

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


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BOURDIEUSIAN POLITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: The Field of War Correspondence 1990-2003

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Lincoln College



Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford

Michaelmas Term 2007 [i.e. 2008 - 1 TS - 1/12/08]

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Abstract:

This thesis examines the cogency of Bourdieusian political theory and social science on phenomenological, empirical and normative grounds. It investigates whether Bourdieu's philosophy of science leads logically to the political content of Bourdieusian theory, and concludes that the originary determinism which characterises Bourdieu's work is a normative commitment. Rather than characterising that which is bracketed out of Bourdieu's neo-Marxist phenomenology – that is, the level of determination accessible neither to the consciousness of the social agent nor the social scientist – as inherently coercive, the thesis argues that the Bourdieusian model can be defended on deontological grounds. Specifically, this entails a deontological acceptance of the cultural value of autonomy and accountability. The tension between these two in turn raises the problem of acceptable levels of exclusion and decontestation, and the thesis concludes that a qualified elitism is defensible and compatible with Bourdieusian principles. The thesis incorporates a case study which serves two functions. First, it puts into empirical practice the principles of Bourdieusian philosophy of social science to ascertain what implications and normative commitments are built into Bourdieusian methodology. In this regard it concludes that while it is possible to produce constructive analysis of systematically misrecognised economies, it becomes necessary to delineate the point beyond which positing further levels of coercive determination is counter-productive – and this can only be done according to deontological criteria. Second, it assesses the merit of Bourdieusian sociologies relative to existing accounts of the journalistic field. It concludes that while Bourdieu is excessively dismissive of individual awareness of the conditions of their field, Bourdieusian field analysis produces significant insights into the processes of naturalisation, self-identification, esotericisation and disinterestedness.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

In this thesis I undertake a political theoretical analysis of Bourdieusian generative or genetic structuralism, investigating whether the heuristic model Bourdieu constructs around the concepts of habitus and field is cogent on phenomenological, empirical and normative grounds.[1] I argue that the designation as political of that which is bracketed out of Bourdieusian phenomenology cannot be derived from Bourdieu's philosophy of social science, and is instead a normative commitment to the priority of political domination. After examining in detail the cogency and political implications of Bourdieusian generative structuralism and its application to fields of cultural production, a case study is presented, comprising a Bourdieusian analysis of the journalistic subfield of war correspondence in the period 1990-2003. The case study is significant in the first instance in what it reveals about the misrecognised principles of differentiation which concretise and reproduce hierarchical power relations both within the field of war correspondence and its relation to external journalistic and non-journalistic fields: namely, it establishes that there are obscured economies of esotericisation and disinterestedness (or ambivalence) which enshrine hierarchical structures as natural and unremarkable.

The case study is more broadly significant in what it reveals about the implications of putting Bourdieusian political-sociological methodology into practice. One important implication is the tension it reveals between the originary determinism, which generative structuralism accords to the processes of subjectification and objectification, and the conception of agency which underpins Bourdieu's normative commitment to autonomy from domination and contestability. While it is true that Bourdieu's phenomenological and political commitments are at least partly in conflict, the aim of this thesis is not primarily to establish the most defensible compromise between these two poles, as other authors have done previously. Bourdieu's aim is to supersede this opposition, establishing the political complicity of its endurance as an interpretative system, rather than arguing for its reconciliation. I argue that while Bourdieu is not entirely successful in this endeavour, he is correct to shift analytical focus from observed manifestations of subjectivity to its structural conditions of possibility.

[1] 'Normative' in this thesis is defined in opposition to 'descriptive'; *i.e.* pertaining to political convictions about what ought to be rather than what is.

I demonstrate that Bourdieu's prioritisation of reflexivity is not, despite his own claims and those of others, an attempt to construct a normless social scientific method, but rather a normative commitment to accountability, responsibility and qualified contestability. While seemingly at odds with Bourdieu's rejection of individualism, the principle of holding cultural producers to account is defensible on deontological grounds, and compatible with Bourdieusian phenomenology insofar as its objects of knowledge are not only disembodied field practices, but the processes of individuation by which agents internalise and practically enact these practices. As a phenomenologist Bourdieu seeks to account for how political determination is experienced in everyday life, especially inasmuch as it is naturalised. While they are the products of individuation, agents' experience of the lifeworld[2] is as selves constituted through practices of selfhood and differentiation, and as such, it remains defensible to speak of ethical or moral claims, not as universal categories, but as meaningful in a particular field context. Thus, in opposition to Bourdieu's claim that journalistic ethics are wholly strategic, it is valid within the Bourdieusian framework to argue that the content of field ethics, and not only their structural preconditions and strategic effects, are valid objects of knowledge.

This leads to the question of how to establish under which circumstances professional or elite knowledge, given that by Bourdieusian theory it is the product of a symbolic 'game', can be defended. This is shown to be conditional on establishing that the symbolic systems which Bourdieu argues obscure the 'real' political nature of objective relations in a field are nonetheless not entirely arbitrary. That is, instead of viewing a field such as journalism (or academia) as completed by its own internal rules and principles, it becomes necessary to construct a defence of the notion that, while such professional worlds may distort or become disconnected from the objective 'world' in which they subsist, it is not the case that such symbolic economies have no relation to their material contexts. This does not amount to a materially deterministic claim that there is a one-to-one correspondence between objective conditions and the subjective, symbolic experience of the lifeworld. The symbolic system which produces its agents and the means by which they interpret their (in this case professional) milieu is instead to be understood as a particular case of the possible, a single instance of a one-to-many correspondence. While one cannot delineate a generative structure which necessitates the

[2] 'Lifeworld' is used in the Husserlian or Schützian sense of a taken-for-granted stream of everyday routines, interactions and events that constitute individual and social experience, rather than Habermas's reworking of the term. It is noted in Chapter 2 that Bourdieu's philosophy of experience is substantively incompatible with that of Habermas.

symbolic system observed in field analysis, its form 'has reason' and as such one can posit the mechanisms which made this observed form, among others, possible.

Bourdieu argues that symbolic economies are oriented towards reproducing and obscuring hierarchies of economic and symbolic capital. I contend that this is not their only function, that fields of cultural production are also at least thinly representative of an objective world, and as such it is a valid move to establish criteria for assessing one representation versus another. This means that despite the fact that it is precisely the monopoly of the power to define the dominant principles of differentiation which is at stake in the journalistic and academic fields, criteria for judging journalistic and academic work are compatible with Bourdieusian political theory. I argue that reflexivity does not establish this compatibility, since for Bourdieu coercive power relations are prior to and determine the means of their apprehension – that is, the complicity of political analysis invariably remains a possibility. This defence will be undertaken on political grounds, by establishing that the logical consequence of the priority of coercive generative structures is fatalism or narcissism. Given that Bourdieu's philosophy of social science is not wholly objective but also motivated by the norms of autonomy and accountability, a limit must be determined beyond which Bourdieusian analysis becomes politically counter-productive. This cannot be achieved without some cost to contestability, and requires a defence of the authoritative subject of Bourdieusian theory.

In broader terms, I argue that while for Bourdieu political structures and their experience and apprehension by agents are inextricable, this does not amount to conspiratorialism. Rather, there is a hypothetical priority of determination which is phenomenologically bracketed out from analysis on the grounds that it cannot be known. While Bourdieu's writings frequently implicitly ascribe a coercive politicality to this originality, this is a purely normative commitment. It is not incompatible with Bourdieusian theory to suggest otherwise. This entails treating the concepts of autonomy, contestability and responsibility deontologically, rather than as symbolic forms the enactment of which is merely strategic.

1.2 Chapter Survey

Chapter 1 sets out the hypotheses of this thesis, as well as the defining characteristics of Bourdieu's philosophy of social science and the central concepts of habitus, practice, field and symbolic system.

Chapter 2 establishes the principal features of Bourdieusian political phenomenology. It then presents a range of critical perspectives on Bourdieu, beginning with the allegation that Bourdieusian political theory is overly deterministic before assessing the extent to which Bourdieu can be reworked to allow for a more cogent agency, and addressing the claim that Bourdieu is excessively culturalist. It ends by positing those themes which will be tested in the case study.

Chapter 3 analyses Bourdieu's social scientific research method. Taking a methodological focus on the concepts examined theoretically in Chapter 2, it assesses the possibilities and implications of operationalising Bourdieusian theory in sociological practice.

Chapter 4 begins by drawing together and interpreting Bourdieu's writings on the journalistic field. It then addresses the question of what, given Bourdieu's relatively modest output on the media, would constitute a defensibly Bourdieusian analysis of journalism.

Chapter 5 presents the results of the case study. It then develops a secondary Bourdieusian analysis of the data, concluding that the field of war correspondence is characterised by two systematically misrecognised symbolic economies. In the final section, a comparative analysis is presented, assessing the merits of the Bourdieusian case study against contributions from theories of professionalism and media sociology.

Chapter 6 summarises the conclusions of the thesis according to the hypotheses set out earlier in this chapter. It ends by considering the implications of this research, in particular the qualification of the arbitrariness of symbolic systems in fields of cultural production, the validity of the authoritative subject of Bourdieusian theory, and the defence of normative criteria for ascribing value to symbolic forms.

1.3 Hypotheses

The thesis will investigate the following hypotheses:

- That Bourdieu's normative political commitments cannot be derived from the phenomenological principles of generative structuralism as such, but rather follow from the normative loading of Bourdieusian phenomenology.

- That Bourdieu is not compelled to ascribe political complicity to that which is bracketed out, that is, the unknowable origins of political determination. This is, rather, a deontological assertion.

- If Bourdieu's commitment to autonomy from domination, responsibility and contestability are accepted as the normative impetus for Bourdieusian analysis, then a limit can be set beyond which analysis becomes self-regarding or fosters fatalism.

- That Bourdieusian analysis is more insightful than contemporary media sociology and professionalism studies, insofar as it moves beyond existing accounts of mystification to posit that it is precisely by the operation of other (overt) rules that hierarchies of power are concretised and obscured.

- That Bourdieusian analysis uniquely allows not only for the articulation of professional symbolic systems but also how norms are naturalised, internalised and forgotten as norms; and that the determination of self-identity proceeds through the alignment of the adaptable, durable dispositions of habitus to the fields of journalism and academia, and to the metafield of cultural production.

- That Bourdieu is excessively dismissive of individual reflection.

- That Bourdieu is wrong to contend that professional value systems such as journalistic ethics are exclusively strategic. While ethical systems do serve a strategic function, their relation to the objective world in which journalism subsists is not entirely arbitrary.

- That symbolic systems can be said to have reason but are not linearly determined, since they are instances of what is rendered possible by the generative structures of a field.

- That a reflexive authoritative subject of Bourdieusian theory is defensible against allegations of elitism.

1.4 Key principles of Bourdieusian Political Theory and Social Science

1.4.1 The Normative Impetus of Bourdieusian Theory

Bourdieu's normative political commitments are articulated fairly consistently across his written works, and are relatively straightforward to describe. All social spaces are characterised first and foremost by struggle. Fields by definition comprise different objective positions, that is, positions which vary according to economic and political power. Groups and individuals compete to occupy these positions, though the 'game' in which they compete masks the existence of a competition over material resources. This proceeds by way of a struggle to control the symbolic capital which makes objective position-taking appear natural or normalised, and at a second level a struggle over the dominant principles of differentiation: that is, the ability to consecrate specific forms of symbolic capital as meaningful. While these symbolic struggles may become disconnected from objective differences, they tend to have the effect of reproducing those differences, which are hierarchical. Thus, Bourdieu's chief concern is the domination of particular groups by others, effected through the accumulation of symbolic and material capital and control of the means to determine what counts as a differentiating principle of capital. Those who are dominated are complicit in their own domination: since their habitus are aligned to the sociohistorically-specific structures of the field, to act in a manner which inflicts symbolic violence on themselves appears instinctive and unproblematic. And since habitus[3] are shared by members of a group, who have in common configurations of both material and symbolic capital, it makes sense to refer to class habitus. That is, rather than individuals, classes, defined both economically and symbolically through status, are the agents of Bourdieu's model.[4] Complicity is significant because it indicates that a social agent's conscious interests are not identical to his objective interests. Domination is significant because it prevents agents acting autonomously from a field's dominant principles of differentiation. And since habitus are collective generative structures, class self-determination is prioritised as a normative goal in Bourdieu's work. If a field is a professional context, then the overt rules that govern conduct in that field will also have the effect of reproducing the hierarchies of that profession. Thus, in journalism, codes of practice are not immediately meaningful in themselves, but rather insofar as they enshrine context-specific position-takings as a natural state of affairs – that is, insofar as it allows those occupying dominant positions to remain such, and to control future determinations of those codes.

[3] This thesis follows Bourdieu's convention of using 'habitus' to designate both the singular and plural.
[4] Bourdieu, 'The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups'.

While he wrote about and intervened in a variety of political contexts, there is across Bourdieu's work a normative opposition to the dominance of one group over another effected by the internalisation and naturalisation (by all agents) of principles of differentiation of symbolic capital whose merit is dubious and whose correspondence to the structures of the objective world is arbitrary. Within a given field, Bourdieu opposes the endurance of elites whose position is normalised by the collective misrecognition of the conditions underpinning their dominance. In fields of cultural production, Bourdieu opposes the increasing dominance of market-driven principles of domination over principles operating at the pole of restricted production: that is, the criterion of commercial success over criteria generated collectively, and independently of economic demands, by cultural producers. This principle leads to Bourdieu's opposition to the domination exerted by global economic structures over locally endemic value systems, and also to his criticism of the increasing importance of public popularity and financial success in the fields of academia, art and literature. In the first case Bourdieu is, like Foucault, vulnerable to the allegation that he reifies the marginalised. In the second, Bourdieu can be – and is – accused of elitism. I demonstrate in this thesis that Bourdieu is if anything dismissive of the ability of agents (marginal or otherwise) to be able to grasp the reality of their existence: it is left to the social scientist to delineate the generative structures which provide the conditions of possibility of the lifeworld which agents experience uncritically. In defending the authority of reflexive academic knowledge, there is an elitist aspect to Bourdieu's work, not to mention an inconsistency with the works in which Bourdieu maps out the quasi-autonomous (from objective conditions) symbolic economies by which the elites of French academia and the literary world maintain their status. A qualified elitism is defensible within a Bourdieusian framework, though the tension between authority and the vacuity of all-pervasive symbolic signifiers of authority remains. It is not possible to derive unqualifiedly defensible political convictions from Bourdieu's political philosophy, since the latter argues that coercive political relations are prior to and constitutive of the apprehension and articulation of political realities. In short, however well-intentioned I am, I cannot guarantee that by expressing normative commitments I am not complicit in the reproduction of hierarchies of power at some undetected level.

1.4.2 Bourdieu and Journalism

Bourdieu came to focus on the media only late in his career, and journalism in particular only sporadically and at the macroscopic level. While the case study will reveal limits to what

Bourdieusian field analysis can defensibly say about journalism and the subfield of war correspondence, its conclusions about how the field operates beyond the level of individual strategy and institutional structures are a significant addition to the sociological understanding of the professional practice of war correspondence. It will be established that the principal themes of the case study – the systematic misrecognition of symbolic economies of mystification and disinterestedness – are not restricted to what they can tell us about Bourdieusian theory or methodology, but contribute substantively to a growing field of Bourdieusian analysis of media fields.[5] Such a Bourdieusian account of journalism is a significant enhancement of Bourdieu's own writings on journalism, which were produced in the context of a mutual antipathy which bordered on the polemical and personal.[6]

1.5 Bourdieusian Theoretical Antecedents

Bourdieu's work ranges from anthropology to political polemic, political philosophy to social scientific methodology. His theorisation and sociological analysis of media fields was limited to a subset of the analysis of cultural production,[7] though it continues to develop and diversify in contemporary Bourdieusian theory and sociology. In short, there are many Bourdieus, and it is important to establish what counts as Bourdieusian. As regards political theory this thesis takes as its starting point the Bourdieu of *Outline of a Theory of Practice*[8] and *The Logic of Practice*,[9] with subsequent elucidation and contextualisation drawn from the full range of Bourdieu's publications. As regards methodology, it is similarly difficult to delineate a definitive account of Bourdieusian social scientific practice. While most widely known for the field analysis which forms the basis of *Distinction*, Bourdieu's sociologies use methods ranging from correspondence

[5] See especially R. D. Benson and E. Neveu, *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005b).
[6] See, for instance, J. Bouveresse, *Bourdieu, Savant & Politique* (Marseille: Agone, 2004): 89-96.
[7] That Bourdieu tended to focus on cultural producers rather than audiences or media content is criticised in, for instance, T. J. Berard, 'Dada between Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy and Bourdieu's Distinction: Existenz and Conflict in Cultural Analysis', *Theory, Culture & Society,* vol. 16, no. 1 (February 1999): 143.
[8] P. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977a). This will hereafter be referred to in the main text of this thesis as *Outline.*
[9] P. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990a). This will hereafter be referred to in the main text of this thesis as *Logic.*.

and discourse analysis to macroscopic economic analysis.[10] The case study of this thesis constructs a political sociology of the contemporary field of war correspondence through a discourse analysis of interviews with fourteen individuals active either in the field itself or the wider 'field of war'.

The concepts upon which the Bourdieusian model is constructed will be revisited in the course of this thesis. It will be useful, however, to begin with a set of indicative definitions and theoretical precedents from which the analysis will proceed. Bourdieu has been categorised as or aligned with any number of theoretical and political positions,[11] but inasmuch as he seeks to establish the conditions of possibility, implications and limitations of the subjective, naturalised experience of the lifeworld, he is first and foremost a phenomenologist. He termed his own model 'genetic' or 'generative' structuralism,[12] and, insofar as he drew on the linguistic structuralism of Saussure, and insofar as 'structures' operate not only at the macrolevel but in the very structured, structuring dispositions which give rise to practice and the terms of its apprehension, this is apt.[13] For the purposes of initial orientation, generative structuralism is classifiable as both an extension and problematisation of Saussure's characterisation of the relation between signifiers and signifieds as arbitrary,[14] though the resulting articulation of relationalism is also influenced by Cassirer as well as the rationalism of Bachelard. It will be

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[10] On discourse analysis, see for example P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991b): 76. On macroanalysis, see for example P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984): 99-168. Correspondence analysis was widely used in Bourdieu's work and in research conducted under his supervision.

[11] Bourdieu is often described as a post-structuralist: see, for instance, D. Robbins, 'The Origins, Early Development and Status of Bourdieu's Concept of "Cultural Capital"', *British Journal of Sociology,* vol. 56, no. 1 (Mar 2005). Bourdieu occasionally used the term 'constructivist structuralism'. See for instance P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992): 11. Bourdieu has also been variously labelled 'modernist', T. Bennett, 'The Historical Universal: The Role of Cultural Value in the Historical Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu', *British Journal of Sociology,* vol. 56, no. 1 (Mar 2005): 141-64; 'relativist', B. H. Smith, *Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory* (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1988); 'postmodernist', S. Miles, 'The Cultural Capital of Consumption: Understanding 'Postmodern' Identities in a Cultural Context', *Culture & Psychology,* vol. 2, no. 2 (Jun 1996): 139-58.

[12] R. Nice (ed.), 'Interview with C. Mahar': unpublished ms, 1985.

[13] Whether Bourdieusian generative structuralism extends or overturns previous structuralist models remains debatable. See respectively, for instance, R. Harland, *Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism* (London: Routledge, 1991); J. G. Merquior, *From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist Thought* (London: Verso, 1986): 189-91.

[14] Most significantly, Bourdieu rejects Saussure's prioritisation of *langue* over parole. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 23-4. The rejection of Saussurean structuralism is determinate and finite, however, and Saussurean lineage of symbolic capital remains clear. See Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 44-5; also W. Schinkel and J. Tacq, 'The Saussurean Influence in Pierre Bourdieu's Relational Sociology', *International Sociology,* vol. 19, no. 1 (Mar 2004).

demonstrated that Bourdieu's qualified reconciliation of structuralism and phenomenology in fact casts the symbolic realm of representation as one of several worlds made possible by objective generative structures, and as such should be interpreted as quasi-autonomous rather than arbitrary in its relation to the material. Bourdieu constructs the concept of habitus upon Merleau-Ponty's application of Saussurean structuralism to political philosophy, specifically casting as political the relation between subject and object, as well as the process of embodiment through which naturalisation of arbitrary relations proceeds.[15] The focus on the domination involved in objectification and subjectification, cast in historical materialist terms, means that Bourdieu is also categorisable as neo-Marxist political sociologist.[16] Beginning his professional life as an anthropologist, *Sociologie de l'Algérie* is in part a response to the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss.[17] His 'conversion' to sociology represents a rejection both of tenets of anthropology and especially of what he saw as the ahistorical theorising of French academic philosophy, which he refers to as 'the philosophical babble found in academic institutions'.[18] The Bourdieusian location of political agency in the gap between stimulus and response owes much to Mauss's analysis of gift exchange.[19] Bourdieu's conception of practice, as the

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[15] Bourdieu's indebtedness to Merleau-Ponty is readily apparent in the latter's delineation of corporeal habituation: "If habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it? It is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when the bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from the effort. The subject knows where the letters are on the typewriter as we know where one of our limbs is, through knowledge bred of familiarity which does not give us a position in objective space." M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962): 166.

[16] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 3-6. It will be seen in Section 2.1 that Husserl in particular influenced Bourdieu's model considerably, though several specific Husserlian tenets are rejected. R. W. K. Lau, 'Habitus and the Practical Logic of Practice: An Interpretation', *Sociology: The Journal of the British Sociological Association,* vol. 38, no. 2 (Apr 2004). Bourdieu writes: "The knowledge we shall call *phenomenological* ... sets out to make explicit the truth of primary experience of the social world, *i.e.* all that is inscribed in the relationship of familiarity with the familiar environment, the unquestioning apprehension of the social world which, by definition, does not reflect on itself and excludes the question of the conditions of its own possibility" [italics original], and counterposes *objectivist* knowledge as being focussed on these objective conditions of possibility. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 3. Bourdieu is frequently described as a neo-Marxist. See, for instance, K. Eder, *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies* (London: Sage, 1993): 63-80. While there is no uncontested category of 'neo-Marxism', Robbins characterises Bourdieu as such because he "denies the Hegelianism of Marxism and transforms class struggle into an epistemological struggle between competing factions". Robbins, 'Introduction' in D. Robbins (ed.), *Bourdieu and Culture* (London: Sage).

[17] P. Bourdieu, *Sociologie de l'Algérie* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1958).

[18] P. Bourdieu, *Choses Dites* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1987): 13. Quoted in J. F. Lane, *Pierre Bourdieu: A Critical Introduction*, 2000): 11.

[19] In addition, the core conceptual unit of Bourdieusian theory, habitus, derives from Mauss's specific construction against the metaphysical Aristotelian sense of the term. M. Mauss, *Sociology and Psychology: Essays* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979): 101.

practically instinctive, spontaneous response oriented to perceived outcome, can also be seen as responding to Wittgenstein's rule-following model.

Bourdieu maintains that the generative structures which orient practice do not have a stable existence which precedes their enactment in practice. That practices enact relational structures, whose reproduction amounts to structured repetition, demonstrates the influence of Austin on Bourdieusian theory.[20] However, for Bourdieu structures are above all methodological constructs, and it is the generative *logics*, determining the conditions of possibility of structural production, which are at the heuristic centre of Bourdieusian political theory. Bourdieu downplays the importance of neo-Kantian structured symbolic systems, claiming that it is the structur*ing* aspect of structured structures which is fundamental.[21] This structuring aspect depends upon the orientation of anticipatory practice according to generative logics, an orientation which is not hardwired into individuals or stable modes of practice but through the internalised, nonconscious, instinctively-enacted dispositions of habitus.[22] Habitus orients practice according to the relational structure of the objective and symbolic systems in which it subsists. This structure is the Bourdieusian field, derived in part from Durkheim,[23] in which the field-specific 'rules of the game' are forgotten as rules and experienced as unremarkable.[24] Fields are characterised as spaces of struggle for appropriation of symbolic capital. It will be seen that more politically significant than appropriation of symbolic capital are the means to determine the principles of differentiation of a field, by which specific forms of symbolic capital achieve practical universality as valuable. While Bourdieusian field theory may thus be seen as informed to a degree by Weberian symbolic economy, the most significant political aspect of the Bourdieusian field is the systematic misrecognition of symbolic systems. Bourdieu characterises structured systems as instruments of domination,[25] and it is through the phenomenological

[20] It will be seen that while the influence of Austin on Bourdieu is significant, it is also qualified. Both reject Austin's linguistic formalism and failure to address institutional and contextual factors; in Bourdieu's words, "ignorance of the conditions of production and circulation of commentary allows and encourages people to search solely in the discourse in question for the 'conditions of felicity' which, though theoretically and practically inseparable from the institutional conditions of the functioning of the discourse, have been assigned to the domain of external linguistics." Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 32.
[21] Robbins, however, argues that Bourdieu in fact takes neo-Kantianism to its logical conclusion in that "he has endeavoured to demonstrate the legitimacy of lived experience as a form of practical thinking that is socially in competition with the forms of philosophical thought". Robbins, 'Introduction': xi.
[22] On Husserlian origins of 'disposition', see B. Smith and D. Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 204-8.
[23] The full intellectual genealogy of the concept of 'field' is set out in P. Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996b).
[24] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 53.
[25] P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* : 166-8.

experience of fields as ahistorical and non-competitive that hierarchies of power are reproduced.[26] Bourdieu uses the term 'symbolic violence' to describe the effects of domination unrecognised or such or accepted by both the dominated and dominant, on the basis of a misrecognition of the essential arbitrariness of the relation between them.[27]

Bourdieu's conception of practice, while central to understanding his political theory, changes over time and context, and is often ambiguous within texts. Warde notes that 'practice' is used in three senses in *Distinction*: first, as a counterpoint to 'theory'; second, to identify some coherent entity formed around a particular activity; third, simply to indicate the performance[28] or carrying out of an action.[29] In terms of the principal themes of this thesis, the critical aspects of Bourdieu's philosophy of practice are that practice is simultaneously structured and structuring, that it operates at the pre- or un-reflective level (including practices of reflection), and that is collective, rather than individually embodied or directed.

The remainder of this introductory chapter describes the general characteristics of Bourdieu's philosophy of science and the particular roles played by the core concepts of habitus, (professional) practice, symbolic system and field. This will serve as a starting point for developing defensible characterisations of those aspects of Bourdieusian theory to be scrutinised in the case study and its secondary analysis. While it will be seen that it is impossible to define a singular, discrete Bourdieusian model, it is possible to set down the terms in which Bourdieu himself constructs his philosophy of social science. It is widely noted in the literature[30] that this philosophy frequently conflicts with Bourdieu's normative political works. I will argue that although this is demonstrably the case, it neither renders Bourdieu's work incoherent, nor does it

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[26] Bourdieu thus makes the distinction between the social recognition of the orthodox and the *doxic*, that is, that which is simply given. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 160.

[27] T. Moi, 'Appropriating Bourdieu: Feminist Theory and Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture', *New Literary History,* vol. 22, no. 4 (1991): 1023; O. Voirol, 'Recognizing and Ignoring: On the Theory of Symbolic Violence', *Social Science Information Sur Les Sciences Sociales,* vol. 43, no. 3 (Sep 2004). See also P. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: *Essays on Art and Literature* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993): 75.

[28] This thesis uses 'performance' in the sense articulated by Goffman. Performative acts are those which are consciously or unconsciously intended constituted so as to give others ('audiences') an impression consonant with the (conscious or unconscious) desires of the actor. A. Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (London: Penguin, 1990): 17.

[29] A. Warde, 'Practice and Field: Revising Bourdieusian Concepts', *CRIC Discussion Papers* (Manchester: CRIC, University of Manchester, 2004).

[30] See in particular R. Costa, '*The Logic of Practices* in Pierre Bourdieu', *Current Sociology*, vol. 54, no. 6 (2006): 873-95.

suggest that a synthesis must be sought between theory and practice in Bourdieu's work. Instead, I argue that it is on normative grounds that limits to Bourdieusian structural determination and to the methodological prioritisation of self-reflexivity can be defended – that is, Bourdieu's core political values can be regarded as at least partially disinterested and non-complicit – and it is only with a phenomenological bracketing-out of the pervasiveness of generative structures that the normative political implications of generative structuralism can be given priority.[31] It is disingenuous to begin from the premise that Bourdieu as a social scientist derives his political claims from his philosophy of social science, as he claims.[32] The development of the concepts of habitus and field are influenced and directed by Bourdieu's political commitments, and it is at the point where these commitments are rendered impracticable by the logic of generative structuralism that strict adherence to that theory becomes counter-productive.

1.5.1 Bourdieusian Philosophy of Social Science

> "My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest logic of the social world can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as a 'special case of what is possible', as Bachelard puts it, *i.e.* as an exemplary case in a finite world of possible configurations."[33]

In this passage Bourdieu responds to the current in Anglo-American political and sociological theory which, especially in 1980s, bracketed the Bourdieusian paradigm together with more aesthetically-focussed or psychoanalytic interpretations of the linguistic post-structuralisms of Derrida, Deleuze and Lacan,[34] or else with the reductionism of models such as rational choice theory.[35] That such a defence is necessary illustrates what Bourdieu regarded as the

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[31] B. Lahire, 'How to Keep a Critical Tradition Alive: A Tribute to Pierre Bourdieu', *Review of International Political Economy,* vol. 9, no. 4 (2002): 598.
[32] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 92-3.
[33] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 2.
[34] See, for instance, S. Lash, *The Sociology of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1990): 237-65.
[35] It is notable that Bourdieu is less frequently associated with the structuralist models of Lévi-Strauss and Piaget, whose combined micro- and macroscopic methodological approaches are clear antecedents of Bourdieu's methodology. See especially J. Piaget, *Structuralism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971).

misappropriation of his work,[36] and marks a parallel to continuing debates over whether the translation of Derrida's method of deconstruction[37] and Foucault's genealogy to Anglo-American social theory lost methodological rigour in the process or accurately represented the lack of clear methodical structure in what is loosely collected under the 'post-structuralist' banner.[38] It will be seen in Section 2.2 that there is, to be sure, significant specific convergence between Bourdieu's theoretical framework and, in particular, the Foucauldian theory of discourse, such as the designation of meaning as a dynamic and practically self-contained process, the problematisation of representationalism and the generative role of power structures. Similarly, while Bourdieu and Derrida articulate similar conceptions of metaphysical materialism,[39] what distinguishes Bourdieu is, in short, that he writes as a political sociologist wielding a social scientific empirical model in pursuit of an explanation of the phenomena conceived according to that materialism, rather than as a linguist or ontologist.[40] And while Bourdieu is a vociferous advocate of the radical questioning of all explanatory models, including his own, he nonetheless consistently defends the appropriateness of empirical science as a basis for sociological methodology and more generally the role of the expert analyst.[41] Again in marked contrast to the relativism ascribed to post- and generative structuralism,[42] Bourdieu

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[36] P. Bourdieu, 'Commentary on the Commentaries', *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews,* vol. 21, no. 2 (1992). See also R. Shusterman, 'Bourdieu and Anglo-American Philosophy', in R. Shusterman (ed.), *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999): 14-28. Lizardo presents an interesting cognitive account of the misappropriation of the habitus model in the US. Lizardo, 'The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu's Habitus'.

[37] Bourdieu explicitly refers to the opposition between Derridean theory and Bourdieusian social science, arguing that there is competition and appropriation in the interaction between the disciplines. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 255. He consistently distanced his model from the technique of deconstruction, labelling it 'relativist' and 'narcissistic'. Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. On Bourdieu's opposition to Derrida and Lyotard, see also N. Lacey, *Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory* (Oxford: Hart, 1998): 174n.

[38] Weininger, for example, explicitly rejects 'abstract debates about reproduction theory' in applying Bourdieu to the American educational context, retaining only the emphasis on methodological rigour. E. B. Weininger and A. Lareau, 'Translating Bourdieu into the American Context: The Question of Social Class and Family-School Relations', *Poetics,* vol. 31, no. 5-6 (Oct-Dec 2003): 375-76.

[39] While both are categorisable as materialists in terms of the ontology which underpins their models, it has been argued that Bourdieu's materialism is more neo-Marxist in its use of political economy. Tilley, *Reading Material Culture*: 65-6.

[40] It will be seen in Chapter 4 that while Bourdieu does treat language as an appropriate object of study, it is as a subset of practice rather than a valid object in itself. See especially Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power:* 1-10.

[41] The epistemic privilege of the trained sociologist was earlier articulated by Mannheim.

[42] See, for example, J. Fiske, 'Cultural Studies and the Culture of Everyday Life', in L. Grossberg *et al.* (eds), *Cultural Studies* (New York: Routledge, 1992); C. Javeau, 'Pierre Bourdieu and Relativism in the Constructions of Propositions Claiming to Be Scientific', *Revue Internationale De Philosophie,* vol. 56, no. 220 (Mar 2002); J. McGuigan, *Culture and the Public Sphere* (London: Routledge, 1996); Smith,

claims a universal validity for the methodology which finds its most thoroughgoing application in *Distinction*:

> "I would like to show that with the same instruments, one can analyse phenomena as different as exchanges of honour in a precapitalist society or ... foundations such as the Ford Foundation, exchanges between generations within a family, transactions in markets of cultural or religious goods, and so forth".[43]

Bourdieu thus argues for the applicability of his model to all sites of cultural production regardless of geographical or historical context,[44] though in fact the question of whether his model is universally applicable or insightful only as regards postwar Western European society (notwithstanding that the model is derived from precapitalist Algerian society[45]) is open to debate.[46]

1.5.2 Habitus in Theory and Practice

The earliest and clearest articulations of how Bourdieusian analysis should be instituted in practice are found in *Le Métier de sociologue* (originally published in 1968 and translated in its fourth edition as *The Craft of Sociology* in 1991), and in *Outline*. The methodology introduced here is intended as a 'metascientific framework' rather than a checklist for the sociologist working in the field. It begins not with the 'object' of political sociology but sociology itself,[47]

Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory, P. Wilcken, 'The Intellectuals, the Media and the Gulf War', *Critique of Anthropology,* vol. 15, no. 1 (1995).

[43] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 92-3.

[44] As Wacquant notes: "Proof is found in those homologies, that one could not make up, between the purest categories of the purest philosophical and psychoanalytic thought (Kant, Sartre and Lacan) and the paired oppositions that organise the ritual acts, myths and oral tradition of the Berber-speaking mountain dwellers." L. Wacquant, 'Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and Its Cracks', in B. Fowler (ed.), *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 105-20

[45] Bourdieu argues that the symbolic economy of Kabylia is very similar to that of late capitalist Western society. Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 104-9.

[46] Calhoun argues that Bourdieu's model is not applicable to historical contexts other than his own. C. J. Calhoun *et al.*, *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993): 5. See also John Guillory, 'Bourdieu's Refusal', in N. Brown and I. Szeman (eds), *Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000): 29.

[47] As Bourdieu writes in *Pascalian Meditations*, "[o]ne has to resign oneself to acknowledging that, in the typically positivist tradition of the critique of introspection, that the most effective reflection is the one that consists in objectifying the subject of objectification." Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 9-10. See also P. Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity* (Oxford: Polity, 2004): 88-94.

proposing that the epistemological and logical principles of that which is labelled 'sociological knowledge' (most succinctly, the output of professional, institutionalised sociological work) are nothing more than sociological particularisations of the principles *upon which all science is based* – principles which are the product of objective positions and relations in the social scientific field.[48] Once the principles of the theory of sociological knowledge are internalised – and internalisation, though potentially incomplete, is a necessary part of one's becoming a sociologist – they form what Bourdieu terms the 'sociological habitus', best understood as the operational disposition of the practising sociologist to apply abstract principles in concrete empirical research. This habitus shapes the knowledge which is produced in the social scientific field; its generative function regarding categories of knowledge and those who produce and legitimate knowledge must be understood if the 'real' nature of the object of a social scientific analysis are to be properly apprehended.[49] Because subject determination is never complete or stable, there is argued to be qualified scope for critical insight into the operation of habitus and thus professional self-reflection – though it will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5 that the limit of self-reflexivity in the habitus model is contested.

Habitus is defined both as a product of history, since the principles of the production it effects are historically engendered schemes, and, since it produces individual and collective practice, history itself.[50] This complex relation is instituted through a system of dispositions, itself a past which survives in the present and 'tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices structured according to its principles'.[51] The system of dispositions may thus be said to act as an internal, 'natural law' which relays the continuous exercise of the laws, conceived in the Millian sense, which comprise the regularities of external objective structures.

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[48] Wacquant, 'Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and Its Cracks': 106.

[49] Bourdieu calls for a theory of sociological knowledge which is a "system of principles defining the conditions of possibility of all distinctively sociological acts and discourses and only those", whatever the theories of the social system specific to those who produce or have produced sociological works in the name of these principles. P. Bourdieu, *Le Métier de sociologue*: 15-16. Quoted in Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 37.

[50] Bourdieu introduces the concept as follows: "The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (*e.g.* the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor". Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 72. See also Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 54.

[51] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 82.

As such, any form of objectivism which identifies these regularities manifest in observed behaviour, without reconstructing the external structures which perpetuate themselves by transmitting their regularities into local laws, is essentially missing the point. Events are not caused by agents, nor, contrary to some readings of Bourdieu,[52] may they be structurally inferred from the networks of differentiated positions of power which form the focus of Bourdieusian field analysis.[53] Instead, events are the product of the *synchronic combination of dispositions and situations* which are themselves never entirely independent, as they are generated by the objective structures which, as follows below, amount to the 'economic', strictly defined, bases of the social environment under consideration.[54] These objective structures, identifiable by sociological analysis, do not, however, equate to habitus. Habitus, as it is rendered methodologically, is the logic by which structured, structuring dispositions and situations interact and produce social effects. And insofar as this is a *practical* logic, it makes sense for Bourdieu to use the same language to speak of the logic of practice in the philosophical-theoretical sense as he uses to speak of its methodological sense, *i.e.* the principles of production of fields and strategies within fields in a given social context. The sociological reconstruction of habitus is thus the reconstruction of the logic which governs the dialectical relationship between objective structures and the cognitive motivating structures they produce and which tend to reproduce them. Finally, since these 'objective structures' are not givens but the product of historical practices 'whose productive principle is itself the product of the structures which it consequently tends to reproduce', the logic of practice constructed by the sociologist must also be a logic of *historical* development of dispositions and structures through practice.

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[52] For example, Harland, *Superstructuralism.*

[53] The case study thus does not seek to infer practice from observed structure, nor to prove the existence of structures from observed practice, but to examine *how* practices in the field of war correspondence are structured, and with what structuring effects. In *Distinction*, Bourdieu argues against 'linear' inference from cause to observed phenomena, and for the establishment of 'networks' of possibility. Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 107.

[54] "If agents are possessed by their habitus more than they possess it, this is because it acts within them as the organising principle of their actions, and because this modus operandi informing all thought and action (including thought of action), reveals itself only in the *opus operatum*. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 18. See also Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 146-50.

1.5.3 Professional and Sociological Practice

Bourdieu invokes Gaston Bachelard to locate the generative function of habitus in professional practice.[55] He calls for the reconstruction of what Bachelard termed the 'everyday' or unreflective philosophy of the scientist, that which is implicit and usually unconscious in spontaneous scientific practice.[56] Pivotally, Bachelard held that this practical logic of the working scientist *naturally transcends* the philosophical oppositions of idealist rationalism and empiricist realism: unconcerned with the abstract causes and consequences of their actions, scientists 'spontaneously and eclectically' combine the creative, constructing imagination of idealism and the rationalising experience of empiricism.[57] Bachelard, writing in 1940, observed that the category of 'fact gatherer', which applies equally to scientists, historians and journalists, is meaningless in isolation. Scientists invariably construct abstract models of noumenal structures which necessitate the phenomena they observe, and they formulate experiments which technically realise the phenomena that the theory had hypothetically posed as a possible effect of those noumenal structures. While Bourdieu takes the step, characteristic of neo-Marxist phenomenology, of problematising as political and then attempting to overcome the division between idealism and empiricism, he does so in a way that defines Bourdieusianism as separate from the post-structuralism of, say, Lyotard, Derrida or Deleuze, insofar as Bourdieu posits symbolic systems which are misrecognised and disconnected from objective structures, though nonetheless not arbitrary or entirely self-contained. These symbolic systems are the context in which professional practice emerges as meaningful and applies to the professional practice of the scientist as well as the behaviour of any social group whose function is to gather, legitimate, produce and disseminate information: that is, the field of cultural production, which incorporates the journalistic field.

When analysing a locus of 'knowledge production' such as social science or journalism, the reconstruction of the process, rooted in practice, by which internalised dispositions generate knowledge, knowability and legitimacy can be summed up by Bourdieu's overarching methodological goal: an examination of the objective conditions of possibility of the knowledge in question. Bourdieu stresses that this is not a subjectivist approach but an exploration of the

[55] See also Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 240-2.
[56] G. Bachelard, *La Philosophie du non: essai d'une philosophie du nouvel esprit scientifique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1940). Quoted in F. Vandenberghe, 'The Real Is Relational: An Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu's Generative Structuralism', *Sociological Theory,* vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1999): 37. See also Robbins, 'Introduction': xviii.
[57] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 37.

limits of objective exploration, or more specifically an analysis of the mode of production of the *practical mastery*[58] which creates the possibility both of objectively intelligible practice and of the lived experience (Bourdieu terms it 'objectively enchanted experience') of that practice.[59] As applied to sociological practice itself, Bourdieu abandons the notion that science is or can be the phenomenological reconstruction of lived experience, and suggests instead that science itself be subject to a theory of practice and practical knowledge, ultimately resulting in an examination of the 'theoretical and social conditions of the possibility of objective apprehension'. Bourdieu's advocacy of an analysis of the objective social conditions of knowledge clearly owes much to the Marx of the *Theses on Feuerbach*,[60] though the insertion of the temporal dimension of practice,[61] the arguable precondition for agency,[62] is intended to express Bourdieu's opposition to the determinist implications of the most common reading of the *Theses on Feuerbach*, namely that behaviour can be inferred from social context.[63] Bourdieu's principal object of knowledge is not observable behaviour, and his methodological aim is not the prediction of behaviour. Instead, the focus is on dispositions aligned to sociohistorical context which enact, in a temporally discontinuous though structurally enduring manner, hierarchies of power. The case study assesses the extent to which examining the conditions of possibility of behaviour – that is, the productive limitations which orient all instinctive, spontaneous and insightful practices towards structural reproduction – generates greater defensible insight than treating actions and speech acts as meaningful in themselves.

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[58] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 79-89; Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 95.
[59] Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 472.
[60] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 96. Also, Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 136: "One has to construct a materialist theory which (in accordance with the wish that Marx expressed in the *Theses on Feuerbach*) is capable of taking back from idealism the 'active side' of practical knowledge that the materialist tradition has abandoned to it." See also Bourdieu, *Choses dites*: 23-4.
[61] See Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 15.
[62] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 6.
[63] "Knowledge does not simply depend, as elementary relativism teaches, on the particular standpoint of an observer 'situated in time and space' takes up on the subject. The 'knowing subject', as the idealist tradition rightly calls him, inflicts on practice a much more pernicious alteration which, being a constituent condition of the cognitive operation, is bound to pass unnoticed: in taking up a point of view on the action, withdrawing from it in order to observe it from above and from a distance, he constitutes practical activity as an object of observation and analysis, a representation." *Ibid.*: 3.

1.5.4 Symbolic Systems[64]

While the end of Bourdieusian sociological analysis is the construction of the relationship between social structure and the dispositions making up the habitus,[65] such a construction cannot take place in the absence of an examination of *individual strategy* operating within the constraints of their social context.[66] Accounts of the behaviour of individuals do feature in Bourdieu's own case studies, though what is emphasised is not the need authentically to recreate that individual experience but to define the principles which define the group or class habitus, of which the individual cases are merely structural variants.[67] This account is realised in the sociological construction of systems of production and exchange, most significantly in Bourdieusian analysis in the construction of *symbolic systems.* Bourdieu augments de Morgan's definition of discourse as 'a range of ideas which is either expressed or understood as containing the whole matter under discussion'[68] with the assertion that this only holds in relation to the necessarily unnoticed complementary category of what is not discussed. The effect is that competition over the power to control the legitimate mode of thought and expression, a competition which proceeds unceasingly in the field of production of symbolic goods, tends to conceal its contribution to the delimitation of the universe of discourse, *i.e.* what is thinkable, and thus to the delimitation of the unthinkable.[69] The methodological objectification of these processes is at the core of Bourdieusian analysis.

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[64] This thesis uses 'symbolic system' in the Lévi-Straussian sense of a network of connected, mutually referential social symbols. The term overlaps with 'symbolic economy', which here is used to emphasise the competitive, power-driven struggle for appropriation of certain social symbols.

[65] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 3.

[66] Bourdieu most concisely defines his conception of strategy in *Pascalian Meditations*: "The language of strategy, which one is forced to use in order to designate the sequences of actions objectively oriented towards an end that are observed in all fields, must not mislead us: the most effective strategies are those which, being the product of dispositions shaped by the immanent necessity of the field, tend to adjust themselves spontaneously to that necessity, without express intention or calculation. In other words, the agent is never completely the subject of his practices. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 138.

[67] "Since the history of the individual is never anything other than a certain specification of the collective history of his class or group, each individual system of dispositions may be seen as a structural variant of all other group or class habitus, expressing the difference between the trajectories and positions inside or outside the class. 'Personal' style, the particular stamp marking all products of the same habitus, whether practices or works, is never more than a deviation in relation to the style of a period or class." Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 86. See also P. Bourdieu, 'The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups', *Theory and Society,* vol. 14, no. 6 (1985a).

[68] Cited in Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 170.

[69] *Ibid.*: 20-1.

In response to the charge that it is difficult to conceive what habitus actually resembles in sociological work,[70] I would suggest that it is here that habitus finds its most definitive methodological expression, in the analysis of the structuredness of practice and the reconstruction of the conditions of possibility of action and communication that this entails. The upshot for a principle such as journalistic professional legitimacy is that the social scientist is set the task not simply of describing the defining characteristics of that which is legitimate (accuracy, timeliness, reliability of sources, reputation of media outlet and autonomy from undue influence), but moreover of reconstructing the process by which legitimacy is conferred, by way of an examination of the professional dispositions manifest across the network of objectively differentiated positions which comprises the journalistic field. It is doubtless no small task, particularly given that the dispositions Bourdieu speaks of and the differentiated power structures which inform them are largely misrecognised and, at least to those within a field, unknowable. Interviews aimed at reconstructing the generative principles of habitus in a given field or the internalised rules which govern professional practice are hindered most obviously by the fundamental priority of habitus (where habitus is prior to and productive of reflection on habitus) and the misrecognition of rules as rules. Further, there is no clear distinction between practice and the supposedly unconscious abstract theories which are thereby spontaneously brought into play. In fact, 'unconscious' abstract theories are not available solely to the sociologist but also, often, to the consciousness of the agent, and that process of self-reflection on the agent's part amounts to a practice the labelling of which as unthinking is contentious.[71] For Bourdieu, the correct response to this conceded difficulty lies not in redefining as more open to social agents access to knowledge of structured, structuring dispositions and thus to knowledge of the conditions of possibility of knowledge, but instead in the sociologist correctly objectifying such reflections on the part of his/her subjects.[72] Merleau-Ponty looms large over this aspect of Bourdieusian method, a key influence which is discussed in greater detail in

[70] See, for example, N. Crossley, 'The Phenomenological Habitus and Its Construction', *Theory and Society,* vol. 30, no. 1 (2001): 81-120.

[71] See J. Hamel, 'The Positions of Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Touraine Respecting Qualitative Methods', *British Journal of Sociology,* vol. 49, no. 1 (1998): 9-11.

[72] Reserving for the social scientist the process of objectification is, unsurprisingly, deemed by several critics to be arrogant or deterministic. Bohman, for instance, argues that "[r]eflexivity is not primarily an effect of theory, as Bourdieu often argues, but a component of the public, *Practical Reason* of agents who interpret and reinterpret their practices with others. Bohman, 'Reflexivity, Agency and Constraint': 177. See also Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source'; N. Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television', in C. Calhoun, E. Lipuma, and M. Postone (eds), *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993): 186. In Sen's words, we are thus condemned to characterising actors as 'rational fools'. A. K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', *Public Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 4 (1977): 317-44.

Chapter 2. Unmethodological, unscientific reflection on practice will invariably presuppose the structures it analyses and, being the product of the same generative schemes as the practices they are said to account for, these second-order knowledges can only reinforce the generative structures by furnishing them with a particular form of 'rationalisation'.[73] Characteristic of Bourdieu's broader tendency to extend Foucault's concept of the 'individual' or 'body' as discursively inscribed from without, by casting that process of construction as internalised and actively participated in by the agent, Bourdieu contends that the adaptiveness and durability of generative schemes are 'doubtless reinforced and accelerated by the dialectic between the schemes immanent in practice and the norms produced by reflection on practices'.[74]

In formulating his model of individuation, Bourdieu draws in part on Weber, in particular the chapter on religion in *Economy and Society*[75] though the modifications Bourdieu makes to the Weberian are as revealing as his adherences. Rejecting the Marxist rejection of specialist production, as well as the structure of the religious message or the mythological corpus favoured by the structuralists, Weber targets specifically the producers of the religious message, the interests which motivate them and the strategies they deploy in pursuit of these interests.[76] Bourdieu extends the Weberian model by asserting that in order to apprehend the 'function, structure and genesis'[77] of symbolic systems, one must apply (non-Weberian) structuralist analysis not only to the symbolic system and its various stances (more correctly, position-*takings*[78]), but also to the agents who act as producers of symbolic goods or, rather, the *positions* they occupy.[79] The key difference between Weber and Bourdieu here is that while the former believed that the recognition of legitimacy is a free individual act, for the latter it is always embedded in the *prereflexive* concurrence of cognitive structures and (unconscious) embodied structures.[80] This is not to suggest that Bourdieu defends the psychoanalytic model of the

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[73] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 20-1.
[74] *Ibid.*: 20.
[75] M. Weber *et al.*, *Economy and Society*: *An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1978): 245-381. Vandenberghe expands upon Bourdieu's use of this chapter in Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 54.
[76] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 57.
[77] P. Bourdieu, 'Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field', *Sociological Theory*, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1994): 16.
[78] For example, Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 30.
[79] "The 'I' that practically comprehends the physical space and social space (though the subject of the verb to comprehend is not necessarily a 'subject' in the sense of the philosophies of mind, but rather a habitus, a system of dispositions) is comprehended, in quite a different sense, encompassed, inscribed, implicated in that space. It occupies a position there which (from statistical analyses of empirical correlations) we know is regularly associated with position-takings." Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 130.
[80] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 38; Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 56.

repression of a truth by some part of an actor's psyche: this would imply an intentionality of consciousness at odds with Bourdieusian phenomenology.[81] Rather, by relying on the concept of acquired dispositions, the sociologist is able to interpret an action as oriented toward an objective without asserting that the objective was a conscious design.[82] While it is often necessary to proceed *as if* conscious design were at work, it is the 'feel for the game',[83] the capacity for spontaneous reaction *without* intention or reflection, which is salient.[84] It is important to maintain the distinction between asserting that strategies for action in the long term and response mechanisms in the short are unconscious, and setting the exposure of these unconscious drives as a methodological goal. For Bourdieu, it is impossible to uncover what an agent is 'really' saying since the dialectical relation between the expressive drive and the structural constraints of the field 'prevents us from distinguishing in the *opus operandum* the form from the content'. He writes at length about the 'censorship' imposed by the structure of the field: the content of the field is indissociable from its appropriate expression, and therefore literally inconceivable outside accredited forms and accepted norms[85]. In short, the content of what is said or done in a field cannot be distinguished from the manner of saying it or, within the field, of hearing it.

1.5.5 Relational Fields

Beyond the pervasive meta-framework of phenomenology, relationalism is one of the most significant influences on Bourdieu's work.[86] Bourdieusian structuralist relationalism is given to obviate the need to be limited by the theoretical opposition between determinism and voluntarism,[87] though it will be seen in Section 2.2 that this supersedence is not entirely

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[81] See Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 97.
[82] Subsequently, this privileging of professional sociological insight rejects the structuralist assumption of self-enclosed symbolic worlds.
[83] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 66-8.
[84] *Ibid.*: 56.
[85] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 168-70.
[86] Bourdieu writes: "To think in terms of field is to think relationally. The relational (rather than more narrowly 'structuralist') mode of thinking is, as Cassirer demonstrated in Substanzbegriff und Funktionbegriff, the hallmark of modern science." P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992): 97. Bourdieu also says that the 'real' is 'relational' in Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 3. See also Schinkel and Tacq, 'The Saussurean Influence in Pierre Bourdieu's Relational Sociology'.
[87] See, for instance, M. Emirbayer, 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 103, no. 2 (September 1997): 292.

achievable, and that questions of determination and agency inevitably remain. It is conceptually useful to entertain the possibility that Bourdieusianism is deterministic, and that that determinism may be defensible. In truth, there are many determinisms. Bourdieu's particular model has its roots in the Durkheimian principle of nonconsciousness, which posits that the social must be explained not by the conceptions of its participants, but by the structural causes which elude awareness but which necessitate the phenomena observed by the social scientist. In Durkheim's words, "It is the structure of relations which constitute the space of the field, which commands the form which the visible relations of interaction and the content itself which agents have of it take on."[88] To be sure, if this line of thinking is followed through the implications for sociopolitical methodology are significant. It is accepted, after Durkheim, that social facts can only be explained by conscious facts, and these conscious facts must be systematically constructed against common sense and objectified into a system of relations in such a way that the objective structural relations between the phenomenal elements necessitate and explain the behaviour of the elements of the constructed relation between the elements.[89] This programme is at the heart of Bourdieusian methodology, and any case study carried out along Bourdieusian principles must be designed within these parameters. In practice, the upshot is that insight into the generative structures of behaviour and perception – as well as the means by which the social scientist analyses these data – is to be located within and seen as being constituted by relational fields. The reconstruction of facts 'against common sense' is not intended to produce objectivity, but rather a description of a relation between social fact and its perception. As a corollary, the reconstruction of the scientific fact against the spontaneous perceptions of the 'real object' is inseparable from its systematic construction as a theoretical object.[90]

The motivation behind exploding the ontological division between the theoretical and the social, by casting both as material and constituted in practice, is clear enough: Bourdieu intends to escape a philosophy of consciousness which adheres to what he regards as an indefensible idealised (meaning non-materially-mediated) concept of theoretical abstraction, with an eye to

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[88] P. Bourdieu, *Leçon sur la leçon* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1982): 42. Cited in Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 42.

[89] N. Kauppi, *French Intellectual Nobility: Institutional and Symbolic Transformations in the Post-Sartrian Era* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1996): 46.

[90] Cassirer's influence is evident here. Cassirer developed the concept of 'lawful series of progressions' to describe the coherent network that scientific concepts inhabit. His form of neo-Kantian transcendental logic posits that the object is not presupposed by logic, but generated by it. The result is that "scientific concepts no longer appear as imitations of thing-like existences, but as symbols representing orders and functional links with reality." Cited in Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 44.

rejecting 'the alternative between internal interpretation and external explanation'.[91] Thus, while it is true that the concept of the field demonstrates the influence of Saussurean relationalism on Bourdieu's work, the practical grounding of both habitus and field means that Bourdieu cannot be simply labelled a relationalist. In fact, the Bourdieusian programme is better characterised as an attempt to establish a middle ground between relationalism and rationalism.[92] Bourdieu suggests that the opposition between formalist analysis, with its immanent interpretation of meaning, and reductionist analysis, with its external reading that directly relates meaning to social forms, can be overcome by demonstrating that the external influences and constraints of a theory or analysis are always mediated by the structure of the particular field which intervenes between the social positions of the producer of social theory and his/her postures in which they are expressed and whose principle lies in the structure of the field of relative positions. As a result, the 'immanent' or hermeneutic approach of, say, anthropology or semiotics, as well as the argued reductionism of Lévi-Strauss[93] can both be avoided by training an analytical eye upon the field (academia, art, science, journalism and so on) in which that knowledge is produced.

