦ Ῥωμαίων οὔτε τοῦ σχήματος οὔτε τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπιβατεῦσαι ἠξίωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥῆξ διεβίου καλούμενος...τῶν μέντοι κατηκόων τῶν αὐτοῦ προὔστη ξύμπαντα περιβαλλόμενος ὅσα τῷ φύσει βασιλεῖ ἤρμοσται.

and *B.G.* V.1.29:

ἦν τε ὁ Θεωδέριχος λόγῳ μὲν τύραννος, ἔργῳ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀληθῆς τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ τιμῇ

For example, when the Goths were losing heart after Roman success in the siege of Ravenna, their envoys made certain claims to Belisarius²⁷. They argue that under Ostrogothic rule, the Romans had been left in peace, that civil service posts had been kept exclusively for Romans, catholics had been tolerated, no laws had been promulgated, and western consuls had been confirmed by the east. If these claims were true, they indicate that Theoderic's authority was fairly limited. It is noticeable that in this passage, the Goths at no point quote any treaty authorising Theoderic's rule in Italy, suggesting that there was no formal arrangement.

To the Goths' claim that both Theoderic and Odoacer were sent by Zeno, Belisarius replied thus:

Θευδέριχον γὰρ βασιλεὺς Ζήνων 'Οδοάκρω πολεμήσοντα ἔπεμψεν, οὐκ ἐφ' ᾧ 'Ιταλίας αὐτὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοι· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ τύραννον τυράννου διαλλάσσειν βασιλεῖ ἔμελεν; ἀλλ' ἐφ' ᾧ ἐλευθέρα τε καὶ βασιλεῖ κατήκοος ἔσται²⁸.

The harshness of this reply can perhaps be accounted for by the awkwardness of the situation. For while Belisarius did not wish to admit Theoderic's rule was in any way legitimate, it could not be denied that Anastasius had conferred some sort of authority.

Indeed, it has been claimed that Anastasius was rather lax in allowing too much freedom to Theoderic. Justinian stipulated to Theodahad that in public, acclamation of the emperor should always come first, and that a statue of the emperor should be set up to the right of any statue of the king. It has been argued that as Justinian posed these caveats, Anastasius did not²⁹. This is not necessarily so, as Justinian may have just been reinforcing previous practice, or perhaps Theodahad had been known to contravene these customs.

τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠὲδοκιμηκότων οὐδενὸς ἦσσαν....
cf. Ennod. *Pan.* (quoted by Gaudenzi (1888), p.32):
quasi adhuc inter imperatores precetur adiungi....

²⁷ Proc. *B.G.* VI.6.14-22, with Gaudenzi (1888), pp.28-29.

²⁸ Proc. *B.G.* VI.6.23.

²⁹ Proc. *B.G.* V.6.4-5, with Jones (1962), p.128.

Other sources see Theoderic as either an imperial figure or rightful king. John of Nikiu distinguishes between Odoacer who bore the title "rex" and Theoderic who resided in Italy for forty-seven years "as its emperor" and refused to appoint a colleague³⁰. At least two sources suggest he ruled the Romans and Goths equally. We find in Jordanes;

regnum gentis sui et Romani populi principatum....continuit

and in the Anonymous Valesianus,

sic gubernavit duas gentes in uno, Romanorum et Gothorum....militiam

Romanis sicut sub principes esse praecepit³¹.

The Epigraphic Evidence.

A similarly confused picture arises from a study of the epigraphic evidence, indicating ever more clearly, that contemporaries of Theoderic were not sure of his exact constitutional role, or deliberately hedged their bets, honouring both him and Anastasius:

salVIS DOMIno. n.....

AUGUSTO ET Gloriosissimo rege

THEODERICO VA.....

EX. COM. DOMESTicorum....

IN ATRIO LIBERtatis.....

QUAE VETUSstate squalore

qUE CONFECta erant

reFECIT³².

It is noticeable that often, as in this inscription, dated to early in Theoderic's reign, Anastasius is placed first. A second inscription dated to 492 when Anastasius held the consulship with Rufus, mentions the emperor alone, again as augustus:

hIC hILARIANUS

REQUIESCIT IN

³⁰ John of Nikiu LXXXVIII.50f.

³¹ Jord. *Rom.* 349; Anon Val. 60. This point is discussed further below, under *Theoderic's Outlook: Theoderic, the Goths and the Romans.*

³² *CIL* vol.VI, no.1794, *ILS* 825 quoted by Gaudenzi (1888), p.23ff; cf. Jones (1962), p.128.

PACE ŠD̄ X CI KAL
 DECEMBRIIS D̄N̄
 ANASTASIO PP AuG CONSL³³.

It seems the general rule, that titles such as "perpetuus" and "augustus" were reserved for Anastasius, but Theoderic could be "glorious" and "triumph-winning" as in this inscription set up by Valerius Florianus:

SALVIS DOMINIS NOSTRIS ANASTASIO PERPETUO AUGUSTO ET
 GLORIOSISSIMO AC TRIUMFALI VIRO THEODERICO VALERIUS
 FLORIANUS V C ET INL.....³⁴.

Other inscriptions were far more imperial in style, such as this one, set up on the via Appia by Caecina Mavortius Basilius Decius:

D(ominus) n(oster) gl(o)r(io)s(issi)mus adq(ue) inclyt(us)
 rex Theodericus,
 vict(or) ac triumf(ator), semper Aug(ustus),
 bono r(ei) p(ublicae) natus,
 custos libertatis
 et propagator Rom(ani) nom(inis),
 domitor g(en)tium.....³⁵

Instigated by one of the Decii family, this inscription is a good guide to the favourable sentiments of some senators towards Theoderic³⁶.

ii) *Theoderic's Outlook: Theoderic, the Goths and the Romans.*

From this survey of contemporary material, the ambiguity of Theoderic's position can be

³³ *CIL* vol.XI, no. 3568; for a similar inscription from the same year, see *CIL* vol.V, no.6221. Both are quoted by Gaudenzi (1888), p.24.

³⁴ Bartoli (1949-1950), p.79; cf.Jones (1962), p.128.

³⁵ *CIL* vol.X.1, nos.6850-6852 and *ILS* 827, and quoted by Gaudenzi (1888), pp.55-56. It has been suggested that this inscription, dated 507-511, calling Theoderic "augustus", was in response to Anastasius' bestowal of the honorary consulship on the Frankish king Clovis; cf. Courcelle (1948-1949), pp.51f.

³⁶ *PLRE* II.349, Decius 2.

seen. Even the unconflicting reports of Jordanes and the Anonymous Valesianus that Theoderic held the same authority over both Goths and Romans can be challenged. The relevant source material is quoted below:

Et moritur Constantinopoli Zeno imperator, et factus est imperator Anastasius. Theodericus enim, qui in legationem direxerat Faustum Nigrum ad Zenonem, at ubi cognita morte eius antequam legatio reverteretur, ut ingressus est Ravennam et occidit Odoacrem, Gothi sibi confirmaverunt Theodericum regem non expectantes iussionem novi principis³⁷.

Jordanes continues this passage of the Anonymous Valesianus,

..ut diximus, anno ingressus sui in Italia Zenonemque imp. consulto privatum habitum suaeque gentis vestitum seponens insigne regio amictu, quasi iam Gothorum Romanorumque regnator, adsumit.....³⁸.

It is difficult to understand the significance of these remarks. Theoderic had been "rex Gothorum" since 474, so it is unlikely this was the title the troops were conferring. Were the Goths then suggesting, "king of Italy"? As it was rare for barbarian kings to adopt territorial titles³⁹, it has been suggested that Theoderic was confirmed as king not only of his Ostrogoths, but of the Heruls, Rugi and other tribes of Odoacer⁴⁰. It seems more probable, however, that Theoderic (whether he wished it or not) was being confirmed as king of both the barbarian troops in Italy and the Romans. Although Theoderic may have felt he ought to wait for Anastasius' acknowledgement, it is unlikely his troops felt any compunction to wait for such niceties. After their triumph over Odoacer, it is understandable that they sought to raise their chief to the position they felt he deserved.

³⁷ Anon. Val. 57.

³⁸ Jord. *Get.* 295.

³⁹ Hodgkin (1891), p.131. He goes onto claim that Theoderic's full title was probably "king of the Goths and Romans in Italy", for which (concerning the Romans), he would need Anastasius' consent; contra Claude (1980), pp.155-157 who believes that Theoderic defined his rule territorially, and had "Italiae dominatum".

⁴⁰ Thompson (1982), p.72; contra Brion (1935), pp.227-233, who believes that Theoderic, having led many different Germanic tribes to reconquer Italy, had to ask for the title of king over them, now peace had been established.

Views less sympathetic to Theoderic have been argued. It has been asserted that far from being a spontaneous acclamation by his troops, Theoderic had merely grown tired of waiting for confirmation of his position from Anastasius, and hoped his soldiers might force the emperor's hand⁴¹. Two key questions pertain to this: did Anastasius view the confirmation by the troops as a usurpation, and how did Theoderic react?

The Actions and Ambitions of Theoderic.

It is difficult to gauge what Theoderic himself hoped for⁴². It is significant that he sought Anastasius' acknowledgement of his rule through senatorial embassies. The senate's support would make for a far smoother transfer of power and also send a powerful message to Anastasius that the new ruler enjoyed the support of the most traditionally minded Romans. It is well-known that Theoderic deliberately cultivated senatorial support by promising Romans should maintain their monopoly on the magistrate and civil service posts⁴³. Thus he reassured his new "subjects",

se omnia, deo iuvante, quod retro principes Romani ordinaverunt, inviolabiliter servaturum promittit⁴⁴.

Theoderic's actions as ruler also reveal, perhaps surprisingly, his modest claims to power. He did not (apart from on one occasion), strike gold or silver coins bearing his own effigy, and he passed only edicta, not laws; legislation and the minting of coins were the specific prerogatives of an emperor⁴⁵.

⁴¹ Jones (1962), p.128.

⁴² Stein (1949), II.112 and Capizzi (1969), pp.161-162 agree that Theoderic coveted the title "king" (of Italy), implying that he ruled over both the Goths and Romans, rather than that of "emperor", despite taking the imperial name Flavius; cf. Hartmann (1897), pp.86ff and Lot (1966), p.240.

⁴³ For more on the differences in treatment of the Goths and Romans, see Bury (1923), I.455-456. Theoderic could not confer Roman citizenship on a Goth. It is extremely unlikely that he would have wanted to alter the cumbersome, but efficient Roman bureaucratic machine.

⁴⁴ Anon. Val. 66. It is possible that Goths could enter the senate, as they could reach the rank of *illustris*, the entry requirement for the senate. Theoderic's well-known respect for Roman institutions probably sprang from his early up-bringing in Constantinople.

⁴⁵ One of Theoderic's privileges was the nomination of the western consul; cf. Jones (1962), p.126.

Theoderic once referred to the life of Aspar in order to show that

the elevation of an Arian and Germanic chief to the imperial dignity was impractical⁴⁶.

It must be clear from this statement and his actions as ruler in Italy, that he did not seek to become emperor of the west. It appears that he desired a certain amount of independence under the general umbrella of eastern sovereignty, and as will become clear from an examination of both his religious and foreign policy, he would not be beholden to Anastasius.

iii) Anastasius' Outlook.

It has been said that

to take the title *rex*, meant that from then on, Theoderic intended to rule Italy in his own name, and not to be a subject of the emperor of the orient any longer⁴⁷.

Did Anastasius regard the acclamation of Theoderic as amounting to a usurpation of power? The fact that the kingship had been conferred on Theoderic, even if it did include authority over the Romans, cannot have come as a surprise, for, after Zeno's promise to Theoderic, Anastasius must have envisaged a similar position, and at least Theoderic had not sought imperial power. It was more likely the fact that Theoderic's victorious troops had taken it upon themselves to confer status, that annoyed and alarmed Anastasius; a reminder that Theoderic was backed by a large and powerful army. The presumption of the soldiers probably explains why he did not feel ready to restore the *ornamenta palatii* in 493.

By 497, however, the situation had changed. With the Isaurian crisis drawing to a close, Anastasius had much more time to consider affairs in the western half of his empire. There had been a no more favourable time for healing the rift with Rome than the present moment, under the conciliatory guidance of the pope, Anastasius II. Moreover, while Anastasius had seen proof of Theoderic's controlled and unpretentious rule, his power was growing, not only

⁴⁶ From "Anagnosticum regis", *Acta synhodorum habitarum Romae* 14, 425, quoted by Wolfram (1988), p.285.

⁴⁷ Vasiliev (1950), p.320, n.4, quoting Gaudenzi (1888), p.23.

in Italy, but generally throughout the west. As the Ostrogoth formed alliances with the Franks, Burgundians and Visigoths, Anastasius possibly felt it was too dangerous to leave his position in Italy undefined and unacknowledged⁴⁸. It thus seems that from the three possibilities of status (imperial, royal and magistral), Theoderic's most resembled regal⁴⁹. The return of the *ornamenta palatii* suggests that Theoderic was more than a *magister militum* in the service of the emperor, yet the limitations on his power, demonstrated in the textual and epigraphic evidence, and by his own actions, preclude the grant of imperial power.

In answer to the criticism that Anastasius gave away with the *ornamenta palatii*, the heart of the Roman Empire to a barbarian chief, it must be said that, in real terms, the western half of the empire had been lost from imperial control for several decades. Anastasius had enough to deal with in the east, to make it impossible to carry out Zeno's agreement and go to Ravenna himself. Giving up the *ornamenta palatii*, particularly when so much of the façade of imperial rule still existed, was not a very great price to pay for the promise of real unity in the empire based on the union of the Church.

Theoderic and the Doctrinal Schism, 491-506.

Theoderic's stance, however, on the continuing schism between east and west was not sympathetic to Anastasius' cause. It is uncertain even as early as 497, whether Theoderic was keen to allow the religious differences to fester and worsen, while political relations followed down the same slippery slope, or whether he would have been pleased at the election of the conciliatory Anastasius II in 498. While it has been suggested that Theoderic went so far as to use his secular authority to influence the election of the latter⁵⁰, his religious policy has been seen as much more conniving. It has been suggested that as Gelasius strove to maintain the primacy of the apostolic see over Constantinople, so Theoderic tried to isolate Italy from the administrative clutches of the eastern imperial capital. Politics and theology met in the

⁴⁸ See Bertolini (1941), pp.47f, and Gaudenzi (1888), p.27 on Theoderic's increased power through international relations.

⁴⁹ contra Lot (1939), p.138ff who believes Theoderic's power was magistral.

⁵⁰ Cessi (1919), pp.50-53, contra Lamma (Picotti 1956, p.253) who believes that Theoderic's tolerance favoured Gelasius and later Symmachus and Hormisdas.

Balkans; it is possible that Gelasius' assiduous correspondence with the bishops of Dardania and Illyricum contained more than doctrinal purpose. For if the churches could be wooed from Constantinople, then how much greater would be the influence commanded by Rome (and thus Ravenna) on the affairs of the Balkans⁵¹.

It was unfortunate that the agreement negotiated between Anastasius and Festus in 497 never had a chance to mature. After the early death of Anastasius II, Rome and Constantinople were plunged into chaos with the election of two papal candidates, Laurentius and Symmachus⁵². While Theoderic could not be expected to prevent the ensuing Laurentian schism, he might have been expected to support the pro-Byzantine, pro-Henoticon candidate, Laurentius, in gratitude for the return of the *ornamenta palatii*. As Laurentius was not lacking in senatorial approval, Theoderic would not necessarily have been backing the loser. It was not until after the turn of the century though, that Theoderic began to have second thoughts about his support of Symmachus, and to realize the implications for his relationship with Anastasius. In 500/501 Festus was able to bring charges against Symmachus and presented a draft of a *libellus* against the beleaguered pope to the king⁵³. If Anastasius' *libellus* against Symmachus is to be dated to 499 (not 507)⁵⁴, then it is likely that it was from this document that Theoderic realized the determination of the emperor to have a pope sympathetic to the cause of unity in the Church. He therefore appointed a Visitor, Peter of Altinum, to carry out papal duties while Symmachus was under investigation. After numerous synods though, the tide began to turn in favour of Symmachus, and with it, Theoderic's support.

There is little evidence to suggest whether Theoderic's vacillation between the two candidates

⁵¹ cf. Lamma (1940), p.172 and chapter four, *The Orthodox Backlash: developments in the Balkans*.

⁵² The Laurentian schism will be discussed fully in chapter four. It would be useful here, however, to highlight the actions of Theoderic; cf. Cessi (1919), pp.107ff and Alessandrini (1944).

⁵³ Cessi (1919), p.143 discusses the good relations at this time between the Laurentian faction and the Ostrogoths at the Ravenna court.

⁵⁴ As I argue in chapter four, *Anastasius' relations with Rome: the Laurentian schism*; cf. Cessi (1919), pp.123ff.

sprang from a concern for peace within Rome or not. His visit to Rome in 500 has often been depicted as a propaganda stunt as a demonstration of unity: unity within the Roman Church, Roman politics, and between Rome and Ravenna⁵⁵. However, whether there is any truth in the claim that he and Gelasius worked together to secure support in the Balkans, it is true that his pro-Symmachaeon and anti-Byzantine beliefs increased together. He saw that there was a significant number of senators, led by Faustus, who did not adhere to the sentimentality of a united empire, and were prepared to back a candidate openly criticized by the eastern emperor⁵⁶.

*Theoderic, Anastasius and the Balkans, 504*⁵⁷.

While relations between Anastasius and Theoderic worsened over the theological divide, so the situation elsewhere deteriorated. In 504, Theoderic decided to send a force to recover Sirmium from the Gepids which had been wrested from them when they had tried to block Theoderic's path to Italy, but subsequently recovered⁵⁸. It was, therefore, as a defensive measure for Italy against the Gepids and other potential invaders, that Theoderic sought to retrieve Sirmium and secure domination of the Save valley. As Ennodius wrote,

Sirmiensem civitas olim limes Italiae fuit, in qua seniores domini excubabant,
ne coacervata illinc finitimarum vulnera gentium in Romanum corpus

⁵⁵ cf. Bertolini (1941), pp.69f.

⁵⁶ contra Bertolini (1929), p.468ff and Burns (1984), pp.88f on senatorial support for Laurentius. Senators realized that Symmachus, like Gelasius, was no friend of the aristocracy; he would not return land donated to the church in more prosperous years. For the role of Theoderic in supporting Symmachus, see Alessandrini (1944), pp.169ff and Bertolini (1941), pp.74ff. Theoderic's increasingly rebellious stance can be charted through his nomination of consuls. As late as 504, he selected a certain Flavius Cethegus (*PLRE* II.281-282), a supporter of Laurentius, yet by 506 two pro-Symmachaeans were chosen for the top jobs: Flavius Messala (*PLRE* II.759-760, no.2), Faustus' son, for the consulship, and Constantius (*PLRE* II.321, no.15), a friend of Faustus, as prefect of Rome. Faustus himself probably became *praetorian prefect* in 507.

⁵⁷ See Appendix D, for a map showing the area in the Balkans disputed by Anastasius and Theoderic at this time and later (508-512).

⁵⁸ The past history of this region of the Balkans is important in judging the justification of Theoderic's claim. In 440, the Huns, with the Ostrogoths and Gepids arrived in the Balkans, led by Attila. After his death, however, these barbarians began to go their separate ways; in 454, the Gepids revolted and occupied Dacia, while the Goths settled in Pannonia. During the 480s, the Ostrogoths moved further into the interior of the Balkans, and the Gepids moved behind them to fill the gap. See variously, Gaudenzi (1888), pp.42ff, Hodgkin (1891), pp.211ff, Ensslin (1947), pp.133ff, Stein (1949), II.145ff, Wozniak (1981), pp.351ff, Croke (1982)(a), p.127, Wolfram, (1988), pp.321ff, and Moorhead (1992), pp.174ff.

excurrent⁵⁹.

Theoderic may have always been suspicious of the Gepids and their friendship with the Romans. After all, when his predecessor, Odoacer, had tried to extend his borders in the Balkans, a force of Gepids came against him, at the instigation of Zeno. It cannot have been a coincidence that Theoderic waited until Anastasius was deeply involved with the Persian war, before striking⁶⁰. The careful timing paid off, and it seems that the Gepids, hampered by internal differences, yielded with little opposition⁶¹. Theoderic ousted them from the right bank of the Danube and annexed Pannonia Secunda, with its capital Sirmium, to the Italian kingdom.

But Anastasius was suspicious of Theoderic's movements. It was far preferable that the important frontier town of Sirmium should be occupied by the Gepids, rather than the Goths, who were more of a threat to the empire's stability. Moreover, at this time a Hun named Mundo was running wild in the province of Moesia I, at the head of a band of brigands⁶². It has been argued fairly conclusively that he was an ally of Theoderic, a point which reveals further strained diplomatic relations between Anastasius and Theoderic⁶³.

It was only with the conclusion of the Persian war, that Anastasius could contemplate action, either about the unwelcome occupation of Goths or the equally unwelcome depredations of Mundo. He directed his attentions against the latter, sending the *magister militum per*

⁵⁹ Ennod. *Pan.* p.277, lines 17ff.

⁶⁰ It is also significant that Theoderic did not personally take up arms, which enabled him to avoid the charge that he had fought against the Roman Empire; cf. Brion (1935), p.292, contra Cassiodorus' propaganda,
By the power of the lord king Theoderic, the Bulgars were defeated and Italy regained
Sirmium.

Cass. *Chron.* 504, quoted by Moorhead (1992), p.175.

⁶¹ See Ennod. *Pan.* p.277, lines 20ff, Marc. C. 505, and Jord. *Get.* 300-301; for division in the Gepids, see Hodgkin (1885), p.438.

⁶² For general information on Mundo, Croke (1982)(a).

⁶³ Stein (1949), II.145 and esp. Croke (1982)(a), pp.126.

Illyricum, Sabinianus, with a force of ten thousand Bulgarians, to capture the freebooter⁶⁴. Mundo appealed for help to Pitzias, Theoderic's general, who was settling the territory he had won from the Gepids. He adopted Mundo's cause, marched into Dacia and with only two thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, won a decisive victory over the imperial forces. He defeated Sabinianus at Horrea Margi, by the river Morava⁶⁵. Theoderic recalled Pitzias to Pannonia, but he did not offer to return Sirmium.

Theoderic and the West.

Successful in the Balkans, Theoderic began to look to the west for further outlets for his influence and authority. The four major powers in the west at this time were the Visigoths, Burgundians, Franks and Vandals, and he sought to bond all four to him through various marriage alliances⁶⁶. One of his daughters married the Visigothic king Alaric II and another married Sigismund, the future king of the Burgundians. In 500, his sister, Almafreda married Thrasamund, king of the Vandals, while he himself married Clovis' sister⁶⁷. Such a policy, as well as cementing peace throughout the west, was designed to secure his own position in Italy and strengthen his guard against any attempt of Anastasius to reclaim the heart of the empire⁶⁸.

Theoderic's scheming, however, did not run smoothly. His relations with the Frankish king hit a rocky patch in 506⁶⁹. The Alamans, defeated by Clovis in the battle of Tolbiac, sought the protection of Theoderic in Raetia, and he now refused to hand them back to their

⁶⁴ Sabinianus was the son of the general of the same name who had fought Theoderic in Macedonia twenty-six years previously.

⁶⁵ It is interesting that in Marcellinus Comes' account, there is no mention of Pitzias. He sees a polarisation of this part of the conflict into a contest between Sabinianus, representative of Anastasius, and Mundo, federate of Theoderic; Moorhead (1992), p.175 and Croke (1995), p.112.

⁶⁶ cf. Levillain (1933), van de Vyver (1937), p.370ff, Lot (1939), pp.119ff and Moorhead, (1992), p.175ff.

⁶⁷ Theoderic's niece married the king of the Thuringians, Hermanfried, and Clovis married Gundobad's niece.

⁶⁸ cf. Bury (1923), I.462.

⁶⁹ On the Franks generally, see Musset (1975), chapt.3, Wallace-Hadrill (1985), chapt.4, James (1988), *PLRE* II.288-90, and on the chronology of Clovis' reign, Bachrach (1970).

conquerors, thus causing a diplomatic rift between the Ostrogoths and Franks⁷⁰. Moreover, Theoderic failed to prevent open warfare between the Visigoths and the Franks, despite a determined effort. It is possible that the quarrel between Clovis and Alaric was engineered by Anastasius. The cause of the disagreement was always unknown; Theoderic claimed that there was no serious point of dispute, but as the two kings were resolved on war, he hinted at the interference of a third more powerful body⁷¹.

In the event, Alaric was slain at the battle of Vouillé, it was rumoured, by Clovis himself, and Aquitaine (the Visigothic kingdom) was annexed to the kingdom of the Franks⁷². As Clovis, recently baptised⁷³, was depicted almost as a Christian crusader driving heretical Arianism out of Gaul, he earned the respect of the Gallo-Roman Church and, in turn, that of the emperor⁷⁴. There is naturally much speculation as to whether Clovis' conversion was driven by sincere religious zeal, or pure ambition. Moreover, considering his subsequent success over the Visigoths and his reward of the consulship in 508 from Anastasius, it is not impossible that he was encouraged by Byzantine diplomacy⁷⁵.

Anastasius and Clovis

The conferral of the consulship on Clovis was recorded thus by Gregory of Tours:

Igitur Chlodovechus ab Anastasio imperatore codicillos de consulatu accepit, et in basilica beati Martini tunica blatea indutus est et chlamyde, imponens vertici diadema. Tunc ascenso equite aurum argentumque in itinere illo, quod inter portam atrii basilicae beati Martini et ecclesiam civitatis est, praesentibus

⁷⁰ Gaudenzi (1888), p.46, Stein (1949), II.147f, with n.1 and Moorhead (1992), p.176.

⁷¹ Cass. *Var.* III.1 and VII.4; Levillain (1933), pp.542-543.

⁷² See Levillain (1933), pp.545ff for more details on the division of Alaric's kingdom by the Franks and Burgundians.

⁷³ The date of Clovis' conversion is much disputed; there are good arguments for Christmas day 496, 498 and 506, cf. Musset (1975), pp.229-230.

⁷⁴ On Clovis as a crusader, see Wood (1985), p.297. On the history of the Arian Visigoths in Tours and the gratitude of the citizens at Clovis' arrival, see Courcelle (1948-1949), pp.52ff.

⁷⁵ Capizzi (1969), p.168.

populis manu propria spargens, voluntate benignissima erogavit, et ab ea die tanquam consul et Augustus est vocitatus⁷⁶.

Two key problems result from this account: what was the nature of Clovis' consulship, and why did Anastasius bestow it?

Although Gregory writes that Clovis received the consular codicils, it is unlikely that the Frankish king became an ordinary consul as his name does not appear on the consular *fasti*⁷⁷. It is much more probable that Clovis was awarded a rank equivalent to that of proconsul or honorary consul. As to the fact that Clovis is described receiving imperial insignia, the diadem and the title "augustus", several explanations have been found⁷⁸. It has been argued that Gregory was writing seventy years after the event, and therefore, would be unfamiliar with protocol. It seems unlikely, however, that Gregory would be ignorant of the implications of the designation "augustus"⁷⁹.

In vindication of Gregory, it has been suggested that it was the ambitious Clovis who turned an ordinary consular ceremony into an imperial coronation, and fabricated the title "august consul"⁸⁰. Again, this view seems to be unlikely; from other sources, it is clear that there was nothing unusual in such an acknowledgement, particularly after such a significant gain of new territory. Thus Procopius writes:

οὐ γάρ ποτε ᾤοντο Γαλλίας ξὺν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ κεκτῆσθαι φράγγοι μὴ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος τὸ ἔργον ἐπισφραγίσαντος τοῦτό γε⁸¹.

⁷⁶ Greg. of Tours, *Hist. Fr.* II.38.

⁷⁷ Courcelle (1948-1949), p.47.

⁷⁸ Ensslin (1936), pp.500-506 on the significance of Clovis' dress.

⁷⁹ Courcelle (1948-1949), p.57 goes too far in imagining that Gregory would not know the difference between "consul" and "augustus".

⁸⁰ cf. Courcelle (1948-1949), p.49.

⁸¹ Proc. *B.G.* VII.33.4, followed by Fustel de Coulanges, *l'Invasion germanique et la fin de l'empire*, Paris 1891, who wrote:

Henceforth, Clovis appeared in the eyes of the Gallo-Romans as the emperor's delegate, and consequently as the representative of the ancient order of things, which, in the midst of the

If the truth has not been distorted by Gregory of Tours, or Clovis himself, what of the others present on the occasion in 508? A suggestion has been proffered that the clergy, grateful for their deliverance from the heretical Arians, and nostalgic for the idealism of imperial sovereignty, were not averse to hailing Clovis as consul and augustus⁸².

While there can be no denying the fact that parading around Tours, dressed in the purple chlamys and diadem and distributing largesse, was usually the mark of an emperor, the most likely scenario allows for Anastasius giving the proconsulship or honourary consulship, and Clovis making the most of the moment to celebrate his triumph in a blaze of popularist propaganda. As for his titles of consul and augustus, a study of Gregory's Latin reveals some explanation, hinging on the word, "tanquam". It is possible "tanquam consul" means *ex consul*, indicating the honourary consulship⁸³. Alternatively, the passage could be rendered, "Clovis was hailed *as if* consul or augustus".

For what reason did Anastasius seek to honour Clovis in such a way? Ostensibly, this was a simple recognition of Clovis' military triumph in the name of Christianity. However, it is impossible to ignore the tension between Theoderic and Clovis. While Anastasius' recognition of Clovis marked him as a subject of the emperor⁸⁴, his new status provided a counter balance to Theoderic in the west⁸⁵, and would be certain to annoy the latter who had been forced to wait for seven years, before any recognition of his conquest was granted. In retaliation, and perhaps, in alarm at Clovis' increased territory and augmented prestige, Theoderic invaded a part of the Mediterranean coast of Gaul. This measure was designed to stop the influence of both the Burgundians and Franks reaching the Mediterranean and

troubles of those times, remained the expression of law. His conquests were in some sort legitimized.

Quoted by Lot (1966), p.250.

⁸² Courcelle (1948-1949), pp.55-56.

⁸³ Bury (1923), I.464, with n.1. In the prologue of the *Lex Salica* Clovis is referred to as a proconsul.

⁸⁴ cf. Rémondon (1964), p.2.

⁸⁵ Wallace-Hadrill (1985), p.72.

possibly threatening the remainder of territory remaining in Visigothic possession⁸⁶.

Around the same time, Anastasius sent a fleet of one hundred ships to ravage the Apulian coast, as a warning to Theoderic to contain his ambitions⁸⁷. However, the sending of such an expedition must have caused Anastasius some sleepless nights. While he needed to sound a warning to Theoderic, it was very difficult to do so without striking against Theoderic's subjects, who were also under his own imperial sovereignty. Marcellinus Comes takes a critical line:

....remensoque mari inhonestam victoriam, quam piratico ausu Romani ex Romanis rapuerunt, Anastasio Caesari reportarunt⁸⁸.

Cassiodorus, who may not have been averse to exaggerating the extent of the damage caused by the Byzantine fleet, claims that the crops in Apulia were burnt (*Variae* I.16) and that the population of the town of Sipontum was attacked (*Variae* II.38). It is probable, however, that the main aim was to blockade Italy, thus endangering trade with the east⁸⁹.

In this tit for tat game, Theoderic immediately organised, at Ravenna, a fleet of five thousand ships. In conjunction with this action, he reinforced the walls at Rome and at various cities on the coast of Italy. He also launched a couple of attacks across the Adriatic against the western coast of the empire.

Theoderic, Anastasius and the Balkans, 508-512.

After this burst of hostility during the middle of the first decade of the sixth century, relations calmed between the two powers. This was achieved on the initiative of Theoderic. He handed back the eastern part of Pannonia Secunda, including the city of Bassinae. The rest

⁸⁶ For hints that Theoderic was galled into taking revenge against Clovis' army, 508-511, Brion (1935), pp.302ff.

⁸⁷ Marc. C. 508; Jord. *Rom.* 356.

⁸⁸ Marcellinus fails to mention the consulship of Theoderic's nominee for this year, indicating that in this breakdown of diplomatic relations, the western consul was not recognised in the east.

⁸⁹ The view of Moorhead (1992), p.182.

of Pannonia, together with Sirmium, was retained by the Ostrogoths. This arrangement has been viewed in different ways from a Byzantine point of view. The peace has been seen as a disgraceful defeat,

une paix qui équivalait à une défaite byzantine à peine voilée⁹⁰,

particularly because the main stronghold of Sirmium remained in Ostrogothic hands. Moreover, it has been claimed by Stein that it was at this time that the emperor recognised Mundo's possession of the Danube river region in Moesia I to the east of the Morava⁹¹. On the other hand, others have seen Theoderic's concession as more significant, entailing the withdrawal of Theoderic from the Upper Moesian-Morava valley, as well as Singidunum.

It was about the time of Theoderic's cession of territory that he sent to Anastasius, the famous letter which stands at the head of the *Variae*⁹². In it he stressed the unity of the empire and how his own kingdom was meant to be an imitation of the empire:

Regnum nostrum imitatio vestra est, forma boni propositi...

The letter was exemplary both in its diplomacy and in the flattery lavished on Anastasius: in such phrases as, "vestrae gloriosissimam charitatem..." and "ad serenissimam pietatem vestram...", one can detect only compliments, rather than any real recognition of superiority⁹³. It is rather ironic too, that Cassiodorus credits Theoderic with "tranquillity", after all his activity both in the Balkans and Gaul.

It is probable that the letter was entrusted to the erudite and eloquent Agapitus, who could be relied upon to argue Theoderic's case diplomatically⁹⁴. The reception and outcome of

⁹⁰ Stein (1949), II.156, followed by Capizzi (1969), p.170.

⁹¹ Stein (1949), II.156 with n.3. He bases his argument on two passages of Procopius *B.G.* VII.33.8 and VII.34.10 which show the Goths as being in possession of Dacia. However, there is no evidence in any source for the transfer of any part of this region to Mundo or the Ostrogoths.

⁹² Gaudenzi (1888), pp.48-50 correctly argues for a date of 508 (rather than 498) for this letter, but then indicated it predates Clovis' consulship, which he dates to 509; cf. Ensslin (1947), pp.154f.

⁹³ So obsequious is the sycophancy that it has been suggested that either Theoderic did not fully understand the meaning, or Cassiodorus altered it when publishing it; see Hodgkin (1891), p.221.

⁹⁴ *PLRE* II.30-32, Agapitus 3.

this letter is not reported, but with the return of at least a little territory to Constantinople, it appears there was at least a temporary healing in relations. There were no further hostilities, though the jockeying for allies continued.

In order to strengthen his influence in the Danube area, Theoderic adopted the king of the Heruls, Rodulf, as his son-at-arms. However, the Lombards who had recently established themselves between the Danube and the Tisza rivers, just to the north of the Gepids, suddenly attacked the Heruls and inflicted a crushing defeat. Rodulf himself was killed. Theoderic, pre-occupied with events in Italy and Gaul, was unable to offer military help⁹⁵; he could only take in a few refugees and the remaining Heruls returned to Scandinavia. Eventually in 512 they were settled by Anastasius inside the Byzantine frontier. Here they took to pillaging the land until checked by a detachment of imperial troops⁹⁶. Despite this inconvenience, are we to see the settlement of the Heruls on Roman territory, as a simple gesture of kindness, or a subtle piece of diplomacy on Anastasius' part? By the settlement, Anastasius could be seen to be challenging Theoderic's claim of alliance with the Heruls. Considering the volatile nature of occupation in the Balkans, it was sound policy, in general, to cultivate links with barbarian tribes.

Anastasius was successful elsewhere in maintaining loyalty and alliances. He sustained good diplomatic relations with the king of the Burgundians, Gundobad, despite the latter's adherence to Arianism, and was on even better terms with his son, Sigismund, who had converted to catholicism under the influence of Avitus, the bishop of Vienne⁹⁷. Sigismund wrote to Anastasius on his accession, as his "fidelissimo e devotissime ministro". He pledges his own loyalty:

vester quidem est populus meus, sed me plus servire vobis quam illi praeesse
delectat.

⁹⁵ This suggests that Anastasius' policy of supporting the Franks and Burgundians was successful, in helping to prevent Theoderic building up a huge "empire" of client-kingdoms, or annexed territory.

⁹⁶ Stein (1949), II.150f, Capizzi (1969), p.171, and Wolfram (1988), p.322. Marc. C. 512, suggests Anastasius resettled the Heruls to strengthen depopulated lands around Singidunum; cf. Croke (1995), p.117.

⁹⁷ Ensslin (1947), pp.302f, Stein (1949), II.185-189.

and refers to old ties:

Traxit istud a proavis generis mei apud vos decessoresque vestros semper animo Romana devotio, ut illa nobis magis claritas putaretur, quam vestra per militiae titulos porrigeret celsitudo:⁹⁸

In another similar letter, he thanked the emperor for granting him the *militiae fasces* (the honorary title of *magister militum*), the *aulae contubernium* (patriciate) and "venerandam Romani nominis participationem" (alliance with the eastern empire)⁹⁹. It is clear that Theoderic was alarmed at this new level of friendship between Constantinople and the Burgundians (bearing in mind the problems such an alliance with the Franks had caused), and he would not allow Sigismund's messengers to travel through Italy to the east¹⁰⁰.

Theoderic and the Doctrinal Schism, 516.

While political relations continued uneasily, the religious schism, deepened by animosity between Anastasius and Symmachus, persisted. The new pope Hormisdas was no less intransigent than his predecessors and Anastasius, far from having the opportunity to persuade him to his point of view, had the revolt of Vitalian to contend with. As suggested in chapter two, there were suspicions concerning links between this rebel and Theoderic; of dubious nationality, and possibly a fellow Goth, was he perhaps in league with Theoderic¹⁰¹? It is tempting to see the appointment of Procopius Anthemius (son of the western emperor, Anthemius) as consul as an attempt to draw the east and west closer together, by evoking old ties¹⁰².

As for Anastasius' feelings at the time, it is difficult to judge. A single letter addressed to

⁹⁸ Avitus, *ep.*83.

⁹⁹ Avitus, *ep.*84; cf. Lot (1966), p.247.

¹⁰⁰ Bury (1923), I.463.

¹⁰¹ Those who agree that Theoderic and Vitalian formed an alliance include, Ensslin (1947), pp.297ff, Capizzi (1969), p.171, and Moorhead (1992), p.195. Others agree that Vitalian was also in contact with Hormisdas; Hartmann (1897), p.210, Sundwall (1919), pp.222ff and Cessi (1920), pp.218ff.

¹⁰² Moorhead (1992), p.195.

the senate in 516, carried by Theopompus and Severianus, appears to hold two opposing views¹⁰³. The emperor addresses the senate as "senatui suo" and uses a greeting that would not have been out of place in a letter of Augustus to his senate; tribunes and proconsuls had been long obsolete in Italy. After the introduction, he begins:

si vos liberique vestri valetis, bene est; ego exercitusque meus valemus.

Yet at the same time, he clearly acknowledges Theoderic's rule:

apud excelsum regem, cui regendi vos potestas vel sollicitudo commissa est....

It is true that the circumstances of the letter go some way to explaining this anomaly. Anastasius, hoping that senators might use their influence on the pope to create a more pro-eastern Church, sought to highlight the close ties between the senate and Constantinople. On the other hand, by exalting Theoderic's *potestas*, Anastasius diminished the *auctoritas* of the pope. The reply is interesting, as, while the senate is clearly rather less pro-Byzantine than in the days before the Laurentian schism, and does not propose to help influence Hormisdas, it nevertheless addresses the emperor with the usual appellations, "imperatore invicte" and "piissime imperator". Furthermore, it casts a favourable light on the relationship between the two rulers:

...indubitanter agnosces, sacrae iussionis oracula quanta senatus vestri fuerint gratulatione suscepta, maxime cum ad hoc et animus domini nostri invictissimi regis Theoderici filii vestri mandatorum vestrorum oboedientiam praecipientis accederet.....¹⁰⁴

It has been suggested that Anastasius made Theoderic his adoptive son in 497¹⁰⁵. There is no evidence for this, but it is possible that the senators saw Theoderic, figuratively-speaking, as the son of Anastasius, the eastern emperor's ruler in the west.

Conclusions: Anastasius' Policy on Italy.

Anastasius' letter and the senate's reply indicate that after nearly twenty years since the return

¹⁰³ See Thiel (1868), p.765 and Gunther (1895-1898), no.113, with Hodgkin (1885), pp.470-472, Bertolini (1941), pp.81-82 and MacPherson (1989), p.70.

¹⁰⁴ Thiel (1868), p.767 and Gunther (1895-1898), no.114.

¹⁰⁵ cf. Gaudenzi (1888), p.59.

of the *ornamenta palatii*, Theoderic's position was still open to interpretation. While Theoderic was careful not to assume delusions of imperial grandeur in Italy, his eagerness to secure foreign allies betrayed his lust for expansion and power. Anastasius' policy of countering this threat with his own alliances reveals only too clearly that mutual distrust had not yet worn away.

In circa 502, the panegyricist Priscian wrote:

Et quo, Roma vetus misit quoscumque, benigne
Sustentas omni penitus ratione fovevendo,
provehis et gradibus praeclaris laetus honorum,
Ne damni patriae sensus fiantve dolores¹⁰⁶.

These exiles probably corresponded with their colleagues back in Rome and must have been responsible in part for any pro-Byzantine sentiment still lingering¹⁰⁷. There has been much debate on the identity of these exiles¹⁰⁸; it is suffice to note here the propaganda element in emphasising the benefits of the eastern empire, and the merits of the eastern emperor in comparison with those of the western king. This was surely done with the intention of encouraging pro-Roman attitude and values in a Gothic Old Rome, and not, at least at the beginning of the sixth century, for planning a full-scale recovery of Italy. It is perhaps surprising then, that Priscian should go onto say:

Utraque Roma tibi nam spero pareat uni
Auxilio summi, qui conspicit omnia, patris¹⁰⁹.

Doubtless Priscian was voicing an underlying desire, the fulfilment of which he must have

¹⁰⁶ Prisc. *Pan.* 242-245.

¹⁰⁷ Bury (1923), I.467.

¹⁰⁸ Suggestions for the identity of the immigrants include exiles from Vandalic North Africa, supporters of Laurentius and Festus (Gaudenzi (1888), p.64), and dissidents banished by Theoderic (Gabatto (1911), pp.240-241). Momigliano (1960), p.240 believes they were aristocratic families, such as the Anicii, who left the unsettled west and sought the political and cultural stability of the east. For a summary of these views, Coyne (1991), pp.167-169.

¹⁰⁹ Prisc. *Pan.* 265-266.

known was a long way off. In this one must recognise Anastasius' foresight. Even Justinian, drawing on the resources carefully accumulated by Anastasius, experienced horrendous difficulties in recovering Italy; his eventual success resulted in a war-torn, dilapidated and impoverished land, which after only three years under Roman government became an easy prey for the new waves of barbarian hordes, namely, at first, the Lombards. Anastasius, lacking the resources available to Justinian, did well to contain Theoderic's expansionist schemes, particularly by his diplomatic alliances in Gaul, and to establish terms, albeit uneasy, on which he and Theoderic could co-exist. Had it not been for the continuing Acacian schism, Anastasius and Theoderic may well have enjoyed a much better relationship. However, notwithstanding the setbacks in their relations, Anastasius was viewed in hindsight as a rather pro-Gothic emperor. Hence the coins of Totila were minted in the name of "the long since deceased pro-Gothic Anastasius¹¹⁰." Moreover, in Totila's letter to Justinian expressing his desire for peace, he wrote:

αἰτοῦμεθα τὰ ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης καλὰ σέ τε προσίεσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἡμῖν
 ξυγχωρεῖν. ὦνπερ μνημεῖά τε καὶ παραδείγματα κάλλιστα ἔχομεν
 Ἀναστάσιόν τε καὶ Θεουδέριχον, οἱ βεβασιλεύκασι μὲν οὐ πολλῶ
 πρότερον, εἰρήνης δὲ καὶ ἀγαθῶν πραγμάτων ἅπαντα ἐνεπλήσαντο τὸν
 κατ' αὐτοῦς χρόνον¹¹¹.

From this evidence, it appears that the inhabitants of Italy, both Roman and Gothic, despite the high ideals of Justinian, looked back with some longing on the advantages of the *modus vivendi* established by Theoderic and Anastasius.

The Barbarian Raids in the Balkans

It was not only by Theoderic that the patterns of settlement of barbarian tribes in the Balkans were upset. Throughout Anastasius' reign, various regions suffered from the raids of the rapacious hordes of Bulgars chronicled for us by Marcellinus Comes¹¹².

¹¹⁰ W. Hahn, *Moneta Imperii Byzantini*, Paris 1973, I.79-85, noted by Wolfram (1988), pp.532-533.

¹¹¹ Proc. B.G. VII.21.22-23.

¹¹² There are a number of suggestions as to the origins of these barbarians; perhaps the most likely proposal is that they were the Bulgars who first appeared in the Balkans in about 480 and were used by Zeno against the Ostrogoths; cf. Croke (1980), p.188 and (1995), p.108. See also Lemerle (1954), pp.282-283 who agrees but

The first, recorded for 493, tells us:

Iulianus magister militiae nocturno proelio pugnans Scythico ferro in Thracia confossus interiit¹¹³.

A much longer account is rendered for another imperial defeat in 499. It begins:

Aristus Illyricianae ductor militiae cum quindecim milibus armatorum et cum quingentis viginti plaustris armis ad proeliandum necessariis oneratis contra Bulgares Thraciam devastantes profectus est.

Marcellinus goes on to record details of a battle beside the river Tzurta where over four thousand imperial troops perished, either in flight or with the collapse of the river bank. The *comites* Nicostratus, Innocentius, Tancus and Aquilinus all died there¹¹⁴. After this massive defeat for the imperial troops, a similar raid was undertaken, unopposed, three years later. Again Marcellinus reports the incursion, this time with a hint of frustration and anger at the frequency of the raids:

Consueta gens Bulgarorum depraedatam saepe Thraciam, nullo Romanorum milite resistente, iterum devasta est¹¹⁵.

There is, then, a long gap until the last invasion to take place during Anastasius' reign; in 517 barbarian cavalry devastated Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly, reaching as far as Thermopylae¹¹⁶. Again Marcellinus provides a record, together with details of an

believes they were the future Kutrigur and Utrigur Hunnic tribes. Bury (1923), I.434-435 thought they were the remnants of the Hunnic empire of Attila, but Zonaras XIV.3.26 refers to them as "Bulgars hitherto unknown". Marcellinus Comes, an Illyrian, alludes to the Romans being attacked "Scythico ferro". There was little attempt by contemporaries to distinguish between different types of barbarian.

¹¹³ See also Zon. XIV.3.26 and *PLRE* II.639, Iulianus 15.

¹¹⁴ Marc. C. 499, followed by Jord. *Rom.* 356 and Zon. XIV.4.8-10, who adds the effect of the Bulgars' piercing battle songs on the Romans. Notices on the four *comites* killed are given in the *PLRE* II.784 Nicostratus 1, II.591 Innocentius 4, II.1052 Tancus and II.125 Aquilinus 5. On Aristus, II.147, no.2.

¹¹⁵ Marc. C. 502; cf. Theoph. AM 5994.

¹¹⁶ It is uncertain who these barbarians were. Several suggestions have been proposed, including Slavs, Antes, or more Bulgarians. Niederle (1923), p.61, Dvornik (1959), p.34 and Croke (1995), p.120, believe they were Slavs; contra Bury (1923) I.436, n.2 who suggested they were Bulgarians or Slavs, and Stein (1949), II.105 who thought they were Antes. There is not enough evidence to come to a firm decision, although Procopius *B.G.* VII.38.7-8, writing about the year 549, remarks that οἱ Σκλαβηνοὶ had not yet attempted to settle on Roman territory.

unsuccessful attempt to rescue the Roman captives:

duae tunc Macedoniae Thessaliaque vastatae et usque Thermopylas veteremque Epirum Getae equites depraedati sunt. mille tunc librarum auri denarios per Paulum Anastasius imperator pro redimendis Romanorum captivis Iohanni praefecto Illyrici misit: deficiente pretio vel inclusi suis cum domunculis captivi Romani incensi sunt vel pro muris clausarum urbium trucidati.

