

**A Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the Miki/Kōmoto
Faction of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan**



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ABSTRACT

A large majority of the members of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan belong to one or other of its factions, the bodies which dominate the party today. In 1987, when the fieldwork for this study was carried out, there were five factions in number. This thesis examines and analyzes the contemporary structural organization and membership of one of them, the Miki/Kōmoto faction, after presenting a systematic account of its history.

This political grouping was investigated from the inside; as an observer, the writer was able to acquire material through direct interaction with members of the faction in their daily routine. Including the introduction and conclusion, eight chapters make up this thesis. Two of them are devoted to the history of the faction, which is chronicled by taking the career of Miki Takeo, the founder, as the central theme. One chapter is concerned with the organization of the faction, and the roles and functions of the members. The relationships among faction members and their connections with outside individuals and groups are the subjects of scrutiny for the fifth and sixth chapters respectively. Chapter seven, on finance, investigates the methods by which the faction as a group and single members of it raise and distribute money. Some of the conclusions drawn in the thesis are specific to the faction; others relate to the wider phenomenon of factionalism inside the party.

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NOTES ON STYLE

In this thesis, the following stylistic conventions have been followed. All Japanese names are given in the Japanese order with family name first. Names of political groupings are not translated into English on those occasions when to do so was deemed inappropriate or thought likely to result in ambiguities. For instance, *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu* would sound nonsensical in English, and both *Shimpotō* and *Kaishintō* could be translated as Progressive Party.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Independent of the formal structure of the ruling party of Japan but playing a crucial role in its dynamics are the LDP factions. These are semi-permanent groupings of Diet members that have their own histories and traditions separate from those of the party, the parent body which provides the arena in which they operate, in competition with each other. Each faction is a focus of loyalty for its members, a centre for the distribution of funds, a mechanism for the more or less institutionalised maximising of political advantage within the party for the leader and also subordinates where this is not seen by the leader to damage his interests, and a grouping with a separate permanent office and administrative staff. Pre-dating the formation of the LDP in 1955, the ancestors of the factions that continue to dominate the party today can be traced back to the immediate post-war years and in some cases further still.¹

There is much general material to be found on the Liberal Democratic Party factions. Sociological and institutional factors have been put forward to explain their evolution, existence and persistence. Their role and the functions they perform in the political environment have been listed, elucidated and examined. Frequently, throughout the history of the LDP, the leadership and numerical strengths of the contemporary factions were analyzed and predictions made about the possible formations of new alliances. Particularly during periods of intense political activity, cursory histories of some of the factions were presented and the careers of the more prominent members traced in outline.

The characteristics of the factions have not remained stable. Various changes have occurred and been remarked upon in the literature. Some studies have attempted to make a comparison with factionalized parties in other countries with the intention of finding and specifying common and disparate elements. In addition to the books and papers which have sought to account for and describe the factions, others have attempted to evaluate them; for instance, were they good or bad, salutary or pernicious.

The earliest comprehensive study of factions and factionalism in the Liberal Democratic Party was made in 1958 by Watanabe Tsuneo.² The latter part of his book remains the best attempt to write separate faction histories. In subsequent papers³ and a second book⁴ Watanabe repeated and added to his earlier analysis. He accounted for the formation and existence of factions by the occurrence of historical processes (particularly changes that took place in the political and business institutions and environment after the war), the medium-size constituency system, the importance of the *giri-ninjō* element in the conservative parties, and the role of money in determining the presidency of the party. Watanabe listed various functions of the faction - services they performed for their members such as the distribution of posts, provision of money, use of an office where political and practical liaisons could be made, and drawing up of an election strategy; in return, support was given by the members to the leader, particularly when he was a candidate for the presidency of the party. Watanabe also mentioned that disagreements over policy might be explained by factional manoeuvring, and work to the disadvantage of the country and people.

Another early study was that by Scalapino and Masumi in 1962. They asserted that “major importance”⁵ must be accorded to factions which they saw as “the vital unit within

the party”.⁶ Indeed they went so far as to say that “factions deserve, in many respects, to be considered as parties in their own right”.⁷

Fukui Haruhiro very cursorily touched on the previous ten years history of the factions in existence in 1967.⁸ He felt that there were “no special personality types or career patterns which qualify a party member to become a faction leader”.⁹ He also believed it futile to look for common criteria in terms of family, education and occupational background and doubted that seniority was a significant factor for eligibility.¹⁰ Fukui dated the ushering in of the era of LDP factionalism to the 1956 presidential election and maintained that factions evolved to satisfy the demands for the acquisition of posts and money.¹¹ He judged that a faction with much more than fifty members would face funding difficulties and show divisive tendencies.¹² Fukui concluded that there was “a marked decline in the authority and prestige of the faction leaders and a general loosening of factional solidarity and discipline”.¹³ This view had changed by 1984 when, fourteen years after the publication of his book, Fukui wrote that factionalism in the LDP had not diminished but indeed become more entrenched.¹⁴ One observation he made in this paper was that the overwhelming majority of party members remained loyal to the factions of their original affiliation; as one example he specified the Miki/Kōmoto faction.¹⁵

The characteristics of factions and factionalism in the LDP were compartmentalised by Stockwin under a number of headings, namely: institutional environment (in particular the medium-size constituency system), leadership, structure, resources, the sociological aspect, and prior loyalties. For him, factions were “an integral part of Japan’s politics ... at least as important as political parties” which they complemented rather than substituted.¹⁶ For Tomita, Nakamura and Hrebenar the LDP was an alliance of factions which “play a crucial role in the resolution of party personnel matters ”¹⁷ Michael

Leiserson attempted to explain the factors which led to the formation of coalitions among factions and the distribution of Cabinet posts by applying game theory.¹⁸

Nakamura said that the Japanese tendency to emphasize the human nexus seemed to be attributable to their social mode of living, adapted to Japanese topography. For instance, he mentioned that collaboration among farmers was generally practiced in irrigation and the cultivation of the soil.¹⁹ Nakamura claimed that it was this emphasis rather than religious faith which gave rise to the segmentation of a number of religious sects, each with its own exclusive and closed order. He attached great importance to the Japanese propensity for cliquism or clannishness. Taking the Zen sect as an example, Nakamura stressed that the split into multitudinous sects and factions was not the result of differences in religious faith or doctrine but due merely to such specific factors of human relationship as the inheritance of the master's endowments.²⁰ Nakamura extended the applicability of his theories to the political world.

Nakane saw the leader of the group to be the outstanding personality with the legitimacy of the leader-to-be based on years of service in the group. Hierarchy, she felt, was formed according to the order of entry into the group. Nakane saw successive leaders being handicapped in comparison to the first leader who took the position by his own efforts and merit; all group members were *de jure* and *de facto* his *kobun*.²¹ The most significant factor in the exercise of leadership was, for Nakane, the personal ties between the leader and his immediate subordinates.²² The central figure in the group, she wrote, was someone to whom normally the other members could attach themselves, often emotionally.²³ She believed the activities of factions were seen by outsiders to be preoccupied with interpersonal relations.²⁴ Nakane differentiated rank, which functioned to maintain the legitimate

order in interpersonal relations, particularly when it was operating externally, from role which was adjustable to changing situations.²⁵

According to Nakane, there was no mobility between factions, and the success or otherwise of the individual politician's career was inseparable from the fortunes of the faction. She claimed that there were no avenues for transfer and the channels of inter-factional communication were very poor. Nakane believed "the well-trained political news correspondent" might be the only medium for the exchange of information.²⁶

Curtis wrote that one of the most central tasks of the faction leader was to assist members raise money on their own. Politicians with Cabinet experience, he claimed, did not in principle receive any funds from the faction but indeed were expected to raise funds for it.²⁷ Curtis believed that factions had been turned into something other than the "personal coteries of supporters of particular party leaders". Rather, there were "various subsets of much less intense loyalties between senior faction members and particular individuals who they helped recruit into the faction".²⁸

At the beginning of 1988, an *Asahi Shimbun* editorial²⁹ characterized changes that it claimed had been taking place in the factions. Their division into a mainstream and anti-mainstream (the latter, by definition, taking exception to the regime in power) had come to be replaced by a "faction total mainstream" - where there was a lack of dissent. This was criticized on the ground that although it made for more convenient political management by the prime minister and secretary-general, factions should function as reciprocal restraints.

Three distinctive features, according to the article, were to be noticed. First, faction management had come to be run by a central machinery. As an example, each of the five major factions had a negotiator, the *jimu sōchō*. No longer did the factions move at

the beck and call of one leader; rather they were like large enterprises with directorates. Second, rank in the party was determined by the number in a faction and not political ethics and vision. An expansion of funds had become necessary to enable the factions to pick out and back new candidates on a national scale. Third, serious consideration was given to the function of dealing with lobbyists. A faction which was influential in government offices could skillfully deal with *jiban* lobbyists. Through the distribution of party posts the factions aimed to achieve a full complement of so-called *zoku giin*.

Although there is an extensive literature on factions, and despite their long history and unquestioned importance within the political process, to the best knowledge of the writer, there has been no serious attempt to write a detailed history or make an analysis of the organization of any one of them that was or continues to be found operating inside the LDP, a party that has ruled Japan without interruption since its inauguration. In the hope of filling this gap, the writer will examine and analyze the contemporary structural organization and membership of one faction in the LDP and present it in the light of a systematic account of its history. No attempt will be made to develop a general theory of political factions, even within Japan, nor will it be suggested that all the conclusions reached in the study would necessarily be applicable to any other faction in Japan's ruling party.

Although a comparative study of two or more factions would have been illuminating and facilitated the isolation of those elements which are not held in common, such an undertaking involved several practical difficulties. To make a detailed scrutiny of a faction, it was necessary for the writer to investigate it from the inside, from the point of view of an observer. Many months were passed developing contacts and making the writer's presence and interest known to people inside and outside the faction chosen; these were individuals

who could provide material and, moreover, help obviate obstacles to direct and continual accessibility to the grouping and its members. By focusing on one faction the writer was able to gain the trust and, in some cases, gratitude of the people involved. This would not have been forthcoming if part of the energy, time and concentration of the writer had been spent on a second faction. Most certainly many informants would have been reticent if not positively unwilling to discuss delicate aspects of factional affairs. Consequently the work on both would have been unsatisfactory.

The faction chosen by the writer was that founded by Miki Takeo, who handed over the leadership to Kōmoto Toshio in 1980. It will be referred to as the Miki/Matsumura, Miki, Miki/Kōmoto or Kōmoto faction depending on the context. Given that it was necessary to consider one of the five contemporary factions in order to scrutinize organizational characteristics, there were a number of reasons why the Miki/Kōmoto faction presented appealing qualities as an object of study to the writer.

First, Miki Takeo had been a member of the House of Representatives continuously from the time he was first elected in 1937. The lineage of his faction was particularly interesting and could be traced back to a small early post-war party that saw itself as neither a conservative nor socialist gathering of politicians. Through picking this faction it was possible to present the complete history of one of the groupings that came together to form a unified conservative party.

Second, over many years, the faction had had an uneasy cohabitation with the others and often was rumoured to be engaged in secret negotiations with one or more opposition parties or parts thereof with a view to breaking away from the LDP in order to form a new alliance. Seen to take a progressive posture inside the party, on numerous occasions it criticized “money politics” and also called for the disbandment of all factions. With

a dwindling and aging membership, the faction was steadily losing influence and its cohesiveness was under threat, not least from attempts to poach its members. The writer was interested in the background to these developments, the effect they had on intra- and inter-factional relationships, and which of the dangers from outside could be countered, and how.

Third, of the original founders of the five factions in existence at the beginning of 1986, only two remained alive. The other, Kishi Nobusuke, had retired from active politics³⁰ and his faction was about to have its third leader. The writer wanted to consider to what degree there was continuity of organization and intra-factional dealings over a change in leadership, the influence a former leader could continue to exercise and the relationship between a founder and direct successor.

Considered as a whole, this empirical study will seek both to provide evidence that could be used to test the suggestions, explanations and hypotheses that have been put forward over many years and by a large number of observers to account for the phenomenon of factions in the LDP, and to question the value judgements that have been made by them inductively on the roles and usefulness of factions in the party and political culture.

Methodology

As a starting point and in order to attain a general if superficial view of the two people at the centre of the study and their political careers, a reading was made of the few books about Miki and Kōmoto.³¹ Later on and throughout the study, other books were read and referred to particularly those by Diet members who, by serving under Miki or otherwise, had some knowledge of the workings of the faction or members in it.³² Wherever possible, confirmation of such printed “disclosures” was checked against primary sources. Where the writer decided to use the information thus obtained notwithstanding the lack

of independent confirmation, this will be expressed explicitly in the text. However, very little use will be made of secondary sources.

Newspapers most often referred to were the *Asahi Shimbun* (both Tōkyō and Ōsaka editions), *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* and *Tokushima Shimbun*. For the immediate postwar period, newspaper yearbooks were utilized as were official pamphlets of some of the political parties. *Kōenkai* publications, publicity leaflets and election posters were perused.

Most material for the thesis and the knowledge on which much of the analysis is based was acquired through direct interaction with members of the faction in their daily routine, often as a passive observer, and by interviewing almost one hundred people including the vast majority of Kōmoto faction members,³³ former Miki/Kōmoto faction members, secretaries to Diet members, political journalists, and people who had known Miki as a child. In addition, opinions and recollections were collected from Diet members affiliated to other factions, local politicians, bureaucrats, academics and executives in the private sector who had had dealings with principal members of the faction.

There were numerous occasions on which the writer picked up information through being in the company of faction members. The more memorable were attending the ground-breaking ceremony for Miki's new office building and partaking of the subsequent lunch, witnessing a general meeting of the Kōmoto faction, following behind-the-scenes arrangements for the annual summer study conference, and observing the campaigns of two candidates for the House of Representatives election in 1986.

Strong connections were forged with several people central to the study. Much is owed to the Miki family whose kindness and generosity facilitated access both to administrative members of the former prime minister's political organization, and to people in Tōkyō

and Miki's constituency, Tokushima, who were knowledgeable about him. The initial introduction to the Mikis was through the good offices of Kunihiro Masao who had worked for the politician as a foreign policy advisor and simultaneous interpreter.³⁴ Contact with the LDP cross-factional group Forum for a Fair Society³⁵ was made possible by Tōkyō University Assistant Professor Masuzoe Yōichi. This group arranged for the writer to cover the 1986 Lower House election campaign of one of its members, Ōshima Tadamori. Fortunately the personal chemistry was good; through the friendship that developed several doors opened and several other junior faction members, notably Kōmura Masahiko and Ide Shōichi, showed a positive interest in the writer's research.

A satisfactory relationship was built up with members of Kōmoto's staff. One secretary in particular, Bōda Gōshi, was very friendly and helpful. Although the writer was never in a position to move freely around Kōmoto's office or visit it as and when he pleased, this was no doubt partly due to the very sensitive nature of many matters which were discussed there and the importance of the office as the centre of activity for a working faction.

Much useful material was found in the National Diet Library where the staff in the Politics and Parliamentary Affairs Division of the Research and Legislative Reference Bureau, particularly Narita Norihiko and Takeda Michiyo, expended great effort and time on the writer's research.

In certain cases, the identity of the source of information has not been given in the footnotes. Sometimes the nature of the material provided necessitated its description in vaguer terms than the writer would have wished either because a more concrete description would have identified the source or because of legal considerations. In every such case, a full explanation has been given in a separate non-published appendix which was available

for inspection by the writer's supervisor and examiners. Where these omissions exist in the endnotes, there is a star.

The Kōmoto Faction in August 1989

Kōmoto faction member Kaifu Toshiki became prime minister of Japan on 8 August 1989 following the resignation of Uno Sōsuke who stood down to take responsibility for the LDP's heavy defeat in the House of Councillors election held the previous month. Uno himself had been elevated unexpectedly to the premiership in June. Opinion polls indicating single figure percentage support for his predecessor, Takeshita Noboru, reflecting public anger at the imposition of a 3% Consumption Tax and the prime minister's involvement in the Recruit Scandal, had moved influential party members and business leaders to call for his relinquishment of the post.

Many influential party members who coveted the presidency were stained by allegations of corruption in this latter affair. All the faction leaders except Kōmoto Toshio and Nikaidō Susumu (who had earned the enmity of Takeshita, the leader of the largest faction, and could speak for but fourteen Diet members) were seen to be involved. Very few of the secondary leaders remained untainted. Of those who did, other obstacles remained. For instance, Miyazawa faction candidates were unlikely to receive the support of the three other large factions which had been operating together as a coalition.³⁶ Neither could potential contestants from the Abe or Takeshita factions expect support from the respective leaders who, not unnaturally, were unwilling to risk losing influence in if not control of their intra-party groupings. Thus it was necessary to put up for the leadership of the party, Diet members who had not up to then been seen as likely contenders, at least in the near future.

The forced departure of Uno, amid recriminations in the LDP over one local (Tōkyō) and one national electoral defeat, compelled the party once again to search for a new leader, but in a more hostile atmosphere. Two politicians who were desirous of running and considered untouched by scandal were Kōmoto Toshio and Kaifu Toshiki, a member of his faction. The former had been a presidential candidate in the early 1980's but a number of factors, particularly the bankruptcy of a shipping company of which he was the *de facto* owner had resulted in him all but admitting that his chance had passed. The latter was seen as being a potential future power-broker inside the party.

A strong desire to be considered as Uno's successor was expressed by Kōmoto³⁷ but he was unable to secure broad support in the party.³⁸ Recognizing this fact and in the knowledge that there was much support for Kaifu, Kōmoto announced that he would not stand and gave his blessing to Kaifu's candidacy.³⁹ With the support of the Takeshita, Abe and Nakasone factions, in addition to that of Kōmoto, Kaifu held off the challenge of two rivals to gain the party presidency by securing 279 out of a possible 451 votes.⁴⁰

This was a remarkable turn of events for the Kōmoto faction. After thirteen years during which it had continuously been separated from the centres of power in the party, through circumstances external to it and more by accident than design, the faction found itself having two of its members being considered seriously for the leadership of the party, one of whom acquired it with the support of three of the four large factions. Such a possibility had not been entertained seriously inside the faction at the beginning of the year. Indeed, the Kōmoto faction was the target of overtures made by the other factions towards members who were dissatisfied and frustrated with their affiliation to a grouping seen as being on the periphery of the LDP.

The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis will examine the history, organization, dynamics and finances of the Miki/Kōmoto faction. The study itself was carried out when the faction was under threat from the others, but attempting to move towards the hub of party power by allying itself with Takeshita Noboru, the leader of the largest faction; this was during the closing months of the Nakasone government and early days of that led by Takeshita. The contemporary analysis will be presented after the historical background to the faction's fortunes. The thesis will be made up of six chapters excluding the introduction and conclusion.

The second chapter will examine the faction's history while taking as a central theme the political career of its founder. Primary sources will be used, wherever possible, to describe Miki's childhood and youth. This period will paint the background to the factors which led Miki successfully to seek election to the Diet at the then minimum allowable age of thirty. Material found which could provide some insight into his thoughts and acts during the eight years he served as a politician prior to the end of the war will be presented after being winnowed. No secondary source will be uncritically accepted. Miki's search for an ideology and grouping will be investigated. His fortunes will be followed through his party's incorporation of and unification with other minor groupings inside the Diet, and the return of the depurged politicians. Their presence, in both the wider political arena and in the party to which Miki and the group of politicians centred on him belonged, threatened to stunt the development of Miki's political career. The chapter will end with the formation of the LDP - the culmination of the irresistible march towards one conservative party, an occurrence that Miki was against but powerless to stop.

Chapter three will record the activities of Miki inside the fledgling party. The prospects for his faction began promisingly with the coming into power of the Ishibashi

government but were dashed suddenly and unkindly with the prime minister's forced early retirement and his succession by Kishi. The political vicissitudes of Miki and his faction under this regime and during the Cabinets of its successors (those led by Ikeda, Satō and Tanaka) will be looked at briefly. The postures of the faction and consequent defections of sub-groupings will be explained together with the background to Miki's three attempts to gain for himself the presidency of the party. An examination will be made of the Miki government with particular scrutiny given to the circumstances behind its formation, its management of the Diet and the factors leading to its fall. The twilight years of the Miki faction - a period of pressure inside the faction for a new leader - and the formation of the Kōmoto faction in 1980 will be detailed. Finally, the initial optimism of faction members will be seen to give way to disillusion and despair as the faction's relative strength waned and it became further and further detached from the centres of power in the party.

Chapter four will be concerned mainly with the organization of the Kōmoto faction as it was towards the end of 1987. The hierarchical nature of the titles and roles given to all faction members will be noted, listed and elucidated with due attention paid to the differences between the image which was and was meant to be presented to outsiders, and the reality. The writer will relate the proceedings of one faction meeting at which he was present; on such occasions, which were frequent and well-defined, all or selected sub-groups of members were expected to come together. The method by which the faction office sent information to members will then be explained and examples given. The writer was frustrated in his attempts to make a more than superficial comparison with a second faction. Access to and close association with one faction was accomplished at the cost of drawing suspicion from the others. Doors to them either remained closed or did not open wide enough to allow evaluation. Nevertheless, an interview was granted with the

director-general of the Miyazawa faction, which allowed a few points of difference to be noticed.

In turning to the secretaries of Kōmoto faction members, there will be a discussion of their own organization and a look at the extent to which they helped each other. Special attention will be given to those who worked for Kōmoto himself. Secretaries from all offices together played a crucial role in the running of the faction annual study conference; this will be described in some detail on account of its importance. It will follow a brief description and history of the organization of the Miki office.

The relationships among faction members will be the subject of scrutiny for the fifth chapter. In order to evaluate continuity, a comparison will be made of the faction under the two leaders and a look taken at the links that existed between Miki on the one hand and Kōmoto, his faction, and its members, on the other. Three basic (and obviously simplified) levels of support for the faction among its members will be suggested and examples furnished. Common elements that can explain affiliation to the Miki faction will precede a study of the effect on recruitment brought about by Kōmoto's ascendancy. Empirical evidence will be used to scrutinize the closeness of the relationships among faction members. This will be followed by a consideration of what is signified by and whose views are incorporated in the set of policies put forward by the faction.

The advantages and disadvantages of belonging to the Kōmoto faction and the related questions of the faction attracting and holding onto new candidates while deflecting approaches from the other factions will be discussed and illustrated through examples. Finally, mention will be made of the support given by the faction to its members during an election campaign and its importance in maintaining a feeling of belonging and unity.

Chapter six will continue the analysis of the membership of the faction, but will be concerned with its interaction with individuals and bodies outside it. This will include the other factions, the LDP, the opposition parties and sub-groups of them. An evaluation of the role and importance of the Kōmoto faction in the decision-making process will follow a study of its relationships with the other factions. Factors influencing the making and breaking of coalitions will be given with the political movements taking place in the run-up to the 1987 presidential election chronicled as a case in point.

Two cross-factional groups inside the LDP will be investigated: the focus in one will be on its organization, and in the other on its effect on the stability of the Kōmoto faction. The first was chosen because five Kōmoto faction members belonged and, through working in its office, the writer could view it from the inside. The importance to the thesis of the second lay in the fact that its existence was a source of worry for Kōmoto. In addition, some general observations on cross-factional groups will be made. Inter-factional cooperation and confrontation among individual members will be discussed and an analysis made of the historical links and antagonisms in Tokushima prefecture. This will lead directly into an examination of the depths of contacts between national and local politicians. The final two sections of the chapter will consider how the Kōmoto faction interacts with bureaucrats and the press.

Chapter seven, on finance, will begin with an attempt to set out, with the help of a diagram, the routes through which money passes into the hands of factions and their members. A brief description of LDP funding will precede some remarks on the financing of the Miki faction. Reliable information on the distribution of faction money down the organization at the time of the study was sparse. Some ground will be covered but additional material which might have proved enlightening will be omitted; the writer

harboured doubts about its reliability and there was a lack of independent confirmation. The manner by which one secretary attempted to garner funds will be examined in detail, and the section on fund- raising parties will describe a fruitful and popular method for Diet members to gather money.

The eighth and final chapter will bring together many of the findings of the study. Some of the conclusions drawn will be specific to the Kōmoto faction; others will relate to the wider phenomenon of factionalism inside the LDP. Appendix one will list the relative strengths of LDP factions in the Lower House between 1958 and 1986, appendix two will chronicle their movements in and out of the party mainstream, and appendix three will be a register of all Diet members who belonged to the Miki/Kōmoto faction (or Miki's party).

Notes and References

- 1 See, J. A. A. Stockwin, "Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties", *Japan Forum*, vol.1, no.2 (October 1989), pp.161-171, from which some of the conceptual ideas expressed have been taken.
- 2 Watanabe Tsuneo, *Habatsu - Nihon Hoshutō No Kaibō*, Kōbundō, 1958.
- 3 For instance, Watanabe, "Habatsu Wa Hitsuyō De Aru", *Ronsō*, October 1962, and "Tatōka No Nami To Jimintō No Habatsu - Sono Yōin No Henka To Kinō", *Kaikakusha*, No. 98 (May 1968), Minshu Shakaishugi Kenkyū Kaigi.
- 4 Watanabe, *Habatsu - Nihon Hoshutō No Bunseki*, Kōbundō, 1964.
- 5 Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, University of California Press, 1962, p.18.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p.54.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p.144.
- 8 Haruhiro Fukui, *Party in Power*, University of California Press, 1970. See in particular pp.107-143.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p.123.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p.126.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p.128.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p.134/135.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p.140.
- 14 Fukui, "The Liberal Democratic Party Revisited: Continuity and Change in the Party's Structure and Performance", *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 10, no.2 (summer 1984), p.433.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p.399.
- 16 Stockwin, *op.cit.*, p.170.
- 17 Nobuo Tomita, Akira Nakamura and Ronald J.Hrebenar, "The Liberal Democratic Party: The Ruling Party of Japan" in Ronald J. Hrebenar, *The Japanese Party System - From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government*, Westview Press, 1986, p.248.
- 18 Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games", *American Political Science Review*, Vol.62, pp.770-788.
- 19 Nakamura Hajime, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, East-West Center Press, 1964, p.530.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p.484.
- 21 Nakane Chie, *Japanese Society*, Penguin, 1973, pp.47-48.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p.66.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p.138.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p.57.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p.83-84.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p.136.
- 27 Gerald L. Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*. Columbia University Press, 1988, p.179.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p.234.
- 29 *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 January 1988.
- 30 Possibly, Kishi was active behind the scenes until he fell ill in 1986.
- 31 These were: Masuda Takuji, *Jitsuroku Miki Takeo*, Hōchiki Shōji, 1975; Miki Yōnosuke, *Miki Takeo - Kōyū 50 Nen No Sugao*, Sankei Shimbunsha, 1975; Nakamura

Keiichirō, *Miki Seiken - 747 Nichi*, Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1981, and Nakamura, *Kōmoto Toshio - Zenjinzō*, Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1982. In particular the first two and fourth books suffer from a lack of rigour. They contain many platitudes and apocryphal anecdotes.

- 32 Books written by Matsuno Raizō and Tagawa Seiichi come under this category.
- 33 Faction members as of 1 January 1989 who were neither formally nor informally interviewed are five in number: Fujimoto Takao, Kōnoike Yoshitada, Hatsumura Takiichirō, Iwasaki Junzō and Ishii Ichiji. However, Hatsumura wrote copious answers to a questionnaire sent him.
- 34 Kunihiro was elected for the Socialist Party in the 1989 House of Councillors election.
- 35 It was later renamed "Forum for a Liberal Society".
- 36 Itō Masayoshi was favourite for a time, but proved unacceptable when he announced his conditions for acceptance. One was the resignation of all Diet members who had been implicated in the scandal. This would have included Miyazawa himself.
- 37 See, for instance, *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 August 1989.
- 38 *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 August 1989.
- 39 *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 August 1989.
- 40 The result was: Kaifu 279, Hayashi Yoshirō (Nikaidō faction) 120, Ishihara Shintarō (Abe faction) 48. *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 August 1989. Two days earlier the same newspaper indicated the likely paths of support between the factions and candidates.

Chapter 2

MIKI TAKEO AND THE FORMATION OF A FACTION

Introduction

In order to understand the factors which enabled Miki Takeo to become the leader of a faction, it is necessary to examine his early career in politics while painting in the general political background. Certain qualities of personality and character appear to have set Miki apart from or above many of his contemporaries before he first stood for election to the Diet. In searching for empirical evidence, the writer sought the views of people who knew Miki when he was a boy. The information provided which relates to events that occurred before the war may be inaccurate due to the passage of time. In addition, most people interviewed were friends, relatives, or employees of Miki and could be expected to present a sympathetic if not flattering portrait. However, with two notable exceptions, no newspaper article relating directly or indirectly to Miki before he declared his candidature could be traced. Perhaps none exists. Thus it was extremely important to hear the recollections of people who knew him when he was young, although questions must remain about whether or not they gave a balanced picture.

Miki's Early Life

On 17th March 1907, in Donari chō, Itano gun, Tokushima Prefecture, Miki Takeo was born into a relatively well-off family engaged in farming.¹ He was an only child and was described by two contemporaries as a boy who enjoyed excellent relations with adults.² Several people emphasized that from an early age he displayed skill in putting his thoughts

into words and had a commanding manner of address.³ According to one source, he used to stand on top of a *zenibako*⁴ and “deliver speeches to anyone who would listen.”⁵ Another person related that Miki would invite people junior to himself into his parents home where he would “test their knowledge as if he were a teacher”.⁶ He recalled Miki being the leader of a group of seven- or eight-year old boys who would go into the mountains to catch birds.⁷ This evidence suggests that Miki might have been articulate at a young age and a natural leader in a peer group, but it is impossible to induce that he exhibited any extraordinary qualities at this time.

Approximately one in every five applicants gaining admission,⁸ Miki entered Tokushima Commercial School⁹ in 1920¹⁰ and lived in a students dormitory.¹¹ Several of his fellow students could recall their impressions of him, which are as follows. His relations with other students were good but not to an extent worthy of special mention.¹² He did not study particularly hard nor was he very fond of sport.¹³ He was an avid reader,¹⁴ interested in photography, but was most active in the oratorical society where he excelled.¹⁵ Miki entered and was successful in contests, his parents proudly displaying the trophies in the house.¹⁶ One competition he won was the All-Tokushima School Oratorical Tournament.¹⁷

Further evidence for Miki’s eloquence is provided by his participation in an event held under the auspices of the *Tokushima Mainichi Shimbun*. Over several days starting on 27 September 1924 a “mock Diet” was held. Miki “belonged” to the “Centre Party”.¹⁸ He put forward a plan for the public election of the prefectural governor,¹⁹ the extension of the franchise for the election of Assembly members and a reorganization of its finances. According to the newspaper, his resolution was adopted. The method by which people were chosen to take part and whether or not participants could choose their party labels is unclear. This event was given much publicity and was unlikely to have been a regular

occurrence. No more detailed information was found by the writer. From a photograph, it appears that sixty or so people took part, most or all of whom were students. This impression was reinforced by the fact that the comments expressed on the conduct of the proceedings were by schoolmasters.²⁰

The School Strike

Books and articles that have chronicled Miki's early life have drawn attention to a strike by the students at his school over the alleged misappropriation of funds by the principal, a man called Kosaka. Miki is said to have been expelled subsequently on the grounds that he was a ringleader.²¹ The truth behind this incident, however, appears to be different. According to the accounts of three of his classmates,²² many of the teachers in the school belonged to a pro- or anti-Kosaka clique, where the division may have been on a point of educational philosophy and policy. Conflict between the two sides came out into the open on several occasions and it was on a rumour that Kosaka and members of his clique had used for their own entertainment, money meant for the building of a gymnasium,²³ that the fourth year students, of whom Miki was one, all went on strike.

In order that no student could be made an example of by the principal and, moreover, with the intention that none dropped out, a compact under joint signature (*renbanjō*) was made declaring dissatisfaction with Kosaka. With the names of the students being written as the rays of a vacuous sun, none was given more prominence than any other. The strike lasted for four or five days and ended when a group of parents went up to the school, discovered discrepancies in its financial management and demanded the resignation of the principal. He and certain other members of staff changed schools that summer. No student

was penalized.²⁴ Kimura stressed that had any individual been singled out, it would have been Shima or himself as they were the class leaders (*kyūchō*).

A newspaper report of the time²⁵ related that all fourth-year students had withdrawn from the school in sympathy with three teachers (Sawa, Horikita and Yamazaki) who had resigned at the end of February because Kosaka was not doing enough to help the graduating students find employment and because he was also being vague about the financial details of a certain matter. The third-year students had adopted a resolution asking the teachers to return, and the fifth-years' had not acted, as they were about to graduate. Two days before the article appeared in the paper, some thirty parents were said to have accepted the principal's explanation and promised to send their children back to the school. The students, however, did not return to the school the following day but rather met secretly. The section head of the Tokushima Prefecture Educational Bureau (*gakumu kachō*) was reported as saying that although it was not the juncture to announce the bureau's attitude, they did not recognize that Kosaka had been dishonest.

This episode might explain why Miki left the school. Given the strained atmosphere, one possibility is that Miki's parents were of a mind to send him elsewhere. Popularized accounts appear to be inaccurate. Miki was a participant in the strike, but not apparently a ringleader; perhaps there were no ringleaders as such. The evidence suggests that he was not expelled. The discrepancies in the various reports of this incident show clearly that great care must be taken to separate Miki from the mythology that has grown up around him.

First Steps towards a Career in Politics

Miki was said to have been a favourite of two teachers in particular: one Horikita, who taught English,²⁶ and a person named Yamazaki.²⁷ A place at *Chūgai* Commercial, a private school in Kōbe, Hyōgo Prefecture, where he moved to in September 1925,²⁸ may have been secured for him by Horikita.²⁹ Interestingly, Miki is listed as having graduated from Tokushima Commercial in March 1926,³⁰ the same month and year that he graduated from this Kōbe school.

Miki continued taking part in oratorical tournaments. In 1925 he is reported to have come first in the Kinki Secondary School Oratorical Tournament³¹ with his Kōbe school winning the group competition.³² This might be what brought Miki to the notice of the chairman of the Board of Directors of *Chūgai* Commercial, Yūki Toyotarō,³³ who was later to help Miki start his political career by providing some finance and introducing him to useful people.³⁴

In April 1926 Miki entered the Commercial Department of Meiji University and joined the oratorical society.³⁵ He became friendly with a senior, Nagao Shinkurō, sixteen years older than himself and also hailing from Tokushima.³⁶ While at Meiji University, both Nagao and Miki were active in the Kantō Students' Oratorical Federation.³⁷ In the summer of 1926, together with five or so others, and with financial assistance from Tadokoro Tagiji, older brother of Nagao, they are said to have undertaken an oratorical campaign around the junior high schools in Tokushima.³⁸

Miki graduated in March 1929 and the following month entered the Law Department. In September that year he travelled to America with Nagao, but returned after him journeying through Europe and Asia on his way back. In Moscow he was able to get an

audience with a senior Japanese diplomat who much later was to ask for Miki's help.³⁹ He returned to Japan via the trans- Siberian Railway,⁴⁰ and arrived in November 1930.

In May 1932 Miki returned to America to study, and boarded in the house of a Japanese family living in America. The son, Asano Mikio, who became his secretary in 1936 and who was to remain a friend until Miki's death, recollected some impressions of the lodger:⁴¹ Miki was able to make friends quickly with many first generation Japanese-Americans despite many of them being far older than he. On a trip to Mexico he contacted and became very friendly with leaders of the Japanese community there. He had no problem meeting and gaining the confidence of people not only many years older than himself but also much senior. He did not have to make an effort to establish inter- personal relationships; rapport would be spontaneous. In particular he became friends and socialized frequently with Fukushima Shintarō and Hirasawa Kazushige,⁴² Japanese foreign office officials based in Los Angeles.

It is not clear at which college Miki studied. Although much later to receive an honorary degree from the institution, Miki appears not to have been a student at the University of Southern California; he was not registered there.⁴³ He may have spent some time at South-Western University.⁴⁴ Miki received some financial support from his parents while he was in America. He told Asano that he had enough money to go to an East Coast college but somehow got stuck in Los Angeles.⁴⁵ After the war, Miki was to use an interpreter in his dealings with the American Occupation Forces. One must therefore question his ability to have undertaken a degree programme in English.

In 1936 Miki returned to Japan, possibly undertook some commercial activities,⁴⁶ but continued his studies at Meiji University and graduated the following year from the Department of Law.⁴⁷ He lived in the Tōkyō suburb of Yoyogi in a house owned by Ikuta

Wahei,⁴⁸ a member of the House of Representatives for Tokushima # 1, who lived two doors away. Ikuta appears to have thought highly of Miki, and wanted Nagao to introduce his (Ikuta's) daughter to him in the hope that a marriage would be arranged and Miki become an adopted son. Nagao refused. The source for this story could not be specific about the date.⁴⁹ However, this incident suggests that even before the outbreak of war, Miki was seen as having an extremely promising career ahead of him.

Asano remembered Miki wanting to run for the Diet from the time he was a student.⁵⁰ One person interviewed asserted that Miki considered giving a false date of birth, were an election to be called before he reached his thirtieth birthday.⁵¹ On 6 April 1937 Miki put down the deposit to stand in the forthcoming election for Tokushima # 2⁵² and, acting as his representative, municipal assemblyman Hosoda Bunmei (Fumiaki?)⁵³ filed his candidacy three days later.⁵⁴

Although he had not stood as a candidate before, Miki was not without some experience of participating in an election campaign. Evidence exists suggesting that he had some involvement on one previous occasion but the details are obscure. It is even unclear whether the election was a national or local one, although the date mentioned suggests the latter was more likely.⁵⁵ Possibly he had been active in other campaigns too.

Miki stressed his independence as a candidate maintaining that the purpose of the election was not to see which of the two big parties would become the larger but rather whether or not the government was supported.⁵⁶ He stood as an independent and, at the age of thirty, was the youngest candidate to seek election. Hosoda, head of Miki's election office in Itano-gun, reported that there was a full house wherever Miki spoke and that it was hoped that the voting would reflect this popularity.⁵⁷ This may or may not have been politicking.

Takashima Hyōkichi was seen to be Miki's main challenger. He was seventy-three years of age, and standing for the *Minseitō* in the same district⁵⁸ of the constituency. Takashima had been returned to the Lower House on five occasions the first being in 1918. From 1895 to 1907 he had been a town assemblyman and then served as a prefectural assemblyman for twelve years.⁵⁹

Asano reported that before Miki gave a speech he would tie a silk sash tightly around his waist to give strength to his voice.⁶⁰ Another source recalled him being an excellent speaker who would go into the audience to discuss issues. This person maintained that such a style was unusual at the time and further suggested that it was the power and feeling behind Miki's speeches which brought in so many people.⁶¹ Miki spoke at seven, fifteen and fourteen speech meetings on the 27, 28 and 29 April respectively.⁶² Of all the candidates only Manabe gave more than Miki's 121 speeches during the campaign.⁶³ Miki was named the "*kamikaze* candidate" after the name of the aeroplane, sponsored by the *Asahi Shimbun*, that was flown successfully from Tōkyō to London the very same month; it was a reference to his attempt to set a record as the youngest person to be elected to the Diet,⁶⁴ a point which he made in his speeches.⁶⁵ Miki claimed that he offered only "fair play" and a "fighting spirit".⁶⁶

Of the four candidates, Miki secured the third and last seat in the three-member constituency edging out Takashima by 2,849 votes.⁶⁷ On being elected he said that he would work to the limits of his power as long as he lived in order to cleanse the Diet, reform political parties and put into practice "public opinion" politics.⁶⁸ All the successful candidates were asked their intentions in the Diet and there were some whose sentiments echoed those of Miki.

Miki as a Prewar Politician

Of the other 109 candidates standing as independents, twenty-nine were returned to the 466-member House of Representatives. In addition, seven out of forty-three candidates for the minor parties were elected,⁶⁹ each representing a different party.

On 29 June 1937 ten independent members⁷⁰ of the Diet came together to form a negotiating body⁷¹ inside the Diet and took the name *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu*;⁷² one of the people involved was Miki.⁷³ It was not a political party as such,⁷⁴ and the participants agreed to work together under the principle that they would have the freedom to operate under the lack of restrictions that they had enjoyed up to that time.⁷⁵ Miki's relationships with his fellow members are unclear although he may have been close to Matsukata Kōjirō and Dōke Seiichirō.⁷⁶

The *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu* was similar to the *Dai Ichi Giin Club*, according to one of Miki's contemporaries, Akagi Munenori.⁷⁷ It was neither a political party nor simply a collection of people who gathered together in a room but something in between. Everyone, without restraint, could freely express and exchange political views.⁷⁸

A little is known of Miki's activities outside the Diet. On 19 February 1938 some four thousand people attended the Japan- America Friendship People's Rally held in Hi-biya, Tōkyō.⁷⁹ The chairman was Imai Gōsuke, member of the House of Peers. Various people belonging to the two Houses and other personages were present including Miki, Kagawa Toyohiko⁸⁰ and the novelist Kikuchi Kan.⁸¹ The main speaker was former Education Minister Nagata Hidejirō.⁸² Although not described as such in books chronicling the event,⁸³ the meeting was held most probably as an attempt to lessen American criticism of Japanese actions in China. There is no evidence that the speakers disapproved of the incursions of the Japanese army into that country. Indeed there are indications to the

contrary. Iwase Akira, the brother of Miki's future father-in-law, was reported as saying, "... what we have done in Manchukuo and what we are doing in North China is not imperialism...."⁸⁴ Another of the seventeen speakers was Miki himself who put forward a resolution calling for closer ties between the two nations to "contribute to the peace of the world and the welfare of mankind".⁸⁵ A resolution adopted described the anti-Japanese boycott in America as being engineered by communists and expressed satisfaction that the United States maintained a calm and strictly impartial attitude following events concerning actions of the Japanese Army in China.⁸⁶ Telegrams were sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, among others.

Miki's thoughts on Japanese-American relations were recorded in a long letter to the *New York Times* dated 6 April 1938 and published nearly six weeks later. Miki wrote, "... my greatest concern is to devote all that is possible within me in rendering service for [a] closer relationship between the United States and Japan". He continued by saying that a nation's merit "... depends solely on whether it is possessed of contemporary culture and civilization of its age". Later on he refers to "... the stagnation of the inert League of Nations' politics...", maintained that "... it is ... unjustifiable to withhold from use unnecessarily certain resources that are of real necessity for the cultural wealth of humanity...", and questioned whether their acquisition "... signifies an infringement of the owner's rights ". Finally, on the subject of the interrelationship between Japan and China he wrote, "... In effect they are one and the same body, for better or worse, and thereby they become the solely concerned parties necessitating mutual moral responsibility in all matters of mutual concern. And thus, in view of this truth, the intrusion of any remote third party between them must be declared devoid of any useful meaning whatsoever."⁸⁷

Given the evidence available on the Hibiya meeting and the content of the above-mentioned letter, it does appear that Miki sought to avoid war between Japan and America but was at least sympathetic to the official Japanese stand on China.⁸⁸

Miki was involved in another episode which concerned the relationship with America. On 26 February 1939, Saitō Hiroshi, the former Ambassador to the United States, died. He had relinquished the post the previous October due to ill health which also prevented him from leaving Washington. According to the *New York Times*, the decision by President Roosevelt to return Saitō's ashes on an American cruiser was made with an earlier Japanese gesture in mind; in 1925 she had sent back the body of American Ambassador Edgar A. Bancroft on a Japanese cruiser, and this had been recalled by an *Asahi Shimbun* representative in New York.

According to Asano, Miki was central to the planning and implementation of the return of Saitō's remains.⁸⁹ He is said to have used his connections at the Washington Embassy and the American Embassy in Tōkyō.⁹⁰ Following the docking of the said cruiser, *Astoria*, in Yokohama on 17 April 1939, there was a welcoming ceremony for the crew of the ship; various events and parties were held in their honour using money raised from the business community.⁹¹ Asano remembered Miki opening an *ad hoc* office inside the Imperial Hotel (closed down when all the related events had ended) to serve as headquarters for the planning.⁹² He asserted that Miki's character and ability to raise money were clearly manifested and that despite attempts by several other people "to muscle in", he was able to maintain control of the proceedings.⁹³ Two sources⁹⁴ recalled the making of a documentary film, "*Ambassador Saitō returns*" by a company in which Miki had a financial interest. They believed that he possessed limited rights to trade the film and made a sizeable amount of money by selling a print to a ship company that wished to use it to attract

passengers on certain voyages. Corroborating evidence for the importance of this event on Japanese-American relations and the goodwill it generated is provided by the *New York Times*, but Miki's role is not mentioned.⁹⁵

The same year saw Miki participate in a new Diet grouping.⁹⁶ On 25 November 1939 there was a meeting of seventeen Diet members from various minor parties, a result of which was the formation of a new negotiating body, the *Jikyoku Dōshikai*. In addition to one non-affiliated Diet member, the *Kokumin Dōmei*, *Tōhōkai*, *Dai Nihon Kakushintō*, and *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu* provided ten, eight, four and eight members respectively. Miki was one of the thirty-one participants. Kiyose Ichirō, later to become a member of the Miki faction, was made chairman of investigation⁹⁷ and the group had an office in Marunouchi.⁹⁸ Like the *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu*, this was more a collection of independent people than a party, and may have been little more than an umbrella grouping of disparate elements. During the 1942 election campaign, one or two of Miki's fellow members went to Tokushima to speak in support of him, but the witness could not recall their names; they may have been colleagues from the defunct *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu*.⁹⁹

Miki in the Wartime Diet

There is little material to indicate Miki's attitude towards the war and his political actions at that time. As a very junior member of the House of Representatives he could not have had much power within that body and was not important enough to merit his movements being chronicled in the newspapers. Although the writer was able to trace a few people who knew him during this period, they were reticent.

On 30 March 1940 the *Jikyoku Dōshikai* was dissolved and over the next five months the political parties disbanded in preparation for the formation of one all-embracing political body.¹⁰⁰ This was founded on 20 December the same year and after various changes of

name and form came to be discontinued with the end of the war. Miki was one of the 435 members who came together under the *Shūgiin Giin Club*, its original name; he remained affiliated throughout.¹⁰¹

There is little evidence detailing Miki's attitudes towards these bodies. He was reported to feel that the president of the *Yokusan Seijikai* should be chosen from among members of the House of Representatives.¹⁰² This suggests that he may have wanted the head to be a person sent by the electorate to the Diet. The circumstances under which Miki initially joined are unknown. He may have been in sympathy with its aims or he may have felt that he had no political future outside. There were minor groupings which co-existed with the government-sponsored body. According to a contemporary in the Lower House, Miki was one of a number of people willing to participate in a movement to set up a new political party.¹⁰³ One was eventually formed but Miki did not take part.¹⁰⁴ It is likely that Miki was politic and declined to take the risk.

Miki appears to have developed excellent contacts inside the Diet. One person interviewed mentioned that he was very friendly with Ōta Kōzō, who had been Chief Cabinet Secretary between 7 April and 30 August 1939.¹⁰⁵ He was on good terms with Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro¹⁰⁶ who, for instance, had asked him about the structure and organization of political institutions in some of the major foreign countries, particularly Germany and Italy. The necessary research was undertaken for Miki by one of his aides and Konoe was reported to be happy with the effort that had been put into it.¹⁰⁷

Miki's marriage in June 1940 to Mutsuko, daughter of Mori Nobuteru, head of a very large industrial concern and himself a former member of the House of Representatives, gave him a secure financial base and facilitated the building up of a network of useful and powerful connections inside and outside the Diet. Various prominent politicians attended

the wedding although probably primarily through a connection with the Mori family. They included Sakurachi Yukio, Minister of Finance, and Matsuno Tsuruhei, Minister of Railways.¹⁰⁸

The years Miki had spent in America and his involvement with several organizations concerned with Japan-American relations may have been the reasons why, despite his connections, he was not given official recognition in the so-called "*Yokusan* election" of 1942.¹⁰⁹ The decision was made locally and could possibly relate to political rivalries. Certainly, affiliation to the *Yokusan Giin Dōmei*, another transformation, was not seen to be sufficient evidence for a candidate's "reliability". Nevertheless, there is no evidence to suggest that he was critical of the war during the election campaign. Within a few days of the result,¹¹⁰ and as one of the eighty-five non-recognized candidates returned for the 466 seats, Miki told a newspaper that he would do his best as a non-combatant soldier to bring to a successful conclusion the Greater East Asia War and establish a Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere.¹¹¹

According to one person interviewed, part of Miki's popularity was due to his returning to the constituency after every session of the Diet to relate to his supporters what was happening, and his keeping in very close contact with the voters to whom he gave much of his time.¹¹² One such individual emphasized that Miki's speeches brought in large crowds and goodwill was generated by his going into the audience to discuss the issues - something that had proved successful in 1937 and was later taken up by other candidates.¹¹³

One source mentioned that Miki was an admirer of Kishi Nobusuke whom he recognized to be an extremely clever and skilful bureaucrat during the early years of the war. When Kishi was Minister of Commerce and Industry, Miki was a member of the Parliamentary Committee and remained so through the change of name to the Ministry

of Munitions.¹¹⁴ Kishi was to be given an important role in the proposed party that Miki had expressed an interest in joining.¹¹⁵ However, later on Miki was to become extremely critical of both the role of bureaucrats in government and Kishi himself. Miki gave reasons for his dislike of the former, but there is no evidence to suggest this accounts for the political animosity between Kishi and himself.

Miki held high positions in the metallurgical and machine industries. He was a director of the Oeyama Nickel Industry Company between June 1940 and November 1943, Managing Director of Fuji Machinery Manufacturing Company between May 1941 and April 1945 and a director of Nippon Metallurgical Industry Company from November 1943.¹¹⁶ The second named was part of the *Mori Zaibatsu*.¹¹⁷ It is unclear what work, if any, Miki undertook for these companies and the advantages he accrued by being on their boards.

In May 1945, in the Suzuki Cabinet, Miki became Councillor¹¹⁸ in the Ministry of Munitions; it had earlier been thought that the equivalent post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be granted him.¹¹⁹ Miki was one of five *kobun* of Kanamitsu Tsuneo¹²⁰ who were put forward by him for a post.¹²¹ Kanamitsu was a powerful politician who had led a third grouping inside the pre-war *Seiyūkai* when it had split into the Kuhara and Nakajima factions. Kanamitsu had initially wanted the post for Akagi but this had been made difficult by the latter leaving the *Yokusan Seijikai* in March 1945 to participate in the founding of the *Gokoku Dōshikai*.¹²² Two people interviewed related that in the closing stages of the war, Kanamitsu set up a study group consisting of junior members of the House of Representatives in the hope of eventually forming a new party.¹²³ This never came to fruition. It is not clear whether or to what extent Kanamitsu distributed money

to his followers.¹²⁴ With the end of the war came the resignation of the Suzuki Cabinet on 15 August 1945.¹²⁵

The Early Postwar Period

During the early days of the American Occupation there was much activity to set up political parties.¹²⁶ Miki himself seemed unsure about which party to join and what political philosophy he should embrace. He considered and discussed with confidants the merits and demerits of joining the Socialist Party.¹²⁷ There was talk that through one member of it, Hirano Rikizō, Miki expressed his desire to enter.¹²⁸ He was also one of some two hundred people, including fifty-two Diet members, who gathered on 7 October under the name of the Preparatory Association for the Formation of the New Japan Liberal Party.¹²⁹ It centred on Hatoyama Ichirō, who had asked Miki to participate in building up the party.¹³⁰

By 16 November thirty-three political parties had come into existence.¹³¹ Ten days later Miki was one of ninety-two unaffiliated Diet members who banded together under the title of the Non-affiliated Club.¹³² This was not a party but rather a grouping of people many of whom were yet undecided about where to affiliate, if at all.

On 7 December, under the name of the Cooperative Association Research Society (*Kyōdō Kumiai Kenkyūkai*), a meeting was held with the intention of forming a political party having “cooperativism” as its principle for economic organization.¹³³ This was achieved eleven days later at a conference at which the Japan Cooperative Party (JCOP)¹³⁴ came into existence. Akagi Munenori and Suzuki Shōgo participated; Tanaka Isaji of the *Shimizu Club*, like the other two later to enter the Miki faction, did not take part at this time but joined later.¹³⁵ Twenty-six House of Representatives members belonged on 19

December.¹³⁶ From published statements on policy it does appear that Kurosawa and Funada headed the party.¹³⁷ Kurosawa wrote that there was but one way to save Japan: the fellow poor had to help each other through the putting into practice of cooperative unionism, and the country had to be rebuilt through applying this principle in politics, economics, education, culture, and people's lives.¹³⁸ The party reported that "positive support" was received from GHQ¹³⁹ when Funada and Ikawa went there to present the party's proposed platform and policies.¹⁴⁰ It is not clear what was meant by this.

According to Miki Mutsuko, Sengoku and Ikawa lived close by in the period immediately after the war. They were all on good terms and on a number of occasions Miki was asked to join the party. He declined on the grounds that he wished to wait until after the first post-war election at which time he would reconsider the situation and be prepared to make a commitment.¹⁴¹ In January 1946, the core of the JCOP was wiped out; twenty-one of the twenty-three Diet members were purged.¹⁴² Neither of the other two lasted the year: Andō Kōzō lost his seat in the April election, and Kita Katsutarō left. It was to Ikawa that was entrusted the task of rebuilding.¹⁴³ On 28 February, at a party conference, Ikawa, Yamamoto Sanehiko¹⁴⁴ and three others¹⁴⁵ were made standing officers.¹⁴⁶ In the April general election, the party saw fourteen people elected.

There was a great deal of movement and confusion in the Diet following the election with numerous formations and dissolutions of minor groupings of politicians. Miki was returned as an unaffiliated candidate, coming top - a ranking he was not to lose until 1979. None of the other four successful candidates in the now unified Tokushima constituency stood as a representative of a party. The one person standing for the Japan Cooperative Party came a poor fifteenth out of thirty candidates. Both prior to and after the election Miki spoke of the need for a party that occupied the middle ground between the Liberal

and Socialist Parties. He aimed to muster like-minded persons to set up a party that was neither a conservative force nor pure left-wing but one that adopted a “socialistic” way of thinking.¹⁴⁷ Perhaps by this term he meant that he envisaged it to be a party closer to the latter than the former. On 13 April 1946 the Liberal Party announced that three people, including Miki, would enter. Miki himself, however, denied that he was so inclined. He admitted that in the past he had frequently been entreated to join the party but maintained that he had never given his consent.¹⁴⁸

Later that month, Miki and Tanaka Isaji became officers of a group of unaffiliated members of the Diet;¹⁴⁹ they held a meeting on 21 April, the same day as a separate grouping of unaffiliated members including Hayashi Heima conferred together. It was decided that the two groups should unite as a negotiating body which they did under the name of the *Daidō Club*.¹⁵⁰ Over forty members¹⁵¹ were for the formation of a party, a negotiating group being seen as ineffectual, and on 13 May the preparatory association for the Japan Democratic Party (paJDP)¹⁵² was formed.¹⁵³

Meanwhile on 27 April, at the first post-election general meeting of the JCOP, Yamamoto became chairman of the Central Committee; the position of secretary-general went to Ikawa.¹⁵⁴ The party sent out invitations to small parties, independents and non-affiliated members of the Diet inviting them to a meeting to be held on 5 May.¹⁵⁵ As a result the Cooperative Democratic Club (the umbrella under which many interested Diet members grouped together), forty-two members from the JCOP, the Hiroshima Cooperative Democratic Party and certain other groupings came together and decided on joint action.¹⁵⁶

The political situation was very fluid at this time; not only the numerical strengths of the small parties but also their names were changing frequently. Thus one source¹⁵⁷ gave the following figures for membership:

Liberal Party	143
<i>Shimpotō</i> ¹⁵⁸	94
Socialist Party	94
paJDP (centring on the <i>Daidō Club</i>)	50
Cooperative Democratic Club (centring on the Japan Cooperative Party)	35
Shinkō Club (centring on the <i>Shinsei Dōshikai</i>)	30
Communist Party	5

with some Diet members having multiple membership and others remaining unaffiliated. A second source¹⁵⁹ reporting the situation at around the same time gave the figures for the fourth, fifth and sixth groupings as forty-four, thirty-one and twenty-seven respectively.¹⁶⁰

Talks were being held continually between various minor groupings.¹⁶¹ Miki himself had been holding discussions with the JCOP and on 25 May he joined its successor, the Cooperative Democratic Party (CDP)¹⁶² which had been formed the day before from its union with all the groupings under the umbrella of the Cooperative Democratic Club (CDC). Six other Diet members joined on the same day, bringing the numerical strength of the party to forty.¹⁶³

Miki left the paJDP at the time that it decided to become a party proper; this was to happen on 5 June 1946. Of the twenty-seven Diet members who belonged, all those who had been elected for the first time that year assented. The more senior politicians

including Miki, Tanaka and Kasai Jūji did not.¹⁶⁴ It is possible that there was friction between the two groups based on members having been first elected to the Diet under very different circumstances.

According to one participant in the CDP, Miki entered it as an individual and not as one of a group which had decided to join.¹⁶⁵ Membership was very strong in some prefectures and non-existent in others. For instance, of the forty-five members in the House of Representatives, five were from Hokkaidō, six from Hiroshima, six from Miyazaki, and seven from Kagoshima.¹⁶⁶ Certainly, this could partly be explained by the fact that the party had most appeal in rural areas. In addition, there were a number of Diet members who did not want to belong to one of the large parties, but preferred to emphasize their connection to the constituency and work together with other people elected from it. In such cases, possibly there were tacit understandings about the boundaries within which one should actively campaign. This may have been the case in Tokushima where, between May 1946 and February 1948, there were periods when three people in the four-seat constituency belonged to the CDP.

As one of the senior politicians (defined by length of service) in the CDP, Miki became one of seven members constituting the standing committee. The top two positions remained in the hands of Yamamoto and Ikawa.¹⁶⁷

The CDP was a very different grouping to its direct ancestor, the JCOP. The latter had been founded not long after the end of the war when there was a great deal of uncertainty about what type of political platform would be acceptable to GHQ. Its members had been elected during the war and were professional politicians. However, the party was dealt a severe blow by the purge and had to be rebuilt. In the 1946 election fourteen of the party's ninety-two candidates won seats. In the reconstructed party most members had

just started serving their first term, and in an atmosphere where it was thought for the first time that a political career was open to all.¹⁶⁸

Inside the party there were two main streams of thought: “cooperative democracy” and “cooperative socialism”.¹⁶⁹ Believers in the first school of thought, one of whom was Miki, advocated taking a road between capitalism and socialism through the formation of industrial and agricultural cooperatives. Kurosawa,¹⁷⁰ already purged, had been a leading proponent of this view; he and others believed in principles laid down by one Grundtwig for Danish agricultural practices. Leading proponents of the other group had both read and were influenced by the thoughts of Robert Owen.¹⁷¹ According to Ide, the point was never reached where these sets of ideas developed into hardened, articulated concepts, but some degree of conflict existed in the party between the two groupings.

The CDP embraced many new Diet members from various defunct minor parties. By the time the party had taken this new name, the political philosophy it espoused had shifted and was seen likely to move further as more and more recruits were sought. In talks leading up to the formation of the new party, Yamamoto had spoken of the JCOP ridding itself of dogma. He said that all parties involved should be willing to consider afresh their policies.¹⁷² For him the formation of the CDP was just the first step in building up a large party. He subsequently put out feelers to many other parties and groupings but the talks held all ended in failure. This hurt his standing in the party. In particular, he was criticized for the rupture in negotiations with the *Shin Seikai* (another minor grouping) and the *Shimpotō*¹⁷³ which could trace its lineage back to the pre-war *Minseitō*. In the former case, one major obstacle concerned the retention of the two characters ~~社~~ and 同¹⁷⁴ which the *Shin Seikai* wanted to delete from the name of a new party. Furthermore, not

all CDP members were in favour of building up the party at the expense of compromising on policy.¹⁷⁵

Miki's Rise to a Position of Power and Influence

During the latter half of 1946, Miki's power and influence in the party were steadily increasing. In addition to his oratorical gifts, he was in a position to provide funds and was extremely skilful in making contacts with other parties. He was a senior politician in the party, being one of the few first elected before the war, had been partly educated in America, and maintained good contacts at GHQ which had been nurtured by Matsumoto Takizō, a good friend and a fluent English speaker.¹⁷⁶ Ide stressed that, above all, Miki had an excellent grasp of politics. Hirakawa recalled that even among politicians, Miki was extraordinarily ambitious. While people were moving between parties, his own among them, Miki was content to stay where he was and build the party up. Various factors were working in his favour. On 19 April 1946, Yamamoto had been notified by the government that he came under the terms of reference of the purge. Although this decision was apparently reversed on 29 July, he was finally banished from active political life on 18 December.¹⁷⁷ Hirakawa felt that Miki's relationship with Yamamoto could be said to have been correct but not particularly close.¹⁷⁸ Then on 18 February 1947, Ikawa, secretary-general of the party, died at the age of 55.¹⁷⁹ As a result, Miki held a post inferior to none in the party.

From the end of 1946 there were moves for the formation of a new party among the CDP, People's Party (formerly the *Shin Seikai*, which had undergone the change of name on 25 September 1946) and the Non-affiliated Club.¹⁸⁰ Both the People's Party and CDP were small parties with little power in the Diet. In the knowledge that influence would

come only with increased numbers, talks began to effect a union. It was a gradual process over several months, the ways of thinking and the policies of the parties being different. Miki represented the CDP, and Matsubara, the People's Party.¹⁸¹ Although some members of the CDP hesitated for constituency reasons, they agreed to merge on 20 February and the People's Cooperative Party (PCP) came into being on 8 March 1947. The breakdown of participants was as follows:

Cooperative Democratic Party	42
People's Party	32
others (one of whom was Tanaka Isaji)	4

Miki became secretary-general and Hayakawa Takashi, from the People's Party, his deputy. At no subsequent time was Miki to be the leader of such a large group of Diet members, and even this position was short lived. On 31 March,¹⁸² a severe blow was dealt by the formation of the Democratic Party under Ashida Hitoshi, which centred on the former *Shimpotō*.¹⁸³ Earlier that month the PCP had planned to give recognition to two hundred candidates for the coming April election in the hope that about 120 would be returned.¹⁸⁴ However, fifteen party members left to join the new party.¹⁸⁵ Though fewer than the thirty converts expected by the Democratic Party, it was more than the five or six that Miki had predicted.¹⁸⁶ In addition, inside the PCP there were people who had no intention of standing in the election and others who expected to be purged.¹⁸⁷ The relative strengths of the major parties on 31 March was as follows:¹⁸⁸

Democratic Party	145
Liberal Party	140
Socialist Party	98

Miki's party eventually gave official recognition to 107 candidates of which it expected some fifty or so to be successful. Overall responsibility for the election lay with Miki who occupied the post of chairman of the Election Strategy Committee.¹⁸⁹

The PCP did not perform well. In the House of Councillors election on 20 April, nine candidates were returned: three in the national constituency and six in the prefectural constituencies. Twenty-four candidates retained seats and seven for the first time gained them in the Lower House election which was held five days later. The strength of the party had fallen to thirty-one.¹⁹⁰ The Socialist Party led by Katayama Tetsu won most seats but was far from having an absolute majority. It held talks with the Liberal, Democratic, and People's Cooperative Parties on forming a coalition government; this came to fruition but without the participation of the Liberal Party.

A government under Katayama was formed on 31 July.¹⁹¹ Over the question of who was to receive which Cabinet posts, Miki's friendship with Nishio Suehiro, secretary-general of the Socialist Party, and information emanating from GHQ provided by Matsumoto enabled Miki to remain continually well-informed on moves taking place.¹⁹² The thirteen Cabinet posts had been expected to be distributed among the Socialist, Democratic and People's Cooperative Parties in the ratio 6:6:1; with the addition of three extra posts, it became 7:7:2. Initially it was thought that Miki would be made Minister of Health and Welfare, but with his party receiving two posts, Miki became Minister of Communications¹⁹³ and Sasamori, who received the second post as the representative of the defunct People's Party, was made Minister without Portfolio.¹⁹⁴ Matsumoto was made Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On 30 June the PCP held its second national congress. Miki's status was raised from secretary-general to the first chairman of the Central Committee. Okada Seiichi became secretary-general.¹⁹⁵ Miki's elevation was no doubt due partly to the satisfaction inside the party over the success of their leader in bringing it into the government.

