UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE, 1789-1843

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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T

This thesis deals with the reformulation of Utilitarian psychology in the early nineteenth century, in the years between the publication of Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation in 1789 and J.S. Mill's System of Logic in 1843. It is offered as a contribution to the history of ideas, and is set principally against "the spirit of an age" losing faith in the constancy and universality of human nature; it rests its analyses on the psychological writings of Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill, and aspires to no special acquaintance with the detailed work of these philosophers in other fields - such as philosophy of law, philosophy of politics and ethics. History of ideas has found few exponents and sympathisers in Oxford since G.M. Young, whose aphorism "Atmosphere is more than Creed" gives much of its spirit and preoccupations; and scholars who consider it as something more than the placing of x and y in the zeitgeist, or the tale of who influenced whom, now tend to gather in Cambridge or at Sussex. For this reason I owe the more to the penetrating eye for sophistry and paralogism of Mr Bill Weinstein, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol; to him this thesis is indebted for its few virtues, and to him I am grateful for discussions which have given much pleasure and delight.

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P R E F A C E

Utilitarianism, in the many forms we shall encounter it, is an entirely secular theory, concerned politically and morally to promote the well-being, material comfort and "utility" of man. It ascribes moral worth to actions in proportion to the success of their consequences in promoting utility, though - in the writers considered in this thesis, at least - it comments at length on the moral value of motives also. In its earliest forms (in the work of Thomas Hobbes) it dispenses with Scholastic concepts of man's natural purpose or God-appointed role in the world, and takes as its basic working data men's everyday needs and wants - or, where these are too complex to be universalised, man's "interest". This interest is primarily conceived, and by most Utilitarian thinkers between Hobbes and James Mill singly conceived, as personal happiness; its elements are primarily, though not solely, considered by Utilitarians to be pleasures. Concentration on interest allowed them to posit not only a universalised, but a constant and unchanging, human nature; and from this human nature they deduced a moral and political theory for mankind, independent of time and place, which was equally, if not more, "natural" than the prescriptions of natural law and natural right.

The satisfaction of wants - in the first instance those implanted by nature, in the second those arising from man's predicament of perpetual conflict for goods in short supply - was believed by all

Utilitarians to be the principal reason explaining man's movement from inertia to perform actions.[1] Want satisfied brought with it pleasure and relief from pain, but more importantly the preservation of the species;[2] in Hobbes's work pleasure, evidenced in the stimulus to vital motion around the heart, was said to be biologically essential to self-preservation.[3] Presented as a "state of nature" argument, this analysis of the original purpose of human action held intermittent attraction for the Utilitarian tradition, notably for Hobbes and James Mill, as a demonstration to governments of the original purpose of their subjects in establishing them.[4] More ordinarily, however, the Utilitarians conceived their political function as supplying an analysis of human intentions, motives and wants to governments, together with recommendations on what governments ought to do (as opposed to what they were originally intended to do). Wants, however, proved so varied even within small communities that no conceptual distillation could be supplied, even by the most energetic inductivist; hence the Utilitarian emphasis on interests, which remained relatively permanent and constant from country to country.

The period of Utilitarian thinking considered in this thesis, however, is an era when the explanation of behaviour by the assumption of an immemorial interest in personal happiness came under increasing attack, from Scots, Germans, Whigs and eventually (in the 1830's) from within the "movement" itself. The hostile armies had in common a fresh understanding of history, in which differences in behaviour between countries and periods of history could no longer be reduced to customary variations on man's permanent and universal interest in personal happiness, but flowed from fundamental differences in "spirit" which could not be simplified or classified for legislators and

moralists. German philosophers of history from Herder onwards approached the laws, institutions and ethics of alien cultures, however barbaric, with respect, and treated "every man.. ultimately (as) a world, in external appearance indeed similar to others, but internally an individual being, with whom no other coincides,"[5] rather than as a primitive and inefficient striver towards utility and happiness. It followed, therefore, that moral and political theory must bend itself to every individual variety of human nature, and not prescribe general rules to promote man's universal interests. J.S. Mill, John Sterling, John Austin and George Grote who read and were persuaded by the Germans in the 1820's and 1830's learned also that unfamiliar behaviour could no longer be judged against absolute standards, whether those standards constituted the judgment of God or the humbler judgment of utility; and that whatever laws, morals, institutions and ceremonies reflected the spirit of a country or an age were "right". The prescriptions of Enlightened philosophers, therefore, could hold good only for countries sufficiently Enlightened to accept them; and the entry of the "historical view" into the mind of J.S. Mill entailed that instant reform, in absolute conformity with universal interest and the dictates of utility, could no longer be validly forced onto the backward and unready.

The shift within Utilitarianism from the absolute to the relative mode of thinking can be seen clearly in two books whose dates of publication mark off the period we are studying: Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) and J.S. Mill's System of Logic (1843).

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This thesis takes as its subject the abandonment of belief in universal principles of human nature at the turn of the nineteenth century, as revealed in the social and political thinking of the English Utilitarians. It is offered as a contribution to intellectual history; the author is a historian and political theorist, and his reasonings in epistemology and philosophy of mind and action do not aspire to formal work in these disciplines, though they are originally founded on unpublished MSS in the case of Bentham and on anonymous periodical writing in the case of James Mill.

It has three specific objectives:

(a) to examine the transformation of Utilitarian thinking about human nature and the grounds of human action, in the work of Bentham, James Mill and early John Stuart Mill;

(b) to ask how conscious the Utilitarians really were that history is an evolutionary process and that man's nature has evolved and changed with it;

(c) to enquire into the justice of J.S. Mill's charge that his father and Bentham were not genuine inductivists; that they were unaware that humanity displays a progress which requires different moral and political procedures for different stages of development; and that they conceived their function as political theorists as producing model institutions for a model man.

We shall also try to show that Bentham's early writings provide a careful analysis of the meaning of "pleasure" and a highly subtle attempt to make sense of the received wisdom that this is the end of human action - though his work as a whole falls into the ancien regime of political philosophy, resting its prescriptions on static assumptions

about human nature. His manuscripts remain still largely unpublished and in a worse state of disarray than those of any other major English philosopher; yet when Boxes 27, 70a and 96 of the University College, London collection finally see the light of day (and these the very minimum), they are likely to prove among the most important sources for Bentham's moral and political thinking that the scholar will consult.

It is, however, in the light of J.S. Mill's objections to Bentham's understanding of human nature that this thesis is largely written. In place of Bentham's "slender" conception of human nature and life,[6] the human character as displayed by J.S. Mill has acquired a whole new range of feelings, - artistic, musical and intellectual; for the ends of man as posited by Bentham and James Mill had "ceased to charm" and revealed "ignorance of the deeper springs" of human nature.[7] What he had learned from the mistakes of Bentham and his father, Mill wrote, was that in politics

> the true system was something much more complex and many-sided than I had previously had any idea of, and that its office was to supply, not a set of model institutions, but principles from which the institutions suitable to any given circumstances might be deduced...
>
> that the human mind has a certain order of possible progress, in which some things must precede others, an order which governments.. can modify to some, but not to an unlimited extent: that all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different stages of human progress not only <u>will</u> have, but <u>ought</u> to have, different institutions...
>
> that any general theory or philosophy of politics supposes a previous theory of human progress, and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of history... [8]

and that in the moral part of man's nature, Bentham overlooks

> the desire of perfection, or the feeling of an approving or an accusing conscience... he but faintly recognises, as a fact in human nature, the pursuit of any other ideal end for its own sake... Man, that very complex being, is a very simple one in his eyes. [9]

Their simplistic approach to human nature, from which they deduced the science of government, had created a host of unnecessary problems for the cause of Progress and Reform, Mill held.[10] They equally failed to understand, in their conviction that want for pleasure and happiness was the main human interest, how men could cling to creeds and institutions whose raison d'etre lay deep in history and which no longer served any discernible purpose. "What struggles... might have been spared if the philosophers of the eighteenth century had done anything like justice to the Past", he sighed.[11]

It used to be held that Darwin and evolutionary theory in the mid-century were responsible for bringing the "historical view" into nineteenth century England and for forcing the decline and death of the universal principles of human nature onto the Utilitarian tradition. Modern historians are not guilty of such blindness, but in recognising the many influences at work on the Utilitarian mind in the early nineteenth century they haye perpetuated a new thesis and a different kind of error. Professors Mack and Baumgardt, authors of the most substantial works on Bentham in the last twenty years, have argued that Bentham was not only "aware" of the historical insights into human nature that his age discovered but incorporated them in several subtle ways into his writings. It follows, therefore, that the crime of which he was accused by J.S. Mill and mid-nineteenth century legal and political theorists - that of adhering to constant and universal principles in explaining human nature - is a crime of which he was not guilty at all. This question is fundamental to our argument; for, as Dr Burrow says, "if Professor Baumgardt and Mrs Mack were correct, the evolutionists of the latter half of the last

century who thought they were in revolt against 'Benthamism' would have been deceiving themselves";[12] and one may add that the field of misapprehension would include every major commentator on Bentham since his death. In this thesis, we shall ask more narrowly how far J.S. Mill and the Utilitarians who seceded from the movement in the 1830's were deceived; and whether examples of the dynamic and historical as opposed to static mode of thinking are genuinely to be found in Bentham and James Mill. Were they in any sense conscious of the modifications imposed by a relativist view of history on the possibility of eternally valid political prescriptions?

The thesis proceeds chronologically, examining in Chapter 1 the social, philosophical and historiographical background to Bentham's writing and in Chapter 2 the importance of "human nature" as a concept to Utilitarians and empiricists, before turning to Bentham, James Mill and the early writing of J.S. Mill in Chapters 3 to 5. We must first distinguish the pool of assumptions on which Bentham drew.

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F O O T N O T E S

1. Hobbes: "And in animal motion this [want-satisfaction] is the very first endeavour, and found even in the embryo; which while it is in the womb, moveth its limbs with voluntary motion, for the avoiding of whatsoever troubleth it and for pursuing of what pleaseth it".
English Works (ed. Molesworth, 1838) I.407

Locke, asking what moves desire, responds: "Happiness, and that alone". This is true, he says, as a habit dating from "the natural womb". Essay on the Human Understanding II.xxi.45

Helvetius: "Let us suppose that Heaven suddenly animates several men; their first employment will be to satisfy their wants, and soon after they will endeavour, by their cries, to express the impressions they receive from pleasure and pain."
De L'Esprit (tr. Mudford, 1807) p.251

Bentham rejects state-of-nature argumemts in his earliest published work, the Fragment (1771); but he accepts the conclusion of Helvetius' argument (though not its process) that pleasure-seeking and want-satisfaction are original and natural activities for man, when claiming that constant desire for pleasure is essential to self-preservation (Works, ed. Bowring, 1838) IX.6

2. Bentham, Works IX.6

3. Pleasure and pain for Hobbes are feelings which powerfully affect the heart, "the prime mover in the body of man". They proceed "not from the reaction of the heart outwards, but from continual action toward the heart. For the original of life being in the heart, that motion in the sentient, which is propagated to the heart, must necessarily make some alteration or division of vital motion, namely, by quickening or slackening, helping or hindering the same. Now when it helpeth, it is pleasure; and when it hindereth, it is pain, trouble, grief, etc."
quoted in J.W.N. Watkins, Hobbes's System of Ideas (1965) p.110

4. See especially the Leviathan, Ch.14 and Ch.26, section 4; and in Mill, Essay on Government Chs.1 and 2, and "Clarkson's Life of Penn", Philanthropist IV (1814) pp.206-209

5. Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of History of Mankind (tr. Churchill, 1800, ed. F.E. Manuel, Chicago 1968) VII.1, p.4

6. J.S. Mill, "Bentham", in Essays on Politics and Culture (ed. Himmelfarb, New York 1963) p.95

7. Autobiography (ed. Lerner, NY 1961) p.13; "Bentham", loc.cit. p.117

8. Autobiography, pp.98-99

9. "Bentham", loc.cit. p.98

10. "Coleridge", in Essays on Politics and Culture (NY 1963) p.142

11. ibid. p.142

12. J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society (Cambridge, 1966) p.33

A N A L Y S I S O F C H A P T E R O N E

1. 1825-40, Germano-Coleridgeanism forced the Utilitarians to rethink human nature at the same time that the Philosophic Radicals were forced out of politics. 2. Fundamental purposes of philosophising (utility & well-being) were not however abandoned; 3. J.S. Mill instead came to terms with the "historical view" of human nature preached by the Germans.

4. Constant and universal principles of human nature were undisputed in the eighteenth century. 4-5. They were obtained by induction or introspection, and 6. were statements of universal similarities in motivation. 7. All human history and behaviour seemed to show man's nature, in his every action - choosing his own interest and pleasure before other things. 8. Historians also typically analysed history by motives; 9. they showed also that human nature was also timelessly as well as universally the same. 10. Selfishness was the prime factor in historical explanation, and 11. societies were explained mechanically, as balances between interests which periodically were upset. 12. History was for the eighteenth century the empirical part of moral philosophy, showing universal human nature in behaviour.

13. German philosophy of history argued in contrast that human nature varied according to the spirit of an age and country. 14. The singular conversion of J.S. Mill to German historical thinking was sufficient to alter the entire course of Utilitarian beliefs in psychology. 15. Few other Englishmen, before or after 1830, knew the Germans well; and 16. James Mill and Bentham, occupied with practical affairs, were uninterested in and unaffected by what they had to say.

18. England, although acquiring an industrial face, was beneath it more socially divided in 1840 than in 1780; the divisions were increased 19. by the masses' conviction that they were getting poorer. 20-21. Crime and rebellion were savagely punished by corrupt judges and chaotic common law; 22. and from a "passionate desire" for the reform of the law Bentham turned to philosophy and the Philosophic Radicals to politics. 23. Despite the German victory over Utilitarian theories of human nature, 24. Utilitarianism lived on as the theory of tutelary law, ending ancient concepts of the law of vengeance and transforming 25. the nineteenth century statute book into a programme of social reform. 26. It inspired some of England's most radical changes in local administration, as well as enjoying offshoots in political economy, ethics and education. 27. In Asquith's phrase, it was "the philosophy in office" in Victorian England, enjoying practical successes independent of its transformation as a psychological theory.

C H A P T E R O N E

T H E S P I R I T O F T H E A G E

> One thing in particular struck me in.. Wilhelm Meister.. It was the thing all the world was in error in. No man has the right to ask for a recipe of happiness: he can do without happiness. There is something better than that.
> (Carlyle) [1]

> Few, if any, of our writings have originated in an abstract love of investigation: our greatest and some immortal works have arisen in the exigencies of the times... A German writes because he has something to say; an Englishman only because it is, or he thinks it is, needed.
> (Pusey) [2]

Thus spoke one major, one minor voice of the opposition in the 1830's to "the philosophy in office", as Asquith called Utilitarianism nearly a century later.[3] Carlyle's preaching, the propagation by Coleridge of a world of understanding as well as reason, and their combined pioneering of German historismus in England were responsible between 1825 and 1840 for shifting the foundations of Utilitarian thinking; the process began with the conquest of the London Debating Society from the Benthamites in 1825-27 and continued by forcing leading Utilitarians such as J.S. Mill, Sterling, George Grote and Austin to reconsider their doctrines. The public influence of the Utilitarians also declined as first the "school" gathered by James Mill for Bentham in the 1820's withered away - men like Ricardo, Hume, Francis Place, J.R. McCulloch, Thomas Tooke among the older, John Grote, Prescott, Eyton Tooke, George Graham and William Ellis among the younger; then the Philosophic Radicals were dismissed from the Commons from 1835 onwards, many of them drifting (with absolute consistency) into championing the comforts of the newly enfranchised middle class in

the 1840's rather than the causes of the dispossessed. In 1851 only Roebuck of the former Philosophic Radical rump remained in the House, member for Bath, fiery and unbowed.

The "Germano-Coleridgeans" succeeded, however, only in the shifting of foundations: they did not destroy the philosophic tradition existing in England since Bacon which insisted on human well-being as the final purpose of ratiocination, and which received contemporary nourishment not only from Utilitarians but from Whigs and Liberals, and a curious form of support in the attitude of an evangelical Church of England to theology.[4] William Empson felt able to describe J.S. Mill in the Edinburgh Review in 1843 as "a converted Utilitarian who is studying German",[5] but Mill yielded nothing to German conceptions of duty and obligation as the grounds of moral behaviour. In an 1832 letter to Carlyle he defended the younger Utilitarians against the charge that on a European scale, they were "the mournfullest figures":

> On the whole there are scarcely any left of the old narrow school of utilitarians; what now distinguishes those who were so... is that they are decidedly less narrow than almost any other persons who aspire to the character of thinkers in this country. The character of the school if such it could be termed, was to see clearly what they did see, though it was but little. This quality I have hopes that they will retain, as their views expand... None, however, has become so unlike what he once was as I myself, who originally was the narrowest of them all... Fortunately, however, I was not crammed; my own thinking faculties were called into strong though but partial play; and by their means I have been enabled to remake all my opinions. [6]

"Remaking his opinions" was precisely J.S. Mill's enterprise in the 1830's. What had been swept away in the onrush of German historical thinking into England was the bedrock of Utilitarian social and political theory in the eighteenth century, the universal

principles of human nature. Herder, the Schlegels and Niebuhr among others argued primarily and consistently that all ages embody a differing character and "spirit", which forms the individual natures of its peoples as well as national beliefs, institutions and laws, and that no fixed character or nature attaches to man universally or temporally. Hume, in the old style, had written, "mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular",[7] and added: "from observing the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity".[8] Where the Germans concluded that the subject-matter of social science - human behaviour, both contemporary and historical, social and personal - was too vast and shifting for induction to be applicable, Hume was merely one of a generation of philosophers and historians bent on Newtonising social phenomena by reducing them to laws, and anxious to rewrite history as the laws of human motion at work. Mill did not abandon the traditional Utilitarian belief that behaviour can yield axioms from which sciences could be concretely deduced, nor the first Utilitarian principle that men desire happiness from all actions (though he widened his understanding of happiness); but he no longer believed that these axioms should attribute universal and timeless qualities to men as individuals, arguing rather that the laws of behaviour should be social and should relate to the successive changes in the state of society, rather than to a human nature presumed to be static. We shall examine his response to German philosophy of history in Chapter 5.

a) The Universal Principles of Human Nature

Forty years earlier, Bentham wrote in an intellectual milieu which still regarded as axiomatic the proposition that human nature is uniform and constant, an entity whose qualities can be revealed by induction. Thus Hume had set out in the Treatise of Human Nature to "introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects", and Hartley to imitate in mental philosophy "the method of analysis and synthesis recommended and followed by Sir Isaac Newton".[9] Problems which caused great subsequent difficulty are overcome by Hume with seeming casualness:

> Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education, which mould the human mind from its infancy, and form it into a fixed and established character.[10]

The cliches of an age are often most clearly stated in its cliched writers, however, rather than in those who develop and rear complex conceptual structures upon them. Few more apposite accounts of the mid-eighteenth century procedure in inducing the science of man can be found than in Abraham Tucker's preamble to The Light of Nature Pursued, explaining further how moral and social discoveries are based on the observed principles of human nature:

> In natural philosophy the experimental method is now universally preferred before the hypothetic, as the surer and more effectual:the like method may be practised in morality, with this only difference, that here is no occasion to make experiments on purpose; for every thing we see, or hear, or feel, or do in our ordinary converse and common occurrences of life, are so many experiments whereon to build our conclusions. From hence we may best discover our own nature, as we can best discover the nature of bodies from their operation; and by diligently observing what we do, how we come to act in such or such manner, together with the consequences and effects of our actions, we shall be likely to lay the surest measures for our conduct and attain the clearest knowledge of what we ought to do.

Bacon, of course, had written at length endorsing the validity of arguing from historical example, for "knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again";[11] but Tucker, like most eighteenth century inductivists, has moved on from Bacon to Newton. It was J.S. Mill, freshly conscious of the evidence of history, who ended one hundred years of Utilitarian introspection by claiming the method "disqualified".[12] Tucker, meanwhile, shows why concepts of justice and goodness can only properly be established on concepts of human nature:

> Some have supposed with Plato that moral and other qualities have an existence of their own, distinct from that of the substances whereto they belong; that they may be clearly apprehended independently of the subject possessing them; that they are eternal and immutable, whereas all other things fluctuate and vary, changing their forms perpetually... It is enough to observe, that whatever independent existence may belong to qualities, we can only come to the knowledge of them by the substances wherein they inhere: nature exhibits nothing abstracted to our view, the abstract must be learned from the concrete... We could not have known what justice or goodness were, had we not seen the actions of men and observed how their sentiments influence their behaviour....
>
> From these sources therefore we must fetch our materials, and when we have gotten competent store of them, I am so far from being an enemy to abstract reasonings, that I shall pursue them as far as can be desired, keeping an eye all along upon use, and correcting my theory from time to time by a reference to facts... But the knowledge of religion and morality arises from the knowledge of ourselves: at least in my own private meditations I have always found, that whenever I have endeavoured to trace them to their first principles, they have led me to consider the nature of the mind. This then we may look upon as the groundwork and foundation... while this is doing we work underground: you see we are very busy, but to what purpose is not so readily visible: nothing appears useful, nothing convenient, nothing serviceable for the purposes of life. Have but patience till we come above ground, and then perhaps you will see a plan arising that promises something habitable and commodious... [13]

This, stated in Tucker's country language, is exactly the position on knowledge, method and origin of morality and political science

from which Bentham starts: but it is an exposition of first principles which Bentham leaves unsaid, even in earliest manuscripts. It is from other sources that his assumptions are to be gathered.

Although men were held by Hume to be universally "nearly equal... in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education",[14] it was on the perception of resemblances in motivation that the universal principles were chiefly grounded. "It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and in all ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: the same events follow from the same causes," Hume declared,[15] and noted that these universal motives were: "Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed throughout society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been observed among mankind".[16] Hobbes had grounded universal motivation on the lust for power; Bentham and James Mill held that men had pleasure and happiness respectively in constant view. Hume's conclusions about motivation, it will be noticed, rest explicitly on observation rather than on introspection; other philosophers, including Bentham and James Mill as well as Tucker, were not so scrupulous,[17] and Bentham was forthrightly attacked by J.S. Mill for "his determination to create a philosophy wholly out of materials furnished by his own mind", a mind which was somewhat incomplete as "a representative of universal human nature", Mill added.[18]

Hume is equally emphatic that the universal principles are

formed by, as well as known from, experience. Among the ingredients of "experience", the influence of education is confined merely to equipping men with opinions - "I am persuaded... we shall find more than one half of those opinions that prevail among mankind to be owing to education;"[19] while environment determines which passions are unleashed and which come to the fore in given periods (the philosophers of the Enlightenment were specially proud of the tendency to altruism and sympathy displayed in their civil and generous age, and studied its origins in depth).[20] Human experience can, however, be understood as something other than the sum result of education and environment upon the mind. For behaviourist philosophy, a man's experience may be viewed equally as the history of a million voluntary actions and their consequences, the history of a million choices between alternatives posed by circumstances, of one path chosen and followed rather than another. Although the alternatives between which men choose may be as infinite as their perceptions, to the analytic temper of the eighteenth century acts of choice appeared repeatedly to pose the same psychological dilemmas - to act for pleasure or pain, for self-interest or altruism; and from men's characteristic responses to these dilemmas the universal principles of human nature were abstracted, and characteristically were stated as propositions about universal motives. Thus Bentham wrote:

> My notion of man is, that, successfully or unsuccessfully, he aims at happiness, and so will continue to aim as long as he continues to be man, in everything he does, [21]

while Hume's list of universal motives was, as we have seen, more ample.[22] What we are here emphasising is that the universal principles of human nature of Hume and Bentham are not an abstraction of man's standing, definitive characteristics of man qua man - his rationality,

for example, or bipedality - but abstractions of his contingent qualities, inductions from habits and tendencies in action and motivation formed in daily experience, and not tautologous extensions of principles forming the definition of man.

Demonstrating universal motivation was considered equally the business of the historian in eighteenth century England as of the philosopher. The baldest statement of the historian's functions came from Hume:

> (History's) chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by shewing men in all variety of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions and revolutions are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science; in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments, which he forms concerning them... [23]

The tendency to view man analytically rather than historically, abstractly rather than empirically, never deserted eighteenth century historians, who yeered habitually towards treating him as a rational being in a static society rather than an organic being in a developing society. Even Montesquieu contrived to explain away the vast variety of customary differences he unearthed as merely the effects of geographical environment on constant human nature.

It was historians who showed the age that human nature was not only a constant in terms of place, a factor which confusingly made Englishmen and the savages they abused essentially alike, but also a constant in time. "Would you know the sentiments, inclinations and course of life of the GREEKS and the ROMANS?" Hume asked. "Study

well the temper and actions of the FRENCH and the ENGLISH: You cannot be mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations, which you have made with regard to the latter".[24] History was written in the eighteenth century as a tale in which the motives of all its actors were constant, and in which their response to standard psychological dilemmas at critical moments determined the subsequent fortunes of armies, peoples and continents. This approach permitted Gibbon and his imitators to adopt their characteristic air of lofty judgment, to write freely of statesmen and leaders in terms of strength and weakness, and to adopt a pervasively didactic tone. The fireside digester of Gibbon's morals recognised that Roman politicians and generals confronted the same psychological choices, the same conflicts of interest as those familiar to his own generation; the correctness or error of their response to these situations provided examples of immediate relevance to his own behaviour, for he shared with men of ancient civilisations the same essential nature, the same limitations and shortcomings. Hence the historians of the age set out to teach lessons. "To write history, without drawing moral or political rules of conduct from it is little better than writing a romance," opined Dalrymple, author of the Annals of Scotland.[25] Progress was therefore mental progress in the first instance; the Enlightenment, for example, showed the human mind learning to think and act in new ways, improving its rational efficiency rather than changing its nature. Hume, Gibbon and Voltaire approached the past as a storehouse of warning, of examples of the actions of unenlightened and irrational men. "If the aspect of some periods seem horrid and deformed," Hume wrote in the History of England, "we may thence learn to cherish with the greater anxiety that science and civility which have so close a

connection with virtue and humanity, and which, as it is a sovereign remedy against superstition, is also the most effective remedy against vice and disorder of every kind".[26]

It was the opinion of Friedrich Schlegel, one of the fiercest opponents of interest-philosophy among German philosophers of history, that the universal principles of human nature had rooted themselves more deeply in eighteenth century history than in philosophy, where they could operate surreptitiously, disguised by events:

> In no other department of human knowledge was the philosophy of the last century able to establish its influence, or root itself so deeply and so extensively, as in history, in which false motives are likely to be less apparent to the reader who does not examine for himself, than when they openly court attention in the shape of philosophic doctrines and opinions.[27]

The false motives were, of course, the universal ascription of historical behaviour to selfishness, to desire of personal interest and advantage, and to the pursuit of individual pleasure and happiness as a final purpose. Sceptical of history written as "social experience", eighteenth century historians were always inclined to stress the exploits of individuals (kings, statesmen, generals) as their central and dialectical facts, on which the fortunes of peoples and generations hung, as these were more readily susceptible of analysis in terms of interests. No rationalist historian conceived himself as setting out to explain the consciousness of past generations; history was confined to factual report, to the limited regions in which material progress was visible, and to the demonstration of motive. Emphasis on individuals also strengthened the Utilitarian illusion that the individual reformer, preaching reason, could as much as any Cromwell advance societies by his unaided efforts from barbarism to the laws and institutions of utility - especially societies where

only the interests of a monarch or an oligarchy, as opposed to the mass resistance of a people, stood in the way of progress.

Societies whose lives and fortunes were shaped by the acquisitive interests of leading individuals - as Bentham regarded England - were understood historically and philosophically in mechanistic terms, as "machines" whose constituent parts were in perpetual tension. Men, universally interested in personal happiness and yet universally and perpetually in competition, were on the mechanical view weights to be dropped in the scales of the balance of power, or cogs and wheels in friction against each other or pulleys and sinkers in varying tensions within the frame; though however regarded, they are elements whose nature is unchanging. Given such human ingredients, rationalist historians concentrated on the "external events" of history rather than on its idea, and this meant ultimately an excess of attention being paid to the dramatic events of history; Coleridge complained that Gibbon reduced history to a collection of anecdotes. Julius Hare objected from Cambridge in 1829,

> I hardly know in what historian you will find more than a register of dates and a bulletin of facts... Indeed, many histories give you little else than a narrative of military affairs, marches and counter-marches, skirmishes and battles: which, except during some great crisis of a truly national war, affords about as complete a picture of a nation's life, as an account of the... surgical operations (a man) may have undergone, would of the life of an individual. [28]

Hare's marches and counter-marches, skirmishes and battles, are the mechanistic counterparts of Utilitarian science of government transferred to history. Conflicts occur when the balance of powers and interests within the social machine is upset; crises and revolutions in history are "extrinsic", the consequence of disequilibrium in the machinery of civil society, when formerly subordinate groups acquire

new weight and influence. The remedies, in turn, appear in eighteenth century history as largely institutional and mechanical - the creation of new hierarchies, the reforming of representative institutions, the correcting of the balance of power in a community by the concession of privileges sufficient to rebalance the scales. Rapin, the most celebrated Whig historian of the age, whose History of England was staple reading for Whigs and Tories and was described by Voltaire as "the nearest to a perfect history in all Europe", wrote the history of the Civil War and, indeed, the whole of post Magna Carta English history, as a perpetual tension between the entrenched supporters of the constitution and those left outside in the cold (be they barons, puritans or landed gentry). The mechanistic approach was as influentual in social and political philosophy as in history, breeding in Bentham among others a political theorist whose reforms are conceived entirely in the language of "checks and balances".

History was credited, therefore, as the empirical part of moral philosophy, though the debate between James Mill and Macaulay in the 1820's makes clear that the eighteenth century failed to demonstrate conclusively by what kind of systematic study moral philosophy could be produced.[29] Preoccupied with psychology and the universal principles of human nature, philosophers largely lost interest in historical theory. Bolingbroke was an isolated voice in the mid-century:

> He who studies History as he studied Philosophy will soon distinguish and collect them, and by so doing he will soon form to himself a general system of Ethicks and Politicks on the surest foundations, on the trial of those principles and rules in all ages, and on the confirmation of them by universal experience.[30]

The opposing German conception of man claimed self-preservation rather than pleasure to be "the first object of every existing being... in obedience to this law, .. from his infancy, without knowing why or wherefore, (man) strives to exercise his powers, to be in motion".[31] This is Herder; but it was the notion he pioneered of man as a complex, many-sided being, distinctively moulded by his environment and by the spirit of his age, which was to undermine the conviction of sensitive Utilitarians in the 1820's in universal principles of human nature. Nothing in rationalist history approximates to Herder's account of the uniqueness and individuality of men:

> Every man has a particular proportion, a particular harmony as it were, between all his sensitive feelings; so that, in extraordinary cases, the most wonderful appearances frequently occur, to show the state of an individual on this or that occasion...
>
> As man is the most artfully complicated of all creatures, so great a variety of genetic character occurs in no other... In him the varying currents of thoughts and desires flow into each other, in a manner peculiar to himself. Thus man, from his very nature, will clash but little in his pursuits with man; his dispositions, sensations, and propensities, being so infinitely diversified, and as it were individualized. What is a matter of indifference to one man, to another is an object of desire: and then each has a world of enjoyment in himself, each a creation of his own. [32]

The concept of man as a being whose nature is individual and irreducible and not universal made itself known in England through Wolf's Prolegomena to Homer (1796), eagerly devoured by philologists, Niebuhr's Römische Geschichte (1812) and Ranke, rather than through Herder or Kant (whom Coleridge failed to understand on a visit to Konigsberg in 1799). Although it was presented in the context of a remodelling of rationalist history,[33] its impact on Utilitarian philosophy was equally great. The influence of German historians over J.S. Mill was the greater because their procedures were as

rigidly inductive as those of Hume or Millar, or any of the Scottish historians he read in youth; but through widening the field of investigation to include moral and religious behaviour, and much custom and ceremonial which rationalists had shrugged off as undifferentiated barbarism, the Germans and their Coleridgean followers in England were "the first," in Mill's view, "who inquired systematically into the inductive laws of the existence and growth of human society".[34] As for "the philosophers of the eighteenth century",

> their mistake was that they did not acknowledge the historical value of much which had ceased to be useful, nor saw that institutions and creeds, now effete, had rendered essential services to civilisation, and still filled a place in the human mind, and in the arrangements of society, which could not without the utmost peril be left vacant.[35]

German philosophy of history won little more than a handful of converts in England throughout the nineteenth century; but in reshaping the beliefs of J.S. Mill about human nature (which we shall examine in Chapter 5) it was responsible, more than Comte, d'Eichtal or St-Simon, for forcing the Utilitarian tradition to reconsider the psychological foundations of the science of government. It won converts in Sterling, who abandoned Utilitarianism altogether at the instigation of Hare of Trinity College, Cambridge, George Grote and Austin; but Grote proved uninfluential as a propagandist for Niebuhr and Austin's best work lay behind him when he visited Göttingen in 1835, returning from Eichorn's classes to profess what J.S. Mill called "great disrespect for the universal principles of human nature".[36] Before 1830, knowledge of German historiography was minimal: Arnold estimated in 1822 that fewer than six people in

England had read Niebuhr, and Pusey records that in the same year only two people at Oxford could read German ("one of them a Mr Mill of Magdalen College" - not John Stuart).[37] Although the Weimar group of personal friends - Goethe, Schiller, Herder and Wieland - were known in Edinburgh, the air of a small club of devotees is easily gained from the correspondence of Crabb Robinson, "le Germaniste le plus compétent en Angleterre" according to Prof. Carré, which abounds in remarks such as "there is no doubt that Coleridge's mind is much more German than English".[38] After 1830, and the forceful propaganda of Carlyle and Coleridge, the Weimar group became better known, though the influence of German philosophy was chiefly confined to the Oxford Movement and English idealism. W.E. Houghton's list of Coleridge, Carlyle, De Quincey, William Taylor, Sterling, G.H. Lewes and Hare as the authorities on German literature and philosophy "until well along in the century" seems virtually complete, though one might add at Oxford the Arnolds, Clough and Froude, and at Cambridge Thirlwall, Whewell and C.C.J. von Bunsen. Morley later noted in his Recollections: "Carlyle and others had given a certain vogue to the great names of Goethe, Schiller, Ranke, Niebuhr, but their effect on general opinion was not effective (sic), and even so late as 1854 serious men spoke of Goethe's work in England as at an end".[39] It was the unique German conquest of J.S. Mill which proved decisive for Utilitarianism.

In contrast to the general uninterest in German philosophy, Pusey was fearful for English theology of the reinterpretation of history and myth which he encountered during his years at Göttingen in the 1820's, studying under the great theologian Eichorn. "I can remember," he told Liddon in May 1878, "the room in Göttingen

in which I was sitting when the real condition of religious thought in Germany flashed upon me. I said to myself, 'This will all come upon us in England; and how utterly unprepared for it we are!'".[40]

The same emotion was not felt in the breasts of Bentham and James Mill, who were busy addressing their studies of morals and legislation not to theologians or academics, but to the field of practical abuses. There is no evidence that either Bentham or James Mill, in the last years of their lives, came even remotely to understand the challenge to the foundations of their thought which German philosophy of history represented. Friedrich von Raumer, a visitor who met the Philosophic Radicals through his friendship with Sarah Austin, records the German estimate of Bentham with a weary note on the latter's contempt for Aristotelians.[41] Both Bentham and James Mill were, intellectually and practically, fighting different battles. J.S. Mill perceived this clearly: Bentham's peculiar province, he wrote, was "to carry the warfare against absurdity into things practical. His was an essentially practical mind. It was by practical abuses that his mind was first turned to speculation - by the abuses of the profession which was chosen for him, that of the law".[42] In his subservience of philosophic to practical ends Bentham stands solidly in the tradition of the eighteenth century, for which politics was not so much a special branch of thinking as the very focus of intellectual activity. Rousseau, confessing that an Institutions Politiques had been intended as the crown of his achievements, gave the reason why:

> I had come to see that everything was radically connected with politics, and that, however one proceeded, no people would be other than the nature of its government made it.[43]

It is a thought which finds many echoes in Bentham. His excursions into epistemology, theory of volition, philosophy of law, ethics and philosophy of education (besides many essays in economics and theory of punishment) are all subservient to the aim of maximising man's happiness - an objective which depends in turn on the reform of governments and the elimination of abuse. It is the social and legal background of Bentham's thought that we shall next examine.

b) The Social and Political Background to Bentham's Thought

Periods of history rich in event and social conflict are open to many interpretations, and early nineteenth century England is no exception to this rule. Anyone who leaves through the pages of the Tory Quarterly, the Whig Edinburgh and the Radical Westminster will find in them three different Englands, bearing no seeming relation to each other. Paradoxically, all three reviews were convinced that England was daily becoming more homogeneous, as the Industrial Revolution stamped out local cultures and the demands of commerce sucked the masses out of an increasingly idealised countryside into stupefying cities, inducing change, upheaval and destruction of traditional life on so great a scale that both poor and rich waited constantly for England to be plunged into the fury of a great levelling revolution.[44] But the facelessness and the seeming sameness of the new urban civilisation were deceiving. England in 1840 was, if anything, more socially divided than sixty years previously, as the relatively homogeneous society of the late eighteenth century, making its living predominantly off the land, splintered into employers and labourers, into skilled and unskilled, into working and middle classes, and as the eighteenth century battle between man and nature for food turned into a nineteenth century battle between man and man for profits. Admittedly the 1830's saw a little elementary democratisation, as two of England's greatest abuses were eliminated in the extension of the franchise in 1832 and the nationalisation of the poor in 1834. But the reforming middle classes of the 1830's were complacent gentlemen in the 1840's, anxious to keep radicals out of Parliament and to settle down to enjoy the fruits of their achievement; and England remained a truly

aristocratic and hierarchical society until the 1880's. Bentham died the night before the Reform Bill (for him a temporary measure) was passed in 1832; his Philosophic Radicals were then at their greatest strength, but ten years later Roebuck alone of the original group remained in the House of Commons, gradually to be transmuted from the man who urged compulsory schooling on the Commons in 1833 and approved the People's Charter in 1838 into a bourgeois censured for complacency in Culture and Anarchy.[45] Divided England began to identify itself as "working class" or "middle class", expressions which crept into the language in the later 1830's;[46] organic, agricultural England of the pastoral imagination, and with it Coleridge and Disraeli's "brotherhood of the land", had well-nigh passed away.

The Philosophic Radicals flirted with the Working Men's Association and the Charter during the 1830's (though J.S. Mill revealed their basically bourgeois approach, fearing in 1831 that violence would throw up a national convention within six months),[47] proposing a unicameral democracy, universal suffrage, the ballot and a form of state paternalism based on Bentham's Constitutional Code, which recommended Ministries of Preventive Service, Interior Communication, Indigenous Relief and Education & Health.[48] The quality of life about which they protested, however, is still, 150 years later, a subject of controversy. Wide-scale research into wage and price levels has still to tell us definitively whether the labourer who moved from the country to the towns in the 1790's was even moderately better off sixty years later.[49] Statistics of consumption suggest a generally greater availability of the diet staples, wheat and meat, and a persistent upward trend in the

consumption of tea, sugar and tobacco (though these statistics have been locally contested); the quality of life was undoubtedly improved by the growth of literacy and the growth of trade unions and friendly and cooperative societies; available statistics of unemployment and real wages demonstrate periodic marked increases in the standard of living, though there were notable regional exceptions.[50] But the continuous threat and frequent reality of minor revolution among workers, coinciding chiefly with the downswings of the trade cycle,[51] suggest little popular conviction of increasing prosperity. Economic depression was, however, only one side of the picture. Sidney Smith, singling out the principal abuses of the age for the purpose of crediting the Edinburgh Review with their reform, pointed chiefly to the boundless chaos of the English legal system:

> The state of England at the period when (the Edinburgh Review) began should be had in remembrance. The Catholics were not emancipated - the Corporation and Test Acts were not repealed - the Game Laws were horribly oppressive - Steel Traps and Spring Guns were set all over the country - Prisoners tried for their lives could have no counsel - Lord Eldon and the Court of Chancery pressed heavily upon mankind - Libel was punished by the most cruel and vindictive punishments - the principles of political economy were little understood - the Law of Debt and Conspiracy were upon the worst possible footing - the enormous wickedness of the slave trade was tolerated - a thousand evils were in existence, which the talents of good and able men have since lessened or removed.[52]

The English Common Law was not only savage in penalty and incoherent in nature; it was also far-reaching in its invasion of individual freedoms, Whig theory to the contrary notwithstanding. In 1821, when James Mill felt obliged to self-censor extremer passages in his Liberty of the Press,[53] the proprietor of the radical weekly, the London Examiner, typically went to gaol for twelve months for an editorial asserting the greater proportion of the Commons to

be "Public Criminals" rather than "Public Guardians".[54] His sentence was doubtless in retaliation for the catalogues of legal corruption regularly detailed in the Examiner, - tales of men hung for the forgery of a £5 note, of women hung for burglary, of small children hung for arson. Statutes of the greatest cruelty came to be regarded as the most essential bulwarks of public order;[55] the capital penalty was conceived of as lending unusual disincentive to such crimes chaotically juxtaposed in the Statute Law as "murdering the King or levying war against the King in his realm, marking the edges of any current coin of the Kingdom; ... maiming or wounding officers going on board ship, in execution of their excise duties, and pocket-picking to the amount of twelve pence or over; ... rape, and destroying the heads of fishponds; serious forgery on the Bank of England, and being in the company of gypsies".[56] The law was substantially barbarous, procedurally random and was in addition interpreted with singular rigidity by the Bench; the Commons was provoked in 1816 to lay articles of charge against Lord Ellenborough, Lord Chief Justice, for misconduct in court (a move enthusiastically supported by James Mill)[57] and Lord Dundas, who virtually ruled Scotland from the High Court in Edinburgh, faced impeachment in 1806, though he was acquitted, over alleged corruption. The Tory Parliament of the early nineteenth century (the Whigs took office for one year only before 1832, in 1806-07) was disposed to maintain the status quo in all areas of the Statute Law, and conservatively interpreted Parliament's function as the supervision of administration rather than the creation of new law by statute.[58]

The violence, anomaly, incoherence and disorder of the legal

system gave to Utilitarianism its "philosophic" political platform in the 1830's. Although a "democrat" where he had earlier supported benevolent despotism, Bentham was no socialist and was personally uninterested in Owenite projects for the practical care of the poor. Nor did he intervene directly in politics. He was, before all else, a philosopher of law intent on recodifying the statute book by means of a science of law, whose first formulation of the Principle of Utility was as a principle to cohere the English legal framework; the principle rests on supposedly universal truths in psychology and history, but these went largely unexamined after 1790. The Principle of Utility and its supporting Pleasure-principle were conceived primarily as tools, as a means to social and political ends, and not as the keystones of a systematic philosophy.[59]

> I saw crimes of the most pernicious nature passing unheeded by the law: acts of no importance put in point of punishment upon a level with the most baneful crimes: punishments inflicted without measure and without choice: satisfaction denied for the most crying injuries: the doors of justice barred against a great majority of the people by the pressures of wanton impositions and unnecessary expense: false conclusions ensured in questions of fact by hasty and inconsistent rules of evidence: the business of hours spun out into years: impunity extended to acknowledged guilt and compensation snatched out of the hands of injured innocence: the measure of decision in many cases unformed: in others locked up and made the object of a monopoly: the various rights and duties of the various classes of mankind jumbled together into one immense and unsorted heap: men ruined for not knowing what they are neither enabled nor permitted ever to learn: and the whole fabric of jurisprudence a labyrinth without a clue. These were some of the abominations which seemed to present themselves to my view.
>
> From the view of these abominations resulted a passionate desire of seeing them cleared away. It soon appeared that to cleanse the Augean stables to any purpose there was no other way than to pour in a body of severe and steady criticism and to spread it over the whole extent of the subject in one comprehensive and unbroken tide. This I determined to attempt: and whatever might be the success, it seemed that the labour of a life, as of a thousand more if I had them would not be ill-bestowed in the endeavour... [60]

Hence Sir Leslie Stephen wrote of the Principle of Utility,

> Bentham founded not a doctrine but a method; the doctrine, which came to him simply as a general principle, was in his hands a potent instrument, applied with most fruitful results to questions of immediate interest... The characteristic of his teaching was not the bare appeal to utility, but the attempt to follow the clue of utility systematically and unflinchingly into every part of the subject. [61]

It is important to understand the concern of Bentham with the reform of law by science (where "science" means essentially "the demand for exactness of statement")[62] rather than with the seizure of political power through a party, in order that the influence of Utilitarianism in nineteenth century England, and the measure of its achievement, may be properly appreciated. Many historians have written of the decline of Utilitarianism after 1835, with the destruction of the Philosophic Radicals, the secession of the London Debating Society to the Coleridgeans,[63] the decline of the Westminster Review, the sapping of the intellectual strength of the movement as Sterling, Maurice, Austin and George Grote all lost interest, and the political retreat of J.S. Mill towards the Whigs and philosophical accommodation with the Coleridgeans.[64] But Benthamite Utilitarianism lodged itself in Victorian life as the idea of paternalistic social reform, unfearful of giving power to the State once its interests had been merged with those of the majority, and as a constant pressure for the purging of the law. In this area its influence has not been confined solely to the Victorian era. The principles of Utilitarianism are the foundation of the twentieth century idea of tutelary law,[65] and the achievement of Utilitarianism has been to end the ancient English tradition which conceives of law and government as a long stop, as an umpire

of the game and an administrator of the rules, rather than an authority intervening constantly to limit personal freedoms in the name of social justice. Bentham's codification proposals were a direct threat to the notion "ubi jus ibi remedia", an eighteenth century principle which conceived of the law as a righter of wrongs ex post facto, as a law of vengeance, rather than as a preventive mechanism or a tool of utility, stimulating useful social reforms. Remedial law allowed the Common Law to evolve as a pragmatic, and hopefully flexible, response to new problems which continually arose, rather than as a body of law harmonised around a thematic principle. It was a very Whiggish notion, distrustful of Tory paternalism, drawing greatly on the lessons 1688 was supposed to have taught, and firmly reflecting the eighteenth century belief in limited government and limited authority, be it at whatever social cost. Francis Place argued in 1825 the orthodox Utilitarian view that the same pragmatic approach explained the philosophy of English government as well:

> Hitherto the government of the country (has) been administered on no general principles, but by temporary expedients for the purpose of accomplishing particular objects or to ward off particular inconveniences. [66]

Bentham's demands, now the axioms of liberal theories of government and justice in the twentieth century, were straightforward: "that the law should be 'cognoscible', i.e. that it should receive the fullest publicity, that it should be simple and speedy, that sentiment and historical appeal should have no weight against Utilitarian logic, and that justice should be uniform and within the reach of all, both geographically and economically".[67] These are now commonplaces, but Benthamite jurisprudence alone championed them

through the nineteenth century.

It was the achievement of Benthamism that the reality of the "Age of Reform" was not confined simply to the public political repentance of 1832. Insistence on the repeal of ingrained abuses and sustained impatience with the Whig appeal to common sense and the judgment of "the natural aristocracy" created an atmosphere in which many of England's greatest acts of social emancipation were pushed through. Much can be read off the Statute Book: the Factory Act of 1833, with the first breath of compulsory education, the New Poor Law of 1834, the Public Health Acts (Baths & Washhouses Act 1846-47, Town Improvements 1847, Public Health Act 1848, Lodging Houses Act 1851, Burials Act 1852, Smoke Nuisance Act 1853), Common Law Procedure Acts 1852, 1854 and 1860 (arising out of the Royal Commissions on law reform in the 1840's), the Youthful Offenders Act 1854, which took children out of Newgate and sent them to reform schools, the Divorce Act 1857, the Debtors Act 1869 (which ended automatic imprisonment for debt) and the Education Act 1870. Utilitarians allied with Shaftesburyite philanthropists to push through the establishment of local authorities which attended with unprecedented detail to the ordinary savageness of daily life. "In a progressive society change is constant," Disraeli uttered as solid Tory philosophy in Coningsby. Some of these changes owed nothing directly to the Benthamites, though one man, Chadwick, perhaps the greatest practical reformer of them all, was behind almost every important improvement in local administration and welfare; but all were framed according to the principles of "democratic Benthamism" (Dicey's phrase),[68] "framed according to the principles which should

pervade a code of laws - their adaptation to the circumstances of society, to the wants of men, and to the promotion of human happiness", in Brougham's words.[69] The Principle of Utility rooted itself in the procedures of Victorian government as a rule of thumb, - the famous administrative formula of "inquiry - legislation - execution - inspection - report", which became part of the working constitution.[70]

"The science of legislation is a practical science," wrote Bentham; "it loses its... use if it rests in speculation".[71] It was perhaps for this reason that Benthamism enjoyed practical successes entirely independent of the misfortunes of Utilitarian theory and the secession of many of the movement's best minds after 1835. The Principle of Utility proved applicable in many fields outside philosophy, succeeding as a slogan in many disciplines and countries where its intellectual origins went unexamined. In retrospect, one can only be surprised at its vitality. Political theories die most often not through refutation, but because the worlds they seek to explain pass away; and Bentham's intransigent radicalism[72] and hopes of organic change, which fed deeply on the discontents of the 1820's, naturally made less impact as its victories over the complacent Toryism of the past became more extensive, as Conservatism itself adopted new attitudes to change, and the years after the Great Exhibition suggested that Britain had finally emerged from starvation and depression. But its achievements were still remarkable. Economically, Utilitarianism continued to inspire the science of political economy;[73] as an ethical and political philosophy, it was lent new life at Cambridge by Sidgwick; in education, it was highly influential in the promotion of more sensible curricula in the schools. It is in law, however, that we find "the immensity

of the achievement performed by Bentham and his school, in the amendment of procedure - that is, in giving reality to the legal rights of individuals".[74] This was Bentham's personal glory, for no other Utilitarian shared his vast knowledge of the law of England, or campaigned so exclusively for legal reform. A much greater victory has been won by Utilitarian social theory than any of the dispossessed Philosophic Radicals could have guessed, and Asquith, born in 1852, was able to report in 1918 of Victoria's whole reign that

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Utilitarianism, we are reminded, was not only the agent of legal and political reform in Victorian life, whose specific achievements were considerable and whose diffused influence is incalculable, but the only coherent and developed theory of social change in England in the first half of the nineteenth century.[76] But whereas in Bentham the practical and philosophical purposes of Utilitarianism were inseparable, after 1840 these responsibilities were divided; and J.S. Mill was as little interested in developments in practical politics in the 1840's and 50's as Bulwer, Roebuck and Molesworth of the ousted Philosophic Radicals were in Mill's rethinking of Utilitarian attitudes to human nature. This said, Utilitarian theory is not profitably to be prised apart from its social setting, and its history is most rewardingly written as a chapter in the history of ideas.

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2. Pusey, letter to Prof. Tholuck of Halle, quoted H.P. Liddon, Life of Pusey (1883) I.238

3. Rt. Hon. H.H. Asquith, "Some Aspects of the Victorian Age", Romanes Lecture (1918) p.16

4. Bacon's conviction that the end of knowledge is "the relief of man's estate", "to subdue and overcome the necessities and miseries of humanity", and that the purpose of philosophy is "not to invent fables and romances of worlds, but to look into, and dissect the nature of this real world", to restore "the commerce of the mind with things" had become well-rooted and not a little vulgarised by the early nineteenth century. Cf. Macaulay's eulogy: "To make men perfect was no part of Bacon's plan. His humble aim was to make imperfect men comfortable... In Plato's opinion man was made for philosophy; in Bacon's opinion philosophy was made for man...The aim of the Baconian philosophy was to provide man with what he wants while he continues to be man... to supply our vulgar wants... An acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia... (Bacon's powers) received their direction from common sense. His love of the vulgar useful, his strong sympathy with the popular notions of good and evil, and the openness with which he avowed that sympathy, are the secret of his influence".
"Lord Bacon", Essays (ed. F.C. Montague, 1903) II.212-6

Much philosophic argument about induction in the early nineteenth century revolved around "what Bacon said", in the literal fashion in which Americans debated about "what the constitution really said". The quarrel over "true induction" was fought most publicly between Macaulay and Bentham, the former endorsing movement from historical particulars to immediate axioms and thence gradually to more general axioms; the latter inducing general axioms from introspection and then deducing less general axioms, with some reference to "the facts". James Mill in early years condemned Bentham's method as yielding only anticipationes, a priori generalisations (see below, p.), but after 1820 he accepted it as offering superior certainty.

The increasing Evangelical sway over the Church of England between 1790 and 1840 was parallelled by a plethora of books urging Christians to be "practical", to show faith in works, etc. Wilberforce wrote that the true Christian knows "that holiness is not to PRECEDE his reconciliation to God, and be its CAUSE; but to FOLLOW it, and be its EFFECT". (quoted F.K. Brown, Fathers of the Victorians, Cambridge 1961, p.118). Practicality showed itself in nearly 300 Church of England charities, some of which are listed in Brown, op.cit. pp.329-340. cf. Macaulay: "This is the age of societies... There is scarcely one Englishman in ten who has not belonged to some association for distributing books, or for prosecuting them; for sending invalids to hospital, or beggars to the treadmill; for giving plate to the rich, or blankets to the poor." (quoted ibid. p.317).

5. The identification of Empson as the reviewer and the quotation are in Froude, Carlyle's First 40 Years, 1795-1835 (1882) II.152
6. J.S. Mill, unpublished letter 22.x.1832 to Carlyle, in National Library of Scotland
7. Hume, "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding", in Essays (ed. T.H. Green & T.H. Grose) (1887) II.70
8. ibid. II.70
9. Hartley, Observations on Man (1749) I.6
10. Hume, "Enquiry", loc.cit. II.68
11. Bacon, "The Advancement of Learning", Works (Boston, Mass.,1863) VI.359
12. Bentham's "determination to create a philosophy wholly out of the materials furnished by his own mind, and by minds like his own; was his first disqualification as a philosopher".
    - J.S. Mill, "Bentham", in G. Himmelfarb, ed., Essays on Politics and Culture (New York, 1963) p.93
13. Tucker, The Light of Nature Pursued (2nd edn., 1806) Introduction p.1-liii
14. Hume, "Of the Original Contract", Essays II.44
15. "Enquiry", ibid. II.70
16. ibid. II.69
17. see below, Chapter 3 p. , and Chapter 4 p.
18. "Bentham", loc.cit. p.93
19. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature I.iii.10 (Everyman ed., 1964) I.118
20. "Custom" and "situation" are Hume's words for environment; "custom has two original effects on the mind, in bestowing a facility in the performance of any action, or the conception of any object, and afterwards a tendency or inclination towards it" (Treatise, II.iii.5, II.133). NB also the discussion in ibid.II.iii.4 (II.131-132) of the effect of "situation" on the passions; martial discipline, fine uniforms, "the pomp and majesty of war" can stimulate a man's natural passion of courage when he "reflects" on his friends and fellow-soldiers, and discourage his natural fear and terror of the enemy.
21. Comment on the Commentaries (ed. Everett, 1928) p.84
22. see quotation footnoted 16 above
23. Hume, Essays II.70
24. ibid. II.70
25. In T.P. Peardon, Transition in English Historical Writing (NY 1933) p.73
26. Hume, History of England ( ), III.297
27. quoted in C.F. Harrold, Carlyle and German Thought (New Haven, 1934) p.161
28. J.C. Hare, Guesses at Truth (3rd ed., 1867) pp.279-280
29. See below, Chapter 4 p.

30. Letters on the Study of History (1738) III.12-13

31. Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, (1784-91), trans. T.O. Churchill, 1800 as Reflections on the Philosophy of History of Mankind, VIII.4. Edited by Frank Manuel, Chicago 1968, p.58

32. ibid. p.34, p.59

33. This is developed in Chapter 5, p.

34. J.S. Mill, "Coleridge", in Essays on Politics & Culture (see fn.12), p.143

35. ibid. p.142

36. J.S. Mill, Autobiography (ed. Max Lerner, New York 1961) p.108

37. Thomas Arnold, in "Bankes's History of Rome", Quarterly Review XXVII (1822) p.281; Pusey, quoted in H.P. Liddon, Life (1883) I.238

38. J.M. Carre, Goethe en Angleterre, (Paris, 1920) Pt.1, p.92 Letter of Henry Crabb Robinson, 29 xi.1811, in Diary (1869) I.352

39. John Morley, Recollections (1917) I.69

40. H.P. Liddon, Life of Pusey (1883) I.77

41. Friedrich von Raumer, England in 1835: Letters Written to Friends in Germany (tr. Sarah Austin, 1836) II.296-7

42. "Bentham", loc.cit. p.84

43. Rousseau, Confessions IX (Everyman ed., 1931) II.55

44. Revolution was not just the hope of Chartists but the real fear of all sections of the community, - capitalists, landowners and peasants. The fear was nourished by the French example of 1830 and the general turmoil of Europe in 1848, and by the continuing distresses of the fluctuating trade cycle - especially in 1816-19, 1830, 1837 and 1839-42. Bertrand Russell tells a revealing story of the last years of his grandfather in the 1850's, at a time when England was prosperous, complacent and comfortable. Woken in the middle of the night by a bump in the dark , the old man gave way to loud shouts of "Revolution! the revolution is upon us!" (see Russell's essay in Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians, London 1943). Fear of impending doom was never far below the surface.

45. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (ed. J. Dover Wilson, Cambridge 1961) p.50, p.65

46. There are some excellent essays on this subject by Asa Briggs, notably "Middle-class consciousness in England", in Past and Present (1956)

47. J.S. Mill, letter to Sterling, 20.x.1831: "If the ministers flinch or the Peers remain obstinate, I am firmly convinced that in six months a national convention, chosen by universal suffrage, will be sitting in London".
Correspondence of J.S. Mill (ed. F.E. Mineka), in Works (Toronto, 1963) XIII.

48. "Constitutional Code", in Works (ed. Bowring, 1838) IX.428-31

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48. Constitutional Code, in Works (ed. Bowring, 1838) IX.428-31

49. The "academically orthodox" view of Sir John Clapham and T.S. Ashton, that the standard of living of the British labouring population improved substantially during the period 1790-1850, has been dislodged - if not dismantled - in the major revival of this question in periodical debate since 1957. See, notably, E.J. Hobsbawm, "The British Standard of Living 1790-1850", Ec.H.R., X (1957), A.J. Taylor, "Progress and Poverty in Britain 1780-1850", History XLV (1960), R.M. Hartwell and E.J. Hobsbawm, "The Standard of Living in the Industrial Revolution", Ec.H.R., XVI (1963), and E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (1964). Thompson dismisses much reliable statistical material of real wages and consumption as insufficient to establish conclusions about the quality of life, and finds more room for literary sources than the others mentioned.

50. Textile workers in Manchester and miners in Birmingham suffered most frequently from unemployment, while the agricultural sector of the economy was continually depressed. Domestic industry was almost entirely killed off.

51. Especially in 1811-12 (the Luddist riots in Yorkshire), 1816, 1819, 1826, 1830, 1837-38 and 1840-42. The emphasis here is on the word coinciding with, rather than caused by, "the downswings of the trade cycle". There is a way of writing nineteenth century history which suggests that working class radicalism was the most natural thing in the world, and that only an empty stomach is required to make a man question the social order. This was not true of the eighteenth century, when stomachs were even emptier; and labouring men, one should always bear in mind, were firmly educated in the Christian belief that "the poor ye shall have always with you", a doctrine confirmed by the laws of classical economics. Economic depressions may have been a catalyst to social unrest; but it is by no means clear, in the periods mentioned, that it was the major operative cause.

52. Smith, Works (London, 1839) I.iv.

53. See his Commonplace Book I (London Library) where the drafted version has many discrepancies with the much milder published essay (1821). Bain (James Mill, 1882) p.196 quotes a letter from Mill to Napier which explains deletions through the need to curtail.

54. The London Examiner 700 (3 June 1821) p.1

55. cf. Bentham: "Among the several cloudy appellatives which have been commonly employed as cloaks for misgovernment, there is none more conspicuous in this atmosphere of illusion than the word Order".
- "The Book of Fallacies", Works II.441

56. Leon Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law (1948) I.10-11

57. Commonplace Book IV (London School of Economics) item 79. "People always obedient to good government", Mill claims.

58. W. Harrison, in Introduction to Bentham's Fragment on Government (Oxford, 1960) p.xvi

59. The Principle of Utility, or Greatest Happiness Principle, had enjoyed an intellectual field-day long before Bentham. Cf. its formulation in the writings of the Scottish philosopher, Francis Hutcheson:
"... the moral evil or vice is as the degree of misery and number of the sufferers; so that action is best which accomplishes the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers".
Enquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil (1747) iii.8

60. Bentham MSS (UCL) Box 27, p.172. quoted in Everett, The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined (New York, 1945) p.3-4

61. Sir Leslie Stephen, quoted in A.S. Pringle-Pattison, The Philosophical Radicals (1907) p.17

62. cf. Stuart Hampshire: "The first [demand we make of a scientist] being only that he should make no statement that is less than exact, as far as it can be checked by observation and experiment... The example of the physical sciences has taught us to expect that the demand for exactness of statement will by itself lead to amazing results".
"Can there be a general Science of Man?" Commentary 24 (1957) p.164

63. The LDS was the most important forum for radical opinion in London in the late 1820's. In 1826 it had 188 members. "Almost every debate was a bataille rangee between the 'philosophic radicals' and the Tory lawyers... In... 1828 and 1829... the Coleridgeans, in the persons of Maurice and Sterling, made their appearances in the Society as a second Liberal and even Radical party, on totally different grounds from Benthamism and vehemently opposed to it". (J.S. Mill, Autobiography, New York, 1961 p.80-81). Mill decided to leave in 1829, and despite a distinguished list of members (see Auto. pp.79-80), the Society did not last much longer.

64. Mill quarrelled badly with the Grotes and the Austins over his management of the Westminster Review, which was calling for a broad-based alliance with the Whigs at a time (1835) when most radicals wanted to exacerbate the differences. cf. also the arguments over whether Whigs should be admitted to Molesworth's Reform Dining Club, and the fury with Mill for flirting with the Whigs when the radicals were reduced from c70-80 MP's to 9 in the July, 1837 election. Excellent accounts of both these incidents are given in M. St. John Packe, Life of J.S. Mill (London, 1954)

- on Mill's philosophic accommodation with Coleridge, n.b. the 1840 essay in the Westminster Review: "Bentham excepted, no Englishman of recent date has left his impress so deeply in the opinions and mental tendencies of those among us who attempt to enlighten their practice by philosophical meditation".
in Essays on Politics & Culture (ed. Himmelfarb, NY 1963) p.121

65. See the excellent discussion of this question in John Plamenatz's essay in M. Ginsburg, Law and Public Opinion in the Twentieth Century (1951)

66. quoted in Graham Wallas, Life of Francis Place (1925) p.185

67. This reduction is by S.E. Finer, in Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick (1952) p.16

68. The phrase is from A.V. Dicey, Law and Opinion in England (1930) p.181

69. Lord Brougham, Speeches II.288

70. The phrase is G.M. Young's, in Portrait of an Age (1953) p.11

71. Bentham MSS (UCL) Box 27, p.163

72. And in case this seems like an overstatement, cf. Works II.423: "Ought it not - this and every reform - ought it not to be temperate? Well then - to be temperate, it must be gradual - to be well done it must be gradually done. Fellow Citizens! as often as you meet with a man holding to you this language, say to him 'Sir, we have our dictionary; what you are saying, we perfectly understand; done gradually means left undone, left undone for ever if possible...'".

73. Through, especially, Ricardo and J.S. Mill. The latter's Principles of Political Economy (1848) remained a classic exposition until well into the twentieth century.

74. A.V. Dicey, op.cit. p.209

75. Rt. Hon. H.H. Asquith, "Some Aspects of the Victorian Age", Romanes Lecture (London, 1918) p.16

76. Given the fact that the Tories stood firm on the status quo and the Whigs were concerned simply to hold the balance. Francis Jeffrey almost elevated "holding the balance" into a political philosophy in numerous articles in the Edinburgh Review, the Whigs' periodical. An admirable example can be found in his article "The State of Parties", in ER XV (1810) pp.504-521, which is teeming with analogies of the Whigs "holding the central isthmus of the constitution, against the erosions of extremists".

A N A L Y S I S O F C H A P T E R T W O

1. Utilitarian belief set out that knowledge of human nature is essential to knowledge of "true knowledge" of law and political institutions. 2. This belief not unique to Utilitarians, but they claimed 3-4. a uniquely scientific understanding of human nature, based on observation and experiment.

5. Pre-Romantic philosophers in concent over essential likeness of men and over the existence of a single, uniform human nature, from which the "true nature" of law and government is deducible. 6. The uniformity of human nature accepted without historical investigation by Utilitarians.

7. Belief in unique human nature and unique "true social structure" rejected by Romantic philosophers of mind and history, poets, etc. 8-9. Theory of intrinsic differences between men, societies, eras of history pioneered by Herder. 9-11. Denial of constancy and uniformity of human nature to have great subsequent impact on Utilitarian social and political thought.

12. The Science of Man no lónger an ambition of philosophers. 13. Conceptual problems and ambiguities with human nature now the focus of English students. 13-14. The properties of human beings either definitive or non-definitive; the class of human beings is definitionally, not inductively, established. 14-15. Human nature is a personification of the contingent but abiding properties of human behaviour and volition, presented as fictitious permanences in the mind. 15-16. The contingent properties of human nature may be physical or psychological, expressing capacities, attributes or dispositions, or even poetic and mystical. 17. Human nature is not, however, a substance, discoverable in the manner of natural objects; it is a purely logical construct, a reflection of man's self-understanding.

18. Attempts to "Newtonise" human behaviour and invent plausible models from the natural sciences met with purely philosophic problems. Induction proved inadequate; the homogeneity of sensation for all men was denied by Romantics, and with it the commensurability of motives; 19. the chemical analogy with instinctive behaviour broke down through man's ability to behave unnaturally and unreasonably.

20. J.S. Mill took the study of man out of individual psychology into philosophy of history, and detached social science from philosophy, thereby transforming the thinking of Bentham.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PLACE OF HUMAN NATURE IN UTILITARIAN POLITICAL THEORY

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a) Human Nature as a Source of Knowledge

One central idea binds together the Utilitarian tradition of political thinking in England, from Hobbes to James Mill: the belief that an understanding of human nature is the only essential prerequisite to an understanding of the "true nature" of law and government. This idea is succinctly expressed by Hobbes:

> The true and perspicuous explication of the elements of laws natural and politic... dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature... and seeing that true knowledge begetteth not doubt nor controversy, but knowledge... [1]

This is not, of course, the only proposition which is common to the Utilitarian tradition. Nor is it, in any sense, the most characteristic or specific of Utilitarian political ideas. The Utilitarian thinkers were united in defence of many more detailed theories about human nature and politics - that, for example, men at all times do seek, and have sought, primarily their own pleasure and happiness, that men's happiness derives from the satisfaction of their wants and desires, that governments ought always to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people subject to them. But of these various propositions, it is the first which supplies a foundation to Utilitarian political thinking, and it is a proposition which has two steps: one, that a philosopher who achieves a proper understanding of human nature, will by so doing discover the ways in which human nature is most totally fulfilled; two, that a philosopher who understands how human nature is most

totally fulfilled, may then proceed to outline with some certainty that "true nature" of law and political procedure which will allow to every man the maximum possible freedom to fulfil himself, according to the demands made by his individual nature.

Now this is, of course, an ancient approach to the theory of politics, and, for example, both Platonic and Christian as well as Utilitarian strains of thought moved from a set of axioms about how human nature is fulfilled to a set of conclusions about how certain legal and political systems can make this most possible. It is a procedure characteristic also of natural-law systems: and, as Schumpeter points out, "the programme of deriving, by the light of reason, 'laws' about man in society from a very stable and highly simplified human nature fits the Utilitarians not less well... than the Scholastics".[2] What was distinctive to the Utilitarians, however, was their understanding of the nature of human fulfilment: men are fulfilled, they argued, by achieving happiness through satisfaction of their temporal wants. This stands in contrast to the Platonic belief that the fulfilment of human nature lies in the full and harmonious development of all of an individual's powers and potentialities, and in even more striking contrast to the Christian belief that fulfilment consists in receipt of the state of grace, and in allegiance to laws of virtue which all men can discover by use of their reason.[3] The Utilitarians stood completely outside interpretations of the fulfilment of human nature expressed as adherence to moral standards imposed from without, or in terms of "freeing" human potentialities stunted or suppressed by "unnatural" laws and political institutions, where such release of potential is considered to have intrinsic value other than as a mere aid to

personal happiness. Human nature is primarily fulfilled, Bentham claimed, in the gratification of men's love of pleasure and power, in the satisfaction of their vanity, their egoism, their selfish interests.

The Utilitarians also distinguished themselves from Natural Law thinking by emphasising the empirical epistemology on which, they held, their understanding of human nature uniquely rested. Hume makes this point with some preciseness in the Treatise. Beginning with a tribute to human nature as the source of all scientific knowledge -

> The only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, (is)... instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or centre of these sciences, to human nature itself; which once being masters of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. [4]

- he then explains that his "foundation almost entirely new" is that of empirically known human nature, human nature elucidated by a New Experimental Philosophy for which Bacon rather than Newton is credited:

> And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation... For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and capacities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and

> situations. And tho' we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain that we cannot go against experience... [5]

It is not clear that any of the Utilitarian political theorists adhered literally to the straightforward Baconian empiricism Hume here outlines: many uncircumspect slides into hypothesis-framing and mechanism litter eighteenth-century psychology. Macaulay's pleading of historical data as the proper Baconian elements in the crucible of the Scientist of Man found, in the years before him, few supporters. "I have entered scarce at all into historical details," Bentham admitted in the Preface to a 1777 draft of a work entitled Of the Principles of Human Action;[6] "notwithstanding all I could do, in spite of all resolves, I have not been able to keep clear of metaphysics".[7] By metaphysics he meant deduction from principles without reference to experience;[8] but he leaves no doubt that he deduces from empirically grounded first principles, which state "that which is universal: which is to be found in all men, and is the same in all men".[9]

However intensely they disagreed about the specific content of human nature or about the "science of method" (J.S. Mill's phrase), philosophers from Aristotle to the French and German Romantics concurred in believing that there existed one single, uniform human nature. The variations exhibited by history in the moral, social and political behaviour of humanity were variously explained away as the behaviour of the pagan or the ransomed, or as the consequence of environmental differences; human nature itself remained constant,

geographically as well as historically, asserting an essential likeness between Rousseau's last exemplars of natural humanity, the Caribs of Venezuela, and eighteenth-century Englishmen (perhaps the most "unnatural" people on earth, if one follows Voltaire). On the supposition of timeless and universal human nature, one of the great informing principles of western political theory was founded: that deducible from this single human nature was a single natural structure of law and political organisation, "ordained" (as teleologists believed) or suitable for all men in all societies in all periods of history. The political theorist's brief, to search out the "true nature" of the social and political structure, was not, therefore, a local or provincial one: his canvas was universal, his ambition, to legislate not just for his own country, but for the world and for time. So Bentham described himself in his Memoranda as "the most ambitious of the ambitious: (my) empire, - the empire (I) aspire to, extending to, and comprehending, the whole human race, in all places - in all habitable places of the earth, at all future time".[10]

This elevated ideal brought into the field of social and political theory almost a superfluity of "universalistic theories". Aristotelians quarrelled with Christians, Cartesians with Utilitarians, in defining the "true nature", but the conviction that a rerum natura politicorum existed, and could be brought to light by a properly scientific investigation, suffered no dilution in their minds. Naturally, disputes proliferated between philosophers over the criteria of a properly scientific investigation, with choices varyingly posed between reason and revelation, at other periods between analogy with Forms and geometrical demonstration. In the period under study a whole generation of philosophers, mostly Scots, wrangled over the precise

nature of Newton's advance on Bacon, and the validity of "analysis and composition" as a ground of knowledge; others searched for the "true nature" in the traditions of Greece, Rome or another specially gifted civilisation, or looked to the conventions of an aristocracy or an imtellectual elite. But the many battles over method disguised, in pre-nineteenth century political theory, the serene concord over ends: it was agreed by all that the blueprint of the "natural" legal and political structure was the prize in the hunt, the hidden treasure awaiting discovery by the skilled explorer.

The constancy of human nature was a notion accepted by the English Utilitarians without detailed historical examination, though among them Hume and Bentham maintained that its constancy was contingent and unnecessary, a quality requiring continual checking against experience. The human properties isolated as universal and timeless were characteristically qualities of mind rather than matter, of man as an active rather than passive being, with particular attention paid to motives and dispositions exhibited in the course of willing and acting. In Hobbes, men are credited with an universal lust for power, in Locke and James Mill for happiness; in Hume they are credited with ambition, greed and self-love, though also with friendship, generosity and public spirit; in Bentham, they are held to act always to promote their own pleasure.[11] Access to motives did not depend for the Utilitarians on reference to history. Hume spoke for all in his comment: "mankind are so much the same in all times and places that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular".[12]

So fundamental was the notion of unvarying human nature to Utilitarian political reasoning, that the battering which this concept received from German philosophy of history at the end of the eighteenth

century was one to which Utilitarian social science never completely adjusted. Changes in elucidation of human nature entailed, for the Utilitarians, changes in human nature itself, for man is a self-conscious creature and his nature is a conceptual reflection of his own self-understanding; and they entailed, further, rethinking of the entire field of social and political conclusions deduced from human nature. In Hume's words, it is "the clue of human nature" which enables us "to extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life".[13]

With the advent of the cluster of doctrines and attitudes we call Romanticism, political and social theory conceived as the deduction of a "natural" political and social community for a "natural" man had either to reject, ignore or adjust to a philosophy of history which undermined its basic assumptions. It was one of a number of beliefs defining the Romantics, from Herder in Germany to Coleridge in England, that the human mind, far from constituting a parcel of faculties and displaying a limited range of motives, was a highly individual entity whose mysteries and capacities for insight and "understanding" (Coleridge's word) had only begun to be explored. Equally, in morals and politics, an infinite number of personal understandings of what is right and just were both possible and valid in the Romantic view, as opposed to a single approach and a single set of institutions and beliefs which it was the task of reason to discover. Challenging the "objective structure of politics, society and law" articulated by the synthesising philosophers and esprits simplistes of the eighteenth century, Herder's examination

of differing political and social systems over two thousand years showed them to possess infinite and irreducible variety. The Romantic movement set out to uncover the polymorphism and polytypism of humanity and to demonstrate that every individual was capable of unique creative activity. It typically denied that men were, in Scott's phrase, "just so many smooth shillings", or that their powers were limited to the standing apparatus of eighteenth century psychology - a reasoning faculty, in which lay men's hope of perfection, confronted by distracting passions, which dragged him down. Friedrich Schlegel, in an argument presumably incomprehensible to English promoters of utility, advanced the idea that.

> Reason is but one and the same in all; however, just as each human being has his own nature and his own particular love, so each person carries also his own poetry within himself. [14]

Bentham chose to ignore the diversity of man's poetic effusion as a philosophic irrelevance, of no consequence in framing axioms of human nature; notoriously he grouped the creative utterance of humanity as one of many "pleasures and pains of curiosity" in the Table of the Springs of Action, satisfying no higher human yearning than the "Interest of the Spying-Glass".[15] For him, the cultural and symbolic forms exhibited by man were merely polychromous outer layers disguising an unchanging core of human nature: for the Romantics, the diversity of "outer forms" of human behaviour disguised an infinite variety of individual natures.

The Romantic theory of the completeness and singularity of all human forms - cultural, social, political, mythical - found isolated precursors in the eighteenth century but was most completely represented in the work of Herder, whose extended study of 1784-91,

Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, was the first major exposition of the new historiography and a sustained demolition of the notion of an uniform human nature. Herder, opposing a radical distinction between the methods appropriate to the study of natural science and those appropriate to elucidating the developing "spirit of man", examined in the Ideen nine specific societies between Arabia and California to establish intrinsic differences between their goals, customs, patterns of social growth and the "spirit" of their histories, traced back to the generations of Shem and Ham.[16] Attacking the dix-huitieme spirit which saw in history only the universal principles of human nature writ large, Herder exulted in the colour, uniqueness, oddness, even irrationality of societies, cultures and traditions; he expressed detestation of anything which made for sameness. Scott shared his attitude:

> The degree of national diversity between different countries is but an instance of that general variety which Nature seems to have adopted as a principle throughout all her works, as anxious to avoid as modern statesmen to enforce, anything like an approach to absolute uniformity.[17]

In England, however, the German insistence on the protean nature of history, geography and human nature came to impinge more directly on Utilitarian social and political thinking than the more general Romantic contempt for "objective truths" and final solutions. Human nature, if an entity answers to the name, is not an essence or monad, possessing unvarying properties, J.S. Mill learned from Germany and France; it is definable, if at all, only in terms of its constant change and development. Carlyle was perhaps the most prominent English Romantic to deny the notion of human nature altogether, abandoning in 1809 the theories he had studied in

Edinburgh for a quasi-Marxist concept of philosophy as "action": "All speculation is by nature endless, formless, a vortex amid vortices"; the "only profitable speculation" is "what is to be done; and How it is to be done", he concluded.[18]

Insistence on the volatility of human nature forced a shift within Utilitarianism, between Bentham's Principles of Morals and J.S. Mill's System of Logic, from static to dynamic modes of thought; Mill conceived himself as framing "universal sequences" rather than "universal precepts" in the science of government. Human nature survived in Mill to play a supporting role in the new science of States of Society, though Mill denied that the empirical laws of human nature generated by "the interest-philosophy of the Bentham school" could ever constitute scientific propositions of an universal validity. "There is scarcely any mode of feeling or conduct which is, in the absolute sense, common to all mankind", he argued,[19] The empirical laws of human nature express uniformities which hold true only within the limits of observation, and are subject to constant modification through the changing circumstances in which they operate; Mill turned from the laws of behaviour to laws of the Formation of Human Character, attempting to deduce the constant causes of certain types of action, and expressing these as laws "assertive of tendencies".[20] This is, of course, simply Bentham's enterprise approached from another direction; and psychology has subsequently proved more interested in Bentham's pleasure-principle than in Mill's "scientific propositions" that "such and such will be the effect of a given cause, so far as it operates uncounteracted".[21] By 1843 we have surrendered "all men seek pleasure from all their

actions" for such "real laws" as "bodily strength tends to make men courageous",[22] and surrendered (we shall argue below) a highly ingenious, genuinely informative, empirical principle of human nature for a deduced science of the Formation of Character of relative triviality.

b) Human Nature: Some Problems with Ambiguity

The concept of "human nature", as an object of study, has passed out of the work of English and American philosophers of mind; its construction has been largely relinquished, along with other ambitions of the Science of Man, to systematic psychologists, sociologists and political scientists. The latter have at times voiced exasperated complaints about the failure of philosophers to produce a final elucidation of "human nature", an attitude which seems to have enjoyed a pre-war currency in the United States: non-Marxist of students of politics (that well-known school), wrote the American political scientist Harold Lasswell,

> who have turned to science have been acutely dissatisfied with the ambiguity of inherited political, social and philosophical literature, ... with the chronic incompleteness of formulation in the traditional literature. The turning to the specific... is to be understood as a stampede to complete philosophy, to reconsider every generality for the purpose of relating it to observable reality. [23]

Seemingly unimpressed with the "stampede" elsewhere, philosophers since Wittgenstein have not commonly singled out difficulties with method as their chief problems in psychology, being more concerned (in an Oxford context) with the status of many philosophical terms in the language without clear ideas attached to them; though the initial difficulty in verifying the meaningfulness of concepts such as "human nature" involves the methodological problem of "providing examples of the sort of thing which the expression ostensibly signifies".[24]

We are all familiar with colloquial statements in which properties of "human nature" are asserted by people without clear specification or understanding of what the term means; this is quite

proper, for as a concept it is definable only from the use to which it is put in speech, given the absence of a recognisable substance or entity which it names. Even if such looseness be conceded, however, universalised propositions about human nature dissolve with annoying frequency into truisms or tautologies. Wittgenstein once observed that anyone who asks a question should be under a responsibility to say what kind of answer he expects; and the elimination of ambiguity is a first essential in any inquiry into the nature of "human nature". Without specification, the concept may variously refer to (a) the definitive or non-definitive properties of man; (b) properties which are either physical or psychological; (c) any one of several logical subdivisions of the word "property" - function, capacity, disposition, etc. In this section we shall attempt to distinguish some of the categories into which human properties fall and, more precisely, ask what kind of knowledge of human properties the Utilitarians demanded as the foundation of a science of morals and politics; and we shall briefly examine the grounds of Utilitarian belief that knowledge of properties of human nature can be acquired in the same manner as knowledge of properties of natural objects.

The qualities and properties of human beings present themselves, in the first instance, as either definitive or non-definitive characteristics. The definitive category refers to those properties which constitute the criteria by which living beings are admitted to the class of "humanity". Such properties both define the class of human beings and, by defining, set limits to the potential membership of the class. Traditionally they include the properties of rationality

of mind, bipedality and hairlessness, though this order of importance can clearly be disputed, and thereby exclude from membership of the human species such animals as chimpanzees and pygmies, who otherwise hold numerous properties in common with humans and several which we can only admire.

In the world of common sense, it is widely assumed that membership of the human class is established, not by reference to a priori, definitional criteria, but by reference to human behaviour. Such illusion is brought about by argument of the form "if he does X, he cannot be human" or "Y is the act of a sub-human". That induction from human behaviour is not the method by which the defining properties of human beings are established can be made clear in asking the question: eliminating all a priori knowledge of "What a human being is", which is the significant group of creatures from which to induce the qualities we normally call "human"? Only when a priori definition has decided which are the beings who possess the marks of humanity can other common facts about members of the human class be induced; and these are the non-definitive characteristics of humanity.

Philosophers since Porphyry have achieved singular unanimity in defining mankind principally through the possession of reason, and have proved more interested in his contingent and non-definitive characteristics. In the eighteenth century Science of Man, these non-definitive characteristics constitute the properties referred to as human nature; and analysis of the contingent but abiding properties of human behaviour, presented as fictitious permanences in a mystical "human nature", constituted for Utilitarians the foundation of the sciences of politics and morals. It follows, therefore, that a

living creature may lack human nature but still be a human being; the Utilitarians stumbled on many objectors claiming to lack human nature as Locke, Hume and Bentham understood it, but they did not deny essential humanity to these people.

The non-definitive characteristics of Man fall into several logical categories: one reason which makes propositions of the type "human nature never changes" opaque and meaningless is the frequent lack of specification of the property referred to in the phrase "human nature". Non-definitive properties may fall into one or more categories in the following schema:

Substance ---------- Properties

Attributes	Capacities	Voluntary Dispositions
Functions	Inclinations	Involuntary Dispositions

Hence "human nature" may refer to attributes (by which is meant, in this analysis, "properties not voluntarily acquired or learned") such as living to a greater age than other mammals, of undergoing an uniquely long childhood among mammals, or just blushing; or it may refer, in the category of dispositions, (by which is meant "fictitious qualities in the mind which give rise to distinctive or habitual actions"), to such voluntary dispositions as to live gregariously, to practice exogamy, to threaten violence under provocation, or - as some of Freud's pupils taught - to suppress our sense of smell in childhood; or "human nature" may point to such involuntary dispositions as to be frightened of fire, or to collapse after three days without sleep. We may speak of human nature in terms of capacities - such as secerning good and evil, evolving language and names for objects in the natural world, uttering propositional statements, thinking

rationally, or achieving knowledge (a capacity which in Linnaeus' classification is a definitive characteristic of Man, lending the name sapiens to the species); or we may point to inclinations, such as acquiring knowledge or amassing material wealth; or we may even intend by the phrase"human nature" reference to a teleological property of Man: "Man exists for the greater glory of God", "objective man, real because active, (is) the result of his own work" (Marx), or "Man finds himself only in salvation".

There is, of course, no reason why the non-definitive characteristics of Man need be purely psychological in nature, or consist in a reduction of behavioural properties in some form. They include, for example, such physical properties (both common and unique to man) as his almost straight vertebral column, non-opposable big toe, and his long legs which make man (among mammals) a walking animal of great endurance in travel. Even the classes of physical and psychological properties do not exhaust the characteristics to which "human nature" may meaningfully refer: when, for example, Romantic poets held that each man possessed his own nature, they did not understand by "nature" properties which were material, or an abstraction of behavioural patterns: they saw something more metaphysical:

> The Human Nature unto which I felt
> That I belong'd, and which I lov'd and reverenc'd,
> Was not a punctual presence, but a Spirit
> Living in time and space, and far diffus'd.
> In this my joy, in this my dignity
> Consisted... [25]

"Human Nature" is not, therefore, a substantive entity - as is normally suggested by the wayward syntax of the propositions in which it is embodied - but rather a fictitious entity, a collective

name for and personification of a group of non-definitive properties of human beings. Lacking substance, there is no conceivable sense in which human nature can be said to knowable in the manner of knowing objects in the natural sciences: it is purely a logical construct, a composite, artificial entity. In the Science of Mind, man is both subject and object of his own investigations, and an alteration in one implies an alteration in the other; any improvement he may achieve in his understanding of his self involves, ex hypothesi, a change in the actual nature of himself.[26] Bentham saw clearly that logical constructions do not involve real creations: "Of Logic... all that it is in the power to do is, to arrange and display in the most instructive manner whatsoever matters have been extracted from these sources (observation and experiment). What it can do, is to methodise; and in that unimmediate way promote creation; - what it cannot do is, to create".[27] Despite his lifelong habit of personifying the concept and talking about "the very constitution of our natures", Bentham understood human nature to be an "all-comprehensive aggregate" of the properties possessed by all men.[28]

Assertions of the fixity of species and of human nature came predominantly from scientists rather than philosophers in the eighteenth century; Buffon's Histoire Naturelle proved especially influential in this regard, being possessed and read by educated men throughout Europe. But the strenuous attempts to Newtonise the study of man, to produce a plausible mechanical model of his "workings" or to analyse his responses to experience as quasi-chemical reactions in a crucible met problems of a primarily philosophic nature. First, the immense diversity of human beings proved beyond the power of

observation and experiment alone to analyse; secondly, ascriptions of motives universally to mankind were meaningful, German philosophers maintained, only on the assumption that sensational experience is the same for all men. Cassirer has since argued that man is a creature who builds a symbolic world into the sensational world which he perceives, for whom "reality" is filtered through the cultural net of his language, his art, his religion, and his personal experience and social traditions. Man, he claims, "does not see reality face to face... he sees it (symbolically)... man has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium".[29] If this theory is valid, the eighteenth century picture of constant motivational responses to a world of hard facts no longer has meaning; motives, produced in a completely personal sensational world, become incommensurable with the motives of others; and knowledge of other minds becomes mere speculation into sensational worlds different in kind from our own.[30] Psychology thus becomes an art of imaginative creation of the minds of others rather than a science. Evidently, some similar assumptions about their perceived "real worlds" do exist among men, for if in fact every man's sensational world was uniquely his then no communication between human beings could take place or public language be devised. It is in fact in Herder that the universal principles of human nature confronted the theory that man is decisively shaped in his nature by his cultural forms; though this theory has since found more protagonists in literature and philosophy of history in England than in psychology.

Thirdly, the analogy between chemistry and human behaviour, which assumes man to respond invaryingly to the elements with which

he interacts, broke down on man's ability to reason and reflect on his experience and do precisely the opposite of what is natural and rational in a given situation. Man's possession of a language which goes beyond the mere power of naming and the expression of emotion and intention (capacities possessed by most animals) to frame sentences and propositions of defined syntax and logical structure, enables him to pick out of the stream of sensation one specific phenomenon, to isolate it and investigate its nature, to reflect on its spatial and temporal relations with other entities and to consider its abstract meaning for him. This distinctively human capacity was noted by Bentham:

> The mind has it in its power to detach... any one or more (of the simple ideas afforded by sensation) from the rest, and either keep it in view in this detached state or make it up into a compound with other simple ideas, detached in like manner from other sources. 31.

But the first thinker to identify this power and ascribe it to its correct source (man's possession of a propositional language) was Herder:

> Man evinces reflection when the power of his soul acts so freely that it can segregate from the whole ocean of sensation surging through all his senses one wave, as it were; and that it can stay this wave, draw attention to it, and be aware of this attention. He evinces reflection when from the whole wavering dream of images rushing through his senses he can collect himself into a moment of waking, dwell on one image spontaneously, observe it clearly and more quietly, and abstract characteristics showing him that this and no other is the object. Thus he evinces reflection when he can not only perceive all the qualities vividly or clearly but when he can recognise one or several of them as distinctive qualities... Now by what means did this recognition come about? Through a characteristic he had to abstract... which ... was the language of the soul. With this, human language is created. 32

For Utilitarians and later for positivists, however, man's ability to use his reason and his capacity of abstraction and yet wilfully

do the opposite of what reason commanded, seemed to damage all hope of accurate prediction of human behaviour based on a Science of Man. It seemed also to destroy the view of man as a quasi-instinctive and passionate responder to situations and events which (as presented in sensation) were alike for all; reason could clearly distort the pattern, and man as a reasoning creature was clearly not analogous to a chemical element, responding uniformly in all uniform situations.

J.S. Mill's response to the German analysis of the socio-cultural habits of groups was to take the study of man out of the field of individual psychology and into the philosophy of history, and to abandon the empirical search for the universal principles of human behaviour for an inquiry into the "formation of character". Mill stood at a turning point in English history of ideas when the social sciences began to detach themselves from philosophy and from an examination of the conditions under which men could satisfy their wants, in a political system which guaranteed fair competition and individual freedom from oppression. Book VI of the System of Logic was a rudimentary attempt at a systematic analysis of the development of states of society, an attempt to give "universalising" a social and evolutionary base; in it the "true nature" of law and government as an object of study has altogether vanished. For Mill, the form of government appropriate for a given country depends on a scientific analysis of its historical development and the prescription of the laws and institutions appropriate to the "stage" it has reached. It was a transformation in thinking Bentham might not have recognised. It is with his understanding of human nature that our detailed study begins.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Hobbes, Human Nature Ch.1, in English Works IV (ed. Molesworth, 1840) p.1
2. Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York, 1954) pp.132-33
3. See, for further examples, the discussion in John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford, 1958) p.11
4. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature (Everyman ed., 1964) I.5
5. ibid., pp.5-6
6. Box 27 (UCL MSS) p.125
7. ibid. p.131
8. "Every science has its own metaphysics. Jurisprudence therefore among the rest. For every science has its peculiar terms to be explained: its peculiar ideas the dependencies and connections of which with one another require to be traced out. Hence the connection of jurisprudence with metaphysics". Box 27, p.140b
9. ibid., p.55
10. Works (ed. Bowring, 1838) XI.72
11. ex.gr., "In the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only with death" - Leviathan Ch.11, "Of Man", (ed. Oakeshott, Oxford 1960) p.64.
    For Locke see Essay on Human Understanding II.21, "Of Power. "what is it moves desire?... happiness, and that alone". (ed. Cranston, New York 1965) p.159.
    Hume, "Enquiry into Human Understanding", Essays (ed. T.H. Green & T.H.Grose, 1883) II.69
    For Bentham and James Mill, see this thesis passim
12. Hume, Essays II.68
13. Hume, Treatise I.5
14. quoted by H.G. Schenk, The Mind of the European Romantics (1966) p.19
15. Works, I.199
16. Herder, Ideen (tr. T.O. Churchill 1800, ed. F.E. Manuel, Chicago 1968) p.146
17. quoted Schenk, op.cit. p.15
18. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus Bk.2, ch.9 (ed. C.F. Harrold, New York 1933) pp.195-96
19. J.S. Mill, System of Logic VI.5.3 (8th ed., 1900) p.564
20. ibid. p.568
21. ibid. VI.5.5 p.568
22. ibid. VI.5.5 p.568

23. quoted Schumpeter, op.cit. p. . The impatience exhibited by other Americans (cf. James T. Shotwell: "We are in the political sciences where the natural sciences were two hundred years ago" (1921)) seems to have few parallels in British social science, except perhaps in the writing of Harold Laski.

24. J.A. Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (1961) p.86

25. Wordsworth, The Prelude (1805-06 version) VIII.761-7

26. See the valuable discussion in R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, 1936) pp.83-85

27. Bentham, Works VIII.116

28. ibid., VIII.206, 256 for theory of aggregates; X.80-81: "From the very constitution of human nature, man prefers his own interest to that of others; without it, the species could not have had existence".

29. Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New York, 1970) p.27

30. Bentham did not begin to think that sensational experience might differ in kind for every individual being. His own speculation on the content of other minds, he noted, "though just in kind", might only be "erroneous in degree" (Box 70a p.23)

31. Bentham, Works VIII.26

32. Herder, quoted in Cassirer, Essay on Man, pp.43-44 (translation by Cassirer)

A N A L Y S I S O F C H A P T E R T H R E E

1. Human nature was the foundation of political argument for Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Bentham. 2. Bentham's understanding of man is (definitionally) an animal possessing reason, who by nature seeks pleasure and avoids pain in all actions. 3. Pleasure-seeking is a contingent quality in man; and 4. "human nature" is understood by Bentham as the personified assemblage of man's contingent qualities. 6. Bentham wavers between regarding a self or person as the subject of action (divided into body and mind) and the strict empirical position, which takes mental phenomena as the only known antecedents of action. 8. "Self", however, is essential to Bentham's philosophy as the referent in decisions re pleasure and pain.

9. What is the nature of the "pleasure" which Bentham believes all men to seek in all actions? 10. A sensation, perception, feeling are varying answers; though 11. in later life he regards these as synonymous. 12. He follows Reid's example in regarding sensations as the effect produced in the mind by external agency (where Hume had refrained from deciding whether impressions on sense arose from external objects or were created in the mind). 14. Pleasure is, therefore, a sensation; sensations are feelings; but many different conscious states are denoted by "feeling". 15. Bentham says nothing to limit the type of feeling to which pleasure may refer; though 16. he believed throughout his life that pleasure was a bodily event as well as a mental experience. 17. Clearly, however, pleasure is conceived by Bentham as differing in feeling from man to man, and as representing 18. a wide variety of conscious states (see his list of sense-pleasures in the Principles of Morals). What characteristic, then, do these many modes of feeling share to make them pleasures? Bentham replies: "I call Pleasure every sensation that a man had rather feel at that instant than feel none". 19. He therefore makes no attempt to define pleasure in terms of specific felt-qualities - its unique defining quality is that it names a sensation which is liked and desired (a notion implicit in preferring feeling X to feeling nothing). 20. The risk of defining "liking" tautologously in terms of pleasure is avoided by an ingenious explanation: 21. to "like" something (i.e. to get pleasure from it) is to desire its continuance or repetition, in preference to 22. feeling nothing. 23. All sensations, therefore, are candidates for the title "pleasure"; 24. this definition (refined by Sidgwick) frees the analyst from limiting definitions in terms of felt-quality.

26. Aware of the infinite qualitative range of pleasures, Bentham was however prepared to analyse pleasures quantitatively. 27. His calculus was held in contempt by J.S. Mill, who felt able to rebuke Bentham for ignorance of the range of pleasures possible. 28. Mill, however, failed to understand that "pleasure" is not the name of a felt-quality, but is a name expressing the fact that a felt-quality is valued (i.e. its continuance or repetition is desired).

30. Bentham's analysis of pleasure compared with Ryle's classification.

32. The question: why do men seek pleasure? is unanswerable: it means, why are certain felt-qualities liked and desired? The further question, why are states of liking in themselves likeable? is not a tautology, for 32. states of liking can in themselves be the object of voluntary action. I like to be doing things which give me pleasure and which I like.

34. Is Bentham's pleasure-principle (all men seek pleasure in all actions) a tautology, however? It is argued, No; its contradiction may be asserted without absurdity; and Bentham holds pleasure to supersede questions of specific taste or need in the choice of all actions. 35. It is, for Bentham, the ultimate object of actions, the end in view, the purpose for which an action is brought about. 36. The principle is not tautologous for those who believe that duty, honour or love of God dictates their actions, rather than pleasure; but Bentham classifies all these as possible pleasures. 38. Pleasure, he holds, is not merely a subsidiary or implicit aim of action, but the prime determiner of human behaviour.

C H A P T E R T H R E E

B E N T H A M

"I ground the civil right of sovereigns," Hobbes wrote in the Leviathan, "on the known natural inclinations of mankind".[1] It was on man's nature, elucidated in terms of "inclinations" (and nor primarily in terms of cognitive or rational abilities, or in terms of the "standing apparatus" of the mind) that Locke, Hume and in turn Bentham rested their political prescriptions. "To understand political power aright," writes Locke, "... we must consider what state all men are naturally in";[2] "there is no question of importance," writes Hume, "whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man";[3] and in one of Bentham's earliest MSS. we find the declaration

> the foundation of political science is the knowledge of mankind... the politics of the legislator is founded on knowledge of the species. [4]

Only Locke, among this empiricist group, appeals in his political argument to principles other than those which define human nature. All reject history both as a source of knowledge ("experience concludeth nothing universally," averred Hobbes)[5] and as any type of justification for inherited forms of government and justice. All reject argument which moves from concepts to states of affairs: to define, as in a vacuum, the meanings of "sovereignty", "obedience", "power", etc. is for the empiricists a meaningless procedure; they ask first, "what is man's nature?"

and then, "what should law, obedience, power therefore be for him?"

Much of Bentham's analysis of human "nature" and behaviour lies buried in unpublished MSS. But his attempt to discover what man characteristically and distinctively is issued in two principles: one, a species-definition of man as an animate being possessing reason, which will be discussed below; and two, a central statement relating to "human nature" which is one of the best known parts of his work:

> When a man does an act, be it what it may, it must be taken for granted, that, all things considered, he finds a pleasure (or mitigation from pain) in it: or else he would not have done it: otherwise, if this be not true, it is not pleasure & pain, but something else, that is a motive to action. 6

This "pleasure-principle" presents problems of meaning and evidence of a highly complex nature, which will be the subject of most of the later sections of this chapter. It will be shown that Bentham's analysis of "pleasure" broadens the understanding of human inclination and appetites of earlier empiricists, such as Hobbes, who chose to emphasise "in the first place" as "a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death".[7] Bentham argued in the Table of the Springs of Action that not merely "power", but an enormous variety of experiences, can count as the "pleasures" that are man's first desire and aim in action.

Knowledge of human nature, therefore, is both a philosophical ahd political objective for Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Bentham, but for none of them is human nature thought to be substantial, or something invariable, after the manner of Scholastic essences, or

possessed of qualitative permanences. Nor is it deemed by them to be an object of knowledge: endless is the confusion, writes Bentham, arising from men's habit of seeing names and inferring the reality of objects corresponding to them.[8] "Human nature" is for Bentham a heuristic, a piece of scaffolding on which other, political and social, arguments can be rested; it is in essence a "fictitious entity", [9] and an "entity" only in the sense of being "a subject matter of discourse".[10] Fictitious entities, Bentham tells us, have no reality, owe their existence only to language, and what is predicated of them is, in strict truth, predicated only of their respective names; but this does not mean that all fictitious entities are redundant as accounts of 'reality' in the manner of poetical, legal and religious fictions.[11] Such concepts as "human nature", and other fictions of logical discourse, are aids to human converse, and are indispensable for the description of what goes on in the human mind.[12] The concept of "fictitious entity" Bentham admits to borrowing from D'Alembert, but it resumes very well the attitude taken by Hume and Locke to constructions such as "human nature".

Human nature is, for Bentham, an "aggregate idea" - a "collective concept" which contains as its members those like qualities which obtain among the beings who are defined (on other grounds) as "men".[13] The class, or "classical aggregate" called Man, from whose myriad individuals the common properties called "human nature" are abstracted, consists as a species (Bentham, borrowing from the "Tree" compiled by Porphyry, a Greek commentator on Aristotle, is nothing less than precise) of "corporeal substances" in possession of life, and endowed with the

"transcendent gift" of reason - possession of which talent distinguishes men from brutes (Bentham is uninterested in other human qualifications such as bipedality and featherlessness).[14] Possession of life and reason, then, makes men men (hence our frequent and literal allusions to murderers and other beings whose command of reason is questionable as "inhuman" or "subhuman"), but it is not to these invariable, because definitional, qualities that Bentham refers in the concept of human nature. Human nature consists of the qualities which adhere contingently, and in common, to the beings defined by possession of reason as men; and like other empiricists, Bentham is preoccupied more with the "active" and appetitive qualities which pertain to human nature than with the "passive" or cognitive qualities.

Misunderstanding of Bentham's way with the word "nature" has, however, led some later examiners of his work to interpret "human nature" not as a constantly changing aggregate of qualities, but as a single entity equipped with powers unempirically ascribed to determine human behaviour and "oblige" men to seek pleasure in action. Rhetorical flourishes by Bentham have helped to confuse the issue: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of... pain and pleasure... a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality...";[15] or "pleasure... the intense, sole and constant object of pursuit, from the very constitution of our natures".[16] The fact that human action is efficiently caused by human nature[17] (or more precisely, by the motives to get pleasure from action which are, for Bentham, its most important&universal quality) is, however, different from asserting that human action is determined by human

nature - a possibility which cannot be known through observation or experience and which cannot, therefore, be entertained. The nature of any object, says Bentham, can only be made known "by means of its relation to objects designated by other names";[18] this entails that there can be no knowledge of essential functions, permanences, necessities or determinations in the nature of objects,[19] and what holds true of objects holds true also of entities ("any subject matter of discourse, designated by a noun-substantive")[20] such as human nature. Not only does he find no ground for ascribing the universality of man's search for pleasure to an a priori determination, he sees no ground for inferring a single and uniform cause (i.e. a constant prior factor). Men often proceed, he says, from discerning a conformity of effect to hypothesising a conformity of cause, which they call a "law of nature" - without realising that this "law" is a statement of the conformity itself, and not of some hidden power in nature producing it:

> The sort of events, the uniformity among which this term (law of nature) has hitherto been employed to designate, are human actions... If it were fully understood, that a law... signifies not an occult cause of conformity among facts, but merely the conformity itself, the phrase might be employed... without danger of confusion.[21]

"Human nature", therefore, is an aggregate idea, a fictitious entity, a statement of an undetermined and undetermining conformity in motives, and not an object possessed of an essential core in the manner of Scholastic objects.

Bentham's denial of a known cause or determination of human behaviour does not extend to a denial of a "subject" of human behaviour: he willingly makes the Cartesian jump from the existence

of consciousness to the existence of a particular "self" or "person" who is conscious. Empirical theory of knowledge argued that impressions are the only knowable entities and treated them as purely mental phenomena (believing, therefore, that actions were adequately explained if their psychological antecedents could be established); but among the empiricists only Berkeley held strictly to the implied denial of a "self" or "agent" as subject of impressions, and Locke, Hume and Bentham all found grounds for positing a principle of personal identity. Certainly Bentham has his passages of strict philosophical allegiance - following Hume, he explains that "when perception has place, ... impressions are, at the time in question, made on sense; ... of the perception... obtained, these impressions are the immediate object and subject".[22] Equally, in the instance of actions and "discourse" (wishes, commands, requests, etc.) he finds mental phenomena to be their only discernible antecedents: "Of discourse, the only immediate subject, is the state of the communicator's mind; in other words, of some one or more of the faculties belonging to it... either the active faculty, (to which belongs the volitional faculty), or the passive faculty".[23] But, this said, much of Bentham's legal and political writing rests specifically on the concept of a "person" - "composed of two reputed parts, ... body and.. mind"[24] - whose behaviour in the role of subject and agent was central to Bentham's investigations. The grounds for positing the existence of "body" differ from those for positing "identity", and Bentham is enough of a loyal Humean to define body consistently as a fictitious entity[25] and as a matter of inference, drawn from "the evidence afforded by perception".[26]

Thus "the body itself, i.e. the existence of it, is but in a secondary or comparatively remote way the object or subject of perception. Of this supposed source of the perceptions that are experienced, the existence is, strictly speaking, rather a subject of inference than of perceptions".[27] But elsewhere, a much more Common Sense approach is adopted. Behave as if the body did not exist and "pain, the perception of pain, will at once bear witness against you."[28] The inference from perceptions to the existence of body is much stronger, he adds (this is an 1815 passage) than that from perceptions to the existence of incorporeal substances.

The sense of identity, therefore, which inheres in this parcel of flesh and blood is no independent entity, existing apart from everyday behaviour and perception. Bentham inherits from Hume a concept of the self as an existential entity, which is both the sum and constantly changing total of past and present experiences, and the principle which unifies these (with the aid of memory and the ability of the mind to perceive relations and resemblances between perceptions). But his chief understanding of the self is as a unit of feeling - a referent against which the pleasure or pain of experiences can be judged and valued, and be rejected or preferred accordingly. In the end, it is the existence of the self which makes sense of action ("purposive movement")[29] taking place at all: for if there were no focal point, no self, to which desires, wants, needs and actions referred, and whose "interests" (the word is Bentham's) dictated that desires, wants, needs and actions should have place, there could be no reason for desires to exist or actions to occur, ex nihilo, at all. It is to this inner

being, clothed in flesh, that the mental events which are the primary data of experience - motives, desires, interests - pertain; and it is from the common factor among these mental events (the constant drive to get pleasure) that **the concept of human nature derives.**

Bentham's "pleasure-principle" has been roughly handled in the history of philosophers, and its meaninglessness has been asserted by some of his closest sympathisers. John Hill Burton, for example, in the introduction to Bentham's collected Works in 1838, tried hard to make sense of it by arguing that "the term nearest to being synonymous with pleasure, is volition: what it pleases a man to do, is simply what he wills to do".[30] Others, such as J.S. Mill, were less patient: he, considering the principle in 1833 in the form that "all men act always for their own interest", commented, "Mr Bentham did no more than dress up the very trivial proposition that all persons do what they feel themselves disposed to do".[31] The discrediting in the 1830's of Bentham's principle is one of the most important, and most unjustly neglected, episodes in the intellectual history of Utilitarianism, and this is described in chapter five. But the confusion among Bentham's disciples about the principle's meaning was not eased by the hesitant response of Bentham himself to the attacks made on it by Macaulay in the 1820's - a hesitation which perhaps should not surprise us, since Macaulay addressed him on questions to which he had not attended in writing for fifty years. It is in Bentham's earliest unpublished writing, in the 1770's, that we find the fullest exposition of the meaning of and evidence for the principle. It is to these problems that we turn first.

(a) Bentham on the Nature of "Pleasure"

> Happily, concerning what is Pleasure & what Pain... mankind are pretty well agreed. 32

What is the nature of the "pleasure" which Bentham believes all men to seek in all their actions? What sort of state, condition, event or entity does the word denote? Bentham's answers to these questions are several but, I shall argue, consistent; the general sense of his many assertions is that "pleasure" is the name of a mental or bodily event, which defines a particular kind of "relation which (a man) bears to any sensible object".[33] The important point about this assertion is that "pleasure", for Bentham, is not a mental or bodily event alone; it is a mental or bodily event which bears a defined relation to sensible objects (or perceptions); and this careful qualification protects Bentham's concept of pleasure from the Rylean objection that, if pleasure is in some sense regarded as an event or feeling, then it could logically occur in isolation - without, that is, any contextual grounds for feeling pleasure. For Bentham, a mental or bodily event is not pleasure unless it stands in a particular kind of relation to perceived, or sensible, objects: a relation which we shall attempt to set out below.

A sors Benthamiana[34] might well yield the judgment that "pleasure" cannot be the name of any single type of mental or bodily event, for in differing contexts Bentham refers to

> the different and opposite modes of sensation, viz. pain and pleasure;

and declares

> pains and pleasures may be called by one general word, interesting perceptions;

and again,

> That is pleasure which a man's judgment, aided by his memory, recommends and recognises to his feelings as pleasure. 35(emphases mine)

The majority of Bentham's allusions to the nature of pleasure define it, however, as a sensation; as do his most forthright definitions.

> One knows well enough what Pleasure is, for there have been no great books written about that. Would a man know what pleasure is, he consults sensation: and sensation informs him without deceit. 36

It is my contention that where, on occasions, Bentham describes pleasure in terms of perception or feeling, he intends reference nonetheless to the mental or bodily event which he commonly denotes by the word "sensation": that is, the action of the mind (and, perhaps, of the body) in reacting to perceptions. In 1776, for example, we find Bentham assuring us, in one of his earliest manuscripts, that "perceptions" are the same thing as "sensations"; while in one of his writings on logic in the 1820's, he asserts that the notion of "perception" is bound up in the sense of the word "sensation":

> ... Sensation, the word being taken in that sense in which it is significative not merely of perception, but of perception considered as productive of pain alone, of pleasure alone, or of both. 37

On the question of the similarity of "sensation" and "feeling", another passage written late in Bentham's life holds them to be, if not synonymous, at least interchangeable:

> Pathematic perceptions: perceptions... in the case where... they are attended with sensations or feelings of pain or pleasure... 38

It is on the strength of these considerations that "pleasure" will

here be treated, for the purposes of analysis, as the mental or bodily event denoted by the word "sensation".

But in establishing a single name for analysis we have not, unhappily, established a single concept - for Bentham's understanding of the nature of "sensation" shows exactly that development which one would expect in a philosopher who begins his writing in the 1770's as a loyal Humean, only to become exposed, in his later life, equally strongly to the influences of Scottish Sensationalism. Bentham's early declaration that "perception" and "sensation" are "the same thing" derives from the example of Hume in the Treatise, where in places "sensation" and "perception" are both used as substitutes for "impression", and all three words are used as synonyms for what we might now call sense-data; and where Hume argues that "the mind can never exert itself in any action which we may not comprehend under the term of perception".[39] It was not until the 1780's that a precise distinction between "sensation" and "perception" was attempted, by Thomas Reid - whose achievement it was to force a conceptual wedge between the notions of the mind's action in perceiving and the mind's action in reacting to perceptions (sensation); and who exposed the confusion between the qualities perceived in objects and the effects on the mind of qualities perceived in objects, which allowed much eighteenth century philosophy to argue as if effects on the mind like pleasure and pain were actually present in the objects producing them. In a famous critical passage Reid wrote:

> Pressing my hand with force against the table, I feel pain, and I feel the table to be hard. The pain is a sensation of the mind, and there is nothing that resembles it in the table. The hardness is in the table, nor is

> there anything that ~~resembles~~ resembling it in the mind. Feeling is applied to both, but in a different sense; being a word common to the act of sensation, and to that of perceiving by the ~~act~~ sense of touch...
>
> The perception and its corresponding sensation are produced at the same time. In our experience we never find them disjoined. Hence we are led to consider them as one thing, to give them one name, and to confound their different attributes. It becomes very difficult to separate them in thought. [40]

This was a conceptual separation which Hume rejected as impossible: to him the phenomena striking upon sense could not be differentiated in their origins:

> As to those impressions which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and it will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind. [41]

So Hume attempted no distinction between impressions arising from external objects (perceptions) and arising from the mind (sensations). All impressions were perceived: "an impression first strikes upon the sense, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other", he wrote. [42] (my emphasis).

That Bentham subscribed to this Humean caution in distinguishing between perceptions and sensations, at least in his earlier writings, there can be little doubt. In 1776, discussing so subtle a reaction to perceptions as the "pleasure of the mind" called "revenge", he says simply "It is a sensation: (and) all sensations are perceptions", treating as one the perceptible qualities of a situation or event and the effect on the mind of those perceived qualities. [43] But by 1800 he has begun to use "sensation" in the manner of Reid, though not, perhaps, with too

precise an understanding of his meaning. "Almost all our perceptions have corresponding sensations which constantly accompany them," wrote Reid, and Bentham explained in turn in his introduction to the Table of the Springs of Action in 1815 how such sensations as "original pleasure and pain... are accompaniments, or results, of perception".[44] But elsewhere the old usage of "sensation" as synonymous with "perception" crops up, and in one passage in his Phenomena of the Human Mind both the old and the new usages occur in the same sentence: where, that is, he speaks of apathematic and pathematic perceptions, "perceptions as they have place in the case where they consist of, or are attended with, sensations or feelings either of pain or pleasure".[45] (my emphasis). Generally, however, in his mature work Bentham's understanding of the nature of sensations echoes the theories of Reid, though because of his peculiar marriage of the Humean language of "impression" with the Scottish language of "perception", this is not always easy to recognise - as, for example, in this example from "Mental Operations, Class 1":

> Perception, conception, apprehension. When perception has place, ... impressions are at the time in question made upon sense: - on some one or all of the senses to the cognizance of which the object stands exposed. Of the perception thereupon obtained, these impressions are the immediate object and subject...
>
> Acts of the intellectual faculty or department are, 1. simple perceptions (in the margin: for the distinction between impressions and ideas we are indebted to David Hume.) 2. Sensations, i.e. perceptions attended with pain or pleasure; and 3. Judgments or opinions.[46]

Bentham here treats sensations in a manner acceptable to the Scots - as "those internal feelings of the mind which arise from impressions made by external objects upon the several parts of our

bodies", as Hartley put it as early as 1749.[47] He even came to argue in 1815 that sensations of pleasure and pain are "more real" than the perceptions to which they stand in relation - and, indeed, act as the test of the reality of those perceptions:

> Pain and pleasure, - together with all sensations of the (illegible) or uninteresting class (for by this name may be characterized all sensations and perceptions other than those of pain and pleasure) are to us the only immediately perceptible entities: in comparison of them, not only the mind itself but our own bodies respectively, with the addition of all other bodies may be considered as belonging to the class of <u>inferential</u> entities. For sensations alone are the immediate objects and subjects of experience: it is from them that we infer the existence of this or that other real entity in the character of an instrument productive (of pleasure or pain?)(this phrase faded)[48]

Thus, in the <u>Ontology</u>, Bentham invites phenomenalists to act upon their supposition that corporeal substances are unreal: the sensation of "Pain, the perception of Pain will at once bear witness against you," he says.[49]

Pleasure, then, is a sensation; and sensations, for the mature Bentham, are personal experiences which are stimulated by perceptions; but what kind of experience is a sensation? In what verbal sense is a sensation undergone? A sensation, it emerges, is a <u>felt</u> experience; Bentham refers severally to "sensations or feelings of .. pleasure";[50] and it is here, in analysing the import of the word "feeling", that a new set of problems begin. There are many forms of conscious state denoted by the word "feeling", including the perceptual ("feel a cool breeze upon the cheek"), the localised bodily sensation ("feel a pain in the foot"), the general bodily condition ("feel energetic, sleepy, refreshed"), the hedonic tone ("feel good, contented, satisfied") and the emotional ("feel distressed, elated, embarrassed"). Now it is possible that Bentham wishes to draw

on all of these understandings of "to feel" when he tells us that "Pleasure" is "that which to (a man's) reflection, affected by his memory, and through it first upon his own feeling, is so". [51] There is no obligation to limit his understanding of "feeling" to that sense of the word which denotes, for example, a localised bodily sensation, such as a thrill of excitement, or an ache in the leg.

