The Peacemakers: Envisioning a Pax Americana in the Age of Empires

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Abstract

The Peacemakers is an imperial history of the American peace movement. The American peace movement – a porous group of cosmopolitan, middle-class Americans – lay at the epicentre of both a transimperial web of peace activism and a broader political ecosystem of nineteenth-century liberal reform. Between 1895 and 1906, the United States, much like its European counterparts, was beset with imperial crises; it violently acquired an insular empire and jostled for position with other empires, as the global imperial system grew to its most expansive and fractious.

This thesis explores the liberal conception of the American imperial project, unpacking how ideas of peace, civilisation, and internationalism framed the American imperial imaginary. It addresses a tension at the heart of this vision of empire, namely that liberal thinkers, policymakers, and activists justified imperialism's inherent violence by appealing to progressive notions of a civilising mission, while also positing that peace stood at the apex of Victorian civilisation. To untangle this contradiction, this thesis asks: How did liberal Americans reconcile their peaceful ideals with their imperial ambitions?

The peacemakers envisioned a utopian world of peaceful empire, as they sought to remedy the ills of the nineteenth-century international order by devising and lobbying for solutions rooted in emerging ideas of global governance. This story is instructive in explaining how liberalism, as an ideology of rights and political restraint, was used to justify a political formation characterised by violence and the abrogation of the sovereignty of non-white peoples. Furthermore, this thesis elevates the contingency of the American imperial project, illustrating how American imperialism was consistently made and remade by a variety of state and non-state actors, whose motives and means sat outside the norms of Victorian America's accepted political discourse.

Extended Abstract

The Peacemakers: Envisioning a Pax Americana in the Age of Empires is an imperial history of the American peace movement at the turn of the twentieth century. The *fin de siècle* represented an inflexion point in the global history of empires; imperial systems across the world were simultaneously at their most widespread while also coming under direct strain from internal and external pressures. The United States was no exception to this. Between 1895 and 1905, the United States, much like its European counterparts, was beset with imperial crises, as it violently acquired an insular empire and jostled for position with other powers.

Peace was vital to the intellectual justification of the American imperial project. Liberal Americans couched their country's expansion into the Caribbean and the Pacific in the language of civilisation and progress. World peace was the telos of this arc of history, representing the final and perfect endpoint of human development. Therefore, the politics of peace in the nineteenth century reveals the inner workings of liberal imperialism in the United States, helping explain how a nation that espoused the ideals of rights and liberty could embark on an imperial project that rested upon violence and coercion.

The disparities between the lofty ideals of peace and the bloody realities of empire were a major talking point for the members of the American peace movement. The peace movement sat at the epicentre of a transimperial web of peace activism – representing the American arm of a global movement – and was enmeshed in the wider politics of Gilded Age reform. Working as an epistemic community, with common values and beliefs, the movement was globally connected and cosmopolitan in outlook. Women's activism and thought were vital to the peace movement, with women comprising a majority of the membership of major peace organisations and building bridges with other reform institutions. The politics of peace – which I have termed peacecraft – therefore, reflected the movement's social and cultural values, exalting restraint, refinement, and temperance. Peace was thus both inward- and outward-looking. On the one hand, it entailed a programme of reform for American diplomacy (privileging international law, multilateral initiatives, and arbitration); on the other hand, it represented a set of tools through which foreign policy might be created and contested outside of the traditional venues of power, as a matter of popular politics.

Consequently, the peacemakers became simultaneous theorists and critics of the United States' emerging imperial project – as they sought to recast American diplomacy (and broader geopolitics) around the principles of imperial cooperation. To the peacemakers, the age of empires was characterised by imperial rivalry and colonial strife. Therefore, they sought to

envision novel solutions to contemporary imperial problems, primarily via the application of mechanisms of global governance. However, nineteenth-century conceptions of peace were also malleable and were applied differently depending on the situation. In the minds of activists, peace did not necessarily mean the absence of war but was instead a style of politics and a constellation of ideas that carried clear racial connotations. The peacemakers' utopian vision of a peaceful world order was one in which empires were the default geopolitical unit, rather than the nation-state. Therefore, the practice of peace in the nineteenth century was characterised by harmonious relations *among* empires and the proper application of the civilising mission *within* empires.

Chapter 1 explores this disparity between high diplomacy and colonial relations by examining the American involvement in the 1895-6 Venezuelan Boundary Dispute. Triggering a brief yet jarring war scare, the Venezuela Dispute arose due to expanding British imperial ambitions in Latin America; the boundary line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guyana had been a matter of contention for decades prior to the 1890s. However, when President Grover Cleveland invoked the Monroe Doctrine and threatened to intervene, the prospect of a third Anglo-American War loomed. The response of the peace movement was one of horror as they publicly railed against any prospect of conflict with Britain. The language of 'Anglo-Saxonism' was vital to this. Relying on tropes of a shared history, language, and religion, the peacemakers sought to portray the United States and Britain as two branches of the same race, in order to publicly warn against war and promote the cause of arbitration. As the crisis abated, the peacemakers sought to harness their momentum and lobby Washington to negotiate a permanent treaty of arbitration with London. The peacemakers' focus on arbitration served the function of stabilising American relations with its erstwhile transatlantic brothers, while also operating as a means by which to exclude Venezuelan voices from the resolution of the dispute. In doing so, the peacemakers actively chose between hemispheric visions of peace, reorienting American diplomacy away from the Western Hemisphere towards the Northern Hemisphere.

In the direct aftermath of the Venezuelan Crisis, a humanitarian crisis on the other side of the world gripped the imagination of liberal Americans. The massacre of the Armenian Christians by the Ottoman Empire sparked a wave of organising and fundraising across the United States, as concerned Americans called for Western empires to act. Chapter 2 examines the peacemakers' response to the Armenian Massacres and places this in dialogue with the movement's response to the Cuban War of Independence. These two humanitarian crises operate as case studies that illustrate when and how the peacemakers could countenance intervening in another imperial polity on humanitarian grounds. In the case of the Armenians, the movement actively engaged in

a transatlantic lobbying campaign to prompt European empires to intervene and place Armenia under the control of a European governor. Conversely, in the case of the Cuban War of Independence, the peacemakers remained sceptical of the cause of Cuba Libre. Publicly blaming the Cuban rebels for the violent tenor of the conflict, the movement called for restraint on the part of the United States – a call that was ultimately not heeded. This difference in approach demonstrates the limited purchase of humanitarian arguments among the peacemakers, a group of individuals for whom such arguments ought to have been highly persuasive. Furthermore, it illustrates the way in which nineteenth-century conceptions of sovereignty were mediated through contemporary understandings of racial and religious difference.

The second half of the dissertation addresses the American annexation and administration of the Philippines. The debate over the annexation of the archipelago, often termed 'The Great Debate', was a rancorous and polarising period in American political culture. As examined in Chapter 3, the peacemakers were active participants in this debate. Despite many peacemakers being bureaucratically enmeshed in the emerging anti-imperialist movement, the peacemakers did not passively adopt a highly polarised stance but instead worked to find alternative solutions to annexation. Such solutions were borne out of the movement's internationalist outlook, as exemplified by their frequent invocation of the 1899 Hague Conference. As such, peacemakers sought not to completely reject imperialism as a form of government but instead proposed a looser imperial formation that would allow for the spread of American culture, religion, and commerce – without having to annex the islands.

The final chapter unpacks the movement's response to the American administration of the archipelago following the election of 1900. This period saw the splintering of the anti-imperialist coalition that had emerged between 1898 and 1900, as well as the growth of connections between peacemakers and Filipino activists. This entailed a shift in tactics; peacemakers actively sought for the administration of the Philippines to be reformed in line with genteel and Christian ideals, rather than have the archipelago jettisoned altogether. Consequently, peace activists looked on in horror as the news emerged of American military misconduct in the Far East. Chief among their concerns were the widespread practices of torture and vice. The news of the use of the 'water cure' upon Filipino insurgents sparked fury among opponents of the United States' imperial mission as they feared the brutalisation of the American military. Similarly, the revelations that vice – specifically sex work and alcohol – was widespread triggered anxieties in the United States that American soldiers would return home shorn of their Christian morality. A moral panic erupted among peacemakers who feared that colonial war would trigger the corruption of American whiteness and masculinity, causing the movement to reappraise, and

ultimately abandon, its belief that the laws of war might moderate conflict.

The dissertation closes with an epilogue that explores the views of two contemporary thinkers who interacted with the movement's ideas and remade them for their own purposes. President Theodore Roosevelt was the movement's antagonist-in-chief. As a champion of 'The Strenuous Life', Roosevelt frequently attacked the movement as overly-supine and idealistic. However, by the time he had reached the Oval Office, he had co-opted the movement's ideas regarding global governance. Taking these ideas to their logical conclusions, Roosevelt made the case for a global police force in his 1904 State of the Union as part of his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In doing so, Roosevelt harnessed the language of global governance in order to provide a full-throated justification of American imperial hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, Harvard philosopher William James sought to address the failures of the peace movement head-on. Speaking to a gathering of peacemakers at the 1904 Universal Peace Congress in Boston, James articulated what would later come to be known as 'The Moral Equivalent of War'. Arguing that war was an immoveable feature of human nature, the Harvard philosopher argued that the movement's top-down schemes for universal peace were a fools-errand. Instead, James proclaimed that the only road to tranquillity lay in a recognition of man's inherent tendency towards violence and war. Echoing Frederick Jackson Turner's invocation of the frontier, James argued that peace would only be brought about when man channelled his energies into conquering nature. Both Roosevelt and James applied the politics of peace without the idealism that had characterised the peace movement. In doing so, each thinker employed peace as a concept in support of imperialism – whether that be the geopolitics of empire or a call to the frontier. As such, these two case studies serve to illustrate that while their ideas were seldom applied in the short term, the politics of peace had a long-lasting afterlife.

Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the generous financial support of Kellogg College and the Rothermere American Institute.

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Introduction

'United We Stand For Civilization and Peace!'[1]

Louis Dalrymple

Envisioning a Pax Americana

At the end of the nineteenth century, peace flowed from the barrel of a gun. In June 1898, as Louis Dalrymple put pen to paper for *Puck's* cover-image, a sense of mission was in the air. A war for the cause of peace was being waged, as the United States was readying itself to intervene in the Cuban War of Independence, with the hope of vanquishing the Spanish from the Caribbean and pacifying the island. In the Pacific, Commodore George Dewey had already sunk the Spanish fleet in a surprising skirmish off the coast of Manila. The United States was, therefore, in the process of becoming a self-actualised imperial power, imbued with a sense of purpose and duty in the age of empires.

With this in mind, Dalrymple depicted Uncle Sam astride a rampart beside John Bull, his Anglo-Saxon kith and kin, surveying the world before him (See Image 1).[2] With both strutting masculine figures armed with rifles and bayonets, Dalrymple portrayed a pair of collaborative empires bound by a common mission, to bring the world 'civilization and peace'. Each man bore the hallmark of his own imperial setting, with Uncle Sam fresh from the frontier, dressed in an army uniform and Stetson, while John Bull wore the traditional Red Coat of the British infantry and a pith helmet. Although the image represented the apogee of Victorian overtures to Anglo-American fraternity and shared destiny, Dalrymple also sounded a subtle note of caution – that if the pair failed to stand united for the values of 'civilization and peace', then divided they would fall, along with their noble aims.[3]

There was, therefore, a distinct sense of irony to Dalrymple's depiction of the two figures seeking to bring peace with rifles in their hands. Rather than being hopeful and tranquil, this vision of peace was coercive and imposing. Dalrymple's ire was hardly surprising given the context; the U.S. North Atlantic Squadron had left Key West for Cuba just days before he had penned his illustration. The American military's goal was to end the brutal Spanish repression of the Cuban revolutionaries – an attempt at peacekeeping. However, the road to war had been

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[1] Louis Dalrymple, 'United We Stand For Civilization and Peace!', *Puck* 43/1109 (8 June 1898), cover.

[2] Ibid; Paul A. Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910', *The Journal of American History* 88/4 (2002), pp. 1315-53.

[3] Stephen Tuffnell, "The International Siamese Twins': the Iconography of Anglo-American Inter-Imperialism', in Richard Scully and Andrekos Varnava (eds.), *Comic Empires: Imperialism in Cartoons, Caricature, and Satirical Art* (Manchester, 2020), pp. 112-116.



Image 1: Louis Dalrymple, 'United We Stand For Civilization and Peace!', *Puck* 43/1109 (8 June 1898), Cover.

paved with belligerent rhetoric and warmongering. And while the conflict that followed might initially have looked like a 'splendid little war' (as Secretary of State John Hay would call it), the intervention would have violent consequences for years to come, as Americans repeatedly sought to pacify the island.[4] Furthermore, the United States was about to gain control over an archipelago that would rise up in violent revolt for over a decade, as American naval forces sought to neutralise the Spanish threat in the Pacific by vanquishing them from the Philippines. For John Bull and Britain, June 1898 was also far from a summer of peace. With the British Empire having just concluded a series of conflicts as part of the Scramble for Africa, namely the Ashanti Wars and Matabele Wars, the coercion that sat at the root of the Empire's so-called Pax Britannica was becoming increasingly evident. Most alarmingly of all, just a few years earlier, the Jameson Raid heralded a looming conflict in British South Africa, which would escalate just a year later into the Anglo-Boer War. Therefore, Dalrymple's laconic visual style begged the question: How could an imperial mission, built on the lofty ideals of peace, justify such levels of violence?

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The end of the nineteenth century was an era of wishful thinking. With a new century beckoning, the American political imagination ballooned as thinkers and activists dreamt of new futures in which the social ills of the past century might be remedied.[5] The future, depending on whom you asked, would be one free of poverty or disease, prostitution or alcohol, and potentially held the possibility of liberation for women and non-white peoples. As technological shifts – such as the laying of the transatlantic cable and the advent of steam technology – spurred a new era of globalisation, conceptions of time and space gained a new elasticity and the realm of the possible dilated.[6]

The end of the nineteenth century was also an imperial moment, representing the apogee of New Imperialism. In the three decades prior to the First World War, global empires were simultaneously at their most widespread while also coming under direct strain from internal pressures, the shifting demands of a globalising world, and the evolving balance of geopolitical

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[4] Walter LaFeber, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 2: The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 137.

[5] Duncan Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race: Empire and the Utopian Destiny of Anglo-America* (Princeton, NJ, 2020).

[6] Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton, NJ, 2009), pp. 63-91; Jay Sexton, 'Steam Transport, Sovereignty, and Empire in North America, Circa 1850-1885', *The Journal of Civil War Era* 7/4 (2017), pp. 620-647; Emily S. Rosenberg, *Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World: 1870-1945* (Cambridge, MA, 2014), pp. 1-10.

power. Narratives of civilisation abounded, as Western Europeans attempted to justify their subjugation of non-white and non-Christian peoples. Vital to this was an understanding of racial, cultural, social, and religious difference, which Americans saw as providing the criteria for measuring a society's worth and corresponding place in the world. Most importantly, a progressive vision of history outlined the stages of social and human development – with Western societies being deemed the most civilised, and with thinkers looking forward in order to visualise what the final stages of humanity might hold. Therefore, in this context, utopias became imperial and empires utopian.[7]

None of these visions of the future were more contingent or malleable than the dream of perpetual peace. Peace, in some form or another, has been considered a feature of politics since antiquity and has a long history in Western political thought.[8] However, as Michael Howard has demonstrated, it was not until the Enlightenment that peace came to be seen as a contingent yet desirable political ideal – rather than merely an interlude in man's natural state of conflict.[9] Traditional accounts of peace trace this turn back to the publication of Emmanuel Kant's seminal essay *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795), which is seen as the wellspring of modern, liberal conceptions of peace, with its call for a 'league of nations' and democratic control over declarations of war.[10] Such visions of peace would develop among liberal intellectuals by way of thinkers such as Benjamin Constant, who viewed war as a passing and ephemeral stage of human history, and Richard Cobden, who prophesied that with greater economic interdependence naturally came a reduction of war.[11] It was, thus, in this context that Sir Henry Maine, the British liberal thinker and jurist, proclaimed in 1887 that 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention.'[12]

However, with this modern invention came modern problems. The utopian vision of a world at

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[7] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race,* passim.

[8] Alex J. Bellamy, *World Peace (And How Can We Achieve It)* (Oxford, 2019), pp. 23-52; Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace* (London, 2000), pp. 7-31.

[9] Howard, *The Invention of Peace.*

[10] Murad Idris, *War for Peace: Genealogies of a Violent Ideal in Western and Islamic Thought* (Oxford, 2019), p. 281-2; Howard, *The Invention of Peace*, pp. 29-31. Kant described his vision for peace as 'republican', owing to the importance that he placed on reforming institutions. However, the intellectual historian Murad Idris has described Kant's theory of peace – which was predicated on 'the rule of law [and a state that] treats its citizens as equal and free, and separates the executive and legislative powers' – as bearing the hallmarks of a liberal democratic peace theory.

[11] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*, pp. 304-306.

[12] Howard, *The Invention of Peace*, p. 1.

peace was contiguous to the theories of history and politics that justified Western imperialism. And by the end of the nineteenth century, the push-and-pull relationship between peace and empire was becoming clear for all to see. In the liberal mind, peace was considered the apogee of Western civilisation and the teleological endpoint of nineteenth-century imperialism.[13] Indeed, to be a bringer of peace was the core heuristic for assessing an imperial mission, whether that be a Pax Romana, Britannica, or Americana.[14] It was perhaps the centrality of peace to the logic of empire that led the imperialist firebrand and Republican Senator, Henry Cabot Lodge, to proclaim that there was 'no nation in the world to which peace is so important as it is to the United States in order to secure ample scope for the great progress we are making' – just as the United States was waging a bloody war in the Philippines.[15] However, as the violent logic of imperialism became clear, many began to wonder how, if at all, peace and empire might co-exist.[16] Nowhere was this more the case than in the United States, which had fostered a deceptively deep history with both concepts. Mythologies of non-entanglement and the Monroe Doctrine had allowed practitioners of American diplomacy throughout the nineteenth century to craft a national narrative that juxtaposed their nation with the imperial and militaristic dynamics of European geopolitics.[17] As westward expansion and the Civil War illustrate, however, this narrative was little more than an intellectual mirage. Nevertheless, as the United States joined the world of empires at the end of the century, it did so with the pretence of exceptionalism. Core to this was the country's early engagement with the emerging field of international law, which signalled, in the minds of many Americans, their state's aversion to conflict.[18] As a result, Americans of a liberal persuasion prayed and hoped that the *fin de siècle* might represent the end of history – that the United States would prove to be the engine for the civilisation of the world and a maker of peace.

This dissertation attempts to untangle the relationship between peace and the American 'Empire

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[13] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*, pp. 301-356.

[14] Ali Parchami, *Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britannica and Americana* (London, 2009), pp. 1-11; 167-170.

[15] William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, 1980), p. 132.

[16] These contradictions are well-trodden ground for the historiography on liberalism and the British Empire. See Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago; London, 1999); Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, 2005); Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton, 2016); Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford, 2010).

[17] Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 2011).

[18] Benjamin Allen Coates, *Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century* (New York, 2016).

Project' at the end of the nineteenth century.[19] Specifically, it asks: If peace was the apex of civilisation, how, in a world of empires, did Americans propose to get there? To achieve this, I examine the place of imperialism (both American and global) in the collective mind of the American peace movement.

The American peace movement did not flinch when faced with the bloody realities of empire. Sensing the contradictions between an ideal that purported the negation of conflict and a political formation that had coercion at its heart, these liberal Americans made efforts to adapt the latter rather than the former. A commitment to peace necessitated drawing the sting out of the world of empires; peacemakers sought not to abolish empire but instead to craft a geopolitical settlement that would elevate Western imperialism into a more perfect form. Understandably, this meant that the United States' emerging empire was at the forefront of their concerns. With their worldview underpinned by a sense of liberal providence, peacemakers prayed and laboured for the United States to become a harbinger of peace during the age of empires.

To accomplish this, they worked to craft internal and external mechanisms that would keep their country on the path of peace. Internally, they sought to reform the practice of American politics such that it was less amenable to the cause of war – drawing from the deep lineage of liberal thinkers who had tied a nation's propensity for war to its internal political character.[20] However, perhaps more interestingly and importantly, the American peace movement also sought to foster a geopolitical settlement that promoted imperial cooperation and collaboration. Such a vision of global order rested on what Duncan Bell has termed the 'empire peace thesis' – the idea that world peace had to be underwritten by either a singular hegemonic empire or a coalition of empires that 'maintained order by limiting the number of autonomous polities'.[21] As such, peacemakers harnessed contemporary ideas of global governance (promoting multilateralism and the codification of international law via initiatives such as arbitration) to reduce empire's inherent tendency towards internal violence and external competition, thus bringing into being an international system of regulated empires, which would ultimately be guided by the United States. Although their policy ideas were seldom adopted as immediate solutions, they articulated a worldview that heralded the coming of American liberal internationalism. Contained within

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[19] John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge, 2009). Much as John Darwin has argued in his seminal work on the British Empire, I treat the United States' empire not as programmatic, but instead as an unfinished empire that was always in the making; it was constantly reinvented and contained shifting modalities of imperial rule.

[20] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*, p. 312.

[21] Ibid. p. 319.

this was a nineteenth-century vision of a rules-based international order – a series of mechanisms by which inter- and intra-imperial conflict might be mediated, established via the virtue of American leadership.

A colour line ran through this view of the world.[22] The utopian vision of world peace in the age of empires was one in which states were racially homogenous, and geopolitics was conducted in accordance with fluid racial hierarchies.[23] These hierarchies often emerged from discussions over a state or people's civilisational status, which was expressed via a set of biological and cultural claims regarding human nature, attainment, and improvement. As such, race is understood within this study as operating as (what Duncan Bell has termed) a 'biocultural assemblage', in which shifting cultural constructions that arose out of human difference were backstopped by a harder and essentialist vision of human biology.[24] Therefore, the Victorian discourse around race represented a mediation between the supposed immutability of biology and a faith in culture's ability to uplift a race's social, moral, and intellectual condition. Such an understanding of race, therefore, privileged the status of peoples deemed to be Anglo-Saxon in origin, who were thought to hold a providential role in world history.[25]

Peace was thus conceptualised as a defence of whiteness in the minds of liberal Americans, with it functioning differently when considering relations between empires rather than relations within empires.[26] Whereas peacemakers would critique empire as a form of government owing to its tendency towards competition among the powers of the Northern Hemisphere, they had a more complicated relationship with the violence enacted within empires. The effect of colonial violence on white peoples was the primary metric by which this was judged, with a cosmopolitan concern for the oppressed being, at best, tangential. Peace, therefore, provided an intellectual mask for the asymmetries of power inherent within imperial rule and operated as a vehicle for the supposed civilising mission of Western imperial forces.[27] Furthermore, where peacemakers

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[22] Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge, 2008).

[23] Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY; London, 2015).

[24] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*, pp. 25-35.

[25] Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons'; Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*, pp. 1-41. As both Kramer and Bell have shown, the construction of a (largely transatlantic) 'Anglo-Saxon' identity was instrumental in formulating these civilisational hierarchies.

[26] Eric Love, *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900* (Chapel Hill; London, 2004). Eric Love has persuasively outlined the ways in which the United States' empire was shaped by defensive concerns over the character of American whiteness.

[27] Idris, *War for Peace*.

sought to distinguish the United States from the less civilised nations of the world, they actively worked to promote their nation's engagement with European empires. Harnessing the politics of imperial comparison, they looked abroad to other empires to judge what constituted imperial best practice and what was unsound imperial conduct.[28] Such a worldview correlated with the movement's demographic makeup; given its racial politics, the peace movement was almost universally white. At times, prominent African Americans were given platforms; for instance, Frederick Douglass, while acting as American Ambassador to Haiti, was appointed Vice President of the American Peace Society, and Booker T. Washington addressed the 1904 Universal Peace Congress in Boston.[29] However, these opportunities were scarce, and African Americans were otherwise absent among the peacemakers, being actively excluded from certain venues of peace.[30]

This body of political ideas was undergirded by an emerging style of politics, which I have termed 'peacecraft'. Peacecraft was not simply a commitment to peace as a political goal but instead represented a desire to reorient both domestic and international politics from its adversarial nature towards Christianity and collaboration. Operating in a world where, as Maartje Abbenhuis has argued, 'the public sphere was an important site for international politics', peacecraft represented an attempt to wrest the power of geopolitical decision-making from the hands of policymakers into those of an educated and respectable middle-class.[31] With their patrician ideals engendering a faith in the ability of culture to trigger racial uplift, practitioners of peace sought to embody their values in their political actions, as they worked to negate the vulgarity of the yellow press at home and promote the civilising mission abroad. This took on two dimensions. On the one hand, peacecraft represented a programme of reform that could combat the pervasive forces of jingoism in Gilded Age political culture, revolving around

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[28] Andrew Priest, *Designs on Empire*: *America's Rise to Power in the Age of European Imperialism* (New York, 2021). Priest's recent monograph is the most wide-ranging work on the politics of imperial comparison in an American context.

[29] 'Officers of the American Peace Society', *The Advocate of Peace and Arbitration* 48/4 (July and August, 1886), p. 82; *Official Report of The Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress, Held at Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., October Third to Eight, 1904* (Boston, 1904).

[30] For instance, Albert K. Smiley, the convenor of the Lake Mohonk Conferences on International Arbitration, actively denied entry to the African-American Baptist minister and missionary leader, Rev. Charles S. Morris. Discussing the matter with Rev. James A. Francis, Smiley stated that while he had no doubt that Morris' 'abilities and character qualify him for membership' of the conference, he had to defer to the Conference attendees who would not be so welcoming. Ultimately, he concluded 'that Mr Morris' presence would, the feelings of the members being what they are, do more harm to the Conference than any good he could do'. Swarthmore, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration Records, 1895-1937 (DG 054) (Hereafter Mohonk Papers), Series III, Box 18 (SCPC-0874), Folder 9, James A. Francis to Albert Smiley, 6 February 1902; Albert Smiley to James A. Francis, 11 February 1902.

[31] Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 2014), p. 160.

campaigns of moral suasion, political lobbying (both public and private), and inter-institutional activism. Simultaneously, peacecraft also operated as a diplomatic style, the core goal of which was the promotion of international cooperation. This entailed a wide range of practices, including transnational networking (via conferencing and maintaining global chains of correspondence), the lobbying of foreign governments, and operating as a proto-think tank where ideas of global governance (such as arbitration and neutralisation) could be discussed and applied to contemporary diplomatic problems. In this, the peacemakers were reformers, not revolutionaries, believing that peace would not arrive with a bang but rather would come incrementally and as a result of their own hard work.

A focus on peace, therefore, provides layered and varied insights into the inner workings of American empire at a point when Western imperialism was at its most widespread and complex. These can be organised as contributing to four major historiographical themes: debates over liberalism and empire, the role of non-state and transnational actors in American empire, the contingent development of the American imperial formation, and the role of empire in histories of global governance and international relations.

The terms liberal and liberalism are used across this study as a way of analysing the peacemakers' beliefs and connecting them to a longer historical trajectory that might be called the 'liberal tradition'. Liberalism is itself a concept that resists precise definition. Such an endeavour is made all the more difficult by the presence of a contemporary Liberal Party across the Atlantic, which was itself a creator of and vehicle for liberal ideas – advocating religious pluralism, an expanded franchise, and a social and imperial policy based around ideas of uplift.[32] Indeed, the peacemakers applied the term 'liberal' as a way of connecting themselves with a deeper intellectual lineage and a contemporary political movement. Historians have long attempted to bring coherence to this intellectual tradition either by seeking to distil the core values that united a vanguard of thinkers across time and space or by examining the sum total of ideas expressed by those who were either self-professed liberals or had the term attached to them by their contemporaries.[33] Both methodologies reveal that liberalism is characterised by competing and often countervailing tendencies rather than a simple, canonical set of values that remains constant across time. Michael Freeden has convincingly argued that it is instead better to think of a series of liberalisms – rather than a singular liberal doctrine – which might be connected by a common reliance on such values as: 'liberty, rationality, individuality, progress, sociability, the

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[32] Christopher Harvie, *The Lights of Liberalism: University Liberals and the Challenge of Democracy, 1860-1886* (London, 1976); Butler, *Critical Americans*.

[33] Duncan Bell, 'What is Liberalism', in Bell (ed.), *Reordering the World*, pp. 62-90.

general interest, and limited and accountable power'.[34] Therefore, the term is used here as a retrospective analytical category, describing those who sought to determine how these core values interacted, how they might be applied to the problems of the age, and those who subsequently worked to bring such a politics into being.

Peace's role as a loadstar for liberal ideas of civilisation foregrounds the adaptable role of violence and coercion within liberal imperialism. Despite its 'protean character', as Gary Gerstle has termed it, American liberalism since the Progressive Era has contained within it three durable yet competing tendencies: emancipation, rationality, and progress.[35] And thus, reading the interplay between peace and empire in the American liberal mind is instructive in recreating the thought process that allowed for the privileging of the last of these concepts at the expense of the first. The imperial history of peace is co-terminus with that of liberal imperialism. Ideas of progress and civilisational attainment bounded the ambit of nineteenth-century liberalism.[36] The ideology contained a pair of duelling impulses, namely the desire to limit state power from specific issues (via the establishment of rights) and the tendency to use power to steer the state towards the direction of progress and the betterment of human life.[37] Such an analytical framing is common within the literature on the British liberal tradition and the British Empire.[38] However, it is largely absent from American imperial historiography, with this mostly being explored via a transatlantic framing.[39] Otherwise, the intellectual history of American empire is cast in terms of understanding the exceptional or unexceptional framing by which Americans understood their empire.[40]

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[34] Michael Freeden, *Liberalism* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 14-15.

[35] Gary Gerstle, 'The Protean Character of American Liberalism', *The American Historical Review* 99/4 (1994), p. 1046.

[36] Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, p. 78.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid; Pitts, *A Turn to Empire;* Bell, *Reordering the World*; Mantena, *Alibis of Empire.*

[39] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*; Leslie Butler, *Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal Reform* (Chapel Hill, 2007), pp. 221-261; Michael Patrick Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1909* (New York, 2012). The one notable exception to this is Michael Patrick Cullinane's work on the function of liberty as a cohering concept for anti-imperialism. As a concept, liberty provides useful insight into the political thought of those who criticised American imperialism. However, while it reveals anti-imperialists' reliance on liberalism's tendency towards emancipation, it does not illustrate how this tendency interacted with liberalism's two other constitutive elements: rationality and progress.

[40] Julian Go, 'The Provinciality of American Empire: Liberal Exceptionalism and U.S. Colonial Rule, 1898-1912', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49/1 (2007), pp. 74-108; Fabian Hilfrich, *Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War* (New York; Basingstoke, 2012); Priest. *Designs on Empire.*

Furthermore, in focusing on peace as a political style, as well as an ideal, the political culture of liberal imperialism is more fully revealed. Indeed, peacecraft might best be seen as an attempt to construct a political culture around liberal imperialism in response to the shifting imperial world at the end of the nineteenth century. Rather than existing in the minds of a select few canonical thinkers, American liberal imperialism was therefore practised and contested by an amorphous cast of non-state actors, who moved beyond national and institutional boundaries, applying and re-interpreting liberal ideas and norms to the problems of empire.[41] Their activities demonstrate the centrality of liberal imperialism to the American imperial project, as well as its limitations, as Americans sought to bring to life the narratives of civilisation and progress that they had imagined.

This focus on the transmission of ideas into concrete political action – taking place outside of the traditional venues of foreign policy-making – also alters the history of non-state actors and their role in crafting the United States' empire project. In this light, the American peace movement, as well as being a wellspring of liberal ideas regarding empire, looks like a geopolitical brain trust for nineteenth-century American reform movements; it operated as a 'proto-think tank' for those Americans who, in the words of Ian Tyrrell, were engaged in 'Reforming the World.'[42] This desire to remedy the imperfections of imperialism was a common one in the nineteenth-century United States, with various groups seeking to buttress the United States' imperial endeavours with (predominantly) Christian ideas of reform; such groups included overseas missionaries, temperance and social purity activists, and women's rights campaigners.[43] Peace, therefore, operated as a guiding principle for transnational reformers, providing them with a framework through which they could understand both high diplomacy and colonial relations.

In this sense, peace was manifested in a set of places and spaces in which American foreign policy was made. Peace was debated, analysed, and conceptualised as part of the growth of new physical and intellectual spaces, which characterised a burgeoning and educated American middle class following the Civil War. This educated middle class was distinctly internationalist in its outlook, consuming a wide array of global knowledge via the proliferation of cosmopolitan

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[41] Ian Tyrrell, 'Inter-Imperial Entanglements in the Age of Imperial Globalization', in Jay Sexton and Kristin Hoganson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of America and the World, Volume 3* (Cambridge, 2021), pp. 716-737.

[42] Ian R. Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton, 2010); Ian R. Tyrrell, *Woman's World – Woman's Empire: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880-1930* (Chapel Hill, 1991).

[43] Ibid; Emily Conroy-Krutz, *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic* (Ithaca, 2015).

periodicals and journals.[44] Similarly, venues for the discussion of peace mimicked this middle-class tenor –with peace meetings being held in metropolitan social clubs and reform spaces, such as the Twentieth Century Clubs of New England and the burgeoning branches of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union. Similarly, a sprawling web of international conferences represented vital venues for conversations about how to infuse the world of empires with a spirit of cooperation – as activists travelled across national and imperial borders to affirm their faith in the higher cause of peace. This varied diet of global conferences points to the importance of place within the peace movement, with such events taking place in metropolitan hubs of respectable politics from Paris to Boston, New York to The Hague. It is thus unsurprising that New England and the American Northeast represented the centre of gravity for American peacemakers.

The constant calls for imperial reform and modernisation that emanated from the peace movement reinforce the contingency of the United States' imperial project. Largely owing to their naivety regarding how imperial power might be exercised – in terms of both colonial relations and high diplomacy – the peacemakers' plans were seldom realised in the short- to medium-term. Nevertheless, the movement's well-connected membership of prominent Americans meant that it represented the connective tissue between policymakers and the American intellectual class. Much as Glenda Sluga has shown to be the case for the post-Napoleonic international order, the American imperial order was not constructed via the diktat of high politics and diplomacy, but was instead consistently contested and renegotiated by a variety of state and non-state actors.[45] And while the movement's direct impact was often limited and tangential in the immediate term, this was a gestational period for key ideas of internationalism that would shape American policy following the so-called 'Great Debate'.

Furthermore, even in this immediate frame, the politics of peace are instructive in illustrating the ambit of the possible during debates over American empire, demonstrating that the United

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[44] Frank A. Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865-1890* (Cambridge, MA, 2009); Heather D. Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians: American Evangelicals and Global Aid* (Cambridge, 2018); Kristin L. Hoganson, *Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920* (Chapel Hill, 2007).

[45] Glenda Sluga, *The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon* (Princeton, 2022).

States' imperial formation existed as the product of active choices and roads not taken.[46] Specifically, the peacemakers imagined a vision of empire that relied not on physical force but on the civilising influence of American culture, religion, and economic heft – something that I have termed 'genteel imperialism'. This style of empire might be known by many names – an informal empire, American soft power, or the constructive forces of American cultural hegemony; however, none do justice to the fusion of ideas and political practices that the peacemakers embodied.[47] This is better understood as the adherence to a specific class-based ideology that underlay a particular vision of the United States' imperial formation.[48] Genteel imperialism was primarily defined by its commitment to middle-class values of cosmopolitanism, Christian respectability, and restrained masculinity. Such values determined both the vision of empire that peacemakers imagined, as well as the tactics by which they sought to bring this into being.

In essence, the peacemakers' model of genteel imperialism represented an attempt to backstop American imperial expansion in the 1890s, and the ideas of civilisation that underpinned it, with liberal, Christian values. Such values were a reflection of the peacemakers' conception of race; genteel imperialism was primarily focused on the cultural improvement of both Americans and their colonial subjects. The patrician politics of peace were simultaneously an attempt at defending American whiteness and uplifting the moral and material condition of non-white peoples, so far as their biological character would allow.

This often manifested as a criticism of the United States' imperial project, largely on account of its violence. However, the term anti-imperialist does not capture the complex cosmopolitan and

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[46] Christopher McKnight Nichols and David Milne (eds.), *Ideology in U.S. Foreign Relations: New Histories* (New York, 2022); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987); William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962); James G. Morgan, *Into New Territory: American Historians and the Concept of US Imperialism* (Madison; London, 2014). The relationship between ideology and American foreign relations has been a long-running field of enquiry, with seminal works from Michael Hunt and William Appleman Williams that have searched for the core assumptions or intellectual blueprint underpinning American foreign relations. More recently, Christopher McKnight Nichols and David Milne have sought to expand the remit of who ought to be counted as a purveyor of ideology in terms of foreign relations.

[47] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World,* p. 3; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca, 1998). Soft power is a term from modern American diplomacy that has limited utility in explaining nineteenth-century imperial developments. Ian Tyrrell has employed cultural hegemony as a frame for understanding the imposition of American moral values over its empire.

[48] Furthermore, the formal-informal binary that is sometimes adopted when thinking about imperial rule does not do justice to the differing modes of nineteenth-century rule, which enacted coercion at various levels – with a disregard for the sanction of the imperial state. For more on this, see the introduction to Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue (eds.), *Imperial Formations* (Santa Fe; Oxford, 2007), pp. 5-42.

civilisational thinking that firmly undergirded imperial criticism in the United States.[49] And while many peacemakers operated in and around the Anti-Imperialist League (AIL), which emerged during the debates over Philippine annexation, their views of imperialism were more constructive than oppositional. Understanding imperial criticism in this way shatters the restraining influence of the labels of pro- and anti-imperialist, which have dogged the literature on American empire – imposing political labels from a specific, bounded debate onto a far more nuanced and diverse set of conceptualisations of empire.[50] A focus on peace instead reveals a long-running popular debate around empire, with different parties arguing not over whether empire was a morally good or bad thing, but instead arguing over what mode of empire might be most virtuous.

Finally, by unearthing the imperial dynamics of peace, the imperial logic of the early history of global governance becomes increasingly clear.[51] As histories of the League of Nations have demonstrated, that mechanisms of global governance were developed by imperial powers was

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[49] For the classic treatment of American anti-imperialism and 'The Great Debate', see: Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (New York, 1968); E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920* (Philadelphia, 1970); Jim Zwick, *Confronting Imperialism: Essays on Mark Twain and the Anti-Imperialist League* (West Conshohocken, Pa, 2007); Nathan Alexander, 'Unclasping the Eagle's Talons: Mark Twain, American Freethought, and the Responses to Imperialism', *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 17/3 (2018), pp. 524-45. A nuanced and broad interpretation of the wider importance of anti-imperialism to the United States' role in the world is available in Ian R. Tyrrell and Jay Sexton (eds.), *Empire's Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism* (Ithaca; London, 2015). This edited volume, however, fails to deal with the height of imperial criticism in the United States, instead, seeking to illuminate the numerous and varied anti-imperialisms that have pervaded thinking about American foreign relations. One notable exception to the institutional focus of these histories is Marc-William Palen, 'Transimperial Roots of American Anti-Imperialism: The Transatlantic Radicalism of Free Trade, 1846–1920', in Jay Sexton and Kristin L. Hoganson (eds.) *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham, NC, 2020), pp. 159-182. The most recent monographs to examine the AIL and the anti-imperialist movement as a whole are Michael Patrick Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1909* (New York, 2012) and Erin L. Murphy, *No Middle Ground: Anti-Imperialists and Ethical Witnessing During the Philippine-American War* (Lanham, MD, 2020). Both of these are extremely valuable additions to the field, offering fresh insights into our understanding of 'The Great Debate'.

[50] A useful comparative case study is Gregory Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920* (Cambridge; New York, 2010). Claeys has powerfully demonstrated how, in the case of critics of the British Empire, those who indulged in imperial scepticism merely wound up advocating a more refined version of imperialism.For more on British anti-imperialism, see: Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire: British Radicals and the Imperial Challenge* (London, 2008).

[51] There has been a recent growth in scholarship which has sought to reconcile histories of empire and histories of international law. Firstly, many have sought to trace the footsteps of empire through the development of international law: Coates, *Legalist Empire*; Jennifer Pitts, *Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2018); Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960* (Cambridge, 2001). Furthermore, some historians have examined the role of imperialism in providing an ordering logic for nineteenth-century conceptions of international society: Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest, 'International Society in Victorian Political Thought: T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer, and Henry Sidgwick', *Modern Intellectual History* 3/2 (2006), pp. 207-38. Of general use on both of these themes are the essays in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2007).

not surprising.[52] However, the peacemakers' attempts to foster international cooperation illuminate that the vision of order upon which late-nineteenth-century visions of global governance rested was intrinsically imperial. Instead of internationalism teleologically building towards a global system of nation-states, the logic of empire was interwoven into the fabric of internationalist thought.[53] Indeed, global governance was finessed and developed by solving the problems of late nineteenth-century imperialism – not in spite of them. In this sense, the liberal vision of global governance, which characterised the early decades of the twentieth century, was forged in the crucible of empire.[54]

A World of Peacecraft

The American peace movement had its genesis in the post-revolutionary period.[55] Motivated by a wariness that was borne out of a generation-long conflict with Britain and a restless religious zeal, a group of pious Northerners sought to organise opposition to warfare in the wake of the War of 1812. December 1815 saw the establishment of the United States' first two dedicated peace societies – the New York Peace Society and the Massachusetts Peace Society – established without any knowledge of each other, despite being founded two weeks apart. Founded by David Low Dodge and Noah Worcester respectively, the new peace organisations worked to distribute literature promoting peace across the American Northeast and it was only in 1828 that a national peace organisation was formed by William Ladd. The new American Peace Society (APS), in the mind of Ladd, was meant to harness the power of public opinion – led by an activist ministry – to pressure the government to refrain from international conflict and promote the cause of global cooperation.

This reliance on moral suasion was, therefore, brought into full focus by the intertwining of two causes: opposition to warfare and the abolition of slavery. The run-up to the Civil War saw the emergence of a set of radical non-resistors around the abolitionist luminary William Lloyd Garrison, with the establishment of the New England Non-Resistance Society (1838). Originally a faction within the APS, the Garrisonians were far less concerned with orchestrating

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[52] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (New York, 2015).

[53] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York; Oxford, 2009). Manela has forcefully demonstrated the limitations of pre-supposing that liberal internationalism was tailored towards a global system of nation-states.

[54] Most accounts of the construction of international institutions do not elevate empire to being an organising logic in their formation. For instance, see Howard, *The Invention of Peace*; Bellamy, *World Peace*; Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London, 2012).

[55] For a brief overview of the nineteenth-century history of the American peace movement see Margot Minardi, 'US Efforts to Promote Peace in the Nineteenth Century', in Charles F. Howlett, Christian Philip Peterson, Deborah Buffton, and David L. Hostetter (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Peace History* (Oxford, 2022), pp. 248-264.

international cooperation and instead saw world peace as flowing from 'a revolution of the human conscience'.[56] Indeed this difference was made clear in a meeting of the APS in September 1838 when the Garrisonians split from the APS over the organisation's refusal to admit women and embrace their activism as a part of the crusade for peace.[57]

However, despite the institutional and philosophical differences over whether peace was only attainable from the top down versus the bottom up, the relationship between peace and abolition endured; the movement henceforth was conceptualised as a crusade for the abolition of war. This was perhaps best demonstrated by how, in spite of their anti-war credentials, the APS rowed in behind the cause of the Union during the Civil War – conceptualising the war as an insurrection to be put down, rather than a formal war waged by a legitimate nation-state, the likes of which they opposed.

The American Peace Society's acquiescence and the bellicose rhetoric of some corners of the pro-Union clergy led a small splinter group of radical activists to break away from the mainstream peace movement and, in the aftermath of the Civil War, establish the Universal Peace Union (UPU) in 1866. Led by a recalcitrant Philadelphia wool merchant, Alfred Love, the UPU campaigned throughout the reconstruction period for the cause of peace, as well as on a host of other issues including 'temperance, black civil rights, improved Indian relations, industrial arbitration, and the women's rights crusade.'[58] Doing so required the maintenance of moral suasion as a political tool, with the UPU attempting to influence public opinion via techniques ranging from petitioning campaigns to public spectacles, such as publicly beating Civil War swords into ploughshares.[59] Coming from a Quaker background, Alfred Love embodied this widened diet of interests and would go on to be the 1888 Vice-Presidential nominee for the National Equal Rights Party ticket, headed by fellow peacemaker Belva Ann Lockwood. From the UPU's birth to his death in 1913, Love worked as the organisation's president, during which time he would be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize on three separate occasions.

Despite the movement's Civil War schism, the Gilded Age character of the two organisations was remarkably similar, with members of each organisation sitting on the governing board of the other. Although the War had led to a major decline in membership, an influx of reform-

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[56] Ibid. p. 253.

[57] Harriet Hyman Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights* (Syracuse, NY, 1993), pp. 36-37.

[58] Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington, 1980), p. 61.

[59] Ibid.

minded professionals from the Northeast revitalised the movement's intellectual life. While they seldom employed the UPU's strident rhetoric or eccentric theatrics, the APS grew to envelope many leading abolitionists (from the patron of John Brown, Gerrit Smith, to abolitionist poet John G. Whittier) and, as a result, many of their corresponding interests. Having voted to admit women in 1871, the APS had swiftly admitted proponents of abolition and universal suffrage such as Julia Ward Howe and Mary A. Livermore, who would both become Vice Presidents of the APS.

Women's work was one of the primary engines of the peace movement. Indeed by the 1890s, women constituted half of the membership of the UPU and one-third of its governing board.[60] Nowhere was the role of women more pertinent than in the movement's growing entanglement with the world of moral reform, most notably with a focus on missionary work and temperance.[61] Grounded in nineteenth-century Christian internationalism, this world of reform sought to combat the ills of vice and heathenism both at home and abroad. Therefore, organisations such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), while not primary instruments of the peace movement, constituted an ecosystem of broadly aligned interests that promoted one another's causes and provided the organisational support of institutions and personnel. For instance, prominent missionaries and temperance activists would sit on the boards of both the APS and the UPU, with the latter frequently using the headquarters of the WCTU to host its meetings. Indeed, by the 1890s, presidents of the APS frequently addressed meetings of the WCTU, while (as of 1897) the President of the WCTU, Frances Willard, held a life membership of the UPU.[62]

Women's peace work was mediated through shifting Victorian notions of womanhood, as contemporaries often highlighted popular assumptions around women's natural tendency towards maternalism and domesticity to explain the growth of women's peacemaking. Indeed, such gendered assumptions led many women to advocate for the abolition of boy's brigades in churches and military drill in schools.[63] However, peace activism was in keeping with a long tradition of women's internationalism. As Megan Threlkeld has demonstrated, many female

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[60] Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue*, p. 47.

[61] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*; Conroy-Krutz, *Christian Imperialism*.

[62] See, for instance, *Report of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union Twenty-Third Annual Meeting Held in Music Hall, St Louis, Missouri, November 13-18, 1896* (Chicago, 1896), pp. 397-408; Swarthmore, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Universal Peace Union Records (DG038) [Hereafter UPU Records], Series 1, Box 4 (SCPC 0462), Folder 1 (Financial Records), Ledger 2, p. 58.

[63] Tyrrell, *Woman's World - Woman's Empire,* pp. 170-180.

activists and thinkers saw their own citizenship in the international community as being a tool through which they might affect global affairs, promote the cause of peace, and thereby secure their own rights as domestic citizens.[64] As such, the networks that they created and the ideas that they promoted were vital and durable pillars of peacecraft. Nevertheless, patriarchy pervaded the movement; therefore, despite their vibrant agitation for the cause of peace, many of these activists found themselves sidelined at crucial moments. While containing many suffrage-supporting men and women, the UPU and the APS resiled from loudly advocating for the cause of women's suffrage. Therefore, their work often was under-acknowledged outside of women's only spaces and was at times seen as being associated with domesticity rather than politics – despite its fundamental role in peacecraft.

Nobody embodied this enmeshment of peace and moral reform more than the head of the WCTU's peace department, Hannah Johnston Bailey. Originally a schoolteacher from Maine, Bailey began her reform career in the Ohio WCTU in 1885, where she persuaded Frances Willard to extend her local peace campaigning to a national level. Inspired by her Quaker background, she worked as superintendent of the WCTU's peace department from 1889 until 1920, becoming a restless propagandist for the cause.[65] Publishing two regular peace newspapers, *Pacific Banner* and the children's periodical *The Acorn*, she also distributed 4,500 Bible passages and 2,500 leaflets pertaining to peace in 1888 alone.[66] By 1893, the WCTU had established peace departments in 25 states, as well as in the District of Columbia.[67] Although Bailey primarily worked out of the WCTU, she also held memberships of and actively contributed to the legacy institutions of the peace movement. She became a member of the UPU in November 1888 and, from June 1889, she sat on the Board of Directors for the APS.

Upon joining the UPU, Bailey was handed a membership certificate by the organisation's secretary and Alfred Love (See Image 2).[68] Bearing a woodcut replication of artist Benjamin West's 1771-2 painting entitled 'Penn's Treaty with the Indians', the certificate bore all the

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[64] Megan Threlkeld, *Citizens of the World: U.S. Women and Global Government* (Philadelphia, 2022), p. 2.

[65] For more on Bailey see, Tyrrell, *Woman's World - Woman's Empire,* pp. 170-175; Yoko Nishimura, 'Educating Women for Peace: The Life and Work of Hannah Johnston Bailey and Katherine Devereux Blake in the Late Nineteenth Century and the Early Twentieth Century Women's Peace Movement' (PhD Thesis, State University of New York, 2006); David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914* (Bloomington, 1976), p. 25.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Swarthmore College, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Records of the Universal Peace Union (DG038) [Hereafter: UPU Records], Series 1, Box 4 (SCPC 0462), Hannah J. Bailey Membership Certificate, November 1888.



Certificate of Membership
of the
UNIVERSAL PEACE UNION

National & International Arbitration, Disarmament, Justice, Equal Rights, Liberty, Purity, The Brotherhood of Man, & the Fatherhood of God.

Remove the causes and abolish the Customs of War.

Inviolibility of Human Life, Temperance. Protection of Capital & Labor. Peace is the sum of all virtues.

"We are met on the broad pathway of good faith and good will, so that no advantage is to be taken on either side, but all to be openness, brotherhood, and love."

This is to Certify that Hannah J. Bailey is an Annual Member of the

UNIVERSAL PEACE UNION

and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of such Membership.

Thomas E. Longshore Secretary.

Philadelphia 11th mo 7th 1888 Alfred H. Love President.

Image 2: Hannah J. Bailey Membership Certificate, November 1888, UPU Records, Series 1, Box 4, (SCPC 0462).

hallmarks of the UPU's commitment to a wide gamut of reform causes, namely: 'National & International Arbitration, Disarmament, Justice, Equal Rights, Liberty, Purity, The Brotherhood of Man & the Fatherhood of God. Inviolability of Human Life, temperance. Protection of Capital & Labor.'[69] Finally, it surmised that 'Peace is the sum of all virtues.'[70] Furthermore, Bailey's membership certificate also stipulated that she was 'entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of such Membership' – implying that this piece of paper was meant to be presented so as to redeem certain, unspecified benefits of membership, operating as an informal, peace activists' passport.[71] With the question of who ought to represent the United States abroad being an active, contested question during the nineteenth century (which sometimes bypassed Washington D.C.), that Bailey might have received such credentials as a means of promoting her as an informal ambassador of peace was entirely commensurate with the practice of peacecraft.[72]

As a result of the influx of varied reform interests, by the 1890s the movement's intellectual life was flourishing; however, it still had a limited membership. The circulation of the American Peace Society's in-house journal, *The Advocate of Peace*, was merely 2,500 in the early 1890s (although this figure had doubled over the previous twenty years).[73] The Universal Peace Union was no different, having several hundred committed members and 'several thousand loosely affiliated sympathizers'.[74] However, the coming years proved to be a period of take-off for the movement; with crises of the United States' empire and the growing momentum behind global governance and international law, interest in peace grew. Between 1901 and 1914, forty-five new peace organisations were established in the United States, with most being comprised of middle-class individuals committed to reform.[75]

The peace movement did not stop at the water's edge, with peacemakers working and travelling across national and imperial boundaries. Despite their limited membership, the movement as a whole was geographically diverse; for instance, the 1896 membership list of the Universal Peace

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] For more on this, see Stephen Tuffnell, *Made in Britain: Nation and Emigration in Nineteenth-Century America* (Oakland, 2020), pp. 56-91.

[73] Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, p. 3

[74] Ibid.

[75] Debenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History,* p. 79.

Union ranged from Ecuador and Santo Domingo to Oxford and Cambridge Colleges.[76] Peacemakers entered into lengthy correspondences with advocates of peace in other countries, simultaneously becoming both products and promoters of various types of imperial formation. Most of these trans-imperial relationships were transatlantic, privileging European peace-workers, with a specific focus on Britain. Via these relationships, peacemakers shared ideas with colleagues, published their ideas in foreign publications, and worked to establish and attend conferences that operated as talking shops in which they joined together to envision a world of peace.

Furthermore, peacemakers also selectively engaged with anti-colonial activists, whether they came from within the American Empire or another. As Chris Suh has demonstrated, the turn of the century represented a moment of contingency, where non-white peoples disrupted the racial hierarchies that underpinned empire by co-opting and adapting ideas of progressive imperialism.[77] The resulting inter-imperial interactions were, naturally, mediated through the lens of white supremacy – with anti-colonial activists often being dismissed or denigrated by the movement on the basis of their race. However, the readiness of peacemakers to form alliances of convenience with anti-colonial activists (whether from the Philippines, Latin American, or beyond) highlighted the shifting valence of race in the minds of liberal imperialists.

Thus, American peacemakers represented a single theatre of a transnational epistemic community – a group of individuals bound together by common interests, friendships, and values – rather than a broad-based social movement.[78] Indeed these transnational and transimperial networks were buttressed by shared understandings of class and religion.[79] The peace movement was largely devoid of working-class voices, instead being made up of the metropolitan, middle-class intelligentsia. As a result, they upheld and promoted the mores of middle-class refinement and respectability, with international travel and a cosmopolitan

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[76] UPU Records, Series 1, Box 4 (SCPC 0462), Membership Book 1893-1896, p. 151.

[77] Chris Suh, *The Allure of Empire* (Oxford, 2023). Japan has received important recent scholarly attention for its contribution to the intellectual history of empire. On the Philippines see Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation: A Global Intellectual History of the Philippine Revolution, 1887-1912* (New York, 2022); Michael Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule* (Ann Arbor, 2003)

[78] Leslie Butler, *Critical Americans: Victorian Intellectuals and Transatlantic Liberal Reform* (Chapel Hill, 2007). Leslie Butler's work on transatlantic liberal reform provides a model for how this community is conceptualised in this dissertation.

[79] David S. Patterson, 'An Interpretation of the American Peace Movement, 1898-1914', in Charles Chatfield (ed.), *Peace Movements in America* (New York, 1973), pp. 20-38. Patterson has argued that the American peace movement was only truly bound together was their shared class identity.

information diet being core elements of polite society.[80] While the movement had a heritage of activism borne out of non-conformist Christianity – specifically Quakerism – the 1890s saw the movement shift to a more inter-denominational approach. The movement's ecumenicalism was no accident. Believing that their virtue had emerged from the experience of working across the divisions between Christian denominations, the movement sought to apply this sense of Christian unity and fellowship to international affairs.[81] The movement, therefore, was made up of voices from mainline Protestantism, Nonconformism, Catholicism, and, at times, Oriental Orthodoxy. Consequently, peace meetings were held at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions and via Christian reform associations such as the WCTU and YMCA.

This transimperial web of middle-class and Christian connectivity was embodied in Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, the secretary of the American Peace Society. Born in Salem, Indiana in 1847, Trueblood was raised in the Blue River Quaker Community, which instilled in him a pious adherence to the principles of peace.[82] Having studied theology at Earlham College (Richmond, Indiana), Trueblood returned to Blue River to serve his community as a Quaker minister before embarking on an academic career.[83] As a scholar of Latin and Greek, he became President of Wilmington College, Ohio (1874-1879) and Penn College, Oskaloosa, Iowa (1879-1890).[84] From his academic life in the Upper Midwest, Trueblood looked outwards and undertook a speaking tour of Europe to promote the cause of peace in 1890-1892 under the auspices of the Christian Arbitration Society of Philadelphia.[85]

With the untimely death of Rowland B. Howard, the Secretary of the American Peace Society, Trueblood was summoned back to the US to assume the role by Robert Treat Paine II, the

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[80] Hoganson, *Consumers' Imperium.*

[81] Don Herbert Yoder, 'Christian Unity in Nineteenth Century', in Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill (eds.), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1968* (Geneva, 1993); Nils Karlström, 'Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work, 1910-1925', in Rouse and Neill (eds.), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, pp. 509-521.

[82] Swarthmore, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Papers of the American Peace Society (DG 003) [Hereafter APS Papers], Papers of Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, Box 19 (SCPC-5469), Folder: Information on Life and Genealogy of Benjamin F. Trueblood, 2-25a, 'Boyhood of Benjamin Franklin Trueblood'.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Charles E. Beals, 'Benjamin Franklin Trueblood', *The Advocate of Peace* 78/11 (December, 1916), p. 326. *The Advocate of Peace* underwent several minor changes in its name across this period. These are as follows: *The American Advocate of Peace and Arbitration (1884-1892), American Advocate of Peace (1892-1893),* and *The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920).* For simplicity, it is referred to as *The Advocate of Peace* across this thesis and is abbreviated to *AoP*.

[85] Ibid.

Society's President.[86] 'A born idealist and trained leader', Trueblood was henceforth tasked with editing the Society's monthly journal, *The Advocate of Peace*, and operating as the Society's official spokesman.[87] Such a role entailed frequent speaking tours throughout the United States, the authoring of pamphlets and books (including an English translation of Kant's *Perpetual Peace)*, the maintenance of networks of correspondence with other American and European peacemakers, working as a lobbyist to the American government, and regular attendance at the annual roster of international peace conferences (including the Universal Peace Congresses, the Lake Mohonk Conferences, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and The Hague Conferences). By the time he died in October 1916, he had made nineteen trips to Europe for peace conferences (where he would make speeches in English, German, and French) and had edited the *Advocate of Peace* for twenty-three years.[88] As a result of his tireless activism and peripatetic lifestyle, Trueblood stood at the centre of a vibrant intellectual community that was both a product and a promoter of the nineteenth-century world of empires.

The Peacemakers

Peace did not necessarily mean the absence of war. Indeed, the binary of peace and war as stable and hegemonic analytical categories has obscured the asymmetries of power and pervasive coercion inherent within nineteenth-century diplomatic practice. Throughout history, peace was understood to contain a multiplicity of meanings. In conventional linguistic accounts of the term, early modern understandings of the concept are rooted in a 'moral notion of tranquillity' or otherwise in a perceived absence of political activity.[89] It was also, however, a euphemism for death (as Emmanuel Kant acknowledged in his essay on perpetual peace). The history of nineteenth-century diplomacy was also replete with genres of conflict that did not fall under the terminology of formal war, whether that be gunboat diplomacy, economic sanctions, or naval blockades. This linguistic instability has given rise to a tendency in the literature to see a division between those who sought the absolute abolition of war versus those who took a gradualist approach.[90] This division, however, obscures that the gradualists were seldom in favour of the abolition of all forms of international conflict and that the absolutists often advocated the abolition of interstate violence, even when it would mean the persistence of other (generally

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[86] APS Papers, Box 24, Folder: General Correspondence from BFT (1892-1916), Robert Treat Paine to Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, 7 March 1892; Robert Treat Paine to Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, 6 April 1892.

[87] 'Benjamin Franklin Trueblood', *AoP* 78/11 (December, 1916), p. 326.

[88] 'Great Friend Dies In East', *The Richmond Palladium and Sun-Telegram* XLI/294 (27 October 1916), p. 1; 11.

[89] Stella Ghervas, *Conquering Peace: From the Enlightenment to the European Union* (Cambridge, 2021), p. 10.

[90] Patterson, 'An Interpretation of the American Peace Movement, 1898-1914', p. 22; Samuel Moyn, *Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War* (New York, 2021).

non-geopolitical) violence.

A large amount of the literature on the peace movement has been written from the vantage point of the modern movement to abolish war – with a glut of work emerging around the Vietnam War.[91] Much of this literature has sought to exhume the history of the present, charting the historical lineage of the opposition to modern wars, whether they be Vietnam or Iraq.[92] Many have even applied the word 'pacifist' to historical actors in the nineteenth century, when the term had yet to be coined.[93] Due to the instability of peace as a concept and the anachronism of the term, I do not use the term 'pacifist' to describe any of the individuals who populate this dissertation. A medley of other terms exists, such as the anti-war movement, non-resistors, or conscientious objectors; however, each of these carries modern baggage. Instead, across this dissertation, I apply the term 'peacemaker' to those who formed part of this porous and amorphous set of liberal Americans.[94] This is partially a recognition that peace was as much a style of politics as it was a political ideal for nineteenth-century Americans; in their minds

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[91] Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States, from the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton, 1968); Sondra R. Herman, *Eleven against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898-1921* (Stanford, 1969)*;* Warren F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Nashville, 1969); Merle Curti, *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936* (New York, 1972); C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918* (Princeton, 1972); Charles Chatfield, *Peace Movements in America* (New York, 1973); David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914* (Bloomington, 1976); Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington, 1980); Charles Chatfield and Robert Kleidman (eds.), *The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism, Social Movements Past and Present* (New York; Oxford, 1992); Harriet Hyman Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights* (Syracuse, NY, 1993); Jay Winter, *Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the 20th Century* (New Haven, 2006); David Allan Mayers, *Dissenting Voices in America's Rise to Power* (Cambridge, 2007); David Allan Mayers, *Wars and Peace: The Future Americans Envisioned, 1861-1991* (Basingstoke, 1998); Charles F. Howlett and Robbie Lieberman, *A History of the American Peace Movement: From Colonial Times to the Present* (Lewiston, 2008); Catia Cecilia Confortini, *Intelligent Compassion: Feminist Critical Methodology in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (New York; Oxford, 2012); Michael Kazin*, War against War: The American Fight for Peace, 1914-1918* (New York, 2017); Charles F. Howlett, 'Elihu Burritt: America's Nineteenth-Century International Peacemaker', in Charles F. Howlett, Christian Philip Peterson, Deborah Buffton, and David L. Hostetter (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Peace History* (Oxford, 2022), pp. 455-473; Margot Minardi, 'US Efforts to Promote Peace in the Nineteenth Century', in Charles F. Howlett, Christian Philip Peterson, Deborah Buffton, and David L. Hostetter (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Peace History* (Oxford, 2022), pp. 248-264.

[92] See for instance, Chatfield and Kleidman (eds.), *The American Peace Movement*, p. xvii-xxv; Herman, *Eleven against War*, p. vii; Mayers, *Dissenting Voices in America's Rise to Power*, p. ix.

[93] Chatfield and Kleidman (eds.), *The American Peace Movement*, p. 1. The *Oxford English Dictionary* identifies the term pacifism as first being used in French at the Tenth Universal Peace Congress (1902). It was then adapted to English during the First World War. Despite its invocation in French, I have seen no nineteenth-century peace activist use this term during my archival work. For works that apply the term to the nineteenth century, see: Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*; Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States*.

[94] Margaret MacMillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London, 2003). The term has previously been used by Margaret MacMillan to describe the diplomats who crafted the peace settlement at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. However, rather than being a critical account of peace itself, it is instead an account of the high diplomacy around of the end of the First World War.

peace was less the product of politics but rather a political process in and of itself. Furthermore, the term acknowledges the coercive impetus that lurked in the background of this style of politics. Peace no longer connoted the absence of war, but instead was something that had to be crafted, if necessary, with force.[95]

The term had widespread contemporary use, with it being frequently repeated in reference to the biblical verse that proclaimed: 'Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called the children of God.' As such, members of the movement regularly used the term to refer to their own, as well as peaceful-minded individuals who sat outside of the immediate circle of peace activists in the American Northeast – ranging from Leo Tolstoy to Theodore Roosevelt.[96] Perhaps most notably, the UPU's in-house journal was entitled *The Peacemaker and the Court of Arbitration*.[97] The journal, along with the American Peace Society's *Advocate of Peace*, was a cornerstone of the movement's media ecosystem – being the primary way in which peacemakers interfaced both with one another and with the wider cadre of reform groups and institutions.