Moves towards a Party of the Centre

On 19 May 1947 at a meeting between Miki and the members of his party belonging to the House of Councillors, it was decided that all nine of them would join the *Ryokufūkai* (which can be translated as Green Breeze Society), a political grouping that sought to operate above party politics. This course of action was deemed appropriate by the PCP which stressed the similarities between the policies of the two. Both were characterized as taking the middle way: being against the two extremes.¹⁹⁶

Miki sought to strengthen his position and that of his party by continuing to look to the minor parties and groupings in the hope that eventually they would be incorporated within the PCP. Centring on Miki's party, the New Politics Council (NPC),¹⁹⁷ a looser body than a political party, was formed on 5 December 1947. The other participants were the *Dai Ichi Giin Club*¹⁹⁸ and the Farmers Party.¹⁹⁹ Unfortunately for Miki, however, the National Farmers Faction Diet Members Body (NFF)²⁰⁰ led by Hirano Rikizō announced it was to secede from the Socialist Party (within which it had been a right-wing grouping), entered into consultations with the NPC and moved to bring down the Katayama Cabinet - of which the PCP was a member. On 13 January 1948 Hirano was purged.²⁰¹ This was politically convenient for the prime minister.

The PCP decided not to participate in the preparations of the NPC to form a new party.²⁰² The NFF had counted on its collusion and in the draft platform had declared the

intention to establish a national party based on cooperative socialist democratism²⁰³ from which both the extreme right and the extreme left would be excluded. Close links with the NFF were enjoyed by three PCP members: Hayakawa, Akita and Ōhara Hiroo. They had served as officers in the NPC, and left their party with the intention of participating in the new one.²⁰⁴

This incident posed a serious threat to Miki's leadership. There were rumours that a large number of PCP members would defect. For instance, in addition to Hayakawa, the name of Taga Yasurō was mentioned; both said they would abide by party policy (not move with the NFF). Miki was reported as saying that no one would leave.²⁰⁵ The political situation was particularly fluid at the time - Ashida too was once again considering the formation of a new party and Miki requested a meeting with one of his advisors, Yabe Teiji²⁰⁶, to search for a way his party could hold its ground.²⁰⁷ In their yearbook, the PCP admitted that before they realized what was happening, the NFF led by Hirano participated in and then took the leadership of the NPC guiding it and quickly moving it towards the formation of a new party.²⁰⁸ Although a new party²⁰⁹ came about, centred on the Socialist Party members who had been followers of Hirano, it remained a small grouping. Plans to form a major party had been hurt by the removal of Hirano.

On 10 February 1948 the Katayama Cabinet resigned. The prime minister stepped down as a result of conflict within his party over the annual budget, which was dictated by SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section.²¹⁰ Although there were dissenting voices, Miki's PCP wanted the coalition to continue under Ashida, and indeed Ashida became Katayama's successor with the blessing of GHQ.²¹¹ The PCP expected two Cabinet posts and wanted one to be Agriculture and Forestry; this went to the Socialist Party. It then

asked for the Education and Transport Ministries. Okada was given Transport but Funada was made Minister without Portfolio.²¹²

The concept of a political party propounding middle-of-the-road policies continued to be bandied about in the press during 1948. There had been discussions between Miki's party and the Democratic Party on a merger during 1947.²¹³ At a general meeting of his party on 30 January 1948, Ashida had broached the subject of forming a political party of the centre. On 5 July, at an address to party members, Miki said that he would not participate in talks aimed at making a conservative alliance, the policy of his party not being conservative. Rather he would seek to align it with small parties having the same ideology. Miki called for the formation of a federation of parties to hold the centre of the political stage. In his view, the policy adopted should not be conservative but should rather advocate a planned economy.²¹⁴ The following day Ashida, addressing members of his Democratic Party, backed Miki and one day later told journalists that he was in favour of a "middle-road" party.

Miki claimed that a central political federation was necessary to rebuild Japan - a task that could not be accomplished by the two big parties, one preaching unrestricted capitalism and the other emphasizing a Marxist class structure. He said that a federation would be the first step in the formation of a political party which would be centred on the Democratic and People's Cooperative Parties, with the hoped-for participation of moderates in the Socialist Party and progressives among the conservatives. Miki spoke of a gathering of some one hundred and fifty members of the Diet.²¹⁵ He discussed this plan widely in political circles²¹⁶ but despite interest in the idea of a party taking the central ground, the conception of what it should be differed among the politicians and the original concept became hazy.²¹⁷

Miki claimed that following the fall of the Ashida government in October after a number of bribery scandals, as head of the third party in the coalition, he was asked by MacArthur if he could form a government, but advised him that the Liberal Party leader, Yoshida Shigeru, should be given this task.²¹⁸ If the account is true, several reasons suggest themselves. MacArthur may have preferred continuity in government to the holding of a general election. He may have shared the aversion of his deputy, Major General Courtney Whitney, and others in Government Section to Yoshida's Liberal Party.²¹⁹ For his part, Miki would have realised that his party could not form a coalition which occupied a majority of seats in the Lower House.

Threats to Miki's Predominance in the Party

In the January 1949 election the PCP won fourteen seats, seventeen less than at the previous election. The Democratic and Socialist parties also suffered catastrophic defeats, the latter ending up with ninety-four fewer seats than it had won twenty-one months earlier. The Communist and Liberal Parties registered impressive victories: the former increased its seats from four to thirty-five and the latter from 131 to 264.

As the leader of a party that had suffered a severe blow, Miki sought urgently to expand its numerical strength. He continued to seek some accommodation with Ashida. For instance, on 17 April he told Ashida that seventy people could be found for a middle-of-the-road force.²²⁰ However, in the shorter term, it was on the minor parties that he set his sights. On 9 May 1949 a resurrected New Politics Council was formed through the coming together of thirty-two Diet members from the PCP, Social Renovation Party²²¹ (SRP) (which had been established by members of the former NFF, Farmers New Party²²² and *Kōsei Club*²²³). Taking the same name as its ill-fated predecessor, it was a negotiating

body inside the Diet with a title to be used only until all the participants came to be absorbed into one party; it was an umbrella for political manoeuvring by a large number of groupings.²²⁴

Although various negotiations took place within the NPC, agreement could not be reached on the formation of a new party²²⁵ and over a period of time various elements withdrew. On 16 February 1950, Miki took his party out. He claimed that he left in the best interests of the remaining five members who were from the former *Kōsei Club*, but was criticized for his action. One newspaper said that it was beyond comprehension for Miki to withdraw his party from a body whose formation he himself had suggested.²²⁶

The same article questioned whether Miki would attempt to merge his party with the Democratic Party [Opposition Faction] (DPOF)²²⁷ or right wing of the Socialist Party. Within his party both courses of action had their supporters.²²⁸ Indeed, in all the parties there were different streams of thought as to realignment.²²⁹

Inside the DPOF itself there were various sub-groupings. The biggest had as its leader Kitamura Tokutarō, and came to be known as the “Kitamura School”.²³⁰ A second, small grouping centred on Tomabechi Gizō, but the sense of union was not strong.²³¹

A merger of the Democratic Party with the PCP had been a possibility for some time. Both parties had suffered heavy defeats in the previous election. With the break-up of the Democratic Party it was not surprising that there should be fresh moves for the formation of a new party. According to one former member of the DPOF and another of the PCP,²³² the parties were close on policy, and there were close connections between the members. At the same time both parties were in distress.²³³ The DPOF member who, more than thirty years later, was to take over the faction yet to be founded by Miki, recalled the

strong anti-Yoshida feeling in both parties; coming together, he maintained, was seen to be the best way to fight the Liberal Party.²³⁴

As a result of talks which were held over a long period of time, the PCP and the DPOF joined together on 28 April 1950 to form the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The remnants of the NPC also participated; it provided five people in comparison to the forty-seven from the DPOF and fourteen from the PCP. One other person joined, from the Social Renovation Party. With sixty-seven members it became the largest opposition party in the Diet, although it held 220 seats less than the Liberal Party.²³⁵

Writing in 1948, Yabe Teiji characterized the PCP as a grouping of Diet members who were initially unaffiliated but came together through various circumstances. He wrote that as one body there was no solid, common base. Rather, he said, it was like an unaffiliated club easily affected by changing alignments in the political world.²³⁶ This could also be said of the PDP. Writing nearly forty years later, former member Ide Ichitarō explained the situation precipitating the union between his PCP and the DPOF as being one where "misery made strange bedfellows".²³⁷

With the formation of the PDP, Miki ceased to be the undisputed head of a party. Rather he was now one of several leaders who had their own band of followers within a larger political body. It is likely that this accentuated any factionalism that existed in Miki's party. Before this time, there appears to have been no recognizably distinct grouping with a separate existence.²³⁸ Initially, Miki's faction was simply the members of the former PCP.

At its founding congress the following appointments were decided upon:²³⁹

Chairman of the Highest Committee Tomabechi
Secretary-General Chiba Saburō

Chairman of the Executive Council Kitamura
 Members of the Highest Committee Tomabechi
 Miki
 Kitamura
 Sakurauchi Yoshio
 Okada

In addition to Miki, only Okada Seiichi had belonged to the PCP.

Among other things, the platform of the party called for full independence for the Japanese people; it pledged both to regulate and correct deficiencies in the freedom of production and security of livelihood, and establish machinery to keep the national economy healthy - based on the ideal of social solidarity and the spirit of cooperation.²⁴⁰ The influence Miki had in drafting this platform is unknown but almost certainly the reference to cooperation was at the insistence of his faction.

At the Second Party Congress on 20 January 1951, thirteen depurged former members of the Diet were formally admitted: twelve had belonged to the House of Representatives and the other to the House of Peers.²⁴¹ All seven of the twelve who had been elected prior to the pre-war dissolution of political parties had belonged to the *Minseitō*. The new officers of the party were:²⁴²

Chairman of the Highest Committee Tomabechi
 Members of the Highest Committee Tomabechi
 Kitamura
 Kimura Gozaemon
 Onimaru Gisai

.....	Inagaki Heitarō
Secretary-General	Miki
Chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council	Chiba
Chairman of the Executive Council	Sakurauchi

Miki was given an important post but, with the entry of the depurgees, the influence of his faction waned.

On 31 August 1951, some other depurged former *Minseitō* politicians who had organized themselves into the *Minsei Kyūyūkai* deliberated on the setting up of a progressive conservative party. Thirty-seven people attended the general meeting on 5 September when they changed their name to the New Politics Club (NPC)²⁴³ and called out for the formation of a new party to challenge the Liberal Party.²⁴⁴ According to Ogusu Masao,²⁴⁵ former secretary to Matsumura Kenzō, an important figure in the pre-war *Minseitō* and one of the group's leaders, from the very beginning there were negotiations with the PDP, cooperation being regarded as desirable by both groupings in order to form a strong anti-Liberal Party alliance.²⁴⁶ Miki represented his party and Matsumura, the NPC.

Ogusu believed that several people were responsible for bringing Miki and Matsumura together; in particular Noda Takeo and Takeyama Yūtarō played important roles. During the war, as Councillor in the Munitions Ministry, Miki had worked under Vice-Minister Noda. Takeyama had belonged to the PCP and, indeed, when first elected to the Diet in 1946, had stood under the banner of the Japan Cooperative Party. He had been “noticed” by Matsumura when the former was a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the latter the Minister in the Shidehara Cabinet.²⁴⁷

Many of the politicians in Miki's faction were elected from rural constituencies and were very dependent on the support of farmers. One of the two areas that Matsumura

attached great importance to was agricultural policy²⁴⁸ and this may have served to bring the two politicians closer to each other. However, Miki was more interested in commerce and industry. According to one source,²⁴⁹ he possibly did not understand the demands, needs or hardships of the farmers as well as did Matsumura. The negotiations between the two politicians went well, although Ogusu and another former secretary of Matsumura, Tagawa Seiichi,²⁵⁰ insisted that the two men could not be said to have been particularly close on a personal level and had very different characters. Former *Asahi Shimbun* journalist Hino²⁵¹ felt that the atmosphere around the two men was similar. According to Ogusu, invariably it was Miki who spoke as the representative of the PDP, whereas there were a number of politicians in the NPC who, through their seniority, political experience, temperament, and character could have been entrusted with that responsibility.²⁵²

The main motivation behind the plan for a new party was to try to bring down Yoshida's Liberal Party. Indeed the name chosen, *Kaishintō*, was the same as that of the precursor to the *Minseitō*, a party which had come into existence to stand against the old Liberal Party (which eventually became the *Seiyūkai*). In addition to the PDP and NPC three other political groupings were involved in the negotiations: the Farmers Cooperative Party (FCP) and, in the House of Councillors, the *Dai Ichi Club* and *Ryokufūkai*.²⁵³

On 2 February 1952, the FCP requested that the new party declare itself in favour of cooperative socialism; this drew them into conflict with the right wing of the PDP and Upper House members of that party who wanted the character of the new party to be a progressive conservative one.²⁵⁴ The party was inaugurated on 8 February and the party proclamation included the phrase "... to rectify the abuses of capitalism a socialistic policy shall also be carried out."²⁵⁵ Of the twenty-seven PDP members in the House of Councillors only ten entered the party. Three in the Lower House reserved their positions.

Four members of the FCP participated and four did not. Meanwhile, the *Ryokufūkai* had withdrawn from the negotiations.²⁵⁶

Miki's negotiating powers were recognized in the PDP and his prestige within it rose as a result of his success. However, he was no longer discussing matters of unification with minor politicians or parties and consequently could not expect to be offered the supreme post. At the founding congress, the distribution of the major posts was determined. Among the thirty-one advisors were ten people who had belonged to the NPC.²⁵⁷ The position of president was left open. Miki became secretary-general, Matsumura was appointed chairman of the Central Standing Committee and Kitamura was made chairman of the Policy Committee. The president's role was executed vicariously by five officers in the party, two of whom were Miki and Matsumura.²⁵⁸ Miki's position was less influential than it appeared. The depurged politicians remained out of the Diet; there had been no election. Miki's ability to recommend candidates (normally a major advantage of holding the post) was severely restricted by the right of precedence that was to be accorded to the depurgees, whose loyalty lay elsewhere.

There was disagreement in the *Kaishintō* over who should take the post of president. Ishiguro Tadaatsu, who had been Minister of Agriculture and Forestry under both Konoe and Suzuki, was approached but refused the offer.²⁵⁹ Matsumura and Ōasa Tadao,²⁶⁰ who had also been a power-broker in the *Minseitō*, favoured former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru,²⁶¹ and this feeling gradually increased in the party. There were, however, dissenting voices. Shigemitsu had not served as a politician, and he was seen as the candidate of the more conservative group inside the party. However, on 18 April 1952, Secretary-General Miki, who was lukewarm to the idea of Shigemitsu becoming president, conferred with Ōasa, who was close to him, and at a meeting of the Highest

Committee²⁶² on 1 May accord was reached on Shigemitsu becoming the president on entering the party.²⁶³

In the October election, the *Kaishintō* put up 211 candidates²⁶⁴ of whom eighty-five were elected; this was eighteen more than at the time of dissolution. Twenty-six of the thirty-two depurgees returned had been members of the Diet before. Miki's influence in the party had declined by virtue of the smaller comparative number of members who could be said to be under his wing. Though he had been elected but once prior to the war, compared to his fellow members of the PDP, Miki was a senior politician who had risen to be head of a political party, albeit a small one. With the depurge and the formation of the *Kaishintō*, at a stroke Miki lost much seniority, power based on superior political intelligence and experience, and influence. In the new party there were many politicians who had been elected and had held important posts earlier than Miki. Some were suspicious of Miki and what he stood for. The election saw the return to the Diet of a large number of these people both within and without the *Kaishintō*. Many Diet members close to Miki lost their seats. It was not only a question of heightened competition; in some cases serving members of the Diet were asked, exhorted or forced to give up their seats in order to let one of the depurged pre-war politicians stand.²⁶⁵ The party as a whole did not make much headway against the Liberal Party which, with 240 seats, still held an absolute if reduced majority in the Lower House.

A power struggle took place inside the *Kaishintō*. Behind the appointment of members to party posts following the election there was much intrigue and jockeying for position among the separate factions within the party; many moves involved Miki and Ōasa. The latter had been approached earlier by the Ashida faction to bring down Secretary-General Miki and Chairman of the Policy Committee Kitamura. Ōasa refused, supported Miki,

who was able to stay on as secretary-general, and in so doing distanced Ashida from the mainstream.²⁶⁶ However, at the party congress in December, the Ōasa grouping aligned itself with Ashida and acted to remove Miki from the post of secretary-general.

By pushing Kawasaki Hideji of the Kitamura faction as a replacement for Miki, Ōasa was successful in breaking the harmony that had existed between the Kitamura and Miki factions, sometimes referred to by the press as “reformists” to separate them from the more conservative elements in the party.²⁶⁷ On 9 February 1953 the party held its fourth national congress. Kiyose Ichirō, a senior politician who had first been elected in 1920, became secretary-general and Miura Kunio, a former bureaucrat who had successfully stood as a “recommended” candidate in the 1942 *Yokusan* election, became chairman of the Policy Committee, following a threat by Ashida to take his faction out of the party if the post were given to Kawasaki.²⁶⁸ Miki became a standing advisor.²⁶⁹

The *Kaishintō* did badly in the second election it contested, in April 1953, when it won only seventy-six seats, a loss of twelve compared to the number possessed at the time of dissolution.²⁷⁰ It only just held onto its position as the main opposition party. The right and left wing Socialist Parties captured sixty-six and seventy-two seats respectively. With 199 seats the Liberal Party lost its possession of an overall majority.

Shigemitsu came under much criticism within the party for his lack of political expertise and inability to raise sufficient money for election campaigns. It was among the so-called reformists that there was most dissatisfaction.²⁷¹ One commentator described Shigemitsu as being beyond rescue - an amateur president who lacked power and spirit, and was controlled by Secretary-General Matsumura.²⁷²

The power and influence of Matsumura inside the party were on the wane. Many members of the former *Minseitō* had gathered under Ōasa and Matsumura inside the

Kaishintō. Both had been relatively senior politicians before the war, Matsumura in particular enjoying a good relationship with Machida Chūji, the president of the *Minseitō* prior to its dissolution. Over a period of time and due in many cases to their receipt of money, the group of people around Matsumura became fewer and fewer. Ōasa, a very clever political strategist and unlike Matsumura a provider of substantial funds, gained control of a large sub-group of the depurged politicians which later on he took with him when he joined up with Kishi.²⁷³ At least one attempt was made to bring Matsumura over to Kishi, who was to develop a strong power base in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He was invited by Ōasa and several people in the party to attend a chrysanthemum viewing party at the house of Yamamoto Kunekichi. Unknown to Matsumura, Kishi had also been invited and an approach was made, unsuccessfully, to entice him into his sphere of influence.²⁷⁴ A small group of politicians remained close to Matsumura; these people were very close to him personally, were pro-mainland China and shared his views on agricultural policy.

Many politicians in the group of Diet members centring on Miki could be said to share his political ideas and way of thinking. Two people in Miki's confidence at the time believed that policy was the binding factor. Money was distributed, but comparatively little.²⁷⁵ During the lifetime of the *Kaishintō*, what gradually was to bring Miki and Matsumura together was their inexorable opposition to the formation of one conservative party and their common experience of serving as secretary-general.²⁷⁶

Kōmoto Toshio, who found himself in the same party as Miki with the union of the PCP and DPOF, could not at this time be said to have had a special relationship with Miki. Two people interviewed remembered him more as a businessman than a politician.

He was not conspicuous in making political statements nor did he come out with particular political views.²⁷⁷

Not all participants had been happy at the formation of the *Kaishintō* or indeed the return of the pre-war depurged politicians.²⁷⁸ One member felt that allowing power to come to rest in their hands had been a mistake and that the politicians elected after the war should have been a little more steadfast.²⁷⁹

In addition to a return of the pre-war situation when there were animosities between the *Minseitō* and *Seiyūkai* (the *Kaishintō* and Liberal Party respectively reflected this division), the amount of money that came to be used in elections increased enormously. The *Kaishintō* was a party of intrigue and devouring ambitions. There was no question of it being a united party with a simple comprehensible policy; rather, it was a collection of people with very different backgrounds and political philosophies whose purpose was to bring down Yoshida and, they hoped, receive ministerships quickly. The struggle for power among the different groupings which had come together to form the party is illustrated by the fact that one month after its inauguration, only in three prefectures and Kyōto had local chapters been set up.²⁸⁰ The existence of different factions inside the party could be traced to historical factors and differences in policy, but the role of money gradually increased in importance.

The Miki faction centred on members of the former PCP, the Kitamura and Ashida factions drew their members from the former DPOF, and the Ōasa, Matsumura and tiny Tsurumi Yūsuke factions were composed mainly of former members of the pre-war *Minseitō*.²⁸¹ There were not always clear lines of distinction between factional affiliation. About one-third of party members were difficult to classify, having ambiguous or nebulous loyalty, or were independent.²⁸² These people, often classified as belonging to the

middle faction, held various views on policy and enjoyed and developed differing degrees of closeness to the main factions.

Since it was a party of diverse and often implacably opposed elements, the stated policy of the *Kaishintō* was often based on compromise.²⁸³ No one political philosophy could be said to run through it. Many of the stated platforms were not enthusiastically espoused by the whole membership. As secretary-general, Miki, although occupying a central and powerful position, did not have the influence to decide policy. It is through his speeches rather than by examining the planks of the party that policy positions can be accorded to him. At the conference to mark the formation of the Tokushima chapter of the *Kaishintō* he declared himself to be in favour of a gradual increase in “self-defence power” and said that reform of the constitution should be dealt with on a supra-party basis.²⁸⁴ He spoke against the proposal for a conservative alliance claiming that it would be a union without a policy, an artifice to make up numerical strength. He maintained that a union should not come into existence in order to bring about rearmament and constitutional reform. The former, in particular, should not be forced through using conservative power.²⁸⁵ On his return from a trip to Europe and America, Miki stated that Japan should have her own self-defence force. It would not be necessary, he said, to reform the constitution if such a force were on a small scale and without the capacity to invade.²⁸⁶

During the life time of the *Kaishintō*, there were various plans and moves to set up a new conservative party by joining with the Liberal Party.²⁸⁷ All, however, were unsuccessful. Despite setbacks, discussions continued among some of the leading conservative politicians.²⁸⁸ Matsumura said that there should be a new party excluding both Yoshida and the influence of Yoshida.²⁸⁹ On 20 September 1954, Shigemitsu met with Hatoyama Ichirō and four other major conservative politicians: Ishibashi Tanzan, Kishi, Miki Bukichi

and Matsumura. It was agreed that a new party to fight Yoshida should be formed.²⁹⁰ A former *Seiyūkai* leader, Hatoyama was a very powerful member of the Liberal Party who had been purged in 1946 on the eve of becoming prime minister. On his return to the Diet, his chosen successor, Yoshida, refused to hand back the reins of power.

Kishi and Ishibashi were expelled from the Liberal Party for their anti-Yoshida actions and a breakup of the party was forecast.²⁹¹ On 23 November, Hatoyama and thirty-six others left the Liberal Party,²⁹² and joined with the *Kaishintō* to form the Japan Democratic Party (JDP) consisting of 120 Diet members.²⁹³ Hatoyama was made president and Shigemitsu the vice-president; Kishi secured the post of secretary-general and Matsumura became chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council.

Expecting the introduction and passing of a motion of non-confidence by the JDP and the two Socialist Parties which could together muster 253 votes to 185 for the Liberal Party,²⁹⁴ Yoshida resigned on 7 December both as prime minister²⁹⁵ and president of the Liberal Party.²⁹⁶ Hatoyama, as leader of the next largest party, became prime minister and Miki became Minister of Transport in the new Cabinet.²⁹⁷

The JDP was formed to bring down Yoshida.²⁹⁸ It was simply a party of convenience like the *Kaishintō* before it. Fierce factional conflict threatened its stability.²⁹⁹ As the leader of a party numbering between seventy and eighty members in the Lower House, a larger following than Hatoyama could claim mostly among members of the former *Seiyūkai*, *ceteris paribus* Shigemitsu should have become the president of the JDP and thus prime minister. In the party, however, it was thought natural that the supreme post be given to Hatoyama on the grounds of his qualities of leadership including personal magnetism, long experience as a politician, and superior political ability, much of which was passed on from his father³⁰⁰ who had himself been a prominent politician. As a result of the

election³⁰¹ held on 27 February 1955, the JDP won most seats, 194, but was well short of an absolute majority.

Negotiations aimed at uniting the two conservative parties had continued sporadically, but were spurred on by moves to bring together the two Socialist Parties.³⁰² With their unification on 13 October,³⁰³ talks between the JDP and Liberal Party took on an increasing sense of urgency. There were various views inside the JDP about the desirability of forming a single conservative party. Matsumura was opposed to a union; he desired a return to the pre-war situation when there were two big conservative parties.³⁰⁴ While secretary-general of the *Kaishintō*, Matsumura had handled negotiations on unification with Satō Eisaku, his opposite number in the Liberal Party. He felt that the talks were a ploy to absorb his party in the larger one. Furthermore, he intensely disliked and distrusted Satō believing that he was being continually lied to and deceived. Convinced that Satō would always hide his true thoughts, Matsumura would contrast him with Ikeda Hayato, chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the Liberal Party, whom he characterized as a politician who spoke freely and openly.³⁰⁵

Miki was also against unification.³⁰⁶ He thought it better that no one party become too big and powerful lest it hold power continuously and become oppressive.³⁰⁷ He wanted there to be two conservative parties, which might take it turns to form Cabinets. When one had power the other would tacitly cooperate from outside the government, and vice versa. Although factions fulfilled this role to some extent, Miki thought parties were better suited to undertake it.³⁰⁸ The reformist parties would also co-exist but [presumably] would not have the numerical strength to govern.

The opposition of Miki and Matsumura to unification was mentioned in the Ashida Diary.³⁰⁹ Pressure appears to have been put on them from many quarters. For instance

Yabe Teiji, who had long been one of Miki's advisers, wrote him a letter asking him to cease his resistance.³¹⁰ A senior member of the Socialist Party wrote that when the time came when two big parties existed, one conservative and the other reformist, he believed Miki would take the third powerful position, "under the banner of cooperativism".³¹¹

The pressure for the conservative parties to merge was unremitting and as a result the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) formally came into existence on 15 November 1955. Hatoyama continued as prime minister but became one of four Acting Committee members, the others being Miki Bukichi, Ōno Bamboku, and Ogata Taketora. The new Cabinet, inaugurated on 22 November, contained members from both the former JDP and former Liberal Party.

Conclusion

There appear to be various reasons why Miki became a powerful politician in the early post-war years. Some relate to his qualities of personality, and others to the general political situation.

Miki was an excellent orator who seems to have enjoyed the cut and thrust of a colloquium on political issues while still a boy. According to various sources, he possessed the charm, depth and maturity to mix casually with relatively powerful individuals and was successful in cultivating friendships and relationships with people much older than himself. He appears to have been adept at gaining the confidence of senior people in the business and political establishments. Perhaps his manner and deportment marked him out as a natural leader before he first stood for the Diet. Miki was pragmatic. He may have harboured doubts about the invasion of China and the war, but there is no evidence to suggest that he spoke out against them. Indeed he justified the former in a letter to an

American paper, and spoke in support of war after if not before Pearl Harbour. A strong impression given is that for Miki, political survival was of major importance.

His hesitation in leaving the *Yokusan Seijikai* during the war, and joining the Socialist Party after it, suggest that he was cautious and unadventurous. Another interpretation would be that he was prudent, and did not take unnecessary risks. He was an accomplished negotiator when working to bring together minor political parties, although, as the episode with the NFF shows, he could be outmanoeuvred. In 1956, looking back over this period, a senior adviser of the Socialist Party, Mizutani Chōzaburō, called Miki a “Balkan politician”, a name that subsequently stuck. Mizutani characterized him as a politician who operated inside a small party planning its security while being sandwiched between two big parties, effectively manipulating the confrontation between the latter.³¹² Certainly Miki’s strength was most in evidence when he operated within a small group. His dislike of large political parties, so evident after the war, was manifested by his decision to stand as an independent and join a minor grouping of essentially unaffiliated Diet members. Another important factor behind Miki’s success was his ability to procure funds. In addition to making use of his own contacts, he married into a very wealthy family.

As a result of the purge, many politicians were banished from open political activity, and were unable to stand again for the Diet until 1952. Miki took full advantage of his transition at a stroke from being a relatively junior politician to one of the more senior Diet members. He utilized the skills and experience he had picked up since 1937. Initially, there was much uncertainty about which political parties would be acceptable to GHQ and which political philosophies most appealing to the electorate. Once Miki had chosen a party and reached the top, through circumstance as well as design, he applied his political gifts to build it up. He was fortunate that the result of the 1947 election gave his party

an opportunity to hold the balance of power - a position that he was to seek continually during his political career. He appears to have had excellent contacts at GHQ and possibly benefited from having been educated partly in America.

As succeeding elections cut back the number of Diet members in his party, Miki sought yet more minor parties to join with his, under his leadership. However, Miki's status in the Diet decreased with the return of the depurgees and he was in danger of being excluded from the most important party posts, and hence losing influence. With the formation of a single conservative party, and partly because of Miki's earlier opposition to the concept, his relative position was further threatened.

It was a combination of Miki's character, financial resources, and the early post-war political situation which enabled him to establish and enjoy a high political profile.

Notes and References

- 1 Ōno Yoshitarō, cousin to Miki and former head of his *kōenkai*, and Miki Ima (no relation), playmate of Miki when he was a little boy, interviews.
- 2 Miki Ima, *ibid.*, and two other boyhood friends of Miki: Murao Tsurue and Harada Sadae, interviews.
- 3 Harada Takayoshi, boyhood friend of Miki, interview. Much later on, Matsumura Kenzō, a politician senior to Miki, was one of many people who were to admire his delivery of speeches. Communication made to Lower House member Sasayama Shigetarō reported in the latter's private diary, entry for 28 October 1970.
- 4 A *zenibako* was a type of money-bag carried around by a man who would perform several of the functions of a bank, an institution, the source claimed, that was not to be found at that time in this part of Tokushima Prefecture.
- 5 Miki Ima, interview.
- 6 These were boys who passed the home of Miki's parents on returning from school. Harada Takayoshi, interview.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 Shima Shinichi, fellow pupil of Miki, interview.
- 9 *Tokushima Shōgyō Gakkō*.
- 10 Shima, interview. He and Miki entered the school in the same year.
- 11 Kimura Imao, fellow pupil of Miki, interview. Kimura lived in the same dormitory as Miki.
- 12 Shima and Kimura, interviews.
- 13 Igata Minoru, fellow pupil of Miki, interview.
- 14 Kimura and Igata, interviews.
- 15 Shima, Kimura and Igata, interviews.
- 16 Miki Ima, interview.
- 17 *Kenka No Gakkō No Benron Taikai*; Kimura, *op. cit.*
- 18 There were, in addition, a "Right Wing Party" and "Left Wing Party".
- 19 *Chihō Chōkan*.
- 20 *Tokushima Mainichi Shimbun*, 28,30 September 1924.
- 21 See, for example, Masuda Takuji, *Jitsuroku: Miki Takeo*, Hōchiki Shōji, 1975, pp.41-44, and Miki Yōnosuke, *Miki Takeo: Kōyū 50 Nen No Sugao*, Sankei Shimbunsha, 1975, p.19.
- 22 Shima, Kimura and Igata, interviews.
- 23 The money had been collected at a bazaar held for that very purpose.
- 24 Shima and Kimura emphasized that no student was expelled for taking part in the strike.
- 25 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 5 March 1924.
- 26 Shima and Kimura, interviews.
- 27 Kimura, interview.
- 28 From a publication of Miki's *kōenkai*.
- 29 Kimura, interview.
- 30 *Tokushima Shōgyō Kōtō Gakkō Dōsōkai*, November 1957.
- 31 *Kinki Chiku Chūtō Gakkō Benron Taikai*.
- 32 See *Saishō*, *Miki Takeo*, *Tokushima Shimbun*, 1975, p.8, and Fukada Ryō, *Shōsetsu Miki Takeo*, Sōshisha(?), 1975, p.50.

- 33 Yūki Toyotarō was Minister of Finance in the Hayashi Senjūrō Cabinet between 2 February and 31 May 1937, and President of the Bank of Japan from 27 July 1937 until 18 March 1944.
- 34 Asano Mikio, interview. See text at page bottom.
- 35 Publication of Miki's *kōenkai*, and *Tokushima Shimbun*, 15 December 1974.
- 36 *Tokushima Shimbun*, 15 December 1974, and Ōno Yoshitarō, interview.
- 37 *Kantō Gakusei Benron Renmei*; Igata Minoru, interview.
- 38 *Kyōdo Ni Kagayaku Hitobito, Dai San Shū*, Tokushima Dōyūkai, 1981, p.579. See also, Miki Yōnosuke, *op. cit.*, p.14,15.
- 39 Amau Eiji was Provisional Acting Ambassador (*Rinji Dairi Taishi*) from 14 August 1930 until 22 November 1934. Some thirty or so years later, having retired from the Foreign Ministry, and also hailing from Tokushima, Amau asked Miki for support to stand for the House of Councillors. Given the prevailing situation in the constituency, Miki felt he had to refuse. Many years after that, during a visit to Britain, Miki asked for the understanding of Amau's son, himself a diplomat then attached to the London embassy. Asano Mikio, interview. According to the son, however, his father had only put out feelers; he never reached the point where he had a firm intention to stand. Amau (Tomio?), interview.
- 40 *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 July 1957.
- 41 Asano, interview.
- 42 These friendships persisted and were two of many useful contacts that Miki made before he entered the Diet. Indeed, Hirasawa acted as an advisor to Miki during his premiership, at which time he created a controversy by suggesting that the question of two islands to the north of Japan, claimed by Japan but occupied by the U.S.S.R., should be shelved until the twenty-first century. Kazushige Hirasawa, "Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.54 no.1 (October 1975), pp.155-172.
- 43 Professor Peter Berton of the said institution, personal communication.
- 44 According to SCAP GS (B) 03333, Miki attended South Western University and the American College in Los Angeles where he studied political science and sociology. The acronym, SCAP, was used to denote both the "Supreme Command" and the "Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces".
- 45 Asano Mikio, interview. Ōno Yoshitarō showed the writer a letter written by Miki to his father thanking him for money received. According to him, Miki was paid a retainer by a Tokushima newspaper for which he wrote a weekly article.
- 46 Miki may have been involved in the buying and selling of some goods which had a connection with bottle labels. Ōno, interview.
- 47 There is much confusion over the dates of the two occasions Miki left and returned to Japan. Those given by the writer appear to be the most likely. See Fukada, *op. cit.*; *Kyōdo ... Shū*, *op. cit.*; *Saishō*, *op. cit.*, and Kasugai Kaoru (President of Meiji University), *Miki Takeo Kun Ni Kitai Suru*, (publisher and year?). Also used was material from Miki's *kōenkai*, and interviews with Ōno Yoshitarō and Asano Mikio.
- 48 Ikuta Wahei was first returned to the National Diet in 1917. Miki lived on one floor of his house and Asano on another. Asano, interview. Miki may have been introduced to Ikuta by Nagao who had himself been introduced by his older brother. Ōno, interview. According to one source, Miki worked for Ikuta as a secretary. Tatamiya Eitarō, *Shin Seikai Jimbutsu Hyōden*, Chūō Keizaiisha, 1958, p.165.

- 49 Ōno, *op. cit.*. The writer was unable to determine whether the approach was made prior to Miki being elected for the first time.
- 50 Asano, interview. He also recalled Miki having been offered a teaching post (possibly) in International Relations at Meiji University upon graduating.
- 51* This was the minimum age at which election to the House of Representatives was allowed by law.
- 52 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 7 April 1937.
- 53 Hosoda entered the municipal assembly on 28 January 1936, and was re-elected on 21 October 1937.
- 54 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 10 April 1937.
- 55 Miki is reported as having been fined and paid a fifty yen fine at Ōsaka District Court in November 1928 for having violated the election law. No other information at all was given. *Shūgiin Giin Keireki*, Reel 44, Naimushō Shiryō Microfiche Nichiroku, Naimushō Keihokyoku, 1942.
- 56 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 10 April 1937.
- 57 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 22 April 1937.
- 58 *Gun*.
- 59 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 28,29 April 1937.
- 60 Asano, interview.
- 61 Shima, interview.
- 62 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 27 April 1937.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 5 May 1937.
- 64 *Asahi Shimbun*, 6, 18 April 1937.
- 65 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 3 May 1937.
- 66 *Ibid.*.
- 67 *Ibid.*.
- 68 *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 3 May 1937.
- 69 *Sōsenkyo Taikan*, Asahi Shimbunsha, May 1937, pp.3,4.
- 70 *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 June 1937.
- 71 *Kōshō Dantai*.
- 72 This can be translated as Lobby # 2, possibly the number of the room in the Diet where the members gathered.
- 73 *Gikai Seido Nanajū Nen Shi: Seitō Kaiha Hen*. Edited by the two Houses of the Diet, March 1961. According to this source, thirteen and not ten people participated.
- 74 Akagi Munenori and Itō Gorō, interviews. Both were elected to the House of Representatives in 1937.
- 75 *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 June 1937.
- 76 The names were given by Asano and Ōno respectively.
- 77 Akagi joined the Miki faction for the first time in 1979.
- 78 There was a lack of primary material and sources for Miki's grouping. Akagi believed that Miki joined the *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu* in order to belong to some grouping in the Diet. The relationship between the two groupings was generally good. Akagi Munenori, interview.
- 79 *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 February 1938.
- 80 *The New York Times*, 13 March 1938. Kagawa had achieved fame as a social worker in the slums and was apparently feted by the Occupation Forces after the war. For a

- very unflattering portrait of the man, however, see Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary*, Tuttle, 1981 (first published in 1948).
- 81 *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 February 1938.
- 82 *The New York Times*, 13 March 1938.
- 83 See, for instance, Masuda, *op. cit.*, pp.78,79.
- 84 *The New York Times*, 13 March 1938. Iwase was returned to the Lower House on four occasions: 1932, 1936, 1937 and 1942. He died on 30 January 1946.
- 85 According to Ōno, Miki gave the concluding speech at which time he said that: (i) there should not be war between Japan and America, and (ii) Japan should not go to America to ask for her friendship; rather the two countries should stand on an equal footing and "join hands over the Pacific Ocean". Ōno, interview.
- 86 *The New York Times*, 20 February 1938. It is not clear whether these two resolutions were one and the same.
- 87 *The New York Times*, 15 May 1938.
- 88 There are references (for instance Masuda, *op. cit.*, p.79) to the Japan-America Comrades Society (*Nichi-Bei Dōshikai*) being formed in November 1939 with Count Kaneko Kentarō as president and Miki as a managing director (*senmu riji*). Unfortunately, the writer could find no primary sources to verify its existence. According to Ōno, this was the name of the organization set up at the time of ex-Ambassador Saitō's death.
- 89 Asano mentioned the participation of Kaneko.
- 90 Hirasawa Kazushige was based in Washington at the time, and, in Tōkyō, Miki's connection at the Embassy was one Eugene H. Dooman who was counsellor. Asano, interview. Fukushima might have been in New York. *Gendai Jinbutsu Jiten*, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1977.
- 91 Many companies engaged in exporting to America made contributions, one example being a silk spinning concern owned by Imai Gōsuke. Asano, interview.
- 92 Asano, interview.
- 93 Asano remembered two ultra-nationalists who were able to obtain an audience with Miki through a political connection they had. In spite of being obliged to meet them, the politician very skilfully gave them short shrift. Asano, *ibid.*.
- 94 Asano and Ōno, interviews.
- 95 See, *New York Times*, 2,3,4, March, 17,18,19, April 1939. According to Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassador to Japan at the time, such was the feeling of "friendliness and gratitude" to the United States, that a committee was set up comprising 117 prominent members of the Diet and others under the chairmanship of Count Kaneko - who was anything but friendly to America. Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan*, Hammond, Hammond and Co., London, 1944, pp.240-246.
- 96 Miki had been invited to join the *Seiyūkai*, one of the two large conservative parties, but declined. Mikuni Ichirō, ed., *Shōwa Shi Tambō*, No.4, Banchō Shobō, 1974, p.?.
- 97 *Chōsa Kaichō*.
- 98 *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 November 1939.
- 99 Shina, interview.
- 100 Although political parties were dissolved in name, behind the scenes the same alliances and factionalism that had up to then existed continued to do so. For instance, in the *Minseitō* there were separate sub-groupings; four of the leaders were Ōasa Tadao, Nagai Yūtarō, Sakurai Hyūgorō and Sakurauchi Yukio . They were not based on

policy, but rather money and other material considerations. A good relation between Ōasa and Maeda Yonezō, who had belonged to the *Seiyūkai*, helped facilitate the smooth running of the Diet during the war. Itō Gorō, former member of the *Minseitō*, interview.

- 101 The *Shūgiin Giin Club* became the *Yokusan Giin Dōmei* on 2 September 1941. Following the general election on 20 May 1942, a further transformation occurred bringing with it the new appellation, *Yokusan Seijikai*. Reorganized on 30 March 1945, it called itself the *Dai Nihon Seijikai*. This was the form that saw its demise on 14 September. This information comes from *Gikai Seido...*, *op. cit.*. There were various groupings, with overlapping membership, of Diet members belonging to the *Yokusan Seijikai*. The *Kinshikai*, for instance, attracted people possessing a military rank. The *Nōson Giin Dōmei* consisted of Diet members with a strong interest in agricultural problems; officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry would be invited to give talks once or twice a month for an hour or so each time. The number of people in each group varied; there were but ten in the *Shiseikai*, but two hundred and sixty-one in the *Keizai Giin Renmei*. These groups did not constitute factions, but were rather gatherings of people with something in common, perhaps sharing nothing more than having been first elected on the same occasion. *Shūgiin Kakuha Shozoku Giin Meibo*, Reel 44, Naimushō Shiryō Microfiche Nichiroku, Keishichō Jōhōka, 1942; and Akagi Munenori, interview. The *Shōgokai* (spelling?), for instance, consisted of members of the *Seiyūkai* first elected in 1930. Funada Naka, *Aoyama Kanwa*, Isshinkai, 1970, p.241.
- 102 Ōki Misao, *Ōki Nikki: Shūsenji No Teikoku Gikai*, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1969, entry for 3 August 1944.
- 103 *Ibid.*, entry for 5 February 1945. Other persons whose names were mentioned include: Kiyose Ichirō, Suzuki Shōgo, Takaoka Daisuke, Matsuoka Kōjirō, and Akagi. The first three were among twenty-five people who left the *Yokusan Seijikai* to form the *Gokoku Dōshikai* on 11 March.
- 104 *Gikai Seido*, *op. cit.*.
- 105*
- 106 Prime Minister between 4 June 1937 and 4 January 1939, and between 22 July 1940 and 17 October 1941.
- 107*
- 108 *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 June 1940.
- 109 It was the Tokushima branch of the *Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyōgikai* composed of seventeen people, which decided not to “recommend” Miki. *Tokushima Shimbun*, 18 December 1974.
- 110 Both Ikuta and Tadokoro, who stood for the first time, failed to win a seat in Tokushima # 1.
- 111 *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 May 1942.
- 112 Asano, interview. Such a course of action, according to him, was at the time very unusual and helped him retain his seat. Asano also recollected Miki, on hearing of his victory, requesting his supporters to keep their hands down while being photographed, to raise them in celebration being thought ungracious.
- 113 Shima, interview.
- 114* The name of the Ministry was changed on 1 November 1943, but was changed back on 26 August 1945. *Naikaku Seido Hyaku Nen Shi*, Naikaku Kanbō, 1986. Fellow

- Committee members included: Akagi Munenori, Iwase Akira, Abe Kan, Uda Kōichi, and Noda Takeo. See, Nakatani Takeyo, *Senji Gikai Shi: Minzoku To Seijisha*, (publisher?), 1974, p.234, and *Nihon Seiji Nempō*, Shōwa Shobō, December 1942, p.465/6.
- 115 Akagi, interview.
- 116 SCAP GS(B) 03333.
- 117 *Tokushima Shimbun*, 21 December 1974.
- 118 *Sanyokan*.
- 119 Akagi Munenori, interview, and Ōki, *op. cit.*, entry for 2 May 1945.
- 120 Kanamitsu was the founder of the Taishō Life Insurance Company. First elected from Oita in 1920 he had been a member of the *Seiyūkai* before the war. After the party split, he led a small faction. Kanamitsu served as Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Abe Cabinet and Minister of Health and Welfare under Konoe. He held senior posts in the government-sponsored wartime political bodies. See *Taisei Yokusankai Yakuin Meibo*, 25 November 1941, and *Yokusan Seijikai Seimu Chōsakai Meibo*, 1943.
- 121 The secretary-general of the *Yokusan Seijikai*, Matsumura Kenzō, was reported to be angry about the behind-the-scenes moves between Kanamitsu and Sakomizu Hisatsune, Chief Cabinet Secretary, over the distribution of these posts. Ōki, *op. cit.*, entry for 6 May 1945. The initial link between Miki and Kanamitsu is unknown to the writer. Akagi also referred to Miki as one of Kanamitsu's *kobun*.
- 122 Akagi, *ibid.*.
- 123 Among the members were: Abe Kan, Aino Kōichirō, Akagi, Matsunaga Tō, Matsumura Kōzō, Nagai Gen and Miki. All but one of the names were given by Akagi and confirmed by Miki Mutsuko who added that of Nagai. According to Kishi, Miki and Abe were also *kobun* of Abe, who gathered under him young Diet members. Kishi Nobusuke, *et.al.*, *Kishi Nobusuke No Kaisō*, Bungei Shunjū, 1981, pp.71,164.
- 124 Miki Mutsuko said that she doubted whether her husband received any money from Kanamitsu. Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 125 *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 August 1945.
- 126 For informative accounts of early post-war political movements, see K. E. Colton, "Prewar Political Influences in Postwar Conservative Parties"; J. Saffell, "Japan's Postwar Socialist Party"; and H. E. Wildes, "Underground Politics in Postwar Japan", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLII, 1948, pp.940-969, 1149-1162.
- 127 Asano, interview. According to Hayashi Kōichi, who had first met Miki when the former won a student oratorical competition in Tokushima and worked for him as a secretary from 1954 to 1974, Miki was offered an executive position in the Socialist Party around the end of 1945, and consulted him about it. It was maintained by Bandō Kazuo, a prefectural politician for the Socialist Party in Tokushima, that Miki's request to the chairman of the (local ?) party, a man named Abe, to enter it was rejected (for a reason unknown to him).
- 128 Mizutani Chōzaburō, "Miki Shin Kanjichō Ron", *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 December 1956.
- 129 *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 October 1945.
- 130 Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 131 *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 November 1945.
- 132 *Gikai Seido...*, *op. cit.*. Other members included Kurosawa Torizō, Funada Naka and Akagi.
- 133 The party centred on Kurosawa, Funada, Yoshiue Shōryo, Sengoku Kōtarō and Ikawa Tadao.

- 134 To avoid confusion with the Japan Communist Party, the acronym JCOP is preferred to JCP.
- 135 Both Akagi and Tanaka entered the Miki faction in the twilight of their political careers.
- 136 *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 December 1945.
- 137 The second rank leaders were Yoshiue, Kimura Toratarō, Nakatani Takeyo, Yoshida and Ikawa. *Sōsenkyo Ni Nozomu Nihon Kyōdōtō No Taido Wo Shuchō*, Nihon Kyōdōtō Hombu, January 1946.
- 138 Kurosawa Torizō, *Waga Tō No Kito Suru Kyōdō Shugi Shakai*, Nihon Kyōdōtō Hombu, 10 February 1946. The following points were to be found in the paper: If free competition is entrusted to industry it will present an aspect of society we should be apprehensive of, namely survival of the fittest and brothers divided by bitter rivalry (page 2). We must begin the rebuilding of Japan with new rural communities; agriculture is the base of the nation (page 4). Through cooperative unions, agricultural management can be improved. We can anticipate among other things team work, cooperative manufacturing of agricultural produce, the rearing of children and cooperative cooking (page 5). From now on Japan will have small to medium-sized industries. Large industries will not be permitted, whether in finance, the buying of materials or even the buying and selling of manufactured goods (page 6). Qualifications were made on this last point and several industries were excluded including those responsible for power, fertilizer plants and important agricultural machinery. Elsewhere it was stated that redevelopment should take place through cooperative enterprises embracing the producers and consumers. See *Sōsenkyo*, *op. cit.*.
- 139 General Headquarters (of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces).
- 140 Funada, *op. cit.*, p.234.
- 141 Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 142 All national politicians had to fill in a questionnaire prepared by SCAP that dealt with their activities during the war. Miki claimed that he had personally financed the Japan- America Amity Meeting (also referred to as the Friendship People's Rally) at Hibiya Public Hall in 1938 and, in the same year, had helped found the Japan-America Comrades Society. In SCAP's file on Miki was noted the fact that he had made statements supporting the war. The file states that "[Miki] strongly advocated international peace before the Pacific War, but when he campaigned for the elections in 1942, he, too, asserted Japan's right to rule the world under the theory of 'the eight corners of one roof', called President Roosevelt 'arrogant' and misquoted him freely". There were two letters from Japanese citizens to MacArthur asking that Miki be purged. Neither attempted to provide proof for the allegations made and although at least one was translated for MacArthur, Miki passed the screening on 24 March 1947. SCAP GS(B) 03332, 03333.
- 143 *Asahi Shimbun*, 24 February 1946. Ikawa was born in 1893 and served as an official of the Ministry of Finance in America in the 1920's. He gave a series of lectures at Columbia University on Oriental economics. Back in Japan, and being close to Konoe, he was involved in negotiations between Japan and America from the end of 1940 until the end of the following year. On 20 June 1946 he was imperially nominated (*chokusen*) to the House of Peers. His membership of the JCOP may have helped its relationship with GHQ. See Hayashi Shigeru, *Nihon No Rekishi 25, Taiheiyō Sensō*,

- Chūō Kōronsha, 1984, p.212, and Itō Takashi, *et.al.*, *Kindai Nihon Shiryō Sensho 5: Ikawa Tadao Nichi-Bei Kōshō Shiryō*, Yamakawa, 1982.
- 144 Yamamoto, who had been president of the journal Kaizō, was brought into the party by Ikawa. He had been returned to the Diet once before, in 1930. Amano Kanzō, former *Asahi Shimbun* journalist, interview. A secretary to Yamamoto, Nikaidō Susumu, was elected for the party in 1946. A former student at the University of California, on being repatriated during the war Nikaidō went to see Miki at his house in Mejiro. Nikaidō later became a top lieutenant to Tanaka Kakuei, a political enemy of Miki. Miki Mutsuko and Asano, interviews.
- 145 Namely, Funada Kyōji (Naka's younger brother), Miyabe Ichirō and Miyagi Kōji.
- 146 None of the five were members of the House of Representatives at the time.
- 147 *Dai 22 Kai Shūgiin Giin Senkyo* - a reprint of undated articles appearing at the time in the *Tokushima Shimbun*.
- 148 *Ibid.*. One of the other two was Mori Satoru, who was Miki's brother-in-law.
- 149 The writer was unable to find any information on this group.
- 150 Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai, *Seitō Nenkan 1947*, Nyūsha, 10 March 1947.
- 151 They included Sasamori Junzō, who later joined the Miki faction, and Akita Daisuke who was also returned from Tokushima.
- 152 *Nihon Minshutō Junbikai*.
- 153 *Seitō.....1947, op. cit.*
- 154 *Ibid.*
- 155 Excluded were the Liberal Party, *Shimpotō*, Socialist Party and Communist Party. *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 May 1946.
- 156 *Kyōdō Minshutō No Katsudō*, *Kyōdō Minshutō Hombu*, 30 November 1946.
- 157 *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 May 1946.
- 158 Both the *Shimpotō* and a later party, the *Kaishintō*, can be translated into English as "Progressive Party". For this reason they are left in Japanese.
- 159 *Seitō1947, op. cit.*
- 160 The *Asahi Shimbun*, on 7 May, reported the membership of the Japan Cooperative Party to be seventeen, with the prospect for seventy people in all to participate in the new party that was to be formed around it.
- 161 *Seitō.....1947, op. cit.*
- 162 *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 May 1946. But note a later date given in *Gikai Seido....., op. cit.*. In many cases dates given in the latter refer to the formal notification and do not accurately reflect the timing of movements between parties.
- 163 They were Tanno Minoru, Matsumoto Takizō and Sakai Toshio from the paJDP, and Hashimoto Jirō, Matoba Kinuemon and Fujimoto Toraki from the Non-affiliated Club. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 May 1946. According to *Kyōdō Katsudō, op. cit.*, at the time of inauguration the party consisted of forty-five members.
- 164 *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 May 1946. Various people outside the Diet were involved in formulating the political platforms of the parties. For instance, Akazawa Masamichi of the paJDP met with Professor Yabe Teiji of Tōkyō University to discuss the character and direction of the party. *Yabe Teiji Nikki*, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1974, entries for 18,24 May 1946.
- 165 Hirakawa Tokuo, former member of the CDP, interview.
- 166 *Kyōdō.....Katsudō, op. cit.*
- 167 *Seitō.....1947, op. cit.*

- 168 One non-affiliated newly elected Diet member entered soon afterwards when there were but seventeen members. Hirakawa Tokuo ran as an independent because he felt he did not understand politics, and joined the party mainly because of his belief in Fabianism and also because he felt that "given the destruction of the Japanese industrial infrastructure, the only road for Japan to take was that which would lead it to become a country concentrating on the agricultural sector". He had not initially intended to run for the Diet, but was requested to do so by one Hidaka (?) who was purged for having held high position in the *Yokusan Sōnendan*. Hirakawa had acted as the general manager (*jimu kyokuchō*) of his campaign. Yamamoto was working hard to bring people into the party, and Hirakawa thought him a man of culture and an intellectual - an opinion that he maintained soon changed. Hirakawa, interview.
- 169 *Kyōdō Minshu Shugi* and *Kyōdō Shakai Shugi* respectively.
- 170 Kurosawa's enthusiasm for the system of intensive dairy farming practiced in Denmark, and their cooperative unions is related in, *Watashi No Rirekisho Keizaijin 17*, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1981, pp.147-216.
- 171 Hirakawa and Ide Ichitarō, interviews. Ide was much later to become Miki's most trusted colleague in his faction.
- 172 *Seitō.....1947, op. cit..*
- 173 Hirakawa, interview.
- 174 Together the two characters signify "collaboration" or "cooperation".
- 175 Inside the CDP, the Kita brothers were strongly against these talks. "Absolute believers in a society based on cooperativism", according to Hirakawa, they were accused of slandering Yamamoto and Ikawa, using abusive language, distributing objectionable literature and on occasion using violence. Charged with openly and covertly acting abominably and injuring the dignity of the party they were expelled at a party general committee meeting on 17 August 1946. *Kyōdō....Katsudō, op. cit..* According to Hirakawa, it was impossible to state definitively whether they walked out or were thrown out of the party. Hirakawa, interview.
- 176 Ide, interview. See, for instance, Justin Williams Sr., *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur*, University of Georgia Press, 1979, p.31, plate between pages 210 and 211, and p.257. Matsumoto was particularly close to Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, and passed on much information to Miki. For instance, according to one person interviewed, in 1948 Chief Cabinet Secretary Satō Eisaku was privy to a certain conversation between Prime Minister Yoshida and General MacArthur. He relayed the information to members of the Cabinet, but in such a way that he could turn it to his own advantage. Through Matsumoto, Miki also knew the substance of the conversation, and he confronted Satō. Matsumoto translated for Miki in his meetings with MacArthur. Some information given him was very sensitive and not publicly known at the time. This included the disclosures that MacArthur was to oversee certain negotiations between Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Prime Minister Yoshida, and that Okinawa would not be returned to Japanese sovereignty for a while. Knowing the source and nature of the information Miki was receiving, Yoshida was very wary of him. Amano, interview. Unfortunately he could not recall the dates of these utterances. One meeting Miki had with MacArthur was on 9 October 1948; Yoshida met the latter on the same day. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 9 October 1948. See also, *Asahi Shimbun Seitō Kishadan, Seitō Nenkan 1949*, Nyūsha.

- 177 See *Seitō.....1947, op. cit.*, and Asahi Shimbun Seiji Kishadan, *Seitō Nenkan 1948*, Nyūsha. Albert Einstein wrote to MacArthur after receiving a request for help from Yamamoto. In his reply, MacArthur referred to some of Yamamoto's writings where, for instance, he praised Hitler.
- 178 Hirakawa, interview.
- 179 *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 February 1947.
- 180 See *Seitō.....1948, op. cit.*
- 181 Ide, interview.
- 182 *Gikai Seido....., op. cit.*
- 183 During February and March, 1947 Miki was in frequent contact with Ashida whom he tried to inveigle into a new party. As conditions he laid down that, (i) Ashida would lead the party, (ii) not all the members of the *Shinpotō* would join, and (iii) cooperativism would be incorporated into the political platform. The talks came to nothing. *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki*, Iwanami Shōten, 1986, entries for 9 February - 31 March 1947.
- 184 *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 March 1947.
- 185 *Seitō.....1948, op. cit.* This included three who left on 26 March, and another eight, two days later. *Asahi Shimbun*, 27,29 March 1947.
- 186 *Asahi Shimbun*, 23 March 1947.
- 187 *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 March 1947.
- 188 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 April 1947.
- 189 *Seitō.....1948, op. cit.* Former, current and new candidates were, in numerical strength; two, forty-one and sixty-four respectively.
- 190 The entry of Kuroiwa Shigeharu brought the number up to thirty-two on 26 June. *Gikai Seido....., op. cit.* The strength of the other major parties as a result of the election was: Socialist Party 143, Liberal Party 131, and Democratic Party 126.
- 191 Katayama himself had been unsure whether or not to form a government, and Miki went to speak to him on several occasions. Asano Mikio and Miki Mutsuko, interviews.
- 192 Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 193 The name of the ministry changed to Posts and Telecommunications on 1 June 1949. *Naikaku Seido....., op. cit.*
- 194 According to a newspaper report, Sasamori was given the post while two other party members, Funada Kyōji and Okada Seiichi, were fighting over it. On the composition of the government, see *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 June 1947, and *Mainichi Shimbun*, 2 June 1947.
- 195 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 July 1947.
- 196 *Kokkai Nenkan*, Kokumin Kyōdōtō, 15 May 1948, and *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 May 1947. For a history of the *Ryokufūkai*, see Nojima Teiichirō, *Ryokufūkai 18 Nen Shi*, Ryokufūkai Shi Hensan Iinkai, 30 August 1971.
- 197 *Shin Seiji Kyōgikai*.
- 198 This grouping had no connection with the pre-war negotiating body of the same name.
- 199 *Seitō.....1949, op. cit.*
- 200 *Zenkoku Nōminha Giindan*.
- 201 *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 January 1948.
- 202 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 January 1948.
- 203 *Kyōdō Shakai Minshushugi*.

- 204 *Seitō...1949, op. cit.*. See also *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 December 1948, and *Kokkai Nenkan 1949*, Kokumin Kyōdōtō, 15 May 1948. Miki had great difficulty in keeping the members of his party in line. For instance, he felt it necessary to ask Yabe Teiji to explain to Ide the situation regarding the NFF. Ide, who was close to the group, was set to leave the party. *Yabe...Nikki, op. cit.*, entry for 22 February 1948.
- 205 *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 January 1948.
- 206 Yabe contributed significantly to the political philosophy and platform of Miki's party. Ex-Miki faction member, Furui Yoshimi, interview.
- 207 *Yabe...Nikki, op. cit.*, entries for 29 January and 5 February. See also the entry for 4 May 1948.
- 208 *Kokkai Nenkan, op. cit.*.
- 209 It was called the *Rōnō Shintō*.
- 210 Justin Williams, *op. cit.*, p.49.
- 211 Ide, interview. See also *Ashida Nikki, op. cit.*, entry for 5 February 1948. Ide himself favoured Yoshida.
- 212 *Seitō...1949, op. cit.*. Although a small party, the People's Cooperative Party needed much money in order to put up candidates all over Japan. Some people around Miki thought that Okada had been made a minister in exchange for a promise to Miki to donate a sizeable amount of money to the party. However, although Okada ran a very profitable salvage company, it was not large enough to provide funding on the scale imagined by others. Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 213 See, for instance, *Ashida Nikki, op. cit.*, entry for 5 October 1947.
- 214 *Asahi Shimbun*, 6 July 1948.
- 215 *Mainichi Shimbun*, 23 July 1948.
- 216 For instance, views were exchanged with Inukai Takeru and Narahashi Wataru. Inukai had first been elected in 1930 and Narahashi had served in Shidehara's Cabinet in 1945. See *Seitō Nenpō*, *Asahi Shimbun Seikeibu Dōjin*, 30 March 1949.
- 217 *Seitō.....1949, op. cit.*.
- 218 Justin Williams, *op. cit.*, p.50.
- 219 *Ibid.*, pp.86-92.
- 220 *Ashida Nikki, op. cit.*, entry for 17 April 1949.
- 221 *Shakai Kakushintō*.
- 222 *Nōmin Shintō*.
- 223 This could be translated as Justice (or Fairness) Party.
- 224 Hirakawa Tokuo, interview. See also *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 May 1949.
- 225 It appears that Miki worked hard to form one party from the various groupings that had come together. On the 21 January, for instance, he was reported to have had talks with Satake Haruki, secretary-general of the *Shakai Kakushintō*, and agreed on the formation of a new party. *Nishi Nihon Shimbun*, 22 January 1950.
- 226 *Mainichi Shimbun*, 20 February 1950.
- 227 Following the 1949 election, talks were held between Yoshida and Inukai, president of the Democratic Party, which led to two members entering Yoshida's Cabinet on 16 February. The party split into an Alliance and Opposition grouping over the question of forming a coalition, although for a while they continued to use the same headquarters. These offices had been inherited, through the *Shimpotō*, from the *Minseitō*. See, *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 February and 8 March 1949.

- 228 In favour of the former were Kōno Kinshō, Hirakawa, Kitsukawa and Ide; Ishida Ishimatsu favoured the latter. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 20 February 1950.
- 229 See *Mainichi Shimbun*, 10 January 1950.
- 230 The members included Nakasone Yasuhiro, Sonoda Sunao, Sakurauchi Yoshio and Namiki Yoshio. Inaba Osamu, former member of the Kitamura group, interview.
- 231 Inaba, *ibid.*.
- 232 Inaba, *ibid.*, and Ide, interview, respectively.
- 233 Ide had explained the coming together of the two parties as being necessitated by political convenience. By themselves they were too small to make any impact on the Diet. Ide, interview.
- 234 Kōmoto Toshio, interview.
- 235 *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 April 1950.
- 236 Yabe Teiji, “Kokumin Kyōdōtō No Shōraisei”, *Godai Seitō Wo Kaibō Suru*, Sassa Hiroo, 1948.
- 237 Ide Ichitarō, “Hoshutō Liberaru No Michi Wo Mattō Shite”, *Chūō Kōron*, August 1986.
- 238 Henceforth, the writer will use the term “faction”, although it was a very different body to that existing in the 1980’s.
- 239 *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 April 1950.
- 240 *Ibid.*.
- 241 *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 January 1951.
- 242 *Ibid.*.
- 243 *Shinsei Club*.
- 244 *Asahi Shimbun*, 4,6 September 1951.
- 245 At the time of writing, March 1988, Ogusu was the chairman of the Board of Directors of the *Sakuradakai*, a political association that could be traced back to the *Minseitō* through the Democratic party. Ogusu had been a journalist for the *Hōchi Shimbun* and had covered the *Minseitō* in 1929, at which time he first came into contact with Matsumura. Ogusu, interview.
- 246 See, *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 September 1951.
- 247 Ogusu, interview.
- 248 The other was *rapprochement* with China.
- 249 Hino Akira, former *Asahi Shimbun* journalist, interview.
- 250 Tagawa Seiichi later entered the LDP. He was a founder member of the New Liberal Club (NLC) and remained outside the conservative party when his fellow members returned to the fold. In July 1989, he was the sole Diet member of the *Shimpotō* (not to be confused with the party of the same name in the 1940’s).
- 251 After he retired as a journalist, Hino, who was born in Tokushima, worked as a secretary for Miki.
- 252 Ogusu, interview.
- 253 *Yomiuri Nenkan 1953*, Yomiuri Shimbunsha.
- 254 *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 February 1952.
- 255 *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 February 1952.
- 256 *Yomiuri...1953*, *op. cit.*.
- 257 The members of the New Politics Club had not yet had the opportunity to stand in a postwar election; thus they were not Diet members at the time.
- 258 *Yomiuri.....1953*, *op. cit.*.

