INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED:
POLITICAL THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF

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Contemporary communitarians focus their critiques on liberal individualism and posit as a counterpoise to the self-sufficiency and priority of the liberal self their own conception of the self: the individual-in-community. Selfhood, in their view, is inherently communal; one cannot know or define oneself, or be an individual, except in and through the community life in which each is raised.

This thesis presents, in contrast to the liberal and communitarian conceptions, a third conception of the self built from developmental psychology—the self as compound individuality. Here the self is seen to develop through a series of levels, each level a world unto itself, but each also a part of a more inclusive whole. Both liberal individualism and the communitarian conception that challenges it are, in the light of the theory of compound individuality, seen to be half-right and half-wrong. They gain coherence, and cogency, only when joined.

Joining the two is difficult. At the center of the difficulty, and at the center of the liberal-communitarian debate, are competing notions of autonomy and of relationships. Some communitarians see autonomy as leading ineluctably to pernicious individualism. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that individual autonomy must be protected from any communal ends and relationships that might limit it.

The theory of compound individuality demonstrates that there is a level of self at which relationships do not threaten autonomy, but, on the contrary, help through autonomy to define the self. Autonomy, rather than jeopardizing relationships by emphasizing self-sufficiency, as the communitarians fear, here promotes a level of constitutive relationships. This level of self beyond individualism might be engendered through increased, though restructured, social and political participation.

But are the communitarians' concerns and their understanding of community fully embraced at this level? If liberal societies were to move beyond individualism, would those societies be any more communitarian and any less liberal? Those societies, as argued in this thesis, would certainly be different from what communitarians envision and from liberal polities today.
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INTRODUCTION

Government, James Madison wrote in Federalist 51, "is the greatest of all reflections on human nature"; and if we know what human nature is, then we can, as Edmund Burke suggested, adjust politics to it. But political philosophers, no less than other kinds of philosophers, have held, for convenience, on principle, and fortuitously, various and conflicting conceptions of human nature.

Current in political theory is a debate between philosophers holding such conflicting conceptions: liberals and communitarians. At issue is the image of human nature upon which liberalism is built. This image of, variously, the person, the individual, the agent, or the self, is from the communitarian perspective faulty and dysfunctional. Humans are here conceived as monads protected by individual rights, with self-selected ends and interests, whose relationships and group memberships are entered voluntarily for the purpose of attaining these ends and advancing these interests, and whose standards for choice and judgement are rational and abstract and lie within. Each individual is therefore responsible both for what he does to others and for the life he creates. The generic term for all such descriptions, by liberals and communitarians alike, is "individualism."
This thesis will examine in some detail the communitarians' critique of liberal individualism and their challenge to it. As we shall see, communitarians have their own conception of human nature and their own problems with it. Chapter 1 focuses on the critiques of three prominent communitarians: Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Sandel. Their arguments against liberalism are discussed in conjunction with their very different conception of human nature or self. This chapter is therefore largely exegetical.

But the communitarian conception as proposed by each theorist is, as mentioned, also in need of critique. There are two ways to proceed. The first is to analyze the conceptions by examining their internal logic and consistency. This is done in a limited way for each theorist in Chapter 1. The second way is to propose an alternative conception of human nature. Such an alternative constitutes Chapter 2. Drawing on the empirical research of developmental psychology, I propose a theory of compound individuality. Here the self is seen to transform through various levels of development, each level a world of interaction between innate structures and historical or existential circumstance. Though each level is a world unto itself, it is also a part of a hierarchy of levels, the later more inclusive than their predecessors. The individual is a compound of all these levels in self-development.

The theory of compound individuality also shows that the liberal and communitarian positions are half-truths, each masquerading as the whole truth. In proper perspective these positions have significant contributions to make. Using developmental psychology to generate this proper perspective and to analyze individualism and the communitarian opposite, I do what Steve Smith claimed is rarely done in applying theories
of human nature to politics; namely, justifying a theory of human nature "by reference to empirical criteria" (Forbes and Smith, 1983, p. 2).

At the level at which individuality can be said to unfold, the level of self-development characterized by autonomy, the person can be a compound in a different sense. Personal identity can be constituted by social relationships. What makes this realization less than straightforward is that the autonomy that undergirds this compound individuality can also lead to the illusion of self-sufficiency characteristic of individualism. To understand how autonomy can function in both ways, to make clear the differences between individualism and compound individuality, and to show how the latter is a level of selfhood beyond the former are the purposes of Chapter 3.

Having identified a level of self beyond individualism, I then examine in Chapter 4 how liberal societies might move toward it. The key to doing so is to structure into participatory procedures the principles of contextualist thinking, another appropriation from developmental psychology, characteristic of the compound individual. The essence of this participation must be dialogue: not only the probing of positions to air and scrutinize the arguments behind them, but also the taking up of positions of others to explain and understand them and to create on each issue a pool of perspectives from which to draw a common decision or a compound common good. Such vague notions will be clarified as the reader proceeds.

If participation of this sort can promote growth beyond individualism to a level of self constituted, as will be discussed, by both autonomy and relationships, can it also produce the kind of constitutive community that communitarians see as fundamental to meaningful life and personal identity, and also see as absent from liberalism? Does the theory of com-
pound individuality and its attendant participatory procedures reconcile liberalism's emphasis on autonomy with communitarianism's emphasis on constitutive community? This, as well as an examination of what communitarians mean and ought to mean by "community," comprises Chapter 5.

Finally, in the Conclusion the ground we have covered and implications for future travel are reviewed, though without benefit of provocative suggestions that go beyond what appears in the text. The text suggests that insofar as liberals lean on and trumpet individualism, communitarians offer a strong critique. But communitarians are wrong to suggest that the only corrective to individualism is a return to some form of constitutive community. Liberals would then seem fortified in their position that autonomous persons can and must be separate reflectively from their communities. Yet they are wrong to suggest that autonomous individuality precedes society or that autonomy must take the form of self-sufficiency. In short, the theory of compound individuality does not leave us with a choice between a Kantian deontological self and an Aristotelian teleological self. Instead, it shows those views each to be partial and only coherent when joined.

In addition to clarifying elements in the liberal-communitarian debate, this study introduces to the reader a body of psychological literature heretofore little explored in political theory. If theories or philosophies about human nature and about politics are interactive, then theories of psychology are interactive, or should be, with political theory.

The theory of compound individuality, which permits us, to paraphrase Rousseau, to distinguish between the variety of human nature and the essentials of it, may lead to changes in how we think about and structure—and thus how we govern—society. To move on a broad scale toward a level
of self beyond individualism; to move, that is, toward compound individuality, would require changes in social institutions. For such changes liberals and communitarians, having been straightened out on the nature of individualism, would undoubtedly plead.
CHAPTER 1

THE DISPOSITION OF THE SELF

Communitarian critiques first began during the Renaissance, when individuality became a virtue. Since that time communitarians have lamented the collapse of community, those bonds of fellowship and solidarity that come from intimately sharing a way of life that both expresses and reinforces a common understanding or world view. Yet today's communitarians differ from their predecessors, even those as recent as the 1950's. Then communitarians attacked modernity; today they attack liberalism. They do so for good reason: The contemporary critics may recognize the benefits of modernity--e.g., greater longevity, reduced poverty, etc.--but they decry the liberal systems that spawn them. Those systems, they argue, are built upon a dangerous illusion: a conception of the self that has either faulty foundations or no foundations at all.

Communitarians see this modern liberal conception as fundamentally different from the conceptions of self of traditional societies. Originally the linchpin of seventeenth-century English political theory, the liberal conception centers around the assumption that every man is the sole proprietor of his own person and capacities and as such owes nothing to society for them. Such individualism was asserted to provide the justification for fundamental civil liberties, which were conceived as an individual's private property. Communitarians think this individualism the core of modern liberalism.
The leitmotif of the communitarians is that individualism fragments and destroys deep, meaningful relationships by conceiving of men as socially independent atoms without obligations to society or to others, except where such obligations suit them. Relationships and community ties are thus voluntary, if not contractual.

The communitarians unite around the opposite view: An individual's life cannot be defined or understood either prior to or apart from a definition of the community life each person is born into and whose rules and descriptions he lives by and shares with others. Thus the moral interests of individuals cannot be reduced to individual interests, but must be deduced from communal interests. These communal interests can be critiqued, but only from within. Each community is therefore sovereign in how it generates its interests and world view.

Consequently, the communitarians and the liberal individualists they criticize manifest profound differences over issues such as the nature of selfhood, the place of community in developing identity, and the meaning and significance of freedom and social obligation. At issue here are not merely two theories of selfhood, but, as Alasdair MacIntyre intimated, the specifications of two almost entirely different ways of life (After Virtue, p. 118). Thus, "it is not surprising," writes Charles Taylor, "that the two sides talk past each other" ("Atomism," 1985b, p. 209).

To understand more thoroughly why this is so and to understand how a reconciliation of the two sides might be attempted, we shall examine the theories of the self of three prominent communitarians: Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Sandel.
Recently the two sides were at least able to talk to each other.

Charles Taylor and Ernest Gellner represented the two sides in a conversation on the costs of modernity broadcast by the BBC. Gellner offered this summary of the two divisive positions:

There are two kinds of self. They are the pre-modern self, which is part of the cosmos, where the environment—social and natural—makes a kind of meaningful whole. This whole is described and articulated in the same terms [used] to describe the self, so that life is part of a continuum...

Then there is the modern self, which is not part of the cosmos but of what [Taylor] calls nature, where nature is an impersonal, orderly system in no way designed on the same principles as man himself...in no way underwriting his aims and his values. Now the difference in our attitudes—Taylor's and mine—lies not in this description. It is that I think this modern, rather lonely, not underwritten, unlegitimated, isolated self is an inescapable price of the cognitive advances by which we live.

Taylor responded to this summary by acknowledging both its general accuracy and the nature of the disagreement between the two theorists. He then amplified his own position: "...[W]hile I agree that we cannot look backward to cosmological views [of the sixteenth century] I think there is a profound truth underlying that view, that the hunger [to belong to a larger cosmic order] is not all wrong. That is, that in order to understand ourselves we have to see ourselves as part of a larger order...to understand ourselves expressively requires that we acknowledge that...."

Especially interesting in this exchange, beyond the succinct summation of the two antithetical positions, is not the disagreement but the agreement between the two. Taylor and Gellner agree that these descriptions capture the essential features of the two conceptions of the self; both
agree that the modern self has eclipsed the pre-modern self; and both agree that this modern self is unappealing. The basis of the disagreement rests, then, on Taylor's assertion that something like the pre-modern view is vital to our self-understanding. Aspects of the pre-modern self need to be restored, for although modern man lives as though he does not need such a self, he cannot live well without it.

Simply put, Taylor's position is that because selfhood is ineluctably a social product, people must form their identities around a commitment to community, to the social matrix that gives rise to individuality. If people do not base identity and understanding on that foundation, then some force will provide such a foundation for them, which is evident today in the forces of religious fundamentalism and blind nationalism. People cannot do without community, whether reflective or imposed.

Indeed, the story of the development of the modern self, according to Taylor, is the story of the distancing of the person from the community. It occurred in three phases (1985c). In the first phase the person is conceived of as "an interlocutor" who converses with others in the community in some "special" or public space. The standards and ends of the community, to which all accede, are derived from these conversations. The person comes to know himself, the kind of person he is, only in the conversations of his culture.

In the second phase a person still knows himself in conversation and according to standards that exist outside himself and in the social order. Now, however, the public space is not necessarily localized. The quintessential example of this is early Christianity in which the conversations about the ecclesiastical and celestial order that generated the social standards could be dispersed and yet thought to be ecumenical.
The final phase, characteristic of modern individualism, is the "interiorization of personhood" (Ibid, p. 277) and the conception of the person as a monad. Here one's standards are not founded, as in traditional societies, on social hierarchy or cosmology, but are now situated within man himself. That interiorization results from regarding the capacities that once flowed out of social intercourse as inherent in man's own nature. Taylor refers to this modern man as the "disengaged" self, the self-defining atomist able to objectify the world and to determine his own purposes or find them in his own desires. Human ends and the standards to judge them by are seen as "set by nature, discoverable by objective scrutiny, or else as autonomously chosen" (Vol. I, p. 113). No longer able to situate himself in a greater whole, modern man now justifies society in utilitarian terms. Relationships and society in general are mechanisms valuable only as instruments in the quest for personal fulfillment. The person is "metaphysically independent of society" (Vol. II, p. 83).

Such a view of the person, says Taylor, has a twofold effect. First, it deprives the person of the capacity for deep self-understanding. One can only come to know himself "against a [communal] background, fitting into this [larger] whole. I must acknowledge my belonging before I can understand myself" (Vol. II, p. 257). This sense of belonging is precisely what liberal society fails to provide. A society built on the theory of the disengaged self and personal self-sufficiency leaves its members "in confusion, self-delusion, in the dark" (Idem). Second, hidden from view in a liberal interpretation of the person is the essential fact that those capacities that make one a human being can be developed only within society, only, as Aristotle observed, through social and political intercourse. Man is constituted by the language and culture of his community. Without
social conversation the person loses the very capacities that make him a person.

In Taylor's view, to be a person one must first be an agent. An agent "is a being with consciousness, where consciousness is seen as a power to frame representations of things." Agents also have "the wherewithal to reply when addressed, because they respond out of their own representation of the world and their situation" (Vol. I, p. 98). Yet these qualities do not constitute personhood. Responding and having an original point of view are something all agents can do. Animals, says Taylor, have individual purposes and points of view. To be a person "requires some kind of reflexive awareness of the standards one is living by (or failing to live by)" (Ibid, p. 103). So a person is an agent "who has a sense of self, of his/her own life, who can evaluate it, and make choices about it. This is the basis of the respect we owe persons" (Idem).

To diminish someone's capacity to understand himself, to interfere with his evaluation and choice, is to deny the injunction to respect him as a person. But surely the modern liberal does not deny that injunction. Indeed, evaluation and choice of one's own life plans, to say nothing of non-interference, are principal parts of liberal individualism. For Taylor, however, that kind of understanding does not go far enough; it is not the sort of choice and evaluation Taylor has in mind. "The essence of evaluation no longer consists in assessment in the light of fixed goals, but also and even more in the sensitivity to certain standards, those involved in the peculiarly human goals" that exist outside the individual. "The sense of self is the sense of where one stands in relation to these standards" (Ibid, p. 105). This evaluation the liberal, with his standards self-generated, cannot perform.
The liberal can evaluate and act on those evaluations, but his reflection lacks "depth" (1976, p. 287). He can choose the best means to his ends--e.g., which kind of career will bring him the most money--but cannot evaluate the nature of the ends themselves or the relation of those ends to the kind of person he is. With all standards private and within, this self is without any method of evaluating his ends other than identifying what he prefers and how he can attain that. Thus while both the pre-modern and modern selves are capable of evaluation, the disengaged self can be only "a simple weigher of alternatives," a utilitarian or weak evaluator for whom problems, desires, and preferences are seen only in terms of the quality of satisfaction derived from a choice.

A strong evaluator, on the other hand, utilizes a "vocabulary of worth"; that is, one evaluates desires in terms of their being nobler, higher, better, etc. than others according to a standard provided by an overall way of life or world view. When one asks, "Who am I?" one finds that at the center of identity are "certain strong evaluations" inherent in oneself (Ibid, p. 34). These are qualities or ends that one values or that one believes must be valued "since they are so integrally a part of [him] that to disvalue them would be to reject" oneself (Idem). Stripped of these the person would not simply be plunged into psychic chaos, into the gloom of identity crisis, but would "lose the very possibility of being an agent who evaluates" (Idem). While still an agent, this self is no longer a person, for personhood hinges on "the ability to adhere to certain evaluations." That ability is "impossible outside the horizon of these essential evaluations" (Ibid, p. 35). When the ability is lost, we do not lose only our personal identities. We lose our identity as persons.
Thus strong evaluations are essential not simply as contents of identity, but also as a framework, an "indispensable horizon or foundation out of which we reflect and evaluate as persons" (Idem). Without that framework I do not know who I am. I cannot know who I am. The disengaged self of liberalism, with no horizon of evaluation, is thus without both identity and boundary. That self is really no self, but "is a kind of extensionless point, a pure leap into the void." Such a self is "another avatar of that recurrent figure which our civilization aspires to realize, the disembodied ego, the subject who can objectify all being, including his own, and choose in radical freedom" (Idem). The result of such a view, says Taylor, is dual alienation. We alienate ourselves from society by defining ourselves independent of and without obligations to it, and in that definition we deprive ourselves of the capacity to know or interpret ourselves in our richest sense.

Taylor calls the attempts to determine what is really important in one's life "interpretations." The human animal "not only finds himself impelled from time to time to interpret himself and his goals, but [also finds] that he is always already in some interpretation" (Ibid, p. 75). We are self-interpreting beings within a horizon of evaluations. As such, we are constantly open to new insights about who we are. "[W]ithin the limits of my capacity to change myself by fresh insight...I am responsible in the full direct 'modern' sense for my evaluations" (Idem). The limits of that capacity, and thus of one's identity, are set by language and common discourse, the conversations of one's culture (1985c, p. 276).

While "in principle no formulations [of basic evaluations] are considered unrevisable" (Vol. I, p. 40), there is no metalanguage available by which a cultural conversation might accommodate every possible evaluation.
Indeed, "it is hard to deny that we have great difficulty grasping definitions whose terms structure the world in ways which are utterly different from and incompatible with our own" (Vol. II, p. 54). What is found to be significant will vary from culture to culture, for significances are associated with the language and the ways of life surrounding them. "There is something irredeemably opaque about any range of significances for those who do not share them" (1985c, p. 269). The disengaged self who is without communal standards is without a hierarchy of significances for making strong evaluative judgements and is thus without any means for either grounding or knowing himself. The "conversation of a community...provides the language by which we draw our background distinctions...The self-interpretations which define [a person] are drawn from the interchange which the community carries on" (Vol. I, p. 8). The disengaged self might participate in what he calls a community or association, but with standards inside each self, such groups are at best aggregations of similar individuals pursuing their own interests, though in concert. Without strong community the modern self is therefore without foundation or constitution.

But if in principle no formulation of basic evaluations is unrevisable, then the boundaries of the communal conversation would seem to be elastic to the point of collapse. One can "transcend the bounds of a particular language and conceptual structure; either by invention of new concepts, or by learning a new language, either a new language or a new terminology" (Ibid, p. 152). Thus one can also transcend the evaluations and standards, since they "are shaped by the language in which they are disclosed." (1985c, p. 276). Indeed, the potential for transcendence is built into linguistic capacity: "[I]t is our language...through which things become objects of disengaged awareness" (Ibid, p. 152). Disengagement enables
one to step back reflectively and examine things in a new light. Yet if
individuals can invent new concepts, those originating within the person,
then how is the position of the strong evaluator any more grounded than
that of the disengaged self? If "language is a way of stepping out of our
situation" (Ibid, p. 159), then how is that disengagement any different
from that of the modern liberal self?

It is different, says Taylor, because although one can step back, one
cannot step outside all positions or evaluations into pure critique, into
an abstract awareness without attribute, into a positionless position.
There is still a danger that reflectivity can leave the individual without
"the structures of a fixed pattern" (Vol. II, p. 261), and so self-
reflectivity, or autonomy, must be exercised within a horizon of evaluations.
While the strong evaluator can reflect, he can know himself and secure
identity only within such a horizon.

Taylor wants, then, to combine autonomy and community. He seeks
thereby to regain for modern man the sense of rootedness and the fact of
social constitution that were lost in the transition from pre-modern to
modern society. But he also wants to retain the modern ability to transcend
the communal view by reflecting on "any quite innovative set of categories
in which to see [his] predicament" that might cause "a gestalt shift in
[his] view of the situation" (Vol. I, p. 40). At the very least man needs
such autonomy lest he become trapped in the absolutist, exclusivist world
views reminiscent of the cosmological phase of self-development and that
today characterize the world views of religious fundamentalism and fanatic
nationalism.

Therefore, to escape the rigidity of boundaries emblematic of the
cosmological orders and to avoid the absurdities of unconditional disengage-
ment, the modern self must somehow touch down in the middle phase, still an interlocutor but able to transcend the conversation. This, however, creates a problem for Taylor's position. Is someone who reflects only within the horizon--within, that is, the boundaries already established by the communal conversation--really exercising autonomy? And if autonomy is to be exercised, as Taylor suggests, such that individuals can invent innovative sets of categories that take them beyond the given horizon of evaluations, then the boundaries of the community can remain established and stable only if autonomy does not disrupt the pattern fixed by the horizon of evaluations.  

Then individuals can invent such sets only for themselves; they cannot bring them into the conversation in an attempt to expand the horizon or boundaries. Any such different views could not be accommodated, for they are or must remain "irredeemably opaque."

Thus even in this phase combining autonomy and community appears to result in unappealing consequences: The only way to strengthen and stabilize the community would be to make the boundaries inflexible. The price for individual autonomy in that circumstance is the possibility of being caught between boundaries--beyond the horizon, not fully disengaged, of course, but also not at home. The only option then is for transcenders to leave the community. Such a consequence is avoided only if autonomy is limited to the community's horizon of evaluations. But, as we asked before, is this really autonomy?

As we shall see, the same issues arise in the theories of Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. Indeed, the desire to combine community and individual autonomy is the fundamental difficulty at the base of most communitarian critiques.
Like Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre also sees three phases in the history of the self, and, likewise, the history is characterized by the increasing distance between self and community. During the first phase, that of the "Homeric" or "heroic" society, membership in a variety of social groups established individual identity. One was known "as a member of this family, this household, this clan, this tribe, this city, this nation, this kingdom. There is no 'I' apart from these." These memberships were not voluntarily entered into or chosen. The relationships and roles of each person were fixed by the circumstances into which each was born, for the stratification of society mirrored the stratification of nature, which mirrored the stratification of the cosmos. The fact that a man was a role rather than held a role gave each person an identity secured in a place sanctioned not only by the society but also by the cosmos. To attempt to withdraw from one's given roles would be "an enterprise of trying to make himself disappear" (p. 126).

Within these prescribed statuses every man had a telos, an innate function or purpose, which was to fulfil his social roles. Just as roles placed and defined one's life in the cosmic scheme, so the fulfillment of duties and responsibilities associated with those roles determined the worth of one's life. How well one fulfilled his roles was not a matter of individual judgement; the criteria of role performance came with the role, not with the man.

In this teleology, says MacIntyre, evaluative claims were factual claims. To call a man "good" was to make a provable statement about his
character, for he was good according to how he performed in his roles; good, that is, according to the objective impersonal criteria attached to each role (p. 84). Yet, MacIntyre claims, a change occurred in this teleology in fifth-century Athens. A new self emerged, one also established in social roles and a moral objective order outside the self, but one that could now call the self into question.

The distinction between the Homeric or heroic self and this Athenian or Aristotelian self rested, then, on the distance between the self and its social roles. No longer was the self nothing but the social roles it had inherited. Now "the self, as distinct from its roles, [had] a history and a social history...intelligible as the end product of a long and complex set of developments" (p. 31). The Aristotelian self still had a telos—to move toward and achieve eudaimonia, a whole life lived well. The means for achieving this telos were the virtues, which also served to define, in part, a life lived well. Men had a set of roles to fulfill in accordance with the telos, but where the Homeric self was embedded in its roles, the Aristotelian self was embedded in the pursuit of the good. While in the Homeric society the cosmic order dictated the place of each person in a hierarchy of social roles, in the Athenian society it dictated the place of each virtue. Thus the pursuit of the good provided choices among the roles within the boundaries of the hierarchy of virtues. The ordering of roles was now open to choice and question. The virtues inherent in each role were not.

Some persons possessed the requisite virtues innately; others had to come by them through systematic training. Nevertheless, all persons benefited from education--training in the virtues--to assure control of their appetites and emotions. "To act virtuously...is to act from inclination
formed by the cultivation of the virtues" (p. 149). But the virtues and one's roles could come into conflict as one moved toward eudaimonia. For example, the polis might demand that the citizen be a warrior willing to die for the community, while the family demanded the continued presence of a husband and father to produce male heirs and to rule the household. Aristotle attempted to resolve such tensions by arranging in a hierarchy relationships as well as virtues. But, MacIntyre points out, Sophocles's Antigone is evidence of the people's recognition of the possible agony in choices available among roles. Both Kreon and Antigone had real, and tragic, choices within a range of available and conceptually enclosed social roles. For the ancient Athenians the self was truly revealed in the conflict of one's roles.

What was not in conflict for the Athenian or, says MacIntyre, for the man of the Middle Ages, was the framework in which role conflict arose. The community was constituted and enclosed by the shared project of achieving the common good: "...[W]hat is good for me has to be good for [any]one who inhabits these roles" (p. 205). The virtues, as both means to the good and part of the definition of it, were therefore local yet universal. The specific roles and rules were sanctioned by each community; yet once sanctioned, anyone living in or according to them would fulfill them in the same way. Such a life was in harmony with the cosmos, mirroring the natural and celestial orders. But the advent of choice and conflict among roles signified a crack in the mirror, some loss of the moral coherence found in Homeric society (p. 135).

The mirror was shattered with the outright rejection of teleology. Moral coherence was lost altogether when science mechanized the universe and stripped both it and nature of purpose. Man, too, lost his telos,
as purpose or ends became something chosen rather than inherited. Thus begins the third or "modern" phase of the self, the era of individualism (p. 195). Having lost teleology, the "big picture" that provided coherence to social and philosophical systems, modern man today has nothing but fragments of such systems that cannot in themselves provide meaningful direction. Free to choose from a limitless supply of purposes and values and attachments, modern man "is unconstrained by any social bonds. His own ends... are for him the only criteria of action." 8

But what is the criterion for the choice of ends? Without a teleological perspective that orders society, nature, and the universe man has none save a recognition of his own preferences:

Everything may be criticized from whatever standpoint the self has adopted, including the self's choice of standpoint to adopt. It is in this capacity of the self to evade any necessary identification with any particular contingent state of affairs that some modern philosophers...have seen the essence of moral agency. To be a moral agent is, on this view, precisely to be able to stand back from any and every situation in which one is involved, from any and every characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgment on it from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity....(pp. 31-32)

Such a description is that of Taylor's disengaged self. Having disengaged or distanced itself from all roles and ends, the self is now able to choose those for itself. Yet the self separate from all particularity ceases to be a self at all. The modern self can take on any role, pursue any interest, adopt any purpose "because it is in and for itself nothing" (Idem).

There is no way to define the self except as disengaged choice, a set of perpetually open possibilities. Yet even this is empty, for at bottom the choices of the self are criterionless, without principle, value, boundaries, or standards. Choices are merely arbitrary reactions to preferences or
emotions. They are, in short, barely choices at all.

The move into modernity has deprived man of the conception of a completed and fulfilled--a whole--human life (p. 34). Such a life was predicated upon a necessary social identity bounded by a telos shared in community. The roles played within that boundary defined the self and placed one "at a certain point on a journey with set goals; to move through life is to make progress--or fail to make progress--toward a given end" (Idem). But rationalists of the Enlightenment saw as "progress" the release of man from such ecclesiastical and aristocratic communities. To achieve a new social order based on that progress, to liberate men from the parochialism and xenophobic myopia of the way of life centered around ties to kin, church, and village, required breaking allegiances to caste, clan, and community. So released, men were free to secure membership in the new modes of authority and responsibility. Yet, says MacIntyre, men were unable to do so, for these new modes and the subsequent new roles lacked any grounding. Adrift in a sea of competition and commercialism, unable to anchor their aims to anything but desires, men were lost, not free.

MacIntyre argues that persons need social relationships for identity. These are not appendages that outlive their purpose, only to be excised. They are the very conditions for securing personality, social cohesion, and moral coherence. The story of one's life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which one derives identity. What modern man, and modern society, needs to do is reinstate the teleological structure that unites the moral fragments that modern man can neither understand nor piece together. Coherence reposes on a concept of telos that constitutes the good of a whole human life, conceived as a unity. Such a unity is not simply individual, but is and must be seen as communal.
The problem, says MacIntyre, is that the foundations of the Homeric and Aristotelian teleologies are no longer plausible. The former involved Greek mythology; the latter, Aristotelian metaphysical biology. What needs to be accomplished, therefore, is to restore the ideas of Aristotelian teleology and virtues, but divest them of the metaphysical biology (p. 196).

This MacIntyre attempts to do by introducing to the modern age a social teleology, the idea of the narrative unity. This is not simply the unity of an individual's life from birth to death. It is the recognition that the history of one's life cannot be told apart from that of the community's. These two histories must be, and are, unified. Therein lies the narrative unity. I am both "the subject of a history that is my own," and I am constituted by a network of similar, interlocking narratives. I am not, therefore, detachable from my social and historical roles and statuses (p. 221), for without them I could have no standards or ends outside myself. I would then be condemned to the solipsism of the modern individualist. The standards, values, and ends are those internal to the roles and practices of the community. The story of the self, consequently, must be one of the search for identity "in and through membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighborhood, the city and the tribe" (Idem).

MacIntyre's position comes to this: Modern liberal societies have too many disparate and competing moral theories, largely because societies have lost the teleological nucleus that unifies and limits these competing fragments. The variety spawns conflict, not consensus. Without shared moral principles or vision, life lacks unity, security, and meaning. A teleological hierarchy of virtues can guide social and political life and provide moral consensus. If we do not accept such a structure, then, claims
MacIntyre, echoing Charles Taylor's view, we shall be forced to accept "a set of institutional arrangements for imposing a bureaucratized unity on society which lacks genuine moral consensus" (p. 254).

Yet it is not clear that the virtues independent of Aristotelian cosmology can be hierarchically arranged, even within a community, so as to generate unity and consensus. The problem seems to be that such virtues, standards, and statuses would only provide security and solidarity if they were rigidly imposed, so that in knowing his role a man "knows also what he owes and what is owed him by the occupant of every other role and status" (p. 122). Yet in the local communities MacIntyre prescribes (p. 263) social roles would then eclipse individuality, as they did in the Middle Ages. Persons would become interchangeable and secondary. It would not be selves but roles that characterized such communities. It is easy to see how the individual could then be submerged for the sake of the whole, for the sake of the well-being of society. If an individual becomes secondary to the common good, then his interests can easily be sacrificed at the altar of that good.

Is this offset by MacIntyre's inclusion within narrative unity of autonomy; that is, that roles can be questioned? The model he espouses is Athenian autonomy, perhaps epitomized by Socrates who challenged the Athenian laws and standards but in the end, in recognition of the social context that bound, defined, and gave meaning to his life, accepted death rather than escape. Through such autonomy the person escapes emotivism and can question his life by having some criterion outside himself by which to decide among possible choices.

To establish that criterion or framework, a standard is necessary "which the individual is not free to accept or reject as he wills or chooses."
Now that cosmology and metaphysical biology are no longer plausible, the source of that standard is sociological: It is set by the community's established social practices. "Here I find criteria proposed to me which I can make my own in the sense that I can frame my choices and my actions in accordance with them, but their authority is derived not from my choice but from the way in which in such a community they cannot fail to be regarded as normative" (Ibid, p. 208).

This ability to question and choose, the ability to reflect, is narrowly confined to the community. In contrast to this social self is the achromatic or autonomous liberal self "who asks, what do I desire, as a man, apart from all social ties, in the frame of the universe?" Such a person "is necessarily working with a meager stock of descriptions, with an impoverished view of his own nature, for he has had to strip away from himself all the attributes that belong to his social existence" (Ibid, p. 100).

The liberal self that MacIntyre depicts needs to be free from all social perspectives, while the self situated in the community is hardly free of any. For the communitarian self, security of identity is guaranteed in the permanence of social position and the absence within the community of "fundamental conflict" (Ibid, p. 103); for the liberal self, autonomy is guaranteed by disposing of all social ties to assure that no ends are imposed. Yet is the choice really only between the disengaged liberal and the individual situated in a well-ordered society, a person "who cannot but think of himself in terms of the life of that community"? (Idem, emphasis added) Are the questions that liberal selves ask themselves always existentially empty, while those of socially situated selves are always communally confined?
MacIntyre's choices are not really so bald. The socially situated self, as we have seen, is not without important choices, especially of purposes. Only in a social context can individuals frame purposes, so that although they can question society, their ability to do so derives from their membership in the community. Yet modern man, armed with autonomy in search of social teleology—narrative unity and the good—would no longer need to be restricted to "the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community...[For] it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists" (p. 221).

How are the moral limitations of those communities—family, clan, neighborhood, city—transcended? Traditions, says MacIntyre, are transcended "through criticism and invention" (p. 222). Yet this ability to question and transcend seems to bring us perilously close to the liberal disengaged self. If the self can invent values and modes of thought, then is the narrative self not in the very same modernist position of interiorizing selfhood and relying upon itself for standards or criteria? Invention subverts the teleological concept of a whole human life lived well, for that life may cease to be evaluated objectively and impersonally and instead may be evaluated with standards, rules, and roles that now exist within, not outside, the self.

Perhaps MacIntyre sees this as inevitable. Modern man cannot do without autonomy, but autonomy jeopardizes community. Can the two be reconciled? Though Socrates saw his role as that of self-proclaimed gadfly, Athenian leaders could only interpret that role according to its established rules and roles. In the Athenian panoply Socrates was the corruptor of the morals of the young. Though the stories each side told about what
Socrates did were "different and incompatible" (p, 173), the end each side chose was the same. To maintain the priority of the community and its laws, Socrates took his life.

An individual through autonomy can transcend the moral limitations of his community, but the community, to maintain its integrity and cohesion, must order banishment or death of its transcenders. Is that necessarily the standoff MacIntyre sees? Is there no way to extend the boundaries of the community to accommodate the inventions and insights of the autonomous? If the community is to continue to provide secure personal identities through social stability, it appears there is not. We are back, then, in the same quandary we encountered in Taylor's account: The self can disengage from communal standards, even invent new ones, and thereby transcend community boundaries. But this not only threatens to leave the self without community, but it also threatens to leave the self without a "self," beyond the horizon of evaluations or stripped of the attributes of social existence. This tension between liberal autonomy and communitarian sociality will become clearer, because the issue becomes even more muddled, in the arguments of Michael Sandel.
Like Taylor and MacIntyre, Sandel distinguishes between a pre-modern self and a modern one. The crux of the distinction lies, again, in distance; this time, in the distance that deontological or rights-based liberalism—the liberalism of much contemporary moral and political philosophy—requires between the self and its aims and attributes. This liberalism, Sandel argues, is based on faulty philosophical and metaphysical foundations. In short, "we cannot coherently regard ourselves as the kind of beings deontological [liberalism] requires us to be."10

According to Sandel's view, liberal society is a collection of individuals, each with his own aims and interests, which are pursued jointly for mutual benefit. Because each also has his own conception of the good life, the government which governs best neither predisposes toward nor presupposes any single particular conception. This neutrality grants to rights a priority over the good, so that rights limit the establishment of any vision of the good. Hence this liberalism is rights-based and deontological, which is perhaps best understood as anti-teleological—that is, its first principles in no way depend upon any notion of final human purposes or upon any particular conception of what is the good for man. Within this kind of scheme the principles of justice hold primacy because they are independently derived; i.e., justice does not repose on any determinate notion of the good. This derivation makes justice more than simply one value among many. It gives it foundational priority; it is prior, that is, to all empirical ends.
According to Sandel's reading of *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls, a quintessential contemporary theorist of deontological liberalism and the focus of Sandel's critique, follows Kant in arguing for the primacy of justice and for the priority of the right over the good. Indeed, justice is the very standard by which values and the good are judged and by which conflicts among them are resolved. This, however, introduces an epistemological problem. To judge such conflicts, to have such standards, one must find a perspective outside or beyond them from which to assay the situation. When the very structure of society is under scrutiny, we need, according to Rawls, an "Archimedean point" (*A Theory of Justice*, p. 260). Such a point must be neither so immersed in the world that its criticality is compromised, nor so detached that the standards involved would be groundless. Rawls's point is called "the original position."

The same holds true for considerations of the nature of the subjects or selves of deontological liberalism. For the right to be prior to the good, the liberal self must be able to stand back from conceptions of the good to choose among them. To be able to stand back in this fashion and to be able to choose, the self must be conceived as apart from those conceptions; it must be at some remove from these ends. The self must also be prior to these ends, since "before an end is chosen, there must be a self around to choose it" (p. 19). Therefore the self is prior to and independent of its choices. Essential to agency is not the ends chosen but the capacity to choose.

In arguing for such a conception of the self, Kant had proposed the "noumenal" realm. He had said that the self is essentially unknowable: "no fixed and abiding self can present itself in the flux of inner appearances." Therefore, to assure the continuity of the self some principle
of unity that "precedes all experience and makes experience itself pos-
sible" must be presumed. Rawls, however, cannot accept the notion
of the noumenal realm, for he denies that it has any connection with the
human situation: Either the self is disembodied without attributes and thus
nothing but abstract consciousness, or it is "radically situated" and its
identity is affected by any changes in one's circumstances. The former
roves about the Kantian empyrean where the self with no object of awareness
other than itself cannot be known; the latter splashes in the sea of cir-
cumstances where the subject is not distant from desires, interests, and
aims, but is those.

In place of these, Rawls proposes to revise the Kantian conception of
the self by removing it from the realm of transcendental idealism into the
realm of "reasonable empiricism" (Rawls, 1977, p. 165). Rawls's project
is to find an ontological equivalent of the Archimedean point, to avoid the
pitfalls both of a disembodied self and of a radically situated self. Thus
he reaches for a perspective metaphorically half-way between them, beyond
one's social situation but not so far beyond it as to be an empty abstraction.
The self needs a critical perspective from afar but "not too far" (p. 17).
The solution proposed by Rawls is "to conceive the self as a subject of
possession," what Sandel calls the "voluntarist" self (p. 54).

As a subject of possession the definition of the self is untouched by
any of its attributes, which are merely possessions. The subject is
"antecedently individuated"—meaning, that the boundaries and identity of
the self are determined and fixed prior to any experience or relationship.
Possession establishes a relationship to attributes—they are mine
rather than yours—yet permits a distance from them—they are mine
rather than me. Thus the deontological self is saved from Kantian
transcendence by being both distinct from yet related to its ends.

It is Sandel's purpose, at least in part, to refute Rawls's claim that he can detach liberalism and the deontological self from Kantian metaphysics. To depict the self as a subject of possession, Sandel points out, is to strip its identity of any attributes, to place it "beyond the reach of experience," to make it "invulnerable" to circumstances, and to fix its identity "once and for all." With the boundaries of the self antecedent to and untouched by contingency, and with its identity empty of constituent traits, the self is free to choose ends as possessions. There are therefore no ends or traits, no attributes, without which the person would cease to know himself. In short, the disembodied or "unencumbered" self found in Kant is also found, inescapably, in Rawls as well (p. 62).12

Sandel sees, as Taylor and MacIntyre did, that at bottom this unencumbered or voluntarist self is emotivist, since the character of its choices is arbitrariness.13 There are no grounds for justifying choices other than groundless preference; there are no means for assessing the quality of ends to be chosen. This self is Taylor's "simple weigher," whose reflection is limited to the prudent assessment of the efficacy of various choices in fulfilling wants and desires. As self-knowledge this kind of reflection consists, in Rawls's words, of knowing "not only what things we want but also how much we want them" ( A Theory of Justice, p. 416). Nowhere does the deontological agent ask, "which of these choices most reflects me?" This cannot occur, because the self can take "as its objects the contingent wants and desires and preferences of the self, but not the self itself" (p. 189).

In contrast to the "unencumbered" view, Sandel proposes the "cognitive" view. On this account, one's particularities are not like seasonal
fashions that are changed periodically. Stripped of these the self that is left is no self at all. As Daniel Bell said, "The person has disappeared. Only attributes remain" (p. 45). The cognitive self is identified by its particularities, aims, traits, and relationships. These are values and ends that are essential to the self, with a sanction independent of the mere fact that the agent holds them (p. 165). They are other than "arbitrary construals" (Taylor, 1985c, p. 262), since they are grounded in the community. Thus the self is socially constituted, defined by and inseparable from its ends "already before it" (p. 59). According to Sandel, once one concedes that ends are given in advance, one thinks of himself no longer as an agent who chooses his ends, but as an agent who is bound in advance (p. 117).

Unlike the unencumbered self, this socially constituted self is (again in Taylor's terms) a "strong evaluator," for his reflection goes to the very boundaries of the self. Reflection enables the self to discern from among the "clutter of possible ends" where its boundaries and definition lie, "what is me from what is mine" (p. 59). Therefore, the self is not radically situated such that identity is contingent on any change in circumstance. Rather, identity is contingent on reflective self-understandings; that is, on discovering through reflection those ends and values and circumstances that make me the person I am. Through this reflective self-understanding, this "cognitive" approach, the person learns to distinguish between ends that are constitutive--"I am this"--and those that are possessives--"This is mine." "The relevant question is not what ends to choose, for my problem is precisely that the answer to this question is already given, but rather who I am...." (Idem) Whereas voluntaristic agency is antecedent and dependent on choice free of contingency, cognitive agency
depends on reflection to discover antecedent, constitutive ends. To be capable of such reflective self-understanding "we cannot be wholly unencumbered subjects" (p. 172). One must have something constitutive to reflect on.

If the self is defined by antecedent ends given by the community, how can one self be differentiated from other selves constituted by the same content? Physicality aside, it cannot. Sandel claims that our self-understandings "comprehend a wider subject than the individual alone" (Iadem). Because I am partly constituted by the shared practices, traditions, and ends of my community; because my individuality is a social product developed through interactions and relationships with others, participation in joint practices, and "a common vocabulary of discourse" (Iadem), then my identity is not an isolate but a conjunction, not a subjectivity but an intersubjectivity. We share a common identity through these common practices, aims, and attachments. As Taylor and MacIntyre also argued, without considering this constitutive community, one can neither fully explain nor understand himself.

Clearly the socially constituted self has choices and conflicts. As with MacIntyre's Aristotelian self, there are tensions among various ends and roles. The boundaries of the self, unlike the unencumbered self, are not prior to contingency and are not fixed. They are, rather, possibilities limited only by the antecedent clutter of possible ends. Reflection enables me to discover among that clutter where my definition and boundaries lie. But what is a discovery? How do I know from within that clutter of possible ends those, more than others, that truly constitute me? Moreover, if some ends are more truly constitutive of who I am than other ends, then the others who share those ends with me must be truly more conjunctive with me. Then
intersubjectivity is not shared community-wide but only with part of it. Sandel says as much. "Where [a] sense of participation in the achievement and endeavor of (certain) others engages the reflective self-understandings of the participants, we may come to regard ourselves, over the range of various activities, less as individuated subjects with certain things in common, and more as participants in a common identity, be it a family or community or clan or people or nation" (p. 143).

Sandel is clear that community is constitutive of persons, though he is unclear in defining it: Community "describes not just what [people] have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover" (p. 180). He is clear that ends stipulated by the community define the self and remain inseparable from it: "The independent self finds its limits in those aims and attachments from which it cannot stand apart" (p. 182). And he acknowledges that there is also a process involved in personal identity: The task of the socially constituted self is "to sort out" the contours of one's identity in the face of the seeming welter of multitudinous, indispensable ends already given.

Yet if the self is inseparable from aims and attachments, then how and to what extent is this an "independent self"? If there are ends to sort out—indeed, to choose from—then how does one do this sorting? How does one know whether an end defines "who I am" rather than "what is mine"? By intuition? By preference? Aside from being limited to a range of pre-designated ends, how is this procedure of discovery different from the choices of a Rawlsian self?

It would seem that once again a communitarian theorist posits a reflective process or autonomy within a circumscribed set of givens or ends;
within, that is, a community. For all three theorists, though perhaps especially for Sandel, this raises the same vexing question: Who is doing the reflecting?

If there are ends that constitute my identity, and yet I am able to reflect on those ends, can render the boundaries of my identity clearer, can discover who I am in the given clutter of ends, then must there not be a reflecting self able to stand back from those ends? Sandel and MacIntyre and Taylor have a conceptual problem: To be judged, an object must be separate from and not fused with the subject that judges. The subject that reflects must be differentiated from the objects reflected upon. If the subject is not at some remove from its ends, then it is embedded in and must be those ends.

Perhaps Sandel would retort that the reflecting self must be able to stand back from only some of those ends, those that are contingent rather than constituent. Yet the ends that constitute the self by definition cannot be the ends reflected on; any end that is an object cannot be the subject. Sandel says that the limits of the independent self are found "in those aims and attachments from which it cannot stand apart." But if the self cannot be separate from these aims, which truly do constitute its identity, then it cannot reflect on them. How then can one understand reflectively who he is? One could only know himself not to be contingent ends.

Does this last point go too far? Clearly one can reflect on predetermined aims and attachments, and from those discover that some are integral to who that person is. Losing these integral ends and relationships affects the person's identity. He ceases to be the person he was. This is common sense. Yet Sandel makes a claim beyond this. These constitutive
ends and relationships are only found in the clutter of ends given by the community. If some ends can be reflected on, why not all ends? Because, answers Sandel, the limits of the independent self are found in that clutter. The self cannot go beyond it without the problem of drifting into a deontological, or unencumbered, state. To avoid the liberal self devoid of all character Sandel postulates a self limited by communal ends. These provide the "fixity of character" (p. 180) essential to selfhood. But those limits can certainly not be "found" or discovered. To do that would require reflecting on them. That, in turn, requires separation from those ends, which Sandel states one cannot do. For if, as Sandel says, reflection shapes the contours of identity (p. 59), then the reflecting subject must be separate from and prior to the constitution of that identity. Only then could the reflecting agent discern from within a clutter of ends those that constitute his identity.

Sandel has an extreme problem with autonomy and community that Taylor and MacIntyre seem to avoid. Taylor and MacIntyre argue that the self can transcend community boundaries and thus can stand apart from its ends, though at great peril to the constitution of the self; Sandel argues that the self is inseparable from and thus embedded in at least some of the community's ends. If the self is the community framework and its ends, then the self cannot reflect on those ends and the framework; if the self can reflect on the ends, then those ends cannot constitute the self.

