A reply to Levick’s ‘Were it physically safe, reproductive human cloning would not be acceptable’

Book section

In the previous chapter, Stephen Levick presents several reasons for thinking that human reproductive cloning would be unacceptable even if it were safe. His main concern is that it is likely to have adverse psychological and social consequences. Levick takes an interesting approach. He discusses five existing situations that are analogous in some respect to human reproductive cloning. In each case he argues that human reproductive cloning is likely to involve either the same or more serious adverse consequences than those associated with the putatively analogous situation. Using analogies is a common method in applied ethics and philosophy. Analogies allow us to think more clearly about situations that are otherwise difficult to imagine, or about which we do not have any empirical information, as in the case of cloning. I will, however, argue that Levick's analogies do not establish the conclusions he wishes to draw from them.

Authors: Devolder, K

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Host title: Contemporary Debates in Bioethics
• Pages: 98-101
• Publication date: 2013-08-01
• ISBN: 9781444337143
• Keywords: Cloning; Identity; Autonomy; Stephen E Levick; Medical Ethics; Assisted Reproduction