What is more, we are told by J.S. Mill that so narrow a view of the feeling-experience as this was possible only for the philosophically vulgar:

> A Feeling and a State of Consciousness are, in the language of philosophy, equivalent expressions: everything is a feeling of which the mind is conscious; everything which it feels, or, in other words, which forms part of its sentient experience. In popular language Feeling is not always synonymous with State of Consciousness; being often taken more peculiarly for those states which are conceived as belonging to the sensitive, or to the emotional, phasis of our nature...
>
> The still greater perversion by which Feeling is sometimes confined not only to bodily sensations, but to the sensations of a single sense, that of touch, needs not to be more particularly adverted to. [52]

There is some echo here of Hume's declaration in the Treatise: "To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see: all this is nothing but to perceive". [53] And in Hume's manner Mill argues further that "one of the sources of confusion is the division commonly made of Feelings into Bodily and Mental. Philosophically, there is no foundation at all for this distinction: even sensations are states of the sentient mind, not states of the body, as distinguished from it". [54] His position here is that all sensed experience or feeling (which is a "genus of which Sensation, Emotion and Thought are subordinate species") [55] takes place in the theatre of the mind, not of the body. But was it, as Mill suggests, impossible for a competent thinker to conceive of feelings

and sensations - such as pleasure - as in some sense bodily events?

The answer is that, whatever its philosophic competence, this was a view accepted by Bentham, at least, throughout his life. Indeed, in his earliest writings in the 1770's, Bentham argued the exact reverse of Mill's thesis: that all sensed experience is bodily-sensed experience, and that states and feelings held to occur "in" the mind derive from "bodily perceptions" [56] in the same way that ideas are but pale copies of impressions:

> Take any pleasure of the mind whatever for an example, and trace it up to its source, we shall always find it originating in the class of pleasures of the body. Suppose that class away, and we shall find that the other never would have had existence. This is no more than a consequence of the grand proposition made manifest by Locke, that our ideas all originate from the senses. [57]

This argument is repeated in Bentham's manuscript appreciation of Maupertuis, where he states that all pleasures can be shown to be feelings of the body (this was in 1776, according to Professor J.H. Burns' dating.) [58] But this was a position he rapidly abandoned: the Principles of Morals, five years later, concedes the different nature of pleasures of the mind from those of the body, and modifies the bald assertion that all pleasures of the mind originate from pleasures of the body:

> It seems pretty certain... that a man's sensibility to causes producing pleasure or pain, even of mind, may depend to a considerable degree upon his original and acquired frame of body. But we have no reason to think that it can depend altogether upon that frame - since... we see persons whose frame of body is as much alike as can be conceived, differing very considerably in respect of their mental frame... [59]

Yet Bentham never reaches Mill's view - that only mind exists, and that it is in the mind that all experience is sensed or "felt".

He disdains judgment on the question of whether mind and body are one substance - "it makes no difference", he replies.[60]

Yet one important conclusion about the way pleasure-sensations feel emerges from his discussion of the mind-body problem. Even "granting for argument's sake" that they <u>are</u> one substance, Bentham concludes that "if a mind be but a part of a body, it is at any rate of a nature very different from other parts of the body".[61] And from this follows analytically the fact that the pleasures of the mind and body (taken to be sensational reactions to perceptions) are <u>felt</u> in "very different... parts of the body" - and therefore Bentham must not be taken to assert that all pleasures are felt in one homogeneous way, or felt, as J.S. Mill insisted, uniquely in the mind.

We should also note that Bentham does not assert that a particular pleasure necessarily feels "the same" to everyone: for, he argues, radical differences in men's "frames of body" and "frames of mind" make them perceive and sense in different ways:

> It seems to be universally agreed, that in the original frame or texture of every man's body, there is a something which... renders him liable to be affected by causes producing bodily pleasure or pain, in a manner different from that in which another man would be affected by the same causes.[62]

That pleasures <u>must</u> be felt by Benthamite man in many different modes is, in a sense, evident from the species of pleasure which Bentham describes in the <u>Principles</u>. We can apply the forms of conscious state denoted by the word "feeling" (see three pages back) to his given list of sense-pleasures, and show the many types of feeling they exhibit, as follows: 1. " - of the taste or palate"

(localised bodily sensation) "including whatever pleasures are experienced in satisfying the appetites of hunger and thirst" (general bodily condition); 2. " - of intoxication" (localised bodily sensation, emotion); 3. " - of smelling" (localised bodily sensation); 4. " - of touch" (localised bodily sensation); 5. " - of the ear" (perceptual); 6. " - of the eye" (perceptual); 7. " - of the sexual sense" (localised bodily sensation); 8. " - of Health" (general bodily condition) "or, the internal pleasurable feeling or flow of spirits... which accompanies a state of full health and vigour" (hedonic tone) "especially at times of moderate bodily exertion" (general bodily condition); 9. " - of novelty; or, the pleasures derived from the gratification of the appetite of curiosity, by the application of new objects to any of the senses" (perceptual, emotional). Clearly, there is no single mode of "feeling" which covers all the cases described here.[63]

What characteristic, then, do these varieties of feeling supposedly share, which makes them instances of "pleasure" - given that their likeness is not a likeness in the mode in which they are felt? In virtue of what common quality are such "pleasure synonyms" (Bentham's phrase) as 'solace', 'prosperity', 'peace', 'sport', 'tranquillity', 'joy', 'mitigation', 'ecstasy' enrolled as members of the pleasure-class?[64] These are questions which Bentham largely ignores in both his published and unpublished writing: but in two passages from different sources, one written early, the other late in his life, he gives an answer of both great importance and conceptual subtlety:

> I call Pleasure every sensation that a man had rather feel at that instant than feel none.[65]

This difficult definition (from an early MS., probably 1773) identifies "pleasure" as any and every sensation whose existence (i.e. whose being felt) is preferred by the feeler, at a given instant, to feeling no sensation. The importance of the definition lies in the fact that it rests its understanding of "pleasure" not on an attempt to make generalisations about the felt-qualities of the entities, states and sensations which we call "pleasure", but on an attempt to pinpoint the unique defining quality of "pleasure" in the fact that pleasure-sensations (or -states, or -conditions) are in some sense <u>always liked and desired</u>; for analysis shows that the notion of "liking the X-sensation" is <u>implicit</u> in the notion of "preferring feeling the X-sensation to feeling nothing". Bentham's definition is limited and cautious; he offers nothing to the philosophical debate about why pleasure seems always desired and desirable; he merely observes that it is so.[66] Further, he is arguing that its state of being desired is the intrinsic quality of a pleasure-sensation (and no mere contingency); what <u>makes</u> a sensation such as "gladsomeness", "joy", "prosperity" a sensation of

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** 64. Some of these pleasure-synonyms do not seem, at first sight, to fall into the class of "sensational reactions to perceptions" - which I have argued above is the understanding of sensation followed by Bentham in his later work. That they do, in fact, fit into this class may be shown by using them in the sentence "X gives me a sense of Y", where X is a perceived event or object and Y any of the list of pleasure-synonyms offered in <u>The Table of the Springs of Action</u> (1815)

** 65 Above the line, "perception" is crossed out above the word "sensation". In the margin, Bentham writes as a parenthesis against the word "sensation" in a passage he translates from Maupertuis - "the word is perception - it makes no difference".
UCL MSS. Box 96, p.128

** 66. Bentham makes short work in the <u>Principles</u> II.19 of monks, ascetics, etc. who claim to disapprove of pleasure and "make it a matter of duty to court pain". All they are doing, he says, is perceiving that "certain pleasures (are)... at the long run... attended with pains more than equivalent to them" and hence seeking pleasure in different, safer forms.

pleasure is the fact that, at a given instant, it is liked and desired ("preferred to feeling no sensation").

Unhappily, however, this explanation of the nature of pleasure-sensations is not free from problems. "Pleasure" and "liking" are so commonly defined in terms of each other that, in referring the meaning of "pleasure" to concepts of "liking and desiring", we are arguably producing a synonym for, or a tautology of, the word "pleasure", rather than an elucidation of its sense. Definition is traditionally and rightly required per genus et differentiam, and the difficulty here is to translate the meaning of "liking X" into language other than "getting pleasure from X" - to avoid, by analogy, explaining E flat as D sharp. Bentham, however, has an answer for this. A man's liking for the X-sensation or X-event (which is what makes X a pleasure to him) is shown in his desiring the continuance or repetition of X: X is liked or desired when it is a sensation or event "during which a man would neither wish to sleep, nor to pass onto any other sensation" [67] (emphasis Bentham's). This is Bentham in 1776, approvingly translating Maupertuis; but in 1829 he still holds this view of pleasure, as this passage from Dumont makes clear:

> Nous éprouvons sans cesse une variété de perceptions qui ne nous interressent pas, qui glisse pour ainsi dire sur nous, sans fixer notre attention. Ainsi, la plupart des objets qui nous sont familiers ne produisent plus une sensation assez forte pour nous causer de la peine ou du plaisir. On ne peut donner ce nom qu'aux perceptions interressantes, a celles qui se font remarquer dans la foule, et dont nous désirons ou la durée ou la fin. [68]

** 68 Emphasis mine. "Ce nom", slighly ambiguous in its reference here, points back to "une sensation assez forte...". "Sensation" here is used in the sense indicated by Bentham in the passage footnoted 6 above: as "a sensation-affording perception".

Pleasure, then, is any sensation (or perception, for Bentham's definition is an early one) which a man likes, in the sense that he desires its continuance; but this analysis of the sense of "liking" leaves at least one ambiguity unresolved. It may be the case that a man likes and desires the sensations occurrent to him, but that nonetheless there exist other sensations that he likes and desires more - and which, if he were pressed, he would describe as the sensations he "really likes". For example, I may "like" living in my college room in the sense that I desire the continuance of the sensations and perceptions arising from my being there; but if I were asked, drawing on broader comparisons, "do you like living in this room as opposed to somewhere else?", I would certainly answer "No - what I really like is living in a hotel suite". It was the belief that people get pleasure only when they achieve their "real likes and desires" - what they like, that is, in preference to other conceivable goods - which led the French philosopher Maupertuis, in whose work Bentham confessed "much surprise" at finding his idea of pleasure anticipated, to conclude that the lives of most people are dominated by moments of pain - where a pain is any perception "que l'ame aime mieux ne pas éprouver qu'éprouver". Most people, Maupertuis argued, desire constantly to do away with (anéantir) the perceptions they experience, and to experience instead a sensation/perception life totally different from that which is actual to them:

> Si on examine la vie d'aprés ces idées, on sera surpris, on sera effrayé de voir combien on la trouvera remplie de peines, & combien on y trouvera peu de plaisirs. En effet, combien sont rares ces perceptions dont l'ame aime la présence ! La vie est-elle autre chose qu'un souhait continuel de changer de perceptions ? elle se passe dans les désirs, & tout l'intervalle qui en sépare

> l'accomplissement, nous le voudrions anéantir; souvent nous voudrions des semaines, des mois, des années entières supprimées; nous n'acquérons aucun bien qu'en le payant de notre vie. 69

Bentham, however, disagreed with the conclusion that "la vie (est) remplie de peines", "de perceptions que l'ame aime mieux ne pas éprouver qu'éprouver". Certainly this conclusion follows, he granted, if we compare our sensations to those we can best conceive of, to "the highest pleasure which a man knows of"; for only the richest, most powerful and most beautiful, only Crassus, Goliath and Venus can know of no wealth, strength or beauty which exceeds their own, and to which their own sensations could be compared unfavourably. [70] Nonetheless, we do every day claim to "like" many objects and events in our flow of perceptions and sensations: there is, for example, some sense in my saying that I like my morning coffee, my college room, my walk to the library, even though I can conceive of champagne, palaces and a chauffeured car to the library; and it is Bentham's argument that my liking of these sensations rests on a comparison made between them and <u>the absence of sensation</u> - between feeling (experiencing) these sensations and feeling nothing. "I call Pleasure", we have already seen, "every sensation that a man had rather feel at that instant <u>than feel none</u>" (my emphasis); and it is certainly the case that, if the concepts of liking and getting pleasure derive from the preference of X to nothing, then a very different estimate of the pleasure-value of human lives is achieved from that reached by Maupertuis.

We may also note in passing that the qualification "I call Pleasure every sensation that a man had rather feel <u>at that instant</u>

than feel none" allows for the possibility that X may constitute a pleasure at one moment but not at another. Coffee, walking to the library, may afford pleasures to me at particular times - i.e. they provide sensations whose continuance I desire and which I prefer to feeling nothing - but it does not follow that at all times I approve of them in this way.

All sensations, therefore, are "candidates" for the status of pleasure: though successful attainment of this status by any sensation at any given moment depends upon fulfilment of Bentham's conditions, (i) that it is preferred by the feeler to feeling nothing, (ii) that its continuance is desired, (iii) that it is desired at that instant: and Bentham's list of pleasure-synonyms in the Table of the Springs of Action, which includes enjoyment, delight, mirth, comfort, gladness, success, prosperity, sport, entertainment, refreshment, relief, and rest, enumerates only some of the sensations which may be preferred by the feeler as pleasures. But although the general attractiveness of such sensations to the feeling (i.e. to the "sentient mind"), and the unattractiveness of such sensations as vexation, humiliation, gloom, embarrassment, is accounted for on the basis of their felt-quality, no hint is offered by Bentham as to the nature of this felt-quality. He argues only that pleasure-sensations, on the ground of their appeal to feeling, are sensations apprehended at a given instant as desirable, and he provides no elucidation of what felt-quality they possess which makes sensations such as joy, delight, mirth, etc., so frequently liked and desired.

This understanding of pleasure is one that Sidgwick was to

sharpen in the Method of Ethics:

> To get pleasure is to have an experience which, as of the moment, one would rather have than not have, on the basis of its felt-quality, apart from any other considerations regarding consequences. 71

The advantage of this definition is that it frees the definer, as we have seen, from saying anything about the "felt-quality" of pleasures. But Bentham at least commits himself to the belief that this quality is heterogeneous in nature: to the belief, indeed, that the felt-grounds on which sensations may be preferred as pleasures are as many and various as sensations themselves. Hence he has no patience with the "unum nomen, unum nominatum" theory of pleasure, which was not uncommon in the eighteenth century; this example is taken from Abraham Tucker:

II.55 (2052) ch 16

> Satisfaction is always one and the same in kind, how much soever it may vary in degree, for it is the state the mind is thrown into upon the application of things agreeable; and whatever possesses that quality in equal degree, whether meats or drinks, or diversion, or gain, or acquisition of power, or reflection on past performances, fills it with the same content and complacence: wherefore the various species of motives must be distinguished by the variety of vehicles containing satisfaction. 72

Tucker, a great admirer of Locke, whose word "satisfaction" he preferred to use instead of "pleasure", was even prepared to make a guess at the way in which satisfaction, or pleasure, is felt physiologically:

I.192 ch 6

> All of which seems to indicate that there is some particular spring or nerve appropriated to affect us with satisfaction or uneasiness, which never moves unless touched by some of the nerves bringing us our other ideas. 73

But Bentham says nothing of "how it is" to feel pleasure, and certainly does not believe that pleasure-quality is of a single

nature, felt always in one state of mind or body. "Of whatever nature a Pleasure be," he writes (emphasis mine), "a Pleasure of the Body, or a Pleasure of the mind: a pleasure of enjoyment and pleasure of possession, or a pleasure of expectation: a pleasure of the concupiscible appetite, or a pleasure of the irascible..." [74] - can there be any doubt here that Bentham is aware of the variety of quality, as feeling, of different pleasure-sensations?

The reluctance of both Sidgwick and Bentham to pronounce upon the nature of the felt-qualities of pleasure-sensations derives, in Bentham's case, certainly from his awareness as an empiricist that knowledge of the quality of a "sensation... (which is) not of him who announces the proposition concerning it" is but "presumption (of) what would be the case", [75] and that in consequence nothing of certainty can be said, with a general reference, about these felt-qualities. His reluctance derives also, perhaps, from an awareness that pleasure-sensations can be felt in so wide a variety of ways, that no set of qualities unique to pleasure-sensations could be conceived or defined. But it would be mistaken to go further than this, or to press the similarity of view between Bentham and Sidgwick, or between Bentham and other modern thinkers, too far. Bentham has no Wittgensteinian awareness of the conceptual impossibility of defining a public word (pleasure) on the evidence of private ostensive reference; he is conscious merely of the practical difficulties of getting at other people's feelings. Unsurprisingly, in fact, he specifically states that a man may learn the nature of pleasure and pain from his own experience; [76] and he shows a consciousness neither of the difficulties of defining private sensations in terms of public words, nor of the logical

priority of "public" to "private" definitions of pleasure. I wish to point out here only that Bentham reaches an understanding of "pleasure" common, in one important respect, to that of Sidgwick and of several twentieth century writers; I do not wish to suggest that the logical path he followed to this conclusion was necessarily the same.

Aware, however, of the qualitative variety of pleasure-sensations privately apprehended, Bentham offers only one ground for the public assessment of the value of pleasures: the quantitative. His tool to equip legislators to make quantitative social comparisons, the felicific calculus, examined pleasures in terms of"intensity: duration: certainty: propinquity; add, if in a political community, extent", though it is worth noting that in a late writing, Bentham removed the much-ridiculed dimension of "intensity" from the list:

> Of these five, the first, it is true, is not capable of precise expression: it <u>not</u> being susceptible of measurement. But the four others <u>are</u>. [77]

Consideration of the felicific calculus led J.S. Mill to conclude, correctly enough, that its value was chiefly political: as he put it, somewhat sneeringly, "a philosophy like Bentham's... can teach the means of organising and regulating the merely <u>business</u> part of the social arrangements"; [78] but it led him also to the false, and more famous, conclusion that the calculus represented the fulness of Bentham's wisdom on the nature of pleasure. We may validly ask, in the light of Bentham's remarks on pleasure examined above, what is the force of Mill's supposition

that Bentham was ignorant of qualitative differences between pleasures; and what is the force of his judgment, taken as an objection to Bentham, that "it would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend upon quantity alone".[79]

The classic statement of Mill's case is his exposition of the qualitative superiority of "mental" to "sense" pleasures:

> There is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.
>
> It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, &c. of the former - that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature... (yet) It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some <u>kinds</u> of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.[80]

Mill's rebuke to "utilitarian writers in general" is for failing to note that some kinds of pleasure are "more desirable and more valuable" than others "<u>in their intrinsic nature</u>", rather than on grounds of "circumstantial advantage" (that is, "their assistance to goods external to them"). Bentham, elsewhere,[81] is held to be ignorant of such purely qualitative distinctions between pleasures, in virtue of his value-equation of pushpin and poetry, "<u>quantity</u> of pleasure being equal". How does Mill's charge affect Bentham?

The answer is that Mill's charge is both true - and discredited in importance. Of the many assaults on his position,

we shall note only Bradley's objection that "mere qualities" are not in themselves comparable; qualities may be compared only when some criterion of value external to them is introduced, that criterion being either greater quantity of pleasure, if the comparer is a hedonist, or some other good, if he is not.[82] Now in the case of Bentham, the criterion of ~~Value~~ Comparison introduced - as both the felicific calculus and Mill's objections have made famous - is that of "quantity of pleasure". But we must observe that "quantity of pleasure", although the criterion by which Bentham ~~Values~~ Compares pleasure-X against pleasure-Y,[83] is not, and cannot be, the ground on which pleasure-X and pleasure-Y are first <u>valued in themselves</u>. For before its value can be assessed in quantitative terms, there must be something about the quality of any pleasure-sensation qua sensation which constitutes its attractiveness to the feeler in the first instance. This means, quite simply, that before a man can assess the quantitative pleasure of sensations arising, ex.gr., from a bag of sweets, there must be something about the quality of sweet-eating sensations, qua sweet-eating sensations, which makes them a pleasure to him in the first place. In any pleasure-sensation - which on Bentham's account is compounded (a) of a sensation, (b) of a desire for its continuance or repetition, which constitutes the "pleasure" - the notion of "pleasure", when conceptually separated from the sensation it qualifies, is not the reason <u>why</u> that sensation is valued (which is for felt-quality), but is a way of expressing the fact that it <u>is</u> valued - in the sense that its continuance or repetition is desired. For the element of "pleasure" in any pleasure-sensation, as understood by Bentham, is not a discrete quality, but rather a

function of quantity, and a ground of comparison: as a concept, it attaches degree to any attractiveness felt qualitatively in sensations which are not, in themselves, comparable; and "different pleasures" are degrees of the same pleasure attached to sorts of other feelings. There are no differences of kind in the pleasure-element of different pleasure-sensations, only differences of degree: and hence in any comparison, the criterion by which one pleasure-sensation is preferred against another can only be a quantitative one, the criterion of degree.[84.]

A Note on Professor Ryle

One of the more surprising offspring of Bentham's theory of pleasure - though not by conscious descent - is the understanding of pleasure held by Professor Ryle. Ryle is of course hostile to the para-mechanical language of "getting pleasure", and he speaks instead of "enjoying"; but his contention that "enjoying" is a species of "the genus attending or giving one's mind to" brings him surprisingly close to Bentham. According to Ryle, a man who has "enjoyed" digging is a man who has "dug with his whole heart in the task, i.e. ... he dug, wanting to dig and not wanting to do anything else (or nothing) instead";[85] and the analogy here with what Bentham would say of a man enjoying digging - i.e. that he dug, desiring the sensations arising from digging to continue - is close. The analogy is even closer when Ryle says of a golfer who has enjoyed, or got pleasure from, his game, that

> he would at no time have welcomed an interruption; he was never inclined to turn his thoughts or his conversation from the circumstances of the game to other matters. He concentrated on it without lecturing himself or adjuring himself to do so. It would have been, and perhaps was, an effort to concentrate on anything else.[86]

It is not our concern here whether Ryle's assessment of the conditions under which a man enjoys a game of golf is, or is not, correct. (It is clearly disputable.) What I want to point out is that Ryle's description is arguably a periphrasis for what Bentham would say more concisely and intelligibly of a golf-player getting pleasure from his game - "that he wanted the sensations arising from his play to be continued and not to be interrupted". The similarity of approach is seen more clearly, perhaps, when Ryle, rising from the example to the theory, tells us about the golfer

that "in this sense, to enjoy doing something, to want to do it and not to want to do anything else are different ways of expressing the same thing";[87] the parallel here with Bentham's idea is evident.

We must not, of course, press this comparison too far - or forget that one of the major points of Ryle's argument is his denial that any parallel mental activity occurs while a man is enjoying himself. Ryle tells us specifically that "to say a man has been enjoying digging is not to say that he has been both digging and doing or experiencing something else as a concomitant or effect of the digging";[88] while Bentham clearly wants to describe a man enjoying digging as both digging and experiencing simultaneously a mental state of desiring the sensations arising from digging to continue. But, this important qualification about parallel mental activity observed, there is a similarity between the two philosophers' understanding of the conditions under which a man gets pleasure (and arguably a greater clarity in Bentham's) which deserves to be noticed.

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Among Bentham's few direct discussions of the nature of pleasure is an early work on Utility, drafted c.1773 (now Box 70a in the University College, London MSS.), and rejected for publication. Much of its material appeared in a rewritten form in the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (written by 1780, published 1789). Below: "What is happiness? Cicero wrote great books upon it... He who can write a great book upon Happiness to know what it is, assuredly will know nothing... One knows well enough what Pleasure is, for there have been no great books written about that..."



Pain

been no great books written about that. Would a man know what pleasure is, he consults their sensation: and sensation informs him without deceit.

4

Shall we then give a meaning to the word Happiness?

Happiness. what

I know but one. It is the Sum of a number of Pleasures. It have had some such notion, seems to have been the great [illegible]

[illegible] to have had some notion of it to solve them some meaning to it,

We know well enough what Pain is - for there have been no great books written about that neither. Would a man know what pain is, let him consult sensation, and sensation will inform him but too plainly.

Pain what

Note [1]

I would not be mistaken. "To know what it is," is one thing: to know how it is producible is another. To know how it is producible may well take up a great multitude of great books. In the ample Sciences of Jurisprudence of

Pleasure of Body - in Eating

I do more than expect the B[illegible] I do more than possess it: I [illegible] sually enjoy[illegible] The pleasure [illegible] a pleasure [illegible] enjoyment. Seats or inte[illegible] instruments [illegible] my tongue, [illegible] palate, my [illegible] mach: The [illegible] ternal [illegible] ment is the [illegible] bread.

INTROD. CH. II. Happiness and Unhappiness. their ingre[illegible]

Box 70a, p.45: "Shall we then give a meaning to the word Happiness? I know but one. It is the Sum of a number of Pleasures. We know well enough what Pain is - for there have been no great books written about that neither. Would a man know what pain is, let him consult sensation, and sensation will inform him but too plainly".

13.

A Pleasure. what.

And now we are enabled to ascertain what it is we mean when we speak of a pleasure: what it is that is the constituent of identity in pleasures: how much it is of the sum total of our sensations throughout life that goes to the constituting of an individual pleasure: tis the identity of the cause. ⊞ *13

Instance Eating

14.

Food is the instrument eating is the cause of a certain pleasure. I eat, and in so doing I feel a pleasure. how much of the sum total of my sensations goes to the making of that pleasure? as much as is occupied by the act of eating [Cf next 90 to 18.]

15.

Magnitude in a pleasure

The product of the intensity and duration of a pleasure, may be termed its magnitude.

16.

Lot of Happiness

What in a single person makes a pleasure, in a state may be said to make a lot of Happiness.

17.

A Pleasure, What.

"And now we are enabled to ascertain what it is we mean when we speak of a pleasure: what it is that is the constituent of identity in pleasures: how much it is of the sum total of our sensations throughout life that goes to the constituting of an individual pleasure: tis the identity of the cause. (Over) Tis (the nature of) the cause that connects one portion of time spent in pain or pleasure with another portion of time spent in pain or pleasure: ... Tis the cause that is the bond of connection between Pleasures. A cause is an instrument in action. The cause of a pleasure is the instrument in action".

(Carried on) "Instance Eating. Food is the instrument, eating is the cause of a certain pleasure. I eat, and in so doing, I feel a pleasure; how much of the sum total of my sensations goes to the making of that pleasure? as much as is occupied by my act of eating".

- Rejecting the possibility of finding the constituent of identity in pleasures in a common felt-quality, Bentham points instead to the cause of the pleasure as its distinguishing element

b) <u>The Problem of Volition: Is the Pleasure-Principle merely truistic?</u>

> The same motives affect and repel, the same passions agitate the members of one family and the members of a thousand; the same passions agitate the convent and the cottage: the cottage and the palace. No man ever lived thirty years without seeing the whole round of them brought into play a thousand times over. [89]

Men, Bentham does not doubt, are universal, constant and eternal seekers of pleasure; and to seek pleasure, in his opinion, is to seek sensations (or perceptions, using the word in the sense he employed in 1773) that are liked or desired on the basis of felt-quality.[90] The felt-quality of a desired sensation cannot be analysed, but "liking" for it can be: (i) it consists in a preference for experience of that sensation to no sensation; (ii) it finds expression in a desire for continuance or repetition of that sensation.

To ask <u>why</u> all men seek pleasure is to pose the unanswerable question: why are the felt-qualities of differing sensations liked or apprehended as desirable ? (Most philosophers since Wittgenstein would say that an answer is not only unreachable, but could not be expressed in any public language.) The further question which arises: why do men strive at all to achieve sensations that they "like"? is not to frame a tautology (for people often claim to perform actions that they dislike, or are indifferent to, either in themselves or for their consequences); but is to demand an answer about why "states of liking" are in themselves likeable and desirable. The felt-qualities of "states of liking" are, like those of desired sensations, irreducible and unanalysable, but it is important to note that "states of liking" can themselves be an object of voluntary action; for the possibility exists that I may eat sweets, ex.gr., not only because (i) I like their taste (which thus becomes a

pleasure-sensation), but also because (ii) "I want to do something I like" - I want, that is, to achieve a "state of liking" in regard to my sensations, because the state of liking my sensations is often agreeable (likeable) to me. (It can be argued that people typically refer to this type of experience in the phrase "I am enjoying myself"). Thus the activity of liking and desiring ("getting pleasure") can be a pleasure to me, as well as all other available experiences and objects: though to debate the pleasure-possibilities of this pleasure in turn is to embark upon an infinite regress.

The other question of relevance here - why do all men seek pleasure? - is treated in section (c) of this chapter, where the problem is examined of how Bentham achieves his far-reaching knowledge of human motivation.

Translation of the pleasure-principle into language of liking and desiring** is, however, responsible for the ghost of tautology that still stalks it. The objection to the principle, when thus set out ("all men seek from their actions sensations they like or desire") becomes: what men seek voluntarily they must be presumed to like, or else they would not seek it. What information, therefore, does the principle offer? Is it not, in fact, as Macaulay and J.S. Mill

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** The reason why, I believe, Hume and Bentham cannot in the first instance use the language of liking and desiring to set out the pleasure-principle, is the difficulty which arises for empiricists of explaining all phenomena in terms of impressions, ideas and faculties. One cannot perceive "like" and "dislike": these words are typically held to name emotions and passions. Hence the experiences of liking and desiring in relation to perceptions are held by Hume to be another type of perception (or impression), called pleasure (with pain). "Original impressions... are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures". Treatise II.1.1

objected, merely true by definition?

Yet the principle is a statement of fact and not of logic. First, it passes the test of an empirical statement, that its contradiction may be asserted without intrinsic absurdity. It is entirely meaningful to say that men do not, in all their actions, aim at "desirable sensations" (pleasures) (how, after all, do we explain actions like visiting dentists, washing plates?) and many of Bentham's readers, not only in the relatively clerical age in which he lived, have argued that their actions aim not at desirable sensations, but at "fulfilment of duty", "pleasing God", etc.

Secondly, the most importánt information which the principle gives is that consideration of pleasure is the determining factor, and the ultimate determining factor, of the objects men seek in their actions; Bentham holds it to supersede all considerations of personal taste, need of the moment or specific desire. We shall see below that desire for pleasure need not be "conscious" (in Bentham's idiosyncratic understanding of the term) to exist; and when consious, it need not be temporally the first or last consideration to spring to mind in the mental formulation of an action. Bentham's argument, laid out, is that a voluntary action does not simply embody an intention to produce specific consequences on the part of its agent. It embodies also, usually implicity rather than explicitly, an expectation or hope[91] on the part of the agent in regard to himself - that he will, in Bentham's sense, like or get "pleasure" from the consequences or state of affairs that his action brings about.[92] This expectation of pleasure, Bentham holds, is not a merely analytic quality of the specific consequences relised in a voluntary action: pleasure is a real entity, its seat "either, in virtue of the whole nervous system

taken together, the whole of the bodily frame, or, in a more particular manner, this or that particular organ or other part"; it can exist in the mind, or it can act for the relief of "uneasiness" (not, however, in the Lockean sense).[93] It is <u>the</u> prime motive (cause) of voluntary action - for it constitutes the "ultimate object" of such action:

> In the case of human action, - a motion, real or fictitious, considered as being produced by an exercise of the faculty of the will, on the part of a sensitive being, - this action has, in every instance, for its cause, the desire and expectation of some good, i.e. of some pleasure or exemption from some pain, and the entity, the good by which this desire has been produced, is in this case, if not the only object, an object, and, indeed, the ultimate object, the attainment of which is, in the performance of the action aimed at. [94]

"An incident", says Bentham, "may be said to be <u>ultimately</u> intentional...insomuch that the prospect of the production of such incident, could there be a certainty of its taking place, would be sufficient to determine the will, without the prospect of its producing any other".[95]

Thus, pleasure is described also as the "end in view" of voluntary action - "one single end, to the attainment of which by the power and under the orders of the will the action is directed"[96] - and as its "final cause".[97] By this phrase Bentham is referring to one of the four Aristotelian types of cause, the <u>causa ut</u>, or that end or purpose <u>for</u> which an action is brought about. In an 1814 MS. he wrote:

> By final cause, is meant the end which the agent had in view; meaning, as hath been seen, by the <u>end</u>, if anything at all be meant by it, the good to the attainment of which the act was directed, - the good, i.e. the pleasure or pleasures, the exemption or security from such or such pain, or pains. [98]

Bentham's careful definition of an end in view distinguishes pleasure from an object in view, i.e. from the kind of consideration such as "personal safety", which men have constantly in view in framing their actions, but which constitutes the end in view in few of them.

There is, indeed, nothing tautologous about Bentham's suggestion that the aim of obtaining desirable sensation - pleasure - is the ultimate motive of human action. It is a suggestion prima facie false to those engaged on tasks which they regard as unpleasant: for the principle removes from them the right to say that they are pursuing anything undesirable. This seeming falsity to agents doing unpleasant things constitutes, in its own right, a "meaningful contradiction" of the principle (the test of its validity as an empirical statement). To the objection that instead of contradicting the statement itself, we are merely showing that other people contradict it, the rejoinder is that the pleasure-principle has a special logical status - expressing inferential knowledge of other people's motives, of the type "X's motive is Y"; and a meaningful contradiction of such a statement, or of any inferential statement about other minds, is a denial from X that this is in fact the case. The principle is also offensive to those who believe themselves to be motivated by considerations of "sympathy", of "doing duty", of pursuing "the honourable, the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the honestum, the decorum... in short", says Bentham, "anything but pleasure".[99] For it implies that a man who gives his money to the poor is making a decision as much tied to self-interest, to considerations of personal sensation, as he who chooses to waste his money at cards. Thus, in the Table of the Springs of Action, "love of God" and "pious fervour" appear under a section

contemptuously labelled "Interest of the Altar" and "patriotism", "public spirit", "family attachment", considered as motives, appear under "Interests of the Heart (more or less expanded)".[100] In the Principles of Morals, the motives which animate "the vilest of malefactors" are held to be not essentially different from these. Moral distinctions can be applied, Bentham argues, only to the consequences of actions, according to the pleasure (goodness) or pain (evil) that they generate: "there is no such thing as any motive that is in itself a bad one".[101] Hence the pleasure reaped by a criminal could not be reprobated, "if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone; but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain (or, what comes to the same thing, such a chance for a certain quantity of pain) that the pleasure in comparison of it, is as nothing: and this is the true and sole, but perfectly sufficient, reason for making it a ground for punishment".[102] Motives are themselves morally equal, for they are universally related to the expectation of pleasure or exemption from pain: and this is true also of intentions, for they are caused by motives.[103]

Bentham endeavoured to unseal men's eyes, not only as moral agents but as political subjects: to make them aware that government and justice were commonly used for the self-interest and personal pleasure of their administrators. Hence his "dedication of his life"[104] to "cleansing the Augean stables" (sic) of English law and government by the urging, as a moral object, of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

It was the simple proposition that men seek pleasure that Macaulay and others rejected as a truism in the 1820's (as indeed it is: men want what they like). But the principle, stated in

the form that all men seek pleasure as the end of action, has a quite different force: that is, to point out to men that pleasure (desirable sensation) is the prime determiner and cause of their actions, and not a merely subsidiary or implicit aim; and that it is in (conscious or unconscious) reference to the "ultimate object" of getting pleasure that they frame their desires and intentions. "It is by the eventual expectation of pleasure and pain," Bentham states,

> that in every case the will, and thereby the agency... are determined. It is by the idea of pleasure or of exemption from pain, considered as about to result from the proposed act, that the volition in pursuance of which the act is performed, and consequently the act itself, is produced. 105

It was, I believe, with a view to making these points more explicit, and to removing ambiguity, that Bentham chose most often in his later writing to set out the principle in the form that self-interest is the end of all human action. But his meaning was no different from before. Thus "Interest, i.e. desire of pleasure and exemption from pain, being, in some shape or other, the source of every thought as well as the cause of every action..."; [106] "in spite of everything which is said, the general predominance of self-regard over every other kind of regard, is demonstrated by everything that is done". [107]

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c) The Theory of Volition: Willing and Consciousness

If we look for the motives which inform everyday actions such as eating meals, going to work, accepting invitations, being friendly, we can normally point to a vast variety of reasons which we hold to be motives for doing these actions. For example, a man may explain his purposes in eating lunch severally according to the occasion: "I am hungry", "this restaurant serves pheasant", "I can't do any more work this morning", he may tell himself. Few philosophers (and no Utilitarian considered in this thesis) would deny that these constitute "reasons for acting" in a perfectly valid sense; but what is denied by Hume and Bentham is that any of these considerations constitute a motive for a man to go to lunch. First, they argue, a confusion is made between a "motive" and a "reason for acting"; there may exist a thousand reasons why a man should do X, but unless he has a desire to do X also, then he has no motive.[108] In Hume's words, "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will... it can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and the effects be indifferent to us"; in Bentham's, "acts of the intellectual faculty will sometimes rest in the understanding merely, without exerting any influence in the production of any acts of the will".[109] What is essential, therefore, to the composition of a motive is the existence of a desire: "a motive to the will: a desire operating in the character of a motive", is Bentham's definition.[110] Thus our friend has a motive for going to lunch if he likes pheasant and he wants to eat it (and, we shall see later, if he has an "interest" in doing so also). Secondly,

Hume and Bentham belong to a long line of philosophers who believe that there exists, among the multitude of ad hoc reasons that can be adduced to explain voluntary actions, one reason, the reason, which constitutes the final motive in all cases of voluntary action, and that this motive in ultimo is the same in all cases. (Their argument, more precisely, is that mental acts called choices are embodied in all voluntary actions, that "choice" is always a moral judgment since it constitutes a decision between alternatives, and that the moral judgment of obligation which precedes all voluntary actions - "I should do X rather than Y" - is finally determined, in all instances, by one, the same, overriding reason). All other reasons for acting, say Hume and Bentham, are reasons precisely because they provide support for the reason for acting, and they draw their strength as reasons proportionally to the degree of support they offer to the reason for acting. This reason, which the Utilitarians believed they had isolated, is bluntly set out by Bentham:

> When a man does an act, be it what it may, it must be taken for granted, that, all things considered, he finds a pleasure (or mitigation from pain) in it: or else he would not have done it: otherwise, if this be not true, it is not pleasure and pain, but something else, that is a motive for action. [111]

In the previous section, we have tried to show that this pleasure-principle is not simply a tautology or a triviality, but in fact gives genuine information about the type of mental experience which men desire as the ingredient of "happiness"; but there are at least two further types of problem which the principle raises, apart from the epistemological one (how does Bentham obtain this information about other minds?) which is examined in section (d)

of this chapter.

The difficulty is this. Most "the-reason" explanations of behaviour which we offer in everyday life are dispositional in nature: for example, we may say of a series of unrelated actions by a friend, "he does these things because he is vain". It is important to note here that the statement "he is vain" is not the motive in each of these actions taken individually, but points rather to the sort of reason or desire which our friend took as his motives in these actions. It is a statement about the kind of considerations which constitute motives for our particular friend, a statement about his disposition to behave in such or such a way - where a "disposition" is "a kind of fictitious entity, feigned for the convenience of discourse, in order to express what there is supposed to be permanent in a man's mind, where, on such or such an occasion, he has been influenced by such or such a motive, to engage in an act... the disposition (a man) is of during a certain period, (is) the sum or result of his intentions during that period".[112]

Now statements of the type "he is vain" are clearly of the same category as "he is considerate" or "he is a pleasure-seeker", and are all most plausibly construed in a dispositional sense. They are, as it were, gloves which fit over a set of otherwise unrelated actions, general rather than particular elucidations of a man's behaviour, elucidations of the principles by which he behaves rather than of the motives which underlie his specific actions. But against such understandings, Bentham construes the statement "he desires pleasure" as a motive-explanation of human behaviour, applicable therefore to each of a man's actions taken individually, and he

argues that "the desire and expectation of pleasure" constitutes the motive in all human action.

This raises evident problems. It is clear that (i) men do not conceive of pleasure as a conscious goal prior to the performance of every action, (ii) the pleasure which men do, on occasions, conceive themselves as aiming at differs radically from the "pleasure" analysed by Bentham (who argued, as we have seen, that to seek pleasure in action is to search for sensations whose experience or repetition is desirable). This much, as it happens, Bentham concedes; but his simple response is to declare "if my theory be true, it will serve as a striking example to prove that not only every single person, but in a manner all mankind, may be determined, and that for many years, by considerations of which they are not themselves conscious".[113]

This raises the questions:

(1) Can men "desire" and "expect" pleasure from actions, without being "conscious" of desiring and expecting?

(2) What account of consciousness does Bentham offer to allow men to aim at goals of which they are unconscious?

(3) What account of the processes of choosing, desiring and willing does Bentham offer wnich allows men to choose things of which they are unconscious?

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The accounts of volition (or "acts of the will")[114] given in Bentham's late essays on Logic elucidate only to a small degree the riddle that a man may aim at pleasure in all his actions, yet remain ignorant or deceived that he is desiring such pleasure. Actions are "motions", Bentham tells us, "real or fictitious, considered as being produced by the faculty of the will, on the part of a sensitive being";[115] and within the act of the will which precedes the performance of an action, he distinguishes four separate stages: the formation of desires, the checking of these desires against a man's interest, the framing of an intention, the presentation of these desires and intentions as motives to the will. "Motives whose influence is most powerful, most constant, most extensive are those of physical desire, love of wealth, ease and life, and fear of pain: all of them self-regarding motives," Bentham notes;[116] "the basis of motives is the eventual expectation of pleasure and pain".[117] Declaring, therefore, that men are moved by one motive alone - "only the expectation of eventual enjoyment of pleasure can operate in the character of motives",[118] and that is so universally - "motives are universally the same in all men; dispositions express their moral differences",[119] Bentham is nonetheless unabashed to tell us that "motives of which they are not conscious may determine the behaviour, not only of individuals, but of all mankind, for many ages".[120]

"How can a man not know his own motives?" Bentham asks helpfully in 1789.[121] "It is often the case that we know the motives of others better than we know our own... because interest tells us to know more about the motives of those on whom our happiness depends than about our own motives, an investigation which brings us no

enjoyment, more likely mortification".[122] (The mortification arises because we are appalled at the predominance of self-regarding interest in our lives). This remark is thoroughly plausible; and indeed, of the elements involved in the mental prolegomenon to action, only a man's intention need be known to him for a purposeful action to take place. (Even this is half-denied by Bentham - "intention may take place when the perceptive faculty is conscious, unconscious, or falsely conscious of the circumstances which accompany it").[123] A man may validly be ignorant, in performing an action, of his interest, his desires, and his motives; and Bentham leaves no doubt that all of these are directed constantly to the achievement of pleasure:

> INTEREST
> ("synonyms, affections and passions";[124] "a word having no superior genus, which cannot therefore be defined"; "a motive considered in an abstract point of view, viz. as possessing the faculty of being called into action, but without presenting to view any particular occasion", 125, 126)
>
> "Interest, i.e. desire of pleasure and of exemption from pain, is the source of every thought as well as the cause of every action", 127
>
> "A subject is of interest to a man when it is considered as more or less likely to be a source of pleasure to him", 128
>
> DESIRE
> "has for its object pleasure or pain or a mixture of both", 129
>
> "has in every case an external object and an internal object, viz. the pleasure which corresponds to that external object", 130
>
> MOTIVES
> "to understand what 'motive' means, we must look to pleasure and pain", 131

In a post-Freudian era it is easy to understand that a man may conceive clearly his intentions in any given action, while his real desires and hopes from such action and his motives and interest in

performing it may be hidden from him. This was by no means apparent to the 18th century philosophic world, however, intent to place desire along with other psychological states, among the immediate data of consciousness, to give it the status ontologically of a feeling or a thought. Locke argued in the Essay on Human Understanding that "ideas in the understanding" are coeval with sensations,[132] that a person's mental states are necessarily known to him; but Bentham denied this, stating in the Ontology that "intentions, affections and motives (are)... out of the reach of direct observation".[133] We shall see shortly that desires and motives are denied a place among the immediate data of consciousness because of Bentham's redefinition of the word "consciousness", which goes beyond the Lockean sense of "awareness" which passed unchallenged for eighty years; but the immediate point is a different one. Desires, motives and interests are universally to be understood, according to Bentham, in terms of pleasure and pain, although such understanding is sadly lacking in the majority of men; but neither of these claims are put forward about intention. Intentions, in contrast to desires and motives, are elements in the volitional faculty which are normally immediate and accessible to the agents; and for most human beings, they are only on occasion directed to the production of pleasure per se. Bentham, although defining pleasure as the "end in view" and "final cause" of all voluntary action, is careful not to identify it as an universally intended consequence of actions, or to suggest that pleasure is, in some sense, a premeditated goal of all action. (There is a further confusion arising from Bentham's declaration that "the expectation of pleasure... in every case determines the will",[134] but we shall see that in Bentham's dictionary the expectation of pleasure does not

imply the premeditation of pleasure). Pleasure is taken as the universal end of action at the level of interest, motive and desire, according to Bentham; and he no doubt ascribes mass ignorance of this universal purpose to the common familiarity of agents with the consequences they intend in actions, while being blind to the desires and motives which inspire such actions.

It is essential to the plausibility of the pleasure-principle that Bentham does not insist that pleasure is taken universally by agents as a premeditated goal of all actions: nor does he insist that a man must conceptualise his expectation of pleasure in any formal or deliberated way in order to expect it.

Our first question, "can men 'desire' and 'expect' pleasure from actions, without being 'conscious' of desiring and expecting?" has an air of paradox for one reason only: it confuses a Lockean definition of "consciousness" with a Benthamite proposition. It is Locke's argument - and this far Bentham agrees - that consciousness "is tne perception of what passes in a man's own mind"; its instrument is the understanding, which "turns inward upon itself, reflects on its operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation".[135] To be conscious, in Locke, is to perceive one's mental states and at the same time to know their nature and identity; having a sensation and knowing it are coeval activities, for sensations are immediate data of consciousness; "to be happy or miserable without without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible".[136] In Bentham, however, consciousness is not merely a state of having a sensation, being aware of its presence, but of correctly apprehending its nature. Consciousness takes place,

Bentham tells us,

> when the party believes precisely those circumstances, and no others, to subsist, which really do subsist. [137]

If a man "fails of perceiving circumstances to subsist, which, however, do subsist," he is unconscious of his mental state, even if aware of its presence; and when he makes a mistake - "he believes or imagines certain circumstances to subsist, which in truth do not subsist", he is falsely conscious of his mental state. The judgment faculty is separate from the perceptive faculty, and is susceptible of many forms of error;[138] a man is only conscious of his mental states - desires, motives, interests, intentions - when he is inwardly aware, learning and correctly apprehending them.

Bentham's judgment, therefore, that "motives of which they are not conscious may determine the behaviour, not only of individuals, but of all mankind, for many ages", turns out to have a highly stipulative meaning. It is this: men may be determined for many ages by motives which they do not correctly apprehend - either because their presence eludes men's awareness ("habits, power of example, continue to dictate behaviour long after the principle on which they were founded ceases to exist")[139] or because men supply a false analysis to themselves, with or without the best of intentions. Transferring meanings, the questions we are trying to answer therefore become: "Can men desire and expect pleasure from their actions, without correctly apprehending the nature of their desires and motives?" and secondly, "what account of consciousness does Bentham offer to allow men to choose goals (or form desires) of whose nature they may be ignorant?" rather than: "... choose goals (or form desires) which elude their awareness?"

Our problem, therefore, has become to show by what theory of volition it is possible to desire and expect pleasure from actions without correctly apprehending this desire and expectation. We require, in effect, a theory of desire and expectation which operates independently of correct apprehension of the end (i.e. final cause or purpose) of such desires.

> Antecedently to action (the actions termed involuntary excepted), the will is, in every case, perceptible in exercise: not so the understanding, [140]

declares Bentham, in course of showing that desires are experiences in the first instance of the "volitional faculty", and do not of necessity address themselves to the "perceptive faculty" (the understanding). (Although desires may be articulated and discussed as verbal formulae, they are not, in other words, identical with such.) In his analysis,[141] Bentham distinguishes between the object of desire - the thing desired, and on occasions consciously proposed as the goal of action - and the end <u>for which</u> that object is sought: and he contends that in all instances of voluntary action, pleasure is the end desired. For an action to be willed, knowledge of an object is all that is necessary, and clearly it is possible to desire an object, event or experience while being ignorant of the end in view; and it is the object, rather than the end or motive in action of which the mind is normally conscious (i.e. correctly apprehends). There is a vast reservoir of purposeless action, both public and private, in civilised and uncivilised societies, whose occurrence can only plausibly be explained by positing ignorance of ends; once made conscious of ends, Bentham believes, men will alter their objects in order to reap the end of pleasure more efficiently.

Pleasure, as defined by Bentham, is a quality of objects and experiences and is not itself an object that can be desired: "I call pleasure every sensation that a man had rather feel at that instant than feel none".[142] As a sensational quality of objects and events desired it explains (as the end, or final cause) why men seek these as objects of desire - the reason being that they embody the desired felt-quality of sensation, that its continuance of repetition is desired. The basic human desire, as viewed by Bentham, is for all things whose quality is such that the agent would prefer their continuance or repetition than not. This is not specifically hedonistic: "getting to work on time" may embody the quality of experience whose continuance or repetition is desired, given the likely alternatives.

"Desiring pleasure", therefore, is a notion only properly understood when the definition of pleasure has once again been unpacked. To treat pleasure as in some sense an "object" in Bentham's theory of volition, as opposed to an end, is the source of all popular misinterpretation of his meaning.

It is the character of pleasure as an end which entails that it is usually found among the implicit rather than explicit aims of action; and also - though this is paradoxical - among the implicit "expectations" of action. When Bentham states that "only the expectation of eventual enjoyment of pleasure can operate as a motive",[143] the notion of expectation must not be construed as involving an explicit (in the sense of verbal or propositional) hope, but as functioning compatibly with Bentham's notion of consciousness - i.e. correct apprehension. Expectation in Bentham's analysis is

conceptually parasitic on the notion of unconscious motivation - for having redefined the notion of unconscious motivation, so that it is possible for motives to exist of which a man has no correct conception, it becomes possible also for expectations to exist without being correctly apprehended or described. It is this which explains the fact that pleasures, although "expected", may arrive "unlooked for".[144]

d) The Epistemological Theory

Bentham offers no specific explanation of the uniformity by which men seek pleasure as an end from ancient to present times, from England to Bengal (a country which served too often in the nineteenth century as a crucible for English experiments in political theory).[145] He merely states that it is so, and appeals to observation and experience for support.[146]

Nowhere, however, does Bentham assert that men seek pleasure as an end because they must, as an immutable principle of their natures; for observation and experience do not give rise to knowledge of necessities.** "Necessity, certainty... whatsoever there is of reality correspondent to any of these names", he writes,

> is nothing more or less than a disposition, a persuasion of the mind, on the part of him by whom these words are employed, in relation to the state of things, or the event or events to which these qualities are ascribed... in the use of these words is virtually involved the assumption of omniscience.[147]

Men do seek, and always have sought, pleasure as an end in all their actions, in all times and places; but they seek it fortuitously and contingently, and not by law or "natural necessity". Human

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** Where he appears to assert this, as in Deontology (1834) I.83: "If the balance of pleasure be really the intense, constant and sole object of pursuit, - if it must always continue to be so, from the very constitution of our natures..." (a passage I have not been able to find and check in the MSS.), he means, I think, that desire for pleasure arises by nature (a truism which is merely the starting point of Bentham's thinking about motives - see Works VIII.279).

The idea that pleasure is found naturally desirable (though not compelling) descends to Bentham from Hume and Helvetius: Hume asserts that we know the goodness of pleasure by an original impression of the senses, Helvetius states that "in the first ages of the world... nature, by hunger, thirst, heat and cold, informed man of his wants, and added... pleasing and painful sensations" (Treatise II.1.1; De L'Esprit (tr. Mudford, 1807) p.248). Thus Bentham tells us repeatedly that men's interest is to seek pleasure, that "to increase the sum of his well-being, every man's desire from birth", and that seeking of his own pleasure is essential to every individual's survival (Box 14 p.142; Works IX.6).

nature in Bentham is no "essence" with duties and functions attached, after Scholastic principles; nor is it determined by biological necessities of the type detected by Hobbes (who argued that men naturally and necessarily seek pleasure in order to quicken the vital motions of the body). Nor, in spite of such terminology as "springs of action" and "psychological dynamics", is men's pursuit of pleasure mechanically determined. To talk about mechanism is to talk about the automation of the internal workings of the mind, not about the behaviour that the process produces. (We shall outline that process when describing interests, motives, desires and will below). Further, there is no evidence that Bentham regards the urge to seek pleasure as an end as a psychological compulsion similar to kleptomania or to drug-induced behaviour. And the point should be made that pleasure-seeking is in no way treated by Bentham as a defining characteristic of mankind; the definition of man that he reaches, following Porphyry, by "logical subalternation", emphasises man's power of reason as his distinguishing character rather than his habit of seeking pleasure as the end of his actions. The principle explicitly rests on behavioural analysis, not on man's static qualities qua man.

How, then, does Bentham know that all men seek pleasure in all their actions? It is clear, at the outset, that his understanding of motivation both universally and historically is not achieved by any sifting of data or through any theory readily identifiable as a philosophy of history. His explanation of the reason in action, of men's true motive, is admitted in a drafted work in 1773 to be both hypothetical and axiomatic. It is based, in essence, on analogy

from his own external behaviour at pleasure-moments to the external behaviour of others:

> If (my system) is founded upon sensation - that is certain: and sensation is the highest evidence - that is also certain
> ... but this sensation is not of him who announces the proposition concerning it (whether of affirmance or denial) it is not of the Possessor, nor can it be (but by accident) of the audience: it is in him and in them no more than a presumption of what <u>would</u> <u>be</u> the sensations, in a case which is not present, of other men, formed upon recollection, observation and analogy - recollection of past experience (of one's own sensations) upon past occasions - observation of the conduct of others - analogy according to which such conduct is presumed to originate from the like sensations as gave birth to the same conduct in ourselves.
>
> It is true again on the other hand that this recollection from experience, this observation and this analogy are the very grounds and the only ones we have of conduct which are universally received as sufficient for the most as well as least important concerns of common life. These observations, this recollection of experience may be erroneous - it may be incomplet'd, tho' just; the analogy, binding together the experience and observations, according to which the sensations of others are presumed to be what we remember our own to have been in cases similar, tho' just as to the <u>kind</u> of these sensations, may be erroneous as to their degree.
>
> This is its weakness, but it is for those who maintain a different one to shew that it is a weakness from which their own is free. 148

Bentham then offers an example of his mode of analogy from his own behaviour to the observed behaviour of others, in a passage which suggests that any inquiry into the content of other minds requires great scepticism on the part of the analyst:

> Drinking is a pleasure. How do I know it? I have a palate, I have felt it. Hearing music is a pleasure - I am deaf and have never felt it - how am I then to know it? because you say you have felt it, and you tell me it is one - But you may be little scrupulous about your veracity, and you may have an interest in making me believe that it is a pleasure to you. Your vanity may be interested in making it believed that you have a source of pleasure that I have not. How am I then to arrive at the truth? My examining your deportment at the time of hearing music, by observing whether it exhibit any of those appearances which I know from my own experience as well as from unsuspected testimony to accompany the perception of pleasure. But your

> countenance is phlegmatic and unexpressive and betrays no marks of pleasure when it is felt: or it is supple and..... and counterfeits pleasure when it is not felt - Still unsatisfied I have nothing left but to observe whether you frequently put yourself in the way of enjoying this pretended pleasure. If I see you do this, when you have no reason to suppose yourself observed, when no other motive but the pleasure to be reapt directly from it can be assigned; from all these considerations put together I may conclude that you reap a pleasure from it, that it is a cause of pleasure. 149

One is tempted to observe that if this degree of detective-work is required for accurate assessment of the sensations of an individual, directly observed, then the task of assigning motives universally would defeat the ordinary man. As if to counter this misgiving, Bentham argued in a later writing (1818) that in the moral sciences, "demonstrations" of mental states (including motivation) after the manner of the natural sciences were not possible. Something is demonstrated in moral science, Bentham states, if it creates "satisfaction" in the mind of an enquirer or an antagonist; so long as the satisfaction created is complete and the enquirer's purposes met, it matters not whether a mental fact is demonstrated by logic, geometry or personal experience. In moral science, argument from experience is of the same mode as a logical or geometrical demonstration, because the phenomena under study (mental acts) are known only from observed acts of the body.