In practice, the social scientist constructs a field which takes the form of an 'ideal-typical' model of the range of social relations among the observed phenomenal relations; in effect, some relational superstructure is described, and particular observed social forms may then be seen as realisations of the *same* symbolic function. The goal of Bourdieusian methodology is to generate the generative relations, equations, tendencies and so on that could create a finite range of actual outcomes - one example of which is the observed set of social facts. Bourdieu surmises:

> "The science of practice has to construct the principle which makes it possible to account for all the cases observed, and only those, without forgetting that this construction, and the generative operation of which it is the basis, are only the theoretical equivalent of the practical scheme which enables every correctly trained agent to produce all the practices and judgements of honour called for by the challenges of existence."[94]

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[91] Kögler notes that it was Mannheim's inability to escape the philosophy of consciousness that led him to conceive of symbolic forms as pre-determined categorical apparatuses, or 'conceptual institutions'. Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source'.
[92] See especially Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational'.
[93] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 94.
[94] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 11.

Once the limiting, defining characteristics are established – incorporating *illusio,*[95] professional interests, struggle for monopoly of authority, circulation of capital, class differentiation, strategies of conservation and subversion – this model can be transposed to other fields of practice so as to offer functional and structural comparisons. Methodologically, this means that the codification and formalisation of the generative and unifying principles of a system of relations in the theoretical model allows for the meaningful comparison of the field of the analytic object and the academic field. This comparison of fields is held by Bourdieu to be crucial insofar as contrasting the application of generative formula can demonstrate to what extent structural 'invariance' can produce empirical variation. The result is that the analyst is less likely to reduce all analysis to a one-field perspective – though it is noted in Chapters 4 and 5 that Bourdieu is criticised for overstating the closedness of professional fields in his own work.

Bourdieu's reworking of Weber's symbolic systems, relationalism and rationalism is not without its critics. Vandenberghe, for one, argues that Bourdieu finds himself trapped in the same predicament as Mannheim had foreseen in *Ideology and Utopia.*[96] Whereas Weber, rather than systematically relating social agents to each other, instead developed an ideal-type of each of them that sought to define the characteristic of the actors *themselves*, both Mannheim and Bourdieu reject this 'substantialist' mindset and focus instead on the social determination of ideas. However, while Mannheim maintains that all knowledge is socially and historically determined, it was never his contention that all knowledge is *reducible* to the social circumstances of its production.[97] Mannheim fails to articulate a methodology which could properly explain the social genesis of ideas without finding recourse to reductionism; Vandenberghe argues that no solution has yet been found. The most widely-voiced criticism[98] is that Bourdieu precludes a more nuanced, metaphysically relational or hermeneutic stance by

[95] "Taking part in the *illusio* ... means taking seriously stakes which, arising from the logic of the game itself, establish its 'seriousness', even if they escape or appear 'disinterested' or 'gratuitous' to those who are sometimes called 'lay people' of those who are engaged in other fields." Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 11. See also P. Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field', in R.D. Benson and E. Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 37.

[96] Mannheim, Karl, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge, 1997): 74-7.

[97] Mannheim maintained that the proper object of sociology is pretheoretical cultural life, and to this end constructed a phenomenology of cultural meaning-constitution by which he claimed to be able to reach a level of interpretative and symbolic assumptions which may not be consciously intended by the subject. See Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source': 144-6.

[98] See, for instance, B. Martin & I. Szelenyi (1987), 'Beyond Cultural Capital: Toward a Theory of Symbolic Domination' in D. Robbins (ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu Volume I*, (London: Sage, 2000): 282; see also P. Kingston, 'The Unfulfilled Promise of Cultural Capital Theory', in *Sociology of Education*, Extra Issue (2001): 88-99.

reducing all behaviour to the pursuit, conscious or otherwise, of capital.[99] It is true that Bourdieu focuses for the most part on symbolic (or economic) struggle,[100] and specifically on competition for the means of determination of legitimacy and hierarchy. However, it is not the case that Bourdieu ignores individual strategies for pursuing or wielding capital in favour of systemic flows of capital which are essentially ubiquitous and determinate of behaviour.[101] While critics have decried what they interpret as a reversion to macroscopic structuralist political economy,[102] Bourdieusian generative structuralism concerns itself with every level of the operation of power – in particular with the process of individuation and internalisation of power relations in the corporeal. The methodology of field analysis is intended to provide access to the social conditions of possibility of agency, individuation and knowledge.[103] The analysis of the production of capital and its circulation through power structures is itself a constructed logic which may be pulled apart self-reflexively: it may (and, for Bourdieu, should) itself become an object of analysis. Capital, however, is not the ultimate end of Bourdieusian methodology.[104] Instead, the economy of symbolic capital and its institution in relational fields are conceived as means of redressing the reductionism attributed to Marxist analysis,[105] the limits of Saussurean relationalism,[106] the philosophy of consciousness implied in Durkheim[107] and the voluntarism of Weber[108] – all of which are necessary in order to articulate explanations of power, knowledge and meaning as social, material, practical phenomena. This is not to suggest that Bourdieu is uniquely successful in overcoming the limitations of previous social theory; in particular, I assess allegations of determinism, elitism and culturalism in subsequent chapers.

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[99] See, for instance, A. Swingewood, 'Sociological Theory', in S. Taylor (ed.), *Sociology: Issues and Debates* (London: Macmillan, 1999): 69.
[100] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 79-82.
[101] *Cf* Bohman, 'Reflexivity, Agency and Constraint': 174-7.
[102] B. Martin & I. Szelenyi, 'Beyond Cultural Capital: Toward a Theory of Symbolic Domination'.
[103] This is also termed the 'space of possibles' of agency. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 64.
[104] Some critics, including Bohman, have argued that it is Bourdieu's overpoliticisation of capital which is at the root of the determinism of his approach. In this thesis I argue that capital is used by Bourdieu only as a methodological device to measure the enactment and embodiment of power relations in field contexts, and as such it is the structural determination of practice whose political teleology is suspect. See Bohman, 'Reflexivity, Agency and Constraint'.
[105] P. Bourdieu, *In Other Words*: 48-50.
[106] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 23-5.
[107] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 44.
[108] For example, Bourdieu, *In Other Words*: 49.

Chapter 2: Phenomenological Context and Critical Perspectives

2.1 Phenomenological Context

While Bourdieu's corpus of work draws on a variety of disciplines, and varies to the point of a limited internal consistency, it can be predominantly characterised as an attempt to describe and explain the naturalised, everyday experience of the political, generative structures which constitute the conditions of possibility of the experience of the world. Although Bourdieu explicitly rejects specific elements of the philosophical frameworks of Husserl, Schütz and Merleau-Ponty and Mauss, his emphasis on describing how phenomena come to be experienced as objects in the world locates his philosophy of experience within the intellectual history that these theorists represent. While Husserl treats conscious intention as the origin of phenomena,[109] Bourdieu aims at the generative structures which create the conditions of possibility of consciousness. However, these distinct approaches have in common the premise that socially-instituted meaning, intention and action are mutually constitutive. In focussing on the structuring of consciousness and the positing of objective meaning by consciousness, Bourdieu is primarily concerned with that which is experienced as taken-for-granted, that which is so naturalised as not to emerge to consciousness. Thus, like Husserl,[110] and later Berger and Luckman,[111] Bourdieu aims to analytically reconstruct the determination of common sense, instinct and normalcy. This is a process in which all agents are engaged: there is a collective common sense or, in Bourdieu's case, habitus by which individuals become self-aware as such and construct 'objective' realities.[112] It is in this sense that the lifeworld is not only a context from which individuals produce meaning; the lifeworld is itself actively constituted by collective subjective intention interpretation and action. This mutual constitution suggests a closed system of meaning production, but Bourdieu's generative structures and (to a lesser extent) Husserl's formal or 'eidetic' terms both aim to describe that space outside of or prior to meaning and cause: that is, the metalevel at which categories easily regarded as universal or natural (such as meaning,

[109] J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, 1958): 25; Smith and Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*: 78-81.
[110] Smith and Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*: 394-437.
[111] P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1966).
[112] Bourdieu, *Pascalian meditations*: 155-9.

explanation and subjectivity) are only a finite case of a wider set of possibilities.[113] Bourdieusian phenomenology can then seek to establish what are the conditions of possibility of the experience of inhabiting the lifeworld, and this focus on experience necessitates the bracketing out of certain questions which can only be answered in metaphysical terms.

In its prioritisation of the material determinants of social phenomena, and more broadly of the pervasive politicality of subject and object determination, Bourdieu's work is most accurately characterised as neo-Marxist phenomenology. In light of this, Bourdieu can be seen as one in a succession of theorists seeking to reconcile phenomenology and structuralism,[114] a move concomitant with the attempt to overcome both subjectivism and objectivism. Bourdieu argues not for the emphasis of one pole over the other, but rather the supersedence of the dichotomy itself. That is, he does not call for a maximally defensible balance between the two, but rather demonstrates the dominance and implications of this conceptual opposition in theory as well as in the everyday experience of fields. In fact, Bourdieu is not innovative in claiming such a supersedence: he, like his predecessors, is still subject to critiques from within the context of the structure/agency debate (see section 2.2.1). I argue below that while Bourdieu is demonstrably (and widely recognised as) deterministic, his determinism is, if reflexively constituted, defensible. For his part, Bourdieu begins from Marx's contention that Hegel's phenomenology fails to supersede subjectivism,[115] and argues that twentieth century phenomenology remains caught between the non-productive limits of objectivism and subjectivism.[116] While in metaphysical terms Husserl's exclusion of the question of the facticity of the material world is valid,[117] Bourdieu claims that it loses in the same blow the determining influence of materiality on consciousness. Against this, it is readily demonstrable that the Husserlian project is not an analysis of conscious experience abstracted from physical experience, but an attempt to give as full as possible an account of agents' experience of the lifeworld,[118] and in this regard Husserl routinely emphasised the importance of incorporating the lived experience of political and

[113] Smith and Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl:* 68.
[114] See, for example, C. Throop and K. Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology: A Critical Assessment', *Anthropological Theory* 2, no. 2 (2002): 185-208.
[115] 'Theses on Feuerbach', in K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Great Books in Philosophy* (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998).
[116] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 1.
[117] Smith defends the method of bracketing against the claim that it is a denial of the world, in Smith, *Husserl*: 249.
[118] *Ibid.*: 249-51. See also Smith and Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*: 304.

cultural structures in everyday life.[119] The import of Bourdieu's reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology – alongside his development of Merleau-Ponty's account of the political determination of corporeality – is ultimately a specific one. In short, while concurring that intention characterises all experience of the lifeworld,[120] Bourdieu understands intention not as something which enacts and finds meaning in a closed symbolic system, but which is in part determined by a material context which exceeds its symbolic apprehension.

This does not amount to a wholesale objectivist 'corrective' to Husserlian subjectivism. Similarly, it is wrong to suggest (as Bourdieu does in *Logic*[121]) that it is only with the corrective of habitus that structuralism moves from an economistic behaviouralism to an analytic approach which can include cognitive and affective aspects in its purview. Most significantly, it remains arguable that Bourdieu's is a model which depicts not only conscious calculation but instinct, spontaneity, intuition and even counter-intuition as (at least partly) determined by often unseen forces of political exclusion and economic hierarchisation. This can be countered by arguing that Bourdieu's determinism is characterised not by the positing of an all-pervasive, all-constitutive set of rules, but rather by the positing of an ever-present regularity which can be traced back to a historically- and culturally-specific set of conditions of possibility.[122] The allegation of super- or hyperstructuralism,[123] which sees Bourdieu's philosophy as predicated on the existence of infinite levels of determination, is then mitigated by the fact that Bourdieu depicts these determining structures not as an inevitably elusive conspiracy but as nothing more than 'the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition'.[124]

The conceptual shorthand by which Bourdieu distinguishes his position from other phenomenologies[125] should not be read as a thoroughgoing dismissal of Husserlian transcendental idealism:[126] doxic experience, pretension and (Husserl's specific reading of) habitus remained central to Bourdieu's work throughout his life. Throop and Murphy argue that

[119] Smith, *Husserl*: 304.
[120] Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology*: 17-19.
[121] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 140.
[122] *Ibid.*: 36-41.
[123] R. Harland, *Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism* (London: Routledge, 1991).
[124] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 72.
[125] That is, while Bourdieu defines his position in opposition to both idealism and determinism, the move is frequently rhetorical. Section 2.3 examines the extent to which Bourdieusianism exceeds or fails to exceed the structure/agency opposition. See P. Bourdieu, 'The Peculiar History of Scientific Reason', *Sociological Forum*, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 1991): 3-26.
[126] In Lizardo's words, 'disembodied solipsism'. O. Lizardo, 'The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu's Habitus', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, vol. 34, no. 4: 379.

Bourdieu overstates his case for superseding idealism and objectivism, and that he gives an equivocal account of phenomenology by conflating Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, Schütz's social phenomenology and Husserl's genetic phenomenology.[127] Wacquant, Bourdieu's student at the Collège de France (and later translator), writes:

> "Bourdieu feels that phenomenology is mistaken in its view of society as an emergent product 'of decisions, actions, and cognitions of conscious, alert individuals to whom the world is given as immediately familiar and meaningful'"[128]

However, the 'geneticism' of Husserl's approach aims specifically to account for the social context and meaning of that immediacy, rather than to enshrine it a natural or deontological category[129] Likewise, if Bourdieu criticises Sartre for not recognising the durable dispositions of habitus which constrain subjectivity,[130] he does so only by reading a volitional intention into Sartrean subjectivity which is at best contestable.[131]

The upshot is that Bourdieu's conclusion – that phenomenology cannot describe how lived experience is produced by a dialectic of internalisation of previously externalised structures[132] – is based on the erroneous reduction of phenomenology to understanding the world as self-evident.[133] Bourdieu's reading of Husserlian phenomenology conflates the categories of *descriptive* and *genetic* explanation: in Bourdieu's view, Husserl does not adequately unpack the structural determination of conscious experience. Bourdieu's portrayal of Husserl's approach then is not so much a simple bracketing out of intangible mechanisms giving rise to consciousness, but an emphasis on transcendental consciousness which precludes a more thoroughly political focus.[134] In fact, Husserl's prioritisation of genetic description does aim at the structures behind the 'natural attitude' or common sense,[135] if not explicated in as forceful a manner as the violence which characterises Bourdieu's account of naturalised symbolic economy. If we consider Husserl's definition of the natural attitude as 'the sum of implicit

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[127] Throop and Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology'.
[128] *Ibid.*: 190.
[129] Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology*: 265-7.
[130] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 42
[131] See N. Fox, *The New Sartre* (New York; London: Continuum, 2003): 47-53.
[132] Throop and Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology': 190.
[133] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 3-4. It is on this basis that Bourdieu claims not to be a phenomenologist.
[134] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 142.
[135] Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology*: 265-7.

natural convictions about ourselves and the world',[136] it is clearly adjacent to Bourdieu's interpretation of *doxa*;[137] and Husserl, like Bourdieu, aims to account for the forces which produce and sustain the lifeworld, rather than insisting that the means of describing experience (scientifically or otherwise) are as enclosed by the parameters of the lifeworld as the primary subjective experience of it.

Throop and Murphy depict a substantial divergence between the two theorists, in that Bourdieu locates the internalisation of structure as itself determinant of consciousness, while Husserl argues that internalisation can only proceed with pre-given structures of consciousness in place. This does not, however, amount to the postulation of a pure subject which does the internalising: while it may exceed internalisation, it is also changed by it. And, finally, it is arguable that establishing differences in approaches to qualifying and unpacking subjectivity is secondary to a greater priority in each body of work: making explicit the implications of objectivism both in interpreting lived experience and in science generally. Here, comparison of Husserl and Bourdieu reduces to the focus of Section 2.2: the level of agency ascribed to the individual inhabiting the lifeworld. Instead of working from the assumption that Husserl is an idealist, Bourdieu a determinist, it is arguable that Husserlian genetic description avoids the subjectivist fallacy of positing pre-given consciousness, while space for agency in Bourdieu's habitus model is, if not explicitly detailed in his phenomenological work, then commensurate with it. It will be argued that attempts to read agency in Bourdieusian theory can only be achieved with significant distortions of the model set out in *Logic* and *Outline*. Bourdieu may thus reasonably be described as deterministic, but a non-individualistic, non-voluntaristic conception of agency remains qualifiedly viable nonetheless.

Bourdieu also develops Schützian phenomenological principles – in particular Schütz's ordering of knowledge distinguishing between common sense and scientific thought[138] – in developing his philosophy of social science.[139] Bourdieu extends Schütz's proposition that second order scientific thought is properly located in the social world,[140] by calling for the double

[136] Throop and Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology': 192.
[137] Bourdieu defines doxa as the beliefs of an individual as 'a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organisation [with which] the natural and social world appears as self evident'. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 156.
[138] A. Schütz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (London: Heinemann, 1972): 220-4.
[139] For a personal reflection on how Bourdieu first read phenomenological philosophy, see especially P. Bourdieu, *'Fieldwork in Philosophy'*, in P. Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
[140] A. Schütz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*: 241.

epistemological break discussed in Section 1.5.[141] For both theorists a 'science of science' is possible, though Bourdieu emphasises that this cannot proceed on the basis of the assumption that the social scientific analysis of the pre-scientific is itself a science.[142] It was noted in above that Bourdieu's generative or genetic structures produce the means of their own apprehension, although the social scientist is able to break with that determination to enable a properly objectified, if not objective, analysis of those structures. While Bourdieu claims a degree of innovation in this regard,[143] it is not the case that Schütz treats the pre-scientific as a realm which can be coldly described by the scientist, rather than as a realm which determines to an extent the terms of reference of its observation and interpretation.[144] As for Husserl, Schütz does not place generative structural determination at the centre of analysis, but neither is the category of natural knowledge characterised as undetermined.[145] It is rather a difference of emphasis, with Schütz seeking to compartmentalise different categories of social scientific data rather than rule one category or another untainted, irrelevant or unknowable.[146]

But while Schütz by no means depicts the taken-for-granted as unstructured or intrinsically meaningful,[147] he does nonetheless prioritise its content. There is an imperative in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* that analysing the interpretations that people make about their interactions with the objective world is essential to understanding that relation between subject and object.[148] As becomes clear in Bourdieu's often dismissive position on the reflections of social actors – in no field so much as the journalistic – Bourdieu can be read as claiming that all that matters is to demonstrate a fit between fundamentally arbitrary subject-object relations. I argue in Chapter 4 that Bourdieu is overly dismissive of agent reflection, but for present purposes the more interesting contrast is between the objects of knowledge in Bourdieusian and Schützian theory. While for Schütz common sense knowledge will often reveal something of the meaning of subject-object relations,[149] for Bourdieu this type of knowledge can only be seen as particular instances of the possible. This distinction matters

[141] The double epistemological break means that Bourdieu categorises three orders of experience constructs, augmenting the traditional division of cognition into directly experienced reality and knowledge about social reality. See, for example, A. Schütz, 'Problems of Interpretive Sociology', in A. Ryan (ed.), *The Philosophy of Social Explanation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
[142] Throop and Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology'.
[143] *Ibid.*: 194-5.
[144] A. Schütz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*: 220-4.
[145] *Ibid.*: 70-4.
[146] Throop and Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology'.
[147] A. Schütz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*: 74.
[148] *Ibid.*: 83-6.
[149] *Ibid.*: 85-6.

because it means that for Schütz, the content of natural knowledge is scientifically productive, whereas for Bourdieu it is something which can be rationalised after the fact. The import of this is that it demonstrates the heightened scepticism with which scientists should approach the basic units of data they encounter. But it also points to a more political implication: sense-data, common sense and everyday reflection are then not only not natural, but structured in such a way as to reproduce hierarchies of power.[150] I argue in this thesis that the postulation of necessary politicality renders Bourdieu's specific criteria for politicality unclear: if coercive power is not only everywhere but productive of future configurations of power, then it is difficult to conceive of political agency, or indeed differentiation between levels of coercion. I contend that while Bourdieu's political writings on journalism suggest the inevitability of endless layers of political domination behind the seemingly natural and conventionally received, the emphasis on finite reflexivity in *Logic* and *Outline* does open up the potential for a practical delimitation – in the neo-Marxist phenomenological sense described here rather than the mere bracketing-out of the intangible[151] – of political analysis. Maintaining the possibility that, while common sense knowledge and first-order reflections are not pre-given, they are not inevitably complicit in the reproduction of domination, means that a (contested) separation can be posited between the politically meaningful and meaningless. It means that some unreflective data can be taken on its own merits, some can be classified as without relevance, and the remainder can be properly identified as structurally strategic: that is, contributing to or evidence of the reproduction of domination defined in particular terms. Establishing the possibility of effective political meaninglessness would thus allow the Bourdieusian model to be specific about what forms of domination are or should be central to it. For present purposes these may be summarised as hierarchisation and structures of distinction and exclusion, reproduced by the complicity of their victims through naturalisation and internalisation. Establishing these specifics then allows for a more specific statement of what would count as a political goal in Bourdieu's model: qualified autonomy from the dominant principle of differentiation which characterises a field and which is geared towards its endurance.

If Schütz's influence on Bourdieu is largely a matter of the distinction of common and scientific knowledges, then the importance of Merleau-Ponty might be its characterisation of the

[150] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 58-9.
[151] *Ibid.*: 64-5.

application of phenomenology as an intrinsically political exercise.[152] While it has been widely noted that Merleau-Ponty anticipates certain key post-structuralist arguments,[153] his account of the everyday of the political was consistently inscribed with a defence of normative judgement and field interventions.[154] The origins of this proto-agency are found in the theory of embodied significance;[155] subject-object dualisms are not encountered in lived experience as such, but through the mediating ground of the body.[156] This move allows Merleau-Ponty, as well as Goffman, to rework theories of rule-following and habit-formation as neither willed nor simple stimulus-response, but as practical, corporeal knowledge.[157] Goffman in particular stresses the variety of ways in which socioeconomic status and social signifiers (in Goffman's words, the 'totalitarian institutions'[158]) are manifest in seemingly incidental body movements in social interactions. Bourdieu develops Goffman's concept of bodily performance, as well as Merleau-Ponty's notion of body hexis – defined as 'the socially inculcated ways an individual moves, carries and positions his or her body in the lived world'[159] – to describe corporeal memories as structures which pass from practice to practice without the mediation of consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty writes:

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[152] While Merleau-Ponty is usually given as the principal phenomenological influence on Bourdieusian theory, Lizardo argues that Piaget is more directly linked to Bourdieu's work. Piaget writes: "To know is to transform reality [through action] in order to understand how a certain state is brought about. By virtue of this point of view, I find myself opposed to the view of knowledge as a copy, a passive copy, of reality. In point of fact, this notion is based on a vicious circle: in order to make a copy we have to know the model we are copying, but according to this theory of knowledge the only way we know the model is by copying it, until we are caught in a circle, unable to know whether our copy of the model is like the model or not . . . To my way of thinking, knowing an object does not mean copying it—it means acting upon it. It means constructing systems of transformations that can be carried out on or with this object. Knowing reality means constructing systems of transformations that correspond, more or less adequately, with reality. They are more or less isomorphic to transformations of reality. The transformational structures of which knowledge consists are not copies of the transformations in reality; they are simply possible isomorphic models among which experience can enable us to choose". Quoted in Lizardo, 'The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu's Habitus': 384.

[153] See, for example, J. Schmidt, *Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism* (London: Macmillan, 1985): 166.

[154] *Ibid.*: 86-9; Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*: 504-30.

[155] S. Priest, *Merleau-Ponty* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998): 74.

[156] I. Marcoulatos, 'Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu on Embodied Significance', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour,* vol. 31, no. 1 (2001).

[157] Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of* Perception: 235-9. Goffman develops a similar account of corporeality: "To walk, to cross a road, to utter a complete sentence, to wear long pants, to tie one's shoes, to add a column of figures – all these routines that allow the individual unthinking, competent performance were attained through an acquisition process whose early stages were negotiated in cold sweat." E. Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972): 293.

[158] Quoted in Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 94.

[159] Throop and Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology': 188.

> "We said earlier that it is the body which understands in the acquisition of habit. This way of putting it will appear absurd, if understanding is subsuming a sense datum under an idea, and if the body is as an object. But the phenomenon of habit is just what prompts us to revise our notion of 'understand' and our notion of the body. To understand is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance – and the body is our anchorage in a world."[160]

Bourdieu's *sens pratique* develops this notion of physical learning of social norms to explain how corporeal inscription is at the heart of the production of subjectivities and the misrecognition of quasi-arbitrary relations between the objective and subjective as normal reality. Both theorists emphasise the dynamism of habituation, arguing that even repetitive, unreflective applications of (generative) logic are never only reproductive: even if we cannot say that they carry a natural potential for reflexivity, they nonetheless enact the potential for their rearrangement.[161] The principal point of divergence emerges in Merleau-Ponty's characterisation of the 'phenomenal body' as the arena in which 'significance and intentionality come to dwell.'[162] Habitus in this sense is more than the sum of a set of dispositions, rather something which itself composes a living presence; this, in turn, is predicated on Merleau-Ponty's positing of an 'original'[163] intentionality. For Bourdieu, while corporeal significance is pervasive in its domination of subjective experience of a field, it is nonetheless an effect of that field. Body hexis may arguably carry the possibility of agency through indeterminacy, but it is not the origin of meaning but rather a determination of generative structures. This in itself does not demonstrate that Bourdieu is excessively objectivist. Rather, it points to Bourdieu's failure to construct the pre-reflexive on phenomenological grounds, opting instead to characterise the pre-reflexive normatively as a domain of political coercion.

Although Merleau-Ponty's politicisation of Husserlian phenomenology is often cited as the influence on Bourdieu's neo-Marxist phenomenology, I noted above that to label Husserl as essentially apolitical is erroneous. Moreover, Bourdieu also explicitly refers (in *Pascalian Meditations* and *Outline*, in particular) to the influence of the anthropological theory of Marcel

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[160] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962): 167.
[161] Marcoulatos, 'Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu on Embodied Significance'.
[162] Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*: 409.
[163] *Ibid*: xix. See E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (Boston: Kluwer, 1982): xxii.

Mauss. Such references most frequently[164] concern Mauss's work on gift exchange, but of potentially greater significance is the centrality of corporeality – specifically, *body techniques*[165] – in the concept of habitus which Bourdieu directly adopts. Mauss writes:

> "Please note that I use the Latin word – it should be understood in France as *habitus*. The word translates infinitely better than '*habitude*' (habit or custom), the '*exis*', the 'acquired ability' and 'faculty' of Aristotle (who was a psychologist). It does not designate those metaphysical *habitudes*, that mysterious 'memory', the subject of volumes or short and famous these. The 'habit' do not vary just with individuals and their imitations; they vary between societies, educations, proprieties and fashions, prestiges. In them we should see the techniques and work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the ordinary way, merely the soul and its repetitive faculties."[166]

Warde notes the dual significance of this passage: first, that it highlights that body techniques are a manifestation of practical reason rather than only mechanical repetitions; and second, that these techniques are not only individual but collective.[167]

Summary

In defence of phenomenology Bourdieu writes that it:

> "has the virtue of recalling what is most particularly ignored or repressed, especially in universes in which people tend to think of themselves as free of conformisms and beliefs, namely the relation of often insurmountable submission which binds all social agents, whether they like it or not, to the social world of which they are, for better or worse, the products."[168]

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[164] Notably in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.
[165] M. Mauss, *Sociology and Psychology: Essays* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979): 95-119.
[166] *Ibid.*: 101.
[167] A. Warde, 'Practice and Field: Revising Bourdieusian Concepts'.
[168] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 173.

Although broadly positive, the latter portion of this excerpt reveals much about Bourdieu's particular interpretation of phenomenology: namely, that individuals must be seen as 'products' of politicised social structures operating through norms and naturalisations which are either undetectable or insuperable. While the viability of agency in Bourdieu's work has been widely discussed, and is specifically addressed in Section 2.2, it is worth noting in the present context of the critiques of Calhoun, Garnham, Ortner and Jenkins.[169] While diverging on substantive political points, these critiques have in common the claim that Bourdieu's overdeterminism stems from his equation of non-representation with nonconsciousness. That which is not represented to consciousness as a phenomenon or aspect of an object is judged to be beyond consciousness – and in light of the discussion here as well as that concerning Durkheim below the realm of nonconsciousness is a space marked by coercive determination.[170] However, it can be countered there is more to consciousness than determination: the sensory, wilful and affective, all of which can have at least a qualified autonomy from determination.

Throop and Murphy make this point succinctly: to conflate discursive or reflective thought with consciousness and intentionality is fallacious.[171] Critics of Bourdieu thus suggest a limit to which one can reduce all aspects of consciousness to structural determination, to which there are two possible responses. The first is to contend that it is precisely in those areas of consciousness which appear as unstructured and unpredictable that depoliticisation of coercive power through normalisation is most effective. As opposed to economic hierarchies of which there is bound to be awareness, it is in the realm of the volitional and affective that dominated groups are likely to be complicit in their own determination[172] – a claim compatible with the hierarchies of class aspiration set out in *Distinction*.[173] The second response is critically to unpack what is meant by fencing off a space of consciousness such as affect. It is reasonable to question whether this space is by definition underdetermined and as such a credible locus for agency, and by extension whether one should be sceptical of the potential for agency ascribed to other categories such as

[169] C. Calhoun, 'Habitus, Field and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity', in C. Calhoun *et al.* (eds.), *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); N. Garnham and R. Williams, 'Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Culture: An Introduction', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1980): 220; S. Ortner, *Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture* (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1996): 11; R. Jenkins, 'Pierre Bourdieu and the Reproduction of Determinism', *Sociology*, vol. 20, no.1 (1982): 270-81.
[170] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 40.
[171] Throop and Murphy, 'Bourdieu and Phenomenology': 198.
[172] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 74.
[173] Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 1-7.

creativity, spontaneity and counter-intuition on the grounds that their very conception appears informed by a normative desire to locate agency.

It is at this point that the structure/agency debate reduces to an intractable opposition between poles assuming the possibility or impossibility of meaningful awareness of the determination of consciousness, the resolution of which I argue in this thesis can be made only on deontological grounds. In the context of the present discussion, Husserlian phenomenology offers a solution which is both pragmatic and, given one concession, defensible. This is to observe that reflective practices do occur in a fashion which leads beyond individual consciousness to practical change, or that insight into one's own position can be meaningful, as least to a degree mandated by intersubjective consensus. Bourdieu's dismissal (following Piaget) of nativist accounts has often been criticised,[174] and the reflections manifest in the case study's interview data offer a good counter argument to Bourdieu's suggestions that all reflections on the journalistic field by journalists are strategic field practices.[175] His account is in part directed by his own antipathy to journalists, accusing them of wielding a double consciousness over the public, sociologists and even themselves, so as to make strategic claims for symbolic or economic capital in the field of cultural production.[176] The contention that when journalists are rationalising to themselves the virtue of their profession their sub- or nonconsciousness is in fact acting strategically does appear overdetermining, but I would argue that it transcends personal prejudice and can be seen as commensurate with Bourdieu's interpretation of phenomenology. We cannot speak of a subconscious in Bourdieu's work – to do so would falsely posit an inner entity which does the work of internalisation – but central to the ever adaptable fit between habitus and field is the notion that one does not need consciously to act strategically, when a durable, adaptable set of dispositions aligns itself to the contingencies of a field such that strategically advantageous action becomes instinctive.

The result is that allegations of overdetermination are to an extent justifiable. Not only in specific politicised contexts but in Bourdieu's neo-Marxist phenomenology more broadly there is an assumption that structured and dominatory structuring practical strategies operate at some level. As with Husserl, Bourdieu brackets out a zone of experience for which no data can be observed. Unlike Husserl, Bourdieu characterises that space not as one in which only

[174] Lizardo, 'The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu's Habitus'.
[175] See Bourdieu, 'Political, Social Science and Journalistic Fields': 41-2.
[176] Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998d): 70.

metaphysical questions are at stake, but as one in which relations of political domination and dominatedness are systematically misrecognised as such. The case study of this thesis and theoretical analyses by other writers[177] do not support this negative politicisation of the intangible. While it is possible (see Chapter 5) to ascribe internalised motives to what is articulated as a benign professionalism, participants themselves make explicit the strategies – often as subtle as dispositional norms – which sustain the hierarchies of the field.[178] And while Bourdieu claims that ethics in a field such as journalism are valid only insofar as they serve as markers of distinction according to which objective positions are differentiated, it will be seen in the case study that interviewees routinely reflect on what would need to change in order for the field to improve. It is always arguable that improvement is nothing more than post-hoc rationalisation of change, articulated by those who have benefited. It is also true that participants often speak of the possibility of transformations in the direction of a political goal not unlike Bourdieu's – not as a universal statement of political mission, but as realistic aims within the field of cultural production in contemporary Britain and the US. These aims can be summarised as autonomy for a field within the broader field of power, and autonomy for institutions and individuals from the pole of unrestricted production within a field. Without suggesting that these goals are necessarily attainable or unambiguously laudable, it is difficult to conceive of the divisive, hierarchy-producing strategy which is assumed to underpin them.

While the task of the sociologist should always be aimed at the unpacking of that which appears genuine (the ascription of responsibility, say, based on an professional instinct or common sense) or 'naturally' valuable (in the case of autonomy, resting on a deontological construction of self-determination), there is an arena of experience which is necessarily inarticulable. There are no phenomenological grounds for Bourdieu's characterisation of that space as one of political priority and the inculcation of coercion;[179] that claim can only be made normatively. And normatively, to proceed as though no principle in journalism or elsewhere is defensible – that is, that autonomy, responsibility and contestability must be characterised as ultimately strategic if not cynical – results in a conservative view of the journalistic field quite at odds with the Bourdieusian political position on the problems of the field and how it could be transformed. The claim that it is possible to describe how a field could be positively transformed necessarily reduces to deontological components, which raises the key question of which institution or

[177] *Ibid.*: 392-3.
[178] I return to this argument in Section 4.2. See Wacquant, 'Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and Its Cracks': 110-2.
[179] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 165.

individuals determine what counts as 'positive' change. While this leaves Bourdieu susceptible to allegations of elitism, a defence of the authoritative subject of Bourdieusian theory is possible For Bourdieu this subject position can only be occupied by the reflexive social scientist or the field outsider,[180] and as such reflections by journalists are categorically dismissed. However, a defence of authority in journalism is also valid within the constraints of the Bourdieusian model, provided that that authority can be established reflexively, taking into account the implications of objectification and balancing transparency and autonomy. According to Bourdieusian theory it is never demonstrable that a journalist's reflections are beyond self-interest. It is possible, however, to conjecture that insight into how the field could be transformed can co-exist with interest – in the same way that Bourdieu's self-interest as a professional social scientist can co-exist with a political conviction directed against the reproduction of hierarchical domination.

2.1.1 Practice Theory

This section will establish where in the context of the philosophy of practice the Bourdieusian habitus model may be properly located, with an eye to setting out its theoretical content definitively so as most defensibly to operationalise it in methodological practice in the chapters which follow. It has been argued by some that the last fifteen to twenty years has seen a proliferation of theories which have a notion of practice at their conceptual core, widespread enough to warrant the identification of a 'practice turn' or 'practical turn' in contemporary social theory, drawing principally on Wittgenstein[181] and bearing the influences variously of Bourdieu, Foucault, Charles Taylor, Harold Garfinkel, Bruno Latour[182] and Anthony Giddens.[183] In this section it will be seen that while the various 'practice theories' recently articulated diverge too substantively to suggest a such unified movement, certain key themes are used consistently.

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[180] *Ibid.*: 1-2.

[181] J. Bouveresse, 'Rules, Dispositions and the Habitus', in R. Shusterman (ed.), *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999): 45-63; B. Frère, 'Genetic Structuralism, Psychological Sociology and Pragmatic Social Actor Theory: Proposals for a Convergence of French Sociologies', *Theory Culture & Society*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Jun 2004): 87.

[182] Mesny recounts that Bourdieu explicitly rejected Latour's concepts of materiality and scientific representation, but misrepresented these in the process. A. Mesny, 'A View on Bourdieu's Legacy: *Sens pratique* v. Hysteresis', *Canadian Journal of Sociology-Cahiers Canadiens De Sociologie*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Win 2002): 540-1.

[183] A. Reckwitz, 'Towards a Theory of Social Practices a Development in Cultural Theorizing', *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2002): 243-4, T. R. Schatzki, 'Practices and Actions: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Bourdieu and Giddens', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 27, no. 3 (1997).

Moreover, these themes are ones which Bourdieu has been prominent in raising – namely, the reconciliation or supersedence of the opposition between structuralism and phenomenology discussed above, and an emphasis on the temporality of subjective determination or the reproduction of structure. Bourdieu did not initiate either of these debates, but was rather one of the more recently influential of a succession of theorists to tackle the question of practice.[184] It is thus possible to locate Bourdieu both in terms an intellectual history in which practice was conceived in the context of debates over structure versus the individual, substantialism versus ephemerality, and rule-following.

Schatzki argues that the emergence of practice as a principal theoretical focus is locatable in four distinct realms. First, 'philosophical practice thinkers' such as Wittgenstein and Charles Taylor use the concept to problematise subjectivity and objectivity and to highlight the conditions of intelligibility. Second, social critics such as Bourdieu and Giddens, and ethnomethodologists, use practice to avoid prioritising either individual actions or social macrostructures. Third, 'cultural theorists' such as Foucault use practice to depict language as an active process. Finally, philosophers of science find the concept a useful orientating device for reconsidering humanist dichotomies between human and nonhuman entities. The following paragraphs summarise the common aspects of these distinct articulations of practice theory, and the extent to which it makes sense to locate Bourdieu in this context.

First, practice theory emphasises that all social phenomena – including knowledge, meaning, language, institutions, power and historical change – are all properly located in relational fields of practices.[185] The proposition that there is no meaning beyond that which is enacted in social context according to the contingencies of a position in a field, for example, is one which holds across all variants of practice theory discussed here. I would argue that this can be extended, and that practice theory is characterised by the temporal aspect of field-located practice. That is, in a rejection of substantialism, it applies consistently that there are no concrete, stable categories of language, knowledge and so on beyond their enactment at discrete moments in time (as well as relational points in spatial or non-spatial fields). Subjectivity conceived in the practical sense, for

[184] The point at which temporality was introduced into the philosophy of practice remains debatable. Smart, for example, makes the case against seeing it as a structuralist or post-structuralist innovation, arguing that temporality is central to the conceptions of practice used by Hegel and Marx. B. Smart, *Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis: A Critical Discussion of the Theory and Practice of a Science of Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976): 144.

[185] Macherey notes that this extends to the theory of practice itself being constructed as a practice ("une théorie du pratique de la pratique"). P. Macherey, 'A Partir De Bourdieu: Penser La Pratique', *Pensée*, no. 330 (2002).

instance, consists in the performance of structured practices of subjectivity, rather than drawing on a discrete philosophy of consciousness. There is not a wholesale embrace of ephemerality, however, as the regularity or structuredness of practices in given contexts give rise to *practical* meaning, subjectivity and so on. However, while maintaining that the structuredness of the essentially arbitrary is compatible with a political orientation which prioritises the observability of power relations and a commitment to political transformation, it remains entirely plausible that the substitution of regularity for concreteness of such categories (meaning, language etc) is still an affirmation of substantialism.

In any case, conceiving of subjectivity as discrete moments of performance of relational contingencies emphasises the social aspect of self-consciousness: rather than relying on individualistic accounts of the self, all categories of meaning are constituted according to shared practical understandings. For recent theories of corporeality this reconceives the body as something which comes into existence, or to consciousness in any case, through practical mastery of the intelligibility of bodies.[186] What 'practical' means in this regard is encapsulated by Bourdieu's corporeal sense in which habitus is 'hard-wired', such that bodies function as 'depositories of deferred thoughts', and 'arms and legs are full of numb imperatives'.[187] In concrete terms, *sens pratique* replaces concepts like belief, purpose and intention with another set comprising skills internalised as instinct, disposition, tacit understanding, and, in particular practical understanding.[188] This demonstrates the intellectual context in which the move made by Bourdieu away from individual 'ownership' of practices towards field-determined practices constituting subjectivity, should be seen. This raises the question of how an ethics of responsibility for one's practices can be conceived if the self does not exceed those practices (see also Chapters 5 and 6). For present purposes, it suffices to note that in a political theory such as Bourdieu's and in the field of journalism – in both of which the imperative of responsibility is clearly present – it too has to be reconstructed as situated practice. That is, just as the self is posited through practices of subjectivity, it enacts external frames of (ethical) reference to gain 'perspective' on those practices. Even if it cannot exceed its own practices or step outside itself to judge its own actions, it practically invokes an externality of self-awareness or self-responsibility, a situated field practice which can be understood like any other.

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[186] See, for instance, G. Noble and M. Watkins, 'So, How Did Bourdieu Learn to Play Tennis? Habitus, Consciousness and Habituation', *Cultural Studies*, vol. 17, no. 3-4 (May 2003): 520-539.
[187] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 73, 69. In the latter quote Bourdieu is paraphrasing Proust.
[188] Schatzki, 'Introduction: Practice Theory': 8.

The recasting of 'individual responsibility' is indicative of the way that practice theory in general, and in no small part drawing on Bourdieusian theory, deals with the individual. As with the phenomenologies discussed above, the practice turn represents a critique both of individualism and structuralism; it is not a rejection of the individual as a valid locus of meaning, but rather the posing of an alternate question: how the individual emerges in social context, how it is constituted in practice, and how the terms of apprehension of the 'individual' (self, body, subjectivity, consciousness) emerge, with what preconditions and with what exclusions. It is this focus on individuation more than anything else which marks Bourdieu as a key progenitor and central axis of the practice turn. Individuation links the programme embarked upon by many writers classifiable as practice theorists either to reconcile or overcome the divide between microscopic and macroscopic constructions of social science. The continuity between practice theorists can be depicted more broadly as an attempt to reconcile, on the one hand, a variant of phenomenology, whether it be Merleau-Pontian, Schützian, or Husserlian, and on the other, either a structuralism after Lévi-Strauss or Saussure or Wittgensteinian theories of rule-following and practical understanding.

2.1.2 Giddens

Finally, a comparison of Bourdieu and Giddens is useful in terms of establishing the relative priority of structures, practices or individuals in Bourdieu's work. It has been seen that Bourdieu is most commonly located in the phenomenological tradition; he is also linked in the literature to post-structuralist theory and the Frankfurt School.[189] However, I would argue that the early work of Giddens also marks an intellectual context immediately adjacent to the key texts in which the Bourdieusian philosophy of practice was initially developed. Giddens's writings on praxis in *New Rules of Sociological Method*, published in 1976, mark an illuminating parallel to Bourdieu's *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique,*[190] published in French four years earlier and in English as *Outline* in 1977. This phase of Giddens's work has been criticised variously for being

[189] See, for example, P. Bourdieu, 'On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology', in P. Bourdieu and J.S. Coleman (eds), *Social Theory for a Changing Society* (Boulder CO; Oxford; New York: Westview; Russell Sage Foundation, 1991c); P. Bourdieu, 'Outline of a Sociological Theory of Art Perception', in P. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993a).

[190] Bourdieu, 'Esquisse D'une Théorie De La Pratique: Précédé De Trois Études D'ethnologie Kabyle', *Travaux de droit, d'économie, de sociologie et se sciences politiques,* No. 92 (Genáeve: Droz, 1972).

idealistic, reductionistic and individualistic.[191] However, while some of these charges may be reasonable on political or sociological grounds, the phenomenology of structuration remains an adaptive and reflexive model of the relation between structure and practice. While it will be seen in what follows that Giddens does not follow through the exposure of conditionality to the same extent as Bourdieu, structuration remains largely defensible against allegations of individualism and voluntarism and, more appositely, its similarities and points of diversion from Bourdieusian theory serve to throw the latter into sharper relief.

For Giddens, structures are neither the inhibitory matrices of Talcott Parsons[192] nor the hardwired programming of the structuralist school,[193] but rather what he terms 'generative sets of rules and resources;.[194] This definition is clearly adjacent to Bourdieu's generative logic, though it is the 'resources' which mark out the gap between the two models. While Giddens concedes that agency is bounded, "the production and reproduction of society ... has to be treated as a skilled performance on the part of its members".[195] This is very close to the Bourdieusian position in purely interactional, intersubjective terms. Where the two diverge most significantly is in how these skills are acquired and wielded: whereas for Giddens individual, quasi-autonomous actors are assumed,[196] for Bourdieu the acquisition of skills and acceptance of the social world in which they are valid is a critical part of the process of individuation. The rejection in generative structuralism of the philosophy of consciousness appears to rule out the possibility that social actors can be aware of the 'rules of the game' of the field in which they are immersed. Instead, specific 'resources' and strategies may indeed be known and reflected upon; what goes unacknowledged are the originary parameters of the field and the reproduction of structure which is effected by engagement in that interactional context. This hypothesis is tested in the positing of misrecognised symbolic economies in the case study. In any case, for Bourdieu it is immersion in a field and the enactment of strategies for individual gain within it which not

[191] Eder, *The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies*: 119. Also C. G. A. Bryant and D. Jary, *Anthony Giddens: Critical Assessments* (London: Routledge, 1997), J. Clark *et al.*, *Anthony Giddens: Consensus and Controversy* (London: Falmer, 1990).
[192] See, for example, A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979): 112-7.
[193] *Ibid.*: 10-28.
[194] From J. Livesay, 'Normative Grounding and Praxis: Habermas, Giddens, and a Contradiction within Critical Theory'', *Sociological Theory*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Autumn 1985): 69.
[195] A. Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies* (New York: Basic Books, 1976): 160.
[196] "As a leading theorem of the theory of structuration, I advance the following: every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which her or she is a member". Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*: 5.

only reproduce a social space but also the individuals who engage in it. That is, as was noted above, practice is logically prior to the individual. Giddens accepts the dual nature of agency – that it is simultaneously structured and structuring[197] – but uses the term 'structuring' in a different way than Bourdieu, depicting it in part as the outcome of individual intention.[198] Practices, then, "are the situated doing of a subject, can be examined with regard to intended outcome".[199] Structures, instead of being the generative logics which produce this situatedness and this intention, are essentially tools to be used by social actors. The use of structures as resources will undoubtedly have the effect of reproducing certain social realities, but they remain primarily the product of practical activity, rather than the product of pre-existing structures for which practical activity is merely the *medium* of reproduction.[200] For Giddens, indeed, structures are the media of practical activity. They are not productive of subjectivity but are "characterised by the 'absence of a subject'".[201]

However, Giddens does not underplay the political importance of the reproduction of structures: structures are for Giddens absolutely 'real', because they are the outcome of practical activity and thus, to a degree to which Bourdieu does not concede, material. But as much as they are outcome, they also produce strategy insofar as they *re*produce the logical or conceptual framework in which practical activity arises. Structural reproduction is thus a limitation upon practical activity, as it is for Bourdieu. The decisive difference between the two is also a subtle one. While for Giddens practice has the unintended consequence of reproducing structures which subsequently limit practice, that 'practice' of which he conceives is not reducible to structure. For Bourdieu, on the other hand, practice is produced by and productive of structure in a way that makes the two concepts virtually inextricable, apart from the temporal gap between structured stimulus and structuring response which is itself a finite, politically-implicated space. Bourdieusian practice is materially concomitant with structure: both emerge in materiality, both become 'real' in precisely the same constitutive process. Conceptually, it makes little sense to speak of practice doing the work of structure, although that is how *Logic* is sometimes read. Rather, the two are inseparable aspects of the constitution of social meaning or of objective power relations: one is the instantiation of the other, but while it seems there is a logical

[197] *Ibid.*
[198] *Ibid.*: 83-5.
[199] Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*: 119.
[200] *Ibid.*: 121.
[201] Livesay, 'Normative Grounding and Praxis': 69.

structural priority which renders practice secondary, in fact neither structure nor practice can be conceived as analytically discrete.

2.2 Critical Perspectives

This section addresses some of the key criticisms and reconstructions of Bourdieusian theory. First, it examines the claim made within the context of the structure/agency debate that Bourdieu is irredeemably deterministic,[202] and that no viable concept of willed, transformative agency is compatible with his political philosophy. Second, it asks whether Bourdieu's model commits the fallacy of culturalism, in which all objects, including the strictly material or economic, are reduced to symbolic forms and objects of knowledge. The question is also raised whether Bourdieu is essentially elitist in his defence of the capacity of the social scientist to reduce agents' reflections to structural effects and strategies – though resolution of this question will be deferred until the case study. Third, it considers the validity of reconstructing Bourdieusian theory by way of immanent critique, working from Bourdieusian first principles and those of his key influences to produce an alternate reading of generative structuralism. Fourth, it frames the elitism critiquq to which I return at the end of the thesis. The section ends by establishing which criticisms of or ambiguities around Bourdieusian theory are answerable in theoretical terms, and posits those which are to be further examined in the methodological context of a Bourdieusian case study.

2.2.1 The Structure/Agency Debate

The structure/agency debate has been one of the most intensely contested areas of sociological theory since the 1960s.[203] As such, consideration of the debate and the possibility for

[202] See, for instance, A. Sayer, 'Bourdieu, Smith and Disinterested Judgement', *Sociological Review,* vol. 47, no. 3 (August 1999).

[203] S. Hays, 'Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture', *Sociological Theory,* vol. 12, no. 1 (1994): 57. Berard argues that Bourdieu, among others, has failed to overcome the dualism of structure on the one hand and agency or practice on the other. T. J. Berard, 'Rethinking Practices and Structures', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences,* vol. 35, no. 2 (Jun 2005): 204-05. A similar critique is presented in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, 'Can There Be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning?' in C. J. Calhoun *et al.* (eds), *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993): 35-44. It is, however, more common to find in the literature arguments about structure and agency in Bourdieu's work in spite of his rejection of the terms. For example, D. Anderson, 'Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action: Burke and Bourdieu on Practice', *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* vol. 37, no. 3 (2004).

overcoming it altogether is not only significant in its own terms, but also because it serves as a focus according to or against which much contemporary social theory is oriented. In what follows the Foucauldian articulation of the structure/agency relation will be taken as the point of origin, for, while Foucault was by no means the first to tackle this question, it has largely been the Foucauldian framing against which others have positioned themselves relatively. It will become clear that Bourdieu's habitus and field models can be seen in part as responding to perceived limitations of Foucault's 'docile body' thesis. A common contention among these theorists is that 'agency' is an empty category as such, and is only meaningful in relation to some form of constraint. This has an echo in theoretical terms insofar as definitions of agency depend entirely on the depiction of power used by each thesis. That said, this section will proceed from two tentative definitions of agency most in evidence in the literature: first, that agency consists in the scope a social actor possesses to discern and to some degree control the power relations in which he or she operates and which at least partly determine his or her conceptual framework and actions (the 'self-determination' prospectus); second, that agency is the possibility of formulating and acting upon an account of domination and transformation which rises above the level of the individual and local (the 'political viability' prospectus').

An often heard critique of *Discipline and Punish* is that by rendering the subject as a 'docile body', Foucault effectively precludes the possibility of agency.[204] Here the 'subject' is characterised by discursive objectification: it is effectively wholly determined at the level of the corporeal, with no effective residual space for self-determination. The concept of freedom is valid in this model, and indeed is necessitated by the existence of its counterpart, coercion, but it is a merely formal freedom. That is, it is implied everywhere without amounting to 'agency' conceived in either sense set out above. It is not a *sine qua non* of political phenomenology that political agency is viable or even conceivable, and critiques of *Discipline and Punish* which rest on deontological conceptions of agency are not in themselves sufficient to prove its necessity.[205] Such arguments emphasise the political consequences of accepting that agency is nonviable – an inert, conservative position at odds with Foucault's stated progressive or radical convictions –

[204] See, for example, J. P. Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York; London: Routledge, 1997a).
[205] T. R. Flynn, 'Truth and Subjectivation in the Later Foucault', *Journal of Philosophy,* vol. 82, no. 10 (1985).

and it will be seen that this is a theoretical move which applies also to Bourdieusianism.[206] Leaving aside for the moment the potential supersedence of the structure/agency opposition, there are potentially three responses: first, acceptance of the futility of political action; second, a modification of the Foucauldian account of dominatory power such that viable agency can be logically, phenomenologically derived from it; and third, an assertion that while agency is at base fantastic, it is politically defensible to act as if it were not. For Foucault (and, in a different manner, Bourdieu), it is imperative that political agency be compatible with principles of structured discourse and corporeal inscription. His later, 'genealogical' period is marked by this drive to reconcile an all-pervasive, positively productive (rather than merely inhibitory) account of coercive power with the possibility of willed transformation and self-determination, in a model cogent enough to withstand allegations that a normative political agenda had simply been 'tacked on' to an incompatible political philosophical model.

At the heart of the Foucauldian[207] defence against determinism is discursive transgression. The transgression of limits and the limits themselves are not simply opposed but interrelated, based on the premise that the limit is simultaneously constraining and enabling. Transgression is not the logical opposite of the limit, but the illumination of limits, the making clear of what is excluded by discourse. "Transgression does not overcome limits ... but shows that what we are, our being, depends on the existence of limits"; and further, the possibility of transgression itself depends upon recognition of the limitedness of the limit[208]. This is compatible with the Bourdieusian (and more broadly neo-Marxist phenomenological) contention that 'constraining' structures are in fact generative of the agency which adheres to them; and by extension that structures generate the means of their own apprehension by the theorist. Several critics have suggested that this amounts to nothing more than the 'archaeological' Foucauldian tenet that agency is the discontinuous, reactive resistance formally implied at each localised manifestation of coercive power.[209] However, it can be countered that casting agency as historical and context-specific is not a negation of the viability of political transformation but a proper materialisation of the political tropes of 'freedom' and 'transformation'. The alternate endpoints of this debate

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[206] J. Grimshaw, 'Practices of Freedom', in C. Ramazanoglu (ed.), *Against Foucault* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993, N. Hartsock, 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?' in L. Nicholson (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism* (London; New York: Routledge, 1990): 171-2.

[207] That is, including not only Foucault but also those who have argued for the viability of agency drawing on his work.

[208] J. Simons, *Foucault & the Political* (London: Routledge, 1995): 69.

[209] See, for instance, Grimshaw, 'Practices of Freedom': 66; Hartsock, 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?': 171-2.

are either that Foucault offers a more nuanced account of the variability of coercion and is pragmatic about resistance, or that his recourse to voluntarism (see below) and individualism corrodes the idea of collective action and stands against the commitment to universalism which traditionally marked 'progressive' politics. It is perhaps more insightful to examine limits and transgressions in Foucault's own terms. That is, if there is a beyond or a space opened up by the illumination of limits, then what are the conditions of this space, how might it be inhabited and in what would transformative action and self-determination consist?

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*,[210] Foucault deliberately avoids filling this 'space' with even a protean content so as to avoid political proscription. However, such a disavowal cannot be neutral any more than an affirmation of a particular conception of the political. The denial of politicality carries its own political commitments, since to avoid reference to 'politics' is to exclude a specific manifestation of the political, and to obscure the presence of another.[211] The character of this politics becomes clear when we look at Foucault's attempt to overcome the oppression/freedom dualism by constructing an alternative axis: the ethical relation to oneself.[212] This does not entail a disavowal of the discursive construction of the subject, but it does rest upon a particular mode of subjectification – namely, the aesthetics of the self. Discernible in this account is a move away from individuation as a wholly discursive, which is to say superficial, phenomenon, to a prioritisation of self-determination whose 'self' can only be that of a modified individualism. That is, the affirmation of volition of the statement 'there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art'[213] is based on a projection of self-mastery at odds with the overdetermination of individuation, down to the sense of corporeality, of Foucault's archaeological period. Recourse to ethics/aesthetics is intended to resolve the apparent contradiction that the self is both fully discursively determined and able, to an extent, to shape its own determination. However, while it is certainly true that if discursively-constructed agents are also active parts of that discourse then their actions will encompass the transgressive as well as the structurally reproductive, willed, directed, *ethical* transgression, including

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[210] M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon, 1982).

[211] Bourdieu observes that much of the normativity of the Foucauldian 'fad' can be explained generationally, by the need of Foucault, Althusser and others to overthrow the dominance of existentialism. Bourdieu, *In Other Words*: 4-5.