The extent of the devastation is evoked by Marcellinus' reference to the Book of Jeremiah, Behold a people cometh from the north country and a great nation shall be stirred up from the innermost parts of the earth¹¹⁷.

These four raids claimed many Roman lives and caused much destruction and enduring damage, including serious depopulation¹¹⁸. What was Anastasius' response? From the record of the 517 incursion, one can see that he was singularly unsuccessful in ransoming the Roman prisoners. The *tribunus* Paul, who was responsible for delivering the ransom money to the praetorian prefect of Illyricum, John, is probably the same Paul who delivered a donative to the Illyrian army in 500¹¹⁹. This largesse, sent to encourage and strengthen resolve after the terrible defeat by the Bulgars the previous year, unfortunately did not prevent the 502 assault to which there was no resistance. However, the long gap between the raids of 502 and 517 indicates that Anastasius' attention to the Long Wall was the most successful factor in preventing the destructive barbarian incursions.

Anastasius' Western Defensive Building Programme: The Long Wall

One of the most enduring landmarks (both figuratively and literally) of Anastasius' reign is his building or restoration of the Long Wall. Today, the southern part of the wall has almost disappeared, but the central and northern sections are fairly well preserved. It is clear that the wall stretched for a distance of about twenty-eight miles from the sea of Marmara, just

¹¹⁷ Jeremiah VI.22, quoted by Croke (1980), p.190 and (1995), p.120.

¹¹⁸ It is possible that a defeat inflicted by barbarians on Pompeius, the emperor's nephew, at Adrianople, belongs to this period. Jord. *Rom.* 356; Stein (1949), II.106 and *PLRE* II.898-899, Pompeius 2.

¹¹⁹ *PLRE* II.853, Paulus 29; *PLRE* II.608, John 62.

to the west of Selymbria, to the Black Sea, between Podima and Lake Dercos. It lay about forty miles to the west of Constantinople to protect a greater extent of the city's aqueducts. Preserved now in places to a height of five metres, the wall was about eleven feet thick with further defence provided by polygonal towers and forts¹²⁰. The building of the wall entailed a new administrative system. In conjunction with the abolition of the vicariate of Thrace, the wall, and the region between it and Constantinople, came under the jurisdiction of two vicars, one under the praetorian prefect, and the other accountable to the *magister militum per Thracias*¹²¹.

There have been two major points of contention concerning the wall. Firstly, what was the nature of Anastasius' contribution? Was he responsible for the complete construction of the wall or merely for restoration works? The second problem concerns the dating, problematical because of the different dates given by or inferred from contemporary sources.

The confusion over whether Anastasius himself had the Long Wall constructed or restored, stems from varying accounts in the sources. While Procopius of Caesarea, Procopius of Gaza and Evagrius all attribute the wall to the work of Anastasius, references can be found in two fifth-century sources which indicate there was a wall existing before the reign of Anastasius, implying therefore that he was responsible for restoration and repairs only. Mention of this earlier wall can be found in the *Life of Daniel* in a passage describing the escape of Zeno from a plot against his life in 469, and in a fragment of Malchus, detailing a sortie by the bodyguard of Theoderic in 478¹²². Like the arguments over the building of Dara, this issue of whether Anastasius constructed or repaired the wall has been polarised by two important

¹²⁰ There is some dispute as to whether there was some kind of earthworks, ditch or moat. Bury (1923) I.435 maintained the wall had no additional defence; contra *ODB* II.1250-1251 claiming there was an outer moat. Evag. III.38 referred to a deep ditch filled with water. Janin (1964), pp.261ff discusses the contribution of the Arab writers on this problem, but see the most recent report, Crow (1997), pp.34-38 where evidence of a ditch is cited.

¹²¹ Bury (1911), p.68, Stein (1949), II.89-90 and Croke (1982)(b), appendix.

¹²² *V. Dan. Styl.* 65, Malch. fr.18.

articles by Croke and Whitby¹²³. There is no need to reiterate their arguments here, but a brief resumé will prove instructive.

Croke, who again supports Anastasius, argues that the two fifth-century texts refer not to the Thracian Long Wall, but to the Chersonese Long Wall, mentioned by Herodotus¹²⁴. Croke then explains how the Chersonese Long Wall would fit geographically into the context of Zeno's escape and Theoderic's sortie. Whitby, on the contrary, insists that the references to the long walls in the *Life of Daniel* and the fragment of Malchus, are to the Thracian Long Wall. It was this wall that suffered extensive damage in the earthquakes which affected the region in 478. He argues further that the references to the walls particularly associated with Anastasius do not categorically attribute the original construction to him. The Whitby scheme entails the construction of the Long Wall in 447 by Theodosius II after the humiliating terms dictated by the Huns, severe damage by the 478 earthquakes, and finally, ruin, until restoration by Anastasius.

It is difficult to decide between the two theories and it is sufficient here, merely to show that Anastasius took steps to improve the defence of the peninsula against the barbarian raids, and especially to protect the approach to Constantinople. The fact that it became known as the "Anastasian Long Wall" indicates that Anastasius' contribution must have been fairly significant¹²⁵.

The problem of when Anastasius made these alterations and improvements arises from inconsistency in the sources. The building of the wall is recorded in the *Chronicon Paschale* under indiction fifteen, the third consulship of Anastasius, which can be calculated as the year 507. The other entry for this year, a demonstration in the circus in favour of crowning Areobindus emperor, is covered much more fully by Marcellinus Comes, and placed under indiction five, the consulate of Paulus and Musicianus in 512. It has been inferred from this

¹²³ Croke (1982)(b) and Whitby (1985).

¹²⁴ Herodotus VI.36.

¹²⁵ Allen (1981), pp.157-158.

that the building of the Long Wall should also be dated to 512. However, as Procopius mentions the wall in his panegyric, which has been dated to circa 502, the 512 date becomes unlikely. This reasoning has led many to suppose the wall was begun in 497, which was also a fifth indiction¹²⁶.

However, this dating ignores evidence from Priscian who does not mention the wall. As it is improbable that Priscian should have omitted the wall, had work begun, the wall should be dated to 502; just before Procopius' panegyric, and just after Priscian's¹²⁷. This dating would make sense in a broader view of Anastasius' strategy in dealing with the barbarian attacks. After the 499 raids, Anastasius sent a donative to encourage soldiers, and when this proved ineffective, he realized more defence was needed, and set about making the Long Wall into a viable defensive structure to offer secure protection to the capital.

The success of the Long Wall has been disputed, with its critics claiming that it failed because it was too long to defend, and faced too many threats from invading armies¹²⁸.

However, these criticisms are based on a passage of Procopius:

οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἦν οἰκοδομίαν τοσαύτην τὸ μέγεθος ἢ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς
ἐξεργάσθαι, ἢ φρουρεῖσθαι ξὺν τῷ ἀκριβεῖ¹²⁹.

Again, as with Dara and other eastern defences, we must bear in mind Procopius' purpose in writing the *de Aedificiis*. A work devoted to the praise of Justinian's buildings would obviously seek to demonstrate the ineffectualness of Anastasius' wall.

It seems the Long Wall was fairly successful in discouraging barbarians, especially from making any attempt against Constantinople. It was not until 517 that imperial territory was again subjected to widespread destruction which was directed, not towards Constantinople, but towards Greece. From the patterns of barbarian incursions under Justinian, it appears that

¹²⁶ Eg. Bury (1923), I.435 with n.5.

¹²⁷ For the arguments on the dating of the panegyrics, see Appendix A.

¹²⁸ Bréhier (1914), col.1452; contra Whitby (1985), p.579, Anastasius established an "effective defence".

¹²⁹ Proc. *de Aed.* IV.9.7.

when the wall was in good repair and manned, it did afford effective protection to Constantinople. For example, in 559 the Huns penetrated the unguarded, earth-quake damaged wall, but after repair by Justinian and the citizens of Constantinople, it blocked the path of the Avars in 577 and the Slavic invasions of 581¹³⁰.

*Anastasius' Defences in the Balkans*¹³¹

As he had in the east, Anastasius sought to repair and restore fortifications along his western lines of defence. While one might be persuaded by a reading of the *de Aedificiis* that most improvements were carried out during the reign of Justinian, there is firm archaeological evidence to indicate Anastasius' involvement. Epigraphic and numismatic material, missing from the eastern sites, can be used to build a fuller picture of Anastasius' concerns with western defensive fortifications¹³².

At Histria on the Black Sea coast a large number of bricks bearing the official stamp,

+IMP(erator) ANASTASIUS,

have been discovered. The bricks were found by the curtain wall, on the north-west side of the wall surrounding the citadel, suggesting that it had been rebuilt during Anastasius' reign¹³³. Excavation of the south-west and eastern parts of the citadel has yielded both private and public buildings, including two basilicas¹³⁴, and some large edifices overlooking Lake Sinoe¹³⁵. All these have been dated between the end of the fifth century and 580, and have been more specifically attributed to the reign of Anastasius¹³⁶. The ruins of many fifth

¹³⁰ Further examples are given by Croke (1982)(b), pp.69-71.

¹³¹ See the map in Appendix D for the following sites where defences were improved by Anastasius.

¹³² For an overview of defences in Scythia, see Scorpan (1980).

¹³³ Barnea (1960), pp.365-366.

¹³⁴ For descriptions of these basilicas, Barnea (1958), pp.331-335.

¹³⁵ Barnea (1958), p.336 discusses a private basilica (a rectangular hall with an apse at the east) in this eastern part of the town, which dates from the end of the fifth century or beginning of the sixth. More information on the development of this area can be found in Scorpan (1980), pp.78ff.

¹³⁶ See Parvan (1915-1916), pp.701-702 and (1925), p.248.

to sixth century constructions and a huge collection of coins dating from Anastasius to Justin II were found in the sector situated on the western plateau of the citadel, indicating that this sector was more extensively occupied under Anastasius¹³⁷.

Excavations carried out at Dinogetia in the south of Scythia on the right bank of the Danube, produced similar results. At various places in the citadel, especially on the west side and outside the surrounding wall, about fifteen fragments of bricks were discovered, all carrying a stamp in relief with the name of Anastasius¹³⁸. The bricks belong mainly to the basilica and towers at the south-west angle of the citadel, thus implying that Anastasius concentrated specifically on restoration work in this area¹³⁹. There is also evidence that the town plan of the fort was modified during a general rehabilitation of the site under Anastasius. Anastasian coins and fifth-sixth century lamps have been excavated, and it has been suggested that the fort, built at the beginning of the fourth century and destroyed at the end of the fourth century or beginning of the fifth, was repaired, firstly under Anastasius and then Justinian.

Noviodunum, standing thirty kilometres along the Danube from Dinogetia, also yielded brick stamps bearing the legend:

+imp]ERATOR ANASTA[sius].

During further excavations here a series of Byzantine coins, running from Anastasius to Phocas was discovered¹⁴⁰. A basilica, excavated properly in 1956 when the usually flooded site was under less water than usual, was found to be of the fifth or sixth century, possibly from the time of Anastasius¹⁴¹.

The restoration of Tomis, the capital of Scythia on the Black Sea coast, has been attributed

¹³⁷ See Petre (1963), p.319.

¹³⁸ On Dinogetia in general, see Barnea (1971), pp.346-347 and for more details about these brick fragments, Barnea (1960), pp.366.

¹³⁹ On this basilica discovered in 1951/1952, see Barnea (1958), p.337-339 and Scorpan (1980), pp.23ff.

¹⁴⁰ Barnea (1971), pp.349ff, and Scorpan (1980), pp.18ff.

¹⁴¹ Barnea (1958), pp.339-341.

by Procopius to Justinian¹⁴². However, it is by no means certain that the three Greek inscriptions describing the renovation of the curtain wall are Justinianic¹⁴³. Indeed, Parvan has asserted that they were either from the reign of Justinian "or a somewhat earlier epoch¹⁴⁴." It has been pointed out that some of the lettering closely resembles that on other brick stamps carrying the name of Anastasius, and that of the inscription,

D(ominus) N(oster) ANASTASIUS P(ius) AUG(ustus)

on a silver plate belonging to Paternus, the bishop of Tomis. The possibility that Anastasius was responsible for some of the improvements at Tomis cannot be excluded. Another indication of the important buildings erected here at this time, is given by the Corinthian and Ionic impost capitals that can be dated to the end of the fifth century or the beginning of the sixth.

Similar evidence can be used for Callatis, also on the Black Sea coast. Although a fragment of an architrave bearing the inscription, "του φιλωκτιστου" dates to Justinian's reign, there are many more sculptures and capitals from the second half of the fifth century and beginning of the sixth, attesting more activity under Anastasius¹⁴⁵. Capitals at Stratonis and Tropaeum Traiani (in the interior of Scythia) date to the same period. At the latter, buildings were erected and rebuilt under both Anastasius and Justinian¹⁴⁶.

Sacidava, situated on a high hill on the right bank of the Danube, also has an Anastasian phase. The initial defensive wall erected in the fourth century and destroyed in the middle or second half of the fifth, was repaired by Anastasius (and again in the second half of the sixth). In level III of the stratigraphy of the site, in a burned layer near the fortress wall,

¹⁴² Proc. *de Aed.* IV.11.20.

¹⁴³ Another similar inscription was found at one of the towers.

¹⁴⁴ Parvan, quoted by Barnea (1960), p.370.

¹⁴⁵ cf. Barnea (1958), p.344 and (1960), p.371.

¹⁴⁶ cf. Barnea (1960), p.371.

were discovered two fragments of bricks bearing the stamp of Anastasius¹⁴⁷.

Procopius attributes improvements to Ulmetum, (in the interior of Scythia)¹⁴⁸ and Beroe (on the Thracian plain)¹⁴⁹ to Justinian, but it is hard to find archaeological proof that the restoration was entirely the work of the later emperor. Procopius does not mention that the work was probably already underway by the time Justinian turned his attention to it. At the south gate a bronze coin of Anastasius was found¹⁵⁰. Building works, such as the gate towers, dating to the end of the fifth century or beginning of the sixth, indicate work carried out by Anastasius at Mesambria (Black Sea coast), a site which is omitted from Procopius' list. This well constructed fortress withstood the Avar assaults and is still referred to in the late sixth and seventh centuries.

It must be concluded that after the series of Bulgar attacks in the 490s and 502, and in conjunction with the work on the Long Wall, Anastasius began a programme of rehabilitation of defences along the Danube limes, the Black sea coast and in the interior of Moesia II and Scythia, which was continued and completed by Justin and Justinian. The discovery of several large structures, particularly basilicas, points not only to defensive action on Anastasius' part, but also a promotion and development of a prosperous town-life¹⁵¹.

¹⁴⁷ Scorpan, (1980), pp.50ff.

¹⁴⁸ Proc. *de Aed.* IV.7.18 writes of Justinian's fortifications here:

ὅλον τοίνυν ἐκ θεμελίων δειμάμενος...

For the general history of Ulmetum, see Scorpan (1980), pp.41-44.

¹⁴⁹ Proc. *de Aed.* IV.11.19.

¹⁵⁰ Hoddinott (1975), pp.312ff has further details on this site. Of course the restoration cannot be securely dated on the evidence of the Anastasian coin. Barnea (1960) portrays a general trend of Anastasius beginning work on these sites which was then continued by Justinian. He argues further (p.373), that as two coins of Anastasius were found at the sites of Aegissus and Troesmis and none of Justinian, Anastasius must be solely responsible for all work carried out; contra Proc. who attributes the establishment of both forts to Justinian, *de Aed.* IV.7.20 and IV.11.20.

¹⁵¹ See the conclusions of Barnea (1958), pp.347-349 and Scorpan (1980), *passim*.

Conclusions.

It is thus clear that Anastasius took some considerable interest in the west. While relations with Theoderic might have been easier, he did succeed in establishing a *modus vivendi*. At the same time, however, he managed to curb the Ostrogoth's ambitious expansionist instincts by a careful counter alliance with the Franks and an enduring friendship with the Burgundians. On another front, he responded to the Bulgar invasions with the Long Wall and improvements to various key forts.

Criticism levelled at Anastasius for his western policy seems to stem from the idea which is encompassed in the passage quoted below:

In the long run, from the military and political point of view, emperors imbued with a strong sense of Roman heritage could not tolerate the situation in which peace and stability for the eastern part of the Roman Empire was procured at the expense of the cession of its western part to forces beyond Constantinople's control¹⁵².

Anastasius' policy towards the west meant that he maintained the boundaries of the empire without trying to reconquer any part; he respected the 475 treaty with the king of the Vandals, Thrasamund, who addressed him as "friend"¹⁵³. At the same time Anastasius did not renounce imperial control or allow the disintegration of the western empire¹⁵⁴. It has been noted that battling the continuous wars against the Persians and trying to reconstruct the shattered Mediterranean Empire could only lead to a tragic involvement in long and costly wars¹⁵⁵. At least Anastasius avoided this fate, and though he lacks the heroic stature from the glorious reconquests of Justinian, his western policy deserves recognition in its own right.

¹⁵² Rubin (1986)(a), p.31.

¹⁵³ Bréhier (1914), col.1452.

¹⁵⁴ Capizzi (1969), pp.172-173.

¹⁵⁵ Rubin (1986)(a), p.47.

*Chapter Four**Religious Policy*

During Anastasius' long reign, he faced an empire in the grip of a tortuous and insoluble religious dispute. This situation was largely a product of previous unsuccessful attempts to create a unity within the Church, in particular the ^{at} Council of Chalcedon (which supported the orthodox cause against the monophysite) and through the Henoticon (an imperial edict, designed by Zeno's patriarch, Acacius). The eastern and western Churches were deadlocked in disagreement over both the east's less than full support of orthodoxy and the propriety of an edict of an emperor and patriarch (not pope) deciding the fate of the Church. Despite several attempts at negotiation, this schism was to continue until after the end of Anastasius' reign.

Both sides tried to gain the support of the Balkans, thus causing a split between the bishopric of Thessalonica (pro-Constantinople) and the majority of clergy and bishops of Illyricum and the Dardania (pro-Rome). The eastern provinces were also split: Egypt being mainly monophysite, Jerusalem mainly Chalcedonian, and Syria divided. Constantinople itself was predominantly orthodox, but, because of the Acacian affair, was refused communion by Rome.

The only hope for Anastasius was to steer a moderate course, keeping to the spirit of the Henoticon as far as possible. As Severus, the extreme monophysite patriarch of Antioch, was to write in a letter to the bishop Solon:

...for if the [Henoticon] does not touch the stumbling blocks that sprang up at Chalcedon and separated the Churches, what is the use of mentioning it? To the pious king, [it] was necessary for the general union of the Churches, since he was desirous of showing that the king who preceded him also had before him the object of bringing into union those who separated on account of the

Synod of Chalcedon....¹.

The most obvious danger of such a policy of moderation, as certain patriarchs found, is that no party was ever satisfied. This often led to vacillation; an erratic zig-zag course in an attempt to meet the demands of irreconcilable factions. Was this the fate of Anastasius, or did he always maintain his own course through the doctrinal battlefield? Did he put personal belief first, or was he, as Severus claimed, forever seeking to establish unity in the Church? These are the questions which must be kept in mind throughout the study of ecclesiastical events during his reign. We turn first to the root causes of the theological dispute which raged under Anastasius.

The Council of Chalcedon.

Between 5th October and 10th November, 451, over five hundred bishops gathered at the church of St. Euphemia, Chalcedon. On 25th October, a definition of the nature of Christ, aimed at smoothing over all the disputed grey areas of dogma that had created so much dissent within the Church, was finally agreed and signed by the majority of bishops². One of the most significant areas of doubt, and one that was to continue to cause problems, was referred to by the statement:

Lord Jesus Christ...born of the Virgin theotokos as to the manhood, one and the same Christ, Son and Lord, only-begotten, made known to us in two natures, unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably.

Four days previously, a formula prepared by the patriarch of Constantinople, Anatolius, was blocked by the papal legates and bishops of the patriarchate of Antioch because, although it affirmed that Christ was "of two natures" and Mary was the theotokos, it did not go far enough concerning the two natures of Christ. The bishops were reminded that they had accepted Leo's Tome which stated,

two natures are united without change, without division and without confusion in Christ.

The Chalcedon definition had to take this into account.

¹ Sel. Let. I:2.

² For the definition of the Council of Chalcedon, see Appendix F.

There had been a similar disagreement at the Council of Ephesus in 449 when many bishops had been unwilling to accept that Christ was "in two natures" after the incarnation; they preferred to say Christ was "ἐκ" two natures. Although separated by only one small word, the two views actually represented two very distinct interpretations of the nature of Christ. Christ "in two natures" identified Christ much more closely with man, emphasising His humanity and His atonement of man's sins. In contrast, the Christ "of two natures" theory saw Christ as the Incarnate Word and its supporters accepted that the mystery of salvation existed in the union of the divine and the human in one being³. This division between "ἐν" and "ἐκ" was to prove to be the foundation of the great "orthodox-monophysite" debate which raged throughout the Roman empire during the reign of Anastasius.

The Council of Chalcedon also dealt with other matters. There was a dispute between Constantinople and Ephesus over the right of the former to interfere in the churches of Asia Minor generally, and in particular at Ephesus. At Chalcedon, two rival bishops of Ephesus who both demanded recognition were deposed, but the question of whether Constantinople had the right to ordain a new bishop was left open. The seniority of episcopal sees had been debated previously at the Council of ^{Constantinople} Chalcedon, 381, when it was decreed that Constantinople was second only to Rome. Then, and eighty years on, this position was disputed by those who believed that the apostolic sees, for example Alexandria, should have primacy. The ambitions of Alexandria itself are clear: her bishops "strove to make themselves masters of Egypt and leaders of the Church in the east". Rome's enthusiasm for questioning the pretensions of Constantinople is equally clear:

[Alexandria] relied on three powerful forces, on Greek piety and monasticism, on the masses of the lower classes, and on the Roman bishops, who had an equal interest in keeping down the bishops of Constantinople....⁴.

However, the twenty-eighth canon of the 451 Council gave Constantinople the authority to consecrate metropolitans of Asia Minor (including Ephesus), Pontus, Thrace, land held by barbarians and "primacy of honour after the bishops of Rome". Old Rome, always jealous

³ For more details on this christological dogma, see Frend (1972), pp.4-7.

⁴ Harnack (1898), IV.191, quoted by Charanis (1974), p.32.

of its unequalled primacy as the see of St. Peter, was not keen to see Constantinople gaining such status and threatening such rivalry. The pope preferred to support Alexandria, the apostolic see of the east; the claims of Constantinople as an imperial city should not be allowed to compensate for the fact it was not an apostolic see. The authority of Constantinople in sacred matters was a sore point in relations between the east and the west and would eventually result in the Acacian schism⁵.

The third result of the Council of Chalcedon was the anathematisation of Nestorius and Eutyches. In 428, the emperor Theodosius II appointed Nestorius, an Antiochene monk and follower of Theodore of Mopsuestia, to the patriarchate of Constantinople. Nestorius had tried to find a more precise definition of faith after the first two oecumenical councils had established that Christ had two natures, divine and human, but could not agree upon how their union should be conceived. Theodore of Mopsuestia taught that each of the two natures was perfect and that they altered in no way in the union. Thus, Mary gave birth to a man and could not be called "theotokos". Nestorius agreed with this interpretation and persecuted believers of the theotokos.

However, Nestorius was opposed by Cyril, patriarch of Alexandria, ruthless, unethical, but a great theologian. Despite the backing of the imperial court for Nestorius, Cyril enlisted the support of Rome and at a general Council held at Ephesus, Nestorius was condemned as the new Judas and deposed. The emperor was persuaded to recognize the synod and Nestorius was outlawed to Persia, but it was not until later⁶ that the former was prevailed upon to pass an edict ordering the burning of all Nestorian works.

⁵ For further discussion, Martin (1953), II.433-458 and Frend (1972), pp.7-15.

⁶ 16th February, 448. Cyril (and his supporters) was excommunicated in June 431 by John, patriarch of Antioch, who saw the language of Cyril's theology, including the famous *Twelve Chapters* he composed for Nestorius to anathematise, as ambiguous. Many of the problems inherent in Cyril's doctrines stemmed from the basic conflict between the theologies of Antioch and Alexandria regarding the relative divinity and manhood of Christ. Apollonius, bishop of Laodicea (Syria), had resolved that the part which in man is the rational soul, was in Christ the Divine Word. This theory was adopted by the Alexandrian theologians and monophysites, but challenged by the Antiochenes, Diodore, bishop of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who saw the divine and human natures as separate, but "united by will and grace so completely that they formed one person". See discussion by Frend (1972), pp.12-14,19.

Eutyches was an aged archimandrite, who by 447, in a misunderstanding of Cyril, had come to believe that one nature of the Word Incarnate had been made flesh, thus challenging the view that Christ's humanity was "consubstantial" with man's. Flavian, patriarch of Constantinople, called a local synod and summoned Eutyches to defend himself. Although he modified his rejection of dyophysite Christology to an assertion of "two natures before the union, one after it", he was deposed. However, he enjoyed the support of Cyril's successor, Dioscorus, who was keen to support Eutyches against the accusations of Flavian, patriarch of the rival and ambitious see of Constantinople. Meanwhile, although the pope had sided with Cyril against the patriarch of Constantinople in 431, by 449 Rome perceived Alexandria as an equal threat. The pope Leo stood against Dioscorus and in a famous letter to Flavian, known as the *Epistula Dogmatica*, or *Tome of Leo*, laid down his profession of faith that in Christ, there were two natures, one personality. He also criticised Flavian for the way he had dealt with Eutyches.

At the Council of Ephesus in 449, Dioscorus held complete control and, supported by imperial representatives, he could afford to ignore the papal legates, and the *Tome of Leo* was never read. Eutyches was reinstated and Flavian deposed. Although voting was coerced, this Council more than any other expressed the general religious feeling of the time, and would have permanently settled the controversy in the east if extraneous interests had not been involved⁷.

The reaction of Rome was rather different: the gathering at Ephesus was denounced as the "Robber Council" and the pope demanded another synod to be held in Italy. The emperor refused and Dioscorus excommunicated the pope.

However, the tide was turning in the east and with the sudden death of Theodosius in July, 450, and the accession of Pulcheria with Marcian, the situation was suddenly reversed. Eutyches was exiled, Flavian's body was brought back to Constantinople and his name inscribed on the diptychs, and at the Council of Chalcedon, Dioscorus was deposed.

⁷ Bury (1923), I.356 (quoted by Charanis (1972), p.35). For a more detailed account of the Council of Ephesus 448, Frend (1972), pp.39-43.

The Council of Chalcedon was no different from any previous solution to religious strife in that it perpetrated and caused at least as many problems as it aimed to solve. As for the definition of faith, it was "the product of an uneasy compromise"⁸. Regarded by Leo as absolute and binding, many bishops in the east saw only the definition of Nicaea, confirmed by the Councils of Constantinople and Ephesus I, as the real exposition of faith. Some bishops and clergy, especially those at Constantinople, adopted the Chalcedonian formula merely in relief to be rid of Dioscorus, and to establish more firmly the ambitions of Constantinople over Alexandria. The establishment of the primacy of the imperial capital in the east was, on the other hand, rather less pleasing to Rome. Marcian's role in the Council also led to a consideration of the degree to which an emperor might interfere in the ecclesiastical sphere. Alexandria, defeated in theology and status, had the most reason to be discontented.

The Henoticon of Zeno.

On 28th July, 482, the emperor Zeno addressed a letter to the bishops, clergy, monks and laymen of Alexandria, Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis. Based on the advice of Acacius, the patriarch of Constantinople, the epistle was divided into three sections: firstly, affirming the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed as the only right and true faith; secondly, condemning Nestorius and Eutyches, and accepting the twelve anathemas of Cyril; and thirdly, adopting a doctrine regarding the nature of Christ which was favourable to the monophysites. In a confession of faith, Zeno asserted that Christ was consubstantial with both God and man and

incarnate from the Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin and Theotokos, is one not two, for we say that both his miracles and sufferings which he willingly underwent in the flesh are of one person.

Anyone who disagreed should be anathematised. The Council of Chalcedon was ignored, rather than condemned. This epistle was the well-known *Henoticon*⁹. That another definition of faith was required after the supposedly ultimate definition of Chalcedon thirty-one years

⁸ Frend (1972), p.47.

⁹ On the Henoticon, see eg. Salaville (1920), Stein (1949), II.31-39, Capizzi (1969), p.57 with n.34 and pp.101ff with n.54, Frend (1972), pp.177-183 and Charanis (1974), pp.43-44.

previously is merely a reflection of the confusion and unease that followed the 451 council. Leo, disputing the twenty-eighth canon about the prerogatives of Constantinople, delayed in ratifying the council, while throughout the east, schisms flared. The deaths of Marcian and especially Pulcheria weakened the orthodox Chalcedonian cause, and Leo died in November 461 having discovered that no Roman pope could govern the east.

Confusion had grown with the two encyclicals of the usurper Basiliscus. The first was based on the theology of Cyril and Dioscorus; Nestorius and Eutyches were condemned, Celestine, the pope, Cyril and Dioscorus were praised, and the status of Constantinople was left ambiguous. Supported by the papacy, but opposed strongly by Acacius, Basiliscus hastily sent a counter-encyclical, reaffirming the rights of the patriarch of Constantinople and denouncing Nestorius, Eutyches and all other heretics. He dared make no reference to Chalcedon for over five hundred bishops had subscribed to his first encyclical¹⁰.

After such confusion, a directive from the restored emperor Zeno was certainly desirable. The Henoticon was designed to subdue the mumblings of discontent in the east and, in particular, to affect a reconciliation between Constantinople and Alexandria, and it was more by accident that the wrath of Rome was provoked¹¹. The Henoticon stood as the official policy of Zeno and Anastasius. It was successful in its immediate aim of healing the schism between Alexandria and Constantinople but pressure continued to grow for an outright rejection (or acceptance) of the Chalcedonian definition of faith.

The Acacian Schism.

Acacius, as the figure behind the Henoticon, obviously signed it. Peter Mongus, leader of the monophysites in Egypt, also accepted it and became patriarch of Alexandria. Calendion, the patriarch of Antioch, opposed it and, suspected of fraternising with Illus and Leontius against

¹⁰ See eg. Stein (1959), I.363-364, and Frend (1972), pp.169-174.

¹¹ The Henoticon unified as closely as possible the theologies of the east: the faith of the first three oecumenical councils was confirmed, and although the Tome and Chalcedon were not condemned, the Council was reduced to a disciplinary body for the anathematisation of Nestorius and Eutyches. See Frend (1972), p.179 who terms it a "masterstroke of Acacian diplomacy", contra Capizzi (1969), p.101 who refers to the tortuous and ambiguous statements of Acacius.

Zeno, was deposed, and replaced by Peter Fuller, a supporter of the Henoticon. Martyrius, patriarch of Jerusalem, eventually accepted it too. Rome was most shocked, not only at the over-ruling of the Chalcedonian definition of faith, but especially because the faith of the Church was now imposed by imperial edict. On taking up office after the death of Simplicius in March 483, Pope Felix III, alerted to the seriousness of the situation by the Sleepless Monks of Constantinople, demanded the ejection of Peter Mongus, the restoration of the definition of Chalcedon, and sent a legation under Misenus, bishop of Cuma, and Vitalis, to make enquiries about the conduct of Acacius. The legation fell into a trap and took communion with Acacius during which the names of Dioscorus and Peter Mongus were read from the diptychs. Meanwhile, on 28th July, 484, Felix III held a synod at which Acacius and Peter Mongus were excommunicated. In retaliation, Acacius removed the pope's name from the diptychs, and thus began the Acacian schism that was to endure thirty-five long years¹².

The Accession of Anastasius.

The break with Rome complete, the union within the east, the main goal of the Henoticon, now began to fracture¹³. As Evagrius wrote, by the time of Anastasius,

έντεῦθεν πλεῖστα τμήματα κατά τε τὴν ἑῶν ἀνά τε τὰ ἐσπέρια μέρη καὶ κατά τὴν Λιβύην ἐτύγχανον ὄντα, οὔτε τῶν ἐῶν ἐπισκόπων τοῖς ἐσπερίοις ἢ τοῖς Λίβυσι σπενδομένων οὔτε αὐ τούτων τοῖς ἐῶις. Τὸ δὲ μείζον' εἰς ἀτοπίαν προῆι. Οὐδὲ γὰρ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκοινώνουν οἱ τῆς ἐῶας πρόεδροι, οὐδὲ μὴν οἱ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἢ τῆς Λιβύης τοὺς θρόνους διέποντες, μήτι γε δὴ καὶ ὑπερορίοις¹⁴.

By the beginning of the 490s, the most significant partisans of the Henoticon, including Peter Fuller, Peter Mongus, Acacius and Zeno, had died. For a brief four months, the patriarchate

¹² *Liber Pontificalis* I.252-253, with Brezzi (1936), pp.324-325, Frend (1972), pp.181-183 and Charanis (1974), p.44.

¹³ For more details regarding the eastern provinces, see Bardy (1947), pp.299-301 and Frend (1972), pp.184-190.

¹⁴ Evag. III.30. A hint of the situation is provided by Theoph. AM 5982, who lists the bishops who fell victim to the Henoticon.

of Constantinople was held by Fravitta, who, in his short office, tried to effect a general reconciliation, but actually satisfied no one. The capital's desire for a pious Chalcedonian emperor was manifested in the calls to Ariadne:

ὀρθόδοξον βασιλέα τῇ οἰκουμένη¹⁵.

But although he was certainly pious¹⁶, there were doubts over the new emperor's past religious convictions. It is well known that although many of Anastasius' immediate relatives were Chalcedonian, other members of his family were not:

Μανιχαῖοι καὶ Ἀρειανοὶ ἔχαιρον Ἀναστασίῳ, Μανιχαῖοι μὲν ὡς τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ ζηλωτρίας οὔσης αὐτῶν, Ἀρειανοὶ δὲ ὡς Κλέαρχον τὸν θεῖον πρὸς μητρὸς Ἀναστασίου ὀμόδοξον ἔχοντες¹⁷.

Furthermore, a rumour circulating widely at the time, told how the orthodox patriarch of Constantinople, Euphemius, had driven the future emperor out of the church where he was preaching presumably monophysite views, overturning his chair and threatening to tonsure his head and parade him through the streets¹⁸.

Most sources are hostile to Anastasius; his whole rule was tainted by his monophysite inclinations. Theophanes referred to him as "the one who rules wickedly" and the *Histoire Nestorienne* claimed that the people were agitated and asked how he could reign over them when he was so wrong about the nature of God¹⁹. Paul the Deacon similarly remarked,

Hic [Anastasius] Romani decus imperii Eutychianae haereseos inlucie

¹⁵ De Caer. I.92. At Constantinople, there was always an orthodox majority. Monks (eg. the "Sleepless Ones") proved to be effective agitators against any imperial policy contrary to their interests. The potential power of the monks was noted by Baynes (1926), p.148 (quoted by Charanis (1974), p.47):

The voice of the monk was what the press is today, and with their religious slogans the monks produced the same effect as modern newspapers with their political war cries.

¹⁶ In Anastasius' defence to all accusations and slurs on his conduct in the doctrinal dispute, at his coronation the crowd shouted:

ὡς ἔζησας, οὕτως βασίλευσον.

De Caer. I.92. Earlier in his career, he had been shortlisted for the patriarchate of Antioch; cf. Theod. Lect. 445, Theoph. AM 5983, Vict. Tunn. 491, Niceph. Cal. XVI.20.

¹⁷ Theod. Lect. 448, Theoph. AM 5983.

¹⁸ Theod. Lect. 441, Theoph. AM 5982, Georg. Mon. 623-624.

¹⁹ Theoph. AM 5982-5983, *Hist. Nest. X*.

maculavit²⁰.

On the other hand, he is praised by Zachariah of Mytilene, a close friend and supporter of the monophysite Severus, who opened his account of the reign of Anastasius with a tale of how, on a visit to Constantinople, John Scholasticus predicted the succession of Anastasius:

On account of the uprightness, virtue and beauty of your mind, because you carry out the good will of God and are gentle, serene, humble and uncorrupted, and to all a protector of gentleness and kindness for the gain of all men who are like you; not because I demand anything from you or flatter you, I will reveal to you that you will immediately be the future king²¹.

More surprising, perhaps, is the praise of the orthodox Evagrius, who commented on Anastasius' peaceful disposition and how he was averse to changes in the Church. Thus Chalcedonianism was neither openly proclaimed or repudiated. It is true that Anastasius removed bishops who were agitators, hence the exile of Euphemius, Macedonius and Flavian, though conveniently they were also in opposition to his own views²².

It is impossible to know which of the sources come nearest the truth, or to establish whether Anastasius was already a convinced monophysite when he came to power. Obviously, the sources are biased, firstly by the authors' own predispositions, and secondly, by later events and Anastasius' undeniably increased monophysite stance.

Such was Euphemius' suspicion that he demanded from Anastasius a written profession of faith promising to follow the Chalcedonian creed and not to introduce any innovation²³, thus

²⁰ Paul, *Hist. Rom.* XVI.2.

²¹ Zach. of Myt. VII.1.

²² These exiles also refute Evagrius' own statement that bishops were allowed to act according to their own opinions; Evag. III.30, with Allen (1981), pp.145-147.

²³ This document was kept in the archives at the Great Church, guarded by the treasurer and future patriarch of Constantinople, Macedonius; Theod. Lect. 446, Evag. III.32, Vict. Tunn. 491, Theoph. AM 5983, Cedr. 626, Georg. Mon. 624.

trying to ensure a degree of security and continuity within the Church²⁴. Euphemius was a convinced Chalcedonian and on his consecration, he wrote to Pope Felix III to notify him of his election²⁵. He refused communion with the monophysite Peter Mongus of Alexandria and removed his name from the diptychs²⁶. But while Euphemius fought battles with the monophysite east, he himself was not accepted by Rome; Felix demanded the removal of Acacius' name from the diptychs, and Euphemius, refusing to allow the slight on the authority of the see of Constantinople, would not comply²⁷.

Anastasius and the West: Relations with the Popes.

a) *Gelasius*

Throughout Anastasius' reign there were sporadic attempts to end the deadlock in relations between the imperial capital and the apostolic see. 492 saw the start of the negotiations to end the schism. However, the new pope, Gelasius, was even more intransigent on the subject of Acacius than his predecessor. Indeed, there is reason to believe that it was Gelasius who used to encourage Felix III in a hardline stance against the pretensions of the east²⁸. He was also responsible for several works against Acacius, such as the *De damnatione nominum Petri et Acacii*²⁹, and was assiduous in his correspondence with the bishops of Gaul and the

²⁴ For Euphemius, Zon. XIV.3.5-8; Le Quien (1740), I.219, Smith and Wace (1880), II.292, Salaville (1920), p.61, Duchesne (1925), pp.2-4, Bardy (1948), p.301, and Janin (1963)b, pp.1410f.

²⁵ Originally from Apamea, Euphemius directed a hospital near Constantinople before becoming patriarch in 490. For his synodical letter to Felix, see Zach. of Myt. VII.1, Theoph. AM 5983, Niceph. Cal. XVI.19 and Grumel (1932), p.132.

²⁶ Peter Mongus disagreed openly with the Tome of Leo and the Council of Chalcedon; Grumel (1932), p.132.

²⁷ cf. Theod. Lect. 442, Theoph. AM 5983, Niceph. Cal. XVI.19.

²⁸ See the *Liber Pontificalis* I.252f, Brezzi (1936), pp.325ff, and Dvornik (1958), pp.110,116.

²⁹ Gelasius is often described as uncompromising, verbose and rigorous in his reasoning, especially on his favourite subjects, the primacy of Rome and the final outcome on the Day of Judgement. As he wrote to Euphemius:

...veniemus ad illud pavendum tribunal Christi...ibi certe dilucidabitur, utrum ego, sicut putatis, acerbus, asper et nimis durus difficilisque sim vobis.

See Thiel (1868), p.320, Schwartz (1934), pp.49ff, with Grisar (1912), II.213ff, Duchesne (1925), pp.12-13 and Frend (1972), pp.193ff.

Balkans on the same subject³⁰. Thus, in a letter to Rusticus, bishop of Lyons, written in 494, he expresses his pleasure at the union with the Gallic bishops and also his distress over the Acacian schism:

quantam ob impiissimi Acacii causam persecutionem sustinemus³¹.

In his correspondence with the bishops of Dardania and Illyricum, he encouraged eastern heretics to return to the true faith. He broke off communion with the bishop of Thessalonica who would not condemn Acacius³² and despatched a letter, justifying why Acacius had been condemned by Rome, for

etiam sine ullo synodo precedente et absolvendi, quos synodos inique damnaverat, et damnandi nulla existente synodo, quos oportuit, habuerit facultatem³³.

On his ordination as pope, Gelasius wrote the customary letter to Anastasius announcing his election³⁴ to which it seems, he received no reply, ostensibly because he had sent no letter to Euphemius. Only later did he write to the patriarch³⁵, after receiving two letters in which Euphemius complained that he had received no letters of communion from the new pope³⁶. He expressed a strong desire for reconciliation, reminding the pope that Acacius had not been officially condemned by any synod. He insisted that the people of Constantinople would not

³⁰ The Balkans were subject to pressure from both orthodox Rome and the east, in favour of the Henoticon and monophysitism; cf. Duchesne (1892), pp.544ff.

³¹ Thiel (1868), p.359.

³² Mansi (1762), VIII.46f, Thiel (1868), pp.382ff and Jaffé (1885-1888), no.638.

³³ Mansi (1762), VIII.50ff, 63ff, Thiel (1868), pp.392ff, 414ff, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.664.

³⁴ Jaffé (1885-1888), no.619.

³⁵ Mansi (1762), VIII.5ff, Thiel (1868), p.312ff and Jaffé (1885-1888), no.620.

³⁶ In 494, Gelasius wrote to Anastasius explaining why he had not informed Euphemius of his election. He made polite excuses, remarking that such a letter was not compulsory and that the schism made such correspondence inappropriate. He reassured the emperor that despite bad ecclesiastical relations, he still "respected, loved and welcomed the Roman princeps". cf. Thiel (1868), pp.349-358, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.632, and Schwartz (1934), pp.19ff. Grisar (1912), II.214 wrote harshly about Anastasius,

Even in his dealings with so narrow-minded and tyrannical an emperor as Anastasius... [Gelasius] was still courteous.

allow the name of Acacius to be removed. Gelasius replied, refusing any compromise, and outlining his approval of the Council of Chalcedon, especially concerning the condemnation of Eutyches. He enquired why other Eutychians, namely Peter Mongus and Acacius, had not been similarly rejected. The main purport of the letter, however, was to establish firmly the supremacy of Rome:

Veniamus, frater Euphemi, sine dubitatione veniamus ad illud pavendum tribunal Christi...et circumstantibus illis, a quibus fides ista defensa est...illic...est agendum...utrum beati Petri gloriosa confessio cuiquam eorum, quos regendos accepit, quidquam subtraxerit ad salutem, an eam auscultare nolenti etiam cum suo periculo rebellis exstiterit obstinata pernicies.

Gelasius here and elsewhere, ignores the twenty-eighth canon of Chalcedon giving Constantinople preeminence over Alexandria and Antioch: he always placed them second and third after Rome, and he seldom referred to his own see without calling it "apostolic". In a letter to the Dardanian bishops, he insultingly alluded to the see of Constantinople as under that of Heraclea, the metropolitan of the province of Europa:

An sedem apostolicam congruebat paroeciae Heracliensis ecclesiae, id est Constantinopolitani pontificis, vel quorumlibet aliorum...³⁷.

Constantinople had no greater claim to primacy than the other centres of imperialism outside Rome, Ravenna, Milan, Sirmium or Trier. Gelasius also stated that patriarchs and bishops could only be judged by the pope who held jurisdiction over the whole Church³⁸. Naturally, such claims were not received well in the east and in a letter to the senator Faustus, Gelasius complained that the easterners had called him "proud and arrogant". However, he made no secret of his contempt for Byzantium, writing to the bishops of Dalmatia and Dardania,

Apud Graecos, quibus multas haereses abundare non dubium est...³⁹

In 492, Theoderic sent an embassy led by Faustus and Irenaeus to Anastasius to negotiate his

³⁷ Thiel (1868), pp.392-414, esp. p.398, Gunther (1895-1898), no.95.

³⁸ This ideal is developed principally in three documents; the *commonitorium* to Faustus (Thiel (1868), pp.341ff), the letter to Anastasius (Thiel pp.349ff), and a long letter to the bishops of Dardania (Thiel pp.392ff). See further Dvornik (1958), pp.113-118.

³⁹ Thiel (1868), pp.335f, Gunther (1895-1898), no.79.

new status⁴⁰ and Gelasius saw his opportunity for bringing to an end the Acacian schism. But conditions were not favourable for peace. Anastasius, offended by Gelasius' response to Euphemius, ordered his legates, despatched to Italy after Theoderic's capture of Ravenna, to avoid contact with the pope. In a motion of petty retaliation, Gelasius sent no letter of salutation to Anastasius with Faustus. He entrusted the latter with negotiations about the schism, briefing him with thoroughly with his *commonitorium*, in which he warns about the sly tricks of the Greeks and refutes their arguments. He wrote thus:

Ego quoque mente percepi Graecos in sua obstinatione mansuros...Quapropter non tam propter religionis causas student dispositionibus publicis obviare, sed potius per occasionem legationis regiae catholicam fidem moliuntur evertere, et tali commercio nituntur sperata praestare⁴¹.

To the pope's demand for the removal of Acacius from the diptychs, Anastasius offered a compromise. From the evidence of later negotiations, it seems that he put forward a proposal that he would recognise Theoderic as king of Italy, in return for papal acceptance of the Henoticon.

Anastasius was obviously keen to establish ecclesiastical peace at Rome so that he could concentrate on affairs in the east. As noted in chapter three, a nod of recognition to Theoderic was not a large price to pay, in return for the promise of a real union based on the unity of the Church⁴². Gelasius, however, was bound to reject the offer. Papal recognition of the Henoticon implied a recognition of the emperor's right to decide matters of doctrine by edict. In his letter of 494, Gelasius set forth his belief that the spiritual authority of Rome also implied temporal power⁴³:

⁴⁰ Hodgkin (1895), III.432-434, Pfeilschifter (1896), p.22ff; cf. chapter 3, part 2, *Theoderic's Constitutional Position: the embassies*.

⁴¹ Thiel (1868), p.341ff, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.622, Schwartz (1934), p.16ff; Charanis (1974), pp.48-49.

⁴² See Capizzi (1969), p.103 with n.64 for Anastasius' preoccupation with the east; the patriarchates of the east were a far greater worry than the papacy of Italy which was farther away and further down the political agenda.

⁴³ Gelasius was persuaded to write to Anastasius by the senate of Rome, which was aware of the pro-Constantinople policy of Theoderic; cf. Brezzi (1936), p.337.

Duo quippe sunt, imperator auguste, quibus principaliter mundus hic regitur: auctoritas sacrata pontificum, et regalis potestas. In quibus tanto gravius est pondus sacerdotum....Nosti etenim, fili clementissime, quod licet praesideas humano generi dignitate, rerum tamen praesulibus divinarum devotus colla submittis, atque ab eis causas tuae salutis expectas, inque sumendis coelestibus sacramentis eisque ut competit disponendis, subdi te debere cognoscis religionis ordine potius quam praeesse....Et si cunctis generaliter sacerdotibus recte divina tractantibus fidelium convenit corda submitti, quanto potius sedis illius praesuli consensus est adhibendus, quem cunctis sacerdotibus et Divinitas summa voluit praeminere, et subsequens Ecclesiae generalis iugiter pietas celebravit⁴⁴?