- 259 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 February 1952.
- 260 During the talks between the PDP and NPC leading up to fusion, there had been objections in the left wing of the PDP against Ōasa's entry, in particular from Kitamura and Kawasaki Hideji. It was claimed that Ōasa had worked with Maeda Yōnezō of the *Seiyūkai* and others, in dissolving the political parties before the war. His close relationship with Prime Minister Yoshida gave cause for suspicion that he was working for a merger of the conservative parties. Kawasaki had referred to a bad thing (unexplained) which Ōasa had done to the former's father during the war. Nakasone backed up Kawasaki, and suggested that Ōasa's background should be investigated. Yoshimura Katsumi, *Sankei Shimbun* journalist, interview.
- 261 Shigemune had served in the post under former prime ministers Tōjō, Koiso and Higashikuni. He was purged by the Occupation Forces. Matsumura, who first came to know Shigemitsu during the war, put his name forward as a candidate. A friend of Shigemitsu at school and later colleague in the Foreign Ministry, Ashida was also in favour. Matsumura Kenzō, *Sandai Kaikoroku*, Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, 1964.
- 262 *Saikō Kanbukai*.
- 263 *Yomiuri*....1953, *op. cit.*.
- 264 *Gikai Seido*....., *op. cit.*.
- 265 In many cases people who had been "looking after" seats stood down with the return of the depurgees. On occasion there were arguments about who should present themselves as candidates. For instance, Funada Naka, a former leader of the Japan Cooperative Party, wanted his brother, Funada Kyōji, to stand down. Eventually, and after much argument he did so and stood instead, unsuccessfully, for the Upper House in 1953. Funada Hajime, interview 28 May 1987. According to Miki Mutsuko, Funada Kyōji was close to her husband. Hirakawa dated the large increase in the amount of money spent during elections, from the time of the return to the open political stage of the depurgees.
- 266 *Asahi Shimbun*, 4,5 December 1952. Here, the writer uses the word "mainstream" to signify these factions that together determined the direction the party took.
- 267 *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 January 1953.
- 268 This served to intensify the conflict between the reformist group and Ashida faction. *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 February 1953.
- 269 *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 February 1953.
- 270 Among the Diet members close to Miki who lost their seats were: Sasamori Junzō, Sasayama Shigetarō, Moriyama Kinji, Ishida Ichimatsu, Hirakawa Tokuo, Kan Tarō, Uda Kōichi and Nakamura Toratō.
- 271 According to Ide, Ishiguro would have made the better president. Not only was he knowledgeable about agriculture, having served as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Suzuki Cabinet, he was a man of character. In comparison, though a fine diplomat, Shigemitsu lacked the qualities necessary to lead a political party; he was a bureaucrat, not a party man. Kōmoto concurred with Ide. According to Asano, Miki used to complain that, despite being party president, Shigemitsu was incompetent in raising funds to run an election campaign. Asano, interview.
- 272 Hanami Tatsuji, *Seikai Kyotōron*, Sekkasha, 1956, p.375.
- 273 Yamamoto Kunekichi and Miyazawa Taneo were two such people.
- 274 Hino, *op. cit.*. He was himself present at the party.
- 275 Hino and Asano, interviews.

- 276 Many people interviewed including Hino, Ogusu and Tagawa believed this to be so. Matsumura served as secretary-general after Kiyose.
- 277 Hirakawa and Hino, interviews.
- 278 It is likely that some of the purged politicians had continued to pull strings behind the scenes, notwithstanding their banishment.
- 279 Ide, interview.
- 280 *Yomiuri*1953, *op. cit.*.
- 281 Hino reckoned that there were but five or six people in the Ashida faction and just two or three in the Tsurumi faction. For one listing of factional affiliation see, *Jitsugyō No Sekai*, August 1954.
- 282 For instance, Shiga Kenjirō was very close to Ashida but had a good relationship with Miki, later joining his faction. Hino, interview.
- 283 According to Ide, it acted as a unified party. Ide, interview.
- 284 *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 April 1952.
- 285 *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 January 1953.
- 286 *Mainichi Shimbun*, 15 November 1953.
- 287 For instance, see *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 March, 18 April, 16 June 1954. The Japan Liberal Party, a small grouping led by Hatoyama Ichirō, was also involved in negotiations.
- 288 There was, for instance, a conference centring on Ishibashi, Kishi and Ashida. *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 August 1954.
- 289 *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 August 1954.
- 290 *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 August 1954.
- 291 *Asahi Shimbun*, 6 November 1954.
- 292 *Gikai Seido*...., *op. cit.*.
- 293 *Ibid.*.
- 294 On 30 November 1954, the relative strengths of the four big parties in the House of Representatives were: Liberal Party 185, JDP 120, Socialist Party (Left) 72 and Socialist Party (Right) 61. *ibid.*.
- 295 Another possibility would have been to dissolve the House and call an election, but there was opposition to this inside the Liberal Party.
- 296 *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 December 1954.
- 297 There was a good personal relationship between Miki and Hatoyama (Ide, interview) helped by a friendship between the two wives. Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 298 Kōmoto faction member Niwa Hyōsuke, Tagawa and Ide, interviews. In addition to the bad personal feeling between Yoshida and Hatoyama, their struggle could be characterized as a fight between bureaucrat and party men groupings of politicians.
- 299 See Asanuma Inejiro, "Kyōdōshugi No Yukue", *Jinbutsu Ōrai*, May 1955.
- 300 Hatoyama Kazuo was returned to the Diet on nine successive occasions from 1892 to 1908.
- 301 In answer to a question during the election campaign, Miki mentioned two former Diet members whom he esteemed: Gotō Shimpei and Hamaguchi Osachi. Miki praised the former, who became a member of the House of Peers in 1903, for his ideals, and the latter, elected to the House of Representatives from Kōchi on six occasions (the first being in 1915), for his "tenderness with firmness" (*jūgōsa*). *Dai 27*...(see endnote 147).
- 302 For instance, see *Asahi Shimbun*, 19 January and 4 June 1955.
- 303 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 October 1955.

- 304 For instance, see Matsumura Kenzō, "Hoshu Kankakusha No Hiai", *Chūō Kōron*, February 1959.
- 305 Furui Yoshimi, Hino, Tagawa and Ogusu, interviews. Matsumura also disliked Satō's brother Kishi, maintaining that he was too close to the militarists during the war and that he possessed an authoritarian streak. Furui, interview. Matsumura tarred Kishi and Satō with the same brush, seeing them as personifying a type of ex- bureaucrat with a way of thinking and reasoning alien to his own. Akagi Munenori (ex-Kishi faction member), interview. For his part, Kishi maintained that his character and that of Matsumura were very different, and the antipathy felt towards him (Kishi) by the older man lasted right up until his death. Kishi, *op. cit.*, pp.134/5. Kishi and Satō were pro-Taiwan, whereas Matsumura was at the forefront of moves to improve relations with China.
- 306 See, for instance, a speech given by Miki in Hokkaidō reported in the *Asahi Shimbun* on 30 August 1955.
- 307 Kōmoto faction member Kujiraoka Hyōsuke, interview. Kujiraoka himself strongly felt that democracy would be "safer" were an opposition party able to pose a realistic threat of taking power.
- 308 Ide describing Miki's view of a conservative two- party system.
- 309 See, for instance, *Ashida Nikki*, *op. cit.*, entry for 6 June 1955.
- 310 Takano Chiyoki, secretary to Miki between March 1955 and 1958, interview. Takano first came into contact with Miki during the 1952 election when, with other students from Meiji University, he went to Tokushima to support him.
- 311 Asanuma Inejirō, *op. cit.*.
- 312 Mizutani wrote, "Miki's calculating character came to be manifested behind the scenes where he was able to swim out of the stormy seas of reorganization in the political world." *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 December 1956. Mizutani was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1928.

Chapter 3

A HISTORY OF THE MIKI/KŌMOTO FACTION, 1956-1987

Introduction

With the formation of the LDP there was one large conservative party, but the factions and sub-groupings of the two former parties continued to exist. This was hardly surprising given the historical processes involved. Relationships based on friendship and trust, financial and moral support particularly during elections and, perhaps to a lesser degree, commonality of background and views on policy were unlikely to be loosened because of the unification of the conservative parties. Moreover, with respect to the Diet members from “the other side”, adversaries within one’s constituency remained adversaries notwithstanding the fact that they now belonged to and received support from one’s own party. Nothing in the act of the formation of the LDP served to lessen the factionalism that had existed before. On the contrary, by virtue of belonging to the governing party, a party that at the time must have appeared to possess an excellent chance of remaining the dominant force in the Diet for a considerable period, there was the increased demand and expectation for important government and committee posts. Furthermore, there was greater competition for party posts which had gained in importance and power concomitantly with its size and role.

The Political Postures of the Miki Faction, 1956-1964

After Hatoyama Ichirō, between 1956 and 1963 there were three prime ministers: Ishibashi Tanzan, Kishi Nobusuke and Ikeda Hayato. Miki and his faction were a mainstay

of the Ishibashi government, but it lasted for only two months. They also secured for themselves a position at the centre of the party during the latter part of the Ikeda regime. In between these two periods, the Miki faction was in opposition within the LDP.

Following the formation of the new party, the question of who should take the presidency in succession to Hatoyama became a burning issue. Factional activity inside the party began with its inception,¹ and intensified with the unexpected death of Ogata on 28 January, which complicated the issue of finding someone who could command wide support.² Further repercussions were felt with the death of another very influential figure, Miki Bukichi, on 4 July.

Acting in unison, Matsumura and Miki with the support of Ishibashi were reported to be involved in moves to form a third party.³ Matsumura had continued to espouse the doctrine of two conservative parties and Miki remained wedded to the idea of setting up a middle-of-the-road party - a belief to which he remained faithful and made half-hearted attempts to bring about on a number of subsequent occasions in his political career. Then and later on Miki was thwarted by an absence of active support in his party, vacillation by the opposition parties and a lack of will based on the fear that he would become politically isolated.

Both Miki and Matsumura were dissatisfied with moves being made by Secretary-General Kishi, and they hoped to increase their strength and voice in the party by absorbing many of the former *Kaishintō* members.⁴ There were a number of politicians very close to Miki on whom he could rely to act and vote according to his behest; there were those who had links with other factions, who were open to approaches made from outside, or who wished to operate independently. There were also others, not generally recognized

as belonging to Miki's faction but who maintained ties of various degrees of closeness and who could possibly be persuaded to move in concert with it.

Many Diet members who had belonged to the *Kaishintō* adopted a "wait-and-see" policy or, for other reasons, remained outside factional influence. Some had affiliated themselves with powerful figures inside the LDP. For instance, the faction led by Kōno Ichirō attracted many Diet members from the so-called reformist wing of the party who had been close to Kitamura;⁵ he himself was given an important role within the faction in the formulation of policy.⁶ According to one participant, some Diet members were drawn to Kōno because of his power, the fact that he had been "trained" by the veteran politician Hatoyama, and his strength of character. The experience of several people in his circle such as Matsuda Takechiyo, first elected in 1928 and who had been Minister of Posts and Telecommunications under Hatoyama, served to strengthen his position in the eyes of some junior and middle-ranking politicians.⁷ Kōno was seen to be influential and able to gather money.⁸ Of the principal figures in the Kitamura group, only Kawasaki entered the Miki faction. Most of the others (including future prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, and his trusted ally Sakurachi Yoshio, who used to frequent Miki's office and enjoy a close relationship with him)⁹ joined with Kōno.

Following Hatoyama's resignation, three main candidates presented themselves for the premiership: Kishi, Ishibashi and Ishii Mitsujirō. Ishibashi had the smallest following of the three; no more than twenty people could be said to belong to his faction. Ishida Hirohide, one of his *kobun* who was a friend of Miki,¹⁰ was a prime mover behind his campaign. He may have been instrumental in securing Miki's help. The Miki faction was the first one to offer its support. Other help soon came by way of the Ōno faction. Through talks between Miki, representing the Ishibashi camp, and Ikeda Hayato, who

supported Ishii, an agreement was reached whereby the candidate coming third would act to transfer his votes to the other.¹¹ The other candidate, Kishi, had tried unsuccessfully to gain the support of Matsumura.¹²

In the election on 15 December, in the second ballot, Ishibashi received 258 votes to 251 for Kishi and thus became president of the party. This was a remarkable achievement considering that in the first ballot Kishi, Ishibashi and Ishii had received 223, 151 and 137 votes respectively. As a reward for his support and his role in forging an alliance with the factions supporting Ishii, Miki was made secretary-general. This brought severe criticism from some of the factions that had been in the Kishi camp. In particular, the Kishi faction pointed to Miki's role in the election campaign, the fact that he had been against the formation of the LDP until the very end, and that he had put forward reformist policies taking his own peculiar path in the post-war conservative world. Ishibashi, however, stood firm.¹³ Some forty candidates were put forward by the faction leaders for Cabinet posts. From what the press had come to call the Matsumura/Miki faction, the names of Ide, Uda, Matsuura and Nakamura Sannojiyō were advanced;¹⁴ the first three received posts.

Miki immediately announced that in order to bring about the dissolution of factions he would work for party harmony through consultation. He wished to rationalize party management and the raising of funds. To elevate the reputation of politics in the Diet, there would be full consultations with the Socialist Party and an effort would be made to unify the Government and the party.¹⁵

It was an enormous blow to Miki when, through illness, Ishibashi resigned on 23 February 1957 after just nine weeks in office. Kishi was designated prime minister two days later, and was reported as having decided that no changes would be made in the Cabinet,¹⁶ although it is not unlikely that he had made up his mind to reshuffle the major

party posts on coming to power with one aim being the forcing of Miki from office. Miki continued to work as secretary-general for some three months after the end of the Ishibashi regime. Kawashima Shōjirō, whom Kishi intended to be Miki's successor, also began to carry out substantial work for the same post, and as an office used accommodation in a hotel. Thus, for a period of time, in effect there were two secretaries-general.¹⁷

On 10 July, Miki resigned as secretary-general and was appointed chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Matsumura was offered the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry but, like Ikeda, declined to participate in Kishi's Cabinet. He put forward Nakamura and Furui in his place. Preferring the former, Kishi appointed him Minister of Transport. The Kishi faction member, Akagi, was made Minister of Agriculture and Forestry.¹⁸ The political colour of the new Cabinet was very different from that formed by Ishibashi, and although Miki still occupied one of the big three party posts, it was a lesser one. Finding fewer political allies in the new Cabinet and working under a prime minister with whom he could not be said to enjoy a good relationship, Miki had lost much relative power inside the party.

Another blow was felt when two people at the centre of the Miki faction who had given much support to him and his movements in the Diet died within three months of each other: Uda Kōichi on 30 December followed by Kōno Kinshō on 29 March 1958. A former member of the *Tōhōkai*, Kōno had unsuccessfully stood for election in 1942. Elected as an independent candidate in 1946, from June of that year he had been a member of Miki's party. A very good relationship had grown up between them, closer than had existed up to that time between Miki and any other political ally.¹⁹ Uda too had enjoyed a very good relationship with Miki and in addition was an important contributor of funds.²⁰

The May 1958 election saw fourteen members of the more than forty strong Miki faction lose their seats.²¹ In the Cabinet reshuffle, Miki became Minister of State, concurrently holding the posts of Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency, Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. No other member of his faction entered the Cabinet.

On 27 December there was an open split between those factions allied with that of the prime minister and those against (by definition, the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions); this threatened the unity of the party. Miki, Ikeda and Nadao Hirokichi, who was Minister of Education in the Ishibashi government, presented their resignations from the Cabinet to Kishi in protest at his bringing forward by two months to January the date of the presidential election, and more generally to criticize his political ideology. Members of these factions²² holding lesser posts such as vice-ministerships moved in sympathy and as directed by their leaders.²³

On 24 January 1959 Kishi was re-elected prime minister, acquiring 320 votes to 166 for Matsumura. The victorious incumbent believed the challenger stood, not because he thought he could win, but rather in order to ascertain the number of people against him (Kishi) whom he could bring together.²⁴ In the reshuffle on 18 June only Kanno Watarō from the Miki faction entered the Cabinet.

On the night of 19 May 1960 the Japan-US Security Treaty was forced through the Diet. All the opposition parties and one part of the anti-mainstream in the LDP including the Miki/Matsumura faction,²⁵ absented themselves from the proceedings.²⁶ Miki said that there were many people against the proposed treaty, and that an attempt should have been made to persuade them to change their minds. According to Ide Ichitarō, Miki

absented himself from the Diet on the occasion of the vote in protest against the forcing through of the measure - not because he was against it.²⁷

Around this time, a distinguished intellectual and political philosopher at Tōkyō University, Maruyama Masao, was involved in talks with the Miki/Matsumura and Kōno factions and was asked to come out with a plan for them to withdraw from the party. In the event, according to Maruyama, Matsumura became distressed over the question of leaving and the plan did not come to fruition.²⁸ It is worthy of note that Miki sought out advice from, and the company of, intellectuals. He worked hard to build up a group of them around him, and indeed his faction was reported to be supported by many.²⁹ Maruyama remembered meeting Miki, at the latter's request, three or four times a year over a period of time. He stressed that, as a rule, he did not enjoy or seek to form connections with politicians but made an exception in Miki's case. Maruyama felt that he neither influenced nor was influenced by Miki whom he saw as a "liberal", on the left of the LDP "possessing both knowledge and ability".³⁰

Criticism of Kishi inside the party became stronger.³¹ The Ishibashi, Miki/Matsumura and Kōno factions took the hardest line calling on Kishi to resign.³² At the same time, in opposition to his policies, there were demonstrations outside the Diet leading to many people being injured and one death.³³ On 23 June Kishi announced his decision to give up the premiership.³⁴ The years of the Kishi regime were an unhappy time for Miki. Having been made secretary-general under Ishibashi, he operated at the centre of the party enjoying control of its purse strings, he had a good working alliance with the prime minister (in addition to Ikeda), and he was in a powerful position to push his own claim for the presidency after him. However, within a few months, Miki was being edged out of power by Kishi, who had strongly criticized Miki's appointment the previous year. In

addition, two of Miki's most trusted aides had died, the faction had done very badly in the 1958 election and Ikeda had drawn closer to Kishi and become Minister of International Trade and Industry in June 1959.

One journalist recalled that Miki was approached by Fujiyama Aiichirō to support the latter's candidacy as successor to Kishi, but refused to give it on the grounds that Fujiyama was his junior in terms of a political career and therefore should not precede him as prime minister.³⁵ It was to Matsumura that Miki was prepared to pledge the faction³⁶ and the latter reserved part of his office as an election headquarters for him.³⁷ Although he was not seen as being a likely winner, Matsumura was Miki's senior and the leader of the group that acted as one with the Miki faction. However, behind the scenes there were moves for an alliance of the so-called "party-men factions" against those of the bureaucrats. There were a number of Diet members, of whom Miki was one, who severely criticized the role played in politics by bureaucrats and politicians who had been bureaucrats.³⁸ Part of the animosity could be traced back to the confrontation between Yoshida and Hatoyama. On the eve of the voting, which took place on 14 July, both Ōno and Matsumura withdrew their candidacies. These tactics were not sufficient to help Ishii beat Ikeda who, with Kishi's support, won on the second ballot.³⁹

Initially the relationship between the Ikeda regime and the Miki faction was cool. The general trend in the faction had been to support Ishii in the presidential election and, as a result it received no posts in the Cabinet formed on 18 July.⁴⁰ Faction leader Kōno Ichirō had been unhappy about Ikeda's victory and tried to set up a new party, but gave up the idea when support from Miki, Matsumura and others was not forthcoming. This was one instance of them flirting with the idea of leaving the party, but refusing to act when the decision was called for. In December there was a Cabinet reshuffle and Furui

Yoshimi, who was close to Matsumura but had given his vote to Ikeda,⁴¹ was appointed Minister of Health and Welfare.

Unlike the period of the Kishi government which was characterized by confrontation both between the LDP and the opposition, and within the LDP itself, the years of the Ikeda government were conciliatory; contentious issues were avoided and the emphasis was put on achieving high economic growth. Over time the Miki faction moved nearer to the prime minister and was rewarded with greater numerical representation in the government until, in what was to be Ikeda's final Cabinet, it occupied two ministerships and one major party office, Miki himself being appointed secretary-general in return for having supported Ikeda's re-election as party president. Regrettably for Miki, he was not to hold the coveted post at the time of a general election, when he would have been presented with a golden opportunity to increase the number of Diet members in his faction.

This was Miki's fourth important post under Ikeda. In July 1961, having turned down the portfolios of Labour and Transport,⁴² Miki was made Minister of State holding again simultaneously the positions of Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. One year later he declined to remain in the Cabinet upon hearing that his faction was to be favoured with but one post,⁴³ but in July 1963 he became chairman of the PARC.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, on 28 September 1962, Miki had been appointed chairman of the Research Commission on Party Organization. Its terms of reference were to include examining the organization and machinery of the party, the question of factions, the regulation of political funding, and the medium-sized constituency system.⁴⁵

The Report of the Research Commission was presented to Ikeda on 17 November 1963. The main points of its recommendations were as follows: Factions should be unconditionally dissolved. The distribution of Cabinet and party posts as well as the giving of official recognition to candidates on the principle of maintaining an equilibrium among the factions should be discontinued; instead, the rule of putting the right man in the right post should be followed. Political funds should be concentrated inside the party (as opposed to factions). The *kōenkai* of a Diet member should not receive more than three hundred thousand yen over a twelve month period from any one individual or corporation. The party president should be recommended through an advisory council made up of the current president, people with the experience of having served as Speaker and other senior members of the party; his period of tenure should be three years. The Policy Affairs Research Council should be expanded and machinery set up for a comprehensive policy research institute affiliated to the party with the function of examining the long term drafting of policy. To strengthen the local organization of the party, members at the nucleus of a Diet member's *kōenkai* should be recommended to join the party.⁴⁶

The report was given much media coverage, and the LDP factions went through the motions of disbanding.⁴⁷ However, their actions were deceptive. There were no significant changes in the method of operation of the factions and within a short time even the pretence was dropped. The report was soon forgotten, and factions and factionalism continued to thrive.

The numerical strength of the Miki faction remained constant throughout the Ikeda regime. As a result of the November 1963 election, thirty four members were returned, one more than there had been at the time of dissolution.⁴⁸ Three years earlier the faction had announced that forty-six out of seventy candidates had been successful in the November

election. The *Asahi Shimbun* pointed out that some ten of them were affiliated with other factions and that a figure of thirty-two (including five in the Ishida group) was more accurate.⁴⁹ Indeed a number of faction members belonged to a sub-group led by Hayakawa Takashi.

The Hayakawa Group and Ikeda

In March 1964 American Ambassador Edwin Reischauer was stabbed by a Japanese youth. On the urging of Miki, his faction leader, Hayakawa Takashi, Minister of Home Affairs, resigned to take responsibility. According to the author of a book on Ikeda who knew Hayakawa, the ex-minister felt that he had been forced to leave the Cabinet and as a result became severely critical of the prime minister.⁵⁰ With his own following inside the Miki faction, Hayakawa acted to prevent Ikeda being elected president for the third time.

Resolving the question of how many people sympathized with and were prepared to act with Hayakawa remains difficult; the number given varies according to the source. What is clear, however, is that it was a very trying time for Miki who had to fight to maintain control of a faction that contained within it many dissenting voices.⁵¹

According to Fujii Katsushi, one of the participants, one month before the July 1964 presidential election, twenty-one members of the faction signed a compact asking Miki to promote the modernization of the party.⁵² Although not expressly stated, it was a request for him to put his faction behind Satō Eisaku, who also sought the party presidency, and not Ikeda.⁵³ Pressure was also put on Miki from outside the faction. For instance, the *Yabe Diary* relates that Hayakawa phoned Yabe to ask him to speak with Miki about his support for Ikeda. Yabe did so, being critical of Ikeda aiming for a third term in office.⁵⁴ On 29 June Miki declared that he would support Ikeda⁵⁵ but, according to Fujii, was

obliged to modify his position from one where he ordered members of the faction to vote for Ikeda to one where he said that he hoped they would, but would not coerce them.⁵⁶

This battle between Miki and Hayakawa must be seen in its historical context. Elected for the first time in 1946 as an independent, Hayakawa moved in and out of the parties Miki belonged to and led. One source⁵⁷ asserted that his relationship with Miki may have been adversely affected by the antipathy felt towards him by Kinoshita Sakae. Kinoshita was one of Miki's financial backers in the early postwar period and was believed by Miki's wife to hold a particularly deep regard for Miki, the younger man by twenty-four years.⁵⁸ Although Hayakawa played an important role in the formation of policy inside the faction, it appears that he and Miki did not get on well with each other.⁵⁹ According to Amano, their personalities were quite different and neither spoke well of the other. One of Miki's secretaries suggested that Hayakawa saw Miki as an equal within the faction rather than as his *sempai*.⁶⁰ He had secondary links with another faction with whose leader, Satō, he enjoyed a close connection.⁶¹ It is not unlikely that negotiations had taken place between them. Inside the Miki faction there were members who were pro-Ikeda; at the extreme, the Matsumura group was strongly anti- Satō.⁶² As a result of this intra-factional struggle, some relationships became very strained⁶³ and the Hayakawa group came to be looked on as a detached force whose members were pro-Satō or sympathetic towards the ambitions of Fukuda Takeo. The leader of another faction, Fukuda supported Satō and, in time, expected to be his successor.

Matsumura Kenzō, His Group, and the Miki Faction

The task of finding a successor to Ikeda, who had fallen ill, was entrusted to Secretary-General Miki and Vice-President Kawashima who were to consult regularly with the outgoing prime minister. Three candidates presented themselves: Satō, Kōno and Fujiyama.

On 28 October 1964, three days after Ikeda's decision to resign,⁶⁴ Matsumura called on the two party officers to relay his views. He stated his conviction that as a criterion the candidate on the side of reformist politics should be favoured,⁶⁵ by which he meant Kōno. Matsumura had been Kōno's *sempai* at university and the two politicians were close.⁶⁶ In contrast, he hated Satō and did not trust him.

On 9 November, Miki and Kawashima visited Ikeda in hospital and it was decided to designate Satō as his successor.⁶⁷ Whether Miki could not or did not want to make the choice and left it to Ikeda, or whether it was on his recommendation that the decision was made, is unclear. Satō was seen to be the strongest candidate in the party and his appointment was likely to be the least controversial. Inside the Miki faction there were both pro-and anti-Satō Diet members; however he moved, Miki knew that he would alienate some people. Speaking later, Miki admitted disliking Satō but maintained that he had felt obliged to recommend him.⁶⁸ Matsumura took his group of followers outside the faction never to return. They felt unable to move with Miki in the political arena and preferred to act independently.

Matsumura Kenzō was born in 1883. After graduating from Waseda University in Politics and Economics in 1906, he worked as a journalist and entered the prefectural assembly before he was elected to the House of Representatives for Toyama in 1928. A member of the prewar *Minseitō*, Matsumura was Parliamentary Councillor in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries during the Saitō Cabinet, and Vice-Minister under Prime Minister Hiranuma. Following the war, he took the Ministership on Shidehara becoming premier, having served as Minister of Public Welfare under Higashikuni. As a consequence of having been chairman of the *Yokusan* Policy Affairs Research Council, Matsumura was purged and did not return to active political life until 1951 at which time, together with

former members of the *Minseitō*, he set up the New Politics Club. The NPC joined with the People's Democratic Party to form the *Kaishintō*. Before he was purged, Matsumura had belonged to the *Shimpotō*, an ancestor of the PDP.

For the first time, Miki and Matsumura belonged to the same party. Over a period of time they began moving closer to each other, but it was in their opposition to the formation of the LDP that they came together. Many people who had been working together with Matsumura in the Diet went their own ways.⁶⁹ According to Ogusu and Tagawa, the small group of people that remained both agreed with his policies and doted on him without seeking political funding.⁷⁰

Initially called by the press the Matsumura/Miki faction in deference to the former's seniority and experience, over time the faction's name changed to the Miki/Matsumura faction and later Matsumura's name was dropped. Matsumura was very much the elder statesman. From the very beginning, Miki took the chair at faction meetings, which took place in his private office.⁷¹ Matsumura did not have his own office or organization as such. Members of his group, who were quite separate to and not dependent on that of Miki, in addition to irregularly attending meetings of the faction,⁷² would occasionally meet in Matsumura's home in the Tōkyō suburb of Saginomiya.⁷³ Later on, Matsumura was given a private office in the *Sakuradakai* which he used until his death.⁷⁴ One cannot speak of there being a Matsumura faction. It was not a grouping where money and posts were distributed. Rather it appears to have been a gathering of people who shared views on the relationship between Japan and China, and on agricultural policy. Participants seem to have been deeply attached to Matsumura personally, and met together socially on occasion.⁷⁵

The diary of member Sasayama Shigetarō⁷⁶ indicates the strength of mutual compassion existing among the members. In the entry for 17 September 1969, on receiving word of Matsumura's intention to resign, the diarist declares a sense of disappointment and asks himself why such people are "unable to sit in a corner of the political world", even if they play no active part. On 25 September he queries whether there is not some "secret medicine" that could give Matsumura a new lease of life - "even just ten years more". On 3 December, expressing regret that there will not be again occasions when the Matsumura group will meet together, Sasayama writes of his being "unable to endure the deep emotion attached to the loneliness and distress of a politician". Throughout the diary, Sasayama speaks in very endearing terms about Matsumura. For instance, on 13 May 1970 he mentions that Matsumura's legs are very weak but that there was "no particular need to worry because this had been the case for some time". He wonders, for at least the third time in the diary, whether or not somehow Matsumura could be rejuvenated. On 20 August 1970 he goes into great detail about the care lavished on him in hospital.

Sasayama also wrote about the relationship with Miki and his faction. In an undated entry, Sasayama acknowledges that he had often been helped by Miki who had arranged interviews of him by the mass media. Because he was seen as being too close to Matsumura, however, Sasayama believed that Miki kept him at a distance. Listing various cases when he felt that Miki should have recommended him and not someone else for a party or government post, Sasayama appeared to be bitter at being passed over. He was very dissatisfied at what he interpreted to be Miki's lack of effort in putting his name forward for a Cabinet post.⁷⁷ On 25 September 1969, Sasayama writes that the Matsumura group could not be called a faction, and that with Matsumura's announced retirement⁷⁸ he expects annoying approaches to be made from factions mistakenly believing he and his

colleagues to be “masterless samurai” from a dissolved faction. Sasayama characterized the group as having “high ambitions and the enthusiasm to love and do their best for Japan”. He stressed the differences with people who, as he put it, “cooperated with anyone, made the foundation for a faction and laboured for their own convenience or distinction”.

On 6 January (year unknown), Ide approached Sasayama in the hope that he would join the Miki faction. The diarist writes that he asked for time to consider the question at length. (Sasayama also mentioned that he and Ishida [Hirohide] agreed to cooperate in prefectural (Akita) politics and that Ishida too recommended him to enter into discussions with Miki).⁷⁹ He writes that there was no immediate hurry to decide and he wanted to watch the political fluidity inside the party.⁸⁰ Later on he mentions that at a meeting with Sasayama, Furui and Kawasaki, it was decided to continue as the Matsumura group.⁸¹ On 28 October 1968⁸² Sasayama met Miki at Matsumura’s house and was asked for his support in the coming presidential election.⁸³

According to the diarist, Matsumura did not think that highly of Miki. He recognized Miki to be a very good speaker and wanted him to use this ability to further the Japan-China relationship.⁸⁴ Although he was in favour of improved relations between the two countries, Sasayama believed that Miki did not work for it thinking that it would be disadvantageous for his (Miki’s) own advancement in the LDP. Sasayama felt Matsumura was more willing openly to invite criticism from the party and worked hard with Fujiyama for the normalization of relations.

Matsumura criticized Miki’s diplomacy as being unsatisfactory. For instance, at a meeting of former colleagues from the *Kaishintō* on 27 April 1967, Matsumura expressed discontent with Miki’s Asian diplomacy. He stated that it leaned too heavily on economic

cooperation without sufficient emphasis being given to Asia's spiritual unity. It was necessary for Japan, Matsumura maintained, to criticize strongly America's policy towards Vietnam.⁸⁵ Matsumura may have seen Miki as a "Machiavellian" type figure.⁸⁶ It is likely that his pride would not allow him to be positioned under the leadership of the junior politician.

There was never a Matsumura/Miki faction. It would be better to see it as the Miki/Matsumura faction with the older politician as the figurehead, having his own small following. However, the most accurate interpretation would be to view the Matsumura group as a distinct entity having a special semi-permanent relationship with the Miki faction. According to one commentator, Miki was far and away the better political gambler possessing a maturity and adroitness in political planning. He saw Miki's tactics and ability in party scheming to be testimony to his overshadowing of Matsumura.⁸⁷

The five people who, together with Matsumura, left the umbrella of the Miki faction over his recommendation of Satō Eisaku to be Ikeda's successor as prime minister were Saeki Muneyoshi, Kawasaki Hideji, Takeyama Yūtarō, Furui Yoshimi and Sasayama.⁸⁸ From this time, the relationships between Miki and the members of the Matsumura group varied considerably. Probably, it would be wrong to talk of a confrontation between the two principals; the feeling between them was cool.⁸⁹ Ogusu maintained that their relationship could be termed neither good nor bad but rather based on political expediency.⁹⁰ Kawasaki remained in close contact with Miki and continued to attend some meetings of the faction.⁹¹

The Miki Faction and the Satō Regime

The Satō government was a long one; it lasted for 2797 days. During this period the Japanese economy continued to register a high annual growth rate. Japan's GNP

was third behind that of America and the USSR by the late 1960's. In foreign policy there were successes but also failures. Relations with South Korea were normalized and Okinawa reverted to Japanese sovereignty. However, the Cabinet did not seriously address the question of the recognition of China and was taken aback by the announcement of President Nixon's proposed visit to China to take place in February 1972. The government was shocked by economic measures taken by America in August 1971, and was forced to revalue its currency that December.

Credited with the responsibility for having appointed Satō, Miki and his faction were rewarded by the new prime minister. For the first four years of the Satō government the Miki faction was in the mainstream and received ten posts over the four Cabinets. Miki himself served continuously: twice as Minister of International Trade and Industry and twice as Foreign Minister.

Two general elections were held during Satō's premiership, both of which resulted in a tiny increase in the number of faction members in the House of Representatives.⁹² However, while the other factions were successfully recruiting people from the Upper House, very few members of that chamber affiliated with the Miki faction. This was the beginning of a trend which was to see a steady increase in the numerical strengths of all the other major factions while the best the Miki faction could do was to check a fall in membership. There were a number of reasons for this. Factional support and thus affiliation had not been as important for the Councillors as it was for their colleagues in the Lower House. There were periods of six years between elections and then little, if any, competition from within the party because of the fewer candidates returned from each constituency. With increased rivalry among the big factions, the minor ones began to be squeezed out. Pressure was put on the non-affiliated LDP members to become attached. One extremely

powerful Satō faction member, Tanaka Kakuei, was particularly active. The Miki faction, by comparison, did not make a great effort. In addition, other factions were known to be less sparing in the distribution of funds. Many members of the House of Councillors had been senior members of the bureaucracy. For reasons explained elsewhere,⁹³ they were not attracted to the Miki faction. Shigemune Yūzō, Speaker of the House of Councillors, was very close to Prime Minister Satō; by threats and promises to the Upper House members, he was able to appropriate LDP votes for him during presidential elections. As a reward, he could “recommend” members of the House for places in the Satō Cabinet. This served to develop their links with the Satō faction.

Although Miki experienced great difficulty in attracting support from the House of Councillors,⁹⁴ he nevertheless decided to run against Satō for the presidency of the party in 1968, and thus, on 29 October, resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁹⁵ He thought he should not run against Satō while he was in his Cabinet. Miki called on Matsumura at his home to ask for support⁹⁶ which was later promised.⁹⁷ However, the members of his group decided to vote according to their own wishes. Kawasaki was believed to favour Miki but both Furui and Sasayama preferred the third candidate, Maeo,⁹⁸ who had inherited Ikeda’s faction. Miki collected many of the votes from the Nakasone faction,⁹⁹ and beat Maeo into second place by twelve votes. Their joint total of 202, however, was not enough to force Satō into a second ballot; the Prime Minister secured 249 votes. The second and third place candidates had agreed to cooperate beforehand were there to be an opportunity to work together against Satō. However, a senior Maeo faction member, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Tanaka Kakuei operated in the Diet to weaken such an understanding. The personal friendship between these two politicians was henceforth to hurt the Miki faction and its successor, the Kōmoto faction.

In his fight to become party president, Miki presented his policy outline. Among the proposals were the following: Informal discussions should be held with the opposition parties. Obligatory education should begin at five. There should be a comprehensive development plan for housing and the question of setting up a Ministry of Housing should be examined. The Regulation of Money for Political Activities Act¹⁰⁰ should be reformed. The party should not have to depend on the bureaucracy but rather have independent research machinery and possess within itself the ability to draft policy. Economic and cultural interchange between Japan and China should be strengthened.¹⁰¹

Two years later Miki again challenged Satō for the premiership.¹⁰² He said that he wanted to bring about politics where large sums of money were not used, and was in favour of the introduction of a small-size constituency system which would utilize proportional representation.¹⁰³ Again, support from some minor leaders was forthcoming.¹⁰⁴ Sasayama interpreted Matsumura's support as coming from what the latter saw as Miki's seriousness in dealing with the issue of the recognition of China.¹⁰⁵ In the October election Miki received 111 votes to 353 for Satō. During the campaign there had been rumours that Miki was planning the formation of a new party,¹⁰⁶ but it is difficult to say whether he was or not and if so how this influenced the voting.

One victory achieved by Miki during the Satō regime was the dethroning of Shigemune.¹⁰⁷ The opposition to the Upper House Speaker was widespread and so, fearing that their candidate would be defeated in the 1971 election for the Chair, Shigemune's supporters put forward Kiuchi Shirō as the alternative. He had served as Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency under Satō. Miki gave his support to Kōno Kenzō with whom he had a very good relationship;¹⁰⁸ his brother was the late faction leader,

Kōno Ichirō. Backed by the ten or so people in the Miki faction and with the support of the opposition parties, Kōno defeated Kiuchi by 128 votes to 118.

Although he had suffered two defeats Miki did not give up hope of reaching the zenith of the party. Criticizing what he called a “bureaucratic administrative type of government with a bureaucratic micro field of vision”, on 15 September 1971, Miki announced that he would again seek the presidency. In his platform he called for the promotion of friendship between China and Japan with the question of Taiwan being recognised as an internal Chinese problem.¹⁰⁹ In domestic policy he said that there should be a change in emphasis from production to social welfare.¹¹⁰

Miki's bid for power received a boost from his faction's incorporation of the group led by Ishida Hirohide. In September, the Akita politician had attended the Miki faction annual summer study conference¹¹¹ and declared the intention of his group¹¹² to enter the faction. The formal decision to accept Ishida's group was made at a general meeting of the faction on 21 October.¹¹³ Calls were made to Kawasaki and others who had been close to Matsumura to participate once again.¹¹⁴ However, at least one member, Furui, preferred Ōhira to Miki as a candidate for the presidency.¹¹⁵ Ōhira had taken over Maeo's faction.

The result of the presidential election of 5 July 1972 was a victory for Tanaka over Fukuda in the second ballot¹¹⁶ after Miki had given him his support in return for an undertaking to re-establish diplomatic relations with China.¹¹⁷ Coming a poor fourth with but sixty-nine votes was a severe psychological blow for Miki. For the second time a group of Diet members centring on Hayakawa favoured another candidate, and several of them voted for Fukuda. On 8 July at a meeting of the executives of the Miki faction it was decided to ask for the withdrawal of Hayakawa, Kanno and several others - a *de*

facto expulsion. Miki requested that the parting be without slander or criticism on either side.¹¹⁸ The departure of the Hayakawa group together with the defeat of five members in the December 1972 election left the Miki faction with a numerical strength of thirty-six in the Lower House.¹¹⁹

The Dawn of the Miki Regime

The Tanaka administration was given much credit for normalizing relations between Japan and China. In economic policy, however, it ran into serious difficulties. Tanaka's ambitious public-works programme triggered a large jump in land prices; the resulting inflation was later fueled by a huge increase in the price of oil following the 1973 Israeli-Arab war. Tanaka's popularity suffered a further blow after the publication of an article in a respected journal in October 1974 detailing his financial dealings.¹²⁰

Appointed deputy prime minister in the first Tanaka government, Miki was given charge of the Environment Agency later that year and retained both posts until he resigned from the Cabinet. During Tanaka's premiership there were always two Miki faction members in the Cabinet.

The relationship between Miki and Tanaka, never good, was poisoned during the 1974 House of Councillors election. The incumbent in Tokushima, Kujime Kentarō, a member of the Miki faction, was forced to stand as an independent when a Tanaka faction nominee, Gotōda Masaharu, was given official recognition. This constituted a direct threat to Miki's own power base. A particularly dirty election campaign ensued during which, in contravention of party rules, many members of the Miki faction went to the constituency to give speeches in support of Kujime.¹²¹ Gotōda failed in his bid to wrest the seat from him, but later gained election to the Lower House.

In protest at Tanaka's "money politics", which Miki considered to be partly responsible for the erosion of support for the LDP in the Upper House elections, he resigned from the Cabinet on 12 July 1974.¹²² Miki and Fukuda had jointly agreed to give up their posts but, subsequent to Miki's departure, three days elapsed before Fukuda too resigned. Miki was perplexed during this interval and told a confidant that he could not understand what Fukuda was waiting for.¹²³ There were other reasons behind Miki's resignation, the most important being the recognition of an opportunity to strengthen his own position vis-a-vis that of the other factions; timing was very important.

At a general meeting of his faction on 26 July Miki proposed that (i) the posts of president of the party and prime minister be separated, (ii) the president should be elected by the vote of all the party members, and (iii) the prime minister should be chosen by Diet members only. Furthermore, to guard against corruption in the election process, such practices should come under the applicability of the criminal law. Within the faction there was the view that these proposals were unrealistic.¹²⁴ During the final days of the Tanaka regime, Ide was reported as saying that the left wing of the LDP, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the right wing of the Socialist Party were proceeding with a plan to form a new middle-of-the-road party.¹²⁵ Miki denied this¹²⁶ but said that were there an opposition party capable of taking power, it should do so. Miki thought it unfortunate that no such party existed. He referred to his own faction as being anti-mainstream, and believed that with the end of the Tanaka regime, the next prime minister should come from his faction's ranks.¹²⁷

Following the *Bungei Shunjū* article and the general animadversion that came as a later consequence, Tanaka stood down from office in November. The party agreed that

the successor should be chosen by Vice-President Shiina Etsusaburō after a process of *nemawashi*.¹²⁸

Several explanations can be put forward to explain Shiina's choice of Miki.¹²⁹ Of the four candidates, Ōhira and Fukuda were thought to be the strongest in terms of numerical support among members of the Diet; Miki and Nakasone were the two outsiders. Shiina, like Fukuda, had belonged to the Kishi faction but he had then participated in the smaller offshoot led by Kawashima Shōjirō; this had made difficult the relationship between them (Shiina and Fukuda). According to one source, Shiina did not like the character of Ōhira¹³⁰ who, besides, was very close to Tanaka; choosing him would have left Shiina open to the criticism of working to perpetuate the previous regime. At the same time, the rivalry between Ōhira and Fukuda being fierce, choosing one against the other might have caused deep divisions in the party. Nakasone was much younger than the other candidates; selecting him might have drawn criticism from the other faction leaders who would have felt that they had a preferential right. Miki was the most senior of the four, had a reputation for being a clean politician and had criticized the large amounts of money used by the LDP in the Upper House elections earlier that year. There was the threat that he might leave the party - admittedly such rumours had been heard before - and, were he to do so, the LDP might lose its grip on the reins of power. Finally, Miki being the head of a small faction with a weak power base in the party, Shiina may have thought that he himself would be able to direct both the party and government.¹³¹ Shiina announced his decision on 1 December¹³² but may have told Miki earlier, perhaps at their meeting on 26 November.¹³³ Tanaka and Ōhira were unhappy about it but Fukuda and Nakasone accepted the arbitration.¹³⁴ Former Prime Minister Satō called on Tanaka at his residence¹³⁵ and, it is believed, persuaded him to accept the ruling.¹³⁶

The Miki Regime:¹³⁷ The Failure of the Legislative Programme and Diet Management.

Miki appears to have formulated his views on policy after canvassing the opinions of others, many of whom would be invited to his home to discuss the issues. People who were knowledgeable in their fields and whose political philosophy was sympathetic to that of Miki would “continually be walking in and out with a minimum of formality”.¹³⁸

It seems that once Miki took a stand on an issue, it could be changed only by thorough and continual counter-arguments. According to Matsuno Raizō, a senior politician who occupied a major party post during Miki’s premiership, the prime minister would casually give his opinion on an issue to see the reaction, utilizing the opportunity as if it were the rehearsal for a speech. Although Miki would try to persuade the three holders (excluding deputy party president Shiina) of major party posts¹³⁹ over to his way of thinking, he would not enforce his opinion through claiming it to be a right of the occupancy of the premiership. Matsuno characterized Miki as being argumentative - a person who in time could talk anyone round and make use of them through tenacity and persuasion. In conversation with people, Miki adopted the psychological ploy of touching their knee, particularly when trying to convince someone of something.¹⁴⁰ It is not unlikely that Miki hoped he could break down the other’s reservations and bring about a more informal atmosphere.

Miki would take upon himself work and chores that a lesser politician would give to minions or leave undone. It was reported that he spent much time making drafts of speeches and rewriting bureaucratic composition.¹⁴¹ He was extremely fond of the telephone as a means of communication and often would make calls himself rather than ask a secretary to do it for him.¹⁴²

Miki was said to be an avid reader of books on political ethics and parliamentary procedure but not on economic policy.¹⁴³ He often spoke against money politics and in favour of political ethics.¹⁴⁴ He would stress that his faction was a policy group.¹⁴⁵ Regrettably for Miki, his views received an unsympathetic hearing in the Diet. They threatened the *status quo*.

Though prime minister, as head of a small faction that had come to power on the whim of one party elder without the support of an alliance of factions, Miki was in a weak position. Although he refused to compromise on the choice of a Minister of Education - and appointed Nagai Michio, a non-member of the Diet¹⁴⁶ - very few members of the Cabinet came from his own faction. Indeed, since the formation of the LDP, no prime minister had seen fewer of his *kobun* enter it.

Miki was unfortunate with his planned legislation. The LDP was unsympathetic to its progressive stance. The Anti-Monopoly Law, even in an emasculated form, was eventually shelved due to fierce opposition from Dokō Toshio, the chairman of *Keidanren*, and from within his own party. The Regulation of Money for Political Activities Act eventually became law, but in a much weakened form by comparison with that initially envisaged by the prime minister.¹⁴⁷ The amount of money that could be given by an individual or company to a political party or organization in a one-year period was limited and all contributions over a certain amount had to be made public. This was a far cry, however, from Miki's stated desire to abolish political funds from companies within three years.¹⁴⁸ Though introduced by Miki, it was not until after the lifetime of his Cabinet that a two-stage method of electing the party president was implemented: people satisfying the criteria of party member or "party friend"¹⁴⁹ were first of all to vote, and this was to be followed by a run off to be decided by the votes of the LDP Diet members.¹⁵⁰

The Political Funds Control Law aimed to clean up election campaigns.¹⁵¹ For instance, as a principle, there was the intention to prevent donations to constituents from Diet members and candidates for the Diet. Votes could be bought through the practice of “inviting” powerful *kōenkai* members to Tōkyō at the expense of the Diet member who provided the transportation and covered various miscellaneous costs. This was to be stopped. Sending gifts of condolence and funeral wreaths, among other such actions, was to be prohibited. Again, because of opposition within his own party, Miki failed to see the bill passed.

Over a period of time various connections termed *kinmyaku* and *jinmyaku* had developed between the LDP and opposition parties.¹⁵² At a *ryōtei*,¹⁵³ money would be passed under the table, and in return the Diet would proceed smoothly the following day; this was one way the LDP “moved” the Diet. Indeed, the Cabinet had at its disposal funds to be used to this end.

Tanaka and certain of his faction members in particular had developed this process into a fine art, and wished to continue using and building up their own apparatus; they were not prepared to lose this role to another faction.¹⁵⁴ At the same time there was the fear that if this supply of money were stopped, the Diet might come to a standstill. Given this situation, the question was what the Miki faction could do. Miki’s position was very weak. His faction was relatively small, had not won power through the formation of an alliance and, besides, had neither the necessary experience nor connections to manage the Diet. Members of it were unaccomplished at formally associating with fellow LDP Dietmen and were unrefined at managing the party and running the Cabinet. Although prime minister and having an extensive personal network and good relations with many

members of the opposition parties, Miki was too busy to deal with the matter himself.¹⁵⁵ It is also quite likely that he felt a great deal of personal distaste about the process.¹⁵⁶

Ishida Hirohide, given much credit for the creation of the Ishibashi Cabinet, was one member of the Miki faction who was a skilful manipulator behind the scenes. He was acting secretary-general but may have felt constrained by his superior, Nakasone, and so did not concern himself in intra-party manoeuvring.¹⁵⁷ Chief Cabinet Secretary Ide Ichitarō did not possess the character or mentality successfully to engage in such movements. Miki had initially wanted to put as Chief Cabinet Secretary a much trusted middle-ranking member of his faction, Kaifu Toshiki, but backed down on encountering much opposition within his faction, partly on account of Kaifu's lack of seniority for such a position. So Kaifu became Ide's deputy. Kaifu had had experience of being chairman of the Diet Management Committee¹⁵⁸ when Tanaka was premier, and, towards the end of the life of the Miki Cabinet, was to become chairman of the Diet Strategy Committee.¹⁵⁹ As Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kaifu was put in charge of dealing with the opposition parties. He often took lunch together with the members of the LDP Diet Strategy Committee and spent much time seeing members of both the LDP and opposition parties. He himself described his most important work during this period as smoothing relations with Diet members within and without the LDP.¹⁶⁰

Hence managing the Diet had to be left to the other factions and Miki was dependent on their goodwill. All his faction could do was ask for their cooperation. Yet it was incumbent on it to take responsibility. Thus three senior members of the faction, Moriyama Kinji, Niwa Hyōsuke and Mōri Matsuhei were entrusted to perform the necessary tasks. Although they were unable to do anything practical they had to do something, Miki being prime minister. Together and individually they solicited the help and support of

influential members of other factions. The three of them became known as “the bowing trio”;¹⁶¹ instead of passing over money, they would take members of other factions to *ryōtei* and, bowing deeply, ask them to undertake the work for them.¹⁶² Naturally, the “intermediaries” might also expect, and receive, financial remuneration.

Matsuno Raizō of the Fukuda faction, first of all chairman of the PARC and later chairman of the Executive Council, worked hard behind the scenes to strengthen and bolster the Miki regime. Indeed, in so doing he incurred the wrath of his own faction - which he subsequently left. For his part Matsuno felt slighted by Fukuda who had prevented Miki from appointing him as secretary-general in his reshuffled Cabinet in September 1976.¹⁶³

The lack of experience in Diet management and the circumstances under which Miki had come to power - which had caused bad feeling in three of the other factions - proved problematical to Miki in his struggle to secure a position of strength inside the party.¹⁶⁴

The Miki Regime: Confrontation with the Other Factions

It became more and more difficult for Miki to control his party. He had earned the suspicion of many fellow Diet members by attempting to push through legislation that appeared to them to be too reformist. In addition, he often turned first to the opposition parties for cooperation;¹⁶⁵ this might be offered before agreement had been reached inside the LDP. Probably he felt they were more sympathetic! His way of running the party and making policy alienated influential people in the LDP. Miki would often act on his own initiative without looking for support from or indeed informing the appropriate bureaucrats or minister. He was accused of undermining their authority by trying to make policy himself.¹⁶⁶

In February 1976 a financial scandal which broke in America was seen to implicate a number of Japanese politicians. The Lockheed Corporation was said to have paid very

large amounts of money in bribes to facilitate the sale of aircraft in Japan and elsewhere. This affair was to dominate Japanese politics through the remainder of the Miki regime.

In June 1976, giving as a reason what they declared to be corruption inside the party, six members of the LDP including Nishioka Takeo and Yamaguchi Toshio from the Miki faction left to form the New Liberal Club. Other members of the party had been aware of and to varying degrees had been in on the moves leading up to the withdrawal, but when the time came to make the decision they stayed where they were.¹⁶⁷ That a group of LDP members should secede during the regime of a prime minister who was sympathetic to their professed views was a big blow to Miki and further weakened his position. One very prominent politician claimed that Tanaka had given the New Liberal Club money!¹⁶⁸

His ideals and political philosophy being novel for the LDP and his base inside the party extremely weak, Miki lacked the power to push his policies through. In order to bolster his position, the Prime Minister needed a good result for the party at a general election. Miki had considered holding an election early in 1976 and had been recommended to do so by people close to him, not all of whom were in his faction.¹⁶⁹ Finally, however, he decided against it. It is likely that this vacillation was a manifestation of his character. He tended towards circumspection. When an election was held that December, it was the first time since the war that the House of Representatives had run its full term.

The dissatisfaction with Miki inside the party that had existed from the time he became prime minister increased and became manifested in what the press termed the “bring down Miki [campaign]” (*Miki oroshi*).¹⁷⁰ At the beginning of May 1976, Shiina held talks with Tanaka, Ōhira and Fukuda separately and they agreed to ask for Miki’s resignation. Both Ōhira and Fukuda remained strong candidates for the presidency and individually they possessed more power inside the party than Miki. Miki countered by meeting his

adversaries individually and attempting to pacify them while stating categorically that he had no intention of complying with their wishes. On 19 May, Matsuno spoke in support of the Prime Minister criticizing anti-Miki moves inside the party.¹⁷¹ Three days later, at a meeting with junior members of his faction, Fukuda openly expressed doubts about the Miki regime.¹⁷² On 27 July, Tanaka was arrested over his involvement in the Lockheed scandal. Miki was criticized inside the party for failing to act to stop the humiliation. The following month there were further moves to bring down Miki¹⁷³ culminating in the formation of the Council for the Establishment of Party Unity (CEPU)¹⁷⁴ on 19 August which was, in effect, a coalition of the factions working for his resignation. Again Miki met the principals involved. One strategy he had was to ask Ōhira and Fukuda which of them was to take over the premiership; neither of them at this stage was prepared to see the other form a Cabinet first.¹⁷⁵ Miki's position became progressively more precarious.

The CEPU demanded a change of regime before an extraordinary session of the Diet was convened. However, on 10 September, Miki held a Cabinet meeting to decide on a day to convoke the Diet but since he encountered fierce opposition from within his Cabinet, no decision was reached.¹⁷⁶ On the following day, he achieved his aim by going round the Cabinet Ministers in turn; he dismissed those who would not put down their names. On 15 September Miki reshuffled his Cabinet, replacing all but two (Fukuda and Ōhira themselves) of the anti-Miki group.¹⁷⁷ The final attempt to bring down Miki was the decision by the CEPU on 15 October to designate Fukuda as his successor, thus ending the rivalry with Ōhira that Miki had up to that time taken advantage of. An election was held in December resulting in the LDP suffering severe losses. It now held a very slim majority of seats. Miki resigned. It was a divided party which had conducted the campaign and Miki's fall from office had been determined beforehand, whatever the result.¹⁷⁸

Before the dissolution of the Diet, of the 265 Lower House LDP members, 51 were pro-Miki, 157 anti-Miki and the rest unclear. Following the election the figures were 51, 140 and 58 respectively.¹⁷⁹ The Miki faction saw 36 candidates elected.¹⁸⁰

From the Miki to the Kōmoto Faction

There was much dissatisfaction in the faction over the circumstances under which Miki had been forced to resign. Mainly among middle-ranking members, there was talk of seceding from the party.¹⁸¹ By joining the opposition, it was argued, the birth of a regime under Fukuda could be prevented. However, such moves were quashed¹⁸² and there were calls for faction unity under Miki.¹⁸³ At the first general meeting of the faction in 1977, Miki called for the search for a new liberalism and conservatism saying that the era of the LDP possessing an absolute majority was at an end.¹⁸⁴

In response to the call of Prime Minister Fukuda for the dissolution of factions, the Miki faction took a critical line maintaining that there was an inconsistency between speech and behaviour; it said that it did not intend to go along with a “camouflage dissolution”. Having played a leading role in bringing down the Miki government, Fukuda was not trusted.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless with the “dissolution” of the other factions already announced, the merits and demerits of the case were discussed at a general meeting of the Miki faction on 30 March. It was decided that, as an organization, the faction would continue to exist but in the form of a policy research group; a second organization was to be newly inaugurated to study international issues, and the question of attendance being open to all would be examined.¹⁸⁶ This signalled the “demise” of all the recognized factions inside the LDP.¹⁸⁷ On 27 April a new policy group, the Policy Research Association,¹⁸⁸ was formed. In addition to all the former members of the Miki faction “joining”, other people who associated through attendance included Fukuda Tokuyasu, Satō Bunsei and Aoki

Masahisa from the “disbanded” Mizuta faction and Ōishi Senpachi from the “disbanded” Nakasone faction. Although Ide was made chairman, and Miki an adviser, leadership was held by the latter.¹⁸⁹ For a period of time the expression “former ‘X’ faction” was used by some newspapers to describe the supposedly disbanded groupings. However, factional activity as such did not cease - members still congregated in the same offices - and indeed became more intense as the December 1978 presidential election approached.¹⁹⁰ By May there was talk of the revival of the summer study conference, in the Miki faction among others.¹⁹¹

There was uncertainty in the faction over who should stand in the election, Miki or Kōmoto. Although Miki was the leader, the general feeling in the faction was that he had no chance of recovering the premiership. The question of which of the two was more popular was irrelevant. A decision was reached and Kōmoto declared his candidacy on 30 October. The non-faction member Matsuno was one of the twenty Diet members who formally recommended him. This number was laid down by party rules. The three other candidates were Fukuda, Ōhira and Nakasone. A primary election was held in the manner that had been envisaged by Miki.¹⁹² Kōmoto came a poor fourth and Fukuda, as he had promised beforehand, on coming second to Ōhira withdrew his candidacy.

The new prime minister made Kōmoto chairman of the PARC, possibly to mollify him in consideration of moves that may have been afoot centring on the Democratic Socialist Party but also involving the New Liberal Club, the Social Democratic Federation, the *Kōmeitō*, and some members of the Socialist Party who, together with the participation of supporters of Kōmoto inside the LDP, were willing to try to install him as prime minister.¹⁹³ Two other faction members received Cabinet posts. Under Fukuda, the faction had held two Cabinet posts but none of the major party posts.

Following the poor showing by the LDP in the 1979 general election,¹⁹⁴ Fukuda challenged Ōhira for the leadership. Both were put forward by the party for a vote in the Diet. This was unprecedented and displayed clearly the disunity in the LDP. Fukuda received 125 votes with the help of the Miki and Nakasone factions, ten fewer than Ōhira. Having supported the victor, two members left the Miki faction.¹⁹⁵ Pressure began to build up for a change of leadership. Rather than dissatisfaction with Miki there was the feeling that the faction should have at its apex a candidate for the presidency of the party. Kōmoto had run for the post as the representative rather than leader of the faction. This was thought to be anomalous and damaging to his chances.

On 6 February 1980 Kōmoto opened his own office¹⁹⁶ and members of the Miki faction began congregating there.¹⁹⁷ An important figure in the formation of the Kōmoto faction was Shibuya Naozō.¹⁹⁸ According to Ogino, Shibuya did not enjoy an exceptionally close relationship with Kōmoto; rather his attitude was that Miki had been prime minister and that the next attempt to install a member of the faction in that position should be with Kōmoto in mind.¹⁹⁹ To avoid ambiguity, there was the general feeling that Miki should dissolve his faction.

At a general meeting of the faction on 27 June, dissolution was decided upon.²⁰⁰ Later the same day, Kōmoto announced at a press conference that he would take an independent road unshackled from factional restrictions.²⁰¹ The following day some ten members of the “former Miki faction” - including senior members Ide, Shibuya, Kaifu and Noro - gathered at a Tōkyō hotel to be seen to give backing to Kōmoto standing as a presidential candidate.²⁰² As the *Asahi Shimbun* said, the only change was that Kōmoto and not Miki was now the head. In fact Miki had agreed to hand his faction over to Kōmoto.²⁰³

Not all the members of the faction participated immediately. Miki himself did not attend Kōmoto faction meetings or go to Kōmoto's office. Ide too remained aloof and Mori, Miki's brother-in-law, did not fully participate until a later date. He said that he felt no obligation to go.²⁰⁴ This did not signify a shift of support to another faction; rather it was a question of pride. Kōmoto's claim to be independent was a stratagem to attract support from outside the faction. By distancing himself from Miki in word if not deed, Kōmoto was hoping for support from quarters that were distinctly cool towards the former prime minister.²⁰⁵

Kōmoto Toshio and the Fortunes of the Kōmoto Faction, 1980-1987

Born in Aioi City, Hyōgo Prefecture in June 1911, Kōmoto Toshio was Miki's junior by four years. According to a biography,²⁰⁶ Kōmoto was expelled from school for giving an anti-war speech but, with the help of a national politician who had received support from his father, he later entered Nihon University. In an interview, Kōmoto reiterated this story and stressed the effect on his character of having worked for two years as a blue-collar worker before undertaking higher education.

The biography relates that after graduating, Kōmoto became president of a shipping company, *Sankō Kaiun*, in 1937, one year after he began working there and three years after its establishment by his brother-in-law.²⁰⁷ In 1938 the company's name was changed to *Sankō Kisen* (*Sankō Steamship Company*). Precisely how Kōmoto reached such a high position in a very short time remains obscure. His biographer does mention that the company was a very small concern when Kōmoto took the helm.

Kōmoto claimed that, as an extremely successful businessman, he was urged by representatives of some local business interests to stand for election immediately after the

war. He delayed his candidacy until the election of 1949 when he stood successfully for the Democratic Party. Kōmoto said that he did not choose the Liberal Party because his connections in it were not so deep.

Following the break-up of the party, Kōmoto and the other members of the Opposition Faction came together with Miki's PCP. Initially Kōmoto took a low political profile and instead devoted himself to building up the company.²⁰⁸ Over a period of time, as his seniority in the Diet increased, he came to be a major supplier of funds to Miki's faction, and the power that this gave him enabled him to take and retain the position as the natural successor to the leader.

Succession by Kōmoto, though welcomed by many members, was not and indeed could not be a smooth process that would involve no difficulties in redefining the inter-relationships among the members. Senior faction members were entrusted with the task of facilitating the transition. Moriyama was given the most important role, next to Kōmoto, in the management of the organization. In the view of one senior member he was not particularly skilled at reconciling divergent opinions.²⁰⁹ Niwa acted as his assistant and felt that he came to play the role of mediator when disagreements arose between Kōmoto and Moriyama. He stressed that he and Moriyama together devoted themselves to building up the faction.²¹⁰

Meanwhile, the bad will that existed between Fukuda and Ōhira continued into 1980. In May, the opposition presented a motion of non-confidence in the Ōhira government. It was carried unexpectedly due to the abstention of many LDP members from the Miki, Fukuda and recently formed Nakagawa factions. Ōhira died during the resulting election campaign, and the consequent landslide victory of the LDP can be put down partly to a

sympathy vote. A member of his faction, Suzuki Zenkō, was chosen as party president after intra party negotiations.

The Suzuki administration continued until October 1982 and was characterized by weak leadership and a lack of direction, particularly in foreign policy. For the Kōmoto faction it was the continuation of a regime that relied on Tanaka for its support and existence. The disgraced politician had been quickly released following his arrest and, although he later resigned from the LDP, continued to wield power in it by virtue of the numerical strength of his faction. The animosity between his faction and that of Miki continued, notwithstanding the change of leadership. Upon the resignation of Suzuki, four candidates announced their intention to stand for the presidency: Nakasone, Kōmoto, Nakagawa Ichirō and the Fukuda faction representative, Abe Shintarō.