If Rawls's theory of the self is untenable, if not incoherent, then by the same token, but from the opposite side, so is Sandel's. On the Rawlsian account, what is beyond agency and thus not subject to choice are the self and the principles of justice, since they obtain prior to any actual choosing. What is not subject to reflective self-understanding on the Sandelian
account is the community framework that sets the bounds of and constitutes identity. Just as the framework of justice is assumed, so is Sandel's framework of community. Just as "the morality of right, which assumes freedom of choice within its bounds, cannot itself be vulnerable to any choice that would challenge or restrict it" (p. 156), so too the morality of the good, which assumes freedom of "sorting out" within the bounds of ends and attachments, cannot itself be vulnerable to reflection that would challenge or expand it. How else could ends and identity be secured? In both cases an unassailable framework, antecedently given, is a prerequisite of identity. Rawls posits an unchosen framework of agency, an a priori self whose boundaries are fixed "once and for all," independent of any ends. Thus the bounds of the Rawlsian self provide a basis for choice that is itself not chosen. Sandel posits an unexamined framework of constituent ends given by an antecedent community. The bounds of community provide the basis for reflection on self and ends that is itself not reflected.

In the end, for both theories, "the self disappears." For Rawls the self stripped of any traits drifts off into pure abstraction, which is no self at all. For Sandel the self is fused with and constituted by its ends, inseparable and thus indistinguishable from those ends...which is no self at all. If "the limited scope for self-reflection...betrays the thinness of the deontological self" (p. 181), then it also betrays the thinness of the socially situated self.

Rather than leave the theories of Sandel and Rawls floundering in contradictions, we can propose a third theory of the self that can redeem them both by requiring for its explication a combination of the Rawlsian and the Sandelian selves. To generate such a theory we can make use of openings in the accounts offered by both theorists.
Asking a Rawlsian subject "who are you?" does not stump him, but elicits a recital of those attributes that he thinks define him. Otherwise, that self is indistinguishable from other selves. Thus Rawls must make some room within his theory for constitutive attributes. In "Justice As Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Rawls does so. He regards citizens as free in that they have a capacity for a sense of justice and can conceive of themselves—and others—as being able to form and live out a conception of the good (1985, p. 240). They are also able to change their conceptions and thereby change themselves; for example, when they undergo religious conversion. What does not change, however, is "their public identity as free persons" because that identity is predicated upon their "moral power" to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good, irrespective of its contents. "[T]hey do not cease to be, for the questions of political justice, the persons they were before" (Ibid, p. 241). Thus a Rawlsian self can change the content of his character—who he is psychologically—while retaining his identity as an autonomous agent—who he is ontologically—because the change is in the content, while the structure of personhood remains the same.

What Rawls describes, albeit in political terms, is what we found in Taylor's differentiation between persons and agents. Taylor sought to identify those capacities that make us distinctly human. Among them is strong evaluation. Such evaluation requires: a) some standard by which to evaluate, b) some act or value to evaluate, and c) some subject to do the evaluating. Imagine that a person acts in a way that society condemns; say,
a soldier is a coward in the face of an enemy attack. The nature of the cowardly act does not entitle us to withdraw or suspend the obligations owed to that soldier as a person. Indeed, it is because he continues to be a person that he can be held accountable for his actions. As a person or self he is separable from those actions. He commits them; he is not defined solely by them. He is something more besides.

Rawls has such a distinction in mind, not between agency and personhood, but between agency and self-concept. Persons "may regard it as simply unthinkable to view themselves apart from certain religious, philosophical, and moral convictions, or from certain enduring attachments and loyalties" (Idem). To alter those would be to change one's self, the person one defines himself to be. Without these particular convictions or attractions the person would be disoriented and in crisis, and would certainly no longer be the same person he had been. Yet though altering his personality and personal definition, he retains his personhood, what Rawls calls the "public or political identity" (p. 242). To hold that the boundaries of the self "are fixed once and for all" such that they are impermeable, invulnerable to transformation by experience, as Sandel says of Rawls (Op. cit., p. 57), contravenes common sense and all the evidence of psychological and religious transformation. What Rawls, and presumably other deontological liberals, can say is that persons can identify themselves by their attributes, but that no attribute or conviction or end is beyond scrutiny. That is so because all of one's identity is not captured by those attributes. There must be a subject, a part of the self, that scrutinizes.

Sandel himself admits of such a subject, though, as we saw, it threatens to undermine his entire theory. The socially constituted self,
through reflectivity, "turns its lights inward upon itself, making the self its own object of inquiry and reflection" (Op. cit., p. 58). Sandel then says that reflection establishes "a certain space between it and me... It [an obsession] becomes more an attribute and less a constituent of my identity...." (Idem) Although he is discussing obsessions in this context, the point extends beyond that to any object of reflection. Moreover, an object of reflection cannot become less of a constituent, implying calibration. Rather, at the first instant of reflection, or before, the critical space is established; the end or obsession is an object and no longer the subject.

Yet this philosophical point does not seem to bear much psychological weight. Surely an Irish Catholic paraplegic woman who works for The Ford Motor Company and is active in the feminist movement can identify with any and all of these traits. But to identify with them is already to presuppose a distinction between the subject and its ends or traits. The fact that there is such a separation means that one can work on those traits, as Sandel describes a person working on an obsession. Sandel claims that an obsession is anything that has taken hold of the person, that has eliminated the "space" between it and the self. Yet this describes the very nature of constitutive ends. It is therefore true of any constitutive end, and not just of obsessions, that reflection restores "the shrunken space between self and ends" (p. 58). It is that space that enables the agent to stand apart from and thus reflect on his traits.

Thus, one's traits or ends may be constitutive of the person in the sense that they are not merely features of his condition, but actually define part of who he is. Sandel grasps this notion, at least intuitively. He suggests that the good of the community and the preexisting ends are
only partly constitutive of one's identity (p. 161). He never elaborates on nor identifies which part is not so constituted, which is why his postulates reduce to a stark two: Either the self is prior to its ends, or it is constituted by those ends.

A more satisfactory theory of the self, to avoid the problems found in relying upon either postulate alone, would seem to require both. The self would therefore be constituted by "two tracks." It would be constituted by traits, aims, and relationships that formed a self-concept and by a reflective subject that made up its agency. The agent could then turn its lights inward to participate in the constitution of its identity, but unlike the socially constituted self this agent would be separate from the ends. As Erik Erikson said, "we can become aware of its work, but never of it" (1968, p. 218).

Anyone holding to deontological liberalism who saw only agency would be susceptible to the criticisms Sandel, Taylor, and MacIntyre have made. As long as the boundaries of the self are conceived of as fixed and given prior to any experience or ends; as long as man is by nature thought to be antecedently individuated, joined to others only voluntarily and for mutual benefit, then as a consequence society will stress values based on individualism rather than those of, say, altruism and cooperation. But to assume the opposite, as Sandel does, that personal identity is formed "in the light of ends already before it" (p. 152), also has severe consequences. If little thought is given to the nature of the subject who reflects, then reflection can easily be limited to a narrow range without considering that the reflecting self may be able to transcend that range. If the social environment limits the definition of a person in a specific manner and to particular ends, then it is reasonable to assume that the individual will come to accept
that socially sanctioned definition as his own.\textsuperscript{15}

The self as a two-track system would seem to provide the essential elements of both communitarian and liberal theories. We cannot imagine identity devoid of traits. Yet while roles and virtues (MacIntyre), evaluations (Taylor), and aims and attachments (Sandel) are necessary, they alone cannot account for selfhood. For there must also be an active agent that does not depend on what we define ourselves as, but on how we come to that definition. Losing that definition certainly creates identity crisis. One ceases to be the person he was. But one does not necessarily cease to be a person. The pieces can be picked up, because the resurrection of identity is not contingent on the renewal of specific particularities, but on the renewal of some particularities and a subject to pick them up. Identity, therefore, consists both of something to reflect on and of a self embedded in language and logic to reflect.\textsuperscript{16}

George Herbert Mead, the renowned social psychologist, described the "essential psychological problem of selfhood" as how to extricate oneself experientially from the self, how to get outside the self, in order to take the self as an object (1962, p. 202). There seem to be two persistent theories on how to come to terms with this problem. The communitarian theory, subsumed in all its varieties under the genus "pre-modern," posits a socially constituted self that is seen in and defined by the ends and values of the community in which the self is situated. When the self examines any of these constitutive traits, it is examining itself. The other theory, christened the "modern" or liberal theory, sees the self as able to step back from any experience, since it is captured by none, and able to take as an object any trait or attribute the self might possess. The self can examine anything surrounding the self, but not the examining self it-
self, for anything that can be examined cannot be the self.

What then occurs, comments Charles Taylor, is that "on the level of theory, [these two] are sorted out and become exclusive alternatives" (Vol. I, p. 114). Each theory is held to be the correct interpretation; each accuses the other of having no self at all: The communitarians criticize liberal theorists for positing a self without attributes and thus empty of all distinction; liberals criticize communitarians for submerging individual selves in collective ends and the common good.

In the next chapter we shall examine in more detail the two-track theory of the self, one that overcomes the limitations of the other two theories by proposing, as outlined, a self-system constituted by agency and self-concept. Using this theory we shall show that the self is neither antecedently individuated and thus impervious to and independent of changes in circumstances, nor socially constituted and thus embedded in the communal ends that are antecedently given. Selfhood is, rather, a multifaceted compound, and we shall call this view of the self as a two-track system, the theory of compound selfhood or compound individuality.

But this does not mean that presupposing a self looking and a self observed requires hypothesizing a Kantian noumenal self prior to and beyond all experience. Instead, the theory of compound individuality will enable us to accomplish what Rawls suggested—to move the self from transcendental idealism into reasonable empiricism. To do so we shall use empirical data drawn from developmental psychology, and we shall then see how the two "exclusive alternatives," as described by Taylor, are really two parts of a more comprehensive whole.
CHAPTER 2

THE THEORY OF COMPOUND INDIVIDUALITY

Surprisingly, the increasing interest among communitarians, and among students of political theory in general, in notions of the self, the person, and individuality has not led them into psychology. Part of the explanation may be that psychologists themselves renewed their study of the self only after they had broken free of the preoccupation with and domination by behaviorism. Today, communitarians would find compatible positions in the theories of a new generation of social psychologists, the "social constructivists," while liberals would find support in the "humanistic psychology" movement that emphasizes the importance to individuals of autonomous choice.

Yet the one area that can be said to have had in recent years the greatest theoretical impact on self psychology is developmental psychology, or what is also called developmental structuralism. It is from this massive, and growing, body of empirical research that we shall derive the theory of compound individuality.

The term "developmental structuralism" was first used in biology: structuralism, to indicate that an organism undergoes a process of growth through increasingly complex forms by differentiation from and reintegration of earlier forms; developmentalism, to describe the internal coherence and spontaneous activity of living things. The idea of structuralism was
introduced into other disciplines; for example, into anthropology by Lévi-Strauss, into psychology by Foucault, into literary criticism by Barthes, and into philosophy by Althusser. But it was combined with developmentalism and pioneered in psychology by Jean Piaget.

Piaget focused his research almost entirely on the structures of cognitive development. He proposed that cognitive or mental growth occurs through a succession of increasingly complex stages, each a structural whole but also only part of a greater whole, the succeeding stage or structure. Cognitive categories, Piaget believed and demonstrated, are fundamental to understanding mental development—a statement that is not tautological. Mental development comprises emotions, will, imagination, creativity, morality, religion, the self; cognition involves simply, but not without complications, the processes of knowing. Self psychologists, moral developmentalists, learning theorists, object-relation psychoanalysts, and ego psychiatrists argue that the cognitive structures are necessary but insufficient for whatever area of mental or psychological growth they are examining. "Cognitive development," wrote psychologist Jane Loevinger, "is the cornerstone of human development as a whole, because cognitive principles constitute the broadest and the most encompassing structures that one can imagine" (1976, p. 42). The cornerstone of our developmental theory of compound individuality or compound selfhood will be the "hard" cognitive structures (H. Gardner, 1972) described by Piaget.
All developmentalists, whatever their research orientations, posit hierarchy. Whatever the perspectives, that hierarchy appears, in general terms, to be the same: a series of levels of organization, each level a totality yet simultaneously a part of the larger, more inclusive, and more complex level that follows it. "Wherever development occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration" (Werner, 1957, p. 126).

Piaget proposed a hierarchy of such levels of cognition: sensorimotor intelligence, preconceptual intelligence, concrete operational intelligence, and formal operational intelligence. (Some of these levels could be subdivided, but for our discussion this is not necessary.) The emergence of the levels is age-related, and the levels arise in invariant sequence. The concrete operational level, for instance, cannot appear before the preconceptual level.

Neither an empiricist nor an a priorist, Piaget saw knowledge as actively constructed and reconstructed over time as the individual interacts with the environment and seeks to maintain an equilibrium—order and constancy—between himself and the external world. When Piaget began his musings and experiments, this was a novel, even radical, notion—that individuals were constantly trying to make sense of the world by constructing hypotheses for "testing" and by fitting them together into some sort of coherent picture or account (H. Gardner, Op. cit.).

The patterns of interaction between the individual and his external world Piaget called "schemas" or "schematas." The repertoire of schemas is
the individual's method of adapting to the environment or to experiences. The schemas undergo constant modification as new experiences or objects are taken in (assimilation), or as the individual adjusts to those objects or experiences (accommodation). Nevertheless, the levels retain throughout these "schematic" changes their property of being unified wholes.

To summarize the Piagetian levels: A baby "makes sense" predominantly through her reflexes, then through sensorimotor experiences and knowledge of objects, and on to mental actions or operations (i.e., actions performed in one's head rather than, for example, by hand). This use of mental symbols develops into "concrete operations" by which a child can understand that relations exist among actions, so that one can view the same scene from different points of view without thinking that components of that scene change whenever perspective is changed. This mental ability culminates in the stage of "formal operations" by which a person can think about her own thinking (a structured whole of operations on classes, not just on symbols.) Let us briefly examine each level independently.

1. Sensorimotor Intelligence (0-2 years)

Piaget found infants to be "undifferentiated"; that is, fused with the material world. The infant cannot distinguish between herself and the world. There is no inside and outside, no subject and object, no body and environment. The infant is aware of events--movements, for example--but cannot separate them or does not see them as separate from herself. "During the early stages the world and the self are one; neither term is distinguished from the other...the self is material, so to speak" (Gruber and Voneche, 1977).
By eighteen months the infant has become successful enough in differentiating her body from her surroundings that she has begun to exercise control over physical actions. Thinking, according to Piaget, grows through the internalization of action. Now the infant can act out situations recalled from memory. Thinking and physical actions are developing together, so that the infant can coordinate actions and perceptions into schemas.

Also by eighteen months comes the ability to use symbols that represent the physical world in images or pictures. These symbols are still perceptual, not conceptual, for the child is simply seeing resemblances or relations between actions or situations. A toddler may fall down and suddenly stop, turn onto her side, and pretend to sleep. She has recognized the similarity between her position when she fell and her position when asleep.

2. Preconceptual Intelligence (1-5 years)

Thinking at this level is still "representational." Although the child can discriminate among colors, for example, she does not think to categorize or classify by color. Piaget called this level "egocentric" because the child reads all experiences through her own immediate world, seeing everything as an extension of herself. She believes that objects are man-made and can be influenced from a distance by her wishes or actions; she ascribes to all objects life and feelings; and she believes that her dreams and thoughts are immediately accessible to others.

At the end of this stage, a child will begin to offer reasons for her beliefs. To the question "why do you think this car is alive?", a younger
child might answer, "Because I do." A child at the end of the stage might instead explain: "Because it goes fast" (Beard, 1969). By this time the child can also classify objects correctly according to color or size or shape. But she can only do so by one category at a time, having trouble with two or more simultaneous relations. Hence a child has no difficulty with the term "small," but does with the term "smaller," which implies a comparison with something else. The classical Piagetian experiment to test a child at this stage of preconceptual thought is the test of conservation. Water is poured from a tall, thin glass into a short, broad glass. Although the child can accurately describe the two glasses, she does not perceive that their capacity is the same despite the change in shape. Thus when the water is poured, the child will say that the short one holds less water. She cannot yet understand relationships between whole and part or classes and sub-classes.¹

Judgements are made on the basis of perceptions; the child cannot take the role of another. If a child examines an object with one red side and one green side, and an experimenter then places the green side toward the child and the red side toward him and asks the child what color the experimenter sees, the child will answer, "green."

Language is quickly developing throughout this level, and that is crucial to further cognitive development. Language begins to replace actions. Eventually verbal thought—as opposed to thoughts in images—will transcend action through speed and comprehensiveness. Thus more and more of the child's thinking is freed from physical actions. The child may no longer have to touch objects to count them.
3. **Concrete Operational Intelligence** (6-10 years)

More and more actions that previously needed to be acted out physically are now performed solely as mental operations. The child can now imagine actions and is freed from needing to perform them physically. But such operations are limited to actions on actual objects or materials easily imagined or already in visual form—hence the term "concrete." By this level the child has also developed the ideas of series and classes. Asked to arrange sticks according to size, a child at the concrete operational level will survey the entire field of sticks and quickly arrange them in order, whereas the child at the preconceptual level must examine each pair of sticks one at a time. Classes can be multiplied and divided; the child can classify blocks using two or more characteristics—for example, color and shape; and she can draw a largest and a smallest circle without needing to draw intermediate sizes.

Piaget described these new operations or cognitive abilities as creating a capacity to see relationships with others. Children play together instead of playing side-by-side. Despite this development, the child still has problems taking the role of others and has trouble relinquishing her own point of view. Relationships between classes still pose problems, and the child at the concrete operations level cannot imagine new possibilities and is unable to see general rules.

4. **Formal Operational Intelligence** (11 years - adult)

This is the level of abstract logic and rationality. Thinking can now deal solely with verbal elements without need of physical referents. The
adolescent can establish, operate upon, and understand abstract relations on relations; i.e., propositional thinking and proportionality. She can also imagine possibilities. Whereas the child at concrete operational level will use trial-and-error methods to achieve a solution, an adolescent at the formal operations level can mentally make plans and create hypotheses for testing; and she can test them mentally--logically--without having to do them physically. This hypothetico-deductive and propositional thinking is a property of formal operations. Only at this level can she create her own conditional statements: "If I do this, then this will follow."

At large, the adolescent at this level will begin to seek general laws, principles, or reasons as explanations, whereas the child at the concrete operational level, and below, is satisfied with descriptions or partial explanations.

Before this level the adolescent is unable to gain access to her own cognitive processes, unable to treat her own thinking as an object of introspective thought. Now she can criticize her own standards, ideas, and assumptions and can deal with complex relationships. Not only can she take the role of others and argue by implication, she can also take a view of the future, not just of past and present. This level thus enables the adolescent to survey and create possibilities; to imagine cases, examples, and worlds that do not exist; to deliberate and reflect. Dialogue is internalized, and the adolescent can think about thinking. The adolescent can operate not only on objects themselves, but also on statements or "formal" propositions about objects.

Piaget believed that this level was initiated through cooperation with others and through exchange of viewpoints, leading to consideration of perspectives different from one's own.
The fundamentally significant and valuable contribution of Piaget was to suggest, and to demonstrate experimentally, that the development of cognitive abilities proceeds through levels of increasing complexity, levels that are increasingly differentiated and more inclusive. Repetition of actions leads at each level to patterns of action or "schemas" that enable the child to interact with the environment through increasingly sophisticated accommodating and assimilating experiences. Still later cognitive structures emerge with linguistic sophistication, enabling the individual to operate upon the physical world with conceptual tools and then finally to operate upon thought itself. Each level is associated with particular ages and unfolds in an invariant sequence. The explanation of the invariant sequence is straightforward: One level does not appear before its predecessor, because the succeeding level builds upon the preceding one. More significant than this, as differentiation increases through the hierarchy, each level not only incorporates those levels preceding, it but transcends them as well. Thus formal operations not only show the properties of concrete operational intelligence, but also include properties not present at the concrete operational level—hypothetico-deductive reasoning or propositional thought.

Any researcher using a developmental-structural model owes a debt to Piaget. Of course, different researchers focus on different aspects of human development—e.g., psychosexual stages, identity formation, object relations. But taken together these studies yield a consistent model of human growth. That model shows two types of growth: 1) the emergence of
basic structures or "levels," which, all agree, arise in invariant sequence
and once transcended, remain in operation; 2) phases or "stages" that occur
or appear as contents or manifestations of those particular basic struc-
tures or levels.

The basic structures are innate, while the stages are determined by
one's personality, history, and culture. Thus, while the stages will
differ from person to person, and from society to society, the basic
structures, since inherent, are the same for everyone.5

But the more crucial aspect of this distinction for our discussion
lies elsewhere: While the basic structures remain in operation once they
have unfolded, the stages associated with a basic structure disappear when
a new basic structure becomes central to how the individual interacts.

Piaget's cognitive levels are basic structures, for we saw in his
theory that the succeeding levels build upon the preceding ones and that
the functions of cognitive structures transcended by later levels remain in
operation. Thus the preoperational level continues operating--one can
still dream, for example--after the conceptual levels have unfolded.

Notice, however, that Piaget's psychology has no self. The cognitive
operations he studied are, since basic structures, innate. At no point in
Piaget's developmental hierarchy of innate operations, at no particular
level, can one say, "There is the self." This is simply because there is,
according to developmental psychologists, no inherent self (Broughton, 1986
and Wilber, 1982).

This is the nature of the sense of self: It is a stage phenomenon, not
a basic structure. At each level the sense of self is generated and inter-
preted according to the basic cognitive structure of that level. From the
interactions between the individual and the environment a self-sense
emerges. Those interactions and their limits are determined by the cognitive abilities that constitute each basic structure. Thus, for example, when an infant is limited to and thus bounded by early sensorimotor intelligence, there is no sense of self because the infant cannot differentiate between himself and the world, between his leg and the table leg. But as sensorimotor intelligence matures, the infant can make such a differentiation. When he bites his blanket, nothing happens; when he bites his thumb, it hurts. His sense of self becomes body-bound. Once preoperational intelligence unfolds, however, the sense of self can shift away from the body and into the mind. Though the sense of self is no longer as the body, the individual still has a body. The functions of sensorimotor intelligence remain, but the sense of self has been completely replaced.

Piaget suggested that each cognitive structure provides operations or capacities that serve as tools for making sense of—he said, for "constructing"—a type of external reality. Yet those operations correlative structure an inner world or self as well. The interactions between the individual and the environment must establish a boundary between self and other, subject and object, inside and outside, so the subject can know the world. As the interactions change, so the boundary changes. When identity shifts to the mind and out of the body, then the individual can operate, can control, the body. This can happen because the sense of self has changed. What was subject has now become object. Before, the infant could not operate on or "see" the body because he was the body. Now he is conscious of his body, and his identity is no longer bound by his skin.

What, then, is the self? It is a two-part "system": how one defines himself and what he defines himself as. The first we call "agency"; the second, "self-definition."
Agency. "Ego," wrote Loevinger, "is above all a process, not a thing... The striving to master, to integrate, to make sense of experience is not one ego function among many but the essence of the ego" (1976, p. 59). Substitute the word "self" for "ego" in this quotation, and one has the essence of agency. The process involves using the cognitive abilities available at each level as tools for operating on the world and, more specifically, for operating on what had most recently been the subject or self. That self has now become, with the shift in boundary, an object of awareness. Thus, preoperational thought can be used to control bodily functions and impulses once the self is no longer constituted as the body.

Self-definition. The agency aspect of the "self-system" changes as new basic structures emerge, and the boundary between self and other shifts so that what once constituted subjectivity can now be objectified and operated on. Agency is always characterized by the process of using the cognitive tools--that is, itself--to organize a meaningful self-concept and world view. It organizes, in brief, a self-definition. Central to that self-definition is what was agency at the prior level. Thus with the unfolding of preoperational thought and the shift of agency into mind, the body becomes part of the self-definition. It is no longer the self itself: The body is "mine"; it is no longer "me," though it still makes up how the individual describes or defines herself. Ask a child at this level to describe herself, and she will say something like, "I have red hair"; ask a child at the concrete operational level, and she will say something like, "I like horses" or "I play chess." The shift is from a literal self-consciousness focused on her body--since what was most recently agency becomes the center of the self-definition--to a self-consciousness about what
Therefore, the self-system consists both of process and of product, of agency or the organizer of identity and of self-definition or what is organized into an identity. A cognitive-developmental approach to identity, comments James Broughton, shows that human growth can only be understood if one realizes that new conceptualizations of self are not simply new self-definitions—that is, new content—but are also new in form—that is, also a process for ordering psychological experience. "This entails that the concept of self is not a self-concept, emphasizing the particular features of a single self, but is a concept of selfhood" that must include agency, or, in his terms, "subjectivity" (1981b, p. 16). What we cannot be conscious of is our agency; what we place at the center of describing ourselves is our self-definition.

MEMBERSHIP VERSUS AUTONOMY

Developmentalists who have examined the nature of or changes in the self, or its equivalents, agree that a stage of self is associated with each basic or cognitive structure. They agree that although devoid of self the cognitive structures are the basis of the self—both as tools for generating a self-definition and as boundaries of the self or agency. They agree that self-development proceeds through stratified stages characterized by increasing complexity, integration, unity, and interaction; similar, in fact, to the procession of the basic structures that underlie them. Indeed, these theorists are in such agreement on these matters that it is possible to say that they are unanimous on the existence, emergence, and nature of these stages. What they all describe in looking
through the prism of the hierarchy of development is not one self but a
"series" of selves; yet not so much a concatenation of selves, as an
"evolution" of self. Each self disappears to be replaced by a "higher
order" self, for at each new level of identity, all the basic structures
that preceded that new level are integrated into identity. This
integration makes the individual at each level a compound. Thus the
individual is a compound self or compound individual.

While it is true that associated with each basic structure is a stage
of self, it is essential to keep in mind that the basic or cognitive struc­
tures can unfold without identity shifting to that level. In other words,
there can be a lag between the use of the cognitive abilities available at
a new level and the shift of agency to that new level. Thus, for
example, as we shall see, an adult can use formal operations to rationalize
or justify maintaining the stage of self--"membership"--associated with
concrete operations.

While there is a "body-self" associated with sensorimotor intelligence
and a "representational" or "magical" self associated with preoperational
intelligence (Arieti, Op. cit. and Wilber, 1980), our discussion will be
limited to the "membership" self of concrete operations and the
"autonomous" self of formal operations. These latter two are the stages at
which the individual becomes truly social, when what is most significantly
other to the self is other selves. Here lies the root of the communitarian-
liberal debate and the key to a possible resolution.
The world of the preoperational or "magical" self is one of shifting images. Although there is some differentiation here between inner and outer, the boundary between self and other is not clearly defined. Thus whatever one senses, whatever appears in one's subjectivity, is taken as absolutely real. This is the stage of "imaginary" friends that are to the child quite real.

With the advent of the preoperational ability to bring up images without requiring the presence of the "corresponding external stimulus" (Arieti, Op. cit., p. 61)--i.e., a child can imagine her father without needing to have him present--identity begins to move from the physical world of the body-self to the mental world. But the thinking at the preoperational level is not linear or logical. It is what Jacques Lacan called in The Language of the Self "the forgotten language of childhood," where syntax collides with magic. At this level resides the notion that wishing someone to break his ankle may in reality cause him to.

Language brings forth a more complex world, one not just of physical objects and images and symbols, but one also of concepts. To coordinate this complexity requires, however, a different level of abilities. The rise of concrete operations, the first truly logical mental operations, supplants the tendency of the preoperational child to give magical explanations and to confuse the part for the whole. Now the world can stop shifting, and it "starts to hold still" (Kegan, 1982, p. 32); it becomes "concrete."

Through concrete operations the child constructs a world that is orderly, regular, and stable. These operations enable the child to coordinate perceptions. Thus while the preoperational child can compare
nickels and dimes (pounds and pennies), the concrete operational child can compare "coins." She can, that is, create classes of things. Now the child can understand the rules of conservation, that the water poured from the tall, thin glass into the short, squat glass is the same amount of water. Those rules extend beyond conservation of number to conservation of group membership. This membership, because it is essential to the creation and maintenance of a stable world view and a stable sense of self, becomes of ultimate concern.

Concrete operations enable the child to take perceptions, impulses, and concepts as objects. Through this ability the child develops "a continuing sense about things and people" (Ibid, P. 161), as well as an enduring disposition. From this disposition the child develops a self-concept. But perpetuation of one's sense of things and people--world view--and one's sense of self--self-concept--requires learning the rules for coordinating perceptions and conceptions. Those rules are not simply the tools for coordination, but are at this level the actual source of the world view and self. Because operations are concrete, the rules to learn or that can be learned are limited to those of the flesh-and-blood others ("concrete" others) by whom the child is surrounded.

Able to sustain perceptions and conceptions, the child is able to build out of what is given or shared a continuing and stable social order that retains its properties from one social perception to the next. Through acting on and coordinating this creation the child generates a sense of self. The child knows herself as a member of that social order. She cannot know herself apart from this group context, for there is no self independent of that context.
Because the child is limited by concrete operations to external characteristics, the boundary between self and other is simplistically drawn. Groups--one's own and other groups--are defined by obvious, concrete characteristics: sex, age, race, costume, etc. Within these groups everyone will be seen to be, or the child thinks they ought to be, very much alike.

While coordination of perceptions brings the ability to take the role of another, this ability is limited to those of one's own group, since within that limit there is no possibility of losing one's self. Control of the world, and of oneself, is gained through mastering the rules by which the world and the group are seen to be governed. To assure that this mastery is not undermined the child avoids anything that is uncertain or unpredictable and focuses on amassing information and statistics. Therefore it is not surprising, as Kegan (1982) observes, that the favorite reading of many children in the membership stage is The Guinness Book of World Records.

It is the limits of concrete operations that lead the child to focus on such interests. When one asks a child at this stage, "Who are you?", the answer will resemble the concrete characteristics listed by James Joyce's young Stephen Daedalus: "Stephen Daedalus, Class of Elements, Clongowes Wood College, Gallins, County Kildare, Ireland, Europe, The World, The Universe."

The hallmark of this stage is competition and compromise. Both are about the experiencing of roles (Kegan, Op. cit., p. 163): Competition establishes, tests, and measures the enduring disposition; compromise tests one's new-found ability to take the roles of others, to see from another's point of view. The elaborate games and rituals characteristic of this stage are means for understanding, exercising, and celebrating roles. Each
participant shows herself and shows others not only that she has a prescribed role, but also that she can fulfil it. Participants therein "display themselves, the selves they have become" (Ibid, p. 166).

There is plenty for the child to learn within the limitations of her group. The rules important to learn are those that enable her to fit in with others (Leovinger, 1976, pp. 17-18). The group places new demands on the child, or, rather, her newly discovered awareness of the group demands more from her. The group "expects the adolescent to be able to take other people's feelings into account...to be able to keep agreements, meet expectations, and construct reasons for doing so--all invitations to the yearning for inclusion" (Kegan, Op. cit., p. 168). All of this is quite different from the egocentrism characteristic of the preoperational child.

Endowed with some perspectivism, able to operate with concepts and thus to learn rules and roles, the child learns to construct and perceive a particular shared reality. Everyone who comes into contact with the child is a teacher describing the world and its operations until finally the child learns the rules for making that world and its roles her own, perceiving it as described. This membership is reinforced as the child acts according to the rules of the group, fulfils her assigned roles, and shares the common reality through communication. As G. H. Mead said, the self is "socially constituted...and must extend as far as the social activity or approaches of social relations which constitute it extend" (1934, p. 223).

Agency is constituted by the rules and roles of the group; the self-definition, by the contents or the shared reality. Thus while the child can choose among acceptable social roles, the range of roles and the factors involved in choosing them are circumscribed by membership. "Since this [membership] mind is not yet capable of formal operational thought,
the self would have no inner capacity to easily judge the true role from the false (or fraudulent) ones—it would tend merely to conform to those roles assigned it" (Wilber, 1983, p. 285). Because the individual cannot see her own agency; because she cannot bring to her attention "the obligations, expectations, satisfactions, purposes, or influences" (Kegan, Op. cit.) of the group; because she cannot reflect on the rules and roles of his shared reality (she can learn them but cannot question them), the group rules. The need to conform is the central feature of the membership self, and the member is therefore acutely aware of the opinions of others. Having no critical distance from them, the child is captured by the viewpoints, opinions, and expectations and conforms to them.9

Since control and stability are essential to the membership self, the child seeks approval from others as a sign that her place in the group—and thus her self—is secure. The limit of the self lies in its inability to consult itself about, to separate from, the shared or group reality. Her membership, as her agency, is unconscious. It is not so much her reality, as the shared perceptions are herself. The group's norms are her norms; the group's codes, her codes. She obeys the rules simply because they are the group's rules.10

Yet the language belies the state of the self. Since the group is the source of self, there is no self to share with others or to conform to group norms. There is no self separate from the group and thus none to bring to the group. As Kegan remarked, others do not speak for her; she is the others speaking (Op. cit., p. 64). Without a self separate from the group the child is not initiated into a ready-made community and does not submit to its system. She is the community standards, purposes, rules, and roles. These are not internalized; they are, as her agency, unconscious
operators. "Something cannot be internalized until we emerge from our embeddedness in it...[I]t is our embeddedness, our subjectivity, that leads us to project it onto the world in our constitution of reality" (Ibid, p. 31). Rather than taken within, the framework is built up from the inside.

In rough terms, the self is seeking like-minds and like-opinions to reproduce, maintain, and reinforce its membership by sharing the symbols—beliefs, ideas, stories, purposes, etc.—of the group. When a person is thrown into a new group, the content may change, but the need to conform remains. Consider the case of a teenage boy who grows up in Little Rock, Arkansas, hating blacks, then moves to Madison, Wisconsin, and becomes an egalitarian (Ibid). Though the perspectives are diametrically opposed, the mode for defining oneself is exactly the same: conformity to one's peer group, expressing the need to fit in. But having no self separate from the group, the member does not perceive it this way.

Membership is most typically the identity of early adolescents. The adolescent, comments James Fowler, "needs mirrors" (1981, p. 151), the eyes and ears of trusted others to reflect the image of an unfolding personality. Thus, for example, adolescent love is preoccupied not so much with burgeoning sexuality as it is, Erik Erikson tells us, with forming a personal myth of the self that is mirrored in another.

Membership, Erikson also says, is the home of ideology, which he defines as "a coherent body of shared images, ideas, and ideals which provides for the participants a coherent, if systematically simplified, over-all orientation in space and time, in means and ends" (1960, p. 81). But as a developmentalist would argue, membership is not necessarily a pernicious level. It marks a step out of egocentrism and toward full perspectivism. The ability to take the roles of others, even if limited, is crucial for a
coherent world view, for it enables viewpoints to be shared and understood. Erikson argues that ideology, despite the simplifications and possible rationalizations, is for adolescents salutary. "Youth needs to base rejections and acceptances on ideological alternatives vitally related to the existing range of alternatives for identity formation" (Ibid, p. 33). The youth is thus presented with new options, ideals, roles, and rules but in a way that is limited and manageable. Whatever the content, aim, or end, the need of this stage is everywhere the same: "uncompromising commitment to some absolute hierarchy of values and some rigid principle of conduct" (Ibid, p. 81).

In the adolescent quest for identity "there is a universal trend toward some form of uniformity (and sometimes to special uniforms or distinctive clothing) through which incomplete self-certainty...can hide in group certainty...Even those who care to differ radically must evoke a certain uniformity of differing" (Ibid, p. 71). But why should self-certainty be incomplete? Membership is a level of shared and certain reality and thus of shared and certain self. But in middle adolescence belonging and membership become desperate needs, because affiliation can become conscious. The unfolding of formal operations can bring the onset of doubt as adolescents expand perspectivism beyond the group, and the agency of the membership self becomes an object of the new self's attention.
Autonomous Self

The unfolding of formal operational thought brings forth the "full range of operations involved in ratiocination" (Gardner, 1972, p. 103). This includes the capacities to express relations in terms of linguistic propositions; to consider systematically the relations of propositions to one another; and to generate counterfactuals, to make hypotheses, and to draw inferences. Whereas concrete operations enables the individual to use rules on concepts and to operate on the world of physical objects and persons, formal operations enables the individual to operate on logical or "formal" propositions about the world. Rather than just operating on the objects themselves, the individual can also operate on statements about objects.

Formal operations enable the individual to transcend the concrete world and so apply to it, or operate on it with, general laws and rules that need not refer to the contents of the particulars. Being able to act upon the world propositionally, hypothetically, and abstractly, the individual can create plans in which any given concrete event is but one instance or only one possibility. She comes thereby to realize that her own group or social order is only one possibility among many. While the membership self could conceive of the future, she could do so only as an extension of the concrete present. For her possibility was a subset of reality. For the formal operational adolescent, reality is a subset of possibility. She can now imagine ideal states and unseen worlds. "The result is a high degree of flexibility; rather than being embedded in their own concrete point of view, youth are able to approach any subject matter from multiple perspectives" (Labouvie-Vief, 1980, p. 152).
Such full-blown perspectivism means that one can separate from and thus operate on the group and its standards. The individual can now see the roles and rules that had constituted the self at the concrete operational level. Rather than being these rules and roles the formal operational adolescent has rules and roles. Whereas the individual at the concrete operational level operated within a flow of concrete events that carried her along and shaped her identity, the individual at the formal operational level can reflect on, can step back from, those events. Whereas meaning for the membership self derived from the group, for the formal operational adolescent a group can be formed around one's own meaning. The principles and processes whereby meaning is made transcend the group itself. The individual can therefore be autonomous as responsibility appears above all to be to the individual self.

Responsibility implies ownership of actions. The obligation to act may come from different sources (authority, social pressures, conscience, self), but responsibility is ultimately always a response of self that defines the relationship to that source of obligation. Self has now moved from being relationships to having relationships. The boundaries of the group--family, gang, clan, tribe, nation--are transcended. Other people are known for the first time, for they can be known as independent, separate persons and not as representatives or members of a sodality.

Social attachments are not necessarily lost, however. Indeed, they may be even more profound, for since the individual is separate from the group, she can evaluate the effects, and therefore the importance, of a group's organization, purposes, and assumptions. Where the self was derived from the community at the prior level, the self at the autonomous level can bring itself, can commit itself, to that community.
Precisely the same is true of personal relationships. Relationships at membership defined the self, for there was no self independent of them. Now relationships are the content, not the context, of the self; no longer constituting agency, relationships can be operated on and can form part of the self-definition. Relationships can be freely entered, not compelled. These are conscious relationships. The interaction within them is between discrete, independent selves who present themselves in relationships and are not embedded in or formed by them.

Identity will shift to the formal operational level as the individual grapples with the realization of the relativity of her own self-definition. With formal operations comes for the first time self-reflectivity. This is both a blessing and a curse. Not only is her world one of open possibilities, but so is her self-definition. She is now aware of the beliefs, values, rules, and roles that had constituted the self, and she asks, "Where do I stand?" and the more familiar, "Who am I?"

Asking such questions is the hallmark of the autonomous self. Identity shifts from "what I am" to "who I am." Late adolescents at this stage do not describe themselves in concrete facts, but use those facts to form more general hypotheses. Rather than saying, as the membership self does, "I like basketball," the late adolescent will say, "I am athletic." Yet that is merely the beginning of how they describe themselves. Attention focuses now on the "metaphysical" self: "Who is in charge of my life? Why am I here? What is the purpose of my life? What is happiness, and how can I achieve it?"

Because the person is now self-reflective, identity shifts from self-definition to agency. At the concrete operational level, and earlier, there was only self-definition, for before formal operations there could
not be self-reflectivity. When identity shifts to autonomy, the result appears to be an intensive focus on agency. The individual continues to have a self-definition, a set of personal beliefs, actions, values, and goals that are central to and that characterize her. But when pressed—for instance, by persistently asking, "Who are you?"—she will identify herself as the organizer of psychological experience more than what is organized (Kegan, *Op. cit.*, p. 103). "The person is not his duties, roles or institutions, but the 'haver' of them" (*Ibid.*, pp. 238-39).

"Instead of being just 'me' (the self-concept or others' conception of me), the self is also the transcendent 'I,' the actually existing center of organization, the conceiver of self" (Broughton, 1982, p. 267). In other words, when pressed, autonomous selves soon abandon discussions of their self-concepts and resort to descriptions of the processes by which they come to self-definitions:

There is a hub or a core to my self and shooting off from that are these qualities that define me: my law practice, my family, my friends, my club, my golf. What is that core? It is the way I change these qualities, the way I rank them in order of importance, or the way I see them change. They may not change, but I do; or they may change, but I really don't. The core isn't really any thing. It is my own style or way to decide what's important. That is really what I am.

Identifying with agency brings with it, says Kegan, a shift from conceiving of oneself exclusively as a member of a particular group or order to a sense of membership "in the human community" (*Op. cit.*, p. 67).

It is this identity that provides the status of individuality: "However distinctly given persons may be known, the construction of individuality suggests a way of knowing them which is common among them" (*Idem*). As James Mark Baldwin pointed out, individuality is singular, but it is also
universal—a property shared by all persons. One may continue to have special obligations to those in one's own group, but now one also senses obligations to all other persons qua persons. An Israeli soldier, serving as a medic during the Six-Day War, revealed in his discussion of aiding Arabs and Israelis alike this sense of dual obligation:

If he [an Arab] had to receive some kind of treatment, he'd receive it, just as every Israeli and every other soldier [would], without any problem...Regarding the Arab, I'll do the same actions, but I'll do it not out of love, well, out of, I don't know, not out of love for the man, but out of some kind of duty I have toward him (Ibid, p. 70).

This is the first and only level of individuality, for only at this level could the self be independent. The self is not simply the owner of its actions, but also the author of those actions and of itself; for at the autonomous stage the self-definition is not something given or something found, but something created, created by choices, deliberations, analysis, and self-reflection. The self can choose itself, so to speak. It is free from the dictates of nature--of instincts and impulses--and free from the dictates of outside authorities. At this level the self is distinct from the roles it plays. Now the self recognizes its agency, its aspect as the organizer of roles, determining which role is appropriate for a given situation. Agency is finally consciously differentiated from self-definition.

The autonomous level emphasizes individuality just as the membership level emphasized group. The functions of the prior levels--the bodily functions and impulses, the imaging mind, the conceptual mind, the rules for operating upon concepts, the taking of roles of others--are integrated into the autonomous self as components of that self. The self is, therefore, a compound of all the preceding levels and the integration of those with the
current one. That current basic structure—formal operations—holds functions not found at the prior levels: The self is now able to think the possible and to think about thinking. It is able "to assume, to presume, to construct ideals, and to conceive the potential, the metaphorical, the probable and improbable, the possible and the impossible" (Arieti, op. cit., p. 144).

To clarify the differences between the membership self and the autonomous self still further, we turn to the work in moral development of Lawrence Kohlberg. It has been said of Kohlberg that he did for understanding how the mind organizes the social-personal world what Piaget did for understanding how the mind organizes the physical world (Kegan, op. cit.). He has done so, says Broughton, by doing what most cognitive-developmentalists eschew: Kohlberg put "the self into the stages of the theory" (1981b, p. 324). Ironically, however, Kohlberg seems to have left out any direct analysis of the self. Yet his "conventional" and "post-conventional" levels of moral reasoning correspond precisely to our membership self and autonomous self, respectively. What will interest us here is not so much how adolescents shift from being membership selves to being autonomous selves, but how adults try to remain at or justify the membership stage in order to escape the conflicts, tensions, and contradictions that can ensue when formal operations unfold.
KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Thirty years ago, influenced by the theories of James Mark Baldwin—the father of social psychology—and the experimental work of Piaget, Kohlberg began a series of interviews with 72 Chicago schoolboys (aged 10-16) to determine whether reasoning about situations involving conflicts over rights and claims (moral dilemmas; see Table 1 for Kohlberg's most famous example) showed any of the features of developmental stage structures. Every hypothetical dilemma involved some question about the relationship between self and other, and the theory derived from these interviews purports to show how the self differentiates from and relates to society and others.

TABLE 1

In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium for which a druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only raise about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell the drug cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make as much money as I can from it." So Heinz broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have stolen the drug? Why? Why not?

Moral development, Kohlberg tells us, "is fundamentally a process of the restructuring of modes of role-taking" (1969, p. 399). Each new structure is characterized by a new cognitive ability that enables the person
to understand and coordinate more diverse points of view and to take into account more of the relevant situational factors. Consequently, as the person proceeds, he is able to handle more complicated dilemmas in a consistent way. Each stage is higher than or superior to its predecessor because each stage is "a more differentiated, comprehensive, and integrated structure than its predecessor" (Ibid, p. 195).

Little of this should by this time be new or surprising to the reader. Kohlberg also echoes other developmentalists in arguing that people move through these stages in an invariant sequence. The stages of his theory, also like those of other developmentalists, are inductive generalizations derived from empirical data.12

Kohlberg classified moral reasoning by three levels--preconventional, conventional, and postconventional--each with two stages. (For an outline of the stages, see Table 2.) Since only the conventional and postconventional levels and their stages are pertinent to our discussion, remarks will be limited to them.

**Conventional**

The moral reasoner on the conventional level is concerned with the performance of good and right roles and with the fulfillment of expectations. At stage 3 those roles and expectations are limited to primary group relations based upon sentiment. Those primary groups are dyadic (two-person) relationships, of which society is an aggregation and social relations mere extensions of interpersonal relations. Moral intentions are therefore based on interpersonal values, and relationships are limited to dyadic, concrete relationships of significance. One's primary concern at this
Table 2. Definition of Moral Stages

I. Preconventional level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or "group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy--nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons ("From Is to Ought." "Is" 164/45)
stage is to please and help those significant others, to gain their ap­proval as a "good boy" or "nice girl."

At the next stage, stage 4, expectations and duties are defined by rules of the system, not by one's relationship to specific persons. Whereas stage-3 community was restricted to primary groups in which the self shares the same perspective (the self is that perspective), stage-4 community demands that one be able to take the perspectives of many roles. Individual relationships are here superseded by the view of community as a system of shared, fixed roles and rules. Society is seen to be a system of relationships, not an aggregation of relationships. Values can only be protected by the maintenance of law and order through a system, not by the actions of a few individuals. Therefore, one must consider what is good or bad for that system, above what is good or bad for one's personal relationships. The primary concern of the stage-4 reasoner is to prevent deviations of the laws, since such deviations threaten the whole system of shared expectations.