He reiterated his belief in denying the secular power's right to judge in ecclesiastical matters in his fourth tractatus⁴⁵. He recalls how the emperors also used to hold the title of Pontifex Maximus, but that God had given the "officia utriusque potestatis" distinctive functions and status.

Hence emperors are in need of pontiffs for their eternal life, and pontiffs must make use of imperial services for temporal necessities.

Gelasius, however, was historically inaccurate in his argument that Christian emperors were the first to give up the title of Supreme Priest, as the emperor Gratian had been the first to do so⁴⁶.

⁴⁴ The supremacy of Rome over Constantinople was a familiar theme of Gelasius' letters and appears in his treatise *Tomus de anathematis vinculo* (see below); cf. Smith and Wace (1880), II.618-619 and Schwartz (1934), pp.222ff. For a discussion on the definitions of "auctoritas" and "potestas", see Dvornik (1951), pp.111-115, Dvornik (1966), pp.804-808 and Richards (1979), p.21. Gelasius' reasoning on the "auctoritas" of the pope versus the "potestas" of the emperor was hardly new. Previously, Ambrose had placed the power of the Church over that of the emperor in his treatment of Valentinian I and Theodosius II.

⁴⁵ Thiel (1868), pp.557ff.

⁴⁶ For the reaction of Gelasius' successors, see further Dvornik (1951), pp.115ff. Particularly ironical is the letter addressed to Theoderic by the bishops of the second synod during the Laurentian schism. They wrote, It is therefore, the concern of your *imperium* to see, on God's invitation, to the rehabilitation of the Church... So we request you to come to the assistance, as a pious ruler, of our weakness and powerlessness, since the simplicity of the priests is not equal to the cunning of the laity...

b) *Anastasius II*

Very different was the manner of the next pope, Anastasius II, who took up office on 24th November, 496 after the death of Gelasius. Anastasius, like his predecessors, had no intention of accepting the Henoticon or dropping Rome's demand for the removal of Acacius from the diptychs. Yet his approach was far more conciliatory. With the second embassy of Theoderic early in 497 to Constantinople to renegotiate for his status in Italy, headed this time, by another senator, Festus, Anastasius II sent a letter with two bishops, Cresconius and Germanus⁴⁷. Anastasius wrote that he desired an end to the schism and unlike Gelasius, he attributed some influence in sacred matters to the potestas of the emperor:

Pectus clementiae vestrae sacrarium est publicae felicitatis, ut per instantiam vestram, quam velut vicarium Deus praesidere iussit in terris, evangelicis apostolicisque praeceptis non dura superbia resistatur, sed per obedientiam, quae sunt salutifera, compleantur.

Anastasius, it seems, was not only willing to be tactful but also to flatter the emperor to achieve the unity so urgently needed within the Church: thus, he ended:

unde...secundum preces nostras annisu et auctoritate imperiali offerte Deo nostro unam Ecclesiam catholicam et apostolicam: quia hoc solum est, in quo non solum in terris, sed etiam in coelo triumphare sine fine possitis.

The outcome of the negotiations were as follows: Festus obtained agreement for further celebrations in honour of the festival of St. Peter and St. Paul and the desired recognition of Theoderic as king of Italy. In return for these concessions he promised that he would persuade the pope to subscribe to the Henoticon⁴⁸. While in Constantinople, Festus took the opportunity to meet with a delegation of Alexandrian emissaries. They, represented by the priest Dioscorus, emphasised the links between the sees of Peter and Mark:

Acta Synhodorum Habitarum Romae (Relatio Episcoporum ad regem, sections 9-12) ed. Th. Mommsen, *MGH AA XII* (Berlin 1884), quoted by Dvornik (1951), p.116. Hence, an example of bishops begging for the help of a heretical king to judge their pope.

⁴⁷ Mansi (1762), VIII.188ff, Thiel (1868), pp.615-623 and Jaffé (1885-1888), no.744.

⁴⁸ Despite apparent concord, it is noticeable that the emperor was still wary of the pope's intentions. He forbade the new patriarch of Constantinople, Macedonius, to send synodical letters to Rome.

Petrum memoramus beatum apostolicum, cuius omnia sanctus evangelista
 Marcus existit imitator⁴⁹.

Unity was established between Rome and Alexandria on agreement of the Henoticon, an acknowledgement by Alexandria of the supremacy of Rome, and the removal of Acacius' name from the diptychs.

Meanwhile, the conciliatory approach of Anastasius II also encouraged the bishop of Thessalonica, Andrew, who had, up to this point, been in communion with the Church of Constantinople. He now published a letter of reconciliation from Gelasius, anathematised Acacius and sent the deacon, Photinus, to Rome. However, in welcoming Photinus, Anastasius antagonised many clergy of the city, who accused him of wishing to rehabilitate Acacius. A number of priests broke communion with him in protest⁵⁰.

c) *The Laurentian Schism*

It is impossible to say whether Anastasius II would ever have been persuaded to break with the traditional stance of Rome and make amends with the east on the emperor's terms. Festus had acted entirely on his own initiative in his promise to Anastasius. However, on his return to Rome, he learnt, to his dismay, of the pope's premature death⁵¹. In view of his agreement with Anastasius, it was imperative that the new pope was as mild and conciliatory as Anastasius II had been, and open to persuasion. Therefore, Festus promoted the election, by means of bribery and political intrigue, of the archpriest, Laurentius⁵². However, the majority, encouraged by Faustus, the senator who had headed Theoderic's first embassy to Constantinople were, were in favour of the deacon, Symmachus. Both were consecrated on

⁴⁹ Thiel (1868), pp.628ff.

⁵⁰ Thus runs the account in the *Liber Pontificalis*, I.258-259:

Eodem tempore multi clerici et presbiteri se a communione ipsius erigerunt, eo quod communicasset sine consilio presbiterorum vel episcoporum vel clericorum cunctae ecclesiae catholicae diacono Thessalonicense, nomine Fotino, qui communis erat Acacio et quia voluit occulte revocare Acacium et non potuit. Qui nuto divino percussus est.

⁵¹ Theod. Lect. 461.

⁵² Theod. Lect. 461, *Landolfus Sagax* XVII.216.

22nd November, 498, Laurentius in the church of Santa Maria and Symmachus in the Lateran basilica.

It is clear that a schism was forming in Rome even before the demise of Anastasius II. The senate and clergy split into two factions, one supporting Gelasius' hardline stance against the east, and the other, taking Anastasius' more conciliatory approach. The pro-Anastasian faction which transferred its sympathies to Laurentius, always remained fairly small and it has been characterised as a fraction of the clergy,

consisting mainly of short-sighted men who were over-disposed to peace, and who really expected Anastasius II to subscribe to the Henoticon⁵³.

Both new popes desired the recognition of Theoderic and thus presented themselves at the court of Ravenna. Although, he had fewer votes, Laurentius might have hoped for the king's support. After all, the bargain with the east required a pope amenable to the Henoticon in return for the restoration of the *ornamenta palatii*⁵⁴. However, it seems that Theoderic was not to be dissuaded from his duty and duly picked Symmachus while Laurentius was conveniently despatched to take up position as bishop of Nuceria in Campania. His supporters in Rome, however, continued to agitate and in 501 Symmachus faced three accusations: not celebrating Easter properly, immoral intercourse with women and illegal alienation of church property. Theoderic, in response to demands of help from Rome, sent an episcopal Visitor, Peter of Altinum, who was unsuccessful at resolving matters⁵⁵. In the course of 501, three synods were arranged: the first two never took place, but finally on 23rd

⁵³ Grisar (1912), p.222. This view however, is somewhat biased. The Laurentian faction was composed of a group of senators, led by Probinus and Festus, who supported the idea of religious unity and were conscious of old ties with Constantinople. Moreover, they still disliked the rule of a "barbarian" Arian king. They were joined by "aliqui pars clericorum", including the deacon Pascasius, well-known for his asceticism; cf. *Liber Pontificalis* I.260. See also, chapter 3, part 2, *Theoderic and the Doctrinal Schism*, 516, for various opinions of senators.

⁵⁴ cf. chapter 3, part 2, *Theoderic and the Doctrinal Schism*, 491-506. See Alessandrini (1944), Pfeilschifter (1896), pp.55ff on Theoderic's role, and Cessi (1920), pp.210ff on the *modus vivendi* of the Church of Rome and the government of Italy.

⁵⁵ An episcopal visitor was usually sent when there was a vacancy to take charge until a new bishop or pope was elected.

October at a session known as the *synodus Palmaris*, an agreement signed by seventy-six bishops decreed that all the accusations against Symmachus were false⁵⁶. Notwithstanding this settlement, the rightful pope was left in virtual exile at the Vatican and Laurentius was recalled. Both he and the Visitor were excommunicated by Symmachus. A synod held in 502 tried further to restore order stating that "no layman can settle any church matter without the pope's leave". Yet the state of unrest, verging on civil war, continued in Rome, especially with Laurentius' conversion of the church of St. Paul into a rival of St. Peter's⁵⁷. In 505, Theoderic was persuaded to intervene: a synod was held at which one hundred and fifteen bishops confirmed Symmachus as their pope and Laurentius retired from the scene to a country estate belonging to Festus.

During Symmachus' time as pope, relations with the east plummeted. Much later in 512, Symmachus was to write:

concerning recent events in the Church of Constantinople, I can only sigh and keep silent⁵⁸.

Angered that his plans for the unity of the whole Church and empire based on the Henoticon had been thwarted, Anastasius composed a *libellus*, a polemic against the pope. He accused him of being a Manichee, of conspiring with the senate to excommunicate him, and "nec ordine consecratus". This letter of Anastasius' is lost, but we do have Symmachus' reply, the *Apologeticus adversus Anastasium imperatorem*⁵⁹.

This *Apologeticus* is usually dated to 506 and it is generally assumed that it was only after

⁵⁶ For more details on the aborted synods and on the *synodus Palmaris*, see Mansi (1762), VIII.230ff and Jaffé (1885-1888), nos.752ff; Smith and Wace (1887), IV.751-755, Grisar (1912), pp.241-243, Alessandrini (1944), pp.168ff. The *synodus Palmaris* caused much controversy as the principle that the pope was subject to no judge was contravened. See the letter of Avitus, bishop of Vienne:

Si papa urbis vocatur in dubium, episcopatus iam videbitur, non episcopus vacillare.
*ep.*34, and quoted by Grisar (1912), pp.244-245. See also Ennodius' *Libellus adversus eos qui contra synodum scribere praesumpserunt*, in Hartel (1882), pp.287-330.

⁵⁷ On this sedition, *Liber Pontificalis*, I.260-262.

⁵⁸ Gunther (1895-1898), no.104.

⁵⁹ Mansi (1762), VIII.213-217, Thiel (1868), pp.700-708, Schwartz (1934), pp.153-157, with pp.248-249; Capizzi (1969), p.115, n.103.

the end of the Persian war that Anastasius was free to turn his attention to the unwelcome developments in Rome. However, the exchange of correspondence between the emperor and pope could also fit the years 499-501 when Festus might have appealed to the emperor for assistance in the struggle to oust Symmachus and to organise a Roman party favourable to the Henoticon. It is also true that Anastasius' accusation of "nec ordine consecratus" is less appropriate for 506 than for the earlier dates⁶⁰.

In the *Apologeticus*, Symmachus addresses Anastasius merely as "emperor" with none of the usual honorific titles. He refutes Anastasius' charges against him, and justifies the continuation of the schism. He explains the old position on Acacius, reaffirms the nature of Christ as defined at the Council of Nicaea and in the Tome of Leo, and points out that the emperor's advocacy of Eutychian heresy does not help the situation. Gelasius' argument over the relative power of the emperor and pope is recycled:

Itaque ut non dicam superior, certe aequalis honor est⁶¹.

He demands of the emperor:

An quia imperator es, nullum Dei putas esse iudicium?

He disputes the charge that he excommunicated the emperor; he had only followed his predecessors in excommunicating Acacius and believes that Anastasius had excommunicated himself by his communion with heretics:

Dicis, quod mecum conspirans senatus excommunicaverit te. Istud quidem ego feci, sed rationabiliter factum a decessoribus meis sine dubio subsequor.

Anastasius and the East: the deposition of Euphemius.

Here we leave the west. It is clear that with Symmachus' *Apologeticus* to Anastasius, so reminiscent of Gelasius' letter, that little progress had been made in the reconciliation of the two halves of the empire⁶². The Church under Symmachus remained firm on the old issues

⁶⁰ cf. Alessandrini (1944), pp.166-167.

⁶¹ See Dvornik (1966), pp.811-812 for further discussion on this passage.

⁶² In hindsight, Anastasius II's more conciliatory approach seemed to some an aberration, but no doubt at the time, there was a real chance of healing the breach.

of Acacius, the supremacy of Rome and the authority of Chalcedon. Anastasius could not unbend on any of these issues, preoccupied as he was with instability in the east, and it is to this part of the empire that we now turn.

In Constantinople, the patriarch continued to advocate pro-Chalcedonian orthodoxy. In 492, he convened a local council at which the decrees of Chalcedon were confirmed⁶³. This insistent promotion of the Chalcedonian cause, his opposition to the monophysite version of the Trishagion⁶⁴, and his possession of the document containing the emperor's profession of faith, were the main reasons for his deposition in 496⁶⁵.

Eventually Anastasius lost patience and accused him of treachery with the Isaurians against the interests of the empire⁶⁶. He asked Euphemius to instruct the bishops of Constantinople to pray for peace during negotiations with the Isaurians. Euphemius passed on this information to John the patrician, father-in-law of Athenodorus, one of the leading rebels. The patrician told the emperor of his patriarch's indiscretion; he was offended and accused Euphemius of consorting with the enemy. He sent Eusebius, the *magister officiorum*, to his patriarch with the message,

αἱ εὐχαὶ σου, [ὁ μέγας, τοὺς φίλους σου ἡσβόλωσαν]⁶⁷.

An assassin (whether to curry favour or on Anastasius' order) drew his sword on the patriarch, but the blow was taken by Paul, a deacon, and the assassin was killed⁶⁸.

⁶³ Grumel (1932), p.134, with a list of the relevant sources. Had it not been for Gelasius' refusal to budge on the point of Acacius, Euphemius would have been content to let the rift be healed.

⁶⁴ This version was formulated by Peter Fuller who added "who was crucified for us." See further John of Nikiu LXXXIX.40ff and Grumel (1932), p.136.

⁶⁵ It is unlikely, as often suggested, that Anastasius was annoyed at Euphemius' enthusiastic letters to Gelasius, as he himself promoted correspondence between pope and patriarch.

⁶⁶ cf. chapter 2, part 1, *The Role of Euphemius*.

⁶⁷ Theod. Lect. 449-450, Theoph. AM 5987, Georg. Mon. 624-625, with Grumel (1932), p.136.

⁶⁸ There was also an ambush to kill Euphemius at a liturgical gathering, but he escaped to safety in civilian clothes.

At any rate, bad feelings continued between the emperor and patriarch with the former continuing to demand with more urgency the return of his profession of faith. A synod, called by the emperor in November 496, found the patriarch guilty of Nestorianism and deposed him⁶⁹. The people of Constantinople, demonstrating in favour of Euphemius, were dispersed by the police and Macedonius, presbyter of the Great Church and guardian of the sacred treasure, was installed in his place⁷⁰. He was a nephew of the former patriarch Gennadius, and was, perhaps, selected by Ariadne and the senate in an attempt to cover up the injustice of the deposal of Euphemius. Although he immediately signed the Henoticon⁷¹, at the same time he guaranteed the safety of his predecessor, lending him money for the journey to Euchaita⁷².

However, it is to the wider sphere that we must look for the reasons behind Anastasius' action: to what was happening throughout the east. Egypt, under the sway of Athanasius II, retained its strong adherence to monophysitism⁷³. Euphemius had tried to secure the

⁶⁹ Mal. 400, Mansi (1762), VIII.186.

⁷⁰ Theod. Lect. 455, Theoph. AM 5988. For details on the pious asceticism of Macedonius, see Smith and Ware (1882), III.777.

⁷¹ Theod. Lect. 456, Zach., *Vit. Sev.*, PO 2.113, John of Nikiu LXXXIX.46, Theoph. AM 5988, 6004, Cedr. 628, Niceph. Cal. XVI.26, and Grumel (1932), p.138.

⁷² Theod. Lect. 457, Theoph. AM 5989, Georg. Mon. 625, with Grumel (1932), p.138.

⁷³ Egypt's exclusive preference for monophysitism has led to the belief in a link between religious conviction and nationalism. Vasiliev (1932), I.132, (quoted by Charanis (1974), p.36) remarked:

The Egyptian Church abolished the use of Greek in its services and introduced the native Egyptian (Coptic) language. The religious disturbances in Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch....assumed the character of serious national revolts and could only be suppressed by the evil and military authorities only after much bloodshed.

However, the monophysites cannot be tied to one location and one social class in the same way that for example, the Donatists could be. There is no hint of an anti-imperial rebellion in Alexandria, two centuries before the arrival of the Arabs. In Egypt it is true that rural communities in particular, which used the Coptic language, are identified with the heart of monophysitism, but as many Egyptians only knew Coptic, there would be little point in holding their services in Greek. Jones (1959), p.280 asks satirically if the average Copt thought:

I am an Egyptian and proud of it. I hate the Roman oppressor, and will at the earliest opportunity cast off the alien yoke. Meanwhile I insist on speaking my own native Coptic instead of Greek, the language of the foreign government, and I refuse to belong to its Church. I do not know or care whether Christ has one or two natures, but as the Romans insist on the latter view, I hold the former?

In 516, the monks and people of Alexandria rioted at Anastasius' choice of a monophysite patriarch and lynched the augustal prefect. However, it seems that this was not a meaningless riot against the rule of Constantinople,

assistance of the pope in deposing Athanasius but had failed, and the latter, with the help of Sallustius of Jerusalem and possibly Palladius of Antioch, accused Euphemius of Nestorianism⁷⁴. Even if he had desired, it would have been virtually impossible for Anastasius to impose orthodox belief. In 496, Egypt gained a new monophysite champion in the appointment of the monk, John II, who openly anathematised the Tome of Leo and the Council of Chalcedon. Anastasius surely considered it better to allow Egypt to remain in peace, which explains his annoyance against Euphemius for stirring up trouble, and also his ingratitude to a certain John the Tabennesiote. The latter, an ex-patriarch of Alexandria, who had rescued the emperor from a shipwreck, hoped for assistance in re-establishing his career, but was refused⁷⁵.

Meanwhile, in Jerusalem there had also been a change of patriarch: Sallustius died in 494 and was replaced by Elias, a staunch supporter of the Chalcedonian creed. He ceased to communicate with the patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria and formed an association with Euphemius.

In Syria and Palestine, doctrinal boundaries were far more blurred. There were three main parties: the Chalcedonians, the fanatical monks of Palestine and Syria II, who wielded great influence in Jerusalem⁷⁶; the monophysites of north-east Syria and Cappadocia II whose power would extend during the reign of Anastasius, under the leadership of the persuasive and ruthless Philoxenus, bishop of Mabbög (Hierapolis); and lastly, the moderates, represented by such figures as Flavian, the patriarch of Antioch⁷⁷. Phrygia, and particularly the area

but the Alexandrians guarding their canonical rights and resisting the interference of a secular power (see Baynes (1926) and Boak (1928), esp. pp.5-6), and in fact, the rioting was aggravated by a far less idealistic reason, the shortage of olive oil; cf. Mal. 401-402.

⁷⁴ Zach. of Myt. VII.1.

⁷⁵ Theod. Lect. 452, Theoph. AM 5984.

⁷⁶ Palestine was generally orthodox, except for the monophysite stronghold of Peter the Iberian; cf. Stein (1949), II.174-176.

⁷⁷ Anastasius deliberately nominated the moderate Flavian, who obediently signed the Henoticon. This seemed a handy compromise at the time, although as events proved, Flavian was able to please neither side.

immediately around Mabbög, were thriving centres of monophysitism and anti-imperialism. Isauria, slightly outside the orbit of Philoxenus' direct influence, was far less extreme: although the Isaurians followed the latter against Flavian of Antioch, they would not condemn the Council of Chalcedon.

With the east in disunity, Anastasius could not afford to have at the head of the Church in his imperial capital, a patriarch so strong-willed and resolute as Euphemius. The only way to achieve any sort of ecclesiastical peace was to pursue a course of moderation, at least to a certain degree. Actions such as Euphemius' desire to bring about the downfall of the Alexandrian patriarch, caused unnecessary trouble. His admirable, if foolhardy, refusal to give back Anastasius' profession of faith was also a cause of irritation to the emperor. To have any chance of holding the splintering eastern Church together, Anastasius had to appear in total command, (which he could hardly do, if being held to ransom by his own patriarch), and to have a degree of flexibility so as not to antagonise any one party, (again impossible, if held to a profession of faith made at a different time under very different circumstances). It was imperative that another patriarch was found who would support the Henoticon, which would loosely unite the eastern Church.

Philoxenus, bishop of Mabbög, and Macedonius, patriarch of Constantinople.

The monophysites of the east found a leader in Philoxenus, bishop of Mabbög (Hierapolis). In his youth, Philoxenus had been noticed at the school of Edessa for his violent opposition to Ibas⁷⁸. His career was advanced by Palladius, the monophysite successor of Peter Fuller, but he was expelled from the diocese of Antioch under Calendion for disturbances created by his preaching of the views of Cyril and his vociferous support of the Henoticon. He was reinstated when Peter Fuller became patriarch again; the latter offered him protection and gave him the bishopric of Mabbög⁷⁹.

⁷⁸ For nefarious stories about Philoxenus' youth, see Theod. Lect. 444 and Theoph. AM 5982. It is possible that these rumours are untrue, given that the orthodox Theodore was unlikely to have any sympathy for the monophysite Philoxenus. However, Joshua Stylites (30), also criticises Philoxenus for being present at a heathen festival in Edessa and not intervening.

⁷⁹ For more details about the life of Philoxenus, see Budge (1894), pp.17-29 and especially de Halleux (1963).

At some point Philoxenus visited Constantinople, but the purpose and date of this visit have caused much controversy. Linked to his visit is a synod held in the imperial capital, the proceedings and date of which are again a subject of much dispute. Let us begin by studying our source material. Victor Tunnensis gives reports of two synods: one under 497:

Macedonius Constantinopolitanus episcopus synodo facta condemnat eos qui Calchedonensis decreta synodi suscipiunt et eos qui Nestorii et Eutyichis defendunt;

and another under 499:

Anastadius imperator Flaviano Antiocheno et Philoxeno Hieropolitano praesulibus, Constantinopolim synodum congregat, et contra Diodorum Tarsensem, Theodorum Mopsuestenum cum scriptis, Theodoritum Cyri, Ibam Edessenum, Andream, Eucherium, Quirum et Joannem episcopos, caeterosque alios qui in Christo duas praedicabant naturas duasque formas, et qui non confitentur unum de Trinitate crucifixum, una cum Leone episcopo Romano et eius tomo, atque Calchedonensi inferre anathema persuasit.

The 499 synod is extremely unlikely to have taken place, as it is improbable that Philoxenus and Flavian would jointly convene a synod or that such a synod would be held without Macedonius being present. Moreover, in 499, the monophysites under Philoxenus did not yet require anathematisation of all leading Chalcedonians. In a letter to Maron of Anaxarbus, Philoxenus explained that initially, he only demanded the anathematisation of Nestorius, thinking this would be sufficient to secure the condemnation of orthodox doctrine⁸⁰.

The details of the 497 synod reported by Victor Tunnensis, however, correspond closely with those announced by Theophanes under the year 499:

Τοῦτῳ τῷ ἔτει Μακεδόνιος γνώμη τοῦ βασιλέως ἐνώσαι τὰ μοναστήρια τῆς βασιλίδος ἔσπευδεν ἀποσχίζοντα διὰ τὸ ἐνωτικὸν Ζήνωνος⁸¹.

Theophanes represents the council as an attempt by Macedonius to rally the monasteries of

⁸⁰ Indeed Abramowski (1965), p.65 places the condemnation of the Antiochaeans by Flavian to between 509-511 when the pressure on Flavian had increased; see also Tisserant in *DTC* (1953), XII.1512-1513.

⁸¹ Theoph. AM 5991.

Dion, Bassianus, the Sleepless Ones and Matrona, who had broken communion with him because of his signing of the Henoticon⁸².

This local synod of 499, aimed at calming the situation in the capital's pro-Chalcedonian monasteries, is often confused with a second synod held at Constantinople in 507 which had a very different outcome. Michael the Syrian reports that Philoxenus went to the imperial city on Anastasius' order to assist with a synod at which the Tome of Leo and the Council of Chalcedon would be anathematised⁸³. The date which Michael assigns to this (prior to the Severan embassy of 508) corresponds with Theophanes' date of 507 for the invitation of Philoxenus by Anastasius⁸⁴. Also under the year 507, Theophanes refers to Anastasius' determination to divert Macedonius from the orthodox faith. Many bishops, in order to win the emperor's favour, rejected the Chalcedon synod. It is apparent from the *Vita Severi* of Zachariah that Anastasius, after reading before the senate a letter of Philoxenus, compelled Macedonius to anathematise Diodore, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Ibas of Edessa, Andrew of Samos, John of Antioch, Euthemius of Tyre, the Council of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo.

The date and purpose of the two synods have often been confused because of their association with Philoxenus and the reason for his visit to Constantinople. It has been argued that he went to the capital in 499 to complain about the nomination for the patriarchate of Antioch of Flavian⁸⁵, who had reintroduced the names of Nestorius and his supporters on the diptychs. However, a later visit to Constantinople to complain about Flavian's activities would also be appropriate. In 505, the synodical letters of John III, which expressed open condemnation of Chalcedon and the Tome went too far, even for the moderate Flavian, who

⁸² Cedr. 628, under the eighth year of Anastasius' reign, mentions an attempt of Macedonius to unite the city monks.

⁸³ Mich. Syr. IX.8.

⁸⁴ Theoph. AM 5999.

⁸⁵ Notably by Lebon (1909), p.41 and Charanis (1974), p.58.

broke communion with the Alexandrian patriarch⁸⁶. If this was the cause of Philoxenus' trip to Constantinople, it fits well with the 507 dating⁸⁷.

It is therefore clear that these synods were held in 499 and 507, each with very different results⁸⁸. Relations between the emperor and Macedonius had grown somewhat sour in the intervening years and would grow more so before the patriarch's deposition. The latter adopted a stronger orthodox belief, was prone to bowing to the wishes of the Constantinopolitan monasteries, and again held on tightly to the emperor's profession of faith. Meanwhile, Anastasius faced an increasingly difficult situation in the eastern provinces and was being driven in the opposite direction to the patriarch's orthodoxy.

The Persian war caused added complications for the ecclesiastical worries of the emperor. At the request of Mar Simeon, a Persian Christian, concerning the fate of Christians in the Persian empire, Anastasius wrote to the Persian king:

You will do well if you order that peace shall reign in your empire in your days; and in this matter, you will gratify and please us, if your order keeps the Christian peoples in your empire unmolested, when you order that they shall not harm one another by reason of occasions of enmity, nor any of your people molest them⁸⁹.

The Persian king complied, but with the outbreak of the war in 502, many monophysites were massacred, and the rest fled to Syria, intensifying the religious struggle there.

In his description of the capture of Amida, a wealthy monastery city, Marcellinus Comes

⁸⁶ In letters concerning the synod of Sidon, the names of John and Philoxenus are often linked, suggesting that the two worked closely together.

⁸⁷ About 507, Anastasius agreed to a remission of one of the taxes in the metropolis of Euphratesia which had suffered war damage; cf. de Halleux (1963), p.63, and brought over a Persian-Syrian painter to decorate the churches of Constantinople, possibly under the influence of Philoxenus: Theod. Lect. 467, Theoph. AM 5999.

⁸⁸ It is not necessary, as de Halleux (1963), pp.62-64 does, to try to amalgamate the two synods.

⁸⁹ John of Eph. *PO* 17.143. Charanis (1974), pp.58-59 has Philoxenus delivering this request in 499, which adds to his argument for a visit of the bishop to Constantinople in that year.

implies that it was betrayed by anti-Chalcedonian monks:

Amidam opulentissimam civitatem monachorum eis astu proditam Choadis rex Persarum quinto mense, quam expugnare eam coeperat, inrupit, proditoresque eis monachos obruncavit⁹⁰.

Such suspicions could not be ignored for Mabbög, an assembly point for offences against Persia down the Euphrates, and Mardin, on the Mesopotamian frontier close to Dara, were both strongholds of anti-Chalcedonianism⁹¹.

In Persia, the monophysites had represented Roman interest; now in Syria, it was imperative that Anastasius should support them as a bulwark against Persian danger. However, in the context of the delicate balance of power in that region between the monophysites and the dyophysites, any imperial favour for one side could easily upset the equation. Anastasius' support of the monophysites, though, seemed to many as no political gesture, but a definite sign of a change in religious policy, guided by personal belief. Whether personal belief was a factor or not, Anastasius could not have missed the opportunity of pacifying and unifying the whole of Syria under the now dominant monophysites, as he strengthened Roman morale and defence against the Persians⁹².

Severus.

Severus, who with Philoxenus, was to become one of the great leaders of the monophysite movement, was a native of Sozopolis in Pisidia⁹³. He came from a wealthy land-owning

⁹⁰ Marc. C. 502.

⁹¹ Frend (1972), p.185.

⁹² It is useful to add here a comparison with the Church of Armenia, which was independent and took no part in the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. In the early 500s, it accepted the views of the monophysite Mesopotamians, who with them, were suffering in the Persian war. It affirmed unity with Rome, condemning Nestorius and Eutyches, and approved "the letter of Zeno blessed emperor of the Romans". There was no political hostility towards the Roman Empire. See Jones (1959), p.293.

⁹³ Many details about the activities of Severus can be gleaned from *The Conflict of Severus, Patriarch of Antioch* by Athanasius Scriptor, and from two other *Lives*, by John, the abbot of the monastery of Beith-Aphthonia in Syria (d.536) and by Severus' friend and student colleague, Zachariah Scholasticus, written while Severus was patriarch of Antioch (513-518/519). See also, *Hist. Nest.* X, Kugener (1907) and Brooks (1903), pp.v-xi. For a discussion of the identity of this Zachariah with Zachariah Rhetor, the writer of the

family but with Church connections. His grandfather, a bishop of Sozopolis, had been present at the Council of Ephesus at which Nestorius was deposed. Severus was educated in grammar and rhetoric at Alexandria where he also studied the work of Libanius and Basil, and gradually widened his reading to encompass Athanasius, Gregory, John Chrysostom and Cyril. However, with the aim of becoming an advocate, he went next to Beirut (in 486). At first he resisted all persuasion to be baptised saying,

You will not make a monk of me, for I am a student of law and love law⁹⁴.

Despite this protestation, he did become more interested in religion, possibly meeting the celebrated Peter of Iberia, and was baptised in 488 in the church of St. Leontius, near Tripolis⁹⁵. Although he returned to Sozopolis to practise law, Severus also made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, where, falling further under the influence of the disciples of Peter of Iberia, he decided to become a monk. He stayed at the monastery of Romanus in the wilderness near Eleutheropolis⁹⁶, before going to Peter's monastery, which was located somewhere between Gaza and Maiuma, where he led an ascetic life. Later he founded his own monastery, and during this time, he developed the monophysite faith that was to become the basis for the rapid rise of the movement up to 518.

Severus based his doctrine on an amalgamation of the Christology and Trinitarian concepts of the Cappadocian Fathers⁹⁷. He believed that "Christ was one", saying in his *Philalethes*:

It is obvious that the same being is at once God and man, consubstantial with the Father according to his divinity and consubstantial with us men according to his humanity⁹⁸.

ecclesiastical history and Zachariah, the bishop of Mytilene who condemned Severus in 536, see Frend (1972), pp.202-203, Bauer (1967), pp.210-211, and chapter 1, *Syriac Sources: ecclesiastical works*.

⁹⁴ Zach., *Vit. Sev.*, PO 2.52.

⁹⁵ The account of Zachariah provides an interesting insight into the student life at Alexandria and Beirut, and into the heathen practices that were still prevalent at the end of the fifth century.

⁹⁶ Athanasius, *Vit. Sev.*, PO 4.600ff, emphasises the influence of Romanus' monastery, one of the remaining bastions of anti-Chalcedonianism in Palestine.

⁹⁷ For more details on the Christological beliefs of Severus, Frend (1972), pp.207-214.

⁹⁸ *Philalethes*, p.107.

He reinforces his point in a letter to Sergius:

when the hypostatic union, which is the perfect union of the two natures is confessed, there is only one Christ, without mixture, one person, one hypostasis, and one nature, that of the Incarnate Word⁹⁹.

During the period of Christ's ministry, Word was really man and "man was made in the image of God¹⁰⁰." As for the Trinity, although it could not be defined by any human rationality, through it, one could achieve a knowledge of Christ. While the Trinity showed one essence, the Light, Life and Goodness of God, each member differed from the other: the unbegotten Father differed from His begotten Son, and both differed from the Holy Spirit, who preceded them both. Severus adhered to these views to such an extreme that he judged it wrong even to greet someone who did not share his doctrinal views¹⁰¹.

It was while Severus was setting up his own monastery that there began a ruthless persecution of Palestinian monks, led by Nephalius. Originally a monophysite, but now a committed supporter of Chalcedonian orthodoxy, it is possible that he was encouraged by Elias, the patriarch of Jerusalem, who noted with alarm the growing numbers of extreme monophysites¹⁰².

Severus, in response, went to Constantinople, at the head of a deputation of about two hundred monks¹⁰³, and laid before the emperor his complaints about the activities of Nephalius. He found the emperor perhaps surprisingly sympathetic to his cause. As already seen, Anastasius had inclined more towards supporting the monophysites in Syria and must have been glad to welcome Severus. It is important to realise, however, that it was Severus' visit to Constantinople that coincided with the ecclesiastical position of the emperor, and not

⁹⁹ Quoted by Frend (1972), p.209.

¹⁰⁰ cf. Frend (1972), p.210.

¹⁰¹ Sel. Let. IV:6.

¹⁰² See Duchesne (1925), pp.19f. For the life of Nephalius, see Moeller (1944) and for his change of faith, Lebon (1909), pp.43-44.

¹⁰³ John of Nikiu LXXXIX.48ff.

the case that the emperor, weak, indecisive and under the influence of the persuasive Severus, drifted into a policy of support for the monophysites and persecution of the orthodox. Anastasius had his own far-sighted policy of how to bring peace and unity to the troubled province of Syria¹⁰⁴. He had no qualms about standing up to the patriarch of Constantinople and the pope of Rome; he would hardly change direction in religious policy on a whim, at the suggestion of a mere monk¹⁰⁵.

Severus was to remain in the imperial capital for three years, during which time, he witnessed the swift growth of Anastasius' monophysitism, which led to the deposition of the leaders of two key sees, Macedonius, the patriarch of Constantinople, and Flavian, patriarch of Antioch. We look now at how this remarkable change came about.

Philoxenus, Flavian and Macedonius, 508-512.

a) *The Synod of Antioch, 508/509.*

While Severus and the deputation of monks remained in Constantinople, dispute in the east continued. Over the previous two or three years, Philoxenus had been gradually intensifying his demands on Flavian, first requiring an anathema on all dyophysites, and then indicating specific individuals by name¹⁰⁶. Philoxenus stirred up trouble among the monks of Syria I, especially in Antioch, accusing Flavian of Nestorianism. Thus in 508/509, at Anastasius' request, Flavian held a synod at Antioch at which Philoxenus was present, and also Constantine, the monophysite bishop of Seleucia¹⁰⁷. Here Flavian subscribed again to the Henoticon, condemned the first three oecumenical synods, passed over Chalcedon in silence and denounced Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, Ibas of Edessa and the other opponents of the Twelve Chapters of Cyril. He introduced four chapters

¹⁰⁴ This is the view of Charanis (1974), pp.62-63, contra Rose (1888), pp.9-10, who saw Anastasius as a weak emperor guided by Severus.

¹⁰⁵ When Severus first arrived in Constantinople, he would have been virtually unknown.

¹⁰⁶ See Evag. III.31, and Lebon (1909), pp.42f.

¹⁰⁷ cf. Mansi (1762), VIII.347-348, who suggests that it was Flavian himself (rather than Anastasius) who called the synod.

giving the impression that he was opposed to the Council of Chalcedon and especially its definition of faith, yet the monophysites were still not yet satisfied. Indeed, they increased their demands to a total rejection of the Council of Chalcedon. Flavian sent a report of the synod and a letter to the emperor, who upheld the cause of the monophysites.

Anastasius replied by way of his τύπος τῆς πληροφορίας or formula of satisfaction and sent it to Flavian to sign. However, there is much controversy over the contents and author of this *typos*¹⁰⁸. Surviving in two sections, the first appears to accept the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople and Ephesus, the Henoticon, and anathematises all dyophysites, while the second part contains anathemas against certain individuals, including Nestorius and Eutyches. Thus, it seems that the *typos* gave a monophysite interpretation of the Henoticon, or put another way, it gave a neo-Chalcedonian view, in agreeing with the anathemas but not the definition of faith of Chalcedon¹⁰⁹.

So much for the content of the *typos*; what of its author? Either the emperor himself was responsible, or it was the work of the capable Severus, ensconced as he was at this time, at the imperial court.

In some ways, the *typos* corresponds to the latter's speech on becoming patriarch, where he mentions the first three oecumenical councils, the Henoticon, and anathematises the Chalcedonian definition and the Tome. However, in a letter to Constantine, Severus recounted how John of Claudiopolis had visited him in Constantinople and said:

There ought to be introduced into the formula of satisfaction this statement, "We receive the synod at Chalcedon, not as a definition of faith, but as a rejection of Nestorius and Eutyches".

¹⁰⁸ The text survives in an Armenian version in "Le Livre des Lettres" and "le Sceau de la Foi". See Moeller (1961), pp.241-243, and Appendix **DF**.

¹⁰⁹ cf. Moeller (1961), pp.245-246; Lebon (1909), pp.47-48 and Capizzi (1969), pp.116-118 also see the *typos* as neo-Chalcedonian, in agreeing the condemnation of Nestorius and Eutyches, but not the definition of faith. Neo-Chalcedonianism was to be defined at a synod of Alexandretta, Cilicia 513-515, and John the Grammarian (Cappadocia) was to be the first known neo-Chalcedonian writer. For further discussion on neo-Chalcedonianism, see Moeller (1951), *passim*.

Severus rejected this proposal outright, saying:

But if the formula of satisfaction in so many words rejects the doctrines of the synod and of the impious Tome of Leo, which are the lifeblood of the abomination of Nestorius, how can we honestly say that we accept this synod as against Nestorius?¹¹⁰

Between this belief and the *typos*, there is a fundamental difference: in the latter, Chalcedon is not mentioned explicitly, while in the former, it is condemned outright with the Tome of Leo.

Could Anastasius have written the *typos*? Certainly in anathematising all dyophysites, the emperor went further than he had gone before in giving the Henoticon a monophysite interpretation. However, in the context of 509, desperate to find a solution to which both Philoxenus and Flavian would be agreeable, he might have thought the *typos* would fit the bill. Moreover, it was not much later that he was to demand from Macedonius a condemnation of Chalcedon, and even to order the surrender of the acts of Chalcedon for him to destroy, thus making the *typos* hardly out of character for this period of his reign. Although the *typos* was not the work of Severus then, who might have hoped for a demand of a total anathema on Chalcedon, it was the presence of Severus in the capital, which pushed Anastasius towards monophysitism at this time¹¹¹.

Flavian still tried to avoid having to sign the *typos*, but produced a new profession of faith very close to it, in which he accepted the Chalcedonian condemnation of Nestorius and Eutyches, but not the definition of faith.

b) *The Deposition of Macedonius*

Anastasius' increased acceptance of monophysitism and his intervention in Syria had serious repercussions in his capital. As he moved more towards monophysitism, Macedonius moved

¹¹⁰ Sel Let. II:1; cf. Zach. *Vit. Sev.*, PO 2.107-108 and Evag. III.31.

¹¹¹ This view contradicts that of Lebon (1909), pp.47-48, Moeller (1961), esp. p.246 and Charanis (1974), pp.64-65 who think that the *typos* was the work of Severus. Lebon even uses Zacharias' *Vit. Sev.* (almost certainly biased), arguing that Severus' supposed efforts for unity in Constantinople prove his moderation.

more towards orthodoxy. The news of Flavian's rejection of Chalcedon was received unfavourably in the orthodox Constantinople, and Macedonius had no choice but to anathematise the previously moderate patriarch and expel his agents¹¹².

In 510, Macedonius refused to communicate with the representatives of John II of Alexandria, unless they accepted the decrees of Chalcedon. To the emperor's demand to anathematise the Council of Chalcedon himself, Macedonius cleverly replied that he could only do so at an oecumenical council presided over by the pope. Macedonius knew that any mention of Rome would infuriate Anastasius and he wanted to make any concession on his part as unacceptable as possible. The ploy was successful. Anastasius did not care to be reminded of the pre-eminence of Rome, and probably appreciated even less Macedonius' views that an emperor could not dictate the policies of the Church. In retaliation, Anastasius took away the right of asylum from the Great Church, and asylum was only recognised in monophysite churches¹¹³.

At this juncture, the supporters of Chalcedon attempted to persuade the emperor of their point of view. With Magna, Anastasius' sister-in-law, they presented him with a book of quotations favourable to the Chalcedonian creed, especially from the writings of Cyril. But Anastasius did not prove amenable: he burnt the book and had its author, Dorotheus, an Egyptian monk exiled¹¹⁴.

It was perhaps in response to the presentation of this book, that the monks of Severus agitated against the emperor and the Council of Chalcedon¹¹⁵, chanting the monophysite version of

¹¹² Theod. Lect. 477, with Miller (1872), p.280, Theoph. AM 6002, Grumel (1932), pp.140-141.

¹¹³ It was rumoured that Anastasius hired an assassin, Eucolus, to dispose of the unco-operative patriarch, but Macedonius avoided the attack and magnanimously ordered a fixed amount of provisions to be given to the criminal; Smith and Wace (1882), III.777.

¹¹⁴ Theod. Lect. 481, with Miller (1872), pp.278-279, and Theoph. AM 6002.

¹¹⁵ For contact between Severus and Macedonius in the capital, and their doctrinal discussions, see Athanasius' *Conflict of Severus*, PO 4.641ff.

the Trishagion with the addition "who was crucified for us"¹¹⁶. This passed without incidence in the church of the Archangel, but the following Sunday, when it was introduced in the Great Church, it provoked a violent reaction from the Chalcedonian monks. There was commotion throughout Constantinople, as the orthodox monks, with Palestinian reinforcements shouted, "Christians, here is the moment of martyrdom; let no one desert the Father." Anastasius, in fear for his life, hastily invited Macedonius to the palace to persuade him to pacify the crowd, and to discuss the fate of the Church. After reprimanding the emperor for his recent inclination to monophysitism, Macedonius left, satisfied that Anastasius would return to the orthodox fold. The riot ceased, probably with the help of the police¹¹⁷.

However, the emperor, having now gained time, could consider his counter-attack. Genuinely fearful at the strength of opposition displayed against him, annoyed at the humiliation received at the hands of his recalcitrant patriarch, and angered at being forced into a very public about-turn, Anastasius would now be keen to re-establish his independence and discredit Macedonius. For the latter he had the perfect excuse. Who had started the riot? Was it not possible to pin the blame ^of Macedonius¹¹⁸?

At the same time, the monophysite leaders accused the patriarch of Nestorianism, and demanded a profession of faith¹¹⁹. Anastasius pressed Macedonius to comply and he did, submitting to the emperor in 511, a document in which, according to Theodore Lector, he acknowledged the first two oecumenical councils and passed over both Ephesus and Chalcedon. However, Evagrius quotes a letter from the orthodox monks of Palestine to

¹¹⁶ The outbreak of violence was so severe that Anastasius was almost forced to flee. For a detailed description of this affair, Duchesne (1925), p.22ff and Stein (1949), II.169; contra Rose (1888), pp.10-12, who follows John of Nikiu LXXXIX.54-68 and Evagrius III.44, and confuses this disturbance over the Trishagion with a later disturbance in 512.

¹¹⁷ Theod. Lect. 483-486, Theoph. AM 6003.

¹¹⁸ Evagrius III.44, quoting a letter of Severus to Soterichus, (an eye-witness, though naturally biased), records that the riots' "prime mover and chief was Macedonius." John of Nikiu LXXXIX.59 also takes this line.

¹¹⁹ Stein (1949), II.169ff gives a different account, relating how Celer, the *magister officiorum*, almost tricked Macedonius into making a dubious profession of faith. Lebon (1909), p.45 discusses the reasons behind the charge of Nestorianism, and concludes that to monophysites, all dyophysite doctrine was Nestorian.

Alcison, bishop of Nicopolis in Epirus, from which it seems that Macedonius' profession also included anathemas against

Nestorius, Eutyches, and those who held the doctrine of two sons and two Christs, or divided the natures¹²⁰.

Which of these opposing version deserve credence? It is probable that the account of Theodore Lector is more biased; a Chalcedonian himself, he is generally hostile to Anastasius. He would be loathe to record any weakening on the part of Macedonius, while if Macedonius could be shown to be merely following the line of the Henoticon, then it would make Anastasius' subsequent action in deposing him all the more unreasonable. Evagrius, on the other hand, although orthodox himself, does not seek to show the monophysite emperor in a negative light, and more crucially, he is quoting external primary evidence¹²¹. There is a case to be made for attributing responsibility to Macedonius for neither version; they were merely circulated under his name¹²². Macedonius later, recalled his profession, rather than denying it, suggesting that he himself was responsible, and under pressure, had bowed to the inevitable, a public condemnation of the Council of Chalcedon.

However, in response to the outrage of the orthodox monks, Macedonius decided to retract his profession and at the monastery of either Matrona or Dalmatius, he declared his acceptance of the Council of Chalcedon and affirmed that he held as heretics all those who refused to receive him. Communion with the monks was restored. At this desertion, Anastasius launched against the vacillating patriarch his final challenge¹²³, demanding from him the original records of the Council of Chalcedon. Macedonius refused, placing them for safety under the altar of the Great Church, from where, however, they were secretly removed

¹²⁰ Theod. Lect. 487; contra Evag. III.31 and Mich. Syr. IX.9.

¹²¹ Charanis (1974), pp.68-69 follows Evagrius.

¹²² Lebon (1909), p.46, contra Grumel (1932), p.141, who thinks that Lebon rejects too easily Evagrius' evidence of the letter of the Palestinian monks.

¹²³ See the letter of Simeon the presbyter, a monk at Constantinople, to Samuel, an archimandrite in Syria, which contains a very detailed account of the deposition of Macedonius; Zach. of Myt. VII.8.

by a certain Calopodius, a steward, and handed to Anastasius, who destroyed them¹²⁴.

On 27th July, 511, Anastasius convened his council and secured its support. On 29th, he assembled the military officers and, perhaps encouraged by the handout of five denarii each, they swore the following oath:

By this law of God [the Gospels] and by the words which are written in it, we will contend with all our might for the true faith and for the kingdom and we will not act treacherously either against the truth or the king¹²⁵.

The next day, largesse was distributed to the whole army. At this point, some of Macedonius' clergy began to turn away from him, and on 31st July, Anastasius ordered the clergy to formally break communion with their patriarch. The orthodox monks who might be expected to cause trouble, were kept out of the city. On 1st August, the monk Pascasius, who had led the orthodox riot after the monophysite addition to the Trishagion, was arrested and revealed that Macedonius was planning a rebellion. Anastasius ordered Celer to arrest Macedonius and deport him¹²⁶. To avoid trouble, he was taken to Chalcedon at night, and at a local synod, he was tried and exiled to Euchaita¹²⁷. The formal charge against the patriarch was of falsifying the text of 1 Tim. 3.6 by altering "ὁς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί" to "Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί"; that is, "as God" he appeared in the flesh, rather than that "he was God". Macedonius' version could be construed as Nestorian¹²⁸. Timothy, presbyter

¹²⁴ Marc. C. 511, Theod. Lect. 491, Theoph. AM 6004; contra James of Edessa, *Chron.* 179, *Chronicon Edessenum* LXXXIII and Mich. Syr. IX.9 who give an alternative version, that the records of Chalcedon were hidden in the coffin of Euphemia the martyr, and Anastasius ordered the coffin to be opened and the records burned.