> The moral sciences are they susceptible of demonstration? It is what men have been sollicitous (sic) to know... <u>When</u> a thing is demonstrated, every thing is done that can be done - a man's satisfaction is compleat, it puts an end to hesitation in the enquirer, to dispute in the antagonist...
>
> What is it then that a man hankers after when he asks for demonstration? His satisfaction. Now this satisfaction, if he obtains it, he obtains what he wants - it is no matter whether it is by means of lines and spaces, or of mood and figure... Anything that will give him.. satisfaction will answer the purpose...
>
> Locke has said they are (i.e. the moral sciences

> demonstrable): has he said true? To know this, we must understand what demonstration is, we must satisfy ourselves clearly what we mean by demonstration...
>
> If men in their speculations, concerning the Moral Sciences, think ever to get clear of the testimony (report) of other men as a part of their foundation, much more of the testimony of their own senses, and this is what they mean by demonstration, they will find themselves mistaken...
>
> We all sufficiently understand what is meant by, to do an act... An act is an act either of the mind alone or of the body: an act of the mind alone is what exhibits no motion, no change in the appearance of the Body... An act of the mind produces no bodily image in the mind of him who considers it: but no individual act of this sort can be known or offer itself to the consideration of a person other than the agent but by some act or acts which is, or are, an act or acts of the body... This act of the body by which the act of the mind makes itself known is such as is found by experience to accompany it.
>
> If the mental act in question be such as has accompanied the bodily act or object in question in my own instance, I can obtain an idea of it: <u>other wise not</u>. 150 (my emphasis)

Having therefore identified my own accompanying behaviour to given sensations of pleasure and pain, I can proceed to observe the behaviour of others. Pleasure may not be a cognitive state - but to the competent analyst, "unambiguous indications" of its presence will be afforded:

> To no man, can the quality of sensibility in the breast of any other man be made known by equally probative and - wisdom; countenance, gesture, deportment, contemporary deportment at the time, subsequent deportment at other subsequent times - from each of these articles of circumstance separately or collectively taken, indications more ... (illegible) and unambiguous may be deduced than from any direct evidence, as is or can be constituted and delivered by any verbal account by him of his own feelings. 151

This last remark should not be taken to mean that Bentham has private-language difficulties about the identification of personal sensations, for the Box 90 definition makes the <u>presence</u> of pleasure (though not its type) a publicly establishable matter. Pleasure is <u>not</u> a twinge, thrill or squeeze which might be mis-

labelled by the introspector: its evidences are publicly accessible, according to publicly acceptable and conventional rules, whereby a man continues in or repeats a given sensation.[152] However, a man standing in the sea who grimaces and swears cannot be held with certainty to be experiencing pleasure - continuance of the sensation in itself not being conclusive evidence; deportment, expression, etc. are the grounds on which a desire to continue that sensation are established.

There is, of course, no more direct evidence for Bentham's analysis of the definition and presence of pleasure than for such metaphysical concepts as Aquinas' belief that desire is "a movement of the appetite", "an inclination of the person towards something apprehended as good". Yet the passages quoted show that at minimum, Bentham has empiricist intentions, and show interesting evidence of what kind of an inductivist he is. His convictions, in ultimo, do not arise from systematic review of the relevant facts in all their complexity, but from reference to the overall plausibility of the argument considered as a piece of reasoning. Hence the challenge: "This is its weakness: but it is for those who maintain a different (system) to shew that it is a weakness from which their own is free".

e) Universal Human Nature and Bentham's "Philosophy of History"

We have tried to show in this chapter that the meaning of the word "pleasure" in Bentham's writing has been substantially misunderstood by his interpreters, as has also the meaning of his pleasure-principle and the grounds of his ascription universally of the motive of pleasure-seeking in voluntary action. In this final section, we ask briefly whether Bentham has also been misunderstood - as Professors Mack and Baumgardt* allege - in the matter of his "philosophy of history". To many Bentham scholars it would be surprising to learn that he had one: but Professors Mack and Baumgardt claim that so far from being ignorant of the diversity of behaviour evident in the world, Bentham was entirely conversant with it, and possesses a "philosophy of history" which makes clear his inwardness with varying behaviour patterns historically.

Of the variety of possible objects in human action - evidenced both geographically and historically - Bentham has an extended grasp: his Table of the Springs of Action displays a vast number of sensations which may be conceived of as pleasures and which may serve as objects of voluntary acts.[153] Although, however, the forms of sensation are limitless in possibility, Bentham states that the end in view of voluntary action is single: "Happiness is man's end: law is his instrument for attaining it";[154] and Bentham's philosophy of law proceeds entirely on the assumption that the duty of legislators is to guarantee the conditions in which the end of behaviour may be universally achieved by individuals, and not to address themselves

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*M.P. Mack, Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas (New York, 1963)
D. Baumgardt, Bentham and the Ethics of Today (Princeton, 1951)

to the direct production of the variety of human objects.

It is clear that Bentham conceives the legal conditions which guarantee the ready achievement of happiness, and the legal conditions which frustrate this, to be universally similar. Happiness is universally guaranteed when each individual is educated in his real interests, and behaves accordingly; it is frustrated when men fail to comprehend their interests and act to the detriment to the greatest happiness of the greatest number (the postulated aim of governors).[155] Hence Bentham, in instructing legislators, is uninterested in the differing patinas of culture, manners and objects of behaviour displayed throughout the world, displayed historically, and displayed by peoples whose civilisation can only be interpreted as an historical survival:

> Legislators who, having freed themselves from the shackles of authority, have learnt to soar above the mists of prejudice, know as well how to make laws for one country as for another: all they need is to be possessed fully of the facts; to be informed of the local situation, the climate, the bodily constitution, the manners, the legal customs, the religion, of those with whom they have to deal. These are the data they require: possessed of these data, all places are alike.[156]

It follows from Bentham's understanding of "pleasure" that all that is needed to guarantee happiness is to provide the freedom for men to pursue those activities wnose continuance or repetition they desire. It matters not, in the immediate sense, whether that happiness consists in worship of the tribal gods of the Gantoos or the lending of money at 12 per cent, as in Bengal.

> What, then? have different countries different catalogues of pleasures and pains? The affirmative, I think, will hardly be maintained: thus far at least, human nature may be pronounced to be everywhere the same.[157]

In his condescending demand for "the facts" of the local situation,

Bentham hardly displays the tenderness of Herder for the infinite prolixity of custom, religion and behaviour, or the sense innate to a philosopher of history of the delicacy and fragility of primitive cultural forms. It is difficult to justify the dignity of "philosophy of history" for such sweeping panoramic contempt as Bentham's vision of the legislator in Asia: "Send the people", he (the legislator) will say, "to me, or me to the people; lay open to me the whole tenor of their life and conversation; paint to me the face and geography of the country; give me as close and minute a view as possible of their present laws, their manners and their religion".[158] It was left to the influence of Scottish philosophers of history to create, in James Mill, the first trace of what might be called "an historical sense"; and to John Stuart Mill to abandon, under pressure from Germany, the timeless and universal certainties of Utilitarian psychology.

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24. PML XVI.33 (1823 addition to MS), p.222-223
25. Works VIII.201
26. Op.cit. VIII.196
27. Op.cit. VIII.224
28. Op.cit. VIII.197
29. Human action is "a motion considered as being produced by an exercise of the faculty of the will", op.cit. VIII.205
30. Introduction to Works, I.xxii.
31. J.S. Mill, "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy", in Collected Works (Toronto, 1969) X.14

32. Box 14, p.9

33. PML XVI.11n

34. I feel Prof. Hart's tag ("Bentham", Proc. Brit. A., 1962) deserves wider circulation.

35. VIII.247; PML V.1; Box 149 p.348. Cf. Box 14 p.142: "To every man what is pleasure?... That which to his reflection, affected by his own memory, and through it first upon his own feeling, is so. Reader, wherever you are, ask of yourself and answer to yourself this question, - is there, can there be, - that man who can know as well as yourself what it has been that has given you pleasure, or what it has been that has given you most pleasure?" (1813) - (freely translated by Bowring in Deon. I.28-29)

36. Box 70a, p.45

37. VIII.247

38. VIII.279

39. Treatise of Human Nature III.1.1 (Everyman ed., 1911, II.166)

40. Reid, "Of Sensation", Essays on the Intellectual Powers (1785) II.16, p.228.

41. Hume, op.cit. I.3.5., Everyman ed. I.87

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44. Reid, op.cit., p.226; Bentham, Works I.207

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50. Cf. PML VI.2: "The disposition which anyone has to feel such or such a quantity or pleasure or pain, upon the application of a cause of given force, is what we term the degree or quantum of his sensibility". Other substitutes for "to feel" are "to be affected by", "to experience"

51. Box 149, p.348

52. J.S. Mill, System of Logic (8th ed., 1900) p.32

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54. J.S. Mill, System Of Logic, I.3.4, p.33

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56. Box 70a, p.55: "All sensations are perceptions, and all perceptions depend upon the body, for it is at the body only that they can come in".

57. Box 70a p.48

58. Box 96, pp.128 ff.

59. PML VI.30
60. PML VI.30n margin
61. PML VI.30n
62. PML VI.28
63. PML V.4
64. Works I.205
65. Box 96 p.128
66. See below, p.269, 288-291.
67. Box 96, p.128. This is Bentham borrowing from Maupertuis: "I thought I had made a sort of discovery, when it has occurred to me that the quantity of Happiness or Unhappiness in any given subject was to be calculated upon these dimensions; ... I was much surprised upon turning over the works of that ingenious philosopher to find the idea anticipated." This early compliment to Maupertuis later gave way to generalised contempt
68. Dumont, Principes de Legislation (Brussels, 1829) ch.VI, I.19
69. Maupertuis, Essai de Philosophie Morale (London, 1750) p.2
70. Box 96, p.128
71. Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, Book 2, ch.3. This is the 2nd edition; cf. this interesting revision in the 6th ed., 1901, p.131: "Let, then, pleasure be defined as feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable; - desirable, that is, when considered merely as feeling, and not in respect of its objective conditions or consequences."
    He also explains (ibid., Book 2, ch.2, 6th ed. 1901, p.127): "I propose therefore to define Pleasure - when we are considering its strict value for the purposes of quantitative comparison - as a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable - or in cases of comparison - preferable". The debt to Bentham is clear.
72. Tucker, The Light of Nature Pursued (1805 ed) II.55
73. ibid. I.192
74. Box 70a, p.50
75. Box 70a, p.23
76. Box 14, p.132: "Pleasures and pains are all of them matters of experience. The acts (meaning the human acts) by which they are respectively produced, are all of them matters of experience". Cf. Box 14, p.49: "Every person is not merely the best judge, but the sole judge of what with reference to himself is pleasure: and so in regard to pain". (Both 1814). See also Box 70a, p.45 (1776).
77. Quoted Werner Stark, Bentham's Economic Writings (1952) III.438
78. J.S. Mill, "Bentham", in G. Himmelfarb, ed., Essays in Politics and Culture (New York, 1963) p.102

79. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1863) pp.11-12

80. ibid., p.11

81. Mill, "Bentham", loc.cit. pp.117-118

82. F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford 1876) p.116

83. The criteria of the magnitude of pleasures (intensity, duration etc) are laid down in Works I.206 and many other places. See also PML VI.15 and 43 on quantity of pleasure. Cf PML XVI.2: "Ethics... may be defined, the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view."

84. See esp., PML IV on the criteria of value in pleasures. Pleasure is throughout treated as an unanalysable datum to the senses, whose attractiveness is private, ineffable and incomparable, but whose dimensions (intensity, duration, propinquity etc) can be publicly established.

85. Ryle, Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth 1963) p.104

86. ibid. p.104

87. ibid. p.104

88. ibid. p.104

89. Box 27, p.154

90. Using the word, that is, in his Box 90 definition of pleasure: hence, e.g., "ice-cream" (a perception) and "revenge" (a sensation) may both be pleasures, and in Bentham's early writing, both "sensations" (see Ch.3, section a)

91. "Without hope... there is no motive" Works VII.567

92. Hence: "no desire can have place, unless when the idea of pleasure or pain, in some degree or shape, has place". ibid. VIII.280

93. Pleasure is construed as absence of uneasiness, ibid. VIII.279-80

94. ibid. VIII.205

95. PML VIII.7

96. Works VIII.205

97. "Having taken a general view of those two grand objects, (viz. pleasure, and what comes to the same thing, exemption from pain) in the character of final causes..." PML III.1

98. Works VIII.210

99. PML II.6

100. Works I.201-2

101. PML X.10

102. ibid II.4

103. ibid VIII.13

104. Box 27, p.172

105. Works VIII.289

106. ibid. VIII.203
107. ibid. IX.61
108. PML X.8
109. Treatise II.3.3 (Everyman ed., II.125-6); PML X.2
110. Works I.208
111. Box 14, p.5
112. PML XI.1
113. Box 70a, p.22. Cf Works II.477: "But how (it may be asked) is it possible that the motive a man is actuated by can be secret to himself? Nothing is more easy - nothing more frequent. Indeed, the rare case is, not that of his not knowing, but that of his knowing it.
"It is with the anatomy of the human mind as with the anatomy and physiology of the human body: the rare case is, not that of a man's being unconversant, but that of his being conversant with it".
114. Works VI.17
115. ibid. VIII.205
116. PML XII.33
117. Works I.211
118. ibid. I.215
119. Box 27, p.55
120. Box 70a, p.22
121. Works II.477
122. ibid. II.478
123. PML VII.5
124. Works II.474
125. PML I.5n
126. Works VI.257
127. ibid. VII.203
128. ibid. I.207
129. ibid. VIII.279
130. ibid. VIII.280
131. ibid. VII.393
132. Locke, Essay on Human Understanding II.i (ed. M. Cranston, 1965) p.68
133. Works VIII.210
134. ibid. VIII.289
135. Locke, op.cit., II.1 (p.61), II.19 (p.141)
136. ibid. II.1, p.65
137. PML VII.5

138. *Box 101*, pp.406-8

139. *Principles of Legislation* p.42

140. Works I.208

141. ibid. VIII.279-280

142. Box 96, p.128

143. Works I.215

144. ibid. I.211

145. I.172ff: "To a lawgiver, who having been bound up with English notions, shall have learnt how to accommodate his laws to the circumstances of Bengal, no other part of the globe can present a difficulty".

146. "Happiness in man be the end of every thought and action; it is by the ideas of pain and pleasure only that happiness can be produced" (Box 70a, p.3); "to increase the sum of his well-being is actually the object of every man's wish, of every man's endeavour, from the beginning of his life to the end of it, that part alone which is passed in sleep excepted" (Box 14, p.142); "the same motives attract and repel... the members of one family and the members of a thousand: the same passions agitate the convent and the cottage: the cottage and the palace. No man ever lived 30 years without seeing the whole round of them brought into play a thousand times over" (Box 27, p.154); "a man's own pleasure... a man's own pain will upon sober consideration and a strict and close enquiry be seen to be actually the... sole ultimate object of pursuit to every man at all" Box 14, p.144

147. Works VIII.210-211

148. Box 70a, p.23

149. Box 70a, p.43

150. Box 14, pp.10-12

151. Box 14, p.36

152. Box 96 p.128; Box 14, pp.10, 27, 44.

153. Works I.195-208; Box 158 passim for the 1815 draft.

154. Box 70a, p.2

155. Men are commonly ignorant of their real interests and therefore apathetic, Bentham argues (Box 61, pp.2-8): universal interest is perpetually sacrificed to individual interest (Box 128, p.235) (1818).

156. Works I.180-181

157. ibid. I.172

158. This, paradoxically, is Bentham's vision of what legislators enlightened by the reading of Montesquieu will demand upon arrival in a distant country. "Since Montesquieu, the number of documents which a legislator will require is considerably enlarged" (ibid. I.173n).

A N A L Y S I S O F C H A P T E R F O U R

1. Mill starts late on deducing the Science of Government from universal human nature, after diversion to reviewing and writing history. 2. His Essay on Government (1819) not only deduces principles from human nature, but proceeds by quasi-geometrical argument. 3. Its air of formal demonstration was intended to disguise an argument for immediate reform, according to J.S. Mill. 4. Mill's procedure in argument similar to Bentham's, but initially more conscious of varieties in human nature and in history. 5. Mill's mode of argument an induction ascending to very general axioms, which transforms Bacon's observing into philosophising. 7. This predictably aroused the Scots, 8. paralysed by the uncertainty Hume had visited on inductive statements, though accepting Reid's arguments against Hume. 9. Mill an honest Baconian throughout his life.

11. Mill an earlier admirer of Hobbesian political method, though more interested in problems re method than in political science in early years. 12. Accepting Reid's caricature of Hume, 13. which argued that essential beliefs about human nature and a material world were put by God into man's mind, 15. Mill defended Reid against all attacks on such innate beliefs as "intuitions". 16. Reid praised for "introducing the true method of philosophising into the science of mind", 17. though Mill, following Bacon also, saw the need to strengthen Reid's axioms with a strong inductive base. 18. Mill, politically very radical, gradually lost interest in Reidian debates on method and found the practical purposes of Baconian argument more congenial.

19. 1795-1806, Mill's beliefs about human nature Calvinist rather than Benthamite; 20. he protests against reductions of behaviour to pleasure-seeking, claiming that men can seek virtue and 21. that pleasures are over-rated; 22. arguing also that if happiness is man's only motive, then all actions must be virtuous (which is absurd). 23. He finds few allies for political reform among Scottish Whigs and Presbyterians, however.

24. The <u>History</u>, 1806-17. Mill follows Millar's example in writing a Scottish propagandist history, both to display the general principles of politics and to recommend reforms outrageous in England. 26. Hobbesian method is ruled out, because human nature cannot be sufficiently simplified to deduce broad political conclusions. 27. Instead, appropriate morals can be deduced from historical experience. 28. Mill still believed, however, that all political and social history can be traced back to human nature in its many varieties; but the variety of "circumstances" meant that a mechanical model would not work. 28. Hume showed the type of history needed: showing how circumstances combined with human nature to produce political change.

29. Mill quickly confronted the problem: Is man reformable? Is he capable of mental change? 30. His eventual conclusion was that education and strong political leadership (using reward, punishment etc) could change men - after 1813-14. Before this, Mill accepted Scottish pessimism about man's hopes of progress, agreeing 31. that man showed little progress as an individual but had done so 32. socially. Nations, Mill learned, moved through fixed stages of

society, and the reformer could measure off different countries' progress on a "scale of civilisation". 33. Mill perceived that this allowed scientific prescription of reforms to countries needing these, 34. especially those which had not progressed since antiquity. All a historically aware reformer need do is consult the previous analogous situation. 35. Hence a philosophy of history was fundamental to James Mill's science of reform, though his respect for local and historical variation was out of Benthamite fear that reforms might otherwise go wrong, which were aimed at the eventual establishment of Utilitarian democracy.

36. Mill came increasing to clash with the Scots, however (1809 onwards) first over their belief that progress could not be imposed and that societies must be allowed to advance naturally. Mill, writing on China and India, became 37. very impatient; and 38. showed none of the Romantic interest in primitive custom in its own right. India must be judged by general rules, he argued, anxious to avoid any seeming approval there of the aristocratic rule he condemned in England. 40. Mill clashed also with the Scots over their low estimate of the role of law and government in producing social reform, over the idea that progress is quite random, and 41. over the idea that time, not passionate individual reformers, brings about progress. 43. Mill became increasingly angry, and accepted instead (1815-16) the associationist version of individual human progress, and 44. became convinced that individual reformers could succeed where time had failed. 45. "Hartley's is the true scent", he announced in 1816.

46. Mill's distress with the Scots reached a peak in his decision to pursue the improvement of human nature as a science, despite Scottish pessimism. Reid's theory of education provided the key, though 47. Mill took it much further, claiming that careful control of circumstances and education during childhood could produce a perfectible human being. 48. Education could succeed where law had failed, in ending the torments of society, though 49. Governments must still act to remove poverty and hunger, the causes of social degeneration. 50. Association of Ideas was the principle on which the general laws of the mind could be established, and which could break down the influences on human character into general, national and individual. 51. Understanding the principles of this break-down, a legislator will be able to prescribe the correct variety of utility to the country or people he is governing. 52. The science of government rests on the universal principle that men seek their own interest before any other.

54. Mill's arguments are openly Baconian and Newtonian; 55. moving by valid inference from a valid empirical law to valid conclusions in the science of government (the only valid conclusions). 56. Mill had argued deductively long before the Essay in 1820; but he was to spend his final years arguing with Scots about his procedures, rather than about their substance. 58. Mill's achievement to devote himself to the application of utility, where Bentham had been uninterested; remaining conscious that a general theory required specific and detailed amendment to be applied successfully in practice.

CHAPTER FOUR

JAMES MILL AND A UTILITARIAN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

It was James Mill, the Scottish preacher whom Bentham called "my spiritual disciple", who devoted himself to winning converts and forming the Utilitarian "movement" in which Bentham had always been uninterested. "It was a very fortunate coincidence," Mill told Bentham in a letter in 1814, "that any man with views and propensities of such rare occurrence as mine, should happen to come in towards the close of your career to carry on the work without intermission".[1]

Unlike Bentham, Mill came late in life to the Utilitarians' profession of deducing the Science of Government from principles about human nature. His first years in London, 1802-06, were devoted to editing his own Literary Journal, to praising the "science of method" of first Reid, then Bacon, and using his weekly column to protest against aristocratic abuse of power; while from 1806-17 he turned away from philosophy to write Scottish propagandist history, recommending for India reforms he dared not urge for England.[2] In 1819, however, fascinated (like many inductivists before him) by the superior certainty which deductive reasoning seemed to offer, and anxious for a "grand sociological display" of the Science of Government for the influential Encyclopaedia Britannica, Mill embraced Utilitarian political method with such enthusiasm that Macaulay denounced his mode of argument as "utterly unfit for moral and political discussions", and Mill spent much of his remaining life defending himself in periodical controversy.[3]

Prima facie, purer examples of the deductive method at work are hardly to be found than in the Essay on Government (1819, published 1820).[4] The basic justification of government is found to be "the need for protection": this conclusion is deduced from the universal principle of every man's tendency "to take from any other man who is weaker than himself".[5] The business of government is deduced syllogistically:

> (1) "To understand what is included in the happiness of the greatest number, we must understand what is included in the happiness of the individuals involved."
>
> (2) "In general terms, the lot of every human being is determined by his pains and his pleasures; and.. his happiness corresponds with the degree in which his pleasures are great, and his pains are small."
>
> therefore,
>
> (3) (Governments') "business is to increase to the utmost the pleasures, and diminish to the utmost the pains, which men derive from one another." [6]

What aroused the attention of the Scottish philosophers among whom Mill had spent his youth -- as devoted to miniscule logic-chopping over epistemology as the Schoolmen had been - was the similarity which such argument bore to the procedures of geometry. Mill seemed to develop, in the Essay, the political arrangements between men in much the way that Euclid outlined the formal relations between bodies in space:

> The reason for which government exists is that one man, if stronger than another, will take him from him whatever that other possesses and he desires. But if one man do this, so will several. And if powers are put into the hands of a comparatively small number, called an aristocracy - powers which make them stronger than the rest of the community - they will take from the rest of the community as much as they please of the objects of desire. They will thus defeat the very end for which government was instituted. The unfitness, therefore, of an aristocracy to be entrusted with the powers of government rests on demonstration. [7]

Scottish readers were moved to wonder, airing the doubts that Bacon

had advised them to feel when confronting fine-spun theories, whether Mill's conclusions bore any necessary relation to actual reality. His argument offended further by its State-of-Nature air, by its seeming establishment of constants relating to interests and motives, **and by its attempt to bridge the is/ought gap between empirical generalisations about human nature and the principles of government. Where Bentham had been content to point to the purposes of government by stating what** they ought to do, Mill tried to demonstrate the purposes of governments by an argument from men's interests in forming them. As a demonstration, the argument fails through being only abstractly true: and in fact Mill never claimed anything more of it. In practical terms, the purposes of governments (in the final cause sense) were ignored by him; his concentration was on the proper behaviour of governments, his method the familiar experimental procedure urged by Bacon. Apart from the Essay, all Mill's political work begins by drawing conclusions about human wants and human behaviour by causal inference from particular observations, and deducing appropriate behaviour for governments as if governments had already adopted these conclusions as articles of policy. The air of formal demonstration in the Essay, John Stuart Mill suggested, was to disguise an argument for Parliamentary reform with the authority of a quasi-scientific proof.[8]

We are dealing once again, therefore, with the old procedure of deducing political science from the universal principles of human nature: Mill differs little from Hume or Bentham in his declaration that

> the whole science of human nature must be explored, to lay a foundation for the science of government.[9]

Human nature, properly codified, supplied the axioms from which whole

sciences could be deduced, in Mill's view; advertisements for his Analysis in 1829 proudly announced what he hoped one day to extract from them:

> This work, on which the author has employed several years, contains a View, purely Expository, of the Phenomena, generally classed under the Heads of the Intellectual and Active Powers of the Human Mind. These Phenomena he has here endeavoured to resolve into their simple elements, and refer them to their most general laws. The present work is to be considered as the ground work of those Practical Treatises, intended to succeed:
>
> - 1. The Book of Logic; or System of Rules for Conducting the Mind in the investigation of Truth.
> - 2. The Book of Ethics; or System of Rules for so regulating the Actions of the Individual, as to render them most conducive to the well-being of himself and others.
> - 3. The Book of Education, or System of Rules for Training the Individual to the highest perfection of his nature - that is, the highest state of efficiency, as the causes of happiness to himself and to his species.
>
> 10

None of these works was ever written, but Mill's ambitions can hardly be described as limited.

Mill differed from Bentham in his greater historical consciousness and his greater awareness of the variety of human conditions for which good government had to be provided. Peoples whose primitivism consisted not only in their backward social and political institutions, but also in their individual blindness to the purpose of living and acting (getting pleasure) and their inefficiency in attaining the true ends of behaviour, could not be treated on the same footing as highly civilised peoples eligible for "the grand discovery of modern times", the representative system.[11] But Mill proved increasingly willing, from the time of his meeting Bentham in 1808, to apply a telescope to history and to contemporary primitive societies, regarding them as crawling slowly towards the pinnacle of civilisation from which he viewed them. On this teleological view, the aims of all

individuals and societies were the same: the attainment of happiness (i.e. pleasure), however dimly they perceived this or strove towards it. Hence, in the 1820's, Mill's consciousness of the progress of society through various "stages" became blurred into belief in a ladder of utility, at the top of which all countries could find a set of model institutions; and the varieties of human nature (seen in the overwhelming backwardness and superstition of the non-European world) gradually turned into annoying divergences from the "norm" of Utilitarian behaviour. Whatever virtues of peacefulness and altruism, of a type unknown in Europe, could be found elsewhere, Mill argued that

> exactly in proportion as Utility is the object of every pursuit, may we regard a nation as civilised. Exactly in proportion as its ingenuity is wasted on contemptible or mischievous objects... the nation may safely be denominated barbarous.[12]

Thus Mill came increasingly to induce a "general human nature" from the particulars of human behaviour, and from that a "general" science of government; although in his last major work in 1835 he urged legislators to bear in mind "the modifications required for the particular circumstances of each particular country", in case they were carried away in the drive to institute Utilitarian government.[13]

Thus despite its deceptive appearance, Mill's mode of reasoning in the 1820's is not a sudden lapse into pure deduction, as has been supposed so often,[14] but is simply a generalised inductivism, entirely consonant with his early writings as a philosopher from 1802-06, and derived from his analysis of Bacon and Reid whom he reverenced to the end of his life.[15] This was correctly discerned by J.S. Mill,[16] who showed that his father's was not the deductive method - defined as "arriving at its conclusions by general reasoning, and verifying them

by specific experience (as is the natural order in the deductive branches of physical science)".[17] Mill's axioms about human nature differed from the a priori hypotheses of the deductivist, which he decried in an early panegyric to Reid as "arbitrary... extravagant and unfounded theories", being axioms in the specific Baconian sense: empirical laws, reached by the amassing and judicious interpretation of data.[18] Their character, and the difficulty contemporaries experienced in recognising them as induced principles, can be gauged from a remark in the History of British India:

> The mental habits which are acquired in mere observing... are almost as different as any mental habits can be, from the powers of combination, discrimination, classification, judgment, comparison, weighing, inferring, inducting, philosophizing in short; which are the powers of the most importance for extracting the precious ore from a great mine of rude historical materials.[19]

It was this distortion of "mere observing" which aroused the wrath of Macaulay, who opposed to Mill's "philosophizing" the principle of direct argument from historical example. J.S. Mill readily saw that Macaulay's broadsides in the Edinburgh Review in 1825 went wide of the target, mistaking his father's reasoning from Baconian axioms as mathematical demonstration; and that Macaulay's literal attachment to "the empirical mode of treating political phenomena, as against the philosophical" would have excluded the reasoning of Newton and Laplace as invalid.[20] James Mill was obliged to "philosophise", his son perceived, because straightforward induction from historical particulars gave rise to principles legitimately referring only to the past, making politics "a science of specific experience". Mill, on the contrary, wished to evolve a reforming Science of Government giving guidance for the future; hence he sought from his axioms about human nature a

generality applicable to the future as well as the past, and deduced a general theory of politics accordingly. Hence Macaulay's plaintive

> accusations against the Benthamic theory of <u>being</u> a theory, of proceeding a priori by way of general reasoning, instead of Baconian experiment, (which) showed complete ignorance of Bacon's principles, and of the necessary conditions of experimental investigation... I saw that Macaulay's conception of the logic of politics was erroneous; that he stood up for the empirical mode of treating political phenomena, against the philosophical... [21]

James Mill knew well the risks he was taking in departing from a literal interpretation of Bacon's injunction: "observe and experiment". He spent his best years, from 1825 to 1836, wrangling over the science of method with half-baked Bacon-loving Scots, and as early as 1820 he wearily quotes in his <u>Commonplace Book</u> Waverley's strictures on the "practical" men, made in a letter to Walter Scott:

> That we differ as to the meaning of the word practical; I think I can see that by a <u>practical</u> view, you really mean a view <u>narrowed</u> to the present and momentary state of things & excluding all considerations of what may at any future moment occur in the place in question; and this I take to be the great error of those who call themselves <u>practical</u> men. They confine their observations to the <u>local spot</u>, & the <u>present</u> day. He who thinks of <u>tomorrow</u>, they call a <u>theorist</u>; if he thinks of the next month, he is a speculatist; but if he attempts to legislate, for a year or more in advance, he is decreed a perfect <u>visionary</u>; or, perhaps the most injurious the wit of the practicals can devise - even a <u>philosophe</u>! [22] (italics Waverley's)

Mill, of course, had read Hume, in whose work it was clearly demonstrated that no necessity attached to the inductive inference. Hume broke down the succession of effect y to cause x into spatial contiguity, temporal succession and joint occurrence, and denied that the connection between them was necessary. Necessity existed only as an idea, residing in the mind, not in externals.[23] The science of politics, on this view, could logically only exist as a collection of contingent propositions, referring to past experience,

de facto rather than de jure in their embodiment of cause and effect. Induction from experience "may provide us experience, not science,"[24] Hume said shortly: in a phrase, induction could yield no general truths, despite its glorious successes in the hands of Newton.

Curiously, in view of Mill's tribulations in the 1820's with Scottish philosophers paralysed by the uncertainty with which Hume had cursed the inductive statement, one of the principles unanimously supported by the Scots before 1800 was the "common sense" response to Humean scepticism. Mill accepted in 1793 from Dugald Stewart the arguments against Hume put forward by Reid, and in 1805 fashionably denounced him as an "over-rated" philosopher.[25] (Reid, as we shall see below, claimed to have rescued certain "original and natural judgments" about the material world and the self from the inductive fire, which existed in the mind "without a possibility of assigning any reason for such belief; or of giving any other account of it, than that such is the constitution of our natures").[26] Mill later rejected Reid's judgments as a form of occult knowledge, and the generally acknowledged failure of Stewart in 1815 to provide "a new antidote to the subtle and perplexing principles of modern scepticism" restored the Humean status quo.[27] The consequence, in the 1820's, was squeals of "speculation" from the "practical men", when Mill and Bentham appeared to be bending the inductive system to yield truths beyond immediate experience and Mill was obliged to spill much ink in showing that no difference existed between "theory" and "practice".

Mill remained an honest Baconian throughout his life in his induction of the universal principles of human nature, both when working from historical example before 1819 and from psychology thereafter.

The empirical nature of his principles is firmly established in an early (1805) swipe at metaphysics:

> Science before Ld Bacon was a collection of theories drawn from the imagination, instead of painfully deduced by the labour of understanding from well-authenticated facts. [28]

In 1810 he entered in his Commonplace Book:

> Particular examples are chiefly of use in furnishing the materials of general rules, and the general rules, thus formed, are the only sure guides of human conduct. [29]

And in 1835, the year before he died, he notes in beating off an attack on Hobbes and Bacon by Mackintosh:

> The operation of expounding the laws of nature. This consists wholly in tracing the phenomena to their general laws, that is, referring as many of them as possible to the operation of a single cause; and the more extensive that operation, - that is to say, the more comprehensive the law which the philosopher has discovered; or, in Sir James's language, the larger the province of human knowledge which he has subjected to a single principle; the more completely has he accomplished his important purpose, and the greater the admiration and applause which he has earned. [30]

Mill has therefore become highly ambitious in his ascent to more and more general axioms; but the principle underlying his method remains the same as in 1805.

In outlining the development of his principles of human nature and of government in the rest of this chapter, we shall show in section (a) that the universal principles, in Mill's early London period before he met Bentham (1802-06), were principally based on Reid, and were very different in nature and in philosophic base from Bentham's; in section (b), that Mill, as much a child of the Scottish Enlightenment as of Bentham, evolved a science of politics based on a philosophy of history between 1806-17; and in section (c), that between 1819-35 he abandoned Scottish historical principles to

subscribe to Benthamite modes of instant reform, allied to a new science of government deduced from specifically Utilitarian laws of human nature, themselves induced from the workings of association in the human mind.

a) Mill's Early Years, 1793-1806: Problems with Method

James Mill was first instructed in 1793 in the integral connection between the science of human nature and the science of government, by Dugald Stewart, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh and Reid's philosophical heir.[31] This wisdom Stewart traced back to Hobbes: and his eager pupil was to become, in the last five years of his life after Bentham died in 1832, the most venerable living exponent of the empirical tradition descending from Hobbes. In 1835 Mill was still praising Hobbes to the skies: of the Introduction to the Leviathan, which recommends the reading of Man rather than Books for wisdom, he wrote: "it is not easy to find the genuine spirit of philosophical enquiry, which is the reverse of dogmatism, more truly expressed than in these words".[32] To Hobbes we owe the key to political understanding:

> He was the first to see clearly, that the elements of political government were the principles of human nature. It was necessary for him, therefore, to begin with the explication of human nature. And no doubt he is at pains to show, when he comes to his political doctrines, that they are correctly deduced from the principles of human nature.[33]

Unlike Bentham, however, who was not greatly delayed in his early years by problems with forming and proving first principles of human nature and extracting political truths, Scottish philosophers were paralysed by severe initial difficulties with method which prevented their giving birth to any significant political philosophy. In a world still haunted by the Humean ghost stalking the inductive statement, distrustful of mechanism and of reductionist psychological theories, and aware of the diversity of human nature displayed in history, Mill was made acutely conscious of the adventurousness of forming any axioms about human behaviour for the purposes of political deduction. He was unable, in the anti-

deductivist Edinburgh atmosphere, to conjure up a hypothesis from nothing and then stretch it to fit the facts - as Bentham had done in 1776 when defining pleasure as "every sensation a man had rather feel at that instant than feel none".[34] This method or procedure was specifically forbidden under the empirical rules (Bentham, too, experienced doubts, regretting that "in spite of all resolves, I have not been able to keep clear of metaphysics")[35] and Mill denounced it [illegible] in 1802 as the method of "a philosopher who makes his hypotheses as a Taylor his doublet, without measure: if they fit not nature, we can make nature fit them".[36]

Mill, therefore, became preoccupied with philosophy of method, though paying special attention to morals, in his first ten years of active philosophic life (1795-1806). He took the path out of the Humean maze shown by Reid, who had (in the Scottish view) rescued the inductive statement from the limbo to which Hume had consigned it, and re-anchored it to Common Sense. Hume had seemingly made it impossible to say anything of certainty about the observed world, showing that to seek out a reality behind impressions and ideas was inconclusive and meaningless, and that the sequences of ideas in the mind were formed at random and without necessity, even when such sequences were frequently repeated. The uniformity detected in natural and human behaviour was, therefore, completely contingent, and in logic one was as justified in expecting the sun to sink at dawn as to rise. Reid caricatured Hume and Berkeley's out-and-out phenomenalism (and implicit solipsism) by claiming that it was a legitimate inference from them that a man might as well run his head against a post (one of the earliest examples of the rhetorical "every schoolboy knows" mode of argument which was to be popularised by Macaulay and the

Edinburgh Review); and he mounted his attack against Hume's demonstration of the random quality of mental sequences in his earliest work in 1764, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, condemning "a system of scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe any one thing rather than its contrary",[37] and which was basically uninformative about the world in which men lived.

Reid provided the Scots with grounds for confidence in making statements about matters of fact. Judgments about the existence and order of an external world enter the mind inclusively with perceptions, he argued; Hume was wrong in claiming that judgment was a separate activity based on comparing impressions.[38] Such judgments are not given by sensations, nor analysed from them: they reside in the mind, like innate affections and passions; the senses simply provide the occasions when they are called into play. These "original and natural judgments are... part of that furniture which nature hath given to the human understanding... They make up what is called the common sense of mankind; and what is manifestly contrary to any of these first principles, is what we call absurd".[39] Rejecting the need or possibility of proving original judgments or beliefs, which constitute the first principles of natural and human behaviour (and would not constitute first principles if they could be proved, he notes conveniently),[40] Reid rests his case on an appeal to common understanding, and presents these first principles as axioms to which men "give a ready assent... as soon as they are proposed and understood".[41] (As we have already seen,[42] Bentham and many other late eighteenth century philosophers were forced to the same rhetorical presentation of their first principles, any certainty attaching to their induced conclusions having been wrecked by Hume).

It was, therefore, by a very simple contrivance that Reid rehabilitated the inductive statement. He merely presented the epistemological sine qua nons of an inductive law, (1) that an external world exists, (2) that this world displays regularities of behaviour, in the guise of "original and natural judgments", packed into the mind by God with all the other mental "furniture", and guaranteed by common sense. Belief in the uniformity or regularity of nature "is necessary for us before we are able to discover it by reasoning, and therefore is made a part of our constitution, and produces its effects before the use of reason," he proclaimed.[43] Thus, by introducing "original and natural judgments" as a kind of trump suit, Reid solved at a stroke that part of the problem of induction which asks why nature need be uniform, why sequences observed de facto need be true de jure. These are principles which are "the inspiration of the Almighty, ... a part of our constitution," is the reply.[44] What is more, the Almighty has implanted in the human mind and constitution many more principles, relating to morals and politics, in the form of original and natural judgments; no longer, therefore, need the moral and political philosopher resort to complicated demonstrative argument from axioms to establish his principles, He need only introspect, and will find in his own mind moral and political truths which are "self-evident", because they conform with reason and common sense.[45]

This would, of course, ultimately not do. So long as the self-evident moral and political truths of common sense proved reasonable and unadventurous, keeping in "the safe and honest medium, upon... ticklish subjects", as Horner recommended the editor of the Edinburgh Review to keep his articles,[46] their intellectual

foundation could escape - in Scotland, at least - without too close a scrutiny. Hence the Edinburgh Review rested for many years a safe and unreforming Whiggism on common sense principles drawn from politics and history, recognised to be such by the "country squires, rusticated peers and provincial doctors" whom Horner identified as its readers in 1804.[47] But anything which masqueraded as an "original and natural judgment" while venturing far from the comfortable prescriptions of Scottish common sense, as James Mill's reforming slogans undoubtedly did in his London Literary Journal from 1802 to 1806, immediately cast doubt on the intellectual edifice upon which it rested. Reid had already used the dangerous word "inspiration" to describe his natural judgments: "we are inspired with the sensation, as we are inspired by the corresponding perception, by means unknown," he wrote.[48] Dugald Stewart had, unsuspectingly, labelled them as "intuitive judgments". They were ultimately recognised and condemned for what they were by J.S. Mill: mere "intuitions".[49]

James Mill rapidly developed doubts about Reid, especially when he listened to the clamours for reaction which Edinburgh philosophers drew as the Common Sense moral of the French Revolution. But he defended Reid against the "coarse" and "illiberal" attacks of Belsham in 1802, claiming that Reid dealt not in intuitions but in ultimate facts:

> The business of all true philosophy is to refer the phenomena of the universe to general laws, or ultimate facts, of which no account can be given. These gentlemen [Reid & Stewart] have attempted to do this with the phenomena of the mind. It is an established rule with the chemical philosophers, approved by all just reasoners, to look upon every substance, which they have not been able to analyze, as a simple substance, until it be analyzed. So must philosophers of all kinds look upon every fact which they are not able to resolve into some more general fact, as an ultimate fact, till it be so resolved.[50]

Mill accepted Reid's belief that an inner guarantee of the existence of

a material world is delivered with every perception:

> The double operation of an internal feeling and the conception and belief of an external cause takes place in every case of perception by the senses. For this important analysis we are indebted to Dr Reid. [51]

In the main part of the philosopher's business, referring phenomena to general laws, Mill held Reid's analyses to be impeccable and wholly in the tradition of Bacon's "glorious doctrine of induction".[52] As Mill saw it in 1803, Reid had kept completely free of all metaphysics and speculation:

> The distinguishing characteristic of the philosophy of Reid is this; that whereas all his predecessors in the study of mind employed themselves in forming arbitrary theories... Reid... adopted the inductive method followed by Sir Isaac Newton, and by an examination of the phenomena of the mind of which we are conscious, endeavoured to give rise to the general laws which regulate our mental operations. [53]

Reid's contributions to method (which included indirect sanction of the Hobbesian political **method)** received praise from Mill until the end of his life: and special congratulation during his early "Reidian period". Endorsing the validity of reasoning from self-evident principles in an orderly way, Reid had written: "we ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are".[54] Thus Mill received a Scottish mandate to go about Utilitarian business, deducing the science of government from the principles of human nature. It is to Reid, he responded, that

> we are indebted for the introduction of the true method of philosophizing into the science of mind, and for some of the noblest discoveries which have been made by any one man in any one science. [55]

But Mill was already aware of the drift towards abstraction inherent in Reid's axioms of common sense, and of the need to fortify

them with a strong inductive base. The need for careful induction of axioms, resting on "careful observation", was taught to Mill, as to so many nineteenth century empiricists, by Bacon:

> In investigating the laws of any part of nature, there are two ways which may be followed, either, 1st, what Ld Bacon calls anticipationes, that is, forming conjectures beforehand of what we think are the rules which nature follows in producing the events which we observe, and then endeavouring to make these events correspond to our theory; or, 2dly, carefully observing the events which nature produces, to learn from these events themselves what is the established order in which nature actually brings them about. The first of these is called the method of hypothesis or theory; the second that of induction or experience.
>
> Dr Hartley, Dr Priestley and Mr Belsham have proceeded altogether according to the first method. Mr Locke, Dr Reid, Mr Dugald Stewart and some others have made great efforts to introduce the second mode of philosophizing into the enquiries regarding mind. 56

Reid himself had steered clear of metaphysics, but not his pupils, Mill found in 1803: "it is at least no uncommon thing to find an author set out with a warm panegyric on the inductive philosophy, and the regulae philosophandi of Newton, who afterwards fills his book with nothing but extravagant and unfounded theories".[57] The need for constant vigilance was paramount.

Mill, however, came to shrug off Reid's preoccupation with defending inductive laws against Hume and found the practical purposes of Bacon more congenial ("enlarging the bounds of the Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible," in Bacon's words, "supplying our vulgar wants" in Macaulay's.)[58] He ignored the problems with Baconian method raised by Jeffrey in the Edinburgh Review in 1804, writing on Stewart's life of Reid; Jeffrey claimed that only observation, not experiment, was possible in the science of mind, that Bacon's laws were therefore without authority and that in matters of "mere

observation", the assignment of causes must always be conjectural.

> All that mere observation could do to determine the movements of the heavenly bodies, had been accomplished by the star-gazers who preceded [Newton]; and the law of gravitation, which he afterwards applied... was first calculated and ascertained by experiments performed upon substances which were entirely at his disposal... (With) operations of the mind...we cannot subject them to experiment...we cannot decompose our perceptions in a crucible...in this department the greater part of that code of laws which Bacon has provided for the regulation of experimental induction, is plainly without authority.[59]

Mill was uninterested. His intentions were practical, and his commitment to Baconian method was shown in an 1806 review condemning Sir James Steuart, whose

> mind was not of that first order which lays hold of general relations, and by happy classification is enabled to disentangle confusion, and ascend to simple and comprehensive axioms...his opinions have no general bearing...
>
> The labours of Dr. [Adam] Smith were of a different kind... he looked through the confusion of the subject... established with the evidence of demonstrations a number of propositions, which truly deserve the name of principles... (he) reared the study to the dignity of a science.[60]

By 1805, therefore, Mill had reached a peculiarly Scottish justification, through Reid & Bacon, of the method of political enquiry practised by Hobbes and Bentham, though this was not to be his final position. His political opinions in these years were wide-ranging (especially after his departure from Scotland in 1802 for London), but they add up to no more than a generalised "passion for improvement", which contrasts strongly with his later elitism. He had not embarked on a science of government nor contemplated it; editing his own Literary Journal from 1802-06 and writing frequent political columns encouraged diffuseness, and little coherent political strategy shows through his articles. Mill remained, of course, a Christian until 1809-10 and regarded himself as primarily a moral philosopher throughout his life, despite long periods of

b) Mill's Early Opinions of Human Nature and Reform, 1795-1806

Mill's judgments on the principles and dispositions of human nature were, in these early years, still distant from Bentham's; he rejected the notion that all human action aims at pleasure, asserted the diversity of human motivation and claimed that the business of government was to promote virtue, not enjoyment. Mill was until about 1810 a Christian, and accepted the Augustinian precepts of the Kirk about man's hopes of happiness and perfection. He was steeped also in the equally gloomy conclusions about human progress and improvement which were slipped into almost every history of any subject which was written in Edinburgh.[61]

His beliefs about human nature and progress reflect, therefore, the cold puritanism of the Scottish Calvinist; and before his sudden interest in 1803 in Baconian induction, they were articulated as the grounds of making moral judgments (Mill felt enabled to describe actors in his Commonplace Book as "slaves of the most irregular appetites and passions," presumably knowing which appetites and passions were "regular")[62] Despite the low Presbyterian opinion of human motives, Mill did not accept that man had stooped to the baseness of behaviour claimed by the Utilitarians, searching blindly for pleasure alone. Man was tainted with original sin in the eyes of God and had fallen from grace, but Mill rejected the Hobbesian conclusion that he was capable therefore only of depraved action: he was in fact capable of an inferior morality, as Calvin had asserted,[63] and possessed some natural passions to seek good. All the Scots followed Hume in protesting against the fashionable reduction of the passions to a desire for pleasure and aversion from pain; Hume asserted the existence of many other "principles, which are most essential to

natures, ... deeply radicated in our internal constitution".[64] By the end of the century, the lists of deeply radicated principles of human nature and innate affections had swelled to absurd proportions as Hutcheson, Butler, Ferguson, Smith, Beattie, Oswald and Reid produced their varying versions, and argued that man's perfection could be brought nearer only if education were used to strengthen his noble tendencies (to honour, virtue, courage, knowledge, etc.). Thus, in 1802, Mill denied strongly that pleasure and pain alone determine action, claiming that men desire virtue, and that virtue is generally the best means to their happiness. Right and good play a special part in shaping men's motives, he argued, reviewing Belsham:

> (His) theory of morals... is a revival of the old doctrine that self-love is the only principle of human actions; but stated rather more boldly with regard to morality than has been generally done... Mr Belsham says we have a regard to our own good only; and that not only we can have no regard to anything else, but we ought to have no regard to anything else, that the pursuit of our own happiness is the sole principle of virtue, and a man is vicious in exact proportion as he swerves from this object.
>
> There are two circumstances which give a slight degree of plausibility to this system. First it is true that virtue is generally the real means of happiness, and if we believe in a righteous Governor of all things, there is the firmest assurance that virtue will be universally accompanied by happiness... it is easy to take one of these objects and represent it as the sole motive to that course. Second. There are very few of our actions which proceed from a single motive. In general several motives concur in producing the same action... It is possible that in the motive of every one of our actions, even the most virtuous, self-love does enter as an ingredient. But does it follow from this, that self is the whole or the greater part of the motive of every action; that a regard to right as right, to good as good, does not enter as one of the ingredients? The fact is otherwise, and it is not the ipse dixit of Mr Belsham, though a species of argument which he himself seems to think unanswerable, that will establish the contrary.[65]

Mill produced no argument at this stage that men learned to desire personal pleasure through the processes of association: the

desire for pleasure was simply one of the innate affections on the eighteenth century's compound list. Nor does Mill adopt, in these early years, the Benthamite argument that pleasure is desired because of an indefinable felt-quality in its sensational forms which makes it desirable above all other things. For Mill it is simply a passion, called into action when the senses present opportunities.

Mill insisted on the possibility (and the nobility) of altruistic behaviour until the end of his life, according to J.S. Mill's Autobiography, and retained a heavy Scottish cynicism about the real value of pleasures:

> His standard of morals was Epicurean, inasmuch as it was utilitarian, taking as the exclusive test of right and wrong, the tendency of actions to produce pleasure or pain. But he had (and this was the Cynic element) scarcely any belief in pleasure; at least in his later years, of which alone, on this point, I can speak confidently. He was not insensible to pleasures; but he deemed very few of them worth the price which, at least in the present state of society, must be paid for them. The greater number of miscarriages in life, he considered to be attributable to the overvaluing of pleasures... The pleasures of the benevolent affections he placed high in the scale; and used to say, that he had never known a happy old man, except those who were able to live over again in the pleasures of the young. 66

Such sober moralism was to become the basis of Mill's passion for political improvement. What above all else he hungered for was a moral reform of politicians, what above all he resented was lax aristocratic abuse of privilege. Not for nothing did J.S. Mill learn in youth "a deep respect" for the character of Socrates:

> My father's moral inculcations were at all times mainly those of the 'Socratici viri'; justice, temperance (to which he gave a very extended application), veracity, perseverance, readiness to encounter pain and especially labour; regard for the public good; estimation of persons according to their merits, and of things according to their intrinsic usefulness; a life of exertion in contradiction to one of self-indulgent sloth. 67

Bentham is supposed to have accused Mill, the Puritan, of being a reformer not because he loved the many, but because he hated the few.[68]

Characteristically, therefore, Mill attacked Belsham "the Utilitarian" in 1802 for arguing that the desire for happiness was the only motive in human action: this led to the absurd conclusion, Mill claimed (though he later adopted it), that all actions, judged by motive rather than consequence, must be virtuous:

> Does it not follow from Mr B's doctrine that it is impossible to commit a vicious action? ... Happiness, according to this doctrine, is the only ultimate object of desire. Nothing else whatever is desired, or can be desired, but as a means of happiness. Properly speaking, therefore, there is only one object of desire, and men are always right in the end, however they may err in the means. In section 7 Mr B determines expressly that it is the motive solely which gives its moral determination to an action... Now if a man can desire nothing but happiness, his ultimate motive is in every case exactly the same, and, by necessary consequence, the action, whatever it may be, perfectly virtuous.[69]

Mill throws up his hands. The logical escape from Belsham's trap, of course, lay in asserting the principle which has come to define Utilitarianism as a moral theory: that the goodness or badness of actions depends on their consequences, not on their motivation. But to Mill, the pious Presbyterian, anxious to reform souls as well as society, this was, in early years, quite unacceptable.

In Scotland, however, Mill found few allies for reform. Common sense intuition did not give rise to radicalism, although the Edinburgh Review - which started shortly after Mill began to make a "precarious living" from the Literary Journal in London in 1802 - did produce shuffling justifications of the French Revolution, and brilliant logical dismantling of the arguments against Catholic Emancipation and for the Slave Trade.[70] But the real position in Scotland is made clear in a note of Lord Cockburn that an Edinburgh meeting to protest

against West Indian slavery in July 1814 was "the first assembling of the people for a public object that had occurred here for about twenty years".[71] In London, in contrast, Mill found sympathetic hearers, although he also found a severe censorship in operation and an increasing tendency to send editors to jail. When, however, his journal collapsed in 1806 , it was to the device of a "Scottish history" that Mill turned to further his political campaign, recommending for India many reforms he was enxious to see in Britain - free trade, cheap and efficient government, the abolition of despotism and state-supported superstition. He had made fast progress by the time he met Bentham in 1808.[72]

c: The History of British India, 1806-17: Scottish Historical Method

The repeated tributes to the Scottish historian John Millar throughout the pages of the History of British India, which was eventually published after 11 years' exhausting work in 1817, make clear the model on which Mill was working after 1806. "That sagacious contemplator of the progress of society... who has with so much knowledge and sagacity illustrated English history" was also the most flagrant of Scottish propagandist historians, writing openly and unabashedly in the rationalist tradition.[73] Millar wrote sociological treatises rather than histories, announcing (for example) at the start of his Origin of the Distinction of Ranks that his purpose was to search out the causes of "those peculiar systems of law and government which have appeared in the world", and to write a "conjectural history" of how man had come to be as he is.[74] Millar did not shrink from condemning barbarism wherever he encountered it, upbraiding not only the many parts of the globe whose "inhabitants are so destitute of culture, as to appear little above the condition of brute animals", but also "polished nations" such as the Greeks and the Romans, whom he found guilty of reducing women to slaves.[75] Scottish historians showed little of the German Romantic fascination with differences in law and custom between countries, detailed so lovingly by Herder[76] among others, as if he were collecting a variety of interesting species. They also cared little for diversity for its own sake, and probed far less deeply than the Germans into the irrational, into the profoundly moral elements of life, and into the real nature of "human nature". The nearest that Millar came to loving documentation of the varieties of human nature can be exemplified in Craig's prefaced remarks to the Distinction of Ranks:

> Even to cursory readers, (the Distinction of Ranks) was calculated to afford amusement, by the various views of human nature which it exhibited, and by the singularity of many of the traits of manners, as well as of national characters and institutions, which it traced to their sources.[77]

Mill modelled himself, therefore, on a type of historical writing which kept a constant eye on the heavenly city, and he aimed less at presenting true narrative than at surveying the broad lines of political and social development in Indian history, and passing Enlightened judgment. An 1803 reading of what Montesquieu called Histoire Raisonée gave rise to a neat formulation of his own policy when writing the History:

> The "Histoire Raisonee", then of the government of one of the European states, has the peculiar advantage of being in a great measure the "Histoire Raisonee" of the government of all the rest. It is thus valuable in an extraordinary degree; as we are more interested in the history of our own government... than we can be in any other.[78]

Histoire Raisonée was by definition shot through and through with preconceived assumptions, and its exemplars plundered history for proofs of their prejudices and for contributions towards the better understanding and improvement of the present. Mill displayed to the full between 1806 and 1817 the eighteenth-century ability to write, e.g., a history of 1689 and produce a burningly relevant political document; his specific achievement was to narrate incidents of small occasion in India and yet extract from them broad conclusions of strange relevance to England, as well as display "the most perfect comprehension of the principles of human society".[79] Millar had already shown the way:

> It is not the progress of the power of England which is the subject of his enquiry [in the Historical View]; but the progress of its government. His purpose is to delineate the changes which successively took place in the political

> arrangements of the country, to refer these if possible to some general law of human affairs, and to point out the tendency, and estimate the value of the regulations which are successively introduced.[80]

Mill was similarly inspired to estimate the tendency of (i.e. condemn) primitive political arrangements, and to draw general wisdom from particulars, such as this 1818 note in his Commonplace Book:

> People Fit.
>
> 1. Wherever people have had a share in the government, whatever be the stage of society, the government has always been better, than any government in the same stage, without the people.
>
> The Greeks & the Romans, better than any other governments in their age - though they knew not the representative system. As soon as the people lost their share, the Greek and Roman gov^{ts} became (perished? - illegible)
>
> All the good there has ever been in any government under the sun owing to the share the people had in it...[81]

Clearly, however, the general laws induced from history had a distressing unreliability compared to general laws deduced from axioms of human nature, since a year later (in the Essay on Government) Mill changed his mind and announced: "a community in mass is ill-adapted for the business of government".[82]

In 1806, however, when he began the History, Mill was still uninterested in a science of government and still resistant to simplifying reductions of human nature to one or two passions, which might serve as axiomatic bases of political deduction. He accepted Millar's conclusion that while humanity displayed a considerable similarity in wants, it displayed enormous diversity in individual character from which general axioms were not easily obtained. Millar had compared this diversity to a vast scattering of dice:

> The character and genius of a nation may, perhaps, be considered as nearly the same with that of every other in similar circumstances; but the case is very different with respect to individuals, among whom there is a great diversity,

> proceeding from no fixed causes that are capable of being ascertained. Thus, in a multitude of dice thrown together at random, the result, at different times, will be nearly equal; but in one or two throws of a single die, very different numbers may often be produced.[83]

Mill did not subscribe literally to the six-sided view of human nature which this seemed to imply, but he rounded on Helvetius in 1807 for reducing innate passions to the love of pleasure:

> It has been objected by Helvetius, that virtue, honour and fear, are not the ultimate principles of action: they may be resolved, all of them, into the love of power; as that again may be reduced to the love of pleasure. Our readers are well acquainted with the simplifying spirit of some modern metaphysics; and the predominant love of explaining all phenomena by any single cause - except the Deity. It is very needless, however, in our opinion, to examine this position, which, true or false, need have no place in a political disquisition. Why are the metaphysicians, upon all occasions, to drive us out of the common use of words, and the maxims of practical experience, by their subtle analysis of moral powers and passions?[84]

What was required for political knowledge, apparently, was not Helvetian metaphysics and Hobbesian deductions from simplified human nature, but a demonstration of the "maxims of practical experience" by careful induction from historical particulars. The History of British India set out, therefore, to convey "just ideas" of the legal, political and administrative ordinances and institutions which it described, meaning by "just ideas" a clear account of their causes, consequences and natural tendencies, and an Enlightened judgment of their compatibility with or opposition to human nature.[85] Millar's Distinction of Ranks had declared a similar aim: "by observing the systems of law established in different parts of the world, and by remarking the consequences with which they are attended, men have endeavoured to reap advantage from the experience of others, and to make a selection of such institutions and modes of government as

appeared most worthy of being adopted".[86]

Mill had no doubts, however, that all political and social behaviour made known in history could be traced back to the principles of human nature; what he refused to accept was the purely mechanical model proposed by Bentham. Circumstances differed so widely between societies and periods of history, he believed (displaying a moment of nineteenth-century consciousness against the eighteenth) that they could not built into a political machine as a kind of constant element. What was needed was an account of how political developments flowed from and interacted with human nature in different times and places, in other words, a history: and after he completed his work on India in 1817, he meditated an exactly similar project on how developments in English law interacted with circumstances and human nature at different periods.[87] Although Millar provided "almost the only source" of information about "the different stages of social progress", it was Hume whom Mill credited in 1803 with having produced the wanted type of philosophical history. Implicitly complimenting Reid and Bacon also, Mill announced that Hume had pointed out

> the manner in which the principles of human nature... operated in conjunction with the circumstances in which the people were placed, to produce the political changes; and thus to refer particular facts to general laws, the real business of philosophy.[88]

In his own work, Mill concentrated on demonstrating that it was the corrupt and self-centred passions of the Hindus, rather than circumstance, which was responsible for their rudimentary political institutions and general backwardness. Such corruption, however, proved much easier to demonstrate (as in a series of rhetorical articles in the Edinburgh while the History was being written) than to change.

d) The History, 1806-17: Is Man Reformable?