Stages 3 and 4 appear to follow our description of membership. Yet the stage 4 "law-and-order" orientation requires some advanced role-taking ability and thus some rudimentary kind of formal operational thought. Thus, from the viewpoint of the theory of compound individuality, it could be described as a transition stage, for competing systems and social orders cannot yet be assessed.

Stage 4 is reason in support of the known and established order of one's own country or subculture within it (e.g., the Catholic Church). The emergence of some formal operations enables the reasoner to rationalize or justify his society and his position in it. But, Kohlberg claims, given the opportunity to engage in discussion of moral dilemmas, the reasoner will
see the limits of stage 4. The ability to create hypothetical possibilities characteristic of formal operations will lead the reasoner to an awareness that one's own society is merely one possibility among many. Now aware of many possible systems, the moral reasoner is drawn to criteria for choosing among them and for adhering to any one of them. This leads to the postconventional level.

2. Postconventional

Whereas stage 4 was a system-maintenance perspective and thus did not provide any guidelines for changing society, stage 5 is the perspective of a rational approach to making laws and rules. The person, no longer embedded in the social order, can now reflect upon it. Rather than striving merely to maintain the social order, the stage-5 reasoner seeks to clarify the purposes for which society has been structured. Society is now defined through contractually agreed-upon expectations, rights, and obligations. The social contract presupposes equality among partners, reciprocity of partners, and liberty of partners, otherwise a contract could not be binding. The person is here able to step back from concrete laws to judge them in accordance with what laws could or ought to be. The stage-5 reasoner can take a perspective outside of society and, Kohlberg argues, prior to society (1971, p. 203).

At this stage the moral reasoner is concerned with how the civic order and its laws are "made" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 200). Social institutions must be seen, according to these reasoners, as the products of rational thought. Although rational persons may contract to establish a certain kind of in-
stitution in one society that they might not establish in another, such in-
stitutions are considered valid as long as the terms of the contract
are based on the free consent of rational agents (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 399).
Within an established order, stage-5 reasoners seek rational agreement on
and justification for the laws and institutions they share.

While stage-5 reasoners can recognize the relativity of many laws and
institutions, they believe that laws to be obligatory must be consistent
with individual rights—life, liberty, freedom from oppression—and con-
sistent with the interests and welfare of the majority (Kohlberg, 1971, pp.
201-203). Obligations to such laws are part of the social contract.
Stage-5 reasoners juxtapose natural rights and utilitarianism. Individual
rights are sacrosanct in any society and must be guaranteed, because they
are prior to any social contract, but the guiding stage-5 maxim is "the
greatest good for the greatest number," provided that good is rational.
Consideration of social utility can lead to laws being changed rather than
simply having laws frozen in place as in stage-4 "law and order" reasoning.

According to Kohlberg, stage-5 reasoners argue that laws to be oblig-
atory must be made through constitutional procedures that all rational
persons can accept. Such laws are binding on all citizens, even those
who disagree, and are to be obeyed as part of the contract (Ibid, p. 204).
But what should a person do in situations where no legal definitions exist
or where those that do are questionable? The stage-5 criteria used for
making laws (impartiality, universality) are then applied to moral choices.
This marks the next stage, stage 6.

At stage 6 reasoners seek rational agreement not on the nature of a
shared social order, or its procedures, but on the principles underlying
such orders. To the stage-5 reasoner obligations to the laws are limited
to those who share in the social contract, who share a social order. At stage 6 reasoners seek rational agreement on a set of moral principles that are valid irrespective of any definite social order and irrespective of any individual's social, economic, racial, or political status. Those principles are 1) persons are of unconditional value—similar, if not identical, to Kant's Categorical Imperative—and 2) individual justice—"the right of every person to equal consideration of his claims in every situation, not just those codified into law" (Ibid, p. 210). A just society is therefore one predicated on and whose actions and laws are determined by such principles. Whereas stage-5 justice derive from what is legal, at stage-6 what is legal derives from what is just.

In brief, while stage 5 can yield "a set of procedural principles on which men could agree...it cannot yield a universal morality on which all men could agree" (Ibid, p. 208). Kohlberg has here made clear what at previous stages seems only implied: that his stages are not only about how persons reason morally, but also about substantive moral contents. This "hidden agenda" has been the focus of some sharp criticism, and critics have been outraged by Kohlberg's suggestion that there are universal substantive moral principles upon which all rational persons will agree. We shall address this claim, and others, when we return to look critically at Kohlberg's theory. But for now our focus will be on clarifying the distinction between the membership self and the autonomous self. Kohlberg's postconventional stages do not really help us other than to suggest that at stages 5 and 6 a person with full formal operations is able to examine critically the laws and values of the social order by stepping back reflectively (stepping out into another role). To pursue the clarification let us focus on some of the "conventional" responses from partici-

My Lai

During the Vietnam war, Paul Meadlow, a foot soldier, admitted before a military tribunal to firing, on orders from his superior, Lieutenant Calley, at unarmed civilians in a Vietnamese village, My Lai. In a televised interview, Meadlow made the following comments in response to the question, "Why did you do it?":

If an officer tells you to stand on your head in the middle of the highway, you do it...

...We was [sic] supposed to get satisfaction from this village for the men we lost over there. I lost a damn good buddy, Bobby Wilson. [In killing] I was getting relieved from what I had seen over there...My buddies getting killed or wounded...It was just revenge. 13

Meadlow's interview revealed that he never questioned his orders. He expressed a Kohlbergian preconventional view that you obey orders to avoid punishment—"getting slapped in the head or kicked in the chest." Meadlow showed little acknowledgement that his actions were not acceptable conduct. When asked how he could have shot babies and children, he responded: "It's just one of those things."

Lieutenant Calley, his superior, showed a Kohlbergian stage-3 orientation. He based his behavior on his notions of what he anticipated others would regard as actions of a model officer. When asked why he fired at civilians while his company of soldiers moved through the village, he said:

Because that's what I was instructed to do, Sir, and I had delayed [in the village] long enough. I was trying to get out of there before I got criticized again...I was a run-
of-the-mill guy. I still am...I had to obey orders and hope that the people in Washington were smarter than me.

Through his actions Galley tried to win praise for fulfilling his role. As with all membership selves, Galley is dependent on others to define for him what is right and wrong. His responsibility is to fulfil the expectations of those "in charge" who made the definitions. If, for example, the "higher ups" (p. 6) define a group of women and children as the enemy and define an officer's role as seeing to it that the enemy is destroyed, then, as Galley said, he "acts as directed...and [will not] feel wrong for doing so" (Idem).

Clearly Galley could not step back from his role and the rules (obeying orders) to test logically the validity of the orders. His testimony at his court martial indicated that he could not comprehend the meaning of the Geneva Convention--that is, the section that requires soldiers to test the legality of orders they receive. Galley admitted that he had received instructions about the Geneva Convention, but when asked, "What are the principles involved?", he responded:

That all orders were assumed legal, that a soldier's job was to carry out the order given him to the best of his ability... You could be court-martialed for refusing an order.

Gally sensed no tension between the Geneva Convention and his orders, because he recognized no conflict between his orders and the law. He could not comprehend the Convention in any way other than how he did, because as a membership self he could only see that all orders were the law. When pressed about what he would do if he had a doubt about an order, Galley responded: "If I questioned the order, I was supposed to carry it out and then come back and make my complaint."
Contrast this kind of reasoning with that of Michael Bernhardt, a soldier in Calley's company. Bernhardt repeatedly refused to fire at civilians. When ordered to shoot a woman running from "LZ dotti" [another village], Bernhardt instead ran after her shouting, "Dong lai!" ["Stop!"], but she got away. Calley then berated him for not shooting her. Later, when another woman was shot because she would not halt, Bernhardt reported the incident to his captain. The captain responded that shooting her was brigade policy. Bernhardt commented:

They couldn't think of a better way to stop her. I just wouldn't have stopped her at all. Nothing needs an excuse to live...When I saw them shooting women and children I figured, "Well, I'm going to have to be doing my own war and let them do their own war."

"Doing his own war" translated into firing over the heads of the villagers at My Lai. He explained his actions this way:

I [won't] do anything if I know it is wrong. No matter whose law it is, no matter whose leadership I am following, [if it is wrong] I won't be able to do it...I am just compelled [not to]...Since My Lai I have had to follow my own decisions...Now this is what I do: I try and apply logic to it rather than anything else; logic to say, "Is this right, or should I do this?"

Bernhardt is clearly able to stand back from the laws and orders that he is meant to follow. "People must be guided by their own standards," he said, "by their self-discipline." He is able to differentiate concrete rules from what is legally and personally acceptable, and is able to calculate the consequences of actions not only on himself but also on others.

In Lieutenant Calley and Michael Bernhardt we have examples of a membership self and an autonomous self. Calley is driven by expectations, as he tries to live up to the conventional role of a good soldier. When that
role demands that he murder civilians, he has no way of stepping outside it
to scrutinize those expectations. Bernhardt, on the other hand, is able
through formal operations and self-reflectivity to operate logically on
rules and roles, to judge whether they have a valid legal and moral basis,
or whether they should be rejected. As an autonomous self, Bernhardt
identifies with following his own standards and his self-discipline.

From the perspective of an autonomous self it is easy to condemn the
actions and thinking of Meadlow and Calley, because the right response is
so clear. "Why can't these men act courageously and do what is right?"
The same question was asked of Nazi guards at Auschwitz and of the partici-
pants in Stanley Milgram's obedience study in which an experimenter orders
a subject to give increasingly severe electric shocks—even "lethal"
shocks—to an actor who is pretending, unseen but audible, to be a learner.
How can people on orders inflict pain on the innocent? Often unnoticed
in these situations is that many participants are membership selves who may
actually be acting courageously (Kegan, Op. cit., p. 65). They may think
that although they do not like what they are ordered by authority figures
to do—most of the subjects in Milgram's experiment protested, wept, and
shook uncontrollably—they are doing what is right by following the orders.
To quit would not be courageous, but cowardly. The world of rules and
roles, of authority figures issuing orders, and of conformity to them, is
both the membership world view and the source of one's self.

Certainly adults such as the three soldiers highlighted above or those
involved in Milgram's experiment are able to explain and rationalize their
actions. But they can do so only in terms of their own world view. In
other words, membership selves being embedded in the rules and roles of the
group, or society, are not so much conforming to that social order by
accepting its terms, as they are that order and can see only in its terms. Though formal operations are available, the person is unable to use them except to justify his membership self. Though the person could be self-reflective, he is unable to be because he is not yet able to extricate himself from the membership world. Nothing has pushed him to the limits of his way of knowing the world. Therefore, his identity has not shifted to the autonomous stage. Stanley Hauerwas describes how Albert Speer eschewed self-reflection while serving the Nazi regime:

He had no effective way to step back from himself, no place to stand. His self-deception began when he assumed that "being above all an architect" was a story sufficient to constitute his self. He had to experience the solitude of prison to realize that becoming a human being requires stories and images a good deal richer than merely professional ones (Quoted in Fowler, 1981, p. 281).

Only when confined in Spandau Prison could Speer come to terms with and take responsibility for the crimes against humanity that he had committed. While he was accepting the use of slave laborers in Germany's factories and mines, Speer says he "did not see these men at all...I was moving within the system...I did not see any moral ground outside the system where I should take a stand." Having reflected on his life and identity inside prison, the purpose for which prisons were originally conceived by the Quakers, Speer asked: "Who was that young man who had now become so alien to me?" (Ibid, p. 280)
Employees of the American Federal Government involved or implicated in the Watergate break-in and/or cover-up provide examples of predominantly stage-3 and stage-4 reasoning. The break-in, an attempt by burglers in the employment of the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) to plant listening devices at the Democratic Party National Headquarters, was the surface, investigations revealed, of a fetid swamp of illegality and harassment that went as high up as the President himself. In an exchange with Senator Howard Baker during the Senate Watergate investigations Mr. Donald Porter, at the time of the burglary an assistant to Mr. Jeb Magruder, head of CREEP, explained why he had lied to the Grand Jury:

Baker: At any time did you ever think of saying, "I do not think this is quite right."?

Porter: Yes I did.

Baker: What did you do about it?

Porter: I didn't do anything about it.

Baker: Why not?

Porter: In all honesty, probably because of the fear of group pressure that would ensue from not being a team player... My loyalty, Senator Baker, is to one man, Richard Nixon...I first met Mr. Nixon when I was eight years old, when he ran for Congress in my district...I felt I had known this man all my life—-not personally, perhaps, but in spirit. I felt a deep sense of loyalty. I was appealed to on this basis.

Porter was aware of the group's motivations and pressures; he could observe and act on (justify) his relations to the group. He even recognized that what he was doing was wrong. But he was unable to act against the group, because it was one source of his identity. He was willing to do what he knew to be wrong, because his loyalty to Nixon superseded any
notion of right or wrong. His overriding concern was to maintain not the system—the society (stage 4)—but the group that was the expression of his source of identity—interpersonal loyalty (stage 3). Porter had the tools—formal operations—for distancing himself from the group, but he was unable to do so since his identity, his meaning, his self, was attached through it to Nixon.

Another conspirator, Egil Krogh, gave a standard stage-4 justification for his actions:

I see now that the key is the effect that the term "national security" had on my judgment. The very words served to block my critical analysis...[T]o suggest that the national security was being improperly invoked was to invite a confrontation with my patriotism and loyalty and so appeared to be beyond the scope and in contravention of the faithful performance of the duties of my office... The very definition of national security was for the President to pursue his planned course.

Krogh's concern was to fulfill his role; maintaining the nation meant maintaining the President. His perspective gave him no way to judge whether the President's planned course was itself a breach of national security.15

Membership selves cannot scrutinize the nature of their commitments or loyalties, since these are the way of agency and the source of the self-definition. Because adult membership selves do not seek to determine by analysis or role-taking whether their cause is just or whether their conscience is "right," they seek merely to bring their actions and beliefs into line with those of the group. A membership self cannot reflect on his need to conform, because the self cannot see what constitutes agency. The need to conform is the principle that organizes experience.

Donald Porter succumbed not to group pressure to commit acts he knew to be
wrong, but he succumbed to the fear that if he did not commit these acts, he would face ridicule and sanctions from those in the group, those who loyally served President Nixon. Though he sensed a conflict between loyalty and "what was right," his need for approbation from Nixon, if only indirect, resolved the dilemma. Porter thus used formal operations to justify and reinforce his membership identity: "I am loyal to Richard Nixon; Nixon or his authorized agents have authorized me to commit improprieties—including perjury; therefore, I shall be loyal and do as instructed." Porter's testimony reveals that conformity did not so much outweigh truth; loyalty to Nixon was Porter's truth.

Porter could not bring into question the nature or basis of his loyalty, the boundaries of his self. Loyalty and conformity give way to "higher" or more comprehensive principles when identity shifts to autonomy. From the perspective of the theory of compound individuality this means that individuals act according to the dictates of reason, according to principles that are valid independent of the group's or society's standards. From Kohlberg's perspective the claim is even stronger. It is that individuals act according to universal moral principles on which all rational persons will agree. This position has been controversial, to say the least, and in the mind of some critics has placed Kohlberg's entire theory in jeopardy.

Indeed, of all the developmental theorists, Jean Piaget apart, Kohlberg has drawn in recent years the most critical attention, both within and outside psychology.\textsuperscript{16} Examining the nature of these critiques will help us determine whether the theory of compound individuality is susceptible to the same criticisms.
CRITIQUES OF KOHLBERG

In the early 1970's, on the strength of his empirical work, Kohlberg claimed that his theory showed not only how people reason morally, but also how they ought to reason. In effect, he claimed to have solved a two-thousand-year-old philosophical conundrum: how to decide what to do when rights and claims conflict. Stage-6 ethical principles, those upon which all rational persons will agree, define the right decision and reasoning for anyone in that situation.

Understandably, the criticism of Kohlberg's theory has centered around Kohlberg's arguments in defense of this claim and centered on the absence of convincing cross-cultural data to support the claim. The critics argue that Kohlberg is presenting a theory that is not universal and whose principled stages are not empirical. Rather, he is presenting a theory based on a Western supremacist view of morality and a description of principled stages drawn from extrapolations from his own political predilections. Critics were certainly justified to respond in this way in 1971 when Kohlberg, with little cross-cultural or longitudinal data, announced: "Almost all individuals in all cultures use the same thirty basic moral categories, concepts, or principles, and all individuals in all cultures go through the same order or sequence of gross stage development."

To substantiate such claims, cross-cultural research would have to show 1) an invariant sequence—-with movement upward and without significant regressions or skipping of stages; 2) the full range of moral stages, including the highest (otherwise those stages cannot be part of any empirical claim); and 3) a correspondence between all types of moral reasoning found in the study and the stages Kohlberg describes.
In 1983 John Snarey of Harvard compared 43 studies carried out in 26 countries (counting the United States) to ascertain whether these claims were substantiated. Of these studies 23% represented primarily Western populations, 46% was on non-European populations influenced by the West (e.g., India and Taiwan), and 31% included non-Western village populations. The studies also showed strong variety in age groups, male and female populations, and socio-economic background. Seven of them were longitudinal studies; the rest were cross-sectional only. Thus, Snarey concludes, "the diversity and number of cultures...are sufficient to evaluate the claim of cultural universality" (1983, p. 15).

With reference to stage invariance, Snarey's analysis shows that 86% of the studies showed an increase in upward stage movement, with 100% showing no stage skipping. The studies bear out Kohlberg's claims about movement to higher stages being age-dependent.

Were all of the stages present? Every study found stages 1 through 4, without exception. In the Western urban societies tested, 100% found stages 4/5 (a transition stage to be discussed below) to some degree and stage 5 to a lesser degree. In non-Western urban societies stages 4/5 and 5 appeared in 91% of the samples; in non-Western traditional folk societies, however, stage 5 was absent from 100% of the cases. How do we account for this?

Kohlberg himself conceded that stage 5 was a rare occurrence even in the United States, and in the mid-seventies he dropped stage 6 altogether from his revamped scoring manual (Gilligan and Murphy, 1980). But even conceding the rarity of stage-5 reasoning, how does Snarey account for its complete absence in the folk societies? One explanation is that given the small samples of adults tested in those societies, it would be unusual, because
of the infrequency of stage 5 in any culture, to see any postconventional reasoning. But two of the traditional cultures tested—Kenyan village leaders and Tibetan monks—showed no one beyond even stages 3 or 3/4. In the case of the Tibetan monks, not only did they fail to score at the postconventional level, but they also scored most often at the preconventional level, below most of the laymen in their communities.

Three of the researchers make the identical case about the absence of stage 5 in folk cultures. Vasudev, Uwe Gielan, and Ting Lei, the principal investigators of the studies in India, Tibet, and Taiwan respectively, argue that Kohlberg’s ethical principles miss the alternative ethical principles subjects use in these cultures. Were the Tibetan monks really reasoning from preconventional positions, or was Kohlberg’s scoring system unable to accommodate their responses or to decipher their alternative ethical principles? Additional research and more careful analysis need to be undertaken to answer this, but, as Snarey concludes, bias appears evident.

To summarize, the data in Snarey’s comparison strongly support the claim of the invariance of stage movement; so, too, they demonstrate the universal presence of stages 1 through 4. But are the postconventional stages really culture-bound and ethnocentric? Is the reasoning of the Tibetan monks based upon insights that are regressive and infantile, or is it so unorthodox and paradoxical that it only sounds like but does not truly represent the preconventional level?

Whatever the causes, and these cannot be our focus in this discussion, the absence of the postconventional stages in the cross-cultural studies makes those stages suspect. Does that absence have any bearing on compound individuality and the autonomous self? Could it be that formal operations
themselves are absent, that so-called "primitive" people cannot think self-reflectively? Claude Levi-Strauss and Bronislaw Malinowski both found evidence that primitive peoples can reason about their customs and norms rather than blindly conform to them.\textsuperscript{19} That is all we need to claim for the autonomous self; that is, it is autonomous with respect to the conventions of one's society and the groups or institutions therein. The existence of formal operations does not depend upon ethical principles; it is the other way around. One needs formal operations to be able to reason from ethical principles, but one does not need to reason from ethical principles to have formal operational thought. Perhaps the homogeneity of folk societies and the moral conflicts within them obviate full-blown perspectivism. But because folk peoples do not use formal operations does not mean they do not have them.

As a basic structure, formal operations are a universal invariant, arising in all humans by a certain age and in the course of normal human development. But their presence does not mean they are used to form identity or to reason morally. Certainly Richard Nixon was capable as President of formal operational thought, but one could with cogency question his moral reasoning during the Watergate episode. The evidence already in on Kohlberg's work verifies at least rudimentary formal operations universally, for at least some is required for stage-4 reasoning, and the cross-cultural and longitudinal data show stage-4 reasoning present in every culture.

The data support all of Kohlberg's contentions if applied only to stages 1 through 4, but still leave in doubt his claims about the principled stages. Despite the early bluster, Kohlberg himself has had obvious doubts about these stages. One of the interesting anomalies that
appeared in Kohlberg's studies was the regression of young adults from stage-4 or even stage-5 reasoning to an anarchic or hedonistic relativism resembling stage-2 reasoning. Such regression would be devastating to the idea of invariance. Because he found evidence of some stage movement upward when these hedonistic relativists had "matured," Kohlberg proposed a transition stage--stage 4/5--between conventional and principled thinking. He revised extensively the scoring manual and stage descriptions with the result that stage-6 descriptions disappeared altogether and the incidents of stage-5 reasoning based upon a redefinition of that stage drastically declined.

This maneuver served merely to oxygenate the flames of criticism. The presence of possible regression, the elimination of stage 6, and the absence of data supporting Kohlberg's claims that the ethical principles of the highest stages were empirical led many critics to agree with Richard Schweder that "reason may be less cunning than Hegel or Kohlberg suppose" (1982, pp. 423-24), that Kohlberg's principles are not the basis of an objective morality dictated by rationality, but are the moral principles, the moral and political content, he most wants to support. It is by no means clear to professional philosophers that there are any formal criteria, let alone natural empirical principles, for resolving moral conflicts.

Two communitarian critics have argued not against Kohlberg's principled stages per se, but against forms of "autonomous rationality." Reid and Yanarella (1977) criticize the Kohlbergian idea--borrowed, they say, from Kant and Piaget, that an individual can use reason divorced from sociality or social circumstances and history to construct "his own reality in such a way that he can be said to be the maker of his own destiny" (Ibid, p. 518). Their critique does affect the theory of compound
individuality, since the autonomous self is embedded in a rationality that permits separation from one's social milieu. According to Reid and Yanarella:

> [A]utonomous rationality or autonomous man obscures the social and institutional context of human subjectivity by situating the problem of identity in a purely internal context...[A]n alternative model of dialectical sociality--derived from Hegel and Marx--radically redefines the problem of individuality and self identity in terms of a practical struggle to overcome the predefined identity imposed upon individuals by the socio-cultural totality, by reconstituting the social conditions and cultural context in which they exist in order to realize their true social nature (Ibid, p. 519).

At issue is what is meant by "true social nature." Kohlberg, who does not talk about identity per se, has argued that the basis of all developmental theory is interaction between "a moral subject" and others (1985, p. 501) and is not "purely internal." Furthermore, from the perspective of any developmental theory the self or subject is not autonomous from the outset, but must, as Kohlberg's theory shows, move away from its conformity to the predefined identity imposed by society. How, then, is Kohlberg's theory at variance from the idea of dialectical sociality described by Reid and Yanarella?

Their Marxist solution of reconstituting social conditions may make the struggle to overcome this predefined identity easier, but it certainly does not make the struggle possible. Individuality and autonomy, as Kohlberg and the theory of compound individuality both argue, are inherently social. That is an essential point of developmentalism. Yet this differs from the Marxist interpretation in that in developmentalism one cannot assume autonomous identity from social or institutional arrangements or changes. Reid and Yanarella are correct to criticize Kohlberg for failing to develop the
sociality aspect of the theory as publicly and thoroughly as he has developed the aspect of separation or differentiation, but they are wrong to suggest that he does not have one. As it turns out, the one Kolhberg does have may be even more deleterious than had he none at all, for as with many developmentalists, Kohlberg stresses autonomy or agency at the expense of inclusion and relationships. The result is the propagation of an individualism that, as the communitarians argue, leaves both social and personal development in jeopardy.

LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN SELVES REVISITED

The mistake, or oversimplification, made by liberal individualists is that criticized by Reid and Yanarella and by the communitarians in Chapter 1: Positing identity or selfhood as agency only, as subjectivity without contents or constituent traits. The theory of compound individuality has been presented in part to offset this notion by showing that self-development involves at every level not only social interactions but also constitutive traits or self-definitions.

Every stage of self-development is an increase in complexity of what one is and what one has. Properties that at one level constituted agency are at the next level seen as possessions or definitions of the self. At the membership level the self was constituted of parts played in the community and by the community itself. At the level of formal operations the autonomous self no longer is those roles, duties, shared reality, or communities, but has them. They do not possess him, but he, them.
Likewise, at this level, the self is seen to have a self or selves. All exclusive identification is by definition unconscious. The moment one is aware of having a body, the person no longer is the body. The self cannot see those structures with which it is identified, for no observing structure--no subject--can observe itself observing. But as an autonomous self the person is conscious of agency, that he is not only a system of self-concepts but also the organizer, even the "creator," of them.

But having rules, roles, and obligations moves responsibility, as was said, to the self. Rules and rights and principles are then followed not to avoid punishment, to maintain social cohesion, or uphold group norms, but to avoid self-condemnation. The independence of the self, the reliance upon the self, the separation from social obligations and norms, and the view of relationships as freely entered and, worse, easily abandoned are the very objections communitarians have leveled against liberalism. The consciousness of agency seems ineluctably to result in individualism.

The response of a liberal who adopted the theory of compound individuality might be this: Although the self is autonomous, it still needs relationships, if only to reinforce its independence. Because selves are now shared in and not derived from relationships, the self can internalize the perspectives of others without fear that the self will be either lost or overwhelmed. The greater role-taking ability available through formal operations means that more and multiple viewpoints can be understood. The autonomous self relishes diversity of viewpoints, because every new and different perspective internalized teaches the self more about itself and the world. The communitarian critique, this liberal might add, is therefore unfounded, for the ability to internalize the world views of others results not simply in the prospect of having more and different relation-
ships, but also in the possibility of having **deeper** relationships than those of membership. One can now understand another and can give oneself to others, whereas before the person had no self to give.

Indeed, modern liberals, Gerald Gaus points out (1983), differ from their classical predecessors in their insistence on the connection between, if not reconciliation of, the individual and the community. J. S. Mill, John Dewey, Hobhouse, Bosanquet, T. H. Green, and Rawls, though markedly different in many respects, all agreed, argues Gaus, that individuals require sociality and community for full human development. According to their modern liberal account no individual can develop all the capacities she possesses. Therefore all individuals need others, who are developing different capacities, to complete their own natures. Rawls, for example, argues that each person relies on the talents and lives of others to round out her own life (1971, pp. 529, 565). He says, "It is as if others were bringing forth a part of ourselves that we have not been able to cultivate" (Ibid, p. 44).

Yet this liberal recognition of a need for relationship and sociality, rejoins the communitarian, in no way undercuts the individualism through which that need is expressed. Surely this notion of needing others to complete one's own life or nature brings the liberal perilously close to treating others, implicitly or otherwise, as means to their own development and to the fulfillment of their lives. This instrumental attitude toward relationships, according to the communitarians, is, as we shall see in the next chapter, an inescapable hallmark of liberal individualism and at the heart of the communitarian critique.

Furthermore, continues the communitarian, at the very moment one internalizes the voices of others for interior dialogue, one may then cease
to need further relationships. Although the voices are of others, they are now part of the independent self. Though socially derived, the person has the illusion of self-sufficiency: One can fulfill one’s need for relationships simply and solely by conversing with the voices within.

Within the terms of the debate set by communitarians, liberals seem to have no way out of this impasse. Liberals insist on autonomy, but communitarians insist that autonomy leads to or implies an individualism as self-sufficiency that is aberrant, manipulative, and pernicious. The communitarian antidote is to restore some form of constitutive community.

The liberal might be tempted to associate the communitarians' socially situated self with the membership self. After all, at the membership stage it is impossible to conceive of any relationship or social role apart from those already defined, determined, and guided by the rules of the social order. Here is a description of self, and life, familiar to any field anthropologist. It is also the basis of the distinction Taylor, MacIntyre, and Sandel have made between the premodern and modern conceptions of the self. One comes to know oneself only in relation to the larger whole of which he is a part. To attempt to answer the question, "Who am I?" without this backdrop or context would plunge one, as Taylor says, "into a kind of nullity, a sort of non-existence, a virtual death" (Vol. II, p. 258).

Yet the very fact that the communitarians are concerned with such a question—and it is one of their principal concerns—makes their theory distinct from a mere description of the membership self. For the question "Who am I?" often signifies a problem with one's identity. The problem arises in this way only when one is self-reflective, only when there is separation between the self and society. Then there is a distinction
between the contents of the self, the self-definition, and the reflecting subject or agent, the unknowable but necessary vehicle of all introspection.

When Charles Taylor insists that all strong evaluations are the result of articulation and are based on communal—i.e., inherited—language and categories; when Michael Sandel states that knowing oneself is the result of reflective self-understanding; when Alasdair MacIntyre claims that the person need not "accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community" in which he lives, but can use "criticism and invention" to transcend them, they are all making a crucial distinction between a rudimentary capacity to sort sensory data, which we ascribe even to animals, and the conceptual and linguistic capacity that enables persons to take themselves as objects of attention, ascribable only to humans. To take oneself as an object of attention means there must be a separation between the subject examining and what is examined, even if that object is an end that is constitutive of one's self-definition. The introduction of self-reflectivity, which the communitarians endorse, removes the description of the self from membership by transforming the central characteristic of the membership level, the nature of rules and roles.

The communitarians' dilemma lies in wanting to have identity constituted by social rules and roles, while also wanting the person to be self-reflective. They want to preserve the kind of selfhood secured in the *polis* or the medieval village when knowledge and options were limited, when life was set. The purpose of reflection, then, as they see it, is not to sunder the relationship between self and village, but to bring the self voluntarily into conformity with the given aims and attachments, rules and roles, of society. This requires internalizing the social sanctions and boundaries. Such an act already implies a self separate from that
which is to be taken within. The membership self lacks the conceptual apparatus to accomplish this. Yet once the self can do this, once self-reflectivity arises, then the embeddedness in social rules and roles, and the assured conformity to them, ends. With self-reflection comes distance; with distance comes alternatives; with alternatives, as Peter Laslett (1975) wrote, the polis ceases to be a community, because all situations cease to be "totally shared situations." The problem of personal identity arises, and the secured social identity, the membership self, is thereby lost.

Then relationships cease to be constitutive and become, as in liberal individualism, means to one's private end. But they do not have to be only that. When relationships are constitutive of agency, they are without commitment. The basis of commitment is self-reflectivity, for then the person can bring himself to and into the relationship. The person can commit himself to others, to society, to the rules and roles of the group.

But commitment always comes with the risk of tergiversation, the threat that scrutiny will not lead to commitment but to departure, censure, critique. It is this aspect the communitarians seem determined to avoid. Thus Sandel wants relationships to be constitutive of agency--that is, inseparable from the self: "...[T]he independent self finds its limits in those aims and attachments from which it cannot stand apart" (1982, p. 182). And yet he wants persons to be able to look within, to determine or discover from among the aims and attachments those that are more constitutive than others. But he cannot have it both ways. If the self is embedded in aims and attachments from which it cannot stand apart, then these cannot be reflected on; if the self can reflect on them, can step back and operate on them, then these aims and attachments are not constituents but attributes.
The confusion stems, it seems, from Sandel's desire to contrast the liberal deontological self with the socially situated self. In fearing the unencumbered self, in seeing in this liberal notion a self without character and thus, ironically, without a self (Ibid, p. 180), Sandel goes to the opposite extreme and posits agency that is constituted by given ends and relationships, or, rather, ignores agency and posits a self as traits only. But criticality does not enable one to escape from all particularity, but, instead, to escape from any specific particularities. Self-reflectivity, when one becomes aware of and identified with his agency, permits the person to move from one backdrop to another, to take the roles of many, of any, others.

In so moving one is never without self-definition; that is, one is never without particular fundamental traits or ends or roles that make him the person he is. To think that one can be without these, to fail to see that identity begins, as the communitarians remind us, from within a social matrix, is to make the mistake found in liberal individualism. By interiorizing all identity, the person has the illusion that he is free of encumbrances and obligations, free to generate his own aims, values, and ends and owes nothing to anyone or to society for them. To think, however, that the self is constituted by and limited to a given set or horizon of traits, ends, or circumstances is to make the mistake found in the communitarian critique. Without distance between the self and rules and roles there is no possibility of self-reflection.

The theory of compound individuality has been introduced to present a more balanced, realistic, and sophisticated view of identity than is found in either deontological liberalism or communitarianism. The theory shows that one's sense of self changes qualitatively at different levels of
development, that one's self-sense is both a product of and a part of the process of developmental changes. Within this developmental schema, individuality is one stage of selfhood in a hierarchy of such stages and is a compound of all those basic structures that preceded this stage of self and constituted the earlier stages.

Individuality is available only at the level of formal operations, once the person can introspect—is self-reflective—and has the capacity for full perspectivism. At this stage the person is aware of and describes himself both as a constellation of concepts, traits, values, goals, etc.—a self-definition—and as the active subject or orchestrator—agent—of that constellation.

The notion of agency does present the subject as not embedded in any particularity. The self, of course, cannot step back from its own subjectivity. That subjectivity, however, is embedded not in any specific evaluation, but in the process of evaluation; it is not embedded in any specific vocabulary or conversation, but in the structure and logic of language. To conceive of self-evaluation exclusively in terms of essential evaluations is to define "I" only in terms of "me"—which characterizes a membership self inescapably tied to specific social rules and roles and which characterizes many of the communitarian descriptions.

Yet the autonomous self of the theory of compound individuality can hardly be aligned with the deontological self. Self-reflectivity introduces perspectivism, which, as said, is not a step out of all roles but out of these roles. Perhaps here is Rawls's Archimedean point, far enough from this particular social perspective, but not so far away as to become pure abstraction. Our situation is what Mary Midgeley described in *Beast and Man*: "We can always walk on [out of our culture] if we want
to enough. What we cannot do is...to be nobody and nowhere" (p. 291). To think we can is to make the mistake of conceiving the person as process only.

The self is unencumbered to this extent: It can criticize any standpoint, including its own. It can thereby evade any necessary identification with a specified contingency, but cannot be without any particular identity. After all, language, the basis of the ability to critique, is itself a social particularity. In taking up any perspective, the self can be different but not empty. Since agency is located within the self in this process, and not within social rules and roles, the self is autonomous, free of these encumbrances or attachments. But no longer embedded in them does not mean no longer identified with them. Now the self can relate to them; now selves can be in and can have relationships, rather than being found in or derived from them.

The theory of compound individuality shows that the communitarian reminiscences about the ancients and their way of life are not so much about a lost way of life as a lost psychological state. It is the memory of harmony, of a time when one was never out of step with one's social environment or out of touch with the ends and attachments that made life meaningful. But the appeal goes beyond nostalgia. The communitarian conception of the self reminds us of the dangers in conceiving of identity without social particularities.

Meanwhile, the appeal of the deontological liberal is his reminder that the self is not captured by the social roles it plays or the rules it follows.

The theory of compound individuality places both of these theories in a perspective that incorporates, or highlights, their attractions while offsetting the distortions of each alone. The autonomous self is one in
which agency can be free of any specified social rules or roles, but must still identify as a self-definition with some rules and roles. The self is steeped in history and in need of relationships, but self-reflectivity enables it to transcend the boundaries of any particular horizon or attachments.

The problem is that once the self is autonomous, the most forceful, and perhaps most appealing, aspect of the communitarian challenge is forfeited—i.e., that relationships constitute a common identity among selves. If the self is not constituted by others, then relationships seem to be values and commitments that the deontological self may find important, but no more so than any other value. Surely, then, even the autonomous self is nothing different from a new, though more elaborate, description of the old individualism.

But the theory of compound individuality also offers a different perspective on autonomy, on individualism, and on relationship. At one stage of autonomous selfhood the individual is a compound in a different sense: He is a compound of self and others, an individuality constituted by autonomy and relationship. This stage of selfhood, which is called, one hopes without confusion, "compound individuality," is distinctly different from individualism. Here relationships are more than means to private ends; they are constituents of identity. But rather than being unable to separate from them, as Sandel suggests, the self is unwilling to do so.

By considering this new perspective in some detail in the remaining chapters, we may find: a way to move beyond individualism; a possible reconciliation of liberalism and communitarianism; and a new angle on an old political dilemma—"how to unite the radical moral autonomy of Kant and the expressive unity of the Greek polis" (Taylor, 1975, p. 388).
The autonomous self, as discussed, emerges with the unfolding of formal operational thought. Here identity is embedded in these operations; i.e., in abstract reasoning, rationality, the system and rules of logic and language that are independent of the phenomena they govern. For the first time self-reflectivity is possible, and it marks this level as that of individuality; only at this level could the person be independent of the rules and roles of his "sodality" and thus be free of the need for group conformity and approbation.¹

This description accounts for only part of the pattern of identity that characterizes each level of self in the theory of compound individuality. That is, it accounts for differentiation—in this case, the self's emergence and separation from its embeddedness in membership. But it leaves out the other two requirements of identity—integration and relationship. Those requirements are indeed involved in this self-reflective process.

First, in differentiating from the sodality the person comes to create a new meaning for "self" and "other." In disengaging from membership the person reviews the rules and roles that had constituted her identity. By acting on what had previously been her subjectivity, her context, the person establishes a new boundary between self and other. The sodality has
moved, as it were, to the "other" side and can now be acted on as a
content. Integration refers to the need to incorporate into this new level
of self the prior basic structure. In this case, it is concrete operations--
not the specific rules and roles that constituted the self, but the
need to live according to some specific rules and roles. In differenti­
tiating from the sodality, the person is now free to choose among its, and
other, rules and roles, to accept or reject them. Since "self-ruled" is
the literal meaning of autonomy, we refer to this level as the level of
autonomous selfhood.

Yet identifying this level as that of autonomy and individuality is
not quite so simple. Although the literal meaning of autonomy is clear,
it does not tell us what constitutes self-rule. There is, as J. N. Gray
comments, "a deep obscurity in the concept of autonomy itself" (1983, p.
89). One reason for that obscurity is that autonomy underlies two distinct,
nearly antithetical, kinds of individuality. To refer to both as
autonomous is to cite what brings them together, but in no fashion indi­
cates what drastically pulls them apart. Thus Isaiah Berlin, for example,
claims that every form of autonomy has in it some degree of a

process of deliberate self-transformation that enables [men] to
care no longer for any of [society's] values, to remain, isolated
and independent, on its edges...I retreat into my own deliberately
insulated territory, where no voices from outside need to be lis­
tened to, and no external forces can have effect. (1969, pp. 135-6)

Yet, as will be argued, rather than describing autonomy, it seems Professor
Berlin has described instead one kind of individuality that autonomy sup­
ports. For autonomy need not entail a rejection of society's values or
an isolation from the presence or influence of others. Berlin is
how autonomy is exercised by an atomist, an atomistic individual. But
autonomy is also exercised in a markedly different way by a markedly different kind of individual—the compound self or compound individual.

Before turning to this, I want first to discuss briefly a definition of autonomy compatible with both kinds of individual, for as I hope to demonstrate, the autonomy underneath is the same for both. But what will interest us more and will make up the bulk of this chapter is the distinction between atomistic individualism and compound individuality. The distinction between the two is the key to any possible reconciliation between liberalism and communitarianism, and that distinction lies in the third requirement of identity formation—relationship.

DEFINING AUTONOMY

In his article on political power and concept contestability John Gray presents two divergent conceptions of autonomy. One, described as Aristotelian, is a closed concept "compatible only with a fairly narrowly defined range of ways of life" (Op. cit., p. 87). According to this view, unless specific choices lead to human flourishing they cannot be considered autonomous choices. Thus choices will soon be restricted to those that consistently provide demonstrable human flourishing. Gray rules out this restricted-range conception because "we have no reason to suppose that the choices of autonomous man will converge on any single way of life" (Ibid, p. 88); or, we might add, will converge necessarily on any single range of ways of life.

The opposite conception of autonomy Gray calls the Kantian view, "primarily a formal, procedural, and open concept: it desiderates the general conditions of any respectworthy choice. Such a choice, if it is
to be autonomous, must be rational...." (p. 86) This conception presents two qualities most frequently cited as defining autonomy: rationality and choice, though neither quality alone is sufficient. Choice can be autonomous, argues Joseph Raz, only if the one choosing has "a variety of acceptable options available to choose from and his life became as it is through his choice of some of these options" (1984, p. 191).

The notion of acceptable options seems a significant one, for if all options save one are unacceptable, the chooser has little choice and perhaps no autonomy. (We cannot say no choice, since there is the option of choosing not to choose, but that, too, may be an unacceptable option, thus undercutting autonomy.) One wonders, however, how many acceptable options are necessary to make choice autonomous. How many constitutes a variety? Yet is the idea of availability of acceptable options sufficient for defining autonomy? Animals also can choose. One could argue that a cat's consistent choice of saccharin-laced cat food, in the face of 37 varieties, caused that cat to have cancer, and thus its life became as it is through its choice. Unless one is willing to grant animals autonomy, more must be added to the conception.

However much animals may choose, they are not rational. They may think, but they do not reason. Adding the second quality—rationality—to choice might then define autonomy. People would be autonomous if they could give reasons for their choices of life-directing, acceptable options. Yet children can give reasons for choices and are capable of making rational choices, within limits, but we would hardly say those choices are made autonomously. Within the theory of compound individuality it is the case that membership selves, those defined as their sodalities, can give reasons for choices and behaviors. Their range of choices and behaviors
are restricted to those sanctioned by the sodality, but within that range members can choose. The members, however, accept the range of choices as given; they do not choose the range, as was also the case with Sandel's constitutive community. The ability to influence the range of choices might well be what separates an autonomous choice from a heteronomous one.

This takes us back to John Gray's point about limited or restricted ranges: There is no single way of life or single range of choices on which all autonomous men will agree. So autonomous men want not only acceptable choices within a range, but also acceptable ranges within which to choose. Part of autonomy must therefore include evaluating and deciding on the acceptability of the range. This idea brings out an aspect of autonomy so far overlooked. More than a kind of choice, autonomy is a process of choosing. That process must involve not only rationality but also self-reflectivity, for to choose autonomously one must have some critical distance from the range offered. Indeed, as Stanley Benn comments, the content of the choice is at best secondary: The emphasis in autonomy is "on processes and modes of consciousness [or self]" and leaves "out of account the content of the autonomous man's principles and ideals. There is no reason why an autonomous man should not be deeply concerned about social justice and community--but I have said nothing to suggest he will be" (1975/6, pp. 129-30). Instead of content, argues Benn, autonomy rests on rationality and self-reflectivity, otherwise "the nomoi that govern him can be those absorbed uncritically and unreflectively from parents, teachers, and workmates...Such a person...governs himself, but by a nomos or set of standards taken over from others" (Ibid, pp. 123-4).

An unreflective and uncritical rational chooser Benn (Ibid) calls heteronomous, and John Gray (1983) calls autarchic. This chooser lacks
precisely what distinguishes the autonomous self from the membership self: self-reflectivity. When the individual can take himself as an object of attention, he simultaneously objectifies and relativizes his sodality, while at the membership level the self is the group, its norms and nomoi. The "autonomous agent must also have distanced himself in some measure from the conventions of his social environment and from the influences of the persons surrounding him. His actions express principles and policies which he has himself ratified by a process of critical reflection" (Gray, 1983, p. 24). Self-reflectivity provides that critical distance. Whereas at the membership level the limits of choice, however rational, were set by the norms and nomos of the group, at the autonomous level the norms and nomos themselves are self-imposed, adopted as a set of standards arrived at through critical reflection.

There is nothing in self-reflectivity that insists that the set of standards of the group must be rejected in whole or in part. The set must simply be scrutinized. Autonomy does not require that one's rules or laws be created ex nihilo or de novo. Most likely they come as selective or modified versions of those of the sodality. They are combined, as is one's identity, into a form that is one's own. The group no longer constitutes the person. Now he is constituted by those insights and principles by which he governs his life and makes his choices.

The autonomous person is therefore not only rational, but he is also differentiational. That is, he is separate from or independent of his sodality or cultural matrix and is now able to reflect on it. The critical distance or independence comes from the emergence of the basic structure of formal operational thought. The person can now take the roles of others who are not in his sodality; he can, in other words, scrutinize the
sodality's world view from the perspective of one outside it. He can now control or regulate the rules and roles, principles and practices, governing his life, something he could not do when identified by those rules and roles.

Autonomy is therefore not independence *per se*, but is independence from the need to follow the norms and rules of one's social milieu. At this stage the person can see that "traditionally settled forms of life can prove to be mere conventions, to be irrational...Role identity is replaced by ego [autonomous] identity; actors must act as individuals across, so to speak, the objective contexts of their lives" (Habermas, 1975, p. 85).

The demand of identity at the autonomous level is to be able to go "behind the line of all particular roles and norms and stabilize [identity] through the abstract ability to present oneself credibly in any situation as someone who can satisfy the requirements of consistency even in the face of incompatible role expectations" (Ibid, p. 86). The acting subject is now what Habermas calls "context-free."

What can he mean by context-free? At the autonomous level an agent can no longer be thought of as a compilation of specific roles. Rather, he has the ability through employing principles "to construct new identities in conflict situations and bring these into harmony" (Ibid, p. 90).

The actor is now free of any context, of any kind of traditional--what Habermas calls "imposed"--norms and can now distinguish and operate according to principles that generate norms. Not only can the person distinguish the general from the particular, the symbolic from the concrete, but now he can make such generalizations himself.

Having established through the theory of compound individuality a level of autonomous selfhood, it would seem that we have arrived at a
position that both braces and weakens the liberal and the communitarian positions. Individuality has been shown not to precede society but necessarily to come through it. This bolsters the communitarian criticism of liberals who see the individual as prior to society and see society as an aggregation of the voluntary contracts of those trying to maximize their own self-interest. But at the same time it undercuts the communitarian notion that individuals are socially constituted. Now the individual can remove himself from the social matrix that shaped him. So while the communitarian is correct that identity is a social product, the liberal is correct that the individual, while not prior to society, can be independent of it. And yet to take up that position is to jeopardize one of the central claims of the theory of compound individuality—to wit, that every level of self requires sociality or relationships. Now the self requires that context only to define the self against it, to separate from it, to use it, and, if need be, to withdraw from it. It is the autonomous self as atomist who plays this out.