¹²⁵ Quoted by Charanis (1974), p.70.

¹²⁶ On 6th August. Theod. Lect. 492, contra Evag. III.32 who says that Celer, a Chalcedonian, secretly advised Macedonius to withdraw. It is possible to reconcile these two accounts: Celer firstly advised Macedonius to leave, but when the patriarch paid no heed, was forced to remove him on the emperor's orders.

¹²⁷ Even before the synod, Macedonius was accused of many crimes, including pederasty, see Theod. Lect. 490. For an account of Macedonius' deposition, see also Mich. Syr. IX.9 and Niceph. Cal. XVI.26. Perhaps ironically, Macedonius was sent to Euchaita, where his deposed predecessor had also been exiled. According to Landolfus Sagax XVII.215, Anastasius' brother, Pompeius, and his wife, provided for Macedonius in his banishment.

¹²⁸ Liberatus, *Brev.* XIX, cf. Frend (1972), p.218. Anastasius also accuses him of being a Manichee; cf. Agapius of Manbidj, *PO* 8.423.

and keeper of the sacred treasures of the Great Church, was ordained patriarch, and the remainder of Macedonius' supporters either fled or were arrested¹²⁹.

Anastasius' actions in deposing Macedonius are very hard to excuse. Indeed, it has been argued that

the irregular and illegal deposition of the patriarch is one of the worst acts that can be laid to his charge¹³⁰.

Again the question had arisen: could an emperor act contrary to the policy of the Church? At this time, however, the policy of the Church was unclear: there was no doctrinal unity and in Anastasius' defence, it can be said that he was upholding the theological beliefs of about half the eastern empire. Although explanations can be found for his increasing embracement of the monophysite cause, few mitigating factors can be found for the ruthless and unfair way in which Macedonius was deposed, an action which earned the censure of both the senate and Ariadne. However, perhaps the rejection of Macedonius, an act caused by momentary loss of control, should be separated from Anastasius' general policy which continued as before, that is, the pursuit of unity based on the Henoticon.

One indication that Anastasius was less under the influence of the leading monophysites than is often supposed, was his choice of Timothy as the new patriarch, rather than Severus, who left Constantinople. According to many sources, Timothy did not have the same high moral reputation enjoyed by his predecessor¹³¹, and he proved to be even more indecisive on which course to follow¹³². Anastasius' relatives, and the powerful Anicia Juliana, refused communion from him¹³³.

¹²⁹ Baronius (1596), VI.600-601 comments that senators suffered especially. Many had their property confiscated and fled to Rome or Thebes.

¹³⁰ Hodgkin (1885), III.455.

¹³¹ cf. Miller (1872), pp.280-282.

¹³² An abbot from the Studios monastery refused to be ordained by a non-Chalcedonian, so Timothy immediately anathematised all who were opposed to Chalcedon. When the emperor heard this, Timothy immediately denied the report and anathematised all Chalcedonians; cf. Smith and Wace (1887), IV.1034.

¹³³ Theod. Lect. 504, Landolfus Sagax XVII.215.

Despite this bad press, Timothy appears, especially at first, to be rather moderate. It is true that he resumed relations with the centre of monophysitism, Alexandria, placing John III in the diptychs. However, in his synodical letter to John, he did not anathematise the Tome of Leo or the Council of Chalcedon, and consequently, John refused to accept the letter¹³⁴. Flavian and Elias, on the other hand, while accepting Timothy's succession, refused to condone the illegal deposition of Macedonius¹³⁵. To counter the emperor's undoubted displeasure, Elias sent a deposition of monks, led by St. Sabas¹³⁶. Anastasius, perhaps unexpectedly, welcomed the monks no less than he had done Severus and his deputation¹³⁷. The emperor and saint met several times and not only was the latter able to gain respite for Elias, but Anastasius also granted Sabas one thousand pounds of gold and promised a tax relief¹³⁸. St. Sabas found warm support from the monophysite relatives of the emperor; Ariadne, Anastasia, and also Anicia Juliana all visited Sabas and paid homage¹³⁹.

c) *The Synod of Sidon, 511/512, and the Ordination of Severus.*

In Syria, the extreme monophysites continued to agitate against Flavian. In 511/12, a synod was convened at Sidon concerning which the sources give two contradictory accounts¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁴ cf. Grumel (1932), p.144. Anastasius sent a letter to John, which, contained no small complaints on the ground that he had not been contented with the Henoticon only, without requiring reference to be made in actual words to the impious things done at Chalcedon or to the impious Tome of Leo.

Sel. Let. IV:2, and quoted by Charanis (1974), p.72.

¹³⁵ Grumel (1932), pp.144-145.

¹³⁶ Cyril of Scyth. *Vit. Sab.* L-LIV, Niceph. Cal. XVI.32.

¹³⁷ Lebon (1909), p.51 remarked,
Une politique religieuse de modération triomphait donc à Constantinople au commencement du patriarcat de Timothée.

¹³⁸ This relief was, however, later rescinded by Marinus.

¹³⁹ Cyril of Scythop., *Vit. Sab.* LIII.

¹⁴⁰ The dating is also disputed: Marc. C. gives 512 (followed by Lebon (1909), p.51), contra Theoph. AM 6003 (ie. 510-511, followed by Duchesne (1925), pp.27-28 and Charanis (1974), p.73 and Mango (1997), p.235). There is little to recommend one date over the other. The earlier dating of Theophanes allows more time for Philoxenus and his monophysites to step up their campaign against Flavian, culminating in his downfall in the following year. On the other hand, the testimony of the contemporary Marcellinus would normally be preferable to that of the unreliable Theophanes.

It seems that there are two possible scenarios: firstly, that Philoxenus instigated the gathering, called in the first instance by Anastasius to oppose the acts of the Council of Chalcedon¹⁴¹; or secondly, that the synod was convened by Flavian to revive the Henoticon and the monophysites were in the minority. This latter view is supported by evidence in the *Vita Severi* of Zachariah¹⁴² and by a letter of Philoxenus himself to the abbot Simeon at Teleda which reads:

Quand Flavien occupait le trône d'Antioche...tous les évêques de l'Orient étaient en communion avec lui. Les uns étaient en même temps engagés dans son hérésie, mais d'autres étaient simplement dans sa communion... Moi seul et les évêques de ma province, à l'exception de trois, nous étions séparés de sa communion; tous les autres, comme je l'ai dit, étaient d'accord avec lui. Lorsque j'eus reçu l'ordre de me rendre à Sidon, non seulement par écrit, mais aussi par l'entremise du préfet qui fut envoyé pour me conduire, je passai par Qinneshrin; je détachai de sa communion le vénérable évêque Siméon, que je pris avec moi; à Tripolis (je détachai de lui) Nicias et Pierre d'Alep... Après que je les eus pris tous deux, par le secours divin, et qu'ils furent passés à notre parti, de nouveau, à Béryte, je détachai de sa communion Marinus, évêque de cette ville, et Thomas de Khunasira qui s'y trouvait. Et nous étions seuls, à nous dix, de tous les évêques de l'Orient, contre lui à Sidon¹⁴³.

On this evidence, it would seem preferable to believe that the synod was called by Flavian, for if Philoxenus had played a leading role, he surely would have said so, and he even admits that he was compelled to attend by the prefect's intervention¹⁴⁴.

As is also apparent from this letter, Flavian enjoyed the support of most eastern bishops, and

¹⁴¹ For this version, see Marc. C. 512, Cyril of Scyth., *Vit. Sab.* LVI, Zach. of Myt. VII.10, Theoph. AM. 6003, Mich. Syr. IX.8, followed by Mansi (1762), VIII.370-374 and Duchesne (1925), pp.27-28.

¹⁴² Zach., *Vit. Sev.*, PO 2.111.

¹⁴³ Lebon (1909), p.52, n.1, quoting from *Brit. Mus. Addit.* 14533.

¹⁴⁴ Charanis (1974), pp.73-4; contra Frend (1972), p.219 thinks that Anastasius called the council.

also that of Elias¹⁴⁵. Though Philoxenus was able to rally the support of fellow monophysites en route, and had the invaluable help of Soterichus, bishop of Caesarea (Cappadocia), there were still only ten monophysite bishops at the synod¹⁴⁶. The emperor was represented by his tribune, Eutropius.

The aim of the monophysites at the synod, to have the Tome of Leo and the Council of Chalcedon publically anathematised, clashed with Flavian's desire to see a revival of the Henoticon. On this occasion, however, the monophysites suffered a setback. Philoxenus produced a petition, organised by Cosmas of Qinneshrin, which amounted to

seventy-seven chapters, with many quotations from the holy doctors, confirming the censure upon the Council of Chalcedon and Tome of Leo¹⁴⁷.

To counter this, the opposition produced letters to various bishops written by the monophysite patriarchs of Alexandria, including Peter Mongus, Athanasius II and John II, of a mild and conciliatory nature, adhering to the spirit of the Henoticon. The monophysites, unprepared and outnumbered, had no ammunition against this attack. As Severus wrote,

these letters.. produced in the city of Sidon, when the synod of bishops was assembled there...cast great shame upon us who were combatting on behalf of the orthodoxy, and nothing else was left to us except only to hide ourselves and yield to manifest refutations¹⁴⁸.

Thus the Synod of Sidon dissolved, though whether by the triumphant Flavian and Elias, or by Anastasius through Eutropius, it is not clear¹⁴⁹. As a mark of goodwill, Flavian and Elias wrote to Anastasius confirming their allegiance to the Henoticon.

The monophysites, however, did not "hide" for long. Philoxenus and his disciples appealed

¹⁴⁵ For Elias' role, see Janin (1963)a, pp.189-190.

¹⁴⁶ Marc. C. 512 claims the monophysite bishops numbered eighty, but this figure seems too large, considering the monophysite defeat.

¹⁴⁷ Zach. of Myt. VII.10 and Mich. Syr. IX.10.

¹⁴⁸ Sel. Let. IV:2 On Severus' relations with Alexandria more generally, see Lebon (1909), pp.53-54.

¹⁴⁹ cf. Lebon (1909), p.54.

to Anastasius, while Flavian sent another profession of faith to the emperor, in which he accepted the first three oecumenical councils and the Henoticon, and passed over Chalcedon¹⁵⁰. The embattled patriarch was able to satisfy neither the orthodox or the monophysites, and, accused of being a Nestorian¹⁵¹, he immediately embraced the monophysite cause, thus cutting himself off from the orthodox. But it was too late. The monophysite leaders had already started to close the net around their prey, and:

κατηγοροῦντες αὐτὸν ὅτι στόματι μόνον τὴν σύνοδον ἀνεθεμάτισεν, καὶ οὐ καρδίᾳ¹⁵².

Philoxenus, with his monophysite monks instigated a riot in Antioch, and forced Flavian into exile at Petra¹⁵³. On 6th November, 512, Severus became patriarch of Antioch and was consecrated at a Synod of Antioch in 513, orchestrated by Philoxenus. The ceremony was performed by Philoxenus himself, the bishop of Tarsus and ten others¹⁵⁴. As Philoxenus wrote,

Mais lorsque Flavien fut parti - certainement par la volonté de Dieu - le vénérable Mar Sévère fut élu et reçut l'ordination dans la grande église d'Antioche.... Dans la suite, tous les évêques se réunirent et vinrent successivement, les uns sous l'influence de mes écrits, et d'autres, persuadés par les écrits de leurs amis qui auparavant étaient en communion avec nous. S'étant réunis et étant venus en grand nombre, il y eut un synode¹⁵⁵.

No doubt Philoxenus was heartily relieved at the eventual banishment of his long-standing

¹⁵⁰ Evag. III.31. There is some suspicion that at the same time Elias sent a letter in which he condemned the Chalcedon Council. The letter from the monks of Palestine to Alcison quoted by Evagrius, mentions a written statement sent by Elias to Anastasius which contained an anathema on all dyophysites. Later Elias insisted this statement was a forgery, and immediately issued another; cf. Duchesne (1925), p.29, Charanis (1974), p.75.

¹⁵¹ John of Nikiu LXXXIX.69.

¹⁵² Theoph. AM 6004.

¹⁵³ The violence escalated with the arrival of Flavian's monks; cf. Evag. III.32, Zach. of Myt. VII.10, Niceph. Cal. XVI. 27. Flavian's banishment was officially agreed at the synod of Laodicaea (512). Significantly, Petra had been the place of Nestorius' exile in 436.

¹⁵⁴ The *chronicon ad 846* p.168 gives a complete list of the bishops at Severus' ordination.

¹⁵⁵ Lebon (1909), p.56, n.1, quoting *Brit. Mus. Addit. 14533*.

foe, as he wrote to the monks at the monastery of Senûn:

What things I have suffered from Flavian and Macedonius, who were archbishops in Antioch and Constantinople, and before them from Calendon, are known and spoken of in every place. But I keep silent concerning those who were prepared to injure me....through....Flavian the heretic... And when I went up to Constantinople on two occasions the like things were done unto me by the Nestorian heretics¹⁵⁶.

Severus' ordination speech included an acceptance of the first three oecumenical councils, a condemnation of all heretics, especially Nestorius and Eutyches, an anathematisation of the Council of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo, and a denouncement of all who believed in the doctrine of two natures. The Henoticon was maintained but interpreted in a completely monophysite way. He announced triumphantly (though not entirely truthfully):

We have as our associates the venerable bishops of Constantinople and Alexandria, and those whom we do not have are strangers to our communion.

The synodical letter was received with particular joy at the monophysite centre of Alexandria.

John the patriarch and his bishops accepted this letter...and read it in their churches throughout the land of Egypt; and they offered prayers and thanked the Lord Christ, who had restored the divided members to their places. And with great joy and spiritual exultation did John....write to the Great Severus an answer to his letter...full of the orthodox faith¹⁵⁷.

Yet still in opposition stood Elias of Jerusalem, Julian of Bostra, Epiphanius of Tyre and many others who refused to recognise Severus¹⁵⁸.

¹⁵⁶ Quoted from Budge (1894), pp.27-28.

¹⁵⁷ *Hist. of Alex. Patriarchs.*, PO 1.448, and quoted by Charanis (1974), p.77.

¹⁵⁸ Eg. Peter of Damasus and Marinus of Beirut. Epiphanius of Tyre was Flavian's brother. See Honigmann (1951), pp.76-77 on Julian, pp.38-41 on Epiphanius, p.97 on Peter, and pp.32-33 on Marinus.

The Trishagion, 512, and Riots in Constantinople.

At the time of the election of Severus, events in Constantinople were reaching a climax. On 4th November, Anastasius issued an edict, which ordered all churches to add to the Trishagion the monophysite clause, "who was crucified for us"¹⁵⁹. Such a move had met with staunch orthodox opposition in 510: why had Anastasius, if seeking to redress the balance in Constantinople after his brutal treatment of Macedonius, chosen this time to introduce this controversial formula again? As the date is so close to that of the ordination of Severus, it was surely an indication of the emperor's support for the patriarch¹⁶⁰.

At any rate, the monophysite addition caused much commotion in the Great Church, where as the choir sang according to imperial orders, the crowd chanted the orthodox version. Blows were exchanged, and many were killed or imprisoned. Again there were disturbances on Monday 5th November, at the church of St. Theodore. On the following day, tension heightened as the crowd gathered in the forum of Constantine to commemorate the anniversary of 472, and an orthodox camp swiftly formed¹⁶¹. They dragged statues of the emperor through the streets and stoned Celer and Patricius who were sent to appease them.

Quorum alii quidem, ceteris die noctuque hymnum trinitatis Christo deo psallentibus, tutam peragrant civitatem et Anastasii Caesaris monastico habitu adsectatores ferro flammisque interimunt: alii claves portarum omniumque signa militaria ad forum quo religionis castra metati fuerant, deferunt ibique Anastasio Caesare in processibus degente Areobindam sibi imperatorem fieri clamitant¹⁶².

So runs the account of Marcellinus Comes. He only mentions that the houses of Plato and Marinus were burnt, and he omits the tale of the monk found in Marinus' house who was

¹⁵⁹ This edict was read by Plato, the city prefect and Marinus, the *praetorian prefect*.

¹⁶⁰ See Charanis (1974), p.78 further on this view.

¹⁶¹ The anniversary commemorated the natural disasters of 6th November, 472, when the skies of Constantinople were blackened with ash from Vesuvius and Asia Minor suffered a series of damaging earthquakes.

¹⁶² Marc. C. 512.

beheaded as the crowd shouted:

οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ φίλος τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος¹⁶³.

Anastasius, desperate to calm the crowd, went to the hippodrome without his diadem and offered to resign, reminding the rebels that they could not all be emperor¹⁶⁴. There are various stories as to how Anastasius convinced the mob; Marcellinus Comes recorded that:

hos cives idem Anastasius Caesar solitis periuriis simulatisque vocibus, sese facturum cuncta promittens...

while Gibbon stated that the crowd

accepted the blood of two unpopular ministers, whom their master without hesitation condemned to the lions¹⁶⁵.

Eventually, the crowds seemed satisfied that they had forced Anastasius into proffering a public resignation, and realised that there was no real viable alternative.

The Orthodox Backlash.

a) *The East.*

i) *The Synod of Antioch.*

Back in Antioch, the new patriarch was initially received enthusiastically, with the crowds shouting:

anathematise the council of Chalcedon,...anathematise the apostate council...cursed be the council, cursed be the Tome of Leo. Deliver the city from heresy¹⁶⁶.

A group of monks, expelled from a monastery near Apamea by Flavian, appeared at Severus' monastery at Maiuma, carrying crosses and hailing him patriarch. Yet increasingly

¹⁶³ Evag. III.44, Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 818, Cedr. 631, contra John of Nikiu LXXXIX.64, who believed that the crowd thought the monk was Severus. Zon. XIV.3.37 adds that a nun was also beheaded.

¹⁶⁴ Evag. III.44, Mal. 408, *Chron. Pasch.* 517.

¹⁶⁵ A statement entirely lacking in proof. See Marc. C. 512 and Gibbon (1898), V.140.

¹⁶⁶ John, *Vit. Sev.*, PO 2.241, Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 823.

throughout his patriarchate, Severus encountered more and more opposition¹⁶⁷. The explanation for this can be found in the possibility that many of the clergy and monks were fairly moderate in whichever view they adhered to, hence the support at Sidon for the moderate Flavian. Severus would accept the Henoticon in an anti-Chalcedonian sense, yet believed it to be "superfluous" and problematic¹⁶⁸. In early 513, the synod at Antioch offered a basis for unity based on acceptance of the Henoticon and the denunciation of the Tome and Council. The offer was rejected by many.

In Cilicia, the neo-Chalcedonian movement, led by John the Grammarian, also inevitably won supporters away from the strict monophysite cause, and in the south, Severus failed to sway certain Arab tribes on the Syrian frontier¹⁶⁹. In desperation, Severus twice sent synodical letters to Elias, the second time accompanied by imperial soldiers. At this, the monks, led by St. Sabas, pronounced an anathema against Severus and those in communion with him¹⁷⁰. Julian of Bostra and Peter of Damascus resigned while two other bishops, Cosmas of Epiphaniis and Severianus of Arethusa, anathematised Severus. The emperor directed Asiasticus, the commander in Phoenicia Libanensis, to eject the latter from their sees, but since they enjoyed extensive support, they were eventually left alone¹⁷¹. Peter of Apamea, alone of his province, attended the Synod of Antioch; the rest of his clergy broke communion with him and Severus. The Isaurian bishops, except Sergius of Philadelphia and Asterius of Calenderis, also condemned Severus¹⁷².

ii) *The Synod of Tyre*

As opposition continued, Philoxenus appealed to the emperor who decided, whether on his

¹⁶⁷ Devreese (1945), pp.70f.

¹⁶⁸ Sel. Let. I:2.

¹⁶⁹ Theod. Lect. 513, Theoph. AM 6005; cf. chapter three, part one, *The Arabs and Christianity*.

¹⁷⁰ Cyril of Scythop., *Vit. Sab.* LVI.

¹⁷¹ Evag. III.34, with Allen (1981), pp.153-154.

¹⁷² Others, however, were either persuaded to accept Severus, or were driven from their bishoprics.

own initiative or at the inducement of the monophysites, to call a synod of Oriental bishops "for the purpose of effecting needed reforms"¹⁷³. As a result, bishops of the provinces of Syria I and II, Euphratesia, Mesopotamia, Arabia and Phoenicia Libanensis convened at Tyre, sometime between 1st October, 514 and 30th September, 515¹⁷⁴. Severus led the proceedings and a doctrinal faith based on the Henoticon interpreted in an entirely anti-Chalcedonian way, was established:

Et [Severus] dum fidei veritatem oriri facit scriptum ipsius Henotici Zenonis in absolutionem errorum quae Chalcedone gesta sunt factum esse interpretatus est¹⁷⁵.

Synodical letters sent to Timothy, John III of Alexandria and Elias were all approved¹⁷⁶.

This is the account given by Zachariah in his *Ecclesiastical History*, but several points seem unlikely. It is improbable that such a synod would be held at Anastasius' instigation or that the synodical letters would have been approved by Timothy, at a time when the capital was threatened by the troops of Vitalian demanding a more orthodox approach¹⁷⁷. There is also some doubt as to whether Elias would have agreed to such a decision, although it has been suggested that the embattled patriarch agreed as a measure of security¹⁷⁸.

De Halleux in his book on Philoxenus¹⁷⁹, argues that the Tyre synod did not exist at all, or if it did, in a far more low-key form. He suggests that the evidence concerning the purpose

¹⁷³ John of Eph. *PO* 2.304-305; Zach. of Myt. VII.12, Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 826 and *Chronicon ad 846* p.168.

¹⁷⁴ Charanis (1974), p.99, is surely right to accept the timing of late 514 or early 515. If it were any later, it would clash with the Synod of Heraclea, which was scheduled for the summer of 515. An earlier date would place it too close to the 513 Synod of Antioch and there must be a sufficient interval from the beginning of Severus' patriarch for the opportunity for relations to worsen.

¹⁷⁵ Zach. of Myt. VII.12, quoted by Frend (1972), p.227.

¹⁷⁶ Grumel (1932), p.146.

¹⁷⁷ cf. chapter two, part two, *The Second Stage of the Conflict*.

¹⁷⁸ Charanis (1974), p.99; see Grumel (1932), p.147 for the re-sending of the synodical letter to Elias.

¹⁷⁹ De Halleux (1963), p.79ff.

and events of the Synods of Antioch and Tyre is so similar, that it must refer to the same occasion. He thus reconstructs the events as follows. The Synod of Antioch was held, probably in 513, on the order of Anastasius at the demand of the monophysites with a three-fold purpose: firstly, to establish firmly the election of Severus; secondly, to condemn Chalcedon and the Tome; and thirdly, to promote peace in the Church. As well as his concerns about the similarity in aims of the two synods, De Halleux believes it would be unlikely that a council promoting monophysitism would be held at Tyre, a stronghold of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. This scenario would allow for a small scale synod to be held later at Tyre to confirm the deposition of Epiphanius and to install a replacement, but that for some reason, the common Syriac source had confused this with the much greater monophysite Synod of 513 at Antioch.

However, it is more convincing surely, to argue that there is room for two important councils, which means there is no need to discount the Syriac source. An initial council was needed in 513 soon after Severus' accession to confirm his ordination, the deposition of Flavian and to reaffirm the Henoticon and the rejection of the Tome and the Council of Chalcedon. It is to this council that the letter of Philoxenus to Simeon of Teleda refers¹⁸⁰. The Synod of Tyre was needed to stem the growing tide of opposition against Severus and went even further in its monophysite interpretation of the Henoticon. As for the location, this should be seen as a positive argument for the synod, not negative. For how better to crush the orthodox than in their own territory, the bishopric of Epiphanius who was the orthodox brother of Flavian? It seems clear that there is ample reason to admit the existence of two important synods.

The Synod at Tyre, however, was unsuccessful for Severus, as opposition towards him continued¹⁸¹. He made further efforts to harness support, attempting, in the spring of 515, to detach the bishops of Syria II from the influence of the Chalcedon archimandrites. At a

¹⁸⁰ cf. Lebon (1909), p.57ff.

¹⁸¹ Dyophysites, such as John of Scythopolis and John the Grammarian, now began to compose apologies for the Council of Chalcedon. In 515 the monks of Palestine wrote to Alcison about the ecclesiastic situation of Palestine and Syria; Evag. III.31.

local synod in Antioch, he tried to depose the bishops of Epiphania, Arethusa and Rhaphania¹⁸². They were supported, perhaps surprisingly, by the emperor, who asked,

that the deprivation of these no-bishops and wicked men in Second Syria might be annulled,

and apparently added

a certain defence of the definition of the men who assembled at Chalcedon¹⁸³.

This seems rather a change of policy from one who had come to adopt a monophysite interpretation of the Henoticon, but Anastasius was perhaps concerned with negotiations with Rome forced on him by the actions of Vitalian¹⁸⁴.

iii) The Deposition of Elias.

Anastasius did, however, support the nefarious actions of Severus against Elias, whose position he had previously upheld. Such a reversal reveals Anastasius' enduring hope for some sort of unity after all. For if he could secure the acquiescence of Jerusalem, all four patriarchates of the east would be in communion. Hopes for an agreement with Rome prevented Anastasius from forcing Elias, but with the defeat of Vitalian at the end of July 516, the situation changed. He therefore instructed Olympius, the governor of Palestine, to procure Elias' recognition of Severus or depose him. This time his monks could not save him and he was exiled to Aila¹⁸⁵.

In his place, John the "guarder of the cross" and son of Marcian, bishop of Sebasta, was proposed as the new patriarch, with the promise that he would recognise Severus. On being

¹⁸² When they refused to go, they were ejected forcefully; cf. Evag. III.34, Sel. Let. I:21; Charanis (1974), p.100.

¹⁸³ Sel. Let. I:24.

¹⁸⁴ cf. chapter two, part two, *Anastasius and the Church of Rome*.

¹⁸⁵ Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LVI, Marc. C. 516. If it is true that Elias had accepted the acts of the Synod of Tyre, then his position must have been seriously weakened. Others say that Olympius produced the letter agreeing to an anathematisation of Chalcedon, claimed as a forgery by Elias.

persuaded by the monks not to do so, he was imprisoned¹⁸⁶, but hastily changed his mind and assured the *dux*, Anastasius, that he would declare his loyalty to Severus in the convent of St. Stephen. About ten thousand monks gathered for the occasion. John, flanked by the monks Theodosius and Sabas, mounted the platform and in response to shouts to "anathematise the heretics and confirm the council", the three of them anathematised Nestorius, Eutyches, Severus, Soterichus of Caesarea and all those who did not accept the definition of Chalcedon¹⁸⁷. Hypatius, Anastasius' nephew, who was visiting Jerusalem as a pilgrim, hastily swore that he supported communion with the Church of Jerusalem and gave Theodosius and Sabas one hundred pounds of gold each for their desert monasteries¹⁸⁸. The two monks asked the emperor for peace in Jerusalem and denounced Severus¹⁸⁹. Anastasius agreed, asking the former to pray for peace, and allowed John to continue in his patriarchate unmolested.

Even with the departure of Elias, Severus could not be content. In 517, a rift grew between him and the new patriarch of Alexandria, Dioscorus II, who was less insistent on an outright condemnation of the Tome and Chalcedon, and more content with acceptance of the Henoticon. In April 518, Severus was to complain that the monophysite Trishagion was not being used in Egypt¹⁹⁰.

Meanwhile, the orthodox eastern clergy did not hesitate to seek support. In 516, many eastern clergy recognised the pope, Hormisdas, and two hundred and seventeen archimandrites and monks signed his definition of faith¹⁹¹. The form of address:

¹⁸⁶ Cyril Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LVI, recounts how a certain Zachariah visited Sabas in prison and told him to pretend to support the monophysite cause to the new *dux*, Anastasius, son of Pamphilius, but later double back on his promise. See also Theoph. AM 6005.

¹⁸⁷ Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LVI, Theoph. AM 6005, Niceph. Cal. XVI.34, Mansi (1762), VIII.376ff.

¹⁸⁸ Theod. Lect. 517ff, with Peeters (1950), pp.8-25.

¹⁸⁹ For the letter of Theodosius and Sabas, see Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LVII.

¹⁹⁰ Homily 125, *PO* 29.1.249.

¹⁹¹ Gunther (1895-1898), no.139; Devreese (1945), p.71.

Sanctissimo et beatissimo universi orbis terrae patriarchae Hormisdas
 continenti sedem principis apostolorum Petri deprecatio et supplicatio....

shows the prestige they accorded Rome. They accused Severus of denouncing the "holy Synod of Chalcedon" and "our blessed father Leo", and complained of his use of violence, as in the massacre of three hundred and fifty orthodox monks on pilgrimage to the tomb of St. Simeon the Stylite. Hormisdas replied with a long letter giving encouragement, urging them to continue their fight for orthodoxy, and again drawing the distinction between secular and sacred powers:

Quicquid adversum regulas patrum de quibuslibet commentariis profertur, abicite. Nullos vos incongruentibus praeceptis aut novis moveat institutis: si enim mundani sunt, ecclesias tenere non possunt, quia eis convenit magis discere quam docere. Nefas enim altaribus piis peregrina inferre libamina, quia certos religiosis disciplinis terminos deus inter ipsa quoque cultus sui praescripsit initia. Inter Levitas et populum suum divisit officium; alia est potestas hominum, alia ministeria sacerdotum¹⁹².

Such correspondence continued between the east and west to the end of Anastasius' reign. An epistle dated 10th February, 518 carried encouragement from the pope to the presbyters, deacons and archimandrites of Syria Secunda and the other orthodox of the east, urging them to bear insults calmly, serve the faith and reject Nestorius and Eutyches¹⁹³.

b) Developments in the Balkans.

The eastern clergy were not alone in their hope of support from Rome. In a letter written at the beginning of October, 516, John, bishop-elect of Nicopolis, consented to sign Hormisdas' *libellus*, and asked the pope,

to take care of all churches and that of Nicopolis according to the habit of

¹⁹² Gunther (1895-1898), no.140. These are the much the same sentiments as those expressed by Gelasius and Symmachus.

¹⁹³ Mansi (1872), VIII.1024, Thiel (1868), pp.820ff, and Jaffé (1885-1888), no.800.

your apostolic see¹⁹⁴.

The bishops of Epirus who met at a local synod to confirm his ordination followed John's example¹⁹⁵. The pope had previously announced in a letter the defection of many Illyrian bishops from Dorotheus, the bishop of Thessalonica who was afraid to break off communion with the patriarch of Constantinople, Timothy¹⁹⁶. Relations between the imperial capital and its Balkan provinces had been strained for some time. According to Marcellinus Comes:

Laurentium praeterea Lychnidensem, Domnionem Serdicensem, Alcissum Nicopolitanum, Gaianum Naisitanum et Evangelum Pautaliensem, catholicos Illyrici sacerdotes, suis Anastasius praesentari iussit obtutibus¹⁹⁷.

Only three were to return to Illyria, as Gaianus and Alcison both died in Constantinople.

Perhaps the most significant sign of Hormisdas' success in winning the Balkans to Rome's side, was the letter of 12th January, 515 from Dorotheus, which addressed Hormisdas as a peace-maker and "champion of the true faith who never errs¹⁹⁸." He respected the Roman see, wishing that:

humanitate quidem Domini et Dei nostri Jesu Christi, intercessionibus autem in cunctis beatissimi apostoli Petri et in omnibus sapientissimi Pauli; ut venerandae eorum sedi et tuae beatitudini juste debitus honor custodiatur atque reddatur, ut nostris temporibus velut secundum principatum sedes apostolicae honorem congruentem suscipiat, et omnis discordia recedat, et ecclesiae omnium nostrum catholica voluntate,...

This was certainly a change of policy by Dorotheus, who had previously maintained communion with the patriarchate of Constantinople¹⁹⁹.

¹⁹⁴ Gunther (1895-1898), no.117.

¹⁹⁵ Thiel (1868), pp.772-724.

¹⁹⁶ Thiel (1868), pp.756-761, Theod. Lect. 521, Theoph. AM 6008.

¹⁹⁷ Marc. C. 516.

¹⁹⁸ Thiel (1868), pp.742ff, Gunther (1895-1898), no.105.

¹⁹⁹ cf. Cessi (1920), pp.220f, Dvornik (1958), p.124.

c) *The Revolt of Vitalian and Relations with Rome.*

As opposition in the east mounted against Severus and the monophysites, and the Balkans sided openly with Rome, the orthodox cause was given another boost by the rebellion of Vitalian, who tried to force Anastasius into negotiations with Rome²⁰⁰.

The real cause of Vitalian's revolt is unclear, but the religious discontent of the orthodox in an increasingly monophysite world, was one of the perceived reasons at the time, and Vitalian, whatever his own desires, was content to harness the support for this worthy cause to his own revolt. After his first assault on Constantinople, a settlement was arranged which included a clause to the effect that the Church of Rome should be allowed to settle the long-standing doctrinal rift. The Trishagion should be restored to its original form, and Macedonius and Flavian should be reinstated²⁰¹. After this truce, Anastasius launched an unsuccessful attack on Vitalian and was again forced to negotiate with Vitalian's troops poised at Sosthenium. This time the agreement included a synod to be held at Heraclea attended by all bishops.

Anastasius then despatched two letters to the pope inviting him to the Heracleian synod which was to be held in July 515²⁰², writing thus:

ut deinceps nulla possit esse dubitatio vel discordia²⁰³.

Anastasius' tone in this letter perhaps reflects the hope he felt at the change of pope, from the intransigent Symmachus, who died 19th July, 514, to Hormisdas, known for his mildness and conciliatory nature²⁰⁴. The new pope replied to the first letter in which he defended Symmachus, but stressed a desire for good will and asked for more information about the

²⁰⁰ cf. chapter two, part two.

²⁰¹ See chapter two, part two, *The Beginning of the Conflict*, for references.

²⁰² For references and the dating of these letters, see chapter two, part two, *Anastasius and the Church of Rome*.

²⁰³ Thiel (1868), p.741, Gunther (1895-1898), no.109.

²⁰⁴ Hormisdas had even reinstated the remnants of the Laurentian party.

proposed synod²⁰⁵. On receiving the second letter, he decided to send an embassy to Constantinople, but even before it arrived, the bishops had already met and dispersed, with no agreement being reached.

On 11th August, 515, the papal embassy arrived at Constantinople, comprising of Ennodius, bishop of Pavia, Fortunatus of Caria, Venantius (a priest), Vitalis (a deacon), and Hilary (a notary)²⁰⁶. They carried four documents: a letter addressed to the emperor²⁰⁷, the *Indiculus*²⁰⁸, the formula of Hormisdas (the *libellus*)²⁰⁹ and a papal letter to Vitalian which is no longer extant. Hormisdas agreed to attend the council called by the emperor, for the sake of peace and unity, although there was no precedent for such an honour. In return, he expected complete support from the emperor, of the kind Marcian and Leo I had given to pope Leo I²¹⁰.

The signing of the *libellus* was of crucial importance. It contained the usual condemnation

²⁰⁵ Thiel (1868), p.745, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.771, Gunther (1895-1898), no.108.

²⁰⁶ *Liber Pontificalis* I.269, cf. Frend (1972), p.232.

²⁰⁷ Mansi (1762), VIII.388, Thiel (1868), p.747, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.773, and Gunther (1895-1898), no.110.

²⁰⁸ Mansi (1762), VIII.389, Thiel (1868), pp.748ff, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.774, and Gunther (1895-1898), no.116. The *Indiculus* was a set of instructions to the envoys governing their every movement. It contained precise guidelines concerning where to stay, what invitations to accept, whom to see and most importantly, specific answers to expected questions from the emperor. It was forbidden that there should be any discussion between Anastasius and the legates, before the former had read the papal letters, and attempts were to be fended off. Thus:

salutes ad pietatem vestram continent et deo gratias agit, quia vos sollicitos de unitate cognoscit ecclesiae; legite et agnoscitis.

The emperor was certainly not allowed to see the papal letter to Vitalian. After the reading of the documents, the envoys may say, for example,

salutat pater vester, deum cotidie rogans et confessionibus sanctorum apostolorum Petri et Pauli vestrum regnum commendans, ut deus, qui vobis tale desiderium dedit, ut pro causa ecclesiae mitti et consulere beatitudinem ipsius eligeretis, ipse et perfectionem bonae retribuatur voluntatis.

If Anastasius accepted Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo, they were to kiss his breast and thank God for his conversion to orthodoxy. See further Cessi (1920), pp.228ff, Hodgkin (1885), III.464-469 and Charanis (1974), pp.89-90.

²⁰⁹ Mansi (1762), VIII.393, Thiel (1868), pp.755f, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.775, and Gunther (1895-1898), no.115, with Charanis (1974), pp.90f.

²¹⁰ The terms of agreement stipulated by Hormisdas, including, of course, adherence to the Council of Chalcedon, have already been noted in chapter two, part two, *Anastasius and the Church of Rome*.

of the principal heretics, a long passage about the apostolicity of Rome, and significantly, demanded the absolute submission of the emperor to the pope:

Quapropter suscipimus et probamus epistolas beati Leonis papae universas, quas de Christiana religione conscripsit. Unde, sicut praediximus, sequentes in omnibus apostolicam sedem et praedicantes eius omnia constituta, spero, ut in una communione vobiscum, quam sedes apostolica praedicat, esse merear, in qua est integra et verax Christianiae religionis soliditas²¹¹:

It is interesting that the *libellus* contained no mention of the more recent developments; the names of Euphemius, Macedonius, Severus and Philoxenus do not feature. Hormisdas was still harking back to the old complaints concerning the supremacy of Rome and Acacius.

It is clear that the pope had given no consideration as to how Anastasius might go about persuading the still considerable monophysite element of the eastern empire to agree to a circular letter announcing the emperor's adherence to Chalcedon, as he suggested²¹². Agreement to Hormisdas' demands also meant the effacement of the name of Acacius from the diptychs, a proposal that the populace of Constantinople would never allow.

It is not clear what took place between Anastasius and Ennodius, but it is recorded that the embassy, "euntes ad Anastasium Augustum, nihil egerunt"²¹³. The embassy returned in the winter of 515 with Anastasius' reply. He asserted that he had never condemned the Synod of Chalcedon openly, Nestorius and Eutyches had already been anathematised and condemnation of the others would only lead to bloodshed. The living should not suffer on account of the dead²¹⁴. Thus, as Frend observed:

In all this Anastasius showed that, whatever his hopes for monophysitism, his

²¹¹ Gunther (1895-1898), no.116b.

²¹² Gunther (1895-1898), no.116a, cf. Charanis (1974), p.91.

²¹³ *Liber Pontificalis* I.269.

²¹⁴ Thiel (1868), p.761, Gunther (1895-1898), no.125.

aim was religious peace and security for all his subjects²¹⁵.

It seems, however, that Anastasius did promise that he would send an imperial embassy at a later date to the pope. He closes his letter with the Biblical quotation:

pacem meam do vobis, pacem meam dimitto vobis²¹⁶.

No answer from the pope is known today.

After the final defeat of Vitalian at the Golden Horn, Anastasius decided to renew negotiations with the pope, sending as ambassadors Theopompus (*comes domesticorum*) and Severianus (*comes sacri consistori*) with two letters: one addressed to the pope²¹⁷, the other to the Roman senate²¹⁸. The pope was offended that the envoys were mere laymen and politicians, rather than the prominent ecclesiastics he had been promised²¹⁹. To Hormisdas, this smacked of insincerity and was proof that the emperor was not serious in his desire to patch up the schism. The contents and sycophantic tone were a further source of displeasure. Anastasius explains that he has sent his legates to give the pope the results of his discussions with bishops about the problems between the Churches of the east and west, but the outcome of the talks is never revealed.

The letter to the senate was very different and indeed, the type of envoys chosen (political rather than ecclesiastical) was more for the benefit of the Roman senators. Anastasius referred to them as "senatui suo" and begged them to use their influence to achieve peace in the Church:

both with the exalted king to whom the power and responsibility of ruling you is committed, and the venerable pope, to whom is entrusted the capacity to

²¹⁵ Frend (1972), p.232.

²¹⁶ Gunther (1895-1898), no.125, with Charanis (1974), p.92.

²¹⁷ Thiel (1868), p.764, Gunther (1895-1898), no.111.

²¹⁸ cf. chapter three, part two, *Theodore and the Doctrinal Schism*, 516.

²¹⁹ cf. Gunther (1895-1898), no.137.

intercede for you with God²²⁰.

Thus Anastasius cleverly attributes power to rule to the king, and to the pope, only the power of intercession. However, as discussed in chapter three, the senate no longer had the same sympathy for the east. The intervening years under Symmachus and Hormisdas had seen the demise of the Henoticon party, either through the former's intransigence or through the latter's policy of reinstating and therefore assimilating members into the orthodox Roman church. The senate's reply confirmed Hormisdas' demand for the condemnation of Acacius, submission to the Roman see and adherence to the Council of Chalcedon²²¹.

In his response, Hormisdas referred to Anastasius' appeal to the senate,

vos senatui urbis Romae, ut me ad pacem hortaretur, iniungitis....audite me pro Christo legatione fungentem²²²:

Thus Hormisdas not only verified the position of Rome once again, and confirmed that Acacius and the Council of Chalcedon were "stumbling blocks" to the peace of the Church, but also reminded Anastasius of his limited secular "potestas" in comparison to his own ecclesiastical "auctoritas" as Christ's representative on earth.

Hormisdas shared his doubts that a compromise could be reached with Avitus, writing thus:

sed quantum ad Graecos, ore potius praeferunt pacis vota quam pectore et loquuntur magis iusta quam faciunt²²³;

However, in this letter he also mentioned the possibility of sending another embassy to the court of Anastasius. He was perhaps encouraged to do so, by his success in the Balkans and especially in the east. He prepared letters for Anastasius, in which he denounced Acacius, for Timothy, concerning his return to orthodoxy, and for the bishops of the east, Dorotheus, and the populace of Constantinople. He despatched them with two legates, Ennodius and Peregrinus, bishop of Misenum in Campania, accompanied by the subdeacon Pullio, in April

²²⁰ cf. Hodgkin (1885), III.471.

²²¹ For this letter and references, see chapter three, part two, *Theoderic and the Doctrinal Schism*, 516.

²²² Mansi (1762), VIII.398, Thiel (1868), p.766, Jaffé (1885-1888), no.779, Gunther (1895-1898), no.112.

²²³ Gunther (1895-1898), no.137, quoted by Charanis (1974), p.97.

517²²⁴.

Anastasius refused to negotiate, and sent the legates back to Italy with orders not to touch at any port, to eliminate the risk of the papal letters being circulated. This attempt of the pope to win over the bishops of the east had enraged the emperor and on 11th July, 517, he wrote back to the pope ending their correspondence:

sed postulationem nostram a praesenti tempore taciturnitate comprimi<mu>s,
inrationabile iudicantes illis precum adhibere bonitatem, qui rogari se nolint
contumaciter respuentes. Iniuriari enim et adnullari sustinere possumus, iuberi
non possumus²²⁵.

Conclusions.

Just before the death of Anastasius, Timothy died and John II was appointed in his place. He anathematised the Council of Chalcedon, yet Severus wrote,

As to the man who has just been insituted and holds the prelacy of the royal city, we have learned that he is John... who is thought to be inclined to the right opinions and holds out some pleasing hopes to the orthodox, but is more desirous of adopting a deceitful middle course²²⁶.

However, there was no room for a "middle" course. There was now little possibility of a union between the four eastern patriarchates: the orthodox backlash had been growing since the election of Severus at Antioch, the pinnacle of monophysite achievement, fanned more than anything by the uncompromising attitude of Severus himself, Philoxenus and other staunch monophysites. To the east (perhaps less concerned with the preservation of Acacius' name than Constantinople), a reconciliation with Rome must have seemed increasingly attractive.

²²⁴ Mansi (1762), VIII.412-418, Thiel (1868), pp.796-806, Jaffé (1885-1888), nos.789-794, Gunther (1895-1898), nos.126-128, with the *Liber Pontificalis* I.269-270.

²²⁵ Thiel (1868), p.813, Gunther (1896-1898), no.138.

²²⁶ Sel. Let. VI:1 and quoted by Frend (1972), p.233.

In Constantinople too, the tide was changing. Rioters on 15th and 16th July, 518, shortly after the death of Anastasius, called for the deposition of Severus, the restoration of the relics of Macedonius to the Great Church, assertion of the Council of Chalcedon and an end to the schism with Rome.

It cannot be denied that this amounted to an overthrow of almost all that Anastasius had worked for. Must it be said then, that Anastasius had failed? At first glance, the record over his reign is hardly impressive. The years between 496 and 516 saw the deposition of four patriarchs and all the while Anastasius was edging more and more towards monophysitism. However, on a closer examination of the context, a more favourable opinion of the emperor begins to emerge.

Although the schism with Rome only ended after Anastasius' death, it is clear that the emperor made several attempts with successive popes to negotiate. The sticking point was Acacius and any concession would have earned the disapproval of the patriarch and led to unrest in Constantinople. The settlement that was finally agreed was extremely unfavourable to the east and would never have been accepted at an earlier time.

As for the east, Anastasius maintained the Henoticon as long as he could. However, with different interpretations of the Henoticon springing up, it was increasingly difficult to maintain unity based on it. Anastasius inclined towards monophysitism, possibly because of his personal views, but more likely, at first, because of the unstable situation with Persia. The monophysites had some very strong leaders, especially Severus and Philoxenus, and it would have been very difficult to oppose them without causing more disruption. In the same way, it must have seemed easy to depose the four patriarchs, awkward in the short-term, but with a view to a calmer state in the long-run. As for the charge that Anastasius was weak, vacillating and open to persuasion on all sides, his wavering can also be seen as a flexible policy, designed to respond immediately to the rapidly changing situation: there was no "right" side to support and outright adherence to one party would upset the delicate balance of doctrinal theories.

Although the schism in the west was healed, there was no solution to the conflict in the east. It did not end until the conquest of the monophysite provinces by the Saracens in the seventh century, when they were no longer under the umbrella of Roman rule²²⁷. There was no solution, and thus history is divided on the success or failure of Anastasius' religious policy. Described as an emperor who allowed his "calm impartiality" to turn to "bitter partisanship²²⁸", this shows little understanding of the complex religious schisms fermenting under his rule, which he strove to control throughout his reign.

²²⁷ cf. Charanis (1974), pp.105-106.

²²⁸ Hodgkin (1885), III.476.

Chapter Five

Administration and Domestic Policy.

It is for his successful financial rehabilitation of the empire that Anastasius is most well-known, and justifiably so¹. At his accession, the state was on the brink of bankruptcy following Leo I's disastrous expedition against the Vandals in 468²; at his death in 518, the imperial treasury held three hundred and twenty thousand pounds of gold³. Was this spectacular saving a result of the "parca subtilitas", the accusation made by his successor Justin⁴? Yet Anastasius managed to implement a number of tax cuts, notably the complete abolition of the unpopular *chrysargyron*, as well as providing subsidies for regions suffering from bad harvests, war and earthquake damage. The key to Anastasius' success lay in a much wider reorganisation of the empire's resources and how they were managed. He therefore not only provided for a restructuring of the fisc, but also catered for the consequences, by introducing changes to the collection of taxes, municipal administration, agrarian legislation and the organisation of the army.

The Court and Imperial Officials of Anastasius⁵.

It can be argued that Anastasius himself could not have been responsible for such a comprehensive programme of administration and legislation, and it is true that he had a highly experienced team of officials and advisers:

...πλείστους δὲ τοιούτους ἀγαθοὺς ἔχειν ἄνδρας τῶν πραγμάτων

¹ Jones (1964), I.235.

² John Lydus, *De Mag.* III.45.

