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Intermediary complexity in regulatory governance

Abstract:

While regulatory governance can be theorized as a three-party game in which regulators use intermediaries to influence targets, I show how regulatory intermediaries can, through delegation and orchestration, engage their own “subintermediaries” to increase their capacity for fulfilling their regulatory mandates and their influence on regulators and targets. I elucidate how the International Criminal Court (ICC)—the key intermediary in the regulatory regime for international crimes—has used no...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1177/0002716217696085

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Department:
Lady Margaret Hall
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada More from this funder
IKEA Foundation More from this funder
Cyril Foster Fund More from this funder
Oriel College, University of Oxford More from this funder
Publisher:
SAGE Publications Publisher's website
Journal:
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Journal website
Volume:
670
Issue:
1
Pages:
170-188
Publication date:
2017-03-13
DOI:
EISSN:
1552-3349
ISSN:
0002-7162
Pubs id:
pubs:700343
URN:
uri:aec604b9-5260-442a-a100-3fd1df50e9c5
UUID:
uuid:aec604b9-5260-442a-a100-3fd1df50e9c5
Local pid:
pubs:700343

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