Members of the Kōmoto faction had worked hard to enrol party members and “party friends”. Were one candidate to put up a good showing in a primary election for the party presidency, it was thought that it would be difficult for another strongly to assert his case.²¹¹ It having become necessary for an intending candidate to secure the “recommendation” of fifty Diet members, Kōmoto had to rely on aid from outside his faction. Feelers were put out to some non-affiliated members of the LDP and a few members of other factions in the hope that Kōmoto could run. Fukuda and Nakagawa both wanted there to be a primary election. Like Kōmoto, they thought that this was the most likely way of wresting away influence from Tanaka. By agreeing to “lend” the recommendations of his faction members, Fukuda enabled Nakagawa to stand, and brought about the calling of a primary election.²¹²

On 25 November Nakasone was elected president upon the withdrawal of the other three candidates following their defeat in the primary election. Although he came second

with twenty-eight per cent of the votes cast, Kōmoto did not seek to force a ballot of LDP Diet members given that Nakasone had received more than twice as much support. The result was a shock to the Kōmoto faction which had expected their leader to fare far better. There were reports that many of those eligible to vote neither paid for membership of the party nor filled in themselves the name of their favoured candidate.²¹³

Nakasone became prime minister with Tanaka's help. He proved himself to be a clever tactician inside the LDP and, contrary to expectation, increased his power in the party after Tanaka's stroke. Unlike his predecessor, Nakasone led from the front and undertook a vigorous foreign policy. At home he set up various panels to consider reform in certain areas including education and administrative reform. One failure was his inability to push a sales-tax bill through the Diet. The years of the Nakasone administration were a period of continued opposition inside the LDP by the Kōmoto faction.

Following the dismal showing of the LDP in the December 1983 election, there were moves to depose Nakasone and install Kōmoto as prime minister.²¹⁴ The New Liberal Club, Japan Socialist Party, Democratic Socialist Party and *Kōmeitō* as well as some members of the LDP were involved. The close relationship between Miki and Kōno Yōhei was one link between the faction and the NLC, and played an important role in the negotiations. It provides an illustration of Miki concerning himself in the affairs of the Kōmoto faction. The plan never came to fruition because of various degrees of vacillation by the opposition parties, doubts over the extent of support that Kōmoto could expect from within his faction, and the question of whether or not he would be prepared to leave the LDP and participate in the formation of a new party. With the LDP forming a coalition with the NLC, the intrigue came to an end.²¹⁵

In October and November 1984, the Kōmoto faction was involved in a plot with the Suzuki and Fukuda factions, part of the Tanaka faction, and embracing the Democratic Socialist and *Kōmei* Parties, to make Tanaka faction member Nikaidō Susumu prime minister. With the help of Tanaka himself, however, Nakasone was able to fight off the challenge and was re-elected president of the LDP without there being a potentially divisive vote.²¹⁶ Nikaidō remained vice-president. This episode occurred in spite of an earlier agreement between the Tanaka and Suzuki factions to continue supporting the prime minister.

Kōmoto had been forced to abandon his hope of becoming a candidate in a presidential election, not being able to acquire the votes of the fifty Diet members necessary to support him.²¹⁷ This brought dissatisfaction in the faction to the fore. From the end of the year there were meetings of middle- ranking and junior members together with and encouraged by Kaifu. The formation of the *Sōseikai* inside the Tanaka faction²¹⁸ which was interpreted as a move by Takeshita Noboru to take it over, and problems surrounding the *Sankō* Steamship Company, were factors strengthening the budding movement inside the faction for new leadership.²¹⁹ The unpopularity of Kōmoto inside the party was believed to have kept the faction out of the party mainstream. Some junior members investigated furtively possible moves in anticipation of the faction's dissolution; to counter this an attempt was made by senior members to limit the damage by calling for unity at a meeting²²⁰ which took place on 26 February 1985. It was stressed that the faction was one centred on policy.

On 12 August 1985 Kōmoto resigned from the Cabinet following the bankruptcy of *Sankō Kisen*. Moves behind the scenes to prevent the collapse failed; one involved a faction member holding Cabinet office.²²¹ Although the company's management was said to have passed into the hands of other people, Kōmoto was described in the press as the *de facto*

owner.²²² Indeed one newspaper report mentioned that the 1984 reconstruction plan for the company was refined at Kōmoto's office - not at the headquarters of *Sankō Kisen*.²²³

A group inside the faction including Itō and Kondō wished to put up Kaifu as candidate for leader. Kujiraoka and Sakamoto Misoji among others favoured Miki, seen by some as a father figure who could unite the faction members and give their affiliation a sense of purpose. Through leaving the Cabinet, no longer being viewed as a viable presidential candidate and suffering the embarrassment of the bankruptcy, Kōmoto was seen to be losing what little influence he had in the party.²²⁴ An emergency general meeting of the faction was held on 16 August. According to a press report, without a dissenting voice among the twenty- nine Diet members present, it was agreed that Kōmoto should remain leader.²²⁵

Around this time Miki took a deeper interest in the faction and held frequent discussions with members sympathetic to him. He arranged study seminars (*benkyōkai*) for them, which were given by experts in various fields.²²⁶ These moves were only halted by the stroke which felled Miki on 4 June 1986. This was a blow to the faction. As a former prime minister with nearly fifty years experience as a member of the Diet, Miki was in a unique position to provide useful first-hand information on what was being thought at the highest levels of the party. As an elder and senior advisor (*saikō komon*) in the LDP he would be in regular contact with current and former leaders. This channel was now closed.

In the Cabinet reshuffle on 28 December 1985, the faction retained its two posts, but was excluded from the seven main party posts.²²⁷ This had the effect of cutting it off from information received when the holders met together in council. It was here that many initiatives were taken for managing the party. The Kōmoto faction was further isolated.

In the 1986 election, despite the enormous gains made by the LDP, it was only the Kōmoto faction that was unable to increase substantially its numbers. Indeed, only four new candidates could be attracted to stand under the faction banner, one of whom “inherited” the seat from his father who had just retired, and another being the former secretary of a recently deceased member. Although one person regained his seat and only one faction candidate failed, the faction showed no net gain following the retirement of Katō (whose son-in-law stood as a candidate for a different faction) and of Fujii, and the decision not to stand of Tsuji. No new candidates were elected to the House of Councillors. There was now a much larger differential in numerical strength between the Kōmoto faction on one hand, and the remaining factions taken individually on the other. The faction received a further setback when it lost one of its two Cabinet seats in the reshuffle.

In 1987 an opportunity presented itself for the faction to become part of the mainstream for the first time in eleven years. After five years in office, the last twelve months of which were a “reward” for the LDP’s success in the 1986 elections, Nakasone was to give up the premiership. Four candidates presented themselves as his successor: Takeshita, Abe, Miyazawa Kiichi (who had taken over the Suzuki faction) and Nikaidō Susumu, who was the leader of those Tanaka faction members who did not wish to enter the Takeshita faction.²²⁸ By aligning itself with the Takeshita and Abe factions, thereby bringing into existence an alliance possessing over half the LDP seats in both Houses taken together, the Kōmoto faction hoped that it would be able to play an important part in the next government. However, negotiations between the three factions proved inconclusive. The Kōmoto faction regained a post in the new Takeshita Cabinet formed on 6 November, but did not achieve the pivotal position that it had sought.²²⁹

By the end of the year Kōmoto had tacitly recognized that he was no longer seen as a credible contestant in a future presidential election. Only in extraordinary circumstances would he be called upon to take the leadership of the party. His energies were devoted to the search for potential entrants to his faction and the adoption of a political posture which would commend itself to a puissant faction operating at the centre of the administration. Approaches to his faction members from predators could be deflected by securing for them acceptable government and party posts, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the longer term, a realignment of LDP members - a regrouping brought about by a fissure in at least one other faction - held out most hope for a secure future for the Kōmoto faction.

Conclusion

As a politician, Miki was most successful as the leader of a small party who sought to increase its numbers by union with and incorporation of other minor groupings and disaffected Diet members; he was never comfortable in the LDP. His *modus operandi* was less suited to manoeuvring inside a large party which, in addition, was too conservative for his liking. In the sense that politicians move in a manner consistent with the circumstances, Miki was unskilful. Through his political posture, the faction spent many years in the political wilderness.

Miki was unlucky. On two occasions subsequent to the formation of the party he held the powerful post of secretary-general but on both occasions was to lose it through the resignation, caused by illness, of the prime minister. In particular, he lost a historic opportunity to build up his faction and secure for himself a major position in the party when the Ishibashi regime ended after only two months.

Although Miki could be characterized as an idealist who attached great importance to policies which were on the left of his party, he was also pragmatic and joined Cabinets where the political philosophy of the prime minister was very different from his own. According to one source²³⁰, on a trip to Britain in 1959, Miki was fascinated by the statement of an (unknown) politician who mentioned the adage, "Politics is the Art of Compromise". Miki was a compromiser. He enjoyed strong personal connections with the opposition parties and could act as a bridge between them. It is likely that he himself remained in the LDP only because it had never lost and in the immediate future seemed unlikely to lose its absolute majority in either of the two Houses.

Miki may have come to feel that he would never acquire the presidency of the party. There appeared to be no prospect of him gaining the support of a majority of LDP Diet members. His appointment was unexpected and can be explained partly by the sense of crisis existing in the party after Tanaka's resignation.

His regime lasted for two years, and probably would have been shorter had he not so cleverly played off the other factions against each other. His power base in the LDP was weak; had he called a general election and achieved a good result for his party, his position would have been strengthened.

The change in leadership of the faction did not bring about an improvement in its fortunes. Given the traditional political postures adopted by the faction, its shallow contacts with the other factions, and its weak numerical strength, it was not targeted as a potential coalition partner either as a central pillar, prop or support. Kōmoto was unable to arrest the decline in the position of the faction inside the LDP. While the other factions continued to increase in strength through the incorporation of minor factions and unaffiliated LDP members, there was little that Kōmoto could offer to attract new recruits.

Notes and References

- 1 See, for instance, *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 January 1956.
- 2 Ogata had been Yoshida's successor as leader of the Liberal Party.
- 3 *Ashida Nikki*, *ibid.*, entry for 22 May 1956.
- 4 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 October 1956.
- 5 Miki and Kitamura had similar views on policy but were not close on a personal level. Hino Akira, interview.
- 6 Inaba Osamu, a former member of the Kitamura group, interview.
- 7 Inaba, interview.
- 8 Inaba and Furui Yoshimi, a former member of the Matsumura group, interviews.
- 9 Hirakawa Tokuo, Hino Akira, and Amano Kanzō, interviews. According to Takano Chiyoki, secretary to Miki between March 1953 and 1958, Sakurachi and Nakasone, among others, continued congregating in Miki's office after the dissolution of the *Kaishintō*. The Kitamura group did not have its own office.
- 10 As a student, in 1937 Ishida had gone to Tokushima to help Miki in his election campaign. Ishida Hirohide, *Watakushi No Seikai Shōwa Shi*, Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, 1986, pp.26-29.
- 11 Ishida, *ibid.*, pp.87-89, and Ide Ichitarō, interviewed in *Sekai*, July 1986.
- 12 To this end, a call was made on Matsumura by Diet member Yamamoto Kunekichi on 8 December 1956. *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 December 1956. See also, Hanami, *ibid.*, p.382.
- 13 *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 December 1956.
- 14 *Ibid.*.
- 15 *Ibid.*.
- 16 *Asahi Shimbun*, 25,26 February 1957.
- 17 Watanabe Tsuneo, *Habatsu - Nihon Hoshutō No Kaibō*, Kōbundō, 1958, p.181/182.
- 18 *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 July 1957, and Akagi, interview. Ichimanda Hisato, who entered the Cabinet, was not at the time a member of the Miki faction. President of the Bank of Japan from June 1946 until 1949, he helped Miki and for a while (dates unknown) operated inside his faction. Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 19 This was stressed by all the people interviewed including Hirakawa, Hino, Miki Hirofumi (Miki's son), and Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 20 Miki Mutsuko, Hirakawa, and Mori Yoshihide, interviews.
- 21 *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 June 1958.
- 22 Nadao was not the leader of a faction.
- 23 *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 December 1958.
- 24 Kishi Nobusuke, *et.al.*, *Kishi Nobusuke No Kaisō*, Bungei Shunjū, 1981, p.199.
- 25 This was the term used often by the press at that time.
- 26 Other absentees included Ishibashi and Kōno Ichirō.
- 27 Ide, interviewed in Miki's "in-house" journal, *Seisaku Kenkyū*, autumn 1986.
- 28* The writer is very grateful to Professor Maruyama for answering the questions posed and to Ou Jian Ying, Lecturer in History at Jinan University, China, for asking them on the writer's behalf, while interviewing him on a separate matter.
- 29 Professor Takabatake Michitoshi, Law Faculty, Rikkyō University, interview. Takabatake told the writer that he had been approached unexpectedly. Without prior warning, Miki himself phoned his residence. See also, *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 June 1975. Many other people who were interviewed mentioned Miki's liking for intellectuals.

- 30 Maruyama mentioned that his relationship with Miki began through their wives getting to know each other as fellow members of the parent-teacher association of their children's school. In addition their homes were within easy walking distance.
- 31 *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 May 1960.
- 32 *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 May 1960.
- 33 See, for instance, *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 May, 16, 19 June 1960.
- 34 *Asahi Shimbun*, 23 June 1960.
- 35 A journalist for the *Mainichi Shimbun*, Kaeda Shirō acted as an intermediary between the two politicians. Kaeda, interview.
- 36 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 6, 10 July 1960. The other candidates were Ōno Bamboku, Ikeda Hayato and Ishii Mitsujirō.
- 37 *Asahi Shimbun*, 12 July 1960.
- 38 See Chapter 6.
- 39 The result of the voting was: First Ballot - Ikeda 246, Ishii 196, Fujiyama 49. Second Ballot - Ikeda 302, Ishii 194.
- 40 The Miki/Matsumura faction had put forward the names of both Furui and Shiga. *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 December 1960.
- 41 See Yoshimura Katsumi, *Ikeda Seiken - 1575 Nichi*, Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1985, p.184.
- 42 *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 July 1961. According to Yabe Teiji, Miki declined the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. *Yabe Teiji Nikki*, entry for 17 July 1961.
- 43 *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 July 1962.
- 44 *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 July 1963.
- 45 *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 September 1962.
- 46 *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 October 1963. The question of reforming the electoral system was entrusted to a deliberation council.
- 47 On 19 December 1963 there was a ceremony to dissolve the Miki faction, and it was announced that the New Politics and Economics Research Institute (*Shin Seiji Keizai Kenkyūjo*), the body through which political funds entered the faction, was to be dissolved within the year. *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 December 1963.
- 48 *Asahi Shimbun*, 23 November 1963.
- 49 *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 November 1960.
- 50 Yoshimura, *op. cit.*, pp.271-273.
- 51 According to Ogino Akemi, secretary to Miki, there were some fourteen people in the group. Ogino, interview. Another source estimated that six or seven faction members were anti-Ikeda and would possibly leave it, were Miki to support the prime minister. *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 June 1964.
- 52 This was a reference to the work of the Research Commission which Miki had chaired.
- 53 The signatories were: Ichimanda, Sasamori, Sasayama, Tanikawa, Kanno, Honna, Fujita, Nohara, Moriyama, Mōri, Kitsukawa, Nomoto, Fujii, Hayakawa, Kitaguchi, Ōtaka, Nakamura Torata, Kubo, Nakayama Eiichi, Shibuya and Nukumi. Sune Hisashi, *Fujii Katsushi No Shinzui - Tenka Ni Kisaku Nashi, Shisei Wa Seisaku Ni Yūsen Suru*, Shin Seikei Dōyūkai, 1982, pp.65-69.
- 54 *Yabe Nikki*, *op. cit.*, entry for 29 June 1964. On 1 July, Hayakawa went to see Yabe and told him that fourteen or fifteen people inside the faction were anti-Ikeda.
- 55 *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 June 1964.

- 56 Fujii Katsushi, *Shoshin Ittetsu*, Yūrinsha, 1985, pp.32,33. It is unclear who did vote for Satō. See also, Gotō Motoo, *et.al*, *Sengo Hoshu Seiji No Kiseki*, Iwanami Shoten, 1982, pp.223,224.
- 57 Amano, interview.
- 58 Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 59 Amano and Ogino, interviews. See also, *Seitō To Habatsu*, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1968, pp.32,33.
- 60 Ogino, interview.
- 61 Sometime during the Ikeda regime (the exact date was not recalled) Yoshimura Katsumi, a political journalist, took an American journalist to meet Satō, Ikeda's main political rival, at his office. During the talks, Hayakawa entered Satō's office but, on noticing Yoshimura, quickly withdrew. Yoshimura Katsumi, interview. The implication is that it was embarrassing for the Miki faction member to be seen in the office of another faction leader by someone who was close to Miki.
- 62 See, *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 June 1964.
- 63 According to Fujii, there was a false rumour that he and the others in the group were moving to prevent Ikeda being elected for a third term as president, having received money from another faction. The rumour reached Miki, and for a time served to make awkward the relationship between the two men. Sune, *op. cit.*, pp.67,68. Fujii remained in the Miki faction until his retirement in 1986.
- 64 *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 October 1964.
- 65 *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 October 1964.
- 66 Furui and Kujiraoka Hyōsuke, interviews.
- 67 *Yabe Nikki*, *op. cit.*, entry for 9 November 1964. See also, *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 November 1964.
- 68 Written version of an off-the-record talk given by Miki on 27 November 1974 to the *Hōsō Seiji Kondankai Jimukyoku*.
- 69 For instance, Ōasa Tadao joined the Kishi faction and took with him Noda Takeo, Miyazawa Taneo and others.
- 70 Tagawa Seiichi and Ogusu Masao, interviews. It is not clear to the writer where the funding for Matsumura and his group came from. One member, Saeki Muneyoshi, was exceedingly wealthy and may have provided money for some or all of the others. Saeki's wife maintained that she was unaware whether or not he had given financial support to Matsumura. *Saeki Muneyoshi To Jimintō*, Nihon Jānaru, (date?), p.89. According to Furui, there may have been occasions on which Matsumura took money from Saeki - times when it was "absolutely necessary" - but not many. Furui, interview.
- 71 Furui, Kōmoto Toshio, Kujiraoka Hyōsuke and Hino, interviews.
- 72 The Matsumura group rarely went to Miki's office. Takano, interview.
- 73 Hino, Ogusu, and Furui, interviews.
- 74 Ogusu, interview. These offices had served as the headquarters of the *Kaishintō* and stood on the plot of land where the *Minseitō* had had their office.
- 75 Ogusu and Tagawa, interviews.
- 76 The writer is extremely grateful to Sasayama Tatsuo, son of Shigetarō, for allowing him to copy and quote part of his father's diary.
- 77 Sasayama specified various cases where he felt that he had been poorly treated. He listed Nakamura Torata becoming a committee chairman instead of him, Akazawa

- being recommended to Ikeda for a[n unspecified] post although his name had been mentioned by the prime minister, and, during the Kishi regime, someone else being assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. These, he wrote, were not the only cases. Because, he continued, Miki never put him forward for a ministership, he was not inclined to join the faction. Sasayama Diary, *op. cit.*. After the group separated from the faction, Sasayama remained in close contact with Kujiraoka, Moriyama Kinji and certain other members. Sasayama Tatsuo, interview. The son mentioned that he too had many friends in the Miki faction.
- 78 In the diary, Sasayama wrote of Matsumura giving *aisatsu* when he publicly announced his decision to retire. Among the small group of people present were Fujiyama Aiichirō, Maeo Shigesaburō, Matsumura Shūtarō (referred to as Miki's representative), Tagawa and the four other Matsumura group members.
- 79 In the same entry, Sasayama queried the relationship between Miki and Ishida. Seeing their two factions as one body, he wondered whether their separation was for reasons of political funding.
- 80 The chronology of these later entries is unclear.
- 81 Diary, date unknown. See also *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 September 1971.
- 82 The writer cannot dismiss totally the possibility that this entry related to the 1966 election.
- 83 According to the diary, various political topics were discussed including the theory behind a two conservative party system, and "politics without money".
- 84 Miki was on record as being in favour of an improvement in the Japan-China relationship. For instance, in 1960, at a speech in Ōsaka, while admitting that recognition would not come soon, Miki spoke in favour of an expansion in trade and improvement in fishing rights, postal services and the like - governmental and not just the private agreements that had been made up to that time. *Asahi Shimbun*, 12 April 1960.
- 85 *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 April 1967. Nakasone, Furui and Kitsukawa Kyūe were among those present.
- 86 Sasayama Tatsuo, interview.
- 87 Hanami, *op. cit.*, p.381.
- 88 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 November 1964. Takeyama became Minister of Construction in the Hatoyama Cabinet on Matsumura's recommendation. Hanami, *op. cit.*, p.387. While a bureaucrat in the Ministry of the Interior, Furui was introduced to Matsumura by Katsuta Eikichi, member of the Lower House for Ōsaka # 5, who had invited both of them to dinner to effect an introduction. Katsuta was Councillor in the Ministry under Prime Minister Saitō and Vice-Minister in the first Kōnoe Cabinet. Furui joined the *Kaishintō* partly because of his relationship with Matsumura and partly because he was so advised by Tōkyō University Professor Yabe Teiji with whom he had been at school and university. Yabe had been sympathetic to the views put forward by the People's Cooperative Party, which he believed to be close to socialism. Yabe considered the *Seiyūkai* and its successor, the *Jiyūtō*, to be too conservative. Furui Yoshimi, interview. Sasayama first met Machida Chūji when the latter went to meet and speak to students from his home prefecture of Akita, who were studying in Tōkyō. Sasayama entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and it was here, in 1929, that he first met Matsumura. Sasayama Shigetarō, *Hakuun Kyorai*, Rakuyū Shobō, (date?), pp.125-127. When he entered politics, Sasayama took over the *jiban* of Machida. Sasayama Tatsuo, interview. Kujiraoka was very close to both Miki and

- Matsumura. "I didn't want them to split up. Matsumura was like a father to me and Miki, my school- teacher". Kujiraoka remained in the Miki faction but stayed close to Matsumura. Kujiraoka, interview.
- 89 Hino, interview.
- 90 Ogusu, interview.
- 91 Hino, interview. When Matsumura was close to death in hospital, he was visited by Miki, Kujiraoka and members of the Matsumura group. Other callers included Maeo Shigesaburō (a powerful faction leader), Nakasone (who had taken over most of the Kōno faction), Akagi and Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi, the last of whom, described as a friend of Matsumura from the *Kaishintō*, was said to be ninety-six and nearly bent over double! Sasayama Diary, entries for 20, 21 August. Matsumura did not designate a successor. Kataoka Seiichi, believed by Furui to be acceptable to the *kōenkai*, stood but failed in the 1969 election. Elected was Yoshida Minoru, also standing for the first time; he entered the Miki faction. In 1972 Kataoka took the seat from Yoshida; the latter was elected to the House of Councillors in 1974.
- 92 For instance, as a result of the December 1969 election, thirty-seven people affiliated to the faction were returned, two more than there had been at the time of dissolution.
- 93 See Chapter 6.
- 94 See note 107. Kōno faction affiliates in the Upper House supported Miki. *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 November 1968.
- 95 *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 October 1968.
- 96 Matsumura expressed his unhappiness about both Miki and Maeo standing. He felt they should cooperate. *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 November 1968.
- 97 Having decided to support Miki, Matsumura asked for Maeo's understanding. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 November 1968.
- 98 *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 November 1968.
- 99 Votes were also collected from all the minor factions. See *Asahi Shimbun*, 31 October and 27 November 1968.
- 100 *Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō*.
- 101 *Asahi Shimbun*, 19 November 1968.
- 102 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 September 1970.
- 103 *Asahi Shimbun*, 24 October 1970.
- 104 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 26, 27 September and 1 October 1970. In his diary entry for 28 October, Sasayama recorded being asked by Matsumura to vote for Miki.
- 105 Sasayama Diary, *ibid.*.
- 106 *Asahi Shimbun*, 24 October 1970.
- 107 See Nakamura Keiichirō, *Miki Seiken, 747 Nichi*, Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūsho, 1986, pp.15,16, and *Seitō To Habatsu, op. cit.* pp.110-114. As a journalist for the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Nakamura covered the Miki faction from the time of Sato's presidency. During the Miki regime he was a secretary to the Prime Minister. In 1974, Miki explained his defeats in the presidential elections by relating how the Upper House Speaker controlled some eighty or ninety votes. Miki maintained that his support in the House of Representatives was on a par with that of the other candidates, but Shigemune could control the final result through promising the dispensation of favours. 1974 off-the-record talk, *op. cit.* See also, Miki Takeo, "Kokumin To Kettaku", Shōgen Kōno Kenzō Kankō Iinkai, eds., *Shōgen Kōno Kenzō*, Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1985, pp.67-70.

- 108 Ide, interview.
- 109 *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 September 1971.
- 110 *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 December 1971.
- 111 See Chapter 4.
- 112* Namely, Utsunomiya Tokuma, Chizaki Usaburō, and Yamaguchi Toshio, in addition to Ishida. According to Mori Yoshihide and Miki Mutsuko, Ishida had wanted to form his own faction but lacked the necessary funds.
- 113 *Asahi Shimbun*, 21, 22 October 1971.
- 114 *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 September, 1971.
- 115 Furui, interview.
- 116 In the first ballot the result was: Tanaka 156, Fukuda 150, Ōhira 101 and Miki 69. In the run off election Tanaka garnered 282 votes to 190 for Fukuda.
- 117 Kunihiro Masao, interview. With Kanemaru Shin (a power behind the scenes of the Tanaka and later Takeshita faction) acting as intermediary, Miki and Tanaka met to form an alliance. Kanemaru Shin, in one of a series of articles in the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* under the title, *Watashi No Rirekisho*, (date?).
- 118*
- 119 *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 December 1972.
- 120 Tachibana Takashi, *Tanaka Kakuei Kenkyū: Sono Kinmyaku To Jinmyaku*, Bungei Shunjū, August 1981, pp.92-106.
- 121 See Chapter 6, and *Asahi Shimbun*, 1, 12 July 1974.
- 122 *Asahi Shimbun*, 12 July 1974.
- 123*
- 124 *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 July 1974.
- 125* See *Sekai*, July 1986. One Diet member who played an important role in the discussions was Kasuga Ikkō of the Democratic Socialist Party. *Asahi Shimbun* journalist, interview.
- 126 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 August 1974.
- 127 Miki's off-the-record talk on 27 November 1974, *op. cit.*.
- 128 This means laying the groundwork [for a decision] through consultations behind the scenes.
- 129 Of course the following explanations are based on much speculation, and the true reason or reasons for Shiina's choice may never be known.
- 130*
- 131 Possibly Miki and Shiina first came into contact during the war when Shiina (not elected to the Diet until 1955) was Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Miki served on the Parliamentary Committee. Later, from April 1945, Miki served under Shiina as Parliamentary Councillor of the Ministry of Munitions (the same ministry under a different name). See *Nihon Seiji Nenpō, 1943 edition*, Shōwa Shobō, December 1947, pp.465/6, and *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 April 1945.
- 132 *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 December 1974.
- 133 Miki's off-the-record talk on 27 November 1974. *op. cit.*. See also Yoshimura Tatsumi, *Sōri No Hōgen To Shitsugen*, Santen Shobō, 1986, p.192/3.
- 134 *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 December 1974. There was anger inside the Fukuda faction at Miki being designated prime minister, but Fukuda asked the members to accept the decision saying that it was to be a Miki-Fukuda Cabinet. Matsuno Raizō, *Hoshu Honryū No Shisō To Kōdō*, Asahi Shuppansha, 1985, p.185.

- 135 *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 December 1974.
- 136 Asano, interview. It is worthy of note that it is contrary to normal practice for the senior politician to pay a visit to the junior one. Some time between July 1961 and July 1962, while chairman of the PARC, Tanaka commented that if Miki had a little more appeal - for instance, if by being Speaker of the House he could calmly deal with two or three riotous sessions of the Diet - then there would be an increased mood for him to be a candidate for the party presidency. *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 June 1963. This statement spoke for both Tanaka's view of Miki and what Tanaka saw to be necessary as a requisite for the party's highest post!
- 137 For an analysis by one insider, see Nakamura Keiichirō, *Miki Seiken - 747 Nichi*, Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1981.
- 138 Asano, interview. Many journalists told the writer that there was a constant coming and going of people into the Miki house, where a warm welcome could be relied upon. More generally, people of various backgrounds would often be invited there. This suggests an informality and lack of pretence which was unusual among senior politicians. Several examples can be given: In the immediate postwar years, Miki housed many students from Tokushima Prefecture who were studying in Tōkyō. They lived like part of his family. Asano, *ibid.*. Around the same time, Miki traced his pre-war barber. Miki employed him as his personal barber and brought him to live in his household. His first wife having died, the barber remarried following an introduction by the Miki family who later also employed their two children. The writer first met the gentleman in 1987 at Miki's home, where his first impression was that the ex-barber was in fact an honoured family member or guest rather than an employee! On another occasion when the writer was present, a group of American teenagers whom Miki's daughter had come to know in America were invited for dinner. They were not all aware of whom Miki was nor seemingly was this expected; first name terms were used by all present including Miki's wife.
- 139 Matsuno was referring to Nakasone Yasuhiro, Nadao and himself who held the three main party posts. Initially not on close terms with Miki, Matsuno formed a close relationship with him to the extent that he lost the trust and earned the enmity of his own (Fukuda) faction by working to keep him in power after Fukuda had taken part in moves to bring him down.
- 140 Kurosawa Yō, Vice-President of the Industrial Bank of Japan, private communication, 25 February 1988, and Takabatake Michio, interview, among others.
- 141 Asano, interview, and *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 June 1975.
- 142 *Asahi Shimbun* 8 June 1975; Takabatake and Ōkubo, interviews.
- 143 Shinohara Hajime, former professor at Tōkyō University, interview.
- 144 It may have been an Australian newspaper that first attached the tag "clean Miki" to the politician at the time he resigned from the Tanaka Cabinet. *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 June 1975. Bandō Kazuo felt that Miki had integrity and did not try to make money from politics.
- 145 Miki had long maintained this. See, for instance, *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 July 1960.
- 146 Nagai's father had been a member of the pre-war House of Representatives who was close to Matsumura, Tsurumi Yūsuke, and some other people who later on found themselves in the same party as Miki.
- 147 The Bill passed the House of Councillors on the deciding vote of the Speaker, Kōno Kenzō, after a tie. See Miki, "Kokumin To Kettaku", *op. cit.*.

- 148 See Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p.44.
- 149 They were, *tōin* and *tōyū* respectively.
- 150 See J.A.A. Stockwin, *Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy*, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 2nd edition 1982, pp.127-129.
- 151 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 April 1975.
- 152 See Chapter 7 for a definition of these terms.
- 153 *Ibid.*.
- 154* *Asahi Shimbun* journalist, interview, and Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p.169.
- 155 Miki did make an effort to garner support. For instance, he was reported as having met Maeo and Kōno, Speakers of the Lower and Upper House respectively, to ask for their cooperation in riding through the Diet Session. *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 May 1976.
- 156 According to Sakamoto Misoji, Miki was against money going to the opposition parties through the Diet Strategy Committee.
- 157 From the time of the Miki regime, with few exceptions, the post of secretary-general was given to a Diet member of a faction different from that of the prime minister. It gave to the occupier a crucial role at the centre of party management, the course of which he could determine. The secretary-general was able to alter the character of the party. He counselled the president and executed party affairs. He held great power over the distribution of money inside the party and influence over the giving of official recognition to election candidates. Miki's power was weakened considerably through not controlling the post. He himself had been secretary-general under both Ishibashi and Ikeda on two of the very few previous occasions the holder did not belong to the prime minister's faction. Unfortunately for him and his faction, he never held the post in the LDP immediately prior to a general election campaign.
- 158 In 1988, this committee met twice a week but, in addition, issues were thrashed out continually in small groups of as few as two or three people. Ōshima Tadamori, personal communication.
- 159 Kaifu's predecessor as Diet Strategy Committee Chairman was Uno Sōsuke of the Nakasone faction. Ōhira faction member Tazawa Kichirō occupied the chair of the Diet Management Committee.
- 160 Kaifu's other work in the post consisted of coordinating policy and contacts between ministries, receiving various people as the official representative of the prime minister, and helping and when necessary deputizing for Ide. Kaifu Toshiki, interview.
- 161 *Ojigi Sannin Shū*
- 162 During the middle of May 1975, for instance, on separate days the Nakasone, Ōhira and Tanaka factions were entertained. *Asahi Shimbun*, 19, 23 May 1975. Niwa Hyōsuke related how he went to see Secretary-General Nakasone every day and received his sympathy for the time and work he was putting in. Niwa, interview.
- 163* See Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p.49, and Matsuno, *op. cit.*, pp.262,263,281-283. According to one journalist close to both the Fukuda faction and Matsuno, the latter, in an attempt at revenge, worked hard behind the scenes to bring down Fukuda after he was elected as Miki's successor.
- 164 The writer had fruitful discussions with many people about the problems Miki encountered including: Niwa Hyōsuke, Kaifu Toshiki, Sakamoto Misoji, Nakamura Keiichirō, Ogino Akemi and Takeuchi Ken. See also Kōno Kenzō, *Gichō Ichidai - Kōno Kenzō Kaisōki*, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1978.
- 165 Nakamura, *op. cit.*, pp.52, 66-70.

- 166*
- 167 They included Sakamoto Misoji, Suganami Shigeru and Shionoya Kazuo of the Miki faction. For a detailed discussion by a participant of the events leading to the formation of the NLC, see Tagawa Seiichi, *Dokumento Jimindattō*, Tokuma Shoten, 1983.
- 168*
- 169 For instance, see Kōno, *op. cit.*, p.108. Kōmoto and Kunihiro were both in favour. Kunihiro, interview.
- 170 The verb “*orosu*” means: to bring down, to relieve [someone] of [his] position. For this section see Gotō, *et.al.*, *op. cit.*, 1982, p.303.
- 171 *Asahi Shimbun*, 19 May 1976.
- 172 *Asahi Shimbun*, 23 May 1976.
- 173 For instance, one Judge Kito, purporting to be the Attorney-General, made a telephone call to Miki in the hope that he would compromise himself over his posture concerning the involvement of Nakasone and prosecution of Tanaka in the Lockheed scandal. See, for example, Higuchi Tsuneo, *Tamaki Kazuo No Yuigon*, Asuka Shinsa, 1987, pp.156-197.
- 174 *Kyotō Taisei Kakuritsu Kyōgikai*.
- 175 Miki related this story to Gerald Curtis, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, who told the writer.
- 176 Of the twenty Cabinet Members, fifteen belonged to the CEPU. *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 December 1986. See also, Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p.269.
- 177 Miki convened the Diet with the participation of the anti-Miki group by compromising with them and agreeing not to dissolve the Diet. There was dissatisfaction over this in his faction and the feeling that a good opportunity had been lost. Nakamura, *ibid.* pp.279/280.
- 178 Writing in the *Asahi Shimbun* on 17 December 1976, Akagi Munenori gave his explanation for Miki’s fall from power. According to him, one cause was the legislation Miki sought to have enacted. Akagi characterized Miki as having a “touch of the intellectual” about him and “lacking boldness and resolution”. He felt that Miki had a weak Cabinet, unable to do anything, because the prime minister neither dissolved the Diet in order to hold a general election nor faced an open presidential election. Akagi asserted that Miki “had no general appeal” because he was chosen by Shiina and others through “secret room *genro* politics”. In an interview, Miki’s Minister of Justice, Inaba Osamu, claimed that Miki’s problems began in earnest with the Lockheed Affair.
- 179 The last set of figures does not include the unaffiliated candidates who later joined the party. *Asahi Shimbun*, 12 December 1972.
- 180 *Ibid.*
- 181* Using the offices of the New Liberal Club, the Miki faction held talks with the Democratic Socialist Party and *Kōmeitō* in the hope of forming a “middle-of-the-road” party. However, the plan came to nothing, partly because the *Kōmeitō* was very closely connected to the Tanaka faction. Middle-ranking former Miki faction member, interview. Matsuno attended a meeting of the Miki faction on 9 February 1977 at which he spoke in favour of a coalition. *Asahi Shimbun*, (date?).
- 182 *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 December 1976.
- 183 *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 December 1976.

- 184 *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 January 1977.
- 185 *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 March 1977
- 186 *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 March 1977.
- 187 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 April 1977.
- 188 *Seisaku Kenkyūkai*.
- 189 *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 April 1977.
- 190 See, for instance, *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 January 1978.
- 191 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 June 1978. The previous year, faction *kenshūkai* had not taken place.
- 192 See note 150.
- 193 See, for instance, Nakamura Keiichirō, *Kōmoto Toshio - Zenjinzō*, Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūsho, 1982, pp.204/206. Nakamura questioned the seriousness of these moves.
- 194 Only one of the ten candidates standing for the Miki faction for the first time was elected. *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 October 1979.
- 195 Chizaki Usaburō and Shionoya Kazuo. Six members of the Nakasone faction also voted for Ōhira. Nakamura, 747 *Nichi*, *op. cit.*, p.334.
- 196 Nakamura, *Kōmoto*, *op. cit.*, p.264.
- 197 Ogino Akemi, interview.
- 198 Ogino and Miki Mutsuko, interviews.
- 199 Ogino, interview.
- 200 There had been a meeting of the executives three days earlier but no conclusion had been reached. *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 June 1980.
- 201 *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 June 1980.
- 202 *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 June 1980. The newspaper referred to the group as the “Kōmoto support faction” (*Kōmoto Shijiha*).
- 203* A very senior faction member told a confidant of Miki that Kōmoto was visibly nervous at the meeting of the Miki faction where dissolution was to be announced. Apparently it was tantamount to declaring Kōmoto to be the successor as leader. Not all the details of the process leading up to the change of leadership are known. Ogino Akemi admitted that there was certain information he could not provide. There may have been a financial element; the writer does not know. Kōmoto himself shed no light on the episode when interviewed.
- 204 Mori said that he was not keen on going, thinking that it would not be the place for him. He felt that the atmosphere was very different to that of the Miki faction and, moreover, to his chagrin, this had been accepted by many of the senior members. It was some time before he felt comfortable in the Kōmoto faction. Mori, interview.
- 205 *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 June 1980.
- 206 Nakamura, *Kōmoto*, *op. cit.*.
- 207 *Ibid.*, pp.60-62.
- 208 Hino and Kaeda, interview. Both journalists covered the *Kaishintō*. In the *Ashida Nikki*, Kōmoto is described as naive with respect to the main thread of politics. Entry for 20 June 1957, *op. cit.*.
- 209*
- 210 Niwa, interview.
- 211 Four candidates had to present themselves in order for there to be a primary election. See also, *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 November 1981, 14 September 1982.
- 212 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 14,16 September 1982.

- 213 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 November 1982.
- 214 With twenty-eight Lower House members, the Kōmoto faction showed a net loss of two.
- 215 For a participant's account, see Tagawa Seiichi, *Tagawa Nikki - Jimintō Ittō Shihai Ga Kuzureta Gekidō No Yōkakan*, Goma Shobō, 1984.
- 216 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 October 1984 and *Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, Tanaka Shihai To Sono Hōkai*, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1987, pp.112-198.
- 217 In attempting to find fifty supporters, among others Kōmoto looked towards members of the Diet who were elected from Hyōgo Prefecture and also those whose alma mater was Nihon University, *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 September 1984.
- 218 Not initially admitted by the participants to be a faction in the making, the *Sōseikai* was founded on 7 February 1985. *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 February 1985.
- 219 *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 March 1985.
- 220 Kujiraoka and Niwa were two of the senior members. *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 March 1985.
- 221 The writer heard unsubstantiated rumours that, among other people, Takeshita and Kanemaru were involved in the attempt to prevent the bankruptcy of the company. Yamashita Tokuo, Minister of Transport and Kōmoto faction member, in the hope of propping up the company made representations to various bodies, but his requests to bank executives for a continuation of financing were not met. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 14 August 1985. Yamashita was criticised for his involvement as both Minister and faction member. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 11 June 1985.
- 222 *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 August 1985.
- 223 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 14 August 1985.
- 224 *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 August 1985.
- 225 Current, former and potential members of the faction attended the meeting. Kōmoto himself left the room during the discussions. *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 August 1985.
- 226* See *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 August 1985, and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 2 September 1985. Just before he suffered a stroke, Miki met invited faction members at the resort of Karuizawa. Some of the people present, unhappy at Kōmoto drawing closer to Takeshita, discussed breaking away from the faction. Junior faction member, interview. Initially only a few people were expected to attend, but several others including Kondō and Shiga, on discovering that a meeting was to take place, asked to participate. Confidant of Miki, interview.
- 227 The seven posts were secretary-general, chairman of the PARC, chairman of the Executive Council, chairmen of the Finance, National Organization and Public Relations Committees and chairman of the National Campaign Headquarters.
- 228 A few Tanaka faction members joined neither grouping.
- 229 See Chapter 6.
- 230 Asano, interview.

Chapter 4

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE KŌMOTO FACTION

Introduction

Existing outside and independent of the formal machinery of the LDP, factions in the name of their leaders, set up, inherit or take over an organization whose *raison d'être* is to further the aims of the Diet members who belong. Inside the headquarters which are bought by, rented to, or provided for the use of the faction,¹ the staff are employed by and owe their prime allegiance to the faction leader or faction organization as a whole, the case varying according to the faction involved.

Kōmoto Toshio opened his own office on 6 February 1980, on the top floor of an office building which, like that of Miki, was close to the National Diet. This was some four months before he officially took over the Miki faction and signified notification of his intention to do so. By starting afresh in a different location with administrative staff who were all his own rather than received in succession from his predecessor, it was hoped that the faction would immediately be seen to have its own character reflecting the personality and character of the new leader. At the same time, but no longer serving as the headquarters of a faction, Miki's office building continued to be used as the centre for his research institute and private political office.

Central Organization

In addition to being referred to as the faction of the leader, all such organizations inside the LDP had grand titles intended to persuade the observer that they were societies

or research groups pursuing serious study. It was at the general meeting of the Kōmoto faction on 3 December 1981 that a formal name, New Policy Research Society, hereinafter NPRS, was decided on.² A hierarchical structure was set up giving titles and functions to senior members who, in their respective capacities were expected to promote the faction's interests inside the party. These titles and the people filling them changed with new circumstances in the faction.³ Shown in figure 4.1 are the titles that were allotted to faction members at an executives meeting on 10 November 1987; at that time a major relabelling took place in order to create new posts, show all members to be participating in the decision-making processes and bring the faction into line with all the others.⁴ Some liberty has been taken in the translation to reflect more accurately the work the holders undertook and the descriptions below relate to the situation existing in the faction at that time.

The NPRS was the name of the organization under which Kōmoto and his staff planned and executed political actions. Its power was derived from its strength in the LDP and, with this in mind, work was undertaken for and help was given to faction members to maintain and solidify a sense of unity. The right of its members to visit and use the NPRS headquarters was inseparable from their belonging to the Kōmoto faction. Many faction meetings and business relating to the faction were conducted in a setting where the participants were, in effect, Kōmoto's guests. Within the NPRS headquarters, there were implicit constraints on members in their actions and words.⁵

At the top, by definition, was Kōmoto. His personal staff ran the organization from the private suite of offices which served as its headquarters, its sole address. Inside the complex, Kōmoto had a private office and a private secretary. No other faction member

Figure 4.1 The Structure of the NPRS on 10 November 1987 (based on material provided by the Kōmoto office)

New Policy Research Society

Advisers-----Miki Takeo (19)
 -----Akagi Munenori (15)

Chairman-----Kōmoto Toshio (15)

Vice-Chairman and Chairman proxy-----Niwa Hyōsuke (11)

Meeting Chairperson and Chairman proxy-----Kaifu Toshiki (10)

Executives---Kujiraoka Hyōsuke (9), Itō Sōichirō (9), Sakamoto Misoji (8)
 Tanikawa Kazuo (8), Fujimoto Takao (8), Mori Yoshihide (7),
 Yamashita Tokuo (7), Kondō Tetsuo (7), Hatsumura Takiichirō (4*)

General Manager-----Sakamoto Misoji

Assistants-----Shiga Setsu (6)
 -----Sakamoto Chikao (1+3*)

Comprehensive Planning Coordinator---Yamashita Tokuo

Deputy Coordinator---Kitagawa Ishimatsu (5)

Researchers-----Usui Hideo (3)

-----Kita Shūji (2*)

Assistants-----Matsuda Kurō (2)

-----Ōshima Tadamori (2)

-----Hozumi Yoshiyuki (1)

-----Ide Shōichi (1)

-----Moriyama Mayumi (2*)

Policy Coordinator---Kondō Tetsuo

Deputy Coordinator---Kudō Iwao (4)

Researchers---Kōmura Masahiko (3)

---Iwasaki Junzō (2*)

Assistants---Noro Akihiko (2)

---Kōnoike Yoshitada (1)

---Murakami Seiichirō (1)

---Ishii Ichiji (1*)

Note: The figures in brackets refer to the number of times the Diet member had been elected. A star (*) signifies election to the House of Councillors.

had the right to such accommodation or staff although, with Kōmoto's approval, an office was on occasion used by one for an *ad hoc* purpose.

In all matters concerning the NPRS the final decision and responsibility were those of Kōmoto although, and depending of course on the particular question, some or all members of the faction might be consulted. Beneath Kōmoto were the senior and ordinary executives of the organization. Within the faction, seniority rose together with length of service in the Diet, usually defined by the number of times elected.⁶ However, seniority was not synonymous with importance in the running of the faction.

Members were officially (and thus publicly) ordered in correspondence to the number of times they had been elected, but internal cognition of the ordering was different. Determining factors that were taken into account included: year first elected, *jinmyaku*, ability to supply funds, personality, number and level of party, government and Diet posts held together with an evaluation of the quality and quantity of work done while in office, and intellectual ability. Diet members who joined the faction late in their political career were ranked with difficulty. They were unwilling to be put behind faction members first elected on a later occasion, yet likely to incur the anger of some of them if given precedence. Their entry could harm intra-faction relations.⁷ There was no wondrous mathematical formula that could use this input to derive rank in terms of an absolute value. Changing circumstances outside and beyond the control of the faction could affect the power balance. For convenience and simplicity the faction members and the roles and functions they performed in the faction will be given according to the official order of the former.

Immediately after Kōmoto came Niwa Hyōsuke who, for this reason, occupied the post of vice-chairman. Tenure gave him the right officially to represent the faction on ceremonial occasions, at parties and other times when Kōmoto was unable to attend and where form in

the sense of physical presence and not substance by way of negotiations or discussions was required. Naturally, the significance of the meeting and the level of representation from other factions may have disqualified Niwa from being an acceptable alternative. Politeness, custom or expectation sometimes necessitated Kōmoto's attendance. This post was not intrinsically powerful nor did it signify influence; there was no question, for instance, of Niwa being seen inside or outside the faction as Kōmoto's successor by virtue of his official position in it. Rather it displayed the fact that with the exception of the two advisers and the leader himself, no other member had been elected so many times. Unlike Kaifu, Niwa had no work in the capacity of chairman proxy.⁸ Given its importance, this title served to maintain the appearance of Niwa's influential power in faction decision-making through equating it with seniority.

Returned to the Diet on one fewer occasion than Niwa and jointly occupying the position of chairman proxy was Kaifu Toshiki. He possessed those character traits which, in the eyes of others, marked him out as a leader of men and attracted the funds necessary for him to build up a following of his own. In addition, having been taken under the wing of Miki before he was elected for the first time, Kaifu had been able to draw on the experience of the former prime minister and avail himself of much of his information. Unlike Niwa, Kaifu was active as chairman proxy; in formal and informal talks with senior party officials, other factions, opposition parties, and indeed other bodies and individuals, he could and did officially represent the faction, his large circle of close contacts and display of outward charm being seen as advantageous in bargaining positions. That he shared an alma mater with Takeshita Noboru (who became prime minister in late 1987), and was thought in the political world to be on good and close terms with him was another important factor. Kaifu was articulate, acknowledged to be very strong in debate and maintained a high

public profile. Being extremely presentable, possessing youthful good looks, wearing a continual smile and dressing well (known to draw attention to his clothes by wearing only polka dot ties), Kaifu was able to project successfully his personality nationally with the help of the mass media, particularly television, which had labelled him as a possible future prime minister. This in turn helped him become one of very few members able to attract new people to stand under the Kōmoto faction banner. In view of this, Kōmoto gave him the very important role of seeking out suitable people to run in elections. Candidates found by Kaifu would have a personal link with him, more so perhaps than with Kōmoto, and were anticipated to remain with him were he to form his own faction.

Particularly among the junior members and indeed the press, Kaifu was seen to be “number two” in the faction.⁹ In the hope if not belief that it would stimulate the growth of the faction, there was the demand from within that he be officially accorded a suitable title so that his importance would be recognized universally. Kaifu’s high profile in the faction was partly a result of that pressure. Much of the work Kaifu did for the faction was with the consideration that he might benefit directly in the future. In addition to his work as chairman proxy, Kaifu presided over general meetings of the faction in his capacity as meeting chairperson.

The ordinary executives of the NPRS comprised all those people junior to Kaifu who had held a Cabinet post at least once.¹⁰ Together with the most senior members of the faction and one or two others they played an important role in decision- making. As a group, they were expected to find and cultivate potentially powerful successors to faction members about to retire and new candidates in constituencies where, at least for some time, there had been no faction representation. The executives had to discuss and examine

LDP policy; they were expected to come up with their own thoughts and proposals which would be put to the party.

One executive, Tanikawa Kazuo, described his function in the faction as being watchful, aiding his seniors, listening to the anguish and aspirations of juniors, and making an effort to solve all problems put before him in the knowledge that the people at the bottom as well as those at the top had anxieties. The junior members had to keep in close contact with their constituencies, returning frequently in order to maintain their support. With committee work and other such obligations they were often kept in Tōkyō. Tanikawa was asked to assist them; he was, for instance, requested to provide a contact or introduce someone who could furnish the contact for a junior politician who had been asked by an influential constituent to look into a particular project but who himself lacked the necessary connection at the highest level in Tōkyō. Again, the junior members may have wanted more time and opportunities to study policy, and expected assistance from Tanikawa who might have been in a position to provide the opening.¹¹

Three members of the executive, Sakamoto, Kondō and Yamashita, had specific functions, clearly defined. As was the case with Kaifu, not only seniority but in addition personality and experience were important factors that had been considered before the major posts were allocated.

The responsibilities of the general manager covered a wide area. His work embraced all faction affairs, particularly important ones such as the making of policy, the preparation and running of election campaigns and funding. He was the official "window" to the other factions, getting together with his counterparts when the need arose possibly to discuss party strategy but more often simply to exchange views. Of course, all the members of the faction had their own contacts in the other factions and could on occasion utilize them,

but this was separate from the work of the general manager who was in charge of all official arrangements and negotiations. For instance, all the general managers met from time to time during the 1987 presidential election when they would smooth and regulate inter-factional dealings. During this period and as an example of the extent of his authority, on one occasion Sakamoto Misoji, the general manager of the Kōmoto faction,¹² contacted a junior member asking that either he or a colleague refrain from attending the fund-raising party of a Takeshita faction member; the Kōmoto faction wished to send no more but no fewer of its members of all ranks to the event than had turned up for a similar function for someone from the Abe faction a week earlier.¹³ Kōmoto wanted to make a coalition of the three factions, and sought to avoid any action of his members being interpreted as overtly favouring the premiership going to one of the two leaders at the expense of the other.

Sakamoto watched over the election machines of the faction candidates; sufficient and appropriate support had to be given to build up and maintain their strength in the constituencies. In particular much time was put aside for the junior members. Support had to be given to the extent that the constituency was seen to be secured. Between elections the general manager would be asked to arrange events in members' constituencies. For instance, a Cabinet minister from the NPRS might be requested to give a talk to a fellow member's *kōenkai*.

The secretary-general of the LDP or the person possessing power in the relevant area could be approached by Sakamoto on behalf of a faction member desiring placement in a particular ministry as vice-minister, as chairman of a standing committee or perhaps director of a Policy Affairs Research Council division. Arrangements for members fund-raising parties were in the hands of the general manager although the degree of help offered and given varied depending on the seniority of the faction member and indeed whether


or not he requested assistance. Faction work could be delegated by Sakamoto; he was more likely to fulfil this role than Kōmoto who had to spend more time dealing with inter-factional affairs. Sakamoto spoke of the existence of a gap between the senior and junior members of the faction, a divide partly explained by the difference in seniority and experience. He saw part of his role as providing a bridge, relating the feeling of those at the bottom to the upper levels of the NPRS.¹⁴ Together with the late Moriyama Kinji, Sakamoto would hold continual discussions with junior members “helping them where we can”.¹⁵

Much of the work for the faction carried out by Sakamoto was allocated to him in recognition of his personality and character; his tone of voice and mannerisms to some extent made him the natural candidate to play the role of peacemaker inside the faction.¹⁶ Such qualities also put him forth as the person best qualified to take care of the funeral arrangements of late members. The faction acted to help the bereaved by taking upon itself part of this function and responsibility. In this sense a corollary can be drawn with a company losing an employee. Together, Kaifu and Sakamoto were responsible for the overall operation of the faction although it was usually in the name of the post held jointly by Niwa and Kaifu that, for instance, communications were sent out informing members of the date of the next general meeting or dinner for “one-term” faction members.

In allocating positions in the NPRS, a question that immediately arose was where to put Shiga Setsu and Sakamoto Chikao, the two members who according to relative seniority were next in line for their first Cabinet posts. They were under pressure to put much time and effort into faction affairs in order both to convince the leader that they deserved recommendation and to repay him for it. Although at one time Kōmoto considered placing one each under Yamashita and Kondō in their respective posts, they

were finally put directly under Sakamoto Misoji, that being less problematical.¹⁷ There was the danger of their “special position” being obscured if they were grouped with the most junior members. As a name *jimu sōjichō*¹⁸ was chosen but anything would have been acceptable.¹⁹

In setting up a structure for the organization, the first thing that was decided was the following relationship:²⁰



While Sakamoto was to be in overall charge, the junior members were to be listed under two people with Cabinet experience in the hope that they would have passed on to them the benefits of the knowledge thus acquired. Previously they had expressed dissatisfaction over having no role to play in the formation of policy; now they were to be given more possibilities of making their voices heard. Kondō and Yamashita were chosen to head the groups because of their characters, qualifications by way of career and the further asset of being closest in seniority.

Kondō, former Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency and one of the few members who had had a career as a bureaucrat, was responsible for and worked with Kōmoto in drawing up the economic policy the faction advocated. The field of study was decided by obtaining a broad consensus among the members. As the coordinator, Kondō distributed a description of the projects to consider and delegated the work to be done. A junior member or members would be asked to investigate a particular problem; a group was formed, a leader chosen, the issue considered and all junior members finally came together to discuss it in a 'brain storming' session with Kondō taking the chair. A report was made with the suggestions presented under the names of the people involved in the

study. Whether the ideas came from the senior or junior members (in both cases Kondō was able to put them forward at a executives' meeting) the policy coordinator considered, sometimes refined and then processed them, finally passing them on to Kōmoto.

By operating in this manner, the faction hoped to gain recognition and cultivate an image as a policy group from within and without the LDP. Kōmoto put great emphasis on economic policy. He took steps to involve more faction members in the decision-making process, thereby hoping to bring their names to public notice. It was hoped that a higher profile would help them when they sought re-election.

The other group of junior politicians was headed by Yamashita Tokuo who had served in the Cabinet twice, once as Minister of Transport and once as Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office. Yamashita saw his role as working to strengthen the organization of the faction and maintain its unity. He was responsible for comprehensive planning, coordinated with Kōmoto on organizational matters, and assisted the general manager in running the faction. At the centre of his work was the search for and implementation of an effective policy to encourage prospective candidates to stand for his faction, and not another, at elections. To increase its voice in the party, to have its policies adopted and to strengthen its position, a sharp increase in the faction's numerical strength was the *sine qua non*. Together with Kaifu, Yamashita actively worked to attract recruits. For instance, early in 1988 Yamashita, Kōmoto, Kaifu and Sakamoto were busy looking for a suitable and acceptable candidate to succeed the late Ōnishi Masao. Yamashita was also entrusted with the task of discovering who was in a "dangerous position" during an election campaign and apportioning how much support in the shape of speeches and money²¹ should go where. Viewed by many of his peers as an extremely capable politician with close links to some of the other factions and powerful members thereof, Yamashita

appeared to be in a position of great strength inside the faction; this was enhanced by his role in funding faction members.²²

Although matters of policy were the domain of Kondō, and more general matters, particularly those relating to strategy, were dealt with by Yamashita, the division of all the junior members into one of the two groups had no significant meaning. According to one member, it was little more than public relations. Nevertheless, both groups were planning to go through the motions.

Holders of Cabinet posts were often, for the duration of their occupancy, excused from some faction duties. Thus Kaifu was reinstated as chairman proxy after his tenure was interrupted while he was Minister of Education.²³

The influence Miki had in the Kōmoto faction was not by virtue of him holding the post of adviser. Both he and Akagi had entered the Diet before Kōmoto and neither had been returned on fewer occasions. The nomenclature used was no more than recognition of this. As their junior and quite independent of the special link existing between Miki and the faction, Kōmoto out of courtesy would listen to them. He was not, however, for this reason bound by their wishes.

Faction Meetings

There were two regular formal occasions when strategy was discussed and information exchanged: the executives meeting and the general meeting.²⁴

In addition to members with experience of Cabinet office, the faction representatives on the Diet Management and Strategy Committees and one representative of the junior members were invited to take part in the executives meeting.²⁵ In the second and third cases, on vacating the committee post the right of attendance was lost. Qualifications for

attendance were not, however, inflexible; other people were invited to attend on occasion. A meeting took place on average once a week. When the Diet was in session, members met in a room in the Diet complex; when it was not, they came together at the NPRS office. The only reason for this was convenience. For instance, members busy with committee work would lose valuable time travelling through central Tōkyō.

All important matters would be discussed when this body met. As the highest decision-making body in the faction, policy, party issues and all other business were more intensively discussed here than in the general meeting. Kōmoto, who sat in on the meetings, would receive prepared and considered reports from Kondō on policy proposals that came up during the course of the discussions. The numerical weakness of the faction being uppermost in the minds of many members, particularly the more junior, much time was given to dealing with this problem. At the meeting that took place during the final week of November 1987, for instance, an important topic on the agenda was to discuss strategy for a forthcoming visit by some executives to the late Ōnishi Masao's constituency to find a successor.²⁶


Once a week all faction members gathered together for the general meeting irrespective of status²⁷ to provide and exchange information, discuss policy²⁸ and faction matters, and to make any comments they deemed relevant. Extraordinary meetings were called if a situation arose in the Diet, government, party or faction that required urgent and immediate action.²⁹ Former members who had lost their seats and people planning to stand for the first time were entitled to and did occasionally participate. They possessed the right to speak.

General Meeting of 17 February 1988

In order that it did not impinge upon participants' later commitments at the Diet, and with the writer in attendance, the general meeting opened a little after eight in the morning in the boardroom of the NPRS headquarters. Members had turned up separately and Kōmoto himself, who had been closeted in his own private office from very early that morning, made his appearance just before it was to be called to order. As shown in figure 4.2, the seating arrangement was dictated by seniority, the changing of seats sometimes becoming necessary to accommodate late arrivals.³⁰ Kōmoto sat at the head of the table; the nearer a member was to him, the higher his status. Junior members left empty chairs between themselves and middle-ranking members notwithstanding the fact that there were absentees. Not only the relative but also the absolute location of a member appeared to be important. Some of the members who were unable to attend were represented by their secretaries. Two of Kōmoto's secretaries sat in on the meeting and others were on call.

In their respective capacities as a deputy secretary-general, deputy chairman of the Executive Council and director of the Diet Management Committee, Tanikawa, Kujiraoka and Ōshima reported in that order. Next on the agenda were drafts of proposed revisions to bills to be presented before the Diet. These were dealt with summarily; clearly the meeting was not the place they were to be examined, discussed or minutely scrutinized. A handout giving details of a party for leading professional and amateur figures in the world of sport, to be hosted by the prime minister with wide media coverage, was then discussed at length. All business on the agenda being completed, members present were invited to bring up any matter they wished to discuss. Noro took the opportunity to put forward passionately his views on revision of one Diet custom,³¹ and asked for the faction to come out with an unequivocal statement declaring its position. Other members of the

Figure 4.2 The Seating Arrangement at the General Meeting of 17 February 1988



Key: Hatsumura \times Hatsumura's place at the table

x_{i2}
 $i=1,2$

Kōmoto's secretaries

x_{2i}
 $i=1-4,6-8$

secretaries representing Diet members unable to attend

x_{25}

the writer

faction expressed their views but finally Kaifu, as chairman, told Noro that he should raise the matter with the policy coordinator. Several other questions were brought up and opinions expressed on various issues but none were dwelt on,³² and Kaifu who had opened, led and directed the meeting, brought it to a close after about forty minutes. As the meeting chairman, it was his responsibility to bring all discussions to a satisfactory conclusion. Kōmoto, who had been present from beginning to end, played no active part in the meeting, remaining silent throughout, which was quite common.³³

Pressing work forced one member to leave while the meeting was in progress. A heavy schedule prevented several members from attending, but they nevertheless made brief appearances in Kōmoto's office earlier the same morning. It was not attendance itself which was of overriding importance but rather the ritual of showing one's face. Having no right to make a statement on anything but a totally non-controversial matter,³⁴ because of the problem of responsibility and authorization, secretaries did not possess the right to speak. Although they were able to pass on important and useful information they could not take over the role of showing regard for and consideration towards Kōmoto and the NPRS by displaying belonging, loyalty and respect through presenting themselves publicly at the office. There were meetings of the faction to which secretaries were not admitted. If the member himself was unable to attend then he went unrepresented.

Although formal, the mood of the meeting was relaxed and not without humour. The senior members of the faction neither monopolized nor attempted to monopolize the content or direction of the proceedings. All members, notwithstanding relative rank, were invited to express their thoughts and opinions; some did so. There was, however, reticence on the part of many junior members to raise points or engage freely in open discussion. Consciousness of occupying a lower rung on the ladder with a concomitant reserve to

participate actively in a group meeting is, however, by no means peculiar to Japanese culture. At the same time, no matters of substance or confidentiality were discussed let alone decided upon; the general meeting was more a means of providing information rather than an organ of decision-making.³⁵ Nevertheless, it was an opportunity for every member to hear and be heard.

Outside of the meeting itself the occasion gave faction members an excellent opportunity to discuss a matter with Kōmoto and his staff and indeed to speak with each other. Who came to see Kōmoto and the length of the time they were given depended on the problem and its urgency. A question might have been asked relating to the general meeting about to take place; it could have been a constituency matter for instance, Kōmoto's presence being requested at an important meeting of the *kōenkai* or a request for him to give a speech. Kōmoto himself might have requested a meeting, possibly to discuss some aspects of the faction's affairs with an executive.³⁶ He could be seen, preferably by appointment, on some other occasions but the morning of the general meeting presented an easier and often mutually convenient opportunity for a confidential discussion.

The number of attenders at a general meeting hovered at around nineteen.³⁷ Faction members holding major party and Cabinet posts were usually too busy to attend. Miki never attended Kōmoto faction meetings and one or two senior politicians rarely attended. Akagi was usually represented by a secretary, his advanced age making him less mobile. Some members, particularly the more senior ones, felt that regular attendance would be injurious to their pride. One junior member frequently absented himself. He felt that he was too busy to attend what he saw as a meaningless meeting, the people present tuning their talk to the company. He believed that political strategy should be discussed, and was critical of what he described as an inconsequential chit-chat over a joint breakfast.³⁸

Regular non-attendance at the general meeting was frowned upon in the Kōmoto office and would not be appreciated by Kōmoto. However, faction members had to be dealt with gingerly if firmly to maintain the internal unity of the faction, and so despite their disfavour, Kōmoto and his staff were circumspect about making absence itself a major issue.

If an election was in the offing or an important policy or personal matter was to be discussed, the press, informed beforehand, would wait in the lounge for a press conference or statement to be made by the faction following the general meeting. Sakamoto or Kaifu would act as spokesman.

Other Meetings

In addition to the general meeting which was attended by members of both Houses, when the Diet was in session, members of the House of Councillors came together about once a month (irregular intervals otherwise) to go over what had been happening during the proceedings, discuss policy and plan strategy. Kōmoto and Sakamoto were usually present at the talks which commonly took place in a private room within a restaurant. As the senior member in the House of Councillors, Hatsumura was responsible for collating, considering and presenting material that was to be on the agenda.

All faction members also came together for study group meetings³⁹ held under its auspices. Lectures given by speakers covered a wide range of fields and were not restricted to political and economic matters. Among those invited to give talks would be academics, journalists and bureaucrats who had links with the faction or its members. These meetings were irregular but could be held at least once a week particularly if they related to a topical

question. Attendance was optional; people interested in the subject would turn up. For instance, a talk on agriculture would draw more people than one on the environment.