³ Proc. *Anec.* XIX.7. Stein (1949), II.193 compares the wealth of the empire under Anastasius to that under Basil II, who in 1025 left two hundred thousand pounds in the state treasury (according to Zonaras XVII.8.23). Basil had ruled an extensive empire which had enjoyed a century of prosperity. See also Treadgold (1995), pp.193-194 who records the surplus in the treasury at the death of various emperors, from Marcian (457) up to Basil II.

⁴ *C.J.* II.7.25.

⁵ For lists of officials during the reign of Anastasius, and a list of his laws, see Appendix G.

προεστηκότας,....⁶

From an examination of those filling the major administrative posts, it is clear that while Anastasius followed tradition in often appointing close family, he also sought to award loyal service with higher office, and he especially sought out learned, cultured and experienced candidates.

The consulship, said to be the only ancient republican office to retain its glamour⁷, was reserved mainly, as was usual, for the emperor himself and his family⁸. A brief glance at the *consular fasti* reveals that Anastasius himself held this office three times (492, 497 and 507) and his three nephews, Hypatius, Pompeius and Probus, held it in successive years, 500, 501 and 502. His brother Paul was in office in 496 and his brother-in-law, Secundinus, in 511. Two further relations of Anastasius, Flavius Anastasius Paulus Probus Sabinianus Pompeius Anastasius and Flavius Anastasius Paulus Probus Moschianus Probus Magnus, held the consulship in 517 and 518 respectively⁹. These family members also held other posts. Secundinus became the city prefect in 492, after Julian proved to be an unpopular choice¹⁰. Hypatius was the *magister militum praesentalis* (503 and 513)¹¹, as was another more distant relative, John, son of Valeriana¹².

⁶ Proc. *Pan.* 30.

⁷ Jones (1964), II.532f.

⁸ Cameron (1978), p.260 comments that Anastasius and members of his family held the consulship so often, thus concentrating state power in the imperial family, that the emperor might have hoped to establish his own dynasty easily. On this point, see also Bréhier (1914), col.1449 and Capizzi (1969), p.44.

⁹ For further discussion on the identity of the latter two, see Cameron (1978), pp.259-260, who believes they are the great nephews of Paulus, Anastasius' brother, contra *PLRE* II.82-83, no.17 and II.701, no.5 and Capizzi (1969), p.42 who both think they are the sons of Anastasius' nephews, Pompeius and Probus. Interestingly, Anastasius did not penalise the religious sympathies of any of his family members by denying them consulship. Pompeius was certainly Chalcedonian orthodox; see Theod. Lect. 505; *PLRE* II.898, no.2. Moreover, the careful observance of seniority by Anastasius should be noted; his brother first held the consulship, then his three nephews, and lastly, Secundinus (not of imperial blood).

¹⁰ *PLRE* II.986, Secundinus 5.

¹¹ *PLRE* II.577-581, Hypatius 6.

¹² *PLRE* II.608, John 60; John of Ant. fr.214e.

Anastasius was also ready to reward service to the empire, and John the Scythian and John the Hunchback, the successful generals of the Isaurian war, were given consulships in 498 and 499 respectively, in recognition of their achievement in eventually outmanoeuvring the guerrilla tactics of the rebels¹³. Similarly, Celer, after bringing the Persian war to a satisfactory conclusion in 505/506, was rewarded with a consulship in 508.

The most interesting and important group of officials chosen by an emperor who was to devote himself to the administration and financial recovery of the empire, is surely those learned and cultured men who brought with them a wealth of practical experience and insight into the workings of the imperial *scrinii*. Himself promoted from the ranks of the *silentiaries* to the imperial purple, Anastasius well understood the value of proficient training in a government bureau. In his rejection of those whose only qualification was their "illustrious" birth, he refused to promote, at Ariadne's request, Anthemius, son of the western emperor Anthemius (467-472), to the *praetorian prefecture*, alluding to the intellectual qualities required for the job¹⁴.

Procopius of Gaza refers briefly to Anastasius' well qualified staff, as quoted above, while Priscian discusses his wise choice of officials at greater length, mentioning two groups that flourished under Anastasius, those from Rome, and men of education and culture¹⁵. Even generals were selected for such attributes; Celer, the *magister officiorum*, 503-518 and consul of 508, was described as:

ἦν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ μετὰ λόγου καὶ παιδείας πάσης χάριτος θεοῦ πολλῆς
πεπληρωμένος καὶ ἀνδρείος,....¹⁶.

His predecessor, Eusebius (*magister officiorum* 492-497), was considered worthy to hold the

¹³ cf. chapter two, part one, *The Conclusion of the War*.

¹⁴ John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.50, Capizzi, (1969), pp.140-141, n.186. See John of Ant. fr.214e for notice of Anthemius' promotion to the consulship in 515.

¹⁵ Proc. *Pan.* 30; Prisc. *Pan.* 248-253.

¹⁶ Theoph. AM 5998. Mal. 399, calls him learned.

consulship twice, once under Zeno, and again in 493¹⁷.

The city prefects appointed by Anastasius again clearly reveal the emperor seeking to choose the most appropriate candidate. After the initial riots and the unpopularity of Julian¹⁸, the emperor sought security in the appointment of his brother-in-law, Secundinus. He was later replaced by the experienced Turcus Rufius Apronianus Asterius, whose titles already included *ex comite domesticorum protectorum* and *ex comite privatarum largitionum*; he was to be consul in 494 and was, incidentally, a literary man, known for his work in editing and publishing¹⁹. However, in 498, in response to the rioting caused by the Green faction at Constantinople, Anastasius appointed Plato, *πάτρων τοῦ Πρασίνου*, in an attempt to restore order²⁰.

Among the *comites sacrarum largitionum*, we find John the Paphlagonian, an effective example of an official who gained the relevant experience and was subsequently promoted. He started out as a *tractator* in the *Scrinium Orientis* at Constantinople and rose to be an honorary consul²¹. Another well-known *comes sacrarum largitionum* was Fl. Taurus Clementinus Armonius Clementinus, though it is not certain when he held this post. He became an ordinary consul in 513, having already been an honorary consul sometime before 511²².

As for the honorary consulship, Zeno had decreed that on the payment of a *centenarium* of gold to the aqueduct fund at Constantinople, the title was automatically bestowed. It is perhaps significant, given Anastasius' care in the selection of his officials, that during his

¹⁷ *PLRE* II.433, no.28.

¹⁸ *PLRE* II.639, no.14.

¹⁹ *PLRE* II.173f, no.11.

²⁰ Mal. 395; *PLRE* II.891f, no.3.

²¹ *PLRE* II.604-605, no.45. His monetary reform will be discussed in detail below: *The Coinage Reform*.

²² *PLRE* II.303.

reign, the honorary consuls were deserving cases: they had all held other important state offices and some were responsible for prominent reforms, or for successful activity in war²³.

One of the most important posts in the imperial government was that of the *praetorian prefecture*. Again from the *fasti*, one can isolate individuals chosen for their education and experience. Polycarp (498), a native of Beirut, was promoted from his post as a *scrinarius*; significantly, he was in office when the *chrysargyron* was abolished²⁴. Leontius (510), another *praetorian prefect* with Beirut connections, had been the professor of law there, and was later involved in the compilation of the *Codex Justinianus*. Zoticus (511-512), from Philadelphia in Lydia, and Sergius (517) were both men of literary talent and the latter had also been an advocate in the court of the *praetorian prefect*²⁵.

The most well-known *praetorian prefect* under Anastasius was undoubtedly Marinus from Apamea. He began his career in Constantinople in the *Scrinarium Orientis* (the financial department of the *praetorian prefect* responsible for the Oriental diocese), taking over as *tractator* from the John the Paphlagonian and eventually becoming Anastasius' chief financial minister²⁶. In this role, he was responsible for many economic and administrative changes (for example, the introduction of *vindices*), and his influence over the emperor was said to be considerable. In the face of extreme criticism from John the Lydian it is difficult to gain a true picture of the contribution Marinus made to the reign of Anastasius, but it is clear that he played a significant role in the formulation of the new administrative structure of the empire²⁷.

²³ For a list of the honorary consuls, see Appendix G.

²⁴ Zach. *Vit. Sev.*, *PO*. 2.59-60, 65; *C.J.* V.30.4; *PLRE* II.895f; Chauvot (1986), p.139 for further details.

²⁵ John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.17, with *PLRE* II.672-673, Leontius 23; John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.26 on Zoticus, with *PLRE* II.1206-1207; *PLRE* II.994-995, Sergius 7.

²⁶ Mal. 400 records that he held the post of *tractator* and *logothetes*, while Zachariah VII.9 uses the term *chartularius*; see Stein (1949), II.204f, n.2 for a discussion on the discrepancy.

²⁷ John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.49.

Dating of the Praetorian Prefecture.

It would be useful here to establish the chronology of the *praetorian prefecture* under Anastasius, before embarking on a discussion of legislation which was often tied to the office of a particular prefect²⁸. Matronius was first to hold this position at the very beginning of the reign (July 491)²⁹, followed by Hierius³⁰. Euphemius is addressed in three laws dated 1st and 30th April and 21st July, 496³¹. The first and third of these laws are actually addressed to an Anthemius but it is more likely that this is a corruption of "Euphemius" rather than a different prefect altogether³². Polycarp held office in 498, as previously mentioned, and was followed by Constantine, whose prefecture covered a span of three years: attested first in February and July, 502³³, he is then the addressee of legislation dated 1st January, 505³⁴. Eustathius succeeded Constantine; he was in office on 19th April, 506 until at least 20th November, 506³⁵.

The dates of these prefects are well established but there are problems in identifying and dating some of the others. Firstly, the case of Apion. A member of the prominent Egyptian family, he was highly regarded by Anastasius, who appointed him ἑπαρχος πραιτωρίων ἀνατολῆς, in charge of provisions for the Roman army at Edessa in 503 during the Persian war³⁶. Bury considers it strange that the *praetorian prefect* himself should supervise

²⁸ This problem has been discussed among others by Bury (1923), I.470-471, Stein (1949), II.782-783, exc. A, and Chauvot (1986), pp.138-144.

²⁹ He is addressed in several laws: *C.J.* VII.39.4, X.27.1, XI.62.14; *PLRE* II.736, no.2. Stein (1949), II.782, dismisses as unlikely the possibility that Matronius was Illus' brother-in-law, as claimed by John of Ant. fr.95.

³⁰ *C.J.* VI.21.16, Mal. 392; *PLRE* II.558, no.6.

³¹ *C.J.* X.16.13, VIII.53.32, X.19.9. *PLRE* II.424, no.3.

³² Stein (1949), II.782. Martindale in *PLRE* II.424 comments that the Latin manuscripts of the *Codex Justinianus* have probably preserved the correct version of the name, Euphemius.

³³ *C.J.* III.13.7; VI.20.18; VI.58.11; VIII.48.5.

³⁴ *C.J.* II.7.22. The Latin manuscript has 1st July, but this has to be amended as this later date clashes with the prefecture of Eustathius; See *PLRE* II.315, Constantine 19.

³⁵ *C.J.* I.4.19, II.7.23, IV.35.22.

³⁶ Mal. 398, Josh. 54; Hardy (1931), pp.25ff.

provisions at the very centre of war and concludes that the Apion who was prefect at the beginning of the Persian war (and who later fell into disfavour) was a different Apion to the hyparch at Edessa mentioned by Joshua³⁷. However, it is equally likely that one and the same Apion held the titular rank of *praetorian prefect* and served in person at Edessa³⁸.

Bury tries to slot in another prefect, Leontius the law professor, at this time³⁹. There is a strong case, however, for the alternative year of 510, especially as John the Lydian indicates that he was in office when Apion was disgraced and exiled in 510⁴⁰.

Even the dating of the prefecture for Marinus has been hotly disputed⁴¹. It is known that he was responsible for the creation of the *vindices* (pre 512)⁴² and it seems probable that he was in office 512-515, as he held the post after Zoticus (511-512)⁴³, but was already ἀπὸ ἐπάρχων in 515⁴⁴. Chauvot doubts that Marinus would have had enough influence before becoming *praetorian prefect* to suggest such a reform as the *vindices*, and thus argues that he held office between 498 and 511⁴⁵. However, in late 511, he was able to persuade Anastasius to abandon his plan to relieve taxes in Jerusalem and Palestine. Therefore, it seems preferable to agree to the 512-515 dating, sandwiched between Leontius and Sergius.

³⁷ Bury (1923), I.470f.

³⁸ Stein (1949), II.782; *PLRE* II.111-112, no.2.

³⁹ Bury (1923), I.470.

⁴⁰ John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.17; Stein (1949), II.782; Chauvot (1986), p.140.

⁴¹ It is debated at length by Chauvot (1986), pp.140-144.

⁴² John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.49; Mal. 400; Evag. III.42 who wrongly dates this reform to his prefecture. The implementation and effect of this reform will be discussed in detail later: *The Introduction of the Vindices and the Defensor Civitatis; the Decline of the Curiales?*

⁴³ Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LIV.

⁴⁴ Mal. 403-405.

⁴⁵ Chauvot (1986), pp.140-144. He is then stuck with three unsatisfactory options; 498-502 (but Polycarp was certainly in office during 498); 502-505 (when Constantine was in office); or 506-511 (which includes Leontius' prefecture in 510). The 512-515 dating is adopted by Bury (1923), I.470; Stein (1949), II.782 and *PLRE* II.727.

Here ends the debate on the chronology of the *praetorian prefects* under Anastasius and with it our discussion on the officials Anastasius selected to administer his empire. From a mixture of close family members, generals with great military achievements, great civic bureaucrats with administrative experience, and men of immense learning and culture, this élite group at Anastasius' court formed a team of accomplished, professional officials who were responsible for the successful restructuring of the empire.

Financial Reforms.

The Chrysargyron.

It was in May 498 at the end of the Isaurian war, that Anastasius abolished the *chrysargyron* or *auri lustralis collatio*⁴⁶. The tax had been introduced by Constantine the Great and appears in the Theodosian Code⁴⁷. It was regulated by successive emperors who made various changes as to how it was collected and who was liable⁴⁸. Originally levied in gold and silver every five years, from the reign of Valentinian and Valens it was collected in gold, and from the fifth century, every four years. The tax basically targeted *negotiatores*⁴⁹, with certain categories of exemptions which were forever changing: the main groups to be exempt

⁴⁶ *C.J.* XI.1.1-2. The abolition is mentioned in many of the sources covering Anastasius' reign; Mal. 398, Josh. 31, Prisc. *Pan.* 149-161, Proc. *Pan.* 13, Theod. Lect. 553, Evag. III.39, Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LIV, Theoph. AM 5993, Cedr. 627, Zon. XIV.3.11, Niceph. Cal. XVI.40. The correct date of the reform is given by Josh. and Cyril of Scythop; contra Mal. who places it after Anastasius' third consulship in 507, Theoph. who dates it to ten years after Anastasius' accession (501), and Cedr. who puts it in the first year of Anastasius' reign (perhaps because of its importance). Cyril of Scythop. who records that the reform took place thirteen years before Sabas' visit to the capital in 511 (thus 498) confuses Delmaire (1989), p.371 who dates Sabas' visit to 512 and therefore calculates wrongly the dating of the *chrysargyron* abolition. Lécivain (1903), p.334 is surely mistaken in doubting that Anastasius carried out the reform. The reference to the *auri lustralis collatio* in Justinian's *Novel* 43, refers to a tax on buildings; see Stein (1917), pp.578ff and Delmaire (1989), pp.371ff.

⁴⁷ There is some suggestion that the *chrysargyron* had been created by the emperor Alexander Severus; see Bréhier (1914), col.1450 and Capizzi (1969), pp.143-144, n.202. However, the confusion seems to arise from the refutation of Zosimus II.38 (who says it was instigated by Constantine) by Evagrius III.40 (and Niceph. Cal. XVI.40-41) who cannot believe that "the first Christian emperor created so wicked a tax". It is more likely that the rhetorical invective of Evagrius is misleading and that Constantine was responsible; Chauvot (1986), p.148, Karayannopulos (1958), p.129 and Jones (1964), I.431.

⁴⁸ Much has been written on the history of the *chrysargyron*; see Seeck (1901), pp.370ff, Karayannopulos (1958), pp.130-133 and Jones (1966), p.154 on how it was exacted (firstly by councils, and then transferred by Julian to the trade guilds of each city who elected their own officials to collect it). Chauvot (1986), pp.148-154, has details on the origins, categories affected, and treatment by Procopius and Priscian.

⁴⁹ Jones (1964), I.431. *Negotiatores* were those who made a living by buying, selling, or charging fees.

were doctors, teachers, landowners and rural craftsmen. Veterans and the clergy enjoyed various degrees of immunity. At the beginning of the sixth century, Procopius of Gaza enumerated five different groups who were affected: artisans, market-gardeners, fishermen, merchants and prostitutes⁵⁰.

According to Cedrenus, the hardships of the tax had been brought to Anastasius' attention by a deputation of monks from Jerusalem led by Timotheus of Gaza, who later wrote a drama on the affair⁵¹. But what was the rationale behind the emperor's abolition of this tax? One of the longest discussions on this subject is that of Karayannopulos, who firstly (and rightly) refutes the assumption of Thirbault that the main classes taxed (the merchants and artisans) had declined and died out by the reign of Anastasius⁵². Indeed, as Karayannopulos himself points out, Ostrogorsky offers the reverse arguments as to the fortunes of the classes in question: Anastasius stopped the tax to allow them to flourish and create an environment in which trade and industry could prosper⁵³. In this sense, the reform can be seen as a part of a larger scheme of financial measures running throughout Anastasius' reign, to the profit of the empire. Karayannopulos himself believes that the abolition by Marcian of the *collatio glebalis*, an unpopular tax in gold levied on senators and their land, hastened the abolition of the similarly unpopular gold *chrysargyron* levied on the relatively poorer elements of society⁵⁴.

There is no doubt that, whatever the political and economic reasons behind *lex* I.I.1-2, the measure was immensely popular. Anastasius received the approval of the Church, who saw a religious and moral element in the decision: as payment had been demanded from

⁵⁰ Proc. *Pan.* 13, Seeck, (1901), pp.373ff, Jones (1964), I.431-432 with n.52, III.108, Chauvot (1986), pp.150ff.

⁵¹ Cedr. 627.

⁵² Karayannopulos (1958), p.136 contra F. Thirbault, "Les impôts directs sous le Bas-Empire romain", *Revue Générale de Droit* 23 (1899), pp.289-321 and pp.481-518, and 24 (1900), pp.32-53 and pp.112-131.

⁵³ Ostrogorsky (1956), p.65.

⁵⁴ Karayannopulos (1958), pp.136-137; for the *collatio glebalis*, see Jones (1964), I.431 with n.51, III.106-108.

prostitutes, the tax had seemed to implicitly recognise prostitution as legal⁵⁵. There is no doubt, too, that Anastasius played on popular reaction with the public burning of the tax registers in the hippodrome. However, this was not just frivolous publicity. He did make a serious effort to ensure that it was never reinstated, for after burning the records he pretended to his officials that he had changed his mind and ordered them to find as many surviving records as they could. When these had been gathered up, he had them burnt as well⁵⁶.

The abolition of the *chrysargyron* has often been seen as a great measure of Anastasius' generosity, his one action which almost redeemed his good name from the taint of heresy, according to one historian⁵⁷. But just how munificent was this measure? From the resistance of the *comitiva sacrarum largitionum*, the bureau responsible for collecting it, it is clear that they must have profited from it, thus the need for Anastasius' pretence of changing his mind to bring to light hidden records. He had the support of the *praetorian prefect*, Polycarp, but had to call in the senate for extra help⁵⁸. There is little evidence for the amounts of money involved as hardly any figures have survived. Sources on the subject tend to make sweeping claims backed up with no hard amounts. Thus, Zosimus claims that the tax was so high that fathers were forced to sell their children into prostitution to raise enough money to meet the demand, while Evagrius rhetorically declares that he needed the eloquence of Thucydides to write about such a law⁵⁹. We do know that one silver *nummus*

⁵⁵ Evag. III.39 wrote that the tax was "vile and hateful to God."

⁵⁶ One can question if all parts of the empire benefitted to the same extent. In Egypt, a tax on trades continued up to the Arab period, though in later times the term "*chrysargyron*" is no longer used. There are several examples of certain groups being taxed, including a tax in gold assessed by streets or quarters in Arsinoe, which sounds suspiciously similar to the *chrysargyron* though payments were made individually and not through guilds. Further discussion, see Johnson and West (1967), p.320.

⁵⁷ Jones (1966), p.269.

⁵⁸ There is some dispute over to whom the tax was paid. Evag. III.39, indicates the *praetorian prefect*, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that it went to the imperial *largitiones*, *C.J.* XI.1.1, Mal. 398, (ταῖς θεΐαις λαργιτιῶσι) and *Proc. Pan.* 13, (ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως θησαυρὸς); Jones (1964), III.109.

⁵⁹ Zos. II.38; Evag. III.39. Such a popular tax reform provided an excellent subject for the panegyricists. Procopius gives a detailed account of the effects of the tax, dwelling on the misery and hardships it caused. The emperor is compared to Peisistratus, the great Athenian reformer, and to emphasise the heroic nature of the act, he is then compared to Hercules. Priscian (152-153) concentrates more on the economic benefits:

Quae pater et dominus terrae delevit in aevum

was charged on horses, mules, oxen and men⁶⁰. The only other information comes from the account of Joshua Stylites who writes on the relief at Edessa:

The whole city rejoiced, and they all put on white garments, both small and great, and carried lighted tapers and censers full of burning incense, and went forth with psalms and hymns, giving thanks to God and praising the emperor, to the church of St. Sergius and St. Simeon, where they celebrated the eucharist. Then they re-entered the city and kept a glad and merry festival during the whole week, and enacted that they should celebrate this festival every year...⁶¹.

The Edessans had been paying one hundred and forty pounds of gold on average every four years. We can compare the rate of land tax from a sixth century papyrus with the annual tax figures for Heracleopolis. The land tax here was eight hundred pounds of gold⁶². As Edessa was an important town on the trade route and Heracleopolis a rural provincial area, Jones suggests from the figures above that agriculture produced twenty times as much revenue as trade and industry. From these calculations then, it would seem that the actual amount of revenue the *chrysargyron* yielded was small in comparison to the state budget as a whole, but it was harsh for those who had to bear the burden of it⁶³.

The Res Privata.

How was the shortfall in revenue caused by the abolition of the *chrysargyron* compensated? Evidence from Malalas suggests that the deficit was balanced by a contribution from the *res privata*:

ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς ἐκούφισε τὴν λειτουργίαν τοῦ λεγομένου

Argenti relevans atque auri pondere mundum,

⁶⁰ Bréhier (1914), col.1450, Jones (1964), I.432.

⁶¹ Josh. 31. Further discussion on Edessa in Duval (1891), p.423.

⁶² *P. Oxy.* 1909; Jones (1974), p.36.

⁶³ This is the view of Jones (1974), p.36 contra Delmaire (1989), p.371, who thinks the tax would have made a significant difference to the state income.

χρυσαργύρου πᾶσαν διαιωνίζουσιν ἀπὸ θείου τύπου, ἥτις ἐστὶ μεγάλη καὶ φοβερὰ φιλοτιμία, ἀντεισάξας ταῖς θείαις λαργιτιῶσι πρόσοδον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτοῦ⁶⁴.

The *res privata* was a fund belonging to the emperor comprising of the rents and profits of property holdings, including *bona proscriptorum vel damnatorum*, *bona vacantia et caduca*, temple property, municipal estates, legacies and the confiscated property of heretics, pagans, and other criminals⁶⁵. Money and the land itself from the *res privata* was then distributed in free gifts to the family, friends and supporters of the emperor, enforced gifts, and donations to institutions such as the Church⁶⁶. Leo and Zeno had emphasised the private nature of the fund by dividing it equally between themselves and their empresses. There are various suggestions as to how Anastasius altered the fund so as to put it more at the service of the state. Some of the first studies on this question concluded that all the private property of the emperor was made available for state use under the auspices of the newly created ministry of *patrimonium*⁶⁷.

Bury and Jones believe that the exact amount of the *chrysargyron* deficit was met with an equivalent contribution from the *res privata*: that is, lands were actually detached from the *res privata* and placed under the management of the new official, the *comes sacri patrimonii*⁶⁸. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the creation of the patrimony was achieved by simply dividing the *res privata* land and profits equally into two⁶⁹.

⁶⁴ Mal. 398.

⁶⁵ Monks (1957), pp.749ff. For how it was organised and administrated, see Haldon (1990), pp.173ff and Kaplan (1992), pp.149ff.

⁶⁶ MacMullen (1976), p.25.

⁶⁷ Karlowa (1885), I.842, His (1896), pp.21-28, Hirschfield (1905), pp.47-48, and Karayannopoulos (1958), p.72.

⁶⁸ Bury (1923), I.442, Jones (1964), I.237.

⁶⁹ Kaplan (1992), p.149 and Stein (1919), p.173, agree with Bury and Jones and contra Karayannopoulos, that the change did not mean the end of private imperial property - Anastasius just released a certain percentage of it for state use.

Karayannopulos, however, questions the underlying theory that Anastasius divided his own lands and rent in any way to produce two separate categories of landholding; the original *res privata* and the new *patrimonium*⁷⁰. There could be no distinction between personal property and crown property. He therefore believes that any *ἰδική οὐσία*, for example, family inheritance (*res familiaris*), automatically became *fundi patrimoniales* on accession to the throne, or as Karayannopulos puts it, when a simple *civis Romanus* became *Imperator Romanus*. The logical conclusion to this argument must be that splitting the *res privata* so the state could benefit was not especially generous as the *res privata* should automatically belong to the state.

This may be so, and it has to be said that any hardship Anastasius encountered was greatly reduced by the vast input of new lands confiscated from Zeno and one thousand Isaurians. However, certainly in contrast to his immediate predecessors, who, as has been noted, retained all the benefits from the *res privata* for themselves, Anastasius' creation of the new *comitiva* under which the *res privata* could be used to the advantage of the state was definitely a step forward. It is particularly telling that his measure was greatly appreciated at the time:

...ἤτις ἐστὶ μεγάλη καὶ φοβερὰ φιλοτιμία,...⁷¹

The Comes Sacri Patrimonii

More light can be thrown on this reform, by a study of the new financial minister, the *comes sacri patrimonii*⁷². The duties of this official were very similar to those of the minister in charge of the *res privata* and indeed they both had the same privileges and both were *illustres*⁷³. This is not surprising, given that there was little distinction in principle (certainly at the time of Anastasius) between the lands which remained the emperor's *res privata* and

⁷⁰ Karayannopulos (1958), pp.73-74, fundamentally disagrees with the theory of His (1896), pp.32-33 that the division of land was made geographically.

⁷¹ Mal. 398.

⁷² C.J. I.34.1.

⁷³ See discussion by Bury (1911), pp.79-80, who notes that the organisation of the office of the *patrimonium* was an exact copy of the office of the *res privata*. Delmaire (1989), p.45 argues that the new officer was on the last rung of the ladder of *illustres* and was mentioned after his two colleagues.

those which were transferred to the *patrimonium*. It is likely that the new minister was to deal with recent and future acquisitions to the *res privata* and especially the confiscated lands of the vanquished Isaurians⁷⁴.

Various parallels have been suggested for Anastasius' new appointment. Under Septimus Severus, the *res privata*, swollen with vast amounts of property after the condemnation of Albinus, Niger and their associates, was made distinct from the *patrimonium principis*⁷⁵. A similar situation arose in the west at the beginning of the fifth century. An official with the title *comes sacri patrimonii* and the rank of *illustris* was created to administer the sudden increase of *res privata*, this time, by the confiscation of the property of Gildo in Africa. Nearer to Anastasius' own time in Italy, there are also potential models with the *comes rei privatae* who dealt with the administration of imperial property under Odoacer⁷⁶ and the introduction of a *comes sacri patrimonii* by Theoderic. There are at least two reasons though why direct imitation of the Italian king's policy is unlikely. Firstly, the office was initially held in Italy by a certain Julian in 505, and if Anastasius' reorganisation was due to a need to manage more effectively the Isaurian lands and provide for the shortfall of the *chrysargyron*, then a date nearer 498 would be appropriate, and would mean his reform preceded that of Theoderic⁷⁷. Secondly, given the rather tense political relations between the east and west at this time, it seems improbable that Anastasius would seek to copy any administrative changes from a king he still perceived in many ways as his subject⁷⁸.

Notwithstanding the cynical opinion of Karayannopoulos (and Capizzi), it is clear that the introduction of a new financial minister, the *comes sacri patrimonii*, was made in order to

⁷⁴ His (1896), p.32 and Bury (1911), p.79 argue against the opinion of Mommsen, who suggested there was unlikely to be a significant difference between the two under Anastasius.

⁷⁵ Monks (1957), p.273.

⁷⁶ For comments on this minister, see Mommsen (1910), pp.464-465 and for the history behind it, Stein (1919), p.173.

⁷⁷ The date of the office first held in Italy is given by Stein (1949), II.206.

⁷⁸ His (1896), p.73 followed by Delmaire (1989), p.694 both agree that Germanic influence would not be strong enough to affect Anastasius.

stabilize the economy after the abolition of the *chrysargyron*⁷⁹. At the same time, the *res privata* itself, with additional lands from the Isaurians, had become too large to be handled by one minister, and thus Anastasius' reform was doubly welcome in solving two problems at once.

Χρυσοτέλεια τῶν ἰουγῶν.

Another reform which has been connected with the abolition of the *chrysargyron* is that of the *χρυσοτέλεια τῶν ἰουγῶν*, whereby Anastasius made provision for the *adaeratio annonae*: that is, the commutation of the land tax used to provide supplies of food (*annona*) and fodder (*capitus*) for the army, from "in kind" to a payment in gold⁸⁰. Much has been written on the history of the *annona*, and it is clear the *adaeratio* had begun much earlier⁸¹. Originally, all *annona* had been levied "in kind", but the process of commuting to gold had begun under Valentinian I when he decreed that the *limitanei* should receive their rations in kind for nine months and cash for the other three. A *novel* of Valentinian III⁸² indicates that before the Vandal invasion, Mauritania and Sitifensis paid all taxes in gold; the *annona* and *capitus* of the troops and *dux* were commuted to fixed payments of four *solidi*. Under Majorian the land tax of Italy was collected entirely in gold⁸³. In the east, the process of changing systems was far more gradual. In 423 the *annona* of the Palatine officials was paid in gold, and in 439, those of the rank of *spectabilis* and *clarissimus* were also paid in gold, but the ordinary soldier continued to be paid in kind. The commutation of land tax from "in kind"

⁷⁹ Most historians agree that Anastasius did put at the service of the state the funds of the *res privata*: Bréhier (1914), col.1449, Stein (1949), II.206, Coyne (1991), p.126 and Jones (1964), I.237 who states that the abolition of the *chrysargyron* "may be regarded as his personal gift to the empire", contra Capizzi (1969), p.146, who believes that the new official was only to administer the funds of the emperor, not of the state.

⁸⁰ *C.J.* X.27.1-3, *Mal.* 394, *Evag.* III.42, *Niceph. Cal.* XVI.44. Lemerle (1979), p.7 comments that a tax on land for the army demonstrates the close interdependence of these three factors and the importance of land for the fisc, and ultimately the safety of the state.

⁸¹ For a general survey of the *annona*, see Segré (1942-1943), and for its history, Geiss (1931), pp.4ff, Lemerle (1979), *passim*, Karayannopoulos (1956), pp.75f on the history of the *adaeratio* and p.78 on the history of the *coemptio*.

⁸² *Novel* XII.46

⁸³ *Novel* II.3; Stein (1949), II.199.

to gold was still a special privilege in 436. There were obvious disadvantages to a tax levied "in kind" as in some areas there might be a surplus while in others, not enough⁸⁴. In emergencies when additional food was required for the army, the state enforced the sale of essential commodities at a special fixed low price⁸⁵. The price of the supplies was then deducted from their gold tax, or if it exceeded the amount of the tax owed, the difference was made up with gold coin⁸⁶. This *coemptio* or *συνωνή* was extremely unpopular, and in the sixth century we find that landowners in certain parts of Italy (Calabria and Apulia) took the option of paying a surcharge to avoid the penalty.

The shortcomings of this whole process of taxing land for army pay and provisions occupied Anastasius' attention from the start⁸⁷. A constitution of 30th July, 491 addressed to the *praetorian prefect*, Matronius, forbade property owners to try to escape the *coemptio* and even ruled that imperial property should not escape the charge⁸⁸. Later, during the prefecture of Polycarp (498), the ^{emperor} completed the process of commutation from tax "in kind" to gold: he converted the bulk of the land tax into gold, levying in each area only as much as was needed for the local troops, and he forbade the compulsory purchase of provisions, except in emergencies, and only with his authorization⁸⁹. The only area to be exempt was the diocese of Thrace where the barbarian incursions had diminished the number of peasants to such an extent that the tax was too low to support the armies and *coemptio* applied to both landowners

⁸⁴ Capizzi (1969), p.143 examines the problems, while Bréhier (1914), col.1450, discusses the rather arbitrary nature of the collection of this tax.

⁸⁵ Lemerle (1979), p.5, picks up Stein's comment that the use of the *coemptio* became "regular and fundamental in the state's economy" towards the end of the fifth century, and notes the significance of the timing of Anastasius' measures, first in regulating, and then changing the system completely.

⁸⁶ The practice of deducting the price of supplies from the tax owed was carried out under Odoacer; Ennod. *Vit. Epiph.* 358; Bréhier (1914), col.1450.

⁸⁷ For discussion on the increase in payments to the field troops and the benefits to the soldiers of having their pay in cash, not "in kind", see the later section in this chapter, *Legislation; the army*.

⁸⁸ *C.J.* X.27.1, with Lemerle (1979), p.6.

⁸⁹ *C.J.* X.27.2-3, Mal. 394. Karayannopoulos (1956), p.72 underlines the point that this is not a new tax, but merely a change to the existing system. He also repudiates Bréhier's suggestion that the *annona* did not just fall on those with landed property.

and merchants was the standard measure⁹⁰. As in Italy the payments were to be set against the gold tax or paid back in gold coin.

Karayannopulos reads much more significance into this measure than just a simple continuation of the gradual process of altering the method of payment of this land tax to a form already reached in Italy. He sees the assessment of the *chrysoteleia* as a specific form of military obligation⁹¹; it was not just an *adaeratio* of supplies of the *annona*, but also an *adaeratio* of men; the *praebitio tironum* was replaced by the *aurum tironicum*⁹². He suggests that this was a temporary measure, designed to meet an acute crisis in the state's finances, but was in fact unhelpful as it resulted in a lack of soldiers. He points out that, significantly, Anastasius was not a soldier but a bureaucrat. Charanis, in his review of Karayannopulos, is unconvinced by these arguments but does not specify why⁹³. However, it is clear that the gold tax on the land to provide military supplies and the gold tax paid in place of providing recruits are two entirely unrelated taxes, and paid to two different financial departments: the former to the *praetorian prefect* and the latter to the *comes sacrarum largitionum*. The only factor they shared was a gradual commutation from "in kind" to gold payments⁹⁴. It is much more likely that Anastasius' reform concerned only the *annona*.

The sources give a variety of responses to these reforms. Karayannopulos compares the praise of the panegyricists, the neutrality of Malalas and the polemic of Evagrius⁹⁵. Of course, their response, and ours, depends on the motive behind the legislation. Was it merely an underhand means of recouping the loss caused by the popular abolition of one gold tax,

⁹⁰ On the hardships in Thrace and the *annona*, see Stein (1949), II.203, Velkov (1962), *passim*, Lemerle (1979), p.6 and Kaplan (1992), p.525.

⁹¹ Karayannopulos (1956), p.80; (1958), pp.119ff, esp. p.121.

⁹² Thus Lemerle (1979), p.5 comments on Karayannopulos.

⁹³ Charanis (1962), p.335.

⁹⁴ For examples of the substitution of the *aurum tironicum* for the *praebitio tironum*, see Jones (1964), I.149, 420 with n.21, III.100.

⁹⁵ Karayannopulos (1956), p.80.

by the institution of another, or was it the natural conclusion to a gradual change in methods of collecting tax (involving the abolition of the unwelcome imposition of the *coemptio*)? Several modern historians agree with the former view, arguing that as the land tax weighed heavily on the poor, the financial reform merely led to

une répartition plus régulière de fardeau des impôts plutôt que dans un dégrèvement réel⁹⁶.

In contrast, Karayannopulos believes that it is more likely that the regulation and tightening up of the legislation governing the *coemptio* in 491 led to the abolition of the *chrysargyron*.

Both these views seem unlikely; they overlook the crucial matter of timing; both reforms were carried out in the same year, 498, during the prefecture of Polycarp. It is clear that the imposition of the *chrysoteleia* cannot have resulted from the abolition of the *chrysargyron*: there would be scarcely time for the affects of the latter to be felt in the treasury. It seems more likely that the commutation of the land tax which provided *annona* and *capitus* was the continuation of a process which was already complete in Italy and which involved the abolition of the unpopular *coemptio*. Finally, it is very noticeable that the year 498, the prefecture of the experienced financier Polycarp, saw a comprehensive range of financial legislation⁹⁷. This would suggest that the emperor and prefect reviewed a range of economic reforms for that year, significantly after the Isaurian crisis was over, rather than the emperor hastily instituting another gold tax to fill the hole in the treasury caused by the disappearance of the last "*aurum*-" tax⁹⁸.

⁹⁶ Vasiliev (1932), p.145; Lindsay (1952), pp.118-119.

⁹⁷ It was at this time that the first phase of Anastasius' coin reform was also introduced - see later discussion.

⁹⁸ Mango (1993), esp. pp.214-215 discusses the possible role of silver stamps in Anastasius' financial policy, noting that 498, which saw the abolition of the *chrysargyron* and the introduction of the coinage reform, also witnessed the introduction of a multiple silver stamping system. Some of the earliest known stamps include the monogram of the *comes sacrarum largitionum* for 498, John the Paphlagonian. Mango argues that Anastasius made use of the considerable surplus of silver which had been accumulating since the cessation of silver coinage (c.400), by selling it for gold. This income of gold filled the hole in the treasury caused by the abolition of the *chrysargyron*, and could be used in its place to pay, for example, the five-yearly army donatives. Although the last of these hand-outs was recorded in 511, gold would certainly be needed to fund the new scheme, (see later discussion in *Legislation; the army*). The stamp was used as a mark of authorization for the release of state silver.

The Introduction of the Vindices and the Defensor Civitatis; the Decline of the Curiales?

Anastasius' most radical solution to the problem of tax collection was the transference of this task, hitherto carried out by the urban *curiales*, to new officials appointed in Constantinople, termed *vindices*⁹⁹. Anastasius had already made some initial reforms concerning tax collection. If a *compulsor* had to be sent to a province because the revenue was not forthcoming or delayed, then his fees and expenses were to be charged, not to the taxpayers but to those responsible for collecting taxes. If it was necessary to send a second *compulsor*, then the first *compulsor* together with those in the provincial *officium* were liable for costs incurred. This was an effort to keep the official scale of fees paid to the *curial* collectors and the officials of the *largitiones* and *praetorian prefecture* down to one *siliqua* per *iugum*, as opposed to sixty *siliquae* per *iugum* in the west¹⁰⁰.

The introduction of the *vindices* though, was a much more radical change. The reform was the brainchild of the notorious Marinus the Syrian¹⁰¹. There is little evidence about the mechanics of the reform, but it seems that tax collection was assigned by auction to those in each province who pledged the greatest amount. This system bore a remarkable similarity to the old way of farming out tax collection in the Roman Republic which led to such spectacular extortion as that revealed in Cicero's *In Verrem*. It is likely that the *curiales*, the

⁹⁹ John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.49, Mal. 400, and Evag. III.42. Prisc. *Pan.* 193-194, is the only source to praise the *vindices*. Chauvot (1986), p.157 discussed Priscian's dilemma; his dislike of Marinus had to be tempered by his need to forever praise the acts of the emperor. Coyne (1991), p.145-146, believes that lines 196-197:

Nunc equites horrent rectorum iussa vehentes

Nec lucri causa commiscent sacra profanis

also refer to the introduction of *vindices*. It is unclear to whom "*equites*" refer. As staff of the provincial governors, they were involved in tax collection and therefore the *vindices* would have checked for abuses among them as with the *curiales* or *agentes in rebus*, the officials of the *magister officiorum*. Chauvot, however, believes that these lines refer to Anastasius' legislation to limit the right of bishops and clergy to alienate church land (*C.J.* I.2.17). One should agree with Coyne that the change of subject (from the *vindices* to alienation of church land) is too abrupt, but this leaves unanswered the question of the significance of the "sacred" and "profane".

¹⁰⁰ *C.J.* X.19.9, 496; with Jones (1964), I.468 with n.138, III.131.

¹⁰¹ The dating of this measure is unclear. Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LIV, claims that *vindices* had been established in Palestine well before 511/512, and if Priscian's panegyric was complete by 502/503, then they must have been introduced by then. This would mean that they closely followed the tax reforms of 498 and Marinus' appointment as *tractator*, (contra Chauvot (1986), pp.158-159, who dated the *vindices* to 506/507 to fit his dating of Marinus' prefecture).

local collectors, were placed under the control of the *vindices* with the provincial governor ultimately responsible.

The *vindices* had to collect enough taxes to cover purely municipal expenditure. Anastasius maintained the regulation of Valentinian I regarding the revenue from municipal property: the town retained one third, the state two thirds. We have the details of one scheme organised by Potamo, the *vindex* of Alexandria for the apportionment of revenues:

ἅπαν γὰρ ἀνερευνομένη ἢ σὴ ἐνδοξότης κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην τῶν
 Ἑλεξανδρέων πόλιν εὐρεν ἐν τῇ πυκτῇ τῇ ἐπὶ τῶν χρόνων ἙΑναστασίου
 τοῦ τῆς εὐσεβοῦς λήξεως, ἠνίκα Μαριανὸς ὁ τῆς ἐνδόξου <μνήμης> ἐπ’
 αὐτῷ τὰ πράγματα ἔπρατε, καταστήναι δημοσίαν πυκτὴν, Ποταμῶνος
 τηρικαῦτα τῶν δημοσίων τῆς Ἑλεξανδρέων προεστῶτος κατὰ τὸ τοῦ
 βίνδικος σχῆμα...¹⁰².

From this scheme, we know that four hundred and ninety-two *solidi* went towards the public baths and five hundred and fifty-eight and a half *solidi* were required for the transport of grain¹⁰³. The export tax was one thousand, four hundred and sixty-nine and a half pieces of gold (increased by a quarter under Justinian¹⁰⁴). It is also interesting to note the transfer of the administration of customs from the control of the *comitiva sacrarum largitionum* to the *vindices* and ultimately to the *praetorian prefect*¹⁰⁵.

Opinion seems divided as to the effect of the institution of *vindices* as tax collectors. On the one hand, it did remove the abuse where rich and influential landowners were taxed lightly because the *curiales* were afraid of offending them, and the poor had to shoulder the burden of heavier taxes. On the other hand, there still remained the possibility that the *vindices* could be bribed. They were very powerful figures and *exactores* and *susceptores* were no doubt

¹⁰² Edict XIII.

¹⁰³ See Johnson and West (1967), p.104 for further details of Potamo’s budget.

¹⁰⁴ Thus, indicating Anastasius’ reasonableness.

¹⁰⁵ The introduction of the *commercarii*, directors of the customs bureau, will be discussed later.

subordinate. There is evidence of heavy complaints of extortion, but the state treasury was full¹⁰⁶. It is perhaps of some significance that only a few cities, namely, Alexandria, Antioch¹⁰⁷, Tripolis, Anazarbus¹⁰⁸ and Aphrodito¹⁰⁹ are definitely known to have possessed a *vindex*. There seems to be no obvious criterion for this choice and it is possible that *vindices* were tried first in a limited number of places to test their success. It should be noted however, that they were appointed in the most important cities of the eastern empire (after Constantinople), Antioch and Alexandria¹¹⁰.

This reform must be seen against a wider background of municipal legislation. Anastasius tried to diminish the possibility of extortion by other changes which strengthened the hand of the bishop and *defensor* whose job it was to protect the rights of citizens against official aggression. In 409, Honorius had passed a similar law in which the *defensor/curator* was to be elected by the bishops, landowners and most notable *curiales*¹¹¹. Anastasius renewed this in a law (19th April 505) stating that the *defensor* must be orthodox and swear an oath before the bishop¹¹². The general extension of the administrative functions of bishops was designed to safeguard the interests of the taxpayer and ensure that the troops received their *annona*¹¹³. It is clear that Anastasius was keen to protect the rights of this newly created electoral body. In an enactment addressed to the *praetorian prefect* Leontius, he replies to a request from the bishop and citizens of Corcyus (Cilicia I) and forbids the officials of the

¹⁰⁶ Most primary sources oppose the *vindices*, but that may be because Marinus was universally disliked. Bréhier (1914), col.1450, questions if the loss of autonomy was not preferable to a "draconian" regime, which led to the ruin of the middle classes.

¹⁰⁷ *Chron. Pasch.* 626.

¹⁰⁸ Sev. Sel. Let. I:27 - addressed to two *vindices* at Anazarbus; I:9 - addressed to Stephen, bishop of Tripolis, which includes a mention of Theodore, the governor and *vindex*.

¹⁰⁹ Johnson and West (1967), p.103.

¹¹⁰ Chauvot (1986), p.158, looks at the limited application of the new office.

¹¹¹ *C.J.* I.55.8, Jan. 409.

¹¹² *C.J.* I.4.19 (=I.55.11); Chénon (1889), pp.345-346 and Karayannopoulos (1958), pp.224ff and esp. p.227.

¹¹³ *C.J.* I.4.18, XII.37.19,1; Stein (1949), II.212-213.

provincial governor to interfere with the designation of the *defensor* or *curator*¹¹⁴. To the new committee he also entrusted city finance and the appointment of the corn buyer.

In tampering with the social fabric of the provinces, Anastasius was bound to face criticism, however successful the change was. The introduction of *vindices* has been seen as another nail in the coffin of the declining town councils. This argument is spearheaded by John the Lydian who believed that the *vindices* were responsible for the decline of the *curiales*, an ancient form of Roman administration, and that the reform only succeeded in lining the pockets of the *vindices* and those of the real instigator of the measure, Marinus¹¹⁵. It is difficult to separate truth from invective in this statement; it is obvious that John the Lydian personally disliked the *praetorian prefect*. However, traditionally, historians were seduced by this biased view, and that of Evagrius¹¹⁶, and believed that there was indeed a social and economic decline in the provinces¹¹⁷.

There are two strands of argument to be explored here. Firstly, the comments of John the Lydian and Evagrius must be questioned; did the *curia* really disappear completely, as they claim? The short answer to this is no, as there is plenty of evidence from the *novels* of Justinian which proves they were still in existence: *decurions* were in fact last mentioned in the time of Leo VI (886-912)¹¹⁸. But how to dispose of the comments of John and

¹¹⁴ *Mon. Asiae Min. Ant.* III (1931), p.125, no.197, A and B; Stein (1949), II.212, n.4, Capizzi (1969), p.149, n.235 and Chauvot (1986), p.155, n.330.

¹¹⁵ John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.49.

¹¹⁶ Referring to the disappearance of the *curia*, Evag. III.42 wrote:

As a result the revenues were to a great extent ruined, and the prosperity of the cities was destroyed. For in old days the nobles were enrolled on the registers of the cities, each city having the members of the council like a kind of senate.

Quoted by Jones (1964), II.760.

¹¹⁷ Jones (1964), II.760 on the non-existence of the city councils after Anastasius. He admits that while *decurions* still had duties to perform, the reins of power had passed from the city councils to officers elected by bishops and landowners, or were chosen by provincial governors or central government. See further, Kirsten (1958), pp.6-7, and Jones (1966), pp.209-210 quoted by Chrysos (1971), p.96, in disagreement.

¹¹⁸ For examples of the *curia* mentioned in legislation, see Chrysos (1971), pp.100ff. *Decurions* are mentioned under Leo VI in *Novel* 46. See also Chauvot (1986), p.158.