What follows is not a history of a set of organisations, but rather of an epistemic community. The peacemakers shared common assumptions as to the ideal direction for the United States and its role in the world, and the style of politics required to get there. While organisations such as the APS and UPU were the centre of gravity for the peacemakers, they will not be treated as the exclusive and authoritative voices of American peacemaking. Rather than assessing the ideologies and actions of those who were card-carrying members of these organisations, I have instead examined those who reached into the peacemakers' toolkit in order to affect the imperial character of American domestic and foreign policy. Doing so not only illuminates the common assumptions held by those in the movement, but also the ideas and actions of those who existed in their orbit: those who engaged with or critiqued their ideas, who were on the receiving end of their lobbying efforts, or who were shut out from participation.

Even so, the archives and publications of these organisations (and their leaders) form the archival backbone of this study. However, this material is placed in dialogue with the voices from the world of peacecraft, whether they be statesmen, members of the wider reform ecosystem, anti-colonial activists, or activists from abroad. Extra attention is paid to the voices of anti-

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[95] DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History*, pp. 79-107.

[96] For examples of the term's internal usage within the peace movement, see 'Dr Hale as a Practical Peacemaker', *AoP* 64/5 (May, 1902), p. 87; 'William Randal Cremer – A White Knight of Peace', *AoP* 70/8 (August and September, 1908), pp. 180-1. For the wider application of the term, see 'Tolstoy as Peacemaker', *AoP* 72/11 (December, 1910), p. 253; 'Ex-President Roosevelt's Services to the Cause of World Peace', *AoP* 71/4 (April, 1909), pp. 73-4.

[97] Hereafter referred to as *The Peacemaker*.

colonial activists who sought to both engage with and critique the ideas of the peacemakers – although their efforts were often derided, ignored, or co-opted. Such material is regularly contextualised with contemporary accounts from the press and official documents, such as the Congressional Record or official diplomatic correspondence.

Given the peace movement's global-facing character and the globalising world in which it operated, this study follows a transimperial methodology to understand the shaping of the United States' empire.[98] By acknowledging that the United States, and the empire that it would come to hold, was porous and subject to broad global forces such as flows of people, capital, and ideas across borders, the assumption that the nation-state must be the default unit of analysis is undermined.[99] In doing so, the character of (a singular) American foreign policy is also challenged, as diplomacy emerges as inherently contested – evolving from both the top and the bottom. In foregrounding that the United States was not simply a nation-state but also an empire, the web of connectivity that surrounded it emerges as inherently shaped by the asymmetries of power core to this mode of governance. Indeed, as Jay Sexton and Kristin Hoganson have argued, such a web is perhaps best seen as the connective tissue between empires.[100]

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This study contains four chapters, each of which is focused on a specific moment of imperial crisis around the turn of the century. As well as addressing the varying crises of imperialism, each chapter also focuses on a different instrument of peace. Therefore, nested within each chapter is a question around which the emerging global state was to be defined: Who was most suited to arbitration? When might sovereignty be violated? Where required neutralisation? And how ought the laws of war to be applied? Each of these concepts bled from one crisis to another, with experimental and creative solutions to the problems of empire accreting across this period. However, each specific episode of imperial strife provided the movement with a new chance to envision new mechanisms with which to regulate the world of empires. Certain threads tie these methods of experimentation together, namely: the shifting place of transnational whiteness in the minds of nineteenth-century Americans, the emerging tension

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[98] Kristin L. Hoganson and Jay Sexton (eds.), *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham, 2020).

[99] Thomas Bender, *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, 2002); Paul A. Kramer, 'Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World', *The American Historical Review* 116/5 (2011), pp. 1348-1391; Ian Tyrrell, *Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective since 1789* (New York, 2015).

[100] Hoganson and Sexton (eds.), *Crossing Empires,* pp. 1-23.

among peacemakers between their desire to make war more humane versus a desire to reduce its overall prevalence, and the enduring questions of who ought to be involved in the process of making American diplomacy.[101]

Chapter One examines the response of the peace movement to the 1895-6 Venezuela Dispute and the ensuing attempt to lobby the American and British governments to pass a permanent Anglo-American arbitration treaty. The dispute was a flashpoint in American diplomatic history, as the US waded into a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana sparking the possibility of a third Anglo-American war. The war scare would eventually subside only for the peace movement to maintain its campaign for a more cordial transatlantic relationship. A vision of transatlantic whiteness – based on a mythology of the two nations' common Anglo-Saxon heritage – was core to the peace movement's campaigning, as the peacemakers deployed arbitration as a means of excluding the Venezuelans from the boundary dispute.

Chapter Two explores the response of the peace movement to the two major humanitarian crises of the 1890s: the massacre of the Armenian Christians in the Ottoman Empire and the Cuban War of Independence, which would eventually prompt American intervention in 1898. These two crises are illustrative of the politics of imperial comparison in this period, with nineteenth-century Americans often viewing them as borne out of a common root cause – the degeneration of global empires. The politics of peace shows the limitations of humanitarianism in this period, as peacemakers took the atypical stance of supporting action in the case of the Armenians and restraint in the case of the Cubans. In making arguments regarding when the United States was justified in violating the sovereignty of another nation (and when it was not), the peacemakers harnessed religious and racial tropes to buttress their claims. Furthermore, the chapter offers a window into the varying and layered tactics of peacecraft, as peacemakers employed familiar tools (such as moral suasion and private diplomacy) as a means of promoting their preferred policy of imperial guardianship.

Chapter Three unpacks the response of the peace movement to the so-called 'Great Debate' over empire that accompanied President William McKinley's decision to annex the Philippines in 1898. It does so by exploring the movement's initial reaction to the Treaty of Paris which declared peace with the Spanish and the transfer of sovereignty of the Philippine archipelago to

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[101] These three threads have been explored to varying degrees by several other prominent historians. On whiteness and American Empire see Love, *Race over Empire*; Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*. On the tension between humanitarianism and peace see Samuel Moyn, *Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War* (New York, 2021). On questions of who ought to make American foreign policy see Ian Tyrrell, 'Inter-Imperial Entanglements in the Age of Imperial Globalization', in Jay Sexton and Kristin Hoganson (eds.), *The Cambridge History of America and the World*, Vol. 3, pp. 716-737; Tuffnell, *Made in Britain*, pp. 56-91.

the United States. Emerging ideas of liberal internationalism were key to understanding the movement's reaction to this, as peacemakers experimented with policies of neutralisation in the hope that this would allow for American civilising influences to spread across the Far East, while precluding annexation. Liberal internationalism's importance here is further illustrated by the ways in which peace activists framed the United States' entry onto the stage of global empires with reference to its participation at the 1899 Hague Conference.

The final chapter examines the ways in which American peacemakers negotiated the changed discourse surrounding American imperialism following the election of 1900. Following the re-election of the pro-imperialist President McKinley, peacemakers altered their tactics, seeking to mould public opinion in their favour and engage more with Filipino anti-colonial activists. Specifically, they shifted their focus from opposing the annexation of the Philippines to arguing that the governance of the archipelago ought to be reformed in line with their genteel, Christian beliefs. Revelations of depraved American military conduct were vital to this shift – as peacemakers expressed their horrors at the news that American soldiers were engaged in wanton acts of barbarity and in unchristian acts of vice. The revelations of torture and vice caused the peacemakers to simultaneously invoke and critically re-examine the laws of war and their applicability to colonial warfare. Rather than this being borne out of a humanitarian concern for the wellbeing of the Filipinos on the receiving end of American imperial misconduct, the peacemakers crafted a critique of the American administration that focussed largely on the effect that colonial rule would have on the white and Christian character of the American republic.

The endeavours of the peace movement often ended in failure. However, in the face of short-term setbacks, the ideas that they crafted and promoted proved durable. As such, the epilogue briefly explores two contemporary thinkers who adopted some of the ideas articulated by the peace movement and remade them for their own purposes. Firstly, I examine the ways in which the Harvard philosopher William James took the failures of the peace movement and used them as a cautionary tale in developing his theory of the 'Moral Equivalent of War', which he primarily articulated at the 1904 Universal Peace Congress held in Boston. Secondly, I analyse the ways in which Theodore Roosevelt co-opted ideas of global governance when articulating his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Specifically, I examine how his concept of a global police force was drawn from the peacemakers' constellations of ideas – only to be turned to a more bellicose purpose. Both James' and Roosevelt's creative reinterpretation of peacecraft were illustrative of peace's enduring utility as a political style and a constellation of ideas – especially when shorn of its idealistic progenitors.

The travails of the peace movement are instructive in the history of the United States' foreign

relations. Exemplifying the fault line that ran through nineteenth-century liberal politics, the peacemakers became simultaneous critics and theorists of empire, as they both extolled the civilising function of Western imperialism while condemning the competitive logic inherent to the imperial system. They contested the construction of the United States' empire project at every turn as they envisioned a more perfect form of empire, predicated on the abolition of war among civilised peoples and the spread of the civilising mission across the world. In seeking to solve the problems of contemporary imperial politics, the peacemakers envisioned a world order that was supra-national by design but transimperial in origin. Core to this was the creation of a world of cooperative empires that would be bound together by new and experimental mechanisms of global governance. Rather than simply meaning the absence of war, peace, in the hands of the peacemakers, became a style of politics and statecraft. On the one hand, peacecraft represented the apparatus of a nineteenth-century rules-based global system, while, on the other, it emerged as a set of tools for the domestic production of peace.

Chapter 1: Venezuela, Arbitration, and the Monroe Doctrine

'A War with England is Like a Civil War.'[1]

Lyman Abbott

Introduction

By 1898, arbitration proceedings between the Republic of Venezuela and Great Britain were drawing to a close. It was three years after President Cleveland's threat of war with Britain that a panel of judges finally met to issue their ruling on the disputed boundary line between British Guiana and the South American republic. The American legal team that was acting on behalf of the Venezuelans, and was headed by ex-President Benjamin Harrison, had reached their concluding remarks. Rather than offering a summary of their arguments, they instead issued a statement affirming their faith that the proceedings before them were a vital step in the creation of a peaceful world order. They maintained that in the 'history of arbitration tribunals this one will find a conspicuous place, and will recommend to other nations the use of this great agency of peace.'[2] For Harrison and his colleagues, the event marked a waypoint in the process through which nations would be brought 'to a bar that will treat them with the same impartiality that is shown to individual litigants'. Once such a bar had been reached, according to Harrison, 'the era of a universal peace [would] be near.'[3]

By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States' role in the world was changing. The traditional principles that had guided American foreign policy during the past century were coming under strain; the tensions between the Monroe Doctrine, Washington's principle of non-entanglement, and the belief in Manifest Destiny had become intractable, as the United States emerged as a global power in the age of New Imperialism. The first of these, the Monroe Doctrine, arose as the main point of contention during the debates over the United States' relations with Great Britain, which surrounded the brief yet jarring war scare over a contested boundary line between British Guiana and the Republic of Venezuela. As has been argued by historians such as Jay Sexton, the Doctrine was a highly elastic pillar of American foreign policy that was consistently adapted and contested throughout the nineteenth century; its invocation

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[1] Lyman Abbott, 'A Plea for Peace', *The Advocate of Peace* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 62.

[2] J.M. Rojas, Benjamin Harrison, Benjamin F. Tracy, Severo Mallet-Prevost, and James Russell Soley, *Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration; The Printed Argument on Behalf of the United States of Venezuela Before the Tribunal of Arbitration* (New York, 1898), Vol. 2, p. 765.

[3] Ibid.

during the Venezuela Dispute represented its reorientation to the age of New Imperialism.[4]

The significance of the crisis has often been presented as either trivial or as an omen of the jingoism that was to explode around the Spanish-American War and the sinking of the USS *Maine*.[5] The crisis, however, offered Americans a renewed opportunity to debate and challenge the utility of the Monroe Doctrine in a shrinking world.[6] Technological changes in the second half of the century – such as the laying of the transatlantic cable in 1866 and the shortening of the Atlantic crossing due to evolving steam technologies – gave momentum to Anglo-American cultural integration.[7] American peace activists saw Anglo-American rapprochement (and for some even reunion) as the first step towards a new world order of peaceful conduct between civilised nations.[8] As such, the construction of a peaceful world order was accompanied by an emerging political style that fused popular politics and diplomacy – peacecraft – of which arbitration represented a fundamental plank.

For the peacemakers, these years were formative. The Venezuela Dispute and the resulting debates over arbitration revealed a central tension in their thinking about American diplomacy: How could an Anglo-American relationship, which would be the motor for the onward march of civilisation, be reconciled with a Doctrine that was designed to distance America from Europe and most of all Britain?

Proponents of peace became the most unequivocal voices contesting the Doctrine and its applicability to the Venezuela case. At the height of the debate, they called for the abandonment of the Doctrine altogether and for the US to acquiesce to an expanded British imperial presence in Latin America. Core to this was the shifting place of whiteness in American political culture

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[4] Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 2011), pp. 12-13.

[5] Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (London, 1969), p. 20; Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven; London, 1998).

[6] Scholars of international relations have applied a constructivist approach to this episode, pointing to the shortcomings of liberal and realist interpretations in their failure to account for domestic racial attitudes. See Srdjan Vucetic, 'A Racialized Peace? How Britain and the US Made Their Relationship Special', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7/4 (2011), pp. 403-22; Steven Ward, *Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers* (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 159-180.

[7] Duncan Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race: Empire and the Utopian Destiny of Anglo-America* (Princeton, 2020); Stephen Tuffnell, *Made in Britain: Nation and Emigration in Nineteenth-century America* (Oakland, 2020).

[8] For a manifestation of this sentiment in transatlantic political culture, see: Michael Patrick Cullinane, '100 Years of Peace among English-Speaking People: Anglo-American Cultural Diplomacy, 1909–1921', *Peace and Change* 46/1 (2021), pp. 5-34.

and its application to global politics.[9] As the US stood on the brink of acquiring its insular empire, the peace movement carefully weighed up the competing claims to white identity and racial solidarity between the British and the Venezuelans. As a consequence, they adjudicated between two clear visions of regional peace, one Pan-American and the other transatlantic. When faced with who ought to hold sovereignty over the disputed territory, peace activists harnessed cultural claims of a common Anglo-American history, religion, and language to shut the door on Venezuelan interests in the matter. Therefore, peacecraft, and the evolving discourse around whiteness that undergirded it, enabled the spatial realignment of American diplomacy in the late nineteenth century – from the Western Hemisphere to the Northern Hemisphere.

The peace movement was steeped in a liberal faith in the civilising capacity of Britain and America, which therefore gave rise to a lively debate on the proper place of empire in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than arguing over the legitimacy of British or American imperialism, a constructive debate emerged in the late nineteenth century, which sought to establish the norms and standards by which an imperial power ought to civilise the so-called backwards nations of the earth. This sowed the seeds of the main debate in the movement during the coming years: ought the United States to stand back and allow European colonialism across the world or would its exceptional status lend it to being the nation that could guide other powers towards a more enlightened imperialism?

Genteel imperialism underlay the way that the peace movement approached this moment of crisis and reconciliation. The civilisational logic in which the American peace movement travelled was visible in their calls for the Venezuela Dispute to be resolved by a process of arbitration between Britain and the United States. The use of arbitration was emerging as the favoured means of international dispute resolution among the peacemakers, whose worldview was built upon a faith in elitism and technocracy.[10] Arising from the academic discipline of international law, arbitration sought to resolve interstate conflicts by having disputes brought before a balanced panel of judges, rather than allow foreign policy to be guided by diplomatic sabre rattling. That relations between and within imperial polities were to be governed and adjudicated by a group of elite and unelected legal experts was characteristic of the peacemakers' genteel vision of the world of empires. The realities of arbitration, however, reveal the asymmetries of power inherent within the practice of peacemaking. As the eventual arbitration of the Venezuela

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[9] See for instance Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality, Critical Perspectives on Empire* (Cambridge, 2008); Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race: Empire and the Utopian Destiny of Anglo-America* (Princeton, NJ, 2020).

[10] See for instance the 'Declaration of the First Lake Mohonk Conference, 1895', *Report of the First Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1895*, pp. 5-6, 81-82.

Dispute by a panel of American, British, and Russian judges demonstrates, the process was little more than an exercise of power by Western imperial states. In the minds of peace activists, arbitration was notionally the main tool that would bind together the civilised nations of the world into a framework of peaceful cooperation, while also being a tool to defend the rights of small states against larger ones and to provide diplomatic tutelage to those nations in need of guidance. Needless to say, this was not how the process of arbitration would come to be received by the Venezuelans, who protested the abridgement of their sovereignty by two self-interested empires.

The use of anti-colonial rhetoric to justify American expansion – what William Appleman Williams and subsequently Jay Sexton have termed 'imperial anti-colonialism' – was a defining feature of the Monroe Doctrine's evolution in the nineteenth century.[11] The peace movement turned this logic on its head, advocating collaborative restraint in support of a British civilising mission in the Western Hemisphere. And while the Monroe Doctrine was not abandoned, as some in the movement had wished, their call for American diplomacy to be spatially reorientated from the Western Hemisphere to the world of so-called civilised nations would resonate with American diplomatic practice for years to come. This chapter first unpicks the competing geographic axes around which the peace movement established its worldview in the 1890s. Next, it examines the debate surrounding the Venezuela Boundary Dispute, before turning to the peace movement's response to the negotiation and failure of the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty for arbitration between Britain and the United States.

The Axes of Arbitration

The settlement of international disputes via arbitration was frequently cited by peacemakers as the silver bullet that would remedy the longstanding problems of nineteenth-century geopolitics. Globalisation and industrialisation meant that states required more innovative and flexible solutions for dispute resolution than the blunt instruments of traditional diplomacy.[12] Therefore, the resolution of the Alabama Claims via arbitration in 1872 provided a proof of concept for peacemakers across the world, who sought to manage the negative features of an international system, which Maartje Abbenhuis has characterised as an 'Age of Neutrals'.[13] War deterrence and

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[11] William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962), pp. 16-52; Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine,* pp. 5-7.

[12] See Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 2014), p. 157.

[13] Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals*; Walter LaFeber, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 2: The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 58. Arising over the use of British shipyards for the construction of a ship that would be used by the Confederacy in the Civil War, the resulting arbitration peaceably settled the claim by awarding the United States $15,500,000.

the avoidance of international conflict were the primary objectives of this international system, where the balance of power within the Concert of Europe was a carefully orchestrated endeavour. As Abbenhuis so ably demonstrates, this culture of neutrality was not solely the purview of a policy-making elite, but instead was the product of an interplay between state and non-state actors, as policy-makers operated 'in an age of mass literacy and mass media, [where] diplomacy was a public enterprise.'[14] Consequently, peacemakers sought to make broad appeals to a newly imagined public, attempting to mould public opinion in favour of their middle-class, elitist policy prescription.

In the decades that followed the Alabama Claims, the British Liberal MP and future Nobel Laureate, William Randal Cremer, became the most prominent English-speaking advocate of arbitration between Britain and the United States. A lynchpin of the transatlantic peace movement, Cremer drew his peaceful sensibilities from his background as a trade unionist, having campaigned heavily for the nine-hour working day. Long a follower of American affairs, he openly stated his support for the Union during the Civil War and had used his position as the founder of the International Workmen's Peace Association (later the International Arbitration League) to campaign for rapprochement between the two countries. This campaign for a cordial Anglo-American relationship had reached its apogee by the late 1880s, following Cremer's election to the House of Commons for the working-class Haggerston division in 1885. From the benches of the Commons, he tirelessly worked to win support from across Parliament in support of a lasting arbitration mechanism between the two nations. 1887 marked Cremer's first attempt to push arbitration up the political agenda, as he gathered the signatures of 234 fellow MPs and 28 members of the House of Lords for a memorial that he would personally present to President Cleveland via the introduction of Andrew Carnegie.[15] The trip was largely unsuccessful, having been blighted by the Anglophobic protests of Irish Americans. However, Cremer's memorial struck a chord with the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Sherman, when it was presented to the Committee by Carnegie and the New York lawyer, David Dudley Field.[16] Sherman, himself a Vice President of the American Peace Society (APS), thus proposed a resolution to the Senate emulating Cremer's memorial. And while the bill died in the House of Representatives on its first attempt, Sherman re-introduced an identical bill in 1890 that passed both chambers.

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[14] Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals*, p. 160.

[15] Martin Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945* (Oxford, 2000), p. 133; Patterson, *Toward a Warless World* p. 19. Carnegie and Cremer had developed a relationship in 1885 when Carnegie had paid off a considerable amount of the IWPA's debt which allowed it to resume normal functioning.

[16] US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. International Arbitration. Hearing. 50th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 141, 18 June 1888.

The bill itself did little but affirm the solidarity of the United States with Cremer's cause; however, it would become a cornerstone of the movement's lobbying campaign that was frequently cited and praised in subsequent years.[17] Cremer's actions and his association with Carnegie had triggered a wave of activity within the American arm of the movement, as local religious groups lobbied in favour of his memorial and members of the APS gathered signatures for an American petition to match Cremer's.

Angered, however, by political indecision and unable to take no for an answer, Cremer returned to the struggle for an arbitration treaty with renewed vigour. Responding to more than 1,300 individual petitions from across Britain, and with Carnegie watching from the public gallery, Cremer shepherded a bill through Parliament that called upon the Government to reciprocate Sherman's resolution and to negotiate a treaty with the United States that committed all future Anglo-American disputes to be resolved by arbitration.[18] The following year, Cremer presented President Cleveland with a further memorial signed by 354 MPs, imploring him to act on Congress's request.[19]

The American Peace Society remained undeterred by the politicking on both sides of the Atlantic over Cremer's and Sherman's resolutions. Convinced that they were swimming with the tide of historical progress, they remained optimistic that the recent small victories were a sign of good things to come. 'The growing spirit of reasonableness and good will which has rendered arbitration so frequent in the near past will render it universal in the near future', wrote Benjamin Franklin Trueblood in *The Advocate of Peace*.[20] Such an historical trajectory was, according to Trueblood, 'the only rational interpretation of the signs of the times.'[21] This sense of providence was likely boosted by the recent use of arbitration to settle a dispute between Britain and the USA over contested sealing rights in the Bering Sea, which had given a boon to the peacemakers'

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[17] Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, p. 22.

[18] British Parliament, Hansard, House of Commons Debate, 'Treaty of Arbitration with the United States' (16 June 1893), vol. 13, cols. 1240-1273; Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists*, p. 144. See also Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, 'International Arbitration. Its Present Status and Prospects', *AoP* 56/ 9 (September, 1894), pp. 201-11.

[19] Trueblood, 'Mr Cremer's Memorial', *AoP* 57/2 (February, 1895), pp. 36-37.

[20] Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, 'International Arbitration. Its Present Status and Prospects', *AoP* 56/9 (September, 1894), p. 211.

[21] Ibid.

cause.[22]

Just as talks with the British were bearing fruit, a conversation of an altogether different tone was about to take place, as delegates from the nations of the Western Hemisphere met in Washington for the Pan-American Conference. The meeting, for the most part, resembled an American attempt to extend its economic sphere southwards across the hemisphere, with the American delegation being representative of American commercial interests. Only one of the ten delegates had previously held a formal diplomatic brief and included figures such as Andrew Carnegie and coal magnate Henry G. Davis.[23] The conference agenda inspired little faith among attendees that its aim was anything other than a naked attempt at American economic expansion - with topics including a customs union and thus a common continental tariff, common silver coinage, a Pan-American commercial bureau, and the provision for a Pan-American railway from Chile to Texas.

However, Carnegie's presence was not only emblematic of American business interests at the conference but was also tied to the American proposals for a hemispheric treaty of arbitration. While such a treaty had not been subject to the same intensive lobbying undertaken by Cremer for an Anglo-American Treaty, the conference saw a push from American peacemakers keen to capitalise on the moment. The American Peace Society, having read the proposals to be discussed at the conference, memorialised all attendees that no issue seems 'more vital to the future interest and prosperity of these American nations than [the proposed treaty]'.[24]

In spite of the movement's enthusiasm, the treaty (as with almost all other measures proposed at the conference) was treated with great scepticism by the Latin American delegations. The conference had already been plagued by infighting regarding the nomination of the secretary, as well as the conference's official language and its rules. And so, a majority of the agenda items were treated with hostility by the Latin American delegates. While the arbitration treaty was one of the items which actually produced a concrete result, the final wording of the agreement

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[22] An issue of contested imperial space, the Bering Sea Dispute revolved around who had the rights to seal in the waters around the Pribilof Islands, off the coast of Alaska. After talks beginning in 1890, both sides agreed to limit land sealing to 7,500 seals per year, to prohibit all pelagic sealing, and to establish a joint commission to arbitrate on the seizure of Canadian vessels by the American navy. For more on this see, Briton Cooper Busch, *The War against the Seals: A History of the North American Seal Fishery* (Kingston, 1987); John Soluri, 'Fur Sealing and Unsettled Sovereignties', in Kristin L. Hoganson and Jay Sexton (eds.), *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham, 2020), pp. 25-45.

[23] James Brown Scott (ed.), *The International Conferences of American States 1889-1928* (New York, 1931), p. 10. For a full exploration of the 1889-1890 Pan American Conference see Samuel Inman and Harold Davis, *Inter-American Conferences, 1826-1954: History and Problems* (Washington D.C., 1965).

[24] Edmund S. Tobey and Rowland B. Howard, 'Memorial to the Washington Conference', *AoP* 52/1 (January and February, 1890), p. 4.

contained broadly defined opt-outs such that any issue which 'may imperil [a nation's] independence' would be exempt.[25] Even with the treaty being so watered down, six out of sixteen delegations refused to sign it. Among those who did sign the agreement, only the home government of newly republican Brazil went on to ratify the proposals.

However, in that moment, the American peace movement was more optimistic, being encouraged by the language of Secretary of State James G. Blaine, who saw the agreement as a necessary first step towards hemispheric peace. Blaine loftily proclaimed the treaty as being the core success of the conference:

> 'If, in this closing hour, the conference had but one deed to celebrate, we should dare call the world's attention to the deliberate, confident, solemn dedication of two great continents to peace, and to the prosperity which has peace for its foundation. We hold up this new Magna Charta, which abolishes war and substitutes arbitration between the American Republics, as the first and great fruit of the International American Conference.'[26]

The agreement, and Blaine's hyperbolic comments, were received with similar levels of optimism in the press. 'The educated sentiment of humanity approves the choice of arbitration as the best method of reaching a satisfactory settlement of differences,' wrote one editorial in the *Advocate,* 'and that the meeting of this Pan-American Conference demonstrates that the people of the Western Hemisphere are willing and ready to enforce among themselves the principle of arbitration.'[27] Similarly, the *Philadelphia Record* extolled Blaine's efforts, claiming that the treaty should be 'an impressive lesson for the older States of Europe, which are wasting the resources of their people in maintaining vast military organizations to insure peace by perpetual readiness for war.'[28] Perhaps the most laudatory was Elihu Root, the international lawyer who would go on to serve in the cabinets of McKinley and Roosevelt. The day after the conference, Root invoked the utopian lines of Alfred Tennyson's renowned poem Locksley Hall, proclaiming that delegates were 'the advanced guard in the greatest movement since civilization began toward the brotherhood of man and the federation of the world.'[29]

However, even if the peace movement were unwilling to acknowledge it, the threadbare nature

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[25] Scott, *The International Conferences of American States*, p. 41.

[26] James G. Blaine, 'The Attitude of the United States', *AoP* 52/3 (May, 1890), p. 71.

[27] 'Close of the International Conference', *AoP* 52/3 (May, 1890), p. 71.

[28] Reprinted in 'Well Done, Mr Blaine', *AoP*, 52/3 (May, 1890), p. 88.

[29] Inman and Davis, *Inter-American Conferences, 1826-1954*, p. 46. The phrase 'the brotherhood of man and the federation of the world' was regularly quoted by peacemakers to affirm their faith that the arc of history would bend in a liberal direction.

of the agreement became apparent almost instantly. American commitments to arbitration had already been perceived as hollow by Latin American activists such as Cuban nationalist José Martí who, during the conference, remarked that 'Arbitrage would be an excellent thing […] if [the United States] would yield to its own appetites.'[30] Less than a year would pass until Martí was proven right, as the Harrison administration showed itself to be unwilling to abide by its own rhetoric, as the US rejected an offer of arbitration with Chile over the murder of American sailors in Valparaiso in 1891.[31]

The difference between American actions and words on the topic of arbitration would come to a head by the middle of the decade. Peace, and the American willingness to pursue it, looked different depending upon where the United States turned its gaze. Looking over the Atlantic, Americans joined in a transnational effort to bring about an end to war between English-speaking peoples; looking southwards, peacemakers were naive in their willingness to celebrate a paper-thin arbitral agreement. However, the tensions between their vision for a hemispheric peace and their belief in an Anglo-Saxon-led world order would be exposed by the coming war scare.

The Venezuelan War Scare

In December 1895, only two weeks after issuing his State of the Union, President Cleveland returned to Congress to deliver a separate message, warning of war with Britain.[32] The President's message sent shockwaves through the country as the fear of war spread. The issue in question was the long-running boundary dispute between British-controlled Guiana and the Republic of Venezuela, which had been simmering in the background of American politics throughout 1895, as a perceived encroachment by the British into the Western Hemisphere. After the State Department had exhausted all diplomatic avenues and had issued a call for arbitration, Cleveland informed Congress that under the authority of the Monroe Doctrine the United States would 'resist [Britain] by every means in its power as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests.'[33] This was commonly recognised in the press as Cleveland pre-emptively setting out his justification for war, should Britain not acquiesce to an arbitration process led by a commission of American jurists and statesmen.

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[30] Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 197-198.

[31] Ibid. p. 196-197.

[32] Grover Cleveland, 'Message of the President', *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President, Transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895*, *Part I* (Washington, 1896), Document 526.

[33] Ibid.




Image 3: Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Commission, 'Boundaries Claimed or Proposed' (55th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document 91), David Rumsey Map Collection, David Rumsey Map Center, Stanford Libraries.

Cleveland's rhetoric was interpreted as a dramatic escalation of tensions and a break with his otherwise subdued engagement with foreign powers. Harvard social critic and man of letters Charles Eliot Norton captured the mood best when remarking to his friend, the British author Leslie Stephen, that 'Cleveland's message fell like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky.'[34] For the American Peace Society, the sense of shock was palpable. Earlier in the year, having seen the issue gain traction in American politics, the APS implored the British to make good on their previous commitments to arbitration, in a first step towards their envisioned Anglo-American peace.[35] Cleveland's message shifted their focus back home; in their eyes, the President had succumbed to the forces of jingoism and thus had imperilled the emerging political and cultural unity of the two Christian, Anglo-Saxon nations.

The boundary dispute had been running since the British had drawn the borders of British Guiana in 1841, with both nations claiming jurisdiction over the mouth of the Orinoco River. Over the course of the next fifty years, the British incrementally increased their demands for land in the disputed region between the two territories (as shown in Image 3). However, by the mid-1890s the British had renewed their attempts to extend their influence in South America more broadly, as they occupied the territory of Corinto in Nicaragua and seized the island of Trindade off the coast of Brazil, in order to build a cabling station. Matters were brought into focus for Washington when the British claimed jurisdiction over the gold fields of Yuruari and Cuyuni in 1894, with the American press responding with Anglophobic indignation at these encroachments on the Western Hemisphere.[36]

Since the 1880s, the boundary dispute had firmly been on the peacemakers' radar as a potential flashpoint that might precipitate an imperial power struggle in the Western Hemisphere. Their initial fear was that belligerent-minded Americans might bring it upon themselves to take up arms and push back against the ever-growing British demands for land in the Orinoco basin. As such, the Universal Peace Union publicly entreated all those who were considering engaging in filibustering expeditions to act with restraint.[37] At the same time, they sought to smooth over diplomatic tensions between the South American Republic and the British. Luckily for the UPU,

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[34] Charles Eliot Norton to Leslie Stephen, 8 January 1896 in Charles Eliot Norton, Sara Norton, and M. A. De Wolfe Howe, *Letters of Charles Eliot Norton* (Boston, 1913), vol. 2, p. 236.

[35] Trueblood, 'Great Britain and Venezuela', *AoP* 57/3 (March, 1895), pp. 61-62.

[36] See for instance Henry Cabot Lodge, 'England, Venezuela, and the Monroe Doctrine', *The North American Review* [Hereafter *NAR*] 160/463 (June, 1895), pp. 651-58. Also see the resultant Congressional lobbying campaign led by Democratic Congressman LF Livingstone.

[37] 'England and Venezuela. What has been done by the UPU Toward a Peaceful Settlement,' *The Peacemaker and the Court of Arbitration* [Hereafter: *The Peacemaker*] 14/7 (January, 1896), p. 135.



This is to Certify that
Mr. Conrad F. Stollmeyer
Vice President of the Universal Peace Union organized 1866 and incorporated by the United States of America 1888, has been appointed a Minister of Peace to visit the Courts and influential bodies of Europe in the interest of Peace, and we solicit the courtesy and consideration which his eminent mission demands.
Alfred H. Love President
John J. Lytle Secretary
Philadelphia, Pa. U.S.A. May 10th 1890
Mr. Conrad F. Stollmeyer, a Citizen of the United States by naturalization and an accredited Delegate of the Universal Peace Union to the Courts of England, France, Germany, Austria and Russia, on a mission of Peace, is recommended to your kind services in furthering the object of his friendly visits.
Edwin H. Fitler
Mayor City of Philadelphia
SEAL OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 1701
SEAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Being assured of the meritorious character of Mr. Conrad F. Stollmeyer, and in view of the worthy object of his mission abroad, I commend him to the Courtesy and Confidence of all persons with whom he may come in Contact in the prosecution of his work.
Given under my hand, and the Great Seal of the State, at the City of Harrisburg this Fourteenth day of June in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and Ninety and of the Commonwealth the one hundred and fourteenth.
By the Governor:
Charles W. Stone
Secretary of the Commonwealth
Wm. A. Sears

Image 4: Diplomatic Credentials of Conrad F. Stollmeyer, UPU Records, Series 1, Box 1 (SCPC-0459), Folder 15.

they had been in correspondence with a longstanding Vice President of the organisation, Conrad Frederich Stollmeyer, who happened to be stationed on the island of Trinidad, less than 10 miles off the coast of Venezuela. Born in Ulm, Germany, Stollmeyer had migrated to Philadelphia by 1838 where he became both a newspaper editor and a railroad investor.[38] Upon establishing himself in the US, he became a Vice President of the UPU and, after moving to the Port of Spain in Trinidad (in order to invest in Caribbean and South American oil), he operated as the UPU's agent on that island.[39]

Tensions simmered throughout the 1890s as Britain escalated its territorial demands. In response, the UPU set out to establish Stollmeyer as the foremost intermediary between the

[38] Swarthmore College, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Records of the Universal Peace Union (DG038) [Hereafter UPU Records], Box 1 (SCPC-0459), Folder 15, Curator of Jane Addams Peace Collection to Mr CC Stollmeyer, 18 March 1938.

[39] Ibid. For more on Stollmeyer and his interests in oil see David McDermott Hughes. *Energy without Conscience: Oil, Climate Change, and Complicity* (Durham, NC, 2017), Chapter 2.

British and the Venezuelans. Already residing in British-governed Trinidad, the UPU issued Stollmeyer with diplomatic credentials – signed by the Mayor of Philadelphia, the Governor of Pennsylvania, and the President of the UPU – in the hope that he would be treated as a 'Minister of Peace' upon handing them to officials in Caracas [see Image 4]. The moment that he reached Venezuela on 3 November 1889, Stollmeyer immediately met with the Venezuelan President, Dr JP Rojas, and the Foreign Minister, Don Agustín Istúriz to whom he attempted to sell his message of peace.[40]

In spite of the intractability of the border issue, the UPU declared Stollmeyer's mission a success when diplomatic channels reopened between Caracas and London in order to address other peripheral issues. In doing so, Stollmeyer made contact with the American envoy to Caracas, William Scruggs, who would become a crucial agitator for the Venezuelan cause. The UPU commented on the entire episode retrospectively in 1896 – extolling Stollmeyer's ability to conduct shuttle diplomacy and the ability of peacecraft more broadly to grease the wheels of diplomatic progress:

> 'The success, it appears from other sources, was brought about by Mr Stollmeyer inducing the Venezuelan government to request Col. Scroggs (sic), the United States Plenipotentiary, to address Mr Blaine our Secretary of State, requesting him to inquire through the United States Minister in London whether the British Government would consent to receive an envoy from Venezuela with a view to arrange pending difficulties as to the Guiana boundary line, the thirty per cent. extra duties levied, and the British claims on Venezuela.'[41]

Still far away from a war footing, this minor de-escalation of tensions gave the peacemakers reason to celebrate. According to the UPU, the Venezuelans were similarly celebratory of their man in Caracas:

> 'The title 'Minister of Peace' was bestowed upon Mr Stollmeyer by the Caraquienos, as, in diplomatic conference with President Rojas Paul and his ministers, he brought the olive branch of the Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia to heal the differences between our neighbour republic and Great Britain. His diplomatic success has been further crowned by the Decoration of the Order of the Bust of the Liberator, fourth class, which the Venezuelan government has bestowed upon him for service rendered to humanity and civilization.'[42]

Stollmeyer's mission was emblematic of peace's elevation to a form of statecraft; his designation as a 'Minister of Peace' was indicative of the emergence of peace being a style of diplomacy

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[40] 'England and Venezuela', *The Peacemaker*, p. 136.

[41] Ibid. p. 137.

[42] Ibid.

(rather than merely an aspiration) – the title was one that the UPU would continue to apply to Stollmeyer with pride [see Image 4]. Whether or not the brief détente between Britain and Venezuela was in fact the result of the actions of those in Philadelphia, Stollmeyer would later acknowledge that 'without the organization of the U.P.U. he could not have done much' to further the cause of peace.[43]

The events of the 1880s, however, were still a far cry from the scenes of jingoism that would beset American political culture later in the 1890s. The issue's sudden political traction in American domestic politics by the start of the 1890s was no accident. In the fifty-year life of the boundary dispute, the Venezuelan government had often sought American intervention on their behalf, but never to any avail. However, by the 1890s they had resolved to take a different approach, engaging the former American Ambassador to Venezuela, William Scruggs (following his successful liaison with Stollmeyer), to stoke American public opinion on the boundary dispute.[44] Scruggs' subsequent intervention was far from subtle. The pamphlet entitled *British Aggressions in Venezuela, Or, The Monroe Doctrine on Trial* argued that America's 'peace and safety' were at stake in the boundary dispute, as the potential establishment of new British colonies in Venezuela would reduce the Monroe Doctrine to ruin.[45] Having exploited commonplace tropes of Gilded Age Anglophobia, Scruggs ended his pamphlet with a call to arms that would echo through the subsequent American debate over the issue:

> '[I]f England should finally decide upon this course, and under the flimsy pretext of a boundary dispute of her own seeking, and […] persist in her efforts to extend her colonial system within the territory and jurisdiction of an independent American republic […] the United States should reaffirm, and maintain at all hazards, the principles of the declaration of 1823. The only alternative would be an explicit and final abandonment of those principles; and that would involve a sacrifice of national honor and prestige such as no first-class power is likely ever to make, even for the sake of peace.'[46]

Scruggs' belligerent rhetoric found a ready home with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who

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[43] Ibid. p. 136.

[44] R. A. Humphreys, 'Presidential Address: Anglo-American Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 17 (1967), p. 143. It is worth noting that Scruggs had been dismissed from his post of ambassador for attempting to bribe the President of Venezuela.

[45] William Lindsay Scruggs, *British Aggressions in Venezuela, Or, The Monroe Doctrine on Trial* (Atlanta, 1895), p. 31. In the first edition of his pamphlet, Scruggs is described as 'Jurisconsult for the Republic of Venezuela', a title that is omitted in subsequent editions.

[46] Ibid. p. 32. For more on the role of Anglophobia in American political culture, see; Stephen Tuffnell, '"Uncle Sam Is to Be Sacrificed": Anglophobia in Late Nineteenth-Century Politics and Culture', *American Nineteenth Century History* 12/1 (2011), pp. 77–99.

authored an article in the *North American Review* echoing Scruggs' line that the boundary dispute was a grave danger to the continued existence of the Monroe Doctrine.[47] 'The time has come for decisive action,' wrote Lodge, 'The United States must either maintain the Monroe doctrine [sic] and treat its infringement as an act of hostility or abandon it.'[48] Having earlier in the article derided those who wished to dilute the Doctrine as being intent on promoting the interests of foreign nations, Lodge's position was clear: either maintain the Monroe Doctrine or face a resurgent British Empire in the Western Hemisphere. Scruggs' pamphlet struck a similar chord with the editor of *The Review of Reviews,* Albert Shaw, who in an editorial note entitled 'Venezuela and British Aggression', attacked the British encroachments into territory that was 'formerly regarded by everybody as an integral part of Venezuela,' stressing that 'the British ought by all mean[s] to prepare definitely to withdraw altogether.'[49]

Perceived British intransigence over the control of the Orinoco Delta proved to be a stumbling block for American attempts to foster a diplomatic solution to the dispute. Cleveland himself had avoided speaking of the Monroe Doctrine in public, given that he 'knew it to be troublesome.'[50] Cleveland's actions had matched his words (or lack thereof). At the start of his second term, he had shelved the proposed annexation treaty of Hawaii and had pulled American troops out of the isthmus of Panama. However, the diplomatic impasse coincided with the elevation of Richard Olney to the role of Secretary of State. Having orchestrated the suppression of the Pullman Strike during his previous role as Attorney General, Olney transferred a similar belligerence to his handling of American foreign affairs.[51] Olney's reaction to the boundary dispute was to invoke and extend the Monroe Doctrine – and America's right under the norms of international law – to intervene in a conflict which he believed directly concerned it. Issuing what would come to be known as the Olney Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine – or what Cleveland would call Olney's 'twenty-inch gun' – Olney pronounced that 'To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.'[52] Writing to the American ambassador to Britain, Thomas Bayard, Olney claimed that any encroachment into the Western Hemisphere by a

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[47] Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement,* p. 14. The article has also been noted for its large historical inaccuracies concerning the boundary dispute.

[48] Henry Cabot Lodge, 'England, Venezuela, and the Monroe Doctrine', *NAR* 160/463 (June, 1895), p. 658.

[49] Albert Shaw, 'Venezuela and British Aggression,' *The Review of Reviews* 10/4 (October, 1894), p. 362.

[50] Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine,* p. 202.

[51] George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York; Oxford, 2008), p. 307.

[52] Richard Olney to Thomas Bayard, July 20, 1895, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, 1896), Document 527; Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 203.

monarchical power was a moral injury to the United States, giving it a legitimate interest in the boundary dispute. 'The people of the United States have a vital interest in the cause of popular self-government', wrote Olney, and it was for America to ensure that self-government and republicanism were nurtured and maintained across the entire hemisphere.[53] Backed up by its superior military clout, Britain was, according to Olney, annexing the Venezuelan territory in all but name, in what amounted to 'an invasion and conquest of Venezuelan territory.'[54]

In his subsequent message to Congress, Cleveland channelled the belligerent tone of Olney's diplomatic correspondence with London, as he stated that there would be only one satisfactory outcome for the United States: arbitration based around an American-led enquiry into the dispute. And while he was aware of the threat to the United States' relationship with its 'friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace', such a blatant and knowing abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine by Britain would result in an unthinkable 'loss of national self-respect and honor.'[55] Despite his earlier forbearance, Cleveland's message proved that the Monroe Doctrine remained a vital tenet of American foreign policy that could easily and swiftly be weaponised.

In the ensuing congressional debates over appropriations for Cleveland's proposed boundary commission, a majority of members of Congress lined up behind Olney's 'Twenty-Inch Gun' in a confident display of jingoism as the body unanimously granted the President his desired funds. The boundary commission was intended to be the fact-finding mission that would lend credibility to the American charges of foul play and thus justify their aggressive drive towards arbitration. Such a display of unanimity in Congress has led Stuart Anderson to claim that the body uttered 'not a word of criticism' of Cleveland's policy.[56] And while it is true that the funds were expedited through the legislature in a display of readiness for war, the Senate became a forum for the discussion of the limits and proper applications of the Monroe Doctrine.

Having worked to shepherd the Cremer resolution through Congress, Senator John Sherman represented the peace movement's most prominent spokesperson in the Senate. His return to the chair of Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1896 earned the plaudits of the *Advocate of Peace* which described this as 'a great support to the cause of a pacific and sensible

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Grover Cleveland, 'Message of the President'.

[56] Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904* (Rutherford N.J.; London, 1981). p. 96.

internationalism', noting his record of being 'strongly opposed to the jingoistic spirit in the country and heartily in favor of conducting all of our international affairs in a peaceful way.'[57] The same issue of the *Advocate* bore the telegram that had been transmitted to Sherman from APS leaders Robert Treat Paine and Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, upon hearing of Congress's support for Cleveland's message. 'Delay action on Venezuelan Commission', wrote Paine and Trueblood, 'Best sentiment of the country condemns all measures tending to war. Powerful reaction has set in.' [58]

Their desire for delay would prove difficult to achieve, as both the House and the Senate sought to appropriate funds as swiftly as possible. Speaking of the need to proceed without any delay, Congressman Robert R Hitt (R-Il) stressed the importance of maintaining a 'spectacle [that] will be presented to the foreigner, to our opponent, of a Republic that is as one man.'[59] When the bill reached the Senate, Hitt's desire for a speedy process without dissent found numerous, prominent advocates. Most vocal of all was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge who – in a trademark display of imperial anti-colonialism – insisted that the boundary commissioners would not even need to go to Venezuela to look at the facts on the ground. Rather they could attain the relevant documents from the former colonial administrators of the territories, in Madrid and in The Hague. 'We want them to report as soon as possible', said Lodge, 'and then we will sustain the Monroe Doctrine with all the strength of the Republic.'[60] The desire for speed and unanimity was not borne out of a desire to see swift justice for the Venezuelans – whose interests were barely discussed in the debate – but rather from a desire to protect the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine, which many Senators presented as being under threat. This had likely not been helped by the widespread circulation of Scrugg's pamphlet or by British calls for an international conference on the Monroe Doctrine, a request that many Senators took particular umbrage with. Should the Senate deny Cleveland's response, according to Alabama Senator John Morgan, '[o]ur action in disaffirming it […] would reach back through the whole question, and would deny the existence of that feature of American law which we call the Monroe Doctrine.'[61] In fact, Morgan claimed that a boundary commission may actually be inappropriate as, even though it might improve American policy on the matter, it may undermine the validity of the Doctrine as a whole:

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[57] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 58/1 (January, 1896), p. 12.

[58] Ibid. p. 11.

[59] US Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 54th Congress,* 1st Session, 18 December 1895, p. 235. [Hereafter Congressional Record, 54th Congress.]

[60] Congressional Record, 54th Congress, 19 December 1895, p. 243.

[61] Ibid. p. 241.

> 'We might find ourselves in a state of serious embarrassment in regard to the question of enforcing this American doctrine if we are guided by the report of a high commission which, in its resultant effects, might uproot the doctrine itself, or might expose it to another half century or century of debate and discussion.[62]'

Therefore, the remarks of Sherman were notable objections to the broad coalition of jingoism in the Senate, as he called for a slow and deliberative process that maintained the influence of the Senate in the boundary commission's work. While voicing his support for the application of the Monroe Doctrine in this case, he maintained that a more considered process was required to avert war – which he sadly accepted was now a ready possibility. 'The assertion of our right to prevent European powers from seizing any part of the American continents,' he claimed, 'from treating America as Africa, to be conquered and divided among the various nations of Europe, can not be questioned.'[63] However, the boundary dispute itself was a long-running affair and thus required no great haste. He therefore insisted that the bill be submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee where it was amended to include mechanisms for the congressional oversight of the commission. Moreover, where Morgan and Lodge had appealed to American national interest in defence of the Monroe Doctrine, Sherman was far more cosmopolitan in his outlook, seeking to present it as a norm of the international system that Britain had created:

> 'I think that the British people, when they understand this matter, when they see that it is attracting the attention of the civilized world, will not press their contention, especially when they remember that the Monroe doctrine was perhaps not so much the doctrine of Monroe as it was the doctrine of Canning, of England, then prime minister, which was agreed to by the United States and Great Britain, and that the power to prevent encroachment by European powers upon American territory upon American States was asserted not only by the United States, but by the cooperation and consent of England'[64]

Sherman's appeal to the 'attention of the civilised world' was an indication of his internationalist outlook. How could the British trample over a norm of the system they had founded, and which protected the welfare of their empire?

Sherman was joined in his scepticism by Colorado Republican Henry Teller, who saw the policy as having no exceptional grounding in international law beyond the common national right to self-defence. Teller similarly acknowledged the relevance and importance, of the Monroe Doctrine in the policy debate over Venezuela. However, much as Sherman had sought to interrogate its utility beyond the dogmatism of the Senate debate, Teller saw the Doctrine's best

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[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid. p. 243.

[64] Ibid. p. 242.

defence as being its limitations. He claimed that it held no special place as a tenet of international law and was merely an expression of 'the principle which is grounded in all international law that the right of self-defense rests in every nation, limited only by its power.'[65] Teller though went further and took aim at the use of the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for an imperialist policy towards South America, claiming that 'The cherished doctrine is, not that we are the guardians of those Republics, not that we assume a protectorate over them, but that while a European Government may claim from them redress for injuries, it shall not claim that redress in a way which shall entitle it to territorial acquisitions.'[66] In acknowledging the rightful claims that European nations might have, Teller's scepticism for the American guardianship of the Western Hemisphere was only tempered by his belief that no European power should be able to seize territory from a republican South American government. Republican values, he claimed, were vital in the defence of the greater civilising virtue of American commerce and prosperity.

Despite their misgivings, however, Sherman and Teller joined in unanimously appropriating the funds to Cleveland. Both expressed a residual faith in the Monroe Doctrine, which was underpinned by a belief that the British would relent under the weight of growing public aversion to a war with the United States. Members of the peace movement outside of Washington were, however, far less certain.

Accepting that they could not remedy the country's war fever through lobbying in Washington, the APS actively mobilised to influence public sentiment into opposing the war, seeking to cultivate the 'powerful reaction' that they referenced in the letter to Sherman. Their initial response was to publicly pass a resolution calling Cleveland's sabre-rattling – even when in support of arbitration – 'worse than a stupendous blunder', which would 'imperil the peaceful progress of Christian civilization.'[67] However, even after the initial wave of jingoism had subsided in the early days of 1896, peace activists remained fearful that war still remained possible, especially as long as the United States continued to insist on sending its boundary commission to investigate the dispute. Therefore, the Society maintained that '[p]ublic sentiment should continue to be […] so concentrated and massed at both Washington and London as to force both governments to back squarely down and confess their wrong[s] rather than commit the appalling crime of plunging the two great peoples, or branches of one people, into a

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[65] Ibid. p. 246.

[66] Ibid.

[67] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 58/1 (January, 1896), p. 10.

fratricidal war.'[68]

In order to maintain the anti-war sentiment, the APS focussed its energies on the press and on the pulpit. In their campaign, activists wrote and preached of the central tension at the heart of the Venezuela Dispute: what was the place of the Monroe Doctrine in the world of an ever-closer Anglo-American relationship? Accepting the necessity of rapprochement between the two countries, their response was to make two interlocking claims about the nature of the Monroe Doctrine. Firstly, they alleged that the Doctrine did not necessitate a blanket prohibition on all European activity in the Western Hemisphere and allowed for certain limited types of European intervention, especially regarding commercial expansion and the extension of the civilising mission. Secondly, they refuted the idea that the Monroe Doctrine granted the United States the right, or the duty, to treat nations in the Western Hemisphere as protectorates.

The peace movement's most prolific editorial voice was Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, who had been elevated to the post of Corresponding Secretary of the APS in 1892. A devout Quaker, Trueblood acted as the Society's main spokesperson by editing *The Advocate of Peace*. Trueblood's promotion to the role, alongside the elevation of Robert Treat Paine to the presidency of the APS in 1891, marked a break with the old leadership of the Society. With Trueblood and Paine at the helm, the society took on a new sense of pragmatism, seeing its main purpose in American politics as being to pacify the jingoistic tendencies of public opinion and to lobby for American statesmen to implement bilateral and multilateral arbitration agreements. Their ultimate goal was to position the United States as a leader in the construction of an imperial peace.

Trueblood was resolute in his assertion that a European presence in the Western Hemisphere was compatible with the Monroe Doctrine. The growing interconnectedness of the world in the late nineteenth century meant that the concept of a separate Western Hemisphere, as envisioned in the Monroe Doctrine, was fast becoming redundant. As Trueblood put it: 'The world is not a world of hemispheres but is one world.'[69] Instead, in acknowledgement of the free trade heritage of the American peace movement, Trueblood saw British influence in South America as the legitimate commercial interest of a European nation. This activity was not only welcome for the mutual benefits of commerce but was also an inevitable consequence of the collapse of the division between the New and Old Worlds. 'No American dictation,' wrote Trueblood in the *Advocate*, 'can prevent the European nations from having their full and legitimate share of the

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[68] 'The Duty of the Hour', *AoP* 58/1 (January, 1896), p. 7.

[69] Ibid.

commerce of the countries on this side of the globe.[70]' And while he did not welcome anything that might be perceived as an aggressive foreign policy, he reasoned that nothing could or should be done to obstruct British business. It would be 'most unchristian and most unfortunate' should the United States stand in the way of 'the great tide of international friendliness and inter-communication.'[71]

This line of thinking reverberated throughout the press in the days after Cleveland's message. The renowned international lawyer John Bassett Moore – who would later provide Theodore Roosevelt with the legal justification for seizing the Panama Canal – published an article in the *New York Evening Post* examining whether British action in Venezuela could be classified as falling under Monroe's concept of European 'future colonization.' Ultimately, Moore reasoned that it could not be deemed so. Tracing out its history, he alleged that the Monroe Doctrine, as originally intended, was only to be applied to 'the settlement by emigrants of a region not under the control of any civilized power, unless that of the parent country.'[72] At best Britain's actions might be described as the transfer of one European colony to another, which was thus permissible under his reading of the Doctrine.[73] Moore's refusal to present Venezuela as a sovereign state in its own right, and merely an ex-Spanish colony, spoke to a worldview that underpinned the peace movement - one where a state's validity in the eyes of international law was defined by its racial and religious characteristics.

The irony was not lost on Trueblood and his colleagues that the United States was operating an imperial foreign policy under the guise of restraining British imperial power. Olney and Cleveland's oxymoronic justification represented the 'Monroe Doctrine gone mad, poisoned by a spirit as dangerous and deadly to American principles of liberty and equality as is conceivable.'[74] It was in pointing out the United States' hypocrisy that the peace activists harnessed their fiercest indignation. Trueblood struck a strident anti-imperialist tone in the *Advocate:*

> 'There is no primacy among American nations; they are all equal; and for the United States to assume such primacy, on no matter what pretext, is not only to take upon herself responsibilities and risks which she ought not, but is to inaugurate, in a small and seemingly very respectable way, the very same system of aggression and interference for

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[70] Ibid. p. 33.

[71] Ibid.

[72] John Bassett Moore, 'The Monroe Doctrine: Its Origin and Meaning' in John Bassett Moore (ed.), *The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore* (London; New Haven, 1944), Vol. 1, p. 337.

[73] Ibid.

[74] 'The President's Special Messsage', *AoP* 58/1 (January, 1896), p. 6.

which Great Britain is so strongly and justly condemned.'[75]

Most excoriating of all was Yale professor of International Law, Theodore S. Woolsey who went to great lengths to prove that the Monroe Doctrine did not represent a solid principle of international law on which the US might justify its actions. In an article in *Forum*, Woolsey denounced the Doctrine as a shakily constructed plank of American diplomacy, which contained many exceptions and exemptions.[76] Since the 1820s the US had allowed the extension of both the British and the French on the North American continent, with the British extending their influence in Canada and the failed French intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. According to Woolsey, the Monroe Doctrine was only treated as sacred when the US needed to use it. However, his sternest criticism and most biting sarcasm were reserved for Olney and his vision of American expansion:

> 'It is a long and dangerous step towards that assumption of the headship of this continent which Mr Olney so tersely describes when he says that the United States is "practically sovereign" throughout the Americas and that "its fiat is law." A glorious and happy future this, where the responsibilities are ours, the profits another's; where dreams of empire under the guise of a protectorate replace peaceful development; where our own will is our only law!'[77]

'It Would Be a War of Brethren'[78]

The Venezuela Crisis had opened up a debate about the United States' role in the world, a debate that the peacemakers would harness in order flesh out their ideas of genteel imperialism. Vital to this were the peacemakers' differing cultural assessments of the Northern and Western Hemispheres, as they argued that the United States should tilt from the former to the latter.

The arguments of Moore, Woolsey, and Trueblood revealed a broader shift in American thinking about geopolitics. Their view that the US ought not to treat the Western Hemisphere as its own imperial sphere of influence – and that it should be open to efforts for European colonisation – was founded on a growing sense of political-cultural unity with Britain. This was partially borne out of the shared cultural values of an intertwining Anglo-American middle class; on both sides of the Atlantic middle class cosmopolitanism ossified understandings of what it meant to be

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Theodore S. Woolsey, 'The President's Monroe Doctrine', *Forum* XX/6 (February, 1896), pp. 705-712.

[77] Ibid.

[78] 'Sermons on Venezuela', *New York Times* [Hereafter *NYT*] XLV/13834 (23 December 1895), p. 9.

civilised and not civilised.[79] Furthermore, where the Monroe Doctrine had once sought to cast the Old World as the sphere of tyranny and monarchy, the liberal gains of the mid-nineteenth century marked a transformation in British political history that created a transatlantic mythology around the common Anglo-Saxon heritage of the two nations.[80] Nowhere was this view more common than in the pulpit.

On 23 December 1895, less than a week after Cleveland's message, the *New York Times* ran a lengthy article reprinting extracts from recent sermons given by twelve different preachers from across the Northeast, all of whom were calling for peace between the two nations.[81] The *Times* had discerned the common themes from the sermons into two headlines: '[The] English were closer than [the] Spanish,' and that 'war [was] not a test of patriotism.'[82] The article prominently featured the sermon of Lyman Abbott, one of two major clerical voices from within the American Peace Society calling for an end to the diplomatic sabre rattling – the other being British-born clergyman Reuen Thomas.

A prolific journalist and preacher, Abbott had come to the clergy in the run-up to the Civil War after spending his early professional years as a lawyer. A close associate of Henry Ward Beecher, whom he had succeeded as pastor at Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, Abbott used the pulpit (along with his editorship of liberal Christian newspaper *The Outlook*) to advocate for a closer relationship between Britain and the United States. The Venezuela Crisis inspired him to formally join the American Peace Society where he became a Vice President in June 1896, although he would later be expelled from the Society due to his increasingly loud calls for America to enter the European arms race in the years prior to the First World War.[83]

As a proponent of white racial providentialism, Abbott recoiled from Olney and Cleveland's rhetoric, bemoaning that America had misguidedly adopted a hostile tone towards its natural ally

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[79] Bell, *Dreamworlds of* Race; Kristin L. Hoganson, *Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920* (Chapel Hill, 2007); Frank A. Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865-1890* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009). Kristin Hoganson has argued that middle-class patterns of consumption played a key role in how Americans experienced their empire. Furthermore, Frank Ninkovich has demonstrated how the world of middle-class periodicals became increasingly cosmopolitan across the nineteenth century, exploring how ideas of both Europeanness and non-whiteness shifted across this period.

[80] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race;* Paul Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910', *The Journal of American History*, 88/4 (2002), pp. 1315-53.

[81] 'Sermons on Venezuela', *NYT* (23 December 1895), p. 9.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, p. 33; 183.

and sided with a nation of questionable Christian character.[84] In a sermon at Plymouth Church on 22 December 1895, Abbott went further and launched a fiery attack on the Monroe Doctrine and on the latent Anglophobia that he saw driving the dispute. The underlying logic of the Monroe Doctrine was inapplicable to the world of 1895 given that the 'despotisms of the Old World, [were] for the most part, defunct'[85]. Even America's old oppressor, Britain, had changed. The distinction between Old World tyranny and New World republicanism was no longer a useful one and the Monroe Doctrine had become an antiquated and irrelevant pillar of American foreign policy:

> 'And now a question of border line has arisen between what is called a republic, but which has been in perpetual turmoil ever since it existed, and a nation as truly democratic as our own in everything but name – between a republic that is republic only in name and a nation that is republic in everything but name; and the Monroe Doctrine is called upon to compel us to interfere. It has absolutely no relation whatever to the subject.'[86]

For Abbott, the end of the century marked a turning point in the history of civilisation. While Anglophobia may have been the understandable consequence of Anglo-American relations for the century after the War of Independence, Abbott heralded the emergence of a new spirit of republicanism in Britain. The end of the century saw the emergence of two Britains: the Britain of Salisbury and the Britain of Gladstone, the Britain of an established Church and the Britain of religious dissent. In Abbott's words: 'She is not all sinner, and she certainly is not all saint. Neither are we, for that matter.'

This variegated image of Britain extended to its imperial mission as well. There had been a tyrannical empire that had oppressed the North American colonies and there was the imperial mission being conducted in India and Egypt: 'India is immeasurably better off to-day than before England planted colonies there. Egypt is immeasurably better under English domination than she was when under Egyptian.'[87] Even the success of America's political institutions bore the fingerprints of British imperial guidance, which Abbott saw as inoculating the United States from the same despotism as former Spanish or French colonies. Echoing British liberal thinkers such as James Bryce and AV Dicey, Abbott argued:

> 'England, what have we not received from her? She has fought our battles for us; she has poured out her blood for us. It was England that gave English-speaking people the

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[84] Lyman Abbott, 'A Plea for Peace', *AoP* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 59.

[85] Ibid. p. 61-62

[86] Ibid. p. 62.

[87] Ibid.

> Magna Charta, without which American free institutions never could have been: it was England that founded the House of Commons, without which the House of Representatives would have been impossible; it was England that established the Constitutions of Clarendon, without which religious liberty would have been unknown upon this continent; it was England that fought and bled for a free press, free education, a free voice, a free nation.'[88]

The resulting Anglo-American convergence should not only discourage war but also ought to encourage the two nations to join together in a common civilising mission. Both nations were disposed towards liberty, and America was uniquely disposed towards peace. Therefore, according to Abbott, 'together England and America may entrap the world in liberty and fill it with peace.'[89] In practice, this meant that the United States ought to encourage rather than obstruct or merely acquiesce to a greater British presence in South America. Although he did not prescribe any direct action to be taken by Washington, other than a more emollient tone, his desired policy was clear. Interestingly for a figure who would go on to support intervention in Cuba and the annexation of the Philippines, Abbott rejected out of hand that America had any moral duty to intervene – let alone any commercial interest.[90] A moral duty would entail the United States taking the South American republics 'under [its] wing and making them our wards' – a mission that was far too large an undertaking.[91] If Trueblood was equivocal in what counted as a legitimate intervention by a European power in South America, Abbott was steadfast. 'We might well wish that England would absorb the whole of Venezuela,' proclaimed Abbott from the pulpit, 'and then go on absorbing more and more; for these Spanish-American republics, with the exception of Brazil, have done nothing for civilization, and England has done much for civilization wherever she has gone.'[92]

Two months later, and after the threat of war abated, Abbott's fellow Congregationalist Reuen Thomas reflected on the durability of the Anglo-American relationship in an address to the Chicago Congregational Club. Thomas' biography embodied the transatlantic ideal of

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[88] Ibid; on Bryce and Dicey's view of the British heritage of the American Constitution see Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*, p. 267; Jordan Rudinsky, 'James Bryce's Home Rule Constitutionalism and Victorian Historiography', in Edward Cavanagh (ed.) *Empire and Legal Thought: Ideas and Institutions from Antiquity to Modernity* (Leiden; Boston, 2020), pp. 492-519.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Benjamin J. Wetzel, 'Onward Christian Soldiers: Lyman Abbott's Justification of the Spanish-American War', *Journal of Church and State* 54/3 (2012), 406-25.

[91] Abbott, 'Plea for Peace', p. 60.