[212] G. Deleuze, *Foucault* (London: Athlone, 1988): 96.

[213] "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress", in M. Foucault and P. Rabinow, *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984): 351. On Bourdieu's distance from this model of the constitution of the self, see S. Lash, 'Structure, Agency and Practical Knowledge (Review Article)', *Contemporary Sociology,* vol. 21, no. 2 (1992): 55-6.

alternate determinations of the self, would only be possible if that ethics were extra-discursive, located in the 'beyond' of power relations. It is clear for Foucault that that beyond the limit is itself the product of ubiquitous, constructive power relations: power is productive of both the limits of discourse and what is outside, such that the 'space' for self-determination Foucault invokes is not apolitical. If this exterior is characterised by aesthetics it is a politicised aesthetics, by which self-determination remains discursively implicated. For present purposes, it is apparent that the creativity upon which the idea of artistic self-creation depends is not materialised or historicised by Foucault, but only posited. At best the lack of contextualisation of this self-determination raises the possibility that it may be irrelevant or meaningless: the deontological assertion that self-determination is in itself a good thing only holds against the backdrop of voluntaristic individualism; otherwise its meaningfulness is conditional and cannot be assumed. At worst this self-determination is complicit in the coercive construction of the subject, proceeding as it must within networks of power relations despite the appeal to aesthetics, with the result that is not substantively distinct from the docile body of *Discipline and Punish*.[214]

By shifting focus from self-determination to collective politics, a similar pattern of obscuring material conditionality and reversion to deontological commitments is demonstrable. Here, at the interdiscursive level, Foucault suggests that there are privileged 'sites' of transgressive thought and action that necessitate the possibility of resistance in all regimes – namely, the discursive margins, and limina between discourses. Foucault's assertions that that 'power is coextensive with the social body; there are no primal spaces of liberty', and that there are 'no relations of power without resistances',[215] make sense in the context of the above articulation of the post-structuralist contention that there is not freedom as such but only that whose precondition is (materially specific) constraint. However, by conflating power and domination, resistance also remains uncontextualised at the broader social level. Power is the ubiquitous condition of discourse; in this light it is not difficult to conceive of resistance as its necessary action-reaction counterpart. Domination for Foucault is conceived in narrower terms than power; it is structured, and it has political effects which can be dissected at multiple levels. It is this form of power which lacks a theorised counterpart in Foucauldian theory. While dominatory power can be

[214] Bourdieu echoes Foucault's account of corporeality when he writes that: "In a society divided into classes, all the products of a given agent, by an essential overdetermination, speak inseparably and simultaneously of his/her class – or, more precisely, his/her position and rising or falling trajectory within the social structure – and of his/her body....". Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 79.

[215] 'Powers and Strategies', in M. Foucault and C. Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (Brighton: Harvester, 1980).

shown to operate in determinate, patterned ways, opposition to it is, again, merely implied and reactive, and at the macro level this means an oppositional politics which is wholly localised and incoherent. This is sensible in its own terms: if dominatory structures produce the structures of their apprehension and opposition, then the always-already adapted mechanisms of dominatory regimes would suggest not opposition so much as oppositions, each fleeting and unstable.

However, Foucault's ethical commitment to political transformation leads to an avowal of a *natural* repository of transformative agency, an oppositional politics whose character and apprehension is not the product of that to which it is opposed. This contrasts with Foucault's earlier contention that the 'natural' is not a deontological category, that the process by which phenomena are naturalised and internalised is a fundamentally discursive one. It means finding recourse to a transcendental form of political agency and to locating it in a 'space' which is also partially universalised. In parallel to agency at the level of self-determination, the transcendental positing of oppositional politics leads not to an unimplicated politics, but rather to an unmaterialised, unqualified statement of formal agency. The lack of contextualisation of that agency does not produce an agency which is underdetermined, but merely one whose particular determination is obscured. This determination is characterised by the reification of the marginal. That the designation of a space or social group as the natural home of transformative power is philosophically suspect is clear enough, and has been much discussed.[216] The lack of material context for such a designation, however, masks the political import of such a designation – that is, the sociohistorical context and discursive implications of lionising the marginal and abnormal. This is a significant occlusion but one not strictly relevant to a discussion of Bourdieu, to whose conceptions of structure and agency we now turn.

Bourdieu on Structure and Agency

In what follows it will be demonstrated that agency in Bourdieusian theory is in large part constructed so as to address the normative injunctions and implicit transcendental appeals of the Foucauldian model. The form 'agency' takes in Bourdieu's work is a dynamic corrective to Foucault's more statically deterministic 'docile body', but, rather than an affirmation of

[216] See, for instance, C. C. Lemert, 'Post-Structuralism and Sociology', in S. Seidman (ed.), *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 271.

productive or creative power on the part of the social actor, this is instead a product of a more dynamic, adaptable and originary account of coercive power in the context of the generative habitus. In fact, Bourdieu extends the common post-structuralist position that agency or freedom cannot be conceived in *isolation* from structure or constraint, to suggest that the two poles of this posited dualism are conceptually inseparable, and that the philosophical/sociological practice of stating this opposition has its own exclusionary or coercive political effects. This would, to be sure, rule out a discussion (at least one not proscribed by self-reflexivity) of structure and agency in Bourdieusian theory. However, as McNay has argued, Bourdieu's specific problematisation of the structure/agency relation invokes normative themes of coercion, strategy, choice and transformation which, while frequently constructed as being unrecognisable as such, can be located in the history of the structure/agency debate.

By articulating a model in which power relations function as generative structures, and which are conditionally reproduced by the practices which they tend to generate, Bourdieu recasts agency as itself conditional, unthinkable distinct from the simultaneously constraining and enabling structures which give it meaning in a particular sociohistorical context. Rather than freedom or agency as such, Bourdieu refers to what Merleau-Ponty termed 'embodied potentialities',[217] a practical sense of strategy experienced as natural or instinctive – that is, not recognised *as* strategic. Where 'choice' is manifest, it is the quasi-arbitrary choice between actions which have meaning largely in the symbolic context of a given field and which are only tenuously connected to the objective structures in which they emerge; in practice the most 'successful' habitus are those adjusted to a field's modalities to the point where that which is best strategically (that is, in terms of the accumulation of legitimate symbolic capital) occurs simply as the 'natural' thing to do. The implication is that where choice presents itself to the consciousness of the social actor, it is invariably an empty distinction through whose process a 'deeper' or alternate structural contingency becomes increasingly misrecognised as such. And where choice is not manifest – where there is an action obviously or unconsciously appropriate to a given situation – there is also an obscuring of the practical, strategic interplay by which that obviousness is, never universally, crystallised. The point is that if there is agency, it is not self-evident or wielded by individuals. There are, rather, practices of agency. These practices are not owned or embodied by social actors, but their effects in social context, given that these practices like any others are structuring as well as structured, may potentially have the transformative,

[217] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 69, L. McNay, *Gender and Agency*: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory (Cambridge; Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2000): 31.

subversive or creative aspects recognisable to the sociologist (or, more correctly, sociological habitus) as agencical.

Logic and *Outline* present a working through of one of the key tenets of Bourdieusian theory: that practices simultaneously express the quasi-arbitrariness (rather than complete arbitrariness) of cultural norms as well as their absolute pervasion of behaviour. That is, while actions, thoughts, self-consciousness and practical sense are mere effects of social frameworks – which is to say the meaning that attaches to them is generated by the same structural configurations as generates the practices of action, thought and so on themselves – expression of those relations is oriented towards reinforcing the relative power relations which in turn reproduce those practices and cause them to be increasingly 'naturalised'. Practice is thus regularising and homogenising, and it proceeds by way of anticipation.[218] One has a certain 'feel for the game' – the generative cognitive and corporeal disposition produced by habitus – which is equitable to a usually unconscious outlook on the probability of certain outcomes;[219] and, Bourdieu contends, anticipation of certain eventualities have a tendency of making those outcomes become fact.[220] At the most general level this resembles Foucauldian discourse theory: the fact that the particular form of a social space is dependent on specific, material conditions is forgotten, the status quo becomes normalised. The practices through which this concretisation is effected could conceivably be anything – from the discernment of what counts as good art or sound academic practice, to cultural identity and the sense of selfhood. The normalisation which is achieved functions on two levels: first, it makes 'natural' the particular hierarchies within a field (culturally, for example, in terms of a hegemonic national identity alongside various minorities, some celebrated, others, patronised or marginalised); second, it makes natural the fact that these fields of practice continue at all (why practices of cultural identity are accepted to be important, for example). At each level, the fundamental contestation between objective positions is obscured by the staticisation manifest at the level of the practical.

It would be technically misleading to suggest that individuals internalise arbitrary relations and express them as their nature: Bourdieu's point is that there is no individual to do the internalising

[218] "The practical world that is constituted in the relationship with the habitus, acting as a system of cognitive and motivating structures, is a world of already realised ends…", Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 53.
[219] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 214-5.
[220] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 55. It has been argued that the relationship between what Bourdieu terms 'objective probability structures' and cultural or social fields bears the influence of Spinoza's 'dual aspect' theory. See R. Moore, 'Cultural Capital: Objective Probability and the Cultural Arbitrary', *British Journal of Sociology of Education,* vol. 25, no. 4 (2004): 450.

other than that expressed by practices of individuation. These practices are as determined, strategic and misrepresenting of structured power relations as any other – in short, the way in which one comes to a sense of self-consciousness or identity is a manifestation of practices whose effects can properly be called strategic, not in the sense of benefiting the 'individual' called into practical existence as a result, but in the sense that specific relative power relations will be reinforced or challenged as a result. For Bourdieu, not only the *manner* by which individuation proceeds but the fact that it constitutes a range of practices at all is itself politically implicated, since the positing of self-consciousness, individuality or interiority all carry political commitments enacted in practices of individuation. The aim of this section is to characterise the particular form in which agency emerges in Bourdieusian theory by identifying model of power on which it is dependent – that is, the practices which hardwire social norms and reinforce (or otherwise) objective power relations. This is also useful in locating Bourdieu in the context of the structure/agency debate, as it provides a clear comparison with Foucault, for whom individuals are effectively reduced to the status of automata, and a common antecedent in the Merleau-Ponty's application of Saussurean linguistics to philosophy, and in particular the theory of embodiment.[221] For Bourdieu, practices are in effect performed from memory, a memory which is not individual but rather endemic to the group habitus of the social space in which an agent operates. Through embodiment and naturalisation an agent perceives the field in which she finds herself as normal, a phenomenon which 'every social order systematically takes advantage of'.[222] This extends to the sense the self, which does not exceed its expression in practices of selfhood, has of its physical form – how it inhabits it and how it interacts with the material world around it – which is to say that the sense of corporeality, conceived as active practice, is both informed by and (re)produces relations of structured power. Symbolic power is thus said to work through the control, or, more correctly, determination of bodies and the 'belief that is given by the collectively recognised capacity to act in various ways on deep-rooted linguistic and muscular patterns of behaviour, either by neutralising them or by reactivating them to function mimetically'.[223]

This is apposite insofar as it demonstrates the extent of determinism in Bourdieusian theory, a determination of symbolic categories which is effectively all-pervasive in the collective

[221] See, especially M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*: 171-7. Also N. Crossley, *The Politics of Subjectivity: Between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty* (Ashgate: Avebury, 1994).
[222] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 69.
[223] *Ibid.*

consciousness of a field and which has determining effects in the objective realm.[224] Whereas Foucault fenced off a 'space' of the constructed individual or social space which eludes determination, for Bourdieu determinism encompasses not only self-consciousness and the sense of individuality but also the senses of physicality and materiality. The originary, generative role ascribed to symbolic economies and the relations of objective power they obscure will necessarily be definitive with regard to Bourdieusian agency. It does not indicate, however, that some form of agency is inconceivable, that because it can only emerge immanently then any protean form of agency is immediately neutralised by an infinitely adaptive set of dispositions which will naturalise the arbitrary and reinforce the coercive even when counter-signification and political opposition are willed. Bourdieu's corporeality is not merely a more ubiquitous, 'deeper' expression of the Foucauldian body of inscribed discourse. It makes sense, for instance, to problematise the observable phenomena that the sense one has of one's physical existence is not universal but conditional on time and space. Conceiving of the body inevitably invokes principles of differentiation such as presence, connectedness, grace or weight, and there is potential merit in pointing out that there is nothing transcendentally natural about the dominance of some principles over others, that the very idea of interpreting experience through physicality is itself strictly arbitrary, and that there are concrete political effects of the practical universality of each.[225] Most importantly, such a move can be seen as productively destabilising in that it posits determination as context-specific, observable and finite.

It is thus precisely by way of such a thoroughgoing account of determination that a conception of agency emerges which can express its divergent forms, temporal and spatial specificity and potential transformativity. As McNay summarises: 'the cultural necessity for a performative reiteration of norms highlights the extent to which they are not natural or inevitable and are, therefore, potentially open to change through processes of resignification'.[226] Bourdieu states the case unequivocally, suggesting that denaturalisation of norms is not only potentially but necessarily transformative.[227] This may be the case, though it will ultimately depend on whether conditionality-exposing academic output can be constructed as reliably transformative praxis or whether criteria of dissemination through symbolic systems must also be met. More important in

[224] Shilling labels this form of determinism 'reproductionalism', capturing not only the pervasiveness of determinism in Bourdieu's work but it dynamic, active constitution in practice. C. Shilling, 'Physical Capital and Situated Action: A New Direction for Corporeal Sociology', *British Journal of Sociology of Education,* vol. 25, no. 4 (2004): 474.
[225] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 89-95.
[226] McNay, *Gender and Agency*: 34.
[227] *Ibid.*: 36.

the present context is the fact that Bourdieu does not go so far as to describe this necessary transformativity as 'agency'. Certainly it does not have the character of willed change, or even change whose outcome or direction is to some extent predictable. Nor can it be seen to meet the second condition stated at the beginning of this section – the potential to be the basis of a relatively stable collective politics. This may be interpreted as a corrective against the residual voluntarism of the late Foucauldian discourse model. However, if there is to remain a viable notion of willed political change and of political collectivism it must be demonstrated that while agency cannot be said to be embodied by individuals or subject to collective will, there may nonetheless be practicable, relatively stable agencical practices.

At the microscopic level of practice, the formal case for agency is relatively simply put. While the habitus which generates practice is adaptive in such a way that complicity with existing structures is overwhelmingly likely,[228] there is a gap between stimulus and response. If, after Mauss, the gap is conceived temporally, it means simply that there is room for reflection (or reflective practices) upon the called-for practice and strategising about its likely outcomes.[229] This would in turn depend upon demonstrating that reflection could itself be insightful, given that it, too, is practically produced and determinate. Conceived phenomenologically, that at which intention is directed is altered as a result of the practice: if the practice is self-consciousness or individuation, then the 'self' which is stimulated to engage in that practice is different from the one which is called into existence by that practice. Whether the practical object is the 'self' or a cultural norm, the point is the same. There is never simple reproduction or mimesis of a structure or symbolic form because these do not exist continually but only insofar as they are called into existence through constitution.[230] Since interpellation is an active process with temporal and material conditionality, distinct objects or symbolic forms are called into existence by every iteration. It is this gap between quasi-universal template and unique, local invocation which allows for the possibility of insight into the finitude of phenomena – though that insight into how things could be different, and any political agenda built upon it, must also be constructed against the knowledge that its particular form, too, is dependent on a specific set of material and social conditions. It is not necessary to establish a stable, reliably

[228] Social actors "become the accomplices of the processes that tend to make the probable a reality". Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 65.
[229] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 149.
[230] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 57-8. The principle that structures guide practice, but only exist insofar as they are reproduced in practice, is central also to the theories of structure articulated by Geertz and Giddens. Tilley, *Reading Material Culture*: 124.

insightful position of perspective to demonstrate agency, still less an embodiable perspective or set of analytical skills. Rather, it is inferable from the discontinuous instantiations of structure that there will be practices of reflection in which conditionality will be revealed and the possibility of transformation (of how structures are instantiated) will be made manifest.

Such conditionality-establishing practices, willed or otherwise, are the precondition for substantive transformation at the macroscopic level of the field. Bourdieu emphasises interventions from without the field, or inter-field interaction, as structures of practice most likely to alter the practically universal symbolic configurations of a field,[231] though practices immanent to a field may achieve the same result. The question remains whether destabilising the practical universalities of a field amounts to an agency consistent with the history of the structure/agency debate.[232] I argue in this thesis that the symbolic economies which characterise a field are neither the linear determinants of the field objective structures nor an internal logic entirely divorced from those structures, but a single manifestation of the conditions of possibility which objective structures generate. Thus, if transformativity consists in establishing alternate possible field structures and symbolic words, then agency will amount to the practice of conceiving how things could be different in normative terms. The idea that challenging principles recognised socially as universal is a 'good thing' or that the fringes of fields are more or less naturally subversive is a particular, determinate invocation of the political, namely one which prioritises freedom, and specifically a form of freedom which is defined according to *choice*. But the acceptance that reflexively-constructed norms can defensibly be used to articulate how a field might be improved means that agency is not reduced to the proliferation of equally arbitrary choices. While normative criteria for political change are invariably informed by the generative structures of a professional field as well as the field from which analysis proceeds, I contend that, since the originality of generative structures is itself a normative commitment, then it is preferable to consider normative frameworks as strategic, potentially distorting but nonetheless not arbitrary. It is established in Chapter 5 that this means that, while journalistic ethics may in large part may be a product of (and means of obscuring) the 'game' of the journalistic field, it refers not only to the internal logic of that field but to, albeit in a disconnected and politically complicit way, the objective world. And as such, the transparent, contestable comparison of different representations of the journalistic field and how it might be

[231] Bourdieu, *In Other Words*: 191-2.
[232] N. Crossley, 'From Reproduction to Transformation: Social Movement Fields and the Radical Habitus', *Theory Culture & Society,* vol. 20, no. 6 (Dec 2003): 44-5.

transformed remains valid. In short, while a journalist's set of ethics or a social scientist's construction of the field may be implicated in the reproduction of field hierarchies, the consequences of cynically dismissing either or both of agents' reflections and social scientific analysis mean that an ongoing, open-ended normative consideration of how a field could be transformed remains valid.

Bourdieu details several mechanisms by which the marginal can be effectively excluded, silenced or co-opted with the effect of reinforcing the status quo of a given field.[233] The latter in particular echoes Foucault's account of the explosion of discourse whereby increased production of knowledge around the abnormal or liminal has the effect not of legitimating it but of rationalising and positioning it according to the strictures of that discourse. For Bourdieu, the exclusion of heterodox positions is less nefarious than the ability of the structured disposition of habitus to interpret and react to that which is unprecedented, spontaneous or counter-intuitive in such a way that the practical response to unfamiliar stimuli reinforces extant anticipatory schemes. Further, there is given to be no absolute limit to this adaptability, no delimitable position in which encountering the 'unnatural' will not inevitably enact practices which reproduce existing patterns, or give the false impression of exposing contingencies or alternatives while reinforcing underlying frameworks for interpretation and response. The absence of an absolute limit does not suggest infinite 'layers' of determination, however. It means only that in phenomenological terms a limit to the pervasion of generative structures *cannot* be established in absolute terms, not that such a limit does not exist. Thus, within specific political contexts, such a limit can only be posited on normative grounds – not out of wishful thinking, but because to posit limitless coercive determination is itself a normative commitment. This points towards a remainder of determination which is not a natural, unfettered space in which political agency can emerge. It is, rather, a qualified agency which articulates or enacts differently-determined practices with different constitutive effects than those which merely reproduce existing field structures.[234] This alternate determination thus provides the conditions of possibility of a form of agency which is itself determined, but heterodoxical, and by the defence of the Bourdieusian model presented here it remains valid to defend a viable authority for differentiating heterodoxical positions. 'Agency' here does not amount to an invocation of willed transformativity which can be appropriated and wielded at certain privileged positions, but rather of alternate practices and ascribed values of symbolic capital, the range and potential

[233] See especially Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 164-9.
[234] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 262-70.

impact of which must still be constructed against the conditions in which that determination takes place. It suggests not an extra-structural space but rather a structured determination which offers insight into the structuredness of that which passes as natural or universal, and potentially into the form of its own determinedness.

I contended above that for agency to have any cogency as a political theoretical concept, and not to be reduced to relativism and endless self-reference, then it needs to articulate the possibility of willed transformation, of conscious direction of political action towards an explicit change in field structures.[235] This does not amount to voluntarism, so long as the subject of that agency is conceived not as a discrete individual or reform movement, but a set of practices which agents may enact – usually haphazardly. It does however instrumentalise political agency, suggesting a degree of insight into and control over political determination which is inconsistent with the more qualified model presented here: that is, one in which heterodoxical practices are observed to occur, there is a limited capacity to discern between these on criteria which are normative but nonetheless do 'matter', but where political change does not originate in conscious intentionality. Subjects can enact alternate subjectivities, but this cannot be wholly controlled or owned, nor can it be with reference to some notion of 'identity' since the self 'resisting norms' is different from the self constituted through acts of subjectification, and the subjectivities which subsequently emerge are not 'self'-determined but merely alternately, conjecturally determined. Similarly, field transformations do not originate in the political subject: that subject and those practices are field determinations, but ones which do not rule out political change or the scope for assessing change. There can be no guarantee of non-complicity, and there can be only qualified scope for radically challenging the generative frames of reference to which habitus is given to be closely adapted. This does not, however, rule out viable agency in Bourdieu's work; rather, it emphasises that qualification – of what change is possible, with what purpose and by which agent – must always be pursued in sociological analysis.

Conclusion

It was posited above that incompleteness of structural determination is in itself insufficient grounds for agency in the absence of an examination of the conditions of its being a structured, structuring political space – that is, a strategic arena, a site of resistance and so on. It has been

[235] In more critical readings of Bourdieusian generative structuralism, the reified marginals.

argued that such a politicality can be derived out of the negotiation in which the ephemeral subject can engage through the selfsame process which determines its subjectivity. McNay, for example, argues that linking the anticipatory dimension to Husserl's concept of protension establishes an 'active and creative relation ... between the subject and the world',[236] concluding that 'the uncertainties and anticipatory elements immanent in the way in which these potentialities are lived renders this an active, interpretative process rather than a merely receptive one'.[237] This does not involve a claim to an extra-structural locus of subjectification: it is not a matter of the subject being incompletely determined by structure and fleshing out its subjectivity from some other source – variously, the quasi-transcendentals of 'identity' or 'culture'. Rather, the incompleteness refers to the contention that the subject is not *only* objectified in its becoming a subject. The subject, determined though it is, plays an active part in the determining process, which is to say that the slippage of determination does not only mean that subversive and transformative practices happen, but that there are situated, constrained agents who can be said to be the subjects of these practices. More strongly deterministic readings of Bourdieusian theory would regard this as a fantastic projection of self-determination. The fact that the objectified subject is also active and determining does not suggest practices which are not the direct issue of the same generative structures which gave rise to that subject – and the only way it could be otherwise is if there were something teleologically unique about the act of determining oneself, again resting on indefensibly deontological notions of the authenticity of identity or of self-creativity.

Ultimately, the Bourdieusian response to the structure/agency debate as set out here is to question why the debate is defined in terms of subject/object, freedom/constraint and complicity/transformation, and with what exclusions and implications. While it is true that arguing for the possibility of negotiation of subjectification risks prioritising an impossibly self-determining agent, the prioritisation of objectification carries its own assumptions and consequences. Having established that the subject is simultaneously determined and determining, to assert that this active determining in fact only amounts to indirect reproduction of generative structure – that is, that the agent is a mere conduit to objectification rather than mediating position between structure and practice – is to assert the fundamental priority of generative structures over the practices which enact and reproduce them. This implies a commitment to a teleology of coercive structural reproduction, which I argue in this thesis is not

[236] McNay, *Gender and Agency*: 39.
[237] *Ibid.*: 38.

inferable from Bourdieu's phenomenology but is rather a matter of conviction. It might also be normatively argued that to proceed as if all agency is in fact fantastic and all change is essentially arbitrary, leads to political inertia – that is, the argument against agency is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The only defensible position on philosophical and normative grounds is then tentatively to construct agency, taking full account of its restricted conditions of possibility, and of the fact that the entire framework in which the structure/agency debate proceeds is itself specifically contextualised, exclusionary and politically implicated.

2.2.2 Reconstructing Bourdieusian Theory for Political or Theoretical Ends

Since the mid-1970s Bourdieusian theory has been appropriated and modified so as to support post-structuralist feminist theory,[238] to undermine other feminisms,[239] to demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of Habermas's theory of communicative action,[240] to articulate a political philosophy of anticapitalism[241] and to argue against various prevailing liberalist doctrines.[242] What these share is an appeal to the authority of Bourdieusian political sociology, whether through specific interpretations of the habitus model or, frequently, an active reworking of Bourdieu's work in a way that leads to an implied or explicit assertion of being 'more Bourdieusian than Bourdieu'. The result is a body of literature which 'argues with Bourdieu against Bourdieu' or offers an 'immanent critique' of Bourdieusian theory.[243] In either case, it is important to establish the limits to which Bourdieusian theory can be modified while remaining demonstrably Bourdieusian. This is not a matter of crystallising an 'authentically Bourdieusian'

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[238] See especially Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York, London: New York, 1990), Moi, 'Appropriating Bourdieu'; C. Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Post-structuralist Theory* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

[239] For example, T. Lovell, 'Thinking Feminism with and against Bourdieu', in B. Fowler (ed.), *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 27-48.

[240] See Bohman, 'Reflexivity, Agency and Constraint'; Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source'; Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television'; F. Poupeau, 'Reasons for Domination: Bourdieu versus Habermas', in B. Fowler (ed.), *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 69-87; C. Taylor, 'To Follow a Rule', in R. Shusterman (ed.), *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999): 29-44; Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational'.

[241] For example, L. Pinto, 'A Militant Sociology: The Political Commitment of Pierre Bourdieu', in B. Fowler (ed.), *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999): 88-104.

[242] For example, P. Bourdieu and T. Eagleton [interview], 'Doxa and Common Life', *New Left Review*, no. 191 (1992).

[243] See, for instance, Dreyfus and Rabinow, 'Can There Be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning?': 35-44; B. Latour, 'The Politics of Explanation: An Alternative', in S. Woolgar (ed.), *Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Sage, 1988): 155-76; Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational'.

position: the shifts and tensions in Bourdieu's own work suggest that there is space for reinterpretation of Bourdieusian principles, and indeed this is the operating assumption of the analysis of the case study. The following section will first delineate where Bourdieu has been located in political sociological literature so as to establish to whom he can properly be labelled adjacent, in support of which political theoretical models the habitus and field frameworks can be invoked, and how far Bourdieusian principles can be reconstructed before they must finally be considered 'unBourdieusian'.

The first category to be considered are those appropriations of Bourdieu which begin by establishing his 'correct' position in the history of political, philosophical or sociological ideas and end by arguing for a specific reinterpretation or application on the basis of this lineage – a strategy which may be characterised as strategic insofar as it trades on the symbolic capital of Bourdieusian theory in articulating a theoretical position. It was noted at the beginning that, in the political theoretical field, Bourdieu has sometimes been aligned, to an extent misleadingly, with the more hermeneutic, arguably more relativist positions of Kuhn, Foucault and Rorty.[244] Since the early 1990s, however, there has been greater recognition, and elaboration by Bourdieu himself, of the influence of Bhaskar, Bachelard and Cassirer, resulting in a repositioning of Bourdieu's neo-Marxist phenomenology as a response to the irreconcilability of rationalism and relationalism.[245] The influence of relationalism on Bourdieu's work was noted in Section 1.5, and mirrors the increasing priority of the concept of field in the second half of his career. Vandenberghe, in particular, depicts Bourdieu's earlier anthropological work as an attempt systematically to transpose Bachelard's 'applied rationalism' from the natural to the social sciences.[246] Bourdieu meanwhile emphasises the importance of Cassirer's contribution in developing a sociological methodology which analyses the fields of production,[247] circulation and consumption of cultural capital, and more broadly Cassirer's nonpositivistic interpretation of the epistemology of the natural sciences used to provide the basis for a 'naturalistic social'

[244] See, for example, T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); R. Rorty, 'Method, Social-Science and Social Hope: Dewey and Foucault', *Critique,* vol. 42, no. (1986). See also J. Verdès-Leroux, *Deconstructing Pierre Bourdieu: Against Sociological Terrorism from the Left* (New York: Algora, 2003).

[245] See, for instance, Wacquant, 'Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and Its Cracks'. Also, C. Norris, *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1992).

[246] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 33.

[247] P. Bourdieu, 'Sur Le Pouvoir Symbolique', *Annales,* vol. 3, no. (1977 1977b): 405-11. Bourdieu published Cassirer's work in a collection he edited in the 1970s.

science.[248] Combining these threads allows Bourdieu's philosophy of science to be seen not as a synthesis of rationalism and relationalism, but rather as a critique of rationalism which demonstrates the need to take heed of the realist stance in order properly to offer a practicable alternative to the two opposed schools.[249]

Vandenberghe notes that while Bourdieu concurs with Foucault and Rorty (amongst others) that 'reality' can only be known through the prism of conceptual categories, he differs in maintaining that these categories nonetheless do not determine the world.[250] While observations are always overdetermined by theory and theory is underdetermined by observation, it remains essential in Bourdieusian theory to avoid the reduction of ontological questions to epistemological ones.[251] On the question of philosophy, Bourdieu's actual position is quite at odds with the more relativistic models of Foucault or Baudrillard: Bourdieu is not opposed to philosophy, but rather directed towards the incessant questioning of what is included in the category of philosophy, under which conditions, and which conception of it attains effective universality – that is, which form of philosophy monopolises the production of philosophical meaning. In particular Bourdieu targets the specific neo-Hegelian philosophy which dominated the continental philosophical field, throughout the nineteenth century, through the work of Kojève, Sartre and Gramsci, and beyond.[252] The key problem of formulating an alternative to Hegelian dialectics is negation; and Bourdieu as well as Deleuze take the approach of attempting to devise a nondialectical conception of negation as the basis for a constitutive theory of practice. While the structuralisms articulated by these writers certainly lack the 'magic' of dialectics, they offer a model by which negation itself is superseded in such a way as to preserve what is superseded; and it is this ongoing survival of supersedence, the complete absence of the notion that ideas and actions can be generated *ex nihilo* that is the basis of practical memory in the Bourdieusian framework. Again in contrast to constructivist approaches, the Bourdieusian logic of practice proposes an alternative ontology to Hegel's – one which is strictly immanent and materialist and refuses any deep or hidden foundation of being, and which is fully expressed in the world (it will be seen that this position is predicated upon deontological claims whose validity is debatable). In

[248] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 35.
[249] Wacquant argues that Bourdieu is closest to Durkheim in his simultaneous application and critique of rationalism. Wacquant, 'Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and Its Cracks'.
[250] Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude that Bourdieu's ontological phenomenological position may be summed up as "The world is prior to my world". Dreyfus and Rabinow, 'Can There Be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning?': 37.
[251] This comment is made in relation to Bhaskar's position. Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 36.
[252] Robbins, 'Introduction': xi-xiv.

opposition to an intellectualist account that poses thinking as the purest or highest form of being – a position which may be argued to encompass Habermas, Taylor and Gadamer – in the ontology developed by Bourdieu and Deleuze, being is thus, in Hardt's words, 'superficial, positive and full'.[253]

The case study of this thesis comprises an investigation of the practical, potentially nonconscious logics operative in the field of war correspondence, as well as the self-reflexive application of this approach to Bourdieusian methodology itself. It will thus examine the process by which 'spontaneous philosophies' or assumptions of noumenal structures in the professional practice of the journalist (and the analyst of the journalist) may be uncovered and described, the extent to which it can be demonstrated that field objects are constructed so as to concretise these assumed structures, and the merits and limits of the self-reflexivity Bourdieu prescribes. For current purposes, the aim of Bourdieu's detailed consideration of the conditions of scientific knowledge is the connectedness of epistemological and ontological principles of social (and indeed all) science, a connection which does not imply the reduction of one to the other. It has been established that Bourdieu intends to distinguish his position from that which can be labelled the relativist epistemological/ontological position, in that while the real and the empirical are mutually constitutive, for Bourdieu they do not entirely collapse into each other. Without such a commitment, scepticism as to the existence of a theory-independent world leads logically to the collapse of the distinction between epistemology and ontology – a collapse considered indefensible by all but the more thoroughgoing relativist theorists.[254] The critique is appropriate with regard to Bachelard, whose premise that being can be analysed only in terms of the knowledge of being can reasonably be argued to imply the dissolution of a world independent of but investigated by science. The Bourdieusian framework, however, avoids such a hollowing-out of ontology by a phenomenological bracketing-out of the condition of being from its remit. It is certainly the case that social scientific objects are constructed rather than discovered by social science, and indeed Bourdieusian methodology proscribes that the construction of the former by the 'sociological habitus' is a principal target for analysis. However, this is meant to address the limits of sociological epistemology, of access to the underlying ontology, rather than to redefine ontological categories.[255] To be sure, Bourdieu

[253] M. Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (London: UCL Press, 1993): xiii.
[254] For example, J. Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (Sydney: Power Publications, 1995). Norris sets out the intellectual context of relativist theorists in Norris, *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War*.
[255] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 1-8.

advocates approaching ontology as a practically constructed, situated and interested intellectual arena rather than as being *per se*, but this does not amount to the proposition that the objective world is completed by its status as symbolic object of knowledge. Bourdieu's preoccupation is with the interestedness of theory,[256] with questioning what are the conditions of the categories of knowledge in a given social context, how generative structures create objects (and subjects) of knowledge and their associated analytic fields (since structures produce are given to generate the means of their own apprehension) and, finally, what political implications these may be shown to have. If Bourdieu brackets out the independent existence of a real world undetermined by theory it is not because he maintains, along with the constructivists, that there is nothing beyond that which discourse inscribes, but because the question of which ontology holds for any given context which is fundamentally contestable. Vandenberghe calls for Bourdieu to be ontologically bold rather than epistemologically cautious,[257] suggesting the need for a 'passionate' affirmation of the scope of theory such that one may reasonably say that alternative descriptions of the world actually offer alternative accounts of the same world.[258] To do so, however, would entail the abandonment of one of Bourdieu's key political theses: that the political implications of epistemological incautiousness are more significant than faith in the existence of the real.[259]

Vandenberghe's argument is characteristic of a recent trend to 'bend' Bourdieusian theory by way of an 'immanent critique' of generative structuralism:[260] thinking in Bourdieusian terms against Bourdieu. Such an approach is defensible if properly defined and supported, and indeed through the case study it will be argued that the tension between Bourdieu's political commitments and his phenomenological foundations point to the need to reassess, without rejecting the Bourdieusian framework, the normative impetus of Bourdieusian theory and the status of its objects and subjects of knowledge. However, while Vandenberghe's critique may

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[256] Or its complicity, regardless of how 'disinterested' it aims to be. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 21.

[257] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational'. See also W. Outhwaite, *New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987): 19-44.

[258] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 39. In contrast to Bourdieu, Castoriadis argues for an imagined sociality whose projection is radically politicised. C. Castoriadis, 'Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary', in G. Robinson and J.F. Rundell (eds), *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity* (London: Routledge, 1994): 326-7.

[259] It is noted in subsequent chapters that Bourdieu in fact does defend a limit to self-reflexive, epistemological caution.

[260] See especially S. Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York; Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1986): 19-43. See also S. Benhabib and D. Cornell, *Feminism as Critique: Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late-Capitalist Societies* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).

rightly be termed an 'internal reconstruction' of the habitus model, it does not amount to an immanent critique. Vandenberghe pursues a rewriting of Bourdieusian theory not through the application of Bourdieu's own terms as Bourdieu defines them, but through a reworking of its foundations with reference to the acknowledged influences on Bourdieusian theory. Namely, given that Bourdieu borrows heavily from Cassirer, Weber and Bachelard, it is suggested that his premissive definitions need to be reformulated in light of a closer and, it is implied, more faithful reading of these writers. The consequences of this rewriting are significant, since it is used to reposition generative structuralism in such a way as to suggest adjacency to theorists some of whose commitments are explicitly problematised by Bourdieu. Vandenberghe argues, with some justification, that Bourdieu's work actually represents a rationalist form of critical realism, and once this is conceded Bourdieu is impelled to accept the realist turn in philosophy and sociology from which he overtly distances himself.[261] While this may include a reasonable assessment of Bourdieu's influences, the prescribed shift leads Vandenberghe to the contentious proposition that Bourdieu, properly reconciled to realism, can be seen as a precursor or ally to Habermas's theory of communicative action.[262] Such a contention stems from the attempt to impose on Bourdieu's theory in entirety those models which Bourdieu has in part accepted, in part rejected and in large part reworked. A more rigorous application of Bachelard may lead to a position which is more thoroughly Bachelardian; it does not in itself demonstrate a logical or rhetorical compulsion for Bourdieusian theory to move in that direction.[263]

There is a strong case for arguing that Bourdieu's political phenomenology in fact demonstrates significant weaknesses in the theory of communicative action. While the habitus is described as the 'product of the structures and producer of the practices and reproducer of the structures',[264] Bourdieu argues that a specific conception of agency is nonetheless possible, a possibility discussed in the previous section. In short, while habitus certainly reproduces the social world, Bourdieu insists that reproduction is not linear, is sometimes chaotic and that there are practices – emerging haphazardly and with limitations – which amount to qualified insight and consciously-intended political change. As noted above, while it does not amount to an unproblematic space for agency, of a process of selection which always intervenes between stimulus and response, and that selection, while also oriented according to habitus, can have

[261] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 62
[262] *Ibid*: 48.
[263] Bourdieu argues that Habermas simultaneously reduces and depoliticises social relations in his theory of communicative action. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 66.
[264] From 'On Symbolic Power', in Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 163-9.

transformative effects (this can be traced to his reworking Mauss's theory of gift exchange in the context of the Kabyle of Algeria).[265] Blumer, a close theoretical relation to Habermas, employs a concept of 'self-interaction' which is not dissimilar to Bourdieu's model of selection.[266] Poupeau and Taylor have argued that since Bourdieu's definition of agency depends fundamentally upon the temporal element inherent in response, and since his explanation of strategic action is cast as a constant, spontaneous reflection upon likely outcomes, then Bourdieusian theory marks a parallel to Habermas's rational communication. This does not logically follow. It is true that 'communication', variously defined, is central to the Bourdieusian and Habermasian accounts of how power is structured, manifest and reproduced – as it is the central axis of political communications studies generally. Further, there is a certain symmetry in that where for Habermas the ideal speech situation is characterised by an absence of coercive power, for Bourdieu (and Foucault) structured power relations are a precondition of both constraint and non-constraint in communicative practice. However, while power is given to be ubiquitous in Bourdieusian theory insofar as it is power relations which structure and generate practice, it is not its ever-presence in communication which *characterises* power. Vandenberghe, as well as Poupeau and Bohman, rely upon this link to demonstrate the possibility that Habermas and Bourdieu are complementary theorists.[267] While for Bourdieu power is always primary, and the goal of politics is accordingly not to project a fantastic absence of power but rather to make explicit the power relations generative of both 'free' and 'constrained' communication, for Habermas it is the unconstrained ideal speech situation which is primary, in the sense that its anticipation is a sine qua non. For Habermas, then, the task of a radical reformist politics consists in the institutionalisation of the ideal speech situation in a democratic system. This in no way suggests complementarity: for Bourdieu, the institutionalisation of the ideal speech situation would necessarily entail symbolic violence.

There is doubtless a case for arguing against Bourdieu from the 'habermasso-ricourdian position'.[268] The sporadic debate between Bourdieu and Habermas never bore substantive fruit, though the schools of thought around each has produced more engaged and engaging material. There is sense, for example, in the contention put forward by Taylor and Vandenberghe that

[265] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 196-202.
[266] See especially H. Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969): 15.
[267] See Bohman, 'Reflexivity, Agency and Constraint'; Poupeau, 'Reasons for Domination: Bourdieu versus Habermas'; Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 56-60.
[268] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 56.

Bourdieu's generative structuralism would benefit from a 'loosening up', through which the 'moral indignation'[269] manifest in his concept of symbolic violence would be given the means of expression that only a measure of voluntarism could provide – a theme revisited at the end of this thesis. However, arguing with Habermas against Bourdieu cannot reasonably be labelled an immanent critique of Bourdieusian theory, regardless of whether one seeks an internal reconstruction or a critique from without the Bourdieusian model. Indeed, any reconstruction of Bourdieusian theory drawing on the work of Habermas, Ricoeur or Taylor will necessarily be external to, and incompatible with, the internal logic of Bourdieu's sociological methodology and its conceptual prioritisation of struggle. The rhetorical appeal, or academic capital, of Bourdieusian political structuralism is sufficiently widely-recognised that a large body of writers opt to attempt such a reconstruction – in spite of a broad perception that Bourdieu is inherently deterministic – rather than articulating a position more easily reconciled with political agency from without Bourdieusian theory. As a result, it is key to any reworking that seeks articulate a more workable account of the possibility of political change that the resulting modified product is still identifiably 'Bourdieusian'. Most commonly the appeal to the authority of the explanatory model of habitus, which can properly be reconstructed as a strategic appropriation of Bourdieusian legitimacy in the academic field, attaches a stronger, less problematised conception of agency than Bourdieu himself posited – a move which in the light of the first half of this chapter must be regarded as at least problematic.

2.2.3 The Culturalist Critique

It was noted above that in the context of the structure/agency debate Bourdieu is most often criticised for being overly deterministic.[270] In this thesis I argue that this amounts to an overloading of the Bourdieusian sense of the political, an ultimately deontological claim of coercive political pervasiveness. However, Bourdieu is also, and perhaps more significantly, accused of being insufficiently or misguidedly political, by focussing too much on the symbolic to the detriment of material, economic analysis. In one sense this is a broadly theoretical question about whether the material world exceeds its cultural or symbolic reception. But there is potentially another political implication. This is that in subsuming the material within the

[269] *Ibid.*: 51.
[270] See, for instance, K. Minogue, 'Language and Domination in Some Latter-Day Marxists', *Government and Opposition,* vol. 27, no. 3 (1992): 397-404.

symbolic, Bourdieu cannot conceive of the political transformation that can be wrought by radical changes in objective context. Rather than focussing on the rupture that material transformation can produce in the symbolic realms of politics and culture, Bourdieu's model stresses the continuity which all symbolic economies are hardwired to produce.[271] This emphasis on continuity is essentially conservative, excluding as it does the possibility of thoroughgoing, willed political transformation.[272] In this section I argue that allegations of culturalism are to an extent justified, but that Bourdieu's position is distinct from (other) post-structuralist theorists in that he does not characterise the cultural world as absolutely arbitrary, but rather as a disconnected, quasi-autonomous determination of the objective structures of the field.

Reckwitz writes that the culturalist turn[273] is characterised by a rejection of the Marxian conceptual model of base and superstructure, in favour of a worldview in which the material only becomes meaningful within classification systems,[274] discourses or language-based interaction. He continues:

> "The material world *exists* only insofar as it becomes an object of interpretation within collective meaning structures. There are no material entities as such, but only systems of distinctions that define certain 'material objects' in a certain form and delimit them from other (material or non-material) objects. Material entities exist as carriers of meaning, as 'objects of knowledge'"[275] (italics original).

Thus, while it has been seen that there is wide disagreement about the possibility of agency and the over- or underdetermination of the subject – as well as on the status of consciousness, perception and the relation between the individual and society – there is a broad consensus in

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[271] H. Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political-Change', *American Political Science Review,* vol. 82, no. 3 (1988): 789-804.
[272] *Ibid.*: 790.
[273] As definitive articulations of culturalism, Ecksetin cites in particular G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); G. Almond and J. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Eckstein writes: To summarise, 'cultural' people process experience into action through general cognitive, affective and evaluative dispositions; the patterns of such predispositions vary from society to society, from social segment to social segment; they do not vary because objective social situations or structures vary but because of culturally determined learning; early learning conditions later learning and learning involves a process of seeking coherence in dispositions. And this is so in order to 'economise' in decisions to act and to achieve predictability in social interactions'. Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political-Change': 792.
[274] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 32-5, 181.
[275] A. Reckwitz, 'The Status of the "Material" in Theories of Culture: From "Social Structure" to "Artefacts"', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2002): 202

post-structuralist theory over the proposition that material objects only exist meaningfully as symbolic objects of knowledge. Whether a cultural theorist is most heavily influenced by phenomenology, structuralism, hermeneutics or symbolic interactionism, then, the social amounts to nothing other than symbolic orders – and it is in this proposition upon which the claim that, for such theorists, the social *is* the cultural,[276] is based. If contemporary neo-Marxist phenomenology has been dominated by the attempt to overcome the subject/object opposition, Reckwitz surmises that while the 'subject' has been variously replaced by discourse, communicative action or practice, the status of the object, narrowly defined as an object of knowledge, has remained intact.

Does this reasoning apply to Bourdieu? I argued above that Bourdieu seeks to overcome not only the categories of subject and object, but also the application of this conceptual dichotomy in phenomenology at all. That is, it is not the prioritisation of one pole or the other which is politically suspect; rather, it is the instrumentalist dualism underlying the positing of such a continuum which reproduces an interpretative framework in which the distinction between active and passive, or determining and determined, is paramount. That said, it was also contended that Bourdieu ultimately fails to complete this supersedence.[277] This is not due to a failure of dialectical reasoning, but instead the insuperability of the structure/agency opposition in normative political theory. In phenomenological terms a model combining habitus and field does effectively do away with the simplistic binary of subject and object. Rather than holding that the objective structure of the field gives rise to subjectivity, Bourdieu insists that the structures of a field generate the means of its apprehension, giving rise to practices of interpretation in which an actor, aligned to the rules of that field, will find it plausible to engage. While there are unarguably moments of objectification and subjectification, these do not arise because agents are natural subjects and their socioeconomic environment appears naturally intelligible. Instead, the emergence of subject and object should be seen as functional – secondary to what Bourdieu terms the 'necessity' of structural reproduction.[278]

While Bourdieu stresses that his method aims to avoid both objectivism and subjectivism, it is clear that a model which casts not only consciousness but also that which it can be conscious of

[276] Clark observes that the result of this is that individuals become defined only by their cultural status; that, for instance, a gay Indian author cannot write anything which will not be interpreted as being determined by that identity. See T. Clark, *The Poetics of Singularity: The Counter-culturalist Turn in Heidegger, Derrida, Blanchot and the Later Gadamer* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005): 17.
[277] See McNay, *Gender and Agency*.
[278] Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 372.

as incidental or functional is by implication objectivist. It is thus for normative reasons that Bourdieu sets aside the absolute possibility of non-complicit intelligibility to consider the possibilities for subjectivity leading to political resistance and change. However, if Bourdieu brackets out the possibility of apprehending how 'deep' politically-loaded structuring goes, he sets the threshold of politicality as prior to the material criteria which mark out distinctions between objective positions in a field. Thus, while Bourdieu consistently returns to the economic realm, he classifies economic capital as a subset of symbolic capital,[279] alongside social and cultural capital, and argues that symbolic violence wrought through social agents' complicity in their own cultural dominatedness is political in the same way that economic deprivation cements an actor's dominatedness. One potential response to this apparent culturalism is to argue that while the economic can be understood only through symbolic interpretative systems – that is, the economic is understood in cultural rather than objective terms – there is another level of materiality which exceeds and precedes its social or cultural apprehension. But for this to be feasible, there would have to be something *objective* about the material, independent of its subjective understanding, and Bourdieu maintains that as social structures produce their own intelligibility as objects, the objective cannot be seen as distinct from the thing for which it is an object. So while Bourdieu frequently refers to the objective positions of the field as an analytic starting point, their generation of the parameters of our understanding of them means that there is no immediately apparent level at which the material emerges separately from symbolic – which is to say cultural – interpretative systems. Bourdieu marks out the separate endurance of the material not by claiming knowledge of it which is extra-discursive, but by pointing out that the symbolic world through which we make sense of the material cannot exhaust the latter, as it is only one of many possible determinations. It is by constructing generative structures as a set of conditions of possibility, it is possible to assert that the objective exceeds our particular symbolic understanding of it.

In phenomenological terms it is the primacy accorded to intentionality which will determine the extent to which a particular philosophy of social science is completed by symbolic systems. If objects in the world are only meaningful insofar as they are referred to or attended to by conscious acts, then there is no remainder of an object which can properly be called 'objective': that is, objectified other than by subjective practices. If this is the case, then all that matters are the systems of typification used by consciousness to arrange objects and make them appear 'real'

[279] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 132-3; Bourdieu, *In Other Words*: 111-3.

to the subject.[280] Reckwitz observes that, for Schütz, material objects are interpreted according to systems of typification that arrange objects 'according to the Kantian schemes of space and time'.[281] And while phenomenology and structuralism obviously diverge over the priority given to consciousness, both adhere to the view that, irrespective of the world as such, mental acts and structures constitute their world of objects according to symbolic schemes.[282] What marks the post- and generative structuralist approaches as distinct is the move away from looking for these schemes in the 'knowing subject', and instead looking to discourse (Foucault), intertextuality, communication (Luhmann) or fields and collective habitus (Bourdieu) as the primary locus of meaning. This, however, simply substitutes discursive or collectively dispositional codes for the phenomenological subject. It does not, significantly, alter the status of the material, which continues to exist as the product of symbolic orders.[283] Thus, for Bourdieu, observations of domestic space in Kabylia and statistical surveys of arts consumption are not presented as an objective or material basis upon which interpretation of cultural meaning proceeds, but instead *through* a symbolic system where meaning derives from practices of distinction and position-taking.

One could argue that prioritising the material over the cultural is itself not so much a philosophical as a political commitment, that economic conditions are more significant than cultural or social context when it comes to explaining the political domination of certain groups in society by others. In this light, the economic analyses Bourdieu presents in works such as *Distinction* and *La Misère du monde* would suggest that at least in normative terms Bourdieu accords comparable weight to the material and symbolic. However, Bourdieu conceives of economic capital first and foremost as a differentiating factor between agents and field positions, rather than as an absolute determinant of an agent's experience. In economic theoretical terms, Bourdieu prioritises equality over absolute wealth. This is a not unpopular view in contemporary debate,[284] but it does distance Bourdieu from a considerable strand of the intellectual history of neo-Marxist thought. This historical current shies away from interpreting all inquiry as generating from and feeding back into a closed system, and claims the ability (and authority) to explain by economic and political means the emergence of collective modes of thought [*skholè*]

[280] A. Reckwitz, 'The Status of the "Material" in Theories of Culture': 204.
[281] *Ibid.*: 204.
[282] *Ibid.*: 204.
[283] *Ibid.*: 205.
[284] See especially J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

in particular historical periods. It is certainly true that such a position relies upon a notion of the extra-discursive, an 'outside' of political determination which structuralism in general and Bourdieu's generative structuralism in particular rejects. However, it is also possible to defend this position through the reflexive construction of the authority of the professional social scientist, elite and institutionalised as he is bound to be, in interpreting social phenomena.

Reckwitz proposes Latour's 'artefact' theory of materiality as a corrective to culturalism.[285] In this model, the material is cast not as 'a basic structure at the foundation of any culture and knowledge',[286] nor as 'a matrix of symbolic objects on the screen of the respective culture'. By 'artefact', Latour draws on Husserlian phenomenology in casting materiality as 'thingness', as 'things' which necessarily participate in social practices in the same way that people do. I would suggest that this is compatible with, and derivable from, Hegel's phenomenological model.[287] The active participation of materiality obviously does not ascribe consciousness to the material world, but it does suggest a limited level of subjectivity. That is, conscious, rational subjectivity is not realisable until there is recognition that its object – here the material world (though alternately other subjects, as in the 'Lordship and Bondage' section of the *Phenomenology*[288]) – also exists in as well as for itself. This world of things will doubtless be interpreted in different ways and as such take on distinct symbolic meanings in different contexts; the difference here is that, as symbolic forms, they are not arbitrarily interchangeable.

Against Reckwitz, I would argue that Bourdieu, to a greater extent than Foucault or Derrida, qualifies the interchangeability of material objects as symbolic forms. While behaviour within a field is oriented towards determining power over the symbolic meaning of material things (among others), agents are first and foremost constrained by their objective positions.[289] While struggles between groups are invariably about shifting not only positions but the symbols which differentiate them, the scope for changing them is limited by the internalisation of the (quasi-arbitrary) field rules. That is, objective position determines how groups interact between each other, but all agents are to a degree unaware of the material underpinning of the whole 'game'. Systematic misrecognition of symbolic economy is considered in the case study of this thesis. For the purposes of the present theoretical discussion, what is significant is that while symbolic

[285] 'Artefact' is a term derived from Husserlian phenomenology. See, for instance, Smith and Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*: 413-5.
[286] A. Reckwitz, 'The Status of the "Material" in Theories of Culture': 208.
[287] See especially B. Latour, 'On Interobjectivity', *Mind, Culture, and Activity*, no. 4 (1996): 228–244.
[288] G. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* [trans. A. Miller] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977): 111-8.
[289] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 30.

forms are somewhat fluid and contestable, agents' implication in the field will limit the scope of conceivable symbolic forms. While Bourdieu speaks of the tendency of economic realities to be forgotten as such (and misrecognised as cultural), this does suggest a limit to how much economics can be symbolically reinvented. The material, for Bourdieu as for Latour, does have residual solidity. Latour uses the term 'artefact' to invoke temporarily stabilised material conditions, as distinct from a monolithic material world of things. Bourdieu likewise does not see the material world as static, but stresses that the objective positions of a field, materially defined, have a resilience which at one level constrains an agent's range of possible strategies, and at another (more reflexive) level forces agents to navigate certain immovable realities.

Bourdieu's reconception of behaviour from individually owned and intended actions to schemes of practices[290] aims to highlight both the symbolic economies which give practices meaning *and* the objective structures which underpin and to a degree generate those economies. Thus, symbolic systems cannot be seen as essentially arbitrary schemes for ascribing meaning. I would argue that they should neither be seen as structures whose whole teleology is self-reproduction, and where the content of meaning attached to practices is peripheral to this process. This is not to suggest that the particular forms of interpretative schemes observed by the social scientist are the natural or unique cultural manifestations of objective positions, which is to say that there is not a simple linear determination of symbolic systems by the power differentials of a field. Rather, as noted in Section 1.5, one should see symbolic systems as 'a particular case of the possible', as one of several economies which could potentially do the work of structural reproduction. The primary task is not simply to establish the non-universal nature of a dominant interpretative scheme – though to establish its contextuality is an important step – but to establish the conditions of possibility for signification.[291] The endpoint of a Bourdieusian analysis is then to establish how a field characterised by differentiation of particular forms of power is reproduce by the generation of a range of possible symbolic schemes, none of which is the singular natural embodiment of that field.

However, it can also be argued that Bourdieu is susceptible to the same claims levelled at other theorists sometimes grouped together as 'practice theorists': in particular, Giddens and Schatzki,

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[290] In Goffman's words: "In analysing the self, then, we are drawn from its possessor, from the person who will profit or lose most by it, for he and his body merely provide the peg on which something of collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time." A. Goffman, *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* (London: Penguin, 1990): 245.
[291] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 3.

discussed in Section 2.1. Each of these theorists recasts the notion of practice explicitly as a means of prioritising materiality to a degree absent in the more rarefied accounts of symbolic systems based around the concepts of text or discourse.[292] However, each posits materiality as a necessary foundation, rather than establishing, as we have seen here, the variegated and active roles that material objects play. This 'thin' materialism is also a reasonable criticism of Bourdieu's conceptualisation of 'objective positions' as material determinants generating worlds of possibility of symbolic systems. While Bourdieusian phenomenology does not necessitate that symbolic systems should be understood as functioning entirely independently of the material world, Bourdieu's conception of mental schemes for interpreting practice accords them a trajectory and momentum which suggests at least a dislocation from the objective world. It is central to the interrelation of habitus and field that agents embrace the symbolic world of the field and forget the material determination of that field, to the point that the reality of that material world becomes systematically unrecognisable as such. In this event, the objective aspect of the field – its differentiated positions of power – is limited to acting as a formal necessity of a field, a metafield of power which underpins the various subfields of power operating in any context, without playing an explicitly active role. Since one of the principal functions of the field is to embed the seeming normalcy of conditional symbolic economies, then the objective foundations become increasingly unknowable to the agent, and to the social scientist they are only posited as generative and durable. Bourdieu posits as a premise that hierarchical objective fields will give rise to symbolic systems which in turn function both to obscure and reproduce these hierarchies, without establishing how active a role the objective world plays in instituting the schemes of practice which characterise those schemes.