INDIVIDUALISM

According to Charles Taylor the appeal and force of atomism or individualism derives from the affirmation of "the self-sufficiency of man alone" ("Atomism," 1985b, p. 189). Individualism "imparts a high degree of completeness...to the single human being, with the implication that separateness, autonomy, is the fundamental, metaphysical human condition" (Arblaster, 1984, pp. 15-16).
One condition of this autonomy is that individuals do not need and are not expected to accept the principles or values of others. Indeed, "the human essence," comments C. B. MacPherson on the canons of individualism, "is freedom from the dependence on the wills of others" (1962, p. 263).

The burden of choice is always the individual's alone, since someone else's choices are a poor guide to solutions to one's own dilemmas. The individual must, and can only, trust his own experience (Arblaster, p. 19). This is an invigorating freedom. Now the person can choose his own way of life independent of any relationships—personal, social, societal—that he does not choose to enter voluntarily. Since he is autonomous, he is free of his sodality and is no longer defined by his relationships in or to it. Now he has relationships and a self to share, if he chooses, in them.

Society then becomes the background to the rights and interests of individuals. Seen as "primary, more 'real' or fundamental than human society and its institutions and structures" (Arblaster, p. 15), the individual takes precedence over society. Each person has his own goals and interests and enters into contractual relationships to pursue and achieve those goals and interests. Obligations are then established by freely contracting with others, a method, as Kant pointed out, that enables each person to make himself reciprocally a means to another's ends without violating either person's freedom.

On this view society is an amalgam of these contracts, with the state providing the mechanisms whereby competing claims or interests are adjudicated. Protected by a foundation of rights, rules, and procedures that ensure that one person does not unduly pursue his interests at the expense of another, each individual proceeds along corridors of justice built on the principle: "From each according to what he chooses to do, to each ac-
cording to what he makes for himself (perhaps with the contracted aid of others) and what others choose to do for him or choose to give him..."[3]

Are the separation, privacy, and noninterference that some political philosophers consider an individual's right also a psychological necessity? In other words, is atomism built ineluctably into the nature, and notion, of autonomy? Steven Lukes argues that if pushed to its logical conclusion autonomy eventuates in ethical individualism, the doctrine that the final authority of ethical behavior, values, and principles is the individual alone (1973, p. 101). Anthony Arblaster recalls and notes the relevance of Aristotle's view on autonomy, a view that brings us back to Charles Taylor's definition of atomism: "Aristotle is absolutely explicit on the question of self-sufficiency. The normal human being is not self-sufficient...Hence autonomy for the individual human being was not an ideal because it was not seen as possible, let alone desirable" (p. 22). But Taylor avoids the confusion that plagues both Lukes's interpretation and Arblaster's citing of Aristotle. Atomism, not autonomy, requires the affirmation of the goal or ideal of self-sufficiency of man alone. Autonomy does not necessarily entail isolation (the misstep we found earlier in Berlin's interpretation) or self-sufficiency. As we have already discussed, it involves being able to step back from and reflect on one's sodality, the ability to step back to cast a critical eye on the values and goals of one's group, and the ability to make rational choices among those, and other, values and goals. Nowhere does autonomy demand, however, that one ought not to be or cannot be influenced by one's group, peers, or past.

Atomism or ethical individualism is one form, but not the only form, of personal identity that autonomy undergirds. There is another, distinctly different form we have labeled "compound individuality" that also requires
autonomy. To understand how compound individuality differs from atomism, we must first review how autonomous selfhood is psychologically constructed.

As the person emerges from the membership level he comes to see his own sodality and its norms as only one possibility among many. The rules and roles of the sodality that had seemed absolute are instead seen as applications of general principles that can be applied in myriad ways. Enabled through self-reflectivity to take the viewpoints of those outside his own group, the person comes to recognize that the world is seen from many different perspectives. He is now free to choose among them. This is the realization, and intoxication, of autonomy. The autonomous person now has two principal tasks. Being self-reflective, he needs to make the self into a system, a coherent whole. This self-system is an organization of experiences and meaning, what we have called the construction of a world view. The second task is to defend and maintain the integrity of that system.

The first task begins as the self establishes a boundary between self and other. (This is true of course for every level of self-development.) This manifests as a shift from what was "me"—what I was embedded in—to what is now "not me"—what the self is differentiating from. When the "not me's" are seen as "others"—that is, when they are seen to be completely separate from him—then differentiation is complete, and integration of identity and relationships with those others can ensue. But if the differentiation process is not complete, then relationships are difficult to form and maintain, for the person still questions where "he" stops and "others" begin. In short, one fears that the autonomous self may be lost, overwhelmed, or abandoned.4

As a result, some developmentalists see atomism as a state reflecting, ironically, incomplete differentiation—a state manifesting an inability to
form an identity in relationships because of fear or anxiety about being absorbed. Robert Kegan writes of the atomist that he "decides entirely for the individual probably because [he] is unable to hold onto the construction of the individual apart from the group if he has to also consider the group" (1982, p. 66). Not being fully differentiated, the self cannot yet be brought to a relationship but is still part of, and thus may be found in, a relationship. Behind the newly discovered sense of freedom and choice and control, then, is the threat that these, and thus one's autonomous identity, will be lost. The atomist's task is therefore to protect and preserve himself against such a threat. To do so the atomist either cuts himself off from others to avoid external influences on his inchoate world view or manipulates others to reinforce his world view by manipulating theirs.  

Yet the very pattern of development we have identified in psychological growth carries this threat built-in. Successful differentiation cannot come without establishing some relationship with the newly defined environment; in this case, other persons. Thus individuation presents the autonomous self with a paradox: Autonomous selfhood cannot be maintained without relationship, but relationships might threaten the world view and undermine autonomy. The way out of this is to use relationships to one's advantage; to use them to reinforce or express one's identity, but not let those relationships touch who one is. To maintain his world view intact, the person is willing to sacrifice relationships and to remove himself from the need to consider others by relying on abstract principles to make his decisions. Thus on behalf of detached logic and rationality, and thereby a reinforced sense of independence, the person has become what psychologist Carol Gilligan calls "the lone contemplator."
The tension between separation and attachment, a tension built into every level of selfhood but now noticed for the first time because of self-reflectivity, has been resolved in favor of differentiation. So the atomistic self "converts the world within its reach into operations on behalf of its personal enterprise" (Ibid, p. 223). That enterprise is to fulfill the person's interests by making others fit into the needs of his own "self-authored" system (Ibid, p. 250).

Autonomy, it would seem, has led through psychological necessity to individualism. But it must also be the case that some can choose the opposite pole of identity and decide in favor of inclusion or relationship. Carol Gilligan found just that. Her studies show that women in making judgements are concerned more with relationships than with adherence to principles or rules. Yet this phenomenon is not seen simply as an indication that women develop differently from men. Rather, it is considered a sign of a woman's deficient development. Indeed, developmental psychologists have persistently interpreted this orientation toward relationships as a hindrance to the development of mature—i.e., principled—judgement. The bias, in testing and in attitude, leads Gilligan to conclude that American society (and by implication other Western liberal societies) honors and thus fosters self-development only as differentiation, while an emphasis on attachments and relationships is dismissed as a subordinate stage to be transcended (1986). Thus researchers such as Donald Levinson have found, not surprisingly, that "the 'models for a healthy life cycle' are men who seem distant in relationships," and that "...[C]lose friendship with a man or a woman is rarely experienced by American men." The bias, in testing and in attitude, leads Gilligan to conclude that American society (and by implication other Western liberal societies) honors and thus fosters self-development only as differentiation, while an emphasis on attachments and relationships is dismissed as a subordinate stage to be transcended (1986). Thus researchers such as Donald Levinson have found, not surprisingly, that "the 'models for a healthy life cycle' are men who seem distant in relationships," and that "...[C]lose friendship with a man or a woman is rarely experienced by American men."7

Thus women's judgements are measured against a male standard and found wanting. The result is that a woman's focus on relationships and her sub-
ordination of achievement to nurturance and of competition to caring leave her "personally at risk...vulnerable to the issues of separation that arise at mid-life" (when, for example, children move away from home). This situation, concludes Gilligan, "seems more a commentary on the society than a problem in women's development."8

Empirical research demonstrates her point. The absence of adequate social support structures for adults holds women in particular in what many researchers refer to, biasedly, as "adolescent"--in this case, attachment-oriented--categories.9 For many of these psychological researchers this means that growth toward differentiation, which they consider the norm, is impeded. Researchers such as Kegan and Gilligan, on the other hand, find that the lack of appropriate social structures does hold women and men back. But the kind of social structures they see as necessary are not those that foster differentiation at the expense of relationship, but those that foster differentiation in relationships.

"...[T]he greatest source of difference [in development] lies with the differing embeddedness cultures available to men and women...One thus has to begin analyzing the possibility that the cultural arrangements are themselves deleterious."10

The arrangements are deleterious for both men and women, for social arrangements that encourage psychological growth toward only one pole of personal identity--whether that pole is relationship or differentiation--will thwart or distort the development of the other pole. Because society does not value attachments as highly as it does differentiation, it not only labels women's orientation as deficient, but also fails to support their efforts to develop themselves, instead of sacrificing themselves, in relationships. Likewise, society thwarts male development by con-
sidering any relationship orientation as ancillary, even adolescent.

As we have seen in developing the theory of compound individuality, identity at the membership and autonomous levels is contingent on social conditions and relationships. Therefore social institutions have a crucial role to play. By determining how the innate or basic structures will manifest, social arrangements influence and circumscribe the forms identity can take. In other words, social institutions reinforce, foster, and express certain forms of identity or selfhood. They can determine whether autonomous selfhood will manifest, and remain, as atomism, or whether it can move beyond individualism to a different kind of self, to compound individuality.\textsuperscript{11}

If men and women are to move on a large scale beyond individualism, then social institutions must exist to foster that movement. Before examining the nature of compound individuality, the level of autonomous self beyond atomism, and the kinds of social structures that might promote it, we ought first to see how atomism itself is fostered, even reinforced, by social conditions.

The idea that social structures can shape personality can be traced back as far as Aristotle, who saw politics as shaping man's inner life and leading him toward virtue.\textsuperscript{12} The same is of course true of Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Tocqueville, and Marx. In recent years sociologists and political scientists have provided empirical support to the idea that, in modern parlance, social structures produce distinct personality types. Foremost among these has been Inkeles and Smith, who in \textit{Becoming Modern} and in its companion volume, \textit{Exploring Individual Modernity}, show how traditional men are transformed into modern men through their contact with modern social institutions.
Inkeles and Smith found that living in cities, having access to mass communications, working in cooperatives or nonindustrial occupations, and, especially, attending formal schools and working in factories all effected more than attitudinal changes. Such experiences reshaped the consciousnesses—the values, needs, behavior, and disposition—of those within these institutions (1974, pp. 10-11). Persons from traditional backgrounds having such experiences "incorporated the norms implicit in such organizations into their own personality" (Ibid, p. 307).

Their purpose in studying the effects of modern organizations on traditional men in Nigeria, Israel, India, Chile, Argentina, and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) was to test empirically the claim that there was a "type of man" or set of characteristics manifesting an identifiable syndrome that could be called "modern" (1983, p. 13). While the separate cultures gave the individual personalities a distinct character, nevertheless, Inkeles and Smith concluded, the cultures did not fundamentally alter the basic principles governing the structure of modern "personality in all men" (1974, p. 12). What are the characteristics of modern men? The authors identified, among others, a sense of personal efficacy; respect for science; openness to new experiences; acceptance of responsibility; the ability to adhere to schedules, to follow abstract rules, and to respond to authority; and the ability to make plans in advance. Once-traditional men had become more-informed participant citizens, highly independent in relations to traditional sources of influence, especially in making personal decisions, and ready for additional new experiences and ideas (1974, p. 290).

Some of these characteristics are slightly misleading. For example, openness to new experiences, which Inkeles and Smith also describe as open-mindedness and flexibility, refers to a person's willingness to meet
strangers, to support scientific exploration, and to accept such technical innovations as birth control (p. 291). These traits herald drastic changes for traditional men, for, as Inkeles and Smith document, the result is to establish independent individual identities. As in Toqueville’s America in the 1830’s, the ground is then fertile for culturing individualism.¹³

If social institutions create forms of personal identity, as Inkeles and Smith and others¹⁴ have argued, then what kinds of social structures might foster growth toward a form of personal identity beyond individualism? Before attempting to answer that, we need to examine the vision of new personal identity beyond individualism, what we have called "compound individuality."

CO-TEXTUALISM AND COMPOUND INDIVIDUALITY

Carol Gilligan (1982) calls her vision of selfhood beyond individualism, the "collective life." It is a means of being and interacting that balances the two poles of identity. We can imagine the difficulty of coming to this state. Men’s orientation is largely toward separation because they fear that inclusion will jeopardize their freedom, since relationships might entail obligations that would limit their independence. Women, on the other hand, orient toward inclusion because they fear that increased self-assertion and differentiation will bring not self-reliance but isolation, loneliness, and anxiety. Both need, says Gilligan, intimacy.

For men intimacy is "the critical experience that brings the self into connection with others, making it possible to see both sides--to discover the effects of actions on others as well as on their cost to the self"
(1982, p. 163). Without this experience, as we have seen, differentiation hardens into indifference and lack of concern for others (while allowing the person to retain, presumably, a willingness to respect others' rights). For women the need is for intimacy but with an emphasis on autonomous choice, on creating a situation in which one's self can be engaged and examined. Without that experience women fail to see that there is an integrity to the self that is brought to, rather than found in or defined by, relationships. Yet in neither case does Gilligan tell us how intimate relationships evolve or are encouraged.

A defender of individualism need not argue that an atomist is unable to see both sides; the point seems to be, rather, that he is unwilling to acknowledge or act on the viewpoints of others unless those viewpoints pertain to his own interests. Nor does it seem the case that atomists cannot connect with others. We can imagine atomistic relationships that to those involved seem intimate. Imagine, for example, a relationship of genuine complementarity in which an atomistic man who wishes or needs to exert or assert his separate self dominates an atomistic woman who needs to subordinate herself in a close attachment to another. The woman wants to define herself by the relationship; the man wants a relationship that confirms or even celebrates his self-definition. The complementarity is complete when each partner becomes for the other what that other, through fear, cannot face in himself—the need for attachments—or in herself—the need for differentiation.

Each is fulfilled not at the other's expense, but because their needs are symbiotic. Both use the relationship to define themselves in what Harry Stack Sullivan (1953) called "cooperation"—involvement with another to enhance oneself that, in the process of fulfilling one's own needs, also
enhances the other. Such relationships can be, as Robert Kegan points out, warm, loving, and supportive, but they keep individualism intact. Therefore, he says, they cannot be intimate: "It is quite possible to form long-lasting love relationships which...actually serve to support the resistance to an evolution which permits intimacy" (Op. cit., p. 249). Whereas these relationships reinforce the partners' own closed self-definitions, intimacy is the characteristic of relationships of persons Kegan calls "interindividuals" (Idem). Intimacy here, as with Gilligan, is a special term referring to interdependence, self-surrender, and the capacity for interdependent self-definitions. Interindividuals can "at once mutually preserve the other's distinctness while interdependently fashioning a bigger context in which their separate identities interpenetrate, by which separate identities are co-regulated" (Ibid, pp. 120, 253). Such is also Gilligan's collective life: "Responsibility includes both self and other, viewed as different but connected rather than as separate and opposed" (Op. cit., p. 147). The conceptions of "collective life" and "interindividuality" form the substance of compound individuality.

Admittedly these descriptions reveal a kind of individuality different from atomism. The new relational dynamic seems to transcend an individualism that necessitated the loss of either individuality or intimacy. And these descriptions, taken from clinical observations, describe not how people ought to feel or ought to interact, but how they do feel and interact. Yet how are we to interpret such terms and concepts as "identity interpenetration" and "identity co-regulation"? It is one thing to suggest that persons remain open to contrasting or contradicting influences or world views, that they be willing to extend, modify, and reconstitute their
self-conceptions in light of new views. Isn't this simply being "open-minded"? But to suggest that compound individuals are those who submit their identities to regulation by others in social encounters strains credulity. It may solve by definition the communitarian problem of reconciling autonomy and relationship, but it seems to defy social life and common sense.

The emphasis in the relationships, and in our explanation, rests on the idea of interdependence. The compound individual can be said to be interdependent in two ways. One way is expressed as a need for relationships, for communicative exchanges that challenge, confirm, or complement one's worldview. In this way one's notions or definitions of self are open to change and transformation. When this occurs from one person to another and vice versa, instead of one-way only, the persons can be said to have interpenetrating or reciprocal identities.

The second way is a need for intimacy with others established through special commitments. Such commitments, generally of a kind found in dyadic relationships—in friendships, marriages, and partnerships—generate special obligations, including the obligation to keep oneself open and to respond to the wishes, needs, movements, expectations, and transformations of the other. Mutuality or reciprocity is also at the core of these relationships. It is measured, writes Stanley Benn, by "the extent to which each is sensitive to the others' responses to his own effort, [and each] is prepared to monitor his own attitudes to his partners and to the partnership, and to adjust to changes in the interest, tastes, values, and personalities of the others" (1982, p. 58).

The difference between these two ways of interdependence is that in the first case—"thin" interdependence—one is not obligated to accommodate,
or to attempt to accommodate, the changes in others. One may be obligated to respond to another, to hear another out, and to consider his view, but he is under no obligation to act on what is communicated. Indeed an atomist may do this to the extent that he is not compelled to change his self-definition. But in intimate relationships—relationships of "thick" interdependence in which one's identity is partly constituted by that relationship—one is not only sensitive to others, one is defined by connections to these others. Whatever happens to them affects and changes everyone involved. Thus the persons are compound individuals. One is required to incorporate the perspectives of one's partner into one's world view, to modify one's own perspective in accordance with the changes in the other. Doing so directly affects who one is. Identity can no longer be closed or exclusively regulated. It is interpenetrating, reciprocal, and co-regulated. Here is something akin to Sandel's constitutive relationships.

The relational context of the compound individual demands that one can no longer rely solely upon logic or rationality in making autonomous choices. One must now take active responsibility for considering the consequences of choices on those involved. Autonomy thereby comes to resemble the opposite of atomistic self-sufficiency, for one does not find the right principles first and then review peoples' positions from the perspective of that self-chosen principle. Rather, one considers the viewpoints of each person and tries to come to positions that accommodate them or that at least take them all into account. In doing so, however, the compound individual does not sacrifice his own views, but includes himself in any calculus of choice or hurt or risk or care.

Both the atomist and the compound individual build a meaningful, coherent world view by establishing a boundary between self and other.
Coming to know the world includes coming to know oneself in relation to that world. Whereas the atomist strives to make that world view fixed and inviolate—whether an internal view constructed or an external view adopted—the compound individual sees her world view, and the boundary between self and other, as contingent. She does not create and maintain a world view in isolation from others. The compound individual "assumes that each genuine perspective will augment or correct aspects of the other, in a mutual movement toward the real and the true...The boundaries of the self and outlook are now porous and permeable" (Fowler, 1981, pp. 187, 198). But, again, the identity of the compound individual is not porous and permeable with regard to every encounter, every give-and-take. It is so only in relations with particular others. Only then is the self a compound of other individuals. If one's life is like a book, then certain of its paragraphs, pages, and chapters will be jointly written. Then one's life is understood and one's self is known only by looking also at the text, the life and self, of the other.

**Contextualism**

Although both Kegan and Gilligan find intimacy the key to moving beyond individualism, how do they propose to develop it? One course might be to encourage contextualism, a level of thinking characteristic of mature adults that may exceed Piaget's formal operational thought. According to Gilligan's empirical work, some individuals in the midst of real-life dilemmas find that categorical or abstract principles alone are inadequate in dealing with the issues. In addition to applying principles of abstract reason, which may have sufficed in hypothetical dilemmas that divest participants of their history and psychology and that separate the conflicts
from the social contingencies out of which they arise, these participants became concerned about their actual relationships, their responsibilities, and the consequences of choices on those involved. They attempted to create a wider context that could embrace or balance the categorical and the contextual, so that judgements would be contingent rather than absolute. These would be made in full recognition of the tension between weighing rights and principles and counting responsibilities and relationships to particular persons in specific situations. Such tension was seen and accepted as a concomitant of the context, something that could not be resolved or thrust aside.

Consider, for example, this case cited by Murphy and Gilligan (1979): Mr. X is having an affair with a married woman. He decides that the right thing to do is to tell the husband about it. Overwhelmed by pressures at the university where she teaches and by illness in her family, the woman is unable to face the additional stress that would ensue from disclosing the affair to her husband. She promises that she will tell her husband at the appropriate time. In the meantime the husband learns of the affair from another source. Now caught between the sense that he has compromised his principles and the realization that the possible consequences of acting on them might have done real damage to the woman he cares about, Mr. X asks: "[W]as her right to sanity which I thought was being jeopardized less important than the husband's right to know?...That is the issue I've got to resolve" (Ibid, pp. 94, 95).

Through this, and other experiences, Mr. X concludes some time later that conflicts of rights do not reduce to a logically deductive moral solution. That is, in such real-life dilemmas one cannot come to an acceptable decision simply by examining and acting on the principles involved. One
has a commitment not only to principles, but also to principals; i.e., a concern for those in relationships that may overrule his dedication to principles alone. Thus judgements appear to occur in two contexts that frame different aspects of the problem: the context of universal logic and abstract rights and the context of compassion in which the particularity of consequences for actual participants dominates.

Mr. X based his morality on the principle of justice: "I have some obligation to correct injustice in whatever way I see" (Ibid, p. 94). For the husband the injustice was "his not knowing the truth." Truth, declares Mr. X, "is an ultimate thing" (Idem). But his relationship created "special obligations and responsibility for consequences" on those directly involved. The relationship tempered his principled stance, indeed, overrode it.

Before this dilemma Mr. X believed that his principles of justice, as Kohlberg argued (1973), were context-free or universal and could generate objectively right action and solutions in moral dilemmas. The substance of any decision thus conform to or fit the principle. Instead of following his principles and informing the husband, Mr. X deferred to the responsibility he felt for the woman and compromised his principles. The result is, as Mr. X says, that though he violated his principle of justice, "I made the right decision" (Ibid, p. 96). The principle of justice might lead to "right" solutions in the ideal world, but may not be the best solutions for the actual time and place and personalities. The right solution depends therefore on the context of the issue or dilemma.

"Interindividuals" or compound individuals use this contextual thinking (or "dialectical modes of reasoning") that incorporates abstract reasoning and generalizable principles, but grounds their application in
a context of consideration of the consequences of choices and of actual responsibilities to the persons involved.16

Consider another example: Judy is a mother in conflict with her daughter, Sarah. Judy holds a set of values essential to how Sarah has been raised. Now grown-up, Sarah is rejecting many of these values. Instead of assuming that her own values must be right, Judy creates a context in which both her's and her daughter's values can be examined jointly—assuming Sarah is willing—thereby testing together what makes good values. Together mother and daughter might then define values acceptable to both, rather than each of them being responsible only for her own. Judy is willing to consider values that might run counter to her's and to learn from values that challenge her own. Most important, she is willing, on the basis of her daughter's values, to transform her own. Such willingness, comments Kegan et al. (1988), is not a matter of temperament but of psychological development. This "openness" involves exploring differences instead of either simply acquiescing to another's or simply accepting those differences—"she has her values; I have mine." Judy thus combines a respect for Sarah's position with the possibility of generating a new kind of relationship.

Contrast this with Martha, undergoing the same sort of conflict with her daughter. Martha believes that her responsibility is to support her daughter and to respect her daughter's independence. While Martha honors her daughter's adoption of values at variance from her's—in other words, while Martha applauds her daughter's ability, and right, to select her own values—Martha cannot acknowledge that her own standards or values might need to be questioned. To honor her daughter's autonomy and simultaneously to maintain the integrity of her own values, Martha takes a relativistic
view: Her values are good for her; her daughter's are good for her daughter. Both Martha and her daughter may help each other to meet their own standards, but not to investigate how either defines or arrives at those standards.

To assume that her daughter's standards might be better would lead to the surrender of her own self-sufficiency. Martha's position stems directly from her capacity to see herself as the originator of her values and standards and from her need to maintain that capacity. Honoring her daughter is simultaneously honoring both her daughter's integrity and self-sufficiency, as well as her own. "When the self is ultimately invested in maintaining itself, and when a choice which reflects that self-system must be made, then this choice is clear--the self's standards must prevail" (Kegan et al., 1988, p. 20).

In his doctoral dissertation on contextual thinking, Michael Basseches provides some empirical support to Klaus Riegel's original assertion (1973) that this mode of thinking is a more encompassing, dynamic, and mature form of cognitive organization. Basseches identified 24 elements or "identifiable moves" in thinking that characterize mature thought. In sum, these moves involve bringing into one's frame of reference conflicting, contradicting, and/or new perspectives. Several of these moves--the "metaformal schemata"--involve the person in examining how disparate, even contradictory, views or systems relate to and can be coordinated with one another (pp. 108-110). For example, in Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma (this volume, p. 70) subjects are asked how a judge should decide the case when Heinz is tried for breaking and entering and stealing. Postconventional reasoning focuses on the principle that life is always of greater value than property (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 69). Yet a contextual thinker might well
focus on the apparent contradiction in a system that honors life over property even bringing such a case to trial. "What kind of society," one might ask, "would allow a druggist to withhold a drug from a woman who is dying?"

Basseches offers another example (1984, pp. 270-71). Imagine a situation in which one country--say, the United States--declares war against another--say, Nicaragua--but in which no one of appropriate military age is willing to risk his or her life. The government defines the war as essential to protecting the "national interest," and thus some must be made to fight. From the principled point of view it appears that each individual has an equal claim not to have to participate in the military action. Some will have to serve, as the government decrees, and so the question becomes, "What is an unbiased, generalizable principle for adjudicating this situation on which rational persons will agree?" One such principle might be justice as fairness, holding a draft lottery that would determine by random choice which citizens would serve. This disinterested procedure would seem to give rise to a moral obligation to serve if one is selected.

The contradiction that a war is in the national interest, but that no one is willing to fight it might lead to the conclusion that the entire framework needs to be challenged. If Nicaragua is perceived as the enemy and yet citizens will not fight, then a way must be found either to re-conceptualize the idea of "national interest" or, outside of war, to eliminate the danger posed by Nicaragua--say, through some sort of diplomacy or embargo. In essence, the contradiction leads the contextualist thinker to call into question the entire framework and to avoid, at least initially, looking for a resolution of the conflict within that framework.
Contextual thinking generates a need to achieve greater inclusiveness in one's perspective. Basseches argues that those using contextualism recognize contradiction and conflict as opportunities to develop and reshape one's own positions and commitments. They recognize "at least the [theoretical] possibility of an integrative resolution of the contradictions" (p. 186). Holding contradictions in tension, he reports, allows one to see her own view as partial and limited, as in the case of Judy and her daughter, while also enabling one to find what is valuable and true in the positions of others. When an integrative view does not occur, then the individual chooses a viewpoint, or a composite viewpoint, from within the context of the broadest and soundest understanding possible—namely, one in which disparate views and arguments have been presented. Thus even if an integrative view is not possible, the context of choice has been expanded.

Such an approach requires more than simple toleration of opposing viewpoints. Basseches says that it involves embracing viewpoints, ideas, or attitudes that conflict with or contradict one's own. It requires both an open mind and an open self-definition (p. 191), for every system or world view is seen to leave something out. For contextualist thinkers formal approaches are inadequate because they fail to account for the situations of and consequences for particular actors. Rather than separating form from content, as in formal approaches, one needs to see that particulars are shaped by the universals one applies to them (p. 332). Thus laws about property rights may seem impartial since they are applicable to all individuals with property. But the laws also define property, a definition that conceivably does not include as property what some persons might value. Thus its partiality is revealed, and content is seen as essential to the
meaning of the abstraction.

Contextual thinking is characterized, therefore, by: 1) recognition of, if not a search for, multiple viewpoints and mutually incompatible world views; 2) acceptance of the necessity of contradictions in order to understand one's own world view; and 3) an integrative approach in thinking about contradictory and conflicting views. Such thinking, writes D. A. Kramer in a summary of the research findings of various "contextualists," is fostered by encountering "different viewpoints and potentially incompatible roles and [by] the necessity of committing oneself to a chosen course from among a multitude of possibilities" (1983, p. 92). In brief, one looks to the context in which decisions or dilemmas arise, and from that context, one looks at the various and conflicting viewpoints that can arise.

At the core of contextualism, above all its other aspects, is the attempt to integrate various views, the attempt to find an inclusive solution. All versions of contextualist theory, comments Kramer, comprise or imply "an integration or synthesis of contradictory [views] into an overriding, more inclusive whole." Psychologists Arlin and Sinnott call it "a pooling or coordination of observations taken from different frames of reference" to create one frame of reference (Op. cit., p. 93)--a different way to describe the sort of exploration of values Judy and her daughter might engage in.

The integrative process is also the key to compound individuality, for although atomists find contradiction and conflicts intolerable, they are still able to recognize them. If self-interest could somehow outweigh this intolerability, then perhaps an atomist could grant a hearing to conflicting views, in the hope of using them to solidify his own positions.
He could then instrumentally use those who express divergent views by selecting from them those views that suited his purposes, while ignoring or dismissing the rest.18

But what the atomist cannot do, without destroying his closed self-definition and the world view he is bound to defend, is take up or embrace conflicting views. Indeed, Carmichael describes the integrative process as "the awkward embrace": the preservation and holding of "all available contradictory views and perspectives" and the attempt to generate from them one inclusive perspective (1966, p. 176). Consider how one political outcome might have turned out had the participants pursued a contextualist line of inquiry:

The Housing Authority of Suffolk, Massachusetts, a small town outside of Boston, had been trying to provide low-cost housing for elderly citizens. To build such housing the town needed financial assistance. In 1982 the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) offered Suffolk a grant of $5,000,000, contingent on the town's building some low-income housing as well. In the town meeting the grant was voted down, for many townspeople feared the influx of the poor, ethnic families who would occupy the low-income housing. "Townspeople appealed to the unity and integrity of their tradition-rooted community to justify segregationist policies" (Bellah, 1985, p. 13), a rationalization that smacked of pure self-service since Suffolk had for many years been less a "tradition-rooted community" and more a "bedroom community," a suburb of convenient commuting to Boston.

According to one townswoman, the Housing Authority took no time to gather the views of any members of the community or of any other governmental agency. Instead "of working with townspeople to develop common
ideas about how to provide housing for people [the poor and the elderly],
the Housing Authority...just went out and made their plans" (Ibid,
p. 187). Instead of taking up everyone's concerns, the Housing Authority
presented its plans as a fait accompli, which polarized the townspeople.
According to the townswoman, no one ever considered limiting the number of
low-income units to offset some of the concern of those who feared an
influx of the poor, and no one ever consulted the federal government about
what an acceptable limited number might be. What the town should have done,
she argued, was make a decision after holding public deliberations in which
the different concerns and conceptions surrounding the proposed plans were
fully aired (Ibid, p. 188).

Yet full contextualism is stronger than an approach calling merely for
diversity of opinion, goals, and values. It is a call not only to hear
divergent views, but also to take them up and respond to them; to consider
the basis and consequences of various positions; to attempt to integrate
or accommodate these positions; and to make judgements and choices from
this integrative perspective.

For these reasons, contextualism is a way to move beyond individualism,
for the atomist fears disparate views. The attempt to derive an inclusive
perspective from conflicting ones requires him to take on the perspectives
of others and requires him to qualify his own world view by accommodating,
or attempting to accommodate, those of others.

Even as a mental exercise this experience can collapse the walls that
enclose the atomist's self-definition. An atomist would then experience
what developmental psychologist William Perry called "the Trojan Horse
phenomenon": Tempted from the fortress of his own attitudes, ideas, and
ways of thinking, the atomist becomes curious about an intriguing figure
(proposal, idea, angle, etc.) that he had not considered or seen before. Suddenly the figure opens up to him and spreads out before him an army of considerations, consequences, suggestions that capture his fortress and break new ground.  

Consider how contextualism might be of use: In a small town in northwestern Vermont, which we shall call Ludlow, governance proceeds through the town meeting, much as it did in Tocqueville's time. At one meeting an issue comes up for discussion that has tormented the town on and off for some years. The town sewage pipe runs along the river that passes through Ludlow. At one spot not far from town children hang on the pipe and swing into the river. The constant use over time invariably splits the pipe, causing sewage leaks and necessitating expensive repairs to the pipe and in the clean-up. In past years the town has paid to have a rope and, later, a swing installed at the swimming spot. The children continue to use the pipe, however, and again it has split.  

At the meeting the townspeople express exasperation about what to do, and they consider some drastic measures. Someone suggests pouring the sewage directly into the river to avoid the need of a pipe and to stop the swimming. This was noted, but was well argued against. Most of the talk focuses on how to protect the pipe. One townsman suggests fencing off the pipe at the swimming hole; another suggests fencing it off with electrified wire (although this is immediately countered with a defense of animals, and others, who wander innocently into the wire); a third suggests hiring security men, maybe college students, to guard the pipe. Finally the town curmudgeon stands and proposes reinforcing the pipe. Then the children can swing on it without damaging it, and the town can stop worrying about spills. It would require a one-time expense and should not,
then, give anyone, including the children, any further trouble. The proposal is applauded, put into motion, and quickly passed.

The curmudgeon's proposal did not reconcile the previous speakers' recommendations. Indeed, it did not deal with them. But it did drive below the surface to what motivated each of them—the desire to protect the pipe from damage. And it touched upon or spoke to those whose perspective was unexpressed and unrepresented—the children. The proposal thus sprang from the denominator common to all the recommendations—the desire to protect the pipe—and it brought together that denominator and the desire of the children. From this "awkward embrace" came a solution utterly simple but, in the heat of debate and narrow focus, easily missed.

Yet most decisions, especially political decisions, are not usually like this. It is far more likely that a compromise will serve as the solution. Either the contending parties agree on a policy or action that no one thinks is entirely satisfactory but that each prefers to the ones the others want—you want to vacation in Greece; I want to vacation in Spain; we settle on going to Italy—or the parties settle on a compromise of alternatives—this year it's Greece; next year, Spain. Indeed, this whole notion of an integrative approach seems paradoxical. How can incompatible, and especially contradictory, viewpoints be reconciled? Opposites seem exclusive, providing no option other than choosing between them. Were the residents of Ludlow simply lucky to arrive at the decision they did? Would more such decisions be reached, without luck, if contextu-alist procedures were established? How, for example, can the issue of abortion be resolved when one side sees the issue as murder of the unborn, while the other sees it as the right of women to control their bodies?
The integrative approach calls for an attempt as far as possible to generate an inclusive perspective. To make such an attempt one must embrace or take up the viewpoints of others, see from the perspectives of others, treat the perspectives of others as if they were one's own. The contextualist thinker may quite readily appreciate that in the case of abortion, for example, both sides have legitimate arguments and that choices emanating from either one lead to substantial, even beneficial, consequences. This does not afford the contextualist the luxury of being able to choose either course willy-nilly. Rather it underscores the anguish in any choice. One is torn between the two positions, both of which are persuasive. One knows that in the choice not made, as Alasdair MacIntyre said, one has left undone what should be done.

To review, contextualists seek to solve dilemmas by combining principles and responsibility or obligations to others. But one can be pulled in one direction by his principles; pulled in the opposite by his responsibility. As Mr. X said: "I violated my first principles, but I made the right decision" (1979, p. 96). The contextualist strives to keep these two in balance, to pool all the perspectives and work through the consequences of each choice on all those involved. He attempts to forge from this awkward embrace a comprehensive, inclusive, or integrative perspective by building on the common elements when views conflict and by transcending the views when they contradict.

Transcending contradictions is, of course, exceedingly difficult. Consider, for example, that the ancients had the water clock, but couldn't tell time. They attempted to divide daylight hours into equal parts and, separately, to divide nighttime into equal parts. But because day and night varied in length from season to season, they could not do it. Only
when man transcended those separate categories and thought to divide up the whole twenty-four hours did keeping time become easy. To accomplish time-keeping the ancients would have had to step back from their categories, from their world view, and to do so without an alternative to push or guide them. Contextualism calls for stepping out of one's world view, but not into the void. It requires stepping into the world view, embracing part of the world view, of another.

The hope of this embrace is both psychological and existential--of breaking through the psychological barriers that insulate the atomist's world view but leave him isolated, alienated, anomic, and alone; and of finding some common ground that might integrate the views or finding a new perspective around which people might unite. As we shall see in the next chapter, this could have significant political consequences, for more than establishing a marketplace of ideas, contextualism might be used to combine those ideas and generate from them a common good.

PRACTICING CONTEXTUALISM

Can the requirements of contextualism--especially the integrative approach--get us to the intimacy characteristic of compound individuality? If compound individuals use contextualism, does using contextualism engender compound individuality? Consider again the nature of the relationship of the complementary atomists and that of compound individuals. Each atomist brings a set of values, goals, beliefs, etc. to be shared in the relationship. Providing the sets coincide, there is little problem. Yet if one of the atomists changes--e.g., declares for bisexuality--or finds some new ideas or beliefs--e.g., converts to a different religion--that conflict
with those of her partner, then what alternative is there when the sharing stops but to walk away? It is unlikely that the man, who asserts and defends his self-definition, will accommodate changes he does not initiate. But it is quite possible that the woman, whose own self-definition is based on this relationship, would acquiesce and modify, even abandon, her own set for the sake of the relationship. This, however, is not reciprocity but acquiescence, since the relationship is the source of the woman's identity.

In intimate relationships commitments to each other breed obligations to accommodate changes in the relationship, but from the perspective of an autonomous self. The constant endeavor is to create new and larger contexts that can encompass the changes that one or the other is going through with the intention of changing oneself as well. Thus the relationship and the identities of both parties are constantly moving; there is a perpetual exchange of points of view to arrive at a new shared meaning that neither partner dictates to the other. What is shared is not fixed or inflexible; it is derived in what Shotter calls a "hermeneutical back-and-forth" (1984), the search for a common perspective or shared way of life.

Both persons come to the relationship as separate, autonomous selves, but neither looks at the other as a person with fixed traits. Rather the relationship is mutually constitutive and mutually defining. It shapes the person I am just as I shape it. Both persons participate in joint actions to remake or redefine their mutual world. These relationships are "fully participatory," writes Stanley Benn, because it is their "joint enterprise" that creates a mutuality that "will flourish the more autonomous the partners." When trouble stirs, the response will not be to blame oneself or one's partner, but will be to ask how the relationship must change to adapt
to the changes that have occurred in the participants in order for the relationship to continue.

But does an intimate relationship really differ from that of a man who defines himself by his relationship, say, to his trade union or company? It does. The principal difference is that an intimate relationship is marked by reciprocity. Changes in one partner necessitate changes in the other, if going only so far as to try to create a larger context that incorporates the changes and lays out new positions that both can share. With a trade union or company, reciprocity would have to be demanded of the entire group rather than demanded of any persons in it. In short, the trade union or company would have to be willing to change to accommodate the changes or perspectives of one member.

Trade unions and corporations do not function this way. They operate, instead, by asymmetry, rather than reciprocity. The flow of initiatives, changes, and adaptations is one-way only; it comes from the governing board to the members or employees. This for good reason; trade unions and companies are not in the business of generating intimacy, unless as a by-product of moves to effect greater productivity or efficiency. (Nor, it might be said, are strong communities, a point to which we shall recur in the final chapter.)

If compound individuality is characterized by intimacy, and if intimacy is in part characterized by contextual thinking, then promoting contextualism may well promote development beyond individualism toward intimacy and compound individuality. If that is to be done on a large scale, then, as argued, social institutions must reflect and effect that development. To grow toward "interindividuality," or compound individuality, says Robert Kegan, the social institutions most in need of restructuring are places
of work (1982, chapter 8). But restructured in what way?

According to Kegan, it is the atomist's very inability to face conflict and contradiction that can lead beyond individualism. As already mentioned, accepting mutually incompatible world views and contradictions as inherent features of reality would put a ponderous strain on an atomist's world view and self-definition. And finding that situation intolerable, he tries to relieve the pressure by dismissing other views or discarding the contradictions. Kegan believes these maneuvers could be frustrated, if not thwarted, by structuring contextualism into social institutions so that participation in deciding about work-related affairs required facing multiple, incompatible viewpoints. If confronted by views that conflict with his own, in a setting in which participation is in his interest, then, Kegan argues, an atomist might be pushed toward compound individuality.

Although it is in his interest to do so, since otherwise he may not deal with the real problems that affect him at work, an atomist might not participate. The fear of divergent views may outweigh the desire or need to participate. Nevertheless, Kegan argues, introducing a forum for contextual thought into organizations could help bring about a personal transformation beyond individualism. Such a forum would require institutional restructuring that would include, but would not necessarily be limited to, the following: 1) an organization-wide sharing of opinions and ideas on the purpose and operations of the organization; 2) developing an open-communications policy among all employees including disclosure, support, and confrontation; 3) evaluating the effects of each person's behavior on others in the organization as well as evaluating the effects of the organization on the environment and society; 4) directly facing con-
flicts in the organization and trying to find novel solutions and accommodations; and 5) trying to emphasize horizontal rather than vertical role differentiation, playing down hierarchy, and trying to create symmetrical rather than subordinate relations. 22

Taken together, these practices could generate, says Kegan, "an institutional capacity for intimacy" (Ibid, p. 244). Bureaucratic organizations do not currently exhibit such structures and thus fail to promote self-development beyond individualism. Yet can the structural changes Kegan proposes accomplish this kind of self-development? Granted, they do encourage persons to step back from the organization; to question its purposes, decisions, and structures; to participate in decision-making and management of problems; and to question their own views and themselves. But how do these procedures reflect and engender "an institutional capacity for intimacy"? Aside from the proposal to look for novel solutions to workplace problems, Kegan does not mention the need to integrate or accommodate various views. How then can this restructuring either fulfil contextual thinking, which Kegan himself says should bring into being "a more integrative judgment" (Ibid, p. 239), or otherwise prepare a participant for intimacy?

If participation is limited solely to the airing and sharing of different views, as Kegan proposes, it cannot. There is no obligation to generate a frame of reference or context that holds various and contradictory views, a context from which might be derived a more inclusive, an integrative, or a common perspective. Intimate relationships carry such an obligation. As constitutive relationships based on reciprocity, they carry an obligation to attempt to accommodate the views and needs and desires of the partner. Without building this need to incorporate or
integrate differing views into one common perspective, without, in other words, constructing a forum that requires complete contextual thinking, there seems little chance of nurturing intimacy and thus promoting compound individuality.

But generating such an integrative perspective, as mentioned, carries problems of its own. The risk is that procedures for building an inclusive context will be diversionary or destabilizing. So we need to examine in the next chapter how integration or accommodation of viewpoints, how even taking up or embracing divergent viewpoints, might be attempted; whether the attempt to forge an inclusive perspective, should the integrative approach fail, could be sufficient to lay the foundation for compound individuality; whether establishing an institutional capacity for intimacy can foster compound individuality on a large scale; and what forms of participation might be required to effect this.

Before moving to these topics, there is an additional dimension to generating compound individuality that, given the communitarian context of the thesis, requires attention. Beyond the empirical evidence he uncovered in actual dilemmas showing that commitment to a course of action can lead participants to maturity of judgement and responsibility to others, what interested psychologist William Perry (1968) was the social "sustenance" that most supported individuals "in their choice to use their competence to orient themselves through commitment—as opposed to using it to establish a nonresponsible alienation" such as hedonism. One such sustenance, of course, as we've seen, is an arena for confronting real-life dilemmas. Perry suggested that college and the armed services were two such common arenas, because they threw together people from disparate backgrounds. But the arenas he found most sustaining, that were most effective
in promoting commitment and responsibility, were those that fostered "a special realization of community," a sense of community that "seemed to derive from reciprocal acts of recognition and confirmation" (Ibid, p. 213). The need, as described by Perry, was to be recognized as a distinct person from within a context of group solidarity.

The relationships characteristic of compound individuality retain the parties' distinctness and autonomy, but are also constitutive of their identities. Could such relationships serve as the basis for a special sense of Sandelian community? Fostering compound individuality through contextualism would not seem, on an initial impression, to guarantee intimate relationships, let alone a network of intimate relationships, of which community might consist. But could building contextualism into social institutions also build community? Could such participatory procedures also be community-building? Is attempting to generate an inclusive or common perspective sufficient for generating shared values and goals, a shared way of life? Or does promoting the common good require, as Robert Paul Wolff (1968) argues, going beyond tolerance and pluralism toward homogeneity?

This concern for both intimate relationships and community brings us back to where we started, with questions not only about community and individuality but also about liberalism and communitarianism. To overgeneralize, liberalism's concern for autonomy and individual rights associates it with individualism and the pole of differentiation at the expense of relationships. Thus communitarians such as Michael Sandel, Robert Paul Wolff, and Alasdair MacIntyre accuse liberals of pursuing freedom to choose values, goals, and interests without sensing a need for the harmony and the solidarity of ends that come from community. Community, in their eyes, is too high a price to pay for autonomy. Their critiques of this liberal
tendency serve as reminders of our need for community and for recognition of relationships as constitutive of persons. But from such reminders comes the communitarian association with attachments to, even embeddedness in, relationships at the expense of autonomy and individuality. Defenders of liberalism such as Amy Gutmann (1985), Stanley Benn (1982), and Ronald Dworkin (1983) accuse communitarians of wanting the harmony of shared values, beliefs, and ends without granting people the freedom to determine or choose which values, beliefs, and ends will be shared. From their perspective, autonomy is too high a price to pay for community.