[92] Ibid. p. 60. Colonisation by England, according to Abbott, would allow for the extension of the civilising mission into Latin America – specifically, the introduction of 'the railroad, the telegraph, the banking system, manufactures, schools, churches, civilization' to South America.

cosmopolitan gentility; born in Britain, Thomas had previously been educated at University College London and in Rostock, Germany. Having worked as a preacher in London, he migrated to the United States in 1875 to take up the pastorate of Harvard Church, from where he became the President of the Boston Congregational Club and took up an interest in philanthropy.[93] In his address, he endorsed the vision of Britain being both a nation of Gladstonian liberalism and Tory jingoism, seeing it as an explanation for Britain's status as a 'monarchical republic'.[94] This oxymoronic view of Britain was a product of the religious fault line that ran through recent British history, with the Tory desire for an established church being the root cause of American separation from Britain. Religious toleration, as practised in America and among British liberals, was, however, the driving force for Anglo-Saxon peace. Thomas was in no doubt that the US rather than Britain was the world's foremost herald of peace, as he saw it as being uniquely peaceful for its entire existence. However, the intellectual heritage of these ideas was fundamentally British, having only emerged 'when English blood – the English language – English ideas of freedom to worship god [and] English ideas of republican government' had 'come into operation and influence.'[95]

To Thomas, as to many of the peace activists who idolised British liberalism, peace was not merely a rejection of war, but was a style of politics that represented the highest stage of civilisation. The very same ideas that Thomas believed would cultivate a nation towards self-government would also foster peaceful conduct between nations. Man's inclination towards violence would be diminished under republican government and hostilities towards other nations would be suppressed and mediated through arbitration. Thomas' sermon thus represented an explicit endorsement of the peace movement's efforts for the creation of permanent international structures for arbitration. Such structures, according to Thomas and the peacemakers, were vital to future historical progress, with Thomas writing that 'If these two nations hold together – settle everything that is discordant by arbitration, be determined that there shall be no deadly warfare between English speaking peoples, no one can forecast the greatness of their future.'[96]

However, more implicit in his sermon was the undermining of the Monroe Doctrine's separation of a New and an Old World. Instead, he saw the end of the nineteenth century as a

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[93] 'Minister Dies Suddenly', *NYT* LVII/18,187 (10 November 1907), p. 9; 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 69/11 (December, 1907), p. 253.

[94] Reuen Thomas, 'The True Mission of England and America', *AoP* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 63.

[95] Ibid. p. 65.

[96] Ibid. p. 68.

moment of opportunity to unite the two nations through a shared sense of their Christian ideals. A common Anglo-Saxon religious identity provided the intellectual bedrock for peace advocates' appeal for the United States to embrace the British civilising mission in South America. Appeals to this identity were the common coin of those who sought to reconcile the United States' dislocation from European affairs with the unstoppable march of liberal progress across the globe.

By the time Thomas had given his sermon in March 1896, the fear of war had dissipated. Faced with events spiralling out of control in South Africa in the wake of the Jameson Raid, accompanied by a growing fear of German influence in that region, the British government shrank from any prospect of war with the United States.[97] For peace campaigners on both sides of the Atlantic, this was a welcome sign that the British had realised the importance of Anglo-American peace and cooperation in the context of growing tensions within the Concert of Europe. The image of a potential Anglo-Saxon Civil War was replaced by those of racial harmony. Cartoonist Charles Taylor captured the mood in *Puck* (see Image 5), where he depicted Anglo-American politicians appropriating Native American clothing, smoking 'common sense' tobacco from a 'peace pipe'. On the floor in front of the Anglo-American statesmen lay a hatchet that was being buried, as Taylor presented the two separate branches of the same race coming to their senses.

The Advocate of Peace reported on proceedings from Parliament in February 1896, noting the references in that year's Queen's Speech to the Venezuela boundary dispute. Here Salisbury's Government outlined their 'sympathy with the desire to come to an equitable arrangement and trust[ed] that further negotiations will lead to a satisfactory settlement.'[98] Similarly, Arthur Balfour, the Government leader in the House of Commons, expressed his desire that the 'British case should be published at the earliest possible date and that neither diplomatic punctilios nor false pride should prevent an honest effort to find a settlement.'[99]

'This determination of Great Britain,' wrote Trueblood, 'which has brought final assurance that we are to have no war, is worthy of supreme honor.'[100] The reduction of tensions and the avoidance of war was an exemplary demonstration in how to diffuse the bout of jingoism that America had experienced two months prior. British forbearance was a 'victory of good-

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[97] Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement*, p. 18.

[98] 'A Peaceful Settlement Assured', *AoP* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 53.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid. p. 54.



Image 5. Charles J. Taylor, 'Let Us Have Peace', *Puck* 38/985, (January 22, 1896), Centrefold.

fellowship [and] of Christian sympathy,' the likes of which peace activists saw as emblematic of a new style of politics that was emerging in the run-up to the new century.

Speaking in the wake of the Queen's Speech, Hannah J. Bailey, the president of the Women's Christian Temperance Union's Peace and Arbitration Department, echoed the language of Abbott and Thomas in expressing her relief. 'A war between the United States and its mother country would be fraught with untold disaster to humanity', she claimed in her address to the 1896 WCTU's annual meeting, 'These are leaders in the civilization and the Christianization of the world and are mutually interested in all the advance movements of the age.'[101] Yet even as the threat of conflict had subsided, activists were under no illusion as to how close the two countries had been to the brink of war. 'If the jingo program set out by our furibund statesmen and populace had been pushed in the unreasoning spirit of the 17th and 18th of December,' claimed Trueblood, 'we should have gone headlong and heart-wrong into the dire calamities of war before the summer flowers were blooming again.'[102]

Instead, what followed was a protracted but cool diplomatic back-and-forth, focussing on the proper mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of the Venezuela Dispute. Arbitration was accepted by both sides, however, disagreement remained over the remit of the proposed panel, with the British holding out that territory which had already been settled ought to be exempted from any arbitral considerations. The issue was finally resolved by Olney and Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, who agreed that an arbitral panel of two American jurists, two British jurists and an independent arbitrator would meet to decide the issue. All land that had been settled by the British for more than fifty years would be exempt from discussion and for all other territory under consideration, the length of time for which settlements had been established would be taken into account.

The peace press erupted in adulation at the news of an arrangement for arbitration. 'It is just a year ago […] that President Cleveland's Venezuela message set all Anglo-Saxondom in commotion,' wrote the *Advocate,* 'Everybody is delighted that the last breezes of the commotion have disappeared with the announcement in London and Washington […] that a basis of settlement of the trouble has been reached.'[103] Trueblood and Paine went as far as to write to Olney to express their gratitude on behalf of the APS and to praise his judgement, seeing him as the architect of the agreement:

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[101] *Report of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union Twenty-Third Annual Meeting held in Music Hall St Louis, Missouri, 13-18 November 1896* (Chicago, 1896), p. 400.

[102] Ibid.

[103] 'The Venezuela Arbitration', *AoP* 58/11 (December, 1896), pp. 269.

> 'The Board feels that this grand consummation is due in large measure to the signal ability, the clear insight and the patient firmness with which […] you as Secretary of State have conducted the diplomatic correspondence regarding the subject, in which you have so fully represented and clearly interpreted the earnest wish of the great body of the American people.'[104]

Such lofty overtures to the principles of peace were, however, completely absent from the responses of Venezuelan officials to news of the terms of the arbitration. Where a year earlier Cleveland's threat of war had been met with excitement, Venezuelan officials greeted the arbitration agreement with dismay. The first issue of concern was the absence of Venezuelan representation on the arbitration panel – which, in the words of Venezuelan President Joaquín Crespo, amounted to 'a national humiliation' for Venezuela.[105] The overriding fear among Venezuelans was that 'the treaty may imply a North American protectorate in South America.'[106] The second issue – the news of which caused rioting in Caracas – was the exemption of areas of British settlement from consideration, a condition that would already yield swathes of disputed land to the British before the arbitration had even begun.[107] In an effort to mollify Venezuelan opinion, the United States conceded that the Venezuelans might choose a member of the panel. However, they insisted that whoever was chosen had to be an American jurist.

'Let us have Peace'[108]

While the news of the peaceful settlement of the boundary dispute was greeted with relief by many observers in Washington and London, peacemakers across the Atlantic showed no desire to relent in their efforts to completely pacify Anglo-American relations. Boosted by their initial success, activists set their sights on a more enduring mechanism to prevent future conflicts – rather than simply viewing the British climb down as their endgame. In their letter of congratulations to Olney, Trueblood and Paine also remarked that the time was ripe for the passage of a permanent treaty of arbitration, which would codify arbitration as the primary method of dispute resolution in Anglo-American relations. Keen to stress that such an agreement was not simply the desire of a metropolitan elite, the pair stressed to Olney that a new treaty would have broad-based support on both sides of the Atlantic, as the 'highest welfare, both material and moral, [of ordinary citizens] demands that their relations be put upon a basis

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[104] Robert Treat Paine and Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, 'Correspondence with the State Department', *AoP* 58/11 (December, 1896), p. 277.

[105] Humphreys, 'Anglo-American Rivalries', p. 161.

[106] 'News in Brief', *The Times (London)* 35119 (5 February 1897), p. 5.

[107] Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 208-209.

[108] Cited as Image 5.

to assure permanent peace.[109]'

The sudden change of emotions revealed a creeping amnesia among American peacemakers regarding the original cause of the entire episode, namely the British encroachments onto Venezuelan territory. That the boundary dispute which sparked the war scare in fact had very little to do with the direct interests of the United States was clearly lost on the leaders of the APS, who now sensed an opportunity. In a sleight of hand that saw them reveal their racial biases, the peacemakers sought to harness their movement's momentum and embarked on a public campaign for transatlantic arbitration – rather than carefully scrutinising the terms of the Venezuelan Boundary arbitration. The campaign in favour of the treaty was one of the most vibrant foreign policy lobbying campaigns in American history up to that point, with historian Stuart Anderson noting that the 'Senate received more petitions and memorials from groups supporting the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty than it had received for any previous American treaty' – with only twelve petitions in opposition (all coming from Irish-American clubs).[110] Such a volume of petitions, however, obscures the top-down nature of this campaign. The bulk of the petitions that the Senate received on this matter were the result of the *New York World* soliciting statements of support from across the American middle classes. In the compendium of petitions that were presented to Congress off the back of this campaign, the *New York World* trumpeted that they had received support from 'bishops and archbishops of all denominations, from presidents of colleges, from mayors of fifty leading cities of the United States, and from the presidents of the boards of trade in forty-eight cities'.[111] The campaign in support of the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty was thus anything but bottom-up.

Sensing that the wind was in their sails, the leaders of the APS lost no time in mobilising as soon as the threat of war had subsided. Writing in the *Advocate,* Trueblood noted that the war scare had 'awakened many from their indifference and [had] stirred up those who were already active to greater energy.'[112] He also remarked upon the way that their colleagues in Britain – notably in the International Arbitration League – had taken the lead by holding conferences and circulating petitions. Most notably the cause had garnered the attention of prominent Anglo-American journalist WT Stead, who had organised a conference of arbitrationists at Sion College as early

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[109] Robert Treat Paine and Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, 'Correspondence with the State Department', *AoP* 58/11 (December, 1896), p. 277.

[110] Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* p. 108.

[111] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Responses of the Newspapers of the United States to the New York World's Telegram Asking an Expression of Opinion Upon the Pending Arbitration Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain.* 55th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 63, 6 April 1897.

[112] 'A Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration,' *AoP* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 54.

as 14 January 1896. As the man whom Andrew Carnegie had once called his 'dear erratic genius', Stead's involvement was unsurprising, being one of the foremost advocates of Anglo-American reunion.[113] With the support of such a renowned figure, Trueblood called for a joined-up movement on both sides of the Atlantic to take 'advantage of the present state of public opinion for securing the establishment of a permanent tribunal for the settlement of difficulties hereafter arising between the Anglo-Saxon nations.'[114]

In spite of this, the initial groundwork for the American arm of the pro-arbitration campaign came not from the seasoned members of the peace movement, but rather from a collection of prominent citizens from Chicago. Although they were not the movement's usual suspects, the Chicagoan arbitrationists fitted the genteel profile of prospective peacemakers, with the group including Mayor of Chicago George B. Swift, future Treasury Secretary Lyman J. Gage, and a host of Chicago businessmen. Stating that they wished to establish 'a movement for cementing all the English-speaking people of the world in peace and fraternal unity', the group called for a conference to discuss and promote the cause of arbitration, to take place on Washington's birthday.[115] This mobilisation of support arose in spite of the relative paucity of information from the White House regarding the progress of negotiations between the two countries. Indeed, the resulting conference was the forerunner of a wave of public meetings in support of arbitration that would occur throughout 1896. Primarily organised by the political reformer Herbert Welsh (who would later play a key role in the debates over the Philippine-American War), the meeting, held in Philadelphia on Washington's birthday, brought together peacemakers who had already spoken out on Venezuela – including Paine, Abbott, and Moore – along with businessmen such as the New York mining magnate, William E. Dodge Jr.[116] The meeting unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a further meeting at Washington in April and declared that 'the common sense and Christian conscience of America and England agree that the time has come to abolish war between these two nations, who are really one people.'[117]

Numerous smaller meetings and associations popped up across the country in response to the meeting at Philadelphia, calling on the US government to act and seeking to spread the word about the forthcoming conference in Washington. Robert Treat Paine hosted a meeting at his

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[113] Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race,* p. 110.

[114] Ibid.

[115] *American Conference on International Arbitration Held in Washington, D.C. April 22 and 23, 1896* (New York, 1896). p. 1 [Hereafter *ACIA*].

[116] For more on Herbert Welsh see Chapter 4.

[117] 'The Arbitration Convention at Philadelphia,' *AoP* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 56.

home in Boston just four days after his attendance at the Philadelphia gathering, in order to drum up support for the forthcoming Washington conference. Paine was joined by a coterie of New England liberals, including Charles Francis Adams and Edwin D. Mead, as well as the future president of the Anti-Imperialist League George S. Boutwell and the Boston Mayor Josiah Quincy.[118]

This wave of organising was not isolated to New England and the liberals of the Northeast. A flurry of activity across the country erupted as business groups, from locations as diverse as San Francisco, St Louis, and St Paul, all voiced their support for arbitration and pledged their attendance at the Washington Conference. The Californian delegation would go as far as to claim that, 'The English-speaking nations are so connected by ties of blood and commerce that a war between them would be particularly atrocious and, in our opinion, would put back the world's progress for many years.'[119] The religious voices of Congregationalists, such as Abbott and Thomas, were now supplemented by those of Catholics; the Archbishop of Baltimore, Cardinal James Gibbons, circulated an appeal that had also been signed by the Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Herbert Vaughan, and the Archbishop of Armagh, Cardinal Michael Logue.[120] Furthermore, as well as the religious and geographic heterogeneity, the circular that advertised the conference, bore the endorsements of figures as diverse as Harvard President Charles W. Eliot, APS President Robert Treat Paine, and the Commanding General of the United States Army, Nelson A. Miles, himself a veteran of the Plains Wars and a future general in the Philippines-American War.[121]

However, this geographic and religious diversity obscured an underlying uniformity at the conference; despite the impressive list of attendees that ranged from generals to lawyers and businessmen from across the country, the event was uniformly attended by middle-class white men. Despite the superficial cosmopolitanism of the conference, certain hierarchies persisted. That women were excluded from participating in any meaningful way raised the ire of those hardened peacemakers who were thus barred from speaking and voting at the conference.[122] Belva Ann Lockwood – who had participated in similar conferences across the world via her

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[118] 'Meeting of Boston Citizens at the Home of Robert Treat Paine,' *AoP* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 71.

[119] *ACIA*, p. 13-14

[120] Ibid, pp. 14-16.

[121] David Patterson has claimed that attendees were overwhelmingly conservative in their outlook. While there is merit to this point, it is worth noting that when specifically thinking about warfare, the pro-arbitrationists actually represented a fairly heterodox set of opinions, including Generals such as Nelson Miles as well as well-established peace activists.

[122] Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, p. 38.

work with the UPU and the International Peace Bureau – was particularly excoriating of the conference's organising committee, which she claimed 'had arranged matters [so] that they represented nobody but themselves.'[123] The uniformity of attendees, therefore, revealed the underlying hierarchy and conservatism that was at play in the peace movement at this critical juncture. Despite the work of figures such as Lockwood and Bailey, patriarchy pervaded the movement, excluding some of the most industrious peacemakers from one of its defining moments.

This narrowness of representation engendered a conservative consensus among attendees at the D.C. conference. Broad agreement emerged that the conference ought to support opt-outs from requirements to arbitrate whenever a matter might concern the honour of the nations in question. Similarly, any attempts to widen the scope of the conference were rebuffed by attendees – most notably regarding the possibility of broadening the call for arbitration to nations beyond Britain and the United States. Speaking against such a suggestion, Trueblood proclaimed that widening the scope of the conference resolution's final wording would undermine the very efforts of the conference.[124] Carl Schurz, the former Mugwump and future anti-imperialist, closed the debate in a similar manner, claiming that 'every one wishes to see the whole world embraced in an arbitration system, but a start must be made, and we make it with an English-speaking nation.'[125]

Such arguments – which chimed with the appeals to transatlantic cultural solidarity as espoused by Abbott and Thomas in the wake of the Venezuela war scare – were pervasive throughout the conference. Speakers made frequent reference to the United States and Britain being united by blood, language, and institutions. Terms such as Anglo-Saxon and English-Speaking People were often used interchangeably and demonstrated the fluid construction of white identity among the peacemakers of the late nineteenth century – with inclusion being dependent on both biology and cultural signifiers such as religion and history. For instance, the former Secretary of State John Foster, who made the conference's opening address, relied heavily on the image of a culturally unified and exceptional race that spanned across the Atlantic. Invoking ideas of 'a common Christianity' and the two nations' common 'lineage, language, and institutions', Foster proclaimed that Anglo-American war was becoming a historical anachronism.[126] In all, he

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[123] Belva Ann Lockwood, 'International Arbitration, Venezuela, Cuba, and the National Conference at Washington,' *American Magazine of Civics*, 9/1 (July, 1896), p. 23.

[124] *ACIA*, p. 27.

[125] Ibid. p. 28

[126] Ibid. p. 19-20.

surmised that:

> 'The English-speaking race is by far the most numerous of the great Caucasian family, and to it is intrusted by Providence the highest interests of civilization and Christianity in the world; and if this Conference shall result in a permanent plan whereby their differences may be adjusted by arbitration, it will win for itself the fame of one of the memorable assemblies of all history.'[127]

Almost all speakers heartily agreed with Foster's sentiments, however, they often differed on the implications of this for the wider world. For some attendees, this appeal to white identity would morph into a fully-fledged appeal for settler colonialism. For instance, the editor of the Illinois periodical *The Interior,* Rev. William C. Gray, employed colourful yet sardonic rhetoric to exalt the global expansion of English speakers:

> 'There are nearly 120,000,000 of English-speaking people in the world. We, the English-speaking people, own and occupy all the American continent north of the Rio Grande. We have a little patch of country in South America, British Guiana, which is very valuable, because on it we raise topics for congressional and other debating societies. It is good for nothing else! We have a considerable quantity of land scattered around in the West Indies. We have beautiful islands, the Bermudas. We own Great Britain and Ireland, Gibraltar and the island of Cyprus, and we have a ninety-nine-year lease of Egypt, renewable forever. In the west we have a resort for military heroes, St. Helena. It has not been occupied lately, but we do not know how soon it may be occupied, if any conqueror rises who thinks he can rule the world. We own large portions of East Africa, South Africa, West Africa, nearly all the East India Islands, and India itself. Out in the Pacific there is a delicious morsel which we are talking about taking for our feast. It is a very sweet doughnut, dripping with Spreckles sugar. Then, after dinner, we shall smoke Havana cigars!'[128]

Gray's comments wholly captured the ambiguity of feeling regarding empire on display in Washington, illuminating the thin line between imperial criticism and jingoistic approbation. However, for others, it was not the English-Speaking race that needed to spread across the globe, but rather Anglo-American culture. As an ever-present advocate of commercial and cultural expansion, Edward Atkinson posed a question to the conference hall, asking 'Would it not become necessary, for instance, to the very development of that huge and almost unknown continent of South America, that the security of Anglo-Saxon institutions, of the English common law, and of personal liberty, should displace the present arbitrary and violent methods of the Spanish-American inhabitants?'[129] Atkinson was a regular on the peace conference circuit.

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[127] Ibid.

[128] Ibid. pp. 99-100.

[129] Ibid. p. 52.

A wealthy and well-connected Bostonian, Atkinson had a varied and eccentric career that included being a fervent campaigner for abolition, an inventor of cooking equipment, and most pertinent to the peace movement, a theorist of free trade economics.

Despite these differences, all speakers were unified in their worldview that the English-Speaking Peoples of the earth had achieved a higher state of civilisation that ought to preclude bloodshed as an element of their relations with one another. Some speakers, however, went as far as to establish a corollary to this worldview, to openly explore the principles which others would only dare to articulate sotto voce – what was the role of war in the less civilised parts of the earth? John Foster was notably restrained in his remarks on arbitration spreading across the globe, declaring that '[I]t seems a Utopian idea to anticipate a general disarmament of nations in our generation, and until barbarism and the spirit of conquest and oppression shall be banished from the earth, governments will be forced to maintain armies and navies.'[130]

The veteran Mugwump activist Carl Schurz was perhaps the most lucid advocate of this worldview. Openly acknowledging the limits of the peace movement's universalism, he claimed that war across the globe may be detrimental to human progress; however, he also argued that war still had a potential role to play in the relations between Western powers and the less civilised peoples of the world:

> 'As to the part war has played, and may still have to play, in the history of mankind, I do not judge as a blind sentimentalist. I readily admit that, by the side of horrible devastations [and] barbarous cruelty, great and beneficent things have been accomplished by means of war, in forming nations and in spreading and establishing the rule or influence of the capable and progressive.[131]

Peacecraft was thus suitable only for Western imperial powers. The world in which the United States was able to balance two competing understandings of arbitration – as peacemakers had done in simultaneously supporting Cremer's campaign and the Pan-American arbitration treaty – now seemed like a distant memory. Schurz enthusiastically praised the inescapable interdependence of the Northern Hemisphere, which he saw as being the product of the 'steamship, the railroad, the telegraph, the postal union, and other international arrangements facilitating transportation and the circulation of intelligence'.[132] Indeed, a faith in the unending arc of progress infused Schurz's internationalist rhetoric as he envisioned how arbitration would motivate the abolition of war among civilised nations:

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[130] Ibid. pp. 19-20.

[131] Ibid. p. 32.

[132] Ibid.

> 'Thus a war between civilized nations means now a rupture of arteries of common life-blood, a stoppage of the agencies of common well-being and advancement, a waste of energies serviceable to common interests-in one word, a general disaster, infinitely more serious than in times gone by; and it is, consequently, now an infinitely more heinous crime against humanity, unless not only the ends it is to serve fully justify the sacrifices it entails, but unless also all expedients suggested by the genius of peace have been exhausted to avert the armed conflict.'[133]

The closing of the conference was appropriately muted – with the attendees passing a resolution which urged the British and American governments to adopt a permanent arbitration treaty; the resolution was presented to President Cleveland and Secretary of State Olney on 14 May 1896.

In the wake of the conference the peace movement was notably optimistic, with the *Advocate of Peace* proclaiming the meeting of arbitrationists in Washington to be one of the greatest events in the history of their movement.[134] Looking on, even Belva Ann Lockwood remained broadly positive. Despite her resentment towards the organising committee and her reservations about the narrowness of the conference, she proclaimed that the conference had been one of the 'most remarkable gatherings that [had] assembled in the capital city since the memorable close of the Pan-American Congress.'[135] However, it was clearly not evident to Lockwood and the attendees of the conference that their embrace of transatlantic peace was a rebuke to the Latin American delegates – most of all those from Venezuela – who had come to Washington in 1889.

The peacemakers' optimism was well-founded, as by the time of the Washington Conference Olney had already commenced negotiations with the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote, regarding a permanent arbitration treaty. By July 1896, both sides had openly set out their negotiating positions with British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury instructing his diplomatic staff to pursue a limited treaty with broadly defined opt-outs to guard against any future British losses, as opposed to Olney's more expansive vision for a lasting system of arbitration.[136] By the new year, the text of the treaty had taken shape – almost perfectly coinciding with the finalisation of the terms for the Venezuelan Arbitration itself.

The eventual treaty broadly aligned with Olney's vision for a new permanent system of arbitration, with opt-out clauses for anything that was defined as a 'vital national interest'.[137] Most

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[133] Ibid.

[134] 'The Washington Conference,' *AoP* 58/5 (May, 1896), p. 101.

[135] Lockwood, 'International Arbitration, Venezuela, Cuba, and the National Conference at Washington', p. 30.

[136] 'Anglo-American Arbitration. The Diplomatic Correspondence', *AoP* 58/8 (August and September, 1896), pp. 193-195.

[137] Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* p. 107.

notably, however, the treaty sought to remedy all future territorial disputes and did so by defining such disputes via the language of imperial space. Article IX explicitly defined the concept of territorial disputes:

> 'Territorial claims in this treaty shall include all claims to territory and all other claims involving questions of servitude, rights of navigation and of access, fisheries, and all rights and interests necessary to the control and enjoyment of the territory claimed by either of the high contracting parties.'[138]

That the clause included 'questions of servitude' alongside access to territories and waterways illustrated the extent to which, in the eyes of those seeking to regulate Anglo-American relations, territorial disputes were indeed imperial disputes. Both sides might feasibly, therefore, dispute territory which they considered not simply to be under their jurisdiction, but which was in their sphere of influence.

As one of his final acts in the White House, Cleveland signed off on the treaty on 11 January 1897 from where it would be sent for ratification in the next session of the Senate – by which time Cleveland and Olney would have left the political stage. This news of the treaty was met with adulation from British and Americans alike. Julian Pauncefote himself remarked that: 'A great Arbitration Treaty will take the wind out of the sails of the Jingoes as regards Great Britain, and the Eagle will have to screech at the other Powers, and let the British Lion nurse his tail.'[139] The treaty even had the support of the incoming president William McKinley who urged the swift ratification of the treaty.

Peacemakers were predictably ecstatic at such news. Writing to Cleveland and Olney, the leadership of the APS heaped praise on the events of the past months – 'We congratulate America and Great Britain and in deed (sic) the whole civilized world on the signing of this Treaty, auspicious harbinger of peace, wrought out under the constraint of Christian conscience.'[140] Not lacking in hyperbole, Reuen Thomas, took to his pulpit in Harvard Church once more to declare that the signing of the treaty (even though it was yet to be ratified), represented 'one of the greatest events of modern history.'[141] Similarly, Belva Ann Lockwood wrote to her European colleagues in the International Peace Bureau about the way in which the signing of this treaty was a boon for the efforts of the peace movement, claiming that 'the seed

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[138] 'Unratified Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of Arbitration between the United States and Great Britain', *The American Journal of International Law*, 5/2 (9 April 1911), p. 90.

[139] Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement,* p. 28.

[140] 'The American Peace Society and the Arbitration Treaty', *AoP* 59/2 (February, 1897), p. 40.

[141] Reuen Thomas, 'One of the Greatest Events of Modern History', *AoP* 59/2 (February, 1897), p. 43.

of our peace work, which has been so well sown, is already bearing fruit.'[142]

Benjamin Franklin Trueblood was perhaps the most elated out of all the peacemakers. Having been invited to give a lecture series at the Meadville Theological School, Pennsylvania, Trueblood addressed the ongoing battle over the arbitration treaty in his ninth talk. The lectures, which would later become the basis for his book *The Federation of the World*, were an overture to arbitration, liberalism, and globalisation. And although he sensed the challenges that would face the treaty in the Senate, he heralded its very existence as a momentous occasion, claiming that the treaty was 'a declaration to the world that [the United States and Britain] have found arbitration not only just and honourable, but easy and pleasant, and that they believe it is safe to take the last obstacle out of its way and make it as easy as a fixed law of nature.'[143] Much like his colleagues at the Washington Arbitration Conference, Trueblood wrote of an arc of history that bent towards peace – at least for the Northern Hemisphere:

> 'When it is once settled and in force, no one with Anglo-Saxon blood in his veins will be any more willing to part with it than with the railroad, the steamship, or the telegraph; and it will in all probability, stop the clamorous mouth of war forever wherever the English tongue is spoken. The example will be contagious, and in a generation or two, if one may judge from the rapidity with which the arbitration movement is gaining strength in Europe, the entire civilized world will have set up for itself a permanent system of peaceful judicial settlement for disputes of every kind arising between the different nations.'[144]

As the treaty reached the Senate, lobbying intensified. Senators were inundated with memorials and petitions from across the United States.[145] The weightiest of these was a petition coordinated by Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World*, containing over 2000 signatories in favour of the treaty which was placed before the Senate in early May.[146] Support for this petition came from every state in the union barring Wyoming and Utah and included the voices of academics, priests, journalists, mayors, businessmen, and regular citizens – all largely, from non-metropolitan areas. All of the supporting statements were appended to the petition and portrayed the treaty as being the United States once more pushing the frontier of civilisation, urging the Senate to ratify it.

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[142] Geneva, United Nations Library and Archive, Records of the International Peace Bureau, Affaires Intérieures du B.I.P., Succursale en Amérique, I.K., Boite 27, Dossier 4, IPM/IPB/01/01/K, Belva Ann Lockwood, 'To the President, Officers, and all of my Dear Colleagues of the International Peace Bureau'.

[143] Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, *The Federation of the World* (Boston, 1899), pp. 114-115.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Petitions are detailed in Senate Documents, 55th Congress, 1st session, no. 63 (Serial 3561).

[146] Ibid.

Despite taking place in closed session, peacemakers across the country kept their ears to the ground to listen for any news of the treaty's progress through the Senate. When it emerged that the Senate would have to enter a special session to continue discussing the treaty, having talked down the clock discussing its terms, the *Advocate* lamented that the delay 'had been brought about purely and simply by obstructionism.'[147] The delay, they feared, was not borne out of a desire for greater scrutiny of the terms of the treaty, but rather the desire of the minority to see the treaty fail. That the debates were taking place behind closed doors, meant that the peace press remained unaware of the specific issues in contention; therefore, they concluded that the senatorial reticence was borne out of the same jingoism and Anglophobia that had prompted the Venezuelan war scare in the first place. 'We have officially, through our State Department, invited all other civilized countries to join us in arbitration conventions', lamented one editorial, 'If this treaty should be defeated by this jingoistic, suspicious, Anglophobic element in the senate, it would look as if we had been guilty of what one of the great dailies calls national self-stultification.'[148]

The image of Anglophobic senators with their knives out for both Britain and the Democratic White House – ready to carve up the treaty (See Image 6) – was one with which the peacemakers could wholly empathise. One of the primary causes of the delay had been the decision to send the treaty to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which, despite being chaired by APS Vice President Senator John Sherman, amended the treaty beyond recognition. Delay and disfigure seemed to be the primary objectives of the obstructionists – as the *Advocate* noted that even if the treaty came to a vote, the damage would already have been done, the treaty having been wrecked by many amendments that would apparently render it toothless. As Louis Dalrymple's depiction of the bill's journey through Congress had satirised, the Senate had stripped the life out of the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty (See Images 6 and 7). Thus when it came out that the Senate had inserted a clause giving itself the power to rubber stamp all issues that would be submitted to arbitration, the peace movement railed against the body's narcissism, claiming: 'As the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, which has now largely degenerated into a school of endless debate, would be required to submit any question, it is supposed that thereby the whole course of arbitration would be effectually blocked.'[149] Nevertheless, even if the treaty would have been rendered unrecognisable and lifeless, the peace movement still urged senators to vote for it, flawed though it was. Despite the existence of a senatorial handbrake, the APS noted that this

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[147] 'Delay of the Treaty in the Senate', *AoP* 59/3 (March, 1897), p. 53.

[148] Ibid.

[149] 'The Arbitration Treaty', *AoP* 59/5 (May, 1897), p. 101.




Image 6: Louis Dalrymple, 'We Won't Do a Thing to It!', *Puck* 40/1039 (3 February 1897), Cover.




Image 7: Louis Dalrymple, 'Poor Thing! – They Have Taken the Life Out of It!', *Puck* 41/1042 (24 February 1897), Cover.

would, in reality, seldom be used – with most issues being relatively uncontroversial. Having an unwavering faith in the progress of humanity, the *Advocate* urged the senate to pass the treaty even if its value was symbolic rather than practical. 'All the rest will come in time,' hoped Trueblood, 'for reforms do not go backward.'[150]

In spite of the broad groundswell of support, the treaty fell short of the two-thirds majority required for ratification by three votes – with a final tally of forty-three in favour and twenty-six against.[151] Upon hearing the news of the treaty's defeat in early May 1897, the peace movement reacted with a mixture of rage and despondency. 'The Arbitration Treaty was rejected by the Senate on the 5th of May,' proclaimed the front page of the *Advocate* 'and the nation [is] hereby self-humiliated and disgraced before the world' – in an article headlined 'The Disgrace of the Nation.'[152] Many in the press attributed the failure of the treaty to the latent Anglophobia of senatorial Silverites who resented the British for the global enforcement of the gold standard. Reflecting on the Anglophobia of the vote, one column in *The Independent* remarked that: 'There is no logical connection between arbitration and free coinage of silver; but there is a logical connection between prejudices, and this prejudice, is linked with others, and all are covered with a cloak called Americanism.'[153]

Carl Schurz, instead, lay the blame not at the feet of the Silverites, or the anti-administration Senators, and instead claimed that 'the most effective blows against [the treaty] were struck from the ranks of those Senators who finally voted for the treaty, or for what was left of it.'[154] He specifically took aim at Senators such as George Hoar (R-Massachusetts) who may have voted for the treaty but dragged his feet throughout the process in protest at the public clamour seeking to influence what he saw as the Senate's own prerogative. Noting the disfiguration of the treaty, Schurz observed that many of the tabled amendments had in fact come from Senators who would go on to vote in favour. Seeing the defeat as an explicit rejection of the sentiment expressed in 1890 at the Pan-American conference, Schurz lamented that 'the leadership of the United States in this great onward movement of civilization has thus been forfeited […] The Senate has put the republic in the lamentable attitude of a false pretender.'[155]

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[150] Ibid. p. 102.

[151] For a detailed breakdown of the vote see US Congress, Senate, *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, Volume 31* (1897-1899), Part I, 6 May 1897, pp. 104-105.

[152] 'The Disgrace of the Nation', *AoP* 59/6 (June, 1897), p. 125.

[153] 'Opinions on the Defeat of the Arbitration Treaty', *AoP* 59/6 (June, 1897), pp. 136.

[154] Ibid. p. 140.

[155] Ibid.

However, before too long, the anger had cooled and the movement's utopian optimism had returned. In the months and years that followed what had initially been an aching wound turned into a beacon of hope for the peace movement, representing the grand possibilities for the English-speaking world. This sentiment was perhaps best captured at the third Lake Mohonk International Arbitration Conference. The conferences had been established two years earlier – just months before the war scare – by Quaker businessman Albert K. Smiley at his mountain resort in upstate New York, being modelled after the conferences that had previously taken place at the same location, namely the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian (founded in 1883) and the Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question (founded in 1890).

By the time of the meeting in June 1897, the peace movement had watched the Arbitration Treaty rise from obscurity and then fall to defeat in the Senate. However, the audience at the conference, which was filled with peacemakers from across the country, was remarkably hopeful in its outlook. Despite its failure, many claimed, including Albert Smiley, that the treaty had in fact been successful in focusing public sentiment on the vital issues of arbitration and Anglo-American relations, as one speaker put it: 'we are not to be discouraged, we are to be encouraged. Senators come and senators go; it is public opinion, steadfast, persistent, intelligent, brace public opinion, that rules the world.'[156] Such a sentiment spoke to a core principle which undergirded so much of the peace movement's philosophy – namely that public opinion would endure as a motor for progress within American politics, even when forces within high politics might knock the nation off the course of a peaceful foreign policy. Perhaps the best articulator of this viewpoint was none other than Robert Treat Paine at Lake Mohonk:

> 'The defeat by the Senate I regard as a temporary blessing in disguise, – not a permanent defeat but a temporary check, which enables us to appeal with confidence to the pulpit, press and people, to all organizations of trade, commerce or labor, to put on the whole armor of God and gird themselves up so that the next effort shall be a triumphant success.'[157]

And while there were hopes from many conference attendees that the treaty would be revived by President McKinley, it was subsumed by the looming humanitarian crises of the mid-1890s.

Conclusion

By the time the arbitration proceedings relating to the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute had been completed in 1898, the peace movement's attention had been diverted by the clouds of war

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[156] 'Opening Address by the President Hon. George F. Edmunds', *Report of the Third Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration* (Lake Mohonk, 1897), p. 5.

[157] 'Address of Hon. Robert Treat Paine', *Report of the Third Lake Mohonk Conference*, p. 94.

forming over Cuba, the enduring strife afflicting Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and the message of Tsar Nicholas II calling for an arbitration conference at The Hague in 1899. Nevertheless, the display of unity as envisaged by Abbott and Thomas had become a reality in the legal proceedings. Meeting in Paris in 1898, the tribunal heard arguments from the legal teams of Britain and Venezuela – with the latter being wholly comprised of American lawyers. And while the team was accompanied by the Venezuelan diplomat and lawyer – José M. De Rojas – the oral submissions were made solely by Americans, with Rojas' contributions being confined to the appendices of the written submissions[158].

American peacemakers touted the absence of Venezuelan voices in the arbitration proceedings as an example of the civilising mission in action. In his closing submission, Ex-President Benjamin Harrison congratulated the court on the absence of Venezuelan representation, claiming that this aligned the process with 'the great courts of justice from which the idea of representation is wholly absent'.[159] Rather than be beholden to principles of representation, the court might act with a true sense of neutrality and impartiality. Ultimately, the judges unanimously decided to find a compromise that broadly favoured the British.[160] The lack of justice for the Venezuelans did not blunt the peace movement's praise. Calling the boundary award 'a great triumph of reason and good sense', Trueblood wrote in the *Advocate* of the case being 'a great event in the progress of civilization.'[161]

Arbitration had fulfilled its intended purpose. War had been avoided, and the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race had been drawn together. Even if they had not won the ultimate prize of a permanent Anglo-American arbitration treaty. The peacemakers had succeeded in wresting power from the forces of jingoism into the hands of an educated, genteel elite. Their relations had been governed not by 'sentiment, passion and unintelligent wrangling' but by the sober restraint of judges.[162] Progress had not been assured in spite of the Venezuelans, but rather because they had been shepherded through the process of arbitration by the United States. Their absence within the proceedings was the hallmark of a movement that saw arbitration as an instrument of international affairs that was designed to solidify peaceful conduct within the Anglosphere and to overlook the interests of others in the name of civilisation.

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158 *Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration. The Printed Argument on Behalf of the United States of Venezuela before the Tribunal of Arbitration.*

159 Ibid. p. 765.

160 Humphreys, 'Anglo-American Rivalries and the Venezuela Crisis of 1895', p. 162.

161 'The Venezuela Boundary Award', *AoP* 61/10 (November, 1899), pp. 227-228.

162 Ibid.

The mid-1890s presented a waypoint in American conversations about the Monroe Doctrine and thus their attitudes towards the Old World, in particular towards Britain. The war scare may have been brief; however, its impact resonated for years to come. Whereas earlier in the decade, peacemakers had appealed to ideas of Pan-Americanism, opinion on the American role in the Western Hemisphere and the wider world was shifting. And while many of the loudest voices during the crisis bore messages of Anglophobia and jingoism, a steady undercurrent of peace activism sought to reorient American diplomacy towards transatlantic solidarity and cooperation. Their arguments were primarily rooted in claims of a common cultural and racial heritage with Britain, as well as in cultural and racial chauvinism towards Venezuela. Totemic of this was the way in which Venezuelan voices were shut out of treaty negotiations, their interests being treated with little regard by both the British and the Americans. The arguments reached their apogee in the debates around the Olney-Pauncefote Arbitration Treaty that sought to realign American diplomacy around pacifying relations with their Anglo-Saxon kin across the Atlantic. As a result, peacemakers threw their weight behind the transatlantic axis of arbitration and abandoned Pan-Americanism. And what had begun as an interest in the application of international law to regulate imperial ambition in Latin America had become a stealthy exercise in imperial collaboration – as a desire for Anglo-American rapprochement would blind peacemakers to the interests of the Venezuelans whom they once sought to aid. This spatial reorientation in American diplomacy heralded a greater engagement with European geopolitics. However, for peacemakers, such a shift posed more questions than it answered, as they sought to determine how the United States ought to interact with the fragile balance of power that characterised the Concert of Europe.

Chapter 2: Armenia, Cuba, and Intervention

'But it is not the art of manliness simply to bow one's head in shame and to utter cries of horror. The question is: What is to be done?'[1]

Robert Stein to James Bryce

Introduction

Nineteenth-century global governance was built on sovereignty. How national borders were drawn, who drew them, and, above all, when they might be violated were all questions that structured how geopolitics was conducted during the age of empires. Debates over these contested ideas underpinned the geopolitical settlement that came to be known as the Concert of Europe, which was simultaneously a formal apparatus for undertaking diplomacy and a common understanding regarding state sovereignty in post-Napoleonic Europe.[2] Despite its subsequent reputation for constructing a fragile (yet peaceful) house of cards, the Concert's founding moment – the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) – was a compromise that balanced British geopolitical pragmatism against an interventionist bloc (namely Russia, Prussia, and Austria) seeking the reversal of Napoleonic and revolutionary gains in Europe.[3] The limits and legitimacy of global governance were, therefore, constructed and contested through debates over when one state might intervene in the affairs of another.[4]

This system was not confined to Europe and spanned the Atlantic. It had a clear and direct impact on the United States' place in the world, with the Congress of Vienna sparking a chain of events that would see the exclusion of European intervention in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine – a policy underwritten by British naval power.[5] Even so, the Monroe Doctrine could not prevent conversations from arising in London and Paris regarding intervention during the American Civil War. Dismayed by the mounting death toll, the European powers openly considered intervening in order to halt the bloodshed. In doing so, European diplomats drew on the growing body of legal precedent concerning intervention, for instance,

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[1] Oxford, Bodleian Library, Papers of James Bryce, MS Bryce 196 fo.99, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 4 May 1896. Microfilm. (Note: all Bryce Papers were viewed on microfilm. 'Microfilm' hereafter omitted throughout footnotes).

[2] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London, 2012), pp. 3-12; Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 39-65; Fabian Klose, *In the Cause of Humanity: A History of Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2022), 21-45.

[3] For the former view see Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals*, for the latter see Mazower, *Governing the World.*

[4] Mazower, *Governing the World*, p. 14.

[5] Alex Bryne, *The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke, 2020).

citing Emer de Vattel's *The Law of Nations* as a means of justifying their violation of a nation's sovereignty.[6] By the end of the nineteenth century, Western debates over intervention had been suffused with a separate intellectual tradition – humanitarianism. A concern for the suffering of others had been a persistent, yet malleable, feature of American political culture. Largely grounded in Christian ethics and an assumption of a universally shared humanity, a belief in human rights and a desire to minimise suffering was notably manifested in the mid-century abolitionist campaigns against slavery. However, as Ian Tyrrell has shown, such an impulse had fused with popular religious practices and organised philanthropy by the 1890s, making humanitarianism an increasingly more frequent argument that was deployed to marshal public interest in foreign affairs.[7]

Therefore, humanitarian intervention had become a contested and powerful concept by the mid-1890s, when a pair of major overseas humanitarian crises gripped American society. Together, the Armenian Massacres (1894-6) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895-8) represented the point at which humanitarianism became a potent intellectual and rhetorical force within the United States' popular foreign policy discourse. This would culminate in the United States acting (in the words of Fabian Klose) 'in the cause of humanity' when intervening in the latter conflict.[8] Historians, such as Charlie Laderman, have recently and persuasively argued that the Armenian Massacres operated as a proving ground for the arguments made months later during debates regarding intervention in Cuba.[9] In both cases, Americans conceptualised the humanitarian crisis as the oppression of a liberty-loving Christian people by a moribund and decaying empire.

The peace movement, however, dissented from this humanitarian groundswell. While they acknowledged the structural similarities of both crises, they approached each with starkly a different attitude. In the peacemakers' eyes, the Armenian Massacres represented a tragedy that ought to shame the Concert of Europe into action. The Cuban Crisis, however, represented a perilous trap that might introduce jingoism into the bloodstream of the American body politic.

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[6] Howard Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations* (Chapel Hill, 2010), pp. 71-72.

[7] Ian R. Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire,* (Princeton, 2010), p. 99.

[8] Klose, *In the Cause of Humanity*.

[9] Ann Marie Wilson, 'In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s', *Le Mouvement Social* 227 (2009), pp. 27-44; Charlie Laderman, *Sharing the Burden: The Armenian Question, Humanitarian Intervention, and Anglo-American Visions of Global Order* (Oxford, 2019); Heather D. Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians: American Evangelicals and Global Aid* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2018); Louis A. Pérez, *Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos* (Chapel Hill, 2008).

Consequently, the peacemakers' disposition when approaching these two issues was markedly different, owing to the proximity of Cuba to American shores and the flexible construction of whiteness in the minds of peacemakers. During the Armenian Massacres (sometimes referred to as the Hamidian Massacres), the peacemakers regularly proclaimed religion to be a vital ingredient of whiteness, as they portrayed the Armenians as a beleaguered white minority that was oppressed by a degenerate, Muslim empire. As a result, the movement fervently campaigned for a European governor to take control of the territory as a means of safeguarding the white Christian minority – with peacemakers debating the extent to which force ought to be used in such a scenario. During the Cuban Crisis, however, the movement's reaction was entirely different. Unlike with the Armenian Massacres, the peacemakers were unable to rely on convenient religious categories to designate a virtuous and malign side in the conflict. Instead, they viewed the Cubans and the Spanish as being locked in a conflict that was simultaneously the product of, and an engine for, their degrading whiteness (See Image 8). Partially blaming the Cuban revolutionaries for the repression that had befallen them at the hands of the Spanish, the movement appealed to Madrid to generously bestow 'Home Rule' upon their inhabitants in the Western Hemisphere. This noticeably pro-Spanish position was widely received by the American public as an anti-American provocation in the wake of the sinking of the USS *Maine*, imperilling the standing of peacemakers and their arguments in the subsequent debates over war and peace in the Caribbean. Thus, their inconsistent opinions on Cuba and Armenia were hardly positions of convenience. Indeed, these positions reveal the strength of the peacemakers' convictions pertaining to the inviolability of white sovereignty.

In the absolute, the peacemakers superficially suggested a highly similar policy prescription for each crisis. In both cases, peacemakers made the case that the territory in question ought to be governed at an arm's length by an imperial ruler, with a mixture of self-government and European supervision. The imposition of a structure of imperial guardianship on both Cuba and Armenia represented the peacemakers' solution to two core problems of the day, namely: What ought to be done with decaying empires? And how might intervention be conducted in an era of great power conflict? Despite not having clear long-term implications as a tool of global governance, imperial guardianship was a harbinger for the looser imperial arrangements of the Mandate System that came into being in the wake of the First World War. However, despite imperial guardianship being the end goal for each of the crises, the peacemakers took markedly different approaches to each episode, largely based on the racial dynamics of each case. On the one hand, peacemakers urged American restraint and forbearance towards the Cuban War of Independence, while, on the other, making the case for Western belligerence in defence of the Armenians.



Image 8: Udo Keppler, 'The Peace Maker' *Puck* 43/1102 (20 April 1898), centrefold.

There was, of course, a distinct irony to the movement debating whether or not intervention might constitute an element of peacecraft. Indeed, much like Udo Keppler's depiction of the United States as a 'peace maker' in the Cuban conflict (see Image 8), peace activists feared that any war defined in such terms would tar the United States with the same militarist brush as the already belligerent Spanish and Cubans. Just as Keppler had depicted Uncle Sam ready to shed his respectable clothes (having already thrown off his hat) and join the fray, the peacemakers feared the coarsening of American political culture and the United States jettisoning its global leadership in the politics of peace. Such a fear underpinned the peacemakers' appeal to the policy of imperial guardianship, as this would allow the United States to achieve the ends of intervention without the use of force.

By examining the similarities and differences between Armenia and Cuba, the racial and geopolitical dynamics of humanitarian intervention become evident. When deployed in a conflict that clearly threatened global whiteness, peacemakers used humanitarian arguments to justify the violation of the sovereignty of a non-white empire. However, in firmly eschewing humanitarian arguments that supported intervention in Cuba, the peace movement articulated a vision of the world that maintained the hardened lines of sovereignty that had been set forth at Vienna. As the peacemakers untangled questions of humanitarianism, sovereignty and intervention, their perceptions of race determined where their sympathies lay. In all, race proved to be the prism through which peacemakers decided whose sovereignty was absolute and whose was paper thin.

Americanising the Eastern Question

As the year 1895 arrived, American and European newspapers were ablaze with detailed accounts of bloodshed and slaughter. Individuals and groups from all walks of life voiced their horror and indignation at the slaughter of Armenian Christians in the Ottoman Empire, with many calling for America to act. According to one editorial in *The Nation*, 'the methods of [the] Turkish government are none of [the United States'] business. But wholesale massacre is in our time the affair of the civilized world'.[10] Going on to call it a 'crime against the human race' which demanded the attention of its readers, *The Nation* typified the tone and urgency of a majority of American commentators on the matter.[11] By March of that year, the front page of the *New York Times* bore the headline 'Eight Thousand Butchered. The Horrors of the Armenian

[10] EL Godkin, 'The Armenian Trouble', *The Nation* 60/1542 (17 January, 1895), p.44.

[11] Ibid.

Massacres Only Just Beginning to be Realised by the World.'[12] Beneath the headline the paper bore eyewitness accounts that described, in graphic detail, the violence unfolding in the Armenian countryside. An outpouring of public sympathy followed as Americans mobilised to prevent the slaughter of 'a peaceful, gifted, industrious Christian people'.[13] However, despite the groundswell of support, opinion remained divided as politicians and peacemakers debated: What ought America to do? What could America do?

With a growing sense of shock at the seeming impotence of Western diplomacy, members of the peace movement articulated a new multilateral solution to the Eastern Question, harnessing their own transimperial relationships. For practitioners of peace, the unfolding events on the border of Europe represented the workings of a moribund empire that was incapable of fulfilling a civilising mission; the proper undertaking of such a mission proved to be a key metric in an emerging hierarchy of imperial conduct. Whereas during the concurrent Venezuela Dispute the peace movement urged restraint and relied on international law as a vehicle for the application of a so-called Anglo-Saxon civilising mission, such tools were off the table when it came to the Ottoman Empire.

At the height of the humanitarian outcry, many peacemakers would openly toy with the idea of humanitarian intervention – albeit by a European power. As Samuel Moyn has demonstrated, a desire to reduce global conflict and humanitarianism could be both complementary and countervailing intellectual tendencies in the American mind at the end of the nineteenth century.[14] The push-and-pull dynamic of these two intellectual traditions was a live discussion among peacemakers during the Armenian Crisis, with the fate of Christians in the Near East causing the salience of humanitarianism to be at its highest watermark for decades.

While calls for direct American intervention in the Ottoman Empire always remained muted from the peace movement, the episode prompted the movement to actively engage in a process of imperial collaboration as humanitarian concerns prompted them to consider if a European power could indeed wage a war for the cause of peace. After much hand-wringing peacemakers concluded that the only solution was for Armenia to be placed under imperial guardianship by a European power.

The so-called Eastern Question had a long history within Western thinking on geopolitics, with

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[12] 'Eight Thousand Butchered: The Horrors of the Armenian Massacres Only Just Beginning to be Realized by the World', *NYT* XLIV/13,600 (25 March 1895), p. 1.

[13] MS Bryce 196, fo. 70, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 28 March 1895.

[14] Samuel Moyn, *Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War* (New York, 2021).

the instability of the Ottoman Empire being a consistent flashpoint for European empires since the eighteenth century. Often characterised as the 'Sick Man of Europe,' numerous failed attempts at modernisation and a consistent undercurrent of internal conflict had made the Ottoman Empire the frequent subject of intrigue for European commentators. The perceived despotism of the Islamic empire had provided an intellectual foil against which European powers sought to conceptualise their own visions of civilisation, with developing ideas of international law in this period being explicitly defined to preclude Ottoman participation.[15] Geo-strategically, the empire played a pivotal role in balancing British and Russian power in the region, with both empires vying for control of the entry points to the Mediterranean along the Bosphorus Strait and the Dardanelles Strait. The simmering tensions between the British and Russian Empires had previously escalated to open conflict in the region, with the Russo-Turkish War of the 1820s, the Crimean War of 1853-56, and the Eastern Crisis of the 1870s. Informed by these past conflicts and the cultural perception of Ottoman civilisation, the status of the Christians in the Near East would become the most pressing Western humanitarian concern of the 1890s.[16]

Having been governed by the Ottomans since the sixteenth century, a nascent nationalism had gripped the Armenian minority in Anatolia by the middle of the nineteenth century. Being keenly aware of such sentiment across the empire, Ottoman statesmen engaged in a modernising project (known as Tanzimat) that would guarantee freedom of religion while also seeking to kickstart a process of Ottomanisation. These commitments to a modern imperial project – enacted in the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 and 1856 – were abandoned by the 1870s, sparking bloody uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875), Serbia and Montenegro (1876), and Bulgaria (1877), with 15,000 being killed in the latter conflict.[17]

The instability and strife in the region came to a halt with the Russian-brokered Treaty of San Stefano (1878), which forced Ottoman acquiescence to independence for the Balkan states and garrisoned Russian troops as a peacekeeping force in Armenia. The latter being intolerable to both the Ottoman Sultan and the British, a new treaty was drawn up at Berlin that undid the perceived Russian gains and replaced the presence of troops with Ottoman promises of reform in that area and a guarantee of the freedom of religion. On the ground, however, the opposite occurred. The Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, took the opportunity to capitalise on British and Russian inertia throughout the 1880s and 1890s – forcibly resettling Muslim Circassians,

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[15] Jennifer Pitts, *Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2018), pp. 22-67.

[16] See Karine Walther, *Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821-1921* (Chapel Hill, 2015).

[17] Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: A History of the Armenian Genocide* (London, 2005), p. 6.

who were fleeing Russian oppression, into the area and encouraging Anatolian Kurds to harass and attack the Armenians, subjecting them to discriminatory taxation and expropriating their lands. Uprisings in 1894 in the Sasun region would trigger the mass repression of the Armenian Christians, which would last two years, and that would foreshadow the violence and bloodshed of the Armenian Genocide two decades later. Modern estimates place the death toll of the Armenian Massacres at 300,000.[18]

The unfolding atrocities in the Near East represented a dilemma for peacefully-minded Americans. Looking from afar, the United States stood removed from the realpolitik that determined European policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Americans, however, had been alerted to the plight of the Ottoman Christians via the network of American missionaries in the Near East – largely organised by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). Being the most prominent Western presence in the whole of Anatolia, the ABCFM organised 114 churches and 1,500 evangelical schools in the region by the end of the nineteenth century.[19] The organisation had the ear of several prominent policy-makers and journalists, many of whom had close family connections to missionaries in the Near East themselves. Perhaps the most notable was Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer, who had been born to missionary teachers in the Turkish port of Smyrna and who was a frequent advocate of Christians abroad. As such, when official channels proved uncooperative, missionaries were often able to find allies across the American middle class. These connections were on show in the widespread publicity of missionary turned journalist Frederick D. Greene's book *The Armenian Massacres or The Sword of Mohammed* – with its introduction by Social Gospeler Josiah Strong – which sold over 130,000 copies of its first press and was prominently featured in periodical accounts of the Massacres.[20]

Intertwined with the missionary lobby was the small but vocal Armenian-American population in the United States. Many of that community sought to take advantage of American naturalisation laws, which would allow them to gain American citizenship, only to return to Armenia with the protections that this would afford them. They were complemented by the itinerant community of Armenian students and preachers who would rub shoulders with liberal, middle-class Americans in the churches and universities of the Northeast. It was these

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[18] Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894-1924* (Cambridge, MA, 2019), p. 44. Morris and Ze'evi provide the most recent historiographical contribution on the Armenian Genocide. They make the case for a broader genocide from 1890-1920, which was predicated on Ottoman aggression towards all Christian minorities within their empire.

[19] Laderman, *Sharing the Burden,* pp. 18-19.

[20] Frederick Davis Greene and Henry Davenport, *Armenian Massacres, Or, The Sword of Mohammed* (Philadelphia; Chicago, 1896); Karine Walther, *Sacred Interests,* p. 258.

interlinked networks of Americans and Armenians that would yield the beginnings of a pro-Armenian movement in the United States, with the meeting of American suffrage activist Alice Stone Blackwell and Armenian priest Ohannes Chatschumian.[21]

'Turkey has outraged the conscience of the civilized world'[22]

The daughter of suffrage campaigner Lucy Stone and abolitionist Henry Blackwell, Alice Stone Blackwell led a life dedicated to reform and activism, working prominently in organisations such as the NAACP and the WCTU. Inheriting the stewardship of the *Woman's Journal* and the *Woman's Column* from Lucy Stone, she would work to broker the merger of the AWSA and the NWSA in 1890. Her tenure as editor of these publications saw peace activism increasingly covered as an issue, for instance, with detailed coverage of events such as the 1893 Universal Peace Congress in Chicago.[23] As a result, she would become well acquainted with those who straddled the porous divide between reform work and peace activism, such as Julia Ward Howe, Edward Everett Hale, and William Lloyd Garrison Jr. Owing to her notoriety as a campaigner for humanitarian and reform causes, she would be formally nominated as a Vice President of the APS in 1903.[24]

Attending a summer camp on the shores of Lake Memphremagog for reform-minded individuals, Blackwell was introduced to the Armenian preacher Ohannes Chatschumian by the camp's organiser Isabel Barrows.[25] Chatschumian had journeyed to the US from his theological training in Leipzig, in order to attend the 1893 World Parliament of Religions at the invitation of Barrows. Several years later, Blackwell remarked upon the impression that Chatschumian had made upon those whom he had encountered in the United States, describing him as 'an exceptionally brilliant and lovable young man and an ardent patriot,' and noting how 'Mrs Barrows became attached to him as if he had been her own son.'[26] Resolved to stay a little longer in the USA, Chatschumian had enrolled at Harvard Divinity School for a year and, at the invitation of Barrows, joined the group of reformers at Lake Memphremagog.

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[21] For a full exploration of their relationship, see Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: A History of the Armenian Genocide* (London, 2005), pp. 13-22.

[22] 'Annual Report of the Directors of the American Peace Society', *AoP* 57/6 (June, 1895), p. 130.

[23] See for instance, Henry Blackwell, 'The World's Peace Congress', *The Woman's Journal* 24/34 (6 August 1893), p. 268.

[24] 'Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Peace Society', *AoP* 65/6 (June, 1903), p. 104.

[25] J.I. Little. 'Life without Conventionality: American Social Reformers as Summer Campers on Lake Memphremagog, Quebec, 1878-1905', *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 9/3 (2010), pp. 281-311.

[26] Alice Stone Blackwell, 'Some Reminiscences', *The New Armenia* 10/2 (February, 1918), p. 20.

Blackwell and Chatschumian quickly developed a close and intimate relationship, with the two talking late into the night about Armenia's culture and recent history, and Chatschumian handing Blackwell nationalist literature on the Armenian Question.[27] Inspired by their flourishing relationship, the pair immediately founded the American Society of the Friends of Armenia as a means of spreading 'knowledge and understanding of the Armenians.'[28] Writing several years later, Blackwell would remember how, on the shores of the lake, the two of them had set out to 'awaken sympathy for [the Armenians] in the American public, and to do everything possible to secure help and protection for them against their persecution at the hands of the Turks.'[29] Electing Julia Ward Howe, who was also present at the camp, as their first president, Blackwell called the organisation 'the germ and forerunner of all that came after.'[30] The Friends of Armenia would soon count among its membership individuals such as William Lloyd Garrison Jr and Edward Everett Hale, both of whom were close acquaintances of Blackwell.

Such a roster of individuals – all of whom sat on the executive boards of the American Peace Society (APS) or the Universal Peace Union (UPU) at varying times – was unsurprising, especially given the close watch of those institutions on the unfolding events in the Near East across the 1890s. As news of the initial wave of violence in Sasun filtered through the American press in early to mid-1895, the 'Annual Report of the Directors of the American Peace Society' struck a despairing tone. Speaking of the global state of imperial relations, it remarked at the end of the report:

> 'Turkey has outraged the conscience of the civilized world and blackened herself with an ineffaceable stain by the barbarous treatment which she has permitted to come upon the peaceable and liberty-loving Armenians. The condition of the world is still dark enough to discourage even the most hopeful Christian optimist, if he look only at these exhibitions of injustice, greed of power and open disregard of the plainest rights of men and of peoples.'[31]

Most notably, the President of the APS, Robert Treat Paine, would himself go on to become a prominent member of the Friends of Armenia, taking an active role in fund-raising for the cause. The great-grandson of the founding father of the same name, Paine was a Harvard-

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[27] Ibid. See also Richard E. Soash, 'Tempered Inclusion: Syrian-Lebanese and Armenian Immigrants and Progressive Era Policy Making, 1894-1924' (PhD Thesis, Florida State University, 2018).

[28] Washington D.C. Library of Congress, Blackwell Family Papers, Alice Stone Blackwell Papers, 1848-1957 [Hereafter Blackwell Papers], Box 26, Reel 22, Subject File: Armenia 1870-1957, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, 'Armenians as I have Known them', p. 2.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] 'Annual Report of the Directors of the American Peace Society', *AoP* 57/6 (June, 1895), p. 130.

educated lawyer who had made a name for himself in his native city of Boston due to his role in philanthropy and social reform. He had been elevated to the position of President of the APS in 1891 after having been Vice President for just two years.[32] On 22 November 1895, Paine presided over a public meeting arranged by the APS at Faneuil Hall in Boston, attended by William Lawrence, the Bishop of Massachusetts, Julia Ward Howe, and Massachusetts Governor Frederic T. Greenhalge. Echoing the horror of the APS, the meeting passed resolutions in support of the British calls for reform of the Ottoman Empire and calling for their fellow citizens to donate funds in support of the oppressed Armenians.[33] The presence of a figure such as Howe was indicative of the post-abolitionist political style that the movement had adopted, characterised by public moralising.

The Universal Peace Union was equally dismayed, with the organisation being similarly intertwined with the pro-Armenian cause. As early as 1890, *The Peacemaker* (the in-house journal of the UPU) had noted that British-Armenian activist Menasse [Minas] Tcheraz had attended a UPU meeting where he was elected as a member of the organisation's executive committee.[34] Tcheraz's writings on the Armenian Question would prove influential for many Americans, including Blackwell who had received copies of his pro-Armenian newspaper from Chatschumian. Despite this, the UPU frequently went to great lengths to stress its commitment to non-violence and non-entanglement. For instance, meeting records show that on 6 March 1895, 'a regular stated meeting' of the Universal Peace Union was attended by an unnamed 'Armenian visitor' as well as the ten named members.[35] At the meeting, they recorded their hope that the pro-Armenian movement should 'seek to secure [the Sultan's] favor in the interests of the persecuted Armenians.'[36] Needless to say, the UPU's hopes that the Sultan would emerge as a protector of the Armenians would prove to be misplaced, as news of the violence in the Near East spread across the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, as passions were running high across the American press, *The Peacemaker* urged, in a typically measured tone, that:

> 'We have laid plans for a number of our friends who have gone to Europe (some of them are officers in our Peace Union), to proceed to Constantinople and see the Sultan

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[32] 'Our New President', *AoP* 53/5 (June-July, 1891), p. 126.

[33] 'Carnage and Flame', *Daily Inter Ocean* (23 November 1895), p. 3.

[34] Robert Stein 'Armenia and Peace' (Editorial Comment), *The Peacemaker* 9/6 (December, 1890), p. 124.

[35] UPU Records, Series I, Box 2, Folder 1, Minute Book 1 (1891 - 1900), p. 141.

[36] Ibid.

