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Reducing compositional to disquotational truth

Abstract:
Disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripke-Feferman theory, although it doesn't probe the compositional axioms.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1017/S1755020309990220

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
New College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Publisher:
Cambridge University Press Publisher's website
Journal:
Review of Symbolic Logic Journal website
Volume:
2
Issue:
4
Pages:
786-798
Publication date:
2009-12-01
DOI:
EISSN:
1755-0211
ISSN:
1755-0203
Language:
English
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:ae411462-c3ed-472e-bded-6fee4f65456c
Local pid:
ora:4867
Deposit date:
2011-01-31

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