And so, in addition to building contextualism into organizational practices in the hope of laying the foundation for widespread compound individuality, we must also consider whether such a context can encompass the divergent views of these two political camps. Could a forum that balances the two poles of personal identity, that is also both participatory and community-building, reconcile liberalism and communitarianism? Each speaks a half-truth, and, as we've seen, the solution to personal identity lies with neither exclusively. It lies, instead, with compound individuality, a perspective that generates a larger context that might reconcile or accommodate both positions. Communitarianism and liberalism should be seen in dynamic tension, where the pull toward relationship does not eclipse the pull toward individuality. They may well represent the two poles of the one process called mature social identity. In this identity persons recognize that the social matrix is responsible for and essential to autonomy and individuality. And it is this social identity that might be educed through active democratic participation built on contextualism.
Self-development through participation, usually construed as political participation, is hardly a new idea. Indeed, it is an ancient one with a pedigree reaching back to Aristotle, who described man as a political animal not because of his interest in politics, but because he could only realize his full capacities in political participation. To be a full or whole or "perfect" human being was possible only for citizens, those who had "the right to share in the office of deliberating and judging with skill...who participate in judging and ruling...who share in the administration of justice and in the holding of office..." The polis thus existed for the moral development and perfection of its citizens; their perfection would create a perfect state.

Yet participation as self-development also suffered a broken and checkered lineage. It became a threat not only to those in offices and on thrones who sought and exercised political control, but also to those in cathedrals who pronounced on and guided spiritual development. In fact, the influence of this line of argument disappeared until its resurgence in Renaissance Florence as republicanism. Only then did the vita activa (the vivere civile) compete with the medieval preference for contemplation. But the modern form did not take shape until the liberal democratic formulations of John Stuart Mill.
PARTICIPATION AS CULTIVATION OF CHARACTER

Mill adopted the self-development conceptions of German idealism, especially of Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt. The "end of man," wrote von Humboldt, "is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole" (quoted in Mill, On Liberty, chapter III, p. 54). Such development had two requirements: "freedom and variety of situations" (Ibid, p. 55). Mill elaborated on both. Men must learn, he insisted, to think for themselves. To do that, to develop their mental and moral faculties—those of "perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference"—men needed to be provided the opportunity of making choices in a social climate in which they were free from external constraints, could face "different experiments in living," and could give "free scope...to varieties of character" (Ibid).

Mill had gone further than von Humboldt in specifying the powers or capacities men needed to develop; specifically, citizens needed to improve their intellectual capacities and political judgements. To accomplish this Mill proposed political participation that would lead to an extension, a "largeness" of "conceptions and sentiments," which in turn would carry citizens beyond "the satisfaction of daily wants..." (Representative Government, p. 233) Participation would exercise the reasoning faculties while encouraging participants to consider subjects that transcended their quotidian concerns, as well as their personal points of view. Through participation, in the face of diversity of opinion, citizens would be introduced into a "range of ideas" that would lead to a development of intelligence quite beyond that of "those who have done nothing in their lives
but drive a quill, or sell goods over a counter."

Such development would enable citizens to protect their rights and interests, for they would be the best judges of both. Thus the true test of good government was whether it permitted the educative political participation necessary for judicious self-protection (Ibid, p. 224). A good government would use participation both to exercise the faculties already existing and to improve these faculties and develop them in others.

But participation also had a third developmental function, to serve as "the first step out of the narrow bounds of individual and family selfishness" ("Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," Collected Works, volume XIX, p. 322). The citizen would then be able to act in a public role and to think of the interests of the community, not simply of his own interests, however expanded. Each "is called...to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private particularities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good...[W]here this school of public spirit does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons, in no eminent social situations, owe any duties to society..." Participation could reorient motivations and interests.

Given some role to play in public processes citizens would develop both their intellectual capacities and their connections with their fellow citizens. As participation schools the citizen's mind, "the influences are constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest, [for] popular institutions are the great means of rendering general in a people...." No means of nourishing patriotism is "so efficacious as free institutions--a large and frequent intervention of the citizens in the management of public business" ("DeTocqueville

For such significant developments, what precisely did Mill propose as suitable participatory institutions? He proposed a) free speech and assembly so that citizens could deliberate before b) voting, which Mill claimed was like a "verdict by a juryman," made after debating the facts of a public affair. In that spirit he also encouraged c) jury duty and d) local office-holding where information and issues were more comprehensible to those developing their mental, moral, and intellectual judgements. "If anyone supposes that this road will not bring [these] I call to witness the entire contents of M. de Tocqueville's great work" (Representative Government, p. 300).

Yet given his emphasis on the values of participation, aren't these proposals exiguous? They had to be, given the tension in Mill's view of participation: If participation is essential as a means of developing persons of national character and competent to think for themselves, then they cannot be competent initially, and so their decisions will be irresponsible and incompetent. How can the experiences necessary for competence in political participation be supplied without simultaneously sabotaging by citizen ineptitude the very institutions that supply them? How can rational governance be maintained when those who are to govern are irrational or not yet rational? It can be done, thought Mill, only by limiting the arenas of political action and by assuring that the competent and more intelligent had a greater voice in making decisions.

Mill was much influenced by Tocqueville's writings on tyranny of the majority. He feared, as Tocqueville did, that the uneducated and inept would dominate and tyrannize politics so as to undermine authority and
individuality. Being ignorant and inexperienced, the uneducated would be susceptible to all manner of demagoguery and manipulation. Unable to judge for themselves, they would simply follow the herd:

Thus the mind is bowed to the yoke; even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done; peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct are shunned equally with crimes, until by dint of not following their own nature they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved; they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own.4

Thus could conformity or too much political power in the hands of the inept dam the course of self-development, for not only are mental capacities not improved or cultivated, but those already in existence wither and starve as well. To remedy this Mill proposed two solutions: to limit participation and to provide the competent and educated with plural votes. While all citizens would make choices, they would not do so equally.

In Mill's scheme the highest levels of policy-making would take place in a nationally representative assembly, while government administration would rest in the hands of experts. The educated would have an obligation to teach the less competent. Through debate and deliberation in the representative assemblies and through discussion in public places, they would show others how to reason about the ends and means of politics. While the educated would receive plural votes, the immoral and illiterate would be deprived of the vote altogether. For the sake of rational government, therefore, Mill rejected direct democracy in favor of plural voting and representative government. Of the two Millian pillars of government, the principle of competence bore greater weight than the principle of partici-
pation. The primary locus of participation would have to be, as it was for Tocqueville, local politics.5

Though not his view when he wrote Representative Government, Mill wrote in his autobiography that universal education could make plural voting unnecessary (1924, pp. 153, 183-4). The reasons seem straightforward. Political participation, according to Mill, by requiring deliberation, judgement, and choice, stimulated the intellectual faculties while also widening the participants' horizons by "elevating the mind to large interests and contemplations" ("Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," op. cit.). Universal education could perform these tasks more efficiently. Certainly telecommunications today widens a citizen's horizons far beyond anything political participation might do, though our universal education can be criticized for the extent to which it fails to stimulate intellectual faculties. Still, it might be sufficient to obviate plural voting. Yet, as we have seen, these were not the only values of political participation. It also shaped national character and generated "love of country," though arguably these, too, rely upon intellectual development that leads one beyond narrow, selfish interests. Developing these "communal" capacities required that citizens work jointly, and non-political endeavors might serve just as well as a requisite spur. Mill himself, following Tocqueville, mentioned work in voluntary associations.

Therefore, under different social conditions political participation might no longer be necessary for Millian self-development, though it would still serve the purpose of protecting individual rights and interests. Yet our focus is on developing capacities different from the intellectual ones emphasized by Mill. So perhaps political participation could have a significant role to play in our task--developing the level of selfhood we have
called compound individuality.

Both Representative Government and On Liberty provide strong defenses of and arguments for individuality and autonomy and for the role of participation in their exercise and development. Mill's works serve as a base for, if not a model of, liberalism. Yet often the quality of autonomy and individuality that liberals laud is, as we have examined, the base for atomism. Our goal is to erect social structures that generate a new mode of self or individuality, in which the shape of autonomy that underlies and bolsters individualism gives way to an autonomy that effects and sustains a co-determined, co-regulated, or "intimate" identity—an identity constituted by relationships and autonomy. Therefore, the participatory structures we need would take us beyond those recommended by Mill; they must encourage participants, especially atomists, to transcend, modify, or reveal their world views. They would have to be both the conditions for and the expression of that level of self, and thus we would have to treat participants as if they were already compound individuals. Having gone beyond placing citizens on juries and having them serve in parish offices as means of self-development, we need the participatory "institutions...to be radically different, according to the stage of advancement already reached" (Representative Government, p. 212). What might be required for development to compound individuality, then, would not be those participatory structures Mill recommended for developing competence, but popular participatory assemblies structured, with some emendations, like Mill's representative assemblies (Ibid p. 259):

An arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent individual [read: of every individual] whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion; where every
person...speaks his mind—not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; when those whose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought to be superior reasons...where every opinion in the country can muster its strength and be cured of any illusion...A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests and opinions, can compel them to listen and either comply, or state clearly why they do not.

Mill's description begins to set a tone for our participatory structures, but our procedures would have to show three significant differences. First, and most palpable, where his participants were representatives, ours would all be citizens. Second, his procedures established a process of daunting debate requiring speakers of eloquence and verve. While debate, discussion, and open exchanges of opinion would have to form the basis of our procedures as well, an emphasis would have to be placed not on attacking positions and scoring points, but in sharing and joining perspectives. Third, Mill's procedures, and his desire for a general cultivation of intellect, called for the airing of diverse viewpoints. Developing compound individuality would require more than that. It would involve the actual hearing, even embracing, of diverse viewpoints, for the purpose of the participatory procedure is to move the participant beyond or outside of his own self-containment, his own exclusive, closed world view. That requires compelling people who wish to participate to listen, not so as to comply or confute—as Mill suggested—but to take up as their own a divergent view. Exhortations to do so are not enough; this requirement would have to be built into the system. One way to do that is with something like the psychological technique called mirroring.
MIRRORING: HABITS OF THE HEART

To review, compound individuality is an adult psychological state defined by three characteristics: 1) problems are solved and dilemmas are addressed by contextualist thinking in which considerations of consequences on actual persons temper the principles by which one judges; 2) persons hold open their perspectives, beliefs, and world views and not only tolerate but also actively seek out conflicting or contradictory viewpoints that challenge their own views; and 3) personal identity is defined by reciprocity, an intimacy with specific others by which one establishes and understands who he is through the joint action or interaction with those others. Thus one's autonomy as a separate person and one's sociality or relationship to another both constitute that person's identity or self-system. William Torbert summarizes this level of selfhood this way:

Each person transcends himself in genuine intimacy with others, experiencing a new form of relationship, seeing himself and the other anew, and gradually in essence, through his fundamental encounters with others, reconstituting his world view and values... The persons who develop intimacy discover/create a shared spirit permeating their different and changing ways of structuring the world." (1976, p. 146)

Compound individuality is, therefore, a dynamic balance between the forces of integrity that seek to establish boundaries and those of intimacy that seek to expand those boundaries. We wish to do through institutional contrivance what Rousseau sought to do through the social contract: transform the self; in our case, beyond individualism. To do so involves establishing some sort of psychological habit by which a person can take up viewpoints other than his own, especially ones that conflict or contradict,
and thereby exercise capacities that leave open or make vulnerable his own world view. Saint Thomas Aquinas said that justice—the giving to individuals their due "with constant and perpetual will"—is a "habit" (*Summa Theologica*, no. II, part II, question 58, article 1). It is contingent upon a certain disposition or state of mind. We seek to establish and build upon a state of mind by which one opens and remains open to the perspectives of others by structuring into participatory procedures the conditions necessary for contextual thinking. The hope is that this habit or psychological state would not only operate during participation, but would also carry over into one's daily relationships and interactions, thus making possible the move to compound individuality. How, specifically, would the procedures have to be structured? To explore that we turn first to the research that informs this entire study—the empirical findings of developmental psychology.

In research to determine how much and why participants changed moral judgements, James Broughton studied an undergraduate "self-analytic" training group. He found little change in participants' judgements and attributed this to the following reasons:

1) few moral issues were discussed;
2) participants made claims and expressed opinions but almost never gave reasons for them;
3) few participants had "enough air-time" to make their positions clear; and
4) people did not respond to what previous speakers had said, but preferred to issue their own opinions *de novo* (1982, pp. 369-371).

While our concern is not with changing moral judgements per se, each of these four conditions would have to be reversed to build full contextualist thinking into participation and to change participants' psychological
orientation.

First, moral issues must be discussed. More than moral dilemmas, these must be real-life dilemmas with flesh-and-blood characters. These are not only the marrow of contextualism but also of politics. As Aristotle said, experience and not formal and technical knowledge is the essential ingredient in praxis. Political issues are those that require careful deliberation, judgement, and decision, for unlike hypothetical moral dilemmas that often conduce to unrealistic principled stances, political issues have real and significant consequences for actual people.

Second, participants must both make claims and give reasons. Taking up the claims and opinions of others has the salutary expansive effect cited by Mill; it opens us to new perspectives and to new relationships. The contextualist requirement, as we shall see below, is not simply to hear another's view but also to consider that view as if it were one's own. By doing that one comes to understand better or in a new way the person who has expressed the view. The goal is to have a "meeting of the minds," but that is not to be confused with what Michael Walzer calls "facile empathy"; that is, trying only to feel with the person instead of joining intellectually with him by entering imaginatively into his situation, arguments, and choices (1970, p. 73).

But imagining how it must be to be in another's place has its own dangers. It can serve as a substitute for the actual concrete positions of the other. Thus reasons must be given for opinions and claims, for knowing the reasons "enables us to appraise particulars...and involves release from the confines of private subjectivity since we can support our judgements with publicly adducible reasons or grounds" (Ronald Beiner, 1983, pp. 8-9).
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Third, every participant must be provided sufficient time to present his views as some assurance that these views will be understood. This requires that the group be small enough to provide time for both presentation and interaction. Maria Jahoda notes that "one of the few valid empirical generalizations of social psychology [is that] direct experience is a stronger influence and a better transmitter of information than...lectures, written instruction, sermons or propaganda..." To be effective, direct experience must involve two-way communication: "[E]very participant gives and receives information, even if he does not presumably speak up...[for] participation involves the whole person in a contact experience [with others]...Behaviour, gestures, facial expressions convey information central to forming rational judgements" ("Toward A Participatory Society?" pp. 212-213).

Implicit in this and the conditions preceding it is the need for face-to-face participation. It is a commonplace now in critiques of participatory democracy that the size of our nations precludes face-to-face interaction. Although it is of course true that we cannot assemble the citizens of, say, Britain in one meeting place, there seems no reason why there could not be a pyramid of interlocking assemblies such as Thomas Jefferson proposed over 150 years ago. Given developments in telecommunications and computers, a system of Jeffersonian "wards" or neighborhood assemblies seems more feasible now than it would have been in the early eighteenth century. There is, at any rate, good reason for keeping the group small and face-to-face, for another valid generalization from social psychology is that the rate of participation declines sharply as an organization increases in size.

Size does not answer one major concern of participationists: the fear of participating. Jane Mansbridge shows in her study of two participatory systems that some people will not participate even when the groups are
small and the other participants, well known. They fear losing control, sounding foolish, making enemies, and—strongest of all—suffering criticism and ridicule (1980, chapter 6, especially pp. 59-71). This seems especially true when the issues under discussion are contentious. "[I]n the face of conflict, emotions turn sour...[I]n face-to-face assemblies...some people do not attend because they know in advance they will get upset" (Ibid, p. 34). Such fears indict participation and must be taken seriously. Providing all participants with equal opportunity to voice their views may seem an assertion of equal worth and respect, but it can be only if a participant feels confident that her colleagues seek first to understand her position rather than to demolish it. This raises a critical issue: How can we dismiss the unsound opinion without dismissing the person who voices it? To pursue the answer to this we need to look at how we might structure our fourth condition toward full contextualism: mirroring.

Mirroring requires that each person who chooses to speak must be able to summarize or repeat the previous speaker's position to the satisfaction of that speaker. This "feedback" shows that each speaker is heard and understood, if only by one other participant (at that point in the procedure). A participant must not only listen to the points of view of others, but must listen attentively. He cannot focus only on those parts of a presentation that corroborate or challenge his own positions or that are vulnerable to critique or ridicule. He must listen so as to understand, though not necessarily accept, the speaker's views. It may seem that this is to demand too much of participants. Yet if the size of the assembly is limited to a Jeffersonian ward of 150, and assemblies are held frequently enough so that citizens can garner the psychological benefits by participating only on issues of interest or meaning to them, then such a procedure ought not
It will happen that not all present nor all who participate will have heard and understood all positions. But mirroring is to be built into the procedures. The effort must be made by any who wish to participate, because the series of presentations create the context for all speakers and set the limits of possible decisions (about which more later). Mirroring focuses participants' attention on the presentations of others rather than on what they themselves are thinking or wish to say in response. Thus any contribution is voiced in the context of those that preceded it and are not issued *ex nihilo*. Speaker A may thus demand of Speaker K a summary of A's positions, since K's own opinions seem to bear directly on those of A. This might proceed as a clarification of K's position: "How do you think your siting of the dam bears on my views about the endangered fish? Can you summarize my view and amplify your understanding of the consequences of your proposal?" Such an exchange might occur an hour after A has spoken, and so a participant cannot concentrate only on the presentation of the speaker immediately before him. Even if K needs to have A recapitulate A's own position—meaning that K did not hear it sufficiently the first time—K must then mirror back A's position, this time assuring A that he has understood. Similarly some "third party" might want to know what A thinks of the possible consequences of K's proposal on A's position. To ask this question this participant would have to lay out briefly K's position—to K's satisfaction. The procedure would move in this fashion, neither linear nor circular, but an upward spiral progressing while turning back upon itself.

Needing to take up the interests and viewpoints of others and mirror them back means that participants cannot fabricate from the interests of
others caricatures or strawmen against whom to compete. Participants must at least indicate that they understand the other's point of view. Confident that his position has been heard and understood a participant might receive a psychological boost, which as we shall see in a moment could be of significance. This still does not mean that his position has been taken seriously. To build in full contextualism the mirroring technique needs that supplement.

A closed world view requires a lever to pry it open, even from the inside. As we have seen of the atomist, for whom the closed world view is the characteristic state, once he has organized experiences and data into an acceptable interpretation, once he has established a meaningful identity, his project is to defend those patterns against assault or change. Thus new information will either be discarded, or ignored, or will be "read" according to the existing patterns. Mirroring might thus provide a wedge by asking each to take up the positions of others. But real leverage would come from an additional demand--participants are to act on and build upon those other positions, to consider them, no matter how offensive, as glimpses into a possible collective solution. In effect, every position is to be treated as a contribution, for even if rejected, it may redirect or modify a participant's, or the group's, responses or thinking. Thus participants are asked to scrutinize positions for useful or salutary elements and, to repeat, to probe for the arguments behind positions. This process of "pooling perspectives" may introduce motion, or doubt, into an atomist's stable world view. (We shall take up this process in detail later in the chapter.)

Having had his perspective understood and dealt with respectfully, a participant might then be in a position to hear what is unsound about his
position without projecting those criticisms onto himself. Such a critique and the very taking up of alternative perspectives create the "cognitive disequilibration" that leads to the "reequilibration" fundamental to development (Broughton, op. cit., p. 371). Critical views and different views can throw a person off his psychological balance, creating a situation in which vulnerability opens him to new possibilities, possibilities that might then be incorporated or integrated into a new equilibrium called compound selfhood.9

EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION AS SELF-DEVELOPMENT

Henry Kariel described participation in political arenas in which participants take up alternative views as one way to expand the self (1969), and what we have done is propose a possible model for doing this, for expanding the boundaries of one's self as one expands, in Millian fashion, his perspectives. This model is an ideal representation, "derived from certain axioms concerning human behaviour" and intended to convince people of "the virtue [and premises] of the model" so that they "may try to alter the political system so that it approximates more closely to the model's requirements" (David Miller, 1983a, p. 136).

In addition to being ideal, the model is also admittedly speculative, since it is extrapolated from behavior that is far from prevalent. There is, however, as we have in part already examined, empirical evidence in support of compound individuality that can lend support to our model. Thus Damon and Killen, for example, concluded from their developmental studies that experiences of strict disagreement retarded developmental change. Subjects needed to hear conflicting viewpoints, but needed to handle them
through "collaborative co-construction," trying to bring these disparate views together ("Peer Interaction and the Process of Change in Children's Moral Reasoning," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 28, 1982). Similarly, Berkowitz and Gibbs found that the quality or structure of the interaction rather than the amount of interaction predicts developmental change. One of the qualities most conducive to change is "active, analytic engagement with the other's reasoning" ("Transactive Communication as a Condition for Moral Development," cited in Broughton, op. cit., p. 373). Although these researchers studied children and adolescents, James Broughton argues that appropriate conditions stimulating developmental change need to be built into the participatory structures of adults.10

Most of the empirical studies on political participation focus either on voting patterns and behavior or on the development of political attitudes and party affiliations.11 By and large, liberal democratic politics provides little else to study. Students of political psychology, thus wishing to know who participates and why, approach the relationship between personality and politics by examining how personality traits affect political orientation, beliefs, and voting. But we wish to know, on the other hand, how participation and specific participatory procedures affect personality. One study that follows the well-traveled path but also offers some discussion of participation as self-development is Paul Sniderman's Democratic Theory and Personality. A look at this work will provide some insight into the general criticisms of participationist positions.

Sniderman disputes the claims of such participationists as Carole Pateman (1970) and Dennis Thompson (1970) that participation leads to important changes in the basic character of citizens (p. 316). His short answer is "that participation in politics offers no unique advantages in
dealing with specific psychological needs or conflicts" (p. 265). Whether
and why the advantages would have to be unique to win his approbation
Sniderman does not say. But while it is true on his own evidence that
those who participate "have a stronger sense of efficacy, less anxiety,
more self-assurance, and higher self-esteem" (p. 317), participation does
not effect these changes because persons bring these qualities to par-
ticipation; they do not develop them in it. Participation thus has
"only a limited power to change self-attitudes." It is not powerful enough
to affect how worthwhile a person believes he is (Idem).

This seems wondrous strange since Pateman cites the small-group
experiments of Lewin in the 1930's that showed democratic procedures to be
more effective than either "laissez-faire" or "authoritarian" procedures
precisely because participation produced significant psychological effects:
reduced self-images and group morale, greater interest and satisfaction in
the tasks to be performed, etc. The depth of Sniderman's position
becomes apparent when one considers his description of participation:
"...supporting a candidate by displaying a sign on one's car or wearing a
button, voting, attempting to persuade family and friends to turn out or to
support a particular candidate, writing a political leader, joining a civic
association, attending a political meeting and the like" (p. 262). One
does not need to propose, as Sniderman does, low self-esteem as the reason
for not participating; boring and ineffectual procedures would do as nicely.
It is no wonder Sniderman finds political participation ineffective in
causing any significant psychological change. His description carries no
mention of discussion of or deliberation on political issues. He sees
participation as having only limited power to change self-attitudes because
he only sees participation as it is currently structured, and then only in
We can thus agree with his proposition that self-esteem is "the cause and not the consequence of participation," but only because participation has not been structured to serve as the cause of changes in self-esteem.

Sniderman could accept such criticism with the retort that, though accurate, it doesn't matter. Participation cannot affect self-esteem because the data show that political leaders, those most deeply involved in participation and thus most receptive to change through it, come to politics with high self-esteem. "To sustain the claims of participatory theorists," he writes, "evidence must be amassed showing that the higher self-esteem of political leaders appeared after and not before they became involved in politics" (p. 317). This cannot be done since "there is no relationship between degree of activity and level of self-esteem" (p. 318).

In short, it doesn't matter how deeply one participates, argues Sniderman; it is not going to bolster one's self-esteem. Yet we have already established that current political participatory structures, especially those mentioned by Sniderman, are not designed to effect changes in self-esteem and thus will not do so. Participationists, however, argue that it is the kind of activity, not the degree of activity, that effects psychological change. They, and we, do not dispute the evidence that only persons with high self-esteem run for office; that is what today's politics requires. Nor do they, or we, dispute the evidence that there is no correlation between degree of activity and self-esteem. Participation as currently constituted appeals to and reinforces certain attitudes, traits, or norms; it is not designed to challenge them or change self-attitudes. We can appreciate Sniderman's perspective all the more by looking more closely at his notion of self-esteem.
Sniderman inquires into how a single personality trait, self-esteem, influences one's attitude and approach toward democratic values. He concludes that persons of low self-esteem have a negative view of politics and will not participate. They have a low opinion of themselves, of politicians, and of their fellow man. They see the world and others as confused and threatening; they seek ready-made explanations of the world, fix blame on easily identifiable causes, groups, institutions, or persons and look in general for simplistic solutions.¹³

Sniderman then contrasts such types with those of high self-esteem. Their "superior capacity for social learning" enables them to learn and accept the norms of their political culture and leads to active support of and participation in politics. Yet does their superior capacity help them grasp the cultural norms whatever they are? If their culture called for a negative view of politics, for an easily grasped and rigid explanation of how the world works, and for simplistic conspiracy theories as causes of world crises—say, a nation of religious fundamentalists with a Manichaean world view—then presumably those with low self-esteem, as Sniderman concludes, would deviate from the social norms and become democrats. As far-fetched or bizarre as this sounds, Sniderman acknowledges it might be true: "...[H]igh self-esteem ought to drive individuals toward accepting the norms of their political culture, whatever those may be" (p. 221). On that view, then, all Soviet dissidents have low self-esteem. Any administration can find in this view the apologia for focusing on the psychological profiles of dissidents while ignoring the content of their grievances.

What of Sniderman's definition of self-esteem? Can it do the work he requires of it? It is, from other vantage points, a one-dimensional definition. Nathaniel Branden, for example, sees self-esteem as the dynamic
interrelationship between self-worth and personal efficacy. The sense of efficacy issues from the recognition that one has the capacities to cope effectively in the world (1969). Political participation might then serve only to underscore one's lack of the necessary capacities, which would reinforce one's low self-esteem. Yet self-worth according to Branden is not a matter of comparing one's capacities with those of others, but is derived from holding a set of ethical standards that one feels is worthy of respect. In that case, participatory procedures that required sincere and respectful treatment of participants' positions and interests might enhance one's sense of worth. They might also give her the confidence to open or change her perspectives, to accommodate a different, and more worthwhile, set of standards.

Contrary to what we might expect, given all that we have said about his study, Sniderman does not end with the facile conclusion that "a lack of self-esteem inhibits the tendency to participate." He claims, rather, that if low self-esteem is combined with "psychological inflexibility," then there eventuates "a catalytic reaction: these traits, in combination, potentiate rather than inhibit involvement in democratic politics" (p. 322). Sniderman has here shifted the focus away from the interaction between personality and social conditions and toward the interaction between psychological forces within the individual. This internal combination of rigidity and low esteem is part and parcel of our definition of the atomist: choosing one psychological pole or orientation over the other and holding tenaciously to it, creating a world view inviolate. If Sniderman is correct that this combination potentiates participatory involvement, then he answers one lurking question: how to encourage atomists to participate. Depending on how participation is structured, they may not need much encouragement.
It is unfortunate that Sniderman never raises the question—in any context in his study—of how participation is to be structured, nor the question of why rigidity and low self-esteem propel rather than repulse participation.

How strong a case, then, can be made for participation as a means of self-development, and is it to be relied upon? Is participation's only function to serve a private end; is it simply to enhance one's self? In addition to enhancing and possibly transforming the self, the contextualist characteristics we have given participation have another property: treating people with respect. Even without such characteristics in their theories, no participationist would suggest that participation only serves a private end. All would at least subscribe to the Marxian view that the participatory development of one ought to lead to the participatory development of all. All would also agree that one purpose of participation is to enact good policies. Beyond this, participation has another public end that communitarians, at least, seem strongly to subscribe to; namely, that the outcomes of participatory procedures should reflect a collective effort to move beyond self-interest and to generate the common good.
The issue under question is this: Does the prize of self-development through political participation come at too high a price? Although people may gain psychologically and personally from participation, isn't there a trade-off in poor decisions, as Mill suggested, and ponderous procedures that bog down the system so that little is accomplished? In short, aren't the practical consequences too great to justify participatory democracy? Participationist Peter Bachrach maintains that classical participatory theory rested on the idea that the quality of the public interest was determined by both the personal benefits derived from participation and the outcomes of the procedures. Thus participation benefited both the individual and the community (1969, p. 3). The contextualist procedures proposed earlier seem to speak to the first benefit, but what of the benefit to the common good?

The common good or public interest is frequently identified with the natural harmonizing of interests within a political community so that the formulation and execution of policies on behalf of the public proceed without complication. Yet the heterogeneity of many modern democracies militates against this view. How do we account, therefore, for unity or harmony under conditions of diverse and conflicting interests? To do so many communitarian-oriented theorists claim that citizens ought to share actively in shaping the public interest, that the common good ought to be created or made from citizens' joint action. The purpose of such a proposition, it would seem, is twofold:

1) to defuse the highly charged complaint against communitarianism that the common good is imposed by and not derived from the collectivity; and
2) to offset or counter the liberal, or libertarian, idea that pursuit of self-interest makes or creates the common good.

The immediate problem lies in how communitarians propose exactly to create this good. Consider two examples:

In "Returning the Social to Democracy" David Harris (1983) says, "There may be no set of public purposes waiting to be discovered. If they exist at all they may have to be actively created." Harris continues, "[I]f a society wishes to avoid [values determined by power or luck] it needs to create a statement of a set of public purposes, adopted by this community because it is this kind of community." This Harris calls creating "a collective act of self-definition through democratic processes" (p. 233). Harris, however, does not say precisely how these public purposes are created, nor does he provide one essential piece of information—Can the self-definition itself change, and if so, is it done through the same democratic processes? Unless Harris pursues this line of inquiry, we are free to assume either that the self-definition does not change, or that it changes by some means other than fully democratic ones.

In a similar vein William Connolly suggests the establishment of the common good as a boundary or barrier within which claims or interests are legitimate and beyond which they do not deserve consideration. The common good is "a set of purposes, priorities, and limits which deserve the allegiance of the citizenry...a set of shared purposes and standards...fundamental to the way of life prized together by the participants" (1981, pp. 2, 91).

What is this set of purposes and standards, and how is it determined? The set comes with the collective life we have been born into and raised in.
The shared ideas, ideals, and practices of that collectivity are constituted by language and constitute our world, our range of criteria. "To participate in a way of life is to carry an enormous load of settled criteria of judgment, standards of appraisal, and beliefs." That seems evident enough. Then, however, Connolly says, "in sharing a language, we share, even if incompletely or imperfectly, these pre-understandings" (p. 110). But this does not follow. We can imagine, and in fact document, myriad ways of life, in radical opposition, within the same language. Sharing the same vocabulary—to say nothing of the same language—of "common good" and "virtue" still leaves interpretation of these concepts wide open. The importance of sharing language lies not only in reinforcing a similar way of life, but also in coming to some understanding of or appreciation for the other's different interpretation or point of view. Because we share the language that gives form, expression, and definition to a certain way of life in no way commits us to sharing or even understanding that way of life. A common vocabulary does not necessarily presuppose a common meaning to the concepts shared; nor does a common language necessarily presuppose common pre-understandings of judgements, standards, or beliefs.

When Connolly looks at "the materials from which a sense of the common good can be constructed" (p. 111), he finds the shelves already stocked with pre-understandings, "shared distinctions, standards, and purposes" out of which "a sense of the common good might crystallize." Connolly acknowledges that "some segments of the populace may militantly repudiate a collective good fervently endorsed by others..." (p. 113), but he says, reverting to his earlier position as if to disqualify what he just spoke, "most citizens much of the time identify with a set of common standards and purposes; the standards are flexible enough to allow space for political dialogue over
their proper deployment in particular settings but determinate enough
to play a creative role in reaching political solutions and compromise..." 
(Ident, emphasis added) The constitution and scope of the common good it-
self, however, are not open to dialogue. Rather, dialogue and debate, in
Connolly's view, are about the institutions and means of expressing, apply-
ing, and sustaining the common good; not about creating, critiquing, or
changing the common good.

The communitarian theories of generating the common good are all too
often like these examples—either imprecisely defined and developed or not
defined and developed at all.14 The invocation of the idea must
therefore be to arouse feelings of solidarity, security, and significance
without risking alienation. To define the common good would entail estab-
lishing its character and boundaries. That would require determining what
to do with those who will not or do not conform to it, thus jeopardizing
the feelings just aroused.

We may agree that the common good is a set of values, purposes,
and standards that persons share collectively, but we want to know how
decisions are made about this set and who decides on which values, purposes,
and standards are to be shared. The difficulty lies here: As communitar-
ians such as MacIntyre make clear, the common good is no longer divinely
delivered or cosmically derived (following from a rigid or limited world
view), as it was in the Greek polis. Then the citizens' instant under-
standing of and "instinctively" correct adjustments to what was needed
flowed from intuitive behavior that obviated exact descriptions or elaborate
discussions of the issue or situation. But when participants ceased to
share common values and experiences, as happened when Alexander extended
the empire into the territories of the barbaroi, then the necessary and
correct adjustments could no longer be assumed.

What the Greeks could take for granted we would need to build into our participatory procedures, and propositions for creating a new harmony could not rest only on the strength of felicitous phrasing. Though it is now a commonplace to find communitarian theorists calling for the creation of the common good, it is equally common to find that their ideas consist of rhetorical flourishes with little argument or evidence. Yet there is good reason why communitarians remain vague about creating the common good, and it is, to put the matter simply, that there appear to be no mechanisms, no alchemy, for transforming self-interests into common interests.

There might remain, then, only two choices for creating the common good: either limit, or even eliminate, private interests and diversity by imposing a set of priorities or standards by which to judge what is in the public interest and then institute citizen participation in decision-making but within the limited range permitted by the imposed set; or to open up the range of options but limit those who can make decisions to the "best and brightest." This latter position was set out eloquently by Walter Lippmann:

I am far from implying that the voters are not entitled to the representation of their particular opinions and interests. But their opinions and interests should be taken for what they are and no more. They are not--as such--propositions in the public interest...[T]heir opinions need to be confronted by the views of the executive, defending and promoting the public interest...The public interest is mixed with, and is often at odds with, their private and special interests...[I]t may be presumed to be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently. (The Public Philosophy, pp. 41-2)
The first choice not only jeopardizes individual autonomy but also raises questions about who selects the set of standards and by what process—the very questions Harris did not address about a community's self-definition. The second choice raises questions about who becomes an executive and by what process. Why does Lippmann assume that executives are free of the "private and special interests" that prejudice choices? Identifying those who see clearly, think rationally, and act disinterestedly and benevolently—especially in the face of political power and privilege—is formidable, as Mill discovered in attempting to identify the most competent. Both positions elicit the perpetual participationist refrain: quis custodiet custodes?  

We can postulate what might constitute a possible third choice. If participation could foster compound individuality, thus enabling people to open to different world views, then perhaps their interests as well as their selves could be open to transformation. If their interests can be expanded or extended, then by pooling their own specific ideas, viewpoints, arguments, and opinions and by deliberating together on issues, citizens might be able to derive from this pool a common good. This would be a procedure based upon and utilizing full contextualism.

Going beyond what we have already established with the mirroring technique, participation built upon full contextualism would require something like the following four-stage "generative procedures": a) a pooling of all participant perspectives, b) submitting those perspectives to scrutiny, c) attempting to combine or encompass or transcend the perspectives, and finally d) taking a vote to reach a definite decision, opinion, or policy. Let us examine each stage more closely.
The first stage we have already discussed to some degree. It is the initial participatory imperative that all participants have their say and are understood. Every contribution then goes into the pool of perspectives--what has been referred to in contextualism as "the awkward embrace"--no matter how contentious, bizarre, offensive, or irrational. Not all positions will be incorporated into a decision, since they will all be subjects of critical scrutiny in the next stage, but all are to be understood. This, following Ronald Beiner, is what we might call the stage of "hermeneutical judgement," which involves understanding rather than explanation or analysis. The mode of inquiry attached to it tends to focus on the implications for and consequences of a position. As Beiner tells us, the hermeneutical participant opens "himself to the phenomena...[He] seeks to penetrate into the actual experiential horizons of those involved in a situation, to gain hermeneutical appreciation of the agents' own understanding of the situation" (Op. cit., pp. 159-60).

Yet surely there are interests that are not to be taken seriously. Why should anyone honor those that are palpably misguided, malformed, or irrational? Because those so shown will be overridden. Though we may come to understand the positions, to treat those positions sincerely and the speakers with respect, we may never accept any aspect of the viewpoints of, say, a neo-Nazi on control of the black and Jewish populations. But if we are not willing to admit his perspective into the pool, then how do we argue against participants who might oppose the viewpoints of those groups we view more sympathetically, perhaps homosexuals or drug addicts or ex-convicts? Nor can we predict how flamboyant or offensive ideas may affect the thinking or views of others. Such ideas may not only disrupt a participant's cognitive equilibrium but may also provide the spark that
kindles a conceptual breakthrough that transcends or incorporates divergent views. There is a place for scrutiny and critique, when positions and interests must be critically examined, and it constitutes the second stage of the generative procedures. Yet to accommodate full contextualism even this stage would have to have a structure slightly different from the usual methods of settling arguments.

Politics is characterized by argument and debate. Political argument as a mode of discourse and decision-making is adversarial. Both sides lay proprietary claim to their positions: "This is mine; that is yours"; then look for the areas in the other's position that are weak, inconsistent, or wrong. These are attacked to expose the vulnerability of that position and to underscore, if only implicitly, the superiority of the attacker's position. The message sent out to other participants is "think about what you will say for it is going to be fair game for attack." It is the sort of message that either engenders the fear of conflict and participation that Jane Mansbridge described, or that convinces participants to waffle with vacuous generalizations that neither expose them to ridicule—or attack—nor succeed in conveying with precision what the speakers mean. Winning and not losing, looking strong by showing up others as weak, and being right and never wrong become paramount. Lawyers, the exemplars of this mode, soon predominate, as in the United States, in the seats of government.

Argument follows such a line because its central operating mechanism is logic, and logic demands consistency. Positions that conflict with or contradict one's own are unsettling because they point to one's own vulnerabilities. To be solid one's world view must own no contradictions. While it is true that some conflicts can be resolved by having the differing viewpoints converge—as in the example in the previous chapter of the water-
pipe controversy in Ludlow—many reduce to contradictions that admit of no convergence—was he helping the old woman up, or was he pushing her down? Logic forces us to fall on one side or the other, for two mutually exclusive propositions cannot both be true. Contradictions, simply put, cannot be resolved, and so in political arguments we press for some decision, for some form of compromise. Each side picks out of the other's position what it can live with—if not take advantage of—and tries to leave behind all the rest. There is no motivation to pick out the best—as opposed to the most exploitable—elements or propositions in the other's positions. Without that motivation, synthesis becomes Mill's classic compromise—"splitting the difference"—or some alternative arrangement or, at worst, a standstill. 17

The purpose of the pool of perspectives, however, is not to hammer away at your opponent's positions while remaining intransigent about yours, but to try to accommodate both sets of interests. But neither is the purpose to resolve or reconcile contradictions. Rather, in the process we seek to bring perspectives together, to examine and explore them to see possible nuances and implications and to set the boundaries of any decision. Exploration is the key concept in this stage of the generative procedures. We scrutinize positions not just to dismiss them, but to see first whether there is anything beneficial or "salvagable" in them before we savage them. The neo-Nazi may have an execrable view on population control of minorities, but by probing his perspective we may find some element to build upon, if only as a tocsin of how not to structure the decision. Breaking a position down instead of dismissing it tout court may not produce results in all cases. But as with mirroring, it may engender an attitudinal change, a different frame of mind. That may lead us to
think about and to accept, individually and collectively, new directions. Participants, when they come to make a decision on an issue, will judge for themselves the cogency and utility of any perspective.

Although contradictions cannot be reconciled, they can sometimes be transcended; that is, taken up by a higher or more encompassing perspective that accepts the contradiction. Thus light is both particles and waves, depending on how one observes it. This transcending or encompassing perspective is the ideal goal of the generative procedures, a compound common good made up of or inspired by the various, diverse perspectives offered by participants. Though rare, it introduces and utilizes an attitude or frame of mind that encourages building on positions and not simply winning at all costs.18

This does not, however, bring us any closer to understanding why any individual would do this. Why should you forfeit part of your position for the sake of a common position, especially when yours seems clearly the best? In such a circumstance what one must do or be willing to do is demonstrate through participation that his position is more suitable, more salutary, more substantial than others also presented or constituted. To do that he must be willing to face public scrutiny of his position, to submit it for consideration, and to argue for it in the face of opposition—creative, constructive, and hostile. He will need to defend his position in the context of considering how it relates to, negates, or supersedes those of the rest. It is a dialogue in which the participant tries to understand the positions of others as she defends her own.

Having explored the various perspectives offered, the assembly would then move toward decision-making, the third and fourth stages. The third stage might not add significantly to the scrutiny stage, but it adds im-
measurably to the dialogue. The ward or assembly would divide into small groups of about 15 participants. The task of each group is to consider the propositions and interests they have heard and pooled, and try to draw or create from them a position or decision that generates a common interest or common good. Research shows that the smaller the group, the more likely that participants will speak, will focus on the topic and follow the discussion, and will show initiative, cooperation, and interest in influencing others and offering solutions.¹⁹

Finally, these small groups would reconvene to present to the plenary group the results of their deliberations. Further discussions would ensue, in which the recommendations of various small groups would be scrutinized. Then through private ballot, show of hands, or other mechanisms decided by the ward the entire group would reach a final decision. Although one position becomes the group's policy, the decision does not necessarily resolve the issue, anymore than the procedures resolve the contradictions. When abortion is the issue, no ward will determine definitively whether it is murder or the woman's right to control what happens to her body. Both those positions may be held with equal conviction and may be considered equally legitimate. And though both will be part of the pool of perspectives that defines not what is out but what must be in the deliberations, the ward must endorse one position, or a composite, as a public policy. One advantage of the generative procedures is that the dialogue therein encourages both sides to see, citing MacIntyre again, that fulfilling one side leaves undone what also ought to have been done.
TRANSFORMING SELF-INTERESTS

These decisions constitute the common interest because they issue from a participatory assembly viewed as comprehensive, comprehending, open, and fair. Choices are not made within a static set of standards or from a limited slate of candidates, but within an everchanging composite of perspectives compiled each issue by participants and through deliberations and dialogue that seek to understand each perspective. From this context the participants try to build or generate a collective common position or interest, to arrive at a position that is not simply tolerable but is beneficial to each and all. This takes us beyond the psychological properties associated with participation and leads us into the nature of its outcomes. The outcome we seek, based upon procedures designed around the contextualism associated with compound individuality, is a "compound common good," so called not because it is a compound made up of or out of all available perspectives, but because it is made from all and is contributed to by all. From all the stones available we build a bridge, but it is not a bridge built of all the available stones.

Furthermore, such outcomes are not the aggregation of private interests, the "will of all," or a sum of particular wills. Nor are they necessarily the fulfillment of all interests. Since some wills or interests will conflict and contradict, the common good cannot be composed of all of them. Yet in what sense is the good thus common? In the sense that all wills and interests create the pool of perspectives from which any composite is made or drawn. All deliberations and decisions are reflected in that pool, and each perspective contributes to that reflection.
This is an ideal procedure. The compound common good is approached, though not necessarily reached, in every case. It reflects the ancient Greek ideal of homonia—being of one mind. On one level such "unanimity" means that men will have the same opinions about what is in their interests; it is the ideal of a single perspective that incorporates all positions into one and, as Aristotle said, makes it "possible for both or all parties to get what they want" (Ethics, 1167a 26-28; quoted in Mansbridge, 1980, p. 14). This seems, as we have suggested, rarely achievable. Yet there is a second level that is more realistic and accessible. On this level men "choose the same actions and do what they have resolved in common." The force of this is different from that of the first, for as Aristotle describes the second, men accept decisions made in common, through common and equal procedures, even when they have spoken or voted against those decisions (Idem).

Men can accept the decisions because they are made fairly and because as a substantive end or good a decision is temporary. The issue is not necessarily resolved and may still be contested and opened again. Thus conflict and controversy are at the heart of this participatory process, for as Ronald Beiner avers, "at no point are we justified in terminating an unresolved argument, for...the next stage may yet bring an enlargement of moral vision to one of the contending parties, allowing this contender to integrate the perspective of another into his own in a relation of part to whole. Therefore at any point there remains the possibility, though not the guarantee, of resolving deep conflict..." (op. cit., p. 186) This is not to suggest interminable deliberations, since in politics, for example, judgements and decisions are necessary in matters requiring public policies. But such policies do not always or usually resolve controversial
issues, and thus these can be opened again.

The goal of the generative procedures is thus twofold: 1) to encourage individuals to take up the perspectives of others as a way to open and expand their own world views, and thereby expand and transform themselves; and 2) to structure a process in which the intention of role-taking is to create a composite or compound common interest that is not a zero-sum interest in which one party succeeds at another's expense.

However promising or hopeful such procedures are, they are still contingent upon a problematic conditional: If these procedures can generate a "habit" or frame of mind that opens one's world view and one's identity, then compound individuality and the compound common good can ensue.

The problem is that the latter does not necessarily follow from the former. The generative procedures may be capable of transforming conflict and transforming the self, but still not produce a compound common good. Compound individuality refers to identity that is coregulated; personal identity is based upon both autonomy as a separate self and intimate relationships with another. But that other is not all others. Intimacy is restricted to special others and special relationships. So even if the idea of "self" in self-interest expanded to include another or some others, it cannot be assumed that self expands so as to include a ward or collectivity. Self-interest might still be my motivation, even in the face, literally, of other interests; and even though "my" self is now constituted by more than just me, I might not wish to include the interests of those in the collectivity I distrust or abominate. In pursuit of my self-interests I may still be willing to override yours.

So we are back to the original dilemma: The generative procedures may create a compound common good if participants approach interests and issues in
the proper, or "public," frame of mind. But how is that frame of mind instilled? Can the procedures themselves transform my interest from narrow concerns about me—even when "me" includes another—to those about "us" as a ward or public or collectivity? Consider the following example offered in a different context by Peter Jones (1983, pp. 167-68).