> and plead with him for the relief of these people. We have written to the Sultan a strong and pleading letter soliciting mercy and protection towards this portion of his countrymen, and we have, in our own quiet way, presented the advantages that would accrue to him and his people if he would grant the Armenians their desires and rights.'[37]

The organisation could count among its number possibly the most prominent visitor to Anatolia in this period: Clara Barton. Barton, who sat as a Vice President of the Universal Peace Union, was the foremost humanitarian activist in the United States. As the founder of the American Red Cross, Barton was a veteran aid worker who had provided humanitarian assistance at home during the Johnstown Flood (1889) and abroad in the Franco-Prussian War.[38] She would depart in 1896 for Anatolia with the goal of spreading relief to those suffering at the hands of Ottoman aggression. Writing to Love just before her departure to Armenia, she informed him that she would 'be the bearer of the [UPU's] messages' to the Sultan.[39] The UPU's restrained style of international advocacy was typified in its choice of Barton as its messenger to the Sublime Porte.[40] The Red Cross, as per the Geneva Convention, was bound to uphold neutrality in conflict, working solely for the alleviation of suffering rather than for political gain. Its actions would have no bearing on the overall status of diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and other imperial powers; instead Barton and her colleagues would simply act as a disinterested humanitarian force. Barton herself had noted her displeasure at the tone of the American press coverage of the massacres (such as that of the *New York Times* above), believing that this would imperil her humanitarian mission by turning the Sultan against all Americans who sought to deliver aid.[41]

Upon her return to the United States in October 1896, Alfred Love was swift to welcome her home, inviting her to address the UPU at their annual meeting at Mystic Grove, Connecticut. In the same letter, he applauded her work and also articulated his own preferred policy on the Armenian Question, claiming that 'we should stop trading with the Turks, send home her representatives, [and] withdraw our funds. The non-[interference] act until [the Sultan is] better behaved. Is this peace? Is this the protector policy that all tell? You know sometimes the

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[37] 'Armenians', *The Peacemaker* 14/3 (September, 1895), p. 47.

[38] Marian Moser Jones, *The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal* (Baltimore, 2013); Julia Irwin, *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (New York, 2013).

[39] 'Clara Barton's Farewell', *The Peacemaker* 14/11 (May, 1896), p. 230.

[40] Sublime Porte refers to the Ottoman seat of government at Constantinople.

[41] Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians*, p. 77.

pocketbook or the money question will do more than the sword.'[42] Despite his seeming restraint, Love's call for sanctions indicated the slow radicalisation of his views on the matter.[43] By the time that Barton had returned, he, like many other peace activists, had concluded that the only way to forestall further suffering in the Near East was for the US to jettison its superficial neutrality and force a new and multilateral solution.

'Armenia Must Have a European Governor'[44]

The discussions taking place within the peace movement and throughout the country revolved around a core problem – how ought the West to deal with a wayward empire on its borders? At best the Ottoman Empire was a poor steward of the civilising mission and at worst it had the active effect of de-civilising its Christian inhabitants. The central reform in contention was the failure of the Sublime Porte to uphold the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, which guaranteed freedom of religion and extended the rights of missionaries to preach and educate in the region.

Much as politicians and peacemakers were exploring the shared civilising features of a supposed Anglo-Saxon mission during the Venezuela Crisis, they did the inverse when observing the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, they amplified rhetorical tropes that stressed the whiteness and cultural virtue of the Armenians. In doing so, they constructed a hierarchy of empires based on varying racial, linguistic, and religious assumptions, which fed into a fluid definition of civilisation. This imperial hierarchy presented a dilemma for those who sought to promote peace within and among empires – how could a seemingly decaying empire be modernised and reformed such that it would become a virtuous member of the imperial club? And moreover, if this proved impossible, what was to be done?

An answer to this dilemma arrived in the mailbags of liberal-minded Americans across the Northeast. The German-American peacemaker Robert Stein had set out to ensure that the United States use all its diplomatic clout to ensure that the European powers take up the Armenian cause. As explored above, the Ottoman Empire's geopolitical status made the prospect of all-out war unlikely. Nevertheless, Stein was clear that there was no way that the safety of the Armenians could be guaranteed under Ottoman rule. It was this assumption that led him to become one of the clearest articulators of a vision of imperial hierarchy in the United

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[42] Library of Congress, Clara Barton Papers [Hereafter Barton Papers], Box 72, Reel 58, General Correspondence, 'L' Miscellaneous, 1863-1911, Alfred Love to Clara Barton, 18 October 1896.

[43] Nicholas Mulder, *The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War* (New Haven; London, 2022). Mulder has articulated how economic sanctions, at the time of their intellectual inception, represented the radical end of liberal alternatives to war.

[44] MS Bryce 196, fo. 102, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 4 May 1895.

States, as he strove to present the Armenians as an erstwhile European race oppressed by the degeneracy of Ottoman rule. Consequently, Stein envisioned a unique and novel solution to the Armenian Question that combined multilateral action – as a means of averting great power conflict – with the divided sovereignty of imperial guardianship in order to forestall violent intervention.

Born in the Prussian province of Silesia in 1857, Stein travelled to the United States at the age of eighteen to train as a Jesuit minister at Georgetown University.[45] Upon discovering the work of Herbert Spencer, he renounced his faith, having become 'convinced that [the Jesuit] cosmology was baseless.'[46] Instead, he graduated from Georgetown with a medical degree and began working as a translator for the US Geological Survey, while immersing himself in anti-vice politics.[47] Writing under the pseudonym Pan-Aryan, Stein frequently commented in the American press on the need for rapprochement between Germany and France, which he saw as being the first step towards his utopian vision for a United States of Europe.[48] The polar regions formed his other major preoccupation, viewing the Arctic Circle as a final geographical theatre for the careful balancing act of European imperial ambition.[49] His writings were often promoted and commented on in the pages of the peace press and he became a member of the Universal Peace Union in the early 1890s[50]. Having been elected to the UPU's executive committee in 1893, he was selected to become a delegate to the Universal Peace Congress held in Chicago as part of the World's Fair.[51] Stein had already experimented with solutions to the Armenian Question several years earlier in an article for *The Peacemaker* where, seeing the clouds of war gathering, he called for 'Armenian Home Rule'.[52] However, as conditions in Anatolia disintegrated for the Christian minority, he became more active in his agitation for a change of administration.

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[45] Cornell University Library, Andrew Dickson White Papers, Microfilm [Hereafter White Papers], Reel 65, Robert Stein to Andrew Dickson White, 4 January 1896, p. 2.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid, p. 2-3; *A Catalogue of the Officers and Students of Georgetown College, District of Columbia, for the Academic Year, 1885-86* (Baltimore, 1886), pp. 61-63.

[48] Pan-Aryan, 'On the Threshold of Universal Peace: An American Answer to the Question How to Reconcile France and Germany', *The Review of Reviews,* Vol. 10 (December, 1894), pp. 635-643. Stein claims authorship of the article in a letter to Andrew Dickson White: White Papers, RS to ADW, 8 January 1895, Reel 63; Robert Stein, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa* (Berlin, 1908).

[49] Robert Stein, *The Defense of Alaska Plea for the Protection American Labor* (Washington D.C., 1910); Robert Stein, *Greater Canada and the Peace Problem* (Washington D.D., 1914).

[50] UPU Records, Series I, Box 4, Folder 2, Membership Records Book, 1893-96.

[51] *The Peacemaker* 12/1 (July, 1893), Front Matter; p. 16.

[52] Robert Stein, 'Armenian Home Rule', *The Peacemaker* 11/2 (August, 1892), pp. 23-24.

Stein's solution, while novel in American politics, had its antecedents on the other side of the Atlantic. Over ten years prior, a similar call had emerged in Westminster from perhaps the most recognisable British statesman to an American audience, Viscount James Bryce of Dechmont, who would prove crucial in the policy's journey. With decades of experience at the forefront of Liberal Party politics, Bryce was the lynchpin of a transatlantic intellectual community of liberal thinkers that sought to advance Anglo-American cooperation and unity.[53] Prior to the peak of his career at the top of British politics – which culminated with his appointment as Ambassador to Washington (1907-1913) – Bryce set out to author a Tocquevillian study of American democracy and society.[54] *The American Commonwealth* was widely read on both sides of the Atlantic and, in the words of one commentator, eventually acquired 'a biblical authority' among American liberals.[55] Many of the intellectuals who had shaped Bryce's thought would enter into lengthy and wide-ranging correspondence with him across the following decades, discussing the global state of colonial relations and wider matters of geopolitics.[56] In Britain, Bryce continued to be among the most prominent commentators on American affairs, as well as an authority on the Armenian Question, having travelled to the region to summit Mount Ararat in 1876 and subsequently publishing an account of this a year later, entitled *Transcaucasia and Ararat*.[57] Thus in 1880, following the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, Bryce called for the nomination of an Armenian governor for the Christian-majority regions of Anatolia.[58]

Bryce would, therefore, become Stein's main sounding board in his quest to remove Armenia from the direct control of the Ottomans. What had previously been an idealistic call for a shift in governance in the Near East in 1880 (when Bryce first articulated the idea) had now become the focal point of a transatlantic campaign under the auspices of Stein's leadership. Writing to Bryce with the manuscript of an article which would eventually be published in *The Arena*, Stein set forward his proposal for Armenia to be administered by a European. Bearing the endorsements

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[53] John T. Seaman, *A Citizen of the World: The Life of James Bryce* (London, 2006).

[54] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (New York; London, 1909).

[55] Hugh Tulloch, *James Bryce's American Commonwealth* (Woodbridge, 1988), p. 10.

[56] Ibid.

[57] James Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat: Being Notes of a Vacation Tour in the Autumn of 1876* (London, 1877). Bryce would release several editions of this. Most notably, in 1896, he released the fourth edition, which contained an account of the Armenian Massacres. Bryce would also be the main advocate of the Armenian cause during the Armenian Genocide, working with Arnold Toynbee to document the Ottoman atrocities, see: James Bryce, Arnold Toynbee, and Ara Sarafian (eds.), *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Falloden by Viscount Bryce* (London; New York, 1916).

[58] See Oded Y. Steinberg, 'The Confirmation of the Worst Fears: James Bryce, British Diplomacy and the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896', *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines* 11 (2018), p. 19.

of Josiah Strong and Cyrus Hamlin (President of Robert College in Constantinople), Stein's piece used Frederick Davis Greene's account of the massacres (a book to which Stein himself had contributed translations) to depict the plight of the Armenians in vivid detail.[59]

Something akin to the proposals for Armenian home rule and Bryce's plan for an Armenian governor was already under consideration among European diplomats, as they proposed that the Christian territories of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, and Mush ought to be united into a single province, which would be ruled first by a Muslim governor followed by a Christian one. Such a proposal was now anathema to Stein. Much as had occurred with the watering down of international treaties in the 1870s, he feared that the Armenian people would pay the price of a geopolitical standoff between Britain and Russia, neither of whom would acquiesce to the other gaining a foothold in the region – and thus inertia would persist.

The violence of the past years had seen the Ottoman Empire forfeit any pretence of being a proper steward of the civilising mission. Human development, to Stein, could not be secured under the rule of a Muslim government, as he claimed, 'Missionaries, consuls, travelers [sic] of all nations unanimously declare that no Mohammedan country, under present circumstance, can be regenerated except under European superintendence.'[60] This was not a matter of specific laws, but rather seeing that those already in place were properly applied, namely the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. 'In a word, there is no need for new laws for Armenia. The existing laws of Turkey are amply sufficient,' Stein wrote, 'What is needed is a new machinery to carry them into effect, because the old machinery is hopelessly corrupt.'[61]

Stein's presentation of civilisational stasis in the Near East made curious use of commonplace nineteenth-century tropes of Islamophobia. As has been documented by historians such as Frank Ninkovich and Karine Walther, the perceived persistence of slavery and polygamy within

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[59] MS Bryce 196, fo. 70, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 28 March 1895; Frederick D. Greene, *The Armenian crisis in Turkey* (New York, 1895), p. 96. Greene's account of the massacres and its introduction by Josiah Strong were frequently cited by advocates of the Armenian cause as the definitive account of the unfolding events in the Near East.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid. fo. 73

Islamic societies was fundamental to the American perception of the Ottoman Empire.[62] Although reference to the latter was notably absent in Stein's depiction of the Sublime Porte, he would subtly weave references to Islamic slavery into his analysis of the Armenian Massacres. Rather than delving into the theology of why no Islamic territory could be guided towards civilisation other than by a European, he laid the blame of the divergence at the feet of a corrupt and bloated Ottoman bureaucracy – doing so with a distinctly American comparison. Referencing Tammany Hall, the notorious symbol of Gilded Age corruption, Stein argued:

> 'Imagine Tammany transferred to Constantinople, multiplied ten or twenty-fold, having at its disposal an army of 700,000 men armed with Mauser rifles and Krupp cannon. Imagine this ring lording it over a population totally defenceless, having neither ballots nor bullets, no education and no press, save the sensor ridden press of three or four seaports. Imagine, furthermore, this ring imbued with the idea that that population is *its property*, by the right of conquest and by gift of Allah; that the only purpose of the existence of that population is to glut the lust and greed of their rulers, for such is the belief in which the members of the Turkish ruling class have been brought up during the past five hundred years.'[63]

Taking examples from across the Near and Middle East, Stein explained that Algeria and Tunisia had seen a remarkable regeneration under the French. His praise was most elaborate for the civilising ability of the British. 'Egypt is prosperous and tranquil: why?' he asked, 'Because she is under British administration. Lebanon is at peace from end to end: why? Because it has a Christian governor appointed with the consent of the powers.'[64] For Stein, colonial development was primarily a matter of making peace within a territory, which would swiftly be followed by economic prosperity for its inhabitants. The previous decades had demonstrated that this undertaking was only possible under a Christian governor.

The most instructive example of civilisational uplift in Stein's portrait of the Near East was that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had previously been governed by the Ottomans until the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. The country, which was now governed by Austria-Hungary, had 'been

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[62] Frank Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, 2009), p. 199-208; Karine Walther, 'Islamic World Encounters', in Kristin L. Hoganson and Jay Sexton (eds.), *The Cambridge History of America and the World. Volume 2, 1812-1900*, (Cambridge, 2021), pp. 669-692. For the place of Islam within the United States' wider imagination, see: Oliver Charbonneau, "'A New West in Mindanao": Settler Fantasies on the U.S. Imperial Fringe', *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 18/3 (2019), pp. 304-23; Oliver Charbonneau, 'Colonizing Workers: Labor, Race, and U.S. Military Governance in the Southern Philippines', *Modern American History* 4/1 (2021), pp. 25-47.

[63] Robert Stein, 'Armenia Must Have a European Governor', *The Arena* LXVI (May, 1895), p. 380. The published version of the article differs in several respects compared to the draft sent to Bryce. The latter does not include this quote on Tammany.

[64] MS Bryce 196. fo. 70, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 23 March 1895.

lifted in the space of 16 years from utter barbarism to the dignity of civilized countries.'[65] The answer of what to do with Armenia, according to Stein, was therefore obvious:

> 'Wherever Mohammedan governments are still in power, anarchy continues to prevail. It is certain then that if Armenia is ever to be redeemed, it must be through the appointment of a European governor. Then why prolong her martyrdom for five years, when it is certain moreover that even then Turkey will not appoint a European governor if she can help it?'[66]

Given that he had just completed 'the regeneration of a ruined country,' which amounted to 'one of the marvels of modern times,' Stein could think of no better candidate for the position than Bosnia's governor, Count Benjamin de Kallay.[67] Not only had Kallay regenerated a post-Ottoman nation, but Kallay himself hailed from a multi-ethnic empire and was also a diplomatically expedient choice. With one eye on the fragile balance of power between Britain and Russia in the region, Stein explicitly stated his wish not to harm the geopolitical independence of Turkey; his preference for a Hungarian governor was in part a desire to remove any concerns of realpolitik that might hinder the Armenian cause. He was also precise in his language that a European, rather than simply a Christian, ought to govern the region, thus precluding any possibility of Armenian self-government.

The mechanism to achieve this goal was to be a groundswell of public sentiment for Armenia, the likes of which had already raised over $300,000 for the Armenian people, largely through appeals by religious institutions such as the ABCFM and the *Christian Herald* newspaper.[68] That this was to come from the United States was vital, given the absence of any territorial stake in the region and its perceived non-engagement with the intricate politics of the Concert of Europe. As such, Stein proclaimed, 'Let a blank petition be prepared, praying that a European governor be appointed in Armenia; let the petition be sent to every church in Europe and America for signature; and when signed, let this petitions [sic] be forwarded in each country to the proper persons or organised bodies, requesting their influence with the great European powers in behalf [sic] of this measure.'[69]

The use of such petitions as vehicles for political change was typical of the long tradition of moral suasion common among nineteenth-century progressives; petitioning, specifically by

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians,* p. 58.

[69] MS Bryce 196. fo. 73-4, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 23 March 1895.

women, had played a fundamental role in the history of antislavery agitation.[70] Best understood as the use of ethical arguments as a means of making political change through the moulding of public opinion, the practice had become prominent in the anti-slavery clashes of the antebellum period.[71] Nineteenth-century thinkers had differed over whether, in this context, public opinion was best thought of as a purely bottom-up phenomenon or instead as something that was mediated through an educated and well-intentioned middle class – with many peacemakers adopting the latter viewpoint.[72] Given the heritage of transatlantic abolitionism that undergirded the peace movement, moral suasion represented a central plank of peacecraft – especially as a form of top-down organising, rather than popular politics. Much as anti-slavery activists had sought to build 'a moral cordon' around the United States, peacemakers such as Stein now sought to lobby across borders to marshal the humanitarian sentiment of numerous publics against the Ottoman Empire.[73]

When Stein's petition reached the desk of Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, just weeks after it had been sent to Bryce, the APS Secretary was more than happy to provide feedback and guidance on how to best appeal to the 'brotherhood of man' as a means of enacting political change. Recommending that he speak to both Robert Treat Paine and William Lloyd Garrison Jr. (who had been present at the Lake with Blackwell and Chatschumian), Trueblood sought to enmesh Stein in his network of middle-class peacemakers. Trueblood's view of the petition was that a bottom-up groundswell of public opinion was both farfetched and ill-judged. Instead, he claimed that the 'names of one hundred prominent citizens from each of the great cities of the United States would have more power than a multitude of ordinary people.'[74] Specifically querying Stein's ambition to have the petition sent to every church in the land, Trueblood pointed out, with subtle derision, that there were nearly one hundred thousand churches in the country.[75]

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[70] See Susan Zaeske, *Signatures of Citizenship: Petitioning, Antislavery, and Women's Political Identity* (Chapel Hill, 2003), p. 3. Zaeske notes the clear and important political function of petitioning in the antebellum United States – specifically as an extra-electoral method of political engagement and identity formation.

[71] See Adam Chamberlin, 'Moral Suasion and Political Action', *American Political Thought* 7/1 (2018), pp. 57-85.

[72] W. Caleb McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery: Garrisonian Abolitionists and Transatlantic Reform*, (Baton Rouge, 2013), pp. 89-112.

[73] Richard Blackett, *Building an Antislavery Wall: Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement, 1830-1860* (Baton Rouge, 1983), pp. 3-46.

[74] Washington D.C., Georgetown University, Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Robert Stein Papers (GTM-710102), Box 1, Folder 5 (Incoming Correspondence S-W, 1895-1916), BFT to Robert Stein, 24 April 1895.

[75] Ibid.

Therefore, Stein's first priority was to ensure that the petition could ultimately be addressed to somebody who could 'concentrate the demand of the entire civilized world' on his mission. In flattering tones, Stein wrote to Bryce: 'Now I know of no man in England or anywhere to whom these petitions from America could be addressed than to you. On the one hand, there is hardly an Englishman who is so popular in the United States as you are; and on the other hand, no one else has so prominently figured as a defender of the Armenians.'[76] Bryce had a slightly different idea, instead suggesting that the petition be addressed to the one other British politician who might match him in notoriety in the United States: William Gladstone. Stein obliged and revised the petition to address the former Prime Minister, with it finally reading: "Sir: The undersigned respectfully pray that you entreat the government of Her Majesty to request His majesty, the Sultan of Turkey, to appoint a European governor in Armenia"[77] Adorning the circular that accompanied the mass petition were five signatures, those of Cyrus Hamlin (Founder of Robert College, Constantinople), Benjamin Orange Flower (Editor of *The Arena*), Helen H. Gardener (Associate Editor of *The Arena*), Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, and Alice Stone Blackwell. Barring Cyrus Hamlin, the early adopters of Stein's petition all came from the world of peacecraft.[78]

For his part, Bryce attempted to lend his name-recognition to the cause, authoring an article for *The Century* in which he assessed the best course of action for the Armenian Question. Referring to Stein and his plan in all but name, Bryce wrote of how '[e]xperience has shown that there is only one way of reforming an Oriental government, and that is putting it into leading strings, by either superseding the chief officials and putting Europeans in their place or by giving them European adjutants who shall virtually direct them.'[79] Assessing both Armenian national homogeneity and racial attainment, Bryce wrote with glowing praise of how the Armenians were 'a race with so much natural vigor, so much natural tenacity of life, and so much capacity for assimilating and using modern ideas.'[80]

Stein's analysis of Armenian civilisation followed a similar line. If he had presented the Ottoman inability to rule Armenia in cultural and political terms, his treatment of Armenia's civilisational

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[76] MS Bryce 196, fo. 763, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 28 March 1895.

[77] MS Bryce 196, fo. 102, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 4 May 1895.

[78] Benjamin Orange Flower was a Vice President of the American Peace Society. While Helen H. Gardener did not hold a formal position in any peace institution, she had previously been described as 'a friend of peace' by the Universal Peace Union, owing to her work in suffrage and temperance, see 'International Conference of Women', *The Peacemaker* VI/10 (April, 1888), p. 184.

[79] James Bryce, 'The Armenian Question', *Century Illustrated Magazine* LI/1 (November, 1895), p. 153.

[80] Ibid. p. 154.

standing was far more complex. Consistently stressing their non-Islamic heritage, Stein wrote at length on the complexion, religion, and cultural attainment of the Armenians, in order to present them as being squarely within the family of European peoples. Writing to Bryce, Stein commented on the stature and complexion of the Armenian people, which he had gleaned from his experiences with the Armenian-American community of New York. Using language that gave very little room for doubt as to his opinions, Stein argued:

> 'First of all [one] will find them to be a remarkably handsome race, at least the dominant type. Their complexion is generally that of Italians. The lips, though full and red, are apt, to show a curve that is not always pleasing to the American eye; but a pair of jet-black eyebrows, seeming all the blacker by the sharp contrast with the white forehead, surmount in magnificent arches a pair of lustrous, soft brown eyes, which might cause the most fanatical worshipper of blond beauty to waver in his faith. Not that blonds are lacking among them; there is one in particular, whose blue eyes, delicate features, fair complexion, and refined manners might easily cause him to be mistaken for an English nobleman.'[81]

Stein would combine such flattering language with allusions to the Armenian nation's heritage as being that of both an 'Aryan' and Christian people. However, for Stein, the true markers of Armenian whiteness were the linguistic and cultural achievements that he had witnessed. Himself a polyglot and a translator, he wrote of his amazement at their linguistic prowess:

> 'It is downright amazing to see an Armenian merchant take his reed pen, and with the utmost rapidity and without the least hesitation write a letter in Turkish to Constantinople, then a letter in good English and in a good American business hand to some American firm; next a letter in equally good French to some French firm; to notice on his desk letters in Greek and Italian; then to be allowed to look in his note-book and find that he writes all the notes therein in Armenian. They have poems and songs of startling beauty, and if they could but bring themselves to discard their forbidding alphabet and adopt the Roman alphabet, there is little doubt that the study of their beautiful language and literature would quickly become fashionable in Europe and America.'[82]

One person willing to take up Stein's challenge was Alice Stone Blackwell who had developed a passion for Armenian poetry and literature; she would even go as far as to compile an edition of translated Armenian poetry, the proceeds of which would go to Armenian cause. In the book's preface, Blackwell interwove her physical and cultural admiration of the Armenians, claiming that '[a]s the beauty of an Armenian girl is often conspicuous even in rags, so it is hoped that the beauty of some of these Armenian poems may be visible even through the poverty of their

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[81] MS Bryce 196. fo. 74, X. Films 8/56, Stein to Bryce, 23 March 1895.

[82] Ibid. Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race*, pp. 54-55; 183-184. The flattening of linguistic difference was seen by peacemakers as a vital process in the onward march of peace. For more on this see Duncan Bell's work on the Simplified Spelling Board.

English dress.'[83] She shared Stein's ideas regarding Armenian heritage, similarly proclaiming them to be of 'Aryan' descent and stating in terms similar to Bryce that they were 'a strong race, not only with vigorous nerves and sinews, physically active and energetic, but also of conspicuous brain power.'[84]

Blackwell's signature on Stein's petition was the result of a long correspondence between the two, as they strategised over how best to word the petition and how best to publicise it. After initially rebuffing Blackwell's desire to employ more bellicose language in the petition, the pair turned their attention to garnering the support of prominent liberal Americans – primarily in New England.[85] Blackwell's input would prove crucial in this. The appearance of Stein's article and the accompanying petition in *The Arena* had, in part, been secured through Blackwell's relationship with Helen Hamilton Gardener, an Associate Editor at the publication. Gardener had stressed to Blackwell that the article would be 'much more profusely illustrated than [*The Arena's*] articles usually [were],' claiming that they had spared 'no expense' in its presentation[86]. Blackwell also set the wheels in motion for Stein's proposal to be printed in the pages of the *Women's Journal* and for the petition to be reproduced in the circular, the *Women's Column*. In a piece for the latter, Blackwell herself would call for a European governor and paraphrased Julia Ward Howe in stating that the current situation was 'as if the United States were to arm the Apache Indians and commission them to keep order in Arizona, while it forbade the white settlers to possess any weapons.'[87]

Not only would Blackwell put the petition in front of more eyeballs, but she would use her close relationship with Frances Willard, the President of the WCTU, to add further prestige to the cause. Writing to Stein, she claimed that 'Not long ago Frances Willard wrote me privately from England that she would authorize me to sign her name to anything I wished on the Armenian question.'[88] This level of trust had surprised Blackwell but she resolved, however, to let Stein

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[83] Alice Stone Blackwell, *Armenian Poems Rendered into English Verse* (Boston, 1896), p. i.

[84] Ibid. p. iii.

[85] Blackwell Papers, Robert Stein to Alice Stone Blackwell, 18 April 1895. Blackwell had sought to include a phrase implying that the Ottomans had to leave 'bag and baggage' from the region – a direct allusion to Gladstone's pronouncements on the Bulgarian Crisis.

[86] Wellesley, Wellesley College, Wellesley College Digital Repository, Autograph Letters Collection, Alice Stone Blackwell to Robert Stein, 12 April 1895 (WCSC_MS_ALS_00260), p. 4, https://repository.wellesley.edu/object/wellesley11532.

[87] Alice Stone Blackwell, 'Armenian Grievances', *The Woman's Column* VIII/14 (6 April 1895), p. 8.

[88] Wellesley Autograph Letters Collection, ALC, Blackwell to Stein, 21 May 1895, (WCSC_MS_ALS_00266) p. 1, https://repository.wellesley.edu/object/wellesley11538.

affix the name to the petition, noting that '[Willard] is very warmly interested in the subject and she and I are very good friends.'[89]

With the list of signatories growing, Stein aimed to widen the petition's scope. By June, three months after Stein's correspondence with Bryce, the petition landed on the desk of Andrew Dickson White, founder of Cornell University and former ambassador to Germany and Russia. In the intervening three months the circular that accompanied the mass petition had gained the signatures of thirty prominent individuals as opposed to the five which had adorned it when Bryce had first seen it. Unsurprisingly, these included many members of the Friends of Armenia Society, including Edward Everett Hale and Julia Ward Howe, as well as a trio of Supreme Court justices: David J. Brewer, Henry B. Born, and John M. Harlan. The petition had also gained further support from the peace movement including from Mary A. Livermore (a Vice President of the UPU), and from Lyman Abbott.

Whether the petition in its fully signed form ever made it onto the desk of William Gladstone remains somewhat unclear.[90] However, in its reporting on the petition, the *New York Times* remarked that this plan of action had been agreed upon by many eminent figures, including both Bryce and Gladstone.[91] And by the summer of 1895, Gladstone would make the last major political intervention of his career, urging the powers of Europe to act in the Near East. In a speech at Chester in August, he endorsed the message that whatever promises of safety and liberty be made regarding Armenia, 'no reforms can be effective which are not placed under the continuous control of the Great Powers of Europe.'[92] In doing so, he acknowledged that this desire not only came from Britain but also from across the Atlantic, claiming that he had it on good authority that he was also speaking on behalf of those whom he termed his 'Transatlantic brethren.'[93]

The former Prime Minister's choice of words was telling, as sitting next to him on the stage was

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[89] Ibid.

[90] Oxford, Bodleian Library, The Papers of William Gladstone, Microfilm, Reel 23 (Add. Ms. 44518, Vol. 433); Reel 24 (Add. Ms. 44519, Vol. 434; Add. Ms. 44520, Vol. 435); Reel 25 (Add. Ms. 44521, Vol. 436; Add. Ms. 44522, Vol. 437) Reel 26 (Add. Ms. 44523, Vol. 438; Add. Ms. 44524, Vol. 439). The microfilmed Papers of William Gladstone show no trace of Gladstone having received the petition itself. However, Gladstone and Bryce had corresponded about possible solutions to the Armenian Question. Gladstone had written to Bryce to suggest that the territory become a 'tributary state'. See MS Bryce 10 fo. 147, Gladstone to Bryce, 14 April 1895.

[91] 'An Appeal For Armenia: Plan For Making It A Province With A Christian Governor', *NYT* XLIV/13,659 (1 June 1895), p. 4.

[92] 'Mr. Gladstone On The Armenian Question', *The Times (London)* 34649 (7 August 1895), p. 4.

[93] Ibid.

the President of the American Peace Society, Robert Treat Paine, who was touring the country at that time. In a letter to Gladstone's secretary three days before the speech at Chester, Paine respectfully addressed the man whom he termed 'the spokesman of the whole English-speaking race.'[94] Using the rhetoric of moral suasion, Paine' main message was one of transatlantic solidarity as he assured Gladstone that: 'not only will he speak to America, but he may speak for our country; to the end that the moral power of both of our nations may be blended in the solemn protest against [this] outrage.'[95] Having heard of Paine's presence in the audience, Gladstone immediately moved to elevate the American peacemaker from the audience onto the stage, from where he would also issue a brief address to the crowd, articulating the strength of feeling on the matter across the United States.[96]

The most surprising name to appear on later drafts of Stein's petition was that of Alfred Love who had, along with many from the UPU, steered clear of any inflammatory public pronouncements on the issue. The signatories of the circular were notably not all of the same view, with many having issued vituperative calls for military intervention. For Love to join with those who were significantly less reticent about the use of force implied either a hardening of attitude on his part or a belief that European governance of Armenia might be secured by non-violent means. The latter would prove to be almost impossible. Contrary to their namesake, a belligerent tone was also adopted by some within the peace movement. Even as early as April 1895, Blackwell had been writing in the pages of the *Woman's Column* that the most effective way to resolve the situation would be for 'one or two American iron-clads [to] be sent to cruise quietly up and down the Mediterranean, without firing a shot, merely to show that we mean business.'[97] Indeed, throughout 1895 the US Navy had stationed two cruisers – the USS *Marblehead* and the USS *San Francisco* – in the Mediterranean, which would periodically enter Turkish waters. From December 1895 till March 1896, the *San Francisco* remained in Turkish waters, firstly conducting target practice off the coast of Alexandretta before lingering off the coast of Smyrna for three months.

Much as with Blackwell's bellicosity, the American Peace Society was surprisingly at ease with the presence of the Navy so close to Anatolia, stating that these ships had been sent 'only for the protection of life and property.' Echoing Stein's plea from a year earlier, the APS proclaimed

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[94] 'Mr. Gladstone and the American Peace Society', *Leeds Mercury* 17,900 (19 August 1895), p. 5.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid; 'Mr Gladstone on the Armenian Question', *The Sheffield and Rotherham Independent* 35/12,751 (7 August 1895), p. 5.

[97] Alice Stone Blackwell, 'The American Interests Involved', *The Woman's Column* VIII/14 (6 April 1895), p. 4.

that:

> 'If the country were made free and independent, placed under proper governorship and kept free from interference, this would not only be an infinite boon to the Armenians themselves, but would do more than anything else to bring Turkey to her senses and solve whole Eastern question.'[98]

However, the peacemakers were beginning to sound increasingly more Panglossian. By the close of the year, it was becoming clearer that the European powers would be unable to reach a solution. The realpolitik that had forced them into the unhappy compromise of the Treaty of Berlin was now keeping them in a fixed state of inaction. And with this retrenchment of European self-interest, the hope of multilateral intervention on behalf of the Armenians ebbed away. For some this meant that the issue receded in their minds; however, for others, views hardened.

Nowhere was this more evident than in Congress. In January 1896, Florida Senator Wilkinson Call introduced a resolution that called on the United States 'by peaceful negotiations, or, if necessary, by force of arms, [to] prevent and suppress the cruelties and massacres inflicted on the Armenian subjects'.[99] Call's rhetoric would match the tenor of outrage in the press, as he invoked the United States' unique mission to intervene in humanitarian crises across the globe:

> 'We have a duty to perform [...] we owe it to civilization and humanity that the power which has been given to us shall be exercised. We owe it to every principle of civilization that the people of Armenia and by a greater interest and obligation that the people of Cuba shall not be murdered by the brutal military despotism which now threatens to extinguish that entire race.'[100]

The resolution was eventually watered down to remove the threat of war, with Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Shelby Cullom introducing a revised resolution, calling on the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to secure the promised reforms for the Armenians. The threat of war was replaced by a warning that the United States would take the 'most vigorous action' in defence of American citizens in the Ottoman Empire and it encouraged the President to seek an indemnity for the loss of property and life already inflicted on American missionaries in the region.[101] Many viewed Cullom's resolution as a meagre offering and when it reached the House it faced a wall of jingoistic rhetoric, with one Congressman boldly stating that 'if need be,

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[98] 'Notes and Comments', *AoP* 57/12 (December, 1895), p. 281.

[99] US Congress, Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 54th Congress, 1st Session, 24 January 1896, 'Armenian Outrages', p. 964.

[100] Ibid. p. 963.

[101] Laderman, *Sharing the Burden,* p. 22-23

I am ready to have the two-edged sword of civilization pierce the cruel heart of the Ottoman Empire.'[102]

Much of this congressional sabre-rattling fell on deaf ears in the White House. President Cleveland, although willing to dispatch two gunships to the Mediterranean, had no intention of embroiling the United States in a geopolitical standoff between Russia and Britain. Still dealing with the fallout from the war scare of the Venezuela Crisis, Cleveland remained obdurate in the face of congressional agitation. Following a final wave of repression in the autumn of 1896 (a response to the Armenian occupation of the Central Bank of Istanbul), the European powers convened to impose a series of toothless reforms and sanctions on the Sultan that would do little to prevent the Greco-Turkish War from erupting but a year later.

What would emerge within the peace movement, and American society more broadly, was a bitter critique of the self-interest of the Concert of Europe – something which one commentator termed as the 'blood-guiltiness of Europe.'[103] Writing in October 1896, as the Ottoman campaigns against the Armenians dissipated, *The Advocate of Peace* was biting in its criticism of European inaction. 'Who is to blame for this dreadful pass to which things have come?' queried one editorial, 'All the military powers of the world, England in her way as much as any. She has kept the Turk on his throne in her own interests.'[104] The inability to intervene was a dilemma of Britain's own making – with London having removed Russian troops from the region in 1878. Going even further, the *Advocate* claimed that Britain had followed 'a colonial policy' and had engaged in the naval race so as to make 'every nation of the world dislike her,' thus leaving her 'entangled in the snare which she herself has helped to weave and lay.'[105] The episode would leave a lasting mark on the imagination of peace activists. Looking back at the period in 1901, during an episode of French gunboat diplomacy off the coast of Constantinople, the APS lamented that the current intervention was only made possible via self-interest and not out of humanitarianism:

> 'In this case financial considerations and "national prestige" were the motives which induced the French government to move vigorously. And the powers appreciated these motives and allowed the French government to act. In the Armenian matter, when a whole people was being massacred and the interests were of a high moral order, not one of the great armed powers cared or dared to move a finger. They stood and snarled at

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[102] Ibid. p. 23. Quote from Republican Congressman David Henderson (Iowa).

[103] Talcott Williams, 'Cuba and Armenia', *Century Illustrated Magazine* 58/4 (February, 1899), pp. 634-635.

[104] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 58/9 (October, 1896), p. 223.

[105] Ibid. p. 224.

each other like a lot of angry dogs.'[106]

The willingness to see Western intervention against the Ottoman Empire, even years after the Massacres had abated, was indicative of both the imperial hierarchy drawn in the early days of the crisis and the lasting humanitarian imprint that the crisis had had on the peace movement. However, the Armenian Massacres represented the high tide of humanitarian sentiment for the peace movement. As shown below, the lines of this imperial hierarchy ossified around pre-existing ideas of race and civilisation, when multilateralism and imperial collaboration were no longer available options to tackle the looming humanitarian conflict on the United States' doorstep.

The Cuban Pivot

As the peacemakers agonised over the fate of Christianity in the Near East, a storm closer to home lingered on the horizon. Having treated the Caribbean as its own sphere of influence, the United States had maintained a long-held fascination with Cuba throughout the nineteenth century and had previously contemplated intervention in the Spanish-held island during the Ten Years War (1868-78).[107] By the mid-1890s, over a million dollars of investment was flowing into Cuba from the United States, with American businessmen speculating on mining and sugar.[108] When war broke out again in 1895, the United States took a keen interest in the anti-colonial struggle of the Cuban revolutionaries, predicting that the Spanish would fail to cling on to the island as part of their empire for much longer.

Beginning as a series of uprisings in the island's eastern mountains, fighting had engulfed the entire country by 1896, as the Cubans rose up to rid themselves of Spanish rule. During the early stages of the war, the Cubans had been led by the revolutionary writer José Martí, who had himself spent a period of exile in New York prior to the outbreak of the war.[109] After initial efforts at reform on the islands, the Spanish resorted to more brutal methods and – with the arrival of the Spanish General Valeriano Weyler and 150,000 more Spanish troops – engaged in a campaign of scorched earth that they hoped would end the conflict for good.[110] Weyler's chosen

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[106] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 63/12 (December, 1901), p. 235.

[107] Jay Sexton 'The United States, the Cuban Rebellion, and the Multilateral Initiative of 1875', *Diplomatic History* 30/3 (2006), pp. 335-65; Andrew Priest, 'Thinking about Empire: The Administration of Ulysses S. Grant, Spanish Colonialism and the Ten Years' War in Cuba', *Journal of American Studies* 48/2 (May 2014), pp. 541-558.

[108] Walter LaFeber, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume 2: The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 122.

[109] Louis A. Pérez, *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill N.C., 1998), pp. 16-31.

[110] LaFeber, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, p. 124.

tactic was to forcibly remove over four hundred thousand Cubans into camps that would be beset by disease and starvation.[111]

American public opinion was enraged at the sight of an escalating humanitarian catastrophe just off the country's shores and the quashing of the republican spirit in the Western Hemisphere. As early as 1895, with fighting only just beginning, voices arose in the pages of the yellow press arguing for the United States to take action. One writer, in September 1895, queried: 'Is it difficult for us to decide between free Cuba and tyrant Spain? Why not fling overboard Spain and give Cuba the aid which she needs[?]'[112] Another writer pronounced judgement on the situation on the island in terms actively designed to stoke American patriotic sentiment: 'Deprived of all rights which men hold dear[,] refused home rule even in local affairs, taxed to the uttermost limit to support Spain's crumbling monarchy, robbed of what was left by unscrupulous Spanish officials, these people have risen for a last determined effort to throw off the foreign yoke.'[113] Indeed many made the leap to compare the scenes of violence in the Caribbean to those that they had read about in the Near East, with the *Atlanta Constitution* proclaiming the slogan that 'Cuba is our Armenia'.[114] One other commentator reflected that when looking on at the humanitarian crisis in Cuba, it was the United States' duty to ensure that the 'blood shed in Armenia was not spilled in vain' and to learn the lessons of European inaction.[115]

Sitting in the metropolises of the Northeast, the peace movement closely followed news of the unfolding violence just a hundred miles from the shores of the United States. Unlike the movement's response to the Armenian Crisis, they proceeded with trepidation. Opinions within the movement varied on the desirability and feasibility of Cuban independence. Although many sympathised with the Cuban desire to be a self-governing polity, a quiet consensus emerged that the optimal solution would be for the island to remain a part of the Spanish Empire, but with greater autonomy. In this, many peacemakers made a similar suggestion to the proposals mooted as solutions to the Armenian Question, prior to the onset of violence; the oppressed nation would have limited and moderated autonomy while sitting within a looser imperial structure.

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[111] John L. Offner, *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898* (Chapel Hill; London, 1992), p. 13.

[112] Clarence King, 'Shall Cuba be Free?', *Forum* 50 (September, 1895), p. 65.

[113] Frank J. Clark, 'Cuba's Struggle for Freedom', *The Cosmopolitan; a Monthly Illustrated Magazine* 19/6 (October, 1895), p. 616.

[114] Pérez, *Cuba in the American Imagination*, p. 24.

[115] Williams, 'Cuba and Armenia', pp. 634-635.

However, despite the crises having similar supposed remedies – namely the imposition of imperial guardianship – the peace movement's response to the Cuban Crisis was functionally very different. Often referring to their desired policy outcome as Cuban Home Rule, the peacemakers broadly rejected the need for intervention, given that they were proposing no shift in sovereignty away from the Spanish. Unlike with Armenia, where European intervention was required to end the bloodshed, the peacemakers backed Spanish incrementalism. Even so, peacemakers varied when discussing the means by which the United States ought to influence the conflict. These divergent points of view broadly followed an institutional cleavage. The American Peace Society was open to recognising Cuban belligerency but urged the utmost restraint when it came to the United States getting directly involved. The UPU preferred to operate behind the scenes to try and mediate the conflict; being steeped in the practice of peacecraft, they lobbied both the Spanish and American governments in an effort to broker a compromise.

The peacemakers' sudden reticence to see the United States dirty its hands with the business of military intervention (especially when placed alongside their bullishness regarding Armenia) was illustrative of the movement's innate anti-jingoism and cynicism towards Cuban claims to whiteness. Humanitarianism, then, was a distinctly constrained element of the peacemakers' worldview, even at a time when it was at its high watermark in American political culture.[116] Instead of making a humanitarian argument in comparing the conflict in the Caribbean to that in the Near East – as many Americans were doing – they sought to derive a solution borne out of contemporary imperial geopolitics.[117] Race and civilisation were vital considerations in allowing the peacemakers to parse the difference between the two conflicts. During the Armenian Massacres, the peacemakers were able to rely on pre-existing religious and racial tropes to paint a good and bad side to the conflict; however, during the Cuban War, they feared that both sides would deface their own whiteness, causing the peacemakers to transition from enthusiasm to ambivalence to hostility when it came to the cause of Cuba Libre. Via the tactics of peacecraft – especially in the case of the UPU – the peace movement sought to present imperial guardianship as the solution to an anti-colonial struggle, arguing that Cuba should receive Home Rule within the Spanish Empire – rather than being sucked into the American imperial orbit.

The Politics of Anti-Jingoism

Although they frequently offered a running commentary on the events unfolding across the island, the American Peace Society seemed broadly more concerned with the impending crisis in

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[116] Samuel Moyn, *Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War* (New York, 2021).

[117] For more on these comparisons see Laderman, *Sharing the Burden*; Pérez, *Cuba in the American Imagination*.

Anglo-American relations and finding a solution to the Armenian Massacres. However, as the violence escalated, the initial instinct of the APS was one of cautious sympathy. In an article which directly compared the fates of Cuba, French-controlled Madagascar, and the Japanese occupation of Formosa (modern-day Taiwan), the *AoP* declared that 'Cuba ought to be free'.[118] In this, the APS quietly reflected the broad current of American public opinion, which increasingly supported the cause of Cuba Libre. With grassroots organisations spreading across the country as early as 1895, the APS reported on 'two immense meetings' held in Chicago. While praising the display of collective organising, the APS notably refrained from condoning the Cuban *casus belli* and simply called for Spain to bestow independence upon the islands in order to meet the demands of right and satisfy the conscience of the civilized world.'[119]

The APS also stopped short of justifying the actions of the Cuban revolutionaries, instead claiming that 'if, without further bloodshed, Spain would declare the island free and independent, it would be the noblest act which that nation has done for a century.'[120] Indeed, the editorial went to great lengths to minimise the Cubans' humanitarian concerns, stressing that there were 'other even more weighty reasons' for the island to be a self-governing republic beyond its mistreatment by Spain.[121] Instead of entertaining Cuban grievances, the *Advocate* remarked, 'various historical, geographical and racial' differences meant that the island and the Iberian metropole could 'never have a very strong feeling of national unity.'[122]

The Universal Peace Union was even more cynical in its approach to the outbreak of war in Cuba. Although Alfred Love and his colleagues were motivated by a similar republican desire to see self-government for the inhabitants of the Caribbean island, they were pessimistic that such an outcome could easily be attained without the United States coming perilously close to entanglement. The optimal means of achieving this thus lay with the Spanish themselves who, according to the Love, ought to '[make] a treaty with Cuba without relinquishing the island, so that a revenue might be derived and a representation guaranteed and, indeed, home rule established, and without humiliation but with honor and glory to Spain.'[123] As will be shown below, the theme of Cuban Home Rule was persistent throughout the peacemakers' debates

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[118] 'Formosa, Madagascar, Cuba', *AoP* 57/9 (September, 1895), p. 204.

[119] 'Notes and Comments', *AoP* 57/11 (November, 1895), p. 259.

[120] 'Formosa, Madagascar, Cuba', *AoP* 57/9 (September, 1895), pp. 204-205.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Ibid.

[123] 'The Cuban Question', *The Peacemaker* 14/4 (October, 1895), p. 85.

around the fate of the Cubans. Failing this change of heart in Madrid, the UPU quixotically advocated that the United States should attempt to purchase the island, just as it had done with Louisiana approximately a century earlier, and grant the Cubans nominal self-government. In no eventuality did the UPU envisage that the Cubans would successfully throw off Spanish rule and establish democracy of their accord.

However, as the rhetoric of jingoism grew and the United States veered perilously close to violent intervention, the movement abruptly backed away from its support of the Cuban cause. In perhaps the most alarming turn of events, the peacemakers found that some of their number were susceptible to the sway of jingoistic rhetoric. As outrage across the country grew, so did the calls for a decisive American response, most audibly from the yellow press and from inside the halls of Congress. However, with this growing popular agitation came a sense of dissatisfaction from within the peace movement, as activists lamented the growing jingoist tenor of the debate. Therefore, instead of falling into line with the humanitarian-tinged jingoism that was gaining traction in American political culture, the peacemakers urged restraint. Their desire for diplomatic forbearance was motivated by their intrinsic scepticism towards jingoism, as well as a creeping suspicion of the racial and civilisational status of the Cuban revolutionaries and their methods of warfare.

The early calls for intervention emerged in Congress at the beginning of 1896 as lawmakers persistently pushed the Cleveland administration (and subsequently the administration of William McKinley) to take a firmer line on the unfolding war on America's doorstep. A flurry of resolutions worked their way through Congress at the start of that year, eventually being compiled into the Morgan-Cameron resolutions, which called for a recognition of Cuban belligerency and, ultimately, Cuban independence from Spain. These resolutions even drew the support of the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Vice President of the APS, John Sherman. Relying on apocryphal information that had been circulated by the *New York Journal*, Sherman predicted that the American people would not tolerate the continuing bloodshed, as he decried the Spanish as 'barbarous robbers and imitators of the worst men who ever lived in the world.'[124]

Sherman's impassioned speech gained plaudits from fellow lawmakers barring two notable dissenters – the Republican Senators Eugene Hale and George Hoar. In a preview of the arguments that would soon be made by other peacemakers, Hale critiqued Sherman's use of

[124] John L. Offner, *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898 (*Chapel Hill; London, 1992), p. 19; David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914* (Bloomington, 1976), p. 56. Sherman would not be the only peacemaker to break ranks with his colleagues in encouraging an American intervention in Cuba. Edward Everett Hale, Lyman Abbott, and Josiah Strong.

sensationalised information and questioned how the burning of villages by the Cuban rebels could possibly constitute the actions of a liberty-loving people.[125] Hale's principled stand against jingoism was supported by the APS, who held a particular disdain for the resolution's stated grounds for intervention. Speaking of both Hale and Hoar, Trueblood (in the *AoP*) claimed:

> 'It is gratifying to know that, in the midst of the general rashness and meddlesomeness, a few men in the national legislature have been wise and strong enough to bring it back to some sense of the great and solemn responsibility resting upon it. The course which Congress has taken has probably closed the door for the doing of anything effective for Cuba, if the time for it should ever have come.'[126]

Nodding to the movement's lukewarm support for Cuba Libre, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood explained the movement's forbearance via the language of racialised warfare. Much as Paul Kramer has shown to have been the case for the Philippine-American War (see Chapter 4), Trueblood's commentary on the Cuban War of Independence made heavy use of racialised tropes that linked a people's conduct in war to its civilisational status.[127] While he agreed that Cuba ought to be free, he stressed that the result would not necessarily be a wholly positive one – but rather the lesser of two evils. Noting that the Cuban people were lacking in the skills of self-government, he mused over the broader implications of a potential American intervention in the Caribbean – in a tone that was strikingly different from his views on Armenia:

> 'Nobody could be more strongly in favor of Cuban independence than we. The island ought to be a free and independent republic. The Cuban people may be poorly fitted at present to control themselves, but they will never learn self-government except by governing themselves. But their liberty and independence will not be promoted by our rashness and sentimental meddlesomeness. It is deplorable to see our nation falling into such a spirit and such inconsiderateness of action as must necessarily, if not, speedily abandoned, bring republican institutions into bad repute, and make it impossible for the United States to exercise that great and generous influence in behalf of liberty and peace which is a part of her world-wide mission.'[128]

In stark contrast to their analysis of the Turkish atrocities in Armenia, the peacemakers saw the Cubans as equal participants in the war and in no way extolled their religious or racial character. Echoing the arguments of Senator Hale, the peacemakers sought to publicise information that cast the Cuban insurgents as the aggressors in the conflict. Breaking from the general consensus in the press, the APS went out of their way to illustrate that 'some thoughtful persons attribute

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[125] Offner, *An Unwanted War*, p. 22; Congressional Record, 54th Congress, 9 March 1896, p. 2592.

[126] 'The Cuban Resolutions', *AoP* 58/4 (April, 1896), pp. 79-8.

[127] Paul A. Kramer, 'Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War', *Diplomatic History* 30/2 (2006), pp. 169-210.

[128] Ibid.

[the depravity of the war] quite as much to a restless and lawless spirit among the Cubans [as the Spanish].'[129] In the case of Cuba, the matter of contention was the Cuban use of the machete in combat. Described as the implement of the Cuban workingman for cutting sugar cane, the *AoP* proclaimed the machete to be Cuba's 'terrible national weapon', which had been used to behead soldiers and mutilate the bodies of Spanish soldiers. Tying the weapon to the broader cause of Latin American independence from Spain, Trueblood sardonically claimed that the weapon had 'done such execution that if the island should win her freedom, the machete ought to be included in the coat-of-arms of Cuba libre.'[130]

While the Universal Peace Union was not so dismissive of the Cuban rebels, Alfred Love and his colleagues freely admitted that the route to peace ran through Spain rather than the Cubans revolutionaries. However, they went one step further than their colleagues in the APS in one respect. Instead of simply editorialising against an escalation of the Cuban conflict, Alfred Love sought to bypass what he saw as a State Department in hock to jingoism and directly lobby the Spanish government. Much as the organisation had attempted to conduct private diplomacy during the Venezuelan Crisis via the activities of Conrad Stollmeyer, Love reached for a well-worn tool of peacecraft – private diplomacy – and penned a letter to the Spanish King, Alfonso XIII. Whether or not Love and his colleagues realised that the Spanish King was, at the time, just ten years old and hardly in any place to halt the impending conflict is unclear. However, such an oversight was indicative of the zealous and somewhat over-eager attitude with which the UPU engaged in these endeavours. This attitude would prove perilous (as will be shown below) when the American public realised that a coterie of peacemakers was attempting to bypass the jingoistic will of the American people.

The letter to the King of Spain was reprinted in *The Peacemaker* and was notable in that it spoke not of the conflict as a humanitarian tragedy but instead as a crisis of colonial relations. Love's suggestion had a familiar ring to it as he urged the Spanish to follow 'the wisest, cheapest, most humane and Christian course' available to them. In the eyes of the peacemakers, this was to 'grant Home Rule to the Cubans, to give them a representation in the General Government, to remove oppressive taxes and to require such revenue that is just and equitable, to withdraw your soldiers and settle all difficulties on a peace basis.'[131] The metaphor of Home Rule was likely an intentional allusion to the questions of Irish self-government that had plagued British politics for decades. Not only were both territories home to large Catholic majorities, but Cuba had attained

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[129] 'Annual Report of the Directors of the American Peace Society', *AoP* 58/6 (June, 1896), pp. 135-137.

[130] 'The Deadly Machete', *AoP* 58/7 (July, 1896), p. 187.

[131] 'To Spain on the Cuban Question', *The Peacemaker* 14/7-8 (January and February, 1896), p. 145.

the status of being 'Spain's Ireland' among many transatlantic onlookers.[132] Much like the APS, Love depicted the Cubans as the aggressors in the war, stating that 'we are asking the Cubans to cease their warlike attitude, and petition [Spain] for their rights of self-government and to be willing to pay a just and proportionate revenue.'[133]

The peacemakers, therefore, were at best dismissive of the cause of Cuba Libre and, at worst, disavowed it altogether. Such an attitude was remarkable when juxtaposed against the broader jingoistic clamour that was sweeping the United States. However, the movement found cause for relief upon learning that – despite the congressional belligerence – the White House was treating the matter with a degree of caution. Initially during the second Cleveland administration, and subsequently after the election of William McKinley, the American executive had been careful to stick to a more subdued tone in contrast to the sabre rattling on Capitol Hill.

In the days prior to McKinley's inauguration, a renewed push to recognise Cuban independence emerged in the Senate – with Senators hoping to impose the issue onto the final days of the Cleveland White House. The underlying logic behind the move was that in recognising Cuba as a coherent, independent state, the revolutionaries would be afforded a diplomatic status that would force a swifter end to the war and allow the United States to row in behind the rebels more easily. The *Advocate of Peace* was predictably circumspect, praising Cleveland's reticence to embroil the United States in the Cuban conflict. Determining the White House's 'prudent and patient' policy as being 'worthy of all commendation', Trueblood wrote in the *Advocate* that this was 'sure in the long run to secure much better results both in the island and in Spain than could possibly come from a bitter war with Spain.'[134]

This effort to recognise Cuban independence foundered in the Senate and eventually died prior to McKinley's inauguration. However, the issue reared its head almost as soon as Congress reconvened to discuss the new president's flagship economic policy of tariff reform. While McKinley had expected the Senate to primarily discuss his desires to raise tariffs on wool, linen, silk, china, and sugar, a further bill was introduced from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Democratic Senator John Morgan (of Alabama), calling for the recognition of the Cubans as belligerents in the conflict. Morgan's gambit had a shrewd logic; belligerent rights were a vital

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[132] See, for instance, the later example of WT Stead calling Cuba 'the Spaniard's Ireland'. William Thomas Stead, *The Americanization of the World; Or, The Trend of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1902), p. 45.

[133] 'To Spain on the Cuban Question', *The Peacemaker* 14/7-8 (January and February, 1896), p. 145.

[134] 'Senatorial Jingoism', *AoP 59*/1 (January, 1897), p. 9; 'Recognition of Cuban Independence', *The Peacemaker* 15/7 (January, 1897), p. 140-1. While the UPU were surprisingly less apprehensive than the APS on the topic of recognising Cuban belligerency, they stressed that the United States should operate as an intermediary that could help broker a peaceful settlement.

prerequisite to affording the Cubans rights and protections under the laws of war, as well as the status of a coherent nation. Chiming with contemporary understandings of belligerency within international law, the recognition of the Cuban rebels was both a message of solidarity as well as a signal to the international community of the rebels' suitability for a certain degree of self-determination.

While the bill would eventually fail, given that enough Republican Senators did not wish to pick a fight with their own President, it provoked further ire from within the peace movement. Writing in the pages of the *Advocate,* Trueblood condemned the continuous drumbeat towards war emanating from Congress, while speaking favourably of McKinley's policy of non-interference:

> 'It becomes increasingly evident that the disease with which the United States Senate is afflicted is jingoism almost pure and simple. The malady is called love of liberty and humanity, germs of which are mixed up with it, but the ailment cannot be wrongly diagnosed after its recent violent exhibition of symptoms.'[135]

All the while, the UPU continued its efforts at mediation. Having written to the King of Spain – which seemingly garnered no reply – the organisation had leant on one of its Vice Presidents on the other side of the Atlantic to push the issue. Señor Arturo de Marcoartu was both a Senator in the Spanish Cortes as well as a Vice President of the UPU and, therefore, the obvious point of contact for the organisation. Himself a Cobdenite peacemaker, Marcoartu's presence successfully sharpened the UPU's efforts at private diplomacy – as he presented the UPU's plea to the Spanish Queen Regent, instead of the ten-year-old King Alphonso. As well as a general petition of peace, the Spanish Senator also seemed to propose 'Home Rule for Cuba' that would allow the island to elect its own legislature, with most executive offices being held by Iberian appointees.[136]

In their response to the ongoing congressional push to recognise Cuban belligerency, the UPU proclaimed a slogan that they had repeated throughout their commentary on the congressional debate over Cuba – 'Belligerent rights are belligerent wrongs.'[137] For the UPU, the desire to recognise Cuban belligerency had gotten the entire question backwards. Rather than accepting the Cuban *casus belli*, the prudent course of action would be to pacify the island; in essence, it would 'take away a wrong and a crime, rather than repeat wrong and crime.'[138] Unlike the

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[135] 'Cuba and the Senate', *AoP* 59/6 (June, 1897), p. 126.

[136] 'Home Rule for Cuba', *The Peacemaker* 15/8 (February, 1897), pp. 167-8.

[137] 'For Cuba and for Peace – Marcoartu Coming', *The Peacemaker* 15/12 (June, 1897), p. 258.

[138] Ibid.

Armenians, whom they saw as helpless victims, the Cubans were willing and active participants in a violent, armed conflict. Indeed, it seemed that the peacemakers were willing to acknowledge the Cubans' *de facto* belligerency, even if they refused to do so *de jure*.

It was only after the deeds of General Weyler had come to light that the movement struck a more understanding tone. Weyler, who had arrived in Cuba in January 1896, proceeded to establish concentration camps into which some four hundred thousand Cuban civilians were forcibly removed. In all, his campaign led to a death toll that modern historians have estimated as being as high as one hundred and seventy thousand.[139] Publishing a letter from a Cuban mother superior in the *AoP* that detailed the condition of Cuban children, the APS concluded that he was rightly nicknamed 'The Butcher', claiming that his actions had shown him to be 'utterly destitute of all attributes of mercy.'[140] However, the peacemakers did not confine their criticism of the bloodshed on the island to Weyler's conduct. Instead, they asked, 'what made General Weyler a butcher?'[141] Their answer was ultimately that for all of his bloody deeds, Weyler's actions were the product of the militaristic tenor of European diplomacy – and Spanish political culture in particular. However, beyond this, the APS drew on their criticisms of Cuban warfare to explain Weyler's conduct while also seeing the persistent American involvement on the island as holding responsibility for Weyler's violent conduct:

> 'We have no words of excuse for General Weyler, not one; nor for the men who have made themselves rich through the opportunities offered by the war. None of these has any right to call himself human. But Spain made General Weyler what he is. And not Spain alone. He was the product of the war method which all the nations follow. He was in a sense created by the Cubans themselves who appealed their cause to the cruel method of the sword, knowing as they did exactly what Spain would do. A share of his responsibility also falls to the filibusters who drove him to the extremity of harshness by going over from our shores to help to drive him from the island.'[142]

A 'Splendid Little War'[143]

Peacemakers' fears and worries would have no cause to relent as the clamour for war reached a boiling point in February 1898, with the revelation of the De Lôme letter and the sinking of the USS *Maine*. As if designed to inflame the opinions of an already tetchy American body politic, a letter emerged from the Spanish ambassador to the Spanish foreign minister criticising McKinley

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[139] Fabian Klose, *In the Cause of Humanity,* p. 224.

[140] 'The Conditions of Things in Cuba', *AoP* 59/11 (December, 1897), p. 257.

[141] Ibid.

[142] Ibid.

[143] LaFeber, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations,* p. 137.

as a weak leader on account of his Cuban policy. The letter was intercepted by Cuban revolutionaries and subsequently printed by the *New York Journal*, inspiring that paper to start a campaign entitled 'Go Home De Lôme' as well as a renewed bout of congressional sabre rattling. As soon as the diplomatic furore over the letter looked to be subsiding, an even more incendiary event took place off the coast of Cuba, with the sinking of the USS *Maine*. Despite some equivocation within the administration over the cause of the explosion (which would turn out to be justified), the loss of two hundred and sixty-six American lives just off the coast of Havana unleashed a frenzy of popular jingoism that McKinley would be unable to contain.[144] Once more, Congress sprang into action, as politicians demanded revenge and a restoration of American honour, with one Democratic congressman from New York, for instance, declaring: 'I am one who believes in peace with honor, and I say now and again there can be no peace with honor until Cuba is free and the crime of the Maine is atoned.'[145] Needless to say, such a vision of 'peace with honor' seemed not to preclude violence.

It was amidst these rising tensions, and a warlike rhetoric that tended ever more towards violence, that most peace activists found themselves swimming against the current of public opinion. However, once more, they contented themselves with the fact that the White House seemed to be on their side in seeing merit in restraint. Praising President McKinley for his previous forbearance, the APS observed that the drive to war was largely a confection of the yellow press. Where public sentiment had once been mostly concerned with improving the lot of the Cuban people, it had now been 'blown into a white heat by the destruction of the Maine.'[146] Pointing specifically to the sensational speeches of statesmen such as Senator Redfield Proctor, who had journeyed to Cuba, the APS noted with relief that McKinley had pursued a foreign policy guided by the principles of peace – claiming that 'His diplomatic methods have shown the highest order of Christian statesmanship.'[147] Indeed, the disparity between the tenor of the public debate and the President's seeming restraint provided the movement with a misplaced sense of hope. Trueblood struck a hubristic note in a letter to Baroness Bertha von Suttner, the Austrian author who had gained global notoriety on account of her novel *Lay Down Your Arms (Die Waffen Nieder)*. 'There shall be no war with Spain about Cuba', boldly proclaimed

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[144] Offner, *An Unwanted War*, p. 122.

[145] Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998), p. 69.

[146] 'The Struggle for Peace', *AoP* 60/4 (April, 1898), pp. 81-82.

[147] Ibid.

Trueblood.[148] Despite the sinking of the *Maine*, according to Trueblood, 'there has been no real danger of war [...] The only danger of war has been in the newspapers and telegrams.'[149]

Where Trueblood had previously promoted the possibility of the European powers intervening in the Near East, he used the pages of the *Advocate* to argue that any such intervention in Cuba would undermine the United States' position as a beacon of peaceful diplomacy. 'If the President's policy fails, and we involve ourselves in hostilities with Spain,' he claimed, 'it will be difficult […] to justify armed intervention either for Cuban independence or the arrest of Spanish inhumanities.'[150] More than anything, the turn towards jingoism, according to Trueblood, was unbecoming of a nation that was supposed to embody the middle-class values of restraint, or as he put it himself, 'we should deserve the just judgments of Almighty God and the contempt of all the civilized world for our weakness and childish loss of self control.'[151] Much as with their fears during the Venezuelan Crisis, the peacemakers foresaw profound reverberations across the globe if the United States broke with its long-held diplomatic traditions. 'We shall have abandoned our historic policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations', wrote Trueblood in the *Advocate*, 'We shall have discarded all the rules of international law which govern the relations of civilized nations.'[152]

Such an appeal to international law and the international standards of civilisation, was common among peacemakers as they reacted with trepidation to the explosion of the *Maine*. Carl Schurz, writing in *Harper's Weekly*, used the peacemakers' well-worn rhetoric comparing an act of warfare to acts of violence between individuals, asking (as was common among many supporters of arbitration): 'What does civilization mean if not the progress from the arbitrament of brute force to the arbitrament of reason and the maintenance of justice by peaceable methods in the righting of wrongs, and in the settlement of conflicting opinions or interests?'[153]

By the time the next issue of the *Advocate of Peace* had gone to print, the world – at least for the peacemakers – had turned on its head. Finally bowing to political pressure in the wake of the *Maine* disaster, McKinley announced a declaration of war against the Spanish on 23 April 1898.