It is in this specific sense that Bourdieu may properly be labelled a culturalist. His political theory focuses in large part on the symbolic economies with which field-inculcated agents make interpretations – and this includes how they interpret material objects – with the implication that these economies mask ongoing, coercive material economies. The result is that while it is thus objective power differentials and relative material deprivation which give the impetus for Bourdieusian analysis of symbolic systems, and indeed give substance to Bourdieu's normative politics, the material and objective, which here amount to distributions of economics and political power, are not foregrounded in Bourdieusian analysis. Against this, it will be demonstrated that such an analysis is indeed possible: Chapter 4 sets out the structured and

[292] A. Reckwitz, 'The Status of the "Material" in Theories of Culture': 210.

structuring aspects of the journalistic field, and the methodology of constructing systematic misrecognition. Other authors have demonstrated the viability of analysing the space of mediated communication as a political field in itself.[293] I argued in Section 2.2.2 that there are limits to 'thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu', but emphasising the material as well as the symbolic is not incompatible with the core principles of Bourdieu's account of political domination.[294]

2.2.4 Elitism

Finally, despite Bourdieu's critiques of elitism in post-structuralist theory generally and Derrida's work in particular, several authors have criticised Bourdieu's position for being overly elitist in its defence of expert knowledge and its dismissal of popular criteria of the value of symbolic capital.[295] The analysis of the case study points to a defence of the authoritative subject of Bourdieusian theory, which itself entails a qualified defence of elite knowledge. Such a proposition can be defended from two distinct theoretical contexts. The first involves the imperative for an elite group to protect and promote some kind of symbolic form regarded as innately superior: for instance, arts funding motivated by the principal of preserving a particular aesthetic form. Such a defence, insofar as it relies on a transcendental conception of symbolic value, is incompatible with Bourdieu's work. The second defence finds its closest equivalent in

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[293] See especially N. Couldry, 'Media Meta-Capital: Extending the Range of Bourdieu's Field Theory', *Theory and Society* vol. 32, no. 5-6 (2003): 653-77.

[294] Schatzki, in particular, attempts such a re-articulation of practice. Drawing on the phenomenological investigations of Heidegger as well as the language-games analysis of Wittgenstein, Schatzki criticises those philosophies which reify the subject or place too strong an emphasis on the human 'collective mind', and those socio-political works which reduce social practices to discursive practices. For Schatzki, 'doings' should be at the heart of social theory, incorporating as they do interaction with material objects, discursive practices and, most significantly, practical knowledge. The latter refers to embodied, quasi-instinctive spatial knowledge and spatial competences, achieved through routine and forgotten as acquired skills, and clearly bears a close resemblance to Bourdieu's *sens pratique*. Schatzki claims to have attained a fuller incorporation of the material in his emphasis on interactions with objects. Shatzki's prioritisation of material objects should finally be interpreted not as a reconnection to an idealised notion of the material, but rather a pragmatic corrective to the culturalist assumption that only interactions between agents are meaningful, that social structures are located in the world, manifest in social practices, rather than in discourse or intersubjectivity, and that political change refers not merely to resignification within symbolic systems but to changes in social structures. See A. Reckwitz, 'The Status of the "Material" in Theories of Culture': 211.

[295] See, for instance, J. Lane, *Pierre Bourdieu: A Critical Introduction*; J. Blewitt, 'Film, Ideology and Bourdieu's Critique of Public Taste', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 33, no. 4 (October 1993): 367; N. Garnham, 'A Personal Intellectual Memoir', *Media, Culture & Society*, vol. 27, no. 4 (2005): 479-80.

the political science literature, and revolves around the degree of autonomy needed in order for certain necessary societal institutions to function.[296] This begins from the premise that a degree of elitism can be compatible with contemporary democratic systems, and indeed that elite systems can be beneficial in terms of competence and efficacy. Bealey qualifies the 'democratic elitist' thesis by arguing that elitism cannot be defended on its own terms. Instead one can concede that some elites, such as the military, are necessary without being virtuous, while others, such as specialist parliamentary committees, can be argued actively to promote democratic values.[297] In either case, the implication is that in order to function properly, elite institutions need to be autonomous – from governmental coercion, to be sure, but also from excessive scrutiny. The same may be said to apply to academia. Bourdieu advocates the analytic dismantling of authority, establishing (after Weber) how it becomes personified and which symbolic economies determine specific forms of capital recognised as authority.[298] However, he also recognises that to characterise all authority as conditional upon strategies aimed at the accumulation of capital is counter-productive. To insist upon the equal validity (more correctly, arbitrariness) of all voices rather than giving priority to expert knowledge is, as I argue in Chapter 6, to negate the norm of responsibility (at least partly) motivating Bourdieu's work, to expose the naturalised mechanisms by which hierarchical domination is effected. In order for the principals of autonomy and responsibility to be viable, then, they must be 'protected' against countervailing forces of populism, relativism and capitalism.[299] To be sure, this can only be defended on the basis that autonomy from the pole of large scale production is a deontological good, a statement at odds with the proposition that the popularisation of knowledge and cultural production is democratising and thus a fundamentally positive normative goal. I do not seek to resolve this debate here, but rather to establish the context in which the case study's consideration of elite knowledge proceeds, upon which basis a final evaluation of the defensibility of elitism in Bourdieusian theory is made in Chapter 6.

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[296] P. Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (London: University of London Press, 1969); R. Vengroff, and F. Morton, 'The Theory of Democratic Elitism Revisited Again', *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* vol. 34, no. 1 (2001): 169-73.
[297] F. Bealey, 'Democratic Elitism and the Autonomy of Elites', *International Political Science Review,* vol. 17, no. 3 (1996): 319-31.
[298] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 178, 241.
[299] See especially Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism.*

Summary

It is now possible to set out those themes, discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, to be examined in a theoretical analysis of Bourdieusian methodology as well as in the case study. First, subsequent chapters will address the question of how Bourdieusian neo-Marxist phenomenology is manifest in methodological practice: that is, how Bourdieu's social scientific method accounts for the embedding of generative structures in agents' experience of the lifeworld as natural. Moreover, the thesis will investigate the implications for Bourdieusian political theory and methodology of the implied premise that coercive structures are prior to individuation and political analysis. The overarching aims of these are not only self-reflexive, and the extent to which Bourdieusian analysis produce unique insights into the field of war correspondence will be assessed in the case study. The case study will also establish whether Bourdieu's methodological principles and normative impetus necessitates the finding of specific conclusions. Subsequent analysis will revisit allegations of determinism, culturalism and elitism in the light of the case study's empirical findings, and ask whether Bourdieu is excessively dismissive of the conscious reflection by agents, and whether a defence of Bourdieu can be posited to each of these claims.

Chapter 3: Social Scientific Research Method

3.1 Bourdieusian Methodology in Practice: Introduction

Bourdieu maintains that, within a properly 'scientific' sociological methodology, it should be possible to construct a model other than (and indeed in certain key respects opposite to) an objectivist, empiricist, inference-based one, or at the other extreme a relationalist anthropological model: that is, one based upon the negative description of the implicit logic of spontaneous practice[300] or, more precisely, of the spontaneous interpretation of statistics where individual strategies are concerned. Bourdieusian epistemology holds that practices cannot be deduced from the objective conditions of their emergence, or from the conditions which produced the principle of their production. Rather, spontaneous, improvisational practices can only be fruitfully explained by:

> "...relating the objective structure defining the social conditions of the production of the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which the habitus is operating, that is, to the conjuncture which, short of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this structure. In practice, it is the habitus, history turned into nature, *i.e.* denied as such, which accomplishes practically the relating of these two systems of relations, in and through the production of practice."[301]

Without placing habitus at the centre of Bourdieusian analysis, it is possible to interpret the Bourdieusian approach as merely a complex understanding of the bilateral, productive, constructive relationship between individual strategy and the field or social structure in which they operate, such that each may produce 'real', which is to say socially meaningful, effects on the other. It is also possible that the habitus enacts methodologically the mystified political originality of generative structures, a theme to which I return in the case study analysis. It was seen in theoretical terms in Chapter 2 that neither linear determinism nor individualist voluntarism are compatible with Bourdieu's framework, the first because it ignores the mutual constitutivity of structures and practices, the second because it fails to take into account the

[300] "[F]ailing to construct practice other than negatively, objectivism is condemned either to ignore the whole question of the principle underlying the production of the regularities which it then contents itself with recording; or to reifying abstractions..." Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 29.
[301] *Ibid.*: 78.

political process by which the individual emerges as a conditional locus of meaning. The concept of habitus is used to reveal the mechanisms generating the conditions of possibility of agent practices and the intelligibility of the fields and associated symbolic economies in which they are manifest. In order to construct habitus methodologically, it is first necessary to clarify the analytical categories which underpin the methodological construction of the generative structures of habitus, namely capital, field, social space, and the economy of cultural goods and the producers and products endogenous to it.

3.2 Capital and Social Space

In the execution of Bourdieusian case studies, to construct the generative principle which objectively grounds observed differences is ultimately a matter of explaining the structure of the distribution of the forms of power or the kinds of capital which are most effective in the social context in question at a particular point in time. These principles of 'vision and division',[302] which are equatable to social categories of perception, are manifest in all behaviour: Bourdieu notes that the differences in practices, in goods possessed and opinions expressed constitute a veritable *language*.[303] Bourdieu argues that differences associated with social positions – goods, practices, manners and so on – function in each society in the same way, that is by the same processes, as differences which constitute symbolic systems. He thus uses the same terms to speak of social differentiation as one could apply to the set of phonemes of a language or the distinctive signs ('differential écarts') that constitute a mythical system.[304] Bourdieu terms such differentiated constituents symbolic capital.[305] Any form of capital, be it economic, social or

[302] P. Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field', in R. Benson and E Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 36.

[303] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 8. Elsewhere, Bourdieu writes: "Ordinary language passes unnoticed, because it is so ordinary, but it carries in its vocabulary and syntax a petrified philosophy of the social, always ready to spring out of the common words, or complex expressions made up of common words, that the sociologist inevitably uses." Bourdieu, *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991a).

[303] See also Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source': 145

[304] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 9. Mannheim has also sought to formulate a conception of the symbolic which was nonreductionistic but correlated to social structures, though he eventually falls short by falling back upon the philosophy of consciousness as his conceptual framework. Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source': 147.

[305] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 112-21; Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 72-6. Bohman contends Bourdieu's definition of symbolic capital (and symbolic violence) is so broad as to render it unworkable, implying that Bourdieu, like Foucault, merely implies symbolic coercion at every conceivable locus without offering an explanation for its generation. Bohman, 'Reflexivity, Agency and

cultural, may function as symbolic capital, signifying any property which, when perceived by social agents possessing the appropriately aligned categories of perception (those produced by dispositions over time), will lead those agents to recognise it and accord it value.[306] The principles of analysis of symbolic systems set out in *Distinction* give the sociologist the means to construct other social and symbolic spaces, Bourdieu argues. The basic principles of objective differentiation and especially the specific distinctive signs which give rise to significant differences in various symbolic subspaces – from art to law, sport and journalism – can be determined, and it is this methodology of reconstructing symbolic systems, particularly of describing the economy by which symbolic goods are exchanged, which provides the basis for what is called "a comparativism of the essential and at the same time … the universal knowledge of the invariants and variants that sociology can and must produce".[307]

The specific sense in which Bourdieu uses capital is derived from Lewin, Cassirer and Elias, and while economic capital often features prominently in Bourdieu's case studies – this is especially true of works such as *La Misère du monde* – the term is intended to be much more broadly applicable. Capital in Bourdieusian methodology is defined as any entity or property which has symbolic efficacy, that is, which is perceived as valuable within the context of a given field. This catch-all definition of capital may be broken down into several sub-categories. Bourdieu is in part responsible for the contemporary currency of the term 'cultural capital' in scholarly analysis and broader social commentary. 'Cultural capital' has been misappropriated and employed against its intended usage, and this has doubtless contributed to the categorical misapprehension of Bourdieu as being adjacent to Robert Putnam. Cultural capital in the Bourdieusian sense is best understood as the social influence which may be wielded through specialised knowledge or skills, and encompasses education, taste and so on.[308] Adjacent to it is the category of 'social capital', defined as relations and networks of influence amongst colleagues and acquaintances.[309]

Constraint': 175-6. The same point is made in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, 'Can There Be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning?': 42. In this thesis I argue that it is the normative loading of the priority of determination, rather than the symbolic forms of capital, which manifest the ubiquity of coercive power in Bourdieusian theory.

[306] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 47.

[307] *Ibid.*: 13.

[308] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 124-5; Bourdieu; *The Field of Cultural Production*: 270 n.24.

[309] H. K. Anheier and J. Gerhards, 'Forms of Capital and Social-Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieu Social Topography', *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 100, no. 4 (1995): 862; Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 108-10. Putnam traces the history of the term back to 1916, and posits that it has been defined in at least six significantly different ways since. R. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York; London, Simon and Schuster, 2002): 3-12. For a critical survey of different models of social capital, see N. Swain, 'Social Capital and Its Uses', *Archives*

Properly deployed, Bourdieu argues, these terms allow for the depiction of fields as systems of dominant and dominated positions in which each *epistemic* position, which is empirically realised in the form of a concrete institution, organisation, social group or individual, derives its distinctive properties from its internal relationship with all other positions. The Bourdieusian *field* may then be defined as a structured space of social positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different types of capital. It is in the relationship between habitus and the field that Bourdieu's philosophical, political and methodological principles are fully realised: in Bourdieu's words it is:

> "between the feel for the game and the game itself, that the stakes of the game are generated and ends are constituted which are not posited as such, objective potentialities which, although they do not exist outside that relationship, impose themselves, within it, with absolute necessity and self-evidence. The game presents itself to someone caught up in it, absorbed in it, as a transcendent universe, imposing its own ends and norms unconditionally."[310]

Bourdieu's location of the concept of capital in the symbolic realm, and subsequently to the social and cultural, does not amount to a seachange in economistic theories of culture and politics. His emphasis on the social processes which are conditional on and conditioned by the presence of certain entities, rather than the entities themselves, is derived from Marx's position that "capital is not a thing, it is a definite social relation of production pertaining to a particular historical social formation, which simply takes the form of a thing and gives this thing a specific social character".[311] Inasmuch as Bourdieu does refer to relations of 'thingishness'[312] in pursuit of the 'real' symbolic economy underlying them, it makes sense to draw a distinction between phenomenological and systemic capital.[313] I argue in this thesis that the distinction between 'material' and 'symbolic' capital is conflicted but not arbitrary in Bourdieu's work. In the

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Europeennes De Sociologie, vol. 44, no. 2 (2003). See also G. Johnston and J. Percysmith, 'In Search of Social Capital', *Policy and Politics,* vol. 31, no. 3 (2003). Social capital is in general of only secondary significance in Bourdieu's work, though it is a principle focus in, for example, his discussion of structures of socialist societies.

[310] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 151.

[311] K. Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 3* (London: Penguin, 1981): 953.

[312] From Husserl's distinction between immanent and transcendent perception, corresponding to the distinction between Being as Experience and Being as Thing. E. Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,* translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931): 133.

[313] P. Graham, 'Hypercapitalism: A Political Economy of Informational Idealism', *New Media and Society,* vol. 2, no. 2 (Jun 2000): 135-6.

Bourdieusian model economic and objective relations are, like social relations, intellectual production and other 'non-thingish' entities, are recognised symbolically, but the fact that specific symbolic interpretations represent instances of a range of possibilities suggests that the symbolic does not complete the material. It was demonstrated in Section 2.2 that this does amount to a qualified culturalism, but it is one which is methodologically productive in its account of the relation between the material and symbolic. The 'labour of representation', which characterises the journalistic field and any where writing, speaking, painting and so on are primary activities, is thus a material process of production which ends in the materialisation of meaning, whose interpretation is determined according to symbolic systems which are themselves materially conditional. This theoretical move is useful as regards the journalistic field, since it provides an alternative to a prevalent, underproblematised tendency to speak of the 'commodification of thought' in creative enterprises. This argument, distinct from that which claims that all value is *necessarily* 'economistic economic' value, posits that the 'economic' has in the specific historical period of late capitalism attained a monopoly over the content of value, such that non-orthodox economic value (aesthetic or ethical, for example) has become meaningless.[314] Bourdieu seeks to avoid orthodox economism not by denying that all production (social, cultural, symbolic) is economic by nature, but by redefining the concept of economy so that it is not narrowly characterised by 'economistic economy'.[315] 'Commodities' in the Bourdieusian sense are the products of conscious distinctions (where the distinguishing process is material and 'economic') between various aspects of social relations; and these distinctions, if they are to be exchanged with any political or economic efficacy, must be exchanged in more or less valued forms of language, which are necessarily the products of more or less valued social relationships.[316] Valuable knowledge is necessarily the product of valorised language, and *vice versa*. It is thus proper to speak of the products of intellectual labour as commodities, but this commodification is stripped of any implied necessary economism. By extension this move allows us to analyse the process by which symbolic goods are translated into thingish goods. In one sense it provides a new take, for example, on the Weberian argument that the socially significant status of people who embodied certain types of capital – priests, politicians etc –

[314] F. Lebaron, 'Pierre Bourdieu: Economic Models against Economism', *Theory and Society,* vol. 32, no. 5-6 (Dec 2003).
[315] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 172-7, Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 112-3. Many critics have argued that Bourdieu in fact fails to avoid orthodox economism. See, for example, Bohman, 'Reflexivity, Agency and Constraint'; Voirol, 'Recognizing and Ignoring: On the Theory of Symbolic Violence'.
[316] Graham, 'Hypercapitalism', 134.

causes them to appear as fetishised, objectified 'things'.[317] Bourdieu concurs that the fact that socially significant power is often embodied by particular legitimated individuals gives rise to the illusion that social value is based on the qualities of the person alone. But for Bourdieu it is the process, rather than the final thingishness obtained, which is of real interest – that is, the mechanisms by which hierarchies of power are reproduced – and he notes the methodological danger of contenting oneself with cataloguing the phenomenological evidence of processes of commodification, instead of undertaking 'labour of enunciation' which is necessary to "externalise the inwardness, to name the unnamed and to give the beginnings of objectification of pre-verbal and pre-reflexive dispositions".[318] Any examination of knowledge commodities as discrete entities will invariably be wide of the mark and, in a broader sense, Bourdieu reminds us that acquisition of symbolic capital is rarely an end in itself, but usually translates into material gain in one context or another.

'Social space' similarly warrants methodological clarification. For Bourdieu, 'space' refers to anything which is topographically constructed as a relational structure of differences generated by a principle that discloses and constitutes a region of reality.[319] This conception of topography is closer to the Aristotelian sense of vertical mediation of subjectivity and objectivity than Marxist topographical metaphors or Adorno's reinterpretation thereof.[320] Any society may be labelled a social space, which is defined as a structure of relational differences generated by the principle of the distribution of different types of capital 'in currency' in the given context. Next, all social spaces are fields in the Bourdieusian sense. This is not to suggest that the terms are interchangeable – it does not hold that fields are by necessity social spaces – but social spaces may be understood as fields of power (or, in Bourdieu's words, fields of struggle) in which social strata (often, though by no means always, classes in the Marxist sense) attempt to transform of preserve the structure of the field. Finally, it is the structure of the forces of the *field of power* which determines the hierarchisation of the positions of the social space at any given time: it should be possible to show that either economic, cultural or social capital is the dominant

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[317] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 73.
[318] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 129. See also Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source': 143-4.
[319] In this definition, 'principle' might be better understood as something closer to Cassirer's 'lawful progression', while 'reality' is intended in the sense of the definition of the 'real' given above. See Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 52. See also Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 30-3.
[320] R. M. Curry, 'Discursive Displacement and the Seminal Ambiguity of Space and Place', in L. Lievrouw and S. Livingstone (eds), *The Handbook of New Media* (London: Sage, 2002): 502-17.

principle at any given point.[321] The field of power is to be regarded as a metafield, and not as a conflation of the 'political field' in its conventional sense. The 'political' in Bourdieusian theory then refers to *the struggle between social groups for the determination of the dominant principle of the hierarchical dispersion of positions in the field.*

3.3 Social Agents

Given that the methodological focus is on movement of capital and the structured generation of principles of differentiation, the role of the individual producers and products (social, cultural or economic) in a Bourdieusian case study is not obvious. This is not a merely abstract consideration, as it determines the extent to which the words of participants in Bourdieusian case can be taken *prima facie* as meaningful, or instead studied only for nonconscious strategising. There is little value in denying that individual actors do in some sense produce, in the context of the case study, reports, op-ed pieces and so on. One could draw the distinction that the Bourdieusian approach is not concerned with the ontological meaning of a cultural product but with its social meaning – though this is perhaps misleading. It has been shown that for Bourdieu a text's meaning is a particular instance of what the generative structures of a field make possible, and as such is neither arbitrary nor inferable from objective context. Since for Bourdieu an entity's ontological status is determined and redetermined through practice, it would make more sense to say that, for the Bourdieusian model, a cultural product exists only to the extent that the objective conditions exist for it to be created and received as having meaning in accordance with extant dispositions for assigning social meaning. The upshot is that when one is talking of an individual text – a piece of reportage, for example – its being conceived, written, published, read and assessed within and beyond the journalistic field, is finally the collective product of that entire field – more specifically, the accumulated, engendered products of all agents working within the journalistic field and in those fields which determine its reception elsewhere. It follows that the *subject* of a journalistic product is not that agent which creates it in its materiality but rather the entire set of agents whose collective disposition allows for the conception of a cultural product and its subsequent reception. In the artistic field this encompasses not only artists but art critics, art buyers, agents, curators, teachers and so on. In the journalistic field the genesis, circulation, reception and recognised meaning of a piece of

[321] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 52-5.

journalism is generated by the complex set of relations between journalists, editors, advertisers and media buyers: in short, to paraphrase Bourdieu's words on another field:

> "...all those who have ties with journalism, who live for journalism and, to varying degrees, from it, and who confront each other in struggles where the imposition of not only a world view but also a vision of the journalistic world is at stake, and who through these struggles, participate in the production of the value of the journalist and of journalism."[322]

Insofar as it *is* possible to speak of individual producers ('the journalist', 'the artist' etc.), Bourdieusian analysis offers more than a simple reduction of the author to her social context. Instead of invoking pairs of text and society, Bourdieusian analysis takes as its object a moving point in social space and time,[323] concretised because it is entrenched in and with habitus. Thus we can speak of an individual repository of internalised structures or matrices of practice, inscribed with a socially specific past and orienting itself towards its possible futures.[324] The 'moving point' is analysable because the practices which constitute it are structured and structuring, generating discourse about its own trajectory,[325] *and* about the formal impositions of the field it traverses, *and* about the social universe articulated in multifarious, relatively autonomous, fields.[326] The end result for Bourdieusian methodology is that instead of analysing a static social background to an actor's behaviour or perspective, it is necessary to take into account the temporal discontinuity produced in a field structured according to a historical development of differentiation.[327] It is this temporal dimension, based on the premise that principles of differentiation produce and are transformed by the field differently over time, that allows us to say that the field and the truths produced within it are historical – without being able directly to derive a field from its external historical situation.[328]

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[322] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 261.
[323] P. Ekelund, 'Space, Time and John Gardner', in N. Brown and I. Szeman (eds), *Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000): 215-40.
[324] Bourdieu and Emanuel, *The Rules of Art*: 258. Also Ekelund, 'Space, Time and John Gardner'.
[325] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 276 n.44.
[326] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 86.
[327] Ekelund, 'Space, Time and John Gardner'.
[328] "...truths produced in a relatively autonomous field can be historical through and through, as is the field itself, without for that being either deducible from historical conditions or reducible to the external conditionings they impose. This is because the field opposes to external forces the shield, or the prism, of its own history, warrant of its autonomy, that is, the history of the 'languages' (in the broadest possible sense of the word) specific to each field or subfield." P. Bourdieu, 'Passport to Duke (Text Read on Behalf

The Bourdieusian field is constructed such that agents or groups of agents are arranged in it according to their relative position in distributions based upon two fundamental principles of differentiation of capital: first, the volume of capital, and second, the relative weight of the different kinds of capital.[329] For Bourdieu, for the purposes of studying late capitalist society, the most efficient categorisations to employ are economic and cultural capital.[330] More broadly, one may say that the space of social positions is recast into a space of position-*takings* through the mediation of the space of dispositions, *i.e.* through the principles of the habitus. As Bourdieu puts it:

> "...the system of differential deviations which defines the different positions in the two major dimensions of social space corresponds to the system of differential deviations in agents' properties (or in the properties of constructed classes of agents), *i.e.* in their practices and in the goods they possess".[331]

As such, for every class of positions identified there is a corresponding class of habitus 'produced by the social conditioning associated with the corresponding condition'[332] and, because the habitus mediates in its generative capacity, there is further a systematic set of goods and properties corresponding to that class of positions and habitus. In fact Bourdieu takes this line of argument much further, concluding that while plural habitus are themselves differentiated, owing to the fact that they are the product of objective social positions, they operate as a generative and unifying principle, ultimately translating the specific characteristics of a structural position into a microscopically differentiated but ultimately unitary lifestyle. While there may be differences between actors in a shared field, the common habitus is itself the principle of differentiation.[333] Following the argument to its logical conclusion, it may be said

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of the Author at the Duke-University Conference Honoring His Work, April 1995)', *Metaphilosophy,* vol. 28, no. 4 (1997).

[329] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 6-7.

[330] Anheier *et al.*, however, argue that Bourdieu assumes a correlation between distribution of economic and cultural capital. Anheier and Gerhards, 'Forms of Capital and Social-Structure in Cultural Fields'.

[331] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 7.

[332] *Ibid.*

[333] A common misreading of *Distinction* is that it argues that agents seek distinction as a goal; rather, Bourdieu's thesis is that to exist in a social space, to occupy a position within a relationally structured space, is to differ, to be different. *Ibid.*: 9.

that where actors occupy adjacent positions, they are to all intents and purposes, methodologically speaking, interchangeable.[334]

The implications are clear: Bourdieusian methodology is susceptible to claims of economic reductionism, helped in no small part by Bourdieu's chosen terminology which often resembles rational action theory.[335] It does not take a substantial logical leap to conclude that Bourdieu aims to uncover strategic action without conscious strategising everywhere he looks, and to explain these strategies in reductionist or economistic forms. If this were found to be the case, it would be clear evidence of Bourdieu's determinist political convictions logically producing a methodology which necessitates the exposure of complicity in coercive mechanisms. For present purposes, it suffices to emphasise that the strong hermeneutic influences which Bourdieu endeavours to reconcile with scientific modelling, as well as his determination not to patronise the objects of his case studies, rule out the possibility of an excessively reductionist starting point. It is true that Bourdieu attributes nonconscious strategy to observed behaviour, and that he takes account of subjective experience by methodically objectifying it against its social context. While this may lead to a position of political overdetermination, it does not necessarily represent an economistic hollowing-out of social meaning.

To illustrate how the above definitions operate in methodological practice, let us turn to Bourdieu's sociological analysis of Martin Heidegger.[336] While Bourdieu explains that this work was intended more as an exercise in methodology than as an 'accusation',[337] it can (and has) been interpreted as at least reductionist.[338] Bourdieu does not claim that Heidegger was a completely determined product of the German philosophical field at a particular juncture in history, that it was inevitable that that field would generate a Heidegger because of the way its differentiated objective positions were configured.[339] Instead, Bourdieu argues that the

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[334] Each individual disposition is seen as a 'structural variant of all the other group or class habitus'. See especially Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 85-6. Anheier *et al.* demonstrate the affinity with the mathematical principle of structural equivalence. Anheier and Gerhards, 'Forms of Capital and Social-Structure in Cultural Fields': 860-1.

[335] J. Guillory, 'Bourdieu's Refusal', in Brown and Szeman, 'Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture': 29. See also R. Benson and E. Neveu, 'Introduction: Field Theory as a Work in Progress', in R.D. Benson and E. Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005a): 10. Bourdieu distances himself from RAT in Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 138-40.

[336] P. Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991e).

[337] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*: 150.

[338] Rahkonen, *Not Class, but Struggle: Critical Ouvertures to Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology*: 25.

[339] Indeed, Bourdieu criticises what he terms the 'external mode of analysis' which seeks to reduce theoretical works to social class, citing in particular Adorno's writing on Heidegger. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 180.

conditions of what it was possible for Heidegger to do or think were objectively determined by the philosophical and literary contexts in which he operated. He pursued a strategy which may reasonably be called 'individual' insofar as it would not have been possible to predict exactly what philosophical path he would end up taking;[340] and yet the path he *did* eventually take should come as no surprise since his strategy was inevitably determined by the rules of the game in which he existed. These 'rules' determine how individual actors compete for academic authority or legitimacy, and tend to favour an individual 'strategy' which reinforces the habitus which created the conditions of possibility of that strategy in the first place.[341] Bourdieu argues that Heidegger's strategy, though 'individually' pursued through competition for prestige (or some other capital), was ultimately directed towards preserving philosophy's position in academia as the ultimate legitimator of what counts as knowledge, and more specifically towards safeguarding the supremacy of neo-Kantianism within the philosophical discipline, and of a particular branch of neo-Kantian thought within neo-Kantianism generally.[342] Similar arguments could be made for other fields of cultural production, and it will be seen in Section 5.3 that Bourdieu articulated a (brief) 'consevative revolution' case about the common trajectories of careers in journalism late in his career. The wider implication is that while structural considerations are undoubtedly important, Bourdieu asserts the impossibility of drawing any inferences from the analysis of formal structure. Rather, in agreement with Chomsky, Bourdieu affirms the independence of the structural properties of linguistic expressions relative to their function.[343] The upshot is that case studies must probe individual strategies if they are to go

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[340] Bourdieu is sometimes erroneously read as suggesting that individual behaviour can be inferred. See, for example, L. A. Pellerin and E. Stearns, 'Status Honor and the Valuing of Cultural and Material Capital', *Poetics,* vol. 29, no. 1 (Apr 2001). Here the authors use mathematical modelling to predict the likelihood of practices of status statements. Bourdieu's position is in fact closer to that of Winch, who notes that "the rule here does not specify any determinate outcome to the situation, though it does limit the range of possible alternatives". Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy*: 92.

[341] To clarify Bourdieu's use of 'strategy', behaviour is organised by the principles of habitus as 'strategies' without being the product of genuine strategic intention; that is, Bourdieu is concerned more with unthinking spontaneous calculation of likely outcomes. "Unlike the estimation of probabilities which science constructs methodologically on the basis of controlled experiments from data established according to precise rules, practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given situation brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical precepts ('that's not for the likes of us'), and, at a deeper level, the unconscious principles of the *ethos* which, being the product of a learning process dominated by a determinate type of objective realities, determines 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' conduct for every agent subjected to those regularities." Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 73-7. Also 'From Rules to Strategies', in P. Bourdieu, *In Other Words* : 59-75.

[342] Bourdieu thus concludes that Heidegger effected a 'conservative revolution' in philosophy. See especially Bourdieu and Collier, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*: 55-69.

[343] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 26-7.

beyond recording regularities and target the question of the principle underlying the production of these regularities.

Bourdieu's case study of parallel cousin marriage in Kabylia, published in *Outline*, demonstrates this point well. Against the structuralist assertion that kinship charts can adequately explain genealogical relationships, Bourdieu counters that what is needed is an examination of the different uses men and women can make of the field of genealogical relationships, and in particular their different readings and uses of *ambiguous* kinship ties.[344] That is, it is in those areas of practice which are the subject of contestation and competition that the production and reproduction of differentiated objective positions and the power relations which effect those differences are thrown into sharpest relief. It is then the relationship between individual actions and the structure of the field in which he or she operates that reveals the principles of production which pervade and determine the nature of that structure and which effect the possible range and direction of social phenomena. Neither individual strategies nor macrostructures can in isolation reveal 'social meaning'; on their own these categories could furnish only superficial descriptions of observed events and not the 'scientifically demonstrable causal relations' that are the basis of explanation in Bourdieusian thought. The practice of agents in a given field only becomes intelligible when one can 'construct the system of the principles and of the laws of the combination of those principles'[345] which they institute more or less spontaneously in their interactions in the social sphere.

3.4 The Economy of Cultural Goods

By reinterpreting Weber's notion of ideal goods and ideal interests through neo-Marxist lens, and by extending the logic of economic calculation to all goods, material as well as symbolic, Bourdieu is able to develop a methodological tool which produces an incisive account of symbolic production: that is, the economy of cultural goods.[346] This economy, Bourdieu argues,

[344] "Contrary to appearances, scarcely more understanding is derived from a structural analysis which ignores the specific functions of ritual practices and fails to inquire into the economic and social conditions of the production of the dispositions generating both these practices and also the collective definition of the practical functions in whose service they function. The Kabyle peasant does not react to 'objective conditions' but to the practical interpretation which he produces of those conditions, and the principle of which is the socially constituted schemes of his habitus." *Ibid.*: 115-6.
[345] *Ibid.*: 70.
[346] Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 54.

conforms closely to the precapitalist economies on which his general (that is, not narrowly, orthodoxically economistic) economic theory is based.[347] At the centre of this theory is the proposition that all economies are characterised by the denial of the economy as such. The work of denial is effective precisely because it is collective, based as it is on the unintentional agreement forged between the dispositions of agents, whether they are directly or indirectly involved.[348] This programme is first outlined in *Outline,* and finds its strongest methodological expression in *Distinction.* The outcome of such a reading of Weber is that an economic reinterpretation of non- and even anti-economic sectors becomes possible – if 'economic' is taken to refer strictly to fields of competition whose operation is in some sense predictable by laws of progression. This means that it is theoretically possible to demonstrate that a well-intended and conspicuous lack of interest in material rewards (on the part of the journalist, academic or scientist,[349] for example) always pays in one way or another, regardless of whether this interest is intended by the agent. An artistic, literary, journalistic or scientific field may be depicted as an economic world reversed,[350] in which the positive sanctions of the market are indifferent or even negative.[351] As such, what distinguishes Bourdieu's reformulation from more orthodox economic models is its ability to take into account disinterestedness as a virtue, one which figures prominently in the artistic, scientific and journalistic fields, amounting to a rejection of monetary reward or fame for example or, more generally, an apparent rejection of calculation and individual strategy which is, on closer examination, itself calculated and strategic. Bourdieu asserts that in fields of cultural production there exist the conditions of possibility of a universe in which the durable dispositions for disinterestedness may be constituted and, once constituted, may find objective conditions for constant reinforcement and become the principle of a permanent practice of virtue. He concludes that "[i]f disinterestedness is sociologically possible, it can only be through the encounter between habitus predisposed to disinterestedness and the universes in which disinterestedness is rewarded".[352] The social world comprises multifarious economic universes, each endowed with specific rationalities which

[347] However, Gartman argues that Bourdieu fails to account for the dynamism of capitalist societies in applying his precapitalist model. See D. Gartman, 'Culture as Class Symbolization or Mass Reification? A Critique of Bourdieu's Distinction', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 97, no. 2 (Sept 1991): 434.
[348] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 94-5. *Symbolic violence*, a key Bourdieusian term, refers to that 'violence' which extorts submission without being perceived as such, based as it is on collective expectations or socially inculcated beliefs. The term is Sartrean in origin, and is used by Wittig in a similar fashion. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 168-72.
[349] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 139.
[350] 'An economic world turned upside down', Bourdieu and Emanuel, *The Rules of Art*: 81-4.
[351] See also Bourdieu, Science of Science and Reflexivity: 55-62.
[352] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 88.

assume 'reasonable' dispositions adjusted to the objective realities of each of them.[353] In the religious, scientific, artistic and other fields, the objective conditions exist for social agents to have an interest in disinterestedness.[354] It will be seen in the case study that while there is some evidence of this theme, evidence tends to take the form of absences rather than affirmations, providing only a tentative basis for extrapolation.

A clear consequence of this line of thinking is that the sociologist will tend to describe as cynically calculated actions which are claimed to be disinterested. The case study assesses the extent to which this is necessarily built in to field analysis. Bourdieu's position is that observed ingenuousness must be taken seriously insofar as it is 'lived reality', but the sociologist must also preserve the fundamental ambiguity between lived disinterestedness and an inevitable level of calculation.[355] This ambiguity is said to be present in reality itself,[356] rather than operating as a methodological construct, and forms the basis for one of Bourdieu's chief arguments about the operation of fields: individual self-deception as to the reality of interestedness is sustained by collective self-deception, by way of a systemic misrecognition inscribed in the objective structures of a society and the perceptual framework of its actors. Inasmuch as the construction of the generative principles which comprise habitus is derived from the articulation of the dialectical relationship between social structure and the dispositions making up the habitus, individual 'strategy' in the conscious sense (that is, as distinct from 'strategy' defined by Bourdieu as unconscious calculation[357]) and field structure, though not ends in themselves, do remain salient.

3.5 The Methodology of Field Analysis

We now turn to the methodological steps by which Bourdieusian field analysis proceeds. The field in Bourdieusian theory represents more than a methodologically expedient category for

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[353] *Ibid.*: 75.
[354] *Ibid.* Also Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 154. For a methodological application of this, see Anheier and Gerhards, 'Forms of Capital and Social-Structure in Cultural Fields': 864-6.
[355] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 92-8. See also Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 72.
[356] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 264-7.
[357] "The language of strategy, which one is forced to use in order to designate the sequences of actions objectively oriented towards an end that are observed in all fields, must not mislead us: the most effective strategies are those which, being the product of dispositions shaped by the immanent necessity of the field, tend to adjust themselves spontaneously to that necessity, without express intention or calculation. In other words, the agent is never completely the subject of his practices." Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 10.

grouping together disparate objective positions and phenomena: objective positions,[358] the power relations between them and the phenomena these engender mean that fields are *objectively* relatively autonomous, structured, structuring and, insofar as they are have a regularising function, they are to an extent regular.[359] While this allows the analyst to speak of fields as more or less discrete entities, however, it remains crucial to distinguish various levels or layers of field operation. As such, Bourdieusian case study analysis usually begins with the location of the field in question within appropriate *metafields*. As far as concerns Bourdieu's own work on the artistic, literary and educational fields, he begins with the relatively uncontroversial situating of these fields within the field of cultural production.[360] Bourdieu also locates journalism within this broader field, a cogent step given the definition of the economy of cultural production articulated in *The Field of Cultural Production*.[361] While it does emphasise the prestige or social influence associated with journalistic endeavour, and the associated interestedness in disinterestedness, this by no means denies the attainment of wealth as a perceived valuable goal in the trade (the convertibility of different forms of capital is one focus of analysis): as will become clearer in the discussion of the capital matrices that follow, in order to locate a field within the field of cultural production it is necessary only to demonstrate a *relative* dominance of cultural capital as a medium of exchange.[362] As introduced earlier, it is also necessary to locate the field of cultural production within the metafield of power: here, the cultural field is both economically and symbolically dominated.[363] While it can be argued that the metafield of power is so all-encompassing as to lose any methodological scope for insight, clear empirical evidence for the operation of habitus may be sought in this field and its relation to subfields. The struggle that goes on in the field of power determines whether the principle of the hierarchisation of the

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[358] Methodologically, this thesis targets the *logics* which reproduce objective positions, rather than the objective positions themselves.

[359] "The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus." Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 79. See also J. S. Mill, *The Logic of the Moral Sciences* (London: Duckworth, 1987): 63.

[360] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 75, 115.

[361] "The field of production and circulation of symbolic goods is defined as the system of objective relations among different instances, functionally defined by their role in the division of labour of production, reproduction and diffusion of symbolic goods." *Ibid.*: 115.

[362] Anheier and Gerhards, 'Forms of Capital and Social-Structure in Cultural Fields', 864; Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 123-4.

[363] An example of this methodological step is presented in R. Cook, 'The Mediated Manufacture of an 'Avant-Garde': A Bourdieusian Analysis of the Field of Contemporary Art in London, 1997-9', in B. Fowler (ed.), *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 164-85.

field of class or category relations is of an economic or cultural nature.[364] Combining these two steps one may conclude, for example, that the intellectual field occupies a dominated position in the field of power, while the field of power itself is situated at the dominant pole of the field of class relations. The positioning of the journalistic field follows.

Within the field of cultural production, comparing different fields by the relative proportions of economic and cultural capital as the basis for competition for control of possession, distribution and legitimation of symbolic capital demonstrates that journalism is roughly similar in economic/cultural capital ratio to the artistic, academic and literary fields – or at least on the same side of the vertical axis. Determining journalism's vertical position on such a map, representing the 'amount' of the dominant form of capital within the journalistic field (conjecturally, cultural) relative to the amount of the dominant form of capital in another field, is considerably more problematic, where 'amount' refers to the relative capacity – hypothetically quantifiable in Bourdieu's view – of a field to monopolise the legitimation and deployment of a given form of capital. If cultural capital is defined in strict terms according to prestige and authority, journalism is located in a dominated position relative to, say, academia or literature, which more effectively determine that which is systematically recognised as culturally valuable. This is Bourdieu's stated position on journalism, evident in his critique of the blurring of the boundaries of philosophy and journalism in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*.[365]

Once the position of the field to be analysed is established in relation to the field of power, the next task is to uncover the objective structure of the relations between positions occupied in the field by agents or the institutions which are in competition with each other in the field. Such an analysis should incorporate a detailed account of the positions of the producers of all forms of capital who are in competition with each other in the field, giving proper regard to the histories of these positions.[366] The internal structure of the journalistic field, it is hypothesised, extends in one dimension from a pole at which economic capital is relatively (and apparently) unimportant and cultural or social capital is held to be valuable, to another pole where the reverse is true.[367] It is problematic at the outset to assign positions at these extremities labels such as 'analytical journalism', 'investigative reporter' and 'quality newspapers', 'scandal-mongering' or 'gutter

[364] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 40-3.
[365] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme'.
[366] Bourdieu sketches such an analysis of television journalism in *On Television*: 39-67.
[367] This will usually correspond to a continuum between high circulation and 'high quality'. See, for example, Anheier and Gerhards, 'Forms of Capital and Social-Structure in Cultural Fields'.

press'.[368] Who and what constitutes and legitimates, for example, 'quality journalism' is one of the struggles of constitution and legitimation in the field of cultural production: investigative journalism, quality papers and tabloids are not trans-historical categories, but sites of competition over specific forms or combinations of capital.[369] No objective position in the field is essentially captured by such conceptual categorisations; rather, these categorisations are used by individuals and organisations in order in an attempt to inhabit those positions and to monopolise the capital associated with them. Individuals and organisations do not embody, essentially, objective positions, instead they are disposed to adapt to the conditions or demands of those positions. For Bourdieu, then, it makes little sense to speak of a figure such as Rupert Murdoch having a conscious plan to dominate the media world, for what determines an individual's strategies are practical, em-bodied (that is, not simply willed) dispositions.[370] By virtue of his own particular habitus Murdoch is a practically engaged player in the media 'game';[371] within this game position-takings are also always '*semi-conscious* strategies in a game in which the conquest of cultural legitimacy and the concomitant power of symbolic violence is at stake'.[372]

Bourdieu's overt politicality and use of polemical language in some texts can lead to ambiguity about his analytical position.[373] The term 'appropriation' in the preceding section functions more rhetorically than analytically, for it implies a degree of conscious will disproportionate to the structurally determined strategies available to the social agent. Alternately, if there is a conscious strategy it is deployed in pursuit of the goods (cultural or otherwise) which necessarily coincide (due to their origins in habitus) with their dispositions, and not, as Bourdieu's phrase here might be misinterpreted to suggest, in willed pursuit of legitimation and reinforcement of social norms.[374] There is no doubt as to Bourdieu's intention to convince us that discursively-

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[368] Potential criteria for mapping the relative positions of journalistic specialisations are considered in Chapter 5.
[369] The attempts by *Libération* to claim specific authority or a particular public voice despite its changing readership and content is examined in Bourdieu, 'Libé vingt ans après', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales,* no. 101-02 (1994a): 39
[370] See especially 'From rules to strategies in Bourdieu, *In Other Words*: 59-75.
[371] Cook, 'The Mediated Manufacture of an 'Avant-Garde': A Bourdieusian Analysis of the Field of Contemporary Art in London, 1997-9': 171.
[372] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 137.
[373] Bourdieu is criticised for being overly 'political' in, for instance, Bouveresse, *Bourdieu, Savant & Politique*: 105. This thesis argues that Bourdieu's political normativity, while to a degree obscured in his work, is ultimately defensible.
[374] Bourdieu, *In Other Words*: 59-75.

inculcated willing submission to conditional norms does amount to 'violence',[375] and that the power of legitimation of social meaning does involve the exploitative appropriation of capital which should, he does not hesitate to urge, be open to all. Bourdieu argues that it is the structured and structuring habitus which generates both networks of social positions and the agents disposed to occupy and compete to occupy those positions.[376] He does not, for instance, simply blame journalists individually for appropriating the symbolic capital which has traditionally been monopolised by philosophers; rather, he laments the supremacy of economic capital in both journalism and (to a lesser though increasing extent) academia which produced the structural changes which led actors to adjust their individual strategies accordingly. And yet at other times Bourdieu does attack those who benefit from the reproduction of a social order through their individual practice, professors at the École des Beaux-Arts, for example,[377] maintaining simultaneously that these individuals are programmed, by the very fact of their occupation of powerful social positions, to act so as to reinforce the structures which produced their position of advantage (as much as disadvantaged actors are disposed to accept the conditions of their disadvantage as natural and to act in willing complicity), and that such actors should be held *responsible* for the violence, of whatever form, that they commit.[378] It is a difficult position to maintain. In order for it to hold, Bourdieu must be read as arguing that although agents are more or less incapable of being conscious of the conditionality of the social positions they occupy, once it is revealed (presumably by the sociological or political analyst) then such actors should be held accountable for the political effects of the actions they prosecute primarily because they are themselves the product of structurally identical political effects. Bourdieu follows this through in more polemical texts such as *On Television and Journalism* but not in the those texts most methodologically definitive of the Bourdieusian generative structuralism, namely *Outline, Logic* and *Distinction*. Rather, he suggests that the exposure of conditionality of coercive political relations can itself produce practices which undermine existing cycles of cultural production and reproduction. For present purposes, there is a significant methodological implication arising from the nonconsciousness of strategy and appropriation. Since the objective positions of a field generate the strategies agents use to take up positions in that field in the pursuit of a capital of more or less self-evident value, any non-

[375] When asked by Terry Eagleton what is violent about symbolic violence, Bourdieu pointed to the variety of subtle forms that violence can take, and used opinion polling as an example. Bourdieu, 'Doxa and Common Life': 119.
[376] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 163-9.
[377] Bourdieu, *the Field of Cultural Production*: 242.
[378] Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance*: 70-77.

methodologically-objectified delineations of field positions – especially those produced by agents within that field, or those which are collectively seen as *natural* specialisations of a field such as journalism – are meaningless insofar as they describe objective reality, and are only of use to the sociologist insofar as they betray attempts to stabilise the meanings associated with specific positions, or insofar as they reveal commodities self-evidently held to be valuable, through competition seen to be the natural progression of the 'game'. I return to this theme in the case study.

3.6 Conclusion

It is the systematic misrecognition[379] of the existing status quo as natural[380] which Bourdieu sets as the prime target of his phenomenological-sociological research: how it is embedded in the everyday experience of the lifeworld, how it is structured, by which processes misrecognition occurs, what events or dispositions it sets in train and so on. And the field of *cultural* production is the site *par excellence* of misrecognition, since:

> "in generating strategies objectively adapted to the objective chances of profit of which it is the product, the sense of investment secures profits which do not need to be pursued as profits, and so it brings to those who have a legitimate culture as a second nature the supplementary profit of being seen (and seeing themselves) as perfectly disinterested, unblemished by any cynical or mercenary use of culture".[381]

The process of misrecognition as an object of analysis inevitably raises the risk of broad cynicism insofar as every observed behaviour may be interpreted as calculated on some level. However, it is also possible that such an approach offers a more sophisticated means by which to judge the actions of agents in a field which there is a fundamental operational contradiction between the economic reality of its existence and its avowed function of the pursuit of 'truth'. Transposing the line of argument set out in *Distinction*, the aim of sociological analysis is thus to establish the ways in which cultural goods are established as valued; the conditions in which the consumers of cultural goods, and their predilection for them, are produced; the appropriation by

[379] Also termed 'collective' misrecognition. *Ibid.*: 139-40, 53.
[380] Bourdieu calls systematic misrecognition a 'discourse of familiarity' which 'leaves all unsaid that goes without saying'. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 18.
[381] Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 86.

individual or institutional cultural producers of such of these objects as are regarded at a particular moment as representative of certain forms of journalism; and, finally, the social conditions of the constitution of the mode of appropriation that is considered legitimate.

CHAPTER 4: Bourdieu on Journalism and Journalism as a Bourdieusian Field

> "...that abominable, voluptuous act called 'reading the paper', whereby all the misfortunes and cataclysms suffered by the universe in the last twenty-four hours – battles which have cost the lives of fifty thousand men, murders, strikes, bankruptcies, fires, poisonings, suicides, divorces, the cruel emotions of statesman and actor, transmuted into a morning feast for our personal entertainment, make an excellent and particularly bracing accompaniment to a few mouthfuls of café au lait."[382]

4.1 Introduction

The mass media are held up by Bourdieu as one of the most pervasive, most effective means by which structured, coercive relations of power are reproduced.[383] However, a systematic analysis of the journalistic field, or an attempt to explain in any detail the reproduction of the structures of the mass media generally through the misrecognition of the symbolic economies therein, is missing in Bourdieu's research.[384] This lacuna is met by critics with a mixture of curiosity and scepticism.[385] Bourdieu attributes to the media a uniquely effective mechanism for institutionalising symbolic violence, and often points out the degree to which journalism in particular has undermined other fields of cultural production. Therefore the mass media would appear to offer Bourdieu the most powerful conceivable empirical application of a theory which sets out to explain the logic by which structured domination is systematically misrecognised and by which ultimately quasi-arbitrary configurations and embodiments of capital attain practical

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[382] M. Proust, 'Sentiments filiaux d'un parricide' in M. Proust, *Pastiches Et Mélanges* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970): 200.

[383] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 1-9.

[384] The absence of an account of the media is particularly conspicuous in Bourdieu's works on cultural reproduction, such as *The Field of Cultural Production*, *Distinction*, *The Rules of Art* and *The Love of Art*. He began to address the media and particularly its role in influencing the principles of differentiation of other (formerly) autonomous field in the early 1990s (see below), and other Bourdieusian scholars developed this line of research from the mid-1990s.

[385] See, for instance, P. Marlière, 'The Impact of Market Journalism: Pierre Bourdieu on the Media', in B. Fowler (ed.), *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): 199.

self-evidence.[386] And it is by no means the case that Bourdieu concedes a limit to his sociological methodology which might rule out its applicability to a field so pervasive as the mass media. There is no point at which the naturalness or universality of a property such as legitimacy is so complete that the sociologist cannot conceive of its fundamental conditionality and describe its existence in practical, structural terms.[387] It might be argued that the gap in Bourdieu's work results from an overly narrow focus on demonstrably closed systems (such as Kabylia), on the basis of which extrapolations about fields of cultural production such as journalism would be simply not valid. I would counter that the distinctive insights given by the Bourdieusian approach are generated precisely by this 'narrow' approach. It is the explanation of minutiae, the exposition of the logic at work in particular instances of observed practice in a relatively restricted context, that allow for the explanation of systems of reproduction at their most intricate, and effective, level. It is after all Bourdieu's work on what is perceived to be ordinary, microscopic behaviour – taste, conversational styles and recreation preferences in specific geographical and historical contexts – which has proven widely influential in contemporary sociological, cultural and pedagogical theory.[388]

It remains to be explained, then, why Bourdieu did not undertake substantive case studies of the media as a field of cultural production, given its ascribed importance as a mechanism for constituting and reproducing a coercive generative logic across many spheres. This question may be explicable biographically. Bourdieu's interest in the media emerges relatively late in his work, by which time he was becoming increasingly concerned with 'direct interventions' in fields rather than their meticulous sociological dissection. It remains possible, however, that fields of media production simply do not lend themselves to Bourdieusian analysis. The latter part of this chapter will assess the tenability of constructing the media and journalism in particular as a Bourdieusian object. I will argue that a properly defined and finite media system is coherent enough in its internal logic and (objective and symbolic) structure to be analysable within the Bourdieusian framework. I will develop an account of the field of journalism (and the subfield of war correspondence, though the competition between war correspondence and other subfields is brought out most clearly in the case study) as an object of Bourdieusian field analysis. The section ends with a discussion of what Bourdieusian methodology may validly tell

[386] 'Configurations' hereafter indicates the three dimensions of what Bourdieu terms the 'space' of the methodological construction of a field: volume of capital, composition of capital and change in these two properties over time. Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 114.
[387] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 222.
[388] See, for example, Moi, 'Appropriating Bourdieu': 1030-1.

us about journalism and war correspondence in particular. The latter part of the thesis will attempt to ascertain to what extent such a concrete analysis is compatible with the much broader political theory Bourdieu articulates. First, however, it is important to emphasise that while there is no systematic generative structuralist account of the media in Bourdieu's work, he has been anything but silent on the politics of the mass media and the media's influence on all fields of cultural production. It is to these works that we now turn.