There were numerous other occasions when members of the faction came to Kōmoto's office; problems concerning *kōenkai* and money were not infrequent. The junior members in particular worried about maintaining support in their constituencies. Through their experience and position, Kōmoto and his staff were able to assist, providing speakers, money, and support in other forms if necessary. Kōmoto might be asked for advice or help from a member who had been approached by a pressure group. The pressure group itself might desire a direct introduction to Kōmoto. In any matter the member considered important, Kōmoto could be and often was approached. Details would be sorted out by the secretaries.

Kōmoto would call into his office, groups of members or individual members with whom he wished to discuss faction affairs. Those called might relate information provided by contacts inside and outside the party; they might be called upon to set up a meeting between Kōmoto and someone else - at the instigation of either side. Although not necessarily secret, neither the substance nor indeed the existence of the talks would inevitably be conveyed to other members.

Faction members holding major party and Cabinet posts would keep Kōmoto briefed on their work and related events. This would be done not only to provide information but also as a courtesy to him. For instance, members occupying posts on the Diet Strategy Committee would report to Kōmoto on what was happening there, and on the talks taking place with the opposition parties. Although this could be conveyed by telephone, given the nature and importance of the negotiations, usually it was thought best to meet and discuss moves at length. One question that often arose was whether or not a proposed plan of the

faction had appeal to the electorate, party, government or prime minister. Again prior to and on his return from a trip to the USA as one of a group of LDP members accompanying the prime minister, Ōshima made a call at Kōmoto's office both as a matter of courtesy and to report on the visit. In addition, Kōmoto would receive calls from faction members giving thanks for such things as help offered, posts received, and consideration given.

Kōmoto received members of the faction in his office but would very rarely pay a call on them, such an action being open to the interpretation that his superior position had been compromised. Of course there were informal occasions when Kōmoto got together with faction members: a "mutual congratulation" party following a general election, and one to welcome the New Year being just two examples. From time to time, subgroups of members came together. For instance, as a single group, everyone elected between one and three times would be invited to Kōmoto's apartment.⁴⁰ The four "one-term" members on more than one occasion had taken a meal at the Kōmoto home; once, the opportunity was taken by the faction leader to relate a history of the faction.⁴¹


On very few occasions would members of other factions go to Kōmoto's office. Making such a call would not have been unlike a LDP member visiting the headquarters of the Socialist Party. The attitude of the Kōmoto office was that there would be no problem over faction members paying rare visits to the office of another faction as long as it did not become a regular occurrence.⁴² Diet members often congregated in their faction headquarters when an important pronouncement was awaited and the hour was such that they would otherwise be away from the Diet complex. This was the case, for instance, on the night of 9 October 1987 when Nakasone was due to declare the name of his chosen successor as prime minister.

Contacting Faction Members

The routes of ordinary communication between Kōmoto's office and faction members are shown in figure 4.3. Many man-hours would have been wasted and much time consumed if Kōmoto's staff had had to contact all faction members individually. To circumvent this, the NPRS office passed on information and requests through the offices of eight members. The same channels were used for information originating in the general manager's office. As is immediately apparent, these were chosen neither because of the seniority nor the positions held within the organization by the eight Diet members concerned. Rather, the practical consideration of convenience of the location of the Diet office was the sole criterion. This network was used for most non-confidential communication coming from Kōmoto's office. Thus, for instance, a message would be relayed stating that a faction meeting was to take place at such and such a time. Faction literature passed through the network would include printed matter on policy, one example being a paper by the policy coordinator presenting what he regarded to be necessary fiscal measures to deal with the economy. Articles written by Kōmoto himself were distributed from time to time. Not all literature would emanate from the faction; LDP-issued material was also distributed. The NPRS office often acquired various papers from the LDP headquarters earlier than did the faction members who were sent the information under separate cover. In such cases, two copies would be received by the Diet members: one direct from the LDP and the other, a little quicker, from Kōmoto's staff. Basically, as soon as Kōmoto's office received material from the LDP, it was sent on. The faction did not in any form regularly publish its views for the files of its members, the general public, or anyone else.

FIGURE 4.3

The Network of the Kōmoto Faction Official Internal Lines of Communication



Note: room numbers are underneath names

based on material provided by the Kōmoto office

Comparison with the Miyazawa Faction (*Kōchikai*)

Unlike the New Policy Research Society, the *Kōchikai* was not the personal vehicle of its leader. The name itself came from a Chinese poem and was chosen for Ikeda Hayato's personal *kōenkai* in June 1957. It was later retained for successor factions. Both Ikeda and Satō Eisaku had been members of the *Heishinkai*⁴³, the faction or grouping inside the Liberal Party that centred on Yoshida Shigeru and which later split into separate factions led by the two junior politicians.

The staff of the *Kōchikai* worked for the organization as opposed to the leader. Thus, for instance, the non-Diet member director-general⁴⁴ of the faction who had overall responsibility for its office affairs had been a personal secretary to Ikeda.

The faction's office had remained in the same place since the time of Yoshida's leadership. Photographs of all former leaders (Ikeda, Maeo, Ōhira and Suzuki) adorned the walls of the boardroom. Like the Kōmoto faction, there were general meetings and executives meetings but, due to its large size, there were also separate meetings for members of the two Houses and for Lower House members of different levels of seniority; the latter was divided into those for people who had been elected from one to three, four to six and over seven times. Junior members were welcome to speak freely but tended to feel inhibited from doing so. The attendance of people who intended to fight to recover a lost seat was permitted. A secretary could listen in on meetings in place of the member but had no right to participate actively.

Senior members of the *Kōchikai* were given positions in the organization just as were those in the Kōmoto faction. In addition and contradistinction, everyone belonged to one of five faction committees: policy, general affairs, financial affairs, organization, and public relations and publicity. Some people belonged to more than one committee, all of which

were headed by a senior member of the Lower House with a deputy from the House of Councillors.⁴⁵

As in the Kōmoto faction, responsibility for important matters such as policy and contacts with other factions was allotted to members according to their seniority, experience and ability. Information was passed from the faction to its members through an identical system to that existing in the Kōmoto faction; without regard to seniority but according to the room number in the Diet office building in which the faction member could be found, communication from the *Kōchikai* office was through a representative for every two floors. The arrangements the faction made for study group meetings and fundraising parties for its members were similar to those in the Kōmoto faction. The *Kōchikai* took great pride in its history and had published two hardback pictorial books relating the history of the faction after twenty-five and thirty years.⁴⁶

The *Tsuitachikai*

All the secretaries to current members of the Kōmoto faction automatically belonged to and constituted the *Tsuitachikai*, the work of which was normally directed from Kōmoto's office. The aims of the association were, in addition to facilitating the carrying out of duties to both the individual Diet member and the faction as a whole, the encouraging of mutual friendship and cementing of the union of the secretaries.

Within the *Tsuitachikai*, posts were allotted according to character, ability, qualification and to a lesser extent seniority, the last of which was more difficult to define than in the case of the faction members. Taken into account was the individual secretary's length of service under the current and former Diet members, his ranking among the secretaries

in his office, the nature of his work, and the status of his employer. It was not clear, for instance, whether the secretary with highest status of a faction member elected twice should be placed above the third-ranked secretary of an eight times elected member. Posts set out in the rules of association were those of: president (*kaichō*), vice-president (*fuku kaichō*), treasurer (*kaikei*), office-work coordinator (*jimu kyokuchō*), *kanji* and *kaikei kansa*, the latter two being titles rather than positions of substance. It was therein stated that the president, who was elected for office at a general meeting, designated fellow secretaries for the other posts. In fact, all the posts including that of president were generally decided by *nemawashi*. The president convened and presided over meetings of the whole association and meetings of its officers; he was assisted in this by his deputies who could stand in for him in his absence. The treasurer, by definition, administered the accounts, and the office-work coordinator the general business. These were the main posts, the others being little more than titles. They were usually held for a period of one year but there was no rule or custom debarring someone from being reappointed. Work could be entrusted to the advisors (*komon*) - secretaries who had previously held the post of president - or secretaries who possessed experience of dealing with certain matters or situations. Frequently, such people were asked for advice and help in making sure things ran smoothly.⁴⁷ Sub-committees and special committees were set up if and when deemed necessary. Among others there had been on occasion a sub-committee for general affairs, publicity, and one to look after the interests of the wives of the Diet members.

Meetings of the *Tsuitachikai* were irregular but there were social events such as a year-end party and annual vacation when members would come together as a group. They would also gather to hold a party for a secretary who was about to retire or change employment. If they so wished, persons who had worked as secretaries to retired and recently deceased

members of the faction could continue to belong, as could secretaries to members who had lost their seats. In the first two cases, by actively keeping up their contacts inside the faction, such people could be offered work by another member of the faction often on the introduction of one of his secretaries. An example was Kōmoto Tsutomu (no relation), formerly secretary to Fujii Katsushi, who on the Diet's members retirement obtained employment under Niwa Hyōsuke. In the other case, the secretary could continue to act as a conduit of information between the faction and the former member thereof who was working to recover his seat. Irrespective of the fortunes of the candidate, when an election took place, as long as he was recommended by the faction, his secretaries were welcome to participate fully in the *Tsuitachikai*. In practice, as may be expected with the passing of time, ties weakened between the *Tsuitachikai* and the individual secretary to a former member of the faction, who might be less and less willing to give of his time and indeed eventually not be called upon to help. Given the fact that a secretary's initial link to the faction was through the membership of one Diet member, this was inevitable.

Not surprisingly, secretaries to Kōmoto played a central role in the *Tsuitachikai* but by no means ran it. In the summer of 1988 the president was a secretary to Kita Shūji; one year earlier it had been a secretary to Ōshima Tadamori.

To cover miscellaneous expenses, each secretary paid five thousand yen yearly to the association. All members of the *Tsuitachikai* possessed a register of names, addresses and private telephone numbers of all other members. Through working together and sharing the hardships and joys of the faction's fortunes many friendships sprang up among the secretaries. After a fund-raising party or evening faction meeting it was not unusual for a group of *Tsuitachikai* members to go to a bar or discotheque together. Furthermore, it being occasionally necessary to watch one's talk in the company of people affiliated to

other political groupings, *ceteris paribus*, a feeling of comradeship was less likely to occur towards the secretary of another faction.

Kōmoto's staff

Kōmoto himself had seventeen secretaries: ten in Tōkyō and seven in his constituency in Hyōgo prefecture.⁴⁸ In Tōkyō, the work was split up between the secretaries according to their respective abilities, personalities and sometimes contacts. Important work consisted of developing and maintaining good relationships with companies and individuals who were able and willing to provide political funds found neither in Hyōgo nor neighbouring Ōsaka. It was also essential to keep in close contact with various government ministries, private organizations and other bodies. Initial approaches were made by both sides.

One secretary looked after the finance of the faction, and another Kōmoto's schedule. There were staff who ensured the smooth running of his office (and his Diet office) and a person responsible for contacts with the press and general publicity. There were no secretaries who specifically worked on the making of policy. When the need arose, "outside" people were asked for advice or brought in. They included bureaucrats and academics who would often have had a close connection to the faction or member of it over a period of time and could be trusted to be discreet.

In Hyōgo most of the work was involved with elections not just that of Kōmoto but also of those local politicians close to him - and the *kōenkai*. Even the secretaries in Tōkyō would, by and large, have come from Hyōgo. They could deal more authoritatively with questions relating to the situation in the constituency and often would be treated more courteously by many of the visitors from the prefecture who came to Kōmoto's office. Secretaries from the constituency were believed to give a better impression to Hyōgo

people and help Kōmoto's popularity. Some secretaries were taken from the *kōenkai* and some were "put forward" by relatives, friends, and acquaintances who held important or influential positions in it.⁴⁹ Many of the students employed temporarily and part-time also tended to come from Kōmoto's constituency; not a few of them would be students at Nihon University - Kōmoto's alma mater.

The Organization of Miki's Office⁵⁰

Up to the time of Miki's death, his office building served the function of housing a research institute dedicated to examining questions of public interest and reporting on them both in position papers and a journal regularly published under the ex-prime minister's sponsorship. A section served as the headquarters of his faction and continued to be utilized as the office from which his political activity was determined and directed.

Before the war, unlike today, members of the Diet did not have their own personal offices provided for them by the State. A few, however, were able to work from rooms they had rented or bought. Miki's first office was located in the Imperial Hotel. Its purpose, however, was *ad hoc* - to serve as the headquarters for the planning of the welcome to be given to and events for the crew of the American warship which brought back the remains of ex-Ambassador Saitō. Once the ceremonies had been completed, this office was closed down. During the war Miki was able to utilize part of a building owned by the company *Aji no Moto*.⁵¹ From 1944, he worked from rooms laid aside for his use by his father-in-law whose company had taken over office space in Jōchi University.

The second floor of a building opposite Shinbashi Station served as Miki's next address, where he moved in 1946,⁵² but the following year saw him in the Jōnan Building in Toranomōn, shared with the pharmaceutical concern Ōtsuka Seiyaku. Miki then

bought the plot of land on which the People's Cooperative Party were to locate their headquarters,⁵³ he himself having a private office within the complex.⁵⁴ His office remained where it was after the party joined with the Democratic Party (Opposition Faction) and moved to Nishi Shinbashi occupying the former headquarters of the *Minseitō*.⁵⁵ It was not until 1962 that Miki moved from this address in Akasaka⁵⁶ to Roku Banchō, another location close to the Diet, where his office was still to be found at the time of his death. It was rebuilt on the same site and completed in 1987⁵⁷ with the upper floors let to outside concerns. Within Miki's office suite there was a boardroom, a large lecture room, four or five small rooms suitable for a tête-à-tête, an office for administrative staff and a private one for Miki, a small library and a small self-contained flat, in addition to a large open office for Miki's "Central Policy Research Institute".

Formally known as the Association of Like-Minded People on Policy,⁵⁸ the institute was run by an office manager.⁵⁹ One person who occupied this post was Hirakawa Tokuo who, having lost his seat in the House of Representatives in 1953, began working for Miki a year or so later. He was responsible not only for editing and overseeing the publication of the institute's journal, but also for organizing the annual Study Group Meeting in Karuizawa.⁶⁰ Originally this was not an occasion for the members of the faction to invite supporters for a free "semi-holiday"; rather the Diet members would gather together with a group of academics to discuss various issues of national interest.⁶¹ In addition to the three or four permanent staff working with Hirakawa, the same number of part-timers often employees from *Tōkyō Denryoku*,⁶² *Tōkyō Jidōsha* or other companies that provided funds for Miki - would sometimes come to give a helping hand.

Scholars and people known as authorities on relevant fields often took up invitations to go to Miki's office to discuss an issue with the politician and his staff. According to one

source, Miki was never satisfied with what he heard - no matter who the advisors were - and would ask for yet more experts and opinions.⁶³ Apparently, this was a cause of some worry at his institute, and not infrequently the staff themselves, rather than Miki, made policy. The person interviewed maintained further that often it was very difficult to get Miki to put his name to a document.

Not surprisingly, the subjects covered and the political slant in the approach taken for articles published in Miki's journal, "Central Policy" (*Chūō Seisaku*), were sympathetic to Miki's political philosophy. Issues examined were not limited to topics at the forefront of public debate. Over the previous thirty years, frequent writings were to be found on: foreign policy towards Asia particularly China, the world economy, health and welfare, education, and political ethics. Contributors included members of the faction and Diet members close to Miki, even those who belonged to other parties and factions.⁶⁴ Academics, industrialists, educators and journalists were also regularly invited to write articles. The first issue of the journal was published not later than in 1955.⁶⁵ Frequency of publication varied: between June 1963 and December 1965 it was monthly, but in other periods there were as few as two and as many as six issues a year. In 1987 it was being distributed quarterly.⁶⁶

About once a month, lectures were held at the institute's office. Speakers were found from the same group of people who contributed to Miki's journal. Attendance was by invitation but people sympathetic to Miki's way of thinking were often welcome to attend.⁶⁷ Former members of and advisers to Miki's faction with a particularly close relationship to the ex- prime minister were welcome to use his offices for business or confidential discussions; a few did. Among others, former Miki faction members Itō Gorō and Kitagawa Ishimatsu and advisor Kunihiro Masao habitually availed themselves of the facilities.⁶⁸

Before Miki was felled by a stroke, former faction members close to and trusted by him often congregated in his office to consult on political strategy; this was quite independent of discussions held in the Kōmoto faction to which some of the participants still belonged. What was said and by whom would not be repeated to Kōmoto. For instance, on 3 March 1986 following the ground-breaking ceremony for the new office building to be erected for Miki's institute, a group of current and former faction members took lunch with Miki. The situation prevailing in the Kōmoto faction was discussed openly; some of the members present were extremely critical of Kōmoto's leadership.⁶⁹ Certain people, of whom one was Kaifu, were privy to much information coming in and going out of Miki's office. In return, they acted as informers and conveyors of happenings in the national political arena.

There was a good and special relationship between Miki's staff and those of Kōmoto, whose office was less than fifteen minutes walk away. However, it was largely based on the political history which linked the two men through their successive leadership of a faction, rather than on a particularly close friendship between them. Miki's office was a totally independent body operating in what it saw to be the best interests of Miki Takeo, which may or may not have coincided with those of Kōmoto. It did not act for, on behalf of, or in place of the NPRS nor did its work supplement it. As the office of a very senior LDP member who had reached the pinnacle of his career and handed over his faction to someone else, it provided an unaffected and relaxed atmosphere for the people able to take advantage of it.

In addition to Miki and Kōmoto, certain other faction members possessed their own offices. Utilized for the political and private affairs of the Diet member concerned, they were independent of the faction and its organization and provided both more space and a greater sense of intimacy than was to be found in the allocated Diet office.

The Faction Study Conference

An opportunity for the faction to publicize itself, while providing the opportunity for its members to be seen to thank members of their respective *kōenkai* for support received, was the faction annual study conference. In common with all other factions, and continuing the tradition of its predecessor, the Kōmoto faction held a conference every summer in a resort hotel. All members had to attend and at their expense could invite a number of supporters to participate in the two-and-a-half-day event. Figure 4.4 shows the attendance record of faction members at the 1987 conference. Kita was excused by Kōmoto from attendance on the grounds of having urgent work.⁷⁰ All other members, with the sole exception of Miki who was in hospital, made an appearance on both days. In particular, the vast majority of junior members and those not in possession of a seat made a display of loyalty by remaining in the hotel from the beginning to the end of the conference.

By tradition, both the lectures given and accommodation provided were in a particular hotel, in the resort town of Hakone. The faction members had their own rooms or shared with one other; guests were as many as eight to a room but did not share accommodation with people belonging to other constituencies. Indeed, the conference offered the Diet members an important opportunity to be seen and heard by *kōenkai* members. The groups tended to sit as separate units during the lectures, keep to themselves during the intervals and take breakfast, lunch and dinner sitting with their member of the faction. In the evenings, the Diet members were often to be found drinking in the supporters' room. There was little interest in socializing with other guests or indeed displaying faction consciousness. Rather, links with one's own constituency group were stressed. Not only the Diet member but also his secretaries paid close attention to the comfort of guests, who

FIGURE 4.4

Attendance Record of Current, Former and Prospective Kōmoto
Faction Members at the 1987 Faction Annual Study Conference

(Members of the House of Representatives)	September 5th		September 6th	
	DAY	OVERNIGHT	DAY	OVERNIGHT
Miki	-	-	-	-
Akagi	x	-	-	-
Kōmoto	x	-	x	-
Niwa	x	x	x	x
Kaifu	x	-	x	-
Ōnishi	x	x	x	x
Kujiraoka	x	-	x	-
Itō	x	x	x	x
Sakamoto	x	x	x	x
Tanikawa	x	x	x	x
Fujimoto	x	-	x	-
Mori	x	-	x	-
Yamashita	x	-	x	-
Kondō	x	-	x	-
Shiga	x	-	x	-
Kitagawa	x	-	x	-
Kudō	x	x	x	-
Usui	x	x	x	x
Kōmura	x	x	x	x
Matsuda	x	x	x	x
Noro	x	-	x	x
Ōshima	x	x	x	x
Hozumi	x	x	x	x
Ide	x	x	x	x
Kōnoike	x	x	x	x
Murakami	x	x	x	x
<hr/>				
(Members of the House of Councillors)				
Hatsumura	x	x	x	-
Sakamoto	x	x	x	x
Iwasaki	x	x	x	-
Kita	-	-	-	-
Moriyama	x	x	x	x
Ishii	x	x	x	x
<hr/>				
(Former Members)				
Hashiguchi	x	-	x	-
Nishiyama	x	x	x	x
<hr/>				
(Prospective Members)				
Otsuji	x	x	x	x
Niita	x	x	x	x

attended not to hear the speeches but rather be seen and photographed with the person they sent to the Diet.

Of the two hundred and fifty-eight guests at the 1986 conference, many worked in the agricultural and commercial sectors; the self-employed and housewives were well-represented and there were a significant number of members of municipal and other local assemblies. Kōmoto's group was by far the largest, comprised of thirty-four people. There was a party of ten with Matsuda, and in no other case was this number exceeded; five or six was the norm.

In both 1986 and 1987 the speakers were from academia, industry, business, journalism and the arts. In several cases they had had links with the faction for many years. The journalist Nakamura Keiichirō, for instance, had worked as a secretary to Miki when he was prime minister.

The final lecture was delivered by Kōmoto. This was very much the highlight of the conference with the content of the speech dealing mainly with Kōmoto's cherished economic policies and his views on the whereabouts of his faction in the party. In 1987 in particular, this one speech was well attended by representatives from television and the press who hoped to hear Kōmoto declare his strategy, if not position, for the presidential election later that year. They were to be disappointed. A year earlier Kōmoto had used the opportunity to criticize Prime Minister Nakasone. He had called for the founding of a regime which unlike earlier ones, he said, could deal with the problems with which Japan was confronted. The conference presented an opportunity for Kōmoto to make a major speech which was likely to be widely reported.

Immediately prior to the first lecture, all faction members already present were introduced to the guests; those arriving subsequently were similarly made known on the first

suitable occasion. Throughout the lecture series, the Diet members sat in the front row of the hall with the five most senior placed at a right angle to everybody else. Miki Mutsuko attended in place of her husband. Taking the chair for the lectures were the seven most junior members to be found in the House of Representatives.

Whenever they had opportunities to make statements to the people assembled, the faction members made public declarations of confidence in and support for Kōmoto's leadership. This was a way of ingratiating themselves with and, possibly, encouraging him. In a passionate speech in 1987, Miki Mutsuko extolled Kōmoto's virtues. Kōmoto, in return, referred to and praised the spirit and philosophy of his *sempai*, Miki. This served to reinforce the unity of the faction by strengthening Kōmoto's position among members who were very close to the former leader.

Not only current members of the faction but those intending to stand at the next election, either for the first time or following a defeat, attended and were presented to the guests. In 1986, for instance, Niita was introduced by Kōmoto who drew attention to his link with Kaifu. This amounted to an admittance of Kaifu's importance in the faction. All potential faction members were enthusiastically applauded. In addition, representatives from the *kōenkai* of retired and recently deceased Diet members were introduced, Kōmoto having earlier detailed their contributions to the faction. In an address to the hall they stressed that they were working hard to find suitable successors to stand in the next election. Although, as previously mentioned, for the guests any feeling of association with the faction was secondary to identification with one Diet member, an increase in the numerical strength of the faction was clearly seen by all to be important. Over and above its members, the faction claimed the right to representation in certain constituencies. It

jealously guarded the network of contacts built up by retired and deceased members while looking for suitable candidates to take them over.

The wives of the faction members were invited to the conference in 1987. An impression of being one big happy family was presented while, at the same time, faction members themselves were able to relax more on account of their spouses assisting in the looking after of their guests.

The general manager of the faction and his two assistants were in overall control of the proceedings. Detailed arrangements for the running of the conference were handled by the hotel staff and faction secretaries working together. The former included several employees of the Tōkyō hotel where Kōmoto's yearly fund-raising party took place. Trusted by the secretaries to help coordinate matters behind the scenes where many intra-factional relationships could not remain hidden, a few people who worked for the hotel were continually assigned to the Kōmoto faction. Throughout the year, they assisted with fund-raising parties and other events held by faction members in sister hotels. This extended to the faction conference held outside the capital.⁷¹ Irrespective of the amount of time a faction member spent at the conference, at least two of his secretaries would be present working with colleagues in planning, supervising and running the proceedings. This was very important work for the *Tsūitachikai*.

The conference ended with a party, a highlight of which was the Diet members individually singing on stage and being photographed with their supporters. This very much epitomized both the character and one important aim of the event.

Conclusion

The NPRS had no meaning over and above an organization which was a cover for a group of LDP Diet members who recognized Kōmoto as their leader. Its machinery was separate from that of the Miki faction to which some of the people had been affiliated. However, there was at least one faction where the leaders changed without there being concomitant changes in its physical location or staff. There appeared to be significant differences in the degrees of institutionalization and modes of operation in the factions.

The titles in the NPRS were for show. Seniority, which must be distinguished from importance, demanded grand names. No one wished to be seen as having less importance than a fellow member elected on fewer occasions; this might have threatened the unity of the faction. Problems could occur with late entrants. An important thing to realize in the distribution of posts was "feeling". Given the different levels of seniority and various inter-relationships among the members the question arose as to how best to label their roles; it was not a question of having the posts and subsequently putting people in them. Any name (within reason) would have done as a title. Given the people the problem was how to set up a pyramidal structure.

Belonging to the faction brought with it the commitment to work for its future. As a general rule, the workload increased with seniority. It cannot be stressed too strongly that not only was there a substantial overlap in the terms of reference of faction posts, but moreover the quantity and importance of work delegated all the way down the system was a function of many variables including seniority, trust, respect and estimated ability. Mutual competitiveness, jealousy and one-upmanship among faction members also came into play.

Faction meetings served to unify the faction. As a general rule, their significance was in bringing together the members at one time and in a situation where they were shown to profess allegiance to the faction. Often the content of the discussions held and information given was of secondary importance.

To complement a feeling of cohesion among the Diet members, their secretaries were encouraged to participate actively in an association of their own. An attempt was made to nurture a sense of belonging on both levels.

The Miki office had ceased to be directly involved in faction affairs although Miki continued to have an interest in the faction for his own purposes and those of Kōmoto faction members close to him, particularly Kaifu. Political ideas emanating from Miki's office may have originated from his staff and advisors. Miki himself appears to have valued academic advice highly, but his desire for perfection could be interpreted as indecisiveness.

The conference was a shop-window for the faction, a way of guaranteeing attention from the press. The faction tried to present itself as a unitary cohesive optimistic body putting forward a political philosophy for the future of Japan. At the same time the conference was a party. Guests came to share the company of the Diet member they supported and have a good time; the lectures were secondary.

Ultimate power inside the faction lay with Kōmoto. In inter-factional negotiations, for instance, his representatives could not commit it to a course of action without his authority. An extreme view would be to see the executives as messengers and the others as something less.⁷²

Notes and References

- 1 For instance, a financial supporter might provide office accommodation.
- 2 *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 December 1981.
- 3* Other persons having had experience of holding senior faction posts since its formation included: Moriyama Kinji, Shibuya Naozō, Noro Kyōichi and Ōnishi Masao. *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 September 1980 and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 31 July 1986. According to one faction member, Moriyama had been responsible for faction funds. Following his death, Ōnishi, who had been in charge of the financial arrangements for fund-raising parties, was seen to be likely to take over Moriyama's work too. Junior faction member, private communication.
- 4 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 November 1987.
- 5* In front of the journalists to whom he was expounding his views on party policy, a junior member was severely chided by one of Kōmoto's secretaries for expressing a personal opinion in Kōmoto's office. This was witnessed by the writer.
- 6 There could be complications if a member was first returned to the Diet, say, x elections before a second member, but had suffered a defeat on $x + 1$ more occasions.
- 7* The entry of Ishida Hirohide into the Miki faction, for instance, soured the relationship between Miki and Hayakawa. See *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 October 1971.
- 8 This was admitted by Niwa when interviewed.
- 9* One junior member suggested that all other senior members of the faction with some aspirations for the leadership suffered from at least one major disadvantage. For instance, Yamashita was too old and Tanikawa had two recent election defeats against him. Several journalists believed that Kaifu lacked the ability to garner sufficient funds.
- 10 Kōmoto himself gave a different definition of qualification for the "executive class". According to him, an essential prerequisite was to have been elected on many (number unspecified) occasions. In addition, it was necessary to care and be concerned about the other members and to understand and aid colleagues with problems in their constituencies. It would be unacceptable for an executive to think only of his own constituency. Furthermore, an otherwise excellent candidate could not be entertained for such a post had he been returned to the Diet but on few occasions. Perhaps the difference was no more than the approach adopted in the explanation. Given one's election to the Diet on six or so occasions and effort made on faction business, the member would expect to be recommended for a Cabinet position; entry to the executive class would be immediate on him being offered and taking the post. Similarly, if one had been recommended for a Cabinet position, then the aforementioned criteria, to Kōmoto's liking, would have been satisfied. Kōmoto dated his own entry to the executive class around 1968 when Miki stood against Satō for the party presidency. This was the year that Kōmoto first became a Cabinet minister. He explained that prior to that time, there being so many senior politicians in the faction, he had not been supported actively by Miki.
- 11 In the writer's presence, Ide mentioned to his father an occasion on which he was contacted by Tanikawa who asked if he would like to attend a study-group meeting.
- 12 Until November 1987, *jimu kyokuchō* and not *jimu sōchō* was the label attached to Sakamoto in his work for the faction. The change was cosmetic only, bringing the names of the posts in the NPRS into line with those in the other factions. In neither

- the quality nor the quantity of work or indeed absolute or relative status of the holder inside the faction was there any modification.
- 13* The two people in question, one of whom provided this information, were annoyed about this directive and, neither wishing to be absent, both eventually attended. They were unsure whether the order emanated from Sakamoto or Kōmoto.
- 14 This point was also made by Tanikawa who mentioned the differences in age and work for the party as important factors. He felt that the people at the bottom had reservations about speaking openly to those at the top. Though they listened, the top-ranking faction members were too busy to follow up their requests. Thus it was the middle ranking members who had to try to “look after” between three and five junior members. This work ceased on becoming a minister. The LDP as opposed to faction workload steadily increased and so less and less time could be put aside for the junior members.
- 15 Sakamoto, interview. Junior LDP members in particular were referred to as “x year students”. For instance, in 1987 Hozumi was called an *ichi nen sei*.
- 16 “If an argument appears to be developing, I go: ‘Now, now! Now, now!’” (*Mā mā, mā mā*). Sakamoto, interview.
- 17 Bōda Gōshi, secretary to Kōmoto, interview.
- 18 This was the title accorded Shiga and Sakamoto Chikao in Japanese.
- 19 The person next in line for a Cabinet post on the grounds of seniority had in the past often been given a title indicating that he was responsible for policy.
- 20 Bōda, interview.
- 21* This information was given by a junior member of the faction.
- 22 How much of the money came from Kōmoto, how much from other sources, what were these sources, and how Yamashita came to wield this power in the faction are questions the writer is unable to answer.
- 23 *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 July 1986.
- 24 *Sewakai* and *sōkai* respectively. In the faction, the word *sōkai* was used interchangeably with *reikai*. In the larger factions, the membership was broken down into sub-groupings in order to facilitate communication and deepen mutual understanding. For instance, in the Takeshita faction those members elected on between one and three occasions came together as the *Hifumi Society* to study policy once a week. *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 November 1986.
- 25 There being few junior members in the faction, only one was allowed to attend as a representative. Had the faction been a little larger, two people one from those members elected on one to three, and the other, four to six times - would have been permitted to take part. Bōda, interview.
- 26 The local chapter of the LDP and Ōnishi’s *kōenkai* would also have an important say in the matter. In Toyama # 1 the head of the *kōenkai* of the late Sumi Eisaku was visited in 1987 by Katō Kōichi of the Miyazawa faction who asked him to support the candidacy of the son, then an employee at NHK. He was born and brought up outside the constituency, and thus it was by no means clear to what extent *kōenkai* support could be counted upon. The head of the *kōenkai* himself was undecided at the time of writing.
- 27 Former members intending to stand again and potential members could also attend. Nishiyama Keijirō and Niita Kōji, interviews. Nishiyama mentioned that information

- on what was happening inside the party was useful for him, but he did not evaluate highly the meetings as an opportunity to learn anything about policy.
- 28 For instance, under the heading “Declaration of an Economic State of Emergency and Proposals for Urgent Counter-Measures”, a document prepared by the NPRS was distributed and discussed (to some extent) during the general meeting that took place on 20 May 1986. Extremely though indirectly critical of the Nakasone regime, the paper explained that despite representation by the faction the relevant government policies had not been changed. Detailed measures to deal with the situation were put forward and explained in some detail.
- 29 For instance, an extraordinary meeting was held not long after the 1986 election to discuss whether or not the faction was agreeable to Nakasone serving one year more as prime minister. Party rules prescribed a maximum of four years.
- 30 The relative location of the seats of members during faction meetings was of great importance because it was an acknowledgement of seniority within the organization seen to be recognised by all.
- 31* This related to proceedings in the Budget Committee coming to a standstill following a walkout by the opposition parties in protest at remarks made by the chairman, Hamada Kōichi.
- 32 The writer suspects that references to the Vietnam War, price of rice, and length of speeches made in the Diet were for his benefit!
- 33* Junior faction member, private communication.
- 34 Under this category would come, for instance, a point of information relating to the date of a meeting.
- 35 The writer’s attendance probably precluded any sensitive matter being discussed. On one occasion in 1986, observation was prohibited on the grounds that an outsider should not be privy to the views held inside the faction on whether or not Prime Minister Nakasone should be allowed a further twelve months in office.
- 36 Prior to the meeting the writer attended, Yamashita had a private talk with Kōmoto about faction business. Following the meeting, Sakamoto Misoji, who was personally very close to Miki and his family, before tackling the issue with Kōmoto, discussed with a senior secretary the proposed setting up of a research institute under Miki’s name to commemorate his fifty years of service in the Diet.
- 37 Bōda, interview.
- 38*
- 39 These were termed *benkyōkai*.
- 40 Kōmura, private communication.
- 41 Ide Shōichi, interview.
- 42 Bōda, interview.
- 43 This name dates from around 1952.
- 44 *Jimu kyokuchō*.
- 45 Details from an official *Kōchikai* information sheet.
- 46 The writer is very grateful to the director-general, Kimura Mitsugu, for information provided.
- 47 For instance, the faction annual study conference (*kenshūkai*) was held in the same hotel every year. To maximize close cooperation and collaboration with the hotel staff and minimize misjudgements in running the event, former *Tsūitachikai* executives made use of their experience and contacts and, as a rule, acted as deputies.

- 48 Bōda, interview.
- 49 This was true of the secretaries of many Diet members.
- 50 For much of the early historical information, the writer is indebted to Miki Mutsuko, Asano Mikio, and Nomura Keiko, secretary to Miki in the closing stages of the war.
- 51 Miki's link with *Aji No Moto* came about through his marriage. For the tree of his wife's family, see *Tōkyō Taimuzu*, 17 January 1987.
- 52 Messages were also taken here for Matsumoto Takizō. The building had to be vacated when the Occupation Forces requisitioned it for work connected to filming. Nomura, interview.
- 53 The Japan Cooperative Party had its headquarters in Kanda.
- 54 Hirakawa recalled drawing up the agreement for sale with the vendor, a scholar named Mochida. There was the criticism that Miki came to use the rooms of the PCP as his private office. Told to Funada Hajime either by his grandfather Naka or the latter's younger brother Kyōji. Funada Hajime, interview.
- 55 The Democratic Party could trace its lineage back to the pre-war *Minseitō* through the *Shimpotō*. According to Miki Mutsuko, her husband paid off all the debts and took full responsibility for the buildings and land in Akasaka even though it had been the headquarters of the PCP and not his private organization. Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 56 This site later became the headquarters for the TBS television network.
- 57 Between 18 January 1986 and 31 July 1987, a small prefabricated building in the same street was used to house his staff while the old building was demolished and a new office block erected.
- 58 The Association of Like-Minded People on Policy (*Seisaku Dōshikai*) was formed before the November 1960 election. *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 November 1960. The name was changed in April 1963.
- 59 Known in Japanese as *jimu kyokuchō*.
- 60 Much pride was felt among past and present faction members and Miki's staff over his faction being the first to hold an annual study group meeting. The venue was inside Ide's constituency. The tradition was continued under Kōmoto's leadership, but in Hakone, not Karuizawa.
- 61 Between five and eight scholars formed the nucleus of the group. Hirakawa Tokuo, interview. The number of participants gradually increased and the form slowly changed until it took the shape that characterized the event held under the auspices of the Kōmoto faction. Miki Mutsuko, interview.
- 62 The company was founded by Miki's father-in-law. Suzuki Haruo, who was the honorary chairman, was also chairman of the Board of Directors of Miki's Research Institute.
- 63* This view was echoed by others.
- 64 For instance, Kōno Yōhei wrote an article for the journal, and there was a very sympathetic look at Doi Takako, Chairwoman of the Socialist Party, in one issue.
- 65 The writer could trace no earlier issue.
- 66 The journal was distributed to other politicians, industrialists, *kōenkai* members and all other interested persons and bodies. A glossy booklet averaging between eighty and one hundred pages, it was sent free to the readers and was not on public sale.
- 67 No charge was made for admission.

- 68 Noro mentioned that he occasionally went to the office to discuss political happenings, but would not go there to relax. Between Kaifu and the office there was a steady two-way stream of information.
- 69 See Chapter 5. In addition to the Diet members, several scholars with close links to the faction, including Kunihiro and Uchida Kenzō, were in attendance; staff and family were also privy to the discussions.
- 70 Yoshida Tomio, secretary to Kita, private communication.
- 71 To this extent one can say faction identification and consciousness reached hotel staff and indeed possibly employees of other concerns which had business dealings with more than one faction.

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Chapter 5

THE FACTION AND ITS MEMBERSHIP: INTERNAL ASSOCIATION

Introduction

If a faction represents something more than a mere grouping of the individual Diet members who belong, there should be one or more common attributes that can be ascribed to them. They could relate to the values and beliefs held by the faction, if indeed such exist; alternatively, there may be connections between the faction and prospective Diet members which serve to determine affiliation. In the case of the Miki/Kōmoto faction, this question must be considered in a historical perspective because of the continuity in faction membership through the change of leadership.

For a faction to be effective as a group, it must move as one body in the party. The closeness of the ties between the old and new faction leader, and between them on the one hand and the members on the other, is one measure to determine the degree of faction cohesiveness. If this was low or if no great benefit accrued from belonging to the faction, other factors had to be at work to encourage entry and discourage disaffiliation, particularly because there were a number of much larger factions which appeared to have more to offer their members.

A Comparison of the Leadership of Miki and Kōmoto

Control of the members of the Miki faction moved to Kōmoto, not because of any similarities in personality or temperament, strong links of friendship between the two men, or grooming of Kōmoto by Miki for the role, but rather as a result of the financial power

that Kōmoto had wielded which made him the only suitable candidate as a successor. In June 1980 the Miki faction was dissolved and the Kōmoto faction, consisting of precisely the same members, came into existence.¹

The change of leadership brought with it a transformation in the faction. Some aspects were immediate and obvious. The faction office now occupied a different building in another part of Tōkyō. The administrative staff and secretaries were those of Kōmoto and their relationships with the faction members were as yet undeveloped. They had not worked for Miki and were short of experience in running an organization. For other reasons too, the framework of the set of interrelationships between the leader and led became looser if not more complicated. In terms of years' experience as a Diet member, Miki was the most senior in the faction. Many of the members had worked with him over a long time and had gone through the same political vicissitudes together. Having built up the faction from scratch, Miki was like a father figure. He had picked many of the members personally and watched over what was largely a "hand-made" group. Between the leader and members taken individually strong links existed, but among themselves the connections were much weaker. In this sense the faction did not have a strong union and was not markedly cohesive.²

In comparison, Kōmoto was not the most senior member in his faction nor had he been a central figure in the Miki faction until the mid-1960's at the earliest. There was no historical reason for a number of faction members to feel or be indebted to him. He had not brought them into the faction and his existence in it was independent of their affiliation. It was only over a period of time that a central position in the Miki faction for Kōmoto came to be consolidated, and then it was due largely to his funding ability.³

Succession to the leadership of an organization such as a faction does not and cannot bring with it the inheritance of the complicated emotional and psychological links that were the preserve of the former head. Nor are obligations or duties owed to the latter transferable to the new leader. Indeed, members that had by choice entered the Miki faction found themselves in the Kōmoto faction through circumstances beyond their control.⁴ Kōmoto had to work hard to maintain the existing cohesion of the faction and build up a new set of relationships between himself and all the other members.⁵

There was also a change of atmosphere in the faction. Kōmoto was not Miki. His way of thinking, conveying ideas and acting were not those of Miki. His qualities of and rights to leadership inside the faction were different. His influence was less. This may have acted as a democratizing factor. With the lack of firm links between Kōmoto on the one hand, and his faction members taken individually on the other, it is likely that the ties among the latter were strengthened.

In answer to a questionnaire distributed to faction members, certain distinguishing features between the faction under Miki's leadership and that of Kōmoto were repeated by a number of respondents. These can be summed up as follows.

Miki was very much the object of the affection of many members. He himself managed the faction. However, policy would be decided by a few people and Miki would subsequently hold separate discussions with individuals and groups often working on them one by one to accept what had been settled. His way of talking was both intimate and warm. He would ask, for instance, what a member thought of such-and-such a course of action.

It was much easier to bring a discussion to a conclusion in the Miki faction. The Miki faction was more an ideological group centring on the leader and with a strong psychological consciousness of this fact. Miki was a theorist interested in the modernization

of the LDP, the dissolution of factions, and purifying the political culture by ridding it of the corruption by money.

While Miki was an idealist, Kōmoto was more practical. The atmosphere inside the Kōmoto faction was colder and a little stiffer. It was managed by not one but several people. Policy was studied as a group. After hearing the views of everyone, Kōmoto would decide on a course of action; in so doing he often brought all members over to his side. He put great emphasis on economic policy, and was respected for these views. He worked inside the existing power structure and this is where his strength lay, unlike Miki whose appeal came from working outside the party. Kōmoto acted in presidential elections while bearing in mind what was occurring elsewhere. He moved to surmount the predisposition of antagonistic elements inside the LDP. Miki, on the other hand, would often ignore what was happening and the ways of thinking in the other factions. His faction would be aloof with a line drawn between it and the LDP. While Kōmoto was “L.D.P-ish”, Miki would state clearly what he considered to be the distinguishing features of his faction.

The character of Kōmoto was very different from that of Miki. He was tranquil in temperament and not so severe on himself and other people about what was said and done. He did not articulate policy as dramatically as did Miki. Neither though was his character as strong. Both Miki and Kōmoto were by nature serious but Miki was more deeply concerned with the philosophy of politics. According to Komine Takao, seconded to Kōmoto as a secretary from the Economic Planning Agency when the politician was its Director-General, Kōmoto thought and argued rationally and disliked being idle and seeing to what he regarded as trivia. He was not interested in *giri* and *ninjō*, which were of great consequence for many people.

Links Between the Old Leader and New Faction

Although Kōmoto took over the leadership of the faction, this in no way signified a severing of links with Miki. The senior politician was made adviser, a post also given to Akagi, to acknowledge the length of time he had been a member of the Diet.⁶ Kōmoto often referred to Miki in his speeches stressing the importance he gave to political ethics. One such occasion was the 1986 summer study conference when, to great applause, Kōmoto praised Miki and wished him a speedy recovery [from his stroke]. Kōmoto capitalized on Miki's image as a clean politician with liberal views and acted to strengthen a public conception of the faction as the conscience of the LDP. The reality was less important than the impression given.⁷

As founder of the faction, Miki naturally retained a deep interest in its future. Although he chose never to attend meetings of the Kōmoto faction,⁸ Miki retained a sense of responsibility for it and remained in close contact with many of its members to whom he could offer help and advice. For obvious reasons, intra-factional matters of extreme secrecy and the utmost delicacy could be entrusted to him, the only person who possessed both the experience and insight fully to comprehend such questions; he was in a position to counsel Kōmoto. Subject to his willingness to act, Miki could take on the role of peacemaker among the members if a serious conflict arose. Dissatisfaction felt by those near the bottom of the faction could be expressed in front of him; he could then relay it to the top and attempt to apply pressure on Kōmoto. He was uniquely qualified for this. Several members of the Kōmoto faction had excellent personal links with Miki. Kujiraoka, in particular, was extremely close to the family and, following Miki's stroke on 4 June 1986, acted as a personal messenger between him and Kōmoto. He was one of the very few people allowed to visit Miki in hospital as his condition progressively deteriorated.

A majority of the sons of former members of the Miki faction who sought election for the first time in or after 1980, chose to stand under the Kōmoto faction banner. They themselves would have contacts in the faction which was predisposed to accepting their candidacy in favour of that of a challenger. The LDP might accept tacitly the preferential right of a faction to fight a seat if there was continuity between the old and new candidate.

Members of the Kōmoto faction were often invited to various events taking place under the auspices of the Miki office. The writer witnessed the presence of a large number of them at the ground-breaking ceremony for Miki's new office held on 3 March 1986. One year later when a party was held to celebrate Miki's fifty years as a Diet member, many younger members of the faction were present including, for instance, Matsuda, who certainly did not have a close link with him.⁹ On this occasion the job of *emcee* was filled by Noro.

Miki himself attended fund-raising parties for Kōmoto faction members, and gave speeches of support. Following his stroke, Miki's wife performed this function. Indeed, the *Mutsukai*, a group centring on Miki's wife¹⁰ and having as its membership the spouses of all faction members, outlasted the Miki faction and welcomed the entry of the wives of Kōmoto faction members. Participants would socialize and holiday together, occasionally journeying abroad.¹¹ Pride was taken in the "long history" of the organization. Only the illness of Miki forced it to cut back on events arranged.

Emotional links existed through Miki and his wife having acted as go-between at the wedding of some Kōmoto faction members including Kōmura, Usui and Noro. There was an indirect link by marriage between the two powerful politicians. A daughter of Kōmoto Toshio was married to the brother-in-law of Miki's daughter.

Strength of Bond between the Faction and Member

Membership in a faction brought with it a sense of obligation. Whatever the innermost thoughts of the faction member, in public at least, respect and obedience were expected to be displayed towards the leader who assumed that in both words and actions all members were prepared to line up behind him, notwithstanding any contradiction with their own values which they might feel. Thus, for instance, on resigning from a Cabinet on a matter of principle, the leader might take it for granted that faction members serving as vice-ministers, possibly chairmen of Diet committees and holders of certain party posts, would follow his example or entrust him with the decision on what action, if any, they should take.¹² In such a case, refusal to bow to the wishes of the leader might result in the member being asked to leave the faction since doubts would otherwise be voiced as to the quality and strength of leadership as well as the solidarity of the faction. While some members would follow the orders of the leader with reluctance, others would be prepared to fall into line without question. Feelings towards the leader varied with the members and were coloured by several factors including the circumstances under which affiliation was decided.

At any given moment over the twenty-five or so years of the existence of the Miki/Kōmoto faction an attempt could have been made to give to each member a different cardinal number C that symbolized the degree of commitment to Miki and by extension his faction. Each C would have represented a scaling to an integer of a function y of constants $x_{1j}, x_{2j}, \dots, x_{mj}$ where each x_{ij} referred directly or indirectly to some attitude or act i towards Miki by member j . Such a quantification would have defined clearly the closeness of the relationship between Miki and each member individually as well as relatively ordering the latter among themselves. However it could not have been

meaningful other than at a specific time since the value of C would vary with changing factors, internal and external to the faction. Even such a limited endeavour might have been impossible. The question of what would constitute the x_i for a given j and the problem of ascribing a numerical value to them would be arbitrary. This does not, however, preclude the making of looser and more general statements about the strength of faction ties given the qualification that there are no exactitudes.

As a simplification, perhaps one could differentiate three levels of membership which cut across seniority in the faction: an inner circle, the dutiful troops, and an outer ring. The inner circle would be those members very close to and in the confidence of the leader entrusted with tasks concerning the management and finance of the faction. They would also be involved in negotiations with the other factions and be expected to work hard to plan for the faction's future by acting to maintain its unity and endeavouring to find new members. The amount and extent of work that could be undertaken by them would increase with their seniority and ability. A junior member, for instance, would be unlikely to be in a position to provide much finance. Factors working to create such loyalty towards the leader would include: a long association possibly pre-dating entry to the Diet, a common political philosophy, a complementation of personalities, personal affection or admiration, and a close family tie. In the case of a particularly strong relationship, there might even be a friendship between the two families.¹³

Members in the outer ring would belong to the faction more through necessity than choice. Electoral reasons, *kōenkai* connections, duty to one's predecessor and obligations in return for help received might have forced the prospective Diet member to enter the faction against his better judgement. Although on the surface close to the leader, certain senior members might be waiting for an opportunity to break away, often taking with

them a number of people. The intention might be to join another faction or start one's own faction. Again, members in this category might seek to take over the faction, perhaps with help from non-faction LDP members.

In between these two extremes were the dutiful troops; mindful of their own political future, although not possessing a strong bond or attachment to the leader personally, they neither initiated moves nor undertook acts to weaken the unity of the faction but were content to remain in it as long as they received material and moral support during an election.

It cannot be stressed enough that this schema is an over- simplification of the reality and cannot but gloss over the ways of thinking, motivations, aims and intentions of the faction members. Its purpose is to reveal and display clearly the existence of different degrees of the consciousness of and commitment to membership.

Many members of the outer ring would have overlapping allegiance with another faction. Such links might have developed before or after election to the Diet, and might be permanent or ephemeral. It was more likely to be the leader or a senior executive in the other faction with whom the connection existed rather than a bond with the faction itself. Serving as a vice-minister under the person concerned was one way of such a link being effected. The existence of these inter- factional connections was often known within the faction of primary association, but there would be little the leadership could do about it. Expulsion from the faction would be considered only in the most extreme case. As long as the member was thought to be giving prior loyalty to the faction, his otherwise deviant behaviour might be overlooked. Furthermore, particularly in times of crisis or when there was animosity between two leaders, people with the necessary links in the other faction could act as a bridge and might be so utilized.

A Diet member might owe allegiance to two or more factions while continuously remaining in just one throughout his political career. There were cases, however, where he would migrate: through his own volition, the demand of the other side, or because he was asked to leave the faction. If he was totally lacking in appreciation of and consideration for a faction he felt forced to enter, a member might be willing to act as a spy reporting back movements in his faction to a senior member of another. This might be suspected if not known by the leader who would be circumspect about whom to take into his confidence. It was not only some people in the outer ring who would receive funds from a plurality of sources within the Diet. Many of the dutiful troops might be tempted by monetary inducements and thereby, step by step, drawn further away from the core.

Membership in the Miki Faction

There were in total some 160 people who belonged to the House of Representatives and were at one time affiliated to either one of the parties Miki led in the early postwar years, his faction, or both. In appendix three, 54 of them have been classified into one of two categories: inner circle and outer ring.

Inside the two groupings the extent of fidelity to the faction varied greatly with the individual and time. For instance, Ide was not initially close to Miki but later became his most trusted confidant. Sakamoto Misoji remained close to Miki but was involved in the talks among a number of LDP members which led to the formation of a breakaway party, the New Liberal Club, during Miki's premiership. There are probably not a few unlisted members who would have a greater claim to inclusion than some of those mentioned, but whose right of precedence is unknown to the writer. Certain others are difficult to classify. For example, Hayakawa would certainly have belonged to the inner circle during some periods, and outer ring on others. Although detailed information cannot be

provided detailing why the writer chose to put certain people in the outer ring, taking all the members together, misdemeanours against the faction included: displaying devouring ambition inside the faction which was deemed threatening to Miki and the *status quo*, being unprepared to accept Miki's leadership, being thought to enjoy an intimate relationship with another faction and (or) its leader, being believed to have accepted funding from another or other factions over a period of time, being suspected of providing privileged information about the faction to its adversaries inside and outside the party, having close links with and accepting money from an *ingaidan*¹⁴, moving in and out of the faction, and generally acting in a suspicious manner.¹⁵

Roots of the Members of the Miki/Kōmoto Faction

There were a number of reasons why and explanations how election candidates and existing Diet members came to belong to Miki's faction (party). In most cases a conscious decision was made by the person concerned, but in others the resolution was made by someone else. Certainly, at the nucleus of Miki's faction were people who had been associated with one of the Cooperative parties before him, or who had followed their leader in joining up with Miki sometime in a ten year period that ended with the formation of the LDP.

Among the early faction (party) members were acquaintances from Meiji University or other educational institutions who had known Miki through participation in oratorical competitions.¹⁶ There were Diet members who had belonged to the same pre-war grouping as Miki.¹⁷ A number of Diet members who had been in the *Tōhōkai* joined with Miki after the war, in some cases after being depurged.¹⁸

Introductions from current and former faction members and their contacts provided a steady source of recruits for Miki. Even after the demise of the Cooperative Party in

all its forms, many aspiring candidates for a Diet seat, particularly those hailing from Hokkaidō and Miyazaki, who were closely involved with the *Nōkyō*¹⁹ ran with the support of the Miki faction.²⁰ Much rarer were those people who had entered the faction because of a family connection.²¹ There were a small number of people who joined because of a long friendship with Miki.²²

In December 1987, excluding Miki and Kōmoto themselves, ten of the twenty Kōmoto faction members who first stood for election under Miki's leadership had been introduced to the Tokushima politician by a current or former faction member,²³ and one was a relative by marriage.²⁴ The fathers of three of the others²⁵ had belonged to Miki's faction. Of the six left, one had a friendship with Miki going back to 1937,²⁶ the father of a second had been in the Cooperative Democratic Party²⁷ and a third had served under Miki as a bureaucrat in the late 1950's.²⁸ The circumstances under which Itō and Tanikawa joined the faction were unusual.²⁹ The case of Iwasaki is not known by the writer.³⁰

The difficulties the Kōmoto faction had in attracting candidates can be evidenced by examining the backgrounds of the nine remaining members. Of the seven in the Lower House, a father or uncle of five of them had belonged to the Miki faction,³¹ and a sixth had worked as a secretary to one.³² The husband of Upper House member Moriyama Mayumi had been a member of the Miki faction. The two other members were both from Hyōgo, where Kōmoto had his constituency and was influential. Clearly it was difficult for Kōmoto to attract to his faction potential candidates who had no prior connection to Miki. Furthermore, some of those who had, sought affiliation elsewhere.

Not a few members admitted to being dissatisfied at representing a small, weak faction, and many had strong secondary links with another. One person interviewed spoke

of his close links with Tanaka Kakuei.³³ Tanaka had both provided him with introductions to powerful and useful people,³⁴ and on a personal level treated him with a great deal of consideration. “Tanaka’s way of doing things” appealed to this Diet member.³⁵ However, not only had Kōmoto helped him greatly in his work before his election, the initial introduction had been effected by a powerful local politician with close links to the Kōmoto faction - a person whom he could not afford to alienate. He had thus felt “unable” to join the Tanaka faction but rather was obliged to enter a faction with which he felt incompatible given its history, the position it had taken on many issues, and its distance from the centre of power. A second person interviewed,³⁶ in addition to mentioning other factors, stressed the factional consideration in his constituency.³⁷ Two of the big four factions were represented and one advantage of joining the Kōmoto faction had been that neither of the other two would be unnecessarily alienated. This was believed by him to be very important because of the danger of making powerful enemies in the party.

Several people had entered the Kōmoto faction through necessity rather than choice. For instance former prefectural politicians who had been aided by a senior member of the faction - even if there was a time lag - felt obliged to stand as one of its candidates. Again, although there were cases of sons or sons-in-law of former members joining another faction, they were not the norm; such a candidate ran the risk of alienating not only people in, say, his father’s faction, but also powerful supporters in the *kōenkai* and potential providers of finance who might have developed their own lucrative links with it. Against that was the unequivocal fact that it was that much more difficult to build up support when the faction the candidate affiliated with was seen as being and remaining weak. On occasions where a successor who was related by blood or marriage joined another faction, the question of there having been “formal succession” often would be hidden - at least in form. In an

attempt to avoid bad feeling and injured pride, one new candidate, enjoying the type of link with the Kōmoto faction mentioned above, but with links to another faction, was not officially announced as his relative's successor in a formal statement at a news conference. This was despite the fact that his relationship with the previous Diet member was well known.³⁸

There were a large number of Kōmoto faction members, particularly among the lower ranks, who would have preferred to have had an equal opportunity to join one of the other four. This was not necessarily because of a negative feeling towards Kōmoto personally, but rather a consequence of their frustration at belonging to a numerically weak faction. At the same time, satisfaction with membership was not limited to the executive class (people who had achieved Cabinet office). Nishiyama, who had lost his seat in 1986, spoke very highly of Kōmoto praising both his policies and character.³⁹ He had met Kōmoto when he was a bureaucrat in the Economic Planning Agency and Kōmoto was the Director-General.

Many members of the Kōmoto faction had strong secondary ties. These may have been formed before or after election to the Diet. Constituency reasons were common for effecting a link between a faction and a candidate. The affiliation of a particularly dreaded foe - often one whose hometown was very close - could draw a member into a relationship with a second and sometimes subsequent faction. Again, with death, retirement, defeat, appearance or indeed upsurge or downswing in the popularity of another candidate, secondary factional ties developed and changed. Obviously faction members were continually interacting with representatives from the other factions. Serving under a senior politician could be a major step in the forming of a firm tie. Joining a cross-factional grouping might result in (or indeed have been intended to bring about) the realization of a solid

link. The frustration of many Kōmoto faction members made them targets for monetary inducements from other factions. Kōmoto's advanced age, the lack of a recognized successor acceptable to all, and the steady decline in faction membership while that of the four others was increasing, served to deepen secondary ties, with exploratory moves coming from both sides.

Relations Among Faction Members

Just as the nature and depth of the feeling between the leader and the led varied with the individual concerned, so were there varying levels of warmth in the personal relationships among the members themselves. From effusive friendliness to icy indifference, during the history of the faction a wide range of sentiments was felt between pairs of people who had affiliated. Not only incompatibilities in character but also events taking place both within and without the faction could have a bearing on the bilateral relationships inside.

Within the Kōmoto faction there were groups of members who regularly fraternized and there were people who made a point of avoiding each other. Some were staunch friends and others were bitter enemies. Each individual liked, trusted and respected his fellow members to different degrees. Many examples can be given. Usui, Kōmura and Ōshima were close friends. Kaifu, Kujiraoka and Sakamoto Misoji were included in the intra-faction group of members called the "Miki direct line"⁴⁰ by the press; they were given this name because they were particularly close to the ex-leader. The bilateral relationships among them, however, were not all good. Differences in character, manner, education and background provided excuses for indifference, antipathy, distaste and jealousy. For instance, junior member A disliked executive B because he claimed he had the habit of repeating the same thing on the same subject at meetings of the faction; he did not get

on well with junior member C who he felt took himself too seriously, and despised middle-ranking member D who he maintained both criticized continually what everyone else was doing while making no effort himself and spoke repeatedly in praise of the person whose *jiban* he inherited.⁴¹ E was said to be contemptuous of F, over what he regarded to be his dubious method of gathering funds.⁴² Several middle-ranking and senior members of the faction disliked Kaifu⁴³ seeing him as a threat to their hopes of increasing their influence inside the faction. Aversion towards a fellow member did not bring with it necessarily an unwillingness to work with him. According to A, not all those faction members who wanted Kaifu to be Kōmoto's successor liked him. Rather they saw him as the person within the faction most likely to have the potential to reach a very high office in the party, and who could thereby help them in their careers.

Between some faction members and a few of the senior secretaries to others there was a warm atmosphere. Through their experience, the secretaries could aid and even advise the Diet members. They were also in a position to know much gossip inside and outside the faction which could prove useful. On occasion, a faction member would invite one or more for a drink or meal.

Political Philosophy of Faction Members

Historical and practical considerations being paramount in determining factional affiliation, it was to be expected that among the membership would be people of different backgrounds, dispositions and views. Neither a common political philosophy nor way of thinking could be ascribed to the members and by extension no cohesive, consistent and comprehensive list of policy ideals could be attributed to the faction itself. The Kōmoto faction was a grouping of people who all in their own ways espoused conservative views.

Value judgments on, conceptions of, importance attached and time allocated to considering, examining and discussing a specific issue varied among the members. Some could be active in persuading the faction or party to take up one policy while others were equally busy working for the opposite end.⁴⁴ This was not to say, however, that the faction put forward no policy as its own. On the contrary, on many issues it took a stance which it articulated before propagating and disseminating.

The position of the faction on a given issue was often at variance with the views of many of the members, who nevertheless were expected to pay lip service to it. On occasion, in private, doubts and disagreements were expressed and no attempt was made to hide a lack of enthusiasm. Openly asserting outright opposition was seen to be divisive and threaten the public fiction of the faction as a cohesive unified body. Occasionally a faction member publicly if indirectly attacked the official line.⁴⁵ However, even the putting forward of and insistence on the opposite extreme would very rarely be seen as a reason to leave or be asked to withdraw from the faction.⁴⁶

Although Kondō was given responsibility for the making of policy and was able to delegate the work involved among members of the NPRS, in practice, the policy platform of the faction was the collection of opinions held and expounded by Kōmoto himself. Various consultations might be held, embracing a number of members, with everyone being given an opportunity to have their say, but the final decision and responsibility lay with the leader.⁴⁷ The degree of involvement of the members varied with the importance of the issue and the urgency in taking and maintaining a stance on it.

The Kōmoto faction had never possessed power inside the LDP, and so the existence of a group studying policy was little more than public relations. As the leader of a small, weak faction Kōmoto hoped that it would be taken seriously, benefit from good publicity and

possibly attract new members if he successfully presented it as a policy group. Two faction members stressed that detailed investigation of policy was carried out in the divisions of the Policy Affairs Research Council, not inside the faction.⁴⁸

There were questions on which the public stand of the faction was unequivocal. Partly in deference to the leader of the Diet members it inherited, the Kōmoto faction was committed to keep defence spending within one per cent of GNP, a guideline set down by the Miki Cabinet.⁴⁹ A change of heart on this issue would have resulted in a loss of goodwill towards Kōmoto from his precursor but also towards the faction from the executives personally close to Miki.⁵⁰ Kōmoto had very strong views on economic policy. He consistently pressed for an increase in public works programmes to be financed through government funding, a large-scale tax-decrease with a concomitant reform of the taxation system to change the ratio of direct to indirect taxes, and an expansion of domestic demand partly to lessen international criticism of Japan's large balance of payments surpluses.⁵¹

From the time of Miki's leadership, the faction had continually stressed the need for political ethics and clean government, but more and more this become an attempt to find and protect for itself a niche where it could remain in the public eye. As one member of the faction related, although Kōmoto maintained the existence of a distance between his faction and policies dictated by money politics, it was only a matter of degree. Many members claimed that the faction could not be said to have a political philosophy as such and that generally LDP factions were not to be distinguished on the grounds of policy.⁵² This appeared to be the case.

Advantages of Membership

Membership of the Kōmoto faction brought with it very few advantages. As a small group, however, certain benefits accrued. Although the members were conscious of their

relative status in the faction, a question which was determined largely by the time they were first elected and the number of times returned, there was a freedom to speak out within the organization that many of them believed could not be found in the other factions. This was put down to the small size of the faction, but also the continuation of a custom set at the time of Miki's leadership.⁵³ The lack of formality helped create and encourage an atmosphere where the members could all relax and those at the bottom could approach their seniors with a minimum of stiffness. This applied at all levels of the faction;⁵⁴ Kōmoto himself was approachable by very junior members. Several of them claimed there was greater awareness of the thoughts, feelings and ideas of fellow members. Everyone had the opportunity to put forward their views and there was less chance of them being misunderstood through pressure of time or lack of knowledge of their standpoint. Having stood for a faction with relatively few members, though one that was trying desperately to increase the number, people elected for the first time were very warmly received and appreciated, and were able to get to know the senior members very quickly. There were frequent occasions when the junior members came together with the executives.⁵⁵ Since the faction was small there was also less competition for posts such as those of vice-minister, committee chairman and division chief in the Policy Affairs Research Council steps to becoming a minister.

The faction had the tradition of appealing for the support of the electorate by claiming that its mode of operation was clean and calling for high ethical standards in the conduct of political affairs. As a faction, whatever the reality, it did not have a dirty image. There is the possibility that this brought in some votes.⁵⁶

One middle-ranking member of the faction⁵⁷ mentioned the advantage of not having to be grateful to so many people on being elected, since there were not so many sources of

finance members of the faction could call on compared to candidates standing under the banner of other factions. Of course this presupposed that the candidate was elected.