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[148] Geneva, United Nations Library and Archive, Bertha von Suttner Papers, BvS/28/378-5/1, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood to Baroness Bertha von Sutner, 23 February 1898, p. 3

[149] Ibid. p. 4.

[150] 'The Struggle for Peace', *AoP* 60/4 (April, 1898), p. 81.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] 'About War', *AoP* 60/4 (April, 1898), p. 88.

The abiding reaction from the American Peace Society was one of shock:

> 'It did not seem to us possible that, so near the end of the nineteenth century, after the leading part which our people and government have taken in the movement for the abolition of war between nations, our nation would suddenly take upon itself the fearful responsibility of inaugurating a war, with all the devastation, passion, corruption and degeneration involved in it. It seemed reasonable to believe that the United States would never have another war, but would hold and strengthen its proud position as the leader of the nations towards a civilization relying for its strength on right and goodwill, and not on the soulless methods of brute force'[154]

The APS's analysis of the outbreak of war was primarily focused on the effects that it would have on American society. Once again casting scorn on the jingoes in Congress and throughout the country, Trueblood denounced the rhetoric around the *Maine* as being 'a motive worthy only of a barbarous people'.[155] His response to those who professed humanitarianism as their motive was illustrative of the faultline that ran through the peace movement, one which divided a humanitarian impulse from those whose primary objective was to abolish war. For the peacemakers, the idea that one might wage a war in order to end a war was absurd. Trueblood registered his amazement at the arguments made in support of McKinley's declaration, claiming that he and his colleague found it hard to understand how a 'people professing to be Christian and civilized' could 'fly in wrath to the monstrous inhumanities of war to stop the inhumanities'.[156]

The UPU, however, was not dissuaded from attempting to de-escalate the situation. By the time the USS *Maine* had sunk in Havana harbour, the UPU had already lobbied numerous officials on both sides of the Atlantic. This had, rather creatively, included a plea for peace to President McKinley from the children of a local Quaker school in Philadelphia.[157] The organisation had also successfully placed an article in a Cuban newspaper (*El Diario de la Marina*) – urging the Cubans to lay down their arms and accept the 'liberal' Spanish peace proposals.[158] However, it would be the organisation's continued efforts to lobby Madrid, in the face of coarsening public opinion and Hispanophobia – that would prove fatal for Alfred Love and his fellow peacemakers. Just two days before McKinley's declaration of war, the UPU had made a final

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[154] 'A Fearful Responsibility', *AoP* 60/5 (May, 1898), p. 101.

[155] Ibid. p. 102.

[156] Ibid.

[157] 'The Continued Efforts of the Universal Peace Union to Avert War', *The Peacemaker* 16/10 (April, 1898), pp. 191-192.

[158] 'Universal Peace Union Not Idle at this Critical Time', *The Peacemaker* 16/9 (March, 1898), p. 170.

attempt to engage the Spanish monarchy, in an attempt to de-escalate the situation. Stressing that he and his colleagues were 'the real representatives of the American heart', Love bemoaned the diplomatic situation between the two states, as he affirmed that the UPU held allegiance not simply to the United States but to the whole of humanity, with no distinction on account of nation.[159] Claiming that 'our hearts are full of sympathy for you', Love wrote to the Spanish monarch that President McKinley had been dragged acrimoniously to the brink of war against his better judgement.[160]

While Love's letter was seemingly filled with inoffensive platitudes, when the text of the letter founds its way into the pages of the yellow press – and it became apparent that the UPU refused to rally around the flag during a time of war – the organisation became a prime target for pro-war jingoists. One local Philadelphia newspaper was particularly venomous in its assessment of the situation, claiming that 'no true-hearted American would select the present as an opportune moment for expressing his sympathy [for the Spanish].'[161] Perhaps most galling of all to the jingoes was that the letter had been written in the UPU's headquarters at Independence Hall. 'The feature of the affair that brings the flash of anger to the American cheek,' wrote an editorial in *The North American,* 'is that this organization so flagrantly and indecently betrayed its host as to formulate its unpatriotic and truckling statement of balderdash and lies within the very halls of an edifice whose walls and rafters ring with the sentiments of freedom and humanity.'[162] Elsewhere in the press, reports emerged that the UPU had been flying the Spanish flag in the hallowed halls of American democracy as many called for the organisation to be removed from their offices.[163]

Tensions boiled over on 27 May 1898, when a crowd gathered in the Philadelphia suburb of Chester to protest what they saw as the treasonous behaviour emanating from one of the most important buildings in the city and the country. The meeting was attended by five hundred people, accompanied by a drum corps, and had been convened by a local school director named William N. Erskine.[164] Together the crowd ignited a bonfire and erected a scaffold, from which they proceeded to hang an effigy of Alfred Love. As the band played the 'Battle Cry of

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[159] UPU Records, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 3: Spanish War Activities, 'Letter to the Queen Regent of Spain and to Señor Sagasta, Premier, Madrid, Spain', 21 April 1898, p.1.

[160] Ibid. p. 2.

[161] 'Treason in the Temple', *The North American* (28 May 1898), p. 4.

[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid; 'Sympathy for Spain,' *Denver Evening Post* (26 May 1898), p. 11.

[164] 'Love Burned In Effigy', *The North American* (28 May 1898), p. 1.

Freedom', the crowd opened fire on the hoisted effigy; with the artificial Alfred Love riddled with bullets, the effigy was swiftly cut down and thrown onto a bonfire.

The violent display of jingoism was accompanied by loud calls for the UPU to be removed from Independence Halls, on account of their disloyalty to their country. On the very same day, members of the city council moved to introduce resolutions that would see them removed on account of their 'unpatriotic, un-American and disgraceful expressions of opinion, and especially emanating from and under the heading [of] 'Independence Hall,' the 'cradle of American liberty."[165]

Even from within the peace movement itself, support was lukewarm. The very same day that Love's effigy had been burnt, the New York Peace Union (the local subsidiary of the UPU) voted to make it known that it did not endorse the UPU's letter, claiming that 'peace must not be purchased with dishonor.'[166] The American Peace Society remained silent on the matter and only belatedly issued a statement in the *Advocate of Peace* in July, claiming that Love and the UPU had been subject to a great deal of misreporting; nevertheless, they noted that the letter had been misjudged.[167] Furthermore, at the opening session of that year's Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference – held just five days after the violent scenes in the streets of Philadelphia – the sense of unease was palpable. The conference's founder, Albert K. Smiley, noted that '[in] some respects […] the present seemed an unfortunate time for holding this Conference.'[168] Furthermore, in what was likely an attempt to avoid the same fate as the UPU, Smiley imposed a gagging order on conference participants, as he 'expressed his confidence that nothing would be said that would in any way convey to the outside world an impression of disloyalty to the government.'[169]

An emergency meeting of the UPU was convened on 30 May to respond to the crisis – only for the committee member to find that they had been locked out of Independence Hall.[170] Meeting at the house of a committee member, the group set out a statement correcting the record, which would be sent to the local councilmen who had barred them from their headquarters. The

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[165] 'The 'Cradle of American Liberty", *Bangor Daily Whig and Courier* 65/135 (28 May 1898), p. 6.

[166] 'Refused To Indorse Love', *North American* (28 May 1898), p. 1.

[167] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 60/7 (July, 1898), p. 158.

[168] *Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration* (Lake Mohonk, 1898), p. 5.

[169] Ibid.

[170] UPU Records, Series 1, Box 2, Minute Book 1 (1891-1900), p. 274.

organisation denied any wrongdoing, with the committee stressing that it 'is not and never has been disloyal or unpatriotic.'[171] They stood behind the cause of Cuban freedom and claimed that their intentions had been misconstrued by the press:

> 'The letter written before war was declared, to the Queen Regent of Spain through Premier Sagasta, was in the line of our work in a friendly and persuasive spirit which has gained in the past 32 years many happy and pacific results for our country and mankind.'[172]

A week later, the committee held their regular monthly meeting in the very same location, with tensions still running high; Alfred Love, whose letter had seen them ejected from their home, rose to give his account of events. The minutes for the meeting state that he 'concluded his remarks by asking that if the Society thought he had done them any injury, or feel he should resign he was ready to give his place to others.'[173] His fellow committee members exclaimed that their views were the precise opposite and that they 'in the strongest terms approved of the course he had taken and the society unanimously endorsed all he had done.'[174]

Conclusion

In some respects, the peacemakers' worries, specifically as they pertained to the American presence in the Caribbean, were unfounded. The American intervention in the Cuban War of Independence would end after just under four months. However, the episode seemed to represent the nadir of their project; peacecraft, as both a means and an end, had ostensibly failed. Not only had the United States demurred from finding a negotiated settlement to the Cuban Crisis but had intervened in a conflict, in a rash display of hot-headedness. The entire practice of peacecraft had suffered a public and violent rebuke. More immediately, fighting had also arisen on the other side of the Pacific that would herald the emergence of a far more enduring conflict – one that would trouble the peacemakers for years to come.

The peacemakers' reticence to support a policy of humanitarian intervention in the case of Cuba was a notable volte face in the development of their worldview – one that put them out of step with the American public. The peace movement ought to have been fertile ground for the humanitarian arguments in favour of intervention. Where they seemed to be notably out of step with public opinion in the Cuban Crisis, they were in the vanguard of humanitarianism when it

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[171] UPU Records, Series 1, Box 5, Folder 3, Letter to Honorable Charles F. Warwick, Honorable Frank M. Riter and the Members of Select and Common Councils of the City of Philadelphia, 30 May 1898.

[172] Ibid.

[173] UPU Records, Series 1, Box 2, Minute Book 1 (1891-1900), p. 276.

[174] Ibid.

came to the plight of the oppressed Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Parsing the difference between these two similar and related crises is illustrative of the ways in which ideas of intervention and sovereignty were shaped far more dramatically by discourses of race and civilisation than by humanitarianism.

Race and civilisation lay at the root of the peacemakers' differing attitudes toward the Cubans and the Armenians, with the latter being portrayed as a beleaguered, yet virtuous, white minority oppressed by an Islamic Empire. The Cubans, conversely, were viewed as equal agitators in a conflict with an imperial power that – when compared with the Ottomans – was misguided but not in a moral state of disrepair. Indeed, the Cuban conflict was, in the minds of peacemakers, hardly a noble struggle for liberty and instead had the effect of degrading the whiteness of both the Spanish and the Cubans. However, this also revealed the peacemakers' providential vision of the United States' role in world history. Whereas the Concert of Europe ought to lead the charge against the Ottomans, the United States could not tarnish its exemplary status as a peaceful interlocutor that acted as a broker in times of conflict.

Chapter 3: 'The Great Debate' and Neutralisation

'If we take the Philippines, the business of bringing peace through war is scarce begun.'[1]

David Starr Jordan

Introduction

At the end of 1899, Carl Schurz, the former Senator and staunch critic of the United States' emerging imperial project, reflected on the recent ratification of the Treaty of Paris. With the benefit of hindsight, Schurz claimed that this treaty had succeeded at ending one war, only to begin a new one. Speaking to a meeting of the newly formed Anti-Imperialist League (AIL) in Chicago, he remarked:

> 'No wonder that treaty found opposition in the Senate. Virulent abuse was heaped upon the "statesman who would oppose the ratification of a peace treaty." A peace treaty? This was no peace treaty at all. It was a treaty with half a dozen bloody wars in its belly. It was, in the first place, an open and brutal declaration of war against our allies, the Filipinos, who struggled for freedom and independence from foreign rule. Every man not totally blind could see that. For such a treaty, the true friends of peace could, of course, not vote.'[2]

Schurz's cynicism regarding the brittle and deceptive peace negotiated in 1898 was well-founded; violence persisted across the archipelago for more than a decade. In essence, Schurz had given voice to a question that was common in the minds of American peacemakers: when it came to the annexation of the Philippines, for whom exactly was peace being guaranteed?

The occupation of the Philippines had by no means been the primary objective of the American military following the declaration of war against Spain. Instead, the American naval operation in Manilla Bay, led by Admiral George Dewey on 1 May 1898, was the execution of a plan to knock out the Spanish navy in the Pacific and eliminate the threat to the American West Coast. However, much like the Cuban intervention, this was an incursion into an already fiery theatre of war, where Filipino revolutionaries had been struggling for their independence from Spain since 1896 (which in itself was the culmination of a twenty-year-long struggle for rights under Spanish rule).[3]

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[1] David Starr Jordan, *Imperial Democracy* (Boston, 1898), p. 8.

[2] Carl Schurz, *The Policy of Imperialism: Address* (Chicago, 1899), p. 8.

[3] For a full description of the Filipino struggle for independence against the Spanish, see Paul Kramer, *Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006), pp. 70-78.

Despite the establishment of a short-lived republic at the end of 1897, with a constitution based on that of Cuba, the rebels, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, eventually capitulated to the Spanish forces. The fighting abated by December 1897 with the Pact of Biak-na-Bato, where Aguinaldo accepted exile to Hong Kong in return for an indemnity of 1.7 million pesos and the commitment of reform from Spanish imperial officials.[4] Conflict, however, resumed shortly after Aguinaldo's departure, as both sides reneged on their commitments; Aguinaldo sought to agitate for revolution from afar, while the Spanish continued their campaigns against the remaining revolutionary forces.

Aguinaldo's position in Hong Kong was a fortuitous one, as this soon became a way-station for the American Pacific fleet. From this position, Aguinaldo proceeded to secure – what he believed to be – American support for the cause of Filipino independence from Admiral Dewey. However, rather than acting as an enabler for the revolutionary cause, Dewey left Hong Kong without Aguinaldo and proceeded to intercept the Spanish Fleet at Manilla Bay. Following Dewey's victory, President William McKinley almost immediately dispatched army and volunteer units to the Philippines, as he mulled the annexation of the archipelago. Thus, before Aguinaldo had even returned to the Philippines, the archipelago's fate was already bound up with the question of the United States' imperial future. The result was a period of bitter and public debate in the United States regarding the acquisition of an insular empire.

This chapter examines the peace movement's involvement in this rancorous public debate regarding the United States' imperial future – the so-called 'Great Debate'. It argues that peacemakers employed an internationalist critique of the United States' emerging empire project. In doing so, peacemakers found themselves in the vanguard of those who sought to critique President McKinley's policy of annexation. In this re-telling, the nascent anti-imperialist movement can be viewed, in part, as an institutional and intellectual outgrowth of the peace movement.[5] The peacemakers framed the so-called 'Philippine Problem' in global terms, seeing both its cause and its potential solution as fundamentally being a problem of global order, rather than purely of American foreign policy – following the logic of late nineteenth-century internationalist thought. Such a critique made specific claims about the role of empires (both American and European) in the construction of a peaceful world order and the spread of a

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[4] Ibid. p. 77.

[5] There has been limited attention paid to the intersection of the emerging anti-imperialist movement and the pre-existing peace movement. Most work that addresses this comes from the bespoke literature on the peace movement, with some historians treating the peacemakers' anti-imperialism as a triviality or viewing these two identities as interchangeable. For an example of the former see Warren F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Nashville, 1969). For an example of the latter see Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington, 1980), pp. 59-78.

Western, Christian civilising mission. In keeping with their understanding of international relations, peacemakers articulated a worldview which sought to promote the spread of Western cultural and economic influence across the globe, while mitigating against the escalation of imperial rivalry.[6] Inter-imperialism was vital to this endeavour; despite their failure to orchestrate a multilateral solution to the Armenian Question, peacemakers maintained the principle that the international system ought to be structured around cooperation between empires. The peacemakers, therefore, portrayed the 'Philippine Problem' as a potential flashpoint for conflict between Western empires and worked to craft solutions that would foster inter-imperial collaboration.[7]

An internationalist worldview was the hallmark of genteel imperialism. A proclivity for global tastes and knowledge had become *à la mode* for respectable Americans by the end of the nineteenth century, with middle-class Americans developing cosmopolitan reading habits and increasingly consuming global commodities.[8] Furthermore, theories of international relations had become increasingly more accessible and understood by the American middle classes, as the discipline emerged and grew in American universities.[9] Middle-class moral values were also vital to this vision of the United States' imperial future, as the peacemakers envisioned an arms-length imperial relationship that would allow the United States to mould the Filipinos' cultural and economic values, without having to take formal control of the archipelago. In this sense, genteel imperialism was a fundamental intellectual plank for the emerging anti-imperialist coalition, allowing critics of empire to simultaneously reject annexation, but constructively promote American cultural hegemony in the former Spanish colonies.[10]

As has been extensively discussed across other chapters, a colour line flowed through this worldview; a nation's capacity to participate in diplomacy was determined by the perception of

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[6] Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 2014).

[7] Stephen Tuffnell, 'Anglo-American Inter-Imperialism: US Expansion and the British World, c.1865–1914', *Britain and the World* 7/2 (2014), pp. 174-95; Frank Schumacher, 'Embedded Empire: The United States and Colonialism', *Journal of Modern European History* 14/2 (2016), pp. 202-24.

[8] Frank A. Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865-1890* (Cambridge, MA, 2009), passim; Kristin L. Hoganson, *Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007), passim.

[9] Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 53-97. Dorothy Ross has used the term gentry-class to describe the Northeastern set of university-educated Americans during the Gilded Age. Their primary aim was to apply new methods from the social sciences to shore up the principle of American exceptionalism. The peacemakers and their genteel attitudes align with this categorisation.

[10] Ian R. Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton, 2010), p. 3. Ian Tyrrell has rejected the terms 'soft power' and 'informal empire' in favour of 'cultural hegemony' to describe the impact of American structural power and non-state actors on the world of empires.

its civilisation among peacemakers. Furthermore, the rationale of genteel imperialism was grounded in a distinction between the civilised and backwards nations of the world, and the spread of cultural and moral influence from the former to the latter. Therefore, the peacemakers' critique of imperialism was matched by a more forceful anti-colonial perspective from Filipino nationalists. Refusing to be categorised as uncivilised, they demanded to treat with the United States on the same terms as the Spanish had, in order to secure peace and self-government. Most visible was the Filipino lawyer and diplomat Felipe Agoncillo, who acted as the representative of the Filipino nation to the United States. Some historians, such as Jim Zwick, have portrayed Filipino anti-colonialism as being woven into the fabric of the anti-imperialist movement, alleging the existence of a 'Filipino-American oppositional solidarity'.[11] While sophisticated connections between Filipino and American critics of empire would emerge following 1900, the limitations of this argument are on full display when examining the peacemakers' role in contesting the Treaty of Paris.[12] Although the two groups – Filipino nationalists and peacemakers – often operated in touching distance of one another, they rarely joined forces when contesting the treaty. Some peacemakers, operating from within the AIL, may have reproduced Agoncillo's writings, but only after he had left the United States in 1899. Furthermore, the two groups often made similar arguments, with both employing the rhetoric of internationalism in their critiques of annexation and promoting an international protectorate as an alternative policy. However, direct intellectual engagement was scarce, revealing that these two groups were largely speaking in parallel, but not in conversation. Indeed, the peacemakers' internationalist critique of empire only really took shape as a result of their interaction with the ideas on display at the 1899 Hague Conference and less as a result of the impact of Filipino nationalists. Ultimately, in the period prior to the election of 1900, the nascent critique of the United States' empire project only gained legitimacy when being taken up by white Americans in the Northeast.

The war of words that surrounded the United States' imperial future at the close of the nineteenth century – which historians have termed 'The Great Debate' – has largely been characterised as a polarised contest between factions of pro- and anti-imperialists who were separated by age, ideology and political style.[13] As such, the peacemakers' role in debates over

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[11] Jim Zwick, *Confronting Imperialism: Essays on Mark Twain and the Anti-Imperialist League* (West Conshohocken, 2007), pp. 25-26.

[12] Ibid. Zwick's arguments on 'Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity' were a pushback against the view (as espoused by Robert Beisner) that the AIL suffered from 'parochialism of spirit'.

[13] For the classical treatment of the anti-imperialists and their role in the so-called Great Debate see: E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920* (Philadelphia, 1970); Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900,* (New York, 1968).

American empire is almost wholly confined to the literature on the peace movement itself. Most scholars have paid minimal attention to the movement's response to the imperial conflicts of the late nineteenth century. Those who do consider these issues largely present peace activists mindlessly adopting anti-imperialist arguments rather than seeing them as key players in a broader community of imperial criticism.[14]

Instead, criticism of imperialism has mostly been understood via the study of the anti-imperialist movement.[15] And while historians such as William Appleman Williams and John W. Rollins have claimed that the anti-imperialists were little better than advocates of informal empire, the label has endured.[16] More recently, Fabian Hilfrich has demonstrated that the historiographical persistence of these labels was the result of an emotionally charged debate that triggered a bout of soul-searching regarding American national identity, its exceptionalist status, and the meaning of democracy.[17] The endurance of pro- and anti-imperialist as analytical categories is, as Hilfrich argues, a consequence of their polarising function during a fiery debate; the debate itself was organised politically around these categories, even if they did not perfectly describe the ideological positions that were held in the two camps. Michael Patrick Cullinane has instead sought to present liberty as the conceptual centre of gravity for the diverse cast of anti-imperialist activists who critiqued American imperialism. Liberty, for Cullinane, represented a rhetorical foil that anti-imperialists used against the bellicose language of the pro-imperialist faction, as they applied their own American conception of rights to questions of empire.[18] However, in focussing on those whose criticism of empire grew out of longstanding concerns regarding peace, the anti-imperialist movement emerges as speaking in a distinctly internationalist register – one that frequently complemented but also often overrode this traditional conception of American and human rights.

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[14] David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914* (Bloomington, 1976), pp. 64-91; Warren F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Nashville,1969), p. 57; Charles DeBenedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington, 1980), pp. 59-78; C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898–1918* (Princeton,1972), passim.

[15] For the classic treatment of the anti-imperialist movement see: Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (New York, 1968); E. B. Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920* (Philadelphia, 1970).

[16] William Appleman Williams, *The Contours of American History* (Cleveland, 1961), pp. 367-8; John W. Rollins, 'The Anti-Imperialists and Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy', *Studies on the Left* 3/1 (1962), p. 18. For a rebuttal to this point of view see Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 84-88.

[17] Fabian Hilfrich, *Debating American Exceptionalism: Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War* (New York; Basingstoke, 2012).

[18] Michael Patrick Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1909* (New York, 2012).

This internationalist critique did not preclude the discussions of rights and liberty commonly associated with the anti-imperialists; however, the peacemakers who most actively articulated this argument were motivated far more by the potential for conflict between great powers. Therefore, their imperial criticism was broadly framed by the attempts to regulate the empires that comprised the Concert of Europe – most notably during the 1899 Hague Conference, which punctuated the 'Great Debate'. The attempts to secure solutions to the so-called 'Philippines Problem' represented an effort to negate any prospect of the US joining the European world of imperial rivalry and militarism, which peacemakers scorned so greatly. The failure to prevent this, left the peacemakers dejected at the prospect of the United States becoming embroiled in a web of imperial entanglements. As Benjamin Franklin Trueblood put it after the re-election of President McKinley in 1900: 'Something very like European militarism, if yet some way off, is now, like an irresistible charmer, looking us straight in the face.'[19]

This chapter is structured into four sections. Firstly, it outlines the arguments made by the Filipinos in opposition to the Treaty of Paris and their limited interaction with the peace movement. Secondly, it explores the ways in which the peace movement came to be embedded and intertwined with the emerging anti-imperialist movement during the passage of the treaty. Third, it presents the peacemakers' response to the outbreak of the Philippine-American War as being tied to their other major concern in that period – The Hague Conference of 1899. Lastly, it explores the ways in which peace activists did not passively oppose annexation but also presented alternative policies that harnessed internationalist ideas and examples of contemporary imperial practices from the British Empire.

Contesting the Peace Treaty

Fewer than four months after the United States had intervened in the Cuban War of Independence against Spain, an armistice was declared between the two powers. The war was a decisive victory for the United States and had extinguished the final remnants of Spanish imperial rule in the Caribbean. Signed on 12 August 1898, the Washington Peace Protocol paved the way for a formal peace treaty between the two nations, which would determine the future of Spain's few remaining colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. After months of protracted negotiations, the Spanish and American peace commissioners were nearing a final settlement; all that was left to determine was the future of the Philippines. The President designated a coterie of international lawyers and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to negotiate peace with the Spanish at Paris. The diplomatic team had been split over the question of the

[19] 'Attitude of the Country on Imperialism' *AoP,* 62/11 (December, 1900), p. 229.

Philippines, with two members maintaining that it would be wise to acquiesce to Spain's continued possession of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu in return for concessions elsewhere.[20]

However, operating on orders from the President, Secretary of State John Hay instructed the negotiators to obtain nothing short of the entire archipelago from the Spanish. Stressing that 'the questions of duty and humanity appeal[ed] to the President so strongly', Hay stated that the United States could not accept 'any division of the archipelago' as it would not 'bring us anything but embarrassment in the future.'[21] Within a month of McKinley's instructions, the treaty between the two nations was signed. The United States would acquire the Philippine archipelago, paying Spain the sum of $20,000,000.[22]

Fearful that their struggle for independence might be thwarted via American and Spanish diplomacy, the leaders of the Filipino independence movement sought dialogue with President McKinley and the American diplomats stationed in Paris. However, much like the Venezuelan diplomats before them, they were met with a mixture of indifference and intransigence. Aguinaldo handed the responsibility of representing Filipino interests to his advisor, and prominent Manilla lawyer, Felipe Agoncillo.[23]

Even before Agoncillo had reached the United States, debate had flared up among the Filipino *ilustrado* elite – who constituted the leaders of the revolutionary government – regarding the correct negotiating position. Alert to the reality that they may not have the arms or personnel to fend off another wave of attacks from the Spanish, or indeed by another imperial power, many feared that the withdrawal of American troops might imperil the geopolitical security of their republic.[24] Agoncillo himself raised the question of whether the Filipinos should actively seek to

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[20] Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay, 25 November 1898, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 5, 1898* (Washington, 1901), Document 845.

[21] Mr Hay to Mr Day, 13 November 1898, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, Document 832.

[22] 'Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, December 10, 1898', *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, Document 712a.

[23] Agoncillo is a difficult character to track down, especially in Anglophone material. The best accounts of his life and his role as a diplomat are: Oscar V. Campomanes, 'Figures of the Unassimilable: American Empire, Filipino American Postcoloniality, and the U.S.-Philippine War of 1898-1910s', (PhD Thesis, Brown University, 2011); Augusto V. de Viana, 'The Development of the Philippine Foreign Service During the Revolutionary Period and the Filipino-American War (1896-1906): A Story of Struggle from the Formation of Diplomatic Contacts to the Philippine Republic', *The Antoninus Journal: A Multidisciplinary Journal of the University Santo Tomas Graduate School* 2 (February, 2016), pp. 19-52; Esteban A. De Ocampo and Alfredo B. Saulo, *First Filipino Diplomat* (Manila, 1978). The last of these has a wealth of reprinted correspondence between Agoncillo and others, much of which has been translated from Tagalog.

[24] De Ocampo and Saulo, *First Filipino Diplomat*, 'Agoncillo to Mabini', 2 August 1898, Document 10, pp. 220-221.

become an American protectorate, in a letter to Aguiunaldo.[25] Interestingly, they described the terms offered to Cuba as being that of an American protectorate – an idea later echoed by the American peace movement.[26] Similarly, others went even further and called for the Filipinos to proactively request American annexation. Against both of these suggestions, Aguinaldo telegrammed Agoncillo that his first objective ought to be securing Filipino independence; only after that had become untenable should he consider any form of shared sovereignty arrangement with the Americans.[27]

To state the case of the Filipino people, Agoncillo approached McKinley directly. To do so, he enlisted the support of D.C. law firm Ralston & Siddons and specifically of the partner, Jackson H. Ralston.[28] A Georgetown-educated Californian, Ralston had practised law for twenty years in the District and was a specialist in international law.[29] He would go on to represent the United States in the Pious Funds Case at The Hague in 1902 and would sit on the Venezuela Claims Commission following the Venezuelan Blockade (1902-3).[30] A peacemaker in the making, he would be elected to the executive board of the APS in 1912 and published extensively on international law and arbitration throughout his life.[31]

Despite having secured an audience with the President in October 1898, McKinley refused to afford him the diplomatic status of speaking for his country and its citizens.[32] McKinley's rebuke carried with it the implicit claim that the Philippine archipelago was itself not a coherent nation and, therefore, could not be granted a seat at the table of high diplomacy. Nevertheless, Agoncillo proceeded to impress upon the President the grievances of the Filipino independence

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[25] Ibid. 'Agoncillo to Aguinaldo', 1 August 1898, Document 9, pp. 217-219. Agoncillo raised a similar query in his previous letter to Apolinario Mabini. It is unclear whether Agoncillo was raising this possibility out of expediency or if it was a policy that he supported.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid, Aguinaldo to Agoncillo, 7 August 1898, Document 11, pp. 222-224; Aguinaldo to Agoncillo, 10 August 1898, Document 12, p. 225.

[28] 'Insurgent Effrontery', *The Times (Washington D.C.)* 1741 (23 January 1899), p. 1; Jim Zwick, *Confronting Imperialism*, pp. 26-27. Ralston's involvement with the AIL and his longstanding interest in international law illustrate the broa overlap between peace and anti-imperialism.

[29] William C. Dennis, 'In Memoriam: Jackson H. Ralston, 1857-1945' *The American Journal of International Law* 40/1, (January, 1946), p. 183.

[30] Ibid.

[31] 'The Eighty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Peace Society', *AoP* 74/6 (June, 1912), pp. 135-37.

[32] Washington D.C., Library of Congress, Papers of William McKinley [hereafter McKinley Papers], Series 1: General Correspondence, Reel 4, mss32268 (3578), Memorandum of Meeting Between Felipe Agoncillo and William McKinley, 1 October 1898; 'Filipinos See the President', *NYT* XLVIII/25,203 (2 October 1898), p. 22.

movement and that, much as the Cubans, the Filipinos had suffered atrocities at the hands of the Spanish, which disqualified them from being able to claim guardianship of the islands. However, without formal diplomatic status, Agoncillo's arguments were treated merely as those of a private citizen, and, according to Western officials, the people he proclaimed to represent existed outside of the ambit of international law.[33]

With no firm promises in hand, Agoncillo journeyed from Washington to Paris to make his case to the peace commissioners themselves. Much as was the case in Washington, Agoncillo's presence in Paris was treated as little more than a triviality by the American diplomatic team, and the door was shut on his participation in the talks over the future of his nation.[34] Without a formal seat at the negotiating table, Agoncillo launched a scathing attack on the terms of the treaty once the negotiating process had been concluded, as he protested the absence of Filipino voices in the process. The peace treaty, according to Agoncillo, 'cannot be accepted as obligatory by my government, since the commission has neither heard nor in any wise [sic] admitted to its deliberations the Philippines nation, which held an unquestionable right to intervene in relation to what might affect their future.'[35] Highlighting the shared international assumptions of the Filipino nationalists and the peacemakers, Agoncillo employed language redolent of peacecraft. The Filipino diplomat argued that international law dictated that the Philippines could not be transferred from the Spanish to the United States, given that the Filipinos had successfully vanquished the former from their land. Therefore, sovereignty over the archipelago was both *de facto* and *de jure* in the hands of the Filipinos, with Agoncillo remonstrating against the eventual Paris peace treaty: 'The Spanish Government has ceased to hold any dominion by deed and by right; and the only authority which exists there and preserves order is that constituted by the Filipinos with the solemn sanction of their votes, the only legal fount of positive modern power.'[36]

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[33] McKinley Papers, Series 1: General Correspondence, Reel 4, mss32268 (3595), 'Memorandum of Felipe Agoncillo, of Manilla, in the Philippine Islands, concerning the situation and aspirations of the Philippine Islands', p. 5.

[34] 'Future of the Philippines', *NYT* XLVIII/15,219 (20 October 1898), p. 4.

[35] 'Plea of the Filipinos', *NYT* XLVIII/15,275 (25 December 1898), p. 4.

[36] Durham, North Carolina, Duke University, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Digital Collection, Broadsides and Ephemera Collection, Folder 11, 'Official protest against the Paris Peace Treaty', https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4q23t43k.

Much like the peacemakers who would subsequently attack the treaty, Agoncillo harnessed the rhetoric of international law to make his case.[37] However, unlike American peacemakers, Agoncillo appealed to this body of thought as a neutral standard that could protect the Filipinos' rights as a smaller nation that had liberated itself from Spanish rule. The Filipino diplomat stressed that the 'Spanish Commissioners in Paris have not been able, within the principles of the Law of Nations to give up or to transfer what, if they ever had, they have totally lost'.[38]

In spite of Agoncillo's overtures to the politics of peace, members of the peace movement neglected to engage with him directly. Ralston represented a solitary point of contact for the Filipinos with the broader community of peacemakers, as his undertakings were notably absent from the pages of the *Advocate of Peace* and *The Peacemaker*. Unlike the subsequent experience of the Filipino Emissary, Sixto López (See Chapter 4), Agoncillo was kept at arm's length from the peace movement. Furthermore, in shutting the Filipinos out of the negotiating process, Western diplomats revealed the unequal standard by which international law was applied. Much as was the case for the Venezuelan lawyers during the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute, a sense of civilisational chauvinism had barred the Filipinos from entering into the negotiations over their own future – the multilateralism inherent in peacemaking had been limited only to Western nations.

Working in Institutional Lockstep

Despite the great lengths to which McKinley and his diplomatic team had gone to include the Philippines in the Treaty of Paris, annexation was by no means complete. Before the treaty became law, it faced an arduous ratification battle in the Senate. And while the arguments of pro- and anti-annexationists were heard on Capitol Hill, peacemakers entered into new coalitions and made arguments against the passage of the treaty in language that was both familiar to the movement and redolent of Agoncillo's argument regarding sovereignty in the Philippines.

Just days before Secretary of State John Hay telegraphed McKinley's wishes to his negotiators, a group of reform-minded Bostonians met to form the Anti-Imperialist League (AIL), in order to oppose any potential annexation of the Philippines. The organisation swiftly gained support from a broad constituency of opponents of imperialism, with figures as politically diverse as the

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[37] Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, pp. 43-47. Cullinane has shown how, during the congressional treaty debate Senator Richard Pettigrew (Silver Republican – Dakota) was the sole exponent of this point of view.

[38] Ibid.

ex-Senator Carl Schurz, historian Charles Francis Adams, and ex-President Grover Cleveland all being appointed as Vice Presidents of the AIL.[39]

When it came to the United States' imperial ambitions, the peace movement already had a track record of urging caution. When the AIL was founded, therefore, it was unsurprising to see key members of the APS on its roster of Vice Presidents. Edward Atkinson, Edwin Mead and William Lloyd Garrison Jr, who were all frequent contributors to the *Advocate of Peace*, all became Vice Presidents of the AIL upon its establishment.[40] Similarly, Carl Schurz and Charles Francis Adams Jr. had both been veterans of the struggle for an Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty and both published extensively in opposition to the annexation of the Philippines.[41] And while he was never a formal officer of the AIL, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood frequently attended AIL meetings, having been present at discussions of the League's platform.[42] Unsurprisingly, therefore, he regularly used his position at the helm of the *Advocate* to aggressively editorialise against the United States' actions in the Philippines.[43]

The most notable individual to travel the path from peace activism to anti-imperialism was the Scottish-American business tycoon Andrew Carnegie.[44] As discussed in Chapter One, Carnegie had long campaigned for the cause of peaceful relations among civilised nations. Motivated by a desire to see the reunion of Anglo-America, Carnegie maintained a close working relationship with William Randal Cremer and contributed to his campaigns for Anglo-American arbitration. As expressed in his 1894 article, 'A Look Ahead', he argued that the federation of the English-speaking nations of the world would eventually 'banish from the earth its greatest stain – the murder of men by men.'[45] As such, Carnegie became a highly outspoken anti-imperialist,

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[39] For traditional accounts of the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League see: Beisner, *Twelve against Empire*; Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, 1972); E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920* (Philadelphia, 1970).

[40] Atkinson and Garrison are recorded as Vice Presidents of the AIL in its first annual report, see *Report of the Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League, Now The New England Anti-imperialist League* (Boston, 1899), p. 14; Mead is noted as having joined in 1900 in *Report of the Second Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, November 24, 1900* (Boston, 1900), p. 5.

[41] Neither formerly sat on the board of the APS. However, see Carl Schurz's speech at the Washington Arbitration Conference and Adams' position on the Conference's Permanent Executive Committee. *American Conference on International Arbitration Held in Washington, D.C. April 22 and 23, 1896* (1896, New York, pp. 88, 31-43.

[42] See APS Papers, Box 17 (SCPC-5467), Scrapbook 2, 'Oceans Our Lines.'

[43] R*eport of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, November 29, 1902 (Boston, 1902),* p. 8.

[44] David S. Patterson, 'Andrew Carnegie's Quest for World Peace', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 114/5 (1970), pp. 371-83.

[45] Carnegie, 'A Look Ahead', *NAR* 156/439 (June, 1893), pp. 693-4. See also Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race,* p. 330-334

frequently writing in the *North American Review* of his opposition to McKinley's annexation policy, which he believed would bring 'serious injury to the Filipinos and to our soldiers and to American citizens who go there'.[46]

The best indication of the overlap between the two movements was the way that the long-standing apparatus of the peace movement moved in lockstep with the emerging anti-imperialist movement in responding to the passage of the peace treaty. Writing just as the details of the Treaty of Paris became public, Trueblood noted with despair in the pages of the *Advocate* that in Europe the view of the United States as an altruistic humanitarian power was rapidly fading: 'The knowledge in Europe of the powerful imperialistic sentiment prevailing in this country strengthens the conviction that our government in its severe demands upon Spain has proceeded as a self-seeking conqueror rather than as a brother in the family of nations.'[47] Recalling the cynicism with which he, and his colleagues, had held for the original stated cause of the Spanish-American War, Trueblood commented that '[o]ur "humanitarian" war is, from its actual results so far, being interpreted not unjustly as really a war of conquest and national greed.'[48]

Most telling of all were Trueblood's closing remarks:

> 'Believing as we do, annexation is not necessary in order to the fulfilment of the nation's present duty to the territories wrested from Spain, that it will result […] in serious impairment of the national life and character, and lead quickly and inevitably to a dangerous and burdensome enlargement of the army and navy and entanglement in the territorial squabbles and unworthy contentions of the war powers, in a word, to the certain decline of the republic, we must utter this last word of protest before the treaty is acted upon by the Senate. We ask all our readers who are like-minded with us to copy, sign and forward to Mr. Erving Winslow, Washington, D. C, the following protest, which is being circulated for signatures by the Anti-Imperialist League:
>
> To the President and Congress of the United States: The undersigned Protests against any extension of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands'.[49]

The American Peace Society was not the only peace organisation that attacked the treaty as containing the false promise of an end to the war. The Universal Peace Union – still smarting from its ejection from Independence Hall – also spoke out. That veterans of the Spanish-American War were parading through American cities as part of numerous peace jubilees

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[46] Andrew Carnegie 'Americanism versus Imperialism II', *NAR* 168/508 (March, 1899), p. 320; see also Carnegie, 'Americanism versus Imperialism', *NAR*, 168/506 (January, 1899), pp. 1-13.

[47] 'The Peace Treaty', *AoP* 60/11 (December, 1898), p. 249.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

naturally drew the ire of the UPU. However, they were most agitated at the idea that peace might be negotiated with the Spanish, while the US still held the fate of the Filipinos and Cubans in their hands. Echoing Agoncillo's remonstration to the peace negotiators, the organisation lashed out at McKinley in the pages of *The Peacemaker*:

> 'Where is the peace? A commission sitting in Paris at this time trying to formulate a peace treaty, or rather holding a conquered nation in the grasp of victorious hands to compel consent to relinquishing possessions without asking the inhabitants thereof as to their wishes or carrying out the principle of the American Republic, that the people shall determine for themselves what shall be their government.'[50]

Above all, the UPU decried the way that the treaty represented not a lasting settlement to the conflict in the Philippines, but rather meant 'Peace by compulsion.'[51]

The fear that the treaty would operate as a Trojan Horse – smuggling European-style militarism into the United States' political culture – was common among all emerging critics of America's imperial actions. One such critic was the President of Stanford College and future Vice President of the AIL, David Starr Jordan. As one of nineteenth-century America's leading biologists and a prominent eugenicist, Jordan had sought to investigate the biological root of warfare – seeking to articulate this in the language of civilisation.[52] Fearing that the treaty marked a new phase in American diplomacy, Jordan remarked that: 'If we take the Philippines, the business of bringing peace through war is scarce begun.'[53] His logic followed that of Agoncillo's opposition to the treaty, albeit with a more irreverent tone, as he reasoned that '[t]he great majority of the Filipinos have never yet heard of Spain, much less of the United States.'[54]

Such language was echoed by Carl Schurz, who had lamented that the peace treaty was 'no peace treaty at all' and instead contained 'half a dozen wars in its belly.'[55] Schurz's fear of future wars was borne out of a similar view that Spain had ceased to exercise sovereignty over the archipelago, and thus the extension of American sovereignty over the islands would require far more than mere signatures on a document. Invoking Lincoln's critique of 'popular sovereignty'

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[50] 'What is a Peace Jubilee', *The Peacemaker* 17/5 (November, 1898), p. 82.

[51] Ibid.

[52] David Starr Jordan, *The Blood of the Nation: A Study of the Decay of Races through the Survival of the Unfit* (Boston, 1906); Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915* (Philadelphia, 1945), p. 169.

[53] David Starr Jordan, *Imperial Democracy* (Boston, 1898), p. 8. Jordan had previously been open in his support of the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty and would become a prominent advocate of peace through eugenics.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Carl Schurz, 'The Policy of Imperialism', p. 8.

in the antebellum South, Schurz lambasted the treaty – arguing that the United States' claims to sovereignty over the Philippines were as weak as 'a soup made by boiling the shadow of the breastbone of a pigeon that had been starved to death.'[56] Schurz, however, was remarkable among peacemakers in that he openly referenced Agoncillo's writings in his case against annexation. Seeking to dispel any pretence that the United States would be welcomed by the Filipinos he claimed that 'you need only read the protest against our treaty of Paris by [the Filipino] representative, Agoncillo, to admit that they make out a strong case.'[57]

With the factional camps already emerging, one senator stood out as an unreconstructed critic of American imperialism as the treaty arrived in the Senate for ratification. Senator George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts was the opposite of a Mugwump, yet he emerged as the most ardent critic of American imperialism on Capitol Hill. Elected to the House in 1869 and then elevated to the Senate in 1877, Hoar had maintained a broadly partisan outlook, even throughout the Republican schisms of the previous decades and during previous debates on imperialism, managing to keep a close personal friendship with President McKinley.[58] Despite his party allegiance, Hoar pulled no punches in his condemnation of annexation, castigating the peace treaty as being the road towards the United States becoming 'a vulgar, commonplace empire.'[59]

As Udo Keppler's far from sympathetic depiction of the McKinley demonstrates (See Image 9), the treaty had caused shock and dismay when it landed in the Senate – with Hoar himself depicted in the foreground with his brow furrowed, fingers interlaced, and gasping in shock. For Keppler, the Philippines remained the elephant in the room during the discussions of peace with Spain; the image perfectly captured Hoar's fear that in ratifying the deceptively titled peace treaty, the Republican Party would become corrupted by imperialism and blinded by Aguinaldoism.

Owing to his beliefs, Hoar became a conduit into the Senate for anti-imperialist sentiment across the country more broadly. Throughout the entirety of the Senate debate over annexation, Hoar frequently delivered masses of petitions to the chamber bearing the names of renowned internationalists associated with the peace movement, including William Lloyd Garrison Jr,

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[56] Ibid.

[57] Carl Schurz, 'The Issue of Imperialism', in Frederic Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, (New York, 1916) [Hereafter *Schurz Writings*], Vol 6, p. 15.

[58] See for instance, George Frisbie Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years* (London, 1904). p. 315-6.

[59] 'A Vulgar, Commonplace Empire', *AoP* 60/11 (December, 1898), p. 247




Image 9: Udo J. Keppler, 'His Contribution to the Christmas Gayety', *Puck* 44/1137 (21 December 1898), Centerfold.

Edwin Mead, Hannah J. Bailey, and Robert Treat Paine.[60] One such petition was sent to Hoar by the Universal Peace Union and had been re-printed in *The Peacemaker*. As veterans of the reform movements of the late nineteenth century, Alfred Love and his colleagues stressed their desire to see the principles of American civilisation introduced into the newly acquired islands, noting that this aim was best achieved through the imposition of 'non-sectarian religion[,] the representative system of a Republican Government, public schools, railroads, commercial intercourse, agriculture, manufactures and all industrial arts.'[61] Conspicuously though, they urged the senators 'not to aim at the annexation of these islands', and instead to leave them to their own form of government.[62] American administration of the island chain was not a prerequisite for the introduction of American standards of respectability and efficiency.

The congressional debate over annexation took place behind closed doors; however, the Congressional Record bears the marks of two clear attempts by Senators to nullify the clause of the peace treaty that called for the annexation of the Philippines.[63] Notably, both were the result of resolutions from Southern Democratic Senators.[64] Despite this, the peace movement broadly reserved their praise for Hoar and his oratory. Their preference for arguments about American republicanism made by Northern senators was hardly a surprise; organisations such as the American Peace Society had few Southern members and were primarily attended by the descendants of abolitionists with interests in reform.

The first attempt to wreck the treaty came from Democratic Senator George Vest of Missouri, whose resolution argued that '[t]he colonial system of European nations can not be established under [the United States'] present Constitution.'[65] It was in the ensuing debate over the constitutionality of annexation that Hoar waged what Robert Beisner has termed 'a full-scale guerrilla campaign' in the Senate.[66] In a speech on 9 January 1899, Hoar acknowledged how remarkable it was for him to break from the stated policy of his party, claiming that 'I have

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[60] US Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, *Proceedings and Debates of the 55th Congress* [Hereafter Congressional Record, 55th Congress], 3rd/4th Session. See petitions presented by Hoar on the following dates: 13 December 1898, 15 December 1898, 20 December 1898, and 5 January 1899.

[61] 'Action of the universal Peace Union in Memorial to Congress', *The Peacemaker* 17/8 (February, 1899), p. 154.

[62] Ibid.

[63] For a full account of the Congressional debates over annexation see Cullinane, *Liberty and Anti-Imperialism,* pp. 29-49.

[64] Christopher Lasch, 'The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man', *The Journal of Southern History* 24/3 (August, 1958), pp. 319-31.

[65] Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 6 December 1898, p. 20.

[66] Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 139.

believed religiously, and from my soul, for half a century, in the great doctrines and principles of the Republican party. I stood in a humble capacity by its cradle. I do not mean, if I can help it, to follow its hearse.'[67] In his speech, he took aim at his Republican colleagues and their claims that American constitutional law provided grounds for withholding statehood from the Philippines. Instead, Hoar retorted that the republican values enshrined in the constitution prohibited any such course of action, calling any deviation from this 'a spasm of folly and delusion.'[68]

Hoar's speech won him plaudits from across the peace movement. 'No speech has been delivered in this country,' wrote Trueblood in the *Advocate,* 'since the period just prior to and including the Civil War, which begins to compare in strength and importance with that made in the Senate on January 9th by Senator Hoar against imperialistic expansion.'[69] However, while Hoar's speech instilled a brief sense of optimism among the peacemakers, it did little to forestall the failure of the Vest resolution.

And so, the attempts to neuter the annexation provisions from the treaty fell to a second anti-imperialist Democratic Senator, Augustus Bacon of Georgia. Bacon's resolution attempted to replicate the arms-length constitutional settlement that had been produced between the United States and Cuba by the Teller Amendment months earlier. Specifically, he urged the United States to renounce any claim of sovereignty over the Philippines and 'leave the government and control of the islands to their people.'[70]

Writing as the treaty's fate lay in the balance, Trueblood editorialised that the only way members of the APS could consider supporting the treaty was if Bacon's resolution was passed, as this would ensure that the treaty would not '[commit] this country to a colonial policy.'[71] However, should Bacon's resolution not be passed, then Trueblood was clear, the APS would not support ratification. Furthermore, Trueblood predicted a groundswell of opposition to imperialism across the country which would 'ultimately compel Congress to act […] in harmony with the spirit and traditions of our institutions.'[72]

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[67] George F. Hoar, *No Constitutional Power to Conquer Foreign Nations and Hold Their People in Subjection against Their Will: Speech of Hon. George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, in the Senate of the United States, January 9, 1899* (Boston, 1899), p. 3.

[68] Ibid. p. 42

[69] 'Its Whole Past, its Whole Future', *AoP* 61/2 (February, 1899), p. 28.

[70] Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, 11 January 1899, p. 561.

[71] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 61/2 (February, 1899), p. 32.

[72] Ibid.

By the time the Vest resolution was being debated in the Senate chamber, Agoncillo had returned to the United States and attempted once more to lobby for his country's independence. Having sent six requests for a meeting to Secretary of State John Hay so that he might register his objections to annexation – with no response – Agoncillo turned his attention to the Senate.[73] In a pamphlet later reproduced by the AIL, Agoncillo memorialised the Senate in strikingly similar terms to the ones he had used with the peace commissioners at Paris. Heavily citing the same authorities from the canon of European international law as many Western peacemakers would do – such as eighteenth-century French international lawyer Emer de Vattel – Agoncillo argued that Spain 'could not confer possession. For she did not enjoy it, and any former right of possession claimed by her had been extinguished by the destruction of her sovereignty over my country'[74] Sensing that the door was closing on the prospects of Filipino independence, Emilio Aguinaldo made one final attempt to secure some semblance of autonomy for his nation. He wrote to President McKinley, now requesting, not independence, but a Filipino protectorate; the protectorate's security would be underwritten by the United States and would be governed by a joint commission of Filipinos and Americans.[75]

Despite this renewed push from Agoncillo, the tide was turning in favour of ratifying the treaty. The most crucial development in the ratification battle came when the leading Democratic Congressman William Jennings Bryan threw his weight behind the treaty's ratification. Although not a Senator himself, his clout within the Democrat Party made his pronouncements in favour of the treaty enough to persuade several senators to switch their votes in favour of annexation. Although he has been largely remembered for his subsequent anti-imperialism in the election of 1900, Bryan went to great lengths to assure Democratic senators that there was a clear difference between 'imperialism and not opposing the treaty'.[76] Bryan would later write in his autobiography that while he was no proponent of imperialism, he had no choice but to back a treaty that would end the war.[77] Therefore, with the support of Bryan, the Treaty of Paris was ultimately ratified with a vote of fifty-seven in favour and twenty-seven against. The only Republican dissenters were Senators George Hoar (Massachusetts) and Eugene Hale (Maine).

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[73] De Campo and Saulo, *First Filipino Diplomat*, p. 90.

[74] Felipe Agoncillo, 'Memorial to the Senate of the United States', in *Memorials From Señor Felipe Agoncillo and Constitution of the Provisional Philippine Government* (Boston, 1899), p. 8.

[75] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City, 1960), pp. 357-358. *Malolos* was originally published via the academic journal, *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review* 25/1-4 (January-December, 1960).

[76] Cullinane, *Liberty and Anti-Imperialism*, p. 43

[77] Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States,* p. 188.

Two days before the Senate had voted on the treaty, violence broke out in Manilla, and the Philippine-American War began. The war would formally last until 1902, with violence persisting throughout the subsequent decades. With the outbreak of violence came the end of the road for Agoncillo. Having frequently been regarded as a spy by the US authorities, who had surveilled him since his arrival, the outbreak of warfare meant that his name was tarnished.[78] He was immediately dropped by Jackson Ralston and his law firm, who claimed that, owing to the outbreak of war, his loyalty to his country meant that he no longer felt able to represent the Filipinos.[79] With his options shrinking, Agoncillo departed for Montreal, from where he hoped to continue the fight.[80] It was only after the passage of the Treaty of Paris and Agoncillo's flight to Canada that critics of empire would properly recognise his efforts, with Edward Atkinson, in his newspaper *The Anti-Imperialist*, reprinting the text of the Agoncillo's 'Memorial to the Senate', alongside a number of his other writings.[81]

'Extending the Empire of Law'[82]

Despite the emerging conflict in the Far East, the peace movement's attention was abruptly diverted by events in Europe. Only weeks after a ceasefire between the USA and Spain had been secured, peacemakers found themselves with further cause for celebration as details emerged of an invitation from Tsar Nicholas II for all Western powers to attend a peace conference at The Hague. The meeting, which would come to be remembered as the First Hague Conference, was intended, in the words of the Tsar, to be an opportunity for the invited nations to 'seek the means of warding off the calamities which [were] threatening the whole world.'[83] Such calamities were fresh in the minds of European peace activists, who starkly remembered the bloodiness of the Franco-Prussian War and who saw the Scramble for Africa as being riddled with potential geopolitical flashpoints.

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[78] 'Turns up in Canada', *The Evening Star* 14334 (6 February 1899), p. 1.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] *The Anti-Imperialist* 1/1-2 (3 June 1899). These documents were formally published by the Anti-Imperialist League; however, Atkinson was one of the many whose career as an anti-imperialist was an extension of his pre-existing identity as a peacemaker.

[82] 'Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I)', in Charles I. Bevans (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, Volume 1* (Washington D.C., 1968), p. 231.

[83] Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *The Hague Conferences and International Politics, 1898-1915* (London, 2019), p. 1.

Optimistic as ever, the *Advocate of Peace* welcomed the Tsar's invitation as being 'the beginning of one of the grandest and most beneficial movements which history has ever recorded.'[84] The ensuing conference – held between May and July 1899 – represented the culmination of decades of public diplomacy by peacemakers, as statesmen and diplomats gathered to discuss 'disarmament, arbitration, the peaceful cooperation of states, the regulation of international order and the laws of war.'[85] The peacemakers, therefore, treated 1899 as their best opportunity to restructure international politics around peacecraft; this meant that the escalating conflict in the Philippines had to vie for their attention, given that most peacemakers considered the Hague Conference to be the most pressing issue of the age.

However, the juxtaposition of the war raging in the Philippines and the utopian visions on display in the Netherlands was jarring for many peacemakers. A lingering sense of cynicism underlay the commentary of many activists, who sensed a hollowness to the rhetoric of perpetual peace being trumpeted throughout the conference. For others, however, the United States' pivot to a colonial policy in the Philippines was not only compatible with global efforts for peace and arbitration but was complementary to this endeavour.

For most peacemakers the principles on display at The Hague existed as a product of the imperial organisation of the world – not in spite of it – with the conference being emblematic of a global system defined by empire. The primary topics under consideration were the proper mechanisms by which international conflict would be resolved and the law of war. The final text of the 1899 Hague Convention was, therefore, of little surprise, with it establishing the first permanent international court and implementing codes of conduct in warfare. The latter targeted a range of inhumane practices on the battlefield, for instance, regulating the use of chemical weapons, emerging aerial warfare, and the treatment of non-combatants. The preamble to The Hague Conventions made it clear, however, that these new laws of war were aimed squarely at Western nations and empires, with the opening clauses of the agreement '[r]ecognizing the solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilized nations' and noting that the delegates were '[d]esirous of extending the empire of law, and of strengthening the appreciation of international justice.'[86]

The final agreement was initially met with excitement by peacemakers across the United States. The Universal Peace Union proclaimed the conference to be 'the most important Conference

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[84] 'The Czar's Note', *AoP* 60/8 (August and September, 1898), p. 176.

[85] Abbenhuis, *The Hague Conferences and International Politics*, p. 2.

[86] 'Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I)', p. 231.

ever held in the history of the world.'[87] While Benjamin Franklin Trueblood deemed the conference a success, with it having fulfilled its stated aim of 'giving a body of improved rules for the conduct of "civilized" war.'[88]

However, despite their praise for the conference and its result, many still lamented the apparent contradictions between the events in the Netherlands and the ongoing violence in the Philippines. Himself an attendee at the conference, Trueblood wrote home to his family that he 'had hoped that the Philippine trouble might [have been] over' by the time he returned home. However, he mournfully accepted that 'from the seriousness of affairs, as indicated by the dispatches, I am afraid that I shall have to enter the fray again when I am home.'[89] Belva Ann Lockwood of the Universal Peace Union wrote to the annual meeting of the UPU in June 1899, congratulating her colleagues on their 'faithfulness and zeal in the great cause of Peace.' However, she noted, with regret, that she and her fellow peace activists were 'working against the tide' of current affairs.[90] She took specific aim at the negotiation of the peace treaty with Spain and the resultant celebrations as being in direct contradiction with the spirit of The Hague:

> 'Next week we are to have a Peace Jubilee, but there is no peace. The innocent and unprotected are being killed daily in the name of patriotism and love of country. Our young men are being slaughtered, infected with disease, accustomed to carnage and the worst passions of men applauded; while victorious generals are worshipped as saints. We must work and wait until better consels [sic] prevail, and pray this Conference may be the opening wedge to the cessation of armaments.'[91]

Carl Schurz firmly agreed with Lockwood's line of thinking. Having been invited to address the convocation of graduating students at the University of Chicago in the early days of 1899, Schurz expressed his outrage at the hypocrisy of American diplomats agreeing to attend a conference in the name of peace and disarmament while the US was embarking on a foreign policy that would yield further conflict. Schurz's ire was particularly cutting for those advocates of empire whom he saw moonlighting as advocates of peace at The Hague; he sarcastically ventriloquised the words of the American delegation at the conference to his audience:

> 'All you tell us about the ruinous effects of increasing armaments and the necessity of stopping them in the interest of civilization and the popular welfare is true. It was our

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[87] 'The Finality of The Hague Peace Conference of 1899', *The Peacemaker* 18/2 (August, 1899), p. 24.

[88] Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, *The Two Hague Conferences and Their Results* (Washington D.C., 1914), p. 5.

[89] APS Papers, Boxes 13-14 (SCPC-5464), Trueblood Family Correspondence, BFT to Sarah Trueblood, 20 June 1899, 4-25b.

[90] 'In Communion with The Hague', *The Peacemaker* 17/12 (June, 1899), p. 228.

[91] Ibid.



Image 10: Unknown Artist, 'The Storm', *Puck* 46/1185 (22 November 1899), Cover.

> own belief some time ago. But we Americans have recently changed our minds. You, gentlemen, say that the Powers you represent would disarm if they could and that general disarmament might be possible if one Power would resolutely begin to disarm. But we Americans are just beginning to arm. You say that this will put another difficulty in the way of general disarmament. But we Americans have, by way of liberating Cuba, won by conquest some islands in both hemispheres, to which we may wish to add, and this business will require larger armies and navies than we now have.'[92]

Schurz's critique of the contradiction between the emollient tone of chattering diplomats at The Hague and the realities of a looming colonial war tapped into a broader American cynicism towards The Hague Conference. As was clear from the depiction of the state of international affairs in 1899 on the front cover of *Puck* in November 1899 (see Image 10), the idealism of The Hague Conference was commonly seen as insufficient protection from the gathering war clouds. Therefore, for many, the politics of peace and the politics of annexation were wholly incompatible.

Belva Ann Lockwood's unease with the dissonance of the two events would prove long-lasting. Years after the conference, Lockwood spoke of the juxtaposition between the meeting at The Hague and the ongoing imperial conflict in the Far East. In 1902, at a celebration commemorating The Hague Conference, Lockwood delivered an address entitled 'Peace Versus Militarism' in which she lamented the general public's inertia towards the ongoing war, in spite of the 'car loads of insane soldiers sent home from the Philippines' and 'the sick and the wounded at the Presidio and other hospitals'.[93] Pointing out the numerous pathways to arbitrate the conflict, Lockwood asked whether Americans ought to 'make barbarians out of ourselves because our enemies are barbarians?'[94] And although she ended her speech on an optimistic note, she also recalled the ways in which American and British delegates to the conference had prevaricated in their commitments, owing to the ongoing conflicts in the Philippines and in South Africa.[95] Imperialism, for Lockwood, had scuppered a prime opportunity to put Western diplomacy onto a peace footing.

Despite the cynicism and disbelief of a majority of peacemakers, a select few remained optimistic that the colonial wars of the close of the nineteenth century were harmonious with the grand vision of perpetual peace which was emanating from The Hague. A minority of

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[92] Carl Schurz, 'The Issue of Imperialism', p. 23.

[93] Swarthmore College, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Papers of Belva Ann Lockwood (DG098), Box 2, Peace Meeting Notes: The Hague Conference, 18-19 May 1902, 'Peace Versus Militarism' (Lockwood-0093), p. 3.

[94] Ibid. p. 5.

[95] Ibid. pp. 15-18.

peacemakers viewed the two matters as existing in separate but linked diplomatic spheres, with the peace conference being a matter of high diplomacy and war in the Philippines operating as part of the American civilising mission.

Having seen the fate that had befallen the Universal Peace Union after they protested the American intervention in the Cuban War of Independence, some peacemakers sought to steer clear of any discussion of topics that might embroil them in any similar scandals. As a result, at the opening of the 1899 Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, the conferences' founder pushed through a resolution outlining that '[T]he discussions of the Conference be limited to the subject of Arbitration, and that consideration of the policy of the administration during and since the war with Spain is not within the scope of this Conference.'[96] Even so, this did not prevent some particularly bellicose peacemakers from alluding favourably to the United States' new imperial endeavours – with the acquisition of the insular empire and the cause of arbitration working to propel mankind further towards a utopian, peaceful world order. For instance, one speaker could not prevent himself from proclaiming his joy at the 'glorious future opening before Cuba and Porto Rico and the Philippines.' 'Whatever may be the pains and penalties of the conquerors,' he stated, 'the islands of the sea may well rejoice and clap their hands.'[97]

Others were even more explicit in their enthusiasm at the prospect of the United States taking a seat at the table of imperial powers. Having joined the peace movement in the wake of the Venezuelan War Scare, Lyman Abbott represented the most pro-imperial voice among the peacemakers who passed judgement on the topic of arbitration. In a direct attack on the views espoused both by his fellow peacemakers and by Filipino diplomats, Abbott asserted that sovereignty had at no point resided with the Filipino revolutionaries and that 'the responsibility for maintaining order and civilization in the Philippines was passed over to [the United States] the moment Dewey destroyed the Spanish force.'[98] Abbott's position prompted a swift rebuke from Edwin Mead, who, in a letter to *The Outlook*, invoked the spirit of 1776 to sarcastically ask if Abbott would go so far as to conclude that the Founding Fathers were 'disturbers of the peace' instead of patriots?[99]

It was, however, when Abbott chose to exploit the backdrop of the Tsar's invitation to argue his case regarding the Philippines that he truly incurred the rage of his colleagues. Two months prior

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[96] *Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration* (Lake Mohonk, 1899), p. 5.

[97] Ibid. p. 54.

[98] Lyman Abbott, 'The Facts', *The Outlook* 61/11 (18 March 1899), p. 620.