The History swiftly extracted from Hindu political experience the need for essential reforms: but it was on the point of prescribing these that Mill came up squarely against the problem - is man reformable? is he capable of mental change? Bentham had given a firm answer of No; men, although not necessarily, were habitually pleasure-seeking animals in competition for a resource in short supply; all that was possible was an efficient reorganisation of their social and political institutions so that the lust for pleasure was channelled to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For Mill, before his conversion to associationism in 1816-17, the cautious answer was possibly: Hume and Reid had shown how, in the long term, education could be adapted to reinforcing the nobler passions of human nature. How, therefore, could human nature be changed in the short term, and backward peoples be advanced to readiness for political institutions which would maximise their happiness?

Mill's eventual solution (examined in section d) was that education must work with a system of patronage, checks and balances to transform political behaviour. Having decided by 1813 that happiness (which included wider satisfactions than pleasure) was the chief, though not sole, object of human endeavour, Mill decided that "the distribution of punishment and reward, above all of honour and disgrace, of dignity and degradation" had the greatest influence on the formation of character. Law itself had no effect, he added.[89] Combined with education, refounded on a science of human nature which illuminated the associationist principles on which desires were formed, nothing more could be done to drag the world's backward peoples out of the dark ages; though Mill recommended legislators to impose Utilitarian

institutions wherever possible, while not neglecting "local variations".

During the years of writing the History, however, local variations assumed startling proportions for the prospective reformer. Mill's misgivings about instant reform centred in his historical consciousness that man was not a ready-made article, awaiting only an Utilitarian patent medicine for his ills, as Bentham had in coarser pages seemed to present him, but the complex product of a long and varied evolution.

> The stage of civilisation, and the moral and political situation in which the people of India are placed, render the establishment of legislative assemblies impracticable. They would be productive of nothing but confusion, and all the miserable consequences which it is our study to avoid. A simple form of arbitrary government, tempered by European honour and European intelligence, is the only form which is now fit for Hindustan. But that government should be one, the interests of which are identified with the interests of the country; and, arbitrary as it must be, such checks and influences might easily be applied, as would render it mild and paternal in its exercise. 90

Further, Scottish history, in examining the interaction of human nature and political changes, had taught Mill to be pessimistic in his hopes for progress and reform. "Men conceive perfection, but are capable only of improvement," averred Ferguson; "there are certain limits beyond which it is impossible to push the real improvements arising from wealth and opulence," wrote Millar; "real progress is not always the most natural... it may have been determined by particular accidents," Dugald Stewart concluded in surveying men's progress from "uncultivated nature".[91] Smith, often criticised by his fellow-philosophers for his low tone, defined progress chiefly in economic terms and seemed to hint that increases in the division of labour and in the absolute wealth of society could bring happiness: but Ferguson asserted, in the History of Civil Society, that Smith

knew that national felicity was built on character and not on economics.[92] Smith himself damns "the pleasures of wealth and greatness, which strike the imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble," as a deception, useful only because it "rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind", and laments in un-Utopian tones: "for every 1 rich there are 500 poor".[93]

The Scots accepted the same basic human psychology as Hume in their ethical and political philosophy (man as a creature of conflicting reason and passions, etc.)[94] but ignored Bentham's conclusion that efficient control of reason and proper understanding of motivation could bring happiness and social progress. They concentrated instead on man as an active member of society, rather than the bundle of psychological fragments seen through the microscope. "We want to know man's usual, not unusual, state as the grounds of the Science of Government," wrote Ferguson.[95] Man's usual state seemed to demonstrate, James Mill learned, that he had been largely corrupted, not improved, on his journey from the State of Nature. Then, Ferguson claimed, man's social relations had been perfectly balanced, before corruption in the form of private property set in, one man became subordinated to another and war ensued among men to obtain wealth. This gave birth in turn to the psychological basis of industrial society: belief in competition, and man's need of anxiety and competition to make him plan for the future, something he never did in the State of Nature.[96]

Mill was largely unsympathetic to Ferguson's jaundiced socialism, but even Adam Smith, from an opposing point of view,[97] reached similarly melancholy conclusions about human progress. Wealth had been acquired, Smith argued, "at the expense of (man's) intellectual, social and moral values.. the torpor of his mind renders him incapable not only of relishing

or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment".[98] Progress had also brought about the destruction of man's "moral sense", his ability (as defined by Hutcheson and Shaftesbury) to recognise instinctively what is good and just. This was because society, not the individual, now established norms of conduct, so a moral was now like an aesthetic judgment: an action was "right" because two or three people so agreed, not because it conformed with an absolute standard. Morality now exists by sympathy, by universal approval, Smith observes sadly;[99] so in a society of crooks the most virtuous is the most wicked.[100]

The Scots finally pinpointed the nature of human progress by concentrating on the progress of societies rather than of individual men. Leaving questions of the improvement of human nature to such practitioners of "hypothesis and chimerical theory" as Hartley (as Mill described him in 1802),[101] they produced instead a scientific guide for the social reformer in the guise of a philosophy of history. Progress, Smith and Millar concluded,[102] moved along a fixed path - a path which all countries had to follow in their development up to the finest achievements of the present, but along which their speed was unequal. The staging posts on the path to civilisation were laid down by Millar and Smith as hunting and fishing, pastoral, agricultural and commercial,[103] though Ferguson analysed the process more in Vico's terms of the developing self-knowledge of societies,[104] and Dugald Stewart in terms of the development of intelligence.[105] The varying positions of different countries, strung out along the path of progress, enabled the philosopher to draw up a "scale of civilisation", a kind of league table on which any nation might determine how well it was doing, both absolutely and relatively to others, and from which the

reformer could read off instantly the measures needed for the improvement of countries at different stages of development. For the scholar, also, the "scale of civilisation" was able to accommodate the bewildering variety (as it seemed to the armchair rationalists reading the Edinburgh Review) of social and political arrangements revealed by new historical research, and the equally puzzling backwardness of much of the world opened up by Enlightened explorers.[106]

Bentham had proved uninterested in such analysis, being concerned with refining his understanding of the promised land, but Mill recognised instantly its importance for social reformers, who could now determine scientifically the varying requirements of backward civilisations. Where laws relating to individual human nature were impossible to discover, a law could now be found to apply on the larger scale to the succession of states of society: and Mill attempted through the History to delineate this succession, for here it seemed possible to give birth to a truly scientific principle on which the social science could be founded. His confidence was expressed in an 1815 letter to Ricardo:

> That book of mine, if it answers my expectation, or rather my wish, will make no bad introduction to the study of civil society in general. The subject afforded an opportunity of laying open the principles and laws of the social order in almost all its more remarkable states, from the most rude to the most perfect with which we are yet acquainted; (it)... will be of some help... in exploring... the course which human affairs, upon the great scale, have hitherto taken, the causes of their taking these different courses, the degree in which these courses have severally departed from the best course, and by what means they can be made to approximate to that course.[107]

What the scale of civilisation revealed was that many contemporary primitive societies had made no significant progress since the Babylonian age, and constituted a kind of "living history":

> As the manners, institutions and attainments of the Hindus have been stationary for many ages, in beholding the Hindus

> of the present we are beholding the Hindus of many ages past, and are carried back, as it were, into the deepest recesses of antiquity. Nor is this all; Of some of the nations, about which our curiosity is most alive, and information the most defective, we acquire a practical, and what may be almost denominated a personal knowledge, by our acquaintance with a living people, who have continued on the same soil from the very times of those ancient nations, partake largely of the same manners, and are placed nearly at the same stage in the progress of society. By conversing with the Hindus of the present day, we, in some measure, converse with the Chaldeans and Babylonians of the time of Cyrus; with the Persians and Egyptians of the time of Alexander. [108]

Ferguson argued similarly that the condition of any existing Arab clan or American tribe enabled us "to behold, as in a mirrour, the features of our own progenitors", just as Thucydides had seen "the most ancient manners of Greece" exemplified in the behaviour of contemporary barbarous societies.[109] By perception of such resemblances, the reformer could prescribe for existing barbarism what had already been applied for the reform of ancient Greece.

History thus exhibited for the Scots a succession of social states and an orderly series of upheavals and crises, resolved by reforms, which marked the dialectical stages of progress along the scale of civilisation. They perceived in history a progression of social crises in much the way that eighteenth century English historians perceived in history a series of psychological dilemmas[110] which, once understood, would allow for the prediction of future behaviour. All the reforming social scientist must do, Mackintosh proclaimed, was consult the previous analogous historical situation:

> We can examine almost every variety of character, manners, opinions, and feelings, and prejudices, of mankind, into which they can be thrown, either by the rudeness of barbarism, or by the capricious corruptions of refinement...
> History... is now a museum, in which specimens of every variety of human nature may be studied. From these great accessions to knowledge, lawgivers and statesmen, but, above

> all, moralists and political philosophers, may reap the most important instruction... What former age could have supplied the facts for such a work as that of Montesquieu? [111]

Hence, where a philosophy of history was ultimately foreign to Bentham (who was equipped with a philosophy of mind and a psychology) it was fundamental to James Mill, and remained so throughout his life. Even in 1835, when a composite philosophy of mind based on associationism was fully developed, Mill notes in the Fragment on Mackintosh "the counter action which the general laws of human nature may receive from specific varieties".[112] His emphasis on the prescription of only such institutions as are appropriate to a given stage of social development had a severely practical (and Benthamite) reason, however, and is far from J.S. Mill's principle, learned from Coleridge, Carlyle and the German romantic philosophers, that "all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and .. different stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different institutions".[113] Mill held bluntly that if a legislator ignored the scale of civilisation when prescribing institutions, he was courting disaster:

> No scheme of government can happily conduce to the ends of government, unless it is adapted to the state of the people for whose use it is intended. In those diversities in the state of civilisation, which approach the extremes, this truth is universally acknowledged. Should anyone propose, for a band of roving Tartars, the regulations adapted to the happiness of a regular and polished society, he would meet with neglect or derision. The inconveniences are only more concealed, and more or less diminished, when the error relates to states of society which more nearly resemble one another. If the mistake in regard to Hindu society, committed by the British nation, and the British government, be very great; if they have conceived the Hindus to be a people of high civilisation, while they have in reality made but a few of the earliest steps in the progress to civilisation, it is impossible that in many of the measures pursued for the government of that people, the mark aimed at should not have been wrong.[114]

e) <u>The History, 1809 onwards: The Clash with the Scottish Idea of Progress</u>.

This was written in 1816; but Mill was to find indigestible, from his first meetings with Bentham in 1808 the Scottish conclusion that the values of given societies, even those they described as savage or little above the condition of animals,[115] were to be viewed in the total context of those societies - not to be rejected as merely "error" or interpreted as halting attempts to realise efficient Utilitarian institutions. The Scots agreed further that progress of countries on the scale of civilisation was random and unplanned, and subject to no rational agency; and that conscious attempts by Utilitarians and missionaries to impose progress on the backward, by transplanting the laws, ethics and politics of more refined nations, were doomed to failure. History, not psychology, was the key to realities in India, Morocco and Madagascar, and to treat these countries as if their problems were those of frustrated pleasure-seekers was to make a fundamental mistake in the Science of Government.

The marriage in Mill's mind between Benthamite rationalism and Scottish "conjectural history"[116] was, therefore, to become increasingly unhappy, and led to tensions in his thinking which were never resolved in his intellectual life.[117] His writings in the <u>Edinburgh Review</u> after 1809 took on a strident, impatient and growingly un-Scottish tone in dealing with the barbarous civilisations of the East, which had seemed to benevolent eighteenth century literati in England and France, as well as in Scotland, to be pleasingly eccentric corners of a rococo universe. A July 1809 article on Guignes' <u>Travels</u> led him to "fix" on the Scale the "condition" of the Chinese: "this country" is very little advanced beyond the infancy, of fixed, or agricultural society".[117] Conclusive evidence for Mill lay in the backwardness of all arts except pottery and gardening, the "despotic"

government which plundered the population, the national character ("the most mendacious known to history") and the degraded status of women, Millar's acid test of civilisation, [118] which Mill described as "worse than savages... they are little above imprisoned slaves". [119] By October 1810 the Edinburgh's Editor, Jeffrey, was complaining that Mill's articles were Trojan horses for Benthamism, after the great man's name and works were advertised and his principles exalted on ~~three~~ several successive occasions, [120] and by 1812 he was openly censoring Mill's work. [121] Mill was on safer ground in 1810 in attacking the Indians as "barbarous and semi-civilised" (Jeffrey having established a precedent in attacking the Chinese as "mean and semi-barbarous...remarkable only for their numbers"), [122] and declaring "English government in India, with all its vices, [to be] a blessing of unspeakable magnitude". "We wish (its) prolongation", Mill added, "for the sake of the natives, not of England". [123] In July 1813 he assaulted the Sikhs as "Hindus... merely Hindus", claiming their history to exhibit "a disgusting uniformity of sanguinary feuds and struggles among a rude people". [124] When the History finally appeared in 1817, imperiously demanding reforms, it displayed such profound animus against the Hindus that Bentham disavowed its mode of expression, [125] and its second Editor in 1841, H.H. Wilson, condemned it as a book whose

> tendency is evil: it is calculated to destroy all sympathy between the rulers and the ruled; to preoccupy the minds of those who issue annually from Great Britain, to monopolise the posts of honour and power in Hindustan, with an unfounded aversion towards those over whom they exercise that power... There is reason to fear... that the harsh and illiberal spirit (which) has of late years prevailed in the conduct and councils of the rising service in India, ... owes its origin to impressions imbibed in early life from the History of Mr Mill. [126]

Doubtless Wilson had in mind such sympathetic behaviour as that of

the Governor-General of India, Lord William Bentinck, who had ~~written~~ told James Mill in December 1827: ~~to Bentham in 1818~~: "I am going to British India, but I shall not be Governor-General. It is you who will be Governor-General." Bentinck seriously proposed in 1828 to demolish the Taj Mahal in order to sell its marble, and was dissuaded only because of the poor prices fetched at an initial sale of marble from the priceless Agra Mines.[127]

Nowhere, however, do we find in Mill any of the fascination of Herder (or, for that matter, of the early Rousseau) with the detail of primitive civilisations, and none of the sense of wonder of the later anthropologists at the infinite prolixity of differing societies. Mill wrote his History specifically to demonstrate that the Hindus were a barbarous and cultureless people, and to demolish the reputation of high civilisation which had been 'created' for them by Sir William Jones, distinguished orientalist, in his several volumes of Asiatic Researches, published in 1798. Mill's History was hardly a work of detached scholarship. It is, in fact, in Dr Burrow's phrase, alive with the sound of the grinding of axes.[128] Even the occasional passage of scholarly patience, as evidenced in the passage quoted above,[129] disappears in later parts of the work:

> Even in manners, and in the leading parts of the moral character, the lines of resemblance (between the Indians and Chinese) are strong. Both nations are nearly to an equal degree tainted with the vices of insincerity; dissembling, treacherous, mendacious, to an excess which surpasses even the usual measure of uncultivated society. Both are disposed to excessive exaggeration with regard to everything relating to themselves. Both are cowardly and unfeeling. Both are in the highest degree conceited of themselves, and full of affected contempt for others. Both are, in the physical sense, disgustingly unclean in their persons and their houses.[130]

But once again, Mill had firm Benthamite reasons for his

harsh description of the Hindus. One of the things which one notices from the correspondence of Ricardo with Mill is Mill's sustained worry whether the reputation created for a tyrannised people by Sir William Jones could bolster the reputation of "tyrannical government" in England. This was how it looked from Ricardo's end:

> Your comparison of their (the Hindus') Government, Laws, Customs and Religion, with what <u>should be</u> the Government, Laws, Customs and Religion, of an enlightened, and highly civilised people, is exceedingly curious, and instructive... The frequent reference to the state, and exertions of other people, to enable us to form correct conclusions respecting the civilisation of the Hindus, brings a grand picture to our view; and tends to improve our knowledge not only of Government, Laws, Religion, Arts and Literature, as things common to all mankind, but also to increase the interest with which we regard the state of each.
>
> The knowledge of each country is not only interesting in itself, <u>but also on account of its becoming a sort of standard by which we may estimate the state of other countries</u>. 131 (my emphasis)

Praise aristocratic government in India, and you praise it in England, was the gist of Mill's worry; but damn it in India and you damn it for the whole world.

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There were, perhaps, three other assumptions of Scottish philosophy of history which Mill accepted in youth but ultimately discarded, despite his belief that his <u>History</u> lay squarely in the Scottish tradition:[132]

(a) the notion that governments have historically played a small part in human advancement, and can only continue thus in the future. Millar laid down in the Historical View, one of the key Scottish works read by Mill,[133] that ideas of liberty, political institutions and laws in all European countries

> proceeded from no artificial or complicated plans of legislation; but were such as occurred successively to the people, for the supply of their immediate wants, and the removal of incidental inconveniences; in a word, [that the feudal constitution was] everywhere, a kind of natural growth, produced by the peculiar situation and circumstances of the society.[134]

Smith, denying also that governments are "the great instruments of progress" in society, argued that the principle behind "the natural course of things toward improvement" was "the uniform, constant and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition".[135] His words were almost echoed by Millar in the Distinction of Ranks.[136]

(b) the notion that progress flows from what Smith called "the law of the heterogeneity of ends" (the idea that in social science and social progress, ends are often varied and unplanned), - a notion which was a facet of that anti-rationalistic mode of thinking which was so marked in eighteenth century Scotland. Both Smith and Millar were voluble on the social paradoxes contrived by the "hidden hand" in society, and Ferguson added:

> If Cromwell said that a man never mounts higher than when he knows not whither he is going; it may with more reason be affirmed, that (societies) admit of the greatest revolutions where no change is intended, and that the most refined politicians do not always know whither they are leading the state by their projects.[137]

Adam Smith thought that "it was not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice of the European governments which peopled and

cultivated America";[138] and the fact that governments had no concept of specific purpose made it easier to understand that society advanced according to its own rhythm, independently of what soldiers or politicians might intend for it.

(c) The notion that social progress is gradual, and cannot be hurried on by the exertions of individual reformers. Ferguson maintained that

> in the human kind, the species has a progress as well as the individual; they build in every age on foundations formerly laid; and, in a succession of years, tend to perfection in the application of their faculties... to which many generations must have combined their endeavours.[139]

Like individual improvement, social progress was also, in the Scottish view, uncalculated and unpredictable:

> Human laws, it has been remarked, are the growth of time and nature, rather than the work of human invention; and can only be advantageously altered by imitation of the great innovator, Time, who, as Lord Bacon observes, 'innovateth greatly, but quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived'.[140]

Bellenden Ken, whose remark this was, was a Whig writing to justify gradualist change, but the same understanding of progress in history was shared by John Millar, the most radical of the Scottish historians, some thirty years earlier. It was the leading principle of all Millar's speculation, wrote Jeffrey, that

> there was nothing produced by arbitrary or accidental causes; that no great change, institution, custom or occurrence, could be ascribed to the character or exertions of an individual, to the temperament or disposition of a nation, to occasional policy or peculiar wisdom or folly; everything, on the contrary, arose spontaneously from the situation of the society.[141]

And a reviewer in 1806 he put these same anti-rationalist sentiments into the mouths of Adam Smith and Kames:

> It was one great object of both these original authors to trace back the history of society to its most simple

> and universal elements - to resolve almost all that has been ascribed to positive institution into the spontaneous and irresistible development of certain obvious principles - and to show with how little contrivance or political wisdom the most complicated and apparently artificial schemes of policy might have been erected. [142]

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All these attitudes were part of a distinctive approach to the problems of legislation and government. The historical cast of Scottish thinking entailed that even the most radical of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, John Millar, was politically Whiggish rather than radical or revolutionary, content to see a comfortable gradualism in political progress, as God apparently intended.[143] Smith, believing similarly that progress had historically been unplanned rather than consciously achieved, viewed law as a reflection of custom rather than as a rationally conceived artifact; and he too was happy to await the arrival of reform in the leisurely measures of progress, rather than transcend the customs of the time by innovative law-making.[144] The problem, Millar explained patiently, is that

> the institutions of a country, how imperfect soever they may seem, are commonly suited to the state of the people by whom they have been embraced; and therefore, in most cases, they are susceptible to those gentle improvements, which proceed from a gradual reformation of the manners, and are accompanied with a correspondent change in the condition of society. In every system of law or government, the different parts have an intimate connection with each other. As it is dangerous to tamper with the machine, unless one is previously acquainted with the several wheels and springs of which it is composed; so there is reason to fear, that the violent alteration of any single part may destroy the regularity of its movements, and produce the utmost disorder and confusion. [145]

Mill's irritability with such attitudes dates, as we have seen, from 1809, well before the <u>History</u> was finished, as Bentham instructed him that Utilitarian law, however unseasonable, was always better

than the laws which it replaced. Yet before "conjectural history" was bastardised in Mill's hands and the "scale of civilisation" used only to pin politically recalcitrant countries firmly to the bottom of the ladder, prior to a propagandist onslaught, Mill was forced to resolve the division of mind between the intellectual heritages he drew on. There were, after all, two traditions of the "idea of progress" which descended from the eighteenth century to confuse the Scots. The first, deriving from Hartleian association psychology, took as its subject Man as a creature of Feelings and Sensations, a type of fluid, non-organised entity, and argued that he was capable of infinite progress and ultimately of perfectibility once environment was led to organise his experience in a scientific way. Progress for men was possible also for nations, for - as J.S. Mill later succinctly expressed it - "men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance".[146] Serious belief in perfectibility - to be achieved through education and scientific progress - found its home mainly in France, where the philosophes persisted beyond Rousseau in regarding social and political problems as purely technical in nature; Bentham spoke for the more cynical English followers of Hume in accepting the likelihood of "environmental progress", but conceding perfectibility only in principle: self-interest was the great obstacle in the way.[147] The other tradition, articulated by Smith, Ferguson and Millar, was frankly pessimistic in its analysis of the past and hopes of the future, and argued - as we have seen - that time and circumstance alone, not the urging shoulder of the reformer, moved the wheel of progress.

For Mill, the difficulty eventually proved insuperable of reconciling the Scottish advice to innovate only tentatively with

the Benthamite counsel to stimulate reform whenever possible, despite potentially tumultuous consequences in some cases. In 1809 he still had hopes that time would usher in a revolution, entering in his Commonplace Book a remark of Lord Macartney in Barrow's Life: "It is vain to attempt arresting the progress of knowledge... The human mind is of a soaring nature, and having once gained the lower steps of the ascent, struggles incessantly against every difficulty to reach the highest. Whatever ought to be will be;... time is the great wonder-worker of our world; the exterminator of prejudice, and the touch-stone of truth; it is endless (sic) to oppose it; power becomes enervate of effort ridiculous". [148] By 1815 he has given up on time; the reformer must act, whatever the social consequences. In 1817 he informed Ricardo: "All great changes in society, are easily effected when the time is come. Was it not an individual, without fortune, without name, and in fact without talents, who produced the reformation?" [149] Charged with anxiety for progress, Mill first of all confronted the fact that there was no logical arrival at perfectibility embodied in the Scottish explanations of progress, while association psychology implied that both progress and perfectibility might be consciously striven for and achieved. Secondly, the Scottish notion of progress implied a "natural" change and development in human nature, while association psychology argued that man, equipped with greater knowledge, will change his ways only because he will come to recognise that paths of behaviour which have seemed profitable in the past are no longer so. In both these dilemmas Mill came to embrace the associationist position.

The shift to Hartleianism was delayed until 1816 - for Mill's passion for mental philosophy was stifled during his 11-year torment

with the History, which he had hoped to finish in three years,[150] and he managed only four articles in this field between 1806 and 1818.[151] Correspondence with Place between 1814 and 1816 shows Mill's boredom with the History, and his frequently-stated anxiety to get back to philosophy. Place was requested to send Mill a copy of Hartley in 1815, and in a letter of early 1816 Mill has dropped all his bitter denunciations of many years. "Hartley has the true scent," he replied to Place,[152] although Mill still derided the vibratory-nerves theory as nonsense, and omitted all reference to it in the thorough-going associationism of the Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, written between 1822 and 1829.

f) 1813-29: Human Nature Educated

Mill's impatience with the pessimism of the Scots reached a peak in 1813, when he defiantly praised Owen's educational experiment at Lanark and declared: "The habit of despairing of human improvement has been indulged in beyond measure, and has prolonged the existence of infinite calamity. It has even become a sort of fashion, an air... many men display it with ostentation, under the garb of a mark of cool wisdom and acute discernment".[153] Individual reformers must now move urgently, he proclaimed, to arrest the daily moral degeneration of the people, to set a new public standard of virtue, and to canvass the end of a system of government which calculatingly dealt out poverty and hopelessness - the causes of degeneration - to the community at large. Seizing on the example of William Penn in the Life by Clarkson which he reviewed in 1814, Mill told whatever Whig readers the Philanthropist may have commanded: "we have a most instructive proof of the important service which the resource of a single man is sometimes capable of rendering to his country, or to his species, (in the career of Penn)".[154]

In his sudden concern for the improvement of individual human nature rather than the species, Mill did not, however, turn for examples to Owen's practical successes in rehabilitating the poor, or to Bentham's appeal to men to learn and follow their true interests. He relied instead on the deterministic theory of education he had learned in youth from Reid - a theory which stated two principles of primary importance. The first was that the dispositions of the human mind are predominantly the result of education, and not of a natural or inherited human nature; the second, that education must be used to strengthen men's nobler, more virtuous and altruistic passions so

that the corrupting effect of even the most evil "circumstances" might be overcome. Mill was to go startlingly further than this. Defining education as "every thing, which acts upon the being as it comes from the hand of nature, in such a manner as to modify the mind, to render the train of feelings different from what it would otherwise have been,"[155] he claimed that education could be so carefully processed, and circumstances so controlled, that perfectibility could come within man's grasp.[156] The admixture of thought is clear: the Humean-Scottish belief in the improving qualities of education, the Benthamite-associationist doctrine that circumstances can be remade to alter the sensational input into the human mind; but twisted into an altogether new possibility of a fabricated human nature and human race. J.S. Mill was, perhaps, its first member: "a made or manufactured man", his friend John Sterling called him.[157]

Mill's intentions with education were, in 1813, still chiefly ethical: attention to morals defines the good man, he argued,[158] and education may bring about an increase in the world's limited stock of virtuous behaviour. One notes, in passing, that Mill's agnosticism, dating from 1808-10, made no difference to his moral preoccupations:

> When we look into the management of human affairs... we find so little done for preventing the human character from assuming any degree of corruption, that the virtue which has everywhere appeared in the world, not the vice, is the astonishing circumstance. What is matter of admiration... also of delight, is the mighty proof which is thus afforded us, of the facility with which the human character may be formed to virtue.[159]

The manipulation of education was quickly to become, however, one of the two main planks of Mill's science of politics, through which he hoped to change the behaviour of both the governors and governed: the other was the manipulation of the universal human interest in

personal happiness, to be used as the basis of rewards and punishments. Education could achieve, Mill argued, what law had failed to bring about - the lifting of society above wretchedness, the transformation of individual circumstances:

> If the character which can be imprinted on human beings in their individual and collective capacities is that which is of primary importance, whether we regard the happiness of individuals or the prosperity of society, - if laws are but so many imperfect substitutes for the defects of character, - if no laws, where character is universally depraved, can save any society from wretchedness, and every deplorable and disgusting circumstance which accompanies the gross mismanagement of human affairs; - if, on the other hand, character, in proportion as it is good, really supplies the place of laws, and prevents the worst from producing all their evil effects, - it cannot but appear to be the first consideration of public wisdom, to ascertain in what degree it is possible to operate to the improvement of human character. This lies at the foundation of everything. No law, or set of laws, however wide a portion of human concerns they embrace, can boast of a comprehensiveness or efficacy equal to this. Every other branch of legislation, in truth, sinks into insignificancy in comparison. Make in any society the human character good, you are sure of every blessing which the laws of our nature, and of that portion of the great whole to which we belong, admit. Leave the human character bad, nothing which human wisdom and human powers can achieve will be of any considerable avail to remove what deforms and torments society.
>
> It being then a point so very clear and certain, that the state of the human character is, of all the circumstances which affect the happiness, the beauty, and order, and well-being of society, by far the most important; the most interesting question, surely, ... is: to what degree is it possible to operate improvement upon human character?
>
> ... We look at laws, we look at governments, we look at what is called <u>practical</u> (that is, what is practical) in human affairs; and we answer, <u>Nothing at all</u>. We consult reason, experience, (what is called <u>theory</u>), - nay, we take every man's opinion... and we answer, <u>Every thing</u>. 160

Mill's account of the reasons for social degeneration is a very Smithian one: division of labour has stultified individual human minds, which attend to a smaller and smaller circle of ideas and objects as civilisation advances and labour is subdivided further; and poverty,

above all else, hunger for food, is responsible for the most obvious symptom of degeneration: the universal preoccupation with pleasure-seeking and avoiding pain.[161] The argument on poverty is reminiscent also of Helvetius, one of the prime authors in the diet fed to J.S. Mill, and praised extensively in the essay on Education, who argued that "in the first ages of the world... nature, by hunger, thirst, heat and cold, informed man of his wants, and added a variety of pleasing and painful sensations, the former to the gratification of these wants, the latter to the incapacity of gratifying them".[162] Thus, Mill notes, a "generous and animating diet" is a necessity before any people can be raised to moral excellence, for a wretched and excellent people has yet to be seen on earth.[163] But it is to the political theory of his social engineering that he turns with most enthusiasm. The business of the educator, he states, is so to arrange the circumstances by which children are surrounded, that their sensational experience will be in the highest degree pleasurable; for "education... denotes the means which may be employed to render the mind... an operative cause of happiness".[164] The business of government, meanwhile, is to realise for man "the grand objects of desire" (food and labour) as well as the conditions in which his interests are regarded and his other demands met; for a man's character is formed from the direction taken by his desires and passions.[165] Quite unaware of the sinister tone his remarks might have for later ages, Mill goes straight to the point:

> The question is, How the mind, with those properties which it possesses, can, through the operation of certain means, be rendered most conducive to a certain end? To answer this question, the whole of its properties must be known. The whole science of human nature is, therefore, but a branch of the science of education...
>
> As the happiness, which is the end of education, depends

> upon the actions of the individual, and as all the actions of man are produced by his feelings and thoughts, the business of education is, to make certain feelings or thoughts take place instead of others. [166]

It is to the discovery of the Association of Ideas in the human mind that Mill credits the possibility of such mental eugenics, though he turns to Locke and Hume rather than Hartley for examples of how this can be achieved. Hobbes, in his study of Human Nature, showed the way in studying the progress of mental feelings, but Locke and Hume did most in tracing their proper order of succession, he announces.[167] For what purpose did Mill wish to deploy the "alarming" powers over the mind which associationism offered, as Hartley called them?[168] His answer carries more of the echoes of a Scottish village pulpit than of newspeak:

> We come now to... the inquiry what are the qualities with which it is of most importance that the mind of the individual should be endowed... These two qualities, the intelligence which can always choose the best possible means, and the strength which overcomes the misguiding propensities, appear to be sufficient for the happiness of the individual. [169]

What the Association of Ideas offered to Mill was a scientific tool to extend man's knowledge of human nature. It now became possible to analyse the sequences of thoughts and desire-formation in the mind, by determining the modes of combination of simple ideas and the influence of "circumstances" upon these combinations, and thus to demonstrate scientifically the nature of human wants and the grounds of behaviour. Association was to prove for Mill a far more forceful tool in yielding the general laws of the mind than historical research:

> The case is illustrated by the steam engine. A man may know much more about the machine, by examining its structure, than by (reading) the history of all the machines that ever were made. [170]

Association - tested and reinforced by education - also offered to Mill the possibility of genuine Baconian experiment on the processes of the mind, superseding mere observation of human behaviour. It further allowed the philosopher to break down human nature into various categories, of general, national, and individual character, by showing how desires and dispositions were prompted by general, specifically national, and specifically individual circumstances. All human character, Mill believed, was created by circumstance:

> In every country, says a great author, there is a certain number of objects which the mode of rearing and the course of life... present alike to every body; and it is the uniform impression of these objects which produces in the citizens that resemblance of ideas and of sentiments, which is called the national intelligence, the national character.
>
> There is, beside these, a certain number... of objects, which chance, and the peculiarity of situation, present to every individual; and it is the additional impression of these ever-varying objects, which in the same individuals produces that diversity of ideas and sentiments which is called individual intelligence and individual character. 171

Equipped with a proper analysis of the grounds of behaviour in the country he is governing, assured that free will will not introduce capricious exceptions, and aware of the universal human interest in personal happiness, the Mill-carrying legislator can now embark on a social science. Governments must address themselves to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, though Mill at no time reduces happiness altogether to pleasures and pains in the literal manner of Bentham; he argues in the Education essay that happiness may consist in intellectual and moral satisfactions, as well as in "simple sensations".[172] A reforming government in India, therefore, possessed of the knowledge of how human nature is formed into individual, national, and "racial" characteristics, can dispense Utility accordingly:

> Utility, absolute utility, general utility, utility upon the whole, generical utility, utility as regards the genus, utility as regards the species, universal utility - all these are names for utility as applicable to human nature in general, to the common attributes of human nature - to what of that nature is held in common by the species. Particular utility, or practical utility, are means for that utility which is applicable to what any particular people have different from others - it is general utility, modified by the specific difference. - This with regard to the race, the genus et species, call it what you will... You talk of abstract utility with regard to the people of England. In this sense it means not only what is good for the species, but what is suited to the English people, as a people, without considering any existing institutions... Abstract utility is what would be good for a people if there were no inconvenience in change - practical utility is what is best for them, allowance made for the inconvenience of change. Absolute utility is what would be good for a people, at the commencement of a political state, when every thing is to institute. When they have institutions, practical utility is this absolute utility, being where the inconvenience of change would surpass the good which the forms of absolute utility could introduce. 173

The science of legislation in Mill thus has two parts: a programme of education, by which the State will improve its subjects and strengthen them for virtuous behaviour, and a programme of utilitarian legislation, by which the interests of the governed will be harmonised and enlarged on the greatest scale possible. What is common to human nature everywhere, Mill argued in 1814 (with the influence of Bentham apparent) is "the universally acknowledged fact that man loves himself better than any other body".[174] That man pursues happiness and flees from misery, he iterated in an attack on Stewart in 1815 that finally freed him from bondage to Reid's instincts, "in other words seeks pleasure and avoids pain, is a known and acknowledged fact".[175] Thus, in a universal principle of human nature, we find the foundations of political science: "all men are governed by motives, and motives arise out of interests; interests are the source from which all inferences from the actions of men of

former times to the actions of those of the present may safely be drawn".[176] The identical human interest in personal happiness enabled the legislator and social reformer not only to argue from the experience of one age to another, but to dispense pleasures and pains as rewards and punishments with assurance of their efficacy. "The distribution of punishment and reward, above all of honour and disgrace, of dignity and degradation" has the greatest influence on the formation of character, Mill maintained.[177]

g: 1829-36: The Final Quarrels over Method

It was the possibility of establishing utilitarian prescriptions for different countries both specifically and universally which allowed Mill to indulge the deductive argument from human nature, which so aroused the fury of the Scots. The utilitarians were no doubt empiricists of the school of Locke and Hume in matters of psychology; but in method they were wholesale Baconians and Newtonians, admiring especially the maxim that from an empirical law, whole sciences of experience could be laid out by subsuming as wide a field of phenomena as possible. Under the Newtonian standard, therefore, Bentham and Mill set out to add politics and psychology to the distinguished list of natural sciences. Bentham took as his regula philosophandi the principle that all human action aims principally at pleasure, Mill the belief that men's highest interest is their own happiness, which generally "corresponds with the degree to which their pleasures are great, and their pains are small".[178] From these principles, government takes its rise: for if nature had supplied all the means of abundance and subsistence, Mill argued, there would be no source of pains among men, nor would one man have taken authority over another; thus it becomes the business of governments to supply the conditions under which labour can be insured for the production of abundance and subsistence, and under which men are afforded protection against persecution.[179]

These conclusions are straightforwardly deduced by Mill in the Essay on Government, without apparent reference to experience; and the seeming resemblance of his argument on the purposes of government to an Aristotelian exposition of final causes, with its seemingly timeless conclusions, eventually aroused the polemical attentions of

Macaulay. In fact, Mill believed, on the model of Newtonian natural science, that valid deduction from correctly established empirical laws must give rise to valid conclusions; and as there could be but one valid line of inference from a properly established and valid empirical law, so only one valid set of conclusions could be drawn in the science of government. It was a belief he held all his life, and which properly separated him - as his son chiefly argued - from the developing historical consciousness of the age, and from the growing realisation that questions of law and institution were relative and not absolute. Long before the familiar controversy of the Essay on Government, Mill had buried in the Philanthropist in 1814 an even more flagrantly deductive demonstration of the science of government:

> There is no necessity upon the actions of men, but either from the hand of nature, or from one another. It is evident that there is no necessity from the hand of nature upon rulers to act according to the laws. The only necessity then must arise from the actions of men. It thus follows, that to make the laws rule, the rulers must of necessity be under the coercion, and the efficient coercion, of some other body of men. And that, it is also evident, must be a body of men who have a preponderating interest... in the exact execution of the laws. As this is a very certain conclusion, which will not be denied, so it is also a very important conclusion, which will be as universally admitted. The clear conclusion of reason is, that for the laws to rule, the rulers must be under check and control; they must in fact be obliged to act, not as they themselves choose, but as some other men choose; viz. the controlling and checking body...
>
> What body of men are they who neither have nor can be made to have an interest different from the great body of the community? It is evident... the general body of the community themselves...
>
> Take any minor portion of the people themselves, and give to them the power of making laws for the rest, and they will act the very same part that would be acted by kings and nobles; that is to say, they will make laws for their own benefit at the expense of the rest. This effect arises from the fundamental principles of human nature; and it is unavoidable... The grand problem of legislation is, not to get rid of it, for that is impossible; but to find the means of counteracting it...

> The principle from which it arises is the universally acknowledged fact, that man loves himself better than any other body. As this is a principle inseparable from human nature, indeed necessary for the well-being, nay, for the preservation of the species; and as it is the grand, overruling spring in man's constitution, every legislative act which is not founded upon it must be fundamentally wrong. Upon this principle it is that the utility is founded of giving a share to the people... in the making of laws. Because, from this undeniable tendency of human nature it is certain, absolutely certain, that without a share in the making of the laws, the interests of the body of the community will be sacrificed through the laws. [180]

Even while drawing out the general laws of history in his 1814 writing, therefore (and Mill claimed bluntly that "the knowledge of the past is good only for the improvement of the future")[181] Mill was bemused into the clearer certainties of the deductive argument. Macaulay in 1829, however, fared much less well with criticism of Mill's method - for the induction he himself practised was simply a more specific mode of constant application to historical example, "perpetually bringing the theory we have constructed to the test of new facts, ... correcting or altogether abandoning it, according as those new facts prove it to be partially or fundamentally unsound" - than with his universal principle of men's self-interest, which he proclaimed as an identical proposition.[182] Despite its failure to make clean and unambiguous points in argument, it was an attack with which Bentham and James Mill never successfully dealt.

Mill clashed repeatedly in his last years with those who damned his failure "to bring the theory we have constructed to the test of new facts" as evidence that "speculation" was taking place. Private notes in his Commonplace Book testify to his irritation: under the heading "Spinning Theories out of Abstractions", he quotes Condillac: "The motives to do this, are pride and the habit, formed from infancy,

of reasoning on vague notions". Condillac, he contimues, "calls the art of induction, l'a- [illegible], which consists, he says, of two operations, <u>decomposer</u> et <u>composer</u>. The method opposed to this, is that of laying down abstract propositions, and from them deducing everything. This he calls Synthese".[183] The <u>Fragment</u>, dismissing the bayings of Mackintosh, even felt an apparent need to establish Mill's bona fides with the statement: "The laws prescribed by man's nature are, of course, the laws tending to human good, whether they be laws actually fixed by any society for its own use, or not",[184] and continuing:

> When the philosopher endeavours to range the objects of his consideration under heads, and as many as possible of them under one head; so that he may obtain propositions true of as great a number of them as possible. Such propositions are found to be of the greatest utility. And the man who in this way subjects the largest province of human knowledge to the fewest principles, is universally esteemed the most successful philosopher.[185]

Mill was quite unable to follow Mackintosh's logic when told that because abstract principles were abstracted from experience, a legislator possessed only of abstract principles relating to law, government and human nature, would be quite unable to govern a country in det[illegible]l:

> There are two sets of circumstances, to which it is necessary to attend in the making of laws. There are circumstances, which all nations have in common. There are other circumstances, which each nation has peculiar to itself. The 1st set of circumstances, those which nations have in common; at least, nations which are nearly on the same level in point of civilisation; are beyond comparison the most important; and were laws well adapted to them, the modifications required for the particular circumstances of each particular country, would not be very great. But here is the curious thing, in the theory of those who prate like Sir James. The men, they say, who alone are capable of attending to the general circumstances; the more numerous and the more important; of understanding them, and making provision for them, are utterly incapable of understanding and making provision for

> the peculiar, far less numerous, and less important, circumstances, which are found in particular communities. Why should they? Has it ever been shewn, that there are any of those circumstances which cannot be made known to these men, when they have occasion to know them? ... The very reverse of all this is the truth. The only men who can apprehend the circumstances which are accidental to this or that particular people, are the men who best understand that far more important part of the circumstances constituting their condition, which they have in common with the men of other communities...
>
> Accordingly, we see what work is made by the men called practical, when they have to construct laws for countries other than their own. They utterly neglect both sets of circumstances, both those which the country in question has in common with other countries, and those which are peculiar to itself. They transplant bodily the laws of their own country, as if this was the best provision which could be made for a country, the circumstances of which may differ in any of several respects. 186

In the aperçus of this last paragraph lie Mill's distinctive achievement in utilitarian political science, and the advance he believed he had made beyond Bentham: he had bent the historical consciousness of the Scottish mind to ensuring that the deduced perfections of Utilitarian thinking might be applied, in lesser or greater detail, throughout a primitive world largely unready for them. Bentham had not bothered to investigate the practical difficulties of implementing his theories; but Mill, with the missionary fervour which had originally converted Bentham to democracy,[187] devoted himself to the problems of application - although chiefly at the prompting of the Scottish philosophers with whom he spent his apprentice years. Sadly, his last published article was a wrangle with the "blockheads"[188] over Theory and Practice, which (according to J.S. Mill) he was fond of repeating were identical. Theory is not fancy, he told them; it is an abstraction of constantly repeated practice; two classes of theory are in existence, "those which are

accurately founded on an observation of the past, and those which are not accurately founded on it"; and "the man whose mind contains the greatest number of general theories, is the man best furnished for correct practice".[189] At the end, a moment of vision: "if philosophy shall ever discover these sequences (of observable changes in the world), all knowledge competent to human nature will be correctly summed up in a few propositions; and mistaken practice will no longer be possible".[190] In the event, J.S. Mill abandoned his endeavours for a science of human nature resting on the principles of association, and returned to the science of society which Mill had articulated in the History of British India, and in which he had then lost interest.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. quoted Bentham, Works (1839) X.481

2. The dangers were real: in 1829 Mill noted the courage of Paley, who compared the divine right of Kings to the divine right of constables. A brief outline includes "Dedication. 8 Reformers - the intrepid publication of the opinions, in the face of danger". Commonplace Book IV (London School of Economics) item 218

3. Macaulay's three attacks on the Utilitarians (in response to the Westminster's campaign against the Edinburgh in 1824) appeared 1825-29, with Mill the special target in the last of them. "When men, in treating of things which cannot be circumscribed in precise definitions, adopt this mode of reasoning, when once they begin to talk of power, happiness, misery, pain, pleasure, motives, objects of desire, as they talk of lines and numbers, there is no end to the contradictions and absurdities into which they fall". ER XCVII (1829) p168

4. Mill to Macvey Napier, editor of the supplement to the Ency. Brit., 11 May 1820: "The article Government will make about three sheets... I agree with you that nothing but a comprehensive outline should for such a work as yours be attempted. The difficulty, however, is to give as much of the reasons on which your framework is erected, as not to leave it wholly unsupported; for the giving of reasons requires words, and sometimes not a few." quoted Bain, James Mill (1882) p.189
   This is a clear indication, I think, that Mill regarded his Essay as grounded in matters of fact rather than an example of pure a priorism, as his son denounced it in the System of Logic. Bain notes correctly that the essay on Education is a much completer example of the a priori method, and that what the Essay on Government presents is a "formal and exhaustive setting forth of the generalisations of historical facts, widely examined, and compared" (ibid. p233) - although the argument from these generalisations is openly deductive in character.

5. Essay on Government (1828 ed.) p.5

6. ibid p.3-4

7. ibid p.7

8. J.S. Mill, Autobiography (New York, 1961) p.97

9. op. cit. p.9

10. Morning Chronicle 7 May 1829 p.2

11. Essay on Government, p.16

12. History of British India (1817) I.428

13. Fragment on Mackintosh (1835) p.144

14. Not least by J.S. Mill in his chapter "The Geometrical or Abstract Method" in Book VI of the System of Logic (1843)

15. Both are praised passim in the Fragment (1835); and in Mill's last article, "Theory & Practice", Westminster Review XXV (1836) the appeal to Bacon is implicit in remarks such as "There are

two classes of theory that exist, those which are accurately founded on observation of the past, and those which are not accurately founded on it" (p.228)

16. Autobiography pp.96-97
17. ibid p.125
18. Literary Journal II (1803) column 569
19. History of British India preface I.xv
20. op. cit (fn.8) p.96-97
21. ibid p.96
22. Edward Bradwardine Waverley, letter to Sir Walter Scott, quoted James Mill, Commonplace Book IV (London School of Economics) item 125. Paper marked 1820
23. Hume, Enquiry into Human Understanding V.1.1
24. ibid IV.12.10
25. Literary Journal IV (1805) col.227-8
26. This is Mill's account of Réid, in "Stewart's Philosophy", British Review VI (1815) p.174
27. ibid p.192
28. Literary Journal V (1805) col.700
29. An animadversion on a remark of Bolingbroke, "That the study of history may make us wiser and more useful citizens, we must apply ourselves to it, in a philosophical spirit and manner. We must rise from particular to general knowledge" - On the Study of History, Letter III.
    - quoted Mill, Commonplace Book II (London Library) 36r.
30. Fragment p.26
31. Bain, op cit, p.16
32. Fragment, p.32. See also the essay on Education (1828 ed.) pp.9-10
33. Fragment, p.37
34. Bentham MSS (UCL) Box 96 p.128
35. ibid., Box 27 p.131
36. Commonplace Book IV (LSE) item 172
37. Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, (Edinburgh 1764) Dedication. p.5
38. ibid., Ch.7.4. p.533
39. ibid., Ch.7.4. p.534
40. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man I.2 (Edinburgh, 1785) pp.36-37. "One who applies to any branch of science... must have formed various opinions and principles by which he conducts himself in the affairs of life... Such common principles seldom admit of proof, nor do they need it. Men need not to be taught them; for they are such as all men of

common understanding know... Such principles, when we have occasion to use them in science, are called axioms".

41. ibid., p.37. Reid adds: "It may, however, be observed, that the first principles of natural philosophy are of a quite different nature from mathematical axioms (and)... have not the same kind of evidence that mathematical axioms have; yet have such evidence, that every man of common understanding readily assents to them, and finds it absolutely necessary to conduct his actions and opinions by them, in the ordinary affairs of life" (p.38)

42. Cf. Box 70a (UCL MSS) p.23, admitting that his theorising on the content of other minds may be "erroneous in degree", though "just in kind". "This is (the) weakness (of my theory), but it is for those who maintain a different one to show that it is a weakness from which their own is free".

43. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, VI "Of Judgment" p.603. "We must have this conviction as soon as we are capable of learning anything from experience; ... this is one of those principles, which, when we grow up and observe the course of nature, we can confirm by reasoning... But it is necessary for us before we are able to discover it by reasoning..."

44. Inquiry, Ch.7.4. p.534

45. Essays on the Intellectual Powers, p.37. "Of those principles, some are common to all men, being evident in themselves, and so necessary in the conduct of life, that a man cannot live and act according to the rules of common prudence without them".

46. Horner to Jeffrey, 28.ix.1805, Horner Correspondence, (London School of Economics), II.114

47. Horner to Jeffrey, 29.xi.1804, ibid., II.81

48. Reid, Works (1843) I.188

49. Stewart, Works (Edinburgh, 1858) VII.26; Mill, Autobiography, p.159

50. Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine, XII (1802) p.7

51. ibid. p.8

52. ibid. p.3

53. Literary Journal I[illegible] (1803) column 569

54. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p.530

55. Mill's notes to Villers, Spirit.. of the Reformation (1805) pp.317-8

56. Anti-Jacobin Review (1802) p.3-4

57. Literary Journal I[illegible] (1803) column 569

58. See Literary Journal [illegible]V (1805) columns 227-8; Bacon, "New Atlantis", Works (Boston, Mass., 1863,); Macaulay, "Lord Bacon", Critical and Historical Essays II.202

59. Jeffrey, in Edinburgh Review III (1804) p.274

60. Literary Journal (2nd Series, 1806) I.231[illegible]

61. Cf. the grudging judgment of Smith, echoed by Ferguson: "A man cannot do much to arrest his country's decline, but he can improve himself" (Principles of Morals I.202). Smith: "Society may subsist.., without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it". (Theory of Moral Sentiments, II.2.2).
Mill's surrender of Christianity is attributed by Bain partly to the influence of Bentham, specifically to the advocacy of General Miranda, a Venezuelan general who sought from Bentham a legal code under which his country might be emancipated from Spanish rule (James Mill, pp.88-89)

62. quoted Shirley Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty (Cambridge, 1965) p.193

63. Institutes of The Christian Religion III.14.2 (tr Battles, 1951) p.769: "I do not so dissent from the common judgment as to contend that there is no difference... between observance and contempt of right and of laws".

64. Hume, Treatise III.2.2 (Everyman ed., 1911) p.205

65. Mill, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, and of Moral Philosophy, by Thomas Belsham", Anti-Jacobin Review & Magazine XII (1802) pp.10-12

66. J.S. Mill, Autobiography (NY 1961) p.37

67. ibid. p.36. Cf. Mill's praise of Fox in 1804 for forthright damnation of historians who "write the apology of venality and despotism... repress the virtuous emotions of hatred and indignation which the scenes in question are calculated to excite, and who have contributed so largely to corrupt the moral sentiments of our people". quoted Bain, op.cit. p.94

68. quoted in Bain, op.cit. p.461, in the context of an indignant letter from J.S. Mill to the Edinburgh Review repudiating the remark after it was published by Bowring among the memoranda of Bentham's conversations

69. Anti-Jacobin Review XII (1802) p.12

70. "With no resource but the precarious one of writing in periodicals": J.S. Mill's description of his father, in Autobiography p.12

71. quoted John Clive, Scotch Reviewers (1957) p.85

72. 1808 is certainly the date of their first serious acquaintance. But it is possible that Mill met Bentham by 1806: there is a reference in Place's Correspondence in 1830 that Mill had known Bentham "for twenty-three or four years"

73. James Mill, History of British India (1817) I.434, 436

74. John Millar, Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (1806 ed) I.2-3

75. ibid. pp.2-3, 40ff, 77ff. Menelaus' wife in the Iliad is worth little more than the treasure on her, he notes; and makes the ritual examination of the eccentric barbarisms of Otaheite (cf Bentham, Works VIII.266)

76. Herder, Reflections (ed. Frank Manuel): "The men with reverted feet in Malacca, the probably rickety nation of dwarfs in Madagascar, the men habited like women in Florida, and some others, deserve such an investigation as has already been bestowed on the albinoes, the dondoes, the Patagonians and the aprons of the Hottentot females" (p.5-6). This is from Book VII of the Ideen, which unabashedly examines the Kalucs, Mungals, Arabs, Californians and a multitude of strange peoples.

77. Craig's preface, Millar op.cit., I.lxxv

78. Literary Journal II (1803) col.327

79. History of British India I.xix (Preface).

80. Literary Journal II (1803) col.326-7

81. Commonplace Book II (London Library) 29r. (watermark 1818)

82. Essay on Government (1828) p.6

83. Millar, op.cit. I.5

84. "Filangeri's Science of Legislation", Edinburgh Review IX (1807) p.368

85. History of British India I.xviii (Preface)

86. Millar, op.cit. I.1-2

87. "The next work which I meditate is a History of English Law, in which I mean to trace, as far as possible, the expedients of the several ages to the state of the human mind, and the circumstances of society in those ages, and to show their concord or discord with the standard of perfection". (1818) quoted Bain, James Mill p.173

88. Literary Journal II (1803) col.261

89. "Essays on the Formation of Human Character (by Owen)", Philanthropist III (1813) p.100

90. Edinburgh Review XVI (1810) pp.155-156

91. Ferguson, quoted in Gladys Bryson, Man and Society (Princeton, 1945) p. ; Millar, quoted Duncan Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar", Cambridge Journal VII (1953-54) p.

92. History of Civil Society (1767) p.223

93. Wealth of Nations V.1.2 p.670

94. The elements of the Humean mind - faculties, passions, powers - were accepted by Ferguson and Smith as given. See, e.g., the History of Civil Society (1793 ed) pp.42-94, esp. pp.84-85 on the selfish and social passions.

95. Ferguson, Principles

96. History of Civil Society (1793) pp.433-4. The History is partly a lament, partly a warning of the dangers brought on by the progress of society; in the last resort Ferguson is a moralist, not a political or social revolutionary.