4.2 Bourdieu on Journalism

> "'Conforama is the Guy Lux of furniture,' says *Le Nouvel Observateur*, which will never tell you that the *Nouvel Obs* is the Club Méditerranée of culture. There is terrorism in all such remarks, flashes of self-interested lucidity sparked off by class hatred or contempt."[389]

4.2.1 *On Television and Journalism*

On Television and Journalism was conceived as an 'intervention', delivered in two lectures on prime time television (thanks, Bourdieu noted, to the symbolic capital he wielded as chair of the Collège de France and through his reputation in French politics[390]). As such it is unsurprising that this work takes the form of a political pamphlet, deploying a range of rhetorical devices to convey a political message in a deliberately polemical fashion. It is here that Bourdieu's emancipatory mantra of 'universalising the conditions of access to the universal'[391] (whilst maintaining the value of restricted *production* of the universal) is given full voice, crystallising the increasingly active campaigning agenda which Bourdieu put forward in the last decade or so of his life. The main thesis of *On Television and Journalism* is that the Western European journalistic field, that of the broadcast media particularly but also of the press, produces and imposes on the public a specific vision of the political field, one that is grounded in the very structure of the journalistic field and the interests endemic to it. The depiction is not

[389] Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 511.
[390] Bourdieu served as special adviser on culture to the French government under François Mitterand.
[391] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 1.

innovative.[392] Bourdieu speaks of the increasing focus on political personalities and 'star' journalists, the preference for sensation over rigorous argument, the promotion of conflict, cynicism, the tendency to conform with competitors' news output, and the obsession with scoops and the collective amnesia this brings.[393] Time and space constraints result in issues being presented with reference to simplistic binaries (right/wrong, citizen/foreigner, business/unions) which are not only misleading[394] but tend to conceal more complex and often more powerful hierarchies. Life is presented in the news as a series of 'disconnected flashes' with neither antecedents nor consequences; news is thus at once dehistoricised and dehistoricising, fragmented and fragmenting.[395] Bourdieu surmises that 'the journalistic field represents the world in terms of a philosophy that sees history as an absurd series of disasters which can be neither understood nor influenced', fostering disenchantment, disengagement and fatalism.[396]

If Bourdieu's political stance on the news media is hardly groundbreaking, his neo-Marxist account of the power relations which constitute the field is similarly conventional. The journalistic field is increasingly subject to market forces. This subjection effects a powerful, often impalpable form of censorship[397] by way of job insecurity[398] (with increasing concentration of ownership the journalist does not have a large selection of potential employers), a loss of independence in more 'managerially' run media organisations (editors are more and more likely to interfere in journalists' work[399]), and the ever-present time restrictions on journalistic

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[392] See especially R. Debray and D. Macey, *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France* (London: NLB, 1981).
[393] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 6. Similar arguments are put forward by M. Schudson, *The Power of News* (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1995): 169-188; J. Tunstall, *Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996): 155-225; B. McNair, *Journalism and Democracy: An Evaluation of the Political Public Sphere* (London: Routledge, 2000): 1-13.
[394] See also C. Sparks, 'Introduction', in C. Sparks & J. Tulloch (eds), *Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standard* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000): 1-39.
[395] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 7.
[396] *Ibid.*: 8.
[397] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 19-22.
[398] See A. Accardo, *Journalistes Précaires* (Bordeaux: Le Mascaret, 1998). Bourdieu's account of cultural production emphasises the importance of individual insecurity or impermanence. Cultural producers such as journalists do not simply define what counts as valuable, but act so as to 'shore up' their insecure position in the relations of cultural capital. See also D. Wright, 'Mediating Production and Consumption: Cultural Capital and 'Cultural Workers'', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 56, no. 1 (Mar 2005). Wright argues that it is necessary to view the relation between cultural production and reception not as immediate, but rather as mediated by a complex set of factors which operate beyond instrumental strategy.
[399] This trend was mentioned by four interviewees.

practice.[400] While Bourdieu stresses the complicity of working journalists in these professional compromises, his framing of self-regulation in terms of 'symbolic violence' is not obviously different from theories of self-censorship which have been voiced for decades.[401] Perhaps the most significant divergence is Bourdieu's insistence on the unconsciousness (or pre-consciousness) of actors' complicity.[402] Systematic misrecognition instituted through the specific logic of practice of the field means that neither the 'victims' nor agents of violence are cognisant even of a symbolic economy,[403] let alone their dominated or dominating position within it.[404] The obvious rejoinder is that agents do reflect and are aware of the institutionalisation of exploitation; how and how well Bourdieusian methodology handles this apparent fact is dealt with in detail below. For present purposes it is useful to bear in mind Michael Mann's critique of neo-Marxist class theory, in which he makes the point that the working classes are well aware of their dominatedness and that to speak of misrecognition is both misguided and patronising.[405] In this regard, however, Bourdieu remains firmly on the more determinist side of the structure/agency debate, as was noted in Chapter 2.[406] He suggests that while journalists (and indeed any social actor, dominated or dominating) may be able to glean the effects of their organisation's position in the field's structure, they are *necessarily* unable to see the extent to which the relative weight of the institution for which they work weighs on them, that is, on their own place within the institution and their ability to affect it. It is only on this point that Bourdieu's analysis moves beyond the standard argument that market (and other) constraints limit journalistic practice and do so in a way which prioritises a particular political position. He hints, briefly, at the processes by which such constraints are instituted in individual practice –

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[400]Bourdieu's thoughts on the commodification of news in the press are perhaps best expressed in a commentary on the twentieth anniversary of *Libération*. P. Bourdieu, 'Libé vingt ans après': 39.

[401] For instance, E. S. Herman and N. Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).

[402] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*: 167.

[403] Poupeau surmises that since for Bourdieu the value of words and other symbols is not determined with recourse to some external standards of rationality, the explanation of their recognition in a field is to be located in the 'institutionalised circle of misrecognition which is the foundation of the belief in the value of a given discourse.' Poupeau, 'Reasons for Domination: Bourdieu versus Habermas': 80. Voirol argues that Bourdieu's account of symbolic misrecognition, and its institution of symbolic violence, is overly economistic. Voirol, 'Recognizing and Ignoring: On the Theory of Symbolic Violence'.

[404] The complicity which characterises symbolic violence is comparable to Gramsci's account of the manufacture of consent. See, for example, Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television': 184. Bourdieu, however, extends and in part rejects Gramsci's ideological approach by locating complicity in domination at a more embodied level.

[405] This argument has been presented most forcefully by E.P. Thompson and Michael Mann. See especially *Ibid.*; Wacquant, 'Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and Its Cracks': 110-2.

[406] See, for example, N. Garnham and R. Williams, 'Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Culture: An Introduction', *Media Culture & Society,* vol. 2, no. (1980): 222.

namely, the internalisation and increasing naturalisation of conditional structural configurations as practical knowledge.[407] Otherwise, *On Television and Journalism* satisfies itself with exposing the 'structuredness' of the field, leaving the mechanisms of its 'structuringness' undertheorised.

4.2.2 *L'Emprise du journalisme*

The issue of *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* devoted to journalism[408] mainly concerns itself with the internal logic of the journalistic field only insofar as it impacts on other fields. As such, Bourdieu disclaims the idea of journalism as a 'fourth power'.[409] He sets his sights instead on 'the influence which the *mechanisms* of a journalistic field more and more submissive to the demands of the market (readers and advertisers) exert first on journalists (and on journalist-intellectuals[410]) and then, and partly through them, on the different fields of cultural production: the academic field,[411] the judicial field, the literary field, the artistic field, the scientific field'.[412] Journalists have historically occupied a dominated position both in the economic field and the field of cultural production. Dominatedness is characterised by a relative lack in the modes of symbolic capital which are recognised by all agents in the field as legitimate, as well as an inability to impose an alternative form of symbolic capital as dominant in the field. In the cultural field academics, artists and writers have traditionally exercised a monopoly over dominant modes of capital, and over the authority to rule on what counts as such.[413] That said,

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[407] Garnham notes the similarity between Bourdieu's account of naturalisation and Durkheim's 'logical conformity'. Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television': 185.

[408] *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, no. 101-102 (1994).

[409] See, for example, J. L. Hulteng and R. P. Nelson, *The Fourth Estate; an Informal Appraisal of the News and Opinion Media* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

[410] On the rise of the journalist-intellectual in France, see especially L. Pinto, 'Le Journalisme Philosophique', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales,* no. 101-102 (1994).

[411] On the trend in France towards philosophical legitimacy being conferred by celebrity status, see especially *Ibid.*

[412] P. Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 3.

[413] Van Dijk presents account of journalistic discourse which is characteristic of the discourse analysis approach. Its broad conclusions are not expressed in vastly different terms to Bourdieusian analysis, but its scope is predominantly *ideological*: that is, there is no account of individuation or practical strategy. Van Dijk casts ideology as 'social cognition', which 'forms the basis of knowledge, attitudes and other more specific beliefs shared by a group'. He concludes that journalists as a group "acquire and use an ideology that consists of a self-schema that self-servingly defines them as people with special abilities, who professionally produce news and background articles in order to inform the public, by value standards such as objectivity, reliability and fairness, while being positioned independently between the public and

journalists also exercise a very particular form of domination insofar as they establish the acceptable means of public expression and one's ability to be recognised as a public figure. Journalists act as 'mystical guardians' of concepts such as 'news value', carrying with it power over the symbolic representation of other groups – 'mystical', because professional practice is structured in such a way as to shelter the field from social questioning of its own principles or conditions of possibility.[414]

Bourdieu's account of the journalistic field is informed by the political motive of defending a specific elite esotericism in the cultural sphere, a theme to which I return in the case study and subsequent chapters. His analysis is thus deployed towards examining *how* the structural constraints which dominate this field modify the configuration of power relations in a wide variety of fields. There is, historically, an opposition between journalism and the more rarefied fields of cultural production. Aside from questions of economic constraints, governmental and elite producers are in a position to exercise the authority concomitant with a monopoly on legitimate information.[415] Rhetorically, Bourdieu calls this monopoly:

> "...a weapon in the struggle in which they (the scientific, juridical and academic fields) are opposed to journalists and in which they try to manipulate information or the agents charged with transmission whilst the press on its side tries to manipulate the holders of information in an attempt to obtain an assurance of exclusivity."[416]

Bourdieu regards the potential for journalists to wield power beyond their own field as lamentable.[417] It may lead – and in his opinion, had already led – to a threat to the structures of authority and legitimation endogenous to specialised fields of cultural production.[418] It was noted earlier that various critics have concluded that Bourdieu's position is untenable insofar as it

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the elites, and having special access to the resource of information." See especially 'The Study of Discourse', in T. van Dijk, *Discourse as Structure and Process* (London: Sage Publications, 1997).

[414] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 7. See also Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television': 185.

[415] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 152-5.

[416] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 4. The increasingly strident tone of Bourdieu's writing during the last decade of his life is noted, for example, by W. Schinkel, 'Pierre Bourdieu's Political Turn?', *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 20, no. 6 (2003): 70-4.

[417] See also Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 41.

[418] "The journalistic field tends to reinforce the 'commercial' elements at the core of all fields to the detriment of the 'pure'. It favours those cultural producers most susceptible to the seduction of economic and political powers, at the expense of those intent on defending the principles and values of their professions." Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 70.

amounts to a defence of elitism.[419] It implies that some forms of domination are legitimate and that a member of an elite, whether it be an established artist or a Bourdieusian sociologist, has the absolute authority to determine which.[420] Bourdieu would not entirely disagree.[421] As a general rule, those who exercise domination over cultural capital operate at the pole of 'restricted' production, the diametric opposite of economically-driven mass market production. Bourdieu argues that the more a cultural producer is rich in the symbolic capital characteristic of a given field and exclusively integrated into the restricted market, the greater the inclination to resist market forces. Conversely, the more producers aim for the mass market, the more likely they are to collaborate with the powers that be – traditionally, the state, church and political party, and more recently the media. Given that resisting market forces is a *sine qua non* of the Bourdieusian political agenda, esotericism must be defended, and this amounts to a defence of the purity of institutionalised expert knowledge. Bourdieu's democratic caveat is that there should also be a *subsequent* de-esotericising of esotericism. Journalism's specific domination of the circulation of the capital inherent in 'publicness', and its increasing vulnerability to market forces, have the effect of introducing a specific form of capital – that defined according to economic success and popularity – to restricted fields of esoteric knowledge:

> "The journalistic field tends to reinforce the 'commercial' elements at the core of all fields to the detriment of the 'pure'.[422] It favours those cultural producers most susceptible to the seduction of economic and political powers, at the expense of those intent of defending the principles and values of their professions".[423]

This implies that domination exists in a plethora of forms, and that some sort of normative standard is required to establish if a given configuration or balance of dominations is legitimate or otherwise.

Bourdieu's antidemocratism at the point of cultural production (coupled with a call for the democratisation of access to the fruits of this restricted production) arises out of a critique of all authority gained through either economic capital or popularity (social capital). In the context of

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[419] See, for example, Marlière, 'The Impact of Market Journalism: Pierre Bourdieu on the Media': 205-6; Verdès-Leroux, *Deconstructing Pierre Bourdieu*; Garnham, 'A Personal Intellectual Memoir'.
[420] Webb labels Bourdieu's position 'almost a Frankfurt School denunciation of mass culture'. J. Webb *et al.*, *Understanding Bourdieu* (London: Sage, 2002): 192.
[421] See, for instance, Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 45.
[422] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 70.
[423] *Ibid.*

the contemporary cultural sphere it is a stand against the trend by which, both within journalism and the fields which are increasingly subject to its influence, legitimacy is increasingly based upon circulation rather than the internal standards by which cultural and political products were once judged.[424] What most concerns Bourdieu is that popularity is associated with a specifically *democratic* legitimacy.[425] A democratically legitimated market will thus pose in *political* terms what is essentially a problem of *cultural* production.[426]

Bourdieu's opposition to opinion-polling emanates from the same line of argument. A seemingly democratic process by which a direct relationship with voters is established, and disposes of those individuals or institutions politically or culturally mandated to propose solutions to social questions, whether they be newspaper editors or political parties.[427] Opinion polls erode the monopoly on the legitimate expression of public opinion previously held by 'experts', an anti-elitist move which may be seen as either democratic or destructive of politics. For Bourdieu, the political elite's loss of autonomy inherent in this challenge to its role as 'guardian of collective values' is reason enough to oppose the trend.

On science, Bourdieu's argument lends itself towards a critique of a relatively recent historical trend whereby scientific questions are answered by purportedly democratic recourse to public opinion. Bourdieu writes:

> "There are economic and cultural conditions of access to a clear scientific judgement and one cannot ask universal suffrage (or a survey) to solve the problems of science ... without annihilating in the same blow those same conditions of scientific production, *i.e.* the barrier at the entry which protects the scientific (or artistic) city against the destructive irruption of external principles of production and evaluation, which are unsuited and misplaced."[428]

(Bourdieu characteristically attaches the appendix that access to the *products* of scientific work should be democratised). Journalism, by dint of the economic logic which increasingly pervades

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[424] Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 43.
[425] This echoes the 'mediocracy' argument set out in Debray and Macey, *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France.*
[426] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 6.
[427] See, for instance, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 'On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason'. See also P. Champagne, 'The Law of Numbers - Measurement of Audience and Political Representation of the Public', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales,* no. 101-1 02 (1994).
[428] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 7.

it, is complicit in this development: it loosens the monopoly of the instruments of diffusion upon which the 'most advanced scientific or artistic research' depends.

Bourdieu also critiques the influence of journalism on the governmental political field, though with less vehemence than he reserves for journalism's desecration of the cultural sphere.[429] It is uncontroversial to assert that politicians must play the journalistic 'game', adopting the language and style necessary in order to project an effective public voice.[430] More contentious is Bourdieu's assertion that the reason for the influence of one on the other is a direct result of the fact that they are both 'very directly and very strictly' under the authority of 'the market and the plebiscite'.[431] There are certainly connections to be drawn, concerning the convertibility of capital between one field and the other and the extent to (and the processes by) which the terms of reference for recognising symbolic value in the journalistic field may produce effects in politics, and *vice versa*. A common generative structure would be sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of similarity in the sorts of domination in the two fields. However, Bourdieu's claim that it follows *logically* that similar structures produce the same subjection to market or popular forces is fallacious, whatever the extent of the observed trends in these two fields towards greater influence by the market (or polling) on professional practice.[432] The weakness in Bourdieu's argument is that observed similarities of trends in different fields are used to infer generative structures, on the basis of which postulation he argues that the observed similarities are hardwired into the social fabric and the conceptual framework of its actors. There may well be a case for claiming that the journalistic field is able to impose its structure on other fields. To suggest that there is a practical logic which necessitates this imposition of power relations is by no means implausible, but Bourdieu does little to address the validity of such a claim. The case study which follows offers a contribution to the debate about whether it is ever possible to demonstrate the validity of a claim of causality between discursive or field structures (or the generative logic which produced them) and observable social phenomena.

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[429] See Marlière, 'The Impact of Market Journalism: Pierre Bourdieu on the Media': 204-5.
[430] See, for instance, J. Corner and D. Pels (eds), *Media and the Restyling of Politics* (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2003): 1-17.
[431] Bourdieu implies that the principles of authorisation which apply to the market and the plebiscite are effectively identical. Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 53.
[432] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 7.

4.3 The Journalistic Field as a 'Structured Structure'

It is possible to construct a more definitive account of the journalistic field which, while absent from Bourdieu's writings on the media, may defensibly be called Bourdieusian. The remainder of this section will develop such an account by constructing the fields of British journalism and of war correspondence in particular as objects of Bourdieusian field analysis on the basis of the analytical guidelines presented in *Invitation* and *Outline*. This will proceed by examining the 'structuredness' and 'structuringness' of the journalistic field. The 'structuring' dimension of the field is simultaneously the most important and most difficult aspect of Bourdieusian field analysis to apprehend, and is the subject of extensive elaboration below. However, it is relatively straightforward to describe the 'structuredness' of the field by extrapolating from works such as *On Television and Journalism* and *L'Emprise du journalisme* through the mediating lens of Bourdieu's methodological works.

To characterise journalism as a field in the Bourdieusian sense is to assert, first, that journalism is structured according to a praxeological system, and second that this system is endogenous to journalism to the extent that the logic and practice of journalism may reasonably be called 'relatively autonomous'.[433] Together, the two propositions invoke the characteristic 'rules of the game' by which journalism operates. When Bourdieu characterises the French broadcast media[434] as relatively autonomous, he is claiming that it is internally coherent, that is, that it has a structured set of internal laws.[435] I would contend that this is not a methodological conceit deployed to establish the field as if it were a self-contained, discrete entity.[436] Rather, it means simply that what happens within a field cannot be apprehended by looking only at external factors. The upshot is that to make sense of the logic by which, say, TF1 or *The Times* operates – that is, the logic which in a sense produces it and which it continues to institute or *enact* – it is

[433] *Pace* Adorno. See D. Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (London: Hutchinson, 1980): 81. See also Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 32.

[434] Bourdieu consistently argues for the applicability of the principles of field analysis across different sites of cultural production and geographical contexts; Champagne uses the French context to demonstrate similar principles of journalistic fields internationally, in P. Champagne and D. Marchetti, 'The Contaminated Blood Scandal: Reframing Medical News', in R.D. Benson and E. Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 113-134. Benson suggests that international comparison demonstrates the need for modifications to the Bourdieusian model in R. D. Benson, 'Mapping Field Variation: Journalism in France and the United States', in R.D. Benson and E. Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

[435] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 75.

[436] A series of such allegations is presented in a dialogue with Bourdieu in Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*: 79.

necessary to take into account more than who owns it and who are its chief advertisers.[437] Ideally, one would grasp the 'totality of the objective power relations that structure the field'.[438] In practice, one would need to establish what the observed nature of TF1 or *The Times* owes to its location in a finite universe of objective relations between competing networks, different media and so on. This relational situating would include such factors as the relative weight given to advertising, market share and the collective symbolic capital of its columnists and other high-status journalists.[439] While inter-field relations and the place fields occupy within the broader field of cultural production and the metafield of power are important, it is necessary in the first instance to identify entities in terms of their intra-field positions. Similarly, we may characterise individual journalists in exclusively positional terms. 'The journalist' is a symbolic form which has no solid existence beyond its social and professional recognition as real. What exists are journalists, recognised as such, who differ by sex, age, medium, affiliation, education, reputation and so on.[440]

Several questions suggest themselves. At what point does a journalist become inculcated with the operating principles of the journalistic field? Is a more experienced journalist to be assumed to have assimilated and naturalised these principles more completely, to have taken on the journalistic position more wholly?[441] From Bourdieu's writings on the academic world, the answer is unequivocally affirmative. At the same time, however, it is important not to overstate the difference between being in a field and not being in a field, or for that matter having been in a field for a few years and a few decades. There is for Bourdieu a collective habitus which unites all actors in a field. This is not to say that all journalists 'think the same', but instead that they share a common logic which generates all the various dispositions, professional ethics, political viewpoints and so on in a field. Further, there must be a substantial amount held in common between the habitus which 'produced' the would-be journalists as they were socialised, in order for journalism or a particular speciality to be an option to them, for them to have considered it as a potential strategy, and for them to have succeeded to some degree in the arena. Some basic,

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[437] See Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 45.
[438] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 40.
[439] Marlière, 'The Impact of Market Journalism: Pierre Bourdieu on the Media': 200. See also Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 33.
[440] Bourdieu, *On Television*: 23.
[441] See also L. Boltanski and G. Burchell, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). While this thesis is concerned with Bourdieusian field theory rather than recent military conflicts as such, Bourdieu's own view of the first Gulf War was that is constituted 'drunken war-mongering'. K. Zamiti, 'Adieu aux armes: Sociologie Des Sociologues', *Peuples Mediterranéens,* vol. 58-9 (January-June 1992).

hypothetical generative logic is assumed as common to all journalists, though the influence of age, amount and range of journalistic experience, and exposure to other fields, are all to be taken into account. Bourdieu's emphasis on the temporal aspect of strategy extends from the microscopic level of individual instances of practice to the long-term acquisition of dispositions or 'personalities'; the latter is brought visibly to bear in works such as *Distinction* and *Homo Academicus*.[442]

As a relational field of forces, journalism is characterised by constant, permanent relations of inequality. Domination is a given; what changes over time is the state of play of competition over the means of domination between journalists. As a social space, the journalistic field is the locus in which actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field in its current state.[443] The power at their disposal defines their relative position and, subsequently, the strategies available to them.[444] 'Competition' is conceived as a naturalised pursuit for finite symbolic resources. Actors do not necessarily compete against each other personally or consciously, though one effect of symbolic violence is the apparent embodiment of a certain configuration of capital by an individual such that that individual comes to be seen to personify that capital.[445] Whether or not it is defensible to characterise all behaviour as competition,[446] self-identification, interaction and the imputation of meaning to the products of the cultural field will all be governed by its internal laws. As far as concerns the behaviour of individual journalists, we may say that there is a set of 'autonomous principles', a consciously acknowledged professional code of conduct, by which actors in the field describe their professional practice and justify their existence and value to the public. There are, to be sure, several contestable codes of journalistic practice. According to the UK Press Complaints

[442] Vandenberghe further develops the use of 'personal biographical trajectories' in post-structuralist methodology. Vandenberghe, 'The Real is Relational': 54.
[443] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 82-3.
[444] Bourdieu's specific use of the terms 'competition' and 'strategy' are derived from his account of habitus which, through its generative and adaptable characterisation, allows us to account for the practical elaboration of strategies without having recourse to some particular strategic calculation. See Poupeau, 'Reasons for Domination: Bourdieu versus Habermas': 76-7.
[445] Bourdieu's argument on personification is largely derived from Weber's sociology of religion.
[446] For Bourdieu, struggle is the defining characteristic of a field: "...when we speak of a field, we are saying that what can be constituted as a system [in the sense of the Russian formalists] for the sake of analysis is in fact the product of permanent conflict." Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 33-4. See also Berard, 'Dada between Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy and Bourdieu's Distinction: Existenz and Conflict in Cultural Analysis': 145. I return to the question of whether there is an overstatement of strategy in Chapters 5 and 6.

Commission's code of practice[447] these principles comprise, in broad terms, a commitment to accuracy, freedom of speech, the public's right to be informed, accountability, unbiased reporting, autonomy or independence from undue influence and the non-coercive treatment of sources.[448] Pivotally, the use of ethical standards endemic to the field does not offer a means by which the journalist may limit the domination she exercises or to which she is subject. It was noted in Chapter 2 that, in the first instance, ethics are to be constructed solely as practical strategy; that the content of ethical systems may be considered meaningful in itself emerges as a subsequent, normative question. Professional pressures which are experienced subjectively as ethical interdictions are in fact, that is in terms of the objective structures of the field, *solely positional* factors. The journalistic field is the social space in which a specific cultural model is imposed on actors through a 'system of overlapping constraints and the controls that each of these brings to bear on the others'.[449] It is respect for these constraints and controls that establishes reputations of professional morality. Any journalistic code of ethics is thus constituted practically, and that practice is informed by the specific structure of the field. Bourdieu notes: 'As a sociologist, I know that morality only works if it is supported by structures and a mechanism that give people an interest in morality'.[450]

The assignation of meaning to cultural production – here, what counts as *news* – is also constituted relationally according to the praxeological structuredness of the field as a whole. The 'raw' information of the event – what happened, where and when – is inseparable from its reception. What is to journalists the more salient information is whether something is worth reporting, which angle to focus on, and what a report's perceived value is anticipated to be. These symbolic values are entirely field effects. That is, what counts as news is a product of the interaction between journalists and editors, rather than some universal or extra-discursive criteria of newsworthiness. Further, these connections between journalists, editors and other field actors

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[447] Press Complaints Commission, *Newspaper and Magazine Publishing in the U.K.: Editors' Code of Practice*, ratified by PCC, London, 7 August 2006.

[448] These were the universals cited by a majority of interviewees in the case study. Marchetti lists the main techniques of journalism generally as "resourcefulness, rapidity, brashness, ability to get there first, independence vis-à-vis sources". D. Marchetti, 'Subfields of Specialized Journalism', in R.D. Benson and E. Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 67. McNair argues that no such universality applies, as each media outlet has a distinct definition of newsworthiness. McNair, *News and Journalism in the UK*: 40.

[449] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 41-2.

[450] *Ibid.*: 50. Bourdieu has been criticised for prioritising the sociological over the ethical: see, for instance, T. M. S. Evans, 'Bourdieu and *The Logic of Practice*', *Sociological Theory,* vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1999). An appropriate Bourdieusian response is to argue that the sociological and ethical are not opposed or exclusive, but that ethical norms are necessarily posited in the practice of sociology.

remain hidden to the readers of newspapers, if only because of the oft-cited maxim that only journalists read all the papers. As Bourdieu observes: "to know what to say you have to know what everyone else has said".[451] This is not to attribute a privileged power to journalists or to suggest that journalists are in a position to be aware of the structuredness of their information-gathering and the resulting homogeneity of the field. In fact, journalists tend to overstate the differences between newspapers or television networks. More accurately, perhaps, the differences of which they speak (who got the story first, who got the angle 'wrong', who got the exclusive interview) are irrelevant to most news consumers. The perceived best managers, editors and journalists, Bourdieu argues, are those for whom all significant information – the best personality to embody an opinion or event, the right angle – is obvious, he who is 'perfectly adapted to the objective exigencies of his position'.[452] It is this embodiable, highly adaptable code which dictates what is given to constitute news, how it is reported and gathered, and whose opinions are recognised as legitimate and authoritative.[453] There is no law set in stone. Journalists are in a sense free to form whatever opinion they will and to pursue any strategy conceivable. But each knows, or instinctively anticipates, that he will be judged according to the standards of the field.

So while objective positions in the field are by definition different,[454] a distinct lack of variety characterises both the press and television news. According to Bourdieusian theory, any observed uniformity in journalistic output or personality will inevitably mask, in a systematic fashion, more originary structural inequalities. These inequalities are the subject of the chapters which follow, and should be distinguished from the overt principles of division which characterise any Bourdieusian field. The journalistic field, like all fields of cultural production, is marked by an opposition between restricted and mass production. Bourdieu argues that, in the French context, the fundamental opposition which marks the print media field has not changed significantly since the nineteenth century. This structure is based around the opposition between those papers which offer above all else *news* [*nouvelles*], preferably sensational, and papers which give priority to thoroughness, analysis and commentary so as to emphasise their

[451] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 5.
[452] See especially Dreyfus and Rabinow, 'Can There Be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning?': 38.
[453] Legitimacy is inextricably connected to symbolic violence. "An institution, action or usage which is dominant, but not recognised as such, that is to say, which is tacitly accepted, is legitimate." P. Bourdieu, *Questions De Sociologie* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1980), in Moi, 'Appropriating Bourdieu'.
[454] Bourdieu writes that 'to exist is to differ' (in P. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production, Or: The Economic World Reversed*: 170), a statement of relationalism which marks a clear adjacency to the double meaning of Derrida's 'différance': that is, to exist is both to differ and to defer.

distinction to the former category 'by grandly affirming the values of objectivity'.[455] The social space in which the newspaper journalism field is located is thus a place of opposition between 'two logics and two principles of legitimation'.[456] These two principles are peer recognition, accorded to those who embody most completely the values or internal principles of the field, and recognition by the largest number, manifest in circulation figures and subsequent access to profitable markets such as book publishing, broadcasting and public speaking.[457] The first logic, determining what is regarded as professional honour, is manifest overtly as the journalistic code of conduct. It is also internalised as a sort of 'journalistic personality' by which an actor 'naturally' or 'instinctively' knows how to ascribe a value or particular angle to an event or article. The second is said to be expressed through a mindset which 'thinks', or more accurately, unconsciously anticipates, by way of categories such as 'it sells well', 'this will go down well with readers' and so on.[458] These examples are not journalists' reflective analyses of stories, but the 'natural' disposition of one who works at the commercial pole of journalism.

It was established earlier that Bourdieu explains this opposition largely in terms of *autonomy* from one or other of the organising principles of a field.[459] Autonomy theoretically could denote independence from economic forces *or* from peer review. In Bourdieu's worldview, though, it is a thoroughly normative category indicating an actor's ability to act according to a noble esoteric principle in the face of market demands.[460] The autonomy of a newspaper will depend upon its market share and the concentration of its advertisers. An autonomous paper is by implication one which operates at the pole of restricted production, the position furthest removed from that at which economic capital is absolutely dominant.[461] The autonomy of an individual journalist is determined in the first instance by the extent to which press ownership is concentrated (with implications for job security), by the position the paper on which she works occupies in the larger space of newspapers (that is, its relative position between the 'market' and 'intellectual' poles), and by the journalist's position within the news organisation – whether she is freelance or salaried, the level of the salary (resorting to producing 'potboilers' to supplement salary is cited as an example of loss of autonomy), her seniority and so on.[462] The type of articles produced will

[455] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 5.
[456] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 70.
[457] *Ibid.* See also Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 52-8.
[458] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 5.
[459] *Ibid.*: 4.
[460] Wacquant, 'Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and Its Cracks': 111.
[461] Or 'the field of large scale production'. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 125-31.
[462] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 5.

also influence the level of autonomy possible. Bourdieu notes that popularisers of science or economics are particularly dependent on other sources of authority. The scope for autonomy among war correspondents will be considered in the case study.[463]

This opposition is, without a doubt, overly simplistic. As a methodological tool it may help to conceive of the field in terms of this opposition, though it is easy to slip from this sort of conceptual model to a map of the existing journalistic field in which the tabloid with the largest circulation 'naturally' takes up residence at one extreme, the most 'weighty' broadsheet at the other. Certainly Bourdieu is guilty of this slippage in his limited analysis of the French media, and this may be explicable by his clear antipathy to the sensationalising tendencies of all sectors of the press in France.[464] Actors within the field are predicted to betray a belief in the opposition inherent in the field to an extent that in fact exaggerates the actual opposition in the field's objective structures, since this is how their distinction is constituted. Interviews conducted for the case study reveal a more complex picture. While distinctions are drawn, not all differentiation is made on the basis of the principles of distinction conventionally attached to mass versus restricted circulation, or sensationalising versus serious news. Within the field, the British tabloids are regarded not so much cynically as sensationalising *and therefore worthless* by 'rigorous' journalistic standards, but as sensationalising and *as such* subject to different criteria for judgement. Several elite journalists and editors for broadsheet newspapers betrayed a view, whether consciously or implicitly, that tabloid journalism is a separate artform altogether and as such requires its own critical standards. Tabloid articles can be (and are) described as 'brilliant', 'wonderful', 'terrible' and so on, on the basis of wholly professional values which are not accounted for in Bourdieu's analysis.

In fact, I would argue that it is the lack in the field of a uniform system of peer review according to 'journalistic values' which most seriously undermines the relevance of Bourdieu's account of cultural reproduction to the case of the press. While it might be argued that fields of cultural production are inevitably subject to economic forces, it is readily demonstrable that the journalistic field differs from the scientific field, at least, insofar as it lacks a clear system of

[463] The rise of digital media has also necessarily reshaped the relative positions (and thus possible position-takings) of the journalistic field, both as a professional social space and a site of cultural production. See, for example, J. N. Davis, 'Power, Politics, and Pecking Order: Technological Innovation as a Site of Collaboration, Resistance, and Accommodation', *Modern Language Journal,* vol. 89, no. 2 (Sum 2005); also E. Klinenberg, 'Convergence: News Production in a Digital Age', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* vol. 597 (Jan 2005).

[464] He criticised *L'Indépendant* on several occasions for its publication of scare-mongering articles.

censure for transgression of the principles of the field.[465] Bourdieu suggests that falling foul of journalistic standards – falsifying sources, making unfounded predictions – would result in a loss of symbolic capital through negative peer regard or, more diffusely, a lowered level of the perceived authority held by a quality paper. On the other hand, in a field or a particular subsection in which symbolic capital is accrued primarily through circulation, there is little to be lost through being ill-informed or ignored by one's peers. That is, there is little translation of transgression into negative capital. While neither of these principles is implausible, it would be simplistic to allege that they do in fact describe the current state of affairs in the media: for instance, that because the tabloids rely solely on economic capital, journalistic standards do not count. However, a model which could properly account for niche markets, describing the power or authority inherent in very specific configurations of different types of capital, may offer a useful explanation of recent phenomena in journalism. I would argue that the simple economic/prestige model offers only a partial explanation of the impunity with which journalists can speculate about or anticipate events on the basis of evidence which is, by historical journalistic standards, insufficient: the lack of either professional indictment or loss of prestige in the case of the premature false declarations of the 2000 US presidential election result by both 'quality' and mass-audience broadcasters is a striking example.[466] It is thus possible that a newspaper associated with a specific brand of journalism (one of 'plain-speaking' or 'speaking for the common man') will succeed or fail not according to a criterion of factual accuracy but on its association with a recognisable moral stance.[467] While Bourdieu's model of the field can conceive of variegated forms of capital and their translatability or insularity, it is not well-equipped to account for niche markets of specific capital beyond (but often convertible to) the standard concepts of prestige and profit. The *Sun* has managed to farm a very specific form of capital distanced from traditional journalistic standards (and thus impervious to the sanctions imposed on transgressing that code), translatable into economic capital yet not exclusively determined by the pursuit of economic success and the sort of cultural production that, in Bourdieu's model, goes along with it. While it has been argued that the paper exists solely for the financial benefit of Rupert Murdoch, the cluster of political positions by which it is very easily identifiable suggests a more complex profile of economic, social and cultural capital. This

[465] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 53.
[466] Webb *et al.*, *Understanding Bourdieu*: 185.
[467] Piers Morgan's resignation from the *Mirror* after the publication of inauthentic images of torture in Iraq is a counter-example.

is crystallised by a projected self-image of anti-elitism and anti-authority, an identity which I argue in Chapter 5 in part characterises a more widespread journalistic disposition.

To address a technical point, the preceding comments are not intended to suggest that it is possible for a paper (or individual) successfully to embody the configurations of capital characteristic of an objective position in a field so completely as to enjoy a complete monopoly on that capital configuration and to be impervious to the sanctions that affect other positions in the field. The position the *Sun* occupies is contested and the forms of capital it seeks to accumulate and ideally embody are also sought by rival publications. That said, it remains clear that Bourdieu's model needs to be augmented if it is to be able to offer insightful analysis into a diverse range of categories and subcategories of capital, and to be able to speak of objective positions in a field as representing complex yet specific and identifiable permutations of these capitals. It will be seen in the case study that it is possible within Bourdieusian methodology to construct a structural explanation of a more complex range of values, and that it is not necessary when faced with a multifaceted regime of professional standards and values to reject the method of reconstructing the generative logic of a structured and structuring field. Carrying out field analysis, like other means of establishing verifiable significance, simply requires the social scientist to establish the number of degrees of freedom appropriate for the balance of clarity and meticulousness sought.

Now, in articulating what is now broadly accepted as the Bourdieusian methodological programme, most forcefully in *Outline* and *Invitation*, Bourdieu is at pains to point out that any analysis which satisfies itself with such a structural mapping as I have presented here is, essentially, missing the point. The relational structure is a methodological construct; it has no objective reality in and for itself.[468] Positing this structure is only the first methodological step. It is a sociological tool which may be deployed towards the study of the primary 'object' of Bourdieusian analysis. This is the generative logic which produces the field and which, though its constitutive relation with the habitus of its agents, generates (through a finite array of choices and a specific way of anticipating future events) modes of practice which entrench that logic. The end of this chapter assesses how the *structuring* aspect of the field can be conceived, inferred and interpreted; Chapter 5 establishes which logics are posited by a Bourdieusian analysis of the field of war correspondence, and with what limitations and implications.

[468] Kauppi, *French Intellectual Nobility*: 46.

4.4 On Reflection and Agency in Field Methodology

First, however, it is necessary to assess the methodological status of the agency of individual actors in the journalistic field. It was noted above that Bourdieusian field analysis may be interpreted as precluding the possibility of meaningful, which is to say objectively critical or politically directed, reflection by agents on their own subjective experience.[469] A standard response to invocations of unconscious assent to domination and systematic misrecognition of coercive symbolic economies is simply to suggest that journalists, academics, scientists and so on are only too aware of the constraints under which they work, of the dominance of market forces and of the hollowness of the pursuit for symbols of professional success which are held by agents to be valueless as anything other than career markers. Bourdieu's rejoinder, often implicit, is that while reflection does occur it cannot be properly critical, which is to say revealing to the level that the sociological analysis can be.[470] The whole system of relations is predicated on the necessity of effective arbitrariness and structured, structuring domination remaining unknown and unknowable. Reflection may produce a degree of self-awareness, though it is always possible that the form the reflecting process takes will usually mask and reinforce deeper, pre-reflective structures by causing other fundamental questions not to be asked and by establishing contingencies as absolutes.[471] This contention has sparked a range of attacks on Bourdieu's theoretical recourse to insidious power relationships and unidentifiable microstructures. Garnham suggests that what Bourdieu seeks to account for through generative structures could in fact be explained by the fact that people are, at base, risk averse – and for sound, rational, historically supported reasons.[472] However, Bourdieu's point is not merely to respond to consciously, inexpertly arrived-at revelations by invoking ever-deeper, increasingly unknowable structures. Bourdieu's intention is rather to demonstrate that the process of reflection, whatever the subjective experience may be, has a *practical function*,[473] and that it will

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[469] L. McNay, 'Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity', *Theory, Culture & Society,* vol. 16, no. 1 (February 1999b): 100.
[470] Hamel, 'The Positions of Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Touraine Respecting Qualitative Methods': 9.
[471] Hamel notes that Bourdieu's position in this regard is adjacent to that of Giddens, who argues that "any social agent has a high degree of knowledge which he invokes in the production and reproduction of daily social practices, but the greater part of this knowledge is practical rather than theoretical". *Ibid.*: 10.
[472] Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television': 183. See also B. Sparrow (1999), *Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press).
[473] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 52-3.

tend always towards instituting a certain set of relations of meanings attributed to words, as much as of groups of actors, more firmly at the practical, unthinking level. For instance, the bulk of journalists are keenly aware of the economic constraints on their professional practice, from salary levels and job security to problems surrounding concentration of ownership, advertisers and so on'; four made a point (without prompting) of emphasising that journalism is first and foremost an industry. But what is masked in the journalistic discourse is the symbolic capital which attaches to a lack of interest in either power or financial gain, manifest as a form of 'underdog status'. Bourdieu would argue that there is an economy of disinterestedness. That is, actors in the journalistic field (and other fields of cultural production) have an interest in being dismissive or ironic about wealth; and decisively, the misrecognition of this economy is reinforced by actors' own insight into the iniquities of the field. This does not render those subjective observations wrong. Subjective insight does, however, serve a practical purpose which it itself cannot reveal.

In a 1997 interview Bourdieu was asked directly if he believed that media professionals are really blind to the mechanisms of their field. He answered in the negative, though quickly added, suggesting that the question was missing the point, that actors in the journalistic field have a 'dual consciousness'.[474] This consciousness comprises 'a practical view which leads them to get as much as they can, sometimes cynically, sometimes without realising it, out of the possibilities offered by the media tool at their disposal', and 'a theoretical view, moralising and full of indulgence towards themselves, which leads them to deny publicly what they do to mask it and even mask it from themselves'.[475] In the interview Bourdieu offers a more caustic account of the multiple purposes of subjective reflection. He claims that dual consciousness allows the journalist to 'both condemn the objective description of their practice as a scandalous denunciation or a poisonous pamphlet, and say equivalent things out loud when speaking privately or even for the benefit of the sociologist who interviews them...'.[476] This response owes more to Bourdieu's personal antipathy towards journalists than to an aversion to self-critique *per se*. Bourdieu is well-known for being dismissive of subjective reflection. But it does not follow from his model that the process is inherently hypocritical. Indeed, Bourdieu has elsewhere expressed the view that subjective experience can be useful to the researcher if interpreted properly sociologically (rather than seen in isolation) insofar as it may point the

[474] Interview by P. R. Pires, originally published in *O Globo* [Rio de Janeiro]; reprinted in Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance*: 70-7.
[475] *Ibid.*: 70.
[476] *Ibid.*: 71.

researcher toward the misrecognised economy operating practically invisibly in the social space where the self-critique emerges.[477]

Self-reflection on the part of an actor in a Bourdieusian field is closely related to the tenability of agency in Bourdieusian theory generally. There is a palpable tension between Bourdieu's depiction of the field as a space of competition over what are essentially arbitrary constructions of value in a given profession,[478] and his overtly political stance which implies that a different economy of symbolic goods would be better. More frequently, he asserts that the existing structure of power relations is getting *worse*. This raises the question whether it is possible for networks of arbitrary signifiers (of 'newsworthiness', of journalistic 'success') to 'get worse' or to be improved through political activism. How, in short, is transformation conceived in the journalistic field? Garnham argues that Bourdieu's debt to Durkheimian cultural arbitrariness makes the idea of demonstrably productive change in the field untenable.[479] Heterodox thought emanating from within the field is necessarily the product of subjective reflection. Therefore it cannot be perceived as representation (accurate or otherwise) of concrete external reality, but only as 'the occupation of a symbolic space made available within the structure of a given field and defined purely in relation to other occupants of that field'. Garnham thus depicts Bourdieu's model as a futile game of musical chairs.[480] As for Bourdieu, the only productive, politically progressive change which can be envisaged is that the journalistic field is not allowed to colonise restricted fields of specialist cultural production. As ever, there is little hope of the internal workings of the journalistic field changing for the better, thanks to its near-complete capitulation to the logic of the market.[481] I would argue that it is possible within a Bourdieusian

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[477] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 119-20.
[478] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 195.
[479] N. Garnham, *Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the Economics of Information* (London: Sage, 1990): 76. In Bourdieu's own words, "the would-be most radical critique always has the limits that are assigned to it by the objective conditions", quoted in Moi, 'Appropriating Bourdieu': 1027. Garnham goes on to argue, however, that critical discourses do not simply remain derivative or marginal in relation to the material and practical conditions which enable them to come into existence, but come to produce material and practical effects in their own right – and it is for this reason that critical discourses can be seen as transformative practice.
[480] Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television': 184.
[481] Bourdieu follows a Marxist line of argument, to the effect that cultural fields are *alienated* because of the transformation of cultural production towards the commodification of culture. This alienation suggests alienation *from* some essence or ideal – unBourdieusian as the notion is – and in *Contre-feux* [the published output of the 'Raisons d'agair' activist group] this essence is the field's 'inalienable ideals', to which field members retain a strong commitment through the durability of the habitus. However, this space for resistance extends only so far as members of the artistic and intellectual communities resisting the rise of journalism. Journalists are implied to have 'capitulated' so completely as to have lost all identification with any 'noble' role for the profession. P. Bourdieu, *Contre-feux: Propos pour servir à la*

framework to make judgements about the state of the journalistic field and how it could be positively transformed. It is possible because one can within Bourdieusian parameters characterise the 'journalistic game' not as entirely arbitrary, but a particular instance of the range of possible symbolic determinisms of the generative structures of the field, structures which have their basis in the objective differences of the field. The contemporary journalistic field is not a singular determination of the material foundations, nor is it an undistorted, non-complicit representation of that world. There is no one-to-one correspondence between the 'news' and the objective world that it describes – since that world (also) is posited as an object of knowledge by the symbolic system which characterises the journalistic practices of finding and making meaning of events. But this does not amount to the proposition that the symbolic system underpinning journalism is entirely disconnected from an objective reality – and as long as there are competing versions of representation, it is defensible on normative grounds to establish (contestable) criteria by which to compare. Normative arguments about the state of the journalistic field are valid, then, because there are political implications in acting as though all possible alternative realities are equally arbitrary. Bourdieusian generative structuralism is in part motivated by the norms of autonomy and contestability, and these norms are compatible with a philosophical model which sees extant symbolic systems neither as arbitrary nor simply determined but as systems whose development is reasonable (rather than inevitable). Finally, since the Bourdieusian approach attempts to describe the everyday experience as ordinary of a field's political structures, then agents' reflections may well be useful – though only if analytically constructed through the double epistemological break described in Section 1.5.

4.5 Constructing the Journalistic Field as a 'Structuring Structure'

The previous section established that Bourdieu did not to develop a generative structuralist analysis of journalism complex, coherent and methodologically defensible enough to amount to an insightful explanation of the logic of the journalistic field and its reproduction, the multifarious forms of capital circulated within the field, and the symbolic economies systematically recognised in professional journalistic practice. Bourdieu offers an account only of the structuredness of the field which, as has been seen, needs to and can be developed within

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résistance contre l'invasion néo-libérale (Paris: Editions Liber, 1998e), published in English as *Acts of Resistance;* also Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme': 5.

the constraints of Bourdieusian theory if it is going to result in a significantly insightful account of journalism. Absent from Bourdieu's writing on journalism is a substantive account of the *structuring* aspect of the field. It is thus the conceivability of the *reproduction of journalistic* habitus, which is to say the possibility of developing a working hypothesis of how the field achieves its structuring effect (as well as being structured) through practice, which is the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

It was noted previously that journalism readily conforms to Bourdieu's characterisation of fields of cultural production.[482] Further, there is no *prima facie* characteristic of journalism which marks it out as categorically different from science, academia or art. On the whole it may be more directly influenced by market logic but it nonetheless has its poles of restricted and mass production, though it was argued above that there are other positions in the field recognised as distinct brands which are not easily locatable on this continuum. The level of specialisation of the knowledge it produces can be argued to be less than that of other fields, but it does exercise a monopoly on a particular kind of knowledge, and holds the authority (to determine what is public knowledge and which actors are public figures) which is the practical expression of that monopoly. It has the forms of symbolic capital one would expect in a field of cultural production: economic, bearing in mind the parallel, misrecognised, economy of 'underdog status', in which social capital is the chief currency; cultural, referring here to status as a moral authority and influence on other public figures and 'public opinion'; and social, comprising peer recognition, seniority and membership of any professional specialisations (lobby journalists, war correspondents, columnists for broadsheets etc). The same taxonomy applies at the institutional level. For newspapers, economic capital then refers to circulation and advertising revenues instead of individual salary; cultural capital to the public role embodied by the paper ('anti-establishment', 'voice of the people', etc); social capital, though the term is perhaps misleading, to the paper's relation to other papers and media – its perceived 'personality', its scope for setting the news agenda and its tenure of desired high-status journalists.

The case study is concerned with the methodological defensibility of a Bourdieusian analysis of a journalistic subfield, and the results will be used to assess the compatibility of Bourdieu's methodology and political philosophy. It aims to assess to what extent field analysis from the

[482] "...the system of objective relations between ... agents or institutions and as the site of the struggles for the monopoly of the power to consecrate, in which the value of works of art and belief in that value are continuously generated" Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 78. He goes on to include the scientific, judicial and journalistic professions as such fields.

gathering of data to conclusions about reproduction of habitus is valid (or validatable) and methodologically practicable. It will use observed data to establish what Bourdieu can tell us about journalism that other schools of thought cannot, as well as what implications specific steps in Bourdieusian analysis might have for Bourdieusian theory at large. A fully-fledged Bourdieusian analysis of the objective structures of the journalistic field would be a very large undertaking in itself, and would overwhelm the principal purpose of the thesis. The objective structure of the field (its structuredness, the first aspect of analysis) is conceptually straightforward, and there is little that is controversial in its construction. Theoretically, it would be possible first to establish the different forms of capital in the field. At the individual level, one could measure salary, seniority, prominence/frequency of articles in newspapers, peer recognition (either through direct questioning, name recognition or 'casual' reference in interviews or writing), career trajectory, public status (name recognition and opinions of a random sample of the public), influence on leaders of other fields (*e.g.* governmental politics) and professional awards. At the institutional level, we could measure circulation, level of advertising and profile of advertisers, public/professional status of senior journalists, demographic breakdown of readership, success in setting agendas for other media, influence on other fields (it would be feasible, for instance, to arrive at some measure of the *Sun's* influence on the Labour government in the period 1997-2001) and ownership. However, inasmuch as this concerns the *structuredness* of the field, it is not of central importance to this thesis.

Let us now turn directly to the more significant question of the generative, structur*ing* logic of the journalistic field. Power relations, forms of capital recognised as valuable, the terms of competition over capital and the individuals and institutions which come to embody specific characteristics all exist, in Bourdieusian terms, only insofar as they are instituted and reinstituted through practice. Practice is engendered by a *disposition to act* or respond in certain way, a disposition which is un- or pre-reflective (though potentially productive of reflection, as we have seen).[483] This practical disposition, adaptable to the entire range of conceivable events, is the effect of habitus. Habitus, in turn, is the generative logic which produces the set of dispositions endemic to the objective positions, conceived wholly relationally, to a particular field. Dispositions, and subsequently habitus, are reinforced or, more correctly, reinstituted through anticipation of likely outcomes of events, anticipation itself making more likely the occurrence

[483] Kögler argues that the focus on the pre-givenness of culture in particular, but by extrapolation social spaces generally, is derived from Mannheim. Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source': 141-3.

of those events[484]. That is, habitus, though the system of dispositions it engenders in a field, produces a finite range of strategies according to the objective positions of the field. This finite range produces an 'infinite' range of choices within a strategy – one can choose any conceivable option, though not what is conceivable, after all – and practice, strategically informed, will invariably reinforce dispositional strategy and hard-wire it at a more reflexive, bodily, 'natural' level. Bourdieu goes on to say that while strategy is a product of habitus it does not *necessarily* (though overwhelmingly) reinforce habitus and aid the misrecognition of the processes by which domination is exercised and extended, a possibility to which we will return.

The crux is that to describe the operation and reproduction of a generative logic, one needs to establish much more than the 'strategies' by which journalists anticipate likely outcomes and 'decide' how to act. As well as describing the competitions over capital in a field, the positions fought over, the manifestations of legitimacy and authority, we must seek to demonstrate that other economies are hidden by these struggles. That is, the goal is to detect what values, tendencies – in short, which dispositional characteristics – are instituted in a more self-evident, natural, or corporeal form by the observable struggle for capital. The aim must be to establish *systematic misrecognition of a symbolic economy* which produces or supports domination which in turn has real effects. To achieve this is not simply a matter of describing the symbolic violence operative in a field. It must be shown how observed patterns of practice contribute to this masking, and it must be shown that such masking is in some sense systematic. It would not suffice to conclude that whatever journalists choose of their own free will to do, they will inevitably reinforce a doxic paradigm. To be substantively revealing, it must be shown how the set of strategies available to a journalist, which is to say the journalistic disposition, is itself structured and produces structuring effects. Both the strategies available in a field and the political effects of strategic practice have, according to Bourdieu, a methodologically articulable form. To complete the picture, one needs to establish the logic which renders this institution and reinstitution systematic.

Translated into concrete terms, it will be necessary first of all to establish exactly what constitutes the different forms of capital in the journalistic field. This will involve an account of what amounts to authority, how it is recognised, how the 'embodiment' of capital in an individual or institution is conceived by actors, what are the terms of struggle or competition over capital or positions in the field, and how capital is recognised, transferred, transformed or

[484] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 218-20.

appropriated.[485] To determine which economies and political effects are thus rendered less visible, there are two options available. First, we may observe a particular form of domination existing in the field which is relatively stable and has some sort of coherent form, make the working assumption that there are reasons for this form, and work backwards to determine the candidate originary structures producing and insinuating this domination into routine, dispositional practice.[486] Second, we can look at the strategies open to actors, the options which must be weighed up in order to decide how to proceed in order to maximise one form of capital or another, and ask, after Bourdieu: by posing these particular questions, what questions are as a result not asked? Of course, an infinite number of questions are not asked: it is for the sociologist to determine which questions are silenced by the asking of questions engendered by the disposition which characterises a field. It will be seen that the question of how one becomes a 'good' journalist is one which is specifically obscured by the symbolic system through which journalists make sense of their professional world.

In the case study which follows, the relationship between generative logic, journalistic dispositions, individual strategies and misrecognition of symbolic economies is sought in the analysis of interviews with war correspondents and other actors operating in the 'field of war'.[487] Specific value judgements of various objective positions in the field, as well as particular types and configurations of capital, are elicited, so as to construct the relational structure and dominant forms of capital endemic to the field: that is, where different journalists, specialisations and news organisations are situated with respect to each other, and what properties are regarded as valuable. The style of these responses and the content and form of the narrative data generated by the interviews' open-ended stimuli will be analysed with the aim of determining the dispositional strategies deployed by the journalists. These are the 'unthinking', 'daytime' or practical philosophies which inform conduct. 'Linguistic capital', a product of professional experience but also deployable towards improved status, will also be considered.[488] The case study will question to what extent there is a certain manner in which journalists talk (given that

[485] Bourdieu does not articulate a detailed account of how these processes occur at the microscopic level.
[486] On routinisation, see Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 34.
[487] Benson and Neveu that this style of analysis, beginning with shared assumptions and common sense, and then seeking to account for individual differences, is adjacent to the 'new institutionalism' which social scientists such as Timothy Cook have applied to journalism. Benson and Neveu, 'Introduction: Field Theory as a Work in Progress': 11.
[488] Robbins defines linguistic capital in the Bourdieusian context as "that subset of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in particular contexts", necessarily reflecting the social conditions present during their acquisition. D. Robbins, *Pierre Bourdieu* (London: Sage, 2000a): 171. See also Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 55-7.

several interviewees speak of the stereotype of the 'gravel-voiced' war correspondent) and whether it can be shown to what extent mastery of this language is useful or necessary in succeeding in journalism.[489] It is immediately apparent that war correspondents do project a loosely common style of speech and perhaps of appearance. Whether this is due to unthinking practical 'strategies' or is instead explicable by mere exposure and familiarity remains to be determined.

In order to demonstrate the existence or otherwise of a relationship between habitus-produced individual strategies and the maintenance of structures of symbolic violence in the field, the interviews were analysed so as to catalogue what properties are natural, self-evident and irrelevant in the practice of a journalist. There is a limit to how much of what is self-evident is observable, as some level of self-evidence inevitably will be shared by the researcher. The main problem, however, seems to be not so much pointing to what is considered self-evident or what questions simply do not arise in the day-to-day practice of the journalist, but in establishing that a systematic masking is taking place, with specific effects. Again, there are two methods of arriving at such an account. The distinction between the two is not immediately obvious but, I would argue, it is significant. First, and in line with the methodology developed in *Outline* and *Invitation*, one can take the responses recorded in the interviews and establish those questions or lines of thought whose non-emergence logically follow.[490] Specifically, this means examining responses and determining, given that those utterances have occurred, what other responses would be subsequently inconceivable (at odds with the whole perceptual framework which generated the observed response), or substantially inconsistent, by which I mean categorically different (that is, using different perceptual categories) rather than merely ambiguous or contradictory in fact. This proves methodologically impracticable, since, while according to Bourdieu observed practices and speech acts have *reason*, this is not the same as saying that their emergence follows a law.[491] That is, while the sociologist should never be surprised at a particular utterance, and should always be in a position to explain why a statement makes sense

[489] "The essential point is that, when perceived through these social categories of perception, these principles of vision and division, the differences in practices, in the goods possessed or in the opinions expressed become symbolic differences and constitute a veritable *language*." Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 8.

[490] See especially Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 21; also Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*: 61-216.

[491] "They may conduct themselves in such a way that, starting with a rational evaluation of their chances of success, it seems that they were right in doing what they did, without one being justified in saying that a rational calculation of chances was at the origin of the choices they made." Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 76.

in a particular context, one cannot establish a logical chain leading to a statement's emergence or non-emergence.[492]

Second, one can take the approach implied by Bourdieu's normative position on the journalistic and other fields of cultural production. Instead of looking at what logically is precluded from expression (and, by extrapolation, conception), this method starts with the conviction that there are lines of thought which are not present in the choices available to actors but which, given the symbolic violence present in the field, *should* be thought.[493] It then seeks to expose what interests are served by this cognitive silence, and suggest mechanisms by which the silencing occurs. The two approaches may well amount to the same thing. For Bourdieu, certainly, it is precisely through logic of a specific kind that political effects are wrought. One must be careful, however, to be clear on what 'logic' means here. It is by all means possible that a specific logical system, an internally coherent, consistent set of values, will produce a certain political effect by its (necessary) exclusion statements and values inconsistent with it. I suggest that this is at the heart of a Bourdieusian methodology properly reconciled to its political commitments. This account of the mechanisms of the reproduction of domination, linked with the phenomenological materialism of the habitus theory, is certainly insightful. It is also indubitably political. There is a sense, however, that the Bourdieu of *Outline, et al.* would have us believe that an optimally disinterested sociological methodology, as a *logical* system *in the social scientific sense* to which Bourdieu adheres, can demonstrate in purely scientific terms the operation and political implications of logics endogenous to specific social contexts. I conclude that any results of such a Bourdieusian analysis rest to a limited extent on deontological claims, but that this is ultimately defensible.

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[492] See also P. Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy*: 83-5.