Evagrius? It can obviously be argued that the remarks are purely rhetorical invective; every generation bemoans the passing of tradition. In addition, there is John's patent dislike of Marinus, clear in other episodes of his writing. Furthermore, it has been suggested that he was writing for Justinian, particularly as the subject lent itself so well to the theme of the later emperor's policy of restoring ancient Roman traditions¹¹⁹. There is, therefore, plenty of evidence to attest the continuation of the *curia* after Anastasius.

Our second strand of discussion must concern the idea that while it is true that new groups were coming to the fore in municipal administration, this development did not start with Anastasius and his introduction of the *vindices*. That other emperors had tried to safeguard the survival of the *curiales* whom they found useful in local administration, indicates that the fabric of the provincial cities had begun to crumble long before Anastasius' time. John the Lydian and Evagrius might mourn the process but their own careers were illustrative of the problem where the young élite who would have held the position of *decurion* sought more lucrative and influential jobs in the imperial capital. New studies, however, are beginning to stress the underlying strength of the provincial city and social élite which continued in some places as late as the seventh century¹²⁰. Whittow emphasises the vitality and self-confidence that could still be experienced in a society with the bishops and clergy (rather than *curiales*) as the civic leaders¹²¹.

Yet another dimension may be added to this analysis. It is always instructive to look further afield for comparative developments and it is interesting to note here with reference to *vindices*, the increase in the importance of the *pagarch* in Egypt¹²². *Pagarchs* developed greater powers, became more independent and grew into a larger clerical department with

¹¹⁹ Chrysos (1971), pp.99f. For Evagrius, the time lapse and the fact he was possibly following John, explains his attitude. Chrysos rightly sees no censure in Malalas who simply comments on the introduction of the *vindices* and does not state the *curia* disappeared as a result.

¹²⁰ Whittow (1990), pp.3-29.

¹²¹ Whittow (1990), esp. pp.22-23 gives examples from Thessalonica in the sixth to seventh centuries where the archbishop, clergy and leading laymen controlled municipal administration.

¹²² See discussion by Liebeschuetz (1973), pp.38-46 and Chauvot (1986), p.257, n.331.

stronger military and police backing¹²³. While they were certainly not the Egyptian equivalent of *vindices*, (they are both mentioned in Justinian's thirteenth Edict), they share definite similarities. Both were directly accountable to the provincial governor, though others, for example, landowners, were involved in their selection. The new *pagarch* would pledge his own property as security for his tax collection, just as *vindices* bided for the tax collection contract. As to how the two offices complemented each other if they were operating at the same time, it seems that a *vindex* would be sent by central government to look after tax collection and local finance, while a *pagarch* would be recruited from the new aristocracy and great landowners by the provincial governor. In answer to criticisms of declining autonomous rule of cities, one can cite the extended duties of the *pagarch*, a change clearly linked to Anastasius' *vindices*, whereby an attempt was made to revive civic institutions which had been weakened by the decline of the *curial* class¹²⁴.

It is true then that Anastasius was partly responsible for the new look of the provincial city, but substituting an outdated classical style of rule for a situation where responsibility lay with the new aristocracy and the Church was no decline but a necessary adaptation to changing circumstances.

The Port Tax.

So far, discussion has been centred on two key gold taxes, the *chrysargyron* and the *chrysoteleia*, and the organisation of tax collection, the introduction of the *comes sacri patrimonii* and the *vindices*. The connections between these reforms have also been explored. We now turn to other economic measures carried out under Anastasius and firstly, to the new port tax which affected all boats crossing the Hellespont to Abydus. There were observation posts here and also at Hieron, at the northern end of the Bosphorus to keep an eye on naval traffic passing to and from the Black Sea and the Aegean, past the imperial capital. The officer at Abydus, the ἄρχων τῶν στενῶν or περίβλεπτος κόμης τῶν στενῶν was to prevent vessels entering the Hellespont carrying weapons without permission, and to ensure

¹²³ Liebeschuetz (1973), p.38 and p.44 on their increased power in collecting taxes.

¹²⁴ Liebeschuetz (1973), p.45.

that all ships had the relevant papers signed by the *magister officiorum*¹²⁵. The officer at Hieron was to ensure that no forbidden cargo reached Russia or the Caucasus¹²⁶. While the latter was paid a fixed salary by the state, the former was recompensed with the revenue from a tax imposed on all shipowners. These surtaxes should not be confused with the ordinary customs tax which continued to be paid to the customs bureau at Constantinople. As stipulated by Anastasius, the ἄρχων τῶν στενωῶν was himself responsible for collecting the surtax. To counter the possibility of abuse of power, the officer had to put down a deposit of fifty pounds which would be confiscated if it was deemed he had acted irregularly.

Commercarii.

The introduction of this new port tax is linked to a general reorganisation of the customs bureau. Previously, the administration of customs had been under the control of the *comitiva sacrarum largitionum*. Now, this sphere of commercial activity passed to the *praetorian prefect*, and the directors of the customs bureaux who served as accountants for the state were chosen by the prefect himself. These would be high-ranking *scrinarii*, now known as *commercarii*¹²⁷. The office is first referred to by Malalas and in an edict on the settlement of the dukes in Mesopotamia and Palestine:

ἀπὸ κομμερκιάριου γε τὸν ἐν Μεσοποταμίᾳ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κλύσματος τὸν
ἐν Παλαιστίνῃ¹²⁸.

This new κομμερκιάριος or *comes commerciorum* would not only act as a commercial agent, but be responsible for the collection of the customs tax¹²⁹.

¹²⁵ Bury (1923), II.355, de Laet (1949), pp.459f, Ahrweiler (1961), pp.240-242, and Capizzi (1969), p.142. On the official at Abydos, Proc. *Anec.* XXV.2ff. The inscription is published by Mordtmann (1879), pp.307ff, who wrongly ascribes it to Justinian, and Grégoire (1922), pp.4-5, no.4.

¹²⁶ The forbidden goods included wine, oil, lard and arms - *C.J.* IV.41.

¹²⁷ An *ex-commercarius* is mentioned by Mal. 396; Stein (1949), II.213-215, Karayannopoulos (1958), pp.164-165.

¹²⁸ Quoted by Delmaire (1989), p.293, see n.49 for references.

¹²⁹ Stein (1949), II.214, n.1 with reference to an inscription in Littmann, Magie and Stuart (1921), pp.24-42, no.20, frs.1-7, line 5; pp.250-251, no.562, lines 12f.

It has been suggested that it was about this time that the *agens in rebus* at Clysma was also replaced by a *commerciarius*¹³⁰. This idea has been opposed, as while the latter was responsible to the *praetorian prefect*, the former official reported to the *magister officiorum*¹³¹. However, in Egypt, administration of customs was the task of either the *vindices* (under the *praetorian prefect*) or the "*alabarques*" (subordinate to the *comes sacrarum largitionum*)¹³².

It is clear then, that at the beginning of the sixth century, there was a general shake-up in customs administration with the introduction of *commerciarii* and the institution of a new port tax.

Reductions and Rebates of Taxes.

There are a number of cases where Anastasius reduced or suspended taxation, often for very specific reasons. One such reduction applied to the *capitatio humana et animalium*. This was a tax imposed on owners and cultivators of land, which tapped the wealth of those rearing livestock, and like a poll tax, fell on those working on the land and their children. It therefore caused particular hardship to those with large families and a small property. In 514, Anastasius reduced by a quarter the payment for those in the dioceses of Asia and the Pontus¹³³.

A year after the reduction of this tax, Anastasius set up in the capital a fund, with a revenue of seventy pounds of gold per annum, to help offset the costs incurred by the clergy of the Great Church in celebrating funerals¹³⁴.

¹³⁰ cf. Stein (1949), II.215, n.1.

¹³¹ Delmaire (1989), p.293.

¹³² cf. Rouillard (1928), p.100, Stein (1949), II.214, n.1 and Delmaire (1989), p.286.

¹³³ John Lydus III.47, John of Ant. fr.214e.2, plus comments by Stein (1949), II.207, n.2, Karayannopoulos (1958), p.195, and Capizzi (1969), p.150, n.242, though he dates this reform to 513. See chapter two, part two, *The Beginning of the Conflict*, for the argument that Anastasius was softening up the inhabitants of the provinces in question, in case he should have to flee the threatening advances of Vitalian.

¹³⁴ C.J. I.2.18; Bréhier (1914) cols.1450-1451, Capizzi (1969), p.145.

On many occasions, Anastasius was prompted to help cities or provinces which had suffered from either natural disasters or the effects of war. In 499-500, when the harvest in Mesopotamia was ruined by locusts, he reduced taxes and provided money for the destitute¹³⁵. It is also reported that he sent "much gold" to the survivors of the Rhodes earthquake¹³⁶. Cities devastated by the Persian war were given assistance. In 503-506 he reduced the taxes on cities which were heavily burdened with the responsibility of providing supplies to the imperial army and after the war, Celer and Calliopius were instructed to make further concessions as they deemed necessary. At Amida the tax was remitted for seven years and at Edessa it was reduced by half, and the emperor gave two hundred pounds of gold for the reconstruction of the public baths¹³⁷. After a raid of the Bulgars on Macedonia and Thessaly in 517, Anastasius authorised the prefect of Illyricum to spend one thousand pounds of gold on ransoming captives, a task that was usually left to the Church and private charities¹³⁸.

There are also examples of generosity of a more private nature. When the consul Paul (498) found himself in debt to the senator and honorary consul Zoticus, after holding munificent celebrations for his consulship, Anastasius gave him two thousand pounds of gold to pay off the debt and to leave him with his own resources¹³⁹.

It is measures such as those recounted above which belie Justin's criticism of his predecessor's "parca subtilitas". Apart from one of the new emperor's early laws in which he reinstated officials Anastasius had dispensed with, there is little evidence for the

¹³⁵ Josh. 42; Duval (1892), pp.5ff, Karayannopoulos (1958), p.216 and Kaplan (1992), pp.380ff.

¹³⁶ Mal. 406, Evag. III.43, Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 815 and Mich. Syr. IX.8.

¹³⁷ cf. chapter three, part one, *Anastasius' Eastern Defensive Building Programme*.

¹³⁸ Marc. C. 517 with commentary by Croke (1995), p.120. Perhaps less to Anastasius' credit was the withdrawal of the rebate of taxes of one hundred pounds of gold on *adiectio sterilium* in Jerusalem and Palestine, granted to St. Sabas. The emperor was persuaded against his original promise by the monophysite Marinus who, it was said, disliked the orthodox in Jerusalem. See Cyril of Scythop. *Vit. Sab.* LIV; Stein (1949), II.194-195, Karayannopoulos (1958), p.266, and Capizzi (1969), p.147, with n.219.

¹³⁹ John Lydus, *de Mag.* III.48.

discontentment of the imperial court under Anastasius' "frugality"¹⁴⁰. From the evidence considered so far, it seems that Anastasius was concerned with tightening up the workings of the taxation system, lightening the load where possible and always ensuring an efficient management of resources¹⁴¹.

The Coinage Reform.

The last, but certainly one of the most significant of Anastasius' economic reforms to be considered is his coinage reform, organised by the *comes sacrarum largitionum*, John the Paphlagonian, in 498. He introduced large copper coins marked with the value on the reverse: M for a forty *nummi* piece which was also known as the *follis* and weighed nine grammes, K for twenty *nummi* (weighing four and a half grammes), and I for ten *nummi* (weighing two and a quarter grammes). Thus remarks Marcellinus Comes:

nummis, quos Romani teruncianos vocant, Graeci follares, Anastasius princeps suo nomine figuratis placibilem plebi commutationem distraxit¹⁴².

In 512, Anastasius doubled the weight of these denominations to eighteen, nine, and four and a quarter grammes respectively and introduced another coin marked E, the five *nummi* piece, weighing two and a quarter grammes¹⁴³. The original coins of the 498 reform remained in circulation and continued at half their marked value, while the gold *solidus*, *semissis* and *tremissis* continued to be struck as before and circulated freely¹⁴⁴. It was also in 512 that

¹⁴⁰ C.J. II.7.25, with Stein (1949), II.196 and n.2, and Capizzi (1969), p.142 with n.192.

¹⁴¹ See C.J. X.16.13 addressed to Euphemius where Anastasius curtailed the authority of the *praetorian prefect* and subordinate bureaux; only the emperor should decide concessions of delay of payment of fiscal dues; Stein (1949), II.207 and Capizzi (1969), p.147.

¹⁴² Marc. C. 498. Croke (1995) follows the version which gives *terunciani* (rather than *terentiani*). A *teruncius* originally weighed one third of an ounce or one thirty-sixth of a pound, and therefore, one fortieth of a *denarius*, and thus the use of term *teruncianos* must be a reference to the *follis*, the forty *nummi* piece; Bellinger (1966), p.84, Metcalf (1969), p.13, Hendy (1985), p.477 and Croke (1995), p.110.

¹⁴³ *Chronicon ad 724*, 824.

¹⁴⁴ See Grierson (1982), pp.52-56 for gold coinage and pp.56-57 for silver.

Anastasius opened the new mint at Antioch¹⁴⁵.

Before Anastasius, the value of the *solidus* against bronze coins fluctuated greatly. While the silver *siliqua* weighed one twenty-fourth of a *solidus* and this ratio was invariable, the value of the *nummus*, a very small bronze coin of low value with an illegible inscription, was far less dependable. As there was often a shortage of official supplies, they were supplemented with unofficial local imitations. This led to overproduction and the consequent inflation of gold¹⁴⁶. There were no coins (except for the silver half *siliqua*, struck in very small quantities) between the *nummus* and the gold *tremissis* which was worth four to five thousand little copper coins¹⁴⁷.

From the evidence of the *Tablettes Albertini*, a collection of legal documents on wooden tablets, dated to the last three years of Gunthamund's reign (484-496), it is possible to chart more closely the rise in value of the *solidus* during the second half of the fifth century. From a rate of seven thousand, two hundred *nummi* to the *solidus*, it rose to twelve thousand in the early 480s and to fourteen thousand in the late 490s. The cause of this inflation was the unchecked issue of the small copper coins¹⁴⁸.

Various measures were taken to stop the fluctuation of the *solidus*. A *novel* of Valentinian III in 445 states that the *solidus* was not to be sold for less than seven thousand *nummi* when bought from a money lender for seven thousand and two hundred *nummi*, and a similar scale existed in the east¹⁴⁹. Basiliscus revalued the *solidus* by equating it with a smaller amount

¹⁴⁵ Other functioning mints were located at Constantinople, Nicomedia and Thessalonica; Bellinger (1966), p.87 and Hendy (1985), p.397. Much has been written about the process of minting coins - the significance of the different *officina* (subdivisions of the principal mints) marks on coins, and the type of dies, whether careful and accurate or experimental, and the numbers of coins made from dies: see especially Metcalf (1961) and (1969), pp.16ff, and Shaw (1963). For a description of coins minted during Anastasius' reign, see Bellinger (1966), *passim*.

¹⁴⁶ Grierson (1959), p.77.

¹⁴⁷ Metcalf (1969), pp.1ff, Hendy (1985), pp.475-476.

¹⁴⁸ Grierson (1959), pp.78-80.

¹⁴⁹ Hendy (1985), p.477.

of copper and lowered the weight of the *nummus* to preserve the ratio of seven thousand, two hundred *nummi* to the *solidus*. Under Zeno the *solidus* went up against the *nummus* and the shortage of gold was exacerbated with the commutation of more taxes into gold¹⁵⁰.

The origins of Anastasius' reform can be found in several different cultures: Vandalic North Africa, Ostrogothic Italy and the Byzantine Empire itself. The Vandals had two series of copper coins. The first came in four denominations, forty-two, twenty-one, twelve and four *nummi* and the second series had three denominations; forty-two, twenty-one and twelve¹⁵¹. After Hilderic, for the silver coinage, the half *siliqua* or two hundred and fifty *nummi* piece was replaced by a coin of fifty *denarii*, and the quarter *siliqua* (one hundred and twenty-five *nummi*) by a twenty-five *denarii* coin. A system, where the silver coinage involved figures of one hundred, fifty, and twenty-five *denarii*, but the copper forty-two and twenty-one *nummi* pieces, created some very awkward fractions. This problem was dealt with in two ways: firstly, by providing smaller copper denominations like the twelve and four *nummi* coins and secondly, by providing larger copper coins with fractions of five hundred *nummi* rounded off.

The coinage of the Ostrogoths was simpler¹⁵². Their silver coinage came in two denominations of two hundred and fifty, and one hundred and twenty-five *nummi*. The copper coinage had two values originally, of forty and twenty *nummi*. Though these were exact fractions of the *solidus* of twelve thousand *nummi* (and the *siliqua* of five hundred), they did not form exact fractions of the silver coins of two hundred and fifty, and one hundred and twenty-five *nummi*. Thus, like the Vandals, the Ostrogoths made up the fractions with the production of smaller denominations, the copper ten and five *nummi* pieces. It is not easy to establish whether it was the Vandals or the Ostrogoths who first had the idea of

¹⁵⁰ Metcalf (1969), p.11.

¹⁵¹ Hendy (1985), pp.478-484.

¹⁵² Hendy (1985), pp.484-490.

creating smaller denominations of copper coinage¹⁵³. But there was clearly another source of inspiration open to Anastasius. Multiple *nummi* coins had been issued under Theodosius II, Leo I, his wife, Aelia Verina and Zeno. They are very similar in design to the coins of Valentinian I, Theodosius I and Arcadius, while Verina's was similar to that of Aelia Flacilla, Theodosius' first wife. It is possible that as the fifth century coins were imitative of fourth century issues, then the coins of the Anastasian reform were in turn inspired by those of the fifth century. Moreover, as the weight of the 512 *folles* was double that of its 498 predecessor, so the latter was double the weight of the multiple *nummus* of the 450s.

Anastasius also continued other features of earlier issues such as the "Christianising" of coins, as in, for example, the coin issued on the occasion of Anastasius and Ariadne's marriage¹⁵⁴. On the reverse is Christ standing between the emperor and empress joining their right hands. Christ has a nimbus, long hair and a beard and there is a circular inscription of "FELICITER NUbTIIS". This is very similar to a marriage belt and rings in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection¹⁵⁵, but the design was probably inspired by a coin commemorating the marriage of Marcian and Pulcheria: Christ stood between the imperial couple who held hands before Him. The same misspelt inscription was used. This, in turn, was a replica of the *solidus* issued by Theodosius II in 437 on the marriage of his daughter Eudoxia to Valentinian III where he stood between the bridal pair. Thus, there was a steady progression from the completely pagan coin of Theodosius, to the Hellenistic portrait of Christ with short hair on the Marcian coin, and thence to the representation of Christ with long hair and a beard under Anastasius.

The first stage of the coin reform came at a time when, as we have seen, Anastasius was making serious changes to fiscal legislation. In the light of this, it must be considered how this measure was intended to contribute to the revival of prosperity. Was it intended for the

¹⁵³ For the view that the Ostrogoths followed the Vandals, see Hendy (1985), pp.487ff, contra Grierson (1959), p.78 and (1982), p.4 who believes that the Roman senate set the trend in 476 and was followed by the Carthaginian senate in the 480s.

¹⁵⁴ Zacos and Veglery (1959) and (1960).

¹⁵⁵ Kantorowicz (1960), pp.3-15.

benefit of trade and industry, for the town or country, or for military expenses? Metcalf studies the use and circulation of the Anastasian coins from an examination of hoards¹⁵⁶. From Cudalbi in the Galatia region thirteen coins of Anastasius were discovered, five small and eight large; from Tell Bisa in Syria three coins were found, two of which were small. Small coins were also found at Jerash, Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Histria, Mangalia and Troesmis in Scythia. Metcalf concludes from this geographical distribution of finds in areas that saw conflict during Anastasius' reign that the coins were used for military expenditure. It must surely be the case though, as argued by Grierson, that the new coins generally made for greater administrative and commercial convenience.

The success of the currency reform has nevertheless been disputed. While the reform was implemented to stem inflation, to the unobservant public it may have appeared that the rising costs were due to the new coins. It is also possible that the 498 coins were too light and caused discontent or confusion. The 512 change would have led to the scaling down of prices, which would not have pleased traders and vendors¹⁵⁷. The text of the Sybil of Baalbek reads thus:

μισῶν πάντας τοὺς πτωχοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ τοῦ λαοῦ ἀπολέσει δικαίως
ἀδίκως....¹⁵⁸.

Prices tended to be rounded up to the nearest multiple of five and there was less opportunity for haggling¹⁵⁹.

On the other hand, the success of the Anastasian reform lay in the fact that a large coin of plain copper formed the basis of the currency rather than one of bullion which was always vulnerable to the reduction of silver content either by private, illegal or governmental

¹⁵⁶ Metcalf (1969), pp.94-99, chapter 8: "How were the small folles used?"

¹⁵⁷ Grierson (1967), p.287.

¹⁵⁸ Oracle of Baalbek 168ff.

¹⁵⁹ R.P. Blake in "The Monetary Reform of Anastasius I and its economic implications" in *Studies in the History of Culture* (1942), believes that this would have been a significant disadvantage to the poor.

action¹⁶⁰. As well as stopping the soaring inflation¹⁶¹, it enriched the treasury as the new coins could be sold to the provinces at a profit. Finally, the official coins in clear denominations must have been easier to deal with than the old, worn *nummi* pieces of the past¹⁶². The reform was very long lasting: coins of the Anastasian model with the imperial portrait on one side and a large M on the other were still struck in Constantinople in the 830s¹⁶³.

Agrarian Legislation.

Anastasius' desire for greater efficiency concerning the fisc can be illustrated further by reference to several particular areas which are targeted in his legislation. Firstly, we look to his reforms concerning land and farming. Because of the dependence of military supplies on land tax, it was imperative that all land must be worked as efficiently as possible¹⁶⁴. To this end, Anastasius introduced two key measures: firstly, to ensure that the land was always provided with workers, and secondly, that in the case of uncultivated soil, it was not the imperial treasury which suffered the loss.

The first enactment concerned the rights of *coloni*¹⁶⁵. Contrary to the 419 legislation of

¹⁶⁰ On the balance of gold and bronze, see Treadgold (1995), p.168.

¹⁶¹ Grierson (1959), p.80 and Jones (1953), esp. p.316; the government, by and large, now fixed the rate of production of coins and their weight, so that fluctuations in the exchange rate were kept to a minimum.

¹⁶² Jones (1953), p.316.

¹⁶³ Metcalf (1969), p.2.

¹⁶⁴ A side issue, not really dealt with by Anastasius, was the perceived decline of the peasant class. As with so many periods of Roman history, the fifth century witnessed the struggle of the free peasant proprietor battling to retain his small plot against the increasing encroachments of the wealthy landowners; Charanis (1944-1945), pp.40-41 and Danstrup (1946), p.239. Lemerle (1979), pp.10ff, esp. pp.15-16, seeks to argue that the idea of the extreme poverty of the rural peasant was a rhetorical commonplace and that while barbarian raids did cause a certain amount of hardship, there was much more prosperity in the countryside than is usually thought. Tchalenko (1953), I.422 concludes after his detailed archaeological report, that the Syrian limestone massif prospered under Zeno and Anastasius.

¹⁶⁵ Much has been written on the definition of the term "*colonus*", its origin and how it was applied by Anastasius. Originally, the term referred to the descendants of the tenants included in the census of Diocletian, in which all peasants were registered in their own village or under the name of their landlord. When the numbers of the original *coloni* began to decline, "free *coloni*" were introduced; there was a clear distinction

Honorius which granted freedom to *coloni* after thirty years¹⁶⁶, Anastasius enacted in 500, that a free man who had leased a farm for over thirty years would then be tied to the land, but remained free in all other ways¹⁶⁷.

This legislation of Anastasius further defines the types of *coloni* (γεωργοί), as he differentiates between the *adscriptus colonus* and the free *colonus*. The former could not own his own land and he did not pay his fiscal dues independently, but through his landlord. The latter (μισθωτός) was free in all respects except with regard to quitting his land. Lemerle comments on the "peculiarity" of this "hybrid class". He dispels any idea of the law providing protection for the old worker against eviction from his land¹⁶⁸; rather the law was an infringement on the labourer's freedom. He questions whether many cultivators allowed themselves to be tied to the land; surely they could leave just before their thirty years was up¹⁶⁹? It is true that this reform was of great benefit to the state and great landowners as it helped to reduce the risk of a shortfall in agricultural labour, thus preventing the consequent shortage in tax¹⁷⁰. However, contrary to Lemerle's argument, perhaps some *coloni* did perceive a measure of security of being tied to their land: certainly, there must have been a reasonable number who complied, as Justinian went on to extend the rule to include their children.

ἡ ἐπιβολή

The commutation of *annona* into a gold tax from payment "in kind" highlighted the problem

between this new group and the original tied *coloni*, now known as "*originali*" or "*inquilini*". It is to the latter that the legislation of Honorius and Anastasius pertains; Jones (1964), II.795-800, Lemerle (1979), pp.20f, and Haldon (1990), pp.26-31 and p.125 who writes on the status and rights of *coloni*.

¹⁶⁶ *C.Th.* V.18.1.

¹⁶⁷ *C.J.* XI.48.19. Charanis (1951), p.135 praises the clarity of this law.

¹⁶⁸ contra Kaplan (1992), p.160 who believes that the law equally benefitted proprietor and peasant.

¹⁶⁹ Lemerle (1979), pp.21-22.

¹⁷⁰ Jones (1974), pp.305ff.

of sterile lands¹⁷¹. Farms which could no longer be cultivated for any reason (the poverty of the owner, or a deficiency in labour) became a heavy public burden as others in the same tax district were responsible for the abandoned land. This additional payment was known as the ἐπιβολή, an old institution from Ptolemaic Egypt¹⁷². There was some confusion, however, over the procedure for larger estates not included in the commune. If one part of the land became unproductive, the whole estate remained liable for the original tax estimation¹⁷³. Similarly, if parts of the estate were sold or divided in inheritance, the estate was still treated as a fiscal unit by the government. In these cases, it is not clear with whom the responsibility should lie for the unproductive land: the whole estate or just the adjacent plot of productive land? Under Anastasius, an attempt was made to rationalise the system and the solution defined by the *praetorian prefect* Zoticus is probably that followed by the *praetorian prefect* Demosthenes (520-524). He decreed that the provincial governor should make the decision about liability in each case, based on the criteria of historical claim, not proximity of lands¹⁷⁴. Anastasius took care that the lands of the recently created patrimonium were to be exempt from the ἐπιβολή ὁμοκλήνων¹⁷⁵.

By clearing up the confusion over responsibility for the ἐπιβολή, Anastasius ensured the continuation of land tax flowing to the treasury and thence to the army, even through periods

¹⁷¹ Haldon (1990), pp.26-31.

¹⁷² For a history of the development of the *epibole*, see Danstrup (1946), pp.242ff and Jones (1964), II.814ff.

¹⁷³ When the whole estate was liable for the original tax estimated, the payment was known as the ἐπιβολή ὁμοδοῦλων in contrast to the ἐπιβολή ὁμοκλήνων, when all those in the same census district were liable; Jones (1964), II.815 and Lemerle (1979), pp.18-19.

¹⁷⁴ *Novels* CLXVI and CLXVIII. The latter contains fragments of the scheme initiated by Zoticus. There is dispute today over whether it was the lands themselves or merely the tax liability which changed hands. There is greater support for the latter view, which seems more likely. See Karayannopoulos (1958), p.242 agreeing with Danstrup (1946), p.248 whom he quotes saying: "Here there is no idea of transfer of land, no *adiectio sterilium*", and Lemerle (1979), pp.9ff who examines Karayannopoulos' article "Die Kollektive Steuerverantwortung in der frühbyzantinischen Zeit" in *Vierteljahrschrift für social-und wirtschaftsgeschichte* 43 (1956), pp.289-322, concluding that the *epibole* is essentially a transfer of tax only. Only Charanis (1962), p.335 following Ostrogorsky maintains that the transfer of land is the main issue and the transfer of tax is incidental. This seems unlikely as the point of the *epibole* was to ensure that the fisc did not lose taxes from uncultivated land, so only the tax needed to be transposed, not the land.

¹⁷⁵ *C.J.* I.34.2. Bury (1923), I.444-445 assumes that they were still subject to the ἐπιβολή ὁμοκλήνων, contra Jones (1964), III.267, n.105, who argues they were exempt.

where land remained uncultivated.

Legislation: the Army.

τὸ ἐξέρκιτόν σου ἔγειρον, τὰς στρατείας σου ἔγειρον,...¹⁷⁶

This was one of the acclamations at the accession of Anastasius and in response, the emperor passed a series of laws concerning the protection of the ordinary soldier against exploitation by military officials. A law of 491 addressed to the *magister militum* Leontius, Zeno's brother, aimed at preventing *tribunes* and their officers from appropriating state pay¹⁷⁷. The emperor also tried to stop the commissaries (*actuarii*, *optiones* and *chartularii*) enriching themselves on the army provisions passing through their hands and exploiting the soldiers who had to pay for their supplies. Officers known as *ergatores* were frequently sent out by the *magister militum*. They were to pay their *solatio* direct to the soldiers and any disputes were to be cleared by the *priores* of the army unit. Actuaries were forbidden to demand more than one *tremissis* per *solidus* as interest on any debt¹⁷⁸. Regulations for leave became less stringent. *Tribunes* now had the power to authorise leave for up to thirty men in a unit¹⁷⁹.

Another law (passed January 1st, 492) was concerned with improving military justice¹⁸⁰. It gave to the *duces limitanei* the same level of control over the *praesentales* troops stationed in their area as they exercised over their own troops. The law also limited the *sportulae* paid to magistrates in courts to one *solidus*, and it prevented soldiers facing prosecution in both civil and military courts.

¹⁷⁶ *de Caer.* 92.246. For a general discussion on the state of the army at the end of the fifth and beginning of the sixth centuries, and the increase of the use of federates and barbarians within the imperial ranks, see Stein (1949), II.85-89 and Chauvot (1986), pp.128-131. Anastasius did not seek to change the essential ethnic make-up of the army, but aimed to improve conditions for ordinary soldiers.

¹⁷⁷ *de erogatione militaris annonae*, of which fragments are found in *C.J.* XII.37.16-19.

¹⁷⁸ Stein (1949), II.198, n.2, Karayannopoulos (1958), p.173 and Capizzi (1969), pp.149-150.

¹⁷⁹ *C.J.* XII.37.16,2-4. Authorization above this limit resulted in penalization.

¹⁸⁰ *C.J.* XII.35.18.

Treadgold attributes to Anastasius¹⁸¹ the changes in practice regarding the five yearly donative and the commutation of soldiers' remuneration¹⁸². He argues that as Anastasius was responsible for the commutation of the land tax from "in kind" to a payment in cash, it is likely that he also converted the field soldiers' payments, giving them twenty nomismata per annum, instead of rations, uniform and arms direct¹⁸³. Treadgold also claims that it was in 516 that the quinquennial donative was abolished and an annual payment was made, possible in celebration of both the emperor's twenty-fifth anniversary of rule and his victory over Vitalian. The army thus reaped the benefits of the more stable economy created by Anastasius' coinage reform and his commutation of the land tax, and the soldiers enjoyed the advantages of being able to buy their own equipment and have pay left over. Looking to the wider picture of economic prosperity, Anastasius also arranged for army supplies to be left to private enterprise in the regions in which the soldiers were stationed. While this reduced the government's outlay in the transportation of goods, it also provided employment for locals¹⁸⁴.

Evidence for further reforms can be found not in the *Codex Justinianus*, but in various inscriptions. For the frontiers of the Oriens and Libya we have precise information about the organisation of troops and reductions in the rising fees paid by the *limitanei* to the military authorities¹⁸⁵. The epigraphical evidence relating to Libya is a summary of one or many ordinances concerning the rights and powers of the *dux* and the troops under his authority. One inscription is addressed to Daniel, *dux* of Pentapolis concerning administration, and the rights of the soldiers in his province. It focuses especially on the registration of *duces*

¹⁸¹ Rather than to Justinian, as Jones (1964), II.670, does; cf. *Proc. Anec.* XXIV.27-29.

¹⁸² Treadgold (1995), pp.153-157.

¹⁸³ Field soldiers benefitted more than the *limitanei* and *scholae*, who received no tangible benefits.

¹⁸⁴ cf. Treadgold (1995), pp.179-180.

¹⁸⁵ On the diocese of the Oriens, Littmann, Magie and Stuart (1921), pp.24-42, no.20 and pp.250-251, no.562, and Waddington (1870), III, nos. 2033 and 1906. See Stein (1949), II.197, n.2 for further references and a discussion on the four fragments of inscriptions. He concludes that they are not all from the same inscription, but were all issued by the same emperor. For Libya, see Oliverio (1936), pp.135-163 on the inscription and his commentary.

(section one), and their number and duties (section two). They and the *numerari* and *primiscrini* should not accept donations from the soldiers (sections four and five). The distribution of rations was regulated (section six) and the duties and rights of the soldiers themselves were set out (sections six to eleven). Chapter thirteen decreed the penalty for any contravention of this ruling, while the final section laid down fixed contributions so there should be no excuse for irregularity.

Contemporary sources report on the comparatively large size of the army during Anastasius' reign. It is said that the force sent against the Persians in 503 numbered fifty-two thousand¹⁸⁶ and in his panegyric, Priscian commented:

Tirones forti numeros nunc milite complent
Veraque non pretio, sed robore signa merentur¹⁸⁷.

The treatment of the theme of the army by the two panegyricists, differs. Procopius refers to a specific occasion: the success of the army against the Arabs in Palestine at the turn of the century meant that the once abandoned cities were now protected again¹⁸⁸. In contrast, Priscian anchors his comments firmly in his section on the administrative reforms of Anastasius during a time of peace. Indeed, there is no doubt that these measures, designed to upgrade conditions for the ordinary soldier and thus ultimately to make the army more efficient, form part of the larger scheme embracing all types of administration to improve the management and economic fortunes of the state.

¹⁸⁶ Proc. *B.P.* I.8.4, Josh. 54. More troops were sent in 504, adding substantially to, or perhaps even doubling the current force; cf. chapter three, part one, *Anastasius' Response - 503*.

¹⁸⁷ Prisc. *Pan.* 204-205. It is possibly this statement that has led Coyne (1991), pp.151-152 to the erroneous attribution of *lex C.J.* XII.44.3 (concerning the promotion of recruits) to Anastasius. The law, according to Krueger (1954), p.477, was passed by emperors Honorius and Theodosius in 408. Treadgold (1995), pp.14-15 and p.203, argues that Anastasius' generous allowances to soldiers (instead of direct issues of rations, uniforms and arms) encouraged many volunteers, ending forced conscription and leading to a reduction in barbarian mercenaries. This, Treadgold maintains, resulted in the Roman success in the Persian war.

¹⁸⁸ Proc. *Pan.* 7 with Chauvot (1986), pp.128-129 and Coyne (1991), p.150-151.

Social Reforms.

Within this framework, Anastasius was responsible for many so-called social reforms, concerned with regulating the duties and conduct of imperial officials, improving the justice system and reviewing legislation relating to the family.

Legislation concerning Officials.

The emperor revised the functions of his ministers and their privileges. The duties of *quaestors* and *tribunes* were assessed¹⁸⁹, and while the burdens on *chamberlains*, *praetorian tribunes* and *comites consistoriani* increased, the latter at least, enjoyed better legal rights. *Silentiaries*, significantly holding Anastasius' previous office, were also favoured with special rights of inheritance of property and exemption from guardianship and curatorship¹⁹⁰. Legislation also included controls on the movement of officials: magistrates were allowed to travel freely between the capital and the provinces, but another law limits the use of the horses to one, except in cases involving the transport of public money¹⁹¹.

One reform that has been associated with Anastasius, though it is unlikely that he was responsible, was that of the prohibition of the old institution of *suffragium*. In ancient Rome, recommendations for office and patronage were widely accepted, but from the second century such practices were increasingly distrusted and seen as corruption, along with outright purchase of office¹⁹². However, from three laws of Anastasius, there is evidence to suggest that it was still a routine part of job seeking within imperial bureaux. His *lex C.J. XII.19.11* concerning imperial secretaries explicitly states that on the death of one such official, those who had lent him the money to secure the post, should be entitled to preferential treatment.

¹⁸⁹ *C.J. I.30.3* on *quaestors*; *C.J. I.42.1-2* on *tribunes*.

¹⁹⁰ *C.J. XII.5.5* on *chamberlains*, *C.J. XII.10.2* on *comites consistoriani*, *C.J. XII.49.12* on *praetorian tribunes*, and *C.J. XII.16.5* on *silentaries*, with Capizzi (1969), p.150.

¹⁹¹ *C.J. XII.1.18* on freedom of movement, with Delmaire (1989), p.50; *C.J. XII.50.23* on the limited use horses.

¹⁹² For the history and definitions of various types of *suffragium*, see Collot (1965), esp. pp.185-212 on the history and the different types of benefit, such as exemption from certain taxes and rapid promotion, which could be acquired by payment. Also, Jones (1964), I.391-396 and Chauvot (1986), pp.144-147.

A law of 498 addressed to the *praetorian prefect*, Polycarp, regulated *suffragium* with respect to *silentiaries*¹⁹³ and lastly, a law of 506 awarded to the sons of advocates of the fisc the privilege of entrance to the *consortium clarissimorum notariorum tribunorum, sine quadam suffragii solutione*¹⁹⁴.

It can be difficult to reconcile this indisputable legal evidence with certain remarks of Anastasius' panegyricists, who, it has been suggested, claim that the emperor did indeed seek to outlaw the practice of *suffragium*:

Nunc equites horrent rectorum iussa vehentes
Nec lucri causa commiscent sacra profanis.

and

...τῶν δὲ κατ' εἰρήνην ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολλῶν τῶν κατὰ
μέρος αἴτιον καὶ ὃ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει τὰς πόλεις.¹⁹⁵

It is going too far, I believe, to take these lines, as Chauvot does, to refer to a date by which the practice had died out¹⁹⁶. However, while Coyne in her commentary refers to Priscian's claim in the context of measures to end corruption in public life, she sees the reference as "brief" and "allusive"¹⁹⁷. From Justinian's strenuous efforts to stamp it out, it is clear that *suffragium* was still flourishing long after Anastasius' death¹⁹⁸.

That is not to claim that the emperor had no interest in "restoring the moral fabric" of the state¹⁹⁹. Procopius and Priscian both rightly refer to the expulsion of informers from the

¹⁹³ C.J. XII.16.5,1.

¹⁹⁴ C.J. II.7.23,2; Collot (1965), pp.214-216, Karayannopoulos (1958), pp.169-170, and Chauvot (1986), p.146 with n.246.

¹⁹⁵ Prisc. *Pan.* 196-197; Proc. *Pan.* 11.

¹⁹⁶ Chauvot (1986), p.147.

¹⁹⁷ Coyne (1991), p.143. The lines 196-197 of Priscian have already been discussed in other contexts - concerning the *vindices* (Coyne), and the alienation of church property (Chauvot).

¹⁹⁸ Jones (1964), I.395-396.

¹⁹⁹ Coyne (1991), p.143.

imperial capital, a response to the crowd's cry at Anastasius' accession: τοὺς δηλότορας ἔξω βάλε²⁰⁰.

Judicial Reforms.

Anastasius can again be seen as the restorer of the "moral fabric of the state" when he turned his attention towards the judiciary, the running of the courts and the conduct of magistrates and judges. In an early law addressed to the *praetorian prefect* Matronius, judges were urged not to accept evidence in any form (rescript, pragmatic sanction) which appeared contrary to the law²⁰¹. Another law sought to ensure equity in a court of law for those of servile condition or serfdom²⁰², while *lex C.J.* VII.51.6 tried to guarantee a degree of fairness with regard to the profits and expenses of a law suit when the prosecutor and defender were unequally well-off or privileged. A similar enactment warned against those with influence using their position to supersede the authority of judges and thus evade jurisdiction²⁰³. A further group of laws pertains to the lawyers and officials involved in the dispensing of justice. In 507, Anastasius responded to a petition from the local advocates of the province of Syria II, granting, on certain conditions, their requests for promotion and benefits²⁰⁴. Other clauses of this legislation passed at different times also consider requests for advancements²⁰⁵ and include a stipulation on the terms and privileges of chief advocates of the bar, who must also serve as advocates of the treasury²⁰⁶. Finally, an undated law limits the *privilegium fori* (the right to claim the jurisdiction of the *magistri* as defendants or the accused in civil or criminal courts) of the officials of the *magistri militum* to the established

²⁰⁰ Prisc. *Pan.* 135-136, Proc. *Pan.* 5, *de Caer.* I.92, and *C.J.* X.16.13,2.

²⁰¹ *C.J.* I.22.6.

²⁰² *C.J.* II.4.43, dated 500.

²⁰³ *C.J.* III.13.7.

²⁰⁴ *C.J.* II.7.24, with Jones (1964), I.356-357.

²⁰⁵ *C.J.* II.7.20.

²⁰⁶ *C.J.* II.7.21-23.

staff (the *statuti*)²⁰⁷.

Legislation on Family Matters.

Anastasius passed a series of laws to clarify and improve existing legislation governing matters concerning the family unit. One law ruled that if a husband divorced his wife with her consent, instead of waiting five years to marry she might do so after one year²⁰⁸. There were several laws about the rights of children, inheritance and guardianship. Fathers without children were now allowed to adopt illegitimate children to whom they could transfer their property²⁰⁹. Two laws addressed to the *praetorian prefect*, Constantine, in 503, dealt with the emancipation of children: one gave parents and guardians permission to emancipate children under their control, while the other secured the rights of such emancipated children²¹⁰. A number of laws concentrated on guardianship: men who had been emancipated were generally obliged to accept legal guardianship of their brothers and sisters²¹¹, and more specifically, were legally responsible for insane siblings²¹². In contrast, as has been noted, *silentaries*, while in imperial service, were exempt from such burdens²¹³.

Governing the people; factions, riots and the emperor's response.

This concludes our section on Anastasius' legislation, designed as far as possible to satisfy the needs of the imperial fisc, to tighten administration to the benefit of the state, but without overburdening, and indeed improving, the lot of his own subjects. While Anastasius was

²⁰⁷ *C.J.* XII.54.5, Jones (1964), I.489.

²⁰⁸ *C.J.* V.17.9.

²⁰⁹ *C.J.* V.27.6, John of Ant. fr.215.

²¹⁰ *C.J.* VIII.48.5 and *C.J.* VI.58.11. Another law, *C.J.* VI.20.18, also of August 502 ensured that all the contributions made "to the common mass of the estate" (Scott (1932), p.138) by children who had become their own masters by petition were the same as those of children who had been emancipated.

²¹¹ *C.J.* V.30.4.

²¹² *C.J.* V.70.5.

²¹³ *C.J.* V.62.25.

largely successful in many areas of his domestic policy, his reign suffered from a more powerful social phenomenon facing the state at this time: the increasing rise in internal strife and violence orchestrated by the factions. This escalating problem began about the time of Zeno and culminated in the *Nika* riot of 532²¹⁴. Anastasius sought to control and even prevent faction riots breaking out, but as an empire-wide problem, each insurrection often with a different trigger, it was a difficult situation to deal with.

A great deal has been written in the past about the nature of the "factions" (the Reds, Blues, Greens and Whites) and their relationship with other divisions of society, such as the demes. Various suggestions have been proffered: that demes and factions denoted sportive organisations based in the hippodrome, or they represented different political persuasions, religious views or social classes²¹⁵. It was most commonly thought that the Greens represented the poorer elements of society and the monophysites and the Blues were recruited from rich landowners who were orthodox in persuasion. It is more generally accepted nowadays that the circus factions in the later Roman Empire were a-political, a-religious and drew on a variety of social classes²¹⁶. It is with this view in mind that we shall turn to the factions riots under Anastasius and examine their nature, how they were dealt with and what this tells us about the emperor's administrative policy.

²¹⁴ As Cameron (1973), p.239 writes "in persistence and intensity [the faction riots] were a new phenomenon". He echoes Procopius (*B.P.I.24.2.*) who wrote:

οἱ δῆμοι ἐν πόλει ἐκάστη ἕς τε Βενέτους ἐκ παλαιοῦ καὶ Πρασίνους διήρηντο, οὐ πολὺς δὲ χρόνος ἐξ οὗ τούτων τε τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν βάρων ἔνεκα οἷς δὴ θεώμενοι ἐφεστήκασιν,....

²¹⁵ See the discussion on this in Chauvot (1986), pp.166f, with notes 420-425, especially on the similarities and differences between the factions and the demes, in n.421, pp.265-266. See generally, Cameron (1976), *passim*, and Winkler (1961), who reviews past literature and concludes that both the main faction parties contained a cross-section of individuals from all political and religious denominations and class distinctions. Cameron argues against the view of Manjlovic (1936), pp.642-656 who believes that the *Blues* represented the aristocracy and the *Greens*, the merchants, artisans and the less well-off. Lindsay (1952), p.54 sees the parties divided politically and financially, while Jarry (1968), *passim*, believes that religious criteria formed part of the distinction; some monophysites, Manichees and Nestorians were *Greens*, while other monophysites and Chalcedonians were *Blues*. Dvornik (1946), pp.119-127, too, saw the *Greens* as the popular, democratic elements of society, recruited from the lower classes, who backed heretical groups, while the *Blues* were more conservative, from the higher classes of society and were orthodox.

²¹⁶ Cameron (1973), p.233.

Malalas informs us that Anastasius favoured the Reds, one of the more minor parties, thus leaving him free to deal with and reprimand equally the greater outrages of the more powerful Blues and Greens²¹⁷. This seemingly simple and potentially effective policy has aroused much suspicion. As the Reds were seen to be closely aligned with the Greens (and the Whites with the Blues), this policy was usually viewed as a cover for Anastasius' secret support for the Green party²¹⁸. Immediately, connections were made with Anastasius' perceived favouring of the lower classes (the abolition of the *chrysargyron*) and his support of monophysitism, two factors traditionally linked with the Greens. In complete contrast to this view is that of Jarry, who saw Anastasius as favouring the rich landowning aristocracy and was therefore a secret supporter of the Blues. It is only an examination of the riots that took place during Anastasius' reign and his reaction to them that will provide the necessary overview of Anastasius' domestic aims.

We turn first to the riots in Constantinople which broke out very soon after Anastasius' accession. Marcellinus Comes records thus:

Bellum plebeium inter Byzantios ortum parsque urbis plurima atque circi igne combusta²¹⁹.

The riot started because of the unpopularity of the city prefect Julian, who had restricted theatrical shows²²⁰. Anastasius responded harshly sending in his troops²²¹ but the crowd set fire to the stadium and two years later rioted again:

Bella civilia adversus Anastasii regnum apud Constantinopolim gesta sunt: statuæ regis reginæ funibus ligatæ atque per urbem tractæ²²².

²¹⁷ Mal. 393; cf. Greatrex (1997), p.66.

²¹⁸ Eg. by Manjlovic (1936), Lindsay (1952) and Alexander (1967).

²¹⁹ Marc. C., 491, with Croke (1995), p.107. John of Antioch fr. 214b also describes this riot but dates it wrongly to 493; see further chapter two, part one, *The Origins of the Conflict*, and Jarry (1968), pp.285f.

²²⁰ Jarry (1968), pp.286f discusses the identity of this Julian.

²²¹ He was perhaps, trying to establish law and order at the start of his reign.

²²² Marc. C. 493. Jarry (1968), p.290 somewhat confusingly links this with the Isaurian revolt.

Detailed evidence for a further uprising in 498 is found in the accounts of Malalas and the *Chronicon Paschale*²²³. This insurrection was sparked off by the Green faction members who were initially angered by Anastasius' refusal to release their partisans who had been arrested by the city prefect for stone throwing. They were further provoked by the despatch of an imperial armed force against them. In the general mêlée in the hippodrome, Anastasius' own life was endangered, and a great fire was started, which destroyed not only part of the hippodrome, but also a section of the Mesê as far as the forum of Constantine. Interesting enough, it seems that though many were punished, Anastasius did replace the offending city prefect with a certain Plato, who also happened to be patron of the Greens²²⁴.