97. Smith equates commerce and civilisation, and the degree of civilisation with the degree of economic efficiency; clearly Ferguson did not define civilisation in this way (Principles of Morals, 1792, I.207, 251-2). Smith regarded man's self-interest as the guarantee of his freedom; for Ferguson, "interest" means care for our animal natures (History p.25).

98. The Wealth of Nations (ed. Cannon, 1904) II.267-8

99. Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (1767) I.i.1-5; esp. pp.17-19, 28, 33-35, 340-7, 392ff.

100. ibid., II.139, 144ff. Typical melancholy: "Nature has not dealt with us so unkindly... as to create any object of intrinsic evil or worthy of undiluted praise" (I.139)

101. Mill, "Elements of the Philosophy of Mind.. by Belsham", Anti-Jacobin Review XII (1802) p.9

102. Smith's stages of economic progress (hunting, pasturage, farming to commerce) were sociological categories as well as economic ones. He equated advanced societies with advanced economic systems not as a vulgar apologist for capitalism, but because they offered the maximum scope for individual freedom. The progress of commerce, he claimed, "gradually introduced order and government, and with them the liberty and security of individuals" (quoted by A.W. Coats, "Smith: the modern re-appraisal", in Renaissance and Modern Studies VI (1962)

This allowed Smith to conceive of progress "in all areas", and brings him into line with other Scottish definitions of progress and civilisation. cf. Adam Ferguson:

"Civilisation... both in the nature of the thing and derivation of the word, belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession or wealth".

- The Principles of Morals I.252

Millar makes the same equation of commercial with social progress in the preface to The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks: "There is... in human society, a natural progress from ignorance to knowledge, and from rude to civilised manners, the several stages of which are usually accompanied with peculiar laws and customs" (4th ed., 1806, I.4)

103. Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments II.v.2 (1797 ed.) pp.30ff esp.; Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms (ed. E. Cannon, 1896) pp.14ff, 107ff, 155-6, 253ff; Millar, Lectures on Government passim, quoted in Craig, Life of Millar, in Origin.. of Ranks (1806) I.xlv

104. Ferguson, Principles of Morals (Edinburgh, 1792) I.252 (see fn 102 above also)

105. Stewart, Works (Edinburgh, 1858) X.33 puts the question this way: "By what general steps has the transition been made from the first simple efforts of uncultivated nature, to a state of things... whence has arisen the structure of a cultivated language... whence the origin of the different sciences and the different arts... whence the astonishing fabric of the political union, ... and the

different forms which civilised society has assumed in different ages of the world?"

106. Cf. the attention paid by Millar to the notion of social progress along a constant scale, to account for diversities of behaviour which would otherwise seem irreconcilable with the idea of stability in the moral sentiments of mankind. See Forbes, "Scientific Whiggism...", loc.cit. p.645, noted by J.W. Burrow, op.cit. p.58

107. Ricardo, "Correspondence", in Works (ed. P. Sraffa, Cambridge 1952) VII.195-6

108. Mill, History of British India (1817) I.469

109. Ferguson, History of Civil Society II.i (London, 1793)(6th edn) p.133

110. See Millar, Origin.. of Ranks, V.2 (1806) I.230-242. Ferguson, History of Civil Society (1793) pp.400ff, discussing corruption, observes that "the actual state of character of mankind... in the worst as well as the best condition, is undoubtedly mixed: and nations of the best description are greatly obliged for their preservation... to those political institutions by which the violent are restrained from the commission of crimes... [thus] nations are enabled to subsist, and even to prosper, under different degrees of corruption, or of public integrity".
English historians, concentrating on external events, on the power-psychology of major individuals, and on critical decisions taken by them as the motor of change and progress, were able to explain the course of history by pointing to the dilemmas and resolutions of powerful men at dialectical moments.

111. Sir James Mackintosh, Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations (1828) pp.26-27

112. Mill, History of India Preface (1817) I.xix

113. J.S. Mill, Autobiography (New York, 1961) p.99

114. History of India, I.429

115. "When we survey the present state of the globe, we find that, in many parts of it, the inhabitants are so destitute of culture, as to appear little above the condition of brute animals; and even where we peruse the history of polished nations, we have seldom any difficulty in tracing them to a state of the same rudeness and barbarism... There is, in human society, a natural progress from ignorance to knowledge..."
- Millar, Origin.. of Ranks (1805 ed) I.2,4

116. Dugald Stewart supplies the best definition of this abused phrase: "Long before that stage of society in which men began to think of recording their transactions, many of the most important steps of their progress have been made... In the want of direct evidence, we are under a necessity of supplying the place of fact by conjecture... To this species of philosophical investigation... I shall take the liberty of giving the title of Theoretical or Conjectural History... what some French writers have called Histoire Raisonée." (Works, Edinburgh 1858, X.33-34)

117. Mill, "De Guignes' Voyage à Peking", Edinburgh Review XIV (1809) p.413

118. Millar, Origin.. of Ranks, Ch 1 passim and (1805 ed) esp. p.89: "When men begin to disuse their ancient barbarous practices, when their attention is not wholly engrossed by the pursuit of military reputation, when they have made some progress in arts, and have attained to a proportional degree of refinement, they are necessarily led to set a value upon those female accomplishments and virtues which have so much influence upon every species of improvement, and which contribute in so many ways to multiply the comforts of life".

119. Mill, "De Guignes", Edinburgh Review XIV (1809) p.414, 424-5, 428-9

120. Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (1928) p.301; Bain, James Mill (1882) p.103, 110. Mill to Bentham, Oct. 1809 after his review appeared of Bexon's Code de la Législation Pénale: "Bexon sadly mangled. The mention of you struck out in all but one place, and these my words, every one of them, removed, and those of Jeffrey put in their place".

Bain (pp 95-96) quotes examples of the Benthamite propaganda Mill was successfully inserting in the Annual Review, and (p.103) claims that Jeffrey deleted in the Edinburgh a sentence describing Bentham as "the only author who has attempted this difficult and important analysis [of criminal law]; and imperfect as his success has necessarily been, we have no hesitation in saying he has done more to elucidate the true grounds of legislative inference than all the jurists who had gone before him".

Mill nonetheless inserted advertisements for Bentham in this Bexon review (ER, XIV, Oct. 1809), in "Spanish Colonies in America", ER XIV (Jan. 1809), and in "The Code Napoleon", ER XV (Nov. 1810).

121. John Clive, Scotch Reviewers (1957) p.57, 94.

122. Mill, "Affairs of India", Edinburgh Review XVI (1810) pp.147-8. Indians are "ignorant and rude", ER XV (1810) p.318

123. Mill, "Voyage aux Indes Orientales, by Barthelemy", Edinburgh Review XV (1810) pp.371-2

124. Mill, "Malcolm's Sketch of the Sikhs", Edinburgh Review XXI (1813) p.433

125. Bain, op.cit., p.179

126. H.H. Wilson, Introduction to Mill's History of India (1840) I.viii-ix

127. The G-G compliment is quoted with awe by Bentham in a letter to Col. Young, Works (1838) X.577. Bentinck's desire to destroy the Taj Mahal (to save money: the E. India Company gave him strict instructions to economise) is best documented in T.G.P. Spear, "Lord William Bentinck and the Taj", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1949) pp.160-187.

The story is likely to be a legend, assiduously spread in Bentinck's lifetime by Indian enemies of the "clipping Dutchman" (as they nicknamed him) and since then by Indian nationalist historians, for whom it provides useful propaganda. Duncan Forbes accepts it as fact ("James Mill and India", Cambridge Journal V (1951) p.22) but Bentinck's most recent biographer, John Rosselli, calls it a "canard", insisting also that the marble auctioned at Agra came from ruined public baths, not from the quarries. The evidence remains inconclusive

See also G.T. Garratt, ed., The Legacy of India (Oxford 1937) p.401. For Bentham's influence in India, Works X.450, "Mill will be the living executive - I shall be the dead legislative of British India".

128. J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society (Cambridge, 1966) p.43

129. See page 170 (footnoted 114)

130. History of India I.472

131. Ricardo, op.cit. pp.227-8 (18 December 1817)

132. Cf. Mill's 1818 letter to Napier, quoted by Bain, op.cit. pp.169-70, in which Mill asks for Edinburgh's opinion of his History "as I reckon the best judges to be with you". In the History, Mill praises himself as advancing the tradition of "that sagacious contemplator of the progress of society", John Millar, whose works remain "almost the only source" in which information can be gathered about "the different stages of social progress". (I.432)

133. Reviewed by him in Literary Journal II (1803) cols.325-333

134. Millar, Historical View (1803 ed) I.375-6

135. Smith, Wealth of Nations, I.320. Individual striving, he maintains, can even overcome the inefficiencies of government. "Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite, not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor". ibid. I.325

136. "There is, however, in man a disposition and capacity for improving his condition, by the exertion of which, he is carried on from one degree of advancement to another". Origin.. of Ranks, pp.2-3

137. History of Civil Society (1793) pp.204-206

138. Wealth of Nations II.86

139. History of Civil Society, I.i (1767) p.5

140. C.H. Bellenden Ker, "English Conveyancing", Edinburgh Review XXXV (1821) p.197

141. Quoted by Duncan Forbes, "Scientific Whiggism", Cambridge Journal VII (1954) p.664, from an early Jeffrey article in the Edinburgh (c 1803). "The temperament or disposition of a nation" (line 4) predates J.S. Mill's writing about national character and political ethology in the System of Logic forty years later; Mill traced his debts to the French

142. Jeffrey, "Craig's Life of Millar", Edinburgh Review IX (1806) p.84

143. Cf. Craig's Life of Millar (prefacing The Origin of Ranks, 1805, p.cvi, cii, cv): "Decidedly hostile to the system of universal suffrage... the necessity of a union of talents and rank, to limit the growing influence of the Court, might be considered as the leading article of Mr Millar's political creed... At all times Mr Millar viewed the inequality of Representation as a defect in the Government; but, while there was a powerful union of great families to resist encroachment, he had considered it rather as a blemish, than a very important practical evil".

144. See footnotes 102, 103 above

145. Preface, The Origin of Ranks. The mechanistic image was not incompatible for Millar with the belief that society evolves. Cf Smith: "Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain and abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand agreeable effects".

146. J.S. Mill, System of Logic VI.7.1, p.573

147. For Bentham and the notion of inevitable perfection, see Warren Roberts Jr. in Political Studies IX (1961) pp.259-60, which draws heavily on the MSS; for the French, see Frank Manuel, Shades of Philosophical History (Stanford, Cal., 1965).

The great optimists were Condorcet ("let us count on that perfectibility with which nature has endowed us...") and Comte:

"The law of perfectibility is... absolute. Today everything leads to the conclusion that with the cessation of wars, with the establishment of a regime that will put an end to violent crises, no retrogression, not even a partial one, will ever again take place. There will be continuity and acceleration of the progressions among the whole of mankind, for peoples will teach one another and sustain one another".

148. James Mill, Commonplace Book IV (LSE) Item 152

149. Mill to Ricardo, 19.x.1817. Ricardo, op.cit., p.198

150. Bain, op.cit., pp.61-62. In October 1816 Mill wrote of the History: "Thank God, after nearly ten years since its commencement, I am now revising it for the press. Had I foreseen that the labour would have been one half, or one third, of what it has been, never should I have been the author of a History of India".

151. "Taylor's Plato", Edinburgh Review XIV (1809); "Essays on the Formation of Human Character, by Owen", Philanthropist III (1813) pp.91ff; "Stewart's Philosophy", British Review VI (1815) pp.170-198; "Education", in Encyclopaedia Britannica (1818)

152. Mill's anxiety to return to philosophy: 20 July 1815, letter of Place to him: "I was right glad to hear what you said of Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Stewart... still more so in contemplating the possibility of your writing a book some day on this subject" (British Museum Add. MSS 35152 f.149).

Mill asks Place for Hartley, 16 Aug. 1815, and again 29 Aug. 1815 (BM Add MSS 35152 f.149, f.159). On receipt, he replies: "Hartley is a book worth you having - though my saying so just now may appear to be a little interested... I think I shall one day be able to make it appear, that the account he renders of the world of ideas is the true one". (6th & 13th Sept. 1815, BM Add MSS 35152 f.161v-162.

Mill to Place, 8 Oct. 1816: "Hartley's is the true scent;but his book is obscurely written; & it will require no little persevering reflection to render the application of his theory perfectly familiar to one's mind in every part of the field of thought. This I shall be going on, doing, doing - but how long it will take to the being done, will depend upon many circumstances". (BM Add MSS, 35152 f.220).

For Mill's boredom with the History: see letter quoted fn.150 above and Mill to Place, 14 Oct. 1814, "much occupied with work on India - got through Hastings' administration and down to commencement of Cornwallis' administration". (BM Add MSS 35152 f.92).

153. "Owen", Philanthropist III (1813) p.110

154. "Clarkson's Life of Penn", Philanthropist IV (1814) p.194

155. Mill, Education (1828) p.19

156. "As the happiness, which is the end of education, depends upon the actions of the individual, and as all the actions of man are produced by his feelings and thoughts, the business of education is, to make certain feelings or thoughts take place instead of others". - Education (1828 ed) p.9

157. Sterling, quoted by Max Lerner, preface to J.S. Mill, Autobiography (New York, 1961) p.viii

158. See, e.g., Philanthropist III (1813) pp.97-98 on the importance of virtue and of improving the human character.

159. ibid., p.101

160. ibid., pp.97-98

161. "As people are ready to sacrifice everything to the obtaining of a sufficient quantity of food, the want of it implies the most dreadful poverty... This or that individual may be an extraordinary individual, and exhibit mental excellence in the midst of wretchedness; but a wretched and excellent people never yet has been seen on the face of the earth". - ibid. pp.28-29.

"That the quality of the labour, in which a man is employed, produces effects, favourable or unfavourable upon the mind, has long been confessed; Dr Smith made the important remark, that the tendency to grow less and less favourable, as civilisation and the arts proceed. (Sic). The division and subdivision of labour is the principal cause. This confines the attention of the labourer to so small a number of objects, and so narrow a circle of ideas, that the mind receives not that varied exercise, and that portion of aliment, on which almost every degree of mental excellence depends". - Education, pp.29-30.

"Owen was early impressed with the truth of the proposition, that human beings are the creatures of the circumstances in which they are placed". - Philanthropist III (1813) p.96

162. Helvetius, De L'Esprit (tr. Mudford, 1807) p.248

163. Education (1828) p.28-29

164. ibid. p.3

165. "Now this is certain, that the means by which the grand objects of desire may be obtained, depend almost wholly upon the political machine". ibid. p.45

166. ibid. p.5, p.9

167. ibid. p.11

168. Hartley, Observations on Man (1749) p.82. "The doctrine of

Association, when traced up to the first rudiments of Understanding and Affection, unfolds such a scene as cannot fail to alarm all such as have any degree of Interested Concern for themselves... [by explaining] those voluntary and semi-voluntary powers, which we exert over our Ideas, Affections...". (p.81-82)

169. Education p.14, p.16

170. Commonplace Book IV (LSE) Item 160 (1819)

171. Philanthropist III (1813) p.102

172. Asking "wherein does human happiness consist?" Mill offers no answer. He contrasts the Humean school who trace "all the elements of happiness... to the simple sensations", (p.17) and the Scots who believe "that there are intellectual and moral forms, which can by no means be resolved into the grosser elements of sense" (p.17).

"We cannot too earnestly exhort philosophers to perfect this inquiry" - Mill shrugs his shoulders and avoids a conclusion (p.17). (All references to Education, 1828).

173. Commonplace Book I (London Library) item 208

174. "Clarkson's Life of Penn", Philanthropist IV (1814) p.208

175. "Stewart's Philosophy", British Review VI (1815) pp.195-6

176. Mill, in Philanthropist IV (1814) pp.134-5. See quotation in Bain, op.cit., p.144

177. Mill, in Philanthropist III (1813) p.100

178. Essay on Government (1828 ed.) p.4

179. ibid. p.4

180. Philanthropist IV (1814) pp.206-207

181. ibid. p.117

182. Macaulay, Works (ed. Lady Trevelyan, 1866) V.270, 266.

183. Commonplace Book IV (LSE) item 85, item 87

184. Fragment on Mackintosh (1835) p.15

185. ibid. p.25

186. ibid. p.144-145

187. Mill's "conversion" of Bentham: Halevy, op.cit. p.154, 255-6; Bentham, Works III.438. Both Halevy and Mrs Mack have developed the case that Bentham's radicalism owes little to the French Revolution and the 1790's and derives from later, domestic influences on which Mill capitalised

188. "Theory and Practice", Westminster Review XXV (1836); the "blockheads" are so called in Fragment on Mackintosh, p.134

189. Westminster Review XXV (1836) p.226, p.228, p.231. Cf., twenty years earlier, Monthly Review XXX (1813) p.412: "Good abstract principles are neither more nor less than the accumulated results of experience, presented in an exceedingly condensed and concentrated state".

190. Westminster Review XXV (1836) p.232

A N A L Y S I S O F C H A P T E R F I V E

1. Mill had no acquaintance with Herder or German philosophers of history; 2. and no understanding of irrational behaviour, or of 3. incommensurable differences between peoples.

5. His son, however, remade Utilitarian social science, 6. by urging qualitative differences between human beings, and 8. qualitative differences between ages in history and countries. 9. Mill's ideological analysis of history was inspired in both France and Germany; 11. in his writing history becomes a subject and agent of human behaviour, and a science of history the new basis of Utilitarian social science.

13. J.S. Mill was primarily helped away from rigid Benthamism by Coleridge, 14. who denied that the mind was passive or apprehensive of matters of fact alone. Coleridge claimed that men could achieve access to the Idea, the inner purpose of history, and 15. the Idea appeared in J.S. Mill's writing as the concept of "the spirit of the age". 17. Mill's new philosophy of history, drawing on Coleridge and Germany, abandoned eighteenth century preoccupations with wars and exploits and 18. stamped an ideological identity on differing eras and societies.

21. Herder's achievement in Germany was to show to empiricists that the universal principles of human nature were not merely ethically offensive (as was argued in England) but empirically untrue. 22. Only J.S. Mill, Sterling, G. Grote and Austin responded to German discoveries, however. 23. Outside the Philosophic Radicals, German writing was popularised in England by Carlyle rather than Coleridge. 24. Niebuhr's History of Rome drew Sterling and G. Grote away from Utilitarian explanations of behaviour, 25. by emphasising "the worth of man" for Sterling and 26. by teaching G. Grote greater respect for myths which related the irrational actions of primitive men. 29. J.S. Mill, having learned to analyse history ideologically from Coleridge and Germany, took a scientific breakdown of civilisation from St Simon and Comte; 31. and after 1840 looked to France rather than Germany for historical inspiration.

33. Utilitarian psychology was attacked within England as well as (by implication) on the Continent. 34. Macaulay impressed J.S. Mill by attacking (i) his father's mode of deductive reasoning from empirical principles, (ii) the universal principles of human nature - which he dismissed as either tautologous or false. 36. Macaulay, endorsing only direct induction from historical data, misconceived James Mill's grounds for deductive reasoning from principles expressing human wants and needs; and 39. J.S. Mill was to produce more subtle reasons for distrusting deduced truths, in the System of Logic. Scientific argument in social science showed the consilience of deductions from laws expressing the Formation of Character with inductions from the state of society for which laws were being devised.

43. Utilitarian social science was not transformed by Darwinists, but by historians who rejected 45. mechanical explanations of man and society, and 47. equipped J.S. Mill with a science of history to replace Bentham's universalised psychology.

CHAPTER FIVE

J. S. MILL AND THE SCIENCE OF THE FORMATION OF HUMAN CHARACTER

> As soon as everything of importance is expressed in writing, a man who is duly qualified may obtain more knowledge of India in one year in his closet in England, than he could obtain during the course of the longest life, by the use of his eyes and ears in India.
>
> (James Mill) [1]

> How much depth there is in the character of a single people, which, no matter how often observed (and gazed at with curiosity and wonder), nevertheless escapes the word which attempts to capture it, and, even with the word to catch it, it is seldom so recognisable as to be universally understood and felt. If this is so, what happens when one tries to master an entire ocean of peoples, times, cultures, countries, with one glance, one sentiment, by means of one single word! Words, pale shadow-play!
>
> (Herder) [2]

Herder did not live to see the tradition of rationalist history in England crowned by James Mill's unparallelled assaults upon the Hindus, published in 1817. His Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-91) was the first major non-rationalist history to examine, among other things, the primitive peoples and customs brought to light in the eighteenth century; opposing history written as disguised psychology and the uncompromising judgments of rationalist historians, it advanced the importance of imagination and intuition into the "soul" of nations, and urged the qualititative differences between individual human beings and between nations as imponderable. James Mill never read Herder or any other German philosopher of history, being too busy mastering "entire oceans of peoples, times, cultures, countries" with the single word of utility; insofar as he knew of the Germans

after 1830 through John Stuart (on whose carefully screened reading list Goethe is the first German to appear, in 1826-7),[3] he lived comfortably unaffected through his son's passionate advocacy of German insights until his death in 1836.

The German demonstration that human behaviour does not conform to reason had, in any event, no meaning to James Mill, any more than Burke's plea that "politics ought to be adjusted not to human reasoning, but to human nature, of which the reason is but a part and by no means the greatest part".[4] The Utilitarian study of universal motivation identified happiness-seeking behaviour as natural behaviour, and therefore as rational behaviour; and Herder's massed evidence of seemingly purposeless action throughout the civilised and uncivilised world was freely translated in Utilitarian analyses into blind struggles to achieve happiness. Herder's conviction that human nature displays infinite varieties was apparent, not to rationalists and natural scientists, but only to men with imagination and to members of the new discipline, "philosophy of history":

> How unspeakably difficult it is to convey the particular quality of an individual human being, and how impossible it is to say precisely what distinguishes an individual, his way of feeling and living; how different and how individual everything becomes once his eyes see it, once his soul grasps - his heart feels - it.[5]

James Mill did not possess imagination. He shared the opinion voiced on the first page of the first volume of the Westminster Review in 1824, that man is composed of a fixed quantity and a moving quantity, but "the sameness is in all cases much greater than the diversity; the essential characteristics of humanity are mightier than climate, education, habit, society, government and events; they are untouched by these causes, in all their combinations, and

continually limit their results".[6] Regarding "the depth in the character of a single people" which Herder discerned, for James Mill such "depth" could be measured in scales. "For ascertaining and knowing amounts, some contrivance is requisite. It is necessary to conceive some small amount by the addition or subtraction of which another becomes larger or smaller. This forms the instrument of ascertainment. Where one thing, taken separately, is of sufficient importance to form this instrument, it is taken. Thus, for ascertaining and knowing different amounts of men, one individual is of sufficient importance. Amounts of men are considered as increased or diminished by the addition or subtraction of individuals".[7] In James Mill's Utilitarian social science, individuals are but atoms of similar construction; their varieties of belief and custom are the consequence of differing associations with happiness and pleasure; their social experiences, far from being irreducible and incommensurable, give rise to general propositions of Euclidean certainty.[8]

James Mill was to some degree aware of the subjectivity of the historian's position, and made, apparently, some attempt to avoid "following his own thoughts" or being "a zealot for some particular and powerful party" in writing the History of British India.[9] His consciousness, however, was not of incommensurable differences between the peoples, generations and civilisations under study, which excludes analysis on universal principles, but the more limited feeling that the processes of association, insufficiently examined, may distort a historian's impartiality of mind:

> In a cursory survey, it is understood, that the mind, unable to attend to the whole of an infinite number of objects, attaches itself to a few; and overlooks the multitude that remain. But what, then, are the objects to which the mind,

> in such a situation, is in preference attached? Those which fall in with the current of its own thoughts; those which accord with its former impressions; those which confirm its previous ideas... What is the principle in the mind by which the choice is decided? Doubtless that of association... To this remains to be added, the powerful influence of the affections; first, the well-known pleasure which a man finds, in meeting, at every step, with proofs that he is in the right, inspiring an eagerness to look out for that source of satisfaction; and, secondly, the well-known aversion which a man usually has, to meet with proofs that he is in the wrong, yielding a temptation, commonly obeyed, to overlook such disagreeable objects. [10]

Where guarantees could be delivered that the senses accurately conveyed reality, all external relations, in the view of Bentham and James Mill, could be reduced to simple formulae, in which prima facie differences of quality could be redefined as differences of quantity. All inner relations (defined by James Mill as the varying patterns of association) could be reduced to universal principles of human nature. These were the fundamental assumptions of Utilitarian social science bequeathed to J.S. Mill, and which were "remade" in the context of a new philosophy of history.

a) Qualitative Differences between Human Beings and Societies

J.S. Mill, as every schoolboy knows, remade the assumptions of Utilitarian psychology and social science as follows: (1) by urging that individual human beings display qualitative, irreducible differences in their natures; (2) by treating the science of human nature (psychology) as one of general propositions and approximate tendencies, not of detailed knowledge, stating the laws by which one mental state succeeds another;[11] (3) by denying that the static properties of a myriad individual natures can in all instances be universalised, and asserting instead universal laws expressing the formation of a given character in given circumstances,[12] laws which may form part of an exact science (Ethology);[13] (4) by considering "outward circumstances" to differ qualitatively in spirit, according to age and country, and to be innumerable, perpetually changing and irreducible;[14] (5) by analysing social phenomena - complex states of society, the actions of man in society - with a view to framing universal sequences rather than universal precepts, and by expressing laws of causation of states of society as laws of the development or "progressiveness of the human race";[15] (6) by reducing the role of Baconian empiricism to that of "obtaining the necessary data for the deductive science", which will "teach us how to frame the proper theorem for the circumstances of any given case".[16]

This said, his most important advance on Bentham can be expressed simply: he chose to base Utilitarian social science on a discerned sequence of "states of society", rather than on universal principles of human nature.

Mill's "conversion" - as we have come to describe it - to the

beliefs that human beings differ in kind, and cannot be treated as unchanging mechanical or mathematical units within social science, was in the first instance an emotional experience, fully documented in the Autobiography.[17] The insights of Wordsworth into a range of visionary feelings and vaster prospects in human endeavour than simply pleasure, of which Mill had no previous apprehension, made him aware, before ever reading Herder and Kant, of motives and reasons for action which had no place in Bentham - and of an inward, irrational quality in the mind which could not be commensurated between man and man:

> Oh! mystery of Man, from what a depth
> Proceed thy honours!
> ... The hiding-places of my power
> Seem open; I approach, and then they close. [18]

By 1832 Mill is able define a "narrow Utilitarian" (damning George Grote in a letter to Carlyle) as one having "much logical and little aesthetic culture".[19]

With the emotional ground thus prepared, we find in Book VI of the System of Logic (written 1840, published 1843) the specifically historical insights of Herder, refracted by Coleridge and influenced by St Simon, that

> every man is ultimately a world, in external appearance indeed similar to others, but internally an individual being, with whom no other coincides,

and that

> nations modify themselves, according to time and place, and their internal character: each bears in itself the standard of its perfection, totally independent of all comparison with that of others. [20]

These were German rather than French aperçus adopted by Mill - that every individual's nature differs, that the civilisations of the past, and primitive civilisations of the present, have their own character

and spirit, and are accordingly to be understood and judged by their own purposes and standards. James Mill had ascribed progress to civilisations in proportion to the influence of Utility within them, and believed that only after reform under Utilitarian rules could they achieve real social and personal happiness. J.S. Mill rejected this: following Herder's conviction that "every nation has its own centre of happiness, as every sphere its own centre of gravity",[21] he argued that "eighteenth century philosophers" had failed to see "the historical value of much which had ceased to be useful, nor saw that institutions and creeds, now effete, had rendered essential services to humanity".[22] Later, in 1845, he specifically commended Michelet for approaching the Middle Ages with this new spirit.[23]

The idea that men's natures, rather than their merely customary behaviour, are shaped by the social consciousness of their country and by "the spirit of the age" found a niche in the Utilitarian tradition first of all in Mill's essay of this title, in 1831:

> If there are some tendencies of human nature, and some of the circumstances by which man is surrounded, which are the same in all ages and countries, these never form the whole of the tendencies, or of the circumstances, which exist in any particular age or country: each possesses, along with those invariable tendencies, others which are changeable, and peculiarly its own; and in no age, as civilisation advances, are the prevailing tendencies exactly the same as in the preceding age, nor do those tendencies act under precisely the same combination of external circumstances.[24]

Hume, of course, had granted the reality of differing social experiences and differing national characters, and - like J.S. Mill - found unifying principles in history in unvarying principles of human nature. But in Humean philosophy such national differences were held to affect only external behaviour, leaving untouched the essential similarity in human motivation which obtained in all

societies, even when separated by millennia as well as by language and geography.[25] Mill properly claimed originality (in England) for his understanding of "the spirit of the age":

> The "spirit of the age" is in some measure a novel expression. I do not believe that it is to be met with in any work exceeding fifty years in antiquity...
>
> It is an idea essentially belonging to an age of change... The present times possess this character. A change has taken place in the human mind; a change which... had already proceeded far before it was generally perceived. When the fact disclosed itself, thousands awoke as from a dream.[26]

"A change has taken place in the human mind": Mill means by this that a change has taken place in the social mind; and most eighteenth century historians would have found it hard to define his meaning. Mill saw the spirit of the age as an active concept, actively shaping and influencing men's ideas and motives, where Hume identified only the "character" of an age (a passive, a posteriori concept). Mill's essay is alive with the ideas of what it calls "the really profound and philosophic inquirers into history in France and Germany"; its historical schema - the alternation of natural and transitional states within society - is specifically borrowed from St Simon's analysis of organic and critical epochs in history.[27]

Mill's advance on Bentham can be further pinpointed in the ideological twist which developed in his writing, completely foreign to any eighteenth century history or philosophy. Take, for example, this passage from his account of the forces making for change in early 1831, a period auguring great disorder and revolution:

> Here we see the peculiar character, and at the same time the peculiar inconvenience, of a period of moral and social transition. At all other times there exists a large body of received doctrine, covering nearly the whole field of the moral relations of man, and which no-one thinks of questioning... This state of things does not now exist in the civilized world... Those who have made the investigation

> of social truths their occupation, have not yet sanctioned any new body of doctrine with their unanimous, or nearly unanimous, consent... ere this can happen there must be a change in the whole framework of society, as at present constituted... for mankind to change their institutions while their minds are unsettled, without fixed principles, ... is indeed a fearful thing. [28]

Crucially, Mill talks about insensible changes in the social mind, about a lack of fixed principles as the motor of revolution in society, where Bentham concentrated on the hard individual facts of legal and political abuse. Such talk was meaningless to older Utilitarians - and indeed to younger ones too, as Eyton Tooke evidenced in his charge against Gustave d'Eichtal, proselytiser of Comtism and J.S. Mill's hero in the late 1820's: "You were concerned with the human race only as a collective being, and lost sight of the individuals who compose it".[29] D'Eichtal noted this remark in his diary and added: "The English invariably distrust the most evident truths if he who propounds them is suspected of having general ideas".[30]

"Having general ideas" sounds like a species of intellectual disease (one which the Utilitarians possessed, if anyone did); but what d'Eichtal meant by it was a preoccupation with the life of communities rather than with the exploits and passions of individuals. Mill in fact convicted the St-Simonians and Comtists of over-simplifying national characteristics and national outlooks, though at the end of his life he singled out his visit to France (1819-21) as having first enlightened him on "the error always prevalent in England, and from which even my father with all his superiority to prejudice was not exempt, of judging universal questions by a merely English standard".[31] The new approach to history learned by Mill, focussing on the life and spirit of societies rather than the deeds of individual statesmen,

received a fine definition in the 1840's from the French socialist, Louis Blanc:

> The true history of our century consists in the history of its ideas. The crafts and subtleties of diplomacy, the intrigues of courts, the noisy debates of assemblies, the conflicts in the open streets; all these are but the outward agitations of society. Its life is elsewhere. It exists in the mysterious development of general tendencies, in that noiseless elaboration of doctrines which prepare the way for revolutions. [32]

Mill, however, was not concerned to set out "the mysterious development of general tendencies": his task was to reduce the mystery to science,[33] and his father's analysis of the successive states of society, in turn borrowed from John Millar, provided him with a model. In 1830 he objected to d'Eichtal that without care, the ideological approach to history could become too nebulous: "Your school... are violating the first and greatest principle of their own philosophy, which is that we ought to consider what is the stage through which, in the progress of civilisation, our country has next to pass, and to endeavour to facilitate the transition and render it safe and healthy".[34] The succession of "changes in the social mind" which Mill discerned, the "intellectual idea of progress" which provided for him the new criterion of unity in history, is examined below in section 4 of this chapter.

It was from the German philosophers of history, however, that Mill learned to reject the vice of simplism and reductionism in the study of man. All students of man and society, he wrote,

> who possess that first requisite for so difficult a study, a due sense of its difficulties, are aware that the besetting danger is not so much of embracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking part of the truth for the whole. [35]

That truth is complex and many-sided,[36] rather than a single element,

is one of the permanent themes of Mill's writings; something which he believed the Comtists had overlooked.

> They deduce politics, like mathematics, from a set of axioms and definitions, forgetting that in mathematics there is no danger of partial views; a proposition is either true or it is not, and if it is true, we may safely apply it to every case which the proposition comprehends in its terms. But in politics and the social science this is so far from being the case, that error seldom arises from our assuming premises which are not true, but generally from overlooking other truths, which limit and modify the effect of the former. 37

Truth, he held, is a gem of many faces, of varying, even contradictory appearances: it cannot be perceived from one standpoint alone, or be analysed into one general principle. This maxim, generally valid, applies specifically to those who aspire to describe and explain social and historical events. Mill pointed to Guizot, the Kepler of the science of history (by which is suggested its "theorizer") for an example:

> He does not exaggerate the influence of some one cause or agency, sacrificing all others to it. He neither writes as if human affairs were absolutely moulded by the wisdom and virtue or the vices and follies of rulers; nor as if the general circumstances of society did all, and accident or eminent individuals could do nothing. He neither attributes everything to political institutions, nor everything to the ideas and convictions in men's minds; but shows how they both cooperate, and react upon one another. He sees in European civilization the complex product of many conflicting influences... 38

It is J.S. Mill's consciousness of history and society as subjects and agents, shaping and directing human nature and social behaviour as well as being shaped and directed by them, that must be regarded as the keystone of the arch linking a new Utilitarian social science with a Utilitarian philosophy of history. This is his first fundamental departure from Bentham's psychological analyses.

Secondly, men in Mill's view are singular and individual in their natures, although there exist "tendencies" which they have universally in common. Thirdly, societies - both contemporary and past - are held to have their own individual characters, which are of a "consistent whole", requiring from the historian and psychologist poetic and imaginative gifts "to realise a true and living picture (of their) circumstances and peculiarities".[39] These profound discoveries in the science of history, and thereby in the science of society - for "in the philosophy of society... we look upon history as the indispensable test and verifier of all doctrines and creeds"[40] - Mill found, in the 1840's, to be most completely embodied in the work of French historians, "the real harbingers of the dawn of historical science".[41] But it was to the Germano-Coleridgeans that Mill credited the first breakthrough in forming "the inductive laws of the existence and growth of human society",[42] and through whose influence he was led to abandon the universal principles of human nature for vaguer, more flexible criteria.

b) J.S. Mill, Coleridge and the revolt against the eighteenth century

> Few persons have exercised more influence over my thoughts and character than Coleridge has; not much by personal knowledge of him, though I have seen and conversed with him several times, but by his works, pieced together by what I have otherwise learned of his opinions, and by the fact that several persons with whom I have been very intimate were completely trained in his school. [43]

Mill was first acquainted with Coleridge through his poetry in 1826-7,[44] but came to draw on him increasingly as "the great awakener in this country of the spirit of philosophy" in the 1830's.[45] What Mill took from Coleridge was, essentially, a profounder conception of human nature and human history than anything which Bentham had offered him; in Coleridge's political philosophy ("a mere commencement") and political economy ("he writes like an arrant driveller") he was uninterested.[46] What was uniquely valuable in Coleridge and his followers was their "contribution, the largest made by any class of thinkers, to the philosophy of human culture".[47]

What is offered in the next four pages is only the most selective account of what Mill found of importance in Coleridge, which conveys nothing of the subtlety and breadth of Coleridge's philosophy. But some central concepts must be explained to make clear the nature of his revolt against "the philosophy of the eighteenth century", as J.S. Mill puts it without apparent sense of ambiguity.

> The Germano-Coleridgean doctrine... expresses the revolt of the human mind against the philosophy of the eighteenth century. It is ontological, because that was experimental; conservative, because that was innovative; religious, because so much of that was infidel; concrete and historical, because that was abstract and metaphysical; poetical, because that was matter of fact and prosaic. [48]

Philosophically, Coleridge rejected eighteenth century sensationalism,

denied that the mind is a passive receiver of sensations alone, argued that it is creative in perception and dual in nature, and strove to establish that its two categories, thought and feeling, were jointly necessary for full apprehension of truth. Coleridge named thought and feeling "reason" and "understanding"; "reason" is held to deal with the world of facts, with the world of ordinary empirical logic, while "understanding" deals with the poetic world, the world of emotion, value, culture, the world of unique moments, felt truths, 'concrete universals'. By reason a man is said in Coleridge to penetrate beyond the first level truth of appearance and attain a knowledge of the Idea, which might be defined as "the metaphysical inner purpose of things".[49] Ideas however have a historical as well as a metaphysical existence, for they participate, in a way analogous to the activity of Hegelian Spirit, in the minds of men, and explain their actions. It is in this sense that they are "the most real of all realities". Few men, however, are aware of the influence of Ideas: "it is the privilege of the few to possess an idea; of the generality of men, it might be more truly affirmed that they are possessed by it".[50]

The theory that men behave according to the promptings of an Idea which they may not consciously apprehend was, of course, diametrically opposed to the eighteenth century theory that conscious egoism and the conscious pursuit of pleasure were the permanent animating forces in human action. It also constituted a very different organising principle in history from that prevalent at the time. Rationalist history espoused as an unifying theme the idea of the mental progress of humanity from primitivism to civilisation, displayed in the gradual subsumption of whole bodies

of knowledge under general laws and the transformation of natural philosophy into natural science. Coleridge rejected both the theory that history finds unity in the improvements of reason and the triumphs of science and the notion that human nature displays an unchanging egoism. Men are often disposed to behave irrationally, he argued, and human nature undergoes constant change, according to the manipulation of the Idea.

> **There is in fact nothing wildly metaphysical in this. To organise any set of historical facts into a significant narrative, one must rely on the presence of ideas - and an 'idea' may be realised in a series of actions which may not be externally linked but which certainly have an intrinsic connection. For example, the great variety of Victorian legislative acts listed on page 34, of this thesis were the work of many men and relate to many areas of life, but all flow from what we understand as "the idea of democratic reform". Coleridge's Idea is in many respects analogous to Herder's "social consciousness" or to J.S. Mill's "Spirit of an Age" (a concept which he in turn took from the St.-Simonians) as the cohesion of the activity of an era; and even a rationalist historian like James Mill 'explains' an event as part of a larger movement going on at the time. For purposes of narration, historians are obliged to write as though an intrinsic connection lies in a series of externally unrelated events because of the common purpose they tend to realise. Coleridge was one of the first writers to make this fact explicit.**[51]

All periods of human history, as well as human nature, are informed by the "Idea" in differing stages of development: this,

says Coleridge, is the ground of the organic unity existing between Past and Present, not some spurious theory of a timeless dedication to pleasure-seeking and self-interest among mankind. The "Idea" develops at varying speeds in different countries; but by a comparative study of similar stages in the development of several nations, the historian may arrive at an understanding of the problems common to them all. It was in this sense that a science of history seemed possible to Coleridge and his followers. Mill was indebted to him; the resemblance of his "scale of civilisation" to Coleridge's evolving Idea, the greater breadth of Coleridge's historical analysis to his father's concepts of progress in civilisation, and the similar function it serves as the foundation of a historical science, are obvious.

Mill acknowledges these and other intellectual debts to Coleridge in one of the most famous passages of the Autobiography:

> The influences of European, that is to say, Continental, thought, and especially those of the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth, were now streaming in on me. They came from various quarters: from the writings of Coleridge, which I had begun to read with interest even before the change in my opinions; from the Coleridgeans with whom I was in personal intercourse; from what I had read of Goethe... From these sources, and from the acquaintance I kept up with the French literature of the time, I derived, among other ideas which the general turning upside down of the opinions of European thinkers had brought uppermost, these in particular: That the human mind has a certain order of possible progress, in which some things must precede others, an order which governments and public instructors can modify to some, but not to an unlimited extent: that all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different institutions: that government is always either in the hands, or passing into the hands, of whatever is the strongest power in society, and that what this power is, does not depend on institutions, but institutions on it: that any general theory or philosophy of politics supposes a previous understanding of human progress, and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of history. 52

There were, of course, many other things which Mill took from Coleridge, which lie outside the consideration of this thesis, but which have obvious import for later developments in his thought. He early came to share Coleridge's emphasis on "the culture of the inward man as the problem of problems",[53] and to share his understanding of the nation as a moral organism as well as free-for-all of competing individuals, linked together only by (the phrase is Carlyle's) "the cash nexus". In general Mill found Coleridge's economics misconceived, but honoured him for having "vindicated against Bentham and Adam Smith and the whole eighteenth century, the principle of an endowed class, for the cultivation of learning, and fordiffusing its results among the community".[54] But his most important legacy from Coleridge, in the long term, was a philosophy of history.

> The brilliant light which has been thrown upon history during the last half century, has proceeded almost wholly from this school,[55]

- Mill wrote of the Germano-Coleridgeans, and praised them for "making the facts and the events of the past have a meaning and an intelligible place in the .. evolution of humanity", for "affording the only means of predicting and guiding the future, by unfolding the agencies which have produced and still maintain the Present".[56]

Mill's revolt against "the eighteenth century" was first of all a revolt against its history: social and historical science can no longer be based on the uniformity of human nature, he learned from Coleridge, for many social "agencies" other than inward psychological promptings make men behave as they do. History, he learned further, is more than the record of political and military events that it was

principally conceived to be in the eighteenth century; for the varying patterns of social behaviour are formed by something more than the dictates of governments and the results of battles. Environment has a cultural and spiritual as well as a political and military aspect, and it is this which is historically responsible for the variety of human nature.

The narrow focus of eighteenth century history and its almost total exclusion of what we now call "social history" (which came through only in biographies) were the inevitable consequences of history organised around the progress of reason and science and the unchanging factor of pleasure-seeking in human nature. When Julius Hare, Liberal Anglican and one of the most notable Germanists in nineteenth century Cambridge, wrote

> Almost all the histories I ever read concur in showing that the world is wholly swayed by the love of money and power; and that nobody ever did a good deed, unless it slipt from him by mistake, except because he could not just then do a bad deed, or wanted to gain a purchase for doing a bad deed with less risk and more profit at some future time, 57

he was not producing an unfair parody: he was simply making the point that a century which found historical significance only in war and aristocratic political intrigue was bound inevitably to display the acquisitive aspects of human nature. Coleridge and Hare agreed that human beings act acquisitively as much as Bentham; they simply denied the universal principle that men act <u>always</u> from self-interest and for pleasure, and that altruism is to be interpreted, and recommended to others, purely as self-interest in disguise. Further, Coleridge posited an evolution in man's nature, opposing the rationalist assumption that varieties of human behaviour were explicable simply

as the exercise of differing passions in differing situations (so, in the "social state", sympathy and magnanimity are strong, while in the State of Nature, aggression and hostility are to the fore). Man's nature evolves, Coleridge taught Mill, because history has more than a purely external impact on humanity - that is, changing material environment but leaving human nature untouched. An age has an ideological "identity" which is stamped on the minds and natures of all the individuals living through it; this identity changes and evolves in time, constituting the progress of the "Idea", and changing with it the minds and natures of human beings. Man remains an identifiable "self", however, because remnants of his former natures (dispositions, attributes) survive throughout his life, just as civilisations retain much of their former character - the ideology of the Renaissance, e.g., still contributes much to the ethical and artistic assumptions of Western societies.

Much of this, of course, was being said by the Germans at the same time, and Coleridge stood in many ways very much nearer to the German than he did to the "Coleridgean" historians, who did not accept his near-Hegelian theory of ideas working themselves out in history (though their interpretation of history was "idealist" in the best sense, in that their aim was always the reconstruction of history "from within").[58] "There is no doubt that Coleridge's mind is much more German than English" - we have already noted the observation of H. Crabb Robinson in 1811, the man most perfectly acquainted with German scholarship at this time.[59] We should not read too much into this remark, however. Coleridge's affinities with the Germans, while obvious in philosophy, are little evident

in his literary work; he had little appreciation of Goethe and Schiller, and he had little acquaintance with German Romantic literature.[60] Crabb perhaps meant nothing more than that Coleridge had little in common with an English mind which conformed to the conventions of eighteenth century philosophy and history. But his achievement in England was real: it was German historiography which subverted the psychological assumptions of Utilitarianism, and it was "a strong Coleridgean army (which) held the passes through which Historismus entered English historiography".[61]

c) The German Historical Zeitgeist

> I am very pleased with the honour you have done me by asking my advice on your project of making a special study of German philosophy. I have not perhaps the right to give on that a very decided opinion, never having read either Kant or Hegel or any of the chiefs of that school, which from the first I have known only through their French or English interpreters. That philosophy has been very useful to me. It has corrected what has been too exclusively analytical in mind, nourished by Bentham and the French philosophers of the 18th century. [62]
>
> (Letter from J.S. Mill to Comte, 13.iii.1843)

Many of the conclusions of German Romantic philosophers of history were not, of course, original. Montesquieu and Vico both understood before Herder that the science of history studies "men", not "man", Montesquieu had made it a commonplace that varieties of civilisation derive chiefly from physical and geographical differences between countries, Lessing and Voltaire had warned against cultural arrogance and assessing the past solely by present standards, and political theorists going back to Aristotle had conceived of society as an organism.[63] But none of them had, before Herder, significantly affected the currency of universal principles of human nature in the historical writing of England, France and Germany. The detail and breadth of the historical study of Herder and others created, in contrast, an argument which rationalist historians could ultimately not ignore. Herder showed - compellingly, to empiricists - that the universal principles were not merely ethically incomplete but empirically untrue. This emerged in his careful, sensitive explorations of the uniqueness and individuality of differing social groups, which set a new example in studying the past by their sympathetic valuation of the colour and detail of the most primitive and barbarous civilisations; most importantly, Herder extended the boundaries of

historical study, to cover both periods of history (such as the Middle Ages) and countries ignored by the rationalists.[64] J.S. Mill called Herder the first of a "series of great writers and thinkers, ... by whom history... has been made a science of causes and effects; who.. have... afforded the only means of predicting and guiding the future, by unfolding the agencies which have produced and still maintain the Present".[65]

Mill's fascination with German historiography was not common to the younger Utilitarians in the 1830's; although John Sterling was converted by Hare in 1829 and (among the older men) George Grote and John Austin were influenced by Niebuhr and Eichorn, it would be quite misleading to suggest that a Coleridgean zeitgeist made off with the Philosophic Radicals en masse. J.S. Mill, Grote and Austin represent, however, perhaps the only significant Utilitarian thinkers of the time besides James Mill and Bulwer Lytton. Few of the Philosophic Radicals were, in any sense, "intellectuals": recording the "disappointment" of James Mill as well as his own, J.S. Mill noted of them that "they were faithful to their opinions, as far as votes were concerned... but on the whole they did very little to promote any opinions, they had little enterprise, little activity".[66] The fate of most of the younger Utilitarians was to enter Parliament, to remain in general ignorant or uncaring of the philosophical and historical attacks levelled against Benthamism in the reviews or in the universities, and to be ousted by the electorate after a brief spell of political glory. The "conversion" of J.S. Mill by the Germano-Coleridgeans to a new apprehension of human nature and potentialities was infinitely important to the development of

Utilitarian ethical and political theory; but the majority of the Radicals disappeared, as explained in Chapter 1, into the squirearchic pleasures of the country life or into faithful administrative work as paternalistic civil servants.

It is difficult to estimate the strength of Coleridge's influence. Mill's Autobiography has told us that Utilitarianism as a political creed gripped Cambridge in the 1820's; but we should not take lightly the opinion of Julius Hare, Fellow of Trinity, speaking of his fellow academics, that "at that time (1829) it was beginning to be acknowledged by more than a few that Coleridge was the true sovereign of English thought".[67] Probably, however, Hare was blinded as to Coleridge's true stature, as his closest scholarly friends were the Liberal Anglicans (followers of Coleridgean philosophy of mind) and he was at this time embroiled in fierce public controversy over the merits of the German historian Niebuhr. J.S. Mill came to read Coleridge's Constitution of Church and State in 1829 on the recommendation of his friend, John Sterling, and this in turn stimulated him to read Niebuhr;[68] but the real measure of Coleridge's public stature probably lies in the fact that most people who discovered German philosophy and history in the 1830's did so through the medium of Carlyle, who was a much more effective propagandist than the reclusive Coleridge.[69]

In the cases of Sterling and George Grote, the direct influence of Niebuhr made greater impact in reshaping their psychological thinking than the mediating influence of Coleridge. Niebuhr's History of Rome (1812) taught them respect for primitive and barbarous peoples, where Utilitarians saw only myth and superstition and the

urgent need of reform. Sterling found in Niebuhr "moral earnestness", "sincere faith" and "a feeling of the Worth of Man in his historical no less than in his present existence"; English writers in contrast "only sought for the most part to analyse some separate faculty or thing that they found in man".[70] Grote found in him "a hearty sympathy for the mass of the people" and a willingness "to treat the sentients and motives" of the most unenlightened nations "with respect, and even their mistakes with charitable censure".[71] Sterling, lifelong friend of J.S. Mill, was an ardent Benthamite in the London Debating Society in the 1820's and at Cambridge, but he received at the end of his short life (he died in 1844, aged 38) a tribute from Hare which shows how far he had departed from Utilitarian contempt for "barbarism" and from James Mill's slanders on primitive Orientals. "Perhaps the most striking and precious quality in (his essays)," Hare wrote, "is the deep sympathy with the errors and faults, and even with the sins of mankind".[72] Few Englishmen "have been more powerfully imprest and acted upon by Niebuhr's History of Rome", Hare added, and quoted Sterling's comment: "(The History) was the first help I had in getting out of the slough of Benthamism".[73]

The development of interest in Niebuhr seems to have been relatively sudden; in 1822 Thomas Arnold estimated that only six people in Britain had read the History of Rome, but in 1844 J.S. Mill noted that the first two volumes were reputed to have had more purchasers in the English translation (by Thirlwall and Hare, 1826) than in its native language.[74] Arnold himself finally read it in 1824, having learned German specially to do so. It was, he wrote,

> a work which may justly entitle its author to the merit of having done for ancient history what Bacon did for science;

> Niebuhr has not so much written a perfect history himself, as he has pointed out the true means by which it may be written; he has taught us to seek for our materials from the most multiplied sources, from laws and from mythic poems, from the annals, traditions, governments and usages of the most distant times and countries. [75]

Niebuhr extended the historical horizon to write something more than the politico-military account of the past which appeared in rationalist histories. In so doing he inculcated not only a new respect for man - "the idea which pervades (German) literature... may be called the WORTH OF MAN", wrote Sterling - but the new historical understanding that the experience of an age is cohered in its "character", "spirit", or "idea".[76] In the case of ancient civilisations, such as Rome, the spirit of the age was bodied forth in myth; in modern civilisations, in the social, moral and political tendencies of nations.

"He has taught us to seek for our materials from the most multiplied sources, from laws and from mythic poems...": in contrast to Arnold and Sterling's immediate recognition of Niebuhr's important revaluation of myth and legend, the painful and gradual acceptance of Niebuhrian attitudes by George Grote is one of the clearest examples we have of the slow assimilation of German historical thinking into Utilitarian psychology. Niebuhr's researches, following those of Wolf, into the nature and truthfulness of myth, and its significance in illuminating the spirit of early civilisations, created insoluble problems for Grote, who was inspired to write his History of Greece by that supreme rationalist, James Mill.[77] The History of Rome had ridiculed some of the central ideas of eighteenth century rationalism, including the notion that men act on all occasions purposefully and with a view to the consequences of their actions (though we have shown above that this is not a part of Bentham's thinking). Niebuhr

showed the Romans, both in authentic history and in legend, to be acting frequently for no discernible purpose whatever. Grote's reaction was equivocal. In the spirit of James Mill, who commanded in the preface to the History of British India that the historian should be critical and distinguish between real and supposed facts and causes,[78] Grote divided "all accredited narratives which float into society" into "accurate matters of fact, exaggerated matters of fact, and entire, though plausible, fiction"[79] - and found in the latter category a wastepaper basket for all records of supernatural, purposeless and irrational behaviour. Only "documented fact", he insisted, represents authentic history; the divine and heroic myths of Greece deal "with a past that was never present".[80] But in the spirit of Niebuhr, however, he allowed to the Greek myths an importance which James Mill totally denied to the myths of the Hindus. "Entire though plausible fictions" may be factually untrue, but they give the historian essential information about the spirit and ttitudes of "unrecording ages":

> Such anecdotes are fictions from beginning to end, but they are specious and impressive fictions - they boast no acknowledged parentage, but they are the adopted children of the whole community - they are embraced with an intensity of conviction quite equivalent to the best authenticated facts... We once more repeat - that they are radically distinct from half-truths or mis-reported matters of fact - for upon this distinction will depend the different mode which we shall presently propose of dealing with them in reference to Grecian history.[81]

"The different mode" of dealing with myth is that adopted by Niebuhr in the History of Rome: Grote commended him for his careful distinctions between those aspects of Roman history which could be treated as authentic (the stories of Livy in particular) and those which were mythical. Grote followed Niebuhr in finding in myth,

in "the fanciful sequences, the supernatural meddling, and the predominance of individual personality", a vehicle of meaning:

> Knowledge with respect to the past... a community (with no literature) will neither possess nor desire; but feelings with respect to the past they doubtless will possess - feelings both fervent and unanimous. And these feelings will prove abundant substitutes for knowledge; they will pour themselves out in legends or myths requiring no evidence beyond their own intrinsic beauty and plausibility; so that the mythopoeic propensity thus exhibits a past time of its own, - suitably coloured and peopled, and thoroughly satisfactory to the popular religious and patriotic faith - though the actual past with its commonplace realities be altogether buried and forgotten.
>
> Such tales... work upon the convictions of an unrecording age with the irresistible force of authenticated truth...
>
> Such tales are found possessing the firmest hold on the public mind and belief, yet confessedly without any foundation in fact - emanating originally from the poets or other productive minds of the community, but adapted by them to the state of feeling which they shared in common with the rest, and requiring no stronger certificate to procure for them both a cordial welcome, and a sincere belief. 82 (final emphasis mine)

"The state of feeling" of an age: seemingly we are not far from Hegel's concept that "history presents a people with their own image in a condition which thereby becomes objective to them".[83] It is a concept which Mill certainly recognised and accepted. But, having gone so far, Grote draws back. "Mere impersonal hearsay" is no evidence, he concludes; he reaffirms the universal principles of human nature, and makes illuminating comparisons in the History of Greece between Athenian demagogues and Radical members of the House of Commons.[84] His fine essay on the mechanics of historical writing in an appreciation of Niebuhr in 1843 reveals, in ultimo, that his desire to purify history was a technical rather than a sympathetic desire for truth - a desire to purge the record of specious fictions to leave a residuum of authenticated fact, rather than to find "truth" in the unique character of different historical periods, in the way

that Herder explained every historical detail as an essential part of the meaning of the whole.