[493] The content of Bourdieu's emancipatory ethic is the source of much debate. Kauppi, for one, identifies Bourdieu with French republicanism. Kauppi, *French Intellectual Nobility*: 51. See also J. Vincent, 'The Sociologist and the Republic: Pierre Bourdieu and the Virtues of Social History', *History Workshop Journal,* no. 58 (Fall 2004): 135-37.

Chapter 5: Practical Strategy and the Misrecognition of Symbolic Economy: Case Study Results

Introduction

The case study methodology was developed within a Bourdieusian conceptual framework. This means that, rather than seeking to define a singularly definitive model of Bourdieusian methodology – there are many variations to Bourdieu's sociological analyses, after all – the questions asked in interviews and their analytic interpretation were generated within Bourdieusian principles. As a result, while it does not claim to be a comprehensive test of the coherence of putting Bourdieusian theoretical principles into practice, it can establish the commitments and implications of carrying out interviews and analysis in a Bourdieusian manner. Likewise, while it does not aim to present a full field analysis in the Bourdieusian sense – I note below that the scope of establishing the objective positionings of the field would overwhelm the aims of this thesis – it can reflexively ask at each stage of the research process, from interviews to primary coding to secondary coding to the generation of hypotheses and broader conclusions, what is necessitated, what is excluded and with what implications.

I thus began by asking interviewees for their professional histories: their reasons for entering the journalistic field, how they came to specialise in war correspondence (and equivalent questions for those working in governmental and military positions), which newspapers or broadcast corporations they had worked for (and in which capacity). This did not lead to the construction of an overall personal trajectory for each respondent, but the interviews did track in particular whether moves in respondents' careers were horizontal or vertical – whether, for instance, a reporter moved from one paper to another of similar symbolic status, working in a position of similar esteem or influence, or instead moved from a desk job to working in the field, or from writing copy to editing or writing comment pieces. The time period which the research spanned necessitated developing a 'snapshot' of the journalistic field, rather than developing a longitudinal account. As such, I elected to focus on individuation: what evidence there was of internalisation of discursive norms in self-presentation, and distinctions drawn between agents and their 'others', whether that be inside our outside the journalistic profession. This was not

done to develop an 'authentic' reconstruction of individual identities, but rather to determine which symbolic markers were collectively available to agents in articulating their own histories and their views of other actors and contemporary journalistic issues. A longitudinal analysis would have included an analysis of class habitus in the contemporary journalistic field, by tracking how the demographic profile of journalists changes from generation to generation according to parents' occupation and participants' education and accumulation of economic capital. The advantage of this case study is the analytic reconstruction of the symbolic systems by which journalists in general and war correspondents in particular make sense of their profession and its political and cultural contexts: that is, the symbolic criteria used to give reasons for what are potentially arbitrary distinctions between field positions, or the rationalisations or normalisations of objective, material differences. And since these symbolic systems are characterised in Bourdieusian terms as arenas of struggle over capital, they can properly be labelled symbolic economies. An interviewee's accumulation of cultural and social capital derives not only from professional seniority, but also in how professional success has translated into connections and achievements outside the subfield of war correspondence. Participants were thus asked, usually indirectly in response to an aside, about their activities in other media and their liaisons with academic and political institutions.

Establishing snapshots of individual actors, their position-takings and accumulated symbolic capital provided the groundwork for the first of two key analytical phases. This was conceived in phenomenological terms: to seek to make explicit the normality with which a working journalist experiences their professional life. In part this was achieved by asking participants to describe not the outstanding, dramatic moments of their careers, but the daily pattern of professional behaviour: collaborating, competing or socialising with other journalists, carrying out interviews and research, how they sent copy to their editors, the procedural or bureaucratic requirements of interacting with military personnel. Phenomenologically, this is less significant than but offers a first step towards constructing another aspect of the experience of normality: constructing the taken-as-given or common-sensical that which is too obvious or internalised to be articulable. It will be seen that determining, albeit cautiously, that which is effectively inconceivable – that whose emergence to consciousness is effectively impossible in a particular social or professional context – can have significant political implications.

It has been seen that Bourdieu extends the phenomenological model beyond the articulation of the given with the aim of describing agents' experience of being in the lifeworld. What Bourdieu emphasises is not the commonality of symbols of everyday life, but rather the commonality of

the principles of *differentiation* (or distinction) which agents use to distinguish symbolic and material forms. The advantage of Bourdieusian phenomenology is that it methodically constructs not merely taken-for-granted symbolic forms, but those taken-for-granted mechanisms which naturalise and reproduce hierarchies of domination and dominatedness. This formed the key analytical focus of the case study: determining which dominant principles of differentiation were held in common by all agents active in the field, which symbolic and material forms were 'instinctively' valorised and who was given to have the power to consecrate symbolic and material forms as meaningful – that is, who is thought to have control over determining what those principles of determination are. In terms of data collection this involved two strategies. The first was to construct a series of questions asking interviewees consciously to compare different journalists, modes of journalism and institutions. Again, this necessarily captures only a segment of the methodological target of 'natural distinctions', and active questioning may in any case overdetermine the responses given. The second strategy was to allow interviews to meander. This allowed for unforced descriptions of whatever came to an interviewee's mind, with an abundance of more or less spontaneous evocations of principles of differentiation which did not have to be articulated or explained, because they were experienced as entirely ordinary. It is the combination of these strategies which allow for construction of the most significant objects of Bourdieusian analysis: the collectively internalised and normalised principles of differentiation which reproduce hierarchies of power within the field, as well as between different fields and subfields, and which determine the gatekeeping mechanisms by which access to the field is regulated.

The empirical data of the case study consist of interviews with fourteen actors active in the field of war correspondence in the period 1990-2003. Eight of the interviewees were war correspondents, of whom five were journalists active in the British media, three in the American media; five worked in print media, three in broadcast journalism. There were six male and two female correspondents, and ages ranged from twenty-eight to late sixties. In line with the Bourdieusian principles, interviews were also conducted with two newspaper editors (one of whom had been a war correspondent previously), a US government official, a think tank president and a (retired) US Army general (who at the time of the interview also advised a think tank). Details are listed in Appendix 1. While the interview context inevitably structures the form and content of what is said to an extent, the semi-structured design allowed for talk which could be categorised not only in terms of the objects and opinions described, but also style, metaphors and, importantly, that which is spoken about as common sense, natural or

unremarkable.[494] The results were analysed in through discourse analysis using the QSR qualitative analysis software package. The coding framework is presented in Appendix 2, and was constructed in several stages. First, data was categorised by speaker, referent and quality ascribed. In the second stage speech styles (cynical, humorous, formal etc) were categorised, along with metaphors, irony, [495] euphemisms[496] and word order suggesting or masking agency. [497] Finally, potentially strategic statements were catalogued: these included speech acts which were contesting or decontesting, inclusive or exclusive, legitimating or delegitimating, naturalisations and statements of common sense (which may also be classified as decontesting), and 'domain expansions' (see below). The patterns with which these different levels of codes coincided or diverged were analysed as evidence of the structured and structuring (statements which decontest a referent, for example, are constructed as actively structuring), and the results are set out below.

5.1 Overt Currencies of War Correspondence

From the widespread use of phrases along the lines of 'knowing what journalism is about' and 'understanding what journalism is', it is clear that there is a set of 'rules of journalism' which are present to the consciousness of actors and are systematically recognised as legitimate.[498] These are not difficult to sketch, broadly combining principles typically listed in official codes of conduct, and less official rules for acting responsibly or honourably. They are present largely in

[494] The decision to conduct semi-structured interviews is based on the methodology used by Bourdieu in *La Misère du monde.* See also N. Mayer, 'The Interview According to Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Analysis of *La Misere du monde*', *Revue Francaise De Sociologie,* vol. 36, no. 2 (Apr-Jun 1995). Bourdieu calls sociological interviews 'provoked' and 'accompanied': 'provoked', because it takes place when requested by the sociologist in order to pursue the object of his or her study; 'accompanied', in that the interviewer both observes and participates in objectifying participant responses, as well as engaging in self-analysis. Hamel, 'The Positions of Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Touraine Respecting Qualitative Methods': 8. McRobbie criticises the methodology of *La Misère du monde* on the grounds that it ignores recent debates over methodology in the field of cultural studies, A. McRobbie, 'A Mixed Bag of Misfortunes? Bourdieu's Weight of the World', *Theory, Culture & Society,* vol. 19, no. 3 (2002).

[495] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 94-6.

[496] *Ibid.*: 80-5.

[497] *Ibid.*: 58-61.

[498] Bourdieu notes that "The paradox of the imposition of legitimacy is that it makes it impossible ever to determine whether the dominant feature appears as distinguished or noble because it is dominant *i.e.* because it has the privilege of defining, by its very existence, what is noble or distinguished as being exactly what itself is, a privilege which is expressed precisely in its self-assurance or whether it is only because it is dominant that it appears as endowed with these qualities and uniquely entitled to define them." Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 92.

the form of *in vivo* characterisations and what Bachelard terms the 'night-time' reflections of actors on their profession, though also detectable through examination of the patterns of referents, properties and speech styles in utterances of this type. While the normative content of a value judgement or characterisation is useful in establishing the relational structure of the field, for present purposes it is the binary of the criterion itself which is of interest, and this is as likely to be invoked in derogatory as in favourable iterations. The appendix contains a full list of categorisations used; the following summarises a few of the key overt differentiating principles of war correspondence.

The dominant criterion of *integrity* was most often expressed as *autonomy* or lack thereof, both from the military (as institution and individual actors) and from other journalists – most overtly, those operating in pools:

> Bottom line was that a lot of the press you know thought this was wonderful, because they were given backpacks and they were you know given chocolate chip trousers and jackets and all the fucking paraphernalia of military status … a lot of journalists love it, they love it, they get sucked in by the military, which is of course the idea. [Interviewee 5]

> I think he was tricked into becoming too close to the armed forces. [Interviewee 4]

The norm of *selflessness*, opposed to *egoism*, was invoked most often in the context of discussions of another clearly apparent norm, *adventurousness*, for example:

> …I have seen times when there's just a certain mentality in a war correspondent which is after self-glory, and cameramen as well. I mean, to really stand out from the crowd, you have to do the crazy thing. Like what's-his-name, the Telegraph guy who walked into the Falklands… [Interviewee 8]

This might be interpreted as a secondary distinction, made where the first principle of differentiation fails to operate as such as a result of its ubiquity. Alternately and, the data

suggests, more likely, selflessness/egoism is indicative of a struggle for domination over differentiating principles, in other words a *practice of delegitimating* adventurousness, emptying it of symbolic capital through reiteration and prioritising another principle of establishing integrity – 'selflessness', for example:

> I found it quite shocking, because his stupidity had meant this person's life. I don't like that and I've met other war correspondents who are more interested in telling you what they've done than the actual situation or what the local people are doing or suffering. [Interviewee 4]

'Substance' is a perpetual theme, differentiating the serious, the difficult, the unglamorous against the vacuous and showy:

> You know, some of 'em are more used to human interest stories and that shit, you know, 'cause that's what they're used to, it's all nice stuff about Private Johnny and his kids back home in Nebraska. [Interviewee 10]

> ...that's not a press issue, that's not the kind of thing that I think about, it's analysis, it's soundbites on television. What's my concerns is, what news editors' concerns are, reporters' concerns are news reporting, access to news, not whether someone calls this a quagmire on the editorial page. That is true, that is carried in newspapers and in all 24 hour cable channels, that is not news, that is thumb sucking. [Interviewee 3]

Differentiation by the criterion of substance is frequently carried by substantial metaphors such as 'grit', 'dirt', 'air' and 'fluff':

> But TV, fucking fluff monkeys. On TV all they want to do is put on familiar faces, instead of good journos. It's all about face time to them, so they put these fucking fluff monkeys out there. See with TV the standards are lower, and that's producers too, not just the journos. There's not as many of 'em, and they don't know anything. It's like you'll

> get a guy and it's like the most exciting thing he'd ever done was the floods in Chicago or something. [Interviewee 10]

Constructed second-order codings did, at the first level of inquiry, provide further evidence of the systematic or at least structured recognition of these principles. For instance, humour was used to convey substance/lack of substance, and autonomy/institutionalisation:[499]

> It'd be like, You got your gun? Check. Your gas mask? Check. Your reporters? [Interviewee 5]

The metaphor of tourism also serves the same purpose in many of the interviews:

> They were like, "We'll tell you if anything's going on, if you're especially nice to us we'll give you a trip so you can see something or other" [Interviewee 2]

> The authorities have organised an excursion to cover the protests... [Interviewee 6]

Cynicism, discussed below as symbolic capital in its own right, most often reinforces the symbolic currency of autonomy – if only through ironically stating its impossibility (I return to cynicism as a subset of disinterest in the secondary analysis of the case study below):

> ...you'll be reliant on briefings and on a few happily released pictures to keep the television people cheerful. [Interviewee 14]

> Those guys [the UN] used to water things down a lot. We'd like make bets over how watered down things were, the reports of bombs dropped by Nato. [Interviewee 13]

Finally, the norm of reportorial 'directness' or 'bluntness' appears in opposition to 'indirectness', 'embellishment' or 'floridness', most visibly through analysis of grammatical agency: chiefly, whether the word order of a sentence obscured or revealed the agent of an

[499] Bourdieu acknowledges research into the structuredness and strategic function of humour in the scientific field in Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity*: 23-5.

action.[500] The interviews with war correspondents (and also military officials) display a strikingly high level of overt grammatical agency in comparison to those with government officials and academics, where latent or contestable agency is prevalent. For example, correspondents were more likely overall to use a subject-verb-object syntax, such as the following:

> So the Americans were firing on them [Iraqi troops] from over there, behind the hill [Interviewee 5]

By contrast, this government press officer often used speech characterised by the passive tense, for example:

> There was an instance where the coverage of the killed and wounded coming back from a friendly fire incident was not allowed and facilitated. [Interviewee 7]

It would be speculative to draw broader conclusions about political as opposed to journalistic language based on these results; tentatively, it might be expected that any differences in professional habitus thus revealed would demonstrate the government official's role of speaking on behalf of an institution, rather than specific injunctions explicitly regulating speech acts. What remains relevant here is the demonstrable presence of syntax as a principle of differentiation, rather than the particular content thereof.

5.2 Bourdieusian Analysis of the War Correspondence Case Study

The previous section presented the case study data according to an analytical framework whose methodology and scope are characteristic of much contemporary media sociology.[501] The purpose of this section is to establish what insights a more thoroughly Bourdieusian analysis can furnish over and above traditional sociologies of professional media fields. This will be

[500] See Appendix 2 for a list of grammatical codes used.

[501] There are in the literature several examples of analyses of the collective construction and reiteration of journalistic standards through professional interaction, which do not then consider the second order implications, *viz.* hierarchical reproduction. See, for example, C. Campbell, 'Foreward', in T. Glasser (ed.), *The Idea of Public Journalism* (New York: Guildford Press, 1998): xiii-xxix. Also J. Carey, 'In Defense of Public Jorunalism', in T. Glasser (ed.) *The Idea of Public Journalism* (New York: Guildford Press, 1998): 49-66.

presented largely uncritically in the first instance. However, I subsequently consider the implications of the Bourdieusian method, in particular the assumption of coercive political structures prior to and productive of all agent reflection and political analysis, and the reluctance to consider agents' reflections and value systems (such as professional ethics) on deontological as well as generative structuralist terms.

Having established in the previous chapter the more overt rules or principles of differentiation of war correspondence which dictate the recognised relational structure of the field, this chapter posits two systematically misrecognised symbolic economies which dominate the reproduction of the field through structured modes of practice: economies of esotericisation (or mystification) and disinterestedness (or ambivalence). The discussion of the latter extends Bourdieu's work on disinterest in economic capital to symbolic capital. While there is evidence of disinterest in financial gain, it is predominantly expressed ambiguously, through ironic, cynical and self-deprecating language. This suggests that such statements are indicative of a broader performed disinterest in power and social status, which I argue is an effective mechanism for establishing a journalist's anti-elitist credentials – itself a potentially valuable form of symbolic capital. This analysis also raises questions about the possibility of critical self-reflection, and of the simultaneous existence of various fields informing individual practice, in Bourdieusian theory. Having assessed the tensions and limitations of the approach, the chapter concludes by presenting an articulation of what Bourdieusian field analysis can validly tell us about the field of war correspondence.[502] In the first instance, however, it is necessary to consider potential problems of ascribing relative autonomy to any field as a starting point of Bourdieusian analysis, given that autonomy is not pre-given but instituted and reinstituted in modes of practice which are themselves necessarily *strategic*. While this is the term that Bourdieu uses to characterise field practices, the subsequent analysis does not assume that – and indeed investigates whether – all practice is politically implicated.

[502] This case study focuses on the instantiation of field norms in individual practice, rather than an institutional analysis of media coverage of recent wars or an audit of media objectivity. As regards the Gulf War 1990-91, see especially W. L. Bennett and D. L. Paletz, *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), G. Philo *et al.*, *The British Media and the Gulf War* (Glasgow: Glasgow University Media Group, 1993).

5.2.1 Practice and the Relative Autonomy of the Field of War Correspondence

It was seen in Chapter 4 that for Bourdieu it is straightforward to postulate the relative autonomy of a professional field or subfield. Journalism is given in various texts as a distinct (if weakly autonomous) field within the metafield of cultural production.[503] For Bourdieu the relative autonomy of 'logical worlds' within this field is self-evident. He speaks of television journalists and popular science writers as examples of subfields characterised by their own peculiar logic, and, following Marchetti's delineation on Bourdieusian principles of other specialisations, it is inferable that war correspondence may be similarly defined.[504] By the relation between habitus and field developed in *Outline,* Bourdieu theorises that actors, being the determined but incomplete effects of field and enacting practical strategies towards the attainment of forms of symbolic capital endogenous to that field, will tend to anticipate and act in such a way as to entrench as 'natural' or 'common sense' the specific logic of the field and, by extension, its relative autonomy.[505] However, the double role of practice in Bourdieusian theory as both the enactment of individual strategy and field reproduction means that the priority of field autonomy cannot be assumed. In particular, it means that if practice produces field autonomy as much as practice is produced by its generative logic, we must construct those practices which speak or imply the autonomy of the field *strategically*; that is, we must examine the anticipatory dimension and potential field effects of 'field autonomy practices'. It is to this problematisation of the field-practice relation that we now turn.

It was seen in Chapter 2 that the characterisation of intention, reflection, reaction, instinct and so on as practical means that they are best characterised as non-voluntaristic, not wholly

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[503] See, for example, Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 33. Bourdieu notes here that even though the relative autonomy of journalism remains crucial even when it is weak. Also Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme'; Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance [Contre-feux].* Champagne, by contrast, writes of journalism's 'impossible', or at least eternally embattled, autonomy in P. Champagne, 'The "Double Dependency": The Journalistic Field between Politics and Markets', in R.D. Benson and E. Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

[504] Marchetti lists six 'internal' and four 'outward (that is, relation to non-journalistic contexts) factors which distinguish journalistic subfields, in Marchetti, 'Subfields of Specialized Journalism'. For a (now somewhat dated) discussion of subfields in British journalism, see J. Tunstall, *Journalists at Work* (London: Constable, 1971).

[505] While in normative terms Bourdieu generally argues for the mutual autonomy of fields of cultural production, Schudson, for one, argues that journalism would benefit from exposure to the principles of differentiation which dominate other fields. Schudson, 'Autonomy from What?', in R.D. Benson and E. Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

discursively inscribed or algorithmic, but rather the *regulated reiteration* of norms,[506] where norms refer chiefly to principles of differentiation. This definition draws on Derrida's (originally Austin's[507]) proposition that intentionality is always limited by the iterability of the sign,[508] and that, since repetition is key, utterances are never singular events but rather the effects of 'citational doubling'.[509] This last submission is adjacent to what Bourdieu terms double-historicity: i.e. practice as the reiteration of history (habitus) which is itself productive of habitus (and its future effects) and which is mediated through a temporal relationship in which the course of reproduction is neither straightforwardly determined nor open to willed change.[510] I argued for the possibility of qualified, determined agency in Bourdieu's model in Chapter 2, though it is necessary in the first instance to construct individually willed acts as practices which may in fact reinforce (other) existing historical structures and actively obscure this reinforcement.[511] The need to contextualise individual acts as strategic within a field characterised by its own rules is summed up by Bourdieu's definition of language as "an economic exchange which is established within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of producing a certain material or symbolic profit."[512]

It is in this sense that practices iterating the relative autonomy of the journalistic field or of war correspondence must be qualified by an examination of the anticipatory structures on which the assertion of autonomy is based. That is, comments by interviewees which either speak this

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[506] Bourdieu frequently uses the more materialist, corporeal concept of 'doxa' as opposed to 'norms', though either may be used if 'norms' if given not to refer only to the discursive. See Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 164-71. Characterising doxa as the 'primary experience of the social world', Bourdieu defines it as "an adherence to the relations of order which, because they structure inseparably both the real world and the thought world, are accepted as self-evident". See Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television'.

[507] See especially J. L. Austin and J. O. Urmson, *How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

[508] Derrida asks, "Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 'coded' or iterable utterance…if it were not identifiable in some way as a 'citation'?" *Ibid.*: 13.

[509] P. Kamuf (ed.), *A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds* (New York; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991): 103.

[510] Bourdieu is thus able to claim that "…domination arises in and through that *particular relation of immediate and infraconscious 'fit' between structure and agent* that obtains whenever individuals construct the social world through principles of *vision* that, having emerged from that world, are patterned after its objective *divisions*." [italics original] 'Introduction', in P. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996a).

[511] Practice, then, for Bourdieu is "engendered in the *mutual solicitation of position and disposition*, in the now-harmonious, no-discordant encounter between 'social structures and mental structures', history 'objectified' as fields and history 'embodied in the form of this socially patterned matrix of preferences and propensities that constitute habitus." P. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*: 2-3.

[512] Robbins, *Pierre Bourdieu*: 179.

autonomy directly or imply it through descriptions of other referents must be construed against existing norms and likely field effects – a process which can only be achieved circularly, since habitus and structuring effect are among the aims of the analysis itself. In methodological terms this need not lead to endless reflexivity.[513] It means rather that the conditions of possibility and potential implications of statements and implications (and interpretations) are to be borne in mind throughout.

Unsurprisingly, then, the data reveal a complex picture of field autonomy. Field separations emphasised *in vivo* do not overtly reinforce the rules of the journalistic game as such. That is, there is little evidence of journalism *as a whole* being favourably compared to the military or government, for example, on the basis of, say, integrity or substance. Instead, the conceptual distinction takes the form of acknowledging that the military and government are different *worlds* with their own logics, and as such should be subject to different descriptive criteria. The recognised prevailing forms of capital of the journalistic field are not reaffirmed by a declaration of superiority to other manifestations of capital, but rather fenced off and insulated from alternative conceptions of such ideals. This is not the whole picture, however, since the separation between journalism and other professional fields is only maintained in certain identifiable, regular modes of practice. And since this is so, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the specific presence or absence (either *in vivo* or by way of analytical construction) of the conceptual separation between journalism and other fields is *strategic* in the Bourdieusian sense of having structured, and potentially anticipatable effects.

Specific invocations of the separateness of the journalistic and other fields take two forms in the interviews. One serves as insulation against the dominant actor categories in the metafield of war, overwhelmingly in situations in which journalists are specifically accused of and routinely characterised as undermining security, creating unnecessary extra work for the military or generally 'getting in the way'. In these situations the perceived dominant actors in the field – military commanders and political leaders – are effectively distanced from the journalistic

[513] Bourdieu termed this type of self-reflexivity 'narcissistic'. See P. Bourdieu, 'Narzisstische Reflexivität Und Wissenschaftliche Reflexivität', in E. Berg and M. Fuchs (eds), *Kultur, Soziale Praxis, Text*: Suhrkamp Verlag KG, 1993c, Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity*: 89-91. From Pels, 'Reflexivity: One Step Up': 12. On Bourdieu's reflexivity as a response to narcissistic reflexivity, see K. Maton, 'Reflexivity, Relationism, and Research: Pierre Bourdieu and the Epistemic Conditions of Social Scientific Knowledge', *Space & Culture*, vol. 6, no. 1 (February 2003). Bourdieu describes his epistemic reflexivity is 'fundamentally anti-narcissistic' in Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*: 72.

'mindset'[514] and, it appears, the pre-reflective journalistic *sens pratique* as well, through characterisation as 'not understanding how journalism works', *e.g.*:

> ...they don't know how journalism works, they don't understand how we do our job. [Interviewee 6]

Any frustration or acrimony ascribed to dominant actors is put down to their misapprehension as irrelevant or unacknowledged of principles universally recognised within the journalistic field – bearing witness is a particularly common example. Thus, in place of a direct confrontation of principles of legitimisation between dominant and dominated fields, recognised journalistic values are bracketed off as esoteric, something of which only journalists understand and realise the importance. In this light the conceptual separation can be seen as properly ideological,[515] specifically as the decontestation of what are necessarily context-specific values such bearing witness, unaccountability to any consciously-recognised social institution and freedom of movement.

The second practical purpose of invoking autonomy is intrafield. Respondents cited the 'otherness' of the military, overwhelmingly, but also of home and foreign governments and the UN, as a measure of their journalistic talents. The military remains a mystery to the public and the majority of journalists, but the successful journalist is able to penetrate alien institutions and comprehend their endogenous logics, for example:

> You gotta understand that the military is a machine. Once you get to know how it works it all makes sense, it's got its own sort of logic. [Interviewee 10]

Such statements are of no great consequence in isolation, but because they were observed to form part of a structured anticipatory mode of practice, that is, a demonstrable reiteration of some norm or position-taking, then they are analytically significant. At the simplest level it is unproblematic to argue that these sorts of utterance serve to demonstrate the credentials of the individual actor, given the recognisability of the criteria to the listener – in this case, the interviewer. We can go further, however, and postulate that as a regulated reiteration, a

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[514] 'Mindset' is one of the most common terms used by interviewees to encapsulate a professional disposition or perceptual framework.

[515] 'Ideology' is used here in the sense which Michael Freeden develops in, for instance, M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996): 3.

recognisable mode of establishing value, this category of statement has the effect of reinforcing that mode as the legitimate criteria in which differentiation is effected in the field.[516] That is, by demonstrating the possession of certain symbolic capital an actor is not only establishing or reinforcing her own position relative to other actors, but also reinforcing that certain symbolic capital as the dominant form that amounts to currency in the field. Here, the structural effect of individual practices, which may defensibly be analytically reconstructed as collectively recognised strategies, is then the reinforcement of the symbolic value of the capacity to engage with 'foreign' journalistic objects, assimilate and translate their specific logics to the 'practical language' of journalism – that is, not merely to translate to the conventionally accepted terms of the journalistic trade but to 'understand' or apprehend the object through the mediation of the journalistic habitus – and to process and package this information in the professional practice of writing copy.

Specific absences of field autonomy in the data also raise several possibilities. In particular discursive situations, namely those involving a discussion of professional competence, interviewees routinely drew distinctions between categories of actor which cut across the given subfields of the field of war but which were based nonetheless on what have been posited here as systematically recognised journalistic values. That is, respondents applied principles of differentiation endogenous to war correspondence – particularly professionalism, integrity, independence from authority, self-sufficiency – to actors from a range of fields. Read one way this is entirely obvious: respondents have their own conceptual categories for assessing actions and actors, and will apply them to all comers. One could, however, look at this absence of field separateness in practical terms, at the level of a structured reinstitution of principles of differentiation in the broader metafield of war (or, alternatively, the field of knowledge production). What we see is that upon criteria such as, say, integrity, actors from all fields represented in the case study distinguish between war correspondents who have it and those who do not, between journalistic specialisations which are perceived to have it and those who do not (for instance, between broadsheet war correspondents and television anchormen), as well as between television anchormen or have it and do not, between categories of military personnel

[516] Difference is only visible ('socially pertinent', in Bourdieu's words) when perceived by an actor capable of drawing distinctions according to the relevant principle of differentiation. By extension, difference only becomes a sign of distinction in the field at large when the principle of vision and division is shared by all agents. Bourdieu goes on to say that the recognition of legitimacy is not, as Weber believed, a 'free act of clear conscience', but is rooted in the 'immediate, prereflexive agreement between cognitive structures and embodied structures, now turned unconscious.' Bourdieu, *The Craft of Sociology*: 56. See also Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 38, 51.

(for instance, special forces and army PR officials), between subcategories of PR officials or special forces personnel, and so on.

A clear pattern which emerges from the interviews is the identification of the war correspondent interviewee with a particular (usually older, more cynical) senior military officer, against both other war correspondents (in the case of print journalists this usually means television or BBC journalists) and junior military staff (especially PR officials). Most striking of all patterns of relational positioning is the alliance of 'independent' (opposed to 'pool') war correspondents and special or elite forces against both pool journalists and regular army personnel.

> They're [US special forces] like, "We're professionals, you're professionals", there's that understanding and they're happy to just you know leave you to it. [Interviewee 2]

> ...and they're [US special forces] like, hey he's known, he's a cool guy. Once they know who you are, once they know you're cool they like completely trust you... [Interviewee 10]

> ...and there were American special forces and Brit special forces, and they said if you got this far, fine, you know, don't get killed, and it worked okay. [Interviewee 5]

Such alliances were presented as natural, not requiring elaboration or argument, and were based on the implicitly shared principles of 'integrity' and 'professionalism', specifically entailing a distinct lack of drama and phrased as 'just getting the job done' or 'knowing what journalism/the military is about', in opposition to those actors who were characterised as overly dramatic, bureaucratic, rule-following or self-interested. In this vein several journalists went so far as to express sympathy with senior military personnel who have to deal with 'clueless' journalists:

> A lot of journalists are just really stupid. Especially these guys at the BBC, they think they're God's gift to journalism, and they piss him [military commander] off and they piss me off too. [Interviewee 2]

> I do sympathise to some extent because the pillock factor rises amongst journalists, and I mean I say that as a 58-year-old who's been doing it for a long time, but I don't think I was as much of a pillock as the ones I see now. I think it might be quite a pain being a PR man, even if you're the greatest PR man, subtle, gentle and understanding, probably eventually the journalistic pillocks piss you off so much that you become unreasonable... [Interviewee 5]

Statements of this sort reveal a degree of insightful perspective into an agent's own field, and as such may be interpreted as lending support to a rational-individualist perspective on the field of war correspondence. However, for present purposes, *viz.* a Bourdieusian analysis of the field, it is necessary to examine the strategic aspect of these 'sympathy statements'. This examination may proceed in at least two ways. First, we can see such recourse to external authority as a means by which the journalist establishes his own credentials within the field and, through regulated recitation, by which those credentials are themselves instituted as dominant, temporarily stable principles of legitimisation within war correspondence. For such a process of authorisation to work it need only be the case that the symbolic authority operative in one field is recognised in the other; the relative autonomy of fields by no means precludes this. Indeed, it is logically coherent to argue that the literal translatability of symbolic authority is in fact unnecessary, and that a systematic *mis*recognition of the authority operative in another field could serve the process of authorisation in the journalistic field just as well.[517]

The pretext of this discussion is not an invocation of rational actor theory, nor is it psychological.[518] There is little to be gained from examining what an actor might hope to gain from allying himself to certain groups, though to be sure several 'psychological' theories as to

[517] For example, a correspondent may ally himself with a politician who is not well regarded in her own field, but whose recognised possession of a certain form of symbolic capital – say, public popularity – may be misrecognised as signalling authority within the political field. The legitimacy of the authority claim within the external field is immaterial; only its recognition *in the journalistic field* as legitimate matters.

[518] "Social relations cannot be reduced to relationships between subjectivities driven by intentions or 'motivations', because they are established between social conditions and positions and therefore have more reality than the subjects whom they link." Bourdieu, *The Craft of Sociology*: 18. For a strong psychological account of war correspondents both in terms of personal histories and effects of reporting conflict, see A. Feinstein, *Dangerous Lives*: *War and the Men and Women Who Report It* (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2003).

why war correspondents see themselves as natural allies of special operations personnel were put forward in the interviews.[519] Instead, the present political analysis, cast in Bourdieusian terms, is concerned with the mechanisms – strategic calculation, individuation, symbolic economy – by which practical strategies, structural products which through their inherent temporality are themselves structurally productive, proceed in the context of the interviews. In the broadest terms, these modes of practice are to be analytically constructed by the social scientist as being oriented towards domination of the means of legitimisation of principles of differentiation in the field. In order to establish how these principles are reinforced or contested, it is necessary also to understand how competition proceeds in those contexts in which these principles (or criteria of value-judgement) are taken as pre-given.[520] Thus, the analysis here seeks to establish the means by which authority is attained and wielded through an examination both of how values such as integrity and autonomy are occupied, possessed or embodied, and, more importantly, of how those differentiating principles are enshrined as dominant and with what political effect.

Bourdieu is less clear about the extent to which such strategies may deploy recourse to modes of authorisation external to the field in question to establish dominance over legitimisation within that field. To flesh out this mechanism is potentially a fruitful move. In Bourdieusian terms, this begins with positing a metafield linking all relatively autonomous fields extant in the contemporary military conflicts, comprising governments, the military, the diplomatic field and the media. Bourdieu begins from the premise that journalism occupies a dominated position in the metafield, certainly along the dimension of what is usually (but perhaps misleadingly here) called social capital – the ability to influence other groups/actors – political power and economic capital. I contend in this thesis that there is an anti-authority, anti-elitist status which journalists enact, and that it amounts to a potentially valuable form of symbolic capital itself. That said, it is reasonable to suggest that if a certain pattern of practice establishes (more correctly, repeatedly reconstitutes) a link to an external institution with more legitimating power (recognisable as such throughout the metafield) than is possible within the media, then within the journalistic field that practice may also serve to concretise an actor's or institution's recognised authority. The success of this appropriation of legitimisation depends, of course, on the 'link'. For it to be successful there need only be recognition within the journalistic field that the link is real, that there is perceived identity.

[519] See also H. Tumber and J. Palmer, *Media at War: The Iraq Crisis* (London: Sage, 2004): 48-63.

[520] Benson and Neveu argue that Bourdieu's emphasis on the dynamics of power relations, and on institutionalisation rather than institutions as such, necessitates his dominant focus on competition. Benson and Neveu, 'Introduction: Field Theory as a Work in Progress': 12.

Second, the political effects of journalists stating identity with external actors and, more generally, applying the same criteria of distinction to actors and institutions across all the subfields of the hypothesised 'field of war', go far beyond the strategic advantage of legitimisation and control of capital within the field of journalism. In short, Bourdieusian methodology asserts that the extension of the rules of the journalistic game to other fields is also to be seen as strategic in the metafield of power. This is not to assert that the 'influence of journalism' is detectable in the military field in the same way that journalism's structured, structuring logic is argued to have transformed the fields of science, the arts and the judiciary. (The influence of journalistic generative logical structures on praxis in the governmental political field is a less contentious proposition, but one beyond the present discussion.) There would need to be demonstrable systematic (mis-)recognition of the differentiating principles which inform journalism within the military field, and there is no clear evidence of this in the interview with an American army general. However, for Bourdieu the metafield is an arena in which subfields (more correctly, those occupying the dominant objective positions within those subfields) exist relationally and in competition for control of principals of domination of symbolic capital. To this extent, by the Bourdieusian model, any application of journalistic criteria of distinction to external actors or institutions is to be regarded as an 'attempt', or more correctly a structurally produced 'strategy', strictly defined, to extend the jurisdiction of the principles of differentiation upon which journalism operates. It is counter-productive to personify journalism as a 'competitor' in the metafield, and to speak of 'competition' between fields is itself a misleading turn on Bourdieu's part. For present purposes what can be said is that the journalistic field, as a generative logic and structuring principle, produces strategies which proceed through individual and institutional practice, and that conceived as a whole this dominant principle itself proceeds by way of strategy, meaning nothing more than the structured anticipation of power effects, in those areas where it necessarily faces and competes with other principles, locally dominant, of legitimisation of authority and circulation of capital.

5.2.2 Systematically Misrecognised Symbolic Economies

To the consciousness of the actor and, at the first level of inquiry, to the sociologist, the overt rules outlined in Section 5.1 govern practice by structuring the exchange or movement of capital systematically recognised as valuable within the field. They set the general, generative

procedures according to which actors interact, determine how individual decisions are made in all conceivable situations by structuring anticipation of outcome, and establish what properties are 'worth pursuing' in professional practice: in short, they define the symbolic economy by which the field operates[521]. However, the principal object of a Bourdieusian analysis of the field is, necessarily, a different symbolic economy altogether. This is not to suggest that Bourdieusian method sets out merely to articulate a fuller understanding of the conceivable symbolic economy, to grasp its workings in a more fundamental way. In fact, Bourdieu's argument is far stronger. The conceivable or recognisable symbolic economy presented here does not represent a merely superficial manifestation of the structural 'reality' of the field. On the contrary, it actively masks that symbolic economy which most effectively determines the principles of legitimisation, the position-takings of authority and circulation of symbolic capital which is misrecognised as such.[522] It is, crucially, precisely by the procession of the recognised rules of the game that a systematic misrecognition of another, more politically productive, set of rules is effected.[523]

The discourse analysis of the interviews suggests that there are two principal misrecognised symbolic economies operating in the war correspondence field, each with significant political effects at the macrostructural level and demonstrable influence on the observable phenomena of individual strategy. The first is an economy of what may be termed *esotericisation* or *mystification*: respondents overwhelmingly depicted journalistic ability as innate, something one either possesses or lacks, *e.g.*:

> He's just a better journalist; he always had a feel [gestures] for the job which Fialka doesn't. [Interviewee 1]

> ...they get a really good sense of what a reporter is. [Interviewee 2]

[521] Bourdieu also refers to this as the 'economics of symbolic exchange'. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 198-202.
[522] See especially 'The Economy of Symbolic Goods' in Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 112-46. Also Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 171-82.
[523] It is in this vein that Bourdieu writes that rather than (or beyond) seeking the 'phenomenal relation between this or that dependent variable' and some independent variable, the aim of Bourdieusian analysis is analytically to construct the *dispositions* which are the structured embodiment of strategies which are themselves effects of the prevailing symbolic economy. These dispositions are, like symbolic economies, always implicit, but in Bourdieu's words they are 'despite everything, recorded in analysis.' Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 12-13.

While there are clear channels through which an individual can acquire the requisite skills, there is no obvious route by which an inexperienced journalist or outsider can acquire the talent and insight necessary to become a 'good' journalist, that is, by which symbolic capital can be accumulated. The implication is most commonly that good journalists are good journalists from the 'start' (presumably before entering the field), or have some 'natural' instinct or 'character' by which their progress towards becoming a 'great' journalist is more or less inevitable. There is an implicit understanding between 'good' journalists (those regarded as good, or those who have achieved recognisable professional success) of what good journalism comprises, as well as an implied, unstated basic world-view.[524] This understanding extends to specific external actors (such as senior military personnel) occupying objective positions in their own fields characterised by similar manifestations of symbolic capital: certain senior military officials, certain diplomats and some politicians are included in this imagined community, as much by their own associations as by the identity evoked by war correspondent interviewees. A common theme among correspondents is that one shouldn't have to ask what constitutes journalistic insight or talent. Actors who overtly refer to concepts which are supposed to be obvious to good journalists are judged to be not simply ill-informed, but incapable of ever understanding what journalism, and by extension the world, is 'about'.

In Weberian fashion, it is thus apparent that actors occupying specific objective positions in the field representing specific configurations of symbolic capital, come to appear to embody those position-takings and capitals, to possess such properties as natural traits. Journalistic skill and success (the two are often, though not always, interchangeable) are, in other words, mystified: that is, their composition, the conditions of possibility for their emergence and the means for possessing or occupying them are blurred, and misrecognised as essence. What is demonstrably a social-historical specificity proceeds to assume the status of a mystic good, all the more symbolically valuable for being unattainable by those who do not possess it.[525] The political effects of misrecognition are clear. First, by esotericising the subject matter of journalistic skill, contestation of what it means to be a good journalist is effectively precluded.[526] Second, by

[524] I argue below that while existing theories of professionalism also account for the naturalisation or rationalisation of success, Bourdieusian theory presents a more convincing account of how naturalisation proceeds.

[525] Bourdieu's own remarks on this phenomenon go only so far as to suggest that of the specialists of all the fields of cultural production, journalists are the least likely to resist the demands of the market and 'universalise the conditions of access to the universal'. Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 81-2.

[526] Garnham makes a similar point, but argues that journalists themselves are in the best position to oppose the trend. Against Bourdieu, he argues for the need to give due weight to the oppositional potential of

being recognised by other actors as embodiments of particular forms of capital, actors are able to establish their occupation of positions of relative power as natural, and thus to extend their dominance over determination of the principles of legitimisation of 'good journalism'. The reproductive aspect of legitimating power attained through mystification and embodiment is readily describable: those recognised as 'natural' authorities on journalism and personifications of journalistic values regularly gain professional positions as columnists and editors, positions in which ruling on legitimacy and journalistic merit is a central, overt part of the job.[527] Further, it is reasonable to assert that the postulated mystified cultural capital is translatable into other forms of symbolic capital,[528] with possession and embodiment of recognised journalistic traits corresponding to (relative) economic success and social capital represented by a professionally successful journalists' influence over the public and the political field.[529] Esotericisation effectively produces the *distinction* of journalism in the public sphere of cultural production and consumption, consecrating the journalist as the recognised authority on what counts as public knowledge, *e.g.*:

> I don't mean an egotistical, egomaniacal role, I mean our very basic role, which is our basic mandate, of going in and bringing information back to people wherever they might be. [Interviewee 8]

> Unfortunately the public don't know, I mean they thought *Bonanza* was live, so there is a sort of duty to try to get it right. [Interviewee 5]

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cultural forms and to the 'socially progressive and utopian potential' of cultural practice. Garnham, 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television': 185-7.

[527] Marchetti notes that while professional success initially depends on specialisation, successful journalists eventually, by becoming commentators and columnists, are generalists. Marchetti, 'Subfields of Specialized Journalism': 65.

[528] A longitudinal analysis of how different forms of capital are accumulated, exchanged and translated in the journalistic field is beyond the remit of this thesis. For a discussion of how such an analysis might proceed through examining various forms of capital, assets and other resources, see M. Savage *et al.*, 'Capitals, Assets, and Resources: Some Critical Issues', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 56, no. 1 (Mar 2005).

[529] This raises the question of *how* one form of symbolic capital is transformed into another. Bourdieu brackets out the ontology of this transformation to focus on the practical recognisability of translation, namely that habitus produces 'learned ratios' of capital which facilitate translation between, for example, economic and cultural capital. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*: 161.

The regulated performance of this privileged position constitutes that which it speaks through structured repetition, again with the result that the journalist's role as gatekeeper of public knowledge comes to be seen as natural, and that the criteria employed to establish what counts as knowledge go increasingly uncontested.[530]

The second misrecognised symbolic economy at work in and indeed productive of journalistic practice is the economy of *disinterestedness* regarding power.[531] I noted above that Bourdieu has written on the structured recognition of the symbolic value of disinterestedness and the concomitant misrecognition of the strategic interest in disinterestedness operative in the scientific field.[532] In short, the playing down of monetary gain is properly interpreted as a strategic practice, insofar as it establishes an agent's possession of other forms of symbolic capital: integrity and autonomy. Bourdieu argues that the conscious decision to eschew monetary reward in the pursuit of a 'higher' good such as scientific knowledge is recognised in the field to be of symbolic value. Possession of this capital is likely to increase the opportunities for an agent to attain more powerful positions in the field, opening up the possibility of translation into social capital – the ability to influence one's peers and determine professional norms and standards – as well as economic capital.

The evidence suggests that integrity and autonomy in the journalistic field may also be performed through expressions of anti-elitism, articulated not through an explicit opposition to wealth but an ambivalent relationship with it. Favourable characterisation of journalists in the interviews frequently includes phrases such as 'not in it for the money' (with some, though less, evidence of mercenarism implied or stated in negative characterisation[533]), alongside an invocation of the preoccupations of truth, objectivity, accountability, bearing witness and so on. Perhaps more tellingly, in the light of the discussion of embodiment and naturalisation above, responses to the question 'Why did you become a journalist?' by and large do not directly cite

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[530] Drawing on Weber's sociology of religion, Bourdieu argues that the isolation of symbolic forms from their social origin results in the *de facto* legitimisation of that social order, 'which is identified with everything natural and in accordance with common sense'. Kauppi, *French Intellectual Nobility*: 47.

[531] See 'Is a Disinterested Act Possible?', in Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 75-91.

[532] For instance P. Bourdieu, 'The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason.' *Social Science Information,* vol. 14 (1975); Bourdieu, *Science of Science and Reflexivity*: 55-62. See also G. N. Gilbert and M. Mulkay, *Opening Pandora's Box*: *A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

[533] One interviewee labelled Martin Bell hypocritical over the tension between his stated principle of 'giving voice' to the victims of war, and his considerable economic and political success.

the pursuit of these ideals but rather share[534] an embodiment theme indicated by phrases such as 'I'm just that sort of person' or that 'it seemed the natural thing for me to do' or 'I couldn't imagine myself doing anything else'[535] – while in the course of the same interviews there appears a clear mastery of the 'noble' values posited as systematically recognised symbolic capital. As with science, we may say that there is an interest in being ambivalent about financial gain, insofar as this ambivalence facilitates accumulation of symbolic capital in the form of integrity and autonomy from elite power. Also as for science, it is clear that the symbolic capital attached to autonomy and integrity may well be exchangeable for professional power and concomitant economic success in future. To suggest, however, that individual actors are invariably actually seeking economic success regardless of their voiced opinions, is at least simplistic and at worst misleading.[536] It is more productive to posit economic capital as one property of recognised symbolic value alongside others, and potentially of less importance than the power of legitimisation of what counts as good journalism and what is accorded the status of public knowledge, which is to say authority in both the journalistic field and in the public sphere. One can always argue, *pace* Bourdieu and Durkheim, that competition over status actively masks economic struggle, though there is insufficient evidence here to support the prioritisation of economic capital over professional esteem and social standing.

Despite his emphasis on the orientation of the particular patterns of practice endemic to a field towards the reproduction of hierarchies of power therein, Bourdieu remains susceptible to the criticism that his analyses, in their attempt to detail how reproduction proceeds in microscopic and symbolic contexts, lose sight of the economic basis of hierarchical relations of power. In this regard Bourdieu's model should be assessed in the theoretical context of Goldthorpe's embourgoisement thesis. For both theorists, while increasing absolute levels of material wealth militates against the possibility of overt class conflict, the complicity of both the dominating and dominated classes means that social mobility is essentially a (functional) myth. Bourdieu in

[534] Five interviewees described the reasons for their entering the field in this way.
[535] In characterising rule-following as embodied practice, Wittgenstein writes that one necessarily reaches a point where, in justifying rule-following, one will inevitably say 'This is simply what I do'. See Taylor, 'To Follow a Rule': 47-51.
[536] Bourdieu notes that the sociologist runs the risk of 'describing as cynical calculation an act which claims to be disinterested' and as such any analysis must be able to deal with both levels of the inevitable 'double-truth' of practice. Introducing the symbolic economy method, he argues that 'this duality of practice is rendered viable by a sort of self-deception or self-mystification; but this individual self-deception is sustained by a collective self-deception, a veritable misrecognition inscribed in objective structures and in mental structures, excluding the possibility of thinking or acting otherwise.' See Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 93-8.

particular emphasises the differences in subjective experiences of the lifeworld – the symbolic distinctions that all agents make, without the need for conscious attention, in their everyday practices in a given field. This is not done for the sole purpose of establishing the intricacies of a field's symbolic economy, but rather to demonstrate how such distinctions have the effect of obscuring underlying material differentiation, which is as a result naturalised or rendered common sensical. It is precisely the reproduction of material power hierarchies that Bourdieu examines systems of symbolic distinction.

Goldthorpe is useful here insofar as he stresses that agents' behaviour cannot be explained only in terms of its determination by a symbolic system. Against, for instance, the post-structuralist matrix of Deleuze and Guattari, symbolic frameworks do not exhaust the meaning of phenomena or behaviour, for there is also material determination.[537] This means that, in the case of journalism, one cannot explain a journalist's actions only by the received and internalised 'differential écarts' of the field; one also has to look to the journalist's economic position in the hierarchy of the profession.[538] It is true that Bourdieu's work often proceeds as if the symbolic systems he analyses, while having effects in the material world, effectively operate as arbitrarily constructed frameworks disconnected from objective differentiation. But he does not argue that the content of journalism – or academic, or literature – is arbitrary, which is to say, not determined only according to symbolic economy. After Goldthorpe, one also needs to establish the economic conditions under which a journalist labours: Bourdieu notes out that the insecurity of a freelance position in an industry with decreasing diversity of ownership will influence a journalist's work, usually unconsciously.

For both writers, then, professional fields need to be analysed in terms of class and mobility. The principal difference is that Goldthorpe argues for premising analysis on class, systematically working through its determining effect on professional norms and practices.[539] Bourdieu, on the other hand, starts from a quasi-autonomous symbolic world, and seeks to establish how its practical symbolic universalisation masks objective hierarchy. It is compatible with both models, however, to examine both how journalists as a group compare socioeconomically to other professions, what internal economic hierarchies they are and the difficulty agents face in

[537] J. Goldthorpe *et al.*, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
[538] J. Goldthorpe, *The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
[539] J. Goldthorpe, *The Economic Basis of Social Class* (London: London School of Economics, 2004).

negotiating these hierarchies. For instance, it could be argued that journalists are known, if not publicly then in the field of cultural production, for their lack of 'refined' or elite taste in the arts. Recent work on cultural consumption suggest that Goldthorpe would not dismiss this as irrelevant,[540] but would maintain that one must begin with economic differentiation, one of the effects of which may well be differences in cultural consumption. A Bourdieusian interpretation takes differences in cultural taste to be of *prima facie* significance, and will then seek to establish which objective relations these reinforce or mystify.

One could also argue that if there is a loosely-defined taste held in common by a sizeable proportion of journalists, which is distinct from that held by more dominant fields in the metafield of cultural production, then this stems from a positively regarded sense of anti-elitism. I have argued above that a disinterest in financial gain can be interpreted strategically – as a means of accruing other forms of capital which may then translate back into economic capital further along a journalist's professional trajectory. This does not indicate that journalists actively, consciously reject the idea of being wealthy: it would be odd if journalists did not want better financial recompense for their work. However, rather than expressing this view in interviews, respondents were more likely to be ironic or deprecating in comparing journalistic salaries to the other fields with which they interact. Comments along the lines of 'You'd never get into this job for the money' [Interviewee 5] have the effect of playing down economic hierarchies in the field of cultural production, while invoking other forms of symbolic capital as valuable: anti-elitism, anti-authority, or a professional self-identity as a permanent underdog who is essentially 'good' but destined not to attain a position of power.

There are two Bourdieusian responses to this, both of which can be seen as properly reconnecting analysis of symbolic economy to objective hierarchies. The first is to argue that it is precisely by reiterating their dominated status relative to political and other elites that the privileged position of the journalistic field – in its right to determine what information counts as meaningful, rather than the economic status of its members relative to average UK salaries[541] –

[540] T. W. Chan and J. Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in England', *European Sociological Review*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2007): 1-19.

[541] According to a National Union of Journalists Report (London: NUJ, 3 October 2004), nearly half of all UK journalists earn less than the national average wage of £26,151; almost three-quarters of journalists earn less than the UK average wage of a professional worker of £35,766; 80 per cent of journalists would be unable to obtain a mortgage to buy the average house in the UK; journalists starting rates are at least £7,000 less than the median starting salary for graduates, and the average graduate starting salary is double what trainees in some media companies earn; one in five journalists have no pension arrangement; a higher proportion of female journalists are in the lower earnings categories; 70 per cent of female

is normalised. The other is to hypothesise that this is in fact an example of journalists' complicity in their own relative dominatedness. What appears as self-reflexive irony actually has the effect of defusing and banalising differences in economic status which would otherwise lead to political conflict. Bourdieu's own views on journalism suggest that he would emphasise the former interpretation, but in fact the two can co-exist without contradiction. In both cases Bourdieu moves beyond the idea that incremental increases in absolute material well-being will tend to mitigate the effects of increasing relative inequality, by examining how structured patterns of subjective experience of existing in a professional field can make the objective hierarchies of that field appear to its agents as either insurmountable, ordinary or, in some cases, signifiers of anti-elitist status.

There are doubtless insights to be gained from examining the journalistic field primarily through the lens of socioeconomic class[542] but, in the context of this thesis, of more importance is what ambivalence over economic capital reveals about the structures productive of strategies governing competition over cultural and social capital, rather than what disinterest in economic capital ultimately, and perhaps ironically, tells us about the structured interest in economic capital. The case study thus offers an opportunity to apply the 'interest in disinterestedness' beyond the economic sphere. While all economies, including 'economic' economies, are symbolic by Bourdieu's definition, the application of the symbolic economies model to cultural and social capital matrices offers the best means of testing whether Bourdieu's *logic* is overly economistic or deterministic.

The advantage of the case study presented here is that it offers an opportunity to analyse a different form of disinterestedness in terms of its symbolic and political efficacy.[543] There is a disinterest which emerges in the data, not uniformly or to an extent which would suggest predictability, but sufficiently regular to suggest a shared matrix of field practices. That is, while

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journalists earn below £30,000 compared to 56 per cent of men - according to the National Statistics Office female journalists average earnings are 82 per cent of those of male journalists. There is no data available on average salaries for war correspondents, though it is expected that these would be significantly higher than the journalistic average.

[542] See especially J. Goldthorpe, C. Llewellyn, and C. Payne, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); J. Goldthorpe and A. McKnight, *The Economic Basis of Social Class – Casepaper 80* (London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion London School of Economics and Political Science, 2004); N. Garnham, 'Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass-Communication', in R. Collins *et al.* (eds). *Media, Culture & Society: A Critical Reader* (London: Sage, 1986): 9-32.

[543] It is in *Distinction* that Bourdieu makes the methodological case for analysing disinterestedness, indifference and insensitivity. Bourdieu, *Distinction*: 34-5.

it is not possible to construct an algorithm necessitating the statements recorded in interviews, it is possible to discern an interpretative structure by which these statements can be seen to be reasonable. This set of statements incorporates a disinterest in drama, in emotionalism, power and celebrity, and a dispassion about adventure and danger. Given that the objects of war correspondence are overwhelmingly dangerous and dramatic situations and powerful, often well-known individuals and institutions, the disinterest exhibited is striking. Moreover, the structuredness of this journalistic dispassion was made clear by the association of clearly delineable speech styles to particular referents. An interviewee's style is likely be more off-hand, irreverent, often playful and frequently modest when either directly describing, or evoking as context for specific referents, situations involving significant risk, personal achievement (such as gaining unique access to a journalistic object) and powerful figures.

> …journalists who have been wounded or killed or otherwise prevented from doing their job [Interviewee 8]

> They pointed their guns at us and shouted, "Who are you? You don't have credentials". And we were like, "This is Pristina, we don't need credentials". But it was all quite fun though. [Interviewee 13]

> …you could get shot at and strafed if you played your cards right [Interviewee 5]

> Drew would be great if you want to talk to the bang bang guys [Interviewee 10]

> I'd done a little bit on the fall of communism… [Interviewee 8]

The use of expletives as a particular mode of practice also highlights this pattern. They are almost universally deployed to emphasise a dismissive attitude to a journalist or other actor who 'just doesn't get it', and occasionally used playfully, in reflecting on war correspondence or particular dangerous situations. It is almost never (in 7 instances out of 110) used to express outrage at a particular journalistic object.

As much as journalists, scientists and writers express a disinterest in a property in which interest is assumed in the broader context of the public sphere, most commonly fame and fortune, war

correspondents betray a distinct lack of interest, seemingly embodied as 'personality' rather than overtly named, in what may be reasonably portrayed as properties recognised as valuable in the broader context of the media and the public sphere: namely, risk-taking, adventure and contact with powerful actors, properties which enable accumulation of the cultural capital attached to integrity and adventure and the social capital attached to rarefied social elites. 'Attached' here indicates that a practice and a form of capital are (mis-)recognised through a given field as either linked in an indicative relationship, or as identical.