The riot and subsequent fire recorded by Marcellinus Comes under 507 is usually assumed to be a reference to the 498 incident described by Malalas and the *Chronicon Paschale*. Jarry²²⁵, however, sees it as an entirely separate insurrection taking place in 507, at the instigation of the Greens, and linked with the disturbance at Antioch in the same year. He ascribes the cause of the Constantinopolitan riot to the arrival of a monophysite Persian-Syrian painter in the capital, whom Anastasius had invited to decorate the churches of Constantinople²²⁶. Jarry's thesis rests on several assumptions which, if cannot be disproved, are certainly shaky. Firstly, one would have to agree that the factions were aligned on religious grounds; yet in examining later religious riots, it is clear that representatives from all factions were involved. Secondly, there would have to be a direct connection between the causes of the Constantinopolitan and Antiochene riots, if any real link is to be established. However, the trouble in the latter was initially directed against the Jews, whom the Greens saw as part of the Blue faction, a completely separate issue. Therefore, while there is no concrete evidence against Jarry's view of a separate 507 riot²²⁷, his explanation of the cause

²²³ Mal. 394-395; *Chron. Pasch.* 498 with the commentary by the Whitbys' (1989), p.100, n.316.

²²⁴ cf. Greatrex (1997), p.66 and esp. p.68 for a favourable comparison with Justinian's treatment of the factions in 532 which led to the Nika riot.

²²⁵ Jarry (1968), pp.294-296.

²²⁶ cf. chapter four, *Philoxenus, bishop of Mabbög, and Macedonius, patriarch of Constantinople*.

²²⁷ contra Croke (1995), p.113.

cannot be upheld and with no alternative suggestion, it is preferable to assume that Marcellinus was referring to the 498 affair.

One of the greatest disasters caused by factional strife under Anastasius happened in 501 at the Brytae festival, a celebration of dance and mime held in the theatre²²⁸. Again the Greens seem to be to blame as the instigators of the trouble. The high loss of life was due to the collapse of the stage. There is no mention of Anastasius taking any specific action during the disturbance. Marcellinus Comes refers to the grief of the city at three thousand killed in such a way, and for the emperor, there was personal grief, as he lost an illegitimate son²²⁹.

Serious trouble again flared in the capital after several years, in 510 and 512, both times in response to the introduction of the monophysite addition to the Trishagion²³⁰. The second occasion was much more severe when the violence raged for several days causing Anastasius to go to the hippodrome without his diadem and offer to resign. The ploy was successful and the rioting ceased²³¹.

Lastly, in Constantinople, there was one circus riot in 514 which flared after Anastasius cancelled a race-meeting as a punishment for earlier disturbances in which many were killed,

²²⁸ See the detailed and possibly eye-witness account of Marc. C. 501; also John of Ant. fr.214c, and Mal. *de insid.* 39.

²²⁹ Jarry (1968), pp.293-294 is right to point out that the text of John of Antioch actually refers to two disturbances, the first under the city prefect Helias, and the second under his successor Constantinus. It is to the latter occasion that the texts of Malalas and Marcellinus refer. We have no further information on the first occasion, on which the *PLRE* II.530 bases its entry on Helias. However, Jarry's argument that Anastasius' illegitimate son did not die at the Brytae festival but in later troubles at the hippodrome (not the theatre), as according to Theophanes AM 5997 (ie.504/505) is doubtful. The entry in Malalas, clearly referring to the disturbances at the Brytae festival, states positively that the trouble resulted in the death of the emperor's son, and there seems no good reason to reject the evidence of the contemporary Malalas in favour of that of the ninth-century Theophanes.

²³⁰ The first ecclesiastical riot in Anastasius' reign occurred in 496 in protest at Euphemius' deposition; cf. Theod. Lect. 455 with Greatrex (1997), p.64.

²³¹ See chapter four, *The Trishagion, 512, and Riots in Constantinople*.

including the *νυκτέπαρχος*, Geta²³².

Malalas records three faction riots outside the imperial capital, in Antioch and Alexandria. Again at the beginning of Anastasius' reign (491), there was trouble at Antioch during which the Greens attacked Calliopius, the *comes orientis* (appointed by the *praetorian prefect*, Hierios). The emperor sacked the unpopular minister, but awarded his replacement with stronger powers for dealing with the Green faction²³³. Some years later in 507, there were further disturbances: the crowds led by the charioteer, Calliipas, attacked the Jewish synagogue at Daphni, plundering and burning it, and massacring the Jews inside. Anastasius appointed Procopius of Antioch as *comes orientis* and Menas of Byzantium as *praefectus vigilum*, but they had little success in controlling the Greens who destroyed a large section of the city round the basilica of Rufinus and slaughtered the unfortunate Menas. In response, Anastasius appointed a certain Eirenaios Pentadiastes as *comes orientis* who, we are told, "brought fear and vengeance on the city"²³⁴. Lastly, for 515/516, Malalas records a riot in Alexandria, caused by a shortage of oil. The rioters murdered the *augustalios*, Theodosius, but were in turn punished by Anastasius "for rebelling against their governor"²³⁵.

It will be clear from this survey of the main riots at Constantinople that there was a fundamental difference between the causes of the popular insurrections at the beginning of the reign and those of the later part. The latter (except the one in 514) were caused solely by ecclesiastical discontent and there is little evidence to suggest that it was one particular party (that is, the Blues) which objected to the monophysite Trishagion²³⁶.

Looking at the earlier riots, it seems that they were mostly started by members of the Greens,

²³² John of Ant. fr.214e.12, with Mommsen (1872), p.355; Cameron (1973), p.233 and *PLRE* II.511.

²³³ Mal. 392-393, with analysis by Jarry (1968), pp.284-285.

²³⁴ Mal. 395-398.

²³⁵ Mal. 401-402.

²³⁶ Cameron (1976), pp.130ff - no ancient source links religious rivalry and the factions.

and Anastasius did not hesitate to take firm action against them. This hardly suggests that the emperor was an unofficial supporter of this faction through his connections with the Reds, despite such comments as "under [Anastasius] Green policy reached its climax²³⁷". Nor does the year 491 inaugurate a great period of influence for the Greens or "a new domination for the next thirty years²³⁸". Does this mean then, that we should accept Jarry's thesis that Anastasius was a secret adherent of the Blue party²³⁹?

Jarry bases his reasoning on several key points, which he proceeds to enlarge on. He argues, firstly, that the text of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, which associated the Reds with the Greens, should be rejected in favour of that of Malalas, which states that ever since the foundation of the hippodrome, the Reds and Blues have been united²⁴⁰. Though he argues that a contemporary text should be more trustworthy, here Malalas is referring to a mythical tale and the foundation of Rome, which perhaps diminishes any claims to complete reliability. Jarry claims secondly, that on no occasion did Anastasius show favour to the Greens; it was a coincidence that the patron of the Greens was appointed in 498 and it was significant that Anastasius intervened in the trouble at the Brytae festival, as this celebration was particularly popular with the Greens. However, the detailed account by Marcellinus Comes does not mention any interference by Anastasius; most of the deaths occurred because of the collapse of the stage.

Finally, Jarry contends that Anastasius' domestic policy shows him committed to helping the aristocracy at the expense of the poor. In particular, he cites the changes in municipal administration with the new electoral body as a measure to award new privileges to the upper

²³⁷ Lindsay (1952), p.118.

²³⁸ As argued by Manjlovic (1936), p.674, Lindsay (1952), p.11 and Alexander (1967), p.97. Cameron (1976), p.101 points out the oversimplification of the idea of distinct social origins of the main colours; most emperors favoured one faction, but few favoured only one social class.

²³⁹ Cameron (1976), p.133 sees Anastasius as favouring the Blues at least in the middle years of his reign.

²⁴⁰ Mal. 176. Jarry (1968), pp.121-122 also maintains, confusingly, that while Malalas asserted that Anastasius favoured the Reds, he did not mean the Reds in general, but those at Antioch, where the alignment was different.

echelons of society, while worsening the condition of the plebs. He does not provide any evidence for these accusations and in previous discussions on these measures earlier in this chapter, we found no indication that there was any such reasoning behind the introduction of the reforms.

It seems clear then, that attempts to find a hidden agenda behind Anastasius' support of the minority Reds have failed, and that he did not support, out of religious, social or political reasons, either of the main parties.

The emperor has been criticised for his heavy-handed response to faction trouble in using force, and this has often been seen as a contributing cause to the worsening behaviour of the factions²⁴¹. However, Anastasius did seek to prevent violence breaking out in the first place. In 499, he put an end to *venationes* (the wild beast shows)²⁴² and in 502, in response to the Brytae disaster, forbade pantomimes²⁴³. The idea behind the measures was to channel the aggressive competition of the faction parties into the hippodrome²⁴⁴: as the later trouble was caused especially by religious fervour and was not faction based, it could be argued that

²⁴¹ Cameron (1973), p.233, contra Greatrex (1997), pp.68 and 71, who believes that Anastasius' hard-line stance was more effective than Justinian's vacillation.

²⁴² If *venationes* were banned in 498, how should the appearance of wild beast shows on the consular diptychs of Areobindus (506) and Fl. Anastasius (517) be explained? Théorides (1958), p.78 gives a description not only of these diptychs, but also of an ivory of 517 with a depiction of a deer fight, and the famous Barberini ivory, dated to the beginning of the sixth century, showing a party of defeated barbarians presented with a variety of savage animals. Guillard (1967), p.290 comments that despite the ban, animal fights continued. Coyne (1991), p.161 suggests that later fights were perhaps bloodless simulated contests. It is possible that the ban was a temporary measure; after all there had been previous restrictions at the beginning of Anastasius' reign (the cause of the unpopularity of the city prefect, Julian.) Alternatively, one has to suppose that the craftsmen continued to carve traditional scenes which were no longer strictly appropriate.

²⁴³ Proc. *Pan.* 16, Prisc. *Pan.* 218-227, John of Ant. fr.214c, and Theoph. AM 5993. Procopius and Priscian both praise Anastasius' measures to control faction violence and the morality behind the reforms (the Christian propriety of games and dancing was always questionable, see the James of Edessa, *Hymns*, PO 7.715-717), though it is more probable that he acted to stop the faction riots at these events rather than out of concern for the animals or because of the "brutalizing effect of the spectacle", Cameron (1973), p.228. In contrast to the panegyricists' approbation, John of Antioch complained that now "the cities were bereft of beautiful dancing". For a discussion on the implications of the ban, see Chauvot (1986), pp.168ff. He believes that the banning of the *venationes* was an economic measure as they formed very expensive entertainment.

²⁴⁴ Cameron (1973), p.231.

Anastasius enjoyed a certain amount of success.

Linked to the idea of the hippodrome as the controlled focus point of factional activity, was the manipulation of the popular and successful charioteer, Porphyrius. Several statues were erected in his honour, by both the Greens and the Blues, and it is the opinion of Cameron that Porphyrius, who could be found driving for both parties, changed allegiance at Anastasius' command, in order to maintain excitement and competition in the hippodrome, where the rivalry of the two main colours could be more easily contained²⁴⁵. Perhaps then, it is not quite true to say that Anastasius relied solely on brief punitive action rather than on sustained preventative methods, though it is true that he might have improved the situation by installing a permanent police-force²⁴⁶.

It is interesting, that despite the less than peaceful relations existing between the emperor and the Greens, they were willing to play a role in the defence of the city against the threat of Vitalian. In an epigram from one of the monuments erected in honour of Porphyrius, the charioteer himself is described as a warrior, ἀριστεύς, πολέμων πρόμαχος²⁴⁷. One should avoid the temptation though, of seeing the conflict in polarising terms of Vitalian and the Blues ranged against Anastasius and the Greens. There is no evidence to suggest such a supposition²⁴⁸. Manjlovic, who championed this cause, is led astray by following Theophanes who claims that in the 512 Trishagion revolt, there was factional support for Vitalian as the crowd acclaimed the rebel as their emperor. It was recorded elsewhere that it was Areobindus who was the people's choice²⁴⁹.

²⁴⁵ Cameron (1973), *passim*, (1976), pp.132-137.

²⁴⁶ Cameron (1976), p.279.

²⁴⁷ *Anthol. Graec.* XV.50, XVI.347-350 with Cameron (1976), p.107. It is probable that the factions did not play a vital role, as they are mentioned by neither Malalas nor John of Antioch, but it is significant that they remained loyal to the emperor.

²⁴⁸ Cameron (1976), p.133 *contra* Dvornik (1946), p.127.

²⁴⁹ Theoph. AM 6005, *contra* Marc. C. 512; Manjlovic (1936), pp.659-660.

It can be seen then, that there are many misconceptions concerning the nature of the factions generally, and in particular, their relationship with Anastasius. It seems though, that as the Greens-led riots occurred at the beginning of the reign and the later riots were not faction based, Anastasius had some success in controlling the problems of escalating faction violence. As it has become increasingly clear from our discussion, since the parties were not defined by politics, religion or class, insurrection and imperial response should not be used as an indicator of Anastasius' favouring of any particular sector of society.

Anastasius' Building Programme.

Unlike his successor, Anastasius had no Procopius of Caesarea to glorify his building programme, and thus is not seen as a great builder in the way that Justinian is. Yet, it is still possible to compose an impressive "de aedificiis" for Anastasius and indeed a careful examination of certain sources reveals that his achievements in construction or restoration were recognized and appreciated. Towards the end of his account of the reign of Anastasius, Malalas writes thus:

ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς Ἀναστάσιος μετὰ τὰς πρώτας αὐτοῦ δωρεὰς πάλιν ἄλλας κατέπεμψε πᾶσι τοῖς ὑποτελέσι τῆς αὐτοῦ πολιτείας. ἔκτισε δὲ καὶ εἰς ἑκάστην πόλιν τῆς Ῥωμανίας διάφορα κτίσματα καὶ τείχη καὶ ἀγωγούς, καὶ λιμένας ἀνακαθάρας καὶ δημόσια λουτρὰ ἐκ θεμελίων οἰκοδομήσας, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐν ἑκάστη παρέσχε πόλει²⁵⁰.

John of Nikiu commented:

And the emperor rebuilt the edifices which had been burnt, and he constructed many beautiful streets; for in his mercy and compassion he loved to build edifices... And he applied himself to completing all manner of beautiful works, that he might remain in tranquillity and peace²⁵¹.

Even Theodore Lector, hardly known for his support of the emperor's religious policy, admitted:

Πολλὰς ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀναστάσιος ἐκκλησίας ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει

²⁵⁰ Mal. 409.

²⁵¹ John of Nikiu LXXXIX.30-31.

ἀνέκτισεν²⁵².

Finally, John the Lydian wrote of the emperor's generosity in providing funds for cities, forts, messes and harbours²⁵³.

Anastasius' building and repair works can be roughly divided into three overlapping categories: those that were utilitarian, those with defence and military purposes, and those with prestige or designed for imperial propaganda²⁵⁴. We start with the first category. Just as the Nika riot and the wars afforded Justinian the opportunity for rebuilding, so for Anastasius, riots, fires, earthquakes and wars provided similar opportunities. Many of the fires recorded at Constantinople during Anastasius' reign were the result of faction riots or religious disturbances; the general destruction caused by these insurrections must have necessitated much repair to the affected area of the city, particularly in the vicinity of the hippodrome²⁵⁵. Similarly, in Antioch, after the Green party riots of 507 when the basilicas of Rufinus and Zenodotus, the two tetrapyla on either side of the former and the praetorium of the *comes orientis* were burned, Malalas remarks:

Ἐκτισε δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ καὶ τὴν λεγομένην Ῥουφίνου καὶ κατὰ πόλιν τῆς Ῥωμανίας διάφορα κτίσματα²⁵⁶.

Anastasius also responded to natural calamities as again Malalas writes:

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας ἔπαθεν ὑπὸ θεομηνίας ἡ Ῥόδος νῆσος τὸ τρίτον αὐτῆς πάθος νυκτός· καὶ πολλὰ αὐτοῖς τοῖς περιλειφθεῖσιν

²⁵² Theod. Lect. 468.

²⁵³ John Lydus III.47.

²⁵⁴ The second category of structures, repaired after war damage or built as part of a defensive system, has already been analysed in the sections on *Anastasius' Eastern and Western Defensive Building Programmes*, in chapter three, parts one and two.

²⁵⁵ Capizzi (1969), p.191, with notes 15-21. He lists references to various fires. The damage caused and subsequent restoration was obviously not on the scale of the rebuilding required after the Nika riot.

²⁵⁶ Mal. 398.

ἐχαρίσατο καὶ τῇ πόλει λόγῳ κτισμάτων²⁵⁷.

Other projects of a utilitarian nature stemmed not from specific damage, but from necessity for a general overhaul or from a desire to improve existing services, especially if to the greater economic advantage of the state. Anastasius was particularly concerned with ensuring good water supplies. He was responsible for the construction of two cisterns, one known as ἡ ψυχρά in the Sacred Palace²⁵⁸ and the other as κιστέρνα τοῦ Μωκίου. With a surface area of twenty-five thousand square metres and fifteen metres deep, it was the largest in Constantinople²⁵⁹.

In the provinces, he built an aqueduct for Hierapolis²⁶⁰. Citizens had previously drawn their water from a reservoir, but in the fifth century this had become unusable and they were forced to make do with rain water collected in cisterns²⁶¹. No solution was offered to the people of Hierapolis until the construction of the aqueduct at the beginning of the sixth century²⁶².

Another area targeted by Anastasius was also connected to water: this time, transport by water, vital for the economy and trade of the state. In Constantinople, he dredged the port of Julian, as recorded by Marcellinus Comes:

portus Iuliani undis suis rotalibus machinis prius exhaustus caenoque effoso

²⁵⁷ Mal. 406. The frequency of earthquakes and subsequent need for rebuilding has been documented by Capizzi (1969), pp.193-195.

²⁵⁸ cf. Janin (1964), pp.204f and Capizzi (1969), pp.199-200.

²⁵⁹ *Souda*, I.188, Michael Glycas, *Annals*. IV.265; cf. Capizzi (1969), p.200, contra Mango (1995), p.16, who believes the cistern is attributed to Anastasius on dubious authority. Anastasius though, seems to have been genuinely concerned to ensure an effective water supply for the imperial city and provinces, as he passed a law (*C.J.* XI.43.11) renewing a constitution of Theodosius forbidding inhabitants to draw water from public aqueducts or fountains without a special permit. Offenders would be fined ten pounds of gold.

²⁶⁰ Proc. *Pan.* 18.

²⁶¹ Goossens (1943), pp.165-167, Chauvot (1968), pp.160-161.

²⁶² The aqueduct was probably constructed in 502 contra Goossens who argues for 505-506 and sees it as a precarious solution, as during war, the Persians could easily cut it, thus depriving the city again of a drinking water supply. However, the construction is mentioned by Procopius (writing 502/3).

purgatus est²⁶³.

In the busy port of Caesarea in Palestine, Anastasius repaired the harbour breakwater²⁶⁴, and at Alexandria, he restored the famous lighthouse by protecting its base, which was being eroded by the sea²⁶⁵. Unhindered functioning of the Alexandria harbour was essential for the shipments of grain leaving Egypt for Constantinople. Finally, it is thought that Anastasius was responsible for the canal at Nicomedia, originally the project of the Younger Pliny²⁶⁶.

Other innovations in Constantinople that might come under the heading of utilitarian building, include the construction of the public baths in the quarter of Dagistheus, which were later completed by Justinian²⁶⁷. At the palace at Blachernae, the emperor built a *triclinos*, which was named after him²⁶⁸, and in the Grand or Sacred Palace²⁶⁹, he turned his attention to the Chalkê, the monumental vestibule which served as an entrance to the palace itself. Whether Anastasius actually constructed from scratch or merely repaired the Chalkê is not clear from the epigram which celebrates his achievement:

οἶκος Ἀναστασίου τυραννοφόνου βασιλῆος
 μῦθος ὑπερέλλω πανυπείροχος ἄστεσι γαίνης,
 θαῦμα φέρων πάντεσσιν,....²⁷⁰.

Mango speculated on whether the Chalkê in question could be the Χαλκὴ τοῦ ἵππικοῦ, which

²⁶³ Marc. C. 509; *Souda*, Anastasius I.187.

²⁶⁴ Proc. *Pan.* 19. For a discussion on the grandeur of the port at Caesarea, see Chauvot (1968), p.162.

²⁶⁵ Bernard (1966), pp.105-110 and Chauvot (1986), pp.162-163. An epigram, *Anthol. Graec.* IX.674, records the repair of the lighthouse, mentioning Ammonius, a patrician, of the fifth-sixth century (see *PLRE* II.72-73, no.8), and thus, is probably referring to the repair at Anastasius' instigation.

²⁶⁶ Anna Comnena X.5; cf. Pliny *ep. ad Traj.* X.41f, 61f, with Capizzi (1969), pp.208-209.

²⁶⁷ Mal. 435-436, *Chron. Pasch.* 528 and Theoph. AM 6020; Capizzi (1969), p.199.

²⁶⁸ Papadopoulos (1928), p.131 and Janin (1964), p.124.

²⁶⁹ This covered the area including the hippodrome, baths of Zeuxippus, the Augusteion, senate house and the Great Church.

²⁷⁰ *Anthol. Graec.* IX.656.

suffered fire damage at the hands of the mob in 498²⁷¹. However, as he concludes, since there were other riots and subsequent fires, it is difficult to prove it was during the 498 occasion that the Chalkê burnt down and led Anastasius to such munificent repairs. Therefore, it seems preferable not to link improvements to the Chalkê specifically to any one hippodrome riot, and keep open the possibility that it was not the Chalkê of the hippodrome, but the actual bronze vestibule of the palace that is in question, which was, of course, itself destroyed in the Nika riot²⁷².

Church Building as Imperial Propaganda

We now move on to buildings designed for prestige or for propaganda purposes. Essentially, any building work carried out with imperial support in funding made for excellent publicity. Construction, particularly on a grand and sumptuous scale indicated a healthy economy; and financial aid to building projects, perhaps especially to the more vulnerable provinces, would ensure the gratitude of the inhabitants. On another level, there functioned the oft-debated concept of caesaropapism. Geanakoplos identifies three basic purposes in building churches: to promote true faith against paganism or heresy, to glorify imperial power on earth as representative of divine power in heaven, and to satisfy personal egoism and ambition²⁷³. The second of these purposes involving the imperial ideology of the emperor as God's representative on earth (God being the creator of all things), evolved from Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*²⁷⁴ and was developed by Procopius in his *de Aedificiis*, as he sought to show how Justinian was often divinely inspired, particularly over St. Sophia and Dara²⁷⁵. Anastasius was also favoured with divine inspiration, as Priscian wrote:

²⁷¹ As reported by Mal. 394 and the *Chron. Pasch.* 498. Such a supposition fits the timing of the epigram, which was written just after the 498 Isaurian defeat. See Mango (1959), pp.26-30.

²⁷² Capizzi (1969), p.201 refers to another *triclinium*, this time inside the Sacred Palace. A round building, it was known as the ὀκτώκιονοις θολόν, and was attributed to Anastasius by Zonaras XIV.4.23. Janin (1964), p.112 discusses this building, but makes no mention of any involvement by Anastasius.

²⁷³ Geanakoplos (1966), pp.185-186.

²⁷⁴ *Vit. Const.* III.

²⁷⁵ For more discussion on such imperial ideology, see Downey (1938), pp.10ff, Armstrong (1969), pp.28-29, Cameron (1985), pp.89ff and Coyne (1991), p.138.

Cui Deus omniparens renovandum credidit orbem²⁷⁶.

For Anastasius, too, the first goal was also very relevant, particularly in his later years as he inclined more and more towards monophysitism. It was important that he supported churches and monasteries financially; such support often helped to create or maintain monophysite centres. In his imperial capital, it was vital for him to be seen as a generous church builder, particularly to an increasingly hostile population, essentially Chalcedonian²⁷⁷. The fact that during the 512 Trishagion riot, a monk who had lived in the church of St. Philip ἐν τοῖς Μελιτιάδου was killed by the orthodox mob, tends to support the supposition that churches founded by Anastasius were monophysite and remained loyal. It is also interesting that the emperor founded two churches on the sites of houses in which he had previously lived, the church of St. Michael inside the enclosure of St. Julian, and ὁ Πρόδρομος ἐν τῇ ὀξίᾳ. Such foundations were perhaps to underline the link between God and emperor²⁷⁸.

We have already come across some examples of Anastasius' church building in the provinces, particularly those connected with defensive projects. However, there are many more examples scattered throughout the empire. In the province of Hellespont, the church at Amisa is attributed to Anastasius in an inscription, thus:

ὁ τοῦ Χ[ριστο]ῦ ἀθλητῆς καὶ τῶν ἐπουρανίων πολίτης
 Θεόδωρος, ὁ τοῦδε τοῦ πολίσματος ἔφορος,
 Ἄναστάσιον βοηθοῖ, τὸν εὐσεβῆ, τροπ(αι)οῦχον,
 [ὅ]ς ἵδρυσεν θρόνον ἱερῶν μυστηρίων ἐπὼνυμον
 οὐπερ λαχὼν Μάμας, ὁ καθαρ(ώ)τατος μύστης,
 κινεῖ μὲν ἀεὶ τοῖς θεοτεύκτοις ἄσμασιν τὴν γλῶτταν
 πληρῶν τῆς πνευματικῆς χορ[ε]ΐας τόνδε τὸν τόπον,
 ἔλκει δὲ φιλοφροσύνῃ ὡς ἑαυτὸν ἄπρ[αντας]²⁷⁹.

²⁷⁶ Prisc. *Pan.* 181.

²⁷⁷ For a full list of churches, see Capizzi (1969), pp.196-199, with further details in Janin (1969), *passim*.

²⁷⁸ Janin (1969), p.343 and p.198.

²⁷⁹ Capizzi (1969), p.211.

At Bosra in Southern Syria, the cathedral of SS. Sergius, Bacchus and Leontius was completed in 502, as dated by the inscription found there on the door of the cathedral:

Under the most beloved God and most holy Julian, archbishop, was built and completed the holy church of Sergius, Bacchus and Leontius, martyrs, who received the prize and triumphed gloriously. In the year 407, 6th indiction²⁸⁰.

It would be interesting to know the emperor's exact role or attitude in this project. Soon after the construction of the cathedral, its bishop, Julian, whose involvement is credited here, was to be deposed as a Chalcedonian who refused communion with Severus, patriarch of Antioch. At Severus' consecration, the very pinnacle of monophysite achievement, would Anastasius be supporting the church building activities of a "heretical" bishop? There are several approaches to this problem: firstly, that Anastasius provided direct financial aid, regardless of doctrinal differences, in the same way as he was prepared to help Sabas; or secondly, his help had a hidden political agenda, and he hoped for influence or sympathy in a strongly orthodox region. Another approach would see the cathedral, begun in the reign of Zeno²⁸¹, completed without imperial funding, which would firstly attest to Anastasius' tolerance at a very difficult time, and secondly, reveal the general prosperity which would enable the building of such a grand cathedral.

Butler lists many churches in Northern Syria which were built between 491 and 518²⁸². The 1592 manuscript of the "Histoire du couvent de S. Hanania" revealed:

All the churches of the Tur Abdin were built by Anastasius; and the dome of the Saffron [monastery] and the temple of Salah and the temple of Mar

²⁸⁰ Waddington (1870), III, no.1915, Littmann, Magie, Stuart (1921), p.246, no.557, *CIG* 8625; Capizzi (1969), pp.213-214 and Butler (1969), pp.125-127. See below for references to a inscription which dates the church to 488.

²⁸¹ See Waddington (1870), III, no.1913, Littmann, Magie and Stuart (1921), pp.248-250, nos.560-561, and *CIG* 8623, with Butler (1969), p.251, for the 488 inscription.

²⁸² Some examples listed by Butler (1969), include the church at Kalôta, 492, p.67; Bâsufân, the church of St. Phocas, pp.67-68; Bâkirhâ, the west church, 501, p.133; Kerrâtîn, the cathedral of St. Stephen, 505, p.158; Zebed, the church of St. Sergius, 512, p.158; the baptistery at Fidreh, 513, p.152; Dâr Kîtâ, the baptistery of the church of St. Paul and Moses, 515, p.155; and Busr il-Harîrî, naos of St. Stephen, the Great Church, 517, p.249.

Abraham at Midyat and the temple of [Mar John of] Kfone and the church ('i(d)to) of Amas and that of Kfarze and the temple of the monastery of the Cross of Hesno d'Kifo: and the sons of Shufnay were the craftsmen, Theodosius and Theodorus²⁸³.

The evidence behind such a claim is unknown, but it has been remarked that the "splendour of the stone work" and the Greek elements at the Saffron monastery point to an injection of imperial funds²⁸⁴.

Church and Monastery at Qartmin.

One of the most significant examples of Anastasius' aid is that to the church and monastery complex at Qartmin in the Tur Abdin²⁸⁵. This was a Jacobite foundation, the history of which is contained in two sources, the calendar of the Tur Abdin and the *Lives of Three Saints* which is preserved in at least two Syriac manuscripts. Three occasions of imperial benefaction are recounted: the original founding by Arcadius and Honorius, and two subsequent gifts, by Theodosius II and Anastasius. These sources contain a description of the construction in 512 of the main church, though they leave unclear the reason for Anastasius' generosity. Various conjectures have been proffered. The first concerns the timing with respect to the ending of the Persian war and the construction of Dara. It is thought that John Sa'oro, originally from Qartmin, who later became the bishop of Amida responsible for the building of the church of the Forty Martyrs, and who directed the city through the period of the Arab wars, to die just before the beginning of the Persian siege, was responsible for instigating the imperial benefaction. This would mean the work commenced just before 502, but was delayed during the war, and then benefited from the influx of fine craftsmen to the area for the building of Dara.

A second conjecture, based on the aniconic nature of the mosaics, leads to a different influence behind the benefaction. Philoxenus, the extreme monophysite bishop of Hierapolis,

²⁸³ Quoted by Palmer (1990)(a), p.52.

²⁸⁴ Palmer (1990)(a), p.123.

²⁸⁵ General information in Bell (1982), pp.6ff and pp.137-139.

condemned the "portrayal in corporeal form of incorporeal beings". He is known to have frequented Qartmin; a passage in the *Life of Samuel* reads,

We have found [a passage] concerning this holy abbey in the letter that was sent by the blessed Philoxenus to Eustochios: "To go there seven times in faith is like going to Jerusalem, for it is built in the likeness and after the pattern of [that city], and it is laid out according to the same design²⁸⁶.

Another section of the *Life* reveals that the column of the stylite at Qartmin, Abel, used to bend down, so the two holy men could embrace²⁸⁷. It has therefore been suggested that the money for the building at Qartmin was part of the largesse organised by Philoxenus to stir up support from monks at the time of Severus' election in Antioch²⁸⁸.

There seems little to choose between these two conjectures and indeed, whichever one chooses, one finds the same philosophy behind the benefaction. The gratitude of the monks concerned, the strengthening of a powerful monophysite establishment at such a significant time, and the enhancing of the reputation of the emperor as the creator of all things on earth, are factors which are present whether initial encouragement rested with John Sa'oro or Philoxenus.

Moving away from church building, another common method of publicising imperial munificence to a particular city was to name it after the emperor himself. We have already found two examples of this phenomenon: Dara and Resafa both became known as Anastasiopolis²⁸⁹. The *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie ecclésiastique* lists a further six in various provinces of the empire²⁹⁰. Another popular target for imperial propaganda was the home town of the emperor which was often embellished. In this case the fortifications of Dyrrhachium were improved, many new buildings were added and even a

²⁸⁶ *Life of Sam.* XVIII.8-11, quoted by Palmer (1990)(a), p.115.

²⁸⁷ *Life of Sam.* XXII.3-4; cf. Palmer (1990)(a), p.113.

²⁸⁸ This is the view of Hawkins and Mundell (1973), esp. pp.294-295.

²⁸⁹ cf. chapter three, part one, *Anastasius' Eastern Defensive Building Programme*.

²⁹⁰ Pétridès (1914), cols.1489-1491.

hippodrome was built²⁹¹.

Capizzi's catalogue of Anastasius' building achievements contains sixty-four separate entries and even though incomplete, reveals a wide range, from renaming cities, to building churches, to dredging harbours. In his panegyric, Priscian seeks to create an impression of a limitless number of projects, which is in keeping with the idea of Anastasius as the "restorer of the world"²⁹². However, it could be argued that such a building policy was hardly in keeping with an impression of Anastasius as a careful and cautious financier, eager to preserve and build up the imperial treasury. There are several points to make in answer to this apparent dichotomy. Firstly, defensive fortifications were obviously necessary for the safety and preservation of the frontiers, and additional civic amenities were just as important in retaining the loyalty of border populations. Secondly, we have already hinted that while many of the utilitarian measures, such as improvements to harbours, and the repairing of the Alexandrian lighthouse, required initial outlay, they were vital to ensure the continuation and prosperity of trade and the empire's economy. Thirdly, while sumptuous church building and decoration may seem a waste of fiscal resources, imperial largesse was rarely without some benefit. The theory behind church building has already been discussed: as his reign coincided with and provoked such bitter doctrinal disputes, it was particularly important for Anastasius to be seen as a benefactor to religious institutions, both to strengthen his position as God's viceregent on earth, as well as specifically helping his own cause of monophysitism.

Conclusions.

From this broad survey of domestic policy, Anastasius' interest in and flair for the administration and reform of the state are unmistakable. His successful financial rehabilitation of the empire, referred to at the beginning of this chapter, is undisputed, but this in turn depended on firstly, the smooth running of the state from the imperial *scrinarii* to the provincial municipalities, and secondly, a correct balance maintained between taxation of the

²⁹¹ Mal. 417-418, Niceph. Cal. XVI.25; Capizzi (1969), p.206 and Valentini (1957), II.41, 308 and 338.

²⁹² Coyne (1991), p.140.

land, the imperial fisc and the sustaining of the army. Anastasius, relying on his own experience as a *silentiary* and on his professional and well trained officials, was able to achieve these aims, as well as introducing a beneficial coinage reform which further stabilized the empire's economy. With the imperial treasury flourishing, Anastasius could afford to be generous with tax cuts and handouts to needy provinces, and to indulge in a building programme, in which he not only restored and advanced fortifications, but repaired harbours, improved drinking water supplies and built churches and monasteries. He was also able to turn his attention to other areas of legislation: improving the judicial system, family law, and regulating the conduct of officials.

Anastasius is not seen as a reformer of the state in the same way that Justinian is often portrayed and indeed, it is true that the latter undertook a massive programme of reform, sometimes even overturning Anastasius' institutions²⁹³. On the other hand, much of the later legislation rested on the foundations laid by Anastasius, and it is certainly true that Anastasius was more successful in building up and maintaining a prosperous treasury.

Anastasius' panegyricists, as has been evident, were unstinting in their praise of their subject's administrative talent, but this final acclaim is found in the *Life of Daniel the Stylite*:

...[Anastasius] will govern the state impartially and honestly...in his time the rich shall not be favoured, neither shall the poor be wronged, for this above all....will be the surest guarantee of prosperity in the world²⁹⁴.

²⁹³ For example, the *vindices*.

²⁹⁴ *V. Dan. Styl.* 91.

Conclusion

Anastasius' reign came to an end on July 9th, 518, when he died aged almost ninety. While his accession to the throne was greeted with enthusiasm and celebrated in the sources, his death is shrouded in tales of the supernatural with thunder and lightning striking the palace where he died, a sure sign of impiety, so it was thought. His age is recorded variously and even the day and time of his death are obscured¹. No children survived him and he made no provision for a successor. His reign is remembered for doctrinal schisms, sour relations with Italy, barbarian raids, defeats at the hands of the Persians, the insurrection of Vitalian and subversive faction rioting.

This thesis has sought to redress the balance and to give Anastasius credit for his considerable achievement in preserving an empire whose security had been weakened by the reigns of Leo I and Zeno, and in delivering to Justin and Justinian a state that was well-organised, prosperous and stable. The benefits from a full consideration of the various areas of Anastasius' rule are crucial for an understanding of the period as a whole. For it is possible to see at once the complex fabric of reforms and interlocking policies.

As soon as the Isaurian threat had been subdued, Anastasius turned his full attention to domestic matters and there is no doubt that he devised a complex policy, innovative, responsive and effective. The popular abolition of the *chrysargyron* prompted a number of measures to make good the loss to the treasury. The emperor contributed money from the *res privata*, usually a private imperial fund, and created a new minister, the *comes sacri patrimonii*, to deal with the changes. A series of reforms ensured the efficient working of the land and prompt payment of taxes which in turn provided for the upkeep of the army. The economic security of the state was improved by the coinage reform, introduced in two stages

¹ Mal. 409 and the *Chron. Pasch.* 518 record that Anastasius was ninety when he died; contra Theod. Lect. 524 and Jord. *Rom.* 359 who calculate he was eighty-eight. Theoph. AM 6010 misdates his death to April 9th (not July 9th). John of Nikiu LXXXIX.93 observed that Anastasius fell ill and died when he was ninety, and is thus the only source to suggest explicitly that the emperor died of natural causes. Others indicate that he died during a thunder storm, his death having been presaged by a dream in which fourteen years of his life were erased; cf. Mal. 408-409, Theoph. AM 6010, and Cedr. 635-636.

in 498 and 512. Tightening of bureaucratic procedures, the regulation of the conduct of officials, improvements to the judicial system, family law and the collection of taxes all contributed to the smoother running and prosperity of the empire. With the imperial treasury flourishing, Anastasius could afford to cut taxes and give generous handouts to stricken provinces, and to mastermind a building programme, in which he built and restored churches and monasteries, as well as improving utilities both in the capital and provinces, and carrying out essential work on fortifications and lines of defence. Justin and particularly Justinian must have been grateful to Anastasius for the three hundred and twenty thousand pounds of gold they inherited, for without it, the latter would have found it difficult to fund his grandiose projects of reconquest and restoration which were so fundamental to the ideology of his reign. He was also indebted to his predecessor for his thorough restoration of the army, as Treadgold thus observes:

Later, after putting down a serious military rebellion, Anastasius left the army so strong that Justinian I could realistically hope to conquer the west².

He further emphasised his point:

After Anastasius' reforms, probably in 498 and 516, the army not only made the Balkans more secure than they had been since the second century, but won conquests under Justinian that were unparalleled in Roman history³.

Anastasius' reign suffers an unfavourable reputation for two main reasons: an unpopular religious policy and an increase in faction rioting. But was this reputation deserved? Concerning the factions, Anastasius reacted quickly to the civic insurrections of the early years of his reign by banning wild beast shows (499) and pantomime dancing (502), and he sought to channel the aggressive rivalry of the factions into the hippodrome where it could be better monitored. These measures were largely successful as later unrest was not factional in origin, but sparked by theological differences. Certainly, Anastasius hardly fared worse than Justinian, whose reign is marred by the Nika riot. This insurrection, which resulted in the deaths of thirty thousand citizens and the destruction of a large part of the centre of

² Treadgold (1995), p.15.

³ Treadgold (1995), pp.156-157.

Constantinople, came about because of the unwise policy of Justinian, who trod an unfortunate middle course between acquiescing in the demands of the factions and sending in the troops⁴.

Greatrex discusses how the Nika riot was only atypical in the severity of its suppression and argues that,

had Anastasius ever shown such hesitation, he too could have been unseated⁵.

Thus, Anastasius' delicate handling of the factions perhaps deserves more recognition than it is usually accorded.

As for Anastasius' religious policy, it has been criticised even by those who otherwise view the reign favourably. Thus Stein commented:

...l'on pourrait facilement compter parmi les plus grands empereurs si sa politique religieuse ne s'était révélée très préjudiciable aux intérêts de l'Etat⁶.

Yet, as I argue in chapter four, Anastasius tried to keep the monophysite eastern provinces content, while making repeated attempts to patch up doctrinal differences with the Roman Church and its intransigent popes. Anastasius should not be blamed for the insecurity of the empire caused by the religious turmoil of this period. He inherited the problem and no solution completely acceptable to all sides was found by successive emperors. At least Anastasius' reign was free from the imperially directed persecutions which took place while Justin and Justinian were on the throne. Although the Acacian schism was healed shortly after Anastasius' death, the 520s witnessed the harassment of anti-Chalcedonians by imperial forces,

who oppressed them everywhere and mercilessly drove them from one place to another⁷.

Anastasius' reign, however, also suffers from a lack of glamour and prestige which is

⁴ Greatrex (1997), p.69.

⁵ Greatrex (1997), p.83.

⁶ Stein (1949), II.217.

⁷ Ps.-Dionysius of Tel-Mahre 837, and quoted by Greatrex (1998), p.130.

associated with the reign of Justinian. The latter's propaganda glorifies his building of St. Sophia, his attention to fortifications, his huge legislative programme and codification of the laws, his restoration of traditional virtues and classical culture, and above all, his reconquests. Anastasius' tactics in foreign policy were very different. He responded to external threats by creating alliances and using defensive measures as far as possible to preserve the boundaries of his empire without expending valuable resources. To the east, his alliance with the Ghassanids and Kindites ensured their loyalty in the ensuing Persian war. Similarly, in the west, while establishing a *modus vivendi* with Theoderic, he kept the Ostrogoth in check by cementing his own alliance with Clovis, the Frankish king, and the Burgundians. As for defensive measures, Anastasius prevented further incursions of the Bulgars threatening the imperial capital by his attention to the Long Wall to the west of Constantinople, while his construction and repair of forts in the east was largely responsible for the twenty years of peace following the 506 treaty between Rome and Persia. As with improvements to the lines of defence in the Balkans, Justinian enjoys Procopius' praise for many works which were actually instigated by Anastasius.

It is readily recognised that Anastasius pursued a more successful foreign policy than Zeno, as Stein thus remarked:

Pas plus que son prédécesseur, Anastase n'a cherché à élargir les frontières de l'Empire d'Orient, mais il a maintenu le prestige de Byzance plus énergiquement que Zénon, à la fois par une politique plus active vis-à-vis de l'Occident et par une guerre que pendant quelques années il soutint contre les Perses⁸.

It could also be suggested that under Anastasius, the empire enjoyed more stability and security than it was to under Justinian's policy of expansion.

At the end of his biography, Capizzi questions if Anastasius deserved the appellation "great"⁹. He concludes, perhaps not surprisingly, that in comparison with Alexander, Hannibal,

⁸ Stein (1949), II.79-80.

⁹ Capizzi (1969), p.253.

Pompey, Julius Caesar, Augustus, Diocletian, Constantine and even Justinian, Anastasius cannot aspire to such an honour. Yet much depends in what terms greatness is measured. Traditionally, it is those who mastermind campaigns who achieve fame and glory. Peace and stability are lower on the agenda and thus there could never be "Anastasius the Great". However, it must be recognised that the opportunities for Justinian to become "Great" would have been severely limited without the full treasury, the tightly ordered infrastructure and the peaceful borders that he inherited from the reign of Anastasius.

Appendix A: *Dating the Panegyrics.*

The accurate dating of the panegyrics of Priscian and Procopius is of critical importance, as they in turn, can be used to date key measures, such as the building of the Long Wall¹ and the introduction of the *vindices*². The problem has been discussed at length with historians divided in their support for an early date of 502/503, and a later time of 512-515. It is the task of this appendix to analyse these opposing views and to determine to which part of Anastasius' reign the panegyrics most likely belong.

Priscian

Let us begin with the encomium of Priscian³. Chauvot argues for the later dating, basing his argument largely on the evidence of lines 298-300:

Hypatii vestri referam fortissima facta
 Qui Scythicas gentes ripis depellit ab Histri,
 Quem vidit validum Parthus sensitque timendum?

where he identifies the Scythians as the troops of Vitalian. He points out that the verbs used for the Persian war, "vidit" and "sensit", are perfects denoting that the war took place in the past, while the verb used for the Scythians, "depellit", is present, indicating that the war was happening at the present time⁴. He believes that the encomium was written in the autumn of 513 for the celebration in the Great Church of Hypatius' initial successes against Vitalian.

¹ Discussed in chapter three, part two, *Anastasius' Western Defensive Building Programme: the Long Wall*.

² cf. chapter four, *The Introduction of the Vindices and the Defensor Civitatis: the Decline of the Curiales?*

³ Those arguing for the earlier dating include Cameron (1974) and Croke (1982)(b), who discusses the dating of the panegyrics in conjunction with his evidence for the dating of the Long Wall (not mentioned by Priscian, but praised by Procopius); contra Chauvot (1977) and (1986), pp.98-107, including a survey of previous literature on the problem, and Coyne (1991), pp.7-16.

⁴ Chauvot (1977), p.545. On Hypatius, see Chauvot (1986), pp.100-107. The argument concerning the use of tenses in lines 299-300 is not watertight, as the present tense is used on other occasions for vividness in past situations, thus line 101 concerning the Isaurian war:

Deicit hos summi genitoris dextera flagrans...

and again lines 104-106:

Pro qua cum ventis *sociantur* proelia nimbis,
 Ignibus et rapidis *armantur* fulgura bello
Percutiuntque sono concussa tonitrua montes.

He explains that such emphasis was put on the Isaurian war long after the event to recall the victory at a time when the empire was again in danger⁵.

Coyne follows Chauvot closely, concluding that a panegyric, always an effective source of imperial propaganda, would be most welcome in 513, a time when Anastasius' position was being threatened, both by the insurrection of Vitalian and the religious riots. She argues that little mention is made of the Persian war because it did not directly challenge Anastasius' hold of the throne, and also because Vitalian and his father had both served in the imperial army. She points out that the last lines:

Barbariaeque ferae capiant iuga vera subactae,
Votaque firmentur populi Sanctique Senatus.

seem to fit particularly well with this argument; the senate had branded Vitalian, always portrayed as a barbarian, a public enemy, while the "prayers" referred to the service held to commemorate Hypatius' success. Coyne goes further than Chauvot in seeing the panegyric as a deliberate part of the propaganda campaign against Vitalian. Anastasius' divine election and the auspicious age in which he rules, are emphasised to retain the loyalty of any potential deserters, including Chalcedonians or those with western ties⁶.

Despite these plausible arguments, it is more likely that the poem was composed in the early months of 502⁷. This is closer to Cameron's view, and he argues that the emphasis on the

⁵ Chauvot (1986), p.99, also points out the possible reference to *vindices*, who, he believes, were not introduced until well after 503.

⁶ Coyne (1991), pp.7-16 on the divine right of imperial rule; esp. p.10 on how the difficult years of 511-515 would make an appropriate time for a reminder of Anastasius' divine sanction. She remarks (p.16) that one way to guard against disloyalty from westerners would be to commission a panegyric from a poet with western ties. (She argues elsewhere (pp.5ff) that Priscian came from Caesarea in Mauretania). She sees line 265 as a reference to the possibility of support from Theoderic and Hormisdas for Vitalian's rebellion and an allusion to the ever widening doctrinal schism between emperor and pope; contra my discussion in chapter three, part two, *Conclusions: Anastasius' Policy on Italy*.

⁷ Cameron (1974), pp.316, proposes a dating of 503. He argues (p.313) against Endlicher and Stein who date the poem to 512, basing their argument on the identification of the Scythians as Vitalian's rebels (lines 298-300), though 512 is far too early for this insurrection. Cameron, however, while much closer to the correct dating, is probably still a year too late. By 503, the Persian war had already begun, and like Procopius (Pan. 28 and see later argument), Priscian gives the impression that the empire is at peace: thus at line 149:

Nunc hominum generi laetissima saecula currunt.

Isaurian war and the *chrysargyron* point to an early date⁸. He also sees other references to faction riots and earthquakes, for example, as more appropriate in the context of 502/503⁹. As for lines 298-300, Cameron believes that it is improbable that Priscian would reverse the chronology of events in consecutive lines, placing Vitalian's revolt before the Persian war. He cites the evidence of John of Antioch, that the Hypatius involved in the initial stages of the Vitalian revolt, as referred to here, was not the emperor's nephew Hypatius, who had fought in the Persian war¹⁰. Cameron speculates that Hypatius (the emperor's nephew) was involved in one of the earlier Bulgar invasions (493, 499 and 502), thus the allusion to the Scythians.