Residents control and pay for a street, its use, its improvements, and its repairs. Each resident has one vote in making decisions about the street, and the vote of the majority is always decisive. The residents have on this occasion three issues to decide, each of which they consider equally important:

a) whether sidewalks should be asphalt or paved. Asphalt is inexpensive but ugly; paving stones are visually pleasing but more expensive;

b) whether the street lights should be kept as gas lights or changed to electric lights. Electric lights, though unattractive and stark, provide the same lighting as gas but at less cost;

c) whether to improve the street's appearance by planting trees or to save money by planting none.

When votes are taken on these issues, the economizers on the street, constituting two-thirds of the residents, win all three votes. The aesthetes lose all three. From the vantage point of the economizers, there is no point in compromise. They have sufficient votes to secure their interests on all three issues: asphalt, electric lights, and no trees. The aesthetes could not have fared worse with a compromise, but their attitude toward it is unknown.

From the perspective of the compound common good, we want to know whether some other outcome might not have served as a mutually satisfying, common good. Could electric lights be used in the existing—though
converted—lamps thus maintaining the character of the street? Must the issues be considered separately? If electric lights are used, could the money saved then be used to plant some trees? If no trees are planted, could the money saved be used for paving stones rather than asphalt? Could there be a mix of asphalt and paving stones?

The street economizers are willing to spend some money but as little as possible. Any bargain compromises their position and is therefore unacceptable, for on no single issue do they need to bargain to get what they want. Indeed, the economizers may think their positions to be the common good, since they wish to save money to everyone's advantage. That attitude, however, requires them to ignore the conflicting positions of the street aesthetes.

Therefore none of the questions we've asked addresses the central issue. The generative procedures may be able to create common interests from a pool of perspectives, but only because participants come already thinking about or already concerned with the common good. What can be done with those concerned only with self-interest? Can participants be encouraged to move from "I" to "we" thinking? Only if the generative procedures can induce a shift from self-interest to common interest can contextualism and participation effect a compound common good.

Communitarian theorists, not surprisingly, are concerned with inducing "we" thinking by transforming self-interests. Yet they manifest the same problem in describing the transformation of interests that they show in describing the generation of the common good; namely, they are long on rhetoric but short on argument. Transforming self-interests into public interests is a centerpiece, for example, of Barber's Strong Democracy. It is crucial, he writes, that participants "imaginatively reconstruct their
own values as public norms through the process of identifying and empathiz­ing with the values of others" (p. 137).

The key to doing this is "public talk" on contested political issues. Deliberating together on such issues "leads men and women to modify and en­large options as a consequence of seeing them in new, public ways...The test of legitimacy is whether an individual value has been changed in some significant way to accommodate large--that is, more common or public--concerns" (p. 136). An individual value that remains unchanged in this way must be illegitimate, and what are we to do about them, especially if held by a majority? The transformative strength of the Barberian deliberative process is role-playing. In public discussions we take the roles of our fellow citizens to see the world through their eyes. Enlarging our percep­tions in this manner increases our understanding that we live together in a public world with public norms that we jointly establish and live by. Thus "participation is a dynamic act of imagination that requires partici­pants to change how they see the world." Rather than suiting individual tastes, participants work jointly "to create a public taste that they all can share" (p. 137). Active citizenship thereby "transforms interests and reorients identity" (p. 209).

Barber manifests tremendous faith in role-playing, but he produces no evidence that this mode of participation, especially as outlined in the second half of his book, can have a transformative effect. Nor does he ex­plain why participants, raised as self-interested atomists, would suddenly, or gradually, develop communal concerns to override the private pursuits that they may think all participants ought to hold. Does Barber assume there will be psychological or social pressure to conform, to please friends and neighbors or to avoid ostracism and ridicule? Are participants made
clear-eyed by public talk and thus able to identify and ready to side with superior arguments? Does simply talking together make participants sympathetic to the positions of others, even to positions they oppose and abhor? Before reverting to some empirical evidence on the effects of participation, we should examine the insights of an earlier political theorist for whom political participation, self-interest, and the common good were paramount concerns. It was Rousseau who sought to devise a system by which to transform men into citizens and to guide politics according to the general will beyond self-interest. Perhaps Rousseau can provide some insight into transforming self-interest from a private vice into a public virtue.

ROUSSEAU'S SELF-INTEREST PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD

"Good social institutions, " wrote Rousseau, "are those which best know how to denature man, taking away his absolute existence in order to give him one that is relative, and transporting the self into the community (transporter le moi dans l'unite commune) so that he no longer regards himself as one, but as a part of the whole, and is conscious only of common life" (Emile, p. 7). The social contract was the means by which man could thus be transformed. He proceeds from the state of nature to the civil state, from instinct to justice, from impulse to morality; "instead of [being] a stupid and unimaginative animal," he becomes "an intelligent being and a man"; instead of having "natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting," he receives "civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses" (Social Contract, Book 1, chapter VIII). Through the social contract
men are brought into association with one another, in which having surren­
dered their rights to the whole community and not to any single individual
or group they give themselves to no one but to all. Having united himself
with all, a man "may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as be­
fore" (Ibid, p. 174). To exercise this autonomy in community, citizens
gather in periodic assemblies to pass laws that they "prescribe to themselves."
Only laws struck in the common interest, as expressions of the "general will,"
are laws so prescribed.

To ascertain the general will while in the assembly, a citizen must
have the proper frame of mind, must ask the right question: Is this proposal
in the general or public interest; is it for the good of all? Only by
adhering to the general will can a citizen be virtuous while being autono­
rous, since "virtue is nothing more than this conformity of the particular
wills with the general will" (Political Economy, p. 128). "[T]o estab­
lish the reign of virtue, men will have to be compelled to obey the general
will, and in this manner will be 'forced to be free'" (Social Contract,
p. 177).

Of course, our concern throughout has been with how the citizen comes
to have the proper frame of mind, with how self-interest is transformed into
or transcended by the common good. Although the citizen asks questions about
the general or public effect of a law on the community, in Rousseau's view
he is actually pursuing self-interest. Even in the context of the whole
group, he can only think of the issue as how it affects him: "...[T]here is
not a man who does not think of 'each' as meaning him, and consider himself
in voting for all." Thus "each wills the general good in his own interest
as strongly as anyone else" (Ibid, Book II, chapter IV, p. 187). To
prefer an answer that favors the general rather than the particular his
self-interest must be seen to lie with or to be served by a choice for the
general. Yet how is it that what is best for the collectivity is judged
always to be best for him? How is it that autonomous choices can be made
to coincide with the general will? It can be made so when the "self" in
self-interest is a collective or common self.

Rousseau modeled his ideal republican citizen on his romantic versions
of the citizens of Sparta and Rome. Like the citizen of Rome, who was
"neither Caius nor Lucius, [but] was a Roman" (Emile, Book I, p. 7),
Rousseau's ideal is to have the citizen completely dedicated to, if not ab­
sorbed in, the community. As Judith Shklar wrote, he is a man without
internal conflicts; "an undivided self is the mark of the citizen..." He
is the one who "finds that his duty is also his inclination. He is intern­
ally whole because he lives in a social environment in which his interests
are perfectly served..." (Men and Citizens, p. 182) More than that,
his interests and his conscience, and thus his autonomy, reflect communal
interests socially formed.

"To form citizens is not the work of a day; and in order to have men
it is necessary to educate them when they are children." All children ought
to be educated in the same way and equally, proposed Rousseau. "If children
are brought up in common in the bosom of equality, if they are imbued with
the laws of the state and the maxims of the general will, if they are taught
to respect these above all things...then they will surely learn to cherish
each other naturally as brothers...and to become in time defenders and
fathers of the state whose children they will have been for so long"
(Political Economy, p. 136). The task of this education is to repro­
duce society in the citizen. The pupil interiorizes the culture, so that
this conscience reflects the culture. When the citizen thus consults his
conscience, he will be led to act according to the general will, in the common interest, on behalf of equality and virtue.

The citizens' very lives are then "devoted to the state" (Social Contract, Book II, chapter IV, p. 206). This devotion is not in recognition of or appreciation for what has been permitted, but is the result of what, and how, citizens have been made. The kind of law that 'forms the real constitution of the state," is written in "the hearts of the citizens... keeps a people in the ways it was meant to go, and insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit. I am speaking of morality, of custom, above all of public opinion." This is a power "on which...success in everything else depends" (Idem).

Education is only one means of instilling this force of habit. Another is civil religion, through which society receives its social cohesion. The sovereign authority determines what the faith will be and has a right to fix the articles of that faith "as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or faithful subject." The civil religion enlarges or encourages social spirit and can make "the country an object of the citizen's adoration...[I]t teaches them that service done to the state is service done to its tutelary god...To die for one's country becomes martyrdom..."(Ibid, p. 272-73) This may be going too far for some sovereigns, but every citizen, says Rousseau, needs a religion to "make him love his duty" (p. 276). The state cannot compel a man to believe in the articles, though it can banish those who do not, not on the grounds of impiety but for anti-social behavior, for being "incapable of truly loving the law and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty" (Idem). Additionally, Rousseau recommends inflaming social sentiments through public festivals and ceremonies, games, theater, patriotism, and
military parades. The point of it all is to build through participation a strong sense of duty and devotion to one's country and of solidarity among the people. No wonder Rousseau looked to Sparta as his model and not to Athens.

But is the self as a common self developed in participation, or is it brought to and reflected in participation? Do the autonomous choices of citizens generate the general will or reflect the general will? Is the common good prior to or derived from participation?

The self is both developed and expressed in participation in activities that are highly orchestrated. Education, for example, is not simply a system of values inculcation. It is also a grand design to give the pupil the illusion that he is spontaneously satisfying wants of his own, when all along the tutor has planned and planted the objects of his desires. Thus the pupil thinks he is doing only what pleases him. When these are put together--fulfilling one's desires and doing only what pleases him--the pupil experiences what Rousseau calls true freedom. In Emile the tutor says: "There is no subjection so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom; one thus enthralls the will itself" (Book II).

The purpose of political participation is to express or exercise this enthralled will. If the education has been proper and if the civil religion, public ceremonies, and patriotic festivals establish social sentiments, then determining the general will should be virtually perfunctory. The solutions to problems will quickly and easily arise within a range of options limited by the internalized framework of common values, customs, and opinions. Citizens restricted to "the simple act of voting," without deliberation or communication, decide such issues as whether to retain the present form of government (Social Contract, Book III,
chapters, 5, 13, 18). Citizens legislate acts of law (acts of sovereignty), but do not commit acts of execution and administration. More important than this, the votes cast do not determine the general will; they can at best only express it. The general will exists prior to and independent of participation. With the proper social spirit and social frame of mind citizens do not need to deliberate but only to search their own conscience. The general will is thereby expressed, in Durkheim's phrase, through "spontaneous agreement of wills" (1960, p. 132). Cultivation of social solidarity results in selves as a collective self. Thus the state is not so much armed "with a coercive power sufficient to overcome resistance as to shape men's minds in such a way that resistance does not occur" (Ibid, p. 137). Every citizen is autonomous in following the dictates of his conscience, obeying only himself, but each conscience is designed according to a social content.

Of course, the system is not perfect. Men will disagree because citizens, being unequal, will take to the system differently. There is within each decision a range, though limited, of possible options to choose from. In some cases, therefore, citizens might will improperly and thus need to be compelled to adhere to the general will. They might have to be forced to be free. "[T]his is the condition which by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the most frightful abuses" (Social Contract, Book I, chapter VII, p. 177). Such abuse is mitigated, even extirpated, because the enforcement of obedience is really compulsions to be free. Those citizens who do not recognize that the general will is not simply in their own best
interests but is their own best interests must be brought to that realization. Only in that way will a citizen surrender his particular interests and individual self to the collective self.

But is this really a "surrender"? That is not precisely what Rousseau said. He did not write, "each citizen gives himself to his country." Rather, he wrote that the compulsion to obey gives each citizen, presents each citizen, brings each citizen to his country. The country is the collective self that precludes dependence on any individual self or particular will, including one's own alone, and creates in place of the individual self one constituted of and by the whole. It does so by becoming the individual's own higher, or true, self. "[I]n place of the individual personality of each contracting party, the act of association creates a corporate and collective body" (Ibid, Book I, chapter VI, p. 175). To force him in this direction, to make his interests the common interests, is to set him free, to lead him along the path of virtuous conduct and in accordance with his own true nature. To internalize the mores, opinions, and purposes of society is to know society's laws without need of deliberation, and is to prescribe laws to oneself in accordance with the general will and independent of the judgements of other men. It is the essence of Rousseau's autonomy that when men act freely, private inclinations and interests converge with public duties and common interests. When one's conscience is the general will, then men are truly free; then does virtue reign.22

Here is Barber's reconstruction of personal values as public norms, but, unlike Barber, Rousseau explains how such a reconstruction is performed. He solves the dilemma of self-interest: "I" thinking turns into "we" thinking when the "self" in self-interest ceases to be an particular self and becomes a collective self shared by all individuals, when the individual
conscience is the same as the collective conscience. Such a transformation, effected through the social institutions already adumbrated, must begin with the legislator who provides the initial, inviolate, and infallible laws and mores that guide the collectivity along the path of virtue and that serve as the foundation for the social system. The legislator's mission is to "take away from man his own resources and give him instead new ones alien to him" (Ibid, p. 194; emphasis added). In this fashion each individual is made "into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives his life and being...[in which] each citizen is nothing and can do nothing without the rest."23

The self as a potentiality, "something yet to be attained," is, says Marshall Berman, Rousseau's radical contribution to political theory (1971, p. 86). But it is a potentiality with a concrete or specific endpoint: the interior miniaturization of the culture. If we think of the self only as a potentiality to become something, an end-product or self-definition or state, rather than also being a process of identity or agency as we had earlier explained, then we can embrace the ideas of a true or real or authentic self. Then criteria for that authentic self can be adduced, and selves that do not conform or live up to the requirements of authentic being, and that may masquerade as our true selves, are to be stripped away, suppressed, or destroyed to reveal, or enable us to attain, "the self."24

But is it possible, as Ellen Wood proclaims in her book on socialist and liberal individualism, Mind and Politics, that the general will represents not a substantive criterion or set of standards, mores, or purposes, but a process for determining them? As unlikely as this seems given all we have said above about Rousseau's theory, it may be that such an
interpretation, though not true to Rousseau's entire corpus, may lie within the ambiguities of his conceptualization of the general will and thus offer some additional insights into how participation can generate the common good.25

In reading the general will as a procedure, emphasis must fall not simply on the institutional framework of participation, but also on the attitude or cast of mind with which citizens participate. An individual's particular will is the general will when the person wills correctly; i.e., when she asks the right question and seeks its answer--Is this proposal for the welfare of all? The general will differs from a majority will and even a unanimous will, because it does not take private interests into account. "...[T]ake away from these same [particular] wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other...the general will remains as the sum of the differences." Remove the zero-sum element, and what remains are the possibilities for the common good and the proper cast of mind for evaluating them. It is this proper cast of mind that makes the expression of the general will possible, for although there will always be "small differences" among the citizens in their thinking about the remaining possibilities for the common good, if the right questions are asked, "the grand total of these small differences would always give the general will, and the decision will always be good" (Social Contract, p. 185). No longer able to pursue those private interests that must eventuate in the loss of others' interests, participants combine the remaining "small differences" into a "grand total" or "sum" that is the common good. The "political act" is to blend together, to total, the differences; that is, to forge into a common interest the differences that surface or remain after proper willing. Thus can we have generative procedures for creating a compound common good.
Our participatory procedures then serve as a substitute for Rousseau's "legislator," for they might be equally capable temporarily--for the span of participation--of "changing human nature, of transforming each individual [while in the procedure]...into a part of a greater whole...of altering man's constitution for the purpose of strengthening it" (Ibid, p. 194). Strengthening his constitution means encouraging him to see himself in the context of the whole, in the context of the conflicting and contradictory viewpoints that he must try to work with, accommodate, temper, and embrace. That effort strengthens the individual's and the group's constitution. Each person gives to himself and to others "new resources alien to him," which are "incapable of being made use of without the help of other men" (Ibid). In our terms, a citizen's own perspective is metaphorically and temporarily annihilated or transcended as he takes up, and perhaps takes on, the viewpoints of others that now modify, or are modified by, his own. This new perspective is "greater and more lasting," being a compound of his and others' thinking. Thus does legislation approach "the highest possible point of perfection" (Ibid, p. 194-95) and thus is each individual still a "complete solitary whole" transformed "into part of a greater whole."

As ingenious, if contorted, as this reading might be, it still fails to resolve our fundamental dilemma: How do we induce the right cast of mind? Rousseau provided an answer: It is taken care of prior to political participation, through the extensive network of educative social mechanisms. But short of his authoritarian and chauvinistic measures, how can we guarantee it? As Rousseau discovered, we cannot, even with draconian tactics. We can at best encourage it, perhaps through participatory procedures that operate by and elicit the "reciprocity phenomenon."26
procedures be an alembic for transforming desires for private advantage into concerns about public interest and the common good? Perhaps by looking at some additional empirical findings on participation and the reciprocity phenomenon we can ascertain whether Barber's prodigious faith in public talk has some foundation.

TRANSCENDING SELF-INTEREST

Brian Barry adduces a possibly useful bit of evidence. "It is a commonplace," he writes, "that trust and cooperation are facilitated by communication," so much so that "it has been found that letting people talk together--about anything--before playing an n-person prisoners' dilemma game increases cooperation" (1983, p. 137). Cooperation is certainly a value necessary to generating a compound common good. It is clear that the street economizers in our example, for instance, would be unwilling to cooperate with the street aesthetes to derive or create a common good. Both may be willing to cooperate to play the game, but when a decision must be made, they would fall back into exclusive positions. Without cooperation at this stage the procedure is reduced to aggregating interests, which depends solely upon the addition of more such interests and not upon the modification of interests. Talk can facilitate cooperation, but how far can that generalization be extended? Does more talk engender more, or greater, cooperation? What effects does structuring or channeling the talk into specific ways have on the nature of the cooperation? Is the evidence in support of cooperation in a hypothetical game applicable to our procedures and to political, real-life dilemmas? How deeply can talk, and what
kinds of talk, affect cooperation? Enough to dislodge one's thinking from self-interest alone?

According to Dennis Thompson's study of "citizenship theorists"—among them John Dewey, A. D. Lindsay, Graham Wallas, and G. D. H. Cole—discussion is an essential, if not the essential, ingredient in making participation meaningful. It has two valuable functions. First, it helps citizens recognize their own political interests; second, it fosters the creation of common interests (1970, chapter 4). Evidence from research on these topics neither refutes nor confirms the first contention (We have already discussed the problems associated with, and the absence of data or evidence for, the second contention.). Using data on opinion formation Thompson argues that an individual's opinions and interests are often formed around those of co-workers and associates. Through discussion the person comes to see the importance and value of various positions and the strengths of arguments for and against different points of view. In this way discussion contributes to a citizen's recognition of his political interests.

Because we rely upon the opinions and views of those we trust when we form opinions and interests, the process can be more emotional and habitual than reasoned and reflective. Political participation with those we know less well adds a dimension of reflection as one encounters different views and hears the arguments for and implications of those views against one's own. This could be a significant addition. Research shows, says Thompson, that within groups of all kinds "a group interest does in fact emerge from discussion and activity" (p. 99). Thus unless these groups are homogeneous to begin with, or predisposed toward homogeneity, it appears that discussion can generate something like a compound common good as people modify
their positions, or their willingness to hold fast to them, in light of differences. But homogeneity is a key factor. Thompson looked at research on discussions and discussion groups that operate in our liberal democracies as currently structured and not in a setting that permitted participation. In these groups "discussion is mostly with like-minded people...[I]f people are left to arrange their own discussions, most will talk to people with whom they agree and whose socio-economic status is the same as theirs" (Ibid; see also Berelson et al., op. cit., pp. 105-9, and Benney, Gray, and Pear How People Vote, pp. 132-33). What would happen if we had political structures that brought citizens together to participate actively in which they might disagree? When "people discuss politics with people with whom they disagree, [they] are more likely to change their minds" (Ibid, p. 100; see also Robert Lane, 1959, p. 90).

Can we rely upon such evidence to make our case for expanding, or deepening, participatory procedures? All the research we've adverted to points to participation, deliberation, and discussion engendering the creation of common interests and pushing us a step beyond self-interest, if not a step into compound individuality. But the evidence remains sketchy if only because participatory opportunities are sparse. Though insufficient to produce any firm conclusions, the evidence and arguments do suggest that procedures structured to effect psychological changes toward compound selfhood, procedures built of dialogue and contextualism, would seem to offer the strongest likelihood of transforming attitudes beyond self-interest. This is the problematic conditional: If participants take up the perspectives of others, to understand those perspectives, then participants, in coming to terms with those others, may become sensitive to the needs, interests, and positions of others. But the transformation from
self-interest to public interests is still problematical and not, as Barber intimates, guaranteed.

But a guarantee is not what we seek. In generating a compound common good our procedures rely upon neither the transformation of interests nor the transformation of self into compound individuality. Instead, they rely upon dialogue and contextualism. The generative procedures function properly when people attempt to take up the positions of others in order to understand and embrace them; in order, that is, to move toward a compound common good. This goal is, as stated, often unrealizable, but it has the effect of getting people out of or beyond their own interests by considering how conflicting interests might be reconciled with their own. Thus participants are not asked to transform their interests, but temporarily to transcend them. Participants may exit with the same interests they had when entering, but while in the procedures, participants try, first, to forge a common perspective and, second, to arrive through dialogue and perspectivism at the best decision possible. That decision will be the most reasonable, for when politics proceeds through dialogue, as David Miller points out, "arguments are trumped by better arguments."29

But unless the procedures do generate a comprehensive or compound common good, people are not going to agree on the substance of the decision. Clearly some interests will be served while others are put aside. Under what circumstances, therefore, will participants accept as legitimate a decision they oppose?

More than the substance of the decision, it is the process or procedure that prompts acceptance. At issue, therefore, is not whether all accept the substance of the decision, but whether all can endorse the decision even in their opposition. If the procedures are recognized to be open,
comprehensive, and fair, then people will go along not because all agree the specific law or policy is just, but because all agree the system is just. We accept the decision because we perceive "that the procedure has been used properly, that is, that those who were in the majority [for example] were attempting to answer the right question in a disinterested spirit" (Ryan, A., 1983b, p. 46). In our own case, this means that participants attempted through the pool of perspectives to forge a comprehensive perspective, and when that fails, to reach a decision through reasoned arguments.

Should it happen that a participant feels morally bound to disobey the policy or law, even though he played a part in making it, then, as Michael Walzer suggests, he will choose to do so through legitimate channels of political dissent (1970, p. 47). Self-interest is not transformed by participation, but when trying to forge a compound common good, it is suspended. If no such good is engendered, and a participant's position is then voted down, the participant's self-interest then rises. While remaining unpersuaded by the arguments, the participant will go along not simply because he accepts the procedures and because the issue can be reopened, but also because he hopes one day, when the issue is raised again, of being in the majority. Tocqueville called this attitude "enlightened self-interest."

There is a danger, however, in interpreting the common good as a process rather than, or more than, an outcome. The common good then becomes a mere abstraction that does not commit or confine us to any substantive ends. While it is true that the very norms and practices that constitute the procedures are held in common, the ends can remain private while only the procedures have a foundation in agreement. But the generative pro-
cedures confine all dialogue and deliberations to the pool of perspectives offered by participants. Moreover, dialogue requires that all private ends pursued within the procedures be submitted to public scrutiny. That will entail defending them with reasoned arguments. A benefit of dialogue built of public reason is that when participants understand the reasons behind positions, they may more readily accept the substance of decisions based on them. The advantage, then, of the dialogic procedure is that adherence to the final outcome is based not on bargaining over or aggregating interests, "but on the strength of the arguments that have been offered for it" (Miller, D. Op. cit., p. 3).

If the dialogic procedures for decision-making are judged to be fair, then the decision will generate a consensus, a general agreement. In a liberal democracy based on majority rule, a procedure would be deemed fair if it had some combination of the following characteristics:

a) All citizens are equally free to deliberate and vote;

b) all citizens are granted equal protection and due process;

c) all are permitted some channels through which to dissent; and

d) all have the right and access to procedures by which to redress or re-examine the decision.

These constitute fairness in a system in which the hardest question, according to Michael Walzer, is "why obey?" (op. cit., p. 46). Why, that is, should a minority obey the decisions of the majority? If such protections and guidelines as outlined above are built into the procedures, then they ought to obey.

What we have described in the generative procedures is, of course, not dissimilar, though we ask why the majority should attend to the positions and interests of the minority. The simple answer is that the entire
system depends on it. If the results of our procedures are to be deemed fair, then the majority must adhere to the requirements or criteria of the procedures. In the attempt to forge a compound common good, the majority must seriously consider the positions offered by participants by treating these positions as if they were to be part of the final decision; and failing that comprehensive perspective, to attempt to generate a consensus by examining the arguments behind and for the positions.

Consider the issue of legalized abortion. The lines of opposition are clearly drawn: Some think of abortion as murder of the unborn; others, as the right of a woman to control her body. Despite the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973, the debate over abortion continues in the United States without surcease.

Such an issue underscores the problem in finding through political debate any convergence of viewpoints. What position could possibly embrace the opposed camps? How might such an issue—whether to legalize abortion—proceed through the generative procedures?

The first difficulties encountered would be those in which participants of opposing views, in order to participate, must consider the positions of others and mirror those positions back to them. The "pro-life" advocates, those opposed to abortion, will need to take up the perspective, say, of a feminist who does not even wish to discuss the ethical implications of abortion, since she sees it as a political and social, not a medical or metaphysical, issue about who has the power to make decisions about women's bodies.

In the process of building up the pool of perspectives, participants will hear and take up many different explanations and arguments for the
two essential positions—pro-choice and pro-life. As participants struggle
to find a common perspective, one that can transcend or accommodate these
two positions, they find themselves offering questions that probe the
reasoning behind the positions. To pro-life advocates: "If you can accept
capital punishment (as surveys indicate many can), then you acknowledge
that in some circumstances lives can be taken. Are there circumstances---
rape or incest---when abortions are called for or are permissible? If you
can accept those circumstances, where and how do you draw the line? If
you defeat this proposition for abortion rights, are you willing to lobby
for and legislate relaxed adoption laws to deal with unwanted babies? Are
you willing to lobby for and legislate greater aid to women with dependent
children, greater day-care, greater aid for emotional and psychological
support to teenage mothers?" To pro-choice advocates: "Why do you think of
a fetus as private property, to do with as you please? Do you see no dif-
cference between the fetus and real estate? Is pregnancy really a matter of
cost-benefit analysis? If you as the mother have the power to decide
whether the fetus should live or die, and you decide to give birth, then
can you demand support for the child from the father if he did not want
the baby? If it is your property, why should the state give you a subsidy
by providing, say, day-care facilities?"

If a matter of individual rights, do we decide to honor the mother's
rights or the fetus's rights? If a social issue, do we decide to intro-
duce many unwanted babies into society each year with the concomitant of
increased welfare expenditures? Responses to all such questions might re-
direct participants' thinking, on both sides.

But the attempt to forge the comprehensive perspective fails. Those
who see the fetus as an unborn human being cannot accept the social and
political arguments that a woman's reproductive freedom is the central issue. Likewise, pro-choice advocates find unconvincing the position that the fetus is an unborn human being. Yet the various arguments and questions have led to some intermediate positions between absolute abortion or absolutely not. Some may be moved by those special circumstances when a human life, even that of an innocent fetus, should be forfeited; others may come to question the wisdom of abortion when we do not know whether the fetus is a human being. So this ward decides that abortion in limited cases is acceptable, limiting it to the first trimester of pregnancy in cases of rape, incest, severe physical danger to the mother, or demonstrable handicaps in the fetus; and in cases where the mother is under 13 years of age or is mentally retarded. The ward does agree that abortions are deleterious to both mother and fetus, and that the proper focus is to work to have the fewest abortions possible.

Most likely, the only sense of victory in a decision such as this where no party gains what it wanted is that both sides have come to appreciate the complexity of the issue and some of the positions of the opposition. All of the efforts go into trying to reach a decision the substance of which all can agree to and, at the very least, into creating a situation "where each person [can] identify with the body making the decision in such a way that, while dissenting from particular outcomes, he still regards the resulting order as one that he has helped to create" (Miller, 1985, p. 5). A lawyer, for example, does not applaud every verdict, yet any lawyer active in a trial regards the judgement in that trial as one he has helped to make, regardless of the outcome. Citizens similarly active in the generative procedures, feeling a part of the decision-making process, can support the decision.
The generative procedures will only be recognized as legitimate if participants are seen to be attempting to generate a compound perspective and to be arguing for and against various positions on the basis of reasons. Otherwise, a minority would be under no obligation to obey or agree, since the decision would be judged to have been made unfairly. Then the entire system is in jeopardy, and the majority—even if operating only out of self-interest—will see its interests, in whole or in part, in jeopardy as well.

Therefore, we have added to the other requirements for a legitimate procedure one more requirement—the attempt to generate a compound common good. This is not an exhortation to "think about the common good," nor does it imply a proper frame of mind. It is a palpable procedure to try to create a perspective that embraces everyone's interests; and interests not embraced will be rejected on the basis of argued reasons. Building this into the procedure is no more suspect than building in individual civil and political rights such as due process on the grounds that justice must be guaranteed even against a majority decision. Our requirement for the generative perspective is a guarantee that each participant is assured that every view is "taken exactly as seriously as that of anyone else" (Ryan, op. cit.).

Behind the attempt to forge the compound common good, behind any decision reached in the procedures, is a necessary commitment, as part of the requirements of participation, to take up the viewpoints of others and, in explaining or supporting or refuting them, to look for and argue from reasons. If the procedures move along properly, then even a disgruntled participant, "by participating in the process, knowing in advance its regular course and the possibility of an adverse outcome, [agrees] to the
legitimacy of the eventual outcome."

The force of the generative procedures is to encourage participants to move beyond individualism and to derive, not impose, a common good. But it also has the effect of underscoring the sociality found at every level of the theory of compound individuality: Any pursuit or goal, however private, exists in a social context and is therefore not the business solely of the agent in pursuit.

These procedures may also serve to confront the task Mansbridge sets before us in *Beyond Adversary Democracy*; that is, "to knit together two fundamentally different kinds of democracies into a single institutional framework" (p. 7). One kind, "adversary democracy," is interest aggregation, criticized by communitarians for emphasizing individual rights over the democratic decisions of the community; the second, "unitary democracy," is criticized for being sentimental and unrealistic--assuming politics to be an activity of "friends" who seek harmony or unity of interests in the face of diverse and divergent interests. Mansbridge insists that the proper political framework must be dichotomous--one set of institutions for conflicting interests, one set for common interests. Our proposal is to create a single set of institutions for advancing common interests by transcending or building upon conflicting ones. The means for forging a common interest--dialogue and perspectivism--can then also be used to make decisions in the face of conflicts. We seek thereby to use democratic procedures to generate socially acceptable outcomes.

This, however, is not our only task. If the generative procedures can encourage movement beyond individualism, if they can also approach by the same methods the creation of a compound common good or socially acceptable outcomes, do they at the same time build community? If shared values,
standards, and purposes can be derived from participants and not imposed on them, then can the procedures for doing so serve as the foundation for community? Can community thereby be built out of, and thus established on, autonomous action? Does participation, then, help reconcile liberalism and its emphasis on autonomy and individual rights with communitarianism and its focus on social identity and collective requirements for a meaningful life? These will be the topics of the final chapter.
CHAPTER 5

VENERATION OF COMMUNITY

Participation in the generative procedures, which we might abbreviate as "generative participation," assumes a willingness to take part in making decisions that affect not only one's own life but also the shape and future of the lives of others and of the life of the community. It cannot be the simple pursuit of private interests. This participation opens up the possibility of intimate relationships as it promotes a habit of considering disparate views and incorporating them into one's own world view. And it does more. The group or community is opened to continuous democratic deliberation about its general will or common interest, just as the individual is similarly opened to the recasting of his world view. Neither the general will nor a particular world view is imposed; both are derived from the interactive relationship among citizens/members actively engaged in the common democratic enterprise.

From the perspective developed so far, it may make little difference whether the participatory setting is political, is the workplace, or consists largely of generative participation in professional, voluntary, civic, or religious organizations. Certainly nothing suggested so far argues that such participation must be political. The active participation required to motivate persons beyond individualism and to create a compound common good might be made available in exclusively private settings.
Yet if generative participation is viewed as a social need, then its setting would have to be public. Given the liberal-communitarian context of our perspective, what we need to know at this point is whether, as C. B. MacPherson phrased it, participatory democracy "brings with it a sense of community" (1977, p. 99). Such an inquiry is important, moreover, to the theory of compound individuality, for at least two of the developmentalists we have cited contend that the self at each level of development is grounded not merely by sociality but by community.

To pursue the possibility of generative participation bringing or building community, three additional areas need to be examined. First, the nature of community: How is it defined and described, especially by the communitarians we have been considering? We have established through the theory of compound individuality that every level of self requires relationship or sociality. Is this essential sociality "community"? Second, the relationship between participation and communitarian concerns: If generative participation does not itself serve as or generate a sense of community, does participation at least speak to some of the communitarians' principal concerns? Does it fulfil the conditions for meaningful living as outlined, or hinted at, by contemporary communitarians? Third, the implications for the liberal-communitarian logomachy: Does generative participation, in conjunction with what we here discern about the nature of community, take us any distance toward a reconciliation of liberalism and its communitarian critics?
WHAT IS COMMUNITY?

Whether defined with technical precision or left to float through the pleasure centers of our psyches, community is a notion people believe in, believe they need, or believe they already have. As a term it encapsulates an entire range of meanings, and thus most authors are content to leave its precise meaning opaque, allowing the reader to find at its heart their own predilections. As we found with the terms "self" and "common good," communitarians often share the use of the term "community" without sharing a compatible meaning. Our approach here will be to define community in its paradigmatic or richest sense, for in that sense alone can we distinguish adequately between community and other terms for social grouping: societies, associations, corporations, and the like. In doing so, we shall discover that community in this paradigmatic sense can exist but at a price that seems too high for most of us willingly to pay.

Defining community may seem not only feckless but nearly impossible. A. H. Halsey wrote that community "has so many different meanings as to be meaningless" (Plant, 1980, p. 205), and George A. Hillery, in his 1955 survey, listed 94 definitions and found that the only common link among them was that each mentioned people. But defining community in its richest sense allows us to avoid wading through endless definitions, each with its own purpose. We shall confine ourselves as far as possible, therefore, to examining distinctions between the idea of community and that of association. This for two reasons: First, on the definitional side community and association share, or can share, many of the same properties, as it were, while on the common sense side few mistake associations for communities. We can without trouble find distinctions in our minds for separating them, thus
implying that strong distinctions may be easy to come by. Second, distinctions may be so easy due in no small measure to work in this area that has gone before, especially that of Ferdinand Tönnies (1957) whose classic rendition, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, is the best place to begin.

Communitarian critics of modern society lament the absence, some would argue the eradication, of community. They see in the rise of commerce and industrialization, and the concomitant specialization, the decline of a way of life characterized by constitutive relationships; cooperation; residential propinquity; common values, purposes, aspirations, and beliefs—in short, a life held in common that gave meaning and identity to persons. The organic social grouping that centered around this common life Tönnies described as Gemeinschaft or "community." It expressed a total way of life and not simply the means to some end. Its basis was natural will—the unfolding and flourishing of traditions and folkways—founded first on the natural bonding of family and kin.

In contrast to "community" Tönnies described Gesellschaft, the "transitory and superficial" (p. 35) way of life found in cities and, more generally, in modern society. Whereas Gemeinschaft was "the metaphysical union of bodies in blood" and bonds of "field and soil" (p. 258), whereby humans relate to one another as "natural members (or parts) of the whole" (p. 192), Gesellschaft—translated as either "society" or "association"—required and spawned relationships of separated, isolated individuals, all in tension with one another. The cement of these relationships and of the society was the contract, an impersonal, abstract, and formal system that demanded not flesh or solidity but quid pro quo. Common values did not exist as in Gemeinschaft, but could be brought about through fiction, the inventing of a "common personality and his will, to whom this common
value has to bear reference" (p. 65). Individuals in interaction while in this fiction were engaged in "transactions." Society or association is, then, an aggregation of contracts and transactions.

Tönnies summarized the distinction this way: "...[I]n Gemeinschaft [people] remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they are essentially separate in spite of all uniting factors" (p. 65).

The contrast was sharply drawn and to good effect. As a communitarian deposition it has served a useful purpose: to point out the ills at the base of modern society while simultaneously pointing up the restoration of community as the proper antidote.

Yet for our purposes Tönnies provides even stronger material for distinguishing between community and association. "A higher type of social bond," higher than love alone which cannot bind unless requited, develops out of the natural social relationships of mutuality found in Gemeinschaft. This bond contains reciprocity and obligation.

Not the existence of obligation but the kind of obligation differentiates community from association. Few associations exist without obligations, but these obligations are fully described in the by-laws, charter, or contracts of the organization and are formally recognized by the members. Obligations in associations, in other words, are spelled out, whereas those in community are implied. Associations are organized for some special purpose in which members join voluntarily to share or develop an interest. Whatever the basis--be it a value, aim, cause, etc.--associations are groups formally organized and with a limited scope. Not only obligations but also rules, regulations, and privileges are clearly defined and circumscribe the interactions of the group.
The implied obligations of a community, on the other hand, arise not out of formal agreement or organization, but out of the natural bonds of kin and out of the relationships of neighbors. Thus in a community, relationships precede obligations, whereas in associations, by-laws and formal obligations determine the kinds of relationships members have.

Communal obligations arise out of the members' concern for the welfare or well-being of all other members, and that concern arises out of the members' own sense of identity. But concern alone is not enough; obligation requires that the concern be acted upon. A community member has an obligation to do what he can to improve the well-being of any and all members.

But let us assume that I am not in the community as a member, but as a social worker. I have relationships with most, perhaps all, of the members. Let us assume that the basis of most of those relationships are not professional concerns, but emanates from my concern for the members' well-being—not just the well-being of those whom I know, but of all members. But because I am not a member of the community, am I under any obligation to help? There is no recognition within the community of any membership obligations that come with the role I play in relation to the group. What if the community demanded some form of assistance from me that I did not want to give? Suppose they wanted me to sell my house to defray expenses for a community project I could not support? Conversely, could I demand that the community assist me? In the first case, I may feel a concern that I need not act on, or I may feel an obligation to the members but not to the community, because the persons are not related to me as members since I am not one. In the case of my making demands of the members to assist me,
they are under no obligation to do so since I am not a member. Obligations to be communal must be reciprocal, but not defined as in a contract. Reciprocity, as Tonnies tells us, arises from the kind of relationship: one in which the parties not only share a common and total way of life but also identify with it. The communards might rightly ask of me: Why aren't you a member?

Without the requirement of reciprocity the silly but possible situation could occur in which a person thought of himself as a member of a community when the community did not. Making donations to charities, for example, is not forming a community with the recipients, even if the action expresses and springs from obligation and concern, because there is no reciprocity. In fact, there could not be reciprocity, for the donation establishes no personal relationship with the recipients. Charity flows not from me to them, but from the organization to them. That organization is, for the donor, at best an association.

In community, reciprocal obligations flow from personal relationships. I may have some obligations to all human beings qua human beings, as we saw with the autonomous self, or to all fellow citizens of my republic, but those are not obligations from me to definite others. They exist whether I know the person or not. Yet community obligations cannot be to places in the community, but to members as persons. Thus we have to clarify Tonnies's distinction by adding the Platonic and Aristotelian idea that community must be limited in size.

We might distinguish family from community in just the opposite way. Societal or universal obligations cannot rest on reciprocal relationships, and familial obligation need not rest on reciprocal relationships. The intimacy of family relationships may entail obligations without reciprocity.
I may provide for a sister in trouble though she detests me and feels no concern for and no obligation to me. My obligation is therefore unconditional. Such obligations may be construed as one vital aspect of the intimacy of family, and perhaps kin, ties.

In conjunction with Tönnies's distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft we can now cite four criteria for paradigmatic community:

1) It must be the sharing of a total way of life and not just sharing interests or associating as a means to an end;

2) it consists of face-to-face relationships (our way of ensuring a certain size) that spawns

3) concern for the well-being of all members and reciprocal obligations to do one's all in fostering well-being; and

4) the community is central to one's identity. The relationships, obligations, mores, roles, ethos, and traditions are not simply important to me, but help make me the person I am.

Each of these criteria is necessary for community; taken together they are sufficient for defining it in its richest or strong sense. As we shall see from the following discussion, dropping any of the criteria creates difficulties that will lead us out of community and back into association.

Using these criteria, we can see that other definitions of community may not only be limited but also wrong. John Ladd (1959), who thinks the very idea of defining a Protean concept such as community a fruitless endeavor, says that all we can say about community is that it is "an aggregation of individual human beings." But a crowd or a mob is also an aggregation of individual human beings. Ladd is not telling us what property or quality community has that separates one aggregation from another. To recur to our original example, how could Ladd distinguish between an association and a
community? When would an association become a community?

In his article "Community Within a Community--the Professions" W. J. Goode (1969) argues that associations of professionals can be considered communities because definitions of both involve the same criteria:

a) members are bound together by a sense of common identity as professionals;

b) members share the same professional values and interests;

c) few members leave their professional associations;

d) members speak a common language--professional jargon--outsiders can only partially understand;

e) the association has some authority over the members and supplies rules and standards guiding behaviour within the profession.

From the criteria for community we have established, this definition falls short. Goode's criteria pertain only to the structure of the organization and in no way pertain to the relationships of those involved. Obligations may arise, but only out of the articles of organization. Yet within the "community" as Goode describes it, there are no obligations to persons, only standards and rules for professional behavior. Identity is with the profession, not with others who are in that profession. Thus one could have an obligation to uphold the reputation and standards of the profession in his own practice, but have no obligation of any kind to any other practitioner.

Goode's criteria are simply too easy to meet without generating anything we would agree is a community. Consider two examples. Imagine an association of anti-community scholars or writers, a group of Ayn Rand enthusiasts dedicated not only to individualism but also to the eradication
of community. They meet together as professional scholars only to share their knowledge and interests as specialists. They identify not simply as writers/scholars but as experts in anti-community argument and "Randism." They use these meetings to forge a united front in their presentations, and so they are anxious to follow the standards the group set. The first question they would want Goode to answer is how their group could possibly constitute a "community."

Or consider an association of professional snake-charmers (or any profession in which there are few members) who meet regularly to hear lectures on the latest techniques and on marketing strategy. These charmers must, for Goode, constitute a community despite the possibility that not one member has ever spoken to another. They attend the meetings, learn from the presentations, then go about their own business afterwards. In short, no one knows anyone else in the community and never needs to. No one ever even needs to speak to another member. Thus an association of professionals constitutes a community in which members can remain perfect strangers.

Dropping any of our four criteria could create equally bizarre communities. Drop the requirement for sharing an overall way of life, and then only one part of a member's personality is sufficient for community. A business corporation could then qualify as a community. Relationships could be close, the person could identify with his company, and he could be concerned about all other employees as employees. But the requirement is not to know one's colleagues as persons, but only to know them as employees, only as far as their professional or work relationship extends. Man is thereby fragmented, for he is divided into at least two parts: employee or colleague and the rest of him.
Fragmentation and separation of human beings into compartments are frequent complaints of communitarians. Both Marx and R. H. Tawney—though the latter perhaps could not be called a communitarian—decried divisions that created an "economic man" subject to one set of laws, a "political man" subject to another, a "family man" subject to a third, (Tawney added and emphasized a spiritual man as well) all unrelated to, and "unintegrated" in, the particular person.

Suppose we drop the criterion of face-to-face relationships. Then a neighborhood community, following our criteria, could include any and all neighbors who moved away. That they could still share a common way of life and live in the next county or city or country strains credulity, but is possible. But a common way of life is made in common and must involve adjustments in living caused by the vicissitudes, great and small, that befall individuals, families, and groups in the community. Those outside the fold, though still adhering to the common values and way of life, cannot be touched by the changes in the community that are bound to occur. Face-to-face relationships also guarantee that the community cannot grow so large that each person will not know everyone. Whether communards have moved away or the community has grown too large, the strain on mutual concern and obligations would be great. Could one feel obligations to persons one had never met? Can there be reciprocity with those who have moved away? Is trust in others granted by dint of membership, or must there also be more to it than that? It would seem that trust is so granted initially because in community one knows that the other will be there when needed. One not known now can be known later. When the group stops being a network of relationships and becomes a system—with members living out or remaining unknown because of size—there is a danger that those within it could become
simply replaceable parts, anyone in the role would do provided it is a community role.

Finally, what would happen if a community member could participate fully and be obligated completely without identifying with the community? However dubious the possibility, consider the example of a Soviet spy who infiltrates an English village community. He takes up the life of a merchant, shares actively in the community life, knows everyone and everyone knows him...to a certain extent. For he conceals his identity as an agent and conceals that he identifies with the life he has in Leningrad. Even though from the outside he appears to be a full member of the community, fulfilling all obligations and acting on concern for all residents of the village, still this is merely an appearance. Would we grant him the status of a full member of the community if we knew his involvement was a ruse? Would we grant such membership to a man who had fallen in love with a communard and feigned involvement just to be near her? The sham involves more than a lack of identity; it involves as well using the community as a means to a specific, and uncommon, end.

COMMUNITARIANS ON COMMUNITY

Communitarians, in trumpeting the restoration of community, must have something like our four criteria in mind. Or do they? When, for example, Sheldon Wolin writes in Politics and Vision that human beings need "to dwell in more intimate relationships with each other, to enjoy more affective ties, to experience some closer solidarity" (p. 363), he cannot mean that man lives without affection or social bonds or attachments.
Familial relations still exist; fraternal associations, clubs, societies, churches, and collegial groups of all sorts flourish in liberal societies. Rather, he, and others, must mean that community as a quality of relationships that invigorate and integrate the whole person, that help constitute identity, and that bind persons to others is a total way of life no longer available. Thus liberal man even in fellowship, association, and family is always a lonely man.

Hence an important distinction separates the solitary man who has no company to keep, no association or relationship that binds him securely and closely; and the lonely man who has company and associations yet finds no solace or security in them, no purpose and no identity. For the solitary man may make a life and identity for himself—as Thoreau did in his temporary retreat at Walden Pond—but the lonely man is not only rootless but also lifeless, what Hannah Arendt called "not being in the world at all."