Factions are very much about numbers. In autumn 1987, following the splitting of the Tanaka faction into the Takeshita faction and much smaller Nikaidō group, the Kōmoto faction found itself not unlikely to hold the balance of power in the forthcoming presidential election. The mood inside the faction at this time was optimistic and the faction was cultivated by the others. Through not having a candidate for the presidency of the LDP and by virtue of being numerically weak, the Kōmoto faction was seen as a potentially reliable partner in a coalition unlikely to try to upstage its partners. In exchange for a small share of the spoils, it was more plausible for it to be a trustworthy ally; a larger faction would demand more and continually look for openings to put its leader on the seat of power.

Disadvantages of Membership

Many of the disadvantages of belonging to the Kōmoto faction related to its small size and were a legacy from the Miki faction. The fewer the members in a faction, the fewer the posts held by them. The fewer the posts the less the information that can be passed on by word of mouth, through faction meetings or literature emanating from its headquarters. Some information is heard later than it would be by members of bigger factions and then through less direct sources; some may not be heard at all. This was the situation in the Kōmoto faction. Committee, party and Cabinet posts held were comparatively few and when offered were often posts regarded as relatively minor, both from the point of view of influence and in providing opportunities to gather money.

Factions which could boast many members with Cabinet experience had a greater potential supply of political funds. These funds were channelled within the faction to junior

members close to the recipient. Kōmoto faction members had to fight these members in their constituencies. If a faction were big, it would have influence in, for instance, the construction industry, insurance companies, and the agricultural lobby. In the Kōmoto faction there was less money coming in and it was therefore that much more important to collect money oneself. The fact that the Kōmoto faction was and for some time had been removed from the centre of power and decision-making, together with the fact that there appeared to be no prospect of it increasing its numerical strength in the foreseeable future, created difficulties for many members when they tried to collect funds in their constituencies and even more in Tōkyō.

It was very difficult to get the policies of the faction accepted by the LDP, and so its political standpoint was of little matter in the party. In other factions there were so-called *chūnikai*⁵⁸ - people who had been elected perhaps four or five times⁵⁹ who looked after a group of junior politicians and “brought them up” in the field of policy they specialized in. These junior members, on reaching the same stage in their political careers, in turn would take on their own “pupils”. In this way the junior politicians could later become *zoku* (members of cliques organized around important and special interests usually in ministries) in that field. Without such help it was generally more difficult to become influential in a policy area, the network of relations being much poorer. In the Kōmoto faction the small size and few *zoku* members made such a system impossible; members had to study policy by themselves. Much work was done in the Policy Affairs Research Council. The Kōmoto faction lacked strength in this organisation. Rarely could a member acquire a plum post. Even if a member of the faction wished to become, say, head of the Construction Division, the strength of the (former) Tanaka faction and weakness of the Kōmoto faction precluded the possibility. According to one Kōmoto faction member, acquiring such posts became

more difficult following the Lockheed Affair. Obstacles would be put in their way, partly in revenge for Miki's role in bringing down Tanaka and failing to act to prevent Tanaka's arrest.⁶⁰

To facilitate the realization of faction goals, it was extremely important to have a good relationship with the other factions and opposition parties. The Kōmoto faction and Miki faction before it had little experience of their members occupying the chairmanships of the Diet Management and Strategy Committees. These posts were extremely important, their holders being at the centre of inter-factional and inter-party negotiations for the smooth running of the Diet.

At a general election it was advantageous to have people known to the public make speeches on one's behalf. In the Kōmoto faction there were very few "crowd-pullers". Apart from one Cabinet minister, Kōmoto, Kaifu and possibly Yamashita were the best draws. A candidate for a faction where the leader was prime minister or was seen to have a good chance of becoming the next prime minister found it easier to engender support from the electorate. By belonging to such a faction the candidate was seen as having that much greater potential to bring to his constituency the fruits of him being close to power. This was one reason why it was important for Diet members to affiliate with a powerful or potentially powerful faction. Kōmoto's resignation from the Cabinet following the bankruptcy of his company made extremely difficult the realization of his hope to become prime minister. Members of his faction could receive relatively little influential outside support during an election and had to rely on their own power and strength.

Even after much expended effort, few candidates were prepared to stand for election under the banner of the Kōmoto faction.⁶¹ It lacked the power to block the appearance of new candidates in constituencies where its members had their *jiban*.⁶² Indeed, because the

faction's voice was small inside the party, problems arose in obtaining official recognition for its candidates, particularly those standing for the first time, if a bigger faction put forward someone else.⁶³

Not only was it difficult for a comparatively small faction to increase its numbers, but moreover every death and retirement of a member had a greater impact on it than it would on a bigger faction. Between the general election of 1986 and the end of 1988 five members⁶⁴ of the Kōmoto faction died.

All LDP members were continually asked for help by constituents to get them, their children, or a relative into a certain school, university or company.⁶⁵ When they did not possess the right connection, fellow members of their faction might be asked for help. Colleagues were also approached when constituents sought work elsewhere.⁶⁶ With few members, there were few constituencies represented by the Kōmoto faction and the total network was smaller.

As a consequence of belonging to a faction whose numerical strength was far below that of the others, which experienced difficulties in attracting new candidates, and where valued posts were hard to come by, some Kōmoto faction members expressed their unhappiness and frustration by forming strong ties with and accepting money from other factions. The object of their true loyalty and hence the unity of the Kōmoto faction could thus be questioned.

Attracting New Candidates

Notwithstanding the great difficulties involved, one very important function for the faction was to attract new candidates. Not only had successors for deceased, retired, and occasionally, defeated members to be found, groomed and persuaded to enter the faction, but new "breeding grounds" had to be sought and discovered. Faction members

felt or were made to feel responsible for having a successor ready on their retirement.⁶⁷ Particularly during periods when the popularity of the LDP was rising, at the very least the faction desired to maintain the numerical differentials existing with the other factions. It was continually on the lookout for promising candidates; approaches were made if it was thought that they had the potential to draw votes.⁶⁸ For instance, a member of the faction serving as a minister might sound out a senior bureaucrat. The geographical distribution of support for prefectural politicians⁶⁹ was examined to see if on paper they had a reasonable chance of winning a seat in a national election.

Not all contacts were initiated by the faction. Some would-be faction members approached the NPRS office, often through a go-between known to both. In such cases the background and social standing of the individual in the constituency were investigated by the faction. If a *prima facie* case was thought to exist, the question was then looked into with a great more detail: from where, for instance, did the current members of the Diet returned from that constituency derive their support, and what were the chances of a new candidate receiving official recognition. Even when the latter was not forthcoming, right up until polling day factional support in the form of money, speakers and the provision of useful connections might be given.

Current and former faction members were often extremely knowledgeable about the prevailing situation in neighbouring constituencies, and they would provide introductions to Kōmoto. Efforts were made to induce non-affiliated LDP Diet members into the faction. Apart from those who had been elected many times, experienced few problems in procuring funds, had served in the Cabinet, felt secure in their constituencies or, for another reason, felt no compulsion to join a faction, a considerable number welcomed an approach. Some had a preference, but perhaps for constituency reasons could not enter the faction of their

choice. An example would be the person waiting and hoping for the electoral defeat or retirement of someone already representing that constituency. As has been mentioned, joining the Kōmoto faction did not in itself appeal to non-affiliated Diet members.

Case Study 1: Suzuki Muneo

It was probably on the suggestion of Matsuda Kurō that his friend Suzuki Muneo, an unaffiliated member of the LDP, first declared an interest in entering the faction during 1987. Negotiations took place and Kaifu gave a speech in support of Suzuki in his Hokkaidō constituency. However, the talks came to nothing, and Suzuki himself finally decided not to join.⁷⁰ Fears had earlier been expressed in the faction that he was too close to Kanemaru Shin, a power behind Takeshita. According to the contemporary view of one faction member, “Maybe what we are hearing is not the way of thinking of Suzuki but rather Matsuda. We must question the meaning and depth of Suzuki’s contacts with Kanemaru and others”.⁷¹

Case Study 2: Niita Kōji

Foreign Ministry bureaucrat Niita Kōji was introduced to Kaifu by one Sasaki, a member of the Hokkaidō prefectural assembly and contemporary of the latter in the Waseda University Oratorical Society.⁷² According to Niita’s account, his first meeting with Kaifu - the initial direct contact with the faction - was in January 1986. In the belief that Niita had the necessary potential as a candidate, Kaifu arranged for an analysis to be carried out of Hokkaidō # 1 constituency (embracing Niita’s home town) and, as a result, decided to support his candidature. Introductions were arranged with various members of the faction,⁷³ with whom there was an exchange of views about the prevailing situation in the constituency and expected movements involving other candidates and support groups.

Use was made of their *jinmyaku* in Hokkaidō # 1. According to Niita, political questions and policy issues affecting the region were rarely mentioned on these occasions.

Niita saw his first task as building a solid base for his *kōenkai* and an information network. His next concern was to develop the campaign through raising the issues he felt to be important to the people of the constituency by discussing them within the framework of a symposium to be held in Sapporo. Part of Niita's funding was from Kaifu, and part from the faction through Kaifu. Requests for aid were also made through the *jinmyaku* developed by Niita when he was in the Foreign Ministry. While building up his *kōenkai*, Niita could be communicated with through Kaifu's Tōkyō office,⁷⁴ and he referred to himself as a member of the Kaifu group (as opposed to Kōmoto faction).

Losing New Candidates

Support from a faction, though beneficial, was not a prerequisite for receiving official recognition. Recognition by the party as a superior contender might be sufficient. Thus a faction which had been in contact with a candidate had to work to strengthen if not formalize the connection, lest the latter leave ambiguous the answer to the question of which faction he would enter if elected,⁷⁵ thereby hoping to benefit by receiving support from several factions all hoping to entice him into membership. Indeed, in addition to maximizing support, keeping all options open presented other advantages. Since the strongest competition in a constituency often came from within the party, a clever candidate might be able to persuade more than one faction to desist from supporting an adversary or, at least, give less than whole-hearted assistance.⁷⁶

The result of an election might strengthen or weaken some factions, effecting changes in the balance of power among them.⁷⁷ There might be advantages in affiliating given the

altered circumstances. The faction, of course, preferred an early promise of affiliation and various ways existed to put pressure on the would-be Diet member. One was to threaten to put up another candidate. A second was to withhold some level of support, possibly financial or an introduction to a vote-broker. Although the candidate would have his own intelligence network in the constituency, a faction could supplement the volume and quality of information coming in about the strengths and weaknesses of all the candidates, including himself.

Dissatisfaction with the support given by a faction might result in the candidate loosening his ties with it. Approaches to and from other factions might occur.⁷⁸ The Miki faction, in particular, did not distribute unlimited amounts of money during election campaigns. Not infrequently, when it was thought that a candidate had little chance of being elected, comparatively little support was offered.

There were prefectures where particular factions were seen to be powerful. Intending candidates might take advantage of this strength, perceived or real, but finally decline to enter the faction. For instance, largely due to the efforts of Miki himself, his faction was relatively strong in Shikoku. Figure 5.1 gives a partial list of successful conservative candidates who were given support by and were expected to enter the Miki/Kōmoto faction, but eventually affiliated elsewhere. According to the Miki office, one of the people listed⁷⁹ had given it good reason to believe that he would join the faction. Quite apart from the support he was given, he often paid visits to the office prior to the election. On being elected, however, although he went to thank Miki's staff for all they had done,⁸⁰ he joined another faction. It seems likely that this had been agreed beforehand. The likely reason was that he had thereby stopped that faction from supporting a powerful challenger, also standing for the first time.⁸¹ A second potential member changed affiliation prior to an

Figure 5.1

An incomplete list of successful conservative candidates who, contrary to earlier expectation, did not enter the Miki/Kōmoto faction

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TOCHIGI#2

Inamura Toshiyuki (Satō)

NIIGATA#4

Takatori Osamu (Satō)

HYŌGO#1

Ishii Hajime (Satō)

NAGASAKI#1

Kyūma Fumio (Tanaka)

KUMAMOTO#1

Kitaguchi Hiroshi (Ōhira)

KUMAMOTO#2

Yoshinaga Haruji (Nakasone)

KAGOSHIMA#1

Nagano Sukenari (Nakasone)

KAGOSHIMA#2

Arima Motoharu (Satō)

HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS

KUMAMOTO

Urata Masaru (Tanaka)

MIYAZAKI

Uesugi Mitsuhiro (Tanaka/Takeshita)

Note: The faction entered is in brackets

election to stop that faction from carrying out its explicit threat of supporting another candidate.⁸²

Support from the Faction during the Election Campaign

One very important function for the faction was to acquire official recognition in an election for its candidates. Without this endorsement, it was more difficult for the would-be Diet member to present himself as a serious contender. Although he would nevertheless receive material aid from the faction, open support would invite severe criticism from the candidates recognized by the LDP in the constituency.

Close cooperation took place between the local office of the faction member and Kōmoto's office during an election.⁸³ There was a continual exchange of information, and the supply of resources provided (speakers, financial aid, printed materials, etc.) could be increased and switched among constituencies if and when the need arose. Senior members, particularly those with Cabinet experience, were expected to speak in support of fellow faction members. One member of the faction⁸⁴ in a particularly difficult constituency bemoaned the lack of nationally known senior colleagues who could draw large crowds. In addition to Kōmoto, Kaifu and Yamashita, only Niwa, regarded as an authority on agricultural issues, was seen by him as being at all efficacious in eliciting support; the rest he felt to be useless!

Between elections, the Kōmoto faction aided former members attempting to regain a lost seat. In addition to providing financial assistance and offering help in building up their *jinmyaku*, events were held inside and outside their constituencies to drum up support and enthusiasm. For instance, five hundred women in the *kōenkai* of one recently defeated candidate⁸⁵ were treated to a weekend holiday at a hot spring resort located in

the constituency of a faction member.⁸⁶ The group spent one evening listening to the views of another member on certain aspects of government policy.⁸⁷ In such a manner could help be given reciprocally; the first faction member would certainly have received some benefit in return for having “introduced” a large number of customers to the *ryokan*. The ex-Diet member opened his own office in Tōkyō in order to keep informed of what was happening in the party and Diet, and develop links with companies having their headquarters in the capital. He claimed to spend ten days out of every twenty in the constituency trying to build up support.

The 1986 Election Campaign of a Junior Member

Kōmoto took charge of the faction’s strategy for the 1986 elections, and called an extraordinary general meeting for early June at which present (excluding retiring), former and intending members attended. The first step for every candidate was to set up a campaign headquarters in his own constituency. That of Ōshima Tadamori⁸⁸ was to be found in a prefabricated building specially erected for the purpose in the city of Hachinohe, where most of his support was centred. A large area was needed: part to be utilized by the campaign workers and part for visitors.

Two fellow members of the LDP, Takenaka Shūichi and Tsushima Yūji, representing the Tanaka and Suzuki factions respectively, were particularly strong in Aomori city, the prefectural capital. One reason Ōshima maintained a low profile (a small office off a main street) in that city was so as not unduly to antagonize them or give them a reason actively to electioneer in Hachinohe, where the fourth LDP candidate, Tanabu Masami of the Fukuda faction,⁸⁹ also had his base. There appeared to be a tacit understanding among the conservative candidates not to “unnecessarily invade” the stronghold of the others. In

many towns and villages in the constituency converted open-fronted shops, inviting to the passer-by, served as Ōshima's campaign branches.

Within Ōshima's election headquarters, the largest room was set aside for people who wished to enter the building to discuss some problem they had, offer support, or just relax. Along the walls were posters expressing support for Ōshima's candidacy. Prominently on display were separate messages of support from the top officers of the party irrespective of faction, in their capacities as president, vice-president, secretary-general, chairman of the Executive Council and chairman of the PARC. Other non-Kōmoto faction endorsements were from Matsuo Kanpei, a member of the Tanaka faction in the Upper House representing the Aomori constituency and not up for re-election until 1989, and Tamaki Kazuo, head of a cross-factional grouping of Diet members to which Ōshima belonged.⁹⁰ All the other declarations of support from National Diet members came from members of the Kōmoto faction, particularly those whose names were known by the local people.⁹¹ Clearly, in an election, the most senior party members had to be seen to support all LDP candidates, notwithstanding faction affiliation.

In Ōshima's promotional material, photographs were used to give the appearance that he had been engaged in deep discussion with leading members of the party such as the prime minister and secretary-general.⁹² Other photographs saw him at the side of Kōmoto and Kaifu. The former was meant to impress constituents; the latter served this purpose too, but additionally displayed factional affiliation partly for respect. Membership of the Kōmoto faction was not explicitly mentioned, but given great prominence was Ōshima's label as an "LDP recognized" candidate. This was also true for speeches he made during the campaign both at public meetings and on television. On some of these occasions he would state that, in common with the faction, he had been against the calling of an

election, opposition to which appeared to be widespread among people who came to hear him speak. However, generally it was not thought to be advantageous for the candidate to refer to Kōmoto, the work of the faction, or his affiliation.

Kōmoto, Kaifu and a few other faction members who were anticipated to draw large crowds came separately to speak for Ōshima's candidacy. They had to sacrifice time ideally spent in their own constituencies, but their support bases were considered to be safe without their uninterrupted presence, and they needed the continual goodwill of the junior and middle-ranking members in order to minimize criticism from within and maintain the cohesion and unity of the faction. Providing support during an election campaign was seen to be one method of temporarily stilling remonstrance about the faction's weakness. Notwithstanding the fact that the leadership had passed to somebody else, Miki too used to spend only one or two days in his own constituency in order that he could travel around the country speaking in support of Kōmoto faction members.⁹³ It was in the interest of all faction members that a vigorous effort was made for every one of them to be re-elected.

In many constituencies there was open antagonism among the LDP candidates, but there was no evidence of such a feeling existing between Ōshima and his rivals. There was indeed a degree of cooperation between them (particularly with Tanabu for whom the Hachinohe vote was equally important) over such questions as the location and timing of certain speech meetings. For instance, the official campaign opened with Ōshima elucidating his ideas to a large audience outside Hachinohe City Hall. The moment his procession of cars pulled away, Tanabu and his fleet of mobile supporters, who had been quietly waiting in a back street, came into sight and used the same pitch.

Members of the House of Councillors, whose constituencies covered whole prefectures, cooperated with some of the Lower House members irrespective of factional affiliation.⁹⁴

Help was of course sought and given by people standing for the same faction but, with much larger constituencies, Upper House members expected support from more than a single Lower House member within one electoral boundary. Ōshima spoke in the campaign of the official LDP candidate standing for the Tanaka faction. This was a difficult decision for him to take, not because of factional considerations but on account of earlier cooperation with the unaffiliated incumbent, Yamazaki Tatsuo, who belonged to the same faction but had lost the endorsement of the party. Kita Shūji helped more than one member of the LDP in the Lower House in Hokkaidō with his supporters apportioned out among the candidates. According to one of his secretaries, "An attempt is made not to alienate people with whom one may have to work."⁹⁵ Kita also left his constituency during the 1986 election⁹⁶ to drum up support for some members of the Kōmoto faction. His high standing in the *Nōkyō*, for instance, stood him in good stead in rural areas.

During the campaign, Ōshima met some of his financial backers and spoke quite freely with them about certain aspects of factional affairs. To one, for instance, in answer to a query about the extent of financial support received from Kōmoto himself, he claimed that the faction leader had been generous with money, even subsequent to the bankruptcy of *Sankō*. A few of Ōshima's supporters appeared to enjoy a closer relationship with the candidate than did the faction as an organization.

Following the election, the faction arranged a celebration party for all its members. This provided the opportunity for fellow members to be formally thanked for help given and served to strengthen the links among them. There was also a separate party given by the LDP for all the candidates elected for the first time.

Conclusion

At the centre of the Miki faction was a group of Diet members whose prior loyalty was to him and not the party. These links came about over time and were as much a reflection of the personal warmth felt towards the leader as an individual as an expression of concurrence on political philosophy or stance. There were also secondary and tertiary levels of membership. On the surface there was little difference with the people in the nucleus. Faction support would be expected by and given to them during elections and they would attend faction meetings as well as undertake work requested. However, faction consciousness was not strong nor was membership valued as such.

In extreme cases, movements inside the party could result in defection. The change of leadership in the faction brought concomitant modifications in emphasis, both in the manner and method of internal operation and in the dynamics of movement inside the party. The transition was not without problems. Although he inherited the faction, Kōmoto could not take over from Miki the complicated web of interpersonal relations. Initially this was partly compensated for by the fact that the faction was once again considered to have a candidate for the presidency of the party; this acted as a unifying factor. With the bankruptcy of his company, however, Kōmoto's hopes for the premiership were apparently extinguished and dissatisfaction among the members grew. Eight years and three elections after becoming faction leader, Kōmoto could point to only a tiny minority of its new members having joined through having a primary contact with him. In many cases the candidates had merely taken advantage of a pre-existing link between their predecessors and Miki. The small size and weakness of the faction was both cause and effect of the unhappiness felt within it. The disadvantages of affiliation easily outweighed the benefits and thus it was extremely difficult for the faction to attract new members.

However, it was simpler for existing members to develop secondary ties than disaffiliate completely.

Various viewpoints on all aspects of policy were to be found in the faction but those of Kōmoto would finally prevail, and become its official (stated) posture. Although members would continue to hold dissenting views, it was not thought necessary to stress differences in public. Particularly during election campaigns, support from the faction was expected and given. The physical presence of some senior members was demanded both to reassure powerful supporters in private meetings and persuade constituents in speech meetings. It is likely that the candidates themselves saw no advantage in specifying their membership of the Kōmoto faction. What was important was to be seen as a recognized candidate for the LDP.

Notes and References

- 1 After the Kōmoto faction was established, Miki, on being asked by Asano Mikio what his feelings were, said that there was the sense of relief; he compared running a faction to a *jitensha sōgyō* - when one stops pedalling, the bicycle collapses. In other words, to keep the faction going, funds had to be injected continually. Asano, *op. cit.*
- 2 Nakamura Keiichirō and Ogino Akemi, interviews.
- 3* There is a curious story regarding their early relationship told to the author by a confidant of Miki, who heard it from two independent sources. Apparently, while still a very junior member of the Diet, Kōmoto, who had drunk considerably at a *ryōtei* that particular evening, accidentally smashed a vase - their prize possession. Happening to enter at an opportune moment, Miki was able to soothe the feelings of the owner and, in so doing, won Kōmoto's gratitude. The writer's informant asked Miki to comment on the episode but he declined to do so. A second person confirmed that Kōmoto, who no longer took alcohol, used to be a heavy drinker.
- 4 This is not to say, of course, that there was widespread dissatisfaction over the change of leadership. On the contrary, it was welcomed by many members who hoped for an improvement in the fortunes of the faction inside the LDP.
- 5* To take the example of a local politician, a prefectural assemblyman for Tokushima was close to Miki and counted himself as a member of Miki's "group". For him, however, this did not signify that he should enter the Kōmoto faction if he decided to stand for the National Assembly. He had already been approached by Katō Kōichi of the Miyazawa faction, and professed that he would prefer to enter that faction while maintaining links with the Kōmoto faction. Private communication, 20 February 1988.
- 6 Although elected the same number of times as Kōmoto, Akagi had entered the National Diet earlier.
- 7 On 6 October 1983, at a meeting of faction executives and members elected on between one and three occasions, it was agreed that were Tanaka to be found guilty in the Lockheed trial, he should resign from the Diet. *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 October 1983. Inside the faction undoubtedly there were differing views as to the wisdom of publicly taking such a stance. The fact that such a statement could be made to the press indicates the consciousness of continuity under new leadership inside the faction, and the necessity felt in the faction to be seen as a unified body.
- 8 Mori Yoshihide, interview. It is worthy of mention that both Fukuda and Suzuki continued to attend meetings of the Abe and Miyazawa factions respectively.
- 9 Among others, the author recalls seeing Usui, Kōmoto and Ōshima. Former members Ide Ichitarō and Itō Goro were present as were several LDP members from other factions including Matsuno Raizō. Opponents from Tokushima, Akita Daisuke and Morishita Motoharu both attended. Gotōda Masaharu, long a thorn in Miki's side, sent a telegram of congratulation.
- 10 The name and character were taken from Miki's wife, Mutsuko.
- 11 Miki Mutsuko, interview, and the wife of Ide Ichitarō, private communication. All wives automatically belonged although some did not attend even once.
- 12 Miki's resignation from the Kishi Cabinet provided such an example. *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 December 1958.
- 13 The families of Matsuura Shūtarō and Matsumoto Takizō were two such examples. Miki Mutsuko, interview.

- 14 These were murky groups connected to and with their headquarters in the LDP, which collected money and information from the Diet.
- 15 This characterization of faction members draws heavily on material information from at least two people in each case from among the following sources: members of the Miki family, current and former secretaries of Miki, former members of the Miki faction and journalists who had covered the Miki faction.
- 16 Four such people were Kumagai Yoshio, Itō Gorō, Matsumoto Takizō and Fujii Masao.
- 17 Takaoka Daisuke, Suzuki Shōgo and Kiyose Ichirō had all belonged to the *Jikyoku Dōshikai*.
- 18* It is possible that one former member was instrumental in introducing the others. Miki was very close to Kōno Kinshō, who had stood unsuccessfully for the *Tōhōkai* in 1942. Members who joined Miki's faction included Suzuki Shōgo, Usui Sōichi and Satsuma Yūji. According to two sources, Shionoya Kazuo, first elected in 1967, had been a disciple of Nakano Seigo, who led the *Tōhōkai*. Not all former members who entered the post-war Diet affiliated with Miki's faction. Shindō Kazuma was one such example of a non-joiner. Others, such as Honjō Shinjirō who stood for Tōkyō # 4, were unable to regain their seats.
- 19 That is, the organization of Agricultural Cooperative Unions.
- 20 In this category can be placed Nakamura Torata, Fujii Katsushi, Takahashi Yūnosuke, Kawaguchi Yōichi, Nukumi Saburō and Sakamoto Chikao. A member of the House of Councillors, Kubo Kanichi, provided the introductions for and to Nakamura Teiji, Hatsumura Takiichirō, Nishioka Takeo, Matsuda Kurō and Kyūma Fumio (who eventually joined the Tanaka faction), amongst others. In Kumamoto, Kitaguchi Tatsunori entered the faction on the introduction of Sonoki Noboru. His son sought election to the House of Representatives under the banner of the Ōhira faction because standing in the same constituency were both Matsuno Raizō, who was close to Miki, and Fujita Yoshimitsu, who retained some contact with the faction. Ogino, interview.
- 21 For instance, Tanaka Satoru was the brother-in-law of Miki Mutsuko. Dr. Suganami Shigeru (who had been close to Kawashima Shōjirō) entered the Miki faction on the recommendation of his cousin, Kujiraoka Hyōsuke; he was also Miki's physician.
- 22 Thus former Ishii faction member Tanaka Isaji entered the Miki faction very late in his political career, but left after it was taken over by Kōmoto.
- 23 Namely Niwa, Kaifu, Kujiraoka, Sakamoto Misoji, Yamashita, Kitagawa, Kudō, Matsuda, Hatsumura and Sakamoto Chikao.
- 24 Mori was the brother of Miki Mutsuko.
- 25 The three were Fujimoto, Shiga and Usui.
- 26 Akagi, who had belonged to the defunct Kishi faction, lost his seat in the 1976 election. In an interview, he said that he was able to keep abreast of developments in politics by accepting invitations to participate in various study group meetings held by people in and close to the Miki faction. Akagi mentioned that he was able to frequent the Miki office and receive much aid and information from, among others, faction member Ide Ichitarō. This was despite the fact that he was not a member of the Diet nor had ever been a member of the faction. It was to repay this help and support received during the 1979 election campaign that Akagi joined the Miki faction.
- 27 This was Kita Katsutarō, father of Shūji.
- 28 In 1958, Kondō was seconded from the Ministry of Finance to the Economic Planning Agency to serve under Miki, who was the Director-General.

- 29 Before his election defeat in 1963, Itō had belonged to the Kōno faction, which he had covered as a journalist for the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. He stood as a member of the Miki faction in 1967, two years after Kōno's death, on account of links he had formed with it while working for the newspaper company. Itō, interview. Tanikawa Noboru, a member of the Liberal Party, died suddenly on the day after the 1955 election. Three years later, his son, Kazuo, was elected to the House of Representatives as an independent. According to Tanikawa, it was on the advice of Nadao Hirokichi, a friend of his father elected from a neighbouring constituency, that he entered the Miki faction. Nadao, Miki and Ikeda were on friendly terms in the Kishi Cabinet. Nadao did not have his own faction and Ikeda was elected from the same constituency as Tanikawa. Tanikawa, interview.
- 30 Iwasaki was not interviewed.
- 31 They were Kōmura, Ōshima, Noro, Ide and Murakami.
- 32 Hozumi worked as a secretary to Shibuya Naozō.
- 33* The last time this faction member met Tanaka was three days before his stroke.
- 34 For instance, the writer was shown a written introduction to Sasakawa Ryōichi, a man who was said to be very powerful behind the scenes of the political world. Sasakawa had been classified as a war criminal, but later achieved fame as a benefactor. Part of his fortune came from the control of motor boat racing in Japan.
- 35 It should be stressed that it was with Tanaka personally that a close relationship existed. This member's ties with the former prime minister's faction weakened with the leadership going to Takeshita, an individual he disliked.
- 36*
- 37* According to another faction member, one politician who as a senior bureaucrat had served directly under one faction leader and, in his election campaign, had been given much support by a second, decided to join the faction of a third, hoping thereby to alienate neither of the other two. Nevertheless, his political career was hampered by the anger felt by one of the two faction leaders, who felt slighted.
- 38*
- 39 Nishiyama, interview.
- 40 In Japanese, Miki *chokkei*.
- 41*
- 42*
- 43* For instance, G looked down on Kaifu whom he saw as an opportunist, partly because earlier he had been a secretary to a Diet member. H and Kaifu strongly disliked each other, a state of affairs that might have come about as a direct result of the jealousy the former was said to feel towards the latter for being more favoured by Miki.
- 44 The classic if old example of opposing views being held within one faction was over the question of relations with China in the 1960's. The pro-Taiwan *Asia Mondai Kenkyūkai* counted among its members six people in the Miki faction of whom one, Tanikawa, was an executive. Kujiraoka, Kaifu and Niwa were three of the nine faction members belonging to the pro-China *Asia-Africa Mondai Kenkyūkai*. All six members of the Matsumura group were associated with the latter and three of them were executives. Miki and Kōmoto participated in neither grouping. *Sankei Shimbun*, 4 May 1965. In 1986, in answer to an *Asahi Shimbun* questionnaire on whether or not there should be a dissolution of the Diet, 12% were For, 80% were Against and Others were 8%. These responses changed to 12%, 72% and 16% respectively when

- the question included the condition that an attempt were first to be made to redress the over-representation of rural constituencies. See *Asahi Shimbun*, 5, 27 April 1986. In answer to another questionnaire from the same source, six out of the 448 LDP members expressed opposition to the proposed Sales Tax that was being put forward energetically by the party. The six hailed from Tōkyō constituencies and were drawn from all five main factions, the single Kōmoto faction member being Kujiraoka. Only 17 LDP members returned the questionnaire. Secretary-General Takeshita said that non-return would indicate approval. *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 February 1987.
- 45 During the run-up to the 1987 presidential election, at a time when Kōmoto was drawing closer to Takeshita, in an obvious reference to the Shimane politician, Kujiraoka made a speech in his (Takeshita's) constituency in which he criticized politics involving the gathering of people by money. He had been invited to speak in his capacity as former Director-General of the Environment Agency. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 June 1987. Indeed the writer heard many different opinions from faction members on who should succeed Nakasone as prime minister.
- 46 There were occasions when individual members of the Miki faction departed or were expelled. For instance, Utsunomiya Tokuma left the faction and party when moves were afoot to bring down the Miki regime. On two occasions a group of people withdrew: the Matsumura group left in protest at Miki's recommendation of Satō to succeed Ikeda as party president, and the Hayakawa group left as a result of the faction supporting Tanaka over Fukuda in the 1972 presidential election.
- 47 This was the view held by most members of the faction. Some, including Hozumi and Hatsumura, stressed the importance of there being an overall consensus; Murakami and Kita among others mentioned an elevated role for the executives and Noro said that procedurally the decision was entrusted to the leader although finally it was the will of all. According to Shiga, Kōmoto viewed policy in all fields from a perspective centring on economic objectives.
- 48* Significant contributions to LDP policy might have been made in the larger, more powerful factions.
- 49 This was officially breached during the Nakasone regime. On leaving office, Nakasone called on Miki's wife (the former prime-minister being ill) to give *aisatsu*. She remonstrated with him for allowing defence expenditure to break through the 1% barrier. *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 November 1987.
- 50* Views on defence spending inside the faction differed widely. Opinions that could be described as hawkish were held by, among others, the three former Directors-General of the Defence Agency (Akagi, Itō and Tanikawa) as well as Matsuda and Kōnoike. One senior faction member mentioned to Nakamura Keiichirō that, in his opinion, Kōmoto did not understand the issues involved.
- 51 There was a consistency in Kōmoto's economic policies. For instance, the first and last measures were called for at least as early as 1977. *Asahi Shimbun*, 31 August 1977.
- 52* Noro referred to the faction as the conscience of the LDP, and Murakami stressed the important role he saw the faction as having, namely, being a check on the "excesses" of the party.
- 53 According to Hirakawa, before the return of the depurgees the atmosphere had been more informal. In addition, the large number of "second generation" Diet members served to stiffen *sempai - kōhai* relationships.

- 54 It was said that there were members of the Tanaka faction who could not recognise all the others.
- 55 Ide Shōichi, interview.
- 56 The author is unaware of any detailed empirical evidence on this issue. However, 17.8% of 1,069 respondents answering a questionnaire following the 1983 House of Representatives Election claimed to attach importance to the faction of the candidate they voted for. No distinction was made between the LDP and Socialist Party factions. Watanuki Jōji, *et.al.*, *Electoral Behaviour in the 1983 Japanese Elections*, Institute of International Relations, Sophia University, 1986, p.200.
- 57 Shiga, interview.
- 58 This can be translated as “mezzanine floor”.
- 59 The term older brother (*aniki*) was used to describe the role performed by the senior politician.
- 60 Mori, interview. Certainly the antipathy felt by Tanaka towards Miki was a factor in the “relegation” of the Miki/Kōmoto faction to a secondary position in the party.
- 61 That the Kōmoto faction found it extremely difficult to recruit new members can be seen quite clearly from a newspaper listing of previously non-affiliated Diet members who joined a faction, and another showing intending candidates for the 1989 Proportional Representation House of Councillors Election. See *Sankei Shimbun*, 20 January 1987, and *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 May 1988 respectively.
- 62 Of course, in individual cases, the faction would have as allies the factions of the other LDP candidates in the constituency.
- 63* Potential candidates unlikely to be given official recognition could be bribed not to stand. One person interviewed admitting that there had been many rumours to this effect, denied that he had postponed his candidature to a later election after accepting money from the then secretary-general.
- 64 They were Miki, Moriyama Kinji, Ōnishi, Mori and Kawada.
- 65 Members of other parties were also asked for help.
- 66 Such constituents might nevertheless be thought to be able to continue “supplying” votes during an election.
- 67 It was not just a question of finding a candidate. The person who was to succeed had to be acceptable to the *kōenkai*. Kōmoto’s help and advice could be asked for and given. To take an example from another faction, as the successor to the late Sumi Eisaku (Suzuki/Miyazawa faction), his son was favoured by the faction. Its general manager, Katō Kōichi, went to discuss his acceptability with the head of the *kōenkai*. Private communication from head of the *kōenkai*. At a general meeting of the Kōmoto faction on 27 May 1986, Fujii Katsushi, on announcing his intention not to run in the next election, explained that he had made an effort to find someone to take over his seat, but regrettably had been unsuccessful. *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 May 1986.
- 68 A good example would be the heir to a family of sake brewers; in such a case there might be a ready-made *jiban*.
- 69 Local politicians often had close links with their national brethren and some hoped to be put forward as successors in the case of retirement or death.
- 70 Matsuda, interview.
- 71* See *Mainichi Shimbun*, 7 June 1987.
- 72* An earlier but unsuccessful approach was made by Niita to Takeshita Noboru. Confidant of Niita, personal communication.

- 73 One was Kita Shūji, member of the House of Councillors for Hokkaidō. Between January and August 1986, Niita held discussions with Kōmoto twice and certain other members three or four times each. Niita, interview.
- 74 The Tōkyō office telephone number on Niita's namecard was that of Kaifu.
- 75 Some candidates wished to enter no faction.
- 76 It was rare for one faction to support multiple candidates in a single constituency.
- 77 Of course the situation might change again with the next general election.
- 78 An offer of a sizeable increase in funding could sway some candidates. Uesugi Mitsuhiro, who had unsuccessfully stood for the Lower House on several occasions for the Kōmoto faction, turned to Tanaka Kakuei for support, and was elected to the Upper House in 1986. Kōmoto faction member Sakamoto Chikao acted as an intermediary. Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, *Tanaka Shihai*, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1985, pp.144-150. This illustrates both Tanaka's power and the complexity of inter-factional relationships.
- 79*
- 80*
- 81 Iwano Miyoji, secretary to Miki.
- 82 The name of neither the candidate nor the faction were provided to the writer.
- 83 Outside of election campaigns, contacts between the two offices were rare, being made only if detailed materials were required, if it was a problem concerning a group of lobbyists, or if a very important matter came up such as the appearance of a potential challenger in the constituency. Bōda, interview.
- 84* Many members of the faction told the writer that the lack of "star speakers" was a big disadvantage during election campaigns.
- 85*
- 86*
- 87*
- 88 The writer, while recognizing the dangers of inductive reasoning, concentrates on one of the two election campaigns he followed in July 1986.
- 89 The fifth candidate was Seki Haremasa.
- 90 See Chapter 6.
- 91 There were also endorsements from the local *Nōkyō* and people of importance in the business community.
- 92 Miki himself made no mention of the LDP in his election promotion material. Other than the appearance of his own name on the posters, there was just a statement declaring that he was for clean and trustworthy politics. This signified the importance of the personal vote. Possibly, only some of the senior politicians could rely solely on their names. Most of the Kōmoto faction members used catchphrases. In the case of Ōshima it was "Think and Action". The leaflet inviting membership in Matsuda's *kōenkai* included photographs of him together with Nakasone and Kanemaru as well as various *sumō* wrestlers and actors. Matsuda was also shown conversing with a few junior members of the Diet including Suzuki Muneo. In very little of the promotional material seen by the writer was faction membership or the name of Kōmoto made explicit. In that of Tanikawa, a *kōenkai* publication dated 10 May 1987, eight faction members, both senior and junior, declared their support for him with several expressing the hope that he would become prime minister in the future. No significant meaning could be attached to this since similar statements of endorsement were made for other faction members. It was a question of mutual help. In promotional material,

political philosophy and policy proposals were left vague; general statements such as “adopting the correct political posture” and “acting positively” were favoured and, no doubt, thought safer.

- 93 Tani Fusako, secretary to Miki. Of course, due to illness, Miki was unable to campaign in the 1986 election.
- 94 Members of both Houses had to campaign simultaneously in 1986.
- 95 Mochizuki Masaaki, secretary to Kita, interview.
- 96 Kita himself was not up for re-election in 1986.

Chapter 6

THE FACTION AND ITS MEMBERSHIP: EXTERNAL ASSOCIATION

Introduction

The LDP received its mandate to govern through the occupancy of a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The factions, which were its constituent elements,¹ reaped the fruits of belonging to the ruling party by operating as a unified body. They were, however, separate organizations with distinct histories which in many cases predated that of the LDP, and they remained under its umbrella because they saw it to be in their interest to do so.

In addition to the formal and informal channels of communication existing among factions, connections were forged and developed between individual factions on the one hand, and opposition parties and subgroups thereof on the other. Networks of contacts extended beyond the national political arena to the local political stage and further still. Factions and their members devoted much time and attached great importance to building up networks which embraced the bureaucracy, industry and finance, the press, pressure groups, and a host of other organizations.

The Faction Inside the Party

Co-existence between the factions has not always been tranquil. Individual factions fared differently with a change in the party leader. Resentment over the number or quality of party and government posts received could threaten party unity as, for instance, could disapproval of the prime minister or anger at a course of action taken by the government.

Nevertheless disaffiliation would rarely be considered a viable course of action. It was unlikely that an alternative government could be formed through the cooperation of all or some of the opposition parties and, moreover, there was enormous pressure on every faction to remain in the party. Many faction members were loath to leave the security offered by the LDP. In addition, opposition could be expected from their *kōenkai*, and influential business leaders might be tempted to threaten the withholding of funds, as the breakup of the party might adversely affect confidence in the health and future of the economy. However, dissent could be displayed while remaining inside the party and with severe consequences for the government.² Thus an effort was made to retain at least a certain level of support from all factions in the party.

For much of its history the LDP was made up of a mainstream and an anti-(or non-) mainstream. The factions in the former held a majority of party seats³ and provided from their ranks the prime minister and most people for the treasured posts; factions in the latter shared the lesser spoils.⁴ Coalitions were made and broken and the fortunes of each faction varied over time. A major factor in determining where power lay was the relative numerical strengths of the factions. Control of a large number of Diet members, and hence their votes, gave the faction leader an influential voice in the party and made him sought after as an ally. One check on his power was the existence of a real or potential adversary who, under certain circumstances, was thought to be capable of taking control of a superior coalition of forces. Although arithmetical considerations might be paramount in settling the distribution of power, an important role was also played by the dynamics of inter-personal relationships. Bonds of friendship between two leaders⁵ as well as reasons of necessity,⁶ prudence⁷ and opportunity⁸ came into play in the making and breaking of compacts.

In the days, weeks and months leading up to a presidential election, inter-factional activity was intense, with moves and counter-moves continually being made in the hope of bringing about the formation or dissolution of conceived alliances.⁹ Faction members utilized their *jinmyaku*; many were entrusted with or took upon themselves the role of messengers between their faction and another. Rumours were plentiful and of themselves might direct and change factional strategy. Money was proffered and promised to members of all ranks inside and outside the faction. The ability and competence of the faction leader to conduct a superior if not successful strategy was under the microscope with potential usurpers hovering in the wings.

The events culminating in the accession to the premiership of Takeshita Noboru provide one example of inter-factional manoeuvring prior to a presidential election. As a reward for the overwhelming victory won by the LDP in the elections of July 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone was given an extension of one year in office. The following year, four candidates fought for the right to succeed him: Miyazawa Kiichi, Abe Shintarō, Nikaidō Susumu and Takeshita. A close friendship was seen to exist between Abe and Takeshita but the support of a third faction was necessary to capture a majority of LDP seats. Without a presidential candidate of its own and desperate to move closer to the centre of power from which it had been adrift for eleven years, the Kōmoto faction was the most likely collaborator.

In the months leading up to the election, there were frequent contacts between the factions at all levels, many hidden from the public and press. Fund-raising parties acted as magnets¹⁰ in drawing the presence of representatives from other factions and there were many occasions when a small number of people from two factions met informally over an evening's entertainment.¹¹ Kōmoto faction members in particular were often feted.

Sensing that there was a greater chance of “backing the right horse” if he allied himself with Takeshita and Abe, Kōmoto reacted positively to their approaches while distancing himself from Miyazawa and Nikaidō. The prospect of securing a position near the centre of power in the party was more important than joining forces with another faction because of a common political philosophy or desired programme of measures.

Clearly under instructions from their leaders, the vast majority of members from the Takeshita and Abe factions came to Kōmoto’s fund-raising party on 14 October 1987;¹² indeed they were bussed in. In the reception area they embraced each other and exchanged greetings in a manner befitting long lost friends. A great show was made to display to outsiders the existence of close bonds between the two factions. Between individual members there were close friendships, but as a spectacle the manner of greeting was pretence, a sham. During the function itself, while speeches were made praising Kōmoto, his leadership and faction,¹³ members of the Takeshita and Abe factions sat in silence right and left of centre stage where the Kōmoto faction members remained on their feet as if to acknowledge their support. In his speech Kōmoto stressed that through a coalition Takeshita and Abe could hold the premiership between them for eight years. At the same time he was careful not to express a preference between them lest he back the wrong one.

Kōmoto’s position was not strong enough to give him the influence to settle which of the two leaders should become prime-minister. Regrettably for him, Takeshita and Abe were unable to agree on who should succeed Nakasone. Unsuccessful in acquiring Kōmoto faction support, the Miyazawa faction wooed the Abe faction, which in terms of numerical strength was much weaker than that of Takeshita, and thus gave Abe confidence to press his claim strongly.¹⁴ Since they were unable to agree among themselves, all three candidates finally agreed to let Nakasone determine who his own successor would be, and

consequently Kōmoto was given no credit for the coming into existence of the Takeshita regime.

For much of its history the Miki/Kōmoto faction was in the anti-or non-mainstream. Several factors accounted for its relative isolation. Members were said to be less rigidly hierarchically structured than in other factions; possibly this was partly a result of values picked up by Miki during his period as a student in America. This put Miki at a political disadvantage, it being said that his faction was "strange".¹⁵ It was unable to trace its lineage back to one of the main conservative parties, its leader had energetically opposed the formation of a unified conservative party in 1955, and the policies expounded in its name were characterized as dovish, liberal and progressive. The faction proved attractive to people on the periphery of the party - cause and effect at the same time. The consequent uneasy presence alongside the other factions felt from within, together with an inferiority in numbers of members, served to make difficult the development of close and long-term relationships with the other factions. As its successor, the Kōmoto faction inherited this unenviable position and moreover saw its relative numerical strength weaken still further through an inability to attract candidates to stand for election under its wing.

The Faction in the Decision-Making Processes of the Party and Diet

In addition to the prime minister, at any given time inside the party there were a number of Diet members who by virtue of the positions they held, their experience or their character, were able to exert strong influence on party policy and direction. For instance, the secretary-general was at the centre of party management. He played an important role in decision-making by reconciling views inside the party, exercised considerable power

over the granting of official recognition to conservative candidates standing for election and managed the financing of the party. The chairman of the Executive Council presided over an organization which discussed and determined important matters relating to the PARC. The Speakers of both Houses held broad authority over their agendas. The Chief Cabinet Secretary, usually a confidant of the prime minister, mediated and coordinated among Cabinet members and chaired the conference of administrative vice-ministers who themselves possessed significant influence on the decision-making process. The chairman of the LDP Diet Strategy Committee was the chief party negotiator for inter-party matters concerning, for instance, compromises on legislation. The two Diet Management Committee chairmen, sat over the bodies that managed the internal affairs of the Lower and Upper Houses.¹⁶ There were also a number of other Diet members who might exercise considerable sway as a consequence of their political (and possibly bureaucratic) careers.

Important posts tended to be given to members of the powerful factions or individuals acceptable to their leaders. Since its inception, on no occasion had a Kōmoto faction member held any of these positions. Kōmoto himself had occupied one of the three main party posts (secretary-general, chairman of PARC and chairman of the Executive Council); he was Executive Council chairman on two occasions. However both were prior to 1980.

Important roles in the formation of government policy were played by the Diet Committees and LDP Policy Affairs Research Council; in the latter there were to be found a Policy Deliberation Committee, various divisions, special committees and research commissions. The distribution of most posts in these organs was decided often by discussions among a group of Diet members representing every faction. Thus, for instance, membership of the LDP divisions was decided upon through consultation among the acting chairman of PARC (often having the same factional affiliation as the chairman) and the deputy

chairmen, who were delegated by all the factions. All would frequently be middle-ranking Diet members.¹⁷ The chairmen of the divisions were chosen after negotiations among the chairman of PARC, the secretary-general, faction leaders and other senior party members.

In deciding whom to place where, the background, ability and interests of the Diet member were considered. A person might be suitable for a post in one division but not another. For instance, with new appointments about to be made at the end of 1986, Matsuda, in America at the time, was telephoned by one of his secretaries who informed him that he could not be put in the division of his first choice. He then listed, in order of preference, the divisions he would like to be considered for and the secretary then passed on this information to a secretary of Shiga, who was a deputy chairman of the PARC.

Similarly, each faction had a deputy secretary-general. It was the Kōmoto faction representative, Tanikawa, who relayed to Kōmura the decision to offer him the Vice-Ministership of either Finance or Defence in the first Takeshita Cabinet; he chose Defence. Negotiations for these posts were held between the acting secretary-general and the deputies. It was a little easier for a Diet member to acquire a desired post if the person who had the power to make or greatly influence the decision, such as the secretary-general, was a member of the same faction. Not only was there likely to be a certain intimacy between them but moreover an approach could be made quicker.

In the distribution of posts, the relative numerical strengths of the factions were often borne in mind. The Kōmoto faction had less muscle than the others in pushing its members into the more important and financially promising posts. A powerful faction, particularly one with connections that had been built up over many years in an area of interest, might, for instance, be able to acquire the post of chairman of the division for one of its members in addition to having strong numerical representation.

Certain factions might be seen to be strong in an LDP division if they had as members individuals who were able to get their policies adopted. Known as *zoku giin*, through a combination of experience, expertise, *jinmyaku* and *kinmyaku*, certain Diet members were able to exert considerable influence within a ministry.¹⁸ However, it was very difficult to determine the extent to which the policies and way of thinking of a faction were reflected in, say, a division. One could not conclude that a faction “controlled” it merely through possessing superior representation. There was the question of quality against quantity. Furthermore, although factional considerations were important in allocating posts such as ministerships, vice-ministerships, division chairmen and chairmen of standing committees, it seems that it was the judgement of the individuals who occupied these positions which was paramount in determining policy.¹⁹ These views were unlikely to have been dictated by the faction and indeed the discussions that took place might be totally free from factional interference or pressure. According to one researcher, “in general the degree of direct factional intervention into the budget process is determined by the intensity of factional strife already present, brought on by other factors”.²⁰

Although faction members appeared to have freedom of action in making policy in Diet and party organs, they were expected to keep Kōmoto informed of what they were doing and what was happening. This applied all the way up the system. As Yamashita explained, “It must be remembered that while holding a ministerial or party post, because there is a faction to which we belong which has a leader who has the highest level of responsibility, it is natural that we seek the consent of Kōmoto”.²¹ Yamashita admitted that he and Kōmoto would not be in total agreement on all issues but that the faction leader was very tolerant to differences in policy views held by members within the limits of faction guidelines.

Cross-Factional Groups


Many cross-factional groups of LDP members explained their *raison d'être* as the necessity for a vehicle to articulate and press for the implementation (or not) of a set of party or policy proposals or an overall political philosophy. However, several came into existence as a manifestation of the ambition of one or more National Diet members to increase their influence in the party through being correctly or mistakenly perceived as the leaders of crypto-factions. Not all participants necessarily shared common goals or interpreted the significance of belonging in the same light. Membership was unlikely to bring with it demands and restrictions on action taken and words spoken which would invite conflict from the recognized factions and thereby threaten the group's existence. It was the formation and strengthening of the bonds among the participants that, some time in the future, might be depended and acted upon if and when the leader made a move. In the meantime participants were able to enjoy the fruits of belonging: money might be supplied, information disseminated and help given during elections. In addition, a less hierarchical set of relationships than was to be found inside a faction could characterize the structure of the group which might also provide an easy opportunity to develop friendships with fellow Diet members of equal or similar seniority.

The Religion and Politics Research Society was an example of a group purporting to be based on the study of policy but which was in fact little more than a political vehicle for its leader. Its existence posed a serious threat to the Kōmoto faction.²²

A second cross-factional group was the Forum for a Liberal Society (FLS).²³ In April 1983, four junior LDP politicians Hamada Takujirō, Ōta Seiichi and Shirakawa Katsuhito of the Suzuki faction and Funada Hajime, then unaffiliated,²⁴ came together through their eagerness to organize a formal group with a permanent research staff outside the

machinery of the LDP or any of its factions. By May 1987, the number had grown to eighteen current and two former members of the Diet, five of whom belonged to the Kōmoto faction.²⁵ Although by far the biggest number, ten, came from the Miyazawa (formerly Suzuki) faction, only the Nakasone faction remained unrepresented - and that by accident rather than design. In the same period of time, FLS employees had increased in number from two to eleven (see Figure 6.1 below).

Figure 6.1 The Administrative Organization of the FLS, as of June 1987



To enter the FLS one had to be recommended by either an existing member or a non-member close to one.²⁶ Officially the group preferred not to ask people to join; rather they hoped that a request would be made. One reason for this was to minimize any bad feeling towards the organization emanating from inside the aspirant's faction. No applicant was accepted if he hailed from the same constituency as a current member or if an objection within the group was raised. Diet members elected more times than the founders would probably not have applied for membership, one reason being that the hierarchical status

in the group might otherwise have been threatened.²⁷ In reality although not openly admitted, the FLS centred around Hamada Takujirō, a former bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance, who had a very sophisticated and extensive *jinmyaku* and was extremely proficient at gathering funds.²⁸

Quite apart from financial support,²⁹ FLS members received various benefits from membership. A monthly journal, *Shin Jidai*,³⁰ published by the group, in addition to containing various articles on politics, economics and topics in a lighter vein, included a two page spread on that member to whose *kōenkai* so many thousands or tens of thousands of copies were to be distributed. The largest printing was for that issue immediately preceding an election.³¹ The research staff of FLS conducted investigations into policy at the behest of individual members.³² They also prepared position papers on topical issues: fiscal reform, social welfare and foreign policy towards Asia were three examples. These were discussed by the Diet members whose ideas were then incorporated in the way of additions or deletions. Although among the membership there were differences in thinking over policy, the view of everyone had to be taken into account; no part of the final draft was to be objected to strongly by any member lest displeasure lead to their withdrawal from the group. Contentious points were modified or expunged. Public presentations of these papers were arranged often in the form of symposia. Other LDP members, industrialists, journalists and foreign ambassadors were among the participants and frequently good coverage was secured in the national press.

Group members were able to take advantage of its *kinmyaku* and *jinmyaku*.³³ Fund-raising parties were held with seating arrangements which ensured that industrialists, businessmen, bureaucrats and the FLS members could freely and easily converse with each other.³⁴ The FLS had its own office suite³⁵ where members congregated once a

month for several hours. Indeed the group closely resembled a faction. For the future, whether or not it will become operative as one is a function of many variables, particularly changes of circumstances in the five currently recognized factions and the degree to which the relationships in the FLS might become bonds of obligation.³⁶ Unless the FLS were to classify itself as a faction, it is unlikely that outside pressure would be applied on its members to withdraw,³⁷ although its movements would be watched closely by those Diet members who saw themselves as adversaries of Hamada. It was a major step for Hamada to move from being just the *de facto* leader to one formally recognized inside the group. Unless great care were taken in the timing, many FLS members might choose to sever their links when the group admitted openly to being a faction.

Cross-factional groupings might attract recruits through the development of a friendship. For instance, Nohara Masakatsu was on good terms with several members of the *Seirankai*, a defunct right-wing pressure group inside the LDP that had been founded in 1973. His son-in-law, Kondō Tetsuo, had travelled to Europe in their company to investigate agricultural policy and entered the group on their invitation for reasons of friendship rather than policy - a friendship which continued after its disbandment.³⁸

There were numerous semi-formal or informal cross-factional groupings whose existence might or might not be formally acknowledged. Although they were not themselves intended to be launching pads for future factions, the full membership was often hidden from outsiders, the participants jealously pulling a curtain over activities indicating the extent of their *jinmyaku*. In July 1987, the cross-factional group set up by one junior member of the Kōmoto faction³⁹ consisted of some twenty-five politicians and bureaucrats. According to the organizer, each participant took a turn in making a presentation;

meetings lasted an average of three hours once a month. Entry to the group was by introduction with the final decision being left to the founder. He stressed that within it there was the conscious intention to avoid vertical stratification among the members; neither were the bureaucrats made to feel inferior to the politicians.

An example of another type of such grouping was organized by Hiraizumi Wataru of the Miyazawa faction. It took the form of a regular seminar, and outside speakers lectured participants on various issues. For instance on 5 February 1987 the writer attended a talk by an American Sovietologist on contemporary Soviet politics. In addition to a number of Miyazawa faction members present, one Kōmoto faction member⁴⁰ and two ex-ambassadors participated.

Occasionally cross-factional groups came about as a result of disquiet about government policy. Proposed measures seen to be unpopular among the electorate gave concern to the Diet members who were fearful of repercussions in their constituencies both in the *kōenkai* and among the voters at large. Through participating in a group set up to investigate the matter, there was an increased likelihood of members having their views expressed at the highest levels of the party. Thus, for instance, some forty people attended the inaugural meeting of the "New Tax System Research Group"⁴¹ on 21 October 1986. This cross-factional group, set up to study the proposed new taxation system, drew its participants from at least four of the five factions with entry open to people in the Lower House elected on fewer than four occasions and Upper House members elected since 1980.⁴²

A close connection might exist between the cross-factional group and one faction, particularly if many of its members were drawn from it.⁴³ In an extreme case Diet members from one faction could show loyalty to the leader of another by joining a group which was financed and supported by him. This might be an easier and, inside the party, more

acceptable mode of action than changing factions, which could cause anger and even retaliatory measures. However, the formation of a cross-factional group might directly threaten a particular faction; such was the case with that set up by Tamaki Kazuo.

Not only faction members but also many of their secretaries were involved in “study groups”. For instance, one was set up by Suehara Tsutomu, secretary to Kōmura Masahiko, and Murakami Yoshioki, secretary to Shiga Setsu. Of the thirty-three members at the end of 1986, nineteen were secretaries to Diet members (nine of whom belonged to the Kōmoto faction), seven were bureaucrats and three were employees at LDP headquarters. Meetings were held once a month at which time either a group member or a contact of one would give a talk on a subject on which he was knowledgeable. More than an opportunity to study, these occasions were aimed at furthering and deepening mutual ties.

Cleavage in Membership, A Case Study: The Tamaki Affair

Formerly a member of the Miki faction, Tamaki Kazuo saw his relationship with Miki rapidly deteriorate⁴⁴ from the time he left over its support for Tanaka in the 1972 presidential election.⁴⁵ Yet, as an unaffiliated LDP member, at the end of 1985 he put out feelers to the Kōmoto faction in the hope of joining. His motive for so doing remains unclear. Conceivably, through affiliation to a faction, he hoped to be recommended for a Cabinet post; a second possibility was that he was acting as an agent for someone else and with the large funds reputed to be at his disposal, would seek to influence the faction’s political direction. On 24 December, together with two other unaffiliated LDP members, Satō Takashi and Sakurai Shin, Tamaki called on Kōmoto to discuss the question of the

three of them entering;⁴⁶ the gist of this meeting was discussed the following day at a general meeting of the faction.⁴⁷

Uncertainty appears to have existed in the Kōmoto faction over whether or not a condition for entry was Satō being recommended by it for a Cabinet post.⁴⁸ Confusion over the faction's attitude towards the three aspirants may be the reason that Satō was made chairman of the Public Relations Committee, a party post that the Kōmoto faction expected and Kondō coveted. There were recriminations inside the faction over it losing one and receiving none of the other six LDP Council posts. There was the suspicion that behind these events was a plot by senior Takeshita faction strategist Kanemaru Shin to take over the faction.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, because of opposition from Miki, the entry of the three politicians, which had looked certain, came to be deferred,⁵⁰ and became the cause of much tension and conflict in the faction with the battle-lines drawn between the senior and junior members.⁵¹ On 28 December, Miki called on Kōmoto at his office to register his opposition.⁵² This could be interpreted as an act of humility; certainly it signified the gravity Miki attached to the situation. Seven junior faction members visited Miki to plead Tamaki's case.⁵³ Finally, on 21 January 1986, the decision was taken not to admit the three.⁵⁴

As a result, Tamaki decided to build up his own "faction". On 1 February, six Kōmoto faction members⁵⁵ joined his group, the Religion and Politics Research Society (RPRS).⁵⁶ Meeting regularly in a private office near the Diet, the RPRS attracted much media attention. More and more Kōmoto faction members began to participate and, in the 1986 election, funds were distributed to middle-ranking and junior members.⁵⁷ Although quite worried about this development, particularly with Kanemaru being honorary chairman, there was little that Kōmoto could do. Such was the desperation in the faction over its

small size and lack of power that by the end of the year eighteen members had joined Tamaki's group.⁵⁸

With the death of Tamaki, following a long illness, on 25 January 1987, any immediate threat to the faction disappeared. The society continued in existence but took a lower profile. Its purpose, as set forth in a statement of intent dated 20 May, was nebulous: "politics were to be established based on a religious spirit, there being no way for the state of things to take a new turn outside of reciprocal cooperation between religion and politics".⁵⁹ No attempt was made to clarify the meaning of this and other such statements. The society appeared to be little more than a cover for the political machinations of its principals.⁶⁰ Not only Kanemaru but also Kōmoto faction member Yamashita Tokuo appeared to be using the group for their own ends.

Frustration at belonging to a small, weak faction which had little or no power inside the LDP and a consequent desire to build up its numbers resulted in many of the junior members enthusiastically encouraging the entry of three unaffiliated politicians as a group, in spite of the fact that the most senior of them had earlier left the Miki faction under a cloud, had criticised Miki when he was prime minister, and was thought to be close to several powerful politicians not trusted by Kōmoto or Miki. When affiliation was denied, although they remained in it, members of the Kōmoto faction who had encouraged or at least been in favour of the application of the three joined them in the formation of what was ostensibly a study group but in truth a crypto-faction. This could be interpreted as a display of anger towards Kōmoto, but was more a method of increasing *jinmyaku* and *kinmyaku* partly to allay fears they harboured for their political futures.

Cooperation and Confrontation between Members of Different Factions

Friendships among politicians crossed factions and parties. Pressure was not applied on faction members to discourage or hinder firm ties coming into existence. A sense of slight unease might be felt when greeting more senior or junior members of other factions with whom there was but slight acquaintance. Moreover, through close and more frequent association with fellow faction members, *ceteris paribus* it was more likely for strong bonds to be formed with them than with people from another group. However, at the same time, stratification within a faction was quite rigid due to differences of seniority, age, experience and the nature and quantity of work that was expected to be undertaken for the faction and party. Consequently members of a given rank found it easiest to develop intimate relationships with other Diet members of the same or similar rank, inside or outside the faction.⁶¹ A common background, perhaps in the nature of work experience prior to being elected, served sometimes as a binding factor.⁶² A close relationship could come about between a minister and his deputy, or between two Diet members funded by the same company. Other links existed through the connections of the former Diet member one succeeded. For instance, two sons might know each other very well before "taking over" seats from their fathers.

One explanation for the continued existence of factions in the LDP, at least in their existing form, was to be found in the "medium-size" constituency system that operated in Japan. In an election campaign a faction member had to compete against not only candidates standing for the opposition parties but also other people given official recognition by his own party.⁶³ It was thus not surprising that different factions in the party

were active in the same constituencies. There were but few constituencies returning multiple candidates for one faction. Indeed in every constituency in the country there was a unique set of factors which together fixed the variables determining not only the factional affiliation of LDP members but, in addition, secondary and tertiary links with both other factions and opposition parties. Irrespective of the nature and depth of the bilateral relationship enjoyed or suffered by faction leaders or factions as unitary bodies, constituency considerations might be responsible for a much warmer (or colder) interaction between two individual representatives. With voter support often localized, becoming thinner as the geographical distance increased from the *jiban* of the candidate, opponents whose place of birth or main centre of support was in close proximity tended to be seen as posing the strongest threat.

Assistance might be given to a candidate by another faction or member of one if there was a special relationship between them; association with a common study group or perhaps a tie of friendship might explain the link. Alternatively, an offer of outside help might be made in an attempt to weaken the position of someone else. There were moves continually inside the LDP to weaken or strengthen the standing of some members, often to the advantage or at the expense of others.

There were occasions on which factions cooperated in the constituencies so that each might maximize the support for and minimize the competition against candidates with a realistic chance of being elected. For instance, according to one source, in 1986 in Hyōgo # 3, Kōmoto desisted from putting up a candidate, although he had planned to do so, and thereby helped elect Tokai Kisaburō from the Abe faction. In return no Abe faction candidate was put up in either Hyōgo # 2, or # 5 and, moreover, Abe gave speeches in support of the Kōmoto faction candidates standing in the two constituencies.⁶⁴

Diet members often helped each other on an individual basis. According to one of the participants, in the latter half of 1987 a member of the House of Councillors, P, visited Lower House member X in his office to formally ask for his support in standing in the coming prefectural gubernatorial election. X did not commit himself but, on P leaving the office, phoned Y to relate the conversation that had taken place and discuss the anticipated postures of S, T and V, all members of the House of Representatives from the same prefecture.⁶⁵ The question of support was clearly separate to factional affiliation. Only X belonged to the Kōmoto faction. Because he was powerful in one part of the prefecture, X was asked for help notwithstanding the fact that he belonged to a different faction.