[99] 'The Philippine Question: Some Dissenting Opinions', *The Outlook* 61/14 (8 April 1899), p. 840.

to diplomats arriving in the Netherlands, the APS had convened a series of meetings designed 'to promote public interest in the coming International Peace Conference at The Hague.'[100] Taking place at Tremont Temple, Boston, the meetings regularly exceeded over one thousand attendees and hosted speeches from prominent peacemakers such as Robert Treat Paine and Edwin Mead. At the third of these meetings, Abbott rose to make a speech promoting the cosmopolitan values of 'international brotherhood' in the context of the discussions of international arbitration at The Hague.[101] According to Abbott, the conference's overriding objective was 'to establish, by the influence and work of the civilized nations, the power of law throughout the globe.'[102] Perhaps recalling his previous fears regarding a third Anglo-American war, from just a few years ago, he remarked on the need not simply to promote arbitration among civilised nations but to construct 'a permanent Supreme Court of the nations that shall be for the nations of the globe what the Supreme Court of United States is for the States of this Union.'[103] The remit of such a court, however, was to be restricted to the nations who had attained a certain civilisational threshold. For those nations and peoples which Abbott deemed as being 'not reasonable and […] not bound by honor', he accepted that force would be the most effective means by which to impress the values of Western civilisation.[104] Elaborating on this, Abbott reasoned that, given that '[t]here are some communities, made up of barbarians, with which you cannot reason […] we must compel obedience by force.'[105] Thus with the Philippines in the United States' lap, Abbott invoked well-worn tropes of the white man's burden, arguing that 'we must pour into the uncivilized regions the forces that make for civilization,' chiefly meaning the establishment of schools and the organisation of law and order.[106]

Still a Vice President of the American Peace Society, Abbott's support for violent methods in the Far East prompted a mixture of confusion and exasperation from his fellow peacemakers. Judging Abbott's analysis of the situation in the Philippines to be 'strangely specious and one-sided,' Trueblood wrote in the *Advocate* that to hear the preacher simultaneously promote the cause of The Hague Conference while defending McKinley's policy in the Philippines sounded

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[100] Edward Everett Hale, 'The Tremont Temple Meetings', *AoP* 61/4 (April, 1899), pp. 85-87.

[101] Abbott, 'International Brotherhood. Applied to the Conduct of the United States in the Philippines', *The Outlook* 61/11 (15 April 1899), p. 867.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid. p. 688.

[106] Ibid. p. 869.

much like 'cursing and blessing proceeding out of the same mouth.'[107] Abbott's stance represented a dissonance that would irk peacemakers for years to come; their utopian vision of the United States operating as a peaceful and exceptional example to the Old World had been sullied just when it could have been most potent. Most of all, Abbott's dissenting opinion represented a grave threat to their goals, namely that a pro-imperialist voice could so easily co-opt their language and principles.

This fear soon materialised as the first American administrators arrived in the Philippines with the mission to pacify the islands. Upon the passage of the Treaty of Paris, President McKinley dispatched a team of commissioners, led by academic and diplomat Jacob Schurman, to oversee the American annexation of the Philippine archipelago. The commission's purported aims were riddled with the language of an imperial peace as they strove to 'assist [the] peaceful extension of American authority and the establishment of civil and peaceful government among the people.'[108] Schurman and his colleagues, however, went to great lengths to assert that under the law of nations, they did not constitute a peace commission – not least because peace had formally been established when American diplomats had secured a ceasefire with Spain a year earlier. Instead, the commission's purpose was to extend American authority across the island chain via expressions of both hard and soft power – with Schurman acknowledging in his report to the President:

> 'For, just as the United States stands ready to furnish armies, navies, and all the infinite resources of a great and powerful nation to maintain and support its rightful supremacy over the Philippine Islands, so it is even more solicitous to spread peace and happiness among the Philippine people; to guarantee them a rightful freedom; to protect them in their just privileges and immunities; to accustom them to free self-government in an ever-increasing measure; and to encourage them in those democratic aspirations, sentiments, and ideals which are the promise and potency of a fruitful national development.'[109]

Unlike the European powers, however, Schurman sought to justify the American presence in the Philippines as a tutelary and exceptional one. Despite his invocation of peace, Schurman's rationale operated in an entirely separate world from the high diplomacy of The Hague. After the formal proceedings with Spain had been completed, the practicalities of annexation were no

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[107] 'Editorial Notes,' *AoP* 61/5 (May, 1899), p, 105.

[108] United States Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President: January 31, 1900* (Washington D.C., 1900), 1/1, p. 3. [Hereafter *Report of the Philippine Commission*].

[109] *Report of the Philippine Commission,* p. 4

longer considered to be within the ambit of high diplomacy; peace would not be negotiated but rather handed down from high.

'Treat the Philippines as We Treat Cuba'[110]

Geopolitics lay at the core of the peacemakers' opposition to the Treaty of Paris. Inspired by the ideas and activism that arose around The Hague Conference, the peacemakers drew on their proto-liberal internationalism to fashion a critique of annexation that was primarily rooted in their belief that the United States' role in the world should be to facilitate cooperation between states. Whereas concerns for the United States' domestic racial character motivated some opponents of annexation, the ramifications of annexation upon American diplomacy undergirded the peacemakers fears regarding annexation. Specifically, peacemakers feared that the acquisition of the Philippines would draw them into rivalries and conflict with other European imperial powers, the likes of which they had sought to combat at The Hague. Annexation of the Philippines, they argued, marked a clear and foolhardy shift in American foreign policy that would see the nation undermine its exceptional status by joining the global club of imperial powers and thereby becoming subject to a vast web of entangling alliances and obligations. Where the movement had previously attacked the backwards-looking tenor of American diplomacy during the Venezuela Crisis, the peacemakers now reached for the traditional policies of American diplomacy. Not only did this include an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, but also a clear and forceful invocation of the Washingtonian policy of non-entanglement, which they reinterpreted as a modern and relevant tenet of American foreign policy.

Inter-imperialism lay at the heart of the movement's search for a solution to the Philippine Problem, as it drew on two primary areas of inspiration.[111] Firstly, peacemakers drew comparisons with the exemplary practices of other empires, specifically, taking inspiration from British-run protectorates.[112] Secondly, they drew on the theoretical language of contemporary international relations. In doing this, peacemakers sought to reconcile their long-standing critique of the imperial rivalries of the Concert of Europe with a pro-imperial multilateralism, the likes of which had been typified at The Hague. Peace activists failed to see any contradictions in, on the one hand, critiquing the entanglements inherent within the United States' new imperial

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110 'Treat the Philippines as We Treat Cuba', *AoP* 62/4 (April, 1900), p. 79.

111 Stephen Tuffnell, 'Anglo-American Inter-Imperialism: US Expansion and the British World, c.1865–1914', *Britain and the World* 7/2 (2014), pp. 174-95.

112 For more on the flows of knowledge between the British and American empires, see Schumacher, 'Embedded Empire'.

policy, while on the other hand, promoting the sort of international cooperation that had occurred at The Hague. Instead, they viewed the former as being akin to the unregulated extension of empires across the world – which would generate a potential series of new flashpoints for conflict – with the latter constituting the ordered expansion of civilisation. As such, their vision of the United States' place in the world was undergirded by a critique of the Concert of Europe as being overly competitive and fragile, rather than it being built upon colonial subjugation. Similarly, the veneration of the British Empire reaffirmed that while peacemakers were members of the AIL, they simply advocated a different form of empire, namely genteel imperialism.

Even before the formation of the AIL, veteran imperial critic and international lawyer Theodore Salisbury Woolsey had proclaimed his fears of the coming imperialist burden upon American diplomacy. Hailing from a long line of Yale professors (his father was the college's President), Woolsey had spent twenty years as Professor of International Law, from where he had worked to promote the discipline as an academic and political force.[113] Writing at the end of 1898, Woolsey mused on the United States' 'early habit of political isolation', noting with anxiety that the winds of change were blowing and that the 'national government has seemed […] to be on the eve of an important change of policy in its aims and ideals.'[114] Expansionism, according to Woolsey, could only have two rationales: a desire to expand American trade into new markets or a faith in the civilising mission of the United States. And while the latter was seemingly a laudable aim, it hardly necessitated annexation. The former, however, promised more insidious consequences, as Woolsey asked: 'does the possession of colonies, for a people organized as we are, promise a healthful growth of trade and markets, or such an entanglement with the rivalries, jealousies, and ambitions of other and powerful nations as to injure both!'[115]

Carl Schurz echoed Woolsey's fears of new and complicated international entanglements. In the very same speech in which he criticised American hypocrisy at The Hague Conference, he lamented that the Philippines was simply the beginning of a chain of events that would remake the United States' role in the world. In order to protect the archipelago, Schurz argued, in typical peacemaker fashion, that the United States was at risk of becoming entangled in an imperial scramble in the Far East and would be forced to intervene further. Much as when he split from

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[113] Charles Cheney Hyde, 'In Memoriam: Theodore Salisbury Woolsey: October 22, 1852-April 24, 1929', *The American Journal of International Law* 23/3 (July, 1929), pp. 616-617.

[114] Theodore Salisbury Woolsey, *America's Foreign Policy: Essays and Addresses* (New York, 1898), p. v.

[115] Ibid. p. vii.

the Republican Party fifteen years prior, Schurz found himself standing up to the party's establishment once again, claiming that:

> 'If we take those new regions, we shall be well entangled in that contest for territorial aggrandizement which distracts other nations and drives them far beyond their original design. So it will be inevitably with us. We shall want new conquests to protect that which we already possess. The greed of speculators working upon our Government will push us from one point to another, and we shall have new conflicts on our hands, almost without knowing how we got into them. It has always been so under such circumstances, and always will be. This means more and more soldiers, ships and guns.'[116]

Unlike his critique of the Treaty of Paris, Schurz was referring to the potential for further conflict with European powers, rather than the need to put down the insurrection of the Filipino revolutionaries, whom the Americans had once called allies. As well as a renewed wave of violence in the Philippines, Schurz also voiced his fear that the United States would make an entrance into the age of empires, engaging in and promoting an international system where the balance of power was precariously poised. As the members of the Concert of Europe continuously competed over territory, the prospect of war would remain an ever-present possibility as the powers raced to construct ever-larger navies.

Schurz was not alone in his fear of the geopolitical ramifications of the United States' new insular empire; the American Peace Society also trumpeted its fears of American entanglements abroad. As violence began to spread across the Philippines, the APS moved to pass two resolutions at its annual meeting on 23 January 1899. The first reiterated the absence of any constitutional basis for annexation. However, the second gave an even more precise indication of the anti-imperialist direction that the APS was about to head:

> '[T]he annexation of the Philippine islands would be attended by great physical and moral evils to our people, would result in the waste of the national resources and would tend to international entanglements, liable to result in the demand for a great burdensome navy and army, which would be frought with great danger to the Republic. Therefore, the islands ought not to be annexed to the United States, but allowed to set up a government for themselves, under such United States or international supervision as may be necessary to secure to the islands wise and stable government.'[117]

The APS' resolution was a signpost towards the peacemakers' preferred solution to the Philippine Problem. Less than a month prior, President McKinley had publicly argued that the United States had no other option than to annex the Philippines. Speaking to an audience of American missionary leaders, the President outlined that all alternative paths of action – Filipino

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116 Carl Schurz, 'The Issue of Imperialism', in *Schurz Writings*, Vol. 6, p. 17.

117 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 61/2 (February, 1899), p. 33.

independence, continued Spanish rule, or the imposition of European colonial rule – were intolerable.[118] However, when faced with the question of what to do with the Philippines, peacemakers from across the country saw an entirely viable and desirable alternative. Their ultimate goal was to find a way in which the Filipinos could establish their own domestic government, thus ensuring that the United States would not need to impose their authority on the islands without having first gained the consent of those they governed. However, they suggested that this be done in such a way that the Filipinos would have their diplomatic capacities curtailed and their borders forcibly opened to the United States' civilising impulses. Such a programme represented genteel imperialism writ large. In not annexing the archipelago, the United States would be insulated from conflict, either with the Filipinos or with other European powers; this would allow well-meaning American citizens and businesses to impose middle-class values of American refinement upon the Filipinos as a means of uplift.

The assessment of the Filipinos as being unfit to handle their own affairs was a common assumption among the peace movement, which was shared with many on the pro-imperialist side. Echoing the sentiments of President McKinley, Theodore Woolsey noted that having liberated the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the United States was on the cusp of 'add[ing] them to the number of bastard republics' that could be seen throughout the former Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere.[119] Speaking specifically of the Philippines, he remarked that 'here are thickly populated islands, whose people are so mixed in race, so uncertain in quality of civilization, so destitute to all appearance in self-government, as to make it doubtful whether they could ever be brought into our Union as an integral part.'[120] Woolsey's judgement that the Filipinos' racial heterogeneity barred them from admission to the Union, echoed McKinley's refusal to afford Agoncillo the status of representative of a coherent nation that could be treated with. And while some peacemakers lauded the Filipinos as acting in the revolutionary spirit of 1776 – frequently comparing Aguinaldo to George Washington – the overriding sentiments of the peace movement were aligned with Woolsey's assessment of their capability for self-government.[121]

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[118] 'McKinley explains U.S. Occupation of the Philippines', in Jeffrey A. Engel, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Andrew Preston (eds.), *America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror* (Princeton, 2014), Document 2.10, p. 43.

[119] Theodore Salisbury Woolsey, 'The Future of the Philippines', in Woolsey (ed.), *America's Foreign Policy: Essays and Addresses* (New York, 1898), p. 106.

[120] Ibid. p. 107.

[121] For a further example of this rhetoric see Carl Schurz, *The Issue of Imperialism*, p. 8.

Writing in the *Advocate*, Trueblood conceded that the islands would indeed benefit from being administered by American hands and accepted that 'the Philippine inhabitants will be much better off under United States sovereignty, forced upon them though it has been.'[122] However, Trueblood argued, this was not the crux of the issue at hand: 'The question is how much better off still they might have been, and how much less degraded we ourselves might have been, if we had gone about their elevation and civilization in a truly Christian and American way.'[123]

It was in devising this 'truly Christian and American way' that peacemakers revealed the inner workings of their model of genteel imperialism. This would see the Filipinos retain control over their domestic affairs, only to be exposed to the supposedly benign forces of American culture, religion, and trade – while having their national security underwritten by the United States. This much was encapsulated in the peace movement's common refrain in this period – that the United States ought to treat the Philippines as they had treated Cuba.[124] The slogan was a clear allusion to the passage of the Teller Amendment, just a year prior. The Amendment represented a self-denying ordinance imposed on the American government by Congress, which stipulated that the United States ought to withdraw from Cuba its troops as soon as the Spanish had been defeated.

The desire to impose American standards of civilisation on the Philippines had broad-based support. In a particularly revealing letter to President McKinley, Andrew Carnegie outlined his fears that the Republican Party would be split in two over the issue of imperialism and thus allow the Silverites into power. 'The only path to a solid party is through your (Philippines) commission' wrote Carnegie to McKinley, claiming that the US should grant self-government for the Filipinos.[125] McKinley ought to proclaim that it was Schurman and his commission's duty 'to give them a fair trial under our protection from external interference. Get agreement that all religion is tolerated and protected, our missionaries to have necessary rights (very important although nonsense) [and] our trade favored in return for protection (also nonsense but politics).'[126] That Carnegie was willing to suggest a policy against his best judgement – economically hitching the Philippines to the United States – demonstrated his abiding desire to ensure the civilisation of the Philippines via commerce and Christianisation.

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[122] 'The President's Boston Speech', *AoP* 61/3 (March, 1899), p. 56.

[123] Ibid.

[124] 'Treat the Philippines as We Treat Cuba', *AoP* 62/4 (April, 1900), p. 79.

[125] McKinley Papers, Series 1, Reel 6 mss32268 (5174), Andrew Carnegie to William McKinley, February 1899, p. 3. Specifically date of this letter is unknown; however, it is marked as February 1899.

[126] Ibid.

Carnegie was not alone in suggesting that genteel imperialism was the solution to the so-called 'Philippine Problem' with Carl Schurz making an almost identical suggestion:

> 'Stipulations should be agreed upon with [the Filipinos] as to open ports and the freedom of business enterprise within their borders, affording all possible commercial facilities. Missionary effort in the largest sense, as to the development of popular education and of other civilizing agencies, as well as abundant charity in case of need, will on our part not be wanting, and all this will help to mitigate their disorderly tendencies and to steady their governments.'[127]

His ultimate goal was for the United States to become the Filipinos' 'best friends without being their foreign rulers.'[128] Schurz's rhetoric hinted towards a common theme among the peacemakers' thinking; no matter the specific mechanism for Filipino civilisational uplift, the peacemakers all agreed on one critical step in this process. Much as with the impact of the Teller Amendment (and later the Platt Amendment) on Cuban Independence, the peace movement demanded that the diplomatic capacity of the Philippines be curtailed in a supposed effort to stave off an imperial scramble for the islands.[129] Whether or not the peacemakers had any knowledge that Agoncillo and his diplomatic team had actively considered a similar policy is unclear. However, the proximity of thinking between the peacemakers and the Filipinos, is illustrative that something very akin to a 'protectorate' was at the core of the peacemakers' policy offering.

There was a note of irony in that, despite their critique of the entanglements of the Concert of Europe, the peacemakers built their solution to the 'Philippine Problem' off of a pre-existing European mode of imperial rule – via a process of imperial comparison.[130] While no peacemaker actively employed the terminology of protectorates, many happily alluded to the British-run protectorate in Egypt as a virtuous example of how an empire might maintain a civilising presence without annexation. As has been demonstrated by historians such as Patrick Kirkwood, the unofficial British administration of Ottoman-controlled Egypt had become a frequently-cited example for all those thinking about the American administration of the

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[127] Carl Schurz, *The Issue of Imperialism*, pp. 34-35.

[128] Ibid. p. 35.

[129] A.G. Hopkins, *American Empire: A Global History* (Princeton, 2018), p. 660; Louis A. Pérez, *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), pp. 36-42. While Cuba would truly become an American protectorate after the passage of the Platt Amendment, Louis Pérez has forcefully argued that the Teller Amendment's stipulation that the United States had the right to pacify the island already made it a *de facto* protectorate.

[130] For more on imperial comparison, see Andrew Priest, *Designs on Empire: America's Rise to Power in the Age of European Imperialism* (New York, 2021).

Philippines.[131] However, for those looking for an example of a looser colonial relationship, Cromer's Egypt was presented as a case study of how a Western power might control a vital piece of imperial infrastructure – in the form of the Suez Canal – with Egypt still nominally being governed by an independent ruling class and being a part of the Ottoman Empire. This example, therefore, loomed large in the minds of peacemakers as they sought to devise internationalist solutions to the 'Philippine Problem' which would develop and perfect a new arm's length imperial model.

No clear consensus emerged on how this ought to be achieved. In attempting to harness the concept of a protectorate as a means of presenting an alternative to McKinley's annexation plans, peacemakers reached into an internationalist toolbox of policy ideas to expand the debate of how to address the 'Philippine Problem'. The two main ideas put forward by peace activists – the neutralisation of the Philippines and the extension of the Monroe Doctrine across the Pacific – initially seem contradictory. However, both were an effort to pivot the United States towards a mode of empire that was designed to foster imperial collaboration; each sought to prevent an imperial power struggle from emerging around the Philippines, while also removing the Filipinos' ability to conduct diplomacy and determine the nature of their borders. In doing so, the peacemakers sought to harness the spirit of international cooperation that had been present at The Hague Conference – presenting equal international access to the archipelago as a solution to the 'Philippine Problem.'

Extending the Monroe Doctrine

The first instinct of the peacemakers was to return to a central tenet of American diplomacy, which had given them cause for alarm just four years prior. The Monroe Doctrine had brought the United States to the brink of war with Britain during the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute. However, the post-1896 interpretation of the Doctrine – appended with the Olney Corollary – proved to be a valuable mechanism by which the United States could act as a guarantor of the Philippines' domestic and international security, while notionally granting them autonomy at a domestic level. Early indicators of this line of thinking were already present in the American Peace Society's opposition to the Treaty of Paris. Echoing their calls for imperial guardianship in Armenia, the peacemakers demanded that the Filipinos be 'allowed to set up a government for themselves, under such United States or international supervision as may be necessary to secure to the islands wise and stable government.'[132]

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[131] Patrick M. Kirkwood, '"Lord Cromer's Shadow": Political Anglo-Saxonism and the Egyptian Protectorate as a Model in the American Philippines,' *Journal of World History* 27/1 (March, 2016), pp. 1-26.

[132] McKinley Papers, Series 1, Reel 6 mss32268 (5174), Andrew Carnegie to William McKinley, February 1899; 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 61/2 February 1899, p. 33.

Perhaps the most articulate exponent of this policy was the strident critic of American expansion – Charles Francis Adams Jr. – who, after serving as a general in the Union army during the Civil War, had simultaneously begun a career as a historian and a railroad magnate. In an address to the Lexington Historical Society, which Trueblood in the *Advocate* declared as being 'among the ablest discussions of the subject of imperialism', Adams launched into a scathing attack on the proposed annexation of the Philippines.[133] The speech – which the AIL would reprint as a pamphlet entitled "*Imperialism" and "The Tracks of Our Forefathers"* – made heavy use of constitutional precedent and atavistic language to argue that annexation was a repudiation of the history of American diplomacy. 'Our precedents are close at hand', claimed Adams, 'why look away from them to follow those of Great Britain? Why need we, all of a sudden, be so very English and so altogether French, even borrowing their nomenclature of "imperialism?"'[134] The results of this policy, Adams argued, would either precipitate an influx of East Asians into the American body politic (what he termed 'Pauper Labor') or cause the US to govern the islands without their consent, thus violating the republic's foundational principles.[135] However, when he considered what ought to be enacted in its place, he advocated a policy that was reminiscent of those advocated by Carnegie and the APS. According to Adams, immediately after driving out the Spanish, the United States ought to declare 'a policy of "Hands-off," both on our own part and on the part of other powers.'[136] Specifically, he argued that Filipino independence ought to be 'morally guaranteed by us as a consequence of the treaty of Paris, and then leave them just as we have left Hayti, and just as we left Mexico and Venezuela, to adopt for themselves such form of government as the people thereof are ripe for.'[137]

Of course, Adams' claim that the United States had actually left any of these states alone was spurious at best, revealing the type of independence that the peacemakers had in mind for the Philippines. Indeed, Adams explicitly cast his policy as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine's geographical ambit. In a speech laden with Anglophobia, Adams claimed that his policy of 'Hands-Off' was 'distinctly American', operating in accordance with the proper application of

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[133] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 61/2 (February, 1899), p. 34.

[134] Charles Francis Adams, *"Imperialism" and "the Tracks of Our Forefathers": A Paper Read by Charles Francis Adams before the Lexington, Massachusetts, Historical Society* (Boston, 1899),

[135] Ibid. p. 15.

[136] Ibid. p. 23.

[137] Ibid.

the Monroe Doctrine and the democratic principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence.[138] Surmising the merits of his proposed policy, Adams proclaimed that:

> 'It recognizes the truth that all just government exists by the consent of the governed. It recognizes the existence of the Monroe Doctrine. In a word, it recognizes every principle and precedent […] which has from the beginning lain at the foundation of our American polity.'[139]

In his closing remarks, Adams took aim at those in the press who had suggested that the anti-annexationists had provided no solution to the Philippines Problem. Directly answering this charge, he attacked those who indulged in the contradictory argument that it was necessary to teach them a lesson in democracy by removing their independence. Instead, the peacemakers would guarantee Filipino independence as a means of extending the civilising mission – with Adams claiming: 'We propose to guarantee them against outside meddling, and, above all, from "tutelage," and make them, by walking, learn to walk alone.'[140]

Adams was not alone in advocating for the Monroe Doctrine to be extended across the Pacific Ocean as a means of preventing the United States from abrogating its founding principles. Andrew Carnegie, having advocated the civilising influence of American religion and trade, also saw the Monroe Doctrine as the primary vehicle by which this might be achieved, claiming: 'Cuba is under the shield of the Monroe [D]octrine; no foreign interference is possible there. Place the Philippines under similar conditions until they have a stable government.'[141]

The common advocacy of the Monroe Doctrine as a solution to 'The Philippines Problem' superficially represented a volte-face from the peacemakers who had just four years earlier railed against it – calling it the product of 'dead mouldy documents' during the Venezuela Crisis.[142] However, in the minds of peacemakers, the advocacy of such a policy in the Philippines was consistent with the post-1896 application of the Monroe Doctrine and the spirit of the Olney Corollary. Rather than completely precluding European imperial presence in the Western Hemisphere, this reworked vision of the Monroe Doctrine implored the American imposition of international law and arbitration on those states in its diplomatic orbit – mainly for the purpose of extending the reach of all Western powers and their civilising capacities. Therefore,

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[138] Ibid.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid. p. 24.

[141] Andrew Carnegie, 'Americanism versus Imperialism', *NAR* 168/506 (January, 1899), p. 12.

[142] Robert Stein, 'Liberty to Despotism: Under Which Flag Will the Venezuelans Elect to Live?' *The Washington Post*, (23 December 1895), p. 4.

extending the Monroe Doctrine to the Philippines archipelago may have been a bulwark against colonisation, but it was also an invitation to other empires to extend their informal reach.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the way peacemakers openly acknowledged the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the Far East as being akin to the imperial practice of a protectorate. Having condemned annexation throughout the treaty debate, Carl Schurz joined Adams in advocating for the extension of the Monroe Doctrine – making it clear that, in his mind, this was equivalent to establishing a protectorate in the Far East. Speaking during the 1900 election campaign, in which President McKinley had rejected Adams' idea, Schurz went to great lengths to attack his geopolitical myopia. In an address at Cooper Union, New York, Schurz proclaimed that the President 'seems not to be aware that under the Monroe [D]octrine we have for more than half a century exercised just that sort of protectorate over our Southern neighbors.'[143] Echoing the 'Hands-Off' policy advocated by Adams, Schurz went on to explain that it entailed 'simply letting the old world Powers know that while we are not responsible for any internal troubles […] and foreign Powers may enforce such obligations by all proper means, we insist that in doing so they must stop short of infringing on our neighbors' territorial integrity or independence.'[144] Schurz's argument portended the logic of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (discussed in the Epilogue), as he freely admitted that the United States underwriting the geopolitical security of the Philippines amounted to little more than a claim to be the arbiter of the archipelago's foreign policy. The prominence of British rule in Egypt as an exemplar of virtuous imperial practice in the transimperial marketplace of ideas meant that Schurz's description of the Monroe Doctrine as being a system of American-backed protectorates was likely no accident.[145] His willingness to extend such a system to the Philippines – with an explicit reference to the concept of a protectorate – was, therefore, indicative of Schurz's desire to formulate a response to the 'Philippine Problem' which would foster co-operation, rather than competition, among Western powers.

Once tempers had cooled and the need for Anglophobic rhetoric had faded, Charles Francis Adams became a champion of imperial protectorates as a means of stabilising colonial relations. Speaking specifically of Cromer's record in Egypt, Adams deemed the British administration of that territory to be 'the most credible page in Great Britain's history of dealing with dependent

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[143] Carl Schurz, 'For Truth, Justice and Liberty, 28 September 1899', in *Schurz Writings* vol. 6, p. 249.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Kirkwood, '"Lord Cromer's Shadow"'.

races.'[146] Writing in 1906 to James Bryce, he pronounced that the 'skill and temper with which [Lord Cromer] unrolls the complex snarl of Egypt are to my mind beyond all praise.'[147] Reflecting on the imperial model as a whole, Adams remarked that Cromer had 'illustrated what can be done under circumstances singularly adverse, through the constant exercise of good judgement, tact and patience.'[148]

By the time of the election of 1900, the anti-imperialist policy of extending the Monroe Doctrine to the Philippines had, in all but name, filtered upwards into party politics. With the Democrats having nominated the staunch anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan as their presidential candidate, the party's platform had thus become similarly hostile to McKinley's policy towards the Philippines. With Bryan himself being amiable to the cause of peace, the peacemakers' policy was adopted in the Democratic Party platform:

> 'The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperiling (sic) our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization nor to convert the Republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to give the Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside interference, such as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America.'[149]

Neutralisation

The peacemakers' opposition to empire was far from uniform. Therefore, while most members agreed that the United States ought to guarantee the independence of the Philippines even if they were not ready to govern their own affairs, the rhetorical framing of how this was to be achieved varied. And while the anti-annexationist cause would soon be bolstered by support from numerous southern white supremacists, the early critics of empire were largely peacemakers who hailed from a classically liberal heritage, with many being prominent advocates of free trade.[150] Therefore, a more cosmopolitan solution emerged for underwriting the

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[146] Oxford, Bodleian Library, Papers of James Bryce, MS Bryce USA 3 fo. 36, X. Films 8/69, Adams to Bryce, 29 May 1906.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid; Charles Francis Adams, 'Reflex Light from Africa', *Century Illustrated Magazine* 72, (May, 1906), pp. 101-111. Adams noted his regret, in 1906, that the United States had not been able to enact a policy akin to Cromer's 'veiled protectorate' in the Philippines.

[149] *Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held in Kansas City, Mo., July 4th, 5th and 6th, 1900* (Chicago, 1900), p. 115.

[150] See Marc-William Palen, 'British Free Trade and the International Feminist Vision for Peace, c.1846–1946', in David Thackeray, Andrew S. Thompson, and Richard Toye (eds.), *Imagining Britain's Economic Future, c.1800-1975: Trade, Consumerism and Global Markets* (Basingstoke, 2018), pp. 115-131; Marc-William Palen, 'Transimperial Roots of American Anti-Imperialism: The Transatlantic Radicalism of Free Trade, 1846–1920' in Kristin L. Hoganson and Jay Sexton (eds.), *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham, NC, 2020), pp. 159-182.

archipelago's domestic and geopolitical security – the proposal that the Philippines ought to be turned into a neutral zone.

While Carl Schurz had agreed with Adams' policy of 'Hand-Off', he also toyed with the idea of neutralisation as being a corollary to this. In his University of Chicago speech, Carl Schurz advocated this very position. Speaking of all the possessions of the United States' insular empire, Schurz remarked that rather than formal occupation, a more pragmatic and informal approach ought to be adopted so as to allow for the free movement of trade and missionaries. As had been the case for Belgium and Switzerland, the former Senator argued that '[t]he Philippines may […] be covered by a guarantee of neutrality on the part of the powers most interested in that region – an agreement which the diplomacy of the United States should not find it difficult to obtain.'[151]

The most notable proponent of neutralisation, however, was the Bostonian free-trade activist and peacemaker Edward Atkinson. Writing in a letter to President McKinley, he reacted with frustration to the allegation that he and his anti-imperialist colleagues did not present a workable solution to the question of what the United States should do with the Philippines. Where once McKinley had stated that there was no alternative to annexing the Philippines, Atkinson stressed that the islands ought to be secured by an international agreement that would ensure that they would not be subject to rule by any imperial power, most of all the United States. Such an agreement would also ensure that the ships and commerce of each nation were allowed equal access to the islands.

Such a policy, according to Atkinson, represented 'an alternative which offers peace with honor, progress and the development of commerce.'[152] Much as McKinley had articulated his imperial gospel to the gathering of missionary leaders, Atkinson presented the policy alternatives that he considered unacceptable before reaching a radically different conclusion to McKinley: 'Dealing with the Philippines it is plain the people of this country will not accept cession. It is plain that they will not permit their being restored to Spanish oppression. The alternative is an agreement among the great powers to neutralise these islands.'[153] Such a policy had a notable history of success in Europe, most obviously with the neutralisation of Switzerland, Belgium, and the British administered neutralisation of the Suez Canal, where this vital piece of maritime

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[151] Schurz, *The Issue of Imperialism,* p. 34.

[152] McKinley Papers, Series 1: General Correspondence, Reel 5 mss32268 (4721), Edward Atkinson to McKinley, 26 January 1899, p. 1.

[153] Ibid.

infrastructure was accessible to all the nations of the world. Evaluating the international situation before him, Atkinson concluded that the policy was the only one that made geopolitical sense:

> 'England does not wish and will not risk her soldiers in taking possession of the Philippine Islands, even if the opportunity were offered. Germany will not take them; Japan might not take them; no other nation desires to take them; each nation desires that the other shall not; each nation desires a coaling station; the open door to commerce, the development of the wants of the Philippines through commerce to the end that their demand for manufactures may increase; the development of their own product correspondingly.'[154]

For Atkinson, peace was a feature of an international system constructed by Western powers, rather than a state of affairs between two nations. As such, the desires of the Filipinos were absent from his thinking – even as war between the United States and the Filipino revolutionaries loomed on the horizon. Hinting towards a different imperial crisis that was brewing in the Far East – namely, Western access to the Chinese market during the Boxer rebellion – Atkinson implored the President to maintain open access for all Western powers to the Philippines:

> '[I]f by agreement it were ordained that all fortifications should be destroyed, that no naval warfare should be permitted within the waters of the Philippines Islands, that all nations might buy coaling stations, land commodities and enjoy commerce under the same system of collecting the revenue, called "the open door," -- all interests would be promoted, oppression would end; the Philippine Islands would become first in the history of the world a sanctuary of commerce, like the Cathedrals of old where God's peace was kept while all around was violence, rapine and war.'[155]

As was clear from the frequent allusions to Belgium and Switzerland, the merits of neutrality had long been discussed among thinkers on Western geopolitics.[156] Indeed, Atkinson's image of the Philippines becoming a universal 'sanctuary of commerce' was not the first time he had touted the idea as the solution to a foreign policy dilemma. Atkinson was one of many peacemakers that had advocated for this same approach to be taken in response to the 1895 coup of American plantation owners against the Hawaiian monarchy. Using almost the same rhetoric that he had employed regarding the Philippines, Atkinson had spoken to the American Peace Society of the need to neutralise Hawaii. Claiming that none of the Western powers 'would like to see either one assume the power and responsibility' for the islands, Atkinson proposed that islands ought to be neutralised. According to Atkinson, each nation's economic interests required 'the

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[154] Ibid. pp. 1-2.

[155] Ibid. p. 2.

[156] For more on the Western view of neutrality as a feature of the nineteenth century international system, see Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, 2014).

right to establish coaling stations, to land electric cables and to enjoy the benefits of their harbors of refuge.'[157]

However, in his earlier remarks regarding Hawaii, Atkinson was far more transparent about both the financial and civilisational motives of such a policy. Away from the heated environment of 'The Great Debate', Atkinson had gone as far as to admit to the audience of peacemakers that there was a strong case for the United States maintaining a well-equipped navy. This would only be employed in order to 'right the wrongs of our citizens even by force, when they are oppressed by the barbarous or by the semi-civilized nations and States that are under the curse of militarism or are still governed by military caste.'[158] For Atkinson, the peaceful benefits of neutralising territory, therefore, only extended as far as conflicts between imperial powers; the policy's purpose was less to protect the rights of those in the neutralised territory and more in service of promoting the interests of Western empires. More so, the true function of this was in service of a higher cause – the promotion of global commerce. Indeed, Atkinson would go as far as to claim that 'we need not degrade our navy by calling our vessels "commerce destroyers" when their true function is that of commerce protectors.'[159] Atkinson was so attracted to neutralisation as an innovative policy solution that this became his prime motivation for becoming a member of the APS (in April 1895), as he sought to leverage the movement's transnational network and public prominence as a means of promoting his idea.[160] His ambitions would prove successful, as peacemakers warmed to the idea. Having been sold the policy by Atkinson, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood wrote glowingly of the idea to his British colleague Hodgson Pratt (founder of the International Arbitration and Peace Association), requesting that he place Atkinson's remarks on Hawaii in a prominent British news outlet, preferably *The Times*.[161]

The policy of neutralisation had an even longer afterlife when it came to the Philippines, being a recurring idea among anti-imperialists following their failure to prevent annexation. As late as

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[157] Edward Atkinson, 'The Neutralisation of Hawaii', *AoP* 57/6 (June, 1895), p. 127.

[158] Ibid. p. 125.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society, Edward Atkinson Papers, Carton 24, Letterbook, Volume 54: 8 December 1894 - 6 April 1902 (SH 15LQ C), Edward Atkinson to Robert Treat Paine, 13 February 1895, p. 519; Edward Atkinson to BFT, 6 April 1895, p. 991.

[161] APS Papers, Box 24, Folder: General Correspondence from BFT (1892-1916), Hodgson Pratt to BFT, 20 April 1895; Hodgson Pratt to BFT, 28 May 1895. Pratt was unable to have Atkinson's remarks placed in any newspaper. The best he could was outline them in a letter to *The Spectator*, see: 'Letters to the Editor: Hawaii, as Halfway-House, Free to All, For Ever', *The Spectator* 74/3491 (25 May 1895), p. 718.

1906, Erving Winslow, the Secretary of the AIL, wrote to the *Advocate* of the need to promote the policy at future peace conferences.[162] 'The neutralization of "weaker peoples"' would prove to be a panacea for the inherent competitiveness of the imperial system.[163] Not only would such a policy foster 'peaceful intercourse, commercial, social or religious' among civilised nations, but would also allow the United States to end the ongoing bloodshed in the Philippines. Even as late as 1912, Winslow would author a pamphlet entitled *Neutralization: America's Opportunity,* in which he bemoaned the United States' failure to employ the policy in the Philippines, with it being an apt way to ward off looming conflict.[164] Whereas arbitration was a tranquil method of mediating international disputes when they arose, neutralisation operated as a preventative remedy in an age of imperial rivalry.

That the Filipinos might violently resist the abrogation of their diplomatic status and the forcible creation of infrastructure, such as coaling stations, likely did not occur to Atkinson or any of the peacemakers. By the time that the Treaty of Paris had passed through the Senate, violence was spreading across the Philippines and the utility of the peacemakers' policy alternatives to annexation had faded. Where the idea of a protectorate had once appealed to Agoncillo and his colleagues, the realities on the ground now precluded a negotiated, diplomatic solution to the 'Philippine Problem' – as the Filipino position on independence hardened. For instance, one anonymous editorial in the *North American Review* in September 1899*,* likely written by Agoncillo from afar, was obdurate and uncompromising in the message it conveyed to its American readers: 'Be convinced, the Philippines are for the Filipinos. We are a virile race. We have never assimilated with our former oppressors, and we are not likely to assimilate with you.'[165] While there had previously and briefly been an overlap between the Filipino diplomats and peacemakers on the issue of protectorates, this overlap had evaporated. The peacemakers' creative thinking had clearly come too late.

Conclusion

The election of 1900 proved fatal for the peacemakers' internationalist vision of the United States' imperial future. The election was a rematch of the 1896 contest, which had seen William McKinley triumph over William Jennings Bryans' free silver platform – and the result four years later was an even more emphatic victory for McKinley. Unlike the Anti-Imperialist League, the

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[162] Erving Winslow, 'The Neutralization of "Weaker Peoples"', *AoP* 68/5 (May, 1906), pp. 112-3.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Erving Winslow, *Neutralization: America's Opportunity* (Washington D.C., 1912).

[165] Anon, 'Aguinaldo's Case against the United States', *NAR* 169/514 (September, 1899), p. 432.

UPU and the APS chose not to endorse the explicitly anti-imperialist Bryan, perhaps sensing that most of their New England membership was uncomfortable supporting such an economic radical.[166]

As well as being a death knell for the aspirations of the Free Silver movement, the election also marked a turning of the page in the American debate over its imperial identity. The annexation of the Philippines was now a settled matter, as was the United States' role as an imperial power. And while the internationalist alternatives proposed by peace activists continued to percolate beneath the surface of American politics, peacemakers swiftly turned their attention to questions of how the United States could best govern and civilise the colonies that it now held.

However, the period between the declaration of an armistice between Spain and the United States and the election of 1900 saw the peace movement engage with questions of empire in a way that they had never done before. Motivated by their sense of shock at a peace treaty that they feared carried 'half a dozen bloody wars in its belly', a majority of leading peace activists embedded themselves in the emerging anti-imperialist movement – with many being present at the birth of the AIL.[167] Becoming active and distinctive voices in the 'Great Debate', leading peacemakers did not simply oppose the prospect of an American Empire but railed against the fragile and perilous international system of the late nineteenth century – which they feared that the United States was about to become entangled in. This critique of late nineteenth-century international relations was fervently on display in the efforts of the global peace movement at the Hague Conference, as it sought to re-align Western diplomacy around the principles of interstate cooperation. However, this not only revealed to American peacemakers the gulf between their utopian aims and the realities of American imperialism, but it also highlighted the global scale of their problem. As such, they sought to extend this spirit of interstate cooperation to the Philippines Problem, suggesting that the islands either be neutralised or that the Monroe Doctrine be extended across the Pacific, ensuring that the islands remained open to trade while being free from imperial rule. In doing so, they sought to knit together these inchoate ideas of liberal internationalism with pre-existing examples of virtuous and efficient imperial practice, specifically taking inspiration from the British-run protectorate in Egypt. In this, they also echoed the Filipino diplomats who had come before them and whom they had neglected to interact with. Thus, although they institutionally situated themselves among the anti-imperialist

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166 'Editorial', *The Peacemaker* 19/6 (December, 1900), p. 123; 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 62/10 (November, 1900), p. 205.

167 Carl Schurz, *The Policy of Imperialism*, p. 8.

movement, the peacemakers had developed a model of genteel imperialism which they hoped would allow the United States to emulate an empire without resorting to military rule.

Chapter 4: Applying the Laws of War in the Philippines

"'War," perhaps "is hell," as General Sherman said; but it need not be hell with Spanish improvements.'[1]

George Kennan

Introduction

With the election of 1900, the tectonic plates of American politics had shifted. The so-called 'Great Debate' was ostensibly over; the American people had voted in favour of the acquisition of the insular empire. Peace activists across the country greeted the new year with consternation, as they feared that their predictions of an unending series of imperial wars would come to pass. 'The rules of so-called civilized warfare have snapped like sand-ropes under the strain of reviving barbarism', proclaimed the front page of the *Advocate* in December 1900, as it lamented that 'the armies of the most advanced nations out-pagan the pagans themselves in cold-blooded butchery'.[2] Not only had they failed to prevent the United States from embarking on a new imperial mission, but yet again they had been beaten by the proponents of militarism and the yellow press. Jingoism, as both a policy and as a political style, had won the day. Therefore, as the year 1901 arrived, peacemakers worried not only about the consequences of ongoing warfare but also about the poison entering the bloodstream of the American body politic.

Realising that they could not put the imperialist genie back into its bottle, the movement changed tack and jettisoned its campaign against annexation. Instead, it called for reforms to the administration of the insular empire, which would recast it in line with the social values of genteel imperialism. This required the search for a new target audience. Where they had once sought to lobby policymakers in Washington, peacemakers now sought to inform and persuade the American public as to the ills of imperial rule. This did not mean that the peacemakers isolated themselves from policymakers on Capitol Hill, but instead, in keeping with their heritage of moral suasion, they sought to shore up their influence by harnessing public opinion. This was, in part, the result of their prior failure; however, it was also a response to the emergence of transimperial networks of activism that saw both American and Filipino activists journeying across the Pacific. Specifically, where they had once neglected to interact with the Filipino nationalists during the annexation debate, they now sought to leverage their relationship with Sixto López, the representative of the Filipinos in the US, and eventually with peacefully-minded Filipinos in the Far East. With these networks came new flows of knowledge and information about conditions on the ground in the Philippines, which prompted a public outcry as the

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[1] George Kennan, 'The Philippines: Present Conditions and Possible Courses of Action III', *The Outlook* 67/10 (9 March 1901), p. 584.

[2] 'The Close of Century', *AoP* 62/11 (December, 1900), p. 227.

American press reported on the violent practices of the ongoing Philippine-American War and the licentious conduct of American soldiers in the Far East. This public outcry was both marshalled and mirrored by the peace movement, which mounted a campaign to turn the public against the pro-imperial consensus in Washington. However, the peacemakers' unease with the course of American imperial policy was more self-interested than humanitarian in nature. Viewing the brutality and licentious conduct of Americans on the ground in the Philippines, they worried that American soldiers – via a process of brutalisation and demoralisation – would return home from the Far East shorn of their Christian values.

These shifts in political technique mirror similar shifts occurring in the anti-imperialist movement, namely the move towards greater transimperial activism and the introduction of a public information campaign.[3] These similarities are unsurprising given the overlap in personnel between the two movements; several activists with backgrounds in peacemaking – such as Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, and Herbert Welsh – operated out of the ailing bureaucracies of the anti-imperialist movement as they sought to promote the public campaigning tactics that were second nature to the peacemakers. As such, this transition from a narrow political lobbying effort to a more expansive public information campaign is best understood as a reversion to one of the main elements of peacecraft – moral suasion.

This chapter argues that, in the wake of the election of 1900, the peacemakers launched a public information campaign that was consistent with the methods of peacecraft that had previously underpinned their movement. This campaign was primarily reactive in nature as peacemakers sought to guard against the degeneration of American manhood, which they saw as being an inherent consequence of colonial governance. The desire of reform movements to impose their moral values and social practices upon the nineteenth-century world of empires has been characterised by Ian Tyrrell as the extension of the United States' moral empire, which was itself elemental in the construction of an American cultural hegemony.[4] This outward-looking reform tendency, however, operated in a push-and-pull relationship with the more defensive tendencies in the American liberal mind, which sought to protect and venerate American whiteness and masculinity. For histories of the peace movement, this moment represents a turning point. As Samuel Moyn has demonstrated, this period was characterised by two intertwined and sometimes contradictory lines of thinking about the place of war in geopolitics – namely, that war was either something to be minimised and eliminated versus the view that war ought to be made

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[3] Michael Patrick Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism* (New York, 2012), pp. 115-147.

[4] Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton, 2010).

more humane.[5] The tensions in these lines of thought were previewed in frequent discussions within the peace movement and were subtly invoked as the peacemakers navigated the shifting valence of humanitarianism during the Armenian Massacres and the Cuban Crisis. The debates over American rule in the Philippines, however, represented the point at which peacemakers realised, with dismay, that making war more humane was (in the words of Benjamin Franklin Trueblood) 'a monstrous absurdity.'[6]

This chapter is structured in five parts. First, it examines the influence of the López siblings on the peace movement and how this was mediated through the genteel imperialists' understandings of respectability. Second, it tracks the movement's pivot from lobbying policymakers on Capitol Hill to speaking to the American public at large. Third, it will examine the congressional investigation into the allegations of torture in the Philippines and the ways in which the laws of war were debated and co-opted by the pro-imperial congressional faction. Fourth, it will examine the movement's reaction to these revelations. Finally, it will align this reaction with the movement's views on vice in the Philippines.

Constructing Filipino Respectability

As the dust settled on the election of 1900, anti-imperialists and peacemakers confronted their failure. Shaken by their inability to dissuade policymakers from embracing a European-style imperial project, the amorphous coalition of genteel imperialists scrambled to refocus their tactics. Chief among these was the search for a new audience, as peacemakers sought to address and mobilise the concerns of the country at large rather than those of a narrow policy-making elite. Specifically, they crafted a transimperial public information campaign that was modelled around the ideas of moral suasion, which had proven so fundamental to the movement's history. Much as they had done during the Armenian Crisis, the peacemakers sought to inform the American public of the nightmarish conditions in the Philippines as they gathered and published information flowing to liberal America via a network of Filipino activists in the United States and a mobile cast of reform-minded Americans. In doing so, they sought to hold American statesmen to account for the administration of the archipelago and the broken promises of American democracy, as they highlighted the gap between the lofty rhetoric of civilisation and the horrors enacted by Americans on the ground in the Far East.

Vital to this transpacific network and knowledge exchange were the siblings Sixto and Clemencia López. The transnational activism of the López siblings was emblematic of a growing anti-

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[5] Samuel Moyn, *Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War* (New York, 2021).

[6] 'The Close of Century', *AoP* 62/11 (December, 1900), p. 227.

colonial intelligentsia that was burgeoning across colonised Asian societies.[7] Hailing from an *Ilustrado* family with a heritage of resistance to colonial occupation, both siblings sought to make the case for Filipino independence from the United States by tapping into the pre-existing network of peacemakers that had crystallised during the late 1890s.[8] As such, each sibling, in their own way, sought to harness the norms of American middle-class sociability to ameliorate their outsider status in American society. Sixto López had joined Agoncillo in 1899 as secretary to the official delegation of the newly established Philippine Republic and had journeyed between the US and Paris to present the Filipino case before the Spanish and American negotiators.[9] By the end of that year, fear of imprisonment had caused López to flee the United States to London, from where he lobbied to further the cause of independence from afar.[10]

From his desk on the other side of the Atlantic, López regularly took to the American press to convey his horror at the events unfolding in his home country. With a moderate tone, replete with the rhetoric of peace, López would swiftly become a darling of the peace movement. At the end of 1899, he called for both sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement that would forestall conflict and preserve the dignity of both nations. Much like Agoncillo before him, he questioned the legitimacy of American rule in the Philippines, querying the legal basis on which the United States claimed sovereignty over the archipelago, all the while flattering his American readership with overtures to the validity of the United States' grand civilisational mission.[11] Writing in *The Independent*, he acknowledged in an emollient tone that even '[t]he Filipinos cheerfully admit that the United States Administration is under moral and legal obligation to see that a stable government is established in the Philippines.'[12] However, he asked, 'does that obligation necessitate annexation?'[13] His answer was unequivocal. In an attempt to align Filipino anti-colonialism to the United States' own founding moment, López stressed that the Filipino desire for liberty was deep-seated and that, while the American army might successfully conquer Filipino territory, the complete and unquestioning acquiescence of the Filipino people would

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[7] Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation: A Global Intellectual History of the Philippine Revolution, 1887-1912* (New York, 2022)

[8] Laura Prieto, 'A Delicate Subject: Clemencia López, Civilized Womanhood, and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism', *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 12/2 (April, 2013), p. 201.

[9] Michael Patrick Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1909* (New York, 2012), p. 131.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Sixto López, 'The Philippine Question: From A Filipino Point of View', *The Independent* 51/2663 (14 December 1899), p. 3337.

[12] Ibid. p. 3340.

[13] Ibid.

contradict their nature. Therefore, 'while the Filipinos [were] as anxious for stable government in the Philippines as is America', they could never accept the complete abrogation of their sovereignty.[14] In a warning that targeted the very core of the United States' liberal imperial mission, López warned that 'even if America succeeds in the *material* conquest of the Philippines, there will never be a *moral* submission on the part of the Filipinos.'[15]

Concluding his plea to the American people, he made one final effort to change hearts and minds – harnessing rhetoric that was reminiscent of the peacemakers' campaigns across the water:

> 'Why not negotiate? If negotiations fail, it will then be time enough for war. True, in the past our overtures of peace and goodwill were not received in a hearty manner by the Administration. But let that pass. It cannot be undignified to do what honor and righteousness demand. Who will help me in the cause of peace? Could any cause be worthier the genius of the statesmen of a great nation?
>
> In placing this statement before the people of America, I beg to assure them that whatever its demerits may be it is the outcome of a sincere desire for peace and for an honorable settlement of the differences and difficulties of the Philippine question.'[16]

Unsurprisingly, López's firm yet conciliatory plea for the US to step back from the brink of war was met with a tepid response in the US. In a direct reply to López's article in *The Independent,* Charles Denby*,* a member of the First Philippine Commission, took offence at the accusation that he and his colleagues wanted to hold the Philippines in 'subjugation'. Heaping the blame for conflict onto the islands' inhabitants, Denby pronounced that '[a]s soon as the insurgents lay down their arms and give us time to breathe unmolested by Mauser rifles and bolo men the intentions of our Government will be made known by Congress.'[17]

And with that, a war of words erupted between the two men, as they publicly traded barbs in the American press from either side of the Atlantic. Responding from London, López sardonically replied that, '[Denby] quotes a number of statements, interesting in themselves, but in most cases no more relevant to my contentions than if he had quoted from Deuteronomy or the minor Prophets.'[18] With a provocative tone, López proceeded to contest the United States'

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[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid. The italics are from the original text.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Charles Denby, 'Some Remarks on "A Filipino Point of View."' *The Independent* 52/2666 (4 January 1900), pg. 9.

[18] Sixto López, 'The Philippine Question: A Reply to Colonel Denby's "Remarks"' *The Independent* 52/2675 (8 March 1900), p. 579.

diplomatic record of the past few years, finally stating that Denby's claims were so obviously full of holes that '[h]is article and the "Preliminary Report" will aid us in our plea for independence.' In a pointed and facetious conclusion, he brushed off Denby's criticism, claiming that: 'And inasmuch as unconscious humor is that highest form of humor so [too] unintentional aid from an opponent is of more real value than the help of friends.'[19]

The bitter transatlantic back and forth was interrupted in the summer of 1900 by Fiske Warren's arrival in London.[20] Something of an anti-imperialist renaissance man, Warren had an eccentrically diverse career which included a highly successful paper manufacturing business, a stint as a professional tennis star, and a regular habit of patronising the fine arts. Warren had taken up an interest in peacecraft as a result of the Philippine Question, having signed a letter to Senator George Hoar in 1899, requesting that the Senator speak at anti-imperialist meetings.[21] He formally joined the Anti-Imperialist League in February 1902 and became a vice president of the American Peace Society in 1903.[22] During his visit to London – which was superficially intended to strengthen the bonds of Anglo-American friendship – Warren successfully persuaded López to return to the US as his guest, from where he could more effectively further the cause of the Filipino people.[23] Returning to the US in October 1900, López made a striking claim as to his purpose. Likely still smarting from his vituperative exchange with Denby, López clearly stated that his intent was not to directly shift American policymakers on the question of annexation or even the United States' wider constitutional relationship with the Philippines. Instead, he claimed, '[m]y object in visiting the United States is […] to tell the American people what the Filipinos desire in reference to the future government of our country.'[24] This shift would preface a broader change in technique for resisting empire on the American mainland, as critics of empire transitioned from seeing figures such as Denby as their main targets seeking an audience with the American people as a whole.

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[19] Ibid. p. 582.

[20] Canning Eyot, *The Story of the Lopez Family, a Page from the History of the War in the Philippines* (Boston, 1904), p. 18; Cullinane, *Liberty and Anti-Imperialism,* p. 133.

[21] *Letter from The Hon. George F. Hoar* (Boston, 1899), p. 4. This letter was reprinted and published as a pamphlet by the Anti-Imperialist League.

[22] *Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, November 29, 1902* (Boston, 1902), p. 8; 'Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Peace Society', *AoP* 65/6 (June 1903), p. 104. Warren was inducted as a vice president of the American Peace Society at the same meeting as Alice Stone Blackwell.

[23] 'America and Sir Walter Scott', *The Times* 35733 (23 January 1899), p. 7. Warren's stated aim for the trip was to express his thanks, on behalf of the Boston Public Library, to the Sir Walter Scott Westminster Memorial Committee. The Committee had donated a replica bust of Scott to the Boston Public Library in an effort to solidify the bonds between (what they saw as) the 'two leading powers of civilization'.

[24] 'To Plead for Filipinos', *Quincy Daily Ledger* 12/229 (1 October 1900), p. 4.

Upon his return to the US, López quickly caught the eye of the peace movement, which began to reproduce his writings while he was stationed in Boston. In the direct aftermath of the election of 1900, both the *Advocate of Peace* and *The Peacemaker* published a letter from López entitled *Christmas Letter to the President and the People of the United States*.[25] Using tropes familiar to the peace movement and reminiscent of his very first article in *The Independent* – in which he spoke directly to the American people rather than to Denby – López channelled the rhetoric of American patriotism to make his case for a moderate peace. He noted that in the US, a land 'wherein are enjoyed the blessings of liberty and abundance', it would be unthinkable that acts of violence, such as those taking place in the Philippines, might occur.[26] However, American citizens who were 'under the influence of martial glory, [did] not realize that thousands of brave men and equally brave women are being slain, by sword and starvation, in a conflict which can only result in death to one people and withered laurels to the other.' He concluded by stressing that '[a]t this season of peace[,] I plead for peace.'[27]

It was not simply his familiar rhetoric that endeared López to the peace movement but also his genteel and moderate character, which many in the movement saw as the characteristics of a kindred spirit.[28] Just three days before he authored his Christmas letter to the American people, López met with Alfred Love, in West Philadelphia at the house of a local architect. Writing in the pages of *The Peacemaker,* Love determined that López was a man of a 'gentle, refined and friendly' disposition and reported that the Filipino diplomat had claimed that his mission was 'sincerely in the interest of peace, humanity and good will.'[29] Much as with his arrival to the United States, López assured Love and those in attendance that his goal 'was not to gain the support of any political party, or to ask favors of anti-imperialists, but simply to tell the truth about the situation in the Philippine Islands'.[30] Such faith in the power of public opinion – and a desire to shape it via a public information campaign – would have been music to the ears of the assembled peacemakers, who had been steeped in the tradition of moral suasion.

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[25] Sixto López, 'Christmas Letter to the President and People of the United States', *AoP* 63/1 (January 1901), p. 21; Sixto López, 'Christmas Letter to the President and People of the United States', 20/3 *The Peacemaker* (March 1901), p. 64.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Prieto, 'A Delicate Subject'. Prieto has made similar claims about the ways in which Sixto Lopez's sister, Clemencia, used contemporary perceptions of respectable womanhood to gain access to new political spaces.

[29] 'An Evening with the Filipinos', *The Peacemaker* 20/1 (January, 1901), p. 5. The architect in question was William Lightfoot Price – a Quaker with a longstanding interest in Georgism.

[30] 'Senor Sixto Lopez A Peaceful Emissary', *The Peacemaker* 20/1 (January, 1901), p. 5.

Moreover, Love reported with relief to his fellow peacemakers of the broad agreement between himself and López regarding the future relationship between the US and the Philippines, which echoed the preferred policy of the peacemakers, and indeed some Filipinos, from before the election. According to Love's recollections of their conversation, the two men had concluded that the best outcome would be the formation of something akin to a protectorate over the archipelago and that the United States ought 'to withdraw the army and navy and give independence to the Filipinos, willingly giving them the benefit of our institutions.'[31] Alongside this, the US would, in Love's words, deter 'any other nation seeking to take possession of the Islands and thus barring their independence' and would proceed 'in asking, not claiming […] a coaling and repair station at Manilla for our vessels; for we hold that the islands of this planet should be international so far as stopping places for vessels in time of distress or for the purposes of coaling and repairs.'[32] According to the UPU's President, both men also seemed to agree on American involvement in the development of Filipino civilisation, namely that the US ought to furnish all necessary 'aid or recommendations in the way of closer commercial relations, public school systems and republican principles, leaving alone entirely creeds and partizanship (sic).'[33] Love concluded simply by remarking that '[t]hese views were presented to Senor Lopez and his companion and approved by them, with the remark that the Filipinos felt 'more friendly to the United States than to any other government.'[34]

Whether or not Alfred Love's recollection of the meeting was an accurate reflection of López's detailed opinion on the policy is doubtful; however, Love's attempts to portray López as part of American polite society represented an attempt to align him with the consensus opinions of that social milieu. In a turn of phrase that bestowed the qualities of Peacecraft and gentility onto the Filipino, a headline accompanying Love's reporting proclaimed, 'Senor Sixto Lopez A Peaceful Emissary'.[35] He concluded that 'If [López] be a fair sample of the Filipino, we are more than ever horrified at the action of our country.'[36] In an effort to demonstrate the respectable character of the most visible Filipino in the United States, the UPU chose to adorn the following issue of *The Peacemaker* with his portrait (see Image 11), a space reserved for prominent American statesmen, academics, or lawyers who were committed to the cause of peace. Certain

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[31] Ibid.


[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid..

[35] 'Senor Sixto Lopez A Peaceful Emissary', *The Peacemaker* 20/1 (January, 1901), p. 5.

[36] Ibid.



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Sixto Lopez

Image 11: 'Sixto Lopez', *The Peacemaker* 20/4 (June, 1901), p. 1.

areas of the American press had previously denigrated López's appearance as a means of delegitimising his mission – with one newspaper editorial in the *Boston Journal* describing him as 'having a perfect "chestnut" head with skin the same color'.[37] The *Boston Herald* similarly attacked his civilisational standing, claiming that 'at home [he] dresses in a breech clout and a bolo and subsists on leaves, roots, and other kinds of savage fodder. He cannot possibly know anything of our civilization, our beneficent purposes, and our unselfish aspirations.'[38]

The image that confronted the American people on the front cover of the UPU's house journal could not have been further from such racialised imagery. Dignified and wearing a suit and tie, López's portrait sat in a position that had previously been occupied by Tsar Nicholas II upon his invitation to The Hague Conference and by John Sherman in order to commemorate his death.

Benjamin Franklin Trueblood struck a similar tone in the pages of the *Advocate* a little over a year later, seeking to present López as a genteel and educated representative of his race – in contrast to the depictions of him in the American press. In commenting on a debate between López and an American missionary leader in the pages of the *Boston Evening Transcript*, the secretary of the APS remarked that López was 'a man of culture and wealth, who has labored [for] years for the liberation and elevation of his people,' and claimed that it would be hard to find 'anything more pathetic' than the recent treatment of 'a man of Mr. Lopez's character and attainments.'[39]

Admittedly, López's politicking amongst the elite of the American Northeast yielded mixed results. For instance, the social reformer Frances Rollins Morse wrote positively to the Harvard philosopher William James following a dinner at the house of Henry Lee Higginson (cousin of Thomas Wentworth Higginson) where López had been in attendance:

> '[López's] claim that the Filipinos are well-educated, and very nearly homogeneous is difficult to reconcile with other statements, but all those other statements, are external, and one can so immeasurably misunderstand people of other races that it is easier to believe him right about his own people than the various naturalists, ethnologists & merchants who have told us what they think of the Phillippines.'[40]

However, a month later, having dined together with Robert Treat Paine and Booker T. Washington, she remarked on the latter's 'self-control & moderation' and noted that '[his] strength is of the kind which can meet that of the Anglo-Saxon race on equal ground & with

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[37] Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism,* p. 133.

[38] Ibid.

[39] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 64/5 (May, 1902), p. 91

[40] Frances Rollins Morse to William James, 15 November 1900, in Ignas Skrupskelis and Elizabeth Berkeley (eds.), *The Correspondence of William James* (Charlottesville, 2008) [Hereafter *James Correspondence*], Vol. IX, p. 359.

mutual understanding.'[41] Comparing López and Washington, Morse remarked that '[I]t is otherwise, I fear, with Mr. Lopez […] I am sure he is a genuine person, & of fine character, & is I dare say undyingly tenacious, but one does not feel that he can strongly affect the greater part of the people who meet him. I fear not.'[42]

In an episode that would echo Morse's uncertainty, the UPU reported on the frosty reception that López had received while visiting the Philadelphia Baptist Ministers Conference.[43] Attending the meeting of one hundred and fifty Baptist leaders at Crozer Hall in Philadelphia, López had requested to address the gathering, only to be refused a spot at the podium with the ministers deeming him a representative of a hostile nation.[44] Instead, López accepted an invitation to attend a nearby meeting of the Colored Baptist Ministers' association and informed *The Peacemaker*: 'My mission is one of peace, and I thought that the ministers who represent the Prince of Peace might care to help me. Those who know me will testify that I am not a warlike man.'[45]

Sixto López's time in the US, however, was brief, with the debate swiftly ossifying (see below). Given the paucity of reliable information on the conditions in the islands, Warren and López determined that the best course of action would to journey to the Philippines in order to both establish the facts on the ground and to allow Sixto to continue negotiations with the American colonial administration.[46] Warren had previously sought to establish an anti-imperialist fact-finding mission to the Philippines, but had been unable to secure the backing for a trip. This trip, however, would prove catastrophic for the Filipino, as the pair's attempt to enter Manila was deemed treasonous by the US authorities. After refusing to swear an oath of loyalty to the American government, López fled to Hong Kong, where he lived in exile.[47]

Sixto López had pioneered a style of anti-colonial resistance that would later be continued by his sister, Clemencia López. Clemencia had journeyed to the United States in February 1902, alongside Fiske Warren, in order to make the case for her brothers', Lorenzo and Manuel, freedom from American imprisonment. As has been shown by Laura Prieto and Michael Patrick

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[41] Frances Rollins Morse to William James, 28 December 1900, in *James Correspondence*, Vol. IX, p. 399.

[42] Ibid.

[43] 'Senor Sixto Lopez A Peaceful Emissary', *The Peacemaker* 20/1 (January, 1901), p. 5.

[44] 'Refused to Hear Filipino', *The Wilmington Sun* 4/46 (18 December 1900), p.1.

[45] 'Senor Sixto Lopez A Peaceful Emissary', *The Peacemaker* 20/1 (January, 1901), p. 5.

[46] Prieto, 'A Delicate Subject', p. 202.

[47] Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism,* pp. 132-26.