That these qualities are systematically played down is explicable in two ways. First, at the level of metafield, by dealing with what are broadly regarded as extraordinary events in daily professional practice, and engaging in the (secondary) practical construction of this (primary) practice as ordinary, the 'war correspondent' is called into being as such, that is, is individuated in a determinate form recognisable as 'war correspondent', in such a way as to achieve distinction from other categories of actor constructed, likewise in a regular, recognisable way, in the field. To a public, which is to say those actors in a position to recognise such constructions (not *as such*, but strictly speaking to misrecognise them as nature), that is those actors participating (consuming for the most part) in the broader symbolic economy of public knowledge production, and indeed to the majority of the journalistic field, which would presumably find such situations dramatic or momentous, an actor unfazed by his subject matter is recognised as possessing a degree of authority. This recognition is a *practical* act which consists in the iteration and reiteration of the possession of something which cannot be possessed, ultimately toward the end of embodiment of a property which is, in absolute terms, unembodiable.[544] In line with the argument presented above, it could be said that the transformation of the object from one of seeming drama to one of ordinary reportorial material, involves the esotericisation of journalistic professional practice and, ultimately, the mystification of the journalistic subject. The 'war correspondent' embodies a transformation inconceivable to the public and other categories of journalist, which is to say that the conditions of possibility for the wholly context-specific emergence of the war correspondent as actor and its object, war correspondence, are effectively masked.[545]

Second, systematic understatement by the war correspondent is explicable by the structures of competitive strategy internal to the discipline and productive of practice within it. As war

[544] See, for example, E. Laclau, *The Making of Political Identities* (London: Verso, 1994).
[545] Bourdieu has also called this transformation 'symbolic alchemy', likening the 'magical power' of symbolic capital to Weberian 'charisma' and Durkheimian 'mana'. Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 99-101.

correspondents are faced with reporting the same general object, it is valid to assert that competition for symbolic capital will find recourse to other means of achieving distinction. That is, competition will proceed along the parameters of the process of objectification rather than of the object itself, with a second-order competition over domination of the *principles of legitimisation of objectification* producing the terms for first-order strategic practice. This is not to suggest that all war correspondence is the same and that since it is all dangerous, journalists must compete on another level: correspondents do, overwhelmingly, compete for objects, to reach the most dangerous locations, get exclusive interviews with the most powerful figures and so on:

> I want to be the best, I want to get the best copy, I want to be foreign correspondent of the year, this is my chance. [Interviewee 8]

But it is also apparent that there is an economy in which off-handedness, cynicism, irreverence and irony are operative as effective indicators of capital, an economy which is not recognised as such. On this basis it can be asserted that strategic, inscribed, unthinking interest in these properties, masked by an overt economy of journalistic practice, produces structural effects in the field:[546] that is, that disinterest or cynicism regularly produces the systematic recognition of competence as a war correspondent, that this competence is increasingly seen as a natural trait, and that this facilitates the occupation of dominant positions of legitimisation both of professional practice (standards such as objectivity) and of these misrecognised principles of differentiation.[547]

A consideration of the temporality of practice in the field under investigation largely bears out this assertion. I discuss below Bourdieu's use of the concept of social ageing or 'field age' to postulate and predict the extent to which actors will have internalised properties which are seen upon self-reflection as neither field-specific nor valuable as capital. In the relatively small

[546] The relationship between individual strategy and symbolic economy is summarised well by Derek Robbins: "Every speech act and, more generally, every action is a conjecture, an encounter between independent causal series. On the one hand there are the socially constructed dispositions of the linguistic habitus which imply a certain propensity to speak and to say legitimate things (the expressive interest) and a certain capacity to speak, which involves both the linguistic capacity to generate an infinite number of grammatically correct discourses, and the social capacity to use this competence adequately in a determinate situation. On the other hand, there are the structures of the linguistic market which impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions and censorships." Robbins, *Pierre Bourdieu*: 297.

[547] Bourdieu addresses the performance and embodiment of competence in the political field in Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 175-80.

sample size of the case study it is certainly true that those actors who had inhabited the field for less than ten years were profoundly less cynical and disinterested than those who had operated within it for thirty years or more.

> I mean, war is the best spectator sport in the world. It's fun, I love it, it's just such a rush … it's kind of like watching sport, but much more intense. So I kind of tend to say if people ask me why I'm a war correspondent, it's like, well if I didn't I'd have to have a fucking job. I mean, this isn't work, it's fun. I'm getting paid to do all this stuff which is totally amazing and I love it, we all do. [Interviewee 10]

It is also true that elite respondents, those exercising domination over professional practice and, I have argued, the principles of differentiation of the misrecognised symbolic economy, exhibited the traits of cynicism and disinterest in a way consistent with a high degree of internalisation or naturalisation. A larger study – one which could test for the presence of counter-examples of long-immersed actors who either have attained positions of influence without accruing the symbolic capital hypothesised here, or who had accrued such capital without exercising domination – may be able to test these findings more rigorously. Long-term research tracking individual trajectories across entire careers would doubtless prove fruitful. More troubling for Bourdieusian methodology, however, is the impossibility of controlling for the effects of simultaneous immersion in other fields. It remains ever possible that patterns of practice, including meaning construction and self-reflection, are effects of extra-professional discourses or multiple professional fields. The conceivability of actors inhabiting and moving between different fields is a considerable problem for Bourdieu's model,[548] one which within the Bourdieusian framework could only be resolved by a detailed comparison of multiple fields and the potential competition between them, for which there is not space to expand on here.

The case study also brought forward a potential tension between Bourdieusian methodology and political theory around the question of self-reflection. This theme was raised in Chapters 2 and 4, and it is now possible to bring to bear on it the empirical results of the case study. Journalists, presumably in common with all professional groups, routinely reflect on their own professional

[548] See, for instance, McNay, 'Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity': 107.

experience, and are only too aware that journalism is pervaded, if not dominated, by principles other than those of objectivity, independence and so forth. Routine, cynical pronouncements on Rupert Murdoch, Robert Maxwell and various tabloid editors demonstrate the extent to which sensationalism, circulation and profit are recognised as underpinning the industry and often undermining those practices normatively constituted in the field as 'noble'. One could counter that while actors may be aware of the dominance of the logic of the market in the journalistic field, what is subsequently obscured is the symbolic economy in which such cynicisms are currency, a means of establishing one's journalistic credentials.[549] However, the case study suggests a critical awareness of strategic practice and linguistic capital which in Bourdieu's model is given to be unthinkable: corporeality, mannerism and dress.

> …now everyone thinks the way you present things is you know with a furrowed brow and an earnest manner. [Interviewee 5]

> …these guys who come back from Afghanistan with their scarves around their necks, a little bit of dust on their shoulders… [Interviewee 14]

There are significant problems with Bourdieu's conception of critical self-reflexivity, as is discussed in Chapters 2 and 6. However, I conclude that in the case study the observed patterns of phenomena indicating insight into what have been constructed as misrecognised economies are evidence not of a level of critical agency at odds with Bourdieusian thought, but rather of the existence of *relatively autonomous subfields within* the field of war correspondence. That is, beyond differentiation between actors along axes of integrity, popularity and so on, there appear to be two separate, discrete logics within which principles of differentiation and competition over their domination occur in relative isolation to the other journalistic 'universe' – though, needless to say, the subfields do also interact in the form of a struggle for domination of the principles of legitimisation of the field of war correspondence as a whole. Simply put, these subfields are characterised by constructions of the 'war correspondent' as 'reporter' and as 'moral authority'. The interview data suggests that while there is undoubtedly competition between the fields in which these dispositions are valid currency (expressed by normative

[549] E.M. Power takes this line in analysing contradictory remarks by interviewees, arguing that establishing the social contingencies of the logic behind self-reflections is more important than the self-reflections themselves. E. M. Power, 'Toward Understanding in Postmodern Interview Analysis: Interpreting the Contradictory Remarks of a Research Participant', *Qualitative Health Research,* vol. 14, no. 6 (Jul 2004).

comparison between of journalistic styles), within each there are distinct, largely independent operative principles of differentiation by which authority and legitimacy are achieved – one, through the position-taking and seeming embodiment of the norm of 'objectivity', the other with articulation and transmission of a political message as its recognised purpose. Successive codings of the interviews demonstrates that many utterances indicative of critical insight are indeed explicable by this division, and that all such utterances would be explicable by postulating other subfields as relatively autonomous – television journalism, for instance. In order to offer a means of analysis which is fully able to apprehend heterogeneity and is properly dynamic – rather than merely invoking temporality as an acknowledged principle – it is, clearly, necessary for Bourdieusian methodology to allow for a multi-field approach. Finally, however, the clear limitations of Bourdieusian theory should not overshadow what is a significant, and valid, result: that in each instance of apparent self-reflective critical insight there is a detectable process of distinction, a practical iteration which, if generated repeatedly and structuredly, will promote the reproduction of the dominant principles of differentiation of the field and its hierarchies of objective positions – specifically, the perceived cachet of war correspondence.

5.2.3 Moral Authority and the Generation Gap

In this section it will be seen that the themes of field age and the rise of the journalist as moral authority may be related in a way which is not causal, but nonetheless suggests significant implications regarding both war correspondence itself and Bourdieu's theory of field reproduction. In the limited sample of the case study, there are three factors which are clearly associated with the likelihood of a journalist to conceive of their role as one of moral authority rather than reporter: gender, nationality and age. I address the gendering of the field of war correspondence below. In the interviews respondents tended to speak of a higher prevalence of journalism practiced as a moral exercise in the US than the UK (though two expressed the opposite opinion),[550] and also attributed morally authoritative journalism to youthful idealism. The small sample size indicates that this conclusion is at best tentative, and also invokes a common interpretative problem: whether to attribute observed changes to historical or generational factors. Let us examine each in turn.

[550] In contrast, Snoddy argues that British journalism is ill-equipped to deal with the imperative that journalists must do more than relate facts. Cited in Matheson, 'Scowling at their Notebooks': 166.

Moral Authority

The inevitability of subjective influences on journalistic output is widely recognised,[551] and the editorialising of news in the British press is particularly remarked upon.[552] It is also evident that certain types of journalist – columnists, most obviously, but also war correspondents – view themselves as figures of moral authority as well as reporters. Whether this status extends to public recognition is less clear, however, since journalism is consistently cited in opinion polls as the least trusted institution in society.[553] At the outset, then, instead of stating as a premise that journalists are increasingly regarded as embodiments of moral authority, it is reasonable to suggest that news consumers expect more opinion to be built into journalism – again, especially in the press – than was the case a generation ago. This section does not aim to describe or account for this historical phenomenon, but rather to establish what would have to have held in order for such a change to take place. That is, the increasing legitimacy of journalism as an explicitly moral enterprise suggests different forms of valorised symbolic capital, and a different set of rules by which journalists are recognised as authoritative or not; this section will establish the symbolic economy of this distinct subspace of the field of journalism.

It is evident from the case study that legitimacy within the field of war correspondence is conferred and recognised largely by fellow correspondents or a network of authority encompassing elite sectors of the political and military fields. I would argue that this elite configuration has dominated the principles of differentiation in the field historically,[554] but it has always co-existed alongside an alternate means for establishing authority: public popularity.[555] This alternate legitimating framework has grown increasingly important over the last two decades, evidenced by the fact that while in 1982 Max Hastings was broadly criticised for casting himself as the focus of his coverage of the Falklands war, by the turn of the century the

[551] B. McNair, *News and Journalism in the UK* (London: Routledge, 2003): 54-73; B. McNair, *The Sociology of Journalism* (London: Arnold, 1998): 61-100.
[552] Henningham and Delano conclude that ethics for British journalists are 'somewhat blurred', with respondents showing a higher likelihood relative to other nationalities to condone subterfuge, distortion and paying sources. J. Henningham and A. Delano, 'British Journalists', in D. H. Weaver (ed.), *The Global Journalist: News People around the World* (Creskill NJ: Hampton Press, 1998): 157.
[553] MORI, *Trust in Public Institutions* (London: MORI Social Research Institute, 2003).
[554] See, for example, T. Gjelten, *Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998); M. Pedelty, *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents* (New York; London: Routledge, 1995).
[555] Champagne, 'The "Double Dependency": The Journalistic Field between Politics and Markets': 58.

existence of 'star' war correspondents, such as Jon Simpson or Rageh Omar, is unremarkable. The relative popularity of a correspondent may be measured by positive feedback from consumers of their copy, or by the extent to which they become a talking point outside war correspondence. For present purposes, however, more significant are the preconditions of popularity, which is to say the forms of performed or embodied symbolic publicly recognisable as either desirable or authoritative, and more broadly the symbolic economy in which this form of symbolic capital is valid currency. I would argue that this is a 'speaking for the people' value, an (apparently) immediate relation of public statement and private consumption which bypasses traditional mediating institutions. It is also a performed subjectivity which is recognisably noble; the journalist as moral authority is not a natural subject but one constituted through repeated practice – a repetition which endures because there is a market for it, which is to say that the projected subjectivity is one that the public recognises as positive. In the same way that Bourdieu argued in the context of academics achieving success by means other than peer review,[556] journalistic public popularity is readily conflated with a notion of democratisation,[557] in that the correspondent is interpreted as a figure whose speech expresses public principles in a way that is autonomous of elite and institutional influence.

What is distinct about the correspondent, as the case study has made clear, is that these principles of autonomy and immediacy are not interpreted as discrete practices but rather are embodied by the journalists themselves in a way that is recognisable as character. Again, drawing on the conclusions of the case study, rather than engaging in contestation over points of political principle, for example, the journalist can be presented as inhabiting a space above the political fray, with nothing more than recognised 'integrity' required for legitimation. This decontestation through embodiment of professional standards and political principles – that is, what it means to have integrity and what counts as democratic – need not be interpreted as nefarious. The case study has shown that within the journalistic field there is an operative practical interest in cynicism about elite power, and that professional success is recognised according to a complex economy of symbolic capital which is not wholly constructed according to the overt principles of journalism. This does not lead to the conclusion that moral authority is

[556] Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*: 59-60. See also Pinto, 'Le Journalisme Philosophique'.
[557] This tension between popularisation and democratisation is set out in L. Chouliaraki, 'Political Discourse in the News: Democratizing Responsibility or Aestheticizing Politics?' *Discourse and Society*, vol. 11, no. 3 (July 2000): 293-314.

in some way conspiratorial; it does suggest, however, that a journalist's disinterest in or autonomy from 'ordinary' politics does serve a practical purpose.[558]

Generation

It was seen in Chapter 4 that Bourdieu did not focus heavily on journalism for most of his career, but did begin to comment on the (mainly French) journalistic field in the last ten years of his life. In a lecture delivered in 2001,[559] he discusses how a new entrant to the field internalises the rules of the journalistic game and mimics the regulating norms of the field in professional practice. In essence, the narrative is that young journalists traditionally enter the field full of idealism and a conviction that they will not be compromised by economic factors or other constraining structures (such as deference and tradition).[560] Over time, Bourdieu argues, these young, strongly moral journalists will come gradually to abandon the idea of journalism as an ethical practice. This process of field immersion has been accelerated by the multiplication of university-level journalism courses, Bourdieu notes. This does not proceed largely through conscious compromise – a weighing up of principle and job security, for instance – but through the unthinking assimilation of the established language of journalism, socialisation increasingly exclusively with other journalists and, most significantly, taking on the structure of journalism as an industry as increasingly pervasively generative of practice – and unremarkable.

However, the case study data suggest the reality is in fact more complex. First, it is clear from the preceding section that there *is* a market for moral authority, that is, that a journalist can acquire self-identity through professional and public recognition by engaging in specifically constructed 'moral' professional practice. This is a symbolic economy not limited to the young (or American); it co-exists with the adjacent field of reportage, and undoubtedly competes with it for the dominance of principles of legitimacy of journalism more broadly, but not in such a way that necessitates the absolute majority of one sub-field or the other. Second, there are young (under 40) war correspondents in the sample who explicitly eschew the moral aspect of their profession, either directly raising the possibility that what they do is (on occasion) morally

[558] Bourdieu's account of the role of professionalism in concretising arbitrary symbolic economies of legitimacy can be compared to Johnson, who in 1972 wrote that professions act as 'the institutionalised form of the control of occupations'. T. J. Johnson, *Professions and Power* (London: Macmillan, 1972).
[559] Reprinted in Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field'.
[560] *Ibid.*

harmful, or dismissing any such lofty notions and self-effacingly speaking of how lucky they are, how much 'fun' the job is, and so on. What is emphasised in these cases is a lack of presumption to speak authoritatively about that on which they report, or on journalism's role in society.

The question of structural ageing is an interesting one, insofar as it offers a vantage point on how the internalisation of the imperatives of a field actually proceeds, and with what level of self-reflexivity. At what point does one's disposition become maximally aligned with the 'rules' of a field?[561] The data here cannot be conclusive on these matters, as only a longitudinal study would provide the necessary perspective and scope. However, it is clear that structural age plays a role, no doubt alongside myriad other factors including socioeconomic background and education.[562] Whether or not the differences are manifest at the generational level, however, we can still approach the practices and self-reflections of the younger respondents as strategies aimed, at either a reflexive or pre-reflexive level, transforming the field of war correspondence. As regards the moral authority sub-field, since it could reasonably be claimed that war correspondence is *necessarily* an ethical practice (insofar as it involves subjective selection with potential political implications), the question then becomes what is the impact of prioritising or making explicit this aspect of professional practice. I have argued above that the reasons for the rise of moral authority are largely social, but, conceived in Bourdieusian terms, it is feasible to argue that such a 'strategy' represents an attempt at 'domain expansion'[563] – that is, an attempt to extend the differentiating principle of moral weight not only to journalism but to the field of cultural production as a whole, against the alternative principles of differentiation which characterise the fields of academia and politics. I would suggest that this is a viable construction of such professional practice, but that the more substantive point resides in the social preconditions against which such competition proceeds, namely the relative currencies of fact or instrumental worth on the one hand and affect on the other. And if such a transformation of the field were proven to have taken place, the emphasis for Bourdieusian social science is to look beyond the transformation itself to what is preserved by what Bourdieu terms a conservative revolution. This may amount to nothing more than a 'plus ça change' perspective, though there is the

[561] Bourdieu notes that structural ageing is an important consideration because the synchronised 'presents' in which people find themselves in a field will be differentiated according to experience, authority and so on. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 104-7.
[562] Marchetti, 'Subfields of Specialized Journalism': 73.
[563] J. Best, *Random Violence: How We Talk About New Crimes and New Victims* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1999).

potential that even a radical transformation of the field reproduces or reinforces at least some of its generative structures, whether they be economic, political, or social.

Within the field of war correspondence itself, it seems that self-effacement on the part of younger correspondents is potentially more interesting still. In the sample there is a clear division of generations of the journalists who emphasise the value of 'just-the-facts' reporting,[564] with one cohort aged 28-40 and another aged 55-65. What both share is a tendency to avoid casting judgement on the relative moral standing of different actors and sides in a given conflict (competence, however, is a common target for all, whether discussing military or media personnel, as discussed above); what distinguishes them is interest. That is, while it was established above that disinterest in drama and elite power has currency as symbolic capital in the field of war correspondence as a whole, the younger reporters were unabashedly enthusiastic about their work and frequently impressed by those whom they interviewed. Without casting self-descriptions as disingenuous, one can construct along Bourdieusian lines the strategies which may reasonably be inferred to be operative behind their articulation. It would be relatively straightforward to argue that youthful vigour is an effective means of marking out one's distinction, which certainly is compatible with the theme of adventurousness set out above. It also makes sense that, while enthusiasm and energy are doubtless valuable to the 'doing' of war correspondence, those who dominate the field – almost exclusively, in their own descriptions, older correspondents – are in a position to impose other principles of differentiation by which success is gauged. If both groups share a reluctance to articulate value judgements, it is clear that this serves different functions for each, For the younger group, self-effacement can be seen as a valuable symbolic commodity in itself (not thinking of oneself as higher than one's interviewees), and it also serves to excuse (and close down discussion of) lack of experience or knowledge. For senior correspondents, however, absences of explicit judgement about situations on the ground are not only absences – that is, they are structured, by cynicism, irony and the other factors laid out in the preceding section. Cynicism and irony are never simple negations, but rather implicit alternate constructions; they are invariably marked by a distinct knowingness which, crucially, does not lead to further explication. This simultaneous refraining from forming a value-judgement, the suggestion of requisite knowledge to make such a judgement, and the instantaneous preclusion of further articulation, has the effect of establishing a legitimacy which can only remain implicit – and thus, mystified.

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[564] '[J]ournalisme pur et dur', Champagne, 'The "Double Dependency": The Journalistic Field between Politics and Markets': 52.

5.2.4 Gender

The most common principles of differentiation between good and bad journalists and journalism were set out above. However, there is another set of principles, each invoked by more than one respondent, which operates along gendered lines. The number of women working in the field has increased significantly over the last forty years,[565] and in the case study interviews there were no overt suggestions that women should not work as war correspondents.[566] However, there were sharp distinctions between descriptions by male correspondents about male and female colleagues; further, the three female correspondents interviewed all saw the field as heavily, and problematically, gendered.

There are some principles which were applied in the data across the board – intelligence, substance, autonomy and the ability to communicate and form good relations with contacts were used regardless of gender. However, two descriptors were only used about male correspondents. On the complimentary side, in the interviews only men are described as having a natural talent or feel for war correspondence. With regard to derision, it is interesting that alcoholism remains a key form of negative symbolic capital (seven respondents mentioned it in this context), and that it was only applied to male correspondents. There were no forms of positive symbolic capital used exclusively to describe female correspondents, but two negative forms were readily apparent. The first is physical attractiveness:

> There's another one, really ugly girl, working in New York, really thin face with sort of lank hair, and she was in Africa before. And she became a moral authority. [Interviewee 5]

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[565] D. Chambers *et al.* (eds), *Women and Journalism* (London: Routledge, 2004): 208-215. This was stated by five interviewees in the case study.

[566] It has been argued, however, that journalistic values are strongly determined according to masculinist norms. De Bruin writes: "But is it that journalism 'accords' with masculine values or is it perhaps that is values have been constructed to fit masculine values? Traditionally developed by male decision makers, who used to monopolise decision making positions, certain styles and values will have become accepted as professional standards, at the same time will have become part of the organisation's house-style – 'that's how-we-do-it-here.'" M. de Bruin, 'Gender, Organizational and Professional Identities in Journalism', *Journalism,* vol. 1, no. 2 (2000): 232.

The second is sexually inappropriate behaviour. One war correspondent, for instance, expressed a negative opinion about the professional ability of a prominent female colleague and, when asked the reasons for his judgement, recounted a situation in which she had gained access to senior military sources by gambling with them and:

> '...dancing around in her knickers'. [Interviewee 14]

There is an interesting parallel to this last example, insofar as it can be reconstructed strategically as resentment of intimacy with sources or figures of authority. Two of the female correspondents believed that the men were *too* likely to become close to powerful sources, that they were unable to retain a professional distance. This was ascribed to their being overly impressed by traditionally masculine manifestations of power: fire-power, machinery, or the adventurousness of special operations:

> Anyway he was covering Kosovo and I think he was a journalist who had been tricked into becoming too close to the armed forces, and I think it happens a lot with especially male journalists, who like to see themselves as one of the boys. [Interviewee 4]

In all, there was no evidence that there is a single masculine or unsexualised disposition to which any actor in the field would come increasingly to mimic in professional practice. Rather, it is clear at this point that there remain a multitude of relational positions in the field, that individual agents take up these positions at certain times under certain conditions, and that some of the relations are defined according to gender.

5.2.5 Conclusion

As well as establishing a 'gatekeeping' structure by which entry into the journalistic field is controlled by other journalists, not merely overtly but through domination of principles of legitimation, the mystification of the skills of the journalist has the effect of enhancing the symbolic value of journalism in the broader metafield of cultural production and, by extension,

in the public sphere.[567] Journalists are accorded the authority to articulate how and why events have occurred, and to decide whether events are newsworthy and thus, in a sense, whether they have happened at all. There is little to be gained from problematising the social necessity of delegating and professionalising the task of recording, interpreting and disseminating phenomena. However, it is of considerable significance that the dominant principles which do not merely rule on legitimacy and authority but positively produce journalistic practice by way of structuring differentiation in the field are themselves structured according to a misrecognised symbolic economy which is productive of discernible effects (*viz.*, the enshrining of hierarchies of power in the field). Further, the mystification of the journalistic trade allows it as a field to compete for symbolic capital (authority, legitimacy) with adjacent fields of cultural production, such as art, literature, the judiciary and science, a thesis which increasingly occupied Bourdieu in the last decade of his life. While it is impossible to demonstrate that a field reproducing itself through regulated practice structured according to the principles of a misrecognised symbolic economy will necessarily be politically nefarious, it is feasible to assert not only that the overt rules of the journalistic game do not fully determine journalistic practice, but that this overt economy renders another set of structured political effects unknowable. This is not the same as contending that it is impossible for the field to produce actors who are 'good' by the overt standards of journalism, nor that an actor has no meaningful capacity to pursue a strategy consciously constructed upon these over principles. It does suggest, however, that legitimacy, as well as domination over what counts as legitimate, is occupied, embodied and wielded on the basis of a complex set of structured practices, a good deal of which are inconceivable to actors in the field.

[567] For another applied example of Bourdieu's account of professionalism, see D. Hodgson, '"Putting on a Professional Performance": Performativity, Subversion and Project Management', *Organization,* vol. 12, no. 1 (Jan 2005).

5.3 Comparative Analysis

The previous section set out the conclusions of a Bourdieusian analysis of the case study interviews. This section evaluates whether a Bourdieusian approach produces insights which other explanatory frameworks cannot, and assesses the significance of these conclusions. It evaluates the Bourdieusian analysis of the journalistic field developed in this thesis against post-structuralist approaches and contributions from theories of journalistic professionalism, ideology and discourse, before considering the limitations and political implications of Bourdieusian analysis.

5.3.1 Political Theoretical and Poststructuralist Approaches

First, let us look at analyses of journalism where there is a precedent for interpreting journalistic practices of differentiation and, particularly, self-reflection, not merely on its own terms but as strategic in the Bourdieusian sense. Drawing primarily on *Language and Symbolic Power*, Matheson puts forward the Bourdieusian contention that reflection by journalists on their professional practice serves a political function.[568] The first part of this function is, to be sure, at the more conspiratorial end of the interpretative spectrum: if we look empirically at existing examples of journalists' reflections, we can conclude that the particular forms it takes actually prevents real reflexivity – where 'real' refers to a level of insight capable of leading to objective changes in the structures of the journalistic field. The second part of the political function is that this political determination of reflection, which amounts to censorship, closes down any contestation of journalistic symbolic capital and thereby helps to reproduce the hierarchies and boundaries of the field. I suggested above that the linguistic styles of offhandedness, cynicism and irony also serve this decontesting function. The result is not simply the circumscription of debate over what constitutes good journalism and the concomitant mystification of journalistic practice, but also the occlusion of the political impact these phenomena have: cementing the gatekeeping and specialisation hierarchy which ensure that those in dominating positions in the field – successful individual journalists in this case, but also editors, advertisers and owners

[568] D. Matheson, 'Scowling at their Notebooks', vol. 4, no. 2 (2003): 165-83.

associated with media outlets occupying positions in either the cultural or economic elite (or both) – maintain their positions.

Matheson takes as his analytic object a discursive form of reflection quite distinct from the case study: journalists' memoirs.[569] The language observed in these publications is broadly news-like, written either in the mood of the 'thrill of the chase', or else seeking to be as accurate a mirror as possible to reality. It is precisely because the language is performative or generic that it ceases functioning as the 'real', everyday, unreflexive discourse which is most revealing of the pervasive but forgotten norms of the field, and thus can tell us nothing about the political implications that such decontestation will have. It has been demonstrated that the language observed in the case study is both more subtle and more fertile in terms of what it can tell us about the journalistic field, especially as regards the use of understatement and irony. It is certainly less obviously generic: while many of the journalists spoke or behaved similarly, at no point did this amount to the deterministic reading of Bourdieu that one cannot do otherwise than perform a pre-existing disposition. The observed language of reflections on war correspondence could best be described not as overdetermined but structured: that is, it is not uniformly categorisable, and it is spontaneous and occasionally chaotic, but it does exhibit sufficient regularity to suggest that structural reasons for its particular articulations can be posited. Bourdieusian analysis allows us to examine firstly the symbolic criteria according to which individuals compete for, occupy and defend the relative positions of a field. Second, it allows us to see the political effect that euphemism, linguistic shorthand and stylistic mannerisms have. In combination, we can see not only the distorted (though not arbitrary) relation between success or power in the field and any set of essential journalistic values, but also the silencing, normalising effect that particular modes of reflection have. In accordance with Matheson, reflections in the case study about how journalism is and should be done reveal an actual set of values or code of professional conduct which actively prevents reflexivity as to the political complicity of these values.[570] As Bourdieu reminds us, no ethical framework is sustainable unless it (also) serves the function of reinforcing existing relations of dominance. Matheson conceives of the determination of reflection on journalistic values as somewhat monolithic, such that euphemism produces a closed system with a single strategic function.[571] The case study demonstrates that while there is linguistic determination – language which has the clear effect of depoliticising

[569] *Ibid.*: 171.
[570] See also B. Zelizer, 'Journalists as Interpretative Communities', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, vol. 10, no. 2 (1993): 219.
[571] Matheson, 'Scowling at their Notebooks': 171

something contestable, or naturalising an existing hierarchy – there is also slippage,[572] and what can reasonably be termed insightful reflection. As noted in Chapter 2, these amount not to 'deep' ontological insight into the structures of a field, but reflections on how the field could be changed according to normative commitments.

Next, let us consider the argument that it is macrostructural factors rather than the specificities of the journalistic game that are simultaneously pervasive and unacknowledged. Edgar presents a means of describing the political context of journalistic reflection in terms which transcend the traditional structuralist argument that discourse helps to preserve the status quo of dominatory relations.[573] One aspect is the overriding influence of liberalism, a theme which Bourdieu tackles in 'On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason'.[574] Bourdieu argues that the effective universalisation of a particular, neo-Kantian form of liberalism after 1968 precludes reflection on its key tenets and implications. It has been normalised to the extent that it *is* liberalism, rather than one manifestation of it, and that liberalism exhausts progressive politics. In the broader sense, this hegemony means that it becomes increasingly unthinkable (rather than simply unfashionable) to question that which should be questioned if reflexivity remains a political aim. In the field of journalism and the metafield of cultural production, the predominance of liberalism[575] naturalises, first, the ascription of politics to culture. There is not space here to address the defensibility of the 1960s cultural turn in social theory in broad terms. Bourdieu's point is, first, that liberal hegemony means that cultural producers and academics alike have developed a collective amnesia about how contested, and resisted, this turn had been previously.[576] Second, the naturalisation of a specific form of liberalism also makes natural the absence of conflict from both political theory and political journalism, such that, it can be argued, the default mindset in the field of cultural production sees conflict as something to be resolved, rather than as a potentially productive political tool. The import here is not proving conclusively which model of conflict is correct, but rather to point out that that which was previously fiercely contested has

[572] In the Derridean sense of a sign failing to signify that which structural determination would predict.
[573] A. Edgar, 'The "Fourth Estate" and Moral Responsibilities', in D. Barry (ed.), *Ethics and Media Culture: Practices and Representations* (Oxford: Focal Press, 2000): 73-88.
[574] P. Bourdieu. and L. Wacquant, 'On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason'. *Theory Culture & Society,* vol. 16, no. 1 (1999): 41-58.
[575] This is not to suggest that there is a single, monolithic liberal system, but rather that one (individualistic, consensualist) liberalism that dominates and silences alternate liberalist and other political modes.
[576] P. Bourdieu, 'The Myth of "Globalisation" and the European Welfare State', in P. Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance*: 29-44.

been normalised through the continual restatement of common sense.[577] Third, this form of liberalism, certainly clear in the journalistic field,[578] sets itself against one form of elitism – traditional political authority – while implicitly enshrining a cultural elite.[579] I argue in Chapter 6 that certain elitisms can under certain circumstances (and qualified by finite contestation) be defended, but others remain unacknowledged, undefended and unopposed.

Fourth, Bourdieu argues that the dominant contemporary mode of liberalism consecrates a culture of individualism, extending from identity politics to social scientific methodology.[580] According to Bourdieu's philosophy of social science, methodological individualism is fallacious in the same way that Weber's (and Simmel's) analytical framework has been criticised.[581] That is, by starting from the individual as the basic analytic unit, methodological individualists err in assuming that large macroscopic social behaviour can be explained by extrapolating from interactions within small groups. For Bourdieu, individuals are not discrete entities in complete possession of their attributes and actions, but rather the product of processes of individuation; and to begin from an unproblematised individual ignores how collective (and political) a process individuation inevitably is. It is thus a matter of beginning from broader structures which generate collective attributes and action, of which – to reiterate – are to be considered particular cases of the possible. This is not presented as a merely theoretical argument: for Bourdieu, the internalisation and naturalisation of the idea that social meaning derives from the deontological individual is at the heart of the atomisation of western societies witnessed over the past 40 years.[582] It is for Bourdieu this specific incarnation of liberalism, built around the rights of the competitive individual, conceived largely in terms of personal economic gain, which underpins the widely documented phenomena of class disintegration, the fragmentation of identity and collective narcissism.[583]

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[577] See especially K. Rahkonen, (1999), *Not Class, but Struggle: Critical Ouvertures to Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Helsinki.
[578] B. McNair. *The Sociology of Journalism*: 84.
[579] In more general terms, Edgar argues that the ethical emphasis on facticity in liberal theory renders journalism incapable of understanding its own cultural influence. See A. Edgar, 'The "Fourth Estate" and Moral Responsibilities', in D. Berry (ed.), *Ethics and Media Culture: Practices and Representations* (Oxford: Focal Press, 2000): 73-88.
[580] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 155.
[581] J. Heartfield, 'Marxism and Social Construction', in S. Wolton (ed.), *Marxism, Mysticism and Modern Theory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996): 7-27.
[582] See especially Bourdieu and Wacquant, 'On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason'; P. Bourdieu, *Contre-Feux;* see also P. Bourdieu, *Contre-feux 2: pour un mouvement social européen* (Paris: Raisons d'agir editions, 2001b).
[583] Bourdieu and Wacquant, 'On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason': 43.

Bourdieu anticipates a second specific politicality, beyond the more prosaic trope that reflection will be structured so as to reproduce hierarchies in the journalistic field, which would be effectively *depoliticised* through reflection and other practices: political economy.[584] He writes in that in order to enshrine the status quo as a natural state, fields of cultural production come to be understood by its social agents as something other than a game in which they compete for economic and political capital. This is both confirmed and denied by the case study. It was noted in Section 5.1 that there is certainly widespread rationalisation of individual success, with respondents either emphasising the relative poverty of successful journalists compared to those in positions of power with whom they mix, or else characterising personal economic status as incidental to their success as journalists. There is also limited evidence of the invocation of economic capital to make a negative distinction – namely, criticism of other journalists who have sold out – though it was noted above that the commercial underpinning of journalism is also recognised. This articulated awareness of the competitiveness of the journalistic game stands against Bourdieu's depiction of the field, but also points to a significant tension between self-image and awareness of context. In political terms, it is likely that self-characterisation as non-economically-competitive in a competitive world will have the effect of leaving that world unchallenged, as stylistically such reflections are delivered with a sense of inevitability about the capitalist underpinnings of journalism ('You'd never get into this job for the money' [interviewee 5]). It is thus a good example both of Matheson's argument, that reflection tends to be structured in such a way as to close down contestability about that which is reflected upon, as well as Bourdieu's contention that a perceived lack of competitiveness can itself be seen as strategic.

The case study's findings can also be understood in the context of linguistic determination. Cameron writes that the theory of political determination and efficacy of language amounts to regarding people not as talking the way they do because of who they are, but 'as who they are because of (among other things) the way they talk'.[585] The case study demonstrates the imperative of avoiding both overdetermination of language and the post-structuralist linguistic conjecture that language naturally partly eludes determination. Rather, it suggests that where statements appear patterned there are likely reasons for their structured emergence, but that one cannot posit a generative structure which necessitates the occurrence of any given speech act. It

[584] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 169-70.
[585] D. Cameron, 'Performing Gender Identity: Young Men's Talk and the Construction of Heterosexual Masculinity', in A. Jaworksi and N. Coupland (eds), *The Discourse Reader* (London: Routledge, 1999): 444.

also implies that some observed statements will not be reasonable, in the sense of being particular instances of the discursive possibilities of a professional field. Interpreting all utterances as performances of identity and status is in fact a decontesting move, precluding debate over the distinction between the political meaningful and insignificant. However, it remains salient that the language journalists use when reflecting on journalism plays a significant role in the struggle for status in that field. The import of the case study's qualification of linguistic determination in the journalistic field is threefold.

First, it demonstrates that a strict interpretation of Bourdieu's field model is impracticable and politically counter-productive. That is, proceeding from the premise that journalistic ethics is *entirely* strategic, and is a *wholly* symbolic world with no correspondence to the objective world, itself has the effect of reproducing existing hierarchical political structures, by fostering fatalism.[586] I have argued that it is erroneous to depict the relationship between the symbolic and material in Bourdieu's work as wholly arbitrary.[587] While there is distortion and dislocation between the two, there is also mutual constitutivity. This does not suggest that the material only exists as an object of symbolic knowledge, since the symbolic system in which it emerges is only a particular permutation of a range of possible systems associated with the objective context.

Second, there is the question of how, in phenomenological terms, journalists experience and make sense of their own identity. On one level it has been established above that Bourdieu is too narrowly deterministic on this point. Spoken evidence of identity does not only reveal the politically complicit practices of identification embedded in the journalistic field, because social agents in that field are many things besides journalists. Further, there is evidence in the case study (such as the reflexive 'furrowed brow' comment by Interviewee 5) that not only are participants capable of producing reflections on the politicality of their field at a level Bourdieu would preclude, but several also demonstrated a propensity to reflect upon the *phenomenological* relation between the journalistic field and the objective world.[588] This may itself be construed as strategic. The particular form such reflections took was *instrumentalist*, emphasising a one-to-one correspondence between their work and the material world.[589] This

[586] Garnham, *Capitalism and Communication*: 85.
[587] See, for instance, Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 200.
[588] Matheson, 'Scowling at their Notebooks': 175-7.
[589] See T. Glasser, 'Journalism's Glassy Essence', *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol. 73 (1996): 784-6.

may be interpreted at first glance as merely naïve, but it can also be seen to have political implications in the sense that it excludes alternate constructions. In any case it is nonetheless evidence of reflection about the subjective experience of being in the objective world at an analytical level beyond that which Bourdieu countenances.

Third, journalistic language is determined not only by the economies of the journalistic field, or by the other fields which journalists simultaneously inhabit, but also by journalism's position within the metafield of cultural production.[590] The characteristics of this determining aspect are difficult to ascertain, but if we accept Bourdieu's claim that journalism occupies a dominated position in the field of cultural production then it may be expected that journalists' language will reflect this inferiority. There is indeed evidence of this in the interview data – namely, the self-deprecation and ambivalence described in the case study – but an alternative analysis can be constructed: namely, that this language is used ironically and reflexively, with the effect of solidifying an agents' claim to other marketable forms of symbolic capital, such as autonomy, anti-elitism and integrity.

To summarise, the post-structuralist account sees journalistic reflection on the profession as being (incompletely) determined by generative structures, not in a uniform manner but with the overall effect of preserving the hierarchies and boundaries of the field. It was seen that introspective language, professional identity and understanding of the relation of journalistic practice to the world can all be constructed as nothing more than strategic imperatives – in brief, that considered reflection on the political structures of the field may themselves preclude real change by reproducing those structures. The same can be said to apply to this second-order statement: treating all practice as purely strategic suppresses discussion around professional ethics and identity. It is only by bracketing out the question of the depth to which political structures are generative that a more broadly political analysis can take place. That is, by proceeding as if there were deontological aspects of ethics and identity, we can focus on the more relevant questions: in what way is the structure of the journalistic field coercive, and what can be done to effect change.

[590] Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, The Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field'.

5.3.2 Professionalism and Journalistic Discourse

This bracketing out of the originary determinism of generative structures leaves an analytical position closer to that branch of journalism studies which interprets the field through theories of professional identity and ideology. While there are varying accounts of professionalisation in journalism,[591] the core theme of each is that journalistic self-identity is held together by a professional identity which journalists project, articulate to each other and operationalise in work practices. Deuze begins with a delineation of overt principles which is equitable to the construction of the first-order symbolic economy detailed in Section 5.1.[592] Further, as with the case study in this thesis, Deuze advocates moving beyond this first economy to another locus of ideological meaning. However, his conception of ideology is not posited as Marxist false consciousness, such that the true nature of the relation between journalistic practice and the world could be objectively discovered. Nor is it a generative structuralist or Gramscian hegemonic interpretation in which the dominant culture of journalism exists mainly to reinforce hierarchical political structures. Rather, for Deuze there is a 'meaning' of journalism which can be understood in deontological terms.[593] This meaning may change over time or from place to place, but the social scientist's aim is simply to describe whatever meaning to the profession there is beyond 'telling people what they want to know.'[594] For this professionalisation model, professional meaning can be found in the conscious reflections of journalists; for instance, professional identity may consist in an inflated sense of social importance. I would argue that this narrows the scope for interpretation in a similar, if obverse, fashion to the pervasively determinist approach The strategy of this thesis is to treat reflections of journalistic identity first as Durkheimian nonconscious actions which are interpreted as strategic and overdetermined in the first instance and then as partly deontological, given the implications of analytic overdetermination discussed in Chapter 2. It is only this approach which allows us to depict professional identity as defensibly meaningful and non-arbitrary to individual actors, *and* as pre-determined (that is, before emerging to the consciousness of individual actors) *and* strategic in terms of the journalistic field as a whole.

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[591] See, for example, J. Soloski, 'News Reporting and Professionalism: Some Constraints on the Reporting of the News', *Media Culture & Society,* vol. 11, no. 4 (1990): 207-28; S. Frith and P. Meech, 'Becoming a Journalist', *Journalism*, vol. 8, no. 2 (2007): 137-64; I. Schultz, 'The Journalistic Gut Feeling', *Journalism Practice*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2007): 190-207.
[592] M. Deuze, 'What Is Journalism?', *Journalism* vol. 6 (2005): 442-64.
[593] *Ibid.*: 445.
[594] *Ibid.*: 442.

If theories of professionalisation construct journalistic identity as an ideology by which it attains special status in society as a whole, they do not effectively explain how this ideology is internalised and naturalised, nor does it account for how it changes over time.[595] They do offer a different level of interpretation than analytic frameworks which seek to understand journalism primarily as an industry, literary genre, culture or social system, in that it looks at how journalists make sense of their own work. It does not question, however, the structural determination underpinning the process of individuation. Instead, it takes a more 'horizontal' approach, seeing journalistic ideology as reproduced between journalists, through the continuous refinement of the consensus about who is a 'real' journalist, and what constitutes 'real' news.[596] This is the goal of the first stage of the case study analysis, in which each speech act referring to good or bad journalistic practice (or journalists) was coded and structured. The conclusion of this preliminary analysis confirms that there is a consensus of sorts, but it is bifurcated. In accordance with the traditional divide in journalistic principles discussed since the late nineteenth century, there are two models of good practice, based on the conception of the task of journalism as reporting the facts or performing a moral service.[597] While there is, unsurprisingly, considerable acrimony between the two camps, there is also a general consensus within each (especially within the 'reporting' sub-field), and also evidence of continual refinement. Principles were not regarded as static and universal, but as temporally and politically contextual, and always contestable – though this changeability was certainly not given to preclude pinning down 'good' journalism in any one time or place.

The secondary analysis of the case study also confirmed another trend noted in professionalisation studies: the mystification of professional practice to outsiders. However, while the analytic categories of mystification and esotericisation are widely used in the professionalisation literature,[598] specifically applying the Bourdieusian model allows us a level of insight available neither to professionalisation's ideological approach nor to the structurally overdetermining approach detailed above. With regard to the former, Bourdieu is able to show not only that mystification occurs but also how, in the context of self-identification and distinction. Professional identity is not simply a functional myth into which individuals buy, fooling themselves and each other. It is inextricably linked with the political process of individuation: that is, professional identity is implicated in the process by which individual

[595] *Cf* Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*: 240-2.
[596] B. Zelizer, 'Journalists as Interpretative Communities'.
[597] M. Schudson, *The Sociology of News* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2003): 64-89.
[598] See especially T. J. Johnson, *Professions and Power* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

consciousness emerges. By this account, the political necessity for distinction at the field level precedes individual identity. Mystification operates as a strategy for achieving distinction, and also precedes selfhood. Thus, not only the form but the fact of self-reflection is necessitated by structural demands – which also shape its particular form.

The above describes the process of professionalisation in the journalistic field which, by way of a journalistic ideology and the emergence of (partially reflexive) self-identity, serves to reinforce the field's hierarchical structures. The precise nature of this 'ideology' is not fully defined in the majority of the literature. Schlesinger, [599] and Golding and Elliott (1977) [600] mention a journalistic 'occupational identity', while Soloski (1990)[601] names an 'ideology of professionalism', without detailing what this is in practice. It is first necessary to define what nature of ideology underpins journalistic professionalism. It was seen above that for Deuze this ideology is not precisely Gramscian, in that although it does reproduce relations of hegemony it does not exist solely as an instrument of structural reproduction. This does not fit the Bourdieusian model, in which modes of self-identity and professional practice such as ethics have little demonstrable ontological depth beyond the political functions they perform in the field. However, the evidence of the case study confirms that Deuze's position is preferable, for two reasons. First, as suggested above, while there are discursive patterns which do give rise to the inferability of the staticisation of arguably arbitrary symbolic capital configurations, many observed speech acts clearly have no such function, because they can reasonably be interpreted as effectively meaningless. The category of meaninglessness cannot be defined absolutely, but it is consistent with Bourdieusian social science that the analyst can draw a line beyond which the search for deeper levels of political reproduction is fruitless or counter-productive. Second, it is impossible to define which determinations are effected specifically in the context of the journalistic field, as opposed to other fields in which an agent is active. One could theoretically make the case that all reflections by an individual effect hegemonic reproduction at some level – the wider field of cultural production, for example – but the data makes clear that only a proportion of reflections can be associated with power relations in the journalistic field. To modify Deuze, in this context a journalistic ideology is best defined, after Freeden,[602] as a coherent set of ideas by which individuals interpret their world and engage with it. To follow

[599] P. Schlesinger, *Putting "Reality" Together: BBC News* (London: Constable, 1978).
[600] P. Golding and P. Elliott, *Making the News* (London: Longman, 1979).
[601] J. Soloski, 'News Reporting and Professionalism: Some Constraints on the Reporting of the News', *Media Culture & Society,* vol. 11, no. 4 (1990): 207-28.
[602] M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*: 3.

Giddens, some of these practices will have political implications and all are at least partly determined by an ideology internalised as normal.[603] Journalistic professionalism is thus an ideology in that it is the product of political structures and is generally oriented towards the political function of structural reproduction – but it is not exhausted by this function.

If journalistic ideology is conceived as a partially politically complicit way of interpreting one's own practice and journalism's relation to society, what is its content? For McMane it consists largely in a collective identity of 'class spirit'.[604] This identity is explained in part by the historic overrepresentation of journalists of working class backgrounds, but is at odds with the contemporary world in which journalism recruits are increasingly middle class (a shift that could either be due to status, in that journalism is arguably increasingly perceived as a profession,[605] or more simply the fact that entry-level positions are unpaid, and thus dependent on parental support). In fact it is plausible that a working-class ideology can easily coexist with a predominantly middle-class demographic. It was seen in the case study analysis that there is a tendency to express a disinterest in financial gain when participants are asked why they entered the profession, or else to mention the gap between average levels of prosperity among journalists and in the more elite circles they encounter professionally. For some, including the former international editor of a British broadsheet, a senior columnist from a broadsheet and the news editor of a major US quality newspaper, this gap is palpably untrue. However, it does serve to reinforce pervasive journalistic self-deprecation, in both the fields of power and cultural production. The journalistic ideology then is not tied to personal economic capital, but to a form of symbolic capital manifest in self- and collective identity, characterised by an anti-authority, anti-elitist mindset.[606] This serves the dual purpose of obscuring the elitism which indubitably pervades journalism internally, and emphasises the functional myth of journalists defending the interests of the masses, speaking truth to power. That it frequently takes the form of a roguish, adventurous anti-elitism also invests journalistic identity with a certain romantic appeal. While it could be argued that this is offset by the negative conventionally-received tropes of journalistic identity, it does help to secure journalism's place within the field of cultural production, a place which is by no means naturally its own.

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[603] Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method*: 121.
[604] A. McMane, 'A Comparative Analysis of Standards of Reporting among French and US Newspaper Journalists', *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 79, no. 1 (1993): 87-100.
[605] Deuze, 'What is Journalism?'.
[606] N. Carpentier, 'Identity, Contingency, Rigidity: The (Counter-)hegemonic Constructions of the Identity of the Media Professional', *Journalism*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2005): 119-219.

Where journalistic identity is romanticised or valorised, it also serves a gatekeeping function as well as reinforcing power relations within the field. The number of speech acts in which participants talk about a good journalist's innate 'feel' for the demands of the profession thus supports the theories of professionalism put forward by Johnson and Deuze. In fact, this argument applies equally to negative mythologies of journalistic identity. Public opinion polling has suggested that journalists in the UK are trusted less than lawyers and estate agents,[607] but this could in itself help to reinforce an ideology within the field, and the relative positions of individual journalists. That is, whether a journalist is perceived as good because of an instinctive sense of journalistic ethics or because they possess the lack of scruples needed to succeed in a cynical world, there is a set of traits the performance and internalisation of which has the political effect of stabilising relative positions of power. Schudson nominates a definition of professional ideology which could feasibly incorporate both negative and positive identification: put simply, the knowledge of what constitutes news, deeply rooted in the communicators' consciousness.[608] This is entirely consistent with the mystification thesis which emerged from the analysis of the case study. The literature, however, lacks a discussion of the degree to which this sense is dislocated from the material represented in news, the extent to which it is defined by a quasi-autonomous symbolic system. This thesis demonstrates that any of these characterisations of journalistic identity – ethical, ruthless or having an innate nose for news – are partially constructed according to the political relations of the field, and broadly operate in such a way that dominant actors or institutions can maintain their positions of status, and reinforce the dominance of a specific (competitive individualist) form of liberalism in the broader field of cultural production. However, there is also a case to be made on phenomenological and normative grounds for bracketing out the question of whether ethics or professional principles can be debated uncynically. While Bourdieu's own work on journalism sees it a pointless exercise,[609] the working through of Bourdieusian theory presented here validates the discussion continued by Schudson and Dahlgren[610] on the basis of a reflexive consideration of the political consequences of not discussing journalistic principles in deontological terms, and in terms of the phenomenological contention that the fundamental priority of dominatory political structures cannot be known.

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[607] Consistently low levels of public trust in journalism was noted in Section 5.2.
[608] M. Schudson, 'The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism', *Journalism,* vol. 2, no. 2 (2001): 153.
[609] Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance*: 70-7.
[610] See, for instance, P. Dahlgren and C. Sparks (eds), *Journalism and Popular Culture* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1993): 1-23; P. Dahlgren, 'Media Logic in Cyberspace: Repositioning Journalism and its Publics', *Javnost/The Public*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1996): 59-72.

A distinction needs to be drawn between a putative ideology, identity and culture of journalism. A 'culture' of journalism is in fact closer to Schudson's definition of an ideology of professionalism and journalism: to restate, a collection of values, strategies and codes characterising professional journalism and shared most widely by its members.[611] An ideology of journalism in the context of this discussion is such a culture as it reinforces the structures of the field, valorising a particular political stance or, putting it into Foucauldian terms as Dahlgren does, reinforcing the 'dominant discourses' of journalism. Identity is not constituted simply in terms of identity politics – that is, in a manner in which identity is *prima facie* meaningful – but rather in the light of the role that field power relations play in the emergence of individual self-consciousness. Identity is thus a narrower category than disposition. Journalistic disposition here refers not to personality characteristics, but the adaptive alignment of individual practices to the demands of the journalistic game. Practices of selfhood form a subset of this field of practices, though others – for Bourdieu, the more effective ones, politically – are those which function outside of consciousness, as instinctive, practical mastery.

I have here suggested three recognisable journalistic identities (reporter, campaigner and cynic): stereotypes to be sure, but also functional myths operative in the public perception of journalism (in the case of the first two), and amongst peers (for the third). Does it make sense to assume that journalistic identity can be reduced to a handful of categories which apply, if not universally, then at least across the western world? Bourdieu, certainly, is criticised for positing such a monolithic model of the journalistic field.[612] However, this criticism is baseless if the analytic position Bourdieu sets out in *Outline* is taken seriously. For Bourdieu it is only the objective structural origins of symbolic capital, identity and so on which are monolithic. The observable permutations generated by these conditions of possibility need share little resemblance in order for commonality of generative structures to be viable. Weaver goes further and suggests, by way of an international comparative analysis, that in their sense of newsworthiness and news values, journalistic identity actually *is* uniform.[613] The case study, while limited in its international scope, reveals substantially more contestability than Weaver suggests, though it has been seen that a common core of values was discovered. In Bourdieusian terms, what is important is not the presence or absence of contestability or diversity of journalistic values and subjectivities, but

[611] Deuze, 'What is Journalism?': 445.
[612] R. Benson, 'Mapping Field Variation: Journalism in France and the United States', in R. Benson and E. Neveu (eds.), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 85-112.
[613] D. Weaver, *The Global Journalist: News People Around the World* (New Jersey: Hampton Press, 1998): 456.

rather the effects of each. In this sense, more important than the fact that there is much debate over journalistic values are the other discourses which are thereby reinforced. Thus, while I have suggested here that debates on the nature of journalism are defensible even if only on deontological grounds, it remains important for the social scientist to be aware that even apparently radical debates usually have the conservative effect of enshrining some principle of differentiation.

In his influential thesis on the politics of war correspondence in the Vietnam War, Hallin posits two interconnected factors which shaped journalistic discourse.[614] The first of these is more bluntly political: government control of the news agenda and its influence over the specific framing of international news. A Bourdieusian analysis does not contribute substantially to this argument since, while Bourdieu does not disagree that holders of official power use overt control, influence and censorship to preserve their positions of domination, his focus is aimed not at disciplinary regimes but at power relations reproduced with the complicity of its victims. In this regard, Bourdieu's potential contribution to journalism studies aligns more closely with Hallin's second factor influencing journalistic discourse: the Cold War consensus.[615] Needless to say, Bourdieu does not tackle the conceptual framework underpinning foreign relations in the US, but does write of the tendency of both the media and official discourse to reduce political issues to binaries of us/them, liberal/authoritarian and democratic/communist.[616] Since journalists in specific professional contexts are already invested with these oppositions, there is no need for the use of overt political coercion to reinforce them. For Bourdieu the consensus in the field of cultural production after 1968 (noted above) was not a monolithic but a binary one. That is, journalists, academics and other cultural producers were not coerced into reproducing a single ideology, but rather into conforming to a continuum – left to right, or liberal to conservative, or, in the case of the French left, social democratic to socialist. The consensus Bourdieu refers to then is over the terms of political debate rather than a political programme as such, and those terms concern specifically the management of the market in social democratic capitalist societies.