What man needs, then, is community in which he is and feels an integral part of an overall way of life. Aside from the austere and often severe environments of monasteries and religious sects and the utopian, if not vacuous, experiments in communal living, such a way of life is not found in liberal society. Thus communitarians have looked over their shoulders for their models: to the polis of ancient Greece, especially Athens; to the medieval village; to Elizabethan society. Yet these models fail to satisfy what might be termed our modern sensibilities, for the price to pay for these communities was a rigid social hierarchy and a concomitant inequality of status. What most communitarians seek is not a facsimile of the past but its ethos in the present. They seek what Marx called Gemeinwesen, in which all persons would be part of an organic community that would elevate the common life and absorb individuals fully within it.
without absorbing their individuality.

This is, of course, the recurrent communitarian objective: to combine individual autonomy and community, what Charles Taylor described as the Hegelian goal of uniting the radical moral autonomy of Kant with the expressive unity of the Greek polis (1975, pp. 388, 427). But this is a dubious endeavor. As we saw from the point of view of the self, the communitarians cannot sustain community without jeopardizing autonomy. From the point of view of community, the communitarians can fare no better. Their objective is kept alive only by their remaining vague about the nature of community, for the only type of community that can securely bind the whole person in an overall way of life is a "total" community that, as we shall see, cannot withstand the independent criticality characteristic of autonomy. Should the communitarians accept something like our fourfold criteria, which can provide the kind of life and identity they seek, they would jeopardize individual autonomy.

Thus Alasdair Mcintyre can define community as agreement on the ends as well as on the means to those ends. These constitute the good shared by all members; to wit, the common good. "It is this sharing which is essential and primary to the constitution of any form of community" (1981, p. 155). Yet vital traditions "embody continuities of conflict" about the scope and nature of the ends and practices (Ibid, p. 222). If that is so, then what happens to community, to the sharing, when conflict erupts? When he says that "the good is neither mine peculiarly nor yours peculiarly" but is the shared good of human relationships--something that sounds as if it ought to define community--the good is either a set of precise contents pursued by those of like-minds--what Sandel condemns in Rawls as the "sentimental" notion of community--or it is a metaperspective devoid of
any guiding content at all: "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for man" (p. 219). In fact, both such goods are possible components of the liberal community that McIntyre himself denounces.

Michael Walzer's attempts to define community are no less shallow. In *Spheres of Justice* he argues that the political sphere is the heart of community, for it "is probably the closest we can come to a world of common meanings. Language, history, and culture come together to produce a collective consciousness." In his understanding, political community is simply a synonym for country or nation (p. 35). Such an approach lacks any analytical bite. Moreover, it is mistaken on at least two counts, our fourfold criteria notwithstanding. First, as we saw in the previous chapter when considering William Connolly's ideas on generating the common good, common vocabulary can be confused for common meanings. Nowhere does this seem more likely than politics. Second, surely ethnic subcultures are a world of common meanings, certainly more so than national politics where Walzer himself admits that sometimes "political and historical communities don't coincide." When they do not, "the sharing [of common meanings] takes place in smaller units" (p. 29). What happens when the meanings shared in the subgroup do not correspond, or perhaps even run counter, to those of the political community? David Miller argues that when politics—as in the kind of socialism with which Walzer is associated—demands an overarching attachment to citizenship or to the national community, then subgroup identity is subordinated or quashed.4

The bonds of commonality established by national politics are sufficient in Walzer's mind for resolving differences among various subcultural communities. But if we can be satisfied with a definition of community as broad as his, then we must be satisfied with calling almost
any kind of association, common enterprise, joint deliberation, public conversation, or generative procedure a form of community.

The definition of community that is closest to that of total community while still alleging to comprise autonomy is Michael Sandel's: "To be a community in the strong sense, a community must be constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants" (1982, p. 175). Rather than a relationship one chooses, constitutive community is an attachment, an end, a given one discovers (Ibid, p. 150). Even though Sandel boldly states that community constitutes one's identity, how this works remains indeterminate and ambiguous. Does discovering attachments necessitate staying attached? How are the discoveries made? They are made through reflective introspection or self-understanding of ends already given. "[T]his notion of community describes a framework of self-understandings that is distinguishable from and in some sense prior to the sentiments and dispositions of individuals within the framework...." (p. 134) It is the community framework that gives shape to personal identity. Yet though one can reflect on what is given within the community, one cannot reflect on the framework itself. One's autonomy is thereby confined to a limited range, which is really not autonomy.

Although Sandel wants community to constitute the self, his language throughout Liberalism and the Limits of Justice implies separation, which he must have for self-reflective discovery. Although he forthrightly declares for a total community of preordained norms, ends, and attachments, he cannot admit that these must be given and cannot be discovered or, worse, chosen. Durkheim (1984) recognized that for community to be constitutive, it had to be a total community; but to be a total community, it had to provide "clear-cut rules defining limits to desire and ambition in all spheres
of life" and "limited horizons for [man's] thoughts." Autonomy, or self-reflection, would have to be suspended.

TOTAL COMMUNITY

Over one hundred and fifty years ago Tocqueville described the nature of total community in his discussion of despotic democracy:

It gladly works for [the citizens'] happiness but wants to be the sole agent and judge of it. It provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, makes rules for their testaments, and divides their inheritances...Thus it daily makes the exercise of free choice less useful and rarer, restricts the activity of free will within a narrower compass, and little by little robs each citizen of the proper use of his own faculties...It covers the whole of social life with a network of petty, complicated rules that are both minute and uniform, through which even men of the greatest originality and the most vigorous temperament cannot force their heads above the crowd. It does not break men's will, but softens, bends, and guides it; it seldom enjoins, but often inhibits, action; it does not destroy anything, but prevents much being born; it is not at all tyrannical, but it hinders, restrains, enervates, stifles, and stultifies...(1969, p. 692)

The communitarians value liberal autonomy but seem trapped by their own insistence on constitutive community. Thus Charles Taylor agrees with Sandel that community is constitutive (1985, p. 8), but will not go as far as Hegel and suggest modeling community after the Greek polis, in which social practices and institutions demanded and reinforced behavior in conformity to ends and norms already given. In this setting the Athenians, according to Hegel, acted "out of instinct," and harmony was assured since the institutional matrix itself was "the essence, the 'substance' of the
This is total community.

Taylor argues that the dire need today is to restore some semblance of Hegelian Sittlichkeit or moral obligations to an ongoing community from which one inherits the norms and ends that form a meaningful life. It is only through such an inheritance that individuals can define themselves (Hegel, p. 379). Liberal political and social theory, with its emphasis on the nature of man as an independent organism and thus on his distance from the community (Ibid, p. 380), provides no 'basis for men's identification with their society' (Ibid, p. 410). Yet Taylor does not see constitutive community as strong or total community. Rather he sees it as cultural conversation. Simply put, it is language and culture that constitutes personal identity; one cannot understand oneself apart from the communicative interchanges the community carries on.

Though such an interpretation of community fits well with the emphasis on sodality and relationships in the theory of compound individuality, it does little to separate community from association. Indeed, Taylor suggests that in order to counter the alienation found in modern liberal societies and to enable men to identify with their communities without introducing fascism, nationalism, or other forms of total community, those partial communities—"geographical, or cultural, or occupational"—essential to social differentiation and personal identity must be renewed (pp. 409-16). This is what Taylor means by community being constitutive.

The irony in this is that an emphasis on partial communities is a hallmark of liberalism. If constitutive communities can be partial, can be geographical or cultural or occupational, then we are not really describing communities but variations of associations.
How are Taylorian partial communities different from those offered in liberal societies? While liberals always enter partial communities voluntarily, Taylor sees persons as natural members of partial communities. Thus there would seem to be two kinds of partial communities: those we can choose to enter and those we are born into; in short, voluntary communities and existential communities. While no communitarian would suggest that liberal societies do not offer voluntary communities, even total communities one can choose to enter, they might suggest that such communities, even if broadly based, numerous, and variegated, exist only as a means to avoid the alienation and hollowness of modern society. They exist only to fill the identity void left by society's preclusion of existential communities. Because modern society emphasizes individualism over community, and because such an emphasis disrupts communal ties, modern society cannot fulfill our need for existential communities, save as exceptions.

Yet every person is born into an existential community. Indeed, everyone is raised in a total community, or so the membership level of self seems. The membership self requires sharing a total way of life, a world view and how to behave in it. Meaning for this self comes through sharing common values, interests, aims, aspirations, and relationships of the community. These are the self. Since identity is as the community, its integrity—the structure and fulfillment of its prescribed rules and roles—is paramount. Social cohesion is based on and found in the shared description of social reality; proper ways to behave are given in the description. Values, meaning, symbols, and solidarity are not chosen or created but given.

Yet considering the arguments that preceded this discussion, how can a child be born into a total community—be it clan, tribe, neighborhood, or
nation—in a modern liberal social structure that precludes community? The fragmentation of man makes total community impossible and, simultaneously, breeds contempt for it. But the level at which such fragmentation takes place, or at least the level at which it can be recognized—the self-reflective level—has not yet been reached. Thus the child "is not conscious of a division between his own attitudes to the community and the way in which that community organizes and articulates its life" (Plant, 1974, p. 19). The membership world is one "which is fundamentally unproblematic; it is constituted by rules which are grounded in belief. Here, not only do men find a generalized world of meaning, but they are able to orient themselves within that sphere because they have an identity which is unproblematic" (Rasmussen, 1983, p. 6).

The notion of an unproblematic identity is essential to making sense of the membership world, for many modern children are not really born into a total community, but into a network of subcultures. Out of this seeming welter a child constructs a coherent world view, not by integrating perspectives but by aggregating them. A network might include the shared conceptions of the society-at-large: its language, mores, laws, history, ideals, etc.—but also the conceptions of separate, even competing, world views. One parent might be Roman Catholic, from a neighborhood that is ethnically homogeneous and from a family that continues to speak only Italian at family gatherings. The other parent might be Jewish, from a family that is not only orthodox but also Zionist. This parent may be close to her parents, but closest to a Zen Buddhist brother who lives with her and her family. For reasons of convenience and enrichment, the family may live in a neighborhood that is predominantly Chinese. The child may go to the best day-care facility, run by Chinese who seek to raise community-
minded children and who propagate the tenets of Confucianism.

This child will absorb no fewer than four different value systems and will learn the rules and roles for governing each. Yet just as children up to a certain age can learn as many as eight languages without confusion, so they can absorb competing, even contradictory, world views, because they do not need to integrate them. When self-reflection begins, conflicts and tensions will arise. The child then starts the move from membership to autonomy. In that move, unless the child opts for one of the subcultures exclusively and in its pure form, the constitutive community, the existential community that Taylor prizes, will be lost.

Are the tensions and conflicts in this scenario the result of diversity or fragmentation? Liberal society permits cultural diversity that leads directly to these tensions. But is this diversity the reflection of society's need for fragmentation as the best, and perhaps only, way of maintaining the system; or is it the reflection of the individual maturational process, that self-reflectivity results in diversity within? Whatever its source, diversity undercuts the idea that the network the child is born into is a constitutive community. It is constitutive, but is it a community? First, the life is not a common way of life, otherwise all would share in it, not in parts of it. Second, the network of subcultures is a community only from the perspective of the child. Only she is identified as it; only she recognizes its many parts and can make them a community. Thus we have that silly but now likely situation in which a person is in a community of one.

So while all the ingredients are present to make community, the membership level is not really a community save for the perspective of the member herself. Yet that perspective may be the ideal that Taylor and
other communitarians seek as community, because it provides a secure and unproblematic identity. But if this is to be maintained in the face of the emergence of self-reflectivity, then such identity comes at a price most are unwilling to pay, the price of diversity and autonomous selfhood, the recognition that my community or world view is only one possibility among many. While the membership self offers an instant solidarity and a ready-made world view, it does so effortlessly. Because the self is unreflective, this cannot be the destination of any communitarian wishing to join community and autonomy.

However salutary autonomy may seem, the communitarians recognize that it, too, comes with a price, the price of certainty and security. Should individuals be allowed to manifest a diversity of interests within themselves, a diversity that may transcend and contradict their community? Can community exist, as Durkheim suggested, only by putting a cap on its members' mental horizons? If the cap is removed in recognition of or to foster diversity, must community thereby be destroyed? Is this what happened with modern society? Should the loss of community thus not be lamented but applauded? Perhaps the critique of the communitarians is then stood on its head: Diversity within man is not the result of fragmentation, but is the concentrated reflection of diversity found among men. It is not the evil of modernity but the development of self-reflectivity, for even if no other ways of life existed for comparison, self-reflectivity permits the creation of hypothetical worlds. To suppress that occurrence we must fit our children with Durkheim's cap.

To limit diversity is to perpetuate what social critic Richard Sennett calls the ethos of the ghetto. It emphasizes sharing a way of life to the exclusion of all others and builds a cocoon against the world. The greater
the stress on collective personality, the more insular, exclusive, and suspicious the outlook becomes. Outsiders are reduced to pseudo-species; unknowns are avoided. "Negotiation becomes the great threat to community: change positions or alter them, and the communal spirit itself is weakened" (1977, p. 251).

This attitude is deleterious even to those within the community, for it leads not to fraternity but to fratricide. In order to share a collective personality the faces of all must be recognizable in the common face. Therefore, the collective personality must remain "rigid and still" (Ibid, p. 250). Every variance in habit or behavior leads to the query: "Is she still one of us?" Individual deviation threatens the whole, and people must be watched and tested. Emotional charging and recharging through rituals, purges, and purifications becomes the standard, and necessary, method to confect solidarity. "Distrust and solidarity, seemingly so opposed, are united" (Ibid, p. 311). The result is what Sennett calls "destructive Gemeinschaft."^7

The sad fact is that a McIntyresque withdrawal into local communities (1981, p. 263) or the creation of a community of communities seem destined to result in, if they are not already built on, the basics of destructive Gemeinschaft. Such actions might even reproduce the same problems for a communitarian society that communitarians excoriate in liberalism: They criticize liberalism for emphasizing individualism; for having exclusively instrumental relationships; for prizing rationality and universals over the concrete, real, and historical; for promoting self-interest and individual rights over a concern for the common good; for conceiving the res publica as an arena for adjudicating competing interests; and for seeing politics as the process for amalgamating private interests into victorious zero-sum
coalitions. Yet many of these features would surely appear in the interactions and relationships among communities. Are communities granted the right to follow the principles and pursue the ends they wish? Can relationships among and between communities be anything but instrumental? What is the basis upon which rights for communities would be established? Aren't communities as closed to alternative world views as atomists are? Aren't the visions of the communitarians merely excuses for like-minded persons to live in a closed world, or for communities to make all persons within them like-minded? Aren't they really promoting individualism on a community scale and thus perpetuating the very weakness that communitarians have denominated the chief liability of liberalism?

However many questions we ask or examples we provide, however intricate our maze of definitions, we always end up at the same Minotaurian dilemma: Communitarians can either pursue total community and risk the submergence, if not the elimination, of individuality; or they can forsake constitutive community, accept strong associations, and battle loneliness, atomism, alienation, and anomie in some other way. Must we, for example, rule out participation, as Taylor does, as one such possible way?
Taylor sees the movements for greater democratic participation as a reac-
tion to modern alienation and as an attempt to exercise autonomy while tak-
ing responsibility for changing one's society. It is part of the recurrent
demand of political theorists "to reconstruct society...do away with heter-
onomy, overcome alienation, or recover spontaneity" (Hegel, p. 411).

Participation, however, says Taylor, cannot work these miracles.
While it is true that modern societies have moved toward the greater
homogeneity that Hegel identified as necessary for equal participation--
since differences might preclude everyone from participating equally--it is
also true, according to Taylor, that this homogeneity has undercut identity
with cultural communities and thereby increased alienation. Modern
society has supplanted subgroup identity and offered nothing in its place.
Stepping in to fill the identity void is fascism, nationalism, totalitar-
ianism (pp. 413-414), the kind of despotic regime described by Tocqueville.
Stepping in is total community.

Thus, it is not participation per se to which Taylor objects, it is
the increased homogeneity that participation requires. But is it homo-
genite or political and legal equality that participation requires? More-
over, what evidence does Taylor adduce to show that modern societies have
moved toward greater homogeneity (p. 412) and that citizens have
developed a unity of outlook and life-style? (p. 410) He doesn't adduce
any. He invokes the same sorts of images found in earlier communitarian
critiques of mass society. We can certainly agree that materially
societies seem much more homogeneous, producing and wanting the same kinds
of goods. Though it is unmistakably true, as Salvador Giner point out (1969, p. 504), that partial or "identity" communities have lost the one factor that characterized traditional communities—economic self-sufficiency—it does not follow that "emotionally and primordially" such identity groups are no longer available. Indeed, making people more alike legally and economically was necessary for enlarging and enlivening social consciousness and for addressing social problems that could be hidden behind communal barriers. It was one way, but perhaps not the only way, to overcome communal provincialism and xenophobia. Consequently, over the past two decades diverse ethnic, religious, and interest subcultures have become more publicly and politically active. Participation seems to have increased not because of homogeneity but because of demands for recognition by diverse identity communities.

Does participation itself offer a way toward, if not a form of, community? J. Roland Pennock suggests that equally important to the contribution participation makes to individual development "is [its] creation of real community" (1979, p. 444). Working with others, he says, satisfies our need to belong and helps us achieve personal identity by becoming an integral and valued part of a collective entity and enterprise (Idem). While citizenship and participatory politics may provide men with integrative experience, as Sheldon Wolin reminds us, by joining us in a life of common involvements (1960, p. 434), it would surely be stretching the point to call that relationship an integrative community. While it might be true that participatory democracy touches on dilemmas and issues pertaining to all aspects of life, this cannot be the same as saying that democracy is a community because it encompasses or deals with an entire way of life. Generative participation does not offer a unifying or integrative perspective as
if it were the successor to the medieval church. Rather it offers an integrative context in which pluralistic, conflicting, multiple viewpoints are aired and honored and in which action is taken and decisions are made even when no unity is reached.

Participation, even the generative procedures, does not constitute a community because the ties that bind people to one another are functional. The purpose of gathering and sharing is to deliberate and to take action on issues important to the collectivity. The procedures are purposeful; the ties are practical. A community, on the other hand, has no single purpose but has purposes; its ties are affective and historical; its obligations, unwritten. Participatory settings function as organizations, according to formal rules and regulations. The community functions according to history, custom, and chemistry. Though both involve face-to-face encounters, there is no demand in participation to know anyone beyond attending to their iterations. In no sense do they share a way of life.

The steps beyond individualism toward compound individuality on a wide scale require a public or collective forum in which participants can take up and act upon the positions of various others. The result is both to generate a compound common good and to take oneself outside or beyond one's own world view. The hope is that such participation will have a spill-over effect beyond participation; that it will benefit the individual in his personal relations by conditioning intimacy. And it may bring individuals to a realization of the value and standards by which they define themselves and to a desire to seek out others to share those values and standards or build them into a way of life. In brief, the generative procedures may encourage and inspire community, but they themselves cannot serve as a community.
Still, any community they would inspire would most likely be a partial community, which might take two forms. First, the partial community might conform to a Rawlsian strong or rich association. Here persons would be joined by identifying with and sharing a set of specific values, purposes, concerns, beliefs, or interests that are judged essential to one's way of life however different that way of life may be from the lives of the others involved. Thus you and I might join a cause promoting economic and workplace democracy, and both come to identify strongly with it. But you could be a rich capitalist who also identifies with your polo playing and sports-car rallies, while I identify no less strongly with my working-class origins and my punk-rock band.

Second, the partial community might be a community of compound individuals. But these individuals, even in community, would still be defined by constitutive relationships and autonomy, which cannot exist in total community.

Yet isn't compound individuality with its combination of constitutive relationships and autonomy precisely what the communitarians seek? It is not exactly what they seek. The constitutive relationships of the compound self are primarily dyadic relationships of limited, significant others. Although identity depends upon both relationships and autonomy, the mutuality involved could not survive the demands of a community-wide reciprocity. 9

But if not exactly a community, doesn't generative participation speak to many of the communitarians' concerns? Don't constitutive relationships, though not as demanding as constitutive community, still undercut the de-ontological liberalism that Sandel decries? If Sandel can accept the idea of partial communities and the need, as we've described it, for sodality if autonomy is to function properly, then generative participation goes a
long way toward fulfilling his communitarian vision. Likewise, generative participation provides the sense of belonging to a greater whole that animates Taylor's arguments. Jane Mansbridge's research supports the idea expressed by Pennock, and questioned by Taylor, that participation supplies the belongingness important to personal identity.10

Does generative participation bring the liberal and the communitarian closer together? As has been said, liberal society permits persons to belong to many different partial communities. Indeed, if community can be defined acceptably as strong association—individuals coming together voluntarily to share specific values and purposes, so much so that they might identify with that sharing—then liberalism can be said to require community. Without it the individuality and autonomy—as opposed to individualism—central to liberalism could not flourish, for it is through the various channels of associative identity that individuality and autonomy can be expressed. Liberalism, therefore, not only tolerates but actually encourages subgroup diversity, a point conceded by no less a communitarian than Robert Paul Wolff.11 These various subgroups and associations might then be classified and evaluated according to the degree to which they adhere to, satisfy, or combine our fourfold criteria for defining community.

Yet if the partial communities and manifold associations for which liberalism is renowned do provide belongingness through diverse choice, why is it that the communitarian analysis continues to hit a nerve? Why, in Erich Fromm's words, does modern man still carry "an unbearable feeling of isolation and powerlessness," and why does modern society still seem vulnerable to, if not characterized by, alienation? Finally, if liberal societies offer membership in and commitments to associations, why is there
so little compound individuality? The response to each question is the same: Liberal societies do not fail to offer partial communities and identity associations, but fail to offer the right kind. They do not require, or demand, generative participation. Liberalism brings man to the level of autonomous identity, but then offers him mostly, or mostly promotes, atomism. Most associations designed around specific purposes and procedures do not need active participation. From the workplace to professional organizations to voluntary groups, few demand that members open themselves, or their world views, to others. That is not their purpose; the views important to the group are those held and shared prior to joining. It is why people join. Therefore, while members may derive a sense of belongingness, they do not derive what can lead them out of atomism—the possibility of constitutive or intimate relationships and open world views. This is the intuitive insight and the challenge of the communitarians, buried under their ambiguities. When Robert Paul Wolff (1968) proposes "a new philosophy of community" to offset the weaknesses of liberalism, he, like the other communitarians we have considered, seeks to reconcile autonomy and the social nature of personality. But the three kinds of community he adumbrates would all be available in and could even define a liberal polity built around partial communities and generative participation.

Participation in the generative procedures strengthens each pole of personal identity as it opens up new possibilities for their connection. Participants exercise their autonomy in each discussion as they review their ideas, beliefs, goals, and standards in relation to the issue under consideration. But at the same time each person will have an attitude of making decisions that affect the collectivity and will try through dialogue
to understand, if not advance, the interests of others. The emphasis is on collective goals, but the generative procedures allow these to be derived, not imposed. Every discussion also holds the possibility of a new and different understanding of one's neighbors and thus a new and different relationship with them. The combination of opening to others and reflecting upon what we think and what others say can lead to deeper self-understanding and to a new habit of heart and mind that spills over into everyday living and that forms a new kind of selfhood characterized by openness and others—compound individuality.

Not surprisingly, many liberals and communitarians at bottom want the same thing; namely, autonomy in community, individuality and meaningful relationships, personal identity constituted by both differentiation and attachments to others. What hangs them up, or keeps them apart, is the presence of atomism, which both would see from the perspective of compound individuality as an aberration. That perspective entails seeing beyond one's own interests as well as beyond one's groups' interests. Each recognizes that he is neither himself alone nor a collective self; that he is neither atomistic, cut off from the past and denying any dependence, nor communally situated, unable to stand back reflectively from the sodality or able to transcend it but not reshape it.

Neither liberal individualism nor communitarianism will ever be sufficient for developing intimacy. Individualists fight the need to open and attach themselves that compound individuality requires. Communitarians cannot tolerate the reciprocity between the self and limited others that intimacy assures. Communities, on their view, demand adjustments to the communities' mores and practices; to cease to have well-established boundaries is to fail to provide members with secure identity. But any commun-

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ity that compound individuals create will be open and reciprocal, among the
members and between each member and the community itself. In other
words, the community, too, must be willing to make adjustments to changes
in its members. No communitarian suggests reciprocity of that sort. Thus
while intimacy and compound individuality do not guarantee community, they
do bring the constitutive relationships that communitarians crave.

Total communities can never provide the kind of environment that
reflective communitarians seek. While such communities can exist in modern
liberal societies, as evidenced in the United States by various monastic
orders, religious groups, and intentional communities, they will always be
exceptions. The liberal soil is not inhospitable, but that soil is made
rich by a mulch of diversity, choice, and autonomy. Communitarians do
not oppose these per se, but see in liberal societies an undue emphasis
on choice and diversity that sacrifices the kinds of social bonds that make
society cohesive. In their desire to avoid individualism and restore com­
munity, the communitarians too often fail to see that their proposals incur
the loss of not just individualism but of self-reflectivity itself. This
is particularly true when they search through history for examples of strong
community. Granted the Greek polis showed proportionally greater
political participation among its citizenry, but its citizen ranks were
tightly constrained. Granted the medieval village offered a more secure
social status, but only through a rigid hierarchy.

If, on the other hand, communitarians wish only to evoke by use of the
term community a need for belonging and a sense of social obligation
on the part of all who are members of the collectivity, then there is no
need to accuse liberalism of failing to provide or of being incapable of
providing a sense of community. Liberalism refers to more than deontology
or the egocentric inclinations and minimal state advertisements of libertarianism. Ronald Dworkin's *Law's Empire*, as an example of recent liberal theory, argues from a decidedly communitarian position. Yet liberalism must do more to move its citizens out of individualism and back toward the social nature of personal identity.

The communitarian attempt to find the right combination of individuality and sociality that can yield diverse expression and social cohesion is worthwhile, if only to show the weaknesses in the social foundations of our present polities. But the way to the combination, as argued throughout this thesis, is not back to the polis but on to compound individuality; is not in the leveling of liberalism but in building upon its encouragement of diversity and its possibilities for greater participation. One senses that communitarians, in leaving their definitions and descriptions of community marinating in ambiguity, intuit this. They would be well advised, therefore, to strengthen their case and avoid quixotism by heeding Machiavelli's comments, which pertain equally well to critiques of liberalism as to nostalgia for bygone communities:

> It appears to me more appropriate to follow the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it, for many have pictured republics and principalities, which in fact were never known or seen.
Contemplating the Hegelian attempt to combine the fullness of moral autonomy with the restoration of constitutive community, Charles Taylor asked, "What is the underlying conception of man and society which can provide a pole of identification for us?" (1979, p. 133) Liberal individualism provides one pole—differentiation—by conceiving of man as independent and self-sufficient, whose goals and interests are individually conceived and are often thought to be of ultimate concern. Communitarians, in opposing this individualism, offer a time-tested alternative built of constitutive attachments and ends: One is known only by the communities from which identity is derived. In this counterpoint they seek to bring autonomy into harmony with an orientation that is decidedly social and relational.

Yet the communitarian enterprise seems doomed from the outset. Autonomy is jeopardized in community when the range of choice is limited or cannot be transcended. If it can be transcended, then the individual is faced with an unfortunate choice: acquiescence or departure. How else could the community continue to provide stable, secure identity and cohesive social life if the social mores, ends, and attachments were not restricted or fixed?

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CONCLUSION

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It is possible to give cogent philosophical accounts of autonomy without sociality, evident, for example, in libertarian literature. But from
a psychological perspective it is precisely the absence of sociality as constitutive relationship in the presence of autonomy that differentiates liberal individualism from the level of self called compound individuality. The communitarians have identified the absence, but have stumbled in their attempts to fit it in with the presence. Their goal of uniting constitutive relationship and autonomy remains unattained, and perhaps unattainable, only because they continue to look over their shoulders for the solution, back to the polis or medieval village rather than forward to compound individuality.

This is understandable. Communitarians can come upon this level of selfhood beyond individualism only by crossing into the alien, and somewhat arcane, territory of developmental psychology. Failing that, they engage in intellectual archaeology to bring to modernity from antiquity and the Middle Ages models and insights of life constituted by shared ends and attachments. The conundrum is that while wishing to save autonomy from liberal individualism, communitarians, in looking to the past, may only do so by subverting either autonomy or community.

The results, for political and social theorists striving to answer Taylor's query, are these two stark poles: Glorify self-sufficiency, differentiation, and self-assertion—or at least accept them as the inevitable price to be paid for modernity—or try to reinstate, or retreat to, a former era when personal identity was formed, defined, and secured in the social ethos.

The dangers in the first are, of course, well described in the communitarian critique of liberalism: The self promoted therein is characterized by the pursuit of self-interests, by egocentrism, and by using others, as Aristotle said, as "living tools" to achieve private ends. Liberalism,
in the communitarian view, entrenches this level of self through social institutions and practices. When society institutionalizes through an emphasis on individualism man's separation from and independence of relationships, the result is, as Kohlberg found in studying moral development in the Western world and as Habermas observed, egocentrism and hedonism raised to a principle.

The danger in the communitarian case is that selves, in being defined by and embedded in society's prescribed roles, statuses, and responsibilities, may become submerged in or fused with the collectivity. Though the traditional values of discipline, industriousness, loyalty, patriotism, convention, customs, deference, and civility may once again guide life, this life may well depend upon a rigid social hierarchy or result in pressures and practices that make one conform. "In traditional societies, and even in the Greek [polis] or under feudalism, a man defined himself in terms of a set of established descriptions by means of which he situated and identified himself vis-a-vis other men" (MacIntyre, 1966, p. 124).

The theory of compound individuality offers an alternative, a possible third pole of identification, seen as a balance between the differentiation pole of liberalism and the relationship pole of communitarianism. It does so not by tying these two antipodal alternatives to particular levels of the self—the communitarian view to the membership level; the liberal view to the autonomous level. Rather, it uses insights from both, while showing how each as a separate formulation of identity is incomplete and thus flawed.

The deontological liberal asserts that individuals and their concomitant rights are prior to any obligations to society. Individual autonomy grants the person the power to choose among conceptions of the good and to
rely upon her own rationality for the standards by which choices are made. The communitarians, in challenging this assertion, point out that such a view presupposes a self socially disengaged, a self that is without any constitutive attributes and is thus no self at all. They see the self, as stated, as inextricably situated in social circumstance and autonomy as exercised within aims and attachments already given.

The theorist of compound individuality, building on extensive empirical research, posits a self-system that encompasses both; namely, agency that is unencumbered and self-definition that is socially situated. The communitarians are wrong, from this perspective, to suggest that the person cannot be, or ought not to be, separate from communal ends and relationships. Autonomy, born of formal operational thought, is based precisely on that separation. But liberals are wrong to suggest that in being separate from, and thus able to act on, social givens, the person is separate from every given. One's autonomy enables one to step back from and beyond communal boundaries, but not beyond all boundaries. To reflect on one's social circumstances, the person must take up some position. Never without some perspective or particularities, the self is simply without these particularities. The liberal folly is to think that the self can exist or operate without any perspective, backdrop, or guide. The self is never without some self-definition.

So while liberals accuse communitarians of developing selfhood through imposition, not choice, communitarians accuse liberals of developing selfhood through invention, not discovery. The theory of compound individuality shows both to be mistaken. To assume, as the liberal does, that selfhood can be created or chosen overlooks the strong communitarian position, substantiated by psychological research, that individuality is a social product
and that the self at every level develops out of a social matrix and depends on sociality. Individuality, even individualism, can only arise after and by coming through membership. To assume, as a communitarian such as Sandel does, that selfhood can be discovered from within a clutter of preordained ends and relationships is to overlook the crucial separation that must exist between what is discovered and the one who discovers. Only a self separate from and thus not constituted by its ends could discover, attend to, and thus act upon those ends.

One can certainly identify with particular ends, ends that may indeed constitute one's self-definition. But these ends require commitment, which is only possible when there is a self separate from--and thus brought to and not found in--the relationship or cause or end. Self-reflectivity, then, permits one to discover that the ends that once constituted his subjectivity are now ends from which he is separate and to which he can thus commit and relate. Autonomy, therefore, not only can attenuate but can also fortify and renew the relationship to one's sodality.

As the theory of compound individuality shows, the self at every level, as it integrates the prior levels, becomes a compound of those levels. Yet at the autonomous level, the level of individuality, the self can also be a compound in a different way. Selfhood is characterized by both autonomy and constitutive relationships. Thus the self or individual is a compound not only of other levels but also of others.

While this is clearly a communitarian goal, compound individuality is not its realization, for agency is here constituted not by communal attachments, but by dyadic relationships; that is, relationships with a few, particular others. The mutuality forged in these relationships makes one's self-definition relational, interactive, and intersubjective. The relationship
is both internal in that one's life story cannot be told or understood without that of the other and external in that one's life is expressed in but not derived from the relationship. The relationship creates a mutual life as the partners co-regulate their identities. But the relationship is a union of two selves, not a merger of one into the other.

Compound individuality is the completion of the differentiation arrested at individualism. The self as an isolate, hiding in the notion of pristine self-sufficiency, is seen from this new perspective as an aberration. The individual can now withstand what the atomist could not: perspectives that challenge or threaten his own world view, and relationships that make demands not only on him but also on his character. The compound individual not only tolerates these divergent viewpoints, but also seeks them out. Now assured of agency regardless of the self-definition, the person can be intimate; that is, can share identity co-regulation with another. This is a healthier person not only because of the nature of his relationships or of her autonomy, but also because of his or her ability to respond to a greater variety of situations, demands, experiences, people, and interpretations. The "spill-over" from such an identity, though little can be said with certainty and without further research, is that the respect and concern and openness showed to others in these relationships can spread out into other aspects of the individual's life.

The failings and ambiguities in liberalism and communitarianism should not blind us to the truths in both theories. The communitarian insistence on the social nature of identity is a reminder that the individuality we cherish is a social product. In that regard communitarians are justified in demanding social obligations from individuals who owe for the level of selfhood that even permits them to forsake the community and sociality.
They would be justified, therefore, to suggest that one such social obligation might be mandatory national service, presumably with a range of choice.

Liberal theory reminds us that the autonomous person, no longer identified as or through the community, can now identify with the community. For the first time the person can commit to standards, to relationships, to values, to a shared way of life. Commitment is only possible because the person has relationships and is not those relationships. Thus commitment can mean deeper, because conscious, relationships.

Missing from modern society, comments Sheldon Wolin, is the ability "to 'identify' with an adequate group, one which will provide membership; that is, a defined role and assured expectations" (1960, p. 357). But if able to make commitments, why can't modern, autonomous citizens identify with liberal associations? Myriad religious and political groups and causes are available; failing that, there is within liberal society unlimited opportunity to start such groups. Indeed, one might even be able to identify with a community circumscribing a total way of life, though such a decision must be autonomous and therefore revocable.

Communitarians might retort that Wolin is arguing for something far different from liberal associations. While it is true that liberal societies tolerate, though perhaps do not encourage, commitment to total communities, notice should be taken of how few, and eccentric, such communities are.

In reply the liberal says that these are few because to modern sensibilities—especially to those who cherish autonomy—the total community will always appear exceptional, if not eccentric. Surely the communitarian must concur that some citizens can establish a stable
identity by defining themselves according to their professions, unions, neighborhoods, ethnic groups, sexual preference, hobbies, or sports teams.

Yet in none of these memberships is there anything but voluntary obligation placed on the individual. If a demand is excessive or, worse, if the group should disappoint the member, then the first and expected response is to walk away. Membership in liberal associations is still instrumental to the achievement of the members' individual ends, and the individual's identity remains stable amidst such groups only because he can readily find a new group as a means to the satisfaction of his interests.

While liberals gather to pursue interests of the individuals involved, communitarians seek something outside themselves—a telos. This end or purpose provides meaning and role, expectations and solidarity, as all work together to attain or embody the end, however constituted. The relationships forged in this sharing define the persons engaged. Thus the communitarians look to the polis, the medieval village, the virtuous republic to find the "defined roles and assured expectations" that are not chosen but that inhere in the shared way of life. Other roles and expectations exist beyond the confines of the community, but beyond that horizon the very structure and meaning of one's life and thus of one's self are in jeopardy.

The life in such a constitutive community is, however, without full participation. Community can demand obligations from its members, since identity is socially constituted and derives from the group. To sustain this stable social identity, to assure social solidarity through defined ends and boundaries, the community must isolate autonomous critique. The community can demand modification of a member's behavior, but it cannot be the other way round. Questioning the community cannot be allowed to lead...
to changes; it cannot have any "cumulative structural consequences," for the community will protect its integrity by assuring that scrutiny "lacks a social base within which it could crystallize into a counterworld, with its own institutionalized cluster of counteridentities" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 65).

Here are the impasse between liberals and communitarians and the tension that strains the communitarian critique: "Let's have autonomy, but not too much of it." To challenge the shared way of life undermines the stability of the social order and thus the security of members' identities. Then relationships can be based not on the persons within the roles but on the roles themselves. When persons become secondary to their roles and the telos, when the person goes but the relationships remain because the roles continue intact, then, as liberals argue, is this not the way in which the individual in community can be sacrificed for the good of the cause, for the cause of the good?

Yet the communitarian longing for the stable but restrictive social orders of antiquity and the Middle Ages continues to have purchase today because of the failings of liberal democratic societies. The social bonds of such societies, based upon contracts voluntarily entered for mutual advantage, are not, the communitarians argue, strong enough to provide social cohesion or secure personal identity. In a society that does not value relationships other than as means to attain private interests, it is easy to sequester the elderly in old-age homes; to endure the poor sleeping on sidewalks; to release the insane and deficient, as a means of curbing expenses, into the life of the streets; to maintain human life by means of machines--thus clashing the right to life with the right to die--while performing abortions--thus clashing the right to life with the right to choose.
The theory of compound individuality offers no clean reconciliation of liberalism and communitarianism. What has been argued in this thesis is that to develop beyond individualism and into compound individuality people need participatory outlets built of contextualism. Liberalism could support such participation as part of any association, but has not done so. Clearly liberal associations do not offer the kind of participation that can lead persons beyond a prudential calculus and into a dialogue that might effect agreement on the substance of a decision. Such participation might well build unity from diversity.

Participation built of contextualism is stronger than a Millian call for diversity of opinion or than some sort of Popperian openness to self-criticism. Those, of course, are part of it. While the "open society" would permit divergent views to exist, the generative procedures of our participation require that participants deal with such views, take them up to create a pool of perspectives, and from that pool try to find a common position that might accommodate or transcend those views. Studies in contextual thinking show that when people follow its principles, they come to recognize, if not incorporate, the claims and viewpoints of others. By opening participants in this way, the generative procedures offer a possible way beyond individualism and toward compound individuality.

The generative procedures would not serve as, nor necessarily conduce to, constitutive community. But in establishing the conditions for moving beyond individualism, they may lead to the constitutive relationships characteristic of compound individuality. This, it would seem, speaks to the principal communitarian concern, without necessitating a retreat into closed, rigid social systems. This while simultaneously reinforcing the social nature of identity and the essential component of autonomy or self-
reflectivity in individuality.

Generative participation, however, is established not simply to talk atomists out of egocentrism and toward compound individuality, but also to generate a compound common good; that is, to arrive at decisions that are, at bottom, the product of common reflection, deliberation, and concern. The attempt throughout the procedures is to push behind the presentation of positions to the reasons for holding and advancing them. In dialogue of this sort participants are bound to one another in the common search for solutions to common problems. By coming to understand and explain the arguments behind and the implications for various positions, participants may generate the kind of solidarity that will permit those who do not vote for the substance of a decision to hold to it as if it were their own. Though not held in common, the decision was made in common. That aids holding it in common. This, too, speaks to the communitarians' concerns.

The ultimate irony of the liberal-communitarian debate may be this: While the force of the communitarian critique rests on how liberalism leads individuals to consent to their own diminution--some would say to their own enslavement--the communitarian counterpoint to liberalism may itself be a form of the very individualism that communitarians decry.

Autonomy can be retained in constitutive community only in two ways: First, if the original commitment to join can be reviewed—a tack that, as discussed, is anathema both to liberals who cherish diversity within and among themselves and to members already in the community, since such review lacks, if only temporarily, absolute commitment. Or, second, if self-reflection is directed only toward achieving the fulfillment of a socially defined role. This achievement, which often amounts to submergence of the self, is precisely the form of individualism predominant among wo-
men; to wit, an orientation toward exclusive, and defining, relationship.

The irony here is that to be a self "created and constituted by others," as Marshall Berman describes this state (1971), a person must make that identity her own self-chosen project. She must strive consciously to be the perfect incarnation of an assigned social role. This is her commitment and the atomistic defense of her identity.

The communitarian vision seems little different. While it is impossible to return to the world of membership when consciousness was confined to the group, it is possible to submerge the self in its ends and attachments, to direct self-reflectivity constantly to keeping one's head down below the horizon, to keeping one's attention on the defined roles and assured expectations. Liberal individualism here lives in its opposite as self-denial, as the person strives to fashion himself always to fit the roles and expectations. In this constitutive community the person gains security of identity through continual renunciation of the separate self.

"In the end," wrote Philip Abbot (1974), "the dream of the fraternal and the liberal polity may both become tyrannies. One must choose the nightmare with which he may share his slumber." Nightmare is not the only alternative. We need not settle for the communitarian quest for the moral harmony of traditional societies, nor for the liberal project of deriving the collective interest by aggregating the private interests of self-seeking individuals. Compound individuality and the generative participation that conditions it offer to Abbot, as to Taylor, a third possibility. One can be constituted by relationships without losing autonomy. By acting autonomously the person remains an individual; by acting in constitutive relationships the person becomes a compound. Both autonomy and relationship then define the individual as a self who cannot be known alone.
NOTES

CHAPTER 1

THE DISPOSITION OF THE SELF

1. Communitarians from this period include Reinhold Niebuhr, especially The Nature and Destiny of Man, Volumes I & II; Simone Weil, The Need for Roots; Canon Demant, Christian Polity; Sebastian De Grazia, The Political Community; Fritz Pappenheim, The Alienation of Modern Man; Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society; as well as Erich Fromm and Robert Nisbet.


Although there are slight, subtle differences among "person," "agent," and "self," these terms will be used interchangeably.

4. Gellner said this, in part, in response to Taylor: "You've said that 'this is the view of the self that you [Gellner] like.' Well, I don't like it. I don't enjoy it; I just think, in all honesty, it is the price to be paid [for modernity]. We can't avoid or evade it. We can't go back. The price has been paid."


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6. It will be crucial to this thesis, therefore, to define what I and various theorists under study mean by "autonomy" and "community." The second and third chapters focus predominantly on autonomy, but I must ask the reader's indulgence, for the discussion of community is postponed until the final chapter.

7. After Virtue, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 172. All page references in parentheses in this section, unless otherwise specified, are taken from After Virtue.


9. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz makes this point in his description of the Balinese: "Physically men come and go, mere accidents in a happenstance history...But the masks they wear, the stage they occupy, the parts they play, and, most important, the spectacle they mount remain, and comprise not the facade but the substance of things, not the least [of which is] the self." "From the Natives' Point of View," American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, 28, 1974, p. 62; quoted in Westen, D., Self & Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 324.

10. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 14. All page references in parentheses in this section, unless otherwise specified, refer to this work.


12. Rawls claims that criticisms that focus on his "conception of the self," such as Sandel's, are mistaken ("Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," p. 239f). "The description of the parties [to the original position] may seem to presuppose some metaphysical conception of the person, for example, that the essential nature of persons is independent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including their final ends...But this is an illusion caused by not seeing the original position as a device of representation" (Ibid, p. 238). Such an illusion may be readily dispelled, as in the article mentioned here, where Rawls discusses in detail the original position a device of representation and where justice as fairness is presented as a conception drawing upon the basic intuitive ideas and premises embedded in the political structures of a constitutional democracy. This, however, does not seem to be the case with regard to the basis of Sandel's critique, A Theory of Justice.

13. Sandel writes: "What makes the [liberal] ethic so compelling but also finally vulnerable are the promise and the failure of the unencumbered self." That promise is of free rational choice independent of particular ends. The failure is the inability to ground choices in anything but arbitrary preference. "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory, Volume 12, no. 1, 1984, p. 83.

14. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 14, no. 3, 1985. References in parentheses in this section refer to this article.
15. Sandel anticipates precisely this. Where the ends are given in advance, says Sandel, the subject does not choose, but reflects "on itself and [inquires] into its constituent nature...acknowledging its purposes as its [sic] own" (p. 58).

Lest one think that "truly" self-reflective agents could easily burst through the conceptual barriers erected by the social milieu, consider this view from social anthropologist Ernest Gellner: "It is hard to imagine a community composed of individuals capable of highly diversified conduct but not also endowed with a sophisticated system of markers for restricting that diversity at any given point. My own guess is that language began not with conveying information but with the need, engendered by the capacity for highly diversified conduct, to constrain volatile conduct. In the beginning was the prohibition." "Sentiments and Sentences," The New Republic, 23 March 1987, p. 38

Taylor, like Sandel, fails to address the nature of the reflecting self, the subject who evaluates. He says that personhood rests on the horizon of evaluations without which one cannot evaluate at all. Yet, as Taylor acknowledges, there must also be an "ability to adhere to evaluations." This ability implies and requires a self separate from those evaluations. Otherwise adhering to them would not be an issue, since the person would be embedded in them.


Ironically, it is psychologists, says D. W. Hamlyn in the same volume, who show a preoccupation with the self-concept to the exclusion of the active self or agent. (See his article, "Self-Knowledge.") In this regard the three communitarian theories under study here approximate the psychological theories of a new generation of social psychologists called the "socio-cognitivists" or the "social constructivists," one of whom--Kenneth Gergen--has defined identity for the movement in this way: Identity is "a subset of highly salient concepts which the individual most frequently utilizes in thinking about himself or his activities." This view clearly mistakes part of identity--the self-concept or what is thought about--for the whole, and ignores the agency aspect or who is thinking or how things are thought about. See Kenneth Gergen, "The Social Construction of Self-Knowledge," in Mischel, T., op. cit.