Thus Grote sloughed off all mythical evidence which appeared to deny the universal principles of human nature that men act always to satisfy wants and to obtain pleasure. But the claim to be able to find in history unlimited examples of the rational pursuit of Utilitarian goals, and to regard history as teaching universally applicable and timeless lessons about the proper methods of government, was beginning to lose currency among Utilitarians. John Austin, the jurist, returned from Germany in 1835 professing "great disrespect" for what he called "the universal principles of human nature of the political economists" and insisted on the evidence which "history and daily experience afford of the 'extraordinary pliability of human nature'", according to J.S. Mill.[85] It was increasingly hard to take seriously propositions such as that of James Mill, who, writing to a friend in December 1817, said that if he found the time he would write a book which would make the human mind as clear as the road from Charing Cross to St Paul's.[86] "We believe the time must come," wrote J.S. Mill in 1842,

> when all systems which aspire to direct either the consciences of mankind, or their political and social arrangements, will be required to show, not only that they are consistent with universal history, but that they afford a more reasonable explanation of it than any other system. In the philosophy of society, more especially, we look upon history as an indispensable test and verifier of all doctrines and creeds.[87]

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Mill's essay on Coleridge begins with a sweeping tribute -

> Bentham excepted, no Englishman of recent date has left his impress so deeply in the opinions and mental tendencies of those among us who attempt to enlighten their practice by philosophical meditation.[88]

but finds his greatness to lie chiefly in his philosophy of history. On other aspects of Coleridge's thought, Mill displays decided scepticism:

> Of Coleridge as a moral and political philosopher (the character which he presents most prominently in his principal works) there is neither room, nor would it be expedient for us, to speak more than generally.[89]

Additionally, Mill is specific that he draws, through Coleridge, on other intellectual sources:

> Coleridge, though he has left on the system he inculcated, such traces of himself as cannot fail to be left by any mind of original powers, was anticipated in all the essentials of his doctrine by the great Germans of the latter half of the last century, and was accompanied in it by the remarkable series of their French expositors and followers. Hence, although Coleridge is to Englishmen the type and main source of their doctrine, he is the creator rather of the shape in which it has appeared among us, than of the doctrine itself.[90]

Scholars have quite properly traced Mill's intellectual debts in social science on the Continent to France rather than to Germany, where Mill found a fully-fledged "science of history" in St Simon and Comte which seemed to overcome the inadequacies of his father's perceptions of social progress in history. Both St Simon and Comte discerned a succession of all-pervasive "myths" and "ideas" in history, by which humanity is said to explain reality; St Simon divided the ideological periods of history into ages alternatively "organic" and "critical", Comte provided a dialectical succession of theological, metaphysical and scientific eras in the life of a nation. Mill acknowledged his debt to them and other French

historians in his distinction between three levels of sophistication in historical inquiry: of the first stage, its character "is to transport present feelings and notions back into the past, and refer all ages and forms of life to the standard of that in which the writer himself lives"; the second stage "attempts to regard former ages not with the eye of the modern, but... with that of a contemporary, to realize a true and living picture of the past time, clothed in its circumstances and peculiarities"; the third and highest stage aims "not simply to compose histories, but to construct a science of history.

> In this view, the whole of the events which have befallen the human race, and the states through which it has passed, are regarded as a series of phenomena, produced by causes, and susceptible of explanation...The facts of each generation are looked upon as one comppex phenomenon, caused by those of the generation preceding, and causing, in its turn, those of the next in order. That these states must follow one another according to some law, is considered certain: how to read that law, is deemed the fundamental problem of the science of history. To find on what principles, derived from the nature of man and the laws of the outward world, each state of sooiety and of the human mind produced that which came after it; and whether there can be traced any order of production sufficiently definite, to show what future states of society may be expected to emanate from the circumstances which exist at present - is the aim of historical philosophy in its third stage. [91]

In this exposition Mill's ultimately positivistic inclinations are revealed - no less than in his classification of Niebuhr into the second stage of historical inquiry. "Of the sagacity which detects the meaning of small things, and drags to light to the forgotten elements of a gone-by state of society, from the scattered evidences which the writers themselves who recorded them did not understand, the world has now, in Niebuhr, an imperishable model".[92] The second stage, however, necessarily precedes the third stage in

Mill's scale of development; and it is to German spade-work in the dead limbo of the past, to Herder's achievement in restoring to colourful and individual life many forgotten periods of history facelessly explained away by the universal principles of human nature, that J.S. Mill owed his initial release from Utilitarian psychology. By 1844 he was writing: "Both in historical speculations, and in the importance of her historical writings, France, in the present day, far surpasses Germany",[93] but prior to 1840 - the year he completed the writing of Book VI of the System of Logic - his primary debts to Germany can be clearly seen.

In terms of intellectual temper, English Utilitarianism was in the long term more allied to the optimism and secularism of French philosophy than to the deeply spiritual nature of German social and political thought. The French philosophers of history espoused a concept of materialistic progress, a vision of Utilitarianism temporalised, and a delight in what Montesquieu called "le bonheur de l'existence", where the young Hegelians were profoundly spiritual in emphasis, profoundly distrustful and pessimistic in their hopes of the material world. In face of French optimism and confidence in the further triumphs of reason, German romantics - and notably Hegel - declared the infinite promulgation of new codes and constitutions to be useless unless accompanied by a transformation in a nation's "soul". The process of transformation, they held, was slow and painful, its speed dependent, not on the will and power of man, but solely on the progress of the Idea through history. Hegel as a young student saluted the advent of the French Revolution as the triumph of reason and hope for the future; maturer Hegel, in

his lectures on the Philosophy of History in the 1820's, dismissed it as abortive and meaningless for World Spirit, as a futile attempt to transcend the necessities of dialectic time. Hegel argued that one nation alone could embody the forward energies of Spirit in a given period, and thereby find real happiness; in 1789 that nation was not France but Germany, where man's mind had been transformed, his soul rehoused, in the long Protestant Reformation which had persisted from the age of Luther. Mill found in German philosophy of history a temporary solace for melancholy in the late 1820's and, in the 1830's, a new foundation for the social science; but in the wilder flights of Hegelian metaphysic there was nothing for him, or for any Utilitarian who believed in linear progress and in the importance of radical and "untimely" reform. We have already noticed Mill's answer to Comte when asked in 1843 whether time was well spent in studying the German philosophers,[94] but not his final reply - No; and from this time onward, he found more Continental inspiration in the philosophic work of Comte, and in the historical writing of Thierry, Guizot and Michelet, than in the works of any German thinker.[95]

d) J.S. Mill and the Science of the Formation of Character

The universal principles of human nature met philosophical attack within England as well as on the Continent, and most famously in Macaulay's three-essay assault on Utilitarian theories of government in the Edinburgh Review from 1825 to 1829. J.S. Mill recognised, on reading Macaulay's review of the Essay on Government, that "there was truth in several of his strictures on my father's treatment of the subject", and he was led by Macaulay to think that "there was really something more fundamentally erroneous in my father's conception of philosophical method as applicable to politics, than I had hitherto supposed there was".[96] Mill did not at first see what this error was; but he later learned from St Simon and Comte that his father's fault was "to mistake the moral and intellectual characteristics of (a particular) era, for the normal attributes of humanity".[97]

Macaulay's attack was confined to Bentham and James Mill; no-one else within the Utilitarian movement, he held, had any significance as a philosopher; and he was scornful of the very title "Philosophic Radical":

> We apprehend that many of them are persons who, having read little or nothing, are delighted to be rescued from the sense of their own inferiority by some teacher who assures them that the studies which they have neglected are of no value, puts five or six phrases in their mouths, lends them an odd number of the Westminster Review, and in a month transforms them into philosophers. [98]

This is, of course, journalism, but it bears out J.S. Mill on the philosophical insignificance of the Philosophic Radicals,[99] and stands as a useful contemporary reassurance to the historian that he is not taking too narrow a view of the intellectual history of

the Utilitarian movement in confining most of his attention to the Mills. "Of those philosophers who call themselves Utilitarians," wrote Macaulay in 1829, "... Mr (James) Mill is, with the exception of the illustrious founder of the sect, by far the most distinguished".[100]

In his review of the Essay, Macaulay first states a "fundamental objection" against James Mill: "that it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the principles of human nature".[101] To this is added a second complaint: that it is impossible, in any event, to induce either from history or psychology principles or axioms of human nature which are universally and timelessly valid. Specifically, Macaulay argued:

a) That since the world discovered the inductive method from Baconian philosophy - "the great deliverance of the human mind"[102] - it has been totally unacceptable "to reason from phenomena up to principles" by the deductive method of the Schoolmen:[103]

> Of the Schoolmen Mr Mill has inherited both the spirit and the style. He is an Aristotelian of the fifteenth century, born out of due season. We have here an elaborate treatise on government, from which, but for two or three passing allusions, it would not appear that the author was aware that any governments actually existed among men. Certain principles of human nature are assumed; and from these principles the whole science of politics is synthetically deduced![104]

b) That the universal principles of human nature of the Utilitarians are either tautologous or false. "What proposition is there," asks Macaulay, "about human nature

> which is absolutely and universally true? We know of only one: and that is not only true, but identical; that men act always from self-interest. This truism the Utilitarians proclaim with as much pride as if it were new, and as much zeal as if it were important.[105]

Preoccupation with the problem of induction and deduction was

forced on J.S. Mill not only by Macaulay, but by Mackintosh, Hamilton, and other Scottish philosophers with whom his father did battle between 1829 and 1836; and the vigorous public debate over the science of method in these years constitutes the uniquely British influence undermining conviction in Mill's mind in the universal principles of human nature and the procedures of Utilitarian political argument. It is difficult retrospectively to understand what fuelled an essentially academic debate within social science over the merits of deductive vs. inductive argument into public controversy. The answer lies perhaps in the Whig mind and especially in Whig history, which set out to dismantle severally specious deductive arguments employed by "Tory" histories to justify historical abuses - e.g. divine right and the powers of the Church. In most cases - Macaulay provides many examples - the argument to be countered moves from an arbitrary definition of human nature and wants (most often claiming to state men's "real" as opposed to "actual" wants) to a deduced prescription of unwanted political and social arrangements.[106] Much of the debate, however, took the form of appeals to Bacon and crass argument on "what Bacon really said": and Macaulay's assumption that Baconian inductivism endorsed only direct argument from historical example (excluding series of deductions checked constantly against "experience") irritated James Mill more than any other point in his polemic. We know this from James Mill's Commonplace Book, and from his son's Autobiography; and the elder Mill's repeated admonition to his children that "theory" does not differ from "practice" eventually gave rise to an article on the subject.[107] Macaulay, unimpressed by James Mill's representation of theory as an abstraction of practice, held his theorising about human nature not to be genuine induction,

but a priori hypothesis-making; and held further that deduction from such hypotheses, even when referred to the nebulous concept of "experience", offended against the stern Baconian command to gain knowledge by observation and experiment, and against the Newtonian maxim "hypotheses non fingo".

Macaulay's misgivings divided, therefore, (1) into doubts about the validity of deductions from supposedly "empirical" principles (in the case of James Mill, from universal principles of human nature), even when checked against "experience"; (2) into doubts about the establishment of high-level induced principles by the method of "composer et decomposer" (Condillac's phrase, quoted by James Mill), by the postulating of hypotheses in the manner of the natural sciences, as opposed to a gradual ascent from specific principles to those of more general application.

Proceeding - in his review of the Essay on Government - to a detailed damnation of the "truths of deduction", Macaulay opens his argument with a misconception of James Mill's real reason in rejecting the formulation of principles in social and political science by direct induction from historical data. He quotes the Essay on Government as saying, somewhat mistily, that the experience of humanity is divided on the question of the right form of government, so we must instead "explore the science of human nature... to lay a foundation" for the science of government - a remark which Mill amplified in the later statement (which would have served Macaulay better) that "as the surface of history affords no certain principle of decision, we must go beyond the surface and penetrate to the springs within".[108] Macaulay interpreted the first remark as a

conscious opting, in the science of government, for a mode of argument admitted by Mill to be second-best - not understanding that Mill believed himself to be in possession of high-level truths about human behaviour which gave rise, through deduction, to an extended series of high-level axioms of greater certainty and complexity than any which could be achieved by unaided observation. The real justification of the method of deduction from empirically founded axioms comes in an argument in the Fragment on Mackintosh, published in 1835, that deduction is not some mysterious general rule remote from practice, applying only in another world. "There are no rules in general; all rules are rules in particular; they are directions for the performance of acts one by one".[109]

J.S. Mill was already aware in 1829 of the misgivings of Bentham about inadvertent slides into deduction, and was an intimate spectator of his father's battles with the Scots; Macaulay's arguments simply constituted a final demonstration of the fact that conclusions validly deduced from axioms enjoy a security in logic that does not follow in experience.[110] In the System of Logic, which he began in 1831, J.S. Mill probed far more deeply than Macaulay into the limitations of deductive method; by 1841, when Books 2 and 3 ("Of Reasoning", "Of Induction") were completed, "circumstances" haw achieved a truly nineteenth-century importance in distorting the otherwise mathematical certainties of the deductive method. "When in every single instance a multitude, often an unknown multitude of agencies, are clashing and combining, what security have we that in our computation a priori we have taken all these into our reckoning? How many must we not generally be ignorant of?" And even were all the relevant agencies known, "how vain the pretence of summing up the effects of many causes,

unless we know accurately the numerical law of each". This in turn demands, Mill notes sadly, an understanding of causes which is beyond our present grasp: "to make the calculation transcends, in any but very simple cases, the utmost power of mathematical science with all its most modern improvements".[111]

These reflections, applied to traditional Utilitarian modes of political reasoning - that is, deduction of political needs and requirements from universal principles of human nature - give rise, in Book 6 of the System, to the coup de grace for seventy years of Utilitarian social science. "While it is an imperative rule never to introduce any generalisation from history into the social science unless sufficient grounds for it can be pointed out in human nature," J.S. Mill wrote,

> I do not think any one will contend that it would have been possible, setting out from the principles of human nature and from the general circumstances of the position of the species, to determine a priori the order in which human development must take place, and to predict, consequently, the general facts of history up to the present time. After the first few terms of the series, the influence exercised over each generation by the generations which preceded it becomes... more and more preponderant over all other influences; until at length what we now are and do is in a very small degree the result of the universal circumstances of the human race, ... but mainly of the qualities produced in us by the whole previous history of humanity. So long a series of actions and reactions between Circumstances and Man, each successive term being composed of an even greater number and variety of parts, could not possibly be computed by human faculties from the elementary laws which produce it. [112]

History, therefore, has become the chief determiner of the content of the human mind and of the nature and progress of society: and knowledge of the laws of history depends on more than deductive extrapolations of universal principles of human nature. This is J.S. Mill's delineation of "the only form in which (a philosophy of society) is yet possible - that of a philosophy of history".[113]

J.S. Mill found for deductive method, therefore, a new and humbler role, as applied to social science: "the ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the a priori reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those of observation a posteriori".[114] The aim of deductive reasoning is deliberately lowered in the System from offering predictions to offering "guidance", from foreseeing facts to outlining "tendencies".[115] Deductive method is valued no longer for yielding universally valid conclusions about the substance of human nature or for statements of universal "laws of society", but is held to provide a rule of limited application in specific circumstances.

> We can never... affirm with certainty that a cause which has a particular tendency in one people or in one age will have exactly the same tendency in another, without referring back to our premises, and performing over again for the second age or nation that analysis of the whole of its influencing circumstances which we had already performed for the first. The deductive science of society will not lay down a theorem, asserting in an universal manner the effect of any cause; but will rather teach us how to frame the proper theorem for the circumstances of any given case...
>
> All the propositions which can be framed by the deductive science are, therefore, in the strictest sense of the word, hypothetical. [116]

As J.S. Mill saw it, the "hypothetical" rather than certain nature of deduced conclusions was the reason requiring, in ultimo, that they be checked constantly against the evidence available from a purified mode of inductive argument in the area under study. This perception - giving rise to a philosophical method which Mill calls the "concrete deductive" - owes most to Comte, whom we may fairly describe as the father of the belief that the laws of social science depend upon the consilience of induced and deduced argument. Through such consilience an empirical law may be converted into a scientific law, Mill observes;

a fact which Comte alone, he claims, has understood.[117]

Consilience of induced laws of "the succession of states of society" with deduced, "ethological" laws of human nature - expressing permanent tendencies in the formation of character, rather than universal matters of fact in human psychology and behaviour - became, in J.S. Mill's hands, the new basis of Utilitarian social science. Arguing that human nature is determined not only by the universal psychological contents descried by Bentham and James Mill, but overwhelmingly by personal and historical circumstance, J.S. Mill rejected the possibility of framing - in the Benthamite mode - genuinely meaningful universal principles expressive of human needs and desires, from which political needs might be deduced and desires satisfied. Legislators with Utilitarian concerns must rather learn the laws of the development of societies and civilisation - that is, the successive stages through which the human mind collectively progresses - and connect these induced laws of social development with deduced, ethological laws expressing tendencies in the development of human character. It is a conception of social science which Bentham would hardly have recognised; and it surrenders the imperative necessity (as Bentham viewed it) of prescribing Utilitarian law at all stages of society to the higher need of prescribing only such law and institutions historically found to be appropriate to a given stage of development.

Where, in essence, Bentham and James Mill were satisfied with straightforward deduction of political and social arrangements from axioms expressive of universal needs, desires and wants in human nature, where they had regarded "circumstance" as merely neutral in its effect

on universal psychological reactions to perception, J.S. Mill reformulated the role of deduction as one of "standing sentinel" over inductive arguments (from observation and historical analogy) of the laws and institutions to be prescribed in varying societies.[118]

Mill further denied that human actions are universally and constantly determined by "anticipation of a pleasure or of a pain" or by "worldly interests",[119] denied that empirical laws could be more than approximate generalisations,[120] denied that empirical laws could constitute ultimate laws of human action (for the scientific laws of action deal with causes, not effects),[121] and denied that "circumstance" was in some sense a single stuff.[122] Where Hume had argued that the dispositions of the Greeks and the Romans could be determined by analysis of those of Englishmen and Frenchmen, J.S. Mill replied:

> When maxims (respecting the feelings or actions of mankind) ... collected from Englishmen, come to be applied to Frenchmen, or when those collected from the present day are applied to past or future generations, they are apt to be very much at fault. [123]

This is the side not only of Macaulay, but of St Simon, Comte and French and German historians against Bentham, James Mill and "rationalist history". Macaulay had argued against James Mill:

> We do not believe it is possible to lay down a single general rule respecting the motives which influence human actions... (for) when (a) question is propounded generally about the whole species, the impossibility of answering is even more evident. Education, station, sex, age, accidental associations, produce infinite shades of variety. [124]

J.S. Mill agreed, though the System of Logic does not sympathise with Macaulay in the peculiarly Scottish battle over the validity of hypothesising in the induction of general principles;[125] and

e) Conclusion

The tracing of intellectual debts is neither the most valuable nor the most accurate way to approach the history of ideas, and because of this I have taken no rigorous care to show how J.S. Mill's individual debts to the Germano-Coleridgeans, to Comte and the French, and to Macaulay, were often debts to all three. Generally in intellectual history, it is not important to be able to state that x was or was not influenced by y. But it is important, however, in studying within the history of social science the shift from "static" to "dynamic" modes of thinking, and the shift from analogies of society made with mechanics to analogies made with biology, to understand that social science in England was not transformed, as was assumed by Sir Leslie Stephen and much of the extant scholarship, by a desire to emulate in the study of society the achievements of biology and evolutionary theory, but by a reaction, from entirely different sources, against the dominant social theory of early nineteenth century England of systematic Utilitarianism. Utilitarian social science did not have to wait for Darwin to find the grail. Men became aware of the ancestry and variety of the world from the writings of historians rather than from the research of biologists or from the discoveries of archaeologists. Even before Darwin, J.S. Mill was not the only social theorist to explain the development of civilisation as conforming to the fixed succession of states of society; Mill had himself been anticipated by a long series of German philosophers of history, French positivists and Liberal Anglican and Scottish philosophers. But what makes J.S. Mill's discovery so crucial for the history of social science was that, though he was not original, he was nonetheless

the first major thinker inside the English empirical system to see the implications of the discovery that human nature evolved. His desertion within the Utilitarian ranks brought a speedier crumbling of belief in the vital original axiom - that all men seek pleasure at all times - than any direct external attack made on the Utilitarian tradition.

Men had been aware in the eighteenth century, of course, that the world was peopled by many tribes and nations whose behaviour differed greatly from that of civilised Europeans, and for whose actions it was often difficult to find any rational explanation at all, but it had always been possible to rest in the comfortable belief that the quaint and strange customs of the Orient and of the primitive world were merely local variations on the universal disposition of individual human beings to look after their own interests at the expense of others'. English empiricism from Hobbes onward argued that the psychologist had only to abstract the inessential from the essential in the behaviour of individuals in order to strip bare the fundamental principle of action. "He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself not this or that particular man, but mankind", Hobbes declared.[131] It was an approach which bore clear signs of the influence of physics and mechanics, the most successful sciences of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the procedure of "thinking away" society and all the inessentials of the human mind, of stating what would be the case if certain disturbing principles did not produce variations, bore an obvious analogy to Newton's First Law of Motion. Having "thought away" society, political theorists had only to ensure that the fundamental principle of individual action - the search for happiness -

was not impeded by external obstacles, in order to guarantee the general happiness of mankind.**

It was only with Herder that the notion gained currency in Europe that in stripping away what was "inessential" in human behaviour, one was ignoring precisely the specific reasons which explained why particular individuals chose to behave as they did. But the eighteenth century, in its search for fundamentals, was impatient with "exceptions" and enthusiastic for rules; variations were uninteresting to men embarked on a Newtonian quest for general laws.

It was, perhaps, the achievement of Herder that the nineteenth century came to realise that the variety of social behaviour could not be reduced to a single synthesising cause, and through his influence that the ancient habit of explaining the raison d'etre of civil society in terms of a single rational purpose first fell into discredit. As Hobbes had put it, "Geometry, therefore, is demonstrable, for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn as described by ourselves; and civil philosophy is demonstrable because we make the Commonwealth ourselves".[132] Political society, by this argument, is an artifact; it is most analogous to a machine, which is best understood by dismantling its components: "everything is best understood by its constituent causes. For, as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure and motion of the wheels cannot be well known, except it be taken insunder and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say not to take them insunder, but yet that they may be so considered

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** The discussion of Hobbes is indebted not only to R.S. Peters but especially to the Cambridge lectures of Dr J.W. Burrow (1965) on The Victorian Intellectual Background.

as if they were dissolved".[133] The later Utilitarians discarded the Social Contract, as an explanation of the origin of communities, as superfluous,[134] but still found a machine whose components are unchanging principles of human nature a satisfactory model for understanding society, and for manufacturing political institutions. For Bentham and James Mill, no less than for Hobbes, society was a conscious rational creation of individual men. Men, they argued, obeyed social rules only because they saw the advantage of doing so. While, however, James Mill as a historian in his three volumes on India explained the difficulties of enforcing legal and social rules in terms of the rigidities of historically conditioned manners, habits, morals and modes of thought, James Mill as a political theorist in the Essay on Government explained these difficulties in orthodox Utilitarian language - in terms of the unchanging egotism of mankind.

It was, perhaps, the greater sensitivity of the nineteenth century to the radical changes wrought in man and society in the course of history, which played the most vital part in the perception of the inadequacies of Utilitarian social theory. If it were true that humanity underwent radical change in history, then it followed that no single generalisation about individual human nature could be eternally valid; and it is, therefore, not surprising that the creation of a social science should have come, in the 1840's and 50's, to be regarded as virtually identical with the creation of a science of history, given the central preoccupation of both subjects with the laws of social development.

Because, it seemed, nothing of general application could be said about developing human nature, social scientists turned instead

to analyse the development of states and "ideas" of society, in order to force a general truth. J.S. Mill declared that men are equally affected by the ethology of their country (its national character) as by personal psychological dispositions; and at this social level of analysis, he argued, uniformities may be found:

> The fundamental problem, therefore, of the social science is to find the laws according to which any state of society produces the state which succeeds it and takes its place. This opens the great and vexed question of the progressiveness of man and society; an idea involved in every just conception of social phenomena as the subject of a science. 136

And further, such laws can be raised to the level of scientific truth:

> History accordingly does, when judiciously examined, afford Empirical Laws of Society. And the problem of general sociology is to ascertain these, and connect them with the laws of human nature, by deductions showing that such were the derivative laws naturally to be expected as the consequences of those ultimate ones. 137

Thus J.S. Mill, acknowledging Comte and German philosophers of history, saw the two main tenets of the new approach in social science as:

1. The insistence that human nature is historically and socially, as well as psychologically, conditioned; and that social science must, therefore, base its conclusions on history and not on psychology alone:

> The series of states through which human nature and society are obliged to pass... must be ascertained by a conjunct analysis, so far as possible, of the whole of history, and the whole of human nature. 138

2. The assertion that different aspects of social life are inter-related:

> Every cause, as its effect spreads through society, comes somewhere in contact with different sets of agencies, and thus has its effects on some of the social phenomena differently modified; and these differences, by their reaction,

> produce a difference even in those of the effects which would otherwise have been the same. 139

- and that society is a "working system", with its own empirical "laws of progress":

> The question is... what are the causes which produce, and the phenomena which characterise, States of Society generally. In the solution of this question consists the general Science of Society. 140

Thus, Mill argued, an understanding of the force of history in shaping and re-shaping the character and the collective psychology of the myriad of individuals who make up society (this is the science of political ethology), would lead to a drastic modification of the importance of the original psychologically deduced universal principles of human nature:

> What we now are and do is in a very small degree the result of the universal circumstances of the human race, or even of our own circumstances acting through the original qualities of our own species, but mainly of the qualities produced in us by the whole previous history of humanity. 141

It is hardly a proposition which one could put into the mouth of Bentham. Nor could Bentham have shared J.S. Mill's emphasis on a "science of history", and on the division of history into different stages of civilisation, each ordered by beings at varying stages in the development of human nature, and each stage requiring different sets of (un-Utilitarian) institutions. For J.S. Mill, the new philosophy of history entailed also a denial of his father's assertion in the Essay on Government that the institutions of representative democracy are those best suited to all societies, and it entailed a denial, as stated above, of the possibility of direct deduction of model institutions from the principles of human nature and the laws of mind.

The differing stages of development of human nature and of society imply a progress in history, Mill argued, and this progress is open to scientific analysis:

> To find on what principles, derived from the nature of man and the laws of the outside world, each state of society and of the human mind produced that which came after it; and whether there can be traced any order of production sufficiently definite to show what future states of society may be expected to emanate from the circumstances which exist at present, is the aim of historical philosophy in... its ultimate and highest attempt. 142

But in the way he chose to define this progress in history, Mill administered a final affront to the Utilitarian tradition:

> From this accumulated evidence, we are justified in concluding that the order of human progression in all respects will mainly depend on the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind, that is, on the law of the successive transformations of human opinions. 143

Where Bentham had found the ordering principle of history in the march of material progress, where James Mill had found an ordering principle in the diffusion of the Principle of Utility through increasing areas of the world, where Hallam, Condorcet and rationalist historians had explained history as a slow progress towards the moral and material enlightenment of the present, Mill took the almost neutral ordering principle of "the progress of the intellectual convictions of mankind". For rationalist thinkers, the "ideological character" of the past could be summed up as the dominance of myth and error: and Condorcet's explanation of myth, probably the most popular of the early nineteenth century, as the deliberate creation of lies by vested interests, found a ready echo in Bentham. Mill cites Comte in the <u>System</u> as the only person who has made a systematic attempt to classify history in terms of the progress of the human mind, but there

is also much of Coleridge and Germany in the concept.

The acceptance of Comtism and German philosophy of history in England was an aspect of the growth of what J.S. Mill called "the relative spirit" - the willingness to admit that institutions, myths and beliefs were not wrong or false, but necessary for their time, however irrational or silly they appeared to the sophisticated historian or philosopher. For Bentham, whom we have defined in this thesis as primarily a philosopher of jurisprudence and a practical reformer of the law, an historical relativism which led to admitting that irrational, absurd and superstitious practices had a social function was barely comprehensible, let alone defensible. Bentham's Utilitarianism was turned to the extinction of the irrational, absurd and superstitious in the law of England; and "taking England for a standard",[144] he argued that law and procedure completely unacceptable in England could hardly be valued, either historically or contemporarily, anywhere else. By 1889, when Pater's Appreciations appeared, the whole Utilitarian crisis and transformation could be seen in perspective, as part of a larger movement. "Modern thought is distinguished from ancient," wrote Pater, "by its cultivation of the relative spirit in place of the absolute... To the modern spirit nothing is, or can be, rightly known except relatively and under conditions".[145]

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of Pericles. 2. (Critical) The era from Pericles to the preaching of Christ. 3. (Organic) The triumph of Christianity in the Middle Ages. 4. (Critical) Luther's denunciation of the Church down to St Simon's own time.

The test of whether a period was organic or critical did not depend on any specific idea man held of God, but rather on whether that idea, made a social force by the spiritual power of our times, synthesised all of man's energies for the common good.

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42. "Coleridge", p.143

43. Letter to Michol 15.iv.1834, in Mineka, ed. Collected Works of J.S. Mill XIII.221

44. Autobiography pp.86-7; the first mention of Coleridge

45. "Coleridge", p.121

46. ibid. pp.161-162

47. ibid. p.143

48. ibid. p.127

49. Coleridge offers a quasi-Platonic definition of the Idea, as "that conception of a thing which is not abstracted from a particular state, form, or mode, in which the thing may happen to exist at this or that time; nor yet generalised from any number of succession of such forms and modes; but which is given by knowledge of its ultimate aim". (Constitution of Church and State, 1839, p.xi)

50. ibid. p.xii

51. It is now almost tautologous that, in Berlin's words, "unless

some relation other than that of scientific causation be postulated, history becomes nothing but a series of externally related events. To explain is to give rational grounds and not merely antecedents. To explain a series of episodes, in this sense, is to attribute them to a rationally intelligible process - the purposive activity of a being or beings - God or man. Without this the events remain unexplained, groundless, 'meaningless'. A mechanical model may enable one to predict or control the behaviour of objects, but it cannot give a rational explanation; and unexplained events in human lives do not add up to human history".
in Karl Marx (London 1939/1963) p.48

52. Autobiography p.99
53. "Coleridge", p.145
54. ibid. p.157; cf.pp.152-3 for a fuller discussion of this point
55. ibid. p.144
56. ibid. p.144
57. J.C. Hare, Guesses at Truth (3rd edition, 1867) p.285
58. The reference is especially to Hare, Connop Thirlwall and Thomas Arnold. See Duncan Forbes, "Historismus in England", Cambridge Journal IV (1954) passim
59. quoted F.W. Stokoe, German Influence in the English Romantic Period, 1788-1818 (1926) p.81
60. see ibid. pp.93ff
61. D. Forbes, "Historismus in England", loc.cit. p.390
62. "Earlier Letters", Mineka p.576. Original in French. "Cette philosophie m'a ete, a moi, fort utile; elle a corrige ce qu'il y avait de trop exclusivement analytique dans mon esprit nourri par Bentham et par les philosophes français du 18eme siecle".
63. See the documents quoted in Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History (Glencoe, Ill., 1959)
64. Cf. the parochialism of a major historian like Hallam, in the face of the German belief that all periods of history are of equal interest: "Many considerable portions of time, especially before the twelfth century, may be justly deemed so barren of events worthy of remembrance that a single sentence or paragraph is often sufficient to give the character of entire generations and of long dynasties of obscure kings".
View of Europe in the Middle Ages (1818) p.xiii
65. "Coleridge", p.144
66. Autobiography p.117
67. Hare, quoted in Duncan Forbes, "Historismus in England", p.
68. An event which goes unmentioned in the Autobiography, and in Bain. It is plain, however, from remarks in the essay on Michelet that Mill did read him. It is Emery Neff who states that Niebuhr followed close on the Constitution of Church and State in Mill's literary diet, but offers no source. (Carlyle

and Mill, NY 1926, p.248).

69. "Then, indeed, the wonderful power with which (Carlyle) put forth (philosophic truths) made a deep impression on me, and I was during a long period one of his most fervent admirers; but the good his writings did me, was not as philosophy to instruct, but as poetry to animate". (Autobiography, p.106).
Carlyle learned German in 1818 to read Niebuhr; and on philosophy of history he may have read not only Herder and Kant, but Fichte, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling. See C.F. Harrold, op.cit. pp.171-6.

70. John Sterling, "The Characteristics of German Genius", in Essays and Tales I.409, 418-9, 420

71. G. Grote, "Niebuhr", Westminster Review XXXIX (1843) p.285

72. Hare, "Memoir of Sterling", prefaced to Essays and Tales p.xxxiv

73. ibid. p.xxx; J.S. Mill, "Michelet", p.121. NB also Sterling's remark, "I have found Niebuhr's letters more congenial and attractive than any other book. Such a monument of diligent self-formation as his life presents I do not know elsewhere. His feeling for the Noble and the True is altogether heroic". (emphasis mine) ibid. p.xxx

74. "Michelet", p.121; Arnold, "Bankes's History of Rome", Quarterly Review XXVII (1822) p.281

75. Arnold, ibid. p.

76. Sterling, op.cit. p.415

77. DNB Life of G. Grote, by G.W. Norman

78. James Mill, History of British India Preface, I.xviii-xix

79. Grote, "Niebuhr", p.289

80. History of Greece (1884 ed.) I.43

81. "Niebuhr", p.293

82. ibid. pp.294-5, p.315

83. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (ed. T.M. Knox, 1948) p.

84. "Niebuhr", p.320; History of Greece, IV.

85. Autobiography, p.108

86. quoted Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians (1949) p.

87. "Guizot", pp.222-3

88. "Coleridge", p.121

89. ibid. p.166

90. ibid. p.124

91. "Michelet", p.125, p.127, p.129

92. ibid. p.128

93. ibid. p.121

94. See above, p.

95. With the important exception of Wilhelm von Humboldt in the Essay on Liberty.

96. Autobiography, p.97

97. ibid., p.101

98. T.B. Macaulay, Works (1866) V.240

99. Autobiography, pp.116-117. "I, as well as my father, founded great hopes on them. These hopes were destined to be disappointed"

100. Macaulay, Works V.239

101. ibid. p.266

102. ibid. p.244

103. ibid. p.241

104. ibid. p.241

105. ibid.pp.266-7

106. Though NB in contrast the "self-evident truths" of that pleasingly Whig document, the American Declaration of Independence: "That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights... That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men..."

107. See Commonplace Book passim, Autobiography p.28, p.96; "Theory and Practice", Westminster Review XXV (1836)

108. James Mill, Essay on Government (1828) p.3, p.16

109. James Mill, Fragment on Mackintosh (1835) p.141

110. cf. Bentham: "Notwithstanding all I could do, in spite of all resolves, I have not been able to keep clear of metaphysics". Box 27 (UCL MSS) p.131, on his study of the relation of principles to practice.

111. System of Logic III.11.2, p.303

112. ibid. VI.10.4, p.597

113. "Coleridge", loc.cit. p.143

114. System of Logic VI.9.1, p.585

115. ibid. VI.9.1, 2, p.585

116. ibid. VI.9.2, p.586-7

117. ibid. VI.10.3, p.597

118. ibid. VI.9.5, p.593: "Thus, even where conclusions derived from specific observation are available for practical inferences in new cases, it is necessary that the deductive science should stand sentinel over the whole process; that it should be constantly referred to and its sanction obtained for every inference".

119. ibid. VI.2.4, p.551; VI.8.3, pp.580-1

120. ibid. VI.5.1, p.563

121. ibid. VI.5.1, p.563

122. ibid. VI.10.2, p.595. "States of society are like different constitutions or different ages in the physical frame..." etc.

123. ibid. VI.5.2, p.564

124. Macaulay, Works V.268

125. System of Logic, III.14.4, pp.322-325

126. ibid. VI.5.2, p.564

127. ibid. VI.5.4, p.567-8

128. ibid. VI.5.4, p.568

129. ibid. VI.5.4, p.568

130. ibid. VI.5.4, p.567

131. Hobbes, Leviathan (1651; ed. Oakeshott, Oxford 1946) p.6 (my emphasis)

132. Hobbes, quoted R. Peters, Hobbes (Harmondsworth 1967) p.68

133. Hobbes, Preface to De Cive, quoted Peters, ibid., p.70

134. "Bentham thought that Hume had disposed of the myth of original contract so conclusively that the task need not be done again" (M.P. Mack, Bentham (NY 1963) p.121).
Bentham does make a specific attack on Locke's version of the Contract, accusing him of reification:
"According to Locke's scheme, men knew nothing at all of government until they met together and agreed to make one. Locke had speculated so deeply, and reasoned so ingeniously, that he forgot he was not of age when he came into the world".
Bentham MSS (UCL) Box 100, p.113, quoted Mack, p.189

135. Cf. the System of Logic: "It has become the aim of really scientific thinkers to connect by theories the facts of universal history; it is acknowledged to be one of the requisites of a general system of social doctrine that it should explain so far as possible the main facts of history; and a Philosophy of History is generally admitted to be at once the verification and the initial form of the Philosophy of the Progress of Society". (VI.10.8, p.607)

136. ibid. VI.10.2, p.595

137. ibid. VI.10.4, p.598

138. ibid. VI.10.

139. ibid. VI.9.2, p.586

140. ibid. VI.10,1, p.594

141. ibid. VI.10.4, p.597

142. "Michelet", loc.cit. p.129

143. System of Logic VI.10.7, p.605

144. "On the Influence of Time and Place...", Works I.171

145. Pater, "Coleridge", Appreciations (1889) pp.105-106

A P P E N D I X

CONCORDANCE OF 36 PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS IN BENTHAM'S PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED WORK

Among the many obstacles confronting the Bentham scholar - beyond the disarray and lack of chronology of his MS writing and the uncertainty attached to Bowring's editing of much or the published work - is the lack of formal address by Bentham to most of the major philosophical and psychological concepts he employs. Apart from the highly original studies of intention, motivation and disposition which appear in the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, and the 1815-18 essays on Ontology, Logic, Language and Phenomena of the Human Mind, there is no systematic study of basic concepts in Bentham equivalent to Locke's Essay or Hume's Treatise. His position on most of the concepts listed below can be gathered only from isolated aperçus, from brief formal definitions, scattered over his work. The following appendix offers a semi-comprehensive concordance (based on the MS and printed works listed in the Bibliography) of 36 key concepts, and makes clear that in many instances Bentham's understanding of a concept can only be gathered through a broad survey of his references.

KEY:

Box numbers refer to the MSS housed at Univ. Coll., London
Deon. refers to the (suspect) Bowring edited Deontology (1832)
PML - Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)
Roman numerals + Arabic figures (e.g. IX.21) refer to passages in Bentham's Works, ed. Bowring (1840) 11 vols.
Pl = pleasure, pn == pain

1. A C T I O N

Motion an essential ingredient in the idea of - , VIII.204
- is either motion itself, or the tendency to motion, VIII.204
(Actual motion not necessary in actual action, as opposed to the idea of action; cf. attraction of magnet and bar of iron, both held stationary by human hand, VIII.204).

- essentially involved in the idea of an object, or some body which stands objected to another body in motion, VIII.205
Human - is a motion considered as being produced by an exercise of the faculty of the will, on the part of a sensitive being, VIII.205
Such - caused in all instances by desire or expectation of pleasure or exemption from pain, VIII.205
The stars exhibit - as much as men, VIII.207

Well-being the end of - , not only for man, but for every sensitive being, VIII.222 Mental operations modes of - , VIII.223
Motion of bodies in space is still - , irrespective of whether they are acting on other bodies, VIII.235
- of the will may be transitive or intransitive, VIII.289
The art of giving direction to - and to volition may be termed psychological dynamics, VIII.289
A man acts for pleasure when "it appears to him necessary that a certain event or state of things should have had place", I.209
The psychological process of his - includes 1. an interest 2. a desire 3. an aversion 4. a want 5. a hope 6. a fear 7. a desire → motive, I.209. This is the case whatever the type of pl aimed at, I.209, I.211

- proper subject of judgments "good" or "bad", not motives, I.216-7
An - always the 'result' of the strongest single or group of - , I.218
- is always the result of motives and interests, I.218

- distinguishable into positive (consisting in motion) and negative (forbearing to move) into external (corporal) or internal (mental), transitive (when motion is communicated to some other body) and intransitive (when effects are limited to the agent), into transient (e.g. to strike) and continued (e.g. to keep something), into indivisible (conceivable but not known to be exemplified - e.g. movement of atoms) and divisible (exemplified), into simple (single acts) and complex (where many heterogeneous acts serve a common end). PML VII.8-20
Whole - includes act, and consequences, PML VIII.2
Act as motion of the body, PML VIII.5n
- and intentionality, PML VIII passim
- may be "heedless", when men do not reflect on likely consequences, PML IX.5
Idea of causation is involved in idea of - , VIII.200
"It is by experience we are taught, that, as in the case of every other modification of human conduct... no - is ever performed without a motive", VI.242
- is motion caused by an exertion of the will, VI.216
- is a name given to an event in so far as it... had the human will for the immediate cause of it, VI.217
Acts of the will distinguish human action from those motions exhibited by the unanimated, VI.217

Internal acts may be unattended by motions in exterior matter, VI.217
Efficient causes of - are motives, VI.256
An - is an event which has for its cause an exertion of the volitional faculty, whether on the part of a person or a thing, VIII.300
Every - of the will produced by interest, that is, motive, II.477
- can be material only on account a tendency to produce pl or pn, PML X.2
- without motive, without interest, is in effect without cause, VII.393
No - without passion, the two are inseparable, VIII.201
Pl and pn the ultimate ends of - , III.214
Only right, proper and universally desirable end of human - , greatest happiness of all whose interest is in question, I.271n
"Voluntary" and "involuntary" -; a distinction B. abstains from, PML VIII.2n
- determined by the idea and contemplation of pl and pn, III.291 (1814)
Men abstracted pl and pn as ground of approving - , but not in all periods of history, Deon.I.278-9
Knowledge of - of the mind attainable only by acts of the body which the former has stimulated, Box 14 p12
When men act, it must be pl that is their motive, Box 14 p5
Well-being, the end of - , constant object of pursuit, Box 14 p.44
Every - by which pl is reaped, is good, Box 14 p.49
Connection between - as causes and Pl and Pn as effects, a matter of experience, Box 14 p.132
Happiness in man, the end of every thought and - , Box 70a p.3
- produced only by the ideas of Pl and Pn, Box 70a p.3
Objects of all - , to procure Pl, to keep off pn, Box 70a p.41
Springs of - , Pleasures and Pains, Box 158 p.64
- only bad when consequences and intentions are, Box 158 p.107
- dictated by habits and power of example long after the principle on which they were founded cease to exist, Principles of Leg. p.42
Cause of - , always desire, VIII.280n.

2. A F F E C T I O N

- of the sensible faculty, sympathy and antipathy, PML II.11n
- is a permanent or habitual state of mind in which sympathy or antipathy towards an object, and consequently the pleasures and pains corresponding to them, are regarded as frequently having place, X.509

cf. the - of women for children, PML VI.35

To - belong the circumstances of firmness of mind, steadiness, bent of inclination, moral sensibility, moral biases, religious sensibility, religious biases, sympathetic sensibility, sympathetic biases, antipathetic sensibility, antipathetic biases, PML VI.46

- are fictitious entities, PML X.26n

Names of - are also, many of them, names of passions, appetites and motives, PML X.26n

- may have degrees or values, I.310, 322

Synonyms, interests, passions, II.474

Circumstances of mind which affect impressions of pl and pn are - and understanding, PML VI.46

- may be figurative motives, PML X.4

Moral pathology consists in knowledge of the - , I.304

State of - determined by state of interests, Box 160 p.407

- of sympathy weakest in earliest period of human existence, Deon.I.171

- , or elements of calculation of psychical class, out of reach of observation, VIII.209

3. B O D Y (CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE)

- the name of the genus generalissimum of the class of real entities, VIII.195
Every perceptible real entity is a - , VIII.195
Distinguished from substance, VIII.195n
Divisible into animal, vegetable and mineral, VIII.195
Divisible into endued with life, or not; endued with sensitive life, or not, VIII.195
- endued with sensitive life = animal. - endued with insensitive life = vegetable. - not endued with life = mineral. VIII.195
Only by the evidence of perceptions can the reality of - be established, VIII.196
Inference from perceptions to the existence of - much stronger than that from - to existence of incorporeal substances, VIII.197
Those who act on supposing the non-existence of - will have pain as a witness against them, VIII.197 No value in searching out the origins of belief in non-existence of - , VIII.197n

Disposition of bodies, acc. to time, place, motion, rest, action etc. VIII.199-200.
Every - has its matter and form, VIII.201, and its qualities, VIII.202
The - is only in a comparatively remote way the subject of perceptions, VIII.224; its existence as a subject is a matter of inference, not of perception, VIII.224
- a species of the genus substance (cf. spirits) VIII.257
Porphyry placed - fourth in the scale of ascension from man (viz. man, animal, living thing, body, substance), VIII.266
Every operation of mind and - result of exercise of will, VIII.279
A man's person consists of two reputed parts, - and mind, PML XVI.33 (1823 addition)
Imperfections of - influence sensibility, PML VI.6
Frame of - , incl. strength, hardiness, health, etc. influence sensibility, PML VI.7-10
Differing frames of - mean that men will feel pl and pn differently, PML VI.28
- of a nature very different from the mind, PML VI.30n
Emotions of - are received as probable indications of temperature of mind, PML VI.33
Male superior to female in frame of - , PML VI.35
Every - is in motion and is likely so to continue, VIII.130
All operations of the - and mind are produced by desires, VIII.279

Strength of intellectual powers corresponds to strength of - , PML VI.12
All - we are acquainted with are compounds of solid matter and empty space, VIII.129
Physical facts have their seat in inanimate - , psychological facts in animate - , VI.216
The whole - may be the seat of pl, or simply a particular organ, VIII.89n
Acts of the - shown by motion, but not those of the mind, Box 14 p.12
Existence of Pl more immediately evident than that of - or mind where it has its seat, Box 14 p.27 (1815)
The - compared to pl an inferential entity, Box 14 p.27
- an instrument for getting pl, Box 70a p.41
Pl of the - contribute less to happiness throughout life than pl of the mind, Box 70a p.48

- the foundation of Pl of the Mind, Box 70a p.48
All perceptions depend upon the - , for it is at the - only that they can come in, Box 70a p.55

4. C A U S E

- of actions interests, VIII.203
Idea of motion inseparable from process of causation, VIII.206-7
Prime - is the factor we must strive to isolate in action, for a multitude of circumstances relating to state of contiguous bodies will influence any motion, VIII.208-9
A - , "only one alone of... sets of co-operating circumstances", VIII.209
No determinate relation between - and effect (because of influence of other circumstances), VIII.209
Much uncertainty inevitable in the deduction of - from effects, and vice versa, VIII.209, especially in field of morals as cf. to physics, VIII.210
Four types of - , (1) material - , where the matter of the body in question contributes to the production of the effect in question; (2) formal - , where the form contributes to the given effect; (3) efficient - , the motion in a causing body, the motion which has the principal share in producing the effect; (4) final - , the end the agent had in view, (i.e. pl or pn) VIII.210.

Habit not strictly a - , but admissible as such, PML X.38n
Chain of - and effects fastened to pl and pn, PML I.1
Pl and pn both efficient and final - , PML III.1
Motive or - of act distinguished from grounds of approbation thereof, PML II.19
Whatever pleasures are excited all at once by action of same - , constitute one pl, PML III.1
Exciting - , an incident or event which produces pl or pn (subdivided, pleasurable or dolorofic), PML VI.4
- produces, but does not determine quantity of, pl PML VI.5
Exciting - differs from motive, PML VI.4n
(Men, Bentham tells us, are constantly acted on by exciting causes, which alter the balance of pl and pn in their minds, and which affect each differently according to their sensibility).

Pn and pl produced in men's minds by - , PML VI.1
But the quantity of pl and pn is not determined uniformly in proportion to the - , but is determined by the particular sensibility of the agent, PML VI.2
- determines materiality of circumstances in producing consequences of act, PML VI.23

Idea of causation inseparable from idea of action, VIII.200-1
Efficient - of actions are motives, VI.256
- is perhaps in every instance the name of a fictitious entity; if one wants the correspondent real entity, substitute the word "author" or "instrument" for - , VIII.130

Relation between - and effect known only by experience, VI.237
" - " ambiguously applied to "motion", "action", "operation", and to "agent", "operator", "author", VIII.208
Action without motive, without interest, is in effect without - , VII.393

Axiom of mental pathology, a proposition expressing consequences in terms of pl and pn found by experience to result from certain sorts of occurrences, and in particular from such in which human agency bears a part, III.224
- of action may be the prospect of personal advantage, in some cases the only - , II.417 (see INTEREST q.v.)
- a fictitious entity of 2nd remove; it depends on motion for existence, VIII.205
No man likely to mistake the state of his sensations, but he may well mistake the - , VIII.329
Connection between acts as - , and Pl and pn as effects, a matter of experience, Box 14 p.132
Pl and pn produced by two types of - , 1. notional (in which man's action has no concern), 2. moral, in which man's action has concern, Box 70a p.3
Laws possess influence over moral - , Box 70a p.3
- is the constituent of identity in pleasures, Box 70a p.51
- is the bond of connection between sensations, Box 70a p.51
Equal - of Pl and pn produce different effects in different people, Box 14 p.4
- of acts, always desire, VIII.280n
- of desire? In some cases I know, in others not, VIII.280n
Faculties, fictitious entities framed to denote the imaginary - productive of some real effect, VIII.224

(Much of Bentham's discussion of causation is a detailed application to motives and behaviour of Hume's argument: "We need only consider, that the will being here considered as a cause, has no more a discoverable connection with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect". Hume in effect denied that there was <u>any</u> knowable connection between an act of will and a subsequent bodily motion).

5. C O N S E Q U E N C E S

Likely - of our actions difficult to calculate because the mind is led astray by several sources of illusion, incl. intellectual weakness, VIII.210
A man has an interest in doing an act when he considers that pl will be among the - , I.207
- only proper subject of "good" and "bad", not motives, I.216
- are the ground on which acts are approved, PML II.19, PML VII.2
- determine relative perniciousness of act, PML VII.2, PML XII.2
- of actions are important to legislators only where they produce pl or pn, PML VII.3
Goodness or badness of - depends on circumstances, PML VII.21 (e.g. in certain circumstances it may be good to kill a man, PML VIII.13)

Act may be intentional without - so being, PML VIII.3
- may be intentional without act wholly being so, PML VIII.4, though the first stage of the act must be so, PML VIII.5
Directly intended - may be directly or obliquely so, ultimately or mediately, exclusively or inexclusively, PML VIII.5-8
- may be advised or inadvised, heeded or heedless, PML IX.2,5,6,10,12,13
Goodness or badness of dispositions viewed acc. to the - they produce, PML XI.2

For a man to be governed by a motive, he must expect certain - , PML X.6
All men calculate - of pl and pn, PML XIV.28
- are material only when they consist in pn and pl or influence its production, PML VII.1
When - are bad, disposition may be called bad, Box 27 p.53b
Connection between acts as causes and Pl and pn as - , a matter of experience, Box 14 p.132
Equal causes of Pl and pn produce different - in different people, Box 14 p.4

6. C O N S C I O U S N E S S

Intention may take place when the perceptive faculty is conscious, unconscious, or falsely conscious of the circumstances which accompany it, PML VII.5
- , when the party believes precisely those circumstances, and no others, to subsist, which really do subsist (in accompaniment or intention); unconsciousness, when he fails of perceiving circumstances to subsist, which, however, do subsist; false - , when he believes or imagines certain circumstances to subsist, which in truth do not subsist, PML VII.5
(ERGO to be conscious of x is not merely to be aware of x but is also to apprehend correctly the nature or existence of x. Therefore a man is not conscious of the desires which inform an intention unless he perceives their nature correctly. If he believes other desires to inform an intention, he is falsely conscious of them).

- relates to the part which the understanding or perceptive faculty has borne, in the production of any incident, PML IX.1

cf. LOCKE: " - is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind" (Essay II.i.19); its instrument is the understanding - in - , "the understanding turns inwards upon itself, reflects on its operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation" (II.i.4)

7. D E S I R E

- is seated in volitional faculty, VIII.279
- has for its object pl or pn or mixture of both, VIII.279
- has in every case an external object and an internal object, viz. the pl which corresponds to the external object, VIII.280
-s have place when pl is expected, VIII.280
Pain accompanies unsatisfied - , VIII.280
- is a motive when it has produced, or is expected to produce, pl VIII.280
No - has place except given the idea of pl or pn, VIII.280
Synonyms for - include liking, I.208 (but not want)
Any - which promises to be contributory to the attainment of the end of action, viz. pl or exemption, is a motive, I.208
- affected by judgment, I.208
No species of - or interest exists which is not frustrated, in its attainment, by the - and interests of other men, I.213
- may be judged as "good or "bad" where they lead to consequences realised through actions, and thus foreseen, I.217
Man's - are governed in a great degree by habits, PML VI.25 and by experience of previous enjoyments, PML VI.25
- connected with "pain of (de)privation", cf. Locke's uneasiness, PML VI.25, PML V.18
- when to a certain degree strong, are termed passions, VI.217
Source of - , interests, I.211 ("In its way to become a motive, the interest has become productive of a desire").
Pernicious - arise from the malevolent passions, from drink and idleness, I.539
- produce all operations of the mind and of the body, VIII.279
- is a state or act of the will, VIII.321
- caused by pl or pn, VIII.279-81
To increase the sum of his well-being, every man's - from birth, Box 14 p.142
- for eating an essential precondition of pl in eating, Box 70a p.49
- always cause of an act, VIII.280n
What causes - ? In some cases I know, in others not, VIII.280n
Cause of - , interests, I.211

cf. LOCKE: Desire is the determiner of the will (Essay II.xxi.33)
"Desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good..." (II.xxi)

(Is there any suggestion in Bentham that desire is a Lockean uneasiness? Insofar as it is part of the genus passion, defined - see below - as a state in which pl or pn are felt in a high degree of intensity, the answer is Yes).

8. D I S P O S I T I O N

- proper subject of judgment, "good" or "bad", not motives, I.216-7
Habit not strictly a cause, but admissible as such, PML X.25n
Goodness or badness of - , viewed acc. to consequences produced, PML XI.2
- a kind of fictitious entity, feigned to express what is supposed to be permanent in a man's mind, PML XI.1
A man's - is inferred from the motives of a number of single acts, PML XI.4
A man's - may be bad if the effects are bad, even though his motives be innocent or unconscious, PML XI.5, 7n
- is the sum of a man's intentions, PML XI.27
- indicate only the probability of future actions of the same kind, PML XI.4
- which anyone has to feel such or such a quantity of pl or pn, in particular cases, is what is termed the quantum of his sensibility, PML VI.2
- may be called "bad" when action produces bad consequences, Box 27 p.53b
- express moral differences between individuals, while motives are universally the same, Box 27 p.55
Sympathy, the - to find Pl in the happiness of others and to share their pl, Principles of Leg. p.36
Habits, power of example, continue to dictate behaviour long after the principle on which they were founded ceases to exist, Principles of Leg. p.42

9. E M O T I O N

-s of body are received as probable indications of temperature of mind, PML VI.33
An act is the result of an - , when the motive by which it is produced is a pl or pn considered as transient, X.569
- is evanescent passion; passion is intense - , Deon.I.263

10. E N T I T Y

Any subject matter of discourse, designated by a noun-substantive, an - , VIII.195 either physical or psychical, VIII.267
- either perceptible or inferential, VIII.195
- either real or fictitious, VIII.195
Perceptible real - , an entity whose existence is made known by the immediate testimony of the senses, VIII.195 It is a body, not a substance, VIII.195 + n.
Inferential - , produced in the mind by reflection or from a chain of reasoning, VIII.195 Either a human inferential - , (e.g. human soul), or superhuman inferential - , (i.e. God), VIII.196
Real - , an - to which existence is really meant to be ascribed, VIII.196
Perceptible real -s include individual perceptions of all sorts, VIII.196 Ideas sole perceptible - , VIII.196 Corporeal substances no other than inferential, VIII.196 But inference from perceptions to existence of corporeal - (or bodies) much stronger than from perceptible - to incorporeal - , VIII.197
Only immediately perceptible - , Pl & Pn; all other - inferential, Box 14 p.27. Division of - into real & fictitious, from D'Alembert, III.286

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11. E X I S T E N C E

No just reason for regarding solidity and permanence as qualities belonging to the essence of reality, VIII.196
Only by the evidence of perceptions can the reality of bodies of any kind be established, VIII.196
- of ideas more immediate than that of corporeal substance, VIII.196
Inference from perceptions to existence of corporeal entities much stronger than that from corporeal entities to - of incorporeal substances, VIII.197
Pain bears witness against those whose suppose non-existence of corporeal substances, VIII.197

No value in searching out origins of belief in non-existence of bodies, VIII.197n

- first ascribed to real entities in the earliest stage of human intercourse by a natural propensity, viz. that of attributing reality to every object designated by words, VIII.199
- a fictitious entity, VIII.203, VIII.210
- the most extensively applicable quality, VIII.210
The quality remaining when all others have been abstracted from entities, VIII.210
- predicable of all entities except non-existence, VIII.210
- the genus generalissimum, formed by abstraction, and constituting the head of the Porphyrian Tree, VIII.257
Synonyms, being, entity, VIII.257
No state of things can have been in - but in some place and time; though - may on occasion be described without these adjuncts, VIII.187
- is a fictitious entity present in every real entity, VIII.210
- of species depends on predominance of private to public interest, and survival also of individuals, II.475
- of Pleasure more immediately evident than that of body or mind where it has its seat, Box 14 p.27
- of real entities inferred from sensations, the only subjects of experience, Box 14, p.27
- of objects proved by the pains arising from ignoring them, VIII.197

12. E X P E C T A T I O N (APPREHENSION, PROSPECT)

Desires have place when there is an - of pl, VIII.280
It is the - of pl and pn which in every case determines the will, VIII.289
Pls of - are those where pls of imagination are accompanied by a judgment or persuasion of the future realisation of the picture so composed, I.207
- synonym of hope and prospect, I.208
- of pl and pn informs all motives, I.211
Only - of eventual enjoyment of pl can operate as a motive, I.215
Motive is the idea or - of good or evil in action, VI.257
- of an event is the persuasion, more or less strong, of its probability, VII.567
Hope is the - of good (pleasure); fear, the - of evil (pain), VII.567
Goodness of laws depends on their conformity to general - , I.322
The bent of a man's inclinations depends upon the - of pl and pn he has from certain objects, rather than from others, PML VI.15
A man's wants depend partly on the strength of his - , PML VI.25
- may be an internal motive, (i.e. of pl or exemption), PML X.5
For a man's - to be governed by a motive, he must expect certain consequences, PML X.6
A motive must be the - of some pl, or other advantage, to be enjoyed in the future, PML XII.7

13. FACULTIES AND POWERS

- all fictitious entities, VIII.196
Mind can perceive diversity or identity as a relation between perceptions, VIII.203
The mind has motions (mental operations) which are semi-real entities; but the notion of "faculties" correspondent to them is a fictitious entity, VIII.223
- an object altogether void of real existence, VIII.224
- the name of a fictitious object framed to exhibit the imaginary cause of some real event, VIII.224

Mental Operations:

I. Operations in which the subject is regarded singly and entirely, e.g. perception, conception, apprehension, attention.
II. Operations in which the subject is considered with regard to past time, e.g. Remembrance, Retention, Recalling, or revocation to Memory.
III. Operations in which more than one object or subject are present to the mind, e.g. Judgment, Decision, Determination, Comparison, Examination.
IV. Operations in which the mind decomposes and recomposes perceptions presented to it in a group, e.g. Abstraction, Imagination, Invention.
V. Operations when a number of objects are present simultaneously to the mind, e.g. Designation (when name and object are linked), Denomination (tne presence of a number of objects and a class name), Methodisation and Arrangement (Classification).
VI. Operations by which ideas are transferred, through the operations of Designation and Expression, to other minds. (through signs, language - both visible and audible), touch, VIII.224-229

All faculties either passive or active, VIII.229
Two - constitute whole structure of mind, VIII.279; perceptive - has all mental experience, appetitive - all mental operations, VIII.279
Volitional - is that in which desire has place, VIII.279

Seventeen mental - , (Perception, Judgment, Memory, Deduction, Abstraction, Imagination, Invention, Methodisation, Attention, Observation, Communication, Comparison, Synthesis, Generalisation, Induction, Analysis, Distribution, VIII.281-2; VIII.74-6).