A Case Study: The Tokushima Constituency⁶⁶

Factional conflict might well manifest itself in the struggle for supremacy in one constituency where the candidates could also be viewed as proxies fighting for the interests of the faction leaders they represented. Such an instance was provided by the 1974 House of Councillors election in Tokushima. A member of the Miki faction, the incumbent Kujime Kentarō, was seeking re-election. With the backing of Tanaka Kakuei, Gotōda Masaharu challenged him. In determining whether or not a candidate was to receive official recognition from the party, LDP headquarters gave serious consideration to the recommendation of the prefectural chapter.⁶⁷ The events surrounding the choice of Gotōda over Kujime were extremely suspicious, it being said that the ballot box which contained the three hundred and sixty votes was sealed tight and sent to Tōkyō, where some months elapsed before the result was announced. During the campaign, influential supporters

were changing sides in unusual circumstances.⁶⁸ Support for Kujime evaporated as the campaign developed and there were suspicions of bribery and intimidation.⁶⁹

Although Kujime was not the official LDP candidate, and in contravention of LDP rules, eighteen members of the Miki faction went to give him support.⁷⁰ As a result Miki Yokichirō, head of the prefectural chapter of the party, moved but failed to have Miki Takeo dismissed from the party.⁷¹ The bitterness caused in this election was an important reason for Miki's later resignation from the Tanaka Government.

Gotōda had become the recipient of much of the anti-Miki sentiment in the prefecture. Seen as oppressively strong because of his control of the local politicians, Miki saw his enemies, not only inside the LDP but also in the opposition parties, join together to destroy what had come to be described as "Miki's Kingdom",⁷² not unlike a feudal *han*. The conflict between the Miki and Gotōda camps started in the House of Councillors but reached down to the prefectural and municipal levels. Criticism of the administration inside the prefecture was made by Miki's opponents, but perhaps more significant in the anti-Miki moves were the relationships many of his foes had with his historical enemies. For instance, a prefectural politician and supporter of Gotōda, Yamaguchi Shunichi, the oldest son of Yamaguchi Kazuo, was bitter about how his father had lost to Miki faction member Kōro Mitsu in the 1962 House of Councillors election. According to him, with Miki's help, Kōro's campaign had seen Prime Minister Ikeda come to Tokushima to make a speech for her.⁷³

Although Gotōda lost to Kujime, he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1976; Akita lost his seat. Three years later Akita received more votes than any other candidate, displacing Miki for the first time.⁷⁴ This was a big psychological victory for everyone in the anti-Miki camp. A second blow was struck by the defeat of one of Miki's

powerful supporters, Takeichi Yasunobu, in the 1981 gubernatorial election. A supporter of Gotōda, Miki Shinzō, was elected, having received support from the Socialist, Democratic Socialist and *Kōmei* Parties.⁷⁵ His father, Miki Yoshiji, had been a recommended candidate in the 1942 election. The head of his *kōenkai*, Miki Toshiharu (Shunji?), was the second son of Miki Yokichirō, who had retired as a member of the Upper House in 1971. Succeeding him and of direct lineage had been Ogasa Kōshō who was returned without official recognition which had been given to Itō Jō, a recipient of support from Miki Takeo. Miki Toshiharu himself, at the time a candidate for the mayoralty of Tokushima, was close to Gotōda who, in turn, was uncle to Inoue Hironori, Socialist Party member of the House of Representatives for Tokushima. In its support for Gotōda and Miki Shinzō, the prefectural chapter of the Socialist Party came into conflict with their headquarters in Tōkyō. The members of the prefectural party attended fund-raising parties for and gave support to local politicians standing for the Gotōda group. One reason they supported him was that he appeared able to bring down Miki and “open up” Tokushima. The fight between Miki and Gotōda for control of Tokushima Prefecture permeated all levels of formal political assemblies in the prefecture and came to be known as the Awa⁷⁶ War. Through a gradual increase in the number of seats taken by his supporters in the local assemblies, Gotōda was able to “wrest control” of the prefecture from Miki.⁷⁷

This long and complicated struggle, which had its analogues elsewhere, gives an indication of the jealousies, rivalries and feuds which cross factions and parties, and characterize Japanese politics on a national and local level. In these battles for influence, often policy differences were put to one side.

Cooperation with Local Politicians

In a 1979 survey undertaken by the *Asahi Shimbun*, 91.2% of the members of the prefectural assemblies⁷⁸ and 78.6% of the mayors, town managers and village headsmen admitted to having close links to National Diet politicians.⁷⁹ According to an investigation carried out by the same newspaper in 1987, 1,371 out of 1,828 prefectural assemblymen⁸⁰ were affiliated to one of the five LDP factions. In both cases the numerical strength of factional representation resembled the relative numbers in the National Diet. The Kōmoto (Miki) faction had fewest supporters, with the number showing a marked decline over the eight years.⁸¹ This was to be expected since there were fewer faction members with which to associate.

Local politicians were in competition against each other to get their pet projects included by the national government in its budget. Those who were successful expected to benefit from voter- support. Thus it was important to develop firm connections with members of the Lower and Upper Houses. Direct links with a faction might have been built up in cases where the local politician had served for many years and occupied an important position in the National Diet member's *kōenkai*.⁸² Again, some local politicians, particularly prefectural governors, themselves belonged once to one of the two Houses. It could be extremely disadvantageous to have as an enemy a powerful local politician.⁸³ There was the danger that due credit for successes would not be given by the voters to the National Diet member responsible because accurate information might not be conveyed to them.

Local politicians tended to support actively their national brethren during election campaigns. They had the opportunity to be seen and heard by their constituents, and

could expect help from the National Diet member and his *kōenkai* during their own campaigns. Thus, for instance, an entourage of local politicians and other supporters⁸⁴ who could draw an audience spent every evening of the 1986 campaign going from place to place giving speeches praising Shiga Setsu, seeking re-election in Iwate # 2. Similarly in Aomori # 1, Ōshima Tadamori would give an address to gatherings all over the prefecture immediately following several “warm-up” speeches by local politicians. Nakamura Toshifumi, a member of the prefectural assembly, explained that in the prefecture some local politicians were affiliated to the factions in the National Diet and some were not.⁸⁵

The *kōenkai* of the national and local politicians occasionally overlapped but were not identical. For instance in Tokushima, some of the secretaries in Miki’s office provided material help, assisted in the distribution of pamphlets, and attended weddings and funerals for certain local politicians. A large amount of their work was concerned with local elections.⁸⁶ However, some of Gotōda’s supporters would also be working for these very same people⁸⁷ as would a number of Socialist Party supporters.⁸⁸

The LDP as a party sometimes worked together with selected opposition parties during election campaigns by supporting a common candidate. During 1987, for instance, there were gubernatorial elections where the conservative party cooperated with the Socialist, *Kōmei* and Democratic Socialist parties in various combinations.⁸⁹

The Faction and Bureaucrats

There were several reasons why few bureaucrats on running for a seat in the National Diet chose to affiliate with the Kōmoto faction. The first was historical. It was under Former Prime Minister Yoshida that a large number of bureaucrats were enticed into politics. As one of the so-called “party men”⁹⁰ whose anger was incurred, Miki criticized this

trend, complaining of what he called "bureaucratic politics".⁹¹ He believed and was indignant that in order to preserve their positions, bureaucrats would continually be adjusting themselves to the new situation. He felt that they took advantage of politicians who were not experts on policy and on becoming politicians themselves would use the standing of their former posts to gather funds.⁹² According to Asano, Miki maintained many contacts with bureaucrats but they were not as overt as those of other senior politicians.⁹³ One of Miki's secretaries said that Miki was not against bureaucrats as such, but rather was unhappy that so many of them became politicians while the "party men" became fewer and fewer.⁹⁴ A number of ex-bureaucrats did enter the faction; one was Kondō. Compared to the intake of other factions, however, they were few. Kōmoto thus inherited a faction with a history of having little appeal for bureaucrats.

Secondly, there was a lack of continuity in high level contact between the Kōmoto faction and a ministry that might have led to suitable candidates presenting themselves for selection. The faction was unable to secure for itself over a long period of time any ministerial position let alone one of the powerful ones such as finance, international trade and industry, or agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Nor was the faction particularly successful in acquiring other important posts in the Diet or party such as those of committee and division chairmen which would have provided excellent opportunities to develop contacts in the bureaucracy.⁹⁵ Compared to other factions, there were few *zoku* in the faction - people who would be influential in the bureaucracy.⁹⁶

Finally, would-be candidates, whether or not they were bureaucrats, were more likely to be attracted to a faction which was strong and thought to have a good future than a small, weak faction that had been unable to acquire many prestigious posts for its members. Thus, in comparison with the others, the Kōmoto faction as a faction did not

possess an extensive *jinmyaku* in the bureaucracy and indeed, partly for this reason, had great difficulty in seeing its views taken up and manifested as government policies.

Individual members of the faction, however, had their own contacts in the various ministries which they did not share with the faction as a body, or their fellow members. They sought to augment their *jinmyaku* by any means possible: school and university ties, links formed during their career, introductions from mutual friends, associates, and acquaintances, and connections “inherited” from their predecessor in the constituency. On occasion, faction members could utilize information given them by bureaucrats to deepen their knowledge and aggrandize their power in the party.

Bureaucrats desired contacts with Diet members, who they hoped would rise quickly in the party and reach positions of influence and power. In return for providing information on what was happening in the ministry, bureaucrats expected “help” in their careers when their contacts established themselves in strong positions.

Part of the power of bureaucrats was derived from the fact that every member of the party expected eventually to be given a Cabinet post. The average length of tenure was short and often the minister had neither sufficient time nor the necessary background to make a deep impression on the ministry. Kōmoto faction members who had been bureaucrats attached different degrees of importance to their background. For instance, Kondō felt that the political judgement and strategy of former bureaucrats could often be called into question.⁹⁷ Nishiyama Keijirō, working to regain the seat lost in the 1986 election, believed that many politicians without the experience of having worked in the bureaucracy were unable to understand policy, and was sorry that the Kōmoto faction attracted so few people from that background. However, he stressed that he was happy

to have joined it particularly because he thought very highly of Kōmoto's way of thinking and his giving a high priority to economic policy.⁹⁸

In addition to their own secretaries, Diet members in a ministerial or vice-ministerial post had one or more secretaries seconded from the ministry. In such a fashion, Komine Takao became secretary to Kōmoto on his taking up the post of Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency in 1983. His work embraced several functions: to explain to the director-general various aspects of policy, to explain to him those parts of the work of the agency which were most important and relevant to his job, to prepare suitable and sufficient material for the director-general to use at various meetings where he had to give speeches and *aisatsu*, and to prepare answers to questions put to the director-general by members of the Diet during, for instance, the proceedings of the Budget Committee. By virtue of the nature of the work, Komine spent much time with Kōmoto and was often at his side while being driven from A to B. Komine was "paired" with one of Kōmoto's private secretaries and had different levels of involvement with others depending on their roles.⁹⁹

As a rule, secretaries seconded from a ministry were assigned to just one minister during their career. In theory, their appointment was independent of a request from either the minister¹⁰⁰ or faction to which he belonged.¹⁰¹ Although not concerned with factional movements, these secretaries saw and heard much concerning party and faction matters. Sometimes, a strong personal relationship developed and it was often possible for the bureaucrat to be helped (or hindered!) in his later career. A few, through a connection thus made, might seek to enter the Diet at a later time and looked to the Diet member under whom they served for help and support. However, as already mentioned, the Kōmoto faction was unsuccessful in attracting many superior candidates.

The Faction and the Press

The big national newspapers and certain other news gathering bodies such as NHK assigned to each faction at least one journalist who covered their affairs for perhaps two or three years.¹⁰² On being appointed they first of all introduced themselves to the members and their secretaries by going to their individual offices. This was a chance to make a good contact with them and to judge who might be useful sources of information. Based on an exchange of views and gossip, many journalists were able to develop a mutually beneficial and profitable relationship with a small number of faction members who in turn saw the journalists as performing the important function of providing information on what was happening in the opposition parties, LDP, and even their own faction.

The relation between the Kōmoto faction and journalists depended on the character of the reporter and not the newspaper he worked for.¹⁰³ If he was trusted and the faction (Kōmoto's secretaries in particular) satisfied with articles he wrote, then the journalist was made privy to a great deal of information. Some journalists, however, were kept at arm's length, the faction feeling that their articles were unfair, that any information given to them might reach the wrong people or that simply there was no advantage to be gained by taking them into their confidence. It was the character and ability of the journalist and not the organization he represented (up to a certain point) which determined the trust and thus information given him.

Certain members of the faction got on well with journalists, others did not. Most useful information was held by senior members of the faction and thus close contact with them was particularly desirable. Often, however, it was the more junior members who not only were more approachable but moreover welcomed the attention. There were several members with whom many journalists had managed to develop a very good relationship.

Ōshima Tadamori, for instance, who himself used to work for the *Mainichi Shimbun*, was at ease with journalists. On occasion, he arranged an informal evening meal at his residence for members of the press covering the faction.¹⁰⁴ Connections with members of the House of Councillors were not so close or indeed much sought after.

Often, the more a journalist was confided in, the less he felt able to write and, it may be argued, in exchange for being given information not readily available he was keeping the extent and depth of his knowledge from both the general public and the organization for which he worked. Some journalists allowed themselves to be wined and dined at high-class entertainment establishments, and then with different degrees of frequency. A few had holidays paid for and arranged by the Diet members they were supposed to be covering “objectively” and there were various stories of reporters receiving money.¹⁰⁵ By virtue of their work, some were able to influence events and revel in their power. Journalists were “scouted” by factions who looked for people with extensive *jinmyaku* to work in their offices. On occasion, they were also put up as election candidates for the faction they were covering.¹⁰⁶ Not all of the reporters who sought the social company of Diet members allowed themselves to be influenced if not compromised by their companions.

Conclusion

Dissatisfaction over the treatment of the faction inside the party was not itself a sufficient reason to secede. Some of the anger felt over what would be interpreted as an inequitable share of government and party posts could be tempered by channelling the energy into manoeuvres aiming to bring about a new dominant combination of factions and hence a new regime. However, were an opportunity to appear where the faction could

play a central role in coalition government involving the participation of a number of the opposition parties, it was not unlikely that it would willingly collaborate.

Close relationships among the members were more in evidence among people of equal or similar rank. Friendships crossed factions and a special bond appeared to exist between LDP members elected for the first time in the same election. Strong links existed between many faction members and other factions but the nature and extent of them varied from person to person. Concern about the future was an important factor in the development of these connections and a large number of members joined cross-factional groupings both as insurance and to widen their *jinmyaku* and *kinmyaku*. Kōmoto, as the faction leader and Kaifu, as the aspiring successor, may have been unhappy about this but could not act to arrest the trend without having brought into the open doubts about their ability to control members.

There were various types of cross-factional groups ranging from those that were no more than vehicles for the political operations of one or more members to those that genuinely sought to provide for the study of policy. These groups did not operate under a fixed format; the formal structure, level and type of activity, aims and motivations of participants and levels of commitment differed. Some came to be permanent fixtures of LDP politics, later becoming factions in their own right, while others were transient bodies that dissolved voluntarily - perhaps on achieving their aim - or ceased to exist through the apathy of the participants. What they all had in common was the presentation of an opportunity for Diet members to extend and deepen their range of contacts.

The weakness of the faction effectively prevented it from securing for itself major party and government posts. This in turn made it more difficult for members to develop expertise in a given area of policy. Fewer significant links could be developed with bureaucrats and

this accentuated the difficulties for the faction to not only get implemented but also put across those policies it favoured.

Cooperation and confrontation between factions was not limited to or defined by that on national stage. The particular circumstances in every constituency gave rise to a peculiar alignment of political forces. In LDP factional warfare, support might be sought from or offered by the opposition parties. Strong links often existed between the national and local politicians who depended on each other for support. This did not necessarily include a factional dimension, but historical associations and nurtured jealousies were often in evidence.

The tentacles of faction influence reached many groups in society, including the press. Through long and continual association with faction members, some journalists came to represent unknowingly its interests and articulate them in their newspapers. Detailed chronological movements of politicians in the party were seen to be more important than an investigation into the wider questions of their honesty and public accountability.

Both inside and outside the LDP, factions were recognized and operated as separate and in themselves complete entities in their dealings with the party, the other parties, and external bodies and individuals. They worked to increase their importance in the party and undermine that of the others. However, inside the factions there were sub-groups and individuals who were themselves principal actors seeking to increase their power as well as that of the factions to which they belonged. The views, desires, aspirations, and intentions that they expressed to other bodies might be those of the faction or those of themselves. Sometimes this was ambiguous.

Notes and References

- 1 There were a small number of LDP members who did not affiliate with a faction.
- 2 For example, on 16 May 1980 a vote of non-confidence in the Ōhira government was put before the Diet by the Socialist Party. As a result of the abstentions of sixty-nine LDP members from the Fukuda, Miki and Nakagawa factions, the government was defeated and an election was called.
- 3 This was not always the case. For instance, Satō, Miki and Takeshita became prime minister after the arbitration of one or more senior party members.
- 4 The treatment of the anti- and non-mainstream factions changed with the regime.
- 5 A case in point was the cooperation between the Tanaka and Ōhira factions which was based largely on the friendship between the two principals.
- 6 Miki blamed Fukuda for prematurely bringing to an end his premiership. Nevertheless, he supported him against Ōhira in 1978 partly because the latter received endorsement from Tanaka.
- 7 Following Ideda's decision to resign through illness, and given the fact that Satō commanded strong support within the LDP, it could be considered judicious of Miki to have put him forward as the successor.
- 8 Miki saw the potential of an early declaration of support for Ishibashi's candidature as an opportunity for his faction to profit in the distribution of posts.
- 9 For instance, in 1984, members of an Upper House grouping consisting of people belonging to or being close to the Nakasone faction approached several Kōmoto faction members and suggested that they come together for their mutual benefit in acquiring Cabinet and party posts. One interpretation of the move was to see it as an attempt by Nakasone to further his chances of re-election to the premiership by weakening the Kōmoto faction. *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 October 1984.
- 10* For instance, this was true of the parties held on 25 May 1987 for Yamashita, and on 10 July for Kaifu and Nikaidō. Miyazawa attended Ōshima's fund-raising party on 17 March 1987 on the suggestion of a junior member of his (Miyazawa's) faction. His presence impressed Ōshima's constituents but also put psychological pressure on the Kōmoto faction member to support him for the party presidency. Later that year, Ōshima reciprocated by attending Miyazawa's party.
- 11* See, for instance, *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 May and 17 July 1987. One member mentioned that he was treated to sumptuous meals so often that he had been suffering from stomach-ache.
- 12 Miyazawa himself was not invited to Kōmoto's party, but some members of his faction attended and one senior member, Itō Masayoshi, gave a speech. The hope remained that Kōmoto might yet look more favourably toward the faction. The official attendance figures issued by the faction were: Takeshita faction 105, Abe faction 85, Miyazawa faction 39, Nakasone faction 3.
- 13 Takeshita and Abe were two of the speakers.
- 14* A junior Miyazawa faction member related that Abe faction members were reminded that a promise by Takeshita (or anyone else for that matter) to hand over the premiership two years hence was devoid of meaning. For one thing, circumstances might have changed making impossible the keeping of the promise.
- 15 Kunihiro Masao and Ogino Akemi, interviews.
- 16 For a detailed account, see M.M. Mochizuki, *Managing and Influencing the Japanese Legislative Process: The Role of Parties and the National Diet*, Ph.D thesis, Harvard

- University, 1982; J.A.A. Stockwin, *Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy*, 2nd edition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, pp.133-135; and Kishimoto Kōichi, *Politics in Modern Japan: Development and Organization*, 3rd edition, Japan Echo, 1988. For an altogether different view, see Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, Macmillan, 1989, particularly pp.31-34.
- 17* One member of the Kōmoto faction mentioned that he was personally averse to a more junior member placing him in a division, notwithstanding the latter's function to do so. He stressed that a request to be put in a certain division would be made directly to Kōmoto. The writer is unaware of how widespread this practice was within the faction.
- 18 Often translated by the word "tribe", the term *zoku* could be applied to Diet Members working outside the framework of a ministry. For example, one could talk of *zoku* in the Diet Strategy Committee. For a detailed description of the subject, see *Jimintō Seichōkai*, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1983; Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki, *Zoku Giin No Kenkyū*, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1987; and Satō Seizaburō and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, *Jimintō Seiken*, Chūō Kōronsha, 1986.
- 19 This was the unanimous view of the ten Kōmoto faction members to whom the question was put. According to Satō and Matsuzaki, *ibid.*, division activity is basically "de-factionalizing" and *zoku* transcend factions. Furthermore, an increase in the influential power of *zoku* in making policy decisions signifies a decline in the influential power of the factions.
- 20 John Creighton Campbell, *Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics*, University of California Press, 1977, p.135.
- 21 Yamashita Tokuo, interview.
- 22 See the section on the Tamaki Affair.
- 23 The official Japanese name was *Jiyū Shakai Forum*. Formerly known as "Forum for a Fair Society" (and in Japanese as *Jiyū Shugi Keizai Suishin Kikō*), it underwent a change of name at the beginning of 1988.
- 24 *Kokkai Binran*, September 1983.
- 25 Namely, Ōshima, Kōmura, Noro, Murakami and Ishii.
- 26* For instance, Ōshima became a member on the introduction of a junior Diet member who was not himself affiliated at the time.
- 27 Funada and Shirakawa had both been elected on one more occasion than Hamada and Ōta.
- 28 Early in 1988, Shirakawa left the group; this was one reason necessitating a change of name. While not knowing the precise reasons for his action, the writer, who worked for twelve months in the organization, believes that the strength of Hamada's personality and range of abilities, while propelling him to the top of the group, caused Shirakawa to re-examine his position in it. It was not without significance that the general manager, Ozawa Sakihiko, who ran many and oversaw all aspects of the group's operations, was brought in by Hamada.
- 29* According to an administrative member of FLS, "relatively small" amounts of money were distributed to members. Interview, May 1986.
- 30 This title, to which the rights were vested in Shirakawa, was to change in 1988.
- 31 Nogami Tooru, the only member of the group at the time to lose his seat in the 1986 election, was the one person who did not distribute copies of the journal among his constituents. According to one of the administrators, this was because of his pride as

- a former journalist of the *Asahi Shimbun*. For any member, the minimum issue was five thousand and the maximum fifty thousand, with the latter being reached only during an election campaign.
- 32 This function was also carried out by researchers at the National Diet Library.
- 33 Of course, this did not refer to those networks which were personal to individual members and jealously guarded.
- 34 Companies or individuals wishing to associate with the group had to pay ten thousand yen a month into a bank account. In addition, the same amount of money was the minimum cost of a ticket to a *hagemasukai*.
- 35* A previous headquarters had to be vacated at twenty- four hours notice when the company which provided it unexpectedly and suddenly faced adverse business conditions.
- 36 Hamada saw his senior in the Miyazawa faction, Katō Kōichi, as his main political rival. The group provided Hamada with an opportunity to build up a faction outside his own. Were circumstances to arise under which he could inherit Miyazawa's mantle, the rationale for the existence of FLS would cease, except perhaps as a "halfway house" - to attract people from other factions.
- 37* At least one of the five Kōmoto faction members did not ask Kōmoto's permission to join FLS; it was not thought by him to be necessary. Kōmoto was, on occasion, asked to give consent to a faction member seeking to enter a cross- factional grouping which may or may not have been a policy study group but would nevertheless probably call itself one. Even if acquiescence were not forthcoming, the person in question might choose to ignore Kōmoto and join.
- 38 Kondō Tetsuo, interview.
- 39*
- 40*
- 41 *Shin Zeisei Kenkyūkai*.
- 42 *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 October 1986.
- 43*
- 44 Tamaki had been introduced to Miki by Hayakawa Takashi, to whom he had been a secretary.
- 45 For one account of Tamaki's method of operation in politics see Higuchi Tsuneo, *Tamaki Kazuo No Yuigon*, Asuka Shinsha, 1987. Tamaki was active criticizing the Miki premiership. *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 June 1975.
- 46 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 25 December 1985. According to one senior faction member, of the thirteen non- affiliated LDP members, at one time or other, six or seven had embarked on talks about entering the faction. *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 December 1985.
- 47 *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 December 1985.
- 48 *Ibid.*.
- 49 The father-in-law of Takeshita, Kanemaru had the reputation of being a power behind the scenes. See also *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 December 1985.
- 50 *Asahi Shimbun*, 25, 26 December 1985.
- 51 *Asahi Shimbun*, 6 January 1986. Neither approval among the junior nor rejection among the senior members was solid.
- 52 This is the only occasion known to the writer of the senior politician calling on Kōmoto.
- 53 *Asahi Shimbun*, 6 January 1986.

- 54* *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 January 1986. According to Sakamoto Misoji, the junior members were finally persuaded that Tamaki's entry would be a bigger disadvantage than advantage, but not before the faction nearly broke up. Kōmura, however, said that he and like-minded people in the faction failed to see how the perceived threat of a takeover from within by Tamaki could possibly materialize. At a luncheon on 3 March 1986 immediately following the ground-breaking ceremony for Miki's new office, certain members of the faction discussed the Tamaki Affair. Executive A was particularly scathing about how the situation had been handled by Kōmoto and got involved in a heated discussion with middle-ranking member B. Executive C defended B by explaining that the latter was not trying to give excuses for the junior members in favour of Tamaki's entry; rather, he was arguing that they were depressed at belonging to a small, weak, declining faction and were worried about their own political futures. They wanted the faction to increase its numerical strength. It was not a question of them liking the individuals concerned.
- 55 They were Kōmura, Matsuda, Ōshima, Sakamoto Chikao, Kita and Iwasaki. See *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 February 1986.
- 56 *Shūkyō Seiji Kenkyūkai*.
- 57* Junior Kōmoto faction member. See also Higuchi, *op. cit.*, pp.217/218.
- 58* In addition to the six already named they were: Akagi, Itō, Tanikawa, Yamashita, Kudō, Usui, Kōnoike, Hozumi, Murakami, Hatsumura and Ishii. Kawada had been a member up to his death. This list was given the writer by a faction member. The total membership at the time was forty-three.
- 59 From *Shūkyō Seiji Kenkyūkai Shui Narabi Ni Kaisoku*.
- 60* One member admitted that the society could not be called a policy group; indeed, he acknowledged it had no policy!
- 61 "A certain atmosphere exists among and one can talk on very friendly terms with people elected for the first time at the same election." Shiga Setsu, interview.
- 62 For example, in explaining the close friendship that had existed between Abe Kan, Nagayama Tadanori and himself in the *Dai Ichi Giin Club*, Akagi Munenori stressed the fact that they had all been village headsmen. Akagi, interview. Kondō told the writer that he had many friends in the Miyazawa faction, including the leader himself, who had been bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance. Matsuda and Suzuki Muneo were close friends although it is a moot point whether or not what brought them together were their reputations as noisy interjectors during Diet proceedings.
- 63 In addition, there might be other conservative candidates, unable to gain party approval, who would join the LDP if elected.
- 64*
- 65*
- 66 The writer wishes to thank Takabatake Michitoshi and *Asahi Shimbun* journalist Hirokawa Hajime for their views, expressed in interviews. See also the articles entitled: Awa Sensō Senkyo Fudoki, in *Asahi Shimbun*, 14-18 June, 1986; Chiji To Awa Sensō, in *Asahi Shimbun*, 4, 5 September 1985 and Takabatake, *Chihō Ōoku*, Ushio, 1986, pp.152-183.
- 67 For instance, in its first endorsement for the 1986 House of Representatives election, the recommendations for official recognition given by 111 prefectural chapters were accepted *in toto*; in the remaining nineteen, the prefectural decision was overturned.

- Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 10 June 1986. See also, Gerald L. Curtis, *Election Campaigning Japanese Style*, Kodansha, 1983.
- 68 The Akita Daisuke group of supporters, for instance, moved from the Kujime to the Gotōda camp. *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 June 1986, and *Awa ...Fudoki*, *op. cit.*, 14 June 1986.
- 69* According to a former Tokushima prefectural politician, large amounts of money began circulating in the constituency from the time Morishita Motoharu first stood as a candidate, in 1963; the situation worsened when Gotōda attempted to gain election to the House of Councillors in 1974. This was confirmed by two employees of Miki's Tokushima office.
- 70 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1, 12 July 1974.
- 71 *Asahi Shimbun*, 2 June 1974. He was unsuccessful. Whatever the rules may have said, the LDP was pragmatic enough to realize the damage to itself such an action would inflict.
- 72 That is, *Miki Ōkoku*.
- 73 *Awa ... Fudoki*, *op. cit.*, 15 June 1986.
- 74 Only in one further election, that of June 1980, was Miki to come top. Akita lost his seat in 1983 and did not stand again.
- 75 Miki was re-elected as governor in 1985 with the support of the Socialist, *Kōmei*, and Democratic Socialist Parties and Gotōda camp. The defeated challenger, Yamamoto Junzō, former mayor of Tokushima City was supported by the Miki (Takeo) and Akita (Daisuke) camps. *Asahi Nenkan*, 1980.
- 76 Awa is the old name for Tokushima.
- 77 Miki's "control" of Tokushima appears to have begun soon after the war. Bandō Kazuo, who served as a prefectural politician for sixteen years and stood unsuccessfully for the Diet as a member of the Democratic Socialist Party in 1969, 1972 and 1976, provided the following background information: In April 1947, Abe Gorō from the Socialist Party was elected governor of Tokushima. Possibly he received some support from Miki. Miki was secure in his seat partly because of his ability to attract eminent speakers when he campaigned. At this time his power was small, since he was just one of five national politicians from the prefecture. This changed when he became a minister, which enabled him to exert influence at the village headman level. In 1949, the Socialist Party lost its representation in the national assembly. By this time, Miki had six or seven supporters in the prefectural assembly and the weakened Socialist Party requested his help in the gubernatorial election. A group of members (including Bandō) travelled to Tōkyō to ask for Miki's support, which he promised on condition that their candidate, Kageyama Shigeto, run not as a member of the Socialist Party but as an independent. At the same time, Miki might have felt that were he not to help Kageyama, he would lose his influence in the prefectural assembly, his supporters there having already agreed to give aid to the candidate. However, the two local newspapers criticized Kageyama for changing labels (Socialist to Independent) and he lost support in the Socialist Party for this very reason. In addition, the election coincided with one for the prefectural assembly. No candidate acquired three-eighths of the votes cast which was, at that time, necessary to be returned. Hara Kikutarō, who came third supported Abe Kuniichi (who received 134,119 votes to 132,634 for Kageyama) and he won the run-off election held less than three weeks later. Thus Miki failed to increase his power in the constituency. Nevertheless, from

- this time, the number of his supporters in the prefectural assembly began to increase. He was the only national politician from Tokushima seen to be powerful. Abe became isolated from the power structure in the prefecture; Hara again stood against him in 1955 and won with Miki's help. Bandō, interview.
- 78 Including the large metropolitan areas and Hokkaidō.
- 79 *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 August 1979.
- 80 Tōkyō, Ibaragi and Okinawa were excluded.
- 81 *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 April 1987.
- 82 In a series of five articles just prior to the 1986 election, the *Iwate Nippō* analyzed the probable sympathies of 1,391 local politicians in the prefecture. Much of the support for Shiga Setsu in Iwate # 2 was interpreted as having been "inherited" from his father (a member of the Lower House for twenty-two years), through him (Setsu) having helped various local politicians in their election campaigns, and as a return for having rendered services to certain sectors of the community, for instance those cultivating tobacco. The head of his *kōenkai*, the prefectural assemblyman Suzuki Saburō, had been a powerful supporter of Shiga's father and was on close terms with a number of members of the Kōmoto faction.
- 83* One junior faction member felt that his political career had suffered many setbacks as a result of opposition from the prefectural governor, who was linked to the Tanaka faction. Interview.
- 84 Several academics and journalists spoke on Shiga's behalf.
- 85* Nakamura himself was unaffiliated and declared that he would remain so for the time being. During the election campaign, he was due to fly to Nagasaki for several days to give support to Nishioka Takeo, once of the Miki faction, later secretary-general of the New Liberal Club and, at the time of the election, trying to recapture his seat as a member of the LDP. Nakamura had unsuccessfully stood for the National Diet as a candidate for the NLC in 1979. In 1980, standing as an unaffiliated candidate, he received 26,810 votes to Ōshima's insufficient 63,958 votes.
- 86 Tani Fusako, secretary to Miki, private communication. The daily work of the Tokushima office was to make the rounds of supporters relating what Miki had been doing in the Diet.
- 87 Although a clear line could be drawn between the pro-Miki and pro-Gotōda local politicians, on a personal level there was no animosity between them and indeed they often socialized together. This was stressed by many of the Miki camp politicians interviewed by the writer, including prefectural assembly member Yano Shigefumi.
- 88 Yano, *ibid.*.
- 89 *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 December 1987. Occasionally, opposition parties worked together in the belief that the support of more than one party, and decrease in the number of opposition parties represented, gave the candidate a greater chance of being elected. See, for instance, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 10 June 1986.
- 90 A distinction was made between the ex-bureaucrats and people who could claim that they were career politicians. Particularly in the late 1950's and 1960's, much was made of this bifurcation particularly during times of intra-party conflict and presidential election campaigns. See, for instance, *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 July 1980.
- 91 Kujiraoka, interview. To give one example, Miki criticized Yoshida for pursuing what he called a totally unacceptable bureaucratic secret diplomacy in his talks with American Secretary of State Dulles. *Tōkyō Shimbun*, 17 February 1951. While noting that

- only three out of the forty-seven faction members had been senior bureaucrats, the *Asahi Shimbun*, on 13 June 1975, made mention of Miki characterizing bureaucratic politics as authoritarian, based on red tape, and evasive of responsibility.
- 92 Hirakawa, interview.
- 93 Asano, interview.
- 94 Iwano Miyoji, secretary to Miki, private communication.
- 95 It should be borne in mind that the strength of a faction in a ministry is not solely a function of the number of its members enjoying power in it.
- 96 See Satō and Matsuzaki, *op. cit.*, p.245.
- 97 Kondō, interview.
- 98 Nishiyama Keijirō, interview.
- 99 Much of this material is based on an interview with Komine Takao on 29 October 1986.
- 100 The word “minister” is here interchangeable with that of “director-general”.
- 101 According to Komine, both had to “show patience” if they did not get on.
- 102 Although not the norm, a journalist might cover more than one faction during his career.
- 103 This was true probably for all factions.
- 104 On one such occasion, at which the writer was present, other guests included the son of a middle-ranking faction member and one of Kōmoto’s secretaries.
- 105 The writer wishes to make it clear here that he is referring to Diet members generally, and not specifically members of the Kōmoto faction.
- 106* Thus Igarashi Fumihiko, a journalist for fifteen years from 1973 for the *Jiji Tsūshin Press*, who had covered the Abe faction, was intending to stand as a candidate for it at the first election in or after 1989. At the same time, he was close to some members and staff of FLS.

Chapter 7

THE FINANCE OF THE FACTION

Introduction

Accurate detailed information on funding is hard to come by. Rumours abound but concrete proof is scarce. Much money is distributed secretly, its source and method of procurement sometimes involving practices that are legally and morally questionable.¹ While the writer is confident about the reliability of the sources given in this chapter, he feels that much of the material discarded because of difficulties in its authentication may have been accurate. However, since it is better to err on the side of safety, ignoring all hearsay and information where an ulterior motive may exist or the respondent was at too great a distance from the principal actors to know the complete scenario, some enlightening examples may have been omitted mistakenly.

Political Funding

Election campaigns, maintaining offices and employing staff cost money. In many constituencies cash is distributed to key vote-brokers and supporters² in the hope of buying their influence. Weddings, funerals and certain other occasions demand monetary gifts. The salary of a Diet member does not begin to cover all these costs and many are unable to acquire sufficient funds by themselves. Influence may increase with experience and length of service in party, Cabinet, and committee posts. Influence creates power and facilitates the making of contacts with people and bodies eager to contribute to the financial pot. Many junior members in particular will lack the necessary *jinmyaku* and


*kinmyaku*³ which would enable them to become financially independent and it is thus from the head of the faction that funds are sought and expected.

Funding inside the LDP, however, is far more complex than a matter of faction leaders supplying money to their followers. Figure 7.1 gives an indication of the multiplicity of routes through which money passes to, within and from the LDP. Legitimate or illegal, open or covert and ethical or morally questionable, the directions of the money flows are illustrated by arrows. The figure requires some explanation.

The case of the leader funding members of his faction (arrow a) is dealt with later. A faction leader may give funds to the leaders of other factions (arrow b) in exchange for a promise of support in a presidential election; he may distribute funds to lesser members (arrow c) in the hope that within their faction they will take up and propagate views sympathetic to his. This will not necessarily be done directly but possibly through one or several trusted people in that faction (arrow d). Providing funds to the leader of one's own faction (arrow e) and possibly surreptitiously to other members (arrow f) may increase one's influence and voice within it. There may be a better chance of receiving a Cabinet or senior party post if one donates money to the leader of a powerful, possibly presidential, faction (arrow g) and influential members thereof. Leaders of cross-factional groups fund members from their own (arrow h) and other (arrow i) factions. Many such organizations are themselves crypto-factions.

Money originating in the LDP also finds its way to some of the opposition parties and individuals within it. It may come from funds available to the Cabinet (arrow j), emanate from or be through the Diet Strategy Committee (arrow k), or be received from a faction or members of one (arrow l). Reasons for such payments include ensuring the smoother passage of bills through the Diet, buying future support (which may or may not be needed),

Figure 7.1 Money flows to, from, and inside the LDP



strengthening the relative position of one party or of some people in it, and weakening the electoral support in a constituency of another LDP member.⁴ In addition, all members of the LDP receive some financial support from the party (arrow m). Money received from industrial and business concerns, federations, associations, societies, pressure groups and various miscellaneous organizations (arrow n) and the uses it is put to (arrow o) are also shown.

The Funding of the LDP

The Economic Reconstruction Council⁵ was formed on 27 January 1955 by Uemura Kōgorō, vice-president of the Federation of Economic Organizations⁶ and others, three days after the calling of a general election for 27 February. Contributions from the business world to the two big parties on the right, the Japan Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, were thus pooled.⁷ This body was dissolved in March 1961 amid various criticisms, one being that the LDP was too dependent on funds from large enterprises. That July, the People's Association⁸ was set up, embracing as members medium and small-sized concerns and individuals as well as the large enterprises. It was reorganized as the People's Political Association⁹ in March 1975. None of these attempts to centralize the channelling of funds into the LDP was successful. Large amounts of money continued to be passed to individual Diet members thereby directly stoking the fires of factionalism. The LDP itself received comparatively little.¹⁰

The Funding of Miki and the Miki Faction

Although Miki was born into a family reasonably well off in terms of wealth within rural Tokushima Prefecture, it seems improbable that his family could have financed an election campaign. Information about his sources of income is scarce. The little reliable

knowledge acquired by the writer relates to two points of origin. When Miki first ran for the Diet in 1937, he received five thousand yen, at that time a tidy sum, from the Bank of Japan with the help of Yūki Toyotarō,¹¹ who was Minister of Finance. It is not unlikely that Yūki, who together with his wife was go-between¹² at Miki's wedding, provided many introductions that greatly helped Miki in his early political career. A second source of finance for this first campaign was the contributions through the Sumitomo Bank sent over from America by people of Japanese descent with whom Miki had become acquainted while a student in that country.¹³

In 1940, through marrying Mutsuko, daughter of Mori Nobuteru who was head of the Mori industrial concern, Miki entered a family tree on whose branches were to be found many prominent industrialists and politicians.¹⁴ From this time on, Miki would have received considerable financial support to further his political career, although the extent remains unclear. Certainly, in the postwar period, Miki received significant funds from independent sources, but it is a matter of conjecture whether, and if so indeed when, the supply of money from his wife's family began to dry up.

In addition to the amount of money Miki injected, which was believed to be substantial,¹⁵ Okada Seiichi, president of a salvage company and like Miki elected from Tokushima, was a major contributor to the People's Cooperative Party.¹⁶ Uda Kōichi¹⁷ and Hamada Masanobu¹⁸ from the neighbouring prefecture of Kōchi, Kinoshita Sakae¹⁹ from Hyōgo Prefecture, Ichimanda Hisato²⁰ elected from Oita Prefecture and Saeki Muneyoshi who hailed from Toyama Prefecture were all fellow members of the House of Representatives who at different times were said to have provided finance for Miki necessary to manage his party (faction). Over what periods and to what extent money was provided are not known by the writer. There were certainly other major donors. Money would be

provided in return for a consideration. In the case of Okada, according to one source,²¹ it was the promise of a Cabinet post.

Another and more recent major provider of funds to the Miki faction was Kōmoto, who, over time, came to be recognized as the natural successor to the leadership of the faction, largely by virtue of his financial power. It seems likely that Kōmoto's shipping company provided ample funds for him to distribute in the political world. How, why and when Kōmoto began injecting large sums of money into the Miki faction, the circumstances behind this, and what understanding, if any, there was with Miki are imponderable issues.²² What does appear to be clear, however, is that Kōmoto came to take it upon himself to undertake much of the financing of the faction. He was a frequent visitor to Miki's house, appeared to have a good relationship with him, and, according to one source,²³ contributed to the faction to the extent of being like a "money machine".

The number of people in the Miki faction who handed out money appears to have been few.²⁴ Of course, since it was a faction in the LDP, substantial contributions were received over a period of time from various industrial and business concerns. Not only would Miki draw on contacts he had through the genealogy of his wife's family, but, moreover, on account of his position as a powerful politician, he was able to draw in funds from unrelated enterprises. To give but one example, through the friendship that existed between some members of the Miki family and one of his sons, the president of a very large well-known company came to be introduced to Miki, and as a result his retailing concern regularly made extremely generous donations.²⁵

Compared to the other numerically significant factions²⁶ and the major conservative parties which existed before the formation of the LDP in 1955, relatively little money was said to be distributed by Miki to the members of his group. One former member, Y,²⁷

of Miki's party recalled his own experience. In one election, not many years after the war, when Y first lost his seat he had received twenty thousand yen from Miki, a sum he felt to be woefully inadequate at the time. The amount being small, Y campaigned on a bicycle instead of an open lorry, and many of his supporters worked for nothing. Miki afterwards apologized, admitting that he bore much responsibility for Y's defeat because he had given him too little money. The seat was recaptured at the next election; four hundred thousand yen was spent by Y and support was also received from the *Nōkyō* and various bodies concerned with education. The last time Y stood for election was before the formation of the LDP. He lost, having spent two million two hundred thousand yen. Y himself lacked the ability to raise funds and blamed the escalation in the amount of money that became necessary to maintain one's seat on the return of Kishi to the open political arena.

It is unclear how often and under what circumstances Miki would ask for money,²⁸ but it is not unlikely that he refused money from dubious sources.²⁹ Hirakawa remembered one member of the faction, Minister of Transport at the time, asking for and receiving political donations from various companies whose business came under the sphere of influence of the ministry. Miki, who had few sponsors in that area, was extremely angry and on his instructions Hirakawa, in his capacity as a secretary to the politician, returned the money.³⁰

Not surprisingly, the political funds available in the faction were insufficient to satisfy the demands of many of the members. People in need of money did not belong to the faction, left the faction for another, or lost an election. Those who continued to hold their seats from the early postwar years and stayed with Miki were close to him personally or tended to be strong in their constituencies without using large amounts of money.³¹

According to Hirakawa, for this reason the Miki faction was known within the LDP as the *Eta/Buraku* faction.³² Yet one member of the Kōmoto faction claimed that even after retiring as faction leader, Miki continued to distribute money to some junior politicians; he did not know whether or not they were members of the faction.³³

All political bodies including parties must file annual reports on their political income and expenditure for the Ministry of Home Affairs; these are then compiled and published. At the time Miki became prime minister the faction was said to be mainly financed by the *Seisaku Kondankai* and the *Kindaika Kenkyūkai* with leading members of the business world connected to Miki belonging to the *Sambokukai* or the *Yōzankai*.³⁴ As in the case of every other faction, however, the published figures in no way reflected the routes, methods and amounts of funding. They were a fiction.³⁵

Although very sparing in handing out money, Miki nevertheless had a working faction; this was quite an achievement.

Distribution of Money in the Kōmoto Faction

There were four main occasions on which Kōmoto gave money to members of his faction: *shōgatsu* (the New Year), *obon* (the Bon Festival), *seibo* (the year end) and during election campaigns. For the first three, everyone was given similar amounts of money,³⁶ but at election time the basic amounts they received were topped up by a sum determined by constituency considerations.³⁷ Money could be given at any time during the campaign.

One person interviewed claimed that for the 1986 election a certain member of the faction was given twenty million yen by Kōmoto to cover all election expenses, with other junior members probably receiving similar sums. Ten million yen was contributed to the coffers of faction members with Cabinet experience.³⁸ It was thought that both these sums

were twice the respective basic amounts paid to members of other factions.³⁹ It was of course impossible to confirm these figures. Various attempts had been made to poach members of the Kōmoto faction and there was great dissatisfaction about its relative weakness inside the LDP. By distributing generous amounts of money, Kōmoto hoped to deflect seductive approaches to the members and still criticism temporarily.

Much faction money was handed out not by Kōmoto but rather by Moriyama Kinji, in early 1987 the second most powerful member in the faction.⁴⁰ This was criticized partially because of the belief in the faction, particularly to be found among many junior members, that it was in their best long-term interest that Kaifu be officially recognized as the eventual successor to Kōmoto. Possessed by Moriyama from the time of the faction's inception, the power to distribute NPRS income⁴¹ was one effective method of slowing down Kaifu's influence and preventing him from attaining a position where he could take control. Nevertheless, in the hope of building up and solidifying his support inside the faction, Kaifu distributed money received from his own *kinmyaku*. Not only was this accepted by certain members of the faction, but indeed it was expected by them if Kaifu wished to be considered seriously as a future faction leader. In fact, one junior member expressed to Kaifu his dissatisfaction at being given what he felt was an unacceptably small sum.⁴²

Members of the faction were not paid salaries monthly or even at regular intervals, but some of their regular expenses were met to strengthen their support base.⁴³ Junior members, for instance, had large overheads in their constituencies. To serve as the focus of operations locally and enable the members to maintain a high profile, an office in every sub-area or major centre of the constituency might have been deemed necessary by some of them. Considerable expense was incurred where there were, say, five or six locations

where offices were sited, each functioning for one or two staff. Some of the costs might have been met by Kōmoto. There were other times when, as a custom, money would be given out. Members of the faction in an official delegation to other countries would receive token payments.⁴⁴ Kōmoto could be approached for money at any time. How much was given to whom and how often was not known by the others. One member suspected that Kōmoto himself may have kept no record of payments and would not have been able to recall such details accurately.⁴⁵

As a general rule, Diet members with Cabinet experience received less money than their junior colleagues.⁴⁶ It was expected that, through posts they had held, various channels of funding would have opened to them. People standing for the first time were given substantial financial support to help build up a *jiban*. Members fighting to regain a seat lost and those who were faced with opponents seen to be very strong were also given special aid.⁴⁷

Developing *Kinmyaku*

All the members of the faction worked hard to develop their own *kinmyaku*. The extent to which “dirty” or “questionable” money was demanded and taken varied according to the individual faction member. There were those who had a reputation for not touching contributions originating from suspicious quarters or in exchange for dubious favours,⁴⁸ but others were not so discerning. For example, J had a well-developed network of connections in a certain country, people with whom he could correspond in the local language. Among other services he offered for a price was a promise to affect introductions to leading Japanese political and business figures which could be the first step to making mutually

beneficial and lucrative if ethically questionable commercial contracts.⁴⁹ Between the two extremes, faction members could be found occupying various points on the spectrum.

Industrial and business concerns were often approached for donations. In the five months from August to December 1987 S, secretary to T, was asked to contact eight hundred companies in the hope that a number of them at least would be prepared to make regular contributions.⁵⁰ S often had to pay at least three visits to a company before they were prepared to offer money. In the week previous to that in which he was interviewed, two companies had agreed to donate money on a monthly basis. Another secretary, neither born nor brought up in the constituency, possessed no link with it independent of his relationship with T, and this put him at a big relative disadvantage. An outsider was often thought to be less knowledgeable and appreciative of the problems in the constituency. On the other hand, S was not only from the same prefecture but hailed from a different city. Thus he was able to develop connections in districts where T was weak.

Not infrequently, S did not get as far as calling on the company. On the telephone, a person might have said very coldly that they had heard of T, but On visiting a company, S found it extremely difficult to extract a promise to pay money regularly or in a lump sum. The first problem was obtaining an audience with a senior member of the concern. Often, S never progressed beyond a middle-level employee or indeed the personnel section. Within one company he might be forced to repeat his talk several times. Independent of the employee's post and importance, S usually began by relating T's background: his family, his schooling and his political career so far, as well as elucidating his standpoint on various policy issues. Not yet having occupied a Cabinet post or vice-ministership was a disadvantage but, at the same time, junior members of the other factions suffered from a similar handicap. T's youth was an advantage. All other things being equal, an older

politician elected on the same number of occasions would have found it more difficult to raise money; he would not have been seen as having the same potentiality to reach a senior party or Cabinet position.

After S's introduction, the company would go through the list of committees and LDP divisions on which T had served and was serving to see what connection existed between the work involved and the business of the company. A bus company, for instance, might have expressed an interest in Diet members who had belonged to the standing committee or division on transportation; again an industrial concern in the chemical industry would have wanted its voice heard in the environment division.⁵¹

In trying to build up T's *kinmyaku*, S availed himself of his own *jinmyaku*; donations were solicited from people totally independent of T: people S was at school and university with and colleagues in his former workplace, among others. Before approaching such friends and acquaintances S would contact graduates from T's university, often a good source of finance. People born in the prefecture who had made good also received calls for support early on. Donations were usually made through one of the various organizations set up for that purpose. For instance, the H Club possessed a registered office and was a play on both T's name and a moral quality.⁵² Members were company chairmen who contributed handsomely.

If, as often happened, the company could not be persuaded to make a regular contribution, it was asked to buy tickets for T's annual fund-raising party.⁵³ A company would often be approached by secretaries to two or more faction members to buy tickets for the same party. This could be embarrassing. On one occasion S was rebuffed by a company that had already bought tickets from a senior faction member who had in person made the

request. Faction members jealously guarded their *jinmyaku* and it was difficult to prevent this happening.

That T was extremely bright, young and would work very hard for the prefecture would be stressed by S in negotiations. However, many company chairmen were extremely unhappy about him belonging to a small and weak faction with little relative power. By way of an explanation, S would clarify the circumstances under which T had inherited the seat from R and the nature of the relationship between R and Miki.⁵⁴

Hagemasukai

There were two basic types of fund-raising parties: one for an ordinary member of the faction and the other for the leader. The purpose was the same - to draw in money from anyone who was prepared to give. Through buying tickets that were "sold" more than once, donors were able to help the Diet members cover evidence of the amount of money received. In addition, contributions to these parties were not subject to legal restrictions.

Many LDP members held big fund-raising parties annually or once every two years. Under the name of *hagemasukai* (meeting to urge [the Diet Member] on) or *shuppan kinen kai* (meeting to commemorate the publication [of a book written under the Diet member's name]), a party with buffet style dinner would be held in the banqueting hall of a large Tōkyō hotel. Tickets were sold mostly to companies, some of which bought in wads of ten and forcibly palmed them off on subsidiaries, subcontractors or other business concerns which, given the bilateral relationship between them, were not in a position to refuse. The money paid for the tickets was seen to be a direct political donation to the Diet member's coffers. Often no company representative would be present at the function. Indeed, many of the people present at the party would have paid nothing: some would be journalists, others members of the foreign diplomatic corps, and many of the rest supporters bussed

in from the constituency. It was hoped that the voters present would be encouraged to collect and give support back in the constituency.

Most of the parties took the same form. With the exception of the Diet member in whose honour the party was being held and who would stand at the front, often with his family, the faction members would line up in order of their seniority to welcome the guests. Sometimes LDP members from other factions particularly friendly with the host attended the party, and took their place in the welcoming queue. The function itself often lasted less than two hours and for the guests entailed listening to one interminable speech after another. Rarely was there substance in the content. In addition to messages of support from local personages and industrialists, some members of the faction would take the floor. Deputizing for Miki, unable to attend since felled by a stroke in 1986, his wife delivered speeches praising the host, his work and his loyalty. As a member of the Kōmoto faction the Diet member's attributes were extolled and a bright future for him promised, notwithstanding the fact that he may have been too junior and recent a recruit to have had any direct connection with Miki. The presence of Miki Mutsuko gave added recognition to Kōmoto as the accepted successor to Miki and what he stood for. Kōmoto would speak highly of the host's qualities, his work in and out the faction and his prospects. For instance, he would describe him as being a Diet member who was sure to reach the top of the LDP ladder. Other commendations were given by faction members currently holding Cabinet posts. This was all to impress the people present.

Indeed, a secondary function of the party was bridge-building. Guests had the opportunity to meet many of the Diet members present and mix among themselves. There were opportunities to have one's photograph taken with a national politician and famous actor or singer; the faction member's prestige might be seen to rise with the number of

“well-known” people he could persuade to attend. Possibilities of forming various business connections existed and were taken advantage of. In this sense (at the price of admission) the host performed a service for his guests.

The final speech would be given by the host himself, who often would give his interpretation of some aspect of policy, assert what he stood for and declare how he was working to achieve that end. Members of the faction attended each other’s fund-raising parties. It gave a bad impression if few fellow Diet members turned up to give support. The role of *emcee* was usually taken by a junior member. This was part of the work expected of him by the faction. Similarly the *Tsuitachikai* would help with the preparations, reception and running of the party.

Tickets to the fund-raising party usually listed some of the supporters of the event. Kōmoto’s name would be prominent and faction members with a high public profile might get a mention. Although their attendance and intention to give a speech might have been known in advance, politicians of other factions would rarely find their names on the printed invitations. The Diet member, by associating himself not formally but rather casually with another faction or member thereof, might avoid being criticized, his action otherwise possibly being interpreted as showing a lack of respect and concern for his own faction and being prejudicial to another LDP member of that constituency.⁵⁵ This did depend, however, on individual circumstances.⁵⁶

Once a year Kōmoto himself held a fund-raising party. In essence it resembled the functions of the members of his faction but was on a much grander scale. Invitations to prominent LDP members would be sent out and a few would accept, the number and people invited depending upon the political situation at the time. Heads of the other factions sometimes both attended and gave warm speeches of support. This was all for

show and at most would be a manoeuvre to draw the Kōmoto faction closer to or further away from another.

Entitled, "Meeting to Tell About the Road of Advancement for Japan",⁵⁷ this party was a very important event in the faction calendar. Not only was every effort made in order to maximize revenue from the sale of tickets but, in addition, extensive media coverage might be given and it was essential for the faction to give a good account of itself. Great care was taken in the planning. Faction consciousness was heightened by publicly differentiating the Diet members present through using coloured rosettes to be affixed to their lapels: one colour for members of the Kōmoto faction and another for everyone else. Within the faction there was the strong view that Kōmoto's party must be seen to be successful and thought to attract the physical presence of many people who had bought tickets. This number, in addition to a factional breakdown of Diet members who attended, was given to the press by one of Kōmoto's secretaries.⁵⁸

Income from *Hagemasukai*

The number of tickets sold, by whom and to whom they were sold, and the amount of money pocketed by the fund-raiser varied with time and the Diet member concerned. However, this was not public knowledge. Figures given out by the Diet members acted to serve their interest not to inform. Tickets were usually priced at twenty or thirty thousand yen each, but again the sums handed over often greatly exceeded the total face value of the tickets bought.

The Kōmoto office was willing to give assistance in selling the tickets. Friends and close acquaintances within the faction would volunteer to give a helping hand. Both inside and outside the faction, Diet members desirous of developing strong links with

the fellow member concerned would use their *kinmyaku*. If the faction member wished to sell tickets to companies in, say, the automobile industry but did not himself have the right contacts, a member with the necessary connections might help. Some faction members moved to protect their relative independence by working hard to sell all the tickets themselves. Irrespective of whether or not the faction member availed himself of Kōmoto's *jinmyaku* and *kinmyaku*, or had had experience of a Cabinet post, the latter's office and the *Tsūitachikai* assisted with preparations for the party. The individual faction member received the profit from his party; it did not go to the faction. However, expenses such as the cost of hiring the banqueting hall and providing food would take up a large proportion of the revenue. It must be stressed that there were no universal rules for selling tickets to these parties. In some cases all members were expected to help out a fellow faction member; in others they were not even requested to give assistance.

All faction members had to sell tickets for Kōmoto's party. One ticket for the party which took place on 9 October 1986 cost thirty thousand yen. According to one secretary, the number of tickets each faction member was expected to sell was calculated by multiplying the number of times he had been elected by one hundred.⁵⁹ Companies that bought the tickets paid the money directly to Kōmoto. It appears that for every ticket sold above the member's quota, half the money went to Kōmoto and half to the seller. One senior member of the faction, displeased with this system, thought it better that less effort should be made to exceed one's quota; if half the extra were sold with all the money going to Kōmoto, he maintained, there might be some abatement of the criticism from companies about the excessive cost of contributing to fund-raising parties caused by their proliferation.⁶⁰ The money that Kōmoto received from his party was likely to be injected into the faction but the total amount of receipts was kept secret. In addition to making

their contribution to overall revenue, members of the faction were expected to sell tickets for these parties in order that their loyalty was openly manifested.

A secretary⁶¹ to a very senior politician in the Abe faction related its guidelines. As a general rule only, members of the House of Representatives elected between one and three times and of the House of Councillors elected once received help with their parties. Their senior colleagues were not expected to rely on assistance from the faction, but of course through personal friendships and connections they might be given help by fellow members. In addition, members with Cabinet experience were expected to contribute money to the faction pool. The more often they had held prestigious posts, the more extensive the *jinmyaku* and *kinmyaku* they could develop, and therefore the greater the amount expected of them.⁶²

Conclusion

In the political culture of Japan, particularly in rural constituencies, it was expected of Diet members and candidates for that office that on certain occasions, they hand out money to constituents. In addition, even within the party, money changed hands to facilitate the acquisition of a post or advent of a situation favourable to the donor. Given this background, the procurement of funding was central to the activities of the members of all factions. As the leader of one, Kōmoto was expected to take care of much of the financial need of his members and money was distributed by him on certain occasions. Belonging to the Kōmoto faction as opposed to one of the four larger factions was often disadvantageous when independently procuring funds. The relative weakness of the faction inside the LDP, itself unhelpful, made the acquisition of profitable posts in the Diet committees and divisions of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Committee far more difficult, compounding

the disadvantage. Companies gave money in expectation of a return; they gave it as an investment.

The Miki faction revelled in its image of being a faction free of corruption and often called for the establishment of political ethics within the system. As leader of the successor faction, Kōmoto attempted to capitalize on this tradition. Miki himself certainly had a reputation of being a “clean” politician and the faction may have benefited at the polls from this publicity.⁶³ However, it would be a mistake to stamp the moral standards of a faction leader on all his subordinates. Each faction member had his own ethical values and standard of conduct by which he would act, just as in every other faction. A historical quantitative study of degrees of willingness of Diet members to accept money from questionable sources might show one faction, possibly that of Miki, to be less reproachable than others, but the difficulties in composing such a table appear to the writer to be insuperable.

In itself, supplying funds to fellow members of the Diet was no guarantee of buying their support. Discernment and subtlety were necessary in many aspects of its dispensation.⁶⁴ The method, manner and timing of its distribution were crucial. The moves of the other actors, real or potential, had to be considered. There was the question of face: taking a monetary payment by winning a round of golf - the game, rules, result and award being no more than going through the motions - might be more acceptable to the recipient than receiving a wad of banknotes in an envelope. Activating him to move in a manner likely to further one's own goal demanded knowledge of changing circumstances and sensitivity to them on the donor's part. In addition, how, how often and when to remind the recipient of monetary favours bestowed required considerable political skill and feeling.

The demand and need for faction money among its members were not solely functions of constituency considerations. The existence of independent wealth, deftness in developing *kinmyaku* and expertise in business were other important factors. As a result, control of a faction through the skilful dispensation of funds became progressively difficult. With the increase in the wealth of the country as expressed by GNP, not only were there more potential sources of income to be tapped but, moreover, in comparison to the situation existing some thirty years earlier, many junior members had developed independent *kinmyaku* and not infrequently founded their own companies too, through which they could gather money. This process was likely to continue.

Notes and References

- 1 An interesting analysis of the funding of the LDP for 1987 is to be found in the *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 September 1988. It includes a look at the financial power in the hands of the secretary-general and chairman and vice-chairmen of the Diet Strategy Committee.
- 2 Real, potential or imagined.
- 3 For a discussion of these terms, see James L. Huffman, *The Idioms of Contemporary Japan XI*, The Japan Interpreter, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp.505-515.
- 4 Through reference to a report (published annually) of the Ministry of Home Affairs listing political donations, a newspaper was able to provide proof of an instance where money was passed from the LDP to an opposition party. Over two years, a political organization belonging to Kōmoto had sent sixteen million yen to political bodies run by members of the Democratic Socialist Party. Three Diet members and one recognized but unsuccessful 1983 election candidate of the party were the recipients but it was claimed that all the money was meant for just one of the people, Kodaira Tadashi. The official attitude of the DSP, expressed by its chairman, Sasaki Ryōsaku, was that it was a problem for Kodaira personally and bore no relation to the party or its policy. The Kōmoto side maintained that the money was no more than assistance to someone with whom Kōmoto had a personal connection - both Kōmoto and Kodaira graduated from Nihon University. *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 September 1984.
- 5 *Keizai Saiken Kondankai*.
- 6 *Keizai Dantai Rengōkai*.
- 7 The two parties came together to form the Liberal Democratic Party later that year.
- 8 *Kokumin Kyōkai*.
- 9 *Kokumin Seiji Kyōkai*.
- 10 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 25 January 1955, and Abe Hitoshi and Uchida Mitsuru, eds., *Gendai Seijigaku Shōjiten*, Yūhikaku, 1978.
- 11*
- 12 *Baishaku*
- 13*
- 14 See, for instance, *Tōkyō Taimuzu*, 17 January 1987.
- 15 Asano and Hirakawa, interviews.
- 16* See also, American Occupation files, SCAP GS(B) 00832 and 00833.
- 17 Miki Mutsuko and Hirakawa, interviews.
- 18 *Ibid.*.
- 19 *Ibid.*.
- 20 Miki Mutsuko, interview. Ichimanda had served as President of the Bank of Japan
- 21*
- 22 The writer put this question to many of the people he interviewed including past and present faction members, current and former secretaries to faction members, journalists and other people who might have been in a position to know. The answers varied widely and were clearly based on speculation and hearsay; perhaps the truth was known by only the two principal characters themselves. What everyone agreed on was that in the 1950's Kōmoto maintained a very low political profile and was busy building up his company. Not until much later did he become close personally to Miki. Perhaps it is of no significance, but in his diary Ashida mentions having borrowed

- money from Kōmoto in 1956. Neither the amount nor purpose was specified. *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki*, Iwanami Shōten, 1986, entry for 4 February 1956.
- 23*
- 24 Hino and Asano were of this view.
- 25*
- 26 Here the writer refers to the Tanaka, Ōhira, Fukuda and Nakasone factions and their antecedents.
- 27*
- 28* According to Asano, Miki did not go around asking for money. One person interviewed claimed that Miki would phone up certain people to ask for money, which he would distribute to members of his faction. He said that Miki's wife could obtain money just by showing her namecard.
- 29 Hirakawa and Asano, interviews.
- 30 Hirakawa, interview.
- 31 *Ibid.*.
- 32*
- 33* Unfortunately the writer was unable to confirm this.
- 34 See *Tokushima Shimbun*, 21 December 1974.
- 35 See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 4 December 1974.
- 36*
- 37*
- 38*
- 39* This was the general consensus of opinion among the journalists covering factions at the time for the *Asahi Shimbun*.
- 40* However, according to Bōda Gōshi, Moriyama dealt only with minute detailed finances such as air tickets and miscellaneous costs incurred by the faction.
- 41*
- 42*
- 43*
- 44*
- 45*
- 46 This was believed by journalists covering the faction.
- 47 Often, the fiercest competition often came from another candidate standing for the LDP.
- 48 Ide Ichitarō was one such faction member.
- 49*
- 50* S was related by marriage to a local politician supporting T; this was an important reason why he was trusted for this work.
- 51 According to S, the company representative would go down the list of committees and divisions on which T had served and was serving while making comments such as, "This is no good. Neither is that..."
- 52*
- 53 That is, *hagemasukai*.
- 54*
- 55*
- 56 Members of other factions, and indeed parties, were often encountered at *hagemasukai*. Such functions provided opportunities for Diet members to forge alliances or show

support for a personal friend. There might have been the further purpose of drawing the money-raiser closer to that person's faction.