A forceful and forthright introduction of agency into such theories would easily rescue the constructivists from the sorts of contradictions and ambiguities that plague Sandel, as such an introduction would of these communitarians as well.
1. These theorists trace their orientation back to the symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley. The constructivists argue that human development, learning, and action are best understood and investigated as the result of human relations; that the language we use to organize and situate ourselves and our world is a social product; and that there are rules for establishing boundaries that are "historically and culturally situated." According to their position, an individual learns to build up or create a world view through the influence and guidance of the social world in which he grows up. Such learning is accelerated when the child grasps rudimentary language that outlines "the common inventory of 'what there is'" within the culture and how that culture works. Through the language and customs of the culture the individual acquires a conceptual system, an intelligibility system, which enables the individual "to make sense of the stimulus world and to participate 'meaningfully' with other members of the culture." This has particular significance for the self: "What there is to understand about the self and how one is to go about it, follows from the rules governing concept usage. The social milieu--customs, concepts, and language--set the boundaries not only of the person's world but also of himself."


2. See in particular the early works of Abraham Maslow and the works of Carl Rogers, Rollo May, and Erich Fromm.


4. Piaget's experiments, especially the specific details of various stages, are under suspicion. Psychologists have found that, for example, many of the tasks characteristic of concrete operations can be performed by pre-operational children if some slight adjustments in the experiments are
made. Children as young as three, for example, have been found to conserve number or classify consistently. (See P. Bryant, "Piaget, Teachers and Psychologists," Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 10, no. 3, 1984.) The stages, though perhaps unfolding more continuously than Piaget claimed, nevertheless exist. Yet it seems the case that these stages do not unfold completely so as to cover all the contents of one's mental operations. Piaget devised for this phenomenon the idea of décalage, that the same mental level may unfold in different stages or at different times depending on the content. Rather than the exception, however, some psychologists see décalage as the rule. (See K. Fischer, "A Theory of Cognitive Development: The Control of Hierarchies of Skill," Psychological Review 87, 1980.)

5. This distinction is commonplace. In biology what is intrinsic is called "genotypic"; how it manifests is called "phenotypic." Piaget distinguished between "synchronic elements"—those that are given—and "diachronic factors"—those subject to "historical pressures" (Gardner, Op. cit., pp. 24–5). Developmental psychologist Jane Loevinger (1976) distinguishes between "dimensions" and "manifestations," while Ken Wilber (1980), borrowing from linguistics, does so between "deep structures" and "surface structures."

6. As other examples, Arieti describes the self as both "a living subject" operating on the world and "an individual as he is known to himself" (1967, p. 48); Elstein and Noam describe it as "both the agent and the result of social interactions" (1982, p. 411). Wilber refers to the "proximate self" or organizer or "I" and the "distal self" or self-concept or "me" (1981, p. 78), and Broughton discusses "a self conceived and a self conceiving..." (1981a, p. 22)

7. Examples of the equivalents would be: moral development (Kohlberg), interpersonal development (Selman), ego development (Loevinger), and development of faith (Fowler).

8. Disagreements arise when someone's basic structures are challenged as stages, or when a generalist or author (such as this one) with a different intention collapses one "inviolate" stage into another. But it is also common practice among developmental theorists to correlate their findings and theories with those of other researchers. Thus, for example, Loevinger (1976) compares and correlates her proposed levels of ego with Perry; Sullivan, Grant, and Grant; Kohlberg; Peck; Fromm; Riesman; Graves; Piaget (moral stages); Erikson; Ausubel; and Ferenczi.

The theory of compound individuality presented here is a distillation of approximately one dozen developmental theories and is a generalization of them. The description of the compound nature of individuality is itself a theoretical insight appearing in a different context in the works of Ken Wilber. See The Atman Project, Up From Eden, and A Sociable God.

9. Loevinger (1976), Kohlberg (1969), Sullivan (1953), and Riesman (1954) all describe this level as one of conformity.

10. The idea of membership is, of course, discussed in cultural anthropology, but it is also discussed by such authors as Talcott Parsons in The
Social System, Leslie White in The Science of Culture, Benjamin
Whorf in Language Thought and Reality, Luckmann and Berger in The
Social Construction of Reality, G. H. Mead in Mind, Self, & Society,
and in a recent, intriguing study, Julian Jaynes in The Origin of Con-
sciousness and the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.

11. This example comes from Ken Wilber, personal correspondence.

12. The empirical bases of the developmental theories used in this thesis
are impressive; for example, Jane Loevinger, though most of her work was
correlative, interviewed over 1500 subjects; Silvano Arieti spent over 16
years examining sick and well subjects in clinical settings; William
Perry spent over three decades working with students at Harvard; and Kohl-
berg followed the same group of males for thirty years interviewing them
every three years.

13. All quotations in this section are from Kohlberg, L. and Scharf, P.
"Bureaucratic Violence and Conventional Moral Thinking," American Journal
of Orthopsychiatry, April, 1972, pp. 1-9.

14. All quotations are from Candee, D. "The Moral Psychology of Watergate,"

15. Of course, exactly the same is true of the actions of Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North, who justified his actions by claiming to have received
authorization from his superiors. He sought such authorization to carry
out the extra-legal activities that he felt advanced the President's
policies. His fundamental loyalty was not to Ronald Reagan personally, but
to "The President as Commander-in-Chief." His actions were to strengthen
the nation and serve his country, not to win social approbation.

16. There would seem to be three reasons for this: 1) Kohlberg makes very
strong claims that 2) are not restricted, as are those of most researchers,
to the confines of the profession and their annals. (His claims and
theories are of interest to, and thus appear in journals related to,
several disciplines: philosophy, sociology, politics, and education.)
3) He has not stopped with generating a theory and testing it. Convinced
of his findings and showing anything but diffidence, Kohlberg has sought
to implement his theory and its practice as the focal point of educational
and penal-reform programs.

   It is also true, as critics Reid and Yanarella have written, that
Kohlberg offers a strong challenge to the behaviorist mainstream in Western
psychology. While this point should not be underestimated, other develop-
mentalists offer the same challenge. If Kohlberg's seems stronger, it is
for the reasons cited above.

17. See, for example, D. Locke, "A Psychologist among the Philosophers." In
Lawrence Kohlberg, S. Modgil & C. Modgil (Eds.), London: The Falmer Press,
1985, especially pp. 29-38 and "The Illusion of Stage 6," Journal of Moral
Education, Vol. 9, no. 2, 1981. See also H. G. Reid & E. J. Yanarella,
"The Tyranny of the Categorical: On Kohlberg and the Politics of Moral
Development." In R. Wilson & G. Schochet (Eds.), Moral Development and
Politics, New York: Praeger, 1980 and R. A. Schweder, "Liberalism as
18. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 175. Kohlberg based his claims on research studies in five cultures: the United States, Taiwan, Turkey, urban Mexico, and a Yucatan village. The studies were not longitudinal, and details regarding sample size, interview translation procedures, and means and range of scores have never been published. See John Snarey, "The Cross-Cultural Universality of Social-Moral Development," a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Association for Moral Education, November 1983.


20. Consider, for example, this description of the Gahuka-Gama of Highland New Guinea: There is "no essential separation of the individual from the social pattern; social roles and social status are not distinguished from the individuals who enact them." Individual identity and social identity were inseparable, "two heads of the same coin." K. Read, "Morality and the Concept of the Person Among the Gahuka-Gama," Oceania, 25(4), 1955, p. 276.

21. Berger and Luckmann (1967) comment: "Maximal success in socialization is likely to occur in societies with very simple division of labor and minimal distribution of knowledge...Put simply, everyone pretty much is what he is supposed to be. In such a society identities are easily recognizable...a knight is a knight and a peasant is a peasant, to others as well as to themselves. There is, therefore, no problem of identity. The question, 'who am I?' is unlikely to arise in consciousness, since the socially predefined answer is massively real subjectively and consistently confirmed in all significant social interaction" (p. 164).

22. Hereafter, the developmental theory will be designated as "the theory of compound individuality," while the particular state constituted by autonomy and relationships will be referred to simply as "compound individuality."
CHAPTER 3

AUTONOMOUS SELFHOOD:
INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COMPOUND INDIVIDUALITY

1. I use the term "sodality" in its broadest sense as a synonym for clan, village, group, tribe, or nation; this to avoid, for the time being, any semantic and interpretive entanglements that might result from the use of the term "community."

2. The terms "atomism" and "individualism," and their derivatives, will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.

3. Nozick, 1974, p. 160. Some writers make individualism out to be the central tenet of liberalism. On this view, Arblaster sees liberalism as supporting only instrumental relationships: "Other people tend to appear as objects, neutral when they do not impinge upon us in any significant way, but otherwise serving as helps or hindrances to the realization of my purposes and the satisfaction of my desires" (1984, p. 37). Yet Arblaster does concede that liberalism offers another strand, exemplified by Kant, that holds that all others are to be regarded as ends-in-themselves, never as means. It is not appropriate to take up this subject here, but it could be argued that this Kantian perspective marks the bifurcation of modern liberalism and classical liberalism. Thus a critique of liberalism, such as Robert Paul Wolff's in The Poverty of Liberalism, that is based on the liberal tendency to treat others as means to another's ends, is more accurately a critique of the libertarianism of someone like Nozick than of modern liberalism per se. For modern liberals could argue that the individualism Wolff decries ceases to be liberal precisely when it views others as means.


5. Sociologist Morris Rosenberg, citing the work of Matthew Erdelyi, suggests that an individual, when his world view is threatened, may employ a series of mechanisms for defense: "The threatening information is not seen; if seen, it does not register; if registered, it is misinterpreted; if correctly interpreted, it is forgotten; and so on. It is as though the raw material of external reality had to pass through a series of ever finer sieves which filter out the impurities--those facts offensive to the self" (Conceiving the Self, New York: Basic Books, 1979, p. 276). What remains is either in consonance with or enhances the world view and thus the self. Some might see here a remarkable summary of the mental functioning of Ronald Reagan as governor of California and as President of the United States. See Garry Wills, Reagan's America: Innocents at Home, 1987.
6. Thus women's responses in Kohlberg's studies, for example, are consistently scored at levels significantly lower than the responses of men, because women, according to the scorers, argue from evaluations of attachments rather than from abstract principles.


11. Recall that an innate or basic structure can unfold without identity necessarily moving with it. Thus, for example, formal operational thought, the sine qua non of autonomous selfhood, can unfold without having identity move completely, or in part, out of membership. Kohlberg's research found that many who show a law-and-order orientation are able through formal operations to step back from individual laws and see them as part of a system of laws. Although the person now sees that laws are the product of an abstract system larger than the sodality, identity continues to be in terms of system maintenance--this time maintenance of the larger system of society. The individual has yet to see the possibility of his separation from or independence of that system.

   Additionally, Kohlberg's stage 4/5 is developmental evidence of atomism as egocentrism, hedonism, and anarchism. But unlike Kohlberg's stage 2, which finds the same characteristics but in young children, stage 4/5 is egocentrism raised to a principle, as Habermas said (McCarthy, 1978, p. 351), an egocentrism that is self-reflective and rational.

12. Aristotle wrote in The Politics: "The citizens of a state should always be educated to suit the constitution of their state. The type of character appropriate to a constitution is the power which continues to sustain it, as it is also the force which originally created it" (Book VIII, chapter I, 1337a II, 1946, p. 332).

13. Inkeles and Smith document that becoming modern means becoming an individual, but their research does not explore what happens over time to traditional men who become modern men. The same factory work that was initially liberating might become enervating and alienating. Charles Taylor, one among many, argues that the social structures underlying and necessary for the functioning of industrial society are beginning to fail. The coordinated and disciplined work needed in the factory is breaking
down because it is monotonous work. The ideals and purposes held out in the industrial societies and essential to their maintenance—the values of success, productivity, compromise, materialism, and the future over the past—are shifting their meaning from integral to man to hateful and hollow. See Taylor, 1985b, chapter I, especially pp. 49-50.


15. See Gilligan, "In A Different Voice," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 47, no. 4, 1977. In 1970 Gilligan and Murphy, following the studies and findings of developmental psychologist William Perry (1968), began a study to explore whether thinking about actual dilemmas involved more contextual thought than thinking about hypothetical dilemmas. They also wanted to study whether life experiences entered into thinking about the hypothetical dilemmas employed by Kohlberg. They found that subjects at age 19 who had met and even exceeded Kohlberg's criteria of formal logic were by ages 22 to 27 beginning "to indicate dissatisfaction with this logic as an adequate basis for understanding their own personal dilemmas." Their subjects did not feel any less strongly that they alone had to be the authors of their conceptions of what is right or true. In this, of course, their subjects were arguing for autonomy. Yet they doubted the possibility that generalizable rules, by which positions were justified, could take into account the particulars of their situations. Gilligan and Murphy's longitudinal data suggest that participants in real-life contexts use a more differentiated thinking in which the demand to judge according to principles had to be tempered by consideration of the consequences on those involved. See Gilligan and Murphy, "Moral Development in Late Adolescence and Adulthood," Human Development 23, 1980.

16. The use of the term "dialectical," though it gives sufficient emphasis to the idea of embracing contradictions central to this mode of thinking, may create, given the oblique use of the term in the history of philosophy, more problems than it solves.

At this point empirical investigations of contextual, or dialectical, thinking seem scant. Nevertheless, those that do exist have been powerful enough to lead at least one psychologist to conclude that a consensus is now emerging in support of a contextual metatheory. See J. Zimmerman, "Social Harmony Theory: A Contextualist Account of Cognitive Functioning," in C. J. Brainerd (Ed.), Recent Advances in Cognitive-Developmental Theory, NY: Springer-Verlag, 1983.


The current debate on contextualism is not about the existence of this mode of thinking, but is on whether it represents a stage beyond formal operational thought or whether it is simply a variation of that formal stage.
18. See Kegan, \textit{op. cit.} and Chandler, M. (1975) for discussion of this. Although theoretically possible, it seems unlikely that an atomist would act in this way. In surveying the psychological strategies used by adolescents to combat the threats associated with multiple views, Chandler found one feature common to them all. They attempted to deal with multiplicity by denying its legitimacy out of hand. Such denial, however, might be characteristic only of adolescent, not adult, behavior, though see note five above.


20. Bellah et al. (1985) discovered in their sociological research that in the kind of atomistic relationships that they found dominant in American society, one characteristic overshadowed the rest—the right to walk away from the relationship when one's needs are not met.

21. See S. I. Benn, "Autonomy, Individuality, and Community," in Kamenka, E. (Ed.), \textit{Community as a Social Ideal}, London: Edward Arnold, 1982. See also Shotter's discussion "Joint Action and the Making of Moral Worlds," in \textit{Social Accountability and Selfhood}, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp. 142-151. Shotter's analysis refers to the development of autonomous action. Thus he writes, "people, although unaware of doing so, construct social worlds of meaning between themselves in the course of social interaction, and in doing so determine the form of their own consciousness, their own categories of thought, perception, feeling, action, and expression..." (p. 142; emphasis added) It is when people become aware of jointly creating this world of meaning, which entails forming their own consciousness, that they are autonomous and co-regulated by intimate relationships.

Shotter uses the term "hermeneutics" as shorthand for the process of creating or constructing a larger context in which conflicting or contradictory interpretations can be examined and clarified. The entire quotation is: "For they are constructing in miniature, in a hermeneutical back and forth, a social order, a common world between them 'of which neither is the sole creator' [Merleau-Ponty]." (p. 164)


Kegan's proposals are, of course, theoretical. He is not concerned with whether and why businesses would restructure in this fashion, though, as mentioned, businesses would most likely come to value an impetus toward compound individuality only as a by-product of greater worker efficiency or greater overall productivity. For such an argument in favor of workplace democracy see Pateman, \textit{Participation and Democratic Theory}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. My thesis follows a similar theoretical line, though the practical side of some of these issues will be touched on in the next two chapters.
CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
SELF-DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-INTEREST


The focus of this chapter should be made clear: I am not considering here the settings of participation, whether participation can work in practice, or how participation as outlined here could work in practice. Moreover, although I have drawn from studies of political participation, since that has been the focus of much of the participation research, I am not suggesting that participation must be political, as if to leave aside or discount ideas such as workplace participation. (Indeed, Pateman and Bachrach argue that workplace participation is not an alternative to political participation or an extension of participation beyond politics, but is already political. For an interesting communitarian perspective on this subject, see Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, "Property/Power," chapter 12, especially pp. 297-303.)

2. It may seem curious that we have not turned first to Rousseau who is so strongly associated with participation (See Pateman, C., Participation and Democratic Theory, chapter II) and with the psychological approach we are taking in this study: It is Rousseau, wrote John Plamenatz, who "turns our mind... to considering how the social order affects the structure of human personality" (Man and Society, volume I, p. 440). Our focus at this point, however, is on how participation fosters self-development, and Rousseau's outlook on that topic is, to say the least, problematic.

Plamenatz, for example, wrote, "It is worth noticing that Rousseau, who was among the first to try to show in any detail how men develop the capacities peculiar to their species through activities which make social and moral beings of them...who urged men to control and transform society to achieve a kind of freedom which he called moral and defined as obedience to a law prescribed to oneself, never used such expressions as 'self-realization,' 'self-fulfillment,' or 'self-improvement'" (Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man, p. 323). Perhaps Plamenatz was being too literal-minded. Certainly Rousseau had in mind some form of self-development. Yet he confused the issue, it seems, by his frequent use of the term "self-sufficiency." [Ronald Grimsley insists "self-sufficiency is his most frequently used term." See "Rousseau and the Ideal of Self-Sufficiency," Studies in Romanticism, volume 10, 1971.] At first glance he seemed to suggest the restoration of the capacity of "primitive" or "natural" man--the very opposite of self-development. But it becomes evident that Rousseau envisioned not a return to the state of nature, but a combination of the freedom of the man in the state of nature with the moral, social, and po-
political obligations and liberties of the civic man. This freedom is clearly different. The freedom of natural man—consisting of self-sufficiency in satisfying his physical needs—is supplanted by the freedom of the autonomous citizen, free from the arbitrary will of others. Thus he remains "as free as before," but is no longer enslaved by "the impulse of appetite alone." No longer the dumb brute, he is now morally free, obeying laws he prescribes to himself. Thus is Rousseau's self-sufficiency a form of self-development as man develops into a citizen. How else can we interpret the opening of "The First Part" of A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1973, p. 4):

It is a noble and beautiful spectacle to see man raising himself, so to speak, from nothing by his own exertions; dissipating, by the light of reason, all the thick clouds in which he was by nature enveloped; mounting above himself; soaring in thought even to the celestial regions; like the sun, encompassing with giant strides the vast extent of the universe; and, what is still grander and more wonderful, going back into himself, there to study and get to know his own nature, his duties and end.

The goal of self-sufficiency, then, is not a return to nature but a turn back to it, a turn taken on an upward spiral of self-development. But there is a profound problem in Rousseau's sense of self-development. It is not the problem usually defined: Is the self realized or annihilated? It is more subtle than that: Does political participation express or does it produce the general will? The distinction is crucial. Whereas Mill sought the rational citizen, Rousseau, the good republican, sought the patriotic citizen. While Mill demanded the development through participation of the critical faculties and thus argued for the presence of a diversity of opinions, Rousseau sought a convergence of private interests and public duties. He sought a homogeneity of viewpoints, to be effected by education, civil religion, games, patriotic festivals, military parades, and theater. Participation was little more than a perfunctory formality for expressing the efficacy of those institutions mandated to inculcate the essential social mores. Citizens did not need to communicate among themselves; the people in the assemblies came to vote, not to debate. So despite his longstanding association with the idea of political participation, Rousseau's participation is not a method of developing the self but of expressing a social self "engineered" through social institutions. Self-development preceded participation, so that if the proper education—by tutor and festival and religion—has been efficacious, political participation could be a simple survey of the success of the social engineering. The citizen would still be autonomous, as Rousseau understood and developed that idea, for the self is not annihilated by or merged with the collectivity; the self is a reflection of the collectivity. It is not developed in participation, but a developed self is brought to participation. Though each represents or presents that collectivity in his own way, still each is none other than the collectivity.

At this point, for the sake of brevity, I have only given the conclusion of an interpretation and have not produced the requisite arguments or evidence. But I shall return to this topic in greater detail later in this chapter: See "Rousseau's Self-Interest Properly Understood."
3. Representative Government. Dennis Thompson argues in John Stuart Mill and Representative Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) that spurring intellectual growth directly, say, through formal education, might be more efficacious for stimulating the kind of mental development that Mill wanted than relying upon political participation. While Thompson may be correct that political participation might stimulate only the development of political skills and the acquisition of narrow political knowledge, he seems to miss utterly the socializing and "community-building" aspects of it.

4. On Liberty, 1972, p. 58. Mill and Tocqueville may have been the first modern political theorists to suggest that the pressures to conform to mass sentiment were a greater threat to liberty than was government interference.

5. To some extent what concerned Mill about the electorate was demonstrated by the voting behavior studies of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (The People's Choice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (Voting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Their studies showed that only approximately one-third of the voters were accurate in their perceptions of where the candidates stood on the issues, and this one-third tended to be the best informed and the best educated (See Voting, chapter 10). Their research also revealed that when those with little interest in the election decide to vote, they were the most susceptible to political influence and information. This led these researchers to the conclusion that the least interested are making the most important decisions, a situation that would have been offset by a scheme such as "plural voting."


7. Bengt Abrahamsson documents this point using Lindblad's survey of the Swedish Communal Workers' Union that showed a marked correlation between local union size and participation. In those local unions with more than 1000 members, 17 percent took part in the annual meeting, while the regular meetings averaged nine percent participation. In those locals with 30 members or fewer the percentages were 70 and 53 respectively. Bureaucracy or Participation (1977), pp. 204-05.

8. Mansbridge's research indicates that participants are vulnerable to others and avoid conflict more because of the social setting in which participation takes place than because of the participatory procedures themselves. In the two settings she investigated in detail, Mansbridge shows that because participants had multiple and daily relations with one another, they worried about gossip, the most frequent form of social sanction. It is fear of conflict, she reports, fear that one's daily routine and interactions will be disrupted, that underscores the drive to settle disputes unanimously.
9. Limitations of space and the scope of this study preclude a detailed
discussion of the feasibility of these participatory procedures and how
they might blend with or supplant current representational structures at
various levels of government. Some combination of these procedures and the
mechanisms and institutions proposed by Benjamin Barber in Strong
Democracy—see especially chapter 10—might suffice, or perhaps a scheme
of imbricating wards with face-to-face assemblies constituting the root
system and limited, accountable representative assemblies constituting the
branches—a facsimile of G. D. H. Cole's proposed hierarchical system of
guilds. (See his Guild Socialism Restated, London: Leonard Parsons, 1920.)

10. Although suggestive, such studies and their findings offer implications
but scant direct empirical justification for what we have proposed. All the
research of the sort mentioned in the text measures developmental change in
dyadic interaction. Although such interaction is the basis of intimacy and
compound individuality and thus bears directly on that aspect of this
study, assessing the variables and conditions that stimulate developmental
change in groups may simply be too difficult. Nevertheless, such studies
as those conducted and cited by Broughton (1982) offer interesting though
limited approaches that ought to be tried in group discussions.

Bear in mind also that those researchers are interested in cognitive
development more than self-development. Compound selfhood, to repeat, is a
change in meaning and not a shift in structures. [Whether that change in one's
self-sense is facilitated by, though not identified with, a shift in basic
structures is too speculative even for this study.] Broughton does add,
however, that something approaching Habermas's ideal speech situation
"would truly foster personal and collective growth of the participants"
(p. 375). In this regard, our procedures are a closer approximation of the
Habermasian paradigm—since distortion-free communication is essential to
those procedures—than the constrained and orchestrated dialogues used in
much developmental research.

11. Johannes Pedersen, for example, reviewed the literature on political
participation to ascertain whether Mill's claims for the educational effects
of participation would be substantiated or refuted ("On the Educational
Function of Political Participation..." Political Studies, volume XXX,
no. 4, 1982). Although interesting in its pertinence to Mill, his research
has little bearing on our concerns. The focus on voter behavior, which,
though crucial to Mill's assertion that the exercise of franchise is the
road to mental cultivation, has little to offer by way of critique to a
model that goes some distance beyond voting. The focus may not even carry
the weight Pedersen supposes, since, as already suggested, Mill packed into
this exercise far more than simple voting.

Pedersen, interestingly, concluded from his studies that electoral
participation is not the "school of public interest" Mill thought it could be.
Voting offers only a minimal socializing effect. But Pedersen does admit
that the evidence on voting increasing a sense of public duty has yet to be
analyzed (p. 563).

12. Pateman, p. 63. Lewin conducted other pertinent experiments that
Pateman does not cite. In "Frontiers in Group Dynamics" (Human Relations
1, 1947) he reported two major components in fostering attitudinal change:
1) participation where the person is involved in discussions and dilemmas,
and 2) communication where opinions and views are actively solicited and debated. In "Group Decision and Social Change" [E. Maccoby et al. (Eds.) Readings in Social Psychology, 1958] he reported that another factor important to change in attitude is the participant's perception that others involved are also willing to commit to decisions and action.

13. See Sniderman, op. cit., chapter 5, especially pp. 191-204. As a counterpoint to this Bachrach and Baratz found during the heyday of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty that when passive, disaffected, and inarticulate representatives from the poor were placed on boards and commissions, they "were invariably transformed into angry, articulate, and concerned individuals." Their participation evolved into genuine involvement. Cited in Bachrach, "Interest, Participation, and Democratic Theory," NOMOS XVI, Participation in Politics, New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1975, pp. 43-4. We can conclude from this that for participatory activity beyond the kinds Sniderman mentions self-esteem is either secondary or irrelevant.


Perhaps the most egregious example of communitarian rhetoric devoid of supporting arguments is Benjamin Barber's Strong Democracy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. (Barber would deny that he is a communitarian and even indulges in some communitarian bashing himself. But he has a harsh and narrow view of communitarianism. He equates it with any movement or theory that posits the achievement of civic identity through the merger of the individual into the collectivity. Communitarianism is too broad an outlook to be encompassed in its entirety by such a one-dimensional view. Indeed, Barber's own insistence throughout his book on the importance of community, though ill-defined, as well as his strenuous criticism of liberalism, places him squarely in our communitarian camp.) In support of his version of participatory, or "strong," democracy--proposed in opposition to both liberalism and his version of communitarianism--Barber fills his book with unsubstantiated notions such as these: Participation takes place in "an evolving problem-solving community that creates public ends..." (p. 152); participation is meant to "invent alternative futures, create mutual purposes, and construct competing visions of community..." (p. 177); participatory politics is a way "to transform conflict through a politics of distinctive inventiveness and discovery. It seeks to create a public language that will help reformulate private interests in terms susceptible to public accommodation" (p. 119); "outcomes [must] be commonly conceived..." (p. 224); and public ends "are literally forged through the act of public participation, created through common deliberation..." (p. 263)
and common action" (p. 152). Although he discusses specific participatory institutions and deliberative procedures, nowhere does he connect them to these ideas on creating public ends or the common good. He tells us what ought to be done, but not how it can be done. Common deliberation, unfortunately, does not necessarily produce either common action or common ends.

Finally, lest the reader think that the idea of generating or creating the common good is a new one, David Harris takes R. H. Tawney to task for suggesting it but failing to supply evidence or mechanisms for how it is to be accomplished: "Tawney seems to have taken it for granted that such [common] ends exist...All men of goodwill would naturally agree that certain ends were ends that they held in common...It does not appear to have occurred to Tawney to consider the possibility that the development of a consensus on [ends] might be prevented either by...deep-seated moral conflict between people with sincerely and reflectively held views..." or by disagreement over the means of effecting it. Op. cit., p. 227.

15. David Stockman, the lodestar in Ronald Reagan's best and brightest constellation, gave evidence in his recently published confessions that where there is heat there need not be much light. It seems that Stockman, having been elevated from a mere Congressman to director of the budget, worked sedulously to put into effect President Reagan's first year tax cuts and restraint of government spending. The premises according to which he and Mr. Reagan operated came from an economic forecast that its authors, Mr. Stockman and Murray Weidenbaum--then the President's chief economic adviser--knew to be false but politically expedient.

16. Lewis Mumford noted that idiosyncratic and aberrant beliefs should under no circumstances be suppressed or eliminated, since it is sometimes by unexpected combinations or unorthodox interpretations of views or beliefs that important new insights are discovered or made. See The Myth of the Machine, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1964, especially volume 1: "Technics and Human Development."

17. Compromise or bargaining amounts to the trading of values. The problem with this process is that if the parties to the negotiations understand that compromise is the goal, then they are tempted to introduce into their positions superfluous demands that they are willing to trade or give up so as to insulate their deeper concerns. For example, at the height of their power the Black Panthers used this tactic as a regular part of their negotiations: Demand much more than you think you can get so as to increase the likelihood that the fall-back or compromise position will give you exactly what you want. One ought to suspect that in the world of negotiations--political, diplomatic, and industrial--this is by no means an exceptional practice. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative [STAR WARS] has been described by some as feasible only as a bargaining chip in the game of nuclear disarmament. As such, it allows the United States to give up nothing--except, perhaps, a chimera--in return for actual cuts in existing Soviet weaponry.

18. Henry Kariel, invoking Kant, describes such a participatory goal as "Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck"--purposiveness without purpose. ("Beginning at the End of Democratic Theory," Duncan, G. (Ed.) op. cit., p. 257) In
short, we need to deliberate and decide on policies but not in conformity to some ideal end. We harness "the energy conventionally invested in the pursuit of ideals," but direct it toward open and indeterminate goals. "The grip of specific ideals can only be loosened in forums that allow for the elaboration and integration of competing ideals. Within such forums, polar opposites of experience can be integrated by a discipline which holds them in a state of suspense" (p. 258). What is this discipline? It is, says Kariel, "a readiness to evoke and arouse new interests, to strengthen weak ones and deflect strong ones, to remain an empathetic and yet detached participant-observer, to maintain a state of tense irresolution, to refuse to deny or affirm anything conclusively..." (Ibid) Unfortunately Kariel, by failing to go into any detail on how to structure and operate this discipline, leaves it, as the communitarians did, ambiguous, if not vacuous. But what is buried within Kariel's proposal is the suggestion that we ought not to attempt to resolve contradictions among propositions, interests, or ideals, but, rather, we should hold them in suspension, using them as a backdrop or context for defining and limiting the decisions we must make. Kariel's discipline seems tantamount to our ideal generative procedure freed from the constrictions of accommodating ideal ends while making use of such ends.


20. Joseph Tussman offers a similar approach in Obligation and the Body Politic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960. Tussman argues that in conflicts of interests two kinds of disagreements must be distinguished. The first he calls disagreements about assertions, those being brief statements of belief, desire, taste, preference: I want more money, I believe all politicians are crooks, etc. The second kind is disagreements about claims. Instead of asserting "I believe all politicians are crooks," a claimant baldly states, "All politicians are crooks." This statement is a claim of truth and can be refuted by finding, for instance, one honest politician. Tussman claims that conflicts must be transformed from assertion disagreements into claim disagreements. "I want higher wages" becomes "I am entitled to higher wages." Then the reasons and arguments behind the claims can be unpacked and scrutinized (pp. 76-81). Unfortunately Tussman never unpacks or scrutinizes his own claim. Weighing the evidence and judging the arguments often involve more than determining the facts in the matter, though that is a start. The facts may not be readily apparent or available, or the arguments may not rest on fact. "Abortion is murder" is definitely a claim, but one that rests at this point more on definition than definitiveness. In short, political decisions
often require value judgements more than proof. That is the point of de-
liberation and of something like the generative procedures. The transform-
ation of language Tussman is proposing is really only a translation. It
may establish more clearly and quickly the arguments behind the viewpoint,
but that is something the participants ought to do anyway, especially in
generative procedures. Certainly the interests of those issuing the state-
ments do not seem transformed because of the difference in expression. If
they are, then this should have been the basis of Tussman's argument rather
than the equally unsubstantiated claim that a citizen "must in this [politi-
cal] capacity, be concerned with the public interest, not with his private
goods. His communication must be collegial, not manipulative" (p. 108).
All he offers is the imperative, Think in the public interest!—an
exhortation Rousseau, for one, found totally inadequate ("A Discourse on

21. Of course, another early theorist with similar concerns was Tocqueville,
whose experiences in America led him to a new understanding of self-interest.
Although self-interest properly understood can correct selfish interests,
it "produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small
acts of self-denial...[I]f it does not at once lead men to virtue by their
will, it draws them gradually in that direction by their habits..."
(Democracy in America, Vol. II, part III, chapter 8) The more men
participate in civic associations the deeper and easier becomes the habit
of thinking of the interests of others: "Men attend to the interests of the
public, first by necessity, afterwards by choice; what was calculation
becomes an instinct; and by dint of working for the good of one's fellow
citizens, the habit and taste for them is at length required" (Ibid,
part III, chapter 4). But Tocqueville is unclear about how self-interest
properly understood actually operates in itself or to the public benefit.
The very fuel of participation— that "all men feel the value of goodwill
and all try to win it by gaining the esteem and affection of those among
whom they must live" (Ibid, part II, chapter 2)—is the same pressure
to conform that Tocqueville found firing tyrannies of the majority. He
failed to distinguish, or to tell us how self-interest properly understood
led to a distinction, between a social pressure to work in concert or to
acquiesce to the superior argument and a social pressure to go along with
the herd irrespective of the quality or nature of the decision. The moti-
vation in both seems the same, and though his tone is confident and his
arguments appealing, Tocqueville remains on this point unconvincing.
Perhaps he set the standard, discussed at length in this chapter, that
communitarians have emulated all too successfully. Thus can communitarian
theorist William Sullivan interpret Tocqueville, contra liberals, as saying
that civic life transforms self-interest into altruism, but then fail to
present any argument either for Tocqueville's case or for his own, which
he has built upon this interpretation. See Sullivan, op. cit.,

22. Carole Pateman says of Rousseau's notorious "forced to be free" that
participation itself "forces" one to be free. The mere act of deliberation
requires one to think for himself, to make his own decisions (Participa-
tion and Democratic Theory, p. 26). Yet this is not the context of
Rousseau's usage. He states that citizens must be forced to obey the
general will, a situation that arises after participation, not during it.
Pateman suggests that citizens, whether they wish it or not, are "educated through participating in decision making." But is she also suggesting that they are to be forced to participate? She also claims that other "methods of educating the citizenry" such as public festivals and civil religion are "not a necessary part of the theory" (p. 25, note 1). Since she does not tell us why this is so, indeed since she drops the subject altogether, we can only conclude that these other methods are unnecessary for, and even harmful to, only her theory. Finally, Pateman suggests that the participatory system is self-sustaining "because the very qualities that are required of individual citizens if the system is to work successfully are those that the process of participation itself develops and fosters" (p. 25). We have interpreted Rousseau's participation differently and with more evidence. Rather than being developmental, participation is expressive. It expresses the level of individual and collective virtue that has been instilled through the systems of civic education: tutorial, patriotic, and religious. Thus it may not be self-sustaining at all.

If there is a convergence of private inclinations and interests with public duties and common interests, how can there be a "will of all," which Rousseau differentiates from the general will? While the will of all represents decisions based on selfish interests rather than on the public interest, such decisions, when made, may be indistinguishable from those made in the general interest. Since the general will is infallible, a poor decision in practice must then reflect the will of all, not the general will. Rousseau's distinction is powerful, therefore, in hindsight, as an excuse for rescinding faulty legislation.

Finally, how does Rousseau's idea of autonomy, on our interpretation, fit with our sense of autonomy? For Rousseau, it would seem, autonomy refers to self-regulation or self-control in accordance with the values and mores of society. It is, in short, free and rational choice within a range of options, a definition of autonomy we have already rejected. Rousseau's educative centerpiece—indeed, his entire social enterprise—is not designed to inculcate a predisposition toward autonomy as we have defined that term—a critical stance toward the rules and roles of one's sodality or society. The whole point of the internalization is that the voice we speak with is not like the community's; it is the community's. The distinction to be made, then, is not between Rousseau's sense of autonomy and ours; rather, it is between his sense of autonomy and what we have previously described as the membership self. The distinction is that internalization presupposes a separation between the individual and the community. Rousseau's autonomous citizen takes into himself the "generalized other," to use G. H. Mead's term, while with the membership self the community voice constitutes the self; there is no separate other. Thus with membership there is no need to force one to be free since the individual is already the embodiment of the general will. This is precisely what Rousseau would like to revive, though he cannot do so if man is also to be self-reflective or autonomous. Thus he proposes a system of inculcation to raise citizens according to, and raise them up into, a right or virtuous or proper standard of conduct, while preserving their freedom to choose. So that when a citizen examines his own thoughts, ideals, life plans, and conscience, he should find society's thoughts, ideals, life plans, and standards or the basis for them. Though he is free to make choices within a restricted range of acceptable options, there will always be the danger of a slip or rift between what is right for the citizen and what he thinks
is right. This is the price of allowing even a limited autonomy, and thus the need to compel obedience.


"can men be forced to defend the liberty of any one among them, without trespassing on that of others? And how can they provide for the public needs, without alienating the individual property of those who are forced to contribute to them?...This difficulty has been removed...by the most sublime of all human institutions, or rather by a divine inspiration, which teaches mankind to initiate here below the unchangeable decrees of the Deity. By what inconceivable art has a means been found of making them subject; of using in the service of the State the properties, the persons, and even the lives of all its members, without constraining and without consulting them; of confining their will by their own admission...and forcing them to punish themselves, when they act against their own will?"

By what art indeed? "These wonders are the work of law," brought down to the collectivity by the legislator, instilled by systems of civic education, enforced by compulsion to obey (Political Economy, 1973, pp. 123-24).

24. For Rousseau the authentic self, says Berman, is the merger of man and citizen. Yet after his studies of man and society Rousseau concluded that this merger was impossible. The only remaining course was to protect man from this dream of fulfillment. Rousseau "theorized about how the state could divert men from themselves by maximizing rewards and incentives within limits which he would define" (Berman, op. cit., p. 299). The self is truly itself when one is "sufficient unto oneself, like God" (Reveries of the Solitary Walker, p. 89). Thus one must either become a man, cut off from human sociey, finding peace and tranquility in himself alone; or become a citizen, abandoning himself to find himself in the collectivity, to be totally controlled—as in the welfarist state described in Julie—and thinking himself totally free. See also Judith Shklar, 1985.

25. See Wood, 1972, pp. 161-173. She is not alone in this interpretation. John Chapman describes the general will as "a process of 'dynamic interaction' in which each participant does not merely reflect one another's judgements "but actively strives to correct them" (Rousseau—Liberal or Totalitarian?, 1956, pp. 45-6). See also Joshua Cohen, "Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy," Philosophy and Public Affairs, volume 15, no. 3, 1986.

26. Joshua Cohen builds on the reciprocity phenomenon Rousseau mentions in Emile (p. 213)—if someone is seen to be advancing our interests we are inclined to advance theirs, and vice versa—"if the reciprocity mechanism is carried to its limit...it results in a general will" (op. cit., p. 294).

27. Jane Mansbridge maintains that once representatives are cut off from face-to-face interaction with their constituents and engage in face-to-face discussion with fellow legislators, they begin to develop interests in ac-
cordance with their colleagues and often away from those of their constituents (1980, p. 240). The implication is that face-to-face interaction can have a significant impact on interest formation. Benjamin Barber presents a similar case, but again without real argument or any evidence. See *Strong Democracy*, pp. 127, 171-73, and 200.

28. See Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications*, and Zeigler, H., *Interest Groups in American Society*. As Dennis Thompson points out, the data on the phenomenon of opinion formation may be exaggerated, if not misleading. It is based on questionnaires in which respondents were asked to report on the political preferences of their associates. Thus the respondents may well read their own preferences into those of their colleagues and friends. See Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90. This, however, does not affect the finding that opinion and interest formation is influenced by interaction with one's friends and colleagues.

29. David L. Miller, "Two Conceptions of Politics," unpublished manuscript, p. 3. It should not be surprising to find Miller's position supported by social psychology. Freed Bales shows in *Interaction and Process Analysis* (1975) that when participation relies upon dialogue, it increases the amount of conflicting viewpoints. In addition, he shows that when the purpose of interaction is to attain a group solution to an issue or problem--our compound common good--cooperation and interaction, as well as solicitation and consideration of viewpoints, are much higher than in competitive groups trying to bargain to gain their interests.

Additionally, the experimental research of Dr. David Perkins suggests that a "competent reasoner" thinks through a problem by challenging and altering his premises. "Effective reasoning," says Perkins, "depends on an active effort to interrogate one's knowledge base" (p. 186). This interrogation, Perkins continues, permits premises to change, and thus one's viewpoint on an issue is "somewhat constructed" by the reasoner's understanding of different arguments for and against positions (p. 178). The dialogue of the generative procedures provides such interrogation; it is both generative and critical. When we probe our own, and others', positions, we discover and concede as well as substantiate and refute. All quotations above are from Perkins, D., 1983.

30. Tocqueville wrote: "[A]ll parties are ready to recognize the rights of the majority because they all hope one day to profit themselves by them...[A] man who is not today one of the majority party may be so tomorrow" (*op. cit.*, p. 241). Such an attitude pervaded the United States, so Tocqueville reported, with the result that "while the majority is in doubt, one talks; but when it is irrevocably pronounced, everyone is silent, and friends and enemies alike seem to make for its bandwagon" (p. 254).

31. Walzer, *op. cit.*, p. 47. Added to this, of course, is also the possibility of reopening an issue, since the decisions taken in the generative procedures do not resolve issues but seek to reach general agreement on a public policy. As Walzer wrote elsewhere: "In democratic politics, all destinations are temporary" (1983, p. 310).
1. Setting becomes an issue when the focus of change is not simply several, or many, individuals but society itself. Which social arrangements are to be changed, how, and when? In addition, there are, of course, serious issues to consider before participation, especially in politics, is implemented. Among these are standard questions about, for example, the complexity of the issues, the competence of the people, the mechanisms to use when decisions must be made quickly, and the methods and costs, in time and money, of supplying information to the participants. To consider these in any depth would take us too far afield, since our approach here is theoretical. Yet consider one daunting obstacle:

Once a ward has made its decision and derived its common interest, its result is then compounded by the results of all the other wards. In a town of 20,000 adults there would be roughly 130 wards. Each ward might elect or select a representative to present and argue its case before the other ward representatives. This "grand ward" of 130 would then operate according to the generative procedures. But imagine that the town is a city of two million adults or over 13,000 wards. Granted a winnowing process might be conceived, but any such process would be tedious and ponderous, to say the least. Or imagine that the issue is of national importance. No electronic breakthrough is going to shorten the route to a decision made through generative political talk.

Perhaps what would suffice in politics is a mixture of participatory arenas and representative structures such as Benjamin Barber proposes in Strong Democracy or David Miller suggests at the conclusion of "The Competitive Model of Democracy." Citizens' rigorous participation might then be restricted, as Mill suggested, to local issues, because the generative procedures could be organized best and would function well at that level. Politics might then retain much of its representative form, but perhaps all levels of government, from town councils to national assemblies, would function according to generative procedures.

At the same time, professional organizations and workplaces of all sorts could be encouraged to adopt these procedures. Structured as they mostly are on a scale smaller than national politics, workplaces could decide on internal issues and policy through generative participation. If Carole Pateman is correct, the increases in worker efficiency and morale, in company productivity, and in worker cooperation through augmented relationships could convince businesses and organizations to try it.

2. See Wilber, A Sociable God, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983, chapters 3, 4, and 7; and Kegan, The Evolving Self, chapter 2. Wilber goes so far as to say that the self at each level is embedded in community.


6. Again, see David Miller, op. cit.

7. Many communitarians ignore sociological and anthropological evidence. This enables them to assume or imply that Gemeinschaft, as an ideal type, actually existed. As Inkeles and Smith report in their empirical studies of what makes man "modern," the idyll is far removed from the realities of village life. Because villagers suffer "deep insecurity both in relation to nature, whence [they] look for sustenance, and in relations to the powerful figures in [the] village...villagers cannot rely on the support of others when in need. Family and group quarrels, indeed feuds, are often as much the norm as is harmony. Distrust is frequently rampant... [I]nsults and abuse are as common in the village as elsewhere, and one waits a long while between rounds of respectful and dignified treatment" (1983, p. 278).

8. "People draw the conventions of community about them, like a cloak around the shoulders, to protect them from the elements--other peoples' ways of doing things, other cultures, other communities." Cohen, A., The Symbolic Construction of Community, London: Tavistock, 1985, p. 63.


10. See the 1983 preface to her book Beyond Adversary Democracy, especially p. xi. She states that face-to-face participation fosters the creation and maintenance of common interests, which in turn encourage members to identify with one another and with the group as a whole.

11. See The Poverty of Liberalism, Boston: Beacon Press, 1968, chapter 4. Diversity may even contribute to an overall sense of solidarity. Vernon and Bernard (1975) declare that "the point of pluralism is not merely that diversity exists, but that diversity is compatible with unity" (p. 189).

12. Robert Kegan intimates that there are so few participatory settings, especially workplaces, because there are so few compound individuals, what he calls "interindividuals." (See The Evolving Self, chapter 8.) The truth of the matter might well be the reverse: There are so few compound individuals because there are so few participatory settings.
13. Belongingness is not the value that some communitarians think it is. Researchers Wahba and Bridwell reviewed the empirical studies undertaken to verify or falsify Maslow's needs hierarchy, one level of which is the social needs that comprise belongingness, acceptance by a group or by friends, etc. This level succeeds the physiological needs—food, water, and sex—that have to be satisfied, according to Maslow, before the social needs can emerge, and precedes the esteem and self-actualization needs that can only arise if the social needs are fulfilled. Wahba and Bridwell report in one section of their review that the most satisfied needs are consistently the social needs. Thus if it is a sense of belongingness to a group that the communitarians feel is missing, then either they have misdiagnosed the real lack, or they are simply wrong. See "Maslow Reconsidered: A Review of Research on the Need Hierarchy Theory," *Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance* 15, 1976.

14. The three types of community are 1) affective community or the mutual awareness of sharing the culture, 2) production community or workers engaged in collective production enterprises, and 3) rational community or collective deliberation on social goals and social choices. These communities reinforce the "reciprocity of awareness" that Wolff says constitutes community.


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