Cullinane, Clemencia López picked up the baton in terms of lobbying an imagined American public through tropes of middle-class respectability, attempting to construct an ideal of civilized Filipina womanhood.[48] Such an image granted her access to spaces that had previously been shut to her brother, as she appeared on stage at meetings of the AIL alongside the organisation's President George Boutwell.[49] Although she was not as enmeshed in the institutions of peace as her brother, her actions reverberated around the peace movement with equal force.[50] Perhaps one of the most enduring achievements of the López siblings' contact with this network of peacemakers was the publication of *The Story of the López Family*. Writing under the pseudonym Canning Eyot, the work had primarily been compiled by Adams, Warren, Herbert Welsh, and López's assistant Thomas H. Patterson, all of whom sought to depict the tragedy of the family as being representative of that of the archipelago, while also presenting them as being the picture of genteel respectability.[51] Whether or not they knew the book had been the product of some of their number, the *AoP* published a glowing review, describing Sixto and Clemencia as being 'so patriotic, so cultivated, so wise and prudent, so incorruptible, so heroic in endurance.'[52] In all, they concluded, that a 'people which has produced such families as this story portrays ought never to have been reduced to political vassalage'.[53] In doing so, the peacemakers sought to harness their transimperial connections into an act of knowledge-making, disseminating knowledge of exemplary Filipinos as evidence of the race's capacity for self-government.

Waging a Public Information Campaign

López's frequent contact with the peacemakers and his desire to speak directly to the American people would eventually rub off on the movement. Lamenting that the re-election of President McKinley had acted as a boon to the cause of imperialism and militarism, the APS feared that this turn in American history would see their country relinquish its status as a beacon of peace for the rest of the world. However, Trueblood remained as obdurate as he did optimistic that a peaceful world was around the corner. Vowing to redouble his efforts, and those of the Society to bring a close to the war in the Philippines, he remarked that '[t]he country will some day come

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[48] Prieto, 'A Delicate Subject', passim; Cullinane, *Liberty and Anti*-Imperialism, pp. 136-138.

[49] Cullinane, *Liberty and Anti-Imperialism,* p. 136.

[50] Prieto, 'A Delicate Subject', p. 228. Although Clemencia López seemingly did not make contact with either the APS or UPU, she did work alongside future Nobel Peace Prize recipient Emily Greene Balch during her time at Wellesley College.

[51] Jim Zwick, *Confronting Imperialism: Essays on Mark Twain and the Anti-Imperialist League* (West Conshohocken, 2013), p. 35; see also Prieto, 'A Delicate Subject'.

[52] 'Review: The Story of the Lopez Family', *AoP* 66/4 (April, 1904), p. 73.

[53] Ibid.

to its senses on this subject, as it did on the matter of slavery and its conduct towards the Indians.'[54] The comparisons with slavery and the American treatment of Native Americans were symbolic of the tactics to which the peacemakers would turn in their hour of need. Echoing their work from the Armenian Crisis, the movement sought to harness the power of moral suasion and turn the tide of public opinion against the war. Similar to López's desire to speak beyond the chattering classes of Washington, the peace movement reached for a different item in activists' toolbox – shifting from the private diplomacy of lobbying Washington officials to the public diplomacy of a mass information campaign.

This shift in tactics is best thought of as the reversion to familiar methods of peacecraft, as elitist peacemakers sought to deploy the familiar tactic of educating the American public on the moral considerations of their country's diplomacy. Specifically, the movement drew on its heritage of moral suasion just as it had done during the Armenian Massacres. The peacemakers' protests were markedly more moderate and outward-looking in their form and content than those they had made prior to the recent election. This mirrored the ways in which López's tactics were a similar departure from those of Agoncillo before him, in that he spoke directly to the American people and pointedly acknowledged that the Philippines would and should benefit from American guidance. From this angle, opposition to American imperialism takes on a different complexion to that which has caused historians to interpret the activity of the anti-imperialist movement in competing and contradictory terms. For instance, Michael Patrick Cullinane has alleged that the movement remained coherent, but shifted its tactics to become a top-down 'social movement' that arose out of the remains of the Anti-Imperialist League (AIL).[55] Erin L. Murphy has conversely argued that the anti-imperialists switched their tactics from speaking to the public to convincing lawmakers that American actions contravened international law.[56] Others, such as Jim Zwick and Daniel Schirmer, have instead tracked the fracturing of the AIL, with the latter concluding that this represented the dissolution of the movement.[57]

The years following the re-election of McKinley saw the balkanisation of the anti-imperialist movement. While the AIL still formally existed, a variety of ancillary organisations emerged with

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[54] 'Attitude of the Country on Imperialism', *AoP* 62/11 (December, 1900), p. 229.

[55] Cullinane, *Liberty and Anti-Imperialism*, pp. 115-147.

[56] Erin L. Murphy, *No Middle Ground: Anti-Imperialists and Ethical Witnessing during the Philippine-American War* (London, 2020), pp. 89-104.

[57] Daniel Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA, 1972), pp. 241-247; Zwick, *Confronting Imperialism*, pp. 6-14.

the aim of spreading information about the Philippines and its inhabitants to the American people, in the hope that they might counteract the pernicious influence of the yellow press. Specifically, the peacemakers who had loudly called for the US to 'treat the Philippines as [it had treated] Cuba' now argued that the movement ought to refocus its efforts on influencing the principles that underlay the governance of the Philippines.[58] While they still called for the islands' independence and neutralisation, they sought to redirect the energy that had been displayed throughout 'The Great Debate' into ensuring that the United States' administration of the Philippines operated in accordance with Christian morality and middle-class values. As detailed in the previous chapter, the term Anti-Imperialist is something of a misnomer, which is of limited ideological utility. Instead, it pertains to a specific faction in 'The Great Debate', which rejected the annexation of the Philippines. As will be shown below, many activists from this faction advocated for the spread of American moral, cultural, and economic influence into the Far East.

The earliest manifestation of the new apparatus for a public information campaign was the Philippine Information Society, established in January 1901 by a cadre of Boston academics led by Charles Francis Adams and supported by figures such as Carl Schurz and Fiske Warren.[59] Seemingly formed as a response to the partisan acrimony of the 1900 election campaign, the Society sought to take the heat out of the issue and 'collect and distribute […] authoritative information, such as is to be found not in partisan literature'.[60]

Adams' desire to defuse tensions, however, was scuppered by the fast-emerging picture of American atrocities in the Far East; flurries of information entered the American political consciousness with the American press reprinting the letters of American soldiers detailing conditions in the Philippines. These revelations arose around concerns over two intertwined issues: vice and war crimes. The intellectual significance of each of these issues will be discussed below; however, this opened up a new front in the debates over the United States' role in the Philippines, re-energising critics of the empire. Liberal Americans sought to reframe the question of the United States' imperial future; no longer did they argue over whether annexation was legally or morally permissible, instead, they sought to reconcile American expansion with the principles of Christian morality and liberal reform. As such, Trueblood's alignment of debates over the United States' imperial formation with the older battles over slavery and Native affairs

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[58] 'Treat the Philippines as We Treat Cuba', *AoP* 62/4 (April, 1900), p. 79.

[59] Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, pp. 242-3; Philippine Information Society, *Facts about the Filipinos* (Boston, 1901), vol.1, no. 1; 'Brevities', *AoP* 63/1 (January, 1901), p. 12.

[60] 'Light on the Philippines', *The Sun (NY)* (23 December 1900), p. 6.

was apt – and thus yielded tactics and arguments all too familiar to the peacemakers.

The shock came with the revelations that not only was an end to the war not in sight – as had been promised to the American people during the recent election – but that American soldiers were themselves engaged in frequent acts of torture and violence against civilians. There had previously been murmurings of such atrocities in the publication of letters in the American press by American soldiers stationed in the Far East. As early as March 1899, American newspapers were describing the execution of prisoners of war, and by March 1900, the *Omaha World* had reported on the use of the water cure by American soldiers.[61] The water cure later proved a major flashpoint in post-1900 discussions of the American administration of the archipelago. The practice resembled an early form of waterboarding in which 'soldiers pinned [a] victim down on his back, forced his mouth open, poured water down his throat until his stomach swelled, and then pushed the water out.'[62] These allegations were picked up and reprinted by the anti-imperialist newspaper *City and State* and the *Friends' Intelligencer* (an organ of the Society of Friends which had extensive links to the peace movement).[63] However, such allegations were generally dismissed as hearsay in an information environment where rumour abounded and factual evidence was scant – despite the best efforts of Adams and his colleagues.[64]

The mood shifted when *The Outlook*, a noticeably pro-imperialist paper, published a series of articles by the explorer George Kennan that set out the state of affairs in the Philippines.[65] A distant relative of the man who would later be a diplomat in the Truman and Kennedy administrations, Kennan was best known for his writings on Russia and was by no means an anti-imperialist. Despite it appearing in the newspaper edited by Lyman Abbott, Kennan's exposé presented a picture of a conflict that, far from being over, was descending into depravity and bloodshed.

Kennan readily acknowledged that the Filipinos might indeed 'be capable of organizing and maintaining, without our aid, a stable and independent government'; however, given that the

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[61] Christopher J. Einolf, *America in the Philippines, 1899-1902: The First Torture Scandal* (New York, 2014), p. 100.

[62] Murphy, *No Middle Ground*, p. 115.

[63] Einolf, *America in the Philippines,* p. 100.

[64] Ibid.

[65] George Kennan, 'The Philippines: Present Conditions and Possible Courses of Action I', *The Outlook* 67/8 (23 February 1901), pp. 439-447; Kennan, 'The Philippines: Present Conditions and Possible Courses of Action II', *The Outlook* 67/9 (2 March 1901), pp. 487-494; Kennan, 'The Philippines: Present Conditions and Possible Courses of Action III', *The Outlook* 67/10 (9 March 1901), pp. 576-585.

United States had brought into being a 'pro-American native party', it was now obligated to remain there.[66] In direct contravention of the claims made by pro-imperialists that the United States might secure a swift exit, Kennan explained that this would not be a matter of days, weeks or months, but instead that 'for a term of years at least, we *must* stay in the Philippines, and *must* exercise there the powers of government. It will cost us, perhaps, some thousands of lives and tens of millions of dollars to do this, but to do it we are virtually bound.'[67]

However, Kennan's most shocking claim came not with his depiction of mission creep in the Philippines, but instead with the revelation that the American mission of benevolent assimilation was little more than a facade. Alleging that there was strong evidence to suggest that American soldiers were killing wounded and defenceless Filipinos, he noted the establishment of penal colonies, the forced removal of Filipinos into camps and, finally, confirmed the earlier reports of the use of the water cure.[68] Although he remarked that he had no evidence that such practices had been directly perpetrated by American soldiers, he admonished the administration for sanctioning such activity.[69] Nonetheless, Kennan summed up his message by noting the shameful irony of the United States' mission:

> 'We generously undertake to free eight million Filipinos from the tyranny and cruelty of Spain; and then, in an effort to convince them of the benevolence of our intentions and make them accept the blessings of security and peace, we find ourselves following the example of general Weyler and resorting […] to the old Spanish methods – murder, torture, and reconcentration.'[70]

Adapting a phrase oft-repeated by the peacemakers – he concluded that "'War,' perhaps "is hell," as General Sherman said; but it need not be hell with Spanish improvements.'[71] The article set the peace movement reeling. Taking Kennan's closing salvo as evidence in favour of its mission, the APS reprinted the most explicit extracts from the article in the *AoP*; in his brief commentary on the article, Trueblood compared the ongoing conflict to the British war in South Africa, arguing that American actions were yet more evidence of the 'inevitable cruelty and inherent wickedness of war.'[72]

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[66] Kennan, 'The Philippines III', p 577.

[67] Ibid. Italics from the original text.

[68] Ibid. pp. 582-3.

[69] Ibid. p. 583.

[70] Ibid. pp. 582-3.

[71] Ibid. p. 584.

[72] 'Philippine War has Tended to Increasing Degeneration', *AoP* 63/4 *(*April, 1901), p. 82.

However, the most hostile response came from the newspaper *City and State* and its editor, Herbert Welsh.[73] A founder of the Indian Rights Association and a tireless reformer in his home city of Philadelphia, Welsh had a long history in the peace movement. Having organised an arbitration conference in Philadelphia in the wake of the Venezuelan War Scare (in March 1896), he also sat on the organising committee of the Washington Arbitration Conference, alongside Charles Francis Adams, Edward Atkinson, and Carl Schurz.[74] He would eventually become a vice president of the APS in June 1901 and frequently wrote for the *Advocate*. Consequently, *City and State,* having been long devoted to Welsh's interest in reform, now became a major venue in which peacemakers would air their grievances with the United States' policy in the Philippines. Having previously published evidence of the water cure, Welsh sounded a note of vindication in seeing that *The Outlook*, which he deemed to be a 'staunch defender of the conquest of the Philippines', was now also reporting the very same tales of horror.[75] A week later, he was a little more pensive, yet no less damning, claiming that '[i]t is a grim and ghastly, an[d] inescapable indictment of the awful hypocrisy which would justify such a policy in the name of Christian civilization.'[76]

As the allegations of torture and misconduct in the Philippines reverberated throughout American society, opponents of empire rallied to force Congress to investigate the events unfolding in the Philippines. Following a flurry of petitioning from the AIL, the veteran anti-imperialist Senator George Hoar attempted to assail the pro-imperialist White House (with Theodore Roosevelt having replaced the assassinated McKinley months before). In a debate which some senators proclaimed to be even more acrimonious than those in the run-up to the intervention in Cuba, Hoar demanded that the US government establish a committee to determine the facts surrounding events in the Philippines – pointing to the example of a similar body being established during the Civil War.[77]

By early 1902, Hoar had finally succeeded in grinding down the opposition to an investigation into the alleged war crimes, with the price being that it was undertaken by the pre-existing Senate Philippines Committee. The establishment of such an inquiry was met by a short-lived sigh of relief from the peace movement. The inquiry 'ought to have [been approved] with the full and

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[73] Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, p. 125.

[74] 'The Arbitration Convention at Philadelphia', *AoP* 58/3 (March, 1896), p. 56; 'The Washington Arbitration Conference (Concluded)', *AoP* 58/6 (June, 1896), p. 147.

[75] 'The Degeneracy of Conquerors', *City and State* X/11 (14 March 1901), p. 170.

[76] '"Thou Art the Man"', *City and State* X/112 (21 March 1901), p. 186.

[77] Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, pp. 234-5.

cordial approval of every citizen in the nation,' wrote Trueblood in the *AoP*. It would, Trueblood hoped, prove a distinct improvement to the work undertaken by the committee thus far, which had done nothing 'to keep this country informed of the true state of things in the island or to check the shameful proceedings.'[78] Their hopes, however, would soon be dashed. The Senate committee was stacked with a pro-imperialist majority and was chaired by the longstanding pro-imperialist, Henry Cabot Lodge. During the investigation, Lodge handed the reins to his colleague, the imperialist firebrand Albert Beveridge, preferring to manage the proceedings from behind the scenes. In reality, Lodge attempted to undermine the committee's procedures, calling hearings at short notice and giving as much exposure to sympathetic witnesses as possible.[79]

Fearing that the investigation would be a whitewash, the peacemakers searched for a mechanism through which they might circumvent the official channels and convey the unadulterated truth directly to the American people. Writing to Schurz in April 1902 – after the Senate had commenced its investigation – Adams noted that 'What we now need […] is some organization which should make itself heard in protest.'[80] It was telling that Adams felt that such an organisation did not already exist in the form of the Anti-Imperialist League. Having previously branded Gamaliel Bradford 'a bore' and deeming Erving Winslow to be 'questionable', Adams' worked to wrest power from the hands of these elderly, out-of-touch Mugwump statesmen at a meeting at the New York Plaza Hotel in mid-April 1902.[81] Rather than arguing for a complete and 'immediate dissolution of America's empire at any cost', Adams sought to reorient the movement towards the public information campaign which he had set in motion with the founding of the Philippine Information Society.[82] For their part, the old guard deemed Adams' proposed publicity campaign to be at best 'a passing excitement'; however, the meeting approved the creation of a new committee which would eventually become the Philippine Investigation Committee (PIC).[83]

This second splinter group from the AIL – following the establishment of the Philippine Information Society a year earlier – represented a shift in the centre of gravity for opponents of American empire. The goal of independence for the Philippines, while a worthy objective, was

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[78] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 64/2 (February, 1902), p. 25.

[79] Adam Cooke, "'An Unpardonable Bit of Folly and Impertinence": Charles Francis Adams Jr., American Anti-Imperialists, and the Philippines', *The New England Quarterly* 83/2 (June, 2020), p. 323.

[80] Cooke, "'An Unpardonable Bit of Folly'", p. 325.

[81] Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 243.

[82] Cooke, "'An Unpardonable Bit of Folly'", p. 326.

[83] Ibid.

no longer a politically salient matter. Therefore, the Committee, which included Adams, Schurz, Welsh, and the lawyer Moorfield Storey, outwardly stated its aim as being 'the full disclosure of the facts connected with the processes and executions in the course of military operations in the Philippine Islands.'[84] Not only would this involve a close relationship with the Senate Committee, but would also ensure the 'complete publicity of their findings.'[85] The Committee, it was hoped, would operate as a sort of shadow investigation – both scrutinising and informing the work of the Senate committee, as well as ensuring that the findings were suitably publicised. They hoped that, much like during the Armenian Crisis, the graphic details of the atrocities might spark a wave of public moralising regarding American conduct in the Far East. The widespread distribution of information, therefore, was intended to bring to bear the full force of American public opinion on policymakers.

With the memory of pre-election polarisation likely fresh in his mind, Adams immediately sought to distance the PIC's work from that of the AIL, claiming that it was 'a mistake to call the new movement anti-imperialistic.'[86] This much was reflected in the way that – without seeking his consent – Adams revealed that Jacob Gould Schurmann (the former President of the Philippine Commission) would be appointed as a Vice President. A week after its establishment, Schurmann made it known publicly that he did not wish to be connected to the Committee and that the Senate Investigation '[could] be trusted without outside assistance.'[87] Much as with Schurmann, the Philippine Investigation Committee was given short shrift by the Senate Committee, with Adams' group resorting to sending a memorial to the Senate which called for the proceedings to be governed by anti-imperialists and for an official bipartisan fact-finding mission to the Philippines to be established.[88]

For his part, President Roosevelt was scornful of the Committee's attempts to scrutinise the Senate proceedings and promulgate their findings. Following their failure to influence the Senate proceedings, the group launched an excoriating attack on the whole saga in a letter to Roosevelt, claiming that 'much, has been, and still remains, "concealed," while many-wrong-doers, for various "reasons," have been, and still are, "favoured or shielded."'[89] Being on the receiving end

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[84] Ibid.

[85] 'Anti-Imperialists Confer', *New York Daily Tribune* LXII/20,254 (30 April 1902), p. 16.

[86] 'Col. Higginson's Name Out', *The Sun (N.Y)* LXIX/243 (1 May 1902), p. 1.

[87] 'Trusts Mr. Roosevelt', *The Washington Times* 2897 (8 May 1902), p. 2.

[88] Cullinane, *Liberty and Anti-Imperialism*, p. 138-9.

[89] 'To the Honorable Theodore Roosevelt', *City and State* XIII/5 (31 July 1902), p. 3 (Supplement).

of the committee's lobbying campaign, Roosevelt remarked in a private letter to Lodge that the Committee's letter barely warranted a reply.[90] 'If I had to write a general answer to their letter', wrote Roosevelt, 'I would either simply send them a copy of my Arlington speech or else take off their individual hides. The latter would be what I should like to do, but I hardly think it is worthwhile dignifying them.'[91]

Debating the Laws of War

Despite the Philippine Investigation Committee's fear of a cover-up, details of the Senate committee's investigation easily found their way into the press. Even without the peacemakers' propaganda, the stories emerging from Capitol Hill made for horrific headlines. For instance, on 24 April 1902, *The Washington Post* bore the headline on its front page: 'Torture of Priest. Alleged Murder by American Soldiers at Bolo. A Water Cure Atrocity.'[92] Furthermore, not only were the shocking crimes of violence and debauchery reported, but so too were the Administration's frequent attempts to withhold information from the committee and the public – even among those newspapers sympathetic to the imperialist cause.[93]

Beyond causing the peacemakers to pivot in their tactics, the revelations from the Senate committee also caused a moment of bleak introspection for the community. This took two forms. Firstly, they feared that extended exposure to the tropical climate and, more importantly, to the Filipinos themselves was causing American masculinity to coarsen, tapping into a long-held fear within the movement.[94] As a movement built on middle-class ideas of civility and Protestant notions of self-restraint, peacemakers feared that the brutalisation of American manhood would both undermine their attempts to steer America's peaceful geopolitical leadership and their racial status above those Filipinos whom they sought civilise.

Secondly, having been in the vanguard of attempts to make war a more humane endeavour, they were confronted not only with their failure but also with the acknowledgement that in making war more humane, they had de-stigmatised violence and allowed for the brutalisation of white

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[90] Dickinson, North Dakota, Dickinson State University, Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library, Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 30 July 1902, Lodge-Roosevelt Correspondence. MS. N-1584. Massachusetts Historical Society. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o294199.

[91] Ibid.

[92] 'Torture of Priest', *The Washington Post* 9448 (24 April 1902), p. 1.

[93] For instance, see the *New York Times'* special report on withholding of evidence by the War Department. See 'Cost of Holding Philippine Islands', *NYT* LI/16325 (3 May 1902), p. 1.

[94] Carolyn Eastman, 'Fight Like a Man: Gender and Rhetoric in the Early Nineteenth-Century American Peace Movement', *American Nineteenth Century History* 10/3 (September, 2009), pp. 247-71.

American manhood. Much like Joseph Conrad's contemporary depiction of Kurtz's descent into madness in *The Heart of Darkness*, the peacemakers saw American military cruelty as being the consequence of extended contact between the American soldiers and their Filipino allies – thus being the first sign of American men 'going native' and the beginning of the process of the de-civilisation of American manhood.[95] In all, the experience revealed to the peacemakers that their efforts to make war more humane might have corrupted American character and thereby ruined the nation's exceptional, peaceful status; no longer could it claim to be a peaceful, genteel exemplar in the quest for the orderly apparatus of global governance. In essence, they feared that in waging colonial warfare, the United States had torpedoed its providential mission.

For the peace movement, the canary in the coal mine had sounded well before Hoar had even attempted to cajole his senate colleagues into investigating the atrocities in the Philippines when the news broke of the capture of the Filipino leader, Emilio Aguinaldo. After years of guerrilla warfare, the American army launched a deceptive and risky expedition to capture the Filipino leader, in the hope that they might bring the fighting to a swift close. Having intercepted a message from Aguinaldo to his brother requesting more troops to his location, the American general, Frederick Funston, devised a plan of Machiavellian ruthlessness to ambush the Filipino leader. Ordering the Macabebe scouts – the Tagalog-speaking Filipinos who were allied to the United States – to masquerade as these requested reinforcements, Funston disguised himself and four other American soldiers as prisoners of war being led to the Filipino encampment at Palanan. Upon entering, the Macabebes opened fire, and Funston moved to capture Aguinaldo.[96]

News of Aguinaldo's capture, and Funston's supposed heroism, was met with rapturous adulation in the American press. A few days following the event, *The New York Times* mused on its front page, 'What will Funston Get? [There is] No doubt in Washington that He Will Be Suitably Rewarded', postulating that he was undoubtedly in line for a hefty promotion.[97] The peace movement, however, looked on in shock at Funston's ploy. Deeming Funston and his colleagues to be 'veritable Benedict Arnolds', *The Peacemaker* noted with sorrow that their actions '[lower] the honor and standing of our country for open, frank, fair dealing, and we blush for

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[95] Joseph Conrad; Owen Knowles and Robert Hampson (eds.), *The Heart of Darkness* (London, 2007); Warwick Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race and Hygiene in the Philippines* (Durham, NC, 2006), pp. 130-157. Anderson has contended that a fear of mental degradation afflicted American administrators in tropical settings, specifically describing a phenomenon of 'colonial nervousness'. He largely attributes this line of thinking to an American understanding of the environment, rather than prolonged contact with the inhabitants of the tropics.

[96] Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, p. 168-9.

[97] 'What Will Funston Get', *New York Times* L/15,982 (29 March 1901), p. 1.

shame.'[98] The APS were no less scathing in the *Advocate* but sounded an even more introspective note. Drawing on a phrase from antiquity, Trueblood and his colleagues declared, 'Silent leges inter arma […] The laws are silent in time of war.'[99] Not only was this an example of the ways in which basic rights were denigrated during wartime, but it was also indicative of the 'war morality' which was fast infecting the American psyche, that was to say, a morality in which 'lying and deceit [are] practiced and gloried in.'[100] Contrasting this with the movement's dearly-held perception of respectable, Christian, Western values, Trueblood stated: 'Our Christianity, out of which our civilization has sprung, includes liars among the lowest of men […] But in war all this civil morality of truthfulness is cast out and thrown to the winds.'[101]

The movement's deployment of this particular reference to antiquity (being borrowed from Cicero) contained a subtle note of irony – the phrase itself had been uttered forty years earlier by Abraham Lincoln to justify his attempted suspension of habeas corpus in 1861. However, as part of their attack on Funston, they found themselves caught up in a broader debate over Lincoln's legacy as a steward of the laws of war. The matter of main contention was the legitimacy of Funston's actions as measured by the Lieber Code – the code of conduct for American soldiers established by Francis Lieber during the Civil War at the behest of Abraham Lincoln.[102] The code, which spelt out the basic laws governing conflict, had become something of a sacred cow for the peace movement. For the peace movement, this illustrated the United States' exemplary status in the history of the nineteenth century; even during the brutality of the Civil War, an American president sought to codify the 'systematized rules for the conduct of forces in the field rules aimed at the prevention of those scenes of cruelty and rapine which were formerly a disgrace to humanity.'[103]

Therefore, it came as a shock to many in the movement to hear one of their own, Theodore Woolsey, arguing that international law, and specifically the Lieber Code, was of little use when assessing the permissibility of Funston's actions. According to Woolsey, there were two questions worth considering here. Did Funston break the established laws of war, and was conflict with

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[98] 'The Capture of Aguinaldo', *The Peacemaker* 20/5 (May 1901), p. 100.

[99] 'War Morality', *AoP*, 63/5 (May, 1901), p. 90.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Benjamin Allen Coates, *Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations In the Early Twentieth Century* (New York; Oxford, 2016), pp. 15-38.

[103] 'International Law and International Arbitration. Lord Chief Justice Russell's Address before the American Bar Association', *AoP* 58/9 (October, 1896), p. 229.

the Filipinos to be covered by these rules in the first place?[104] On the first question, Woolsey gave a mixed response on the particulars, claiming that tactics such as military ambush were permissible under the Lieber Code and the Hague Conventions; however, he noted that disguising one's soldiers amounted to a breach of the Code.[105] Nevertheless, on the second point, Woolsey was unequivocal. Claiming that the 'so-called Filipino Republic' was little more than 'a body of insurgents [fighting] against the sovereignty of the United States', he argued that Aguinaldo and his men had 'no international standing or rights.'[106] Consequently, the Filipinos had neither the protections nor obligations normally conferred to a belligerent under international law – with Woolsey noting that Funston's actions, at worst, amounted to 'a stratagem illegal in war only with a lawful belligerent.'[107]

The *Outlook* – the publication which had published Woolsey's legal analysis – itself had taken a cautious editorial line, which cleaved a middle way. Noting that Funston's actions required a deal of moral scrutiny, the paper sounded a note of restraint at the precedent that this would set. 'The most serious objection to war is not the suffering which it entails, but the change in moral standards which it involves,' wrote Abbott, sounding similar to his old peacemaker colleagues.[108] However, he stopped short of criticising Funston for breaking the laws of war themselves and, much like Woolsey, claimed that his actions were indeed in line with the precedents of international law.[109]

In the eyes of the APS, that *The Outlook* had stopped short of a full-throated criticism was yet further evidence of the publication's shameful pro-war stance. This, alongside similar views being espoused in *The Independent*, drastically shook the movement's faith in the established Christian press. More than anything, it was the willingness to decouple the laws of war from Christian morality which caused the most consternation for the APS:

> 'It is useless to attempt to describe, with any English adjective, the shamefulness of such a doctrine. It crushes to dust the last stone of the foundations of morals. It turns morality into a thing of mere temporary, shifting, baseless expediency. If lying, stealing and killing are right under the circumstances and for the reasons given by the *Independent*, then any other immorality is right under similar conditions. And if these iniquities – the

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[104] Theodore S. Woolsey, 'The Legal Aspects of Aguinaldo's Capture', *The Outlook* 67/15 (13 April 1901), p. 855.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid. p. 856.

[107] Ibid.

[108] 'War Morality', *AoP* 63/5 (May, 1901), p. 90.

[109] Ibid.

> whole category of sins – are right and justifiable in accomplishing the purposes of war, they are right in private and social life wherever they are employed for just and righteous ends. Not a single reason can be adduced to the contrary.'[110]

Woolsey's invocation of the Lieber Code as a legal (if not a moral) standard that exonerated American conduct in the Philippines was merely the beginning of a wider debate over the relevance of the laws of war to colonial conflicts. With the actions of the American army coming under increasing scrutiny, the accepted laws of war – such as the Lieber Code and the Hague Conventions – and their applicability to those deemed uncivilised became a core area of debate. Advocates of genteel imperialism sought to make the case that the United States ought to embody the modern-day codes of chivalry and impose these on the rest of the world. Conversely, the ardent pro-imperialists, in the words of Paul Kramer, alleged that '[t]hose who adopted guerrilla war […] surrendered all claims to bounded violence and mercy from their opponent.'[111] Specifically, they argued that the actions of the guerrilla fighting force were indicative of the Filipinos' low civilisational and racial status, thus disapplying the protections of the laws of war.[112]

Therefore, the Senate hearings on American misconduct during the early stages of the Philippine-American War became the main arena in which the colonial validity of the laws of war was contested. With Lodge at the helm, the committee took a full two months to hear testimony from pro-imperial witnesses. This included a lengthy testimony from Governor Taft that ran over the course of an entire month. All the while, peacemakers sought to build a compelling case that would succeed in the court of public opinion, with Welsh trawling through local newspapers to find letters home from American soldiers that would contradict the rosy picture being painted on Capitol Hill.[113] He even went as far as to hire private investigators to track down soldiers who had returned home and convince them to testify when the time came.[114]

Taft's lengthy testimony succeeded in eating into the committee's time and, for the time being, pouring cold water onto the matter. Only being pressed on the atrocities in the Philippines for two hours during a quasi-filibuster that would last several weeks, his remarks would become the

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[110] Ibid. p. 91.

[111] Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, 2006), p. 131.

[112] Paul A. Kramer, 'Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War', *Diplomatic History* 30/2 (2006), pp. 169-210.

[113] Einholf, *America in the Philippines* p. 106; Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, pp. 125-126.

[114] Einholf, *America in the Philippines* p. 106.

script that would be used by all pro-imperialists when asked about the allegations of torture. Taft claimed that if such events had occurred, they were infrequent and against the orders of army superiors.[115] Furthermore, he sought to undermine the criticisms of the anti-imperialists on the panel by claiming that if the conflict in the Philippines was in any way resemblant of 'a crime against civilization', then this was the fault of the remaining Filipino insurgents who, in their refusal to capitulate, were prolonging the war.[116]

As Taft was busy with his filibuster, Secretary of War Elihu Root swiftly worked to pull together the administration's defence, eventually sending over to the committee a several hundred-page document that detailed: the correspondence of the generals on the ground, reports of the court-martials in response to allegations of torture, and accounts of the brutality of the Filipino insurgents towards the Americans. In all, Root's position was a denial that there were any widespread atrocities in the Philippines. Much like Taft, he claimed that any instances of the water cure were infrequent and against direct orders.[117] However, he went further and sought to contrast the honourable conduct of the American military with that of the Filipinos. Alongside his documentary evidence, Root also attached a copy of the Lieber Code, which he called 'the practical and effective guide and rule of conduct to which every officer understands he must conform,' as well as communiqués from army generals which called 'for the observance and enforcement of these humane rules.'[118] In all, '[t]he war in the Philippines has been conducted by the American Army with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare', Root assured the committee.[119] Conversely, he laid the blame for the occasional American abrogation of these rules at the feet of the Filipino victims themselves. It was 'not incredible' to assume that 'soldiers fighting against such an enemy […] witnessing [Filipino atrocities], should occasionally be regardless of their orders and retaliate by unjustifiable severities. Such things happen in every war, even between two civilized nations, and they always will happen while war lasts.'[120]

Despite Taft's jeremiad and Root's carefully crafted defence of the administration, the army officers who subsequently came before the committee were far less eloquent in their defence and

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[115] US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Philippines, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands. Hearing* 57th Congress, 1st Session Doc. No. 331 [Hereafter *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*] Vol. 1, p. 75; passim; Einholf, *America in the Philippines*, p. 107.

[116] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, pp. 78-79.

[117] Einholf, *America in the Philippines,* pp. 109-110.

[118] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, pp. 949-950.

[119] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, p. 950.

[120] Ibid.

cracks in the pro-imperialist armour swiftly began to show. The next witness to be called by Lodge was Brigadier General Robert Patterson Hughes, the commander of the Department of the Visayas. Keen to avoid another lengthy exposition, anti-imperialist senators zeroed in on the counter-insurgency tactics of the American military. Senators Joseph Rawlins (D-Utah) and Eugene Hale (R-Maine) led the cross-examination of Hughes and his claims about the nature of war. The general had readily admitted that as the insurgency went on, the treatment of the Filipinos, in his words, became 'stiffer'.[121] After being prompted to elaborate, Hughes explained: 'In the first campaign the rules of civilized warfare were rigidly enforced', noted Hughes, '[b]ut the next year we found it necessary to adopt more stringent methods in order to reach these people.'[122] However, it was on the burning of Filipino towns that Senator Rawlins pushed the hardest. Noting that Hughes had accepted that Filipino homes had been destroyed without so much as a second thought while the army searched for insurgents, Rawlins prompted Hughes to explain himself further.[123] 'The destruction was as a punishment', explained Hughes.[124] Clarifying if Hughes was aware that this would harm the women and children of the settlement, more than the guerrillas, Rawlins asked, '[b]ut is that within the ordinary rules of civilized warfare?'[125] Hughes replied bluntly, 'These people are not civilized', and as such, the laws of war were inapplicable.[126]

Racing to his defence, the pro-imperialist Senator Charles Dietrich (R-Nebraska) clarified, 'In order to carry on civilized warfare, both sides have to engage in such warfare.'[127] With this remark, the mask had slipped and the pro-imperialists' real intentions were revealed. Specifically, they interpreted the laws of war as allowing for a civilised power such as the United States to act with broad latitude when in conflict with those they deemed less civilised, as the laws of war were silent. As Paul Kramer has noted, a self-reinforcing logic underpinned such a perspective given that '[c]ivilized men might reluctantly adopt savage methods to defeat savages, but they could do so without surrendering their civilization; guerrilla war was tactical for whites, ethnological for nonwhites.'[128]

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[121] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, p. 558.

[122] Ibid. p. 560

[123] Ibid. p. 558.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Kramer, *Blood of Government,* p. 131.

City and State seized upon Hughes' testimony, pointing out that his admission that the US army frequently flouted the laws of war stood in stark contrast to Secretary Root's assertion that the laws of civilized warfare had been followed to the letter. Welsh's publication printed the excerpts from Root's defence and Hughes' testimony side by side under the headline, 'Conflicting Witnesses'.[129] Less than a month later, Welsh had heard enough. With Hughes' testimony in the open, Welsh judged that Root had attempted to mastermind a cover-up and printed an article with the headline: 'Mr Root Should Retire'.[130]. Welsh's pronouncement was the first shot in a long campaign from the peacemaking press, which sought to oust Root from his position on account of his acquiescence to and his obfuscation of the atrocities in the Philippines. Root, they reasoned, had lied while holding public office; if this was allowed to stand, then the rot might spread and the federal government would be plunged into the worst excesses of Gilded Age corruption.[131]

By April 1902, the Senate investigation had reached a fever pitch. Months had passed since the committee had begun its proceedings, with Lodge and his allies prevaricating by only calling sympathetic witnesses. However, by the spring, the anti-imperialist senators on the committee were finally able to call their witnesses. And within the space of four days, the edifice of an American civilising mission began to crumble, as the double standards and contorted logic inherent within the pro-imperialist application of the laws of war became clear. Specifically, the testimonies of four junior army officers provided a stark contrast to the administration's minimisation of the use of torture, concentration camps, and violence against civilians.[132]

The first three officers – Sergeant Charles S. Riley, Private William Lewis Smith, and Sergeant Edward J. Davis – bore witness to the explicit orders of American generals to conduct the water cure, corroborating the stories that had been circulated in the American press.[133] In a direct contradiction of the efforts of the pro-imperialist faction to downplay American culpability for the atrocities, the trio detailed how Filipinos in their company acted on the explicit orders of their superiors – Captain Edwin F. Glenn and Lieutenant Arthur L. Conger – when undertaking the water cure. Despite the persistent questioning of the obdurate senators, each confirmed that these actions were not a direct retaliation for equally malicious offences by Filipinos, but were

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[129] 'Conflicting Witnesses', *City and State* XII/12 (20 March 1902), p. 183.

[130] 'Mr Root Should Retire', *City and State* XII/12 (17 April 1902), p. 247.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Einholf, *America in the Philippines,* p. 124.

[133] *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, vol. 2, pp. 1527-1547; 1726-1736.

instead a proactive attempt by the Americans to seek out information on the location of insurgents' weapons caches and the movements of guerrilla forces.[134] The information, having been procured, was then used to burn the village, which was supposedly playing host to insurgent Filipino forces. For their part, the anti-imperialist senators probed the witnesses so that there could be no doubt that this practice was unprovoked and disproportionate.

However, it was the final of these witnesses, Lieutenant Grover Flint, that proved the *coup de grace*.[135] Having been provided as a witness to the Committee by Welsh himself, Flint remarked that he personally had seen the water cure used on at least twenty occasions by the Macabebe Scouts, who, at that time, were being directly instructed by an American sergeant.[136] When asked by Senator Lodge as to the extent of the participation of American soldiers in these actions, Flint remarked that even though no Americans had directly participated in these activities, they had been undertaken by the Scouts with the knowledge of his commanding officer, who had been 'sitting about 60 yards away.'[137] Flint, while stating that this practice was not undertaken by the Americans, uttered a remark that would have sent a shiver down the spines of genteel imperialists everywhere, '[The American soldiers] simply assisted the Macabebe scouts in this. They simply volunteered their assistance.'[138] The idea that working alongside Filipinos might degrade American soldiers' sense of morality, such that they were willing to assist in acts of torture, would prove shocking to the liberal assumptions of American civilisational superiority.

Sensing a dramatic revelation close at hand, the anti-imperialist senators continued to probe. The hearing eventually descended into a fiery and contentious cross-examination of Flint, with senators from each side frequently interrupting and talking over one another. Detailing his experience of witnessing the water cure, Flint noted that the general intention was to force suspected insurgents to reveal their guns or bolos (a knife commonly used in the Philippines). However, he remarked that this hadn't always been successful and that, on occasion, the men subjected to the water cure had no weapons to yield. One senator, recognising the significance of this, queried the sergeant's earlier assertion that the peaceful Filipinos had been treated in accordance with the laws of war. 'I ask you in that connection whether or not the people upon

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[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid. pp. 1765-1784.

[136] Ibid. p. 1766.

[137] Ibid. p. 1768.

[138] Ibid. p. 1766.

whom this water cure inflicted […] were not peaceful citizens of the archipelago.'[139] Flint replied that he and his colleagues could never be sure.

The final line of questioning came from Senator Culberson (D-Texas) on the army's policy of burning Filipino villages in an effort to forcibly move the population into towns. 'Do you know who they borrowed that method from?' asked Culberson, leading the Sergeant towards his eventual point.[140] 'Yes, sir; I saw it done in Cuba', remarked Flint. 'Under whose authority in Cuba?' continued Culberson leading the Lieutenant towards his desired answer.[141] 'Under General Weyler, I believe', concluded Flint.[142] Without knowing it, Flint had made Culberson's point for him.

'The bottom has at last fallen out of the policy of concealment and denial,' pronounced the *Advocate,* with the soldiers' testimonies laying bare 'all the heartless deeds done during three years in the Philippines.'[143] The revelations, according to Trueblood, had come as a shock not only to the peace movement but also to pro-imperialists – ranging from the White House to the so-called 'fire-eating newspapers.'[144] From his point of view, the '"patriotic" fears', which had driven Senator Lodge to embark on a policy of maximum obfuscation, '[had] been more than realized', lamented Trueblood, 'our Philippine policy has got "above ground," out of his secret committee room, and it "smells to heaven"'.[145]

'The Degeneracy of the Conquerors'[146]

The senate hearings had confirmed the worst fears of the peace movement. As they realised that the Roosevelt Administration, in the words of one editorial in *City and State*, had worked to 'conceal the facts and shield the guilty', peacemakers saw through the mirage of American compliance with the laws of war.[147] Their response, however, was varied. For some, this was a moment to highlight American transgressions from the guiding principles that they had worked

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[139] Ibid. p. 1783.

[140] Ibid. p. 1784.

[141] Ibid.

[142] Ibid.

[143] 'A Triennium of War's Brutalism and Debauchery', *AoP* 64/5 (May, 1902), p. 85.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Ibid.

[146] 'The Degeneracy of the Conquerors', *City and State* X/11 (14 March 1901), pp. 169-170.

[147] 'Guilty As Charged', *City and State* XIII/22 (27 November 1902), p. 341.

so hard to establish. However, for the majority the opposite was true. Where the revelations had elicited denial in some, for others, the entire project of a civilising mission was about to unravel.

Having taken part in the Senate Investigation, George Hoar directly took on the contradictions inherent in the pro-imperialist arguments. In a speech to Congress after the close of the Senate hearings, Hoar assailed his pro-imperialist colleagues and their justifications for the brutality in the Far East. Deploying the ever-present tropes of the Revolutionary Era and the Civil War, Hoar once more laid out his case that the United States had no right to purchase the archipelago, let alone govern it. However, reflecting on the insight he had gained from the past months, he went a step further. With the words of his committee colleagues likely still ringing in his ears, he directly addressed the politicians who mistakenly claimed that no formal state of war existed in the Philippines. 'We are not at war with [the Filipinos] or with anybody', conceded Hoar.[148] 'Yet the Filipinos have a right to call it a war.'[149] Implicitly addressing the argument made by the pro-imperialists, Hoar alluded to the claims that the Filipinos were not party to the protections of the laws of war as they did not represent an entire nation or because they were employing guerrilla tactics. Of this, he specifically claimed, 'A guerrilla warfare (sic), carried on by a weaker people against a stronger, is recognised and legitimate', noting that the United States itself had employed such tactics on occasion during the Revolutionary War.[150] Hoar's line of thinking, therefore, positioned him in stark opposition to his colleagues, who had argued that the laws of war were inapplicable in this scenario, given that the Filipinos were not a formal belligerent in the conflict. Instead, specifically remarking on General Funston's actions, Hoar noted that the United States had 'two guides for the conduct of military officers in such circumstances' – namely the Lieber Code and the Hague Conventions.[151] With this in mind, he proceeded to lay out every detail of the two codes that had been contravened by Funston's actions, concluding that such a record was 'abhorrent to all civilized mankind.'[152]

Much as his fellow peacemakers had reacted in the wake of the Treaty of Paris, Hoar noted the sad irony of the United States professing to be a pioneer of international law on the world stage while simultaneously doing the opposite in its newly acquired colonies:

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[148] *The Attempt to Subjugate a People Striving for Freedom. Not the American Soldier, Responsible for Cruelties in the Philippine Islands. Speech of George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, in the Senate of the United States, May 22 1902.* (Washington D.C., 1902), p. 3.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid. p. 18.

[151] Ibid. p. 21.

[152] Ibid. p. 22.

> 'So, Mr. President, in this attempt to force your sovereignty by this process of benevolent assimilation, we have been brought to the unexampled dishonor of disregarding our own rules for the conduct of armies in the field and to disregard the rules to which our national faith has just been pledged to substantially all the civilized powers of the earth.'[153]

Hoar's speech would be reprinted by the APS in the *Advocate*, with Trueblood heaping praise on the Bay Stater. 'It is full of truth, moral and political', gushed Trueblood, 'it glows with the finest and noblest sentiments; it is sincere and devoid of all rhetorical tricks; it is comprehensive and logical; it is lucid in style; it is direct and courageous without being intolerant.'[154] Of specific note to the peacemakers was Hoar's application of the laws of war as the proper yardstick for American conduct, which Trueblood praised as 'thoroughgoing and impressive.'[155]

However, despite their praise for Hoar's oratory and his defence of the laws of war, the spring of 1902 represented the final denouement for the peace movement. Although they remained inspired by the Senator's rhetoric and eloquence, their growing intellectual distance from Capitol Hill was becoming evident. With the revelations of the shooting of civilians, the establishment of concentration camps, and the widespread use of torture, the movement had been confronted with the fact that one of their aims – to make war more humane – had failed. Unlike Hoar, the wide peace movement did not find much intellectual refuge in the laws of war. Instead, the catastrophe of the Philippines was not simply a failure to apply the laws of war, but of the fundamental inability of the laws to prevent such atrocities. Thus, the Lodge Committee represented the *coup de grace* to the movement's engagement with the idea that war might be made more humane; peacemakers had realised that their goals of making war more humane and reducing its prevalence (to the point of abolition) were incompatible.[156] And while some in the movement would maintain the laws of war as a rhetorical touchstone, the flashpoint of 1902 saw

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[153] Ibid. p. 23.

[154] 'Senator Hoar's Latest Philippine Speech', *AoP* 64/6 (June, 1902), p. 110.

[155] Ibid. p. 111.

[156] Samuel Moyn, *Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War* (New York, 2021). As Samuel Moyn has shown the desire to make war more humane and the desire to prevent war from occurring in the first place were two competing urges within American liberal politics during the late nineteenth century.

many confront the intellectual contradictions in their project.[157] As Trueblood put it in the pages of the *Advocate,* 'It has been overwhelmingly proved once more […] that there is no such thing as a righteous and humane war, and that there never can be.'[158]

Nonetheless, an even greater fear undergirded this moment of crisis. Beyond the introspection as to their own mission, the peacemakers observed the brutalisation of American manhood on display in the Philippines and, moreover, detected traces of this shift in the American body politic. Civilised white American men, they feared, having spent too long by the side of the Filipinos, would throw off their restrained, Christian morals.[159]

The peacemakers' anxieties about the coarsening and degenerating effect of empire on American political culture had already been present prior to the revelations of torture, as they reflected on the invidious rhetoric of the 'Great Debate'. This had become most acute just prior to the Senate Committee hearings when General Funston, recently returned from the Philippines, threw a particularly violent barb at the critics of empire. Having recently been the subject of Mark Twain's satirical pen, Funston had taken it upon himself to bring the fight to the home front.[160] Speaking at a banquet in Chicago as part of his post-war publicity tour, the General noted with glee that he had personally 'strung up' thirty-five Filipinos without allowing them a proper trial.[161] He then remarked that such a policy would be well suited to those who had recently petitioned Congress to call for peace in the archipelago – specifically claiming that they ought to be 'dragged out of their homes and lynched.'[162] Needless to say, the reaction of the

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[157] Lake Mohonk Papers, Series III, Correspondence, Reports, and Related Documents 1895-1918, Box 20 (SCPC-0876), Folder 9, Herbert Welsh to Albert K. Smiley (14 May 1903); Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman, *Secretary Root's Record: "Marked Severities" in Philippine Warfare, An Analysis of the Law and Facts bearing on the Action and Utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root* (Boston, 1902), passim. Both Storey and Welsh would continue to use the Lieber Code as a yardstick by which to measure American activities in the Philippines. For instance, Welsh mounted a campaign at the 1903 Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference to get the attendees to lobby the White House to release its legal assessment of the actions of General Nelson Miles and how these comported with the Civil War code. Similarly, Storey and his colleague Julian Codman authored a lengthy and fiery tract that sought to indict the embattled Secretary of War, calling for his removal. The introspection of 1902 rendered this rhetoric superficial as peacemakers, by their own admission, were faced with a clear example of the flaws in the regime that they had striven to build. The latter, especially, marked one of the last actions of the Philippine Investigation Committee.

[158] 'A Triennium of War's Brutalism and Debauchery', *AoP* 64/5 (May, 1902), p. 86.

[159] The desire to defend white republicanism is explored in Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (*Cambridge, 2008); See also Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven; London, 1998).

[160] Mark Twain, 'A Defence of General Funston', *NAR* 174/546 (May, 1902), pp. 613-624.

[161] Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation,* p. 234-5

[162] Ibid. p. 235.

peace movement was acrimonious. 'Imperialistic militarism has gone to seed in general Funston', exclaimed Trueblood in the *Advocate*, '[if] this soldier had his way, it would likewise already have begun to bear its legitimate fruit in a most terrible way, and we should have gallows up in every prominent city in the land'.[163] For Trueblood, Funston's comments had uncovered the inner workings of the imperialist mind, revealing the bitter and pernicious effects it would have on American society. 'He has taken the sheep's clothing off', argued Trueblood, 'and revealed the animal in his native wildness.'[164]

The disclosures of American atrocities in the Philippines, therefore, added an even greater degree of urgency to their diagnosis of the effects of imperialism on the United States. Not only was the humanisation of war a fool's errand, but war was irreconcilably corrosive to the republican and refined values upon which American democracy was supposed to be built:

> 'What is the lesson of it all? There are many minor ones, but the main lesson is that war is still the same ancient and immemorial hell; that it is cruelty and in its essential nature cannot be humanized; that it cannot be engaged in without moral degradation and besmirchment; that it lets loose and stimulates the bestial passions; that it makes men bloodthirsty, callous, cruel, vengeful, lustful; that it breaks down regard for the liberties, rights and lives of others; that it develops the spirit of lying and deceit in the field, of mental dishonesty and sophistry among its supporters at home; that it is doubly corrupting and dehumanizing when employed by a strong, professedly civilized people in aggression against one that is undeveloped and weak.'[165]

A similar conclusion was reached by the UPU, which found that atrocity and cruelty were inherent in war's internal logic, claiming that 'war cannot be carried on with kid gloves.'[166] Instead, they concluded that war by its very nature 'breeds just such torture, injustice and inhumanity.'[167] For the APS, this was conclusive evidence that not only was war an inherently abominable endeavour, but that the efforts to curb its excesses had been, in their core objectives, misguided and harmful. In allowing men to undertake actions that they would never have otherwise considered, humane war had normalised and sanitised the most brutal and unchristian practices. As such, the humanisation of warfare represented a perversion of the entire myth of civilisational progress that had underpinned the peacemakers' worldview. The act of undertaking a war for the cause of civilisation was, according to the APS, especially egregious. Given that the

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[163] 'Funstonism', *AoP* 64/4 (April, 1902), p. 62.

[164] Ibid. p. 63.

[165] 'A Triennium of War's Brutalism and Debauchery', *AoP* 64/5 (May, 1902), p. 85.

[166] 'The Horrors of War in the Philippines', *The Peacemaker* 21/2 (February, 1902), p. 28.

[167] Ibid.

laws of war had allowed American soldiers to rationalise that their actions as permissible and perhaps even encouraged, meaning that colonial warfare had operated as a proving ground for unchristian and basic practices of brutality. That such a fate had befallen a Christian republic which was meant to act as a beacon for the rest of the world was particularly disappointing. 'If any country ought to be able to wage a "civilized" war, it certainly should be a professedly Christian country like ours', mused Trueblood, 'especially when fighting, as is claimed, in the name of civilization.'[168] The result of this so-called humane war had been 'a miserable failure', and despite the rhetoric, it had 'become clear as noonday that in sections of the [Philippines] American officers and soldiers, not expecting that their doings would come to light, have been guilty of barbarities scarcely above the bestiality of the lowest savages.'[169]

The evidence of the degenerative effect of colonial warfare soon became apparent right before their eyes, as American soldiers returned home from the Philippines. Following on from their bitter exchange with General Funston, the APS noted with dismay that the General had reported a marked upsurge in the number of desertions and court-martials among the recently returned soldiers, which he had attributed to the 'monotony of garrison life' and the abolition of the military canteen.[170] 'It does not seem to have occurred to this commanding officer, who has a record in the demoralizing art of deception and lying unsurpassed in army annals,' remarked Trueblood in the *Advocate,* 'that the real cause of this degeneracy in his department is to be found in the degrading and bestializing influences of the campaign against the "[n****rs] and savages" in the Philippines, coupled with those of the soldier's profession in general.'[171]

However, the fiercest reaction came from Herbert Welsh in the pages of *City and State*. Having led the charge to expose the horrors of the Philippines, Welsh's reaction was less one of shock and more of indignation. As early as Kennan's reporting in *The Outlook*, Welsh had regularly published letters from American soldiers that detailed the inhumanity of the water cure and the brutalising effect of colonial warfare on American soldiers. As many other critics of empire had recognised, Welsh lamented that the practice had historically been employed (albeit sparingly) by the Spanish, but was promulgated by the Americans' Filipino allies, the Macabebe Scouts.[172] The practice, therefore, posed a dual threat to white republicanism in the United States. Firstly, the

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[168] 'A Triennium of War's Brutalism and Debauchery', *AoP* 64/5 (May, 1902), p. 85.

[169] Ibid.

[170] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 64/11 (November, 1902), pp. 202. Following his abrasive publicity tour, Funston had been placed at the head of the Colorado army department.

[171] Ibid.

[172] 'By Way of Manila', *City and State* XII/1 (2 January 1902), p. 7.

specific practice of the water cure had a Spanish origin and thus, in copying the ailing empire that they had sought to supplant, American soldiers risked becoming degenerate themselves. As Welsh himself put it: 'It would appear that we have gone Spain one better in this business as we Americans are apt to do in those things to which we put our hand.'[173] However, possibly even more concerning was that American troops learnt this not from the Spanish but were taking lessons from Filipinos. As such, Welsh lambasted the 'use of "savage allies" who in their warfare have revived the horrors of the Inquisition.'[174] The irony was not lost on Welsh that American statesmen had been claiming, just three years prior, that they could not contemplate returning the islands to the Spanish on account of their brutal treatment of the natives.[175] Indeed he would go so far as to term the army's actions as being tantamount to 'American Weylerism' – echoing the line of questioning which characterised the senate investigation.[176]

Welsh's biting tone did not end there. Having noticed that many of the previously pro-imperialist senators had remained silent on the topic of the water cure, he invoked images of the Spanish Inquisition to satirically propose a course of action. With a provocative and macabre frame of mind, Welsh asked, '[why] not try a touch of the water-cure torture on them, which we have found, when applied to the Filipinos, so productive of loquacity?'[177] These politicians were doubtless all Christians and, therefore, Welsh reasoned that if their moral compasses had deemed the practice acceptable for use in the Philippines, then what was wrong with its use at home? 'Spain and the Macabebes have taught us the clever trick', goaded Welsh, 'why not use it on the recalcitrant at home, as well as on the contumacious abroad? It would be a striking object lesson in up-to-date colonial methods not realizable otherwise to sluggish imaginations.'[178]

Despite his abrasive sarcasm, the idea that the water cure would corrupt the American body politic was a gnawing concern for Welsh. While American republicanism being abased by a Spanish practice of torture was shocking, the most terrifying prospect was of American soldiers learning Filipino habits. The Macabebe Scouts – the pro-American group of Filipinos – themselves came in for harsh criticism from Welsh. Often simply referred to as the United States' 'savage allies', Welsh saw their very association with the military as a step beyond the

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[173] Ibid. p. 9.

[174] Ibid.

[175] 'The Citizen is Responsible', *City and State* XII/2 (9 January 1902), p. 23.

[176] 'American Weylerism', *City and State* XII/3 (16 January 1902), p. 42.

[177] 'An Eloquent Silence', *City and State* XII/3 (16 January 1902), p. 37.

[178] Ibid

pale.[179] Much as Charles Francis Adams had, three years prior, compared the United States to its old imperial oppressor, Welsh recalled the British employment of natives during the American Revolution. Noting how 'Lord Chatham arraigned Great Britain for using "savage allies" against the American colonies', Welsh wrote that the United States was committing the very same sin against 'not rebellious colonies, but betrayed friends.'[180]

Welsh was in no doubt that the prospect of American soldiers learning from the Filipinos they were meant to be civilising was a nightmare scenario. In an article in which he described, with graphic imagery, the details of the water cure as practised by the Macabebes, Welsh lamented that 'Our men see this thing often enough and they begin to enjoy doing it themselves.' [181] Employing an abolitionist dog whistle, Welsh wrote of how the water cure would become 'in time an "institution," as one of our teachers wrote, – "a peculiar institution"– perhaps, for the oriental conquest business, a necessary one.'[182] This, according to Welsh, ought to strike fear into American public opinion, with the Americans who had voted in favor of imperialism finally being confronted by 'the Frankenstein they have created and have endowed with monstrous life.'[183]

Trueblood was equally horrified that such depravity could have emerged from the American Republic. Addressing a meeting of ministers at Tremont Temple in April 1902, he proclaimed that 'we must lay the responsibility of this tragedy of horrors where […] it belongs – upon ourselves the people.'[184] Much like Welsh, Trueblood argued that the American military – and American society more broadly – needed to rise above its basest instincts. Speaking before the audience of ministers, he fervently proclaimed that the argument 'that the Filipinos have done barbarous things will not excuse us. The plea of necessity is always the plea of [a] weakling or a tyrant.'[185] Indeed, when assessing the proximity of the American military to the Macabebes, he claimed that he and his countrymen were guilty of allowing 'the deliberate and open employment of the mercenary and cruel Macabebes as the pilots of our enterprise of conquest.'[186]

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[179] 'By Way of Manila', *City and State* XII/1 (2 January 1902), p. 7.

[180] 'Secretary Root's Denial', *City and State* XII/9 (27 February 1902), p. 135

[181] 'The Way Out', *City and State* XII/5 (30 January 1902), p. 71

[182] Ibid.

[183] Ibid.

[184] *Ministers' Meeting of Protest Against the Atrocities in the Philippines* (Boston, 1902), p. 7.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Ibid. p. 8.

Elsewhere, Welsh would go to great lengths to denigrate the Macabebes, directly attacking the White House for the acclaim that they had shown this group.[187] Specifically, Welsh addressed President Roosevelt's recent decision to publicly praise the Macabebes for their service, during his first State of the Union. Welsh queried that it 'seems strange that the President should have been ignorant of the barbarous methods of the Macabebes, since every one else who pretended to any knowledge of the details of our Philippine campaigns knew what those renegade and debased natives whom we employed were doing.'[188] However, the editor of *City and State* laid the blame most of all at the door of the American Generals who employed the Macabebes, knowing the effects this would have on their troops. 'All of them knew that the Macabebes were expert torturers,' wrote Welsh 'and that their methods of warfare were barbarous and cruel in the extreme […] Yet they continued to employ these demons'. This, therefore, rendered the American generals on the ground in the archipelago 'morally and technically responsible for the wrong involved, and the demoralization of the army which, first like a creeping paralysis, then a raging fever, followed.'[189]

The fear that moral degradation was a learned behaviour, which would corrupt the character of American soldiers, was a familiar trope for peacemakers. Mixing a Spencerian belief in the inheritability of human behaviour with their predilection for bourgeois and respectable masculinity, the coarsening of American character represented a potent threat to the very core of their mission.[190] For instance, while stressing the importance of having a military which acted with honor, Welsh proceeded to excoriate the conduct of the American military for abasing its own honour during the past three years. 'Cruelty and lying are both qualities inconsistent with the honor of the army', wrote Welsh, 'In the moral world cruelty and falsehood are not only demoralizing, they are in the highest degree contagious diseases. Both these vices are inconsistent with the honor of an officer and a gentleman.'[191] The language of disease was all too familiar for the genteel peacemakers who had engaged so vibrantly in temperance work (see

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[187] 'Message of the President', in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901* (Washington D.C., 1901). In his first annual address, President Roosevelt stated: 'The heartiest praise is due to large numbers of the natives of the islands for their steadfast loyalty. The Macabebes have been conspicuous for their courage and devotion to the flag. I recommend that the Secretary of War be empowered to take some systematic action in the way of aiding those of these men who are crippled in the service and the families of those who are killed.'

[188] 'Spontaneous Petitions', *City and State* XII/5 (19 June 1902), p. 391.

[189] 'The Evidence Surveyed', *City and State* XIII/6 (7 August 1902), p. 85.

[190] See Richard Weikart, 'Was Darwin or Spencer the Father of Laissez-Fair Social Darwinism?', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 71/1 (July, 2009), pp. 20-28.

[191] 'The Honor of the Army', *City and State* XII/26 (26 June 1902), p. 408.

below for a lengthier discussion of the politics of vice in the Philippines). Welsh, therefore, epitomised the common anxiety among peacemakers that returning soldiers would shed their Christian morals – the much-feared process referred to as demoralisation – and spread their newly acquired brutality throughout American society. Having found a taste for violence in the Philippines and unrestrained by any oversight, returning soldiers might seek to import their newfound morality back home. As Welsh put it, 'The practice of cruelty excites the passion for cruelty', which, he worried, would be unleashed on American soil.[192]

The foremost concern among peacemakers was, therefore, less one of humanitarianism and more one of perceived national self-interest. In an article entitled 'The Degeneracy of the Conquerors', Welsh laid out his thinking on the matter:

> 'The importance of these facts is the corroboration that is found in them of the warning that has always been sounded by those opposed to this conquest of an alien race – that in addition to the harm and misery it inflicts upon the conquered, the deterioration in the character of the conquerors is a fact to be reckoned with in the consideration of the question'[193]

As genteel members of the American middle class, the supposed creeping tide of degeneracy was undergirded by the peacemakers' intertwined understandings of Christian morality and Victorian masculinity; the values of restraint and self-control were fundamental to their archetypal American man. For instance, in his discussion of military honour, Welsh challenged the growing consensus that martial honour ought only to be defined by a soldier's physical courage, stressing that it should also be defined in terms of his moral courage. Indeed, Welsh took aim at the jingoes who sought to ignore conditions in the Philippines that were:

> 'in the highest degree destructive of [the army's] morals, of just standards, of chivalrous feeling, of veracity, of self-restraint, of true manliness, of moral courage – in a word of precisely those qualities in which true honor consists.'[194]

Often styled as being the diametric opposition to a martial model of nineteenth-century masculinity, this genteel vision of middle-class masculinity was also a reaction to the perceived threat of a coarser masculinity that could be found among newly arrived working-class immigrants.[195] Genteel masculinity was thus a vision of manhood that was bounded by ideas of

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[192] Ibid.

[193] 'The Degeneracy of the Conquerors', *City and State* X/11 (14 March 1901), pp. 169-170.

[194] 'The Honor of the Army', *City and State* XII/26 (26 June 1902), p. 408.

[195] Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*; Gail Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago; London, 1995), pp. 1-44.

race – that is to say that it was largely an idealised projection of middle-class American whiteness – as well as being grounded in a Protestant tendency towards self-denial.[196] This vision of manhood was best captured by the American Peace Society's response to Theodore Roosevelt's invocation of 'The Strenuous Life', in which Roosevelt had taken aim at the peacemakers, denouncing them as 'silly humanitarian prattlers who sit at home in peace.'[197] Indeed, Trueblood happily conceded that the peacemakers shrunk 'from Quixotic "adventure", from conquest by violence, from the satanic practice of going about like roaring lions seeking whom they may devour.'[198] It was the allegation that their movement was insular that the peacemakers found so galling, with Trueblood contending that they took 'the largest interest in their neighbors – not to ride boot and spur over them, but to help them and to respect and promote their rights.'[199] The movement, according to Trueblood, had no issue with an outward-looking American foreign policy that, as Roosevelt put it, was "'playing a great part in the world'", but they insisted that this be done in 'at last a half Christian and American way.'[200]

'Beer Follows the Flag'[201]

The moral panic that engulfed the peace movement did not end with the denunciation of the American methods of torture. Closely intertwined with the fears of American manhood's growing degeneracy was an equally common fear that American soldiers, away from the eye of polite society, were engaged in illicit and intemperate behaviour. Much as with their fears for the brutalisation of American soldiers, peacemakers feared that war would cause American men to shed the respectable habits of American society, as they engaged in conduct that would otherwise be deemed permissive and socially unacceptable. Such actions potentially represented an irreversible moral backsliding and, thus, a grave threat to the health of the republic. These fears were a projection of contemporary American middle-class concerns regarding respectability, with peacemakers pondering the decivilising impact of vice – that is to say, the drinking of alcohol and prostitution. Brutalisation and licentiousness represented the dual threat that was manifested in the common usage of the term 'demoralization' by the peacemakers, which was often deployed not to mean that American soldiers would lose their motivation but

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[196] Ibid. This religious dimension of American masculinity has been largely unexplored by the foremost scholars of imperial masculinity in the United States, Kristin Hoganson and Gail Bederman.