Additional arguments can be added to strengthen the case for an earlier date. The reference at lines 254-260 to the defeat of the Persians (which would necessarily date the poem post 506) could also fit the Roman victory over the Arabs in 502¹¹. Furthermore, while Coyne argues that line 656 refers to the political and theological rifts between Rome and Constantinople in 513/514, there remains the fact that Priscian's wish for the obedience of both Romes is similarly appropriate for 502 when the Laurentian schism was raging at Rome and Anastasius and Symmachus were exchanging insults. For Stein, Chauvot, Coyne and others who see the encomium as firmly set in the years of Vitalian's revolt, 512/513, there is a further disadvantage. They fail to take into account Marcellinus Comes' reliable dating

⁸ Chauvot (1977), p.540 disputes this suggestion, arguing that a date of 503 would still mean that there was a gap of five years between the ending of the Isaurian war and the abolition of the *chrysargyron* thus invalidating the point that the panegyric was written as a direct response to these achievements.

⁹ Faction rioting, unconnected to the doctrinal schism, occurred mainly in the first half of Anastasius' reign: cf. chapter five, *Governing the People; factions, riots and the emperor's response*. See further Cameron (1974), pp.315-316, who also notes that there was a series of earthquakes between 494-503, followed by a long gap before the earthquake on Rhodes in 515.

¹⁰ John of Ant. fr.214e; see Cameron (1974), pp.313-315 and chapter two, part two, *The Second Stage of the Conflict*.

¹¹ The suggestion that the allusion is to the Arabs is made by Helm (1954), col.2343 and Ficarra (1978), I.364 and is discussed by Chauvot (1986), pp.136-138. He suggests that Priscian was ignorant of the exact details, and therefore lumped together information pertaining to both the Arabs and Persians. It seems unlikely, however, that Priscian, a court poet, who would have had access to accurate information, would have made such an error, and therefore, this must be a specific reference to the Arab defeat in 502.

of the start of the revolt at 514¹². Moreover, while Coyne eagerly proposes that the poem is part of Anastasius' propaganda campaign during this revolt, she does not explain the absence of important and successful aspects of Anastasius' defensive building programme; even such key sites as the Long Wall and the fortification of Dara are omitted. Surely Priscian would want to stress the defence measures which had been undertaken against other hostile forces¹³?

Procopius

There are similar problems with the dating of Procopius' panegyric. While we are told that the encomium was delivered at the setting up of the emperor's statue in Gaza¹⁴, this information is of no use in determining the timing of the delivery. Thus, again, a suitable date has to be conjectured from clues gleaned from within the text. Controversy arises over the disputed dating of the Long Wall, the construction of which is praised by Procopius¹⁵. Those who use the chronology of the *Chronicon Paschale*¹⁶ are obviously led astray by the late dating and argue that the panegyric belongs to the last years of Anastasius' reign¹⁷. Kempen correctly rejects the 512 dating as too late, but arguing that the Long Wall was begun in 499, dates the panegyric from 501 which is too early. He fails to take into account the mention of the Roman success over the Arabs in 502¹⁸, and the ban on pantomime

¹² cf. chapter two, part two, *The Beginning of the Conflict*.

¹³ It is also unlikely that he would be emphasising Anastasius' merciful nature, as at, for example, line 130:
Sed tamen Augusti superat clementia cuncta,

¹⁴ On Procopius' delivery of the poem to the statue, see Kempen (1918), p.xii and Chauvot (1986), pp.97-98.

¹⁵ Proc. *Pan.* 21.

¹⁶ The *Chronicon Paschale* inserts the notice of the building of the Long Wall just after the riot in Constantinople, during which Areobindus is proclaimed emperor. This insurrection is dated to 512 by Marcellinus Comes, thus prompting the idea that the Long Wall also belongs to 512. The dating, however, in the *Chronicon Paschale* is generally very insecure (cf. chapter one, *Greek Sources: the chronicles*).

¹⁷ Kempen (1918), pp.xxii-xxvi and Chauvot (1986), pp.95-96 consider the problem, and note various previous attempts to date the encomium relying on the evidence of the Long Wall.

¹⁸ Proc. *Pan.* 7.

dancing¹⁹.

Chauvot notes these objections to Kempen's argument and suggests that as the panegyric was obviously composed during a time of peace²⁰, it was delivered in the spring of 502, between the treaty with the Arabs and the beginning of the Persian war. However, Chauvot does not allow for the construction of the Long Wall in this year, which he dates to 497²¹. As discussed elsewhere, a 497 dating is premature for the Wall, which only successfully controlled barbarians from 503 onwards²². The Chauvot date for the panegyric of spring 502 should perhaps be moved slightly forward to the summer of 502, to allow for the beginning of work on the Long Wall, but before the beginning of Kavadh's invasion in the August²³.

The end of the Isaurian revolt and the beginning of the period of *renovatio*, so celebrated by both Priscian and Procopius, was without doubt an auspicious time, and most suitable for the writing of panegyrics.

¹⁹ Proc. *Pan.* 16 and chapter four, *Governing the people; factions, riots and the emperor's response*.

²⁰ Proc. *Pan.* 28.

²¹ Chauvot (1986), pp.220-221, n.113 follows Bury (1923), p.436 who dates the wall to 497.

²² cf. chapter three, part two, *Anastasius' Western Defensive Building Programme: the Long Wall*.

²³ Croke (1982)(b), pp.73-74, dates the building of the Wall to 503/504 and Procopius' panegyric to 503/507, which is slightly later than argued here. Nevertheless, the idea roughly follows Croke's scheme, which places Priscian's panegyric just before the construction of the Long Wall and Procopius' just after. Chauvot disagrees with this model, as he assigns Priscian's encomium to later in Anastasius' reign and believes that it is not significant that the Long Wall is not mentioned.

Appendix B: *A Fragmentary Encomium: P. Gr. Vindob. 29788B-C*¹.

This encomium, of which fragments remain in papyrus *P. Gr. Vindob. 29788B-C*, has been the subject of much debate regarding the identification of the addressee and the author². The poem certainly concerns the achievements of an emperor, and it is the object of this appendix firstly, to suggest that Anastasius is the unnamed honorand, and secondly, that Christodorus (or possibly Colluthus) is the anonymous poet.

The fragmentary encomium survives in a Vienna papyrus, from which Gerstinger restored and published one binion of a codex (known as *P. Gr. Vindob. 29788A-B*), which contains a hexameter poem on nature in spring or autumn, a hexameter encomium on the patrician Theagenes of Athens and two letters (nos. 80 and 90) of St. Gregory of Nazianzen. Gerstinger also edited a separate leaf (*P. Gr. Vindob. 29788C*) which is presumed to have come from the same codex³. Unfortunately, this leaf has been torn so that the line beginnings on the verso, and line endings on the recto are missing, as are the names of the author and honorand. Gerstinger assumed that all the poems were by the same hand, datable to the fifth or sixth century, and he thus ascribed them all to Pamprepius⁴.

However, there is no firm evidence on which to make this attribution: it is feasible that two or more authors were responsible, thus leaving open the possibility that our encomium was

¹ For the text, see the end of this appendix. References made to the text, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from McCail's version.

² Esp. Viljaama (1968) contra McCail (1978).

³ Gerstinger (1928), gives a description of the papyrus (sect. I, pp.3-7), the text (sect. II, pp.7-42), a commentary (sect. III, pp.43-82), fragments of the encomium (sect. IV, pp.82-85) and finally, the letters of St. Gregory (sect. V, pp.87ff). Photographs of the text are published by E. Heitsch, *Die griechischen Dichterfragmente der römischen Kaiserzeit*², Göttingen 1963, I.108, referred to by McCail (1978), p.38.

⁴ Gerstinger (1928), p.83. He is followed by P. Graindor, "Pamprépios(?) et Théagénès", *Byzantion* 4 (1927-1928), pp.469-475, but is challenged by P. Maas, "Pamprepios von Panopolis", *Gnomon* 5 (1929), pp.250-252. Gerstinger bases his assumption on the fact that Pamprepius was in Athens in the 470s and was a protégé of Theagenes. See further Viljaama (1968), p.55.

produced by a poet other than Pamprepicus⁵. McCail, in his article, focuses firstly, not on the author, but on the identity of the emperor. He argues that stylistically the poem falls within the reigns of Leo I to Justinian I⁶, and while he finds few echoes of the reigns of Leo I, Justin I and Justinian I, and dismisses the arguments of Viljaama in favour of Anastasius as superficial, he sees plenty of references to the rule of Zeno⁷. He suggests then, given the emphasis on imperial victory, that the encomium must have been written in 489-490, just after the suppression of Illus and Leontius, at a time when Zeno was trying to promote his brother's accession to the throne. Such an occasion rules out the authorship of Pamprepicus, as he died during the revolt, and McCail makes no suggestion for an alternative encomiast.

Validation of McCail's thesis rests on agreement that the description of war (verso, 1-15) is a reference to Zeno's war against Illus and Leontius rather than the Isaurian revolt of Anastasius' reign. His rejection of the latter proposal is based on the following argument. The poet broadly follows Menander's scheme for panegyrics in discussing achievements in war, followed by achievements in peace. We find praise for military victory over the Isaurians at verso 1-15, recto 10-14, and over the Persians, recto 15. As the Isaurian war ended in 498 and the Persian war not until 506, McCail believes that it is

odd that the part of the encomium traditionally allotted to the emperor's achievements in war should be devoted to the earlier war, while the more recent campaign is relegated to the part of the scheme reserved for administrative achievement...further, some fifteen lines are devoted to the suppression of the Isaurians but only five (perhaps even fewer) to the Persian war.

⁵ Viljaama (1968), pp.55-56 agrees that all the poems were by the same poet, but disagrees with Gerstinger that the poet was Pamprepicus. He argues that the style and metrics differ markedly from the *Hymns* of Pamprepicus' contemporary, Proclus. The author was certainly an imitator of the Nonnan style, but of a slightly later generation, thus from the time of Anastasius (or Justin). Heitsch (1963) warns against assuming that the fragmentary encomium is part of Pamprepicus' *Isaurica*. There is no clue in the poem on autumn or spring, as the allusion at the end to Egypt would be appropriate for any number of poets.

⁶ McCail (1978), pp.39-40 recognises the influence of Nonnus (mid fifth century), providing a *terminus post quem*, and sees the poem as "too literate" for the second half of the sixth century.

⁷ On this point, he follows Gerstinger (1928), p.84 who also believes that the emperor is Zeno.

However, the theory that the war is Anastasius' can be substantiated by a closer look at the text.

As the first lines of the encomium are lost, we are deprived of the introduction which would have doubtless included references to the emperor's place of birth, his family, early life, nature and so on, as laid down by Menander. We begin then, in the middle of the emperor's "πράξεις κατὰ πόλεμον" which could belong just as well with Anastasius as with Zeno. There is no reason why the "pursuer of the enemy" referred to in lines three (ἔδεκτο), five (ἀλάπαξε) and nine (ἐδιδά[σκ]εν), and named as John the Scythian by McCail, should be assumed to be acting here under Zeno's command, for he was also Anastasius' general⁸. McCail comments that Theoderic, Zeno's other general, was suspected of colluding with Illus and dismissed, and this explains why John is described as acting alone, (-μόνος, line 6). However, although Anastasius had two generals, John the Scythian and John the Hunchback, the former captured Athenodorus and Longinus of Karadala in 497 and was enjoying his consulship in 498, while his colleague was still pursuing Longinus of Selinus, Indes and others⁹. In this respect, each could be described as working "-μόνος", and indeed, there is no reason why John the Hunchback should not be the general indicated here.

Similarly, the words ἀ] νιχνεύειν (line four), ἴχνια θήρης (line six) and ἐλάσσας (line seven) which, in McCail's view, apply to the imperial army's pursuit of Illus, could also refer to the army's pursuit of Longinus of Kardala, Longinus of Selinus, Athenodorus and Indes. The accounts of the war of Anastasius' reign stress the tactics of guerilla warfare adopted by the enemy and the difficulty of the terrain for the imperial troops, entirely consistent with the idea of an army tracking down its prey¹⁰. Furthermore, while it is true that line five

λο, λέων δ' ἀλάπαξε καλιάς

could allude to the troops investing the castle of Papirius and the subsequent execution of Illus and Leontius who were dragged from the chapel, alternatively, it could be a reference

⁸ cf. McCail (1978), p.55.

⁹ cf. chapter two, part one, *The Conclusion of the War*.

¹⁰ cf. eg. Theoph. AM. 5985-5987.

to Anastasius' destruction of the same fortress, as described by John of Antioch¹¹. McCail rejects the obvious link between this lion simile and that explored by Priscian in his panegyric, on the grounds that while it is Anastasius who is the subject of the comparison in Priscian's work, it is the general in this case¹². However, it seems worth making the association between the two similes, if they both pertain to the conduct of Anastasius' war against the rebels, particularly as Anastasius is compared to a lion on another occasion, by Zachariah of Mytilene:

God stirred up the spirit of this believing king like a lion to the prey, and he roared, and made the whole faction of the enemies of truth to tremble¹³.

Lines nine and ten, concerning the woes of the captives, seem equally relevant for the defeated of both wars, as does line eleven on the loss of their ancestral possessions. Sources for the Anastasian war recount how the emperor expelled the Isaurians from Constantinople, confiscated their property, and by the end of the war, had even driven them from their homeland. Finally, while McCail claims that lines twelve to fifteen allude to the mercy of Zeno towards Illus' wife and daughter and Verina, let us compare the ending of Priscian's section on the Isaurian war:

Sed tamen Augusti superat clementia cuncta,
Qui stratos relevat, domuit quos Marte superbos,
Hostibus et pacis concedit munera pacis¹⁴,

As McCail admits, the anonymous poet was only following the instructions of Menander, who advised that the "πράξεις κατὰ πόλεμον" should end with mention of the emperor's clemency¹⁵. Thus, there is no reason why the lines twelve to fifteen should be specific to Zeno; they are equally appropriate for Anastasius.

¹¹ John of Ant. fr.214b: καὶ τὸ Παπειρίου καλούμενου φρούριον πέμψας κατέστρεψεν.

¹² Prisc. *Pan.* 67-79, cf. McCail (1978), p.43.

¹³ Quoted by Coyne (1991), p.105.

¹⁴ Prisc. *Pan.* 130-133.

¹⁵ Men. 374.25ff.

Here ends the section on achievements in war as prescribed by Menander, and the poet moves on to the emperor's activities in times of peace, indicating that they outdo those in war¹⁶. McCail sees the next lines (eighteen and nineteen) as referring to the championing of refugees and petitioners¹⁷. Among those who benefitted from the emperor's concern were the ἀνδράσιν Αὐσονιή[ω]ν, (line 20). In 475, Zeno ransomed captives in Africa from the Vandal king Genseric, and in 483 intervened against Huneric's protection of Placidia, the widow of the former western emperor, Olybrius. Anastasius, too, is praised for his hospitality to exiles from Old Rome:

Et quo, Roma vetus misit quoscumque, benigne
Sustentas omni penitus ratione fovendo.....¹⁸.

Priscian makes it clear that these men were appointed to distinguished positions within the court; the mention of ἔσω βασιληίδος ἀύλης (line 19) is perhaps a reference to these eminent posts in Anastasius' administration.

While it is certainly true that these lines (eighteen to twenty) belong equally well in the context of Anastasius' reign as in Zeno's, it seems that the next lines (twenty-one to twenty-five) are actually more relevant to the rule of the former. McCail refutes the idea that the poets mentioned (line twenty-one) are the cultured men from Rome alluded to by Priscian, and suggests that they are the poets favoured by Zeno: Pamprepius, awarded a professorship after the recitation of a poem, Pelagius, a poet and close friend of Zeno's, and Panolbius and Aetherius, "poet journalists". However, by the time this poem was written, 489/490 by McCail's own reckoning, Pamprepius was already dead (484)¹⁹ and Pelagius had just been or was about to be executed, ostensibly for his paganism, but more likely for his criticism of the emperor²⁰. The atmosphere at the court of Zeno could hardly be said to encourage a

¹⁶ cf. Men. 375.10ff.

¹⁷ McCail (1978), p.56.

¹⁸ Prisc. *Pan.* 243-244. Note that the term "Ausonian" is used in both the fragmentary encomium and by Priscian, though it is true that it was common in poetry of this period.

¹⁹ *PLRE* II.828.

²⁰ Cedr. 621, Zon. XIV.2.29; *PLRE* II.857, Pelagius 2.

flourishing of literary culture, while Anastasius was known for rewarding men of letters and to inspire literary and intellectual endeavour²¹.

The poem continues on the recto, the top of which is missing, depriving us of the first few lines of the next section²². However, taking together the content of line nine,

πάσι μὲν εὐνομηγῆς ἀν[ύ]σας ἔαρ ε[

with the scheme of Menander, it is possible to speculate, as McCail does himself, that the poet was discussing aspects of Anastasius' πράξεις κατ' εἰρήνην, subdivided into δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις. The first category included such topics as the moderation of taxes, the good conduct of officials, and justice²³. McCail rejects the suggestion of Gerstinger for the reconstruction of [ἀρ]γυρέη (line four), which we may take as a hint of Anastasius' abolition of the *chrysargyron*. Viljaama upholds Gerstinger's proposal; certainly, according to Menander, a reference to the restructuring of the tax system would be appropriate at this point²⁴.

As for references to officials, McCail suggests that ἀρχένα γαῦρον (line fourteen) refers to Zeno's brother, Longinus, who became *magister militum praesentalis* after his release from captivity in 485, and held the consulship in 486 and 490. He conducted a campaign in the country of the Tzani, establishing a camp there in 489 near the territory of the Lazi, from which region eunuchs were imported. About the same time, Zeno reduced the autonomy of the Armenian satraps who had sided with Illus and Leontius and decreed that the four most powerful satraps would be appointed by the emperor. This is the history behind the events of lines ten to fourteen, according to McCail. The control of the importation of eunuchs is reflected in the mention of the bed-chamber, "θαλάμοιο", while the suppression of the

²¹ See my forthcoming paper in the volume based on the *Race, Religion and Culture in Late Antiquity* conference.

²² The text is mutilated by a hole at the beginning and a tear at the end.

²³ Men. 375.8ff, cf. McCail (1978), p.57.

²⁴ McCail (1978), p.39 sees the absence of any mention of the *chrysargyron* as a powerful argument against the poem being about Anastasius.

"gold-tunicked enemy" (the Armenians) would be a blow to Persia²⁵.

Again though, an alternative and perhaps more attractive hypothesis presents itself. Is it not equally possible that "αὐτοκασ[ιγνητ]" (line six) may be an allusion to Anastasius' own brother Paul, who held the consulship in 496? "διογενή[ς]" (line seven) is the *comes scholarum*, who commanded Anastasius' army in 493-494, but whose activity with Longinus, McCail believes, is the subject of this and the next line. However, if "διογενή[ς]" is not simply the Homeric epithet, "born of Zeus", then there is no reason why this is not a reference to Diogenes' deeds under Anastasius. As for the lines ten and eleven,

.....]ιης θρέπτειραν ἀτασθαλο[

.....]θαλάμοιο κατέθλασε[

could they not be a reference to Anastasius' reforms designed to improve integrity and morality in the state²⁶? Such an explanation makes these lines much more appropriate for a section which deals with the emperor's "πράξεις κατ' εἰρήνην": McCail even acknowledges the disadvantages of such a lengthy passage on military operations in the second half of an encomium and tries to justify it as an "act of enlightenment"²⁷.

Notwithstanding this, the next lines (twelve to fourteen) without a doubt, refer to matters of war. Surely it is clear that an allusion to a Persian defeat is much more fitting in Anastasius' reign, than in Zeno's, under whom no military offensive was undertaken by either side, while the Persian campaign formed a major part of Anastasius' military activity²⁸. Directly before the latter's Persian war, there was an offensive from the Arabs, possibly referred to in the

²⁵ McCail (1978), pp.57-59.

²⁶ This would then be the beginning of the σωφροσύνη section. "θρέπτειραν ἀτασθαλο[" might allude to Anastasius' expulsion of informers from the state, and "θαλάμοιο" could refer to Anastasius' laws on adultery, cf. Proc. *Pan.* 22:

καὶ διὰ τὸν σὸν ἔννομον φόβον δίκαια μὲν τὰ συμβόλαια, σώφρονες δὲ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις οἱ γάμοι, γνήσια δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ οὐκ ἀμφίβολοι τοῖς πατράσι διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν οἱ παῖδες.

It was thought by some that the abolition of the *chrysargyron* was a sign of Anastasius' disapproval of prostitution, as it had seemingly condoned the trade by taxing it.

²⁷ McCail (1978), p. 58.

²⁸ The poet was using the same Nonnan phrase "ἀχένα γαῦρον" as used by Proc. *Pan.* 9 concerning Anastasius and the Isaurians, cf. Nonnus *Dion.* XX.51: ἀχένα γαῦρον ἔχοντα κατ' οὐρανὸν "Ἄρεα φεύγω.

previous line. It is, of course, surprising that the poet should introduce at this stage, further activities from a hostile context, but it was possibly with the intention that we should compare how Anastasius extirpated wrongdoing at home with how he dealt with foreign enemies, an idea which is perhaps encapsulated in the following line describing the emperor as a good king and good spearsman²⁹.

This line acts as a transition to a new topic, which McCail suggests is the beginning of the σωφροσύνη section, which he believes omits the usual themes of morality and order, and includes praise solely of the Augusta³⁰. It seems clear, though, that the poet's section on σωφροσύνη started at line ten, as discussed above, and the description of the Augusta (bereft of kinsmen) is suited to Ariadne, whether married to Zeno or to Anastasius³¹.

The last lines refer to some sort of internal conflict which, after some detailed consideration, McCail identifies as the revolt of Marcianus in 479³². He was about twenty-four, thus fitting the description "τις ἀγνηνορέων αἰζήτιος"; he and his rebels had Zeno (γαλιναίω) cornered in his palace (πᾶσα.....ἐλπωρῆ δεδόνητο); and the populace of Constantinople provided support for Marcianus by hurling missiles from their houses and roofs onto Zeno's troops, hence a "δήμου ξεῖνον ἄθυρμα".

Once more, an alternative suggestion may be equally or even more appealing. Vitalian could also be described as "τις ἀγνηνορέων αἰζήτιος", and Anastasius' hope may have been shaken

²⁹ Line 5. There is no problem with the concept of the non-military Anastasius wielding a spear, cf. Priscian's lion simile.

³⁰ McCail (1978), pp.49, 59-60.

³¹ Viljaama restores lines 16-18 thus:

σ]ῆσι σαοφροσύνησι τεῆν παρακάτθ[εο
πατρίδι τ[ο]ῖος ἐὼν ἐπιδεύεα κηδεμονή[ων
τοῖς [.....ἐπι]δήμιον ἴχνος ἐρ<ε>ίσας.

On such a reading, these lines could refer to Anastasius' building programme, comparable to Prisc. *Pan.* 184-192 and Proc. *Pan.* 17-21, and an appropriate topic for this section. Of course, this is mere conjecture and may not be sound palaeographically.

³² McCail (1978), pp.60-62. This is the next topic prescribed by Menander "τύχη λαμπρά"; illustration of the emperor's good fortune.

as Vitalian drew up his troops outside the gates of the imperial city³³. Just before Vitalian's rebellion there had been a "hurling of stones" in the 512 Trishagion riot, described thus by Marcellinus Comes:

...Celerem et Patricium senatores ad se supplicandi sibi vel satisfaciendi gratia missos iactis pluviae instar lapidibus repullerunt...³⁴

In this instance, instead of the usual hurling of stones, there was the "δήμου ξείνον ἄθυρμα", perhaps a reference to the "θεῖον ἄπυρον", hurled by the imperial forces onto the rebel ships³⁵? This explanation fits better with the basic meaning of "ἀμάθυνεν" on the next line which means "to reduce to dust, by fire³⁶".

Menander directed that a comparison with other emperors should follow; it is possible that there is no comparison here because the emperor has already been compared with Odysseus³⁷. This would mean a deviation from Menander's scheme which was however, not without precedent: for although Procopius compared Anastasius with Cyrus, Agesilaus and Alexander in the penultimate sections³⁸, Priscian's comparison of Anastasius and the Antonine emperors fell much earlier and was much briefer³⁹.

This concludes the discussion of the poem surviving on *P. Gr. Vindob. 29788C*: there remain, however, a few lines on the top of folio 29788*B* (verso), though it is unclear whether they are

³³ contra Viljaama (1968), pp.56-57 who proposes that these lines concern one of the riots caused by the circus factions where the usual weapons were stones; in 498, Anastasius was almost hit by a stone in the hippodrome.

³⁴ Marc. C. 512.

³⁵ cf. chapter two, part two, *The Defeat of Vitalian*.

³⁶ McCail (1978), p.52 admits that this is the basic meaning of "ἀμάθυνεν" and gives an example from Homer, *Il.* IX.593:

ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει.

He adds that it is frequently used with this meaning in Nonnus' *Dionysiaca*.

³⁷ lines 18-19.

³⁸ Proc. *Pan.* 25-27.

³⁹ Prisc. *Pan.* 46-49.

the prescribed epilogue of the same hexameter encomium, or from a separate poem⁴⁰. The information contained in the fragment in no way helps with the identification of authorship or the honorand, though it is possible that the Constantine mentioned was the *praetorian prefect* of 502-505⁴¹.

While McCail argues his point with extreme thoroughness and ingenuity, it is apparent that an equally good, and in many places, superior case can be made for identifying the honorand as Anastasius, not Zeno. This poem thus adds to the small corpus of works composed in Anastasius' honour, and though fragmentary, it is nevertheless possible to detect many of the key events of the reign and to recognise the same achievements so praised by Priscian and Procopius. Doubt, however, still hangs over the question of authorship. For while it is agreed that the author was a proficient exponent of the style of Nonnus, it seems virtually impossible to determine which of the possible candidates is our encomiast⁴². One can only conjecture that for the reign of Anastasius, Christodorus and Colluthus would be likely contenders⁴³.

⁴⁰ McCail (1978), p.63 is unsure, but believes the lines could contain the expected comparative element and epilogue.

⁴¹ cf. Viljaama (1968), p.57. McCail (1978), p.63 suggests plausibly that this was a reference to Constantine the Great, and therefore part of the comparative element.

⁴² On the difficulty of finding distinguishing features, see the discussion by Viljaama (1968), p.57, and on the style of Nonnus, Viljaama (1968), pp.11-12, 37-42 and Whitby (1994).

⁴³ Viljaama (1968), pp.56-58 explores the possibility that Christodorus was responsible for the other two poems on the papyrus. An encomium on the neoplatonist Theagenes would not be out of place in the work of an author who had written a poem on the disciples of Proclus. The allusion to Egypt at the end of the poem on spring or autumn would also be appropriate for Christodorus. It is worth noting the propensity of Homeric expressions in the fragmentary encomium (flagged up by McCail throughout his linguistic commentary), plus the comparison of the emperor with Odysseus. It is known that Christodorus was a great admirer and imitator of Homer; the latter is described by Whitby (1988) as Christodorus' master, and the statue of Homer in the Zeuxippus baths has the longest description (forty lines). Whitby has suggested though, that as the poem survives only on a papyrus in Egypt, this may point to Colluthus as the author, who possibly remained in his native land, rather than Christodorus, a member of the court literary circle, who might have hoped for a greater circulation of such a panegyric piece.

P. Gr. Vindob. 29788B-C.

1. Edited by Gerstinger (1928).

Folio 29788C, verso.

1]βασι[λ..].[.....]ας
]ν ἀδερκέος ἐλ[π]ίδι φήμης
]ρτεν ἔδεκτο δὲ θέσπιν ἀνωγὴν
]ν ἰχνεύειν βασιλῆων
 5]ο' λέων δ' ἀλάπαξε καλιάς
]τάτη μόνος ἴχνια θήρης
 ἀρετ]ῶν ἐγκύμονας ἄνδρας ἐλάσσας
]σαν ὑπὸ σπήλυγγα μελάθρων
]σε δίδα[σκ]εν οἰζύας' [ο]ἱ δὲ πεσόντες
 10 πο]ινήτει[ρα]ν ἀναστενάχοντες ἀνά[γ]κ[η]ν
]α πατρω[ίω]ν κτεάνων ῥιψα[....]αρ[
 γ]ὰρ γεγά[ασι]ν ἐλώριον ἀλλὰ[..]θεον[
]υδρ.[.....]οσ[...].οι[..]τρον ἔ[λ]εγξας
]ρης ἵνα κόραις
 15]ἀπελύσασα δεσμῶν
 τ]οῖ[ον] ἐς ἔργον ἀνάπτων
 ὑπέ]ρτερα μάλλον ἀείσω
]ηκαο πᾶσιν ἀρήγων
]μέσω βασιληίδος αὐλῆς
 20]σι σὺν ἀνδράσιν Αὔσονίησ[ι]ν
 π]ολλοὶ δέ τε παῖδες ἀοιδῶν
 τε]ῆς ἤπτοντο τραπέζης
 φ]ερέσβιος ἦσθα πορείη
 τύ]χης πάντεσσι τιταίνων
 25]σκες εὐχ[ο]ς ἀοιδαῖς
].τι[.....ε]λθῶν
]ος

Folio 27988C, recto.

1 [τ]οιο[
 [τ]όσσα[
 [...]·[
 [άρ]γυρέη[
 5 σοῖ γὰρ[
 αὐτοκασ[ιγνητ
 διογενή[ς
 ἐς πυμάτην πιπ[τ.....] Αἴγυ[πτον
 πᾶσι μὲν εὐνομίης ἀν[ύ]σας ἔαρ ε[
 10 [παλλ]ακίης θρέπτειραν ἀτάσθαλο[ν
 [.....]θαλάμοιο κατέθλασε[
 ἔνθα μὲν εὐνήσας ὑπερήνορα[
 ἔνθα δὲ χρυσοχίτωνος ὑπόπτερ[ον
 ἀύχενα γα[ύ]ρον ἼΑρηος ἸΑχαιμεν[ίδου
 15 τοῖος ἐὼν βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατε[ρὸς καὶ ἐπάρχων
 [σ]ῆσι σαοφροσύνησι τεὴν παρακάτθ[εο
 [.....]θεων ἐπιδευέα κηδεμονή[σας
 τοῖς [.....]δήμιον ἴχνος ὀρίσας
 ημ[.....].ο μὴ κάμε δῖος ἸΟδυσσεύς
 20 []σας
 εἰ καὶ ἐρ...σ.γ.οισ[.....]·[
 χθιζὸν γὰρ πτολίεθρον ἀμ[
 ἴμερος ὠλεσίπατρις ἔρυκ[ε
 πᾶσα δὲ λωβητῆρι περιζωσ[
 25 ἐλπωρῆ δεδόνητο γαληναίω[
 καὶ τις ἀγνηορέων αἰζηιὸς ε[
 θαρσαλέ[ως] σώζων· φονίη δ' οἰστῆρ[ήλατος ὀρμῆ
 ἐμφύλ[ο]υ στονόεσσαν ἐδύσατο λ[ύ]σσαν αὐτης
 εἰρήνης ἀδίδακτον ὀμήλικα λάε[σι βάλλων.
 30 οὐ μὲν λᾶας ἔπαλλεν ἐθήμον[ας ἀλλὰ
 δῆμου ξεῖνον ἄθυρμα φονο[κτόνον
 μ[.]σ[.]ρα[.]ν ἀμάθυνεν ἀχειρ[
 [.....]χατ[
 [.....]·σ·[

Folio 29788B, verso.

1]ε δίκης κοσμήτορι[
 σ]αόφροσι Κῶς τε[
]τόσσον φίλος ὄσσο[ν
]ὄσσον Διὶ Φοῖβος[
 5]ωσι τὰ γ..ερο[
]γε[..]νω[

About seven lines missing.

αμ[
 παγ[].[
 μεσ[]..[

Folio 29788C, recto.

- 1 .]οιο[
 .]όσσα[

- 5 ..].ρε[
 σοῖ γὰρ[
 αὐτοκασ[ιγνητ
 διογενή[ς
 ἐς πυμάτην πιπ[.....]....[
 πᾶσι μὲν εὐνομιῆς ἀν[ύ]σας ἕαρ ε[
- 10]ιῆς θρέπτειραν ἀτασθαλο[
]θαλάμοιο κατέθλασε[
 Ἔνθα μὲν εὐνήσας ὑπερήνορα[
 ἔνθα δὲ χρυσοχίτωνος ὑπόπτερ[
 αὐχένα γαῦρον ἄρηος Ἄχαιμεν[
- 15 Τοῖος ἐών, βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατε[ρός τ' αἰχμητής,
 [σ]ῆσι σαοφροσύνησι τεῆν παρακάτθ[εο νύμφην
]εων ἐπιδευέα κηδεμονή[ων
 Τοῖγ[.....ἐπι]δήμιον ἴχνος ἐρ<ε>ίσας
 ημ[.....] ὃ μὴ κάμε δῖος Ἄδυσσεύς
- 20 * * * * *
 Εἰ καὶ ἐρ...σ.ν.οις[.....].[
 χθιζὸν γὰρ πτολίεθρον ἀμ[
 ἴμερος ὠλεσίπατρις ἐρ..[
 πᾶσα δὲ λωβητῆρι περιζωσ[θεῖσα
- 25 ἐλπωρῆ δεδόνητο γαληναίῳ [βασιλῆι
 καὶ τις ἀγνηορέων αἰζήιος ε[
 θαρσε.....εζων, φονίη δ' οἰστρ[
 ἐμφύ[λο]υ στονόεσσαν ἐδύσατο [
 εἰρήνης ἀδίδακτον ὀμήλικα λα.[
- 30 Οὐ μὲν λᾶας ἔπαλλεν ἐθήμον[
 δῆμου ξεῖνον ἄθυρμα φονοσ[
 μ[.]σ[.]ρα[.]ν ἀμάθυνεν ἄ χειρ[
]χατ[
]σ[

Folio 29788B, verso.

1]ε δίκης κοσμήτορι[
 σ]αόφροσι Κωστα[ντίνω
]τόσσον φίλος ὄσσο[ν
]ὄσσον Διὶ Φοῖβος [᾿Απόλλων
 5]ωσι ταν..ερο[
]νε[.]νω[


About seven lines missing.

αμ[


παν[


εισ[

Appendix C: Maps of Pamphylia and Western Tracheia
Cilicia Tracheia
Cilicia Pedias
From Mitford (1980).




Pamphylia and Western Tracheia.







Appendix E: Map 1: The Transcaucasus (after Greatrex 1994).



Map 2: The Arabian Peninsula (after Greatrex 1998)



Map 3: Main Sites relevant for Anastasius' relations with the Arabs
 The Persian War
 Anastasius' Eastern Building Programme
 (After Shahîd 1995).



Appendix F.

*The Popes and Patriarchs (491-518).**Rome*

Gelasius	492-496
Anastasius II	496-498
Symmachus	498-514
Hormisdas	514-523

Constantinople

Euphemius	490-496
Macedonius	496-511
Timothy	511-518
John	518-520

Antioch

Palladius	488-498
Flavian	498-512
Severus	512-518

Jerusalem

Sallustius	486-494
Elias	494-516
John	516-528

Alexandria

Athanasius	490-498
John II	498-505
John III	505-516
Dioscorus II	516-518

The Definition of Faith as agreed on at the Council of Chalcedon, 25th October, 451.

Following then the Holy Fathers, we all unanimously teach that Our Lord Jesus Christ is to us one and the same Son, the self-same Perfect in Godhead, the self-same Perfect in Manhood, truly God and truly Man, the self-same of a rational soul and body, consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead, the self-same consubstantial with us according to the manhood, like us in all things, sin apart; before all the ages begotten of the Father as to the Godhead, but in the last days, the self-same for us and for our salvation [born] of the Virgin Theotokos as to the manhood, one and the same Christ, Son and Lord, Only-begotten, made known to us in two Natures, unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the difference of the Natures being in no way removed because of the Union, but rather the properties of each nature being preserved and concurring into one Prosopon and one Hypostasis, not as though he were parted or divided into two Prosopa, but One and the self-same Son and only-begotten God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ, even as from the beginning the prophets have taught concerning him, and as the Lord Jesus Christ Himself hath taught us and as the symbol of the Fathers hath handed down to us¹.

¹ The definition of the Council of Chalcedon, quoted from Frend (1972), pp.1-2.

Anastasius' typos.

Ex epistula Anastasii imperatoris adversus omnes schismaticos qui (quae?) erat post (41) annum concilii Chalcedonensis.

Una est definitio fidei quam accipimus CCCXVIII sanctorum Patrum, qui Nicaeae congregati sunt, ea quae ostendit quia unus est e sancta Trinitate Dominus Noster Jesus Christus Verbum Dei, id quod incarnatum est e sancta et deipara Virgine Maria et inhumanitus est. Illam definitionem habuerunt CL sancti Patres, qui in Constantinopoli congregati sunt propter Sanctum Spiritum. Secundum illam etiam beata synodus (eorum) quae Ephesi congregati sunt et anathematizarunt Nestorium schismaticum et omnes qui secundum ipsum putant et credunt, sicut et epistula quae vocatur Henoticon Zenonis, orthodoxi imperatoris, item et epistula Johannis archiepiscopi Alexandriae ea quae ostendit eodem modo, in qua anathematizat tomum Leonis et qui transgressi sunt illam definitionem et ducas naturas post unionem definiverunt super unum Christum. Nos, sicut accepimus a sanctis Patribus, non dicimus duas naturas, sed unam naturam incarnatum Deum Verbum confitemur, et anathematizamus synodum Chalcedonis, cum ipsa etiam Leonem et Tomum eius et eos qui dicunt Christum duos filios, unum ante tempora et alterum qui in fine temporis. Et (eos) qui dicunt post confessionem unionis duas naturas et duas personas et duas formas et duas proprietates et distinctiones etiam uniuscuiusque naturae opus, reicimus et anathematizamus quia adversus beati Cyrilli duodecim capitula invenitur.

Anathematizamus Paulum Samosatenum et Diodorum et Theodorem et Nestorium et Theodoretum et Ghoutaris (Eutherius?) et Andream et Hibam et Johannem Aegaeum et Barsaumam et Acacium Persam (read Persam et Acacium?), et Apollinarem et Eutychetum et Sabellium et Arium et Eunomium et Macedonium et Manetem et Marcionem et Bardesanem et abominabiles

doctrinas eorum et (eos) qui sicut ipsi credunt, nisi poenitentiam egerint, et omnes sectas quae pugnaverunt et pugnant adversus rectam fidem apostolicae Ecclesiae, et omnes qui non confitentur quia deigenitrix est Maria sancta Virgo, et ex ea incarnatus est et homo factus est immutabiliter et inexplicabili modo is, qui similis et filius est substantiae Dei Patris, et Filius naturae nostrae ipse secundum incarnationem. Et (eum qui) unus est ante incarnationem similiter et post incarnationem, sicut antea diximus, unam naturam incarnati Dei Verbi confitemur, passus est ut homo et suis passionibus abstulit passiones nostras, et mortuus est et morte sua occidit mortem et mansit impassibilis et immortalis ut Deus. Ipse et Patri, qui misit eum, et Sancto Spiritui gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen².

² The first section is taken from *Le sceau de la foi*, ed. K. Ter-Mekerttschian, Eshmiadzin 1914, p.128, and the second section from *Le livre des Lettres*, ed. J. Ismireantz, *Bibl. Sahag-Mesrobianne* 5 (1901), pp.277-278. Both quoted by Moeller (1961), p.242, and n.3, pp.242-243.

Appendix G: *Key Ministers and Officers (491-518)*¹.*Consuls*

491	Olybrius (East).
492	Anastasius I (East); Fl. Rufus (East).
493	Fl. Eusebius (East); (?Faustus) Albinus iunior (West).
494	Fl. Turcius Rufius Apronianus Asterius (West); Fl. Praesidius (West).
495	Fl. Viator (West).
496	Paulus (East).
497	Anastasius I (East).
498	John the Scythian (East); Paulinus (West).
499	John the Hunchback (East).
500	Fl. Patricius (East); Fl. Hypatius (East).
501	Pompeius (East); Fl. Avienus iunior (West).
502	Fl. Probus (East); Rufius Magnus Faustus Avienus iunior (West).
503	Fl. Dexicrates (East); Volusianus (West).
504	Fl. Rufius Petronius Nicomachus Cethegus (West).
505	Sabinianus (East); Fl. Theodorus (West).
506	Fl. Areobindus Dagalaifus Areobindus (East); Fl. Ennodius Messala (West).
507	Anastasius I (East); Venantius (West).
508	Celer (East); Basilius Venantius iunior (West).
509	Fl. Inportunus (West).
510	Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius iunior (West).
511	Fl. Secundinus (East); Fl. Felix (West).
512	Fl. Paulus (East); Moschianus (East).
513	Fl. Taurus Clementinus Armonius Clementinus (East); Fl. Probus (West).
514	Fl. Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator (West).
515	Procopius Anthemius (East); Florentius (West).

¹ The following lists of officials are based on those in the *PLRE* II.1242-1307.

- 516 Fl. Petrus (West).
 517 Fl. Anastasius Paulus Probus Sabinianus Pompeius Anastasius (East); Fl. Agapitus (West).
 518 Fl. Anastasius Paulus Probus Moschianus Probus Magnus (East).

Honorary Consuls

- 497 Apion
 498 John the Paphlagonian
 pre 506 Areobindus
 508 Clovis
 pre 511 Clementinus
 514 John, son of Valeriana

City Prefects of Constantinople

- 491 Julian
 c.492 Secundinus
 500 Helias
 501 Constantinus
 507-512 Plato

Comites Sacrarum Largitionum (East)

- 498 John the Paphlagonian
 ?513 Clementinus

Magistri Officiorum (East)

492-497 Fl. Eusebius
 503-518 Celer

*Magistri Militum (East).**1. Magistri Praesentales**a) magistri peditum; patricii*

492-499 John the Hunchback
 503 Fl. Hypatius
 514-515 John, son of Valeriana

b) magister equitum

500-518 Fl. Patricius

2. Magistri Militum per Orientem

483-498 John the Scythian
 503-504/5 Fl. Areobindus Dagailphus Areobindus
 505-506 Pharesmanes
 ?516-518 Fl. Hypatius

3. Magistri Militum per Illyricum

491/518 John
 499 Aristus
 505 Sabinianus

Praetorian Prefects

491	Matronius
494-496	Hierius
496	Euphemius
498	Polycarp
502-505	Constantine
505-506	Eustathius
510	Leontius
511-512	Zoticus
512-515	Marinus
517	Sergius
undated	Armenius
	Arcadius

Vindices

512/515	Potamon (Alexandria)
513/516	Alexander (Anazarbus)
513/516	Musonius (Anazarbus)
early VI	Dracontius
early VI	Martyrius
513/518	Theodorus (Tripolis)

*Legislation (491-518)*¹.

1. *C.J.* I.2.17 (undated²) Concerning churches and their property.
C.J. I.2.18 (undated) Concerning money assigned to the Great Church for funerals.
2. *C.J.* I.4.17 (undated) Concerning the corn buyer.
C.J. I.4.18 (undated) Concerning soldiers and their *annona*.
C.J. I.4.19 (505) Concerning the *defensor* of the city.
3. *C.J.* I.5.11 (510) Against Manichaeism.
4. *C.J.* I.22.6 (491) Concerning judgement obtained fraudulently by petition.
5. *C.J.* I.29.4 (undated) Concerning the office of the *magister militum*.
6. *C.J.* I.30.3 (492) Concerning the duties of a *quaestor*.
7. *C.J.* I.34.1-3 (undated) Concerning the administration of the *res privata*.
8. *C.J.* I.42.1 (undated) Concerning the duties of the *magister officiorum*.
C.J. I.42.2 (?512) Concerning the duties of tribunes.
9. *C.J.* I.55.11 = *C.J.* I.4.19.
10. *C.J.* II.4.43 (500) Concerning litigation for serfs and slaves.

¹ Laws numbered according to Krueger's edition of the *Codex Justinianus*.

² Not dated by consuls.

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|-----------|---|
| 11. | <i>C.J.</i> II.7.20 | (497) } | |
| | <i>C.J.</i> II.7.21 | (500) } | |
| | <i>C.J.</i> II.7.22 | (505) } | Regulations for the advocates of various judges. |
| | <i>C.J.</i> II.7.23 | (506) } | |
| | <i>C.J.</i> II.7.24 | (517) } | |
| 12. | <i>C.J.</i> III.13.17 | (502) | Concerning jurisdiction for high-ranking or privileged officials. |
| 13. | <i>C.J.</i> IV.29.21 | (517) | Concerning women and their rights of hypothecation. |
| 14. | <i>C.J.</i> IV.35.22 | (506) | Concerning action and counter-action in court cases. |
| 15. | <i>C.J.</i> V.17.9 | (497) | Concerning regulations on divorce. |
| 16. | <i>C.J.</i> V.27.6 | (517) | Concerning children and legitimacy. |
| 17. | <i>C.J.</i> V.30.4 | (498) | Concerning legal guardianship. |
| 18. | <i>C.J.</i> V.62.25 | (499) | Exemption for silentaries in guardianship. |
| 19. | <i>C.J.</i> V.70.5 | (undated) | Concerning guardianship of the insane. |
| 20. | <i>C.J.</i> VI.20.18 | (502) | Concerning the duties of emancipated children. |
| 21. | <i>C.J.</i> VI.21.16 | (496) | Regulations on the wills of soldiers. |
| 22. | <i>C.J.</i> VI.58.11 | (502) | Concerning the rights of emancipated children. |

23. *C.J.* VII.39.4 (491) }
C.J. VII.39.5 (500) } Concerning prescription of forty years.
C.J. VII.39.6 (undated)}
24. *C.J.* VII.51.6 (undated) Concerning the profits and expenses of litigation.
25. *C.J.* VIII.36.4 (501) Concerning litigation.
26. *C.J.* VIII.48.5 (502) Concerning the emancipation of children.
27. *C.J.* VIII.53.32 (496) Concerning the registering of donations.
28. *C.J.* X.16.13 (496) Concerning tributes in grain and in cash.
29. *C.J.* X.19.9 (496)} Concerning the collection of tribute.
C.J. X.19.10 (498)}
30. *C.J.* X.27.1 (491) } Concerning the *coemptio*.
C.J. X.27.2-3 (undated)}
31. *C.J.* X.32.66 (497-499) Concerning *decurions* and their sons.
32. *C.J.* XI.1.1-2 (498) Abolition of the *chrysargyron*.
33. *C.J.* XI.43.11 (undated) Concerning the drawing of water from aqueducts.
34. *C.J.* XI.48.19 (undated) Legislation to tie *coloni* of over thirty years service to their land.
35. *C.J.* XI.62.14 (491) Concerning contracts or leases on imperial land or property.

36. *C.J. XII.1.18* (undated) Concerning the rights of magistrates travelling to Constantinople.
37. *C.J. XII.5.5* (undated) Concerning the rights of imperial chamberlains.
38. *C.J. XII.10.2* (undated) Concerning the counts of the consistory.
39. *C.J. XII.16.5* (497-499) Concerning the privileges of the silentiaries.
40. *C.J. XII.19.11-12* (undated) Concerning the succession of imperial secretaries, and their privileges.
41. *C.J. XII.20.6* (undated) Concerning the conduct of agents employed in the transaction of business.
42. *C.J. XII.35.18* (492) Concerning improved conditions for ordinary soldiers.
43. *C.J. XII.37.16-19* (undated) Concerning the distribution of military subsistence.
44. *C.J. XII.49.12-13* (undated) Concerning the privileges of praetorian tribunes.
45. *C.J. XII.50.23* (undated) Regulations on the use of the public post horses.
46. *C.J. XII.54.5* (undated) Concerning staff officers and generals and their privileges.

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