In more specific terms, it is possible to flesh out how this consensus leads to conformism and exclusions in journalistic practice. First, political reporting may oppose one political position or another, but is incapable of challenging (or being cognisant of) the conditions of possibility of

[614] D. Hallin, *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
[615] Bourdieu and Wacquant, 'On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason'.
[616] Bourdieu, 'L'Emprise du journalisme'.

the political landscape itself. Financial journalism may support or oppose fiscal or monetary policies, but will unthinkingly conform to sustained economic growth through market development as the overarching goal of economic policy. Foreign affairs coverage may support or oppose nationalism, interventionism or humanitarianism, but will instinctively reinforce an exclusionary, us-and-them categorisation, determined hierarchically. And arts journalism may champion the avant-garde over traditional cultural producers, but only in such a way that preserves certain principles of differentiation and the elites who determine them.[617] Bourdieusianism augments contemporary journalism studies by suggesting that even a good journalist can only hope to have autonomy from a particular dominant journalistic or cultural ideology. A journalist cannot reliably reflect critically on the paradigm from without, since she is herself a product of a discourse defined in oppositional terms. Applying this argument to academics, writers and artists, while an individual may set out any position on cultural production from elitist to populist, according to Bourdieusian logic it is unthinkable to an individual implicated in the game of cultural production to question why culture matters, politically, at all. The culturalist allegations against Bourdieu were set out in Section 2.2.3: like Marcuse, he is criticised for assuming that the category of 'culture' is politically meaningful before analysing the politics of the specific forms it takes. However, it can be countered that Bourdieu is not using culture deontologically, but rather seeking to make sense of the political structures which produce not only the forms culture takes but also the means of their apprehension and differentiation. In journalism studies, specifically, the Bourdieusian approach can describe those conceptual categories which become practically unthinkable in a particular sociohistorical context. These are the metafields within which not only the particular dominant forms but the categorical validity of concepts such as culture attain political meaningfulness.

In a later work Hallin articulates a position closer to this Bourdieusian account.[618] Instead of speaking of the dominance of US liberalism or conservatism or of a nationalist or patriotic consensus in international news, Hallin points to a broader historical trend in which ebbs and flows in political predominance as well as journalistic principles should be located. This is a period of 'high modernism', in which norms such as 'seamlessness' and 'wholeness' dominate the working journalist's view of their profession. It is only on the basis of this metaconcept of

[617] For a Bourdieusian analysis of arts journalism see, for instance, G. Harries and K. Wahl-Jorgensen, 'The Culture of Arts Journalists: Elitists, Saviors or Manic Depressives?', *Journalism,* vol. 8, no. 6 (2007): 619-639.
[618] D. Hallin, 'The Passing of the "High Modernism" of American Journalism, *Journal of Communication*, vol. 42, no. 3 (192): 14-25.

the journalist's relation to the world that more concrete principles can become operative. Commenting on the work of Golding and Elliott,[619] Merritt[620] and Kovach and Rosenstiel,[621] Deuze groups the dominant principles of the high modernist period in journalism (roughly identified as 1960-90) as public service, objectivity, autonomy, immediacy and ethics. The primary principles of the case study confirm four of these categories, though I would argue that the last is redundant. It is reasonable to argue that what journalists share is not a common ethical position, but rather the fact they have an ethical position, however different. However, while Deuze identifies the key characteristics of ethics as a sense of morality, validity and legitimacy, it is difficult to see how these categories could be filled other than through the previously identified principles which invoke a valuable role with regard to the public, neutrality, impartiality, relevance and independence.

5.3.4 New Institutionalism

As with professionalism, it is useful to assess what a Bourdieusian account of journalism tells us that new institutionalism does not.[622] It was noted in Chapter 4 that Bourdieu conceptualises journalists not as individuals as such, but as journalists who differ. That is, it is cultural and class distinctions which characterise the journalistic field, rather than some collective professional identity. This depiction of the journalistic field (like any other) as an arena of struggle does give a more variegated account than institutionalism could generate. However, Benson argues that institutionalism, for its part, has greater scope for explaining what he terms the 'cultural inertia of professional traditions'.[623] It is certainly the case that institutionalism stresses the role of historical practices in explaining a professional or institutional culture which exceeds the sum of its practices. However, I would argue that Bourdieu's use of habitus as 'double historicity' – that is, as something which is determined by, which naturalises, obscures and reproduces history,[624] is also capable of explaining the role that traditions play in shaping present practice. Moreover,

[619] P. Golding and P. Elliott, *Making the News* (London: Longman, 1979).
[620] D, Merritt, 'Public Journalism – Defining a Democratic Art', *Media Studies Journal*, vol. 9, no. 3 (1995): 125-32.
[621] B. Kovach and T. Rosenstiel, *The Elements of Journalism* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2001).
[622] This section refers in particular to the reworking of Weber by DiMaggio and Powell. See P. DiMaggio and W. Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48 (1983):147-160.
[623] R. Benson, 'News Media as a "Journalistic Field": What Bourdieu adds to new institutionalism, and vice versa', *Political Communication,* vol. 23, no. 2 (2006): 187-202.
[624] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*: 82.

Bourdieu adds two significant elements to the institutionalist account: first, he describes *how* the historicity of habitus is forgotten as history;[625] second, he gives cogent explanation of *why* there is cultural inertia – in short, that it preserves the status quo which benefits certain groups of actors in the field. Bourdieu writes:

> "The stakes of the struggle between dominants and pretenders, the issues they dispute … depend on the state of the legitimate problematic, that is, the space of the possibilities bequeathed by previous struggles, a space which tends to give direction to the search for solutions and, consequently, influences the present and future of production."[626]

However, what new institutionalism does address in a way which Bourdieu does not is the influence on field practices of other fields. Bourdieu writes that "if I want to find out what one or another journalist is going to say or write, or will find obvious or unthinkable, normal or worthless, I have to know the position that journalist occupies in this space. I need to know, as well, the specific power of the news medium in question."[627] Bourdieu does allow that the journalistic field varies according to medium, but does not adequately develop the possibility that it also varies by country, or that the unique economic and political fields in different countries will influence agents in their respective journalistic fields in distinct ways. Duval, for instance, attempts to measure both internal and external capital in the French business press.[628] The results are tentative, highlighting not the inadequacy of the research but the difficulty of constructing accurate measures of metacapital in the metafield of power within which the journalistic field interacts with others, but does suggest the potential benefit of including extra-field influences in any analysis of professional behaviour. Bourdieu does embrace this approach in later works,[629] but continues to stress the tendency of one field's dominant principles of differentiation to supplant another's, rather than exploring the idea that an agent's habitus may be simultaneously aligned to several fields.

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[625] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*: 56.
[626] Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*: 206. Quoted in Benson, 'News Media as a Journalistic Field': 188.
[627] Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*: 41.
[628] Duval, 'Economic Journalism in France'.
[629] See especially Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, The Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field'.

5.3.5 Journalistic Dispositions

While Bourdieu does not extend to simultaneous field immersion, he does place emphasis on another set of extra-field factors explaining agents' behaviour: namely, their personal histories before becoming professionals.[630] This is by no means to suggest that Bourdieu invokes a discrete, voluntarist individual whose personality resists professional normalisation. Rather, an individual's habitus will have been active in various fields throughout the agent's lifetime, and as such his/her sense of selfhood – including professional selfhood – will have been multiply determined. For Bourdieu, this means in particular an emphasis on a journalist's parents, upbringing, socioeconomic class and education. While the case study in this thesis was unable to undertake a longitudinal analysis, it is clear from Bourdieu's work that not only field position but also temporal trajectory are constitutive of an individual's schemes of practice.[631] The case study, while for reasons of space could not conduct entire life histories of interviewees, thus seeks to establish why entering the journalistic field made sense to a respondent, why it seemed a logical or natural step to take. The responses – in the majority of cases along the lines of 'I'm just that sort of person'– bear out the contention that for each individual a combination of experiences and position-takings with regard to location, class and so on will make certain life choices more or less automatic and others unthinkable. The advantage of this approach is that, instead of viewing a journalist's output as an unequivocal structural determination, the Bourdieusian approach will conceive of it as one possibility among many, and then work backwards to attempt to construct the conditions of possibility and the structural configurations underlying them. The social scientific construction of habitus does not allow for the prediction of behaviour, but it does point towards the mechanisms which make a particular professional act – say, the composition of a specific article – conceivable, normal and professionally meaningful.

While diverging significantly on emphasis, the authors included in this discussion of journalistic ideology, professionalism and discourse all confirm the notion that professional journalistic

[630] Writing about the gendering of journalism, Van Zoonen notes that: "...men's professional identities are much less fragmented and problematic than those of women in journalism.... Female journalists working in traditional news journalism therefore have a much more fragmented and contradictory professional identity than men." This adds another dimension to the discussion over whether Bourdieu overstates the disposition-determining aspect of professional fields, suggesting that the extent to which professional identities are determined intra-field varies according to demographic variables. L. Van Zoonen, 'One of the Girls? The Changing Gender of Journalism', in C. Carter *et al.* (eds), *News, Gender and Power* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998): 39, 45. De Bruin argues that globalisation is another factor leading to increasing fragmentation of disposition. M. De Bruin, 'Gender, Organizational and Professional Identities in Journalism', *Journalism,* vol. 1, no. 2 (2000): 233.

[631] Benson, 'News Media as a "Journalistic Field"': 194.

principles are not universal, but historically and socially specific. This context may be determined variously, from the dominance of a particular capitalist economic mode, or of liberalism, or of a teleological shift towards or away from rationalism or relativism, for example. The literature demonstrates that it is nothing new to interpret trends in journalism as reflective of historic shifts.[632] Nor is it a radical departure to contend that such shifts represent not simply journalism adapting to what economic or social forces require of it, but to an extent a quasi-autonomous development whose meaning is impossible to assess apart from internally – that is, in the terms of the symbolic system which characterises journalism at any particular juncture. I argue in this thesis that while Bourdieu tends to stress continuity to the detriment of an account of historic change, shifts can be accounted for in his model, and explained both according to endemic symbolic and extrinsic material forces. The primary political function of journalistic principles in any particular context is as a means of differentiating dominated and dominating positions within the journalistic field, and journalism's position in society more broadly. If struggle is the defining characteristic of a field of cultural production, then a dominant set of professional principles can be understood as the means by which individuals and institutions compete. This competition is not so much for ownership of whichever the dominant principles of the day are, but for the ability to determine what counts as a recognisably dominant principle of differentiation in future.

It has been seen that professionalist accounts of journalism commonly incorporate a journalistic discourse or ideology. From Bourdieu, we can also derive a journalistic disposition, in the sense of a set of anticipatory mechanisms and embodied practices oriented to the symbolic system which journalists use to construct meaning around objects and phenomena and, inasmuch as self-reflection is one of these practices, which contribute to the determination of agent subjectivities. The professionalist approach often also encompasses a notion of collective identity, and I suggested above that there is a widely held underdog identity, as well as at least three distinct journalistic 'types' (reporter, campaigner, cynic) within the field. The category of identity does not fit easily within the Bourdieusian framework, as it places greater emphasis on the content of subjective experience than the mechanisms which establish the preconditions of that experience. However, it has been demonstrated that the content of at least some individual self-reflections resists reduction to nonconscious strategising. Carpentier presents a response to this incompatibility which squares well with Bourdieusian theory insofar as it brackets out the

[632] See, for instance, M. Conboy, *Journalism: A Critical History* (London: Sage, 2004); McNair, *News and Journalism in the UK*; McNair, *The Sociology of Journalism*; Schudson, *The Power of News*.

ontological status of conscious self-reflection.[633] I noted in the case study instances in which an interviewee speaks of the stereotype of the war correspondent as having a 'furrowed brow' or 'gravel[ly] voice', and Carpentier begins from the abstracted, generalised image of journalists 'scowling at their notebooks'. By two interviewees, such descriptions are used cynically, suggesting that journalists will consciously conform to a stereotypical professional identity if they believe it will make them appear more authentic. For Bourdieu, such individuation will largely occur below the level of conscious reflection. Carpentier argues that, regardless of the ontological grounding of such identities, as soon as there is temporary stabilisation of a professional subjectivity then political analysis can be brought to bear on them. In the broader context Carpentier is writing against the Derridean branch of post-structuralist thought which argues that macroconcepts such as identity and hegemony are baseless insofar as the power relations which underpin them are inevitably local rather than universal. In a move compatible with Bourdieu (and also Latour and Laclau), qualified, temporary, staticisation of modes of subjectivity or professional discourse is sufficient grounds to treat the content of those categories, and not only their conditionality, as meaningful.

In practical terms, this means that we can look both at what constitutes journalistic subjectivity, as well as more traditional categories such as codes of conduct, ethics and journalism's role in society. Against the professionalisation model, this does not proceed from an assumption of homogeneity in journalistic dispositions; it was seen above that journalistic identities are diverse and often conflicting. What a Bourdieusian perspective allows for, which professionalism does not, is the contention that oppositional or conflicting identities – between generations, specialisations, or between 'reporters' and 'moral authorities' – rather than transforming the field through struggle, actually serve to reinforce hierarchical power structures in the field. Carpentier's evocation of Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse is appropriate here,[634] insofar as it emphasises that while there are significant stakes in the struggles between subgroups in a field, the continuation of those struggles will cement the terms of reference for future struggles, thus effecting a reproduction not of who dominates and who is dominated, but of the principle of differentiation between the two. This thesis argues that both the content of intrafield struggles as articulated by agents, and the underlying politically-structured space which is obscured by those overt struggles, are politically salient and methodologically defensible. Bourdieu unnecessarily

[633] N. Carpentier, 'Identity, Contingency and Rigidity: The (Counter-)Hegemonic Constructions of the Identity of the Media Professional', *Journalism*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2005): 199-219.
[634] *Ibid.*: 199-202.

excludes potentially fruitful evidence in rejecting the analysis of ethics and self-reflection as they are consciously understood by agents rather than through the nonconscious, strategic effects they enact. Carpentier argues for the validity of examining ethics, but only on the basis that, by observation, there are norms and nodal points (field positions, in the Bourdieusian sense) which endure.[635] This can be argued more forcefully. It remains of primary importance to uncover the mechanisms which sustain these norms and points, as well as who benefits and who is disadvantaged by their continuance. However, in order to meet the phenomenological commitment to describing as fully as possible the experience of being in the journalistic field, and the political imperative of opposing decontestation, norms and positions conceived in qualifiedly deontological terms, is valid.

[635] *Ibid.*: 201-7.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications

The case study produced both significant insights into the field of war correspondence and the limits of Bourdieusian methodology. This is not inconsistent: for Bourdieu, the results of sociological analysis can always be defended as being 'about' something more than the academic apprehension of its object, though that is the necessary starting point of Bourdieusian research. It can thus defensibly be claimed that the systematic misrecognition of symbolic capital exposed within the field is illuminating about the field itself, while simultaneously arguing that the self-reflexive application of Bourdieusian principles demonstrates that there is a limit to how much political determination can be attributed to observed practice. We now leave behind the empirical conclusions about war correspondence so as to focus on the conclusions drawn about Bourdieusian philosophy of practice: namely, the deontological ascription of political complicity to generative structures in Bourdieusian theory. It has been demonstrated in this thesis that the hypothetical origin of political determination in Bourdieusian theory – that which gives rise to the possibility of field practices, consciousness, apprehension and analysis – is itself implicitly political. That is, instead of maintaining that 'the political' only has meaning in the specific contexts in which it emerges as a recognisable symbolic category, all determination is characterised by the tendency to reproduce structures in which individuals and groups dominate or are dominated. This is a defensible teleology of structure, but it is not one which can be directly derived from Bourdieusian phenomenology. Insofar as it is defensible to articulate, first, a belief that a field can become better or worse;[636] second, a conception of transformation which, willed or not, goes beyond the merely haphazard; and third, a notion of power whose continuity by way of its structuredness exceeds its individual instantiations, then it makes sense to speak of politics as something qualifiedly substantive and durable, rather than constructing the political in purely reflexive terms. The question which then arises is at what point a limit to Bourdieu's philosophy of social science should be established on normative grounds. Too rigid an adherence to the idea that practices are never fully 'owned' by individuals, to take one significant example, would necessitate abandoning an ethical position based on individual autonomy and responsibility. *Distinction, La Misère du monde, On Television and Journalism* and Bourdieu's *Le Monde* commentaries make it clear that autonomy and

[636] While this may be variously defined, in this thesis I have defined positive change in a field with greater autonomy of the pole of restricted production from the pole of large-scale production.

responsibility, at both the group and individual level, are operational in Bourdieu's politics. The problem is not that there is such a quasi-universal as responsibility in Bourdieu's work, but that a strict adherence to Bourdieusian phenomenological principles would restrict analysis to the (academic) field-specific conditions of possibility and nonconscious strategising aspects of such a norm. In more general terms, the political loading of the determination of practice necessitates conceptions of domination and transformation whose precise form and conditionality is mystified.[637] The above should make clear that it is not a matter of pedantry to point out the endurance of this quasi-universal. The perseverance in Bourdieu's work of implicitly natural or universal origins of political domination obscures what is included in and excluded from this category, under which conditions it is meaningful and how it varies according to context.

It is then neither difficult nor, in the final analysis, of great significance in itself that one can locate concepts in Bourdieu's work which operate as quasi-universal[638] but which are, by the phenomenological principles Bourdieu foregrounds, inevitably contextually and temporally determined. The political, or more correctly the instances of political instantiation, are imbued with a teleology which is implicitly projected as a stable category. This may be properly termed substantialism,[639] albeit of a particular kind where substance is recast as always-already-vanishing instantiation or calling into being that is, to an extent, regular and durable. It is a position which can only be supported deontologically, conceding that the originality of the structural determination of transformativity must be bracketed if normative commitments to autonomy, responsibility and contestability are to be prioritised. This occlusion, which succeeds in positing transformative politics as a transcendental category, in turn rests upon, I contend, Bourdieu's definition of practice. Practice for Bourdieu is, in some limited but crucial respect, mystified: it is the location of the invisible action of coercive political power and simultaneously the indefinable, intangible site of political resistance and subversion.

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[637] This thesis does not contend that the exposure of autonomy and responsibility in Bourdieu's work is novel. See, for example, C. Calhoun and L. Wacquant, '"Social Science with Conscience": Remembering Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002)', *Thesis Eleven,* no. 70 (2002); J. Crowley, 'Pierre Bourdieu's Anti-Politics of Transparency', *Innovation: the European journal of social sciences,* vol. 15, no. 2 (2002); M. Schudson, 'Autonomy from What?'.

[638] Crowley, for instance, notes that Bourdieu's drive towards disinterest resulted in Bourdieu being seen as apolitical, where in fact a normative political philosophy is detectable in Bourdieu's work. See Crowley, 'Pierre Bourdieu's Anti-Politics of Transparency'.

[639] That is, the belief that there is a 'real existence' underlying phenomena, or 'the doctrine that substantial noumena exist as a basis for phenomena', *Random House Unabridged Dictionary* (1997).

Methodologically, it follows that every observed and observable social phenomenon is to be interpreted as an instance of domination or autonomy (or both). Not only does this preclude a differentiation of power effects, it rules out any limits to the political at all, since there is no phenomenological category which is not characterised by determination, and determination is inherently, inescapably political. This extension not just of power effects but of *violence* to every conceivable action, rather than generating a more incisive, calibrated account of the operation of power, in fact results in the opposite. There remain no means by which to distinguish the determined and determining aspects of practice from the merely observed, since the scope of what counts as practice is limited to the points of inscription. Further, if there is determination, there are no means by which to differentiate the significantly political from the trivial, since to exclude any manifestation of power from the (meaningfully) political is to commit precisely the fallacy that Bourdieusian theory seeks to expose in other theories as well as in culturally accepted normative frameworks and in common sense. The dilemma is particularly problematic at the level of the apparently banal: while for Bourdieu's conception of political domination and agency to be meaningful there needs to be a corresponding conceptual category of the meaningless outside it, Bourdieusian analysis is most incisive when it uncovers the political mechanisms underpinning seemingly innocuous arenas. In the next section I argue that if a distinction between the politically significant and insignificant is to be drawn, in other words if a limit, beyond which Bourdieusian analysis is deemed to be politically counter-productive, is to be set, then it cannot be achieved through social scientific calculation. Determining that which is bracketed out of phenomenological investigation is not entirely subjective, but nor can it be completely objective. Rather, it is a matter of establishing defensible, transparent criteria, and this in turn depends upon establishing the validity of an authoritative subject of knowledge.

6.1 The Impossible Object and Subject of Bourdieusian Theory

The case study has established the conditionality of the overt 'rules of the game' and misrecognised symbolic economy by which the value of journalistic output and, especially, the field-wide recognisability of the capital which marks a (successful) war correspondent, is established. In phenomenological terms this is equivalent to establishing the structures of subjectification in the journalistic field: namely, which subjectivities are recognisable (by peers and the broader public audience) as journalists or war correspondents, and how individuals embody those subjectivities quasi-naturally. This section addresses the implications of such an

account of professionalism. First, it is necessary to establish what can be said about the object of journalism or war correspondence in the light of the fact that analysis points towards, if not its arbitrariness, then its overdetermination by a symbolic system whose rules are disconnected from objective relations. Second, a Bourdieusian reading necessitates a second-order, self-reflexive application, this time of professionalism and legitimacy in academic research. This will be approached from the premise that there are practical limits to self-reflexivity beyond which academic work reduces to an inwardly-focussed examination of the implicatedness of academic practice, which I have argued here is counter-productive to the normative impetus of Bourdieusian analysis.

It was established in Chapter 2 that, for Bourdieu, there is nothing natural or universal about the instrumentalist manner in which the world is apprehended through the subject/object dichotomy. Further, Bourdieu, *pace* Merleau-Ponty, posits that its continued practical manifestation is both observable and demonstrably reinforcing of coercive, hierarchical political structures. It is therefore to be expected that the processes of subjectification and objectification, distinct from an analytical elevation of subject and object, continue to figure prominently in this branch of political theory. Foucault coined the term 'assujetissement' to capture the double-edged sword of subjectivity: in short, that subjectification necessitates subjection, insofar as it is inevitably accompanied by an objectification whose extent and consequences cannot be fully controlled. It was seen in Section 2.1 that the intellectual history of the phenomenological supersedence of the subject-object dichotomy and the political response to subjectification and objectification have been dominant themes in twentieth century phenomenology. Common to these approaches to the subject-object question, however, are two dilemmas. The first is that objectification is simultaneously coercive and necessary in the carrying out of academic work. The second is that subjectification – the embodiment of knowledge or speaking as an authority – is simultaneously phenomenologically impossible, practically (observably) existent in the context of a coercive relation to its objects, and necessary if normative ideals of professional accountability or personal responsibility are to hold. Let us address the problem of objectification in neo-Marxist phenomenology first.

Bourdieu, like Foucault and many others,[640] is frequently preoccupied with the risk that the best-intended social theorist may inadvertently reinforce an unacknowledged coercive power relation. Further, it is argued that academic self-reflexivity is not infallible: the writing of political and sociological theory is always liable to be complicit with dominatory structures in ways which are to an extent unknowable. On first principles, the object of political theory (for academics) is that which is determined by academic practices recognised as legitimate within the field – in a sense, the object is whatever those with authority say it is. However, this is never sustainable, for two reasons: first, the 'subject' is not a stable category but instead a temporally specific subjectivity which is also always objectified;[641] second, 'objects' are similarly unstable and resist complete determination. Theorists from the ethnomethodological tradition emphasise the ethical commitment to avoid overdetermining the analytic subject; Bourdieu argues instead that such objectification is unavoidable, and the only defensible methodological response is to make overt and defend the specific character of that objectification.[642] The potential implication is that the 'object' is not equatable with a social group or individual as such; it is instead the product of the political theoretical habitus, and nothing more. That is, the objects of Bourdieusian theory are the generative logics constructed in methodological practice, distinct from and not thickly representative of the 'things' or social groups themselves.

Bourdieu thus distances himself from that theoretical position which aims to allow its objects to 'speak for themselves', or to represent their experience 'authentically'. However, it cannot be argued that that which Bourdieu's sociological works are 'about' stops at the interaction of multiple habitus. It is clear that what Bourdieu terms 'double-distancing'[643] does not entirely reject representationalism, though authentic or true representation are ruled out. Generative logic, bodily hexis, regulated doxa, economic relations, social imperatives and linguistic commonplaces are not only objectifications as such, but objectifications of something which

[640] The academic overdetermination of the analytic object is a particularly recurrent preoccupation in postcolonial theory. See, for example, H. K. Bhabha, 'The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: The Question of Agency', *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994); G. C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on Widow-Sacrifice', *Wedge,* vol. 7, no. 8 (1985). Bourdieu largely opposed postcolonial theory, as Richard Nice noted: "He argues with Franz Fanon. He's unable to subscribe to the romantic idea of the Third World revolution, precisely because he is too aware of the conditions for what he calls a rational project, and he is rewriting those ideas in *Algeria 1960*." R. Nice (ed.), 'Interview with C. Mahar': unpublished ms, 1985.

[641] Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 118-20.

[642] P. Bourdieu, *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999): 8.

[643] See Hamel, 'The Positions of Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Touraine Respecting Qualitative Methods': 9-11.

exceeds its symbolic apprehension as an object of knowledge. We may then say that the object of Bourdieusian theory remains, with qualification, the structured space of relative, objective positions. His response to the problem of overdetermination of the focus of analysis, characteristic of neo-Marxist theorists from Adorno to Laclau, is the constant questioning of the conditions of particular forms of objectification – scientific, economic, psychological and so on. In so doing, the theorist inevitably posits other objectifications – for Adorno it is a dialectical doubly-negated object, for Bourdieu it is the logic of generative structures – and the professional imperative is to make the particular assumptions and commitments of each approach explicit. It is thus defensible to investigate whether there is a particular disposition of war correspondent, and to draw conclusions about what counts as legitimate in the field. It is imperative, however, that the same focus is trained upon the field in which this knowledge is produced, and it is to this that we now turn.

6.2 The Authoritative Subject of Bourdieusian Theory

It is by now clear that a key aim of any Bourdieusian analysis is to undermine the natural embodiment of a 'legitimate' subjectivity, and this applies self-reflexively to the social theorist as well as to the matter of his work. Rather than recognised repositories of knowledge, there are objective positions and position-takings in the academic field, and there is competition over those positions from which the dominant principles of legitimation are practically stabilised.[644] This is distinct from conventional postmodernist[645] claims of the 'death' of the author, for while Bourdieu rejects the individualistic conflation of theorist and theory, he nonetheless defends professional expertise and authorial responsibility.[646] The individual cannot be constructed as the embodiment of a certain knowledge without taking into account the social space and associated economy in which that individual operates and in which the knowledge is produced. But it should be possible to assess knowledge in terms other than how well a theorist's habitus is

[644] As well as considering the stratified nature of particular disciplines, this entails an examination of the relational positions of those disciplines with respect to each other. For example, Bourdieu notes that to become a sociologist at the time he graduated from the École normale supérieure amounted to joining 'France's intellectual outcaste' L. Wacquant, 'Following Pierre Bourdieu into the Field', *Ethnography,* vol. 5, no. 4 (2004): 388. The academic field is also determined by gendered and class-based principles of differentiation D. Reay, 'Cultural Capitalists and Academic Habitus: Classed and Gendered Labour in UK Higher Education', *Womens Studies International Forum,* vol. 27, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 2004).
[645] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*: 254-5.
[646] See especially Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*: 1-8.

aligned to the particularities of the professional academic field. That is, *pace Homo Academicus,* one may rightly interpret academic success as the successful accretion of symbolic capital which is objectively meaningless; one may reconstruct legitimate knowledge as the mere recitation of practices mandated by an arbitrary social structure; but nonetheless one can critically assess different accounts as representations of the same material object, though as objects of knowledge they are distinct.

The result is that while the concept of an individual subject of Bourdieusian research is phenomenologically untenable, and while technically the validity of this research is expressed in terms of categorical imperatives endogenous to the academic field as much as with reference to its representativeness of the object concerned, the different practical effects of different knowledges dictate that one *should* compare knowledges and hold authors to account. This may be seen as a normative injunction whereby Bourdieu defends the notions of authorial responsibility and 'critical spirit', in contradistinction to the 'consensualism' which he argues has accompanied the rise of relativism in social theory.[647] As noted in Section 5.3, this consensualism is given to consist in the universalisation of 'liberalist' values,[648] to the extent that their material finitude and the specific context of their emergence has become obscured.[649] As specifically regards the contemporary state of academic research, he emphasises in particular three themes. First, 'radical' political theory dealing with properly material sociohistorical change has been replaced by identity politics and managerialism.[650] Second, the centrality of individualism to contemporary political thought and practice has gone uncontested.[651] Third, the principle of avoiding overdetermination of the objects of research – a theme held in common by Bourdieu's own political philosophy and post-colonialist thought – has its own practical implications: namely, the silencing of the academic voice through a thoroughgoing suspicion of

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[647] This echoes the arguments set out by Edward Said in E. W. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures* (London: Vintage, 1994).

[648] See 'Un entretien avec Pierre Bourdieu', *Le Monde,* 14 January 1992.

[649] See, for instance, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 'On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason'. By contrast, Wilcken argues that the principle cause of post-1968 intellectual malaise in France is not consensus but the pluralisation of social theory effected by the rise of 'anti-humanist' doctrines such as post-structuralism, which masquerade as democratising. Wilcken, 'The Intellectuals, the Media and the Gulf War'.

[650] *Ibid.*: 42-3.

[651] See especially the collections of polemics published by the *Raison d'agir* 'researcher activist' group which Bourdieu cofounded, *Contre-feux* and *Contre-feux 2*. While it is valid to speak of a generalised theoretical consensus over liberal individualism, it is not difficult to find dissenting scholars. See for example C. Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: Norton, 1978); R. Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

elitism.[652] Bourdieu's response is to make overt that which has in his view become excluded, and whose exclusion is now perceived as natural, from academic discourse, and to construct an epistemological subject which is professional, institutionalised, elite and defensible.

It was noted in Chapter 3 that the scientific field operates in such a way as to obscure the conditionality of the principles of legitimacy upon which success in the field is judged, by restricting access to positions of scientific knowledge production. However, it is precisely that restricted locus which allows for the production of 'practical' (if not absolute) universals whose claims to legitimacy may be mystified by professional practice, but whose effects can be *publicly* assessed. The defence of expert knowledge is then not to allow everyone to practice science on the grounds that the field's principles of division should be contested as broadly as possible, but on the contrary that restricted production should be encouraged and universalisation should only apply to access to the output.[653] In Chapter 4 it was seen how this argument applies to the field of cultural production in general; it also, Bourdieu argues, applies to the academic field. Bourdieu argues that it is imperative that the autonomy of the restricted pole of production be preserved, not in the name of academic 'purity', but because it is only in this restricted locus that the field of cultural production operates according to principles which, while themselves not universally valid, are autonomous from those of the competitive market.[654] Bourdieu argues against the inherent advantage of having a variety of forms of knowledge produced according to different principles of legitimation (restricted and unrestricted) since it does not logically hold that 'more is better' when all forms of knowledge (or subjectivity) are political effects; such a move entails a conflation of choice and freedom.[655] Instead, restricted production is defended on the normative basis of autonomy, with the caveat that the preconditions of positions of authority are contestable and made explicit. Bourdieu argues that while there is nothing naturally valuable about academic knowledge, anti-elitist arguments to

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[652] See especially Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance [Contre-feux]*. On the role of the academic in resisting neoliberalism, see Bourdieu, 'A Reasoned Utopia and Economic Fatalism'.

[653] An application of Bourdieusian analysis to the tension between popular journalistic and scientific construction of medical issues is presented in Champagne and Marchetti, 'The Contaminated Blood Scandal: Reframing Medical News'. For a more general account of the effects of journalism (especially that pole determined by the principle of popularity) on specialist policy, see B. Lingard and S. Rawolle, 'Mediatizing Educational Policy: The Journalistic Field, Science Policy, and Cross-Field Effects', *Journal of Education Policy,* vol. 19, no. 3 (May 2004).

[654] Against this, Pels argues that Bourdieu's account of intellectual authority amounts to the invocation of an 'anarchist utopia'. D. Pels, 'Knowledge Politics and Anti-Politics: Toward a Critical Appraisal of Bourdieu's Concept of Intellectual Autonomy', *Theory and Society,* vol. 24, no. 1 (February 1995).

[655] M. Lloyd, 'Performativity, Parody, Politics', *Theory Culture & Society,* vol. 16, no. 2 (Apr 1999): 205. Similarly, Adkins argues that there is an 'elision of reflexivity and freedom' in Adkins, 'Introduction: Feminism, Bourdieu and After'.

open academia to the principles of legitimation which govern the field of cultural production and the metafield of power more broadly are themselves politically implicated. What is held to be democratising is in fact an advocacy of heteronomy, and for Bourdieu the case for defending the autonomy of a subspace of a field against heteronomous forces is always valid on political grounds.[656] This 'privilege of esotericism' is justifiable because it is only under conditions of restricted production that certain forms of knowledge are possible.[657] Bourdieu attaches the stipulation that the results of such production should be universalised, but despite this it is clear that the defence of authoritative, institutionalised academic knowledge does amount to a defence of what would on sociological principles be incompatible with Bourdieusian theory: monopoly of the principles of differentiation by those who possess the symbolic capital needed to enter the academic field, and successfully negotiate its quasi-arbitrary rules.[658] It is not a stance simply affirmed through conviction, but arrived at through consideration of the political implications of academic objectification, as well as the implications of not forming objectifications or objectifying differently and multiply. It is by this route that the multi-perspectival approach which this thesis takes can be defended – namely, simultaneously, that what individual actors in the case study say can be insightful observations on their field; that there is a symbolic system masked by the procession of overt professional practice; and that academic research into this field can infer significant conclusions about that field, rather than being limited only to stating its own complicity.

This thesis has argued that there is a political overloading of subject- and object-determination in Bourdieu's work, based on normative claims, which amounts to a teleology of structural reproduction of relations of domination and dominatedness. This conclusion is reached by working logically from two starting points, analysing the successive implications which emerge around each. The first origin is Bourdieu's philosophy of social science, and it has been demonstrated that Bourdieu's conception of the political as something which precedes and exceeds all observable processes of determination cannot be derived from a social scientific framework which proceeds from a double break with the observable.[659] That is, while Bourdieu

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[656] Bourdieu details the limits of democratisation of higher education in *The Inheritors*, making the broader point that what appears to be progressive or democratising will also entail the reproduction of stratified, coercive norms at some level. See Lane, *Pierre Bourdieu: A Critical Introduction*: 61-3.
[657] Bourdieu, 'The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Journalistic Field': 45.
[658] Arguments against the esotericising trends in contemporary social theory are widespread. See, for instance, N. Chomsky, *Language and Responsibility* (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1979); Wilcken, 'The Intellectuals, the Media and the Gulf War', 48-9.
[659] See also Kögler, 'Alienation as Epistemological Source': 145.

works from observed evidence to establish the influence of successively more deeply implicated regimes of power, the originality he ascribes to coercive power cannot be derived from this reasoning. Instead, it can only result from the normative ascription of coercive politicality to unobservable determination. This assumption of political implication in cultural production is a motivation for 'doing' Bourdieusian social science rather than a conclusion disinterestedly reached by its enactment. Bourdieu's politics and methodology are indeed inconsistent, in the sense that one cannot work from the latter to the former by case study alone. However, rather than rendering the Bourdieusian model incoherent, I contend that this is a finding which presents the possibility of opposing the argument that Bourdieu's social scientific framework, if followed to its logical conclusion, points to an insuperable level of political complicity which would make any form of political action futile. Instead, I would argue that if we accept that Bourdieu's method is politically motivated – certainly by a belief in deep political implication, but also by a parallel defence of the qualified ability to distinguish negative and positive implications of group action and structural change – then the methodology can be seen instead as an effective means of establishing a practical limit to Bourdieusian analysis. Phenomenologically, Bourdieu is committed to making explicit as great a range of the experience of being in a field as possible, particularly those structures which are so effectively internalised as to elude consciousness. But he also concedes the existence of a realm of determination which cannot be observed or articulated. It is true that Bourdieu characterises this hypothetical point of origin as meta-determining, as much as Schütz conceived of it in subjectivist terms. However that origin or space is rendered, the phenomenological principles underpinning Bourdieu's work suggests that there is a point at which the analyst cannot make further reliable claims about determination.

The normative political limits of Bourdieu's politics are more simply described: one begins from the political principles motivating Bourdieu's writing and activism, and continues seeking to identify successive aspects of political determination and hierarchical reproduction until the point where to continue political analysis becomes self-defeating or narcissistic. It is, in short, a practice of limiting Bourdieusian analysis at the point that it leads to political inertia. This is hardly revolutionary in itself. Phenomenology necessitates the bracketing-out of some aspect of experience whose political character cannot be known. Likewise, political structuralists are bound to designate a point beyond which the generativity of structures reduces either to conspiracy or to apathy. Any theorist seeking a reconciliation of the two disciplines, and a concomitant supersedence of subjectivism and objectivism, likewise faces this necessity in

practical political terms – that is to say, if political action is not to be rendered indefensible – of ascribing a useful limit to political theory.

There remain valid counterclaims. How is the political theorist to ensure that the establishing of a limit to the applicability of political analysis is not itself a mechanism of reproducing coercive hierarchies in the social context examined? In the phenomenological tradition, the notion that there will be a point at which it 'makes sense' to bracket out levels of structuration as unknowable, would itself suggest a case for deconstructing that professional or practical 'sense'. By Foucault's account, it is not only the positing of specific limits but their existence at all which enshrines oppositions (inside/outside; that to be analysed/that not to be analysed) which help to reproduce distinctions in social spaces. It can also be argued that the setting of limits exaggerates the meaning of transgression of those limits, where no such value is guaranteed. What Bourdieu gives us is a defence of the authority with which the limits of political analysis may be – albeit temporarily, reflexively – established. An authoritative subject whose positing does not reduce to subjectivism is viable in Bourdieusian theory, through the rejection of the personification of that subject, and establishing with what structural preconditions and with what symbolic and material effects a subject of knowledge emerges. It does not elevate this subject above structural determination, but nor does it reduce it to an effect of objectification. It distinguishes between different modes of determination – the mutual constitution of agent and structure, the concomitant emergence of phenomena and the means of their apprehension – and judges that those positions of subjectivity in the field (made possible in particular temporal, social and material context) operating autonomously from the heteronomous pole should be prioritised over those subjectivities determined by heteronomous principles of differentiation.

This is an imperfect solution to the questions of structure and agency and the legitimacy of authority. There are three counter-arguments in particular. First, one need only note that it is in the interests of those who articulate such a model to do so – it is a post-hoc rationalisation of the position that social scientists already occupy. It is thus at heart an elitist defence. This charge can be answered by seeking to demystifying that which constitutes an authoritative position. This demystification is primarily a matter of transparency rather than contestability, as priority must be given to the ability of those at the autonomous pole of a field to determine its principles of differentiation, protected from exogenous principles (such as economic) and intrusive surveillance. Second, it is naïve to suggest that authoritative subjects operating according to the principle of the autonomous pole are immune from competition over material and symbolic capital. This is certainly true as regards individual agents, but it is a matter of individual

subjectivities being partly determined by the principles associated with each pole, rather than the opposition itself collapsing. One can respond by arguing that while individuals will always retain an interest in financial rewards, it is nonetheless viable to maintain that there a field positions which uniquely provide the preconditions for the production of certain types of knowledge. This is not concomitant with a defence of rarefied or esoteric knowledge; it suggests rather that there are some knowledges which can only emerge in the absence of economic imperatives.

Third, the Bourdieusian model requires that we accept autonomy deontologically, as a political good which does not need to be contextualised and disaggregated. Further, we would have to accept not only that autonomy from the heteronomous pole is in itself valuable, but that it provides a necessary precondition for an ethics of social science – that is, that it provides for the production of uniquely defensible knowledge. Now, Bourdieu makes clear that a set of professional ethics cannot exist as universal properties but rather operate as a configuration of dispositions endemic to a particular field at a particular time. A particular ethic will only endure insofar as it serves (also) strategically, to reinforce the domination by one group of another in that social space. This is only defensible if the ethics in question cannot be reduced to the arbitrary currencies of a field game, and this in turn, as was seen above, can only be resolved on normative grounds. None of these grounds is flawless. Autonomy, I have argued here, is both a necessary principle of social scientific research and a principle which by definition preserves exclusionary mechanisms. Radical contestability of enshrined forms of symbolic capital is central to Bourdieu's method, yet must be balanced against this requirement of autonomy. Transparency and accountability are similarly loaded: the compulsion to speak the truth of one's representations carries with it the Foucauldian risk that one is not revealing but producing truths, and that these will inevitably be subject to disciplinary regimes.

It has been demonstrated that Bourdieu's analytical model can be an incisive means of explaining how what appear to be natural hierarchies, elites, dominant institutions and individuals, as well as the criteria which signify these, are in fact contextually determined by misrecognised struggles for material and symbolic power. It is certainly the case that for Bourdieu no institution or individual can be considered a natural repository of wisdom about or insight into a specific professional context. There are, however, positions within a field from which insight and normative judgement are conditionally possible. In one sense this is simply a necessary move if Bourdieu is to defend his own writing. In truth, Bourdieu does not only rely on the 'magic' of reflexive social science to defend his own research; he also claimed throughout

his life 'outsider status' within the academic field. In line with the argument for qualified agency presented in Section 2.2, I would conclude that just as no individual is the embodiment of authoritative subjectivity in a field, neither is that authoritative subjectivity precluded by being the structured, structuring product of a field. That is, there exist positions and associated practices of insight which an agent may – not naturally or completely but haphazardly and sometimes complicitly – occupy and perform. Insights are made, sometimes by accident, and sometimes consistently by a single agent. With a degree of reflexivity on the part of that actor, and with finite scrutiny from without the field, that 'outsider' perspective from a field insider may be defended as productively insightful. The tension that arises concerns how best to balance the need for scrutiny with the need for professional or institutional autonomy. Bourdieu sets the bar for journalistic self-regulation considerably lower than for academia. This is not, I contend, out of personal prejudice but rather the conviction that the journalistic field is more subject to heteronomous principles of differentiation. While it may be true that the academic production of knowledge is moving towards greater dominance by economic criteria, the industrial imperative in journalism is at present more pervasive. This does not mitigate the claim made in Chapters 4 and 5 that Bourdieu is excessively dismissive of agent insight in the journalistic field. Likewise, it does not amount to a refutation of the elitism which characterises Bourdieu's limited academic exceptionalism. It suggests rather that in both fields (and the field of cultural production more broadly), practices of insight and normative judgement are possible, that these practices are more likely to be enacted in positions autonomous from the principles of differentiation which characterise mass production, but that complicity in the reproduction of hierarchies of power is always possible. Despite this possibility, Bourdieusian analysis is compelled to defend the (contestable) validity of criteria for critically comparing representations made in the journalistic and academic fields; phenomenologically, because such representations are not wholly reducible to arbitrary symbolic forms; and normatively, because of the implications of abstaining from ascribing relative value to social phenomena and political claims.

6.3 Summary

In terms of the hypotheses set out in Section 1.3, it is now possible to present a brief summary of what has been demonstrated in this thesis. As regards the field of war correspondence, it is clear that a Bourdieusian analysis produces significant insight into the mystification of journalistic practice. While the professionalism literature acknowledges the fact of mystification in all

professions, the case study demonstrates that it is not through professional insularity or complicity that gatekeeping structures in the journalistic field are reproduced. Rather, it is overt competition over what constitutes good journalism that a more pervasive, determining symbolic economy is misrecognised as such. It allows for the elucidation not only of the fact of professional journalistic norms and ideology, but insight into how these are enacted in both self-reflective and distinction-making processes, and how their contestedness is forgotten.

In terms of the implications for Bourdieusian theory, it is clear, first, that there is an aspect of political determination in the Bourdieusian framework which exceeds the principles of generative structuralism. Bourdieu's ascription of coercive politicality to the very teleology of structures – and hence their apprehension and opposability – is thus properly characterised as a deontological claim. This claim is manifest not only in Bourdieu's politics but in the normative impetus of his philosophy of social science: that is, Bourdieusian social science cannot be understood as normatively disinterested, since the relentless pursuit of further levels of coercive domination is pre-disposed to revealing such domination. The Bourdieusian framework can, however, be defended on normative grounds. In opposition to coercive domination Bourdieu posits autonomy, responsibility and (qualified) contestability. These can be analytically reconstructed as nonconsciously strategic, but since to do so leads to complicity in their undermining in social context, we are compelled to accept them as deontological grounds for 'doing' political analysis. That is, the point at which Bourdieusian analysis, motivated by these norms, works against their promotion in fields as Bourdieusian of knowledge, is a defensible limit to Bourdieusian objectification – as well as to reflexivity. This raises the question of under which authority reflections by agents and by social scientists are to be treated as meaningful in themselves, or instead constructed only according to symbolic economy and the assumption of misrecognition. Bourdieu is overly dismissive of the content (rather than function) of agent reflections. However, it is consistent within the Bourdieusian framework to argue that such reflections are not equally reducible to arbitrary symbolic form, since they are also partly representative of a world that exceeds its symbolic representation – and when there are different symbolic constructions of a common material world, Bourdieusian theory necessitates quasi-stable, contestable criteria for assessing competing representations. Since different symbolic systems are not arbitrary but have reason (albeit not directly inferable from material context), it is possible, to a degree, to describe structural determination in a manner which is not only complicit in structural reproduction. This amounts to academic exceptionalism, but a qualified

elitism is defensible if the need for academic autonomy is balanced against transparency and demystification of professional processes of objectification.

Appendix 1: Interviewee Details

No	Age (2002)	Gender	Years in journalism (2002)	Nationality	Current Location (2002)	Current Position (2002)	Former Position
1	65	Male	N/A	US	Washington DC, US	Think tank senior advisor	US Army general
2	Late 50s	Male	≈30 yrs	UK	London, UK	Columnist, UK broadsheet	War correspondent, various newspapers (broadsheet/tabloid)
3	50s	Male	N/A	US	Washington DC, US	Think tank president	Political scientist
4	38	Female	≈15 yrs	Australian	Oxford, UK	Broadcast Journalist, BBC	Broadcast journalist and war correspondent, Australia
5	58	Male	≈35 yrs	UK	London, UK	Broadcast journalist, non-BBC	War correspondent, broadcast and press (broadsheet)
6	50s	Male	≈25 yrs	US	Washington DC, US	Senior editor (quality newspaper)	International editor (quality newspaper)
7	Late 40s	Female	N/A	US	Washington DC, US	US State Department press official	Government advisor

No	Age (2002)	Gender	Years in journalism (2002)	Nationality	Current Location (2002)	Current Position (2002)	Former Position
8	40s	Female	≈20 yrs	US	London, UK	Broadcast journalist, non-BBC	War correspondent, US Television
9	50s	Male	≈20 yrs	US	Baltimore, US	Senior academic	Broadcast journalist/ editor, US public radio
10	28	Male	3 yrs	US	Washington DC, US	War correspondent, US weekly news magazine	N/A
11	63	Male	≈40 yrs	UK	Washington DC, US	Journalist, US newspaper (quality)	Journalist, various US and UK newspapers (broadsheet/tabloid)
12	62	Male	≈40 yrs	UK	London, UK	Senior editor, UK broadsheet	War correspondent, international editor, UK broadsheets
13	Late 30s	Male	10 yrs	UK	London, UK	War correspondent, UK broadsheets	War correspondent, tabloid
14	50s	Male	≈30 yrs	UK	Washington DC, US	Columnist, UK broadsheet	Journalist/war correspondent, UK tabloids/broadsheets

Appendix 2: QSRN6 Coding Structure

The following is a representation of the hierarchical tree by which the case study interviews were coded. The numbers in parentheses give the 'address' of each code, with the first number indicating the highest level in the hierarchy, and subsequent numbers indicating sublevels.

(1) /ACTOR
(1 1) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 2) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 3) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 4) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 5) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 6) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 7) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 8) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 9) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 10) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 11) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 12) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 13) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(1 14) /ACTOR/[NAME REMOVED]
(2) /REFERENT
(2 1) /REFERENT/ARMY US
(2 2) /REFERENT/COMMENTATORS
(2 3) /REFERENT/EDITORS
(2 4) /REFERENT/GOVT US
(2 5) /REFERENT/INDEPENDENTS
(2 6) /REFERENT/MARINES
(2 7) /REFERENT/MEDIA
(2 8) /REFERENT/MILITARY UK
(2 8 1) /REFERENT/MILITARY UK/PUB RELATIONS
(2 9) /REFERENT/MILITARY US
(2 9 1) /REFERENT/MILITARY US/PUB RELATIONS
(2 9 2) /REFERENT/MILITARY US/SOLDEIRS
(2 9 3) /REFERENT/MILITARY US/MIL LEADERS
(2 10) /REFERENT/NEWS AGENCIES
(2 11) /REFERENT/POOL
(2 12) /REFERENT/PRESS
(2 12 1) /REFERENT/PRESS/PENTAGON
(2 12 2) /REFERENT/PRESS/TABLOIDS
(2 12 3) /REFERENT/PRESS/BROADSHEET
(2 12 4) /REFERENT/PRESS/INDEPENDENT
(2 12 5) /REFERENT/PRESS/TELEGRAPH
(2 12 6) /REFERENT/PRESS/GUARDIAN
(2 13) /REFERENT/SPECIAL OPS
(2 14) /REFERENT/TV

(2 14 1) /REFERENT/TV/CNN
(2 14 2) /REFERENT/TV/OTHER
(2 14 3) /REFERENT/TV/US
(2 14 4) /REFERENT/TV/UK
(2 14 5) /REFERENT/TV/FRENCH
(2 15) /REFERENT/WC
(2 15 1) /REFERENT/WC/BBC
(2 15 2) /REFERENT/WC/BROADSHEET
(2 15 3) /REFERENT/WC/TV REP
(2 15 4) /REFERENT/WC/STARS
(2 15 5) /REFERENT/WC/WOMEN
(2 16) /REFERENT/UN
(2 17) /REFERENT/OWN EXPERIENCE
(2 18) /REFERENT/JOURNALISTS
(2 19) /REFERENT/WAR
(2 20) /REFERENT/TIMELINESS
(2 21) /REFERENT/ACCESS
(2 22) /REFERENT/MILITARY-GOVERNMENT/MEDIA
(2 23) /REFERENT/PUBLIC
(2 24) /REFERENT/'OTHER SIDE'
(2 25) /REFERENT/PRESS
(2 26) /REFERENT/DANGER
(2 27) /REFERENT/CONTENT
(2 28) /REFERENT/MILITARY OTHER
(2 29) /REFERENT/TECHNOLOGY
(2 30) /REFERENT/VOICE OF AMERICA
(2 31) /REFERENT/GOVT UK
(2 32) /REFERENT/BBC
(3) /QUALITY
(3 1) /QUALITY/ADVENTUROUS
(3 2) /QUALITY/QUALITY INSTITUTION
(3 3) /QUALITY/BRAVERY
(3 4) /QUALITY/SUCCESS
(3 5) /QUALITY/KNOWS JOURNALISM
(3 6) /QUALITY/DISHONEST
(3 7) /QUALITY/NO INTEGRITY
(3 8) /QUALITY/UNPROFESSIONAL
(3 9) /QUALITY/DISOBEDIENT
(3 10) /QUALITY/DOESN'T KNOW GAME
(3 11) /QUALITY/INDEPENDENT
(3 12) /QUALITY/INTEGRITY
(3 13) /QUALITY/IRREVERENT
(3 14) /QUALITY/TRUSTING
(3 15) /QUALITY/UNIQUE
(3 16) /QUALITY/CONTROL FREAK
(3 17) /QUALITY/OBEDIENT
(3 18) /QUALITY/POWERFUL
(3 19) /QUALITY/PROFESSIONAL
(3 20) /QUALITY/LIKES
(3 21) /QUALITY/CONTACT
(3 22) /QUALITY/INTERESTING

(3 23) /QUALITY/HONEST
(3 24) /QUALITY/AUTHENTIC
(3 25) /QUALITY/EXPERIENCE
(3 26) /QUALITY/UNBUREAUCRATIC
(3 27) /QUALITY/OPEN
(3 28) /QUALITY/RESPECTFUL
(3 29) /QUALITY/DISRESPECTFUL
(3 30) /QUALITY/DOES WHAT WANTS
(3 31) /QUALITY/HAS TO TRY
(3 32) /QUALITY/RISK AVERSE
(3 33) /QUALITY/BACKWARD
(3 34) /QUALITY/NO SUBSTANCE
(3 35) /QUALITY/DIFFICULT
(3 36) /QUALITY/SUSPICIOUS
(3 37) /QUALITY/CLOSE
(3 38) /QUALITY/TRUSTWORTHY
(3 39) /QUALITY/SENSIBLE
(3 40) /QUALITY/BAD AT JOB
(3 41) /QUALITY/KNOWS GAME
(3 42) /QUALITY/GOOD AT JOB
(3 43) /QUALITY/USEFUL
(3 44) /QUALITY/COERCIVE
(3 45) /QUALITY/HARD DONE BY
(3 46) /QUALITY/EGOTISTICAL
(3 47) /QUALITY/PRAGMATIC
(4) /STYLE
(4 1) /STYLE/CYNICAL
(4 2) /STYLE/OFF-HAND
(4 3) /STYLE/MORAL
(4 4) /STYLE/SCEPTICAL
(4 5) /STYLE/OUTRAGED
(4 6) /STYLE/FACTUAL
(4 7) /STYLE/REFLECTIVE
(4 8) /STYLE/HUMOROUS
(4 9) /STYLE/RHETORIC
(4 10) /STYLE/UNDER
(4 11) /STYLE/EXAGGERATED
(5) /EXPERIENTIAL
(5 1) /EXPERIENTIAL/CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES
(5 2) /EXPERIENTIAL/CONTESTED
(5 3) /EXPERIENTIAL/RE/OVER
(5 4) /EXPERIENTIAL/SYNO/HYPO/ANTO-SIGNIFICATION
(6) /RELATIONAL
(6 1) /RELATIONAL/EUPHEMISTIC
(6 2) /RELATIONAL/(IN)FORMAL
(7) /EXPRESSIVE
(8) /METAPHORS
(8 1) /METAPHORS/WAR
(8 2) /METAPHORS/GAME
(9) /GRAMMAR
(9 1) /GRAMMAR/PROC/PARTICIP [WORD ORDER]

(9 1 1) /GRAMMAR/PROC/PARTICIP/SVO [SUBJECT-VERB-OBJECT]
(9 1 2) /GRAMMAR/PROC/PARTICIP/PASSIVE
(9 1 3) /GRAMMAR/PROC/PARTICIP/SVC [INTERCEDEING CLAUSE]
(9 2) /GRAMMAR/UNCLEAR
(9 2 1) /GRAMMAR/UNCLEAR/AGENCY
(9 2 2) /GRAMMAR/UNCLEAR/CAUSALITY
(9 2 3) /GRAMMAR/UNCLEAR/RESPONSIB
(9 3) /GRAMMAR/NOMINALISATIONS
(9 4) /GRAMMAR/ACT/PASSIVE
(9 4 1) /GRAMMAR/ACT/PASSIVE/ACTIVE
(9 4 2) /GRAMMAR/ACT/PASSIVE/PASSIVE
(9 5) /GRAMMAR/+/-
(9 5 1) /GRAMMAR/+/-/POSITIVE
(9 5 2) /GRAMMAR/+/-/NEGATIVE
(10) /REL GRAMMAR [RELATIONAL GRAMMAR]
(10 1) /REL GRAMMAR/AUTH MOD [AUTHORITY CLAIM]
(10 1 1) /REL GRAMMAR/AUTH MOD/JOURNO+
(10 1 2) /REL GRAMMAR/AUTH MOD/JOURNO-
(10 2) /REL GRAMMAR/EXPRESS MOD [EXPRESSIVE]
(10 2 1) /REL GRAMMAR/EXPRESS MOD/MAY/MIGHT
(10 2 2) /REL GRAMMAR/EXPRESS MOD/SHOULD/N'T
(10 2 3) /REL GRAMMAR/EXPRESS MOD/CAN/'T
(10 3) /REL GRAMMAR/STATEMENT GRAMMAR
(10 3 1) /REL GRAMMAR/STATEMENT GRAM/DECLARATIVE
(10 3 2) /REL GRAMMAR/STATEMENT GRAM/GRAM QUESTION
(10 3 3) /REL GRAMMAR/STATEMENT GRAM/IMPERATIVE
(10 4) /REL GRAMMAR/INC/EXCLUSION
(10 4 1) /REL GRAMMAR/INC/EXCLUSION/WE/YOU
(10 4 2) /REL GRAMMAR/INC/EXCLUSION/THEY
(12) /CONNECTIVE
(13) /EXT REF [EXTERNAL FRAMES OF REFERENCE]

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