[197] 'Roosevelt on the Strenuous Life', *AoP* 61/5 (May, 1899), p. 100.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Ibid.

[201] *Report of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting* (Chicago, 1901), p. 108

rather that they would jettison their morals. For a community of activists which was heavily committed to the cause of moral reform, both at home and abroad, the colonial demoralisation of the American military, therefore, represented the subjugation of their entire project. In this sense, the peacemakers' genteel imperialism was matched not simply by a desire to impose American moral standards on the Philippines, but also by a desire to defend the genteel character of white America.

Much as was the case with their analyses of violence and torture, peacemakers' feared that the behaviour of American soldiers would eventually be reflected at home, as American soldiers would learn habits in the Far East only to try and re-enact them upon their return. This fear was manifested in two major policy problems for the American colonial state – the establishment of the military canteen and the licensing of prostitution.

As has been demonstrated by Paul Kramer and Ian Tyrrell, the politics of vice were inherently transimperial, especially for the community of peacemakers who frequently placed intemperance at the core of their critiques of European empires.[202] For instance, Trueblood frequently mused on the deleterious effects of imperialism on the American body politic as he travelled through the American South (in February 1900), promoting the cause of peace in the wake of The Hague Conference. During a truncated trip that was frequently interrupted by illness and bad weather, the Secretary of the APS snaked around Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia and South Carolina – to preach his message of American peace.[203] Hosted by the Alkahet Lyceum, an educational organisation based in Atlanta, the speaking tour was intended as a way for Trueblood to warn of the dangers of European militarism, while also reflecting on the events at The Hague. However, during one address, Trueblood veered from his normal script and considered the effects that warfare had had on European veterans. 'Visit one of the European capitals and you soon learn what militarism is', proclaimed Trueblood, as he determined that a typical European veteran was 'a moral leper, an idle, insolent loafer, […] a pestilential swaggering parasite fastened upon the community.'[204] The implications of Trueblood's pronouncements,

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[202] Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*; Ian Tyrrell, *Woman's World - Woman's Empire: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880-1930* (Chapel Hill; London, 1991); Paul A. Kramer, 'The Darkness That Enters the Home: The Politics of Prostitution during the Philippine-American War', in Ann Laura Stoler, Gilbert M. Joseph and Emily S. Rosenberg (eds.), *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History* (New York, 2006), pp. 366-404. For an analysis of the relationship between the American empire project and the history of sexuality, see: Laura Briggs, *Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico, American Crossroads* (Berkeley; London, 2002).

[203] APS Papers (DG 003), Box 13 & 14 (SCPC-5464), BFT Letters to his family, 1900-1905, 5-1 – 5-11.

[204] APS Papers (DG 003), Box 17 (SCPC-5467), Scrapbooks by and about BFT, Scrapbook 1, 'The Curse of Militarism', 8 December 1900.

according to one newspaper, were obvious:

> 'As long as our soldiers are sent away to our island colonies we will look with great complaisance on the despair of the natives who long for independence, but the time will arrive when our soldiers come home to roost – when these men who have been free from the restraints of polite society – who have lived in the debauching atmosphere of the garrison and who have drunk in the principle of might makes right will come to be a factor in our own society.'[205]

The two main causes for concern – namely the liberality with which American soldiers treated alcohol and sex – tapped into the pre-existing worldview of the peacemaking community, enflaming those activists for whom an interest in suffrage, social purity, and evangelical Christianity had been a gateway to peacecraft. Nowhere was this more the case than with the peace movement's enmeshment with the Women's Christian Temperance Union. Temperance and peace were inherently related concepts in the minds of liberal Americans – and as such, the rhetoric and networks of peace activism were often overlayed on top of the architecture of the temperance movement. For instance, the UPU frequently held meetings in the Philadelphia headquarters of the WCTU and a number of the vice presidents of both the UPU and the APS were also prominent advocates of temperance. Both communities had lengthy and intertwined histories that found their roots in the antebellum abolitionist movements. And for both temperance activists and peacemakers, the Philippine-American War was a watershed moment where each realised that regulation – whether that be of warfare or of vice – was an actively harmful policy outcome. As their heritages would suggest, the only positive outcome was abolition. As such, the loudest remonstrations against the widespread presence of alcohol in American military life came from the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, with campaigns being focussed on the military canteen – the army-run drinking establishments that were originally set up to prevent soldiers from buying unregulated local alcohol.[206]

Even during the Spanish-American War, Hannah J. Bailey, the head of the WCTU's peace department (and a prominent activist in the UPU and APS), railed against war's promotion of

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[205] Ibid.

[206] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*; Tyrrell, *Woman's World - Woman's Empire*. For instance, see the American contributions to the Polyglot Petition – a petition signed by over a million people that was handed to President Grover Cleveland in a denunciation of the global trade of liquor and narcotics.

intemperate behaviour.[207] Much as Mark Twain had satirically argued, Bailey wrote a lengthy exposition querying the violent methods of the American civilising mission, asking: 'Can christian civilization be taken to a people by the implements of war and developed at the mouth of the cannon and the point of the bayonet? Is this 20th century civilization?'[208] However, it was the pervasive effects of military excess and the widespread use of alcohol that gave Bailey the greatest cause for concern. For Bailey, the correlation between military veterans and heavy-drinking was evidence that war itself caused an unhealthy and unchristian attitude toward alcohol and vice. Looking even further back than the Spanish-American War, she noted that 'we find everywhere in the beautiful homes which the Government has provided for the soldiers of the Civil War, [...] the sober, Christian veteran is the exception and not the rule.'[209] Therefore, in Bailey's eyes, the war with Spain had created a whole new generation of young alcoholics:

> 'In the Spanish-American War the boys and the young men who went forth were said to be, "The Flower of the Country." That many of these [boys] were from pure homes would seem evident, as they could not be accepted if heart or nerve or eye had been impaired by the use of alcoholics or other narcotic poisons.'

However, she concluded that as a result of 'the temptations of the army canteen and other demoralizing influences we find them returning to these homes, staggering under the influence of intoxicants and foul from the use of tobacco.'[210] Therefore, as reports began to accrue of licentious behaviour by the American military in the Far East, opinion among the temperance community hardened. Speaking to the Annual Meeting of the National WCTU in 1900, the organisation's president Lillian Stevens noted with sadness that around two hundred canteens and four hundred American saloons had already been established in the Philippines.[211] Not only would this operate as a barrier to the spread of Christian principles to the Filipinos via missionaries it would also have deleterious effects on the American soldiers themselves. Stevens noted that the widespread presence of liquor had already resulted in eleven suicides and that a

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[207] For more on Bailey and her involvement in the peace movement see Yoko Nishimura, 'Educating Women for Peace: The Life and Work of Hannah Johnston Bailey and Katherine Devereux Blake in the Late Nineteenth Century and the Early Twentieth Century Women's Peace Movement' (PhD Thesis, State University of New York, 2006); Tara M. McCarthy, '"The Humaner Instinct of Women": Hannah Bailey and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union's Critique of Militarism and Manliness in the Late Nineteenth Century', *Peace and Change* 33/2 (2008), pp. 191-216.

[208] Swarthmore, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Hannah Johnston Bailey Papers, 1836-1923 (DG 005) [Hereafter Bailey Papers], Box 1 (SCPC-0780), Folder 8, Articles n.d., 'War and 20th Century Civilization', p. 9.

[209] Ibid. p. 10.

[210] Ibid. pp. 10-11.

[211] *Report of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting held in La Fayette Opera House, Washington D.C.* (Chicago 1900), p. 94.

quarter of all Americans in hospital were there due to their drinking.[212] A year later, Stevens was even more melancholic as she detailed how the trade of alcohol across the Pacific to the American army was burgeoning. Noting that most of this flowed to the West Coast via the Santa Fe railroad, Stevens remarked on how one official working that route had noticed the volume of alcohol being sent over the ocean had doubled. Much to the WCTU's dismay, the official had quipped that 'beer follows the flag.'[213]

Trueblood's own uneasiness with the military canteen in the Philippines was clear from his comments while on tour in the South as well as from the editorial line taken by the *Advocate*. Here, he reacted caustically to Funston's insinuation that the misbehaviour of newly returned soldiers from the Philippines was the result of the lack of the military canteen. However, in the same way that the temperance movement often operated as a mouthpiece for the promoters of peace (for instance, lobbying in favour of Anglo-American arbitration), so too did the peace movement become a mouthpiece for the apparatus of the temperance movement.

This was most notable in the way that the American Peace Society supported the endeavours of Rev. Wilbur Crafts. An 'irrepressibly energetic Presbyterian minister', Crafts was the leader of the International Reform Bureau, a lobbying group that focussed on campaigning against alcohol and drugs.[214] Crafts was at best agnostic on the question of American expansion and at times, even entertained the idea that it would be an effective vehicle for the export of American morality. His moral crusade against vice saw him harness every means at his disposal to promote his cause – including placing articles in any journal that might prove friendly to his cause. Needless to say, this included a strategically placed article in the *Advocate,* critiquing the American Government's licensing of the military canteen. Taking note of the British example, Crafts noted that he had some sympathy for the British generals currently operating in South Africa. Claiming that one could approve of Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener without needing to approve their *casus belli* in the Boer War, he specifically applauded the removal of one of war's most deadly features – the military canteen, which was 'worse than dum-dum bullets and lyddite shells'.[215] Noting that American alcohol had the effect of 'brutalizing' the Filipinos rather than civilising them, Crafts lamented the state of affairs in the Far East. 'That we have in fact done the brutalizing, history and government statistics both prove,' wrote Crafts, '[o]ur soldiers have been

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[212] Ibid. p. 94-5.

[213] *Report of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting held in the First Baptist Church Fort Worth Texas* (Chicago 1901), p. 108.

[214] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, pp. 123-145.

[215] Wilbur F. Crafts, 'Snap Shots from Washington', *AoP* 62/6 (June, 1900), p. 137.

carried across the Pacific in transports provided with a whiskey bar […] and the same illegal infamy was found on the transports that carried our soldiers about the Philippines and brought them home.'[216] Crafts' horror was based on the reports of a Tennessee chaplain who had gone to the Philippines only to '[behold] the Sodom which American rum [had] made in Manila'.[217]

'Some soldiers spent all their final payment for whiskey on the transport returning', noted Crafts as he detailed that the priest had found the streets of Manila 'full of American saloons – above four hundred of them – with the horrible accompaniments of gambling and prostitution.'[218] With growing horror, Crafts remarked that 'Many of our soldiers were captured when intoxicated in the company of native women, and ninety per cent of the diseases were to the bar and the brothel.'[219]

As Crafts indicated, the colonial administration's licensing of drunkenness was not the only instance of regulated vice that caused peacemaker disquiet. The revelations in June 1900 that the American military was habitually inspecting prostitutes and brothels, in an effort to protect licentious American soldiers, similarly enraged those that existed in the sizeable overlap between the peace movement and temperance movement.[220] While the moral panic over the so-called 'social evil' was largely a reflection of the social conservatism of the peacemakers' domestic attitudes, it was also tinged with their racialised view of the world. Whereas some peacemakers had sought to elevate the perception of figures such as Sixto López, the prospect of inter-racial sexual relationships in the Far East was, for some, a step too far. For instance, during the annexation debate, Hannah J. Bailey had railed against the prospect of allowing an influx of Filipino immigration into the United States. This was not simply a matter of importing cheap, Filipino labour (as some critics of empire presented it) but was also a social question. 'The social plane of the people on the islands is,' she wrote, 'at the lowest.'[221] Employing commonly repeated tropes about Filipino civilisational attainment, she reasoned that 'Their only wants realized by themselves consist of shelter, food, and enough clothing to partially cover themselves, and perhaps ornamental decorations for their almost nude bodies. Their moral status is unmistakable

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[216] Ibid.

[217] Ibid. p. 138.

[218] Ibid.

[219] Ibid.

[220] A note on terminology. These are the terms that were deployed by historical actors. Though they are not the terms used in common parlance today, I have continued to use them, given that they convey a sense of the moralising and judgemental outlook they held.

[221] Bailey Papers, Box 1 (SCPC-0780), Folder 3: Articles 1892-1916, 'Peace and Arbitration', p. 23.

when we remember that the custom of cannibalism still prevails in many of the islands.'[222] While the López siblings might have been respectable representatives of their race, the prospect of prolonged close contact between the two races would prove too much to handle for most peacemakers.

Despite the common reference to the British innovation of the Contagious Disease Act among reformers, the American inspection regime was fundamentally an adaptation of the Spanish regime rather than a British import. An inspection regime had existed in the Philippines since the 1880s when the Spanish had given doctors the duty of inspecting sex workers for signs of sexually transmitted diseases, such as syphilis, and shutting down unlicensed brothels. As Paul Kramer has noted, it is remarkable that this regime was maintained throughout the upheaval of 1898, as the islands transitioned from Spanish to Filipino and then to American rule.[223] Indeed at the beginning of the American administration of the archipelago, the administration had even mandated that the inspections be undertaken by Spanish physicians, rather than Americans, on account of a shortage of doctors. As such, the pre- and post-1898 system of inspection bore marked similarities, namely that prostitutes would be examined by doctors (once a week under the US and biweekly under Spanish rule), and those with a clean bill of health would be issued a certificate or provided a stamp in an inspection book. Those found to have an STD would be forcibly placed in a designated hospital (the first of these being in the corner of the San Lazaro leper colony). The fees for these inspections would be paid by the women themselves, and those establishments choosing not to comply would forcibly be shut down.

The liberal American perspective on vice, as espoused by many of the social purity and temperance activists, was thus grounded in exceptionalist thinking, with activists habitually scolding the Old World powers for their state-sponsored systems of vice.[224] The United States, with its previously limited colonial holdings, had refrained from the state licensing system of vice and therefore, had very little track record of such behaviour, according to activists. Furthermore, as was clear from Trueblood's southern lecture tour, the prevalence of vice in European empires operated as a vital point of comparison in the peacemakers' critique of the European system of imperialism.

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[222] Ibid. Bailey was employing a common imperial trope of depicting the colonised body as unclothed in order to delegitimise the Filipinos as being culturally backwards.

[223] Kramer, 'The Darkness That Enters the Home', pp. 366-404.

[224] For instance, the American social purity campaigners Katherine Bushnell and Elizabeth Andrew led an investigation into the British regulation of vice in India in 1897, in which they called for the abolition of the British Contagious Diseases Act in India.

This, however, changed in June 1900 when the journalist William E. Johnson, in a sensationalist article for the pro-prohibition newspaper the *Chicago New Voice,* reported on the supposedly flourishing system of regulated sex in the Philippines. As his choice of publication would suggest, Johnson had also reported heavily on the influx of alcohol into the Philippines and portrayed the two issues as being closely linked.[225] Johnson's report highlighted, with shock, that in Manila alone the US military was licensing two hundred brothels, which played host to over six hundred sex workers.[226] Perhaps the most galling detail in his report was the revelation that some of these brothels, on account of their license from the American military, had adorned their premises with the American flag. This detail got to the heart of the peacemakers' critique of the regulation of vice. Much as was the case with the humanisation of war, in making illicit sexual behaviour safer, the American administration had made it more widespread (and had even actively promoted it) – thus missing the real danger entirely.

As early as 1899, Edward Atkinson was willing to draw a causal link between tropical conquest, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, and unchristian conduct in the army.[227] However, with Johnson's revelations of the extent of American licensing in the Far East, Atkinson took specific aim at the American administration in Manila. Although he was primarily concerned with the commercial dimensions of the war in the Philippines, he lambasted the licensed brothels of Manila and the charade that this equated to a civilising mission. 'Over that establishment the flag of the United States floats in Manila', argued Atkinson in an article for the *Advocate*, 'and none have the right to demand that it shall be taken down so long as that flag is an emblem of force now being exerted in order to deprive the people of the Philippine Islands of their liberty.'[228] Atkinson would even go so far as to attack the preachers who were encouraging young men to enlist in the army, calling these men hypocrites for luring the uncorrupted towards an institution that would expose them to the worst proclivities of tropical vice.[229]

Much as Crafts had broadened his view of the struggle against viceful and indecent behaviour to a global scale, Atkinson pointed to the example of the British Empire and the Contagious Diseases Act. Despite the American inspection regime having been based on the Spanish, and

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[225] See Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, pp. 123-145.

[226] Ibid. p. 139.

[227] Edward Atkinson, *The Cost of National Crime and The Hell of War and its Penalties* (Boston, 1899), p. 17. Atkinson had argued that: 'A war of conquest or any permanent occupation of tropical countries by white troops brings not only revers and malaria upon them of well-known kinds, but yet worse, more fatal and more certain to bring moral and physical degeneration upon them, is the infection of venereal disease.'

[228] Edward Atkinson, 'The Commercial Aspects of War', *AoP* 63/2 (February, 1901), p. 44.

[229] Ibid.

not the British system, Atkinson saw the British case as being the most analogous example of what would befall the American troops. Specifically, he remarked that in both India and Hong Kong over half of the serving military population ended up in hospital 'as the penalty for vice.'[230] Worst of all, however, was his fear that the American experience 'will be that of England, where by methods devised by the Royal College of Surgeons, an effort is made with very partial success to prevent the corruption of the blood of England by the fourteen thousand soldiers returned annually from service in the tropics of India and other British dependencies.'[231] Conflating white bodies with the American body politic, Atkinson treated the Filipinos as synonymous with disease, thus casting his imperial criticism as both racial and pathological.[232]

For Atkinson, the link between vice and brutality was causal. Taking aim at those who purported to adhere to a 'strenuous life', but who in fact enjoyed a life of middle-class mercantilism, he noted that while 'the conduct of war has thus rendered it necessary for men of high character and standing […] to do acts which would disgrace any man occupied in commerce, other features of modern warfare have become more and more vicious.'[233] Above all, he concluded, '[s]tanding armies are of necessity nurseries of vice, especially when required for service in the tropics.'[234]

Trueblood, in the pages of the *Advocate,* had made a similar link between war's brutalisation of a man's character and the army's proclivity for vice-fuelled behaviour. In his attack on Funston's dismay at the levels of desertion among veterans of the Philippine–American War, Trueblood argued that the general 'ought to ask himself [why] do "saloon keepers, gamblers and prostitutes," […] move so uniformly and numerously into the neighborhood of camps, if there is nothing unusually enticing to them in the men quartered there?'[235] The answer was obvious to Trueblood. Vice was inherent to military life – with the only remedy being abolition.

As was the case with the military canteen, the WCTU were by far the loudest campaigners on the issue of sex work and prostitution. Just a few months after William Johnson's report had emerged in the press, Lillian Stevens, had passed judgement on the regulation of vice in the Philippines at the organisation's annual meeting. Much like Atkinson, Stevens took the example

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[230] Ibid.

[231] Ibid.

[232] Anderson, *Colonial Pathologies*, p. 1-11.

[233] Atkinson, 'The Commercial Aspects of War', p. 44.

[234] Ibid.

[235] 'Editorial Notes', *AoP* 64/11 (November, 1902), p. 202.

of the British Empire as a cautionary tale stressing that 'We are unwilling to believe that our Government will allow to be introduced among the soldiers that infamous system which brought such just contempt upon England when the condition of affairs in India became known to the world.'[236] Consequently, Stevens and her colleagues pleaded with the President to 'prohibit the licensing of such houses or the making of any provision whatever for their existence in any of the territory under the jurisdiction of the United States.'[237] For the temperance activists, their protest against the state regulation of vice, much like their opposition to the military-run canteens, was based on a simple belief that the American state must not promote or mollify the conduct of vice. Furthermore, much like Atkinson, the WCTU condemned sexual contact between Americans and Filipinas out of a desire to protect the purity of the white race. As Stevens put it, 'We protest with all possible emphasis against our Government's regulating vice in any form, and […] against anything calculated to foster that crime which degrades its citizens, destroys the purity of the family and deteriorates the race.'[238]

An equally strong body of opinion was to be found among suffrage campaigners, who saw the administration's policy as both being hostile to the welfare of Filipinas and normalising intemperate behaviour.[239] In a whole issue dedicated to the topic, Alice Stone Blackwell's *The Woman's Column* outlined the core reasons that American women ought to oppose the state licensing of prostitution in the Philippines. In a telling allusion to her abolitionist heritage, Blackwell alleged that 'in all countries where State regulation prevails, the women in the licensed houses are to a large extent slaves.'[240] Much like the movement's critique of humane warfare, Blackwell's argument was one of moral hazard. She alleged that in regulating an evil and unchristian practice, the state was sanitising it and thus providing for it to become more widespread – or as Blackwell herself put it, 'the illusion of security increases vice.'[241] Furthermore, much as other peacemakers had done, Blackwell highlighted the ways in which systems of regulation for colonial vice were corrosive of democratic values around the world. 'In the European countries where State regulation has prevailed for centuries', argued Blackwell, 'the results have been beyond description in the corruption of the police, the oppression and cruelty

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[236] *Report of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting*, p. 95.

[237] Ibid.

[238] Ibid.

[239] Tyrrell, *Woman's World – Woman's Empire*. As Ian Tyrrell has demonstrated, critiques of colonial vice were also undergirded by the work of suffragists and evangelicals.

[240] 'A National Disgrace', *The Woman's Column* XIII/23 (17 November 1900), p. 1.

[241] Ibid. p. 2

excessed upon the miserable women, the deadening of the public conscience, and the complete shamelessness produced.'[242] Thus according to Blackwell, the only solution was for the entire system to be abolished.

A final source of opposition to the state licensing system came from the population of American missionaries in the Philippines who saw the institution as a danger to their efforts at proselytisation. Alice Byram Condict of Orange, New Jersey, was one such missionary. Condict embodied the intersection of ideas and communities that opposed vice in the Philippines. Described as 'a member of the W.C.T.U. and a friend of peace' by the UPU, she had previously travelled to India to work as a missionary, from the Methodist Episcopal Church during the famines of the late 1890 where she distributed medical aid.[243] By her own admission, Condict had welcomed the American acquisition of the Philippines; the United States had not just acquired a new coaling station but also now had a launchpad from which it could 'bring to these ancient lands the Christianity, the civilization and the commerce that will put warm blood into their veins.'[244] However, her faith in the American imperial project was soon shaken, as she made her way to the Philippines to continue her missionary work.

Given her belief in the civilising capacity of American imperialism, Condict's reaction to the news of the licensing of prostitution in the Philippines was one of horror and disgust. It seems that she had first received word of the revelations from her missionary colleagues back in the US, rather than noticing the widespread practice of inspection herself. 'Several missionaries here have recently received letters from the home land inquiring as to the truth of accounts published in the United States of the licensing of houses of prostitution', she wrote in a report to the American press, 'I have accordingly been making inquiries, and find, to my chagrin, that these shocking reports are only too true facts.'[245] Her thinking on licensing echoed that of the peace activists who had attributed the burgeoning of vice to the army's brutalisation of American manhood. 'This, of course, is simply the iniquitous plan of men who regard the army simply as so much fighting material,' she argued, 'The idea of right or wrong has not been considered at all; therefore, the dark deeds have become the military law.'[246]

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[242] Ibid.

[243] 'Woman's Peace League of Manila', *The Peaemaker* 20/5 (May, 1901), p. 104.

[244] Alice B. Condict, *Old Glory and the Gospel in the Philippines. Notes gathered during professional and missionary work* (Chicago, 1902), p. 17.

[245] 'What Leading People Say', *The Watchman* 82/5 (31 January 1901), p. 2.

[246] Ibid. p. 3.

Less than a month after her outburst in the press against American colonial policy, Condict found herself at the centre of another matter that went straight to the heart of the genteel vision of empire. In April 1901, *The Peacemaker* excitedly reported with word from Manila of the establishment of 'the first Woman's Peace League in the Philippines and the formation of the first W.C.T.U. in Manila' by a group of American women and Filipinas.[247] In an article reprinted from *The Manila Freedom*, *The Peacemaker* described the League's first meeting held at the Teatro Libertad in Manila on 10 February 1901. In her address to the gathering, Alice Condict proclaimed that the event represented 'the formation of the first woman's club in the Philippines'.[248] Whether or not her leadership in the League was a direct response to the crisis of the American civilising mission was unclear. However, the League's primary goal was, according to Condict, to allow the women of the archipelago (American and Filipina) 'to lend their influence for peace.'[249] Condict also explained to her audience that a far more profound goal lay beneath this primary aim – one that revealed the genteel principles that underpinned her presence in the Philippines. The present war, she argued, was the result of how 'Enemies of yours and of the United States had poisoned the Filipino mind leading you to believe that America would be even more cruel and unjust than Spain.'[250] It was the role of the Peace League to prove this wrong and to change Filipino hearts and minds towards peace.

Condict was joined by Constancia Poblete – the daughter of a revolutionary newspaper editor Pascual Poblete – whom had been described as 'the guiding spirit of the movement'.[251] She was far more measured in her address to the fifty American women and two hundred Filipinas in attendance, as she stressed the common cause among the peacefully-minded women in the United States and the Philippines, rather than seeking to justify American rule.[252] Despite Poblete's distinctly less imperial tenor, the organisation asserted itself as a pro-American institution, with its constitution and by-laws being modelled on the Woman's Club of Condict's

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[247] 'First Woman's Peace League in the Philippines', *The Peacemaker* 20/4 (April, 1901), p. 84.

[248] 'Woman's Peace League of Manila', *The Peacemaker* 20/5 (May, 1901), p. 105.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Ibid.

[251] Ibid. p. 104. For a broader overview of the response of the Ilustrado elite to American annexation and colonial governance, see Michael Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule* (Ann Arbor, 2003). Constancia Poblete later became the vice-chair of the Filipino Carnival. This was shut down by the US as it conflicted with the American Manila Carnival. See Alfred McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, 2009), p. 193.

[252] 'Women Form Peace League', *NYT* L/15941 (10 February 1901), p. 3.

hometown of Orange, New Jersey.[253] The organisation's founding resolution was a message addressed to the American President and the 'Ladies of North America', stating: 'We have organized a woman's league to obtain peace. We salute the President. We salute you, pleading your co-operation.'[254] Writing to *The Peacemaker*, Condict was hopeful that the League would lead to the spread of similar organisations around the archipelago. Furthermore, she noted, approvingly, that many 'hinted that their first duty will be to wait on Mrs [Hilaria] Aguinaldo' – a woman who had already made a name for herself during the war by founding the Asociación de la Cruz Roja, a precursor to the Filipino arm of the National Red Cross.[255]

The stated aims of the Peace League were therefore aligned both with those of the pro-American Federalist Party and the American peacemakers, who now sought to focus on steering the material and moral conditions of the archipelago, rather than contest the validity of annexation.[256] Furthermore, the League embodied a restrained style of collaborationist politics, being based on the image of American Woman's Clubs and counting among its members Helen Taft, wife of the governor. Paul Kramer has coined the phrase 'fiesta politics' to describe the 'new cultures of Filipino-American sociability', which characterised the collaboration between the two elites.[257] Such a style of politics exemplified the genteel norms that the peacemakers had hoped might be achieved by the Peace League – a far cry from the unchristian acts of vice being perpetrated by the army.

However, a power imbalance also ran through the actions of the Manila Woman's Peace League. As was suggested by the League's alignment with the pro-imperialist views of the Filipino Federalist Party, the politics of the League tilted towards the American administration. For instance, a few days after its creation, the League met at the Governor's residence to discuss the best course of action that might end the hostilities. Two rival resolutions emerged, one from Helen Taft and the other from Poblete.[258] The future First Lady called for the remaining insurgents to lay down their arms and surrender. However, Poblete, in line with the activism of Clemencia López before her, issued a resolution calling instead for the immediate release of prisoners of war. Taft's resolution was adopted, and Poblete's ignored; however, the rift between

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[253] 'Peace League in Manila', *New York Daily Tribune* LXI/19951 (1 July 1901), p. 5.

[254] 'Woman's Peace League of Manila', *The Peacemaker* 20/5 (May, 1901), p. 106.

[255] Ibid.

[256] Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics*.

[257] Kramer, *Blood of Government*, p. 162.

[258] 'Women's Peace League Meets', *NYT* L/15944 (13 February 1901), p. 5.

the two was illustrative of the asymmetry of power inherent within peacecraft. The American vision of peace represented complete capitulation by the Filipinos. However, for Poblete, much like the López siblings before her, peace lay not simply in the Filipinos laying down their arms, but in the United States equally applying the liberal norms and standards of civilisation that they purported to follow.

Conclusion

Despite their best efforts, conflict and vice endured in the Philippines well after the establishment of the Manila Women's Peace League and after the Senate Investigation had ended. The movement could point to certain symbolic victories, such as the President's declaration of an official end to the war in July 1902 and the issuance of Circular Order No. 10, which called on military officials to warn their subordinates against viceful practices.[259] However, neither of these precluded vice and violence being a common feature of the American administration of the Philippines. Indeed, as late as 1906, peacemakers, such as the Bostonian lawyer and civil rights activist Moorfield Storey, were editorialising against American war crimes in the Philippines.[260]

However, for the movement itself, the debates over the American administration of the Philippines would prove pivotal. If the peacemakers had developed a cynicism towards humanitarian arguments during the Cuban Crisis of 1898, they offered a full-throated denunciation of the humanisation of war when contesting the American administration of the Philippines. This period represented the culmination of the peacemakers' intellectual unease with their two overlapping goals, namely, the desire to make war more humane and the desire to reduce conflict. In confronting the actions of American soldiers in the Philippines, the peacemakers had come to see that by regulating warfare, they had provided it with tacit moral cover – thereby promoting it. Not only was this true of soldiers' conduct in battle but also of their conduct off the battlefield. Peace activists aligned their criticism of colonial war with colonial vice, waging a campaign against the military canteen and the licensing of prostitution, both of which they saw as being a means of promoting vice through its sanitisation.

Furthermore, in the period following the election of 1900, peacemakers were pioneers of a new form of imperial criticism – both in terms of tactics and ideas – which interwove peacecraft as a political style and genteel imperialism as a political ideal. Following the failures of the annexation debate, the politics of opposing empire mutated such that it bore striking resemblances to

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[259] Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, p. 140-141; Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, pp. 142-143.

[260] Moorfield Storey, *The Moro Massacre* (Boston, 1906).

peacecraft – with peacemakers now at the helm of new anti-imperialist institutions. In many ways, this entailed a reversion to the norm, as peacemakers reached for the tactics of moral suasion that had been a frequent feature of their history. However, in other ways, peacecraft took on a new shape, as new transnational networks became the focal point of lobbying campaigns and knowledge-making efforts, as peacemakers worked with Filipinos in the US and in the Far East in an attempt to shape the United States' imperial project. These interactions all bore the marks of the civilisational hierarchies that undergirded peacecraft. As such, the peacemakers' criticism of empire was defensive, as they sought to protect both the United States' supposed leadership in the geopolitics of peace and its white republican character. In essence, this represented genteel imperialism in its fullest form, as peacemakers worked to guard American manhood from the debilitating effects of demoralisation and brutalisation. To criticise the United States' empire was almost never a renunciation of empire as an inherently unjust, immoral or even illiberal form of rule. Instead, peacemakers were engaged in a form of imperial criticism that was ultimately constructive, as they envisioned the world of empires that they hoped that the United States might bring into being.

Epilogue: 1904

'Great indeed is Fear; but it is not, as our military enthusiasts believe and try to make us believe, the only stimulus known for awakening the higher ranges of men's spiritual energy.'[1]

William James

Introduction

Between 1895 and 1904, the peace movement failed at almost every turn. The *fin de siècle* had seen American political culture and foreign policy undergo a metamorphosis. Most strikingly, the United States had acquired the insular empire. The Philippines had been annexed, war raged across the archipelago, the United States stood on the cusp of creating a Cuban protectorate, and the nation had acquired a host of other 'appurtenances' to the union. However, beyond this, radical shifts had taken place that left the peace movement's core missions all but ruined. Jingoism had infected the American body politic: wrecking the cause of arbitration in 1897, driving the country to war in 1898, and allowing unchristian vice to flourish while the stars and stripes hung above Manila. As they gathered with their European counterparts in Boston in 1904 for the thirteenth Universal Peace Congress, the country that lay before them was transformed radically in contrast to when the Congress had last been hosted in the United States, at the 1893 Chicago World's Fair.

However, while the movement failed to fulfil any of its short-term policy aims, its impact on American intellectual life was far more profound than this list of failures would indicate. Their desired policy outcomes may not have materialised, but the peacemakers had shifted American political discourse, altering how liberal Americans believed that their country ought to position itself in the world of empires. The movement's restless campaigning consistently provided an alternate way forward for Americans in search of a Providential role in world history, widening the ambit of the possible. Focussing on the politics of peace highlights the contingency of the United States' imperial formation, emphasising that this was the product of conscious choices, rather than it coming into being as an accident. Furthermore, although they didn't know it, the peacemakers' ideas were prescient. The warnings of a looming global conflict were apt and so too were the policies that they prescribed as a remedy for the ills of an ever-more competitive global system. Instruments of global governance, which sought to bind Western imperial projects closer together, would become more prevalent and pertinent on both sides of the First World War. Thus, their vision of a Pax Americana was a dreamworld that soon existed on the cusp of reality.

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[1] William James, 'The Moral Equivalent of War', in Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (eds.), *The Works of William James* (Charlottesville, 2008), Vol. 11, p. 173.

Often the peacemakers failed due to their naivety. Ignorant as to how power was practised in Gilded Age politics and imperial geopolitics, the idealists that made up the peace movement failed to see how their utopian ideals might be received and understood by their contemporaries. While the movement was well-networked, it failed to understand how policymakers might take the lofty ambitions of their rhetoric and contort this to the cause of American self-interest.

This epilogue is therefore concerned with those who picked up these ideas, which the peace movement had developed in the crucible of American imperial discourse, and applied them in ways that the peacemakers could not, illuminating the limitations of idealism on the movement's politics and demonstrating how peace could be co-opted for pragmatic and imperialist ends. It will unpack two case studies that illustrate how political actors turned to the rhetoric and logic of the peace movement when seeking to articulate a new vision of the United States' role in the age of New Imperialism. Although these actors did not wholly subscribe to the politics of peacecraft, a desire for the United States to fulfil its exceptionalist role in the world of empires saw them pioneer the use of modern tools of global governance.

Firstly, it examines the ways in which the Harvard philosopher William James confronted the failures of the peace movement to guide public opinion away from jingoism and militarism. Realising that this was a task far beyond the peace movement, James set out an alternate understanding of peaceful politics as he sought to devise 'The Moral Equivalent of War'. Secondly, it looks at how President Theodore Roosevelt co-opted the language and ideas of the peace movement when he devised his response to the debt crises in Venezuela (1902) and Santo Domingo (1904). Far from being naive as to the application of geopolitical power, Roosevelt's response – best known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine – took up the peacemakers' ambitions of building a global state and extended them into new territory. Where many peacemakers had often dreamed of an international state comprised of a global legislature and global judiciary, Roosevelt set forth the idea of a world police power led by the United States.

In all, these case studies illustrate that while the peace movement failed, the practice of peacemaking endured.

The Moral Equivalent of War

William James was one of the most eccentric members of the peace movement. Born to a wealthy, literary family in New York, James spent his childhood traversing the Atlantic, as he and his siblings (including brother Henry James) frequently journeyed to Europe. Having studied at Harvard, James embarked on an academic career that saw him become a pioneer in the emerging

field of psychology, publish widely on religion, and establish pragmatism as a philosophical doctrine. Although not a frequent contributor to popular discussions of peace, James had opposed the growing imperial tenor of the United States' foreign policy, claiming that the nation was at risk of 'puking up its ancient soul' during the debates over the annexation of the Philippines.[2]

By the time the father of American psychology arrived at the 1904 Universal Peace Congress, his oppositional views were hardening. Held at Tremont Temple, the site of numerous anti-imperialist meetings and just a short walk from James' office at Harvard, the doyens of the peace movement were in attendance. This included American peace leaders such as Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, Julia Ward Howe, and Herbert Welsh, but also newcomers such as Jane Addams and Booker T. Washington. Furthermore, peacemakers from across the globe had travelled to Boston to take part, including the Austrian Baroness, Bertha von Suttner, author of the bestselling novel *Die Waffen Nieder* (Lay Down Your Arms) and perhaps the most prominent peace activist in Europe – as well as the veteran arbitration campaigner William Randal Cremer.

Late into the evening on the conference's penultimate day, William James rose to give the final speech of the day – in which he sought to set out the philosophical basis for peace. The evening had already seen a star-studded roster of Victorian peacemakers; however, unlike many other peacemakers, James was notably more downcast than his colleagues. Clearly rattled by the country's recent slide into jingoism and the scenes of violence in the Philippines and South Africa, James saw only failure. The past decade had seen the peace movement lose the battle for public opinion in spite of its best efforts, as the American public consistently opted to support the cause of militarism and jingoism. Therefore, James concluded that something profound was at play.

In a line of thinking that stood in stark contrast to many of his colleagues in the room, James reasoned that peace was not man's true state of nature – in fact, the opposite was true. According to James, a biological tendency towards violence was an enduring and unchanging aspect of man's innate character. 'Our permanent enemy is the rooted bellicosity of human

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[2] William James to Henry Lee Higginson, 18 September 1900, in Ignas K. Skrupskelis, and Elizabeth M Berkeley (eds.), *The Correspondence of William James* (Charlottesville, 2008), Vol. 9, p. 312. For a more complete view of James' views of foreign affairs see Robert Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (New York, 1968), pp. 35-52; Alexander Livingston, *Damn Great Empires!: William James and the Politics of Pragmatism* (New York, 2016); Linda Schott, 'Jane Addams and William James on Alternatives to War', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54/2 (1993), pp. 241-54; Duncan Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race: Utopia, Empire and the Destiny of Anglo-America* (Princeton, 2020), pp. 318-319.

nature', he proclaimed to the room full of peacemakers.[3] This inherent bellicosity was not confined to the martial-spirited warmongers that were found in the military, but was a quality on full display among 'historians in their studies and clergymen in the pulpits', all of whom strayed into being 'war's idealizers'.[4] As a result, he argued that a 'millennium of peace would not breed the fighting disposition out of our bone and marrow, and a function so ingrained and vital will never consent to die without resistance, and will always find impassioned apologists and idealizers.'[5] James' biological determinism rang a dissonant note with the otherwise idealistic tone of the conference. In language that likely would have alarmed the gathering of peacemakers, James claimed that 'We do ill, I think, therefore, to talk much of universal peace or of a general disarmament. We must go in for preventive medicine, not for radical cure.'[6]

It was not only James' enquiry into human nature that would have shaken his audience to their very core. The Harvard philosopher went further and explored why war held such an enduring hold on human nature. James postulated that a desire to experience danger and risk lay at the heart of man's attraction to war, with it representing 'the final bouquet of life's fireworks.'[7] This alluring quality was entirely understandable given the track record of human history – '[If] we think how many things beside the frontiers of states the wars of history have decided,' James queried, 'we must feel some respectful awe, in spite of all the horrors.'[8] This may not be such a bad thing, thought James, as he claimed that Western 'civilization, good and bad alike, has had past wars for its determining condition.'[9] And thus should war disappear as a reality of human life, a 'deadly listlessness would come over most men's imagination of the future if they could seriously be brought to believe that never again […] would a war trouble human history.'[10] James was certainly not glad that this was the state of affairs; however, he was acutely aware that his diagnosis of the state of war and peace at the turn of the century ran counter to the optimistic liberalism of the mainstream of the peace movement. For James, even if peace sat at the apex of Victorian civilisation, war was the vital (though perilous) engine of historical progress.

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[3] *Official Report of The Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress, Held at Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., October Third to Eight, 1904* (Boston, 1904), p. 267.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid. p. 268.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid. p. 267.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

In his closing remarks, James mused that there was, perhaps, one arena where man's natural attraction to violence might reasonably be channelled. 'A country that turns its arms only against uncivilized foes is, I think, wrongly taunted as degenerate.'[11] Such a state of affairs was surely better than 'absolute crimes against civilization'.[12] In essence, according to James, if man had to wage a war, surely colonial wars were better than wars among civilised Western powers.

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The speech to the Boston peacemakers was, however, only the beginning for William James. Having taken a year-long visiting position at Stanford in 1906, James expanded on his thoughts and offered a solution to the problem of human nature that he had outlined two years earlier. Despite the interlude, James' analysis of human nature remained the same, as he delivered a speech to Stanford students and faculty members in which he surveyed human history to demonstrate the inherency of war to human character. To seek to extinguish this natural inclination was, for James, a fool's errand, as he claimed that 'military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their place among our ideals until better substitutes are offered than the glory and shame that come to nations as well as to individuals from the ups and downs of politics and the vicissitudes of trade.'[13]

Following a similar logic to that of Theodore Roosevelt's valorisation of 'The Strenuous Life', James accepted that martial masculinity and physical hardship were laudable and virtuous endeavours. 'Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood,' he noted, 'and human life without hardihood would be contemptible.'[14] Indeed, according to the Harvard philosopher, all agreed that 'the race should never cease to breed' such values.[15] However, unlike Roosevelt, he acknowledged that, despite its intrinsic utility, man's innate tendency to belligerence ought not to be the guiding principle of modern life. Instead, James articulated a vision of the United States guided by a perfect equilibrium of militarism and peace. 'The duty is incumbent on mankind, of keeping military characters in stock,' he commented to his audience at Stanford, 'of keeping them, if not for use, then as ends in themselves and as pure pieces of perfection – so that Roosevelt's weaklings and mollycoddles may not end by making everything else disappear from

[11] Ibid. p. 268-9.

[12] Ibid. p. 269

[13] James, 'The Moral Equivalent of War', p. 162.

[14] Ibid. p. 166.

[15] Ibid.

the face of nature.'[16]

Despite his overtures to man's violent character, James firmly grounded himself as a purveyor of peace, stating that 'I devoutly believe in the ultimate reign of peace and in the gradual advent of some sort of a socialistic equilibrium.'[17] However, away from the placid sensibilities of the peacemakers, he found himself truly able to speak his mind. 'But I do not believe that peace either ought to be or will be permanent on this globe,' he argued, 'unless the states pacifically organized preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline.'[18] Of course, the idea that army discipline would have any constructive role to play in the establishment of a peaceful world order would have been a hard pill to swallow for a movement that had recently excoriated the conduct of the American military in the Far East.

James' solution as to how to channel martial spirit towards the welfare of the nation, without allowing it to become all-consuming, was to seek out the 'Moral Equivalent of War'. Specifically, this represented a Turnerian peace that harnessed the language of empire and conservation - with James arguing that man ought to channel his energies into battling nature.[19] Instead of mandating military conscription, the United States ought to introduce 'a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against *nature* […] and numerous other benefits to the commonwealth would follow.'[20] This would satiate the desire of young men to experience danger and risk and would provide society with men who had laboured for the betterment of their nation and themselves. Not only would this cultivate a virtuous base of republican citizens, but the policy would also extend man's mastery over nature itself. In line with contemporary ideas of conservation, James' call for young men to return to the frontier was rooted in a desire to impose human efficiency on nature's inherent capacity to produce waste. James' fleshed out his vision to those in the audience:

> 'The military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind, as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's real relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently solid and hard foundations of his higher life. To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. p. 170.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Frederick Jackson Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History,' in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1893* (Washington D.C., 1894), pp. 199-227. A little over a decade prior, Frederick Jackson Turner had remarked upon the function of the expanding frontier in the development of American history and had mused upon the looming effects of its closure.

[20] Ibid. p. 171. Italics from original text.

> December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. They would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in immemorial human warfare against nature, they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and teachers of the following generation.'[21]

Which nature man was supposed to enter was unclear. Given, that the ability to conquer nature was an established trope in the nineteenth-century construction of white identity, the expansionist undertones to his comments were likely not lost on his audience.[22] Furthermore, given his comments in Boston that colonial warfare was the lesser of two evils, it is easy to imagine the specific territories that James believed were ripe for conservation and improvement. With the frontier having closed and the United States having gained colonial holdings across the Pacific, therefore, the corollary to the moral equivalent of war seemed to be colonial governance.

William James was both a purveyor of peace and a critic of the politics of peace. Being alive to the failures of the peace movement and seeing through its progressive idealistic rhetoric, James' solution was thus to steer into the skid of empire. Any attempt to divert man from his natural warlike tendencies would prove ineffective and thus grand visions of universal peace were working against the grain of man in his state of nature. Rather than seeing imperialism as producing problems that could only be assuaged via an overriding of human nature, James saw empire as a necessary corrective for the flaws of man's nature. As such, he rejected the schemes of global governance, universal peace, and disarmament in favour of a different utopia –man's return to the natural frontier.

The Peace of Justice

Just weeks after William James had given his preliminary thoughts on peace to the Universal Peace Congress in Boston, President Theodore Roosevelt issued his annual message to Congress. Covering topics as varied as environmental management and labour relations, the 1904 State of the Union message was also a lengthy exposition of the Bull Moose's vision for the United States' role in the world. Indeed, it offered a vision of world peace entirely distinct from that on display in Boston, even when compared to the biological essentialism of William James,

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[21] Ibid. p. 171-2. For more on the context of turn-of-the-century debates over conservation and resource management, see Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920* (Pittsburgh, 1999), pp. 1-4.

[22] Ian R. Tyrrell, *Crisis of the Wasteful Nation: Empire and Conservation in Theodore Roosevelt's America* (Chicago, 2015), p. 6.

in the form of his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The events leading up to his 1904 annual message had given Roosevelt much to contemplate. Nine years earlier, Roosevelt had rejoiced at the prospect of a looming war with Britain over the issue of Venezuela, specifically taking aim at the peace movement, claiming with glee to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, 'I rather hope the fight will come soon. The clamour of the peace faction has convinced me that this country needs a war.'[23] Almost a decade later issues regarding the South American republic were flaring up once more, and Roosevelt found himself with another opportunity to beat back the European powers from the Western Hemisphere. Shortly after the boundary dispute with Britain had been adjudicated by a panel of legal experts, the government of Venezuela, led by the nationalist President Cipriano Castro, defaulted on its debts, many of which were held by German and British creditors. As European gunships loomed off the coast of Caracas, the American president gave the green light to Berlin and London to press their claims, stating that if 'any South American State misbehaves towards any European country […] let the European country spank it.'[24] However, despite his initial enthusiasm for European action, the realities of European gunboat diplomacy off the coast of Caracas gave Roosevelt pause for thought. As Venezuelan ships were sunk and Puerto Cabello was bombarded, the President pressed the powers to retreat and bring the case to The Hague for arbitration. A full-scale European intervention had been avoided, for now.

Unfortunately, this did not mark the end of European powers embarking on missions of debt collection in the Western Hemisphere. A separate case had been simmering in the Caribbean, as the republic of Santo Domingo verged on revolution and anarchy, struggling under the weight of its debts to American and European creditors. The island had previously been the subject of intrigue for American statesmen and businessmen – just as had been the case in Cuba – and its burgeoning sugar economy had meant that investments totalling $20 million had flowed into the island via the New York-based Santo Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC).[25] Therefore, when the faltering republic defaulted on its debts to the SDIC in mid-1904, the company took over the customs house, much to the dismay of the circling Europeans. Fearing a repeat of the Venezuelan episode, the President pre-emptively dispatched ships to protect the company's

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[23] Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven; London, 1998), p. 39.

[24] Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York, 2011), p. 226.

[25] Walter LaFeber, *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 2: The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 188. For more on the long history of the United States' imperial relations with Santo Domingo in the nineteenth century, see Nicholas Guyatt, 'America's Conservatory: Race, Reconstruction, and the Santo Domingo Debate', *The Journal of American History*, 97/4 (2011), pp. 974-1000.

property and authority from Dominican retribution, as well as the integrity of the government from European intrigue.

With war looming, the American President had no shortage of suggestions as to how best to de-escalate the stand-off over Dominican debt. A Pan-American solution had already emerged in the form of the Drago Doctrine, a subversion of the Monroe Doctrine originally articulated by the Argentine diplomat Luis Drago in response to the Venezuelan blockade. Hoping to foster Pan-American multilateralism, Drago called for the American nations to multi-laterally declare that intervention in the Western Hemisphere on the basis of debt collection (whether by Europeans or Americans) was illegitimate.[26] Similarly, interested Europeans chimed in with their own suggestions regarding how best to settle issues of Latin American debt. Modelled after European interventions in Greece and Turkey, the governments of Belgium, France and Italy suggested that the burden of financial management ought to be shared amongst the powers – with each nation assuming ownership of a single customs house on the island.[27] Whereas this solution would likely have chimed with the genteel imperialism of the peacemakers (and resembled many of the policy solutions they had devised to forestall annexation of the Philippines), Roosevelt had other ideas.

Not wishing to rely on non-American ideas and policies, Roosevelt devised a distinct and creative solution to the problem of growing European interference in the Western Hemisphere – namely, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. While Roosevelt jettisoned the multilateral tendencies of the peace movement, he instead was happy to rely on the movement's idealism and, most of all, their advocacy for global governance.

Roosevelt had previously done little to conceal his disdain for the peace movement. During the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute (1895) he had written to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge to complain of the endeavours of the advocates of international arbitration. 'The moneyed and semi-cultivated classes, especially of the Northeast,' he wrote, 'are doing their best to bring this country down to the Chinese level.'[28] The only 'legitimate fruit' that would be borne out of the politics of peace, according to Roosevelt, would be the production of a 'flabby, timid type of character, which eats away the great fighting features of our race.'[29] However, by the time he

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[26] Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine,* p. 228.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 29 April 1896 in Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.) *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge 1884-1918* Vol. I (New York, 1925), p. 218.

[29] Ibid.

pondered his response to the revanchist European powers, his attitude seemed to have softened.

Although President Roosevelt's 1904 State of the Union is best remembered for his articulation of the Roosevelt Corollary, the message was a far more expansive articulation of his worldview – including his views of peace – than is often acknowledged. Having already opined on the domestic issues of the day – from civil service reform to conservation – the President turned to foreign relations. Rather than immediately addressing the looming conflict with the Old World, Roosevelt instead turned to the politics of peace. 'The steady aim of this Nation,' claimed Roosevelt, 'should be to strive to bring ever nearer the day when there shall prevail throughout the world the peace of justice.'[30] Such a vision of peace was to be contrasted with those who preached the message of peace at any cost and instead represented the imposition of 'the Strenuous Life' onto geopolitics. Much like William James, Roosevelt took aim at the naive assumption that peace was man's true state of nature, instead claiming that peace was something that needed to be vigorously defended and if necessary enforced. 'There are kinds of peace which are highly undesirable, which are in the long run as destructive as any war' argued the President, '[t]yrants and oppressors have many times made a wilderness and called it peace.'[31] As such, in what was likely a pointed attack on the peace movement, Roosevelt attacked the timidity of those who refused to stand up for the nation's security:

> 'Many times peoples who were slothful or timid or shortsighted, who had been enervated by ease or by luxury, or misled by false teachings, have shrunk in unmanly fashion from doing duty that was stern and that needed self-sacrifice, and have sought to hide from their own minds their shortcomings, their ignoble motives, by calling them love of peace.'[32]

Roosevelt's definition of peace was thus markedly different from that articulated by the mainstream of the peace movement. What good was peace, queried Roosevelt, if it had no teeth? In contemplating this, TR outlined his understanding of international society and global government that would underpin his reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Multilateralism and the politics of cooperation were seemingly desirable outcomes; however, sometimes such peaceful ambitions needed to be backed up with force in order to prevent transgressions against the international order. Roosevelt reasoned that the goal of the United States, and indeed all civilised nations, should be 'the attainment of the peace of justice, of the peace which comes when each nation is not merely safe-guarded in its own rights, but scrupulously recognizes and

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[30] 'Message of the President' in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1904* (Washington D.C., 1905).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

performs its duty toward others.'[33]

In articulating a conception of the obligations that were owed between nations – and querying how these might be adjudicated and enforced – Roosevelt had waded into a debate that had plagued the peace movement for decades. The dream of the apparatus of a global state – to mediate the geopolitical conflict – had been an ever-present feature of the peacemakers' internationalist thought.[34] The establishment of a general system of international arbitration, under the auspices of a world court, was the first priority for peacemakers. The next concern was to construct the so-called 'Parliament of Man' – a global legislature that might further develop international law. However, the final pillar of a global state remained elusive. Given that the idealist visions for a global state were rooted in peace activism, the concept of a global executive – frequently referred to as an international police force – which might enforce arbitral decisions was often considered to be redundant to the utopia that peacemakers were seeking to build. For instance, in his 1899 manifesto for a cosmopolitan system of global governance, *The Federation of the World*, Benjamin Franklin Trueblood outlined his hesitancy at proposing an international executive:

> 'As to the enforcement of the legal enactments of the world government, little difficulty might be expected. An international police is certainly not impossible, if it should ever be needed to enforce the decrees of a congress of nations. Such a state as we are supposing will not, however, be established until arbitration generally prevails and war is practically a thing of the past. Law will then need few, if any, sanctions, and force will play a very small part in its execution. The sense of honor and loyalty to right will prove amply sufficient to secure obedience. The chief functions of the government of the world state will be legislative and judicial, and its executive duties will be largely those of simple direction and guidance rather than of compulsion.'[35]

Unlike Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, Theodore Roosevelt was hardly so sanguine. Instead, Roosevelt argued that in order to achieve 'the peace of justice' – where nations respected their obligations to others – civilised nations needed to take decisive action to fortify the integrity of the international order. Much like the peacemakers, Roosevelt acknowledged that the peaceful and cooperative resolution of international disputes was a worthy goal. However, he stressed that the engine of a peaceful world order would not be an international judiciary or a 'Parliament of Man', but instead a global police force. Acknowledging that there was 'no judicial way of enforcing a right in international law', Roosevelt reasoned that the result of this would either be

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[33] Ibid.

[34] For more info on peacemakers' debates over international society and global governance, see Warren F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Nashville, 1969), passim.

[35] Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, *The Federation of the World* (Boston; New York, 1899), p. 144.

a greater acquiescence to international misbehaviour (and thus the promotion of 'brutality and aggression'), or for any 'aggrieved nation [to] valiantly [..] stand up for its rights.'[36]

In a boon to the peace movement, Roosevelt concluded that any 'self-respecting, just, and far-seeing nation' should seek to 'aid in the development of the various movements which tend to provide substitutes for war,' an endeavour which would render all peoples and nations 'more responsive to the general sentiment of humane and civilized mankind'.[37] However, Roosevelt's preferred way of achieving this took the peace movement's ideas of global governance and stretched them to their fullest extent. Not only ought a virtuous nation to 'repel any wrong', but it should also 'in exceptional cases […] take action which in a more advanced stage of international relations would come under the head of the exercise of the international police.'[38]

Thus, Roosevelt's scepticism that the international order could be governed without coercion had given him reason to propose the third and final arm of a global state, a project which had consistently proved a bridge too far for the peace movement. With this in mind, he turned to the most pressing geopolitical matter of the day. 'All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous', he noted in a clear allusion to the recent debt crises in Venezuela and Santo Domingo.[39] Nevertheless, the President was also keen to wave his big stick, as he proclaimed that '[c]hronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may […] ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation'.[40] The natural outcome of such a policy, was an expansion of the Monroe Doctrine such that the United States would be forced 'however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.'[41]

The Roosevelt Corollary was thus simply a reinterpretation of ideas that had been in circulation among the peace movement for at least the past decade. Roosevelt had simply picked up the peace movement's ideas and ran with them. As always, the movement had been naive as to how their ideas could or should be applied in practice, failing to grapple with the difficult decisions that would need to be taken in order to make their dreamworld a reality. That the movement's

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[36] 'Message of the President' in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1904* (Washington D.C., 1905).

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

greatest antagonist, the hero of San Juan Hill, could so easily co-opt the movement's rhetoric and ideas was emblematic of the movement's idealism. However, this also pointed towards the enduring appeal of global governance as a remedy for the inherent competitiveness of the world of empires. Despite his track record of taunting peacefully-minded Americans, Theodore Roosevelt would soon be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in ending the Russo-Japanese War. As the movement lurched towards the 1910s, the remit of who might be considered a peacemaker was still expanding; the movement was losing its grip on who owned the politics of peace.

Conclusion

Both William James and Theodore Roosevelt, in their own ways, saw through the idealism of the peace movement. As a hardened realist and imperial statesman, Roosevelt was direct in his assertion that a global state without coercive enforcement would be all but meaningless. Similarly, James realised that human nature, and thus public opinion, was more bellicose than the idealistic peacemakers cared to acknowledge and thus the dreams of universal peace ought to be secondary to the channelling of man's energies towards the frontier. However, while these two case studies starkly highlight the naivety of the peace movement – and help explain why they failed so regularly – they also demonstrate the enduring appeal of the politics of peace. Ideas of international cooperation and conflict reduction remained attractive, whether they were bottom-up attempts to divert man's innate vigour towards the frontier or top-down visions of a global state. Indeed, despite their realism, both James and Roosevelt saw a providential narrative to human history that arose from man's natural tendency towards conflict. The tension between the world of empires' inherent competitiveness and an arc of progress that bent towards a civilised and peaceful state of world affairs gave liberal Americans much to think about at the turn of the century; the peace movement provided the intellectual building blocks with which the United States would come to articulate a solution to this problem. However, in constructing their dreamworld, the peacemakers failed to address the contradictions and tensions present in their worldview. Specifically, they neglected to probe empire's inherently violent qualities when they argued that peace was the apex of civilisation. As such, both James and Roosevelt articulated the things that the peacemakers either couldn't say or would only say *sotto voce* – namely that coercion and violence were facts of life that had to be accommodated, rather than wished away.

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The world of empires at the turn of the century was built on the mythology of peace. Peace did not simply mean the absence of war but also represented an imperial logic and a style of politics. As an imperial argument, a tranquil world order represented the end of history that liberal

imperialists envisioned when assessing the broad sweep of human existence. Peace was thus something to promote among Western empires, which had an inherent tendency to compete with one another, and something to impose on the less civilised nations of the world, which had yet to meet the necessary threshold of human development.

The history of the peace movement is thus instructive in helping us understand the tangle of ideas and arguments that undergirded the spread of Western Empires prior to the outbreak of the First World War. As a global-facing and well-connected community, the American peace movement was a wellspring for ideas regarding the United States' role in a world of empires; peacemakers simultaneously embodied the roles of creative theorists and strident critics of the United States' shifting imperial formation. Operating as the American arm of a broader transimperial ecosystem of peace activism, which emanated from the metropolises of Western Europe, the movement worked in tandem with other peacefully-minded groups across the Atlantic to steer Western empires towards peaceful coexistence and internal harmony. The legacy peace organisations, such as the American Peace Society and the Universal Peace Union, were not the only major players in this transimperial web of peacemaking; overlapping worlds of reform – most notably temperance and missionary work – represented sturdy redoubts of peacemaking. As a result, they typified the worldview of Victorian liberalism in the United States, adhering to a value system underpinned by Christian internationalism, free trade dogma, middle-class refinement, and professional respectability.

The politics of peace did not necessarily entail the abolition of Western imperialism, but rather called for the regulation, modernisation, and Christianisation of nineteenth-century imperial practice – as peacemakers laboured to draw the sting out of the age of empires. As a result, many in the movement butted up against the emerging labels of pro- and anti-imperialist, as they envisioned a more perfect form of imperial rule and became accidental (if unfulfilled) empire builders. In the minds of many peace activists, critiquing the United States' empire project did not amount to a complete rejection of empire as a form of government. Indeed, while many peacemakers operated in the orbit of the Anti-Imperialist League during the Great Debate, they did so with the intent of providing constructive criticism, either seeking to provide an internationalist alternative to annexation or calling for reform of the United States' administration of the insular empire.

Vital to the peacemakers' understanding of empire were contemporary ideas of global governance, which formed the springboard from which their reconceptualisation of the American imperial project launched. Specifically, they devised internal and external mechanisms to foster international cooperation between imperial powers and the proper implementation of

the civilising mission within empires. External mechanisms for an imperial peace included the implementation of neutralisation zones and multilateral protectorates upon contested imperial space, as well as the promotion of arbitration agreements and international law as means of solving international disputes. In order to maintain peace within empires, peacemakers called for the opening of imperial territories to free trade and missionary work, as well as policies to promote social purity. This emerging model of empire is best understood with reference to the genteel character of the peace movement, with it representing the imposition of white, Christian, middle-class values on the nineteenth-century global order.

World peace was predicated on a racialised understanding of the nineteenth-century world order, in which geopolitics was conducted in accordance with fluid racial hierarchies. Such hierarchies were constructed with the United States in a privileged place as a white, Christian republic with a providential role in world history and all other nations being measured against such qualities. As a result, who counted as a legitimate nation that could participate in international relations – indeed who might potentially qualify as peaceful – was an inherently racialised question. Western empires that were comprised of a white ruling class were broadly considered to exist within the realm of high diplomacy, whereas the so-called backwards nations were required to go through the process of civilisation before they could take a seat at the table. Peace, therefore, operated as a defence of whiteness rather than an altruistic desire to eliminate all violence within the global system. Nowhere was this clearer than in the movement's scepticism towards the politics of humanitarianism, which was only entertained when a threat to global whiteness emerged – whether that be in the movement's response to the massacre of Armenian Christians in the Near East or the revelations of American military misconduct in the Philippines. Similarly, relations between the peace movement and anti-colonial activists were often mediated through a prism of civilisational chauvinism, with many anti-colonial activists either being ignored, rebuffed, or kept at an arm's length.

As well as a worldview, peace also operated as a style of politics, in which peacemakers sought to embody their own peaceful ideals. Partially an extension of the abolitionist political style of the mid-nineteenth century, peacecraft represented an attempt to wrest the practice of diplomacy and the development of imperial policy away from policymakers in Washington. Peacemakers, therefore, took up the role of private diplomat, engaged in acts of public diplomacy, lobbied governments, practised moral suasion, maintained international chains of correspondence, attended international conferences, and preached the gospel of peace from the pulpit. In doing so they made and remade American foreign relations outside of the traditional venues of power, as they contested and reinterpreted the American empire project so as to fashion it in keeping

with their genteel worldview. The work and thought of women were vital in this. Figures such as Hannah J. Bailey, Alice Stone Blackwell, and Belva Ann Lockwood constructed and contested American imperialism at every turn, petitioning governments, creating transimperial networks, and organising peace conferences. 1904 also saw the entry of Jane Addams into the world of peacecraft, with the pioneer of Hull House addressing the Universal Peace Conference in Boston to outline a Progressive alternative to war – just minutes before William James spoke of a 'Moral Equivalent of War'.[42] It is therefore no surprise that, in the decades to come, peace work became a redoubt of women's political activism; Jane Addams would go on to found the Women's Peace Party in 1915 and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in 1919.

War makes for compelling stories. However, a focus on the politics of peace is vital to understanding the ways in which thinkers and policymakers understood the United States' empire and the world around them. The unspooling of the relationship between liberalism and empire is a knotty historical problem that has yielded numerous insights into both the inner workings of the United States' empire project, as well as the development of liberalism in Gilded Age America. How in one breath did nineteenth-century Americans preach a message of freedom, rights, and justice, and in the next embark on an imperial project that would trample all over such lofty ideals? An unyielding faith in the forward march of progress was the lodestar for American liberals, casting a long shadow over the valence of rationality and emancipation in imperial politics. Peace was vital to this intellectual equation. More than being a simple call to end war, peace carried within it a constellation of ideas that motivated Americans to promote and critique imperialism, while widening the ambit of the possible within Gilded Age politics. Moreover, peace became a form of statecraft, one that provided Americans with a set of tools with which they could navigate and even steward a global system characterised by imperial rivalry. From this perspective, the American empire project is riddled with contingency, and its construction littered with roads not taken. And while the vision of a Pax Americana and a nineteenth-century rules-based international order was never brought into being during the age of empires, peace remained at the core of the imperial imagination.

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[42] *Official Report of The Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress, Held at Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A., October Third to Eight, 1904* (Boston, 1904), pp. 145-147; 261-262.

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