Power may be defined as the faculty of giving determination either to the state of the passive faculties, or to that of the active faculties, of a subject, III.222
Passive - either sensitive or insensitive, III.223 (if former, subject is animal)
State of active or passive - may be declared in discourse, VIII.299
Pl and pn the bond of union and channel of communication between the perceptive - and the volitional - , VIII.280
- divided by Bentham into perceptive and appetitive (VIII.229) or intellectual and volitional (I.196ff). (cf. Hobbes's division into cognitive and motive powers, and Hume's division between understanding and passions)
- an object manifestly void of real existence, VIII.224
- a fictitious entity, VIII.224

14. F I C T I T I O U S E N T I T I E S

Faculties, powers of the mind, all - , VIII.196
- is an entity to which existence is ascribed in the forms of grammatical discourse, but to which in reality existence is not meant to be ascribed, VIII.197
- are all noun-substantives whic are not real entities, VIII.197

Every - bears a relation to a real entity, and can only thus be understood, VIII.197

A - may be of 1st remove, when it may be conceived of solely by its relation to a real entity, (e.g. "motion" and "rest" as predicates of bodies), VIII.197. A - may be of 2nd remove when it may be conceived of only by taking into consideration a - of the 1st remove (e.g. qualities of - of 1st remove, such as slowness, quickness, rectilinearity as qualities of motion), VIII.197

- owe their existence to language, VIII.198
- must be spoken of as existing for the purpose of discourse, VIII.198

Differ from non-entities (e.g. the Devil), VIII.198

What is predicated of - is predicated, in strict truth, only of their respective names, VIII.199.
- properly labelled "name of a fictitious entity", but this is not convenient, VIII.199

Fictions of <u>logical</u> discourse must not be condemned like poetical, legal or religious fictions, VIII.199. They are aids to human converse, VIII.199

Physical - in Bentham's list are the same as Aristotle's 10 Predicaments, with the exception of substance, VIII.199. They are (1) Quantity, (2) Quality, (3) Place, (4) Time, (5) Motion, (6) Rest, (7) Action, (8) Passion, (9) Relation, (10) Substance, VIII.199

These terms are all expressive of either the nature of body (1 + 2) or of its disposition (3 - 9). Matter and form - , VIII.201; matter is a - relating to substance, a real entity, VIII.201

Absolute - of the 2nd Order, VIII.202. These may be qualities of quantities, or modifications of qualities, VIII.202. They include "goodness" and "badness", understood in terms of pl and pn, VIII.203

Synonyms to "quality" include Nature, Sort, Kind, Mode, Complexion, Description, Character and Shape, VIII.203

Bentham uncertain whether "subject" and "object" in physical actions are names of - , though he is certain they are in the case of psychical action, VIII.206

Memory is a - , a kind of receptacle for past perceptions, VIII.224-5

Aristotelians ascribed real existence to many objects which are in fact - , VIII.238-9

Source of ethical - , (e.g. obligations, rights), sensation, VIII.197 (where sensation = perception considered as productive of pl or pn).
- are used in discourse as though they named substances or real entities, VIII.262-3
- indispensable in allowing men to describe what passes in the mind, VIII.199

15. HUMAN NATURE

"All-comprehensive aggregates" such as kingdom, class, order, genus, species, varieties (and, by analogy, human nature) belong to the class of fictitious entities, VIII.206
These may in turn be divided into lesser aggregates, VIII.206
(NB connection between "man" as a class and "human nature", expressing his contingent qualities of behaviour).

Well-being the end of action not only for man, but for every sensitive being, VIII.222
"By the observation of the properties which are possessed by all men... the aggregate idea expressed by the word man will have been formed", VIII.256 (by abstraction, VIII.256)
Animals observed to differ from vegetable life by act of respiration, VIII.257
Man a rational animal, VIII.268

Men behave most often acc. to Principle of Utility "by the natural constitution of the human frame", PML I.12
There exists a primeval and constant source of sympathy in - , PML VI.27
All men calculate, PML XIV.28

Bentham did not make - what it is, Box 70a, p.59
From very constitution of - , man prefers his own interest to that of others; without it, the species could not have had existence, X.80-81
Equal causes of pl and pn produce different effects in different people, Box 14 p.4
Man will continue to aim at happiness so long as he lives, Comment on the Commentaries (1928 ed.) p.84

q.v. NATURE and PLEASURE & PAIN; cf. LOCKE: "Men have an inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness" (Essay II.xxi.52)

16. INTENTION

Out of the reach of direct observation, VIII.210
In calculating likely effects of our -s, the mind is ensnared by several sources of illusion, VIII.210
- proper subjects of judgments "good" or "bad", I.216, (not motives, I.216-7), in respect of the consequences intended.
- may appear in the character of a motive, PML VI.4a
Disposition is the sum of a man's - , PML XI.27
- caused by motives, PML VIII.13, PML X.33, PML XI.28, PML XII.1
- in regard to consequences of acts depends on 1. state of will or intention in regard to act itself; 2. state of understanding, or perceptive faculties, with regard to circumstances with which the act appears to be accompanied, PML VII.5
- , or elements of calculation of psychical class, out of reach of observation, VIII.210
- may take place when the perceptive faculty is conscious, unconscious, or falsely conscious of the circumstances which accompany it, PML VII.5

SEE Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780-9) ch.7

17. I N T E R E S T

- , i.e. desire of pl and of exemption from pn, is the source of every thought as well as the cause of every action, VIII.203
- is the cause, specifically, of every action in which names designate persons and things, names plainly expressing the relation of either pl or pn to a man's interest, VIII.203
Unless... it means conducive to a man's well-being, to the maximisation of the aggregate mass of pl, .. the word "interesting" is devoid of meaning, VIII.290
A subject is of - to a man when it is considered as more or less likely to be a source of pl to him, I.207
A man has an - in performing an act when he considers that pl will be possessed as a result of it, or greater than he already has, I.207
No human act can ever strictly be disinterested, I.211-12, because all voluntary acts are informed by motives and these by interests, I.212
It is occasionally possible that an act may be free of self-regarding - , I.212 All men dominated by - , I.212, although actions can still be distinguished acc. to merit, I.212
Benevolence and sympathy are modes of - , I.212
Whatsoever is done or said is the result of - , I.212
No species of desire and - exists which is not frustrated in its attainment by the desires and -s of other men, I.213
Self-regarding -s are those which are neither social nor dissocial, I.216
Destroy self-regarding - , the whole race perishes, the thread of human life is cut, I.216
- cannot be properly be described as "good" or "bad", I.217

Correspondent to every species of motive, is a modification of - , VI.257
A Motive is an - in a state of action (i.e. on a given occasion actually exerting its influence on the mind of an individual), VI.257
- is a motive considered in an abstract point of view, viz. as possessing the faculty if being called into action, but without presenting to view any particular occasion, VI.257
A man has an - in doing x when he is urged by the force of some motive to do it, VI.257
- corresponding to self-regarding are those most commonly in view, VI.257n, but dissocial and social - exists, e.g. in the prosperity of mankind, my country, my profession, my party, my friend, VI.257n
To say "x is my - " points not only to that good, but to the general effect of that event upon my well-being, VI.257

Strongest -s are those which arise out of pls of taste, sexual appetite, wealth, power, reputation, ease, novelty, religious sanction, sympathy and antipathy, and from the pns of death, injury, poverty, disgrace, labour, religious sanction, sympathy and antipathy, VII.567

→ a word having no superior genus, which cannot therefore be defined, PML I.5n
A thing is in the - of an individual when it tends to add to the sum total of his pls, or diminish his pns, PML I.5n.
Clues to men's likely behaviour can be learned from reference to their - , IV.494-5, V.526

That men's actions are guided by their - , "be the class or body of public men to which a man belongs what it may, - of public men, not to speak of other men, - for a clue to his conduct, which ought to be expected at his hands, this is what, in one of my lately published

works has been ventured to be proposed in the character of an universal rule", IV.495
(Bentham admits that there may "appear" to be exceptions, but the question is, "not how it will be in regard to a few individuals, but how it will be in regard to the majority"). Papers on Codification, 1817. reference to "Plan of Parliamentary Reform", 1817.

- sole clue to political conduct, III.526, both of individuals and of bodies; and also sole clue to nature of moral conduct, III.526
- "those springs of action, on the predominant force and efficiency of which the preservation of every individual is every day of his life dependent", III.526
Reason can never overcome force of - , III.507, esp. among legislators.
Mind of all public men subject to influence of public and private - , II.475
Never has public - been put before private - , or ever can be, II.475
This is "a natural and general predominance", II.475 (though "a supposition", Bentham qualifies carefully).

- among the earliest feelings to which speech could give existence, VIII.203
Sinister - , understand self-conscious sinister - , I.217
Synonyms, affections and passions, II.474
Only through - can a legislator effect his purposes, II.474; he cannot rely simply on men with social motives.
In general tenor of life, self-regarding - is predominant over all other - put together, IX.5 This is an axiom, IX.5
Proof: continued existence of species: if men relied on others to ensure their survival, they would be dead and extinct. They are not; ergo they seek their own - , IX.6
- , that is, motive, produces every act of the will, II.477

The only - which a man at all times and on all occasions will find adequate motives for consulting, are his own, PML XVII.7
Happiness substituted for word - , IX.6
A man's - is to guarantee the pl of others to ensure his own, IX.7
"When, from the introduction of a measure, a man beholds the prospect of personal advantage to himself, .. it is certain that the contemplation of this advantage must have had some share in causing the conduct he pursues... it may have been the only cause", II.416

The sacrifice of self-regarding - to social - , less frequent than insanity, IX.61
- of men in being happy not diminished by behaviour of governments, Box 146 p.85
State of - determines state of affections, and state of opinion, Box 160 p.407
Self-regarding - predominant under every form of government, and universal - perpetually sacrificed to particular - , Box 128 p.235 (1818)
Masses ignorant of their real - , and therefore apathetic, Box 61 pp.2-8
- the clue to the constitution of the human mind, Deon.I.101
- the common master of all spirits, and esp. of the enlightened, Deon.I.101
On most or all occasions, a man has an - in accommodating his own self-regarding - to the self-regarding - of others, Box 14, p.139
Self-regarding - and other-regarding - act in alliance, Box 14,p.139, in the enlightened man, although Nature has planted competition between the two, Box 14 p.139

- created by power of popular or moral sanction, love of reputation, Box 14, p.141

Reputation is proportionate to the regard a man appears to have for the - of others, Box 14, p.141
To have an - , is to be concerned to act, Box 70a p.3
- "a concernment", Box 70a p.3 margin
- either Pl or pn, Box 70a p.4
Interesting perceptions, celles dont nous desirons ou la duree ou la fin, Principes I.19
Dominance of self-regarding - , is shown by everything which is done, despite everything which is said, IX.61
Men act in pursuit of what they consider to be their - , qu. Stark III.422

cf. HELVETIUS: Personal interests alone dictate our morality and judgments, De L'Esprit p.38
cf. J.S. MILL'S criticism of "the interest-philosophy of the Bentham school", which he identifies with "the geometrical, or abstract, method", which supposes that a social phenomenon "results always from only one force, one single property of human nature".

18. M I N D

Of nothing that has place in our - can we speak except as if it were a portion of space, with portions of matter, some of them at rest, others moving in it, VIII.299 These are fictitious entities, VIII.299

- can perceive diversity and identity between perceptions, VIII.203
Whole structure of - has two faculties, perceptive and appetitive, VIII.279
Every operation of - and body result of exercise of will, VIII.279
- may be active or passive, (acc. to whether the will is operativ or not) in the production of the events of which it is the scene, VIII.289
A man's person consists of two reputed parts, body and - , PML XVI.33
The soul is one indivisible thing (unlike the body), PML VI.23
Emotions of body are received as probable indications of the temperature of -, PML VI.33
All operations of the - and body are produced by desires, VIII.279
Firmness of - influences sensibility, PML VI. passim, esp.13
Strength of intellectual powers corresponds to strength of body, PML VI.12
Insanity of - corresponds to bodily imperfections, PML VI.23

Mind is not the same entity in every man, PML VI.29
- different nature from rest of body, even if regarded as same substance, PML VI.30n
Circumstances of - which affect pl and pn are affections and understanding, PML VI.46
Act of the - is either of intellectual faculty or of will, PML X.2
What is permanent in a state of - is a disposition, PML XI.1
Pains of - are either of sufferance or apprehension, PML XVI.33
All that the - contains are desire, perception and the judicial faculty, VIII.321

Phenomena of the human - , the same all over the world, esp. in Europe, Box 27, p.66
Acts of the - exhibit no motion, Box 14 p.12
Acts of the body put an image in the - of he who considers them, Box 14 p.12
Objects affect the - not acc. to what they are in themselves, but acc. to the ideas they produce in the - , Box 14, p.7
(cf. seeing a wax apple and desiring it as if it were real).
Existence of pl more real than of body or of - , Box 14 p.27

cf. HELVETIUS: Nature presents objects to us, which have relations both with regard to themselves and to us; the knowledge of those relations constitutes what we call the - , De L'Esprit p.8

19. M O T I O N

In the idea of - , the idea of a moving body is necessarily implied. VIII.207, VIII.128
- of bodies in space is action, irrespective of whether it is acting on any other body, VIII.235

- , "when predicated of any being, is a physical fact: true, it is an attribute of animate beings, but not in virtue of those qualities which constitute the animate, since it is equally an attribute of in-animate ones.
"But if to the word - , we add the word voluntary, we then introduce, over and above the physical fact of the motion, another fact; viz. an exertion of the will, considered as preceding and causing the motion. This last fact is a psychological fact; since it is not capable of having its seat in any other than animate beings". VI.216

By an event, is meant some - , considered as actually having come about in the course of nature, VI.217 (I.e. without human will behind it)
" - " may be used to describe workings inside the mind as well as outside, even though those workings cannot be observed, VI.217
- is the state in which every body is and is likely to continue in, VIII.130
Positive acts consist in - or exertion; negative... in rest, PML VII.8
Transitive acts, those that convey - from one body to another (cf. intransitive), PML VII.13

Three articles in - always to be considered, 1. the quantity of matter that moves; 2. the direction in which it moves; 3. the velocity with which it moves, PML VIII.5n
An object may bear an <u>active</u> relation to a man's pl, by - on his sense, PML XVI.11n

A physical fictitious entity , VIII.204
- may be exhibited only by showing the relative different positions of bodies to time and space, VIII.204
- inseparably involved in relations of cause and effect, VIII.207
By direction given to matter in a state of - , is mechanical power produced, VIII.286
- has its origins either in volition or attraction and repulsion (cf. Newton), VIII.287
Sources of - , VIII.128-148 (incl. mechanical, electric, etc.)

- in animals, when generated by will, is found to be produced by a shortening of a mass of muscular fibres, VIII.134

20. M O T I V E

A desire is a - when it has produced, or is expected to produce, pl, VIII.280
- are Springs of Action, considerations acting immediately upon the will, I.205
Pl can act as a - only through the medium of imagination, I.207, where a pl recalled by imagination is accompanied by a judgment or persuasion of the future realisation of the picture so composed - viz. expectation), I.207
Synonyms, inducement, incitement, incentive, I.208
- to the will, a desire operating as a - , I.208; - to the understanding, a consideration which increases the efficiency of a desire as a - to the will, I.208
Any desire which promises to be contributory to the attainment of the end of action, viz. pl or exemption, is a - , I.208
(No word exists, says Bentham, for - which restrain action in the interests of pl, I.208). (cf. "Inhibition", J.F. Herbart, 1816)
Basis of - is the eventual expectation of pl and pn, I.211
Varying assessments of - by public opinion, and varying appellatives for them discussed, I.212-214
Reasons for approbation and disapprobation given, I.212-14
Only the expectation of eventual enjoyment of pl can operate in the character of a - , I.215; therefore -
No such thing as good or bad - , only consequences, I.215
Practical consequence of approving only good -s, governmental chaos (for "bad" motives must be harnessed), I.215
Men seldom influenced by one - alone, I.218
An action is always the result of the strongest single or group of - , I.218
Names of - are often names of passions, appetites and affections, PML X.26n
- or cause of act distinguished from ground of approbation of it, PML II.19
No action ever performed with out a - , VI.242

Efficient causes of actions are - , VI.256
- is the idea or expectation of good or evil... from a mode of action, VI.257
No word exists for - producing inaction or rest (now inhibition), VI.257
There exists a - correspondent to every species of pl or pn, VI.257
Correspondent to every species of - , is a modification of interest, VI.257
- is an interest in a state of action (i.e. actually exerting its influence on the mind of an individual at a given moment), VI.257
While an interest is a - considered in an abstract point of view, i.e. possessing the faculty of being called into action, but without presenting any particular occasion, a - designates an object which points no further than to the particular good which is considered as being in view, VI.257
By reference to pl and pn, the word - receives clear meaning, VI.257
So many distinguishable sorts of pl and pn, so many distinguishable - , VI.257

For a man to be governed by a - , he must expect certain consequences, PML X.6
A - must be the prospect of some pl, or other advantage, to be enjoyed in the future, PML XII.7

-s correspondent to the several species of pl and pn, I.197-206 and have no other basis, I.211 122
- not so perceptible in acts of the intellectual faculty, II.477
How can a man not know his -? II.477-8 It is often the case that we know the - of others better than we do our own, II.478 (Why? Interest tells us to know more about the - of those on whom our happiness depends than about our own - . an investigation which brings us no enjoyment, more likely mortification, II.478. The mortification arises because we are appalled at the predominance of self-regarding - , II.478).

- or cause of an act differs from the ground of approving it, PML II.19
- is a prospect of some pl or of security from some pn, PML V.33
- is always some pl which the act in question is expected to be a means of continuing or producing, PML X.9
Bentham's endeavour to produce a complete catalogue of human - , and to show them to be founded on the expectation of pl and pn, PML X.13n, PML X.14-15
- whose influence is most powerful, most constant, most extensive, are those of physical desire, love of wealth, ease and life, and the fear of pain: all of them self-regarding - , PML XII.33
- may be the same as intention, PML VI.4a
- is the cause of intention, PML VIII.13, X.33, XI.28, XII.1
A man may be governed by a - only when he looks to the consequences of an act, PML X.6
- may refer both to expected pl or pn and to the pl or pn actual upon looking to pl or pn in the future, PML X.6
- may be impelling or restraining vis-avis action, PML X.43
cf. - and intention as good and bad, PML IX.14-15
- which influence the production only of intellectual acts, are speculative, PML X.2
- of the understanding are REASONS FOR ACTIONS; but Bentham has interest in them only insofar as they are considerations which influence the WILL to action, PML X.8
- whose influence terminates in the understanding, are speculative, and Bentham has no interest in them, PML X.8
- in its most extensive sense, anything that can give birth to an action, PML X.2
- denotes both really existing incidents which give birth to action and also fictitious entities such as passions or affections in the mind, (avarice, benevolence etc.); these are unfigurative and figurative - , PML X.4
- substantially nothing more than a pl or pn acting in a certain manner, PML X.9
- applying to practice (i.e. influencing the will, as opp. to the understanding only), are practical motives, PML X.3
Any object likely to produce pl may serve as a - , PML X.8
- which are real incidents, are of two different kinds. 1. an internal perception of likely pl or pn, which will determine an action - e.g. the pleasure of going to the races and winning money; 2. an external event, which has a likelihood of bringing about such internal perception of pl, e.g. the coming up of a lottery ticket, PML X.5
- which stands nearest to act is the internal - in esse which consists in the expectation of the internal - in prospect, PML X.7 This is an immediate - ; all others are remote, PML X.7
Pointing out - to the understanding is giving reasons for a possible action, PML X.8

The only interests a man always has adequate - for consulting, are his own, PML XVII.7
To understand what - means, we must look to pl and pn, VII.393
Not all species of pl and pn can serve as a - , VII.393
To understand what - means, we must look to hope (expectation of pl) and fear (of pain), VII.393
- are causes of psychological motion and rest, VII.393
Different - produced by different kinds of pl PML X.12
No man can be inclined, on all occasions, to promote your happiness more than you, and no-one can know as well as you what your pl is, PML XVI.44
Goodness or badness of - generally depends on their tendency to produce pl or pn (this is why antipathy is a bad motive generally, although on occasion it may have good effects) PML II.19
Actions may be often the result of other - than utility, PML II.19
- a kind of fictitious entity, a kind of passion (quality, disposition) or propensity in the mind, Box 27 p.25
- is some expected good, viz. some pl or the avoidance of some pn, Box 27 p.25c
- are universally the same in men; dispositions express their moral differences, Box 27 p.55
The same - attract and repel in one family and in 1000, in convent and cottage, Box 27 p.154
Nothing but the eventual enjoyment of pl can act as a - , I.215
All - are abstractedly good, Deon.I.126
No man has, ever had, can, or could have, a different - from the pursuit of pl or the shunning of pn, Deon.I.126
When men act, it must be - that is their motive, Box 14 p.5
An idea must be present to the mind at the very moment of action to serve as a - and produce an effect, Box 14 p.204
- of which they are not conscious may determine the behaviour, not only of individuals, but of all mankind, for many ages, Box 70a p.22
No - bad, Box 158 p.107
- , or elements of psychical calculation, out of reach of observation, VIII.209

21. N A T U R E

Differences of - commonly inferred from differences of name, VIII.239
- a fictitious personage, VIII.125n
- does not do man's work, but her own, viz. making minerals, animals and vegetables, VIII.125n

"Whenever you are bid to see Nature doing man's work, be sure that it is not Nature that is doing it, but the author, or somebody else that he patronises, and whom he has dressed up for the purpose in the goddess's robes". VIII.125n
(cf. Natural Rights, Natural Justice, etc)

Conformity in a group of facts is a quality discerned in our own minds; but men often proceed from discerning a conformity of effect to that of cause, and speak of a law of - ; without realising that the conformity itself expresses a law, VII.83n

"The sort of events, the conformity among which this term (law) has hitherto been employed to designate, are human actions. The sort of events of which we are now looking out for the cause, are not human actions, but natural events...
"If it were fully understood, that a law of - signifies not an occult cause of conformity among facts, but merely the conformity itself, the phrase mignt be employed in this sense without danger of confusion", VII.83n

- has placed mankind under governance of pn and pl, PML I.1
Without a clear view of the - and connections of the objects being treated, Bentham was walking in darkness, Box 27, p.131
If pl be the intense, sole and constant object of pursuit, from the very constitution of our - , ... Box 149 p.363

- of objects can be known only in terms of relations to other objects, I.206 (i.e. there is no knowledge of essences).
Objects with similar names do not necessarily share similar - , II.450
Part of man's very - to think first about - , Deon.I.101

By the principle of self-preference, understand that propensity in human - , by which, on the occasion of every act that he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness, whatsoever be the effect of it, in relation to the happiness of similar beings. IX.5

22. O U G H T

In the word Deontology is comprehended the knowledge... of the course by which, on each occasion, ... means... conducive to (the) common end (may be set out), VIII.289

(the common end: eudaemonics, or the art of applying life to the maximisation of well-being).

- , meaning of the word to be decided acc. to the Principle of Utility, PML I.10
What men - to do shall be governed only by pl and pn, PML I.1
" - " at best the expression of an opinion, a covering for despotic, unsupported assertion, Box 149 p.364

23. P A S S I O N

Related to emotion, affection (q.v.) and humour, X.510
- is a state of mind transient or permanent, in which the emotion (a state of pl or pn) or affection is regarded as being in a high degree of intensity, X.510
Desires, when to a certain degree strong, are termed - , VI.217
Synonyms, affections, interest, II.474
- may be figurative motives, PML X.4
No action is without - , VIII.210; they are inseparable.
Names of - frequently names of motives, PML X.26 + n.
- calculates more or less in every man; most of all, the passion that corresponds to the motive of pecuniary interest, PML XIV.28
Moral pathology consists in knowledge of the - , I.304
- is intense emotion; emotion is evanescent - , Deon.I.263
Nature of - can be understood only by their division into different heads of pl and pn, Deon.I.263
Reason, applied to the government of the - , is the making the scale turn in favour of a greater pl in preference to a less, Deon.I.268
Reason inefficacious against - because it cannot raise up ima lively enough, Deon.I.268
- defeats reason because 1. distant pls promised by reason lack vivacity; 2. distant pls less certain, Deon.I.268-9
- may generate pernicious action, Deon.I.268-9
- appeals to that which is, intellectual faculties bring what will be into thought, Deon.I.271

cf. LOCKE: "Aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame etc. have each their uneasiness too, and thereby influence the will. These passions are scarce any of them, in life and practice, simple and alone, ... scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it".
Essay II.xxi

see DESIRE q.v.

24. P E R C E P T I O N

Only - can establish the reality of a body of any kind, VIII.196
Our - of ideas more immediate than that of corporeal substances, VIII.196
-s real psychological entities, VIII.202 Diversity and identity of - perceptible to the mind, VIII.203

- generally accompanied by an act of the judgment faculty, VIII.224
- either pathematic or apathematic, VIII.279, either judgment-involving or judgment-not-involving, VIII.279
- not attended by pl or pn have no claim to attention, VIII.289
- not capable of erring, though the judgment faculty is, VIII.320

Reality of beings not attested by - , VIII.196 (only by inference)
Relation of perceptive faculties to action, PML I.9 passim (Consciousness)
- , attention, judgment, memory, these are the sources of discourse at large, VI.18
- a mental operation of logic, VIII.224; when - has place, impressions are made on sense; of the - thus obtained, these impressions are the immediate object and subject, VIII.224; the body itself is but in a secondary and comparatively remote way the object or subject of - , VIII.224
At the time of - , the mind may be passive or active in relation to it; if passive, then the - is simply the work of the perceptive or intellectual faculty; if active, then the will or volitional faculty finally takes part in its production, VIII.224

- may be rendered faint or indistinct by old age, VI.251
Can - be deceived? No, only judgment, VI.251 (see SENSATION q.v.)
Blind men who have sight restored at mature age perceive all objects as equally near, VI.251n
Grounds of intellectual weakness in - and sensation and judgment, VI.251-5
Impressions of sight and hearing, defined, VI.251
Pls and pns are interesting - , PML V.1, either simple (single) or complex
- divisible into original and derived (memory), PML V.12
Internal - of pl and pn is a motive, PML X.5
Men believe more propositions on trust than on - , Deon.I.277-8
Pl and pn only immediately perceptible entities, Box 14 p.27
All sensations are - , Box 70a p.55 (c.1773)
All - depend upon the body, for it is at the body only that they can come in, Box 70a p.55
Original pl and pn, accompaniments or results of - , Box 158 p.72
Interesting - , celles dont nous desirons ou la duree ou la fin, Principes de Legislation (1819) I.19

NB HUME'S reservation of perception to refer to any content of the mind, and all actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, thinking, are so called, Treatise III.1.1

25. P E R S O N (& SELF)

- subject of logic and knowledge, VIII.233
Of discourse, the only immediate subject is the state of the communicator's mind, (in other words, of some one or more of the faculties belonging to it), VIII.299
A man's - composed of two reputed parts (1823 add.), body and mind, PML XVI.33
Impressions are the immediate object and subject of perceptions; the body itself is but in a secondary and comparatively remote way the object or subject of perception, VIII.224
Subjects of perception vary individually in sensibility, PML VI.passim
A man's pleasure depends 1. on his own - ; 2. upon exterior things around him, PML XXVI.11
Man described as a real entity, VIII.327
Concept of identity (and relation) a fictitious entity, VIII.203

26. P R I N C I P L E S

An axiom is a sort of rule, whose properties are 1. incontestableness, 2. comprehensiveness, 3. clearness, III.215
Axioms of mental pathology enunciate facts about sensations being produced by certain states of things or events, operating as their efficient causes, III.215
- and rules intimately connected, III.214-5
- no more than a single term, an abridgement of a rule, III.215
- refers to anything which constitutes the foundation or beginning of a series of operations, PML I.2n
- are reasons for laws, PML preface
- are "fictitious motives", i.e. a kind of quality, disposition, passion or propensity in the mind which stimulates action, Box 27 p.55a-b (cf. PML X.4)
- have motives to which they correspond, Box 27 p.55 c-d
(cf. motives and corresponding interests, I.196-204; to pl of possession, - of lucre; to pl or revenge, - of anger, etc.)

- a kind of fictitious entity, the operation of which is considered as disposing a man's conduct to be governed by the motive correspondent to such -, Box 27 p.25c-d
Example, a man's conduct originates from - of revenge and motive of anger, Box 27, p.110
Minutest positions in Bentham's system deduced as consequences from general - , Box 27 p.110
A man of - , he who lays down to himself a rule of action and conforms constantly and steadily to it, Box 14 p.189

27. PLEASURE AND PAIN

Pn evidence of the existence of corporeal substance, VIII.197. Pl the ultimate object of human action, VIII.205 Well-being the end of every action not only for man, but for every sensitive creature, VIII.222, composed of balance of pl over pn, VIII.222.
Well-being "the universal end", VIII.231 Happiness the object of the disciplines of art and science, VIII.240, and of logic, VIII.241
Pn is equivalent to loss or pl; pl is equivalent to exemption from pn, VIII.247 Pl and pn "different and opposite modes of sensation" VIII.247
Pl object of desire, VIII.279 Pl of apples "their supposed agreeableness", VIII.279 Pl the absence of uneasiness, VIII.279-80
Pn accompanies unsatisfied desires, VIII 280 A desire for pl in an action expected to produce it is a motive, VIII.280 Idea of pl essential to forming a desire, VIII.280

Pls considered in themselves belong to perceptive faculty; considered as desires and motives producing volition and action, belong to appetitive faculty, VIII.280
- only objects possessed of intrinsic and independent value, VIII.289.
- generally experienced concomitantly with perceptions, VIII.289
Sensation of pl = enjoyment, VIII.289
Will determined in every case by the eventual expectation of pl, VIII.289
Pls stand everywhere in the character of ends, I.205
Synonyms to pl given, I.205-6
Value of pl, I.206 Dimensions of value applicable also to reward, punishment and compensation, I.206 Pl = good, pn = evil, I.206
The ground of happiness, justice, duty, obligation, virtue = pl, I.206
Pl operates as a spring of action when action is regarded as a means of obtaining it, I.206 Some pls, however, inert, e.g. recollection, imagination, I.206
Original pls, those immediate to perception, I.207 Derivative pls, those derived from past perception, I.207
Pls apply themselves first as ideas to the will I.207 and these are either conclusive or not (i.e. apply next to the understanding) I.207
-s acquire bad names (dyslogistic appellatives) on account of their pn-producing, accidental effects of particular actions, I.209
Not all types of pl have equal numbers of bad names, varying acc. to the weight of censure upon them, I.210

Every man knows best what conduct is conducive to his well-being, Box 14 p.143
Concerning what is Pl and what pn, mankind pretty well agreed. Box 14 p.9
No-one disposed to doubt that Pl and pn are real entities, Box 14 p.27
Existence of Pl more immediately evident than body and mind, Box 14 p.27
- only immediately perceptible entities, Box 14 p.27
- have their seats in body and mind, Box 14 p.27
Well-being differs from happiness, in being the balance of Pl and pn rather than the total absence of pn, Box 14 p.35
Most men in possession of well-being, but not of happiness, Box 14 p.35
Well-being the end of action and constant object of pursuit, Box 14 p.44
Personal pl the sole object of pursuit, Box 14 p.44; bestowing pl on my friend is bestowing pl on me, Box 14 p.45
Every man the sole judge of what to him is pl, Box 14 p.49
Pls ingredients of happiness, Box 14 p.216
Connection between acts as causes and -s as effects, a matter of experience, Box 14 p.132

Animals suffer only pn of sensibility, not of anticipation, PML XVII.4n
- foundations and roots of several species of psychological entity, I.211
- existence of, is known by constant and universal experience, I.211
Pl in itself (devoid of painful consequences) purely good, pn purely evil, I.214-5, I.217
Sense of duty = fear of pn which is likely in the event of its neglect, I.219
Differing frames of body mean that each man is affected by - differently, PML VI.28
Whatever pls excited evil at once by same cause, are same pl, PML III.1
Happiness consists of enjoyment of pls, security from pns, PML VII.1
Only - good or bad in se, PML VII.21
There exists a motive correspondent to every species of pl, VI.257
So many distinguishable sorts of pl, so many distinguishable sorts of motive, VI.258
Insofar as actions produce pls, they are good, even in the instance of the most atrocious malefactors, VI.259n

Synonyms of pl, good (which is properly the cause or instrument of pl), profit, convenience, advantage, emolument, benefit, happiness;
of pn, evil, mischief, inconvenience, disadvantage, loss, unhappiness, PML IV.7

An object may bear upon a man's pl, either 1. in an active way, by motion; or 2. in a passive and quiescent way, by being moved to or acted upon, and either 1. immediately (by direct contact with organs of sense) or 2. remotely, involving the intervention of another external object, PML XVI.11n
Some pls are too ethereal to excite an interest, to operate in the character of a motive, VII.393
Pls and pns which <u>can</u> act as motives, enumerated, I.196-205
- the only consequences of laws which interest men, I.238
Happiness aggregate of - , see Helvetius & Hartley. III.286, IV.540
Value of pls compared to money, IV.541
- in which men have strongest interest, VII.567
- in their nearest degrees run into each other indistinguishably, VIII.89n
The source of pn may be inside or outside the body, VIII.89n
The seat of pl is either, in virtue of the whole nervous system taken together, the whole of the bodily frame, or, in a more particular manner, this or that particular organ or other part, VIII.89n
- the source of political fictitious entities, effects and causes, VIII.206
- source of appetitive faculty, originator of all mental operations, VIII.279
- depend upon the enactments of law, X.85
- related to emotion affection passion humour X.509-510
Pl the ultimate end of action, III.214 (where "end" denotes a good, the prospect of eventually experiencing which operates as a motive tending to produce at the hands of any sensitive being, some good which is an object of human desire or hope, III.214).
Pls are either of expectation or enjoyment, PML V.14 + n
On all occasions, the pl of individuals comes into competition with the pl of others, IX.6 Attention to the pl of others is the guarantee of my own highest pl, IX.7
- are interesting perceptions, PML V.1
- both final and efficient causes, PML I.1, PML III.1

Happiness man's end, law his instrument for compassing it, Box 70a p.2
- produced by two types of cause, 1. notional (in which a man has no concern) - e.g. Nature; 2. moral, in which man is concerned, Box 70a p.3
Knowledge that pl attends my own action, available from my feelings, Box 70a p.43
Knowledge that pl attends the actions of others, available from analogy with and observation from external appearances, Box 70a p.43
What pl is, one knows well enough, Box 70a p.45
Nature of pl, to be found by consulting sensation, Box 70a p.45
Pl any sensation a man would rather have at that instant than none, Box 96 p.128
Satisfaction of hunger (want of food) is pl; no-one perverse enough to deny it, Box 70a p.45
Pls of the mind contribute more to happiness throughout life than pls of the body, Box 70a p.48
Pls of the mind founded on pls of the body, Box 70a p.48
(a consequence of Locke's proposition that all ideas originate from the senses, Box 70a p.48)
Pl in eating only possible when desire to eat precedes it, Box 70a p.49
- to exist, must possess intensity and duration, Box 70a p.50
- possess many natures: of body, or mind; of enjoyment, or possession; or of expectation; of concupiscible appetite, or of irascible, Box 70a p.50
Predicates of pl in all instances the same, Box 70a p.50
Constituent of identity in pls, their cause, Box 70a p.51
Original - , accompaniments or results of perception, Box 158 p.72
Elements of value of - , intensity, duration, (together magnitude), certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, extent, Box 161a p.7
Happiness consists of pls of the body and the mind, Box 27 p.101
- sensations VIII.126-7
Pls the bond of union and channel of communication between the perceptive and volitional faculties, VIII.280
Equal causes of pls produce different effects in different people, Box 14 p.4
- produced in men's minds by actions of certain causes, PML VI.1
Pl and happiness referable to men's desires and feelings, not the conclusion of calculation, about a given situation, I.394
- will always be produced by pns, I.194 Perfect happiness a chimera, I.194

No-one can be as sure to be inclined to promote your pl, on all occasions, as yourself, and no-one knows as well as you what your pl is, PML XVI.44
Goods are valuable not for themselves, but for the pl they produce, PML IV.8
Pl is what a man's judgment recognises to himself as such, Box 149 p.358
Pl the intense, constant and sole object of pursuit, from the very constitution of our natures, Box 149 p.363
Value of arts and sciences, exactly in proportion to the pl they yield, Rationale of Reward (1825) p.206
Pushpin as good as poetry, quantity of pl being equal, ibid. p.206
Have different countries different catalogues of - ? No, I.172
Human conduct determined by idea and contemplation of - , III.291
Artless and untutored Nature engages men in pursuit of pl, Deon.I.150
Pls not the only objects of action, but always the cause of action in affecting the will. VIII.238

A31

In - of the body, the - may result immediately from the perception it accompanies; in - of the mind, it can result from the action of an object of sense only by association (with pleasurable perceptions already in the memory), PML XVI.11n
A man's pl depends 1. on his own person, 2. on exterior objects, PML XVI.11
- governs mankind by nature, PML I.1, and serves as a moral standard, PML I.1
Pl to be reprobated only on account of producing greater pn than itself, PML II.4 PML II.9
Pl (and happiness) sole ends a legislator should have in view, PML III.1
Pl's known under other names by ascetics (the honest, glorious etc) PML II.6
Pls differ not in kind, only in circumstances of production, PML III.8
The force of - should be known to legislators, PML IV.1
Any cause of pl is a good, PML IV.6 or a profit, if the pl is distant, PML IV.7
Pls are simple or complex acc. to the cause: where one cause produces a mass of pls, they are apt to be looked on as one pl, PML V.1
Simple (single & irreducible) pls enumerated: sense, wealth, skill, amity, good name, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, and pls dependent on association) + simple pns, PML V.2-3 & passim
- eitner extra-regarding or self-regarding, PML V.32
- are homogeneous real entities, PML VI.6n
Primary pls, those which affect a man's self; secondary, those which affect others, PML VI.26
No man can be so good a judge as the man himself, what it is gives him pl or displeasure, PML XIII.4

28. R E A L E N T I T Y

- an entity to which existence is usually meant to be ascribed, VIII.196
Perceptible real - include impressions, ideas and perceptions of all sorts, VIII.196
Solidity and permanence not criteria of - , VIII.196
Only by the evidence of perceptions can the reality of bodies be established, VIII.196 Reality of ideas more immediate than that of corporeal substances, VIII.196 Substances the only - , VIII.223
Classes of - are fictitious entities, VIII.
Sensations alone are the objects or subjects of experience: it is from them that the existence of - is inferred, Box 14 p.27

29. R E A S O N

Logic is the art of - , VIII.232 Aristotle's logic aimed at acquiring knowledge, Bentham's aims at producing happiness, VIII.232
Experience, observation and experiment the only processes by which real knowledge can be obtained, VIII.233, VIII.238. Logic should be conducive to happiness, VIII.241
- can never overcome force of interest, III.507
A - for an act conveys the idea, supposed or actual, of its addition to the greatest happiness, III.215
- not a mental faculty, rather a word used to express approbation of the use made of other faculties, VIII.76-77
- a word which implies use of the faculty of thinking, and of the right use of it, II.457
Pointing out - is to point out motives respecting the probability of pl or pn from an action, PML X.8
Laws rarely founded on - , I.158-163
Influence of human - is no other than that of understanding on understanding, II.439
Rationality of agency depends upon the connection between intention and consequences, PML VII.4
- inefficacious against passion because it cannot raise up images lively enough, Deon.I.268
- , applied to the government of the passions, is the making the scale turn in favour of a greater pl rather than a less, Deon.I.268
- abstracts pns and pls from dross surrounding them, Deon.I.272

30. S E N S E A N D S E N S A T I O N

- is SENSATION

- of pl, i.e. enjoyment, VIII.289
- , (when it signifies perception considered as productive of pl and pn), the source of ethical fictitious entities, such as obligation and rights, VIII.247
Pl and pn "different and opposite modes of - ", VIII.247
Only individual objects present themselves to sense, VIII.265
Only through senses can things be known to man, VIII.300
- : feelings have their seat in some one or more of the five senses, VI.217
- subdivisible into pleasurable, painful, or indifferent, VI.217
Pls and pns of sense (motives: physical want, need, exigency, necessity, desire, appetite), I.198 (Table)
- not capable of being deceived, only judgment, VI.251

An impression is, in case of sight, the sort of - produced by the striking of rays of light... upon the retina; in case of hearing, the sort of feeling produced by the vibration given to the air by the sonorous body, and from the air communicated to the auditory nerve, VI.251
Ideas derived from the senses, actively or passively, PML XVIII.11n
Objects presented to the senses, formative of ideas, set out, VIII.44; they are 1. bodies and portions of matter, in rest or motion (where Natural History is the subject), 2. operations (motions), subject matters operated upon, instruments operated with, results - mostly bodies operated upon, now in a new form, (where Experimental Philosophy is the subject), VIII.44
The degree or quantity of a sensation like grief can only be guessed at from external indications, PML VI.33n
No man likely to be in error re the state of his - , but he may well be re the causes, VIII.329
Ideas are either copies of external objects perceptible to the senses, or they are Ideas of Sensation, - copies of ideas excited in the mind by the first sort mentioned, and thus Ideas of Reflection, Box 14 p.13
Sensations alone the immediate subjects or objects of experience: all other real entities are inferred from them, Box 14 p.27
- foundation of Bentham's system, Box 70a p.23
- the highest evidence, Box 70a p.23
- of others can be inferred by analogy and observation, though risk of error regarding their degree (though not their kind) exists, Box 70a p.23
Senses give evidence of credibility of an action to happiness, Box 70a p.28
Consulting - gives knowledge of what Pl is, Box 70a p.45
Any - that a man would rather have, at that instant, than none, is Pl, Box 96 p.128
Bond of connection between - , their cause, Box 70a p.51
All - are perceptions, and all perceptions depend upon the body, Box 70a p.55
Pl and pn - , VIII.126-7
- signifies not merely perception, but perception productive of pl or pn, or both, VIII.247

31. S U B S T A N C E

Matter and - are not synonymous, though on many occasions they may be used as substitutes for one another, VIII.201
- defines both incorporeal and corporeal substances; "matter" tends to refer to corporeal only. VIII.201
"Matter" cannot be conceived of except in relation to the entity "form"; this is not true of - , VIII.201
- name of a class of real entities; "matter" and "form" are but the names of a class of fictitious entities, springing out of the sort of real entities distinguished by the word - , VIII.201
cf. "the matter of that - ", "the form of that - ".

- a real physical entity, VIII.202 (cf. perceptions, which are real psychical entities, VIII.202). - the only real entities, VIII.223
- name of the only species of perceptible real entity, VIII.235
Quantity and quality no more than the affections of - , VIII.235; the seven other Aristotelian predicaments (time, place, motion, rest, action, passion, relation) are relations of - , VIII.235
- the genus of which bodies and spirits are species, VIII.257
Argument that body and mind are one - , opposed by Bentham, PML VI.30n
Physical facts have their seat in inanimate bodies, psychological facts in animate, VI.216

32. U N D E R S T A N D I N G

Motive to the - , any consideration which tends to increase the efficacy of a desire in the character of a motive to the will, I.208
Ideas of pl not effective upon the will apply to the - , I.209
At this stage the idea of pl is a velleity: if approved as a ground of action by the - , it becomes volition, I.209
Influence of - on - is no other than the influence of human reason, II.439
State of -, or perceptive faculty, in regard to intention, may be of consciousness, unconsciousness, or false consciousness, PML VII.5
Relation of - or consciousness to acts, PML IX. passim
All sentences express either the state of the - or the will of the speaker, PML XVII.29n
To - belong, as a circumstance influencing sensibility, quantity and quality of knowledge, strength of -, and insanity, PML II.19
Circumstances of an act are objects of the - , or the - may be ignorant of them, PML VIII.13
"Suppose my statesman a man of - ", Box 27 p.141
- relates to a man's consciousness of the circumstances producing any incident, PML IX.1

33. U T I L I T Y

If an object "have anything belonging to it that can.. be termed use", "it must be either by giving increase to the aggregate mass of pl", ... VIII.231
- of Logic, VIII.232-3 (leading to knowledge, which is valuable only on account of the happiness it produces, VIII.241)
Principle of - , explained, PML.I.1-5
Name borrowed from Hume, I.242
Import given to, by considerations of pl and pn, III.286
Logic only worthy of study on grounds of - , VIII.220
- should be the base of reasons attached to a code of law, I.163
Defect of the word - , that it does not point as clearly to ideas of pl and pn as do "felicity" and "happiness", framed as a principle, PML I.12
- ascribable only to sources of pl, Rationale of Reward (1825) p.205
- has no value except in leading to happiness, Deon.I.224

34. V O L I T I O N

Every operation of mind and body is a result of exercise of will or volitional faculty, VIII.279
- is formed out of desires and motives being willed to action, VIII.280
- is produced out of desire operating in the character of a motive, VIII.280
- is produced by the idea of pl as about to result from a proposed act, VIII.289
The art of giving direction to - and to action may be termed psychological dynamics, VIII.289
Volitional faculty branch of the active, I.299
- emerges as the perfection of velleity (i.e. desires for pl operating as motives which are not immediately conclusive upon the will), I.209
- , or acts of the will, VI.217

cf. LOCKE: "Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action. And what is the will but the faculty to do this... a power?"
Essay II.xxi

cf. LOCKE: "The actual exercise of (the) power (of the will), by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called voluntary" (Essay II.xxi)

35. W A N T S

Synonyms, Need, Demand, Exigency, Necessity (not desire), I.208
Want satisfied brimgs pl, I.208
- , need, exigency, necessity, may exist without corresponding desire, I.208 (cf. the wants and desires of a man unconsciously in danger, I.208).
A man's - depend on 1. his habits of expense, 2. his connections in the way of burden, 3. any present casual demand he may have, 4. the strength of his expectation, PML VI.25

36. W I L L

Exercise of - distinguishes human action, VIII.205
- is the prime cause of volitional (thelematic) actions, VIII.207
Every operation of mind and body the result of the exercise of - , VIII.279
- is the faculty by which volitions are immediately translated into action, VIII.280
- can only be exercised when desire in the character of a motive (i.e. seeking pl) has place, VIII.280
- may or may not have part in the production of the events of which the mind is the scene, VIII.289
Actions of the - may be transitive or intransitive, VIII.289
- determined in every case by eventual expectation of pl, VIII.289
Springs of action are those objects and considerations which act immediately on the - , I.205
Action is motion caused by an exertion of the - , VI.216
Acts of the - , volitions, VI.217
Acts of the - distinguish human actions from the motions exhibited by the unanimated, VI.217
Every act of the - is produced by interest, that is, motive, II.477
The - is the source of the contraction of muscular fibres in animal motion, VIII.134
A logic of the -, desirable, (Aristotle's being confined to the understanding), V.270, PML preface, PML XVII.29n
All sentences enunciate either the state of the - or of the understanding of the speaker, PML XVII.29n
Science of law is to be branch of logic of the - , PML preface
Motives to the understanding may serve as motives to the - , PML X.8
- necessarily yields to solicitation of greatest apparent good, (pl), Deon.I.268
It is by the eventual expectation of pl and pn that the - is in every case determined, VIII.289
PRIMARY - declares conduct to be pursued, SECONDARY creates motive for pursuing it, (either a Pl or pn), Box 70a p.4 (c.1773)
Secondary - announces pl or pn consequent upon pursuing of primary will, Box 70a p.4 (c.1773)

1. cf. LOCKE: "The will or power of volition is conversant about nothing but that particular determination of the mind whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This... plainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire; which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us on" (Essay II.xxi)

2. cf. LOCKE: The will "being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest..." (II.xxi). "The will, or power of volition" (II.xxi)

3. cf. LOCKE: "This power which the mind has to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it, or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will". (II.xxi)

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

BENTHAM

The main printed texts used are:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham (ed. John Bowring, 1843) 11 vols.

The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (general ed. J.H. Burns, 1970-) notably the Correspondence, ed. T.L.S. Sprigge, Vols.1-3, and the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Vol.4, ed. H.L.A. Hart. (The latter frequently cited in this thesis as the Principles of Morals)

Economic Writings ed. Werner Stark (1952) 3 vols.

The Bentham MSS. in University College, London (some 200 boxes) lie in considerable disarray and are, within the boxes, frequently listed without chronology of any kind. They are gradually being sorted for publication in a 38 vol. Collected Works ed. J.H. Burns. Many of the MSS listed below as relevant to a study of Bentham's psychology present a further problem to the scholar, in being scored with lines of deletion across the page (see. ex.gr., the photograph of important remarks on pleasure between Ch.3 section (a) and section (b),). Deletion may be for at least two purposes: either as rejection for publication, or as dissatisfaction with or disavowal of the thought. I have chosen to use deleted passages where they are clearly consistent with lines of thought indicated in work printed before Bentham's death (the 11 vols published by Bowring were without Bentham's supervision and, as in the case of the notorious Deontology, contain many instances of gratuitous "improvement" of the English by Bowring, with consequent distortion of the sense).

BOX 14 Happiness, 1-9 (1773, 1790); Jurisprudence, 10-13 (c 1773); Morals, 20 (no date); Logic or Deontology, Happiness & Unhappiness, End of Action, Pleasure and Pain, Summum Bonum, 35-143 (1814); Practical Deontology (1814), 142-53; Deontology, 180-313 (1818-31); Articles on Utilitarianism. 314-411 (1829).

BOX 15 Political Deontology, Motives (1816-31) 1-322

BOX 27 Principles of Human Action (c.1777) 25-28; Happiness & Unhappiness, Dimensions (c.1778) 29-40; Dispositions (c.1778) 52-59; Motives, Consciousness (1778-80) 60-94; Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (c.1780) 117-75.

BOX 32 Civil Code (1785-90), incl. Principles adverse to the Greatest Happiness, Helvetius, Objects of Civil Law)

BOX 36 Constitutional Code: First Principles (1821) 75-100

BOX 70a Laws in General (1774) 1; Principle of Utility (c.1776) 2-35; Happiness & Unhappiness (c.1776) 111-55; Utility the secret guide, even when unrecognis'd and disavow'd, 36-55.

BOX 85 Law Amendments (1827-28) 1-120, passim.

BOX 96 Maupertuis and Pleasure & Pain, (c.1773) 128-31.

BOX 97 Axioms of Mental Pathology (1828) p.211

BOX 100 Influence of Time and Place in matters of Legislation (c.1785, 5-33)

BOX 101 Logic chs.1-10, Chrestomathia, Logic - Arts & Sciences Division, Deontology (1814-15, 1826) 88-498.

BOX 149 Deontology (343-66, written by Bowring in 1831).

BOX 158 Springs of Action (1814-18) 52-122.

BOX 161a Defence of the Principle of Utility (1817) 1-19.

The following British Museum Additional MSS are of interest:

Letter to G. Grote, 1821, 29,806 f.1; to J. Henry, 1827-30, 30,151; "Works", 18th & 19th Century, 33,547-33,551; letters to Samuel Bentham, 1769-75, 33,537 ff.223-370 passim; to J. Priestley, 1774, 33,537 ff.324, 326; to F. Place, 1823-31, 35,144 f.157b, 35,145 ff.81-90, 35,149 ff.42, 68-73; to J. Bowring, 1826, 36462 f.263; to F. Place, 1817-31, 37,949 ff.47, 48, 57, 248, 250, 252, 254. (Letter-book of JB and Samuel Bentham, 1784-89, 37520).

JAMES MILL

The main printed texts used are:

Analysis of the Human Mind (1829) 2 vols.

Correspondence with Ricardo, in D. Ricardo, Works (ed. P. Sraffa, Cambridge 1952) Vols. 6 and 7

Essays on Government, Education and Colonies (repr. from Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1828)

Fragment on Mackintosh (1835)

History of British India (1817) 3 vols.

Selected Economic Writings (ed. D.N. Winch, Chicago, Ill. 1966)

Notes to Villers, An Essay on the Spirit and Influence of the Reformation of Luther (1805)

Much of James Mill's extensive periodical writing has gone unidentified, though the studies of Prof. Winch, of the Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals and (most comprehensively) of R.A. Fenn have largely filled the gaps left by Bain. Much identification must remain speculative; but at the very least, the following articles used in Ch.4 above bring a quantity of valuable and largely unstudied material on Mill to the attention of the scholar:

(1) "Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind, and of Moral Philosophy, by Thomas Belsham", Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine XII (1802)

(2) "Life of Reid by Stewart", Literary Journal I (1803) col.567-570

(3) "Millar's Historical View", Literary Journal II (1803) col.325-333

(4) "Craig on Millar", Literary Journal (2nd Series) I (1806) col.225-235

(5) "Filangeri's Science of Legislation", Edinburgh Review IX (1807)

(6) "Taylor's Plato", Edinburgh Review XIV (1809)

(7) "Voyages aux Indes Orientales", Edinburgh Review XV (1810) pp.363-84

(8) "Affairs of India", Edinburgh Review XVI (1810) pp.128-57

(9) "De Guignes' Voyage à Peking", Edinburgh Review XIV (1809) pp.407-29

(10) "Stewart's Collected Works", Literary Journal (2nd Series) I (1806) col.225-235

(11) "Essays on the Formation of Human Character (by Owen)", Philanthropist III (1813) pp.91ff

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(13) "Clarkson's Life of Penn", Philanthropist IV (1814) pp.190ff

(14) "Stewart's Philosophy", British Review VI (1815) pp.170-198

(15) "Theory and Practice", Westminster Review XXV (1836) pp.223-234

The unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis (1971) of Mr R.A. Fenn will, when printed in 1975, provide a detailed study of evidence for these and many other periodical writings of Mill.

MSS material: in addition to the Mill-Taylor Collection (LSE),

MS material on James Mill is as follows:

The Commonplace Books 1-3 (London Library), 4 (London School of Economics)

Letters to Place & Napier, (British Museum Add. MSS., viz. to Napier, 1814-31, 34,611 f.55; 34,612, ff.70, 117, 128, 140, 148, 161, 192, 212, 287, 354, 383, 405, 414, 428, 438; 34,613 ff.10, 71, 190, 245; 34,614 f.356; 34,615 ff.26, 100.
to Place, 1814-31, 35,144 ff.113-115, 35,149 ff.120b-123b; 35,152 ff.53b, 56, 70, 71, 84, 92, 93, 99, 103b-106b, 110b, 111, 116b, 117b, 118, 119b-132b, 139-143, 147, 148, 153b, 158, 160-173, 182b, 186-188, 195-217, 219, 222b-239; 35,153 ff.1, 18-29, 33-37, 42, 50, 197. 37,949 f.18.

(See also Place's Correspondence, BM Add. MSS. 35,148-35,153).
(See also Horner Correspondence, London School of Economics).

JOHN STUART MILL

The main printed texts used are:

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