57 In Japanese, *Nihon No Shinro Wo Kataru Kai*. From the time he was first elected, Kōmoto used this title for similar occasions and as a heading for published collections of his speeches and ideas.

58* There would be a discrepancy between this figure and the number of people who did attend.

59*

60*

61*

62 Fukumoto Hideaki, a journalist for the *Chūgoku Shimbun* who covered the Abe faction, interview.

63 The phrase "Clean Miki" may be a translation from an Australian newspaper article, which appeared at the time Miki resigned from the Tanaka Cabinet. See *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 June 1975.

64*

Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the internal structure, organization, dynamics, and finances of an LDP faction have been investigated after chronicling its history. As a starting point, early biographical details of the founder were provided, mostly from primary sources. Much of the material used in the thesis was acquired by the writer through securing a position from which he could watch and participate in faction affairs, and after earning the trust of the actors who were central to the workings of the faction.

The choice of the Miki/Kōmoto faction as the object of study has given a number of results. Some are pertinent only to this faction, while others relate to the wider question of factionalism inside the party.

The small size and weakness of the Kōmoto faction, relative to the other four, were traits that had been inherited from the Miki faction, its predecessor. There was continuity of constitution and purpose. In taking over the leadership, Kōmoto assumed institutionalized control of the membership, but also received by descent a set of relationships with the other factions already determined by a prior history. These were at best cool, and proved disadvantageous for the Kōmoto faction when it sought to ally itself with one or more of the bigger factions.

As a consequence of being excluded from the centre of power of the party (and thus government), the Kōmoto faction was unable to see its policies realized, and encountered

difficulties when it tried to attract to its ranks prospective members who lacked pre-existing ties with it. In a number of cases, entrants had joined because of a sense of duty or obligation rather than as an act of desire or design.

Inside the faction, it was necessary to distinguish between official rank, defined by the number of times a member was elected, and true standing, which was a function of several variables. On the surface, it appeared that faction management had come to be run through a central machinery, but in essence power remained securely in the hands of the leader. Although there was some debate on policy, the more junior members exerted little or no influence on the proposals put forward by the faction as its own. On many matters Kōmoto conferred with a few trusted senior members, an attempt was made to secure faction agreement (as opposed to seeking a consensus), and there was the consciousness that an extremely unpopular course of action could damage the cohesiveness of the faction.

The Kōmoto office was for the conduct of political business; it was not a place for faction members to come together to socialize. The faction was a vehicle for its members to seek to accomplish their political aspirations. To this extent, there was unity of purpose and a sense of belonging. Emotional ties that existed, between the members on one hand and the faction on the other, could be accounted for by long and continual congregation together rather than positive feelings of association.

The Kōmoto faction survived for a number of reasons. Although it was small, its membership was not insignificant given the relative numerical strengths of the four big factions. It could not be ignored by the others. Throughout the political vicissitudes of the faction, Kōmoto was able to provide party and government posts for its members; he continued funding them. One faction member, Kaifu Toshiki, was seen to have future party leadership potential. This served to unify the faction. Moves were made by the

other factions to develop a close relationship with certain Kōmoto faction members, and to some extent they were successful. However, there appeared to be no advantage in switching “official” affiliation.

There are more general conclusions which can be drawn from this study. The coming into existence of factions was a historical process rather than a series of conscious decisions by individuals or groups of politicians. The formation of one all-embracing conservative party, the LDP, may have caused hitherto loose groupings to solidify and become more recognizable as separate entities, but this was little more than a further step in a sequence of stages. The necessary elements existed long before 1955.

Cultural, psychological and institutional factors accounted for the existence and persistence of factions. One major cause appears to have been the tendency in Japanese society to belong to and operate in small groups rather than seek prominence through acting in a single-minded individualistic manner. Furthermore, many candidates who entered the Diet “inherited” a seat from a father or father-in-law. They were not natural leaders (or indeed instinctive politicians), and could be drawn to more powerful, able and charismatic figures for support. On occasion, this was bolstered by feelings of *giri* and *ninjō* which might be in evidence.

A large number of Japanese politicians took a local as opposed to a global view; they were most interested in seeing projects realized in their constituencies. Strong and enduring support from the voters had to be earned by providing for them. Powerful allies were needed to acquire part of the pork-barrel.

The very fact that factions existed led to their perpetuation. Prospective LDP candidates felt often that they had no alternative but to affiliate. Not to do so might threaten their chances of being elected or their careers in the party. Indeed, the most important

advantage secured by association was that it facilitated the winning of official party recognition in an election campaign. This brought in many votes. Party backing might be given to those who stood while claiming a lack of affiliation, but it was not unlikely that covert ties with one or more factions had been developed.

Factional activity intensified during party presidential elections. At that time, factional politics could degenerate into the arithmetic of combinatorics. The power of a faction was often determined by its numerical strength. It was very difficult for junior members to remain independent. The fierce inter-factional struggles during presidential campaigns which had contributed to the atmosphere encouraging factionalism, served to help maintain it.

The existence of the medium-size constituency system nourished factionalism. Given the success of the LDP, a plurality of candidates were returned from most constituencies. It was natural that those competing directly against one another would seek support from different groupings.

In attributing relative causal weight, the writer would stress the cultural and psychological factors, and the pressure applied, perhaps including threats, during presidential election campaigns. The electoral system and the pork-barrel aspect were seen by him to be less important factors which supported rather than were responsible for the existence of factions.

There were other advantages secured by affiliation to a faction. Among them should be included the offer of moral and financial support, the earlier attainment of party and government posts, the quicker receipt of information, the opportunity to follow more closely movements of senior party members and the proceedings of the Diet committees, party divisions etc., the possibility of attending a larger number of *benkyōkai*, the chance to

make more contacts with fellow LDP members, and the provision of assistance in dealing with interest groups in the constituency.

This study has shown that the LDP factions were not homogeneous. Their organizations and the dynamics of movements in them were moulded by many factors including their histories, traditions, leadership structures, and characters of past and present members. It was therefore natural that they all have their own special colouring. However, neither were factions totally diverse. For instance, there were similarities in their pyramidal membership structures: the corresponding parallel levels of status and responsibility facilitated inter-faction discussions and negotiations. Differences between two factions could become more (or less) pronounced with a change of leadership.

There was no evidence to suggest that any given faction would be led necessarily by a particular "type" of person. However, certain abilities and attributes appeared to be of overriding importance. First was the talent for gathering funds and the perception to distribute them cleverly. Second was the display of cunning and subtlety in dealing with powerful members of other factions. Third was the possession of those character traits which would enable a Diet member to be seen as a major performer on the political stage a man who could direct and control a faction; it was not necessary to be a natural leader. In addition there was an element of luck. The fortunes of a prospective leader were not independent of those of the current leader, the faction itself, and potential challengers in it. Certain attributes which were indispensable for political leaders in some other countries were not of great importance for LDP faction leaders. Thus, it was not necessary for the latter to have a following among the national electorate, or be noted if indeed respected for their views on government policy.

There were no rigid rules about how much money was distributed to whom by the faction leader.¹ Nor was its dispensation limited to a given number of occasions. It did appear to be the case that a significant number of Diet members were able to garner substantial funds independent of the faction, and party. For instance, not a few ran consultancies soliciting commissions from inside and outside the country. Financial “semi-independence” gave them some freedom from factional fetters. It would be wild speculation to give to each source of funds, a fixed percentage of the total amount of money collected in, say, a year. The ratios varied with time and the member concerned. Certainly, money from the party would be a very small proportion.

Much of the power in the party was held by a small number of members who were able to attract adherents through their current or future prospects of distributing money and posts. Whatever the faction of primary association, LDP members sought to secure their positions by developing secondary ties with potential leaders elsewhere. Some had mutually recognized bonds with one or more factions; others were pragmatic, and their sympathies moved in chorus with the sentiment at the centre of the party. It was not necessary to change factions. Indeed such a move was difficult and might antagonize unnecessarily some elements in the party. The success or otherwise of a Diet member’s career, although affected by the fortunes of the faction of association, was not inextricably bound up with them.²

At the same time it must be stressed that not all faction leaders were “faithful” to their members. They watched out for their own positions which they would seek to protect at the cost of alienating a number of them.³ Thus it would be incorrect to regard loyalty as one salient characteristic of the membership of LDP factions.⁴ Faction members were more

likely to occupy some intermediate point on the spectrum ranging from devout loyalty to total disloyalty than to be found at one of the two extremes.

Doubts about the loyalty and commitment to a faction called into question the meaning of affiliation. It was probably less important to see oneself as a member of faction A than to be seen as one by others, outside the faction. The numerical strengths of the factions were frequently estimated but rarely tested. At the same time, given the pork-barrel politics of Japan, it was to be expected that a candidate for the premiership might expect and receive some support from fellow LDP members representing the same or an adjacent constituency notwithstanding factional affiliation.

It follows immediately from the above that there were vertical and horizontal links among Diet members which crossed factions; hence there were channels of inter-factional communication that could be and were used.⁵ This was supplemented by the services provided by those journalists who acted as conduits of information. The receipt of items concerning events inside the same faction was seen by its members to be of great value.

In the absence of a previous detailed analysis of the internal structure and dynamics of any LDP faction, it was difficult, with any great certainty, to enumerate changes that had taken place in the workings of a faction over a period of time. Clearly there were differences. Possibly, they were more in the nature of modifications than a metamorphosis adjustments brought about through a slow and considered evolution. A number of specific points can be made when attempting to draw a historical comparison.

It is likely that LDP Diet members had a little more freedom of movement inside the party than they enjoyed in, say, the 1960's. One cause was the increase in the number of *zoku giin*, which were a "de-factionalizing" influence. A number of LDP members spent time studying the workings of a specific ministry and the policy issues considered

there. Through gaining proficiency in a particular field, developing strong contacts in the ministry, and consequently reaching a position of influence in it, they were able to make a name for themselves independent of faction affiliation. This had come to threaten the prominence of the faction heads and weaken factional power. It was also a factor facilitating the collection of outside funds.

A second cause was the election to the Diet of representatives of a generation whose values were less traditional and conservative than those of their forbears. Less respect was felt towards a senior politician simply on the grounds of his advanced age or long length of service in the Diet. These more junior politicians demanded greater representation in important faction organs. They were increasingly involved in the making of lower-level decisions and, in theory if not practice, their views were sought by faction leaders.

On the other side, however, while it appeared to be true that there was a plurality of power centres in the large factions, often and against their will, the sub-leaders could be brought into line when an outward display of faction unity was called for by the leader. For instance, members would be told how to vote during presidential elections. Dissenters might be expelled.⁶ In addition, the careers of members could be advanced or hindered by their success in conducting faction business.

Certain families continued to provide new Diet members for the party. On occasion, the candidate himself was reluctant to stand, but the urging of vested interests in the constituency, the desire to prevent a break-up of the *kōenkai*, a feeling of responsibility to the people who had worked for and been associated with the father (or father-in-law, etc...), and the sense of duty (burden?) to continue the family tradition were factors which made refusal difficult. Often faction affiliation remained the same. There was the consciousness of being the second or subsequent representative from one family and, sometimes, of having

the duty to uphold the principles and views laid down by the predecessor. This tended to slow down the process of change.

It is necessary to distinguish between trends and a temporary state.⁷ The apparent lack of expressions of dissent among the factions, noticeable in early 1988, was a case of the latter. The existence of a "faction total mainstream" was partly a reflection of the characters of the faction leaders and their reluctance to adopt a stance which could alienate the others; this might result in fewer posts being offered to their members. Neither political ethics nor vision had been a prerequisite in the past for high rank in the party. Rather, shrewdness in dealing with fellow members was a valuable commodity. Numerical strength had always been important in determining power.

The benefits of belonging to a faction for a LDP Diet member have already been listed. In addition, the presence of factions led to advantages in terms of the system and Japanese norms of behaviour. The amount of power in the hands of any one politician was lessened and diluted; faction leaders acted as reciprocal restraints on each other. Organizations and staff separate from those of the party provided an opportunity for factions to frame policy independently and thus animate political debate. In the absence of a viable opposition,⁸ the factions were able to take up and represent alternative postures on policy issues.

In some form, factions might continue to exist and flourish in the LDP independent of the political framework in which they operated. Adoption of a small-size constituency system would leave intact those other factors, mentioned earlier, which accounted for the phenomenon of factionalism.

Nevertheless, even if the manifestation of factionalism in the LDP was inevitable, it is the opinion of the writer that factions performed no useful role in the party which could not have been executed without their presence. Indeed, members did not secure the

advantages that could accrue from belonging to relatively small political groupings. The factions were not instrumental in encouraging debate among junior and middle-ranking party members. They could not be said to effect the function of conveying the will of those at the bottom to those at the top. Rather they served to affix further restrictions on the freedom of the LDP members who belonged. Although factions and their leaders were a defence against dictatorship by the party leader, they served to replace it by an oligarchy.

The existence of factions hindered democratic processes in the party and drew attention away from matters of political substance. The personal views of the affiliated Diet members were suppressed and the expression of them restricted. Excessive thought and time were given to factional manoeuvrings. Coalitions of convenience were sought; commonality of political philosophy was secondary. Often it was difficult to see where power lay and who exercised it. Political strife among faction leaders could permeate the proceedings of the Diet, its committees and party divisions. The manner in which the distribution of posts was decided owed much to factional considerations. Incompetence did not of itself disqualify a candidate for a position. The careers of superior or capable politicians could be hindered by belonging, not necessarily by choice, to a faction out of favour. The LDP factions were an obstacle to the freedom of their members, not an organ through which their wills were conveyed. Given the existence of factions, it was advantageous to belong to one. Their existence itself was not advantageous.

Such negative aspects of Japanese politics would not necessarily cease to be manifested with the dissolution of factions. It is not unlikely that with their disappearance, groups of LDP members would gather together once again, begin operating as separate units (that is, faction-like bodies), and over time become bureaucratized if not institutionalized. Possibly only the form would be different.

Notes and References

- 1 This finding differs from that of Curtis.
- 2 Nakane was mistaken on this point.
- 3 For instance, as successor to Prime Minister Uno Sōsuke, Takeshita Noboru favoured Kaifu over Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who was from his own faction. He was prepared to damage his relationship with Hashimoto rather than risk losing influence in, if not control of, his faction.
- 4 These views run counter to those of Fukui.
- 5 Again, see Nakane.
- 6 In the 1989 presidential election there were special circumstances. No faction leader was particularly enthusiastic about Kaifu. Even Kōmoto had mixed feelings; he coveted the post himself.
- 7 See *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 January 1988.
- 8 Under the leadership of Doi Takako, the Socialist Party has acted to discard some of its ideological baggage.

Appendix 1

**THE NUMERICAL STRENGTHS OF
THE LDP FACTIONS IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
1958-1986**

Appendix 2

MOVEMENTS OF THE LDP FACTIONS IN AND OUT OF THE MAINSTREAM, 1955-1987

November 1955


April 1956

December 1956

March 1957

January 1959

July 1960



July 1960


July 1962

July 1964

December 1964

December 1966

November 1968



November 1968


October 1970

July 1972

December 1974

December 1976

December 1978



December 1978

July 1980


November 1982

October 1984


September 1986

November 1987


MAINSTREAM



NEUTRAL



ANTI-(OF NON) MAINSTREAM




November 1987


June 1989

August 1989


ADMINISTRATIVE



INVERTED



ANTI-(or NON-) MAINSTREAM



Appendix 3

**LISTING OF THE DIET MEMBERS
WHO BELONGED TO
THE MIKI/KŌMOTO FACTION
(OR MIKI'S PARTY)**

House of Councillors

<u>CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN</u>	<u>DATE OF ELECTION</u> 20 February 1928	20 February 1930	20 February 1932	20 February 1936	30 April 1937	30 April 1942	10 April 1946
<u>Niigata</u>							
KOYANAGI Makie				X	X M P ₉	X TE SL P	
<u>Nagano</u>							
KOYAMA Kunitarō	X	X	X	X	X M P ₉	X TE SL P	

HOUSE OF PEERS

Viscount (子爵) MISHIMA Michiharu entered the House of Peers in 1929; after the war he was elected to the House of Councillors for the National Constituency.

DATE OF
ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY
and POLITICIAN

Hokkaido

KITA Shizji

TAKAHASHI Yanosuke

KAWAGUCHI Yoichi

KOBAYASHI Tokiichi

MAISUURA Sadayoshi

Aomori

SASAMORI Junzo

Miyagi

MURAMATSU Hisayoshi

Yamagata

Ito Goro

4 June 1950

24 April 1953

LDP formed, 15.11.55

8 July 1956

2 June 1959

1 July 1962

4 July 1965

7 July 1968

27 June 1971

7 July 1974

10 July 1977

22 June 1980

26 June 1983

6 July 1986

~

~

~

~

~

n-a

5

failed

had belonged to the Lower House 1

died 13 February 1976

~

had belonged to the Lower House

failed

n-a

~

had belonged to the Lower House

~

~

had belonged to the Lower House

CONSTITUENCY
and POLITICIAN
DATE OF
ELECTION

20 April 1947

4 June 1950

24 April 1953

LOP formed, 15.11.55

8 July 1956

2 June 1959

1 July 1962

4 July 1965

7 July 1968

27 June 1971

7 July 1974

10 July 1977

22 June 1980

26 June 1983

6 July 1986

Tochigi

MORIYAMA Mayumi

WASAKI Junzō

YANO Noboru

Chiba

USUI Seichi

Kanagawa

SUZUKI Kenichi



Niigata

KOYANAGI Makie

x ——— x

x ——— x

failed failed

x

x ——— x

x

failed
x

had belonged to the Lower House, died 18 October 1987

CONSTITUENCY
and POLITICIAN
DATE OF
ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Notes
<u>Tokushima</u>		
KOSIME Kentarō		died 2 July 1980
KAMENAGA Tomoyoshi		
Kōro Mitsuo	23	
<u>Kagawa</u>		
Miyoshi Hajime	24 April 1953	Failed
<u>Saga</u>		
NARESHIMA Naotsugu		died 16 November 1981
<u>Nagasaki</u>		
HATSUMURA Takichirō		
NAKAMURA Teiji		
KUBO Kanichi		

4 June 1950
 20 April 1947
 2 June 1959
 1 July 1962
 4 July 1965
 7 July 1968
 27 June 1971
 7 July 1974
 10 July 1977
 22 June 1980
 26 June 1983
 6 July 1986

LOP formed, 15.11.55
 8 July 1956
 2 June 1959
 1 July 1962
 4 July 1965
 7 July 1968
 27 June 1971
 7 July 1974
 10 July 1977
 22 June 1980
 26 June 1983
 6 July 1986

DATE OF CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN ELECTION

20 April 1947	4 June 1950	24 April 1953	10 th formed, 13.11.55	8 July 1956	2 June 1959	1 July 1962	4 July 1965	7 July 1968	27 June 1971	7 July 1974	10 July 1977	22 June 1980	26 June 1983	6 July 1986

Kumamoto

KIYAGUCHI Takunori

SONOKI Noboru

Oita

IWAO Jinzo

Miyazaki

SAKAMOTO Chikao

NUKUMI Saburo

National/Proportional Representation Constituency

TAKEUCHI Kiyoshi

KOYAYASHI Kuniji

2 --- died 31 May 1965

1

X
X
X
X

1 --- 2 --- 2 --- died 22 October 1976

19 --- died 21 August 1984

X --- 14 17 20 --- X

6 July 1986

26 June 1983

22 June 1980

10 July 1977

7 July 1974

27 June 1971

7 July 1968

4 July 1965

1 July 1962

2 June 1959

8 July 1956

LDP Formed, 15.11.55

24 April 1953

4 June 1950

20 April 1947

CONSTITUENCY DATE OF ELECTION and POLITICIAN

TAMAKI Kazuo

MARUYAMA Masaya

ISHIKAWA Seiichi

Kusunoki Masatoshi

NOMOTO Shinatsuchi

MAISUBARA Kazuhiko

OGAWA Hiroyoshi

MISHIMA Michiharu

OKAMURA Bunshirō

OKU Muneko

HITOSUMATSU Sadayoshi

KATSUMATA Minoru

failed

x 18

MLC --- 15 --- failed 16

failed

x

x

x

x

x

failed

n.a. 7 8

see footnote 1/2
n.a. 9 10 --- failed, died 25 May 1954

x 1/2

x

x

failed

x

13

12

D

House of Representatives

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION									
<u>Tokyo</u>	10 May 1920									
HAMANO Seigo	10 May 1924								✓ failed 3	□
<u>Kanagawa</u>	20 February 1928									
YONEDA Yoshimori (pre-war, elected for Ehime)	20 February 1930								⊗	TE SH
KOIZUMI Junya (pre-war, elected for Kagoshima)	20 February 1932								⊗ M	Pg ✓ ⊗ TE SH □
<u>Niigata</u>	20 February 1936									
TAKAOKA Daisuke	30 April 1937								⊗	⊗ DCJ P 11 ✓ ⊗ NVGY N-A □
<u>Toyama</u>										
MAISUMURA Kenzō		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗ M	Pg ✓ ⊗ TE SH □
<u>Fukui</u>										
SATSUMA Yūji										⊗ 8E SH <u>SH</u>
<u>Aichi</u>										
SUZUKI Shōgo									⊗	⊗ DCJ P 14 ⊗ 9 VGY N-A □
<u>Mie</u>										
NAGAI Gen									⊗	⊗ M Pg ⊗ TE SH <u>SH</u>
<u>Kyōto</u>										
NAKAMURA Sanjōyō									⊗	⊗ M P 13 ✓ ⊗ TE SH □
TANAKA Isaji										⊗ TE N-A <u>na</u>
KAWASAKI Suegoro									⊗	⊗ M Pg ✓ ⊗ TE SH □
<u>Osaka</u>										
KANNO Watarō										✓ ⊗ TE NA □
HINOISUMAI Sada-yoshi		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗ M	P 15,10 ⊗ TE SH <u>SH</u>

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result	Notes
<u>Tochigi</u> #1 MORIYAMA Kinji	10 April 1946	Failed	
	25 April 1947	Failed	
	23 January 1949	Failed	
	19 April 1953	Failed	
FUNADA Kyōji	22 May 1958	Failed	
	20 November 1960	Failed	
+ TAKASE Den #2 INAMURA Toshiyuki	27 February 1955	Failed	
	21 November 1963	Failed	
<u>Gunma</u> #1 KANÉKO Yōjirō	27 February 1955	Failed	
	19 April 1953	Failed	
IGARASHI Kichizō #2 + NOMOTO Shinakichi	27 February 1955	Failed	
	19 April 1953	Failed	
<u>Saitama</u> #2 YAMAGUCHI Toshio #4 YAMAMOTO Katsuwichi	27 February 1955	Failed	
	19 April 1953	Failed	
	22 May 1958	Failed	
	20 November 1960	Failed	
	21 November 1963	Failed	
	29 January 1967	Failed	
	27 December 1969	Failed	
	10 December 1972	Failed	
	5 December 1976	Failed	
	7 October 1979	Failed	
	22 June 1980	Failed	
	18 December 1983	Failed	
	6 July 1986	Failed	died 2.5.87

LD.R. formed 15.11.55

died 9.10.54

died 24.6.59

Failed elected to Upper House in 1953

na x x ...

Failed

...

L(i)

L

L(i)

L

L(i)

L

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

Kanagawa

#1 YONEDA Yoshimori

#3

① KOIZUMI Junya

HAGIHARA Teshio

SUZUKI Kenichi

Niigata

#2 TAKAOKA Taisuke

Toyouma

#1 SAHEKI Muneoyoshi

ASOO Shōzō

INADA Kenji

#2 NAITŌ Tomoaki

MATSUMURA KENZŌ

YOSHIIWA Minoru

10 April 1946

25 April 1947

23 January 1949

1 October 1952

19 April 1953

27 February 1955

LD.P. formed, 15.11.56

22 May 1958

20 November 1960

21 November 1963

29 January 1967

27 December 1969

10 December 1972

5 December 1976

7 October 1979

22 June 1980

18 December 1983

6 July 1986

failed

failed
x

failed
n-a
see Upper House listing

failed
n-a

failed

failed

x

x

x(1)

x(1)

x

x

x

failed

D(1)

D(1)

x

x

x

m(1)x00

m(1)x00

x(1)

x(1)

x

x

x

failed

failed

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x x x ... 2 died 21 August 1971

failed elected to the Upper House in 1974

x

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

- Gifu
- #1 YANAGIHARA Saburo
- Shizuoka
- #1 MATSUOKA Kahei
- #3 SHIONOYA Kazuo
- TAKEYAMA Yutaro
- TSUBOI Kamezō

DATE OF ELECTION	CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	Result
10 April 1946	○ TAKEYAMA Yutaro	c(1)X00 ㄥ
25 April 1947	○ TSUBOI Kamezō	n-a(1)X100 ㄥ
23 January 1949	Gifu	ㄥ(1)
23 January 1949	Shizuoka	ㄥ00XX ㄥ failed
1 October 1952	Gifu	ㄥ
19 April 1953	Gifu	ㄥ
27 February 1955	Gifu	ㄥ
22 May 1958	Gifu	failed
20 November 1960	Gifu	ㄥ
21 November 1963	Gifu	ㄥ
29 January 1967	Gifu	ㄥ
27 December 1969	Gifu	ㄥ
10 December 1972	Gifu	ㄥ
5 December 1976	Gifu	ㄥ
7 October 1979	Gifu	ㄥ ㄥ ㄥ ㄥ
22 June 1980	Gifu	ㄥ
18 December 1983	Gifu	ㄥ
6 July 1986	Gifu	ㄥ

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result
Mie #1 + YAMATE Mitsuo	10 April 1946	failed n-a
	25 April 1947	failed n-a
	23 January 1949	n-a(i) 30 x
	1 October 1952	x x
	19 April 1953	x
	27 February 1955	x
	LD.P. formed, R. 1158	x
	22 May 1958	x
	20 November 1960	failed
	21 November 1963	failed x
	29 January 1967	x ...
	27 December 1969	x
	10 December 1972	x
	5 December 1976	failed
	7 October 1979	x
	22 June 1980	x
	18 December 1983	x
	6 July 1986	x
KAWASAKI Hideji	10 April 1946	SH(i)
TANAKA Satoru #1	10 April 1946	SH(i) 2
TANAKA Satoru #2 + NORO Kyōichi	10 April 1946	SH(i) 2
+ NAGAI Gen	10 April 1946	SH(i) 2
NORO Akihiko	10 April 1946	SH(i) 2
Shiga	10 April 1946	failed
TIMAI Kō	10 April 1946	n-a(i) x 100 x
	25 April 1947	n-a(i) x 100 x
	23 January 1949	x 00 x x
	1 October 1952	failed
	19 April 1953	x
	27 February 1955	x
	LD.P. formed, R. 1158	x
	22 May 1958	x
	20 November 1960	failed
	21 November 1963	failed failed
	29 January 1967	x
	27 December 1969	x
	10 December 1972	x
	5 December 1976	... x
	7 October 1979	x
	22 June 1980	n-a
	18 December 1983	x
	6 July 1986	x
Kyōto #1 NAKAMURA Sanjōjyō	10 April 1946	failed
	25 April 1947	failed
	23 January 1949	x x
	1 October 1952	failed
	19 April 1953	x
	27 February 1955	x
	LD.P. formed, R. 1158	x
	22 May 1958	x
	20 November 1960	failed
	21 November 1963	failed failed
	29 January 1967	x
	27 December 1969	x
	10 December 1972	x
	5 December 1976	... x
	7 October 1979	x
	22 June 1980	n-a
	18 December 1983	x
	6 July 1986	x
TANAKA Isaji #2 KAWASAKI Suegorō	10 April 1946	failed
	25 April 1947	failed
	23 January 1949	x x
	1 October 1952	failed
	19 April 1953	failed
	27 February 1955	x
	LD.P. formed, R. 1158	x
	22 May 1958	x
	20 November 1960	failed
	21 November 1963	failed
	29 January 1967	x
	27 December 1969	x
	10 December 1972	x
	5 December 1976	... x
	7 October 1979	x
	22 June 1980	n-a
	18 December 1983	x
	6 July 1986	x

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result
<u>Wakayama</u> #2 HAYAKAWA Takashi	10 April 1946	n-a(i) 1000 x 23
	25 April 1947	n-a(i) 1000 x 23
	23 January 1949	SR 04 x
	1 October 1952	x
<u>Tottori</u> FURUI Yoshimi	19 April 1953	x
	27 February 1955	x
	22 May 1958	x
+ AKAZAWA Masamichi	10 April 1946	n-a(i) x 2000 ³
	25 April 1947	n-a(i) x 2000 ³
	23 January 1949	failed x
	1 October 1952	x x(i) failed n-a
<u>Okayama</u> #1 KOEDA Kazuo	10 April 1946	failed n-a
	25 April 1947	x(i)
	23 January 1949	failed x
	1 October 1952	failed x
#2 TAGA Yasuō	10 April 1946	failed n-a
	25 April 1947	x(i)
	23 January 1949	failed x
	1 October 1952	failed SOR
FUSII Katsushi	10 April 1946	(F)
	25 April 1947	x(i)
	23 January 1949	failed x
	1 October 1952	failed x
	19 April 1953	x
	27 February 1955	x
	22 May 1958	x
	20 November 1960	x
	21 November 1963	x x
	29 January 1967	x x
27 December 1969	x x	
10 December 1972	x x	
5 December 1976	x x	
7 October 1979	x x	
22 June 1980	x x	
18 December 1983	x	
6 July 1986		

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result
Hiroshima		
#1 MATSUMOTO Takio	10 April 1946	m(1) 1200 x
	25 April 1947	failed m(1) 400 x
	23 January 1949	200 x
	1 October 1952	200 x
	19 April 1953	failed 200 x
	27 February 1955	failed 200 x
	22 May 1958	failed
	20 November 1960	failed
	21 November 1963	200 x
	29 January 1967	200 x
	27 December 1969	200 x
	10 December 1972	200 x
	5 December 1976	failed 200 x
	7 October 1979	200 x
	22 June 1980	200 x
	18 December 1983	failed 200 x
	6 July 1986	200 x
#2 HIRAKAWA Tokuo		
#2 TANIKAWA Kazuo		
+OHARA Hiroyo		
#3 OMIYA Gosaburo		
HAYASHI Keichiro		
FUSII Masao		
Yamaguchi		
#2 KOMURA Sakahiko		
KOMURA Masahiko		

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result
<u>Tokushima</u>		
MIKI Takeo	10 April 1946	n-a X 100 x
OKADA Seiichi	25 April 1947	n-a (1) X 000 x
AKITA Daisuke	25 April 1947	n-a (1) X 000 x 345
<u>TAKEICHI Yasunobu</u>		
<u>Kagawa</u>		
#1 KUSIMOTO Sutesuke	10 April 1946	n-a (1) X 000 x
FUSIMOTO Takao	25 April 1947	n-a (1) X 000 x
#2 KATO Tsunetarō	25 April 1947	n-a (1) X 000 x
+ TOYOZAWA Toyoo	25 April 1947	n-a (1) X 000 x
	10 April 1946	n-a X 100 x
	25 April 1947	n-a (1) X 000 x
	23 January 1949	X 00 X
	1 October 1952	X
	19 April 1953	X
	27 February 1955	failed
	22 May 1958	LD Reform 15.11.58
	20 November 1960	X
	21 November 1963	X
	29 January 1967	X
	27 December 1969	X
	10 December 1972	X
	5 December 1976	X
	7 October 1979	X
	22 June 1980	X
	18 December 1983	X
	6 July 1986	X

failed

failed x 6

died 11.9.63

failed

failed L(Y)

failed

failed

failed

failed

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

KuKuwaKa

#1 NAKAMURA Torata

Tsutsi Hideo

#3

ARAKI Masuo

Saga

ESHIMA Tats

o TATEBAYASHI Mikio

YAMASHITA Tokuo

Nagasaki

#1 NAKASHIMA Tats

NISHIOKA Takeo

KYOMA Kumio

#2 MATSUDA Kuro

10 April 1946

25 April 1947

23 January 1949

1 October 1952

19 April 1953

27 February 1955

LD formed 1956
22 May 1958

20 November 1960

21 November 1963

29 January 1967

27 December 1969

10 December 1972

5 December 1976

7 October 1979

22 June 1980

18 December 1983

6 July 1986

failed

m(i)

m102x

m3

x 4 ...

x

failed

failed

p(i)

DXX

x ...

x

failed

n-a(i)X000 x

failed failed

failed

x n-a(i) 2 x

x

x

failed
n-a

failed

failed

n-a(i) x x ...

x

x1

failed failed

x

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result
Kumamoto #1 FUJITA Yoshimitsu	10 April 1946	n-a(1)10 x
Kumamoto #2 FUJIMOTO Toraki	25 April 1947	failed x
Kumamoto #1 HASHIMOTO Jiro	23 January 1949	n-a(1)20 x
Oita #1 ICHIMANDA Hisato	1 October 1952	failed x
Oita #2 HIROSE Masao	19 April 1953	x
Oita #1 MATSUBARA Kazuhiko	27 February 1955	failed failed x
Oita #2 HIRANO Hachiro	22 May 1958	failed failed x
Oita #1 HARAJIRI Tsukane (F)	20 November 1960	x
Oita #2	21 November 1963	x
Oita #1	29 January 1967	x
Oita #2	27 December 1969	x 3
Oita #1	10 December 1972	failed ...
Oita #2	5 December 1976	...
Oita #1	7 October 1979	x
Oita #2	22 June 1980	x
Oita #1	18 December 1983	x
Oita #2	6 July 1986	x

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result
Kumamoto #1 FUJITA Yoshimitsu	10 April 1946	n-a(1)10 x
Kumamoto #2 FUJIMOTO Toraki	25 April 1947	failed x
Kumamoto #1 HASHIMOTO Jiro	23 January 1949	n-a(1)20 x
Oita #1 ICHIMANDA Hisato	1 October 1952	failed x
Oita #2 HIROSE Masao	19 April 1953	x
Oita #1 MATSUBARA Kazuhiko	27 February 1955	failed failed x
Oita #2 HIRANO Hachiro	22 May 1958	failed failed x
Oita #1 HARAJIRI Tsukane (F)	20 November 1960	x
Oita #2	21 November 1963	x
Oita #1	29 January 1967	x
Oita #2	27 December 1969	x 3
Oita #1	10 December 1972	failed ...
Oita #2	5 December 1976	...
Oita #1	7 October 1979	x
Oita #2	22 June 1980	x
Oita #1	18 December 1983	x
Oita #2	6 July 1986	x

DATE OF ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN

CONSTITUENCY and POLITICIAN	DATE OF ELECTION	Result	Notes
Miyazaki #1 KASHIMA Tetsu	10 April 1946	m(l)X00 x	failed
	25 April 1947	m(l)X00 x	failed
	23 January 1949	L	
	1 October 1952	x	
	19 April 1953	x	failed
	27 February 1955	x	failed
	22 May 1958	x	failed
	20 November 1960	x	
	21 November 1963	x	
	29 January 1967	x	
	27 December 1969	x	Failed
	10 December 1972	x	Failed
	5 December 1976	x	Failed
	7 October 1979	x	Failed
	22 June 1980	x	Failed
	18 December 1983	x	Failed
	6 July 1986	x	Failed

Failed elected to Upper House in 1976

Miyazaki

#1

KASHIMA Tetsu

0 KAWANO Yoshimitsu

SHASHI Kimi

MORI Yukio

#2

SAKAMOTO Chikao

+ KAWAGOE Hiroshi

+ ITO Iwao

Legend, Notes and References

The names of the faction members were taken from various editions of the *Asahi Shimbun*, *Tōkyō Shimbun*, *Mainichi Shimbun*, and *Kokkai Binran*. Some were added and others taken out after discussions with Miki Mutsuko, Ogino Akemi and Iwano Miyoji. No authoritative listing exists, and thus doubts must remain about some entries, particularly with respect to the periods of affiliation. Many of the figures and dates below are taken from *Gikai Seido 70 Nen, op. cit.*, in which the writer has discovered some inaccuracies and omissions. On occasion, the formal admittance of a Diet member into a party was a number of days after the move had been made. For instance, according to the *Asahi Shimbun*, Miki entered the Cooperative Democratic Party on 25 May (and not 15 June) 1946. Some such errors may have gone unnoticed. No attempt has been made to list affiliation before the 1937 election.

Legend

- + - Classified as belonging to the inner circle.
- - Classified as belonging to the outer ring.
- ⌘ - Stood successfully for the Diet (elections between 1920 and 1942).
- ⌘ - Returned to the Diet for the same party as Miki (People's Cooperative Party: 1947 and 1949).
- ⌘ - Returned to the Diet as a member of Miki's grouping/faction within the party (*Kaishintō*: 1952 and 1953; Japan Democratic Party: 1955; and Liberal Democratic Party: 1958-1986).
- ∇ - Returned to the Diet for the Democratic Party.
- Ⓒ - Returned to the Diet for the Japan Cooperative Party.

- L** - Returned to the Diet for the Liberal Party.
- L(H)** - Returned to the Diet for the Liberal Party (Hatoyama Wing).
- L(Y)** - Returned to the Diet for the Liberal Party (Yoshida Wing).
- Sh** - Returned to the Diet for the *Shimpotō*.
- Soc** - Returned to the Diet for the Socialist Party.
- so(R)** - Returned to the Diet for the Socialist Party (Right Wing).
- SR** - Returned to the Diet for the Social Renovation Party.
- fc** - Returned to the Diet for the Farmers' Cooperative Party.
- NLC** - Returned to the Diet for the New Liberal Club.
- m** - Returned to the Diet for a minor party.
- n-a** - Returned to the Diet as a non-affiliated member.
- failed** - Failed in the election.
- (1)** - Returned to the Diet for the first time (not always indicated).
- x** - Depurged.
- 1** - Participant in the formation of the *Dai Ni Hikaeshitsu* on 30 June 1937.
- PC** - Participant in the formation of the *Dai Ichi Giin Club* (earlier known as the "Preparatory Association for the *Shin Kōshō Dantai*", which came into existence on 10 July 1937) on 21 July 1937.
- M** - Member of the *Minseitō* at the close of the Diet Session on 7 August 1937.
- J** - Participant in the formation of the *Jikyoku Dōshikai* on 27 November 1939, which was dissolved on 30 March 1940.
- SK** - Member of the *Seiyūkai* (Kuhara faction) at the opening of the Diet Session on 23 December 1939.
- P** - Participant in the formation of the *Shugiin Giin Club* on 20 December 1940.

- ㇏ - Participant in the formation of the *Yokusan Giin Dōmei* on 2 September 1941.
- ✓㇏ - Successful “recommended candidate” in the 1942 election. *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 April 1942.
- ✓^{failed}_(FR) - Unsuccessful “recommended candidate” in the 1942 election. *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 April 1942.
- (FT) - Unsuccessful candidate for the *Tōhōkai* in the 1942 election. *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 April 1942.
- (F) - Other unsuccessful candidate in the 1942 election. *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 April 1942.
- ㇏ - Participant in the formation of the *Yokusan Seijikai* on 20 May 1942.
- ✓ - Seceder from the *Yokusan Seijikai* on 7 March 1945.
- G - Participant in the formation of the *Gokoku Dōshikai* on 11 March 1945.
- ㇏ - Participant in the formation of the *Dai Nihon Seijikai* on 30 March 1945.
- γ - Joined the *Dai Nihon Seijikai* on 15 August 1945.
- sh - Participant in the formation of the *Nihon Shimpotō* (NS) on 24 November 1945.
 - Participant in the formation of the Japan Liberal Party (JLP) on 25 November 1945.
- N-A - Participant in the formation of the Non-affiliated Club (N-AC) on 26 November 1945.
- c - Member of the Japan Cooperative Party (JCOP) in January 1946. *Sōsenkyo Ni Nozomu Nihon Kyōdōtō No Taido Shuchō, op. cit.*
- ㇏ - Purged because he had been a “recommended candidate” in the 1942 election. *Kōshoku Tsuihō Ni Kansuru Oboegaki Gaitōsha Meibo*, 20 February 1948.
- ㇏ - Purged (see note ‘x’). *ibid.*
- ✗ - Participant in the formation of the Preparatory Association for the Japan Democratic Party (paJDP) on 13 May 1946.
- ✗ - Participant in the formation of the *Shinkō Club* on 13 May 1946.

- ✕ - Participant in the formation of the alliance including the JCOP and the Cooperative Democratic Club (CDC) on 13 May 1946.
- - Participant in the formation of the *Shinseikai* (union of the *Shinkō Club*, one part of the N-AC, and one part of the paJDP) on 19 July 1946.
- - Participant in the formation of the People's Party (PP) on 13 September 1946.
- - Member of the Cooperative Democratic Party (CDP) at the close of the Diet Session on 11 October 1946.
- - Participant in the formation of the People's Cooperative Party (PCP) on 8 March 1947. Omitted are those members who left the party before, or did not stand in, the April election.
- (The *Nihon Shimpotō* was dissolved on 31 March 1947. One hundred and fourteen members of the party, five people from the N-AC and twenty-six non-affiliated Diet members, came together to form the Democratic Party (DP).)
- ✕ - Elected for a period of three (and not six) years.
- - Left the PCP to join the *Ryokufūkai* on 19 May 1947.
- - Left the *Ryokufūkai* to form the *Shinsei Club* on 4 July 1948. The latter was dissolved on 13 March 1950.
- - Participant in the formation of the New Politics Council (NPC) (union of the PCP, Social Renovation Party (SRP), Farmers' New Party (FNP), and the *Kōsei Club*) on 9 May 1949.
- - Member of the PCP who withdrew from the NPC on 16 February 1950.
- - Ex-members of the PCP who took part in the formation of the *Dai San Club* on 13 March 1950.

- ✕ - Participant in the formation of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) (union of the Democratic Party (Opposition Faction) (DP(OF)), PCP, and the [people who had remained in the] NPC) on 28 April 1950.
- ✕ - Ex-member of the PCP, in the Upper House, who entered the PDP on 2 May 1950.
- \ - Other entrant in the PDP.
- ✕ - Participant in the formation of the *Kaishintō* on 8 February 1952 (12 February for members of the Upper House).
- - Participant in the formation of the *Minshu Club* on 12 February 1952.
 - (The Japan Democratic Party (JDP) was founded on 24 November 1954, following the dissolution of the *Kaishintō* the day before. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was founded on 15 November 1955.)
- - Member of the Matsumura group, which parted from the Miki faction when Miki selected Satō to be Ikeda's successor as prime minister. *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 November 1964.
- - Member of the Ishida group, which was absorbed into the Miki faction on 21 October 1971.

Notes and References

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES : Before the April 1946 Election

- 1 Election declared invalid on 6 May 1939.
- 2 Elected to the Diet on 30 May 1939.
- 3 Entered the Diet on 11 January 1943.
- 4 Listed as a member of the *Dai Ichi Giin Club* on 7 August 1937.
- 5 Elected to the Diet on 9 November 1921.

- 6 Elected as a non-affiliated member in the 1937 election, but moved to the *Dai Ichi Giin Club* on 23 July 1937. His election was declared void on 14 February 1938.
- 7 Participant in the formation of the *Yokusō Giin Dōshikai* on 11 March 1945.
- 8 Was non-affiliated; joined the *Yokusan Seijikai* on 7 August 1942.
- 9 Entered the *Yokusan Seijikai* on 23 May 1942.
- 10 Resigned from the *Dōkōkai* on 28 March 1942.
- 11 Participant in the formation of the *Dai Ichi Hikaeshitsu* on 26 December 1941.
- 12 *Ibid.*.
- 13 Participant in the formation of the *Giin Club* on 14 November 1941.
- 14 Participant in the formation of the *Kōa Giin Dōmei* on 12 November 1941.
- 15 Participant in the formation of the *Dōkōkai* on 10 November 1941.
- 16 Participant in the formation of the *Kōa Giin Dōmei* on 12 November 1941.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES : After the April 1946 Election

HOKKAIDŌ

- 1 Moved from the paJDP to the NS on 15 May 1946.
- 2 Moved from the paJDP to the NS on 15 May 1946.
- 3 One of nine participants in the formation of the FNP on 28 January 1949.
- 4 One of nine participants in the formation of the FNP on 28 January 1949.
- 5 One of nine participants in the formation of the FNP on 28 January 1949.
- 6 Participant in the formation of the FCP on 17 December 1949.
- 7 Participant in the formation of the FCP on 17 December 1949.
- 8 Participant in the formation of the FCP on 17 December 1949.
- 9 Voted for Ōhira against Fukuda in the November 1979 presidential election.

AOMORI

- 1 Manager of the Aomori chapter of the *Tōa Dōmei Kyōkai*.

IWATE

- 1 Forfeited seat on 23 May 1955 due to election violation.
- 2 Also counted in the Ishibashi faction. *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 November 1960.
- 3 Shiga did not enter the party on its formation. *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 February 1952.

MIYAGI

- 1 Moved from the paJDP to the CDP on 25 May 1946. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 May 1946.

YAMAGATA

- 1 Returned to the Diet on 23 September 1972.
- 2 Also counted in the Kōno faction. *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 November 1960.
- 3 Both a recommended candidate and manager of the Rikyō (?) chapter of the *Tōa Dōmei*.

FUKUSHIMA

- 1 Parliamentary-Secretary of the Navy, by Imperial Appointment (*chokunin*).
- 2 Left the PCP and joined the DP on 26 March 1947. *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 March 1947.
- 3 Designated as coming under the purge directive, on 7 December 1947. *Seitō Nenkan*, 1948, *op. cit.*.

IBARAKI

- 1 Manager of the Yoshida *mura* chapter of the *Taisei Yokusankai*.
- 2 Participant in the formation of the PCP on 8 March 1947.

TOCHIGI

- 2 One of fifteen participants in the formation of the NFF on 19 January 1948.
- 3 One of twenty participants in the formation of the “preparatory association for the *Kakushin Shintō*” (paKS) on 23 February 1948. This became the Social Renovation Party on 13 March.
- 4 Agreed reluctantly to allow his older brother, Naka, to stand in his place, but for the Liberal Party. Funada Hajime, interview. Kyōji ran unsuccessfully for the House of Councillors as a non-affiliated candidate.
- 5 Joined the Funada faction.

GUNMA

- 1 One of seven participants in the formation of the *Kōsei Club* on 11 February 1949.

CHIBA

- 1 Manager of the Chiba chapter of the *Tōhōkai*, and other posts.

TŌKYŌ

- 1 Moved from the *Shinseikai* to the Non-affiliated Club on 20 July 1946.
- 2 Moved from the Non-affiliated Club to the *Shinseikai* on 25 July 1946.
- 3 Left the PDP on 27 October 1951.
- 4 Moved from being non-affiliated to the PDP on 10 December 1951.
- 5 On 11 September 1976, at a meeting of the faction, Utsunomiya expressed his dissatisfaction over Miki compromising with the anti-Miki forces in the party. He later left both the faction and party.
- 6 Kujiraoka was elected initially from Tōkyō #6; three of the wards together became Tōkyō #10 in 1964.

TOYAMA

- 1 *Yokusan* chairman of PARC, and a recommended candidate.
- 2 Announced his intention not to stand at the next election. *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 September 1969.

ISHIKAWA

- 1 Tokuda belonged to the Miki faction. Sakamoto Misoji, interview.

FUKUI

- 1 Various posts inside the *Tōhōkai*. He resigned from the NS on 22 June 1946.

NAGANO

- 1 Stood unsuccessfully for the House of Councillors (National Constituency) in 1953.

SHIZUOKA

- 1 Moved from the Non-affiliated Club to the CDP on 17 June 1946.
- 2 Voted for Ōhira against Fukuda in the November 1979 presidential election.

AICHI

- 1 Councillor (*Sanyo*) of the *Tōhō Dōshikai*.
- 2 Left the paJDP to become non-affiliated on 15 May 1946.
- 3 Participant in the formation of the Non-affiliated Club on 16 May 1946.
- 4 Moved from the Non-affiliated Club to the CDP on 17 June 1946.
- 5 Moved from the paJDP to the CDP on 13 June (25 May, according to the *Asahi Shimbun*) 1946.
- 6 Not given official recognition in the election by the LDP.

MIE

- 1 Resigned from the NS on 8 March 1947.
- 2 Editor-in-chief of the Mie chapter of the *Tōa Renmei Kyōkai*. This organization existed between 8 October 1939 and 4 January 1946.
- 3 One of seven participants in the formation of the *Kōsei Club* on 11 February 1949.
- 4 Married to a sister of Miki's wife.

SHIGA

- 1 Moved from the paJDP to the Cooperative Democratic Club on 15 May 1946.

KYŌTO

- 1 Director at the Central Headquarters of the *Dai Nihon Butokukai*.
- 2 Left the paJDP to become non-affiliated on 21 June 1946.
- 3 Moved from being non-affiliated to the Non-affiliated Club on 17 July 1946.
- 4 Participant in the formation of the PCP on 8 March 1947.
- 5 Left the PCP to become non-affiliated on 30 March 1947.
- 6 (i) Purged in April 1947, but (ii) order revoked that August. *Asahi Nenkan*, 1948, *op. cit.*.
- 7 Entered the Diet on 21 December 1960.

ŌSAKA

- 1 Elected to the House of Councillors in 1950.
- 2 Left the faction in July 1972 over his support for Fukuda in the presidential election.
- 3 Failed to be elected for Ōsaka #3; part of the constituency became Ōsaka #7 in 1975.

HYŌGO

- 1 Also counted in the Kishi faction! *Mainichi Shimbun*, 24 May 1958.

WAKAYAMA

- 1 Moved from being non-affiliated to the *Shinsei Club* on 15 May 1946.
- 2 Left the PCP to become non-affiliated on 20 February 1948.
- 3 Participant in the formation of the paKS on 23 February 1948.
- 4 One of five participants in the re-formation of the SRP on 8 November 1949.
- 5 Left the faction in July 1972 over his support for Fukuda in the presidential election.

TOTTORI

- 1 Chief of a bureau in the Ministry of the Interior dealing with certain police matters (*Keiho kyokuchō*).
- 2 Moved from the *Shin Seikai* to the CDP on 23 September 1946.
- 3 A top official in the Yonago chapter of the *Taisei Yokusankai*, and other.

HIROSHIMA

- 1 Moved from being non-affiliated to the paJDP on 15 May 1946.
- 2 Moved from the paJDP to the CDP on 15 June (26 May, according to the *Asahi Shimbun*) 1946.
- 3 Left the PCP and joined the DP on 26 March 1947. *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 March 1947.
- 4 Entered the Diet on 29 June 1946, having been the “top loser” in the April election.
- 5 Entered the Diet on 29 June 1946, having been the “second top loser” in the April election.
- 6 Left the PCP to become non-affiliated on 20 February 1948.

- 7 Participant in the formation of the paKS on 23 February 1948.
- 8 Returned to the Diet for the PCP in a by-election for Hiroshima #3 on 8 April 1948.
- 9 Designated as coming under the purge directive, and disqualified from Diet membership on 13 December 1947.

YAMAGUCHI

- 1 Deputy-manager of the Aichi Prefectural chapter of the *Dai Nihon Butokukai*.

TOKUSHIMA

- 1 Moved from the paJDP to the CDP on 15 June (25 May, according to the *Asahi Shimbun*) 1946.
- 2 Moved from the *Shin Seikai* to the CDP on 23 September 1946.
- 3 Left the PCP to become non-affiliated on 20 February 1948.
- 4 Participant in the formation of the paKS on 23 February 1948.
- 5 Moved from the SRP to the DP on 28 September 1948.
- 6 Resigned on 9 September 1965.

KAGAWA

- 1 Links with the Ōno and Ishibashi factions. Watanabe, *Habatsu*, 1958, *op. cit.*.
- 2 Recommended candidate, and other.

EHIME

- 1 Director of the *Dai Nihon Yokusan Sōnendan*.

KŌCHI

- 1 Moved from the *Dai Ichi Giin Club* to the PCP on 26 June (20 June, according to the *Seitō Nenkan*, 1948, *op. cit.*) 1947.
- 2 Moved from the PCP to the *Dai Ichi Giin Club* on 27 October 1948.
- 3 Moved from the DP(AF) to the DP(OF).
- 4 Recommended candidate, and other.
- 5 Stood unsuccessfully for the House of Councillors in 1953.

FUKUOKA

- 1 One of nine participants in the formation of the FNP on 28 January 1949.
- 2 Left the NPC to join the FCP on 16 February 1950.
- 3 Joined the *Kaishintō* in October 1952 having stood as a candidate for a minor party in the election earlier that month. See *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 February 1952.
- 4 Left the faction in July 1972 over his support for Fukuda in the presidential election.

SAGA

- 1 Manager of a chapter of the *Dai Nihon Yokusan*.
- 2 In the *Kaishintō* when the Diet was convened on 24 October 1952.

NAGASAKI

- 1 Entered the Tanaka faction on 3 December 1981. *Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, Tanaka Shihai*, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1985, p.149.

KUMAMOTO

- 1 Moved from the Non-affiliated Club to the CDP on 25 May 1946. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 May 1946.
- 2 Moved from the Non-affiliated Club to the CDP on 25 May 1946. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 May 1946.
- 3 Left the faction in July 1972 over his support for Fukuda in the presidential election.

OITA

- 1 One of five participants in the formation of the JFP on 20 February 1947. Two of the other four were the Kita brothers from Hokkaidō.
- 2 In the *Kaishintō* when the Diet was convened on 24 October 1952.
- 3 Also counted in the Kishi and Ikeda factions. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 24 May 1958.

MIYAZAKI

- 1 Left the PCP and joined the DP on 28 March 1947. *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 March 1947.
- 2 Entered the Diet for the CDP on 6 July 1946, having been the “top loser” in the April election.

KAGOSHIMA

- 1 Resigned from the CDP on 14 February 1947.
- 2 Participant in the formation of the Non-affiliated Club on 16 May 1946.
- 3 Moved from the Non-affiliated Club to the CDP on 25 May 1946. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 May 1946.
- 4 Left the CDP to become non-affiliated on 17 December 1946.
- 5 Entered the Tanaka faction in 1980. *Tanaka Shihai, op. cit.*, p.149.

HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS : After the April 1946 Election

HOKKAIDŌ

- 1 Participant in the formation of the *Dai Ichi Club* on 10 July 1950.
- 2 Left the *Kaishintō* and joined the Non-affiliated Club on 10 May 1954.
- 3 Resigned on 1 February 1955.
- 4 Fails to win election to the Lower House for Hokkaidō #5 as a candidate for the Socialist Party (Right Wing) in the February 1955 election.
- 4 Elected to the Lower House in 1958.

AOMORI

- 1 Elected for *Kaishintō* on 30 July 1953.

TOCHIGI

- 1 Elected on 8 December 1974.

CHIBA

- 1 Elected on 8 March 1981.

KANAGAWA

- 1 Elected to the Lower House in the 1946 election as a non-affiliated candidate. Participant in the formation of the *Shinkō Club* on 13 May 1946, the formation of the *Shinseikai* on 19 July, the formation of the People's Party on 26 September, and the formation of the PCP on 8 March 1947.

NIIGATA

- 1 Elected on 15 May 1955.

NAGANO

- 1 Elected to the Lower House in the 1946 election for the CDP.

NARA

- 1 Left the *Minshu Club* and joined the Liberal Party on 10 February 1953.

TOTTORI

- 1 See National Constituency, note 17.

TOKUSHIMA

- 1 Party official recognition went to a Tanaka faction candidate.
- 2 Lost her seat in the Lower House in 1947.
- 3 Elected on 15 August 1947 for the Democratic Party.
- 4* According to one source, he moved to the Miyazawa faction in the hope of becoming a minister in the near future. Furthermore, he had no compunction about leaving the faction under Komoto's leadership.

NAGASAKI

- 1 Elected on 15 March 1970.
- 2 Resigned on 28 January 1970 to stand in the gubernatorial election.

KUMAMOTO

- 1 Died on 23 December 1962.
- 2 Elected on 29 January 1963.

MIYAZAKI

- 1 Elected on 10 December 1961.
- 1 Elected on 12 December 1976.

NATIONAL / PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION CONSTITUENCY

- 1 Participant in the formation of the *Dai Ichi Club*, following the 1950 election.
- 2 Moved from the *Kaishintō* to the Non-affiliated Club on 27 November 1954.
- 3 Lost his seat in the Lower House in 1949.
- 4 Participant in the formation of the Genuine Non-affiliated Club on 18 May 1953.
- 5 Moved from the Genuine Non-affiliated Club to the *Ryokufūkai* on 25 November 1954.
- 6 Moved from the *Ryokufūkai* to the LDP on 2 December 1955.
- 7 Participant in the formation of the *Dai Ichi Club* on 10 July 1950.
- 8 Moved from the *Dai Ichi Club* to the *Kaishintō* on 26 May 1952.
- 9 Moved from being unaffiliated, to the PDP following the 1950 election.
- 10 Participant in the formation of the *Minshu Club* on 12 February 1952. Moved to the Liberal Party on 10 February 1953.
- 11 On the dissolution of the *Dai San Club* on 2 May 1950, remained unaffiliated.
- 12 Lost his seat in the Lower House in 1949.
- 13 Lost his seat (for the Liberal Party) in the Lower House in 1953.
- 14 Elected for Tottori on 1 November 1981.
- 15 Entered the LDP on 5 July 1980.
- 16 Failed as Kōmoto faction member. *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 June 1983.
- 17 On 5 November 1981 announced he would enter the Kōmoto faction. Had been a member of the Miki faction, but received support from both the Kōmoto and Tanaka factions during the previous election. *Asahi Shimbun*, 6 November 1981.
- 18 Left the faction in July 1972 over his support for Fukuda in the presidential election.
- 19 Was a former secretary to Miki, who, while a Meiji University student, stayed at a lodging house run by Takeuchi's family.

20 One of the few bureaucrats to enter the faction, possibly on the introduction of Akazawa Masamichi.

INTERVIEWS

A number of the people listed below provided information on more than one occasion; in such cases, either the month of the most informative interview or the word "multiple" has been written.

Akagi Munenori	(Kōmoto faction member)	July 1987
Kōmoto Toshio	(Kōmoto faction member)	February 1988
Niwa Hyōsuke	(Kōmoto faction member)	February 1988
Kaifu Toshiki	(Kōmoto faction member)	February 1988
Itō Sōichirō	(Kōmoto faction member)	July 1987
Kujiraoka Hyōsuke	(Kōmoto faction member)	December 1987
Sakamoto Misoji	(Kōmoto faction member)	June 1987
Tanikawa Kazuo	(Kōmoto faction member)	June 1987
Kondō Tetsuo	(Kōmoto faction member)	February 1988
Mori Yoshihide	(Kōmoto faction member)	July 1987
Yamashita Tokuo	(Kōmoto faction member)	February 1988
Shiga Setsu	(Kōmoto faction member)	July 1987
Kitagawa Ishimatsu	(Kōmoto faction member)	June 1987
Kudō Iwao	(Kōmoto faction member)	June 1987
Usui Hideo	(Kōmoto faction member)	June 1987
Kōmura Masahiko	(Kōmoto faction member)	multiple
Ōshima Tadamori	(Kōmoto faction member)	multiple
Noro Akihiko	(Kōmoto faction member)	July 1987
Matsuda Kurō	(Kōmoto faction member)	December 1987
Hozumi Yoshiyuki	(Kōmoto faction member)	July 1987
Ide Shōichi	(Kōmoto faction member)	multiple
Murakami Seiichirō	(Kōmoto faction member)	multiple
Sakamoto Chikao	(Kōmoto faction member)	November 1987
Kita Shūji	(Kōmoto faction member)	November 1987
Moriyama Mayumi	(Kōmoto faction member)	October 1986
Miki Mutsuko	(wife of Miki Takeo)	multiple
Miki Hirofumi	(son of Miki Takeo)	
Takahashi Kiseko	(daughter of Miki Takeo)	multiple
Fujii Katsushi	(Kōmoto faction member [until the 1986 election])	March 1986
Nishiyama Keijirō	(Kōmoto faction member [until the 1986 election])	November 1987
Niita Kōji	(aspirant to membership of Kōmoto faction)	November 1986
Furui Yoshimi	(former member of Miki faction)	July 1987
Hirakawa Tokuo	(former member of Miki's party)	
Ide Ichitarō	(former member of Miki faction)	April 1987
Itō Gorō	(former member of Miki faction)	multiple
Sasayama Tatsuo	(member of Miyazawa faction)	June 1987
Hamada Takujirō	(member of Miyazawa faction)	multiple
Inaba Osamu	(member of Nakasone faction)	March 1988
Funada Hajime	(member of Takeshita faction)	May 1987

Asano Mikio	(former secretary to Miki)	November 1987
Hayashi Kōichi	(former secretary to Miki)	September 1986
Iwano Misoji	(secretary to Miki)	multiple
Nomura Keiko	(former secretary to Miki)	July 1987
Ogino Akemi	(secretary to Miki)	multiple
Ōkubo Eikichi	(former secretary to Miki)	August 1986
Sekai Shōichirō	(former secretary to Miki)	August 1986
Takano Chiyoki	(former secretary to Miki)	
Yoshida Takashi	(secretary to Miki)	August 1986
Gōda Bōshi	(secretary to Kōmoto)	May 1987
Ōno Yoshitarō	(cousin of Miki)	
Harada Sadae	(boyhood friend of Miki)	March 1988
Harada Takayoshi	(boyhood friend of Miki)	March 1988
Miki Ima	(boyhood friend of Miki)	March 1988
Murao Tsurue	(boyhood friend of Miki)	March 1988
Igata Minoru	(contemporary of Miki at school)	November 1987
Kimura Imao	(contemporary of Miki at school)	November 1987
Shima Shinichi	(contemporary of Miki at school)	November 1987
Kunihiro Masao	(broadcaster and former advisor to and confidant of Miki)	multiple
Hino Akira	(former journalist and secretary to Miki)	June 1987
Nakamura Keiichirō	(political commentator and former secretary to Miki)	May 1986
Haga Yasushi	(professor of politics, Tōkyō Kōgyō University)	
Shinohara Hajime	(former professor, Law Faculty, Tōkyō University)	
Takabatake Michitoshi	(professor, Faculty of Law and Politics, Rikkyō University)	May 1986
Igarashi Akio	(assistant professor, Faculty of Law and Politics, Rikkyō University)	May 1986
Amano Kanzō	(former journalist, <i>Asahi Shimbun</i>)	October 1987
Hirokawa Hajime	(<i>Asahi Shimbun</i> journalist)	August 1986
Ikui Kumiko	(<i>Asahi Shimbun</i> journalist)	multiple
Kaeda Shirō	(former journalist, <i>Mainichi Shimbun</i>)	February 1988
Takeuchi Ken	(<i>Asahi Shimbun</i> journalist)	
Yoshimura Katsumi	(former journalist, <i>Sankei Shimbun</i>)	October 1987
Ōshima Toshio	(N.H.K. journalist)	
Komine Takao	(secretary to Kōmoto from the Economic Planning Agency)	October 1986
Amazu (Tomio?)	(bureaucrat in the Foreign Ministry)	March 1988
Bandō Kazuo	(former member of Tokushima prefectural assembly)	August 1986

Kurogawa Tsutomu	(member of Tokushima prefectural assembly)	August 1986
Nakanishi Fumio	(member of Tokushima prefectural assembly)	August 1986
Shichijō Akira	(member of Tokushima prefectural assembly)	August 1986
Yano Shigefumi	(member of Tokushima prefectural assembly)	August 1986
Ozawa Sakihito	(secretary-general of Forum For A Fair Society)	multiple
Iizuka Hiroshi Ogusu Masao	(secretary to Abe Shintarō) (former secretary to Matsumura Kenzō)	November 1986
Tagawa Seiichi	(former secretary to Matsumura Kenzō)	September 1986

Many secretaries to Kōmoto faction members provided information; their names must go unrecorded.

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